wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

wage profiles and imperfect capital markets a positive analysis this paper examines the structure of long term employment contracts when labor is mobile and risk averse employers are unable to monitor workers outside job offers workers cannot borrow against future income and workers productivity is increasing in the length of service with the long term employer workers are then liquidity constrained and the contract trades off consumption smoothing against efficiency in turnover in contrast to previous papers which have examined this problem this paper provides a continuous time formulation that permits a detailed characterization of the properties of the wage profile

strategic labour contracts labor contracts affect a firm s cost function and for this reason they can be used as a recommitment device to gain a strategic advantage against other firms in a model that is otherwise neutral it is found that if firms compete in prices then strategic considerations alone yield results similar to those obtained by c azariadis 1983 workers are underemployed and worse off in more adverse states of nature on the other hand if firms compete in quantities then the equilibrium contracts resemble those of j green and c kahn 1983 workers are overemployed and better off in more adverse states

monotone stochastic choice models the case of risk and time preferences suppose that when evaluating two alternatives x and y by means of a parametric utility function low values of the parameter indicate a preference for x and high values indicate a preference for y

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

optimal labour contracts when workers have a variety of privately observed reservation wages if a firm does not know the individual ex post outside opportunities of its contracted workforce then it can use hours wages and redundancy payments to screen them will a second best contract have underemployment inefficiency or overemployment and with a stochastic contract are those workers randomly selected for layoff worse off than their retained colleagues involuntary layoff or vice versa involuntary retention the answers depend on the nature of the workers preferences two polar cases are looked at corresponding to permanent and temporary layoff the former is characterized by overemployment and involuntary retention the latter by underemployment and involuntary layoff also examined are simple contracts where all retained workers are paid a common wage and all laid off workers receive a common redundancy payment handling asymmetric information in stochastic contracts has led to two technical innovations first a number of results are proved even though all the truth telling constraints are explicitly included second a new regularity condition is found under which the local constraints are sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility at an optimum

the incentive implications of incomplete insurance the multiplicative case abstract when states of nature are not completely verifiable and payments in a pareto efficient insurance scheme contribute multiplicatively to wealth the insured may be better off in the insured against event depending upon the behavior of relative risk aversion

optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints abstract consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk averse employees if the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states relative to full information efficiency such contracts either yield underemployment in all states or excessively high variability in employment

does consumer sentiment forecast household spending if so why in the three months following the iraqi invasion of kuwait the university of michigan s index of consumer sentiment ics fell an unprecedented 24 3 index points to its lowest level since the 1981 1982 recession this collapse in household confidence became the focus of a great deal of economic commentary and indeed frequently was cited as an important if not the leading cause of the economic slowdown that ensued concern was fueled by the well known contemporaneous correlation between the ics and the growth of household spending figure 1 shows quarterly averages of the index 1978 1993 together with the quarterly growth in real personal consumption expenditures as measured in the national income accounts bureau of economic analysis the correlation is impressive of course it is not surprising that sentiment and the growth of spending are positively correlated this correlation may simply reflect that when economic prospects are poor households curtail their spending and also give gloomy responses to interviewers thus the contemporaneous correlation between sentiment and spending does not refute traditional life cycle or permanentincome models of consumption nor does it necessarily make the job of forecasting changes in consumption any easier from the point of view of an economic forecaster the questions of interest are first whether an index of consumer sentiment has any predictive power on its own for future changes in consumption spending and second whether it contains information about future changes in consumer spending aside from the information contained in other available indicators in section i we present evidence that the answer to the first question is a clear yes we find that lagged values of the ics taken on their own explain about 14 percent of the variation in the growth of total real personal consumption expenditures over the post1954 period further investigation shows that the answer to the second question is probably yes as well though here the margin is narrower and the evidence more murky the ics contributes about 3 percent to the r2 of a simple reduced form equation for total personal consumption expenditures in the longer of the two sample periods we examine but nothing in the shorter sample period though the latter result is heavily influenced by the observation for 1980 2 for the major subcategories of spending the contribution generally ranges between 1 percent and 8 percent overall we read the evidence as pointing toward at least some significant incremental explanatory power therefore we take as given for the remainder of the paper that sentiment forecasts spending and we turn to the issue of how that statistical relationship should be interpreted one possible interpretation is that sentiment is an independent driving factor in the economy and that changes in carroll division of research and statistics stop 80 federal reserve board washington dc 20551 fuhrer research department federal reserve bank of boston boston ma 02106 wilcox division of monetary affairs stop 71 federal reserve board washington dc 20551 we have benefited from the research assistance of stephen helwig and christopher geczy and the comments of an anonymous referee the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not of the federal reserve board the federal reserve bank of boston or the other members of the staff of either institution ithe conference board s consumer confidence index also plunged at the same time

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

bumping layoffs and worksharing this paper deals with an interesting but often neglected labor practice prevalent in large north american firms with well developed internal labor markets large north american firms typically respond to a decline in demand for their products by first reducing the number of hours worked or worksharing as the demand continues to fall however they begin to make skilled workers bump onto unskilled jobs displacing unskilled workers skilled workers are laid off only after a considerable number have bumped i develop an implicit contract model and explain the practice

liquidity constrained employment contracts abstract kahn and scheinkman 1985 have shown that optimal contracting between risk averse workers and risk neutral but liquidity constrained firms results in underemployment if firms have better information than workers this result is extended here by allowing the firm to divide its wealth between capital and liquid assets so that liquidity is a choice variable the firm generally chooses a portfolio under which it is optimal not to choose the risk neutral i e expected profit maximizing employment contract the underemployment result is thereby shown not to be strongly dependent on the choice of parameters

conformity replication of design and business niches conformity affects the choice and design of organizations conformists replicate successful strategies play along with the rules of the game and display inert behavior conformity leads to the dominance of one mode the combined impact of conformity and inertia and the existence of employment costs switching costs and network externalities may exclude equally or superior efficient modes from replacing the incumbent mode the first mover unable to overcome these barriers to entry efficient maverick organizations are forced into niches this is illustrated with respect to niches formed by labor managed firms and ethnic businesses

involuntary employment in contracts with risky job search involuntary employment in contracts with risky job search the implications of partially insurable job search risk for incentive compatibility in a standard contracting framework are explored when unemployment spells provoke job search workers face risk in spell duration and reemployment wages when search effort is not variable contracts including unemployment insurance will yield involuntary employment when search effort is diminished by ui benefits firms shift some compensation back to wages increasing the relative attractiveness of employment the analysis begins with a theorem on incomplete insurance by imai geanakoplos and ito 1981 for which a simple proof and economic intuition are provided i introduction in seminal models of contingent labor contracts azariadis 1975 and baily 1974 sought to explain the behavior of wages and employment over the business cycle much of the subsequent literature for example grossman and hart 1983 and hart 1983 has been devoted to exploring the impact of asymmetric information on such properties of contracting equilibria as over or underemployment wage flexibility and whether or not utility falls when a worker is fired this paper looks at the effects on contingent labor contracts of the asymmetry in risk faced on the one hand by workers who being laid off when the contract is implemented experience job search risk which is partially uninsured due to asymmetric information and on the other hand by workers who retaining their jobs return to a known status quo for the rest of the period in most contingent contracting models all relevant information about the prevailing state of nature is revealed at once and wage and employment levels are then determined once the contract is implemented there is no residual uncertainty this sequence of events agreement upon a contingent contract resolution of uncertainty determination of wages and employment is a reasonable approximation to the experience of workers who retain their jobs since they know their wages and their working conditions workers who are laid off however often face considerable risk over the effectiveness of job search and the terms of future employment this creates an asymmetry in the riskiness of the ex post outcomes of the contract job retention means no more uncertainty within the period while layoff entails further within period risk associated with job search and reemployment while severance pay or unemployment benefits can reduce some of the uncertainty associated with job loss they will not generally provide complete insurance this is because the intensity of job search and the arrival of job offers are private information since the firm cannot verify for example the intensity of job search it will insist that the worker bear some of the risk associated with the search s outcome this is a standard principal agent problem see for example shavell 1979 equilibrium labor contracts will therefore offer workers a gamble between job retention with no residual risk and layoff with some uninsured job search risk 1 this asymmetry in residual risk affects the contingent contracts workers enter into for example if workers feel more comfortable facing a given risk when their incomes are higher the residual risk associated with layoff may lead them to accept lower contingent wages in the employed state in exchange for greater severance pay when laid off a problem with this kind of modification of the standard contract i e one with no residual risk is that if enough compensation is shifted into the unemployed state expected utility may actually be higher for laid off workers than for those who are retained this is a situation with voluntary layoffs and involuntary employment at prevailing wages retained workers would rather be laid off if workers can increase their chances of being fired by behaving unproductively involuntary employment contracts may be unenforceable

labor contracts in a model of imperfect competition we propose a definition of involuntary unemployment which differs from that traditionally used in implicit labor contract theory we say that a worker is involuntarily unemployed if the marginal wage implied by the optimal contract exceeds the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption we construct a model where risk neutral firms have monopoly power and show that such monopoly power is necessary for involuntary unemployment to arise in the optimal contract we numerically compute examples and show that such unemployment occurs for a wide range of parameter values

entry deterrence under trade unions this paper argues for the integration of labor unions in the analysis of industrial organization such a linkage is important for at least two reasons first unions are often concentrated in big firms which tend in general to face an imperfectly competitive environment in their product markets second unions are usually able to extract in the form of higher wages some rents which result from the market power of firms see for example freeman and medoff 1984 on the impact of unions on firm profitability in the u s a firms should thus take union behavior into account and in particular realize that strategies toward rival firms will tend to affect unions ability to extract rents we illustrate here the impact of unions in industrial organization by focusing on the topic of entry deterrence ed in section 2 we first argue that unions tend to lower the profitability of two standard widely studied ed strategies limit pricing under incomplete information and the use of sunk costs section 3 then turns to union contracts as a possible alternative ed strategy available to incumbent tirms finally section 4 assesses the welfare impact of unions in these settings while section 5 suggests directions for research

evaluating federal reserve predictions of growth in consumer spending this study shows that federal reserve forecasts of growth in both total consumption and durable spending are generally rational under asymmetric loss and the forecasts of growth in nondurable services spending while unbiased biased fail to be rational yet these forecasts are all directionally accurate the forecasts of growth in total consumption durable and services spending are more less accurate in predicting the downward upward moves and are thus of value when policymakers assign more less cost to incorrect downward upward predictions the forecasts of growth in nondurable spending are equally accurate in predicting the downward and upward moves and are thus of value when policymakers assign similar cost to both incorrect downward and upward predictions utilizing survey data to measure the private forecasts we further provide partial support for the asymmetric information hypothesis that the federal reserve has useful information about the state of the economy that is not known by

the usefulness of consumer confidence in forecasting household spending in canada a national and regional analysis i introduction in 1960 the conference board of canada launched its series of quarterly surveys of consumer attitudes since then the results of these surveys have provided policy makers economic forecasters and business managers with useful information on future economic trends the increasing demand for the survey results both by the public and the business sectors as well as the expanding coverage given to them in the media appear to confirm their popularity and usefulness to better gauge consumer sentiment the conference board of canada also designed the index of consumer attitudes ica for the entire nation as well as for the five canadian regions the atlantic provinces quebec ontario the prairies and british columbia 1 the ica is derived from answers to four attitudinal questions contained in the survey of consumer attitudes because two of these four questions relate to the respondent family s economic prospects over the next six months and to the employment prospects for the community over the next six months the index is widely thought to reflect consumer expectations with respect to future economic conditions which in turn would influence consumption behavior a number of empirical studies have investigated the effectiveness of indices of consumer confidence as leading indicators of consumer spending in canada an early paper by shapiro and angevine 1969 finds that the composite index of consumer mood derived from the financial post s quarterly survey of consumer buying intentions is a very useful tool for predicting consumer spending on durable goods 2 in a follow up study angevine 1974 also finds that measures of consumer mood based on the financial post s survey are statistically significant explanatory variables for three consumption categories nondurable goods semidurable goods and services rayfuse 1982 reports that consumer sentiment as captured by the ica tends to lead movements in consumer expenditures on durable goods by one quarter 3 more recently cote and johnson 1998 examine whether the ica improves the fit of a consumption equation that includes other macroeconomic variables they find that inclusion of the ica improves the explained variation in growth in consumer expenditures per capita by 18 percentage points 4 the purpose of our article is to provide a fresh empirical perspective on the effect of consumer confidence on household spending in canada although past studies confine their attention to national data the present investigation examines the ability of the ica as well as the individual attitudinal questions used in the survey to forecast canadian household spending not only nationwide but also at a regional level to our knowledge our study represents the first endeavor in the literature to assess the usefulness of regional consumer confidence indices in forecasting household spending our work also employs significantly extended time series for the various components of consumer expenditure used in previous canadian studies employing the results of the conference board of canada s survey of consumer attitudes for the sample period 1979q4 2001q4 our empirical findings indicate that at the national level the ica is a reliable predictor of total personal consumption expenditures as well as of various subcategories of consumer spending in the presence of control variables on the other hand our regional results are quite diverse suggesting that economic fore casters and government policy makers should be cautious about using regional confidence indicators to predict consumption growth the remainder of this article is structured as follows section ii describes the four attitudinal questions used in the construction of the ica at both the national and the regional levels section iii discusses the econometric methodology and the data employed in our empirical analysis section iv reports the correlations between growth in total personal consumption expenditures pce and the contemporaneous ica as well as the different lags of the ica

rational and adaptive performance expectations in a customer satisfaction framework this article develops and tests alternative models of market level expectations perceived product performance and customer satisfaction market performance expectations are argued to be largely rational in nature yet adaptive to changing market conditions customer satisfaction is conceptualized as a cumulative construct that is affected by market expectations and performance perceptions in any given period and is affected by past satisfaction from period to period an empirical study that supports adaptive market expectations and stable market satisfaction using data from the swedish customer satisfaction barometer is reported

efficient contracts with costly adjustment short run employment determination for airline mechanics this paper presents an empirical analysis of firm specific employment and wage outcomes for mechanics in the domestic airlines industry a dynamic contracting model is presented that incorporates both costly employment adjustment and potential gaps between contract wage rates and the opportunity value of workers time the model gives a useful description of the employment output linkage in the data but is less successful in capturing the dynamic relation between employment contract wage rates and wage rates outside the airline industry copyright 1986 by american economic association

wage rigidity implicit contracts unemployment and economic efficiency standard implicit contract theory can explain wage rigidity but not unemployment and pays insufficient attention to the general equilibrium aspects and constraints limiting the set of feasible contracts implicit contracts must specify an enforcement mechanism can only be conditional on observable information and must be of limited complexity without these restrictions contracts generate full employment which is constrained inefficient natural restrictions on enforceability or complexity alone do not produce unemployment though limited observability may with two or more restrictions unemployment may result specifically periodic unemployment can arise if contracts are of limited complexity and cannot be enforced through third parties copyright 1987 by royal economic society

forecasting consumption the role of consumer confidence in real time with many predictors summary we study the role of consumer confidence in forecasting real personal consumption expenditure and contribute to the extant literature in three substantive ways first we re examine existing empirical models of consumption and consumer confidence not only at the quarterly frequency but using monthly data as well second we employ real time data in addition to commonly used revised vintages third we investigate the role of consumer confidence in a rich information context we produce forecasts of consumption expenditures with and without consumer confidence measures using a dynamic factor model and a large real time jagged edge dataset in a robust way we establish the important role of confidence surveys in improving the accuracy of consumption forecasts manifesting primarily through the services component during the recession of 2007 2009 sentiment is found to have a more pervasive effect on all components of aggregate consumption durables non durables and services copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

incomplete insurance and absolute risk aversion abstract suppose that a subset of states of nature are not verifiable individually given an optimal feasible insurance scheme the expected utility across a group of unverifiable states is greater less than that of a verifiable state if the degree of absolute risk aversion is decreasing increasing

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

directional forecasts of gdp and inflation a joint evaluation with an application to federal reserve predictions many studies have undertaken separate analyses of the fed s forecasts of real gross domestic product gdp growth and inflation this article presents a method for jointly evaluating the direction of change predictions of these variables we conclude that some of the inflation forecasts examined separately were not valuable however the joint pattern of gdp and inflation projections was generally in accord with the economy s movements directional forecasting is now an increasingly popular metric for forecasting performance pesaran and timmermann 2004 414

does customer satisfaction have directional predictability for u s discretionary spending abstractresearch indicates that past growth in customer satisfaction is an important factor in explaining the in sample behaviour of growth in discretionary spending motivated by such evidence we take an out of sample forecasting approach to examine whether customer satisfaction has directional predictability for two types of discretionary spending these include spending on motor vehicles and spending on recreation services which display frequent negative growth for the period 1995 2015 our results indicate that customer satisfaction accurately predicts the direction of change in both types of spending under symmetric loss to augment we further show that the widely reported consumer sentiment has no directional predictability for either types of discretionary spending

credit rationing and implicit contract theory an empirical study abstract this paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing the empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements this implies that commercial banks in japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations however the evidence does not support the view that japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of fried and howitt 1980 furthermore the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts these empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members

on modelling the natural rate of unemployment with indivisible labour this analysis investigates modelling the natural rate of unemployment in settings where labour s utilization has some lumpy aspect to it specifically the introduction of various nonconvexities into tastes and technology lead to unemploy ment in general equilibrium equilibria can emerge where 1 those currently unemployed have higher probabilities of being unemployed in the future than those currently employed 2 some agents are jobless while others work overtime and 3 seniority rules seemingly arise whereby old workers cannot be laid off so long as either new workers are being hired or some workers are doing overtime the relative welfare levels of employed and unemployed agents are analysed

involuntary unemployment and worker moral hazard this paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance in repeated moral hazard situations workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance contingent however the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances the theory of implicit labour contracts as developed over the past decade has thrown considerable light on the nature of long term employment relationships by emphasizing that firm owners are usually less risk averse than workers and thus have an incentive to insure workers against fluctuations in the demand for the firm s product the theory manages to explain the emergence of long term contracts characterized by downward real wage rigidity see holmstrom 1983 however the theory also typically implies that workers will be indifferent about whether they are to be retained or laid off this runs contrary to the common observation that there is an element of involuntariness in layoff decisions i e within any job category with given skill and performance history if a proportion of randomly chosen workers are to be laid off in a recession the laid off workers would strictly prefer to be retained not only is this phenomenon of involuntary layoffs interesting to explain per se it also seems relevant to the keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment interpreted as unequal treatment of similar workers where some are employed while others are not and unemployed workers would strictly prefer to be employed it thus seems worthwhile to examine if the theory of implicit contracts can be extended to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily as a test of its plausibility and as a possible source of a consistent microfoundation for keynesian propositions to explain why the firm does not insure workers against the risk associated with selection of those to be laid off it is natural to think of possible informational asymmetries this has been attempted by geanakoplos and ito 1981 and moore 1985 geanakoplos and ito introduce the realistic feature that a firm does not observe spot market opportunities available ex post to a laid off worker this permits only incomplete insurance against the risk of layoff however their model produces the paradoxical conclusion that with decreasing absolute risk aversion workers strictly prefer ex ante being laid off moore allows workers to have better ex ante information about their spot market opportunities but finds a similar tendency toward involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that firms cannot perfectly observe effort decisions of employed workers and use the threat of involuntary layoff as a discipline device the analysis of stiglitz and weiss 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and singh 1982 of principal agent relations in the absence of demand fluctuations suggests that the threat of contract termination may be used as an incentive device in their models

the effect of customer satisfaction on consumer spending growth abstract predicting aggregate consumer spending is vitally important to marketing planning yet traditional economic theory holds that predicting changes in aggregate consumer spending is not possible previous attempts to predict consumer spending growth using standard macroeconomic predictor variables have met with little success the authors show that the lagged change in customer satisfaction which contributes to future demand has a significant impact on spending growth however this impact is moderated by increases in consumers debt service ratio a key budget constraint that affects consumers ability to spend using an asymmetric growth model more than 23 of the variation in the one quarter ahead spending growth is explained which represents a notable improvement over prior specifications

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

job search and the duration of layoff unemployment this paper derives an optimal job searching strategy for workers on layoff and an optimal recall policy for firms when each side anticipates the other side s actions correctly it shows that workers search for an alternative job only if the probability of recall falls below a critical level and that firms may recall before the recovery of demand depending on the costs of laying off and hiring workers and the probability of losing workers on layoff through the use of optimal job searching and recall policies the paper derives expressions for the duration of layoff unemployment and discusses briefly their comparative static properties

why not cut pay abstract i interviewed over 300 business people labor leaders business consultants and counselors of unemployed people all in the northeast of the united states during the recession of the early 1990 s in order to learn why wages and salaries declined in only a few firms employers were reluctant to cut pay because they believed doing so would hurt employee morale leading to lower productivity and current or future difficulties with hiring and retention it was thought that these effects would in the end cost more than the savings from lower pay there were few indications that unemployed people had excessive wage expectations on the contrary many unemployed were too flexible and found themselves rejected by firms as overqualified in most companies pay cuts were not a useful alternative to layoffs because pay cuts would not make it worthwhile to retain many employees and because layoffs harmed morale less than would pay cuts the findings support none of the theories of wage rigidity except those of solow and akerlof that emphasize morale

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

labor contracts with voluntary quits this paper considers labor contracts between the risk neutral firm and risk averse workers with heterogeneous outside opportunities alternative wages which become known to the worker after a costly on the job search in the case of a deterministic alternative wage self selection over a menu of contract wages would achieve the first best contract if the alternative wages are stochastic the second best contract emerges as a trade off between productive efficiency and risk sharing workers who voluntarily search are fewer and workers who search are less likely to quit if the search effort is not monitored even fewer workers search

job search and implicit contracts a model incorporating costly search and implicit contracts is examined the contracts differ from those studied in the traditional literature by allowing for both temporary and permanent layoffs a natural rate of unemployment is determined and comparative statics analysis shows that changes in the utility value of leisure in the cost of search and in the dispersion of prices each have an ambiguous effect on this natural rate

an equilibrium model of quits under optimal contracting abstract this article develops an equilibrium model of quits in a labor market and examines the effect of contracting under asymmetric information when compared with symmetric information and noncontractual base lines we demonstrate that quits increase in periods of high output without postulating exogenous price rigidity

on the dynamics of u s consumer sentiment and economic policy assessment abstractwe utilize the michigan surveys of consumers data to first investigate the dynamic relationship between consumers assessment of current and future economic conditions index of current economic conditions icc and index of consumer expectations ice and then examine how these assessments are influenced by deterioration improvement in consumers appraisal of economic policies of the government gp we further assess how deterioration improvement in icc and ice influences gp for 1978 2015 our findings first indicate that icc and ice are cointegrated and both respond to disequilibrium to restore the long run equilibrium relationship second deterioration in gp results in deterioration in both icc and ice improvement in gp however results in improvement in ice with no impact on icc third deterioration in both icc and ice results in deterioration in gp improvement in ice results in improvement in gp but improvement in icc has no impact on gp the observed asymmetries are in line with n

asymmetric information bargaining and unemployment fluctuations we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where wages are determined by bilateral bargaining and the firm has superior information the asymmetry of information introduces unemployment fluctuations and dynamic wage sluggishness because the information of the firm is only revealed gradually wages fall slowly in response to a negative shock and unemployment exhibits additional persistence it is shown that high job destruction will generally be followed by a period of higher than average job destruction that the presence of common shocks introduces an informational externality and that bargaining is an inefficient method of wage determination as compared to implicit contracts

a characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information abstract employment distortions are characterized for different combinations of firm s risk aversion and the degree of normality of leisure in worker s preferences using a novel method all previously established results are derived and the previously unresolved cases are worked out

risk aversion and the choice between risky prospects the preservation of comparative statics results most results in what can be termed the comparative statics of risk aversion are obtained when there is only one source of uncertainty the primary example which originally motivated the definition of risk aversion is that more risk averse people are willing to pay a higher premium for insuring against risk it is known that the results do not generally carry over when there is another source of uncertainty the paper develops conditions under which comparative statics results are robust against the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty

financial capacity and output fluctuations in an economy with multi period financial relationships this paper motivates a financial propagation mechanism in the context of an intertemporal production economy with asymmetric information and with borrowers and lenders who enter multi period financial relationships a key feature is that aggregate output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity which in turn may constrain current production especially in bad times a small but persistent shift in aggregate conditions may have a large impact on financial capacity making the framework capable of motivating large endogenous fluctuations in financial constraints understanding how small disturbances can induce large output fluctuations is an on going quest in macroeconomics this paper develops a simple framework in which shifts in aggregate economic fundamentals are amplified through their impact on financial conditions a distinguishing feature is that output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity and financial capacity may constrain current production especially in bad times a number of recent papers have resurrected the view that financial factors may play a part in propagating business fluctuations the underlying theories exploit the idea that with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders agency costs may drive the price of uncollateralized external funds above the price of internal funds in this kind of setting a borrower s financial position is a key determinant of the terms of credit she faces in the aggregate swings in borrower balance sheets over the cycle amplify fluctuations in investment and output essentially by inducing counter cyclical movements in the required premium for external finance this simple mechanism is broadly consistent with informal descriptions of how financial and real variables interacted in the great depression bernanke 1983 and in the postwar business cycles eckstein and sinai 1986 in addition numerous recent panel data studies beginning with fazzari hubbard and peterson 1988 support the notion of a financial investment accelerator mechanism

dynamic contractual enforcement a model of strikes this paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement a firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce if the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently then modulo discounting the first best is implementable but strikes are always off the equilibrium path if the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium the dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring the equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes

relative risk aversion revisited through cross sectional analysis of the asset holdings of individual households this study adds to the evidence available on relative risk aversion it utilizes the national longitudinal surveys nls 1 which have advantages over the data bases used in previous studies assumptions about relative risk aversion are made in a number of theoretical economic and financial models 2 an empirical study by cohn lewellen lease and schlarbaum clls 1975 concluded that relative risk aversion declined as wealth increased across households while a second empirical study by friend and blume f b 1975 concluded from mixed evidence that relative risk aversion remained relatively constant as wealth increased the present study finds that by restricting the sample to higher wealth households and by defining wealth narrowly patterns consistent with decreasing or constant relative risk aversion emerge and these are compatible with the earlier studies however the use of a broader based sample and a more comprehensive measurement of wealth alters the conclusions and a pattern indicative of increasing relative risk aversion emerges thus the paper cautions that constant or decreasing relative risk aversion assumptions in theoretic models may not be realistic descriptions of the risk attitudes of typical u s households first the literature on relative risk aversion will be reviewed second the model used to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion will be discussed the third section will present empirical results and contrast them with those of earlier studies finally the material will be summarized and the conclusions indicated

a note on long term contracts abstract the purpose of this paper is three fold i to interpret townsend s 1982 long term contract model as a labor contract model where a value of job matching for a worker is a private information ii to contrast townsend s long term contract model with holmstrom s 1983 long term contract model in a common framework and iii to explore the effect of workers mobility on the contract configuration of the two models both holmstrom and townsend construct models in which a single period contract is not viable but a long term contract is however reasons for this characteristic in the two models are quite different this paper proposes a simple framework of labor contracts with illustrates the essential difference of the two models and the role of mobility costs mobility costs in the two types of long term contracts are shown to be beneficial for both workers and the firm results of comparative statics show how contract configurations in two models are influenced by changes in mobility costs

dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract this paper discusses the distortion of employment within a two period asymmetric information contracting model in which an exogenous demand shock is serially correlated and is known only to firms the obtained results show that serial correlations of the state of nature can cause not only underemployment but also overemployment even when overemployment never occurs in the context of a static asymmetric information contracting model

heterogeneous information and the theory of the business cycle the inability to observe the money supply and price level has been an essential ingredient of informational based equilibrium models of cycles here we assume these data are available but show that heterogeneous information about the productivity of capital can lead to a monetary theory of fluctuations in equilibrium each agent s investment depends on the difference between his own productivity and the perceived real rate in the presence of money demand shocks the nominal rate is noisy signal of the real rate this leads to greater fluctuations in output than if all agents had the same information

union wages temporary lay offs and seniority it is widely believed that the seniority system in conjunction with the collective bargaining process contributes significantly to the determination of the unemployment level in unionized sectors causa i empiricism suggests that real wage demands often remain buoyant in these sectors in the face of seemingly high rates of unemployment among union members james medoff 1979 p 380 convincingly documents the evidence that adjustment through lay offs is substantially greater in unionized firms than in comparable non unionized firms the usual but somewhat informal explanation is that the outcome of union voting is greatly influenced by senior workers who are fairly certain that they will not be laid off when normal shifts in the industry s demand for labour occur 2 these inframarginal workers are believed to vote for higher wage settlements than they would if their own jobs were not so secure

layoffs recruitment and interfirm mobility contract and search theories are integrated to provide a consistent explanation of contract formation the intertemporal structure of labor markets the absence of ex post market clearing and thus of unemployment in a contractual setting self fulfilling equilibria are described in which low productivity firms lay off some workers while high productivity firms recruitment search intensity and the resulting degree of interfirm mobility are endogenous the effects of severance pay on layoffs and mobility are identified finally the market economy is shown to generate too few layoffs whenever high productivity firms recruit new hires without recruitment laidoff workers are immobile and equilibrium is constrained efficient

human resource management and performance in european firms we develop a theoretical framework to examine three hypotheses on the relationship between human resource management hrm practices and organisational performance in european firms the first is that collaborative forms of hrm practice are more strongly associated with superior firm performance than calculative forms the second is that these associations are strongest where national institutional and normative settings support them the third is that employer employee consultative committees and collective payment methods are also associated with superior firm performance the first two propositions are strongly empirically supported as is the third albeit more weakly the implications of the findings for european policy and varieties of capitalism theory are discussed

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory