cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

seasonal cycles business cycles and the comovement of inventory investment and output the importance of inventory investment in the business cycle is well known its role in the seasonal cycle is less well known the authors examine the variation of inventory investment and its comovement with output over the seasonal and business cycles they measure the deterministic and stochastic seasonal components of monthly inventory data and find seasonality contributes about 75 percent of the total variance similar to the proportion found in gdp the authors find that inventory investment and output exhibit high correlation with similar magnitudes at seasonal and business cycle frequencies these findings are consistent with the idea that seasonal cycles and business cycles are propagated through similar mechanisms and suggest that inventory investment may play as important a role in the seasonal cycle as it does in the business cycle

the role of information sharing in cooperative research and development abstract this paper develops a model in which r d cooperation enables firms to increase the probability of discovering a new product by sharing information about research strategies and outcomes numerical computations of equilibrium show that cooperation tends to increase in the underlying probability of research success total surplus generally increases as more firms cooperate and cooperation in equilibrium never exceeds that which maximizes total surplus however when the probability of an innovation s success is relatively low no cooperation occurs nor will much be socially desired finally self imposed limits on membership in the cooperative entity tend to reduce total surplus

on the design of stable joint ventures abstract an analytical model is developed to study the problem of designing stable joint ventures aimed at jointly developing and supplying a new technology the analysis focuses on the extent to which traditional motives for joint ventures like cost sharing synergy effects or technological spillovers may shape the incentives for firms to cheat on the arrangement and hence despite larger cooperative benefits endanger the formation of a stable agreement the cheating firm although supplying the contractually specified inputs to the venture manages to keep its knowhow proprietary while benefiting from the loyal partner s know how through spillovers from the venture only if know how can be kept sufficiently proprietary within the venture will synergy effects stimulate the formation of a stable joint venture increasing the profitability of cooperation while at the same time stifling the incentives to cheat but if know how becomes difficult to appropriate synergy effects may increase the incentives to cheat resulting in no agreement at least when both parties have perfect foresight

disclosure of know how in research joint ventures abstract research joint ventures rjvs usually face technical uncertainty their expected cost typically depending on the know how disclosed by the partners however the partners have little incentive to share their know how when they are simultaneously competitors in other markets in this setting we show that sometimes profitable rjvs do not start when the disclosure of know how is not contractible and characterize the incentive contracts when they exist we also analyze rjvs as an alternative to licensing contracts for the transmission of know how finally we show that the eec s technology policy based on cost subsidies has negative consequences on firms incentives to share know how

optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture abstract we analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free riding problem between the members of an rjv assuming that government intervention is subject to an additional adverse selection problem caused by its inability to distinguish the value of the potential innovation although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms free riding problem they imply different social losses if the government is not able to distinguish perfectly the value of the potential innovation the advantage of monitoring tools relative to subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the government can obtain about firms r d performance

colluding victims a public choice analysis of international alliances analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility maximising actors large allies are exploited by small allies when output is a public good empirical analysis of defence expenditures in nato yields results consistent with the proposition that exploitation increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good but why would large countries acquiesce a public choice analysis offers a different perspective if producers of armaments are rent seeking are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure

better to give than to receive altruistic provision of a global public good developed countries may gain more than developing countries from the provision of a global public good the greater their valuation of the good the higher the productivity of developing countries contributions and the more developed countries derive satisfaction from altruism

scanner data and the measurement of inflation this paper outlines the potential use of bar code scanner data from retailers for the measurement of inflation the source benefits from its extensive coverage in providing data on prices quantities and values of transactions of each model of a good sold relative weights can thus be ascribed to price changes in both base and current months at a highly detailed level which allows us to estimate substitution bias methods of adjusting for quality changes can be considered the dummy variable hedonic approach is compared with a superlative exact hedonic approach and a matching technique akin to that used by statistical offices

the organization of r d and environmental policy abstract we consider a setting where firms undertake emission reducing r d and the regulator who sets the emission tax is unable to commit credibly firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction we examine two regimes with respect to the organization of r d independent r d and an environmental r d cartel erc environmental r d is higher in the erc compared to independent r d for small damages and also for large damages when r d is efficient in contrast when damages are large and r d is inefficient the opposite is true the same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare

menu costs firm strategy and price rigidity abstract after controlling for chain specific effects higher menu costs are associated with a slight decrease in the probability of a price change and an increase in the size of a price change firm strategy is more influential in determining the incidence and magnitude of a price change

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

termination clauses in partnerships abstract we show that when designing a partnership agreement partner firms may prefer not to specify how to allocate the commonly owned assets should there be an early termination of the contract by not including such a clause firms induce litigation before a court with positive probability firms create this ex post inefficiency in order to increase the levels of non contractible investments i e increase the ex ante efficiency the absence of an asset allocation clause works as a discipline device that mitigates the hold up problem within the partnership in our set up no other contract but that without an asset allocation clause can credibly create an ex post inefficiency

research joint ventures and optimal r d policy with asymmetric information abstract when to allow research joint ventures rjvs or not is an important instrument in the development of an optimal r d policy the regulator however is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate r d optimally the extent to which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable that is private information to the firms in the industry in a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a second best r d policy where the government can either allow rjvs or not and give lump sum subsidies to the parties involved the second best r d policy without subsidies will either block some welfare improving rjvs or allow some welfare reducing ones with lump sum subsidies the second best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasing rjvs or blocking welfare increasing ones

the policy implications of the globalisation of innovation abstract the paper develops a taxonomy of the globalisation of innovation based on three categories a the international exploitation of technology produced on a national basis b the global generation of innovations c the global technological collaborations the most evident changes implied by the increasing globalisation of innovation and technology are the tougher and increased competition and the greater collaboration between actors both across and within national boundaries the advantages just as the costs of these tendencies can be substantial leading to a higher risk of winners and losers the paper analyses the different impact that each category might have on the economic and innovative performance of countries and regions with the aim of defining the implications for national policies it is suggested that public policies play a different role in each of the three processes of the globalisation of innovation and that a single strategy does not exist neither from a firm s nor from a government s perspective the paper emphasis that none of the three categories in this taxonomy renders national policy obsolete on the contrary public policies are necessary on a far wider range than those currently implemented in the majority of countries

menu costs posted prices and multiproduct retailers we use a unique store level data set to directly measure menu costs and to study the price change process at a large u s drugstore chain we compare and contrast the magnitude of these measures with similar measures from four large u s supermarket chains we find that 1 the actual magnitude of menu costs as a share of revenues 2 menu costs per price change 3 the frequent use of promotional pricing and 4 the use of weekly pricing rules are similar across both retail formats given that the main common features of these two types of retail formats are that i they both use posted prices and ii both are multiproduct retailers selling a large number of products our findings suggest that the magnitude of the menu cost components we measure and the price change practices we document may be generalizable across retail formats with these two features

innovation and cooperation implications for competition and antitrust n k robel laureate robert solow and his colleagues on mit s industrial productivity commission recently noted dertouzos lester and solow 1989 p 7 undeveloped cooperative relationships between individuals and between organizations stand out in our industry studies as obstacles to technological innovation and the improvement of industrial performance and later p 105 that interfirm cooperation in the u s has often though not always been inhibited by government antitrust regulation these striking conclusions warrant further exploration unfortunately industrial organization textbooks still discuss horizontal cooperation and competition almost exclusively in terms of standard cartel theory on the other hand vertical cooperation contracting is viewed differently and some textbooks provide treatments of supplier buyer relationships in which cooperation is viewed as enhancing efficiency both in the textbooks and in policy discussion among economists cooperation among competitors is highly suspect being perhaps the last bastion of what was once referred to as the inhospitality tradition in antitrust as a result very little literature addresses how cooperation among competitors can promote competition notwithstanding that cooperation among competitors may sometimes be essential if innovating firms are to compete in today s increasingly global markets imai and baba 1989 such cooperation is already important in japan and in europe 1

research joint ventures vs cross licensing agreements an agency approach abstract in this paper two broad categories of organizing a cooperative r d project are compared a research joint venture rjv and a cross licensing agreement cla in a non deterministic r d setting including asymmetric information we show that an rjv is more efficient in providing incentives it allows to capture existing synergies and facilitates the dissemination of the partners know how which is socially desirable however contrary to a cla an rjv faces the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners regarding the provision of their know how to the venture which could lead a cla to perform more efficiently and in some cases this organization turns out to be superior

disclosing own subsidies in cooperative research projects abstract this paper analyzes in a theoretical framework including asymmetric information and uncertainty first why firms participating in cooperative research projects may be interested in hiding information about own subsidies to their partners and second whether the public disclosure of subsidies would be welfare improving we show that the answers to those questions depend mainly on whether the efforts are strategic complements or substitutes and on the way in which the firms ex ante share the total expected profits from the project

conversation with secrets we analyze the sustainability of a conversation when one agent might be endowed with a piece of private information that affects the payoff distribution to its benefit such a secret can compromise the sustainability of conversation even without an obligation the secret holder will disclose its secret if it prevents preemptive termination of the conversation the nonsecret holder lacks this possibility and stops the conversation competition and limited effectiveness of the conversation amplify this result of early disclosure and render the conversation process less sustainable we discuss policy and managerial implications for industry standard development and joint ventures

optimal pricing with costly adjustment evidence from retail grocery prices in many theoretical models it is assumed that there are costs associated with adjusting prices in this paper the existence type and magnitude of such costs are investigated empirically a discrete choice dynamic programming model that nests fixed and variable costs is developed and econometric estimates of the adjustment cost function are obtained the data used to implement the model consist of weekly retail prices and sales of three brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small u s town the study has several distinguishing characteristics first the data are highly disaggregate at the level of brand and store second variables are sampled at weekly intervals third the model nests fixed and variable adjustment costs and can therefore determine their relative importance finally the discrete choice model is both structural and dynamic

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

a dynamic economy with costly price adjustments this paper studies a general equilibrium model of a dynamic economy with menu costs each firm s productivity is exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks around a trend and the money supply to monetary shocks around a trend all consumption pricing and production decisions are based on optimizing behavior there exists a staggered markov perfect equilibrium with prices determined by a two sided s s markup strategy the paper analyzes the optimal markup strategy and investigates the dynamics of the price index and the aggregate output the welfare consequences of the uncertain aggregate productivity and money supply are also examined

why are products sold on sale explanations of pricing regularities this paper reports on interesting changes in markdown pricing practices over time and differences in the pricing within a product line the price discrimination and the uncertainty hypotheses appear to better explain the data than the peak load hypothesis fashion has become more important over time and appears to explain the greater seasonal variation in retail apparel prices in recent years differences in uncertainty also explains differences in the pricing of different types of men s dress shirts

price dynamics in uk manufacturing a microeconomic view this paper examines the response of prices to cost and demand shocks in seventy five three digit and four digit industries in the united kingdom during the 1980s the results suggest that prices responded sluggishly to costs but virtually not at all to demand the short run response to materials and fuel shocks was much larger than the response to unit labor cost shocks and some of this difference persisted into the long run prices responded more sluggishly to cost and demand shocks when aggregate inflation was lower and finally pricing dynamics were more sluggish in less competitive industries copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

r d cooperation and product market competition abstract i derive equilibria that is self enforcing agreements for firms that cooperate in improving their product and compete in marketing it i am particularly interested in the interaction between rd ii product improvement is a function of the effort by each firm iii firms cannot observe each other s effort iv firms market the product by simultaneously setting prices the analysis reveals some surprising results i find that in some cases although monopoly prices can be sustained in equilibrium optimal equilibria call for firms to set lower than monopoly prices in the short run thus providing the right incentives for investment in r d under a different set of assumptions i find that it is optimal to reduce r d effort below the efficient level as a means to sustain short run collusion in prices even though efficient r d effort could be achieved in equilibrium

cooperative r d between vertically related firms with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of cooperative r d in two vertically related duopolies which are two final good manufacturers and two input suppliers with horizontal and vertical spillovers vertical r d cartels yield a larger social welfare than non cooperative r d and if the horizontal spillover rate between the input suppliers is not sufficiently high than horizontal r d cartels technological improvement is accelerated by forming vertical research joint ventures rjvs whether or not their member firms r d decisions are coordinated vertical rjv cartels yield the largest social welfare when the vertically related firms can coordinate their r d decisions and or share useful knowledge fully

lobbying under political uncertainty abstract this paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge we characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence we also offer some results for the general case including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient

coordinating research through research joint ventures abstract in a simple model we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms research abilities are private information this can be done with budget balance even though there are participation constraints there is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities the conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable we give a condition under which the profit maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance

heterogeneity in price rigidity evidence from a case study using microlevel data we combine two data sets to study price rigidity the first consists of weekly time series of retail wholesale and spot prices for twelve products these time series contain two exogenous cost shocks we find that prices exhibit more rigidity in response to the second shock than the first the second data set consists of all publicly available information about the shocks content analysis of these information reveals that the first shock is larger and more persistent and the market has more information on it than the second we conclude therefore that prices are more flexible in response to cost shocks that are larger that are more persistent and on which market participants have more information

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

toward a positive theory of international institutions regulating international aviation markets the regulation of postwar international aviation markets suggests that existing approaches to international institutions cannot adequately account for important elements of international institution building in particular scholars have neglected how domestic politics shapes the incentives of national governments to create and maintain international institutions and the impact of domestic politics on the scope and functions of international institutions drawing on positive theories of regulation and the literature on property rights i argue that national politicians use international institutions to increase the wealth available for domestic redistribution in short national politicians create and maintain international institutions to maximize domestic political support i present a domestic political model that explains how when and why national politicians create international institutions the model is applied to the creation of institutions governing international aviation markets in the late 1940s and the reformulation of these institutions over the past two decades

the theory of international economic sanctions a public choice approach comment william kaempfer and anton lowenberg in this review september 1988 have developed an engaging model of the sanctions process grounded in public choice they identify potentially influential private forces that might affect the nature of a sanctions package while the spirit of their effort is laudable the model fails to incorporate some absolutely essential information about the legal institutional and strategic framework in which sanctions decisions are made as a consequence they reach a conclusion that flies in the face of existing facts contrary to what is suggested by kaempfer and lowenberg kl and contrary to the implications of their model the evidence clearly indicates there is an unequivocal bias against the use of import restrictions in favor of export controls the recent history of economic sanctions shows that only somewhat more than one third of sanction episodes involved both export and import controls further gary hufbauer and jeffrey schott 1985 observe that in instances where only one or the other is invoked export controls are almost always preferred to restrictions on imports 2 an almost exclusive reliance on export controls in economic foreign policy measures is particularly evident in the actions of the united states in the 1970s 3 the purpose of this comment is to explore the causes of this asymmetry there are at least three reasons why export controls have been favored over import controls reasons that play no part in the kl model first the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt has institutionalized a bias against import barriers in favor of export controls second in the united states domestic legal constraints favor export controls and discourage import controls third as will be argued export controls are more easily reversed than import controls and reversibility is a desirable component in any foreign policy based trade intervention consider these points in turn in the 1946 1948 period during which time the gatt was first negotiated trade barriers were identified most often with those artificial impediments to trade that restrict foreign access to domestic markets especially tariffs for this reason gatt rules and actions have sought primarily to dismantle import barriers john jackson 1969 p 502 notes that despite the fact that extensive export controls do exist there has been only one complaint with respect to such controls reflected in gatt documents this is the czechoslovakian complaint against the united states in 1949 for the imposition of discriminatory export controls 4 jackson p 502 observes that there is very little if any effective gatt policing of export control policy and he comments later p 539 that insofar as any gatt obligations can be avoided without consequences this avoidance operates in effect as an exception this suggests that those foreign policy export controls that are pro department of economics university of arizona tucson az 85721 i thank alan deardorff bernard hoekman and robert stem for helpful discussions on work related to this note my thanks also to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments see p 28 and tables 4 1 4 5 pp 70 77 hufbauer and schott 1985 2ibid p 28 3see for example richard cooper 1987 pp 301 302 and p 305 and kenneth abbott 1981 p 741 4this is confirmed more recently by barry carter 1988 p 97 the only other event involving export restrictions challenged before the gatt was the u s embargo against nicaragua in 1985 which involved both import and export restrictions

holiday price rigidity and cost of price adjustment the thanksgiving christmas holiday period is a major sales period for us retailers due to higher store traffic tasks such as restocking shelves handling customers questions and inquiries running cash registers cleaning and bagging become more urgent during holidays as a result the holiday period opportunity cost of price adjustment may increase dramatically for retail stores which should lead to greater price rigidity during holidays we test this prediction using weekly retail scanner price data from a major midwestern supermarket chain we find that indeed prices are more rigid during holiday periods than non holiday periods for example the econometric model we estimate suggests that the probability of a price change is lower during holiday periods even after accounting for cost changes moreover we find that the probability of a price change increases with the size of the cost change during both the holiday as well as non holiday periods we argue that these findings are best explained by higher price adjustment costs menu cost the retailers face during the holiday periods our data provides a natural experiment for studying variation in price rigidity because most aspects of market environment such as market structure industry concentration the nature of long term relationships contractual arrangements etc do not vary between holiday and nonholiday periods we therefore are able to rule out these commonly used alternative explanations for the price rigidity and conclude that the menu cost theory offers the best explanation for the holiday period price rigidity

price rigidities and market structure conventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of keynesian unemployment is the observed rigidities of wages and prices what has been lacking however is a satisfactory theory or conjunction of theories which explains how wages and prices can be at non market clearing levels the objective of this paper is to sketch out several alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon each in contrast with keynesian theory is consistent with the observation that as the economy goes into a recession real product wages do not increase and may in fact decrease all of the theories assume rational profit maximizing firms and all entail some important departure from the standard competitive paradigm the first three explanations represent minor adaptations of standard models

what is new keynesian economics this research was supported by the national science foundation i am grateful to george williams for help with the data and to steven allen laurence ball olivier j blanchard timothy bresnahan charles calomiris dennis carlton robert chirinko russell cooper stanley fischer herschel grossman r glenn hubbard david laidler john leahy assar lindbeck n gregory mankiw david romer julio rotemberg dennis snower john taylor andrew weiss and two anonymous referees for comments on one or more earlier drafts i am also indebted to michael parkin and edmund s phelps for helping to establish the etymology of the phrase new keynesian

redistributive cooperation market failure wealth transfers and the basle accord indecember1987 policymakersbelongingtothegroupoften g 10 signeda far reaching agreement on international nancial regulation the basle accord ontheinternational convergence of capital measuresand capital standards underthetermsof thisagreement g 10 policymakersimplemented uniform risk based capitalrequirements on commercial banks the origins of the basle accord according tokapstein lay in the consequencesof international nancial integration international nancial integration by raising systemic risk and eroding regulators capacity toensure the soundness of national banking systems generated a market failure evi denced by thedebt crisis commercial bankshad accepted ariskier portfolioofloansthan society considered optimal and were now unwilling to bear the full costs of thislending behavior financial market failurecreated a demand for international regula tiontowhichpolicymakersrespondedby supplying thebasleaccord to theextentthat the payments system had the characterof apublic good it wasreasonable to askevery state to contribute to its maintenance bank supervisors responded to theneed for greater oversight by negotiating the basleaccord

rents from in kind subsidy charity in the public sector public choice analysis usually focuses attention on the behaviour of self interested individuals but this paper considers rent seeking when some taxpayers are motivated by altruism redistribution policies initiated by self interested rent seekers require taxpayer approval even if taxpayers are fully informed their resistance to inefficient schemes is reduced when public sector schemes are the only means available to pursue altruistic goals altruism serves to broaden the scope within which rent seekers may operate a discussion of international tied aid illustrates the impact which rent seeking can exert on public sector charity

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed