any non welfarist method of policy assessment violates the pareto principle reply the public at large many policymakers and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non welfarist that is they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals utilities we show however that any non welfarist method of policy assessment violates the pareto principle

fertility social mobility and long run inequality dynastic altruistic models with endogenous fertility have been shown to be unable to generate enough intergenerational persistence using a bewley model with endogenous fertility we show that it is possible to recover persistence key ingredients for our result include exponential child discounting discrete number of children diminishing costs of child rearing and an elasticity of intergenerational substitution larger than one our model provides a unified framework of analysis for long run inequality that incorporates fertility choices

revisiting the classical view of benefit based taxation this paper explores how the persistently popular classical logic of bene t based taxation in which an individual s bene t from public goods is tied to his or her income earning ability can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory if lindahl s methods are applied to that view of bene ts rst best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics in particular the coe cient of complementarity between public goods and innate talent constrained optimal policy with a pareto e cient objective that strikes a balance controlled by a single parameter between this principle and the familiar utilitarian criterion can be simulated using conventional constraints and methods a wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result including those that match well several features of existing policies to the extent that such an objective re ects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing

the macrodynamics of sorting between workers and firms we develop an equilibrium model of on the job search with ex ante heterogeneous workers and firms aggregate uncertainty and vacancy creation the model produces rich dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed workers vacancies and worker firm matches evolve stochastically over time we prove that the surplus function which fully characterises the match value and the mobility decision of workers does not depend on these distributions we estimate the model on us labour market data from 1951 2007 and predict the fit for 2008 12 we use the model to measure the cyclicality of mismatch between workers and jobs

do employers use unemployment as a sorting criterion when hiring evidence from a field experiment the stigma associated with long term unemployment spells could create large inefficiencies in labor markets while the existing literature points toward large stigma effects it has proven difficult to estimate causal relationships using data from a field experiment we find that long term unemployment spells in the past do not matter for employers hiring decisions suggesting that subsequent work experience eliminates this negative signal nor do employers treat contemporary short term unemployment spells differently suggesting that they understand that worker firm matching takes time however employers attach a negative value to contemporary unemployment spells lasting at least nine months providing evidence of stigma effects

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

employer search training and vacancy duration we develop a model of optimal employer search strategy when information about match quality is endogenous the model is tested using four data sets two of which have not previously been used as theory predicts we find that when filling positions requiring more training employers search more intensively and extensively employers also search more extensively when hiring workers with more education and with prior experience these findings provide strong evidence of systematic variation in search strategies based on the characteristics of the positions and job applicants factors that influence employer search also affect the duration of a vacancy

job search stigma effect and escape rate from unemployment this article formulates job search models incorporating certain types of the stigma effect of unemployment it is assumed that the probability of getting a job offer given the unemployment individual contacts the firm is influenced by the duration of unemployment and is justified in a signaling context the optimal search is analyzed for one sector as well as across several independent labor market segments it is shown that there are reasonably general conditions on the search environments for which both the individual reservation wage and escape rate are negative duration dependent a fact observed in empirical studies

cashier or consultant entry labor market conditions field of study and career success we measure impacts of entry conditions on labor market outcomes for the us college graduating classes of 1974 2011 a large recession reduces initial earnings by 10 through full time work and wag

the effect of unemployment benefits and nonemployment durations on wages abstract we estimate that unemployment insurance ui extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in ui eligibility in germany we show this effect combines two key policy parameters the effect of ui on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers our framework implies if ui extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration then reservation wages do not bind we derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects the effect of ui on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects jel j31 j64 j65

does family ownership structure affect investment cash flow sensitivity evidence from italian smes abstractthe aim of this article is to investigate whether family control family management and family ownership concentration affect the investment cash flow sensitivity of small and medium sized enterprises smes by analysing a sample of italian smes for the period 2004 2013 i find that family owned businesses are significantly associated with higher investment cash flow dependence this relation however is found to be driven by two distinct factors i the presence of a highly concentrated family ownership ownership concentration channel and ii the active involvement of the family in the business family management channel

axioms for health care resource allocation this paper examines principles of health care resource allocation based on axioms for individual preferences and distributive justice we establish axioms for representing individual preferences by quality adjusted life years qalys as well as axioms for existence of a social welfare function depending only on qalys a symmetric cobb douglas social welfare function is characterized by an axiom stating that social welfare is anonymous with respect to the distribution of individual life years replacing this axiom with an axiom of non age dependence we obtain a characterization of a utilitarian social welfare function with certain weights further we give axioms for a social welfare function being a weighted sum of power transformations of individual qalys

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

on the effects of ranking by unemployment duration abstract we propose a theory based on the firm s hiring behavior that rationalizes the observed significant decline of callback rates for an interview and exit rates from unemployment and the mild decline of reemployment wages over unemployment duration we build a directed search model with symmetric incomplete information on worker types and non sequential search by firms sorting due to firms testing of applicants in the past makes expected productivity fall with duration which induces firms to rank applicants by duration in equilibrium callback and exit rates both fall with unemployment duration in our numerical exercise using u s data we show that our model can replicate quite well the observed falling patterns with the firm s ranking decision accounting for a sizable part

pareto principles from inch to ell abstract under mild conditions including the possibility of compensation by monetary transfer this paper shows that all versions of the pareto principle viz the pareto indifference the weak pareto the strong pareto and the full pareto are in fact mutually equivalent

a matching model with endogenous skill requirements we consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements the distribution of worker abilities is exogenous but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms high skill jobs produce more output than low skill jobs but high skill jobs require high skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill we use a matching model together with a nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics wages and unemployment

statistical discrimination and duration dependence in the job finding rate this article models a frictional labour market where employers endogenously discriminate against the long term unemployed the estimated model replicates recent experimental evidence which documents that interview invitations for observationally equivalent workers fall sharply as unemployment duration progresses we use the model to quantitatively assess the consequences of such employer behaviour for job finding rates and long term unemployment and find only modest effects given the large decline in callbacks interviews lost to duration impact individual job finding rates solely if they would have led to jobs we show that such instances are rare when firms discriminate in anticipation of an ultimately unsuccessful application discrimination in callbacks is thus largely a response to dynamic selection with limited consequences for structural duration dependence and long term unemployment

information externalities in the labour market and the duration of unemployment a matching model is analysed in which firms imperfectly test workers prior to hiring them if some firms hire only workers who pass the test there is an informational externality unemployment duration is a signal of productivity in equilibrium if it is profitable for a firm to test it is also profitable for it to condition its hiring decision on duration hiring those whose duration is less than a critical value this testing equilibrium is inefficient with too much testing and too low a critical duration value sensitivity analysis of the latter suggests explanations for the dependence of re employment probabilities on duration and the instability of the u v curve

extensive search intensive search and hiring costs new evidence on employer hiring activity this paper presents recent evidence on employer search to fill a position a 1982 employer survey sponsored by the national institute of education and the national center for research in vocational education provides the basis for analyzing employer search and hiring costs the paper examines the effects of such factors as employer size dismissal costs unionization on the job training adjustment costs capital and labor market conditions on intensive employer search extensive employer search and hiring costs intensive employer search is measured by the average number of hours the employer spends recruiting screening and interviewing per applicant extensive search is measured by the number of applicants seen per applicant interviewed and the number interviewed per employment

heterogeneity and unemployment dynamics many previous articles have studied the contribution of inflows and outflows to the cyclical variation in unemployment but ignored the critical role of unobserved heterogeneity across workers thi

when individual preferences defy sustainability can merit good arguments close the gap in this paper we discuss how merit good arguments may contribute to discussions about sustainability to this end we clarify how merit good arguments deviate from individual preferences and relate the justification for deviations from individual preferences to two conceptions of well being an informed preference satisfaction and a perfectionist conception building on this framework we analyze how merit good arguments can be helpful for discussing sustainability as justice what challenges merit good arguments pose to future generations and whether they can serve as a normative justification for green nudges the analysis yields two main insights first a reflection on the concept of merit goods is helpful in sorting out the different justifications that sustainability interventions may rely on in particular it allows separating the challenges of redistribution internalization of externalities and increasing individual consumption of particular merit goods such as health care or education more clearly second the precise notion of merit goods by itself however only offers a limited contribution and does not represent a blank check to justify deviations from individual preferences

duration dependence and labor market conditions evidence from a field experiment this article studies the role of employer behavior in generating negative duration dependence the adverse effect of a longer unemployment spell by sending fictitious resumes to real job postings in 100 u s cities our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker s unemployment spell with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months we explore how this effect varies with local labor market conditions and find that duration de pendence is stronger when the local labor market is tighter this result is consistent with the prediction of a broad class of screening models in which employers use the unemployment spell length as a signal of unobserved productivity and recognize that this signal is less informative in weak labor markets jel code j64

any non welfarist method of policy assessment violates the pareto principle a comment in a recent article kaplow and shavell 2001 claim that any methodof policy assessment that is not purely welfarist violates the pareto prin ciple kaplow and shavell use the term welfarism to describe notionsof social welfare under which assessment of policies depends exclusivelyon their effects on individuals utilities p 281 a welfarist policy as sessment uses a social welfare function from the set

the promise of positive optimal taxation normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice abstract a prominent assumption in modern optimal tax research is that the objective of taxation is utilitarian i present new survey evidence that most people reject this assumption s implications for several prominent features of tax policy instead preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective the principle of equal sacrifice i generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective proposing a method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting pareto efficiency then i show that optimal policy in this generalized model calibrated to the survey evidence and u s microdata is capable of quantitatively matching several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in the survey and reality including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited tagging together these findings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation

the combinatorial assignment problem approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes this paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment for example assigning schedules of courses to students based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes ceei in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together the main technical result is an existence theorem for approximate ceei the mechanism is approximately efficient satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness and is strategyproof in large markets its performance is explored on real data and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets and most are both manipulable and unfair

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

negative marginal tax rates and heterogeneity the bulk of the theory of optimal taxation recommends that the marginal tax rate be everywhere positive labor supply is distorted downwards compared with laissez faire the conditions under which the result holds continuous labor supply or intensive margin unobserved productivity constant opportunity cost of work utilitarian planner with a redistributive motive towards lower incomes have been thoroughly investigated jesus seade 1977 1982 ivan werning 2000 martin f hellwig 2007 the purpose of the present paper is to describe how negative marginal tax rates can be optimal keeping with the intensive set up largely studied in the literature when there are multiple dimensions of heterogeneity indeed james a mirrlees 1976 in its section iv indicates along a line that will be pursued further here that the sign of the marginal tax rate cannot be predicted when the agents in the economy differ along several dimensions of heterogeneity workers differ in both their productivities and opportunity costs of work under utilitarianism heterogeneity comes into play through its impact on cardinal utilities how social weights or marginal utilities of income vary with income determines the shape of the optimal tax scheme conditionally on income utility and more importantly its derivative with respect to income may either decrease or increase with work opportunity costs this may vary according to circumstances depending on whether the cost is associated with poor living conditions i e a handicap or reflects a taste for leisure or opportunities outside the labor market such as gardening at home or black market activities for a given income the social weight is proportional to the expected marginal utilities where the expectation is taken over the distribution of work opportunity costs at this income level therefore the social weight curve depends on both the specification of the cardinal utility function and on how the distribution of work opportunity costs changes with income the fact that heterogeneity can blur the redistribution motive through the possible correlation between ability and onerousness of work has been discussed in models where agents have a finite number of types a pioneer work is that of joseph e stiglitz 1982 who shows that the high skilled individual should face a negative marginal tax rate if the low skilled individual s upward incentive constraint binds which is the case if social weights are increasing in type the importance of this observation for policy was pointed out in katherine cuff 2000 who is the first to explicitly link social weights to the opportunity cost of work using alternative choices of cardinal utilities in a model with four types combining two values for productivity and two values for the cost of work robin boadway et al 2002 showed how it can be optimal to have binding upward incentive constraints when high opportunity costs are associated with small social weights

nonemployment stigma as rational herding a field experiment abstract long spells of unemployment are known to reduce the likelihood of re employment but it is difficult to discern the reasons for this observation using an experimental method that controls for search intensity and possible discouragement of job applicants i document that job market opportunities for the nonemployed diminish rapidly over time in this experiment duration dependence is solely due to firm perceptions why do firms view long spells of nonemployment as negative signals rational herding is one important factor managers believe that unemployed applicants were previously interviewed and if the applicants were productive they would have been hired

ranking unemployment duration and wages it explores the implication of one central assumption when firms receive multiple acceptable applications they hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount of time this assumption ranking is contrasted with the assumption of random hiring no ranking by embodying this assumption in a model of the labour market with job creation destruction and matching the joint behaviour of unemployment the distribution of unemployment durations and wages are characterized the implication that the re employment prospects of employed workers were they to become unemployed are better than those of the currently unemployed appears to have been an important feature of european unemployment experience in the 1980 s this paper examines the effects of the composition of unemployment on wage determination it explores one central assumption when firms receive multiple acceptable applications they hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount of time we refer to this assumption as ranking and contrast it throughout to the assumption of random hiring or no ranking by embodying this assumption in a model of the labour market with job creation destruction and matching we characterize the joint behaviour of unemployment the distribution of unemployment durations and wages ranking has a number of important implications first in addition to the obvious result that the exit rate from unemployment is a decreasing function of duration we show that the effect of duration is stronger the higher the rate of unemployment second with the wage depending on the distributions of prospective unemployment durations the presence of long term unemployed per se has little effect on wages third looking at the relation between the wage and the aggregate level of unemployment and comparing ranking to the case of no ranking the wage moves less with the level of unemployment but more with the change in unemployment put simply ranking and no ranking models show exactly the same aggregate unemployment slightly different long run responses of wages to unemployment and sharply different wage dynamics the paper is organized as follows section i characterizes the matching process and derives a matching function based on an urn ball process with vacancies as urns and applications by unemployed workers as balls thus the distribution of applications per vacancy depends on aggregate unemployment and vacancies vacancies with at least one acceptable application are filled when a vacancy receives more than one acceptable application firms use a rule to choose among applicants thus the rule determines who is hired but does not affect the number of hires section ii uses this matching function in a model of the labour market with continual job creation and destruction and characterizes the equilibrium values of unemployment vacancies and hires

the rise of economics in competition policy a canadian perspective competition policy in canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics in this article we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy cartels single firm conduct and mergers we focus on canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the united states and europe

economic evaluation of services for a national health scheme the case for a fairness based framework in this paper we argue that the usual framework for evaluating health services may need modification in the context of a national health scheme nhs some costs and benefits may need to be ignored or discounted others included at face value and some transfer payments included in the decision algorithm in contrast with the standard framework we argue that economic evaluation in the context of an nhs should focus on social transfers between taxpayers and beneficiaries and that the nature and scope of these transfers is determined by the level of social generosity some of the implications of a modified framework are illustrated with a re examination of i costs and transfer payments ii unrelated future costs iii moral hazard and iv the rule that marginal costs should equal marginal benefits we argue that an explicitly fairness based framework is needed for the evaluation of services in an nhs in contrast the usual welfare economic theoretic framework facilitates the sidelining of issues of fairness

income variance dynamics and heterogeneity recent theoretical work has shown the importance of measuring microeconomic uncertainty for models of both general and partial equilibrium under imperfect insurance in this paper the assumption of i i d income innovations used in previous empirical studies is removed and the focus of the analysis is placed on models for the conditional variance of income shocks which is related to the measure of risk emphasized by the theory we first discriminate amongst various models of earnings determination that separate income shocks into idiosyncratic transitory and permanent components we allow for education and time specific differences in the stochastic process for earnings and for measurement error the conditional variance of the income shocks is modelled as a parsimonious arch process with both observable and unobserved heterogeneity the empirical analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 1967 1992 panel study of income dynamics we find strong evidence of sizeable arch effects as well as evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the variances

determinants of callbacks to job applications an audit study abstract we summarize findings from an audit study investigating how unemployment duration age and holding a low level interim job affect the likelihood that experienced college educated females applying for administrative support jobs receive a callback from potential employers the results show no relationship between callback rates and unemployment duration in contrast workers age 50 and older and workers with an interim job are significantly less likely to receive callbacks we also summarize disparate findings in the growing literature of resume based audit studies of career histories and discuss avenues in which the literature could achieve results that are more comparable and externally valid