curbing agency problems in the procurement process by protest oversight we study a model in which a potential bidder in a government procurement may challenge its exclusion from the procurement before a quasi judicial board in the case of a sole source procurement the excluded vendor does not know whether the decision was justified in terms of expected surplus or alternatively was due to an agency problem we explain the occurrence of i equilibrium protests ii deterrence of inefficient sole sourcing iii overdeterrence the choice of a competitive procurement when sole source would be appropriate iv buyoff settlements which preserve inappropriate sole source procurement and v fedmail settlements which accompany appropriate sole source procurements our normative analysis addresses recent legislative initiatives to reform the protest process

implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation abstract in a finite trader version of the diamond and dybvig j polit econ 91 1983 401 model the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism i e each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader when the model is modified by formalizing the sequential service constraint cf wallace fed reserve bank minneapolis quart rev 12 1988 3 the truth telling equilibrium implements the symmetric ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

currency competition a partial vindication of hayek abstract this paper establishes the existence of equilibria for environments in which outside money is issued competitively such equilibria are typically believed not to exist because of a classic overissue problem if money is valued in equilibrium an issuer produces money until its value is driven to zero by backward induction money cannot have value in the first place this paper shows that overissuance is not a problem if agents believe that if an issuer produces more than some threshold number of notes then only those notes issued up to the threshold will be valued additional notes will be worthless this result is very general applying to any monetary economy in which equilibria with and without valued money exist if the money supply is finite the paper also compares the allocation achieved by a monopolist to that achieved with competitive issuance in both a search and an overlapping generations environment the results depend on the environment considered but two general conclusions arise first it is ambiguous whether competitive issuers can achieve a more desirable allocation than a monopolist second with competitive issuance a licensing agency can always improve on pure laissez faire and achieve the efficient allocation in the long run

financial intermediation with risk aversion the paper extends diamond s 1984 analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the intermediary it shows that as in the case of risk neutrality the agency costs of external funds provided to an intermediary are relatively small if the intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with stochastically independent returns even though the intermediary is adding rather than subdividing risks the underlying large numbers argument is not invalidated by the presence of risk aversion with risk aversion of entrepreneurs as well as the intermediary financial intermediation provides insurance as well as finance in contrast to earlier results on optimal intermediation policies under risk neutrality the paper shows that when an intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with stochastically independent returns optimal intermediation policies must shift return risks away from risk averse entrepreneurs and impose them on the intermediary or on final investors

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

regulatory reform and productivity growth in the uk s public utilities the reforms in the regulation of the uk nationalised industries over the last decade are examined and the extent to which they have been successful in achieving one of their declared aims that of increasing the efficiency of the enterprises operations is considered to achieve this the productivity performance of nine of the largest enterprises over the last twenty years was analysed the results show that the rate of productivity growth has been significantly higher during the 1980s compared with the preceeding decade it is concluded that a large part of the observed upturn in productivity is a result of changes in efficiency

contestability in bus markets evidence from the british de regulated market following the 1985 transport act in great britain reforms in the provision of bus services continue across europe and other parts of the world to this day the british experience however remains a key point of study in informing these continuing developments this article looks at the issue of contestability in bus markets and tests for the existence of the contestable market in britain through an examination of fare levels profit margins and technical efficiencies in 90 identifiable bus markets the main conclusion is that there is evidence of the contestable market in britain however it can hardly be described as widespread only found to be present in 15 of the 90 markets identified in the sample the real issue however particularly with regard to continuing reforms elsewhere in europe is the ability of regulatory authorities to maintain competitive and contestable free markets and the research suggests that in the face of market forces this is simply not possible the only conclusion therefo

productivity growth and biased technological change in hydroelectric dams abstract this paper analyses productivity growth and the nature of technical change in a sample of portuguese hydroelectric generating plants over the period 2001 to 2008 in a first step we employ the luenberger productivity indicator to estimate and decompose productivity change a malmquist productivity index is also used for a comparative purpose the results paint a picture of mixed productivity performance in the portuguese energy sector the first decomposition underlines that in average the productivity variation is explained by the technological change then in a second step we analyse the nature of this technical change by using the recent concept of parallel neutrality briec et al 2006 we observe a global shift in the best practice frontier as well as in the evidence of input bias in technical change

inflation financial markets and long run real activity abstract empirical evidence suggests that real activity the volume of bank lending activity and the volume of trading in equity markets are strongly positively correlated at the same time inflation and financial market activity are strongly negatively correlated in the long run as are inflation and the real rate of return on equity inflation and real activity are also negatively correlated in the long run particularly for economies with relatively high rates of inflation we present a monetary growth model in which banks and secondary capital markets play a crucial allocative function we show that at least under certain configurations of parameters the predictions of the model are consistent with these and several other observations about inflation finance and long run real activity

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

the efficiency of state owned and privatized firms does ownership make a difference abstract this paper compares the pre and post privatization efficiency of a sample of state owned enterprises privatized in spain with the efficiency of their closest private competitors we perform a two stage double bootstrap data envelopment analysis model in the first stage the efficiency is estimated through a bootstrapped data envelopment analysis and then followed in the second stage by a bootstrapped truncated regression our results provide evidence that i there were no significant differences in efficiency between the state owned enterprises and their private counterparts before privatization and ii the efficiency of newly privatized firms significantly increased after their privatization while private competitors showed no significant improvement during the same post privatization period

board structure and firm technical efficiency evidence from canadian state owned enterprises abstract the objective of the study is to analyze the board performance relationship for a group of 14 canadian soes this context is unique because soes do not have major control devices other than the board as the interaction effect if any between the board and other corporate governance structures is expected to be low we do not have to fully control for the potential impact of different control devices or to disentangle them completely from influencing board composition the performance is also measured using data envelopment analysis dea a linear programming method used for the first time in this research area as such this study contributes to the operational research literature while applying dea method to untraditional fields of research the results from the multivariate analysis suggest that board size and board independence are positively related to firm technical efficiency only when soes are exposed to market discipline in other words product market competition is a precondition for boards to be effective

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

bank incentives contract design and bank runs abstract we study the diamond dybvig bank runs deposit insurance and liquidity j polit econ 91 1983 401 419 model as developed in green and lin implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation j econ theory 109 2003 1 23 and peck and shell equilibrium bank runs j polit econ 111 2003 103 123 we dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors instead our bank is a self interested agent with a technological advantage in record keeping we examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank run equilibria for a special case we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities we also find that the uniqueness result in green and lin implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation j econ theory 109 2003 1 23 is robust to our form of agency but that the non uniqueness result in peck and shell equilibrium bank runs j polit econ 111 2003 103 123 is not

tariff structure of japanese electric power companies an empirical analysis using dea this research explores a marginal cost mc based pricing system using data envelopment analysis dea this dea technique is widely applied for performance analysis and efficiency measurement in public and private sectors this article does not follow such a previous research direction rather directing itself towards the new measurement of mc and ramsey prices of multiple electric power services as an important case study this research applies the proposed dea approach to examine how much the current tariffs of japanese electric power services deviate from these mc and ramsey prices this type of research has never been explored in japan even though such a research effort is needed by many policy makers and consumers it is hoped that our empirical findings can serve as a policy making basis for guiding the japanese electric power industry this study believes that this japanese experience is useful for other nations such as asia pacific countries where many public industries are regulated by their governments

the optimal size of a bank costs and benefits of diversification abstract this paper provides a theory of diversification and financial structure of banks it shows that by diversifying the bank portfolio and financing it with debt the bank can commit to a higher level of monitoring by linking the benefits of diversification to the costs the paper derives an optimal size of the bank which is bounded the costs of diversification lie in the higher overload costs with which the banker is faced by monitoring more projects the benefits of diversification lie in increasing the bank s owner s incentives to monitor the lenders

the impact on technical efficiency of the uk privatization programme the level of technical efficiency in nine organizations privatized in the uk in the 1980s is assessed technical efficiency is measured for a number of years before and after privatization using data envelopment analysis this non parametric method allows efficiency to be measured without having to specify either the form of the production function or the weights for the different inputs and outputs used nevertheless inputs and outputs have to be specified and some assumption has to be made about production conditions consequently three models are estimated the first assumes constant returns to scale the second allows for variable returns and the third adds environmental variables for technological change and the business cycle to the input output set the nine organizations studied yield mixed results in some cases there is clear evidence of an improvement in technical efficiency in others there is no discernible impact of ownership on performance

competition and increasing returns to scale a model of bank size this study examines the causal effects of bank size on banks survival asset quality and leverage two forces drive these effects increasing returns to scale derived from banks expertise and competition the first enables bigger banks to survive competition better have higher asset quality and be more leveraged it drives banks into a race for expansion this race toughens competition between banks which edges out small banks and may worsen all banks asset quality consequently the banking industry will be dominated by a small number of highly leveraged banks in this study financial intermediation arises endogenously and co exists with direct finance

monitoring the monitor an incentive structure for a financial intermediary this paper studies financial intermediation i e delegated monitoring in a costly state verification model there are a finite number of agents thus the intermediary cannot fully diversify its portfolio and is subject to default risk the role of the intermediary is to satisfy simultaneously the different portfolio preferences of borrowers and lenders two questions arise when a delegated monitor is subject to non trivial default risk a what arrangement solves the problem of monitoring the monitor b what intermediary portfolio accomplishes optimal asset transformation between borrowers and lenders unlike previous delegated monitoring studies the law of large numbers is not sufficient to obtain our results instead we appeal to a stronger results the large deviation principle which establishes that convergence in the law of large numbers is exponential

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

financial market frictions monetary policy and capital accumulation in a small open economy abstract we consider a small open economy with a costly state verification problem and binding reserve requirements the presence of these frictions leads to the existence of two steady states with credit rationing an increase in the money growth rate the world interest rate or reserve requirements raises lowers gdp in the high low activity steady state however sufficiently large increases in money growth or the world interest rate can transform the high activity steady state from a sink to a source the model also delivers prescriptions for restoring the stability of this steady state in such an eventuality journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e5 f4

an assessment of tarp assistance to financial institutions six years after the passage of the 2008 troubled asset relief program commonly known as tarp it remains hard to measure the total social costs and benefits of the assistance to banks provided under tarp programs tarp was not a single approach to assisting weak banks but rather a variety of changing solutions to a set of evolving problems tarp s passage was associated with significant improvements in financial markets and the health of financial intermediaries as well as an increase in the supply of lending by recipients however a full evaluation must also take into account other factors including the risks borne by taxpayers in the course of the bailouts moral hazard costs that could result in more risk taking in the future and social costs related to perceived unfairness our evaluation is organized in five parts 1 what did policymakers do 2 what are the proper objectives of interventions like tarp assistance to financial institutions 3 did tarp succeed in those economic objectives 4 were tarp funds allocated purely on an economic basis or did political favoritism play a role 5 would alternative policies either alongside or instead of tarp and alternative design features of tarp have worked better

regulatory reforms and productivity an empirical analysis of the japanese electricity industry the japanese electricity industry has experienced regulatory reforms since the mid 1990s this article measures productivity in japan s steam power generation sector and examines the effect of reforms on the productivity of this industry over the period 1978 2003 we estimate the luenberger productivity indicator which is a generalization of the commonly used malmquist productivity index using a data envelopment analysis approach factors associated with productivity change are investigated through dynamic generalized method of moments gmm estimation of panel data our empirical analysis shows that the regulatory reforms have contributed to productivity growth in the steam power generation sector in japan

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

banking risk and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract this paper develops a model of banking frictions and banking risk as a sort of systemic risk changes in banking risk lead to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity we decompose the macroeconomic effect of a banking risk shock into a pure default effect and a risk aversion effect when risk sharing among investors is imperfect when the shock generates a bank risk spread similar to the peak value during the global financial crisis the overall effect is a decline in employment by 4 66 the default effect leads to a 3 40 employment decline by a within model measure and a 3 51 decline by a between model measure the remaining is attributed to the risk aversion effect a practical implication of our analysis is that by developing financial safety net and improving risk sharing among investors the society can mitigate the adverse macroeconomic effects of banking risk shocks to some extent but cannot eliminate all of them

bank capital requirements business cycle fluctuations and the basel accords a synthesis abstract in order to survey the mechanisms through which the introduction of basel ii bank capital requirements is likely to accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking this paper brings together the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel of propagation of exogenous shocks and the literature on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the basel accords we conclude that the theoretical models that revisit the bank capital channel under the new accord generally support the basel ii procyclicality hypothesis and that the magnitude of the procyclical effects essentially depends on i the composition of banks asset portfolios ii the approach adopted by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements iii the nature of the rating system used by banks iv the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves through time v the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by the banking institutions vi the improvements in credit risk management and vii the supervisor and market intervention under basel ii the recent events and instability in financial markets all over the world have led the procyclicality issue to enter the agendas of several political international fora and some measures to mitigate procyclicality are being put forward the bank capital channel literature should now play an important role in evaluating their effectiveness

impact of energy efficiency policy to productive efficiency of electricity distribution industry in the philippines abstract the study analyzes the productive efficiency and simulates the effect of the energy efficiency policy on the productive efficiency of the electricity distribution industry in the philippines using data envelopment analysis dea the study finds that the main source of technical inefficiency in the distribution utilities is scale inefficiency moreover the study finds that with dsm electricity savings targets the technical efficiency of the industry would slightly improve significant improvement of technical efficiency is furthermore found with system loss reduction targets the paper concludes that the energy efficiency policy which benefits the overall economy and whole electricity supply industry results also in productive efficiency improvement in the distribution sector of the industry

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

fund families as delegated monitors of money managers because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than outsiders can learn from her realized returns she expects inefficiency in future contracts that condition exclusively on realized returns a fund family that learns what the manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if the family is large enough the family s incentive is to retain any given manager regardless of her skill but when the family has enough managers it adds value by boosting the credibility of its retentions through the firing of others as the number of managers grows the efficiency loss goes to zero

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

diversification and competition financial intermediation in a large cournot walras economy abstract an economy with partially diversified imperfectly competitive cournot intermediaries is replicated the cournot walras equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive equilibrium with no uncertainty despite the convergence the tension between diversification and competition persists when the economy becomes large and is manifested in the rates of convergence of price quantities and per capita welfare to their respective limits to maximize the rate of convergence of per capita welfare resources must be allocated in a particular way that balances the gains from better diversified intermediaries and the gains from more competition in the intermediation sector journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d61 d89 g10 g21 l10 l16 o16

slack adjusted dea for time series analysis performance measurement of japanese electric power generation industry in 1984 1993 abstract using a new slack adjusted data envelopment analysis sa dea model which explicitly incorporates an influence of slacks into its efficiency measurement this study discusses a use of various efficiencies and index measures for dea dynamic analysis an analytical formulation to determine the type of return to scale rts is proposed for the new dea model this paper mathematically discusses when multiple solutions occur on rts and how to deal with such a difficulty as an important case study this paper applies the proposed dea approach to examine the performance of japanese electric power generation companies from 1984 to 1993 two policy implications are suggested for guiding the japanese electric power industry

banking crises and the lender of last resort how crucial is the role of information this article develops a model of bank runs and crises and analyses how the presence of a lender of last resort lolr affects the solvency of the banking system we obtain a one to one mapping from the depositors equilibrium strategy to an optimal contract prevailing in the economy the study finds that the difference between a perfectly informed and an imperfectly informed lolr can be crucial our results indicate that a perfectly informed lolr is a pareto improvement however if the supervisory process of the lolr is subject to noise then the gains from ex post efficiency may be outweighed by ex ante inefficiency induced by moral hazard which is conducive to lower lending rates in the economy

bank and nonbank financial intermediation conglomerates trade credit arrangements and banks are all instances of financial intermediation however these institutions differ significantly in the extent to which the projects financed absorb aggregate intermediary risk in whether or not intermediation is carried out by a financial specialist in the type of projects they fund and in the type of claims they issue to investors the paper develops a simple unified model that both accounts for the continued coexistence of these different forms of intermediation and explains why they differ specific applications to conglomerate firms trade credit and banking are discussed conglomerates trade credit arrangements and banks are all instances of financial intermediation in each case the conglomerate headquarters supplier bank obtains funds by selling financial securities while in turn providing funds in exchange for a claim on project cash flows 1 however in spite of the fundamental similarity between these forms of financial intermediation important differences exist between them in particular

information constrained insurance the revelation principle extended abstract private information induced incentive constraints can cause allocations to diverge from full information optimal allocations often in the direction of limited insurance but can bring unanticipated anomalies related plausible contract exclusion restrictions can be damaging in welfare terms more generally private information optimal allocations can be sensitive to the information structure suggesting that the latter be specified with an eye toward realism as well as tractability in an effort to make tractability less of a constraint the paper shows how two apparently difficult information structures a costly state verification environment and a multiperiod multilateral private information environment can be handled theoretically by revelation principle methods the paper also shows how solutions can be generated numerically

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

institutional investment mergers and the market for corporate control the increasing importance of institutional investors as shareholders in individual companies has led to an important debate on their impact on corporate performance in this paper we focus on their role in the market for corporate control this has so far been the subject of very little systematic investigation despite its theoretical and practical significance we consider the impact of financial institutions using two u k merger samples and employing both univariate and multivariate techniques of analysis in the first sample drawn from the low merger period 1981 1983 pre and post merger differences are found between merging companies with and without a significant institutional presence however in the takeover boom year of 1986 from which the second sample is drawn all such distinctions become blurred

corporate real estate analysis evaluating telecom branch efficiency in greece this article proposes productivity analysis for evaluating the relative efficiency in corporate real estate usage across decision making units using data from the greek telecommunications organization gto we measure the productivity of 127 branches using the number of employees and the total area covered per building as inputs and the number of telephony access lines as outputs we apply three nonparametric data envelopment analysis dea models assuming constant returns to scale crs variable returns to scale vrs and slacks based measures sbm respectively we discuss how the proposed approach can provide real estate managers and analysts a multi informational tool that allows the quantification of targets and may serve as a guide tool for the efficient employment of real estate assets

performance and efficiency in colombia s power distribution system effects of the 1994 reform we assess evolution in performance efficiency and productivity of colombia s power distribution utilities before and after the 1994 regulatory reform that introduced electricity market activities for the power sector in 12 distribution companies from 1985 to 2001 performance is evaluated contrasting changes in mean and median by wilcoxon rank sum and pearson tests on financial and other performance indicators technical efficiency is measured by means of data envelopment analysis dea the nature of the dataset allows the estimation of malmquist productivity index and its evolution in time results show a recovery after the reform in the main performance indicators of profitability partial input productivity and output plant efficiency and productivity increased after the reform mainly in the largest utilities used as benchmarks in the dea efficiency scores measures meanwhile the less efficient power distribution companies did not improved after the reform and were not able to undertake plant restructuring to catch up in plant efficiency with respect to the pareto efficient input allocations econometric results on dea efficiency scores suggest a positive effect of policy reform

ownership structure institutional organization and measured x efficiency efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area in this paper we relate these developments to harvey leibenstein s original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behavior of course it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realize what it is that is being maximized however we shall evade this easy escape route into nonfalsifiable hypothesizing and instead shall take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics

costly intermediation and consumption smoothing i introduction financial intermediaries play an essential role in economies transferring funds from agents who do not wish to use them immediately to those who do improving the allocation of resources with consequences for efficiency and welfare as hahn 1971 pointed out financial intermediation is not a costless activity it uses real resources such as labor and capital and governments often tax such activity this generates a wedge between the deposit and borrowing rates and consequently implies that households face different interest rates depending on whether they are savers or borrowers we construct a neoclassical growth model with costly intermediation in order to analyze two positive questions 1 what are the quantitative welfare implications of intermediation costs 2 are the welfare effects evenly distributed across individuals with different levels of wealth individuals in our neoclassical growth model face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity an endogenous borrowing limit and costly intermediation households smooth consumption over time by making deposits at a financial intermediary in good times and running down credit balances or getting loans in bad times intermediation costs generate a wedge between loan and deposit rates with interest payments on loans higher than the return on deposits we assume that financial institutions provide all the intermediation and therefore abstract from direct borrowing and lending between households 1 as in martins da rocha and vailakis 2010 the intermediary has a labor intensive technology maximizes profit is remunerated by the marginal product of labor and takes regulation as given 2 see hahn 1971 diaz gimenez et al 1992 and mehra piguillem and prescott 2011 for similar approaches our goal is to analyze the effects of intermediation costs on agents intertemporal ability to smooth consumption and insure against labor income shocks as a consequence we focus on unsecured consumption loans such as personal loans and credit card debt and abstract from the effects of intermediation costs on entrepreneurship and productivity unsecured consumption loans while only a subset of the total credit market allow us to construct a direct measure of intermediation costs for our quantitative exercise in addition the fraction of unsecured credit over all credit in the data provides another dimension on which we can assess the performance of our model we use our model to measure key statistics of the u s economy including intermediation costs and perform counterfactual experiments reducing intermediation costs leads to two effects first for a given interest rate decreasing borrowing costs expands net borrowers consumption possibility frontiers and even current savers may benefit with positive probability they may need to borrow to smooth consumption in the future due to bad labor productivity shocks second there is an indirect effect lower intermediation costs imply an increase in the demand for loans which raises the interest rate this offsets part of the decrease in borrowing costs and also increases interest income improving savers welfare determining the net impact of these effects requires a quantitative analysis we interpret a reduction in intermediation costs as an improvement in the financial intermediation technology or a reduction in taxes on financial transactions the welfare analysis focuses on stationary equilibria and transitional dynamics the transition is slow and abstracting from it can lead to misleading welfare calculations also mobility in wealth means that comparing for instance the agent with median wealth in two stationary equilibria may not involve the same household we find three main quantitative results first intermediation costs have a large effect on welfare for the u s economy the average aggregate welfare gain of all agents from reducing intermediation costs from 3