merit pay practices implications for pay performance relationships this study uses a monte carlo simulation to examine how the relationship between pay and performance is affected by the pay system measurement error in appraising performance the consistency of true performance over time and the rules governing promotion decisions the authors find that conventional merit systems achieve a considerably better link between pay and performance than does a bonus system with periodic adjustments in base wages a bonus system without periodic base wage adjustments also performs less well than conventional merit systems because merit systems benefit from the consistency of true performance over time one surprising finding is that even very substantial error in the measurement of performance has only a modest effect on the pay performance correlation

relative wage positions and quit behavior evidence from linked employer employee data the authors analyze the importance of relative wage positions within firms in western germany in the context of individual quit decisions as an inverse measure of job satisfaction using a linked employer employee data set liab for the years 1996 2005 whose sample consists of full time male prime age workers in western germany without college degrees they ascertain whether workers find status or signal effects stronger motivators for quit decisions they find that workers with higher relative wage positions within their firms are on average more likely to quit their jobs than those with lower relative wage positions and that workers who experience a loss in their relative wage positions are also more likely to accept a wage cut associated with their job transition overall results suggest that a signal effect is on average stronger than a status effect

status seeking income taxation and efficiency abstract it is well known that status seeking produces distortions in consumption competition to achieve status leads to over consumption of those goods which confer status it has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to pareto improvements in this paper we extend a model of status which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax we show that a pareto improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax benefit scheme a number of results follow the model is extended to a two period analysis to accommodate the reputation building element of status achievement without altering the conclusions

on the economic architecture of the workplace repercussions of social comparisons among heterogeneous workers we analyze the impact on a firm s profits and optimal wage rates and on the distribution of workers earnings when workers compare their earnings with those of coworkers we consider a low productivity worker who receives lower wage earnings than a high productivity worker when the low productivity worker derives dis utility not only from his own effort but also from comparing his earnings with those of the high productivity worker his response to the sensing of relative deprivation is to increase the optimal level of effort consequently the firm s profits are higher its wage rates remain unchanged and the distribution of earnings is compressed

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

foreclosures house prices and the real economy from 2007 to 2009 states without a judicial requirement for foreclosures were twice as likely to foreclose on delinquent homeowners analysis of borders of states with differing foreclosure laws reveals a discrete jump in foreclosure propensity as one enters nonjudicial states using state judicial requirement as an instrument for foreclosures we show that foreclosures led to a large decline in house prices residential investment and consumer demand from 2007 to 2009 as foreclosures subsided from 2011 to 2013 the foreclosure rates in nonjudicial and judicial requirement states converged and we find some evidence of a stronger recovery in nonjudicial states

optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion we analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse the presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts when the concern for equity becomes more important there is convergence towards linear sharing rules the sufficient statistics result is violated depending on the environment contracts may be either overdetermined i e include non informative performance measures or incomplete i e neglect informative performance measures finally our model delivers a simple rationale for team based incentives implying wage compression 2010 elsevier inc

wage determination for career and non career workers in the uk is there labour market segmentation this study proposes that the earnings of career employees are influenced by a different set of parameters from the earnings of non career employees the above proposition is tested by using a matched employer employee sample within the econometric framework of a bivariate sample selection model where the career status is modelled as endogenous and is subject to choice decisions

bank mergers and crime the real and social effects of credit market competition using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks we provide micro level within county evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates diminished local construction lower prices an influx of poorer households and higher property crime in subsequent years the elasticity of property crime with respect to merger induced banking concentration is 0 18 we show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition we examine the real and social impact of local credit competition by documenting a link between the competitiveness of the local banking market credit conditions urban development and crime several recent studies peek and rosengren 2000 cetorelli and gambera 2001 klein peek and rosengren 2002 and burgess and pande 2003 tie credit market imperfections to diminished real economic activity and growth other studies connect the economic environment to property crime freeman 1999 levitt 2001 raphael and winter ebmer 2001 and nilsson 2004 it is reasonable to hypothesize therefore that reductions in bank competition may lead to economic decline and subsequently increases in property crime we empirically investigate the effects of bank consolidation and increased market power on credit availability and real activity using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks in the 1990s we provide micro level evidence that garmaise is from the ucla anderson school and moskowitz is from the graduate school of business university of chicago and nber we have benefited from the suggestions and comments of tony bernardo marianne bertrand phillip bond doug diamond mark duggan eugene fama

house prices home equity based borrowing and the u s household leverage crisis us household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession the top panel of figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975 which accelerated beginning in 2002 in just five years the household sector doubled its debt balance in comparison the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest the middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt to income ratio during the same time period corporate leverage declined the dramatic absolute and relative rise in us household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years one reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers mian and sufi 2009 strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006 however which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners given that 65 percent of us households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively we examine this home equity based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency we follow a random sample of over 74 000 us homeowners who owned their homes as of 1997 at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008 the bottom panel of figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006 while the aggregate trend is suggestive

the dispersion of employees wage increases and firm performance previous studies examining intra firm wage dispersion and firm performance have focused on wage levels the authors of this study argue that for purposes of comparing wage dispersion s positive inc

rewards to academia the remuneration of vice chancellors and principals this paper models the financial remuneration to vice chancellors and principals at uk higher education institutions after describing the alternative theoretical underpinnings for the determination of pay an earnings function is estimated utilizing institutional and personal characteristics the model suggests only a partial linkage of managerial and performance related indicators to remuneration levels this suggests substantial scope for reorientation of rewards towards such indicators rather than relying on an efficiency wage this would appear particularly appropriate given the present and continued disclosure of this information together with the increased focus on performance indicators relating to teaching and research within the uk higher education sector

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

wage dispersion and productive efficiency evidence for sweden the swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized solidarity bargaining followed by substantial decompression of wages after central bargaining broke down supplies observations well suited to empirical evaluation of arguments about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution we obtain no results supporting fairness morale and cohesiveness theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity reduction of interindustry wage differentials evidently did however contribute positively to aggregate output and productivity growth most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

effort and comparison income experimental and survey evidence the authors test the hypothesis that individual effort on the job depends both on one s own income and on the individual s position in the relevant income distribution combining experimental evidence from a gift exchange game with multi country issp survey data they analyze the extent to which relative income affects an individual s effort finding that an individual s rank in the income distribution more strongly determines effort than does others average income which suggests that comparisons are more ordinal than cardinal their experiment also reveals that comparisons over time affect effort individuals who received higher income offers or enjoyed higher income rank in the past exerted lower levels of effort for a given current income and rank

wage transparency and performance a real effort experiment abstract without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment a change of wages does not affect performance with transparency however higher paid workers tend to work more accurately and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates

work quality and optimal pay structure piece vs hourly rates in employee remuneration this paper constructs a model investigating the impact of pay structure on the quantity and quality of work and its welfare implications we prove that a change in pay structure alone could increase the utility of employers given the employees utility level and hence by appropriate income distribution could increase social welfare

the contagion effect of foreclosed properties although previous research shows that prices of homes in neighborhoods with foreclosures are lower than those in neighborhoods without foreclosures it remains unclear whether the lower prices are the result of a general decline in neighborhood values or whether foreclosures reduce the prices of nearby non distressed sales through a contagion effect we provide robust evidence of a contagion discount by simultaneously estimating the local price trend and the incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures at its peak the discount is roughly 1 per nearby foreclosed property the discount diminishes rapidly as the distance to the distressed property increases the contagion discount grows from the onset of distress through the foreclosure sale and then stabilizes this pattern is consistent with the contagion effect being the visual externality associated with deferred maintenance and neglect

frames of reference and the quality of life asked to choose most people state confidently that they would rather be killed in an automobile accident than to survive a quadraplegic and so we are not surprised to learn that severely disabled people experience a period of devastating depression and disorientation in the wake of their accidents what we do not expect however are the speed and extent to which many of these victims accommodate to their new circumstances within a year s time many quadraplegics report the same mix of moods and emotions as able bodied people do there is also evidence that the blind the retarded and the malformed are no less happy than other people ads for the new york state lottery show participants fantasizing about how their lives would change if they won i d buy the company and fire my boss people who actually do win the lottery report the anticipated rush of euphoria in the weeks after their good fortune followup studies done after several years however indicate that these people are no happier indeed are in many ways less happy than before as a young man fresh out of college i served as a peace corps volunteer in rural nepal my one room house had no electricity no heat no indoor toilet no running water the local diet offered little variety and virtually no meat and yet at no time during my two year stay in nepal did i experience a sense of material deprivation on the contrary my monthly stipend of 40 was much more than most others in my village had and with it i experienced a feeling of prosperity that i have recaptured only in recent years these observations illustrate the critical role of context as a determinant of human satisfaction the neoclassical economic model of choice abstracts from context saying that utility depends only on the level of consumption consumption levels obviously are important and the neoclassical model performs reasonably well in many instances and yet its narrow focus misses something important to predict people s behavior to draw inferences about their well being or to make intelligent policy decisions we must not only know the relevant levels of consumption but also have an appropriate frame of reference within which to evaluate them

interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure this article shows by example that when workers care about relative income and are free to choose their coworkers the equilibrium distribution of wages within firms must be less dispersed than the corresponding distribution of marginal products an implicit market for within firm status is shown to produce welfare gains by sorting workers among firms in accordance with how much they are willing to pay for high rank the resulting equilibrium pareto dominates allocations in which each worker is paid his marginal product

pay inequality and firm performance evidence from matched employer employee data a large matched employer employee data set for sweden is used to test several predictions from tournament theory for white collar workers a positive and significant effect of intra firm wage dispersion on profits and average pay is found using various measures of wage dispersion this result is robust for controlling for firm differences in human capital and firm fixed effects as well as for instrumenting the wage dispersion variable to take into account endogeneity of wage dispersion using data on around 10 000 managers a positive and significant association between pay dispersion and profits is also found for executives further results include a positive relationship between market demand volatility and wage dispersion measured as coefficient of variation in managerial pay and a negative effect of the number of managers contestants on managerial pay spread the first two results are in accordance with predictions from tournament theory while the last one is not

securitization and loan performance ex ante and ex post relations in the mortgage market this study examines the relation between securitization and loan performance using a comprehensive dataset from a major national mortgage lender loans remaining on the bank s balance sheet ex post incurred higher delinquency rates than sold loans contrasting the negative relation between screening efforts and ex ante probability of loan sale explored by prior studies moreover the performance gap between sold and retained loans was wider among the subsample of loans that were perceived as easier to resell the investors seeming advantage over the originating bank can mostly be explained by information revealed during the time between loan origination and sale

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

liquidation values and the credibility of financial contract renegotiation evidence from u s airlines how do liquidation values affect financial contract renegotiation while the incomplete contracting theory of financial contracting predicts that liquidation values determine the allocation of bargaining power between creditors and debtors there is little empirical evidence on financial contract renegotiations and the role asset values play in such bargaining this paper attempts to fill this gap we develop an incomplete contracting model of financial contract renegotiation and estimate it using data on the airline industry in the united states we find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downward when their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fieet is low our results show that strategic renegotiation is common in the airline industry moreover the results emphasize the importance of the incomplete contracting perspective to real world financial contract renegotiation

optimal tax and public investment rules for congestion type of externalities optimal government policy is considered in a second best framework where consumers and producers cause an externality of the congestion type and income distribution issues are taken into account the theoretical results of the optimal tax literature are adapted using the concept of the net social pigouvian tax an illustrative age model uncovers the relative importance of its components the model demonstrates that the level of the externality tax does not depend strongly on distribution concerns as reoptimization of the other taxes ensures that the income distribution objective is reached the model also allows us to study the interaction between externality taxes and public abatement

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

initial labor market conditions and long term outcomes for economists each year graduate students entering the academic job market worry that they will suffer due to uncontrollable macroeconomic risk given the importance of general human capital and the relative ease of publicly observing productivity in academia one might expect that long term labor market outcomes for students graduating in unfavorable climates will resemble long term outcomes for those graduating in favorable climates in this paper i analyze the relationship between macroeconomic conditions at graduation initial job placement and long term outcomes for ph d economists from seven programs using macroeconomic conditions as an instrument for initial placement i show that a quality and type of initial job have a causal effect on long term job characteristics i also show that better initial placement increases research productivity which helps to limit the set of economic models that can explain the effect of initial placement on long term jobs

do good workers hurt bad workers or is it the other way around i study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model a worker s productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker firm specific component firms advertise unconditional wage offers only the resulting equilibrium is inefficient with a too high wage premium for high type workers and too few high type jobs this reduces the welfare of high type workers my findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation where it is argued that the existence of high type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low type workers

credit supply and the price of housing we show that since 1994 branching deregulations in the u s have signi cantly af fected the supply of mortgage credit and ultimately house prices with deregulation the number and volume of originated mortgage loans increase while denial rates fall but the deregulation has no eect on a placebo sample formed of mortgage compa nies that should not be aected by the regulatory change this sharpens the causal interpretation of our results deregulation acts to relax access to mortgage credit and pushes the demand for house ownership outwards interestingly the fraction of securi tized mortgage loans remains unchanged through the process we nd evidence house prices rise with branching deregulation and particularly in metropolitan areas where construction is inelastic for topographic reasons we document these results in a large sample of counties across the u s we also focus on a reduced cross section formed by counties on each side of a state border where a regression discontinuity approach is possible our conclusions are strengthened jel classi cation numbers g21 g10 g12

the determinants of attitudes towards strategic default on mortgages we use survey data to measure households propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them strategic default when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house the willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home equity shortfall our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non pecuniary factors such as views about fairness and morality we also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

wage disparity and team productivity evidence from major league baseball using data describing baseball teams from 1985 to 1998 it is found that levine s levine d i 1991 cohesiveness productivity and wage dispersion journal of economic behavior and organization 15 237 255 team cohesiveness hypothesis is supported over ramaswamy and rowthorn s ramaswamy r rowthorn e 1991 efficiency wages and dispersion economica 58 501 514 danger potential hypothesis the implication is that teams with greater wage disparity experience a reduction in team performance 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

the recognition and reward of employee performance this paper examines when and to what extent an individual s relative wage depends on his her productivity relative to others doing the same job starting wages were influenced by background characteristics and training cost realizations but not by relative productivity wages one year later were influenced by productivity but the effects were small the wage elasticity was 2 at small establishments and 0 at establishments with over 400 employees the wage response to relative productivity and training costs was weaker in small labor markets suggesting that wages do not fully respond to performance because of the firm specificity of job performance differentials

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

why fuel prices differ fuel taxes differ largely between countries this paper reviews a number of considerations from the theory of public finance that may explain these differences based on a multiple regression model we find for tax competition in europe that small countries tend to be more aggressive than large countries by charging lower fuel taxes to attract customers from neighbouring countries there is strong evidence that fuel is just considered as one of the many sources for government expenditure as the share of government expenditure in gdp is higher the fuel tax tends to be higher no support is found for the hypothesis that fuel taxes are higher in countries where externality problems are more severe proxied by car density of the country in this respect the normative literature on pricing externalities has found little support in the realities of transport policy

piece rate contracts for other regarding workers when workers are paid with piece rates inequality arises naturally we consider workers who care about income comparisons and are either status seeking or inequality averse we identify circumstances under which inequality attitudes lead workers to exert more effort than they would otherwise and also circumstances under which workers inequality attitudes lead firms to set lower piece rates than they would otherwise the key behavioral assumption for both of these results to hold when workers are identical is behindness aversion the property that changes in inequality matter more to the worker when he is behind than when he is ahead jel d01 j33 m52

a case for taxing charitable donations abstract we develop a model that allows for public goods and status signaling through charitable contributions we use this setup to re examine the conventional practice of rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions

reconsidering pay dispersion s effect on the performance of interdependent work reconciling sorting and pay inequality pay dispersion in interdependent work settings is virtually universally argued to be detrimental to performance we contend however that these arguments often confound inequality with inequity t

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

estimating the cost of justice for adjuncts a case study in university business ethics american universities rely upon a large workforce of adjunct faculty contract workers who receive low pay no benefits and no job security many news sources magazines and activists claim that adjuncts are exploited and should receive better pay and treatment this paper never affirms nor denies that adjuncts are exploited instead we show that any attempt to provide a significantly better deal faces unpleasant constraints and trade offs adjunct justice would cost universities somewhere between an additional 15 50 billion per year at most universities can provide justice for a minority of adjuncts at the expense of the majority as well as at the expense of poor students universities may indeed be exploiting adjuncts but they cannot rectify this mistake without significant moral costs

why truck distance taxes are contagious and drive fuel taxes to the bottom this paper analyzes the way in which countries with international and local truck traffic decide to switch from a simple fuel tax system to a dual system of fuel and distance charge taxes we show what drives a country to switch and how this affects the level of fuel taxes as well as incentives for other countries to also adopt the dual system the model is partially able to explain the gradual extension of kilometer charging for trucks in europe the model also shows that in the absence of diesel cars the gradual introduction of kilometer charges will make fuel taxation for trucks virtually disappear and will lead to a system where truck use is 1 taxed mainly based on distance 2 is taxed too heavily and 3 where highest distance taxes are expected in transit countries with a strong market position when the fuel tax must in addition serve as an externality tax for diesel cars the introduction of distance charges for trucks will give rise to diesel taxes that are lower than the external cost of diesel cars for trucks this leads to a sum of diesel taxes and distance charges that are higher than the external cost of trucks

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

forced sales and house prices the market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals this implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions but also by idiosyncratic factors including the urgency of the sale and the effects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house first houses are productive only when people are living in them owning an empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a financial asset second houses are fragile assets that need maintenance and are vulnerable to van dalism unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect third short term rental contracts involve high transactions costs resulting from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage fourth houses are expensive indivisible and heterogeneous assets each house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain poten tial buyers and not to others so selling a house requires matching it with an appro priate buyer because of the high costs of intermediation in housing this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer fifth most home owners must finance their purchases using mortgages collateralized debt contracts that transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults the expansion of mortgage credit in the early 2000s and the recent decline in house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006 foreclosures transfer houses to financial institutions which must maintain and pro tect them until they can be sold foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure pro cess and because financial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly in a liquid market an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price but

congestion and tax competition in a parallel network the purpose of this paper is to study the effects of tolling road use on a parallel road network where each link can be tolled by a different government using both theoreticaland numericalmo dels the paper analyses the potential tax competition between countries that each maximise the surplus of local users plus tax revenues in controlling local and transit transport three types of tolling systems are considered i toll discrimination between local traffic and transit ii only uniform tolls on local and transit transport are acceptable iii tolls on local users only the results suggest that the welfare effects of introducing transit tolls are large but that differentiation of tolls between local and transit transport as compared to uniform tolls does not yield large welfare differences also the welfare effects of toll cooperation between countries are relatively small in comparison with the welfare gains of non cooperative tolling of transit the numerical model further illustrates the effects of different transit shares and explicitly considers the role of asymmetries between countries higher transit shares strongly raise the transit toll and slightly decrease local tolls with asymmetric demands the welfare gains of introducing differentiated tolling rise strongly for the country with lower local demand

executive compensation and tournament theory empirical tests on danish data this article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation i test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2 600 executives in 210 danish firms during a 4 year period i ask are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance most of the predictions gain support in the data

balance of power and the propensity of conflict we study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict our experimental results suggest in a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power if bargaining involves endogenous demand choices however the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced in turn the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

why don t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages redefaults self cures and securitization we document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007 having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans we show that this reluctance does not result from securitization servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation including the one most likely to be affected by securitization and to different definitions of delinquency our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small and for subprime loans we use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation and self cure risk the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will become current without renegotiation make renegotiation unattractive to investors

cohesiveness productivity and wage dispersion abstract when work groups support the goals of the firm firms will want to increase group cohesiveness if narrowing wage dispersion increases cohesiveness then companies will pay an efficiency wage to the low end of the wage distribution this variant of efficiency wages predicts firm wage effects and predicts that unemployment will be concentrated among low wage workers furthermore workers at cohesive firms will have higher marginal products than will similar workers at other firms thus policies to encourage the growth of cohesive firms will increase national output

signaling in secret pay for performance and the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy although the vast majority of u s firms follow a policy of pay secrecy research provides a limited understanding of its overall utility to organizations building on signaling theory we develop

the effect of wage dispersion on team outcome and the way team outcome is produced the impact of intra team pay dispersion on team productivity is a highly discussed issue on the one hand wage differentials provide incentives for higher employee effort on the other hand pay inequality may reduce team cohesiveness and increase feelings of relative deprivation leading to lower performance analysing nonlinear effects of wage dispersion in professional soccer we find empirical evidence that team performance is strongest when there is either very high or very low wage inequality medium levels produce the weakest team performance in addition we show that the pay structure affects the team s playing style even after controlling for team and coach heterogeneity we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications as well as the limits of generalization

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

mortgage modification and strategic behavior evidence from a legal settlement with countrywide abstract we investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of us state government lawsuits against countrywide financial corporation which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers using a difference in differences framework we find that countrywide s monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0 54 percentage points a 10 percent relative increase immediately after the settlement s announcement the estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise these results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs jel d14 g21 k22 r31

securitization and mortgage renegotiation evidence from the great depression we use loan level data from the nyc metropolitan area to examine the extent to which lenders attempted to prevent foreclosures with concessionary modi cations during the great depression we nd no principal forgiveness in the sample and only a handful of concessionary mortgage modi cations of other types far more mortgages terminated through foreclosure than received any sort of concessionary modi cation the results indicate that there are signi cant impediments to renegotiation of residential mortgages beyond securitization as such less renegotiation seems unlikely to be a major cost of securitization of residential mortgages

forced asset sales and the concentration of outstanding debt evidence from the mortgage market we provide evidence that lenders differ in their ex post incentives to internalize price default externalities associated with the liquidation of collateralized debt using the mortgage market as a laboratory we conjecture that lenders with a large share of outstanding mortgages on their balance sheets internalize the negative spillovers associated with the liquidation of defaulting mortgages and thus are less inclined to foreclose we provide evidence consistent with our conjecture arguably as a consequence zip codes with a higher concentration of outstanding mortgages experience smaller house prices declines these results are not driven by unobservable zip code or lender characteristics

sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance an experimental investigation agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this proble

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

what triggers mortgage default this paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default negative equity and illiquidity to do so the authors combine loan level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower s broader balance sheet this gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers those with high credit card utilization rates the authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default with comparably sized marginal effects moreover these two factors interact with each other the effect of illiquidity on default generally increases with high combined loan to value ratios cltv though it is significant even for low cltv county level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk though less so than high utilization and strongly interact with cltv in addition having a second mortgage implies significantly higher default risk particularly for borrowers who have a first mortgage ltv approaching 100 percent this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item