nash cournot or lindahl behavior an empirical test for the nato allies this paper derives systems of demand equations for distinguishing between nash cournot and lindahl behavior in a group that either shares a pure public good or an activity that provides a private and a pure public joint product systems of simultaneous equations are estimated based upon nash cournot and lindahl behavior for a sample of ten nato allies for the 1956 1987 period nonnested hypothesis tests support the nash cournot specification for five of the ten sample allies no evidence of lindahl behavior is found the nash cournot joint product specification outperforms the pure public model for all sample allies

relative earnings and individual union membership in the united kingdom considerable attention has been focused in recent years on the empirical analysis of the effect of trade unions on the structure of earnings such empirical investigation usually entails measurement of the union non union differential in wages or earnings at the level of the individual this involves comparison of the earnings of union members with estimates of what their earnings would be were they not union members or equivalently examination of differences in earnings between individuals comparable with regard to all other relevant characteristics who differ in their union membership alone in the united kingdom all previous attempts at estimation of this differential have used aggregate data at either the industry or occupation level 1 the conventional methodology involves regression of the logarithm of the average wage on either the proportion of workers who are union members or the proportion covered by a collective agreement together with a vector of industry characteristics that are deemed to determine the non union wage however several problems are immediately apparent with this methodology first the model ignores the possibility of variation in the differential across industries which has potentially serious consequences second the vector of other characteristics customarily used is somewhat limited and raises doubts concerning the adequacy of the standardization for what might loosely be termed labour quality third only a sub sample of industries is ever used owing to lack of data those industries excluded are generally smaller in terms of employment that those included if the differential varies with the size of the industry a further bias will be induced all of these problems are either removed or lessened by the use of individual level data for an analysis of their impact at the industry level see geroski and stewart 1981 2 as a result it is now widely accepted that the appropriate way to measure such differentials is to use micro data sets at the level of the individual worker until recently suitable data have not been available for the united kingdom and hence such analysis was not possible this paper presents the first estimates for the united kingdom based on individual level data if the value of the union non union differential were the same for all workers in the unionized sector analysis at the industry level and the individual level would produce similar results however the marshallian laws of derived demand suggest that this will not be the case despite this clear prediction of variation in the differential there has been little systematic investigation of the variation this paper also presents such an analysis since variation in the differential across industries results in aggregation bias in industry level studies such an analysis is of considerable relevance to the evaluation of the evidence from such studies as well as being of interest in its own right the paper is laid out as follows section i presents a method of estimating the union non union differential at the individual level while section ii

limit order submission strategies under asymmetric information abstract this paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit order submissions to shocks in a pure limit order market in the market we study informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads volatility momentum and depth by contrast uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions the dominance of the informed over limit order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively priced limit orders

limit order book as a market for liquidity we develop a dynamic model of an order driven market populated by discretionary liquidity traders these traders must trade yet can choose the type of order and are fully strategic in their decision traders differ by their impatience less patient traders demand liquidity more patient traders provide it three equilibrium patterns are obtained the pattern is determined by three parameters the degree of impatience of the patient traders which we model as the cost of execution delay in providing liquidity their proportion in the population which determines the degree of competition among the liquidity providers and the tick size which is the cost of the minimal price improvement despite its simplicity the model generates a rich set of empirical predictions on the relation between market parameters time to execution and spreads we argue that the economic intuition of this model is so basic its main results must be robust in much more general models

trade unions and firms product market power a production function model with efficient bargaining between oligopolistic firms and unions is developed to distinguish between product market power and union power in capturing economic rents the model is formalised using the generalized nash bargaining solution and is empirically tested on four belgian manufacturing sectors the conclusions are that product market power is significantly eroded by wage rents but firms retain most of their power during negotiations also the restrictions imposed on the data do not reject the hypothesis that wage erosion arises from efficient bargaining in accordance with other empirical findings for belgian manufacturing

school board politics school district size and the bargaining power of teachers unions this paper presents a public choice theory of the bargaining power of teachers unions the theory predicts that the power of the unions rises with the size of a district the theory is tested by examining the relationship between district size and various bargaining outcomes for a sample of 771 california school districts in 1999 2000 as hypothesized teachers salaries rise and the ratio of teachers per pupil falls with increasing district size the paper also considers several alternative explanations for these results

the many faces of tiebout bias in local education demand parameter estimates abstract tiebout sorting can occasion bias in public service demand parameter estimates in at least three distinct ways this paper identifies each of these types of tiebout bias and provides estimates of each of their magnitudes first the empirical results suggest that the type of tiebout bias first identified by goldstein and pauly is positive and large but that their proposed method of correcting for that bias substantially overestimates its magnitude second failing to control for unobservable taste variations that are negatively correlated with the difference between an individual household s income and the income of the decisive voter is found to impart a significant negative bias into the income parameter estimate we find that conventional demographic descriptors do not adequately control for such taste variations and consequently fail to protect the income parameter estimates from this type of tiebout bias finally the significant negative relationship between individual household school expenditure demands and deviations of individual household income from the income of the decisive voter suggest that tiebout sorting is a significant phenomenon

the theory of public goods non nash behaviour abstract most treatments of equilibrium public goods provision assume zero conjectural variations in the sense that each individual regards the behaviour of the rest of the community as independent of his own this paper introduces nonzero conjectural variations into the model a diagram is introduced which can depict both the individual s and the community s equilibrium in the presence of nonzero conjectural variations equilibrium and optimal outcomes are compared and a specific functional form is used to investigate the effect of community size on the nature of equilibrium finally we discuss the requirement that conjectures should be consistent

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

school finance reform and voluntary fiscal federalism california has transferred the financing of its public schools from localities to the state in response many families have supplemented the tax revenue of their local public schools with voluntary contributions this paper analyzes that phenomenon we propose a model of partial cooperation among parents in making voluntary contributions to their public schools under reasonable conditions the model predicts that contributions per pupil should decline with school size we estimate this relationship using data on contributions to california schools our estimates reveal that contributions per pupil do decline with size however the rate of decline is surprisingly slow 2002 elsevier b v all rights reserved

unionised labour market and strategic production decision of a multinational i show that a foreign firm may sell the same product through both foreign direct investment fdi and export and this decision depends on the size of the product market it happens irrespective of whether the labour market in the domestic country or in the foreign country is unionised unlike the existing works focusing on risk diversification in presence of demand or cost uncertainty i explain the co existence of fdi and export in a world with certainty the endogenous determination of the wage rate plays an important role for my results my analysis shows the effects of the fixed cost of fdi and competition in the product market on the production strategy of the foreign firm

imperfect competition in financial markets an empirical study of island and nasdaq the competition between island and nasdaq at the beginning of the century offers a natural laboratory to study competition between and within trading platforms and its consequences for liquidity supply our empirical strategy takes advantage of the difference between the pricing grids used on island and nasdaq as well as of the decline in the nasdaq tick using the finer grid prevailing on their market island limit order traders undercut nasdaq quotes much more than they undercut one another the drop in the nasdaq tick size triggered a drop in island spreads despite the island tick already being very thin before nasdaq decimalization we also estimate a structural model of liquidity supply and find that island limit order traders earned rents before nasdaq decimalization our results suggest that perfect competition cannot be taken for granted even on transparent open limit order books with a very thin pricing grid

a taxonomy of automated trade execution systems abstract a taxonomy of automated trade execution systems in financial markets is developed over 50 automated market structures in 16 countries are analyzed these markets consist of computerized rules governing both allowable message types and the means by which such messages are translated into trades computerized market structures are classified by ordered sets of trade execution priority rules trade matching protocols and associated degree of automation of price discovery and transparency to include informational asymmetries between classes of market participants differences in systems across types of financial instruments geographical locations and over time are analyzed jel g15 d44

the effects of group size and income on contributions to the corporation for public broadcasting this paper examines the extent to which individual contributions to public television are explained by the size of the audience which receives the individual station s television signal it also incorporates the effects of income on contributions to public television in order to assess the combined effects of income and group size on contributions to public goods

an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework this paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model in a more general framework it does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs as well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model a new class of models is also discovered this framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency the empirical analysis of trade unions and the effects of trade union legislation copyright 1987 by royal economic society

decomposing liquidity along the limit order book abstract in this paper we estimate the asymmetric information and order processing components of liquidity at extended depths along the limit order book using data from the inet ecn we find that the asymmetric information component decreases as depth increases inactive stocks have more information asymmetry at the inside quotes but it decreases more rapidly along the book than for active stocks the order processing component of liquidity has fixed and variable constituents consistent with a fixed cost per order as well as a variable portion based on the size of the order

consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods why the conventional theory does not work abstract the conventional theory of voluntary contributions to public goods assumes that each person maximises his utility taking other people s behaviour as given nash conjectures it is now coming to be recognised that this theory is inconsistent with observed behaviour this paper argues that the problems of the theory are compounded and not as some economists have argued resolved by relaxing the assumption of nash conjectures if individuals conjectures are consistent each person will hold the correct belief that other people s contributions are inversely related to his own under most reasonable assumptions equilibrium is a state in which no one contributes anything

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

efficient bargains and the mcdonald solow conjecture this article explores the mcdonald and solow 1981 conjecture that the outcome from a bargain over wages and employment can be approximately achieved by a bargain over wages and the labor capital ratio the crew size where the latter can be argued to be more representative of the real world i derive a crew size contract curve and show that this conjecture is not generally true a test to determine which model is generating real world data is suggested the wage rigidity results derived by mcdonald and solow for their contract curve do not apply to this crew size contract curve

work rules featherbedding and pareto optimal union management bargaining this article examines a model of semiefficient bargaining in which the union and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules the results are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient bargaining i e over wages and the level of employment and bargaining solely over wages

non nested tests of efficient bargain and labour demand models abstract in this paper efficient bargain and labour demand models derived from a variety of product market structures are compared using non nested test procedures data on wage employment outcomes are drawn from actual contract data from the canadian unionised sector results indicate that efficient bargain models are preferred to labour demand models

eighths sixteenths and market depth changes in tick size and liquidity provision on the nyse using limit order data provided by the nyse we investigate the impact of reducing the minimum tick size on the liquidity of the market while both spreads and depths quoted and on the limit order book declined after the nyse s change from eighths to sixteenths depth declined throughout the entire limit order book as well the combined e ect of smaller spreads and reduced cumulative limit order book depth has made liquidity demanders trading small orders better o however traders who submitted

adverse selection and competitive market making empirical evidence from a limit order market this article presents a new methodology for testing economic restrictions on the price schedules offered in a limit order book that are based on i break even conditions for marginal limit orders and ii rational updating conditions for order book revisions over time using order flow data from the stockholm stock exchange i find strong evidence of insufficient depth in the limit order books relative to the theoretical predictions an extended model which allows the model parameters to depend on market conditions captures some of the systematic variation in the observed order book depth article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the determination of profit margins in uk manufacturing this paper examines the determinants of profit margins in 91 u k manufacturing industries over the period 1983 86 it considers how the inclusion of labor market characteristics in empirical industrial organization specifications affects the estimated concentration margins relationship the empirical work pays detailed attention to the endogenous nature of variables derived from structural industrial organization models the authors report instrumental variables estimates of margins equations in which there emerges a significant role for labor market characteristics indeed both unionization and industrywide unemployment are found to depress profit margins the impact of concentration is seen to be biased downward when these variables are omitted

competition among trading venues information and trading on electronic communications networks this paper explores the competition between two trading venues electronic communication networks ecns and nasdaq market makers ecns oier the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution which attract informed traders thus trades are more likely to occur on ecns when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock return volatility are high ecn trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ecn trades than though market maker trades however ecn trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and oier them better executions technological innovations that enable high speed low cost electronic trading systems are dramatically changing the structure of nancial markets exchanges and markets around the world are merging or forming alliances to improve liquidity and reduce costs in the face of increased competition from each other and from these computerized trading systems trading volume on electronic communications networks ecns has grown rapidly over the past several years ecns are now involved in more than a third of nasdaq trading volume and are attempting to increase their market share in nyse listed

price adjustment within a framework of symmetric oligopoly this paper is concerned with the generation and testing of predictions on price adjustment from a model of symmetric oligopoly two types of industry demand regimes are considered linear and iso elastic it is shown that these can be distinguished by a simple test and linear demand is given strong support it is then shown that the industry conjectural variation may be treated as a function whose properties can be established by non linear estimation of the price adjustment equation

what s in a name what leads a firm to change its name and what the new name foreshadows abstract this paper examines corporate name changes this paper connects different types of corporate name changes to the reputational concerns that precede them and to the important corporate events and performance changes that follow them the empirical results suggest that a firm adopts a radically different name to disassociate from a poor reputation the name of one of its well recognized brands to associate with a good reputation or a minor change in its name by adding or deleting a part of its name that identifies it with a particular product to accompany a narrower business focus or a broader business focus the empirical results also suggest that except for radical name changes significant organizational upheaval follows most corporate name changes the strength of the firm s subsequent economic performance is tied to changes in the business direction that the type of name change foreshadows

public sector performance measurement and stakeholder support abstract over the past several decades there has been dramatically increased attention paid to measuring the performance of public sector and nonprofit organizations in the united states and elsewhere recent research has indicated that public sector and nonprofit organizations are responsive to performance measurement in both productive and unproductive ways however it is not yet known how stakeholders respond to this measurement this paper makes use of a unique panel survey dataset of the population of elementary and middle schools in the state of florida to directly investigate this question we exploit the fact that florida changed its school grading system in 2002 and study the degree to which private contributions to schools are responsive to the information contained in school grades we find evidence that school grades can have substantial effects on a school s ability to obtain private contributions we also observe that schools serving different clienteles are treated differently in response to changes in school grades

trading and liquidity on the tokyo stock exchange a bird s eye view the trading mechanism for equities on the tokyo stock exchange tse stands in sharp contrast to the primary mechanisms used to trade stocks in the united states in the united states exchange designated specialists have affirmative obligations to provide continuous liquidity to the market specialists offer simultaneous and tight quotes to both buy and sell and supply sufficient liquidity to limit the magnitude of price changes between consecutive transactions in contradistinction the tse has no exchange designated liquidity suppliers instead liquidity is provided through a public limit order book and liquidity is organized through restrictions on maximum price changes between trades that serve to slow down trading in this article we examine the efficacy of the tse s trading mechanisms at providing liquidity our analysis is based on a complete record of transactions and best bid and best offer quotes for most stocks in the first section of the tse over a period of 26 months we study the size of the bid ask spread and its cross sectional and intertemporal stability intertemporal patterns in returns volatility volume trade size and the frequency of trades and market depth based on the response of quotes to trades and the frequency of trading halts and warning quotes the trading mechanism for equities on the tokyo stock exchange tse stands in sharp contrast to the primary mechanisms used to trade stocks in the united states in the united states exchange designated specialists have affirmative obligations to provide continuous liquidity in the market and to maintain a private limit order book with the public s limit orders on the tse exchange designated intermediaries saitori log limit orders and match them to incoming market orders but provide no market making services in the united states specialists offer simultaneous and tight quotes to both buy and sell on the tse public limit orders constitute the available bids and offers in the united states specialists supply sufficient liquidity to limit the magnitude of price changes between consecutive transactions 1 on the tse the market mechanism places limits on the magnitude of consecutive price

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federal system proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks the author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations the author characterizes the response of political economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions partial replacement is the most likely outcome though others are possible copyright 1987 by american economic association

wage premia price cost margins and bargaining power in belgian manufacturing abstract an asymmetric nash bargaining model as developed by j svejnar 1986 is empirically tested on industry wage negotiations in belgium union s relative bargaining power emerges from this model as the fraction of firm s profits per worker which the unions are able to capture in excess of the alternative wage the estimates of the bargaining power coefficients for blue as well as white collar workers reject the symmetric split the difference outcome determinants of the cross industry variation of bargaining power are explored as well

endogenous scope of firm union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons abstract there is strong evidence that employees motivation and incentives in the workplace are affected by vertical pay comparisons in a stylized cournot duopoly model with firm specific unions that institutionalize workers vertical fairness concerns we show that universal wage employment w e bargaining may arise as the equilibrium scope of bargaining institution we thus propose that intra firm vertical fairness concerns may resolve the mismatch between recent findings in the empirical literature on labor market institutions and the predictions of traditional models that universal w e bargaining will never arise in equilibrium the scope of bargaining puzzle we derive a number of testable hypotheses that address the recent shift towards more decentralized bargaining institutions the decline in unions bargaining power and the prevalence of w e bargaining

penny pricing and the components of spread and depth changes abstract recent studies show that decimal pricing led to significant reductions in the spread and depth on the nyse in this paper we examine how the observed changes in the spread and depth can be attributed to different factors we show that stocks with higher proportions of one tick spreads and odd sixteenth quotes and more frequent trading before decimalization experienced larger declines in the spread and depth afterwards we interpret this result as evidence of reduced binding constraints and increased price competition under decimal pricing we also find that decimal pricing led to nontrivial changes in select stock attributes and that these changes exerted an additional impact on spreads and depths our results suggest that sub penny pricing may further reduce the spreads of high volume low risk or low price stocks

the legacy of serrano the impact of mandated equal spending on private school enrollment 1 introduction the california supreme court decision in serrano v priest in 1971 was the first state supreme court ruling to declare a state s education finance system unconstitutional 1 the suit originally filed by a class of los angeles county public school children and their parents argued that the california public school finance system was unconstitutional because of its reliance on a local property tax system under this system large differences in property wealth created enormous variations in educational resources across the state in its subsequent 1976 serrano h decision the california supreme court found that the state legislature s response to the first serrano decision was insufficient the court ordered the state legislature to follow a trial court s requirement to implement a funding formula that reduces wealth related per pupil expenditure disparities i e property tax revenue exclusive of categorical aid and special needs to 100 across school districts the serrano ii decision resulted in a nearly complete shift of the fiscal responsibility for k 12 education in california from local to state government in the aftermath of the initial serrano decision suits were filed in several other states claiming unconstitutional inequities in the state education system many of these suits were successful between 1973 and 1983 six state supreme courts new jersey 1973 connecticut 1977 washington 1978 west virginia 1979 wyoming 1980 arkansas 1983 found their systems of educational finance unconstitutional similar rulings followed in 1989 in kentucky montana and texas in 1993 in massachusetts and tennessee in 1994 in arizona and in 1997 in new hampshire ohio and vermont a third of the states education finance systems now have been ruled unconstitutional as a result of these rulings and legislative based education reforms in a number of other states education expenditure inequality has been reduced 2 this in turn has left local districts with less latitude in determining spending levels parents in richer districts are expected to be especially frustrated with the limits on spending that accompany equalization changes in state educational finance systems to gain greater equity affected average spending on education in these states the initial research on this issue focused on the california experience where raw expenditure figures reveal the dramatic change in per pupil spending in california since the initial serrano decision in 1971 in academic year ay 1969 1970 per pupil spending in california s public elementary and secondary schools was slightly greater than the national average 106 25 of the national average ranking 14th among all states however by ay 1992 1993 education expenditures in california had fallen to 85 6 of the national average and its rank had dropped to 34th silva and sonstelie 1995 concluded that education spending in california in 1989 1990 was significantly lower than they would have otherwise predicted they attributed about half of the lowered spending to the legislation following serrano ii and the other half to the growth of the student population in california but the california experience of reduced expenditures appears to be atypical manwaring and sheffrin 1997 found spending to be higher in many states as a result of litigation or legislativebased educational finance reform downes and shah 1995 similarly estimated that school finance reform raised spending in some states and lowered spending in other states murray evans and schwab 1998 found state per pupil spending rose with successful state education finance litigation the variation across states in the spending effects of education finance reforms may be due to the source court ordered or legislative and or degree e g weak reform strong reform etc of the reforms in any case there should be greater interest in supplementing what the public schools do or opting out of the public system if reforms cause spending in a state to fall

stealth trading which traders trades move stock prices usingaudit trail data for a sample of nyse firms we show that medium size trades are associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and volume this result is consistent with the predictions of barclay and warner s 1993 stealth tradinghypothesis we find that the source of this disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium size trades is trades initiated by institutions this result is robust to various sensitivity checks our findings appear to confirm street lore that institutions are informed traders 2001 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries a model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions local bargaining and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry in both cases the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages in addition industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement

on the economics of philanthropy friedman says that he accepts this argument as justifying governmental action to alleviate poverty economists will be familiar with this kind of argument someone takes as a premise that a particular activity is the subject of altruistic concern by individuals he shows that if matters are left to unco ordinated private philanthropy a free rider problem will arise and then he claims that this problem can be solved by some kind of intervention by government this strategy has been used to justify many kinds of intervention including compulsory transfers of income through the tax system hochman and rodgers i969 public policy to stimulate saving and investment marglin i963 sen i967 and the subsidisation or public provision of health care arrow i963 lindsay i969 culyer i976 this whole line of argument rests on a particular theory of private philanthropy which in turn relies on three principal assumptions first there is the publicness assumption the charitable activity in question say the relief of poverty or the provision of health care is a common argument in many individuals utility functions and so is a public good in the theoretical sense samuelson i954 in some cases of private philanthropy it is indisputable that the charitable activity is a public good from which donors derive utility consider for example the case of yachtsmen contributing to the royal national lifeboat institution or potential cancer victims contributing to the cancer research campaign in other cases the assumption takes on a rather different character rich britons contribute towards famine relief in cambodia childless old age pensioners contribute towards the care of handicapped children in such cases one would have to be extremely cynical to believe that the charitable activity furthers the self interest of the donor in any significant way but one might suggest that for purely altruistic reasons the donor derives utility from knowing that less fortunate people are being made better off such an effect will be called an altruistic externality friedman along with all of the other writers quoted in the first paragraph of this paper relies on altruistic externalities to justify the publicness assumption the second assumption is that of utility maximisation each individual s decisions concerning his philanthropic

the strategic choice of union oligopoly bargaining agenda abstract this article analyzes the optimal choice of union oligopoly bargaining agenda i e right to manage versus efficient bargaining under possible market entry it is shown that agreement by both the union and the incumbent firm about efficient bargaining emerges as equilibrium in nash strategies even more so under non blockaded entry for deterrence motives this is consistent with the common empirical findings that unionized firms do not behave according to the prediction of the right to manage model that employment will be on the labor demand curve the entry deterrence effect highlighted in this paper also suggests that labor market organization should not be overlooked as a component of the welfare analysis of product market competition

school finance spatial income segregation and the nature of communities in a general equilibrium model that links school and housing markets a purely public school system regardless of the degree of centralization results in substantially more spatial income segregation than a purely private system however the combination of a public system with a private school market yields the least residential segregation as housing price distortions from the capitalization of the public system generate incentives for middle and high income private school attendees to live with lower income public school attendees the impact of vouchers and the sensitivity of results to alternative school production models is also investigated

tiebout bias and the demand for local public schooling institute of university of ii business and california economic research berkeley center for real estate and urban economics working paper series working paper 86 109 tiebout bias and the demand for local public schooling by daniel l rubinfeld perry shipiro judith roberts these papers are preliminary in nature th urpose 39 to stimulate 39 ussion comment therefore they are not t cited or quoted 39 ny p ation wit express permissio the author graduate school of business administration

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

the effect of wage bargains on the stock market value of the firm the author estimates the change in the value of common stock resulting from an unexpected change in collectively bargained labor costs using bargaining unit wage data and nyse stock returns he estimates a dollar for dollar trade off between these variables this result is consistent with stock valuations based on present value maximizing managerial decisions that is the results are consistent with hotelling s lemma the author also finds support for the hypothesis that collective bargains maximize the sum of shareholder and union member wealth that is the results are consistent with strong efficiency in the contracting environment copyright 1989 by american economic association

a non cournot model of voluntary collective action the interaction of selfish rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real world cases of voluntary collective action the model which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional cournot theory predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory the impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union

an analysis of trade size clustering and its relation to stealth trading abstract nyse and nasdaq trades increasingly cluster on multiples of 500 1 000 and 5 000 shares such clustering varies over time and across stocks and tends to increase with the level of trading activity furthermore rounded trades tend to have more persistence both in occurrence and in trade initiation finally medium sized rounded trades tend to have greater relative price impact than large rounded trades from these observations we surmise that trade size clustering is consistent at least in part with the actions of stealth traders who tend to use medium sized rounded transactions in an attempt to disguise their trades