the dynamic effects of government spending policies in a two sector endogenous growth model this paper investigates the impact of government spending policies in a two sector model of endogenous growth endogenous growth arises because all factors of production physical and human capital are reproducible both temporary and permanent government spending shocks are examined the model implies that a permanent lump sum financed increase in government spending raises the long run growth rate this occurs because the negative wealth effects of a spending increase will increase labor supply on the other hand an income tax or wage tax financed rise in government spending reduces the growth rate the output effects of a temporary increase in government spending may be greater or less than a permanent increase in spending copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

non price strategic behavior the case of bank branches abstract we perform an empirical study of banks branching decisions as a strategic non price variable in an oligopolistic setting using panel data of banks from norway we find clear evidence that banks act strategically in their branching decisions taking into consideration the future response from rival banks the analysis is applied to a unique data set which covers the entire banking sector during both pre and post banking crisis periods where very different types of conduct are found in each of these periods both for banks and borrowers moreover we find that a bank specific branch network does not confer externality on other banks as a result branch network affects only market shares but not market size

how bank capital buffers vary across countries the influence of cost of deposits market power and bank regulation abstract this paper analyzes the bank and country determinants of capital buffers using a panel data of 1337 banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002 after controlling for adjustment costs and the endogeneity of explanatory variables the results show that capital buffers are positively related to the cost of deposits and bank market power although the relations vary across countries depending on regulation supervision and institutions their impact is the result of two generally opposing effects restrictions on bank activities and official supervision reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline but at the same time they promote higher capital buffers by increasing market power institutional quality has the two opposite effects better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance however have a clear positive effect on capital buffers by both strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce risk taking incentives

multimarket competition in banking with an example from the portuguese market abstract banks typically have more than one branch and their activities usually span over several markets this multilocational nature of banks generates equilibrium price dispersion the paper proposes a spatial competition model to explain price differences across banks in the deposits market the model allows to separate two different sources of observed market power collusion in the industry and product differentiation induced by location in local markets an application to portuguese commercial banking is reported as an illustration

the dominance of inefficiencies over scale and product mix economies in banking abstract this study measures and analyzes inefficiencies for all u s banks in 1984 inefficiencies are measured relative to a thick frontier cost function and are found to dominate measured scale and product mix economies most inefficiencies are operational in nature involving the overuse of physical inputs rather than financial involving overpayment of interest also technical inefficiencies proportionate overuse of all inputs dominate allocative inefficiencies improper mix of inputs these results suggest that competitive pressures in banking from deregulation will be focused primarily on banks that do not control costs rather than on those of a particular size or product mix

on the ineffectiveness of tax policy in altering long run growth harberger s superneutrality conjecture abstract in 1964 harberger conjectured that although theory predicts that changes in tax rates affect investment and growth in the long run in practice tax policy is an ineffective instrument to influence growth this paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence in favor of this view the growth effects of tax policy in the class of endogenous growth models driven by human capital accumulation are examined and numerical simulations of these models confirm the results harberger predicted cross country panel regressions estimated using a new method for measuring effective tax rates produce significant investment effects from taxes that are consistent with negligible growth effects these results are robust to the introduction of other growth determinants

competition and commercial banks risk taking evidence from sub saharan africa region abstractthis study investigates the relationship between competition and the risk taking attitude of banks we test how this relationship manifests in the sub saharan african ssa region s commerci

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

long term sustainability of third party facilitated market linkages evidence from the usda marketing assistance program in the armenian dairy industry abstract public private partnerships are increasingly seen as an important tool to build agri food supply chains and develop markets for agri food products in emerging economies however many of these initiatives fail when the public component of the program ends one exception is the usda market assistance program map that facilitated the redevelopment of the armenian dairy sector after privatization this paper presents a case study of this initiative and hypothesize that the usda map facilitated farmer investment in private enforcement capital this investment resulted in sustainable market relationships between farmers and dairy processors even after the usda map expired we find empirical evidence to support this hypothesis using a panel dataset collected from 172 armenian dairy farmers in 2004 and 2009

the effect of taxation on human capital this study finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital of the few earlier studies to address this issue most suggested a negligible effect of taxation on investment in human capital this earlier conclusion is shown to be incorrect by using a model that is more general in several respects than the models used previously

on the taxation of human and physical capital in models of endogenous growth abstract this paper studies the effects of factor income taxation and of subsidies to human capital accumulation in models of endogenous growth it examines in particular how these effects depend on the specification of the leisure activity and on the technology and tax treatment of the sector producing human capital it shows that the negative effects of factor income taxes on economic growth are stronger when the human capital sector is a market good under these circumstances a subsidy to human capital accumulation can offset the direct growth effects of labor taxation making it akin to a consumption tax the paper then briefly discusses the normative implications of the analysis for the optimal taxation of factor incomes

a two sector model of endogenous growth with leisure in this paper we analyze a class of endogenous growth models with physical and human capital and with three altematives uses of time unqualified leisure work and education in contrast to some other related models we find that even in the absence of technological extemalities there could be multiple balanced paths we provide a characterization of the qualitative behavior of consumption leisure work and education over those balanced paths and study their transitional dynamics

banks as multioutput oligopolies an empirical evaluation of the retail and corporate banking markets the distinction between retail and corporate banking markets is of much importance in real life banking organizations the two markets differ with respect to concentration the importance of informational asymmetries and the extent of customer mobility within a standard conjectural variation model estimated on cost efficient banks as well as on the full sample of banks the authors empirically characterize the strategic behavior in each of these markets and also focus on cross market interactions to see whether initial moves in one market affect the equilibrium in the other market they compare their findings to the predictions that would follow from merely considering concentration ratios such as the herfindahl index

comparing contracts an evaluation of contract farming schemes in africa abstract the sufferings of so many small farmers in africa who produce on contract have been well recorded and analyzed yet it seems that such production will continue to expand can governments and nongovernment organizations ngos take any action to reduce the suffering we examine our own experience of contract farming in nigeria and south africa in the context of earlier research and draw attention to important issues which have received little attention in the literature notably staffing of schemes farmers previous experience with multinational national companies mncs water control and labor issues we make recommendations toward codes of practice which could be issued to companies regulators and small farmers

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social

from the static to the dynamic some problems in the theory of taxation abstract this paper considers problems and issues that arise when we attempt to extend the static theory of taxation and production planning to a dynamic context and to combine that theory with theories of growth the reasons dynamic theory is less developed include problems with the analytical tractability of even those dynamic models which attempt to retain the basic structure of the static model furthermore difficult and interesting issues arise in a dynamic context which are either not present or are much less severe in the static theory special attention is paid to these new issues and the difficulties they pose

tax structure and growth in a model with human capital abstract the effect of the tax structure on the long run growth rate of income and consumption is analyzed where tax structure refers to the mix of taxes on physical and human capital which satisfy an exogenously given government budget constraint the factor used intensively in the consumption good sector relative to the capital goods sector as a whole is taxed more highly in a growth maximizing tax structure an endogenous labor supply the tax treatment of depreciation and the effect of replacing the income tax with a consumption tax are all considered

bank capital and liquidity creation in asia pacific we calculate liquidity creation for a large sample of commercial banks in 14 asia pacific economies from 2005 to 2012 we find that banks in this region created 7 83 trillion in liquidity in 2012 or approximately 3 24 times the total liquidity created in 2005 large banks and those based in developing asia created the highest liquidity we also investigate the bicausal relationship between liquidity creation and regulatory capital and find that the trade off between the benefits of financial stability induced by enhanced capital requirements and those of higher liquidity creation is applicable to all of the sample banks regardless of bank size and economic region

on the implications of market power in banking evidence from developing countries abstract this paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies it sheds light on the competition stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators the degree of market power bank cost and profit efficiency and overall firm stability the results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency despite significant cost efficiency losses the findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies

the impact of deregulation on price and non price competition in the portuguese deposits market abstract the portuguese deposits market experienced a pronounced deregulation phase from 1986 to 1992 during that period the situation moved from a highly regulated market in which government controlled institutions accounted for more than 90 of the market to a complete integration into the fully liberalised european internal market this paper studies the evolution of market power and non price competition during that deregulation process using panel data a system of three equations was estimated representing optimality decisions for deposit rates advertising expenditures and branches an important conclusion is that interest rate and entry deregulation were associated with an increase in both price and non price competition the small foreign owned banks were found to have virtually no market power in deposits on the other hand although no direct relationship between market power and market share was found significant market power was detected for the wholesale and banks that existed since before the revolution thus mergers between large banks are not likely to directly increase market power for the participating firms although the association found between market power and concentration suggests that such mergers may increase the banking industry s profits

an empirical analysis of dynamic nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry this article develops a dynamic model of nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to analyze advertising competition in the u s cigarette industry the model generalizes existing studies by allowing advertising to affect both firm market shares and the total size of the market the model also allows dynamic conjectural variations to arise from the intertemporal links created by the durability of advertising we use these dynamic conjectural variations to distinguish alternative models of competitive interaction we estimate the complete model of firm production demand and advertising choice by using data for u s cigarette producers the results indicate that firm advertising primarily affects the level of market demand with a firm s effect on rival firms market shares arising through variations in the number of brands sold empirical results on firm behavior suggest that firms act as if their advertising choices will alter the future advertising choices of rival firms in both the high tar and low tar cigarette markets

efficiency and technical progress in banking empirical results for a panel of german cooperative banks abstract using 1989 1992 individual data of 757 german cooperative banks and applying the intermediation approach we specify a multi product translog cost function for this part of the german banking industry for all size classes moderate economies of scale can be identified there is also evidence of economies of scope which supports the notion of universal banking as for cost efficiency we find that the average banks in all size classes deviate considerably from the best practice cost frontier all banks enjoy growth of total factor productivity which is higher for the smaller banks in the sample

how to measure the market power of banks in the lending business accurately a segment based adjustment of the lerner index numerous empirical studies use the price cost margin based lerner index li to assess the general market power of banks a common procedure within those li applications is to approximate the market price required for the li measurement as the ratio of a bank s total revenues to total assets we discuss the major flaws of this aggregated procedure and propose an adjusted i e business segment orientated li approach which is then applied to assess the market power of banks in the specific lending business at the country level our empirical study is based on an original data set containing all interest related categories weighted by the respective loan as well as deposit volumes in the countries of the european monetary union zone emu from 2003 to 2013 our results reveal that the country specific market power of banks in the lending business has been substantially underestimated in previous studies based on aggregated outputs for example averaged across the five most important economies in the em

bank competition and financial stability in asia pacific the impact of bank competition on financial stability has been a focus of academic and policy debate over the last two decades and particularly since the 2007 08 global financial crises beck 2008 oecd 2011 under the traditional competition fragility view banks cannot earn monopoly rents in competitive markets and this results in lower profits capital ratios and charter values this makes banks less able to withstand demand or supply side shocks and encourages excessive risk taking marcus 1984 alternatively the competition stability view suggests that competition leads to greater stability a less competitive banking market may lead to more risk taking if the big banks are deemed too important to fail and as such obtain implicit or explicit subsidies via government safety nets mishkin 1999 in addition banks with more market power tend to charge higher loan rates which may induce borrowers to assume greater risk leading to greater default in competitive banking markets loan rates are lower too big to fail issues and safety net subsidies are smaller and this results in a positive link between bank competition and stability boyd and de nicolo 2005 it could also be the case as noted by martinez miera and repullo 2010 that bank competition and stability are linked in a non linear manner and in a similar vein berger et al 2009 argue that competition and concentration may coexist and can simultaneously induce stability or fragility

how private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions the enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities contracts can be enforced through a variety of mechanisms both public and private however in many developing and transitional countries these public institutions are either absent or ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement under such conditions private enforcement mechanisms may provide a suitable replacement for public enforcement institutions this may be done externally through a third party or internally through self enforcing agreements this paper analyzes the use of self enforcing arrangements or internal private enforcement mechanisms using a case study of an agri business in a transition economy juhocukor a s a slovakian sugar processor we show that the use of internal private contract enforcement mechanisms can have a significant positive effect on output and efficiency for both partners to the exchange transaction in an environment characterized by the absence or ineffectiveness of public enforcement institutions

private enforcement capital and contract enforcement in transition economies the enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities there are many situations where public institutions are ineffective in enforcing contracts this is the case in economies in transition where public enforcement institutions themselves are being reformed under such conditions private mechanisms could enforce contracts external private enforcement is done by third parties e g strong arm private agents although such enforcement may be effective it may have unwanted externalities alternatively internal private enforcement can be done through the use of so called private enforcement capital i e private losses that result from breaching the contract these losses result directly from contract termination or non renewal and indirectly from reputational damage by designing contracts such that these private losses from contract breach outweigh potential benefits contracts can be made self enforcing in this article we first present a conceptual framework to interpret contracts and to analyze how the use of private enforcement capital can enforce contracts then we illustrate such internal private contract enforcement mechanisms with several case study examples of agri business contracting in transition countries where public enforcement fails

the impact of interfirm relationships on investment evidence from the polish dairy sector abstract financial constraints and credit market imperfections are a major constraint on investment growth and poverty reduction in transition and developing countries this paper analyses the impact on investments of financial assistance programs as part of interfirm relationships our empirical evidence is based on a two stage survey methodology qualitative evidence on dairy companies assistance programs was gathered in the first stage through in depth interviews at the level of the dairy companies quantitative data on 290 milk producing rural households in poland was collected through a random survey in the second stage the empirical analysis shows that dairy companies have played an important role in financial assistance in particular for dairy specific investments in addition they had an important indirect impact on farm activities and investments through feed supply and loan guarantee programs

on endogenous growth with physical and human capital this paper presents a class of models in which agents may devote part of their nonleisure activities to going to school so as to increase the efficiency units of labor they supply to the firms and the wages they receive the interaction among the technology of human capital accumulation and agents preferences will determine endogenously the economy s rate of growth given a constant returns to scale technology for physical capital accumulation we characterize the set of steady states as a ray from the origin and show the global convergence of every off balanced path to some point on this ray further properties concerning the dynamic evolution of the state and control variables around the ray of steady states are also established our analysis is useful to understand the role played by the technologies of physical and human capital in the process of accumulation and to evaluate the impact of policies geared toward attaining higher levels of capital our results highlight the importance of human capital

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

integration and competition in the european financial markets abstract financial integration in europe should affect the competition between markets and intermediaries and generate a convergence of both interest rates and margins among different countries this paper analyzes both the evolution of the convergence in interest rates and the level of competition and its inequalities among the european banking systems for the period 1993 2001 the inequality index used the theil index allows us to break down the inequalities into a country and a specialization effect if the former effect dominates it would mean that national banking markets are segmented due to the existence of obstacles or barriers to integration on the other hand dominance of the latter effect would be related to the different level of competition depending on the type of banking specialization

a general two sector model of endogenous growth with human and physical capital balanced growth and transitional dynamics abstract we examine a two sector endogenous growth model with general constant return to scale production technologies governing the evolution of human and physical capital we prove the existence uniqueness and saddle path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium a dual approach drawing on techniques from international trade theory is used to provide complete characterization of the transitional dynamics of consumption goods and education outputs human and physical capital inputs and the relative price of human capital investment we investigate the long run effects of changes in time preference and factor taxation and show the emergence of instability or indeterminacy when factor taxes are too distortionary journal of economic literatureclassification number d90

why hold ups occur the self enforcing range of contractual relationships one of my most enjoyable intellectual experiences was working with armen alchian on the klein crawford and alchian 1978 hold up paper in this paper i extend the basic framework presented in that paper pointing out what i now consider to be its shortcomings and providing insights into the nature of hold ups and the form of contracts chosen by transactors to avoid hold ups the major analytical extension entails combining hold up analysis with my work on private enforcement because private enforcement capital is limited and written contract terms are necessarily imperfect transactors must optimally combine court enforced written terms together with privately enforced unwritten terms to define what i call the self enforcing range of their contractual relationship hold ups occur when unanticipated events place the contractual relationship outside the self enforcing range this probabilistic framework where transactors enter contractual relationships knowing that a hold up may take place but believing that the expected gains from trade outweigh the expected rent dissipating costs associated with the hold up risk is shown to have important implications for understanding the structure of contracts adopted by transactors in the marketplace i why do hold ups occur i begin with a simple example that illustrates the basic economic forces involved in a hold up assume that a builder constructs a house on a piece of land the builder does not own but rather only leases short term after the initial land lease expires the landowner could hold up the builder by raising the land rent to reflect the costs of moving the house to another lot this example illustrates all the hold up factors emphasized in klein crawford and alchian a the builder has made an investment that is highly specific to a particular piece of land and b the landowner has taken advantage of the incompleteness of the contract that governs the relationship in particular the fact that the lease does not cover future years to c expropriate the quasi rents on the builder s specific investment the obvious question is why anything like this would ever occur that is why would someone be so naive as to build a house on land for which they had only a short term lease our primary goal in klein crawford and alchian was not to explain the existence of hold ups but rather the institutions adopted by transactors to avoid hold ups for example we would expect that builders anticipating a potential hold up problem would decide to purchase the land or at least to sign a long term ground lease before starting construction however we do present some examples in the paper of hold ups that actually occurred the implicit reason we give for the occurrence of these hold ups is transactor ignorance apparently transactors are not always smart enough to choose the contractual arrangement that would eliminate the hold up problem oliver williamson provides a similar but much more explicit answer to the question of why hold ups occur when defining opportunism he states by opportunism i mean self interest seeking with guile this includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms such as lying stealing and cheating opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit more generally opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information especially to calculated efforts to mislead distort obfuscate or otherwise confuse 1 for example the hold up may have occurred in our illustrative house construction example because the landowner deceived the builder with a low up front land rental price and vague promises about the future relying on the ability of one transactor to take advantage of the naivete or ignorance of another transactor is a highly unsatisfactory way to explain the incidence of hold ups simple examples of deception such as a builder constructing a house on land that is only rented short term rarely if ever occur

analysis of a two sector model of endogenous growth with capital income taxation this paper addresses a two sector model of endogenous growth in which one sector produces final goods and the other produces new human capital both sectors employ human as well as physical capital under constant returns to scale technologies unlike existing studies of this type of model that have mostly concentrated on steady state analysis or on numerical simulations of calibrated models this paper presents an analytical argument concerning the dynamic behavior of the growth path and the effects of capital income taxation in and out of the steady growth equilibrium it is demonstrated that the dynamic behavior of the economy and some policy effects depend heavily upon the magnitude of factor intensity used in each production sector copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

oligopolistic interdependence and the structure of production in banking an empirical evaluation the main purpose of this paper is to incorporate the oligopolistic nature of the banking industry into the conventional production model in order to contribute to the empirical literature on the structure conduct and performance in banking and to achieve unbiased measures of scale economies and efficiency depending on which of the models is accepted by the data this is done by appending behavioral equations specifying banks conjectures regarding the reactions of other banks to its output change this formulation enables us to test for the correct type of behavioral model and relate it to the resulting estimated technology if estimates of economies of scale and inefficiencies depend on the behavioral model adopted other studies which ignore product market behavior may well be subject to misspecification errors the paper also sheds light on the nature of the oligopolistic interdependence in the banking sector copyright 1994 by ohio state university press