unauthorized immigration and fiscal competition abstract reflecting upon recent enforcement policy activism of us states and countries within the eu towards unauthorized workers we examine the overlap of centralized federal and decentralized state or regional enforcement of immigration policies in a spatial context among other results we find that if interstate mobility is costless internal enforcement is overprovided and border enforcement and local goods are underprovided when regions take more responsibility in deciding policies this leads to higher levels of unauthorized immigration under decentralization interregional migration costs moderate such over underprovision moreover income distributive motives in the host country may shape the design of immigration policies in specific ways the basic model is extended in several ways first we study how the policies change when regions can exclude unauthorized immigrants from the consuming of regionally provided goods or services second we assume that the potential number of unauthorized immigrants is endogenous and finally we examine the effect of considering an alternative spatial configuration that includes border and interior regions

interjurisdictional spillovers decentralized policymaking and the elasticity of capital supply a key question in the fiscal federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome see e g oates 1972 a striking example where this question is of particular importance is the current debate on global warming the failure of the copenhagen summit in late 2009 has shown impressively that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hard to realize one might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach where each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy of other countries gives hope for an efficient policy outcome further important examples of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure at first glance it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be optimal it is not only the very existence of spillovers that causes doubt the policy instruments themselves also create policy externalities despite this presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking the previous literature provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice an important example is the paper of oates and schwab 1988 who argue that the choice of capital taxes in an economy with identical jurisdictions mobile capital and local pollution may indeed be efficient in a remarkable recent paper ogawa and wildasin 2009 extend the analysis to account for transboundary pollution spillovers and asymmetric countries and still get the efficiency result in their model emissions and thus the extent of spillovers generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction the choice of capital taxes is then distorted by the jurisdictions incentives for tax competition and by the jurisdictions disregard of spillover effects but the key argument is that both distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking in accordance with the previous literature we show that under a fixed capital supply zero capital supply elasticity the decentralized policy choice is indeed optimal if the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive however capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized

competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment abstract tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards the tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels one would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements despite this the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down performance requirements are as popular as ever we explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms in equilibrium municipalities choose performance requirements which maximize joint surplus from investment competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

corporate taxation in the oecd in a wider context against the background of increased globalisation statutory corporate tax rates have shown a clear downward trend over the last two decades the sharp decline in these rates was accompanied by substantial tax base broadening and a comparable reduction in personal income tax rates only until the early 1990s this suggests that corporate tax competition is of increasing importance so far corporate tax revenues remain fairly stable but an analysis of corporate taxation in the context of the overall tax systems shows that a substantial shift towards value added taxes has taken place while the trends so far have been driven by smaller european countries recent tax reforms indicate that increasing tax competition is inducing a shift towards consumption even for larger economies

tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure this paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants tastes for public goods and which finance local public expenditure through a source based tax on capital income the taste for public goods is the private information of local governments the central government seeks an optimal policy in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates the uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption it is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction c 1998 academic press

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous this paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers the small country always gains and the large country always loses from tax competition thus implying tax competition leads to redistribution from the large to the small country however the large country always attains a higher utility than does the small country these results imply that our model encapsulates both the importance of being small as well as the importance of being large we also show that tax harmonization leads to redistribution from the large to the small country

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

strategic public policy around population thresholds abstract political economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both re election and financial incentives this article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether when and how local office holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases using data from all 589 belgian municipalities over the period 1977 2016 our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits particularly for apartments these policy changes occur early in the election cycle and at least for housing policy are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold

an analysis of the corporate income tax policy of less developed countries unlike developed countries corporate tax rather than personal tax revenues are the greater source of public finance for less developed countries ldcs this paper analyses the corporate income tax policy for a large panel of ldcs over the period 1980 2006 the analysis shows that although the corporate tax rate has been decreasing in ldcs corporate tax revenues have been increasing as a percentage of total tax revenues and gdp contrary to standard tax competition theory there is also strong evidence that corporate income taxes in ldcs are increasing in the country s openness as measured by capital mobility the analysis also shows that the corporate tax rate is increasing in the personal tax rate as income shifting theory predicts however this has not translated into increased corporate tax revenues of equal interest is the lack of evidence of a relationship between the ldc s government revenue needs and its corporate tax rate

rehabilitation decisions in rental housing an empirical analysis abstract housing policy makers show increased interest in encouraging rehabilitation of the existing housing stock but little is known about what factors influence the decision to invest particularly in rental housing making policy design difficult this paper presents an empirical analysis of individual landlords housing rehabilitation decisions in one housing market the analysis tests hypotheses about the impacts of detailed neighborhood structure and site characteristics on each owner s investment activity findings support the general hypothesis that economic returns to investment have a major effect on rehabilitation decisions identify some other important circumstances and suggest which among many specific policy levers should be effective

strategic control of growth in a system of cities abstract this paper provides an analysis of the supply restriction model of growth controls growth controls in such a model harm consumers while enriching landowners and they will only be adopted if landowners have political power in the model this power is manifested in the city government s use of a social welfare that takes both landlord and consumer welfare into account since cities cannot be small if the supply restriction inherent in growth controls is to have an impact strategic interactions must be considered in the analysis of city choices a general model is presented and an extended example based on leontief preferences is then considered comparative static analysis of nash equilibria in the leontief case shows that perturbations of preferences or other characteristics of a single city can have important spillover effects that alter the choices of all cities in the region

leviathan and competition among jurisdictions the case of benefit taxation abstract this paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and thus helps to tame leviathan governments however this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government in the case of benefit taxes e g user charges a leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum sum taxes

the effects of energy price technology and disaster shocks on china s energy environment economy system abstract this paper constructs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model to analyze the effects of energy price technology and disaster shocks on china s energy environment economy 3e system it also studies stylized facts as well as co integration and error correction dynamic analyses of this system the disaster shock is modeled as a two state markov switching process the results show that both technology and energy price shocks increase the ratio of environmental investment to gdp the improvement in technology and rising energy prices helps to reduce co2 pollution and improve economic restructuring among the three kinds of shocks technology shock is the most important the robustness of the model is tested through statistical methods

optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition abstract this paper models the optimal division of public goods provision between central and regional governments in an economy with interregional tax competition regional provision is inefficient because governments compete for scarce capital by lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefficiently low levels on the other hand central provision is inefficient because it is determined by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature the optimal degree to which public good provision should be decentralized depends on a tradeoff between these inefficiencies in our main model complete centralization is never optimal regional governments should supply some public goods

eco dumping capital mobility and international trade a small open economy s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution the country produces traded as well as non traded goods is it in the country s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded good sector the answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country however if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded good sector the opposite of ecological dumping

international competition in corporate taxation evidence from the oecd time series despite numerous studies controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries in this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across oecd countries since the 1950s issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive race to the bottom in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross sectional analysis in contrast we adopt an explicitly time series method to what are essentially time series questions cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the oecd and europe as a whole it does however indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries mainly in northern europe important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations kenneth stewart and michael webb

public input competition abstract public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive this paper analyzes the nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition even though the regions are assumed identical the equilibrium may not be symmetric the problem with non cooperative behaviour is not only that regions invest too much but that too many regions may choose to invest depending on the parameter values the nash equilibrium may be efficient may be inefficient or may not exist at least not in pure strategies better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition the analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments competition to attract mobile factors

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

tax policy and present biased preferences paternalism under international capital mobility this paper deals with tax policy responses to quasi hyperbolic discounting earlier research on optimal paternalism typically abstracts from capital mobility if capital is mobile between countries it may no longer be possible for national governments to control domestic savings via capital taxation as in a closed economy in this paper we take a broad perspective on public policy responses to self control problems by showing how these responses vary i between closed and open economies ii between small open and large open economies and iii depending on whether or not both source based and residence based capital taxes can be used

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

on the welfare effects of tax limitation much recent literature has been devoted to providing theoretical and empirical analysis of the proposition that government is too large far less attention has been paid to the issue of whether tax and expenditure limitations such as those in effect in many us states are an appropriate remedy to excessive government size this paper uses conventional tools of welfare economics to analyze the welfare effects of tax limitations in an economy made up of many local governments the conclusions are mixed where government charges monopoly prices tax limitation will reduce welfare where government provides outputs that exceed those that would be competitively supplied tax limitation may improve welfare

the impact of public infrastructure capital on regional manufacturing production cost seitz h and licht g 1995 the impact of public infrastructure capital on regional manufacturing production cost reg studies 29 231 240 the paper presents an analysis of the impact of public infrastructure capital on manufacturing production cost in the 11 west german states we present a simple theoretical model of a cost minimizing firm in which the stock of public capital is included as a proxy for public services provided to firms as a fixed unpaid factor of production duality theory is used to recover the productivity effects of public infrastructures by calculating the cost saving effects that are associated with public services using a translog cost function we present panel estimates for the manufacturing industry in the 11 states of west germany with labour buildings and machinery as private factors of production the results strongly indicate significant cost reducing effects of public infrastructure services and suggest that public capital formation encourages private investment s

should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate if jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately they tax only land because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital to exploit absentee owners however jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level as absentee ownership increases throughout the economy land taxation results in greater inefficiency to alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land the higher level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate uniform taxation of land and capital or property taxation thus may be more efficient than separate taxation jel classification h21 h71 est ce que la terre et le capital devraient etre taxes d une maniere uniforme si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre separement elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalite imposee au capital cree des distorsions dans l allocation du capital mobile mais pour exploiter les proprietaires absents les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au dela de ce que l efficacite commande a proportion que la propriete absente se developpe dans l economie la fiscalite imposee a la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacite pour reduire cette inefficacite attribuable a la sur taxation de la terre le niveau senior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors a taxer capital et terre au meme taux parce que le desir d attirer le capital reduit le taux de taxation il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital ou de la taxation sur la propriete soit plus efficace que des taux d imposition differents

the spillover effects of good governance in a tax competition framework with a negative environmental externality we investigate the impact of a political regime shift affecting consumers business interests and lobby contributions when countries engage in tax competition in capital and a polluting resource when consumers have more influence than resource owners the resource tax rate and public spending rise while environmental damages lobbying contribution and the capital tax rate fall this response can spillover to other countries leading to lower welfare capital tax harmonization improves welfare of consumers and resource owners resource tax harmonization and governance harmonization both reduce the influence of lobbying and improve consumer welfare but resource owners are worse off

fiscal decentralization in rentier regions evidence from russia summary the paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure as a result such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest data on russian regions in the late 1990s early 2000s support this hypothesis advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development

do local government fiscal spillovers exist evidence from counties municipalities and school districts abstract numerous theories posit that the fiscal decisions of one jurisdiction influence the fiscal decisions of its neighbors the main contribution of this paper is to address empirical difficulties in testing for spillovers using a regression discontinuity design on a newly collected dataset i utilize close elections from this large dataset of local referenda in ohio to isolate the effect of exogenous increases in taxation and spending of one jurisdiction on neighbors fiscal decisions for all jurisdictional types and referenda revenue sources bonds income property and sales tax there is no evidence of spillovers and relatively small effects can be ruled out

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

tax evasion fiscal competition and economic integration abstract this paper examines the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax harmonization policies in an economic union first for symmetric countries it proves that the equilibrium values of the tax and audit rates are less than optimal tax harmonization alone will also lead to a less than optimal audit rate second for asymmetric countries the paper shows that integration may turn an honest country into an evading one it argues that tax harmonization alone may be a bad policy in that it can make both countries worse off it may also cause an otherwise honest country to turn to evasion

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

tax competition relative performance and policy imitation rather than about their absolute payoffs governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments moreover they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere i study such behavior in a standard tax competition game both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies evolutionary stability for games with finitely many players is the appropriate solution concept independently of the number of jurisdictions involved an evolutionarily stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game with infinitely many players it thus involves drastic efficiency losses

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility abstract a single region s optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility in this model property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods e g residential property the key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods the role of labor mobility is also investigated

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand the main purpose of this paper is to review recent theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of housing demand in particular we ask what is known concerning the permanent income elasticity of housing demand vis a vis the current or measured income elasticity what is known concerning price elasticities what is the appropriate functional form for housing demand equations what is the role of demographic variables what is known concerning dynamic aspects of housing demand what appear to be the major sources of bias in existing estimates of demand equations

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

overlapping soft budget constraints abstract our paper identifies a potential problem with decentralization at a time when its virtues are widely extolled we show that responsibility for equalization at multi levels within a decentralized federation creates an overlapping equalization policy that can worsen fiscal discipline contrary to qian and roland 1998 we also show in our set up that fiscal competition among regional rescuers does not act as a commitment device to harden the local budget constraint

ethanol demand in brazil regional approach abstract successive studies attempting to clarify national aspects of ethanol demand have assisted policy makers and producers in defining strategies but little information is available on the dynamic of regional ethanol markets this study aims to analyze the characteristics of ethanol demand at the regional level taking into account the peculiarities of the developed center south and the developing north northeast regions regional ethanol demand is evaluated based on a set of market variables that include ethanol price consumer s income vehicle stock and prices of substitute fuels i e gasoline and natural gas a panel cointegration analysis with monthly observations from january 2003 to april 2010 is employed to estimate the long run demand elasticity the results reveal that the demand for ethanol in brazil differs between regions while in the center south region the price elasticity for both ethanol and alternative fuels is high consumption in the north northeast is more sensitive to changes in the stock of the ethanol powered fleet and income these among other evidences suggest that the pattern of ethanol demand in the center south region most closely resembles that in developed nations while the pattern of demand in the north northeast most closely resembles that in developing nations

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

property taxation nash equilibrium and market power abstract differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area following wildasin 4 and bucovetsky 2 the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a nash game in the tax rate the tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

income redistribution and public goods provision under tax competition abstract a standard result in existing literature is that public goods are under provided under tax competition see zodrow and mieszkowski 1986 this paper shows that introducing redistribution concerns changes the result capital mobility reduces income redistribution by increasing the efficiency costs of capital taxation if public goods have positive distributional effects providing more public goods counteracts the negative effects of capital mobility moreover under the condition that labor income and capital income are positively correlated less income redistribution through capital taxation can be compensated by stronger taxation of labor income as a result a higher level of public goods is desirable if capital mobility increases

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references