efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership this paper compares the impact of two equalization transfer schemes on regional budgetary choices a gross equalization scheme where ex post transfers to regions are financed from federal tax revenues and a net equalization scheme where region to region ex post transfers allocated by the federal government are self financed the net equalization scheme reduces ex post federal intervention and should therefore be favored over the gross equalization scheme in order to reduce opportunistic regional behaviour in addition the two equalization schemes differently affect the composition of public expenditures the gross equalization scheme generates an upward distortion of the amount of capital public expenditures whereas the net equalization scheme generates a downward distortion of the amount of current public expenditures compared to the optimum a welfare analysis reveals that incentives to use a net equalization scheme are strengthened for a sufficiently high number of regions

bailouts in federations is a hard budget constraint always best this article analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation where there is a moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments regional governments can avoid a bailout from the center by exerting costly effort in this setting a hard budget constraint is not always optimal because it can provide excessive incentives for high effort and thus discourage investment that is socially efficient thus a hard budget constraint can imply the opposite kind of inefficiency that emerges under a soft budget constraint where the common pool problem can give rise to inefficiently low effort and overinvestment

teen motherhood and abortion access it is argued that the net effect of any restriction of abortion access on birth rates is an empirical question this study examines the impact of access to abortion on county teenage birth rates birth rates are expected to decrease by 1 among white adolescents aged 15 19 years for a 25 mile increase in the distance to the nearest abortion provider particularly among in wedlock births data are obtained from 1973 88 national natality local area summary files for counties in the us and four other national sources data did not provide useful information on the empirical relationship between access and birth rate for densely populated urban areas cross sectional findings that had omitted variable bias indicate that an increase of 25 miles in distance to a provider was associated with an additional 1 4 births per 1000 white teenage women or a 3 increase in the average teen birth rate of 45 1000 white teenagers the findings from a county fixed effects model that controlled for omitted variable bias indicate that an increase of 25 miles was associated with a reduction in teen births of 0 5 1000 or about 1 of the mean birth rate both medicaid restrictions and parental consent laws were negative and significant and more negative in poor and more isolated counties the state year effects models did not change findings on distance and medicaid restriction effects the effects of changes in timing of laws suggests that laws followed preexisting trends changes in distance to provider were primarily in the first 2 years following the change out of wedlock births were unaffected by changes in distance to providers the out of wedlock teen birth rate increased with a complete ban on abortions fewer wanted births were associated with small restrictions findings imply that closing of clinics during 1977 88 had an impact on teen birth rates of under one tenth of 1 the 20 increase in teen births was unexplained

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income foreign source capital income taxes are examined from the point of view of optimal taxation in the framework of a simple economy with international real capital flows a taxonomy of alternative systems of such taxation is first presented showing how crediting and other tax parameters induce what are called source based residence based and related systems next tax rates are determined that are optimal from a single country s point of view given those of the others the achievability of these rates under the various systems is analyzed finally tax rates that are optimal from an international point of view are considered again achievability of an international optimum under the various systems is considered leading to the main conclusions that i a pure residence based system in all countries can achieve an international fiscal optimum ii it cannot however be sustained as an equilibrium

interprovincial migration and local public goods the objective of this paper is to test whether fiscally induced migration occurs in canada that is whether interprovincial migration flows are influenced by government tax and expenditure policies in order to do so a multinominal logit model of migration is developed in which individuals choose to live in the province where their utility would be highest the model is estimated using aggregate data for the period 1962 81 the results indicate that migration is influenced by provincial government spending trough the magnitude and direction of the effect differs with the type of government spending the implication of these results is that intergovernmental transfer payments and provincial natural resource revenues also have the potential to influence migration flows in canada summary in fre excerpt

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing evidence from the german states 1975 2005 abstract cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guarantees and intergovernmental transfer schemes this paper explores whether such features of cooperative federations lead to subnational soft budget constraints using panel data from the german states covering the 1975 2005 period the methodology is based on the premise that subnational governments borrowing will exhibit vertical and horizontal strategic interactions if they operate under soft budget constraints therefore a test for strategic interactions in subnational borrowing can be used to infer whether a cooperative federation like germany is susceptible to soft budget constraints the results suggest that state borrowing in germany exhibited horizontal but not vertical interactions during the time frame of the analysis this indicates i that german states faced soft budget constraints and ii that they were more concerned about the likelihood of a bailout than about its volume

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

a note on the antipoverty effectiveness of child support among mother only families the current population survey is used to examine the antipoverty effectiveness of child support social insurance and welfare among motheronly families in 1995 child support brought about 6 7 percent of pretransfer poor mother only families over the poverty line an effect similar to that of social insurance and welfare a brief trend analysis shows that child support s antipoverty effectiveness has been growing some potential reasons why child support s effect is still so small in the face of substantial changes in child support policy are hypothesized

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

rationalizing child support decisions the authors provide a framework within which the child support compliance decisions of noncustodial fathers and the child support awards set by institutional agents can be coherently interpreted the model of child support transfers is able to capture qualitatively the features of the monthly payment distribution estimated parental decision rules are used to infer the implicit weights given by institutional agents to the postdivorce welfare of parents and children the authors find that the weight attached to the combined welfare of the custodial mother and child is significantly less than the weight given to the father s welfare in most sample cases copyright 1995 by american economic association

competition in interregional taxation the case of western coal markets for many products are dominated by small group of states or countries with a natural advantage in the marketplace because of some initial endowment of resources favorable climate or location the purpose of this paper is to explore how such markets involving a few political jurisdictions interact noncooperatively we examine how such a market might be structured and operate and the extent of monopoly rent that can be extracted in the absence of collusion we answer these questions for an empirically estimated model of western u s coal in which two states montana and wyoming dominate production we demonstrate that in this market the amount of rent that can be extracted is greatly reduced through competition relative to a cartel nevertheless even with two producing states competing against each other significant rents can be captured significant enough to refute the contention that little rent can accrue without a cartel

regional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization abstract we study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation regional governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods administrative capacity and to raise tax revenues fiscal capacity two regimes are compared on efficiency grounds under partial decentralization regional governments rely on central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs under full decentralization marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes we show that the presence of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full decentralization dominance this condition may also be sufficient depending on the projects characteristics some extensions are presented

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

transfers among divorced couples evidence and interpretation we analyze divorce settlements made by a cohort of whites who graduated from high school in 1972 the effects of spouses incomes on the divorce transfer are estimated and used to simulate the welfare effects of divorce on husbands wives and children under alternative assumptions about marriage contracts and the ability of a couple to continue coordinating resources in the aftermath of divorce we find a positive negative relationship between divorce transfers and the growth of husband s wife s earnings during marriage the estimated expenditure on children in the divorce state is only half the accustomed level during marriage

the incidence of regional taxes in a general equilibrium framework abstract a six region general equilibrium model of the united states is presented and used to evaluate the incidence of state local business taxes because this formulation allows for labor and capital mobility the provision of public goods distinctions between household and business level taxes and the interaction of state local and federal tax systems numerical analysis is particularly appropriate simulations show that capital improvements generally bear the average economy wide burden of business taxes levied on them regardless of whether a multilateral or unilateral policy change is considered or whether the alternative tax is imposed on immobile resources or household income however for other factors of production both mobile andimmobile the effects vary across scenarios a demonstration that incidence should not be thought of as a single outcome or value

the wisconsin child support assurance system estimated effects on poverty labor supply caseloads and costs the economic impact of a child support assurance system csas is simulated with microdata on custodial families in wisconsin the csas includes a uniform child support standard automatic wage withholding a minimum child support benefit and wage subsidy for eligible families the simulation incorporates a model of the labor supply decision representing the custodial parent s choice of whether to participate in csas or in the current afdc system the results suggest that csas can significantly reduce poverty as well as welfare caseloads if child support collections increase by one half of the difference between estimated ability to pay child support and current collections csas will be less costly than the current system

sub national tax autonomy and deficits empirical results for 27 oecd countries van rompuy p sub national tax autonomy and deficits empirical results for 27 oecd countries regional studies this paper explores the impact of the revenue mix on the budgetary performances of regions and local governments in 27 organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries from 1995 to 2010 the main data are obtained from the oecd fiscal decentralization database that distinguishes tax income according to the degree of sub national control over own resources the empirical results point to a positive impact of autonomous tax income on sub national fiscal balances in contrast to tax sharing agreements however the positive budgetary influence of tax autonomy only prevails from a minimum share of autonomous taxes in sub national own revenue

a regional general equilibrium model of the united states tax effects on factor movements and regional production a six region general equilibrium model of the united states is used to assess the potential long run effects of state local and federal tax policies on output and the allocation of factors across regions and sectors the nonuniform structure of state local taxes and their interaction with federal taxes means that regional output is affected quite differently than would be projected solely on the basis of changing average regional tax burdens the study provides a useful indication of conceptual and empirical issues that must be considered in further regional modeling efforts issues which do not arise in closed economy national models copyright 1989 by mit press

tax competition and income redistribution an empirical analysis for switzerland tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because first it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile andsecond such a policy if undertaken in onejurisdiction will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies in this paper the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with swiss subfederal data therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theswiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution

the importance of local fiscal conditions in analyzing local labor markets a new test of the compensating wage differential model is proposed the logic behind roback s model which shows how differences in nonproduced amenities may be reflected in intercity wage differentials is extended to the case of differences in local fiscal conditions represented by tax rates and publicly produced services results show that differences in local tax rates and services provisions do generate compensating wage differentials across cities the effects of a particularly large set of taxes and effective services output measures are examined differences in local fiscal conditions are shown to play important roles in explaining the variance in intermetropolitan wages

do economic effects justify the use of fiscal incentives the community of location this presumption serves as the basis for the granting of lucrative economic development incentives to footloose businesses this article examines whether large mobile firms generate significant net benefits for the region of location panel data and nonrandom estimation techniques are applied to a primary database of large firms that made location decisions in the 1980s to explore the impact of location on regional economic performance the empirical analysis explores different treatment regions both effects within the county and the metropolitan statistical area msa of location and different control regions the results show that large firms fail to produce significant net benefits for their host communities calling into question the high stakes bidding war over jobs and investment

competitive tax theory in open economies constrained inefficiency and a pigovian remedy abstract in an economy with multiple governments each is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes on a directly mobile tax base a government is said to be competitive if the total cost of its decisions including the excess burden is perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there is another set of distortionary taxes and associated public expenditures for which all individuals in the economy are better off it is shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy is derived

decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries we study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program while governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales but interregional targeting may deteriorate as central grants to high poverty regions shrink owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions

does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference evidence from intergovernmental transfers in india abstract one area of fiscal policy in which several countries have delegated responsibility to an independent agency is the distribution of national resource transfers across regional and local governments such delegation is expected to promote equity and efficiency and mitigate distortions created by political incentives this paper tests whether delegation to an independent agency indeed makes a difference by contrasting the impact of partisan politics on two types of fiscal transfers to states in the indian federation over a period of time 1972 1995 the pattern of evidence shows that while the transfers that are determined by the central political executive are indeed distributed to favor particular states that are politically important for the central ruling party the transfers that are delegated to an independent agency serve to constrain such partisan impact

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

optimality free mobility and the regional authority in a federation abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of a federation characterized by strategically competing regions and freely mobile homogeneous individuals analyses of this economy have concluded that achieving a pareto optimal will require intervention by a national authority this paper makes one basic point the nash equilibrium of regional authority behavior is pareto optimal the implication is that there is no role for a national authority in either providing interregional transfers or correcting for decentralized provision of public goods the nash equilibrium involves samuelson public goods provision and regions purchasing preferred population distributions with optimal interregional transfers

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

too big or too small a synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers abstract there is a growing body of literature on the commitment problem of interregional transfers the problem occurs because of an ex post bailout by a central government leading to ex ante adverse incentive consequences for a local government however different models have yielded different economic consequences the local government may be too large overspending and or overborrowing or it may be too small raising less of its own revenue in the presence of interregional spillovers the equilibrium may yield a pareto efficient outcome the present paper aims to synthesize these models developing a simple decentralized leadership model a critical question concerns what decision is made ex ante by the local government namely public expenditure or tax collection with the remaining policy instrument being residual adjusted by ex post transfers we discuss how different scenarios affect the equilibrium outcome

recent theoretical work on the soft budget constraint the soft budget constraint is a syndrome that was identified and studied by janos kornai in his analysis of centrally planned economies see kornai 1980 the syndrome is said to arise when a seemingly unprofitable enterprise is bailed out by the government or the enterprise s creditors in other words the enterprise is not held to a fixed budget but finds its budget constraint softened by the infusion of additional credit when it is on the verge of failure kornai viewed the soft budget constraint as a crucial ingredient for explaining the salient features of socialist economic performance in particular the pervasiveness of shortages one interesting puzzle is why centrally planned economies have been particularly susceptible to the influence of the soft budget constraint the capitalist world is hardly immune as the recent financial crisis in asia attests but on the whole it has proved less vulnerable indeed the very origin of the soft budget constraint and the mechanism by which it gives rise to shortages and other undesirable effects are also obviously important questions although kornai s work has long been well known and appreciated answers to these associated theoretical questions have been hazarded only recently in maskin 1996 i surveyed some of the initial efforts in this direction including mathias dewatripont and maskin 1995 which argues that centralization of credit can give rise to soft budget constraints because it facilitates the refinancing of

environmental and land use regulation in nonrenewable resource industries implications from the wyoming checkerboard this paper examines how the oil and soning that these effects should be similar gas industry responds to changes in environmental to those of production and property taxes and land use regulations pertaining to drilling by like stollery however they do not conexamining differences in regulatory practices on sider the situation where environmental federal and private land a simulation model for regulations directly affect explo ration and wyoming is used to estimate losses of oil and gas development output over the next 60 years because of higher activities in any case the drilling costs found on federal property the pres limited number of studies in this area and ent value of these losses comes to about 800 mil their narrow scope is surprising in light of lion a lso this case study is of interest because it the importance of environmental complishows that future production is more sensitive to ance costs to firms that produce from nonchanges in environmental regulations that apply to renewable resources and because of the drilling than to changes in severance taxes levied observation by jaffe et al 1995 that a on production

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

explaining saving investment correlations national saving and investment rates are highly positively correlated in virtually all countries this is puzzling as it apparently implies a low degree of international capital mobility this paper shows that the observed positive correlation between national saving and investment rates arises naturally within a quantitatively restricted equilibrium model with perfect mobility of financial and physical capital the model is consistent with the fact that saving investment correlations are larger for larger countries but are still substantial for small countries further the model is consistent with the finding that current account deficits tend to be associated with investment booms copyright 1993 by american economic association

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility abstract we examine the non cooperative provision of a pure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the european union where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and the central government is a stackelberg follower a federation with decentralized leadership the center makes interregional income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region despite the degree of labor mobility we show that the pure public good and interregional transfers are generally allocated efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership

understanding the soft budget constraint we propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist transitional and market economies our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences in light of this interpretation we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics

welfare child support and strategic behavior do high orders and low disregards discourage child support awards qualitative research has documented strategic behavior in response to child support policy parents of children on welfare have an incentive to avoid formal child support since most states limit the amount of formal child support that women on welfare can receive the disregard and have relatively high child support orders for low income fathers this pa per develops a simple model to make several predictions about how the disregard and order might interact to influence formal child support or ders using data from the cps css merged with state child support vari ables i find some evidence that higher orders and lower disregards are associated with fewer child support orders

a note on public goods in a decentralized fiscal union implications of a participation constraint this paper re examines the question of whether federal ex post redistribution in terms of public funds leads to under provision of public goods when member states may leave the economic federation

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

can capital income taxes survive in open economies optimal tax theory forecasts that small open economies should not tax capital income yet countries do tax capital income why the inconsistency this paper shows that use of the double taxation convention whereby governments credit taxes paid abroad against domestic taxes helps explain this inconsistency in particular capital income will be taxed if a dominant capital exporter acts as a stackelberg leader when setting its tax policy due to the convention other countries will then tax capital imports making it attractive for the dominant capital exporter to tax capital income without a dominant capital exporter however the model still forecasts no capital income taxes can taxation of capital income survive the increasing integration of world capital markets a number of recent papers suggest not diamond and mirrlees 1971 for example showed that a small open economy would not choose to tax the income generated by the physical capital located within the country this is because production would occur efficiently under an optimal tax system which requires that domestic investments earn the rate of return available on the world capital market in principle a country might still attempt to tax income earned on the savings of its residents however in practice income from savings invested outside the country is virtually impossible for a government to monitor individuals therefore can evade tax on such savings with very little risk as razin and sadka 1989 show such capital flight in theory eliminates any possibility of a tax on savings investors will simply transfer their funds abroad to avoid taxation yet virtually all countries do in fact tax the capital income earned by corporations and individuals located within their borders how can the theoretical forecast of no capital income taxation be reconciled with this simple observation it is difficult to use existing models with any confidence to analyze the implications of changes in capital income tax rates if these same models forecast that countries should never tax capital income

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

federalism and the soft budget constraint the government s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade off between political benefits and economic costs the latter depending on the decentralization of government two effects of federalism are derived first fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and thus serves as a commitment device the competition effect second monetary centralization together with fiscal decentralization induces a conflict of interests and thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation the checks and balance effect the authors analysis is used to interpret china s recent experience of transition to a market economy copyright 1998 by american economic association

efficient tax exporting in a multijurisdiction economy with free mobility of households between communities some portion of any community s tax is incident upon nonresident landowners it is shown that when the objective of a community is taken to be the level of satisfaction of its residents a fully efficient allocation is a nash equilibrium of the decentralized game in general no local tax structure that restricts a community s tax base to residents can attain the optimum thus tax exporting is necessary for independent local government behavior to be consistent with efficiency

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

regional effects of taxes in canada an applied general equilibrium approach this paper reports on an applied general equilibrium regional model for canada which is used to investigate the regional effects of taxes earlier literature on regional tax effects is reviewed and the main features of the model are briefly described existing literature on regional tax effects is largely non quantitative and does not discuss several important regional features of taxes such as taxes which are predominantly on products or industries located in particular regions results suggest that regional effects of taxes can be significant and in the canadian case at least do not tend to counterbalance one another in general richer regions tend to lose and poorer regions gain from federal taxes but other regional characteristics such as manufacturing non manufacturing or resource non resource can be important this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

how do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism tax vs expenditure optimization previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public flnance while expenditures adjust residually this paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable in particular it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments in uences the way local governments decide on public policy unlike the presumption the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures the result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local flscal efiort the results ofier a new perspective of the e ciency implications of federal policy toward local governments and thereby enable a more precise characterization of local government behavior in flscal federalism

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

strategy and market structure in western coal taxation this paper analyzes the potential market power of western states in setting coal severance taxes and the emphasis placed by these states on the development of their coal resources vs obtaining tax revenues three market structures are analyzed one involves a western regional cartel setting taxes collectively the other cases are noncooperative tax equilibria with montana and wyoming competing against each other we conclude that the western states seem to be primarily concerned with revenue collection and are very efficient extractors of economic rent

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

u s abortion policy and fertility as measured by the total fertility rate tfr fertility in the united states fell sharply beginning in the early 1960 s dropping to below the replacement level in 1972 and to well below the replacement level in the late 1970 s since then the tfr has hovered below replacement level also in the early 1970 s several states followed by the u s supreme court in its 1973 roe v wade decision legalized abortion this paper explores whether there is a connection between changes in abortion policy and u s fertility since the initial legislation legalizing abortion government abortion policies continue to change with government policies in general becoming less sympathetic to abortion this shift is most notable in states decisions to end federal funding for abortions through medicaid in the late 1970 s and most recently in some of the provisions of the federal 1996 welfare reform legislation specifically the personal responsibility and work opportunities act of 1996 prowra included illegitimacy bonuses for the five states that are most successful in reducing the number of out of wedlock births while decreasing abortion rates committee on ways and means 1996 proposals to further restrict abortion as well as proposals to liberalize abortion continue to receive active consideration despite large numbers of abortions more than one for every three live births the effect of abortion policy on the number of children born is not clear in the parallel debate about the oral contraceptive some claimed that the new contraceptive technology caused the decline in fertility in the mid 1960 s others claimed that the oral contraceptive simply made the decline less costly for couples in the

child support welfare dependency and women s labor supply this study evaluates the potential effectiveness of alternative child support policies in reducing welfare program participation employing longitudinal data from the panel study of income dynamics the analysis addresses the simultaneity of women s decisions regarding welfare participation labor force participation and annual hours of work following marital breakup the estimation framework accounts for the endogeneity of child support payments with female labor supply and for the selection bias due to differential rates of remarriage among divorced separated women results show that higher child support payments would i decrease welfare participation and ii increase average hours of work the empirical estimates are used to assess the potential effects of adopting alternative child support policies such as the wisconsin child support assurance system these results suggest that large potential welfare cost savings are attainable but significant reductions in welfare participation rates would only be achieved through substantial improvements in child support enforcement or through government assured child support payments

birth control and female empowerment an equilibrium analysis we analyze from a theoretical perspective the impact of innovations in birth control technology on intrahousehold allocation of resources we consider a model of frictionless matching on the marriage market in which men as well as women differ in their preferences for children moreover men unlike women must marry to enjoy fatherhood we show that more efficient birth control technologies generally increase the power hence the welfare of all women including those who do not use them this empowerment effect requires that the new technology be available to single women an innovation reserved to married women may result in a disempowerment effect

internationalization and changes in tax policy in oecd countries the importance of domestic veto players this article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1986 to 1990 some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems the authors findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates the institutional structure of a country was most important countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player these results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and or parties is necessary

tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership this paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers the paper s main result is that ex post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities insulating tax policy from capital mobility federal policy however introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition specifically ex post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare deteriorating relative to tax competition

when is two better than one how federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition the current paper models power maximizing politicians behavior subject to imperfect political competition and perfect citizen mobility it then analyzes the welfare implications of federal and non federal structures the model abstracts from both heterogeneous preferences the most common argument in favor of federalism and externalities the most common argument against showing that even in this simplified setting federalism has important welfare implications there is one class of equilibria in which more federalism has the purely beneficial effect of offsetting imperfections in the political process however there is also a second class of equilibria in which citizen mobility makes political imperfections more severe by creating safe districts for both political parties 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations a cross country analysis abstract fiscal decentralization consists primarily of devolving revenue sources and expenditure functions to lower tiers of government by bringing the government closer to the people fiscal decentralization is expected to boost public sector efficiency as well as accountability and transparency in service delivery and policy making decentralization also entails greater complexity in intergovernmental fiscal relations and coordination failures in fiscal relations are likely to have a bearing on fiscal positions nationally and subnationally evidence provided in this paper for a sample of 30 countries suggests that coordination failures in intergovernmental fiscal relations are likely to result in a deficit bias in decentralized policy making particularly in the case of developing countries which may not meet important requirements for successful decentralization

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment in this model the central government is benevolent but cannot commit to ex post intergovernmental transfer policies while local governments act strategically after accounting for the ex post motives of the central government we then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze the effect of central control on local borrowing and show that central control is of no benefit because ex ante local taxation works to offset it we find the model yields different policy implications that central control is effective when extended to the case of residential mobility

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

child support welfare dependency and poverty female headed families have among the highest poverty rates of any major demographic group in the united states the purpose of this paperis to investigate empirically the effectiveness of current child support enforcement policies and to determine their role in reducing poverty and welfare dependency a special supplement to the april 1982 current population survey provides the data for the analysis the results indicate that child support enforce ment may represent an effective means for re ducing welfare program costs but isunlikely to have a dramatic effect on either welfare de pendency or poverty copyright 1986 by american economic association

tax decentralization and local government size this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments while many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy the paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments tax separation rather than on tax base sharing would restrain local public expenditures using an unbalanced panel of oecd countries the key finding is that only property taxes mostly based on a tax separation scheme seem to favor smaller local governments thus while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments it does not appear sufficient as tax separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required

the effect of state and local taxes on economic growth a time series cross section approach results based on pooled time series and cross section data are presented which indicate that state and local tax increases significantly retard economic growth when the revenue is used to fund transfer payments however when the revenue is used instead to finance improved public services such as education highways and public health and safety the favorable impact on location and production decisions provided by the enhanced services may more than counterbalance the disincentive effects of the associated taxes these findings underscore the importance of considering the incentives provided by a state s expenditures as well as by its taxes i n the past several years a number of states have implemented limitations on taxes or expenditures while others have raised tax rates in response to the revenue shortfalls of the early 1980s although much of the ongoing debate over state fiscal structures revolves around expressed preferences over tax expenditure combinations per se the question of how state and local taxes may affect economic growth is often central to the discussion nonetheless the empirical evidence remains sparse previous studies can be divided into two broad categories assessments of the magnitudes of tax costs and statistical analyses of the relationship between tax rates and growth cost studies have tended to minimize the role of taxes in business location decisions either because state and local taxes are a relatively small component of total costs for most businesses or because interstate tax differences are small relative to other cost differences between states although these results suggest that the role played by taxes is a minor one describing how large the tax disparities may be is not the same as ascertaining their economic effect of the statistical studies many including bloom 1955 thompson and mattila 1959 and carlton 1979 1983 find no relationship between taxes and growth however kleine 1977 grieson 1980 and generally grieson et al 1977 report negative correlations romans and subrahmanyam 1979 find growth to be negatively related to the fraction of revenues devoted to transfer payments and a variable which they claim measures personal tax progressivity but positively related to business taxes with the exception of carlton who estimates models of the birth and size of firms within metropolitan areas and the grieson et al 1977 and grieson 1980 studies which consider taxes in new york city and philadelphia these authors use data from a single cross section of states more recently newman 1983 and plaut and pluta 1983 both use cross sectional data from two time periods the former finding negative effects of corporate tax rates and the latter yielding mixed results in this study we utilize a time series from 1965 through 1979 of cross sections of 48 states exploiting the richness of this data set we are able to allow for otherwise unexplained differences between states which could be expected to bias results based on a single cross section moreover this much larger sample provides the statistical power necessary to disentangle the separate effects of different categories of taxes public expenditures and transfer payments a distinguishing feature of this paper is that we explicitly recognize the government budget constraint linking these fiscal variables and the deficit or surplus in addition we have taken account of the effects of labor force characteristics by including variables for wage rates unionization and population density our results indicate that tax increases significantly retard economic growth when the revenue is used to fund transfer payments as a result programs of income redistribution are more effectively undertaken at the federal than at the state and local level on the other hand when the revenue is received for publication april 30 1984 revision accepted for publication january 22 1985 university of california davis i am indebted to the institute of governmental affairs at the university of california davis for financial support to adrienne kandel for invaluable research assistance and to two referees for their helpful comments 1 see williams 1967 morgan and brownlee 1974 vasquez and deseve 1977 and the advisory commission on intergovernmental relations 1981 see also due 1961 for a survey of the early literature including a discussion of the findings and limitations of survey results on this topic 574 1 copyright 1985 this content downloaded from 157 55 39 35 on mon 29 aug 2016 04 45 38 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms state and local taxes and economic growth 575 used instead to finance enhanced public services such as highways education and public health and safety the favorable impact on location and production decisions provided by the improved services may more than counterbalance the disincentive effects of the concomitant taxes these findings underscore the importance of considering the incentives provided by a state s expenditures as well as by its taxes we begin by sketching a model which provides the basis for the analysis and discussing appropriate estimation techniques then in section ii we describe the data used and our hypotheses the econometric results are presented in section iii followed by brief concluding remarks in the final

welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation abstract the european commission is currently seeking a rapid accelaration of the process of commodity tax harmonisation within the european community substantial changes in domestic tax structures are envisaged yet the welfare theoretic basis of the policy has remained obscure this note goes some way towards suggesting a welfare argument for harmonisation as a collective response to tax induced trade distortions intentional or otherwise it is shown that a programme of multilateral domestic tax reform involving convergence towards an appropriately weighted average of pre existing tax structures a kind of harmonisation is potentially pareto improving

national tax systems versus the european capital market capital taxation alberto giovannini the current structure of taxes on capital income across ec countries can be exploited by corporations to reduce tax burdens skilled individuals can indulge in tax avoidance too the liberalization of capital movements stands to turn tax avoidance into a cottage industry this article provides a primer on capital income taxes and describes strategies which reduce the tax burden from a policy perspective the question is how to avoid massive tax evasion after 1992 there is no need to harmonize if the right taxation principle is adopted two principles are contrasted the territorial principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic investment irrespective of the country of residence of the beneficiary and the worldwide principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic savings irrespective of where they are invested it is shown that the worldwide principle involves much fewer distortions than the territorial principle a strict application of this principle would effectively solve the problem of tat evasion in europe without requiring full harmonization of the tax systems its full implementation would require the abolition of withholding taxes the elimination of tax deferrals which are quite pervasive throughout europe and an in depth review of blocking and secrecy laws

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

the dynamics of u s internal migration in this paper we have theoretically derived a net migration equation and estimated it using time series data for 51 u s regions over the period 1971 1988 the results indicate that the dynamic response of net migration is stable and is significantly related to stock equilibrium changes induced by amenity differentials relative employment opportunities relative real wages and industry composition excerpt

overlapping soft budget constraints abstract our paper identifies a potential problem with decentralization at a time when its virtues are widely extolled we show that responsibility for equalization at multi levels within a decentralized federation creates an overlapping equalization policy that can worsen fiscal discipline contrary to qian and roland 1998 we also show in our set up that fiscal competition among regional rescuers does not act as a commitment device to harden the local budget constraint

a stackelberg model of child support and welfare this article models the child support and welfare decisions of never married parents on welfare as a stackelberg game the mother chooses whether to exit welfare report paternity and to obtain a formal child support order if a child support order is obtained the father chooses whether to comply with the order simulation results from the structural parameters indicate that increasing the child support disregard increases paternal compliance slightly and affects maternal paternity reporting more significantly effects are limited however by low paternal incomes results also indicate that high award amounts can decrease expected child support payments to women on welfare