competition increases x efficiency a limited liability mechanism the main result of this study is that a financial constraint may serve as a disciplining device on the internal efficiency of a firm and the tougher the product market competition the higher the disciplining power this limited liability mechanism may in part account for the alleged disciplining power of product market competition on firm efficiency however even if policies that promote competition enhance x efficiency the gain may be outweighed by a less efficient allocation of risk moreover this adverse risk effect has repercussions implying that the effect of reduced entry barriers on competition and consumer s welfare is small

toward natural implementation the authors identify some fundamental conditions that a natural mechanism should satisfy in exchange economies first they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be implemented in nash equilibria by natural mechanisms second they show that the class of social choice correspondences implementable by price and two quantity mechanisms is equivalent to the class of social choice correspondences implementable by price and allocation mechanisms third the authors find that the no envy correspondence is implementable by a two quantity mechanism and the fair correspondence is implementable by a price quantity mechanism copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

product market competition and managerial slack this article analyzes the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives in contrast to hart 1983a i show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem the difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences the importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism through which competition affects incentives

implementation of nash bargaining solutions with non convexity abstract nash solutions for two player bargaining problems with non convexity are shown to be dictatorial selections of nash product maximizers in recent literature in this paper we show that these solutions are implementable as unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocations of a sequential game

competition risk and managerial incentives this paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers a central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure the main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases as a result of greater product substitutability or greater market size principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs at the same time more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm level profits consequently managers incentives are positively correlated with firm level risk consistent with empirical evidence a decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives

resale price maintenance under asymmetric information we study resale price maintenance rpm and quantity fixing arrangements qf in a framework with successive monopolies under both adverse selection and moral hazard the analysis compares the private and the welfare properties of both contractual modes under asymmetric information both kinds of vertical contracts entail a double marginalization driven by the information rents distributed to a privately informed downstream retailer this forces the upstream producer to sell above his marginal costs the upstream producer always prefers rpm to qf but the impact of rpm on consumers surplus is ambiguous whenever rpm is the preferred contracting mode for the vertical structure from an ex ante viewpoint it also raises consumers surplus thereby producing a pareto improvement relative to qf contracts

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

economic determinants of land invasions this study estimates the effect of economic conditions on redistributive conflict we examine land invasions in brazil using a panel data set with over 50 000 municipality year observations adverse eco nomic shocks instrumented by rainfall cause the rural poor to invade and occupy large landholdings this effect exhibits substantial heterogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems but not by other observable variables in highly unequal municipalities negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality cross sectional estimates using fine within region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict i introduction c onflict over land is endemic to many rural econo mies in environments marked by a highly skewed distribution of property incomplete land and credit markets poorly or unevenly enforced property rights and weak political institutions agents often resort to extralegal means to improve their economic positions the poor frequently invade private properties and occupy them until either forcibly expelled or granted official titles land conflict which is prevalent in many countries such as brazil south africa uganda and venezuela may distort the allocation of resources in the agricultural sector away from productive uses and thereby contribute to the persistence of rural poverty how do economic conditions affect this redistrib utive conflict this paper explores this question using a rich municipal level data set of 5 299 land invasions from 1988 to 2004 in brazil we follow miguel satyanath and sergenti 2004 by using rainfall as a source of exogenous variation to study the relationship between income and conflict and we find that adverse economic shocks cause the rural poor to invade large landholdings this effect exhibits considerable het erogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems in highly unequal municipalities negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality the effect of income shocks is even stronger in highly polarized municipalities as measured by the degree of bimodality in the land distribution cross sectional estimates using fine within region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict we also find that income shocks cause significantly more land invasions in municipalities with a greater proportion of land under fixed rent contracts by contrast we find no evidence of heterogeneity on a range of other political and socioeconomic variables including political competition sharecropping police expenditures and social welfare spending recent microeconometric studies have examined two

implementing just and efficient decision making in an economy with one public good one private good and quasi linear utilities we explore decision making mechanisms to non cooperatively implement an efficient outcome by auctioning the leadership role among agents one implements egalitarianism namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo a refinement of this mechanism so called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome it achieves egalitarianism above the vickrey clarke groves decision

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

dynamic capacity planning using strategic slack valuation in this paper we analyze a particular aspect of capacity planning that is concerned with the active trading of production facilities for a homogenous product market we provide a theoretical rationale for the valuation and trading of these assets based on a metric of strategic slack we show that trading production assets with non additive portfolio profitability involves complex coordination with multiple equilibria and that these equilibria depend on the foresight in the planning horizon using the concept of strategic slack we have analyzed the dynamics of market structure the impact of asset trading on the level of production of the industry and to derive boundaries on the value of the traded assets moreover through computational learning the formulation is applied to a large oligopolistic electricity market showing that plant trading tends to lead to increased market concentration high prices lower production and a decrease in consumer surplus

choosing wisely a multibidding approach reaching decisions about the location of noxious facilities such as dump sites environmentally hazardous plants nuclear power generators and the like is a highly contentious issue for instance in february 2000 the u s senate decided that nationwide nuclear waste would be shipped to the yucca mountain site in nevada conditional to it being approved as a high level nuclear waste repository despite the attractive compensation package the state of nevada voiced vehement opposition president clinton vetoed the bill and in may 2000 the senate failed to overturn it as such the major problem facing the u s nuclear industry on where to site a high level radioactive waste repository remains virtually unresolved neither are decisions about the location of desirable events easily solvable every two years the international olympic committee selects hosts for the summer and winter games a procedure that is constantly under review and revision in order to bring about the best possible outcome until about a year ago the decision was made by a vote based on bids and plans submitted by candidate cities however the recent controversy surrounding the choice of salt lake city to host the 2002 winter games culminated in the design of a new procedure for choosing the host of the 2006 winter games this procedure called for the selection of two finalist cities in this case turin and sion immediately after which the host was selected by secret ballot in this case turin another similar issue is currently the subject of heated debate in spain the spanish government both on the national and local level has recently been discussing various possible projects for transferring water from rivers in the north of spain to the arid southern regions the parties involved have conflicting interests with regard to several aspects of the projects proposed particularly the water rich regions are hesitant to give up parts of their water resources the parties involved have still not agreed upon the choice of a transport mode or the size of the transfer payments that would compensate the localities that are relinquishing part of the water supply these and several other cases belong to a class of problems in which a group of agents has to choose one out of several projects a project is efficient if it maximizes the aggregate welfare of the group members reaching an efficient outcome is trivial when the designer has all the relevant information however it is often the case that the parties concerned possess much more information than the designer hence the designer faces a nontrivial problem if she wishes to optimally choose one of the projects moreover from a normative point of view even if the designer has all the information it is easier to justify the use of a fixed procedure to reach a decision than to modify the procedure for various cases in light of information disclosed or already available to the designer several well known methods are available for the problem of choosing one out of a set of alternatives one class of methods consists of various voting schemes such as majority voting or the borda rule the outcomes generated by these methods need not be efficient due to strategic behavior on the part of the agents another class of methods consists of vickreyclarke groves mechanisms for this class truthtelling is a dominant strategy that always results in the choice of an efficient alternative however these mechanisms are not budgetbalanced and the payments collected from the perez castrillo department of economics code universitat autonoma de barcelona 08193 bellatera barcelona spain wettstein department of economics bengurion university of the negev monaster center for economic research beer sheva 84105 israel we thank herve moulin for his helpful suggestions suresh mutuswami who encouraged us to check for strong nash equilibria and francis bloch mark gradstein moshe justman jordi masso and two anonymous referees for their useful comments perez castrillo gratefully acknowledges financial support from bec2000 0172 and 2000sgr 00054

public ownership of the external world and private ownership of self liberal political philosophy represented classically by john locke and today by libertarians defends great inequality of economic outcome on the basis that people own themselves and are entitled to establish private property in the external world by virtue of that self ownership contemporary nonlibertarian political philosophers such as john rawls and ronald dworkin achieve their relatively egalitarian conclusion by effectively denying self ownership as a premise an alternative challenge to liberalism which does not take the radical starting point of denying self ownership is to declare that while certain rights to benefit by virtue of superior skill should be protected a degree of self ownership productive assets in the external world be viewed as publicly owned and not privately appropriable what allocation mechanisms on a space of possible economies satisfy axioms that are necessary to guarantee both private ownership of self and public or joint ownership of the external world we propose a

undominated nash implementation in bounded mechanisms we study implementation in undominated nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms an undominated nash equilibrium is a nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy a mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy we identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation these conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature for economic settings we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies

noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution given a finite set of alternatives players alternate making offers player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto if 2 accepts it is enforced and the game ends otherwise 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives and so on if all alternatives are vetoed a disagreement alternative is enforced first we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game then we show that this outcome converges to the area monotonic solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity

endogenous firm efficiency in a cournot principal agent model abstract in a market of cournot firms managed by agents the degree of firm efficiency is inversely related o the number of firms in the market journal of economic literature classification numbers l22 d23 d43

competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector abstract we consider a regulation problem with complete contracting in a principal agent model with adverse selection and review within this model the various channels by which external competition parameters affect incentives within the regulated firm the channels are the principal s information the principal s objective function the agent s incentive constraint the agent s participation constraint we consider in particular a better information structure a threat of liquidation a fight for talent a more efficient private sector and the existence of better substitutes we characterize in each case the conditions under which the effect on incentives is positive

implementation in undominated nash equilibria without integer games a mechanism which uses neither integer games nor modulo games is shown to implement any social choice function in a production economy with private and excludable public goods more precisely th

strategic incentives for innovations and market competition abstract we consider a principal agent model to provide a general analysis of how risk affects incentives of firms who invest in cost reducing r d and compete in the product market we specify the conditions under which higher risk reduces incentives of all firms we also examine the conditions under which an increase in risk may trigger opposite responses of rivals in the same industry some firms will strengthen while other firms will weaken the incentives provided to their agents this result holds regardless of the mode of competition in the product market cournot or bertrand as long as the rivals r d decisions are strategic substitutes it can generate new empirical implications and can provide an explanation for the lack of strong empirical support in the literature for a negative relationship between risk and incentives we also discuss policy implications regarding the effect of risk on the incentives to innovate and welfare

characterizations of the pivotal mechanism the pivotal mechanism is strategyproof demand revealing in public decision problems where preferences are quasi linear moreover no agent has an incentive to free ride by withdrawing from the committee and consuming whatever decision is taken by the remaining agents strategyproofness plus no free ride characterize the pivotal mechanism this mechanism is anonymous and neutral yet together strategyproofness anonymity and neutrality do not characterize it they will however if reasonable lower or upper bounds on final utilities are imposed our last characterization of the pivotal mechanism uses the no free ride axiom and two mild monotonicity properties but not strategyproofness

anarchy and its breakdown anarchy defined as a system in which participants can seize and defend resources without regulation from above is not chaos but rather a spontaneous order however anarchy is fragile and may dissolve either into formless amorphy or into a more organized system such as hierarchy under anarchy each contestant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources anarchy is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort the decisiveness parameter is sufficiently low and incomes exceed the viability minimum these considerations explain many features of animal and human conflict

how to pay for the peace a theoretical framework with references to african countries this paper analyses a simple game theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some gifts to his opponents as a means to defend his position in power if the government is a cournot nash player then there is no gift in equilibrium and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defence expenditures however if the government is a stackelberg leader then he will use the gift as a tool in his policy for staying in power

on the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences the paper reexamines the foundations of the axiomatic nash bargaining theory more specifically it questions the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and extends it to a family of non expected utility preferences a bargaining problem is presented as x d 2 where x is a set of feasible agreements described in physical terms d is the disagreement event and 1 and 2 are preferences defined on the space of lotteries in which the prizes are the elements in x and d the ordinal nash bargaining solution is defined as an agreement y satisfying for all p e 0 1 and for all x e x if px 1 y then py 2 x and if px 2 y then py x where px is the lottery which gives x with probability p and d with probability 1 p revisions of the pareto symmetry and iia axioms characterize the ordinal nash bargaining solution in the expected utility case this definition is equivalent to that of the nash bargaining solution however this definition is to be preferred since it allows a statement of the nash bargaining solution in everyday language and makes possible its natural extension to a wider set of preferences it also reveals the logic behind some of the more interesting results of the nash bargaining solution such as the comparative statics of risk aversion and the connection between the nash bargaining solution and strategic models

the nash program non convex bargaining problems we define and characterize an extension of the nash bargaining solution to non convex bargaining problems and in the spirit of the nash program of implementing cooperative solutions non cooperatively we show that this solution is supported by rubinstein s econometrica 50 1982 97 110 model of bargaining and its corresponding set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria

manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism abstract given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities consider the n person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution any constrained equal income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d71

input versus output monitoring who is the residual claimant abstract we observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal agent relationship we show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by the identity of the residual claimant of the principal agent relationship the principal will find input monitoring more efficient if the principal is the residual claimant and he will find output monitoring more efficient if the agent is the residual claimant if residual claimancy is a choice the principal will be the residual claimant under input monitoring under output monitoring residual claimancy is not an issue if both residual claimancy and the monitoring instrument can be chosen the principal will choose to monitor input and to be the residual claimant journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l22

the relation between farm size and farm productivity the role of family labor supervision and credit constraints abstract the paper shows that if the performance of hired farmhands is affected by supervision from family members and if the availability of credit is dependent on the amount of land owned then a systematic positive or negative relationship between per acre yields and farm size will prevail a model with no supervision effects on labor productivity would predict that yields are unaffected by farm size the paper also investigates the relation between land utilization and owned holding size when land rental possibilities are limited results are shown to be compatible with various observed patterns in ldcs

auctioning and selling positions a non cooperative approach to queueing conflicts abstract complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served they firstly compete with each other for a specific position in the queue then the winner can decide to take up the position or sell it to the others in the former case the rest of the players will proceed to compete for the remaining positions in the same manner whereas for the latter case the seller can propose a queue with corresponding payments to the others which can be accepted or rejected in this paper we show that when the players are competing for the first position in the queue then the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the corresponding mechanism coincides with the well known maximal transfer rule while an efficient queue is always formed in equilibrium we also argue that changing the mechanism so that the players compete for the last position implements the minimal transfer rule the analysis discovers a striking relationship between pessimism and optimism in this type of decision making

conflict and distribution abstract we develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics the model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth ethnicity religion and political ideology we settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics however in general the conflict distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d72 d74

a nonparametric efficient public good decision mechanism undominated bayesian implementation abstract it is known that with incomplete information there are bayesian mechanisms that undertake public projects achieving ex post efficiency and budget balance however there are two shortcomings in these mechanisms first the mechanism designer is required to know the agents prior beliefs which is quite demanding second the mechanism may possess multiple equilibria including undesirable ones this paper presents a bayesian mechanism that is nonparametric in that the mechanism designer cannot incorporate any information other than that received from the agents moreover at all undominated bayesian equilibria of the mechanism the public project is undertaken efficiently and budget is balanced journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d78 d82

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

nash demand game and the kalai smorodinsky solution we introduce two new variations on the nash demand game in one as in all past variants of nash demand games the nash bargaining solution is the equilibrium outcome the other demand game allows for probabilistic continuation in cases of infeasible joint demands specifically with probability 1 p the game terminates and the players receive their disagreement payoffs but with probability p the game continues to a second stage in which one of the two incompatible demands is randomly selected and implemented surprisingly the kalai smorodinsky solution is always the outcome of the most robust equilibrium of this game moreover ranking other solution concepts is impossible

subgame perfect implementation of bargaining solutions abstract this paper provides simple four stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two person bargaining solutions in subgame perfect equilibrium the solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent s utility function so that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement outcome is 0 this class of solutions includes the nash kalai smorodinsky and relative utilitarian solutions the game forms have a structure of alternating offers and contain no integer device

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

rulers and the ruled patterned inequality and the onset of mass political violence the theory of patterned inequality between rulers and ruled provides a valuable analytic approach to the relationship between inequality and political violence under conditions of a bifurcated pattern of inequality the probability of political violence is likely to be greater than under a more generalized inequality typically measured by the gini index a strong systematic relationship between patterned inequality in latin american landholdings and deaths from political violence was discovered using the exponential distribution as a model for the lower portion of the land distribution and the log exponential for the upper this degree of association was far stronger than that found between the gini index of land inequality in latin america and deaths from political violence evidence supporting the theory was also found in an analysis of middle eastern landholdings

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

reference functions and balanced concessions in bargaining in bargaining agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated using the reference function concept of thomson 1981 this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted the kalai smorodinsky solution arises as a special case another solution in this class which depends on the entire feasible set is generated by using the centre of gravity as the reference function

fair allocation when players preferences are unknown suppose an arbitrator needs to allocate an asset among two players whose claims on the asset are incompatible the allocation outcome is said to be fair if the arbitrator awards an outcome that brings the same utility payoff to the two players whenever the two players claims are symmetric and the allocation set is symmetric in conjunction with other natural axioms this fairness requirement implies a unique allocation outcome for any claims problem we propose a mechanism which can be used by the arbitrator to implement this allocation outcome even when the players preferences are unknown to the arbitrator jel c78 d63 j52

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions abstract most real life bargaining is resolved gradually during this process parties reach intermediate agreements these intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds we identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions the nash proportional and as a special case to the egalitarian solution and discrete raiffa solutions we show that the robustness of intermediate agreements plus additional well known and plausible axioms provide novel axiomatizations of the above mentioned solutions hence we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutions bargaining theories

thirty years of agricultural growth in brazil crop performance regional profile and recent policy review the postwar economic growth of brazil has received much attention in specialized and general literature on development structural change associated with rapid and sustained industrialization with strong backward linkages into intermediate capital goods sectors has been the focus of much of this work the costs benefits and distortions growing out of this secular process of economic growth have been documented highlighting the unusual performance of the brazilian economy among the middle income developing countries finally the important shift in policy regimes from import substitution in the 1950s to export substitution beginning in the late 1960s has been analyzed adding a rich base of data and results with which to evaluate the brazilian performance and test various hypotheses concerning the impact of selected policy parameters on efficiency growth and distribution 2 however until recently less attention has been devoted to a review of the performance of the agricultural sector within this scenario of rapid change and growth 3 this becomes important in interpreting trends in income distribution in the 1970s this article is directed toward filling this gap in part through reviewing the empirical record on the aggregate and regional performances of output area and yield of the cropproducing sector of brazilian agriculture over the 30 year period 195080 this is possible through the extensive time series on crop output in metric tons area in hectares and physical yields generated by the annual crop reporting series of the brazilian institute of geography and statistics fibge a series that accounts for 98 of all crop output in brazil during this period

coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy in our model it is assumed that each agent knows the sum of the utility functions of the entire society as well as his own utility under this information assumption a social choice mechanism has to make a public decision and choose a balanced set of side payments the mechanisms providing for stability against coalitational manipulation are shown to be egalitarian an extension of an arbitrary egalitarian mechanism to a set of inconsistent messages is given in an explicit form journal of economic literature classification number d82

implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities abstract a simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule furthermore the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than e where e can be arbitrarily small

let s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad this paper shows that a minimal degree of consideration for other people s well being enables society to agree that one social policy is the best i offer axioms that imply that this best policy maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities the weight of each individual is the inverse of his or her maximal possible utility from social endowments the suggested policy is not sensitive to the choice of the von neumann morgenstern utilities the key axiom is that individuals agree that giving all the endowments always to one person is as bad as giving them to any other person

preemptive investment toehold entry and the mimicking principle this article explores the ability offirms to successfully enter against an initial monopolist by pursuing toehold entry sinking entry costs early and planning to produce only later we endow the incumbent with strongfirst mover advantages for example capital is the only input and is completely sunk and in each period the incumbent invests before entrants nevertheless the incumbent s profit can easily be negative if it tries to deter all entry when the market is growing the incumbent may need prohibitive capital in place early on because once toehold entry has occurred the incumbent s planned capital expansion might no longer be rational surprisingly even if market conditions remain stationary the incumbent may still allow some entry in the model some firms are always deterred showing that several firms can deter others more effectively than can a singlefirm the difference arises because onefirm cannot commit to mimicking the aggregate investment path that several independent firms would choose this mimicking principle offers a general perspective for understanding when a monopolist finds deterrence optimal

the separability axiom and equal sharing methods a quasi linear social choice problem is defined as selecting one among finitely many indivisible public decision and a vector of monetary transfers among agents to cover the cost of this decision this decision is based upon individual preferences which are assumed to be additively separable and linear in money the separability axiom is a consistency property for choice methods on societies with variable size the decision is not affected if we remove an arbitrary agent under the condition that he be guaranteed his original utility level and the cost to the remaining agents is modified accordingly thus the utility level assigned by the social choice function to agent i is the price at which the other agents are unanimously willing to buy agent is share of the decision power a general characterization of choice methods satisfying this axiom is provided three subclasses of particular interest are characterized by additional milder axioms those are i equal sharing of the surplus left over some reference utility e g the utility at a status quo decision ii utilitarian methods that merely select the efficient public decision and perform no monetary transfers and iii equal allocation of nonseparable costs which divides equally the surplus left over from the utility derived from the pivotal mechanism also known as the vickrey clarke groves mechanism

implementation in undominated strategies a look at bounded mechanisms this paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems it is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies an example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features in part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded this sort of tail chasing construction common in the constructive proofs of the literature is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium if such mechanisms are ruled out then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition called strategy resistence for social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy proofness this contrast suggests that this issue should be examined as it applies to other solution concepts used in implementation theory the last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to nash implementation and undominated nash implementation

inequality and insurgency maldistribution of land in agrarian societies is commonly thought to be an important precondition of mass political violence and revolution others argue that because of the difficulty of mobilizing rural populations for political protest land maldistribution is irrelevant except as part of an inegalitarian distribution of income nationwide these rival inequality hypotheses have significant implications with respect to the kinds of reforms likely to reduce the potential for insurgency in a society they are tested using the most comprehensive cross national compilation of data currently available on land inequality landlessness and income inequality support is found for the argument that attributes the greater causal import to income inequality moreover the effect of income inequality on political violence is found to hold in the context of a causal model that takes into account the repressiveness of the regime governmental acts of coercion intensity of separatism and level of economic development

implementing the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution the bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that are used by all non winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner s proposal that procedure non cooperatively implements the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution

the equal loss principle for bargaining problems abstract we introduce a new bargaining solution which we call the equal loss solution this solution equalizes across agents the losses from the ideal point two characterizations of the solution are presented by formulating axioms specifying how bargaining solutions should respond to changes in the feasible set and the ideal point

reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation abstract consider a two person economy in which resources are allocated so as to maximize agent 1 s utility subject to the condition that agent 2 remains at least as well off as he was initially we show that agent 1 who is explicitly favored by the mechanism gains nothing by manipulation while agent 2 can reverse the asymmetry of the mechanism in his favor we give two other examples of mechanisms for which an analogous reversal of asymmetries takes place

collusion proof yardstick competition abstract this paper analyses the incentives for collusion among firms when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition the central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private correlated information and are unable to communicate later the analysis shows that collusion is costly to society only if firms can commit to side payments third best collusion proof yardstick competition entails more less distortion of efficiency for low productivity high productivity firms than second best yardstick competition the benefit of yardstick competition vanishes in the limit as correlation of private information becomes near perfect

individual preferences organization and competition in a model of r d incentive provision abstract understanding the organization of rd 2 knowledge is not perfectly appropriable 3 scientists are responsive to both monetary and non monetary incentives and 4 firms compete on the product market we show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists and these effects interact first high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high and to strengthen incentives when competition is low second the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is u shaped with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers we also show that the performance contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research while the fixed component decreases we relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence and also discuss their implications for management and public policy

collective risk taking in the commons abstract the management of natural commons is typically subject to threshold effects if individuals are risk averse some of the recent economic literature holds that uncertainty on the threshold may have a positive impact by lowering incentives to over consume the paper shows that this intuitive result may unravel when uncertainty is modeled as a discrete or multimodal distribution using a variant of the nash demand game with two thresholds two types of nash equilibria typically coexist cautious respectively dangerous equilibria in which agents coordinate on the low threshold resp the high threshold when both types of equilibria coexist the symmetric dangerous equilibrium is always pareto dominated by the symmetric cautious equilibrium and the latter is always pareto efficient we use an experimental setting to assess the severity of the coordination and equilibrium selection problem while cautious resp dangerous play is decreasing resp increasing in the probability that the threshold is high coordination failures are salient for intermediate probabilities where the likelihood of coexistence of both type of equilibria is high we find that there is a u shaped relationship between overall coordination and the probability that the threshold is high

the conditional auction mechanism for sharing a surplus a first bid auction to allocate the leadership role is used to choose a public decision and a balanced set of transfers the mechanism is shown to implement an equal sharing of the surplus above the average utility level at the equilibrium an agent s message reveals the other agent s utility when only two players are involved and the exact value of the joint surplus a variety of other contexts allow for the construction of similar auction like mechanisms displaying the same mirror image effect

explaining agricultural and agrarian policies in developing countries the paper describes and as far as possible explains variations in policies programs and institutions that influence agricultural growth agrarian relations and rural welfare across developing countries and over time it evaluates the impact of distorted policy patterns on agricultural production and rural poverty and identifies conditions under which policy reforms meant to bring about greater efficiency and equity are likely to be initiated and sustained it draws upon a broad range of literature to show how material conditions missing markets and government policies affect static welfare outcomes patterns of accumulation state formation and the establishment of political institutions it suggests ways to improve policy advice and proposes directions for future research

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem a general model of lower bound individual rationality and upper bound axioms for fair allocation is proposed the unanimity welfare function associates to each individual utility function the highest equal utility feasibile when all agents share this utility if this function is a feasible lower bound resp upper bound then it is the highest lower bound of all resp the lower upper bound applying this to cooperative production of private goods we characterize when the unanimity welfare is a lower upper bound function and when the stand alone welfare is an upper or lower bound our approach unifies several familiar fairness properties

land inequality and conflict intensity this paper investigates the impact of land inequality on conflict intensity a fundamental distinction with the existing literature lies in the nature of inequality under consideration we investigate how land inequality across landlords only influences the intensity of the fight against a rebel group comprised of landless individuals we show that conflict intensity is non monotonic in land inequality in particular the most severe conflicts occur for intermediate land inequality levels moreover a pareto improving and thus voluntary transfer of land from the smaller to the larger landlord may exist

product market competition and organizational slack under profit target contracts in a framework a la martin 1993 we introduce a common component in the managers private information in order to address three related questions what is the impact of contracts that reward managers on the basis of realized profits on firms productive and allocative efficiency relative to cost target contracts how do these contracts shape the relationship between competition and organizational slack can we then explain the existing evidence of an inverted u shaped relationship between competition and cost reducing activities as documented in aghion et al aghion p bloom n blundell r griffith r howitt p competition and innovation an inverted u relationship the quarterly journal of economics 120 pp 701 728 2005 we show that profit target contracts introduce a horizontal contractual externality between the competing firms that mitigates organizational slack and improves upon productive efficiency relative to cost plus mechanisms moreover when executive compensations are conditioned on profits an inverted u shaped relationship between product market competition and managerial effort obtains finally we also show that when contractual instruments are endogenous i e when shareholders can choose between profit and cost target rules the equilibrium with profit target contracts always exists and is the only one that survives to standard refinements

the effects of competition on executive behavior economists presume that competition spurs a firm to be more efficient by forcing it to reduce its agency problems this article investigates this presumption it finds that the effects of competition on executive behavior can be decomposed into four effects each of which is of potentially ambiguous sign theory thus offers no definitive defense of this presumption this article also derives sets of conditions under which increased competition has the presumed effect of reducing agency problems in some sets important conditions are that increased competition reduce the executive s expected income and that agency goods e g shirking be normal goods for the executive the article shows that an increase in the shareholder bargaining strength can both reduce the agency problem and make it more sensitive to competition

the pure compensation problem egalitarianism versus laissez fairism a binary choice problem with side payments and quasi linear utilities is considered we study two compensation rules called social choice functions the egalitarian rule divides equally the surplus above the average utility level the laissez faire rule chooses an efficient decision but performs no transfer egalitarianism is characterized by a monotonicity axiom called agreement no two agents ever disagree in comparing two distinct preferences of a third one laissez fairism is characterized by the no subsidy axiom a coalition would not be worse off if the other agents were not present

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two player model of society where only armed self enforcement of property rights is possible the main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players the parameter space is partitioned into regions in which the respective types of equilibrium occur the equilibrium types involve positive arms expenditure by respectively neither player the richer player and both players the latter case involves a sub type in which the poorer player s entire endowment is expended on arms jel d30 d72 d74

vertical integration or separation of the sales function as implied by competitive forces abstract in the present paper we link the decisions concerning the sales strategies that are made by competing firms we demonstrate that when the demand schedules facing competing firms are moderately correlated asymmetric equilibria may arise where only one firm decides to establish its own sales force while its competitor sells its product through an independent sales agency when demand schedules are highly correlated however only symmetric equilibria can arise since firms derive greater benefits from imitating rather than contradicting their rivals choices we demonstrate that vertical separation of its sales function is more likely than vertical integration when firms produce products that are highly substitutable