neighborhood information exchange and voter participation an experimental study we study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters decisions we do so in a participation game in which we distinguish between early and late voters each late voter is told about one early voter s turnout decision cases are distinguished where the voters are allies support the same group or adversaries with opposing preferences and where they are uncertain about each other s preferences our experimental results show that the social embeddedness matters this information increases aggregate turnout by approximately 50 the largest effect is observed for allies early voters strategically try to use their first mover position and late voters respond to this

a class of tractable incomplete market models for studying asset returns and risk exposure abstract we present a class of tractable incomplete market models where agents face both aggregate risk and limited participation in financial markets tractability relies on the assumptions of small asset volumes and of a period utility function that is linear beyond a threshold in line with fishburn s 1977 contribution in decision theory we prove the existence of an equilibrium and derive theoretical results regarding asset prices and consumption choices this small trade model is able to reproduce a low safe return and a high equity premium together with a realistic representation of household exposure to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks

one two three infinity newspaper and lab beauty contest experiments beauty contest is a game in which participants have to choose typically a number in 0 100 the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers we describe and analyze beauty contest experiments run in newspapers in uk spain and germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them despite the uncontrollability of these experiments these results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried we claim that all observed behavior across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools can be interpretedas iterative reasoning level 1 reasoning level 2 reasoning and level 3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples while the equilibrium choice level maximum reasoning is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists the results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject pools and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines

toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation its many dimensions from the perspective of market economics this new thrust was consolidated in 1976 by s peltzman who developed a formal market model in which regulations were viewed as commodities brokered via political markets in response to bids and counter bids by those who stood to gain or to lose from specific regulation outcomes the subsequent contribution by becker 1983 added insights and institutional flesh to the stigler peltzman embryo confirming regulation as an integral component of mainstream market economics an important implication of such contributions especially those from the chicago perspective is that regulation for the most part confirms resource efficiency within market process that political markets in the absence of entry barriers are just as effective as are competitive commodity markets in achieving economic efficiency defined within a comparative institutions framework nowhere is this complacency more apparent than in the conclusion drawn by becker 1983 from a detailed formal analysis of competition among pressure groups for political influence

an expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty abstract in economies where agents bear some risk the analysis would often be facilitated by the assumption that the risks are i i d and disappear in the aggregate a formal appeal to the law of large numbers requires the consideration of a sequence of finite economies in an economy with a continuum of agents there are countable families of sets for which it is impossible for a law of large numbers to be valid with countably many agents and a finitely additive measure independence is compatible with the law of large numbers

costs of business cycles for unskilled workers abstract unskilled workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are skilled workers moreover unskilled workers earn less income which limits their ability to self insure we examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk and income across different skill groups translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles we find that the welfare cost of business cycles for unskilled workers is substantially higher than the welfare cost for skilled workers

public goods and minimum provision levels does the institutional formation affect cooperation we investigate experimentally the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding minimum contribution level to a public good groups either face the minimum level exogenously im

the changing technology of technological change general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour abstract in the past most innovations have resulted from empiricist procedures the outcome of each trial yielding knowledge that could not be readily extended to other contexts while trial and error may remain the primary engine of innovation developments in many scientific disciplines along with progress in computational capabilities and instrumentation are encouraging a new approach to industrial research instead of relying purely on trial and error the attempt is also to understand the principles governing the behaviour of objects and structures the result is that relevant information whatever its source can now be cast in frameworks and categories that are more universal the greater universality makes it possible for the innovation process to be organised in new ways firms can specialise and focus upon producing new knowledge and the locus of innovation may be spread across both users and producers more generally the use of general and abstract knowledge in innovation opens up the possibility for a division of labour in inventive activity the division of innovative labour the implications for public policy especially that on intellectual property rights are discussed

has consumption inequality mirrored income inequality we revisit to what extent the increase in income inequality since 1980 was mirrored by consumption inequality we do so by constructing an alternative measure of consumption expenditure using a demand system to correct for systematic measurement error in the consumer expenditure survey our estimation exploits the relative expenditure of high and low income households on luxuries versus necessities this double differencing corrects for measurement error that can vary over time by good and income we find consumption inequality tracked income inequality much more closely than estimated by direct responses on expenditures jel d31 d63 e21

precautionary saving over the business cycle we study the macroeconomic implications of time varying precautionary savings within a general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints aggregate shocks and uninsurable idiosyncratic unemployment risk our framework generates limited cross sectional household heterogeneity as an equilibrium outcome thereby making it possible to analyse the role of precautionary saving over the business cycle in an analytically tractable way the time series behaviour of aggregate consumption generated by our model is closer to the data than that implied by the hand to mouth and representative agent models and it is comparable to that produced by the krusell and smith 1998 model

asset prices in a huggett economy this paper explores asset pricing in economies where there is no direct insurance against idiosyncratic risks but other assets can be used for self insurance subject to exogenously imposed borrowing limits we analyze an endowment economy based on huggett 1993 11 both with and without aggregate risk our main innovation is that we obtain full analytical tractability by studying the case with maximally tight borrowing constraints we illustrate by looking at riskless bonds equity and the term structure of interest rates and we show that the model can reproduce many features of observed asset prices when idiosyncratic risks are quantitatively reasonable

social connectedness improves co ordination on individually costly efficient outcomes we study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asymmetric coordination games social ties are varied by making players interact with partners from different in groups fellow members of their own sports team members of their sports club students of their university subjective social ties are further measured by direct questionnaires we find that smaller and more salient in groups lead to significantly more group beneficial choices the same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social ties we discuss the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning

forward induction in the battle of the sexes games this paper provides experimental evidence on forward induction as a refinement criterion in the basic extensive form one of the two players chooses to play a battle of the sexes game or to receive a certain payoff according to forward induction choosing to play the game is a signal about intended action though the presence of the outside option changes play we find only limited support for the forward induction hypothesis the effects of the outside option also reflect the creation of a focal point through the asymmetry created by offering the outside option to one of the two players jel c72

voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice abstract the efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common interest issues critically depends on voter motivation i e on voters willingness to cast an informed vote if voters are motivated voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes we experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters information cost and the competence of the expert we find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects

volunteerism after the tsunami the effects of democratization using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in aceh indonesia for 2005 09 the paper examines the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami volunteer labor is the village public sector labor force for maintenance clean up and renovation of public capital while also examining the effects on volunteerism of village destruction and trauma pre existing social capital diversity and aid delivery the papers focuses on the effects of democratization the tsunami and massive international aid effort prompted the settlement of the insurgency movement in aceh which had led to suspension of local elections over the prior twenty or more years until 2006 village heads who call volunteer days were effectively selected by village elites who may highly value the public facilities maintained by volunteer labor with elections volunteer days fall under the new regime with democratically elected village heads calling fewer volunteer days which may appeal more to the typical villager identification comes from pseudo randomized differential timing of elections

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

selecting public goods institutions who likes to punish and reward we study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand and preferences over as well as behavior within various public goods institutions on the other hand we incentive compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions we find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment somewhat surprisingly preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics conversely individual characteristics including institutional preferences are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game for instance risk averse individuals preemptively punish more often this suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty although they may not affect the original selection into institutions

group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas a survey and meta analytic evidence abstract we survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games public goods games common pool resources and the prisoner s dilemma the 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms endogenous endogenous with the option to play the game and exogenous on cooperation rates our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free riders independently of the sorting mechanism we complement the survey with a meta analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting what is more we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups these observations are related as we show in the survey the success of a sorting method in matching like minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked

2002 lawrence r klein lecture liquidity and asset prices we broadly define liquid assets or monetary assets as any asset that can be readily sold in the market and can be held by a number of people in succession before maturity we ask in what environment is the circulation of liquid assets essential for the smooth running of the economy by developing a canonical model of a monetary economy i e where the circulation of liquid assets is essential we are able to examine the interaction between liquidity asset prices and aggregate economic activity

the paradox of voter participation a laboratory study it is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical observations about voter turnout we report the results of an experiment designed to test the voter turnout predictions of the rational choice palfrey rosenthal model of participation with asymmetric information we find that the three main comparative statics predictions are observed in the data the size effect whereby turnout goes down in larger electorates the competition effect whereby turnout is higher in elections that are expected to be close and the underdog effect whereby voters supporting the less popular alternative have higher turnout rates we also compare the quantitative magnitudes of turnout to the predictions of nash equilibrium we find that there is undervoting for small electorates and overvoting for large electorates relative to nash equilibrium these deviations from nash equilibrium are consistent with the logit version of quantal response equilibrium which provides a good fit to the data and can also account for significant voter turnout in very large elections

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

who bears aggregate fluctuations and how the consumption of high consumption households is more exposed to fluctuations in aggregate consumption and income than that of low consumption households in the consumer expenditure cex survey the exposure to aggregate consumption growth of households in the top 10 percent of the consumption distribution in the cex is about five times that of households in the bottom 80 percent given real aggregate per capita consumption growth about 3 percentage points less than its historical mean during the past year these figures predict that the ratio of consumption of the top 10 percent to the bottom 80 percent has fallen by about 15 percentage points relative to trend using income data from piketty and saez 2003 we show that the income especially the wage income of rich households is more exposed to aggregate fluctuations so their higher income exposure is a likely contributor to their higher consumption exposure finally we find a striking change in the exposure of the incomes of high income households prior to the early 1980 s the incomes of high income households were not more exposed to aggregate fluctuations thus while high income households currently bear an inordinately large share of aggregate fluctuations this is a recent occurrence this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the perils of democracy abstract in this work we examine a common social dilemma in experimental economics the public goods game to determine how voting impacts pro social behavior as noted in markussen et al 2014 a democratic dividend exists couching the public goods game in a phenomenon that is playing out in much of the world drastic income inequality we examine the decision of groups to share local public goods with groups that have effectively no endowment to contribute toward public nor private consumption our results show the perils of democracy in that subjects in the position to vote use their advantageous situation to reward the ingroups at the expense of the less endowed outgroup members

money liquidity and welfare abstract this paper develops an analytically tractable bewley model of money demand to shed light on some important questions in monetary theory such as the welfare cost of inflation it is shown that when money is a vital form of liquidity to meet uncertain consumption needs the welfare costs of inflation can be extremely large with log utility and parameter values that best match both the aggregate money demand curve suggested by lucas 2000 and the variance of household consumption agents in our model are willing to reduce consumption by 3 4 to avoid 10 annual inflation the astonishingly large welfare costs of inflation arise because inflation increases consumption risk by eroding the buffer stock insurance value of money thus hindering consumption smoothing at the household level such an inflation induced increase in consumption risk at the micro level cannot be captured by representative agent models or the bailey triangle although the development of financial intermediation can mitigate the problem with realistic credit limits the welfare loss of moderate inflation still remains several times larger than estimations based on the bailey triangle our findings provide a strong justification for adopting a low inflation target by central banks especially in developing countries where money is the major form of household financial wealth

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

banks as secret keepers banks are optimally opaque institutions they produce debt for use as a transaction medium bank money which requires that information about the backing assets loans not be revealed so that bank money does not fluctuate in value reducing the efficiency of trade this need for opacity conflicts with the production of information about investment projects needed for allocative efficiency intermediaries exist to hide such information so banks select portfolios of information insensitive assets for the economy as a whole firms endogenously separate into bank finance and capital market stock market finance depending on the cost of producing information about their projects

how does development assistance affect collective action capacity results from a field experiment in post conflict liberia social cooperation is critical to a wide variety of political and economic outcomes for this reason international donors have embraced interventions designed to strengthen the ability of communities to solve collective action problems especially in post conflict settings we exploit the random assignment of a development program in liberia to assess the effects of such interventions using a matching funds experiment we find evidence that these interventions can alter cooperation capacity however we observe effects only in communities in which by design both men and women faced the collective action challenge focusing on mechanisms we find evidence that program effects worked through improvements in mobilization capacity that may have enhanced communities ability to coordinate to solve mixed gender problems these gains did not operate in areas where only women took part in the matching funds experiment possibly because they could rely on traditional institutions unaffected by the external intervention the combined evidence suggests that the impact of donor interventions designed to enhance cooperation can depend critically on the kinds of social dilemmas that communities face and the flexibility they have in determining who should solve them

tipping versus cooperating to supply a public good in some important multiplayer situations such as efforts to supply a global public good players can choose the game they want to play in this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision by a group with fixed membership playing over a finite number of periods to choose between a tipping game in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute and a prisoners dilemma the classic cooperation game in the prisoners dilemma the first best outcome is attainable but cannot be sustained as a nash equilibrium in the tipping game only a second best outcome may be attainable but there exists a nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the prisoners dilemma we show that many groups persistently choose the prisoners dilemma despite its strategic disadvantage and that the groups that eventually choose the tipping game do better than the ones that stick with the prisoners dilemma

stationary ramsey equilibria under uncertainty abstract deterministic dynamic equilibrium models with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous agents exhibit stationary solutions where the most patient household owns the economy s capital stock an example shows that this result does not carry over to stationary stochastic environments we prove under some conditions the existence of a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in two related setups the first is the existence of a stationary nash equilibrium where each agent s payoff depends on his capital process and the capital processes of the remaining agents the second existence theorem applies to a stationary competitive equilibrium model journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e13 e21 d80

endogenous group formation in experimental contests abstract we experimentally study endogenous alliance formation and contest effort choices in a generic three player contest differences in intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to expend effort cause self selection weakly motivated players have an incentive to enter into an alliance and to free ride on strongly motivated players hence strong players prefer to stand alone self selection has direct consequences for effort in endogenously formed alliances but we also find evidence of an effort stimulating effect if players endogenously form an alliance which is in line with theories of in group favoritism the experimental evidence on self selection is in conformity with a theory analysis of the game

forward induction in coordination games abstract this paper provides experimental evidence on the power of forward induction arguments in a 2 2 coordination game allowing one player the option of obtaining a certain payoff instead of playing the game coordinates play in the direction predicted by the forward induction argument however two way pre play communication is a more effective coordination device

endogenous reputation formation under the shadow of the future recent research has shown that making people s decisions known to others may enhance cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner s dilemma games with random matching this paper experimentally studies whether people can cooperate with each other by endogenously showing their identities and building cooperative reputations when there is an option to hide the identities our experiment shows that a non negligible fraction of subjects choose to conceal their identities and accordingly subjects fail to cooperate with each other in communities if hiding is cost free however almost all subjects disclose their identities and successfully achieve cooperation if a cost is charged for the act of hiding this finding has a broad methodological implication for the study of reputation mechanisms when infinitely repeated games are used in an experiment as people s behavior may be determined by their ability to hide identities

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

reshaping institutions evidence on aid impacts using a pre analysis plan this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled reshaping institutions evidence on aid impacts using a pre analysis plan conducted between 2005 and 2009 in sierra leone the study observed the impact of pre analysis plan pap on local institutions by imposing participation requirements for marginalized groups including women and test for learning by doing effects in sierra leone on the individual and village level requiring women and young adults to take on leadership positions participate in project meetings and sign off on project finances does not have any persistent effect on their participation in local decision making or attitudes regarding leadership ability the project successfully established village organizations and tools to manage the project the distributions of the project s benefits were equitable and leakage was minimal there was a significant positive impact on the stock and quality of local public infrastructure however there are no detectible changes in the ability to raise funds for local public goods decision making process or social norms and attitudes funding for the study derived from the gobifo project the institutional reform and capacity building project ircbp the world bank development impact evaluation dime the horace w goldsmith foundation the international growth center 3ie and the national bureau of economic research nber african successes project

the demand for bad policy when voters underappreciate equilibrium effects most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians motives to supply bad policy but voters may themselves be partially responsible by demanding bad policy in this article we posit that voters may systematically err when assessing potential changes in policy by underappreciating how new policies lead to new equilibrium behaviour this biases voters towards policy changes that create direct benefits welfare would rise if behaviour were held constant even if those reforms ultimately reduce welfare because people adjust behaviour conversely voters are biased against policies that impose direct costs even if they induce larger indirect benefits using a lab experiment we find that a majority of subjects vote against policies that while inflicting direct costs would help them to overcome social dilemmas and thereby increase welfare subjects also support policies that while producing direct benefits create social dilemmas and ultimately hurt welfare both mistakes arise because subjects fail to fully anticipate the equilibrium effects of new policies more precisely we establish that subjects systematically underappreciate the extent to which policy changes will affect the behaviour of other people and that these mistaken beliefs exert a causal effect on the demand for bad policy

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

conventions and local interaction structures experimental evidence we present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff dominant and a risk dominant nash equilibrium we examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players strategy choices our three major observations are the following first local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods see also keser ehrhart and berninghaus economics letters 1998 second when players are allocated around a circle the neighborhood size has in the long run no effect on the players strategy choices third with the same neighborhood size players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium this is true although the players are given exactly the same instructions

collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy experimental evidence this paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring we find that subjects payoffs i decrease as noise increases and ii are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise but exceed it for high noise under the assumption that the subjects strategy uses thresholds on the public signal for transition between cooperation and punishment states we find that the best fitting strategy simply compares the most recent public signal against a single threshold

efficiency equity and timing of voting mechanisms we compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete in many political institutions ranging from small committees to mass elections voting is sequential which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters for a stylized model we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems which we test using controlled laboratory experiments most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games we find a tradeoff between information aggregation efficiency and equity in sequential voting a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs

burning money and pseudo first mover advantages an experimental study on forward induction abstract the mere potential for one player to burn money prior to play has been shown in theory to be an effective device to select this player s most preferred outcome e g in the battle of the sexes game j econ theory 48 1989 476 j econ theory 57 1992 36 in this study we assess the behavioral relevance of this theoretical claim it is shown that its validity depends on whether the game is played in extensive or normal form in extensive form games first movers benefit substantially from having the opportunity to burn money in advance the effect is much weaker in the normal form game however in two control treatments first movers who can select between two related games gain an advantage although standard forward induction arguments do not have any bite these results suggest that we need to make further theoretical advances to understand the role of physical timing and first mover advantages in games

portfolio inertia and stock market fluctuations this paper uses population wide data from the panel study of income dynamics and the survey of consumer finances to resolve the conflict between overtrading and inactivity shown in administrative data on brokerage and retirement accounts respectively considerable inertia is found and linked to characteristics e g limited education or resources but less to index movements the downswing has encouraged staying out rather than getting out of the market the small minority with brokerage accounts exhibits important differences in trading patterns relative to the population and invests small fractions of wealth in brokerage accounts results strengthen the case for default options in retirement accounts and built in trading provisions in mutual funds

forest biorefineries a business opportunity for the finnish forest cluster abstract bioenergy and biomass based products offer the greatest new opportunities for diversifying business in the forest cluster in particular biorefineries which can be integrated into the pulp and paper industry seem to have immense future potential this article aims to explore the biorefinery concept and related new products and business operations as well as new business strategies and company models which are part of the biorefinery value chain these factors which contribute to the establishment and success of forest biorefineries were examined using internet survey responses and compared between scandinavia north america and south america this article looks at the results of the survey primarily from the finnish perspective to help identify competitive advantages upon which successful business operations in the finnish forest cluster can be built according to the survey the outlooks for technical and raw material choices as well as barriers to biorefinery diffusion are very similar in all the studied areas biorefineries and related energy products are considered the way to sustainably guarantee the forest cluster s success an increase in the price of oil motivates the development of forest biorefineries and wood based biofuels however it is obvious that there is a need to revaluate from a fresh perspective the utilisation of wood and the wood refining chain in the forest cluster the survey respondents consider wood based biofuel and chemical production a serious business opportunity for the forest cluster in finland there is a strong confidence in the production of biofuels however all the countries included in the study trust in their own national strengths and in their chance to be a leading actor in the forest biorefinery business worldwide the forest biorefinery business seems to have market potential and global competition can thus be expected

thanks but no thanks a new policy to reduce land conflict abstract land conflicts in developing countries are costly both directly and through increased land degradation an important policy goal is to create respect for borders this often involves mandatory expensive interventions we propose a new policy design which in theory promotes neighborly relations at low cost a salient feature is the option to by pass regulation through consensus the key idea combines the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction as a first low cost pass at empirical evaluation we conduct an experiment among farmers in the ethiopian highlands a region exhibiting features typical of countries where borders are often disputed

read my lips but only if i was elected experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises shirking and trust abstract we experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office holders and increases citizens trust using a novel multi person investment game with voting we indeed find that elected office holders shirk less i e they back transfer more to citizens relative to investments than randomly appointed office holders surprisingly this effect is not driven by electoral competition inflating office holders promises instead elected office holders feel more committed to their promises than their randomly appointed counterparts elections initially also increase citizens trust because voters select candidates with the right kind of promises neither low nor non credibly high however over the course of the entire experiment we find no evidence that electoral competition increases citizens trust

an explanation of anomalous behavior in models of political participation this paper characterizes behavior with noisy decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions applications include voting participation games candidate entry the volunteer s dilemma and collective action problems with a contribution threshold a simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a quantal response equilibrium and the resulting predictions are compared with nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner

altruism the samaritan s dilemma and government transfer policy this paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor the framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk averse poor who face some possibility of loss the government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf with unconditional transfers the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss this reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects these may be avoided if the government makes in kind transfers of insurance copyright 1995 by american economic association

institutions and behavior experimental evidence on the effects of democracy a novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed in contrast to the previous literature our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects e g those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions

equilibrium in a production economy with an income tax this paper develops a method to study an infinite horizon production economy distorted by a state dependent income tax this setting permits taxes to depend on the capital stock an endogenous state variable and thus captures situations where the evolution for capital and taxes is jointly determined to solve this model the consumption function is represented as a fixed point of a nonlinear monotone operator that is defined such that its nth iteration computes the consumption function n steps away from the horizon for a corresponding finite horizon economy the oparator s monotonicity is exploited in proving the existence of and constructing an equilibrium copyright 1991 by the econometric society

property rights and choice the case of the fishery formal property rights are typically established after considerable waste has occurred despite the effectiveness of such schemes in addressing the inefficiencies of common pool resources adoption can be contentious because of the assignment of wealth and political influence that accompany the transition to exclusive property rights this paper studies how the early involvement of harvesters in policy implementation designed to address the commons inefficiency may foster perceived legitimacy and lessen political opposition to the establishment of individual property rights we demonstrate that it is optimal for a manager facing industry strife and reform delay to allow firms to self select into the property rights regime the strategic interaction of harvesters leads to an equilibrium characterized by the global adoption of property rights thus by providing harvesters with a choice between management systems policy makers can reduce the transaction costs associated with the need to create political consensus while ensuring an outcome similar to the top down implementation of market based management evidence is provided from a recent policy change in maryland fisheries in which the provision of a choice resulted in the overwhelming adoption of individual transferable quotas and the end of the race to fish

explaining variation in broker strategies a lab in the field experiment in senegal the implications of clientelism for democratic accountability are mixed brokers not only help coordinate votes for collective gain but also exploit their position to advance personal interest i argue that brokers use distinct strategies persuasion reciprocation and punishment to motivate voters as a function of their local institutional context competitively selected brokers whose preferences are aligned with those of followers can rely more on persuasion than instrumental inducements economically autonomous brokers are more likely to rely on sanctions than reciprocity evidence to support both the proposed typology of broker strategies and their determinants is collected in senegal a clientelistic democracy where group level heterogeneity generates natural variation in broker types a coordination game played with real brokers illustrates that participants are less likely to sacrifice personal gain when brokers are competitively selected more likely when they most fear retribution qualitative da

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

asset pricing with limited risk sharing and heterogeneous agents we develop a model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents that generates a large equity premium while simultaneously matching stock market participation and individual asset holdings the high risk premium is driven by incomplete risk sharing among stockholders which results from the combination of aggregate uncertainty borrowing constraints and a realistically calibrated life cycle earnings profile subject to idiosyncratic shocks we show that it is challenging to simultaneously match asset pricing moments and individual portfolio decisions while limited participation has a negligible impact on the risk premium contrary to the results of models where it is imposed exogenously

incomplete markets liquidation risk and the term structure of interest rates we analyse the term structure of interest rates in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets borrowing constraint and positive net supply of government bonds uninsured idiosyncratic shocks generate bond trades while aggregate shocks cause uctuations in the trading price of bonds long bonds command a liquidation risk premium over short bonds because they may have to be liquidated before maturity following a bad idiosyncratic shock precisely when their resale value is low due to the simultaneous occurrence of a bad aggregate shock our framework endogenously generates limited cross sectional wealth heterogeneity among the agents despite the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic shocks which allows us to characterise analytically the shape of the entire yield curve including the yields on bonds of arbitrarily long maturities agents desire to hedge the idiosyncratic risk together with their fear of having to liquidate long bonds at unfavourable terms imply that a greater bond supply raises the level of the yield curve while an increase in the relative supply of long bonds raises its slope

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination we examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker productivity assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as effective as imposing the same contract exogenously this positive effect is largely offset by a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay we decompose the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to selection and strategic anticipation and find that selection has a greater effect than strategic anticipation we use a reverse sort treatment to show that the effect of selection is sufficiently strong to overcome the direct effect of lower performance pay yielding coordination at high effort levels in spite of low incentives

competition cooperation and collective choice the ability of groups to implement efficiency enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics this study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice if the majority decide competition is almost always adopted if likely losers from competition have veto power it is often not and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone

equality under threat by the talented evidence from worker managed firms does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality are high ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes the article revisits this long standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker managed firms the analysis is based on novel administrative data sources which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers ability type the article s key findings are that worker managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms and high ability members are more likely than other members to exit

rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma experimental evidence this paper presents experiments designed to examine the sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma the authors test the hypothesis by controlling the subjects ability to build reputations and by manipulating their beliefs that their opponent is irrational or altruistic the responses of subjects strongly support the sequential equilibrium prediction the results also suggest an important role for homemade altruism that is a natural tendency to cooperate that subjects bring to the experiment from the outside the authors find that there may be no difference between the beliefs that an opponent is altruistic and the actual chance it is so copyright 1993 by royal economic society

endogenous outside options in coordination games experimental evidence abstract in this experiment traders choose between an outside option offered by an intermediary and playing a coordination game with each other the intermediary is either a broker or a dealer we find that intermediaries manage to attract traders even to offer levels lower than the payoff that traders could have obtained had they rejected the intermediary s offer for any given offer traders are more likely to accept a dealer s offer than a broker s offer the introduction of either intermediary type reduces average trader s earnings on the other hand intermediaries have a coordination role as predicted by the forward induction argument when traders reject the intermediary s offer and play the coordination sub game they achieve a significantly greater level of coordination

public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes abstract the burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions we let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free rider problem depending on parameter settings most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes we find that cooperative orientation political attitude gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting

firm organization industrial structure and technological innovation abstract the formal and informal structures of firms and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation this paper explores the properties of different types of firms with respect to the generation of new technology various archetypes are recognized and an effort is made to match organization structure to the type of innovation the framework is relevant to technology and competition policy as it broadens the framework economists use to identify environments that assist innovation

costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination abstract this paper investigates the coordination failure that arises from combining two small pre existing groups and focuses on the reaction of group members to this change in environment in an experiment small groups were first able to establish a coordination history in a repeated minimum effort game in the second phase two groups with different histories were combined into a larger group unlike most of the previous literature subjects could endogenously choose to communicate in the newly formed group for a small fee while communication proved to be necessary for preventing coordination failure in the newly formed group only every second subject was willing to implement communication particularly subjects from groups with a less efficient coordination experience in the first phase were more likely to realize the potential of coordination failure in the new group and were thus more likely to decide for communication the results may be useful for understanding how groups coordinate in changing environments as they are common in economic contexts

co managing common pool resources do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms abstract we examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common pool resources in particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depend on the prevailing local norms and ecological values held by resource users for this purpose we employ a framed field experiment that is based on a rangeland model for semi arid regions and carried out with communal farmers in namibia and south africa participants could vote for three best practice management rules found in many places around the world that are discussed for implementation in the study area temporary private property rights rotational grazing or limitation of livestock numbers all rules were designed in a way that facilitated cooperation or coordination of actions the focus of this study lies on the interactions between these rules and prevalent ecological norms exhibited in the rounds prior to rule implementation in contrast to previous lab experimental studies we find that democratic voting of rules is not sufficient for high rule compliance and an overall enhancement in cooperation rules turned out to be inefficient if they were in conflict with the prevalent ecological norm

the risk free rate in heterogeneous agent incomplete insurance economies abstract why has the average real risk free interest rate been less than one percent the question is motivated by the failure of a class of calibrated representative agent economies to explain the average return to equity and risk free debt i construct an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and smooth consumption by holding a risk free asset i calibrate the economy and characterize equilibria computationally with a borrowing constraint of one year s income the resulting risk free rate is more than one percent below the rate in the comparable representative agent economy

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

what price coordination the efficiency enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play a model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group subjects bid the market clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria the efficiency enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements the model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection copyright 1998 by american economic association

information cascades replication and an extension to majority rule and conformity rewarding institutions in a randomly determined order each agent was given an independent private signal about which of two states was selected by a random draw after receiving the private signal each agent made a publicly announced decision about the state thus at the time of personal decision each agent had a private signal and also knew the decisions of all preceding agents the experiments focused on three different types of organization 1 agents were rewarded according to whether their announced decision was right or wrong this individualistic institution is the one studied by anderson and holt aer 1997 their discovery of information cascades is replicated 2 agents were rewarded according to whether a majority of announced decisions were right or wrong under this majority rule institution the instance of information cascades is sharply reduced 3 agents are rewarded more according to whether their personal announced decision was the same as the majority decision than they were rewarded if their decision was correct this conformity rewarding institution is motivated by proceedings in which there is incentive to produce reports that conform to the reports of others substantial information cascades are observed

commercial development of energy environmentally sound technologies for the auto industry the case of fuel cells abstract the economic importance of energy and environmental issues is continuously increasing affecting both process and product design in business the energy crisis in california in 2001 made this basic issue universal new technologies are expected to reduce pollution derived both from production processes and products with costs that are still unknown and in competition with more mature technologies high nevertheless until now there is still little but growing knowledge concerning the process of technological innovation in the fields of energy and environment in this paper we analyze the development of zinc air fuel cell zafc and its transfer from a research laboratory to potential mass production zafc are a new environmentally sound technology proven to have commercial value that can be used for substituting internal combustion engines ices and meeting zero emission vehicles zev regulations although zafc performances are higher than traditional electric batteries ones commercial costs are still high hence the pathway to mass production may come from stationary application of fuel cells for power in contrast to the conventional paradigmatic approach we argue that the existing economic and organizational literature concerning technological innovation is not able to fully explain steps followed in commercializing energy environmentally sound technologies existing models mainly consider adopting problems which are due to market uncertainty weak application lack of a dominant design and problems in reconfiguring existing organizational routines above all market power exists in terms of control over technological innovation and its commercial application barriers are erected that prevent new technologies such as fuel cells from becoming adapted through pro active government intervention such as the case in california new advanced technologies can move rapidly into the marketplace from this discussion we draw some conclusions and issues for further research concerning policy making for sustaining the process of technological transfer and firms strategies in technological innovation

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

limitations of dominance and forward induction experimental evidence abstract forward induction implied that forgoing a sure outside option can alter after subsequent beliefs and behavior our laboratory results do not support forward induction except in a very simple game where it is equivalent to the elimination of dominated strategies

internal conflict market uniformity and transparency in price competition between teams abstract the way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict we experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams affects teams ability to compete vis a vis each other and consequently market outcomes participants took part in a repeated bertrand duopoly game between three player teams which had either the same or different levels of internal conflict uniform vs mixed profit division was either private pay high conflict each member received her own asking price or equal pay low conflict profits were divided equally we find that internal conflict leads to tacit coordination on high prices in uniform private pay duopolies but places private pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets but intensified in mixed markets we propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers d43 l22 c92

toward prospective voluntary agreements reflections from a hydrogen foresight project abstract there is substantial interest in promoting the emergence of a hydrogen based energy economy if successful this would represent a policy led discontinuous transition away from existing fossil fuel based systems such a move has few precedents and few policy tools exist to manage such a complex and uncertain endeavour furthermore existing hydrocarbon energy systems can be considered techno institutional complexes tic which have developed through the path dependent co evolution of physical technologies and social institutions these complexes have numerous structures that ensure their perpetuation and create important barriers to the implementation of alternatives like hydrogen based systems the authors explore the application of prospective voluntary agreements pva as a policy tool process that can help facilitate a move towards a hydrogen based economy through foresight and negotiation from this perspective we look at the recent case of the nordic hydrogen energy foresight project for evidence

recursive equilibria in an aiyagari style economy with permanent income shocks in this paper we prove the existence of a recursive competitive equilibrium rce for an aiyagari style economy with permanent income shocks and perpetual youth structure we show that there exist equilibria where borrowing constraints are never binding this allows us to establish a non trivial lower bound on the equilibrium interest rate to solve the individual s problem we present a new approach that uses lattices of consumption functions to deal with the non compact state space and the unbounded utility function the approach uses only the first order conditions of the problem euler equations the proof is constructive and it serves as a theoretical foundation for the convergence of a policy function iteration procedure