interpreting measures of economic loss evidence from contingent valuation and experimental studies abstract from the standpoint of conventional welfare theory it is surprising that responses to contingent valuation studies of environmental goods have shown a consistent difference between willingness to pay and compensation demanded measures of economic loss this paper examines these results in light of four reasons most often given as grounds for their dismissal new experimental evidence supports an interpretation of the observed disparity in payment and compensation based measures as both real and psychologically meaningful an alternative conceptual framework suggested by prospect theory is outlined and its relevance for economic assessments of potential environmental change is discussed briefly

debt futures and options optimal price linked financial contracts under moral hazard and limited liability this paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability there is moral hazard and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in output in this setting the optimal contract is a price contingent commodity bond that can be replicated by combining pure debt commodity futures and commodity call option contracts although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal a pure debt contract is almost never optimal various properties of the entrepreneur s optimal price contingent promised payment are described copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness we analyze a principal s ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents who have private information about the circumstances of the exchange honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully as long as the mechanism is suciently fair the probability that an equilibrium allocation is chosen by an agent who is lying should not be too large without intolerance for lying the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest with even a small intolerance for lying the optimal mechanism is discontinuously altered it may still involve ethics screening whereby some allocation chosen by a dishonest agent is never chosen by an honest agent it happens either when the dishonest is overstating circumstances or when the principal is forced to allow for some suboptimal announcements due to an excessive intolerance for lying with limited intolerance for lying ethics screening allows for doing better than in the standard setup where the agent is dishonest with certainty even if honesty is unlikely however if intolerance for lying is too strong the principal cannot improve upon the standard setup

state contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics abstract optimal bank regulation is studied in a model where bank quality is private information and bank portfolio choice is subject to moral hazard regulators wish to control bank risk solely because high risk adversely affects a bank incentives to improve its mean return numerical methods are developed to study the model capital regulation alone has a limited ability to separate types including ex post fines achieve separation at lower cost resulting in improved welfare low quality banks are fined on high returns in order to control risk taking high quality banks face fines on lower returns mainly to ensure truth telling by low quality banks high quality banks bear the full cost of regulation

cross compliance as payment for public goods understanding eu and us agricultural policies cross compliance cc is a mechanism for encouraging farmers to fulfill certain environmental conditions in return for governmental support payments introduced to united states us and european union eu agricultural policy from the 80s onwards upcoming new us farm bill 2012 and eu common agricultural policy after 2013 policies will include cc cross compliance is seen i as a policy for enforcing environmental objectives or ii as a way to organize and reward agricultural public good production in recent years the instrument s effectiveness and efficiency have been criticized to validate the deviating understandings we drew back on an economic institutionalist perspective we found that regarding eu cc as payment for public goods does not generally align with the existing german property rights distribution in both the eu and us cc standards above those contained regulatory law have characteristics of a payment for public goods but create severe problems we conclude that cc even if useful for triggering and broadening environmental protection efforts may cause several long term problems therefore the rights structure should be clearly communicated law enforcement function should be temporary the instrument should be included in an overall concept and payments should be better linked to the environmental output

measuring the existence value of wildlife what do cvm estimates really show two research programs are brought together to contribute to the growing body of work on alternatives to standard welfare based approaches to environmental valuation and policy the first is the theoretical literature undermining the new welfare

price principle and the environment should preferences count as a normative discipline welfare and therefore resource economics postulates that preferences should count in the allocation of resources this postulate cannot be justified in relation to choice or to well being the nor mative qualities that attend choices e g ac countability responsibility commitment and consent explain why choices should count but not preferences which are not actions but theo retical entities constructed ad hoc from stipu lated descriptions of behavior they are then said to explain the satisfaction of preferences moreover has no demonstrable relation with any conception of welfare or well being not sim ply defined in terms of it jel a13

deductible contracts against fraudulent claims evidence from automobile insurance insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource allocation problem in many markets the object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance this type of contract is observed in many markets even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification a higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat particularly when the insured anticipates that the claim has a small probability of being audited to verify this proposition we estimate a loss equation for which one of the determinants is the amount of the deductible using a data set of claims filed for damages following an automobile accident with twenty insurance companies in quebec in 1992 because we have access only to reported losses a higher deductible also implies a lower probability of reporting small losses to isolate the fraud effect related to the presence of a deductible in the contract we jointly estimate a loss equation and a

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

strategic default in the international coffee market this article studies strategic default on forward sale contracts in the international coffee market to test for strategic default we construct contract specific measures of unanticipated changes in market conditions by comparing spot prices at maturity with the relevant futures prices at the contracting date unanticipated rises in market prices increase defaults on fixed price contracts but not on price indexed ones we isolate strategic default by focusing on unanticipated rises at the time of delivery after production decisions are sunk and suppliers have been paid estimates suggest that roughly half of the observed defaults are strategic we model how strategic default introduces a trade off between insurance and counterparty risk relative to indexed contracts fixed price contracts insure against price swings but create incentives to default when market conditions change a model calibration suggests that the possibility of strategic default causes 15 8 average losses in output significant dispersion in the marginal product of capital and sizable negative externalities on supplying farmers

greenwash vs brownwash exaggeration and undue modesty in corporate sustainability disclosure corporate greenwashing has accelerated in recent years bringing in its wake growing skepticism about corporate green claims although a theory of the drivers and deterrents of greenwashing has begun to emerge it is static in nature and does not incorporate the full range of ways in which firms can misrepresent their environmental performance our contribution is threefold first we extend the theory of organizational information disclosure to incorporate the possibility of undue modesty about a firm s environmental social and governance practices second we hypothesize about the drivers of exaggeration and undue modesty based on which of a firm s stakeholders are salient at a given point in time to do so we place the firm within a dynamic context that has largely been missing in the prior literature third we test our hypotheses using a data set that allows us to directly compare corporate green claims against actual performance results reveal that corporate output growth deregulation and low profits under deregulation significantly affect the choice between greenwashing and brownwashing the effects of growth and profits are mitigated by external scrutiny

values of gains and losses reference states and choice of measure the available empirical evidence continues to suggest that people commonly value losses more and often much more than otherwise commensurate gains consequently current practice of using the wtp measure for all changes is often likely to lead to misleading assessments of welfare changes the reference dependence of preferences implies instead that while the wtp measure is appropriate for gains the value of both positive and negative changes in the domain of losses will usually be more accurately assessed with the wta measure

cost padding in regulated monopolies abstract this paper considers the regulated monopoly that pads or falsifies its costs to increase the cost reimbursement it receives from the regulator contrary to the standard literature on cost regulation the firm engages in cost reducing investment before it enters into a regulatory contract this pre contractual investment in cost reduction determines the firm type at the contracting stage the paper derives both the optimum incentive compatible falsification contract and the equilibrium type distribution with the distribution of cost types determined endogenously by the pre contractual investment choice an increase in the cost of falsification has two effects first there is a direct effect that reduces cost padding because it becomes more expensive to do so second there is an indirect effect that increases cost padding because the firm responds by choosing lower investments and lower investments are associated with more cost padding it is demonstrated that the direct effect will dominate and both expected levels of cost padding and expected costs for falsification will be reduced however the indirect effect increases real costs and despite the reduction in cost padding the net effect can reduce welfare it is determined that these conclusions are significantly different from those obtained when the distribution of cost types is exogenously fixed

a note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation abstract laffont and tirole s using cost observation to regulate firms j polit econ 94 1986 614 641 pioneering analysis identifies the optimal procurement contract when the supplier can readily inflate his innate production cost without detection when the buyer has some ability to limit such cost inflation an alternative contract can outperform the contract identified by laffont and tirole the alternative contract induces substantial pooling discontinuous production costs and effort supply and rent that varies non monotonically with innate cost

inefficiency and common property regimes abstract much of the literature on the commons focuses on the fact that many agents are assigned usage rights simultaneously but less attention has been paid to the exercise of exclusion rights the simultaneous exercise of one of the two rights by all the owners of a common causes a problem of overexploitation in the first case competition in use and underuse in the second competition in exclusion the relevance of both inefficiencies stems from the way they illustrate the general conflict between individual and collective interests this paper proposes a formal synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of resources in common property regimes the synthesis takes into account the following features i the importance of the consumer surplus for the analysis of the issue ii the attitude of economic agents in the face of a reciprocal externality linked to the exploitation of the common and iii the social and the private costs of exploitation

wta estimates using the method of paired comparison tests of robustness the method of paired comparison is modified to allow choices between two alternative gains so as to estimate willingness to accept wta without loss aversion the robustness of wta values for two public goods is tested with respect to sensitivity of the wta measure to the context of the bundle of goods used in the paired comparison exercise and to the scope scale of the public good project there was no statistical difference in wta measures for open space based on independent treatments with different contexts one treatment involved valuing open space within a set of goods with similar value the other treatment involved valuing open space within a choice set of goods which had lower dollar values than open space there was a statistical difference in wta between a permanent expansion in the bus system and a temporary expansion in the bus system we conclude the method of paired comparison appears to be a very promising approach to elicit measures of wta

private information and inventive activity abstract this paper examines incentives for investment in inventive activity in an environment subject to informational constraints on the one hand the inability of the public to monitor such investments suggests that inventors should bear a high share of the risk associated with their efforts on the other hand the very novelty of an invention could make it difficult to sell to a skeptical public this difficulty could induce an inventor to engage in costly signalling activity this papers considers this friction and the nature of contracts which balance the incentive to invent against the incentive to signal optimal contracts are interpreted in terms of financial arrangements between entrepreneurs and investors

legal institutions environmental protection and the willingness to accept measure of value abstract this paper looks at the us legal system and negative environmental externalities i provide a positive explanation for the role of courts in environmental disputes using the willingness to accept wa measure of value i further suggest that environmental law has aided courts in attaining a new welfare standard wa efficiency the explanation offered here contrasts with those found in law and economics because i propose that courts are not substitutes for markets and as such one of their important roles may be to efficiently redistribute entitlements the analysis is formalized with a model in which the court allows a victim of pollution to exert a credible threat against a polluter which results in increased social welfare even beyond what would exist in a zero transaction cost world i also investigate when legal policy based on wa efficiency is appropriate and suggest that the answer may hinge on rawl s notion of primary goods

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

choices without prices without apologies valuing is usually regarded as a process of compressing information about attributes into a single metric armed with this reduced form of compact information the consumer can consider a particular object with a particular price attached or implied and make an informed decision but the process of valuing is less straightforward than we ordinarily suppose when environmental goods and services become the object of information compaction it is possible that important information is lost we comment on the choice problem germane to environmental goods and services and challenge the presumption that environmental choices made without explicit pricing are inferior to those in which hypothetical valuation studies are undertaken

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

the value of biodiversity markets society and ecosystems the value of biodiversity is discussed at different levels including market value non market values to humans and the value of biodi versity to ecosystems the main conclusion is that although market exchange values of environmental services may be used to justify biodiversity protec tion measures it must be stressed that exchange value constitutes a small portion of total biodiver sity value the total value of existing biodiversity is largely unknown but indications are that it is essen tial to human existence the various levels of biodi versity value point to the need for a hierarchical and pluralistic methodology to determine appropri ate policies for its preservation jel q21 i introduction among ecologists there is a general con sensus that biodiversity1 is of critical impor tance to the health of ecosystems and even for the long term survival of the human species there is also a consensus that bio diversity is being lost at a rate which is a cause for concern 2 economists on the other hand generally view biodiversity as just an other good which is to be placed in the basket of market choices just as any other the discussion of the specifics of biodiver sity policy has been unsatisfactory partly because of the different meanings of the word value used by economists and ecolo gists many ecologists fail to understand the logic of market allocation and why biologi cal resources are used in seemingly irra tional ways many economists fail to ap preciate the narrowness of the concept of economic value as indicated by relative prices determined by market exchange fol lowing anderson 1966 and brown 1984 the discussion below considers economic measures of value to be species of the genus assigned value which belongs to the family value many biologists and paleontologists be lieve that we are at a critical point in the history of the human species and perhaps even in the 600 million year history of com plex multicelled life on earth if the paleon tologists and biologists who study the phe nomenon of mass extinction are correct the current human induced mass extinction may be of the same order of magnitude as the five other major extinction episodes which destroyed between 20 and 96 percent of existing species on the planet ehrlich and ehrlich 1992 ward 1994 wilson 1992 we are living in a truly remarkable period in earth s 41 billion year history the valua tion decisions our species has made in the recent past and will make during the next few decades will determine the fate of life on earth for the next tens of millions of years it is critical to clarify the language and concepts we use to estimate the value of biodiversity and thus policies leading to its destruction or preservation the importance attached to the issue of biodiversity preservation necessarily in volves ethical judgments about duty to fu ture generations and responsibility toward the nonhuman natural world although in dividuals hold a variety of conflicting beliefs about human responsibility to the natural world this does not mean that policy choices

hardball and the soft touch the economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs abstract we examine an environment of costly state verification in which insureds possess private information about the magnitude of an insurable loss insurers can verify the actual loss suffered only by incurring a positive resource cost and insureds may verification and may lead to more generous settlements optimal insurance contracts are shown to mitigate the incentives to evade by a combination of incentives which include the overpayment of easily monitored losses and undercompensation for claims exhibiting higher verification costs

robust contracting with additive noise abstract we investigate the idea that linear contracts are reliable because they give the same incentives for effort at every point along the contract we ask whether this reliability leads to a microfoundation for linear contracts when the principal is profit maximizing we consider a principal agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability in which the agent observes the realization of a mean zero shock to output before choosing how much effort to exert we show that such a model can indeed provide a foundation for reliable contracts and illustrate what elements are required in particular we must assume that the principal knows a lower bound but not an upper bound on the shocks

optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly inexact verification abstract this paper integrates the often dichotomized models of costly state verification and costly claim falsification it is found that when verification is inexact it is possible for an optimal insurance contract to consist of both positive claim falsification and positive insurer verification provided that falsification cost and verification cost are sufficiently low and the insured is risk averse satisfying constant absolute risk aversion this result certainly contrasts with the common belief that falsification and verification are mutually exclusive in an optimal insurance contract some characteristics of the optimal falsification verification and indemnification profiles including implementability are analyzed

stock market reactions to customer and competitor orientations the case of initial public offerings recognizing that initial public offerings ipos represent the debut of private firms on the public stage this study investigates how pre ipo customer and competitor orientations ccos affect ipo outcomes building on information economics we propose that ccos influence investors sentiments toward an ipo and that both ipo specific variables which influence the credibility of cco information and facets of the organizational institutional and task environments which influence the appropriateness of cco information moderate this influence we test the framework using data collected from computer aided text analysis expert coders and secondary sources for 543 ipos across 43 industries between 2000 and 2004 a bayesian shrinkage model which accounts for industry specific effects and uses latent instrumental variables to address cco endogeneity shows that ccos positively influence ipo outcomes furthermore 1 underwriter reputation and venture funding positively moderate the effects of ccos 2 technological and market turbulence positively and institutional complexity negatively moderate the effect of customer orientation and 3 technological turbulence competitive intensity and institutional complexity positively moderate the effect of competitor orientation also accounting for endogeneity using latent instrumental variables substantially improves the predictive validity of the model relative to alternative model specifications

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

willingness to pay and willingness to accept how much can they differ comment i agree with the point made by edoh y amiran and daniel a hagen 2003 that there can be a substantial or even infinite divergence between the wta and wtp for a public good even where there is a nonzero elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good provided that the indifference curves are asymptotically bounded with respect to market goods in the manner they describe this is an important point they are also correct to point out that the elasticity of substitution is a local concept whereas their asymptotic boundedness condition applies also for discrete changes my 1991 paper used a local analysis because it was following the structure of the analysis in robert d willig 1976 and alan randall and john r stoll 1980 i wanted to show that while randall and stoll appeared to extend willig s local result on wta versus wtp from price changes to changes in the quantity of a public good the relevant elasticity was in fact different and involved the substitution elasticity as well as the income elasticity i view these points by amiran and hagen as not two separate results but essentially the same result their asymptotic boundedness condition generalizes my zero elasticity of substitution condition to discrete changes the asymptotic boundedness condition can be expressed as follows assuming a bivariate utility function u x q and given a reference point x q associated with a reference utility level u u x q there exists some q q such that for all q q there exists no x such that u x q u in other words no amount of x can substitute for the reduction in public good from q to q q in the case of a zero elasticity of substitution q q but as amiran and hagen show in their theorem 1 this is unnecessarily restrictive when dealing with a discrete reduction in q furthermore their theorem 2 can be viewed as a special case of their theorem 1 in which q 0 which makes q an essential commodity it is well known in consumer theory that the wta to avoid the loss of an essential market good is infinite their theorem 2 extends this result to the case of an essential nonmarket good but as their theorem 1 shows essentialness is not necessary for an infinite wta the boundedness condition is the key and this implies a fundamental lack of substitutability between money market goods and the public good

valuing water level changes in reservoirs using two stated preference approaches an exploration of validity the combination of travel cost tcm and contingent behaviour cb methods is a relatively new research avenue in the recreational valuation community contrary to simple tcm applications tcm cb facilitates the ex ante valuation of marginal welfare effects resulting from environmental quality or quantity changes similar to the contingent valuation method cv even though tcm cb is highly policy relevant i e to inform changes in management regimes at recreational sites the validity of estimates has hardly received any attention and little is known about the performance of tcm cb compared to cv in this paper tcm cb and cv are explored with respect to several validity tests in a case study on the recreational effects of water level changes in a reservoir overall the findings reveal that tcm cb and cv perform equally well in terms of theoretical validity but that the marginal recreational value varies significantly between the two methods we also observe that both methods face similar internal difficulties with respect to the stability of values when the order of a set of valuation questions is changed

competition for talent under performance manipulation abstract we study the effects of introducing competition for ceos assuming that the talent of ceos is not observable and that they can misreport their performance without competition for talent firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low powered incentive contracts competition for talent removes those inefficiencies but it leads to excessively high powered incentive contracts causing efficiency losses that can be more severe than the inefficiencies that competition mitigates if misreporting is not a concern however then competition for talent has unambiguously positive effects on efficiency

biased valuations damage assessments and policy choices the choice of measure matters abstract damages from for example an oil spill can be measured by how much people are willing to pay to avoid them or by the minimum compensation they demand to accept them and decisions to clean up can be justified by the willingness to pay to do it or by the compensation necessary to forgo it contrary to the usual official and unofficial conventions that the choice of measure is of no matter the empirical evidence and intuitions of most people strongly suggest otherwise the appropriate choice of measure appears to turn not on legal entitlements but on the reference state people use to judge negative and positive changes a criteria that is likely to call into question most estimates of the damages of increased health risks and the value of environmental mitigation efforts

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

are you a good employee or simply a good guy influence costs and contract design we develop a principal agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal the level of output and a soft behavioral signal the supervision signal about the agent s level of effort in our model the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal these activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task we show that the agent s ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result interestingly the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high powered incentives this result implies that the optimal contract and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not depends on the magnitude of the productivity based influence costs we show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

the effect of earnings forecasts on earnings management we develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting earnings management is modeled as a window dressing action that can increase the firm s reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm s real cash flows earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager s communication of the firm s future cash flows we show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings we also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts finally our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the revelation principle by contrast in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted nonetheless earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts

optimal leverage and aggregate investment we analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level moreover aggregate leverage decreases with the risk shifting problem and increases with the effort problem

the effect of business interdependencies on product r d intensive business performance one of the major decisions that firms face regarding r d intensive businesses is a structural one establishing the appropriate level of internal strategic interdependency within and among business units the current discussion over the effectiveness of creating small independent and entrepreneurial venture units in multi business corporations is part of this larger structural concern the aim of the present research is to study the efficacy of different structural linkages for achieving market share and roi objectives in product r d intensive businesses the study focuses on interdependencies between business units in product r d intensive businesses that produce consumer products or industrial products a sample of 641 businesses 221 consumer products and 420 industrial goods is drawn from the pims data base a cluster analysis is run to identify natural groups of homogeneous businesses for each of the seven identified groups established suppliers fast movers high tech job shops stalled giants established diversifiers dominant specialists and laggers a multi way analysis of variance is performed to study the influence of various interdependencies measured in term of vertical integration shared facilities and shared marketing on two criteria of performance market share and roi the findings indicate first that the interdependencies required to achieve high performance are contingent upon the nature of the product r d intensive business and its environmental characteristics second for a given business configuration high performance interdependencies are influenced by the type of performance objectives selected by the business such as market share or profitability finally the results imply that a multi business corporation which possesses a portfolio of product r d intensive businesses probably requires a more diverse set of interdependencies than for example simply mainstream centralized industrial r d organization on the one hand and independent entrepreneurial units on the other hand effective competition for a firm with diverse r d intensive businesses may often call for a capability to support concurrently multiple levels of internal interdependencies and to reject create or modify this set of interdependencies as the situation warrants

choice modelling and its potential application to tropical rainforest preservation abstract loss of rainforest occurs in part because of a global market failure problem markets routinely transmit signals about international demands for forest products such as timber but fail to transmit signals about demands for preservation to make efficient resource allocation choices decision makers need some framework to estimate the non use values that might be held by an international community for rainforest preservation non market valuation techniques can be used for this purpose but framing and other problems limit the application of the contingent valuation method cvm an alternative technique choice modelling cm appears to hold some promise because it can be used to model complex situations and to frame choices consistent with real life choices in this paper a cm experiment to assess the values that australians hold for rainforest conservation in vanuatu is reported the experiment disguises effectively the issue of interest rainforest conservation in vanuatu within a pool of other conservation locations also the experiment demonstrates that choice tradeoffs may involve a variety of environmental and socio economic factors rather than be concentrated on some monetary tradeoff the results demonstrate that a variety of predictive and valuation tools can be gained from a cm experiment and suggest that further development is warranted

auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector abstract this paper investigates the impact of a ministry s budget size on the choice between auditing a niskanen bureau and employing competitive bidding in the provision of a publicly funded good the ministry s marginal expected payoff increases fastest with budget size for auctioning as opposed to auditing however the ministry is shown to switch from a purely public provision to a competitive provision as the budget size increases even if expected fixed costs favor the audit the study contributes to the literature by extending the niskanen framework and by endogenizing the institutional arrangements for the provision of public sector goods

limits to substitution and irreversibility in production and consumption a neoclassical interpretation of ecological economics abstract there are many methodological approaches within ecological economics one of the principal modes of analysis is a modified version of the standard neoclassical model this paper examines the parallels which emerge between the ideas of some ecological economists concerning production and the ideas of others concerning consumption when these ideas are interpreted in the neoclassical paradigm it is well known that ecological economics is characterized by arguments concerning limits to substitution between inputs energy natural capital etc vs manufactured capital labor etc in production and the implications these have for sustainability however various authors have also expressed concerns regarding limits to substitution in consumption either between environmental assets and other goods or between basic needs commodities and other goods though the specific reasons for non substitution are different in the production and consumption cases the underlying theme is that individual commodities and other inputs have unique physical or other properties which make them poor substitutes ideas about irreversibility in production and economic development are also prominent in ecological economics likewise many authors have argued for similar irreversibilities in consumption behavior in analogy to the term technological change i coin the term preferential change to describe these phenomena the linking themes in this case are that the economy environment system is evolutionary in character and that external effects intended and unintended consequences of actions or processes imposed on other parties or resources are all pervasive

willingness to pay and compensation demanded experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value aside from possible income effects measures of the maximum amounts people will pay to avoid a loss and the minimum compensation necessary for them to accept it are generally assumed to be equivalent unexpectedly wide variations between these sums however have been noted in survey responses to hypothetical options this paper reports the results of a series of experiments that confronted people with actual money payments and cash compensations the results indicate that the compensation measure of value seems to exceed significantly the willingness to pay measure which would appear to call into some question various rules of entitlement damage assessments and interpretations of indifference curves

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

corporate tax evasion with agency costs this paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion using a costly state falsification framework we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and in particular how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority the optimal contract may adjust to offset at least partially the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion and we find a new and policy relevant non equivalence result penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders

equilibrium subprime lending this paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared the model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities as well as default and trading intensities we offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults in our model both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities thus debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research