optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation the fisher equation revisited stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0022 2879 28199602 2928 3a1 3c102 3atlrbni 3e2 0 co 3b2 2journal of money credit and banking is currently published by ohio state university press your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals ohio press html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon aug 27 13 58 08 2007

the form of incentive contracts agency with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability the analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard risk neutrality and limited liability we introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state the form of the contract is debt a capped bonus when the critical ratio is increasing decreasing in the state an increasing critical ratio in the state space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced form distribution of output which we term the decreasing hazard rate in effort property dhrep the critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion we analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse the presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts when the concern for equity becomes more important there is convergence towards linear sharing rules the sufficient statistics result is violated depending on the environment contracts may be either overdetermined i e include non informative performance measures or incomplete i e neglect informative performance measures finally our model delivers a simple rationale for team based incentives implying wage compression 2010 elsevier inc

pollution claim settlements reconsidered hidden information and bounded payments abstract a principal s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent the principal may be a pollution generating firm the agent may be a nearby town the principal offers a contract to the agent who has the right to be free of pollution then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution finally a production level and a transfer payment are implemented suppose there is an upper bound possibly zero on payments that the agent can make to the principal in the second best solution there is underproduction for low cost types while there is overproduction for high cost types in contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first best solution

are monetary policy reaction functions asymmetric the role of nonlinearity in the phillips curve abstract this paper investigates the implications of a nonlinear phillips curve for the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules combined with a quadratic loss function the optimal policy is also nonlinear with the policy maker increasing interest rates by a larger amount when inflation or output are above target than the amount it will reduce them when they are below target specifically the main prediction of our model is that such a source of nonlinearity leads to the inclusion of the interaction between expected inflation and the output gap in an otherwise linear taylor rule we find empirical support for this type of asymmetries in the interest rate setting behaviour of four european central banks but none for the us fed

on the fisher effect abstract we use post war quarterly data for belgium canada denmark france germany greece ireland japan the netherlands the united kingdom and the united states to examine the fisherian link between inflation and short term nominal interest rates in doing so we apply the king and watson 1997 methodology paying particular attention to the integration and cointegration properties of the variables since meaningful fisher effect tests critically depend on such properties we conclude that the data are generally rejecting the fisher effect

nonparametric nonlinear cotrending analysis with an application to interest and inflation in the united states given the assumption that the components of a vector time series are stationary around nonlinear deterministic time trends nonlinear cotrending is the phenomenon that one or more linear combinations of the time series are stationary around a linear trend or a constant hence the series have common nonlinear deterministic time trends in this article i develop nonparametric tests for nonlinear cotrending and i derive nonparametric estimators of the cotrending vectors i apply this approach to the federal funds rate and the consumer price index inflation rate in the united states using monthly data to analyze the price puzzle

bonus pools and the informativeness principle abstract previous work on moral hazard problems has shown that under certain conditions bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk neutral workers in our paper we demonstrate that if a firm employs at least two workers it may further benefit from combining worker compensation via a bonus pool contract and relative performance evaluation such combination leads to saved rents under a wide class of luck distributions in addition if the employer is wealth constrained complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can increase the set of implementable effort levels all our results hold even though workers outputs are technically and stochastically independent so that in view of holmstrom s informativeness principle individual bonus contracts would be expected to dominate bonus pool contracts

mean reversion in the real interest rate and the effects of calculating expected inflation we investigate the measured persistence in the real interest rate using a variety of methods to annualize inflation and calculate the real rate results from a battery of conventional unit root tests yield conflicting conclusions for the various real rates adding to an existing confusion regarding mean reversion both long memory and exponential smooth transition autoregres sive models estar nonlinearity are considered as possible alternatives and in contrast to the unit root test results we find highly robust evidence against the unit root null based on the empirical results monte carlo analysis is performed to study the disparate results obtained using fractional integration and unit root tests

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the welfare performance of sequential pricing mechanisms consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits furthermore evidence suggests that a menu of optional two part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective

the co2 growth nexus revisited a nonparametric analysis for the g7 economies over nearly two centuries abstract using a long dataset and some recently popularized nonparametric econometric techniques this study revisits the nexus between economic growth and carbon dioxide co 2 emissions for the g7 countries over nearly two centuries the use of nonparametric modelling is warranted by the fact that long historical time series are often subject to structural breaks and other forms of nonlinearity over the course of time we employ nonparametric cointegration and causality tests along with the cross validated local linear regression analysis and validate the existence of the environmental kuznets curve in six of the g7 countries canada france germany italy u k and the u s and the only exception is japan our empirical analysis also finds co 2 emissions and economic growth to be cointegrated and closely interrelated in the granger sense our results are robust and highlight the nonlinear causal relationship between the two variables

subjective performance indicators and discretionary bonus pools key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective that is they are difficult to specify and or verify for contracting purposes when a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms despite their optimality however discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information our analysis identifies circumstances under which this additional agency cost is small for example the subjective information signals are precise or the number of agents participating in the bonus pool increases when incentive schemes can be based on both objective and subjective performance indicators the relative weights to be placed on alternative signals are shown to differ from the ones predicted by models with objective signals only we also demonstrate that correlation in measurement errors has a different impact on the structure of optimal incentive schemes when the performance indicators are merely subjective

financial liberalization private investment and portfolio choice financialization of real sectors in emerging markets abstract using firm level panel data we analyze the impacts of rates of return gap between financial and fixed investments under uncertainty on real investment performance in three emerging markets argentina mexico and turkey employing a portfolio choice model to explain the low fixed investment rates in developing countries during the 1990s we suggest that rather than investing in irreversible long term fixed investments firms may choose to invest in reversible short term financial investments depending on respective rates of returns and the overall uncertainty in the economy the empirical results show that increasing rates of return gap and uncertainty have an economically and statistically significant fixed investment reducing effect while the opposite is true with respect to financial investments

financialisation and capital accumulation in the non financial corporate sector a theoretical and empirical investigation on the us economy 1973 2003 recent research has explored the growing financialization process in the u s and other advanced economies the term is a catch all phrase used to denote important changes in the structure of non financial corporations balance sheets including the growth of income from financial subsidiaries and investment as well as growth in the transfer of earnings to financial markets in the forms of interest payments dividend payments and stock buybacks this paper seeks to empirically explore the relationship between financialization in the u s economy and real investment at the firm level using data from a sample of non financial corporations from 1973 to 2003 i find a negative relationship between real investment and financialization first increased financial investment and increased financial profit opportunities may have crowded out real investment by changing the incentives of firm managers and directing funds away from real investment second increased payments to the financial markets may have impeded real investment by decreasing available internal funds shortening the planning horizons of the firm management and increasing uncertainty these two channels can help explain the negative relationship i find between investment and financialization

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

tournaments with gaps a standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes if agents performance is measured on a cardinal scale the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize we analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents under unlimited liability the principal strictly benefits from a gap by partially insuring the agents and thereby reducing labor costs if the agents are protected by limited liability the principal sticks to the standard tournament

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

understanding the fisher equation it is argued that univariate long memory estimates based on ex post data tend to underestimate the persistence of ex ante variables and hence that of the ex post variables themselves because of the presence of unanticipated shocks whose short run volatility masks the degree of long range dependence in the data empirical estimates of long range dependence in the fisher equation are shown to manifest this problem and lead to an apparent imbalance in the memory characteristics of the variables in the fisher equation evidence in support of this typical underestimation is provided by results obtained with inflation forecast survey data and by direct calculation of the finite sample biases to address the problem of bias the paper introduces a bivariate exact whittle bew estimator that explicitly allows for the presence of short memory noise in the data the new procedure enhances the empirical capacity to separate low frequency behaviour from high frequency fluctuations and it produces estimates of long range dependence that are much less biased when there is noise contaminated data empirical estimates from the bew method suggest that the three fisher variables are integrated of the same order with memory parameter in the range 0 75 1 since the integration orders are balanced the ex ante real rate has the same degree of persistence as expected inflation thereby furnishing evidence against the existence of a fractional cointegrating relation among the fisher variables and correspondingly showing little support for a long run form of fisher hypothesis copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

what fisher knew about his relation we sometimes forget abstract expected consumption growth increases the real interest rate as one tries to smooth consumption over time we demonstrate that placing it in the fisher relation 1 is consistent with the euler equation governing the purchase of nominal bonds 2 explains observed procyclicality of the real interest rate 3 is supported empirically and 4 provides an alternative method for estimating the consumer s degree of relative risk aversion

relative performance or team evaluation optimal contracts for other regarding agents this paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other regarding preferences it offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance evaluation we analyze a principal multi agent model and assume that agents are inequity averse or status seeking we show that team contracts can be optimal even if the agents performance measures are positively correlated such that relative performance evaluation would be optimal with purely self interested agents and even though relative performance evaluation provides additional incentives to provide effort if agents have other regarding preferences furthermore optimal incentive contracts for other regarding agents can be low powered as compared to contracts for purely self interested agents

the response of term rates to fed announcements in february 4 1994 the federal reserve began the practice of announcing changes in the targeted level for the federal funds rate immediately after such decisions were made this paper investigates to what extent the policy of the announcement affected a key ingredient in the monetary transmission mechanism the term structure of nominally risk free treasury securities we find that term rates react much more in unison during announcement days than at any other time moreover the practice of circumscribing almost all changes in the federal funds rate target to federal open market committee fomc meeting dates regiments the formation of market expectations in the overnight rate and the price discovery process of term rates thus facilitating the fed s goal of controlling long term rates

nonlinearity in the fed s monetary policy rule this paper investigates the nature of nonlinearities in the monetary policy rule of the us fed using the flexible approach of hamilton 2001a we find that while there is significant evidence of nonlinearity for the period to 1979 there is little such evidence for the subsequent period possible asymmetries in the fed s reactions to inflation deviations from target and the output gap in the 1960s and 70s may tell part of the story but do not capture the entire nature of the nonlinearity the inclusion of the interaction between inflation deviations and the output gap as recently proposed appears to characterize the nonlinear policy rule more adequately

a theory of sales quotas with limited liability and rent sharing sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus this article shows that under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota the results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed the model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job specific skill

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

non linearities in the dynamics of oil prices abstract examining stationarity is of particular importance and represents the first step in empirical time series research non stationarity invalidates many of the results obtained from standard techniques and therefore requires special treatment because oil prices play an important role in affecting economic variables this paper examines the stationarity of real oil prices brent dubai wti and the world over the period 1973 2 2011 2 real oil prices are expressed in the currencies of seven asian countries indonesia japan korea malaysia the philippines singapore and thailand and in the u s dollar while using linear unit root tests without structural breaks shows no evidence of stationarity allowing for breaks shows very limited evidence of stationarity we argue that these results are attributed to the presence of nonlinearities in the behavior of oil prices testing for nonlinearity shows significant evidence of nonlinearity in all the cases with evidence of exponential smooth transition autoregression estar nonlinearity type in most cases applying unit root tests that account for two types of nonlinearities smooth transition and nonlinear deterministic trends reveals evidence of stationarity in all the cases

a penny for your quotes patent citations and the value of innovations the use ofpatents in economic research has been seriously hindered by the fact that patents vary enormously in their importance or value and hence simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output the purpose of this article is to put forward patent counts weighted by citations as indicators of the value of innovations thereby overcoming the limitations of simple counts the empirical analysis of a particular innovation computed tomography scanners indeed shows a close association between citation based patent indices and independent measures of the social value of innovations in that field moreover the weighting scheme appears to be nonlinear increasing in the number of citations implying that the informational content of citations rises at the margin as in previous studies simple patent counts are found to be highly correlated with contemporaneous rd however here the association is within afield over time rather than cross sectional

takeover threats and managerial myopia this paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long term interests in order to boost current profits if stockholders are imperfectly informed temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price hence the managerial concern with current bottom line the magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms

a long run non linear approach to the fisher effect we argue that the empirical failure of the fisher effect found in the literature may be due to the existence of non linearities in the long run relationship between interest rates and inflation we present evidence that for the u s during the 1960 2004 period the fisher relation presents important non linearities we model the long run non linear relationship and find that an estr model for the pre volcker era and an lstr model for the post volcker era are able to control for non linearities and constitute long run co integration vectors monte carlo evidence produces support for the hypothesis that non linearities may also be responsible for the less than proportional coefficients of inflation usually found in the linear specifications

financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation over the past decades financial investment of non financial businesses has been rising and accumulation of capital goods has been declining the first part of the paper offers a novel theory to explain this phenomenon financialization the shareholder revolution and the development of a market for corporate control have shifted power to shareholders and thus changed management priorities leading to a reduction in the desired growth rate in the second part the link between accumulation and financialization is tested econometrically by means of a time series analysis of aggregate business investment for usa uk france and germany extensive test of robustness are performed for the first three countries evidence that confirms the negative effect of financialization on accumulation is found author s abstract

do expected shifts in inflation affect estimates of the long run fisher relation recent empirical studies suggest that nominal interest rates and expected inflation do not move together one for one in the long run a finding at odds with many theoretical models this article shows that these results can be deceptive when the process followed by inflation shifts infrequently we characterize the shifts in inflation by a markov switching model based upon this model s forecasts we reexamine the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation interestingly we are unable to reject the hypothesis that in the long run nominal interest rates reflect expected inflation one for one

contests with draws axiomatization and equilibrium we introduce and axiomatize a class of single winner contest success functions that embody the possibility of a draw we then analyze the game of contest that our success functions induce having different prizes delivered in the occurrence of a win and a draw we identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric interior nash equilibrium and show that equilibrium efforts and equilibrium rent dissipation can be larger than in a tullock contest with no possibility of a draw due to increased competition even if the draw prize is null these results suggest that a contest designer may profit from introducing the possibility of a draw finally we show that this approach naturally extends to multiprize contests with multiple draws across different subsets of the set of players jel c72 d72 d74

additional evidence on bonus plans and income management abstract we extend healy 1985 by examining the relation between discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms for the 1980 1990 period contrary to healy we find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound managers select income increasing discretionary accruals and vice versa we believe that our results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis than with healy s bonus hypothesis however mechanical selection bias in portfolio formation cannot be entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for our results

ex post unbalanced tournaments tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced if at the outset one agent is stronger than the other the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down handicaps can in this case restore incentives in practice competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths then competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down but handicaps cannot be used we show how a simple means introducing the possibility of a tie can often resolve the problem we examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties