constrained efficiency in the neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we investigate the welfare properties of the one sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first order condition of a constrained planner s problem this condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low the factor composition of income of the consumption poor using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature we illustrate that there can be either over or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long run distribution of wealth for the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking it has much too low a steady state capital stock

supply side interventions and redistribution we evaluate the eect on welfare of shifting the burden of capi tal income taxes to labor taxes in a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and constant tax rates we calibrate and simu late the economy we nd that lowering capital taxes has two eects i it increases e ciency in terms of aggregate production and ii it redistributes wealth in favor of those agents with a low wage wealth ratio when the parameters of the model are calibrated to match the distribution of income in terms of the wage wealth ratio the redis tributive eect dominates and agents with a high wage wealth ratio would experience a large loss in utility if capital income taxes were eliminated

shrinking ageing population and other drivers of energy consumption and co2 emission in the residential sector a case from eastern europe energy use and the resulting environmental impacts are interrelated with socioeconomic development of a certain region what is more the residential sector plays an important role as a major consumer of the energy thus it is important to identify the underlying patterns of energy consumption and the resulting co2 emission amidst the external shocks this paper focuses on the case of residential energy consumption and co2 emission in lithuania over 2004 2016 this example is important given the context of shifts in the size and structure of population economy and energy transformation in lithuania that occurred over the period covered the analysis relies on the index decomposition analysis and factorizes the changes in co2 emission into the effects of population size household size dwelling area energy intensity and carbon factor the results indicate that decline in energy intensity and population played the most important role in pushing the co2 emission down yet these effects were offset by the changes in the lifestyle of the population i e household size and dwelling area along with increasing carbon factor these findings are contrasted to the corresponding findings form the earlier studies around the world and the resulting policy implications are delivered

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

optimal taxation merging micro and macro approaches efficient provision of social insurance and efficient redistributionofresourcesamongindividualsaresomeofthemostimportantandchallenging questions in macroeconomics and public finance a seminal contribution of mirrlees 1971 is the starting point for the modern approach to answering these questions a trade off between efficiency and insurance or equity is inherent to this approach and is a key determinant of the optimal policy in this paper we argue that the large body of research that follows mirrlees approach has been developing in two quite separate directions referred to in this paper as the micro and macro approaches we argue that merging the two directions

progressive screening long term contracting with a privately known stochastic process we examine a model of long term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves in addition the realized values are also private information we characterize a class of environments in which the profit maximizing long term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple structure we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic sequences of static contracts within each sequence higher realized values lead to greater quantity provision however an increasing proportion of buyer types are excluded over time eventually leading to inefficiently early termination of the relationship moreover the menu choices differ by future generosity with more costly up front plans guaranteeing greater quantity provision in the future thus the seller screens process information in the initial period and then progressively screens across realized values so as to reduce the information rents paid in future periods copyright oxford university press

sources of lifetime inequality is lifetime inequality mainly due to differences across people established early in life or to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime we answer this question within a model that features idiosyncratic shocks to human capital estimated directly from data as well as heterogeneity in ability to learn initial human capital and initial wealth we find that as of age 23 differences in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime earnings lifetime wealth and lifetime utility than do differences in shocks received over the working lifetime jel d31 d91 j24 j31 to what degree is lifetime inequality due to differences across people established early in life as opposed to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime among the individual differences established early in life which ones are the most important a convincing answer to these questions is of fundamental importance first and most simply an answer serves to contrast the potential importance of the myriad policies directed at modifying or at providing insurance for initial conditions e g public education against those directed at shocks over the working lifetime e g unemployment insurance second a discussion of lifetime inequality cannot go too far before discussing which specific type of initial condition is the most critical for determining how one fares in life third a useful framework for answering these questions should also be central in the analysis of a wide range of policies considered in macroeconomics public finance and labor economics we view lifetime inequality through the lens of a risky human capital model agents differ in terms of three initial conditions initial human capital learning ability and financial wealth initial human capital can be viewed as controlling the intercept of an agent s mean earnings profile whereas learning ability acts to rotate

efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks a first order approach this article studies efficient allocations in a dynamic private information economy with a continuum of idiosyncratic shocks that are persistent i develop a first order approach for this environment and show that the problem has a simple recursive structure that relies on only a small number of state variables making the problem tractable i find sufficient conditions that guarantee that the first order approach is valid to illustrate the first order approach i numerically compute the efficient allocations in a mirrleesean economy with productivity shocks that follow a random walk and verify the validity of the first order approach i show that persistent shocks create a new trade off where the social planner decreases the informational rent of the agent today at the cost of providing higher insurance in the future copyright 2013 oxford university press

a quantitative analysis of capital income taxation this paper studies the quantitative impact of eliminating capital income taxation on capital accumulation and steady state welfare in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of sixty five period lived individuals who face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty under a wide range of parameter configurations the capital income tax rate that maximizes steady state welfare is positive even though eliminating it completely would raise the steady state capital stock toward the golden rule this is because the tax burden is shifted toward the younger and liquidity constrained years reducing the individuals ability to self insure copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

insurance and taxation over the life cycle we consider a dynamic mirrlees economy in a life cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement individual productivity evolves as a markov process and is private information we use a first order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour income tax rate when productivity is an ar 1 our formula resembles an ar 1 with a trend where i the auto regressive coefficient equals that of productivity ii the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the frisch elasticity of labour and iii the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth the last property implies a form of short run regressivity our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights the average labour tax rises from 0 to 37 over 40 years whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12 to 0 at retirement we compare the second best solution to simple history independent tax systems calibrated to mimic these average tax rates we find that age dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains in this way our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems copyright 2013 oxford university press

time consistent optimal fiscal policy this article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period s capital income tax rate we find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment first capital income tax rates are very high 65 on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment second labor income taxes are rather low on average about 12 versus a value of around 31 under full commitment finally labor income taxes are quite volatile whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

the impact of urbanization on residential energy consumption in china an aggregated and disaggregated analysis abstract although the relationship among urbanization energy consumption and co2 emissions has been extensively studied in recent years little attention has been paid to the effect of urbanization on residential energy consumption china as the largest developing country still has tremendous potential for urbanization in the future and this paper thus explores the effect of urbanization on the changes of residential energy consumption during 1996 2012 for china both from aggregated and disaggregated perspectives using the divisia decomposition method the findings on aggregated energy show that the urbanization contributes 15 4 to the increase of residential energy consumption during 1996 2012 but with a diminishing trend over time meanwhile from the disaggregated perspective the urbanization process contributes to an improvement of residential energy consumption structure specifically 1 of increase in urbanization rate may result in a decrease of 420 thousand million tonnes of residential coal consumption and an increase of 301 thousand tonnes of oil consumption

drivers of urban and rural residential energy consumption in china from the perspectives of climate and economic effects abstract in this study we investigate the driving forces behind the changes in residential energy consumption rec in china s urban and rural areas over the 2001 2012 period based on the logarithmic mean divisia index method the rec changes are decomposed into seven driving forces which are climate change energy price energy expenditure mix energy cost share in total expenditure expenditure share in income per capita income and population effects according to the results climate effect due to increasing days with abnormal temperature energy cost share effect characterized by more expenditure to be paid for energy use income effect describing constant income growth in the residential sector definitely increase rec in both urban and rural areas in contrast energy prices and energy expenditure mix effects negatively contribute to the rec increase respectively because of the increase in energy prices and the transition from the low priced energy to high priced energy expenditure share and population effects play opposite roles in urban and rural areas and the reasons and implications are analysed in depth

opportunity and social mobility the fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of poor parents unequal opportunity is generally thought to be one of the weak points of modem capitalist societies the ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor social mobility is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies here i argue that both of these characteristics are in fact necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided i argue this point using a generational version of the model of phelan and townsend 1991 an infinitely repeated general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints in my model each household s stochastic output is a function of its level of effort since effort is assumed to be costly and privately observed households can shirk higher than minimal effort levels must be induced by making a household s present or future consumption dependent on the household s observed output history a large literature considers models similar to this including green 1987 atkeson and lucas 1992 phelan 1994 1995 wang 1995 hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 khan and ravikumar 2002 the main difference between the economies in that literature and here is that here instead of a household consisting of a single infinitely lived individual a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals a familial dynasty each of whom lives for one period this difference affects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations when households consist of a single infinitely lived individual allocations can be ranked according to their implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities if one allocation delivers a distribution of ex ante utilities dominated by another allocation then the first allocation is inefficient however if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals then the appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious how those in the first generation rank allocations will in general differ from how their descendants rank allocations this paper addresses this conflict between generations by ranking allocations according to a rawlsian veil of ignorance criterion rawls 1971 that is here society seeks to maximize the expected dynastic utility utility including altruism toward descendants of an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and the identity or output levels of his ancestors 1 i argue that this corresponds to a societal ranking which does

nonlinear capital taxation without commitment we study efficient nonlinear taxation of labor and capital in a dynamic mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints policies are chosen sequentially over time without commitment our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates

flat tax reform a quantitative exploration abstract this paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the u s is replaced by a flat tax as proposed by hall and rabushka 1995 the flat tax 2nd ed hoover the central aspects of such reform the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply as well as its distributional consequences are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model main results are that i the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive effect on capital accumulation ii mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems but aggregate labor in efficiency units increases iii in all circumstances analyzed the distributions of earnings income and especially wealth become more concentrated

decomposing inequality in energy related co2 emissions by source and source increment the roles of production and residential consumption abstract using provincial data on energy related co2 emissions in china from 1997 to 2014 and the co2 emission gini coefficient ceg this study evaluates china s spatial inequality in energy related co2 emissions further we decompose this inequality and its variation from the perspectives of production and residential energy consumption using the source decomposition and source increment decomposition methods this paper presents a new ceg source increment decomposition method that can achieve complete decomposition the results reveal a downward trend in china s overall production sector and residential sector co2 emissions inequality although the gini coefficient of co2 emissions from the residential sector is larger than that from the production sector the contribution of the latter to the overall ceg is higher the impacts of the spatial inequality of co2 emissions from china s production and residential sectors depend on the type of energy the concentration effect is the primary factor responsible for inducing changes in china s overall and production sector co2 emissions inequality but it is not the only dominant factor for the residential sector co2 emissions inequality

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents abstract in this paper we develop a new approach for finding optimal government policies in economies with heterogeneous agents using the calculus of variations we present three classes of equilibrium conditions from government s and individual agent s optimization problems 1 the first order conditions the government s lagrange euler equation and the individual agent s euler equation 2 the stationarity condition on the distribution function and 3 the aggregate market clearing conditions these conditions form a system of functional equations which we solve numerically the solution takes into account simultaneously the effect of the government policy on individual allocations the resulting optimal distribution of agents in the steady state and therefore equilibrium prices we illustrate the methodology on a ramsey problem with heterogeneous agents finding the optimal limiting tax on total income

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

inequality and social discounting we explore steady state inequality in an intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks when the welfare function depends only on the initial generation efficiency requires immiseration inequality grows without bound and everyone s consumption converges to zero we study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare the social discount factor is then higher than the private one and for any such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady state cross sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists with no one trapped at misery

salt or sludge exploring preferences for potable water sources decision makers often use information about public preferences to guide public policy several disciplines gather information on preferences through surveys by asking respondents to make hypothetical choices over potential policies however the context of the choice question differs between approaches with some failing to make the full consequences of the respondent s choice explicit in the question in this study we investigate whether question context matters by exploring whether economic and psychology approaches yield a similar understanding of community preferences towards a large scale recycled wastewater scheme we find that stated preferences differ depending on whether the preference question is contextualised using economic incentives the findings provide insight into the implications of inappropriately contextualised preference questions methodological considerations in attitude identification and estimation and the diversity of values and public attitudes towards recycled wastewater

optimal taxation in a limited commitment economy this paper studies optimal ramsey taxation when risk sharing in private insurance markets is imperfect due to limited enforcement in a limited commitment economy there are externalities associated with capital and labor because individuals do not take into account that their labor and saving decisions aect aggregate supply wages