risk aversion and bandwagon effect in the pivotal voter model the empirical literature on the effects of opinion polls on election outcomes has recently found substantial evidence of a bandwagon effect defined as the phenomenon according to which the publication of opinion polls is advantageous to the candidate with the greatest support this result is driven in the lab experiments by a higher turnout rate among the majority than among the minority such evidence is however in stark contrast with the main theoretical model of electoral participation in public choice the pivotal voter model which predicts that the supporters of an underdog candidate participate at a higher rate given the higher probability of casting a pivotal vote this paper tries to reconcile this discrepancy by showing that a bandwagon effect can be generated within the pivotal voter model by concavity in the voters utility function which makes electoral participation more costly for the expected loser supporters given the strict relationship between concavity and risk aversion the paper also establishes the role of risk aversion as a determinant of bandwagon

aggregation and pairwise aggregation of demand when the distribution of income is fixed abstract this paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise aggregation of the demand functions of a group of consumers conditions under which the mean demand for each pair of consumers satisfies the slutsky restrictions when the distribution of income is fixed the sufficient conditions imply existence of a representative competitive consumer whose demand is the mean demand of the group the necessary conditions imply that such a representative consumer exists for every fixed income distribution only if the consumers have homothetic preferences or alternatively if for each price vector all the consumers income expansion paths lie in the same plane

consumer demand and the life cycle allocation of household expenditures the purpose of this paper is to estimate the parameters of household preferences that determine the allocation of goods within the period and over the life cycle using micro data in doing so the authors are able to identify important effects of demographics labor market status and other household characteristics on the intertemporal allocation of expenditure they test the validity of the life cycle model using excess sensitivity tests and find that controlling for demographics and labor market status variables can largely explain the excess sensitivity of consumption to anticipated changes in income

signaling and election motivations in a voting model with common values and responsive candidates in this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters behavior we analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one dimensional policy space voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate s preferences candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates policy choices we analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates names and private signals css equilibria we show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions we provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most finally we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized all css equilibria are inefficient in the limit

reconstructing the eurozone the role of eu social policy it is widely recognised that the institutional architecture housing monetary union in europe is deeply flawed although there has been considerable discussion about how these shortcomings can be put right relatively little has been said about the role eu social policy can play in making the eurozone more stable and sustainable the purpose of this paper is to address this shortcoming it is argued that that some form of eu social union is urgent for without it the immediate financial problems facing the members of the eurozone cannot be resolved the paper seeks to explain what role eu social policies can play in the construction of an adequate federal framework for the monetary union it is argued that a fully fledged social union is unlikely to emerge that involves massive transfers from the european core to the periphery at the same time it is envisaged that eu social policy will need to be strengthened considerably with interventions focusing on employment creation and on the capacity of national governments to maintain domestic social safety nets

allocation inflexibilities female labor supply and housing assets accumulation are women working to pay the mortgage this article uses data from the 1986 canadian family expenditures survey to estimate a life cycle consistent model of household labor supply and commodity demand that incorporates a mortgage qualification constraint based on earnings both the parametric and nonparametric implications of the model suggest that the labor supply of a nontrivial percentage of married women is constrained by mortgage commitments the results of generalized selectivity models of female labor force participation and labor supply show that the positive effect of a high debt service ratio exceeds the negative effect of young children

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

the paradox of voter participation a laboratory study it is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical observations about voter turnout we report the results of an experiment designed to test the voter turnout predictions of the rational choice palfrey rosenthal model of participation with asymmetric information we find that the three main comparative statics predictions are observed in the data the size effect whereby turnout goes down in larger electorates the competition effect whereby turnout is higher in elections that are expected to be close and the underdog effect whereby voters supporting the less popular alternative have higher turnout rates we also compare the quantitative magnitudes of turnout to the predictions of nash equilibrium we find that there is undervoting for small electorates and overvoting for large electorates relative to nash equilibrium these deviations from nash equilibrium are consistent with the logit version of quantal response equilibrium which provides a good fit to the data and can also account for significant voter turnout in very large elections

job polarization in europe the structure of employment is always changing and economists are always trying to understand those changes in the 1990s the idea of skill biased technological change sbtc was used to understand the shift in employment toward more educated workers see david h autor and lawrence f katz 1999 for a survey however in recent years it has become appar ent that a more nuanced approach is needed the idea of sbtc might lead one to predict a uni form shift in employment away from low skilled and toward high skilled occupations but studies for the united states autor katz and melissa s kearney 2006 and the united kingdom goos and manning 2007 have shown that there is growth in employment in both the high est skilled professional and managerial and lowest skilled personal services occupations with declining employment in the middle of the distribution manufacturing and routine office jobs this is what goos and manning 2007 term job polarization although see the introduc tion to goos and manning 2007 for antecedents of these ideas there are several hypotheses about the rea sons for job polarization first the routiniza tion hypothesis first put forward by autor frank levy and richard murnane 2003 sug gests that the effect of technological progress is to replace routine labor which tends to be clerical and craft jobs in the middle of the wage distribution second there is the view that globalization in general and offshoring in par ticular is an important source of change in the job structure in the richest countries see for example alan s blinder 2007 third there may be a link between job polarization and

transformations of the commodity space behavioral heterogeneity and the aggregation problem aggregation in exchange markets is studied by imposing restrictions on distributions of the households characteristics approximate bounds for market demand price elasticities that depend upon specific measures of behavioral heterogeneity are provided increasing behavioral heterogeneity makes aggregate expenditures more independent of prices this has strong consequences for the prevalence in the aggregate of the weak axiom of revealed preference of gross substitutability and on uniqueness and stability of the walrasian exchange equilibrium these strong macroeconomic regularities are obtained essentially through distributional assumptions as no rationality requirements are imposed on individual demand functions other than homogeneity and walras law journal of economic literature classification numbers d11 d41 d50 el 1992 academic press lnc there are still quite a few unpleasant gaps nowadays between macroanalysis and microanalysis of socioeconomic systems a leading instance drawn from social choice theory is arrow s celebrated impossibility theorem 1 which states that any attempt to aggregate individual preferences into a consistent social ordering or a collective choice procedure satisfying a few appealing requirements is bound to fail the impossibility arises however only if one insists that the procedure should work for every possible environment or in other words for all distributions of individual preferences a possible resolution of the problem is therefore to identify broad classes of distributions of preferences for which aggrega the bulk of the research reported in this paper was essentially done at yale university during the fall semester of 1990 i thank all my colleagues for their support and comments especially martin shubik herbert scarf and truman bewley i also had very useful conversations with jorgen weibull mike jerison andreu mas colell christian gouri6roux camille bronsard guy laroque bruno jullien and bernard caillaud i am much indebted to ai klevorick for his comments on an earlier draft but my greatest debt is to werner hildenbrand whose pioneering insights and stubborn insistance have over the years kept quite a few of us struggling beyond the fads of the moment with the aggregation problem our profession is fortunate indeed to have him around

elections with limited information a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources a one dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested candidates do not know voter utility functions and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions a fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined using poll and endorsement data as information sources it is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters any equilibrium extracts all available information all participants voters and candidates alike act as if they were fully informed for fixed candidate strategies a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium and this process is shown to imply a bandwagon effect

prospects for the eurozone for wim duisenberg the euro s perceived independence from the nation state was a path breaking achievement to be proud of and to cherish little more than a decade later and three years into the deepest economic crisis europe has known since the great depression duisenberg s elation rings strangely anachronistic since what the nationless euro seems to have achieved above all is to undermine whatever mutual confidence at the heart of our community there may have been at the start this special issue takes stock of the euro crisis so far it is concerned with the in depth analysis of its main causes policy proposals for a recovery from the crisis and reform strategies for the reconstruction of a more viable and egalitarian eurozone in the future this introduction provides an overview of both core features of the euro crisis and related debates as well as individual contributions to this special issue section 1 examines the origins of the euro crisis section 2 reviews key policy developments in the evolution of the crisis from its onset in may 2010 to the adoption of outright monetary transactions omts by the european central bank ecb in september 2012 and section 3 provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

engel curves leading to the weak axiom in the aggregate for every range of admissible incomes the authors characterize the class of engel curves with the property that if an economy has first a price independent distribution of income and second preferences which are identical across consumers and generate engel curves in the class then the corresponding aggregate demand function satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference this class is defined by two simple conditions the no torsion condition says that in the relevant range of income the engel curve is contained in a plane through the origin the uniform curvature condition says that in addition the engel curve is either convex or concave to the origin copyright 1987 by the econometric society

public information and electoral bias abstract we present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate these findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences e g through pre election polls or expert forecasts may undermine the democratic process our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge then the unique type symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which each alternative is equally likely to win the election by contrast when citizens are ignorant about the preference distribution the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower welfare is therefore unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the preference distribution

testing for aggregation bias in linear models this paper discusses alternative methods of testing for aggregation bias and proposes direct tests of the discrepancy of the macroparameters from the average of the corresponding microparameters and derives tests of aggregation bias in the general case where the parameters of interest may possibly be nonlinear functions of the microparameters the paper also develops a durbin hausman type misspecification test of the disaggregate model these tests are then applied to disaggregate and aggregate specifications of employment functions for the u k economy disaggregated by forty industries copyright 1990 by royal economic society

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting we investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models in a generalized costly voting model we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient increasing turnout in small elections is only inefficient if the electorate is evenly divided or if there is already almost complete voter participation finally we argue that the effects underlying our results are robust in a large class of endogenous participation models

a unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group specific costs we provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting focusing on type symmetric equilibrium we show that for small electorates members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election as the electorate size grows without bound equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group we relate our equilibrium characterization to myerson s poisson games and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium

bandwagons and momentum in sequential voting in this paper i show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1 these bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate significantly in this equilibrium the pivot probability for each voter is non zero even in an infinite population consequently the bandwagons do not always start after one or at most two favourable decisions as do economic cascades and varying levels of informative voting are observed consistent with observations from sequential voting in u s presidential primaries further voters are exposed to counterintuitive incentives referred to as buyers remorse that have been attributed to real primary voters i also derive equilibrium behaviour in this environment when voting is simultaneous and compare the quality of information aggregation within each mechanism i relate the conclusions to u s presidential primaries and find they are consistent with a common conclusion about the front loading of the primary process that in tight elections with no front runner simultaneous voting is preferred whereas in lopsided elections sequential voting is preferred the superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

demographic effects in demand analysis estimation of the quadratic expenditure system using microdata the purpose of this paper is to estimate a complete theoretically plausible system of demand equations on microdata using the rich detail of these data to investigate the impact of demographic variables on demand behavior the system which we estimate is the quadratic expenditure system qes introduced by howe pollak and wales we evaluate four methods for incorporating demographic variables into the demand system three of these procedures imply parameter restrictions while the fourth does not tests on the restrictions imply that for our data unrestricted estimation yields significantly greater explanatory power

choice between disaggregate and aggregate specifications estimated by instrumental variables methods a choice criterion is proposed for discriminating between disaggregate and aggregate models estimated by the instrumental variables method the criterion based on prediction errors represents a generalization of criteria developed in the context of classical regression models the article also derives general tests for aggregation bias in the instrumental variables context the criterion and the tests are applied in an analysis of u k employment demand it is shown that a model disaggregated by 40 industries predicts aggregate employment better than an aggregate model and that significant biases exist in estimates of the long run wage and output elasticities obtained from the aggregate model

econometric analysis of aggregation in the context of linear prediction models this paper deals with the problem of aggregation where the focus of the analysis is whether to predict aggregate variables using macro or micro equations the grunfeldgriliches prediction criterion for choosing between aggregate and disaggregate equations is generalized to allow for contemporaneous covariances between the disturbances of micro equations and the possibility of different parametric restrictions on the equations of the disaggregate model a new test is proposed of the hypothesis of perfect aggregation which tests the validity of aggregation either through coefficient equality or through the stability over time of the composition of the regressors across the micro units the tools developed in the paper are then applied to employment demand functions for the uk economy disaggregated by 40 industries firstly a set of unrestricted log linear dynamic specifications are estimated for the disaggregate equations and then linear parameter restrictions are imposed as appropriate corresponding unrestricted and restricted aggregate equations are estimated two different levels of aggregation are considered aggregation over the 23 manufacturing industries and aggregation over all 40 industries of the economy in both cases the hypothesis of perfect aggregation is firmly rejected for the manufacturing industries the prediction criterion marginally favors the aggregate equation but over all industries the disaggregated equations are strongly preferred

a comparative welfare analysis of electoral systems with endogenous turnout i investigate the welfare properties of a broad class of electoral systems with endogenous turnout i find that the welfare ranking of electoral systems depends on the composition of the electorate if citizens have identical voting costs then all electoral systems that satisfy certain regularity properties generate the same level of welfare if voting costs are heterogeneous and the two parties are almost equally popular then majority rule mr generates the highest welfare among these systems i also analyse a model with heterogeneous and group specific costs i show that under certain conditions proportional representation dominates mr

altruism and voting a large turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior abstract i propose a game theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large the model has two key features that jointly drive the result i some agents are altruistic or ethical ii among the agents who prefer any given candidate the fraction of altruistic agents is uncertain when deciding whether to vote or not an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare of the society under suitable homogeneity assumptions the asymptotic predictions of my model coincide with those of feddersen and sandroni 12 up to potential differences between the respective parameters that measure the importance of the election i demonstrate with an example that these homogeneity assumptions are not necessary for qualitative predictions of my model i also show that when the fractions of altruistic agents are known turnout rates will typically be close to zero in a large election despite the presence of altruism

household economies of scale in consumption theory and evidence household economies of scale arising from the existence of househo ld public goods increasing returns in household production and or bulk discounts are incorporated into a utility theoretic model of household demands individuals are assumed to be identical and symmetrically treated within households economies of scale parameters for five goods are estimated using the quadratic expenditu re system and data from the u s consumer expenditure survey on expenditures by all adult households results suggest the existence o f significant economies of scale in the consumption of all of the included goods with economies being especially pronounced in the consumption of shelter copyright 1988 by the econometric society

follow the leader theory and evidence on political participation using state by state voting data for u s presidential elections the authors observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness to explain the strategic component of political participation they develop a follow the leader model political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal which depends on the expected closeness of the race at both state and national levels and how voters respond to their effort structural estimation supports this model for example a 1 percent increase in the predicted closeness at the state level stimulates leaders efforts which increases turnout by 0 34 percent

heterogeneity biases distributional effects and aggregate consumption an empirical analysis using stratified microdata using stratified microdata from the canadian famex 78 86 surveys this paper investigates whether observed heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume across strata actually hinders the aggregation process despite significant heterogeneity in marginal responses the divergences between aggregate predicted consumption and the predictions from a model that uses average strata responses are found to be small whenever the strata demands are approximatively linear at the mean and the commodity group considered is not a luxury good on the other hand some cross sectional estimates obtained by pooling the strata are shown to be contaminated by unwanted cross moments further the analysis reconciles the fact that while there exists significant heterogeneity in consumer demands the related distributional effects in the aggregate equation have not been found to be important

asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls this paper demonstrates that the existence of public opinion polls amplifies the effects of shifts in the distribution of the public s preferences over the issue space on the election s results voters evaluate candidates by their positions on the issue space and by a valence or general ability dimension some individual s the informed have more precise information about the relative abilities of candidates than others the uninformed since public opinion polls reflect the information of the informed high approval for a candidate at the polls signals to the uninformed that he is more likely to be abler however high approval may also reflect changes in the distribution of the public on the issue space as a result the uninformed partly confuse the two effects and public opinion polls tend to reinforce the effects of shifts in the public s ideological preferences on election results a shift to the right that shows up as more support for the right wing candidate at the polls is partly interpreted as a higher efficiency of this candidate as a result he wins with a higher margin than the margin he would have won with in the absence of polls or under perfect information

what do we learn about consumer demand patterns from micro data the aim of this paper is to assess the importance of using micro level data in the econometric analysis of consumer demand to do this we utilize a time series of repeated cross sections covering some 4 000 households in each of 15 years employing a number of different aggregation procedures we conclude that aggregate data alone are unlikely to produce reliable estimates of structural price and income coefficients however once certain aggregation factors as well as trend and seasonal components are included an aggregate model is not necessarily outperformed across all demand equations in terms of forecasting ability jel d12 c52 c31 the purpose of this paper is to develop a complete consumer demand system based on a time series of individual household data and to use it to measure the biases introduced into the study of consumer de mand behavior when aggregate data are used in place of the appropriate microeco nomic data we assess the suitability of ag gregate data through the impact on income and price elasticities and by evaluating the ability of both micro and aggregate based models to forecast aggregate consumer de mand the biases introduced by the use of aggregate data depend upon the way that household characteristics interact with in come and price effects and on departures of demand systems from linearity we explore the structure of microeconomic demand sys tems and the role of household characteris tics in the behavior of consumer demand both for the light this may shed on the pattern of future demands and for the im plications this behavior has for issues of aggregation consumer demand patterns typically found in micro data sets vary considerably across households with different household characteristics and with different levels of income we model this variability by making intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations of our demand sys tem depend on household characteristics and by allowing for nonlinear total log expenditure terms in fact in theory consistent demand systems it is total ex penditure rather than disposable income that is allocated across goods we find that this general framework leads to a well specified data coherent demand system which is a quadratic extension of the popu lar almost ideal model of angus s deaton and john muellbauer 1980 the micro level estimates are shown to be sensitive to the treatment of endogeneity of total expen diture and to the specification of interaction terms with household characteristics in ad dition this specification is also shown to possess many attractive features for the evaluation of aggregate models

optimal income distribution rules and representative consumers this paper derives observable properties of economies with optimal income distribution rules that specify consumers incomes as functions of aggregate income and prices optimality implies that the aggregate demand function is generated by a single representative consumer cf samuelson 1956 we derive an additional implication which when consumers receive fixed shares of aggregate income requires that the consumers demands become more dispersed when aggregate income rises this last condition has empirical support the results relate the representative consumer s preferences to a version of kaldor s compensation criterion and show when both can be used for normative analysis without internal inconsistency

viewpoint measuring the well being of the poor with income or consumption a canadian perspective there is a long tradition of using consumption measures derived from statistics canada s household expenditures surveys to study material well being inequality and poverty we offer an introduction to this research income and consumption measures give different pictures of the patterns of material well being in canada but the differences are not as large as in the us we also provide a comparison to meyer and sullivan s results on data quality canadian expenditure surveys are of high quality unique aspects of these surveys variation in quality control measures over time and the possibility of comparing to income tax data provide important insights into the quality of survey data on income and consumption il existe une longue tradition d utilisation de mesures de consommation derivees de l enquete des depenses des menages de statistiques canada pour mesurer le bien etre materiel l inegalite et la pauvrete les auteurs presentent ces recherches les mesures de revenus et de consommation donnent des portraits differents des patterns de bien etre materiel au canada mais les differences ne sont pas aussi importantes qu aux etats unis on presente une comparaison avec les resultats de meyer et sullivan sur la qualite des donnees les enquetes sur les depenses sont de haute qualite au canada certains aspects uniques de ces enquetes variation dans les mesures de controle de qualite dans le temps et possibilite de comparer les donnees derivees des rapports d impot sur le revenu fournissent des apercus importants sur la qualite des donnees d enquetes sur le revenu et la consommation canadian economics association