why an informed principal may leave rents to an agent this paper characterizes incentive contracts for the situation where a principal is privately informed about the technology governing an agency relationship in contrast to a standard principal agent relationship it is shown that a principal who values effort highly will choose to induce effort by paying a high base wage and low bonus payments moreover the equilibrium contract has the principal transferring rents to the agent even though contracting possibilities are unrestricted and both principal and agent are risk neutral consequently the informed principal framework is shown to provide a rational for the payment of efficiency wages copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

optimal procurement mechanisms for an informed buyer this paper studies a buyer e g a government agency offering a procurement contract to a number of privately informed suppliers the buyer has private information about her demand for the product to be procured the optimal mechanisms for all types of the buyer are examined it is optimal for the buyer to reveal her demand information through the contract offer and use a first price sealed bid auction procedure to award the contract announcing her reserve price in advance any second price auction is shown to yield less expected surplus for the buyer than the optimal first price auction does when the buyer s marginal willingness to pay decreases with quantity

optimal auction with resale this paper investigates the design of seller optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good in that case the optimal allocation characterized by myerson 1981 cannot be achieved without resale i find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale in two bidder cases i prove that the myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions with three or more bidders achieving the myerson allocation is more difficult i prove that it can be implemented in special cases in those cases the myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions each optimally chosen by a reseller

effects of family background on earnings and returns to schooling evidence from brazil we investigate whether omitted family background variables are responsible for high returns to schooling estimated in brazil returns to schooling fall by about one third when parental schooling is added to wage equations surprisingly the schooling of fathers in law has larger effects on wages than the schooling of fathers on the basis of a model of assortative mating we interpret this as evidence that parental characteristics represent unobservable worker attributes rather than nepotism in the labor market we conclude that the family background bias in returns to schooling is modest and need not imply returns to family connections

imports domestic production and transnational vertical integration a theoretical note suppose a developing country has the choice of importing cars i or producing them at home in a subsidiary s of a transnational company or in a domestic firm under a licensing l contract from a transnational which ties the import of components from the latter if the criterion of national benefit is given by consumer surplus under i or s and by consumer surplus plus the profits of the domestic firm under l we compare the benefits from the alternative regimes i s or l under different market structure assumptions in most cases the regime s seems to dominate the conclusions are then modified by pointing to factors excluded from the basic model

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

when does it pay to get informed a repeated principal agent problem where both sides start out symmetrically uninformed about a productivity related parameter and where the principal has the option to costlessly learn this parameter is analyzed typically the principal delays the acquisition of information to avoid costly signaling if the learning decision of the principal is observable by the agent the expected delay is longer than if it is unobservable the discrepancy is due to the ability of the principal to avoid costly signaling when he is known to be uninformed

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values abstract the standard approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed disinterested third party who prior to the auction designs and implements a collusive mechanism in environments where collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties this approach may neglect information leakages from simply a proposal to collude we consider a model of collusion where one informed bidder proposes to another as in es and schummer 2004 we allow for general interdependent values and affiliated signals in contrast to third party modeling approaches collusion is inefficient from both a social perspective except for the case of pure common values and from the perspective of the ring both bidders are better off than without colluding but the surplus extracted from the seller is distributed asymmetrically between the bidders the potential for information leakage from proposing is bad for low types who reveal that they are weak competitors but is advantageous for high types because they are able to signal their strength we identify a so called briber s curse whereby acceptance of a proposal causes the proposer to downgrade her expected value for the object when there is additional competition in the form of bidders outside of the cartel the briber s curse significantly harms cartel profits and raises seller revenues

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal the case of private values we analyze the principal agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three stage noncooperative game contract proposal acceptance refusal and contract execution we assume that the information does not directly affect the agent s payoff private values equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique moreover it is pareto optimal for the different types of principal the principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information equilibrium allocations are the walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

level k mechanism design non equilibrium models of choice e g level k reasoning have significantly different sometimes more accurate predictions in games than does nash equilibrium when it comes to the maximal set of functions that are implementable in mechanism design however they turn out to have similar implications focusing on single valued rules we discuss the role and implications of different behavioural anchors arbitrary level 0 play and prove a level k revelation principle if a function is level k implementable given any level 0 play it must obey a slight weakening of standard strict incentive constraints further the same condition is also sufficient for level k implementability although the role of specific level 0 anchors is more controversial for the sufficiency argument nonetheless our results provide tight characterizations of level k implementable functions under a variety of level 0 play including truthful uniform and atomless anchors

consumption inequality and intra household allocations the current literature on consumption inequality treats all adults within the household equally making the implicit assumption that all consumption inequality is between not within households however increased marital sorting on earnings and the subsequent rise in the share of women s income in the household may have important implications for consumption inequality measured at the individual level we use an extension of the collective framework of chiappori to estimate a rule for assigning resources to individual household members we then construct a measure of individual level inequality by looking at implied changes in intra household allocations and explore the implications of our framework for the measurement of individual level versus household level consumption inequality our analysis which is based on households comprising one or two adults suggests that the conventional approach of ignoring intra household allocations underestimates the level of cross sectional consumption inequality by 30 and overstates the trend by two thirds our findings also indicate that increases in marital sorting on wages and hours worked can simultaneously explain virtually all of the decline in within household inequality and a substantial fraction of the rise in between household inequality in the uk since the 1970s

the role of information sharing in cooperative research and development abstract this paper develops a model in which r d cooperation enables firms to increase the probability of discovering a new product by sharing information about research strategies and outcomes numerical computations of equilibrium show that cooperation tends to increase in the underlying probability of research success total surplus generally increases as more firms cooperate and cooperation in equilibrium never exceeds that which maximizes total surplus however when the probability of an innovation s success is relatively low no cooperation occurs nor will much be socially desired finally self imposed limits on membership in the cooperative entity tend to reduce total surplus

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

east west joint ventures and buyback contracts abstract contractual joint ventures cjvs and the buyback form of countertrade are popular methods that socialist countries use to attract foreign investment in this paper we explore some reasons why this is so and also explain two predominant characteristics of these contracts the existence of sharing rules and minimum standard requirements on inputs the model stresses the incentive problems involved when a socialist host country which does not allow foreign direct investment uses a cjv to obtain the fruits of some knowledge based production process from a multinational enterprise

the economics of joint ventures in less developed countries the paper examines the microeconomic partial equilibrium behavior of joint ventures established between transnational corporations and domestic partners in less developed countries it focuses on issues relating to resource allocation and profit distribution under various institutional scenarios the analysis places special emphasis on the role of bargaining power transfer pricing stock ownership and profit shares of the parties and the responsiveness of joint ventures to national development goals some of the results apply to wholly owned subsidiaries of transnational corporations local firms and licensing arrangements which emerge as special cases

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

property rights and the efficiency of bargaining we show that efficient bargaining is impossible for a wide class of economic settings and property rights these settings are characterized by i the existence of adverse efficient opt out types whose participation does not change the efficient allocation and who when they opt out are the worst type other agents can face and ii non existence of the marginal core and its multivaluedness with a positive probability we also examine the optimal allocation of property rights within a given class that satisfies i such as simple property rights liability rules and dual chooser rules we characterize property rights that minimize the expected subsidy required to implement efficiency with two agents simple property rights that are optimal in this way maximize the expected surplus at the status quo allocation but this no longer holds with more agents we also study second best budget balanced bargaining under a liability rule the optimal second best liability rule may differ from but is often close to the expectation of the victim s harm which would be optimal if there were no bargaining however liability rules that are close to a simple property right result in a lower expected surplus than the simple property right they are near

informed principal problem with moral hazard risk neutrality and no limited liability abstract we consider a principal agent moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties and no limited liability in which the principal has private information the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented outcome these distortions can explain e g efficiency wages beaudry 1994 and muted incentives inderst 2001 we show that in a large class of environments these distortions vanish if the principal is allowed to offer sufficiently rich contracts

host country policy transfer pricing and ownership distribution in international joint ventures a theoretical analysis abstract this paper develops a simple model of an international joint venture in which the ownership shares are endogenously determined as the outcome of nash bargaining between a multinational firm and a host firm it shows how tax subsidy policy by the host country s government and transfer pricing of inputs by the multinational firm may influence the equity distribution of the joint venture insofar as the optimal level of these policies is dependent on the primitives the model generates empirical hypotheses regarding the impact of the primitives on the equity distribution

crime and victimization an economic perspective the recent upward trend in crime rates of developing countries has spurred widespread public concern about personal and proprietary insecurity in some countries the questions of crime violence and victimization are attracting more attention from academics and policy makers than traditional economic problems the objective of this paper is to examine the main issues related to crime and victimization from an economic perspective for this purpose the paper combines a review of the main results established in the literature with original research on the causes of crime and the risk factors of victimization the first section provides a review of the estimates of the costs of crime the main theoretical and empirical research on its causes and the relative advantages of official and survey data on crime the second section presents original work on the main causes of violent crime from a cross country perspective the empirical work starts with a basic model of the economic determinants of homicide and robbery rates in turn this empirical model is extended along five dimensions 1 deterrence factors 2 illegal drug related activities 3 demographic issues 4 income and ethnic polarization and 5 social capital the third section reviews recent case studies of latin american cities that rely on survey data to assess the empirical determinants of the probability of victimization these studies focus on three types of risk factors 1 individual characteristics 2 household characteristics and 3 community characteristics the main conclusions from the previous sections are summarized in section four

does improved local supply of schooling enhance intergenerational mobility in education evidence from jordan the impact of the growth of the local supply of public schools in the post colonial period on intergenerational mobility in education is a first order question in the arab world this question is examined in jordan using a unique dataset that links individual data on own schooling and parents schooling for adults from a household survey with the supply of schools in the subdistrict of birth at the time the individual was of age to enroll from a school census the identification strategy exploits the variation in the supply of basic and secondary public schools across cohorts and subdistricts of birth in jordan controlling for year and subdistrict of birth fixed effects and interactions of governorate and year of birth fixed effects the findings show that the local availability of basic public schools does in fact increase intergenerational mobility in education for instance a one standard deviation increase in the supply of basic public schools per 1 000 people reduces the father son and mother son associations of schooling by 18 20 percent and the father daughter and mother daughter associations by 33 44 percent however an increase in the local supply of secondary public schools does not seem to have an effect on the intergenerational mobility in education

full implementation and belief restrictions we introduce a framework to study the problem of full implementation under general restrictions on agents beliefs which we call implementation first we provide a characterization of the properties of the mechanisms that achieve implementation these conditions relate the possibility of achieving full implementation to the strength of the strategic externalities induced by the mechanism we then study how to achieve full implementation via the design of simple transfer schemes in these context the general conditions for implementation suggest a simple design principle in which belief restrictions are used to weaken the strategic externalities induced by the baseline transfers of the belief free benchmark importantly our results require minimal information on agents beliefs which regard simple moments of the distribution of types these moment conditions arise naturally in applications and in practical problems of mechanism design

on the role of commitment in a principal agent relationship with an informed principal abstract in many circumstances a principal who has private information when contracting with an agent may perform some further action simultaneously with or after the agent s choice of an action we analyze such a principal agent relationship with an informed principal as a noncooperative game and distinguish two extensive form games first the principal can commit to his subsequent action at the time of contracting second the principal s announcement for his action is not binding at the time of performance we show that commitment by the principal leads to separation and no commitment leads to pooling journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d82

why is child labor illegal abstract we present a theory of the emergence of laws restricting child labor or imposing mandatory education that is consistent with the fact that poor parents tend to oppose such laws we find that if altruistic parents are unable to commit to educating their children child labor laws can increase the welfare of higher income parents in an ex ante sense on the basis of an empirical analysis of latin american household surveys we demonstrate that per capita income in the country of residence has the predicted effect on child labor supply even after controlling for other household characteristics

an undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values in a class of informed principal problems with common values we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation it is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret it always exists is unique and continuous in the priors it is undominated i e efficient among the different types of the principal subject to the agent s interim participation constraint it is a perfect bayesian equilibrium of the three stage game in myerson 16 and maskin and tirole 14 it dominates the rsw allocation as defined in maskin and tirole 14 and coincides with it when the latter is undominated it is the unique neutral optimum as defined in myerson 16 when there are only two types when the assured allocation is separating then it is a neutral optimum with three or more types it is an equilibrium of a game of competition in a market with adverse selection

on the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation we consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent one dimensional private types we prove that for any bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus the short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to gutmann kemperman reeds and shepp 1991 we also show that the equivalence between bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations

asymmetric first price auctions abstract a new approach to asymmetric first price auctions is proposed which circumvents the need to examine bidding strategies directly specifically the ratio of bidders endogenous payoffs is analyzed and compared to the ratio of the exogenous distribution functions that describe beliefs most of the results are inferred from this comparison in the existing theoretical literature assumptions of first order stochastic dominance or stronger imply that the latter ratio has very specific properties but no such assumptions are imposed here it is proven that first order stochastic dominance is necessary for bidding strategies not to cross when this assumption is relaxed in the numerical literature it is done in a manner that leads to exactly one crossing however it is straightforward to construct examples with several crossings finally bid distributions will cross in auctions with two bidders whenever second order but not first order stochastic dominance applies

a signaling based theory of contractual commitment to relationships abstract in this paper i present signaling as an explanation for how and why parties commit to relationships when they initially contract about the terms of those relationships two forms of contractual commitment to a relationship are considered a promise to trade in the future contracted quantity and a promise not to trade with anyone else contracted exclusivity a party is said to commit more to a relationship if it commits initially to trade a higher quantity and or to a higher level of exclusivity i characterize equilibrium contracts and therefore commitment both the ability to signal information through an exclusivity commitment and whether the informed party commits more to the relationship when the relationship is more likely to succeed depend on the source of the asymmetry of information

gathering information before signing a contract after being offered a contract an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature this enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation cost the authors show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to observe the state of nature and they explore its terms later they show that the principal finds it profitable to organize competition between several agents even though he has monopoly power and can push a single agent down to his reservation utility copyright 1992 by american economic association

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

on the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner take all games abstract a long standing conjecture is that winner take all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk takers and the extinction of risk averters in many species a winner take all game determines the males right to reproduce and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk takers psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk taking than females using an evolutionary model of preference formation we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk taking in winner take all environments journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

imitative innovation and international joint ventures a dynamic analysis abstract in this paper we deal with some dynamic issues of international joint venture in the context of a developing country we provide a rationale for international joint venture formation as well as its subsequent instability where instability is interpreted as payoff readjustments between the partners in the venture although the joint venture is formed in response to government restrictions on foreign equity holdings in the first period its subsequent instability is caused by both the change in government policy as well as the outcome of imitative technological innovation undertaken by the host partner it is also shown that uncertainty about the government policy in the second period plays an important role in the formation of joint venture in the first period

signaling quality with increased incentives previous work on informed principal problems with moral hazard suggested that the principal should signal project quality by retaining a larger share of the project and hence lowering incentives for the agent we show that this view is incomplete if project quality and effort are complements and effort is more valuable for high quality projects a principal with a high quality project may separate from a principal with a low quality project by increasing incentives for the agent this holds with a risk neutral agent who is protected by limited liability as well as with a risk averse agent and unlimited liability a dynamic version of our model in which the agent learns project quality in later periods provides an explanation for the use of initially reduced royalty rates in business format franchising contracts

incentives for cooperative and non cooperative r and d in duopoly abstract this paper tries to explain why duopolistic firms would like to enter cooperative r and d venture even when they would act non cooperatively in the product market we show that both very high and very low probabilities of success in r and d can induce firms to go for r and d joint ventures this research highlights the modus operandi for cooperative research even without and spillover of individual r and d and or with a reasonably low sunk cost of r and d

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

families schools and primary school learning evidence for argentina and colombia in an international perspective this article presents evidence on the associations between family background school characteristics and student performance in primary school in argentina colombia and several comparison countries as a general pattern educational performance is strongly related to family background weakly to some institutional school features and hardly to schools resource endowments in an international perspective family background effects are relatively large in argentina and relatively small in colombia a specific argentine feature is the lack of performance differences between rural and urban areas a specific colombian feature is the lack of significant between gender performance differences nonnative students and students not speaking spanish at home perform particularly weak in both countries in argentina students perform better in schools with a centralized curriculum and ability based class formation

relational contracts and the value of relationships this article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known i consider a principal agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option i show that if the principal has the bargaining power she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus i characterize how information is revealed how the relationship evolves and how this depends on bargaining power jel c78 d82 d83 d86

the design and price of information abstract a data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty he can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller his willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information the data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments we establish the properties that any revenue maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy every experiment is a non dispersed stochastic matrix and every menu contains a fully informative experiment in the cases of binary states and actions or binary types we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments jel d42 d81 d82 d83

auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types abstract this paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment the key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyers otherwise conditionally independent valuations assuming that the seller announces the mechanism before investing the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which leaves buyers no information rent and leaves the seller indifferent between his investments under these conditions the seller can in fact extract the first best surplus almost fully

informed principal and countervailing incentives it has been shown by maskin and tirole 1990 proposition 11 that with quasi linear preferences and private values an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place the note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives

the informational content of surnames the evolution of intergenerational mobility and assortative mating we propose a new methodology for measuring intergenerational mobility in economic well being our method is based on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes it circumvents the need for intergenerational panel data a long standing stumbling block for understanding mobility it does so by using cross sectional data alongside a calibrated structural model to recover the traditional intergenerational elasticity measures our main idea is simple if inheritance is important for economic outcomes then rare surnames should predict economic outcomes in the cross section this is because rare surnames are indicative of familial linkages if the number of rare surnames is small this approach will not work however rare surnames are abundant in the highly skewed nature of surname distributions from most western societies we develop a model that articulates this idea and shows that the more important is inheritance the more informative will be surnames this result is robust to a variety of different assumptions about fertility and mating we apply our method using the 2001 census from catalonia a large region of spain we use educational attainment as a proxy for overall economic well being a calibration exercise results in an estimate of the intergenerational correlation of educational attainment of 0 60 we also find evidence suggesting that mobility has decreased among the different generations of the 20th century a complementary analysis based on sibling correlations confirms our results and provides a robustness check on our method our model and our data allow us to examine one possible explanation for the observed decrease in mobility we find that the degree of assortative mating has increased over time overall we argue that our method has promise because it can tap the vast mines of census data that are available in a heretofore unexploited manner

a theory of joint venture life cycles abstract in this paper we provide a dynamic theory of joint venture life cycle that relies on synergy organisational learning and moral hazard we demonstrate that depending on parameter values the outcome may involve any one of the following stable joint venture formation joint venture formation followed by breakdown or cournot competition in all the periods we also provide some interesting welfare results

informed principal moral hazard and the value of a more informative technology we analyze a principal agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology we characterize perfect bayesian equilibria of the contracting game that possess the following properties i a principal with a more informative technology ends up earning less profits than a principal with a less informative one does ii compared to the complete information case the actions implemented by the privately informed principal can be distorted iii the agent can end up being better off when the principal has private information

informed seller with taste heterogeneity consider a seller with a single indivisible good facing a buyer whose willingness to pay depends on his privately known taste and on product characteristics privately known by the seller what selling procedure can arise as an equilibrium of the game in which the seller strategically chooses mechanisms conditional on his information we characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes and establish that ex ante revenue maximizing mechanisms are in this set there is generally a continuum of revenue ranked equilibrium outcomes focusing on the revenue maximizing equilibrium we show that the seller in general benefits from private information and does not benefit from committing to a disclosure or a certification technology we also provide conditions under which the privacy of the seller s information does not affect revenue

are wholly foreign owned enterprises better than joint ventures abstract this paper provides a general equilibrium model for examining the individual as well as the joint effects of export requirements and local equity controls of multinational firms the results suggest that for a small open economy under tariff protection the desirable policy is 100 foreign ownership of subsidiaries coupled with an export share requirement

asymmetric auctions with resale we study first and second price auctions with resale in a model with indepen dent private values with asymmetric bidders the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post auction trade which in our model takes place via monopoly pricing the winner makes a take it or leave it offer to the loser we show a a first price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium and b with resale the expected revenue from a first price auction exceeds that from a second price auction the inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a gen eral revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded jel d44

capital market imperfections and forms of foreign operations abstract we develop a model of foreign operations to determine a parent firm s choice between wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures and the degree of equity participation in the latter case we introduce capital market imperfections into the model to capture a positive effect of the firm s net worth on investment this effect plays an important role in determining organization forms because the investment level affects the optimal form which determines technology transfer we show that parent firms with strong technological advantages can be controlling shareholders even if they take minority positions in ventures with local firms

a note on the seller s optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two sided incomplete information it is shown with an example that in bilateral trade problems with two sided incomplete information some seller types may obtain higher expected payos in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take it or leave it oer contrary to popular belief if one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the informed seller then the op timality of a take it or leave it oer for the seller is restored journal of economic literature classi cation numbers c72 c78 d82

bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in the independent private values model we prove in the standard independent private values model that the outcome in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers of any bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant strategy mechanism

optimal private good allocation the case for a balanced budget abstract in an independent private value auction environment we are interested in strategy proof mechanisms that maximize the agents residual surplus that is the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity we find that under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents that is it will be budget balanced specifically optimal mechanisms have a simple posted price or option form in the bilateral trade environment we obtain optimality of posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions

auctions with almost homogeneous bidders abstract we prove that around the symmetric case where the values are identically distributed the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder specific parameters of the value distributions we show that the revenue equivalence between the first price and the second price auctions to the first order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the revenue equivalence theorem thereby formally establishing the first order equivalence fibich et al g fibich a gavious a sela revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions j econ theory 115 2004 309 321 noticed for their particular perturbation

how much does sorting increase inequality some commentators argue that increased sorting into internally homogeneous neighborhoods schools and marriages is radically polarizing society calibration of a formal model however suggests that the steady state standard deviation of education would increase only 1 7 percent if the correlation between neighbors education doubled and would fall only 1 6 percent if educational sorting by neighborhood disappeared the steady state standard deviation of education would grow 1 percent if the correlation between spouses education increased from 0 6 to 0 8 in fact marital and neighborhood sorting have been stable or even decreasing historically sorting has somewhat more significant effects on intergenerational mobility than on inequality

informed principal with correlation in this paper we analyze a simple two sided adverse selection model with one principal and one agent they are both risk neutral and have private information about their type we also assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with the one of the agent the main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public the principal can design such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative signal on the agent s one we fully characterize the equilibrium of the principal agent game in which different types of principal offer the same menu of contracts that leave the agent uninformed about the principal s type this gives more freedom to the principal when setting the transfers because the agent s constraints need to hold only at an interim stage the principal gains from a peculiarity of the correlated environment different types of agent have different beliefs about the probability distribution over the states of the world

resale in second price auctions with costly participation abstract we study sealed bid second price auctions with costly participation and resale each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff if resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function the symmetric equilibrium where all bidders use the same cutoff is less efficient than a class of two cutoff asymmetric equilibria existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two cutoff equilibria with resale moreover the equilibria with resale are more asymmetric and under a sufficient condition more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale

technological progress mobility and economic growth this paper analyzes the relationship between technological progress wage inequality intergenerational earnings mobility and economic growth in periods of major technological inventions a decline in the relative importance of initial conditions raises inequality enhances mobility and generates a larger concentration of high ability individuals in technologically advanced sectors stimulating future technological progress and growth however once technologies become more accessible mobility is diminished and inequality decreases but becomes more persistent the reduction in the concentration of ability in technologically advanced sectors diminishes the likelihood of technological breakthroughs and slows future growth user friendliness therefore becomes unfriendly to future economic growth copyright 1997 by american economic association

generalized reduced form auctions a network flow approach we develop a network flow approach for characterizing interim allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints both ceilings and floors applications include a variety of settings of practical interest ranging from individual and group specific capacity constraints set aside sale partnership dissolution and government license reallocation

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

collusion via resale the english auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post auction interbidder resale is allowed we show this by constructing equilibria where with positive probability one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders these equilibria interim pareto dominate among bidders the standard value bidding equilibrium without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or postbidding spoil division

social mobility and preferences for redistribution in latin america this paper has two parts the first part presents an overview of the evidence concerning intergenerational mobility in latin america the second part studies the correlation between mobility perceptions and political preferences the results show first that educational mobility is much lower in latin american countries than in the united states and that latin americans are quite pessimistic about their own mobility experiences and social equality in general second the results show that preferences for redistribution are stronger i among poor individuals ii among those who believe that they were unable to surpass their parents socioeconomic status and iii among those who think that market outcomes are unfair a similar result applies with respect to the support for both market outcomes and the privatization of state owned enterprises

learning dynamics in research alliances a panel data analysis the aim of this paper is to empirically test the determinants of research joint ventures rjvs group dynamics we develop a model based on learning and transaction cost theories which represent the benefits and costs of rjv participation respectively according to our framework firms at each period in time weigh the benefits against the costs of being an rjv member rjv dynamics can then be interpreted as a consequence of this evolving trade off over time we look at entry turbulence and exit in rjvs that have been set up under the us national cooperative research act which allows for certain antitrust exemptions in order to stimulate firms to co operate in r d accounting for unobserved project characteristics and controlling for inter rjv interactions and industry effects the tobit panel regressions show the importance of group and time features for an rjvs evolution we further identify an average rjvs long term equilibrium size and assess its determining factors ours is a first attempt to produce robust stylized facts about co operational short and long term dynamics a neglected dimension in research co operations but an important element in understanding how collaborative learning works

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

a general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments we consider the class of bayesian environments with independent types and utility functions which are both quasi linear in a private good and linear in a one dimensional private value type parameter we call these independent linear environments for these environments we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints we also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization together with the appropriate incentive taxes we illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision

intergenerational mobility and the process of development this paper offers an explanation for some evidence that intergenerational earnings mobility is higher in more developed economies and that mobility is positively correlated with wage equality in the model mobility promotes economic growth via its effect on the accumulation and allocation of human capital growth influences mobility via its effect on incentives to acquire education and its effect on liquidity constraints upon such acquisition in the process of development mobility increases and the distribution of education becomes better correlated with ability redistributive policy has a negative effect on growth in developed economies and a positive effect in developing economies

sorting and long run inequality many social commentators have raised concerns over the possibility that increased sorting in society may lead to greater inequality to investigate this we construct a dynamic model of intergenerational education acquisition fertility and marital sorting and parameterize the steady state to match several basic empirical endings we end that increased sorting will signiecantly increase income inequality four factors are important to our endings a negative correlation between fertility and education a decreasing marginal effect of parental education on children s years of education wages that are sensitive to the relative supply of skilled workers and borrowing constraints that affect educational attainment for some low income households

tariff jumping and joint ventures it is well known that high tariffs tend to induce foreign direct investment fdi by encouraging the investors to jump the tariff wall this paper examines the economic interaction among tariffs fdi and international joint ventures ijv we show that in the presence of a strong local competitor even if opening a fully owned subsidiary is not profitable to a foreign firm the foreign firm may still enter the host country market through ijv however ijv is not profitable for sufficiently high tariff rates hence we argue that liberal trade policies may attract foreign investments through the formation of joint ventures

the role of optimal threats in auction design abstract this paper studies revenue maximizing auctions when buyers outside options depend on their private information and are endogenously chosen by the seller we show that the revenue maximizing assignment of the object can depend crucially on the outside options that the seller can choose as threats depending on the shape of outside options sometimes an optimal mechanism allocates the object in an ex post efficient way and other times buyers obtain the object more often than is efficient

robustly collusion proof implementation a contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion we show that agents collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents including both uncorrelated and correlated types in those circumstances any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion including the second best level can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior the collusion proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude provided that noncollusive agents incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism our collusion proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion

resource allocation under demand uncertainty and private information we study the effect of multilateral private information on the efficiency of markets where capacity constrained upstream agents supply a resource to downstream entities facing uncertain end demands we analyze two models a pooling system in which a single downstream principal pools a resource from multiple upstream agents and a distribution system in which one upstream principal allocates a resource across multiple downstream agents we show that the presence of multilateral private information does not hinder efficiency in the pooling system in contrast in the distribution system the quantities allocated to downstream agents can exceed as well as fall short of their first best levels these results shed light on the recently improved performance of u s agricultural produce market and the observed episodes of shortages oversupplies in flu vaccine and other seasonal markets this paper was accepted by manel baucells decision analysis