optimal investment in learning curve technologies we study optimal investment in technologies characterized by the learning curve there are two investment patterns depending on the shape of the learning curve if the learning process is slow firms invest relatively late and on a larger scale if the curve is steep firms invest earlier and on a smaller scale we further demonstrate that learning investment differs greatly from investment in technologies without learning effects learning investments generate substantial initial losses and are very sensitive to downside risk we show that the most susceptible to losses and risk are technologies with intermediate speed of learning

real options agency conflicts and optimal capital structure abstract we examine the impact of a stockholder bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy we find that an equity maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value maximizing strategy and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects equityholders incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics

investment under uncertainty with strategic debt service the presence of a well designed bankruptcy code is an important part of the nancialarchitecture in developed economies by allowing the creditors to seize the assets of theborrowers who fail to make contractual payments the code generates bene cial ex ante e ectson debt capacity and rm value by giving the borrowers options to renegotiate their debtobligations and seek bankruptcy protection the code increases the likelihood that borrowersmay avoid ine cient ex post liquidation as hart 1999 notes the code should balanceex ante rm value maximization with ex post e ciency the bankruptcy codes in di erentcountries weight this tradeo di erently and hence vary in terms of the distribution of rightsand powers between borrowers and lenders in this paper we provide an inter temporal framework to examine how the creditors liquidation rights and the distribution of ex post bargaining powers in uence the rm s in vestment and nancing decisions and a ect ex ante rm value we show that strongerequityholders bargaining power lowers debt capacity reduces rm value and discouragesgrowth option exercising our calibration suggests that the quantitative e ects of ex poststrategic renegotiation on ex ante rm value may be large our paper provides an attempt to integrate nancial architecture into the theory of in vestment growth option exercising by building on two strands of literature investment anddebt pricing we extend the real options approach to investment pioneered by mcdonaldand siegel 1986 and brennan and schwartz 1985 to allow for capital structure decisionsunder strategic debt service we also draw insights from corporate debt pricing capital struc ture literature which focuses on leverage and security pricing after investment has alreadybeen made merton 1974 black and cox 1976 and leland 1994 our paper bridgesthe gap between these two strands of literature by characterizing the optimal investment and nancing decisions and the option value of waiting in closed form we show that the inter action between nancing and investment decisions in the presence of strategic debt servicegenerates new insights and also quantitatively important e ects on ex ante rm value

how to maximize domestic benefits from foreign investments the effect of irreversibility and uncertainty when a foreign monopolist facing uncertain future demand can either export to a host country or serve the market by undertaking an irreversible foreign direct investment the host government maximizes net domestic benefits by nearly fully subsidizing the investment cost in combination with taxing away benefits that exceed the gains from exporting without the subsidy maximization of domestic benefits leads to underinvestment from a world welfare point of view

credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics we study the implications of credit market frictions for the dynamics of corporate capital structure and the risk of default of corporations to do so we develop a dynamic capital structure model in which firms face uncertainty regarding their ability to raise funds in credit markets and have to search for investors when seeking to adjust their capital structure we provide a general analysis of shareholders dynamic financing and default decisions show when markov perfect equilibria in financing and default barrier strategies exist and when uniqueness can be achieved we then use the model to generate a number of novel testable implications relating credit market frictions to target leverage the pace and size of capital structure changes creditor turnover and the likelihood of default c 2014 elsevier inc all rights reserved

when and how much to invest investment and capacity choice under product life cycle uncertainty abstract while empirical research indicates that innovations typically follow a product life cycle that is subject to uncertainty in many industries endless cash flow growth is still at the heart of most papers guiding investment decisions under uncertainty this paper studies the effect of an uncertain technological life cycle on the decision to invest in new product introduction taking into account the combined effects of flexible investment timing and optimal capacity choice based on a numerical example referring to investment decisions in facilities for the production of electric vehicle batteries we find that the optimal investment threshold follows an s curve over the product life cycle and derive the optimal capacity choice for the given investment decision

venture capital staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty abstract our paper presents a dynamic model of entrepreneurial venture financing under uncertainty based on option exercise games between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist vc in particular we analyze the impact of multi staged financing and both economic and technological uncertainty on optimal contracting in the context of vc financing our novel approach combines compound option pricing with sequential non cooperative contracting allowing us to determine whether renegotiation will improve the probability of coming to an agreement and proceed with the venture it is shown that both sources of uncertainty positively impact the vc investor s optimal equity share specifically higher uncertainty leads to a larger stake in the venture and renegotiation may result in a dramatic shift of control rights in the venture preventing the venture from failure moreover given ventures with low volatility situations might occur where the vc investor loses his first mover advantage based on a comparative static analysis new testable hypotheses for further empirical studies are derived from the model

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

the interaction of debt financing cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty abstract significant progress has been made toward understanding a levered firm s optimal investment policy under uncertainty to date however not much work has concentrated on the time scale trade off and collectively held real options we employ a game theoretic real option model between a firm and a government to analyze the effect of uncertainty and investment stimulus in the form of cash grants on optimal investment timing financing and investment scaling we find that the jointly held real option between the firm and the government leads to underinvestment regardless of whether the firm has the possibility to issue debt subsidies however reduce the level of underinvestment notably the results indicate that even though levered firms receive less support they invest more than unlevered firms this challenges recent findings that a firm s optimal investment level is not affected by the way it finances a project similarly we find that for realistic parameter constellations the levered firm s optimal investment threshold can be higher than that of its unlevered counterpart this indicates that the availability of tax shield benefits does not necessarily serve as an incentive to invest earlier finally we show that the effect of cash flow uncertainty on the equilibrium level of grants is ambiguous and triggers the switch from a subsidy to non subsidy regime

market impacts of energy storage in a transmission constrained power system environmental concerns have motivated governments in the european union and elsewhere to set ambitious targets for generation from renewable energy re technologies and to offer subsidies for their adoption along with priority grid access however because re technologies like solar and wind power are intermittent their penetration places greater strain on existing conventional power plants that need to ramp up more often in turn energy storage technologies e g pumped hydro storage or compressed air storage are proposed to offset the intermittency of re technologies and to facilitate their integration into the grid we assess the economic and environmental consequences of storage via a complementarity model of a stylized western european power system with market power representation of the transmission grid and uncertainty in re output although storage helps to reduce congestion and ramping costs it may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions from conventional power plants in a perfectly competitive setting conversely strategic use of storage by producers renders it less effective at curbing both congestion and ramping costs while having no net overall impact on emissions

measuring the agency cost of debt we adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt an underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen we identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change the model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt the optimal capital structure for a firm is now widely regarded to be determined by a broad range of factors including a mix of tax effects the various agency problems associated with different securities and the various costs of issuing securities including the costs created by adverse selection while the existence of a theoretical optimum has been demonstrated in a variety of papers a less explored area has been the construction of detailed models that enable us to measure each of the relevant factors for a particular company and thereby to determine the actual optimal mix for that firm this gap in our understanding is particularly glaring in the case of agency costs in order to allow a careful modelling of strategic relations the parameters of most agency models are either so simplified that it is impossible to associate them with measurable parameters of a real world case or else the models simply abstract from certain critical factors such as a robust measure of price risk that must be incorporated into any real application for example although we now understand that sinking funds dividend restrictions and other bond covenants help to resolve the conflict of interest between bondholders and equity we do not yet have much in the way of models with which to determine the optimal parameters of these very covenants contingent claims models can provide a consistent framework for multiperiod valuation that properly accounts for risk but they usually abstract from the agency factors entering capital structure decisions when using a contingent claims model to value a firm s securities it is common to take the value of the firm itself as governed by an exogenously defined stochastic process the value of the firm s securities are then derived from this underlying value and as merton 1974 points out in his paper on the pricing of risky debt the modigliani miller theorem obtains so that the value of the firm is independent of the value and the type of debt in order to apply the contingent claims techniques to a setting in which agency problems are central some adaptation is necessary in this paper we

oil and the macroeconomy since world war ii all but one of the u s recessions since world war ii have been preceded typically with a lag of around three fourths of a year by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum this does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions evidence is presented however that even over the period 1948 72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the u s recessions prior to 1972 by extension energy price increases may account for much of post opec macroeconomic performance

multi stage product development with exploration value enhancing preemptive and innovation options abstract we provide a real options framework for the analysis of product development that incorporates research and exploration actions product attribute value enhancing actions with uncertain outcome as well as preemption and innovation options we derive two stage analytic formulas and propose a general multi period solution using a numerical lattice approach our analysis reveals that exploration actions are more important when the project is out or at the money near zero npv and less important for high project values in a multi stage setting exploration actions are important even for in the money projects when follow on actions exist that can enhance the expected value of the project with path dependency early actions are more valuable since they enhance the impact or reduce the cost of subsequent actions preemptive controls affecting rare event jump frequency and innovations that introduce positive jumps are more valuable for firms with higher frequency of competitive threats involving low volatility

can tax convexity be ignored in corporate financing decisions abstract the standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule this paper extends the structural contingent claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule it is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio while the former effect seems insignificant in general the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant we conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one thus the short answer to the question in the title is no

the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a real options model abstract this paper examines the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a canonical real options model we show that the critical value of a project that triggers the exercise of the investment option exhibits a u shaped pattern against the volatility of the project this is due to the two countervailing risk and return factors in effect we further show that such a u shaped pattern is inherited by the expected time to exercise the investment option thus for relatively safe projects greater uncertainty shortens the expected exercise time and thus enhances investment this is in sharp contrast to the negative investment uncertainty relationship commonly found in the extant literature finally we show that the positive investment uncertainty relationship is more likely for high growth projects than for low growth projects

capacity decisions with debt financing the effects of agency problem abstract this paper studies the capacity management problem for a firm that uses debt financing this is done by analyzing the effect of the associated agency problem when making capacity decisions the agency problem arises when there are potential conflicts of interest between the firm owner and the lender we show that this agency problem can constrain the firm s optimal capacity decision because the borrowing rate will increase as the risk of default increases with capacity level chosen the firm will therefore try to optimally choose the level so as to reduce the risk of bankruptcy which the lender will take into account and as a consequence the firm will try to control the risk associated with potentially high borrowing costs however even when the expected bankruptcy cost is carefully controlled the optimal capacity decision is still made at the risk of incurring considerable agency costs in addition the corporate tax level can also play a significant role in capacity choice we show that although a higher tax rate leads to bigger tax benefit of debt and lower agency cost it also gives rise to a higher tax liability after balancing the tax benefit of debt with the agency cost the firm can make an optimal decision on the capacity level required the efficacy of financial hedging for mitigating the agency cost is also analyzed finally we compare and contrast our analysis with existing studies and it appears that we have been able to obtain a deeper insight into the problem

on the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model abstract it appears to be widely accepted in the real options literature that an increase in uncertainty should have an inhibiting effect on investment our article demonstrates that the notion of a negative uncertainty investment relationship is not always correct we show that in certain situations an increase in uncertainty can actually increase the probability of investing and thereby have a positive impact on investment

investment under alternative return assumptions comparing random walks and mean reversion abstract many recent theoretical papers have come under attack for modeling prices as geometric brownian motion this process can diverge over time implying that firms facing this price process can earn infinite profits we explore the significance of this attack and contrast investment under geometric brownian motion with investment assuming mean reversion while analytically more complex mean reversion in many cases is a more plausible assumption allowing for supply responses to increasing prices we show that cumulative investment is generally unaffected by the use of a mean reversion process rather than geometric brownian motion and provide an explanation for this result

taxes and stimuli of investment under uncertainty this article considers the effect on an irreversible investment of a subsidy to investment in combination with a taxation of future profits it is shown that such a combination raising a zero expected revenue decreases the trigger value of investment the tax rate for which the stimulus works at zero expected cost decreases as heterogeneity in the group of investors increases the importance of the result is exemplified by the graduate tax

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions a dynamic framework this article analyzes the interaction between a firm s dynamic investment operating and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs using numerical analysis we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects we find that higher production flexibility due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility enhances the firm s debt capacity thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing while higher financial flexibility resulting from lower recapitalization costs has a similar effect production flexibility and financial flexibility are to some extent substitutes we find that the impact of debt financing on the firm s investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant

finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment abstract this paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncertainty which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates investment typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual however in today s economy firms face a fast changing technology environment implying that investment projects are usually considered to have a finite life the present paper studies investment projects with finite project life and we find that in contrast with the existing theory investments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty it is shown that this particularly happens at low levels of uncertainty and when project life is short

optimal exercise of jointly held real options a nash bargaining approach with value diversion this paper provides a two stage decision framework in which two or more parties exercise a jointly held real option we show that a single party s timing decision is always socially efficient if it precedes bargaining on the terms of sharing however if the sharing rule is agreed before the exercise timing decision is made then socially optimal timing is attained only if there is a cash payment element in the division of surplus if the party that chooses the exercise timing can divert value from the project then the first best outcome may not be possible at all and the second best outcome may be implemented using a contract that is generally not optimal in the former cases our framework contributes to the understanding of a range of empirical regularities in corporate and entrepreneurial finance

real options with ex post division of the surplus abstract this paper examines a real option model where two vertically related firms are involved in a specific investment project that is subject to an uncertain payoff while ex post bargaining between a seller and a buyer leads to underinvestment by the seller in a standard model where timing of the seller s investment is exogenous we show that this need not be the case when the seller s timing of investment is endogenous however bargaining with a buyer leads to excessive waiting more severe holdup and higher uncertainty will lead to vertical integration of activities to avoid timing inefficiencies

entrepreneurial finance with equity for guarantee swap and idiosyncratic risk we consider a risk averse entrepreneur who invests in a project with idiosyncratic risk in contrast to the literature we assume the entrepreneur is unable to get a loan from a bank directly because of the low creditability of the entrepreneur and so an innovative financial contract named equity for guarantee swap is signed among a bank an insurer and the entrepreneur it is shown that the new swap leads to higher leverage which brings more diversification and tax benefits the new swap not only solves the problems of financing constraints but also significantly improves the welfare level of the entrepreneur the growth of welfare level increases dramatically with risk aversion index and the volatility of idiosyncratic risk

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

how to escape a declining market capacity investment or exit this paper considers a firm that faces a declining profit stream for its established product the firm has the option to invest in a new technology with which it can produce an innovative product while having the option to exit at any point in time in the presence of an exit option earlier work determined the optimal timing to invest where it was shown that higher uncertainty might accelerate investment timing in the present paper the firm also decides on capacity this extension leads to monotonicity i e higher uncertainty delays investment timing we also find that higher potential profitability of the innovative product market increases the incentive to invest earlier where however we get the counterintuitive result that the firm invests in smaller capacity finally if quantity has a smaller negative effect on price the firm wants to acquire a larger capacity at a lower investment threshold

investment under uncertainty the case of replacement investment decisions we analyze the determinants of replacement investment decisions in a contingent claims model with maintenance and operation cost uncertainty we find that the optimal time between replacements is increasing in the volatility of cost the purchase price of a new asset and the corporate tax rate and is decreasing in the systematic risk of cost the salvage value of the asset and the investment tax credit the optimal time between replacements can either increase or decrease with an increase in the depreciation rate extensions of the model to examine the effects of technological and tax policy uncertainty on replacement investment decisions give intuitive but striking results uncertainty about the arrival of a technological innovation that would decrease maintenance and operation cost results in a significant decrease in replacement investment uncertainty in a tax law change that would encourage investment decreases current investment and uncertainty in a tax law change that would discourage investment increases current investment

choosing among alternative discrete investment projects under uncertainty abstract irreversible choice among mutually exclusive projects under output price uncertainty is considered increasing returns are shown to make it optimal to wait for the largest project greater uncertainty of the price process makes it optimal to wait for a larger project

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

an empirical investigation of money demand evidence from a cash in advance model this paper investigates the empirical performance of a cash in advance model of money demand in which the income velocity of money may be nonstationary generalized method of moments is used to estimate parameters from first order conditions but unlike much of the existing empirical work on money asset pricing models the euler equations are not assumed to hold exactly instrumental variables methods are used to estimate the model parameters with careful attention paid to the choice of valid instruments the estimated parameters are used to solve the model and its predictions are compared with those of an unrestricted var

the paradox effects of uncertainty and flexibility on investment in renewables under governmental support abstract given that companies have the flexibility to decide about size and timing of a renewable electricity investment the existence of four paradox effects is proven only the type but not the amount of governmental support has an influence on the optimal capacity of a renewable electricity generating system a decrease of governmental support over time may result in higher capacities of renewables installed on an industry level at least on the short term likewise higher uncertainty may encourage an expansion of these capacities in contrast technological progress may hamper the expansion of capacities finally these four paradox effects are exemplified in a germany based case study regarding a photovoltaic project

large scale integration of deferrable demand and renewable energy sources we present a stochastic unit commitment model for assessing the impacts of the large scale integration of renewable energy sources and deferrable demand in power systems in terms of reserve requirements we analyze three demand response paradigms for assessing the benefits of demand flexibility the centralized co optimization of generation and demand by the system operator demand bids and the coupling of renewable resources with deferrable loads we motivate coupling as an alternative for overcoming the drawbacks of the two alternative demand response options and we present a dynamic programming algorithm for coordinating deferrable demand with renewable supply we present simulation results for a model of the western electricity coordinating council

investment and financing decisions with learning curve technology abstract the learning curve has a significant impact on production cost hence corporate profit in a number of industries while the learning curve is well recognized in the economics literature and its effect on operating costs and production decisions widely studied its effect on corporate investment has been largely unexplored to our knowledge there is one paper that examines this issue but it is limited to unlevered firms we therefore examine a levered firm s optimal investment and financing choices when using learning curve technology the main findings are as follows the effect of leverage on the investment decision depends on the level of debt using the optimal debt level will result in earlier and larger investment thus leverage has a positive effect on investment overall and the difference between levered and unlevered firm is an increasing function of learning speed the optimal leverage ratio without a borrowing constraint is an increasing function of learning speed with a borrowing constraint the investment decision is similar to the unconstrained borrowing case but the leverage ratio is initially increasing and subsequently decreasing in learning speed moreover it is a decreasing function over a wider range for a more stringent borrowing constraint for decreasing returns to scale technology and for a less volatile product market