estimating convergence for asian economies using dynamic random variable models abstract this paper analyzes the convergence in per capita gross domestic product gdp among 17 asian countries over the period 1960 1992 we use a dynamic random variables model that allows both country differences and similarities to enter into the analysis of growth and convergence and also corrects for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation we find evidence in favor of regional convergence in these countries with a rate of convergence of around 2 per year

the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation the fisher equation revisited stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0022 2879 28199602 2928 3a1 3c102 3atlrbni 3e2 0 co 3b2 2journal of money credit and banking is currently published by ohio state university press your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals ohio press html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon aug 27 13 58 08 2007

estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition an experimental investigation we evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data using an entry exit game we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a markov perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior if behavior was collusive however the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals the laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments our main finding is that prediction errors due to collusion are modest in size we also document a different deviation from equilibrium behavior inertia that can lead to large prediction errors

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

individual learning and cooperation in noisy repeated games we investigate whether two players in a long run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown specifically we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and or the monitoring structure each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned we show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a belief free equilibrium we also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples copyright 2014 oxford university press

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

collusion under monitoring of sales collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms prices are private information and their quantities are public information such an information structure is consistent with several recent price fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins for a class of symmetric oligopoly games it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion an asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas in practice cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

why are real interest rates not equalized internationally 1 introductioninternational financial economists are intensely concerned with several parity conditions that relate goods prices and asset returns across countries these include purchasing power parity ppp interest rate parity irp and variations of these two such as relative ppp ex ante ppp and real interest rate parity rip each of these parity conditions measures a degree of integration between the economies of the world the greater the economic integration across countries the greater the likelihood that the more restrictive of these parity conditions will have empirical support for example the strict ppp hypothesis implies that aggregate price levels will be equal in terms of a common currency this condition is very stringent because it does not allow for even temporary deviations from the equilibrium condition 1 a less restrictive version is long run ppp where price levels measured in a common currency across countries converge over some period of time may be a very long period of time recognizing all of the impediments that keep strict ppp from holding economists have put their efforts in studying the long run version of this equilibrium condition there is a relatively large literature examining the equality of real interest rates internationally 2 in all of these studies the real interest rate is defined by the fisher equation these studies then go on to estimate and test for the simultaneous existence of uncovered interest parity uip which is also called the open economy fisher relation and ex ante ppp eappp the other conditions sufficient for rip the problem in this strategy is that the fisher equation may not hold many studies have been devoted to examining the validity of the fisher relationship for both the u s and other economies 3 the results of this line of inquiry have been decidedly mixed even if the fisher relation does hold it is unlikely that the fisher effect will be one for one as implied by defining the real interest rate from the simple fisher equation both mundell tobin and tax effects can drive a wedge between inflation expectations and the effect on nominal interest rates 4 it would seem more appropriate to treat the fisher relation as another testable parity condition than as an assumption in this study we examine the underlying parity conditions sufficient for rip treating them as hypotheses to be tested the four parity conditions or equilibrium relationships upon which rip is predicated uncovered interest parity uip ex ante ppp eappp the fisher relation in each country i e the fisher relation in country a and the fisher relation in country b imply time series implications for the observable variables specifically if any of the nominal interest rates or inflation rates can be characterized as integrated variables evidence of which we will provide then the four parity conditions imply one common stochastic trend between them therefore an initial examination of the sufficient conditions for rip should include a test for a unit root in the observable variables and then a test for the number of common stochastic trends in a given rip system because the power of univariate unit root and stationarity tests is notoriously low many exploit the power gains available by using panel tests however there are serious drawbacks to some of these panel unit root tests for example o connell 1998 taylor and sarno 1998 and breuer mcnown and wallace 2001 we overcome these drawbacks by taking advantage of recent innovations in univariate and multivariate unit root tests that have substantially greater power to reject a false null but are not subject to the size distortions associated with some popular panel based tests our use of these methods leads us to conclude that each rip system analyzed can be characterized to some degree as a system of integrated variables that share more than one common trend

average marginal tax rates from social security and the individual income tax we extend previous estimates of the average marginal tax rate from the federal individual income tax to include social security our computations consider the tax rates on employers employees and the self employed the income that accrues to persons with earnings below the ceiling and the effective deductibility of employers social security contributions from workers taxable income the next effect of social security on the average marginal tax rate is below 02 until 1966 but then rises to 03 in 1968 04 in 1973 05 in 1974 06 in 1979 and 07 in 1982 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

nonlinearity and stationarity of inflation rates evidence from the euro zone countries earlier studies hardly reject the hypothesis of a unit root in inflation few studies have examined the possibility of nonlinearity in inflation and tested nonlinear stationarity of the inflation rates this study thus intends to fill the gap this study utilizes the tests for nonlinearity along with the unit root tests that allow for nonlinearity in the variables to examine the stationarity of inflation rates of 12 european countries that formed the euro zone ez later in the sample period the results suggest that the majority of these countries inflation rates can be characterized by mean reversion during the floating exchange rate period many of them appear to be nonlinear stationary this finding is essential in conducting applied economic studies for these countries when constructing models whose validity relies on whether or not inflation is stationary the results of this study also imply that shocks to inflation have a transitory effect on inflation in the euro area therefore it would be le

are tax effects important in the long run fisher relationship evidence from the municipal bond market are nominal bonds appropriately discounted for taxes empirical estimnates of the response of nominal interest rates to changes in inflation the fisher effect have failed to produce a definitive answer four reasons have been put forward as possible explanations i tobin effects ii fiscal illusion iii peso problems and iv different estimators utilizing data on taxable and tax exempt bond interest rates and several different estimators we find that the fisher effect estimates are always larger for the taxable bond relative to the tax exempt bond suggesting that fiscal illusion and different estimators cannot account for the previous results how economic agents respond to the tax burdens of assets with different tax treatment is an important issue at both the level of the individual micro and the aggregate economy macro one clear source of evidence would appear to be the market for high quality debt trading in both taxable and tax exempt debt occurs on a daily basis the response of the rates of return on taxable and tax exempt debt to changes in expected inflation are described by the fisher relationship the fisher relationship is one of the oldest equilibrium relationships in financial economics fisher s original proposition was that if the real rate of interest is relatively constant over time a fully perceived change in the purchasing power of money as proxied by the inverse of the rate of inflation would be accompanied by a proportional increase in the nominal interest rate darby 1975 points out that when nominal interest income is taxed as are interest payments on u s treasury bills the fisher relationship implies a response from nominal interest rates that is greater than the change in expected inflation in order to maintain the constant ex ante real interest rate summers 1983 suggests that given average marginal tax rates in the united states the appropriate value of the fisher effect is 1 3 to 1 5 for tax exempt bonds the original fisher specification should be a good approximation implying a fisher effect close to unity in a seminal paper fama 1975 presents evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in nominal

private monitoring and communication in cartels explaining recent collusive practices motivated by recent cartel practices a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms prices and quantities are private information conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports the properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid lysine and vitamins

the long run link between money growth and inflation is inflation always a monetary phenomenon many economists believe that the link between money growth and inflation in the u s has weakened over the last two decades due in part to the federal reserve s policy experiment in 1979 1982 and innovations in the financial sector of the economy i find that the long run relationship between money growth and inflation is strong in a statistical sense and important economically the key result is that the trend or growth component in cpi inflation is entirely due to the trend component of monetary base growth jel c32 e31 e51

what fisher knew about his relation we sometimes forget abstract expected consumption growth increases the real interest rate as one tries to smooth consumption over time we demonstrate that placing it in the fisher relation 1 is consistent with the euler equation governing the purchase of nominal bonds 2 explains observed procyclicality of the real interest rate 3 is supported empirically and 4 provides an alternative method for estimating the consumer s degree of relative risk aversion

introduction to repeated games with private monitoring abstract we present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring the literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents actions although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price cutting exchange of goods with uncertain quality and observation errors it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players this is in sharp contrast to the well explored case of repeated games under public information with the celebrated folk theorems and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case however rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d43 d82 l13 l41

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

a theory of hub and spoke collusion abstract we develop a model of hub and spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers demand is stochastic and collusion between retailers is difficult the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient rotemberg and saloner 1986 in the hub and spoke collusive agreement retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier the supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price by organizing the collusion the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain we show that surprisingly this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare

the fisher hypothesis a multi country analysis this paper tests whether the fisher hypothesis holds for a sample of 26 countries by assessing the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation rates taking into consideration the short run dynamics of interest rates the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a one to one relationship between the interest rate and inflation for more than half of the countries under study

unit roots and persistence in the nominal interest rate a confirmatory analysis applied to the oecd this paper investigates the stochastic properties of long term and short term nominal interest rates for the oecd over the post war era for that purpose we employ univariate unit root tests as well as panel unit root and stationarity tests that explicitly allow for cross sectional dependence overall we find overwhelming evidence that the nominal interest rate contains a unit root which may be driven by a stochastic common factor the computation of half lives through impulse response functions also points to a high degree of persistence this has important implications for the cointegration analysis of the fisher equation the uncovered interest parity and the term structure jel classification

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

collusion in dynamic bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication abstract this paper studies collusion in repeated bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated it derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim trigger strategy this analysis is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations in this model it is shown that the above sufficient conditions hold if idiosyncratic noise terms are sufficiently small journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

do expected shifts in inflation affect estimates of the long run fisher relation recent empirical studies suggest that nominal interest rates and expected inflation do not move together one for one in the long run a finding at odds with many theoretical models this article shows that these results can be deceptive when the process followed by inflation shifts infrequently we characterize the shifts in inflation by a markov switching model based upon this model s forecasts we reexamine the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation interestingly we are unable to reject the hypothesis that in the long run nominal interest rates reflect expected inflation one for one

price cutting and business stealing in imperfect cartels although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns important puzzles remain standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment but they fail to explain two important factual observations first apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs second it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected we propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation

two illustrations of the quantity theory of money of two central implications of the quantity theory of money that a given change in the rate of change in the quantity of money induces i an equal change in the rate of price inflation and ii an equal change in nominal rates of interest the illustrations were obtained by comparing moving averages of the three variables in question using quarterly u s time series for the period 1953 77 readers may find the results of interest as additional confirmation of the quantity theory as an example of one way in which the quantity theoretic relationships can be uncovered via atheoretical methods from time series which are subject to a variety of other forces or as a measure of the extent to which the inflation and interest rate experience of the postwar period can be understood in terms of purely classical monetary forces the theoretical background of the study is reviewed very briefly as it is familiar material in the next section the data processing methods are described and rationalized in section ii the illustrations

short term interest rates as predictors of inflation on testing the hypothesis that the real rate of interest is constant in an innovative and provocative paper in this review eugene fama presents evidence which appears to be consistent with the joint hypothesis that the real rate of interest ignoring taxes is a constant and that the market for u s treasury bills is efficient in the sense of embodying rational expectations those findings are strikingly at variance with a long list of previous studies which seemed to support the view that the real rate of interest varies over time and can be related to economic variables such as real output monetary policy and so forth 2 the methodologies which lead to these contradictory conclusions are quite different previous studies had followed the lead of irving fisher by relating nominal interest rates to distributed lags on past rates of inflation 3 these distributed lags are generally interpreted as approximations to the market s expected rate of inflation and thus any remaining variation is attributed to variation in the real rate 4 fama s methodology on the other hand draws on the fact that the difference between the market interest rate and the subsequently observed rate of inflation the ex post real interest rate consists by definition of the ex ante real interest rate plus a pure forecasting error 5 the hypothesis of market efficiency implies that these forecasting errors must be serially random thus observing ex post real rates is equivalent to observing ex ante real rates with random measurement error these errors of course confound the problem of identifying variation in the ex ante real rate in this paper we will argue that the relative magnitude of these measurement errors is such that the tests carried out by fama were not powerful enough to reject the joint hypothesis that the ex ante real rate is a constant and expectations are rational more powerful tests which are presented in this paper using the same data do lead to rejection of that hypothesis of course rejection