natural resources and sub national economic performance does sub national democracy matter abstract the differentiation in the impact of resources on economic growth is often explained by the specifics of institutional factors the aim of this paper is to investigate how sub national political differences influence the effect of natural resources on economic growth using a dataset of russian regions this paper demonstrates that sub national democratization influences the growth effects of resources and considers possible mechanisms for this influence the paper finds that in russia natural resources are only capable of promoting growth in the regions with non democratic political systems that at the same time have an efficient and non corrupt bureaucracy

natural resources curse or blessing are natural resources a curse or a blessing the empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible this paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources these include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate deindustrialization and bad growth prospects and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law corruption presidential democracies and underdeveloped financial systems another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries and keeps in place bad policies finally resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets the survey also offers some welfare based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies

in the shadow of the vote decision making in the european community scholarship on the european community ec focuses particular attention on how formal voting rules and institutional reform condition decision making outcomes the predominant view of ec history holds that decision making remained paralyzed until institutional reforms in 1987 and 1992 restored and expanded adherence to majority voting rules which in turn unblocked and expedited ec legislative efforts in this study i challenge these fundamental assumptions using comprehensive data for 1974 95 and a series of quantitative assessments including event history analysis i show that decision making in the 1970s was anything but paralyzed that the impact of the luxembourg compromise has been greatly overstated that institutional reforms actually encumbered rather than eased the ec legislative process and that institutional effects are mediated by the underlying distribution of member state preferences the findings have important implications for our understanding of the history and future trajectory of european integration and highlight the applicability of standard political science theories and methods to the study of the ec

boom bust cycle asymmetrical fiscal response and the dutch disease this paper investigates the changes in expenditure policy in oil exporting countries during boom bust in commodity price cycles and their implications for real exchange rate movements to do so we introduce a dutch disease model with downward rigidities in government spending to revenue shocks this model leads to a decoupling between real exchange rate and commodity export price movement during busts we test our model s theoretical predictions and underlying assumptions using panel data for 32 oil exporting countries over the period 1992 to 2009 results are threefold first we find that changes in current spending have a stronger impact on real exchange rate compared to capital spending second we find that current spending is downwardly sticky but increases in boom time and conversely for capital spending third we find limited evidence that fiscal rules have helped reduce the degree of responsiveness of current spending during booms in contrast we find evidence that fiscal rules are associated with a significant reduction in capital expenditure during busts while responsiveness to booms is more muted this raises concerns on potential adverse consequences of this asymmetry on economic performance in oil exporting countries

an institutional critique of intergovernmentalism most intergovernmentalist analyses of european integration focus on treaty bargaining among european union member governments recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis an approach that asserts that a government s ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the council of ministers to which it is pivotal this approach suffers from two major weaknesses first it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments second power index analysis fails to consider the important roles of the commission of the european communities and the european parliament in legislative processes today s procedures affect the mix of agenda setting and veto power and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes if intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds it must take into account these legislative dynamics

channel bargaining with risk averse retailer abstract we first consider a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer where there is only one product with stochastic demand the retailer is risk averse with conditional value at risk cvar as her risk measure and the manufacturer is a risk neutral agent we model the problem as a nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate about the wholesale price and order quantity we show that there exists a nash bargaining equilibrium for the wholesale price and order quantity with equal and unequal bargaining power we also find that even for the equal bargaining power between the two agents the retailer s bargaining power for the supply chain profit increases as she becomes more risk averse we then extend the model to the case where demand is endogenous and can be manipulated by setting the retail price we show that there exists a nash bargaining equilibrium for the wholesale price retail price and the order quantity under equal bargaining power

the impact of natural resources survey of recent quantitative evidence the cross country empirical evidence for the natural resource curse is ample but unfortunately fraught with econometric difficulties a recent wave of studies on measuring the impact of natural resource windfalls on the economy exploits novel datasets such as giant oil discoveries to identify effects of windfalls uses natural experiments and within country econometric analysis and estimates local impacts these studies offer more hope in the search of quantitative evidence

rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions abstract this paper is about the determination of common external tariffs cets in customs unions cus we first examine how the relationship between preferences over cet levels technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a cu is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues we then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium cet among other things we find that when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members imports tariff preferences may be polarized the trade patterns of some cu members may be endogenous and as a result their payoff functions may not be single peaked this leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules e g the population and consumption rules and raises the possibility of a condorcet paradox

corruption in russia abstractwe analyze the determinants of corruption in russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 russian regions for the period 2004 13 we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels corruption declines as relative salaries rise yet at strongly diminishing rates furthermore we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement education levels and unemployment rates

the first law of petropolitics finalversion received19 april2011 we examine empirically the relationship between crude oil prices and the ebb and ow of democratic insti tutions in order to test the hypothesis that high oil prices undermine democracy and sustain autocracy we use a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and timeperiods nding strictly no evidence in favour of this so called first law of petropolitics friedman2006

transfers of governmental power the meaning of time dependence king alt burns and laver 1990 proposed and estimated a unified model in which cabinet durations depended on seven explanatory variables reflecting features of the cabinets and the bargaining environments in which they formed along with a stochastic component in which the risk of a cabinet falling was treated as a constant across its tenure two recent research reports take issue with one aspect of this model warwick and easton replicate the earlier findings for explanatory variables but claim that the stochastic risk should be seen as rising and at a rate which varies across the life of a cabinet bienen and van de walle using data on the duration of leaders allege that random risk is falling we continue in our goal of unifying this literature by providing further estimates with both cabinet and leader duration data that confirm the original explanatory variables effects showing that leaders durations are affected by many of the same factors that affect the durability of the cabinets they l

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

revisiting the single european act and the common wisdom on globalization the european program of liberalization launched by the single european act sea of 1987 is commonly seen as a powerful instance of globalization trends of economic integration liberalization and international institution building this article revisits the origins of the sea to argue that the extent and success of its liberalizing program depended on a causally distinct push for european institutional reform a retracing of concrete political patterns behind the sea greatly strengthens broader statistical and theoretical challenges to the notion of strong universal trends of globalization

technical note a risk averse newsvendor model under the cvar criterion the classical risk neutral newsvendor problem is to decide the order quantity that maximizes the one period expected profit in this note we consider a risk averse newsvendor with stochastic price dependent demand we adopt conditional value at risk cvar a risk measure commonly used in finance as the decision criterion the aim of our study is to investigate the optimal pricing and ordering decisions in such a setting for both additive and multiplicative demand models we provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness and existence of the optimal policy comparative statics show the monotonicity properties and other characteristics of the optimal pricing and ordering decisions we also compare our results with those of the newsvendor with a risk neutral attitude and a general utility function

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

revisiting the resource curse natural disasters the price of oil and democracy fluctuations in the price of oil and the contemporaneous political changes in oil producing countries have raised an important question about the link between oil rents political institutions and civil liberties this article presents a sim ple model of the relationship between resource income and political freedom and using an instrumental variables approach estimates the causal effect of shocks to oil revenues on levels of democracy using a new data set multiple measures of democ racy and various specifications ifi nd that the effect of oil price shocks is larger than might be expected and on the order of the effects found from changes in gross domes tic product an umber of studies show that ar esource curse exists that is they demonstrate that relatively large natural resource endowments exert negative effects on politi cal institutions both case studies and analyses based on data drawn from large numbers of countries across long periods of time show that individuals are less able to hold their leaders accountable if they live in countries blessed by abundant natural resources than if they reside in less well endowed nations in contrast to conventional wisdom then at least some types of wealth undermine rather than accelerate the development of democratic political institutions the existing literature however suffers from two problems that cast doubt on their conclusions about the resource curse first contributors to it cannot disen tangle two very different mechanisms 1 changes in resource income produce changes in political institutions and 2 shifts in governments policies explain variations in resource revenues for example oil prices rise when political leaders either consolidate their power russia and venezuela or pursue more radical pol icies iran it is also true however that rising prices can enable leaders to aban don moderate policies postponing for example the pursuit of market oriented

asymmetric oil price shocks tax revenues and the resource curse abstract the paper proposes an asymmetric relationship between oil rents and institutions such that only positive oil windfalls adversely affect institutional quality and negative oil windfalls have no impact we test this theory empirically by studying the dynamics of institutional quality in russian regions we find that increases in tax revenues caused by exogenous positive oil price shocks do not change regional income but increase corruption and reduce regional democracy and governance quality declines in tax revenues from negative oil price shocks do not affect institutional quality but decrease regional income

risk aversion in inventory management traditional inventory models focus on risk neutral decision makers i e characterizing replenishment strategies that maximize expected total profit or equivalently minimize expected total cost over a planning horizon in this paper we propose a framework for incorporating risk aversion in multiperiod inventory models as well as multiperiod models that coordinate inventory and pricing strategies we show that the structure of the optimal policy for a decision maker with exponential utility functions is almost identical to the structure of the optimal risk neutral inventory and pricing policies these structural results are extended to models in which the decision maker has access to a partially complete financial market and can hedge its operational risk through trading financial securities computational results demonstrate that the optimal policy is relatively insensitive to small changes in the decision maker s level of risk aversion

oil price shocks income and democracy he effect of natural resource wealth and income on political institutions is a central issue at the intersection of economics and political sciences we contribute to this research by examining the effect of international oil price fluctuations on democratic institutions over the 1960 2007 period we also exploit the very persistent response of aggregate income to oil prices to study the effect of persistent oil price driven income shocks on democracy our results indicate that countries with greater net oil exports over gdp see improvements in democratic institutions following upturns in international oil prices for example positive oil price shocks lead to improvements in the polity democracy score as well as the subscores for executive constraints executive recruitment and political competition and a higher probability of a democratic transition we estimate that an oil price driven 1 percentage point increase in per capita gdp growth increases the polity democracy score by around 0 2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentage points in the long run the effect on the probability of a democratic transition is around 0 4 percentage points our work relates to the literature on the link between political institutions and natural resource wealth and income an influential early contribution is lipset 1959 who documents that high income countries tend to be more democratic he argues that this positive correlation arises because higher per capita income is a symptom of the modernization of society and that modernization also increases citizens demand for political participation the positive association between income and democracy has also been emphasized by huntington 1991 who holds that higher per capita income was one of the key factors behind the

managing the evolution of multilateralism author s downs george w rocke david barsoom peter n abstract in the past five years a relatively extensive literature has emerged that explores the demand for multilateral cooperation that is those factors that motivate states to develop or resist developing formal institutions that operate to increase interstate economic military or environmental cooperation 1 these factors include the transaction costs associated with ad hoc and multiple bilateral arrangements increased interstate trade the diffusion of liberal trade theory information about the costs of environmental degradation and trends in elite ideology to date however our understanding of the supply side of multilateralism the standards that are set for admission the order and speed with which candidate states are admitted and the impact of expansion on cooperation and future evolution has been relatively undeveloped 2 partly as a result theorists have had little to say about how multilateral institutions are likely to evolve or what the policy consequences of their expansion will be 3 supply side issues are important because multilateral organizations usually do not spring forth full blown they grow instead of forming an inclusive agreement that is one that covers nearly all of the states that its designers eventually hope to include many multilateral organizations start out with substantially smaller memberships and generally expand over time we argue that among the many possible explanations for the choice of this design strategy there is a rational choice argument

are windfalls a curse abstract a puzzling feature of temporary terms of trade booms is that some countries have responded to such windfalls by running current account deficits furthermore those countries that ran current account deficits failed to attain greater post boom growth rates indicating the deficits were consumed or invested in low quality projects the point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in determining outcomes if fiscal control is unitary then the consumption smoothing effect is operative and representative agent models of the current account have predictive power however if control is divided among several fiscal claimants a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption smoothing effect leading to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive temporary shock we model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself this results in a deterioration of the current account we also show that all the windfall is dissipated with the country experiencing no increase in welfare 1998 elsevier science b v

implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity amanufacturer writes supply contracts with n buyers then the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer builds capacity finally demand is realized and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers the court remedy for breach of contract specific performance versus expectation damages affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation and hence how the firms make investments ex ante the firms may also engage in renegotiation design inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation for example when a buyer grants a financial hostage to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation tradable options which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers this paper proves that under surprisingly general conditions the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts fixed quantity contracts this may require renegotiation design and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly

more oil less democracy evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries this article exploits variations in the timing and size of oil discoveries to identify the impact of oil wealth on democracy i find that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil approximately the initial endowment of iraq pushes a country s democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades the estimated effect is larger for oilfields with higher quality oil and lower exploration and extraction costs however the estimates become less precise when oil abundance is measured by oil discovery per capita suggesting politicians may care about the level instead of the per capita value of oil wealth

multilateralism with small and large numbers multilateralism international governance of the many was defined by the united states after 1945 in terms of certain principles particularly opposition to bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict postwar multilateralism also expressed an impulse to universality john ruggie s generalized organizing principles that implied relatively low barriers to participation in these arrangements a ticket of admission was always required whether acceding to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt or joining the international monetary fund imf and the world bank nevertheless the price of that ticket was not set so high that less powerful or less wealthy states could not hope to participate

the elusive curse of oil abstract our goal is to show that contrary to the claims made in several recent papers the effect of a large endowment of oil and other mineral resources on long term economic growth of countries has been on balance positive moreover the claims of a negative effect of oil and mineral wealth on the countries institutions are called into question

optimal order quantity and pricing decisions in single period inventory systems abstract in this paper we consider simultaneous pricing and procurement decisions associated with a one period pure inventory model under deterministic or probabilistic demand we investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions for an type policy to be optimal for the determination of the procurement quantity we also show how the corresponding optimal price can be obtained