the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

weaving straw into gold managing organizational tensions between standardization and flexibility in microfinance this article explores how organizations balance the pressures to pursue efficiency through standardization with the need to remain responsive to local needs the study combines rich ethnography with detailed loan data to show that both standardization and flexibility through relational ties provide substantial organizational benefits but also carry significant costs thus no strategy is inherently superior and their coexistence generates the best results such coexistence however creates contradictions that must be managed here i use microfinance as a strategic setting and gain analytic leverage from the random assignment across branches of loan officers who exhibit significant heterogeneity in rule enforcement styles some enforce rules strictly whereas others frequently bend them to respond to client needs i find that loan officers with relational styles exercise discretion productively to enhance organizational performance yet their effectiveness is contingent on the presence of rule enforcing peers as evidenced by the significant underperformance of branches with a high concentration of officers of either type in contrast branches that contain discretionary diversity or a balance between enforcement styles perform best this is not due to diversity per se but because loan officers process decisions in local credit committees committees that contain discretionary diversity generate a productive tension that induces participants to justify decisions along broader organizational goals thus maintaining a productive balance between standardization and flexibility implications for organizational theory and practice are discussed

the impact of group lending in northeast thailand abstract much of the literature on group lending focuses on its high repayment rates rather than its goal of promoting borrower welfare most studies that attempt to measure the impact of group lending neglect the issues of self selection and endogenous program placement thus leading to biased estimates of impact one reason for this neglect is the lack of data that would allow for identification of impact this paper surmounts these problems by using data from a quasi experiment conducted in northeast thailand in 1995 1996 program participants were identified in six control villages 1 year prior to receiving loans surveys were then conducted of these control members treatment members in eight older program villages and nonmembers in both types of village this survey design allows for straightforward estimation of impact the results indicate that program loans are having little impact although naive estimates of impact that fail to account for self selection and endogenous program placement significantly overestimate impact

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

informal credit markets in india informal financial markets those which are not regulated or monitored by the banking authorities account for much of business credit in developing countries these unregulated informal credit markets icm are important both in their own right as part of each country s financial system and because of their reciprocal relations with growing enterprises and the regulated financial sector in order to study the operations of some of these markets in detail in urban commercial settings we conducted an extended survey of some of the informal credit markets of india 2 based in some cases on centuries of operation these markets proved to be important in the functioning of the contemporary economy indigenous style bankers belonging to particular ethnic communities and castes formerly provided the full range of banking services to their clients 3 with the rise of modern western style banking the indigenous bankers either have transformed themselves to serve sectors such as wholesale trade not well served by the modern sector or provide services which the modern bankers cannot provide though any estimate is very approximate it seems that informal credit markets account for as much as 20 of commercial credit outstanding in the various markets surveyed we began by surveying the gujeratis some of whom still practice their traditional form of full service banking in their homeland of gujerat and adjoining bombay the shikarpuris or multanis originally full service bankers in sind who now provide commercial credit in various other centers the chettiars in south india the rastogis in uttar pradesh and the marwaris especially in eastern india 4 but our surveys revealed that a wide range of ethnic groups were now involved in informal credit markets and the more meaningful differentiations

the use of village agents in rural credit delivery using a simple principal agent model this article examines the incentive problems that arise when a formal financial institution such as a rural bank utilises a member of the rural community to act as an agent in screening potential borrowers and collecting repayment optimal compensation schemes are derived for the agent and their implications are discussed in addition i show that the norms and rules that govern village life may aid the financial institution by helping to constrain possible strategic behaviour by the agent

a theory of interactions between mfis and informal lenders abstract we provide a theoretical analysis of effects of entry of a microfinance institution mfi into an informal credit market which is segmented whereby informal lenders derive some market power owing to privileged information concerning borrower specific default risks relative to informal lenders the mfi has a cost advantage and an informational disadvantage regarding borrower risk borrowers differ along another dimension landholding which is observable to all lenders mfi entry is shown to induce selection effects across risk and landownership dimensions in shifts of borrowers from informal lenders to the mfi which could raise informal interest rates as observed in many ldcs the model is consistent with evidence from bangladesh and west bengal in contrast to hypotheses based on cream skimming scale diseconomy inducing collusion facilitating or crowding in effects of mfis on informal credit the model implies that mfi entry is pareto improving for borrowers irrespective of effects on informal interest rates

access to capital in rural thailand an estimated model of formal versus informal credit the aim of this paper is to understand the mechanism underlying access to credit the author focuses on two important aspects of rural credit markets in thailand first moneylenders and other informal lenders coexist with formal lending institutions such as government or commercial banks and more recently micro lending institutions second potential borrowers presumably face sizable transaction costs obtaining external credit the author develops and estimates a model based on limited enforcement and transaction costs that provides a unified view of those facts the results show that the limited ability of banks to enforce contracts more than transaction costs is crucial in understanding the observed diversity of lenders

microfinance spillovers a model of competition in informal credit markets with an application to indian villages despite widespread interest in the development of microfinance spillover effects on the non using population and redistributive issues remain largely unexplored i study a competition game between microfinance institutions mfis offering joint liability loans and moneylenders offering individual loans in presence of adverse selection i show that one unintended consequence of the entry of a microfinance sector in local credit markets can be to trigger an increase in the equilibrium informal interest rate because mfis tend to attract a disproportionately safe share of the borrower pool away from incumbent moneylenders the existence of such composition externality depends crucially on the size of the microfinance sector and the risk composition of the borrower pool the model predicts a non linearly increasing relationship between informal interest rates and mfis capacity in relatively safe credit markets and no relationship in risky villages i show evidence supporting these predictions using a first hand panel database that records all credit transactions over 8 years for a sample of about 1000 households living in indian villages with extensive space and time variation in the size of their microfinance sector

pricing chance constraints in electricity markets this letter considers a stochastic electricity market in which the uncertainty is handled using a proportional control law and chance security constraints we prove that in this framework market clearing prices yielding a robust competitive market equilibrium can be computed and used for stochastic market settlements by risk aware system operators an illustrative case study corroborates the usefulness of the proposed approach

a little at a time the use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs abstract informal lenders appear to be thriving even in regions where microfinance institutions mfis such as the grameen bank have established lending programs we suggest that an explanation for this well documented observation lies in the ubiquitous use of regularly scheduled repayments by mfis borrowers are typically required to repay their loans in tightly structured installments beginning soon after loan disbursement this little remarked aspect of the repayment schedule is usually explained as inculcating fiscal discipline among borrowers we argue that an alternative rationale for this loan repayment structure lies in the difficulty of monitoring borrowers actions the potential for moral hazard leads mfis to use innovative mechanisms such as regularly scheduled repayments which indirectly coopt the better informed informal lenders conversely this installment repayment structure allows informal lenders to survive further we show that this linkage can not only expand the volume of informal lending but may also raise the interest rate in the informal sector

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

here today gone tomorrow can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible this paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives in the form of access to additional loans to discourage borrowers from strategic default or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized we propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions mfis by endogenizing the default penalty while constraining the mfi to maintain sustainable lending operations furthermore accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock we show that under certain circumstances the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans

policies and impact an analysis of village level microfinance institutions this paper uses variation in policies and institutional characteristics to evaluate the impacts of village level microfinance institutions in rural thailand to identify impacts we use policies related to the successful unsuccessful provision of services as exogenous variation in effective financial intermediation we find that institutions particularly those with good policies can promote asset growth consumption smoothing and occupational mobility and can decrease moneylender reliance specifically cash lending institutions production credit groups and especially women s groups are successful in providing intermediation and its benefits to members while buffalo banks and rice banks are not the policies identified as important to intermediation and benefits the provision of savings services especially pledged savings accounts emergency services and training and advice surprisingly much publicized policies such as joint liability default consequences or repayment frequency had no measured impacts jel 012 016

do women borrowers augment financial performance of mfis abstractthere is some consensus that depth of outreach and financial performance of microfinance institutions mfi are positively correlated a majority of microcredit borrowers are women and since the prevalence of female borrowers is even greater among the very poor there should be a positive correlation between female borrowers and financial performance most of the mfis target women as preferred borrowers however no study to date has investigated the relationship between targeting women and mfi s sustainability with respect to profitability and yield utilizing a panel of 892 mfis over a period of 10 years this study shows that increased proportion of women borrowers has a statistically significant positive impact on yield and financial performance of mfis consequently this article also analyses the implication as to whether female borrowers have better repayment rate than male borrowers

contestability a revisionist view many claims have been made about the significance of the contribution of contestability theory to industrial organizat ion this paper concludes that contestability theory leaves unanswere d questions about the identity of entrants and the source of their re sources a modification to the theory is proposed rather than as a h indrance to potential entry sunk costs are viewed as being of key si gnificance for the disciplining of oligopolists through potential ent ry with the proposed modification the analysis of the costs of mult iproduct firms may be more easily integrated with recent developments in industrial organization copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

micro credit initiatives for equitable and sustainable development who pays abstract there is a growing acknowledgement that micro credit programs have potential for equitable and sustainable development however my anthropological research on the micro credit program of the grameen bank shows that bank workers are expected to increase disbursement of loans among their members and press for high recovery rates to earn profit necessary for economic viability of the institution to ensure timely repayment in the loan centers bank workers and borrowing peers inflict an intense pressure on women clients in the study community many borrowers maintain their regular payment schedules through a process of loan recycling that considerably increases the debt liability on the individual households increases tension and frustration among household members produces new forms of dominance over women and increases violence in society

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

moneylenders and bankers price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market abstract in many areas of the world a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision we present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs motivated by studies of rural credit markets we show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition increasing prices or inducing exit higher prices interest rates result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers the models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders

formal informal sector interaction in rural credit markets abstract the majority of small cultivators in the less developed countries are not regarded as credit worthy by the formal sector financial institutions and are forced to borrow from the moneylenders in the informal credit market this paper shows that when such borrowers differ in their likelihood of default and the moneylenders are asymmetrically informed about the client specific degree of risk the policy of providing cheap credit through the formal sector can generate adverse composition effects which worsen the terms of credit and the availability of loans in the informal sector

managing credit for the rural poor lessons from the grameen bank abstract this paper based on a detailed study of the grameen bank in bangladesh suggests that the credit policies of the bank do not constitute a sufficient explanation for the bank s success and that its acclaimed policy of replacing individual collateral with group guarantee is in fact not practiced the paper presents an alternate explanation for the success of the grameen bank in addition it explains how the grameen bank has been able to overcome typical problems of implementing development programs by sustaining good performance from its large work force and keeping to a minimum the tendency of a few target beneficiaries to corner program benefits and flout organizational norms for their personal benefit

group lending local information and peer selection this paper analyzes how group lending programs use joint liability to utilize local information that borrowers have about each other s projects through self selection of group members in the group formation stage these schemes are shown to lead to positive assortative matching in group formation faced with the same contract this makes the effective cost of borrowing lower to safer borrowers because they have safer partners conditional on success their expected dues to the lender are lower than that of riskier borrowers the resulting improvement in the pool of borrowers is shown to increase repayment rates and welfare q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

demystifying nonparticipation in microcredit a population based analysis abstract given the current popularity of microcredit schemes as a means of poverty alleviation their accessibility to the poorest is of obvious concern this paper examines a targeted microcredit program in bangladesh to assess its coverage among the poor and to identify program and client related barriers impeding participation a population survey of over 24 000 households reveals that although three quarters are eligible for microcredit less than one quarter participate rates of participation in microcredit are higher among poorer households multivariate analysis identifies lack of female education small household size and landlessness as risk factors for nonparticipation based on a 7 random sample of this population the implications of these findings for poverty alleviation policies and programs are discussed

which microfinance institutions are becoming more cost effective with time evidence from a mixture model italian speakers tend to stress the second component of german morphologically complex words such as compounds and prefix verbs even if the first component is lexically stressed to improve their prosodic phrasing an automatic pronunciation teaching method was developed based on auditory feedback of prosodically corrected utterances in the learners own voices basically the method copies contours of f0 local speech rate and intensity from reference utterances of a german native speaker to the learners speech signals it also adds emphasis to the stress position in order to help the learners better recognise the correct pronunciation and identify their errors a perception test with german native speakers revealed that manipulated utterances significantly better reflect lexical stress than the corresponding original utterances thus two groups of italian learners of german were provided with different feedback during a training session one group with manipulated utterances in their individual voices and the other with correctly pronounced original utterances in the teacher s voice afterwards both groups produced the same sentences again and german native speakers judged the resulting utterances resynthesised stimuli especially with emphasised stress were found to be a more effective feedback than natural stimuli to learn the correct stress position since resynthesis was obtained without previous segmentation of the learners speech signals this technology could be effectively included in computer assisted language learning software