real options agency conflicts and optimal capital structure abstract we examine the impact of a stockholder bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy we find that an equity maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value maximizing strategy and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects equityholders incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics

debt in industry equilibrium this article shows 1 how entry and exit of firms in a competitive industry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capital structure and 2 how given a trade off between tax advantages and agency costs a firm will optimally adjust its leverage level after it is set up we derive simple pricing expressions for corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand for industry output plays a crucial role when a firm optimally adjusts its leverage over time we show that total firm value comprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixed capital structure plus a continuum of options for marginal increases in debt article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the alternative vote and interethnic moderation a reply to fraenkel and grofman the alternative vote av is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise fraenkel and grofman have modeled the likely effects of av in severely divided societies in order to impugn av as a tool of interethnic accommodation in this response i show that fraenkel and grofman s model is based on extreme assumptions that bear no relation to party and voter behavior in such societies models based on realistic assumptions about strategic behavior and cross national experience with av both demonstrate that av generally provides centripetal incentives that can contribute to interethnic coalition building and accommodation

a multi winner nested rent seeking contest this paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent seeking contest in which there may be several winners we first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest in contrast to the previous work we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large

optimal financial policy and firm valuation since the classic work of miller and modigliani 1961 laid down the principles for the valuation of firms under conditions of certainty some two decades ago academic interest in the problem of valuing the individual firm has waned yet in addition to the obvious importance of this problem for security analysts investors and acquirers of corporations the issue of firm valuation is fundamental to much of the theory of corporate finance what determines the risk of the firm how the rate of return required by investors may be inferred from capital market data the influence of financing policy on firm value and other issues of central concern to the theory of financial management this almost total neglect of firm valuation is attributable perhaps to the overwhelming influence of the research programme initiated by the development of the capital asset pricing model only three years after the publication of the above mentioned paper by miller and modigliani in its primary form the capital asset pricing model is a statement about the equilibrium rates of return on securities rather than about the equilibrium values of securities it is straightforward to transform the model into a statement about the dependence of current equilibrium values upon an exogenously specified distribution of end of period values however in this form the model is inherently unsatisfactory since it fails to take account of the fact that in reality the distribution of end of period firm values is not exogenously given but is determined as part of a subsequent capital market equilibrium attempts to iterate the single period capital asset pricing model over several periods in order to avoid the need to take the distribution future security values as exogenous have been unsuccessful for the most part since not being able to derive they have been forced to assume both the requisite normality of the distribution of subsequent security prices and the legitimacy of ignoring endogenously determined shifts in the individual investor s investment

asset substitution and structured financing this article shows how structured financing can be used to solve the asset substitution problem in a dynamic setting structuring induces the firm s owner to optimally choose the first best operating strategy even though the owner s value function might be locally convex concave which would ordinarily lead to overinvestment underinvestment in risky projects this result is demonstrated in two different continuous time settings one that is based on the risk shifting framework of leland 1998 and one that generalizes the scaled return model of green 1984 it is shown that the contractual nature of the structuring is a key determinant of the issuing firm s dynamic asset volatility furthermore unlike nonstructured financing the default conversion probability of a structured debt security may be increasing decreasing in the firm s total assets structured securities are therefore hedge assets which potentially explains the popularity of structured securities among investors and third party issuers

accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency abstract we argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency in particular we predict that it resolves debt equity conflicts facilitating a firm s access to debt financing and limiting underinvestment this permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might not be pursued our empirical results confirm these predictions we find that more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment and that these effects are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information asymmetries we also find that conservatism is associated with reduced overinvestment even for opaque investments such as research and development

stochastic capacity investment and flexible vs dedicated technology choice in imperfect capital markets this paper analyzes the impact of endogenous credit terms under capital market imperfections in a capacity investment setting we model a monopolist firm that decides on its technology choice flexible versus dedicated and capacity level under demand uncertainty differing from the majority of the stochastic capacity investment literature we assume that the firm is budget constrained and can relax its budget constraint by borrowing from a creditor the creditor offers technology specific loan contracts to the firm after which the firm makes its technology choice and subsequent decisions capital market imperfections impose financing frictions on the firm our analysis contributes to the capacity investment literature by extending the theory of stochastic capacity investment and flexible versus dedicated technology choice to understand the impact of capital market imperfections and by analyzing the impact of demand uncertainty variability and correlation on the operational decisions and the performance of the firm under different capital market conditions we demonstrate that the endogenous nature of credit terms in imperfect capital markets may modify or reverse conclusions concerning capacity investment and technology choice obtained under the perfect market assumption and we explain why the theory developed in this paper suggests some rules of thumb for the strategic management of the capacity and technology choice in imperfect capital markets this paper was accepted by john birge focused issue editor

the merits of neo downsian modeling of the alternative vote a reply to horowitz in professor horowitz s rejoinders 2004 2006 to fraenkel and grofman 2004 2006a he mischaracterizes our formal results retreats from previous claims about the conditions for the alternative vote electoral system to generate centripetal outcomes renders explicit his dubious assumptions about voter behavior in divided societies and greatly exaggerates the global evidence in support of pro moderation outcomes under the alternative vote here we respond to horowitz s 2004 criticism in this journal of the formal model of fraenkel and grofman 2004 and to the broader defense in horowitz 2006 of majoritarian vote pooling arrangements as means of mitigating ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

efficient prizes in prototype development contests abstract a prototype has a specific payoff with technological uncertainty about the costs of development market uncertainty involves the issue of which developer has his prototype accepted by the sponsor an efficient prize induces the welfare maximizing amount of r d

measuring the agency cost of debt we adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt an underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen we identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change the model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt the optimal capital structure for a firm is now widely regarded to be determined by a broad range of factors including a mix of tax effects the various agency problems associated with different securities and the various costs of issuing securities including the costs created by adverse selection while the existence of a theoretical optimum has been demonstrated in a variety of papers a less explored area has been the construction of detailed models that enable us to measure each of the relevant factors for a particular company and thereby to determine the actual optimal mix for that firm this gap in our understanding is particularly glaring in the case of agency costs in order to allow a careful modelling of strategic relations the parameters of most agency models are either so simplified that it is impossible to associate them with measurable parameters of a real world case or else the models simply abstract from certain critical factors such as a robust measure of price risk that must be incorporated into any real application for example although we now understand that sinking funds dividend restrictions and other bond covenants help to resolve the conflict of interest between bondholders and equity we do not yet have much in the way of models with which to determine the optimal parameters of these very covenants contingent claims models can provide a consistent framework for multiperiod valuation that properly accounts for risk but they usually abstract from the agency factors entering capital structure decisions when using a contingent claims model to value a firm s securities it is common to take the value of the firm itself as governed by an exogenously defined stochastic process the value of the firm s securities are then derived from this underlying value and as merton 1974 points out in his paper on the pricing of risky debt the modigliani miller theorem obtains so that the value of the firm is independent of the value and the type of debt in order to apply the contingent claims techniques to a setting in which agency problems are central some adaptation is necessary in this paper we

on the interaction of real and financial decisions of the firm under uncertainty this study analyzes the interaction between the optimal level of investment and debt financing for this purpose a model is structured in which a firm facing an uncertain price has to decide on its optimal level of investment and debt the amount of investment sets a limit on output whose optimal level is determined after price is realized the debt involved is risky there exists a possibility of bankruptcy the analysis proves that investment and its optimal financing have to be simultaneously determined and that a negative relationship exists between operating and financial leverage we also demonstrate that as the tax rate increases optimal capacity decreases and optimal leverage increases an analysis of the impact of changes in the expected price shows that under some conditions an increase in expected price would lead to an increase in optimal investment firm size and a decrease in optimal debt

irreversible investment managerial discretion and optimal capital structure abstract we explore the significance of employee compensation and alternative reservation income on investment timing endogenous default yield spreads and capital structure in a real options setting a manager s incentive to under over invest in a project is associated to labor income he has to forego in order to work on the project the manager s salary his stake on the project s equity capital and his subsequent income should he decide to terminate operations we find that the optimal level of coupon payments decreases with managerial salary and ownership stake while it is increasing in the manager s reservation income yield spreads optimal leverage ratios are increasing decreasing in the manager s salary and ownership stake while they are decreasing increasing in the manager s reservation income exploring agency costs of debt as deviations from a value maximizing investment policy we document a u shaped relationship between agency costs of debt and the managerial compensation parameters the manager s reservation income salary and ownership share

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt abstract this paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders risk taking decisions we show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders it also implies a lower leverage which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields we then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt we find that this option mitigates equityholders risk shifting incentives compared to standard short term debt this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution

a game options approach to the investment problem with convertible debt financing we consider a firm that operates a single plant and has an expansion option to invest in a new plant with convertible debt financing this conversion feature introduces another complication not only because of the added conversion timing problem by the bond holder but also because the equity holder needs to take future conversion into account when evaluating her expansion financing decision we have two main objectives here we use game options techniques to analyze optimal strategies involved in this convertible debt financed expansion problem the first goal is to provide a comprehensive framework and procedure for solving the problem in a mathematically tractable way secondly we illustrate our solution method through a concrete example with economic analysis this includes a comparison with straight bond financing and comparative statics with respect to price volatility and conversion ratio in this regard we attempt to clarify how the conversion feature affects the equity holder s investment decisions throughout the paper we study expansion options by viewing a firm s existing operation bankruptcy threat conversion decisions and financing decisions all together

credit rationing concessionary lending and debt maturity abstract a firm raises capital for a two period investment while creditors observe the project status midstream unobservable managerial perks may consume capital each period when the firm is unfortunate early on short term financing results in either concessionary lending or costly liquidation rolling over short term debt may be problematic because the high risk premium creditors demand when asset value is low relative to debt impares managerial motivation precisely when the incentive to defer perk consumption is weakest long term financing may reduce total agency costs be enabling lenders to charge higher initial premia in effect shifting loan repayments to states in which incentive constraints are non binding

real flexibility and financial structure an empirical analysis i examine the empirical relation between real flexibility and financial structure i test whether real flexibility increases debt capacity by lowering default risk and making assets more marketable or decreases debt capacity by facilitating risk shifting and asset substitution i measure real flexibility as the sensitivity of marginal production and investment decisions to variations in the economic environment i find that financial leverage is negatively related to production flexibility but positively related to investment flexibility this split in results suggests that although asset substitution facilitated by investment flexibility can be prevented contractually risk shifting facilitated by production flexibility is intractable copyright 2003 oxford university press

the design of rent seeking competitions in the standard tullock model of rent seeking as a noncooperative game aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal exceed or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker s investment if the supply of an input into the rent seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem he supplies it and designs the rent seeking game to maximize his wealth the author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician s wealth in one input and two input rent seeking processes

on the debt capacity of growth options we relate the value of growth options in the firm s investment opportunity set to the level of debt in the firm s capital structure underinestment costs of debt increase and free cash flow benefits fall with additional growth options thus if debt capacity is defined as the amount of debt the firm optimally adds for an incremental project then the debt capacity of growth options is negative this result implies that book leverage should fall with the addition of growth options our tests using a large sample of industrial firms confirm this prediction

renewing assets with uncertain revenues and operating costs we study optimal replacement and abandonment decisions for real assets when both revenues and costs are uncertain and deteriorate with age we develop an implicit representation of the renewal boundary as the solution to a set of simultaneous equations this quasi analytical method has the merit of computational ease and transparency we show that the correlation between revenues and operating costs has a significant influence on the renewal boundary and that the increase in revenue immediately following a renewal has a greater relative influence on the boundary than either operating cost or renewal cost the quasi analytical method is sufficiently flexible to deal with other real option models involving 2 variables

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions a dynamic framework this article analyzes the interaction between a firm s dynamic investment operating and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs using numerical analysis we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects we find that higher production flexibility due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility enhances the firm s debt capacity thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing while higher financial flexibility resulting from lower recapitalization costs has a similar effect production flexibility and financial flexibility are to some extent substitutes we find that the impact of debt financing on the firm s investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant

revisiting corporate growth options in the presence of state dependent cashflow risk abstract given a non trivial market price of risk we study the impact of state dependent cashflow risk on the optimal investment policy and on the ensuing value of an unlevered firm that holds the option of scaling up cashflows from its assets in place upon incurring an irreversible cost the firm s investment decision and value are studied as a function of the market price of risk and of the degree of state dependence in cashflow risk

an integrated model of multinational flexibility and financial hedging abstract we construct a model of a multinational firm with flexibility in sourcing its production and with the ability to use financial markets to hedge exchange rate risk agency costs generated by the firm s capital structure create a link between the firm s financial policy and its production decisions the firm s need for hedging is directly related to the degree of flexibility and the production plan it chooses is a function of the hedging strategy it employs consequently the firm s ability to exploit its competitive position depends upon the degree to which its flexibility is matched by the construction of an appropriate hedging strategy

incorporating financing related determinants of value in the discounted cash flow model abstract the paper discusses how some of the main types of interaction between financing and value can be incorporated in the discounted cash flow model of valuation including effects arising from taxes transactions costs disclosure information asymmetry and agency problems it explains whether a given effect should appear in a project s cash flows in its cost of capital or as an upfront adjustment to value most of the effects imply that the principle of value additivity does not hold

victimization rent seeking and just compensation when should government compensate citizens for harm inflicted by public policy in practice all public policy is harmful to somebody even when it is beneficial to society as a whole the common view in the legal profession is that a fuzzy but serviceable line can be drawn between taking which should be compensated and the proper exercise of the policy power where no compensation is warranted recently this view has been challenged by some authors who argue that harm to victims of socially advantageous public policy should never be compensated and by others who argue that compensation is almost always warranted the latter would go so far as to proscribe all redistribution of income as a taking from the well to do this paper is a defense of the common view against both challenges the key to the problem is the distinction between unalterable risk and the risk of victimization of citizens by the government giving rise to rent seeking and a general disorganization of society

committees and rent seeking effort abstract this paper explores the extent to which administrative structures may influence the extent of rent seeking effort within the environments explored relatively smaller efforts tend to be invested to influence the deliberations of commitees than those of single administrators to the extent that these efforts may be considered unproductive rent seeking the widespread use of committees may reflect the fact that savings from reduced rent seeking more than offset the greater decision costs of committees

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

optimal priority structure capital structure and investment we study the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic model where the firm has multiple debt issues and equityholders choose the timing of investment jointly optimal capital and priority structures can virtually eliminate investment distortions because debt priority serves as a dynamically optimal contract examining the relative efficiency of priority rules observed in practice we develop several predictions about how firms adjust their priority structure in response to changes in leverage credit conditions and firm fundamentals notably financially unconstrained firms with few growth opportunities prefer senior debt while financially constrained firms with or without growth opportunities prefer junior debt moreover lower rated firms are predicted to spread priority across debt classes finally our analysis has a number of important implications for empirical capital structure research including the relations between market leverage book leverage and credit spreads and tobin s q the influence of firm fundamentals on the agency cost of debt and the conservative debt policy puzzle the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

dynamic r d investment policies this paper examines dynamic r d investment policies and the valuation of r d programs in a contingent claims framework we incorporate the following characteristics of r d programs into our model learning by doing collateral learning between different projects in the program interaction between project cash flows periodic reevaluations of the program different intensities of investment capital rationing constraints and competition we show that a firm may invest in multiple projects even if only one can be implemented after development is complete furthermore the firm may significantly alter its funding policy over time for example it may simultaneously develop multiple projects for a period of time then focus on a lead project and potentially resume funding of a backup project if the lead project fails to deliver on its early promise we show how a firm can forecast expected r d spending through time for an optimally executed r d program while project volatility plays an important role in determining r d program value we find that for high volatility projects the optimal investment policy is not very sensitive to changes in or misestimation of volatility in considering whether to accelerate development of a project a firm should balance the adverse effects of increased costs and the loss of investment flexibility against the positive effects of rapid uncertainty resolution and accelerated cash flows in the presence of a budget constraint that prevents the firm from simultaneously accelerating projects and developing projects in parallel we find that if one project significantly dominates another early in the development stage the option to accelerate the lead project is likely to be more valuable than the option to exchange projects thus the backup project would be shelved in order to commit extra resources to development of the lead project finally competition from other firms leads to more parallel investment in the early development stages of projects less parallel investment in the latter stages of development and lower overall investment

the design of rent seeking competitions committees preliminary and final contests the paper examines the common practice in multi contest rent seeking competitions where finalists are selected based on rent seekers efforts in a preliminary contest we find that for any single contest design rent seeking expenditures could be reduced by introducing a preliminary contest if the marginal returns to rent seeking effort in the preliminary contest is sufficiently low in addition to other reasons the paper argues that this may explain why such multi contest designs are common we argue that rent seeking expenditure in the preliminary stage represents the cost of reducing the number of contestants we also find that the practice of setting a higher quality standard in the final contest than the quality standard in the preliminary contest reduces rent seeking waste we derive an expression for the optimal number of finalists under certain conditions we find that the optimal number of finalists is directly proportional or equal to the square root of the number of potential contestants finally we show that whether rent seeking expenditures rise or fall when the rent is awarded by a committee instead of a single administrator depends on the sensitivity of the committee relative to that of the single administrator

endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages abstract this paper studies the endogenous determination of public budget allocation across hierarchical education stages in less developed economies the top class has dominant political power to implement its most preferred policy which is characterized by exclusive participation and large schooling expenditure at higher education at the expense of basic education in developed economies the budget allocation is more balanced under certain parameters it leads to expanded participation of the middle class in higher education the model offers an explanation to the observed cross country policy difference and is broadly consistent with historical evidence

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

irreversible investment financing and bankruptcy decisions in an oligopoly this paper examines a firm s debt level investment timing and investment scale choices in a continuous time model where the output price of a good that the firm produces depends on a stochastic demand shift variable and the total industry supply of the good using the simple symmetric cournot nash equilibrium assumption that all firms are identical and therefore follow the same financing and investment strategies we show that competition decreases the output price and hence encourages a firm to wait for a higher demand level before it is profitable to invest we also demonstrate how uncertainty bankruptcy costs and corporate taxation affect the firm s financing and investment decisions

dynamic investment and capital structure under manager shareholder conflict abstract this paper investigates the interactions between the investment and financing decisions of a firm under manager shareholder conflicts arising from asymmetric information in particular we extend the manager shareholder conflict problem in a real options model by incorporating debt financing we show that manager shareholder conflicts over investment policy increase not only the investment and default triggers but also coupon payments which lead to a decrease in the equity value moreover given the presence of manager shareholder conflicts debt financing increases investment and decreases total social welfare as a result there is a trade off between the efficiency of investment and total social welfare with debt financing these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work in this area

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

bank skin in the game and loan contract design evidence from covenant lite loans in a model of dual agency problems where borrower lender and bank nonbank incentives may conflict we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness as bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread we find support for the hockey stick relation with bank s stake in covenant lite loans averaging 8 0 median we also find that covenant lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high

voting on meritocracy abstract this paper considers a setting where a resource such as education budget is to be distributed among agents the latter differ in their ability to make use of the resource and the issue is that of determining the allocation rule whereby the individual shares of the resource may depend on their relative efforts of obtaining it the paper s focus is on endogenous determination through voting of the degree of meritocracy in the resource allocation system which determines the marginal productivity of one s effort it is found that a meritocratic system is expected to be supported by highly productive individuals and opposed by those with low productivity when the decision making becomes less elitist and involves broader participation of population groups the support for meritocracy decreases

debt maturity choice of nonpublic italian firms this paper focuses on debt maturity of nonpublic italian firms of small and medium size by international standards and that mainly use bank loans as source of external financing compared to few similar studies the main contributions are that panel estimations allow to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity firms are also permitted to choose simultaneously leverage and debt maturity the evidence is that debt maturity is shorter for companies that are riskier and affected by asymmetric information in areas of the country with poorer legal enforcement in choosing debt maturity lenders lay greater emphasis on indicators of firm information opacity

where have all the parties gone fraenkel and grofman on the alternative vote yet again the alternative vote av is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise fraenkel and grofman 2004 2006a 2006b have repeatedly attempted to show that av is not conducive to interethnic moderation in severely divided societies in this response to their latest attempt i point out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis in contrast i explain how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group i also explain why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under av than they are under systems such as the single transferable vote which is in use in northern ireland and i show that fraenkel and grofman s interpretations of av s operation in australia fiji sri lanka and papua new guinea are contrary to the evidence

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions the effects of agency conflicts abstract we examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder bondholder conflicts over investment policy we find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under and overinvestment however the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage since the firm s initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set the model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity and how these choices interact with a firm s growth opportunities

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

strategy takes a holiday fraenkel and grofman on the alternative vote the alternative vote av is an electoral system that tends to produce centripetal effects it therefore has some potential to foster interethnic compromise and coalition in severely divided societies fraenkel and grofman s attempt to show that av will not necessarily and uniformly produce moderate results refutes a proposition that has not been advanced and does so on the basis of assumptions contrary to those specified by proponents of av s generally moderating propensities fraenkel and grofman s examination of two elections under av in fiji is based on perverse interpretations of the data and embodies a serious underestimate of the extent to which strategic behavior can support interethnic moderation

rent seeking with multiple winners this paper examines the impact of the number of winners allowed by regulators on rentseeking expenditures it is demonstrated in a widely used model that an increase in the number of winners will decrease total rent seeking expenditures this result is generally obtained regardless of whether the firms are risk averse or risk lovers when regulators award coveted market franchises there will be smaller welfare losses if more winners are allowed