intermediation and resale in networks i study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure a partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power competition governs trade withi

using local labor market data to re examine the employment effects of the minimum wage using quarterly census data for 1996 2000 the author evaluates how minimum wages affected teenage employment at the county level an analysis that includes all counties yields small and statistically insignificant effects consistent with previous research using state panels however in counties where the minimum wage was likely binding above the market clearing wage for teens the negative impact on employment was considerably larger the effect was strongest in small counties was restricted to transitory jobs and new hires and apparently was not experienced by young adults ages 19 22 the small employment effects found in much of the literature the author argues at least partly reflect the estimates inclusion of local labor markets where the minimum wage is not binding by averaging the effects across all areas with no disaggregation based on where the minimum wage is binding and where it is not these studies overlook important regional variation

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

bargaining orders in a multi person bargaining game abstract this paper studies a complete information bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of different sizes or bargaining strengths the bargaining order is determined endogenously with a finite horizon there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the buyer purchases in order of increasing size from the smallest to the largest with an infinite horizon if the sellers have sufficiently different sizes there is a unique equilibrium outcome which has the same bargaining order if the sellers have similar sizes with an infinite horizon there may be multiple equilibrium outcomes with different bargaining orders

why do firms produce multiple outputs this paper demonstrates that there are at least three distinct explanations economies of scope essential jointness and uncertainty it also demonstrates that economies of scope may be due to output interactions as well as to sharable inputs and the cost and profit function as usually defined are not the true profit maximising functions the supply of inputs and sale of outputs in one production process are organised among several firms and or plants in order to minimise aggregate production and transaction costs

trading in networks theory and experiments intermediation is a prominent feature of economic production and exchange two features of intermediation are salient coordination among traders between the source and the destination and competition between alternative combinations of intermediaries we develop a simple model to study these forces and we test the theoretical predictions in experiments our theoretical analysis yields a complete characterization of pricing equilibrium in networks there exist both ecient and inecient equilibria suggesting a key role of coordination among intermediaries strategic interaction leads to either buyer and seller retaining all surplus or intermediaries extracting all surplus we develop conditions on network structure under which these di erent extremal outcomes arise respectively laboratory experiments show that eciency prevails in almost all cases so traders are successful in coordination subjects coordinate on extreme surplus division finally experiments highlight the role of network structure in determining pricing and the

bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers abstract we analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium this paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the walrasian outcome

the role of networks in antitrust investigations antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming from within the defined markets of interest however competitive pressures can also come from other markets even when individually these markets place only weak constraints on one another collectively they may matter a networks approach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can sometimes paint a more accurate picture we demonstrate this through some simple examples and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets as a leading example we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation

an advantage of the multiproduct firm the transferability of firm specific capital abstract in a world of uncertainty particular benefits of multiproduct organization arise out of a need to revise production plans when transactions for inputs are costly production involves inputs which are firm specific the ability to transfer firm specific inputs withi n the multiproduct firm yields benefits not available to the single product firm these benefits to firm diversification are not dependent on the assumption of managerial risk aversion and cannot be replicated by investors diversifying their portfolios

bilateral bargaining in networks abstract each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus a maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus according to the protocol proposed by rubinstein and wollinsky equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining econometrica 53 1985 1133 1150 all pairs which reach an agreement obtain the discounted payoffs and are removed from the network this bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the dulmage mendelsohn decomposition partition of the bipartite network of the set of nodes in this network

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

asymmetric information and intermediation chains we propose a parsimonious model of bilateral trade under asymmetric information to shed light on the prevalence of intermediation chains that stand between buyers and sellers in many decentralized markets our model features a classic problem in economics where an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty paradoxically involving moderately informed intermediaries also endowed with market power can improve trade efficiency long intermediation chains in which each trader s information set is similar to those of his direct counterparties limit traders incentives to post prices that reduce trade volume and jeopardize gains to trade

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks we introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts we find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi linear the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure furthermore the set of stable outcomes is essentially equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria and all stable outcomes are in the core and are efficient by contrast for any domain of preferences strictly larger than that of full substitutability the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed

bargaining and efficiency in networks abstract we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement the global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium for many networks all markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient even as players become patient we investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect but non markovian equilibria the analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

normative observations on the international value added chain and strategic groups the formulation of strategy can be fruitfully viewed as placing bets on certain markets and on certain links of the value added chain the key to understanding a global strategy is to locate how competitive positions in one national market change the economics for entry into other countries and into other product lines this article argues that global strategies succeed by creating certain economies along and the between value added chains and by designing marketing programs that adapt products to national needs and yet exploit these upstream economies two major conclusions are that a company can compete in different strategic groups across countries and that a hallmark feature of a global strategy is the creation of operational flexibility to benefit from uncertainty

bilateral trading in networks in many markets goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric we study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features we show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non monotonic but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time with the possible exception of the last period the price dynamic is therefore reminiscent of fire sales and hot potato trading traders who intermediate the object arise endogenously and make a positive profit the profit earning intermediaries are not necessarily traders with many connections for the case of multilayer networks they belong to the path that reaches the maximum number of potential buyers using the minimal number of intermediaries this is not necessarily the path of the network that maximizes the probability of consumption by traders who value the most the object i e welfare

liquidity risk in sequential trading networks abstract this paper studies a model of intermediated exchange with liquidity constrained traders intermediaries are embedded in a trading network and their financial capacities are private information we characterize our model s monotone pure strategy equilibrium agents earn positive intermediation rents in equilibrium an experimental investigation supports the model s baseline predictions concerning agents strategies price dynamics and the division of surplus while private financial constraints inject uncertainty into the trading environment our experiment suggests they are also a behavioral speed bump preventing traders from experiencing excessive losses due to overbidding

efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too interconnected to fail institutions abstract the regulation of large interconnected financial institutions has become a key policy issue to improve financial stability regulators have proposed limiting banks size and interconnectedness i estimate a network based model of the over the counter interbank lending market in the us and quantify the efficiency stability implications of this policy trading efficiency decreases with limits on interconnectedness because the intermediation chains become longer while restricting the interconnectedness of banks improves stability the effect is non monotonic stability also improves with higher liquidity requirements when banks have access to liquidity during the crisis and when failed banks depositors maintain confidence in the banking system

middlemen in bilateral search markets this article examines the role of middlemen in bilateral search markets e g employment agencies real estate brokers it is shown that the middleman narrows the set of buyer firm and seller worker types who search seller types with high valuations and buyer types with low valuations drop out of the search market and instead trade through the middleman the middleman also decreases the equilibrium search intensities of those agents who search it is proven that the middleman improves welfare if search is very costly and inefficient and decreases welfare if search is effectively costless and very efficient

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

frictional intermediation in over the counter markets we extend duffie et al s 2005 search theoretic model of over the counter otc asset markets allowing for a decentralized inter dealer market with arbitrary heterogeneity in dealers valuations or equivalently inventory costs we develop a solution technique that makes the model fully tractable and allows us to derive in closed form theoretical formulas for key statistics analysed in empirical studies of the intermediation process in otc markets a calibration to the market for municipal bonds allows us to quantify important unobservable characteristics of this market including the severity of search and bargaining frictions and the nature of heterogeneity across dealers we use our calibrated model to study the effect of these market characteristics on total welfare and the distribution of gains from trade across customers and dealers

are the effects of minimum wage increases always small new evidence from a case study of new york state the authors estimate the effect of the 2004 6 new york state nys minimum wage increase from 5 15 to 6 75 per hour on the employment rates of 16 to 29 year olds who do not have a high school diploma using data drawn from the 2004 and 2006 current population survey they employ difference in difference estimates to show that the nys minimum wage increase is associated with a 20 2 to 21 8 reduction in the employment of less skilled less educated workers with the largest effects on those aged 16 to 24 their estimates imply a median employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage of around 0 7 large relative to previous researchers estimates the authors findings are robust to their choice of geographically proximate comparison states the use of a more highly skilled within state comparison group and a synthetic control design approach moreover their results provide plausible evidence that state minimum wage increases can have substantial adverse labor demand effects for low skilled i

networks versus vertical integration we construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppliers vertically integrated firms make their own specialized inputs in networks manufacturers procure specialized inputs from suppliers that in turn sell to several manufacturers the analysis shows that networks can yield greater social welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic demand shocks individual firms may also have the incentive to form networks despite the lack of long term contracts the analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides predictions as to the shape of different industries

multi item auctions a collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders and each bidder is to receive at most one item assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal in a suitable sense for the bidders in this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy

implications for minimum wage policies of an s shaped labor supply curve abstract a model of family labor supply provides a rationale for raising minimum wages when the labor supply response is negative at low wages under those circumstances the labor market can be caught in a malthusian poverty trap of excess supply unemployment overextended workdays child labor and falling wages raising minimum wages may therefore help resorb this excess supply and stabilize the labor market setting a virtuous cycle in motion in a two sector context such a policy would increase wages in both the covered and uncovered sectors evidence from a study of costa rica in particular is consistent with those conclusions

minimum wage laws what does an employment increase imply about output and welfare abstract card and krueger find empirically that minimum wage laws may increase employment the current paper seeks the analytical implications of employment increasing minimum wages for output and welfare the standard supply and demand model cannot be used for this purpose one needs a model in which employment increasing minimum wages are at least possible such as this paper s efficiency wage model here an employment increase is neither necessary nor sufficient for expected welfare gains for either employed or unemployed workers an employment increasing minimum wage raises output but unambiguously lowers labor force participation and hurts those who remain unemployed

efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets the paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades a model is presented in which the identity of buyers of sellers and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy the analysis first considers small economies and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence a characterization of prices and flows and some negative results relating welfare to network structure the second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets and presents necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately efficient when the number of players is large

from micro to macro via production networks amodern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units each relying on the flow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output which in turn is routed towards other downstream units in this essay i argue that the structure of this production network is key in determining whether and how microeconomic shocks affecting only a particular firm or technology along the chain propagate throughout the economy and shape aggregate outcomes therefore understanding the structure of this production network can better inform both academics on the origins of aggregate fluctuations and policy makers on how to prepare for and recover from adverse shocks that disrupt these production chains two recent events have brought to the forefront the importance of interconnections between firms and sectors in aggregate economic performance consider first the 2011 earthquake in japan while the triple tragedy of the earthquake the ensuing tsunami and the near nuclear meltdown at fukushima surely resulted in a significant destruction of human and physical capital its effects would have been largely restricted to the affected areas were it not for the disruption of national