inefficient credit booms this paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks in particular it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post even though from a first best perspective the equilibrium always displays under borrowing from a second best point of view excessive borrowing can arise the inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market this generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts the model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

inflation stabilization the experience of israel argentina brazil bolivia and mexico rampant inflation is a major economic problem in many of the less developed countries two out of three attempts to stabilize these economies fail inflation stabilization provides a valuable description and a critical analysis of the disinflation programs introduced in argentina bolivia brazil and israel in 1985 86 and discusses the possibility of such a program in mexico it documents the initial steps in stabilization as well as the reasons for failure as architects of the programs several of the authors are in key positions to assess which aspects were critical in getting the programs accepted and where to look for difficulties and failures in israel inflation was halted without recession the challenge to policy makers today is in shifting from stabilization to the revival of sustained growth this experience is described fully by michael bruno and sylvia piterman who examine the critical issue of exchange rates and by alex cukierman who uses modeling to analyze the interaction of money wages prices and activity under rational expectations that take the government s policy objectives into account endemic inflation and a sudden increase in external debt burden argentina s economy raising the wider issues of high inflation economies and stabilization that are discussed in the chapter by jose luis machinea and that by guido di tella and alfredo canavese eduardo modiano and mario simonsen take up issues of wages in brazil particularly the problem of finding an equitable way to deal with a wage freeze simonsen develops an ambitious game theoretic rationalization of incomes policy as a coordinating device for imperfectly competitive economies bolivia did reach hyperinflation price increases of more than 50 percent each month before stabilizing juan antonio morales shows how stabilizing the exchange rate in an economy where all pricing was already geared to the dollar achieved stabilization without a wage or price freeze and francisco gil diaz asks whether an incomes policy based program could work to control ever increasing inflation in mexico michael bruno is governor of the bank of israel guido di tella is a fellow of st anthony s college a professor at the di tella institute in buenos aires and a member of parliament in argentina stanley fischer is vice president of development economics and chief economist at the world bank rudiger dornbusch is ford international professor of economics at mit

economic and political determinants of budget deficits in developing countries abstract the evidence from a large sample of developing countries tends to reject the empirical implications of optimizing models of the process of determination of fiscal deficits tax rates seigniorage and inflation the paper also presents some preliminary evidence that an important reason for the failure of the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy is that fiscal deficits are partly determined by political factors and that cross country differentials in budget deficits may depend on measures of political instability in particular as suggested by a number of recent theoretical approaches an increase in the degree of political instability appears to lead to greater budget deficits

effects of financial innovations on market volatility when beliefs are heterogeneous abstract consider a model with two logarithmic utility maximizer agents that observe aggregate consumption but disagree about its expected rate of change markets are incomplete we first show that volatility of the interest rate in an economy with additional information is higher in a complete markets economy with no additional information there are two differences in volatility with the previous the first one due to the increase in volatility of the wealth share of the individuals is always positive the second difference is the change in covariance between the components of the interest rate volatility and can be positive or negative

managing expectations instruments vs targets should policymakers offer forward guidance in terms of a path for an instrument such as interest rates or a target for an outcome such as unemployment we study how the optimal approach depends on a departure from rational expectations people have a limited understanding of the behavior of others and of the general equilibrium ge effects of policy the bite of such bounded rationality on implementability and welfare is minimized by target based guidance if and only if ge feedbacks are strong enough this offers a rationale for why central banks should shine the spotlight on unemployment when faced with a prolonged liquidity trap a steep keynesian cross or a large financial accelerator

belief disagreements and collateral constraints belief disagreements have been suggested as a major contributing factor to the recent subprime mortgage crisis this paper theoretically evaluates this hypothesis i assume that optimists have limited wealth and take on leverage so as to take positions in line with their beliefs to have a significant effect on asset prices they need to borrow from traders with pessimistic beliefs using loans collateralized by the asset itself since pessimists do not value the collateral as much as optimists do they are reluctant to lend which provides an endogenous constraint on optimists ability to borrow and to influence asset prices i demonstrate that the tightness of this constraint depends on the nature of belief disagreements optimism concerning the probability of downside states has no or little effect on asset prices because these types of optimism are disciplined by this constraint instead optimism concerning the relative probability of upside states could have significant effects on asset prices this asymmetric disciplining effect is robust to allowing for short selling because pessimists that borrow the asset face a similar endogenous constraint these results emphasize that what investors disagree about matters for asset prices to a greater extent than the level of disagreements when richer contracts are available relatively complex contracts that resemble some of the recent financial innovations in the mortgage market endogenously emerge to facilitate betting

the handbook of international macroeconomics preface 1 introduction rick van der ploeg amsterdam 2 quantity constrained models of open economies neil rankin warwick 3 imperfect competition and open economy macroeconomics huw d dixon york 4 relative price movements in dynamic general equilibrium models of international trade david backus nyu patrick kehoe pennsylvania and finn kydland carnegie mellon 5 international fiscal policy coordination and competition assaf razin and efraim sadka tel aviv 6 capital taxation in the world economy a lans bovenberg tilburg 7 history of the international monetary system implications for research in international macroeconomics and finance barry eichengreen berkeley 8 on inflation unemployment and the optimal exchange rate regime george alogoskoufis athens 9 macroeconomic policy speculative attacks and balance of payments crisis pierre richard agenor and robert p flood imf 10 continuous time models of exchange rates and intervention giuseppe bertola princeton 11 stylized facts of nominal exchange rate returns casper g de vries leuven 12 partial versus general equilibrium models of international capital market equilibrium 13 sovereign debt kenneth kletzer santa cruz 14 growth and external debt daniel cohen cepremap 15 growth and deficits in an interdependent world index

extrapolation and bubbles abstract we present an extrapolative model of bubbles in the model many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals an average of the asset s past price changes and the asset s degree of overvaluation and waver over time in the relative weight they put on them the model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles that bubbles will be accompanied by high trading volume and that volume increases with past asset returns we present empirical evidence that bears on some of the model s distinctive predictions

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

a welfare criterion for models with distorted beliefs this paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief neutral ine cient if it is ine cient under any convex combination of agents beliefs while this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations it can identify negative sum speculation in a broad range of prominent models with distorted beliefs

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

news noise and fluctuations an empirical exploration a common view of the business cycle gives a central role to anticipations consumers and firms continuously receive information about the future which is sometimes news and sometimes just noise based on this information consumers and firms choose spending and because of nominal rigidities spending affects output in the short run if ex post the information turns out to be news the economy adjusts gradually to a new level of activity if it turns out to be just noise the economy returns to its initial state therefore the dynamics of news and noise generate both short run and long run changes in aggregate activity this view appears to capture many of the aspects often ascribed to fluctuations the role of animal spirits in affecting demand spirits coming here from a rational reaction to information about the future the role of demand in affecting output in the short run together with the notion that in the long run output follows a natural path determined by fundamentals in this paper we examine whether this view is consistent with the data we reach three main conclusions the first two methodological the third substantive structural vars typically cannot recover news and noise shocks the reason is straightforward if agents face a signal extraction problem and are unable to separate news from noise then the econometrician faced with either the same data as the agents or a subset of these data cannot do it either while structural estimation methods cannot recover the actual time series for news and noise shocks either they can recover underlying structural parameters and thus the relative role and dynamic effects of news and noise shocks estimation of both a simple model and then of a more elaborate dsge model suggest that agents indeed solve such a signal extraction problem and that noise shocks play an important role in determining short run dynamics recent efforts to estimate business cycle models in which expectations about the future play an important role include christiano et al 2010 and schmitt grohe and uribe 2012 those papers follow the approach of jaimovich and rebelo 2009 and model news as perfectly anticipated productivity changes that will occur at

a risk centric model of demand recessions and speculation we provide a continuous time risk centric representation of the new keynesian model which we use to analyze the interactions between asset prices financial speculation and macro economic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand in principle interest rate policy is highly effective in dealing with shocks to asset valuations however in practice monetary policy faces a wide range of constraints if these constraints are severe a decline in risky asset valuations generates a demand recession this reduces earnings and generates a negative feedback loop between asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession phase average beliefs matter not only because they affect asset valuations but also because they determine the strength of the amplification mechanism in the ex ante boom phase belief disagreements or heterogeneous asset valuations matter because they induce investors to speculate this speculation exacerbates the crash by reducing high valuation investors wealth when the economy transitions to recession which depresses wealth weighted average beliefs macroprudential policy that restricts speculation in the boom can pareto improve welfare by increasing asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession

balance of payments crises and devaluation the collapse of a fixed exchange rate is typically marked by a sudden balance of payments crisis in which speculators fleeing from the domestic currency acquire a large portion of the central bank s foreign exchange holdings faced with such an attack the central bank often withdraws temporarily from the foreign exchange market allowing the exchange rate to float freely before devaluing and returning to a fixed rate regime this paper links the timing of the initial speculative attack to the magnitude of the expected devaluation and to the length of the transitional period off loating an implication of the analysis is that there exist devaluations so sharp and transition periods so short that acrisis must occur the moment the market first learns that the current exchange parity will eventually be altered for sufficiently long transition periods the floating exchange rate overshoots its new peg before appreciating back toward it for shorter periods the rate depreciates monotonically to its new fixed level accordingly the central bank s return tothe foreign exchange market can occasion a capital outflow or a capital inflow this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

heterogeneous expectations and bond markets this paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions the heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation the relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena including the excessive volatility of bond yields the failure of the expectations hypothesis and the ability of a tent shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

the effectiveness of monetary policy anchors firm level evidence analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange rate pegs inflation targets and central bank independence can help anchor private sector inflation expec tations yet there are few direct tests of this argument we offer cross national micro level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private sector inflation concerns using firm level data from eighty one countries approximately 10 000 firms we find evidence that international anchors exchange rate commit ments correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private sector concerns about inflation while domestic anchors inflation targeting and central bank inde pendence do not our conjecture is that private sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange rate anchors because they are more transparent more con straining and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements the literature on monetary policy highlights the role of monetary institutions in stabilizing private sector inflation expectations central bank independence cbi inflation targeting it and fixed exchange rates pegs are widely viewed as insti tutions that have the capacity to mitigate private sector concerns that policymak ers will exploit them after they have locked in their price wage and investment decisions while other empirical research explores the institutional correlates of inflation and its variability yielding mixed results we use firm level data in our study to directly assess the impact of monetary anchors on private sector inflation concerns we find evidence that pegs mitigate firm owners concerns with infla tion but that domestic anchors such as it and cbi are uncorrelated with our micro indicators of inflation expectations considerable research has investigated the use of it cbi and pegs as institu tions that establish monetary policy credibility whereas these anchors are expected

a macroeconomic model with a financial sector this paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents we pursue four sets of results i the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes as volatility spikes agents precautionary motive increases depressing prices even further log linear approximations fail to capture these non linear effects that can cause economies to be significantly depressed for long periods of time ii endogenous risk during volatile episodes increases asset price correlations iii financial experts impose a negative externality on each other and on the labor sector by not maintaining adequate capital cushion and funding structure iv while risk sharing within the financial sector through securitization and derivatives contracts reduces many inefficiencies it can also amlify systemic risks

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

credibility and exchange rate management in developing countries abstract the paper discusses the role of credibility factors in the conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries the analysis is based on a simple framework in which policymakers are concerned about inflation and external competitiveness price setters in the nontradable sector of the economy engage in a strategic game against the authorities the model generates a devaluation bias which undermines the credibility of a fixed exchange rate the role of reputational factors signaling considerations and joining a currency union as possible solutions to this bias is examined

capital flight and political risk abstract this paper provides the first serious attempt to examine the relationship between political risk and capital flight for a large set of developing countries the outcomes of the analysis show that in most cases political risk variables do have a statistically robust relationship to capital flight once domestic and international macroeconomic circumstances are added at least when the robustness test as proposed by sala i martin is applied we conclude that on the basis of the analysis in this paper we have found support for the hypothesis that political risk leads to increased capital flight

disaster risk and preference shifts in a new keynesian model in rbc models disaster risk shocks reproduce countercyclical risk premia but generate an increase in consumption along the recession and asset price fall through their effects on agents preferences gourio 2012 this paper offers a solution to this puzzle by developing a new keynesian model with such a small but time varying probability of disaster we show that price stickiness combined with an eis smaller than unity restores procyclical consumption and wages while preserving countercyclical risk premia in response to disaster risk shocks the mechanism then provides a rationale for discount factor first and second moment uncertainty shocks

managing credit booms and busts a pigouvian taxation approach we study a dynamic model in which the interaction between debt ac cumulation and asset prices magni es credit booms and busts we nd that borrowers do not internalize these feedback eects and therefore suf fer from excessively large booms and busts in both credit ows and asset prices we show that a pigouvian tax on borrowing may induce borrowers to internalize these externalities and increase welfare we calibrate the model by reference to i the us small and medium sized enterprise sector and ii the household sector and nd the optimal tax to be countercycli cal in both cases dropping to zero in busts and rising to approximately half a percentage point of the amount of debt outstanding during booms

temporary stabilization predetermined exchange rates the paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects it is shown that the temporary policy does and furthermore that the real effects tend to become bigger in absolute value as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened the central discussion is carried out in terms of a one good cash in advance model with perfect capital mobility and ramsey type consumers results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

political cycles and exchange rate based stabilization fixed exchange rates implemented to increase credibility and attract foreign investment or as an alternative approach to stabilization in high inflation economies have been shown to be successful in expanding economic activity and correcting inflation in the short term but often lead to undesirable outcomes in the medium to long term although there is a wealth of literature documenting the boom bust cycles associated with the adoption of a nominal anchor no adequate explanation has been proffered as to governments repeatedly choosing policies that are self defeating the authors address this question with a political economy explanation based on the notion of a self interested government for which short term stabilization is attractive in the face of incentives posed by the electoral cycle if the election coincides with the boom phase of an exchange rate based stabilization incumbent governments increase the likelihood of gaining reelection and the bust phase will develop if at all only after the contest the authors thus suggest a modified version of the traditional political business cycle from the standpoint of a self interested office seeking government exchange rate based stabilizations can make good political sense empirical results based on an analysis of eighteen latin american countries from 1970 to 1999 support the insights of the argument movements towards a more fixed exchange rate are greater than three times more likely in a preelection period than in other stages of the electoral cycle

good bye financial repression hello financial crash some unintended consequences of financial liberalization in latin america are analyzed in this paper intrinsic imperfectious in financial markets and the policy dilemmas they pose are reviewed first the stylized facts of southern cone experiments in financial liberization are then presented alternative ways of organlzing domestic capital markets under latin american conditions are discussed and an eclectic reform mongering program is proposed

devaluation levels versus rates abstract in a context of infinitely lived families a la sidrauski where consumers are lump sum compensated for the inflation tax and there is no capital mobility it is shown that a devaluation improves while an increase in the rate of devaluation deteriorates the balance of payments

the benefit of crises for economic reforms when expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the effect of convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance public investment in the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts in taxation generally have become possible only under the impact of major emergency and crisis mostly in wartime in a number of developing countries in

yardstick competition and fiscal disparities an experimental study recent theoretical research suggest that yardstick competition may be biased by the presence of fiscal disparities between local governments and that fiscal equalization may help in correcting this bias this paper provides an empirical test of these theoretical predictions by means of a laboratory experiment

risk premia and the real effects of money this paper proposes a flexible price theory of the role of money in an economy with incomplete idiosyncratic risk sharing when the risk premium goes up money provides a safe store of value that prevents interest rates from falling reducing investment investment is too high during booms when risk is low and too low during slumps when risk is high monetary policy cannot correct this money is superneutral and ricardian equivalence holds the optimal allocation requires the friedman rule and a tax subsidy on capital the real effects of money survive even in the cashless limit

temporary stabilization policy abstract the effects of a temporary slowdown in the rate of expansion of money supply are studied under ramsey lucas and money superneutrality assumptions it is shown that such a policy expands consumption and leads to capital decumulation and current account deficits in the short run the model is a benchmark case in which temporary policy is always detrimental to welfare connection with the policy credibility issue is briefly discussed

fiscal restraints and voter welfare this paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection the role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters interests we use the model to examine the optimality of inefficient taxation limits on the size of government increasing transparency and yardstick competition some conclusions are surprising for example we show that some forms of fiscal restraint can only be desirable when incumbents are sufficiently likely to be benevolent

credit crises precautionary savings and the liquidity trap we use a model a la bewly huggett ayagari to explore the eects of a credit crunch on consumer spending households borrow and lend to smooth idiosyncratic income shocks facing an exogenous borrowing constraint we look at the economy response after an unexpected permananent tightening of this constraint the interest rate drops sharply in the short run and then adjusts to a lower steady state level this is due to the fact that after the shock a large fraction of agents is far below their target holdings of precautionary savings and this generates a large temporary positive shock to net lending we then look at the eects on output here two opposing forces are present as households can deleverage in two ways by consuming less and by working more we show that under a reasonable parametrization the eect on consumer spending dominates and precautionary behavior generates a recession if we add nominal rigidities two things happen i supply side responses are muted and ii there is a lower bound on the interest rate adjustment these two elements tend to amplify the recession caused by the credit tightening

financial innovation and asset price volatility we compare asset prices in an overlapping generations model for incomplete and complete markets individuals within a generational cohort have heterogeneous beliefs about future states of the economy and thus would like to make bets against each other in the incomplete markets economy agents cannot make such bets asset price volatility is very small the situation changes dramatically when markets are completed through financial innovations as the set of available securities now allows agents with different beliefs to place bets against each other wealth shifts across agents and generations such changes in the wealth distribution lead to substantial asset price volatility

speculation and risk sharing with new financial assets while the traditional view of nancial innovation emphasizes the risk sharing role of new nancial assets belief disagreements about these assets naturally lead to speculation which represents a powerful economic force in the opposite direction this paper investigates the eect of nancial innovation on portfolio risks in an economy when both the risk sharing and the speculation forces are present financial assets provide hedging services but they are also subject to speculation because traders do not necessarily agree about their payos i de ne the average variance of traders net worths as a measure of portfolio risks for this economy and i decompose it into two components the uninsurable variance de ned as the average variance that would obtain if there were no belief disagreements and the speculative variance de ned as the residual variance that results from speculative trades based on belief disagreements financial innovation always decreases the uninsurable variance because new assets increase the possibilities for risk sharing my main result shows that nancial innovation also always increases the speculative variance this is true even if traders completely agree about the payos of new assets the intuition behind this result is the hedge more bet more eect traders use new assets to hedge their bets on existing assets which in turn enables them to place larger bets and take on greater risks my second set of results concern endogenous nancial innovation when belief disagreements are su ciently large a pro t seeking market maker introduces assets that maximize the average variance among all possible choices completely disregarding the risk sharing motive for nancial innovation my third set of results concern a calibration of the model in the context of the gdp indexed assets proposed by athanasoulis and shiller 2001 when traders have reasonable amounts of belief disagreements these assets would have the unintended consequence of increasing their consumption risks

intertemporal asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs abstract we examine the behaviour of the interest rate asset prices and asset holdings in an economy with heterogeneous rationally updated beliefs about the expected rate of production growth the equilibrium interest rate is a weighted average of the interest rates that would prevail in economies populated by homogeneous agents with the beliefs of the respective agents in the heterogeneous model the weights are given by the fractions of total wealth held financial innovation affects the dynamics of allocations and prices but preserves the aggregate output process and the structure of equilibrium asset prices also display the wealth weighted average characterization journal of economic literature classification numbers c60 d52 d91 g12

a model of capital and crises we develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices the model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy and the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations low intermediary capital reduces the risk bearing capacity of the marginal investor we show how this force helps to explain patterns during financial crises the model replicates the observed rise during crises in sharpe ratios conditional volatility correlation in price movements of assets held by the intermediary sector and fall in riskless interest rates

explaining fiscal policies and inflation in developing countries abstract in this paper we investigate empirically the determinants of inflation seigniorage and fiscal deficits in developing countries we first test the optimal taxation theory of inflation for a group of 21 lcds we find that the implications of this theory are rejected for all these countries we then proceed to implement a number of tests based on the new political economy approach to macroeconomic policies we deal with some of the implications of a credibility and reputation model and of a strategic government behavior model we find that the data support the most important predictions of the political economy view of fiscal policy our measures of political instability and political polarization play an important role in explaining cross country differences in seigniorage inflation government borrowing and fiscal deficits we end by discussing directions for future research

pecuniary externalities in economies with financial frictions this article characterizes the efficiency properties of competitive economies with financial constraints in which phenomena such as fire sales and financial amplification may arise we show that financial constraints lead to two distinct types of pecuniary externalities distributive externalities that arise from incomplete insurance markets and collateral externalities that arise from price dependent financial constraints for both types of externalities we identify three sufficient statistics that determine optimal taxes on financing and investment decisions to implement constrained efficient allocations we also show that fire sales and financial amplification are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate inefficient pecuniary externalities we demonstrate how to employ our framework in a number of applications whereas collateral externalities generally lead to over borrowing the distortions from distributive externalities may easily flip sign leading to either under or over borrowing both types of externalities may lead to under or over investment

optimal time consistent macroprudential policy collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions made in good times affect collateral prices during a crisis we show that under commitment the optimal financial regulator s plans are time inconsistent and study time consistent policy quantitatively this policy reduces sharply the frequency and magnitude of crises removes fat tails from the distribution of asset returns and increases social welfare in contrast constant debt taxes are ineffective and can be welfare reducing while an optimized macroprudential taylor rule is effective but less so than the optimal time consistent policy

the timing of stabilizations abstract a unified framework is developed for examining stabilization from high inflation in a stochastic environment optimality conditions for the delay in the adoption of a stabilization program and its possible abandonment are derived and analyzed the anticipation of external aid is shown to reinforce delay in the implementation of a stabilization also conditionality agreements become necessary to ensure that the administration of external aid will increase the probability of success of the program the presence of speculative activity reinforces delay in the implementation of stabilizations and is found to necessitate otherwise unnecessary frontloading of adjustment

intermediary asset pricing abstract we model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary intermediaries face an equity capital constraint risk premia r

in search of yardstick competition a spatial analysis of italian municipality property tax setting this paper uses italian local government data to test for fiscal interaction arising from yardstick competition to discriminate yardstick competition from competing theories of strategic interaction we account for the incentives and constraints generated by the electoral system in particular for the presence of term limits and the size of the majorities supporting the mayors estimation of a local property tax setting equation uncovers positive spatial auto correlation in local tax rates of jurisdictions where the mayors run for re election in uncertain contests while interaction is absent where either mayors face a term limit or are backed by large majorities

survival and long run dynamics with heterogeneous beliefs under recursive preferences i analytically characterize the long run behavior of an economy with two types of agents who differ in their beliefs and are endowed with homothetic recursive preferences agents with more incorrec

what causes the failure of inflation stabilization plans abstract the paper discusses the causes of failure of inflation stabilization plans following a description of stylized facts of inflation stabilization a model of balance of payments crises is presented highlighting some of the main factors leading to the collapse of stabilizations empirical results obtained when estimating a binary probit model over a panel of 34 stabilizations identify real exchange rate appreciation lack of foreign reserves and government budget deficits as the main causes of failure of inflation stabilization plans this is consistent with the model presented in this paper with the stylized facts of stabilizations and with some of the models found in the literature

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

asymmetric yardstick competition and municipal cooperation this paper addresses the issue of inter jurisdictional cooperation when incumbents are pure rent seekers asymmetric fiscal needs bias yardstick competition as in allers 2012 while incumbents gain control over the political yardstick competition by cooperating this bias leads to asymmetric rent share cooperation is also intrinsically unstable furthermore incentives such as matching grants or economies of scale may enhance cooperation but will not increase political accountability

a theory of demand shocks this paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumer expectations regarding aggregate productivity agents are hit by heterogeneous productivity shocks they observe their own productivity and a noisy public signal regarding aggregate productivity the public signal gives rise to noise shocks which have the features of aggregate demand shocks they increase output employment and inflation in the short run and have no effects in the long run numerical examples suggest that the model can generate sizable equilibrium dsge models of the business cycle include a large number of shocks to technol ogy monetary policy preferences etc but typically do not include expectational shocks as independent drivers of short run fluctuations 1 this paper explores the idea of expectation driven cycles looking at a model where technology determines equilibrium output in the long run and consumers receive noisy signals about technology in the short run the presence of noisy signals produces expectational errors this paper studies the role of these expectational errors in gener ating volatility at business cycle frequencies the model is based on two ingredients first consumers take time to recognize permanent changes in aggregate fundamentals although they may have good information on the current state of the individual firm or sector where they operate they have only limited information regarding the long run determinants of aggregate activity second consumers have access to public information that is relevant to estimate long run productivity this includes news about technological innovations publicly released macroeconomic and sectoral statistics financial market prices and public statements by policy makers however these signals provide only a noisy forecast of the long run effects of technological innovations this opens the door to noise shocks which induce consumers to temporarily overestimate or underestimate the productive capacity of the economy

margin based asset pricing and deviations from the law of one price in a model with heterogeneous risk aversion agents facing margin constraints we show how securities required returns increase in both their betas and their margin requirements negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind lowering risk free rates and raising sharpe ratios of risky securities especially for high margin securities such a funding liquidity crisis gives rise to bases that is price gaps between securities with identical cash flows but different margins in the time series bases depend on the shadow cost of capital which can be captured through the interest rate spread between collateralized and uncollateralized loans and in the cross section they depend on relative margins we test the model empirically using the credit default swap bond bases and other deviations from the law of one price and use it to evaluate central banks lending facilities jel g01 g12 g13 e44 e50 the paramount role of funding constraints becomes particularly salient during liquidity crises with the one that started in 2007 being an excellent case in point banks unable to fund their operations closed down and the funding problems spread to other investors such as hedge funds that relied on bank funding therefore traditional liquidity providers became forced sellers interest rate spreads increased dramatically treasury rates dropped sharply and central banks stretched their balance sheets to facilitate funding these funding problems had significant asset pricing effects the most extreme example being the failure of the law of one price loop securities with nearly

yardstick competition fiscal disparities and equalization abstract the theory of political yardstick competition states that a comparison of public service levels and tax rates with those in nearby jurisdictions can provide voters with a useful instrument to assess politicians performance however we argue that fiscal disparities bias this yardstick and that this bias may be removed through fiscal equalization

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

the exact timing of the collapse of an exchange rate regime and its impact on the relative price of traded goods as of february 28 1983 ninety four countries are classified as having a fixed exchange rate regime 38 are pegged to the u s dollar 13 to the french franc 14 to the special drawing right and 24 to different baskets of currencies the choice of a fixed exchange rate peg implies a specific monetary discipline namely monetary growth equal to the growth rate of the currency or currencies to which a country is pegged monetary policy is thus subject to an exchange rate rule rather than to either a monetary growth rule or alternatively to discretionary policy a fixed exchange rate is a specific case of an active crawling peg where the preannounced rate of change in the exchange rate is zero active crawling peg rules whereby the exchange rate is adjusted downward by a preannounced amount over a specified period of time have been practiced in various places particularly in latin america recent experiments include argentina beginning december 1978 brazil during the 1980 calendar year chile from february 1978 to june 1979 jamaica from may 1978 to may 1979 portugal from august 1977 to june 1979 and uruguay beginning october 1978 1 at times the prean

the macroeconomics of shadow banking we propose a dynamic macroeconomic model of nancial intermediation in an environment where households demand liquid assets in contrast to the literature intermediaries can issue equity without any friction in normal times intermediaries maximize liquidity creation by levering up the collateral value of their assets a process we call shadow banking a rise in uncertainty causes investors to demand liquidity in bad states intermediaries respond by simultaneously deleveraging and substituting toward safe liabilities shadow banking eectively shuts down prices fall and investment plummets the model generates amplication via endogenous collateral runs as well as ight to quality eects the model s macroeconomic eects are consistent with a slow economic recovery even when and especially when intermediary capital is high we analyze the impact of several policy interventions in the areas of unconventional monetary policy and regulatory reform

uncertainty shocks and balance sheet recessions this paper investigates the origin and propagation of balance sheet recessions i first show that in standard models driven by tfp shocks the balance sheet channel disappears when agents can write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy optimal contracts sever the link between leverage and aggregate risk sharing eliminating the concentration of aggregate risk that drives balance sheet recessions i then show that uncertainty shocks can help explain this concentration of aggregate risk and drive balance sheet recessions even with contracts on aggregate shocks the mechanism is quantitatively important and i explore implications for financial regulation

political factors in international economics an overview abstract the intellectual interaction between politics and economics is not new theolder term to describe what economists do political economy which until recently survived only in french translation and on the masthead of one of the premier professional journals is a case in point a more pertinent example is provided by developments over the past two decades in the field of industrial organization the shift from an exclusively public interest view of economic regulation to one in which regulation is seen as the result of interaction between utility maximizing politicians and various interest groups 1 the extension of such ideas to international economics is i believe both necessary and desirable and as these papers indicate with the right experimental design it can also prove highly illuminating

excessive dollar debt financial development and underinsurance we propose that the limited financial development of emerging markets is a significant factor behind the large share of dollar denominated external debt present in these markets we show that when financial constraints affect borrowing and lending between domestic agents agents undervalue insuring against an exchange rate depreciation since more of this insurance is present when external debt is denominated in domestic currency rather than in dollars this result implies that domestic agents choose excessive dollar debt we also show that limited financial development reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter emerging markets the retarded entry reinforces the underinsurance problem

the rate of return on everything 1870 2015 what is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and if so by how much is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long run which particular assets have the highest long run returns we answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive data set for all major asset classes including housing the annual data on total returns for equity housing bonds and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015 and our new evidence reveals many new findings and puzzles

credibility and stabilization the paper deals with stabilization as a one shot problem to ask what credibility means in a world where programs will succeed with probability one a model is spelled out where the equilibrium program has some ex ante probability of failure the model draws attention to the factors that raise or lower the probability of success of a stabilization program and thus offers a positive theory of stabilization reputation that emerges as a central element in repeated games has no role in this model

yardstick competition and partial coordination exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates abstract this paper explores a striking form of tax policy interdependence that can be observed in the german federation though municipalities enjoy discretion in setting the local business tax rate large fractions of municipalities in some states even the majority set identical tax rates our analysis shows that this tax rate bunching is not the result of federal or state level institutions possible explanations rest on partial coordination and yardstick competition the role of the former is exemplified by the finding that small jurisdictions and jurisdictions sharing the same county are more likely to engage in bunching yardstick competition seems also relevant since jurisdictions for which strategic tax setting should be associated with larger gains and lower cost are in fact more likely to set identical tax rates