agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining abstract we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda in the procedure proposals must be made on only one issue at a time although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table when bargaining frictions are small there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements including ones with delay however equilibrium payoffs cannot be made arbitrarily small perpetual disagreement cannot be supported in equilibrium this multiplicity contrasts with the uniqueness found in the literature for a procedure where offers can be made in any subset of remaining issues

issue by issue negotiations the role of information and time preference abstract the alternating offers bargaining game with two pies and incomplete information has a bargaining sequential equilibrium where the strong type of the informed player restricts his offer to one pie leaving it to the other player to make an offer on the second pie an offer on both pies comes only from the weak type of informed player hence an issue by issue negotiation agenda may arise from signaling considerations journal of economic literatureclassification number c78

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

bargaining piecemeal or all at once perfect information rubinstein style bargaining models are used to explore questions about multiple issue bargaining is it ever sensible to offer on only a subset of the issues being bargained what is the effect of limiting offers so that they must cover all issues we conclude that in realistic settings the answer to the first question is yes and that restricting offers to those covering all issues may be harmful to one or both parties

alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit abstract in a seminal paper ariel rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two person bargaining problem in this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum if the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways for example because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small we also show that for a fixed discount rate all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero

interest rates and inflation in the frequency domain new evidence abstract we employ new data on interest rates from the tax free sector to test the fisher hypothesis tax free rates permit a test without determining the appropriate marginal tax rate to assign to investors we use band spectral estimation

the importance of the agenda in bargaining abstract this paper discusses a multi issue bargaining game in which the players set up an agenda and negotiate on the issues sequentially according to this agenda we demonstrate that the agenda might play an important role in the bargaining and discuss the relationship between the agenda and the final outcome of the bargaining game assuming that players have conflicting evaluations regarding the importance of the issues under negotiation we identify the type of agenda each player prefers we also show that in such cases the outcome of the bargaining game need not to be efficient by demonstrating the strategic use of the agenda the paper explains the phenomenon of bargaining on the agenda

a letter to the editor on wage bargaining abstract the rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations a strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place this paper extends the rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium

first things first the agenda formation problem for multi issue committees abstract the paper focuses on sequential bargaining procedures in which parties are allowed to differ in several respects we first highlight the strategic effects in the bargaining game and the often conflicting incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas we then show that there is a pareto superior agenda among the issue by issue procedures this consists in setting the most important issue first unless this is difficult urgent in the sense that there is probability of game breakdown after a rejection in the negotiations over this issue in this case parties prefer to negotiate over the easy issue first

selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two issue complete information bargaining game abstract this paper explores the effects of a selective acceptance rule on the outcome of two issue negotiations the alternating offer game introduced here allows for the possibility that settlement may be reached on one issue while negotiation continues about the other this model captures features of laws that are generally believed to increase efficiency the analysis shows that if one issue is indivisible there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with no pareto improving alternative equilibria with opposing valuations rapid communication guarantees inefficiency these are unique examples of this strong form of inefficiency in an alternating offer bargaining game with complete and perfect information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 j30

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents this paper models the wage contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide in each period whether or not to strike for the duration of that period we show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement although both parties are completely rational and fully informed this has implications for other inefficient phenomena such as tariff wars debt negotiations and wars in general we characterize the set of equilibria show that strikes can occur in real time and discuss extensions of the model such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities copyright 1991 by american economic association

the fisher hypothesis under different monetary regimes we examine the relation between inflation and nominal interest rates under the various monetary regimes in effect in the united states since the turn of the century our data include a newly constructed time series of short term municipal bond yields observed annually since 1902 the results generally support the hypothesis that after tax nominal yields adjust point for point with rationally forecasted inflation for the postwar years but strongly reject that hypothesis for the preceding years we suggest and offer supporting evidence that the difference between the two subperiods may be attributable to differences in the optimal forecasting technique for each era when forecasting is a costly endeavor

an integrated framework for rural electrification adopting a user centric approach to business model development rural electrification re has gained prominence over the past two decades as an effective means for improving living conditions this growth has largely been driven by socio economic and political imperatives to improve rural livelihood and by technological innovation based on a content analysis of 232 scholarly articles the literature is categorized into four focal lenses technology institutional viability and user centric we find that the first two dominate the re debate the viability lens has been used less frequently whilst the user centric lens began to engage scholars as late as 2007 we provide an overview of the technological institutional and viability lenses and elaborate upon the user centric lens in greater detail for energy policy and practice we combine the four lenses to develop a business model framework that policy makers practitioners and investors could use to assess re projects or to design future rural electrification strategies

deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment abstract bilateral sequential negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal and if the common discount factor is close enough to one journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c78 j52

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining a two period example abstract it is shown that the pareto optimal outcomes in a two period simultaneous move bargaining model violate forwards induction rationality when the players are sufficiently patient this bargaining model describes a situation where a principal is represented by an agent whose flexibility is restricted hence a bargaining process with such agents can create costly delays the result also provides another example of the power of forwards induction and stability

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small