financial intermediation reserve requirements and inside money a general equilibrium analysis abstract reserve requirements are examined in a general equilibrium context the paper develops a simple general equilibrium model that includes diverse opportunities for investment and a role for financial intermediaries two versions of the model are considered one is a thought experiment in which currency serves purely to satisfy legal reserve requirements the other is more realistic the model is used to analyze the comparative static effects of changes in reserve requirements the effects of changes in other parameters of the economy in the presence of reserve requirements and some qualitative issues raised by reserve requirements

bidding behavior at sequential first price auctions with out supply uncertainty a laboratory analysis abstract we report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on bidding behavior and prices in sequential first price auctions with private independent values and unit demands supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold i e the length of the sequence we observe an important overbidding in all but the last stage of a sequence no matter whether supply is certain and a non monotone behavior when supply is certain yet the data qualitatively support most stage to stage bid predictions and the price trend predictions for risk neutral bidders

sequential auctions price trends and risk preferences abstract we analyze sequential auctions in a general environment where bidders are heterogeneous in risk exposures and exhibit non quasilinear utilities we derive a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium for the sequential dutch and vickrey auctions respectively with an arbitrary number of identical objects for sale when bidders are risk averse preferring the equilibrium price sequences must be downward upward drifting the declining price anomaly is thus evidence of bidder risk aversion in this general environment these results derive from a key assumption that bidders marginal utilities are log supermodular in payment and type

sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk decreasing and increasing price sequences a large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds this article introduces a tractable form of risk aversion called aversion to price risk and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk when there are informational externalities there is a countervailing effect which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction even if bidder s signals are independent the article shows how to decompose the effect of aversion to price risk from the effect of informational externalities

interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention we develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term safe asset when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility in such a situation a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate it can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand

modeling individual preferences for energy sources the case of iv generation nuclear energy in italy the planned re introduction of nuclear energy in italy was abandoned in the aftermath of the fukushima nuclear accident twenty years earlier soon after the chernobyl accident italians had also voted against nuclear energy however a new nuclear energy technology i e fourth generation is under research and development this paper investigates its social acceptance by means of a robust methodology employing 1 choice experiments 2 structural equation modeling and 3 information treatments within an online nation wide survey results show a great deal of preference heterogeneity the majority of the sampled respondents oppose new nuclear plants in italy with some not willing to accept any monetary compensation at all however another segment of respondents more confident that fourth generation nuclear energy goals will be achieved show a modest support towards the implementation of new nuclear projects additional variables were found to affect opposition

evaluating the public perceptions of nuclear power in china evidence from a contingent valuation survey national natural science foundation of china 71303199 71373218 ministry of education foundation of china 13yjc790123 11jbgp006 13jzd010 fundamental research funds for the central universities 201122g008 2014221001 national social science foundation of china 13zd167

sequential auctions theory and evidence from the seattle fur exchange we develop a model that incorporates salient features of the seattle fur exchange identical lots of furs are auctioned sequentially bids must be raised by specified increments and the winner of a lot has the privilege of beginning the bidding on the subsequent lot predictions of the theory are consistent with the data revenue implications of the theory are also explored

deposit insurance and money market freezes in the presence of deposit insurance a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets we show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank based retail financial markets in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings rich regions which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits and in savings poor regions which have to pay large spreads in money markets this asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and in the presence of demand externalities can cause large output losses

valuing the mortality risk of wildlife reintroduction heterogeneous risk preferences abstract this study is the first to value the mortality risk incurred from wildlife reintroduction we conducted choice experiments on wolf reintroduction in hokkaido japan in order to value the resulting mortality risk this process involves three unique factors the mortality risk is zero before the reintroduction the increment of the risk caused by the reintroduction is substantially small and the risk largely depends on citizens individual characteristics concerning reintroduction because of these factors the heterogeneity of risk preference is expected to be large in order to examine these heterogeneous risk preferences we use a random parameter logit model the estimation results confirm that considerable heterogeneous risk preferences exist finally the mean marginal willingness to pay to prevent the loss of one person per one billion people because of wolf reintroduction is several hundred yen

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

the external costs of nuclear power ex ante damages and lay risks interest has been growing in embedding the external costs of fuel cycles resulting in electricity generation into prices in any attempt to internalize these costs for the nuclear cycle the remost but real possibilities of accidents and the wide gap between lay perceptions and expert assessments of such risks must be taken into account this paper discusses this including the following topics an expected utility model of power plant operations accident risks simulation comparison of experts versus lay risks comparison of experts versus lay risk literature simulation of expert versus lay risks current practice in estimating the damages from accidents at nuclear power plants appear to ignore significant features of the problem from the perspective of economic analysis individual aversion to risk the exante perspective in decision making under uncertainty and lay risk perception are all conceptually important elements of a damage estimate that accords with observation of behavior and the theory that underlies it but that are ignored by common practice 18 refs 1 tab

catalogue vs order of sale effects in sequential auctions theory and evidence from a rare book sale we examine bidding in a rare book sequential auction that has features of a natural experiment lots were arranged in alphabetical order the reserve set non strategically and half the bids placed by mail in bidders we distinguish between the effects induced by the print order of the catalogue from those by the sequential nature of the sale we document the existence of distinct catalogue effects on prices number of bids and price variability and determine their causes we demonstrate that these catalogue effects also influence floor bidder behaviour we derive a theoretical model that generates key aspects of floor bidder behaviour copyright 2004 royal economic society

the welfare cost of bank capital requirements abstract capital requirements are the cornerstone of modern bank regulation yet little is known about their welfare cost this paper measures this cost and finds that it is surprisingly large i present a simple framework which embeds the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model a capital requirement limits the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to deposit insurance however this capital requirement is also costly because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity the key insight is that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of households preferences for liquidity and this allows for the derivation of a simple formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function of observable variables only using us data the welfare cost of current capital adequacy regulation is found to be equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of between 0 1 and 1

equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions abstract we study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending price auctions the seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction despite the lack of commitment by the seller we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties strategic non disclosure of information takes the form of non participation in the early auction by low valuation bidders while high valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations some buyers who would profitably buy at the reserve price refrain from participating in order to decrease the second auction reserve price

retailers and consumers in sequential auctions of collectibles we analyse an independent private value model where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second price auctions in this heterogeneous game bidders may have differently distributed valuations and some have multi unit demand with decreasing marginal values retailers others have a specific single unit demand consumers by examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect the study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders nous analysons un modele a valeurs privees independantes dans lequel des encherisseurs heterogenes sont en concurrence pour des objets vendus lors d encheres sequentielles au second prix dans ce jeu heterogene les encherisseurs tirent leurs evaluations de distributions qui peuvent differer et certains les revendeurs ont des demandes multi unitaires avec des evaluations marginales decroissantes alors que les autres les consommateurs ont une demande individuelle specifique l examen des strategies d equilibre et des sequences de prix montrent que la presence de consommateurs conduit en moyenne a des encheres plus agressives de la part des revendeurs et que la presence d encherisseurs heterogenes constitue une explication plausible a la decroissance des prix l etude de l esperance du revenu du vendeur confirme l interet des commissaires priseurs a inviter differentes categories d acheteurs

does deposit insurance increase banking system stability an empirical investigation based on evidence of 61 countries in 1980 97 the authors find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector

bidders choice auctions raising revenues through the right to choose sales of multiple real estate properties are often conducted via a sequence of ascending auctions giving the winner at each stage the right to choose one of the available lots we show that when bidders are risk averse such bidders choice auctions raise more revenues then standard simultaneous or sequential ascending auctions we also report the results of laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of bidders choice auctions vis a vis the simultaneous ascending auction the revenue superiority of the bidders choice auction is corroborated by the experimental data finally we compare observed bidders choice auction is corroborated by the experimental data finally we compare observed bidding behavior in the experiments with theoretically predicted bids to estimate a common risk aversion parameter from the data

financial intermediation business failures and real business cycles in this paper a general equilibrium business cycle model is construct ed that when subjected to real disturbances mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output money business failures risk pr emia intermediary loans and prices in contrast monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence thus providing support for real business cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business cycle behavior a credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

endogeneity of risk perceptions in averting behavior models this paper examines the relationship between averting expenditures choices and perceived health risks models in the literature often employ risk perceptions as explanatory variables without addressing the potential endogeneity of the perceived risk we examine the implications of ignoring endogeneity in this context using an application to both drinking water choices and expenditures and perceived health risks our data are from an internet based cross canada survey that employs a novel interactive risk ladder to elicit mortality risk perceptions relating to water we employ two fundamentally different methods to assess the impact of risk perceptions on behavior an analysis of expenditures on alternate water sources and a model of proportional choice of water sources results suggest the presence of averting behavior with respect to perceived mortality risks and that the estimated effect of water risks is greater than 3 times higher when using approaches that correct for endogeneity compared to models that do not

entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first price procurement auctions an experimental study abstract though many real life auctions are run independently of each other from the bidders point of view they often form sequences of auctions we investigate how behavior responds to the additional incentives that are present in such auction sequences comparing subjects decisions in single first price procurement auctions with their decisions in a game consisting of two subsequent first price procurement auctions we find that in line with the theoretical prediction entry and bidding behavior is crucially affected by the opportunity cost of early bid submission though entry decisions and average bids in the auction sequence systematically deviate from the perfect bayesian equilibrium prediction while the nature of the opponent human being or computer has no significant effect on these findings giving subjects additional feedback on winners and prices seems to reduce the deviations from the equilibrium prediction

right to choose in oral auctions abstract oral right to choose auctions raise higher revenue when buyers are risk averse when standard sequential and right to choose auctions allocate the objects in the same fashion this means that sellers prefer the latter

equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply abstract in many sequential auctions supply is unknown ex ante consequently price formation depends on information regarding supply uncertain supply reduces the option value and yields declining prices however prices increase if it becomes known that supply falls short of expectations

piecewise procurement of a large scale project this paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large scale project in the unique markov perfect equilibrium mpe of the dynamic procurement game it is found that 1 unlike the static setting the procurer s optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly it is nonmonotonic as one more supplier participates in the procurement auction the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost btypesq while increasing competition in the mature stages 2 this in turn implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers 3 absent scheduling and or resource constraints the procurer prefers to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers technology exhibits constant or increasing returns and no additional suppliers are enticed to bid and 4 the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the vickrey type d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions we analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects either economies or diseconomies of scale we show that economies of scale give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices whereas the converse is not generally true moreover first and second price auctions are not always revenue equivalent economies of scale make second price auctions more profitable for the seller whereas revenue equivalence may be preserved in the case of diseconomies

auctions and the price of art the value of most important works of art is established by public auction either directly by an actual sale or indirectly by reference to other sales how the auction system works is thus a critical determinant of how the public s preferences are translated into the evaluation of artistic work the auction system is central in the determination of the incentives for artistic work and the efficiency of the auction system is a key determinant of the cost of creating and distributing works of art this paper contains a review of the burgeoning new research of the last decade that has been designed to shed light on how the art auction system actually works what it indicates about price formation and how well it performs we begin our discussion in section 2 with a short description of the mechanics of the auction system and then organize the remainder of our discussion around two major topics the first topic concerns how auction prices can be used to determine and compare overall price movements within the art market and other markets and the second topic concerns how the auction mechanism influences prices we

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism we analyze the transmission effects of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model of the financial sector with bank lending and securities markets bank lending is constrained by capital adequacy requirements and asymmetric information adds a cost to outside bank equity capital in our model monetary policy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity rather it operates through changes in the spread of bank loans over corporate bonds which induce changes in the aggregate composition of financing by firms and in banks equity capital base the model produces multiple equilibria one of which displays all the features of a credit crunch this article is concerned with the monetary transmission mechanism through the financial sector in particular the banking sector and securities markets specifically it analyzes the effects of open market operations on bank lending and securities issues in a real economy by building on recent advances in the microeconomics of banking it provides some underpinnings for the credit view of monetary policy which in its simplest form relies on an exogenously assumed limited substitutability between bank loans and bonds the macroeconomics literature distinguishes between the money view and credit view of monetary policy transmission bernanke and blinder 1988 1992 the money view takes bonds and loans to be perfect substitutes and only allows for the effects of monetary policy on aggregate investment consumption and savings through changes in interest rates the credit view allows for an additional effect on investment and economic activity operating through bank credit supply

bank net worth asset prices and economic activity abstract a dynamic general equilibrium model is proposed to study the interactions between the banking sector asset prices and aggregate economic activity a durable asset serves as a productive input and as a collateral for loans the propagation mechanism of a negative productivity shock is enhanced and prolonged through the interaction of credit constraints and asset prices where the bank loan and the investment are squeezed by a higher bank capital asset ratio for lending and at the same time a stricter collateral requirement for borrowing the model explains why banking crises often coincide with depression in the asset markets the results also bear policy implications for the debates over regulatory bank capital adequacy and credit control policies

public preferences for alternative electricity mixes in post fukushima japan abstract using representative household survey data from japan after the fukushima accident we estimate peoples willingness to pay wtp for renewable nuclear and fossil fuels in electricity generation we rely on random parameter econometric techniques to capture various degrees of heterogeneity between the respondents and use detailed regional information to assess how wtp varies with the distance to both the nearest nuclear power plant and to fukushima compared to fossil fuels we find a positive wtp for renewable and a negative wtp for nuclear fuels these effects in absolute terms increase with the proximity to fukushima

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

bottom fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions abstract we study standard sequential auctions in which the seller chooses the order of sale and right to choose auctions in which the winner chooses her preferred item from the remaining items empirically prices in sequential auctions tend to decline and sellers often hold right to choose auctions in our setting the right to choose format guarantees declining prices and efficiency in the standard auction a buyer may submit a low bid for the first item bottom fishing despite its being her less preferred item an example shows that the standard auction has declining prices is inefficient and gives lower expected revenue than the right to choose journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

signal jamming in a sequential auction abstract in a sequence of first price auctions with stable private values bidders strategically conceal their private information until the last auction we characterize equilibrium bidding and explore how such signal jamming affects the dynamics of equilibrium prices

the influence of task complexity on consumer choice a latent class model of decision strategy switching the literature indicating that person context and task specific factors cause consumers to utilize different decision strategies has generally failed to affect the specification of choice models used by practitioners and academics alike who still tend to assume an utility maximizing omniscient indefatigable consumer this article 1 introduces decision strategy selection within a maintained compensatory framework into aggregate choice models via latent classes which arise because of task complexity 2 it demonstrates that within an experimental choice task the model reflects changing aggregate preferences as choice complexity changes and as the task progresses the import of these findings for current practice model interpretation and future research needs is examined

ordering revenue and anchoring in art auctions we estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by sotheby s and christie s we exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in new york city when the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21 higher relative to the mean sale premium and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is around 11 higher we provide evidence that this is due to an anchoring effect

the role of interbank markets in monetary policy a model with rationing the empirical research on monetary transmission has reported a number of puzzles challenging extant theoretical models of the transmission mechanism in this paper we argue that asymmetric information in the interbank market may be important to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the transmission process we show that asymmetric information may induce an equilibrium with rationing this in turn has two major implications first it reconciles the apparent irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy magnitude puzzle and second it shows that this impact will not be limited to short term credit supply but will also affect long term lending even if the corresponding interest rate is unaffected composition puzzle

budget constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information i study a budget constrained private valuation sealed bid sequential auction with two incompletely informed risk neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non monotonic functions of a bidder s type multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation efficiency and revenue the sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders the sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods if a particular good say is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale then auction revenue and the price of good are higher when good is sold first

attitudes toward catastrophe in light of climate change and other global threats policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes this paper reflects on what society s attitude toward low probability high impact events is or should be we first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses based on this conception we review studies from decision sciences psychology and behavioral economics that explore people s attitudes toward various social risks contray to popular belief we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion the preference for a mean preserving contraction of the loss distribution and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations next we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk we explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other regarding preferences finally we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk

eliciting public preference for nuclear energy against the backdrop of global warming one of the most important issues related to sustainability is to reduce the use of fossil fuels due to the reduction in greenhouse gases ghg emission nuclear power results in low carbon emissions and is thus important to mitigating the adverse effects of global warming and climate change however the downside of nuclear power cannot be overlooked and consequently nuclear power is a controversial issue in many countries around the world thus an important question concerns how people should support nuclear power do the climate and energy security benefits of nuclear power outweigh its risks and costs therefore we use a modified double bounded contingent valuation model to explore the attitudes and the willingness to pay wtp of a country in order to demonstrate its implications for policy we confirm that supporters and opponents of nuclear power are balanced both in terms of their numbers and in terms of their wtp the policy implication is that people do not support any dramatic increase or reduction in nuclear power and that nuclear power should still be an important means of generating electricity in taiwan the current share of nuclear power in electricity generation of 20 should be maintained in the near future

sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects two completely informed but possibly asymmetric bidders buy or sell identical claims in sequential auctions they subsequently receive monetary prizes that depend upon the final allocation of claims iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leaves a unique nash equilibrium for any prize schedule prices weakly decline as the auctions progress and points of strict decline have a simple characterization for one class of prize schedules which arises naturally if duopolists bid for a scarce input the equilibrium is completely characterized many initial allocations generate the same final unequal division of claims which may be interpreted as the natural market structure journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d44 l11

the declining price anomaly in dutch dutch rose auctions in symmetric independent private value auctions of a single object with risk neutral bidders the english second price auction has strategic simplicity it is optimal for bidders to reveal their valuation of the object and make bids accordingly in that case the auction is won by the person with the highest valuation who pays a price equal to the second highest valuation in a dutch first price auction this simplicity vanishes here winning bidders have to pay their bid to make a profit they shade their bids and bid below their valuation of the object somewhat loosely one may state that an english auction is truth revealing whereas a dutch auction requires strategic behavior the simple structure of the one unit english auction vanishes if two identical objects are auctioned sequentially now in the first round it is optimal for bidders to shade their bids to account for the option value of participating in the subsequent second round robert j weber 1983 bidders with a higher valuation also have a higher option value therefore they shade their bids in the first round by a greater amount than do bidders with a lower valuation as the auction proceeds the number of bidders decreases over the sequence of auctions the number of objects decreases as well the first fact has a negative effect on the competition for an object and the second has a positive effect both effects cancel out and prices follow a martingale as a result all gains to waiting are arbitraged away and the expected prices in both rounds are the same the latter result also holds for sequential auctions of more than two objects and does not depend on whether the auction is english or dutch this neat theoretical result is not supported by empirical research which usually finds price declines orley ashenfelter 1989 found a mild price decrease in sequential auctions of identical units of wine mcafee and daniel vincent 1993 also present empirical evidence on sequential wine auctions they found that on average the second unit of wine was sold at a price 1 4 percent lower than the price of the first unit victor ginsburgh 1998 uses data from wine auctions in which the auctioneer acted as an agent for bidders who were not present at the auction he found price declines but apparently the absent bidders entered bids that did not fit with the theory empirical studies by ashenfelter and david genesove 1992 see also jean jacques laffont 1997 and alan beggs and kathryn graddy 1997 concern heterogeneous objects they also detected price declines because of the contradiction between theory and empirical studies the declining price phenomenon is regarded to be an anomaly

outside options another reason to choose the first price auction abstract in this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first price and second price auctions with outside options we find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors outside options however overbidding in first price auctions is significantly higher with outside options than without first price auctions yield more revenue than second price auctions this revenue premium is significantly higher with outside options in second price auctions the introduction of outside options has only a small effect

sequential auctions with synergies an example abstract an equilibrium in an example of a two unit sequential ascending price auction where some bidders have superadditive values is presented the equilibrium is in pure strategies in equilibrium the expected price declines from the first to the second auction

the effect of risk characteristics on the willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions from electric power generation the objective of this study is to estimate willingness to pay wtp for the reduction of mortality risks caused by fossil fuel natural gas coal and oil versus nuclear electric power generation systems and to examine the influence of risk characteristics involved with electric power generation on wtp a choice experiment was conducted to achieve these objectives the attributes for nuclear risks in the experiment included the probability of disasters and the expected losses if a disaster occurs we find evidence of i a baseline effect where wtp is sensitive to hypothetical versus actual baseline expected mortality ii a labeling effect where surprisingly the term nuclear has no effect on wtp but the term fossil fueled power generation results in lower wtp and iii disaster aversion meaning that people focus on the conditional loss from a nuclear disaster not the probability we also find that the wtp for reducing deaths from a nuclear disaster is about 60 times the wtp for routine reducing fossil fuel generation related deaths