regret and feedback information in first price sealed bid auctions we investigate the effect of regret related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions two types of regret are possible in this auction format a winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid and a loser may regret missing an opportunity to win at a favorable price in theory under very general conditions being sensitive to winning and paying too much should result in lower average bids and being sensitive to missing opportunities to win at a favorable price should result in higher bids for example the u s government s policy of revealing losing bids may cause regret sensitive bidders to anticipate regret and bid conservatively decreasing the government s revenue we test these predictions in the laboratory and find strong support for both

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

secret versus public reserve price in an outcry english procurement auction experimental results abstract in a set of human experiments we analyze the impact of the buyer s reserve price policy in an online open outcry reverse auction we measure the impact of revealing or not the reserve price on the buyer s expected cost when suppliers may be risk averse results confirm that the optimal public reserve price policy dominates for the buyer when the lowest cost supplier is weakly risk averse but in contrast with theory the secret reserve price policy does not dominate when he becomes very risk averse analysis of strategic suppliers bidding behavior shows in conformity with theory that they react to the secret reserve price and are more aggressive when they are more risk averse this explains why the optimal public reserve price does not perform better in this context but is equivalent to the secret one however strongly risk averse bidders are less aggressive than predicted by theory that is why the secret reserve price policy does not strictly dominate

real rigidities and the non neutrality of money rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks and by themselves small frictions in nominal adjustment such as costs of changing prices create only small non neutralities but this paper shows that substantial nominal rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions the paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for two specific sources of real rigidity one arising from goods market imperfections and the other from labour market imperfections

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

effects of household shocks on risk preferences and loss aversion evidence from upland smallholders of south east asia avoiding risk in financial decisions is credited to be a key contributor to persistent poverty and poverty traps in spite of this the methods used to measure behaviour under risk rarely reflect a

risk averters that love risk marginal risk aversion in comparison to a reference gamble we propose an analytical distinction between standard risk aversion based on the valuation of a single gamble and marginal risk aversion based on the change in valuation between two gambles we measure marginal risk aversion in two dimensions mean and variance data from a field experiment is used to study marginal risk aversion our results suggest that individuals rely on a reference gamble when assessing marginal risk individual responses to marginal changes in mean and variance are nearly identical in direction and magnitude suggesting that information on both standard and marginal risk aversion is needed to accurately model behavior copyright 2008 oxford university press

linking risk aversion time preference and fertilizer use in burkina faso this paper investigates whether burkinabe maize farmers fertilizer use decisionsare correlated with their risk and time preferences we conducted a survey and a se ries of hypothetical experiments on a sample of 1 500 farmers we find that morepatient farmers do use more fertilizer but it is only because they plant more maize afertilizer intensive crop rather than because they use more fertilizer per hectare ofmaize planted conversely we find no statistically significant link between risk aver sion and fertilizer use we use a simple two period model which suggests that riskaversion may indeed have an ambiguous effect on fertilizer use

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

the impact of agricultural biotechnology on yields risks and biodiversity in low income countries abstract this paper shows that the current generation of transgenic crop varieties has significant potential to improve economic welfare in low income countries these varieties might increase crop yields in low income countries in cases when pesticides have not been used they will reduce negative health effects of chemicals when they replace them with low transaction costs appropriate infrastructure and access to intellectual property multiple varieties of transgenics will be introduced the gain from transgenics will be reduced and crop biodiversity may be lost when only a small set of varieties is transgenetically modified the adoption of transgenics will also be affected by risk and credit considerations

risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers in china abstract despite that insect resistant bt cotton has been lauded for its ability to reduce the use of pesticides studies have shown that chinese bt cotton farmers continue to use excessive amounts of pesticides using results from a survey and an artefactual field experiment we find that farmers who are more risk averse use greater quantities of pesticides we also find that farmers who are more loss averse use lesser quantities of pesticides this result is consistent with our conceptual framework and suggestive evidence where farmers behave in a loss averse manner in the health domain and place more weight on the importance of health over money in the loss domain

consistency of risk preference measures an artefactual field experiment from rural china a variety of measures have been developed to elicit individual risk preferences how these measures perform in the field in particular in developing countries with non student subjects is still a

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

information disclosure in auctions an experiment we report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first price sealed bid auctions interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching protocol and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period when bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods prices are higher than the theoretical prediction however when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction we suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

does feedback really matter in one shot first price auctions does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one shot environments we revisit this question in first price auction markets we consider three feedback types minimal only knowing whether winning or not loser also knowing the winning bid and winner knowing the second highest bid if winning filiz ozbay and ozbay 2007 find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids we use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs using a sample of 624 subjects we find that bidders ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid value ratios

simultaneous estimation of risk and time preferences among small scale cattle farmers in west africa this article reports results from economic field experiments with cattle dependent small scale farmers in west africa we simultaneously estimate both risk and time preferences and examine how demographic and socio economic characteristics are correlated with each preference the empirical basis for our analysis is a panel data survey of 211 households conducted in mali and burkina faso in 2007 and 2011 and economic experiments conducted with the heads of these households in 2011 the theoretical basis for our analysis is a discounted utility model we apply prospect theory and quasi hyperbolic discounting to estimate the present values of future utility streams we apply a maximum likelihood approach to jointly estimate risk and time preferences and to investigate the correlations among the preference parameters and observable characteristics we find that on average the west african cattle farmer is generally more risk averse and more patient than similarly situated respondents from asia additionally risk and time preferences are correlated with wealth education and religion we find that constraints in wealth and education are associated with greater risk aversion and impatience furthermore time spent in a koranic school is positively related to the overweighting of small probabilities greater risk taking behavior and patience

the econometrics of damage control why specification matters the contribution of damage control agents to production differs fundamentally from that of standard inputs lands labor capital this paper develops an econometric model based on the key characteristics of damage control agents and examines its properties it demonstrates that standard production function specifications overestimate damage control agent productivity and have erroneous implications for the evolution of damage control agent productivity and use in response to changing environments e g the spread of pest resistance it also proposes several alternative specifications and discusses methods for estimating them

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

revisiting the home bias puzzle downside equity risk deviations from normality in financial return series have led to the development of alternative portfolio selection models one such model is the downside risk model whereby the investor maximizes his return given a downside risk constraint in this paper we empirically observe the international equity allocation for the downside risk investor using nine international markets returns over the last 34 years the results hold for both daily and monthly data and also from an international perspective due to greater downside risk investors may think globally but instead act locally the model s results therefore provide an alternative view of the home bias puzzle

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

an endowment effect for risk experimental tests of stochastic reference points recent models of reference dependent preferences indicate that expectations may play a prominent role in the presence of behavioral anomalies a subset of such expectations based models predicts an endowment effect for risk that risk attitudes differ when reference points change from certain to stochastic in two purposefully simple risk preference experiments eliminating often discussed confounds i demonstrate both between and within subjects such an endowment effect for risk these results provide needed separation between expectations based reference dependent models allow for evaluation of recent theoretical extensions and may help to close a long standing debate in decision science on inconsistency between utility elicitation methodologies

optimal inattentive length in macroeconomic models abstract this paper proposes an approximate solution of firm s optimal inattentive length in a standard macroeconomic model the approximate solution conceptually fits a sticky information model better and predicts empirically more plausible inattentive length than the one proposed by reis reis r 2006 inattentive producers review of economic studies 73 793 821

pricing substitutable products under consumer regrets abstract since many firms provide consumers with substitutable products which may be launched sequentially over several periods strategic consumers need to make their purchase or wait decisions at the beginning of the first period however they may face second period valuation uncertainty when such decisions are made and decisions made under uncertainty may lead to regrets ex post lots of empirical studies show that consumers anticipate these regrets and take anticipated regrets into consideration this paper studies the impact of valuation uncertainty and consumer anticipated regrets on consumer purchasing behavior firm s prices and pricing strategy we consider a firm selling two substitutable products over two periods one product for one period in a selling season the firm announces all its prices at the beginning of the selling season price commitment or announces each price at the beginning of each period dynamic pricing besides a consumer may experience purchase regret from missing a better choice if she chooses to buy in the first period and otherwise wait regret if she chooses to wait consumers make decisions based on the firm s prices and strategies and the anticipated regrets we find that a firm may need to set a lower price in the first period even when the average valuation in this period is higher second with price commitment the impact of each type of regret on the optimal second period price can be opposite and depends on the value of the uncertainty and regret parameters finally we show that price commitment dominates dynamic pricing and the value of price commitment depends on the uncertainty and anticipated regret

expectations as endowments evidence on reference dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experiments while evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to reference points little is known about what determines them we conduct two experiments that show that reference points are determined at least in part by expectations in an exchange experiment we endow subjects with an item and randomize the probability they will be allowed to trade subjects that are less likely to be able to trade are more likely to choose to keep their item in a valuation experiment we randomly assign subjects a high or low probability of obtaining an item and elicit their willingness to accept for it the high probability treatment increases valuation of the item by 20 30 copyright 2011 oxford university press

consumer rationality and the status quo received microeconomic theory presumes rational consumers maximize utility over all commodity bundles recent analysis however suggests that a consumer s status quo may limit economic rationality bias consumer decisions and induce serious errors in survey based valuations of public and private goods using regression and choice theoretic frameworks we investigate the existence of status quo effects in the consumer valuation of a particular unpriced product the reliability of residential electrical service such valuations have become important in electric utility resource planning and rate making we find substantial status quo effects which must be addressed in welfare comparisons regarding electric service reliability

learning by doing and learning from others human capital and technical change in agriculture household level panel data from a nationally representative sample of rural indian households describing the adoption and profitability of high yielding seed varieties hyvs associated with the green revolution are used to test the implications of a model incorporating learning by doing and learning spillovers the estimates indicate that i imperfect knowledge about the management of the new seeds was a significant barrier to adoption ii this barrier diminished as farmer experience with the new technologies increased iii own experience and neighbors experience with hyvs significantly increased hyv profitability and iv farmers do not fully incorporate the village returns to learning in making adoption decisions

the effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions while most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that each bidder s utility for an outcome depends only on his own profit we allow the utility to also depend on any regret that a bidder suffers after the fact and characterize when and how this affects bidding specifically a winner might regret money left on the table in federal offshore oil lease sales while a loser might regret seeing an object sell for less than his own value for it we show that for risk neutral bidders who after the fact know the winner s price for the object a bidder s optimal bidding strategy will not depend on the relative weight given to profit versus regret if both forms of regret weigh equally heavily however if bidders weight money left on the table regret more heavily then the bid taker suffers likewise if losers do not learn the winner s price then the bid taker also suffers thus the existing models exclusion of regret from risk neutral bidders utility functions affects the applicability of the

the impact of violence on individual risk preferences evidence from a natural experiment this study estimates the impact of kenya s post election violence on individual risk preferences because the crisis interrupted a longitudinal survey of more than five thousand kenyan youth this timing creates plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to civil conflict by the time of the survey the study measures individual risk preferences using hypothetical lottery choice questions which are validated by showing that they predict migration and entrepreneurship in the cross section the results indicate that the post election violence sharply increased individual risk aversion immediately after the crisis the fraction of subjects who are classified as either risk neutral or risk loving dropped by roughly 26 percent the findings remain robust to an iv estimation strategy that exploits random assignment of respondents to waves of surveying

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

anticipated loser regret in third price auctions abstract losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret in third price auctions if bidders anticipate loser regret then in line with the experimental findings in a symmetric equilibrium the bids are more than the risk neutral nash equilibrium

reference dependent subjective expected utility abstract a reference dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented in this theory preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points which may be uncertain acts it is characterised by a set of axioms in a savage style framework a restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states encoded in a satisfaction function from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction given weak additional assumptions the restricted theory excludes cycles of choice explains observed disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept valuations of lotteries and predicts preference reversal

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

information feedback in first price auctions i apply the notion of a self confirming equilibrium sce to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders perceptions about their strategic environment and consequently their bidding behavior in a private values setting revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs justifying the assumption of nash equilibrium in contrast in every symmetric sce of a symmetric affiliated private values model bidding strategies and revenue are weakly higher if only the highest bid is revealed i also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

portfolio choice and trading in a large 401 k plan we study nearly 7 000 retirement accounts during the april 1994 august 1998 period several interesting patterns emerge most asset allocations are extreme either 100 percent or zero percent in equities and there is inertia in asset allocations equity allocations are higher for males married investors and for investors with higher earnings and more seniority on the job equity allocations are lower for older investors there is very limited portfolio reshuffling in sharp contrast to discount brokerage accounts daily changes in equity allocations correlate only weakly with same day equity returns and do not correlate with future equity returns

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions comment glenn harrison s recent 1989 article in this review has provoked the loudest debate yet heard among experimental economists his critique of the james cox vernon smith and james walker 1983a b 1985a b 1988 henceforth csw laboratory studies of first price sealed bid auctions with independent and private values in my view raises a fundamental methodological issue that is well worth debating and the csw research program deserves further discussion in this short comment i confine myself to what i see as the most important issues and do not try to address all evidence relevant to the ongoing debate first i summarize harrison s central argument very briefly after pointing out two shortcomings in harrison s specific analysis of csw i propose a methodological reconciliation finally and with some trepidation since my own experience with the auction data is relatively slight i suggest an alternative approach to understanding the anomalies discovered by csw

rationality of choices in subsidized crop insurance markets the u s crop insurance market has several features that set it apart from other insurance markets these include explicit government subsidies with an average premium subsidy rate of about 60 in recent years and the legislative requirement that premium rates be set at actuarially fair levels where the federal government sets rates and pays all costs related to insurance policy sales and services bearing these features in mind we examine the extent to which farmers crop insurance choices conform to economic theory a standard expected utility maximization framework is constructed to analyze trade offs between higher risk protection and larger subsidy payments we decompose the effect of coverage level on expected utility into insurance premium loading and subsidy transfer effects where the loading effect vanishes if rates are actuarially fair given an actuarially fair premium we infer that a rational farmer should choose either the coverage level with the highest premium subsidy or a higher coverage level evidence from a large insurance unit level dataset contradicts this theoretical inference and so suggests anomalous insurance decisions in a novel application of the mixed logit framework we show that the probability an insurance product is chosen declines as out of pocket premium expenditures increase even though higher values of these expenditures should reflect improved grower welfare premium expenditures appear to be more salient than the uncertain future benefits they support we apply our regression to the recent trend yield adjustment innovation in crop insurance

robust monopoly pricing we consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information in the robust version the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution we characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors i maximin utility and ii minimax regret the equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty the concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

the role of risk and transaction costs in contract design evidence from farmland lease contracts in u s agriculture the objective of this article is to provide new empirical evidence on landlord tenant choices of share versus cash rent contracts in u s agriculture the focus is on the contribution of explanatory variables that represent transaction costs risk sharing incentives or both an empirical model of contract choice is tested against the 1999 agricultural economics and land ownership survey aelos and finds mixed evidence for low transaction cost and risk sharing incentive motives for landlord tenant choices of a share versus cash rent contract however the behavior of landlords and tenants is consistent with them being risk averse although it is standard to control for the riskiness of the principal s task that is contracted we find that other attributes of the landlord are an important part of a relatively complex story for u s land tenancy contacting the latter results have generally been ignored in other published landlord tenant contracting studies

regret theory a bold alternative to the alternatives in their famous 1982 paper in this journal loomes and sugden introduced regret theory now more than 30 years later the case for the historical importance of this contribution can be made

estimation of multicrop production functions this paper considers whether separability or nonjointness is the better approach for attaining tractability for multicrop production function estimation characteristics of agricultural production associated with allocated inputs physical constraints and output determination imply sufficient nonjointness for estimation whereas separability is less plausible the paper also addresses estimation of production functions with allocated inputs where allocations are not observed and demonstrates a proposed approach by way of example

investment dynamics with information costs investment in physical capital at the micro level is infrequent and large or lumpy the most common explanation for this is that firms face non convex physical adjustment costs the model developed in this paper shows that information costs make investment lumpy at the micro level even in the absence of non convex adjustment costs when collecting and processing information is costly the firm optimally chooses to do it sporadically and to be inactive most of the time this behavior results in infrequent and possibly large capital adjustments the model fits plant level investment rate moments well and it also matches some higher order moments of aggregate investment rates keywords investment dynamics information costs inattentiveness lumpy investment jel classification d21 d83 d92 e22

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

impact of bt cotton in china abstract a sample of 283 cotton farmers in northern china was surveyed in december 1999 farmers that used cotton engineered to produce the bacillus thuringiensis bt toxin substantially reduced the use of pesticide without reducing the output ha or quality of cotton this resulted in substantial economic benefits for small farmers consumers did not benefit directly farmers obtained the major share of benefits and because of weak intellectual property rights very little went back to government research institutes or foreign firms that developed these varieties farmers using bt cotton reported fewer pesticide poisonings than those using conventional cotton

the rich domain of uncertainty source functions and their experimental implementation we often deal with uncertain events for which no probabilities are known several normative models have been proposed descriptive studies have usually been qualitative or they estimated ambiguity aversion through one single number this paper introduces the source method a tractable method for quantitatively analyzing uncertainty empirically the theoretical key is the distinction between different sources of uncertainty within which subjective choice based probabilities can still be defined source functions convert those subjective probabilities into willingness to bet we apply our method in an experiment where we do not commit to particular ambiguity attitudes but let the data speak

theory and misbehavior in first price auctions comment in his recent paper in this review glenn harrison 1989 argues that the conclusions of james cox et al 1982 1983 1985 1988 in their studies of first price private value auctions are not well supported because of shortcomings in the way their experimental investigations were designed analyzed and reported harrison argues that the expected cost of deviations from risk neutral nash equilibrium rnne bidding in these auctions was quite small less than 0 05 at the median so that in terms of expected monetary payoffs payoff space many subjects had little to lose from deviating from the rnne strategy harrison suggests that the significance of the differences cox vernon smith and james walker hereafter csw report between subjects bids and the rnne bids deviations in the message space may therefore need to be reexamined in discussing harrison versus csw we have three primary points to make first in arguing that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space harrison 1989 p 749 we think harrison has overstated his case however we agree with his more important point that looking at the cost of deviations is a useful diagnostic tool for determining when experimenters are likely to have lost control over subjects incentives further as we will show in section i this part of harrison s critique applies with special force to csw s studies of bidding second a broader examination of the results of private value auction experiments indicates that risk aversion cannot be the only factor and may well not be the most important factor behind bidding above the rnne found so often in first price privatevalue auctions the most telling evidence here is bidding above the dominant bid price found in second price auctions kagel et al 1987 kagel and levin 1990 and the risk loving found under several treatment conditions in csw s 1984 own multipleunit discriminative auctions auctions in which the high bidders pay their bid price these and other data inconsistent with risk averse bidding are largely ignored in csw 1988 but are nevertheless relevant to the substantive issue of risk aversion in private value auctions they are discussed in section ii third there are data gathered in other investigations which provide strong support for the view that the deviations from rnne bidding reported in first price auctions are not the results of the low expected cost of such deviations however these data unlike the higher stakes payoff data that csw offer in response to harrison are not consistent with csw s subsidiary conclusions that the data can be well accounted for by a narrow class of risk aversion parameters for the bidders together with the assumption that all agents are playing a nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information a key difference between these experiments and csw s is that if subjects do not respond to csw s treatment condition increasing the payoffs from experimental to u s dollars their behavior will be consistent with csw s theory in contrast department of economics university of pittsburgh pittsburgh pa 15260 we thank jack ochs and emilie roth for thoughtful discussions on earlier drafts of the paper jim cox and glenn harrison for helpful comments on the initial draft of the paper susan garvin for research assistance and ray battalio carl kogut and don meyer for providing us with access to their data research support was provided by the information science and technology and economics divisions of the national science foundation the alfred p sloan foundation and the russell sage foundation the usual caveat applies with special force iwe do not respond to specific comments that csw 1992 make in response to our comment as in order to avoid indefinite regress the ground rules for this debate required us to comment on csw s criticism of harrison after which they would be given the opportunity to respond to our comment

on the mis use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion tests of risk sharing in the contracting literature often rely on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion the intuition behind these tests is that since contract choice is monotonic in the coefficients of risk aversion which are themselves assumed monotonic in wealth the effect of a change in wealth on contract choice is clearly identified we show that tests of risk sharing relying on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion are identified only insofar as the econometrician is willing to assume that a the principal is risk neutral or her preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion cara and b the agent is risk neutral

does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making an experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness previous research has shown that individual decision making is often characterized by inertia that is a tendency for decision makers to choose options that maintain the status quo in this study i conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments i regret aversion and ii ambiguity driven indecisiveness i use a between subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior in each condition participants choose between two simple real gambles one of which is the status quo option the findings indicate that regret aversion and ambiguity driven indecisiveness are equally important determinants of inertia which in turn plays a major role in individual decision making

household portfolio diversification a case for rank dependent preferences the proliferation of novel preference theories in financial economics is hampered by a lack of non experimental evidence and by the theories additional complexity which has not been shown to be critical in applications in this article i present arguments in support of preferences with rank dependency using the survey of consumer finances data i document two widespread patterns inconsistent with expected utility i many households simultaneously invest in well deversified funds and in poorly diversified portfolios of stocks and ii some households with substantial savings do not invest anything in equities i show that portfolio choice models with rank dependent preferences plausibly parameterized and under fully rational assumptions are quantitatively consistent with the observed diversification these results call for further efforts to integrate the models of rank dependent preferences in portfolio theory and asset pricing the decision theoretic literature has long acknowledged the shortcomings of the expected utility theory of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 several generalizations of the theory are inspired by the experimental evidence and aimed at improving its descriptive accuracy however there are few applications of new models of preferences in finance and expected utility continues to dominate the field 1 two principal hurdles slow the proliferation of novel preferences in financial economics first the lack of empirical non experimental or field data confirming that the behavior motivating non expected utilities is widespread outside the laboratory settings second the additional and often significant complexity of the alternative preferences which has not been shown to be critical in applications where the models based on expected utility fall short of reasonable predictions this article presents empirical and theoretical this paper was previously circulated under the title household portfolio diversification the paper has benefited from the comments of shlomo benartzi luca benzoni markus brunnermeier john dickhaut maria perozek raj singh hersh shefrin and workshop participants at minnesota finance bag lunch 2003 wharton conference household financial decision making and portfolio choice and 2003 summer meetings of econometric society i would like to thank cam harvey the editor and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions a special thanks to jack kareken for comments and editorial help on an earlier draft i am grateful to donna zerwitz for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author address correspondence to valery polkovnichenko finance 3 122 csom 319 19 th

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters economists have long emphasized the importance of expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes yet there has been almost no recent effort to model actual empirical expectations data instead m acroeconomists usually simply assume that expectations are rational this paper shows that while empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense expectational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households views derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters which in turn may be rational the model s estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports this inattention generates stickyness in aggregate expectations with important macroeconomic consequences

are risk preferences stable across contexts evidence from insurance data using a unique dataset we test whether households deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household coverage specific poisson processes we find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions jel d11 d83

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions the paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent payos the reference point is endogenised as the expected price of the good in the auction the model predicts that in equilibrium bidders both overbid and underbid in comparison to the standard bidding function without reference dependent utility the model predicts that more bidders overbid than underbid and that bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders or the reserve price increases finally it is shown perhaps surprisingly that revenue equivalence continues to hold between rst and second price

an empirical analysis of risk aversion and income growth risk aversion enters many theoretical models of human capital investment but attitudes toward risk have not been incorporated in empirical models of human capital investment this article develops a model of the joint investment in financial wealth and human wealth to show that human capital investment is an inverse function of the degree of relative risk aversion using data from the survey of consumer finances i find that wage growth is positively correlated with preferences for risk taking more educated individuals are also more likely to be risk takers thus risk taking explains a portion of the returns to education

design choices in privatized social security systems learning from the swedish experience in the 2000 u s presidential campaign george w bush advocated a partial privatization of the social security system according to his plan a portion of the payroll tax would be designated for individual savings accounts at the same time as this issue was being debated in the united states sweden was in the process of launching a system that is very similar to president bush s proposal although bush s plan did not get much attention in the early years of his administration the proposal may resurface either in the united states or in other countries if so important lessons can be learned from the swedish experience in particular the swedish plan adopted an interesting mix of design choices that can now be evaluated based on three years of post implementation experience although there is a large literature in economics on the design of social security systems most of that literature is concerned with macroeconomic considerations such as funding in contrast there has been much less attention devoted to the details of how plans might be designed in part because these details do not seem important from a standard economic perspective in this paper we reverse this usual pattern and focus our attention on the design aspects of the swedish plan we find that although most of the design choices are those that might be approved by most economists in some cases these choices produced undesirable consequences

auction fever rising revenue in second price auction formats the prevalent term auction fever visualizes that ascending auctions inconsistent with theory are likely to provoke higher bids than one shot auctions to explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally we design four different strategy proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo endowment effect arguments psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value a control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one shot auction with real endowments we conclude that when bidders are uncertain about their valuations auctions that foster pseudo endowment may raise bids and revenues

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

when does it pay to delay supplier qualification theory and experiments we study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening qualification screening is costly for the buyer involving product tests site visits and interviews in addition to a qualified incumbent supplier the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification the buyer wishes to run a price only open descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction we analytically study the buyer s optimal strategy accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract in our analysis we derive the incumbent s optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high cost incumbents hold back on bidding or even boycott the auction to preserve their profit margin and only lower cost incumbents bid to win these results are strikingly different from the usual open descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy we test our analytical results in the laboratory with human subjects we find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

economic behavior under uncertainty a joint analysis of risk preferences and technology a method is developed to estimate jointly risk preferences and technology under general conditions the approach is illustrated in an application to the analysis of u s corn soybean acreage decisions over time the results provide useful information on the nature of farmers risk preferences and on the influence of price risk and production risk on acreage allocation and farmers welfare copyright 1996 by mit press

advance selling when consumers regret we characterize the effect of anticipated regret on consumer decisions and on firm profits and policies in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations advance purchases trigger action regret if valuations turn out to be lower than the price paid whereas delaying purchase may cause inaction regret from missing a discount or facing a stockout consumers whom we describe as emotionally rational act strategically in response to the firm s policies and in anticipation of regret in this context regret explains two types of behavioral patterns inertia delayed purchase and frenzies buying early at negative surplus we show how firms should optimally respond to consumer regret and also characterize a normative regret threshold above which they should not advance sell action regret reduces profits as well as the value of advance selling and booking limit policies for price setting firms inaction regret has the opposite effects these effects are diminished by capacity constraints and are reversed for firms facing price pressure in the advance period owing e g to competition or market heterogeneity regret heterogeneity explains premium advance selling for the capacity constrained firm which may benefit from larger shares of regretful buyers finally we show how the negative effects of regret on profits can be mitigated by regret priming marketing campaigns and by offering refunds or options or allowing resales our results highlight the importance of assessing the relative strength of regret within and across market segments and of accounting for these factors in pricing and marketing policies this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

behavioral models for first price sealed bid auctions with the one shot decision theory abstract we build an auction model with the one shot decision theory which describes the process of a bidder deciding his her bidding price in first price sealed bid auctions the decision making procedure involves two steps first for each of his her possible bidding prices the bidder examines every possible highest bidding price provided by the other bidders and chooses one as a focus point of this bidding price of him her then the bidder determines such a bidding price as the optimal one that generates the best outcome when its focus point occurs the optimal bidding price can be obtained and two common phenomena in auction markets throwing away and overbidding are well explained

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

theft gift giving and trustworthiness honesty is its own reward in rural paraguay in developing countries lacking legal enforcement villagers may use implicit contracts to minimize crime i construct a dynamic limited commitment model in which a thief cannot commit to forego stealing but is induced to steal less by the promise of future gifts combining survey data on production theft gifts and trust with experiments measuring trustworthiness i provide supporting evidence farmers living near more relatives or with plots that are difficult to steal from give fewer gifts and trust more and those living near more relatives also experience less theft giving increases when trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater

lab and life does risky choice behaviour observed in experiments reflect that in the real world risk preferences play a crucial role in a great variety of economic decisions measuring risk preferences reliably is therefore an important challenge in this paper we ask the question whether risk preferences observed in economic experiments reflect real life risky choice behaviour we investigate in a sample representative for a rural region of eastern uganda whether pursuing farming strategies with both a higher expected profit and greater variance of profits is associated with willingness to take risks in an experiment controlling for other determinants of risk taking in agriculture we find that risky choice behaviour in the experiment is correlated with risky choice behaviour in real life in one domain i e the purchase of fertiliser but not in other domains i e the growing of cash crops and market orientation more broadly our findings suggest that economic experiments may be good at capturing real world risky choice behaviour that is narrowly bracketed