the effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions in this paper a new decision rule for capital budgeting is considered a firm has the opportunity to invest in a project of uncertain profitability over time the firm receives additional information in the form of signals indicating the profitability of the project the belief that the firm needs to have in a profitable project for investment to be optimal is calculated and analyzed it is shown that the probability of investing in a project with low profitability is larger when the firm uses a conventional rule like the net present value rule as a counterintuitive result it is obtained that it can be optimal to undertake the investment at a later point in time in case the expected number of signals per time unit is higher also an error measure is discussed that indicates the accuracy of capital budgeting rules in this stochastic environment

trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the gatt an empirical assessment abstract this paper is a first attempt to empirically determine why countries choose to violate or adhere to gatt rules when making trade policy adjustments between negotiating rounds we use a previously unexploited set of data in which countries implemented two types of protection under the gatt system between 1973 and 1994 i legal protection in which countries utilized the gatt s safeguards provisions and ii illegal protection in which the protection was provided outside of the safeguards provisions resulting in a formal trade dispute we find substantial evidence that concerns for retaliation affect government policy decisions in ways which contribute to the explanation of the existence of trade disputes

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty abstract we investigate the value of delaying the punishment in private monitoring repeated games with almost public information when players use a grim trigger strategy if the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered the equilibrium set would change

the level and quality of value at risk disclosure by commercial banks in this paper we study both the level of value at risk var disclosure and the accuracy of the disclosed var figures for a sample of us and international commercial banks to measure the level of var disclosures we develop a var disclosure index that captures many different facets of market risk disclosure using panel data over the period 1996 2005 we find an overall upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public we also find that historical simulation is by far the most popular var method we assess the accuracy of var figures by studying the number of var exceedances and whether actual daily vars contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues unlike the level of var disclosure the quality of var disclosure shows no sign of improvement over time we find that var computed using historical simulation contains very little information about future volatility

symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models with incomplete information this paper considers a real options model with incomplete information in a duopoly setting i show that even in the presence of a first mover advantage there are circumstances in which the preemption region is eroded entirely and the only equilibrium strategy is of simultaneous type both players should exercise together or not at all this outcome arises if the price paid by a player from exercising the option simultaneously with his competitor over exercising alone as a stackelberg leader is low such an outcome has not been previously recognised in the literature the underlying information structure has been applied in a one firm setting to a range of different contexts of late all of which have competitive pressures in practice as such the existence of this equilibrium under certain conditions ought to be recognised

managerial incentives on the near linearity of optimal compensation contracts are examined when outcomes depend on managers choices as well as efforts as the cost of effort shrinks relative to payoffs the optimal contract converges to a linear payoff if the control space of the agent has full dimensionality but not otherwise thus when the agent can trade expected return for greater correlation with other returns it is better to ignore relative performance when the cost of effort is small when the choices include all fair gambles and hedges the linear schedule is no more expensive than any other schedule that induces effort unfair gambles are examined as well

adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability the argument has frequently been made that the pattern of diffusion associated with most new innovations will typically have certain characteristics a diffusion curve for an innovation is usually defined as the proportion of its potential users who have already adopted as a function of time measured from the first adoption many empirical studies by both economists and other social scientists have shown that diffusion curves nearly always have two distinct characteristics i they are s shaped the proportion adopted is an increasing function of time which is initially convex but eventually becomes concave and ii they tend to be right hand skewed the inflection point occurs at a time corresponding to a proportion adopted which is less than one half so that the function is concave over the greatest amount of time in fact this skewing is occasionally severe enough to make the diffusion curve appear concave everywhere the focus of most empirical studies of innovation diffusion has centered on identification of either the major determinants of the speed of diffusion or the characteristics of firms which determine how long they delay adoption the seminal contributions are griliches 6 study of hybrid corn and mansfield s 121 study of 12 industrial innovations these studies and most of the similar ones following conclude that diffusion is faster for innovations with higher profitability and that large firms tend to be the earliest adopters some studies e g mansfield 121 herregat 71 have attempted to ascertain

the impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm s investment policy in this paper we provide a model which describes how voluntary disclosure impacts on the timing of a firm s investment decisions a manager chooses a time to invest in a project and a time to disclose the investment return in order to maximise his monetary payoff we assume that this payoff is linked to the level of the firm s stock price prior to investing the profitability of the project and the market reaction to the disclosure of the investment return are uncertain but the manager receives signals at random points in time which assist in resolving some of this uncertainty we find that a manager whose objective can only be achieved through voluntarily disclosing the return is motivated to invest at a time that would be sub optimal for an identical manager with a profit maximising objective

dynamic r d competition with learning to account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation we formulate a differential game of r d competition with an unknown hazard rate we show as time passes with success firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation reducing their r d investment and possibly exiting the race an increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms r d intensities for given beliefs but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race time paths of r d investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms

agency theory and stochastic dominance recently agency theory has become popular as a means of explaining the structure of contracts between various classes of economic agents oftentimes the contracts of interest represent sharing rules for the payoffs that result from some production activity in the usual two party model of the contracting problem one party designated the principal delegates authority for decisions affecting production to another party designated the agent typically the assumptions made about the consequences of the agent s actions are that they are associated with effort on the part of the agent for which the agent but not the principal has disutility and that greater effort will result in higher payoffs from production in every state of nature moral hazard is then introduced by assuming that the principal is unable to observe the agent s effort or to infer what effort the agent applied through an ex post observation of the payoff that results

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

the pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management banks hold capital to guard against unexpected surges in losses and long freezes in financial markets the minimum level of capital is set by banking regulators as a function of the banks own estimates of their risk exposures as a result a great challenge for both banks and regulators is to validate internal risk models we show that a large fraction of us and international banks uses contaminated data when testing their models in particular most banks validate their market risk model using profit and loss p l data that include fees and commissions and intraday trading revenues this practice is inconsistent with the definition of the employed market risk measure using both bank data and simulations we find that data contamination has dramatic implications for model validation and can lead to the acceptance of misspecified risk models moreover our estimates suggest that the use of contaminated data can significantly reduce market risk induced regulatory capital

strategic interaction among nations negotiable and non negotiable trade barriers trade policy is modelled as a two stage game between governments governments choose a negotiable trade barrier in the first stage of the game which is co operative the level of this barrier is treated as a binding commitment in the second stage of the game where the non negotiable trade barrier is chosen non co operatively hence governments choose trade barriers during negotiations with a view to influencing the equilibrium of the non co operative game to follow this proves to be a convenient framework in which to analyse the idea that trade agreements contain loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments trade negotiations induce substitution toward less efficient instruments of protection but are nevertheless welfare improving as long as the negotiations are relevant i e the negotiable barrier is actually in use and the two instruments are not perfect substitutes

u s trade threats rhetoric or war working paper 95 7 the international agricultural trade research consortium is an informal association of university and government economists interested in agricultural trade its purpose is to foster interaction improve research capacity and to focus on relevant trade policy issues it is financed by united states department of agriculture ers fas and csrs agriculture canada and the participating institutions

antidumping and retaliation threats abstract we propose and test two ways in which retaliation threats may dampen the antidumping ad activity we observe first the threat of retaliatory ad actions may make a domestic industry less likely to name a foreign import source in an ad petition second the prospect of a gatt wto trade dispute may make government agencies less likely to rule positive in their ad decision using a nested logit framework we find evidence that both retaliation threats substantially affect us ad activity from 1980 through 1998

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour part i principal agent models are studied in which outcomes conditional on the agent s action are uncertain and the agent s behaviour therefore unobservable for a model with bounded agent s utility conditions are given under which the first best equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by contracts relating payment to observable outcomes for general models it is shown that the solution may not always be obtained by using the agent s first order conditions as constraint general conditions of lagrangean type are given for problems in which contracts are finite dimensional 1 the moral hazard situation

linearity with project selection and controllable diffusion rate in continuous time principal agent problems i extend holmstrom and milgrom s model by allowing the agent to control privately or publicly the diffusion rate process and show that the optimal contract is still linear i discuss the conditions under which conflicts over the choice of diffusion rate do and do not arise as an application i examine project selection problems of a firm conflicts between the manager and investors arise because giving the manager too much incentive to work to increase the profit from ongoing operations can induce him to be too conservative in project selection possibly resulting in optimal contracts with low sensitivities

incentives for effective risk management under the new capital accord banks choose between two different types of risk management systems the standard or the internal rating based approach the paper considers how a bank s preference for a risk management system is affected by the presence of supervision by bank regulators the model uses a principal agent setting between a bank s owner and its risk management the main conclusion is that previously unregulated institutions can be expected to switch to the lower quality standard approach subsequent to becoming regulated i e the presence of regulation may induce a bank to decrease the quality of its risk management system

do countries free ride on mfn abstract the most favored nation mfn clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations to address this issue we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation we show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product thus providing a rationalization for the principal supplier rule we also show that through this channel equilibrium tariffs vary according to the herfindahl hirschman index of export shares higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff estimation of our model using sector level tariff data for the u s provides strong support for this relationship

unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation abstract we analyze a bank that operates under the basel credit and market risk requirements and that maximizes its value through recapitalizations dividends and liquid asset investments according to our model the market risk requirement may postpone recapitalization and this way increase the bank s default probability we show that this is indeed the case if the expected return and volatility of the liquid asset portfolio are high i e then the market risk requirement raises the default probability of the bank in this sense the market risk requirement is inefficient

does risk aversion affect bank output loss the case of the eurozone abstract we propose a new model to infer the evolution of bank specific output losses due to the uncertainty in bank output prices losses are based on bank risk aversion with micro foundations tethered to the uncertainty regarding prices our model allows us to measure time varying bank specific output losses and risk aversion while taking into account all bank cross sectional heterogeneity we employ a panel data set to estimate the input and output elasticities with both parametric and non parametric techniques we are the first to document that increasing risk aversion among eurozone banks during the financial crisis resulted in sizable output losses although subdued thereafter losses have been resurging in recent years both conventional and unconventional monetary policy responses by the european central bank ecb mitigated uncertainty in bank output prices though unequally so across countries certain measures of unconventional monetary policy may have even enhanced bank risk aversion and thereby output losses but mainly so for large countries