campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

a spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error this paper presents a unidimensional spatial model of voting in which members of congress vote based on an imprecise perception of roll call alternatives the model is applied to the senate roll call votes of 1977 to estimate the ideal points of the senators and to examine the role of a liberal conservative dimension in describing votes on economic issues relative to social issues in light of the spatial model the paper argues that standard models of roll call voting are not based on a theory of choice and hence that it is difficult to interpret their results alternatives to standard models based on the spatial model are developed and are used to analyze the role of ideology in deciding a specific economic issue coal strip mining

multi resource investment strategies operational hedging under demand uncertainty abstract consider a firm that markets multiple products each manufactured using several resources representing various types of capital and labor and a linear production technology the firm faces uncertain product demand and has the option to dynamically readjust its resource investment levels thereby changing the capacities of its linear manufacturing process the cost to adjust a resource level either up or down is assumed to be linear the model developed here explicitly incorporates both capacity investment decisions and production decisions and is general enough to include reversible and irreversible investment the product demand vectors for successive periods are assumed to be independent and identically distributed the optimal investment strategy is determined with a multi dimensional newsvendor model using demand distributions a technology matrix prices product contribution margins and marginal investment costs our analysis highlights an important conceptual distinction between deterministic and stochastic environments the optimal investment strategy in our stochastic model typically involves some degree of capacity imbalance which can never be optimal when demand is known

savings and loan and finance industry pac contributions to incumbent members of the house banking committee this paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry pacs and membership on the house banking committee the distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the house banking committee the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator we find that members of the house banking committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance pacs than do other members of congress and that being chairman of the house banking committee also pays a dividend

a test of the structure of pac contracts an analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s enactment of the bill was a major victory for the national rifle association which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark gun control act of 1968 congressional quarterly almanac 1986 p 82 i introduction every election the same political action committees pacs contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office well informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes 1 a mischaracterization of the exchange between pacs and politicians may produce these contradictory results empirical studies of roll call voting typically use pac contributions from only one election cycle earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior congress while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange recent empirical work however suggests another possibility interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles stratmann 1995 shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports snyder 1990 1992 presents evidence that interest groups make long term investments in politicians previous studies by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of pac money on legislative votes we examine roll call votes on gun control in the u s house of representatives during the 1980s to determine whether pacs make spot market purchases prepay for votes in the prior election cycle or make long term investments we investigate whether pac contributions have a durable long term investment effect as snyder 1992 suggests we consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract first we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control the national rifle association nra and hand gun control hgc their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of congress in which no floor vote occurred nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange further 1986 nra expenditures are significantly higher for first term representatives which is consistent with long term investments but contradicts a spot exchange since freshmen have the least influence to sell second we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting to date no empirical paper tests whether pac money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting and only stratmann 1995 and grenzke 1989 use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes our probit estimates indicate that nra expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and hgc expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes the independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one session prepayment nor a spot exchange the influence of nra expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long term investment the literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that pac contributions alter representatives votes interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of congress stratmann 1991 bronars and lott 1997 if a difficult to quantify variable and thus omitted from regressions signals a representative s true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable pac contributions might appear to influence votes the pattern of contributions and votes on gun control however indicates attempts by the nra and hgc to influence votes not merely the composition of congress

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand this paper extends the real options literature by discussing an investment problem where a firm has to determine optimal investment timing and optimal capacity choice at the same time under conditions of irreversible investment expenditures and uncertainty in future demand after the project is installed with a certain maximum capacity this capacity is fixed as an upper boundary to the output and cannot be adjusted later on it turns out that in the framework of this once and for all decision uncertainty in future demand leads to an increase in optimal installed capacity but on the other hand it causes investment to be delayed to an extent that even small uncertainty makes waiting and accumulation of further information the optimal decision for large ranges of demand limiting the capacity which may be installed weakens this extreme effect of uncertainty

asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage given incomplete factor markets appropriate time paths of flow variables must be chosen to build required stocks of assets that is critical resources are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor markets barney barney j 1986 strategic factor markets expectations luck and business strategy management sci october 1231 1241 sustainability of a firm s asset position hinges on how easily assets can be substituted or imitated imitability is linked to the characteristics of the asset accumulation process time compression diseconomies asset mass efficiencies inter connectedness asset erosion and causal ambiguity

earnings quality in uk private firms comparative loss recognition timeliness abstract uk private and public companies face substantially equivalent regulation on auditing accounting standards and taxes we hypothesize that private company financial reporting nevertheless is of lower quality due to different market demand regulation notwithstanding a large uk sample supports this hypothesis quality is operationalized using basu s 1997 time series measure of timely loss recognition and a new accruals based method the result is not affected by controls for size leverage industry membership and auditor size or by allowing endogenous listing choice the result enhances understanding of private companies which are predominant in the economy it also provides insight into the economics of accounting standards

conflict of interest and congressional voting a note results of this study are consistent with those of previous voting studies which have shown that party ideology and constituency characteristics are often significant explanatory variables in equations to explain voting no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that congressmen s voting decisions depend upon their private financial interests this suggests the conclusion that much of the concern about apparent conflicts of interest is unfounded but it must be recognized that this study has examined voting on just a few issues and has used data on financial holdings which were lacking in precision as more data becomes available in the next several years we should be able to resolve this question with greater confidence

a stochastic programming approach to power portfolio optimization we consider a power portfolio optimization model that is intended as a decision aid for scheduling and hedging dash in the wholesale power market our multiscale model integrates the unit commitment model with financial decision making by including the forwards and spot market activity within the scheduling decision model the methodology is based on a multiscale stochastic programming model that selects portfolio positions that perform well on a variety of scenarios generated through statistical modeling and optimization when compared with several commonly used fixed mix policies our experiments demonstrate that the dash model provides significant advantages

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

environmental protection a theory of direct and indirect competition for political influence how is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying this paper develops a model of direct lobbying the government and indirect persuading the public competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary however an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion or a rise of public environmental awareness induces substitution between the two the findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness the size of its economic stake and hence the associated lobbying effort and the efficiency of its organization in exerting political influence how then can we explain why some environmental groups have been very successful against polluting industries when the latter s economic stakes seem very high and they lobby more and their interests are more efficiently organized some might suggest that the reason for the success of the environmental movement is that environmental groups have large memberships and can provide block votes 2 however according to olson 1965 a large membership of an interest group is not necessarily an advantage and it is still uncertain whether environmental groups are able to mobilize their members to cast votes based on such affiliations this paper suggests an alternative explanation by developing a theory of direct and indirect competition between special interests for political influence rather than marshalling block votes a primary feature of our framework is that two opposing interest groups an environmentalist group and an industrialist group compete directly and indirectly for political influence in a three stage game the indirect competition takes place in the first stage in which interest groups exert effort in persuading the public to indirectly influence government policy the direct competition takes place in the second stage in which interest groups exert effort in

discussion of the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition the accrual process is central to financial accounting accruals adjust cash flows to reported earnings and form the building blocks for the balance sheet given the importance of accruals to financial accounting it is surprising how sparse the modeling of the overall accrual process has been within the literature until recently the state of the art empirical approach modeled total accruals as a function of the change in sales and property plant and equipment pp e jones 1991 recently working capital accruals have been more formally modeled as a function of firms selling activity and past present and future operating cash flows e g dechow kothari and watts 1998 dechow and dichev 2002 ball and shivakumar incorporate conditional conservatism an important feature of the earnings process into existing accruals models specifically they recognize that accruals are expected to be an asymmetric function of firm performance in which economic losses are captured by the accruals process in a more timely manner than gains their evidence documents a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses and gains and demonstrates that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have superior explanatory power the authors innovation advances

risk induced resource dependency in capacity investments a capacity acquisition process is resource dependent when the existing resources impact the valuation of new resources and thereby influence the investment decision following a formal analysis of resource dependency we show that uncertainty and aversion to risks are sufficient conditions for resource dependent capacity acquisition distinct from the technology lock in effects of increasing returns to scale or learning risk aversion can induce diversity we develop a stochastic programming framework and solve the optimization problem by decomposing the problem into investment and operational horizon subproblems our computational results for an application to the electricity sector show inter alia that technology choices between low carbon and fossil fuel technologies as well as their investment timings are dependent upon the resource bases of the companies with scale debt leverage and uncertainty effects increasing resource dependency particularly we show that resource dependency can significantly impact the optimal investment decisions and we argue that it should be evaluated at both company and policy levels of analysis

the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition we investigate the role of accrual accounting in the asymmetrically timely recognition incorporation in reported earnings of gains and losses timely recognition requires accruals when it precedes complete realization of the gains and losses in cash we show that nonlinear accruals models incorporating the asymmetry in gain and loss recognition timelier loss recognition or conditional conservatism offer a substantial specification improvement explaining substantially more variation in accruals than equivalent linear specifications conversely conventional linear accruals models by omitting the loss recognition asymmetry exhibit substantial attenuation bias and offer a comparatively poor specification of the accounting accrual process linear specifications also understate the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows these findings have implications for our understanding of accrual accounting and conservatism as well as for researchers estimating discretionary accruals earnings management and earnings quality

deregulation firm capabilities and diversifying entry decisions the case of financial services the resource based view of the firm as a historically determined bundle of specific assets and capabilities predicts that diversification patterns will reflect attempts to utilize these attributes more intensively and so enjoy economies of scope furthermore it suggests that such diversification moves will not be restricted to wholly owned activities but will include joint ventures where contracting costs permit this note uses the opportunity created by structural deregulation in u k financial services to examine entry decisions wholly owned and collaborative across an unusually homogeneous set of firms it is found that diversifying entry broadly follows firm specific and product specific characteristics providing support for the resource based theory in the service sector however as in manufacturing it appears that firm size is important whilst the residual regulatory and ownership arrangements also exercise a significant effect copyright 1995 by mit press

bertrand edgeworth competition demand uncertainty and asymmetric outcomes abstract we analyze investment and pricing incentives in a symmetric bertrand edgeworth framework with uncertain demand firms choose production capacities before observing demand prices are chosen after demand is observed if the extent of demand variation exceeds a threshold level then a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for capacities does not exist a smaller firm has no incentive ex ante to expand its capacity because capacity expansion would reduce its expected revenue in the event that demand is lower than expected output prices are predicted to have positive variance when demand is low and zero variance when demand is high journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

the theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation in this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states we find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors 1 the extent of public sector union membership which represents the interest group hypothesis has a positive influence on pro union legislation 2 the extent of employer opposition to unions as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections has a negative effect on bargaining laws 3 two taste variables the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state have a positive influence on these laws a result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation

contributions to federal election campaigns by government contractors the author develops a theoretical model that determines whether or not a firm sponsors a political action committee and if it does the quantity of funds that the political action committee will disburse the firm is assumed to face supply and demand schedules for political action committee receipts whose positions depend on attributes of the firm such as firm size government sales intensity and market structure two related equations derived from the theoretical model a probit equation for political action committee sponsorship and a disbursements equation are estimated using pooled data on 226 government primarily defense contracting firms during the 1979 80 and 1981 82 election cycles copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

the effectiveness of savings and loan political action committees in recent years political action committees pacs have played an increasingly important role both in contributing to candidates and in influencing voting patterns savings and loan pacs are numerous throughout the country and consist of pacs affiliated with individual institutions and trade associations the question which is addressed in this research paper is the effectiveness which savings and loan related pacs have had on influencing voting patterns

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

is certainty in carbon policy better than uncertainty abstract uncertainty in the strictness of carbon policy can have significant impacts on power generating firms capacity investment decisions and market outcomes we investigate the effects of this policy uncertainty on firms expected profits consumers surplus and firms cost for reaching a co 2 emission target our results derived from a game theoretical model and applied to realistic data indicate that uncertainty in the carbon policy induces more capacity investments in fossil and renewable technologies we find that it is optimal for firms with higher risk aversion to invest more in renewable technologies than their less risk averse rivals for policy makers our results suggest counter intuitively that retaining the flexibility to update emission targets whilst causing uncertainty in the carbon policy is beneficial this is because it provides higher expected consumer surplus and lower expected electricity price power generating firms are also better off under the policy uncertainty by having lower expected costs for reaching the emission goal and higher expected profits when firms risk aversions are low these results support the approach employed in european power markets to periodically update the co 2 emission cap depending on the prevailing circumstances rather than having certainty in the decrements of the caps over a longer time horizon our insights can help policy makers and firms to make better decisions by understanding how carbon policy uncertainty impacts the optimal capacity investments and how these investments might depend on the firms heterogeneity in risk aversion

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

the relation between earnings and cash flows abstract a model of earnings cash flows and accruals is developed assuming a random walk sales process variable and fixed costs and that the only accruals are accounts receivable and payable and inventory the model implies earnings better predict future operating cash flows than current operating cash flows and the difference varies with the operating cash cycle also the model is used to predict serial and cross correlations of each firm s series the implications and predictions are tested on a 1337 firm sample over 1963 1992 both earnings and cash flow forecast implications and correlation predictions are generally consistent with the data

sprayed to death path dependence lock in and pest control strategies theoretical literature on the economics of technology has emphasized the effects on technological trajectories of positive feedbacks in a competition among technologies that all perform a similar function the presence of increasing returns to adoptions can force all but one technology from the market furthermore the victor need not be the superior technology this paper provides an empirical study of one technological competition which illuminates this theoretical work it uses theoretical results to explain why chemical control of agricultural pests remains the dominant technology in spite of many claims that it is inferior to its main competitor integrated pest management copyright 1996 by royal economic society

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

cash flow asymmetry causes and implications for conditional conservatism research earnings asymmetric timeliness captures both accrual and operating cash flow cfo asymmetric timeliness because recognition of operating cash flows does not reflect differential verification thresholds for recognizing unrealized gains versus losses cfo asymmetry adds noise or bias to tests of conditional conservatism we show that cfo asymmetry is predictable in the cross section and varies systematically with life cycle characteristics removing cfo from earnings and using accruals based measures of asymmetric timeliness eliminates several biases that prior studies have attributed to other sources moreover accrual asymmetric timeliness varies in the cross section as theory predicts going forward we recommend researchers use accruals based asymmetric timeliness measures when testing for conditional conservatism

does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents the theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name the existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate s stock of brand name this simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent s campaign spending and how well he does

flexible capacity strategy with multiple market periods under demand uncertainty and investment constraint abstract we establish a flexible capacity strategy model with multiple market periods under demand uncertainty and investment constraints in the model a firm makes its capacity decision under a financial budget constraint at the beginning of the planning horizon which embraces n market periods in each market period the firm goes through three decision making stages the safety production stage the additional production stage and the optimal sales stage we formulate the problem and obtain the optimal capacity the optimal safety production the optimal additional production and the optimal sales of each market period under different situations we find that there are two thresholds for the unit capacity cost when the capacity cost is very low the optimal capacity is determined by its financial budget when the capacity cost is very high the firm keeps its optimal capacity at its safety production level and when the cost is in between of the two thresholds the optimal capacity is determined by the capacity cost the number of market periods and the unit cost of additional production further we explore the endogenous safety production level we verify the conditions under which the firm has different optimal safety production levels finally we prove that the firm can benefit from the investment only when the designed planning horizon is longer than a threshold moreover we also derive the formulae for the above three thresholds