cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps abstract this paper examines how the country breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import competing and foreign exporting firms the contribution of the analysis is to show how firm level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country breadth i show that a country specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade in contrast a broadly applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import competing firm but will slow down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm s adoption of new technology the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

gender differences in the allocation of assets in retirement savings plans in 1995 40 percent of working men and 32 percent of working women were covered by a defined contribution dc plan a distinguishing characteristic of these plans is that workers can generally choose how their assets are invested using data from the 1992 and 1995 surveys of consumer finances scf this paper examines whether workers differ systematically by gender in the allocation of assets in dc plans previous researchers have reported that many workers tend to invest their retirement assets too conservatively and in particular that women are less likely than men to invest in risky assets such as stocks in the presence of an equity premium a lower propensity by women to invest in stocks could translate into large differences in the accumulation of financial wealth for retirement we establish that gender differences in investment decisions exist though they are more complicated than previous studies have suggested we show that these differences are not completely explained by differences in individual or household characteristics a few studies have examined gender differences in investment decisions vickie l bajtelsmit and jack l vanderhei 1997 richard p hinz et al 1997 these studies use administrative data and report that women tend to invest their retirement funds in less risky vehicles than men michael haliassos and carol c bertaut 1995 use the 1983 scf to examine why such a large fraction of households do not own any stock they report that gender does not have a significant effect on the probability of owning stock though gender differences are not the focus of their paper what these data sources lack haliassos and bertaut being the exception is a rich set of demographic and other variables on households that theory predicts should affect investment behavior this paper adds to the literature by examining gender differences in investment decisions conditioning on such variables the results highlight the importance of including marital status risk aversion measures and the portfolio of assets held outside dc plans when examining gender differences in investment decisions in these plans

are women really more risk averse than men a re analysis of the literature using expanded methods while a substantial literature in economics and finance has concluded that women are more risk averse than men this conclusion merits investigation after briefly clarifying the difference between making generalizations about groups on the one hand and making valid inferences from samples on the other this essay suggests improvements to how economists communicate our research results supplementing findings of statistical significance with quantitative measures of both substantive difference cohen s d a measure in common use in non economics literatures and of substantive overlap the index of similarity newly proposed here adds important nuance to the discussion of sex differences these measures are computed from the data on men women and risk used in 35 scholarly works from economics finance and decision science the results are considerably more mixed and overlapping than would commonly be inferred from the broad claims made in the literature with standardized differences in means mostly amounting to considerably less than one standard deviation and the degree of overlap between male and female distributions generally exceeding 80 in addition studies that look at contextual influences suggest that these contribute importantly to observations of differences both between and within the sexes

voluntary export restraints and expectations an analysis of export quotas in oligopolistic markets the frequency of export quotas imposed as voluntary export restraints has been increasing this tends to create the expectation that similar export quotas will be imposed in the future even if free trade is allowed now the author analyzes the effect of such an expectation he demonstrates that if a quota is expected to be imposed on foreign exporting firms it intensifies the exporting firms competition in the prequota period this offsets the protection which the export quota as a voluntary export restraint will provide for domestic import competing firms in the future quota period copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

market equilibrium under the threat of a ver abstract this paper characterizes market equilibrium under oligopoly when a ver has introduced both asymmetry amongst exporters and uncertainty a restrained and an unrestrained exporter choose price strategically under the threat of a ver on the latter a pure strategy equilibrium is shown to result only when the probability of the ver is high otherwise a unique mixed strategy equilibrium results as the probability of the ver rises the expected domestic price rises even if the ver is not imposed

endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment abstract using bernheim and whinston 1986 common agency game we endogenize trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm where both firms influence the domestic government s trade policy via their contributions the foreign firm can jump over trade restrictions by undertaking foreign direct investment fdi in the domestic market the government prefers a voluntary export restraint ver to a tariff for two reasons first a ver leads to higher contributions from the foreign firm than a tariff second a ver provides a higher level of protection to the domestic firm without generating fdi by the foreign firm

trade policy subtleties with multinational firms abstract regional trade blocks must specify domestic content rules that define the conditions under which a good qualifies as domestic and so may be freely traded within the block this paper analyzes such rules focussing on oligopolistic industries in which foreign multinationals rely much more on imported intermediate inputs that do domestic firms in such a situation we argue that domestic content provisions are anti competitive reducing overall final output of the industry and shifting rents to domestic firms these ideas are examined analytically and then numerically using an applied general equilibrium model of the north american auto industry

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior abstract this paper studies the strategic reactions of firms to protectionist policies that are enforced with endogenous probability this probability is a function of firms actions firms in the country that may adopt the protectionist measures try to increase the probability of sanctions while foreign firms try to reduce this probability a simple framework is used to derive general results for uncertain protection this framework is used to analyze the responses to specific protectionist policies such as antidumping legislation and restrictions on the import market share finally the paper studies the welfare implications of the model

are women more risk averse we find that single women exhibit relatively more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men using u s sample data we examine household holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender differences in financial risk taking as wealth increases the proportion of wealth held as risky assets is estimated to increase by a smaller amount for single women than for single men gender differences in financial risk taking are also influenced by age race and number of children greater financial risk aversion may provide an explanation for women s lower levels of wealth compared with men s jel j16 d81 g11

gender based risk aversion and retirement asset allocation this research examines whether women have higher risk aversion than men as demonstrated by their retirement asset allocation the analysis is extended to investigate how retirement asset investment decisions are made in married households initial results suggest controlling for demographic income and wealth differences lead to no significant difference in the proportion of retirement assets held in stocks between women and male faculty for married households with joint investment decision making results indicate that gender differences are a significant factor in explaining individual retirement asset allocation our estimates imply that women faculty are more risk averse than their male spouse jel j16 g11 d10

risk sharing networks and insurance against illness most risk sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village generally the full risk sharing hypothesis is rejected this paper uses detailed data on all insurance networks within a village in tanzania networks are not clustered but largely overlapping we test whether full risk sharing occurs within these networks while village level full insurance cannot be rejected for food consumption we find evidence consistent with at least partial insurance of non food consumption via networks

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

the economics of voluntary export restraint agreements the three substantive sections of this survey deal with the economic consequences of voluntary export restraint agreements vers e g the multi fibre arrangement and vers on japanese auto exports section 2 focuses on the disposition of quota rents under the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and the absence of substitute suppliers section 3 considers imperfect competition and the role of vers as cartelization instruments facilitating collusion section 4 analyzes the discriminatory effects of vers when there are third country suppliers a broad conclusion is that the economic consequences of vers are more complex than the standard trade policy analysis based on tariffs because of the issues discussed in sections 3 and 4 copyright 1989 by blackwell publishers ltd

why can t countervailing duties deter export subsidization abstract this paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former to explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the gatt conform countervailing duty measures factors such as delay in retaliation the gatt constraint on the amount of countervailing duties and voluntary export restraints must be considered we find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties evidence from cote d ivoire abstract this paper investigates the hypothesis that households in cote d ivoire take part in spatially diversified risk sharing arrangements with members of their own ethnic group empirical tests are presented using several estimation methods to deal with heteroscedasticity measurement error and extreme value problems to examine whether results are robust across estimation procedures the hypothesis of complete risk sharing within ethnic groups is rejected however there appears to be some partial insurance performed by individual households with other members of the same ethnic group particularly for the households residing in the regions least likely to have access to formal financial arrangements

the formation of risk sharing networks this paper examines the formation of risk sharing networks in the rural philippines we find that geographic proximity possibly correlated with kinship is a major determinant of mutual insurance links among villagers age and wealth differences also play an important role in contrast income correlation and differences in occupation are not determinants of network links reported network links have a strong effect on subsequent gifts and loans gifts between network partners are found to respond to shocks and to differences in health status from this we conclude that intra village mutual insurance links are largely determined by social and geographical proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversification of income risk the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of dyadic models

precautionary saving under liquidity constraints evidence from rural pakistan this paper investigates precautionary saving under liquidity constraints in pakistan using household panel data in particular while we estimates kimball s 1990 prudence parameter we deviate from dynan s 1993 framework by explicitly considering liquidity constraints as in zeldes 1989 by doing so we attempt to differentiate the standard precautionary saving caused by uncertainty from the one due to liquidity constraints furthermore endogenous liquidity constraints are considered to resolve issues of selection biases in this study we document substantial evidence of the presence of precautionary saving in pakistan more specifically the estimated prudence is significantly higher for liquidity constrained households as compared with unconstrained ones the results support the emerging view that facilitating saving may often be more important than finding better ways of lending to the poor

changing patterns of wealth distribution evidence from ghana a largely unexplored feature of structural transformation is the change in the composition of an economy s asset holdings in most poor economies assets are concentrated in land in rich economies

gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking comparing children in colombia and sweden we explore gender differences in preferences for competition and risk among children aged 912 in colombia and sweden two countries differing in gender equality according to macro indices we include four types of tasks that vary in gender stereotyping when looking at competitiveness running skipping rope math and word search we find that boys and girls are equally competitive in all tasks and all measures in colombia unlike the consistent results in colombia the results in sweden are mixed with some indication of girls being more competitive than boys in some tasks in terms of performance change whereas boys are more likely to choose to compete in general boys in both countries are more risk taking than girls with a smaller gender gap in sweden

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry the political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import competing producers the regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving or instigating international collusion hence voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import competing producers and a de emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement similarly trigger price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti dumping measures to preserve fair competition likewise the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated but as demonstrated by kalt s econometric analysis contentious complaint of unfair foreign competition voluntary export restraints trigger price mechanisms and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors

information sharing and oligopoly in agricultural markets the role of the cooperative bargaining association we study incentives for information sharing among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output information sharing always increases expected grower and total surplus but may reduce expected intermediary profits even when expected profits increase with information sharing intermediary firms face a prisoner s dilemma where it is privately rational to withhold information given that other firms report truthfully this equilibrium can be avoided if firms information reports are verifiable and if firms commit to an ex ante contract that enforces participation in information sharing we show how agricultural bargaining legislation can implement such a contract with the bargained farm price representing a sufficient statistic of all information held by intermediary firms

quota induced cycles we present a new framework to compare the dynamic effect of tariffs and quotas in the presence of oligopoly suppose that the domestic and the foreign firm play a quantity setting game over time in a perfectly stationary economy a markov perfect equilibrium has the foreign firm exporting at the constant rate under a tariff in contrast under the quota the rate of exports changes monotonically over the course of each year causing seasonal fluctuations in domestic production quota induced cycles can make dynamic market segmentation possible and raise profits for both the firms above what they earn under the equal import tariff

imperfect competition in agricultural markets and the role of cooperatives a spatial analysis important characteristics of many agricultural markets are costly to transport raw products and relatively few processors one or more of which is often a cooperative this paper analyzes pricing behavior in these oligopsonistic spatial markets and focuses specifically upon the conjecture that cooperatives may have a procompetitive effect on the behavior of rival non co op processors the existence and magnitude of a procompetitive effect is shown to depend upon a number of structural and strategic factors including competitive relations among the non co op processors and a cooperative s membership and pricing policies

the cyclical behavior of strategic inventories this paper presents a model in which inventories are used by a duopoly to deter deviations from an implicitly collusive arrangement higher inventories allow firms to punish cheaters more strongly and can thus help to maintain collusion we show that when demand is high the incentive to deviate increases so that increases in inventories may be optimal for the duopoly this rationalizes the observed positive correlation between inventories and sales in our empirical section we show that as our model predicts this correlation is more important in concentrated industries we also provide several examples where inventories have been a factor in cartel behavior

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

asset smoothing consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints abstract a growing literature asks whether low wealth agents can accumulate assets over time or whether they are trapped in poverty this paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model with endogenous asset price risk to explore savings and portfolio decisions in a resource poor environment characterized by risk and subsistence constraints optimal portfolio strategies are found to bifurcate despite divisible assets and fully rational agents wealthier agents acquire a higher yielding portfolio and pursue conventional consumption smoothing poorer agents acquire a less remunerative portfolio and pursue asset smoothing rather than consumption smoothing asset based risk coping thus results in positive correlation between initial wealth and portfolio rate of return

quantitative restrictions and tariffs with endogenous firm behavior abstract this paper considers a foreign oligopoly which dominates an importing country s market with its exports of differentiated products it constructs a model where firm behavior is endogenously determined in an infinitely repeated game and it analyzes the impact of trade policies on market conduct and welfare optimal tariffs optimal quotas and optimal tariff quotas are characterized and compared one result is that quotas can enhance competition and increase welfare another result is that quotas can be superior to tariffs finally optimal tariff quotas are welfare superior to either tariffs or quotas alone

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

vers and expectations extensions and evidence this paper analyses the effects of an expected future voluntary export restraint on the level of firms current exports to a market the traditional result that current exports increase is shown to depend on the degree of collusion in the exporting industry and the anticipated restrictiveness of the ver the former relationship is tested by reference to the effect of ec import surveillance on its imports surveillance is argued to indicate an increased probability of a ver in the future and it is found that while competitive industries respond to it by increasing exports to the ec less competitive ones curtail exports this constitutes one of the few empirical tests of the strategic part of strategic trade policy

consumption insurance an evaluation of risk bearing systems in low income economies the hypothesis of full risk sharing can be taken to data from low income countries and evaluate formal and informal financial systems in many contexts idiosyncratic risks are high so credit insurance arrangements could be beneficial statistical tests reveal that households in southern india take advantage of these possibilities villages in cote d ivoire and countries in thailand do not do as well the paper includes an empirical description of the devices used to smooth consumption and a theoretical discussion of private information and incentives on ideal operating systems the full information and mechanism design frameworks provide benchmarks for policy analysis

ec members fighting about surplus vers fdi and japanese cars the distribution of consumer and producer surplus among ec members of three different trade regimes free trade a voluntary export restraint ver and a ver in conjunction with foreign direct inv

windfall profits and vertical relationships who gained in the japanese auto industry from vers this paper employs an event study to analyze the effect of the 1981 voluntary export restraint agreements on profits in the japanese automobile industry stock price movements of seven japanese automakers and sixty nine of their suppliers are examined the results indicate that the profits of japan s producers of passenger cars rose as a result of the voluntary export restraints while only some suppliers large ones and those producing specialized parts or services appear to have shared the benefits voluntary export restraints increased profits for some firms in the japanese auto industry but many suppliers did not share the windfall copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

asset allocation and individual risk aversion 1992 asset allocation and individual risk aversion financial analysts journal vol 48 no 6 pp 32 37

the role of obsolescence and inventory costs in providing commitment this paper modifies the cournot and stackelberg models to allow the firms to sell less than they have produced and to store the unsold portion of their output as inventory even if one of the firms can choose its output before the other if it is costless to carry unsold goods forward then the cournot outcome emerges we show however that costs of carrying the inventory forward endow the firms with a limited degree of commitment to sell what they have produced this partially restores the first mover advantage if the firms choose their outputs simultaneously the cournot outcome emerges and has locally consistent conjectures

trade diversion from tomato suspension agreements trade barriers can cause output to be diverted to other countries and into other products we study the effect of a voluntary price restraint vpr on mexican tomatoes entering the united states the diversion caused by the vpr is statistically and economically significant representing over four fifths of the direct effects of the trade barrier when the vpr was binding mexico exported more tomatoes to canada the united states cut back on exports while canada increased their exports to the united states the vpr also diverted fresh tomatoes in mexico into paste production which was then exported to the united states des barrieres commerciales peuvent entrainer la diversion de l output vers d autres pays ou d autres productions on etudie la diversion causee par les accords de restriction volontaire des prix arvp des tomates mexicaines entrant sur le marche americain la diversion causee par les arvp a ete statistiquement et economiquement significative representant plus des quatre cinquiemes des effets directs de la barriere tarifaire quand les arvp ont ete contraignants le mexique a exporte plus de tomates au canada les etats unis ont reduit leurs exportations alors que le canada augmentait ses exportations vers les etats unis les arvp ont aussi entraine une diversion des tomates fraiches au mexique vers la production de puree de tomate un produit qui a alors ete exporte vers les etats unis

research and development voluntary export restriction and tariffs abstract the effect of trade policy on domestic research development r d in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on the nature of policy instruments tariffs or non tariff barriers when the r d investment has uncertain consequences on marginal cost a voluntary export restriction ver decreases innovation by the domestic firm as compared to the free trade level this result holds both under cournot and bertrand competition a tariff increases r d investment it is a new rationale for southern firms to prefer ver as a policy instrument besides the well known argument that it facilitates collusion

nontariff barriers and trade liberalization i introduction it is common to recognize that tariffs have gradually been replaced by nontariff barriers ntbs some authors go even further and argue there is a law of constant protection an expression used by bhagwati 1988 mainly to dismiss the idea baldwin 1984 600 for instance writes not only have these measures become more visible as tariffs have declined significantly through successive multilateral trade negotiations but they have been used more extensively by governments to attain the protectionist goals formerly achieved with tariffs the purpose of this article is to set up a model in which the effect of trade liberalization on the use of quotas and antidumping laws can be investigated directly we analyze two types of bilateral trade liberalization tariff reductions and quota elimination we show that our model is consistent with a progression from the use of tariffs only to the use of quotas following tariff liberalization to the use of antidumping laws when quotas have been jointly tarrified second it is also consistent with a narrowing of the range of industries in which each of these instruments is used third the extent of bilateral tariff liberalization and the ensuing degree of replacement of tariffs by ntbs depend on the combination of two industry specific characteristics the government s preferences for domestic firm profits and the importance of international transport cost in the industry overall our results suggest that treaties that remove or reduce one type of distortion may lead to the use of other policies tha t are even worse but despite the use of ntbs overall trade is more liberal to show these results we use a standard two country model with two way trade where the policy maker s objective function is quasi concave this last characteristic is important to explain some of the results as it leads to strategic complementarity in the tariff game and to the possibility of interior solutions in the quota game our results appear to track three separate sets of empirical facts well first evidence shows that there is a clear emergence of quantitative restrictions in the 1960s in manufacturing sectors and in developed economies followed by an explosion in the use of antidumping constraints since the 1980s 1 the emergence of these two ntbs can be linked to preceding multilateral trade rounds and in particular to the completion of the kennedy round today the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt 1990 10 notes that despite a recent decline in the number of anti dumping investigations initiated in the united states and the european communities anti dumping remains after tariffs the most frequently invoked trade policies in these countries antidumping measures are also spreading to developing countries nogues 1993 quantitative restrictions are meanwhile on the decline as signatories of the uruguay round agreement are now required to tariffy existing quotas and constrain their future use gatt 1990 documents specific import quotas import licensing restrictions and items subject to import prohibition that have been eliminated in recent years second the gradual replacement of trade tools has also been accompanied by a reduction of the number of sectors affected by ntbs whereas very few products were traded without levy before the various gait rounds renner 1971 finds that 7 of the four digit product classes were affected by quantitative restrictions in the united states and in the european communities in 1970 the number of antidumping cases in the european communities initiated and or ending up with a positive decision represents a fraction of this number see gait 1993b mainly concentrated on a very small number of sectors see messerlin and reed 1995 of course it is not because a smaller number of sectors are affected by ntbs that overall protection necessarily decreases however given the high rates of growth in world trade it seems likely that despite this substitution the overall level of protection has decreased over time

in search of homo economicus behavioral experiments in 15 small scale societies we can summarize our results as follows first the canonical model is not supported in any society studied second there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross cultural research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments third group level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games fourth individual level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups fifth behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

voluntary export restraints as protection policy the u s beef case there are several well known implications of international trade theory which are relevant to our study with a tariff an importing country s welfare can improve only if the excess supply curve is upward sloping under the large country assumption bhagwati has shown that a quota used by an importer can be equivalent to a tariff and mintz has contrasted features of tariffs quotas and vers empirical work has focused largely on the effects of tariffs and equivalent quotas generally exporting countries lose from such trade barriers in contrast we find that exporting countries gain and importing countries lose with a ver we also contrast the gains and losses of vers in the case of frozen boneless beef to an optimal tariff and optimal export tax the theoretical implications of vers for beef exporters were first recognized by freebairn and gruen

anti dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly abstract this paper constructs a conjectural variations model of international oligopoly in which the home country s optimal policy responses to the foreign government s subsidies and foreign firms dumping can be calculated some theoretical support is found for tariffs that countervail part of the foreign export subsidy the optimal fraction depends on the size of own and cross effects in demand and on the extent of market competition however no normative case is found for anti dumping duties

the closed loop motive for voluntary export restraints this paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints in a dynamic game model of duopolistic competition it is shown that the imposition of a voluntary export restraint at the free trade level of imports increases the market price and the profits of all firms in the industry if free trade is identified as the closed loop subgame perfect cournot equilibrium of the game hence the authors conclude that the predictions of static cournot competition do not carry over to the dynamic case

compositional standards import permits and market structure the case of canadian cheese imports the imposition of cheese compositional standards by the canadian authorities has created divisions within the canadian dairy industry and has motivated criticisms from several of canada s trade partners the standards impose minimum limits on the percentage of casein coming from fluid milk we develop a theoretical model to investigate the implications of canada s compositional cheese standards while accounting for canada s trade policy we illustrate why a type of cheese that is not directly impacted by the standards might be the most affected we show that the standards can decrease the domestic demand for milk or the value of imports our empirical investigation identified breaks in the processes determining import unit values shortly before or shortly after the beginning of the implementation of the standards

international competitiveness and industry pricing in canadian manufacturing this paper examines the effect of the international competitiveness of home producers on their pricing evidence based on the 1970 75 period supports the claim that in the canadian manufacturing sector domestic prices are set in accordance with a mixture of two pricing hypotheses the eastman stykolt pricing hypothesis esph and the monopolistic pricing hypothesis mph however in the 1975 80 period when their competitiveness increased prices were set solely according to the mph for the purposes of assessing the impact of free trade this paper shows the circumstances under which each or a mixture of these pricing hypotheses employed in the harris cox model on the gains from freer trade would be appropriate

cleaning up while cleaning up pollution abatement interest groups and contingent trade policies this paper analyzes the political economy of environmental policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection we argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing the preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers

endogenous protection foreign direct investment and protection building trade abstract we introduce the possibility of foreign direct investment fdi in a strategic oligopolistic setting with endogenous protection and find that a number of unique subgame perfect equilibria may arise including a new result we call protection building trade this phenomenon occurs in our model when foreign firms locating production in the home country try to increase protectionist pressures in the home country through increased exports to provide larger barriers against other foreign competitors in future periods we discuss how the foreign firm behavior surrounding significant u s protectionist actions including the vers on japanese automobiles may be consistent with protection building trade behavior

injury based protection with auditing under imperfect information 1 introduction this article focuses on the use of signals to limit distortionary protection when a domestic firm has private information about injury from foreign competition we assume that a domestic authority is mandated to use trade policy to maintain domestic production while minimizing costs to domestic consumers the presence of asymmetric information about domestic production costs means that the firm will have an incentive to overstate the harm it is suffering from imports we analyze how the authority can use an incentive device to punish a firm if a costly audit determines that the firm has overstated its injury an incentive compatible mechanism is derived consisting of a probability of audit a tariff and a penalty that will insure that the firm does not retain informational rents associated with the private information this basic problem of an authority assessing domestic injury arises in a number of critical trade policy contexts the two most prominent examples in the world trade organization wto system are safeguard mechanisms and unfair trade remedies i e antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in both types of administered protection cases a domestic trade authority must determine whether injury beyond some critical level has occurred before wto consistent protection can be imposed the information used to evaluate injury is provided by the affected domestic industry which has an obvious incentive to overstate the harm caused by foreign competition given that these types of contingent protection procedures are the single most important form of protection under the wto system potential misuse of private information is of great importance there are two strands of relevant literature the first considers strategic behavior in the specific context of administered protection the second concerns information asymmetries in more general trade policy outcomes the former strand has focused on strategic behavior between firms to exploit administered protection procedures prusa 1992 shows how antidumping cases in home and foreign firms can manipulate contingent protection to enforce collusion staiger and wolak 1991 study how antidumping acts as a cartel enforcing device in a noncooperative infinitely repeated game framework in a two period noncooperative game framework with uncertainty prusa 1994 shows that the home firm might feign first period injury in order to get the protection in the second period this may induce foreign firms to raise their export prices and to lower their own domestic market price as shown by fischer 1992 firms will try to act strategically to increase the endogenous probability of protection leidy and hoekman 1991 and leidy 1994 extend this concept more broadly to contingent protection and call it spurious injury the second strand of the literature focuses more broadly on incomplete information in trade policy collie and hviid 1994 investigate rent extraction from a foreign monopolist with incomplete information about domestic demand qiu 1994 and brainard and martimort 1997 investigate strategic trade policy with incomplete information about the domestic cournot firm s costs herander and kamp 1999 consider how incomplete information about the domestic cost structure can affect the outcomes of quantitative restrictions while collie and hviid 1994 herander and kamp 1999 and qiu 1994 use a signaling game framework brainard and martimort 1997 develop their approach within an incentive contracts context this article s approach is based on both incentives and signals we follow partially the approach of kohler and moore 1998 who analyze the same information asymmetries but use transfers to the domestic firm to elicit truth telling the present analysis takes perhaps a more realistic tack by considering how an authority can audit information provided by the firm to eliminate misrepresentation of injury

are women as likely to take risks and compete behavioural findings from central vietnam using controlled experiments to compare the risk attitude and willingness to compete of husbands and wives in 500 couples in rural vietnam we find that women are more risk averse than men and that compared to men women are less likely to choose to compete irrespective of how likely they are to succeed relevant to development programmes concerned with lifting women out of poverty our findings suggest that women may be more reluctant to adopt new technologies take out loans or engage in economic activities that offer higher expected returns in order to avoid setups that require them to be more competitive or that have less predictable outcomes

quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice abstract in a vertical product differentiation model under cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long run quality for a quantity restriction at and in the neighborhood of the free trade import level average quality increases only when the low quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota voluntary export restraint the change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota the imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long run choice of quality

tariffs quotas and voluntary export restraints with and without internationally mobile capital this paper presents a general framework for comparing the effects of tariffs quotas and vers voluntary export restraints both with and without international capital mobility expressions for the shadow price of foreign exchange and the shadow price of capital under each type of trade restriction are derived and it is shown that although international capital mobility raises the welfare cost of tariff protection it lowers the welfare cost of quantitative restrictions in most cases the effects of exogenous shocks in the presence of quotas are intermediate between those in the presence of tariffs and those in the presence of vers tarifs douaniers contingentements et restrictions volontaires d l exportation quand le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur presente un cadre general d analyse qu il utilise pour comparer les effets de tarifs douaniers de contingentements et de restrictions volontaires a l exportation dans des contextes ofu le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur derive le prix fictif du change etranger et le prix fictif du capital sous l un et l autre types de restrictions au commerce et montre que meme si la mobilite internationale du capital augmente le cofut en terme de bien etre de la protection tarifaire elle reduit le cofut en terme de bien etre des restrictions sur les quantites echangees dans tous les cas les effets de chocs exogenes quand des contingentements existent sont toujours dans la fourchette entre ceux qu on observe quand des tarifs douaniers existent et ceux qui prevalent quand des restrictions volontaires i l exportation existent

more on the non equivalence of voluntary export restraints abstract this note demonstrates that vers limiting exporters to a percentage of the domestic market are not equivalent to other trade restrictions and that they can be inferior to equivalent import quotas even when the quota rents accrue to foreign exporters

financial decision making are women really more risk averse 40 males 33 females gain gambling gain domain loss gambling loss domain a contextual frames b abstract gambling frames studies the application of experimental methods provided stronger control of the economic environment in which decisions were made we elicited data which call into question the prevalence of stereotypic risk attitudes in financial decision making first we find that the comparative risk propensity of male and female subjects is strongly dependent on the financial decision setting second and more important we observe no gender differences in risk propensity when subjects face contextual decisions since in practice financial decisions are always contextual our results suggest that the above gender stereotype may not reflect true male and female attitudes toward financial risks i gender specific risk behavior an experimental design our experiment was designed to examine gender specific risk propensity in decisions relevant for investors and managers table 1 gives an overview of the experimental design in the main treatment we implemented risky choices in the form of investment and insurance decisions choice behavior in this treatment henceforth called the context treatment directly measures the risk behavior of male and female subjects in contextual financial decisions we also ran a control treatment in which the same risky choices were presented as abstract gambling decisions this control treatment henceforth called the abstract treatment allows us to validate the risk behavior induced by our experimental procedure in the light of the above mentioned gambling evidence in the context treatment subjects were confronted with risky choices in two different decision contexts subjects first had to complete a series of investment decisions they were then presented with a series of identical choices this time however framed as insur1 wealth effects from income differences outside the laboratory may still affect risk behavior in our experiment they are controlled for in our model 2 experimental instructions are available in german from the authors or in english from our web page www wif ethz ch publikationen htm ance decisions each investment and insurance decision incorporated a choice between a risky lottery and a certain payoff with the series of choices implemented in the two frames we elicited our subjects certainty equivalents for the same four risky lotteries l1 l2 l3 l4 in both contexts we implemented two frames in the context treatment in order to measure the risk propensity of subjects toward both perceived gains and perceived losses in both frames all possible payoffs for each decision were positive in the investment frame these payoffs were also presented as gains while in the insurance frame the same payoffs were presented as losses relative to an initial endowment therefore elicited certainty equivalents in the investment frame measure subjects risk propensities in the gain domain while certainty equivalents in the insurance frame measure risk propensity in the loss domain if in contextual financial decisions female subjects are generally more risk averse than men our results should display ceteris paribus lower female certainty equivalents in both the investment and insurance frames 3 the four lotteries l1 l2 l3 and l4 each had two possible outcomes payoffs in swiss francs 1 sfr a 0 60 and their probabilities were 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 30 sfr 2 10 sfr 2 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 and 50 sfr 2 20 sfr 2 respectively 4 experimental evidence suggests that individual risk propensity will vary systematically between the gain and loss domain daniel kahneman and amos tversky 1979 383 vol 89 no 2 gender and economic transactions 3y16 my68 mp 383 friday dec 10 08 20 am lp aer my68 figure 1 differences in mean certainty equivalents ce between male and female subjects by frame note certainty equivalents and male female differences are measured in swiss francs in the abstract treatment we confronted a different group of subjects with exactly the same risky decisions as those in the main treatment however as mentioned before all choices in this control treatment were framed as abstract gambling decisions again two frames were implemented in the gaingambling and loss gambling frames we measured the risk attitudes of subjects toward gambles in the gain and loss domain respectively subjects in both treatments were told in advance that one of their choices would determine their experimental earnings further all subjects completed a post experimental questionnaire which yielded information on each subject s disposable income this information is necessary to exclude wealth effects due to income differences outside the laboratory as an explanation of gender specific choice behavior

decreasing relative risk aversion and tests of risk sharing the relative risk aversion rra coefficient of a household whose consumption is close to the subsistence level may be very high for example if consumption is exactly at the subsistence level the household may not be willing to bear any risk if this is the case then the rra coefficient must be a decreasing function of wealth for poor households therefore we should allow the possibility of decreasing rra drra in testing the full risk sharing hypothesis however existing tests in the empirical literature are derived using preferences that exhibit either increasing or constant rra even when they are applied to data containing low income households we therefore use a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility which implies increasing constant and decreasing rra as special cases to test full risk sharing hypothesis using the international food policy research institute ifpri and the international crops research institute of the semi arid tropics icrisat household level data sets we find evidence in support of the drra hypothesis along with evidence favoring full risk sharing hypothesis at the village level and evidence against the hypothesis at the inter village level when rra is restricted to be constant we replicate the previous results in the literature reject the full risk sharing hypothesis at both levels our tests however reject this restriction and favor drra in almost all cases these results suggest that it is important to allow for drra in testing the full risk sharing hypothesis when data containing low income households are investigated this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

risk and household grain management in developing countries a dynamic model is presented of a household s joint production storage and trade decisions when facing transaction costs and risk in prices and yields grain management decisions balance the goals of maximising profits and reducing consumption price risk model solutions calibrated to chinese data show that grain s consumption role makes it an attractive form of precautionary saving even when households have access to credit the joint nature of production and savings decisions limits the income loss associated with risk coping and the desire to store grain can explain why subsistence households are frequently net purchasers but rarely net sellers of grain

a welfare comparison between vers and tariffs under the gatt economic theory suggests that tariffs are welfare superior to voluntary export re straints vers in the presence of perfect competition however with imperfectly competitive markets some authors have found that vers may be welfare superior to tariffs we reconsider the comparison between a ver and a tariff in the context of gatt based constraints using a model of perfect competition we show that a ver can welfare dominate a tariff increase that is accompanied by a compensatory reduction in the tariff on another good or if the tariff is matched with a retaliatory tariff on domestic exports une comparaison des effets de bien e tre des restrictions volontaires a 1 exportation et des tarifs douaniers dans le cadre du regime du gatt la theorie economique suggere que

consumption risk sharing in social networks we develop a model of informal risk sharing in social networks where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments we characterize incentive compatible risk sharing arrangements and obtain two results 1 the degree of informal insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network measured by the number of connections that groups of agents have with the rest of the community relative to group size twodimensional networks where people have connections in multiple directions are su ciently expansive to allow very good risk sharing we show that social networks in peruvian villages satisfy this dimensionality property thus our model can explain townsend s 1994 puzzling observation that village communities often exhibit close to full insurance 2 in second best arrangements agents organize in endogenous risk sharing islands in the network where shocks are shared fully within but imperfectly across islands as a result network based risk sharing is local socially closer agents insure each other more

self production friction and risk sharing against disasters evidence from a developing country summary this paper uses a unique household data set collected in vietnam to empirically test the necessary conditions for an extended version of the consumption risk sharing hypothesis the test explicitly incorporates self production and uses natural disasters such as avian influenza droughts and floods to identify the effectiveness of market and non market risk sharing mechanisms with these additional treatments full risk sharing within each commune cannot be rejected which suggests the presence of omitted variable and endogeneity biases in existing studies that reject full risk sharing we also find that credit constraints have a significant impact although limited commitment is not necessarily serious

is risk fully pooled within the household evidence from ghana using detailed household survey data from ghana this paper examines whether the transitory incomes of individual household members affect household expenditure patterns divided into six sections the themes include risk sharing networks household survey data from ghana theoretical framework of risk sharing within households estimating transitory income and effects on household budget shares the conclusion that transitory incomes earned by different members of the household have different effects on household expenditure patterns this implies that household members do not engage in full risk pooling with each other moreover it is not always the case that all women or all men display similar preferences or risk pooling behavior this suggests complex features within the household risk sharing structure which is more complex than might be hypothesized by a simplistic analysis framed along gender lines

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

can the production smoothing model of inventory behavior be saved the production smoothing model of inventory behavior has a long and venerable history and theoretical foundations that seem very strong yet certain overwhelming facts seem not only to defy explanation within the production smoothing framework but actually to argue that the basic idea of production smoothing is all wrong most prominent among these is the fact that the variance of detrended production exceeds the variance of detrended sales this paper first documents the stylized facts then it derives the production smoothing model rigorously and explains how the model can be amended to make it consistent with the facts finally it reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence and tries to draw some tentative conclusions

gender differences in risk behavior an analysis of asset allocation decisions in ghana abstract within a developing country context little is known about gender differences in risk preferences as reflected in asset allocation decisions much of the empirical literature within development studies on risk and investment in assets centers on risk coping and risk management strategies of households with some exceptions this literature primarily focuses on household and household level outcomes previous experimental studies have explored gender differences in risk preferences in developing countries with inconclusive results using unique national representative sex disaggregated data with self reported asset ownership and wealth information of individuals within households in ghana from a multi country project the gender asset gap project this paper explores men and women s risk preferences as reflected in asset allocation decisions through a decomposition method typically used to explore gender differences in wage employment the study finds that although women hold significantly fewer risky assets than men in absolute terms and as a proportion of their wealth in the sample men and women do not have systematically different risk preferences the results in this paper differ from the results in many empirical studies in developed countries where women are often found to be more risk averse than men as the first study to look at gender differences in risk aversion in terms of asset allocation with in the developing country context the results from this study provide evidence that gender differences in risk attitudes may vary by cultural context as the growing experimental literature in developing countries suggests

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

voluntary export restraints profits and quality adjustment this paper develops a model of vertical differentiation to assess the impact of output constraints on the profits and quality choices of firms subject to them a competitive environment is developed with the automobile industry in mind multiproduct oligopolists producing differentiated goods who behave as coumot competitors the results show that an output constraint will not induce constrained firms to upgrade their product line when their unconstrained competitors produce higher quality models it is also shown that an output constraint can raise the profits of constrained firms despite output increases by unconstrained firms

antidumping duties undertakings and foreign direct investment in the eu we study the effects of eu antidumping policy when foreign firms can jump antidumping duties through foreign direct investment fdi in the eu we show that duty jumping or duty pre empting fdi occurs if the eu administration has broader objectives than protecting eu industry s profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad the expectation of price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in fdi and may even discourage fdi as long as products are not too differentiated the results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping fdi

consumption risk technology adoption and poverty traps evidence from ethiopia much has been written on the determinants of input and technology adoption in agriculture with issues such as input availability knowledge and education risk preferences profitability and credit constraints receiving much attention this paper focuses on a factor that has been less well documented the differential ability of households to take on risky production technologies for fear of the welfare consequences if shocks result in poor harvests building on an explicit model this is explored in panel data for ethiopia historical rainfall distributions are used to identify the counterfactual consumption risk controlling for unobserved household and time varying village characteristics it emerges that not just ex ante credit constraints but also the possibly low consumption outcomes when harvests fail discourage the application of fertilizer the lack of insurance causes inefficiency in production choices