sticky prices and monetary policy evidence from disaggregated us data this paper disentangles fluctuations in disaggregated prices due to macroeconomic and sectoral conditions using a factor augmented vector autoregression estimated on a large data set on the basis of this estimation we establish eight facts 1 macroeconomic shocks explain only about 15 of sectoral inflation fluctuations 2 the persistence of sectoral inflation is driven by macroeconomic factors 3 while disaggregated prices respond quickly to sector specific shocks their responses to aggregate shocks are small on impact and larger thereafter 4 most prices respond with a significant delay to identified monetary policy shocks and show little evidence of a price puzzle contrary to existing studies based on traditional vars 5 categories in which consumer prices fall the most following a monetary policy shock tend to be those in which quantities consumed fall the least 6 the observed dispersion in the reaction of producer prices is relatively well explained by the degree of market power 7 prices in sectors with volatile idiosyncratic shocks react rapidly to aggregate monetary policy shocks 8 the sector specific components of prices and quantities move in opposite directions

information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

hospital choices hospital prices and financial incentives to physicians we estimate an insurer speci c preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in california the function is additively separable in a hospital price paid by the insurer the distance traveled and plan and severity speci c hospital xed eects capturing hospital quality we use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital severity interactions and obtain markedly dierent results than those from a logit the estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality lower priced hospitals but the cost quality trade odoes not vary with capitation rates the patient protection and aordable care act of 2010 includes provisions to establish ac countable care organizations acos in the medicare program these are groups of health care providers that oer services to a large number of patients and are eligible to share in any cost savings they achieve for the medicare program 1 private sector acos are forming in parallel to this initiative often with very similar structures and payment arrangements the proportion of savings acos keep is linked to their performance on quality standards the goal of the initiative is to reduce health care costs in both medicare and private insurance and to improve coordination of care the tying of cost savings to quality standards is designed to mitigate the concern that an increase in incentives to control costs might lead to a decrease in the quality of care the health policy literature has noted that similar cost control incentives are currently utilized by some health maintenance organizations hmos in california and elsewhere 2 in this paper we investigate the impact of these incentives on the cost and quality of care provided to patients focusing in particular on the choice of hospital for privately insured patients giving birth we use

real rigidity nominal rigidity and the social value of information does welfare improve when firms are better informed about the state of the economy and can thus better coordinate their production and pricing decisions we address this question in an elementary business cycle model that highlights how the dispersion of information can impede both kinds of decisions and in this sense be the source of both real and nominal rigidity within this context we develop a taxonomy for how the social value of information depends on the two rigidities on the sources of the business cycle and on the conduct of monetary policy jel d21 d82 d83 e32 e52

wage rigidities and jobless recoveries abstract real wage rigidities cause jobless recoveries suppose that a one time shock reduces the capital stock below trend if wages are flexible they decline and employment increases at the moment of the shock before both revert back to normal levels as the economy grows back to trend if wages are completely rigid and the labor market is otherwise frictionless the shock causes a proportional and permanent decline in employment capital output consumption and investment relative to trend in a search model with rigid wages the shock causes a persistent but not permanent decline in these economic outcomes a jobless recovery

temporary wholesale gasoline price spikes have long lasting retail effects the aftermath of hurricane rita abstract i study u s gasoline prices following hurricane rita to show that short lived geographical differences in the severity of wholesale gasoline price spikes are associated with long lasting geographical differences in retail prices in most u s cities wholesale prices spiked significantly for roughly 2 weeks following the hurricane however in cities where this spike was particularly large retail margins remained higher than in other cities for nearly 2 months high retail margins dissipated more quickly after the hurricane in cities where competition between stations tends to generate cyclical retail price fluctuations independent of wholesale cost movements i discuss why prices may have fallen faster in cities exhibiting retail price cycles and present additional results identifying differences in market characteristics between cities with and without price cycles i find that cycling cities tend to have higher population density and have independent nonrefinery brand stations that are mor

rules communication and collusion narrative evidence from the sugar institute case detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion the sugar institute did not fix prices or output prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement coordinate on jointly profitable actions ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating and determine whether cheating had occurred in contrast to established theories cheating did occur but sparked only limited retaliation partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents jel l13 l41 this paper reexamines the cartel problem by studying the private discussions within one cartel while we find much that is in accord with george j stigler s 1964 basic insight that firms would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to cheat on it we also uncover puzzles for established theory and identify elements that a richer theory should encompass especially regarding the role of communication in collusion our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable series of notes on the weekly meetings of the sugar institute this trade association was formed in december 1927 in the wake of several years of falling margins and excess capacity by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the united states it operated until 1936 when the supreme court ruled its practices illegal among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings was louis v place vice president of mccahan a midsize refinery in philadelphia place who was in charge of all activities of the company except production and raw sugar purchases wrote over 500 pages of single spaced detailed

rationally inattentive seller sales and discrete pricing prices tend to remain constant for a period of time and then jump in the literature this rigidity is usually interpreted to reflect a cost of adjusting prices this article shows that price rigidity can alternatively reflect optimal price setting when there are no adjustment costs namely if the seller is rationally inattentive the model generates non trivial pricing patterns that are consistent with the data and that are hard to explain with the traditional adjustment cost model in particular prices are adjusted frequently but move back and forth between a few given values hazard functions are downward sloping and responses to persistent shocks are sluggish these results are obtained in a model that implements rational inattention without simplifying assumptions on the functional forms of the processed signals

booms and busts with dispersed information abstract dispersed information can generate booms and busts in economic activity boom bust dynamics appear when firms are initially over optimistic about demand due to a noisy private news consequently they overproduce which generates a boom and depresses their markups because the news is private firms cannot relate these low markups to aggregate optimism as low markups can also signal low demand this overturns their expectations generating a bust we emphasize a novel role for imperfect common knowledge dispersed information makes firms ignorant about their competitors actions which makes them confuse high noise driven supply with low fundamental demand

edgeworth price cycles and intertemporal price discrimination in a retail gasoline market exhibiting edgeworth price cycles prices change asymmetrically with many small decreases interrupted by occasional large increases the result is a de facto menu of prices from which consumers can choose based on exactly when they buy this article introduces four classes of purchase timing strategies designed to systematically shift consumer purchases towards the cycle troughs it shows in the study market of toronto canada the monetary gains to consumers from optimized timing strategies are as high as 3 9 markups earned from these consumers fall up to 82 in spite of the gains from timing strategies surprisingly few consumers use them evidence is presented that a main reason is that consumers are not well informed about the cycles policy implications are discussed

monetary policy for rationally inattentive economies with staggered price setting the paper examines the optimal monetary policy when firms are constrained by information processing capability and infrequent price adjustments firms information processing limit gives rise to imperfect knowledge about macroeconomic aggregates and endogenous information learning contingent on the monetary policy staggered price setting introduces the observed price duration and additional policy tradeoffs resulting from the interactions between nominal rigidities and imperfect information processing the integrated model implies an optimal policy that commits to complete price stabilization in response to natural rate shocks but not in response to markup shocks in the presence of markup shocks it is optimal for the central bank to focus on price stabilization in the initial periods following markup shocks and shifts the emphasis to output gap stabilization later moreover larger information capacity stronger complementarities and more persistent shocks require more aggressive price stabilization in the short run

empirical studies of gasoline retailing a guide to the literature abstract this paper surveys the empirical literature on gasoline retailing which has been growing rapidly over the last three decades possibly in response to antitrust and regulatory concerns and increased availability of pricing data studies of both pricing and non price decision variables are considered in general it is found that crude oil prices are the primary driver of national price movements over time however market structure has been identified as playing a role in price dynamics equilibrium selection and price differentials across markets and stations the economic literature emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity across stations and coordination problems faced by retailers several directions for future work are suggested including the development of theory and demand estimation using high frequency station level data

edgeworth cycles with partial price commitment abstract the price commitment model of maskin and tirole 1988 provides an extensively cited foundation for edgeworth cycles we examine the viability of edgeworth cycles when price commitment is partial in the sense that a subset of firms are committed to price in each period if multiple firms are not committed in each period then the existence of edgeworth cycle equilibria requires a demanding convexity condition on the profit function

testing mixed strategy equilibria when players are heterogeneous the case of penalty kicks in soccer the concept of mixed strategy is a fundamental component of game theory and its normative importance is undisputed however its empirical relevance has sometimes been viewed with skepticism the main concern over the practical usefulness of mixed strategies relates to the indifference property of a mixedstrategy equilibrium in order to be willing to play a mixed strategy an agent must be indifferent between each of the pure strategies that are played with positive probability in the mixed strategy as well as any combination of those strategies given that the agent is indifferent across these many strategies there is no bene t to selecting precisely the strategy that induces the opponent to be indifferent as required for equilibrium why an agent would in the absence of communication between players choose exactly one particular randomization is not clear of course whether agents in real life actually play nash equilibrium mixed strategies is ultimately an empirical question the evidence to date on this issue is based almost exclusively on laboratory experiments e g barry o neill 1987 amnon rapoport and richard b boebel 1992 dilip mookherjee and barry sopher 1994 jack ochs 1995 kevin a mccabe et al 2000 the results of these experiments are mixed o neill 1987 concludes that his experimental evidence is consistent with nash mixed strategies but that conclusion was contested by james n brown and robert w rosenthal 1990 with the exception of mccabe et al 2000 which looks at a three person game the other papers generally reject the nash mixedstrategy equilibrium while much has been learned in the laboratory there are inherent limitations to such studies it is sometimes argued that behavior in the simpli ed arti cial setting of games played in such experiments need not mimic real life behavior in addition even if individuals behave in ways that are inconsistent with optimizing behavior in the lab market forces may discipline such behavior in the real world finally interpretation of experiments rely on the assumption that the subjects are maximizing the monetary outcome of the game whereas there may be other preferences at work among subjects e g attempting to avoid looking foolish that distort the results tests of mixed strategies in nonexperimental data are quite scarce in real life the games played are typically quite complex with large strategy spaces that are not fully speci ed ex ante in addition preferences of the actors may not be perfectly known we are aware of only one paper in a similar spirit to our own research using data from classic tennis matches mark walker and john wooders 2001 test whether the probability the player who serves the ball wins the point is equal for serves to the right and chiappori department of economics university of chicago 1126 east 59th street chicago il 60637 levitt department of economics university of chicago groseclose graduate school of business stanford university 518 memorial way stanford ca 94305 the paper was presented at games 2000 in bilbao and at seminars in paris and chicago we thank d braun j m conterno r guesnerie d heller d mengual p reny b salanie and especially j l ettori for comments and suggestions and m mazzocco and f bos for excellent research assistance any errors are ours 1 the theoretical arguments given in defense of the concept of mixed strategy equilibria relate either to puri cation john c harsanyi 1973 or to the minimax property of the equilibrium strategy in zero sum games for recent elaborations on these ideas see authur j robson 1994 and phil reny and robson 2001 2 the ultimatum game is one instance in which experimental play of subjects diverges substantially from the predicted nash equilibrium robert slonim and alvin e roth 1998 demonstrate that raising the monetary payoffs to experiment participants induces behavior closer to that predicted by theory although some disparity persists

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

do auctions and forced divestitures increase competition evidence for retail gasoline markets to foster competition governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate or by imposing divestitures the dutch government has done exactly that organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and imposing divestitures of such stations on the four major companies we evaluate this policy experiment and find that the auctioning of licenses without an obligation to divest has no discernible effect on prices an obligation to divest lowers prices by 1 3 2 3 at divested sites moreover prices decrease by 0 9 1 2 at sites nearby this suggests that the observed price decreases are at least partly due to competitive spillovers

business cycle dynamics under rational inattention we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with rational inattention and compare its predictions to data households and decision makers in firms have limited attention and optimally allocate their attention rational inattention is the only source of slow adjustment the model matches the empirical impulse responses to monetary policy shocks and aggregate technology shocks at the same time profit losses and utility losses from inattention are very small furthermore it matters whether one uses this model or a conventional dsge model for policy analysis

learning over the business cycle policy implications abstract this paper studies the policy implications of the endogeneity of information about the state of the economy the business cycle can be made less noisy and more efficient by incentivizing firms to vary their pricing and production decisions more with their beliefs about the state of the economy this calls for countercyclical taxes complemented by a monetary policy that leans against the wind the optimal policies trade off allocative efficiency for informational efficiency

information rigidity and the expectations formation process a simple framework and new facts we propose a new approach to test the full information rational expectations hypothesis which can identify whether rejections of the null arise from irrationality or limited information this approach quantifies the economic significance of departures from the null by quantifying the underlying degree of information rigidity applying this approach to u s and international data of professional forecasters and other agents yields pervasive evidence consistent with models of imperfect information furthermore the proposed approach sheds new light on policies such as inflation targeting and those leading to the great moderation affecting expectations finally we document evidence of state dependence in the expectations formation process

the effect of explicit communication on pricing evidence from the collapse of a gasoline cartel we study the collapse of collusion in quebec s retail gasoline market following a competition bureau investigation and show that it involved two empirical regularities high margins and asymmetric price adjustments using weekly station level prices we test whether collusion was successful and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel s strategy we do so in the markets targeted by the investigation and in markets throughout the province with similar pre collapse pricing cyclical markets our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement margins fell by 30 15 in target cyclical markets and adjustments became more symmetric

menu costs and phillips curves this paper develops a model of a monetary economy in which individual firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as general inflation sellers can change price only by incurring a real menu cost we calibrate this cost and the variance and autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic shock using a new u s data set of individual prices due to klenow and kryvtsov the prediction of the calibrated model for the effects of high inflation on the frequency of price changes accords well with international evidence from various studies the model is also used to conduct numerical experiments on the economy s response to various shocks in none of the simulations we conducted did monetary shocks induce large or persistent real responses

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

a simple spatial model for edgeworth cycles abstract maskin and tirole 1998 formalise edgeworth s 1925 model of a dynamic equilibrium between two players where prices increase sharply and decrease slowly the edgeworth cycle here we present an application of the model showing how edgeworth cycles might arise in a marketplace where spatial competition is important we illustrate the approach using the example of retail gasoline markets where edgeworth cycles have been widely observed

search and price dispersion in online grocery markets abstract consumers often purchase multiple products at a time from retailers creating multi product incentives for search in this paper we consider how product variety affects consumer search intensity and the dispersion of prices in multi product retail markets we employ online grocery pricing data from four large retailers in the uk to estimate search costs and equilibrium price dispersion for food products under circumstances where i consumers search for single products and ii consumers search for multiple products at once we compare estimates in each case between a model in which utility increases with product variety and a model in which utility is not a function of variety relative to our preferred specification with variety effects in utility we find estimates of both search cost and search frequency to be biased upwards in single product settings when variety effects are ignored however we find estimates of search costs are biased upwards while search frequency is biased downwards in multi product settings when variety effects in utility are ignored

professionals play minimax the implications of the minimax theorem are tested using natural data the tests use a unique data set from penalty kicks in professional soccer games in this natural setting experts play a one shot two person zero sum game the results of the tests are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect i winning probabilities are statistically identical across strategies for players ii players choices are serially independent the tests have substantial power to distinguish equilibrium play from disequilibrium alternatives these results represent the first time that both implications of von neumann s minimax theorem are supported under natural conditions during the last few decades game theory has contributed to a reshaping of important aspects of the methodology of economics and other social sciences in a large part this is because the language concepts and techniques of non cooperative game theory have become central to many areas of the discipline undoubtedly studying the interaction of ideally rational players greatly aids our understanding of the behaviour of real individuals firms and other agents moreover as kreps 1991 remarks studying the former should aim at understanding the latter the point of game theory is to help economists understand and predict what will happen in economic social and political contexts theoretical contributions should thus feed back to empirical analysis however testing the implications of the theory has proven extremely difficult in the literature the primary reason is that many predictions often hinge on properties of the utility functions and the values of the rewards used even when predictions are invariant over classes of preferences data on rewards are seldom available in natural settings moreover there is often great difficulty in determining strategy sets and in measuring individuals choices effort levels and the incentive structures they face as a result even the most fundamental predictions of game theoretical models have not yet been supported empirically in real situations in view of the substantial problems associated with testing theoretical predictions using natural data many authors have been compelled to test them in experimental settings interestingly enough despite the controlled structure of experiments the results of many experiments during the last few decades typically reject the assumption that subjects are playing according to the theoretical implications of equilibrium play for instance a number of experiments have evaluated the empirical validity of von neumann s minimax theory for two person zero sum games a theory that occupies a central position in our understanding of strategic situations the results have been mixed and are often rather negative see for instance brown and rosenthal 1990 rapoport and boebel 1992 camerer 2003 and the references therein

exogenous information endogenous information and optimal monetary policy most of the analysis of optimal monetary policy is conducted with the calvo model this paper studies optimal monetary policy when the slow adjustment of the price level is due to imperfect information by decision makers in firms we consider two models a model with exogenous dispersed information and a rational inattention model in the model with exogenous dispersed information complete stabilization of the price level is optimal after aggregate productivity shocks but not after markup shocks by contrast in the rational inattention model complete stabilization of the price level is optimal both after aggregate productivity shocks and after markup shocks moreover in the model with exogenous dispersed information there is no value from commitment to a future monetary policy by contrast in the rational inattention model there is value from commitment to a future monetary policy because then the private sector can trust the central bank that not paying attention to certain variables is optimal

monetary policy and price responsiveness to aggregate shocks under rational inattention this paper presents a general equilibrium model that is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that the u s price level and inflation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks the model of this paper builds on recent work by mackowiak and wiederholt 2009 who show that models of endogenous attention allocation deliver prices to be more responsive to more volatile shocks as everything else being equal firms pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks in fact according to the u s data aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy shocks inducing in this paper firms to pay more attention to the former than to the latter however most important this work adds to the literature by showing that the ability of the model of this paper to account for observed price dynamics crucially depends on monetary policy in particular this paper shows how interest rate feedback rules affect the incentives faced by firms in allocating attention a policy rate responding more actively to expected inflation and output fluctuations induces firms to pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks this new mechanism of transmission of monetary policy helps rationalizing the observed behavior of prices in response to technology and monetary policy shocks and implies novel predictions about the impact of changes in taylor rules coefficients on economic fluctuations

monetary policy for inattentive economies we offer a contribution to the analysis of optimal monetary policy we begin with a critical assessment of the existing literature arguing that most work is based on implausible models of inflation output dynamics we then suggest that this problem may be solved with some recent behavioral models which assume that price setters are slow to incorporate macroeconomic information into the prices they set a specific such model is developed and used to derive optimal policy in response to shocks to productivity and aggregate demand optimal policy is price level targeting base drift in the price level which is implicit in the inflation targeting regimes currently used in many central banks is not desirable in this model when shocks to desired markups are added optimal policy is flexible targeting of the price level that is the central bank should allow the price level to deviate from its target for a while in response to these supply shocks but it should eventually return the price level to its target path optimal policy can also be described as an elastic price standard the central bank allows the price level to deviate from its target when output is expected to deviate from its natural rate

policy with dispersed information information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity and cannot be centralized by the government or any other institution in this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the government to observe this information we show that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on ex post public information regarding the realized fundamentals and aggregate activity when information is common as in the ramsey literature or when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks as in the mirrlees literature the contingency on fundamentals alone suffices for efficiency when instead agents have private information about aggregate shocks the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial an appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to i dampen the impact of noise and hence reduce non fundamental volatility without also dampening the impact of fundamentals ii induce agents to internalize informational externalities and hence improve the speed of social learning iii restore a certain form of constrained efficiency in the decentralized use of information and iv guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any additional information jel c72 d62 d82

indicator variables for optimal policy the optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward looking variables are derived and interpreted both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment an example of optimal monetary policy with a partially observable potential output and a forward looking indicator is examined the optimal response to the optimal estimate of potential output displays certainty equivalence whereas the optimal response to the imperfect observation of output depends on the noise in this observation

identifying and characterising price leadership in british supermarkets price leadership is a concept that lacks precision we propose a deliberately narrow falsifiable definition then develop it illustrate its feasibility and test it using the two leading british supermarket chains we find both firms engaging in leading prices upward over a range of products with the larger being initially more dominant but the smaller increasing leadership activity to take overall leadership over time however more price leadership events are price reductions than price increases consistently led by the smaller firm nevertheless the increases are of larger monetary amounts than the falls so average basket price increases over time

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

portfolio choice attention allocation and price comovement abstract this paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint given their expected investment strategy in the next period which is to hold a diversified portfolio in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal when investors use this private signal to update information about two assets changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement the model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets

price discrimination and bargaining empirical evidence from medical devices many important issues in business to business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous this paper uses new panel data on buyer supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market while many phenomena that restrict price discrimination are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs e g mergers group purchasing organizations and transparency i find that 1 non discriminatory pricing actually works against hospitals because competition is more intense under price discrimination and 2 results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

mergers when prices are negotiated evidence from the hospital industry in recent years many hospitals have merged in part to gain bargaining leverage with managed care organizations mcos we investigate the price impact of hospital mergers by formulating and estimating an equilibrium bargaining model between hospital systems and managed care health insurers over prices for inpatient services we estimate the parameters of the model using claims and discharge data from northern virginia in 2006 inova health system proposed to acquire prince william hospital we nd that this merger would have raised prices signicantly and that the remedy of separate bargaining imposed by the ftc in a separate hospital case would have resulted in a larger price increase

gas wars retail gasoline price fluctuations this paper examines the retail gasoline price fluctuations known as gas wars weekly prices for the los angeles area were examined for the period from january 2 1968 through december 23 1975 the observed fluctuations were remarkably regular and apparently large ly predictable the data appear consistent with the recent game theory model of e maskin and j tirole in which competing firms produce edgeworth cycles by undercutting each other and eventually relenting copyright 1993 by mit press

the industrial organization of health care markets the u s health care sector is large and growing health care spending in 2011 amounted to 2 7 trillion and 18 percent of gdp approximately half of health care output is allocated via markets in this paper we analyze the industrial organization literature on health care markets focusing on the impact of competition on price quality and treatment decisions for health care providers and health insurers we conclude with a discussion of research opportunities for industrial organization economists including opportunities created by the u s patient protection and affordable care act

petrol prices and subjective wellbeing abstract we examine the effect of petrol prices on subjective wellbeing swb using household panel data to do so we use 17 waves of the household income and labour dynamics in australia hilda survey based on our preferred instrumental variable estimates we find that a standard deviation increase in petrol prices leads to a decline of 0 0157 0 0245 standard deviations in swb the finding that increases in petrol prices significantly lower swb is robust to alternative measures of wellbeing and alternative ways of addressing endogeneity as well as employing different sources of fuel price data measured at a range of frequencies we also examine the channels through which petrol prices influence swb and find that maintaining social networks is an important way through which petrol prices influence swb

a semiparametric discrete choice model an application to hospital mergers we propose a computationally simple semiparametric discrete choice estimator to model rich consumer heterogeneity we assume groups of observably similar consumers have similar preferences but allow preferences to vary freely across these groups model flexibility is easily adjusted by setting a single tuning parameter we suggest a cross validation method to do so we analyze the model s properties in the context of hospital mergers both analytically and via a monte carlo analysis the model performs well for policy relevant substitution and welfare measures even if misspecified when the tuning parameter is set within the neighborhood of the value chosen by cross validation jel c14 d12 i11 l41

indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information the optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward looking variables are derived and interpreted both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment the private sector is assumed to have more information about the state of the economy than the policymaker certainty equivalence holds for the optimal reaction function in state space form t he coefficients are independent of the degree of uncertainty about the state of the economy however in the case of commitment certainty equivalence does not hold for the reaction function in integrative form the policy instrument cannot be written as a distributed lag of past estimates of past states of the economy instead optimal policy will generally depend on new estimates of past states of the economy and in ways that depend on the information structure furthermore the usual separation principle does not hold since the estimation of the state of the economy is not independent of optimization and is in general quite complex we present a general characterization of optimal filtering and control in settings of this kind and discuss an application of our methods to the problem of the optimal use of real time macroeconomic data in the conduct of monetary policy

gasoline price dispersion and consumer search evidence from a natural experiment the vast majority of empirical studies examining the link between consumer search and price dispersion focus on how changes in consumer search impact price dispersion this article does the reverse it examines how a shock to price dispersion impacts consumer search a direct measure of search is used and an exogenous shock to price dispersion is found in a refinery fire that caused decades old retail gasoline price cycles and the nonlinear high frequency price dispersion pattern generated by them to stop identifying effects from this shock the results show a substantial response of consumer search to changes in price dispersion

observing and shaping the market the dilemma of central banks while the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions the more the central bank influences the market the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates how should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market this paper analyses the optimal central bank s action and disclosure under endogenous central bank s information for three operational frameworks pure communication action and communication and signaling action when the central bank takes an action it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes however in the realistic case where central bank s action is observable it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action

austrian style gasoline price regulation how it may backfire in january 2011 a price regulation was established in the austrian gasoline market which prohibits firms from raising their prices more than once per day similar restrictions have been discussed in new york state and germany despite their intuitive appeal this article argues that austrian type policies may actually harm consumers in a two period duopoly model with consumer search i show that under the regulation firms will distort their prices intertemporally in such a way that their aggregate expected profit remains unchanged this implies that as some consumers find it optimal to delay their purchase due to expected price savings but find it inconvenient to do so a friction is introduced that decreases net consumer surplus in the market

optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge we study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy information imperfections emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite shannon capacity to process information we then ask how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms processing capacity when price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark up shocks for a large range of capacity values this fi nding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms processing capacity when mark up shocks are persistent accommodation may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in the long run thereby generating a hump shaped price response and a slow reduction in output instead when prices are strategic substitutes policy tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark up shocks in addition there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care market summary managed care health insurers in the usa restrict their enrollees choice of hospitals to within specific networks this paper considers the implications of these restrictions a three step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer the results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans a welfare analysis assuming fixed prices implies that restricting consumers choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately 1 billion per year across the 43 us markets considered this figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

the 1 5th mover advantage there has been much discussion about the timing of moves in games however one assumption usually goes unquestioned namely that of an irrevocable commitment of the first mover in many cases this is not realistic since final commitments are often preceded by actions that are binding only to a limited degree partial commitments an example is the announcements of price changes i analyze a game in which the degree of a partial commitment is endogenized in the case of strategic complements a player profitably makes use of the possibility to commit partly she chooses a role somewhere between first and second mover which gives her a 1 5th mover advantage

information acquisition and welfare we study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information first we relate the in efficiency in the acquisition of information to the in efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition next we show how the acquisition of private information affects the social value of public information i e the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the quality of public information finally we illustrate the implications of the results in a monetary economy with price rigidities and dispersed information about productivity shocks

information immobility and the home bias puzzle many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can but why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry we model investors endowed with a small home information advantage who choose what information to learn before they invest surprisingly even when home investors can learn what foreigners know they choose not to investors profit more from knowing information others do not know learning amplifies information asymmetry the model matches patterns of local and industry bias foreign investments portfolio outperformance and asset prices finally we propose new avenues for empirical research

sectoral price data and models of price setting in the median sector 100 percent of the long run response of the sectoral price index to a sector specific shock occurs in the month of the shock the standard calvo model and the standard sticky information model can match this finding only under extreme assumptions concerning the profit maximizing price the rational inattention model of mackowiak and wiederholt 2009a optimal sticky prices under rational inattention american economic review 99 769 803 can match this finding without an extreme assumption concerning the profit maximizing price furthermore there is little variation across sectors in the speed of response of sectoral price indexes to sector specific shocks the rational inattention model matches this finding while the calvo model predicts too much cross sectional variation

forecasting gasoline prices in the presence of edgeworth price cycles abstract forecasting is a central theme in economics the ability to forecast prices enables economic agents to make optimal decisions for the present and future in this article we investigate if and how gasoline prices can be forecast in retail gasoline markets that are subject to high frequency asymmetric price cycles known as edgeworth price cycles we examine a series of purchase timing decision rules and a series of feasible forecasting algorithms for updating those rules over time we find that in the presence of cycles agents in our five australian markets can systematically reduce purchase prices below market average the equivalent of 11 to 15 u s cents per gallon using simple decision rules and feasible forecasting algorithms

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

a comparison of regular price cycles in gasoline and liquefied petroleum gas abstract regular and asymmetric gasoline price cycles are observed in a number of countries while most studies found that such price cycles are well characterized by the theoretical edgeworth price cycle some studies suggest alternative explanations this paper contributes to this literature by being the first to compare regular price cycles in a nongasoline product liquefied petroleum gas lpg with gasoline price cycles our main finding is that lpg price cycles in the perth area of western australia are much longer and more asymmetric than gasoline price cycles in the same market this finding is consistent with noel s 2008 prediction that edgeworth cycles are longer and more asymmetric when aggregate demand is more elastic the aggregate demand for lpg is presumably more elastic than the demand for gasoline

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

do edgeworth price cycles lead to higher or lower prices abstract a recent literature seeks to understand the causes of the high frequency asymmetric retail price cycles observed in many retail gasoline markets however much less attention has been given to the effects of the cycles in particular whether the cycles lead to higher or lower prices and margins the leading theory for the underlying cause of the price cycles edgeworth price cycles is silent on the issue the challenge in addressing this most important question has been the difficulty in isolating cycle effects from other confounding factors especially market structure in this article i exploit a unique natural experiment to isolate the effect of cycles a refinery fire that in a matter of days halted cycles that had previously persisted for decades i find that edgeworth price cycles lead to lower prices and lower margins i conclude with implications for competition policy

mixed strategy in oligopoly pricing evidence from gasoline price cycles before and under a timing regulation this paper studies oligopoly firms dynamic pricing strategies in a gasoline market before and after the introduction of a unique law that constrains firms to set price simultaneously and only once per day the observed gasoline pricing behavior both before and under the law is well captured by the edgeworth price cycle equilibrium in the maskin and tirole dynamic oligopoly model my results highlight the importance of price commitment in tacit collusion i also find evidence that the price leadership outcome under the law is better predicted by mixed strategies play than by alternative hypotheses

asymmetric responses in the timing and magnitude of changes in australian monthly petrol prices to daily oil price changes abstract this article investigates whether uncompetitive pricing tactics are being employed in the retail petrol market in australia through examining the effect of a change in daily oil prices on monthly petrol prices to do so we incorporate asymmetry into the coefficients of a normalised beta weighting function within an asymmetric mixed data sampling amidas framework this enables us to examine both the timing and the lagged marginal effects of a change in retail petrol prices in response to a change in the oil price we find evidence of asymmetries in both the timing and magnitude of retail petrol prices to a change in the oil price specifically we find that while price falls are slowly and symmetrically passed onto consumers price increases are more delayed but higher in intensity over time depending on the capital city when retailers eventually do increase petrol prices in response to an oil price rise with delay the price rise is between 2 1 and 3 4 times more than when retailers reduce petrol prices in response to a fall in the price of oil this finding is consistent with retailers delaying substantial petrol price rises in order to mask the existence of uncompetitive practices

collusion with intertemporal price dispersion we develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion dispersion clouds consumer price awareness encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price for less patient firms monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales the most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble edgeworth cycles low consumer attentiveness enhances the effectiveness of price dispersion by reducing the payoff to deviations involving price reductions however for sufficiently low attentiveness price rises are also a concern

coarse pricing policies the muted volatility of inflation during the great recession and its aftermath has refocused attention on the constraints that firms face when adjusting prices using new empirical and theoretical results i argue that each firm s choice of how much information to acquire to set prices plays a central role in determining the patterns of pricing at the product level and the degree of aggregate price rigidity in response to shocks in support of the information channel i present product level evidence that firms price goods using coarse pricing policies that are updated infrequently and consist of a small menu of prices firms are heterogeneous in the complexity and duration of their pricing policies and this heterogeneity is reflected in differential responses to the great recession cycle with firms exhibiting more complex policies responding more aggressively i develop a theory of information constrained price setting that generates coarse pricing endogenously and quantitatively matches the discreteness duration and volatility of policies in the data the information friction dampens the responsiveness of prices to shocks and coupled with heightened volatility induces firms to keep prices relatively high to protect against losses in an uncertain environment

signalling effects of monetary policy we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the policy rate signals the central bank s view about macroeconomic developments to price setters the model is estimated with likelihood methods on a u s data set that includes the survey of professional forecasters as a measure of price setters inflation expectations this model improves upon existing perfect information models in explaining why in the data inflation expectations respond with delays to monetary impulses and remain disanchored for years in the 1970s u s monetary policy is found to signal persistent inflationary shocks explaining why inflation and inflation expectations were so persistently heightened the signalling effects of monetary policy also explain why inflation expectations adjusted more sluggishly than inflation after the robust monetary tightening of the 1980s

retail gasoline price cycles across spatially dispersed gasoline stations abstract studies of volatility in retail gasoline prices have used either weekly averages of the prices at a small subset of stations in a city or daily observations on prices at a small number of stations this paper uses daily observations on station specific prices within a large canadian metropolitan area to address whether weekly average prices or prices for a small number of stations provide an accurate description of pricing in a market with volatility this paper considers whether researchers using restricted data can draw meaningful conclusions about the appropriate theoretical model and the policy response to allegations of anticompetitive behavior

the signaling role of policy actions abstract in an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank s assessment to firms because mark up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion recognizing the signaling role of its instrument the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms beliefs while providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms coordination is highly valuable

vertical control and price cycles in gasoline retailing we examine norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station specific observations from 2003 to 2006 the four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry wide labeled price support this moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern where we observe de facto simultaneous decision making by the headquarters without knowledge of their rivals prices when every monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level the price level on mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

price leadership and unequal market sharing collusion in experimental markets abstract we consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price setting duopolies we investigate the effect on collusion of sequential versus simultaneous price setting we also examine the effect on collusion of changes in the size of each subject s market share in case both subjects set the same price our results show that sequential price setting compared with simultaneous price setting facilitates collusion if subjects have equal market shares or if the follower has the larger market share with sequential price setting we find more collusion if subjects have equal market shares rather than unequal market shares we observe more collusion if the follower has the larger market share than if the follower has the smaller market share

endogenous price commitment sticky and leadership pricing evidence from the italian petrol market this article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky pricing policy using daily italian firm level prices and weekly average eu prices we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold first it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes after the policy change the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost based to sticky leadership pricing second using a dif in dif estimation and a synthetic control group we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky leadership pricing our paper highlights the importance of price commitment by a large firm in order to sustain tacit collusion

an empirical investigation of the determinants of asymmetric pricing abstract this article empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases using daily price data for over 11 000 retail gasoline stations i find that prices fall more slowly than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs premium gasoline prices are shown to fall more slowly than regular fuel prices which supports theories based upon competition with consumer search further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing

optimal monetary policy when information is market generated endogenous i e market generated signals observed by firms have crucial implications for monetary policy when information is endogenous firms gather a demand signal from their market that is both real and nominal as a result the traditional surprise channel of monetary policy is absent instead monetary policy works through a signaling channel as it affects firms information through the demand signal the optimal policy is then the signaling policy i e the policy that maximizes the information content of the demand signal in our setup the signaling policy targets a positive correlation between money supply and prices which emphasizes the natural response of prices to real shocks on the contrary in the more traditional case of exogenous information optimal monetary policy would stabilize prices as it acts through the surprise channel we show that the signaling policy is optimal regardless of the amount of attention that firms pay to central bank communication

a theory of endogenous commitment commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action the weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed as it is assumed this paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model we construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish but pay a switching cost if they do so we show that for games with two players and two actions there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple structure this equilibrium is independent of the order and timing of moves and is robust to other protocol specifications moreover despite the perfect information nature of the model and the costly switches strategic delays may arise in equilibrium the flexibility of the model allows us to apply it to various environments in particular we study an entry deterrence situation its equilibrium is intuitive and illustrative of how commitment power is endogenously determined copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

elasticity of attention and optimal monetary policy abstract optimal monetary policy depends on whether agents have exogenous endogenous inelastic or endogenous elastic attention under elastic attention optimal monetary policy induces equilibria that are not possible under the other two settings no attention to any shocks that generate inefficient economic fluctuations

seasonal patterns in daily prices of unleaded petrol across australia abstract this study addresses a very significant policy issue not previously examined at a disaggregated level for australia by identifying on which day s petrol is more expensive and in which locations discount days are non existent after conducting a time series analysis of the day of the week effect in retail prices of unleaded petrol in 114 locations across australia jan 2005 to apr 2012 it is observed that prices mostly peak on thursday friday and then decline until they hit their cyclical trough mainly on sunday tuesday however these daily differences are only statistically significant in capital cities or large regional centres a cross sectional analysis of the mean prices during the period nov 2007 to feb 2012 shows that a in remote and less populous locations where sales are presumably limited and overhead costs are high petrol is more expensive b petrol generally costs more in places which exhibit less price variability the disaggregated and location specific results can increase our understanding of australia s retail petrol market and can be beneficial to motorists as well as various government and non government organisations such as the accc australian competition and consumer commission aaa australian automobile association and fuelwatch

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

edgeworth price cycles evidence from the toronto retail gasoline market i exploit a new station level twelve hourly price dataset to examine the strong retail price cycles in the toronto gasoline market the cycles appear similar to theoretical edgeworth cycles strongly asymmetric tall rapid and highly synchronous across stations i test a series of predictions made by the theory about how firm behaviors would differentially evolve over the path of a cycle the evidence is consistent with the existence of edgeworth cycles and inconsistent with competing hypotheses while the cycles are an interesting phenomenon for study in their own right the evidence has important policy and welfare implications

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

optimal monetary policy with uncertain fundamentals and dispersed information this paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector s uncertainty about the economy s fundamentals information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks a standard productivity shock and a noise shock affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized despite the lack of superior information monetary policy can affect the economy s relative response to the two shocks as time passes better information on past fundamentals becomes available the central bank can then adopt a backward looking policy rule based on more precise information about past shocks by announcing its response to future information the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by forward looking consumers with different beliefs and thus affect the equilibrium allocation if the announced future response is sufficiently aggressive the central bank can completely eliminate the effect of noise shocks however this policy is typically suboptimal as it leads to an excessively compressed distribution of relative prices the optimal monetary policy balances the benefits of aggregate stabilization with the costs in terms of cross sectional efficiency copyright wiley blackwell