design and rating of risk contingent credit for balancing business and financial risks for kenyan farmers abstractweather related agricultural risks and limited access to credit are serious impediments to agricultural productivity and growth in developing countries this paper describes a novel insuran

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

competition and the ratchet effect in labor markets the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or by cutting pay we model this effect as a multiperiod principal agent problem with hidden information and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally consistent with our theoretical model we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition which are nearly eliminated when competition is introduced this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

earnings within education groups and overall productivity growth to offer a possible interpretation for recent empirical findings on earnings growth this paper constructs a simple model with endogenous human capital investment a distribution of natural abilities and unbiased technological progress the model predicts that in the long run average earnings within any education group will grow more slowly than average wages overall it also predicts that average earnings in high education groups ultimately will rise relative to average earnings in low education groups in the model these processes do not imply secular increases in the degree of inequality in the overall cross sectional distribution of earnings

a theory of trade secrets in firms this article provides a simple theoretical model of trade secrets in hierarchical firms a crucial assumption is that each manager has access to trade secrets pertaining to his own hierarchical level as well as to all lower levels the article explores some implications of this assumption for optimal degree of trade secrets accumulation and protection as well as for the wage structure in firms in addition the model implies that managers may have an incentive to overpay their subordinates and protect their firms trade secrets too much

the ratchet effect and the market for secondhand workers workers in a long term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the future we show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of efficient piece rate contracts when the difficulty of the job is unobserved by the firm gibbons 1987 has shown that all piece rate contracts will be inefficient together these results may explain why piece rates are common in some jobs such as agricultural work and sales and not as popular for many manufacturing jobs

student abilities during the expansion of us education abstract the us experienced two dramatic changes in the structure of education in a 50 year period the first was a large expansion of educational attainment the second an increase in test score gaps between college bound and non college bound students this paper documents the impact of these two trends on the composition of school groups by ability and the importance of these composition effects for wages the main finding is that there is a growing gap between the abilities of high school and college educated workers that accounts for one half of the college wage premium for recent cohorts and for the entire rise of the college wage premium between the 1910 and 1960 birth cohorts

multiskilling technical change and the japanese firm worker cooperation with technical change accounts for much of the success of large japanese firms the authors argue t hat this cooperative attitude is due in large part to multiskilling by training workers in more than one job a firm assures its workers th at they will not be made worse off by labor saving innovations in a simple model the authors show that multiskilling leads to an endoge nous distinction between permanent and temporary workers wages that are attached to the worker rather than the job and comparative advantage in process style innovations there is even a role for the company song copyright 1993 by royal economic society

inequality income growth and mobility the basic facts during the 1950s and 1960s mean wages in the united states grew rapidly and the dispersion around this growing mean changed very litde starting in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s and 1990s these patterns were reversed mean wages grew slowly and inequality increased rapidly these changes in labor markets were reflected in changes in the distribution of family income the mean of the distribution of family income did increase after 1973 in spite of the near constancy of mean real wages as family members increased the number of hours they worked however the increase in inequality of wages was mirrored by an increase in the dispersion of family income a large descriptive literature has documented the rise in inequality while a smaller behavioral literature has sought to delineate the causes of this rise these changes in the distribution of family income a fected rates of poverty directly during the 1950s and 1960s temporary increases in poverty during recessions were more than offset by declines in poverty during economic expansions as long as the poor gained along with everyone else fi om the secular growth in the mean one could be confident that poverty rates would ratchet down this is exactly what happened as poverty rates fell from 22 4 percent in 1959 to 11 1 percent in 1973

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

review of de soto s the mystery of capital in the mystery of capital hernando de soto promotes his explanation of why formal capital markets function poorly in developing countries de soto argues that much of the population of developing countries lacks access to credit not because they lack assets but because ownership of their property is secured informally which prevents the use of property as collateral the inability to convert assets into capital keeps the developing world from benefiting from capitalism

piece rate incentive schemes this paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece rate compensation schemes the informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century the formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting the main result is as follows in a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior then no compensation scheme piece rate or otherwise can induce the worker not to restrict output

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

the unbanked evidence from indonesia to analyze the prospects for expanding financial access to the poor bank professionals assessed 1 438 households in six provinces in indonesia to judge their creditworthiness about 40 percent of poor households were judged creditworthy according to the criteria of indonesia s largest microfinance bank but fewer than 10 percent had recently borrowed from a micro bank or formal lender possessing collateral appeared as a minor determinant of creditworthiness in keeping with microfinance innovations although these households were judged able to service loans reliably most desired small loans calculations show that the bank given its current fee structure and banking practices will lose money when lending at the scales desired so while innovations have helped to extend financial access it remains difficult to lend in small amounts and cover costs

uncertainty task environment and organization design an empirical investigation the paper addresses two broad research questions 1 how do internal uncertainty associated with the task environment and external uncertainty arising from market volatility impact organization design 2 what are the relationships among various elements of organization design delegation of decision making incentives monitoring and internal labor market practices promotion training employment security we expand on prendergast 2002a who challenged the conventional view of a tradeoff between risk and incentives and build a single unified framework for answering our two research questions using a uniquely rich dataset that contains detailed information about the task environment of core employees and organization design at the individual group and firms levels in 530 minnesota firms in the mid 1990s we first find support for prendergast s key argument that internal uncertainty over which employees have control affects directly the allocation of decision making and only indirectly incentives via allocation of decision making this confirms similar findings by foss and laursen 2005 devaro and kurtulus 2010 and shi 2011 we also find that internal uncertainty has much impact on organization design through the choice of delegation of decision making at the employee level less so at the group level and very little at the firm level whereas external market uncertainty has little effect on organization design especially at the individual and group level decision making monitoring various internal labor market practices and incentives are strongly related to each other through substitution and complementarity

rational herding toward the poor evidence from location decisions of microfinance institutions within pakistan analyzing the geographical location of almost all the microfinance institutions mfis within pakistan this paper gives further evidence that microfinance activities do not reach the poorest rural areas especially we explore how this result is driven by the uncertainty faced by mfis in their location decision i e they can hardly predict accurately whether or not they will perform financially furthermore we find that mfis are spatially clustered and identify three main reasons for this common attraction factors i e the characteristics of one area fits to the preferences of all mfis so that they are all located in the same areas payoff externalities to be collocated and herd behavior i e mfis follow one another most importantly we find that a significant part of this herding process is rational i e early locations of mfis convey information used by later ones such that it reverses or neutralizes the negative impact of uncertainty resulting then in more locations in needier areas since it allows them to be located in poorer areas mfis improve the achievement of their social goal this latter result is rather good news for those who reckon that a better access to financial services enhances economic growth and fosters poverty alleviation indeed rational herding constitutes an endogenous moderator effect to the big issue that financial services penetration is too weak in the poorest rural areas

life cycle schooling and dynamic selection bias models and evidence for five cohorts of american males this paper examines an empirical regularity found in many societies that family influences on the probability of transiting from one grade level to the next diminish at higher levels of education we examine the statistical model used to establish the empirical regularity and the intuitive behavioral interpretation often used to rationalize it we show that the implicit economic model assumes myopia the intuitive interpretive model is identified only by imposing arbitrary distributional assumptions onto the data we produce an alternative choice theoretic model with fewer parameters that rationalizes the same data and is not based on arbitrary distributional assumptions

evaluating seasonal food storage and credit programs in east indonesia abstract predictable annual lean seasons occur in many rural areas including west timor in indonesia imperfections in savings and credit markets make it difficult for staple farmers to convert harvest season output into lean season consumption we conduct a randomized evaluation of a seasonal food storage program and a food credit program by providing improved ways to transfer assets across seasons each program functions as a subsidy on lean season consumption we find that neither program had effects on staple food consumption the storage program increased non food consumption the credit program increased reported income and reduced seasonal gaps in consumption our results are consistent with positive income effects through the expansion of budget sets but suggest that the average household could be close to staple food satiation

access to finance an unfinished agenda recent data compilations show that many poor and non poor people in many developing countries face a high degree of financial exclusion and high barriers in access to finance theory and empirical evidence point to the critical role that improved access to finance has in promoting growth and reducing income inequality an extensive literature shows the channels through which finance promotes enterprise growth and improves aggregate resource allocation there is less evidence at the household level however and on the effectiveness of policies to overcome financial exclusion the article summarizes recent efforts to measure and analyze the impact of access to finance and discusses the unfinished research agenda

the slowdown in american educational attainment relative to those for high school graduates lifetime earnings for college graduates are higher for more recent cohorts at the same time across successive cohorts born after 1950 there is a stagnation in the fraction of high school graduates that go on to complete a college degree what explains this phenomenon i formulate a life cycle model of human capital accumulation in college and on the job where successive cohorts decide whether or not to acquire a college degree as well as the quality of their college education cohorts differ by the sequence of rental price per unit of human capital they face and by the distribution of initial human capital across individuals my model reproduces the observed pattern in college attainment for the 1920 1970 birth cohorts the stagnation in college attainment is due to the decrease in the growth rate of the rental price per unit of human capital commencing in the 1970s my model also generates about 80 of the increase in lifetime earnings for college graduates relative to those for high school graduates observed across cohorts

education borrowing constraints and growth abstract this paper studies the effects of educational borrowing constraints on economic growth and welfare we consider a three period lived overlapping generations model in which individuals finance their educational expenditures by borrowing we show that if the elasticity of human capital to educational expenditure is great enough the relationship between the tightness of the constraints and the growth rate is inverted u shaped when the constraints are binding moreover when the constraints cease to be binding the growth rate is constant we also show that a relaxation of the constraints cannot be pareto improving even if the growth rate rises

mobile money financial inclusion and development a review with reference to african experience we survey literature on mobile money and its contribution in promoting financial inclusion and development with a focus on sub saharan africa we use taxonomic descriptive and analytical methods to evaluate the state of knowledge in the area we analyse how mobile technology in general may contribute to economic development and financial inclusion in theory and practise we explain the mechanics of mobile money using kenya s m pesa as a canonical example and consider whether the literature has fully established the potential economic impact of mobile money especially its contribution to financial inclusion we also consider market structure pricing and regulatory implications of mobile money we conclude by highlighting issues that require further investigation the take up of mobile money mobile money and financial inclusion substitutability between mobile money and conventional finance and regulatory structures for institutions providing mobile money services

endogenous fiscal policy and capital market transmissions in the presence of demographic shocks abstract previous analyses of population aging mainly focused on the social security implications of the aging trend this paper addresses aging in an open economy framework with two regions that have politically responsive fiscal policy regarding education finance demographic shocks start an economic growth process but results are sensitive to a critical parameter in the model that indicates return to education spending low values of this parameter are associated with less favorable economic outcomes hence a policy implication emerges that enhancing the education system might pay off in terms of easing the negative growth and welfare consequences of expected demographic shocks

household responses to economic and demographic shocks marginal logit analysis using indonesian data abstract we analyse the responses of indonesian households to demographic and economic shocks and examine how these responses vary in relation to the household s permanent income and the extent to which the shock is common across the community households respond in different ways to demographic and economic shocks economic shocks are more likely to result in a labour supply response from the household and this probability is further increased if the shock is common for rural households use of savings increases with permanent income the article also examines the role of the interviewer in influencing survey responses

firm heterogeneity in capital labour ratios and wage inequality author s leonardi marco abstract this paper documents the increasing dispersion of capital labor ratios across firms in the us and provides some empirical evidence of a positive correlation at the two digit industry level between the dispersion of capital labor ratios across firms and residual wage inequality to explain this empirical fact the paper adopts a search model where firms differ in their optimal capital investment the exogenous decline in the relative price of equipment capital makes the distributions of capital labor ratios more dispersed in a frictional labor market this force generates wage dispersion among identical workers ols estimates of the relationship between capital dispersion and the relative price of equipment capital support the main hypothesis of the model

do microfinance institutions accomplish their mission evidence from the relationship between traditional financial sector development and microfinance institutions outreach and performance this article analyses the relationship between outreach and performance of microfinance institutions mfis on the one hand and traditional financial sector development on the other the results indicate that mfis reach more clients and are more profitable in countries where access to the traditional financial system is low this finding is in line with the market failure hypothesis mfis respond to a need that banks do not fulfill and mfis flourish where the formal financial sector fails along the same line the results demonstrate that mfis serve poorer people in countries with well developed financial systems the results suggest that in countries with well developed financial systems the two sectors stand in more direct competition with each other this competition pushes mfis down the market and makes mission drift by mfis less likely

worker cooperation and the ratchet effect workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase output but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much money workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves we show that this outcome is inevitable in a competitive environment however there are noncompetitive situations where firms can use piece rates to get cooperation from their workers these predictions are consistent with case history evidence from the cotton spinning industry in england in the nineteenth century and the lincoln electric company in the united states even today

interdependence in worker productivity this paper investigates interactions between co worker productivity levels in a rich empirical context workers have unambiguous output measures compensation that depends on individual and group output to differing degrees and potential peers beyond their immediate work group important productivity interdependencies exist which could arise from the group based component of compensation peer pressure common supervisors or information exchanges but not group based output or technological interdependence workers with the strongest individual incentives seem least sensitive to these interactions in contrast they are important to workers with no individual incentives for these workers peer pressure must be a powerful influence copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side