an appraisal of alternative blueprints for international policy coordination this paper examines two schemes for the international coordination of macroeconomic policy using a world econometric model the national institute global econometric model the first is the extended target zone scheme proposed by j williamson and m miller 1987 which involves targeting fundamental equilibrium exchange rates using monetary policy and using fiscal policy to control domestic demand the second uses fiscal policy to target the current account and monetary policy to stabilize domestic demand both schemes are parameterized using optimal control techniques on the national institute global econometric model and the welfare gains in using these schemes compared to historical experience from 1974 to 1986 are assessed

fair trade towards an economics of virtue over the past 10 years the sales of fair trade goods particularly those carrying the fair trade labelling organizations international flo certification mark have grown exponentially academic interest in fair trade has also grown significantly over the past decade with researchers analysing the model from a wide range of theoretical perspectives whilst fair trade is generally acknowledged as a new supply chain model it has tended to be studied at the micro organisational level rather than at the macro systems level as a consequence its wider impact as institutional innovation at the field level appears to have been under theorised so far in order to address this research gap this article uses a neo institutionalist perspective to analyse fair trade not simply as a new exchange model working within existing organisational and economic structures but rather as an agent of institutional entrepreneurship at and beyond the field level from this latter perspective fair trade brings a new set of transformational meanings to extant exchange and consumption models and reforms fields of economic exchange by disrupting and then re assembling key institutional elements around modern consumption to roll back commodity fetishism and reconnect consumers and producers the type of institutional change driven by fair trade can be seen as a form of social entrepreneurship

why do different countries choose a different public private mix of educational services we observe a wide range across countries in the percentage of total enrollments that attend private rather than public schools this paper seeks to explain 1 the systematically higher proportion of private enrollments pvt in developing as compared with developed countries at the secondary level and 2 the seemingly random variation across countries within a given level of education and stage of development i argue that the latter is due to differentiated demand and nonprofit supply both of which stem from cultural heterogeneity especially religious heterogeneity in contrast the large pvt at the secondary level in developing countries is hypothesized to stem from limited public spending which creates an excess demand from people who would prefer to use the public schools but are involuntarily excluded and pushed into the private sector the limited public spending on secondary education in turn is modelled as a collective decision which is strongly influenced by the

modeling charitable giving using a box cox standard tobit model there is a large literature investigating the determinants of charitable giving in particular price and income elasticities we find that many of the most often reported results from this literature rely on a model specification that is inappropriate when applied to recent federal tax file data we develop a standard tobit model with a box cox transformation parameter that nests a number of other specifications the box cox model yields estimates of price elasticities and expected charitable contributions that differ from those obtained using the typical specification additionally we find that the use of sample weights provides potentially important policy insights copyright 1991 by mit press

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin a general model this paper develops a model of large group chamberlinian monopolistic competition in which 1 there are many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm is negligible in that it can ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry leads to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve the existence of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium is established in a companion paper more particular questions such as whether the market provides too many or too few products are addressed for a special case of the model

competition and screening with motivated health professionals two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals who are privately informed about their ability and motivation hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue the non profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers in equilibrium when both hospitals are active the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability neutral allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar the non profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for profit one

how important is pro social behaviour in the delivery of public services a number of papers have suggested that pro social behaviour in the workplace may be sensitive to the institutional environment but there is little empirical research that attempts to test this directly using data on worker behaviour this is the aim of this paper we show that individuals in the non profit sector are significantly more likely to do unpaid overtime than those in the for profit sector however we find no evidence of adjustment along either the extensive or intensive margins when individuals change sectors the results of our analysis therefore point to selection and we find supporting evidence that individuals do self select on the basis of their propensity to donate labour

comment on endogenous objectives and the evaluation of targeting rules for monetary policy 1 four mccallum principles itis bothanprivilege andapleasureformetoparticipateinthisconferenceinhonorofbennettt mccallum henceforthbtm thus beforeproceedingtomakespeci c comments regarding carl walsh s elegant paper on endogenous objectivesand targeting rules i would like to begin by providing some context in light ofbtm snumerouscontributionstotheanalysisofmonetarypolicy forthispurpose itishelpfultohighlightfourbasicprinciplesofeffectivemonetarypolicythatbtmhas consistently emphasized over the past several decades given the logicalcoherencyandintuitiveappealofhisworkonthissubject itisonlynaturaltorefertothesefourpointsasthe mccallumprinciples the rstmccallumprincipleisthatmonetarypolicymatters thatis theconductof monetary policy can have important consequences for social welfare btmanalyzedthetheoreticalandempiricalunderpinningsofthisprincipleinaseriesof

monopolistic competition with experience goods this paper constructs a model of monopolistic competition where consumers cannot directly verify product quality prior to an initial purchase instead consumers base initial purchases on observed prices which perfectly signal firms qualities both in and out of equilibrium equilibrium quality is less than efficient but generally bounded away from the minimum quality with free entry observable product variety exceeds what would prevail with perfect information as repeat purchases become large relative to initial purchases or as firms become small relative to the size of the market equilibrium product quality rises and the market converges to the full information equilibrium

quality competition with profit constraints abstract firms in markets such as health care and education are often profit constrained due to regulation or their non profit status and they are often viewed as being altruistic towards consumers we use a spatial competition framework to study incentives for cost containment and quality provision by altruistic firms facing profit constraints if prices are regulated profit constraints lead to lower cost containment efforts but higher quality if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic under price competition profit constraints reduce quality and cost containment efforts but lead to lower prices if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic profit constrained firms cost containment efforts are below the first best while their quality might be too high or too low if prices are regulated profit constraints can improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price depending on the degree of altruism

the geography of giving the effect of corporate headquarters on local charities abstract does the presence of corporate headquarters in a city affect the incomes of local charities to address this question we combine data on the head office locations of publicly traded u s firms with information on the receipts of local charitable organizations cities like houston san jose and san francisco gained significant numbers of corporate headquarters over the past two decades while cities like chicago and los angeles lost our analysis suggests that attracting or retaining the headquarters of a publicly traded firm yields approximately 3 10 million per year in contributions to local non profits likewise each 1000 increase in the market value of the firms headquartered in a city yields 0 60 1 60 to local non profits most of the increase in charitable contributions is attributable to an effect on the number of highly compensated individuals in a city rather than through direct donations by the corporations themselves the increased private sector donations from the presence of corporate headquarters do not seem to crowd out government grants to local charities

evaluating the extended target zone proposal for the g 3 this paper evaluates the extended target zone proposal of williamson and miller using the national institute world economic model gem williamson and miller s proposals envisage that real exchange rates will be controlled by movements in relative interest rates that fiscal policy will be used to steer nominal demand towards a target which depends on capacity utilization inflation and the current balance and that the average level of world interest rates will be used to control global nominal demand we evaluate the performance of these rules for the united states germany and japan over the period 1975 84 using control methods to determine the best choice of parameters in the feedback rules we then consider how history would have differed from actual events had such rules been in place the results suggest that such rules would have led to a significant improvement in economic performance exchange rate variability would have been reduced and the dramatic increase in united states interest rates which took place after 1980 would have been avoided this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does competition from private surgical centres improve public hospitals performance evidence from the english national health service abstract this paper examines the impact of a government programme which facilitated the entry of for profit surgical centres to compete against incumbent national health service hospitals in england we examine the impact of competition from these surgical centres on the efficiency measured by pre surgery length of stay for hip and knee replacement patients and case mix of incumbent public hospitals we exploit the fact that the government chose the broad locations where these surgical centres independent sector treatment centres or istcs would be built based on local patient waiting times not length of stay or clinical quality to construct treatment and control groups that are comparable with respect to key outcome variables of interest using a difference in difference estimation strategy we find that the government facilitated entry of surgical centres led to shorter pre surgery length of stay at nearby public hospitals however these new entrants took on healthier patients and left incumbent hospitals treating patients who were sicker this paper highlights a potential trade off that policymakers face when they promote competition from private for profit firms in markets for the provision of public services

wolves in sheep s clothing is non profit status used to signal quality abstract why do many firms in the healthcare sector adopt non profit status one argument is that non profit status serves as a signal of quality when consumers are not well informed a testable implication is that an increase in consumer information may lead to a reduction in the number of non profits in a market we test this idea empirically by exploiting an exogenous increase in consumer information in the us nursing home industry we find that the information shock led to a reduction in the share of non profit homes driven by a combination of home closure and sector switching the lowest quality non profits were the most likely to exit our results have important implications for the effects of reforms to increase consumer provision in a number of public services

siblings strangers and the surge of altruism abstract we demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists we assume that each individual plays a one shot prisoner s dilemma game with his or her sibling or with a stranger and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game we model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents we then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population we specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists

the nonprofit sector and industry performance abstract despite the importance of nonprofit industries in the economy little analysis has been conducted as to whether the behavior of such industries differs from that of for profit industries extending previous firm level analyses we propose a neoclassical theory with an endogenous nonprofit sector our analysis implies that nonprofit firms have a competitive advantage over for profit firms so that marginal changes in the industry operate through the for profit sector as such marginal industry behavior is identical to that of a for profit industry and nonprofit regulations may have a limited impact or even no impact on overall industry performance our theory has the methodological advantage that standard for profit analysis applies directly to nonprofit firms because they can be analyzed as for profit firms with lower costs we discuss aspects of the empirical literature that test this theory of nonprofit activity

competition between microfinance ngos evidence from kiva summary this paper investigates empirically the effect of competition between microfinance ngos seeking subsidized capital from individual social investors although ngo behavior in competitive environments is often subject to controversy there is little formal empirical evidence to illustrate theoretical findings and inform policy using data from kiva an online peer to peer p2p microfinance platform we find that competition has a sizable negative impact on projects funding speed and that the effect is stronger between close substitutes this is important because competition for subsidized capital implies organizational pressures similar to those faced when ngos compete for donations

solving for optimal simple rules in rational expectations models this paper presents algorithms that solve for optimal simple monetary policy rules in rational expectations models with precommitment and discretion the algorithms are applied to the models in fuhrer j money credit banking 29 1997 214 clarida et al j econ lit 37 1999 1661 and rudebusch econ j 112 2002 402 to examine the efficiency properties of operational policy rules we show that optimized taylor type rules preform well in these models but that aside from the fuhrer moore model this result is sensitive to whether the central bank can respond to current period shocks taylor type rules that are operational in the sense that they do not respond to current period information are found to be highly inefficient in the rudebusch model and in the clarida et al 1999 model

equilibrium with product differentiation tive consumer formulations is used to examine the properties of single and multiple price equilibria conditions under which decreases in the intensity of consumer preferences reduce price are given it is shown that with certain types of demand curves entry can eliminate price cost markups even given product differentiation if competition is localized it is demonstrated that entry does not affect the markup finally the effect of spurious product differentiation on price is examined

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

not for profit entrepreneurs abstract entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not for profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives such incentives protect donors volunteers consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur we derive conditions under which completely self interested entrepreneurs opt for not for profit status despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises we also show that even in the absence of tax advantages unrestricted donations would flow to non profits rather than for profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non profits

would nonprofit workers accept to earn less evidence from france this article focuses on wage differentials between french nonprofit for profit and public sectors considering the public sector allows testing more extensively the labour donation theory preston 1989 the findings support this theory because nonprofit workers accept to earn significantly less than they would earn in the for profit and public sectors they also suggest differences in the motivations of workers in these sectors nonprofit workers are attracted to their work for reasons transcending material compensation

whither the nonprofit wage differential estimates from the 1990 census this article provides new estimates of the nonprofit for profit wage differential in the u s economy using observations on 4 1 million private sector employees from the 1990 census i find either zero or slightly positive economy wide wage differences between nonprofit and for profit employees in a standard earnings equation format significant wage differentials are found at the disaggregated occupation and industry level and provide a basis for testing hypotheses explaining nonprofit for profit wage differences

the economics of vocation or why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse abstract given the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions why could not nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the profession we tell a story in which the status of nursing as a vocation implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of applicants attracted the underlying mechanism accords with the notion that increasing wages might attract the wrong sort of people into the profession and highlights an in efficiency wage mechanism particular to vocations which makes wages sticky up wards the analysis has implications for job design in vocation based sectors such as nursing and teaching

comment on mckinnons s monetary rule i f the world wishes to return to fixed exchange rates then mckinnon s monetary rule provides the right way to go about the task over the past year he has modified his longstanding proposals in order to accommodate the breakdown of monetarism he no longer urges the participants to follow a fixed rate of aggregate monetary growth consistant with zero inflation but instead to vary their aggregate monetary growth in a way that will achieve zero inflation thus recognizing the variability in velocity similarly he has widened his recommended band to 10 percent at least initially and now calls for interest rate variations to be used to manage rates except when they move to the margins at which point symmetrical unsterilized intervention becomes mandatory i see no reason to quibble with his analysis on the means to fix exchange rates the remaining question is of course whether the end of fixed nominal exchange rates is a sensible one in questioning that i am not challenging his analysis of the costs that floating rates have imposed on the world or his judgment of their vast magnitude i have tried to argue the same myself williamson 1985 pp 38 46 but that does not mean that there are not real social benefits from exchange rate flexibility in this note i shall outline those benefits and then proceed to describe my principal analytical disagreement with mckinnon the alternative which i shall contrast to the mckinnon rule is the extended target zone proposal developed in edison miller and williamson 1987 and sum

a total eclipse of the heart compensation strategies in entrepreneurial nonprofits abstract we examine how shifting resource dependencies influence compensation strategy during commercial transitions within entrepreneurial nonprofits analyzing a longitudinal sample of 4732 organizations we show how compensation strategies shift non linearly as nonprofits transition from contributed resource dependence to market based resource dependence dynamic quadratic models unveil a dual threshold of commercialization concerning this transition nonprofits at moderate stages of commercialization contend with competing dependencies from both contributed and market based sources resulting in a decrease in compensation spending and an increase in part time employment at higher stages contributed resource dependence is eclipsed by market based dependence reflected in increasing compensation spending and full time employment

consistent conjectures in monopolistic competition abstract models of monopolistic competition such as dixit and stiglitz and spence typically assume firms take market variables as parametric this conjectural variation corresponds to chamberlin s large group approximation although these models need not have a large number of firms the present note following perry shows that consistent conjectures about the size and number of rivals can provide a more satisfactory basis for this assumption

comparing the global performance of alternative exchange arrangements abstract this paper presents and applies a methodology useful for studying the operating characteristics of a number of alternative monetary arrangements using a large scale simulation model of the world economy we consider the performance of the regimes when policymakers do or do not observe the shocks and when policymakers infer the shocks using an optimal filtering rule although the results are model specific and at best illustrative of the issues involved the approach does have the advantage of providing a richer framework of analysis than is possible in simple models of international interdependence

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

an accurate measurement of the crowd out effect income effect and price effect for charitable contributions in the past empirical research on charitable contributions has focused on two issues estimating the income and price elasticities of contributions and estimating the extent to which government funding crowded out private contributions the two fundamental problems in all these studies are the differences in the underlying conceptual models and the use of imperfect data for empirical analysis this paper addresses both of these problems

quality reputation and the choice of organizational form this paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior we extend the glaeser and shleifer glaeser e shleifer a 2001 not for profit entrepreneurs journal of public economics 81 99 115 framework which studies an entrepreneur s optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non contractible into a repeated interaction setting the main result is that when reputations can be sustained then for profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured this finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer consumer relationship may be inadequate

media coverage and charitable giving after the 2004 tsunami author affiliation philip h brown department of economics colby college 5246 mayflower hill waterville me 04901 usa e mail phbrown colby edu corresponding author jessica h minty analysis group inc 111 huntington avenue 10th floor boston ma 02199 usa e mail jminty analysisgroup com acknowledgment we are grateful to claudio agostini michael donihue martin farnham rebecca graninger daniel hamermesh melanie siben tom tietenberg andreas waldkirch seminar participants at colby college and two anonymous referees for numerous helpful comments and suggestions we would also like to acknowledge reuters alertnet and chuck lakin for their assistance in identifying data sources and care usa catholic relief services mercy corps surfaid international and four other relief agencies for providing data for the purpose of this research finally philip h brown would like to thank the international food policy research institute for sabbatical support during the preparation of this manuscript 1 introductionrelief workers have long believed in the causal relationship between media coverage of humanitarian crises and charitable giving to relief agencies for example private donations to relief agencies during the early stages of the 1994 rwandan genocide were sufficient to support approximately one million displaced rwandans but after the tribulations of o j simpson and tanya harding eclipsed rwanda in the media funding for relief activities began to decline the perception among many aid workers in the camps for rwandan refugees including one of the authors was that the media had turned its back on the crisis with potentially dire consequences 1while anecdotal evidence abounds few studies have systematically assessed the relationship between media coverage and the behavior of private donors and those that do suffer from important analytical shortcomings for example an analysis undertaken by the institute for philanthropy finds that 14 of 15 surveyed british philanthropists believe that the media has the power to encourage private giving with 11 of the 15 being inspired to make charitable donations themselves breeze 2005 similarly olsen carstenson and hoyen 2003 find a high correlation between the total number of relevant articles in western newspapers and the total amount of humanitarian assistance allocated to victims of the flooding in mozambique in 2000 and the cyclone in eastern india in 1999 unfortunately neither sample is large enough to make generalizations nor is there any attempt to quantify the magnitude of the causal relationship in part the difficulty in quantifying the relationship stems from disentangling the effect of new developments in stories covered in the media from the pure effect of media coverage returning to the rwanda case the former is tantamount to asking what is the combined effect of 10 000 additional deaths and a five minute news story on donations to u s charities while the latter is equivalent to asking given that 10 000 people were killed what is the effect of increasing the news story from five minutes to six in this paper we use the december 26 2004 tsunami as a case study to quantify the causal effect of media coverage on donations to charity specifically we consider the effects of reporting on three nightly network news broadcasts and articles in two prominent newspapers on private donations to seven u s relief agencies to eliminate the time lag between when news reports are seen or read and when donations are received by relief agencies we focus exclusively on donations made via the internet we also control for donor fatigue tax incentives and weekends to better isolate the effect of media coverage finally to alleviate simultaneity concerns and omitted variable bias including new developments in the tsunami story itself we use announcements of casualties among u

asymmetric information ownership and quality of care an empirical analysis of nursing homes theoretically when asymmetric information exists nonprofit organizations due to the attenuation of the property right provide better quality of service than do the for profits despite extensive theoretical examination of the behavior of nonprofits there has been very little empirical testing of the plausibility of these theories this article addresses the effect of ownership type on the quality of service in the nursing home industry an environment particularly conducive to identifying the existence of asymmetric information the study shows that the differences between for profit and nonprofit homes do become manifest when asymmetric information is present

hospital competition and quality with regulated prices we analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices considering the effect of both introducing competition monopoly versus competition and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs increased substitutability or a higher number of hospitals with semi altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous in contrast to the received body of theoretical literature this is consistent with and potentially explains the mixed empirical evidence

signaling and screening of workers motivation abstract this paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm we characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers motivation is private information while posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply the optimal wage scheme entails a trade off between the probability of filling the vacancy the rents left to the worker and the expected worker s motivation

dynamic income progressive taxes and the timing of charitable contributions using an econometric model of charitable giving and a 10 year panel of tax return data i find that previous studies have underestimated the effects of permanent income and overestimated the effects of permanent changes in tax prices the significant statutory tax changes that occurred during the 1980s especially in 1986 serve to identify the key model parameters my results imply that people smooth their giving when transitory income changes but also time their giving to exploit transitory changes in tax prices the results also raise questions about how effectively the tax incentives permanently influence the level rather than just the timing of charitable giving by individuals

the charitable activities of terrorist organizations violent groups sometimes invest significant resources in social work notably in the form of charities and ngos the present paper models a terrorist group s charities as a means to advertise its cause in order to raise popular support the analysis explains how different types of organizations arise in equilibrium depending on government policies then the interaction between a purely terrorist group and an independent local ngo is examined it is shown that a purely terrorist group always invests in more attacks than an integrated terrorist charity organization furthermore the latter may have more ngo activity than a separate local ngo

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federal system proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks the author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations the author characterizes the response of political economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions partial replacement is the most likely outcome though others are possible copyright 1987 by american economic association

replacing trust with control a field test of motivation crowd out theory results in behavioural economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out motivation if agents are mission oriented rather than self interested we test this prediction on a sample of non profit organisations in sweden traditionally contracts with the main principal the swedish foreign aid agency have been based on trust and self regulation we designed a randomised policy experiment effectively replacing the trust based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal overall using both self reported and observed measures of outreach we find that the intervention increased outreach reduced expenditures and reduced the number of financial irregularities

working in the for profit versus not for profit sector what difference does it make an inquiry on preferences of voluntary and involuntary movers we investigate the drivers of the for profit not for profit wage differential by comparing judgments of job characteristics of workers who voluntarily or involuntarily moved from the former to the latter sector we define voluntary movers as those who applied for a job in a not for profit organization and when successful resigned from a for profit position while involuntary movers have either been laid off by their company or resigned without already having a job offer in the not for profit sector we observe that a large share of voluntary movers do not end up with higher wages but surprisingly do have higher job satisfaction after the change the vast majority of voluntary movers find significantly higher time flexibility improved relationships with stakeholders and closer conformity to educational skills in their new jobs our findings support the forprofit not for profit compensating differential hypothesis and shed light on mechanisms that are beyond the job donation behavior of intrinsically motivated workers

subsidies hierarchy and peers the awkward economics of higher education higher education is a business it produces and sells educational services to customers for a price and it buys inputs with which to make that product production is subject to technological constraints costs and revenues discipline decisions and determine the long run viability of a college or university but higher education is not just a business while that statement is often meant to imply that higher education is nobler than business more decent and humane in the purposes it serves it can also mean that even in economic terms higher education is in important ways simply different from a business this paper asks how well our extensive experience with commercial businesses and the microeconomic theory of firms and markets that has evolved to describe them helps in understanding the economics of higher education that experience and those insights will be used by trustees politicians administrators lawyers reporters and the public as well as by economists to understand and evaluate the behavior of colleges and universities so it is useful to ask how safe it is to use the economic analogy in the context of higher education drawing parallels between universities and firms students and customers faculty and labor markets and so on the discussion here seeks to identify the key economic features of higher education that make it different from familiar for profit industries and to ask what difference those differences make this is a stick that can be picked up from either end one approach is to start with meticulous economic theory and see how far it can be made to encompass the economic realities of higher education an excellent recent paper by rothschild and white 1995 does that in their matching model students and colleges meet

voluntary activities and daily happiness in the united states this article analyzes differences in daily happiness between those individuals in the united states who perform voluntary activities during the day and those who do not using the well being module of the american time use survey 2010 we find that those who devote any time to voluntary activities during the day report higher levels of daily happiness than those who do not comparing the happiness obtained from a range of activities we find that volunteering is among the most enjoyable indicating that time spent on voluntary activities is utility enhancing we document that the effect of voluntary activities on the experienced utility of individuals can be decomposed into a time composition effect and an activity effect with the latter explaining between 11 and 46 of the observed difference jel d13 j16 j22

value of an additional firm in monopolistic competition the paper develops a model of monopolistic competition in which the satisfaction levels consumers get from products are independently and identically distributed potential substitution among products then generates demand curves through the mechanism of order statistics the value of extra variety can be calculated directly pareto lognormal and beta distributions are investigated using numerical integration some but not all cases support the argument that the optimal number of firms exceeds the equilibrium number

specification of policy rules and performance measures in multicountry simulation studies abstract much recent analysis of international monetary and fiscal policy issues has been conducted by stochastic simulations with multicountry econometric models in these studies it has become standard practice to consider alternative policy rules of a form that calls for departures of a policy instrument from some baseline reference path that are proportional to deviations of a specified target variable from its own baseline path the present paper argues that this standard rule form is seriously defective for such issues because th eimplied rules often fail to be operational and have associated performance measures that can be misleading in important cases jel c50 f30

working for god evidence from a change in financing of nonprofit health care providers in uganda what motivates religious nonprofit health care providers this paper uses a change in financing of nonprofit health care providers in uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior we show

charitable motives and bidding in charity auctions research on bidding in auctions has generally relied on the assumption of self interested bidders this work relaxes that assumption in the context of charity auctions because understanding charitable motives has important implications for auction design and charities fundraising strategies this study investigates bidders specific types of charitable motives and the strength of these motives we carry out three controlled field experiments consisting of real life auctions conducted on a local internet auction site we use a novel design in which we simultaneously run charity and noncharity auctions for identical products and vary the percentage donated to charity results show that auctions with proceeds donated to charity lead to significantly higher selling prices a result due to a higher bidding by bidders with charitable motives rather than to increased bidder entry we also find that increased prices only occur when the charitable donation is a percentage of the auction revenue and that a fixed charitable donation associated with each auction has no effect on prices furthermore we find that prices are increasing in the percentage donated to charity we find considerable support for a model of voluntary shill like bidding where charitable bidders try to increase proceeds in charity auctions we also find that auctions with 25 of revenue donated to charity had higher net revenue than noncharity auctions hence companies may be able to use charity auctions as part of a corporate social responsibility strategy and at the same time increase profitability even though they donate part of the proceeds to charity

compensation in the nonprofit sector we investigate the determinants of pay in the nonprofit sector using data for 25 55 year olds from the 1994 88 current population survey outgoing rotation groups our results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensation is primarily determined in competitive markets without labor donations to nonprofit employers one implication is that nonprofit workers receive virtually the same wages as observationally equivalent employees in similar positions with profit seeking enterprises we cannot rule out the possibility of nonprofit penalties or premiums for selected groups however the differentials are generally small and competition appears to play a dominant role in nonprofit wage setting

managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility abstract this paper presents a theory of corporate social responsibility in the form of the private provision of public goods and private redistribution by a firm these social expenditures are determined by a manager operating under a compensation contract chosen by shareholders in a capital market that prices social expenditures the theory incorporates three explanations for compensation systems that encompass social performance first consumers may reward the firm for its social expenditures second managers may have personal preferences for contributing to social causes and third the shareholder clientele a firm attracts may prefer social expenditures social incentives are higher powered the more consumers reward the firm and the stronger are shareholders warm glow preferences for social expenditures profit incentives are higher powered the more consumers reward the firm but are independent of shareholder preferences when consumers reward the firm for its social expenditures firms with higher ability managers have both higher operating profits and higher social expenditures when times are good so a positive correlation is predicted in bad times however the correlation is negative except for firms with very low ability managers in very bad times where the correlation is zero

managerial talent motivation and self selection into public management the quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries calls to attract the economy s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound this paper studies self selection into managerial and non managerial positions in the public and private sector using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation we find that if demand for public sector output is not too high the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector as a result relatively many of the more able managers self select into the private sector since this outcome is efficient our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private sector levels is not cost efficient

what s in a message the longitudinal influence of a supportive versus combative orientation on the performance of nonprofits in this article the authors propose that in the long run a nonprofit organization with supportively oriented positioning e g promoting a cause is likely to survive longer and achieve more donations compared with a nonprofit with a combative orientation e g fighting against something to test this proposition the authors adopt a three pronged approach that 1 uses publicly available financial data from nonprofits tax filings over a ten year period 2 measures annual donor pledges from a field study with a registered nonprofit organization and 3 examines actual donation behavior of participants in a longitudinal lab study moreover the authors test this proposition for donations of money as well as time they consider various theoretical mechanisms that might cause the proposed effect such as regulatory focus theory inertia in giving and the preponderance of supportive charities

agency costs in environmental not for profits we examine the behavior of not for profits using utility maximization this leads to testable hypotheses regarding the costs of agency associated with the activities of not for profits our tests are similar to those previously employed regarding not for profit objectives but our interpretation is different our empirical test uses data on environmental groups unlike previous studies biased toward a finding of service maximization we account for endogenous explanatory variables a weak statement of our results is that managers of environmental groups derive positive marginal utility from expenditures for purposes other than providing services there may also be empirical support for a stronger conclusion

nonprofits and public good provision a contest based on compromises abstract two competing nonprofits with ideologically distinct missions compete for donor funding to provide an indivisible public good in a population with heterogeneous preferences this paper examines the extent to which average public values are undermined and nonprofits ideology compromised in a contractual game in which the right to provide the public good is the outcome of competition between nonprofits we also scrutinize the roles of i cooperative versus competitive contracting ii multiple public goods iii enforceability of actions and iv observability of nonprofit costs in determining the equilibrium terms of the contract in each case the intensity of the ideological divide between the donor and the nonprofits jointly impact the degree to which compromises are made in terms of both the public s and nonprofit s missions and the ability on the part of the donor to reap double cost saving and strategic financial gains

the dilemma of accountability for professionals a challenge for mainstream management theories professional institutions are increasingly confronted by fiscal constraints and political pressures to improve and increase their accountability in a competitive consumer driven market accordingly the need to ensure efficiency and accountability is of strategic importance this article reports on a qualitative study of medical professionals that assessed the utility of financial incentives and external control methods derived from agency theory to ensure accountability of professionals the authors argue that approaches derived from stewardship and institutional theories can extend the principal agent perspective to sustain greater social and ethical accountability

the social role of not for profit organizations hospital provision of charity care during the 1980s the state of new york shifted from a straight block grant to a matching grant method for reimbursing hospitals with the matching rate varying from 0 to 75 percent across years these changes allow estimation of pure income and price effects for hospitals supply of uncompensated care charity and bad debts the price efrect is positive and significant but no income effect was found hospitals in more concentrated markets provide more charity care as do teaching hospitals and the presence of public hospitals in a market reduces private hospitals provision of charity care

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin special results the idea of large group monopolistic competition was first introduced by chamberlin in i 933 although a large literature has developed on this topic since that time it can be argued that few of the models which have been formulated really capture monopolistic competition in chamberlin s sense in a companion paper to this one hart i 983 a model was presented which it was claimed did satisfy the desiderata of large group monopolistic competition specifically the model had the property that i there were many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm was negligible in the sense that it could ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry led to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faced a downward sloping demand curve and hence equilibrium price exceeded marginal cost the model of hart i983 was quite general and only such issues as the existence and limiting properties of equilibrium were considered the purpose of the present paper is to analyse a special case of this model in greater detail and to consider in this context the old question of whether too few or too many brands are produced under monopolistic competition before embarking on the analysis however let me briefly indicate why i believe that there is a need for a new model of monopolistic competition further discussion of this may be found in hart i983 in the last few years a sizeable literature has developed on imperfect competition and product differentiation see for example dixit and stiglitz i977 lancaster i979 salop i979 and spence i976 in much of this literature see for example spence i976 markets of fixed finite size are considered where the entry of firms is limited by the existence of set up costs under these conditions only a finite number of firms can operate and hence firms will not be negligible in the sense of 2 in addition due to the integer problem operating firms will generally make strictly positive profits i e 3 is violated models of