international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

social interaction co worker altruism and incentives social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers to attract and retain workers managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high quality co worker relationships this paper develops a principal multi agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities but also in social interaction with their colleagues which in turn creates co worker altruism we study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate we show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

disguised protectionism global trade rules and alien invasive species current international law strongly favors policies designed to make imports safer e g in terms of invasive species over policies explicitly designed to discourage imports we show that this preference may be counterproductive a externality in trade is incorporated into a political economy model of policy formation nations can address the externality by inspecting cargo and imposing a fine on contaminated imports we compare the equilibrium when inspection is the only policy option relative to the equilibrium that emerging when nations may also manipulate the tariff ruling out the tariff causes socially excessive stringency in general social welfare losses if domestic supply is highly inelastic and in some circumstances an increase in the real tariff measured as the difference between world and domestic prices

profitability and profit sharing claims that profit sharing is a purely distributive wealth confiscation scheme without incentive effects due to free rider problems are based on neglect of cooperation and interaction in the workforce when these activities are difficult to monitor directly group incentives such as profit sharing can increase efficiency and maintain a superior nashequilibrium with strictly individual optimization with simultaneous wls tobit estimates we find here strong effects of profit sharing and worker ownership shares on residual owners return on capital in medium sized metal working firms in west germany complementing earlier results on productivity

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

tariffs with private information and reputation abstract several tariff games are examined in which the home country has private information about whether its government is a low or high tariff type if the foreign government is uncertain about this type in a one shot game its nash equilibrium tariff will be lower higher than if it knew the home government were a low high tariff type in two multistage games misleading behavior by the home government is an equilibrium strategy for sufficiently high discount factors whether or not uncertainty is persistent is important for welfare results tariff rules do not necessarily dominate discretionary policy in these models

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

trade policy cross border externalities and lobbies do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes abstract we analyze whether linking international cooperation in trade policy to environmental policy or other issues with nonpecuniary externalities promotes more cooperation in both policies or whether cooperation in one is strengthened at the expense of the other in the context of self enforcing agreements we show that if the policies are independent in the government s objective function then linkage promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the policy that is easier to enforce under no linkage however if the linked policies are not independent and if these policies are strategic complements then linkage can sustain more cooperation in both issues than no linkage the policies are strategic complements only if i the production externality has cross border effects ii the weight on the externality cost is high iii import competing lobbies are not powerful

social norms of work ethic and incentives in organizations abstract in this paper i model the relation between the dissemination of social norms of work effort work ethic in a given society and the choice of incentives by firms and i motivate it by presenting evidence from three different datasets that suggests that work ethic is correlated with the intensity of firms incentives when the effort choices of different agents in a firm are complementary having hard working coworkers makes an agent more productive therefore in equilibrium she will work harder foreseeing that a work ethic is more useful to hard working agents parents will be more willing to transmit it in societies in which the probability that their offspring will have coworkers with strong work ethic is higher i then expand the model to incorporate the firm technology choice allowing firms to decide between complementary and separable production processes in societies with wide dissemination of work ethic firms will want effort to be complementary as in modern production processes while the opposite is true when the dissemination of work ethic is narrow finally i investigate the comparative dynamics of the model

sorting in the labor market do gregarious workers flock to interactive jobs this paper tests a central implication of the theory of equalizing differences that workers sort into jobs with different attributes based on their preferences we present evidence from four new time use data sets for the united states and france suggesting that workers who are more gregarious as revealed by their behavior when they are not working tend to be employed in jobs that involve more social interactions we also find that workers report substantially higher levels of job satisfaction and net affect while at work if their jobs entail frequent interactions with coworkers and other desirable working conditions

evolutionary efficacy of a pay for performance scheme with motivated agents the paper studies the short run and long run effects of the introduction of a team oriented pay for performance p4p payment scheme when agents may differ in their degree of intrinsic motivation toward the job suppose that new potential employees were able to assess the expected pay offs of current workers then they may modify their approach to work in order to follow the employee type that earned the highest expected pay off we show that the definition of the scheme needs to take into consideration the effects produced on the evolution of the motivation of new generations in particular the desirability and success of a p4p scheme strongly depend on the way incentives are allocated to the members of a team on the power of the quality related financial incentive and on the economic and social context in which the scheme is introduced the analysis is in part motivated by the introduction in uk in 2004 of a p4p scheme for family practitioners in the uk quality and outcomes framework qof and of a new system of assessing the quality of academic research completed in 2014 research excellence framework ref

working in public and private firms abstract we develop a theoretical framework for comparing incentives labor productivity and the allocation of effort in public versus private enterprises we incorporate socializing an activity which yields utility for workers and affects a firm s output into a multitask model of work organization we establish the two following results first the optimal workers compensation policy displays a larger incentive intensity in the private firm than in the public firm second labor productivity in the private firm may be higher or lower than in the public firm both results fit well with the findings of empirical work

a unifying market power measure for deregulated transmission constrained electricity markets market power assessment is a prime concern when designing a deregulated electricity market in this paper we propose a new functional market power measure termed transmission constrained network flow tcnf that unifies three large classes of transmission constrained structural market power indices in the literature residual supply based network flow based and minimal generation based furthermore it is suitable for demand response and renewable integration and hence more amenable to identifying market power in the future smart grid the measure is defined abstractly and allows incorporation of power flow equations in multiple ways we investigate the current market operations using a dc approximation and further explore the possibility of including detailed ac power flow models through semidefinite relaxation and interior point algorithms from matpower finally we provide extensive simulations on ieee benchmark systems and highlight the complex interaction of engineering constraints with market power assessment

policy linkage and uncertainty in international agreements i introduction negotiations over the north american free trade agreement nafta brought issues concerning the environment and a country s environmental policies to the forefront of international trade negotiations as a result nafta includes several environmental provisions as well as an environmental side agreement the side agreement established a commission to review each country s environmental standards and environmental enforcement record in addition the side agreement includes an enforcement mechanism to ensure that each country upholds its standards by threatening the withdrawal of trade benefits for noncompliance thus nalfta ties the benefits of the trade policy portion of the agreement to compliance in a side agreement concerning domestic policies in this sense nafta appears to reflect a belief in the benefits of linking issues e g trade and domestic policy obligations within an integrated agreement the question of when issues should be linked will only grow in importance in coming years as issues of trade and the environment or other domestic policy issues like labor standards move to the forefront indeed at the ministerial meetings in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round many general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies including environmental policy labor standards and competition policy to be examined the question of how to integrate environmental issues into the world trade organization wto will no doubt be accompanied by questions of whether to enforce environmental obligations with the threat of the suspension of trade concessions many free trade advocates have argued that environmental issues and other domestic concerns should be negotiated in separate international agreements that are divorced from the gatt wto framework in effect calling for two separate nonlinked agreements thei r primary concern is that disputes with respect to environmental policy will undermine the previous gains made in liberalizing trade barriers in contrast many environmentalists argue that environmental concerns should be more fully integrated into existing international agreements a linked agreement their main concern is that any environmental agreement that is separate from the gatt wto framework will be unenforceable without the threat of trade policy retaliation this article addresses these concerns with a theoretical analysis of the benefits and costs of linking issues like trade and domestic policy within a unified agreement under conditions of uncertainty the theory of self enforcing trade agreements has been well established by dixit 1987 bagwell and staiger 1990 and riezman 1991 who showed how countries can support low tariffs within a repeated relationship by configuring the tariff agreement so that each country fears that a decision to cheat on the agreement would trigger a costly retaliatory episode in the future ederington 2002 extended this repeated tariff game to include two policy instruments trade and domestic policy and showed that under conditions of perfect information cross retaliation e g enforcing cooperative domestic policies with the threat of trade policy retaliation does not help support a more efficient agreement intuitively even though trade policy sanctions are a stronger punishment to cheating they are not necessary because countries have less incentive to deviate from the agreement with their domestic policy thus with perfect information linked and nonlinked agreements are functionally equivalent however this leaves unanswered the question of whether or not cross retaliation may be beneficial or detrimental under conditions of imperfect monitoring it seems natural to relax the assumption of perfect information especially with respect to domestic policies and other nontariff trade barriers

workplace productivity and bonus preferences why do men with low productivity prefer individual pay this paper examines the relationship between workers productivity and preferred bonus scheme the data are from a company where agents work in teams and receive a bonus that depends on individual and team performance standard agency theory predicts that workers with productivity below the team average prefer a team bonus while high productivity agents prefer an individual bonus risk aversion may temper the taste for individual pay this model predicts the observed relationship between productivity and bonus preferences very well there is however one pattern that it cannot explain many low performers especially men prefer individual bonuses

gatt a cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime abstract as global tariff rates have fallen the use of nontariff barriers to trade have become more prevalent one incentive for a country to depart from free trade is to levy the optimal tariff in order to maximize domestic welfare the gatt was designed to maintain free trade through a system of managed retaliation as is well known in a game theoretic trade model of tariffs with no uncertainty free trade is an equilibrium outcome however with the introduction of uncertainty and asymmetric information it is shown that the equilibrium outcome s has each country imposing nontariff barriers to trade

worker characteristics and wage differentials evidence from a gift exchange experiment there is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations hence when making contracting decisions employers should take into account that workers are heterogenous with respect to both their productivity and their social preferences this paper presents causal evidence that they do in a real effort experiment we elicit measures of workers productivity and trustworthiness and make this information available to potential employers our data show that employers pay significant wage premia for both traits firms make highest profits with trustworthy workers in particular with highly productive and trustworthy workers we also document differences in the strength of gift exchange across worker types in particular output and profit levels of trustworthy workers are less dispersed than those of not trustworthy workers jel code c910 j410 d860

gift exchange incentives and heterogeneous workers by incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal agent model i investigate the relation between monetary gift exchange and incentive pay while allowing for worker heterogeneity i assume that some but not all workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them the principal can be egoistic or altruistic absent worker heterogeneity an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation however the latter is not always required to credibly signal altruism furthermore since some workers do not reciprocate the principal s altruism the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types such a contract is characterised by excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation

trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection abstract wto rules prohibit disguised protection in the form of domestic policies how then do governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation s domestic tax reduction is a protective measure or a reaction to a production externality in this paper each government privately observes whether a production externality associated with its import competing good is high or low this paper finds that in an optimal agreement disguised protection with domestic policies is never used by governments with a high externality and is never commonly realized moreover in an optimal agreement tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies

optimal international agreement and restriction on domestic efficiency the wto s strict treatment of domestic subsidies has not been well received in the existing literature an essential reason is that the consequent restriction on domestic efficiency is hardly compatible with the existing theory of government intervention under which the primary objective of using domestic subsidies domestic efficiency is not sacrificed for another objective we develop a trade agreement model in which the magnitude of a legitimate domestic subsidy with which to address a production externality is private information we find that an optimal agreement substantially restricts domestic efficiency for the international objective of expanding market access

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

on the merit of equal pay performance manipulation and incentive setting abstract work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly used metrics we created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities using two independent experiments we show that whenever pay for performance is used manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives by contrast paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production

domestic policies national sovereignty and international economic institutions to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world this question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the wto formerly gatt in the realm of labor and environmental standards in this paper we establish that the market access focus of current wto rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards in principle with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty not less these rules can deliver globally efe cient outcomes i introduction to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world at a broad level this question probes the limits of any international economic institution whether geared toward real or e nancial concerns that is designed to promote global efe ciency while respecting national sovereignty naturally the answer depends upon the particular problem that the institution is meant to solve in other words the answer depends upon the inefe ciency that would arise under unilateral policy choices at a more specie c level this question is at the center of the debate concerning the appropriate scope of the world trade organization wto formerly gatt recently member countries have considered ways to broaden the wto s orientation beyond conventional trade policy measures to include labor and environmental standards there are now initiatives to introduce the issue of labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda of the wto with the purpose of creating a wto social clause the social clause would specify a set of minimum international labor standards and then permit restrictions to be placed against imports from countries not complying with these minimum standards with regard to environmental policies a wto committee on trade and environment has been established to identify the relationships between trade and environmental measures and to

dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non cooperatively countries know their own level of protection but not the other country s level of protection using import trigger strategies cooperation in the form of low tariffs can be supported although there are periodic reversionary high tariff episodes however if terms of trade trigger strategies are used cooperation does not occur

strategic interaction among nations negotiable and non negotiable trade barriers trade policy is modelled as a two stage game between governments governments choose a negotiable trade barrier in the first stage of the game which is co operative the level of this barrier is treated as a binding commitment in the second stage of the game where the non negotiable trade barrier is chosen non co operatively hence governments choose trade barriers during negotiations with a view to influencing the equilibrium of the non co operative game to follow this proves to be a convenient framework in which to analyse the idea that trade agreements contain loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments trade negotiations induce substitution toward less efficient instruments of protection but are nevertheless welfare improving as long as the negotiations are relevant i e the negotiable barrier is actually in use and the two instruments are not perfect substitutes

firm based measurements of market power in transmission constrained electricity markets in this paper two different approaches to analyzing firm based market power considering transmission constraints are proposed one is an application of the transmission constrained residual demand jacobian while the other is a generalization of the residual supply index to the case of transmission constraints these two approaches provide complementary evaluations of market power medium and large scale system examples are provided to demonstrate computational efficiency and both approaches could be applied to real world electricity markets

output and wages with inequality averse agents we analyze a two task work environment with risk neutral but inequality averse individuals for the agent employed in task 2 eort is verifiable while in task 1 it is not accordingly agent 1 receives an incentive contract which due to his wealth constraint leads to a rent that the other agent resents we show that greater inequality aversion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labor productivity more specifically inequality aversion reduces eort wage

intention based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control abstract empirical research suggests that despite strengthening conventional incentives to put in effort exerting control might reduce worker performance the present paper shows that intention based reciprocity can explain such hidden costs of control if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information not being controlled might then be considered to be kind because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort this argument contrasts existing theoretical wisdom on the hidden costs of control that is almost exclusively based on signaling

incentives to motivate abstract we present a model in which a motivator can take costly actions or what we call motivational effort in order to reduce the effort costs of a worker and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives we distinguish two cases first the firm owner chooses the intensity of motivation and bears the motivational costs second another agent of the firm chooses the motivational actions and incurs the associated costs in the latter case the firm must not only incentivize the worker to work hard but also the motivator to motivate the worker we characterize and discuss the conditions under which monetary incentives and motivational effort are substitutes or complements and show that motivational effort may exceed the efficient level

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

union relative wage effects a survey of macro estimates this paper surveys union wage effect estimates drawn from empirical cross section wage equations fitted to macro aggregated data in 34 post 1963 studies containing such equations each estimate is the partial derivative of the dependent wage variable in logarithmic units with respect to the extent of unionism fraction unionized variable in the equation this paper shows that these estimates contain a mixture in uncertain ratio of the union nonunion wage differential or wage gap on the one hand and an extent of unionism effect on the other therefore the macro estimates should not be interpreted as wage gap estimates

friends or foes optimal incentives for reciprocal agents abstract widely used performance based contracts put positive or negative externalities on co workers these externalities have been proven to shape an organization s working climate especially when workers exhibit social preferences however it is a priori unclear whether a more friendly or a more competitive working environment should be encouraged in this paper we develop a theoretical model in which a self interested principal has to motivate a set of agents to work hard agents are symmetric potentially risk averse and exhibit reciprocity concerns towards each other we show that the principal reduces the cost of achieving high effort provision by designing a psychological gift exchange game thereby replacing monetary with psychological incentives we find that the optimal incentive scheme depends on the interplay between the agents attitudes towards risks and their preferences for reciprocity in particular the optimal scheme implements i a relative performance compensation scheme which induces an exchange of unkindness if agents are relatively little risk averse and ii a joint performance compensation scheme which induces an exchange of kindness if agents are sufficiently risk averse our findings can explain some puzzling empirical results

negotiated trade restrictions with private political pressure we consider a home government with political pressure to restrict trade the foreign country is compensated with a portion of the tariff revenues or quota rents but cannot directly observe the political pressure abroad in this setting the two countries negotiate over the volume of trade and transfer of rents depending on the level of political pressure we determine globally optimal incentive compatible trade policies in which the home government has no incentive to overstate or understate the pressure for protection

a sensitivity approach to detection of local market power potential market power gives certain market participants the ability to manipulate the market to their advantage when their product is not substitutable by competitors identification of generators which have the potential for market power either individually or within a small group is performed using sensitivity information from the linear programming optimal power flow lp opf the impact of network constraints on admissible price perturbations are used to group generators that have the potential to exhibit local market power specific price perturbation vectors are found that highlight a constraint induced locational advantage for these suppliers in practice this is most commonly observed in load pockets for which iso policies mitigate market power

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

social interactions and product quality the value of pooling in cooperative entrepreneurial networks why do cooperatives often pay a pooled price despite the free riding incentives it entails in this paper we highlight that a cooperative is an enterprise owned by a network of entrepreneurial members by taking explicitly into account the social interactions among entrepreneurial members and the impact of social ties on members product quality provisions we identify the circumstances when pooling is efficient it is shown that social interactions mitigate the free riding effect of pooling and that the amount of members social interactions depends upon and increases with the cooperative s pooling ratio we show that the complete pooling policy is not only economically efficient but also socially advantageous when the context of the cooperative is conducive to frequent social interactions among members