an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

intersectoral labor immobility sectoral comovement and news shocks sectoral comovement of output and hours worked is a prominent feature of business cycle data however most two sector neoclassical models fail to generate this sectoral comovement we construct and estimate a two sector neoclassical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dgse model generating sectoral comovement in response to both anticipated and unanticipated shocks the key to our model s success is a significant degree of intersectoral labor immobility which we estimate using data on sectoral hours worked furthermore we demonstrate that imperfect intersectoral labor mobility provides a better explanation for the sectoral comovement than an alternative model emphasizing the role of labor supply wealth effects

industry and firm specific factors of innovation novelty this article investigates the underlying factors that might shape the firm s choices with respect to degrees of innovation novelty using a sample of 2983 firms observed under the portuguese community innovation survey we assess the relative relevance of a set of firm and industry specific factors in explaining firms choices about incremental or radical innovation the results indicate that both the firm s idiosyncratic historical factors giving rise to heterogeneous r d capabilities and the industry context have power to shape the firm s innovation choices even though firm specific factors appear to be more powerful the estimated impacts on firm s innovation novelty are nonetheless significantly moderated by the type of firm and industry

nominal price rigidity money supply endogeneity and business cycles abstract this paper investigates the ability of nominal price rigidity to explain the co movement of inflation with the cyclical component of output observed in the post war u s data a dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed with the introduction of monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity in a standard real business cycle model allowing for an endogenous money supply rule it is then demonstrated that sticky price models can explain the observed associations between movements in inflation and output much better than flexible price models this result depends little on whether money supply is assumed to be endogenous or not

macroeconomic fluctuations and the allocation of time what are the fundamental driving forces of macroeconomic fluctuations in particular why do people spend more time working in booms and less in recessions these are basic questions of macroeconomics recent thinking has emphasized technology shifts preference shifts and changes in government purchases as likely driving forces it is useful to distinguish atemporal and intertemporal effects of the driving forces under standard assumptions the technology shift has no effect through atemporal channels because income and substitution effects exactly offset a straightforward decomposition of movements of employment attributes most of them to the atemporal effects of preference shifts

balanced growth despite uzawa i use an event study approach to present novel evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on firm level profits using the uncertainty surrounding the negotiation and ratification process of the canada united states free trade agreement of 1989 cusfta i estimate the impact of different types of tariff reductions on the abnormal returns of canadian manufacturing firms i find that canadian import tariff reductions lead to lower and reductions in canadian intermediate input tariffs to higher abnormal returns the impact of u s tariff reductions is less clear and depends on the size of the affected firms i also calculate the total profit increase implied by my estimates overall cusfta increased per period profits by around 1 2 this was mainly driven by intermediate input tariff reductions which more than offset the negative effect of canadian import tariff reductions

indivisible labor and the business cycle abstract a growth model with shocks to technology is studied labor is indivisible so all variability in hours worked is due to fluctuations in the number employed we find that unlike previous equilibrium models of the business cycle this economy displays large fluctuations in hours worked and relatively small fluctuations in productivity this finding is independent of individuals willingness to substitute leisure across time this and other findings are the result of studying and comparing summary statistics describing this economy an economy with divisible labor and post war u s time series

gas market distorting effects of imbalanced gas balancing rules inefficient regulation of pipeline flexibility this paper analyzes the value and cost of line pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets through examination of the techno economic characteristics of gas transport pipelines and the trade offs between different ways to use the infrastructure transport and flexibility line pack flexibility is becoming increasingly important as a tool to balance gas supply and demand over different periods in the european liberalized market context a monopolist unbundled network operator offers regulated transport services and flexibility balancing services according to the network code and balancing rules therefore gas policy makers should understand the role and consequences of line pack regulation the analysis shows that the line pack flexibility service has an important economic value for the shippers and the tso furthermore the analysis identifies distorting effects in the gas market due to inadequate regulation of line pack flexibility by disregarding the sunk costs of flexibility in the balancing rules the overall efficiency of the gas system is decreased finally the analysis demonstrates that the actual costs of line pack flexibility are related to the peak cumulative imbalance throughout the balancing period any price for pipeline flexibility should therefore be based on the related trade off between the right to use the line pack flexibility and the provision of transport services

the impact of lead time on capital investments abstract we study equilibrium investment strategies of firms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures investment with significant lead time or time to build and investment without or minor lead time we investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time to build versus when it is not we characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum we offer some new results the model predicts that controlling for demand and production and investment costs investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries which often exhibit time to build than in fast paced industries where time to build is insignificant furthermore for both investment types investment with or without time to build we offer a novel equilibrium in which firms incrementally invest this behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints also expected outputs are lower than cournot outputs as firms face uncertainty moreover the amount of uncertainty has different effects over investment types

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

risky business the allocation of capital abstract in models of the firm a mean preserving spread in the price of output increases the expected value of profits and frequently the firm s demand for capital these results seem to contradict the conventional wisdom from financial asset pricing models where an increase in an asset s risk decreases the demand for that asset this paper shows that in general equilibrium an increase in exogenous risk usually increases expected output in that technology the result from the theory of the firm but it may also increase the risk of that technology the results from finance an increase in exogenous risk always reallocates capital toward less risky businesses

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

an empirical examination of the timing of land conversions in the presence of farmland preservation programs using a panel of parcel level data we estimate a hazard model and find strong evidence that the mere existence of an option to preserve farmland delays decisions to convert farmland to developed uses by about six years a reduction in median conversion time of 12 to 43 depending on parcel size where such delays allow local governments to improve infrastructure or implement stricter growth control measures benefits of a preservation option may be even more long term also increases in the variance of returns to development tended to slow conversion for parcels with all but the highest lot capacities copyright 2008 oxford university press

two remarks on cournot equilibria abstract we describe two simple results in the theory of cournot equilibria the first has to do with the effect of taxation in a cournot industry and the second describes under what conditions a cournot equilibrium will implicity maximize an objective function these results are probably known but are not well known and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out

entry deterrence and innovation in durable goods monopoly this paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well we show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good the equilibrium is therefore determined not only by competitive pressure due to time inconsistency but also by the incumbent s concern for maintaining the technological leadership we demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

dynamic r d competition the authors study a simple two stage stochastic patent race involving two firms they examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race the authors find that the leader engages in rd 2 a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results and 3 the effects of research joint ventures whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results copyright 1987 by royal economic society

optimal r d investment strategies under the threat of new technology entry abstract this paper studies the r d investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry the r d project is subject to technical uncertainty the incumbent can successfully prevent entry by innovating however in an entry deterrence situation the resulting monopoly is different from a monopoly without an entry threat because potential competition means that the monopolist completes the r d project which it otherwise would not have done greater technical uncertainty stimulates initiating exploratory r d and can result in implementation of more expensive research projects this is a result of the limited downside risk of the project it does not matter whether the outcome of an initial r d stage is disappointing or very disappointing since in both cases the firm will simply abandon the project the welfare analysis shows that the threat of entry may reduce welfare in case of entry deterrence

labor market polarization the decline of routine work and technological change a quantitative analysis abstract a common hypothesis for labor market polarization is that technological progress has decreased the price of machines which are substitutable with middle skilled jobs and complementary to higher and lower skilled jobs i quantitatively evaluate this hypothesis in a dynamic general equilibrium model i find that the near constant elasticities of labor demand in the standard technology hypothesis and the observed dynamics of the price of machines are inconsistent with rapid polarization pre 2000 and its slower dynamics thereafter extending the model to allow for a separate investment sector requiring only high skilled workers generates a much closer fit to data

non separability and sectoral comovement in a sticky price model this paper resolves the sectoral comovement problem between nondurable and durable outputs that arises in response to a monetary shock in a two sector sticky price model with flexibly priced durable goods we analytically demonstrate that the non separability between aggregate consumption and labor can generate the comovement between nondurable and durable outputs in response to a monetary policy shock we then estimate the degree of non separability together with other parameters using a bayesian approach we find that the non separable preferences are supported by the data and our estimated model generates the sectoral comovement in response to a monetary shock

warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets abstract we develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block we prove that the warrant bond price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant bond price equals the warrant bond price in the block constrained economy we illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

what does an oligopoly maximize a monopolist maximizes a well defined objective function monetary profit in a competitive industry although each individual pursues selfish objectives the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function social welfare can we say the same for an oligopoly do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a fictitious objective function necessary and sufficient conditions for nash equilibria of static and state space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

a patent race in a real options setting investment strategy valuation capm beta and return volatility abstract in this paper we study financial properties of r d intensive firms through a continuous time real options patent race model numerical analysis in this study shows that intense competition drives a firm to invest more aggressively which then pushes up its cost of capital and return volatility while introducing negative return correlation with its competitor furthermore we find that a firm s position in competition has important impacts on its financial properties for instance a firm s cost of capital is a non monotonic function of its relative position in the race in addition the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and investment can be negative when a firm is far ahead or far behind or positive when firms are close in the race

strategic real options under asymmetric information abstract this paper studies the effect of private information on the capital allocation decisions of firms who operate under imperfect competition i analyze two interactive firms one with private information and the other without who must decide when to undertake an irreversible and uncertain investment decision traditional non strategic models of irreversible investment under uncertainty involve a single decision maker and result in an optimal period of delay before the investment is undertaken in a strategic setting firms must balance their desire to delay against competitive advantages from early investment i find that an equilibrium may not exist within the standard continuous framework when the private information is over revenues moreover when an equilibrium does exist the competitive pressures from the uninformed firm are weak this is in contrast to existing models with asymmetric information over costs where an equilibrium always exists and the competitive pressures remain strong hsu and lambrecht 2007 this work shows that the investment timing decision and thus the value of the private information is highly sensitive to the nature of incomplete information

sticky wages and sectoral labor comovement abstract a defining feature of business cycles is the comovement of inputs at the sectoral level with aggregate activity standard models cannot account for this phenomenon this paper develops and estimates a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model that can account for this key regularity my model incorporates three shocks to the economy monetary policy shocks neutral technology shocks and embodied technology shocks in the capital producing sector the estimated model is able to account for the response of the u s economy to all three shocks using this model i argue that the key friction underlying sectoral comovement is rigidity in nominal wages

increasing returns and unsynchronized wage adjustment in sunspot models of the business cycle a challenge to models of equilibrium indeterminacy based on increasing returns is that required increasing returns for generating indeterminacy can be implausibly large and rise quickly with the relative risk aversion in labor we show that unsynchronized wage adjustment via a relative wage effect can both lower the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy to a plausible level and make it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor consequently indeterminacy and sunspot driven fluctuations can emerge for plausible increasing returns regardless of the relative risk aversion in labor our model generates reasonable dynamics in terms of matching the business cycle and sunspot shocks become more important with labor market friction

dynamic r d investment policies this paper examines dynamic r d investment policies and the valuation of r d programs in a contingent claims framework we incorporate the following characteristics of r d programs into our model learning by doing collateral learning between different projects in the program interaction between project cash flows periodic reevaluations of the program different intensities of investment capital rationing constraints and competition we show that a firm may invest in multiple projects even if only one can be implemented after development is complete furthermore the firm may significantly alter its funding policy over time for example it may simultaneously develop multiple projects for a period of time then focus on a lead project and potentially resume funding of a backup project if the lead project fails to deliver on its early promise we show how a firm can forecast expected r d spending through time for an optimally executed r d program while project volatility plays an important role in determining r d program value we find that for high volatility projects the optimal investment policy is not very sensitive to changes in or misestimation of volatility in considering whether to accelerate development of a project a firm should balance the adverse effects of increased costs and the loss of investment flexibility against the positive effects of rapid uncertainty resolution and accelerated cash flows in the presence of a budget constraint that prevents the firm from simultaneously accelerating projects and developing projects in parallel we find that if one project significantly dominates another early in the development stage the option to accelerate the lead project is likely to be more valuable than the option to exchange projects thus the backup project would be shelved in order to commit extra resources to development of the lead project finally competition from other firms leads to more parallel investment in the early development stages of projects less parallel investment in the latter stages of development and lower overall investment

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

production and spatial distribution of switchgrass and miscanthus in the united states under uncertainty and sunk cost abstract the u s cellulosic biofuel mandate has not been enforced in recent years uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of the mandate in addition to high production and harvest cost have contributed to a delay in the widespread planting of bioenergy crops such as switchgrass and miscanthus previous literature has shown that under uncertainty and sunk cost an investment threshold is further increased due to the value associated from holding the investment option in this paper we extend the previous literature by applying a real option switching model to bioenergy crop production first we calculate the county level break even price which triggers a switching away from traditional field crops corn soybeans and wheat to bioenergy crops under various scenarios differing by commodity prices production cost and biomass price expectations we show that the resulting break even prices at the county level can be substantially higher than previously estimated due to the inclusion of the option value in a second step we identify counties that are most likely to grow switchgrass or miscanthus by simulating a stochastic biomass price over time our results highlight two issues first switchgrass or miscanthus are not grown in the midwest under any scenario under low agricultural residue removal rates biomass crops are mostly grown in the southeast second under the assumption of a high removal rates bioenergy crops are not grown anywhere in the u s since the cellulosic biofuel mandate can be covered by agricultural residues

open loop equilibria and perfect competition in option exercise games the investment boundaries defined by grenadier 2002 for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open loop strategies as closed loop strategies they are not equilibria because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth options the perfectly competitive outcome is produced by closed loop strategies that are mutually best responses in this equilibrium the option to delay investment has zero value and the simple npv rule is followed by all firms the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

news and financial intermediation in aggregate fluctuations an important disconnect in the news view of fluctuations is the lack of consistent evidence suggestive of significant macroeconomic effects of news shocks findings from estimated dsge models that in theory allow news shocks to matter quantitatively suggest that they do not this disconnect can be resolved once we augment a dsge model with a financial channel that provides amplification to news shocks our results suggest that news shocks to the future growth prospects of the economy are significant drivers of u s fluctuations explaining as much as 50 and 37 of the variance in hours worked and output respectively in cyclical frequencies

commodity price shocks and the business cycle structural evidence for the u s this paper evaluates the relative importance of commodity price shocks in the u s business cycle therefore we extend the standard set of business cycle shocks to include unexpected changes in commodity prices the resulting svar shows that commodity price shocks are a very important driving force of macroeconomic fluctuations second only to investment specific technology shocks particularly with respect to inflation neutral technology shocks and monetary policy shocks on the other hand seem less relevant at business cycle frequencies neutral technology shocks rather play an important role at low frequencies

strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant this paper develops an adverse selection model for a two stage supply chain with one supplier one retailer and a potential outside entrant supplier who makes a partially substitutable product the work is different from most research on entry deterrence that only considers a single stage model our main interest is to investigate how the incumbent supplier can strategically maximize her profit by a wholesale pricing policy when facing the potential entrant we focus on a model where the entrant supplier will sell her product through the same incumbent retailer we derive the optimal decisions for each player and study the comparative statics of the equilibrium to investigate how the supply chain structure may affect the deterrence strategy of the incumbent supplier we also consider three alternative models with different channel structures when both suppliers sell their products directly when the entrant has another independent retailer and when the entrant sells her product directly through the comparison we find that the existence of the common downstream retailer often enhances the deterring motivation of the incumbent supplier

risk premia and preemption in r d ventures i analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of r d ventures engaged in a multiple stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty after solving in closed form for the case of a two stage race in continuous time i show that a firm s risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead compared to the case where firms collude r d competition erodes the option value to mothball a project reduces the completion time and the failure rate of r d and causes higher and more volatile risk premia numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

skill biased technological change and the business cycle over the past two decades technological progress in the united states has been biased towards skilled labor what does this imply for business cycles we construct a quarterly skill premium from the cps and use it to identify skill biased technology shocks in a var with long run restrictions hours fall in response to skill biased technology shocks indicating that at least part of the technology induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labor demand investment specific technology shocks reduce the skill premium indicating that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregate production

a dynamic game of r and d patent protection and competitive behavior a theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to r and d in an n firm industry is developed using differential games this technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem static game theory and optimal control the use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the nash equilibrium in investment rules this paper addresses the problem of resource allocation to research and development among the important issues that a firm engaging in r and d must evaluate are uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation the possibility of a protracted development period the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market in what follows we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of r and d enumerated above we will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis determining the nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms the availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed the impact of increasing rivalry on nash equilibrium investment in r and d depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards if patent protection is perfect then increasing the number of nash rivals results in increased r and d effort however when imitation is rewarded the opposite may be true finally some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below

uncertainty investment and industry evolution we study the effects of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty on the entry of firms total investment and prices in a competitive industry with irreversible investment we first use standard dynamic programming methods to determine firms entry decisions and we describe the resulting industry equilibrium and its characteristics emphasizing the effects of different sources of uncertainty we then show how the conditional distribution of prices can be used as an alternative means of determining and understanding the behavior of firms and the resulting industry equilibrium finally we use four digit u s manufacturing data to examine some implications of the model

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

warrant valuation and exercise strategy abstract this paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value unless warrants are perfectly divisible no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants the problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

an equilibrium model of investment under uncertainty this paper analyzes the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous rms in a competitive uncertain environment we characterize rms optimal investment strategy explicitly and derive a closed form solution for rm value we show that in the strategic equilibrium real option premia are signi cant as a result rms delay investment choosing optimally not to undertake some positive npv projects the model predicts that rm returns vary over the business cycle with returns negatively skewed during expansions but positively skewed in recessions

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

public technology transfer commercialization and business growth abstract this study analyzes the conditions for the commercialization of public technologies transferred to the private sector and the subsequent effect on business growth we focus on the commercial exploitation of technologies transferred by universities and public research institutes u pris to companies the empirical analysis uses detailed information regarding an extensive set of actual instances of public private technology transfer in korea 514 cases of technologies transferred by 43 major u pris to highlight the role of company absorptive capacity and internal innovation capabilities cooperation with u pris and the intensity of market competition in determining commercialization success and business growth we find that the intensity of market competition significantly influenced the paths along which absorptive capacity and internal innovation capacity affected successful commercialization and successful commercialization in turn affected business growth effective partnership is a key factor of the successful commercialization of transferred technologies irrespective of market situations absorptive capacity contributes to their short term success and long term growth when market competition is strong

project selection commitment and competition we examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once a new project opportunity arises every period taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends in our dynamic game when two firms are free of commitment they move sequentially in random order symmetric pure strategy markov perfect equilibria always exist in equilibrium the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover even when the value of the project is the same for both firms a monopolist rejects more projects and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior we extend the model to allow for externalities asymmetry and n 2n 2 firms

identifying the role of risk shocks in the business cycle using stock price data i introduction the finance literature on the forecastibility of stock returns has concluded that stock market movements are by and large not because of changes in the expected future cash flow of firms but are primarily because of changes in the risk premium that is how the expected cash flows are discounted by stock market participants cochrane 2011 1 these changes in risk premia also have important implications for real variables in the economy especially for consumption and investment an increase in the risk premium prompts households to reduce current consumption as they start to discount expected future income more heavily more importantly changes in the required return on equity alter the cost of capital of corporations when they finance new investment for firms that rely on external debt to finance marginal investment a lower stock price translates into lower net worth and therefore a higher cost of borrowing bernanke gertler and gilchrist 1999 similarly firms that rely on new equity issues are able to raise less funds from each new share when their stock price is lower even for firms that finance investment exclusively through internal funds i e retained earnings plus depreciation allowance the required return on existing shares reveals the opportunity cost of internally financed investment tobin 1969 tobin and brainard 1977 this is because at least in principle these funds can be returned to existing shareholders as dividends and new funds can then be raised from the markets through new equity shares for which investors would demand a risk premium figure 1 omitted in the aggregate u s corporations are predominantly financed through equity the dotted line in figure 1 plots the credit market liabilities of u s non financial corporations as a percent of the sum of equity and credit market liabilities in their balance sheets 2 by this measure debt financing accounts for about a third of total financing averaged over the whole sample and equity financing accounts for about two thirds the solid line in figure 1 provides an alternative measure which takes into account all financial liabilities including items such as trade payables but nets out financial assets to obtain a measure of net debt mcgrattan and prescott 2005 now debt financing accounts for only 15 of total financing in the post war period and its importance has declined in the last two decades note that both of these series are stock measures as opposed to flow measures that is they refer to financing of all past investments and do not necessarily reflect how corporations are financing investment at the margin these measures can also be biased against debt financing because most debt items are recorded on a book value basis in the flow of funds but equity is recorded on a market value basis to overcome these caveats i consider the flow components of sources of funds i e internal funds net new equity and net new debt as a share of corporate tangible investment in figure 2 several patterns emerge first the ratio of internal funds to gross capital expenditures has been close to 1 throughout the post war period in other words at least in the aggregate u s corporate investment has been by and large financed internally second new equity issuance has not been an important source of financing in fact net new stock issues have been mostly negative in the latter part of the sample this mainly reflects the preference of corporations to distribute resources to shareholders through stock buybacks rather than ordinary dividend payments because of the preferential tax treatment of long term capital gains third net new debt has contributed to about a third of aggregate financing assuming that the discrepancy in the flow account is distributed proportionally to each financing component as internal funds and net new stock issues are fairly reliable data series we can reasonably lump the rather large discrepancy item in the ffa data with net debt

political institutions of electricity regulation the case of turkey abstract turkey has been going through a liberalization process in its electricity market over the last decade so far the regulatory content of the market reforms has been in the center of attention in the literature to the negligence of regulatory governance however recent studies which applied the theoretical insights of new institutional economics to utilities regulation have demonstrated that political endowments of the country draw the boundaries to which extent such regulatory content can be effectively implemented in line with these studies this paper adopts an institutional approach and attempts to identify the political endowments of turkey in order to further analyze whether the market reforms succeeded in bringing about sufficient checks to cure the institutional problems in other words the paper takes a picture of the overall regulatory arena the results show that the current regulatory structure especially government regulator relations yet fails to meet good regulatory governance criteria the paper also provides some policy suggestions

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

marginal pricing of transmission services an analysis of cost recovery this paper presents an in depth analysis of network revenues computed with marginal pricing and in particular it investigates the reasons why marginal prices fail to recover the total incurred network costs in actual power systems the basic theoretical results are presented and the major causes of the mismatch between network costs and marginal revenues are identified and illustrated with numerical examples some tutorial and others of realistic size the regulatory implications of marginal network pricing in the context of competitive electricity markets are analyzed and suggestions are provided for the meaningful allocation of the costs of the network among its users

irreversible investment real options and competition evidence from real estate development abstract we examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment and the effect of competition on this relationship using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in vancouver canada built from 1979 1998 we find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments empirically a one standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development these results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion

sectoral shifts and comovements in employment abstract sectoral shifts in employment from manufacturing to services are viewed as a structural transformation which occurs over a long period of time economists point out that a rapid technological advance in the manufacturing sector relative to that in the service sector is the underlying cause of this phenomenon however few have associated this with business cycle analyses this paper finds that a relatively faster technological advance in the manufacturing sector named manufacturing specific technology shock generates sectoral comovements in employment in the short run while it leads to sectoral shifts in employment in the long run the behavior of investment is the key to this finding

the access pricing problem a synthesis the baumol willig efficient component pricing rule states that it is efficient to set the price of access to an essential facility equal to the direct cost of access plus the opportunity cost to the integrated access provider the authors analyze the relevant notion of opportunity cost under various assumptions about demand and supply conditions including product differentiation bypass and substitution possibilities which all reduce opportunity cost compared to the benchmark case they show that the ramsey approach to access pricing developed by j j laffont and j tirole 1994 is closely related to the efficient component pricing rule provided opportunity cost is correctly interpreted

aggregate fluctuations and the industry structure of the us economy abstract in a two sector economy changes in intermediate input trade as reflected in cost share fluctuations are key to determining the amplification properties of investment specific and neutral shocks i document that the cost shares of intermediate inputs produced by the investment sector correlate positively with gdp whereas those of inputs produced by the consumption sector correlate negatively with gdp the two sector model of greenwood et al 1988 is extended to allow for trade of intermediate goods and to show that the documented correlations discipline heterogeneous elasticities of substitution in intermediate inputs across sectors shock amplification that is the effect of a sectorial shock on aggregate value added depends on the degree of heterogeneity in these elasticities of substitution for a calibrated economy to that of the united states i find that shock amplification is stronger than in a unitary elasticity economy it is also stronger than in an economy with a common non unitary elasticity that is either inferred from data via reduced form estimates or calibrated to match the same targets as our benchmark economy

the dynamic effects of neutral and investment specific technology shocks the neoclassical growth model is used to identify the short run effects of neutral technology shocks which affect the production of all goods homogeneously and investment specific shocks which affect only investment goods the real equipment price crucial for identifying the investment shocks experiences an abrupt increase in its average rate of decline in 1982 so the analysis is based on a split sample on the basis of the preferred specification the two technology shocks account for 73 percent of hours and 44 percent of output s business cycle variation before 1982 and 38 percent and 80 percent afterward the shocks also account for more than 40 percent of hours and 58 percent of output s forecast errors over a three to eight year horizon in both samples the majority of these effects are driven by the investment shocks

what do we know about investment under uncertainty recent theoretical developments relating to investment under uncertainty have highlighted the importance of irreversibility for the timing of investment expenditures and their expected returns this has subsequently stimulated a growing empirical literature which examines uncertainty and threshold effects on investment behaviour this paper presents a review of this literature a variety of methods have been used to investigate the empirical implication of irreversibility in investment the majority focusing on the relationship between investment flows and proxy measures of uncertainty a general conclusion is that increased uncertainty at both aggregate and disaggregate levels leads to lower investment rates this suggests that there is an irreversibility effect under which greater uncertainty raises the value of the call option to delay a commitment to investment this effect appears to dominate any positive impact on investment arising from the fact that greater uncertability under certain circumstances increases the marginal profitability of capital the methods used raise a number of issues which call into question the reliability of the findings and these are addressed in the paper however if such irreversibility effects are present then their omission from traditional investment models casts doubt on the efficacy of such specifications jel classification d81 d92 e22

the effects of uncertainty on investment and the expected long run capital stock abstract this paper examines the effects of output price uncertainty on the optimal investment behavior of a risk neutral competitive firm with a constant returns to scale production function in the presence of convex costs of adjustment investment is an increasing function of q the shadow price of capital given the current price of output we find that increased uncertainty will raise the current rate of investment increased uncertainty will also increase the expected long run capital stock if the price of output is serially uncorrelated however if the price of output is serially correlated then the direction of the effect of increased uncertainty on the expected long run capital stock depends on the curvature of the marginal adjustment cost function in this case we obtain results which are directly opposite of the results in the literature and we locate the flaw in the existing analysis

a stochastic model of investment marginal q and the market value of the firm this paper presents closed form solutions for the investment and valuation of a competitive firm with a cobb douglas production function and a constant elasticity adjustment cost function in the presence of stochastic prices for output and inputs the value of the firm is a linear function of the capital stock the optimal rate of investmentis an increasing function of the slope of the value function with respect to the capital stock marginal q a mean preserving spread of the distribution of future price increases investment an increase in the scale of the random component of a price can increase decrease or not affect the rate of investment depending on the sign of the covariance of this price with a weighted average of all prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

understanding the macroeconomic impact of illiquidity shocks in the united states in this paper we empirically investigate the role of stock market illiquidity shocks stemming from amihud s illiquidity measure in explaining u s macroeconomic fluctuations from 1973 to 2018 we find that the impact of illiquidity shocks on economic activity is substantial and historical decomposition analysis shows that cumulative illiquidity shocks were an essential contributor to the prolonged economic slump of the great recession moreover our identified illiquidity shocks represent a distinct source of macroeconomic instability this suggests that illiquidity shocks measured by the stock price impacts may contain more information than other types of shocks in recent studies such as financial shocks and uncertainty shocks jel c32 e32

monetary policy and the relative price of durable goods abstract in a structural vector autoregressive model of the us the response of the relative price of durables to a monetary policy contraction is either flat or mildly positive it significantly falls only if narrowly defined as the ratio between new house and nondurables prices these findings are rationalized via the estimation of two sector new keynesian nk models durables prices are estimated to be as sticky as those of nondurables leading to a flat relative price response to a monetary policy shock conversely house prices are estimated to be almost flexible such results survive several robustness checks and a three sector extension of the nk model these findings have implications for building nk models with durable and nondurable goods and for the conduct of monetary policy

valuing flexibility as a complex option this paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing demand curves for our model s underlying assets output products may be downward sloping in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption also our marginal production exercise costs may be increasing in addition we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint these elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system s value we illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters

the access pricing problem with deregulation a note this note extends the analysis of m armstrong c doyle and j vickers 1996 to the case of retail price deregulation it is shown that the optimal access price may be above below or in the linear case equal to marginal cost that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the efficient component pricing rule and that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price rather than the margin is regulated

the uncertainty multiplier and business cycles abstract i study a business cycle model where agents learn about the fundamentals by accumulating capital during recessions agents invest less and this generates noisier estimates of macroeconomic conditions and an increase in uncertainty the endogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty further reduces economic activity and thus gives rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies aggregate fluctuations to discipline learning dynamics i parametrize the model so that it matches not only standard business cycle moments but also survey data on macroeconomic forecasts i find that the uncertainty multiplier amplifies output standard deviation by 16

the diversity of design of tsos it is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets we argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a wilson 2002 modular framework applied to the management of electricity flows at least three modules make the core of transmission design 1 the short run management of network externalities 2 the long run management of network investment and 3 the coordination of neighboring transmission system operators for cross border trade in order to tackle this diversity of designs of tsos we show that for each of these modules three different basic ways of managing them are possible among the identified twenty seven options of organisation we define an ideal tso second we demonstrate that 1 monopoly design differs from this ideal tso and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the institutional definition and allocation of property rights on transmission while 2 definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure they have to complement each other to be efficient some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation

news shocks and the slope of the term structure of interest rates abstract we adopt a statistical approach to identify the shocks that explain most of the fluctuations of the slope of the term structure of interest rates we find that one shock can explain the majority of unpredictable movements in the slope impulse response functions lead us to interpret this shock as news about future total factor productivity tfp by showing that slope shocks are essentially tfp news shocks we provide a new explanation for the relationship between the slope and macroeconomic fundamentals our results also provide a new empirical benchmark for structural models at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance jel e23 e43 e52 g12 g14

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

optimal r d investment for a risk averse entrepreneur abstract entrepreneurs investing in r d projects face technical uncertainty associated with the cost to completion of the project which is idiosyncratic and inherently unhedgeable we extend existing real options models of r d investment to incorporate the cost of bearing this unhedgeable risk and find it decreases risk averse entrepreneurs valuations of r d projects and increases the minimum npvs required for continued investment in r d threshold npvs relative to unpriced risk values and threshold npvs as in the unpriced risk case for less risk averse entrepreneurs with small r d projects threshold npvs remain negative and decrease with technical uncertainty however for sufficiently risk averse entrepreneurs with sufficiently large r d projects threshold npvs can become positive and increase with technical uncertainty

learning and shifts in long run productivity growth abstract an extensive literature has analyzed the macroeconomic effects of shocks to the level of aggregate productivity however there has been little corresponding research on sustained shifts in the growth rate of productivity in this paper we examine the effects of shocks to productivity growth in a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents do not directly observe whether shocks are transitory or persistent we show that an estimated kalman filter model using real time data describes economists long run productivity growth forecasts in the united states extremely well and that filtering has profound implications for the macroeconomic effects of shifts in productivity growth

comparing shocks and frictions in us and euro area business cycles a bayesian dsge approach this paper estimates a dsge model with many types of shocks and frictions for both the us and the euro area economy over a common sample period 1974 2002 the structural estimation methodology allows us to investigate whether differences in business cycle behaviour are due to differences in the type of shocks that affect the two economies differences in the propagation mechanism of those shocks or differences in the way the central bank responds to those economic developments our main conclusion is that each of these characteristics is remarkably similar across both currency areas copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

warrant exercise dividends and reinvestment policy in this paper we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants we analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies first we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding however sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders even absent dividends because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm s scale increases the riskiness of an equity share second oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding

investments of uncertain cost abstract this paper examines irreversible investment decisions when projects take time to complete and are subject to two types of cost uncertainty the first is technical uncertainty i e uncertainty over the physical difficulty of completing a project which is only resolved as the investment proceeds the second is input cost uncertainty i e uncertainty over the prices of construction inputs or over government regulations affecting construction costs which is external to the firm these two types of uncertainty have very different effects on the investment decision a simple investment rule is derived that maximizes firm value and is used to analyze the decision to start or continue building a nuclear power plant during the 1980s

adaptability of competitive electricity reforms a modular analysis abstract among the competitive electricity reforms that have been implemented in europe and the us for the last 18 years none has survived over several years without major changes their changing nature raises the question of their adaptability two characteristics of reforms play a key role on their adaptation properties firstly they are modular objects in the sense of baldwin c 2008 where do transactions come from modularity transactions and the boundaries of firms industrial and corporate change 17 1 155 195 secondly they are produced in an institutional process which leads to incomplete rules and designs pistor k xu c 2003 incomplete law international law and politics 35 931 1013 we propose a typology of adaptations based on the framework proposed by williamson o e 1991 comparative economic organization the analysis of discrete structural alternatives administrative science quarterly 36 2 269 296 for contracts 1 in case of small disturbances adaptations are realized quasi automatically by autonomous decisions of the institutions governing the implementation of reforms 2 in case of middle range disturbances adaption is made by coasian bargaining 3 finally in case of strong disturbances or when bargaining is not feasible the adaptation of reforms is in the hands of legislative and executive institutions north d c 2005 le processus du developpement economique editions d organisation these institutions can reform the reforms joskow p l 2006 introduction to electricity sector liberalization lessons learned from cross country studies in sioshansi f p ed electricity market reform an international perspective elsevier amsterdam pp 1 32 hogan w w 2002 electricity market restructuring reforms of reforms journal of regulatory economics 21 103 132 the role of these types of adaptations in each electricity reform is a consequence of the allocation of rights to the regulator to stakeholders and to legislative and executive institutions

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances