electronics and growth cycles in singapore with the help of spectral and structural time series analyses it is found that the demand for electronics in the usa goes through a cycle with a period of about four to five years because of the synchronized nature of the electronics market the global demand for electronics is likely to follow a similar cycle the electronics cycle is unlikely to be caused by a regular business cycle the major cause of the electronics cycle appears to be a product cycle which results from the introduction of new products to the market as a result countries like singapore which depend heavily on electronics exports may face roller coaster rides especially in their manufacturing growth product diversification is the best solution to the problem

equal employment opportunity law and firm profitability based on a sample of 260 cases reported in the wall street journal between 1964 and 1986 this study finds that the equity value of firms charged with violating equal employment opportunity eeo laws fell at the time that a suit decision or settlement was announced most dramatically the value of firms involved in class action suits fell 15 6 percent on average around the time of the suit further the average loss to shareholders exceeds the amount firms are required to spend to settle the case this may be due to the expected costs of changing employment practices or to the information about the firm s management that is revealed by the case a staggering number of statutes amendments and court decisions regulating equal opportunity in employment have been passed during the past 25 years firms found guilty of violations of equal employment opportunity laws have been required to pay millions of dollars in back pay and to alter their employment practices to comply with the laws this study measures the costs to firms resulting from government and private lawsuits and the further costs of losing those suits i address this question by examining changes in the market value of the equity of firms at the time a lawsuit is filed for a violation of an equal employment opportunity eeo law and at the time a decision of guilty or a settlement

a positive theory of environmental quality regulation this paper demonstrates that environmental quality regulation may enhance producer wealth while simultaneously reducing an externality problem by restricting access to common property regulation not only corrects a resource misallocation but it creates a scarcity rent as well in the recent history of environmental quality the common access problem has been addressed by federal and state agencies through a standards based approach rather than through the enforcement of tradable property rights as a consequence rents from the right to use these assets have accrued to producers the data are convincing that there is a strong interplay between producers consumers and the victims of pollution each party has some influence on the outcome and one sided analysis neglects many important aspects of regulation environmental quality regulation is complicated but many of the observed perplexities are consistent with a rent seeking self interest theory of government 46 references 1 figure 7 tables

a signaling model of environmental overcompliance abstract we present a theory of unilateral regulatory overcompliance as a signaling device firms that have a competitive advantage in the use of a cleaner but more costly technology overcomply in order to signal to an imperfectly informed benevolent government that compliance costs are low thereby triggering tougher regulation we identify the conditions under which such an overcompliance signaling equilibrium arises showing that there may be over overcompliance in that firms may overcomply even when tougher regulation is not socially desirable we also discuss the differential implications of the signaling theory as compared to other theories of unilateral regulatory overcompliance

auctions or grandfathering the political economy of tradable emission permits despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits we still observe that a hybrid policy in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions is adopted in some cases we also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits this paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering auctions or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy by constructing a two stage lobbying game in which the type of policy instrument auction grandfathering or a hybrid instrument is determined in the first stage and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups

regulation the opec oil supply shock and wealth effects for electric utilities a popular view among specialists in electric utility economics is that the regulatory process exacerbated the negative effects of the opec s oil price increases during the 1970s in contrast peltzman s theory of regulation suggests that regulators should buffer a firm from cost increases this paper examines these contending propositions by examining the stock returns for a sample of electric utilities during the opec oil shock of october 1973 the data are more consistent with a buffering effect than a regulatory lag

optimal regulation under uncertainty this paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm s owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return we argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors the deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach we present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty in our approach the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors perceptions and preferences over risk return characteristics we portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value given the prices set by regulators within this framework it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors we also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm in the traditional regulatory framework as thoroughly described and explained by bonbright 3 the goal of regulators is to set rates in such a way that all costs are covered including a return on invested capital commensurate with the risk of equity investment determination of the latter is difficult at best it is generally agreed that 1 the fair return depends on risk 2 the return required by investors as compensation for risk bearing is most accurately measured by observing the returns to competitive firms in otherwise similar circumstances and 3 estimation of required returns by observation of other regulated firms is generally inappropriate since the risk and regulation effects are confounded more recently myers 13 has argued for the application of finance theory to rate determination within the traditional regulatory framework in particular he argues that the capital asset pricing model capm developed by sharpe 14 lintner 9 and mossin 12 is especially well suited for this purpose since a single quantitative measure of risk is relevant in that model further since the capm offers an explicit equilibrium risk return relationship information about the risks and returns of all firms can be directly employed in determining the fair return to a regulated firm

oil and the macroeconomy since world war ii all but one of the u s recessions since world war ii have been preceded typically with a lag of around three fourths of a year by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum this does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions evidence is presented however that even over the period 1948 72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the u s recessions prior to 1972 by extension energy price increases may account for much of post opec macroeconomic performance

crude oil and the macroeconomy tests of some popular notions a note perhaps no other economic events in the post world war ii era have generated as much attention as the series of crude oil price shocks that have jolted the world economy since the opec boycott of 1973 a tremendous amount of space in the popular and professional literature has been devoted to analyzing the impacts of these shocks on the developed economies and the adjustments these shocks have induced one residual of this literature has been a general impression that since 1973 the functional relationship between crude oil prices and the developed macroeconomies has been dramatically and fundamentally altered yet to our knowledge no one has formally tested this impression recent evidence of hamilton 1983 suggests that crude oil prices had a strong impact on the u s business cycle well before 1973 further while textbook treatments of oil price shocks tend to highlight cost push inflationary effects the research of berndt and wood 1975 1979 and wilcox 1983 indicates the net complementarity between energy and capital in the u s economy is quite strong both before and after 1973 thus oil price shocks may have stronger real effects than generally believed in this paper we formally test three popular notions associated with the so called

shareholder wealth effects of legislative events the case of airline deregulation this paper presents empirical evidence about the impact on shareholder wealth of legislative events leading to the enactment of the airline deregulation act of 1978 in contrast to prior regulatory event studies this paper examines not only the final legislative enactment but also the congressional hearings that preceded it no significant effect on shareholder wealth is indicated when averaged across all airline firms and all legislative events impact of deregulation however was expected to be different for trunk airlines than for local airlines moreover market expectations likely changed with the change in the political climate during the course of deregulation deliberations from an industry financial health emphasis under a republican ford administration to a consumer welfare emphasis under a democratic carter administration we find that trunk airlines experienced significant positive abnormal returns during the ford administration but negative abnormal returns during the carter administration in contrast local airlines exhibited significant negative abnormal returns during both the ford and carter eras systematic risk of both trunk and local airlines also increased with the change in the political climate

cost raising strategies advantage rivals by raising their costs in this paper we show that strategies designed to raise rivals costs have a number of advantages over predatory pricing they are credible do not necessarily require the victim to exit and do not necessarily require the existence of classical market power the paper sets up a general model proves a number of general results and then applies the model to specific strategies involving overbuying inputs and vertical integration

comparison of energy consumption and ghg emissions of open field and greenhouse strawberry production abstract the greenhouse areas in iran have expanded rapidly and the greenhouse holders have shown a great tendency to cultivation of those crops that used to be cultivated in open fields although greenhouses are intensive in terms of yield and whole year production they are considered being one of the major contributors to greenhouse gases ghg emissions in the agricultural sector in the present study strawberry cultivation in greenhouses gh and open fields of was selected as a representative of those crops which can be grown in both systems initial data were randomly collected from 70 ofs and 33 ghs in province of gilan iran energy consumption and ghg emission of two different strawberry production systems were compared moreover energy use efficiency of gh producers due to more energy consumption was studied then degrees of technical efficiency te pure technical efficiency pte and scale efficiency se were determined using data envelopment analysis dea additionally the amount of energy inputs wasted in inefficient greenhouses was assessed and energy saving was computed furthermore the effect of energy optimization on ghg emission was investigated and the total amount of ghg emission was calculated the total average of energy input and output was estimated at 35 092 4 mj ha 1 and 10 405 9 mj ha 1 for of production and similarly 1 356 932 8 mj ha 1 and 137 772 4 mj ha 1 for gh strawberry production total ghg emission was calculated as 803 4 kg co2eq ha 1 and 35083 5 kg co2eq ha 1 for of and gh production respectively based on the evaluations 20 2 273 902 8 mj ha 1 of overall energy sources can be saved if the performance of inefficient farmers is enhanced optimizing energy in the greenhouse production can result in a significant reduction in total ghg emission and the present emission of ghg can be reduced to the value of 29309 1 kg co2eq ha 1

can rents run uphill a note on the theory of regulation no one familiar with the history of regulation would be surprised that inefficient firms can benefit at the expense of the efficient yet this outcome has not been analyzed within the standard rent seeking models this paper has derived conditions under which less efficient firms can profitably secure regulation that imposes costs on their more efficient rivals the possibility that less efficient firms can form a profitable coalition does not mean that they will actually do so we have analyzed only the polar situations in which inefficient firms form a coalition to put efficient firms out of business and efficient firms try to block the regulation by offering counter bids the actual formation of coalitions will depend on political entrepreneurship mcchesney 1987 the opportunity costs of various producers fort and hallagan 1987 and the particular cost functions of forming a coalition functions that may well differ among various firms i have placed these influences in the ceteris paribus pound in order to analyze the demand and supply conditions that are conducive to successful rent seeking by less efficient firms the theoretical demonstration that less efficient firms can outbid their more efficient counterparts for legislation and still earn profits helps explain a common regulatory outcome

is the yen dollar exchange rate really responsible for east asia s export and business cycles a commentary on mckinnon and schnabl 2003 in a paper published in the world economy ronald mckinnon and gunther schnabl claim that fluctuations in the nominal yen dollar exchange rate are the principal causal factor behind the export and business cycles in east asian countries mckinnon and schnabl 2003 their econometric work however suffers from at least two important difficulties first while mckinnon and schnabl preclude industry shocks as an explanation for the east asian countries macroeconomic fluctuations cyclical fluctuations in the global electronics industry have a significant impact on their short run export and output dynamics second although mckinnon and schnabl assume that the relative industrial competitiveness of japan and other east asian countries moves in tandem with fluctuations in the nominal yen dollar exchange rate the empirical validity of this assumption is not indisputable once these two issues are taken into account properly it becomes very difficult to make a convincing case for the yen dollar exchange rate being the main driver of east asia s macroeconomic instability a brief critique will also be made of another paper that has appeared recently in the world economy doraisami 2004 which models malaysia s pre crisis export dynamics using the nominal yen dollar exchange rate as a proxy for the country s export competitiveness

optimal pollution taxation in a cournot duopoly it is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution it has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage in this paper i derive the optimal pollution tax for a cournot duopoly if firms have different production costs the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage this is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm it is also shown that if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level

was china the first domino assessing links between china and other asian economies abstract several commentators have suggested that competition from china in particular its 1994 devaluation and strong export performance during 1994 95 may have contributed to the asian crisis of 1997 98 we provide evidence against this view we show that the devaluation was not important in economic terms and china s strong export performance in 1994 95 was matched by other asian economies we also show that the period 1993 and 1996 was marked by relative stability in the export shares of china and other asian economies in various geographical regions and industries the paper concludes by outlining channels through which the asian crisis could affect china

further analysis of the theory of economic regulation the case of the 1969 coal mine health and sfnety act scott m fuess jr and mark a loewenstein how does government regulation influence the structure of industries in the coal mining industry increased safety can be provided with personal protection devices or with engineering controls but the type of safety standard imposed is important because larger producers have a comparative advantage complying with engineering controls time series evidence indicates that the 1969 coal mine health and safely act by imposing engineering controls drove out smaller less safe mines thereby shifting production toward larger mines many of the proposals made in the name of safety have little to do with the safety of the individual miner but a great deal to do with the vested interests of the most powerful forces in the coal industry the large operators and the union mr robert holcomb pike county coal operators association house hearings on coal mine health and safety 4 march 1969 556 7 i introduction the theory of compensating wage differentials predicts that a worker will demand greater compensation if he is to bear a higher risk of injury on the job higher wages are paid for jobs where the probability of a fatal accident is greater although it is not clear this wage differential is paid for other unpleasant job characteristics despite this compensation for job accidents the federal government heavily regulates workplace safety federal job safety standards generally do not specify injury rate standards to be met rather regulations typically require producers to use particular types of equipment and workplace designs focusing on particular safety standards the economic report of the president 1987 199 200 notes in the case of the cotton dust standard for example the risk of lung disease could be reduced by allowing the use of disposable masks osha s occupational safety and health administration preference for engineering controls is particularly costly in the case of noise control the theory of economic regulation initiated by stigler 1971 1975 and peltzman 1976 suggests that government regulations benefit certain interest groups at the expense of others maloney and mccormick 1982 105 argue that if the most efficient firms in an industry have a comparative advantage in complying with regulation then price will increase more than costs for some firms the rents of marginal firms will decline and some will exit as they face higher costs pashigian 1984 notes that if there are economies of scale in compliance then regulation can increase the market share of the larger producers according to bartel and thomas 1985 osha regulations do not appear to have led to lower injury rates but the differential cost effects of occupational safety legislation may have benefited large producers and unions few studies notably marvel 1977 and linneman 1980 have examined specific acts of legislation to determine how government regulation redistributes rents among producers in an industry pashigian 1986 201 calls the study of regulation s intraindustry effects an infant industry this paper contributes to this infant industry by modeling the effects of safety regulation to study the impact of the 1969 coal mine health and safety act on underground bituminous coal mining previous empirical studies indicate that federal mine safety regulation has had important indirect effects on the coal mining industry central to our analysis of these effects is miller s 1984 observation that safety can be produced with clearly defined alternatives either labor specific personal protection devices or capital specific engineering controls and workplace designs since larger producers enjoy a comparative advantage complying with engineering controls and smaller producers have a comparative advantage complying with personal safety standards the type of safety standard decreed will favor one group of producers over the other

a framework to compare environmental policies 1 introduction to analyze environmental policy proposals it is important to determine the conditions under which some policies might work better than others when will a pollution tax work better than the sale of permits or some other alternative which is easier to administer or to enforce does one policy apply better to some kinds of pollutants than to others which policy has a greater chance of getting enacted this paper provides a framework to compare alternative policies for each pollutant in each context one policy may be more efficient while others better account for competing objectives like administrative efficiency political feasibility and fairness using this framework the paper will analyze and compare eight types of policies clearly no single policy instrument will work best in all cases under some circumstances command and control cac instruments might be necessary in either of two forms i emission restrictions sometimes called performance standards or ii technology restrictions that might be called design standards if emissions are difficult or impossible to measure for example then the authorities can at least enforce rules that require the proper installation of the required pollution control equipment such as a flue gas desulfurization unit scrubber on every electric power plant or a catalytic converter on every automobile in other cases that are important to identify these cac instruments can be replaced by incentive instruments such as taxes subsidies or permits as suggested by pigou 1932 the pollution problem could be addressed by i taxes on the pollution or ii subsidies to abatement a pigouvian tax applies to the pollutant itself rather than to output at a rate equal to the pollutant s marginal environmental damages med the term incentive instruments includes both the pigouvian tax and the subsidy to abatement and it includes two other policies that involve permits such as those traded by electric utilities under the clean air act amendments of 1990 those permits could be i grandfathered or handed out to existing firms in proportion to past emissions or ii sold at auction by the government a simple analytical model is used below to demonstrate conditions under which the pigouvian tax is equivalent to a government sale of permits much of the environmental economics literature finds that the use of incentives is more cost effective than cac restrictions with imperfect information the regulatory authorities may or may not know what is the cheapest form of abatement technology thus cac regulations may require technology that is more expensive than necessary with a tax or a price per unit of emissions however each firm has incentives to find and to undertake any form of abatement that is cheaper than buying a permit since only the cheapest forms of abatement are undertaken these incentive policies can minimize the total cost of achieving any given level of pollution protection so far this cost effectiveness argument does not distinguish between taxes subsidies permits that are handed out or permits sold at auction yet the handout of permits does not raise any revenue thus a new literature in environmental economics concentrates on a distinction between policies that raise revenue like a tax on pollution or the sale of permits as opposed to polices that do not raise revenue like the handout of permits or a cac restriction on emissions 2 the model below will be used to reflect on this distinction as well so far i have listed two cac policies two pigouvian solutions and two versions of a permit policy yet in some cases with well defined property rights even with pollution coase 1960 shows how the private market can still achieve economic efficiency on its own government does not need to intervene at all except perhaps to help enforce property rights through a court system

supply shocks and price adjustment in the world oil market understanding the impacts of transitory oil supply shocks on world oil prices is crucial to the evaluation of the economic impacts of shocks and the design of policy responses to address those impacts this paper integrates short run and long run approaches to oil price determination with particular emphasis on the two price structure of the world oil market with coexisting short term spot prices and long term contract prices even transitory shocks are shown to exhibit persistence effects on long term prices some implications for econometric models of the relationship between spot and contract prices are discussed

the political economy of environmental regulation towards a unifying framework there are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy building on insights from this theoretical work and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation there are two primary contributions of this research the first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy for example there is as yet no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive based mechanisms such as marketable permits and effluent fees the second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy this framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups

regulation and firm size fda impacts on innovation this article estimates the highly differential impacts of fda regulations on pharmaceutical firms of various sizes where size is measured as scale of r d expenditures estimation is performed using the method of maximum quasi likelihoods using productivity trends of the united kingdom as a control to isolate fda regulatory effects in the united states it is shown that smaller u s pharmaceutical firms suffered devastating reductions in research productivity because of fda regulations in contrast the largest u s pharmaceutical firms apparently benefited from regulation as sales gains due to reduced competition more than offset their quite moderate declines in research productivity

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

environmental regulation whose self interests are being protected special interest can explain why environmental policy limits economic activity in areas where air quality is above minumum standards locational competition among region helped create a policy that raised factor mobility cost from slower to faster growing regions analysis of votes shows greater support for this policy was received from northern urban constituencies and the greatest opposition came from the south and the west pollution abatement costs per unit of output are higher in areas with higher not lower air quality

regulation and systematic risk the case of electric utilities a primary finding is that the presence and intensity of regulation strongly affect systematic risk the empirical results support the view that beta is endogenous to regulation and suggest caution regarding the use of observed measures of systematic risk in assessing the cost of capital in regulatory procedures results suggest that systematic risk is not only endogenous but also uniformly lower in regulated versus unregulated regimes beta is lower the more intensive the degree of regulation and the results hold whether regulation is measured in terms of conferred authority statutes and judicial opinions of inputs resources devoted to regulation or of outputs regulated price the record for the period 1969 74 when factor prices for electric utilities were rising dramatically suggests that the observed lowering of risk cannot be attributed to simple regulatory lag on the other hand the results are observationally equivalent to regulation lowering systematic risk as a by product of wealth redistribution or because reduced risk is the preferred outcome of political constituents 32 references 8 tables

frontrunners and laggards the strategy of environmental regulation under uncertainty the extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts first companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation second ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates finally regulators use limited information provided by the industry i construct a game theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator in equilibrium companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry this profit driven behavior is not always socially detrimental however as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost additionally the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates if companies condition compliance on the installation cost only low cost companies install in equilibrium the analysis combines regulatory capture with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator

when are private standards more stringent than public standards retailers private standards are increasingly important for addressing consumer concerns about safety quality and social and environmental issues empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts this article develops a political economy model that helps explain this stylized fact we show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one depending on several factors

national treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities we analyze the role of national treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy a social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good we show that whether national treatment of standards interferes with welfare maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker consumption or emissions tax and differences in the cost of complying with the standard we also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal this asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare maximizing policy to violate national treatment on analyse le role du principe de traitement identique des entites domestiques ou importees dans la reglementation des normes environnementales dans une economie ouverte un gouvernement utilise des normes pour controler les emissions decoulant de la consommation d un produit transige internationalement on montre que le fait que le traitement identique des normes va ou non interferer avec l objectif poursuivi qui est de maximiser le niveau de bien etre va dependre de l ensemble des instruments disponibles pour l architecte des politiques une taxe sur la consommation ou sur les emissions et des differences dans les couts a encourir pour se conformer aux normes on souligne aussi l incidence asymetrique des normes sur les produits domestiques et importes quand les taxes sont sous optimales cette incidence asymetrique peut faire que la politique qui vise la maximisation du bien etre soit en violation du principe de traitement identique

estimating the structure of market reaction to news information events and lumber futures prices we develop a new event study technique the distributional event response model derm appropriate to relatively slowly evolving information events we apply the model to twelve years of daily lumber futures prices and analyze the effects of three different types of information releases a monthly housing starts estimates b aperiodic administrative and judicial announcements about u s canada trade disputes and c novel and unprecedented court decisions related to the endangered species act esa the information releases are different in ways that predict their relative speeds of impoundment in prices we find that housing start events are absorbed more quickly than trade events which are absorbed more quickly than esa events

to fight or not to fight an analysis of submission struggle and the design of contests this paper considers the players behaviour in an asymmetric two player contest when do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate analysing contest success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met thus such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive if a self interested rule setter chooses the contest success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate applications to rent seeking and environmental regulation are discussed

an analysis of energy use and relation between energy inputs and yield in tangerine production abstract the objective of this study is to determine energy balance between inputs and output for tangerine production in mazandaran province one of the most important citrus production centers in iran data is collected by administering a questionnaire in face to face interviews the results show that the highest share of energy was utilized by application of chemical fertilizers and chemicals average yield and energy consumption are calculated as 26862 5 kg ha 1 and 62260 9 mj ha 1 respectively the energy productivity and net energy value are estimated as 0 43 kg mj 1 and 8201 4 mj ha 1 respectively the ratio of energy outputs to energy inputs is approximately 0 87 in addition the cobb douglas production function is applied to estimate the econometric relationship among different forms of energy consumption the findings suggest that tangerine producers must optimize their use of indirect and non renewable energy resources they apply an excess use of some energy inputs resulting in an inverse effect on yield as well as imposing risks to natural resources and human health

market power and cartel formation theory and an empirical test abstract antitrust enforcement makes it difficult to test theories of cartel formation because most attempts to form cartels are blocked or kept secret however federal laws allow u s produce growers to operate marketing cartels through devices called marketing orders these cartels use quantity controls and quality standards to raise prices of fresh produce some growers have adopted marketing orders and others have not this paper develops and tests a positive theory of the adoption of marketing orders the theory suggests that growers in a region are more likely to adopt a marketing order if the demand for fresh produce is inelastic the growers market share in the fresh market is large there are barriers to entry and expansion the fraction of the output the growers ship to the fresh market is not too large or too small growers are homogeneous and large cooperatives exist probit analyses support these hypotheses

green business and blue angels this paper presents a model of a monopolist svoluntary overcompliance with legal environmentalstandards under asymmetric information about thefirm s environmental impacts the key assumptions are the existence of quality premia for environmentalsoundness a positive but imperfect degree ofmonitoring and adaptive consumer expectations conditions necessary for overcompliance to arise in aprofit maximizing equilibrium are derived the effectsof a third party eco labeling system are analyzed itis shown that the existence of an independent labelingauthority increases the likelihood of overcomplianceto be profit maximizing moreover firms might have anincentive to lobby for the introduction of such asystem the effect of consumers risk preferences andan instrument for preventing greenwash companieslying about their environmental performance is alsodiscussed

the impact of corporate pollution on market valuation some empirical evidence abstract this paper investigates the relation between the market valuation of publicly listed corporations and their social performance as measured by their pollution record relative to environmental regulations expectations are that corporations with a good bad environmental record should be valued at a premium discount by the stock market such a relation results from the emergence of ethical or green investing and from an increased awareness by investors of the potential negative consequences from corporate environmental damages two significant innovations are introduced in this study first using governmental data a pollution index is computed for each sample firm second the relevance of social information for investors purposes is directly assessed by looking at the relation between the pollution index and a firm s market valuation within the accounting identity framework modigliani and miller 1958 results suggest that a firm s pollution performance is interpreted by market participants as providing information about its environmental liabilities furthermore results weakly support the existence of a premium discount in the stock market valuation of firms that meet do not meet environmental regulations thus lending some credence to the existence of a demand by some stock market participants for ethical or green investments this suggests that the disclosure of audited social information of a non financial nature in a firm s annual report could be beneficial to market participants

strategic quality competition and the porter hypothesis abstract this paper offers new support for the porter hypothesis within the context of a quality competition framework we use a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which two firms simultaneously choose to produce either a high environmentally friendly quality or low standard quality variant of a good before engaging in price competition in this simple setting we show that a nash equilibrium of the game featuring the low quality good can be pareto dominated by a different strategy profile in which both firms opt in favour of the green product our analysis demonstrates that in such a case both firms stand to profit from the introduction of a rule penalizing any firm refusing to produce the environmentally friendly product we also find that consumers themselves may benefit from such regulations this is always the case when shifting from low quality to high quality production brings about a cost efficiency improvement

studying firm specific effects of regulation with stock market data an application to oil price regulation regulations are often introduced and reformed in response to unanticipated changes in market forces in late 1973 for example opec quadrupled the world price of oil and u s policy makers responded by imposing oil price regulation such events pose a fundamental problem of interpretation for studies that use stock prices to identify the economic effects of regulation what portion of the capital gains or losses experienced by investors in regulated firms is due to regulation and what portion is due to unanticipated economic events to answer these questions we use microeconomic theory to derive hypotheses about how the capital gains and losses created by opec pricing and u s regulatory policies are related to the underlying characteristics of petroleum firms we test the hypotheses by including a model of firm specific abnormal returns in the standard market models of common stock returns earned by investors in petroleum firms the results indicate the u s oil production and refiner access to price controlled crude oil were sources of capital gains and that u s and foreign refining were sources of capital losses

the impact of economics on environmental policy abstract environmental economists have seen their ideas translated into the rough and tumble policy world for over two decades they have witnessed the application of economic instruments to several environmental issues including preserving wetlands lowering lead levels and curbing acid rain this essay examines the impact of the rise of economics in the policy world on the making of environmental policy i focus on two related but distinct phenomena the increasing interest in the use of incentive based mechanisms such as tradable permits to achieve environmental goals and the increasing interest in the use of analytical tools such as benefit cost analysis in regulatory decision making i argue that economists and economic instruments have had a modest impact on shaping environmental health and safety regulation but that economists will play an increasingly important role in the future although the role of economics is becoming more prominent it does not follow that environmental policy will become more efficient this apparent inconsistency can be explained by the political economy of environmental policy

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

exploring new ways of assessing the effect of regulation on environmental management abstract studies indicate that while a variety of factors positively influence voluntary environmental management regulatory pressures are among the most important however most research examines samples representing large manufacturers or single industries essentially assuming a level of regulatory constraint using a sample of heterogeneous facilities this study finds that facilities can be classified according to the level of regulatory constraint and that group membership impacts the choice of environmental management strategy when assessed within a utility maximization framework more extensively regulated facilities implement more individual environmental management practices but participate in fewer formal voluntary environmental programs veps compared to other facilities

trade causes of the asian crisis the malaysian experience prior to the onset of the asian financial crisis there was a deterioration in the external trade position of most countries that were affected by the asian currency crisis however little is known about why this occurred this paper aims to identify the causes of a slowdown in export growth in malaysia while misaligned exchange rates have been widely cited as a cause of the slowdown in east asia in the malaysian context at least a vulnerability to the downturn in the electronic cycle could also be a major factor leading to poor export performance using the us yen dollar rate as a proxy for exchange rate misalignment and us total new orders for electronics as a proxy for global electronics demand cointegration analysis was used to establish the likely causes of a slowdown in malaysia s export performance the empirical evidence suggests that the coincidence of exchange rate misalignment with a downturn in the global electronics demand cycle was responsible for the sharp deterioration in export performance

the strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards this paper investigates the welfare consequences of strategic behavior by firms to affect the amount of environmental regulation they face environmental regulation often attempts to force an industry to develop cleaner technology but the regulator may have no means to commit to a specific standard this lack of regulatory commitment induces firms to choose innovation strategically it is well known that firms have incentives to suppress innovation to induce the regulator to ratchet down the standard and this strategic behavior lowers welfare this paper explores a countervailing incentive in oligopoly settings firms have heightened incentives to innovate so as to increase regulation and raise rivals costs in equilibrium the incentive to raise rivals cost can mitigate the welfare loss arising from no regulatory commitment also a regulator who is unable to commit ex ante to the stringency of a regulatory standard can induce more clean technology than a regulator with a commitment mechanism

cleaning up while cleaning up pollution abatement interest groups and contingent trade policies this paper analyzes the political economy of environmental policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection we argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing the preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers

rent seeking and its implications for pollution taxation one of the fundamental insights gained from the study of economics comes from an understanding of how market prices arising from private property and exchange can motivate efficient responses to the problem of scarcity not surprisingly when private property rights and market exchange are deemed not to be feasible for either technological or political reasons economists have overwhelmingly recommended that politically imposed prices be employed as surrogates for market prices the most extensively discussed example of this in the literature is the use of pollution taxation as a means of motivating polluters to take the full cost of their polluting activities into account 1