the world market risk premium and u s macroeconomic announcements abstract conditional tests of the international capm in previous studies e g harvey 1991 help identify predictability but not causality in this paper we take an event study approach to examine if the world market risk premium is particularly higher on prescheduled us macroeconomic announcement days empirically we apply the savor and wilson 2014 methodology to daily us stocks as well as foreign stocks cross listed in the us our findings suggest that there is a causal relationship from the state of the global economy to the world market risk premium

eco labelling by a for profit certifier countervailing power and its consequences for profit certifier s eco labelling is common in industries where firms have some countervailing power on sharing gains from labelling we show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong power a certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain this switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard this is consequential for evaluating policies the dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used and ultimately upon firms countervailing power

which market integration measure abstract this paper compares the dynamics of the financial integration process as described by different empirical approaches to this end a wide range of measures accounting for several dimensions of integration is employed in addition we evaluate the performance of each measure by relying on an established international finance result i e increasing financial integration leads to declining international portfolio diversification benefits using monthly equity market data for three different country groups i e developed markets emerging markets developed plus emerging markets and a dynamic indicator of international portfolio diversification benefits we find that i all measures give rise to a very similar long run integration pattern ii the standard correlation explains variations in diversification benefits as well or better than more sophisticated measures these findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks

essays on duopoly competition with asymmetric firms is profit maximization always an evolutionary stable strategy abstract we propose both a well mixed and spatially structured evolutionary game to analyze the competitive behavior of retail firms in duopolistic markets firms from two different populations high low efficiency compete and the available strategies are i profit or ii revenue maximization under bounded rationality assumptions firms can update their behavior through dynamic learning mechanisms in addition to a replicator dynamics approach we develop an agent based model to increase realism and to capture possible spatial effects on firms strategic behavior a convergence between the methods is observed and given specific conditions revenue maximization may corresponds to an evolutionary stable strategy ess

real capital market integration in the eu how far has it gone what will the effect of the euro be real capital market integration how far has integration gone what euro effect much effort has been devoted to the study of financial market integration in europe little is known however about real capital market integration the degree to which plants and equipment move to take advantage of locally high returns this paper looks at the evidence an analysis of flows of foreign direct investment in europe shows that integration was quite limited in the early 1980s but has increased considerably since then another analysis looks at rates of return of a large number of firms it reveals that country specific factors play a significant role in explaining corporate returns even after taking risk into account this finding is incompatible with the capm definition of market integration the view that integration is limited in europe is further strengthened when the same approach is carried out for the usa and canada part of the national specificity appears to be related to labour and goods market regulations which harm firms profitability if by introducing more transparency and eliminating currency risk emu strengthens competition on the real capital market one obvious economic benefit will be a more rational and efficient use of capital but the most important potential consequences are political special interest regulations of an exclusively national nature will not survive they will either fall in a wave of internationalist liberalization or become embedded in harmonized regulations at the federal level a reduction in excessive regulatory burdens notably in the labour market could lead to substantial and shared productivity gains georges de menil

oligopoly game price makers meet price takers abstract the paper studies an oligopoly game where firms can choose between price taking and price making strategies on a mixed market price takers are always better off than price makers though the profits of both types decline in the number of price takers we investigate and confront two possibilities of firms decisions about their types forward looking equilibrium reasoning and backward looking individual learning we find that the cournot outcome is the only equilibrium prediction and it is learnable if firms are sufficiently sensitive to profit differences however with a larger number of firms a unilateral deviation from cournot behavior becomes profitable under learning this incentive creates a space for permanent oscillations over different markets with a positive but low number of price takers

agency conflict and corporate strategy the effect of divestment on corporate value among the various stakeholders of a firm senior managers are the most likely targets for private and public political pressures other stakeholder groups are less visible and may be perceived as less influential in corporate strategy formulation and implementation in some situations consequently senior executives may adopt corporate strategies in response to political pressures even if these strategies may be costly to shareholders in this study a special case is examined the effect of divestment of south african business units on firm value using data from 1984 through 1990 we examine the impact that announcements of divestments have upon the stock return behavior of publicly traded firms our results indicate that significant and negative excess returns accrue to shares of companies announcing divestments of south african operations these results are supportive of the premise that noneconomic pressures may influence managerial strategies rather than value enhancement goals 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

the role of corporate sustainability performance for economic performance a firm level analysis of moderation effects abstract this paper analyses the link between sustainability management and economic performance its main research question concerns the association of social responsibility and environmental management with economic performance determinants of the latter and possible moderation effects based on data collected from financial databases and kinder lydenberg domini for the period 1992 to 2003 the paper analyses the link of corporate sustainability performance with economic performance using panel estimation techniques the analysis shows that advertising intensity moderates the association of corporate sustainability performance and economic performance as measured by tobin s q for research and development efforts relative to firm size no moderating role on the link between corporate sustainability and economic performance is identified a sensitivity analysis using separate measures for social and environmental performance reveals that the latter only has a direct effect and the former only a fully moderated effect on economic performance policy and management implications of these findings are discussed

finance as a driver of corporate social responsibility finance is grease to the economy therefore we assume that it may affect corporate social responsibility csr and the sustainability of economic development too this paper discusses the transmission mechanisms between finance and sustainability we find that there is no simple one to one relationship between financial development and sustainable development but there are various often indirect linkages it appears that most of the literature concentrates on the role of public shareholders when it comes to changing corporate policy and performance in a more sustainable direction however this focus neglects the potential impact of the credit channel and private equity on a firm s non financial policies and performance these very powerful mechanisms can govern business policies and practices therefore there appears to be much more scope for finance to promote socially and environmentally desirable activities and to discourage detrimental activities than has been acknowledged in the academic literature so far

market entry waves and volatility outbursts in stock markets abstract we develop a simple agent based financial market model in which speculators market entry decisions are subject to herding behavior and market risk in addition speculators orders depend on price trends market misalignments and fundamental news using a mix of analytical and numerical tools we show that a herding induced market entry wave may amplify excess demand triggering lasting volatility outbursts eventually however higher stock market risk reduces stock market participation and volatility decreases again simulations furthermore reveal that our approach is also able to produce bubbles and crashes excess volatility fat tailed return distributions and serially uncorrelated price changes moreover trading volume is persistent and correlated with volatility

firm valuation earnings expectations and the exchange rate exposure effect consistent with previous research we fail to find a significant correlation between the abnormal returns of our sample firms with international activities and changes in the dollar we investigate the possibility that this failure is due to mispricing lagged changes in the dollar are a significant variable in explaining current abnormal returns of our sample firms suggesting that mispricing does occur a simple trading strategy based upon these results generates significant abnormal returns corroborating evidence from returns around earnings announcements as well as errors in analysts forecasts of earnings is also provided it is a widely held view that exchange rate movement should affect the value of a firm standard economic analysis implies that the profitability and value of most u s firms with foreign sales or operations abroad should increase decrease with an unexpected depreciation appreciation of the dollar as expected foreign currency cash flows translate into larger smaller u s

interactions between stock bond and housing markets abstract we develop a model in which investors can participate in stock bond and housing markets investors market entry decisions are subject to herding effects and depend on the markets price trends and on their mispricings the dynamics of our model is governed by a four dimensional nonlinear map and its unique inner steady state is characterized by standard present value relations between dividends rents and the bond rate amongst other things we show that endogenous stock and housing market dynamics emerge countercyclical to each other if investors react strongly to the markets price trends such a cross feedback reflects investors tendency to transfer their enthusiasm from one speculative market to another

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

side effects of nonlinear profit taxes in an evolutionary market entry model abrupt changes coexisting attractors and hysteresis problems in order to demonstrate that nonlinear tax systems may have surprising and potentially undesirable side effects we develop an evolutionary market entry model in which firms decide on the basis of past profit opportunities whether or not to enter a competitive market our main focus is on the case of a proportional tax on positive profits such a piecewise linear tax scheme induces a kink in the firms profit functions and may lead to abrupt changes in a market s dynamics coexisting attractors and hysteresis problems since these phenomena can also be observed in more general models a proper understanding of their basic mechanism may be helpful to explain the intricate behavior of many economic systems

selfish bakers caring nurses a model of work motivation abstract work contributes to people s self image in important ways we propose a model in which effort is unobservable and where individuals have a preference for being important to others this gives the following predictions 1 if a worker s effort is paid by his marginal productivity bakers effort is just like in the standard model 2 if a worker s wage is unaffected by his effort nurses more effort is provided than in the standard model 3 to prevent that shirkers become nurses nurses wages must be kept strictly lower than bakers income at this wage level there will be too few nurses 4 overinvestment in nursing equipment can be justified as a means to attract motivated nurses 5 even with full income compensation both nurses and bakers may experience a net utility loss when losing their job 6 similarly both nurses and bakers may prefer work to welfare even with full income compensation

retailing public goods the economics of corporate social responsibility abstract this paper explores the feasibility and desirability of corporate social responsibility csr we identify csr with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads using a model with profit maximizing firms the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between csr and traditional models of private provision of public goods indeed firms that use csr will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods we compare csr with government provision and charitable provision discussing when csr by private for profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision

strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market this paper investigates the impacts of competition structures on firms incentives for adopting strategic environmental corporate social responsibility ecsr certified by a non governmental organization we show that to induce firms to adopt certified ecsr the certifier will set a standard lower than the optimal one and the standard in cournot competition is higher than that in bertrand competition finally we show that firms and consumers benefit from firms certified ecsr

another look at the role of the industrial structure of markets for international diversification strategies abstract this paper re examines the extent to which gains from international diversification are due to differences in industrial structure across countries recent papers by roll 1992 journal of finance 47 3 42 and heston and rouwenhorst 1994 journal of financial economics 36 3 27 investigate this issue and find conflicting evidence using a new database the dow jones world stock index with coverage in 25 countries and over 66 industry classifications we decompose comprehensively both country and industrial sources of variation we confirm that little of the variation in country index returns can be explained by their industrial composition we also uncover differences in the proportion of variation in industry index returns that is captured by country and industry factors and discuss the implications for global diversification strategies

how are stock prices affected by the location of trade abstract we examine pairs of large siamese twin companies whose stocks are traded around the world but have different trading and ownership habitats twins pool their cash flows so with integrated markets twin stocks should move together however the difference between the prices of twin stocks appears to be correlated with the markets on which they are traded most i e a twin s relative price rises when the market on which it is traded relatively intensively rises we examine several explanations of this phenomenon including the discretionary use of dividend income by parent companies differences in parent expenditures voting rights currency fluctuations ex dividend date timing issues and tax induced investor heterogeneity only the last hypothesis can explain some but not all of the empirical facts we conjecture that a country specific sentiment shocks might affect share intensity b investors are rational but markets are segmented by frictions other than international transactions costs such as agency problems

a real options approach to abatement investments and green goodwill in this paper we adopt the green goodwill argument as to why firms voluntarily invest in abatement capital we investigate the effects on the abatement investment decision of changes in uncertainty about future green goodwill competitor abatement investments regulations etc using a real options framework our results indicate that increased uncertainty about consumers willingness to pay for green products in the future discourage voluntary abatement investments the model also suggests that voluntary abatement investments are promoted by an increased threat of regulation and competitor abatement investments furthermore the benefit cost ratio of the abatement investment project at the point where it is optimal to invest is independent of what regulatory regime stringent or lenient the firm operates in we also conclude that despite the fact that voluntary abatement investment exists there may still be room for environmental policy

economic incentives for tourism firms to undertake voluntary environmental management abstract the management of natural assets at tourism destinations has relied strongly on the traditional assumption that agents free ride tourism firms are expected to overuse resources for their private interest and be subject to a trade off between being green and being competitive however there are many examples of voluntary environmental actions undertaken by the tourism industry the present paper reviews the literature on the economic consequences of voluntary environmental action taken by tourism firms and presents three challenges to the commonly held tragedy expectations these results suggest the viability of alternative environmental policymaking that takes potential voluntary action under consideration

monte carlo methods for security pricing the monte carlo approach has proved to be a valuable and flexible computational tool in modern finance this paper discusses some of the recent applications of the monte carlo method to security pricing problems with emphasis on improvements in efficiency we first review some variance reduction methods that have proved useful in finance then we describe the use of deterministic low discrepancy sequences also known as quasi monte carlo methods for the valuation of complex derivative securities we summarize some recent applications of the monte carlo method to the estimation of partial derivatives or risk sensitivities and to the valuation of american options we conclude by mentioning other applications

feed in tariff and tradable green certificate in oligopoly abstract feed in tariff fit and tradable green certificate tgc schemes are studied in a formal model and numerical example using the uk data we find that if the markets were perfectly competitive then feed in tariff and the certificate price would be the same however when the markets are imperfect they are generally different while both the tariff and certificate price fluctuate around the difference between the costs of green and black energy the tariff deviates more from the cost difference than the certificate price the supplies of both black and green energy under fit are higher than tgc obviously as a result of subsidies a troubling outcome is that the total energy supply increases under fit as the renewables quota increases which can negate other measures to mitigate climate changes such as demand management finally using the data from the uk market we find that social welfare under tgc is consistently higher than fit for a wide range of values of the parameters

corporate philanthropic giving advertising intensity and industry competition level this article examines whether the likelihood and amount of firm charitable giving in response to catastrophic events are related to firm advertising intensity and whether industry competition level moderates this relationship using data on chinese firms philanthropic response to the 2008 sichuan earthquake we find that firm advertising intensity is positively associated with both the probability and the amount of corporate giving the results also indicate that this positive advertising intensity philanthropic giving relationship is stronger in competitive industries and firms in competitive industries are more likely to donate this study thus provides evidence suggesting that even in the wake of catastrophic events corporate philanthropic giving is strategic

the persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressure abstract in this paper we study the long run outcome if firms are repeatedly matched to play a n firm cournot oligopoly game and can select their type of business objective firms can either be profit maximizing or socially concerned also pursuing consumer welfare we use an indirect evolutionary approach to distinguish between the endogenous profit maximizing choice of the firms business objectives and their corresponding market behavior our main result is that the prospects of long run survival of firms pursuing social strategies strongly depends on the number of firms in the industry if a social strategy entails higher marginal production costs it is best suited if the number of firms in the industry is not too large in particular we demonstrate that the relation between long survival and the level of competitiveness of the industry is inverse u shaped we confirm this result by using the concept of coalition stability and further show that if a high number of firms adopt a social strategy welfare might be lower than with just profit maximizing firms

convergence in the finite cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning abstract convergence to the nash equilibrium in a cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics the development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the cournot game have been extensively studied in the literature several articles show that the walrasian equilibrium is the stable ess of the cournot game but no general result has been established for the difficult case of simultaneous heterogenous mutations authors propose specific selection dynamics to analyze this case vriend 2000 proposes using a genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to cournot equilibrium with individual learning the resulting convergence has been questioned by arifovic and maschek 2006 the aim of this article is to clarify this controversy it analyzes the mechanisms that are behind these contradictory results and underlines the specific role of the spite effect we show why social learning gives rise to the walrasian equilibrium and why in a general setup individual learning can effectively yield convergence to the cournot equilibrium we also illustrate these general results by systematic computational experiments

exchange rate exposure and industry characteristics evidence from canada japan and the usa abstract this paper examines industry level exchange rate exposures for canada japan and the usa measuring exposure by adding the change in the exchange rate to the domestic market model of industry portfolio returns some industries in all three countries display significant exposures moreover for each country the exchange rate is important for explaining industry returns at the economy wide level to explore whether exchange rate exposures are systematically linked to the activities of the industries we model exposure as a function of industry characteristics for all three countries the relation between exposure and industry characteristics is broadly consistent with economic theory jel f3

competitor orientation and the evolution of business markets competitor orientation i e the focus on beating the competition rather than maximizing profits seems to thrive in business situations despite being by definition suboptimal for profit maximizing firms our research explains how a competitor orientation can persist and even thrive in equilibrium in markets that reward only profits we apply evolutionary game theory to business markets where reputation matters we use three games that represent classic interactions in business marketing chicken to illustrate competition for product adoption the battle of the sexes channel negotiations and the prisoners dilemma pricing battles initial populations are assumed to have both profit maximizing managers and competitor oriented managers i e those who gain additional utility from beating others we demonstrate that a competitor orientation can survive in equilibrium despite selection that is based solely on profits using chicken we show that a competitor orientation thrives and can even overrun the population we use the battle of the sexes to show that a competitor orientation will overrun one population in a two sided negotiation e g all retailers in a retailer manufacturer dyad last using the prisoners dilemma we show that competitor orientation is not selected against we conclude that evolutionary profit driven selection pressures cannot be assumed to eliminate nonprofit maximizing behavior even when selection is based purely on profitability

the foreign exchange exposure of japanese multinational corporations we find that about 25 percent of our sample of 171 japanese multinationals stock returns experienced economically significant positive exposure effects for the period january 1979 to december 1993 the extent to which a firm is exposed to exchange rate fluctuations can be explained by the level of its export ratio and by variables that are proxies for its hedging needs highly leveraged firms or firms with low liquidity tend to have smaller exposures foreign exposure is found to increase with firm size we also find that keiretsu multinationals are more exposed to exchange rate risk than nonkeiretsu firms it is conventional wisdom that exchange rate movements affect both the cash flows of a firm s operations and the discount rate employed to value these cash flows measuring foreign exchange exposure is now a central issue of international financial management and this issue has spawned a considerable amount of research existing empirical evidence on foreign exchange exposure however seems perplexing studies have so far documented a weak link between contemporaneous exchange rate fluctuations and stock returns of u s multinational firms 2 gendreau 1994 finds it difficult and unconvincing that the weak results imply that exchange rate changes have no effect on exporters stock returns bartov arnd bodnar 1994 attribute the observed insignificant relationship between exchange rate changes and st ock returns to probable problems associated with the previous studies samiple selection procedure or to mispricing caused by investors errors in estimat

evolutionary efficacy of a pay for performance scheme with motivated agents the paper studies the short run and long run effects of the introduction of a team oriented pay for performance p4p payment scheme when agents may differ in their degree of intrinsic motivation toward the job suppose that new potential employees were able to assess the expected pay offs of current workers then they may modify their approach to work in order to follow the employee type that earned the highest expected pay off we show that the definition of the scheme needs to take into consideration the effects produced on the evolution of the motivation of new generations in particular the desirability and success of a p4p scheme strongly depend on the way incentives are allocated to the members of a team on the power of the quality related financial incentive and on the economic and social context in which the scheme is introduced the analysis is in part motivated by the introduction in uk in 2004 of a p4p scheme for family practitioners in the uk quality and outcomes framework qof and of a new system of assessing the quality of academic research completed in 2014 research excellence framework ref

replicator dynamics in a cobweb model with rationally heterogeneous expectations abstract this paper extends the adaptively rational equilibrium dynamics of brock and hommes brock w a hommes c h 1997 a rational route to randomness econometrica 65 1059 1160 by introducing a generalized version of the replicator dynamic the replicator equilibrium dynamics red couples the price dynamics of a cobweb model with predictor selection governed by an evolutionary replicator dynamic we show that the red supports the conclusion of sethi and franke sethi r franke r 1995 behavioural heterogeneity under evolutionary pressure macroeconomic implications of costly optimisation the economic journal 105 583 600 that costly rational beliefs persist though unlike them these results obtain in the deterministic case numerical evidence shows that complex dynamics exist as in brock and hommes even though no weight is placed on strictly dominated predictors in an red steady state

evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms abstract in this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities confronting remarks by milton friedman and gary becker we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non profit motives we find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit maximizing rivals one insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare but that the level of social concern should not be too high based on a strategy s profitability we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity here we observe that the consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm if the firms propensity to switch between a social or a profit maximizing strategy is sufficiently large steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur

the measurement of vertical economies and the efficient structure of the electric utility industry in this article the concept of multiproduct cost economies is modified to the case of production at vertically related stages to derive an explicit and general measure of economies of vertical integration the utility of this measure is then demonstrated by estimating the vertical cost structure of the electric utility industry and by carrying out the calculations necessary to determine the magnitude of vertical economies in this industry the results provide empirical evidence of the existence of significant economies of vertical integration between the generation and transmission distribution stages of electricity supply copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

an illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning and its consequences for computational analyses abstract drawing a conclusion from recent insights in evolutionary game theory we show that a so called spite effect implies that there is an essential difference between individual and social learning we illustrate its consequences for the choice of computational tools in economics and social settings in general by analyzing two variants of a genetic algorithm

the economics of corporate social responsibility a firm level perspective survey this paper analyzes the economics of corporate social responsibility csr as a private response to market imperfections in order to satisfy social preferences depending on whether they affect regulation competition or contracts market imperfections driving csr decisions are classified in three categories public goods and bads and altruism imperfect competition and incomplete contracts we successively present these drivers of csr decisions and highlight the nature of incentives external or internal at work and the testable and tested hypotheses in the reviewed studies we finally review the link between csr and financial performance as well as between csr and social and environmental performance a twofold discrepancy appears in the literature opening future research paths a disconnection between our understanding of csr drivers and csr impacts and a knowledge gap between csr financial and social consequences the latter having received little attention

a note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies abstract in this note we show that the results developed in n singh and x vives 1984 rand j econ 15 546 554 are sensitive to the duopoly assumption if there are more than two firms prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition this will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements if goods are substitutes high quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition hence it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

does industrial structure explain the benefits of international diversification abstract we examine the influence of industrial structure on the cross sectional volatility and correlation structure of country index returns for 12 european countries between 1978 and 1992 we find that industrial structure explains very little of the cross sectional difference in country return volatility and that the low correlation between country indices is almost completely due to country specific sources of return variation diversification across countries within an industry is a much more effective tool for risk reduction than industry diversification within a country

currency risk premia and uncovered interest parity in the international capm abstract zero investment uncovered interest parity uip portfolio positions provide perfect factor mimicking portfolios for currency risk in the international capm context their returns are the currency risk premia since the uip positions on average provide low returns the currency risk premia must be low so that currency risk appears not to be priced in an unconditional model however previous research has shown that uip returns are predictable and may be quite substantial conditionally we use this observation to generate a specific conditional version of the international capm a gmm approach shows that the conditional model performs well while the unconditional international capm is marginally rejected the paper thus argues that previous rejections of the international capm stem from the fact that currency risk premia are by nature low over extended periods of time and do not provide evidence against the international capm

certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets we investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms incentives to engage in costly corporate social responsibility csr activities as well as their relative market and societal implications we find that the csr certification standard is the lowest under for profit private certifiers and the highest under a non governmental organization ngo with the standard of a welfare maximizing public certifier lying in between yet regarding industry output this ranking is reversed certification of csr activities is welfare enhancing for consumers and firms and should be encouraged finally the market and societal outcomes o f csr certification depend crucially on whether certification takes place before or after firms csr activities

oligopoly games with local monopolistic approximation we propose an oligopoly game where quantity setting firms have incomplete information about the demand function at each time step they solve a profit maximization problem assuming a linear demand function and ignoring the effects of the competitors outputs despite such a rough approximation that we call local monopolistic approximation lma the repeated game may converge at a nash equilibrium of the game played under the assumption of full information an explicit form of the dynamical system that describes the time evolution of oligopoly games with lma is given for arbitrary differentiable demand functions provided that the cost functions are linear or quadratic in the case of isoelastic demand we show that the game based on lma always converges to a nash equilibrium this result compared with best reply dynamics shows that in this particular case less information implies more stability

learning cycles in bertrand competition with differentiated commodities and competing learning rules this paper stresses the importance of heterogeneity in learning we consider a bertrand oligopoly with firms using either least squares learning or gradient learning for determining the price we demonstrate that convergence properties of the rules are strongly affected by heterogeneity in particular gradient learning may become unstable as the number of gradient learners increases endogenous choice between the learning rules may induce cyclical switching stable gradient learning gives higher average profit than least squares learning making firms switch to gradient learning this can destabilize gradient learning which because of decreasing profits makes firms switch back to least squares learning

the coexistence of stable equilibria under least squares learning abstract in this paper we consider firms that learn about market conditions by estimating the demand function using past market data we show that learning may lead to suboptimal outcomes even when the estimated demand function perfectly fits the observations used in the regression and firms thus perceive to have learned the demand function correctly we consider the salop model with three firms and two types of consumers that differ in their sensitivity to product differences firms do not know the demand structure and they apply least squares learning to learn the demand function in each period firms estimate a linear perceived demand function and they play the perceived best response to the previous period price of the other firms this learning rule can lead to three different outcomes a self sustaining equilibrium the nash equilibrium or an asymmetric learning equilibrium in this last equilibrium one firm underestimates the demand for low prices and it attracts consumers with high sensitivity only this type of equilibrium has not been found in the literature on least squares learning before both the nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning equilibrium are locally stable therefore the model has coexisting stable equilibria

selection dynamics asymptotic stability and adaptive behavior selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria this is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis this paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic the inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best response outcomes

social rewards externalities and stable preferences this paper examines the role of social rewards as a corrective mechanism for activities which generate externalities the focus of this paper is on the circumstances under which social rewards provide effective and feasible incentive mechanism that may replace laws and regulations in particular social mechanism is effective only in a society in which individuals who care about their standing in the society can survive in the long run we show that the nature of economic interaction between matched players influences whether the socially minded individuals survive in the long run and restricts the effectiveness of social rewards however circumstances exist where the socially minded survive even though relative fitness is determined only by economic payoff 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

the evolution of walrasian behavior consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior occasionally experimenting with some small probability in this context it is shown that the unique long run outcome of the process has all firms playing walrasian i e choosing an output that maximizes profits when taking the market clearing price as given

a dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices abstract we develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyze the effects of competition on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level our model combines a differential game approach with a hotelling spatial competition framework and our analysis applies in particular to industries such as long term care health care child care and education if providers nursing homes hospitals schools nurseries use closed loop decision rules which imply strategic interaction over time we show that although increased competition leads to higher quality in the steady state quality provision is nevertheless lower than under open loop rules and also suboptimally low from a welfare perspective thus our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interaction between competing providers as a potential source of inefficiency in quality provision

not in my community social pressure and the geography of dismissals we investigate the impact of local social pressure on firms firing decisions using linked employer employee data we show that secondary establishments located further away from headquarters have higher dismissal rates than those located closer the effect of distance on dismissals is stronger the greater the visibility of the firm in the local community of its headquarters and the larger the degree of selfishness of that community we show that these findings can be explained by the social pressure exerted by the communities where firms headquarters are located which induces ceos to refrain from dismissing at short distance from their headquarters

an evolutionary cournot model with limited market knowledge abstract in this paper we analyze a dynamic game of cournot competition with heterogeneous firms choosing between two different adaptive behavioral rules in deciding output strategies the underlying oligopoly structure is standard using a constant return to scale technology n firms produce homogeneous goods which are sold in a market characterized by constant price elasticity in this setup we assume that a fraction of firms employs a quite rough rule of thumb the so called local monopolistic approximation lma whereas the complementary fraction plays best reply br a more demanding strategy in terms of information and computation requirements the model is first considered with exogenously fixed fractions of firms in the two complementary groups then it is generalized by considering an endogenous evolutionary switching process between the two behavioral strategies based on profit driven replicator dynamics the role of the number of firms information costs and inertia or anchoring attitude in production decisions is analyzed as well as the influence in the evolutionary process of random noise in the demand function and memory of past profits global properties of the oligopoly with evolutionary pressure between behavioral rules are discussed with particular regard to cases in which the nash equilibrium is unstable

credence goods efficient labelling policies and regulatory enforcement we analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of credence goods via alternative labelling procedures when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute producers can either self label their products or have them certified by a third party the government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the green or the brown producers our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information we extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers when corrupt producers can affix spurious labels the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities we find that mandatory self labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling unless the market share effect greatly exceeds the incentive to cheat effect

csr in an asymmetric duopoly with environmental externality we investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation a la ramsey and a negative environmental externality pollution in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility csr in its statute and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function if the market is sufficiently large the csr firm sells more accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit seeking rival

morally motivated self regulation 2 this paper focuses on self regulation motivated by altruistic moral concerns the context is one in which individuals can voluntarily self regulate in the presence of opportunities to free ride on the self regulation of their trading partners moral preferences can mitigate free riding but moral preferences can be limited in the sense that they may be weaker the greater the socioeconomic distance from a trading partner and can depend on whether others are expected to reciprocate the scope of self regulation can be increased by moral suasion but individuals can also form organizations to reduce free riding this paper characterizes the scope of self regulation as a function of the form and strength of moral preferences and explains the effectiveness of organizations in expanding that scope moral preferences can be conditional on the actions of others or limited by socioeconomic distance a citizen thus may self regulate when interacting with someone close but not with someone far away moral preferences can also be conditional or unconditional unconditional moral preferences are independent of the action of others whereas with conditional preferences a citizen is more willing to self regulate if other citizens are expected to reciprocate 3

market failure and government failure f or several decades a debate has been raging in development economics on the relative virtues of the free market as opposed to state intervention with the help of analytical models of a market economy the interventionists demonstrate what they consider serious instances of market failure that is the inability of a market economy to reach certain desirable outcomes in resource use the protagonists of free markets on the other hand compile impressive lists of ill conceived and counterproductive policy measures implemented by the governments of different countries at various times leading to wasteful use of resources in their economies this debate inevitably remains inlconclusive the analytical results on market failure do not disappear in the face of the evidence that most governments or for that matter most economies of less developed countries with or without state intervention have performed rather badly when there appears to be scope for imnprovement over the market outcome the search for the appropriate corrective measures goes on some protagonists of government failure question the significance of such market failures others voice skepticism about the ability of governments to take any action in the economy which is not counterproductive but none of them seems to be able to explain why a less developed country like india failed to grow during the first half of this century under a non interventionist colonial adnministration thus while the debate goes on neither side succeeds in convincing the other

corporate social responsibility a microeconomic review of the literature this paper provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate social responsibility csr depending on whether an individual can be considered as selfish or whether she has also social preferences motives for csr can be explained in different ways furthermore we explicitly highlight the influence of different corporate governance system on csr as well as the relationship between firms size and social commitment because it is difficult to distinguish between different theories in empirical studies we argue that an experimental approach might be suitable to test theories of csr

the exchange rate exposure of u s multinationals this article examines the exposure of u s multinationals to foreign currency risk evidence is presented that the relationship between stock returns and exchange rates differs systematically across multinationals given these results the study focuses on the determinants of exchange rate exposure the comovements between stock returns and the value of the dollar is found to be positively related to the percentage of foreign operations of u s multinationals copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

a panel project on purchasing power parity mean reversion within and between countries abstract previous time series studies have shown evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates deviations from purchasing power parity ppp appear to have half lives of approximately four years however the long samples required for statistical significance are unavailable for most currencies and are potentially inappropriate because of regime changes in this study we re examine deviations from ppp using a panel of 150 countries and 45 annual post wwii observations our panel shows strong evidence of mean reversion that is similar to that from long time series ppp deviations are eroded at a rate of approximately 15 annually i e their half life is around four years such findings can be masked in time series data but are relatively easy to find in cross sections

private vs public regulation political economy of the international environment minimum standards set by a world environmental organization weo and ngo labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection we explore the potential inter play between these two approaches when the weo is subject to pressure from producers we find that if weo and ngo schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an ngo alternative increases industry resistance to weo proposals and this may reduce welfare if however the schemes are run in parallel existence of the ngo lessens producer opposition to weo activities this allows the weo to be bolder in its proposals which is good for welfare

corporate social responsibility in the banking industry motives and financial performance abstract the current study investigates the association between corporate social responsibility csr and financial performance fp and discusses the driving motives of banks to engage in csr three motives namely strategic choices altruism and greenwashing suggest that the relationship between csr and fp is positive non negative and non existent respectively we obtained our sample which covered 2003 2009 from the ethical investment research service eiris databank and bankscope database the data consists of 162 banks in 22 countries we then classified the banks into four types based on their degree of engagement in csr this study proposes the use of an extended version of the heckman two step regression in which the first step adopts a multinomial logit model and the second step estimates the performance equation with the inverse mills ratio generated by the first step the empirical results show that csr positively associates with fp in terms of return on assets return on equity net interest income and non interest income in contrast csr negatively associates with non performing loans hence strategic choice is the primary motive of banks to engage in csr

the cost of capital in international financial markets local or global abstract this paper analyzes to what extent international and domestic asset pricing models lead to a different estimate of the cost of capital for an individual firm under the maintained assumption of perfect international financial integration we distinguish between i the multifactor solnik sercu icapm including both the global market portfolio and exchange rate risk premia and ii the single factor domestic capm we use a sample of 3 293 stocks from nine countries in the period 1980 1999 the domestic capm yields a significantly different estimate of the cost of capital from the multifactor icapm for only five percent of the firms in our sample we attribute the close correspondence between local and global pricing to strong country factors in individual stock returns which are probably due to lack of real integration our results reinforce the home bias puzzle

managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility abstract this paper presents a theory of corporate social responsibility in the form of the private provision of public goods and private redistribution by a firm these social expenditures are determined by a manager operating under a compensation contract chosen by shareholders in a capital market that prices social expenditures the theory incorporates three explanations for compensation systems that encompass social performance first consumers may reward the firm for its social expenditures second managers may have personal preferences for contributing to social causes and third the shareholder clientele a firm attracts may prefer social expenditures social incentives are higher powered the more consumers reward the firm and the stronger are shareholders warm glow preferences for social expenditures profit incentives are higher powered the more consumers reward the firm but are independent of shareholder preferences when consumers reward the firm for its social expenditures firms with higher ability managers have both higher operating profits and higher social expenditures when times are good so a positive correlation is predicted in bad times however the correlation is negative except for firms with very low ability managers in very bad times where the correlation is zero

endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in cournot competition abstract an evolutionary game theoretic model of cournot competition is investigated individuals choose from a finite set of different behavioral rules each rule specifies the quantity to be produced in the current period as a function of past quantities using more sophisticated rules may require extra information costs based upon realized payoffs the fractions of the population choosing a certain behavioral rule are updated according to the replicator equation with noise the long run behavior of the evolutionary system consisting of the population dynamics coupled with the quantity dynamics of the cournot game may be complicated and endogenous fluctuations may arise we consider a typical example where firms can choose between two rules the nash rule and the best reply rule we show that a homoclinic tangency between the stable and unstable manifold of the equilibrium occurs as evolutionary pressure increases implying bifurcation routes to complicated dynamics and strange attractors

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations abstract we analyze a nonlinear discrete time cournot duopoly game where players have adaptive expectations the evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two dimensional map the long run behavior is characterized by multistability that is the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs which correspond to nash equilibria in the quantity space hence a problem of equilibrium selection arises and the long run outcome strongly depends on the choice of the players initial beliefs we analyze the basins of attraction and their qualitative changes as the model parameters vary we illustrate that the basins might be nonconnected sets and reveal the mechanism which is responsible for this often neglected kind of complexity the analysis of the global bifurcations which cause qualitative changes in the topological structure of the basins is carried out by the method of critical curves

environmental pressure group strength and air pollution an empirical analysis there is an established theoretical and empirical case study literature arguing that environmental pressure groups have a real impact on pollution levels our original contribution to this literature is to provide the first systematic quantitative test of the strength of environmental non governmental organizations engos on air pollution levels we find that engo strength exerts a statistically significant impact on sulfur dioxide smoke and heavy particulates concentration levels in a cross country time series regression analysis this result holds true both for ordinary least squares and random effects estimation it is robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of engo strength with the help of instrumental variables the effect is also substantively important strengthening engos represents an important strategy by which aid donors foundations international organizations and other stakeholders can try to achieve lower pollution levels around the world

the optimal vertical structure in the electricity industry when the incumbent has a cost advantage abstract this paper studies how the vertical structure of the electricity industry affects the social welfare when the incumbent has a cost advantage in generation relative to the entrants the model consists of a generation sector and a transmission sector in the generation sector the incumbent and entrants compete in a cournot fashion taking as given the access charge to the transmission network set in advance by the regulator to maximize the social welfare two vertical structures integration and separation are considered under vertical separation the transmission network is established as an organization independent of every generator whereas under vertical integration it is a part of the incumbent s organization the optimal vertical structure is shown to depend on the number of entrants if the number of entrants is smaller than a certain threshold vertical separation is superior in welfare to vertical integration and vice versa this is because the choice of vertical structure produces a trade off in the effects on competition promotion and production efficiency if a break even constraint is imposed in the transmission sector however vertical integration is shown to be always superior in welfare

environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets abstract survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher price for a product that generates less environmental harm we induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers incentives to offer products of differing quality buyers are unaware of the product quality before purchase as is often the case for goods with differing environmental quality we first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible we then study various treatments that could remedy this failure seller reputations and unverified cheap talk signals sometimes increase the number of higher valued green goods the only reliable way to improve product quality in the experiment however is to use a third party that charges a fee to certify product quality claims

the corporate social performance financial performance link strategic managers are consistently faced with the decision of how to allocate scarce corporate resources in an environment that is placing more and more pressures on them recent scholarship in strategic management suggests that many of these pressures come directly from sources associated with social issues in management rather than traditional arenas of strategic management using a greatly improved source of data on corporate social performance this paper reports the results of a rigorous study of the empirical linkages between financial and social performance corporate social performance csp is found to be positively associated with prior financial performance supporting the theory that slack resource availability and csp are positively related csp is also found to be positively associated with future financial performance supporting the theory that good management and csp are positively related 1997 by john wiley sons ltd