fiscal federalism quantitative studies we often think of fiscal decisions as being made by a single government but in the united states the reality is that an astounding number of entities have the power to tax and spend state local and federal governments all play crucial roles in the u s fiscal system and the interrelation has been the source of continuing controversy this fact is the focus of the seven papers and commentaries presented in this volume the result of a conference sponsored by the nber the contributors use various quantitative tools to study policy issues obtaining results that will interest policymakers and researchers working in the areas of taxation and public finance the first three papers study the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government john joseph wallis and wallace e oates look at the extend and evolution of decentralization in the state and local sector robert p inman examines the growth of federal grants and the structure of congressional decision making and jeffrey s zax investigates the effects of the number of government jurisdictions on aggregate local public debt and expenditures the next three papers look at the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal tax returns using an econometric analysis douglas holtz eakin and harvey s rosen examine the effects of deductibility on revenue sources and level of expenditures lawrence b lindsey looks at how deductibility affects the level and type of taxation george r zodrow uses a two sector general equilibrium model to investigate revenue effects of deductibility finally charles r hulten and robert m schwab analyze the problem of developing an accurate estimate of income for the state and local sector finding that conventional accounting procedures have underestimated the income generated by a startling 100 billion

is there a leviathan in your neighborhood this paper measures effects of decentralization in local government hierarchies on local public sector size this sector shrinks if decentralization encourages competition among governments it expands if decentralization sacrifices scale economies in a sample of 3 022 counties larger county governments reduce competition and increase aggregate local public sector size relative to aggregate county income more cities and towns increase competition and reduce its size more special and school districts sacrifice scale economies and increase it two recent articles have attempted to identify the effects of decentralization in state and local government on the size of the state and local public sector wallace oates 1985 finds no important effects michael nelson 1987 finds modest evidence that increased competition among government units reduces the size of the public sector this article demonstrates that the effects of decentralization are important and complex decentralization which encourages competition reduces the size of the local public sector decentralization which discourages scale economies increases it

an introduction to vote counting schemes t he design of an electoral system is fundamental to any democracy motivation for understanding how electoral system design matters comes from many directions the creation of new constitutions in eastern europe the recent trauma of a three way presidential election in the united states the ongoing debate over u s redistricting and gerrymandering the furor caused by lani guinier s call for a more representative voting system the status quo adds another incentive plurality rule is pervasive even though it is a flawed system fortunately there is no lack of suitable alternatives one of the purposes of this symposium and this paper in particular is to help illustrate and motivate the remarkable variety of alternative mechanisms that aggregate individual preferences to decide an election this overview offers a summary of sixteen distinct methods and demonstrates by example how some of the more complex systems work the shorter papers that follow focus on some of the more popular alternatives including approval voting single transferable vote the maximum likelihood rule and more one can speculate on why alternatives to plurality rule have had such a difficult time being adopted part of the cause may be arrow s general possibility theorem arrow 1951 demonstrates that any voting system applied to an unrestricted collection of voter preferences must have some serious defect we must always choose between flawed alternatives with conflicting theoretical guidance to help select the least flawed option people evaluate a system by its likely effect on the status quo outcome since those in power tend to want to

china s economic and trade development imbalance to equilibrium the rapid pace of china s economic and trade development has been considered as a great success since the entry of wto in 2001 most recently china has succeeded in coping with the global financial crisis and achieved a rapid v shaped recovery which rebounded to two digit growth rate and lead to strengthening its international status nevertheless china has exposed many potential problems in face of the financial crisis which due to international and domestic unbalanced features of china s economic operation system the pattern of china manufacturing and world consuming is a game with no winners while the investment leaded economic development mode achieves high growth rate but without enriches its own residents the current imbalanced economic development mode cannot be sustained and shall be changed in the future which is not only the consensus of economists at home and abroad but also a striving goal for the chinese government for its 12th five year plan however china will face great and formidable challenges by changing the economic development mode to achieve an equilibrium state

property tax and fiscal discipline in oecd countries this paper investigates the effects of property taxation on fiscal discipline for a sample of oecd countries over the period 1973 2011 we find that aggregate property taxation in total tax revenues is not statistically correlated with the primary surplus to gdp ratio in contrast a greater reliance on property taxes pertaining to sub national governments contributes to fiscal discipline suggesting that fiscal decentralization should favor responsive tax base instruments

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

an empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction the case of business income taxes in canada both federal and provincial governments in canada levy corporate taxes on busi nesses in their jurisdictions which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax exter nalities within the federation using a simple model of interdependent tax choices we estimate tax setting functions for the federal government ontario quebec and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces we find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax inter actions provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces

hoarding of international reserves in china mercantilism domestic consumption and us monetary policy abstract we develop a two country two period model able to reproduce the key qualitative aspects of the us china co dependency and imbalances as the result of the chinese and american authorities pursuing different but complementary objectives we show that a mercantilist reserve hoarding has served well the chinese policy goals fast gdp expansion and labor mobilization and has been compatible with the us ones high households consumption if the us authorities keep monetary policy sufficiently loose thus reducing the real value of the us liabilities held by china this latter finds less tempting to stop financing the us external deficit appreciate the currency and increase consumption on the contrary if the policy goals in china change from the maximization of gdp growth to higher households standards of living a rebalancing process may be ignited we then discuss the model and its theoretical predictions also in light of the five year plans approved by the chinese ruling party

local intergovernmental competition and the law of 1 n this article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal law of 1 n and leviathan theories which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases and the costs of distributive politics which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases using a panel of u s state and local government spending data empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the leviathan model is partially offset by the law of 1 n this result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature

the effect of property tax limitation measures on local government fiscal behavior abstract previous evidence on the effects of tax and expenditure limitation measures has not been conclusive difficulties arise in characterizing differences in fiscal institutions across states and estimating behavior in the absence of limitation measures a recently enacted tax limitation measure limits the growth in local property taxes in some illinois jurisdictions but not in others such differential treatment of otherwise similar jurisdictions provides a natural experiment for estimating the impact of the tax cap on local government fiscal behavior we find that the cap has been effective in that the fiscal behavior of capped jurisdictions differs from that of never capped jurisdictions

fiscal federalism and economic growth this paper uses an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth the analysis shows that federalism which allows public good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers who live in different jurisdictions increases the incentive to save this stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth

the effects of customs unions on the pattern and terms of trade in a ricardian model with a continuum of goods abstract this paper adapts the dornbusch fischer samuelson continuum of goods ricardian model to three countries the pattern of trade and the terms of trade are determined endogenously in this general equilibrium model we derive comparative statics effects of endowment and tariff changes on trade patterns and terms of trade and apply the results to customs union theory trade creation and trade diversion impacts of unions are shown to be determined by the position of countries traded goods on the continuum in addition the desirability of economic integration is found to depend on the level of country development

fiscal decentralization and government size numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors this paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth fiscal decentralization the results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy

what s the point of reciprocal trade negotiations exports imports and gains from trade this paper explains why trade policy makers may prefer reciprocal trade negotiations rtn to unilateral tariff reductions utr for economic reasons it answers puzzles like why wto reciprocity and strengthens the unnecessarily weak case made for the wto by those who downplay or dismiss benefits from foreign tariff reductions ftr rtn is superior to utr because it provides economic benefits that utr cannot namely ftr benefits which are clearer than potentially important utr benefits whereas each policy offers efficiency gains any terms of trade effect of utr generally detracts from these gains while any terms of trade effect of ftr is typically beneficial especially for a small price taking country with this benefit augmenting ftr s efficiency gains moreover benefits from reductions in foreign barriers may come from several sources they are not solely the result of terms of trade improvement or economies of scale the two benefits already noted in the literature though often dismissed for example with foreign ntb elimination possible home benefits are shown even with rising costs and terms of trade deterioration rtn is also superior to utr because by eliminating protection in either ntb or tariff form rtn provides an escape from not only a terms of trade prisoners dilemma but many other previously unrecognised prisoners dilemmas including one in international rent transfers and several others with no economies of scale or terms of trade motivation of course if superior rtn is not an option utr may well be desirable if reciprocity is an option but only in a narrower cu or fta form such reciprocity may still be superior to utr or it may be inferior theory cannot unambiguously rank these

the leviathan lottery testing the revenue maximization objective of state lotteries as evidence for leviathan unlike other governmental units statelottery agencies publicly acknowledge thattheir primary objective is revenuemaximization this claim and the inherentmonopoly power of lottery agencies providesa unique arena to test for leviathan withdata obtained from united states lotterygames i perform a laffer curve analysis toderive the optimal lottery tax rates fordifferent categories of games theseoptimal tax rates and monte carlosimulations are then used to test whetherthe current tax structure of lottery gamesis indeed the revenue maximizing structure i find strong empirical evidence for the leviathan lottery

the spillover effects of state spending abstract this paper estimates the extent to which state spending is influenced by the spending of neighboring states examining several different metrics of neighborliness in order to better identify the channels for interstate spillovers it improves on previous studies by taking advantage of exogenous shocks to state medical spending to abstract from correlated local conditions and by allowing for spatial autocorrelation focusing on mandated increases in medical spending the analysis shows that each dollar of state spending causes spending in neighboring states to increase by almost 90 cents the most predictive measure of neighborliness is the degree of population mobility between states suggesting that rational concerns about adverse migration may drive the interdependence of state spending policy

an alternative welfare decomposition for customs unions the authors present a means of evaluating the effects of customs union formation by a decomposition of the overall welfare effect into two components the consequences of induced changes in domestic prices and the effects on income of adjustments in tariff rates and endogenous changes in the pattern and volume of trade a virtue of the proposed decomposition is that it is path independent providing unambiguous results for analyses of both marginal and discrete changes in tariff rates this property means that the decomposition may be numerically implemented to provide better insight into the welfare effects of economic integration

technical progress in a three country ricardian model with a continuum of goods abstract this paper develops a three country extension to the ricardian model with a continuum of goods in contrast to the standard two country version uniform technical progress in one country is shown to make the country which is a close substitute in production unambiguously worse off while improving the welfare of the other less similar country

government size and decentralization evidence from disaggregated data public choice models of government behavior draw heavily from the economics literature of industrial organization following the argument that private monopoly in production leads to relatively high prices and profits the public choice literature suggests that similar analysis of government structure may be useful in the modeling of public production brennan and buchanan 3 4 model government as leviathan a public entity which seeks to maximize its revenue the leviathan hypothesis is motivated by the desire to successfully understand government behavior as well as to recommend effective means of controlling its behavior among other suggestions brennan and buchanan offer the private monopoly corollary that competition among different fiscal units is an effective means of controlling the aggregate size of leviathan the resulting decentralization hypothesis is total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller ceteris paribus the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized 3 15 this paper tests the decentralization hypothesis by examining a data set which considers all units of government by disaggregating federal spending on a state by state basis we construct a cross section of state data on federal state and local government activity all previous examinations of the decentralization hypothesis at the level of the state have excluded the activity of the federal government however given that federal government expenditures greatly exceed those of state and local governments previous cross sectional tests of the decentralization hypothesis may have employed grossly incomplete measures of governmental activity in each state our study provides two extensions to the debate one by testing the decentralization hypothesis at the level of state aggregation we suggest that previous cross sectional studies do not report strong evidence in support of the hypothesis because of their exclusion of the federal sector two our study suggests the importance of including all potential competitors in the government arena state local and federal governments our study does not solve all issues concerning aggregation

the determinants of municipal tax rates in british columbia in this paper we study the regional pattern of municipal business property tax rates in the province of british columbia reduced form tax setting equations produce some evidence that municipal governments respond to tax changes in neighbouring jurisdictions a joint investigation of the determinants of tax base and municipal taxation decisions however reveals that it is difficult to interpret this response as arising primarily out of competition over tax base there is also some evidence that municipal tax rates are sensitive to taxes set on the same base by super municipal bodies jel classification c33 h71 les determinants des taux d imposition municipale en colombie britannique dans ce memoire les auteurs etudient le pattern regional des taux d imposition municipale sur la propriete fonciere commerciale dans la province de la colombie britannique on montre a l aide d un modele en forme reduite d equations de definition des taux d imposition que les gouvernements municipaux reagissent aux changements dans les taux d imposition dans leur voisinage cependant un examen conjoint des determinants de la base d imposition et des decisions municipales montre qu il est difficile d interpreter cette reaction comme emanant d une concurrence fiscale on montre aussi que les taux d imposition municipale sont sensibles aux niveaux de fiscalite imposes sur la meme base par les autorites supra municipales

prospects of trade liberalization between the developed and the developing countries abstract this paper analyzes the theoretical and policy aspects of various possible approaches multilateral preferential and others toward new initiatives for liberalizing trade relations between the developed and the developing countries the increasing differentiation between the newly industrializing countries nics and the less developed countries ldcs suggests that a multidimensional framework allowing flexibility in dealing with different subsets within the developing countries would be more relevant the paper analyzes the probable outcomes and constraints of the various trade liberalizing options with regard to their effects on trade flows welfare and terms of trade

fiscal decentralization and the size of government a european country empirical analysis this article is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size using a panel data set of the eu 15 countries we analyse the effect of decentralization on aggregate national and subnational government sizes by separating the long run effects of decentralization from its short run dynamics in the long run tax autonomy reduces central expenditure but increases and to a greater extent subnational public expenditure leading to higher aggregate public expenditure we find also that vertical imbalances tend to increase the sizes of subnational national and aggregate governments

a thorn in the lion s paw has britain paid too much for common market membership the welfare consequence of britain s entry into the common market is studied for 1972 1980 the figures show that in some years britain would have been better off by 3 4 percent of gdp trading on its own its average losses were greater than 1 5 percent of gdp moreover a feasible alternative arrangement is described in which common market association would benefit both great britain and other common market countries without harming non common market countries the methodology involves a general equilibrium model of customs union formation which determines financial arrangements such as cross country compensation and the distribution of common tariff revenues obviously similar studies can be done for other applications such as the proposed north atlantic free trade area

searching for leviathan comment and extension in a recent article wallace oates 1985 investigated whether fiscal decentralization tended to act as a constraining influence on the overall size of the public sector this hypothesis has been advanced by several alternative theories of government behavior including richard musgrave s 1959 model of how the distribution function of government would be carried out by subnational governments geoffrey brennan and james buchanan s 1980 leviathan model and the more traditional public choice model for example walter hettich and stanley winer 1984 all contend that the decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources and thereby constrains taxing power oates analyzed two data sets one pertaining to the state and local sector in the united states and the other consisting of a sample of 43 countries and found little empirical support for the decentralization hypothesis the purpose of this paper is to reconsider his analysis in the case of state and local governments specifically it will be argued that oates s measures of decentralization may be inappropriate to test the hypothesis furthermore by taking into account the structure or composition of local governmental jurisdictions within a state empirical support of the decentralization hypothesis can be marshaled for general purpose local governments such as counties and municipalities i measuring fiscal decentralization among the states

an empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the leviathan model of government this paper has investigated the ability of an extreme and relatively simple model of political behavior to explain the level of revenues generated by state and local governments in general the behavior of these governments appears to be at least consistent with many of the fiscal outcomes predicted by the leviathan theory several although not all of the specific leviathan theory hypotheses considered received empirical support the evidence was consistent with the hypothesis that states utilizing comprehensive tax bases especially a personal income tax can be expected to generate higher levels of aggregate revenues strong support was also observed for the contention that intergovernmental competition by general purpose substate governments may serve as a substitute for constitutional constraints in limiting the revenue generating power of local governments

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

3 3 theory of customs unions abstract four recent models those of berglas corden meade and riezman which have extended the theory of customs union to 3 3 dimensions are reviewed the reasons for both apparent and real differences among the welfare propositions from these models are explained some new extensions are derived the main conclusions are that the family of 3 3 models introduce several effects which cannot be present in 3 2 models and that the distinctions among the models are due mostly to diverse assumptions concerning the trilateral pattern of trade which are not readily apparent

best practices in regional trading agreements an application to asia regionalism in asia particularly in the form of free trade areas ftas is a recent trend that is becoming increasingly important this has been disturbing to many given the significance of trade and investment in asian economic growth and development and the region s key role in global commerce in light of this trend the goal of this paper is to develop a blueprint or a set of 10 best practices that can be used as a guide to ftas in order to ensure that they approximate first best outcomes to the greatest extent possible next the paper applies this framework to the existing ftas between asian countries and their regional and extra regional partners the results suggest that the more advanced regional accords generally receive high grades with the notable exception of rules of origin which tend to be even more problematic in the context of accords in which an oecd country is a party

privatization and government size a budget constraint view of government shows that privatization need not alter spending when it is implemented without a rule forbidding re use of the funding backing newly privatized programs only when these funds are eliminated from the budget process e g tax rebates or permanent deficit reduction can these funds not back new programs or expand existing programs this is an important caveat since privatization proposals do not contain such rules with such rules privatization can increase allocational efficiency and lead to smaller government size

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

trade agreements vs unilateral tariff reductions evidence from modeling with a continuum of goods the relative merits of preferential trading agreements and unilateral tariff reduction are investigated yielding the conclusion that preferential agreements are superior for plausible specifications of tastes and endowments the attractiveness of agreements however depends crucially on general equilibrium effects on intraunion and external terms of trade game theoretic differences between the alternative policy strategies are emphasized agreements are cooperative equilibria while unilateral action defines a noncooperative stackelberg equilibrium the analytical framework is a three country variant of the dornbusch fischer samuelson classical trade model numerical simulations also illustrate that agreements may enhance government revenue and learning by doing copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

geographically discriminatory trade arrangements a bstract an eight region numerical general equilibrium model of global trade is used to investigate the impacts of various geographically discriminatory trade policy arrangements gdas on regional trade and welfare results suggest that the important factors determining gains and losses in any gda are such issues as whether initial levels of protection are asymmetric the relative sizes of participating regions and the pattern of trade between participating and non participating countries results also appear to confirm the implication of wonnacott and wonnacott 1981 that the gain from reducing a partner s tariff is typically a more important consideration in evaluating potential benefits from a customs union than the traditional concerns of trade creation and trade diversion

is unilateral tariff reduction preferable to a customs union the curious case of the missing foreign tariffs during the past decade and a half an important part of the literature on customs unions has dealt with the question of whether a country might obtain the gains it would achieve from a customs union cu in an alternative way by a unilateral tariff reduction utr utr may involve a partial reduction in tariffs or a reduction all the way to zero a widely accepted conclusion see eitan berglas p 329 c a cooper and b f massell 1965b pp 745 47 roma dauphin ch 2 harry johnson p 280 melvyn krauss pp 417 19 and peter robson is that utr does indeed hold out the prospect for all the gains from a cuwithout the disadvantagesif two important simplifying assumptions are made namely that we ignore economies of scale and the effects of a customs union on the terms of trade 2 in the words of berglas it is important to note that if a preferential trade agreement does not affect the terms of trade then it does not allow for any mutually beneficial policy opportunities which are not open to each of the member countries separately through utr p 329 if this conclusion is correct it is very important in that it undercuts the earlier literature on customs unions the question asked by jacob viner in his pioneering work whether a cu represents a net gain or a net loss in economic efficiencybecomes unimportant except insofar as a customs union is based on terms of trade effects3 or economies of scale 4 since a cu can be summarily rejected in favor of utr the utr case would mean that for economists the puzzle is not to identify the efficiency gains or losses from a cu but rather to explain why countries form customs unions in the first place berglas p 329 cooper and massell 1965b p 247 and johnson p 270 indeed in his survey of cu theory krauss identifies the problem raised by cooper and massellof why countries form customs unionsas the theoretical issue of the past decade the 1960 s just as in the prior one the major issue as explicitly defined by jacob viner 1950 was whether a customs union represented a movement towards freer trade or greater protection p 413 the typical reply to the cooper massell question is countries tend to form a cu for noneconomic reasons berglas pp 329 30 5

preferential trading agreements an investigation abstract a three country general equilibrium model of international trade in an arbitrary number of goods is constructed and the welfare effects of the formation of a preferential trading club e g customs union free trade area are analyzed

an ex ante model for estimating the impact on trade flows of a country s accession to a customs union this paper presents a structural ex ante model to study the trade creation and trade diversion effects associated with a country s accession to a customs union the model extends previous studies by introducing explicitly product differentiation and exports in the determination of trade creation and trade diversion unlike the traditional vinerian analysis where the role of exports is neglected the model handles the effects of the elimination of the common external tariff facing home exports the model is then applied to portugal s accession to the european community and estimates of trade substitution elasticities are presented for 26 sectors finally these elasticities are used along with other parameter estimates to classify sectors according to whether they would give rise to trade creation or trade diversion

theory and evidence on the political economy of the minimum wage this paper examines how closely the minimum wage has been set to the most popularly stated goals of minimun wage policy i first estimate these goals the minimum wage rate at which the relevant labor demand is unitary elastic maximizing the total earnings of minimum wage workers about 5 35 and the level that would lift a typical minimum wage worker s family out of poverty about 5 17 i can reject that the actual minimum wage policy has been driven by desire to achieve these goals and find that a simple interest group model best explains the historical path of the minimum wage rate

partners to a preferential trade agreement implications of varying size abstract most often the theory of preferential trade agreements assumes a small home country and a large partner in this paper the welfare implications of a small trading partner are examined a distinction is found between two ranges of size a country may be just small or be ultra small conventional propositions about the likelihood of a gain or a loss from entering into a preferential agreement would still hold when the partner is small whereas some of them would have to be reversed when the partner is an ultra small economy

regional trading arrangements natural or supernatural members of the customs union the potential unfavorable effects arise from the introduction of distortions in the relative price between the goods of members and nonmembers in terms of classic customs union theory the trade off is between trade creation and trade diversion the entire exercise assumes that the firstbest solution of worldwide free trade is not attainable for political reasons thus the choice between a status quo of nondiscriminatory most favored nation mfn tariffs and a move to preferential trading arrangements pta s is an exercise in the theory of the second best this paper summarizes recent research by the authors we make an evaluation of the

tax decentralization and local government size this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments while many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy the paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments tax separation rather than on tax base sharing would restrain local public expenditures using an unbalanced panel of oecd countries the key finding is that only property taxes mostly based on a tax separation scheme seem to favor smaller local governments thus while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments it does not appear sufficient as tax separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required

fiscal decentralization and government size an extension this paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants grants it is argued serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self finance their expenditures the results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector the results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling

does fiscal decentralization constrain leviathan new evidence from local property tax competition this paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains leviathan government using panel data for pennsylvania we compare actual property tax rates to the leviathan revenue maximizing rates for municipalities school districts and counties using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government we find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates we also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates this calls into question the current literature s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

china trade policy review a political economy approach chinese trade policy has experienced great reversal in the year of 2008 a series of constraining measures taken previously have been loosened eventually we investigate this situation using a political economy approach unlike in democratic countries where interest groups play a crucial role in trade policy change in china given the political reality leaders will and trade partners pressure are the determinant factors we call this top down and outside in trade policy actually the idea of harmonious society and scientific development emphasised by top leaders in october 2006 paved the road for the following trade policy adjustment i e reducing tax rebate limiting processing trade compressing the catalogue for foreign investment etc however with the shock of a global financial tsunami these measures get coastal areas relying on foreign trade heavily into trouble the economic downturn in pearl river delta even astonished the decision making body calling on a quick reversal in foreign trade policy if interest groups had been allowed to express their demand formally and adequately from the very start the cycle of taking up first but giving up last in policy design would have not taken place in other words the bottom up and inside out trade policy should be more stable although flexibility is necessary in the face of uncertainty frequent and discretionary trade policy change usually produces effects of pro government not pro market this is unfavourable for the transformation in china the constraining trade policy in mid 2007 to mid 2008 has been a part of the government s desire to seek healthier development however with the inside and outside surroundings getting worse the structural adjustment long run objective has had to concede to the economic growth short run objective

does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs evidence from bolivia this paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from bolivia empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization these changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need nationally these changes were driven by the smallest poorest municipalities investing devolved funds in their highest priority projects the findings contradict common claims that local government is too corrupt institutionally weak or prone to interest group capture to improve upon central government s allocation of public resources d 2002 published by elsevier b v

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

a tiebout tax competition model abstract this paper analyzes a tiebout tax competition model where heterogeneity of consumer preferences is introduced into a standard tax competition framework following the modern tiebout tradition consumer sorting in the model is achieved through the activities of profit maximizing community developers once sorting is achieved the equilibrium is equivalent to that in a standard tax competition model with immobile but heterogeneous consumers a principal lesson of the analysis is that under capital taxation consumers with high public good demands are worse off than under a head tax regime in pursuit of high levels of public spending high demand communities impose high tax rates which drive away capital the analysis also establishes a number of other results