competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

ultimate recovery mixtures abstract we propose a relatively simple accurate and flexible approach to forecasting the distribution of defaulted debt recovery outcomes our approach is based on mixtures of gaussian distributions explicitly conditioned on borrower characteristics debt instrument characteristics and credit conditions at the time of default using moody s ultimate recovery database we show that our mixture specification yields more accurate forecasts of ultimate recoveries on portfolios of defaulted loans and bonds on an out of sample basis than popular regression based estimates further the economically interpretable outputs of our model provide a richer characterization of how conditioning variables affect recovery outcomes than competing approaches the latter benefit is of particular importance in understanding shifts in the relative likelihood of extreme recovery outcomes that tend to be realized more frequently than observations near the distributional mean

credit risk drivers evaluating the contribution of firm level information and of macroeconomic dynamics abstract understanding if credit risk is driven mostly by idiosyncratic firm characteristics or by systematic factors is an important issue for the assessment of financial stability by exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments we observe that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency towards excessive risk taking using an extensive dataset with detailed information for more than 30 000 firms we show that default probabilities are influenced by several firm specific characteristics when time effect controls or macroeconomic variables are also taken into account the results improve substantially hence though the firms financial situation has a central role in explaining default probabilities macroeconomic conditions are also very important when assessing default probabilities over time

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

dual distribution channels the competition between rental agencies and dealers managerial decisions involving marketing channels are among the most critical that an organization must make part of the reason for this importance is that relationships between manufacturers and their intermediaries usually involve long term commitments that are difficult to change on the other hand in order to respond to the realities of the market place an organization must be ready to adapt its distribution practices sometimes under considerable uncertainty about the long term consequences such a problem faces the u s automobile industry which has led manufacturers to experiment with various channel structures when manufacturers first changed their distribution policies they were clear about the short term effect on sales but were unsure about its longer term impact on profitability in this article we develop a model to analyze the marketing of durable products through multiple channels our analysis suggests that even though it was not apparent at the time manufacturers were indeed behaving optimally when they changed their policies our model provides insights not only to automobile manufacturers but also to practitioners and academics who are interested in understanding the unique problems associated with marketing durable products through multiple channels we develop a two period model by assuming that a single manufacturer markets a durable product through two retailers a rental agency and a dealer the rental agency focuses mainly on renting the product in a daily rental market while the dealer focuses on selling the product to a different set of customers in the sales market to model the development of channels in the u s automobile industry we analyze three different channel structures the first structure a separate channel reflects the state of the industry through most of the 1980s when rental agencies were franchised solely to rent and dealers solely to sell the cars in response to a decrease in overall sales manufacturers encouraged rental agencies to sell their slightly used rental cars in the consumer market resulting in the second structure an overlapping channel dealers did not like this arrangement however and in the next experiment a buyback channel some manufacturers began buying back used rental cars and selling them through dealers in terms of the consumer side of the model we assume that consumers are heterogeneous and have product valuations that are distributed uniformly between a low and a high value in addition they recognize that as the durable depreciates with use its secondhand market value decreases while both sold and rented goods depreciate with use we assume based on an analysis of market prices that sold goods depreciate at a higher rate than rented goods given these different depreciation rates and consumers underlying utility functions we develop the market demand functions in the dealer s and rental agency s markets then for each of the channel structures we solve the intermediaries and manufacturer s problems the main contribution of this article is that it allows us to evaluate the profitability associated with various channel structures for all the players in our analysis the dealer the rental agency and the manufacturer in terms of the intermediaries we find that the overlapping channel is the most profitable structure for the rental agency on the other hand it is the least profitable for the dealer in terms of manufacturer profitability our model suggests that the separate channel is the least profitable and the overlapping channel is the most profitable it is interesting to note that the distribution structure in existence today is more akin to a buyback channel this strikes us as a compromise channel which alleviates dealer concerns with the overlapping channel and yet does not harm rental agencies as much as a separate channel these are surprising results because conventional wisdom has been that the overlapping channel was competing away profits for all players this suggests to us that automobile manufacturers were indeed on the right track when they began experimenting with the structure of their distribution channels

paying too much and being happy about it existence causes and consequences of tariff choice biases abstract a common assumption underlying the analysis of consumers choices among optional tariffs is that consumers choose the tariff that maximizes their surplus and thus the tariff that leads to the lowest billing rate for a given amount of usage yet there is evidence that many users prefer a flat rate even though their billing rate would be lower with a pay per use tariff flat rate bias and some users prefer a pay per use tariff even though they would save money with a flat rate pay per use bias the authors conduct four empirical analyses based on three different data sets they show that the flat rate bias is more important and has a greater regularity and time persistence than the pay per use bias they classify potential causes of the flat rate bias as insurance effect taxi meter effect convenience effect and overestimation effect and show that the insurance the taxi meter and the overestimation effects lead to a flat rate bias they provide evidence that underestimation of usag

sale or lease durable goods monopoly with network effects this paper studies the pricing problem of a durable goods monopolist it finds that contrary to the existing literature profits from selling durable goods might be higher than from leasing when the products exhibit network effects under the influence of network effects there exist multiple self fulfilling equilibria that would sustain different network sizes at the same price by using the assumption that consumers are cautious about network growth we find that consumption externalities among heterogeneous groups of consumers generate a discontinuous demand function which requires a lessor to offer a low price if she wants to reach the mass market in contrast a seller enjoys a relative advantage in that she can build a customer base by setting a lower initial price and raise the price later in the mass market our finding that selling can be more profitable than leasing holds when consumers are more cautious about the prospect of the product s success which might be the case if for example the technology or manufacturer is relatively unknown

loss given default for leasing parametric and nonparametric estimations abstract this study employs a dataset from three german leasing companies with 14 322 defaulted leasing contracts to analyze different approaches to estimating the loss given default lgd using the historical average lgd and simple ols regression as benchmarks we compare hybrid finite mixture models fmms model trees and regression trees and we calculate the mean absolute error root mean squared error and the theil inequality coefficient the relative estimation accuracy of the methods depends among other things on the number of observations and whether in sample or out of sample estimations are considered the latter is decisive for proper risk management and is required for regulatory purposes fmms aim to reproduce the distribution of realized lgds and therefore perform best with respect to in sample estimations but they show poor performance with respect to out of sample estimations model trees by contrast are more robust and outperform all other methods if the sample size is sufficiently large

capital requirements under the credit risk based framework abstract this work aims to study the hypothesis of lower capitalization of banks under the risk based rules introduced in basel ii in this sense an assessment of the impact of these rules on the capital requirements for non financial firms credit risk is performed a comparison with basel i is presented and intervals of variation for the risk drivers such that capital requirements exceed the ones under basel i are established data for a european country supports the hypothesis of a smaller capitalization of banks under the risk based framework as far as credit risk in concerned

the war of information we analyse political contests campaigns between two parties with opposing interests parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy the information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit parties actions are strategic substitutes increasing one party s cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less information for voters parties actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged party s cost may be beneficial asymmetric information adds a signalling component resulting in a belief threshold at which the informed party s decision to continue campaigning offsets other unfavourable information

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

defensive marketing strategies this paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response in particular we show that if products can be represented by their position in a multiattribute space consumers are heterogeneous and maximize utility and awareness advertising and distribution can be summarized by response functions then for the profit maximizing firm it is optimal to decrease awareness advertising it is optimal to decrease the distribution budget unless the new product can be kept out of the market a price increase may be optimal and even under the optimal strategy profits decrease as a result of the competitive new product furthermore if the consumer tastes are uniformly distributed across the spectrum a price decrease increases defensive profits it is optimal at the margin to improve product quality in the direction of the defending product s strength and it is optimal at the margin to reposition by advertising in the same direction in addition we provide practical procedures to estimate 1 the distribution of consumer tastes and 2 the position of the new product in perceptual space from sales data and knowledge of the percent of consumers who are aware of the new product and find it available competitive diagnostics such as the angle of attack are introduced to help the defending manager this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 4 pages 319 360 in 1983

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

pricing access services many established industries such as the online service industry the telecommunication industry or the fitness club industry are access service industries when using services in these industries consumers pay for the privilege of accessing the firm s facilities but do not acquire any right to the facility itself a firm s pricing decisions in access industries frequently come down to a simple choice among flat fee pricing usage pricing or two part tariff pricing however it is not so simple for firms in those industries to make this choice access service firms typically face a mix of consumers who have intrinsically different usage rates a key characteristic of access service firms however is that the cost of providing an additional minute of usage is typically negligible as long as the firm has the necessary capacity to serve its customers service capacity which corresponds to the total available time on a firm s system is often limited in this paper we show that service capacity and consumer usage heterogeneity are two important factors that determine a firm s optimal choice we develop a model that incorporates these two salient characteristics shared by access industries and study what determines a firm s choice among the three alternative pricing structures flat fee pricing usage pricing or two part tariff pricing our analysis shows that in the presence of consumer usage heterogeneity service capacity mediates a firm s optimal choice in a complex yet predictable way a firm s choice also hinges on whether heavy or light users are more valuable in terms of their willingness to pay on a per unit capacity basis the presence of both consumer usage heterogeneity and capacity constraints prompts a firm to choose its pricing structure to attract a desired customer mix and to price discriminate as a result two part tariff pricing is not always optimal in access industries and a firm s pricing structure can vary in a complex way with the interaction of those two factors specifically we show that when light users are more valuable a firm may use a two part tariff or a flat fee depending on whether the firm is constrained by its service capacity but never charge a usage price alone or offer any signing bonus a negative flat fee or a flat payment to customers when heavy users are more valuable a firm may choose to set a usage price a signing bonus plus a usage price or flat fee interestingly regardless of whether heavy or light users are more valuable in an access service industry only flat rate pricing is a sustainable pricing structure once the industry has developed sufficient excess capacity we also show that the optimal pricing strategy in access industries can have some intriguing nonintuitive implications that have not been explored elsewhere for instance when the industry capacity is unevenly distributed between competing firms the large capacity firm may well be advised to increase rather than to decrease its price to accommodate the small firm it would be too costly and too tactless for the large firm to do otherwise in fact the strategy of accommodation calls on the larger firm to retreat in both light and heavy user markets and leave more of its capacity idle and more of the market demand unmet when the small firm s capacity hence the industry capacity increases this implies that incremental policy measures that encourage the growth of smaller companies in the presence of a large company can be welfare decreasing because the growth of smaller firm can force the retreat of a large company at the expense of market coverage today services account for two thirds to three quarters of the gnp not only in the united states but also in many industrial countries access industries are growing rapidly to exert profound impact on today s economy however service pricing in general and pricing access services in particular have not received adequate attention in the literature in this paper we take the first step in understanding how capacity constraints and consumer usage heterogeneity mediate the choice of pricing structures in both monopolistic and competitive contexts

forecasting bank loans loss given default abstract with the advent of the new basel capital accord banking organizations are invited to estimate credit risk capital requirements using an internal ratings based approach in order to be compliant with this approach institutions must estimate the loss given default the fraction of the credit exposure that is lost if the borrower defaults this study evaluates the ability of a parametric fractional response regression and a nonparametric regression tree model to forecast bank loan credit losses the out of sample predictive ability of these models is evaluated at several recovery horizons after the default event the out of time predictive ability is also estimated for a recovery horizon of 1 year the performance of the models is benchmarked against recovery estimates given by historical averages the results suggest that regression trees are an interesting alternative to parametric models in modeling and forecasting loss given default

dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition we present a dynamic pricing model for oligopolistic firms selling differentiated perishable goods to multiple finite segments of strategic consumers who are aware that pricing is dynamic and may time their purchases accordingly this model encompasses strategic behavior by both firms and consumers in a unified stochastic dynamic game in which each firm s objective is to maximize its total expected revenues and each consumer responds according to a shopping intensity allocation consumer choice model we prove the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium provide equilibrium optimality conditions and prove monotonicity results for special cases the model provides insights about equilibrium price dynamics under different levels of competition asymmetry between firms and multiple market segments with varying properties we demonstrate that strategic behavior by consumers can have serious impacts on revenues if firms ignore that behavior in their dynamic pricing policies moreover ideal equilibrium responses to consumer strategic behavior can recover only a portion of the lost revenues a key conclusion is that firms may benefit more from limiting the information available to consumers than from allowing full information and responding to the resulting strategic behavior in an optimal fashion

support vector regression for loss given default modelling abstract loss given default modelling has become crucially important for banks due to the requirement that they comply with the basel accords and to their internal computations of economic capital in this paper support vector regression svr techniques are applied to predict loss given default of corporate bonds where improvements are proposed to increase prediction accuracy by modifying the svr algorithm to account for heterogeneity of bond seniorities we compare the predictions from svr techniques with thirteen other algorithms our paper has three important results first at an aggregated level the proposed improved versions of support vector regression techniques outperform other methods significantly second at a segmented level by bond seniority least square support vector regression demonstrates significantly better predictive abilities compared with the other statistical models third standard transformations of loss given default do not improve prediction accuracy overall our empirical results show that support vector regression techniques are a promising technique for banks to use to predict loss given default

a conversational war of attrition we explore costly deliberation by two differentially informed and possibly biased jurors a hawk lones and a dove moritz alternately insist on a verdict until one concedes debate assumes one of two genres depending on bias a juror say lones is intransigent if he wishes to prevail and reach a conviction for any type of moritz next to concede in contrast lones is ambivalent if he wants the strongest conceding types of moritz to push for acquittal both jurors are ambivalent with small bias or high delay costs as lones grows more hawkish he argues more forcefully for convictions mitigating wrongful acquittals if dovish moritz is intransigent then he softens strategic substitutes leading to more wrongful convictions ambivalent debate is new and yields a novel dynamic benefit of increased polarization for if moritz is ambivalent then he toughens strategic complements and so surprisingly a more hawkish lones leads to fewer wrongful acquittals and convictions so more polarized but balanced debate can improve communication unlike in static cheap talk we also show that patient and not too biased jurors vote against their posteriors near the end of the debate optimally playing devil s advocate we shed light on the adversarial legal system peremptory challenges and cloture rules

repatriation of debt in the euro crisis with the beginning of the euro crisis the long standing trend of european financial integration reversed investors unwound cross border positions of debt obligations and increased holdings of locally issued debt in other words debt obligations were repatriated we use data on bank portfolios to document three new empirical regularities of the financial disintegration i repatriation affected mainly debt of crisis countries ii repatriation affected mainly public debt iii the public debt of crisis countries that was not repatriated was reallocated to large and politically influential countries within the euro area we read these results in light of standard theories of cross border portfolio allocation and argue that the sum of these patterns constitutes evidence for the secondary market theory of public debt

joint effect of financial fragility and macroeconomic shocks on bank loan losses evidence from europe abstract a reduced form model including nonlinearities is estimated from pooled data from nine european countries during 1982 2004 to show the effects of macroeconomic shocks and financial fragility on bank loan losses the main ingredients of the model are unanticipated output and interest rate shocks estimated from published macroeconomic and naive forecasts the model fits the data well capturing the extremely high levels of loan losses witnessed in different financial crises

concurrent renting and selling in a durable goods monopoly under threat of entry this article analyzes the choice of contract sales or rental of a durable goods monopolist facing a threat of future entry although in the absence of such a threat a monopolist would prefer to rent his entire output we show that the threat of entry alters that preference there is an optimal preentry contract mix involving both rental and sales if both firms behave as cournot duopolists after entry the optimal choice of preentry contracts enables the erstwhile monopolist to gain the same profits as he would if he behaved as a von stackelberg leader

modeling the loss distribution in this paper we focus on modeling and predicting the loss distribution for credit risky assets such as bonds and loans we model the probability of default and the recovery rate given default based on shared covariates we develop a new class of default models that explicitly accounts for sector specific and regime dependent unobservable heterogeneity in firm characteristics based on the analysis of a large default and recovery data set over the horizon 1980 2008 we document that the specification of the default model has a major impact on the predicted loss distribution whereas the specification of the recovery model is less important in particular we find evidence that industry factors and regime dynamics affect the performance of default models implying that the appropriate choice of default models for loss prediction will depend on the credit cycle and on portfolio characteristics finally we show that default probabilities and recovery rates predicted out of sample are negatively correlated and that the magnitude of the correlation varies with seniority class industry and credit cycle this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

to grab for the market or to bide one s time a dynamic model of entry we consider a simultaneous move dynamic entry game the fixed cost of entry is private information entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry we consider general continuous distributions for the fixed cost and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies comparative statics results are derived as the time between rounds approaches zero all of the action occurs during an arbitrarily small amount of time for the bertrand model we extend the analysis to allow for n firms

product customization and price competition on the internet the internet provides an unprecedented capability for sellers to learn about their customers and offer custom products at special prices in addition customization is more feasible today because of advances in manufacturing technologies that have improved sellers manufacturing flexibility we first develop a model of product customization and flexible pricing to incorporate the salient roles of the internet and flexible manufacturing technologies in reducing the costs of designing and producing tailored consumer goods we show how a monopoly seller may earn the highest profits by producing both standard and custom products and can raise prices for both types of products as customization and information collection technologies improve simultaneous adoption of customization in a duopoly reduces the differentiation between their standard products but does not intensify price competition compared with a two facility monopolist the duopoly may underinvest in customization consumer surplus improves after sellers adopt customization but does not monotonically increase as customization technologies advance when firms face a fixed entry cost and adopt customization sequentially the first entrant always achieves an advantage and may be able to deter subsequent entry by choosing its customization scope strategically

loss functions for loss given default model comparison abstract we propose a new approach for comparing loss given default lgd models which is based on loss functions defined in terms of regulatory capital charge our comparison method improves the banks ability to absorb their unexpected credit losses by penalizing more heavily lgd forecast errors made on credits associated with high exposure and long maturity we also introduce asymmetric loss functions that only penalize the lgd forecast errors that lead to underestimate the regulatory capital we show theoretically that our approach ranks models differently compared to the traditional approach which only focuses on lgd forecast errors we apply our methodology to six competing lgd models using a sample of almost 10 000 defaulted credit and leasing contracts provided by an international bank our empirical findings clearly show that models rankings based on capital charge losses differ from those based on the lgd loss functions currently used by regulators banks and academics

buying sharing and renting information goods information goods such as books journals computer software music and videos can be copied shared resold or rented when such opportunities for sharing are present the content producer will generally sell a smaller amount at a higher price which may increase or decrease profits i identify three circumstances where profits increase 1 when the transactions cost of sharing is less than the marginal cost of production 2 when content is viewed only a few times and transactions costs of sharing are low and 3 when a sharing market provides a way to segment high value and low value users

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

the determinants of bank loan recovery rates in good times and bad new evidence abstract we find that factors explaining bank loan recovery rates differ depending on the state of an underlying credit cycle our modelling approach incorporates a two state markov switching mechanism to capture underlying economic conditions this latent credit cycle variable helps to explain differences in observed recovery rates over time using us bank default loan data from moody s ultimate recovery database and covering the pre and post global financial crisis gfc period the paper develops and implements a dynamic model for bank loan recovery rates we accommodate the distinctive empirical features of the recovery rate data while incorporating a large number of possible determinants we find that certain loan specific and other variables hold different explanatory power with respect to recovery rates in good versus bad times in the credit cycle i e depending on underlying credit market conditions our findings demonstrate the importance of accounting for counter cyclical expected recovery rates when determining capital retention levels

systematic effects among loss given defaults and their implications on downturn estimation abstract banks are obliged to provide downturn estimates for loss given defaults lgds in the internal ratings based approach while downturn conditions are characterized by systematically higher lgds it is unclear which factors may best capture these conditions as lgds depend on recovery payments which are collected during varying economic conditions in the resolution process it is challenging to identify suitable economic variables using a bayesian finite mixture model we adapt random effects to measure economic conditions and to generate downturn estimates we find that systematic effects vary among regions i e the us and europe and strongly deviate from the economic cycle our approach offers straightforward supportive tools for decision makers risk managers are enabled to select their individual margin of conservatism based on their portfolios while regulators might set a lower bound to guarantee conservatism in comparison to other approaches our proposal appears to be conservative enough during downturn conditions and inhibits over conservatism

optimal entry timing abstract a player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede information about the potential entrant s type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry i analyze stationary equilibria using the public belief as a state variable no equilibria in pure strategies exist and smooth pasting conditions need not hold under both d1 and a novel refinement the informed player has nondecreasing value functions and her strategy has the following structure for high states both types enter with certainty for a possibly empty interval of intermediate states no type enters and for low states the high type enters while the low type mixes i obtain closed form solutions and analyze comparative statics for such equilibria the welfare effects of the presence of news relative to no news depend on the starting belief however for a fixed equilibrium a marginal increase in news quality always helps the informed player regardless of her type and always hurts total welfare

evaluating density forecasts with applications to financial risk management density forecasting is increasingly more important and commonplace for example in financial risk management yet little attention has been given to the evaluation of density forecasts the authors develop a simple and operational framework for density forecast evaluation they illustrate the framework with a detailed application to density forecasting of asset returns in environments with time varying volatility finally the authors discuss several extensions copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

strategic real options abstract i study hidden investment in quality in a dynamic persuasion game a seller such as a project manager or startup company controls an asset and wants to convince a potential buyer such as an acquiring company or a regulator that it has high quality the buyer observes exogenous news with quality dependent drift and holds a call option on the asset the seller is privately informed about quality and can wait at a flow cost upgrade at a fixed cost or exit the market for low upgrade costs multiple equilibria exist and exhibit novel reputational dynamics resetting barriers and skew brownian motion a generalization of a reflected stochastic process in one type of equilibrium a seller with low quality waits until his reputation hits rock bottom and then upgrades with some probability inducing upward reputational jumps in equilibrium the seller may exit at an intermediate reputation in a second type the low quality seller mixes over exiting at low reputations and upgrading in an intermediate sweet spot region the results suggest a social benefit to setting high expectations for effort when agents start with low reputations and help explain why agents respond to adversity in drastically different ways across environments

forecasting bankruptcy more accurately a simple hazard model i argue that hazard models are more appropriate than single period models for forecasting bankruptcy single period models are inconsistent while hazard models produce consistent estimates i describe a simple technique for estimating a discrete time hazard model i find that about half of the accounting ratios that have been used in previous models are not statistically significant moreover market size past stock returns and idiosyncratic returns variability are all strongly related to bankruptcy i propose a model that uses both accounting ratios and market driven variables to produce out of sample forecasts that are more accurate than those of alternative models copyright 2001 by university of chicago press

optimal pricing strategy for new products robinson and lakhani 1975 initiated a long research stream in marketing when they used the bass model 1969 to develop optimal pricing path for a new product a careful analysis of the extant literature reveals that the research predominantly suggests that the optimal price path should be largely based on the sales growth pattern however in the real world we rarely find new products that have such pricing pattern we observe either a monotonically declining pricing pattern or an increase decrease pricing pattern that does not seem close to the sales path in this paper we use a variation of the generalized bass model called gbm developed by bass et al 1994 that yields optimal pricing policies that are consistent with empirical data

pricing information goods a strategic analysis of the selling and pay per use mechanisms we analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods these mechanisms are selling where up front payment allows unrestricted use and pay per use where payments are tailored to use we analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay per use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known ticking meter effect we demonstrate that pay per use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low in a duopoly one firm uses selling and the other uses pay per use here in contrast to the monopoly selling yields higher profits than pay per use we demonstrate that surprisingly the profits of both duopolists can increase as the psychological cost associated with pay per use increases next we show that uncertainty in consumer use frequency does not affect pay per use in a monopoly but lowers profits from selling in a duopoly both the seller and the pay per use provider obtain lower profits when use frequency is uncertain we also analyze how pricing mechanism performance is affected if the firms cannot commit to prices if the pay per use provider offers a two part tariff and if consumers are risk averse

strategic transmission of costly information it is ofren the case that an individual s decision is at least partly based on information received from another and when the agents payoffs depend on both the former s decision and on the latter s information there is an incentive for the informed individual to attempt to bias the decision maker s decision in his or her favor by strategically manipulating the information transmitted in a seminal paper crawford and sobel 1982 hereafter c s study such strategic information transmission in the context of an abstract sender receiver game variants of the crawford and sobel model have been applied widely and as the application varies so often does the interpretation of type in some cases type refers to a preference parameter given by nature as for example in bargaining theory e g farrell and gibbons 1989 matthews 1989 whereas in other settings for instance legislative decision making or expert testimony type refers to more or less technical information concerning how decisions map into final consequences and as such is acquired information e g gilligan and krehbiel 1987 milgrom and roberts 1986 when the information has to be acquired it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly for otherwise there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed so long as the receiver can observe surely or at least accurately infer whether the sender is informed and so long as messages are cheap talk there is no issue here for strategic information transmission save whether to become informed at all however there are many circumstances when it is inappropri ate to assume the receiver has such knowledge one possibility is that a receiver may know that a sender has some relevant informa tion but be uncertain of the quality of this information a second perhaps more important possibility is that a receiver is unable to tell whether a potential sender is uninformed inter alia this problem constitutes the rationale for ignorance of the law being inadmissible as a legal defense were it admissible then informed miscreants would mimic uninformed transgressors leads voters to be skeptical of politicians claiming ignorance of illegal arms deals and makes the sec sensitive to problems in distinguishing insider trading from legitimate good judgement so there is an intrinsic asymmetry in that it is generally possible for say senders to verify possession of at least some information but it is typically prohibitively difficult to verify any lack of knowledge

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

the delivery option in credit default swaps abstract under standard assumptions the reduced form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments bonds and credit default swaps cds simultaneously using a data set of euro denominated corporate bonds and cds our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data and subsequently using it to price cds resulting in model cds spreads up to 50 lower on average than observed in the market an extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in cds contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default by using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option contradicting this common assumption case studies of chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest to deliver bond and applied to data largely eliminates the mispricing calibrated recovery values lie between 8 and 47 for different obligors exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries a cross sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors no evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid ask spread notional amount coupon or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity

pricing derivatives on financial securities subject to credit risk this article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two types of credit risks are considered the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default the second is where the writer of the derivative security may default we apply the foreign currency analogy of jarrow and turnbull 1991 to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a spot exchange rate arbitrage free valuation techniques are then employed this methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives such as swaps and caps the purpose of this article is to provide a new theory for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two sources of credit risk are identified and analyzed the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default paying off less than promised this is the case for example with imbedded options on corporate debt the second is the credit risk introduced by the writer of the derivative security who may also default examples include over the counter writers of options on eurodollar futures swaps and swaptions for pricing derivative securities involving credit risk there are currently two approaches the first views these derivatives as contingent claims not on the financial securities themselves but as compound options on the assets underlying the financial securities this is the case for example with the pricing of imbedded options on corporate debt see merton 1974 1977 black and cox 1976 ho and singer 1982 chance 1990 and kim ramaswamy and sundaresan 1993 or the pricing of vulnerable options see johnson and stulz 1987 in practice however this valuation methodology is difficult to use first the assets underlying the financial security are often not tradeable and therefore their values are not observable this makes application of the theory and estimation of the relevant parameters problematic second as in the case of corporate debt all of the other liabilities of the firm senior to the corporate debt must first and simultaneously be valued this generates significant computational difficulties as a result this approach has not

the red and the black mental accounting of savings and debt in the standard economic account of consumer behavior the cost of a purchase takes the form of a reduction in future utility when expenditures that otherwise could have been made are forgone the reality of consumer hedonics is different when people make purchases they often experience an immediate pain of paying which can undermine the pleasure derived from consumption the ticking of the taxi meter for example reduces one s pleasure from the ride we propose a double entry mental accounting theory that describes the nature of these reciprocal interactions between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of paying and draws out their implications for consumer behavior and hedonics a central assumption of the model which we call prospective accounting is that consumption that has already been paid for can be enjoyed as if it were free and that the pain associated with payments made prior to consumption but not after is buffered by thoughts of the benefits that the payments will finance another important concept is coupling which refers to the degree to which consumption calls to mind thoughts of payment and vice versa some financing methods such as credit cards tend to weaken coupling whereas others such as cash payment produce tight coupling our model makes a variety of predictions that are at variance with economic formulations contrary to the standard prediction that people will finance purchases to minimize the present value of payments our model predicts strong debt aversion that they should prefer to prepay for consumption or to get paid for work after it is performed such pay before sequences confer hedonic benefits because consumption can be enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it in the future likewise when paying beforehand the pain of paying is mitigated by thoughts of future consumption benefits contrary to the economic prediction that consumers should prefer to pay at the margin for what they consume our model predicts that consumers will find it less painful to pay for and hence will prefer flat rate pricing schemes such as unlimited internet access at a fixed monthly price even if it involves paying more for the same usage other predictions concern spending patterns with cash charge or credit cards and preferences for the earmarking of purchases we test these predictions in a series of surveys and in a conjoint like analysis that pitted our double entry mental accounting model against a standard discounting formulation and another benchmark that did not incorporate hedonic interactions between consumption and payments our model provides a better fit of the data for 60 of the subjects the discounting formulation provides a better fit for only 29 of the subjects even when allowing for positive and negative discount rates the pain of paying we argue plays an important role in consumer self regulation but is hedonically costly from a hedonic perspective the ideal situation is one in which payments are tightly coupled to consumption so that paying evokes thoughts about the benefits being financed but consumption is decoupled from payments so that consumption does not evoke thoughts about payment from an efficiency perspective however it is important for consumers to be aware of what they are paying for consumption this creates a tension between hedonic efficiency and what we call decision efficiency various institutional arrangements such as financing of public parks through taxes or usage fees play into this tradeoff a producer developing a pricing structure for their product or service should be aware of these two conflicting objectives and should try to devise a structure that reconciles them

war and conflict in economics theories applications and recent trends we review the main economic models of war and conflict these models vary in details but their implications are qualitatively consistent highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings recent empirical literature employing both laboratory and field data in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory however this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict we finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges

competition in persuasion we study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate we show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general we identify a condition on the information environment i e the set of signals available to each sender that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome regardless of preferences the same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

confirmation bias and signaling in downsian elections how do voters behavioural biases affect political outcomes we study this question in a model of downsian electoral competition in which office motivated candidates have private information about the benefits of policies and voters may infer candidates information from their electoral platforms if voters are bayesian candidates have strategic incentives to anti pander they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs however anti pandering incentives are ameliorated if voters inferences are subject to confirmation bias voter confirmation bias can thus counteract distortions due to the strategic interaction between candidates potentially leading to welfare improvements indeed we show that all observers whether biased or bayesian would like the representative voter in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves

effects of payment mechanism on spending behavior the role of rehearsal and immediacy of payments past expenses have been shown to influence future spending behavior by depleting available budgets however a prerequisite for this relationship is the accurate recall of past payments and the experiencing of the full aversive impact associated with them this article shows that the use of different payment mechanisms influences both these factors and hence moderates the effects of past payments on future spending specifically past payments strongly reduce purchase intention when the payment mechanism requires the consumer to write down the amount paid rehearsal and when the consumer s wealth is depleted immediately rather than with a delay immediacy two experiments show support for the proposed theoretical framework

process innovation product differentiation and channel structure strategic incentives in a duopoly in this paper we analyze the joint implications of two effects a inserting independent profit maximizing retailers into thechannel system provides buffering to the manufacturers from price competition when their products are highly substitutable and intrachannel contracts are observable as shown by mcguire and staelin 1983 under the assumption of constant marginal production costs and b lack of channel coordination results in a reduction in manufacturer s incentives to invest in efforts to reduce production costs as shown by jeuland and shugan 1983 for the case of bilateral monopoly we show that both these results are robust in the sense that the first holds even in the presence of the vertical externality of manufacturer s effort reduction in a noncoordinated channel and the second holds regardless of the degree of substitutability between the competing channel s products specifically we analyze a four stage game with two manufacturers and two retailers where the intrachannel contracts are linear and observable and manufacturers make investments in process improvements to reduce their production costs we find that the optimal channel structure decision depends on interactions between two parameters the degree of substitutability between products and the level of investments required to achieve production cost reduction these parameters represent what have been widely interpreted in the management literature as the two primary generic strategies that most organizations follow in order to gain competitive advantage cost leadership and product differentiation porter 1980 thus our analysis brings out the strategic and interdisciplinary nature of the channel structure decision that can significantly affect firm profitability our main results are as follows first we find that decentralized noncoordinated channels appear as more profitable equilibrium than integration or perfectly coordinated channels at high product substitutability even when process innovation dimension is accounted for in agreement with the literature however the range of substitutability over which decentralization is an equilibrium strategy is smaller the easier it is to reduce production costs intuitively the easier the cost reduction the larger the cost penalty that the channel incurs as a result of not coordinating investment and pricing decisions between channel members and thus smaller the range over which decentralization is an equilibrium this implies that there is an explicit tradeoff between efficiency and strategic incentives in distribution channel design second we show that decentralized manufacturers invest less in process innovation than integrated manufacturers do regardless of the structure of the competing channel and the degree of substitutability between products consequently a decentralized channel has higher costs charges higher prices and produces lower quantities than an integrated channel does moreover these differences get larger the easier the cost reduction the effect on manufacturer profits however is not that clear manufacturers make higher profits by decentralizing if products are highly substitutable inagreement with mcguire and staelin 1983 and coughlan and wernerfelt 1989 however we also find that the relative profitability of decentralization at high substitutability and of integration at low substitutability increases the easier the cost reduction moreover the range of substitutability over which decentralization is more profitable than integration is itself larger the easier the cost reduction though decentralization is an equilibrium strategy over a smallerrange thus process innovation accentuates the profit difference between integrated and decentralized channels andmakes the prisoner s dilemma situation worse in the choice of distribution channel structure finally we analyze two examples of coordinated decision making in a channel a divisional integrated system and franchising in the first case we find that decentralization can emerge as a unique and more profitable equilibrium at high product substitutability in contrast to mcguire and staelin 1983 in the second case we find that decentralization is not always a unique equilibrium and it is not always more profitable than integration in sharp contrast to the results by coughlan and wernerfelt 1989 thus franchising does not provide a sure way of achieving channel coordination when marginal production costs are not constant in sum this paper highlights the importance of simultaneously considering both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of interorganizational relations on one hand and on the other paying attention to cross functional interactions across marketing and operational decisions to better understand the underlying incentives that shape firm and market structures conventional focus of marketing on demand side effects and of operations on cost side effects can lead to suboptimal decisions

price discovery and trade fragmentation in a multi market environment evidence from the mts system this paper proposes new metrics for the process of price discovery on the main electronic trading platform for euro denominated government securities analysing price data on daily transactions for 107 bonds over a period of twenty seven months we find a greater degree of price leadership of the dominant market when our measures as opposed to the traditional price discovery metrics are used we also present unambiguous evidence that a market s contribution to price discovery is crucially affected by the level of trading activity the implications of these empirical findings are discussed in the light of the debate about the possible restructuring of the regulatory framework for the treasury bond market in europe

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

selling and leasing strategies for durable goods with complementary products it has been recognized that when a durable goods manufacturer sells its output it has an incentive to produce at a rate that will drive down the market price of the product over time because anticipation of declining prices makes consumers less willing to invest in owning the durable good selling can be self defeating for the manufacturer if the manufacturer instead leases the product it can eliminate its own incentive to decrease the price over time which allows it to extract larger rents from consumers in this paper we investigate how a durable goods manufacturer s choice between leasing and selling is affected by a complementary product that is produced by an independent firm we show that a durable goods manufacturer that leases its product has an incentive to increase prices by limiting the availability of the product in response to the availability of a complement because this potential for opportunistic behavior discourages output of the complement leasing can also be problematic as a result the durable goods manufacturer faces a trade off between leasing which commits the manufacturer to not overproduce and selling which commits it to not underproduce our contribution is to identify this trade off and show how a durable goods manufacturer can use a combination of leasing and selling to balance its strategic commitment across both its own market as well as the complementary market

a computational approach to pricing a bank credit line abstract using trended brownian motion to characterize borrower cash needs over time we are able to derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of a bank credit line as well as the likelihoods for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan armed with these analytic results we solve for the credit line mark up rate and the configuration of stored liquidity that maximizes the bank s intertemporal expected profits from the loan the optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations whose solutions we then simulate over a host of scenarios

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

campaign advertising and voter welfare this paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it an electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players many voters two candidates and one interest group the group has non verifiable insider information on the candidates quality and on the basis of this information offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position candidates spend the contributions they receive on non directly informative advertising this paper shows that 1 a separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive 2 although voters are fully rational a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare improving and 3 split contributions may arise in equilibrium and if they arise too often they are detrimental to voters

ratings migration and the business cycle with application to credit portfolio stress testing the turmoil in the capital markets in 1997 and 1998 has highlighted the need for systematic stress testing of banks portfolios including both their trading and lending books we propose that underlying macroeconomic volatility is a key part of a useful conceptual framework for stress testing credit portfolios and that credit migration matrices provide the specific linkages between underlying macroeconomic conditions and asset quality credit migration matrices which characterize the expected changes in credit quality of obligors are cardinal inputs to many applications including portfolio risk assessment modeling the term structure of credit risk premia and pricing of credit derivatives they are also an integral part of many of the credit portfolio models used by financial institutions by separating the economy into two states or regimes expansion and contraction and conditioning the migration matrix on these states we show that the loss distribution of credit portfolios can differ greatly as can the concomitant level of economic capital to be assigned

recovery rates default probabilities and the credit cycle in recessions the number of defaulting firms rises on top of this the average amount recovered on the bonds of defaulting firms tends to decrease this paper proposes an econometric model in which this joint time variation in default rates and recovery rate distributions is driven by an unobserved markov chain which we interpret as the credit cycle this model is shown to fit better than models in which this joint time variation is driven by observed macroeconomic variables we use the model to quantitatively assess the importance of allowing for systematic time variation in recovery rates which is often ignored in risk management and pricing models

the demand for local telephone service a fully discrete model of residential calling patterns and service choices we present an empirical model of households choices among local telephone service options for example between flat rate and measured service and the interrelation of these choices with the number and average duration of local calls households make at each time of day to each geographical zone using a nested logit model with estimation performed on a randomly selected subset of the households calling patterns we calculate elasticities of demand for each local service option number of calls average duration and revenues with respect to the fixed monthly charges and the usage charges for calling under each option we find moderate price elasticities of number of calls with respect to usage charges for households subscribing to measured service nevertheless raising usage charges has a negligible effect on revenues since a sufficient number of households either originally subscribe to flat rate service or convert to flat rate service in response to higher usage charges we find a high elasticity of demandfor each service option with respect to itsfixed monthlyfee this indicates high substitutability among service options the shift among service options induces new calling patterns which wefind to be a small but not negligible indirect effect e most telephone operating companies offer residential customers several options for local service there are two general categories of service flat rate service under which a household can for a fixed monthly charge make an unlimited number of calls within a specified geographical area and measured service for which the household pays a lower fixed monthly fee but can make only a specified number or dollar value of calls at no extra charge after which charges are incurred for additional calls various flat rate services differ in the size of the geographical area in which calling is at no extra charge with higher monthly fees for larger areas measured services differ with respect to the threshold number or dollar value of calls beyond which the customer is charged

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

gambling in contests this paper presents a strategic model of risk taking behavior in contests formally we analyze an n player winner take all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed brownian motion with drift a player whose process reaches zero has to stop the player with the highest stopping point wins unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition here higher stopping times are riskier because players can go bankrupt we derive a closed form solution of a nash equilibrium outcome in equilibrium highest expected losses occur at an intermediate negative value of the drift

competitive policy development we present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies yet agree on certain common objectives policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals these investments are specific to a given proposal which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power competition undermines this agenda power forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker this beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals jel d72 d73 d78 e61 during the early years of the new deal president franklin delano roosevelt faced an enormous challenge he believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues including agriculture trade banking employment and social insurance however although roosevelt was well versed in policy crafting workable proposals for such a far reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity or that of his immediate advisors instead the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies although these individuals shared some common goals e g ending the great depression they also had deep seated ideological disagreements among themselves and with the president about what policies the federal government should pursue classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency weber 1991 famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a mere dilettante when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors more recently scholars

interaction of market and credit risk abstract experience during the financial crisis illustrates that the integrated measurement and management of different forms of risk remains a challenge for industry practitioners researchers and financial supervisors alike in the context of related literature this article summarizes new research on the interaction of market and credit risk and implications for risk management that is presented in this special issue the research covered highlights in particular the errors that can occur in the aggregation of the two types of risk and the strong relationships between them that suggest caution in the use of pragmatic distinctions between them the article also touches on some research based lessons for supervisory policies and suggests some directions for future research

research note consumer heterogeneity and competitive price matching guarantees price matching guarantees are widely used in consumer and industrial markets previous studies argue that they are a marketing tactic that facilitates implicit price collusion this is because once a store adopts this marketing tactic its rivals can no longer steal its customers by undercutting its price and hence they have little incentive to initiate price cuts while a store with price matching guarantees has no fear of losing customers to rivals price cuts it has every incentive to raise its own price to charge a higher price to its loyal consumers a growing body of legal literature uses this argument today to justify calls for antitrust actions against stores employing this marketing tactic however this theoretical conclusion baffles practitioners and industry experts in practice sellers typically embrace this marketing tactic in response to heavier competition and a growing bargain consciousness among shoppers the introduction of price matching guarantees by a store is frequently interpreted by industry observers as the initiation of a price war rather than a signal of price collusion this assertion is supported in many instances by the fact that stores that introduce price matching guarantees also roll back their prices and typically suffer subsequent loss of profits most ironically the favorite examples used by researchers to illustrate how price matching guarantees can enforce price collusion crazy eddie and nobody beats the wiz have subsequently either gone bankrupt or filed for federal bankruptcy protection in this study we show that price matching guarantees can indeed facilitate competition the expected prices and profits can be strictly lower when all stores adopt price matching guarantees than when they are not allowed to this is because the adoption of price matching guarantees generates not only a competition dampening effect which has been recognized in the literature but also a competition enhancing effect this latter effect comes from the fact that price matching guarantees encourage price search by those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are mindful of saving opportunities these consumers will have incentives to obtain the rival store s price when their favorite store offers price matching guarantees to avail themselves of the lowest possible price at their favorite store as a result price matching guarantees reduce the number of purchases at the store from those consumers who would have paid the full price and thus prompt a store to price more aggressively to bid for more incremental sales this competition enhancing effect can more than offset the competition dampening effect in markets where consumers differ in their price search costs and store loyalty thus our study casts doubt on the advisability of blanket prohibition on price matching guarantees our argument relies only on consumer segmentation and on the phenomenon of periodic sales both of which are common in retail markets we arrive at our conclusion by incorporating bargain shoppers and opportunistic loyals into the standard sales promotion models in contrast the past literature on price matching guarantees ignores the ubiquitous phenomenon of sales in retail markets and overlooks those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are alert to saving opportunities as a result it is troubled by two awkward conclusions on the one hand price matching guarantees simply remove rivals incentives to undercut in price and hence also their incentives to run sales this implies that the adoption of price matching guarantees in a market will eliminate the phenomenon of sales which is obviously counterfactual on the other hand in equilibrium no consumer actually invokes price matching guarantees as each player has incentives to close any price gap in the market this is obviously false based on our casual observations and our conversations with store managers theoretical research on the subject thus far has been overwhelmingly one sided and empirical or experimental studies are conspicuously lacking we hope that our conclusion will spark further research in both directions a healthy debate will broaden our perspective on an issue of great importance in formulating public policies and in managerial decision making

research note the role of production lead time and demand uncertainty in marketing durable goods firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty this is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season once the firm has produced the goods the available production volume affects the firm s subsequent marketing decisions in this paper we study the relationship between the firm s production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer we develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies after taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions we find that the firm s optimal inventory level is u shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products furthermore unlike the case for nondurables for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved

effects of debt collection practices on loss given default abstract in this article we propose an lgd model that is solely based on legal and internal debt collection actions our model is supported by empirical tests in which it performs better than a usual firm specific model this result is noteworthy when we recall that the model has only binary variables that indicate whether an action was taken our model can be applied to update the lgd of distressed firms in a timely manner reflecting the actions taken during the debt collection period it also can be used to assess the effect of a recovery action and to determine whether to apply an action to certain types of debt