stopping agents from cheating abstract when a principal hires two or more agents to work in a correlated environment each agent s reward will depend on the other s performance unfortunately with just the usual optimal incentive constrained contracts being offered the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal they cheat however the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost this mechanism uses one agent to police the other and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts

rational versus adaptive expectations in present value models using data on stock price and dividends and on long term and short term interest rates we test an important implication of present value models that current value is a linear function of the conditional expectations of the next period value and the current determining variable this implication combined with rational expectations re is strongly rejected combined with adaptive expectations ae it is accepted the latter model can also explain the observed negative relation between the rate of return and stock price thus the re assumption should be used with caution the ae assumption may be useful in econometric practice

the inexorable and mysterious tradeoff between inflation and unemployment this paper discusses the short run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment although this tradeoff remains a necessary building block of business cycle theory economists have yet to provide a completely satisfactory explanation for it according to the consensus view among central bankers and monetary economists a contractionary monetary shock raises unemployment at least temporarily and leads to a delayed and gradual fall in inflation standard dynamic models of price adjustment however cannot explain this pattern of responses reconciling the consensus view about the effects of monetary policy with models of price adjustment remains an outstanding puzzle for business cycle theorists several years ago i gave myself a peculiar assignment i decided to try to summarise all of economics in ten simply stated principles the purpose of this task was to introduce students to the economic way of thinking in the first chapter of my textbook principles of economics i figured if god could boil all of moral philosophy down to ten commandments i should be able to do much the same with economic science most of the ten principles i chose were microeconomic and hard to argue with they involved the importance of tradeoffs marginal analysis the benefits of trade market efficiency market failure and so on i allocated the last three principles to macroeconomics the first of these was a country s standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services which i viewed as the foundation of all growth theory the second was prices rise when the government prints too much money which i took to be the essence of classical monetary theory the last of my ten principles is the subject of today s lecture society faces a short run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment perhaps not surprisingly this statement turned out to be controversial when my publisher sent out the manuscript for review a few readers objected

green goals and full employment are they compatible abstract two empirical correlations are studied one between economic growth and environmental impacts and the other between the lack of economic growth and unemployment it is demonstrated that at a global level economic growth is strongly correlated with environmental impacts and barriers to fast decoupling are large and numerous on the other hand low or negative growth is highly correlated with increasing unemployment in most market economies and strategies to change this lead to difficult questions and tradeoffs the coexistence of these two correlations which have rarely been studied together in the literature on green growth degrowth and a growth justifies ambivalence about growth to make key environmental goals compatible with full employment the decoupling of environmental impacts from economic output has to be accompanied by a reduction of dependence on growth in particular strategies to tackle unemployment without the need for growth several of which are studied in this article need much more attention in research and policy

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

a model of negotiated transfer pricing abstract a large majority of firms employ negotiated transfer pricing yet this method of decentralization remains largely unexplored this study develops a model of negotiated transfer pricing incorporating private divisional information as this is the setting where decentralization is most compelling the firm designs a compensation system utilizing divisional performance evaluation and negotiated transfer pricing a dynamic bargaining model is employed to capture managerial negotiations the study demonstrates that the firm can design managerial compensation schemes and bargaining infrastructures so that the negotiated transfer pricing structure allows it to reach the upper bound on available profits

monetary aggregates and output series title working paper frb title monetary aggregates and output date publication federal reserve bank of cleveland working paper no 9813 author s scott freeman finn kydland type working paper frb topics s us economy

the time varying nairu and its implications for economic policy the nairu the unemployment rate consistent with a constant rate of inflation is estimated in this paper as a parameter allowed to vary over time value is determined in an econometric model where the inflation rate depends on its past values demand and supply shocks the nairu estimated for the gdp deflator varies over the past forty years within 5 4 to 6 5 percent its estimated value for the most recent quarter 1996 q2 is 5 6 percent the nairu has declined in recent years in response to global competition immigration other factors weakening labor s bargaining position and the rapidly declining prices of computers and other electronics

the economic effects of constitutions replicating and extending persson and tabellini persson and tabellini the economic effects of constitutions the mit press cambridge 2003 show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects here the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used in replicating and extending their analyses we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely with regard to electoral systems the original results are largely confirmed majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker the institutional details such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size are particularly important

the effect of taxation on human capital this study finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital of the few earlier studies to address this issue most suggested a negligible effect of taxation on investment in human capital this earlier conclusion is shown to be incorrect by using a model that is more general in several respects than the models used previously

constitutions and economic policy at the rare moments in history when a nation debates constitutional reform the key issues often concern how the reforms might affect economic policy and economic performance for example italy abandoned a system of pure proportional representation where legislators were elected according to the proportions of the popular national vote received by their parties and moved toward including ingredients of plurality rule where legislators are elected in each district according to who receives the highest number of votes key italian political leaders are now considering proposals to introduce elements of presidentialism where the head of government is elected by direct popular vote rather than the current parliamentary regime a common argument in italy was that the electoral reform would help stifle political corruption and reduce the propensity of italian governments to run budget deficits in the 1990s constitutional reforms have been debated and implemented in a number of other countries too for instance new zealand moved away from a pure system of plurality rule in single member districts to a system mixing elements of proportional representation japan also renounced its special form of plurality rule the so called single nontransferable vote in favor of a system that mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation similar proposals have been debated in the united kingdom in latin america questions have been raised as to whether the poor and volatile economic performance of many countries can be traced to their presidential form of government

the effects of government expenditure on the term structure of interest rates most formal macroeconomic models treat all assets as being of common maturity typically this is assumed to be either extremely infinitesimally short a short term bill or infinitely long a perpetuity in reality of course there is a whole spectrum of assets in existence having varying times to maturity moreover different agents in the markets are concerned with rates of return extending over different time horizons participants in asset markets can typically adjust their portfolios virtually instantaneously so that some short run rate of return is appropriate as an argument of the relevant asset demand functions on the other hand investors in physical equipment are typically locked into some longterm financial arrangement in which case it is some long term rate that is the appropriate argument of the investment function provided that the financial markets operate efficiently arbitrage by participants in the asset markets will bring the instantaneous rates of return on assets of varying maturities into equality l in this paper we introduce both a short rate and a long rate into a simple dynamic macroeconomic model the framework we employ is the familiar blinder solow 1973 model it is shown how through arbitrage the current long rate at any point

a comprehensive short run analysis of a possible turkish phillips curve the studies on phillips curves relating the rate of unemployment to the rate of inflation are the results of the search for a reliable tool for forecasting inflation and implementing monetary policy the original phillips curve has attracted considerable attention and since then it has undergone several important changes although the evidence of a negative relationship between the rate of change in a money variable and unemployment rate has not been proven it is still considered to be critical for policymaking and is on researchers agenda niskaken 2002 the existence of a phillips curve for turkey is investigated with the linear and non linear specifications for the conventional and new keynesian phillips curves with inflation expectations and natural rate of unemployment for annual 1980 2001 and semiannual 1988 2 2003 1 data sets the results indicate no evidence of a phillips curve for all specifications and both data sets the semiannual data seems to have a better fit in all specifications

detecting unemployment hysteresis a simultaneous unobserved components model with markov switching abstract we construct a new markov switching unobserved components framework for analysing hysteresis effects featuring trend cycle decomposition identification of spillovers between the components and asymmetry over the business cycle the decades long upward trend in german unemployment is fully explained by hysteresis the great recession was well absorbed because both hysteresis and structural unemployment were substantially reduced after institutional reforms in contrast u s unemployment was not driven by hysteresis effects

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

the economic effects of direct democracy a first global assessment this is the first study that assesses the economic effects of direct democratic institutions on a cross country basis we find that total spending as well as spending on welfare is lower in countries with mandatory referendums consistent with the previous literature but we also find that countries with national initiatives appear to spend more and be more corrupt finally budget deficits government effectiveness productivity and happiness appear unrelated to direct democracy institutional detail thus matters a great deal in general the effects of direct democratic institutions become stronger if the frequency of their actual use is taken into account effects are usually stronger in countries with weak democracies

did financial factors matter during the great recession abstract yes they mattered to reply to this question we assess the predictive content of macroeconomic and financial latent factors on the key variables industrial productivity short term interest rate and inflation during the great recession period 2007 2009 in the united states in this respect we propose a forecasting analysis using a factor augmented var model when we estimate the model with only financial factors we improve the predictions in the short and medium horizons meanwhile when we estimate the model with only macroeconomic factors we improve the forecasting performance in the longer horizon

sluggish us employment recovery after the great recession cyclical or structural factors this paper aims at investigating the causes of the observed departure of employment path from the gdp movements occurred in us in the late of 2008 onwards starting from a production function approach and assuming that the tfp growth is explained by variables linked to the business cycle we are able to formulate an extended version of okun s law based on cyclical factors out of sample forecasting for the period 2008 onward shows that predicted us employment is on average 1 7 above the observed one meaning that this gap cannot be attributed to identified cyclical factors

in search of the natural rate of unemployment abstract the natural rate of unemployment can be measured as the time varying steady state of a structural vector autoregression for post war us data the natural rate implied by this approach is more volatile than most previous estimates with its movements accounting for the bulk of the variation in the unemployment rate as well as substantial portions of the variation in aggregate output and inflation these movements in turn can be related to variables associated with labor market search theory including unemployment benefits labor productivity real wages and sectoral shifts in the labor market there is also a strong negative relationship between inflation and the corresponding measure of cyclical unemployment supporting the existence of a short run phillips curve

resource allocation auctions within firms there is growing interest in the use of markets within firms proponents have noted that markets are a simple and efficient mechanism for allocating resources in economies in which information is dispersed in contrast to the use of markets in the broader economy the efficiency of an internal market is determined in large part by the endogenous contractual incentives provided to the participating privately informed agents in this paper we study the optimal design of managerial incentives when resources are allocated by an internal auction market as well as the efficiency of the resulting resource allocations we show that the internal auction market can achieve first best resource allocations and decisions but only at an excessive cost in compensation payments we then identify conditions under which the internal auction market and associated optimal incentive contracts achieve the benchmark second best outcome as determined using a direct revelation mechanism the advantage of the auction is that it is easier to implement than the direct revelation mechanism when the internal auction mechanism is unable to achieve second best we characterize the factors that determine the magnitude of the shortfall overall our results speak to the robust performance of relatively simple market mechanisms and associated incentive systems in resolving resource allocation problems within firms

a theory based state dependent phillips curve and its estimation to explain the existing empirical irregularity about the slope of a phillips curve this article provides a model of imperfect competition to short that the slope of a phillips curve is shock dependent we empirically apply a state space markov switching model to examine the impact of inflation surprise on the unemployment gap resulting in the state dependent phillips curve fitting quite well our empirical evidence indicates that an unexpected monetary expansion does produce effects in reducing unemployment rates and that supply shocks should not be ignored in estimating the phillips curve because they dominate demand shocks in several nonoil shock periods jel c51 e24 e52 i introduction it is well known that a downward sloping short run phillips curve implies a trade off between the inflation rate and unemployment rate however empirical findings point out that the slope of the phillips curve depends on the selected sample periods 1 does any theoretical model explain the changes in the slope of a short run phillips curve as displayed in the data can we find empirical support for our model that implies a slope changeable phillips curve to answer these questions this article provides a theoretical model implying that the slope of the phillips curve is shock dependent we then apply a state space markov switching model to investigate the empirical support of the theoretical model although a stable negative short run phillips curve is crucial for producing inflation forecasts in policy making institutions there is no general consensus about the negative slope of the phillips curve in empirical literature 2 one of the explanations to the previous empirical irregularity as suggested by king and watson 1994 is that the relationship between unemployment and inflation is shock dependent which means that the slope of a phillips curve relies on the dominance of the demand or supply shocks therefore the conventional single equation regression based on the state independent framework is not appropriate apart from neglecting the state dependent characteristic of the phillips curve there are several other drawbacks for conventional empirical studies when investigating the phillips curve first many articles assume that forecast errors of inflation are homoscedastic which is challenged in the literature the homoscedastic assumption is debatable because several studies such as engle 1983 jansen 1989 evans 1991 and brunner and hess 1993 point out significant heteroscedasticity in the u s inflation rate arch or garch type models provide estimates of how the conditional variance of inflation varies over time within a given structure and therefore they ignore the possibility of structural changes caused by changing regimes a markov switching heteroscedasticity model is an alternative that allows regime changes in the variance structure instead of applying arch type models to estimate the time varying conditional variance of inflation within a given structure this article takes into account the influence of regime changes on inflation s variance we apply the state dependent conditional heteroscedasticity approach provided by brunner and hess 1993 and evans and wachtel 1993 to estimate the forecasting errors of inflation the second drawback is a constant natural rate assumption the unemployment gap is the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate conventional literature assumes a constant natural rate which is challenged theoretically and empirically as stated by gordon 1997 the existence of unionization unemployment insurance programs and labor force demographics leads to a highly persistent unemployment rate we therefore assume that the unobservable natural rate is time varying and behaves in accordance with the hysteresis of unemployment rates 3 recent empirical works of a regime switching approach on the phillips curve have focused on whether the relationship between inflation and unemployment rates is nonlinear as in ferri et al

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

constitutions politics and economics a review essay on persson and tabellini s the economic effects of constitutions in this essay i review the new book by torsten persson and guido tabellini the economic effects of constitutions which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules i also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy

monetary policy and market interest rates this thesis contains four chapters each of which examines different aspects of the uncertainty facing monetary policymakers monetary policy and market interest rates investigates how interest rates set on financial markets respond to policy actions taken by the monetary authorities the reaction of market rates is shown to depend crucially on market participants interpretation of the factors underlying the policy move these theoretical predictions find support in an empirical analysis of the u s financial markets predicting monetary policy using federal funds futures prices examines how prices of federal funds futures contracts can be used to predict policy moves by the federal reserve although the futures prices exhibit systematic variation across trading days and calendar months they are shown to be fairly successful in predicting the federal funds rate target that will prevailafter the next meeting of the federal open market committee from 1994 to 1998 monetary policy with uncertain parameters examines the effects of parameter uncertainty on the optimal monetary policy strategy under certain parameter configurations increasing uncertainty is shown to lead to more aggressive policy in contrast to the accepted wisdom should central banks be more aggressive examines why a certain class of monetary policy models leads to more aggressive policy prescriptions than what is observed in reality these counterfactual results are shown to be due to model restrictions rather than central banks being too cautious in their policy behavior an unrestricted model taking the dynamics of the economy and multiplicative parameter uncertainty into account leads to optimal policy prescriptions which are very close to observed federal reserve behavior

effects of pro growth policies on employment evidence of regional disparities the main objective of our research is to study the direct impact of pro growth economic policies on employment creation globally and regionally as evidence has countered policy makers expectation

empirical constitutional economics onward and upward abstract empirical constitutional economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered rather than summarizing the state of the art this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions it calls for recognizing additional constitutional institutions as explanatory variables as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables its major emphasis is however on calling for the next logical step in this field namely to endogenize constitutions

is there a core of practical macroeconomics that we should all believe with emphasis on the adjective practical and the normative verb should my answer to the question of this session is a resounding yes indeed i spent a good deal of time between january 1993 and january 1996 acting on the belief that there is such a core macro model so i certainly hope it exists this believable core model falls well short of perfection leaves many questions unanswered and is subject to substantial stochastic errors nonetheless it is both useful and extensively used in policy analysis where contact with reality is a necessity and you cannot beat something with nothing it also closely resembles but does not quite match the way macroeconomics is taught to beginning and intermediate but not to graduate students in this short presentation i will describe briefly the main practical elements that i think we should agree on without worrying too much about their theoretical underpinnings then i will turn to two critical failings of the standard macro model which cry out for theoretical and empirical repair my organizing principle is the textbook exposition that has been standard though not universal in teaching intermediate macroeconomics for years the question is how does it differ from the core model used in policy analysis

the determinants of nominal income output and the price level a synthesis of the keynesian and neo classical views this paper deals with one of the oldest problems in macroeconomics the business cycle of the old tradition the fluctuations of output and the price level of the keynesian tradition and the real business cycle of the recent literature it examines how demand and supply functions evolve through time after an exogenous shock to demand it borrows from keynes the idea that in static equilibrium aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions are essential tools of macroeconomic dynamics it borrows from friedman the notion that money plays an essential role in the determination of the macroeconomic equilibrium the paper derives some empirical implications with regard to the rational behavior of economic agents and shows that after a change in aggregate demand real output and the price level will follow a counterclockwise movement in the price level real output plane this implies that it is incorrect to hypothesize as has been done by both keynesians and monetarists alike that the two variables would be positively correlated in our model this would only be true if the accelerator principle were to play an important role in the dynamics of aggregate demand

the impact of tfp growth on steady state unemployment theoretical predictions of the impact of total factor productivity tfp growth on unemployment are ambiguous and depend on the extent to which new technology is embodied in new jobs we evaluate a model with embodied and disembodied technology capitalization and creative destruction effects in econometric estimates with a panel of industrial countries we find a large negative impact of tfp growth on unemployment which implies that embodied technology and creative destruction play no role in the steady state dynamics of unemployment capitalization effects explain some of the estimated impact but a part remains unexplained

an approach to transfer pricing under uncertainty from the perspective of agency theory newer insights perhaps can be gained into issues of decentralization and transfer pricing transfer pricing can be viewed as a mechanism which simultaneously establishes proper incentives for the agent such as a divisional manager or a subcontractor and induces an optimal decision on the quantity of production when such a decision is delegated in a decentralized setting in this paper we consider a principal such as top management who delegates a production decision to an agent and wishes to induce proper decisions through proper compensation the word proper refers to whatever is optimal under the circumstances including uncertainty divergence of preferences and information asymmetry one example of such setting see below for a discussion of another scenario is the relation between a contractor principal and a subcontractor agent whereby production is subcontracted because of economies of scale and scope and there is no intermediate market for the transferred product the problem of devising an optimal transfer price mechanism in a world of certainty was addressed by ronen and mckinney henceforth rm 1971 they did not consider whether their transfer price mechanism generalizes to a world of uncertainty moreover their mechanism assumed that the divisional managers agents wish to maximize their respective divisional accounting profits and that there is only information asymmetry no moral hazard 1

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

do the right thing incentives for policy selection in presidential and parliamentary systems constitutional structures shape politicians behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the dierent incentives schemes they generate in this paper we analyze these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems the comparison is carried out by analyzing how the two systems may select the ecient policy in presence of asymmetric information presidential and parliamentary systems dier in that the policy proposed by the executive in the parliamentary system is condence depende nt and observable the main ndings suggest that the parliament responds better to the incentive scheme in the presidential system due to the lower uncertainty legislators face over their term limit however the parliamentary system generates a more ecient behavior of the executive due to selection and disciplining eects

political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems evidence from germany combining local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in a german state we study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a quasi experimental framework we hypothesize that state governments pursue two distinct goals when allocating grants to local governments 1 helping aligned local parties win the next election and 2 buying off unaligned municipalities that may obstruct the state government s policy agenda we argue furthermore that the relative importance of these two goals depends on local political conditions in line with this argument we show empirically that the effect of political alignment on grant receipts varies depending on the degree of local support for the state government while previous contributions find that aligned local governments always tend to receive larger transfers our results imply that the political economy of intergovernmental transfers is more intricate

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies