multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences abstractthis article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization we show that 1 a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods enabling it to provide more public goods 2 the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost 3 each country obtains an identical utility increment and 4 the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country all results are derived based on well known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels

tax authority to the european parliament in this paper we analyze whether countries of the ec community should plead for a decentralized system to finance the european funds rather than using a uniform tax imposed by the european parliament the analysis is within a multistage game theoretic framework in which the implication of the financing system of a confederation on the investment behavior in the respective states is considered the paper is in the tradition of the literature which claims that from a view of global efficiency property rights structures inducing ex post efficient allocations may be worse than a system leading to an ex post inefficient allocation for this specific economic issue we elucidate the tradeoff between incentive effect and distributional policy especially we demonstrate that rather homogeneous countries benefit by installing a central tax institution if the countries are rather heterogeneous the countries may have opposing interests with respect to the answer of the question which is presented in the title it is possible that the high developed country prefers to install a central tax authority while the low developed country does not however in general the reverse ordering which is more in line with our intuition results

demand for charity donations in private non profit markets the case of the u k abstract this paper presents estimates of the demand for donations for u k charities in 1985 these estimates make demand depend upon price fund raising expenditure a quality index and alternative revenue sources the price elasticity of donations found here shows for the most part an elastic response and is consistent with previous studies using u s data our empirical results suggest that non profits in the u k unlike their counterparts in the u s are net revenue maximisers we discovered no significant evidence that public donations crowded out private donations in our sample of 300 charities

equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models abstract despite widespread application of the impure public good model surprisingly little attention has been given to the model s equilibrium properties this paper presents a proof that clearly shows sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a nash equilibrium

olson s exploitation hypothesis in a public good economy a reconsideration since the publication of olson s 1965 the logic of collective action the exploitation hypothesis in which the rich shoulder the provision burden of public goods for the poor has held sway despite empirical exceptions to address such exceptions we establish two alternative exploitation hypotheses based on contributors asymmetric preferences or on their productivity differences regarding the public good the classic hypothesis and its two variants are proven in a novel fashion for asymmetric preferences we also establish the exploitation hypothesis for the joint products model with private and public co benefits our theoretical insights are then illustrated by some empirical examples from the field of international public goods such as military defense and cross border pollution

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

monopolistic competition growth and public good provision a normal good in this article i develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market in this context increases in the size of the group are increases in the population of a society i find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision the reason is quite simple as population increases the number of private goods available for consumption also increases this raises the marginal utility of income and increases the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good while the level of voluntary contributions falls in this model the optimal level of provision is shown to increase with population thus there is a growing divergence between the optimal and equilibrium levels of provision of the public good in the standard model with a pure public good individual welfare rises with an increase in population both because of the increase in the level of provision of the public good and the reduced contribution per person that results from the population increase furthermore in the model of monopolistic competition without a public good welfare also increases with population due to the wider of variety of goods which are available in a larger economy however when the models are combined an increase in popu lation has an ambiguous effect on welfare this stems from the reduction in the level of provision of the public good as the population increases the model of monopolistic competition in this article is based on krugman 1980 this model assumes a simple form of increasing returns to scale under which each good may be produced by incurring a fixed set up cost plus a constant marginal cost of production when the population increases the economy can support a broader range of goods and this leads to a higher real income for individuals in the economy thus economic growth arising from a scale effect leads to reduced contributions to the public good in this model economic growth can also be caused by increases in total factor productivity in the model of monopolistic competition used here this would be reflected by reductions the fixed and marginal cost of production it turns out that reductions in these parameters also lead to reduced public good provision

tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of spillovers on the equilibrium population distribution across jurisdictions in a local public good economy with free mobility spillovers are parametrized by a matrix ij where ij 0 1 when spillovers are symmetric and close to 0 or 1 pure local public goods and pure public goods all equilibrium jurisdiction structures are symmetric however any population distribution can be sustained in equilibrium for some value of the spillover parameter in the class of utility functions with additive externalities we identify the unique family of utility functions for which equilibria are symmetric except for an isolated value of this is a class of utility functions which are linear in the public good and a power function of the private good u c a 1 c with this specification of utility we show that an increase in results in a more fragmented equilibrium population distribution and that when spillovers are asymmetric and large a jurisdiction which is more centrally located i e benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions has a larger population in equilibrium

nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model abstract we model a single club heterogeneous consumer exogeneous income economy as an aggregative public good game under common assumptions if club quality functions are homogeneous of positive degree in the club facility investment and use an unique nash equilibrium exists

does institutional change spread across countries explaining spatial patterns in human rights if a country improves its human rights record will neighbouring countries benefit beneficial spillovers could justify intervention by the un or one of the many other organisations that internationally fight human rights violations we document that countries human rights performances often resemble the human rights situation of their neighbours however exploiting time variation in a spatial panel we find that much of that resemblance is simply determined by the shared geographical location changes in neighbouring countries have little influence on local human rights suggesting that contemporaneous spillovers and interactions are limited

simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity i study a simple widely applicable approach to handling the initial conditions problem in dynamic nonlinear unobserved effects models rather than attempting to obtain the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous variables i propose finding the distribution conditional on the initial value and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables the approach is flexible and results in simple estimation strategies for at least three leading dynamic nonlinear models probit tobit and poisson regression i treat the general problem of estimating average partial effects and show that simple estimators exist for important special cases copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

a theory of impact philanthropy this article develops a new model of altruism called impact philanthropy an impact philanthropist is someone who wants to personally make a difference while that motive is straightforward its logical implications are significantly different from other models of philanthropy for example the contributions of other donors can reduce an impact philanthropist s charitable fulfillment as a result cooperation among impact philanthropists can reduce aggregate giving in addition impact philanthropy can lead to a codependent relationship between givers and receivers in which both benefit from the other finally the model suggests a conflict between charitable organizations and its donors concerning the allocation of charitable gifts in particular a charitable organization prefers to spread a donor s contribution across many goods whereas a donor prefers to target his or her contribution at a specific good d 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

pareto optimal redistribution and private charity abstract when private charity exists and is motivated by utility interdependence a non pareto optimal outcome the free rider problem typically arises nevertheless incremental fiscal redistribution cannot achieve a paretian welfare improvement so long as private charity continues at positive levels donors respond to incremental fiscal redistribution by reducing their voluntary contributions by exactly a dollar for every dollar transferred in this way no net transfer is achieved unless incremental fiscal redistribution is pursued to the point where private contributions have been driven to zero alternatively a net transfer may be achieved by fiscal measures which affect donors marginal incentives to donate

public good provision in indian rural areas the returns to collective action by microfinance groups self help groups shgs are the most common form of microfinance in india the authors provide evidence that shgs composed of women only undertake collective actions for the provision of public goods within village communities using a theoretical model this paper shows that an elected official whose aim is to maximize re election chances exerts higher effort in providing public goods when private citizens undertake collective action and coordinate their voluntary contributions towards the same goods this effect occurs although government and private contributions are assumed to be substitutes in the technology of providing public goods using first hand data on shgs in india the paper tests the prediction of the model and shows that in response to collective action by shgs local authorities tackle a larger variety of public issues and are more likely to tackle issues of interest to shgs the findings highlight how the social behavior of shgs can influence the governance of rural indian communities

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

ideals versus dollars donors charity managers and government grants this paper demonstrates how changes in untied lump sum government grants or income from unrestricted endowments will affect the behavior of charities operated by managers with strong philosophical or professional commitments an increase in such funds will reduce the charity s accountability to private donors and lower its fund raising activities the grant will not be spent entirely on raising the quantity of output instead it will permit the charity manager to reduce his or her dependence on the costly solicitation of donors who do not completely share the manager s preferences in order to understand nonprofit charities one must recognize both their diversity and the independent role of their managers in furthering this diversity we will miss much of their special character if we view them as mere conduits seeking faithfully to reify the wishes of their contributors in this paper i demonstrate how an increase or a fall in untied lump sum government grants or income from unrestricted endowments will affect the behavior of charities operated by managers with strong philosophical or professional commitments to some service mixes rather than others an increase in such funds will reduce the charity s accountability to private donors and lower its fund raising activities the grant will not be spent entirely on raising

why do only the g7 2 countries among united nations members discuss about international public goods a simulation study abstractthis article investigates why only the group of 7 plus china and russia g7 2 countries among 194 united nations members discuss about international public goods by simulating the heterogeneity of income prices and preference parameters on the total provisions and the number of free riders we find that the number of contributors for international public goods is 15 under the 194 member countries while the others are free riders in addition the contributors are the top 15 powerful countries with largest dropout value over the world then the discussion with only 15 countries for public goods is meaningful as large as the heterogeneity of parameters is the number of contributors becomes closer to g7 2

the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods abstract this note provides an alternative elementary proof of bergstrom blume and varian s well known result on the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of a public good when all goods are normal

the dynamics of aid and political rights using cross country panel data we explore the extent to which the variation over time in measures of democracy and political rights can be explained by changes in aid inflows thus providing direct evidence on the impact of innovations in donor policy on the quality of recipient governance we distinguish between the short run and long run effects of changes in aid our results are very different from those based on cross country variation in aid inflows we find evidence of large differences between the effect of aid for political reform and the effect of other types of aid in aggregate these effects also depend on the recipient country s initial level of political development there is no evidence that aid intended for political reform has achieved its objective and in some countries it may be counterproductive however aggregate aid can have a beneficial effect on political rights

scaling up foreign aid will the big push work international donors are substantially scaling up aid programmes at the same time there are widespread reservations over how much aid recipient countries can use effectively such concerns are supported by the aid effectiveness literature which finds that there are limits to the amounts of aid recipients can efficiently absorb this article demonstrates that a big push in foreign aid will not lead to diminishing returns as long as donors get the inter country allocation of aid right this is true even if donors provide aid at levels equal to the well known target of 0 7 per cent of their gross national income

community enforcement of fisheries effort restrictions abstract this paper models the use of community sanctions to restrict effort in a simple gordon schaefer style model of the fishery with heterogeneous fishing costs the withdrawal of cooperation in other areas of life is used to both restrict effort and to sanction those who continue to cooperate with those who have not restricted effort coalition proof nash equilibria are generated by a combination of sanctions discouraging the defection of small groups and stock reductions discouraging noncooperation by large groups both entry restrictions and individual quotas can be supported by community sanctions under some parameter combinations however there are cases where each can generate lower total rents than would be available under open access relatively low cost fishers are more likely to support entry restrictions and ignore community attempts to restrict individual effort while high cost fishers are more likely to support quotas

an accurate measurement of the crowd out effect income effect and price effect for charitable contributions in the past empirical research on charitable contributions has focused on two issues estimating the income and price elasticities of contributions and estimating the extent to which government funding crowded out private contributions the two fundamental problems in all these studies are the differences in the underlying conceptual models and the use of imperfect data for empirical analysis this paper addresses both of these problems

consistent estimation of the impact of tax deductibility on the level of charitable contributions when charitable contributions are tax deductible the marginal price of charitable giving in other consumption foregone per dollar of contributions is generally less than unity further if the income tax schedule is a progressive step function the marginal price of contributions is generally a rising step function of the level of contributions the problem of estimating a contributions demand function for individuals is therefore complicated by the spurious correlation between the level of contributions and the observed marginal price we take this econometric problem into account in estimating a contributions demand function using data from the 1972 73 consumer expenditure survey after comparing our results with those of estimation techniques used by other authors we provide evidence on the impacts of alternative tax policies on charitable giving using our estimates of the model parameters

does foreign aid corrupt abstract we estimate the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality aid decreases corruption our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different controls

uniqueness of nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods an improved proof our 1986 paper private provision of public goods presents a theorem on the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods richard hirth of the university of pennsylvania and clive fraser of warwick have independently suggested that although our theorem is correct our proof is incorrect each writer proposes an alternative method of proof for the theorem with characteristic charity to our own deficiencies we prefer to view our earlier proof as unduly opaque rather than wrong whichever view one takes a more transparent proof is called for the proof presented here follows the same outline as our 1986 proof but explains a step of the argument that was far from obvious in the original proof this proof uses the notation of the 1986 paper and refers to facts that are proved there

technological innovations and sectoral change transformative capacity adaptability patterns of change an analytical framework following up on recent debates about sectoral systems of innovation and production the paper introduces a heuristic framework for analyzing and explaining distinct patterns of technology based sectoral change the concept is based on two interrelated influencing factors the first is the sectoralspecific transformative capacity of new technologies themselves that is their substantial or incremental impact on socioeconomic and institutional change in a given sectoral system the second is the sectoral adaptability of socioeconomic structures institutions and actors confronted with the opportunities presented by new technologies the first factor the sectoral transformative capacity of new technologies enables us to identify the technology based pressure to change and adjust the structural institutional and organizational architectures of the sectoral system the second complementary factor sectoral adaptability helps us to discern the distinct social patterns of anticipating and adopting this technology based pressure the specific interplay between the two influencing factors creates distinguishable modes of sectoral transformation ranging from anticipative and smooth adjustments to reactive and crisis ridden patterns of change even processes of radical sectoral change continue over longer periods of mismatch and are characterized by numerous and mostly gradual organizational structural and institutional transformations

conditionality and aid effectiveness re evaluated this paper evaluates aid by considering how effective aid has been in exerting leverage on policy choices it is rather easy to demonstrate that if a country is unwilling to implement policy reforms attaching conditions to aid will not ensure sustained reform in this sense conditionality does not work this ignores the fact that donors through aid and conditions can influence recipient policies the argument of this paper is that if the analysis focuses on channels of influence one can better identify ways to enhance aid effectiveness reform is a slow and difficult process and donors would be more effective development partners if they see their role as being to support rather than force this process in simple terms donors should provide the information and technical assistance to help governments to make policy choices rather than dictating choices by imposing conditions

noncooperative household demand we study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods deriving the counterpart to the slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true slutsky matrix in the unitary model we provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative

pareto optimal redistribution comment occurs in the context of the hochmanrodgers scheme is a function of a people s rate of substitution between the satisfaction derived from retaining income and that derived from giving it and b the initial distribution of earnings which exists before giving occurs whatever the values of a the outcome will differ depending on b such at least will be the case unless everybody s rate of substitution is such that complete equality results pareto optimal redistribution thus constitutes a secondary redistribution which depends on the initial distribu

interior matching equilibria in a public good economy an aggregative game approach abstract if the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired pareto optimal outcome it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium using the aggregative game approach developed by cornes and hartley 2003 2007 this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good in particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and warr neutrality in the case of matching

diffusion of general purpose technologies understanding patterns in the electrification of us manufacturing 1880 1930 i examine the diffusion of the electric motor between 1880 and 1930 i find that long lag times are determined by the degree of technical difficulty in application after solutions became available electrification generally proceeded rapidly to make this claim i explore three industries urban transit printing and paper making i identify points at which viable electric solutions to particular problems were found and examine adoption patterns both before and after these events the explanation contrasts with common demand side explanations such as costly user adaptation or information diffusion and imposes conditions on the application of standard supply side models the results are particularly important when examining the diffusion of broadly defined technological categories such as general purpose technologies in the history of diffusion of many innovations one cannot help being struck by two characteristics of the diffusion process its apparent overall slowness on the one hand and the wide variations in the rates of acceptance of different inventions on the other rosenberg 1972 191 copyright 2005 oxford university press

origins and pathways of innovation in the third industrial revolution this study examines the factors that shaped the long term evolution of the ict industry in sweden 1950 2013 using a new historical microdatabase on actual innovation output the driving forces and technological interdependencies in the third industrial revolution are chronicled the results of this study support some stylized facts about technological interdependencies in general purpose technologies a closely knitted set of industries have provided positive and negative driving forces for the development of ict innovations the historical evolution of gpts can in this perspective be described as a sequence of development blocks

distributional effects in household models separate spheres and income pooling we derive distributional eects for a non cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour we consider the nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game our main result is that in general the two partners either choose to contribute to dierent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good the former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of lundberg and pollak 1993 the second outcome yields local income pooling a household will be in dierent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household any bargaining model with this non cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling we conclude that targeting bene ts such as child bene ts to one household member may not always have an eect on outcomes

nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems abstract for a very general class of pollution control models involving strictly quasi concave utility functions over consumption and environmental quality and strictly convex emission abatement cost functions a proportional cost sharing mechanism is presented inspired by the ratio equilibrium introduced by 7 it is shown that the proportional solution yields a cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts and that the resulting utility imputation always lies in the stand alone core of the cost sharing game in order to decentralize the proportional cost sharing equilibrium a financial compensation mechanism implementing the proportional solution in complete information nash equilibrium is presented

the cost of segregation in social networks abstract this paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks we first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by bonacich centrality then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions which roughly speaking measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors the proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that display special segregated interactions which suggests an asymptotic neutrality of redistributive policies

on the private provision of public goods on networks abstract this paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors provisions we present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a nash equilibrium for general networks and best reply functions in addition we investigate the neutrality result of warr 38 and bergstrom blume and varian 6 whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision financed by lump sum taxes to this effect we show that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond a special network architecture in the neighborhood of the set of contributors

an empirical test of neutrality and the crowding out hypothesis this paper tests warr s neutrality hypothesis that the voluntary provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income specifically i test the null hypothesis of neutrality against the alternative that total contributions to a public good will be larger the less equally income is distributed to test this hypothesis a new data set is constructed by merging data on total voluntary contributions to individual public radio stations with 1990 census data on the income distribution in each station s listening area i find that voluntary contributions increase as income inequality rises

aid allocation and poverty reduction the authors derive a poverty efficient allocation of aid and compare it with actual aid allocations they build the poverty efficient allocation in two stages first they use new world bank ratings of 20 different aspects of national policy to establish the current relationship between aid policies and growth onto that they add a mapping from growth to poverty reduction which reflects the level and distribution of income they compare the effects of using headcount and poverty gap measures of poverty they find the actual allocation of aid to be radically different from the poverty efficient allocation in the efficient allocation for a given of poverty aid tapers in with policy reform in the actual allocation aid tapers out with reform in the efficient allocation aid is targeted disproportionately to countries with severe poverty and adequate polices the type of country where 74 percent of the world s poor live in the actual allocation such countries receive a much smaller share of aid 56 percent than their share of the world s poor with the present allocation aid is effective in sustainably lifting about 30 million people a year out of absolute poverty with a poverty efficient allocation this would increase to about 80 million people even with political constraints introduced to keep allocations for india and china constant poverty reduction would increase to about 60 million reallocating aid is politically difficult but it may be considerably less difficult than quadrupling aid budgets which is what the authors estimate would be necessary to achieve the same impact on poverty reduction with existing aid allocations

the isolation paradox and the discount rate for benefit cost analysis one argument used to justify a rate of discount for benefit cost analysis below the market rate is based on a divergence of private and collective behavior known as the isolation paradox in this paper we reexamine this argument using a three period general equilibrium model incorporating the intergenerational structure of benevolence assumed by earlier writers we show that in this model the appropriate rate of discount is the market rate regardless of the existence of the isolation paradox in the absence of other market distortions no shadow pricing of capital inputs is necessary in the calculation of net present value

family policy with non cooperative families we consider a non cooperative model of a family s time allocation between market work and providing a home produced family public good such as child care or care for the elderly the model predicts underprovision of the public good because of crowding out this does not necessarily warrant public provision in contrast to other approaches in family economics we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be pareto improving we also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving

group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes abstract using the traditional model of voluntary public good provision it is shown that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies as long as private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes this result generalizes a previous cobb douglas example with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria

additionality and reverse crowding out for pollution offsets in water quality trading market based environmental policies frequently include offset provisions that allow polluters who are not subject to a binding cap to participate in trading programs when offsets are used for compliance it is important that they are additional in the sense that the payment from the trading program induces environmental benefits that would not occur without the program in this paper we analyze a water quality trading program in ohio u s to estimate the extent to which the offsets are additional using data from the program and a farmer survey we estimate the number of additional conservation practices that are adopted by farmers who participated in the trading program relative to the counterfactual outcome without the program using matching methods we find no statistically significant increase in the number of conservation practices due to the trading program we also examine whether the trading program may have crowded out government funding we also do not find significant evidence for such crowding out instead finding some evidence that the trading program may have led to greater participation in federal cost share programs

striving for a large market evidence from a general purpose technology in action several scholars have tried to focus on growth accounting of specific examples of general purpose technologies gpts but what are the factors that might make a general purpose technology succeed or fail once the invention has been triggered this paper is a preliminary answer to this question and attempts to study gpts from an ex ante perspective trying to understand what is the behaviour and performance of the producer firms and what the factors are that can favour or hamper their diffusion in the application sectors the paper follows a historical perspective on a control technology introduced in the last few decades by a silicon valley start up company

climate agreements in a mitigation adaptation game abstract we analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation public good and adaptation private good strategies in a climate agreement we show the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwarranted adaptation can lead to larger self enforcing agreements associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causes mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements we argue that our results extend to many public goods the well known problem of easy riding may turn into easy matching if the marginal utility of public good consumption is strongly influenced by private consumption

the uniqueness of the subscription equilibrium with endogenous labor supply abstract this paper presents a proof of the uniqueness of the nash equilibrium if public goods are financed through private donations and distortionary income taxation