economic shocks wealth and welfare the immediate effects of the asian crisis on the well being of indonesians are examined using the indonesia family life survey an on going longitudinal household survey there is tremendous diversity in the effect of the shock for some households it was devastating for others it brought new opportunities a wide array of mechanisms were adopted in response to the crisis households combined to more fully exploit benefits of scale economies in consumption labor supply increased even as real wages collapsed households reduced spending on semi durables while maintaining expenditures on foods rural households used wealth particularly gold to smooth consumption

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

knowledge diffusion input supplier s technological effort and technology transfer via vertical relationships this paper studies the effect of knowledge diffusion on the incentives for developed countries dc firms to undertake costly technology transfer to their less developed countries ldc suppliers whose cost of production varies inversely with their technological effort when the incumbent supplier s cost of improving efficiency is high diffusion of knowledge to other potential input producers encourages technology transfer as it increases upstream competition however and in sharp contrast to existing literature when technological effort is less costly knowledge diffusion discourages technology transfer by reducing the incumbent supplier s technological effort

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

strategic resource dependence we consider a situation where an exhaustible resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time to build delay for the substitute we find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the hotelling model 1931 are reversed over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch under such a threat of demand change the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for delaying the transition to the substitute the analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence

do husbands and wives pool their resources evidence from the united kingdom child benefit common preference models of family behavior imply income pooling a restriction on family demand functions such that only the sum of husband s income and wife s income affects the allocation of goods and time testing the pooling hypothesis is difficult because most family income sources are not exogenous to the allocations being analyzed in this paper we present an alternative test based on a natural experiment a policy change in the united kingdom that transferred a substantial child allowance to wives in the late 1970s using family expenditure survey data we find strong evidence that a shift toward greater expenditures on women s clothing and children s clothing relative to men s clothing coincided with this income redistribution

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

the supply side of co2 with country heterogeneity several recent articles have analyzed climate policy paying explicit attention to the fact that carbon resources are non renewable in most of this body of literature the economy is treated as a single unit and in the context of climate policy it seems reasonable to interpret this as the whole world however carbon taxes and other climate policies differ substantially across countries with such heterogeneity the effects on the emission paths of changes in taxes costs and subsidies might be very different from what is found for a hypothetical world of identical countries

the neoclassical firm under moral hazard we develop a model of the neoclassical firm under moral hazard with endogenous capital and employment and perfectly competitive capital labor and product markets we assume that effort becomes harder to measure as the firm gets larger and the exogenous parameters are affiliated the model explains why incentives decline but wages rise with firm size the mixed evidence on the risk reward tradeoff and the positive correlation between wages and profits in the long run incentives are increasing in risk via endogenous capital finally the model makes novel predictions about the relationship between incentives and labor market conditions

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

do private transfers displace the benefits of public transfers evidence from south africa abstract this paper investigates whether government transfer programs displace or crowd out private support focusing on a large increase in state old age pensions in south africa using data spanning the period of the expansion we find that each rand of public pension income to the elderly leads to a 0 25 0 30 rand reduction in private transfers from children living away from home however despite the large increase in income there were no significant changes in migration labor supply or household composition we also show that evaluations of the distributional effects of the pension are overstated when crowding out is ignored

licensing information goods abstract a significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis patent holders however may face a dynamic problem namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem there are situations however where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent the case of information goods or due to compulsory patenting laws we study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations relative to the existing literature we obtain the following main results i all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation ii royalty licensing may be superior to fixed fee or auction licensing from the licensor s point of view iii social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales iv even for non drastic innovations the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation before the innovation was discovered

on capturing oil rents with a national excise tax this paper argues that since the supply of oil in the ground is inelastic the incidence of a sales tax on oil maintained forever at a fixed rate would fall entirely on the oil suppliers in the world economy however the elasticity of supply of oil to a single country depends on that country s imports as a share of world output and on the elasticity of demand for that country the paper calculates optimal tax rates for a country as a function of these variables and estimates optimal oil tax rates for the u s for some oecd countries separately and for the u s plus the oecd collectively current u s tax rates are shown to be far below optimal values

household composition labor markets and labor demand testing for separation in agricultural household models this paper tests the separation of farm labor supply and labor demand decisions using the observation that household composition is an important determinant of farm labor use with nonseparation after assessing the conditions under which the test has power against several alternatives an empirical model is developed to test the proposition that farm employment is independent of family composition the model is estimated on a data set from rural java the null hypothesis that farm labor allocation decisions are independent of household structure is not rejected the results are robust to different specifications of the labor demand function copyright 1992 by the econometric society

rearranging the family income support and elderly living arrangements in a low income country this study examines the link between income and living arrangements our identification comes from exploiting a discontinuity in age in the benefit formula for the social pension in south africa in contrast to previous literature we find no association between pension income and elderly independence we do find that potential beneficiaries alter their household structure when they become pension eligible prime working age women depart and the presence of children younger than five and young women of childbearing age increase these shifts in coresidence patterns are consistent with a setting where prime age women have comparative advantage in work away from extended family relative to younger women the additional income from old age support may induce a change in living arrangements to exploit this advantage

global warming prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view abstract this paper investigates how the choices of the instruments affect the interactions in a stock externality game global warming between cartelized fossil fuel suppliers and consumers more precisely the paper studies the equilibria in markov strategies in a dynamic game with each player choosing either the quantity or the price strategy including short run first mover advantages indeed opec and its opponent iea have tried both instruments in the past and play currently in quantities given such a non competitive setting both players should prefer the price instrument therefore both players are expected to switch back to price and tax policies if global warming will be treated effectively

public policy and extended families evidence from pensions in south africa how are resources allocated within extended families in developing economies this question is investigated using a unique social experiment the south african pension program under that program the elderly receive a cash transfer equal to roughly twice the per capita income of africans in south africa the study examines how this transfer affects the labor supply of prime age individuals living with these elderly in extended families it finds a sharp drop in the working hours of prime age individuals in these households when women turn 60 years old or men turn 65 the ages at which they become eligible for pensions it also finds that the drop in labor supply is much larger when the pensioner is a woman suggesting an imperfect pooling of resources the allocation of resources among prime age individuals depends strongly on their absolute age and gender as well as on their relative age the oldest son in the household reduces his working hours more than any other prime age household member

disadvantageous oil tariffs and dynamic consistency a large importer who places relatively greater weight on future than current oil consumption will import less oil in the future than if it were able to commit itself in advance to future tariffs and may find itself worse off than if it were unable to impose tariffs at all futures markets and storage modify these adverse effects and may avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency copyright 1990 by american economic association

taxing incumbent monopoly to foster entry abstract this paper investigates whether it is welfare enhancing to tax the output of a monopoly in order to foster cost inefficient entry this question is of particular concern in the energy markets dominated by cartel like affiliations opec and oil russia s gas exports to europe and the interest and practice to stimulate the development of alternative fuels making the realistic assumption that none of the players can commit to future policies subsidies are not a viable strategy for the government a tax cannot be first best but can be second best if the government cannot force the incumbent monopoly to sell its output at no profit and if the incumbent s profit is discounted however stimulating supply by improving the conditions for entry is not the prime concern of taxation after all it lowers aggregate supplies and may even lower the entrant s supply but to accrue parts of the monopoly rent

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a