fiscal spending and green economic growth evidence from china abstract the green economy is considered as an efficient way for sustainability but the connection between fiscal spending and green economic growth has not been systematically explained this paper attempts to fill this research gap based on the panel data of 282 prefecture level cities from 2005 to 2016 we first construct the green economic growth index by using the non radial direction distance function then by employing the system gmm estimation we further evaluate the effect of fiscal education spending and r d spending on green economic growth finally we explore the potential mechanism and discuss our findings we obtain the following conclusions 1 the green economic growth index fluctuated in the study period we attribute it to the political tournament of local governments 2 the system gmm estimation results confirm the existence of composition effect and technique effect in the full sample but the sub sample analysis suggests that there is a heterogeneous effect in different areas with different resources abundant degree 3 mechanism analysis illustrates that fiscal r d spending and education spending foster the green economic growth through technological activities and human capital intensive activities respectively but they exhibit distinct roles in different areas based on these findings we propose some targeted policy suggestions for promoting green economic growth

on the endogeneity of cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria games of accumulation abstract we characterize equilibria of games with two properties i agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur but ii they can only add to their initial amounts the equilibrium set consists of just the cournot nash outcome one or both stackelberg outcomes or a continuum of points including the cournot nash outcome and one or both stackelberg outcomes a simple theorem that uses agents standard one period reaction functions and the one period cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set applications include contribution oligopoly and rent seeking games

backward induction algorithm for a class of closed loop stackelberg games abstract in the paper a new deterministic continuum strategy two player discrete time dynamic stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed loop information structure the considered payoff functions can be widely used in different applications mainly in conflicts of consuming a limited resource where one player called leader is a superior authority choosing strategy first and another player called follower chooses after in case of convex payoff functions and certain parameter values we give a new particular backward induction algorithm which can be easily realized to find a leader follower equilibrium of the game in a certain sequential equilibrium realization from the last step towards the first one with respect to the current strategy choices of the players considerations on uniqueness and game regulation i e setting parameters of the game to achieve a predefined equilibrium are also provided the finite version of the game with finite strategy sets is also given along with its simplification and solution method several practical examples are shown to illustrate the comprehensive application possibilities of the results

dynamic governance of clean energy markets how technical innovation could accelerate climate policies abstract this article explores the governmental means to accelerate technical progress in climate protection it is based on selected best practice cases in which the diffusion of low carbon technologies has been accelerated by ambitious policies the empirical cases involve not just renewable energies but also energy efficiency the latter being considered more difficult in terms of governance the examples are taken from advanced oecd countries as well as from emerging economies this article will explore which factors have caused this dynamic development the conclusion reached will show that the interaction of positive feedback mechanisms which has already been described as virtuous cycle provides only a plausible theoretical explanation if the policy cycle is added to the market cycle and the innovation cycle climate policy should not only define ambitious targets but also address all three feedback mechanisms

south korean green growth and the jevons paradox an assessment with democratic and degrowth policy recommendations the policy instruments at the core of the notion of green growth are central to south korea s national strategy for green growth nsgg 1 green stimulus packages 2 price based or market corrective policies and 3 green research and development to bring about a technological shift that increases resource efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources this assessment of the nsgg explores the potentials and limitations of 3 in light of the jevons paradox the commonly found association between improved efficiency and increased resource use greenhouse gas ghg emissions and total energy use have increased since the implementation of the nsgg despite overall improvements in energy efficiency we argue that the jevons paradox is a fundamental limitation of the nsgg and suggest policy alternatives to the nsgg 1 increased public participation in environmental decision making and 2 economic degrowth

dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers stackelberg games play an extremely important role in such fields as economics management politics and behavioral sciences stackelberg game can be modelled as a bilevel optimization problem there exists extensive literature about static bilevel optimization problems however the studies on dynamic bilevel optimization problems are relatively scarce in spite of the importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena rationally in this paper we consider discrete time dynamic stackelberg games with feedback information dynamic programming algorithms are presented for the solution of discrete time dynamic feedback stackelberg games with multiple players both for independent followers and for dependent followers when the followers act dependently the game in this paper is a combination of stackelberg game and nash game

on price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel fringe game abstract we consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members we show that i the outcomes of the closed loop and the open loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers the cartel fringe game a la salant 1976 coincide and ii when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop cartel fringe game thus the outcome of the cartel fringe open loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium however the interpretation of the cartel fringe model where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing nash cournot does not extend to the case where firms can use closed loop strategies

analyzing the functional dynamics of technological innovation systems a scheme of analysis various researchers and policy analysts have made empirical studies of innovation systems in order to understand their current structure and trace their dynamics however policy makers often experience difficulties in extracting practical guidelines from studies of this kind in this paper we operationalize our previous work on a functional approach to analyzing innovation system dynamics into a practical scheme of analysis for policy makers the scheme is based on previous literature and our own experience in developing and applying functional thinking it can be used by policy makers not only to identify the key policy issues but also to set policy goals

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

on noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader follower game abstract in this paper we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous firms compete on quantities to this end we consider a two stage game of complete and perfect information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers the stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game existence and uniqueness are more difficult to handle in this framework insofar as the presence of several leaders and followers displays a richer set of strategic interactions then to prove existence we notably provide a new procedure to determine the conditions under which the optimal behavior of the followers may be written as functions of the sole strategy profile of the leaders some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions

evolving theories of sustainability and firms history future directions and implications for renewable energy research abstract sustainability has become a critical perspective in managing firms via a holistic approach by considering economic environmental and social dimensions of firms with the rising significance of sustainable development the theories of sustainability in firms have evolved during the past six decades this article offers a critical review of the evolving theories linking sustainability to firms and discusses their implications for future renewable energy research the relationships among different theories are critically analysed and the directions for future research are discussed the paper shows that the main theories linking sustainability to firms in a chronological order are 1 corporate social responsibility 2 stakeholder theory 3 corporate sustainability and 4 green economics currently various innovative approaches and new theories emerged such as co evolution theory and multi level perspective reflecting three directions of theory development namely 1 shifting from what to how 2 growing use of interdisciplinary approach and 3 towards broader systems renewable energy studies associated with firms and future research opportunities in this area are also critically analysed the comprehensive review offered in this paper provides a useful reference for policy makers corporate managers and researchers interested in corporate sustainability and renewable energy related studies

on line computation of stackelberg equilibria with synchronous parallel genetic algorithms this paper develops a method to compute the stackelberg equilibria in sequential games we construct a normal form game which is interactively played by an arti1cially intelligent leader ga l and a follower ga f the leader is a genetic algorithm breeding a population of potential actions to better anticipate the follower s reaction the follower is also a genetic algorithm training on line a suitable neural network to evolve a population of rules to respond to any move in the leader s action space when gas repeatedly play this game updating each other synchronously populations converge to the stackelberg equilibrium of the sequential game we provide numerical examples attesting to the e7ciency of the algorithm 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

green growth from a growing eco industry to economic sustainability abstract there are many questionable assumptions in the discussion of economic growth one of them is the idea that governments are able to achieve sustained high growth another one is the believe that the solution to pressing financial and social problems centers on higher growth it is also questionalble however to say that giving up on economic growth as a paradigm is the necessary condition to tackle the environmental crisis in actuality solving such problems is about radical growth in environmental and resource saving technologies it is also about radical de growth in products and processes that undermine long term living and production conditions this paper describes some best practice cases of green growth and the conceptual generalisations given by the oecd and other established institutions in europe and asia it traces the transformation of the concept of green growth and evaluates the strategy that accompanies it

on stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market abstract in a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity stackelberg games provide some new results with price stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games in the price stackelberg game we show there is a unique spne where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower but both get equal payoffs we prove that generally quantity stackelberg games are less competitive than price stackelberg games however we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result

drivers of green bond market growth the importance of nationally determined contributions to the paris agreement and implications for sustainability abstract green bonds are increasingly being applied to finance emissions reductions sustainable development and other cleaner production investments conducive to reaching the 2 c temperature target of the paris agreement as their markets are relatively nascent there is a gap in the empirical literature on the drivers of green bond market growth to assess the impact that capital market growth drivers and nationally determined contributions to the paris agreement have on green bond issuance volumes as indicators of market growth this study employed a structural equation model using a panel dataset of over 300 billion in green bonds issued in 49 countries between 2007 and 2017 this is the first econometric study to demonstrate unique drivers of green bond market growth in addition to factors that similarly affect conventional bond market growth this is also the first study to construct a normalized index of nationally determined contributions robustness scores to measure their impacts on green bond market growth macroeconomic latent factors exerted three times the total influence exerted by institutional latent factors institutional effects are positive and indirect while oecd membership impacts were small and statistically insignificant nationally determined contributions scores exerted the largest positive and statistically significant impacts among observed variables these results suggest that nationally determined contributions and other macroeconomic and institutional factors are driving growing green bond issuances that will finance climate and sustainability investments through the future they also highlight the need for broader examinations of the determinants of green bond issuances as investment vehicles for sustainable outcomes

energy related ghg emission in agriculture of the european countries an application of the generalized divisia index abstract sustainable agriculture food security and welfare of the farmers require an integrated analysis of the performance of the agricultural sector in this paper we follow the energy environment economy framework and focus on decomposition of changes in the energy related greenhouse gas ghg emission in agricultural sectors of the selected european union eu countries the research relies on country level data from fao and eurostat describing economic activity energy use and ghg emission in the agricultural sectors of the european countries during 1995 2012 the main drivers carbon factor of energy consumed in agriculture energy intensity of agricultural production and growth in agricultural production and their impacts on the energy related ghg emissions in agriculture are analysed for selected countries the generalized divisia index is applied to decompose the changes in the energy related ghg emissions france latvia and belgium appeared as the only countries with increase in ghg emissions during 1995 2012 in the case of france energy intensity went up along with increase in the scale of agricultural production in latvia and belgium an increase in carbon factor appeared as the major factor driving an increase in ghg emissions the appropriate policies need to be employed in these countries seeking to reduce ghg emissions from energy consumption in agriculture improvements in energy efficiency appear to be a more feasible mean for ensuring further reductions in ghg emission

the growth discourse growth policy and sustainable development two thought experiments abstract this paper addresses three aspects of growth the discourse the policy and the impacts the growth discourse claims that the central factor for social economic political and environmental progress is economic growth it is assumed to create wealth and provide the necessary means for social and environmental purposes on the basis of the growth discourse different growth policies can be derived based on different economic and political ideologies in order to reveal the implications of de facto degrowth two thought experiments are conducted for physical and economic end to growth strategies the latter is capable of meeting environmental objectives but implies significant social tensions and hardships and calls for transition strategies consisting of carefully designed steps

population economic growth and regional environmental inefficiency evidence from u s states we apply a conditional directional distance function allowing multiple exogenous factors to measure environmental performance we evaluate the air pollution performance levels of u s states for the years 1998 and 2008 states environmental inefficiency is determined by population size and gdp per capita gdppc the overall results reveal that there is much variation in environmental inefficiencies among the u s states a second stage nonparametric analysis indicates a nonlinear relationship between states population size gdppc levels and states environmental inefficiency levels our results indicate that environmental inefficiency on the whole decreases with increased population and income per capita but there are limits to this improvement and at high income and population levels the tendency may reverse

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

green economy and related concepts an overview for the last ten years the notion of a green economy has become increasingly attractive to policy makers however green economy covers a lot of diverse concepts and its links with sustainability are not always clear in this article we focus on definitions of green economy and related concepts and an evaluation of these concepts against the criterion of strong and weak sustainability the article serves three purposes firstly we identify and describe diverse theories concepts approaches and tools related to a green economy among these are the theories of environmental economics and ecological economics the concepts and approaches of cleaner production waste hierarchy bio economy industrial ecology circular economy nature based solutions and dematerialization through product servicizing and tools like life cycle assessment and cost benefit analysis secondly we develop a framework that shows the capacity of the green economy concepts approaches and tools to support the transition towards sustainability such a framework can serve as a heuristic to embed diverse concepts and approaches into a green economy framework thirdly we briefly discuss green economy concepts with respect to their impact on strong and weak sustainability depending on the different concepts approaches and tools identified in the green economy framework different degrees of substitutability and trade offs between environmental and economic benefits are allowed and more or less structural changes of our modes of living are required by discussing the notion of green economy and related concepts approaches and tools we seek to make a contribution to their definitions and relationships as a prerequisite for operationalizing green economy

the timing of a rate request by a regulated firm the rate of return review is an integral part of the relationship between a regulated firm and its regulatory agency traditionally the agency has been portrayed as the aggressor demanding a rate review whenever the firm s earned rate of return exceeded the agency s authorized rate of return 2 13 15 although this approach has been widely criticized 7 12 9 11 evans and garber 8 argue that its primary advantage is in the tractability of the regulatory constraint alternative methodologies have been suggested but none has received general acclaim although baily and coleman 3 and bawa and sibley 4 have refined the role of the regulatory agency by modeling the enforcement of the rate of return constraint in a probabilistic sense the agency is still responsible for initiating rate review and the firm is still assumed to maximize expected profits subject to a rate of return constraint although the rate of return constraint has been diluted the roles of the agency and the firm are unchanged in a seminal article joskow 10 questioned whether the regulatory agency was the aggressor in the rate review process he argued that the firm initiates the process triggering a review to raise the level or change the structure of their rates further he suggests that the regulatory agency is concerned with price and not profit or rate of return data throughout the 1970s and 1980s supports joskow s argument that the firm is the aggressor in the rate review process further evidence in support of joskow s hypothesis is provided by burness montgomery and quirk 5 in a study of the electric power industry s acquisition of capital to explain industry actions they contrasted the predictive power of the averch johnson type model to that of a joskow type model and found joskow s model to be a better predictor of industry behavior if it is the firm that initiates the review process what causes the firm to set the process in motion again joskow 10 argued that the firm would file for rate review to keep earned rates