term limits and pork barrel politics abstract we develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re election decisions we characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare contributions of our paper include we detail how pork provision by more senior incumbents interacts with term limits to affect electoral outcomes pork provision transfers of resources from districts with junior legislators to districts with more senior legislators induces voters to be more forgiving of extreme location by incumbents especially incumbents in small or poor districts pork provision can explain why re election probabilities in congress exceed those for governors term limits reduce voter welfare when all that matters are the ideological positions taken by the office holder term limits may be advantageous when senior incumbents can extract benefits for their constituencies at the expense of districts with more junior representatives large or rich districts especially value term limits when there is substantial pork provision we characterize the welfare of all voters not just the median voter

correlation neglect voting behavior and information aggregation in this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation between their information sources correlation neglect we find that this cognitive bias can improve political outcomes we show that the extreme beliefs which result from correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on political preferences we characterise conditions on the distribution of preferences under which this induces higher vote shares for the optimal policies and better information aggregation

the innovative performance of german multinationals abroad evidence from the european community innovation survey this article analyzes cross country differences in innovation behavior of subsidiaries of german multinational enterprises the analysis is based on data from community innovation survey cis4 and covers 16 european countries we find considerable differences in innovation input intensity and innovation output intensity between german subsidiaries located in different european countries multivariate analysis reveals that these differences are largely related to firm characteristics a significant relationship between firm level innovation and host country characteristics can only be found for innovation output copyright 2011 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

is voter competence good for voters information rationality and democratic performance a long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence this literature got its start arguing that voters lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability a more recent literature deepens the debate with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so we argue that regardless of its conclusions about voter competence this literature s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided we use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians when this strategic interaction is taken into account increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse one simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the

media bias and influence evidence from newspaper endorsements this paper investigates the relationship between media bias and the inuence of the media on voting in the context of newspaper endorsements werst develop a simple econometric model in which voters choose candidates under uncertainty and rely on endorsements from better informed sources newspapers are potentially biased in favor of one of the candidates and voters thus rationally ac count for the credibility of any endorsements our primary empiricalnding is that endorsements are inuential in the sense that voters are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of the endorsement the degree of this inuence however depends upon the credibility of the endorsement in this way endorsements for the democratic candidate from left leaning news papers are less inuential than are endorsements from neutral or right leaning or newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the republican thesendings suggest that voters do rely on the media for information during campaigns but that the extent of this reliance depends upon the degree and direction of any bias

classifying technology policy from an evolutionary perspective abstract for the classification of technology policy in an evolutionary framework the taxonomy of mission and diffusion oriented policy design introduced by ergas ergas h 1987 the importance of technology policy in dasgupta p stoneman p eds economic policy and technological performance cambridge univ press cambridge is useful however ergas indirect method of identifying the respective policy style is only able to give a first and rough insight in the technology policy of a specific country to improve on that we developed a so called direct method aiming at a sound characterization of single policy measures and giving a more detailed picture about policy orientation to demonstrate the basic procedure of the suggested approach it is applied empirically on the german technology policy of the last 2 decades

absorbing technological spillovers simulations in an evolutionary framework this paper offers a simulation analysis of firm strategies which differ by the degree of absorbing technical know how generated elsewhere it investigates the success of those firm strategies in a heterogeneous oligopoly setting in which firms compete by introducing new products and processes simulation results show that building up absorptive capacities tends to be a superior strategy in technologically heterogeneous environments reducing spillover effects leads to a slowdown of technological progress because cross fertilization effects are of minor relevance where markets competition is reduced the absorptive strategy tends to be only technologically superior copyright 1998 by oxford university press

is the endowment effect an expectations effect a hallmark result within behavioral economics is that individuals choices are affected by current endowments a recent theory due to k szegi and rabin 2006 quarterly journal of economics 121 1133 1165 explains such endowment effect with a model of expectations based reference dependent preferences departing from past work we conduct complementary experiments to disentangle expectations verified probabilistic beliefs held by subjects from other features of endowment such as assignment to a good hence allowing us to compare the effect of expectations with that of other variations while mere assignment can affect choices we do not find a large role in the effect for k szegi rabin expectations

the case for responsible parties electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars arguably to paraphrase it does not provide enough choice between candidates this article provides a formal account of the perceived negative effects of platform convergence we show that when parties do not know voters preferences precisely all voters ex ante prefer some platform divergence to convergence at the ex ante median after characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium of competition between responsible policy motivated parties we conclude that all voters ex ante prefer responsible parties to opportunistic purely office motivated ones when parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized that platforms diverge but not so polarized that they diverge excessively however greater polarization increases the scope for office benefits as an instrument for institutional design we calculate the socially optimal level of platform divergence and show that office benefits can be used to achieve this first best outcome if parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized

competence and ideology we develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and valence voters observe an incumbent s valence and policy choices but only know the challenger s party our model provides a rich set of novel results in contrast to existing predictions from static models we prove that dynamic considerations make higher valence incumbents more likely to compromise and win re election even though they compromise to more extreme policies consequently we find that the correlation between valence and extremist policies rises with office holder seniority this result may help explain previous empirical findings despite this result we establish that the whole electorate gains from improvements in the distribution of valences in contrast fixing average valence the greater dispersion in valence associated with a high valence political elite always benefits the median voter but can harm a majority of voters when voters are sufficiently risk averse we then consider interest groups igs or activists who search for candidates with better skills we derive a complete theoretical explanation for the intuitive conjectures that policies are more extreme when igs and activists have more extreme ideologies and that such extremism reduces the welfare of all voters

incentive design under loss aversion compensation schemes often reward success b ut do not penalize failure fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature yet the standard principal agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance this paper shows that under loss aversion there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is e ndogenous a further benefit of capping losses for example through options is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes jel f3 f4

negative voters electoral competition with loss aversion this paper studies how voter loss aversion affects electoral competition in a downsian setting assuming that the voters reference point is the status quo we show that loss aversion has a number of effects first for some values of the status quo there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo regardless of other parameters second there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters ideal point than in the absence of loss aversion in a dynamic extension of the model we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage and we find that this increases policy rigidity finally we show that with loss aversion incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences the underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent this prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new and we test it using elections to us state legislatures the results are as predicted incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter

context dependent voting and political ambiguity abstract in recent decades psychologists have shown that the standard model of individual choice is often violated one regularly observed violation is that choices are influenced by the decision context to incorporate these effects into politics we introduce a theory of context dependent voting and apply it to the puzzle of why candidates are so frequently ambiguous in their policy pronouncements we show that context dependent voters develop a taste for ambiguity even when they evaluate distances quadratically and exhibit traditional risk aversion turning to aggregate effects we incorporate context dependent voting into a model of electoral competition and show that strategic candidates respond in equilibrium to context dependent voters by offering ambiguous platforms thereby affecting the policy outcome

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

why has us policy uncertainty risen since 1960 we consider two classes of explanations for the rise in policy related economic uncertainty in the united states since 1960 the first stresses growth in government spending taxes and regulation a second stresses increased political polarization and its implications for the policymaking process and policy choices

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

loss aversion under prospect theory a parameter free measurement agrowing body of qualitative evidence shows that loss aversion a phenomenon formalized in prospect theory can explain a variety of field and experimental data quantifications of loss aversion are however hindered by the absence of a general preference based method to elicit the utility for gains and losses simultaneously this paper proposes such a method and uses it to measure loss aversion in an experimental study without making any parametric assumptions thus it is the first to obtain a parameter free elicitation of prospect theory s utility function on the whole domain our method also provides an efficient way to elicit utility midpoints which are important in axiomatizations of utility several definitions of loss aversion have been put forward in the literature according to most definitions we find strong evidence of loss aversion at both the aggregate and the individual level the degree of loss aversion varies with the definition used which underlines the need for a commonly accepted definition of loss aversion