promoting entry of high quality workers through us immigration policy abstractwe examine how us immigrants would be affected by applying a simple point system for admission as canada does since us immigration policy emphasizes family reunification immigrants have lower education and earnings than natives with unauthorized immigrants education below legal ones using american community survey data and center for migration studies data which allows us to distinguish legal from unauthorized immigrants we examine the effects of requiring immigrants to meet 2 of 3 conditions 1 a high school or college degree 2 being less than 40 years old and 3 working in a professional occupation while admitting the same numbers of immigrants this policy changes the source countries of immigrants and there are large positive effects on immigrant earnings immigrants use of government transfer programs is reduced to below natives and income inequality falls finally with existing policy immigrant earnings growth is not enough to overtake natives given immigrants entering ea

explaining us immigration 1971 1998 abstract in this paper we develop and estimate a model to explain variations in immigration to the united states by source country since the early 1970s the explanatory variables include ratios to the united states of source country income and education as well as relative inequality in addition we incorporate the stock of previous immigrants and a variety of variables representing different dimensions of the immigration quotas set by policy we use the results to shed light on the impact of policy by simulating the effects of the key changes in immigration policy since the late 1970s we also examine the factors that influenced the composition of u s immigration by source region over the entire period

a model of forum shopping owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea e g authors security issuers sponsors of standards resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users buyers or adopters of the worth of their property or idea we analyze the sponsor s choices ofcertifier and design social preferences regarding these choices and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users of a downstream presence of the sponsor and of certifier market power finally we study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing ideas

social security eligibility and the labor supply of older immigrants the employment rate of native born men falls at a much faster rate than that of immigrants as the two groups approach the age of retirement the author draws on u s census data from 1960 2000 to examine how the eligibility requirements for social security benefits affect immigrants decisions to leave the labor market as they near retirement age because a person needs to have worked in the united states for at least ten years to qualify for benefits newly arrived immigrants may not yet have accumulated the requisite employment credits to do this and thus have greater employment rates than other comparably aged persons the probability that an older immigrant is employed falls once the ten year work rule is satisfied the implication of this finding is that immigration may affect the increase in retirement benefits that will inevitably occur as the baby boom generation retires

strategic timing of adoption of new technologies under uncertainty abstract in this paper we introduce experience effects into a duopoly game of timing of adoption of new technologies which exhibit exogenous technological progress departing from the existing literature with this model we obtain continuous and downward sloping reaction functions we find that a higher level of uncertainty increases the extent of dispersion between the equilibrium timings of adoption furthermore we find that the equilibrium timings are even more dispersed when the leader takes the follower s reaction into account when firm roles are made endogenous we find that if there is an incentive to lead follow the equilibrium timings are more less dispersed finally we show that it is possible for collusive adoption to improve welfare

the changing labor market position of canadian immigrants this paper uses pooled 1971 1981 and 1986 canadian census data to evaluate the extent to which 1 the earnings of canadian immigrants at the time of immigration fall short of the earnings of comparable canadian born individuals and 2 immigrants earnings grow more rapidly over time than those of the canadian born variations in the labour market assimilation of immigrants according to their gender and country of origin are also analysed the results suggest that recent immigrant cohorts have had more difficulty being assimilated into the canadian labour market than earlier ones an apparent consequence of recent changes in canadian immigration policy labour market discrimination against visible minorities and the prolonged recession of the early 1980s summary in fre excerpt

the performance of immigrants in the canadian labor market in this article we examine the economic assimilation of immigrants to canada we provide new evidence on immigrants who arrived in the 1970s and document an increase in the dispersion of labor market outcomes across immigrants of different vintages over time our results confirm u s evidence of permanent differences across immigrant cohorts what distinguishes the canadian experience is small or negative rates of assimilation for most cohorts over the sample period finally we test the overidentification of the assimilation process specified in previous studies and fail to reject the usual cohort fixed effect specification

the receipt of transfer payments by immigrants to canada using the native born as a benchmark we examine immigrants reliance on canadas social safety net we find that immigrants have lower participation rates in unemployment insurance and social assistance than natives we also find that assimilation leads to greater participation in both these programs more recent immigrant cohorts have higher recipiency rates than their predecessors the results for social assistance contrast with u s evidence that the raw entry participation rates of many immigrant cohorts exceed the native rates finally our analysis of rent subsidies shows that immigrants initially have higher rates of participation which fall with assimilation excerpt

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

earnings distribution of cuban immigrants in the usa evidence from quantile regression with sample selection abstractthis article analyses the conditional earnings distribution for cuban immigrants in the usa considering buchinsky sample selection in a quantile regression model the test proposed by huber and melly to test the independence between error terms and regressors conditional on the selection probability is also considered this is the first attempt in the migration literature to use quantile regression with sample selection the data used come from the us american community survey the results show that the hypothesis of conditional independence is not rejected and increments in earnings associated with the usual socioeconomic characteristics in labour studies vary between the cohorts considered the main conclusions are that a decline in returns from education may be a sign that a high level of education no longer provides a competitive advantage and that being a black person is associated with substantially lower earnings regardless of the individuals position in the earnings distribution this

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

sustaining fiscal policy through immigration this paper explores the fiscal implications of immigration to the us and argues that immigration policy should be viewed as a vital part of fiscal policy in particular a case is made that skill

unemployment insurance and job duration in canada we use data from the canadian 2 year longitudinal labour market activity survey of 1986 87 to estimate the effect of the unemployment insurance ui system on job duration particular attention is focused on the entrance requirements of the ui system which relate eligibility for ui benefits to an individual s recent employment history the article makes operational the ui entrance requirement provisions which take into account variations in the regional unemployment rate controlling for many personal and job characteristics we find evidence that a significant number of jobs terminate when they have reached the duration that would permit a ui claim

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

dynamic patent licensing abstract this paper shows one way a fixed fee can dominate an auction if no one knows whether the innovation will succeed or not when it appears and if its life exceeds the life of the patent then selling one licence by fixed fee maximizes inventor profit for some probabilities of success the reason is a nonlicensee is better off when a rival buys a license because this reveals the nature of the innovation if it succeeds the nonlicensee can adopt in the future after the patent has expired this expected future gain can outweigh the expected loss during the life of the patent

umbrella branding as a signal of new product quality an example of signalling by posting a bond i present a signalling model in which a multiproduct firm can use its reputation as a bond for quality by using a brand name for an established product when it introduces a new experience good as out of equilibrium beliefs are specified a false signal may be taken to imply that both the established and the new product are of low quality in contrast the absence of a signal leaves open the possibility that one of the two products is of high quality hence the signal can be credible without excessive sunk costs as long as the bond posted is sufficiently large

the use of transfer payments by immigrants this paper uses data from the 1976 survey of income and education to compare the receipt of transfers by families headed by male and female immigrants and those headed by native born americans the average level of transfers is found to be considerably higher among families headed by immigrants but this is almost entirely the result of the higher average age of family members among the immigrant group a reflection of the large inflows of immigrants into the u s during the pre 1924 period when age and other factors are held constant immigrant families are found to be considerably less likely to rely on welfare than native families and their receipts from social insurance programs are found to be only slightly higher

the economics of a centralized judiciary uniformity forum shopping and the federal circuit abstract in 1982 the u s congress established the court of appeals for the federal circuit cafc as the sole appellate court for patent cases this court was created ostensibly to eliminate inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of patent law across federal courts and thereby mitigate the incentives of patentees and alleged infringers to forum shop for a preferred venue we perform the first econometric study of the extent of nonuniformity and forum shopping in the pre cafc era and of the cafc s impact on these phenomena we find that in patentee plaintiff cases the pre cafc era was indeed characterized by significant nonuniformity in patent validity rates across circuits and by forum shopping on the basis of validity rates we find weak evidence that the cafc has increased uniformity of validity rates and strong evidence that forum shopping on the basis of validity rates ceased several years prior to the cafc s establishment

antitrust settlements and trial outcomes risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome the authors find that a one percent increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0 13 percent they also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs copyright 1996 by mit press

reputational spillovers innovation licensing and entry abstract adoption of a new product by a multiproduct finn may affect all its sales by altering its reputation as an innovator if adopting a success has a halo effect that enhances the adopter s reputation then an inventor s licensing profit exceeds monopoly profit from the new product if adopting a failure has a black eye effect that damages the adopter s reputation then an inventor s licensing profit is maximized by a fixed fee not an auction when both effects are present an inventor licenses new products that are likely to succeed but enters with those that are likely to fail