prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

sealed bids sunk costs and the process of competition how do firms recover precontract costs for example suppose 10 firms compete in a sealed bid auction for the right to explore and develop an offshore oil field each spends 500 000 to estimate the value of the field and to prepare its bid suppose this investigation reveals that the tract is worth approximately 20 million if sunk costs do not matter competition dictates that the winner must bid 20 million but if the winner is to recover its prebid costs the maximum offer can be only 19 5 million furthermore long run industry equilibrium considerations suggest that the highest bid will be only 15 million 20 million minus the total bid preparation costs of 5 million if competition forces firms to charge marginal cost why do firms ever invest in resources which become sunk in some industries inframarginal rents can be used to recover these costs however the example above as well as many others involves an all or none deci

delegated portfolio management abstract a problem of screening agents with privately known forecasting abilities and reservation utilities and then eliciting truthful information from these agents once they are employed is considered for the case of risk averse agents and large principals an approximately optimal solution is constructively characterized under the assumption that payoffs are normally distributed a significant extension of the definnetti savage probability elicitation result is developed under this extension knowledge of agent preferences is not required when the underlying conditional distributions are symmetric and this fact is exploited to solve the screening problem in a mean variance formulation

determinants and shareholder wealth effects of the sales method in acquisitions we analyze the sales method for a sample of 575 acquisitions announced between 1998 and 2012 and find that targets choose auctions to maximize the target takeover premium through greater competition and to relax their financial constraints auctions compared to negotiated deals are associated with significantly higher target announcement returns especially for relatively small targets bidder returns are positively related to auctions for bidders acquiring relatively small targets not for the full sample taking into account size differences we find that auctions decrease target gains and increase bidder gains expressed in dollars

litigation risk and ipo underpricing abstract we examine the relation between risk and ipo underpricing and test two aspects of the litigation risk hypothesis 1 firms with higher litigation risk underprice their ipos by a greater amount as a form of insurance insurance effect and 2 higher underpricing lowers expected litigation costs deterrence effect to adjust for the endogeneity bias in previous studies we use a simultaneous equation framework evidence provides support for both aspects of the litigation risk hypothesis

markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions this paper studies the relation between the premiums in takeover bids involving exchange listed target firms from 1975 91 and the pre announcement stock price runups the evidence shows that the pre bid runup and the postannouncement increase in the target s stock price the markup are generally uncorrelated with little substitution between the runup and the markup the runup is an added cost to the bidder this finding has important implications for assessing the costs of insider trading it also raises interesting questions about the role of information from public capital markets in private takeover negotiations

do auctions induce a winner s curse new evidence from the corporate takeover market abstract we contrast the winner s curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers the winner s curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover in our empirical estimation we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals controlling for endogeneity we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition we also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding analysis of post takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition as a whole the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner s curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids

estimating recreation demand using the properties of the implied consumer surplus consumer surplus estimates are random variables while they are generally recognized as stochastic little attention was given to their properties prior to bockstael and strand s 1987 evaluation of conventional practices for using recreation demand models in benefit measurement their paper as well as all the research it stimulated adopted a similar strategy namely to judge the methods for estimating demand or random utility models based on the properties of their respective consumer surplus estimates this paper proposes a different strategy to define estimators based on the properties of their implied consumer surplus estimates this type of argument is not new and usually is associated with the rationale offered for bayesian estimators 2 however the motivation for the estimator proposed here can be based on minimizing the mean squared error of the consumer surplus estimates moreover it can be constructed from the statistics usually reported with ordinary least squares ols estimates

determinants of portfolio performance ii an update 1991 determinants of portfolio performance ii an update financial analysts journal vol 47 no 3 pp 40 48

measuring the cost of time in recreation demand analysis comment in the february 1981 issue of the journal mcconnell and strand present a model of recreation demand in which the opportunity cost of an hour of travel to a recreation site is assumed not to equal the average hourly income of the recreating family they test the model with data from a 1978 survey of sportfishermen in the chesapeake bay region simply stated the model hypothesizes that the sportfishermen will behave as if the price of a recreational trip is the sum of cash costs and the opportunity cost of travel time this opportunity cost is hypothesized to be some ratio k of average family income per hour times the travel time mcconnell and strand estimate the value of k by regressing recreation days against cash costs and opportunity cost of time as separate variables the ratio of regression coefficients then is an estimate of k they go on to estimate the ratio k of the opportunity cost of travel to the average income for sportfishermen in the chesapeake bay region the authors hypothesize that the ratio k falls between 0 and 1 implying that sportfishermen value the time in transit lower than their average income when working sufficient conditions for k to equal one include a the tax rate is zero b marginal earnings are constant and c nonwork income equals zero this comment is written to point out certain aspects of the study which may have led to an underestimation of the value of k it is argued that mcconnell and strand have misspecified their demand equation in such a way that their estimate for k 612 is biased downward mcconnell and strand hypothesize the demand relation

estimating the precision of welfare measures abstract three methods for constructing standard deviation and or confidence intervals for welfare estimates have been employed in the recreation demand literature a taylor s series approximation the bootstrap and a method proposed by krinsky and robb this paper presents the results of two sets of simulation experiments designed to examine the accuracy of these methods the first simulation examines the methods accuracy in estimating the standard deviation of welfare estimates the second simulation examines the accuracy of the methods in constructing confidence intervals

the resolution of failed banks during the crisis acquirer performance and fdic guarantees 2008 2013 abstract we find that winning bidders in fdic failed bank auctions from 2008 to 2013 experience substantial positive abnormal stock returns returns are inversely related to bid amounts after controlling for bid determinants consistent with wealth transfers from the fdic providing implicit subsidies to acquirers the results challenge arguments that wealth transfers in earlier crises stemmed from since eliminated bidding restrictions but support the prediction of cash in the market pricing theory that during crises resolution through acquisition requires subsidization winning bid amounts are related to proxies for cash in the market pricing fdic loss sharing not widely used before the recent failure wave is an important influence on bids

marginal welfare measures for discrete choice models abstract this letter deals with the use of discrete choice models for applied welfare analysis an approximate formula is presented for the marginal willingness to pay for a change in the attributes of any of the discrete alternatives which is simple to calculate and has an intuitive interpretation

on the political economy of uk pension scheme regulation we take the opportunity of the recent consultation exercise on uk defined benefit pension schemes conducted by the pensions regulator to examine the approach to pension scheme portfolio management that it and the related pension protection fund have adopted after summarising the regulatory basis we identify three essential building blocks for further examination the notion of matching liabilities to long term government bonds the use of standard deviation of return as a measure of risk and the idea that strategic asset allocation is the most important decision in portfolio management this last one the brinson axiom we examine these foundations individually and then collectively with the aid of two unobtrusive postulates the first being the efficient markets hypothesis and the second that pension scheme assets should be used to purchase only those securities with minimal default risk from the perspective of what we have elsewhere called the keynes graham schema we conclude that the foundations are unsound and that the conventional approach adopted not only by both the regulator and the protection fund but also by the major actuarial consultancies induces if not actually requires pension schemes to engage in speculation rather than investment

in search of the winner s curse earlier papers on the winner s curse have provided theoretical arguments that winning bidders in an auction will incur ex post losses even when all bidders use reasonable ex ante bidding strategies this paper demonstrates that these arguments are erroneous optimal ex ante bidders will never suffer from a winner s curse in an auction where only the winning bid is announced furthermore such bidders will on the average not suffer from a winner s curse in an auction where all bids are announced thus if a winner s curse is a behavioral reality then bidders are not generally using ex ante optimal strategies

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

reducing barriers in future benefit transfers needed improvements in primary study design and reporting abstract original research provides many social benefits including additions to our stock of knowledge benefit transfer is a formal process whereby our stock of knowledge rather than original research is used to inform decisions any shortcoming in this stock directly affects our ability to conduct valid and reliable benefit transfers this paper discusses three general criteria that are necessary for valid benefit transfers and how original research designs and reporting of results unnecessarily constrain the potential of benefit transfers we make several suggestions regarding how original research through improved design and reporting might increase the validity and reliability of benefit transfers we also recommend that repositories for original research surveys and data be developed to insure long term availability of study information

why do sellers usually prefer auctions we compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly a simple simultaneous auction and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding the sequential process is always more efficient but preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers because the auction is more conducive to entry precisely because of its inefficiency it usually generates higher expected revenue we also discuss the effects of lock ups matching rights break up fees as in takeover battles entry subsidies etc

empirical testing of auction theory given the state of affairs in auction theory there is at least one model for instance to support any position one would care to take concerning the revenue of sealed bid vs open auctions it should not come as a surprise that a fair amount of empirical work in auctions is underway this paper reports the results of some recently completed research i first discuss papers in which the predictions being tested derive directly from the pure theory of auctions and then papers in which the predictions arise out of an application of auction theory to a related institution

the place of portfolio management in the keynesian canon recent publications such as the two volume oxford handbook of post keynesian economics harcourt and kreisler 2013 and the elgar companion to post keynesian economics king 2012 provide authoritative summaries of the current state of the art on a very wide range of relevant topics in particular the contents pages of these books define the field as seen by adherents the obvious implication being that those topics excluded have not yet acquired the necessary status by passing appropriate academic tests of relevance and coherence inter alia the focus of this article portfolio management is on one of these omitted topics starting from the fundamental recognition of uncertainty we examine the whole range of characteristics of the keynesian approach demonstrating the coherence and applicability of its multidimensional nature in the process pointing by contrast to the one dimensional sterility of the conventional approach our general conclusion is that there is a rightful place in the keynesian canon for portfolio management by which we mean not only investment management but also speculative management where these two qualifiers are used in the keynes graham sense

bootstrapping in applied welfare analysis bootstrapping procedures are used to estimate the statistical properties of common empirical welfare measures results from a monte carlo experiment indicate that welfare estimates such as marshallian consumer surplus often exhibit significant bias standard errors of welfare estimates are found to often exceed the magnitude of the point estimate for typical cross section data sets and are generally larger than the difference between comparable hicksian and marshallian measures precision of welfare estimates can be markedly enhanced through generating larger data sets obtaining better model fits and through imposition of innocuous inequality restrictions on the demand function parameters

tobin s q and the gains from takeovers this paper analyzes the relation between takeover gains and the q ratios of targets and bidders for a sample of 704 mergers and tender offers over the period 1972 1987 target bidder and total returns are larger when targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios the relation is strengthened after controlling for the characteristics of the offer and the contest this evidence confirms the results of the work by lang stulz and walkling and shows that their findings also hold for mergers and after controlling for other determinants of takeover gains in a recent paper lang stulz and walkling lsw 1989 document that the abnormal returns in tender offers are related to the tobin s q ratios of the targets and the bidders in particular they find that target bidder and total returns are higher when takeover targets have high q ratios and bidders have low q ratios where one is used as a cutoff point to separate high q firms from low q firms in fact bidders with high q ratios have significant positive abnormal returns when they engage in a takeover while bidders with low q ratios have significant negative abnormal returns the best takeovers in terms of value creation are those where a high q firm takes over a low q firm the opposite scenario holds for the worst case takeovers low q firms taking over high q firms if q is interpreted as a measure of managerial performance these findings imply that better performing firms also make better acquisitions and that more value can be created from taking over poorly performing companies while the results of lsw are insightful they leave a number of questions unanswered their sample consists only of tender offers several studies have documented that the returns to targets in mergers are smaller than those in tender offers see jensen and ruback 1983 and huang and walkling 1987 it would therefore be useful to see whether the lsw 1989 results hold for a larger sample which includes both mergers and tender offers previous research has also shown that the characteristics of the takeover hostile versus friendly and single versus multiple bidder the form of payment cash versus securities the time period before 1968 1968 1980 1981 and later and the relative size of target and bidder are important determinants of the magnitude of takeover gains and their distribution

the choice of issuance procedure and the cost of competitive and negotiated underwriting an examination of the impact of rule 50 previous research suggests that firms choose negotiated issuance over competitive despite its apparently higher net interest cost this result is shown to arise partly from failure to correct for a selectivity bias in the choice of issuance procedures two stage analysis is used in a model that includes qualitative and limited dependent variables to re estimate the net interest cost difference between competitive and negotiated issues results support the hypothesis that the choice of issuance procedure is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization examination of debt issues subject to rule 50 of the public utility holding company act indicates that the regulation as applied is not

determinants of portfolio performance in order to delineate investment responsibility and measure performance contribution pension plan sponsors and investment managers need a clear and relevant method of attributing returns to those

actual averting expenditure versus stated willingness to pay the purpose of this study is to perform a complete comparison of actual averting expenditure and stated willingness to pay measures and to determine if the averting expenditure is a lower bound of the willingness to pay measured from contingent valuation experiment as suggested by literature in addition to the single value comparison bootstrap krinsky and robb jackknife and cameron are four simulation methods used to calculate confidence intervals for response function sample sizes of 100 200 and 1000 are simulated 100 and 200 times respectively a set of data with 540 households from a contingent policy referendum survey is employed for our purpose under a specific level of bod improvement a one to one single mean value comparison of the actual averting expenditure is greater than the mean willingness to pay from utility difference model the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical expectation for expenditure difference that averting expenditure is a lower bound of willingness to

some evidence of the winner s curse the mathematical complexity of auction theory has restricted empirical work to qualitative tests of its basic predictions with mixed results this paper exploits the theory of order statistics to derive a nash bid function that is linear in its parameters allowing direct estimati on by linear least squares the bid function is fitted to a cross section of auctions for highway construction contracts from thirty three states and provides support for several hypotheses of the theory of common value auctions copyright 1988 by american economic association

corporate takeover bids methods of payment and bidding firms stock returns this study explores the role of the method of payment in explaining common stock returns of bidding firms at the announcement of takeover bids the results reveal significant differences in the abnormal returns between common stock exchanges and cash offers the results are independent of the type of takeover bid i e merger or tender offer and of bid outcomes these findings supported by analysis of nonconvertible bonds are attributed mainly to signalling effects and imply that the inconclusive evidence of earlier studies on takeovers may be due to their failure to control for the method of payment recent studies on corporate takeovers provide inconclusive results on the valuation effects of acquisitions on the common stock of bidding firms 1 substantial differences are reported between the studies that analyze acquisitions initiated as tender offers and those that confine their samples to merger proposals the existence of mixed empirical findings for the bidding firms makes it difficult to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions about the managers acquisition motivations nevertheless the reason for the substantial difference between empirical findings on mergers and tender offers still remains an unresolved issue it is observed however that mergers are usually common stock exchange offers whereas tender offers are usually cash offers given that different methods of financing a project have different signalling implications myers and majluf 39 the differential stock returns of bidders in mergers and tender offers may be due to the method of acquisition financing

adopt a hypothetical pup a count data approach to the valuation of wildlife the willingness to pay wtp for a coyote conservation program is estimated using a novel payment vehicle based on how many problem coyotes respondents would be willing to sponsor for a year this hypothetical scenario mimics an increasingly popular type of actual market data from a phone survey conducted in prince edward island are analyzed using count data models that consider different processes explaining zero responses and the level of positive responses this is particularly important in the case of coyotes often regarded as an economic bad estimates of wtp per coyote per year around 18 22 and annual wtp per contributor of about 46 57 are obtained

on equity markets long term decision making and performance metrics the 2012 kay review of uk equity markets and long term decision making confirmed that short termism was a problem identifying asset managers as the dominant players in the investment chain mr kay concluded that their appointment and monitoring was too often based on short term relative performance and recommended an examination of the metrics employed using as conceptual framework the keynes graham schema proposed by woods in 2013 we demonstrate that the most commonly employed measure the time weighted rate of return is inappropriate and inaccurate as a performance metric and should be replaced by the familiar but generally ignored money weighted rate of return hitherto there have been three strands to the economics and finance literature on portfolio management namely with reference to the efficient markets hypothesis the selection of optimal portfolios in a mean variance context using quadratic optimisation techniques and principal agent issues that exist between portfolio managers and their clients in this article we initiate a new strand in the literature by focusing on the metric used to measure the performance of a portfolio manager incidentally showing that our approach has immediate implications for the three existing strands

auctions of companies robert g hansen auctions of companies are conducted in ways that contradict received auction theory the major puzzles are 1 sellers restrict the number of bidders 2 sellers restrict the number of bidders 3 bidders are screened by an initial round of nonbinding bids and 4 bidders offer and sellers sometimes accept preemptive bids puzzles 1 2 and 4 are explained by assuming that some information concerning the company can if released reduce the value of the company puzzle 3 is explained as a way for sellers to select the highest valued bidders equilibrium is maintained by using the initial bids to set a reserve price for the final bidding round jel d44 d82 g34 i introduction from 1989 to 1998 19 593 private companies were reported to be bought and sold in the united states many through an auction process the total value of these transactions was in excess of 315 billion 1 in addition from 1989 to 1998 there were 13 134 reported divestitures of divisions subsidiaries or product lines the value of these transactions was in excess of 900 billion perhaps not surprisingly an industry of advisors auctioneers exists to facilitate these transactions and the institutional framework by which auctions of companies are conducted has become somewhat standardized the purpose of this article is to apply auction theory to explain this standardized institutional framework the article proceeds as follows section ii describes the standardized process used for selling private companies or divisions of public companies points out how these practices conflict with certain aspects of received auction theory and presents initial arguments that explain the rationality of the practic es in section iii a more formal model is developed to show how some of the standard corporate auction practices can be explained section iv deals with what may be the most intriguing institutional practice the use of preliminary nonbinding indications of interest section v concludes the article with a preliminary discussion of entry fees and preemptive bidding ii the typical auction process and consistency with auction theory the typical process for selling a private company or division of a public company runs as follows 2 upon making the decision to sell the selling company will retain or will already have retained an advisor who will serve as de facto auctioneer the auctioneer drawing on knowledge of the selling company will draw up a preliminary list of potential bidders this list will probably include competitors suppliers customers and acquisition oriented conglomerates or leveraged buyout houses the advisor will also exercise his judgment at this time as to whether or not a prospective bidder will be willing and able to complete a transaction at a satisfactory price if a negative judgment is made that potential bidder will likely be excluded from further participation the remaining prospective bidders will receive a very cursory description of the selling company and will be offered a more in depth offering memorandum if they sign a confidentiality agreement although the first cursory description may no t even include the selling company s name the offering memorandum will be quite detailed including the sort of information that would typically be in a public corporation s securities and exchange commission 10k filing as well as traditionally confidential information on current issues at the selling company overview of costs plans for market and product developments and so on the next step is for the prospective bidders to submit preliminary nonbinding indications of interest for the selling company these indications will be either a number or a range of numbers that are supposed to represent bidders first approximations of their estimates of the value of the target 3 the preliminary indications are then used by the auctioneer to further reduce the number of bidders who will proceed further only the top bidders on their list are permitted to go forward 4 although the screening is clearly not as straightforward as the preceding passage presumes there is no doubt that the likelihood of ad mittance to the next round increases with the preliminary bid even though that bid is nonbinding

some results on the variance of welfare estimates from recreation demand models this paper examines three points concerning the variances of consumer welfare measures 1 the size of variance estimates depend on the assumed source of error 2 the precision of welfare estimates as measured by the coefficient of variation generally falls with an increase in the size of the welfare change and 3 the difference between marshallian and hicksian welfare measures also depends on the assumed source of error and may be small relative to the standard error these results are demonstrated analytically using the linear or semilog demand function a simple simulation experiment illustrates the possible magnitude of these points

the effect of common sources of regression error on benefit estimates discussions of the sources of error in recreation demand analysis are common in the existing literature the most traditional line of thought e g gum and martin considers the error component in predicting the individual s recreation behavior to arise from unmeasured socioeconomic factors others e g hanemann attribute at least some of this error to fundamental randomness in human behavior applied statisticians e g hiett and worrall on the other hand suggest that recall of annual number of recreational trips i e the quantity demanded is subject to substantial error still others e g brown et al have argued that recall of explanatory variables such as travel expenses contains error despite the discussion of potential error sources there is no work which relates the sources of error in the demand relationship with benefit measurement 1 of practical importance in recreational demand estimation is whether error assumptions have an influence on welfare measures since it is for public policy decision purposes that recreational demand estimation is usually undertaken will the estimated consumer surplus derived from demand analysis be independent of the assumed source of the error in the regression the purpose of this paper is to explore how the assumptions about sources of error influence estimates of recreation benefits a discussion of the various sources of error in de

the gains to bidding firms from merger abstract this study examines the effect of mergers on the wealth of bidding firms shareholders bidding firms gain significantly during the twenty one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids these results fail to support the capitalization hypothesis that bidders gains are captured at the beginning of merger programs bidders abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the merger partners and the gains during the announcement period are larger for mergers which are successful though the gains are larger prior to 1969 merger bids after 1969 also significantly increase the wealth of bidding firms shareholders the results suggest that the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological deficiencies the findings of this study are consistent with value maximizing behavior by the management of bidding firms

bidding in common value auctions how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner s curse experienced construction industry executives suffer from a winner s curse in laboratory common value auction markets dyer et al dyer d j h kagel d levin 1989 a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions laboratory analysis econom j 99 108 115 this paper identifies essential differences between field environments and the economic theory underlying the laboratory markets that account for the executives success in the field and a winner s curse in the lab these are 1 industry specific mechanisms which enable contractors to escape the winner s curse even when they bid too low 2 learned industry specific evaluative processes which enable experienced contractors to avoid the winner s curse in the first place and 3 important private value elements that underlie bidding also identified are a number of industry specific bidding characteristics whose evolution can be explained using modern auction theory lessons are drawn regarding the use of experime

does it all add up benchmarks and the compensation of active portfolio managers in this article the authors examine theoretically the use of benchmark portfolios in the compensation of privately informed portfolio managers they find that the use of a benchmark and particularly the types of benchmarks often observed in practice cannot be easily rationalized specifically commonly used benchmark adjusted compensation schemes are generally inconsistent with optimal risk sharing and do not lead to the choice of an optimal portfolio for the investor moreover benchmarks do not help in solving potential contracting problems such as inducing the manager to expend effort or trying to screen out uninformed managers copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

a semiparametric smooth coefficient estimator for recreation demand we introduce a semiparametric smooth coefficient estimator for recreation demand data that allows more flexible modeling of preference heterogeneity we show that our sample of visitors each has an individual statistically significant price coefficient estimate leading to clearly nonparametric consumer surplus and willingness to pay wtp distributions we also show mean wtp estimates that are different in economically meaningful ways for every demographic variable we have for our sample of beach visitors this flexibility is valuable for future researchers who can include any variables of interest beyond the standard demographic variables we have included here and the richer results price elasticities consumer surplus and wtp estimates are valuable to planners and policymakers who can easily see how all these estimates vary with characteristics of the population of interest

asset allocation dynamics and pension fund performance using a data set on more than 300 u k pension funds asset holdings this article provides a systematic investigation of the performance of managed portfolios across multiple asset classes we find evidence of slow mean reversion in the funds portfolio weights toward a common time varying strategic asset allocation we also find surprisingly little cross sectional variation in the average ex post returns arising from the strategic asset allocation market timing and security selection decisions of the fund managers strategic asset allocation accounts for most of the time series variation in portfolio returns while market timing and asset selection appear to have been far less important copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

some evidence on the winner s curse comment the theory of auctions has developed extensively since robert b wilson s 1977 seminal paper due to the complexity of equilibrium strategies however empirical researchers have been slow to incorporate and test the most basic theoretical precepts typical empirical studies estimate ad hoc bidding models with no attempt to ascertain whether the implied behaviors are theoretically plausible the recent paper by stuart e thiel 1988 attempts to bridge this gap thiel obtains closed form equilibrium bidding functions that are theoretically motivated and linear in parameters and which facilitate empirical estimation and testing if widely applicable thiel s empirical approach would constitute a major methodological breakthrough unfortunately thiel s approach applies only in special cases that are of limited practical interest linear bidding strategies emerge only under circumstances that are unlikely in the real world the limited range of thiel s approach may not be apparent to casual readers of his paper even when linear strategies do exist they are not unique under the special assumptions of thiel s model for each nash equilibrium in linear strategies there exists a related family of nonlinear strategies thus further justification must be found for basing empirical research on the linear specification we also note a significant error in thiel s work the symmetric strategies he derives on the basis of order statistics do not constitute a nash equilibrium we derive proper expressions for the symmetric nash strategies and discuss a specification error in thiel s regression analysis that would account for the mixed results obtained in his application to the highway construction industry

functional form and the statistical properties of welfare measures this paper uses monte carlo analysis to compare the variance of consumer s surplus for several functional forms for demand although the semilog and linear forms fit the data well by statistical criteria the coefficients of variation for consumer s surplus generated by these forms were substantially larger than for the double log and linear log forms while this paper is framed in the travel cost approach to recreational demand there are implications for the choice of functional form whenever the measure of interest is a nonlinear transformation of the estimated parameters in an influential article ziemer musser and hill note the importance of the choice of functional form for the magnitude of estimated measures of welfare change in a study of the demand for a recreation site based on the travel cost model they report nearly a fourfold difference between consumer s surplus based on a linear demand curve and surplus computed from a semilog demand their research emphasizes that good estimates of demand may not yield good estimates of welfare the estimate of consumer s surplus is a

the role of accounting quality in the m a market we examine the role of target firms accounting quality in the merger and acquisition process we predict that target firm accounting quality will be positively associated with 1 the likelihood that the deal will be structured as a negotiation rather than as an auction 2 the speed with which the deal reaches final resolution and 3 the likelihood that the proposed deal is ultimately completed our empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions these results complement and extend existing findings on target firm accounting quality and provide new evidence that financial accounting quality relates positively to the efficient allocation of the economy s capital resources this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

on keynes as an investor as keynes himself admitted in 1938 his approach to portfolio management changed dramatically during the course of his career he abandoned speculation in favour of investment namely a careful selection of a few investments having regard to their cheapness and potential intrinsic value over a period of years ahead in other words he was applying the margin of safety a concept we particularly associate nowadays with benjamin graham who incorporated it inter alia into his magnum opus of 1934 security analysis an examination of the writings of keynes on the one hand and graham on the other reveals considerable overlap between not to say unity of their respective conceptions such is their complementarity that it is reasonable to speak of a keynes graham schema we conclude that this is the natural starting point for the 2011 kay review of uk equity markets as it should have been for the myners review of uk institutional investment a decade ago copyright oxford university press

anomalies the winner s curse abstract next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch try the following experiment in your class take a jar and fill it with coins noting the total value of the coins now a

the costs of bankruptcy chapter 7 liquidation versus chapter 11 reorganization our paper explores a comprehensive sample of small and large corporate bankruptcies in arizona and new york from 1995 to 2001 bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to the measurement method used we find that chapter 7 liquidations appear to be no faster or cheaper in terms of direct expense than chapter 11 reorganizations however chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better thereby allowing creditors to recover relatively more our paper also provides a large number of further empirical regularities our paper analyzes the largest sample of corporate bankruptcies to date we research approximately 300 cases from the arizona and new york federal bankruptcy courts from 1995 to 2001 these cases consist of 1 both publicly traded and privately held corporations and 2 both chapter 7 liquidations and chapter 11 reorganizations this sample is practically the entire population of unique corporate bankruptcies in these courts our paper s primary objective is to measure how the two available bankruptcy procedures differ especially but not only in terms of cost we explore four variables namely the change in the estate s value during bankruptcy a measure of indirect costs the time spent in bankruptcy another and more common measure of indirect costs the expenses submitted to and approved by the bankruptcy court a measure of direct costs and the recovery rates for creditors and apr violations our most important findings are that chapter 7 liquidations are not cheaper than chapter 11 reorganizations particularly after we control for endogenous self selection of firms into bankruptcy procedure bankruptcy professionals attorneys accountants trustees regularly end up with most of the post bankruptcy firm s value in chapter 7 arturo bris is at imd yale school of management and ecgi ivo welch is at brown uni

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices