the influence of csr on firm value an application of panel smooth transition regression on taiwan abstractprevious studies on the relationship between corporate social responsibility csr and firm value generally belong to one of the two opposing schools of thought the social impact hypothesis and the shift of focus hypothesis this study however proposes that the relationship between csr and company value is non linear and neither wholly positive nor negative we employed the corporate social responsibility index crsi to test this hypothesis the panel smooth transition regression pstr model was used to analyse listed taiwanese firms from 2010 to 2012 and calculate the value transition threshold of csr using csri as the transition variable we then applied pstr to determine whether csri shows a two regime non linear relationship as inferred by our model empirical findings show that the threshold value of csri is 13 082 thus we concluded that investment in csr does not contribute to enhancing company value until it exceeds the value transition threshold

financial intermediation as a beliefs bridge between optimists and pessimists this paper proposes a new framework for understandingnancial intermediation in contrast to previous research we consider a setting in which intermediaries possess no inherent information processing or monitoring advantages instead in an economy with overly optimistic entrepreneurs who require funding from overly skeptical pessimistic investors we show that intermediaries can arise endogenously in such a setting only a rational intermediary will be su ciently optimistic tond it worthwhile to invest in a technology for screening entrepreneurs projects and yet be pessimistic enough to use this technology our framework produces implications consistent with heretofore unexplained stylized facts and a number of others which are as of yet untested

firm size and efficiency in the german mechanical engineering industry research usually finds a positive size efficiency relationship but few studies focus on sectors dominated by small and medium sized firms smes this paper fills this gap by analyzing this relationship in the german mechanical engineering industry sector which is both successful and increasingly dominated by smes the analysis using a large and representative dataset finds that small and large firms are on average the most efficient ones while medium sized firms have on average the greatest inefficiencies thus the size efficiency relationship is u shaped rather than monotonically increasing additionally the analysis finds that companies with active owner s are significantly more efficient and that capital firms are less efficient than firms with personally liable owners being located in either east or west germany has no effect

overconfidence and moral hazard abstract in this paper i study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract on the one hand an optimistic or overconfident agent disproportionately values success contingent payments and thus prefers higher powered incentives on the other hand if the agent overestimates the extent to which his actions affect outcomes lower powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort level if the agent is moderately overconfident the latter effect dominates because the agent bears less risk in this case there are efficiency gains stemming from his overconfidence if the agent is significantly overconfident the former effect dominates the agent is then exposed to an excessive amount of risk and any gains arise only from risk sharing under disagreement an increase in optimism or overconfidence increases the effort level implemented in equilibrium

gibrat s law and persistence of growth in greek manufacturing this study makes use of a sample of greek manufacturing firms during 1995 2001 in order to analyze gibrat s law we find gibrat s law is rejected for the total sample of firms since persistence of growth plays a key role the classification of firms in size and age groups however yields more interesting results gibrat s law is rejected for micro small and young firms since an inverse relationship between firm growth and initial firm size is found along with a persistence of growth rates in subsequent periods in contrast gibrat s law is accepted for medium large and old firms implying that the growth patterns of these categories follow a random walk and do not tend to persist in subsequent periods

managerial overconfidence and corporate risk management abstract we examine whether managerial overconfidence can help explain the observed discrepancies between the theory and practice of corporate risk management we use a unique dataset of corporate derivatives positions that enables us to directly observe managerial reactions to their speculative gains and losses from market timing when they use derivatives we find that managers increase their speculative activities using derivatives following speculative cash flow gains while they do not reduce their speculative activities following speculative losses this asymmetric response is consistent with the selective self attribution associated with overconfidence our time series approach to measuring overconfidence complements cross sectional approaches currently used in the literature our results show that managerial overconfidence which has been found to influence a number of corporate decisions also affects corporate risk management decisions

rational overoptimism and other biases rational agents with differing priors tend to be overoptimistic about their chances of success in particular an agent who tries to choose the action that is most likely to succeed is more likely to choose an action of which he overestimated rather than underestimated the likelihood of success after studying the comparative statics of this mechanism i show that it also causes agents to attribute failure to exogenous factors but success to their own choice of action to disproportionately believe that they will outperform others to overestimate the precision of their estimates and to overestimate their control over the outcome

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the simple economics of research portfolios this article identifies biases in market portfolios of parallel research projects arising from the noncongruence of social goals and private aspirations occasioned by those circumstances where the market rewards only the winner and where the winner is awarded the entire social surplus it is shown that under risk neutrality this noncongruence implies that t he market encourages the development of too many discoveries too lar ge a spread in the distribution of the quality of discoveries and an excessive occurrence of multiple discoveries copyright 1987 by royal economic society

r d and the growth of firms empirical analysis of a panel of italian firms abstract this paper deals with the growth of firms and with their innovative activities the main hypothesis of the paper maintains that firms with a strong commitment to r d have a higher rate of growth because they succeed in the product market after a review of the related literature the paper presents an econometric analysis of the r d growth of firms relation based on a database of italian firms data on a sample of 500 firms with time series in the range 1989 1997 were drawn from the mediocredito survey of italian manufacturing descriptive analysis shows that the sales growth rate of firms with r d is higher than that of firms without r d econometric analysis is performed in two steps first we apply a panel unit root test im k pesaran h shin y 1997 testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels dae university of cambridge mimeo to verify whether the firm size significantly affects firm growth the test confirms gibrat s law that firm size has a stochastic trend second we explore whether there are variables with stochastic trends that could account for firm size according to our estimates the growth rate of firms is positively correlated with research intensity in these estimates a further interesting result is that investment in ict is not significant or shows a parameter with negative sign

do firms growth rates depend on firm size the empirical literature dealing with corporate growth does not in general give support to gibrat s law stating that the expected increase in firm size is proportionate to its initial size leaving their growth rates independent of size using a relatively large and representative sample of approximately 2 500 danish firms representing all industries we have evaluated the validity of gibrat s law over the period 1990 2004 the present analysis addresses this question by applying econometric methods to test gibrat s law and correcting for problems related to autocorrelation the empirical findings of our study do not generally support gibrat s law but in contrast to the results of earlier studies the analysis reveals that firms growth rates are more likely to be positively related to firm size

acquiring information through peers we develop an endogenous network formation model in which agents form connections to acquire information our model features complementarity in actions as agents care not only about accuracy of their decision making but also about the actions of other agents in equilibrium the information structure is a hierarchical network and under weakly convex cost of forming links the equilibrium network is core periphery although agents are ex ante identical there is ex post heterogeneity in payoffs and actions

managerial career concerns and investments in information we extend the implicit incentives literature by analyzing how career concerns affect a riskneutral manager s decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it the manager has unknown ability that determines the probability with which a good project is available so the market updates ability assessments from project outcomes while project choice is efficient in equilibrium an unobservable investment in the precision of project evaluation allows the manager to control the probabilities of future reputational states this distorts his investment in precision above first best when project payoffs can be observed only on accepted projects

impact of global economic crisis on firm growth the global economic crisis has had an adverse effect on and may continue to affect the entrepreneurial sector all over the world however even in a recessionary period there will always be some firms growing faster than others it is therefore imperative to understand the variables and processes that make some firms grow faster or more resilient to crisis than others in this paper we focus on firm size and its contributions to growth we examine whether growth rates of manufacturing and service industries are independent of firm size during the period of economic crisis based on a large sample of surviving firms in the manufacturing and hospitality industries the results of two step dynamic panel suggest that turnover growth is positively associated with companies size during the observed period of economic recession 2008 2013 in both industries large and medium sized firms exhibit higher growth than do small firms

ceo optimism and forced turnover abstract we show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk averse chief executive officer ceo to choose the first best investment level that maximizes shareholder value optimism below above the interior optimum leads the ceo to underinvest overinvest hence if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders ceos with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic ceos face using a large sample of turnovers we find strong empirical support for this prediction the results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value

doing well while doing bad csr in controversial industry sectors in this article we examine the empirical association between firm value and csr engagement for firms in sinful industries such as tobacco gambling and alcohol as well as industries involved with emerging environmental social or ethical issues i e weapon oil cement and biotech we develop and test three hypotheses the window dressing hypothesis the value enhancement hypothesis and the value irrelevance hypothesis using an extensive us sample from 1995 to 2009 we find that csr engagement of firms in controversial industries positively affects firm value after controlling for various firm characteristics to address the potential endogeneity problem we further estimate a system of equations and change regression and continue to find a positive relation between csr engagement and firm value our findings support the value enhancement hypothesis and are consistent with the premise that the top management of us firms in controversial industries in general considers social responsibility important even though their products are harmful to human being society or environment

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

overconfidence ceo selection and corporate governance we develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager who sometimes makes value destroying investments has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to ceo under value maximizing corporate governance moreover a risk averse ceo s overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion overconfident ceos also underinvest in information production the board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident ceos finally sarbanes oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors but to reduce project investment

do firm sizes and profit rates converge evidence on gibrat s law and the persistence of profits in the long run three panel unit root tests are applied to a 31 year firm size growth and profit rate data set for 96 large quoted uk firms all tests reject the unit root null for log size if the augmented dickey fuller autoregressions exclude a linear time trend if a linear trend is included the results are more ambiguous and appear to differ systematically between tests the view that firm growth is either random or near random does not receive unequivocal support in all tests there is however strong and consistent evidence of mean reversion in profit rates

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

overconfidence compensation contracts and capital budgeting a risk averse manager s overconfidence makes him less conservative as a result it is cheaper for firms to motivate him to pursue valuable risky projects when compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside opportunities moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager flatter compensation contracts that make him better off overconfident managers are also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts because overconfidence commits them to exert effort to learn about projects still too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him to accept highly convex compensation contracts that expose him to excessive risk

toward an economic theory of leadership leading by example this paper explores leadership within organizations leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary rather than coerced activity of the followers this paper considers how a leader induces rational agents to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead them copyright 1998 by american economic association

high growth firms in changing competitive environments the us pharmaceutical industry 1963 to 2002 firms across sectors and regions are highly skewed in their ability to engage with innovation and even more skewed in their ability to translate investments in innovation into higher growth recent attention has been placed on the importance of high growth firms hgf for innovation policy our paper explores under what conditions hgf matter for translating r d investments into economic growth and how this depends on firm specific and industry specific factors we use quantile regression techniques to study the r d growth relationship in hgf compared to low growth firms unlike previous studies we pay particular attention to whether this relationship depends on the particular period in the industry s life cycle we focus on the us pharmaceutical industry from 1963 to 2002 and find that the r d growth relationship is sensitive to the changing competitive environment over the industry s history which suggests that innovation policy must focus not only on firm attributes but also competitive structures

endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the ceo author s hermalin benjamin e abstract this paper develops a model in which the effectiveness of a board s monitoring of the ceo depends on the board s independence the independence of new directors is determined through negotiations implicit or explicit between the existing directors and the ceo the ceo s bargaining position and thus influence over the board selection process depends on an updated estimate of the ceo s ability based on prior performance many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena in this model we also explore the implications of this model for proposed regulations of corporate governance structures please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

portfolio choice in research and development we analyze the effects of a winner take all patent mechanism on the riskiness of the research strategies chosen by competingfirms as well as on thefirms incentives to duplicate research projects nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social optimum in a oneshot simultaneous move game in which competitors choose the riskiness or correlation of their research performances we show that neither society nor firms have any preference for correlation per se while the divergence between social and privately optimal levels of risk depends on skewness characteristics of the probability distribution over discovery dates and on levels of risk aversion

overconfidence insurance and paternalism it is well known that when agents are fully rational compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of insurance markets we find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks compulsory insurance makes low risk agents worse off hence behavioral biases may weaken some of the well established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information

managers with and without style evidence using exogenous variation in a large panel of compustat firms we find that firm policy changes after exogenous ceo departures do not display abnormally high levels of variability casting doubt on the presence of idiosyncratic style effects in policy choices after endogenous ceo departures we do detect abnormally large policy changes these changes are larger when the firm is likely to draw from a deeper pool of replacement ceo candidates suggesting the presence of causal style effects that are anticipated by the board our evidence suggests that managerial styles are not transferred across employers and that standard f tests are inappropriate for identifying style effects the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

career concerns and bayesian overconfidence of managers we show that managerial overconfidence can be a rational response to the economic and institutional environment rather than a personal trait a manager whose contract may not be renewed upon poor performance relative to his peers chooses risky projects in the firm this may result in more than half of the managers rationally estimating their abilities to be better than average although there can be underconfident managers in equilibrium it is never the case that more than half of them estimate their abilities to be below average in any equilibrium

managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism managerial overconfidence overconfident managers overestimate ixwxuhuhwxuqviurpwkhluilupv lqyhvwphqwv 7kxv zh predict that overconfident managers will tend to accelerate good news recognition delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting furthermore we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism we find robust evidence of a negative relation between ceo overconfidence and accounting conservatism we further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect our findings add to the growing literature on overconfidence and complements findings in schrand and zechman 2011 that overconfidence affects financial reporting behavior

corporate prediction markets evidence from google ford and firm x despite the popularity of prediction markets among economists businesses and policymakers have been slow to adopt them in decision making most studies of prediction markets outside the lab are from public markets with large trading populations corporate prediction markets face additional issues such as thinness weak incentives limited entry and the potential for traders with biases or ulterior motives raising questions about how well these markets will perform we examine data from prediction markets run by google ford motor company and an anonymous basic materials conglomerate firm x despite theoretically adverse conditions we find these markets are relatively efficient and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25 reduction in mean squared error the most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at google the inefficiencies that do exist generally become smaller over time more experienced traders and those with higher past performance trade against the identified inefficiencies suggesting that the markets efficiency improves because traders gain experience and less skilled traders exit the market

managerial optimism and earnings smoothing abstract this paper empirically examines how ceo optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises the main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller in absolute value earnings surprises a possible theoretical explanation is offered for these results based on a combination of the torpedo effect the innate behavior of optimists and the risk of litigation prosecution for over reporting earnings

defending gibrat s law as a long run regularity according to gibrat s law of proportionate effect the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the period examined while earlier studies tended to confirm the law more recent research generally rejects it this article reconciles these two streams of literature taking into account the role of market selection and learning in reshaping a given population of firms through time consistently with previous studies we find that gibrat s law has to be rejected ex ante since smaller firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts however a significant convergence toward gibrat like behavior can be detected ex post this finding is an indication that market selection cleans the original population of firms so that the resulting industrial core does not depart from a gibrat like pattern of growth from a theoretical point of view this result is consistent with those models based on passive and active learning and can be seen as a defense of the validity of the law in the long run

choosing between risky prospects the characterization of comparative statics results and location independent risk we consider expected utility maximizers choosing from a family of risky prospects and examine how choice is influenced by the decision makers attitude to risk if the family of risky prospects can be ordered so that as decision makers are more risk tolerant they choose a gamble higher in the ordering then it is natural to say that the family of risky prospects admit a comparative static result the paper characterizes when comparative static results of this sort exist an application is to propose a criterion of location independent riskiness

measuring risk attitudes in a natural experiment data from the television game show lingo we use data from a television game show involving elementary lotteries as a natural experiment to measure risk attitudes unique features of our data set are the substantial monetary stakes and the large sample size crra and cara utility specifications perform approximately equally well we find robust evidence of substantial risk aversion extensions of the basic model which allow for a separate utility flow purely from playing the game or for decisions based on decision weights instead of actual probabilities raise the estimated degree of risk aversion

is the market biased against risky r d this article analyzes the riskiness of the r d strategies chosen by firms engaged in a winner takes all patent race in contradiction to dasgupta and stiglitz 1980 we show that when the distribution of invention times is symmetric the market equilibrium cannot be safer and may be riskier than is socially optimal we identify the economic reason for the emergence but only if there are few competitors

does gibrat s law hold evidence from canadian retail and manufacturing firms this paper investigates the validity of gibrat s law holding for firms in manufacturing and retail trade sectors the object is to expand our knowledge of gibrat s law to include non manufacturing firms a unique longitudinal firm level database which contains information on canadian incorporated establishments enables the inter industry comparison the findings of the analysis are that gibrat s law is violated in both manufacturing and retail sectors violations of gibrat s law for both sectors include i growth rates that depend on firm size ii growth variability that depends on firm size and iii a negative persistence of firm growth finally age effects or selection effects are not the causes of these violations