joseph schumpeter lecture ideology i develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained yet individually rational distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets in processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education health insurance pensions etc individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects or their children s versus the costs of misinformed decisions because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial endogenous social cognitions emerge thus an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government conversely an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand with public sector capital this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history dependent dynamics the model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views even when ex post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news jel h11 d72 d83 p16 z1

self rewards and personal motivation self administered rewards are ubiquitous they serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation we show that in a model with time inconsistent and reference dependent preferences self rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self control problems we also discuss the different types of self rewards the individual can use such as vice goods and virtue goods and analyze which types of goods the individual prefers

overconfident consumers in the marketplace when consumers sign contracts expectations about future usage of the product or service matter for instance the value provided by car insurance depends on how likely a consumer believes she is to file a claim the value provided by a gym membership depends on how often a consumer anticipates going to the gym and the value provided by a cellular phone contract depends on how many gigabytes of data a consumer anticipates using the standard modeling paradigm makes the expedient assumption that consumers have rational expectations imposing rational expectations drastically simplifies models and eliminates the need to directly measure beliefs as they coincide with the distribution of observed outcomes yet a large literature shows that consumer beliefs often deviate substantially from rational expectations in systematic ways this has important consequences for contract design firm profits consumer welfare and public policy the term overconfidence is used broadly in the psychology literature referring to both overoptimism and overprecision overoptimistic individuals overestimate their own abilities or prospects either in absolute terms or in comparison to others in contrast overprecise individuals place overly narrow confidence intervals around forecasts thereby underestimating uncertainty these biases can lead consumers to misforecast their future product usage or to overestimate their abilities to navigate contract terms in consequence consumer overconfidence causes consumers

a simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory abstract this paper studies a contract between an optimistic agent and a realistic principal both risk neutral even with complete contracts and ex ante symmetric information it may be impossible to achieve the first best unless the weight on emotions is sufficiently low

does the better than average effect show that people are overconfident two experiments we conduct two experimental tests of the claim that people are overconfident using new tests of overplacement that are based on a formal bayesian model our two experiments on easy quizzes find that people overplace themselves more precisely we find apparently overconfident data that cannot be accounted for by a rational population of expected utility maximizers who care only about money the finding represents new evidence of overconfidence that is robust to the bayesian critique offered by benoit and dubra jean pierre benoit and juan dubra 2011 apparent overconfidence econometrica 79 1591 1625 we discuss possible limitations of our results

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

overconfidence and asymmetric information the case of insurance this paper contributes to the recent behavioral economics literature by showing that whether or not overconfidence changes qualitative predictions in asymmetric information markets may depend on the market structure itself we first show that overconfidence may overturn fundamental relations between observable variables in perfect competition asymmetric information insurance markets in monopolistic insurance markets in constrast we find that overconfidence may be observationally equivalent to variations in the risk composition of the economy our analysis provides a number of novel testable implications on i price heterogeneity within and across risk classes ii the relationship between ex post risk and insurance coverage iii the fact that a significant fraction of agents chooses to be uninsured and iv the relationship between underinsurance and age

positive self image in tournaments this paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent s self assessment the manager of the firm on the other hand correctly assesses workers productivities and self beliefs when setting tournament prizes the paper shows that under a variety of circumstances firms make higher profits when workers have positive self image than if workers do not by contrast workers welfare declines due to their own misguided choices

selfish bakers caring nurses a model of work motivation abstract work contributes to people s self image in important ways we propose a model in which effort is unobservable and where individuals have a preference for being important to others this gives the following predictions 1 if a worker s effort is paid by his marginal productivity bakers effort is just like in the standard model 2 if a worker s wage is unaffected by his effort nurses more effort is provided than in the standard model 3 to prevent that shirkers become nurses nurses wages must be kept strictly lower than bakers income at this wage level there will be too few nurses 4 overinvestment in nursing equipment can be justified as a means to attract motivated nurses 5 even with full income compensation both nurses and bakers may experience a net utility loss when losing their job 6 similarly both nurses and bakers may prefer work to welfare even with full income compensation

thanatology and economics the behavioral economics of death death is an integral part of life yet the economic modeling of death is perfunctory with most of the controversy focused on whether people s planning horizon ends with their own life or extends beyond that in contrast one might expect that of all aspects of life decisions that require facing up to one s own mortality engender unique fears and psychological reactions 1 that we are forwardlooking and can anticipate death distinguishes human beings from other species sigmund freud s student otto rank 1941 argued that mortality anxiety was the fundamental human fear and he attributed the genesis of man s religious impulses and the source of humanity s construction of meaning and order to the awareness of one s personal finitude rank s ideas were revived and popularized in ernest becker s 1973 book the denial of death the idea that many people live in denial of their own mortality is common in literature and philosophy perhaps best summarized in the words of the 17th century french epigrammist francois la rochefoucauld one cannot look directly at either the sun or death many central issues in economics such as the intertemporal pattern of consumption are at stake if people systematically deviate from the predictions of standard models with regard to decisions concerning their own death assessing whether this is true requires enriching the models of how people behave in the face of death and testing them against observed patterns of behavior

a model of positive self image in subjective assessments this paper suggests a mechanism that describes individuals positive self image in subjective assessments of their relative abilities the mechanism assumes individuals have heterogeneous production functions that determine ability as a function of multiple skills make skill enhancing investments with the goal of maximizing their ability and make ability comparisons using their own production function within this framework the paper provides conditions under which there is positive self image positive self image is increasing in the ease of the task the number of different skills needed for the task and the variability of production technologies in the population

the endowment effect as blessing we study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation we pay specific attention to barter trade of the kind that was common in prehistoric societies and suggest that the endowment effect and the winner s curse could have jointly survived natural selection together we develop a new family of hybrid replicator selection dynamics and show that under such dynamics even if biases only partially compensate for each other individuals with both biases can survive in the population in the long run

motivated health risk denial and preventative health care investments abstract people deny health risks invest too little in disease prevention and are highly sensitive to the price of preventative health care especially in developing countries moreover private sector r d spending on developing country diseases is almost non existent to explain these empirical observations i propose a model of motivated belief formation in which an agent s decision to engage in health risk denial balances the psychological benefits of reduced anxiety with the physical cost of underprevention i use the model to study firms price setting behavior and incentive to innovate i also show that tax funded prevention subsidies are welfare enhancing

time tradeoff sequences for analyzing discounting and time inconsistency this paper introduces time tradeoff tto sequences as a general tool to analyze intertemporal choice we give several applications for empirical purposes we can measure discount functions without requiring any measurement of or assumption about utility we can quantitatively measure time inconsistencies and simplify their qualitative tests tto sequences can be administered and analyzed very easily using only pencil and paper for theoretical purposes we use tto sequences to axiomatize quasi hyperbolic discount functions we demonstrate the feasibility of measuring tto sequences in an experiment in which we tested the axiomatizations our findings suggest rejections of several currently popular discount functions and call for the development of new ones it is especially desirable that such discount functions can accommodate increasing impatience

collective memory cultural transmission and investments memory plays a crucial role in the transmission of cultural and national identity in every soci ety and every country the collective memory1 transmitted to the young by the older generation through a variety of channels e g school textbooks the media monuments and commemora tive rituals influences their perception of their cultural identity and values and their willingness to invest in them with major economic as well as political and social consequences this natu rally raises two questions first what would be the socially optimal transmission of collective memory to the young is it the case as intuition might suggest that the older generation should strive to be as unbiased accurate and comprehensive as possible in communicating its collec tive memory to the younger generation if not why and how should it depart from this objec tive second is collective memory transmission in practice likely to differ from what would be socially optimal and if so how these questions are at the heart of many current debates including those over education policy e g how history should be taught the level of control the state should have over school textbooks and curriculum 2 over the media e g the role of the corporation for public broadcasting cpb in the united states or the british broadcasting corporation bbc in the united kingdom 3 and over cultural integration e g centralized ver sus decentralized institutions in the european union legislation affecting freedom of speech in the united kingdom 4

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

the bright side of managerial over optimism human estimation and inference are subject to systematic biases such as overconfidence and over optimism in contrast to prior research that has identified multiple negative consequences of these biases we focus on positive effects we empirically examine a setting in which over optimism a is a related but different bias from overconfidence b emerges dynamically in a rational economic framework and c generates higher managerial effort importantly this additional effort improves firm profitability and market value

overconfidence as a social bias experimental evidence abstract the overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented we consider overconfidence as a social bias for a simple real effort task we show that individually economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence by contrast the introduction of a very basic purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self assessments additionally observing others actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting

great expectations and the end of the depression what ended the great depression in the united states this paper suggests that the recovery was driven by a shift in expectations this shift was triggered by president franklin delano roosevelt s fdr policy actions on the monetary policy side roosevelt abolished the gold standard and announced an explicit policy objective of inflating the price level to pre depression levels on the fiscal policy side roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending which helped make his policy objective credible the key to the recovery was the successful management of expecta tions about future policy roosevelt s rise to power is modeled as a policy regime change as in thomas sargent 1983 and peter temin and barry wigmore 1990 this paper formalizes temin and wigmore s argu ment in a repeated game setting using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and argues that the regime change can account for the recovery in the model a regime change means the elimination of certain policy dogmas that constrain the actions of the government the regime change generates an endogenous shift in expectations due to a coordination of mon etary and fiscal policy this coordination ended the great depression by engineering a shift in expectations from contractionary i e the private sector expected future economic contrac tion and deflation to expansionary i e the public expected future economic expansion and inflation the expectation of higher future inflation lowered real interest rates thus stimulating demand while the expectation of higher future income stimulated demand by raising permanent income

contractionary devaluation risk evidence from the free silver movement 1878 1900 i identify significant effects of devaluation risk on interest rates and output using us silver coinage policy news between 1878 and 1900 as clean shocks to exchange rate expectations the free sil

risk and rationalization the role of affect and cognitive dissonance for sexual risk taking this paper analyzes the mechanisms underlying excessive sexual risk taking in the presence of hiv drawing ideas from psychology on decision making processes and risk evaluation a theoretical mode

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

hindsight biased evaluation of political decision makers hindsight bias is a cognitive deficiency that leads people to overestimate ex post how predictable an event was in this paper we develop a political agency model in which voters are hindsight biased and politicians differ in ability defined as information concerning the optimal policy when public information is not too accurate low ability politicians sometimes gamble on suboptimal policies in an attempt to mimic the high ability type who has superior private information they go against public information and choose a policy whose expected payoff to society is negative we model hindsight bias as a memory imperfection that prevents voters from accessing their ex ante information about the state of the world we show that the bias can act as a discipline device that reduces policy gambles and can therefore be welfare enhancing although it is well known that restrictions on information acquisition can be beneficial for a principal our contribution is to show that a psychological bias can have such an effect

overconfidence in forecasts of own performance an experimental study systematic overconfidence by individuals regarding their abilities and prospects could have important economic consequences but overconfidence has received little direct testing within economics we use experiments to test for overconfidence in people s forecasts of their absolute or relative performance in two unfamiliar tasks given their chosen effort participants have incentives to forecast accurately with opportunities for feedback learning and revision forecasts are evaluated at aggregate and individual levels we find zero mean error or underconfidence far more prevalent than overconfidence underconfidence is greatest in forecasts of absolute rather than relative performance and among those using greater effort quantity or quality

to be consumed with moderation abstract we study the optimal behavior of a hyperbolic discounting agent who has incomplete information about his own preferences and can only learn them through consumption we show that even if moderate current consumption and moderate future consumption always dominates abstinence the agent may optimally decide not to consume as a commitment device against inefficient learning that would lead to future excesses this provides a rationale for why smokers gamblers or compulsive buyers stick to second best personal rules of behavior such as abstinence without invoking standard habit formation arguments we also study how urges modify the strategy of the individual

us agricultural exports and labor market adjustments this study empirically investigates the impact of us agricultural exports on farm and nonfarm employment and tests how individuals adjust to agricultural export shocks based on the data from 1991 to 2017 and a bartik style instrument that exploits cross regional variation in agricultural export exposure stemming from initial differences in agricultural specialization and temporal variation in predicted us exports from exogenous tariff reductions we find that a 1 increase in agricultural exports increases farm employment by 0 302 and has no statistically significant impact on nonfarm employment the individual level analysis shows that in response to positive agricultural export demand shocks natives with a college degree are more likely to become self employed and start farm activities and while non natives without a college degree are more likely to become hired farmworkers a back of the envelope calculation based on the estimates of agricultural trade elasticities of employment shows that on balance job gains due to us agricultural exports are slightly larger than job loss due to agricultural imports resulting in a net gain of around 0 24 million farm jobs over 1991 2017

an economic analysis of debt swaps and case study of the harvard debt for education swap abstract evaluation of harvard university s debt for education swap with ecuador yields a clear bottom line harvard unambiguously gains from the deal since tuition receipts more than double initial outlays and the university acquires assets to fund research in ecuador ecuador s economic benefits however are less clear since the dollar outflow from ecuador may exceed the amount of new scholarship aid plus the true buyback value participants in future debt for education deals must consider both the uncertainty of economic gains and possible macroeconomic consequences for the debtor country

disagreement and learning in a dynamic contracting model we present a dynamic contracting model in which the principal and agent disagree about the resolution of uncertainty and we illustrate the contract design in an application with bayesian learning the disagreement creates gains from trade that the principal realizes by transferring payment to states that the agent considers relatively more likely changing incentives the interaction between incentive provision and learning creates an intertemporal source of disagreement risk that alters optimal risk sharing there is an endogenous regime shift between economies with small and large belief differences and an early shock to beliefs can lead to large persistent differences in variable pay even after beliefs have converged under risk neutrality selling the firm to the agent does not implement the first best because it precludes state contingent trades the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

a cue theory of consumption psychological experiments demonstrate that repeated pairings of a cue and a consumption good eventually create cue based complementarities the presence of the cue raises the marginal utility derived from consumption in this paper such dynamic preferences are embedded in a rational choice model behavior that arises from this model is characterized by endogenous cue sensitivities costly cue management commitment and cue based spikes in impatience the model is used to understand addictive habit forming behaviors and marketing the model explains why preferences change rapidly from moment to moment why temptations should sometimes be avoided and how firms package and position goods

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

recovery from the great depression the farm channel in spring 1933 from march to july 1933 us industrial production rose 57 percent we show that an important source of recovery was the effect of dollar devaluation on farm prices incomes and consumption devaluation immediately raised traded crop prices and auto sales grew more rapidly in states and counties most exposed to these price increases the response was amplified in counties with more severe farm debt burdens for plausible assumptions about farmers relative mpc the incidence of higher farm prices and the aggregate multiplier this redistribution to farmers accounted for a substantial portion of spring 1933 growth this farm channel thus provides an example of how the distributional consequences of macroeconomic policies can have large aggregate effects that recovery in 1933 benefited from redistribution to farmers suggests an important limitation to the use of 1933 as a guide to the effects of monetary regime changes in other circumstances

migration and asymmetric information comment a comment on an article by viem kwok and hayne leland concerning the relationship between asymmetric information and the brain drain of skilled labor from developing countries is presented a reply by kwok and leland p 535 is also included annotation

hedonic recall bias why you should not ask people how much they earn abstract the empirical literature which explores the effect of wage on job satisfaction typically uses data drawn from social surveys in these surveys the amount of wage is reported by the respondents themselves thus the explanatory variable of the econometric models may differ from the true wage people earn our paper shows that the use of survey data can lead to considerable over estimation of the importance of wage as a determinant of wage satisfaction in particular responses seem to be affected by a recall bias people who are satisfied with their wage are more likely to over report their wage in questionnaires the more satisfied they are the more they over report and vice versa unsatisfied people we name this behavioral disposition hedonic recall bias

the value of information when preferences are dynamically inconsistent the paper reviews the main findings on individual decision making under time inconsistent preferences incomplete information and different learning environments first when agents choose whether to learn or not avoiding costless information can be their optimal strategy strategic ignorance predicts a systematic bias in the agents perceived payoff second when information flows exogenously as in the literature on investment under uncertainty agents may undertake irreversible investments anticipating expected losses such decisions are taken only as a commitment device against the acquisition of future information undesirable from the current perspective furthermore several equilibria coexist the agent will succeed in avoiding investments with losses or not depending on the degree of trust on his future behavior third under learning through consumption abstention can be part of an equilibrium strategy in activities where moderate consumption if feasible would yield a higher payoff c 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings we extend expected utility theory to situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation prior to the resolution of uncertainty we show how these anticipatory feelings may result in time inconsistency we provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the potential impact of anticipation on asset prices

the evolutionary logic of honoring sunk costs i introduction economists claim that sunk costs should not figure in current decision making because by definition these expenditures cannot be retrieved and should be treated as bygones but there is a large literature both experimental and anecdotal in which people are observed to waste resources by honoring bygones that could not possibly make them better off see e g arkes and blumer 1985 arkes and ayton 1999 mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 thaler 1980 such excess in wasting resources is unlikely to have been tolerated by nature in the process of evolution if it did not serve some purpose to enhance fitness in our remote past the purpose of this study is to suggest such a function whereby evolutionary processes have hardwired a concern for sunk costs in human decision making 1 the concept of honoring sunk costs has been referred to in the literature as the concorde fallacy 2 arkes and blumer 1985 have a number of other examples of good money being thrown after bad economists have provided various explanations for why sunk costs appear salient to humans kanodia bushman and dickhaut 1989 and prendergast and stole 1996 propose a theory where reputational effects make agents unwilling to change their decisions mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 have suggested several models involving information content reputation or constraints on decision making that provide rational reasons for taking sunk costs into account likewise baliga and ely 2011 have proposed a model in which sunk costs may acquire salience as a memory kludge because they may contain information about the value of a project previously initiated but whose value has now been forgotten carmichael and macleod 2003 have proposed a model where in a bilateral bargaining situation the norm of taking account of sunk costs resolves the hold up problem that typically results in underinvestment thaler 1980 arkes and blumer 1985 and whyte 1986 suggested a prospect theory approach to understanding sunk cost effects arkes and blumer 1985 the philosopher nozick 1993 and others have argued that honoring sunk costs can alleviate problems of time inconsistency and temptation john may believe that going to the theater is a good thing but when the time comes he cannot rouse himself to do so because it would require relinquishing whatever else appears appealing at the time to circumvent this john buys tickets in advance as a precommitment device but to do this he must believe in the first place that his future self is going to honor sunk costs 3 whatever the reason for the time inconsistent preferences say hyperbolic discounting the honoring of sunk costs may be used to remedy the problem of time inconsistency but nozick for example offers no reason for why sunk costs are honored in the first place we offer an evolutionary reason to suggest why nature may have hardwired a proclivity in humans to honor sunks costs a reason that differs from those offered in the articles cited above we propose that the built in salience of sunk costs is an adaptation to the problem of self control self control problems may arise in decision making because contrary to our untutored perceptions the human brain has a triune 4 rather than a unitary structure maclean 1989 panksepp 1998 because of the way the brain has evolved different regions within it defined by their own neuroanatomical and neurochemical features deal with different aspects of action and behavior although interconnected through chemical and neuronal pathways the different control centers tend to act autonomously and may conflict in their responses to stimuli when the emotional or motivational centers which lie in the sub cortical limbic system push us to certain actions that the rational persona in the cortex wishes to deny there is a conflict and the problem of self control arises panksepp 1998 301 notes

looking at the bright side the motivational value of confidence abstract the motivational value of confidence postulates that individual effort provision is increasing in beliefs on one s own ability this relation is supposed to also hold for overconfident individuals who have exaggerated ability beliefs we present the first empirical evidence on the existence of a motivational value of absolute confidence that many microeconomic models with overconfident agents build on moreover we document that negative debiasing information on individual ability diminishes effort provision a result that is of obvious relevance for many contexts such as labor relations or learning at school we also offer a strategy for identifying significant absolute overconfidence at the individual level

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal agent relations we conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents performance can only be evaluated subjectively principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals in contrast to existing models of reciprocity we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self evaluations even if agents pay offs are independent of it in turn principals provide more positive feedback relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent if this does not affect their pay off

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

decreasing impatience a criterion for non stationary time preference and hyperbolic discounting despite recent interest in hyperbolic discounting there has been little discussion of exactly what property of time preferences is instantiated by hyperbolic or quasi hyperbolic functional forms the paper revives an earlier proposal in prelec 1989 that the key property is prattarrow convexity of the log of the discount function which corresponds to decreasing impatience di at the level of preferences di provides a natural criterion for assessing the severity of departure from stationarity in that greater di is equivalent to more choices of dominated options in two stage decision problems as well as greater convexity of the log of the discount function inefficient choices may arise as intentional precommitments or as unintended reversals of preference by naive agents

are you a good employee or simply a good guy influence costs and contract design we develop a principal agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal the level of output and a soft behavioral signal the supervision signal about the agent s level of effort in our model the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal these activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task we show that the agent s ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result interestingly the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high powered incentives this result implies that the optimal contract and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not depends on the magnitude of the productivity based influence costs we show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

financial education and behavioral finance new insights into the role of information in financial decisions recent empirical evidence based on surveys and experimental activities within the fields of behavioral finance and financial education has offered economists new empirically based insights into how individuals use information in making financial decisions specifically the importance of information in financial decisions may be reduced or eliminated by psychological aspects of the individual such as a state of overconfidence that is individual or shared with a group or by the individual s limited ability to process complex and abundant information this paper aims to complement this emerging body of literature by studying how individuals perceive and process information when making financial decisions we review these contributions and suggest a number of broad guidelines that can provide a framework for future discussion of this topic within financial decision theory

efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time inconsistent abstract we consider an exchange economy with time inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable if consumers have identical discount factors then allocations that are pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation proof in an economy with a sequence of markets competitive equilibria are pareto efficient in this sense and for generic endowments only if preferences are locally homothetic

economic analysis of brain drain abstract in this paper we consider the brain drain problem arising from the possibility of signaling and individual s two stage decision procedures within an asymmetric information framework where the ranking of the universities provides a signal to domestic employers our results indicate that at rational expectations equilibrium there is an association between students of a particular quality and corresponding qualities of universities they will choose to attend to attain ph d s moreover we can predict whether these graduating ph d s choose to return home or remain abroad

midweek effect on soccer performance evidence from the german bundesliga the home advantage phenomenon is a well established feature in sports competitions in this study we examine data from 2 013 soccer matches played in the german bundesliga during the seasons from 2007 2008 to 2016 2017 using a very rich data set our econometric analysis that is based on matching methods reveals that the usual home advantage disappears when the game is in the middle of the week instead of being on the weekend our results indicate that as the midweek matches are unevenly allocated among teams the actual schedules of the bundesliga favor teams with fewer home games in midweek the study also shows that these soccer specific findings may have some implications for the design of contests in general jel d00 l00 d20 z20

contracting with self esteem concerns it is widely accepted in social psychology that the need to maintain and enhance self esteem is a fundamental human motive we incorporate this factor into an otherwise ordinary principal agent framework and examine its impact on the optimal incentive scheme and the agent s behavior especially focusing on the form of intrapersonal strategy known as self handicapping incorporating self esteem concerns into a contracting situation yields an implication that runs counter to conventional wisdom that is the standard tradeoff between risk and incentives may break down i e more uncertainty reduces agency cost and hence results in stronger incentives in the presence of self esteem concerns this is because uncertainty mitigates the need for self handicapping this result provides a possible reason for why we do not empirically observe this tradeoff in a robust manner we present an intuitive condition for this anomaly to arise and provide a set of testable implications the present framework also reveals why and how team production can be made more profitable by providing an explanation for the increasing popularity of team production finally this simple logic is applied to identify additional implications for the hidden costs of external enforcers such as evaluation and monitoring which are discussed extensively in social psychology

a memory based model of bounded rationality in order to investigate the impact of limited memory on human behavior i develop a model of memory grounded in psychological and biological research i assume that people take their memories as accurate and use them to make inferences the resulting model predicts both over and underreaction but provides enough structure to predict when each effect dominates i then use this framework to study the consumption decision the results match empirical work on consumption predictability as well as differences in the marginal propensity to consume from different income streams most importantly because it ties the extent of bias to a measurable aspect of the stochastic process being forecasted the model makes testable empirical predictions

corporate prediction markets evidence from google ford and firm x despite the popularity of prediction markets among economists businesses and policymakers have been slow to adopt them in decision making most studies of prediction markets outside the lab are from public markets with large trading populations corporate prediction markets face additional issues such as thinness weak incentives limited entry and the potential for traders with biases or ulterior motives raising questions about how well these markets will perform we examine data from prediction markets run by google ford motor company and an anonymous basic materials conglomerate firm x despite theoretically adverse conditions we find these markets are relatively efficient and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25 reduction in mean squared error the most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at google the inefficiencies that do exist generally become smaller over time more experienced traders and those with higher past performance trade against the identified inefficiencies suggesting that the markets efficiency improves because traders gain experience and less skilled traders exit the market

presidential address social transmission bias in economics and finance i discuss a new intellectual paradigm social economics and finance the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior this emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other a key underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions i use five fables models to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach and offer several emergent themes for example social transmission bias compounds recursively which can help explain booms bubbles return anomalies and swings in economic sentiment

strategic ignorance as a self disciplining device we analyse the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare the extent of the externality is initially unknown but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure we show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions incomplete learning may occur on a markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra personal game in such a case each agent s incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self restricted information this conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance all equilibria featuring this property strictly pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs

confidence enhanced performance there is ample evidence that emotions affect performance positive emotions can improve performance while negative ones may diminish it for example the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences shaking loss of concentration that may impair performance in sports on stage or at school there is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted recollection of past events and distorted attributions of the causes of successes of failures recollection of good events or successes is typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or own effort while failures are attributed to bad luck in addition these attributions are often reversed when judging the performance of others the objective of this paper is to incorporate the first phenomenon above into an otherwise standard decision theoretic model and show that in a world where performance depends on emotions biases in information processing enhance welfare

monetary factors in the great depression this paper examines the role of monetary policy in the early stages of the great depression and considers the mechanism whereby this policy may have affected real activity i conclude that the depression was preceded by a dramatic shift towards a highly contractionary monetary policy the economic impact of this policy seems unlikely to have come through the conventional keynesian channels of a shortage of liquidity and high ex ante real interest rates but instead may have operated through unanticipated deflation and after 1930 through the disruption of financial intermediation as a consequence of the banking panics

an economic model of the brain drain asymmetric information in the labor market is discussed as a major cause of the exodus of foreign trained students from developing countries the authors suggest that employers in the country in which the students have been trained have a more accurate judgment of the true productivity of students than have employers in the students native country an illustrative numerical model is developed and its implications are analyzed annotation

intergenerational attitudes towards strategic uncertainty and competition a field experiment in a swiss bank with a market entry game inspired by camerer and lovallo 1999 we study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors especially when the market capacity is not too low or when earnings from entry depend on relative performance this difference persists after controlling for attitudes towards non strategic uncertainty and for beliefs on others competitiveness and on relative ability seniors are more willing to compete when they predict a higher number of competitors this contradicts the stereotype of less competitive older employees

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

information and the equity premium we determine how better information aects the average equity premium in a standard representative agent exchange economy perfect information obviously eliminates the equity premium and we show that a particular kind of information about the level of future consumption always lowers the average equity premium surprisingly information must sometimes raise the average equity premium no matter what the preferences of the representative agent information purely about the volatility either of consumption or the marginal utility of consumption raises the equity premium for a wide class of preferences moreover information can raise the average equity premium by an arbitrarily large percentage while still matching important magnitudes such as average growth and the risk free rate we consider two dierent economies a two period economy with arbitrary preferences for the representative agent and an infinite horizon economy with standard additive separable ces utility with independent growth rates through time