movers and shakers chaos makers in tourism development abstract like most of their counterparts in other social sciences tourism researchers have traditionally focused on aspects of tourism phenomena that exhibit order linearity and equilibrium while eschewing situations where disorder non linearity and disequilibrium are more apparent although constructs such as the destination life cycle model demonstrate the heuristic value of this approach it results in aspects of tourism development that are intrinsically chaotic being overlooked thus for instance the fundamental role of entrepreneurs in destination development has received scant attention largely because their behaviour is not readily understood in terms of the conventional analytical framework this paper argues that the chaos complexity perspective provides a potentially useful alternative framework for providing insights into the underlying dynamics of tourism development and a case study involving the examination of entrepreneurial activity on the gold coast in australia is used for illustrative purposes in this context chaos is presented as essentially a creative process and entrepreneurs play a primary role both as chaos makers and as initiators of adaptive responses to chaos induced by external events

common values unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous entry in u s offshore oil lease auctions although an auction of drilling rights is often cited as an example of common values formal evidence has been limited by the problem of auction level unobserved heterogeneity we develop an empiri

dynamic adverse selection and the supply size in this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information we obtain that full trade occurs in every dynamic competitive equilibrium moreover we show that if prices can be conditioned on the supply size then a dynamic competitive equilibrium always exists while it fails to exist if prices cannot be conditioned on the supply size and the frequency of exchanges is high enough we conclude that the possibility to condition prices on the supply size allows us to reach efficiency in the limit for exchanges becoming more and more frequent while otherwise the welfare loss due to delays of exchanges remains bounded away from zero

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

production planning in the case of uncertain individual demand extension for an mrp ii concept abstract to gain competitive advantage firms have increased their number of variants in recent years but as a consequence it has become more and more difficult to forecast demand data at the level of individual products over the planning horizon however practical experience shows that forecasts of aggregate demand are quite accurate exact data for individual products can be determined for the current but not for the remaining periods for the remaining periods only upper and lower bounds of the demand data for individual products can be predicted with certainty in many cases this means that production planning should follow a hierarchical planning concept first production planning should be conducted at the aggregate level over the planning horizon to determine simultaneously the resource requirements regular capacity and overtime and the quantities of the product groups in order to satisfy aggregate demand second for the immediate scheduling period the detailed planning level should determine how available production resources have to be allocated to the individual products subject to some constraints imposed by the aggregate plan mrp ii manufacturing resource planning is a production planning system which is based on a hierarchical concept and has been developed for such complex production situations the paper concludes that the mrp ii concept is only partially suited to production planning in the case of uncertain demand a hierarchical model which can be incorporated into the mrp ii concept is therefore proposed for uncertain demand an alternative method for uncertainty reduction is also briefly discussed

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

customer order driven production an economical concept for responding to demand uncertainty abstract to gain competitive advantage firms have increased their number of variants in recent years but as a consequence it has become more and more difficult to forecast demand at the level of individual products over the planning horizon in this situation customer order driven production becomes more and more important production quantities are determined at the moment the customer orders are known and therefore demand uncertainty is removed short delivery times relative to the competitor and sufficient capacities as well as a flexible production must be guaranteed the new production concepts e g jit and more general lean production or time based manufacturing reinforce the tendency to a more customer order driven production a mathematical model is presented to derive conditions for an economical customer order driven production

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining we study a one sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer s valuation we show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes in particular second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers we show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay when the buyer assigns positive probability to the seller knowing the buyer s value then delay not only can occur but it must occur for a class of equilibria however in all other cases delay will never occur

search adverse selection and market clearing we examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing a seller who has private information about product quality and a buyer are matched to bargain over price they form a long term relationship if they reach agreement they return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved the market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

the timing of out of court settlements parties to a lawsuit will frequently delay litigation even in circumstances where a voluntary agreement is eventually reached this article is concerned with what causes legal disputes to be prolonged over time we discuss dynamic models of litigation to illustrate how changes in the bargaining environment might generate empirical hazard functions comparative statics results are then corroborated with empirical estimates of a hazard function adjusted to account for both the heterogeneity of lawsuits and the nonproportional time dependence suggested by theory

selling a lemon under demand uncertainty we consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals assuming that the high quality seller insists on a price we show that the low quality seller s surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers knowledge about the demand state if they are also uncertain about demand then demand uncertainty increases the low quality seller s expected payoff and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time if buyers know the demand state then demand uncertainty does not affect the low quality seller s payoff but she must employ a sophisticated pricing strategy

selling procedures with private information and common values the seller posted price procedure is probably the most common method for making transactions in modern economies we analyze the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common value elements in a model of two sided private information we characterize the fully revealing perfect equilibrium offer strategy of the seller we also characterize equilibrium behavior under two other pricing procedures a sealed bid procedure and a direct revelation mechanism finally we examine the efficiency of these procedures and show that as the degree of common values increases fewer mutually beneficial agreements are attained

bridging the gap bargaining with interdependent values abstract we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values we base our analysis on the equilibria characterized by deneckere and liang 2006 for the gap case we show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to smooth screening over time in the double limit prices are independent of the shape of the distribution of values when the uninformed agent s ability to commit to prices disappears so do her rents yet trade still exhibits delay

costly search with adverse selection solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing we analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes a low quality seller benefits more from trade and therefore searches more intensively than a high quality seller this makes a seller s contact carry negative information but a seller s availability become a stronger indicator of high quality in the stationary environment the two effects exactly offset each other and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller in the nonstationary environment the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller

dynamic trading with developing adverse selection abstract we study a dynamic trading game in which the information asymmetry between the agents develops over time a seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good but the seller becomes informed after the game begins we show that this developing adverse selection gives rise to novel trading dynamics in particular if the seller s learning speed is high the equilibrium features collapse and recovery behavior both the equilibrium price and the trade probability first drop and then increase over time while the trade surplus monotonically decreases as the learning speed increases the seller s surplus may change non monotonically

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

sequential bargaining with correlated values the paper analyzes an infinite horizon sequential bargaining game with one sided offers between a buyer and a seller when the buyer s valuation depends on the seller s the seller knows the value of the object and the buyer does not the influence of relative discount factors on the solution is studied it is shown for example that an impasse may result if the buyer offeror is too impatient relative to the seller the buyer makes a single take it or leave it offer

which utilization and service level lead to the maximum eva abstract in this paper a model for evaluating the influence of utilization wip fgi service level and production lead time on eva economic value added is developed in order to link the available logistical key figures with a market perspective and discuss their influence on company value the question answered in this paper is what is the optimal utilization and service level of a production system in order to achieve the maximum possible eva for a company a single product single machine make to order production system with investment dependent machine capacity is modeled the model combines a market share concept based on delivery production lead time and service level with concepts describing the logistical relationships between wip utilization production lead time and service level in addition to the explanatory use of the model it can provide support for strategic decisions concerning investing or divesting machinery the main application of this model is in describing the link between capacity investment and company value comprehensively based on data available from cost accounting in real companies furthermore this paper shows that high flexibility of personnel and machine capacity increases the maximum possible eva of production systems even if this flexibility is linked to additional costs

search with adverse selection this paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection we study information aggregation by the price how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices when search frictions are small we identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small we trace this to a strong form of the winner s curse that is present in the sequential search model the failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations

hierarchical model for production planning in the case of uncertain demand the paper deals with hierarchical production planning for a multiperiod model consisting of an aggregate planning level and a detailed planning level in the case of uncertain demand at the beginning the detailed demand for the actual planning period is known whereas for future planning periods only upper and lower bounds of detailed demand are known on the other hand the aggregate demand on the product group level is supposed to be deterministic at each planning period over the whole planning horizon for the aggregate planning level robust production plans i e aggregate production plans which can be disaggregated to a feasible detailed plan for every possible detailed demand are proposed and a consistent disaggregation is executed for the detailed planning level two sets static and dynamic of sufficient conditions for robustness of the aggregate plan as well as dynamic disaggregation conditions are derived these sufficient conditions are a generalization of the results of lasserre and merce the performance of the sufficient conditions are demonstrated by a computational study which shows the potential advantage of the approach

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller we analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller the seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game which is unobservable to buyers at the interim stage of the game the information and payoff structures are the same as in the market for lemons our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create any efficiency gain if i the common discounting is low and ii the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex ante contract under which the trade happens with probability one our result does not depend on whether the offers by buyers are private or public

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

bargaining with endogenous information two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values this paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable three types of inefficiencies can arise if the information cost is in an intermediate range no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information if the information cost is low any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition if the agents face asymmetric information cost the akerlof s lemons problem arises as a self fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

on durable goods markets with entry and adverse selection we investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time the model is a dynamic version of akerlof 1970 identical cohorts of durable goods whose quality is known only to potential sellers enter the market over time we show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade the model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations jel classification d82 a propos des marches de biens durables quand il y a entree de nouveaux commercants et selection adverse les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendres par le mecanisme dynamique des prix dans un marche concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a selection adverse et entree exogene de nouveaux commercants dans le temps ce modele est une version dynamique du modele d akerlof 1970 des cohortes identiques de biens durables dont la qualite est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels arrivent sur le marche dans le temps il semble qu il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prevu par un modele statique en particulier on montre qu il existe un equilibre cyclique ou tous les biens sont transiges a l interieur d un nombre fini de periodes apres leur arrivage et que a chaque phase du cycle l eventail de qualite des biens transiges s accroit les commercants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualite attendent plus longtemps et l imperfection du marche se traduit par la longueur de temps d attente avant la transaction le modele fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marche

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small