the causes of preference reversal observed preference reversal cannot be adequately explained by violations of independence the reduction axiom or transitivity the primary cause of preference reversal is the failure of procedure invariance especially the overpricing of low probability high payoff bets this result violates regret theory and generalized nonindependent utility models preference reversal and a new reversal involving time preferences are explained by scale compatibility which implies that payoffs are weighted more heavily in pricing than in choice copyright 1990 by american economic association

a test of the rational expectations hypothesis using data from a natural experiment data on contestants choices in italian game show affari tuoi are analysed in a way that separates the effect of risk attitude preferences from that of beliefs concerning the amount of money that will be offered to contestants in future rounds this separate identification is possible by virtue of the fact that at a certain stage of the game beliefs are not relevant and risk attitude is the sole determinant of choice the rational expectations hypothesis is tested by comparing the estimated belief function with the true offer function which is estimated extraneously using data on offers actually made to contestants we find a close correspondence leading us to accept the rational expectations hypothesis the importance of belief formation is confirmed by the estimation of a mixture model which establishes that the vast majority of contestants are forward looking as opposed to myopic

claim timing and ex post adverse selection many health care treatments are not urgent and may be delayed if patients so choose because insurance coverage is typically determined by the treatment date individuals may have incentives to strategically delay treatments to minimize out of pocket costs the strategic delay of treatment a particular form of moral hazard can be an important source of subsequent adverse selection in which ex ante identical individuals select insurance coverage based on their differing accumulation of previously delayed treatments this article investigates these forces empirically in the context of the missing market for dental insurance using rich claim level data my analysis reveals that approximately 40 of individuals strategically delay dental treatments when incentivized to do so and this flexibility in delaying treatment can explain why the market for dental insurance has largely unraveled more generally the counterfactual analysis suggests features such as open enrolment periods and contracting on pre existing conditions may be helpful tools in overcoming adverse selection in insurance contexts where the timing of uncertainty is not contractible

game shows and economic behavior risk taking on card sharks this paper studies individual risk taking behavior with a unique data set risky decisions of contestants during the threeyear history of the television game show card sharks in the bonus round of the game individuals choose how much to wager on positive expected value gambles with known and varying probabilities and large possible payouts since no special skills or knowledge are involved empirical analysis is not complicated by a contestant s superior information about her own abilities stakes can reach 16 000 and average 3 200 few experimental budgets permit even one observation of this magnitude first i simply estimate how risk averse contestants behave under the assumption of expected utility maximization i estimate a lower bound for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 0 00031 which when multiplied by per capita u s personal income gives an estimate of relative risk aversion of 4 8 this estimate is higher than most econometric estimates of risk aversion contestants however do not act in a manner consistent with expected utility maximization so this number should not be given a structural interpretation rather it is simply a useful way to summarize average willingness to bear risk of individuals on the show second i explore how individual behavior is inconsistent with expected utility theory the amount a contestant wishes to wager depends critically on the amount of wealth she has accumulated in the bonus round and therefore on the size of the stakes this is at odds with expected utility theory since the size of the stakes although far from insignificant is small relative to a person s wealth contestants should then have close to constant absolute risk aversion with respect to accumulated winnings in the game a more striking result deals with contestants who had previ

preference reversals and the independence axiom of all of the paradoxical patterns of behavior reported in laboratory experiments one of the most perplexing for decision theorists is the preference reversal phenomenon a subject in a preference reversal experiment is typically given a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a modest amount of money a p bet and a lottery with a low probability of winning a large amount of money a bet the lowest amount of money for which the subject would willingly sell either of these lotteries is also elicited the most common reversal is for a subject to choose the p bet over the bet but to put a higher selling price on the bet preference reversals were first reported by harold lindman 1971 and sarah lichtenstein and paul slovic 1971 in discussing the psychologists discovery of such reversals david grether and charles plott remark the inconsistency is deeper than mere lack of transitivity or even stochastic transitivity it suggests that no optimization principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices 1979 p 623 this paper offers a simple alternative explanation of documented preference reversals an explanation that does not require the abandonment of the transitivity assumption

assessing individual risk attitudes using field data from lottery games we use information from the television game show with the highest guaranteed average payoff in the united states hoosier millionaire to analyze risktaking in a high stakes experiment we characterize gambling decisions under alternative assumptions about contestant behavior and preferences and derive testable restrictions on individual risk attitudes based on this characterization we then use an extensive sample of gambling decisions to estimate distributions of risk aversion parameters consistent with the theoretical restrictions and revealed preferences we find that although most contestants display risk averse preferences the extent of the risk aversion implied by our estimates varies substantially with the stakes involved in the different decisions

market based empirical research in accounting a review interpretation and extension a decade and a half of the most concerted and ambitious research effort in accounting history is evaluated here it is the search into the relationship between publicly disclosed accounting information and the consequences of the use of this information by the major group of usersequity investors as such consequences are reflected in characteristics of common stocks traded in major exchanges this research effort known as market based accounting research mbar obtained its impetus from major developments in finance theory during the late 1950s and early 1960s these were the portfolio selection theory and its offspring the capital asset pricing model capm and the concept of informationally efficient capital markets ecm subsequent developments in information economics agency theory and optimal incentive signaling models were quickly incorporated into mbar while the impetus to this line of research came from other disciplines accounting was not only a beneficiary but also to a modest extent a benefactor mbar is relevant to the study of capital market efficiency the capm information economics and regulation this contribution distinguishes mbar from most accounting areas whose contributions to other disciplines are negligible in

unions and monopoly profits using cross sectional data for u s manufacturing the author identifies a negative effect of unions on the profits of highly concentrated industries and virtually no effect on the profits of unconcentrated industries the results for concentrated industries are explained in terms of the monopoly model which predicts a negative effect of unions on profits equivalent to the change in employer s surplus the monopoly model also suggests that previous profit studies which omitted the union variable were likely to significantly underestimate the relationship between concentration and profits this prediction is also supported by empirical evidence m sany studies have demonstrated the ability of unions to raise wages above the level of nonunion workers higher union wages in turn may affect the level of prices employment capital intensity productivity and profits recent studies by clark 1982 and freeman 1983 have found significant negative effects of unions on profit rates in the united states using line of business data from 1970 to 1980 for 900 firms clark found a negative effect of unions on the rate of return to capital more specifically the union effects were found to be significantly negative when market shares were low and insignificant when market shares were high according to clark the absence of a union effect in the latter case can be explained by the ability of firms with market power to pass on higher union wages into higher prices 1982 p 47 on the other hand freeman 1983 using data from the survey of manufactures from 1958 to 1976 and the internal revenue service from 1965 to 1976 also found a negative effect of unions on profits contrary to clark s results however the union profit effect was negative only in concentrated industries the point of contention appears to be the role of concentration in determining the union profit effect rather than the overall negative impact of unions the results of clark and freeman are important because previous industrial organization research on profit rates generally ignored unions for instance of the forty six profit studies surveyed by weiss 1974 none included a union variable more recently a profit study in this review by ravenscraft 1983 using high quality line of business data from the federal trade commission also ignored unionization as will be demonstrated the omission of the union variable leads to an understatement of the effect of industrial concentration on profits this means that concentrated industries generate much greater profits than indicated by previous research in order to measure the size of the understatement a new concept employer s surplus is developed which illustrates the theoretical impact of a union wage increase on monopoly profits the empirical estimates of employer s surplus in this paper indicate how monopoly profits are divided between firms and unions most of the data used in this study were obtained from james medoff and charles brown 2 unlike the previous two studies each observation corresponds to a state by two digit sic industry for manufacturing in 1972 because of the large variations in unionization across states this data set offers a useful test of the union profit effect i employer s surplus according to accepted theory the profit maximizing monopolist will employ labor up to the point where the market wage equals the marginal revenue product mrp 3 if for simplicity we assume that all other factors are variable then the mrp curve represents the monopolist s long run demand for labor in the absence of unions employment is determined by the intersection of the mrp curve and nonunion wage wn as pictured in figure 1 if unions raise wages to wa employment will decrease from ln to l with the reducreceived for publication november 28 1983 revision accepted for publication july 6 1984 eastern washington university i am very grateful to dave bunting lisa brown bill dickens claire brown and george strauss for their valuable suggestions on this research this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 from the author s ph d thesis the union impact on profits productivity and prices university of california berkeley 1 see parseley 1980 for a recent review of this literature 2 i would like to thank brown and medoff for making these data available to me 3 marginal revenue product is equal to marginal revenue multiplied by marginal physical product see rees 1979

economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon a reexamination in a recent issue of this review david grether and charles plott 1979 hereinafter referred to as g p presented a series of experiments that show that individual decisions are made in a manner inconsistent with standard preference theory this inconsistency can be illustrated by the following example individuals under suitable laboratory conditions first have a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a small sum of money the p bet probability bet and a lottery with a high stake but low probability of winning the m bet money bet after indicating a preference for one of the lotteries in the pair the same subjects are then asked to place a monetary value on each of the individual lotteries grether and plott found that a large number of participants stated a preference for the p bet in the first round but placed a higher value on the other lottery the m bet in the second round this behavior a preference reversal is inconsistent with the traditional statements of preference theory

anchoring in financial decision making evidence from jeopardy abstract this paper analyzes 12 596 daily double wagering decisions of 6064 contestants in the us game show jeopardy we exploit a situation in which a player has to unexpectedly wager on responding correctly to an unknown clue known as a daily double clue we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis of contestants anchoring heavily on the initial dollar value of a clue in wagering this positive relationship remains statistically significant at the one percent level after controlling for other characteristics that may independently affect wagering decisions such as scores clue categories time trends individual jeopardy experience and player fixed effects exploiting within player variation only raising the anchoring amount by 100 translates to an increase of 29 in the wager an alternative explanation of underlying strategic considerations appears unlikely and results are consistent throughout a number of robustness checks overall these findings suggest that anchoring can play a substantial role in financial decision making under pressure

rejecting small gambles under expected utility this paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion rejecting a gamble over a given range of wealth levels imposes a lower bound on risk aversion using this lower bound and empirical evidence on the range of the risk aversion coefficient we calibrate the relationship between risk attitudes over small stakes and large stakes gambles we find that rejecting small gambles is consistent with expected utility contrary to a recent literature that concludes that expected utility is fundamentally unfit to explain decisions under uncertainty paradoxical behavior is only obtained when calibrations are made in a region of the parameter space that is not empirically relevant

international r d rivalry and export market shares of unionized industries some evidence from the us manufacturing sector abstract this paper investigates how union activity that captures r d rents alters the strategic investment behavior of internationally competitive firms the effect of union activity in the spencer b j brander j a 1983 international r d rivalry and industrial strategy review of economic studies 50 707 722 framework is to reduce the firm s strategic investment in r d and its export market share the empirical investigation at the industry level indicates that union activity has a significant and negative impact on r d investment decisions in the us manufacturing sector an important contribution of this work is its attempt to empirically distinguish between strategic and non strategic r d the strategic effect of r d on export market share in an imperfectly competitive product market is a decreasing function of the level of union activity

the small sample bias of the gini coefficient results and implications for empirical research the gini coefficient is a downward biased measure of inequality in small populations when income is generated by one of three common distributions the paper discusses the sources of bias and argues that this property is far more general this has implications for i the comparison of inequality among subsamples some of which may be small and ii the use of the gini in measuring firm size inequality in markets with a small number of firms the small sample bias has often led to misperceptions about trends in industry concentration a small sample adjustment results in a reduced bias which can no longer be signed this remaining bias rises with the dispersion and falls with increasing skewness of the distribution finally an empirical example illustrates the importance of using the adjusted gini in this example it is shown that controlling for market characteristics larger shipping cartels include a set of firms that is stochastically identical in terms of relative size to those of smaller shipp

rent shifting and rent sharing a re examination of the strategic industrial policy problem this paper reexamines the market structure problem in the strategic trade policy literature it is shown that rent sharing between the home union and the home firms raises total home industry rents regardless of whether the international duopoly is cournot or bertrand furthermore home welfare also rises with cooperation if the international industry consists of more than two firms if the industry is faced with entry and if there is domestic consumption this paper shows that rent sharing can be a robust strategic industrial policy and can be interpreted as a solution to the market structure dilemma

the ex ante and ex post price effects of quarterly earnings announcements reflected in option and stock prices the subject of this study is the effect of investors anticipations of impending informative disclosures on the behavior of option and stock prices our approach introduced in a previous paper patell and wolfson 1979 and substantially extended here represents the following significant departure from traditional information content studies instead of analyzing security price reactions to announcements we analyze preannouncement option prices in order to discern investors beliefs about the range of possible stock price reactions expected to accompany a forthcoming disclosure whose actual content is not yet known in the tests reported here we focus on quarterly earnings announcements as disclosure events whose timing is predictable and we attempt to detect their systematic influence on the relationship between stock and option prices our operational definition of information content emphasizes changes in the variability of common stock returns in response to earnings disclosures while market efficiency precludes investors from predicting the direction of the stock price change which will accompany a future earnings announcement it is likely that investors will anticipate increased price variability at the time of disclosure and indeed several studies have documented announcement date increases in stock price volatility

accounting for changing prices the value relevance of historical cost price level and replacement cost accounting in mexico this paper investigates the value relevance of historical cost price level and replacement cost accounting using a sample of mexican firms from 1989 to 1995 it contributes to prior research by distinguishing between two distinct aspects of changing prices 1 the change in the general price level and 2 the change in the value of specific non monetary assets i select mexico to examine because it is unique in requiring and disclosing separately price level and replacement cost adjustments a sample of mexican firms also addresses a key reason cited for mixed results in previous assessments of the usefulness of price level and replacement cost accounting using united states data the effects of inflation are too weak to detect high rates of inflation in mexico ranging between 7 and 52 during the sample period mitigate that potential problem results indicate that replacement cost adjustments are relatively and incrementally relevant beyond historical cost and price level measures while price level adjustments are incrementally value relevant beyond historical measures

equilibrium selection payoff or risk dominance the case of the weakest link abstract when a game has more than one nash equilibrium a coordination issue arises pareto and risk dominations are two available criteria to select one of them there is a debate on how to use these criteria when they point in different directions we study the first wave of the weakest link show broadcast in france to generate field data on this issue observed behavior can be rationalized in terms of pareto and risk domination the payoff dominant equilibrium is selected if it is not too risky otherwise players coordinate themselves according to risk dominance this rationalization is in line with the experimental literature

evidence on income measurement properties of asr no 190 and sfas no 33 data a number of studies have tested the association between security returns or levels of market value and current cost accounting data as reported under sec accounting series release no 190 asr 190 and statement of financial accounting standards no 33 sfas 33 for example beaver griffin and landsman 1982 henceforth bgl beaver and landsman 1983 henceforth bl and olsen 1985 found no association while bublitz frecka and mckeown 1985 henceforth bfm and murdoch 1986 found a weak association 1 in this paper we estimate cross section regressions of security returns on historical cost net income and holding gains as was done previously but with several extensions first we define our variables in terms of realizations of returns income and holding gains rather than in terms of unexpected changes thus we

coordination focal points and voting in strategic situations a natural experiment this paper studies coordination in a multi stage elimination tournament with large monetary incentives and a diversified subject pool drawn from the adult british population in the tournament members of an ad hoc team earn money by answering general knowledge questions and then eliminate one contestant by plurality voting without prior communication we find that in the early rounds of the tournament contestants use a focal principle and coordinate on one of the multiple nash equilibria in pure strategies by eliminating the weakest member of the team however in the later rounds contestants switch to playing a mixed strategy nash equilibrium

monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics a survey of thirty one experimental studies which report data on the comparative effects of monetary rewards and opportunity cost shows 1 several studies in which increased rewards shift the central tendency of the data toward the predictions of rational models 2 in virtually all cases rewards reduce the variance of the data around the predicted outcome this is consistent with a model in which rewards are balanced against decision cost in agent behavior and explicates the argument that when rational models fail it can be attributed to low opportunity cost of deviations from the rational prediction

consistency of risk premium measures this research uses the results of a series of within sample experiments to elicit risk premium measures from agricultural producers results show that there is little consistency between measures in different contexts and using different elicitation methods suggesting that underlying risk preferences are not consistent these results highlight some of the difficulty with expected utility theory and risk measurement

union rent seeking intangible capital and market value of the firm abstract this study considers the effect of unions on intangi ble capital investment and profitability within the context of a market value rather than a more traditional accounting based approach theory is provided suggesting unions are able to affect profitability by sharing in the economic returns to firm specific intangible capital in support of this hypothesis we find unionization reduces the returns to r d and produces a corresponding limiting influence on r d investment at the firm level i introduction a n extensive literature in economics has ex amined the determinants of profitability with much of the focus centering on the role of market structure only recently however have the effects of labor unions on profitability been analyzed ths is surprising since labor economists long have emphasized union influences on wages and productivity that in turn may affect profitabil ity in recent studies freeman 1983 and karier 1985 report a significant limiting influence of unions on price cost margins in high concentra tion manufacturing industries using firm level data and the market based tobin s

the price is right but are the bids an investigation of rational decision theory the television game show the price is right is used as a laboratory to conduct a preference free test of rational decision theory in an environment with substantial economic incentives it is found that contestants strategies are transparently suboptimal in response to this evidence simple rules of thumb are developed that are shown to explain observed bidding patterns better than rational decision theory further learning during the show reduces the frequency of strategic errors this is interpreted as evidence of bounded rationality finally there is no evidence that a concern for fairness significantly alters bidding behavior copyright 1996 by american economic association

lowest unmatched price auctions lowest unmatched price auctions lupas specify that the lowest bid placed by only one participant wins they are used in internet trading and tv and radio shows we model lupas as games with minimal restrictions in particular allowing players to place more than one bid since multiple bids have been observed in most actual lupas though lupas are games for which a closed form solution does not seem to exist in general our model generates several testable implications about the type of strategies played in equilibrium and the highest bid in a given lupa our analysis suggests that players follow strategic considerations and arrive at decisions which at least in the aggregate are generally consistent with theoretical predictions yet there are some remarkable deviations

decision making under uncertainty when the stakes are high evidence from a lottery game show illinois instant riches a televised set of three different games of chance provides a natural experiment for assessing the risk taking behavior of individuals recently there have been a limited number of other studies that have also used game shows as natural experiments including card sharks 6 jeopardy 11 and the price is right 1 an advantage of using game shows over most laboratory experiments is the ability to see how individuals respond to wagers involving relatively large sums instant riches is particularly interesting in this regard because it involves very high stakes across the three games played the potential winnings from wagers offered to contestants ranged from 2000 to 100 000 losses from 3000 to 35 000 and expected values from 10 938 to 15 000 given our data our primary research objective is to provide additional evidence on the degree of risk aversion under high stakes wagering to date that evidence is mixed gertner concludes that card sharks contestants are on average risk averse metrick could not reject the hypothesis that jeopardy contestants are risk neutral in respective experimental studies using indian peasant farmers and chinese university students binswanger 2 3 and kachelmeier and shehata 9 employed small nominal stakes that were nonetheless large relative to their subjects monthly incomes e g 20 percent to just over 100 percent of income both reported a shift toward risk aversion as stakes were increased but in the kachelmeier study the subjects remained largely risk neutral in another experimental study this time involving modest stakes e g hundreds of dollars goodman et al 7 found expected value to be the best predictor of las vegas casino patrons certainty equivalents a result implying risk neutrality in all these studies the stakes were lower than for instant riches

sectoral shifts and interindustry wage differentials the observed differences in wages across industries may arise from a lack of worker mobility particularly among experienced workers allowing the effects of industry shocks to persist for some time although young workers arbitrage wage shocks they will have little effect on the dispersion of experienced workers wages if young and old workers are poor substitutes in production this explanation is investigated using the five censuses of population between 1940 and 1980 the evidence strongly suggests that differences in pay are not temporary phenomena the data provide some support for the role of human capital and ability

an experimental test for risk aversion abstract this paper evaluates an experimental method to measure attitudes to risk in individual subjects the method is applied to study the degree of risk aversion of 46 subjects the results lead us to reject a working hypothesis of risk neutrality for such experimental subjects

risk attitudes in large stake gambles evidence from a game show this article estimates the degree of risk aversion of contestants appearing on vas o no vas the mexican version of deal or no deal we consider both dynamic agents who fully backward induct and myopic agents that only look forward one period further we vary the level of forecasting sophistication by the agents we find substantial evidence of risk aversion the degree of which is more modest than what is typically reported in the literature

alternative measures of profit margin an empirical study of the potential information content of current cost accounting the primary purpose of this study is to investigate the link between price changes in product markets and price changes in financial markets the nature of the association is central to evaluating the information content of current cost accounting measurements such as those promulgated in the sec s accounting series release no 190 asr 190 and the fasb s statement of financial accounting standards no 33 sfas 33 although both asr 190 and sfas 33 state that financial statements based only on historical costs do not provide investors with sufficient information to assess the underlying economics of firms in periods of rapidly changing prices empirical evidence suggests there was no apparent reaction to the initial replacement cost releases mandated by asr 190 e g see beaver christie and griffin 1980 1 this study offers one explanation for the lack of an observed market

the gender of opponents explaining gender differences in performance and risk taking abstract analyzing 8169 contestants over 32 years of the us game show jeopardy we find that women compete more aggressively become marginally more competitive and take on more risk when paired against men specifically a woman is more likely to win a jeopardy episode and within the show to respond to a clue once responding she is also marginally more likely to respond correctly potentially most surprising even the sizeable gender gap in risk taking analyzing daily double wagering decisions disappears once a woman competes in an otherwise all male field of competitors men on the other hand wager significantly less when paired against women only but the gender of opponents does not affect their competitive performance otherwise our rich sample allows us to control for a host of potentially confounding factors and player fixed effects thereby eliminating potential biases from unobservable individual characteristics our findings are consistent with an explanation that emphasizes an adaptation to social norms applied to gender

risky choice in the limelight this paper examines how risk behavior in the limelight differs from that in anonymity in two separate experiments we find that subjects are more risk averse in the limelight however risky choices are similarly path dependent in the different treatments under both limelight and anonymous laboratory conditions a simple prospect theory model with a path dependent reference point provides a better explanation for subjects behavior than a flexible specification of expected utility theory additionally our findings suggest that ambiguity aversion depends on being in the limelight that passive experience has little effect on risk taking and that reference points are determined by imperfectly updated expectations

march madness strategic behavior in ncaa basketball tournament betting pools abstract this paper uses data from the natural experiment of ncaa basketball tournament betting pools in a descriptive study of strategic behavior the observed behavior in these pools differs from equilibrium behavior in a robust manner bettors overback the heaviest favorites the size of this bias falls slightly in larger pools where the induced profit opportunities are higher than in smaller pools this indicates that a small number of players are adjusting their behavior to reflect the changing strategic situation while the aggregate behavior remains away from equilibrium

a natural experiment in jeopardy this paper uses the television game show jeopardy as a natural experiment to analyze behavior under uncertainty and the ability of players to choose strategic best responses the results suggest that while most players bet in a rational manner the failure rate for choosing best responses increases as the betting problem grows more complex and that players choices are affected by the frame of the problem however suboptimal betting tends to decrease as inferior players are driven from the game the data also allow for estimation of the extent of risk aversion the results imply near risk neutrality jel c72 c93

deal or no deal decision making under risk in a large payoff game show we examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular tv game show deal or no deal and related classroom experiments contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes our results point to reference dependent choice theories such as prospect theory and suggest that path dependence is relevant even when the choice problems are simple and well defined and when large real monetary amounts are at stake

examining risk preferences under high monetary incentives experimental evidence from the people s republic of china several experimental sessions were conducted to elicit certainty equivalents for a sequence of lotteries involving real monetary outcomes the opportunity to conduct sessions in the people s republic of china afforded the ability to offer very large monetary incentives relative to subjects living costs in the highest payoff condition subjects earned three times their normal monthly revenue in the course of a two hour experiment results indicate a statistically significant impact of the level of monetary incentives on revealed risk preferences however even under extreme monetary incentives subjects demanded amounts well in excess of expected value for low probability gain prospects copyright 1992 by american economic association

decision making under risk in deal or no deal we analyse the choices of 399 contestants in the australian version of the television game show deal or no deal we calculate risk aversion bounds for each contestant revealing considerable heterogeneity we then estimate a structural stochastic choice model that captures the dynamic decision problem faced by contestants to address individual heterogeneity we nest the dynamic problem within the settings of both a random effects and a random coefficients probit model our structural model produces plausible estimates of risk aversion confirms the role of individual heterogeneity and suggests that a model of stochastic choice is indeed appropriate we find mixed evidence of greater risk aversion by females we also examine generalizations to expected utility theory finding that the rank dependent utility model adds non negligible explanatory power and indicates optimism in probability weighting finally we test but are unable to confirm the existence of an endowment effect for lotteries copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

more laboratory evidence on the disparity between willingness to pay and compensation demanded abstract recent experimental work showing a disparity between willingness to pay for and compensation demanded to give up lottery tickets is contrary to economists ideas about rationality presented here are the results of experiments in which subjects participate in second price auctions to indicate willingness to pay and compensation demanded for lottery tickets that have fixed odds of winning or losing money when the auction institution used has truthful revelation of preferences as the dominant strategy and that strategy is announced to subjects the difference between the measures of value decreases significantly the within subject comparison design provides a more discriminating measure of behavior than between subject comparison designs used previously

do unions capture monopoly profits this paper challenges the conclusion reached in recent studies that unions reduce profits exclusively in highly concentrated industries from their review of previous studies and their analysis of 1977 data on 367 fortune 500 firms the authors conclude that there is no convincing evidence that concentration produces monopoly profits for unions to capture moreover they find that the union wage effect is not greater in concentrated industries as suggested by the hypothesis that unions capture concentration related profits evidence is found suggesting that a firm s market share its expenditures on research and development and its protection from foreign competition provide more likely sources for union rents than does industry concentration several recent studies have found that unions reduce profits significantly and some have concluded that this profit reduction is restricted to highly concentrated industries both conclusions are important the finding that unions reduce profitability indicates that in general the cost increasing effects of unions outweigh any positive productivity effects they may bring to the workplace such a

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

entrepreneurship over the life cycle where are the young entrepreneurs most individuals do not start a business and if they do they start well into their 30s to explain these stylized facts i estimate a dynamic roy model with experience accumulation risk aversion and imperfect information about ability using the panel study of income dynamics information frictions and income risk reduce entrepreneurship by up to 40 and 35 respectively entry costs and information frictions explain most of the delayed entry results from counterfactual policies targeting delayed entry suggest that entrepreneurship education can yield higher returns than subsidies fostering young entrepreneurship yields higher returns than fostering old entrepreneurship

willingness to pay and compensation demanded experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value aside from possible income effects measures of the maximum amounts people will pay to avoid a loss and the minimum compensation necessary for them to accept it are generally assumed to be equivalent unexpectedly wide variations between these sums however have been noted in survey responses to hypothetical options this paper reports the results of a series of experiments that confronted people with actual money payments and cash compensations the results indicate that the compensation measure of value seems to exceed significantly the willingness to pay measure which would appear to call into some question various rules of entitlement damage assessments and interpretations of indifference curves

rationality and the price is right abstract the television game show the price is right offers a unique laboratory for observing decision making behavior because rewards are much higher than those encountered in a typical economics experiment and because of the substantial opportunity which contestants have for formulating their strategies analysis of contestant behavior substantiates 1 the persistence of decision making errors despite the penalties associated with such errors and despite the existence of simple strategy which outperforms contestants behavior and 2 that learning drives competitors toward more effective behavior

measuring risk attitudes in a natural experiment data from the television game show lingo we use data from a television game show involving elementary lotteries as a natural experiment to measure risk attitudes unique features of our data set are the substantial monetary stakes and the large sample size crra and cara utility specifications perform approximately equally well we find robust evidence of substantial risk aversion extensions of the basic model which allow for a separate utility flow purely from playing the game or for decisions based on decision weights instead of actual probabilities raise the estimated degree of risk aversion

securing victory or not surrendering optimal play when facing simple calculations a natural experiment from the swedish and us jeopardy this article empirically investigates the common assumption of economicagents capabilities to process complex mathematical problems to findoptimal strategies applied in economic modelling by expl

last place aversion evidence and redistributive implications we present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are last place averse participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution in modified dictator games participants randomly placed in second to last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below last place aversion suggests that low income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them using survey data we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase similarly in the general social survey those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict jel codes h23 d31 c91