communication networks in markets abstract this paper proposes and tests experimentally a dynamic model of bargaining to analyze decentralized markets where buyers and sellers obtain information about past deals through their social network there is a unique equilibrium in which every individual obtains the same outcome independent of their network position and this outcome depends on the peripheral least connected individuals in the network the main testable predictions are that networks with high density and or low variability in the number of connections across individuals allow their members to obtain a better deal these predictions are tested in a lab experiment through 4 treatments that vary the network that subjects are assigned to the results of the experiment lend support to the theoretical predictions subjects converge to an outcome that is independent of their network position and they fare better if they are assigned to a network that is dense and or has low variability in number of connections across members

the role of demand in land re development abstract vacant previously developed land in cities can generate negative externalities on surrounding areas and is often the target of policies to promote re development this paper provides estimates of the price sensitivity of land re development a crucial parameter for the success of these policies my estimates measure how prices affect long run conversion of unused or underused previously developed land in england the empirical strategy uses school test scores and admission district boundaries in a boundary discontinuity design to generate variation in housing demand that is orthogonal to re development costs results show that the probability of re development is effectively sensitive to housing prices estimates indicate that a 1 increase in prices leads to a 0 07 percentage point reduction in the fraction of hectares containing brownfield land price differences or substantial subsidies could lead to a significant amount of re development in the long run this is confirmed by observed land use changes between 2007 and 2011 being disproportionately concentrated in high price areas

an extension of mohring s model for land rent distribution abstract in an early paper herbert mohring j pol econ 49 1961 presented a model for land rent distribution yielding the well known result that the price of land must fall with the distance from the city center to offset transportation costs our paper is an extension of mohring s model in which we relax some of his drastic simplifying assumptions this extended model has been incorporated in a method for economic evaluation of city master plans which has been applied to a swedish city in this method the interdependence among housing heating and transportation the durability of urban structures and the uncertainty of future demand are explicitly considered within a cost benefit approach some empirical results from this pilot study concerning land rent distributions are also presented here

residential spatial growth with perfect foresight and multiple income groups abstract this paper presents explicit solutions for expanding monocentric cities with two or more income groups housing is durable but deteriorates over time and redevelopment cannot take place landlords have perfect foresight the utility function and housing technology are cobb douglas population per capita income and transportation costs per mile change at constant percentage rates the model is solved analytically using an infinite time horizon as development proceeds outward a constant fraction of land is developed with high income housing and the remaining land is reserved for future low income development at any time housing is constructed at one distance for high income consumers and at a lesser distance for low income consumers high income housing is first occupied by high income consumers then filters to low income consumers and is ultimately abandoned low income housing is first occupied by low income households and ultimately abandoned

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

what does tax aggressiveness signal evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement abstract we study the stock price reaction to news about corporate tax aggressiveness we find that on average a company s stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in tax shelters we find some limited evidence for cross sectional variation in the reaction for example the reaction is more negative for firms in the retail sector suggesting that part of the reaction may be a consumer taxpayer backlash in addition the reaction is less negative for firms that are viewed to be generally less tax aggressive as proxied by the firm s cash effective tax rate we interpret this as being consistent with the market reacting positively to evidence that a firm is trying to reduce taxes when their financial reports would lead one to believe the firm is not tax aggressive

dynamics of urban land use sequential location of an office firm and residence abstract the objective of this paper is to depict the transition in the land use pattern of the suburbanization of workers and the concentration of business firms by considering a sequential entry of a firm and its worker who minimize the total cost under monopsony in the land market the equilibrium development process of the urban land use pattern under a height restriction is derived it is shown that the first replacement of a residence with a firm always takes place at an intermediate location and successive replacements take place inwardly with alternations of right and left and then outward replacements begin when the height regulation is removed the equilibrium density function of firms is shown to be a duocentric cosine truncated curve symmetrical with respect to the city center and the equilibrium density function of residence is linear it is also demonstrated that the optimum density distribution of the firms and the workers becomes identical to the equilibrium distribution except for a difference in a parameter value and that the optimum central business district cbd and city lengths are shorter than the equilibrium cbd and city lengths respectively

bargaining and markets complexity and the competitive outcome abstract rubinstein and wolinsky rev econ stud 57 1990 63 78 consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade they show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome here i consider rubinstein and wolinsky s model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences together with the standard payoff in the game then every equilibrium is stationary markov and induces the unique competitive price thus i demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome

evolution of urban housing stocks a model applied to baltimore and houston abstract historical simulations of urban residential growth in baltimore and houston based on a model of the growth process which has two distinct components are presented the vintage component utilizes the growth of income and population and an assumption that housing is putty clay to predict the age distribution of the housing stock in each period the spatial component of the model determines where this housing construction will take place according to 1 housing is built on vacant land and 2 the pattern of construction obeys the rules of the standard monocentric models housing is demolished when economically obsolete the putty clay vintage aspect of the model produces fairly accurate city wide vintage distributions but there is much more mixing of vintages and income in baltimore by location than predicted even under monocentric assumptions most favorable to mixing

urban decline and durable housing urban decline is not the mirror image of growth and durable housing is the primary reason the nature of decline is so different this paper presents a model of urban decline with durable housing and verifies these implications of the model 1 city growth rates are skewed so that cities grow more quickly than they decline 2 urban decline is highly persistent 3 positive shocks increase population more than they increase housing prices 4 negative shocks decrease housing prices more than they decrease population 5 if housing prices are below construction costs then the city declines and 6 the combination of cheap housing and weak labor demand attracts individuals with low levels of human capital to declining cities

bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers abstract we analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium this paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the walrasian outcome

the role of networks in antitrust investigations antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming from within the defined markets of interest however competitive pressures can also come from other markets even when individually these markets place only weak constraints on one another collectively they may matter a networks approach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can sometimes paint a more accurate picture we demonstrate this through some simple examples and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets as a leading example we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation

a comparative dynamic analysis of zoning in a growing city abstract this paper examines how zoning alters the pace and pattern of residential development in a dynamic open city it shows how zoning comparative dynamics systematically vary within and across urban areas relating predicted effects to time paths of exogenous economic variables determining bid rents binding zoning is seen to fundamentally alter development trajectories temporarily halting development at some locations while inducing leapfrog development at others zoning impacts under both perfect foresight and myopic developer behavior are derived and examined

commuting congestion and employment dispersal in cities with mixed land use abstract for centuries cities have been modeled as having centered employment scarce access to which generates land rent this paper first presents some new empirical evidence that in us cities actual employment turns out to be almost as dispersed as residences this range of urban forms is generated with analytic ease in a model that assumes land can have mixed rather than exclusive use at any location the model has firms trading off a central agglomeration force against the lower wages that accompany shorter commuting distances in peripheral locations at one extreme with very high agglomerative forces employment is approximately centered with long commute distances and high congestion levels at the other extreme lower agglomerative forces lead to employment that is completely dispersed commute distances of zero and the absence of congestion maximizing output minus congestion never leads to a pattern of land mixing where employment is fully dispersed a market model however often does if the mix at each location is based on the relative magnitude of the land rent offered from residential as opposed to commercial uses

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

optimal spatial growth of employment and residences abstract this paper examines the location patterns of employment and residences in an urban area characterized by irreversible land use commitments and smoothly growing population it is assumed that all output is shipped to the center of the urban area and that workers have commuting costs of getting to work the optimal solution which is also the equilibrium solution minimizes the present discounted value of aggregate shipping costs plus commuting costs the residential area expands outward over time but a constant fraction of the land is always reserved for future employment development

bilateral bargaining in networks abstract each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus a maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus according to the protocol proposed by rubinstein and wollinsky equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining econometrica 53 1985 1133 1150 all pairs which reach an agreement obtain the discounted payoffs and are removed from the network this bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the dulmage mendelsohn decomposition partition of the bipartite network of the set of nodes in this network

the effects of government housing policies in a vintage filtering model abstract long run and short run effects of low income government housing policies are examined in a model that treats housing as a durable good which declines in quality over time short run and long run market equilibria are characterized rent subsidies are analyzed in detail and results for other policies are presented

cartels and antitrust the role of fines in deterring violations at the margin the potential benefits of effective antitrust action include both increased economic efficiency through the expansion of output and improved equity through the redistribution of income from monopolies to consumers a large and growing literature is devoted to empirically testing and documenting the economic consequences of antitrust casebringing activity a second empirical literature is focused on the role which economic variables play in the determination of casebringing activity by the united states department of justice 2 what separates these two bodies of literature are the behavioral linkages between anti

the spillover effect of antitrust enforcement we address the question of how the threat of antitrust enforcement spills over from one industrial submarket to another we build a formal model describing the technology through which an initial antitrust indictment can reveal evidence of additional infractions in the same industry our approach is organized around the belief that the flow of information on antitrust violations is closely linked to commodity flows as it turns out our method proves able to explain the differential response of highway construction cartels in various states to recent changes in the severity of antitrust sanctions

spatial growth and redevelopment with perfect foresight and durable housing abstract in this paper i present a theoretical model of the spatial growth of an urban area with durable housing i combine several assumptions that typically complicate the analysis i housing developers have perfect foresight ii the initial development and many waves of redevelopment are considered in each developer s plan and iii the closed city assumption is made so that the time path of population is exogenous and that of consumer utility is endogenous i still obtain explicit solutions for the spatial pattern of urban growth and for the timing of the initial residential development and each successive redevelopment at each distance from the urban center i compare perfect foresight growth to growth with static expectations and i examine the comparative statics of both

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

bargaining dynamics in exchange networks abstract we consider a one sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and the dynamics of bargaining in such a market our dynamical model is local involving iterative updates of offers based on estimated best alternative matches in the spirit of pairwise nash bargaining agents are not strategic in our model we establish that when a balanced outcome a generalization of the pairwise nash bargaining solution to networks exists our dynamics converges rapidly to such an outcome

hedonic pricing with redevelopment options a new approach to estimating depreciation effects abstract the standard hedonic model of durable assets is a special case of a more general model that contains two additive terms 1 use value of the existing hedonic vector and 2 the value of the option to reconfigure hedonic characteristics one empirical implication is that the two parts of value are related e g use value increases with interior area whereas option value decreases with intensity the ratio of structure value divided by land value increases in building age reduce use value but increase option value data from greenwich connecticut indicate that intensity has the expected negative effect coefficients on building age are shown to be better measures of depreciation when intensity variables are included in the regression

price dispersion in stationary networked markets abstract different sellers often sell the same good at different prices using a strategic bargaining model i characterize how the equilibrium prices of a good depend on the interaction between its sellers costs its buyers values and a network capturing various frictions associated with trading it in contrast to the standard random matching model of bargaining in stationary markets i allow agents to strategically choose whom to make offers to which qualitatively changes how the network shapes prices as in the random matching model the market decomposes into different submarkets and in the limit as bargaining frictions vanish the law of one price holds within but not across them but strategic choice of partners changes both how the market decomposes into different submarkets and the determinants of each submarket s price

bargaining and efficiency in networks abstract we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement the global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium for many networks all markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient even as players become patient we investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect but non markovian equilibria the analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

uniform spatial growth with perfect foresight and durable housing abstract this paper presents explicit solutions for expanding monocentric cities housing is durable and redevelopment cannot take place landlords have perfect foresight the utility function and housing technology are cobb douglas the population of the city per capita income construction costs and transportation costs per mile change at constant percentage rates the model is solved analytically using an infinite time horizon if the population growth rate is greater less than twice the difference between the growth rates of income and transportation costs development density increases decreases with distance from the city center detailed comparative statics are presented for both open city and closed city growth

residential buildings and the cost of construction new evidence on the efficiency of the housing market present value studies of asset market efficiency are controversial because they compare asset prices to unobserved discounted streams of future rents as an alternative if housing markets are efficient then the price of residential capital or buildings should satisfy the following two conditions i deviations between new building prices and construction costs should disappear faster than construction lags and have no effect on construction and ii temporary building price shocks should dissipate at a similar rate for different vintage buildings results from an error correction model support both hypotheses for single family housing in vancouver british columbia this implies that the implicit market for residential buildings is efficient and that any inefficiencies in the housing market must lie in the market for land itself

market reaction to the filing of antitrust suits an aggregate and cross sectional analysis the data were obtained from the february 1982 international financial statistics the ifs code is given in parentheses the exchange rate was end of period exchange rate ae real income was real gdp u k sweden 99 b p and real gnp germany canada u s 99 a r interest rates were a treasury bill rate u k canada u s 60c call money rate germany 60b and government bond yield sweden 61 money was 34 prices were the consumer price index 64 references

urban spatial development with durable but replaceable capital the theory of urban spatial development until recently has been primarily a static theory of economic equilibrium the models of alonso l mills 6 and muth 7 determine a complete spatial equilibrium between the supply and demand for urban land the study of growth or change in such models therefore has been limited exclusively to comparative statics wheaton 8 it should be clear that the central and in many respects unrealistic assumption of such models is that housing capital is neither physically nor economically durable without durability there is no opportunity cost to old capital no barrier to change and no history to an urban area within such a framework a common set of conclusions emerges regarding urban spatial structure residential density and the price per unit of land decline monotonically from the location of employment a greater population results in higher density at all locations while increases in income or decreases in the cost of travel create a more steeply sloped density and price gradient in the last few years there has been a growing awareness that the equilibrium portrayed by such models does not correctly reflect the process of urban development theoretical papers by anas 2 31 and brueckner 4 and an empirical model by harrison and kain 5 develop an alternative theory of urban spatial development in which the process of growth is explicitly modeled and in which capital is completely durable in their models the spatial development of cities occurs incrementally over time in successive rings from the center of employment outwards the development of each ring is done with myopic foresight and is therefore determined exclusively by market conditions at the time of development once built

ncaa enforcement and competitive balance in college football this article investigates the effects of national collegiate athletic association ncaa enforcement on the competitive balance of major college football conferences in the context of the standard empirical crime model using an unbalanced panel describing 11 major division ia football conferences from 1953 through 2003 ncaa enforcement efforts in the form of investigations and probations and the severity of punishment measured as the average length of probations imposed are found to have opposite but not necessarily offsetting effects on competitive balance greater levels of enforcement in a conference improve competitive balance on the other hand greater severity of punishment reduces competitive balance the empirical evidence indicates that these changes take approximately five years to be fully dissipated overall the empirical results indicate that on average the net effect of ncaa enforcement is an improvement in competitive balance

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

landscape preferences and patterns of residential development abstract i analyze a model of residential location choice where people derive utility from their proximity to open space when people have such landscape preferences then 1 equilibrium residential development is mixed with undeveloped land 2 equilibrium land price gradients depend sensitively on how land markets are organized are not generally monotonic and may or may not reflect the value of open space and 3 dynamic equilibria generally have the property that more remote areas are developed before more central areas finally when compared to optimal development equilibrium development houses too many residents too close together and remote areas are developed too soon these results imply that equilibrium development may not be sprawling enough and that policies to encourage infill development are not welfare improving

cross border listings and price discovery evidence from u s listed canadian stocks we examine the contribution of cross listings to price discovery for a sample of canadian stocks listed on both the toronto stock exchange tse and a u s exchange we nd that priceson the tse and u s exchange are cointegrated and mutually adjusting the u s share of price discovery ranges from 0 2 percent to 98 2 percent with an average of 38 1 percent the u s share is directly related to the u s share of trading and to the ratio of proportions of informative tradeson the u s exchange and the tse and inversely related to the ratio of bid ask spreads with the enhanced globalization of nancial markets the number of non u s rms cross listing shares on a u s exchange has substantially increased attracting non u s listings is now a top priority of the u s stock exchanges at the end of 2000 420 non u s rmswere listed on the new york stock exchange nyse the number of foreign rmslisted on nasdaq waseven higher the popularity of international cross listings has prompted many academic studies on the topic 1 most of these studies focus on the bene ts of international cross listings including the reduced cost of capital and the enhanced liquidity of a rm s stock studiessuch asalexander eun and janakiramanan 1987 1988 and foerster and karolyi 1993 suggest that the cost of capital declines because the portion of the risk premium that compensates for cross border investment barriers dissipates miller 1999 and foerster and karolyi 1999 propose increased investor recognition as another possible explanation several studies examine changes in trading volume and costs due to international cross listing foerster and karolyi 1998 nd that the bid ask spreads in canada decrease after the cross listing of canadian stocks in the united states domowitz glen and madhavan 1998 suggest that the impact of cross listing is complex and depends on the degree of quote transparency that is the extent to which price information is observable in the two markets smith and so anos 1997 examine if cross listing is a zerosum game with increased trading in the united states being oiset by reduced

bilateral trading in networks in many markets goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric we study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features we show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non monotonic but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time with the possible exception of the last period the price dynamic is therefore reminiscent of fire sales and hot potato trading traders who intermediate the object arise endogenously and make a positive profit the profit earning intermediaries are not necessarily traders with many connections for the case of multilayer networks they belong to the path that reaches the maximum number of potential buyers using the minimal number of intermediaries this is not necessarily the path of the network that maximizes the probability of consumption by traders who value the most the object i e welfare

spatial aspects of housing quality density and maintenance this paper is concerned with how housing quality maintenance and structural density and household income vary over location when the housing stock is durable these issues have been investigated before but the models employed have been restrictive for example in brueckner 1981 maintenance expenditures are constrained not to vary through time in sweeney 1974a 1974c the maintenance technology is defined in a way which does not allow upgrading or even holding housing at constant quality and in ho man and pines 1982 there is no clear distinction between construction and maintenance and their model describes a long run accumulation of housing capital as a process of gradual upgrading a similar approach can be found in the nonspatial model of von rabenau 1976 in an earlier paper amott et al 1983 adp hereafter we extended the analysis of landlord builder behavior by allowing the unrestricted construction maintenance policy in this paper we use the model of adp to investigate some spatial aspects of the filtering process in a stationary state housing market in the process we examine the robustness of some results in the literature

urban economic theory land use and city size this book examines the economic reasons why people choose to live where they live and develops through analysis of the bid rent function a unified theory of urban land use and city size the first part of the book explicates the basic theory of urban land use and optimal city size residential location behavior of households is examined in a microeconomic framework and equilibrium and optimal patterns of residential land use are discussed the corresponding equilibrium and optimal city sizes are studied in a variety of contexts part two extends the classical theories of von thunen and alonso with the addition of externality factors such as local public goods crowding and congestion and racial prejudice the rigorous mathematical approach and theoretical treatment of the material make urban economic theory of interest to researchers in urban economics location theory urban geography and urban planning

the profitability of price fixing evidence from stock market reaction to federal indictments the authors estimate the profitability of price fixing by examining the stock price reaction to federal indictments for 127 firms during 1962 1980 they hypothesize that the reaction is composed of expected legal costs lost monopoly profits and or various negative market signal effects the mean abnormal return over the wsj indictment announcement date and the day before is a statistically significant 1 08 this corresponds to a total value loss of 2 18 billion 1982 of which only about 13 can be attributed to various legal costs e g fines and damages the 1 89 billion residual might be in all or part the present value of monopoly profits lost because of conspiracy dissolution they test this and other possible explanations and on balance find support for the lost monopoly profit interpretation copyright 1991 by mit press

financial consequences of antitrust enforcement haworth earnings productivity and changes in employment discrimination during the sixties american economic review 65 mar 1975 158 168 lazear edward the narrowing of black white wage differentials is illusory american economic review 69 sept 1979 553 564 family background and optimal schooling decisions this review 62 feb 1980 42 51 long james employment discrimination in the federal sector journal of human resources 11 1 1976 86 97 welch finis black white differences in returns to school american economic review 63 dec 1973 893 907

spatial patterns of residential development abstract a simple dynamic model of residential development with durable housing where all households are identical and all developers have perfect foresight is studied it is shown that unlike the case of static models it is quite possible that house size decreases and thus population density increases with distance from the city center and that the house rent curve has positive gradient in certain area

responsiveness of rural and urban land uses to land rent determinants in the u s south ricardian and von thunen land rent models are combined into a single land use share model including farm forest and urban land uses the land share model is applied to the southern united states and elasticities are extracted that measure land share response to changes in population income land values prices and costs in counties with different degrees of urbanizationt he study explores the effect of treating either rural or urban land as a residual use while this practice is common in existing land use studies it is found to significantly affect parameter estimates in this county level analysis

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

costs of adjustment and the spatial pattern of a growing open city this paper investigates the effect of costs of adjustment on the dynamic characteristics of intra urban resource allocation the analysis is concentrated on the development pattern of an open city within a system of many cities both in steady state and in variable state economies competitive equilibrium of the urban system as a whole is also discussed and compared to pareto optimum allocation some of the results that characterize the resource allocation under static analysis are reestablished for the dynamic case as well but others that follow from comparative statics are shown to be incorrect under the dynamic analysis

the fundamentals of land prices and urban growth abstract in a very simple model in which capital is durable and landowners have perfect foresight the price of urban land has four additive components the value of agricultural land rent the cost of conversion the value of accessibility and the value of expected future rent increases a growth premium in rapidly growing cities the growth premium may easily account for half of the average price of land and may create a large gap between the price of land at the boundary minus conversion cost and the value of agricultural land rent

nash in nash bargaining a microfoundation for applied work a nash equilibrium in nash bargains has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly this paper proposes a non cooperative foundation for nash in nash bargaining that extends the rubinstein 1982 model to multiple upstream and downstream rms assuming there exists gains from trade for each rm pair we prove that there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement and negotiated prices that correspond to rubinstein prices if and only if the marginal contribution of a set of agreements is weakly greater than the sum of the agreements marginal contributions we provide stronger conditions under which equilibrium prices are unique

the joint influence of agricultural and nonfarm factors on real estate values an application to the mid atlantic region county level farmland and residential housing values are estimated for the mid atlantic region as a function of farm returns developed land values household incomes population densities and location results are based on the hypothesis that farmland owners anticipate land development and that nonfarm factors are important determinants of farmland prices response of farmland prices to change in farm returns is found to be inelastic and relatively uniform in rural and urban counties response to nonfarm factors is found to be more elastic and substantially greater in rural counties copyright 2001 oxford university press

the value of administered protection a capital market approach the focus of this paper i s on the escape clause petitions filed under the trade act of 1974 section 201 first the capital marketevent study method is used to analyze the effects of protection decisions then cross section regressions are performed to examine the influence of key variables on the observed market reaction the authors conc lude that while protection is beneficial to beleaguered industries the extent o f such benefits is quite narrowly circumscribed and is conditional on internal v ariables for each firm protection is thus not the panacea that its advocates cl aim copyright 1986 by mit press

efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets the paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades a model is presented in which the identity of buyers of sellers and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy the analysis first considers small economies and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence a characterization of prices and flows and some negative results relating welfare to network structure the second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets and presents necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately efficient when the number of players is large

growth speculation and sprawl in a monocentric city abstract an economic theory of sprawl in a growing monocentric city is presented where decision makers have perfect foresight leapfrog development and discontinuous land rent functions may occur and be efficient in both an ex post and ex ante sense where the extent of future growth is uncertain decision makers become speculators and the spatial pattern of development is more complicated ex post inefficiency generally occurs

markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks abstract we study the markov perfect equilibria mpes of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement we establish the existence of mpes and show that mpe payoffs are not necessarily unique a method for constructing pure strategy mpes for high discount factors is developed for some networks we find that all mpes are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient