the public private wage differential in a poor urban economy the occupational structure of wages is generally more compressed in high than in low income countries the role of non market forces in determining the structure of wages is of interest for reasons of allocative efficiency as well as for distributional concerns this paper considers how wage differentials may be generated between the public and private sectors of a developing economy data from a 1971 household survey of the tanzanian urban wage labor force are used to determine the pattern of wage differences across employer groups after standardizing by worker characteristics public sector employees are found to have earned a substantial wage premium over workers employed in the private sector the non market character of these differentials is examined in light of a number of hypotheses on public sector wage determination

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

is the efficiency wage efficient the social norm and organizational corruption the effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption we model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem we find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect the snowball effect which intensifies the corruption effect this intensified effect due to the snowballing character of social norms may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm jel classification d82 j41

corruption and the role of information several studies have explored how certain economic and cultural variables affect a country s corruption level this study extends previous research by not only considering these variables but also taking into account the impact that information and communication technology can have on corruption the results indicate that the greater the access to information the lower the corruption levels therefore bridging the digital disparity across countries can also serve to lessen national corruption levels

corruption in russia abstractwe analyze the determinants of corruption in russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 russian regions for the period 2004 13 we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels corruption declines as relative salaries rise yet at strongly diminishing rates furthermore we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement education levels and unemployment rates

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

organized crime corruption and punishment we analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment when bribing costs are low that is badly paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates indeed beyond a threshold further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime

salience and consumer choice we present a theory of context dependent choice in which a consumer s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods such as quality or price an attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good s attributes relative to that attribute s average level in the choice set or more broadly the choice context consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes and their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality price ratios the model accounts for a variety of disparate evidence including decoy effects and context dependent willingness to pay it also suggests a novel theory of misleading sales

on controlling crime with corrupt officials abstract this paper attempts to synthesize the recently developed strategic approach towards modeling corruption and the classical views the following propositions are sought to be proved a if reward schemes are introduced the classical and the strategic approaches yield similar results so far as controlling crime is concerned b with probability of detection being dependent on the effort of a corrupt official crime cannot be controlled and c in the context of an infinitely repeated game of crime the corrupt law enforcing agent might choose less bribes and lower effort level than the myopic optimal and hence would strategically pamper crime

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

some implications of the unofficial economy bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries abstract this paper shows why some countries are trapped in an equilibrium with high unofficial economic activity and corruption while other countries are not the potential for different outcomes follows directly from the complementary nature of unofficial economy and corruption activity

corruption and microenterprises in russia abstract in russia compliance with the rules and regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life has created a hostile environment for microenterprises more serious than the regulations per se however is the potential niche they create for opportunistic behavior by regulatory authorities in russia the regulatory state has created a corrupt cadre of government bureaucrats who frequently engage in rent seeking behavior while enforcing regulations firms are not uniformly affected by corruption however this paper shows empirical evidence of differential incidence of extortion based on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics corruption in russia is similar to a regressive tax and acts as a disincentive to innovation and growth it may induce technologically inefficient production decisions and can dilute economies of scale and scope

educational expansion government policy and wage compression abstract the main objective is to measure the elasticity in the response of relative wages by education to relative supplies of educated labour using rigorously comparable urban wage labour market surveys an econometric comparison is made of kenya and tanzania countries which constitute a natural experiment having different secondary education policies but being similar in other relevant respects post primary educational expansion as kenya is an effective means of compressing wages however the tanzanian scarcity premium on post primary education is held down by the alternative means of public sector pay policy the analysis suggests an important role for occupation in the wage adjustment process

imf conditionality conceptual problems and policy alternatives abstract this paper argues that the main issue damaging relations between developing countries and the international monetary fund is the latter s position that external disequilibria are always a consequence of excess aggregate domestic demand caused by excessive credit expansion as a result fund sponsored stabilization programs center on demand contraction through a credit crunch and may establish stricter domestic performance criteria than necessary to attain the balance of payments objectives the author suggests that the imf establish a two tier conditionality system which he calls the hands off approach with one tier composed exclusively of balance of payments or foreign exchange denominated variables and the other of domestic currency denominated variables the two tier system would allow more flexibility in compliance assessment and might reduce substantially the number of breakdowns of fund programs a revised hands on approach for the fund is also suggested the author critiques the recessive biases of the currently used financial analytical exercises and makes specific proposals to introduce growth exercises to establish the foreign credit requirements of a growth oriented stabilization program and thus to introduce performance criteria for creditor countries and banks a form of reciprocal conditionality

wage differentials and moonlighting by civil servants evidence from cote d ivoire and peru as part of their efforts to reduce fiscal deficits many governments have allowed public sector salaries to erode often on the assumption that government workers are overpaid vis a vis those in the private sector that assumption is tested by analyzing public private pay differentials in cote d ivoire and peru switching regressions models are estimated using full information maximum likelihood fiml and the results are compared to those obtained using ordinary least squares ols techniques the ols yields seriously biased estimates of the pay structure suggesting that public wages are higher than private wages the fiml estimates show the opposite our probit analysis also shows that the wage disadvantage of civil servants is a determinant of the greater prevalence of moonlighting among public than private employees the evidence suggests that reductions in employment rather than pay while being less palatable in the short term will be more effective in the long run

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

fiscal corruption a vice or a virtue abstract recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues in allowing fiscal corruption by strengthening the bargaining power of corrupt tax officers it is argued that tax evasion may be reduced and tax revenues increased but does such an intriguing paradox justify policies that stimulate corruption our answer is no and this note puts forward three arguments to support our view first while an increase in corruption may raise revenues in the short run in general the opposite will be the case in the longer run second the instrumental value of reducing corruption goes far beyond its effects on tax evasion and tax revenues accepting corruption as a policy strategy to increase tax revenues may undermine values of democracy and good governance third eliminating corruption should be considered an end in itself thus contrary to recent suggestions on incentive reforms in tax administration the reasonable starting point for policy debates in this area should still be that an increase in fiscal corruption is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues sustained development cannot occur in an institutional framework that fosters corruption and extra legal tax enforcement