efficiency considerations and the exemption of food from sales and value added taxes we evaluate efficiency considerations underlying the widespread exemption of food from sales and value added taxes and the implications for tax policy household and restau rant meals and both constant and increasing returns cases are examined higher taxes on food offset the non taxation of time inputs into household production even under constant returns to scale with increasing returns gains from taxing food are higher and amplified by subsidizing restaurant food and all marginal cost components of restaurant meals on effi ciency grounds exemption of food from sales and value added taxes emerges as socially costly policy especially under increasing returns

tax collection with agency costs private contracting or government bureaucrats historically governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes this paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors while bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs profit maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level generally the choice of collection methods depends on a comparison of the welfare loss associated with monitoring in the bureaucratic setting and the welfare loss associated with overdetection of evasion in the private setting copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

the political economics of redistribution inequality and tax avoidance a central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality however empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed this paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement by focusing on structure induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution depending on two opposing effects the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue

a distributional theory of government growth this article presents a closed form solution for time consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter extending meltzer and richard s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government at low stages of economic development the median voter identified as a relatively poor worker prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage at higher stages of development however when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises yet in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times hence government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state

tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

efficient black markets abstract this paper investigates analytically the welfare effects of black market activities that firms undertake to evade taxes the desirability of a black market is linked to the attributes of the goods supplied by black market firms the analysis identifies cases where a black market reduces increases the distortionary impact of taxation on the allocation of resources across the goods that the government is attempting to tax leading to a welfare gain loss

taxes and transaction costs in asset market equilibrium abstract this paper examines the effects of capital taxation in an imperfect capital market in which acquiring risky assets incurs costs individual portfolio choice has two distinct aspects the extensive choice of which assets to hold in the portfolio and the intensive choice of what fraction of wealth to invest in each asset held the traditional assumption of zero transaction costs obscures the extensive choice this paper shows that if trading in assets is costly capital taxes have extensive effects as well as the intensive effects previously studied

coase theorem complexity and transaction costs this paper by introducing complexity considerations provides a dynamic foundation for the coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining negotiation outcomes we show when the players have a preference for less complex strategies the coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs specifically complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs we also show the latter is true in the rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs

asset allocation with distorted beliefs and transaction costs abstract in this paper we study the problem of the optimal portfolio selection with transaction costs for a decision maker who is faced with knightian uncertainty the decision maker s portfolio consists of one risky and one risk free asset and we assume that the transaction costs are proportional to the traded volume of the risky asset the attitude to uncertainty is modeled by the choquet expected utility we derive optimal strategies and bounds of the no transaction region for both optimistic and pessimistic decision makers the no transaction region of a pessimistic investor is narrower and its bounds lie closer to the origin than that of an optimistic trader moreover under the choquet expected utility the structure of the no transaction region is not necessarily a closed interval as it is under the standard expected utility model

spend it like beckham inequality and redistribution in the uk 1983 2004 a main activity of the state is to redistribute resources standard political economy models predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution this paper shows that for the uk in the period 1983 2004 a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has not been associated with increased redistribution we explore this example of the paradox of redistribution using attitudinal data we show that standard political economy models of the individual demand for redistribution do have explanatory power but that other attitudes and beliefs are also very important moreover these attitudes and beliefs change quite quickly so are very important in explaining variation in the demand for redistribution

investment strategies under transaction costs the finite horizon case we examine the effect of proportional transaction costs on dynamic portfolio strategies for an agent who maximizes his expected utility of terminal wealth for portfolios composed of a single risky asset and a single riskless asset constantinides 1979 shows that the optimal investment policy is described in terms of a no transaction region where the optimal policy is to refrain from trading if initial portfolio holdings lie within the region and to transact to the nearest boundary of the region if portfolio holdings lie outside the region because the boundaries could not be derived analytically we developed an efficient and tractable algorithm to obtain the boundaries which are expressed as the ratio of the dollar holdings in stocks and bonds we considered two cases the same transaction costs for the two assets and costs incurred on only the risky asset we derived the optimal trading strategies and utility levels for a large set of realistic parameters in particular we show that the no trans

bargaining and markets complexity and the competitive outcome abstract rubinstein and wolinsky rev econ stud 57 1990 63 78 consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade they show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome here i consider rubinstein and wolinsky s model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences together with the standard payoff in the game then every equilibrium is stationary markov and induces the unique competitive price thus i demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome

taxation with costly administration the concept of a tax technology is used here as providing a unified framework for analyzing both administrative activity by tax authorities and tax resisting activity by taxpayers this framework provides a simple formalization of adam smith s four components of tax costs administration substitution active noncompliance and passive compliance the model is used to derive policy implications concerning the proper measurement of the cost of public funds and concerning the criterion for optimal administration

voting inequality and redistribution this paper surveys models of voting on redistribution under reason able assumptions the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner if the median is poorer than average redistribution is from rich to poor and increasing inequality increases redistribution however under different assumptions about the economic environment redistribution may not be simply rich to poor and inequality need not increase redistribution several lines of argument are presented in particular political participation public provision of private goods public pensions and tax avoidance or evasion

plea bargaining with the irs abstract the purpose of this paper is to propose a new evasion counteracting policy and to prove its welfare improving property the new fatota policy allows a target group of businesses to choose between the following two options paying a fixed amount of taxes thus exempting themselves from tax audits or paying only the amount they choose to pay and subject to possible tax audits it is shown that fatota is very similar to the plea bargaining system of the u s criminal proceedings and our results can be treated as an extension of the grossman katz analysis to the crime of tax evasion

the optimal elasticity of taxable income abstract the strength of the behavioral response to a tax rate change depends on the environment individuals operate in and may be manipulated by instruments controlled by the government we first derive a measure of the social benefit to affecting this elasticity the paper then examines this effect in the solution to the optimal income taxation problem when such an instrument is available first in a general model and then in an example when the government chooses the income tax base

majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance abstract a benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income the present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare result for a right skewed distribution of taxed income we show that the political distortion from majority voting is increasing in the median voter s avoidance vice versa keeping the decisive voter s avoidance constant the political inefficiency is decreasing in the average level of avoidance in the economy

informality and development in developing countries informal firms account for up to half of economic activity they provide livelihood for billions of people yet their role in economic development remains controversial some like hernando de soto 1989 2000 see informal firms as an untapped reservoir of entrepreneurial energy held back by government regulations in this view unleashing this energy by reducing entry regulations or improving property rights would fuel growth and development others like levy 2008 take a more cynical view stressing the advantages enjoyed by informal firms and workers from avoiding taxes and regulations a report from the mckinsey global institute describes informal firms as parasites competing unfairly with law abiding formal firms farrell 2004 in this view informality should be suppressed not unleashed still others follow the development tradition of lewis 1954 harris and todaro 1970 and more recently rauch 1991 and see informality as a byproduct of poverty from this dual perspective formal and informal firms are fundamentally different productive formal entrepreneurs pay taxes and bear the cost of government regulation to reach new customers raise capital and access public goods these entrepreneurs are often educated and find it more profitable to run bigger formal firms rather than the smaller informal ones in contrast informal entrepreneurs are typically uneducated and unproductive and they run small businesses producing low quality products for low income customers using little capital and

the tax evasion social multiplier evidence from italy we estimate social externalities of tax evasion in a model where congestion of the auditing resources of local tax authorities generates a social multiplier identification is based on a contrast of the variance of tax evasion at different levels of aggregation we use a unique data set that contains audits of about 80 000 small businesses and professionals in italy and also provides an exact measure of reference groups in our model we find a social multiplier of about 3 which means that the equilibrium response to a shock that induces an exogenous variation in mean concealed income is about 3 times the initial average response this is a short run effect that persists to the extent that auditing resources are not adjusted to internalize the congestion externality

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

voting over taxes the case of tax evasion this paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible we characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver in this case we find unconventional patterns of redistribution e g from the middle class to the poor and the rich

does the median voter model explain the size of government evidence from the states despite an attempt by its own authors it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by meltzer and richard 1981 has had convincing empirical backing in this paper we adapt that model to a model of state government size the main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows government size as measured by the percentage of income devoted to government redistribution grows we test the model using panel data from the us states from 1979 1991 in contrast to the results found by meltzer and richard 1983 we find little evidence to support the model the results are robust to several model specifications and estimation techniques

labour supply tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds an empirical investigation abstract in this paper we extend the concept of marginal cost of public funds itmcf to incorporate tax evasion in the labour market mcf values are also computed from various tax reforms applied to the province of quebec canada 1985 for this purpose a utility based labour supply model that allows for both regular and irregular work activities is used at the benchmark situation the mcf associated with an increase in marginal income tax rates ranges between 1 39 and 1 53 depending upon whether we consider rationing or not moreover the presence of the irregular sector accounts for between 0 02 and 0 05 of this mcf although small in magnitude the impact of the irregular sector increases rapidly with the level of marginal tax rates

a characteristics approach to optimal taxation line drawing and tax driven product innovation real world tax legislation assigns goods to different categories of tax rates on the basis of observable characteristics allowing the tax system to handle a constantly evolving set of available goods we recast the theory of optimal taxation in the language of characteristics and we show how to optimally draw lines that delineate tax rate regimes such lines are associated with notches in tax liability as a function of characteristics creating incentives to introduce goods with new combinations of characteristics in order to reduce tax liability with a restricted set of tax instruments such notches are in general part of the second best optimal tax system

evading auditing and taxing the equity compliance tradeoff tax evasion and auditing are analyzed in a model of linear income taxation taxpayers minimize expected tax payments including penalty for underreporting while the tax administration sets its audit policy to maximize expected net revenue under the restriction of only two audit rates per class of taxpayers given the reaction of taxpayers and tax administration we derive the optimal income tax that the government should adopt to maximize social welfare there are several classes of taxpayers each characterized by a given distribution of pretax income and specific audit policy parameters

model misspecification and underdiversification in this paper we study intertemporal portfolio choice when an investor accounts explicitly for model misspecification we develop a framework that allows for ambiguity about not just the joint distribution of returns for all stocks in the portfolio but also for different levels of ambiguity for the marginal distribution of returns for any subset of these stocks we find that when the overall ambiguity about the joint distribution of returns is high then small differences in ambiguity for the marginal return distribution will result in a portfolio that is significantly underdiversified relative to the standard mean variance portfolio

tax evasion and the size of the underground economy abstract the theoretical literature on the relationship between the tax system and the underground economy is extended using a model similar to the one examined by watson journal of public economics 1985 27 231 246 in which tax evasion is possible in one sector of the economy but is impossible in the other we prove that a rise in the tax rate increases decreases the number of agents in the sector in which tax evasion is possible if preferences exhibit increasing decreasing relative risk aversion we also use our model to investigate the relationship between the tax rate and the total amount of tax evaded

the optimal size of a tax collection agency the condition that characterizes the optimal size of a tax collection agency is derived and then given a simple interpretation in terms of excess burden the paper clarifies an earlier finding of sandmo which suggests that the optimal degree of enforcement is higher than a simple cost benefit calculation would indicate the appropriate condition is that at the margin the resource cost of increasing enforcement should equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in exposure to risk the increased revenue gained from stricter enforcement does not enter the expression because it merely represents a transfer among the economy s identical agents

welfare effects of changing commodity tax rates toward uniformity abstract this paper presents a theory of tax reform that is applicable to a many good economy where i the initial tax structure is arbitrarily given ii no lump sum tax exists and iii the initial tax revenue must be maintained after the reform sufficient conditions are established under which tax changes definitely result in increases in welfare they indicate that in a wide class of situations the uniform tax structure can be a useful intermediate target on the way to optimum

on the optimal tax base for commodity taxation taxed considerable effort has been devoted to characterizing the manner in which the optimal tax rates differ across the taxable commodities but the literature has rarely addressed the issue of which commodities should be included in the tax base in fact the standard optimal tax model cannot provide a useful answer to this question because it does not contain any of the resource costs normally associated with the collection of taxes an omission that seriously diminishes the policy relevance of the model 2

on income tax avoidance the case of germany abstract we present a micro estimate determining taxed income as a function of gross income and all major deduction options depending on household and asset categories it shows that tax savings strongly increase with increasing income resulting in an effective marginal tax rate 16 percentage points below the legislated one for the highest income groups this calls into question the intended distributional impact of progressive income taxation our estimate suggests aggregate income tax losses to the german fiscal authorities in the order of magnitude of 34 of wage and income taxes paid in 1983 relative to 1994 tax proceeds this percentage would amount to dm 105 b

financial globalization inequality and the rising public debt abstract during the last three decades government debt has increased in most developed countries during the same period we have also observed a significant liberalization of international financial markets we propose a multicountry model with incomplete markets and show that governments may choose higher levels of debt when financial markets become internationally integrated we also show that public debt increases with the volatility of uninsurable income idiosyncratic risk to the extent that the increase in income inequality observed in some industrialized countries has been associated with higher idiosyncratic risk the paper suggests another potential mechanism for the rise in public debt jel d31 e62 f65 h63

complexity and competition extensive form market games typically have a large number of noncompetitive equilibria in this paper we argue that the complexity of noncompetitive behavior provides a justification for competitive equilibrium in the sense that if rational agents have an aversion to complexity at the margin then maximizing behavior will result in simple behavioral rules and hence in a competitive outcome for this purpose we use a class of extensive form dynamic matching and bargaining games with a finite number of agents in particular we consider markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers and deterministic exogenous sequential matching rules although the results can be extended to other matching processes if the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences lexicographically with the standard payoff then every equilibrium strategy profile induces a competitive outcome

a letter to the editor on wage bargaining abstract the rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations a strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place this paper extends the rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium

the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates a critical review this paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data first we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis we discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic second we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the united states to illustrate those issues third we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out finally we discuss avenues for future research jel h24 h31 j22

labor market institutions taxation and the underground economy abstract the paper aims at qualifying the links between labor market institutions taxation tax monitoring and underground economic activity the proposed model is a continuous time matching model with one commodity roduced either overground or underground underground economic activity arises because of partial compliance with regulations and tax contributions imposed by the government vacancies and workers search are directed at a specific labor market workers are heterogenous in the subjective cost they face when operating in the irregular sector analytical and numerical investigations suggest that interactions between regular and irregular activities can affect standard results of policy interventions in that respect the paper supports the view that policies aiming at increasing individuals benefits of participating in the regular sector are more desirable than a deterrence policy

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

ghost house busters the electoral response to a large anti tax evasion program the incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance we study the electoral response to the ghost buildings program a nationwide anti tax evasion policy in italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities two million buildings were registered as a result of the program our difference in differences identification strategy exploits both variation across towns in the ex ante program scope to increase enforcement as well as administrative data on actual building registrations local incumbents experience an increase in their reelection likelihood as a consequence of the policy in addition these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher speed of public good provision implying complementarity among enforcement policies the underlying tax culture and government efficiency

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

an exact solution to a dynamic portfolio choice problem under transactions costs the presence of any friction in financial markets qualitatively changes the nature of the optimization problem faced by an investor it requires one to either act or do nothing an issue which of course does not arise in frictionless situations the investor considered here accumulates wealth without consuming until some terminal point in time when he consumes all his objective is to maximize the expected utility derived from that terminal consumption we postpone the terminal point far into the future to obtain a stationary portfolio rule the portfolio policy is in the form of two control barriers between which portfolio proportions are allowed to fluctuate we show how to calculate them

optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between optimal taxation and optimal tax enforcement a central question concerns the extent to which revenue should be raised through higher tax rates which distort behavior or greater enforcement which distorts behavior and also entails direct resource costs in the models examined some expenditure on enforcement may be optimal despite its resource cost its distortionary effect and the availability of other revenue sources having no enforcement costs rules for optimal tax rates and enforcement expenditures are derived which also indicate the marginal cost of government funds and optimal enforcement priorities for a tax collection agency

optimal taxation capital mobility and tax evasion the problem of capital flight and tax evasion is of paramount concern to many countries the fear is that capital mobility may lead to capital flight from high to low tax countries in such large amounts that it deprives a nation of its tax base and as a consequence its welfare system today s international climate where bank secrecy laws protect foreign investors anonymity in addition to substantial differences in national tax rates makes this fear a reality capital flight and tax evasion are also of concern from an equity as well as an efficiency point of view to the extent that labor cannot evade taxation as easily as capital labor is subject to higher effective tax rates than capital the presence of capital flight therefore imposes a higher tax burden on immobile factors and creates inequality giovannini 1989 and razin and sadka 1991 have recently studied the welfare effects of capital flight both studies are undertaken from the extreme assumption that foreign savings cannot be taxed and hence that tax evasion is undetectable and costless although evidence suggests that governments have difficulties taxing foreign source income governments derive positive tax revenue from foreign source income this paper thus adopts a different perspective capital flight and tax evasion are viewed as problems of tax enforcement the purpose of the paper is to analyze the intertemporal savings decision of an individual who can allocate consumption between two periods by borrowing and lending abroad and domestically it is assumed that foreign savings can evade taxation with a certain probability depending on the amount of money the government allocates to tax enforcement within this setting we investigate how taxes on foreign and domestic savings should be set optimally and how much money if any the government should allocate to tax enforcement

top incomes in the long run of history a recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid hence aggregate economic growth per capita and gini inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes we discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series including income definition and comparability over time and across countries tax avoidance and tax evasion we provide a summary of the key empirical findings most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks top income shares do not recover in the immediate postwar decades however over the last thirty years top income shares have increased substantially in english speaking countries and in india and china but not in continental european countries or japan this increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes as a result wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past finally we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open

political complements in the welfare state health care and social security abstract all oecd countries target a large majority of their welfare spending to the elderly through public pensions and health care programs spending in both programs has largely increased in the past decades often more than the share of elderly in the population we suggest that these phenomena may be due to political complementarities between these two transfer programs we show that these two programs may coexist because public health care may increase the political constituency in favor of social security and vice versa specifically public health decreases the absolute longevity differential between low and high income individuals therefore rising the retirement period and the total pension benefits of the former relatively to the latter this effect increases the political support for social security among the low income young we show that in a political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election a voting majority of low income young and retirees supports a large welfare state the composition between public health and social security is determined by intermediate median income types who favor the contemporaneous existence of these two programs since public health increases their longevity enough to make social security more attractive technological improvements in health care strengthens this complementarity and lead to more welfare spending

tax reform and the political economy of the tax base abstract this paper studies the political prospects for reform in a model where the tax base and statutory rate are separate instruments of tax policy the model suggests that large changes in the tax code may be easier to enact than marginal reforms the tax base faces a tipping point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support reform at this tipping point tax reform is pareto improving politically feasible tax reform occurs when fiscal needs are large but may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal tax rates there is strategic complementarity in lobbying for tax exemptions resulting in multiple equilibria the model s main predictions are consistent with recent tax reforms in oecd countries

positive arithmetic of the welfare state abstract this paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because i retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group and ii the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low income young to support this system in a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity we show that for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population a welfare system composed of a within cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election social security is sustained by retirees and low income young while intragenerational redistribution by low income young unlike unidimensional voting model our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups

using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural elasticities theory and evidence from pakistan we develop a framework for nonparametrically identifying optimization frictions and structural elasticities using notches discontinuities in the choice sets of agents introduced by tax and transfer policies notches create excess bunching on the low tax side and missing mass on the high tax side of a cutoff and they are often associated with a region of strictly dominated choice that would have zero mass in a frictionless world by combining excess bunching observed response attenuated by frictions with missing mass in the dominated region frictions it is possible to uncover the structural elasticity that would govern behavior in the absence of frictions and arguably capture long run behavior we apply our framework to tax notches in pakistan using rich administrative data while observed bunching is large and sharp optimization frictions are also very large as the majority of taxpayers in dominated ranges are unresponsive to tax incentives the combination of large observed bunching and large frictions implies that the frictionless behavioral response to notches is extremely large but the underlying structural elasticity driving this response is nevertheless modest this highlights the inefficiency of notches by creating extremely strong price distortions they induce large behavioral responses even when structural elasticities are small

costly bargaining and renegotiation we identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs first for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached secondly even when there are equilibria in which an agreement is reached we find that the model always has an equilibrium in which agreement is never reached as well as equilibria in which agreement is delayed for an arbitrary length of time finally the only way in which the parties can reach an agreement in equilibrium is by using inefficient punishments for some of the opponent s deviations we argue that this implies that when the parties are given the opportunity to renegotiate out of these inefficiencies the only equilibrium outcome which survives is the one in which agreement is never reached regardless of the value of the transaction costs

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents this paper models the wage contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide in each period whether or not to strike for the duration of that period we show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement although both parties are completely rational and fully informed this has implications for other inefficient phenomena such as tariff wars debt negotiations and wars in general we characterize the set of equilibria show that strikes can occur in real time and discuss extensions of the model such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities copyright 1991 by american economic association

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

efficient repeated implementation this paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function scf with innitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of possibly history dependent mechanisms such that i its nash equilibrium set is non empty and ii every nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty we show with minor qualications that in the complete information environment an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if and only if it is ecient we also discuss several extensions of our analysis including constructions employing only nite mechanisms

tax enforcement a public choice perspective federal income tax inforcement varies greatly across individual states while it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency anecdotal evidence suggests it does not in this paper we apply the weingast moran model to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the irs specifically we model irs audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations we find that the interstate differences in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the irs shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the irs

portfolio rebalancing model with transaction costs based on fuzzy decision theory the fuzzy set is one of the powerful tools used to describe an uncertain environment as well as quantifying any potential return and risk portfolio liquidity is taken into account and a linear programming model for portfolio rebalancing with transaction costs is proposed the level of return that an investor might aspire to the risk and the liquidity of portfolio are vague in an uncertain financial environment considering them as fuzzy numbers we propose a portfolio rebalancing model with transaction costs based on fuzzy decision theory an example is given to illustrate the behavior of the proposed model using real data from the shanghai stock exchange

tax evasion concealment and the optimal linear income tax this paper incorporates tax evasion into the analysis of optimal linear income taxation taxevaders can influence the probability of being caught if audited through expenditures on concealment it is proved that tax evasion can make a given tax system more as well as less progressive depending on the concealment technology the paper derives and interprets simple formulas for characterizing the optimal tax rate and audit probability it also gives sufficient conditions under which tax evasion lowers the optimal tax rate while showing that an increase in the optimal tax rate is also possible

postponing retirement the political effect of aging abstract conventional economic wisdom suggests that because of the aging process social security systems will have to be retrenched in particular retirement age will have to be largely increased yet is this policy measure feasible in oecd countries since the answer belongs mainly to the realm of politics i evaluate the political feasibility of postponing retirement under aging in france italy the uk and the us simulations for the year 2050 steady state demographic economic and political scenario suggest that retirement age will be postponed in all countries while the social security contribution rate will rise in all countries but italy the political support for increasing the retirement age stems mainly from the negative income effect induced by aging which reduces the profitability of the existing social security system and thus the individuals net social security wealth

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

complexity and repeated implementation this paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an ecient social choice function when the agents preferences evolve randomly we show that the freedom to set dierent mechanisms at dierent histories can give the planner an additional leverage to deter undesirable behavior even if the mechanisms are restricted to be simple and nite specically we construct a history dependent sequence of simple mechanisms such that with minor qualications every pure subgame perfect equilibrium delivers the correct social choice at every history while every mixed equilibrium is strictly pareto dominated more importantly when faced with agents with a preference for less complex strategies at the margin the ecient social choice function can be repeatedly implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies our results demonstrate a positive role for complexity considerations in mechanism design

optimal taxation and optimal tax systems the theory of optimal taxation has for the pas two decades been the reigning normative approach of taxation this paper argues that in its current state optimal tax theory is incomplete as a guide to action concerning many critical issues in tax policy it is incomplete because it has not yet come to terms with taxation as a system of coercively collecting revenues from individuals who will tend to resist the coercive nature of collection taxes implies that the resource cost of implementing a tax system have been and will continue to be a critical determinant of appropriate tax policy the paper first presents the three cornerstone propositions of optimal tax theory and then it discusses the influence of these propositions on recent tax policy developments it concludes by sketching an alternative to optimal taxation called the theory of optimal tax systems which embraces the insights of optimal taxation but also considers the technology of raising taxes and the constraints placed upon tax policy by that technology the optimal tax systems perspective is shown to shed light on the choice of tax instruments the problem of tax evasion and the appropriate tax treatment of capital income this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fixing the leak in okun s bucket optimal tax progressivity when avoidance can be controlled this paper examines optimal income tax progressivity when avoidance responses to taxation are important and can be controlled at some cost by the government a simple example shows that ignoring the fact that avoidance can be controlled that the leak in okun s bucket can be fixed can lead to misleading implications about the optimal degree of tax rate progressivity the paper then generalizes the standard modei of the optimal linear income tax to include taxpayer avoidance behavior and the ability of government to control the avoidance but not the labor supply response to higher marginal tax ites the discussion suggests that if the tax burden is to be made more progressive base broadening and increased enforcement ought to be considered as alternatives or complements to increasing tax rates for high income individuals

tax bases tax rates and the elasticity of reported income abstract tax reforms usually change both tax rates and tax bases using a panel of income tax returns spanning the two major u s tax reforms of the 1980s and a number of smaller tax law changes i find that the elasticity of income reported on personal income tax returns depends on the available deductions this highlights that this key behavioral elasticity is not an immutable parameter but rather that it can be to some extent controlled by policy makers one implication is that base broadening reduces the marginal efficiency cost of taxation the results are very similar for all income categories indicating that the rich are more responsive to tax rates because tax rules that apply to them are different their tax base is narrower the point estimates indicate that the tax reform act of 1986 reduced the marginal cost of collecting a dollar of tax revenue with roughly half of this reduction due to the base broadening and the other half due to the tax rate reduction as a by product the analysis in this paper offers a reconciliation of disparate estimates obtained by previous studies of the tax responsiveness of income

will destination based taxes be fully exploited when available an application to the u s commodity tax system abstract we develop a tax competition model that allows for the setting of both an origin based and a destination based commodity tax rate in the presence of avoidance and evasion in the presence of evasion jurisdictions will give cross border shoppers tax preferential treatment thus not fully exploiting the potential of destination based taxation moreover the divergence between origin based and destination based taxes is stronger when the incentives for consumers tax arbitrage opportunities increase the united states is one example of many such systems while sales taxes are due at the point of sale use taxes are due on goods purchased out of state we document that when able to set both rates a majority of jurisdictions levy destination based use taxes at a lower rate than origin based sales taxes in response to changes in state level policies that increase tax avoidance opportunities the results of the empirical model broadly confirm our theory

why do developing countries tax so little the power to tax is taken for granted in a great deal of mainstream public finance in considering limits to taxation traditional research in the field focuses on limits imposed by incentive constraints which are tied to asymmetric information or to politics and political institutions the limits to taxation are rarely tied to the administrative capacity of the state but incentive constraints alone cannot explain the vast differences in the levels of taxation that we see across the world and across time low income countries typically collect taxes of between 10 to 20 percent of gdp while the average for high income countries is more like 40 percent in essence our view on these patterns is similar to that taken by joseph schumpeter 1918 almost a century ago when he noted the fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history an enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the state necessitates and from the use to which the results are put in order to understand taxation economic development and the relationships between them we need to think about the forces that drive the development process poor countries

the political economics of not paying taxes this paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance when tax avoidance is possible the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay this affects both redistributive outcomes as well as political attitudes towards taxation depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge when the avoidance possibilities are limited the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained if the tax avoidance technology is more effective however the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation where a coalition of poor and the very richest favor a higher tax rate comparing the model predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity it comes surprisingly close to actual observations

inequality the politics of redistribution and the tax mix political economy literature generally predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution however there is no clear empirical evidence supporting such a relationship by incorporating an informal sector that evades income taxes we account for the tax base effect that along with the political channel determines the equilibrium redistribution and tax mix we find a non monotonic relationship between inequality and redistribution and explore under which conditions an unequal society relies more heavily on indirect taxes to finance redistribution ultimately this paper shows the limitations of the income tax to finance redistribution in developing countries even when taxes are democratically chosen

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

inequality and redistribution revisited abstract as inequality rises taxation can be less efficient in the sense that a given tax rate produces a smaller tax base if this tax base effect outweighs the conventional political effect then increasing inequality can induce less public spending or redistribution contrarily to alesina and rodrik and persson and tabellini

the political economy of long term care we build a two dimensional political economy model to explain the provision and financing of long term care and income redistribution voting agents differ in need and income opening up two conflicts one sets families with disabled parents who are in favor of a public long term care program against the ones without such parents who oppose public financing the other sets the poor against the rich with the former preferring heavier income taxation than the latter we show that a structure induced equilibrium always exists and that it is unique if informal care is provided in equilibrium the equilibrium not only explains the negative association of income inequality and long term care financing but also allows predictions about how demographic change might impact long term care arrangements and expenses

utilitarianism and horizontal equity the case for random taxation this paper establishes that far from being able to derive the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism the principle is actually in consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances we derive conditions under which a it is optimal to impose random tax schedules ex post randomization and b it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals ex ante randomization the implications for optimal tax theory are discussed more generally it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent not only with utilitarianism but even with pareto optimality this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

political economy of ramsey taxation abstract we study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self interested politician who cannot commit to policies we show that as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens the chamley judd result of zero long run taxes holds in contrast if the politician is less patient than the citizens the best subgame perfect equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long run capital taxation

the economics of tax amnesties abstract this paper examines some of the economic implications of tax amnesties we present a model where individuals are initially uncertain about the disutility from tax evasion when they file their tax returns if they later learn that they would like to be more honest than they have been an amnesty gives them an opportunity to report additional income we also show that as the probability of an amnesty rises people report less income as a consequence an optimal collection policy requires the government to balance the cost of lost tax revenue against the gains from an amnesty

perfect equilibria in a negotiation model rubinstein s alternating offers bargaining model is enriched by assuming that players payoffs in disagreement periods are determined by a normal form game it is shown that such a model can have multiple perfect equilibria including inefficient ones provided that players are sufficiently patient delay is possible even though there is perfect information and the players are fully rational the length of delay depends only on the payoff structure of the disagreement game and not on the discount factor not all feasible and individually rational payoffs of the disagreement game can be supported as average disagreement payoffs indeed some negotiation games have a unique perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement

tax evasion and the allocation of capital abstract the efficiency cost of capital misallocations between the corporate sector and the noncorporate sector is typically measured using statutory tax differences corporate source income tax compliance is high because of third party reporting however while noncorporate rental income tax compliance is low differential evasion thus exacerbates statutory differences and enlarges the efficiency cost to measure this effect we build a numerical general equilibrium model where households simultaneously choose portfolios of risky assets and fractions of income to report