executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

food insecurity and public assistance this paper examines if welfare programs reduce the probability that vulnerable households experience food deprivation because of financial constraints although the 1996 welfare reform legislation specifically limited the eligibility of immigrant households to receive assistance many states chose to protect their immigrant populations by offering state funded aid to these groups i exploit these changes in eligibility rules to examine the link between food insecurity and public assistance the evidence indicates that a 10 percentage point cut in the fraction of the population that receives public assistance increases the fraction of food insecure households by about 5 percentage points

management turnover and product market competition empirical evidence from the u s newspaper industry we examine the relationship between management turnover and market structure for newspapers in 50 large cities from 1950 to 1993 we find that competitive markets display greater turnover rates than monopolistic markets and that turnover rates are increasing in the degree to which a newspaper trails its competition in market share we find no evidence that the turnover performance relationship varies with market structure we discuss the implications of these findings for theories concerning competition and managerial employment contracting the results appear most consistent with the hypothesis that the greater likelihood of liquidation in competitive markets leads to elevated turnover rates copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

competition risk and managerial incentives this paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers a central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure the main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases as a result of greater product substitutability or greater market size principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs at the same time more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm level profits consequently managers incentives are positively correlated with firm level risk consistent with empirical evidence a decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives

efficiency wages and x inefficiencies within most organizations agents may spend time on a variety of tasks productive and redistributive in this paper i derive an optimal multi task incentive scheme under the assumption that agents have limited liability the wage level is shown to increase with an agent s discretion and the organization s profits with multiple agents it is generally not optimal for the principal to fully eliminate distributional conflict within the organization the resulting influence costs constitute a measure of x inefficiency the analysis illuminates the relationship between competition and influence costs emphasizing the role of the organization s production technology

rent sharing in the european airline industry abstract to the extent that product market competition affects managerial incentives to control costs price cost margins offer a poor guide to the evaluation of market power we propose a method to evaluate simultaneously both market power and its pass through on cost we focus on rent sharing between unions and management as a mechanism through which costs are endogenised we develop and estimate a structural model of competition where wages are endogenously determined in the first stage with a price setting market game following in the second stage this structural model is then estimated using data for 8 european airlines from 1976 1990 we find a strong support for the hypothesis that lax competition induces extensive rent sharing through excessive wages

industry product market competition and managerial incentives abstract while some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives other studies suggest a complementary relation the underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration however recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions product substitutability market size and entry costs given the level of industry concentration using these determinants of competition this study contributes to the literature by showing that a firms provide stronger incentives when industry competition is greater b competition is multi dimensional in its relation to incentives and c industry characteristics play a major role in influencing incentives

when less is more the benefits of limits on executive pay we derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders but not executives having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance contingent contracts this has implications for the ideal composition of the board the analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive compensation reform

competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector abstract we consider a regulation problem with complete contracting in a principal agent model with adverse selection and review within this model the various channels by which external competition parameters affect incentives within the regulated firm the channels are the principal s information the principal s objective function the agent s incentive constraint the agent s participation constraint we consider in particular a better information structure a threat of liquidation a fight for talent a more efficient private sector and the existence of better substitutes we characterize in each case the conditions under which the effect on incentives is positive

strategic incentives for innovations and market competition abstract we consider a principal agent model to provide a general analysis of how risk affects incentives of firms who invest in cost reducing r d and compete in the product market we specify the conditions under which higher risk reduces incentives of all firms we also examine the conditions under which an increase in risk may trigger opposite responses of rivals in the same industry some firms will strengthen while other firms will weaken the incentives provided to their agents this result holds regardless of the mode of competition in the product market cournot or bertrand as long as the rivals r d decisions are strategic substitutes it can generate new empirical implications and can provide an explanation for the lack of strong empirical support in the literature for a negative relationship between risk and incentives we also discuss policy implications regarding the effect of risk on the incentives to innovate and welfare

slack in the state owned enterprise an evaluation of the impact of soft budget constraints abstract in this paper slack in resource utilization is estimated using data envelopment analysis for a sample of 67 indian state owned 63 private sector and 27 foreign owned enterprises on a comparative basis the study is cross sectional and carried out for the year 1991 to assess how far the operation of soft budget constraints has had an impact on the economic performance of indian firms particularly operated as state owned enterprises specifically the presence of debt capital provided primarily by government owned financial institutions is strongly and negatively related to performance the results show that if firms turn out to be all equally efficient then average materials costs human capital usage costs costs associated with other operating items and physical capital usage by each state owned enterprise sampled can be reduced by rs 203 million rs 201 million rs 53 million and rs 255 million respectively if existing levels of inputs are used efficiently then the average addition to the value of output by each state owned enterprise can rise by rs 693 million the analyses reveal significant slack in resource utilization in indian state owned firms resulting from soft budget constraints and the implications of the existence of slack are discussed

the effect of foreign competition on forecasting bias this paper studies the effect of foreign competition on the extent of forecasting bias i focus on two biases often described in the behavioral economics literature overoptimism and excessive belief in trends using data from firm level surveys in five african countries i show that firms that do not face foreign competition generate forecasts of sales growth that have greater trend and optimism biases than firms that have foreign competitors i further provide evidence that these erroneous forecasts have real effects on firms inventory management

financing investments in renewable energy the impacts of policy design abstract the costs of electric power projects utilizing renewable energy technologies rets are highly sensitive to financing terms consequently as the electricity industry is restructured and new renewables policies are created it is important for policymakers to consider the impacts of renewables policy design on ret financing this paper reviews the power plant financing process for renewable energy projects estimates the impact of financing terms on levelized energy costs and provides insights to policymakers on the important nexus between renewables policy design and financing we review five case studies of renewable energy policies and find that one of the key reasons that ret policies are not more effective is that project development and financing processes are frequently ignored or misunderstood when designing and implementing renewable energy policies the case studies specifically show that policies that do not provide long term stability or that have negative secondary impacts on investment decisions will increase financing costs sometimes dramatically reducing the effectiveness of the program within u s electricity restructuring proceedings new renewable energy policies are being created and restructuring itself is changing the way rets are financed as these new policies are created and implemented it is essential that policymakers acknowledge the financing difficulties faced by renewables developers and pay special attention to the impacts of renewables policy design on financing as shown in this paper a renewables policy that is carefully designed can reduce renewable energy costs dramatically by providing revenue certainty that will in turn reduce financing risk premiums

the determinants of firms performance can finance constraints improve technical efficiency this paper analyses the mechanisms through which binding finance constraints can induce debt constrained firms to improve technical efficiency to guarantee positive profits this hypothesis is tested on a sample of firms belonging to the italian manufacturing technical efficiency scores are computed by estimating parametric production frontiers using the one stage approach as in battese and coelli battese g coelli t 1995 a model for technical efficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data empirical economics 20 325 332 the results support the hypothesis that a restriction in the availability of financial resources can affect positively efficiency 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

competition and the evolution of efficiency abstract this paper presents an evolutionary model of the relationship between inter firm competition and intra firm organizational or x efficiency we model x inefficiency within the firm as a prisoner s dilemma effort monitoring problem whose evolution is influenced by external competitive pressure from other firms a closed form stochastic equilibrium displaying survival of the fittest dynastic cycles is derived and analyzed the main result is that there exists a well defined sense in which competition is a surprisingly powerful force for efficiency

competition long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms abstract internal reward structures in firms are often integral parts of their culture and are changed infrequently in comparison to decisions about e g prices this paper investigates how this feature of firm organization provides a mechanism through which product market competition affects firms internal efficiency the design of firms internal organization is modeled as a choice of an incentive structure between a principal and an agent with strategic implications for firm s competitive positions on the product market it is shown that contrary to popular beliefs there may be a negative relation between the competitiveness of the product market and effort incentives

the effect of competition on executive compensation and incentives evidence from a quasi natural experiment the research was partially funded by fundacao para a ciencia e a tecnologia through the applied microeconomics research unit nima award no pest oe ege ui3181 2014

discouraging rivals managerial rent seeking and economic inefficiencies we argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers decisions in general managerial rent seeking affects not only the level of investment but also the form our basic hypothesis is simple given the now well established scope for managerial discretion managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation and a manager s pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management the board of directors and rival management teams or takeover artists this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the efficiency of firms what difference does competition make in cournot oligopoly the efficiency of a firm relative to others determines its market share this relationship gives an incentive to improve efficiency the incentives are greater in markets where firm behaviour is more competitive components of firm efficiency are identified by frontier production function techniques in 19 uk manufacturing sectors technical change average efficiency of each firm relative to the frontier and the efficiency of each firm relative to its own best practice in each period short run declines in market shares and profits induce the firm to improve efficiency relative to its best practice long run differences in efficiency are correlated with differences in gross investment

product market competition and upstream innovation evidence from the u s electricity market deregulation this paper studies the innovation response of upstream technology suppliers when their downstream buyers transition from regulation to competition by modeling the impact of the 1990s u s electricity deregulation on patenting we find that after deregulation the net competition effect comprising the pure competition and the escape competition effect decreased innovation by 18 3 and the appropriation effect increased innovation by 19 6 other deregulation factors have led to a 20 6 decline in aggregate after deregulation innovation by the upstream technology suppliers has declined by 19 3 and upstream innovation quality and generality have declined as well

the impact of market competition on ceo salary in the us energy sector1 abstract in this work we examine the impact of market competition on ceos salaries by analyzing a sample of alls p american firms in the energy sector in the 1992 2015 time span and measuring market competition by means of the so called herfindhal hirschman index we divide industries into three sub groups based on small medium and high market concentration and try to expand our research by exploring the impact of the recent financial crisis the paper investigates how ceos salaries are affected by firm level determinants e g firm size returns on assets returns on equity capital expenditure market concentration tobin s q etc as well as by the individual characteristics of each ceo e g ceos age gender based on our findings the market concentration index in the us energy sector has a negative and statistically significant impact on ceo salary for all firms that operate in either a highly monopolistic or a purely competitive environment the results of this empirical work are robust after examining for different alternative high order fixed effects specifications

a bargaining model of farrell inefficiency abstract an enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency the distance of firms inside a frontier following the model of farrell farrell 1957 the measurement of productive efficiency journal of the royal statistical society series a 120 3 253 290 we propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure the theory is based on the idea that workers can bargain low effort high crew sizes etc if they and the firm have some monopoly power we provide simple theoretical expressions for the empirical measures of technical and allocative efficiency and compare them to those in the statistical literature we also consider the relation between competition and efficiency

product market competition and boundaries of the firm this paper studies the effects of product market competition on firm boundaries in a duopoly setting each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over a retail asset delegating property rights over the retail asset to an indepedent retailer disintegration transfers incentives from the manufacturer to the retailer and has the benefit of increasing product quality and profits owing to the retailer s superior efficiency however it also forces the manufacturer to forfeit part of the profits competition increases the net benefit from delegation and leads to more efficient vertically disintegrated structures cet article etudie la concurrence sur le marche des produits et ses effets sur les limites de l entreprise dans un modele de duopole chaque producteur associea un distributeur choisit soit une structure verticale integree dans laquelle le distributeur est son employe soit une structure desintegree dans laquelle le distributeur est independant plus efficace en termes d incitations au distributeur la structure desintegree genere des profits joints plus importants elle oblige cependant le producteur a partager les profits avec le distributeur la concurrence augmente le benefice et reduit le cout de la desintegration favorisant ainsi des structures verticales desintegrees et efficaces

critical mass effect and restructuring in the transition towards a market economy abstract restructuring firms in a transition economy produces a sort of network externality in that the profitability of restructuring depends on the number of firms that already adopted this strategy we investigate under what conditions a critical mass exists i e a situation in which such externality is positive and restructuring spurs imitation possibly leading to the eventual transformation of the whole economy we find a critical mass effect when the main effect of restructuring is an increase in value added i e aggregate demand rather than an increase in the firm s ability to compete against rival home firms the critical mass case becomes the typical one when competition spurs firms efficiency

the effects of competition on executive behavior economists presume that competition spurs a firm to be more efficient by forcing it to reduce its agency problems this article investigates this presumption it finds that the effects of competition on executive behavior can be decomposed into four effects each of which is of potentially ambiguous sign theory thus offers no definitive defense of this presumption this article also derives sets of conditions under which increased competition has the presumed effect of reducing agency problems in some sets important conditions are that increased competition reduce the executive s expected income and that agency goods e g shirking be normal goods for the executive the article shows that an increase in the shareholder bargaining strength can both reduce the agency problem and make it more sensitive to competition

vertical integration or separation of the sales function as implied by competitive forces abstract in the present paper we link the decisions concerning the sales strategies that are made by competing firms we demonstrate that when the demand schedules facing competing firms are moderately correlated asymmetric equilibria may arise where only one firm decides to establish its own sales force while its competitor sells its product through an independent sales agency when demand schedules are highly correlated however only symmetric equilibria can arise since firms derive greater benefits from imitating rather than contradicting their rivals choices we demonstrate that vertical separation of its sales function is more likely than vertical integration when firms produce products that are highly substitutable