growth and inequality in the dual model of development the role of demand factors this paper relates growth and income distribution in the development of a dual economy its originality lies in the fact that the analysis of income inequality uses the whole lorenz curve instead of some summary measures and that the dual economy is represented through a fully specified general equilibrium model conditions for particular shifts in the lorenz curve are derived they mostly involve the income and price elasticities of demand faced by the traditional sector of the economy and suggest that an unambiguous drop in income inequality is somewhat unlikely at the dual stage of development

ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

natural resources curse or blessing are natural resources a curse or a blessing the empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible this paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources these include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate deindustrialization and bad growth prospects and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law corruption presidential democracies and underdeveloped financial systems another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries and keeps in place bad policies finally resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets the survey also offers some welfare based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies

strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

entrepreneurial drain under moral hazard a high yield sector curse we describe a two sector general equilibrium model of productive sorting under output risk and incomplete information risk neutral entrepreneurial individuals can either produce alone or acting as employers insurers team up with risk averse non entrepreneurial individuals although the latter option has the potential to generate more surplus when effort is unobservable and risk is high the moral hazard problem in mixed matches may be too severe for mixing to be attractive to both risk aversion types leading to a segregated equilibrium in which risk averse individuals select low risk low yield activities an increase in the profitability of the riskier sector can then trigger a switch from a mixed to a segregated equilibrium and cause aggregate output to fall evidence from a panel of non oecd countries showing that the presence of uninsured small scale mining firms has a negative impact on the relationship between natural resource exports and agrarian productivity suggests that this high yield sector curse might be present in natural resource rich low income countries

miners wages in post war britain an application of a model of trade union behavior the paper studies the determination of wages in the british coal industry a utility maximising model of a trade union is used to represent the behaviour of the national union of mineworkers a non linear structural model is derived and is estimated by full information maximum likelihood the results are quite encouraging there is support for a neo classical demand curve for miners labour and a significant estimate of workers relative risk aversion

the institutional and psychological foundations of natural resource policies abstractthe pressures of political interests which drive the resource curse are well understood but ordinary citizens are usually cast both as the innocent victims of this process and as the potential solution if only governments could be made more accountable to them this paper draws upon recent developments in social psychology to discuss the formation of mass opinions on two aspects of resource ownership one is the spatial assignment of ownership between local and national claims which has been a significant cause of conflict the other is the assignment of revenues between current consumption and future investment which has usually been excessively biased towards the former i suggest why in the absence of an active government communications policy to offset them known psychological biases may interact with resource discoveries to generate mass opinions which contribute to these problems

the resource curse analysis of the applicability to the large scale export of electricity from renewable resources abstract the resource curse has been analyzed extensively in the context of non renewable resources such as oil and gas more recently commentators have expressed concerns that also renewable electricity exports can have adverse economic impacts on exporting countries my paper analyzes to what extent the resource curse applies in the case of large scale renewable electricity exports i develop a comprehensive model that integrates previous works and provides a consolidated view of how non renewable resource abundance impacts economic growth deploying this model i analyze through case studies on laos mongolia and the mena region to what extent exporters of renewable electricity run into the danger of the resource curse i find that renewable electricity exports avoid some disadvantages of non renewable resource exports including i shocks after resource depletion ii macroeconomic fluctuations and iii competition for a fixed amount of resources nevertheless renewable electricity exports bear some of the same risks as conventional resource exports including i crowding out of the manufacturing sector ii incentives for corruption and iii reduced government accountability i conclude with recommendations for managing such risks

endogenous insecurity and economic development abstract we explore the implications of endogenous credit market imperfections for the endogenous relationship between investment insecurity and the process of economic development in the initial stages of development the fraction of agents engaged in nonproductive diversionary activities e g rent seeking grows as the opportunities to gain from diversionary activities expand in later stages however diversion falls as capital market imperfections are overcome and productive activities become more secure and more profitable we detail the forces that determine whether the insecurity generated by an economy s early development will choke off the growth process we also compare the cost effectiveness of alternative policies designed to prevent diversion

secession with natural resources we look at the formation of new indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources we argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources we describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post breakup local outcomes

dynamic wage employment bargaining with employment adjustment costs this paper looks at the consequences of introducing employment adjustment costs into two standard models of trade unions the right to manage model and the efficient bargain model the authors look at how unions affect both the speed of adjustment to equilibrium and the long run equilibrium they examine the consequences of the model for the estimation of dynamic labor demand equations and for the testing of trade union models copyright 1989 by royal economic society

reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

natural resources and economic development new panel evidence the question as to whether natural resources are a curse on economic growth and development is subject to considerable debates and remains controversial using heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques this paper provides a fresh re examination of the resource curse while allowing for cross section heterogeneity and commonalities in the nexus between natural resource abundance and economic development it finds in a sample of developing countries that economies endowed with abundant natural resources tend to develop more slowly than countries with scarce resources natural resources are on average a curse however there is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of resource abundance on economic development across countries perhaps because of differences in the extent of government intervention access to sound money legal structures and the security of property rights the degree of globalization and or corruption

from rent seeking to human capital a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth we present a growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking in the form of resource competition and working in a human capital sector the latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital adding shocks in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking interrupted by small failed growth spurts eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit the model also generates a rise and fall of the so called natural resource curse before the takeoff an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes shortly after the takeoff the effect is negative and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks les auteurs presentent un modele de croissance ou les agents divisent leur temps entre la chasse aux rentes sous la forme de concurrence pour la ressource existante et le travail productif dans le secteur du capital humain cette derniere activite peut se faire dans le commerce ou le secteur manufacturier la chasse aux rentes a des effets externes negatifs sur la productivite du capital humain si l on injecte des chocs prenant la forme de fluctuations dans la taille de la ressource contestee le modele peut generer une longue periode durant laquelle les revenus stagnent et le niveau de chasse aux rentes est eleve periode interrompue par des petits sursauts de croissance qui tournent court et suivie eventuellement par une transition permanente a un sentier de croissance soutenue ou a la limite les activites de chasse aux rentes disparaissent le modele genere aussi l apparition et la disparition de la malediction des ressources naturelles avant que la croissance prenne son envol un accroissement de la taille de la ressource contestee a un effet positif sur les revenus peu apres le decollage l effet est negatif et sur le sentier de croissance equilibree le taux de croissance des revenus per capita est independant des chocs sur la ressource

oil windfalls and export diversification in oil producing countries evidence from oil booms abstract this paper examines the factors behind export diversification in oil countries specifically we investigate the impact of oil booms on export diversification through an empirical framework the paper finds that economy s export structure before the oil boom determines whether oil windfalls might affect the diversification process thus an oil boom negatively affects export diversification only if countries initially exhibit low levels of diversification in countries with a high level of diversification before the boom an oil boom has no impact on diversification these results are based on a large sample of 134 countries and are robust to various sensitivity analyses they are corroborated with data from the manufacturing sector which show that oil booms only reduce diversification in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

destructive competition factionalism and rent seeking in iran summary the literature on the resource curse suggests that the quality of institutions determines a country s ability to transform resource wealth into economic development this article explores the link between resource rents institutions and economic performance by focusing on the case of iran a key feature of iran s institutional environment is its factionalized political system we give an introduction to the main actors vying for control over the country s resources and analyze the effect of their destructive competition using a theoretical model we study how oil revenues and the relative strength of interest groups affect private investment and economic efficiency

optimal dutch disease growth models of the dutch disease such as those of krugman 1987 matsuyama 1992 sachs and warner 1995 and gylfason et al 1999 explain why resource abundance may reduce growth however the literature also raises a new question if the use of resource wealth hurts productivity growth how should such wealth be optimally managed this question forms the topic of the present paper in which we extend the growth literature on the dutch disease from a positive to a normative setting we show that the assumptions in the previous literature imply that the optimal share of national wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down however some dutch disease is always optimal thus lower growth in resource abundant countries may not be a problem in itself but may be part of an optimal growth path the optimal spending path of the resource wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time and we discuss why this is the case

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

natural resources and the quality of economic development abstract are natural resources a blessing or a curse for human development this article attempts to answer the question by distinguishing between a dependence on natural resources and an abundance of the same dependence is measured in terms of exports of metals and fuel while resource abundance is calculated on the basis of the subsoil assets per square kilometre and per capita results show the existence of a negative correlation between metals and ore exports and human development while subsoil assets measures are rather positively related these effects are particularly significant in countries with a comparatively lower institutional quality the cases of botswana the democratic republic of congo and equatorial guinea briefly examined suggest however that the effects of natural resources on human and economic development can be very different and strictly related to specific national political and institutional characteristics

why do some resource abundant countries succeed while others do not on average resource abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource poor counterparts but the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources but its variation for every nigeria or venezuela there is a norway or a botswana why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others this paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource abundant winners and losers differ in light of this it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse with a particular emphasis on recent developments

why does asset inequality affect unemployment a study of the demand composition problem abstract this paper is devoted to a general equilibrium analysis of the relationship between the inequality in asset holdings and the aggregate levels of output and employment in a developing economy since luxuries and basic goods compete for the use of the same scarce resources unemployment is concieved as a mechanism whereby the market demand for basic goods can be limited to a sufficiently low level so that the high demand for luxuries can be met the ambiguous effects of capital accumulation on employment are also examined

environmental and resource economics a canadian retrospective the paper reviews research contributions to environmental and resource economics by scholars in canada we focus mainly on work from the past 25 years but also highlight earlier pathbreaking work we begin by looking at broad trends in research both internationally and within canada we then review canadian contributions to various topics in the field canadians have played a leading role in the development of the field especially in resource economics international environmental economics and the valuation of environmental amenities

historical legacies a model linking africa s past to its current underdevelopment abstract recent studies have found evidence linking africa s current under development to colonial rule and the slave trade given that these events ended long ago why do they continue to matter today i develop a model exhibiting path dependence which provides one explanation for why these past events may have lasting impacts the model has multiple equilibria one equilibrium with secure property rights and a high level of production and others with insecure property rights and low levels of production i show that external extraction when severe enough causes a society initially in the high production equilibrium to move to a low production equilibrium because of the stability of low production equilibria the society remains trapped in this suboptimal equilibrium even after the period of external extraction ends the model provides one explanation why africa s past events continue to matter today

unemployment in britain male unemployment in britain has risen from around 2 per cent in the 1950s to around 17 per cent in 1985 see figure 1 the figures are for male unemployment because there is no consistent series for women 1 even more remarkably unemployment has fallen in only three years out of the last twenty 1973 1978 and 1979 to account for this we need a model that explains both changes in the natural or non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment nairu and deviations from it we use a three equation supply side model centred on the labour market this has two main features the first concerns the determination of employment in the short run the labour demand function that we use cuts through the fruitless debate now raging especially in europe as to whether current unemployment is classical or keynesian according to the classical view employment is too high because real wages are too high according to the keynesian view real wages are not binding and unemployment is high because the product market does not clear with prices too high relative to nominal demand the whole debate is set in the framework of perfect competition yet in perfect competition prices are set by impersonal forces and it is not clear what could possibly stop prices clearing the market it is much more reasonable to think of prices as being set by imperfectly competitive firms existing prices being the best they can think of given the demand they face in this context firms demand for labour will depend on both the real product wage and the level of real aggregate demand this is the demand function we estimate and it conforms both to common sense and to the data however this does not imply that employment can be made to grow without limit by pumping up real demand for in the medium term when price surprises are eliminated our model determines three variables employment real wages and real demand on the basis of three equations an employment equation a price equation and a wage equation thus in the medium term there is a natural level of employment and corresponding to this a natural level of real aggregate demand the second key feature of our model concerns the medium term determination of unemployment in the medium term the planned mark up of wages over prices in wage settlements must be consistent with the mark up of prices over wage costs in employers pricing behaviour for if wage setters try to set real product wages higher than is consistent with employers pricing behaviour this generates ever increasing inflation thus the key to understanding unemployment in the medium term is the behaviour of wage setters if events occur that push them towards too high real wages then unemployment has to rise to offset these influences we shall call these influences wage pressure variables or push factors and they are clearly crucial in understanding unemployment the variables here include the social security system employment protection

resource intensity institutions and development summary we examine the relationship between resource abundance and several indicators of human welfare consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth we find that given an initial income level resource intensive countries tend to suffer lower levels of human development while we find only weak support for a direct link between resources and welfare there is an indirect link that operates through institutional quality there are also significant differences in the effects that resources have on different measures of institutional quality these results imply that the resource curse is a more encompassing phenomenon than previously considered and that key differences exist between the effects of different resource types on various aspects of governance and human welfare 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

are economic rents good for development evidence from the manufacturing sector abstract are rents or excess profits good for development rents could induce firms to lobby or bribe governments to preserve the status quo on the other hand rents may promote growth by giving firms the needed funds to make investments in fixed capital or research and development to test this question empirically we use a panel of manufacturing data at the industry country year level and measure rents by the mark up ratio we find that the relationship between rents and growth is strongly negative with the results being primarily driven by the poorer countries or those with worse institutions in the sample this result holds when we instrument for mark up using the average mark up in other industries in the country even in industries with high external financing needs and countries with less developed financial sectors precisely the places where excess profits could be used to drive growth we find that rents are especially harmful consistent with the rent seeking mechanism we highlight we find that high rents are associated with a slower reduction in tariffs we also test for the most likely alternative mechanism that higher rents cause slower growth through the channel of allowing managerial slack we find that controlling for management has little impact on our estimate of the impact of mark up on productivity growth

oil governance and the mis allocation of talent in developing countries this paper sheds light on the relationship between oil rent and the allocation of talent toward rent seeking versus more productive activities conditional on the quality of institutions using a sample of 69 developing countries we demonstrate that oil resources orient university students toward specializations that provide better future access to rents when institutions are weak the results are robust to various specifications datasets on governance quality and estimation methods oil affects the demand for each profession through a technological effect indicating complementarity between oil and engineering manufacturing and construction however it also increases the size of the cake therefore when institutions are weak oil increases the incentive to opt for professions with better access to rents law business and the social sciences rather than careers in engineering creating a deviation from the optimal allocation between the two types of specialization

commodity prices and growth an empirical investigation whereas empirical evidence on the effect of higher commodity prices on the long run growth of commodity exporters is ambiguous time series analyses using vector autoregressive var models have found that commodity booms raise income in the short run in this paper we adopt panel error correction methodology to analyze global data for 1963 to 2008 to disentangle the short and long run effects of international commodity prices on output per capita our results show that commodity booms have unconditional positive short term effects on output but non agricultural booms in countries with poor governance have adverse long term effects which dominate the short run gains our findings have important implications for non agricultural commodity exporters with poor governance especially in light of the recent wave of resource discoveries in low income countries

asymmetric oil price shocks tax revenues and the resource curse abstract the paper proposes an asymmetric relationship between oil rents and institutions such that only positive oil windfalls adversely affect institutional quality and negative oil windfalls have no impact we test this theory empirically by studying the dynamics of institutional quality in russian regions we find that increases in tax revenues caused by exogenous positive oil price shocks do not change regional income but increase corruption and reduce regional democracy and governance quality declines in tax revenues from negative oil price shocks do not affect institutional quality but decrease regional income

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

employment in the british coal industry a test of the labour demand model the authors test the conventional model of labor demand against the alternative that bargaining takes place over both wages and employme nt for a time series cross section data set covering the british coal industry they note the difficulty of identifying the contract curve under the alternative hypothesis and suggest the use of variables affecting the union and management status quo points as instruments for the endogenous wage they find that outside variables such as benefits and manufacturing wages are important in determining the level of employment thus rejecting the labor demand model copyright 1988 by royal economic society

do unions contract for added employment the efficient contract model predicts unions will contract for added employment that is a level of employment higher than would be predicted by the demand curve for labor using three data sets on canadian industries in 1971 81 u s industries in 1972 and u s construction projects in 1973 74 and several estimation techniques the author estimates and compares labor demand equations for both union and nonunion firms some regressions that control for few variables support the added employment hypothesis but those with more complete specifications reject it

prosperity without conflict abstract social conflict and slow growth are features of many developing economies this paper considers the role institutions of property rights and conflict management can play in both achieving prosperity and mitigating conflict in these economies we study how introducing conflict over economic distribution into an otherwise standard model of growth can shape optimal second best taxation policy when diversionary activities cannot be taxed in this context we find that the maximization of economic efficiency may call for a reduction in growth in order to mitigate the problem of diversion even though the economy s growth is inefficiently slow in the absence of taxation this is so when institutional quality is sufficiently poor but not otherwise the paper warns against the conventional justification of growth promoting policies on efficiency grounds independently of institutions

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

effective property rights conflict and growth abstract this paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare this interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights a symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor these results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights furthermore if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare improving

an introduction to applicable game theory this paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists i try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts there are four kinds of games static or dynamic and complete or incomplete information complete information means there is no private information the corresponding solution concepts are nash equilibrium in static games of complete information backwards induction or subgame perfect nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information bayesian nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete information and perfect bayesian or sequential equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information the main theme of the paper is that these solution concepts are closely linked as we consider progressively richer games we progressively strengthen the solution concept to rule out implausible equilibria in the richer games that would survive if we applied solution concepts available for simpler games in each case the stronger solution concept differs from the weaker concept only for the richer games not for the simpler games

bundled payments for healthcare services proposer selection and information sharing the centers for medicare and medicaid services cms has introduced a bundled payments for care improvement bpci initiative each bundle pertains to a specific medical condition a set of linked services and a length of time referred to as an episode of care proposers choose bundles design service chains and propose target values of quality metrics and payments per episode expert panels evaluate proposals based on cms announced relative weights but there is no limit on the number of proposers that may be selected moreover there is no minimum score that will guarantee selection which makes selection uncertain for proposers we develop normative models for the parameter selection problems faced by potential proposers within the cms proposal selection process proposers have private information about their costs of achieving different quality targets which determine their equilibrium responses we show that an optimal strategy for cms under its current approach may be to either announce a fi

predator or prey parasitic enterprises in economic development abstract in many developing and transition economies mafia like activities are rampant extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives incorporated in a model of industrialization bimodal club convergence may result economies may get stuck in a predators club characterized by a vicious cycle of poverty and predation societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club poor societies with a high flow of new entrepreneurs however may grow out of the trap and join the rich producers club

resource windfalls political regimes and political stability abstract we study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes we show that windfalls have no effect on democracies while they have heterogeneous political consequences in autocracies in deeply entrenched autocracies the effect of windfalls is virtually nil while in moderately entrenched autocracies windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system to frame the empirical work we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability and potential challengers decide whether to try to unseat the incumbents the model uncovers a mechanism for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies as well as the the differential impact within autocracies

employment adjustment in uk manufacturing this analysis differs from previous studies of labor demand in its explicit inclusion of the costs to the firm of adju sting its workforce these costs include institutional factors such a s employment protection legislation and unions and market factors su ch as the degree of slack in the labor market two questions are addr essed what is the quantitative impact of these forces and does their inclusion improve the fit of a labor demand function the results sh owed these factors to have a strong influence on the rate of hiring f iring and to improve significantly on conventional labor demand funct ions copyright 1988 by royal economic society

oil and women a re examination abstract in a seminal article ross 2008 reports a negative correlation between oil production and women s representation in the labour force and politics across countries this article re examines these relationships exploiting variations in oil endowments to address endogeneity concerns we confirm that oil production causes decline in women s representation additionally we show that consistent with dutch disease effects oil production decreases women s employment in the traded sector however it also leads to an increase in women s employment in the nontraded sector we explore some social consequences of oil production and show that it results in women marrying earlier and having more children

avoiding the resource curse indigenous communities and canada s oil sands summary concerns about a resource curse in canada have been raised in response to rapid growth in the petroleum sector in northern alberta in previous research there has been little consideration of how symptoms of the resource curse are experienced and managed at a regional scale and by indigenous communities an analysis of effects and responses is offered using a natural financial human and social capitals framework without consideration of how to manage the symptoms of the resource curse oil and gas activity is likely to further disadvantage indigenous populations already living on the margins of canadian society

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

games with incomplete information a simplified exposition with inventory management applications abstract in most existing literature in supply chain management it is assumed that the players possess complete information about the game i e the players payoff objective functions are assumed to be common knowledge for static and dynamic games with complete information the nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium are the standard solution concepts respectively for static and dynamic games with incomplete information the bayesian nash equilibrium and perfect bayesian equilibrium respectively are used as solution concepts after presenting a brief review of the static and dynamic games under complete information the application of these two games in inventory management is illustrated by using a single period stochastic inventory problem with two competing newsvendors next we illustrate the bayesian nash and perfect bayesian equilibrium solution concepts for the static and dynamic games under incomplete information with two competing newsvendors the expository nature of our paper may help researchers in inventory supply chain management gain easy access to the complicated notions related to the games played under incomplete information

inter firm trade finance in times of crisis the paper discusses the main features that distinguish inter firm international trade finance from alternative sources of financing on the one hand inter firm trade finance could help overcome informational problems associated with other lending relationships on the other it may contribute to propagate shocks due to the interconnection among firms along credit chains the paper evaluates the potential effects of a financial crisis on the use of trade credit for firms operating in developing countries it argues that while the advantages of trade credit might remain largely unexploited due to poor legal institutions the disadvantages might be exacerbated because of these firms greater exposure to a default chain based on these arguments a menu of choices is identified for what policymakers can do to boost firms access to inter firm trade finance in times of crisis

the curse of the haven the impact of multinational enterprise on environmental regulation abstract we analyze the behavior of multinational enterprises in the context of resource rich and poor countries and regarding high and low income countries we depart from the pollution haven hypothesis and the resource curse the pollution haven hypothesis states that multinational enterprises move their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation the resource curse holds that economic growth in countries abundant in natural resources is reduced we find that more polluting firms are relatively more often located in countries with weak environmental regulation however multinational enterprises do not have a significant impact on environmental regulation in the host country it appears that it is mainly the quality of institutions that drives both the pollution haven and the resource curse

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

resource grabbing by status conscious agents abstract we introduce a dynamic model of resource grabbing by status conscious agents i e agents value not only their absolute consumption levels but also the relative status within their reference group we explore the effect of the concern for relative consumption on the growth rate and the welfare of an economy where agents appropriate from a common property resource our model shows that the greater is agents concern about their relative status the more aggressively they tend to behave consequently social welfare is lower because the growth rate of the public asset is reduced due to higher extraction rate we also consider the effect of increased heterogeneity and show that social welfare decreases as the distribution of status consciousness among agents widens

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

migration as an antidote to rent seeking abstract we develop a new mechanism through which skilled migration may influence economic performance in the sending country if agents can choose between acting as rent seekers and engaging in productive activities and only productive skills are exportable a positive probability of migration to a more secure economy reduces the relative expected returns from rent seeking thus decreasing the proportion of skilled workers who opt for parasitic activities such an improvement in the allocation of talent may prevail over the loss of skilled workers due to outmigration however we show that this result is not robust to the introduction of endogenous protection if productive workers share their resources between accumulation of productive capital and investment in security prospective migration may induce a weaker protection against rent seeking which in turn might depress average income in the source economy

cursing the blessings natural resource abundance institutions and economic growth summary since sachs and warner s sachs j d warner a m 1995a natural resource abundance and economic growth nber working paper no 5398 contribution there has been a lively debate on the so called natural resource curse this paper re examines the effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth using new measures of resource endowment and considering the role of institutional quality we find a positive direct empirical relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth in both ols and 2sls regressions the positive resource effects are particularly strong for subsoil wealth our results also show no evidence of negative indirect effects of natural resources through the institutional channel

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

does oil corrupt evidence from a natural experiment in west africa abstract this paper explores the oil discovery announcements in sao tome and principe 1997 1999 to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption for this purpose we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts sao tome and principe to cape verde a control west african country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries the unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents we analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations we find clearest increases on vote buying education namely in the allocation of scholarships and customs ranging from 31 to 40 of the subjective scale we interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources