the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

three problems of social organisation institutional law and economics meets habermasian law and democracy this paper attempts to identify certain implications of habermasian ethics for the economic analysis of law it does so by demonstrating a complementarity between the habermas of between facts and norms and the veblen ayres commons tradition s of economic analysis three unresolved problems of social organisation raised by the institutionalists are addressed the legitimacy of the status quo ante buchanan schmid the legitimacy of society s transaction structure klevorick and the problem of social order hobbes platteau discourse ethics demonstrates how these problems may be resolved the model of human agency adopted in institutional law and economics permits an easier fit with discourse ethics than would be possible with the neoclassical traditions

mne institutional advantage how subunits shape transpose and evade host country institutions scholars increasingly emphasize the impact of institutions on multinational enterprises mnes but the opposite relationship has attracted less research that is mne agency in relation to institutions based on a comparative case study of six mnes from the united states and sweden this paper remedies this it explores and explicates mne subunits strategic responses to host country institutional constraints and opportunities in five different regions a new institutional approach is adopted which allows for an investigation of mne subunit agency in relation to normative and cognitive institutions as well as regulative ones this fine grained analysis reveals not only what kinds of responses mne subunits invoke but why and how they are able to respond we identify four strategic responses by which subunits shape transpose and evade institutions in the pursuit of competitive advantage innovation arbitrage circumvention and adaptation these responses are driven by three key enablers multinationality foreignness and institutional ambiguity that serve to enhance and heighten three mechanisms reflexivity role expectations and resources by linking the enablers and the mechanisms to specific types of strategic responses in a framework and typology the paper not only contributes to emerging research on the interplay between mnes institutions and strategy but to strategy practice

the family and the state the immaturity of children sometimes precludes efficient arrangements between children and parents or others responsible for child care the difficulty in establishing efficient relations within families provides the point of departure for our interpretation of the heavy state involvement in the family the authors believe that a surprising number of state interventions mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their care many regulations of the family improve the efficiency of family activities these interventions include subsidies to education and training social security and other old age support subsidies to births laws that limit access to divorce and the sale of children and laws that require parents permission for early marriage and other choices of children families that leave bequests can force children to repay parents for investments in human capital by reducing bequests therefore these families do not underinvest in childrens human capital by contrast families that do not leave bequests often poorer families do underinvest in children the state may subsidize schools and other training facilities to raise investments in children by poorer families to efficient levels authors modified

what makes management style similar and distinct across borders growth experience and culture in korean and japanese firms using a survey database of japanese and korean firms we compare the styles of two asian business systems with a japanese rather than an american mirror there are substantial differences in the two country styles we introduce two sources of convergence firm size as measured by sales and globalization as measured by export ratio and find that both of these factors reduce the difference with globalization the more significant of the two

the law and economics movement in the last thirty years the scope of economics has expanded dramatically beyond its traditional domain of explicit market transactions today there is an economic theory of property rights of corporate and other organizations of government and politics of education of the family of crime and punishment of anthropology of history of information of racial and sexual discrimination of privacy even of the behavior of animals and overlapping all these but the last of law 2 some economists oppose this expansion in whole or more commonly in part 3 there are a number of bad reasons all i think closely related for such opposition and one slightly better one 1 one bad reason is the idea that economics means the study of markets so that nonmarket behavior is simply outside its scope this type of argument owes nothing really to economics but instead reflects a common misconception about language more specifically a failure to distinguish among three different types of word or concept the first type illustrated by the term marginal cost is purely conceptual the term is rigorously and unambiguously defined by reference to other concepts just as numbers are but again like numbers there is no observable object in the real world that it names try finding a firm s marginal costs on its books of account the second type of word illustrated by rabbit refers to a set of real world objects few such words are purely referential one can speak of a pink rabbit or a rabbit the size of a man without misusing the word even though one is no longer using it to describe anything that exists nevertheless the referential function dominates finally there are words like law religion literature and economics which are neither conceptual nor referential such words resist all efforts at definition they have in fact no fixed meaning and their dictionary definitions are circular they can be used but not defined 4 one cannot say that economics is what economists do because many noneconomists do economics one cannot call economics the science of rational choice either the word rational lacks a clear definition and passing that difficulty there can be noneconomic theories of rational choice in which few predictions of ordinary economics may hold for example because the theory assumes that people s preferences are unstable there can also be nonrational economic theories an example is the type of survival theory in industrial organization in which firms that randomly hit on methods of lowering their costs expand vis a vis their rivals another example is marxism one cannot call economics the study of markets either not only because that characterization resolves the question of the domain of eco judge u s court of appeals for the seventh circuit senior lecturer university of chicago law school 1111 e 60th st chicago il 60637 i thank gary becker frank easterbrook william landes geoffrey miller richard porter george stigler geoffrey stone and alan sykes for comments on a previous draft and nir yarden for research assistance see for example gary becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1985 p 53 george stigler 1984 gerard radnitzky and peter bernholz 1986 2 for a recent conspectus of economic analysis of law see my book 1986 3see for example ronald coase 1978 coase is of course a leading figure in the economics of property rights so his opposition is far from total 4for an excellent discussion see john ellis 1974 ch 2

thorstein veblen and post darwinian economics thorstein veblen is noted for his view that economics should be an evolutionary science however although the term evolutionary has been adopted in general terms by subsequent institutional economists there has been remarkably little detailed exploration informed by biology of what veblen meant by an evolutionary science and the character of the post darwinian economics that he attempted to build this essay explores the reasons for veblen s attachment to darwinism informed by developments in biology itself and identifies some distinctive and enduring features of veblen s evolutionary theory copyright 1992 by oxford university press

tax incentives and the demand for life insurance evidence from italy the theoretical literature suggests that taxation can have a large impact on household portfolio selection and allocation in this paper we analyze the tax treatment of life insurance considering the cancellation of tax incentives in italian life insurance contracts for investors with high marginal tax rates and the introduction of incentives for those with low rates using repeated cross sectional data from 1989 to 1998 we find that the tax reforms had no effect on the decision to invest in life insurance or the amount invested the likely explanations are the lack of information and lack of commitment to long term investment

plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion a model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented the prosecutor s private information consists of the strength of the case while the defendant s private information consists of h is guilt or innocence in equilibrium a fraction of cases are dismis sed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant in the remaining cases the prosecutor s offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty reveals the strength of the case it is shown t hat unlimited prosecutorial discretion may be socially disadvantageou s since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality copyright 1988 by american economic association

do investors respond to tax reform evidence from a natural experiment in germany abstract we present new evidence for the importance of taxation in households investment decisions a difference in difference analysis shows that a tax reform in germany which revoked the tax exemption of life insurance returns triggered a significant increase in demand prior to the reform

2 the institutional structure of production 1 prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1991 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

rules of thumb in life cycle saving decisions we analyse life cycle saving decisions when households use simple heuristics or rules of thumb rather than solve the underlying intertemporal optimisation problem we simulate life cycle saving decisions using three simple rules and compute utility losses relative to the solution of the optimisation problem our simulations suggest that utility losses induced by following simple decision rules are relatively low moreover the two main saving motives reflected by the canonical life cycle model long run consumption smoothing and short run insurance against income shocks can be addressed quite well by saving rules that do not require computationally demanding tasks such as backwards induction

environmental scanning in korean firms organizational isomorphism in action this paper reports some of the findings of a study on environmental scanning practices in six large korean firms and compares the results with those of previous studies on scanning conducted in the united states such comparisons are made for both the scanning behaviors of individual managers and the structures roles and systems of formal environmental scanning units the overall conclusion that emerges is that while scanning behaviors of american and korean firms are quite similar on average they differ significantly in the extents of inter organizational variances in the two societies scanning practices of u s firms are diverse while those of korean firms are remarkably similar

sme internationalization modes in the german biotechnology industry the influence of imitation network position and international experience in this article we reveal how network enabled imitation processes impact young small and medium sized enterprises smes internationalization and how a firm s network position as well as its experiential knowledge moderate imitative behavior in internationalization modes building on institutional network and organizational learning theory we suggest that firms imitate the internationalization modes of their peers in their network moreover we argue that a firm s imitation propensity depends on two important boundary conditions network position and past experience applying a longitudinal event history analysis to analyze the complete population of 977 german biotechnology firms between 1996 and 2012 largely supports our hypotheses our findings reveal that firms imitate the internationalization modes of their peers in a precise manner this implies that the imitation of others can initially serve as a presumably convenient low risk shortcut to a planned or experience driven internationalization process furthermore our results confirm that this imitation process is channeled through formal network relations and that central network positions that are associated with superior information access enhanced legitimacy and status may promote deviating behavior acknowledging the interplay of different learning sources our findings additionally show that initial internationalization mode choices of smes can have a lasting effect on subsequent internationalization behavior overall our study contributes to a more nuanced view of imitative behavior of internationalizing smes and its boundary conditions and highlights future research opportunities that exist for considering imitation and its implications in international business research

information and the coase theorem abstract some economists think the coase theorem implies a lot about the proper scope of government intervention in the economy and about the welfare consequences of laissez faire others see it as a mere tautology that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient the coase theorem is important only if we believe that efficient negotiation is likely of course we can attribute inefficiencies to bargaining imperfection but it may not be useful to do so such attitudes sometimes seem to depend more on ideology than on reason this article gives one economist s reasoned view it discusses the coase theorem as a decentralization result and why decentralization results are interesting it considers mechanism design for revealing private information and describes the problems of centralization should the coase theorem should be viewed as a second best result property rights are more efficient than some reasonable alternative does the coase theorem recommend an institution or make

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the approach of institutional economics this paper assesses the old institutional economics it emphasizes the importance of key old institutionalist themes concerning the necessity of habits and rules and the role of institutions a problem in the alternative theoretical program of the new institutionalism is the untenability of its assumption of an original institution free market or state of nature even optimizing behavior requires the prior existence of habits and rules although it still lacks a complete and systematic theory the evolutionary approach of the old institutionalists tackles the problem of the interactive relationship of actor to structure without analytical reduction to one or the other

environmental scanning behavior in a transitional economy evidence from russia we examined the effects of perceived strategic uncertainty in seven environmental sectors on the scanning behavior of russian executives strategic uncertainty was highest in sectors influenced by

taxation and household portfolio composition us evidence from the 1980s and 1990s abstract this paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates the set of financial assets that households own and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets it analyzes data from the 1983 1989 1992 1995 and 1998 surveys of consumer finances and develops a new algorithm for imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys the empirical findings suggest that marginal tax rates have important effects on asset allocation decisions the probability that a household owns tax advantaged assets such as tax exempt bonds or assets held in tax deferred accounts is positively related to its tax rate on ordinary income in addition the portfolio share invested in corporate stock which is taxed less heavily than interest bearing assets is increasing in the household s ordinary income tax rate holdings of heavily taxed assets such as interest bearing accounts decline as a share of wealth as a household s marginal tax rate increases

a pedagogical treatment of bilateral monopoly most economists are familiar with the concept of bilateral monopoly an upstream monopolist sells its output to a single downstream buyer that may also be a monopolist in its output market the theory of bilateral monopoly has a rich history that can be traced to the writings of cournot 10 and menger 31 over the 150 or so years that the problem has been under consideration however economists have offered a variety of solutions ranging from a completely determinate intermediate good price and output to a completely indeterminate solution within a specified range interestingly this historical divergence of opinion concerning the correct outcome under bilateral monopoly still persists a clear consensus has not yet emerged surprisingly this lack of unanimity exists despite the fact that bowley 5 provided the theoretically correct solution in 1928 2 even more surprising however is the apparent popularity of the incorrect solution a recent survey of the population of intermediate microeconomic texts on the authors bookshelves revealed that over 80 percent of the current treatments of this topic are in error 3 table i presents the results of that survey those authors who present a correct analysis of bilateral monopoly recognize that optimality requires joint profit maximization this leads them to the correct conclusion regarding the determinate quantity of the intermediate product exchanged of the five treatments we have classified