the impact of nationalism patriotism and internationalism on consumer ethnocentric tendencies the study investigates the impact of patriotism nationalism and internationalism as antecedents to consumer ethnocentrism in turkey and the czech republic controlling for demographics the findings indicate that the impact of patriotism and nationalism is not consistent across the two countries consumer ethnocentrism in turkey is fueled by patriotism and in the czech republic by nationalism internationalism does not have a significant effect on consumer ethnocentrism in either country managerial implications of these findings are considered and future research directions are identified

the thrill of victory measuring the incentive to win there is ample evidence that incentive pay structures such as tournaments result in increased performance is this due to selection or increased individual effort and is any increased individual effort caused by pecuniary incentives or merely thirst for the thrill of victory tov prior literature has not separated the different effects we look at performance in horse and dog racing and find that only horses controlled by jockeys during the race exhibit performance corresponding to pecuniary incentives while both respond to selection and tov the results show that pay structures do matter

reversing urban bias in african rice markets evidence from senegal summary urban bias constitutes an important institutional impediment to economic development in poor countries some african governments now recognize that they should invest in agricultural productivity in order to reverse urban bias but often forget the equally important objective of investing in quality tailored to consumers so as to reverse urban bias footprint on food markets we conduct framed field experiments in two major urban markets in senegal and find that the majority of urban consumers are willing to pay quality premiums for local rice suggesting that investment in post harvest rice quality is a priority in the reversal of urban bias 2012 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

country of origin effects on product evaluations this article reviews the literature regarding the effect of country of origin on buyer evaluations of products the issue is important for countries especially resource poor developing countries that need to increase manufactured exports and for firms that source products in countries different from where sold marketing inferences are drawn and implications for future research are developed

importer behavior the neglected counterpart of international exchange international exchange is a two sided coin involving exporters and importers however a systematic search of the academic literature reveals a striking imbalance while exporter behavior has been extensively studied importer behavior remains a largely neglected area of study even though importers are playing an ever more important often dominant role in consummating trade transactions in this article we assert that this neglect stems from two critical but flawed assumptions the first is that exporters are the driving force behind international trade transactions and the second is that importers follow the neoclassical economics theory of rational choice in international sourcing

assessing the impact of country of origin on product evaluations a new methodological perspective a new methodological approach for examining the impact of country of origin on product evaluations is proposed it takes the form of a multiattribute attitudinal model analyzed by means of a system

a cross national comparison of consumer research measures the impact of three factors that affect the psychometric rigor of cross national consumer research comparisons is measured in this study conclusions are also drawn about the interactions among these factors and the resultant deterioration in the psychometric quality of the data

client perceived performance and value in professional b2b services an international perspective drawing from the resource based view and a contingency approach the authors develop and test a model of the antecedents of client perceived value in the context of international professional business to business services consultants engineers project management it consultants etc in a developing economies setting further we examine the effects of key moderators e g country of origin coo firm s international experience client s buying experience on client perceived performance and value the results generally support the hypotheses that client perceived performance is impacted by a firm s internal resources e g technical skills customer orientation innovation in addition this relationship is contingent upon the coo effect while client perceived value is moderated by the client s buying experience the findings can guide practitioners as to the key drivers of client perceived value and under what conditions this value is maximized

efficiency wage models of unemployment one view h lorne carmichael persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies what could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models this paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments it concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment persistent involuntary unemployment of workers is a recurrent problem in labor markets all over the world unemployed workers seem unable to find work even though they are willing to accept lower wages than those being paid employed workers with similar skills what could be preventing wages from adjusting to clear these markets many recent papers known collectively as the efficiency wage literature now claim to have the answer this paper will survey the efficiency wage literature and critically evaluate some of its accomplishments efficiency wage models have already been examined by yellen 1984 katz 1986 and stiglitz 1987 and have received generally favorable reviews this paper is more critical its overall conclusion is that efficiency wage models provide some useful insights into the workings of the labor market but they do not provide a satisfactory account of wage rigidity or involuntary unemployment there are at least five separate versions of the efficiency wage model they share a common structure however and this is outlined in the first section of the paper this section also attempts to relate efficiency wage models to other recent models of unemployment section ii examines and criticizes the different approaches in detail section iii evaluates the achievements of this approach and suggests some directions for future work i a general efficiency wage model efficiency wage models as the name suggests are first of all models of wages they generate unemployment by showing that firms will sometimes want to set wages at non market clearing levels it is useful to begin therefore by reviewing how wages and employment are determined in some related models in a perfectly competitive labor market the wage for each type of labor is adjusted constantly to maintain equality of supply and demand overall employment fluctuates in response to demand changes as workers move up and down their labor supply curves unemployment is voluntary in that anyone who is not working prefers that state to employment at the going wage for people of his skills as well the value of a worker s marginal product is equal to the marginal value of his leisure so there are no unexploited wage bargains between unemployed workers and firms this model is successful in predicting the long term response of wages to shifts in demand and supply but it is clear that in the short run its depiction of voluntary unemployment and flexible wages is unrealistic a natural way to generate more realism is to assume that wages are inflexible in the short run in this case a reduction in demand away from a long run equilibrium will lead to rationing of jobs by employers as they attempt to stay on their labor demand curves the unemployment here is involuntary in that the unemployed would prefer to be working at the going wage and is inefficient in that there are lost gains from trade between these workers and firms the weakness of this model is that it is silent about the mechanism that keeps wages rigid unemployed workers who offer to work for less than the fixed wage ought to find work the early implicit contract models of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 provide one explanation for wage rigidity these models introduced the idea that wages can do more than just clear the market for labor wages in an implicit contract model are used to shift the risk generated by uncertain output market conditions from risk averse workers to the risk neutral firm

integrator contracts with many agents and bankruptcy this article analyzes optimal livestock production contracts between an integrator company and many independent growers in three similar industries broiler turkey and swine the analysis provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of distinct incentive schemes in these industries by examining the effects of bankruptcy the key factors are shown to be the output price volatility and the firm size with large companies dominating the broiler industry a small price volatility facilitates the use of two part piece rate tournaments by contrast given the prevalence of smaller companies in the swine industry a larger price volatility generates a bankruptcy risk which renders the use of tournaments infeasible given the combination of medium size companies in the turkey industry an intermediate price volatility produces a mixed result where tournaments and fixed performance standards exist simultaneously

empirical research in international marketing 1976 1982 this paper reviews empirical research in international marketing published during the period 1976 82 the review focuses on what has been researched and how the research has been conducted this research is evaluated a cooperative multidisciplinary empirical research program in international marketing is then proposed

competition and cooperation in the workplace abstract this paper examines promotion systems which are competitive a tournament or noncompetitive a quota scheme we introduce helping technologies where some aid to co workers is efficient and consider various worker bargaining strategies it is shown that the competitive scheme consistently prevents helping efforts while the non competitive scheme induces an efficient allocation of effort if workers bargain over help because the non competitive scheme is less risky it may dominate the competitive scheme even if workers do not help each other if workers bargain over help the non competitive scheme will typically enhance welfare

the liability of foreignness in capital markets sources and remedies the accelerating pace of global capital market integration has provided new opportunities for firms to raise capital abroad through global debt issues cross listings and initial public offerings in foreign stock exchanges however existing empirical evidence suggests that foreign firms tend to be at a disadvantage compared with domestic firms and they often suffer from investors home bias the objective of this paper is to understand why firms are facing problems when accessing capital in foreign markets and possible mechanisms that can help to mitigate these problems it expands the liability of foreignness lof research beyond the product market domain to include liabilities faced by firms attempting to secure resources in foreign capital markets we identify key differences between product and capital markets related to information environment time structure of transactions and linkages between buyers and sellers we analyze institutional distance information asymmetry unfamiliarity and cultural differences as the main sources of capital market lof cmlof we suggest possible mechanisms that managers can employ to mitigate cmlof and overcome investors home bias bonding signaling organizational isomorphism and reputational endorsements we also outline directions for further theoretical and empirical development of the cmlof research

a welfare analysis of global patent protection in a model with endogenous innovation and foreign direct investment abstract this paper constructs a north south quality ladder model in which foreign direct investment fdi is determined by the endogenous location choice of firms and examines analytically how strengthening patent protection in the south affects welfare in the south strengthening patent protection increases the south s welfare by enhancing innovation and fdi but it also allows the firms with patents to charge higher prices for their goods which decreases welfare however the model shows that the former positive welfare effect outweighs the latter negative effect moreover introducing the strictest form of patent protection in the south that is harmonizing patent protection in the south with that in the north may maximize welfare in the south as well as in the north further a similar result can also be obtained in a nonscale effect model

country of origin effects for uni national and bi national products this study examines the effects of country of origin and brand name cues on consumer evaluations of uni national and bi national products and estimates the perceived values of such cues from personal interviews with a regional quota sample of household residents the study found the salience of country of origin in product evaluations under within subject experimental design finally managerial implications are discussed in regards to international branding and sourcing strategies

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

a meta analysis of country of origin effects this note reports a quantitative analysis of the country of origin coo effect based on fifty two articles or papers containing sixty nine independent studies and 1 520 effect sizes an analysis of fifteen study characteristics revealed that country of origin effects are only somewhat generalizable using omega squared as the measure of effect size verbal product descriptions produced larger coo effect sizes than did the presence of an actual product likewise single cue studies produced larger coo effect sizes than did multiple cue studies and larger samples produced effect sizes that on average were greater than those produced by smaller samples the size of an observed coo effect was a function of whether the dependent variables was a quality reliability perception or a purchase intention the average effect size of quality reliability perceptions was 30 whereas the average effect size for purchase intentions was 19 purchase intentions were most susceptible to methodological artifacts than were quality reliability perceptions study findings selectively confirm and refute common beliefs regarding the impact of a country of origin cue on product perceptions and purchase intentions

a primer on cardinal versus ordinal tournaments i introduction the tournament literature has considered primarily two relative performance evaluation schemes that are consistent with what we observe in practice the rationale behind each of these incentive schemes is that relative performance evaluation is useful when agent performance is subject to common shocks in which case individual performance is not a sufficient statistic for individual effort that is the performance of other agents can enhance the inference of the effort exerted by an individual agent one important difference between these schemes is that under rank order or ordinal tournaments the prizes are prespecified and agents compete for rank by contrast under two part piece rate or cardinal tournaments the total prize is fixed and agents compete for a share of the pie 1 each agent receives a base payment and a bonus depending on the difference of his performance from the average performance of his peers 2 average performance provides an informative signal about the value of common shocks inflicted on agents ordinal tournaments are prevalent in contests where rank is more important than individual performance for instance sports contests where contestants compete for medals or fixed prizes or when individual performance data are not readily available for instance promotion contests where the individual contribution of contestants cannot easily be separated from that of their co workers or subordinates by contrast cardinal tournaments are popular in several occupations or industries where cardinal performance data are readily available e g salesmen contracts physician contracts with hmos and agricultural contracts 3 both ordinal and cardinal tournaments are relatively simple to design even though they are only proxies of theoretically optimal schemes 4 prior literature has contrasted the efficiency properties of either ordinal or cardinal tournaments against those of piece rates under piece rates each agent is evaluated according to his absolute performance thus agents receive a base payment and a bonus which is based typically linearly on their individual output 5 piece rates are sometimes expressed as fixed performance standards when an agent s performance is evaluated against a fixed standard instead of the average output obtained lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 and nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 have shown that ordinal tournaments are superior to piece rates when agent activities are subject to common shocks that affect performance 6 more recently marinakis and tsoulouhas 2012 2013 investigated and verified this result for cardinal tournaments relative performance evaluation via tournaments constitutes a pareto superior move by removing common uncertainty from the responsibility of agents and by charging a premium for this insurance the principal increases his profit without hurting the agents moreover by providing this type of insurance tournaments enable the principal to implement higher power incentives than under piece rates what is still an open question in the literature above is a comparison of ordinal to cardinal tournaments the consensus among tournament theorists is that even though ordinal tournaments are informationally wasteful as in holmstrom 1982 by ignoring the agents cardinal performance data if available they are however more general because they are less restrictive on the functional form of the contract i e they are step functions with a linear or non linear trend part of the appeal is that the founders of tournament theory focused on ordinal tournaments nevertheless a significant part of the current tournament literature has analyzed cardinal tournaments instead 7 this paper fills in this gap in theory by developing a framework that can be used to analyze both cardinal and ordinal tournaments as well as piece rates and in doing so it provides a primer on tournaments and piece rates

self enforcing contracts shirking and life cycle incentives he labor market is a rich and complicated place when a worker takes a job he expects to earn a wage but will also care about rates of wage growth fringe benefits levels of risk retirement practices pensions promotion and layoff rules seniority rights and grievance procedures in return the worker must give up some time but he is also asked to upgrade his skills train other workers provide effort and ideas and defer to authority in questions of how his time is spent great changes are occurring in the way labor market institutions such as these are modelled central to the new approach is the concept of a self enforcing implicit contract this is the latest in a series of variations on the ideas of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 and is one of the more exciting new developments in the theory of labor markets this essay will outline this approach and evaluate some of its accomplishments the ideas will be presented in the context of an incentive model that is of some independent interest the model was introduced by becker and stigler 1974 and was extended by lazear 1979 to account for wage growth and mandatory retirement in these papers the workers retire at a fixed age lending the name life cycle incentives to the approach more recently shapiro and stiglitz 1984 have used a version without a fixed retirement date to account for unemployment this version is often called the shirking model these models have generated some controversy but much of it can be resolved when the models are presented in the framework of self enforcing contracts in fact this simple incentive model can do even more it can provide a rationale for competitive hierarchies where firms place their workers in competition with

reaping what you sow an empirical analysis of international patent harmonization abstract this paper extends analysis of the gatt uruguay round by quantifying the impact of international patent harmonization as implied by the trips agreement patent harmonization has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries the us being the major beneficiary developing countries are major contributors to these transfers but canada the uk and japan also make sizable contributions

pay for percentile we propose an incentive scheme for educators that links compensation to the ranks of their students within comparison sets under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort moreover because this scheme employs only ordinal information it allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessments this removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting assessment scales education authorities can employ separate no stakes assessment systems to track trends in scaled measures of student achievement jel i21 i28 j33 j45

location costs product quality and implicit franchise contracts abstract in the literature on international trade only little attention has been given to informational asymmetries between firms and consumers with respect to product quality the few economic models that analyze the question of how asymmetric information about product quality might affect trade flows treat product quality as exogeneous in contrast our model takes product quality as an endogeneous variable i e firms can choose the quality they wish to produce in this case location costs can signal product quality under certain conditions and thereby affect international trade flows more specifically intra industry trade in vertically differentiated experience goods can be determined by information asymmetries about product quality

trust across borders we make the case for fresh approaches to examine the role of trust in international collaborations based on the idea that not only do the levels of trust differ across international borders but also both the nature of trust and the institutional and cultural support for trust can vary across different national contexts collaboration partners from different countries are therefore likely to bring either symmetric or asymmetric conceptions of trust to the business relationship we develop a model and propositions linking symmetry and asymmetry in the institutional and cultural support for trust in international collaborations with the degree of partner interdependence and identify implications for governance and trust building investments we conclude with some suggestions for research that incorporates trust asymmetries between partners

job design delegation and cooperation a principal agent analysis abstract this paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent or laterally among agents the resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents and how the agents tasks are divided among them in the framework of the standard principal agent relationship with moral hazard it is shown that i an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent s job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task and ii the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents

interim performance feedback in multistage tournaments the optimality of partial disclosure workers competing in a tournament for a prize e g a promotion often perform sequentially in multiple stages when the firm is privately informed about the workers performance it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results but the policies that enhance final stage effort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage in our model the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form disclose only if all workers perform poorly this result offers a novel justification for partial disclosure in performance feedback also it contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the extreme policies of full disclosure and no disclosure

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

east west trade the view from the united states many factors contribute to the trade surplus enjoyed by the united states in its foreign trade with the communist countries of europe and asia most studies of east west trade have focused on the problems of entering communist markets and or the potential market in these countries this paper focuses on one of the factors that may be a long term inhibiter or stimulant to increased u s imports of goods from communist countries that is consumer perceptions of products from eastern europe and the people s republic of china our results indicate that there is a market in the united states for goods from communist countries and that there are identifiable segments of the population that are willing to purchase from these countries and would support increased trade relations

intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment abstract this paper develops a product cycle model with endogenous innovation imitation and foreign direct investment fdi we use this model to determine how stronger intellectual property rights ipr protection in the south affects innovation imitation and fdi we find that stronger ipr protection keeps multinationals safer from imitation but no more so than northern firms instead the increased difficulty of imitation generates resource wasting and imitation disincentive effects that reduce both fdi and innovation the greater resources absorbed in imitation crowd out fdi reduced fdi then transmits resource scarcity in the south back to the north and consequently contracts innovation

intellectual property rights licensing and innovation in an endogenous product cycle model abstract we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the product cycle to study the effects of stronger intellectual property rights iprs in the south on the incentives of firms in the north to innovate and to license advanced technologies innovation and licensing are random processes requiring resources stronger iprs increase the licensor s share of rents and reduce the costs of licensing contracts thus the returns to both licensing and innovation would rise while additional resources would be available for r d in consequence innovation and technology transfer would rise however the effect of stronger iprs on relative wages between regions is ambiguous

bidding for brains intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers we introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of nash equilibrium ipr policy choice among countries we show that governments have incentives to use iprs in a bidding war for global talent resulting in nash equilibrium iprs that can be too high rather than too low from a global welfare perspective these incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth thus allowing them to prevent the poaching of their brains by larger wealthier markets

intellectual property rights foreign direct investment and industrial development this paper develops a north south product cycle model in which innovation imitation and the ow of fdi are all endogenously determined in the model a strengthening of ipr protection in the south reduces the rate of imitation and it increases the ow of fdi indeed

are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal a highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock the reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability bankruptcy constraint limits the payments the principal can make provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small this finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms even though limited liability becomes an issue for different ranges of liquidation values under the two schemes tournaments are still superior when the liquidation value of the firm is intermediate or large even though the limited liability constraint is still binding for intermediate values surprisingly uncertainty in the price of output strengthens the need for tournaments by expanding the range of liquidation values over which tournaments are dominant because price uncertainty introduces additional bankruptcy risk these findings provide insight into policy implications in the contracting out of services by state and local governments in procurement in rent seeking contests and in tournaments used by hmos

moral hazard asset specificity implicit bonding and compensation the case of franchising i introduction there is a large and growing interest in the structuring of compensation to deal with the moral hazard problem much of this literature treats various forms of income sharing such as piece rates and sharecropping as a means for a principal to provide incentives to an agent this literature has been extended to the case of two sided moral hazard where both parties to an exchange may shirk another mechanism to induce effort discussed in the literature is bonding where workers post a bond that is forgone if effort is inadequate klein 1980 and klein and leffler 1981 treat the possibility of specific assets as constituting an implicit bond where poor performance by a firm is penalized by bankruptcy and sale of assets at a loss this paper studies a situation where these issues coalesce the case of compensation arrangements in franchising the typical franchise contract calls for the sharing of franchise income between franchisee and franchisor additionally franchisees may be terminated for poor performance if franchise assets have a degree of specificity the ensuing sale of assets at a loss provides a penalty for poor performance we examine the determinants of franchise royalty rates and fees in this setting while there is a literature on two sided moral hazard and some empirical work on franchising based on this idea none incorporates the potential influence of asset specificity we explicitly consider the role of implicit bonding and asset specificity in conjunction with moral hazard on the part of both trading parties we go beyond previous work in franchising by estimating the effects of asset specificity and other influences on the royalty rate further part of our empirical work utilizes improved micro data on actual franchise contracts our approach and its implications are discussed in section ii consistent with previous work we expect the royalty rate to decrease increase as the importance of the franchisee s franchisor s input increases however more specific capital with the threat of termination acts as an implicit bond and substitutes for a reduced royalty rate in inducing franchisee effort thus we expect royalty rates to increase with asset specificity also unlike other approaches we do not necessarily expect an inverse relationship between the royalty rate and the franchise fee for example the greater the importance of franchisor effort the higher the royalty rate but the franchise fee may also increase if franchise revenue rises by enough our hypotheses are tested using two different data sets an original firm level data set is taken from federal trade commission ftc required uniform franchise offering circulars ufoc 1 in addition data are obtained from bond s 1989 the source book of franchise opportunities the data are discussed and the results presented in section iii we find substantial support for our approach for example factors that increase the importance of the franchisee s effort such as the number of employees supervised lower the royalty rate and increase the franchise fee also a reduction in the specificity of the franchisee s investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee 2 section iv summarizes our findings and concludes the paper ii the approach and the hypotheses the typical franchising contract consists of a two part payment by the franchisee to the franchisor the franchisee pays an up front nonrefundable franchisee fee and a continuing royalty payment usually a percentage of sales in return the franchisee receives the right to use the franchisor s brand name capital and a method of operation in addition the franchisor provides on going support to the franchisee however the franchisor maintains the right to unilaterally terminate the contract if the franchisor determines that the franchisee is not delivering a product consistent with the quality guaranteed by the brand name

matching product catgeory and country image perceptions a framework for managing country of origin effects the study of country of origin coo effects examines how consumers perceive products emanating from a particular country this study examines coo in terms of the fit between countries and product categories a framework is suggested which matches the importance of product category dimensions with the perceived image of the country of origin along the same dimensions such matches or mismatches can be either favorable or unfavorable managers can use product country match information to assess consumers purchase intentions and assist them in managing their product s coo data collected from consumers in ireland mexico and the united states demonstrate the product country match framework and its strategic implications

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

trips trade and growth a two country model of endogenous growth is employed to assess the importance of intellectual property rights to trade growth and technology transfer the paper provides theoretical results linking the intellectual property rights regime to trade patterns aggregate r d worldwide growth and aggregate welfare measures failure to provide patent protection for foreign made innovations forces innovators to employ less than the best practice research technologies reduces aggregate r d activities worldwide effectively eliminates technology transfer across countries and reduces worldwide growth copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

authenticity is contagious brand essence and the original source of production it is well established that differences in manufacturing location can affect consumer preferences through lay inferences about production quality in this article the authors take a different approach to this topic by demonstrating how beliefs in contagion the notion that objects may acquire a special aura or essence from their past influence perceptions of authenticity for everyday consumer products and brands specifically they find that due to a belief in contagion products from a company s original manufacturing location are viewed as containing the essence of the brand in turn this belief in transferred essence leads consumers to view products from the original factory as more authentic and valuable than identical products made elsewhere the authors further reveal that consumers who are higher in sensitivity to contagion are more likely to exhibit this effect and that activating the concept of contagion enhances preferences for products made in the brand s original factory the authors clos

tournaments with prize setting agents in some tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation union members bargain over wage distribution and some firms allow self managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation incentive structure and division of labor we analyze and test experimentally a tournament where heterogeneous agents determine the spread between winner prize and loser prize we investigate the relationship between prize spread uncertainty heterogeneity and effort we find that a large prize spread is associated with a low degree of uncertainty and a high degree of heterogeneity and that heterogeneity triggers effort by and large our real effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions

a north south model of intellectual property rights protection and skill accumulation this paper examines how stronger intellectual property rights ipr protection in the south affects the processes of r d investment technology transfer and skill accumulation it finds that stronger ipr protection has only a temporary impact on the innovation rate while it has a negative impact on the long run imitation rate in the north the impact on the process of skill accumulation is negative and increases the within country wage inequality in the south the impact is ambiguous and depends on the externality that skill accumulation generates on the process of education in addition the paper shows that skills play a crucial role in attracting fdi inflows and strengthening ipr protection may be ineffective in attracting technological knowledge when the level of local skill is low

intellectual property rights and quality improvement this paper explores why theories about the effects of intellectual property rights ipr protection on foreign direct investment fdi and innovation have reached mixed conclusions in our model northern firms innovate to improve the quality of existing products and may later shift production to the south through fdi southern firms may then imitate the products of multinationals we find that imitation can increase fdi and innovation for quality improvements whereas the opposite occurs when innovators develop new varieties hence stronger ipr protection by reducing imitation may shift innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

causes of the difficulties in internationalization we study the causes of the difficulties faced by firms when they internationalize in search of new markets we build on the resource based theory to argue that the difficulties in internationalization can be separated into three main sets based on their relationship to advantage loss of advantage provided by resources transferred abroad creation of a disadvantage by resources transferred abroad and lack of complementary resources required to operate abroad in each set we further distinguish difficulties that are specific to a firm from those that are common to a set of firms we argue that only a few of the resulting types of difficulties of internationalization are exclusive to the cross border expansion and propose solutions that address the root cause of each type

do tournaments solve the two sided moral hazard problem abstract the paper analyzes the optimality of relative performance evaluation via two part piece rate tournaments in incentive contracting with multiple agents and two sided moral hazard if the agents are risk averse it is shown that a tournament is optimal only when the following conditions hold i there is common uncertainty inflicted on the activities of the agents that is not contingent on their actions but can be contingent on the principal s action ii the principal sufficiently saves in transaction costs by employing a tournament iii the number of agents is sufficiently large then the feedback effect of using a tournament to monitor the agents is that the principal s moral hazard problem is relaxed when the principal takes a single action it can also be relaxed when the principal can vary her actions with the agents but there are economies of scale in her activity absent common uncertainty the optimum scheme is shown to be a fixed performance standard rather than a tournament but if the agents are risk neutral a tournament can still be optimal provided that ii and iii hold

brand origin recognition accuracy its antecedents and consumers cognitive limitations an ever growing literature has reported consumer bias toward national origins of products and has explored factors that moderate such bias researchers have assumed if only tacitly that consumers are knowledgeable of brand origins and that this knowledge is a significant influence that drives judgments of product quality brand attitudes and choice behavior in the marketplace using categorization theory and attribute diagnosticity as the theoretical foundation our research reveals that consumers actually have only modest knowledge of the national origins of brands and that american consumers proficiency at recognizing foreign brand origins is predicted by variables such as socioeconomic status past international travel foreign language skills and gender in the second of two studies we determined that brand origin recognition is based largely on consumers associations of brand names with languages that suggest country origins these studies ultimately lead us to conclude that past research has inflated the influence that country of origin information has on consumers product judgments and behavior and its importance in managerial and public policy decisions

quality ladders and product cycles we develop a two country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes firms in the north race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology intensive products each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success in the south entrepreneurs invest resources in order to learn the production processes that have been developed in the north all r d investment decisions are made by forward looking profit maximizing entrepreneurs the steady state equilibrium is characterized by constant aggregate rates of innovation and imitation we study how these rates respond to changes in the sizes of the two regions and to policies in each region to promote learning

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

the impact of public policies on innovation and imitation the role of r d technology in growth models it has been shown under the assumption of linear r d technology that a government subsidy to imitative innovative r d decreases increases imitative effort but increases decreases innovative effort and that strengthening the enforcement of patent laws leads to a decrease in innovative r d but to an increase in imitative r d by replacing the linear r d technology with a sufficiently convex r d technology we have shown that the counter intuitive results are reversed in the case of linear r d technology the socially optimal r d policies and activities are indeterminate but with convex r d technology optimal innovation and imitation subsidies would induce the market to generate socially balanced innovative and imitative activities

wages effort and incentive compatibility in life cycle employment contracts existing models of incentive compatibility in life cycle employment contracts arrive at different predictions partly because of the different kinds of contract breaking behavior allowed in them this paper sets out and classifies the full range of such behaviors argues that no model has yet incorporated all of them and examines the consequences of doing so in the context of lazear s well known model in the extended model wages cannot rise faster than marginal products throughout the entire contract and the set of feasible contracts can often be empty even when both parties can commit to terminate the contract whenever it is broken by the other party

entry reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement we examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights ipr enforcement equilibrium ipr violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns holding constant a multinational s incentive to innovate better ipr enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare the multinational s incentive to innovate may be inversely u shaped in the strength of ipr enforcement if timed properly however stronger ipr enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare testable implications concerning observable ipr violations are derived

multinational production effect on brand value direct foreign investment in manufacturing abroad has a number of consequences for the firm one aspect particularly salient when the company s image is tied to its home country is the impact of the dfi upon customer perceptions of the brand the present study shows how changes in perceptions can be assessed prior to the investment decision and how the brand value consequences of a particular location can be estimated the proposed method is illustrated using data from a japanese company s entry into the u s

endogenous product cycles we construct a model of the product cycle featuring endogenous innovation and endogenous technology transfer competitive entrepreneurs in the north expend resources to bring out new products whenever expected present discounted value of future oligopoly profits exceeds current product development costs each northern oligopolist continuously faces the risk that its product will be copied by a southern imitator at which time its profit stream will come to an end in the south competitive entrepreneurs may devote resources to learning the production processes that have been developed in the north there too costs of reverse engineering must be covered by a stream of operating profits we study the determinants of the long run rate of growth of the world economy and the long run rate of technological diffusion we also provide an analysis of the effects of exogenous events and of public policy on relative wage rates in the two regions

a cross cultural study of made in concepts cross cultural studies of the perceptions of countries of origin by industrial users have been few but they are important because of their managerial implications for multinational firms this study uses data obtained from american and french directors of purchasing of major industrial firms concerning their perceptions of 5 major made in concepts after the data were corrected for response bias results show both how the respondents perceive the made in concepts and the differences between the american and french perceptions

how perceived brand globalness creates brand value in today s multinational marketplace it is increasingly important to understand why some consumers prefer global brands to local brands we delineate three pathways through which perceived brand globalness pbg influences the likelihood of brand purchase using consumer data from the u s a and korea we find that pbg is positively related to both perceived brand quality and prestige and through them to purchase likelihood the effect through perceived quality is strongest pbg effects are weaker for more ethnocentric consumers

innovation and wage effects of international outsourcing abstract we investigate the effects of increased outsourcing of production to a low wage country such international outsourcing lowers the marginal cost of production and thus increases profits creating greater incentives for innovation a reduction in the resource requirement in adapting technology relative to improving products or an expansion in the portion of production that can be outsourced generates a greater extent of international outsourcing a lower relative wage and a faster rate of innovation an increase in production taxes in the north production subsidies in the south or a subsidy to adapting technologies has similar effects

promotions as work incentives i introduction why do professional partnerships like law firms accounting practices and management consulting groups to name a few rely almost exclusively on promotions for incentives and do not typically use incentive pay to motivate their associates we offer a possible explanation for this observation that is based upon the fact that these firms face similar capital constraints that is when capital is required in professional partnerships the funds are usually obtained internally from the firm s partners since partnerships are legally prohibited from incorporating and selling shares to the public it is this common capital restriction which may explain the widespread use of promotion based contests in this class of firms 1 we argue that principals cannot effectively set compensation rules without at least some knowledge of the production environment while such knowledge is costly to acquire it is jointly produced while performing supervisory services supervision may also provide information on the states of the world knowledge which is important for the design of compensation mechanisms it appears therefore that principals are likely to be active participants in supervision rather than passive bystanders who delegate all production responsibilities this improves the efficiency of owner managed firms relative to that of firms owned by passive shareholders most papers in the literature such as lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 and holmstrom 1982 concentrate on the moral hazard arising from the inability of the passive principal to observe workers effort we allow for a similar moral hazard on the part of the supervising principal generally within the type of organization considered here it is at least as difficult for workers to observe supervisory effort as it is for the supervisor to observe worker s effort hence both workers and their supervisor are subject to moral hazard which must be resolved by the appropriate choice of compensation scheme lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 and nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 have shown that where the agents and principal are risk neutral both piece rates which are related to an individual s measured output and tournaments which pay a monetary prize to the highest producers yield first best results in contrast when workers are risk averse neither mechanism is efficient the relative efficiency of each compensation mechanism has been shown to depend upon the relative magnitude of the common errors in the measurement of total group output and the individual errors associated with the measurement of the individual s effort on the one hand and the degree of workers risk aversion on the other hand we believe such comparisons between economic contests and piece rates are unduly restrictive and may obscure some important elements in the theory of compensation both tournaments and individualistic piece rates are imperfect instruments which omit different pieces of relevant information tournaments ignore information on quantitative differences among participants while individualistic piece rates ignore information about the group it is quite straightforward to show that the existence of common error and risk aversion cannot explain the prevalence of tournaments in these firms relative piece rates for example will reduce the variance in compensation due to errors in the measurement of effort associated with group output without the additional variance associated with the discrete nature of the tournament reward risk averse employees would therefore prefer relative piece rate schemes to tournaments what we see however is the widespread use of contests as compensation mechanisms in the type of firms examined in this paper to explain this phenomenon it is necessary to focus on the often ignored fact that most contests in these firms take the form of promotions to partnership which in turn entails supervisory responsibilities

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

the incentive effects of tournaments with positive externalities among workers much recent research concerning work incentives has analyzed tournaments or contests between workers for rewards based on a comparison of their relative performance 3 5 8 9 12 bull schotter and weigelt 2 2 argue that tournaments are empirically pervasive characterizing incentives for many salespeople competing for bonuses managers vying for high level positions academics striving for limited tenured positions and politicians whose election hinges on relative votes received contrarily nalebuff and stiglitz 12 40 suggest that tournaments are rare for example many employees face incentives produced by upward sloping age earnings profiles 6 individual piece rates profit sharing or group bonus schemes 14 or potential firing 11 responding to this lack of agreement over the pervasiveness of tournaments recent theoretical research has begun to identify circumstances where tournaments fail or succeed the corpus of such work generalizes the conditions under which tournaments are optimal for example tournaments can respond effectively to common environmental shocks to productivity 5 12 heterogeneous workers 13 employee and employer moral hazard problems 3 monitoring difficulties 9 and inefficiencies associated with firing as an incentive 11 less work has addressed circumstances where tournaments may fail the question which concerns us here to date three circumstances where tournaments fail have been identified first as lazear and rosen noted in their seminal article on tournaments such incentives fail if individual effort can be measured perfectly or precisely inferred from output as they put it a difference of opinion is necessary for a horse race 8 845 if the winner is known before the race only the winner will run and slowly at that second lazear 7 analyzes circumstances where agents can engage in sabotage or increase the probability of winning by reducing their opponent s measured output tournaments then fail because the saboteur can reduce his or her own output while

stage dependent intellectual property rights inspired by the chinese experience we develop a schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment we show that optimal intellectual property rights ipr protection is stage dependent at an early stage of development the country implements weak ipr protection to facilitate imitation at a later stage of development the country implements strong ipr protection to encourage domestic innovation therefore the growth maximizing and welfare maximizing levels of patent strength increase as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of patent strength in china

diaspora ownership and international technology licensing by emerging market firms abstract the liability of origin makes participation in international technology licensing challenging for emerging market firms we draw on signaling theory to propose that diaspora ownership diaspora members equity investments in their homeland firms constitutes a reliable third party signal of emerging market firms trustworthiness which facilitates the access of these firms to international technology licensing we further hypothesize that the efficacy of diaspora ownership as a third party signal varies with the firm s subnational context specifically the relevance of diaspora ownership signal increases with the degree of homogeneity of the within industry r d effort in the firm s sub national location this is because under these conditions additional signals are required to differentiate between local firms operating in the same industry in contrast the diaspora ownership signal has a smaller effect in dysfunctional institutional contexts due to their prohibitive transaction costs we test our arguments on a matched sample of 597 indian firms operating between 2006 and 2015 and find general support for the predicted relationships our study advances research on the liability of origin of emerging market firms the work on subnational dimension of international business and the literature on the benefits diasporans bring to their homelands and resident countries