the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

the market for quacks a group of n quacks plays a price competition game facing a continuum of patients who recover with probability whether or not they acquire a quack s treatment if patients chose rationally the market would be inactive i assume however that patients choose according to a boundedly rational procedure which re ects anecdotal reasoning this element of bounded rationality has signi cant

special purpose entities and bank loan contracting abstract in this study we show that a firm s use of special purpose entities spes is associated with unfavorable loan contract terms including higher loan rates collateral requirements and restrictive covenants further analyses suggest that the association between the use of spes and unfavorable loan contract terms is primarily due to the increase in the information risk faced by lenders as firm managers can easily use spes to manipulate earnings and hide losses specifically we find that the use of spes has a more pronounced effect on increasing the cost of loans and causing more stringent non price loan terms when managers have a stronger incentive to manipulate earnings and when banks have less knowledge about the spe sponsor firms due to the lack of prior lending relationship in addition we find that the use of spes is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting restatements and greater information asymmetry between inside managers and outside capital suppliers

do banks provide financial slack we study the decision to choose bank debt rather than public securities in a firm s marginal financing choice using a sample of 500 firms over the 1980 to 1993 time period we find that firms are relatively more likely to choose bank loans when variables that measure asymmetric information problems are elevated the sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank debt to information problems is greater for firms with no public debt outstanding these results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks help alleviate asymmetric information problems and that firms weigh these information benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing bank financing why do some firms borrow from public sources while others rely exclusively on private lenders the answer to this question is not well understood existing theories suggest that a firm must consider the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of bank debt financing relative to other potential financing choices the potential benefits of bank financing include low moral hazard and adverse selection costs and ease of renegotiation in financial distress 1 the potential costs of bank financing include monitoring costs suboptimal liquidation outcomes and distortions induced by information monopolies 2 the goal of this paper is to identify whether adverse selection problems influence a firm s choice between new bank debt public debt or common stock in particular we are interested in assessing the empirical validity of the hypothesis that banks have the ability to accurately price a firm s claims thus inducing a preference for firms that are undervalued by the market to

evidence on whether banks consider carbon risk in their lending decisions banks face a dilemma in choosing between maximising profits and facilitating the sustainable use of resources within a carbon constrained future this study provides empirical evidence on this dilemma investigating whether a bank loan announcement for a firm with high carbon risk conveys information to investors about the firm s carbon risk exposure collected through a bank s pre loan screening and ongoing monitoring we use a sample of 120 bank loan announcements for asx listed firms over the period 2009 2015 we measure high low carbon risk exposure based on whether firms meet do not meet the reporting threshold of the nger scheme we document positive and significant excess loan announcement returns for loan renewals for high carbon risk firms but not for loan initiations further we document a more significant loan announcement return for renewals with favourable term revisions finally we find no evidence that the market differentiates between domestic and foreign lenders taken together our results suggest that investors perceive that banks incorporate carbon risk considerations into their lending decisions our results highlight the value of banks as financial intermediaries given the information asymmetry surrounding firms carbon risk exposure and more generally the need to extend modern banking theory to consider issues such as the impact of banks csr reputation on lending decisions

the resolution of financial distress most models of financial structure embody an assumption about financial distress that causes debt to be costly to the issuing firm this approach has been criticized on the grounds that the assumed costs could be avoided by a costless financial reorganization in this article we show that despite the possibility of costless reorganization it may be rational for firms to incur significant costs in the resolution of financial distress the main assumptions that give rise to our results are the existence of asymmetric courts to impose a reorganization on the claimants of a firm article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the role of games in security design we contend that security design should be approached as a problem of game design that is contracts should specify the procedures that govern the behavior of contract participants in determining outcomes as well as the allocations resulting from those outcomes we characterize optimal contracts in two nested classes all contracts including those that depend on the state and state independent contracts we demonstrate that in situations in which the dependence of contracts on the state is limited contracts designed as games can improve the allocation of resources relative to nonstrategic allocation rules article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

when do banks take equity in debt restructurings this article examines the conditions under which bank lenders make concessions by taking equity in financially distressed firms i show that the role banks play in debt restructurings depends on the financial condition of the firm the existence of public debt in the firm s capital structure and the ability of public debt to be restructured empirically i find that for firms with public debt outstanding banks never make concessions unless public debtholders also restructure their claims when banks do take equity on average they obtain a substantial proportion of the firm s stock and they maintain their position for over two years article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the second moments matter the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the allocation of loanable funds abstract this paper investigates how variations in macroeconomic uncertainty distort commercial banks allocation of loanable funds by analyzing the dispersion of banks total loan to asset ratios over a quarter century period

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

bank debt restructurings and the composition of exchange offers in financial distress this article examines the relation between bank debt forgiveness and the structure of public debt exchange offers in financial distress i find that the structure of exchange offers and the likelihood of an offer s success are significantly related to whether the bank participates in the restructuring transaction exchange offers made in conjunction with bank concessions are characterized by significantly greater reductions in public debt outstanding and significantly less senior debt offered to bondholders overall the results suggest that the structure of a firm s public and private claims significantly affects the firm s ability to modify its capital structure in financial distress recent empirical studies provide apparently conflicting evidence on the relation between the mix of private and public debt in a firm s capital structure and the ability of the firm to restructure its debt outside of bankruptcy for example gilson john and lang 1990 find that the likelihood of a successful debt restructuring is positively related to a firm s reliance on bank borrowing in contrast asquith gertner and scharfstein 1994 and james 1995 find that for firms with public debt outstanding banks rarely make unilateral concessions indeed the latter two studies suggest that the avoidance of bankruptcy depends on the ability to restructure public not private debt claims finally gilson 1994 finds less debt reduction in financial distress the higher the proportion of bank debt a firm uses in this article i examine the relation between bank debt restructurings and the composition of public debt exchange offers by financially distressed firms the secured status of bank debt and institutional constraints on bank debt for equity swaps imply that banks are unlikely to provide debt forgiveness unless their claims are impaired i e the face value of the bank s claim is greater than the value of the collateral net of transactions and bankruptcy costs 2 however drawing on theoretical work by gertner and scharfstein 1991 i argue that bank participation in a restructuring can play an important role in resolving

covenants in venture capital contracts this paper studies how covenants are included in contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs i show that vcs hold covenanted veto rights even though they are shareholders who have access to other powerful governance solutions unlike bank loans and bonds venture capital vc contracts exhibit considerable variation in their contractual designs i exploit this variation to confirm the argument that covenants are in place to overcome a conflict of interest that arises from debt like contractual features of a venture capitalist s preferred stock in particular i find that contracts with higher fixed payoffs include 1 6 more covenants than do contracts with lower fixed payoffs similarly vc contracts with no vc board majority requirement include 0 6 more covenants than do contracts that require a vc board majority covenants are also more common with older companies and when fewer vcs invest in a round my findings contribute to both the debt covenant literature and the entrepreneurial finance literature this paper was accepted by brad barber finance

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

multiple lenders and corporate distress evidence on debt restructuring multiple banking is a common characteristic of the corporate lending particularly of medium sized and large firms however if the firms are facing distress multiple lenders may have serious coordination problems as has been argued in the theoretical literature in this paper we analyse the problems of multiple banking in borrower distress empirically we rely on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit file information on distressed lending relationships in germany in particular it includes information on bank pools a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in distress we find that the existence of small pools increases the probability of workout success and that this effect reverses when pools become large we identify major determinants of pool formation in particular the number of banks the distribution of lending among banks and the severity of the distress copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

bond covenants and delegated monitoring this paper examines alternative contracting arrangements available to a firm seeking to finance an investment project the authors consider the choice between loan contracts with covenants based on noisy indicators of the firm s financial health and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring specialist in one interpretation the specialist is a financial intermediary the firm s choice is shown to depend upon the firm s credit rating the accuracy of financial indicators of the firm s condition the loss from premature liquidation of the firm s project and the cost of monitoring

can student effort be manipulated does it matter this article provides evidence that college students effort can be manipulated substantially by making changes in the college testing regime and moreover that student effort is a meaningful input in education production the evidence comes from a quasi experiment where a mid semester test with a pass requirement is introduced to a mandatory one semester business school course in macroeconomics four cohorts of students one before and three after the introduction of the pass requirement have reported their study effort twice during the semester and the relationship between achievement and study effort is investigated by using a within subject within student across study periods approach

discussion of the effects of corporate governance on firms credit ratings abstract ashbaugh skaife collins and lafond 2006 the effects of corporate governance on firms credit ratings journal of accounting and economics this issue find that better governed firms receive better credit ratings and poor governance costs the median speculative grade firm 38 million in excess interest they also find that managers choose to be poorly governed to expropriate wealth the results from the primary analysis are persuasive leaving little doubt on whether ratings agencies value corporate governance however the authors estimate of the economic costs of poor governance is likely to be overstated despite the evidence on the costs of poor governance the final analysis leaves the question as to why firms choose to be poorly governed largely unanswered

fear anger and credit on bank robberies and loan conditions we study the impact of emotions on real world decisions made by loan officers by analyzing the loan conditions of loans granted immediately after a bank branch robbery we find significant differences in conditions of the loans granted after a robbery compared to changes in loan conditions that occur contemporaneously at unaffected branches in general loan officers seem to adopt so called avoidance behaviour in accordance with the literature on posttraumatic stress their avoidance behavior is halved within two weeks after the robbery and the effect further varies depending on the presence of a firearm during the robbery

real flexibility and financial structure an empirical analysis i examine the empirical relation between real flexibility and financial structure i test whether real flexibility increases debt capacity by lowering default risk and making assets more marketable or decreases debt capacity by facilitating risk shifting and asset substitution i measure real flexibility as the sensitivity of marginal production and investment decisions to variations in the economic environment i find that financial leverage is negatively related to production flexibility but positively related to investment flexibility this split in results suggests that although asset substitution facilitated by investment flexibility can be prevented contractually risk shifting facilitated by production flexibility is intractable copyright 2003 oxford university press

where do financial constraints originate from an empirical analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed this paper offers such an analysis we study in particular the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a unique survey data on finnish small and medium sized enterprises smes the survey data suggest that adverse selection is empirically more prevalent than moral hazard in the capital markets that the smes face we also find that of the variables indicating the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard the former has more explanatory power in regressions modeling the availability of external finance to the smes than the latter finally we document that our proxies for adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related to the age of firms just like peter diamond s 1989 model predicts

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

the structure of multiple credit relationships evidence from u s firms when firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing in this paper we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small u s firms we find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors moreover borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms informational transparency the results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs especially during corporate reorganizations

secured lending and default risk equilibrium analysis policy implications and empirical results the authors examine collateral in a competitive equilibrium in which borrowers can choose hidden actions and may additionally possess hidden knowledge apart from explaining the widespread use of collateral despite deadweight costs they show that an increase in the riskless interest rate causes equilibrium loan rates and collateral requirements to increase a decline in the deadweight costs of collateral reduces the equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard and an increase in the borrower s project size reduces equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard some of these predictions are tested and found to be supported by the data copyright 1991 by royal economic society

foreign entry and bank competition abstract foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent s informational advantage both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low cost outside competitors into credit markets the entrant s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency cost advantage this paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises the results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets

collateral type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk abstract this paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default pd of bank loans we focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables collateral type of lender and bank borrower relationship while controlling for the other explanatory variables the study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle 1988 2000 collected by the bank of spain s credit register central de informacion de riesgos we find that collateralised loans have a higher pd loans granted by savings banks are riskier and finally that a close bank borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk

the effect of lender identity on a borrowing firm s equity return previous research demonstrates that a firm s common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities by contrast commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns this article investigates whether the lender s identity influences the market s reaction to a loan announcement although we find no significant difference between the market s response to bank and nonbank loans we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns this evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor s or investment banker s perceived quality signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors previous studies show that certain types of loan announcements generate significantly positive abnormal returns to the average borrower s equity 1 this finding contrasts with the negative equity returns generally associated with a corporation s issuance of public securities smith 1986 this difference in market reactions indicates that private and public securities are not perfect substitutes for the average firm in this sense lender identity defined as public versus private lender significantly impacts the borrower s abnormal equity return the standard theoretical explanation for this difference is that private lenders either obtain private information about the firm s value or they have the incentive and ability to monitor firm behavior more effectively than other outside monitors can although the empirical literature on private lending has evaluated primarily commercial bank loans and lines of credit these theoretical arguments apply equally to any type of private

does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ evidence on specialization in private debt contracting this paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private market corporate lending adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information problematic firms however finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers particularly more leveraged borrowers evidence supports both regulatory and reputation based explanations for this specialization in passing we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies

debt ownership structure and legal system an international analysis this paper is concerned with the ownership structure of corporate debt from an institutional perspective an attempt is made to identify the factors affecting bank debt use from an international sample of companies from austria germany japan belgium france italy holland spain portugal finland sweden and the usa the results show that bank debt depends both on factors specific to each company and on institutional features of each country more exactly it is found that bank loans are related to firm size to the quality and risk of the projects and to the collateral it is also found that a number of legal institutional factors are impacting on the source of firms debt such as creditor protection firm disclosure requirements and law enforcement

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

do bondholders lose from junk bond covenant changes this article documents that firms can and do change the covenants of their public debt indentures through consent solicitations a game theoretic model shows that bondholders may consent to covenant changes even when it is not in their collective interest to do so despite this finding bondholder returns around solicitations are positive further analysis indicates that bondholders coordinate their actions to modify or defeat disadvantageous proposals and therefore can demand some of the gains resulting from covenant modifications the policy implication of this study is that bondholders may not need additional regulatory or judicial protection in the solicitation process copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

alternative information sources and the information content of bank loans this paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements we differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions the empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts if these other indicators are reliable and signalimproving prospects banks do little further investigation however if the indicators are noisy and signal declining prospects banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers resulting in the production of valuable information recent theories of financial intermediation concentrate on the role of banks in reducing informational asymmetry leland and pyle 1977 suggest that informational asymmetries may be the primary reason that intermediaries exist campbell and kracaw 1980 demonstrate that an important function of financial intermediation is the production of information diamond 1984 develops a model which shows that financial intermediaries can exist simply because they provide an efficient means of evaluating and monitoring borrowers these information transmission theories argue that banks provide unique information production services in an imperfect capital market they suggest that banks know more about the prospects of the firms they lend to than do others thus bank loan agreements should convey useful information to the market a number of researchers empirically examine the uniqueness of bank loans fama 1985 approaches the issue by examining the rates on certificates of deposit and other high grade commercial papers he concludes that since bank borrowers bear the cost of reserve requirements there must be something special about bank loans james 1987 conducts an event study around the announcement of bank credit agreements and reports a significantly positive two day announcement return his results provide evidence support

real costs of nominal grade inflation new evidence from student course evaluations college gpas in the united states rose substantially between the 1960 s and the 2000 s over the same period study time declined by almost a half this paper uses a 12 quarter panel of course evaluations from the university of california san diego to discern whether a link between grades and effort investment holds up in a micro setting results indicate that average study time would be about 50 lower in a class in which the average expected grade was an a than in the same course taught by the same instructor in which students expected a c simultaneity suggests estimates are biased toward zero findings do not appear to be driven primarily by the individual student s expected grade but by the average expected grade of others in the class class specific characteristics that generate low expected grades appear to produce higher effort choices evidence that nominal changes in grades may lead to real changes in effort investment

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

capital structure and debt structure using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation relative to high credit quality firms lowcredit quality firms are more likely to have a multi tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non bank debt with loose covenants we discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts jel g32

the information content of distressed restructurings involving public and private debt claims abstract this paper examines debt restructurings by financially distressed firms we develop a model which predicts that in public debt exchange offers firms with unfavorable private information will offer equity claims to convince bondholders that the firm s prospects are poor in contrast offering equity to well informed private lenders conveys favorable private information to outsiders consistent with our analysis we find positive average abnormal returns around restructurings that offer equity to private lenders and senior debt to public debtholders and we find significant negative average abnormal returns when private lenders are offered senior debt and public lenders are offered equity

dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion abstract we explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous time principal agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors the principal when the manager agent has loss averse preferences our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers

do bank loan relationships still matter james 1987 and lummer and mcconnell 1989 find that during the 1970s and 1980s the market responded positively to announcements of bank lending agreements however many of the advantages associated with bank lending relationships have largely disappeared since the 1980s due to financial system changes and greater availability of and less costly financial information we find that bank loan announcements produced positive abnormal returns in the 1980s but by the latter part of our sample period those announcement returns disappear entirely we do find that bank loan relationships may still be valuable to smaller poorer performing firms or during periods of high credit risk spreads

bank loan commitment contracts data theory and tests over 80 per cent of all commercial bank lending to corporations in the u s is done via bank loan commitments yet the authors have little empirical knowledge of loan commitment contracts in this paper they describe the rich contractual structure of bank loan commitments based on data pertaining to over 2 500 contracts the authors then develop a model which demonstrates that the observed complex structure of bank loan commitment contracts which typically include multiple fee structures borrower specific contracting variables and the standard material adverse change clause is important when the bank faces borrower adverse selection and moral hazard problems finally the authors verify the robustness of their model by confronting its additional testable predictions with the data copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

arm s length financing and innovation evidence from publicly traded firms using a large panel of u s companies i document that firms that rely more on arm s length financing such as public debt and equity innovate more and have higher quality innovations than firms that use other sources such as relationship based bank financing i hypothesize that one possible reason for this finding is the greater flexibility and tolerance to experimentation associated with arm s length financing i find support for this hypothesis by showing that firms with more arm s length financing have greater volatility of innovative output and are more likely to innovate in new technological areas furthermore focusing only on bank financing i demonstrate that firms have more novel innovations if they borrow from multiple banks use predominantly credit lines and have less intense covenants i address potential endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variable analysis and by showing that innovation increases significantly after new public debt offerings and seasoned equity offerings but d

an investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt abstract we examine the cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt for a sample of public utility issues the lowest cost method depends on a firm s transaction costs which comprise flotation costs agency costs and the costs of searching the market our findings suggest that firms minimize the cost of issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest transaction costs

monitoring and structure of debt contracts this paper presents a theory of optimal debt structure when the moral hazard problem is severe the main idea is that the optimal debt contract delegates monitoring to a single senior lender and that seniority allows the monitoring senior lender to appropriate the full return from his monitoring activities the theory explains i why debt contracts are prioritized ii why short term debt is senior to long term debt and iii why financial intermediaries usually hold short term senior debt whereas long term junior debt is widely held another implication of the theory is that covenant and maturity structures will be set to conform to the seniority structure

performance incentive fees an agency theoretic approach this paper employs recent developments in agency theory to study the impact that com pensation contracts have on portfolio management investment decisions in a restricted mean variance world two types of incentive contracts for mutual fund managers are ana lyzed and compared the results show that the symmetric contract while not necessar ily eliminating agency costs dominates the bonus contract in aligning the manager s interests with those ofthe investor investment companies and by extension their managers control a large and increasing percentage ofthe aggregate wealth of their clients more investors are putting their money under the control of these advisers than ever before con sequently potential conflicts of interest arise between investment company own ers and their financial management advisers the securities and exchange com mission sec has been concerned with this issue for a number of years the agency has commissioned several studies to investigate the issue and has set forth certain rulings concerning the behavior of investment company advisers of par ticular importance has been the compensation arrangement between mutual fund management and the fund owners in fact the sec has issued specific guidelines regarding allowable fee schedules for managers these guidelines have ied to a policy debate concerning whether the sec has been too stringent or not stringent enough in regulating compensation for investment managers the present study takes a new approach to this problem in an attempt to resolve this debate the fiduciary relationship between mutual fund management and the inves tors they represent may be viewed as a principal agent relationship conse quently the methodology from the agency literature can be applied to study the impact of various compensation arrangements on the potential conflict of interest between these two groups

debt and communications technology diffusion retrospective evidence this study has evaluated the relationship between debt in the capital structure of firms and the dynamics of broadband and digital technology adoption in the united states based on a large dataset on local exchange carriers in the united states over a contemporary historical fourteen year period from 1988 to 2001 using treatment effects modeling the impact of debt in impacting the levels of firms broadband deployment has been found to be negative and significant the primary source of debt in the sector has been in the form of arm s length corporate bonds and the assumptions of the monitoring hypothesis associated with such debt that lenders in the face of information and collective actions problems might not be able to control managers and hence invest less in highly technology intensive situations are supported by the data additionally the data set has been split into separate sets for two periods one between 1988 and 1995 for the period before the telecommunications act of 1996 came into force and the other set between 1996 and 2001 and the results have stayed consistent a test of the coefficients between the two periods has shown that the negative impact of leverage on broadband deployment has become stronger after the introduction of competition in the sector and this has suggested that the change in the institutional logics between the two periods has been of material impact in influencing lenders perceptions

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the design of internal control and capital structure we study the design of internal control and capital structure we pose the question when is control allocated only to shareholders and when is it allocated to other stakeholders such as debtholders or the management team we show that shareholders debtholders get control when the firm s cash flow is relatively sensitive insensitive to managerial effort our theory implies that the signs of the correlations between endogenous variables when shareholders have absolute control are reversed when debtholders have veto power in particular debt level and firm value are negatively positively correlated when debtholders have veto power shareholders have absolute control article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

security pricing and deviations from the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of 30 filings under the 1978 bankruptcy reform act we measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents on average 7 6 of the total awarded to all claimants evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets the absolute priority rule hereafter apr states that a bankrupt firm s value is to be distributed to suppliers of capital such that senior creditors are fully satisfied before any distributions are made to junior creditors and junior creditors are paid in full before common shareholders bankruptcy reorganization proceedings however are leaving shareholders and junior creditors with valuable assets even when senior claimants receive only partial settlements as barrett and sullivan 1988 noted traditionally shareholders have been last in line their claims on a troubled company s assets have had the lowest priority and their impact on the course of bankruptcy code proceedings generally has been next to nil but lately the balance of power has been shifting warner 1977 provided one of the early discussions of the implications of deviations from the apr baldwin and mason 1983 pp 510 511 examined the resolution of claims in the massey ferguson reorganization and provided no support for the hypothesis that the market believes absolute priority rules will be enforced if the firm defaults on its financial obligations franks and torous 1989 analyzed a sample of bankruptcies that occurred during the period 1970 through 1984 and found that 21 of 27 sample cases exhibited departures from the apr more recently weiss 1990 examined 37 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1980 and 1986 and reported that 27 of the cases involved apr violations

the paradox of liquidity the more liquid a firm s assets the greater their value in a short notice liquidation it is generally thought that a firm should find it easier to raise external finance against more liquid assets this paper focuses on the dark side of liquidity greater asset liquidity reduces the firm s ability to commit to a specific course of action as a result greater asset liquidity can in some circumstances reduce the firm s capacity to raise external finance firms with excessively liquid assets are in the best position to finance illiquid projects this leads us to a theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation based on the liquidity of assets

gaming performance fees by portfolio managers we show that it is very difficult to devise performance based compensation contracts that reward portfolio managers who generate excess returns while screening out managers who cannot generate such returns theoretical bounds are derived on the amount of fee manipulation that is possible under various performance contracts we show that recent proposals to reform compensation practices such as postponing bonuses and instituting clawback provisions will not eliminate opportunities to game the system unless accompanied by transparency in managers positions and strategies indeed there exists no compensation mechanism that separates skilled from unskilled managers solely on the basis of their returns histories

the determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements the paper examines the determinants of contract terms on bank revolving credit agree ments revolvers of medium large publicly traded companies we model the duration maturity secured status and pricing decisions within a simultaneous decision frame work thereby overcoming the biased and inconsistent estimates in prior single equation studies of debt contract terms we find strong interrelationships between contract terms with significant bi directional relationships between duration and secured status and be tween the all in spread and commitment fees and a unidirectional relationship from both duration and secured status to all in spread we also illustrate how several single equa tion studies of contract terms draw incorrect conclusions because of their inappropriate assumption that other contract terms and leverage were exogenous finally our results sup port the hypothesis that the setting of contract terms plays an important role in alleviating contracting problems

role of collateral and personal guarantees in relationship lending evidence from japan s sme loan market this paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in japan s sme loan market we find that firms riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used we find however that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral these findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank s seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring this incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees

the efficient use of conditioning information in portfolios we study the properties of unconditional minimum variance portfolios in the presence of conditioning information such portfolios attain the smallest variance for a given mean among all possible portfolios formed using the conditioning information we provide explicit solutions for n risky assets either with or without a riskless asset our solutions provide insights into portfolio management problems and issues in conditional asset pricing

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

bankruptcy law and bank financing exploiting the timing of the 2005 2006 italian bankruptcy law reforms we disentangle the effects of reorganization and liquidation in bankruptcy on bank financing and firm investment a 2005 reform introduces reorganization procedures facilitating loan renegotiation the 2006 reform subsequently strengthens creditor rights in liquidation the first reform increases interest rates and reduces investment the second reform reduces interest rates and spurs investment our results highlight the importance of identifying the distinct effects of liquidation and reorganization as these procedures differently address the tension in bankruptcy law between the continuation of viable businesses and the preservation of repayment incentives

securitization and mortgage renegotiation evidence from the great depression we use loan level data from the nyc metropolitan area to examine the extent to which lenders attempted to prevent foreclosures with concessionary modi cations during the great depression we nd no principal forgiveness in the sample and only a handful of concessionary mortgage modi cations of other types far more mortgages terminated through foreclosure than received any sort of concessionary modi cation the results indicate that there are signi cant impediments to renegotiation of residential mortgages beyond securitization as such less renegotiation seems unlikely to be a major cost of securitization of residential mortgages

sources of gains to shareholders from bankruptcy resolution abstract using a logistic regression model we identify the characteristics of firms whose shareholders are likely to benefit from bankruptcy resolution that is winners losers are firms whose shareholders experience positive negative excess returns after bankruptcy filing we find that winners are relatively smaller firms with higher proportions of convertible debt tend to file for bankruptcy for strategic reasons have low share ownership concentration and suffer comparatively larger pre filing stock price declines among winners shareholder returns are greater for firms that have higher levels of private debt and research and development r d expenditures and operate in more concentrated industries in addition our analysis indicates that an ex ante trading strategy of purchasing bankrupt stocks with a greater than 50 probability of being a winner on the day after bankruptcy filing and holding the stocks for a year on an average can generate average compounded and excess compounded holding period returns of 71 and 42 respectively

calibrated incentive contracts this paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability moral hazard and adverse selection the paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of simple benchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible due to limited liability constraints the resulting dynamic contracts are detail free and satisfy robust performance bounds independently of the underlying process for returns which need not be i i d or even ergodic publication abstract

distressed exchange bargaining power and prior capital structure abstract financially troubled companies often make distressed exchange de offers to its creditors to postpone costly bankruptcy reorganization we derive the optimal terms and timing of a de offer consisting of debt reduction and an equity stake in the restructured firm the de terms and timing are affected by shareholder bargaining power with greater shareholder bargaining power resulting in earlier de offer smaller debt reduction and smaller equity stake the impact of shareholder bargaining power is greater when bankruptcy cost is larger and tax rate is higher we also show that renegotiability of debt increases ex ante firm value and results in a higher optimal leverage ratio both firm value and optimal leverage ratio are decreasing functions of shareholder bargaining power

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal

a simple model of educational standards the author models standards for educational credentials such as high school diplomas standard setters maximize their conception of social welfare knowing that utility maximizing students choose whether to meet the standard the author shows that more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards the median voter would prefer higher standards under symmetric distributions and decentralization lowers standards among identical communities optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference for leisure deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education or increased student heterogeneity superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity egalitarianism and pooling under decentralization