balancing skilled with unskilled migration in an urbanizing agricultural economy summary in the early stages of economic development the migration of unskilled workers contributes to labor intensive manufacturing production in middle income countries however the migration of skilled workers becomes the more important factor in economic progress evaluating the skill content of migration patterns therefore is essential to understanding migration s economic implications for this purpose we investigate the determinants of skilled and unskilled migration decisions in vietnam rural higher education is shown to promote knowledge intensive production by encouraging skilled individuals to migrate to cities in complementary fashion commercial farm development helps alleviate urban overcrowding by encouraging unskilled individuals to remain at home

the pricing of durable exhaustible resources partial or total durability characterizes a large class of exhaustible resources hotelling s r percent rule will apply to a durable resource produced in a competitive market but will not apply if the resource is produced in a monopolistic market however the r percent rule does not mean that price is steadily rising it is shown that in general the competitive market price will fall initially as the stock in circulation increases and later will rise as the stock decreases and eventually depreciates toward zero after production ceases accounting for durability may thus help explain the u shaped long term price profiles observed for many resources 11 references 3 figures

reprint of crop prices and the individual decision to migrate abstract this paper investigates the effect of commodity prices in particular rice and coffee on the decision of migrating at the individual level as most coffee production is sold by households for exports we would expect that coffee price shocks would have a direct effect on the probability to migrate on the other hand we would anticipate that fluctuations in rice prices have little or no effect on migration decisions given that rice is mainly produced for household consumption we test these hypotheses drawing evidence from migration in viet nam we show that the lower the price of coffee the higher the likelihood of migrating this evidence seems to suggest that migration acts as a shock coping strategy we find that rice prices have no effect on the probability of migrating we further explore the extent of migrants self selection and show that lower coffee prices increase the migration probability of individuals with lower education

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

durable goods monopoly learning by doing and the coase conjecture abstract the coase conjecture states that if a durable goods monopolist can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently then in equilibrium she will charge the competitive price and the market will be saturated quickly this conjecture is shown to be refuted when production of the durable good is subject to learning by doing for the linear case it is shown that there exist a stationary strategy perfect equilibrium in which the monopolist charges competitive prices but the market is saturated slowly an interesting analogy between bargaining and durable goods monopoly with learning by doing is also pointed out

rural urban migration household vulnerability and welfare in vietnam summary this paper investigates the interaction of migration vulnerability to poverty and welfare of rural households in three provinces in central vietnam it addresses three questions 1 to what extent do shocks motivate rural household members to move to urban areas 2 are migrants in the new urban settings better off in terms of working conditions and quality of life and 3 what is the effect of migration on rural household s welfare and vulnerability to poverty the analysis uses panel data of 2200 households from rural vietnam covering the period 2007 2010 and a tracking survey of 299 migrants from 2010 the empirical evidence from a probit model shows that migration especially migration for employment is a livelihood support strategy for households exposed to agricultural and economic shocks migration for education is more likely observed among households with higher human capital and being financially better off nevertheless the probability of migration decreases with the employment opportunity in the village migrants perceive themselves to be better off at the place of destination but income losses from shocks of their rural households may reduce their employment quality the results from difference in difference specifications with propensity score matching techniques suggest that migration has positive income growth effects and that these effects are more pronounced in provinces with fewer job opportunities these effects help not only migrant households moving out of poverty but it also improves the poverty situation in rural areas

does relative deprivation induce migration evidence from sub saharan africa this analysis revisits the decades old relative deprivation theory of migration in contrast to the traditional view that migration is driven by absolute income maximization we test whether relative deprivation induces migration in the context of sub saharan africa taking advantage of the internationally comparable longitudinal data from integrated household and agriculture surveys from tanzania ethiopia malawi nigeria and uganda we use panel fixed effects to estimate the effects of relative deprivation on migration decisions using per capita consumption expenditure and multidimensional wealth index as well being measures we find that a household s migration decision is based not only on its absolute well being level but also on the relative position of the household in the well being distribution of the community in which it resides we also discover that the effect of relative deprivation on migration is amplified in rural agricultural and male headed households results are robust to alternative specifications including the use of hausman taylor instrumental variable htiv estimator and pooled data across the five countries results confirm that the migration relative deprivation relationship also holds in the context of sub saharan africa we argue that policies designed to check rural urban migration through rural transformation and poverty reduction programs should use caution because such programs can increase economic inequality which further increases migration flow

dynamic adverse selection and the supply size in this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information we obtain that full trade occurs in every dynamic competitive equilibrium moreover we show that if prices can be conditioned on the supply size then a dynamic competitive equilibrium always exists while it fails to exist if prices cannot be conditioned on the supply size and the frequency of exchanges is high enough we conclude that the possibility to condition prices on the supply size allows us to reach efficiency in the limit for exchanges becoming more and more frequent while otherwise the welfare loss due to delays of exchanges remains bounded away from zero

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

no lease is short enough to solve the time inconsistency problem the author provides a model of endogenous lease duration determination in the context of the durable goods monopolist problem he shows that infinitely many leases per finite unit of time are required to solve completely the time inconsistency problem thus suggesting that leasing may not provide a practical solution the author also provides a warning regarding the results that can be derived by exogenously setting lease durations equal to one period by resolving a paradoxical result in the literature copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

the pricing of durable exhaustible resources comment in its simplest form hotelling s 1931 r percent rule states that in a competitive market with no extraction costs the price of an exhaustible resource will grow at the rate of interest for instance if price grows at a rate slower than the rate of interest it is in the interest of each firm to sell its entire stock immediately the hypothesized price path is obviously not an equilibrium even if there are extraction costs and firms are not identical it remains true that price net of marginal cost rises at the rate of interest the proposition generalizes to monopolized resources along the equilibrium path of extraction net marginal revenue grows at the rate of interest in a recent article in this journal levhari and pindyck 1981 henceforth l p show the r percent rule extends to durable exhaustible resources in a competitive market but they conclude that it does not hold in a monopoly market this is a surprising result following the hotelling logic should it not be possible for the monopolist to rearrange production from low net marginal revenue dates to high net marginal revenue dates and raise its present value the primary purpose of this comment is to show that hotelling s rule does in fact hold this is shown in section ii our result is compared with that of l p in section iii the conflict is shown to arise from a disagreement over the relevant marginal revenue in continuous time increasing the flow of production of a durable good at a particular point in time has no effect on the sales price at that or any other point in time hence the rate of change in the flow of revenue at that particular point in time is the sales price this is the definition of marginal revenue l p use however durables are different from nondurables in that a perturbation in the production trajectory over some length of time will affect the entire sales price trajectory in choosing its

monopoly production of durable exhaustible resources we examine monopoly production of a durable exhaustible resource previous authors have implicitly assumed that the monopolist is able to make binding commitments about future decisions we consider the more plausible case in which the monopolist lacks this ability and must choose from dynamically consistent plans two models are considered a discrete time model in which there is a strictly finite initial stock of the resource and a continuous time model in which costs are an increasing function of cumulative production we find that as a general result monopoly leads to overconservation the monopolist who cannot precommit produces the efficient quantity ultimately but does so too slowly by contrast the monopolist who can precommit produces less than the efficient stock even in the limit we also find that increased importance of exhaustibility hastens the extraction of the resource copyright 1990 by the london school of economics and political science

credible signals of the release of new versions i introduction many products are marketed some time after they have been developed for instance a new smartphone may be developed and tested well before it is available for purchase a new car might be prototyped and driven months before it comes to the market indeed a firm will often have several products concurrently in a development pipeline consumers may know a product is in that pipeline without knowing its progress towards the market because the outcome of such development and testing is not visible to outsiders the firm knows whether it can market a product before consumers do consumers are uninformed about when and if the new product will be marketed to them economists have long recognized that the present demand for durable goods depends on future prospects such as the future price or the introduction of an improved version 1 the existence of such an improved version is often the seller s private information if consumers anticipate a new version some will defer purchases until the new version is available and the seller will face low demand for the present version disclosing the new version is not in a monopoly seller s interest a seller whose good does not have a new version would also like to communicate that fact to consumers while a firm with a successful product innovation can credibly disclose the new version with relative ease a firm that has failed to develop a new product could have great difficulty convincing consumers that the product has no new version in such situations it is important to examine whether prices can inform consumers whether a new version will be marketed in the near future in a recent paper choi et al 2010 developed a model with a risky product development process in which reputation effects allow cheap talk announcements to signal successful product development to consumers an announcement induces consumers to delay or divert purchases to the announcer s coming product which increases the announcer s profit and can improve welfare 2 in their model the announcer and her non innovative rivals supply the original good competitively because of this an announcement does not reduce profit on the current version this paper will focus on markets where the seller has substantial market power before innovating so announcing a successful product development has a cost in terms of current revenue further because we attend to prices as signals this model may also apply to markets where a long run relationship between consumers and firms may not be sustainable another objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure a government policy mandating disclosure of any new version is an alternative means of informing consumers 3 as long as firms are not willing to lie to the government such a policy would credibly communicate whether a new version of a durable is coming mandatory disclosure would bring about full information as consumers are informed about any improved future version before observing the price of the current version in this paper we explore a two period model of a durable good monopoly in which consumers are initially uninformed about whether there will be a new version of the current good the monopoly seller is privately informed if he will be able to market an improved version in the second period in the first period consumers must decide whether to purchase the good now or wait for an upgraded version they may be able to infer from the price of the current version whether the seller will bring a new version to the market it is important to see first whether prices can serve as signals and second how welfare compares between any signaling outcome and a full information benchmark corresponding to mandatory disclosure we will show that there is a unique equilibrium supported by intuitive beliefs in this equilibrium the seller s private information about an improved version is completely revealed to consumers

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

transient poverty poverty dynamics and vulnerability to poverty an empirical analysis using a balanced panel from rural china china s economic reforms starting in the late 1970s have resulted in rapid economic growth with annual growth in gross domestic product averaging greater than 10 percent per year for more than thirty years accompanying this rapid growth in national accounts have been rapid and widespread reductions in poverty with these reductions in poverty however there has often been observed an increase in income inequality both between as well as within rural and urban sectors this rising income gap challenges the notion that economic reforms in china have been as successful as the poverty statistics would suggest in this paper we suggest that an alternative view would be to consider the effects of these reforms on changing the chronic nature of poverty and reducing household vulnerability to poverty using a balanced panel from rural china from 1991 through 2006 we find that most poverty among our sample has shifted from being chronic in nature to being transient with households either shifting into a state of being non poor moving in and out of poverty among our sample vulnerability to poverty has been declining over time but the declines are not uniform over time or space we decompose household vulnerability status into two proximate causes low expected income and high income variability finding vulnerability increasingly due to income variability additionally we demonstrate that vulnerable households have very different characteristics than non vulnerable households

durable services monopolists do better than durable goods monopolists the authors consider a monopolist who can commit to a price path when selling a good for which individual consumers demand at most one unit only if the monopolist can also commit to destroying unpurchased stock and the timing of stock release can she earn more than a static monopolist this additional commitment power has empirical revelance for a wide range of goods that the authors term durable services the inability to store output facilitates price discrimination by a durable services monopolist by permitting the credible threat of rationing the authors detail sufficient conditions for a durable services monopolist to produce more than a static or durable goods monopolist produces

licensing information goods abstract a significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis patent holders however may face a dynamic problem namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem there are situations however where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent the case of information goods or due to compulsory patenting laws we study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations relative to the existing literature we obtain the following main results i all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation ii royalty licensing may be superior to fixed fee or auction licensing from the licensor s point of view iii social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales iv even for non drastic innovations the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation before the innovation was discovered

environmental stressors and migration evidence from vietnam the argument that environmental change is an important driving force of migration has experienced a strong revival in the climate change context while various studies predict large environmental migration flows due to climate change and other environmental events the ex post empirical evidence for this phenomenon is inconclusive we contribute to the extant literature by focusing on the micro level we examine whether and how individual perceptions of different types of environmental stressors induce internal migration the analysis relies on original survey data from vietnam including both migrants and non migrants the results suggest that individual perceptions of long term environmental events such as droughts significantly reduce migration while perceptions of sudden onset environmental events such as floods significantly increase the likelihood of migration controlling for other determinants of migration these findings also imply that improving the targeting of aid to environmental disaster affected areas and the financial and technical support for adaptation to environmental change could be the most productive policy options policymakers thus need to implement a wide range of developmental policies in combination with environmental ones in order to improve society s ability to effectively cope with environmental change and minimize its effect on migration

a survey measure of risk aversion abstract we use survey data on the well being of individuals to measure attitudes toward risk risk neutrality cannot be rejected by the data

relative risk aversion around the world abstract in this letter the hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion is examined for 15 countries using property liability insurance data for more than half the cases it is shown that crra can not be rejected following that the degree of relative risk aversion is estimated and found to usually lie between one and two

bridging the gap bargaining with interdependent values abstract we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values we base our analysis on the equilibria characterized by deneckere and liang 2006 for the gap case we show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to smooth screening over time in the double limit prices are independent of the shape of the distribution of values when the uninformed agent s ability to commit to prices disappears so do her rents yet trade still exhibits delay

remittances and vulnerability to poverty in rural mexico international remittances have been portrayed as the human face of globalization given their potential to alleviate poverty by directly increasing household income using a panel of rural households in mexico from october 1998 to november 2000 this study assesses whether this is in fact the case however rather than examining whether transfers income would reduce future consumption poverty we asked if transfers are likely to reach people whose conditions are prone to worsen in the future we used vulnerability to consumption poverty to quantify the extent to which risks and the more permanent disadvantages embedded in most rural livelihoods can translate into future declines in well being we found contrary to our expectations a negative and statistically significant relationship between the remittance of transfers including foreign remittances and the threat to future poverty that rural households could experience

monopoly extraction of a durable non renewable resource failure of the coase conjecture the author studies a perfect information rational expectations markov equilibrium for the situation where a monopolist extracts a nonrenewable resource that is converted to a durable good even if short run extraction costs are constant the coase conjectur e fails provided that the depreciation rate of the durable good is positive copyright 1993 by the london school of economics and political science

depreciation erodes the coase conjecture if a durable good monopolist produces at constant marginal costs and the good depreciates there exists a family of strong markov perfect equilibrium smpe one member of this family entails instantaneous production of the level of stock produced in a competitive equilibrium this is consistent with the coase conjecture other smpe in the family entail steady state production at a stock level lower than in the competitive equilibrium there may be a jump to these steady states or they may be approached asymptotically monopoly profits are positive in these equilibria and the coase conjecture fails

an experimental test for risk aversion abstract this paper evaluates an experimental method to measure attitudes to risk in individual subjects the method is applied to study the degree of risk aversion of 46 subjects the results lead us to reject a working hypothesis of risk neutrality for such experimental subjects

the new economics of labor migration this paper reviews selected theoretical and empirical developments in the field of labor migration economics the migration behavior of individuals differs in accordance with their perceived relative deprivation those who are relatively more deprived tend to have stronger incentive to migrate than those who are relatively less deprived moreover a reference group characterized by more income inequality is likely to generate more relative deprivation highly skilled workers are also more likely to migrate migration decisions are often made jointly by the migrant and nonmigrant with a contractual arrangement regarding the sharing of costs and returns the exchange of commitments to share income provides coinsurance of particular interest are the determinants of the speed of adoption of migration as an innovation and the characteristics associated with the delay in the adoption of innovation new econometric techniques including techniques for the analysis of qualitative dependent variables techniques that correct for sample selection bias and those for the analysis of longitudinal data have substantially benefited empirical research in this area new methods that can correct for the biased estimate of the wages particular individuals would receive at 2 or more locations at the same point in time allow researchers to test locational decsion making models estimates of these structural models of labor migration support the hypothesis that individuals respond to income incentives in making the decsion to migrate further research is needed on the pazzling observation that migrant workers earn less than native born workers with similar characteristics during the 1st few years after migration but more thereafter other topics that need further research include the macroeconomic effects of migration the microeconomic and macroeconomic relationships between aging and labor migration and the migration behavior of dual earner families

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

network externalities and the coase conjecture abstract this paper addresses two general questions first what is the effect of market structure on the development of a network in a dynamic model with rational expectations secondly is the intuition that network externalities are economies of scale on the demand side correct these questions are examined in a model of durable good production in the presence of network externalities two results are presented first the coase conjecture fails in its strongest sense when network benefits are increasing in the current network size secondly a committed monopolist may be socially preferable to a time consistent producer when network externalities are sufficiently large the analysis indicates an analogy between network externalities and learning by doing

monopoly power and the recycling of raw materials due to increased interest in resource conservation the recycling of raw materials has grown in significance in most industrialized economies in general recycled raw materials require a smaller net input of other basic resources such as energy than do the original primary materials as a consequence the long run cost trends seem to favor an ever higher use of secondary materials over primary materials many of the industries currently practicing recycling are highly concentrated i e aluminium steel newsprint motor oil and other metals with a few exceptions1 the impact of recycling on industry output and price remains largely unexplored the welfare implications of a monopolist confronted by an independent and competitive secondary materials sector are not exactly new concerns in the field of anti trust economics the problem was given its sharpest judicial focus in the famous aluminium company of america alcoa case of 1945 the celebrated jurist learned hand ruled that alcoa did constitute an illegal monopoly under the law since it ultimately had control of the secondary ingot sector through the stock of scrap aluminium milton friedman has suggested however that judge hand was in error and that a competitive recycling sector would tend to push the price of aluminium down to the marginal cost of virgin aluminum production 3 pp 278 79 two authors of a more contemporary genre have drawn conclusions that differ substantially on the important issue of whether or not the procompetitive effects of the recycling sector will be sufficient to achieve pareto optimal results gaskins concludes that the existence of a competitive secondhand market makes things worse in the short run and does not substantially lower the price of aluminum in the long run 4 p 255 alternatively swan finds conditions under which the price of aluminum would be driven down to the marginal cost of virgin aluminum ingot production 7 p 83 gaskins formulates a dynamic model of the aluminurm industry where he considers the impact of recycling on alcoa s monopoly power the critical assumptions of gaskin s model are a linear demand curve with time stationary elasticity and a linear secondary ingot supply function in addition the

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

crop prices and the individual decision to migrate abstract this paper investigates the effect of commodity prices in particular rice and coffee on the decision of migrating at the individual level as most coffee production is sold by households for exports we would expect that coffee price shocks would have a direct effect on the probability to migrate on the other hand we would anticipate that fluctuations in rice prices have little or no effect on migration decisions given that rice is mainly produced for household consumption we test these hypotheses drawing evidence from migration in viet nam we show that the lower the price of coffee the higher the likelihood of migrating this evidence seems to suggest that migration acts as a shock coping strategy we find that rice prices have no effect on the probability of migrating we further explore the extent of migrants self selection and show that lower coffee prices increase the migration probability of individuals with lower education

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games the theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization for example questions about resource extraction advertising research and development investment in new capacity and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved however an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game the issue is the appropriate formulation of the players strategy spaces

durable goods coasian dynamics and uncertainty theory and experiments this paper presents a model in which a durable goods monopolist sells a product to two buyers each buyer is privately informed about his own valuation thus all players are imperfectly informed about market demand we study the monopolist s pricing behavior as players uncertainty regarding demand vanishes in the limit in the limit players are perfectly informed about the downward sloping demand we show that in all games belonging to a fixed and open neighborhood of the limit game there exists a generically unique equilibrium outcome that exhibits coasian dynamics and in which play lasts for at most two periods a laboratory experiment shows that consistent with our theory outcomes in the certain and uncertain demand treatments are the same median opening prices in both treatments are roughly at the level predicted and considerably below the monopoly price consistent with coasian dynamics these prices are lower for higher discount factors demand withholding however leads to more trading period

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

damaged durable goods i analyze a durable goods monopolist s incentives to introduce a damaged good a stripped down version of the original good in an infinite horizon framework the damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the coasian time inconsistency problem however it may lead to a welfare reduction low valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low quality damaged good early rather than buy the high quality original good later and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions this welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework