purchasing power parity based on effective exchange rate and cointegration 25 ldcs experience with its absolute formulation abstract with the development of cointegration technique the purchasing power parity ppp theory has received renewed attention most studies have tested the theory by using data from developed countries dcs and some high inflation less developed countries ldcs they have mostly rejected its empirical validity in this paper we use the concept of effective exchange rate and quarterly data over 1973 1988 to examine the experience of 25 ldcs for most countries we found little empirical support for the ppp

growth miracles and failures in a markov switching classification model of growth abstract in this paper economic growth is interpreted as a sequence of transitions between distinct growth regimes that countries visit with different frequencies countries featuring similar growth dynamics are endogenously grouped into three different clusters the first cluster comprises successful countries that are characterized by lengthy periods of high or very high growth moderately successful countries in the second cluster experience both periods of reasonable growth and periods of stagnation whereas failing countries in the third cluster suffer from highly volatile growth rates with frequent episodes of crisis successful countries are characterized by better initial conditions policies and institutions compared to the other countries neither initial conditions nor institutions distinguish moderately successful from failing countries what makes them different is policy in the form of investments into infrastructure and human capital trade liberalization and limited policy volatility

revisiting purchasing power parity for african countries with nonlinear panel unit root tests this study applies panel seemingly unrelated regressions sur kapetanios et al kapetanios shin snell kss surkss tests proposed by wu and lee 2009 to investigate the properties of long run purchasing power parity ppp in 15 african countries the empirical results from the univariate unit root and panel based unit root tests indicate that ppp does not hold for these 15 countries under study however panel surkss tests indicate that ppp is valid for four of these 15 countries these results have important policy implications for these 15 african countries under study

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

the political dynamics of economic growth summary we argue that an understanding of the political drivers of economic growth needs an explanation of the political dynamics around the transition from one growth phase to another and that the political drivers of early stage growth accelerations are different from that of growth maintenance informal institutions are likely to play a role in growth acceleration while formal institutions of credible commitment the provisioning of public goods and the overcoming of co ordination failures will be more important in growth maintenance we present empirical evidence drawn from country case studies and cross country econometric analysis that provides support to our theoretical propositions

stationarity of asian pacific real exchange rates abstract using a nonlinear unit root test we reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for most of the asian pacific real exchange rates but not for the japanese yen based rates there is more evidence for level stationarity in the singapore dollar based rates than in other currency based rates

nonlinear dynamics in deviations from the law of one price a broad based empirical study abstract in this paper we test empirically the validity of the law of one price using data for five major bilateral us dollar exchange rates and nine goods sectors during the recent floating exchange rate regime since the early 1970s using threshold autoregressive models we find strong evidence of nonlinear mean reversion in deviations from the law of one price with plausible convergence speeds consistent with theoretical arguments on international goods markets arbitrage under transactions costs and with an emerging strand of empirical literature these results contribute towards forming a consensus view in favor of discrete regime switching in deviations from the law of one price and the presence of differing nonzero transactions costs across a broad range of goods and countries

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

are any growth theories robust this article investigates the strength of empirical evidence for various growth theories when there is model uncertainty with respect to the correct growth model using model averaging methods we find little evidence that so called fundamental growth theories play an important role in explaining aggregate growth in contrast we find strong evidence for macroeconomic policy effects and a role for unexplained regional heterogeneity as well as some evidence of parameter heterogeneity in the aggregate production function we conclude that the ability of cross country growth regressions to adjudicate the relative importance of alternative growth theories is limited despite the vast amount of empirical research generated by new growth theories there is remarkably little consensus on which mechanisms are most salient in explaining cross country differences this article is designed to provide some evidence on this question by examining the robustness of empirical support for different growth the ories as determinants of both aggregate growth and its underlying components total factor productivity tfp growth and physical and human capital accumulation one reason for the lack of empirical consensus on growth determinants is that the main statistical tool in empirical studies cross country growth regressions provides very different answers depending on how the regression is specified which for this context typically amounts to the choice of control variables individual papers typically employ regressions that include modest subsets of the body of regressors that have been pro posed in the literature as a whole others employ a kitchen sink approach to evaluate the relative evidentiary support of competing growth theories in such an exercise a large number of variables are included in a regression and those variables that prove to be significant are then declared to be the important determinants of growth while the others are dismissed as unimportant rodrik et al 2002 sachs 2003

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

nonlinear adjustment to purchasing power parity in the post bretton woods era abstract this paper models the dynamics of adjustment to long run purchasing power parity ppp over the post bretton woods period in a nonlinear framework consistent with the presence of frictions in international trade we estimate exponential smooth transition autoregressive estar models of deviations from ppp which are obtained using the johansen cointegration method for both consumer price index cpi and wholesale price index wpi based measures and a broad set of us trading partners in several cases we find clear evidence of a mean reverting dynamic process for sizable deviations from ppp with the equilibrium tendency varying nonlinearly with the magnitude of disequilibrium analysis of impulse response functions also supports a nonlinear dynamic structure but convergence to long run ppp in the post bretton woods era is very slow

endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model abstract the following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent the model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income consumption and growth are identifiable bureaucratic red tape is then added to the model the results suggest that a priori corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

dependency disarticulation and denominator effects another look at foreign capital penetration less developed countries desparately need capital to develop but countries dependent on foreign capital face slower economic growth higher income inequality and possibly impaired domestic capital formation these conclusions emerge from a reassessment of glenn firebaugh s broad critique of capital dependency research which exposed an important error in earlier studies the solution charts new theoreticall ground by factoring dependency effects into the differential productivity of foreign and domestic investment and the negative externalities from foreign capital penetration the revised formulation is applied to cross national analyses of economic growth decapitalization and income inequality the findings consistently support capital dependency theory

does ppp hold in african countries further evidence based on a highly dynamic non linear logistic unit root test with a view to investigating whether the purchasing power parity ppp theory holds true for selected african countries during the january 1980 december 2003 period we employ a rigorous highly dynamic non linear logistic unit root test as first advanced by leybourne et al 1998 which is considerably more powerful than those tests traditionally used compared with the rejection of the null of the unit root process for only one of the 22 countries under study when we use the traditional adf pp kpss np and the df gls unit root tests with the leybourne et al 1998 test we strongly reject the null of the unit root process for a surprising six of the 22 countries these empirical results clearly indicate that ppp holds true for these six countries namely the central african republic the cote d ivoire kenya madagascar uganda and lesotho

long run purchasing power parity with asymmetric adjustment further evidence from african countries this study applies threshold cointegration test advanced by enders and siklos 2001 to investigate the properties of asymmetric adjustment in long run purchasing power parity ppp in 22 selected african countries during the period of january 1980 to december 2003 although there is evidence of long run ppp for most african countries the adjustment mechanism is asymmetric these results have particularly important policy implications for african countries

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

institutions versus policies a tale of two islands recent work emphasizes the primacy of differences in countries colonially bequeathed property rights and legal systems for explaining differences in their subsequent economic development barbados and jamaica provide a striking counter example to this long run view of income determination both countries inherited property rights and legal institutions from their english colonial masters yet experienced starkly different growth trajectories in the aftermath of independence from 1960 to 2002 barbados gdp per capita grew roughly three times as fast as jamaica s consequently the income gap between barbados and jamaica is now almost five times larger than at the time of independence since their property rights and legal systems are virtually identical recent theories of development cannot explain the divergence between barbados and jamaica differences in macroeconomic policy choices not differences in institutions account for the heterogeneous growth experiences of these two caribbean nations

trade as a threshold variable for multiple regimes abstract this paper employs the data sorting method developed by hansen econometrica 68 2000 575 which allows the data to endogenously select regimes using different variables it is shown that openness as measured by the trade share to gdp is a threshold variable that can cluster middle income countries into two distinct regimes that obey different statistical models our result suggests that openness may not be as crucial in the growth process of low and high income countries but it is instrumental in identifying middle income countries into high and low growth groups

empirics of hills plateaus mountains and plains a markov switching approach to growth abstract most economic growth research has been aimed at explaining cross country differences in average growth rates however it is well known that growth experiences differ over time within a country almost as much as they differ among countries this paper builds on pritchett s 2000 pritchett lant understanding patterns of economic growth searching for hills among plateaus mountains and plains world bank economic review may 2000 14 2 221 250 observation that the growth process can be thought of as transitions between different growth regimes and proposes a framework for systematic analysis of such regimes and the dynamics of the transitions i estimate a markov switching regression to characterize four distinct growth regimes and transitions between them the results show that countries switch among regimes of stable growth miracle catch up stagnation and crisis with the transition probabilities determined by the quality of institutions better institutions appear to improve long run growth by making episodes of fast growth more persistent low average growth rates in countries with weak institutions are a result of these countries spending more time in stagnation regimes rather then being incapable of fast growth at all weak institutions do not rule out growth takeoffs but limit their sustainability the approach directs attention to shifts in growth performance and highlights the fact that identical average growth rates can mask very distinct growth paths

wealth culture and corruption this paper examines the impact of national wealth income distribution government size and four cultural variables on the perceived level of corruption in a country the study finds that corruption is significantly correlated to gnp per capita power distance masculinity and uncertainty avoidance significant interaction effects occur in collectivistic and high power distance countries suggestions for future research are developed

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

structural differences in economic growth an endogenous clustering approach this article addresses heterogeneity in determinants of economic growth in a data driven way instead of defining groups of countries with different growth characteristics a priori based on for example geographical location we use a finite mixture panel model and endogenous clustering to examine cross country differences and similarities in the effects of growth determinants applying this approach to an annual unbalanced panel of 59 countries in asia latin and middle america and africa for the period 1971 2000 we can identify two groups of countries in terms of distinct growth structures the structural differences between the country groups mainly stem from different effects of investment openness measures and government share in the economy furthermore the detected segmentation of countries does not match with conventional classifications in the literature

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

convergence clubs and subsistence economies abstract this paper focuses on one possible explanation for the empirical evidence of a income convergence among the world s poorest countries and among its wealthiest countries and b income divergence among most of the remaining countries the model incorporates the assumption of subsistence consumption into the neoclassical exogenous growth model yielding outcomes that are consistent with the convergence divergence empirical evidence while subsistence consumption can lead to negative saving and disaccumulation of capital it can also coincide with positive saving and accumulation of capital the model predicts that the poorer the country the lower its saving rate a result that also appears to be borne out by the evidence provided here

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

income inequality development and dependence a reconsideration we reconsider the role of foreign investment in income inequality in light of recent critiques that question the results of quantitative cross national research on foreign capital penetration we analyze an unbalanced cross national data set in which countries contribute different numbers of observations with a maximum of 88 countries and 488 observations dated from 1967 to 1994 random effects regression models that control for unmeasured country heterogeneity are used to investigate effects of foreign capital penetration on inequality measured as the gini coefficient against the background of an internal developmental model of inequality we adapt firebaugh s 1992 1996 critique of the literature on the effect of foreign investment on economic growth to the study of income inequality and find that the stock of foreign direct investment has an effect on inequality that is independent of the mechanisms identified by firebaugh we explore tsai s 1995 claim that the effect of foreign capital penetration is spurious and find that foreign stock has a significant positive effect on inequality net of region specific differences an alternative interpretation of the findings of the foreign investment inequality literature is discussed in light of the discovery of an inverted u shaped relationship between income inequality and foreign investment stock per capita we conclude that thinking on the relationship between income inequality and investment dependence should be revised in light of an investment development path relating the inflow and outflow of foreign capital to economic development

macroeconomic volatility and welfare in developing countries an introduction macroeconomic volatility both a source and a reflection of underdevelopment is a fundamental concern for developing countries their high aggregate instability results from a combination of large external shocks volatile macroeconomic policies microeconomic rigidities and weak institutions volatility entails a direct welfare cost for risk averse individuals as well as an indirect one through its adverse effect on income growth and development this article provides a brief overview of the recent literature on macroeconomic volatility in developing countries highlighting its causes consequences and possible remedies it then introduces the contributions of a recent conference on the subject sponsored by the world bank and pompeu fabra university barcelona

co integration tests for long run equilibrium in the monetary exchange rate model abstract the monetary model of exchange rate determination is tested as a long run equilibrium relation tests of co integration among the variables in this model over a wide range of specifications are generally unfavorable to the monetary approach

the solow model with ces technology nonlinearities and parameter heterogeneity this paper examines whether nonlinearities in the aggregate production function can explain parameter heterogeneity in the solow growth regressions nonlinearities in the production technology are introduced by replacing the commonly used cobb douglas cd aggregated production specification with the more general constant elasticity of substitution ces specification we first justify our choice of production function by showing that cross country regressions favour the ces over the cd technology then by using an endogenous threshold methodology we show that the solow model with ces technology is consistent with the existence of multiple regimes copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

openness in services trade and economic growth abstract we examine the relationship between openness in services trade both telecommunication and financial and economic growth via the threshold regression model to test for a differential impact between low and high income countries results confirm the existence of a two regime split

institutional causes macroeconomic symptoms volatility crises and growth countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies including high inflation large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more slowly during the postwar period does this reflect the causal effect of these macroeconomic policies on economic outcomes one reason to suspect that the answer may be no is that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also have weak institutions including political institutions that do not constrain politicians and political elites ineffective enforcement of property rights for investors widespread corruption and a high degree of political instability this paper documents that countries that inherited more extractive institutions from their colonial past were more likely to experience high volatility and economic crises during the postwar period more specifically societies where european colonists faced high mortality rates more than 100 years ago are much more volatile and prone to crises based on our previous work we interpret this relationship as due to the causal effect of institutions on economic outcomes europeans did not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions in areas where they faced high mortality once we control for the effect of institutions macroeconomic policies appear to have only a minor impact on volatility and crises this suggests that distortionary macroeconomic policies are more likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional problems rather than the main causes of economic

social articulation as a condition for equitable growth abstract a formal model is developed to establish the structural conditions that result in growth being progressive or regressive on the personal distribution of income these conditions include 1 intersectoral investment priorities between wage goods and luxuries and 2 the state of the levels and distribution of incomes which determines the social origin of demand for different sectors of the economy the particular combinations of investment and income structures that result in equalizing social articulation or unequalizing growth social disarticulation are derived we show empirically that the structural conditions that allowed rapid but unequalizing growth in brazil between 1968 and 1977 were those of social disarticulation

another look at the export of raw materials and economic growth recent empirical evaluations of the economic consequences of specialization in the export of raw materials have been seriously hampered by inadequate conceptualization and measurement of the central variables a scale is advanced to measure relative degree of processing of exports and it is shown that specializing in the export of goods with low levels of processing has a significant negative effect on economic growth the broader results suggest that position in the world economy is an important determinant of the economic fate of nations

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

purchasing power parity over two centuries strengthening the case for real exchange rate stability a reply to cuddington and liang cuddington and liang 2000 purchasing power parity over two centuries journal of international money and finance 19 751 755 examine the long span of sterling dollar real exchange rate data of lothian and taylor 1996 real exchange rate behavior the recent float from the perspective of the past two centuries journal of political economy 104 488 509 and claim to reject long run purchasing power parity by fitting time trends or by considering very high order autoregresssive representations this reply demonstrates however that the central claims of lothian and taylor are in fact strengthened by the implications of cuddington and liang s analysis in that while the economic importance of introducing trend terms is slight this leads to a faster estimated speed of mean reversion c 2000 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved jel classification f31 f41 c22

threshold cointegration and purchasing power parity in the pacific nations the paper uses a threshold cointegration methodology to explore the properties of long run purchasing power parity ppp in the pacific nations using japan and the usa as base countries it is shown that long run ppp holds for most asian countries but that the adjustment mechanism is asymmetric in contrast to symmetric error correction models it is found that asymmetric adjustments of nominal exchange rates play an important role in eliminating deviations from long run ppp

real exchange rate behavior in the middle east a re examination abstract this letter extends recent work by bahmani oskooee bahmani oskooee m do exchange rates follow a random walk process in middle eastern countries economics letters 1998 58 339 344 on testing long run purchasing power parity for middle eastern countries during the post bretton woods period using multivariate nonlinear models strong support is provided for highly nonlinear reversion of real exchange rates toward a stable equilibrium for each country examined

do weak institutions prolong crises on the identification characteristics and duration of declines during economic slumps this paper studies periods of prolonged contractions in output per capita in a sample of 145 countries from 1950 to 2014 economic slumps are defined as abrupt interruptions of a period of growth by several regime switches slumps start with a sharp contraction along with a trend break which is followed by another switch when growth stabilizes again the paper then analyzes the correlates of these slumps focusing on the length and depth of the contraction from the beginning of the slump to its trough the results establish three new stylized facts i weak political institutions predate crises whereas political reforms tend to follow them ii the length and depth of economic declines are robustly correlated with executive constraints and ethnic heterogeneity and iii there is a robust interaction between these two variables suggesting that institutions constraining leaders are important for stabilizing growth this is particularly relevant for sub saharan africa where politics are often ethnic and decision makers are comparatively unconstrained

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

do all countries grow alike abstract this paper investigates the driving forces of output change in 77 countries during the period 1970 2000 a flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for i the inefficient use of resources and ii different production technologies across countries the proposed model can identify technical efficiency and input change for each of three endogenously determined regimes membership in these regimes is estimated rather than determined ex ante this framework enables explorations into the determinants of output growth and convergence issues in each regime

on the output effects of barriers to trade we study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a hecksher ohlin trade model into an optimal growth framework the model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity furthermore there is a selective development trap to which countries may or may not converge depending on policy income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase hence cross country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per capita income observed across countries the effects are quantified and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of tfp and long run income differentials across countries we study the effects of international trade policy on output to do so we analyze a standard neoclassical growth model where countries can trade intermediate goods the markets of these goods are structured as in the also standard hecksher ohlin trade model thus trade happens owing to comparative advantage which emerges from differences in factor endowments across countries 2 we focus on the case of a small price taking economy one can solve for equilibrium sequentially first each period s output and trade can be treated as a static problem and its solution can be summarized by a mapping from capital and labor to the output of the final good then using that endogenous mapping as if it were an exogenous production function one can solve the intertemporal decisions of agents in the economy in that way a potentially complex dynamic trade problem is avoided it turns out that the equilibrium mapping linking inputs and final output is affected by tariffs as the gains from trade impact not only welfare but also the availability and price of intermediate inputs and hence productivity

macroeconomic stability and the distribution of growth rates it is often argued that macroeconomic instability can form a binding constraint on economic growth drawing on a new index of stability threshold estimation is used to divide developing economies into two growth regimes depending on a threshold level of stability for the more stable group of countries the output benefits of investment are greater conditional convergence is faster and measures of institutional quality have more explanatory power suggesting that instability forms a binding constraint for the less stable group macroeconomic stability is also shown to dominate several other candidates for identifying distinct growth regimes

the purchasing power parity debate originally propounded by the 16th century scholars of the university of salamanca the concept of purchasing power parity ppp was revived in the interwar period in the context of the debate concerning the appropriate level at which to re establish international exchange rate parities broadly accepted as a long run equilibrium condition in the post war period it first was advocated as a short run equilibrium by many international economists in the first few years following the breakdown of the bretton woods system in the early 1970s and then increasingly came under attack on both theoretical and empirical grounds from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s accordingly over the last three decades a large literature has built up that examines how much the data deviated from theory and the fruits of this research have provided a deeper understanding of how well ppp applies in both the short run and the long run since the mid 1990s larger datasets and nonlinear econometric methods in particular have improved estimation as deviations narrowed between real exchange rates and ppp so did the gap narrow between theory and data and some degree of confidence in long run ppp began to emerge again in this respect the idea of long run ppp now enjoys perhaps its strongest support in more than 30 years a distinct reversion in economic thought

disarticulation and human welfare in less developed countries disarticulation refers to the juxtaposition of economic sectors with different levels of development and productivity disarticulation is hypothesized to have a negative effect on social well being net of economic development because it inhibits the spread effects generally thought to be associated with economic growth findings are in accord with this hypothesis although the relationship is complex the strongest effects of disarticulation are found among the poorest nations the concept of disarticulation opens a new and promising avenue of research that may help to resolve contradictory findings of recent research on the political economy of growth

testing for country heterogeneity in growth models using a finite mixture approach we define a bivariate mixture model to test whether economic growth can be considered exogenous in the solovian sense for this purpose the multivariate mixture approach proposed by alfo and trovato is applied to the bernanke and gurkaynak extension of the solow model we find that the explanatory power of the solow growth model is enhanced since growth rates are not statistically significantly associated with investment rates when cross country heterogeneity is considered moreover no sign of convergence to a single equilibrium is found copyright 2008 john wiley sons ltd

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

searching for stationarity purchasing power parity under the current float abstract using panel data methods we investigate long run purchasing power parity by testing for unit roots in real exchange rates of industrial countries under the current float the evidence against the unit root hypothesis is stronger for larger than for smaller panels for monthly than for quarterly data and when the german mark rather than the united states dollar is used as the base currency while we find that accounting for serial correlation considerably weakens the evidence against the unit root null the results as a whole are consistent with long run purchasing power parity

testing for convergence clubs in income per capita a predictive density approach the article proposes a technique based on the predictive density of the data conditional on the parameters of the model to jointly tests for groups of unknown size in a panel and to estimate the parameters of each group the procedure is applied to the problem of identifying convergence clubs in scaled income per capita data the steady state distribution of european regional data clusters around four poles of attraction with different economic features the distribution of income per capita of oecd countries has two poles of attraction and each group clearly identifiable economic characteristics we share the uncommonness of being different j p roche

the market for public office why the indian state is not better at development abstract how and why officials are transferred from one post to another can in india does have far reaching consequences for the effectiveness of public service organizations such as irrigation agriculture forestry and soil conservation departments the transfer mechanism used in many departments of indian states involves a kind of internal labor market a truer market than in the way that term is often used by labor market economists it allows pressures for corrupt behavior to bear down on the incumbents of certain posts and itself amplifies those pressures frequently the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments why is the indian state not better at promoting development to an important degree because of the corruption transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives

the overvaluation of purchasing power parity abstract recent panel studies of purchasing power parity have reported strong evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates however these studies fail to control for cross sectional dependence in the data this failure has dramatic consequences raising the significance level of tests with a nominal size of 5 percent to as much as 50 percent it is shown in this paper that controlling for cross sectional dependence no evidence against the random walk null can be found in panels of up to 64 real exchange rates this finding cannot be attributed to low power as there is ample power in panels of this size to reject the unit root null