the federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission the authors show that the interest rate on federal funds is extremely informative about future movements of real macroeconomic variables then they argue that the reason for this forecasting success is that the funds rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves that is the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy actions finally using innovations to the funds rate as a measure of changes in policy the authors present evidence consistent with the view that monetary policy works at least in part through credit i e bank loans as well as through money i e bank deposits copyright 1992 by american economic association

turnover in the afdc population an event history analysis the control group of families with female heads from the denver income maintenance experiment is utilized in this analysis of afdc turnover this study uses event history techniques a methodology that is more appropriate for exploring welfare dynamics than the logit approach of earlier work increases in age and the wage have significant negative effects on the rate of entering afdc a higher guarantee raises this rate significantly age and the guarantee have significant effects with opposite signs on the exit rate other variables are not systematically related to turnover the estimates are applied to projected changes in lengths of time spent on and off afdc and in afdc caseloads due to changes in the explanatory variables

state dependent pricing and the dynamics of money and output standard macroeconomic models of price stickiness assume that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time we present an alternative model in which the pricing decision depends on the state of the economy we find a method of aggregating individual price changes that allows a simple characterization of macroeconomic variables the model produces a positive money output correlation and an empirical phillips curve in addition the impact of monetary shocks depends crucially on the current level of output which points to a natural connection between state dependent microeconomics and state dependent macroeconomics i introduction there is a long tradition in macroeconomics of attributing the real effects of nominal demand shocks to nominal price stickiness in this view if there is no change in prices when nominal demand rises then quantities must bear the burden of adjustment hence nominal price rigidity provides the friction needed for nominal demand shocks to be transmitted to the real economy standard models of this transmission mechanism such as fischer 1977 and taylor 1980 are based on the assumption that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time the main reason for considering such time dependent pricing rules is their analytic tractability constraining firms to adjust their prices at prespecified times both simplifies the derivation of equilibrium strategies and allows the use of powerful time series techniques to analyze aggregate dynamics the main disadvantage of the timedependent approach is that between price adjustments firms are not allowed to respond even to extreme changes of circumstance this makes it difficult to know whether the qualitative effects of money in these models are the result of nominal rigidities per se or of the exogenously imposed pattern of price changes an alternative approach to modeling price stickiness is to allow the price setting decision to depend on the actual state of the

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

money income prices and interest rates including data from the 1980s sharply weakens the postwar time series evidence indicating significant relationships between money however defined and nominal income or between money and either real income or prices separately focusing on data from 1970 onward destroys this evidence altogether evidence indicating cointegration of real income and real money balances with due allowance for the effect of interest rates also deteriorates when the sample extends through the 1980s a positive finding is that the spread between the commercial paper rate and the treasury bill rate consistently contains highly significant information about future movements in real income copyright 1992 by american economic association

purchasing power parity for developing and developed countries what can we learn from non stationary panel data models the aim of this paper is to apply recently developed panel cointegration techniques proposed by pedroni 1999 2004 and generalized by banerjee and carrion i silvestre 2006 to examine the robustness of the ppp concept for a sample of 80 developed and developing countries we find that strong ppp is verified for oecd countries and weak ppp for mena countries however in african asian latin american and central and eastern european countries ppp does not seem relevant to characterize the long run behavior of the real exchange rate further investigations indicate that the nature of the exchange rate regime doesn t condition the validity of ppp which is more easily accepted in countries with high than low inflation

income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate msas abstract we examine how differences in state income tax rates as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures influence the choice of state of residence for households federal tax filers moving into multistate metropolitan areas msas using data from the irs on the migration of taxpayers msas that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market these msas allow residents to live in one state and work in another state we find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an msa however contrary to what would be expected this impact is only significant in msas in which the filing state is based on employment states without reciprocity and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence states with reciprocity in msas where states do not have reciprocity agreements a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4 1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers analogously we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these msas results in a 3 3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow agi our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate msas without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in msas without reciprocity

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

public transportation demand in a border metropolitan economy empirical research for public transport demand has uncovered numerous interesting commonalities across metropolitan economies this study examines the demand for municipal bus services over time in el paso texas usa el paso is one of the largest metropolitan economies in the usa located directly adjacent to an international boundary with another country this study not only models the demand for municipal bus services as a function of traditional variables such as price income and weather but also includes regressors designed to measure the potential impacts of cross border economic conditions on el paso ridership results from a linear transfer function ltf modelling approach indicate that rider volumes are affected by domestic as well as international economic conditions in this border metropolitan area

intrinsic bubbles and regime switching abstract froot and obstfeld 1991 allow for an intrinsic bubble in stock prices using approximately a century of annual data for the us in an attempt to model the widely documented deviations from the prices predicted by present values or fundamentals however they assume that the log of real dividends follows a constant random walk with drift over the whole period we show that this assumption is invalid and that a markov switching model is a more appropriate representation of dividends we then generalise the formulation of stock prices including the intrinsic bubble to allow for this and show that regime switching provides a better explanation for stock prices than the bubble we show that when allowance is made both for the bubble and for regime switching in the dividend process the incremental explanatory contribution of the bubble is low

tests of the money neutrality and rationality hypotheses the case of japan 1973 1985 this study examines the macroeconomic rational expectations hypothesis for japan in the period 1973 1985 monthly seasonally unadjusted data and the empirical methodology utilized by frederic s mishkin 1982 are used to test the hypotheses of money neutrality and rationality of expectation formation jointly and separately two alternative methods of inducing stationarity in the output data are employed the tests reject the joint hypothes es of money neutrality and rationality as well as the separate hypothesis of money neutrality the separate hypothesis of rationality cannot be rejected copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

liquidity loanable funds and real activity abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of two traditional explanations of the monetary black box linking money and real activity the liquidity effect and the loanable funds effect these effects are modeled with a monetary production economy in which central bank injections of cash are funnelled into the economy through the credit market since only borrowers have direct access to the newly injected cash monetary injections cause nominal interest rates to fall if firms are borrowers then monetary injections also increase current and future real activity

analyzing the length of welfare spells abstract this paper studies the determinants of the length of individual spells of welfare focusing on how the length of a spell affects the probability of its termination the analysis utilizes six years of monthly data on time spent in the afdc program among female household heads a variety of duration dependence models are estimated monthly afdc participation does not show strong evidence of duration dependence two distinct groups appear to utilize welfare one with a very low and constant probability of leaving welfare and a second group which is more affected by time on the program

the political economy of regional integration projects at borders where poor and rich meet the role of cross border shopping and community sorting abstract at borders between poor and rich countries huge service price differentials could be exploited to mutual benefit offering better paid job opportunities to the poor as well as better shopping opportunities to the rich however cross border shopping is often limited by the substantial transaction costs of crossing the border moreover countries and regions frequently fail to cut these transaction costs even when they have the opportunity to do so we provide a politico economic analysis of cross border integration projects more specifically we show how the political outcome depends on i intra country mobility ii decision making and housing ownership regimes and iii federal grants and international border regulations our analysis builds on two key characteristics in which individuals differ interregional mobility and intercultural ability

the dynamic impacts of monetary policy an exercise in tentative identification it is currently popular to identify monetary policy shocks with innovations in some measure of reserves or in the federal funds rate these assumptions about the interest elasticity of the supply of or demand for reserves imply monetary policy shocks that produce dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables that are anomalous relative to traditional monetary analyses this paper tentatively identifies supply and demand shocks in the markets for reserves and m2 for the 1980s and contrasts them with results for the 1970s in the later period identified monetary policy shocks have dynamic impacts that are fully consistent with traditional analyses

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

taxing an independent scotland if scotland were to become independent it would gain considerably more control over its tax system than it currently enjoys in this paper we consider the consequences of independence for the optimal design of a new scottish tax system an analysis which would also be of some relevance for considering the consequences for tax design of independence of other smaller nations scotland is different from the rest of the uk in some ways that are important for tax system design incomes are more equally distributed for example that is one reason why the progressive income tax currently raises less per head in scotland than in the rest of the uk it also suggests that there is less to be gained in terms of redistribution from sharply progressive taxation independence would create additional complexity for individuals and firms working or trading across borders it could also put downward pressure on tax rates and our analysis suggests that optimal tax rates in an independent scotland are likely to be lower than optimal rates in the uk as a whole at the same time the context of a substan tial budget deficit will continue to put upward pressure on tax rates

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

political jurisdictions in heterogeneous communities we investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population we consider heterogeneity in income race ethnicity and religion and we test the model using american school districts school attendance areas municipalities and special districts we find strong evidence of a trade off between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity we also find evidence of a trade off between economies of scale and income heterogeneity conversely we find little evidence that ethnic or religious heterogeneity shapes jurisdictions to clarify the direction of causality between heterogeneity and jurisdictions we exploit shocks to racial heterogeneity generated by the two world wars

a comparison of the effect of welfare programme features on welfare participation one and two parent families the effect of welfare programme characteristics on the decision to enter the welfare system is modelled as a binary discrete choice latent variable model dependent upon an underlying index function the two chief classes of welfare beneficiaries in the us welfare system are analysed two parent families and single female headed families the data set is a large recent non experimental multiyear cross sectional pooled data set derived from the us census bureaus current population survey behavioural impacts from a range of economic variables are consistent in sign with predictions made by economic theory newly estimated comprehensive descriptive statistics of the entire welfare system for both single female household heads and married couples with children are employed to characterize the welfare system statistically significant estimates of substantial magnitude are obtained for the impacts on welfare participation for the welfare guarantee level the effective tax rate on earned income and the effec

the simple analytics of tobacco taxation with illegal supply this paper examines the impact of tobacco excise taxes where legal and illegal supplies coexist the government s objective is to minimize cigarettes smoked in the economy or to maximize revenue or to minimize illegal activity it reacts to a competitive illegal supply in an adjoining jurisdiction a model of consumer choice is used to demonstrate how demand response to tax changes can yield counterintuitive results while the model mimics the canadian market similar situations characterize the us and european markets a novel element of the paper is the treatment of externalities on the supply side rather than the demand side resume analytique simple des taxes sur le tabac quand il y a offre illegale ce memoire examine l impact des taxes sur la vente de tabac quand des offres legale et illegale coexistent l objectif du gouvernement est de minimiser les cigarettes fumees dans l economie ou de maximiser le revenu fiscal ou de minimiser l activite illegale il doit prendre en compte l offre concurrentielle illegale dans une juridiction contigue on utilise un modele de choix du consommateur pour montrer comment la reaction de la demande aux changements dans les taxes peut engendrer des resultats contre intuitifs bien que le modele soit concu pour le marche canadien on trouve des situations avec des caracteristiques similaires dans les marches americain et europeens un element novateur du memoire est sa prise en compte des externalites du cote de l offre plutot que du cote de la demande

nash equilibrium tariffs for the united states and canada the roles of country size scale economies and capital mobility a theoretical analysis of optimal nash equilibrium tariff rates is presented a numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find nash equilibrium tariff rates for the united states and canada the nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates 18 percent for the united states and 6 percent for canada the united states is essentially indifferent between the nash equilibrium and free trade while canada is better off at the latter by 4 billion empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller there are scale economies and free entry and capital is internationally mobile

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

effective tax rates and guarantees in the afdc program 1967 1982 estimates of effective tax rates on earned and unearned income and estimates of effective guarantees in the afdc program by state are provided for the period 1967 1982 the results indicate that effective real guarantees fell every year from 1967 to 1981 but stabilized in 1982 effective tax rates on unearned income rose steadily from 1967 to 1981 and took a particularly large additional jump in 1982 effective tax rates on earned income fell after 1967 but then gradually rose throughout the 1970s until 1982 when they took a much larger jump thus guarantees fell and tax rates rose over the 1970s as tight budgets forced states to restrict benefits and in the early 1980s tax rates were pushed even higher by federal legislation

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

the spatial incidence of local retail taxation this paper examines the effects of local retail taxation in two simple models of spatial competition suppose that a suburb or central city imposes an excise tax or subsidy on a particular commodity such as gasoline liquor restaurant meals or groceries or imposes a general sales tax that affects many commodities simultaneously to what extent does this lead to higher prices within the jurisdiction and in neighboring jurisdictions section ii presents the basic model of spatial competition that forms a component of the fixed locations model of section iii and the entry model of section iv infinitely many stores are located along an infinite line and demand density is completely inelastic and uniform along the line the main endogenous variables of interest are the prices charged by the different stores throughout the paper a nash equilibrium in prices is assumed section iii presents the fixed locations model in which the tax is imposed after stores have already established themselves store locations are fixed due to location specific sunk costs if a suburb containing a single store imposes an excise tax on a commodity the store that is taxed and its first second and third nearest neighbors on each side increase their prices by 57 7 percent 15 5 percent 4 2 percent and 1 1 percent of the tax respectively this result is independent of the spacing of the stores and independent of whether or not they are evenly spaced if a suburb containing several stores imposes an excise tax the changes in price follow directly by adding the effects of taxes on several adjacent stores if a central city taxes all stores on the right half line the results are given by 12 the taxed and untaxed stores closest to the boundary

cross border shopping from small to large countries abstract contrary to predictions of theoretical models there are many examples in the real world of cross border shopping from small to large countries we demonstrate that a sufficient wedge between marginal costs of public funds in small and large countries can explain this phenomenon

tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice abstract the paper considers a two community model with freely mobile individuals individuals differ not only in their incomes but also in their tastes for a local public good in each jurisdiction the amount of public services is determined by majority vote of the inhabitants and local spending is financed by a residence based linear income tax when making their residential and political choices individuals thus face a trade off between the provisionary and redistributive effects of policies we analyze this trade off and show that tiebout like sorting equilibria often exist if the spread in tastes among individuals is very large an almost perfect sorting according to preferences emerges otherwise a partial sorting prevails and stratification into rich and poor communities is more pronounced importantly we demonstrate that all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals are allowed to relocate after voting

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

eu regional policy and tax competition the european union eu provides coordination and financing of trans european transport infrastructures i e roads and railways which link the eu member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility this raises the question of whether eu involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies moreover an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition we analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms we show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition in contrast with regard to union periphery infrastructure the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures here the effects on tax competition are ambiguous our results provide a rationale for eu level regional policy that supports the development of intra union infrastructure

effects of unanticipated monetary policy on aggregate japanese output the role of positive and negative shocks in this paper evidence is presented for japan that an asymmetry exists between the effects of positive and negative money shocks on output this result held over different lag lengths in the monetary variables for different specifications of the call money rate equation and when monetary policy was measured by the monetary base or by m2 cd unanticipated money unlike positive and negative shocks was statistically insignificant in explaining output results reinforce findings for the united states that an asymmetry between the effects of unexpected expansionary and contractionary monetary policy may constitute an empirical regularity requiring further investigation

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

the political geography of tax h e avens and tax hells worldwide many governments rely on personal income taxation as one of their major sources of tax revenue casual empirical evidence suggests that although most developed countries levy substantial taxes particularly on higher incomes there also exist a few countries that are characterized by no or very low income taxation a distinguishing feature of the countries in the latter group is that they are geographically very small as can be seen from table 1 which presents international income tax policies and geographical dimensions of some selected countries in the present paper we investigate whether the geography of a country is related to its pattern of taxation central to our argument is the ongoing international integration in the last decades in some cases e g in the european union the process has advanced to the point at which all formal constraints to mobility have been abandoned this development has also greatly improved the mobility of households across states or national borders in contrast to the mobility of production factors however the effects of household mobility migration are not confined to budgetary consequences as taxpayers immigrate or emigrate the inand outflow of citizens also alters policy objectives by changing the composition of the electorate in a jurisdiction at the same time migration decisions especially those of wealthy individuals are based on local tax policies consequently the migration of households determines fiscal policies through the interplay of two basic effects 1 residential choices determine tax rates through a process in which a jurisdiction s inhabitants select their local policies and 2 tax and welfare policies in each jurisdiction influence residential decisions as we argue in this paper this interdependency of residential and political decisions may provide an explanation for the stylized facts illustrated in table 1 we consider a simple framework in which households differ in incomes and national tax policies are democratically determined as a natural implication of their earning characteristics high income households ceteris paribus prefer to live in countries with low taxation for ease of exposition we refer to those countries as tax h e avens in a slight perturbation of popular nomenclature low income households in contrast are more interested in generous public spending than in low income tax rates ceteris paribus they prefer to reside in countries with large welfare programs financed by substantial taxation which we call tax hells for obvious reasons thus individual preferences imply a self selection process which leads to the segregation of households across countries according to income classes 1 if this segregation is in turn supported by a national vote for low taxes in countries where high income earners live and high taxes in countries where lower income earners live an equilibrium with tax heavens populated by wealthy residents and tax hells populated by the less affluent evolves yet the geographical size of countries plays a crucial role in this development first it affects the number of a country s inhabitants the population size because households sort hansen apax partners company possartstr 11 81679 miinchen germany kessler department of economics university of bonn adenauerallee 24 42 53113 bonn germany kessler wipol uni bonn de we thank two anonymous referees marcus berliant dennis epple christian ewerhart gerhard glomm david pines urs schweizer and participants in presentations at the university of munich the 1997 site meeting stanford the 1997 american econometric society summer meeting pasadena and the 1996 iipf congress tel aviv for helpful suggestions and discussions both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn remaining errors are our own the views expressed in this paper should not be attributed to apax partners company 1 the sorting of individuals by preferences across jurisdictions goes back to the famous contribution of charles m tiebout 1956 on migration as a means to reveal preferences over public goods