buyer s equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility a recursive approach we study a decentralized trading model as in peters 1984a where heterogeneous market participants face a trade off between price and trade probability we present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in nash equilibrium based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

premature de industrialisation theory evidence and policy recommendations in the mexican case the main consequences of premature de industrialisation are a slowdown in the rate of economic growth and the deferral of economic development despite having adopted a successful export led growth strategy since the early 1980s these two phenomena have characterised the mexican economy during the past three decades in this article i investigate whether premature de industrialisation has been a major contributor to mexico s economic stagnation and attempt to identify which factors have been driving it the results confirm the hypothesis of premature de industrialisation and suggest that the evolution of income capital accumulation labour manufacturing productivity trade openness and the exchange rate provide an explanation for this process i also suggest a set of alternative policy measures aimed at returning the mexican economy to the path of growth and development

note the newsvendor model with endogenous demand this paper considers a firm s price and inventory policy when it faces uncertain demand that depends on both price and inventory level the authors extend the classic newsvendor model by assuming that expected utility maximizing consumers choose between visiting the firm and consuming an exogenous outside option the outside option represents the utility the consumer forgoes when she chooses to visit the firm before knowing whether or not the product will be available the authors investigate both the case in which the firm s price is exogenous and the case in which price is chosen optimally the paper makes two contributions first the authors show that the firm holds more inventories provides a higher fill rate attracts more customers and earns higher profits when it internalizes the effect of its inventory on demand second the authors show that in the endogenous price case the firm s two dimensional decision problem can be reduced to two sequential single variable optimizations as a result the endogenous price case is as easy to solve as the exogenous price case

on the welfare gains of price dispersion can price dispersion be associated with higher levels of welfare to answer we compare two economies that differ only in the way prices are formed in the first sellers post a unique price quantity pair with no price dispersion in the second sellers post a quantity only and let prices be determined ex post by realized demand resulting in price dispersion we show that while agents trade lower quantities when prices are dispersed an intensive margin effect they also trade more often an extensive margin effect at low inflation the extensive margin dominates making agents better off with price dispersion

pricing access services many established industries such as the online service industry the telecommunication industry or the fitness club industry are access service industries when using services in these industries consumers pay for the privilege of accessing the firm s facilities but do not acquire any right to the facility itself a firm s pricing decisions in access industries frequently come down to a simple choice among flat fee pricing usage pricing or two part tariff pricing however it is not so simple for firms in those industries to make this choice access service firms typically face a mix of consumers who have intrinsically different usage rates a key characteristic of access service firms however is that the cost of providing an additional minute of usage is typically negligible as long as the firm has the necessary capacity to serve its customers service capacity which corresponds to the total available time on a firm s system is often limited in this paper we show that service capacity and consumer usage heterogeneity are two important factors that determine a firm s optimal choice we develop a model that incorporates these two salient characteristics shared by access industries and study what determines a firm s choice among the three alternative pricing structures flat fee pricing usage pricing or two part tariff pricing our analysis shows that in the presence of consumer usage heterogeneity service capacity mediates a firm s optimal choice in a complex yet predictable way a firm s choice also hinges on whether heavy or light users are more valuable in terms of their willingness to pay on a per unit capacity basis the presence of both consumer usage heterogeneity and capacity constraints prompts a firm to choose its pricing structure to attract a desired customer mix and to price discriminate as a result two part tariff pricing is not always optimal in access industries and a firm s pricing structure can vary in a complex way with the interaction of those two factors specifically we show that when light users are more valuable a firm may use a two part tariff or a flat fee depending on whether the firm is constrained by its service capacity but never charge a usage price alone or offer any signing bonus a negative flat fee or a flat payment to customers when heavy users are more valuable a firm may choose to set a usage price a signing bonus plus a usage price or flat fee interestingly regardless of whether heavy or light users are more valuable in an access service industry only flat rate pricing is a sustainable pricing structure once the industry has developed sufficient excess capacity we also show that the optimal pricing strategy in access industries can have some intriguing nonintuitive implications that have not been explored elsewhere for instance when the industry capacity is unevenly distributed between competing firms the large capacity firm may well be advised to increase rather than to decrease its price to accommodate the small firm it would be too costly and too tactless for the large firm to do otherwise in fact the strategy of accommodation calls on the larger firm to retreat in both light and heavy user markets and leave more of its capacity idle and more of the market demand unmet when the small firm s capacity hence the industry capacity increases this implies that incremental policy measures that encourage the growth of smaller companies in the presence of a large company can be welfare decreasing because the growth of smaller firm can force the retreat of a large company at the expense of market coverage today services account for two thirds to three quarters of the gnp not only in the united states but also in many industrial countries access industries are growing rapidly to exert profound impact on today s economy however service pricing in general and pricing access services in particular have not received adequate attention in the literature in this paper we take the first step in understanding how capacity constraints and consumer usage heterogeneity mediate the choice of pricing structures in both monopolistic and competitive contexts

trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse we endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand auctions bargaining discount pricing etc expose buyers to the price risk the uncertainty of not knowing how much to pay in advance fixed price trading eliminates the price risk which is why risk averse customers accept paying more to shop at such stores

directed search for equilibrium wage tenure contracts i analyze the equilibrium in a labor market where firms offer wage tenure contracts to direct the search of employed and unemployed workers each applicant observes all offers and there is no coordination among individuals workers applications as well as firms recruiting decisions are optimal this optimality requires the equilibrium to be formulated differently from the that in the literature of undirected search i provide such a formulation and show that the equilibrium exists in the equilibrium individuals explicitly tradeoff between an offer and the matching rate at that offer this tradeoff yields a unique offer which is optimal for each worker to apply and applicants are separated endogenously according to their current values despite such uniqueness and separation there is a non degenerate and continuous wage distribution of employed workers in the stationary equilibrium the density of this distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages in all equilibrium contracts wages increase with tenure which results in quit rates to decrease with tenure moreover the model makes novel predictions about individuals job to job transition and comparative statics

perfect competition in the continuous assignment model abstract this paper provides a rigorous formalization in the context of the transferable utility assignment model of perfect competition as the inability of individuals to favorably influence prices the central tool for the analysis is the social gains function the central issue is differentiability of the gains function with respect to the population seven conditions are shown to be equivalent to perfect competition perfect competition and imperfect competition are possible for both finite and continuum assignment economies but most finite economies are imperfectly competitive while most continuum economies are perfectly competitive however most large finite assignment economies are approximately perfectly competitive journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 c62 c78

competing premarital investments this paper studies premarital parental investments in children s wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage by investing in their children s wealth parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry in large marriage markets the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition but equilibrium investments are not efficient

sorting versus screening search frictions and competing mechanisms in a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism price posting prevails when meetings are rival i e when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer s meeting probability under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non rival price posting is not an equilibrium multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

efficiency of simultaneous search this paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity they observe firms wage postings before choosing where to apply owing to coordination frictions a firm may not receive any applications otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers it is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient walrasian outcome as application costs vanish even for nonnegligible application costs the entry of firms the search intensity and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency

asymmetric capacity constraints and equilibrium price dispersion abstract price dispersion arises despite perfect information about prices in equilibrium the higher capacity firm adopts a high price high availability strategy the lower capacity firm adopts a low price low availability strategy and consumers are more likely to shop at the high price firm

competitive equilibrium with search frictions a general equilibrium approach abstract when the trading process is characterized by search frictions traders may be rationed so markets need not clear we build a general equilibrium model with transferable utility where the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity in the spirit of the arrow debreu theory prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics but also on the probability that their trade is rationed the standard definition of competitive equilibrium is extended by replacing the market clearing condition with an exogenous matching function which describes a trading technology that is not frictionless as is typical in search models the matching function relates the rationing probabilities of buyers and sellers to the ratio of buyers to sellers in the market when search frictions vanish our model is equivalent to the continuous assignment model of gretsky et al 20 we adapt their approach which uses linear programming techniques and duality theory to show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is constrained efficient in our environment our competitive equilibrium notion is equivalent to that of directed or competitive search the strength of our formulation and the linear programming approach is that they allow us to generalize the constrained efficiency and existence results in the directed search literature to a much broader class of economies our framework also opens the door to the use of existing algorithms for computing equilibria and taking these models to the data

market power and efficiency in a search model we build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and resulting policy implications of firms market power in a frictional labor market our environment has two main characteristics wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and there is a finite number of agents we find that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and that the firms market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms a minimum wage forces the low productivity firms to increase their wage leading them to hire even more often thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they limit firms market power by improving the workers outside option

aggressive tax avoidance a conundrum for stakeholders governments and morality this is the conundrum that gives rise to the issue of tax avoidance although governments always seem to lack sufficient funds to support the needs of society tax codes are often written that offer a way out of paying taxes for some but not all constituents the ways out are referred to as loopholes that allow taxpayers to avoid taxes this paper first defines the basic terms of tax avoidance and tax evasion and then offers an ethical review of the morality of aggressive tax avoidance aggressive tax avoidance is then addressed in relationship a corporate entity s tone at the top the conclusion is drawn that use of the letter of the law to avoid payment of taxes sorely needed by governments for the good faith provision of public goods and services is ethically unacceptable several suggestions for change are provided including a new financial statement disclosure and the possibility of a published corporate ethics report

moral ethics v tax ethics the case of transfer pricing among multinational corporations in recent years there has been an increased awareness with regards to ethics in business more specifically the abundance of well publicized examples of cheating greed and hypocrisy has created some alarm about the general state of personal ethics josephson 1988 recent examples include the oliver north ivan boesky and jimmy swaggart cases the tax practitioner probably has little direct concern for matters of misconduct and ethical improprieties as mentioned above adherence to a code of conduct appears to circumvent the ethical conflict typically found in the business environment the tax practitioner s ultimate goal is tax minimization for clients this goal has the blessings of the courts and the writers of tax law

the mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment we study the implementation of constrained efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function we argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding this holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching function has decreasing returns to scale where the hosios rule does not apply both with and without heterogeneity this wage determination mechanism is similar to the one proposed by mortensen 1982 in a different setting

an equilibrium theory of learning search and wages we propose an equilibrium theory of learning from search in the labor market which addresses the search behavior of workers the creation of jobs and the determination of wages as functions of labor market histories in the model each worker has incomplete information about his job finding ability and learns about it from his search outcomes the theory formalizes a notion akin to discouragement over each uninterrupted unemployment spell unemployed workers update their beliefs about their job finding abilities downward and reduce their desired wages one contribution of the paper is to integrate learning from search into an equilibrium framework by inducing endogenous heterogeneity in workers beliefs learning from search provides a novel explanation for a set of related empirical observations about the labor market including unemployment duration dependence and wage dispersion another contribution is to apply lattice theoretic techniques to analyze learning from experience which is useful because learning generates convex value functions and in principle multiple solutions to a worker s optimization problem

pricing and signaling with frictions abstract we study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites observing sellers choices of prices and sites but not quality buyers choose which site to visit a seller s choices of prices can direct buyers search and signal quality a unique equilibrium exists and is separating when the quality differential is large the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information otherwise the quality of goods and or the number of sites created is inefficient due to a conflict between the search directing and signaling roles of prices

new microfoundations for the aggregate matching function empirical studies of the aggregate labor market matching function have favored a cobb douglas functional form for which there are no microfoundations in the existing literature i present a new model for the matching process based on a telephone line poisson queuing process which unlike other microeconomic approaches can be integrated directly into standard theoretical search models this implies a ces matching function approximately cobb douglas when search costs are approximately linear the model allows empirical estimates of matching function parameters to be interpreted in terms of the costs and benefits of search

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

competition among auctioneers in large markets we analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers first the auctioneers commit to some reserve prices second the bidders enter one auction if any and finally the auctions take place we show that for any finite set of feasible reserve prices each auctioneer announces a reserve price equal to his production cost if the numbers of auctioneers and bidders are sufficiently large though finite our result supports the idea that optimal auctions may be quite simple our model also confirms previous results for some limit versions of the model by mcafee econometrica 61 1993 1281 1312 peters rev econ stud 64 1997 97 123 and peters and severinov j econ theory 75 1997 141 179

information and prices with capacity constraints since george j stigler s 1961 seminal work the literature on consumer search has attempted to understand the relationship between the prices that are set by sell ers and the extent to which consumers can observe and compare these prices before purchasing a good in the theoretical branch of this literature one conclusion is almost universal as buyers become better informed about prices ex ante sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium 1 in fact this relationship is so engrained in the theory of consumer search that it is often accepted as manifest and applied to various markets and situations with little or no hesitation 2 in this paper i examine a completely standard consumer search model with one small yet often relevant additional restriction i assume that sellers possess a limited number of goods or can only serve a limited number of customers at once so that a given seller may be unable to meet realized demand in such an environment i show that the conven tional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold having more informed consumers can lead to either an increase or decrease in equilibrium prices or have no effect at all i characterize the regions of the parameter space where each is likely to occur the assumption that a seller s capacity may be fixed and that this constraint may be binding is a fairly important feature of many markets in some markets time is the constraint doctors and barbers and contractors can only serve a limited number of clients at once in other markets space is an issue private schools have a lim ited number of spots in each classroom while restaurants have a limited number of tables perhaps most common is markets in which sellers inventory is occasionally a limiting factor landlords have a limited number of apartments for rent and ticket agents have a limited number of concert tickets available in markets such as these consumers regularly trade off price and availability they are willing to pay more for

bidding for money we analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches we consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining two different pricing mechanisms are used ex ante price posting and ex post bidding auctions also we consider settings both with and without lotteries we find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining but with different comparative static and welfare properties

directed search and job rotation abstract we consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined and match quality is initially unknown a large firm benefits from the opportunity to rotate workers so as to partially overcome the loss of mismatch as a result in the unique symmetric equilibrium large firms have higher labor productivity and lower separation rates in contrast to the standard directed search model with multi vacancy firms this model can generate a positive correlation between firm size and wage without introducing any ex ante productivity differences or imposing any non concave production function assumptions

price dispersion in a directed search model this paper investigates a directed search model in which some buyers are uninformed about prices we find that sellers strategies are given by discrete distributions in any symmetric pricing equilibrium when the proportion of uninformed buyers is sufficiently high the unique symmetric pricing equilibrium involves a countably infinite number of atoms

efficient and competitive rationing abstract the contracts that interest us here are called priority service contracts the salient feature of such contracts is that they specify each customer s priority in obtaining service that is they specify the tank order in which a customer is served out of the available supply until all customers are served or supply is exhausted such contracts essentially establish queues for customers in section 1 the author provides some background about priority service section 2 formulates a basic model and offer several illustrations also describes two main examples that motivate the theoretical development section 3 derives some key results that show how the prices of priority service contracts are designed to induce customers to self select efficient service orders in section 4 the author discusses various ways that state enterprises can organize markets that implement priority service efficiently in section 5 we study the operation of competitive markets for priority service section 6 concludes with some summary remarks two themes are emphasized one is that a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting priority service for absent spot markets the other is that oligopolistic firms may have insufficient incentives to offer efficient product diversity consequently allocative efficiency depends on entry of numerous firms even so dispersal of supplies among many firms can prevent productive efficiency when there are advantages from pooling supplies

worker heterogeneity the job finding rate and technical change we examine the implications of changes in the skill distribution on the equilibrium matching process and the job finding rate using a directed search approach worker abilities are selected from a distribution while firms face heterogeneous entry costs and direct their job offers to workers we identify conditions under which technical progress increases or decreases the job finding rate allowing for entry and the effects of technical changes on heterogeneity we find that the effects of skill neutral technical progress on job finding rates are unambiguously non negative but the effects of skill biased changes depend on the elasticity of vacancy costs however both skill neutral and skill biased technical changes are pareto improving ex ante if all agents are risk neutral c 2014 elsevier b v all rights reserved

auctions vs fixed pricing competing for budget constrained buyers abstract we investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained buyers by adopting either fixed pricing or auctions first or second price we show that first and second price auctions are payoff equivalent when some bidders are financially constrained so sellers are indifferent to adopt either format we characterize possible equilibria and show that if the budget is high then sellers compete via fixed pricing if it is low then they compete via auctions and if it is moderate then they mix so both mechanisms coexist the budget constraint becomes less binding if sellers use entry fees interestingly an improvement of the budget e g letting customers pay in installments may lead to fewer trades and a loss of efficiency

ex ante price offers in matching games non steady states a matching problem is considered in which sellers can publicly commit to a trading price that differs from the price at which buyers expect to trade elsewhere in the market when demand and supply are nearly equal the equilibrium ex ante price offer lies below the price associated with the nash bargaining split this relationship reverses when the level of excess demand is large sellers always have an incentive to make ex ante offers when prices elsewhere are determined by nash bargaining this can be interpreted to mean that nash bargaining is an unstable pricing institution copyright 1991 by the econometric society

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

directed search with multi vacancy firms abstract i construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create within this framework the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously wages play an allocative role in the matching process and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms i characterize the unique equilibrium comparative statics generate testable implications for cross sectional variation in matching efficiency as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment moreover allowing for ex ante heterogeneity across firms the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size wages profitability and hiring

a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection the paper describes a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection and shows how refinements of equilibrium can be used to characterize uniquely the equilibrium outcome equilibrium exists under standard conditions it is shown that under certain conditions a stable set exists and is contained in a connected set of equilibria for generic models there exists a stable outcome that is all the equilibria in the stable set have the same outcome these ideas are applied to markets with one sided and two sided uncertainty under standard monotonicity conditions it is shown that the stable outcome is separating and implies a particular pattern of matches of buyers and sellers

noncontractible heterogeneity in directed search this paper provides a directed search model designed to explain the residual part of wage variation left over after the impact of education and other observable worker characteristics have been removed workers have private information about their characteristics at the time they apply for jobs firms value these characteristics differently and can observe them once workers apply they hire the worker they most prefer however the characteristics are not contractible so firms cannot condition their wages on them this paper shows how to extend arguments from directed search to handle this allowing for arbitrary distributions of worker and firm types the model is used to provide a functional relationship that ties together the wage distribution and the wage duration function this relationship provides a testable implication of the model this relationship suggests a common property of wage distributions that guarantees that workers who leave unemployment at the highest wages also have the shortest unemployment duration this is in strict contrast to the usual and somewhat implausible directed search story in which high wages are always accompanied by higher probability of unemployment

a competitive distribution of auctions in this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded a competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism it is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller s best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market the purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium for an economy in which sellers compete by offering different direct mechanisms to buyers no attempt is made to give a complete characterization of all possible equilibria rather we focus on one equilibrium in which the contracts that are offered by sellers in equilibrium and buyer s behaviour under these contracts are both independent of traders beliefs about one another the equilibrium illustrates one of the reasons why contracts that are employed in practice may not be as finely tuned to beliefs as the theory of mechanism design says that they should be the answer is simply that contracts are not offered in a vacuum sellers in the model studied in this paper need to compete with one another in order to attract buyers highly tuned mechanisms tend to extract buyer surplus in such an environment sellers are able to attract many buyers by offering to use cruder mechanisms that leave some surplus for buyers in this paper sellers are allowed to have different costs for the commodity that is being traded nonetheless the equilibrium for the limit economy in which there are infinitely many buyers and sellers is such that every seller offers a second price auction and publicizes a reserve price equal to his cost in a standard monopoly auction the optimal reserve price for the seller exceeds his cost by an amount that depends on his beliefs about buyers valuations myerson 1981 a seller who raises his reserve price has his profits affected in two distinct ways by raising his reserve price the seller makes it unprofitable for some buyer types to participate in his auction the seller therefore loses any surplus that he might have earned by trading with these buyers the buyers who still find it profitable to participate in the seller s auction will end up having to pay a higher price when they win because of this increase in the seller s reserve price this means that the seller will be able to extract a bit more surplus from buyers who continue to participate the seller raises the reserve price until the marginal cost associated with raising the reserve price is just equal to the marginal gain associated with the ability to extract more surplus from remaining buyers competition mitigates this argument since there is a limit to the amount of surplus that the seller can extract from remaining buyers before they decide that they should instead choose one of the alternative auctions that are being held on the market with

immobility rationing and price competition a model is studied where firms advertise prices and buyers play a noncooperative search game in an attempt to secure output from firms at the advertised prices firms face rising marginal costs and may not be willing to supply everything demanded at their price if they wind up with many buyers it is shown that rationing will occur in equilibrium no matter how averse buyers are to this possibility the result is specialised to a case where rationing occurs with probability one the equilibrium price and outputs are characterised for this case the theory of search has taken the literature in imperfect competition in an important direction by analysing the behaviour of buyers and sellers in an environment where there is no centralised technique for coordinating the choice decisions of buyers in this paradigm buyers are uninformed about the price that is charged by each different store essentially buyers cannot observe the strategies of individual firms an apparently more common but little analysed problem occurs when buyers can observe the pricing strategies of firms because of advertising but cannot observe the choice strategies of other buyers the ex post utility enjoyed by the buyer is uncertain because he does not know whether capacity constraints or rising costs might force the firm to ration or delay delivery if too many buyers choose the same firm

residual wage disparity and coordination unemployment how much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms to answer we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high or low productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers calibrated to the u s economy workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms and can conduct on the job search the stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump shaped skewed significantly to the right and with baseline parameters generates residual dispersion statistics 75 90 of those found empirically however the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment

multiple applications competing mechanisms and market power abstract we consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by the firm s candidate when the contract space includes application fees there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient and it has a posted wage equal to match output in the inefficient equilibria the wage is below match output and the value of a worker s application depends on whether he or she receives another offer this allows individual firms to free ride on one another and gives firms market power when we endogenize the number of applications and allow for general mechanisms only the efficient equilibrium survives by allowing for general mechanisms we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications literature

characterising deindustrialisation an analysis of changes in manufacturing employment and output internationally deindustrialisation is typically conceptualised as a decline in manufacturing as a share of total employment from a kaldorian perspective deindustrialisation could have negative implications for long run growth given the special growth pulling properties of manufacturing however defining deindustrialisation purely in terms of employment share is conceptually limiting given that some of the kaldorian processes operate primarily through output rather than employment as well as blunting empirical analysis by not focussing enough on changes in manufacturing share of gross domestic product gdp this study develops a new method using decomposition techniques to analyse changes in manufacturing employment levels and shares in 48 countries over periods of deindustrialisation the analysis separates out changes in the levels and shares of employment manufacturing into components associated with changes in the share of manufacturing in gdp the growth of manufacturing value added the labour intensity of manufacturing production and economic growth the results indicate that in most cases the decline in manufacturing employment is associated primarily with falling labour intensity of manufacturing rather than an overall decline in the size or share of the manufacturing sector we suggest that deindustrialisation should appropriately be defined in terms of a sustained decline in both the share of manufacturing in total employment and the share of manufacturing in gdp copyright the author 2008 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

wage vacancy contracts and coordination frictions abstract we consider a directed search model with risk averse workers and risk neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage vacancy contracts i e contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants we establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage vacancy contracts we show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a monotonic expected utility property which is efficient furthermore we investigate the role of wage vacancy contracts on welfare and competition

the seven main stylized facts of the mexican economy since trade liberalization and nafta in mexico a remarkably dynamic expansion of exports has been associated with a surprisingly poor overall growth performance moreover this collapse of the export multiplier took place in a context of both massive inflows of foreign direct investment and unrestricted market access to the us the first two items on all developing countries growth agenda today therefore the study of mexico is an ideal scenario within which to assess the impact of the new development model on growth and catching up copyright 2005 oxford university press

directed search and the bertrand paradox i study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition extended to incorporate general capacity constraints congestion effects and pricing based on ex post demand in the presence of any one of these ingredients the bertrand paradox fails to hold hence despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails specifically bertrand s paradox will not arise whenever the buyers expected utility from visiting a seller is decreasing in that seller s realized demand

sorting and decentralized price competition we investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to sorting of heterogeneous agents there are two aspects of value creation the match value when two agents actually trade and the probability of trading governed by the search technology we show that positive assortative matching obtains when complementarities in the former outweigh complementarities in the latter this happens if and only if the match value function is root supermodular that is its nth root is supermodular where n reflects the elasticity of substitution of the search technology this condition is weaker than the condition required for positive assortative matching in markets with random search

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

international corporate taxation and u s multinationals behaviour an integrated approach this paper explores the effects of corporate taxation on u s capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices the econometric analysis first indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates with a magnified impact particularly for low tax rates implying that the attractiveness of low tax countries is not weakened by anti deferral rules and cross crediting limitations further explorations suggest that firms report higher profit higher subpart f income and are less likely to repatriate dividends when they are located in low tax jurisdictions finally when the role of effective transfer pricing regulations is estimated it appears that low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income shifting ce memoire s interesse aux effets des impots sur le revenu des societes sur l investissement et les pratiques de planifications fiscales des firmes multinationales americaines l analyse econometrique indique que l investissement americain est fortement influence par le taux d imposition moyen et que cet impact est sensiblement plus important pour de faibles taux d imposition ceci suggere que l attractivite des pays a faible imposition n est pas affaiblie par les limites imposees par le systeme fiscal americain sur la possibilite de differer l impot et sur les moyennes de credit des tests additionnels montrent que les firmes reportent un profit ainsi qu un revenu subpart f plus important et rapatrient moins leurs dividendes lorsqu elles sont localisees dans des pays a faible imposition finalement en estimant le role joue par l efficacite des reglementations en termes de prix de transferts il apparait qu un faible etat de droit est associea de plus fortes manipulations fiscales

what is the role of the asking price for a house abstract this paper considers the role of the asking price in housing transactions both theoretically and empirically significant fractions of housing transactions involve sales prices that are either below or above asking price which might suggest that asking price has limited relevance however many housing transactions involve a sales price exactly equal to asking price a fact that has previously drawn little notice strongly suggesting that asking price does matter the paper develops a model where asking price is neither a binding commitment nor a ceiling yet still directs buyer search and impacts sales price using novel survey data the paper provides empirical evidence consistent with asking price playing a directing role in buyer search consistent with theory this effect is stronger for more atypical houses and in bust markets

bertrand equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility this paper considers price competition among firms when there are capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms a natural method of allocating buyers among firms arises in the equilibrium of the buyers search game sufficient conditions are given under which the buyers equilibrium varies continuously with the prices charged by firms capacity constraints are used to guarantee that this ensures existence of mixed strategy equilibria for the pricing game played by sellers we show that natural pure strategy equilibria arise when the game is made large in appropriate ways since bertrand s criticism of cournot it has been known that models where sellers compete with prices may have undesirable properties when the commodities traded are homogenous in the simplest models with constant marginal costs price may be driven down to the competitive level even when there are only two firms more problematic if sellers are subject to capacity constraints nash in prices equilibrium may not exist at all these problems all arise because of a discontinuity in firms profit functions that arises when the prices of two or more firms are equal there have been many attempts to resolve this problem the simplest is to constrain sellers prices to be equal and to force them to compete in quantities this is the basis of most of the literature on monopolistic competi

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

foreign direct investment and de industrialisation the purpose of this study is to discuss the various issues regarding de industrialisation and to systematically analyse the causes of this phenomenon in addition the effect of the recent increase in foreign direct investment on de industrialisation will be analysed unlike extant studies this study employs a more reliable method of estimation known as the generalised method of moments system for establishing the importance of foreign direct investment fdi with regard to de industrialisation for a general assessment of the different factors of de industrialisation including fdi this study classifies the causes of de industrialisation in oecd countries into external and internal factors as a result the analysis has proved that not only internal and external factors are major factors of de industrialisation fdi inflow and outflow are also major factors

competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices abstract in this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts two variants of the model are studied one extends a model first analyzed by wolinsky rev econ stud 55 1988 71 84 in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers the other variant extends the model of mcafee econometrica61 1993 1281 1312 in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions the equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d82

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

competition in transactions mechanisms the emergence of price competition abstract this paper models competition between firm market makers there are two goods a divisible numeraire and an indivisible good produced by firms the set of active consumers is random all consumers are identical conditional on arriving at the market first firms produce output equivalently install capacity and commit to a transactions mechanism next nature chooses the set of consumers at the market and each active consumer commits to visit a single firm all equilibria involve all firms choosing a fixed price thus price competition is derived not assumed journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l13

alternative theories of wage dispersion abstract we analyze labor market models where the law of one price fails i e models with equilibrium wage dispersion we begin considering ex ante heterogeneous workers but highlight a problem with this approach if search is costly the market shuts down we then assume homogeneous workers but ex post heterogeneous matches this model is robust to search costs and delivers equilibrium wage dispersion however we prove that the law of two prices holds equilibrium implies at most two wages we explore other models including one combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity which is robust and delivers more realistic wage dispersion

ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment we study the implementation of constrained efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction we argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding this holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching process has decreasing returns to scale where the hosios rule does not apply both with and without heterogeneity

aggressive tax avoidance by managers of multinational companies as a violation of their moral duty to obey the law a kantian rationale managers of multinational companies often favour an aggressive tax avoidance strategy that pushes the legal limits onto the advantage of shareholders and the disadvantage of the spirit of democratically legitimized tax laws the public and media debate whether such aggressive behaviour is immoral aggressive tax avoidance is a subset of the aggressive legal interpretations potentially observable in all fields which places little weight on the will of a democratically legitimized legislation a thorough ethical analysis based on the deontological approach of kant demonstrates that aggressive tax avoidance as a special case of operating on the edge of legal boundaries is potentially immoral applying the kantian contradiction of conception or will test shows that this maxim might not be conceived or willed as a general law of nature if all natural or legal persons aggressively interpret laws on all subjects and in every imaginable situation then central principles of the system of law we all rely upon would be severely compromised therefore aggressive tax avoidance by managers of multinational companies may violate the managers moral duty to obey not only the letter but also the intention or spirit of the law the validity of the argumentation depends critically on the formulation and interpretation of the respective maxims and on assumptions about the legal system preserving central elements of kantian philosophy the article demonstrates the complexity of a philosophical argumentation which tries to justify the moral intuitions that underpin the common negative evaluation of aggressive legal strategies in business

ethics in tax practice a study of the effect of practitioner firm size while much of the empirical accounting literature suggests that if differences do exist big four employees are more ethical than non big four employees this trend has not been evident in the recent media coverage of big four tax practitioners acting for multinationals accused of aggressive tax avoidance behaviour however there has been little exploration in the literature to date specifically of the relationship between firm size and ethics in tax practice we aim here to address this gap initially exploring tax practitioners perceptions of the impact of firm size on ethics in tax practice using interview data in order to identify the salient issues involved we then proceed to assess quantitatively whether employer firm size has an impact on the ethical reasoning of tax practitioners using a tax context specific adaptation of a well known and validated psychometric instrument the defining issues test

contingent prices and money price posting with directed search is a widely used trading mechanism coles and eeckhout showed that if sellers are allowed to post prices contingent on realized demand instead of one price then there is real market indeterminacy in this article we fit this contingent price posting protocol into a monetary economy we show that as long as holding money is costly there exists a unique equilibrium rather than a continuum in this equilibrium sellers post a low price for when the buyer is alone a high price for when several buyers show up and buyers randomize between sellers and money holdings

a theory of commerce abstract the theory of commerce advanced here captures prominent features of retail trade large employment congestion effects anonymous posted prices and quantity discounts this theory is built around a directed search model where buyers preferences are private information the analytical solution is easily inserted in a neoclassical growth framework in this framework the parameters of retail trade are calibrated using commercial margins and employment welfare properties depend on the sellers ability to charge two tier prices with two tier prices the directed search equilibrium is efficient otherwise it is not this contrasts with the full information benchmark where directed search is always efficient

behavioral demand effects when buyers anticipate inventory shortages abstract firms often worry about how buyers will react when there is an inventory shortage but the anticipation of facing a shortage may also impact buyer behavior in this paper we use a combination of theoretical modeling computational methods and laboratory experiments to understand buyers search behavior in markets where there is potential for either a costly or costless inventory shortage when inventory shortages are costly to buyers we find their equilibrium purchasing strategy generates a newsvendor problem among the firms in turn experimental data suggests buyer behavior can be explained by prospect theory better than by standard assumptions of fully rational expected utility maximizing agents indicating that potential inventory shortages generate loss aversion among buyers and there is systematic mis identification of the probability with which they will be able to procure an item using computational methods we find firms are able to extract more surplus from behavioral buyers via higher prices than would be predicted by the standard model on the other hand when inventory shortages are not costly to buyers the effect of behavioral biases on the part of buyers is not relevant but in this case there can be a benefit to reducing inventory via a reduction in price competition

stagnation or transformation of a dual economy through endogenous productivity growth a growth model is developed for an open dual economy the economy expands owing to a higher growth rate of labour productivity in the modern sector through the kaldor verdoorn channel and higher effective demand through a keynesian channel the model incorporates a retardation mechanism affecting the slopes of productivity and output growth schedules as labour surplus and economies of scale diminish a wage led or profit led regime and initial conditions may give rise to de industrialization in terms of both output and employment a growth trap sustaining a situation of structural heterogeneity or sustainable employment and adequate output and productivity growth

search theory the 2010 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences this paper surveys search theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the 2010 laureates for the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences peter diamond dale mortensen and christopher pissarides

search direction and wage dispersion in a directed search model we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers this determines the market structure there are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of offers and the equilibrium strategies involve mixing this results in wage dispersion we show that if the unemployment vacancy ratio is close to unity the stable equilibrium consists of two submarkets with opposite search directions otherwise the long side of the market sends offers the stable equilibrium is efficient given the frictions

price dispersion with directed search we model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity constrained sellers sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price we study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up we characterize the sale price distribution parametrically studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares we also determine endogenously

directed search with multiple job applications we develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs the main result is that all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion despite the fact that workers and firms are homogeneous wage dispersion is driven by the simultaneity of application choice risk neutral workers apply for both safe and risky jobs the former yield a high probability of a job oer but for low pay and act as a fallback option the latter provide with higher potential payo but are harder to get furthermore the density of posted wages is decreasing consistent with stylized facts unlike most directed search models the equilibria are not constrained ecient

external shocks structural change and economic growth in mexico 1979 2007 summary this article finds that shocks to net financial inflows world oil prices the us growth rate and the lagged real exchange rate explain most of the fluctuations in mexico s annual growth since 1979 the article also estimates how the effects of these external constraints have changed since mexico s liberalization policies of the late 1980s and the formation of nafta in 1994 estimates of an investment function and other tests show that growth drives investment but not conversely in the short run investment is driven mainly by oil prices and the accelerator effect foreign direct investment has no significant impact 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

uniqueness of equilibrium in directed search models we study a decentralized trading model as in 7 where a finite number of heterogeneous capacity constrained sellers compete for a finite number of homogeneous buyers by posting prices this directed search model is known to admit symmetric equilibria yet uniqueness has proved elusive this study makes two contributions a substantive contribution is to establish uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium a methodological contribution is to develop a tool based on directional derivatives to characterize equilibrium

gaining more by stocking less a competitive analysis of product availability the price competition between two firms can affect their decisions about product availability with occasional stockouts a firm loses from foregone sales yet it may indirectly benefit from the higher price a competitor is able to charge the more prone customers are to search elsewhere for the product upon encountering a stockout the greater is the gain from the reduced price competition between firms this paper establishes conditions whereby the strategic interaction of reduced price competition between firms outweighs the loss from foregone sales in such cases a firm can increase its expected profits by choosing to stock less these results provide a competitive rationale for the high stockout levels observed in some retail situations and have implications for the analysis of product availability in public policy settings

directed search on the job and the wage ladder we model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers search using wage offers and employment probabilities applicants observe all offers and face a trade off between wage and employment probability there is wage dispersion among workers even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous equilibrium wages form a ladder as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time this is because low wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage with a lower chance of success

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

product market and the size wage differential using directed search to model the product market and the labor market i show that large plants can pay higher wages to homogeneous workers and earn higher expected profit per worker than small plants although plants are identical except size a large plant charges a higher price for its product and compensates buyers with a higher service probability to capture this sizerelated benefit large plants try to become larger by recruiting at high wages this size wage differential survives labor market competition because a high wage is harder to get than a low wage moreover the size wage differential increases with the product demand when demand is initially low and falls when demand is already high

competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints abstract ever since the seminal work by rothschild and stiglitz q j econom 90 1976 629 on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non existence of equilibrium in pure strategies has received much attention in the literature we extend the original analysis by considering firms which face capacity constraints which might be due to limited capital we show that under mild assumptions an equilibrium exists where every consumer obtains his appropriate rothschild stiglitz contract

efficient unemployment insurance this paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion an increase in risk aversion reduces wages unemployment and investment unemployment insurance has the opposite effect insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk an economy with risk neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance but an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output therefore moderate unemployment insurance not only improves risk sharing but also increases output

on the equivalence of walrasian and non walrasian equilibria in contract markets the case of complete contracts this paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged in the first model contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets clear in the second model contract designers compete directly against one another by offering alternate contracts it is shown that walrasian allocations correspond with the equilibrium allocations in the model with direct competition when the number of traders is made large furthermore the expectational assumptions that drive the walrasian analysis coincide with off the equilibrium path conjectures in the problem with direct competition