efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

retail payments new contributions empirical results and unanswered questions abstract we offer a selected survey of retail payments and suggest areas where additional research would prove useful after summarizing eight papers presented at a recent norges bank central bank of norway payment conference and published in this volume we show how they and many of the other papers presented there have contributed to the payments literature we also illustrate how institutional and other differences across countries led to different payment arrangements historically which now due to technological innovation affecting bank costs have made payment arrangements across countries more homogeneous

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice abstract by using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers attitudes toward each payment method we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity we find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types our policy experiments suggest that for the sub population who hold both credit and debit cards removing rewards would increase their share of paper based payment methods i e cash and checks measured in terms of in store transactions by no more than 4 percentage points

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs abstract this paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade to be feasible when trader beliefs can be statistically dependent allowing for dependent beliefs produces equilibrium and comparative statics behavior that differs qualitatively from that observed in bilateral trade models in which traders have independent beliefs

cash burns an inventory model with a cash credit choice abstract a dynamic cash management model is analysed where agents choose whether to pay with cash or credit at every point in time in the model credit usage depends on the current stock of cash a novel result that matches recent micro evidence on households payment choices the optimality of such a decision rule is novel and cannot be obtained by models where cash credit decisions are made at the beginning of each period we discuss how to use the model to account for cross country evidence on the intensity of credit usage and for several statistics on the size and frequency of cash withdrawals the model is used to assess the household s welfare cost of phasing out cash

financial innovation and the transactions demand for cash we document cash management patterns for households that are at odds with the predictions of deterministic inventory models that abstract from precautionary motives we extend the baumol tobin cash inventory model to a dynamic environment that allows for the possibility of withdrawing cash at random times at a low cost this modification introduces a precautionary motive for holding cash and naturally captures developments in withdrawal technology such as the increasing diffusion of bank branches and atm terminals we characterize the solution of the model which qualitatively reproduces several empirical patterns we estimate the structural parameters using micro data and show that quantitatively the model captures important economic patterns the estimates are used to quantify the expenditure and interest rate elasticity of money demand the impact of financial innovation on money demand the welfare cost of inflation and the benefit of atm ownership

consumers use of debit cards patterns preferences and price response debit card use at the point of sale has grown dramatically in recent years in the united states and now exceeds the number of credit card transactions however many questions remain regarding patterns of debit card use consumer preferences when using debit and how consumers might respond to explicit pricing of card transactions using a new nationally representative consumer survey this paper describes the current use of debit cards by u s consumers including how demographics affect use in addition consumers stated reasons for using debit cards are used to analyze how consumers substitute between debit and other payment instruments we also examine the relationship between household financial conditions and payment choice finally we use a key variable on bank imposed transaction fees to analyze price sensitivity of card use and find a 12 decline in overall use in reaction to a mean 1 8 fee charged on certain debit card transactions we believe this represents the first microeconomic evidence in the united states on price sensitivity for a card payment at the point of sale

how effective are rewards programs in promoting payment card usage empirical evidence card issuers have mainly relied on rewards programs as their main strategy to increase usage however there is scarce evidence on the effectiveness of these programs this paper is addressing two topics which could have important managerial and public policy implications i it estimates the impact of rewards on the use of cards and ii it quantifies their economic effects in terms of the cash substitution we find that rewards may significantly modify choice for card payments their economic impact also varies significantly across types of rewards and merchant activities additionally rewards seem to be more effective for debit cards

how does incompatibility affect prices evidence from atm s if consumers value mix and match combinations of network complements incompatibility between different sellers components should affect prices in atm markets a 1996 governance change exogenously generated such incompatibility by allowing banks to impose surcharges when other banks deposit customers use their atm s in our data incompatibility makes the relationship between deposit account pricing and own atm s more positive and makes the relationship between deposit account pricing and competitors atm s more negative the level effect on prices is positive the pattern of results is more pronounced in high population density markets where customers may care more about atm s

investment and usage of new technologies evidence from a shared atm network when new technologies become available it is not only essential that firms have the correct investment incentives but often also that consumers make the proper usage decisions this paper studies investment and usage in a shared atm network be cause all banks coordinate their atm investment decisions there is no strategic but only a pure cost saving incentive to invest at the same time because retail fees for cash withdrawals are regulated to zero at both branches and atms consumers may not have the proper incentives to substitute their transactions from branches to the available atms we develop an empirical model of coordinated investment and cash withdrawal demand where banks choose the number of atms and consumers decide whether to withdraw cash at atms or branches we find that banks substantially underinvested in the shared atm network and thus provided too little geographic coverage this contrasts with earlier findings of strategic overinvestment in networks with partial incompatibility furthermore we find that consumer usage of the avail able atm network is too low because of the zero retail fees for cash withdrawals at branches a direct promotion of investment through subsidies or other means can improve welfare but the introduction of retail fees on cash withdrawals at branches would be more effective even if this does not encourage investment per se

the role of commitment in bilateral trade abstract this paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers as discounting vanishes the seller of a good is informed of its quality which affects both his cost and the buyer s valuation but the buyer is not to characterize this payoff set we derive an upper bound using mechanism design with limited commitment we then prove that this upper bound is tight by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment in bargaining in particular they imply that the buyer s inability to commit before observing the terms of trade is what precludes efficiency

optimal policy for a two stage assembly system under random demand this paper considers an inventory system in which an end product is assembled from two components each of which is ordered from an external supplier only the end product has final demand which is assumed to be random using the functional equation approach of dynamic programming we characterize the forms of both the optimal order policy for the components and the optimal assembly policy of the end product for a multiperiod problem of arbitrary but finite length we believe that this work represents the only exact analysis of an mrp type assembly system when demand is stochastic

atm foreign fees and cash withdrawals abstract we evaluate the impact of foreign fees paid by consumers on their cash withdrawals at automatic teller machines henceforth atms these so called foreign fees are paid when consumers withdraw cash from atms which are not owned by their home bank we take advantage of a natural experiment whereby non linear foreign atm fees in one specific bank became suddenly applicable at one point in time we also use this experiment to evaluate the substitutions between foreign atm withdrawals and other home atm or desk withdrawals as well as with payments by card using panel data on accounts we first estimate average treatment effects on the treated before carrying on with the estimation of a simple structural model the latter procedure allows us to compute the counterfactual impacts of changing the schedule of foreign fees impacts are sizeable on bank profits and consumer welfare

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

to surcharge or not to surcharge an empirical investigation of atm pricing this paper investigates depository institutions decisions whether or not to impose surcharges direct usage fees on nondepositors who use their atms in addition to documenting patterns of surcharging we examine motives for surcharging including both direct generation of fee revenue and the potential to attract deposit customers who wish to avoid incurring surcharges at an institution s atms consistent with expectations we find that the probability of surcharging increases with both the institution s share of market atms and the time since surcharging was first allowed in the state and decreases with increasing local atm density further we find evidence consistent with the use of surcharges to attract deposit customers who are new to the local banking market but we find no evidence that larger banks use surcharges as a means to attract existing customers away from smaller local competitors

technical note optimal control of an assembly system with multiple stages and multiple demand classes we consider an assembly system with multiple stages multiple items and multiple customer classes the system consists of m production facilities each producing a different item items are produced in variable batch sizes one batch at a time with exponentially distributed batch production times demand from each class takes place continuously over time according to a compound poisson process at each decision epoch we must determine whether or not to produce an item and should demand from a particular class arise whether or not to satisfy it from existing inventory if any is available we formulate the problem as a markov decision process and use it to characterize the structure of the optimal policy in contrast to systems with exogenous and deterministic production lead times we show that the optimal production policy for each item is a state dependent base stock policy with the base stock level nonincreasing in the inventory level of items that are downstream and nondecreasing in the inventory level of all other items for inventory allocation we show that the optimal policy is a multilevel state dependent rationing policy with the rationing level for each demand class nonincreasing in the inventory level of all nonend items we also show how the optimal control problem can be reformulated in terms of echelon inventory and how the essential features of the optimal policy can be reinterpreted in terms of echelon inventory

ex ante efficient ex post individually rational trade abstract consider a bilateral trade model with two sided incomplete information for a general set of independent beliefs an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient interim individually rational mechanism is constructed thus imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency

irrigation technology adoption and gains from water trading under asymmetric information we develop a water allocation and irrigation technology adoption model under the prior appropriation doctrine with asymmetric information among heterogeneous farmers and between farmers and water authorities we find that adverse selection reduces the adoption of modern irrigation technology we also show that even with asymmetric information incentives for water trade exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to all parties this suggests that under asymmetric information a thin secondary market improves the allocation of water resources and induces additional adoption of modern irrigation technologies

using cash to monitor liquidity implications for payments currency demand and withdrawal behavior this paper provides one explanation why cash is still used for transactions despite a broad diffusion of noncash payment instruments in particular we argue that a distinctive feature of cash a glance into one s pocket gives a signal of the remaining budget and past expenses provides utility to some consumers using payment survey data we show that consumers who need to keep control over their remaining liquidity and who have elevated costs of information processing conduct a larger percentage of payments using cash withdraw less often and hold larger cash balances than other consumers

alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical microeconomics four alternative but related approaches to empirical evaluation of policy interventions are studied social experiments natural experiments matching methods and instrumental variables in each case the necessary assumptions and the data requirements are considered for estimation of a number of key parameters of interest these key parameters include the average treatment effect the treatment on the treated and the local average treatment effect some issues of implementation and interpretation are discussed drawing on the labour market programme evaluation literature

optimal policies for multi echelon inventory problems with batch ordering in many production distribution systems materials flow from one stage to another in fixed lot sizes for example a retailer orders a full truckload from a manufacturer to qualify for a quantity discount a factory has a material handling system that moves full containers of parts from one production stage to the next in this paper we derive optimal policies for multi stage serial and assembly systems where materials flow in fixed batches the optimal policies have a simple structure and their parameters can be easily determined this research extends the multi echelon inventory theory in several ways it generalizes the clark scarf model by allowing batch transfers of inventories rosling 1989 shows that assembly systems can be interpreted as serial systems under the assumption that there are no setup costs we show that the series interpretation still holds when materials flow in fixed batches which satisfy a certain regularity condition finally veinott 1965 identifies an optimal policy for a single location inventory system with batch ordering this paper generalizes his result to multi echelon settings

inventory rationing in a make to stock production system with several demand classes and lost sales this paper considers the stock rationing problem of a single item make to stock production system with several demand classes and lost sales for the case of poisson demands and exponential production times we show that the optimal policy can be characterized by a sequence of monotone stock rationing levels for each demand class there exists a stock rationing level at or below which it is optimal to start rejecting the demand of this class in anticipation of future arrival of higher priority demands a simple queueing model is analyzed to compute the operating cost of a rationing policy in a numerical study we compare the optimal rationing policy with a first come first served policy to investigate the benefit of stock rationing under different operating conditions of the system

demand for cash with intra period endogenous consumption abstract we extend the literature on the demand for money by relaxing the assumption of a constant rate of consumption although total consumption is still fixed over the period agents can choose more than one rate of consumption and cash depletion in the period to minimize the cost of money management consistent with empirical evidence we find that agents do not smooth intra period consumption instead their rate of consumption will be positively related to their cash position this positive correlation depends on the volatility of the consumption process

the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed bid double auctions abstract this paper modifies myerson and satterthwaite s j econ theory 29 1983 265 281 analysis of direct bilateral trade mechanisms with two sided incomplete information by developing a new technique for analyzing their payment rule restrictions for each member of a narrow class of beliefs this new technique defines a mechanism that is both ex ante efficient and ex post individually rational moreover the resulting allocation is shown to be equivalent to that generated by the linear equilibrium of a k double auction

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

status quo bias in bargaining an extension of the myerson satterthwaite theorem with an application to the coase theorem we use a generalized version of the myerson satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good where there is two sided private information on the valuations we show that when preferences are convex and quasi linear and when the private information represents the magnitude of the utility gain or loss and follows a uniform distribution that the most efficient mechanism always exhibits a bias towards the status quo in the case that utility functions are quadratic in the amount traded we prove that for any incentive compatible direct mechanism there is an expected bias towards the disagreement point in other words for the class of preferences we study there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases