interest and growth in an economy with land dynamic inefficiency means that in a growing economy some generations can be made better off without making others worse off in the following article the author shows that dynamic inefficiency is ruled out if there exists a nonproducible productive asset that is land this claim is established for arbitrary growth paths not only for steady states

do legislators votes reflect constituency preference a simple way to evaluate the senate u s senators frequently vote against the preference of their constituency assuming that such a preference exists both of a state s senators represent the same constituency whenever they split their votes one or the other is necessarily going against the constituency preference for the sample of defense related votes analyzed above misrepresentation either observable vote splitting or unobservable vote matches that go against the constituency preference occurred at least 37 percent of the time at least 46 percent on one vote although party differences accounted for more than two thirds of the vote splitting a substantial number of splits remained besides a party difference for a state s senatorial pair is itself problematical

out of step out of office electoral accountability and house members voting does a typical house member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll call decisions we investigate the relationship between incumbents electoral performance and roll call support for their party controlling for district ideology challenger quality and campaign spending among other factors through a series of tests of the 1956 1996 elections the tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting first in each election an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party second this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants third a member s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party and this relationship holds for not only marginal but also safe members

off the cliff and back credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis abstract we study the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial crisis using detailed data on monthly us imports we show that credit conditions were an important channel through which the crisis affected trade volumes by exploiting the variation in the cost of capital across countries and over time as well as the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit markets exported less to the us during the peak of the crisis this effect was especially pronounced in sectors that require extensive external financing have limited access to trade credit or have few collateralizable assets exports of financially vulnerable industries were thus more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of less vulnerable industries and this sensitivity rose during the financial crisis the quantitative implications of our estimates for trade volumes highlight the large real effects of financial crises and the potential gains from policy intervention

campaign spending and senate elections 1978 84 this paper uses a sample of recent senate election results and estimates vote equations that show challenger spending hurts and incumbent spending helps incumbent re election while both types of spending have diminishing returns the effects are asymmetrical challenger spending is more productive at lower levels of spending but incumbents can spend greater amounts more profitably than can challengers these results can explain why senate incumbents spend money why they typically outspend their challenger and why incumbents who can outspend their challenger would tend to be against spending limits or public financing

transparency in parliamentary voting how does transparency affect voting behavior to answer this question we exploit a switch from a show of hands to electronic voting in the upper house of the swiss parliament the change which took place halfway through the 2011 2015 legislative period also brought about the online publication of individual voting records using the lower house as a control group we compare individual voting decisions in a set of identical votes in both chambers this unique framework makes it possible to estimate the causal effect of increased transparency on legislators choices since the reform members of the upper house are less likely to deviate from the majority decision of their party legislators representing the same canton are also less likely to cast an aligned vote suggesting that voters lose influence over their representatives in parliament

exchange rate management and manufactured exports in sub saharan africa this paper presents an overview of the evolution of exchange rate regimes in africa and then attempts to assess empirically the impact of exchange rate policy on manufactured export performance on a panel of major sub saharan africa countries over the 1970 92 period we examine the impact of three exchange rate policy indicators real effective exchangerate changes real exchange rate volatility and model based measures of real exchange rate misalignment export supply functions are estimated for three manufacturing industries textile chemicals and metals and two exchange rate regimes a fixed rates regime including six cfa franc countries and a more flexible regime represented by five non cfa countries our findings show that exchange rate management matters for export performance this is evidenced both by the significant impact of changes in the real effective exchange rate and by the negative influence exerted independently by real exchange rate misalignment on the

shirking and political support in the u s senate 1964 1984 several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on the job consumption or ideological behavior these findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support this paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse the results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support a corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly

representation in municipal government municipal governments play a vital role in american democracy as well as in governments around the world despite this little is known about the degree to which cities are responsive to the views of their citizens in the past the unavailability of data on the policy preferences of citizens at the municipal level has limited scholars ability to study the responsiveness of municipal government we overcome this problem by using recent advances in opinion estimation to measure the mean policy conservatism in every u s city and town with a population above 20 000 people despite the supposition in the literature that municipal politics are non ideological we find that the policies enacted by cities across a range of policy areas correspond with the liberal conservative positions of their citizens on national policy issues in addition we consider the influence of institutions such as the presence of an elected mayor the popular initiative partisan elections term limits and at large elections our results show that these institutions have little consistent impact on policy responsiveness in municipal government these results demonstrate a robust role for citizen policy preferences in determining municipal policy outcomes but cast doubt on the hypothesis that simple institutional reforms enhance responsiveness in municipal governments

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

selection and influence interest groups and congressional voting on trade policy studies of the effects of interest groups on congressional roll call voting typically view party and ideology as competing factors and rely on a factoral model of interests or a sectoral model including only interest groups with a direct stake in the vote we depart from that strategy in several ways we define interest groups at the level of standard industrial classification two digit codes and observe the universe of interests for 1979 90 we use measures of geographically and nongeographically based economic interests to estimate the representative s party and ideology we also consider the factor endowments of individuals within a district to examine their impact on floor votes we then investigate the influence of these interests on members party affiliation and ideology as well as a pool of five floor votes on foreign trade using instrumental variables for party and ideology economic interests account for a substantial portion of the variance in all cases and models that also include other explanatory variables are highly accurate in estimating floor votes

an examination of the market for favors and votes in congress this paper examines the strategies that horse traders and power brokers adopt in trading favors to pass legislation although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading with data from the senate vote on the byrd amendment to the 1990 clean air act i conduct such a test the test provides evidence that on this vote i favor trading occurred ii the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination and iii the coalition leaders did not collude with each another

a natural experiment in proposal power and electoral success does lawmaker behavior influence electoral outcomes observational studies cannot elucidate the effect of legislative proposals on electoral outcomes since effects are confounded by unobserved differences in legislative and political skill we take advantage of a unique natural experiment in the canadian house of commons that allows us to estimate how proposing legislation affects election outcomes the right of noncabinet members to propose legislation is assigned by lottery comparing outcomes between those who were granted the right to propose and those who were not we show that incumbents of the governing party enjoy a 2 7 percentage point bonus in vote total in the election following their winning the right to introduce a single piece of legislation which translates to a 7 increase in the probability of winning the causal effect results from higher likeability among constituents these results demonstrate experimentally that what politicians do as lawmakers has a causal effect on electoral outcomes

benchmarking across borders electoral accountability and the necessity of comparison when the economy in a single country contracts voters often punish the government when many economies contract voters turn against their governments much less frequently this suggests that the international context matters for the domestic vote yet most research on electoral accountability assumes that voters treat their national economies as autarkic we decompose two key economic aggregates growth in real gross domestic product and unemployment into their international and domestic components and demonstrate that voters hold incumbents more electorally accountable for the domestic than for the international component of growth voters in a wide variety of democracies benchmark national economic growth against that abroad punishing rewarding incumbents for national outcomes that underperform outperform an international comparison tests suggest that this effect arises not from highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from pre benchmarking by the media when reporting on the economy the effect of benchmarked growth exceeds that of aggregate national growth by up to a factor of two and outstrips the international component of growth by an even larger margin implying that previous research may have underestimated the strength of the economy on the vote

a directional theory of issue voting from stokes s 1963 early critique on it has been clear to empirical researchers that the traditional spatial theory of elections is seriously flawed yet fully a quarter century later that theory remains the dominant paradigm for understanding mass elite linkage in politics we present an alternative spatial theory of elections that we argue has greater empirical verisimilitude based on the ideas of symbolic politics the directional theory assumes that most people have a diffuse preference for a certain direction of policy making and that people vary in the intensity with which they hold those preferences we test the two competing theories at the individual level with national election study data and find the directional theory more strongly supported than the traditional spatial theory we then develop the implications of the directional theory for candidate behavior and assess the predictions in light of evidence from the u s congress

the statistical analysis of roll call data modern studies of legislative behavior focus upon the relationship among the policy preferences of legislators institutional arrangements and legislative outcomes in spatial models of legislatures policies are represented geometrically as points in a low dimensional euclidean space each legislator has a most preferred policy or ideal point in this space and his or her utility for a policy declines with the distance of the policy from his or her ideal point see davis hinich and ordeshook 1970 for an early survey the primary use of roll call data the recorded votes of deliberative bodies 1 is the estimation of ideal points the appeal and importance of ideal point estimation arises in two ways first ideal point estimates let us describe legislators and legislatures the distribution of ideal points estimates reveals how cleavages between legislators reflect partisan affiliation or region or become more polarized over time e g mccarty poole and rosenthal 2001 roll call data serve similar purposes for interest groups such as americans for democratic action the national taxpayers union and the sierra club to produce ratings of legislators along different policy dimensions second estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative behavior for instance roll call analysis has been used in studies of the u s congress both contemporary and

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

reexamination of dynamic efficiency with taxation on land abstract this paper examines the possibility of overaccumulation of capital in an overlapping generations economy with land with zero population growth rate the steady state equilibrium is dynamically efficient imposition of property tax on land however distorts the no arbitrage condition and can generate dynamic inefficiency a similar possibility arises in an economy with a positive growth rate in population

check bouncing and fiscal irresponsibility evidence of nonideological shirking by legislators kalt and zupan have measured ideological shirking by legislators here we present evidence concerning nonideological shirking we demonstrate that representatives with more overdrawn checks tend to be more fiscally irresponsible with fiscal irresponsibility measured by national taxpayer union ratings and by representatives voting behavior on the recent house balanced budget amendment vote

taxes torts and the toxics release inventory congressional voting on instruments to control pollution i introduction governments can choose from a wide variety of policy instruments to control pollution including tax and subsidy schemes marketable permits information provision programs liability systems with well defined property rights and command and control selection of emission standards or technologies economists throughout the 1980s devoted significant effort to modeling the relative merits of these instruments the question of why politicians would prefer one manner of controlling pollution over another also attracted attention starting with buchanan and tullock s 1975 positive theory of externality control in which polluters find direct regulatory controls on emissions more profitable than pollution taxes theories of instrument selection have been developed in which politicians choose policies based on the relative costs and benefits to shareholders workers and environmentalists are affected by the constraints imposed by political institutions and are driven to select the most efficient policy instrument to achieve a given level of redistribution 1 to date however there have been few empirical tests of what drives instrument selection in environmental policy there is a large empirical literature devoted to explaining the level of support for environmental programs in congress most articles focus on the degree to which a legislator s stand on a given environmental bill can be explained by narrow district interests generally the material interests of constituents or by ideology either constituents or the member s own policy preferences studies of voting on environmental legislation by ackerman and hassler 1981 crandall 1983 pashigian 1985 and yandle 1989 offer evidence that legislators actions are in part explained by the district or state level impacts of proposed legislation on their constituents kalt and zupan 1984 find that after controlling for constituents material self interest in proposed strip mining legislation the ideology of constituents and the personal ideologies of their representatives influence voting on this aspect of environmental preservation as grier 1993 demonstrates debate over the general role of the legislator s specific ideology in voting continues in studying votes in the house and senate on the proposed size of the superfund during debate over the program s renewal hird 1993 concludes that congressional voting on superfund is found to represent legislator s environmental and liberal ideologies as much as if not more than narrowly defined self interest he links the importance of ideology to voting on superfund in part to the bill s symbolic environmental appeal in environmental legislation the final impact of a bill on industry and the environment often depends on issues resolved through technical amendments downs s theory of rational ignorance and arnold s theory of the degree to which constituents will link congressional actions with real world outcomes predict that members of congress may be less constrained by general constituent interests on amendment votes since these votes are less likely to be covered in the media than are final legislative votes as denzau and munger 1986 and grier and munger 1991 note groups with specific interests such as affected industries may find it less costly to persuade a member of congress to vote their way on a measure if the representative s constituents are supportive of or indifferent to the measure in the case of technical amendments affected parties may be more influential than on highly visible votes because the lack of media coverage translates into a lower probability that the vote will become a major campaign issue in future elections this implies that voting on the instruments to control pollution will be driven in part by the specific district level costs and benefits of these measures while voting on the final passage of a bill will be more driven by general constituent interests

old voters new voters and the personal vote using redistricting to estimate the incumbency advantage we provide new estimates of the size of the personal vote in u s house elections from 1872 to 1990 we take advantage of the natural experiment that attends decennial redistricting every ten years most incumbents are given new districts that contain a combination of old and new territory by contrasting an incombent s vote in the new part of the district with his or her vote in the old part of the district we can estimate the magnitude of the personal vote the vote that the incumbent receives because he or she represented the voters in the past our estimates confirm prior work that shows that a large fraction of the incumbency advantage owes to the personal vote as opposed to challenger quality unlike past research we are able to estimate the relationship between district partisanship and the personal vote we find a significant interaction which shows that incumbents develop larger personal votes in areas where they are electorally most vulnerable here is no doubt that incumbents today have a substantial advantage over nonincumbents in u s house elections the overall size of this advantage has been fairly well established as has the fact that incumbents electoral strength has increased dramatically over the postwar period measured in terms of vote share the overall incumbency advantage grew from a modest 1 3 percentage point edge in the 1940s and early 1950s to a 7 10 percentage point edge in the 1980s and early 1990s 1 there is much less agreement about the sources of the incumbency advantage and the causes of its growth congressional scholars have identified a variety of factors that may be responsible which can be grouped into three broad categories the first and the focus of this paper is electoral advantage that stems from a legislator s homestyle members of the house are reputedly very responsive to their constituents in turn their constituents reward them with their votes mayhew 1974b fenno 1974 and others detail the sorts of activities that legislators do to build a widely known and respected name including casework frequent visits to the district position taking on issues and securing federal benefits a second source of the incumbency advantage is candidate quality incumbents may win because they are the best candidates running and they do noticeably worse when they face state legislators and other experienced challengers finally incumbency may simply act as a voting cue a label which voters rely on because party has become less relevant assessing the importance of these different factors has significant implications for our normative evaluations of the modern congress and our understanding

government transparency and policymaking we argue that making lawmakers more accountable to the public by making it easier to identify their policy choices can have negative consequences specifically we analyze a model of political agency with a single lawmaker and a representative voter in our model the lawmaker has better information than the voter about the appropriateness of alternative policy courses in addition the voter is uncertain about the incumbent s policy preferences specifically the voter is worried the incumbent is an ideologue our model suggests that when lawmakers expect their policy choices to be widely publicized for those lawmakers sufficiently concerned about reelection the desire to select policies that lead the public to believe they are unbiased will trump the incentive to select those policies that are best for their constituents hence lawmakers who would do the right thing behind close doors may no longer do so when policy is determined in the open

dynamic inefficiency in an economy with land contrary to the belief that capital over accumulation is impossible in an economy with land i e a non reproducible factor of production this paper shows that the possibility of dynamic inefficiency depends on the income share of land and examines the historical tendencies of the income share of land in the u s

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

the strength of issues using multiple measures to gauge preference stability ideological constraint and issue voting a venerable supposition of american survey research is that the vast majority of voters have incoherent and unstable preferences about political issues which in turn have little impact on vote choice we demonstrate that these findings are manifestations of measurement error associated with individual survey items first we show that averaging a large number of survey items on the same broadly defined issue area for example government involvement in the economy or moral issues eliminates a large amount of measurement error and reveals issue preferences that are well structured and stable this stability increases steadily as the number of survey items increases and can approach that of party identification second we show that once measurement error has been reduced through the use of multiple measures issue preferences have much greater explanatory power in models of presidential vote choice again approaching that of party identification

ideology and candidate evaluation how does the expressed political ideology of voters influence their evaluation of presidential candidates the classic answer to this question is provided by the spatial theory of electoral choice in which utility for a candidate is a function of the proximity between the voter and candidate positions on the liberal conservative continuum we have argued elsewhere that spatial theory while intellectually appealing is inadequate as an empirical model of mass behavior we have developed a directional theory of issue voting that we believe provides a more realistic accounting of how specific policy issues influence utility for a candidate directional theory is based on the view that for most voters issues are understood as a dichotomous choice between two alternative positions while ideology is widely understood as a continuum of positions the directional model can be applied to the relationship between ideology and candidate evaluation in this paper we compare the two theories using national election study data from 1972 to 1988 the results tend to favor the directional model over the traditional proximity model we conclude by briefly tracing out the implications of this finding

property taxes and dynamic efficiency a correction according to kim and lee 1997 property taxes as opposed to capital gain taxes and taxes on rent endanger dynamic efficiency the present paper shows that the choice of the tax base is immaterial what counts is whether the taxes eliminate the after tax rent empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case

dynamic estimation of ideal points for the us congress theories of candidate positioning suggest that candidates will respond dynamically to their electoral environment because of the difficulty of obtaining bridge votes most existing approaches for estimating the ideal points of members of congress generate static ideal points or ideal points that move linearly over time we propose an approach for dynamic ideal point estimation using project vote smart s national political awareness test to construct bridge votes we use our dynamic estimates to measure aggregate change to measure individual level change and to study the institutional and structural factors that explain the changing positions of house candidates and members of congress we demonstrate that while the republican party has been selecting increasingly extreme candidates democratic incumbents have become more extreme while in office we also find that the congruence between elected members of congress and their constituents is mostly explained by the selection as opposed to the responsiveness of the candidate nonetheless we find evidence of dynamic responsiveness of incumbents in specific circumstances we find that competitiveness midterm elections and sharing the president s party affiliation are associated with greater responsiveness conversely retirement is not associated with a change in responsiveness we find no evidence of responsiveness of challengers finally we find that close elections draw challengers who are more in line with the district s ideology

explaining variation in the competitiveness of u s senate elections 1922 2004 we develop and test predictions about the factors determining the competitiveness of elections to the u s senate to do so we deliberately abstract away from candidate specific conditions that have often been used to study political competitiveness in order to focus on basic structural features of the electoral landscape in our framework party specific constraints on the ideological positioning of local candidates linked to the national party organization and its contributors interact with the heterogeneity of state electorates to determine the number of highly competitive senate contests three hypotheses emerge from this model 1 the greater the diversity of a party s national legislative delegation the more highly competitive senate elections we will observe 2 states in which the ideological heterogeneity of the electorate is relatively high will exhibit a greater number of highly competitive elections and 3 highly competitive senate contests will be more common in states with closed primaries than in states with open primaries we provide strong evidence in support of the first two hypotheses and some evidence in support of the third

macroeconomic conditions and committee re election rates the traditional literature on the link between the macro economy and house elections follows kramer 1971 and assumes all members of the president s party are equally vulnerable to voter wrath caused by economic changes using presidential party return rates from 10 house committees over the time period 1916 1996 i find the impact of economic conditions at the polls varies by committee generally committees that manage money or provide a public good are the most sensitive to economic fluctuations contrastingly members of the public works committee and the rules committee are more insulated from electoral culpability due to economic fluctuations

beyond the median voter preferences district heterogeneity and political representation despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts however all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter we utilize a unique data set consisting of individual level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences we find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts

partisanship and economic behavior do partisan differences in economic forecasts predict real economic behavior survey data regularly show that assessments of current and expected future economic performance are more positive when a respondent s partisanship matches that of the president to determine if this is a survey artifact or something deeper we investigate whether partisanship is associated with behavioral differences in economic decisions we construct a new data set of county level quarterly taxable sales to examine the effect of partisanship on consumption consumption change following a presidential election is correlated with a county s partisan complexion a result consistent with partisans acting outside the domain of politics in accordance with the opinions they express in surveys these results support an expansive view of the role of partisanship in mass politics and help validate surveys as a method for studying political behavior

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

the dynamics of state policy liberalism 1936 2014 applying a dynamic latent variable model to data on 148 policies collected over eight decades 1936 2014 we produce the first yearly measure of the policy liberalism of u s states our dynamic measure of state policy liberalism marks an important advance over existing measures almost all of which are purely cross sectional and thus cannot be used to study policy change we find that in the aggregate the policy liberalism of u s states steadily increased between the 1930s and 1970s and then largely plateaued the policy liberalism of most states has remained stable in relative terms though several states have shifted considerably over time we also find surprisingly little evidence of multidimensionality in state policy outputs our new estimates of state policy liberalism have broad application to the study of political development representation accountability and other important issues in political science abstract from author

legislative voting and the economic theory of politics empirical studies of legislative voting have multiplied since the mid 1970s early work 13 distinguished two modes of representation delegates who vote as voters want and trustees who use their own judgment more recently researchers have considered only delegates claiming that legislators who use their own ideology are shirking following principal agent theory representatives are conceived as conduits through which citizens transmit and express interests empirical work on this question however has found that the legislator s ideology explains more variation in vote choices than is explained by measures of constituent interest the seeming contradiction has led some 9 10 17 to reject the economic theory of legislator behavior as erroneous the truth is that no such theory has ever been fairly stated much less tested estimating equations have been ad hoc and the usual approach to measuring ideology has imposed correlation between the equation error and an explanatory variable 8 in both cases the result is

the international credit channel of u s monetary policy transmission to developing countries evidence from trade data abstract in a large sector level bilateral trade dataset we find robust evidence supporting a broad international credit channel of u s monetary policy transmission to developing countries we show that u s monetary policy has a significant effect on the sectoral composition of developing countries exports financially more vulnerable sectors have a significantly more negative exposure of their trade to a tight u s monetary policy especially in financially less developed exporting countries or during significant u s tightening periods moreover we identify both a monetary policy dependence mechanism and a financial dollarization mechanism through which u s monetary policy can influence the sectoral composition of developing countries exports

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

the effects of campaign spending in house elections new evidence for old arguments the question of how campaign spending affects election results remains open because the simultaneity problem has proven so intractable green and krasno s 1988 recent attempt to solve the problem and to demonstrate that marginal returns on spending are as great for incumbents as for challengers again comes up short a panel feature of the abc newslwashington post congressional district poll conducted during the 1986 elections offers a fresh perspective on the question analysis of changes in voting intentions during the final six weeks of the campaign shows that as the tainted ols studies have invariably suggested the amount spent by the challenger is far more important in accounting for voter s decisions than is the amount spent by the incumbent

when is quality of financial system a source of comparative advantage abstract dominant theories of trade tend to ignore the role of finance as a source of comparative advantage on the other hand the finance literature places financial institutions as a driver of economic growth this paper unites these two competing schools of thought in a general equilibrium framework for economies with high quality institutions defined by the competitiveness of the financial sector the quality of corporate governance and the level of property rights protection finance is passive on the other hand for economies with low quality institutions the quality of the financial system is an independent source of comparative advantage interestingly the conventional measure of financial development the size of the financial market relative to gdp does not adequately capture the underlying quality of financial institutions in addition free trade may reduce the aggregate income in south financial capital tends to flow from south to north

property taxes and dynamic inefficiency a correction of a correction abstract according to homburg s 2014 comment on kim and lee 1997 a property tax cannot cause dynamic inefficiency in overlapping generations models with land unless the tax confiscates the entire land rent but then homburg claims land would be intrinsically worthless and the market for land would be closed the latter claim is invalid because as a store of value land can trade at a positive price even though its net return is negative

determining trade policy do voters hold politicians accountable models of trade policy often depend on the efficient aggregation of individual preferences while much of the recent empirical work on trade focuses on whether domestic coalitions form along class or sectoral lines the process of preference aggregation itself remains understudied in democratic countries voting is typically assumed to be an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences but such an assumption may be misleading when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate using data from a survey of 36 501 potential voters in the 2006 u s midterm congressional elections this article explores the salience of trade policy for voters as a whole and for populations predicted to be most affected by changing trade patterns the article offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on the central american free trade agreement relative to roll call votes on other issues of the day the article finds trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance in voters knowledge of their representatives policy positions and in its effect on voters propensity to vote for the incumbent the low salience of trade policy particularly among highly affected groups calls into question voter driven models of trade policy

district complexity as an advantage in congressional elections scholars of congressional elections have argued that an increase in constituent diversity increases the level of electoral competition following models of boundedly rational candidates we argue that there is strong reason to believe that the opposite is true as the complexity of the electoral landscape increases challengers will have a more difficult time locating an optimal platform when facing an experienced incumbent using data from the 2000 national annenberg election study we construct a novel measure of district complexity for u s house districts and test whether the entry of quality challengers and the incumbent s share of the two party vote are affected by the complexity of the electoral landscape we find strong support for the hypothesis that complexity benefits incumbents for both indicators of electoral competition which stands in contrast to most of the existing literature on diversity and incumbent performance

policy responsiveness and incumbent reelection in state legislatures does policy responsiveness on the part of incumbent legislators affect their prospects for reelection recent studies of congressional campaigns demonstrate that incumbents who support policies that are more congruent with their constituents preferences face fewer reelection obstacles the present analysis considers this question in state legislative elections where voter knowledge of legislator activities is generally quite low the findings demonstrate that incumbents positioned farther from the average citizen and toward their party s base are only slightly more likely to be challenged than other incumbents however more partisan voting incumbents do attract challengers capable of raising and spending larger amounts of money interestingly incumbents positioned closer to their party s base actually receive a greater share of the vote in most contested elections only when challengers spend significant amounts of money do we see the positive effects of partisan voting by incumbents diminished overall these findings demonstrate the mechanisms by which policy positions of incumbents in a low information environment affect the challengers that emerge and the level of voter support received

evidence on electoral accountability in the u s senate are unfaithful agents really punished many have questioned whether voters are able to hold incumbent officials electorally accountable through a retrospective voting strategy we examine u s senate elections from 1962 to 1990 in forty one states explaining which incumbents ran for reelection and their success in seeking reelection we find that an incumbent s deviation from her state party platform decreases the probability that she will run for reelection and win if she runs furthermore the electoral mechanism is found to be more efficient when voters are better informed finally we find that our divergent party platform model provides a better fit than the median voter model

trading policy constituents and party in u s trade policy studies of us trade policy legislation focus on the effect of constituents on trade policy voting and give less weight to institutions such as political parties to demonstrate that political parties affect voting i compare the votes of politicians who share constituency characteristics but differ in political party affiliation this approach requires less reliance on assumptions about or empirical measures of constituents trade preferences the results demonstrate that political parties play a significant role in legislative voting on trade policy theories of political economy therefore should incorporate how constituency interests and partisan pressures affect legislative voting

on the mis measurement of legislator ideology and shirking in this paper we show that current statistical measures of legislator s shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested we note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross sectional regressions where legislators voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis specified we also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct the uncovered set and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate we argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by senators is equally consistent with senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data

federal tax policies congressional voting and natural resources can abundance of natural resources affect legislators voting behavior over federal tax policies we construct a political economy model of a federalized economy with district heterogeneity in natural resource abundance the model shows that representatives of natural resource rich districts are more less willing to vote in favor of federal tax increases decreases this occurs because resource rich districts are less responsive to federal tax changes due to the immobile nature of their natural resources we test the model s predictions using data on roll call votes in the u s house of representatives over the major federal tax bills initiated during the period of 1945 2003 in conjunction with the presence of active giant oil fields in u s congressional districts our identification strategy rests on plausibly exogenous giant oil field discoveries and exploitation and narrative based aggregate federal tax shocks that are exogenous to individual congressional districts and legislators we find that i resource rich congressional districts are less responsive to changes in federal taxes ii representatives of resource rich congressional districts are more less supportive of federal tax increases decreases controlling for legislator congressional district and state indicators our results indicate that resource richness is approximately half as dominant as the main determinant namely party afiliation in driving legislators voting behavior over federal tax policies

the economics of political campaign finance feca and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers this paper introduces a structural model of campaign finance which permits estimation of the marginal costs of raising money as well as the marginal benefits of spending and saving money the model is estimated for the 1986 through 1990 election cycles the results demonstrate that the probability of retirement hinders an incumbent s ability to raise money and that incumbents willingly trade off electoral security for financial gain

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed

foreign aid and domestic politics voting in congress and the allocation of usaid contracts across congressional districts this paper investigates the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of united states agency for international development usaid contract spending across congressional districts within the united states the extent to which such a relationship matters has become increasingly important in recent years as the end of the cold war and the advent of the republican controlled congress have eroded the traditional base of support for foreign aid we develop a model to illustrate how the distribution of contract spending could be used to increase support for foreign aid but at the expense of development impact in effect trading quality for quantity data on domestic foreign aid contract spending and votes in the 104th congress house of representatives allow us to test whether the geographic distribution of usaid contract spending within the united states is consistent with a systematic attempt to build support for foreign aid in congress econometric results provide little evidence of such attempts apparently because voting on this issue is insensitive to the distribution of contract spending

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district