optimal voting rules under uncertainty the theory of constitutional choice of voting rules developed by buchanan and tullock is an extended to an explicit decision theoretic form voters in the constitutional position choose what they believe will be their optimal share or majority rule for making social decisions by maximizing their individual expected utility from the anticipated social decisions under conditions of uncertainty the rule that maximizes expected social benefits depends upon 1 the expected distribution and intensity of preferences on future issues and 2 the decisionmaking procedures and costs decisionmaking and external costs are shown to be interrelated following this analysis failure to pass laws imposes external costs in the same way that passing them does so that the optimal majority may be lower when desirable laws are viewed as changing over time decisionmaking costs depend upon the way in which voters are persuaded to support or oppose bills upon the distribution of preferences on bills and on vote trading possibilities if vote trading is almost costless a wide range of decision rules has nearly equal social benefits finally the model is used to discuss optimal voting rules for several decisionmaking bodies

voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes increasing revenue or increasing incentives to evade many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed i model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs i confirm the importance of administrative costs in a survey of german competent local tax authorities i then test the effects of voluntary disclosure on the tax evasion decision using the introduction of the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the u s for identification the analysis confirms that the introduction of voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion

the highs and lows of the minimum wage effect a time series cross section study of the canadian law we examine the effects of minimum wage legislation in canada over the period 1975 93 for teenagers we find that a 10 increase in the minimum wage is associated with roughly a 2 5 decrease in employment we also find that this result is driven by low frequency variation in the data at high frequencies the elasticity is positive and insignificant the difference in the elasticity across the bandwidth has implications for the interpretation of employment dynamics as a result of minimum wage policy and experimental design in minimum wage studies it also provides a simple reconciliation of the new minimum wage research which reports very small negative or positive elasticities

the consequences of minimum wage laws some new theoretical ideas economists generally agree that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers however this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of firms labor is not dependent on the wage in this paper we show that in a conventional efficiency wage model a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs the formal logic of our model is similar to the case of labor demand under monopsony but arises in a model with a large number of employers

taking the high road compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers abstract this paper provides evidence of evasion in the context of a widely used commuter tax allowance and explores evasion spillovers as a determinant of the individual compliance decision for this purpose we exploit discontinuities in the commuter allowance scheme and employ a research design resting on a large panel of individual tax returns we find that around 30 of all allowance claims are overstated and consistent with deliberate tax evasion we observe sharp reactions of taxpayers to thresholds where the allowance discretely jumps to a higher amount further we use variation in job changes to uncover spillover effects from the work environment on the individual compliance decision these effects appear to be asymmetric job changers moving to companies with a higher fraction of cheaters increase their cheating in contrast movers to companies with a lower fraction of cheaters tend not to alter their reporting behavior we provide suggestive evidence that the spillover has more to do with an information environment but can ultimately not reject other behavioral explanations such as asymmetric persistence of norms

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes although forbidden in democratic states a market for votes could improve efficiency this paper examines the way trading votes will change the outcome of an election a two party model with two phases is presented in the pre trading phase the two parties set their agendas consisting of a direct subsidy and an income tax in the trading phase voters buy and sell votes on the basis of rational voter behavior and a given income distribution it is shown that the outcome of the election depends mainly on how the selling voters are distributed among the voters

estimating dynamic demand for cigarettes using panel data the effects of bootlegging taxation and advertising reconsidered abstracct a dynamic demand for cigarette consumption is estimated using pooled data of 46 states over the period 1963 to 1980 a price elasticity of 0 2 and an insignificant income elasticity is found using pooled estimation techniques the bootlegging effect is modeled explicitly using neighboring price the effect is found to be significant two major policy issues are analyzed in light of these new estimates 1 cigarette taxation is found to be an effective tool for generating revenues even though there may be spillover effects to neighboring states where bootlegging is significant 2 the effects of the fairness doctrine act and the advertising ban on cigarette consumption are re examined we find mild support for the effectiveness of subsidized anti smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption and no support for the thesis that the ban on advertising helps to increase per capita consumption

the intergenerational causal effect of tax evasion evidence from the commuter tax allowance in austria does tax evasion run in the family to answer this question we study the case of the commuter tax allowance in austria this allowance is designed as a step function of the distance between the residence and the workplace creating sharp discontinuities at each bracket threshold the distance to these brackets is a strong determinant of compliance since it corresponds to the probability of detection the match of different administrative data sources allows us to observe actual compliance behavior at the individual level across two generations to identify the intergenerational causal effect in tax evasion behavior we use the paternal distance to bracket as an instrumental variable for paternal compliance we find that paternal noncompliance increases children s non compliance by about 20 percent

tax evasion and inequality this paper attempts to estimate the size and distribution of tax evasion in rich countries we combine random audits the key source used to study tax evasion so far with new micro data leaked from large offshore financial institutions hsbc switzerland swiss leaks and mossack fonseca panama papers matched to population wide wealth records in norway sweden and denmark we find that tax evasion rises sharply with wealth a phenomenon random audits fail to capture on average about 3 of personal taxes are evaded in scandinavia but this figure rises to close to 30 in the top 0 01 of the wealth distribution a group that includes households with more than 45 million in net wealth a simple model of the supply of tax evasion services can explain why evasion rises steeply with wealth taking tax evasion into account increases the rise in inequality seen in tax data since the 1970s markedly highlighting the need to move beyond tax data to capture income and wealth at the top even in countries where tax compliance is generally high we also find that after reducing tax evasion by using tax amnesties tax evaders do not legally avoid taxes more this result suggests that fighting tax evasion can be an effective way to collect more tax revenue from the very wealthy

from the lab to the field a review of tax experiments tax experiments have been gaining momentum in recent years although this literature dates back several decades with new developments in methods and data availability tax experiments have gradually moved away from lab settings and towards the field this movement from the lab to the field has happened against the background of the credibility revolution in applied economics which has seen more rigorous methods applied to policy relevant questions and of the availability to researchers of administrative data from tax returns these developments have allowed significant advances in the experimental literature on tax compliance this paper reviews this literature giving particular attention to field experiments using administrative data but putting them in the broader context of the compliance literature a particular effort is made to take a global perspective in a literature that is only recently seeing the emergence of evidence from africa latin america and asia

competition and the cigarette tv advertising ban competition and the cigarette tv advertising ban i introduction whether advertising increases or decreases competition has been debated for decades on one hand kaldor 1949 50 bain 1956 and others argue that advertising reduces competition by enabling the leading firms in an industry to increase product differentiation this lowers the existing elasticity of demand for the firm s output and erects barriers to the entry of new firms into the industry on the other hand telser 1964 nelson 1975 and others argue that advertising increases competition by disseminating information about the price and other product attributes more widely among consumers this increases the demand elasticities facing the existing firms and facilitates the entry of new firms the results of empirical studies of these alternative theories conflict and so the debate continues 1 empirical studies generally focus on large cross sectional industry samples and compare various measures of competition e g profits industrial concentration or market share stability between high advertising consumer goods industries and low advertising producer goods industries the principal drawback of this approach is that one must control for the many differences among industries in addition to advertising which might affect the proxies for competition the present paper takes a different approach to test the same hypotheses the 1970 ban of cigarette advertising on television can be viewed as a quasi experiment i assume that it substantially reduced the efficacy of cigarette advertising whatever its effects on competition and test for these effects by comparing industry performance measures before and after the ban the results on balance indicate that the ban reduced competition in the cigarette industry ii background in 1970 federal legislation was passed banning the advertising of cigarettes on television and radio effective 2 january 1971 the ban was the result of increasing evidence assumulated during the previous two decades regarding the adverse effects of smoking on health and was not related to considerations of industry competition prior to the ban the cigarette industry was a heavy user of television advertising see table i from 1963 to 1970 the industry s television plus radio advertising to sales ratio averaged 7 4 percent 2 the industry s total advertising to sales ratio during this period averaged 9 8 percent which was among the highest of all industries 3 television advertisements accounted for 76 percent of this total in effect the ban forced the industry to drop its principal advertising medium virtually overnight of course the industry could and did substitute advertising in other media for the lost television advertising however during the first five years after the ban increased spending in other media did not offset the elimination of television advertising expenditures consequently the mean total advertising to sales ratio fell to 6 7 percent during 1971 75 4 these advertising substitutes were qualitatively inferior exacerbating the impact of the spending reductions on efficacy advertising intensity did not approach pre ban levels again until 1976 during 1976 80 the advertising to sales ratio averaged 11 0 percent higher than the mean for the pre ban years 1963 70 5 because the substitutes were inferior to television advertisements the increased advertising expenditure per dollar of sales does not mean that the market impact of advertising was necessarily greater than for the pre ban period 6 it should also be noted that the ban did not cause a decline in industry sales it it had this might have generated its own confounding effects on the performance measures analyzed below total cigarette sales rose from about 470 billion units in 1960 to about 533 billion units in 1970 and about 620 billion units in 1980 a 32 percent increase over 1960

nonparametric tests of market structure an application to the cigarette industry the revealed preference approach is used to construct a nonparametric test of the monopoly model and some simple generalizations of it and the test is applied to data for the cigarette industry it exploits the maintained hypothesis that variations in the excise tax charged on a package of cigarettes allow us to assess seller reactions to common exogenous variations in marginal cost results indicate that the monopoly hypothesis and other simple models that do not embody at least a moderate amount of competition serve as poor predictors of the effects of excise tax changes on cigarette prices sales and revenues copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

do norms on contribution behavior affect intrinsic motivation field experimental evidence from germany abstract this paper studies how imposing norms on contribution behavior affects individuals intrinsic motivation we consider the church levy which the catholic church in germany collects as a charitable donation despite the fact that the levy is legally a tax we design a randomized field experiment with treatments informing individuals that the levy is a tax we demonstrate that treatment effects differ across motivational types among weakly intrinsically motivated individuals communicating the legal norm results in a significant crowd out of intrinsic motivation in contrast strongly intrinsically motivated individuals do not show any treatment response

who participates in tax avoidance evidence from swedish microdata abstractthis article empirically examines why not all individuals participate in tax avoidance we use rich swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers with a link between corporate and individual tax returns and document that few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation in addition to monetary benefits from tax avoidance incentives the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance access as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities awareness are important factors for the individual s tax avoidance decision we further show that tax avoidance spreads within communities the impact of the local network is stronger for non commuters who live and work in the same municipality

vote trading with and without party leaders two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority individuals have different privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money we study theoretically and experimentally the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market the theory has strong predictions in both cases trading falls short of full efficiency but for opposite reasons with group leaders the minority wins too rarely with market trades the minority wins too often as a result with group leaders vote trading improves over no trade with market trades vote trading can be welfare reducing the theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data

testing hypotheses about firm behavior in the cigarette industry data on the effects of excise taxes are used to investigate the level of competition in the cigarette industry a lower bound on the numbers equivalent of firms in the context of the conjectural variations model is derived and estimated results point to at least a moderately high level of competition and in particular allow for the rejection of the perfect cartel model this paper relies on comparative statics results and hence circumvents recent criticisms of a study of monopoly behavior in the cigarette industry

fairness spillovers the case of taxation abstract it is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred however grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts causing non compliant behavior there we present evidence that such fairness spillovers can incur large economic costs a belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich do not pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work

an examination of the market for favors and votes in congress this paper examines the strategies that horse traders and power brokers adopt in trading favors to pass legislation although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading with data from the senate vote on the byrd amendment to the 1990 clean air act i conduct such a test the test provides evidence that on this vote i favor trading occurred ii the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination and iii the coalition leaders did not collude with each another

reducing evasion through self reporting evidence from charitable contributions abstract in absence of third party reporting taxpayers are required to self report information with various degrees of detail ranging from uncorroborated claims to comprehensive records with receipts using a quasi experimental design applied to noncash charitable contribution deductions i show that even basic self reporting requirements are effective at reducing evasion but impose large compliance costs on taxpayers i find that simplified reporting requirements reduce reporting costs by 55 per person and substantially increase claimed donations however half of the new donations are due to evasion thus information reporting should only be imposed on total reported donations above a pre specified threshold

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

measurement of monopoly behavior an application to the cigarette industry a simple scheme is proposed to measure monopoly pricing behavior the coefficient of the tax rate term in a price equation identifies the ratio of price to marginal cost no direct measurement of costs is required so a major problem for other empirical studies of monopoly is avoided empirical results for cross section time series data support rejection of atomistic competition but also provide evidence against the operation of an effective cartel in the cigarette industry the model represents an alternative interpretation of related results in a recent paper by barzel application of the methodology to other markets is feasible

how effective is the minimum wage at supporting the poor this study investigates the antipoverty efficacy of minimum wage policies proponents of these policies contend that employment impacts are negligible and suggest that consumers pay for higher labor costs through imperceptible increases in goods prices adopting this empirical scenario the analysis demonstrates that an increase in the national minimum wage produces a value added tax effect on consumer prices that is more regressive than a typical state sales tax and allocates benefits as higher earnings nearly evenly across the income distribution these income transfer outcomes sharply contradict portraying an increase in the minimum wage as an antipoverty initiative

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

the effects of logrolling on congressional voting the theoretical public choice literature suggests that vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior yet empirical voting models do not allow for vote trading these models recognize that observed ideology may influence legislative behavior but do not correct for unobserved ideology this study devises new tests for logrolling and ideology the empirical model controls for logroll agreements and unobserved ideological interest via the correlation of unobserved variables the results reflect the presence of vote trading coalitions on some votes but not on others the results cast doubt on the importance of personal ideological interests of legislators copyright 1992 by american economic association

equity and efficiency in rationed labor markets the social welfare implications of income tax policy are shown to critically depend on whether or not labor markets are rationed i e on the existence of involuntary unemployment with rationed labor markets raising taxes on the employed and transfers to the unemployed might improve both equity and efficiency it improves equity by redistributing income from the employed to the unemployed it improves efficiency as it encourages people with a small utility surplus of employment to exit the labor market leaving their jobs for people with a higher utility surplus i derive conditions under which this result continues to hold when only part of the labor market is rationed when there is both frictional and rationing unemployment and when rationing endogenously follows from trade unions monopoly power

scale economies and rent seeking in legislative parties this paper examines equilibrium legislative party size based upon scale economies in producing political outcomes political production finding policies legislators desire and votetrading to pass them has strong scale economies up to but not far beyond a majority of the voters either one or two parties is efficient but a larger number is not a single party s optimal long run strategy is to benefit a dominant majority by avoiding the creation of an effective second party but short term rent seeking is in legislators and leaders interests which eventually causes a second effective party and a stable two party equilibrium estimates of party size for the u s congress suggest considerable short term rent seeking

enforcement socioeconomic diversity and tax filing compliance in the united states in this article we examine the determinants of tax filing compliance in the united states we use county level data on non filing rates for the tax year 2000 obtained directly from the internal revenue service we include explanatory variables identified in the rational compliance framework including an enforcement index against identified non filers the audit rate of filers and the average penalty rate for both filers and non filers we also examine the role of socioeconomic diversity on tax compliance testing whether within county heterogeneity in household income language race and religion can help explain variation in non filing rates we find that non filing is increasing with heterogeneity by race although not by income or language and that non filing is decreasing with heterogeneity by religious membership as for enforcement variables we find that non filing rates tend to fall with the enforcement index other variables have somewhat mixed results

industry dynamics and the minimum wage a putty clay approach we document two new findings about the industry level response to minimum wage hikes first restaurant exit and entry both rise following a hike second there is no change in employment among continuing restaurants we develop a model of industry dynamics based on putty clay technology that is consistent with these findings in the model continuing restaurants cannot change employment and thus industry level adjustment occurs gradually through exit of labor intensive restaurants and entry of capital intensive restaurants interestingly the putty clay model matches the small estimated short run disemployment effect of the minimum wage found in other studies but produces a larger long run disemployment effect

ghostbusting in detroit evidence on nonfilers from a controlled field experiment abstract many people who owe income tax fail to file a timely tax return in communication with these ghosts what messages from the tax authority are effective for eliciting a return this is the first study to address message content in communication with income tax nonfilers i assess the efficacy of messages related to penalty salience punishment probability compliance cost and civic pride by evaluating the response to experimental mailings distributed by detroit to 7142 suspected resident nonfilers the penalty salience message was the most effective relative to a basic mailing that requested a return penalty salience mailings that stated the statutory penalty for failing to file a return tripled response rates from 3 to 10 compliance cost mailings that enclosed a blank tax return and punishment probability mailings that stated the recipient s federal income also raised response rates relative to the basic mailing but civic pride mailings did not i investigate the impact of treatment mailings on the behavior of untreated neighbors and find no evidence of geographic network effects

taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota abstract in 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected minnesota taxpayers was informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be closely examined compared to a control group that did not receive this letter low and middle income taxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance the effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity to evade in fact the difference in differences is not statistically significant for those who do not have self employment or farm income and do not pay estimated tax surprisingly however the reported tax liability of the high income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

a framework for dynamic oligopoly in concentrated industries in this article we introduce a new computationally tractable framework for ericson and pakes style dynamic oligopoly models that overcomes the computational complexity involved in computing markov perfect equilibrium mpe first we define a new equilibrium concept that we call moment based markov equilibrium mme in which firms keep track of their own state the detailed state of dominant firms and few moments of the distribution of fringe firms states second we provide guidelines to use mme in applied work and illustrate with an application how it can endogenize the market structure in a dynamic industry model even with hundreds of firms third we develop a series of results that provide support for using mme as an approximation we present numerical experiments showing that mme approximates mpe for important classes of models then we introduce novel unilateral deviation error bounds that can be used to test the accuracy of mme as an approximation in large scale settings overall our new framework opens the door to study new issues in industry dynamics

the median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium koford 1982 in a unidimensional setting the outcome under the former is the median while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location this paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median in particular for pure redistributive issues however for distributive issues the two equilibria will differ finally the comparative statics of the two models are examined while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences

democracy undone systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets we study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule we identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium in equilibrium only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority the equilibrium strongly resembles an all pay auction for decision power it makes clear that votes are only a medium for the allocation of power the probability of a minority victory is always higher than efficient and converges rapidly to one half as the electorate increases for any minority size the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant democracy is undone by the market

why can modern governments tax so much an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries we develop an agency model explaining why third party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful while third party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion we embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development showing that the tax take evolves as an s shape driven by changes in third party information we show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development

taxes informality and income shifting evidence from a recent pakistani tax reform abstract this paper examines firm behavior to taxation in a low enforcement and large informality setting using quasi experimental variation created by a tax reform which increased taxation of partnerships substantially relative to firms of other legal form and the population of income tax returns filed in pakistan in 2006 11 i document that treated firms report significantly lower earnings migrate into informality and switch business form in response to the increase in tax rate the revenue loss caused by these behavioral responses is so large that by the third year after the reform the government was collecting less revenue than it would have without the tax increase this implies that the new tax rate was on the wrong side of the laffer curve and would not have been optimal under any social preferences the richness of the data and tax variation permits me to decompose the observed responses into real and evasion margins and to identify fiscal externalities created by the reform on other tax bases the welfare cost of the reform increases by around 40 once these externalities are taken into account

is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution textabstractwe analyze the redistributional dis advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the in efficiency of labor rationing compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change a minimum wage increase raises involuntary unemployment but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment a minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing we show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment we write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum wage increase is undesirable in nearly all oecd countries a reduction in the minimum wage along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant would yield a pareto improvement

learning by doing organizational forgetting and industry dynamics learning by doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of flrms pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting we show that forgetting does not simply negate learning rather learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces in particular a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior market dominance and multiple equilibria whereas a model with learning alone cannot

the effects of banning advertising in junk food markets we develop a structural model to analyze the eects of banning advertising on market equilibria and welfare in junk food markets we consider the impact on demand and prices and show how to quantify welfare eects when advertising might lead consumers to take decisions that are inconsistent with their underlying preferences we use transaction level data on the potato chips market and nd that banning advertising leads to a direct reduction in demand but also toughens price competition leading to lower prices and increased demand welfare increases as consumers benet from no longer making distorted

morality in the market abstract being honest can be a competitive disadvantage in markets with the opportunity to violate laws and regulations producers who are willing to cheat may crowd out more efficient producers who are honest and buyers who are willing to cheat may crowd out honest buyers with higher willingness to pay this mechanism makes morality honesty a bad substitute for sanctions in markets honesty reduces cheating but the output may be less efficiently produced and less efficiently allocated among buyers i also show that the effect of honesty depends crucially on the fraction of honest traders among both buyers and sellers while it does not matter whether a buyer or a seller pays the sanction it does matter who is honest

a re examination of the fiorina plott and eavey voting experiments how much do cardinal payoffs influence outcomes abstract in fiorina and plott s 1978 classic committee voting experiments the players failure to choose the core is puzzling eavey 1991 ran the same experiments with different payoffs to see if the outcomes would change they did contrary to a core equilibrium this paper further examines the results using the individual and aggregate payoffs we examine whether the players maximize aggregate dollar payoffs or coalition aggregate payoffs they do not however the equilibrium moves in a direction consistent with the comparative statics of cardinal payoffs both core and cardinal payoffs seem to determine the results

a note on the effect of cost changes on prices in a recent article in this journal sumner 1981 took an ingenious approach to estimating the level of monopoly power in the cigarette industry he noted that differences in marginal costs exist in the industry due to varying levels of state taxes the sales prices established will satisfy the equation p i liq l mr mc where p price and q the elasticity of demand for the product in question if elasticity is a constant observing the change in marginal cost and the change in price enables one to infer the elasticity of demand perceived by the firm elasticity could then be used as a proxy for the firm s market power this technique turns out to be of very limited applicability however because it is extremely sensitive to the functional form assumed for the demand curve consider the general problem of a firm facing constant marginal costs of c in maximizing profits the firm solves

a note on seniority and political competition seniority conveys political power to legislators despite the fact that all legislators have equally valuable voting power what prevents a coalition of junior members from exercising their political power to form a coalition and claim an equal share of the power by eliminating the benefits of seniority several models explain how valuable services are supplied by senior members so the returns to seniority may be looked at as compensation for their services this still does not explain why the providers of those services should be chosen based on seniority rather than on some other criterion

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

when does coordination require centralization this paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag ers are privately informed and communicate strategically we consider a multi divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk the only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights we show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

bunching at the kink implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts abstract a large literature in empirical public finance relies on bunching to identify a behavioral response to non linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually we conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in medicare part d where a kink in the individual s budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous donut hole we show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts these findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest

feasible smooth income tax schedules benefits and distributional implications existing tax schedules are often overly complex and characterized by discontinuities in the marginal tax burden in this paper we propose a class of progressive smooth functions to replace persona

why so much stability an optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either 1 extreme restrictions upon preferences or 2 constraints upon the agenda the implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

optimal tax administration abstract this paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions the enforcement elasticity of tax revenue that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates among the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures and of the optimal compliance gap

logrolling in the u s congress i introduction a long standing question in political science is whether exchange occurs in legislatures as it is expected in any economy where the intensity of demand varies the issue was originally raised by buchanan and tullock 1962 and expanded by coleman 1966 and mueller 1967 the subsequent literature has produced numerous models of vote trading haefele 1971 riker and brams 1973 koford 1982a much of the work suggests that vote trading leads to chaotic results see for example riker and brams 1973 kramer 1977 and mckelvey 1976 currently vote trading s quantitative importance and optimality are unknown references to logrolling go back to the early literature in political science bentley 1907 refers to it and since then scholars such as mayhew 1966 and ferejohn 1974 have provided primarily anecdotal evidence for logrolling the economic analysis of logrolling has mostly been theoretical and little work has been done to assess the qualitative and quantitative importance of vote trading in legislatures however much might be learned from such analysis given the apparent puzzle that for most roll calls votes on parts of bills only a minority of districts stand to gain yet such proposals get passed until recently vote trading has not been identified empirically stratmann 1992 is the only paper that identifies vote trades statistically and it looks only at vote trades among agricultural interests however it would be interesting to know whether logrolling is prevalent in circumstances other than farm commodity programs we need to identify logrolling coalitions to assess how widespread logrolling agreements are we expect them to be common if the intensity of demand for legislation varies related to the issue of vote trading is the question of what factors determine congressional voting behavior major elements in a legislator s voting decision are constituency interests ideology party and perhaps vote trading one segment of the literature on congressional voting has focused on the role of political parties as an important force determining a legislator s voting decision some authors have argued that parties provide an organizational framework within which logrolling will happen see for example fiorina 1974 koford 1987 weingast and marshall 1988 johnson and stratmann 1992 alternatively lindsay and maloney 1988 suggest that party discipline forces a legislator to vote for or against a piece of legislation the latter view implies that on some issues party affiliation forces the legislator to vote against constituency interests 1 whether party affiliation is a signal to constituencies of one s overall propensity to vote on bills or a means to build coalitions or whether both elements are important is an unresolved question voting along party lines can be due to party loyalty or party pressure promoting the interests of one s constituency or logrolling within the party to answer questions about voting along party lines and about vote trading and coalitions within a quantitative framework one has to distinguish empirically between party loyalty and logrolling coalitions that are organized within a party empirical studies have typically included a party dummy variable in regression equations however if logrolling coalitions are organized within a party such a dummy variable will measure both potential party loyalty or potential party discipline and membership in a logrolling coalition this paper uses a different approach to separate the logrolling variable from the party loyalty variable and so distinguishes between voting for a proposal because of membership in a log rolling coalition organized by a party and because of potential party discipline this paper analyzes a broad range of votes where logrolling has been reported the analysis spans two congresses 1959 to 1962 and examines trades between interests favoring subsidies for city interests labor interests and farm interests

logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism theory and evidence from china this paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of logrolling between interest groups on social welfare in a non democratic political system in particular we focus on china where bureaucratic interest groups are separate vertical organizations reaching down from beijing to the provinces and cities the key question in this paper is what are the effects of the logrolling of parochial interest groups on state policies and social welfare in autocracies we address this question both theoretically and empirically the theory predicts a specific distortion in resource allocation because of logrolling while the empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction we find policy outcomes under logrolling are characterized by excessive spending on all the interest groups preferred goods and insufficient spending on public goods we test the existence of logrolling between the ministry of civil affairs and ministry of health in china our result shows logrolling between the two ministries lead to inefficiencies in social security and health care policies

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

experimental evidence on the relationship between tax evasion opportunities and labor supply abstract motivated by the observation that access to evasion opportunities is distributed heterogeneously across the labor market this paper examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on such evasion opportunities we first discuss the channels through which access to evasion affects labor supply responses and then set up a laboratory experiment n 205 in which all participants undertake a real effort task over several rounds subjects face a tax rate that varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income the treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not we find evidence that participants in the treatment group respond differently to changes in the net of tax rate than participants in the control group the effect is more prevalent when tax rates fall additionally the direction of the treatment effect is dependent on the evolution of tax rates across rounds

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

an empirical analysis of dynamic nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry this article develops a dynamic model of nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to analyze advertising competition in the u s cigarette industry the model generalizes existing studies by allowing advertising to affect both firm market shares and the total size of the market the model also allows dynamic conjectural variations to arise from the intertemporal links created by the durability of advertising we use these dynamic conjectural variations to distinguish alternative models of competitive interaction we estimate the complete model of firm production demand and advertising choice by using data for u s cigarette producers the results indicate that firm advertising primarily affects the level of market demand with a firm s effect on rival firms market shares arising through variations in the number of brands sold empirical results on firm behavior suggest that firms act as if their advertising choices will alter the future advertising choices of rival firms in both the high tar and low tar cigarette markets

non optimal unanimous agreement in collective decision making unanimous agreement is accepted as a benchmark for economic efficiency because with everyone in agreement on an issue a pareto superior move will result from the issue s approval 1 this view of unanimous agreement is not completely accurate though because when unanimous agreement occurs under a less than unanimous decision rule a situation could arise in which individuals could agree with a majority in order to avoid being in the minority there is an important distinction to be made between a decision rule of unanimity and unanimous agreement under a less than unanimous decision rule under a unanimous decision making rule every voter has veto power and so can vote against an issue to keep it from being approved this means that under a unanimous decision rule nobody will approve an issue unless approval makes the individual better off that the status quo under a less inclusive rule like simple majority rule an issue can be approved without the vote of any particular voter as long as a majority of the voters approve typically the voter s single vote will not affect the outcome of a majority rule election thus the voter faces the more complex choice of being in the majority coalition or in the minority coalition sometimes a voter will be better off in the majority coalition than in the minority coalition even if changes proposed by the majority coalition make the voter worse off than the status quo therefore one would not be justified in concluding that because there is unanimous agreement on an issue everyone is made better off unanimous agreement under majority rule may result from all voters in a majority rule system being better off in the majority rather than the minority even if the change that is unanimously approved is not a pareto superior move 2 the general idea behind non optimal unanimous agreement is relatively straightforward under majority rule a majority has the power to exploit the minority 3 therefore under some situations everybody joins the majority on an issue even though some find themselves worse off when the

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

on the stability of legislative outcomes this paper argues that by arranging vote trades in the face of information costs legislative committees contribute to the stability of legislative outcomes a structure of permanent committees and subcommittees facilitates informational specialization and helps legislators acquire experience in their specializations committees arrange vote trades by adjusting amounts of recommended spending on separate items in bills that receive majority support each legislator is allotted a roughly equal amount of legislative spending that he can influence plus an additional amount that depends on his skill and experience as a committee member

on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments i introduction laboratory methods are now widely accepted as a methodological approach in economics and increasingly they have been used to examine specific public policy issues there is much to be gained from careful laboratory experiments they offer a low cost means of testing and replicating policy innovations and they generate precise data on individual behavior thereby allowing estimation of behavioral responses importantly they allow many policy innovations to be introduced singly and exogenously in a controlled environment and as a result laboratory experiments are typically seen as having a high degree of internal validity brewer 2000 campbell and stanley 1966 shadish cook and campbell 2002 because the causal relation between variables can be properly demonstrated however as emphasized by plott 1987 using laboratory experiments can allow more general inferences regarding human behavior only when the setting implemented in the laboratory parallels what is observed in the naturally occurring world even beyond this requirement of parallelism is the need for generalizing behavioral observations from the laboratory to the field or external validity internal validity can be demonstrated through the evaluation of the design however external validity can only be verified empirically and only with respect to the specific setting being investigated this paper investigates the external validity of laboratory experiments and does so in the context of experiments on tax compliance behavior tax evasion is central to many important policy questions current estimates report the tax gap or difference between taxes owed and taxes paid in the united states to be 450 billion annually internal revenue service 2012 beyond these massive revenue losses evasion creates major misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to cheat on their taxes its presence requires that government expend resources to detect noncompliance to measure its magnitude and to penalize tax evasion evasion alters the distribution of income in arbitrary unpredictable and unfair ways and it may contribute to feelings of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law more broadly it is not possible to understand the true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects of tax evasion laboratory methods have been used to examine a wide range of policies that may affect the compliance decision policies that have not always proven amenable to either theoretical analyses or empirical analyses with field data however laboratory studies of compliance are sometimes viewed with skepticism the most common criticism is that the student subjects typically used in experiments may not be representative of taxpayers undergraduates may have little experience with filing tax returns and their economic and demographic backgrounds may differ from those of taxpayers another criticism is that the context of laboratory compliance experiments does not closely enough resemble the context in which actual compliance decisions are made as a result there is a concern that experimental results on policy innovations that rely upon student subjects in laboratory compliance experiments cannot be generalized to the population it is this issue that we examine here building on previous research we present several types of evidence on the external validity of experiments on individual compliance decisions a first question examines whether behavior of laboratory participants is replicated by behavior of individuals making a similar decision in the naturally occurring world that is do participants in laboratory experiments exhibit different patterns of behavior than individuals in a similar naturally occurring setting to answer this question we utilize a special data set from the u s internal revenue service irs assembled as part of its national research program nrp

minimum wage policy with optimal taxes and unemployment abstract using a search model i derive a formula that links the welfare gains from the minimum wage to its effect on low skilled labor force participation and employment this formula shows that the minimum wage is welfare improving if pushing the low skilled labor market tightness downwards brings it closer to its efficient level i estimate the causal effect of the minimum wage on low skilled labor force participation and employment using federal and state minimum wage variation i discuss the policy implications of my estimates when viewed through the lens of the marginal welfare gain formula

the impact of advertising regulation on industry the cigarette advertising ban of 1971 this article studies the impact of the 1971 tv radio advertising ban on the cigarette industry data indicate that industry advertising spending decreased sharply immediately following the ban but recovered and actually exceeded the preban level within five years a dynamic oligopoly model of advertising is developed to incorporate two potential explanations the estimated model fully accounts for the puzzling trend with 74 of the postban advertising spending increase explained by industry dynamics and 26 explained by learning furthermore this article uses the new concept of nonstationary oblivious equilibrium to handle intractable state space and accelerate equilibrium computation

health scare excise taxes and advertising ban in the cigarette demand and supply the cigarette industry is a fascinating laboratory for industrial economists because of its concentrated market structure and history of conflicts over health and tax issues the industry has been the focal point of many economic studies most of the recent studies have concentrated on the demand side of the market for example bass schmalensee hamilton and fujii deal with the impact of advertising and the health scare on cigarette demand 4 15 10 8 barzel johnson and sumner ward assessed the importance of the excise tax or ad valorem tax on consumers cigarette demand 3 12 16 on the supply side vernon rives naylor developed an econometric model of the tobacco industry 20 which however is more concerned with the agricultural aspects of the product than the industry s market organization a careful review of the above studies suggests serious shortcomings which appear to limit their application to policy formulation or market analysis first the variables are introduced in an ad hoc fashion without reference to existing demand or supply theories second none of the above studies recognizes explicitly the interactions among the variables in the demand and the supply equations in the context of the determination of market equilibrium this paper has three objectives 1 to apply the standard neoclassical market theory to the cigarette industry 2 to identify the interactions between cigarette demand and supply using a simultaneous equations approach the first such attempt in a cigarette industry study and 3 to evaluate the effects of cigarette taxes advertising and health scare issues on the industry s output based on the empirical results obtained from the simultaneous equations analysis the judicious selection of explanatory variables careful data

export to elude abstract how does domestic value added tax vat reform affect firms export we address this question via a model in which firms choose their sales for the domestic and foreign markets optimally the model predicts that strengthening domestic tax enforcement has a negative effect on domestic sales but a positive effect on exports when firms face a convex production cost function we test the model predictions using detailed firm and product level data from chinese industrial surveys and customs records our empirical analyses rely on china s golden tax project which is an information technology introduced in 2001 2002 that dramatically reduces the cost of vat enforcement we find that after the adoption of the technology by the government firms located far from local tax offices face a larger increase in their effective vat rates than those located nearby the enforcement effect and the former increase their export more than the latter the elusion effect we also find that the elusion effect is stronger for firms subject to higher export rebates or more severe financial constraints

reported gross income and marginal tax rates estimation of the behavioural reactions of spanish taxpayers this article estimates for the spanish personal income tax the elasticity of reported gross income to marginal tax rates the identification of this elasticity has been performed using the reform approved by law 35 2006 which came into force in january 2007 the elasticities obtained suggest the existence of important efficiency costs with significant regional differences the average elasticity estimated for spain as a whole is 0 676 however this elasticity is highly dispersed throughout the spanish administrative regions which indicates the unequal power of distortion of the tax thus households whose principal source of income is salary display an elasticity of 0 337 compared to 0 682 for households whose main income source comes from business or savings lastly a positive correlation is also detected between elasticity and income level an elasticity of 3 6 is reached for taxpayers with an annual gross income exceeding 100 000

centralized vote trading this paper presents a model of centralized vote trading in a legislature in this model legislators trade only with party leaders who set prices at which they will buy needed vote changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders and purchases promises from the leaders to pass or defeat particular bills of high concern to the legislator relative to the price the leguslator must pay

do lower minimum wages for young workers raise their employment evidence from a danish discontinuity we estimate the impact of youth minimum wages on youth employment by exploiting a large discontinuity in danish minimum wage rules at age 18 using monthly payroll records for the danish population the hourly wage jumps up by 40 percent at the discontinuity employment falls by 33 percent and total input of hours decreases by 45 percent leaving the aggregate wage payment almost unchanged we show theoretically how the discontinuity may be exploited to evaluate policy changes the relevant elasticity for evaluating the effect on youth employment of changes in their minimum wage is in the range 0 6 1 1

vote trading in power sharing systems a laboratory investigation in theory decentralized vote trading in power sharing systems promotes a efficiency by assigning greater decision making power to individuals that care a lot about the election s outcome and b dispersion of benefits since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes we experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that indeed allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election importantly these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions thus reinforcing their empirical relevance

a field experiment on intertemporal enforcement spillovers enforcement can affect compliance directly and indirectly through spillovers we study intertemporal enforcement spillovers by conducting a randomized field experiment in a university exam the initial phase of the experiment is the exam itself we induce variation in enforcement by randomly assigning students to rooms with different monitoring levels the second phase is post exam in this phase all students are subject to the same low level of monitoring our outcome variable is the probability that students steal a pen in the post exam phase we find that enforcement in the exam phase has a strong intertemporal spillover on compliance in the post exam phase students subject to a high monitoring level in the initial phase are about 33 less likely to steal the pen than students subject to low initial monitoring

reciprocity and willingness to pay taxes evidence from a survey experiment in latin america are citizens more willing to pay taxes when the government s performance improves we review the tax morale literature disentangling its different components and provide empirical evidence exploiting a novel survey conducted in seventeen latin american cities and an experimental attempt at measuring reciprocity in tax collection in developing countries the evidence suggests that governments interested in increasing tax revenues should not focus solely on escalating the coercive power of the state that is more audits and fines rather providing better public services to society can be an effective albeit limited tool to raise revenues

higher taxes more evasion evidence from border differentials in tv license fees this paper studies the evasion of tv license fees in austria we exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion comparing municipalities at the low and high fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0 3 percentage points the positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks