economics and the international trade commission negotiated during the 1980s and the u s semiconductor agreement with japan because the u s antidumping and antisubsidy laws are now one of the most important means used to restrict imports the administration of these laws has come under considerable scrutiny many observers are concerned that these laws are being administered in a way which favors u s industries in this paper i attempt to address some of these concerns by determining the extent to which the administration of the u s unfair trade laws is based on the economic criteria specified in the unfair trade legislation in particular this study examines the importance of economic criteria in the antidumping and antisubsidy decisions of the international trade commission itc the itc is one of the most important agencies responsible for administering the u s unfair trade laws and its role extends beyond these laws into other areas including the escape clause the administrative role of the itc in unfair trade cases is to determine whether unfairly traded imports are a cause of material injury to a domestic industry many other authors have examined the basis for itc decisions the results of baldwin 3 and goldstein and lenway 8 provide support for the hypothesis that the itc uses at least some of the legislated economic criteria appropriately both studies examine the escape clause decisions of the itc and find that industries with declining profitability are more likely to receive favorable itc decisions goldstein and lenway 8 also find that the itc is immune to congressional pressures for protection both studies however focus solely on escape clause decisions which represent only a small fraction of itc decisions and do not involve allegations of unfair trade escape clause actions are also different from other itc decisions in that the president must ultimately decide whether relief is warranted

endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets abstract this paper endogenizes the borrowing constraints on capital in a production economy with incomplete markets we find that these limits get looser with income a property that is consistent with us data on credit limits the framework with endogenous limits is then used to study the effects of a revenue neutral tax reform that eliminates capital income taxes our results illustrate that it is very important to take into account the effects of tax policies on the limits throughout the transition these effects can be big enough to change the overall conclusion about the desirability of a tax reform

public provision of private child goods abstract this paper analyzes the public provision of private goods for children in a politico economic model with endogenous fertility the government provides every child with goods that can also be purchased by parents in private markets and the level of provision is determined by majority rule households with many children benefit from the public provision more than those with fewer children thus a political conflict arises between them the distribution of the number of children across households which is a crucial factor for determining which group is politically dominant is endogenously determined by households fertility decision the sequential interaction between fertility and political decisions might lead to multiple equilibria equilibrium with high fertility and low private public spending ratio and equilibrium with low fertility and high private public spending ratio our model could explain the large differences in fertility and structure of child related spending across countries

panel estimates of male female earnings functions this paper applies single and simultaneous equation fixed effects fe and random effects re panel data estimation techniques to obtain male and female earnings function parameters using the panel study of income dynamics psid the paperfinds that earnings appreciation with experience and depreciation with labor market intermittency are comparable for men and women further skill atrophy rates increase not decrease once one controls for heterogeneity and endogeneity finally the unexplained male female wage differential declines from 40 percent to 20 percent when one adjusts for heterogeneity adjusting for endogeneity depends very much on the choice of instruments however when adjusting for endogeneity the gender earnings gap falls and approaches zero percent these results hold for two separate subsamples so that the estimates appear robust independent of sample selectivity

cheap children and the persistence of poverty this paper develops a theory of fertility that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty within and across countries if educated individuals have a comparative advantage in raising educated children then parental fertility choice is shown to give rise to a poverty trap in which the poor choose high fertility rates with low investment in child quality moreover the impact of child quality choice on economic performance is amplified by the diluting effect of higher fertility on physical capital accumulation the theory proposes insights regarding the effects of inequality globalisation and life expectancy on economic growth and demographic transitions this paper develops a theory of fertility and child educational choice that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty within and across countries the joint determination of the quality education and quantity of children in a household is studied under the key assumption that individuals productivity as teachers increases with their own human capital in contrast the minimum time cost associated with raising a child regardless of the child s quality the quantity cost is not affected by parental education as a result the price of child quantity relative to the price of child quality increases with individuals wages in particular for low wage individuals for whom the opportunity cost of time is low children of minimal quality are cheap this assumption therefore generates a comparative advantage for the poor in child quantity whereas high wage educated individuals have a comparative advantage in raising quality children consistent with the well known evidence poor households thus choose relatively high fertility rates with relatively low investment in their offspring s education and therefore their offspring are poor as well in contrast high income families choose low fertility rates with high investment in education and therefore high income persists in the dynasty evidence from the us provided by hanushek 1992 suggests that a trade off between quantity and quality of children does indeed exist hanushek argues that movements in family size could explain over half the variance in some test scores and that the elasticity of achievements with respect to the number of children in the family is 0 03 implying that the annual achievement growth of each child in a family will fall about 2 when a second child is added and about 0 5 when a sixth child is added 1

default and aggregate income abstract this paper studies how default varies with aggregate income we analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed idiosyncratic income by allowing for default default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance default penalties ensure that only these agents default we show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income we provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous

securitized markets international capital flows and global welfare we study the effect of collateralized lending and securitization on the global supply of securitized assets welfare and international net and gross capital flows in a two country general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic investment risk the financial sectors in the two countries home and foreign differ by the collateral requirement for investment loans with home requiring lower margins in autarky home endogenously supplies more assets and enables more risk sharing upon financial integration capital flows from foreign to home leading to lower interest rates and an increase in the global supply of assets foreign enjoys substantial welfare gains through better risk sharing and portfolio reallocation while the welfare experience for home is ambiguous gross capital flows arise when agents face aggregate shocks to the expected payoff to investment projects but can collapse when shocks concern the variance of returns

designing optimal disability insurance a case for asset testing we analyze an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes an optimum is implemented by an asset tested disability system in which a disability transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a specified maximum the logic behind this result is that an agent who plans to falsely claim disability a finds doing so unattractive if he does not adjust his savings and b cannot collect disability insurance if he does adjust his savings in the desired direction upward for a calibrated economy we find that welfare gains from asset testing are significant

the optimum quantity of debt abstract we find that the welfare gains to being at the optimum quantity of debt rather than the current us level are small and therefore concerns regarding the high level of debt in the us economy may be misplaced this finding is based on a model of a large number of infinitely lived households whose saving behavior is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints this model incorporates a different role for government debt than is found in standard models and it captures different cost benefit trade offs on the benefit side government debt enhances the liquidity of households by providing an additional means of smoothing consumption and by effectively loosening borrowing constraints on the cost side the implied taxes have adverse wealth distribution and incentive effects in addition government debt crowds out capital via higher interest rates and lowers per capita consumption

default and punishment in general equilibrium we extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools the equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates along with the usual prices of assets and commodities by reinterpreting the variables our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates it also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets we show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model and that default in conjunction with refinement opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets the market chooses the promises default penalties and quantity constraints of actively traded assets

topping up or opting out the optimal design of public provision schemes there is extensive public provision of private goods in all developed countries the public provision scheme is often designed so that individuals can opt out but not top up supplement the publicly provided quantity quality using an optimal income ta

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

will the stork return to europe and japan understanding fertility within developed nations we seek to explain the differences in fertility rates across high income countries by focusing on the interaction between the increasing status of women in the workforce and their status in the household particularly with regards to child care and home production we observe three distinct phases in women s status generated by the gradual increase in women s workforce opportunities in the earliest phase characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s in the united states women earn low wages relative to men and are expected to shoulder all of the child care at home as a result most women specialize in home production and raising children in an intermediate stage women have improved but not equal labor market opportunities but their household status lags women in this stage are still expected to do the majority of child care and household production increasing access to market work increases the opportunity cost of having children and fertility falls female labor force participation increases working women in this phase of development have the strongest disincentives to having additional children since the entire burden of child care falls on them in the final phase of development women s labor market opportunities begin to equal those of men in addition the increased household bargaining power that comes from more equal wages results in much higher if not gender equal male participation in household production female labor force participation is higher than in the intermediate phase the increased participation of men in the household also reduces the disincentives for women to have additional children and fertility rates rise compared to the intermediate phase the intermediate low fertility phase might describe japan italy and spain in the present day while the scandinavian countries the netherlands and the modern day united states may be entering the final phase after presenting the empirical evidence we predict that high income countries with the lowest fertility rates are likely to see an increase in fertility in the coming decades

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

consumer bankruptcy a fresh start consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck but by driving up interest rates makes life cycle smoothing more difficult we argue that to assess this trade off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features life cycle component idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty and expense uncertainty exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets we find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules more persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect our findings suggest the current us bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values jel d14 d91 k35

welfare implications of the bankruptcy reform act of 1999 abstract in recent years personal bankruptcy has become an important issue to consumers creditors and legislators alike over 40 billion dollars of unsecured debt were discharged in 1998 by 1 44 million households these losses have led legislators to propose a variety of changes in bankruptcy law the most important and recent of which is the bankruptcy reform act of 1999 ba99 i develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of personal bankruptcy to investigate the trade off between the consumption smoothing role of bankruptcy and the interest rate and deadweight costs it imposes i find that stringent means tests would reduce filing rates only slightly and would have only modest welfare consequences on the other hand the elimination of bankruptcy altogether is found to have substantial benefits this result is robust to income shock persistence and to stringency in the application of means tests

the welfare costs of worker displacement abstract recent work has documented the large persistent earnings losses associated with the displacement of high tenure workers in this paper we assess the welfare costs of this risk assuming that workers do not have access to insurance markets we find that the cost is substantial on the same order of magnitude as the cost associated with unemployment risk we also argue that long duration unemployment insurance is likely to exacerbate this cost and that government financed severance payments are a far more effective way of dealing with the displacement risk

public versus private education when differential fertility matters we assess the merits of different education systems in a framework that accounts for the joint decision problem of parents regarding fertility and education specifically we compare the implications of a public and a private schooling regime for economic growth and inequality we find that private schooling leads to higher growth when there is little inequality in human capital endowments across families in contrast when inequality is high public education yields higher growth by reducing fertility differentials in addition public schooling leads to income convergence while private schooling can result in ever increasing inequality our analysis highlights theimp ortanceof accounting for endogenous fertility differentials when analyzing educational policies

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

the rise in the disability rolls and the decline in unemployment between 1984 and 2001 the share of nonelderly adults receiving social security disability insurance income di rose by 60 percent to 5 3 million beneficiaries rapid program growth despite improving aggregate health appears to be explained by reduced screening stringency declining demand for less skilled workers and an unforeseen increase in the earnings replacement rate we estimate that the sum of these forces doubled the labor force exit propensity of displaced high school dropouts after 1984 lowering measured u s unemployment by one half a percentage point steady state calculations augur a further 40 percent increase in the rate of di receipt

a reconsideration of minsky s financial instability hypothesis the worst and longest depressions have tended to occur after periods of prolonged and reasonably stable prosperity this results in part from agents rationally updating their expectations during good times and hence becoming more optimistic about future economic prospects investors then increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that would previously have been considered too risky so when a downturn does eventually occur the financial crisis and the extent of default become more severe whereas a general appreciation of this syndrome dates back to minsky 1992 jerome levy economics institute wp 74 and even beyond to irving fisher 1933 econometrica 1 337 357 we model it formally in addition endogenous default introduces a pecuniary externality since investors do not factor in the impact of their decision to take risk and default on the borrowing cost we explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

efetividade do instrumento antidumping no brasil entre 1990 e 2007 the aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of anti dumping instrument in brazil two aspects the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors and the effects of macroeconomic variables and industry size on the likelihood of petitioner law enforcement antidumping the results showed that macroeconomic variables have no effect on the number of antidumping filings for the brazilian economy from 1990 to 2007 moreover result supports the hypothesis that adverse scenarios in the national economy and the specific characteristics of sectors petitioners for the increased probability of conclude by the application of antidumping law reducing its effectiveness

unsecured debt with public insurance from bad to worse abstract in u s data income interruptions the receipt of public insurance and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related the central contribution of this paper is to evaluate bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other our analysis delivers two striking conclusions first we find that u s personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier that prevents the public insurance system from improving welfare second contrary to popular belief we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more not less bankruptcy

what happens when information leaves a market evidence from postbankruptcy consumers federal law mandates the removal of personal bankruptcies from credit reports after 10 years the removal s effect is market efficiency in reverse the short term effect is a spurious boost in apparent creditworthiness especially for the more creditworthy bankrupts delivering a substantial increase in both credit scores and the number and aggregate limit of bank cards the longer term effect is lower scores and higher delinquency than initial full information scores predict these findings relate to both the debate over the bankruptcy code and the wisdom of influencing market clearing by removing information

demographic change human capital accumulation and r d based growth employing an overlapping generations model of r d based growth with endogenous fertility and education decisions we examine how demographic changes induced by an increase in life expectancy influence the long run growth rate of the economy we demonstrate that life expectancy when relatively low high positively negatively affects economic growth this paper also compares the growth implications of child education subsidy policies i e policies for enhancing basic education and child rearing subsidy policies i e pro natal policies and demonstrate that while the child education subsidies consistently foster economic growth child rearing subsidies may negatively affect economic growth

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

the political economy of administered protection trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by congress though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism in this paper we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the form of the paper is not novel a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty antidumping and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979 this is the period over which the trade act of 1974 was in force because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided

the role of unemployment insurance in an economy with liquidity constraints and moral hazard the potential welfare benefits of unemployment insurance along with the optimal replacement ratio are studied using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model to provide a role for unemployment insurance agents in our economy face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks and are unable to borrow or insure themselves through private markets in the absence of moral hazard replacement ratios as high as 65 are optimal and the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance are quite large however if there is moral hazard and the replacement ratio is not set optimally but is instead set to an empirically plausible value the economy can be much worse off than it would be without unemployment insurance

an evaluation of lender redlining in the allocation of unsecured consumer credit in the us credit discrimination in the us has been a topic of considerable interest over the past few decades this paper examines the lending behaviour of a commercial depository institution with respect to unsecured consumer loans in minority versus non minority us census tracts in contrast to previous studies the data include information about applicants credit scores and marginal exceptions to loan policy in a logit model of the probability of denial no evidence of discrimination is found for overall loans or when an application is turned down even when a minimum credit score is reached the evidence of non discrimination is not as clear for applications that were approved despite falling short of minimum credit scores or applications that barely met the minimum score but were turned down the results suggest that future research on lending discrimination should focus on these marginal exceptions to loan policy

evidence on the insurance effect of bankruptcy exemptions abstract defaulting on one s debts when experiencing an adverse event can help insure households against unexpected income risks but the effect of allowing default on debt levels is ambiguous not least because lenders may restrict access to credit hence the optimal punishment for bankruptcy is unclear the us states allows householders to keep a variety of assets when filing for bankruptcy the bankruptcy exemptions and these exemptions change substantially between states and over time by exploiting these differences this study shows that raising the exemptions i marginally decreases the level of unsecured debt that household s hold ii makes consumption smoother thus despite the effect on debt levels the generous provisions to debtors in arrears may be helping us households to insure themselves against income risk

the impact of consumer credit access on unemployment unemployed households access to unsecured revolving credit more than tripled over the last three decades this article analyses how both cyclical fluctuations and trend increases in credit access impact the business cycle the main quantitative result is that credit expansions and contractions have contributed to moderately deeper and more protracted recessions over the last 40 years as more individuals obtained credit from 1977 to 2010 cyclical credit fluctuations affected a larger share of the population and became more important determinants of employment dynamics even though business cycles are more volatile newborns strictly prefer to live in the economy with growing but fluctuating access to credit markets

the output costs of hard and soft sovereign default abstract how costly are sovereign debt crises in this paper we study output losses during sovereign default and debt renegotiation episodes since 1980 in contrast to previous work we account for the severity of default and not only for its occurrence specifically we distinguish between hard and soft defaults using new data on debtor payment and negotiation behavior and on the size of haircuts towards private external creditors we show that hard defaults are associated with a much steeper drop in gdp of up to ten percent compared to soft defaults the results are consistent with theoretical models assuming proportional output costs of default

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

job search and savings wealth effects and duration dependence this article studies a risk averse worker s optimal savings and job search behavior as she moves back and forth between employment and unemployment we show that job search effort is negatively related to wealth under the assumption of additively separable utility consequently job search exhibits positive unemployment duration dependence because wealth is drawn down to smooth consumption as the spell progresses finally given optimal search savings still provide imperfect insurance against income fluctuations precautionary savings are built up during employment spells and run down during unemployment spells but the consumption path will not be perfectly smooth over states

sovereign debt with heterogeneous creditors we develop a sovereign debt model with heterogeneous creditors private and official where the probability of default depends on both the level and the composition of debt higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives to repay due to more severe sanctions but it is also costly because it lowers the value of the sovereign s default option the model can account for the co existence of private and official lending the time variation in their shares in total debt as well as the low rates charged on both it also produces intertwined default and debt composition choices

household borrowing after personal bankruptcy a large body of literature has examined factors leading to filing for personal bankruptcy but little is known about household borrowing after bankruptcy this paper augments the existing literature with a comprehensive analysis of postbankruptcy borrowing using data from the survey of consumer finances we find that filers generally have more limited access to unsecured credit but borrow more secured debt after bankruptcy than comparable households that have never filed for bankruptcy filers also pay higher interest rates on all types of debt in addition as more time passes after filing credit access and borrowing costs improve however filers remain more prone than comparable nonfilers to experience financial distress accumulate less wealth and use expensive credit sources like payday loans even more than 10 years after filing

macroeconomic determinants of the world trade disputes this article is whether and how the world macroeconomic environments influence the world trade disputes we use two pronged approach first we try to answer the question whether and how global macroeconomic environments are attached to the count of the world trade disputes even if the traditional literature captures it at the national level global picture needs to be completed the second question we address is that given the set of trade dispute initiating countries whether and how differently high middle and low income countries respond to their macroeconomic environments in their decision makings of trade disputes initiations the universe in the second question is a selected set of the filing countries only not all countries on this planet one can capture the behaviours of the countries involved in the trade disputes under certain macroeconomic circumstances the period is from 1995 to 2008 covering all records of trade disputes since the birth of the world trade organization wto

consumption smoothing in island economies can public insurance reduce welfare abstract in this paper we study the effects of certain types of public compulsory insurance arrangements for aggregate shocks on private allocations in environments with limited commitment we show that this type of insurance can improve the wellbeing of private situations but it can also deteriorate it we also describe how different characteristics of the environment affect the role of public insurance using data on the mexican progresa program we document the impact that some government programs have in crowding out private transfers

firm participation in steel industry lobbying firm participation in steel industry lobbying i introduction what are the causes of recent protectionist pressure exerted by u s import competing firms studies by coughlin terza and khalifah 1989 feigenbaum and willett 1985 and takacs 1981 examine the empirical relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the aggregate frequency of escape clause petitions file by u s manufacturing firms although the results are mixed as to whether international macroeconomic performance influences the demand for protection the studies indicate that domestic macroeconomic conditions significantly influence the frequency of escape clause petitions 1 as important as these are to understanding the underlying sources of protectionist pressure they do not address another equally important aspect of protectionist pressure the determinants of a single industry s demand for protection the fact that most protectionist pressure results from actions taken by individual industries underscores the importance of understanding the determinants of industry pressure indeed most trade legislation is designed to respond to the problems of individuals sectors of the economy in this paper we empirically examine the microeconomic determinants of the protectionist pressure exerted by the u s steel industry in antidumping and countervailing duty cases from 1982 after the trigger price mechanism was abolished to 1986 the steel industry is a particularly attractive subject for empirical analysis since no other industry pushed more aggressively for protection during the 1980s in recognizing that the degree of pressure exerted by an industry is the aggregate result of decisions made by individual firms to contribute to a collective action the microeconomic approach offers two advantages over previous studies 2 first to explain industry pressure we model the decision of the representative firm taking into account the incentives that a firm faces in a collective setting for example we recognize that the benefits of antidumping and countervailing duties have characteristics of a public good so that individual firms may have an incentive to free ride a proposition supported by the empirical results second we specify microeconomic variables that reflect the economic conditions facing the representative firm in the steel industry rather than macroeconomic variables which may not accurately measure the economic performance of specific industries or the international pressures they face in contrast to previous studies which found a significant relationship between macroeconomic performance and aggregate pressure we do not find that the steel industry s economic performance influences the degree of industry pressure our second objective is to examine the policy implications of free riding by testing the relationship between the effectiveness of a coalition of firms and the degree of protection actually received if an effective coalition of firms can influence the policy outcome then antidumping and countervailing duties are more likely to be provided to segments of the steel industry that can minimize the free rider problem since these segments are not necessarily those that absorb the greatest injury u s trade policy may not be meeting its goal of providing greater relief to firms most injured by dumped or subsidized imports the results confirm the proposition that segments of the steel industry which are injured by dumped or subsidized imports and which can organize an effective coalition do in fact receive greater protection than those segments that are merely injured ii the representative firm s decision to contribute to a less than fair value action to obtain protection from alleged less than fair value lfv imports imports that are either dumped by foreign firms or subsidized by foreign governments firms representing a domestic industry must file a complaint of foreign dumping or export subsidization with the international trade administration ita which then determines the magniture of dumping or subsidization

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

injury based protection with auditing under imperfect information 1 introduction this article focuses on the use of signals to limit distortionary protection when a domestic firm has private information about injury from foreign competition we assume that a domestic authority is mandated to use trade policy to maintain domestic production while minimizing costs to domestic consumers the presence of asymmetric information about domestic production costs means that the firm will have an incentive to overstate the harm it is suffering from imports we analyze how the authority can use an incentive device to punish a firm if a costly audit determines that the firm has overstated its injury an incentive compatible mechanism is derived consisting of a probability of audit a tariff and a penalty that will insure that the firm does not retain informational rents associated with the private information this basic problem of an authority assessing domestic injury arises in a number of critical trade policy contexts the two most prominent examples in the world trade organization wto system are safeguard mechanisms and unfair trade remedies i e antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in both types of administered protection cases a domestic trade authority must determine whether injury beyond some critical level has occurred before wto consistent protection can be imposed the information used to evaluate injury is provided by the affected domestic industry which has an obvious incentive to overstate the harm caused by foreign competition given that these types of contingent protection procedures are the single most important form of protection under the wto system potential misuse of private information is of great importance there are two strands of relevant literature the first considers strategic behavior in the specific context of administered protection the second concerns information asymmetries in more general trade policy outcomes the former strand has focused on strategic behavior between firms to exploit administered protection procedures prusa 1992 shows how antidumping cases in home and foreign firms can manipulate contingent protection to enforce collusion staiger and wolak 1991 study how antidumping acts as a cartel enforcing device in a noncooperative infinitely repeated game framework in a two period noncooperative game framework with uncertainty prusa 1994 shows that the home firm might feign first period injury in order to get the protection in the second period this may induce foreign firms to raise their export prices and to lower their own domestic market price as shown by fischer 1992 firms will try to act strategically to increase the endogenous probability of protection leidy and hoekman 1991 and leidy 1994 extend this concept more broadly to contingent protection and call it spurious injury the second strand of the literature focuses more broadly on incomplete information in trade policy collie and hviid 1994 investigate rent extraction from a foreign monopolist with incomplete information about domestic demand qiu 1994 and brainard and martimort 1997 investigate strategic trade policy with incomplete information about the domestic cournot firm s costs herander and kamp 1999 consider how incomplete information about the domestic cost structure can affect the outcomes of quantitative restrictions while collie and hviid 1994 herander and kamp 1999 and qiu 1994 use a signaling game framework brainard and martimort 1997 develop their approach within an incentive contracts context this article s approach is based on both incentives and signals we follow partially the approach of kohler and moore 1998 who analyze the same information asymmetries but use transfers to the domestic firm to elicit truth telling the present analysis takes perhaps a more realistic tack by considering how an authority can audit information provided by the firm to eliminate misrepresentation of injury

the household bankruptcy decision personal bankruptcy filings have risen from 0 3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1 35 percent in 1998 and 1999 transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event lenders lost about 39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy filings but economists have little understanding of why households file for bankruptcy or why filings have increased so rapidly until very recently studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult because no household level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings in this paper we use new data from the panel study of income dynamics which includes information on bankruptcy filings to estimate a model of households bankruptcy decisions we find support for the strategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households are more likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher our model predicts that an increase of 1 000 in households financial benefit from bankruptcy would result in a 7 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings our model also predicts that if the 1997 national bankruptcy review commission s proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented there would be a 16 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings each year but if the 100 000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the u s senate were adopted our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of filings we find little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households file when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay finally controlling for state and time fixed effects our model shows that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate filing rates

the macroeconomics of child labor regulation we develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences and multiple steady states can arise the introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill biased technological change which induces parents to choose smaller families the theory can account for the observation that in britain regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality and coincided with rapid fertility decline

household debt repayment behaviour what role do institutions play despite the lively policy debate on rising household debt arrears and personal bankruptcy filings there is relatively little empirical evidence on the determinants of households debt repayment behaviour or on the incidence of arrears even less is known about how arrears compare between countries although debt levels are known to vary widely using data from the european community household panel we first show that arrears are frequently associated with subsequent adverse consequences such as future unemployment or bad health second we find that arrears are often precipitated by an adverse shock to the household s income or health but that there are large differences between countries in how households react to these events finally we show that these differences can be partly explained by local financial and judicial institutions as captured by contract enforcement and information sharing indicators in other words we show that while adverse shocks are highly important the extent to which they affect repayment behaviour depends crucially on the penalty for defaulting this finding suggests that although repayment problems often arise from a genuine inability to repay some households seem to behave strategically burcu duygan bump and charles grant

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

efficiency and the role of default when security markets are incomplete this paper argues that default plays an important positive role in the economy if markets are incomplete and traders are only able to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute regardless of future events contingent contracting may be severely restricted moreover opening new markets may not relieve these restrictions default promotes efficiency in a way that opening new markets does not by making it possible for traders to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute with high probability but not with certainty copyright 1993 by american economic association

personal bankruptcy law debt portfolios and entrepreneurship bankruptcy provides entrepreneurs with insurance against the financial consequences of failure at the cost of worsened credit conditions using a quantitative general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship we show that the presence of secured credit in addition to unsecured credit substantially alters this trade off if secured credit is not available the optimal bankruptcy law is harsh since the negative effect dominates if secured credit is available the optimal law is lenient since entrepreneurs rationed out of the unsecured credit market can still obtain secured credit lowering the costs of worse credit conditions we find significant welfare gains from reforming the law

majority rule and the public provision of a private good this paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good health care

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

population technology and growth from malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond this paper develops a unied growth model that captures the historical evolution of population technology and output it encompasses theendogenous transitionbetween three regimes that have characterized economic development the economy evolves from amalthusianregime wheretechnologicalprogressis slow andpopulationgrowthprevents anysustainedriseinincomepercapita intoapost malthusianregime wheretechnological progress rises and population growth absorbs only part of output growth ultimately a demographic transition reverses the positive relationship between income and population growth andtheeconomyentersamoderngrowthregimewithreducedpopulationgrowth

unemployment insurance and capital accumulation abstract in this paper i examine a model economy with production search and unemployment insurance the introduction of capital into the economy of wang and williamson j monetary econom 49 7 2001 1337 generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero the result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise unlike most of the literature i compute explicitly the cost of the transition path agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path i then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios

inequality and growth why differential fertility matters we argue that inequality and growth are linked through differential fertility and the accumulation of human capital we build an overlapping generations model in which dynasties differ in their initial endowment with human capital growth the income distribution and fertility are endogenous due to a quantiy quality tradeoff families with less human capital decide to have more children and invest less in education when initial inequality is high large fertility differentials lower the growth rate of average human capital since poor families who invest little in education make up a large fraction of the population in the next generation a calibrated model shows that this fertility differential effect is quantitatively important we also provide empirical evidence to confirm the links between inequality differential fertility and growth suggested by the model

the risk free rate in heterogeneous agent incomplete insurance economies abstract why has the average real risk free interest rate been less than one percent the question is motivated by the failure of a class of calibrated representative agent economies to explain the average return to equity and risk free debt i construct an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and smooth consumption by holding a risk free asset i calibrate the economy and characterize equilibria computationally with a borrowing constraint of one year s income the resulting risk free rate is more than one percent below the rate in the comparable representative agent economy

default insurance and debt over the life cycle abstract the widespread use of debt and default suggests that unsecured credit markets play an important role in consumption smoothing in this paper i address two previously unanswered questions first how does policy towards debt default affect the evolution of consumption and net worth over the life cycle second how does debt default policy interact with social insurance over the life cycle the findings are as follows first us default policy appears lax in the sense that it creates severe credit constraints especially for the young second eliminating default will lower consumption inequality among the young but will increase it among the old third social insurance alters default risk and in turn loan pricing and therefore matters for purely intertemporal smoothing

redistributive taxation and personal bankruptcy in u s states abstract personal bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers vary considerably across u s states and over time our hypothesis is that both policies are imperfect substitutes in insuring consumption of risk averse agents in incomplete markets exploiting data variation over time for 18 u s states for the period 1980 2003 we find considerable support for this hypothesis redistributive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions are negatively correlated and both policies are associated with more equal consumption growth

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

trade credit in zimbabwean manufacturing abstract credit from suppliers is an important but often neglected source of finance for manufacturing firms zimbabwe is no exception unlike credit from financial institutions trade credit does not rely on formal collateral but on trust and reputation contract enforcement is flexible network effects and statistical discrimination affect the screening of trade credit applicants black entrepreneurs are disadvantaged by their lack of business contacts and by the difficulty of distinguishing themselves from the mass of financially insecure and short lived african owned businesses in zimbabwe a vicious circle is created between weak financial base unreliability as a debtor and inability to gain access to credit