what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

performance contracting in after sales service supply chains performance based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital intensive industries such as aerospace and defense known as power by the hour in the private sector and as performance based logistics pbl in defense contracting it aims to replace traditionally used fixed price and cost plus contracts to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by tying a supplier s compensation to the output value of the product generated by the customer buyer to analyze implications of performance based relationships we introduce a multitask principal agent model to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts in our model the customer principal faces a product availability requirement for the uptime of the end product the customer then offers contracts contingent on availability to n suppliers agents of the key subsystems used in the product who in turn exert cost reduction efforts and set spare parts inventory investment levels we show that the first best solution can be achieved if channel members are risk neutral when channel members are risk averse we find that the second best contract combines a fixed payment a cost sharing incentive and a performance incentive furthermore we study how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle as uncertainty in support cost changes finally we illustrate the application of our model to a problem based on aircraft maintenance data and show how the allocation of performance requirements and contractual terms change under various environmental assumptions

myopic investment decisions and competitive labor markets this paper analyzes an agency problem where managers are able to control an unobservable variable that affects the time distribution of returns on a firm s investments managers have an incentive to select myopic investments in order to convince the labor market that they have relatively high ability the authors demonstrate that if employment terms are determined in competitive labor markets and there are lower bounds on compensations then at the principal s second best contract managers make a myopic investment choice they also characterize the structure of the principal s second best contract and conduct comparative statics at this solution copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the informal sector and the political economy of development this paper takes an initial step in integrating insights from two sets of literature which have focused on central aspects of development with unfortunate independence it highlights politically valuable resources which are identified in the political economy literature and shows that the informal sector literature provides ample evidence that these resources in general are i scarcely available to informal entities ii poorly valued in their possession and iii more often collectively unexploited by them overall there seems to be an important though neglected bias in how the political system in less developed countries formulates crafts and implements policy

divide and rule the economic and legal implications of the proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and supply companies in the dutch electricity sector abstract in machiavelli s theory of power the concept of divide and rule forms the main theme the ruler has absolute power and to maintain and increase such power all means are justified when viewed against the background of this theory the current debate in the netherlands on the unbundling of energy electricity gas companies can be observed as an example of divide and rule in which the dutch minister of economic affairs plays a central role yet contrary to machiavelli in his time the dutch government does in fact aim principally at the greater welfare of the dutch people it is therefore noteworthy that while important steps in the decision to unbundled have been taken there is no evidence that the dutch people will indeed benefit from the envisaged unbundling

the political economy of regulations and trade wine trade 1860 1970 dramatic changes in the 1860 1970 wine trade provide insights on the political economy of regulations and policy instrument choice and trade an invasion of phylloxera in the 1870s turned france from the world s leading exporter to a massive importer of wine and grapes when french production recovered a combination of tariffs safety regulations and quality standards were introduced to protect its french producers causing dramatic changes in global wine and grape production and trade including in spain italy turkey greece algeria tunisia and morocco changes in wine regulations were caused by relative income and loss aversion factors in political economy tariffs were the preferred policy instruments as they directly restrict imports bring in revenues have low transaction costs and are preferred political instruments when there are information imperfections safety regulations and quality standards including labelling and input prohibitions reduce asymmetric information for consumers or undesirable externalities and simultaneously protected domestic producers regulations were often targeted at imported products wine and raisins when tariffs were ineffective or constrained by institutions such as on colonial wine hence tariffs and quality regulations were jointly used in wine policy both as complements and as substitutes in policy design

the lens of contract private ordering james buchanan 2001 p 29 avers that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics he further contends that this fundamental understanding is better realized by examining economics through the lens of contract rather than the lens of choice buchanan 1975 because the latter has been the reigning paradigm in economics during the 20th century lionel robbins 1932 melvin w reder 1999 the lens of contract is understandably less fully developed interest in contractual approaches has nevertheless been building up whence the gap between these two has been closing this paper sketches some of these developments with emphasis on private ordering

comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies the role of legislative committee structure abstract this paper analyzes the impact of legislative committee structure on policy outcomes comparing a tax committee enacting tax expenditures and a decentralized system of specialized committees undertaking direct spending an endogenous commodity taxation framework is combined with models of legislative bargaining and committee voting the main conclusion is that the tax committee structure gives rise to lower subsidy levels under a wide range of circumstances however it is only under a more restrictive set of assumptions that social welfare is higher in the tax committee regime this theoretical analysis is illustrated by two examples of institutional change in congress

earnings manipulation and the cost of capital the cost of capital the widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short term stock price performance this paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm s cost of capital using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle depending on a firm s earnings profile it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times because of this dependence on the state of the economy earnings manipulation can influence a firm s cost of capital despite the forces of diversification

the paradoxes of the successful state abstract three issues are discussed in this paper first i argue that it is impossible to understand the east asian growth miracle without appreciating the importtant role that government policy played in stimulating private investment second i will summarize some of my work on the determinants of policy effectiveness based on a cross country comparison of export subsidy regimes and show that the usual rules of thumb on what makes for good policy uniformity transparency non selectivity etc are quite useless in predicting which policy regimes perform better in practice third i will provide some evidence that the government s social insurance role creates a complementarity between states and markets these three sets of ideas yield a more balanced and nuanced view of the role of the state in economic development than has recently become commonplace

national culture and corporate investment we explore the relation between individualism and horizons and types of corporate investment based on individualism s implications for risk taking we find that firms in individualistic countries invest more in long term risky than in short term safe assets moreover the effect of individualism on long term investment hinges on rd and 2 firms in individualistic countries invest more in r d because they have higher investment efficiency or pick less risky r d projects we further find that individualistic firms tend to employ excess cash to increase r d rather than increase dividends and r d decisions are less reliant on internal financing but more responsive to growth opportunities in individualistic countries

a transaction cost analysis of the land development process the production of our built environment involves many transaction costs we want to avoid unnecessary transaction costs nevertheless we hardly take account of transaction costs when considering different ways of organising the development process the most important reason is probably the difficulty in identifying them this paper shows why transaction costs are important and offers a method for identifying them with this method it is possible to compare the efficiency of different institutional arrangements

the power of the purse and its implications for bureaucratic policy making a dilemma of the power of the purse is thatcutting an agency s budget may make a desired policyinfeasible i examine the implications of thisdilemma with a repeated game in which a bureau choosesunobservable policies after a legislature sets itsbudget the bureau is work averse and has its ownpolicy preferences and therefore may cheat but thelegislature may perform an audit to recover slack funds a main result is that if the legislaturedesires a higher policy level than the agency then itfaces a trade off between good but wasteful policiesand bad but efficient ones

public versus private sector procurement ethics and strategy what each sector can learn from the other the government purchasing market constitutes the largest business sector in the world while marketers would benefit from a deep understanding of both sectors how the two sectors differ in terms of ethics and strategy largely remains unknown the purpose of this research therefore is to explore differences between the for profit and not for profit sectors on two critical aspects of business to business procurement ethics and strategy using survey data from a sample of 328 procurement professionals in the for profit and not for profit sectors key differences are explored findings suggest that buyers in the for profit sector are more likely to behave opportunistically conversely the buyers leaders in the not for profit sector behave more opportunistically and are more willing to turn a blind eye to their subordinate buyers opportunistic behaviors in addition key differences in procurement strategy are unveiled suggesting that not for profit procurement practices have some room for improvement based on the findings theoretical and managerial implications are drawn and a future research agenda is proposed

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

an analysis of the housing redevelopment process in korea through the lens of the transaction cost framework this paper applies the transaction cost framework to the analysis of the housing redevelopment process in korea the housing redevelopment process involves various identifiable transactions and cos

pay for locally monitored performance a welfare analysis for teacher attendance in ugandan primary schools public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify and that serve twin objectives to incentivize agent performance and to provide information for planning purposes received wisdom has it that pay for locally monitored performance p4lmp will result in collusion and undermine both objectives but simple coasian logic suggests the reverse p4lmp puts transferable money on the table and may enable interested parties to bargain to a more efficient outcome this paper develops a theoretical model that shows why and for which parameters the welfare enhancing coasian scenario exists focusing on education we model how the preferences of a teacher agent and headteacher local monitor affect actual and reported teacher attendance and how these equilibrium outcomes depend on the financial stakes attached to reports to capture the value of information we also consider the welfare of a bureaucracy that makes a costly policy mistake when holding the wrong belief about teacher performance we test the model and estimate the predicted effects using data from a field experiment in ugandan primary schools randomly varying whether head teachers reports of teacher attendance are tied to bonus payments or not consistent with coasian logic p4lmp increased actual and reported teacher attendance by 9 and 15 percentage points respectively and reduced policy mistakes by 7 percentage points relative to unincentivized local monitoring we use these experimental impacts to undertake a detailed cost benefit analysis and conclude even under conservative assumptions that welfare improved when paying for locally monitored performance

the gains from differentiated policies to control stock pollution when producers are heterogeneous we derive optimal input taxes to control stock pollution problems generated by heterogeneous agents the taxes vary over time and in response to differences of asset quality and technology choice we also derive second best policies and compare them to the efficient policy and also among themselves different policies will affect the timing for when and the extent to which conservation technologies are adopted a numerical example based on the california drainage problem shows significant efficiency gains from the optimal policy compared to no intervention but much of the gains are lost with second best interventions the gains from optimal policies do not always increase with the degree of heterogeneity copyright 2008 oxford university press

contribution to productivity or pork barrel the two faces of infrastructure investment abstract this paper proposes a simultaneous equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth we model explicitly the political economy process driving infrastructure investments in doing so we eliminate a potential source of bias in production function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy our empirical findings on a panel of france s regions over 1985 92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were indeed significant determinants of the cross regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments by contrast we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending even after controlling for pork barrel

the old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism abstract in economics recent emphasis on institutions suggests new policy dimensions for the traditional theory of economic policy which originated with tinbergen and others at the time of the keynesian revolution the paper presents elements of the traditional view instruments targets and policy models and then considers new aspects of policy especially policy for structural change the discussion emphasizes the implications for institutional design of incomplete knowledge and endogenous politics both public and private actors rely on incomplete policy models and the models themselves can become intermediate targets of policy

budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority the divestiture of the house appropriations committee in the1880 s has received considerable attention of an empiricalnature this paper presents a formal model of legislativedecisionmaking using a common agency formulation to representinterest group lobbying of legislators this framework is usedto analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriationsauthority the conditions under which decentralization leadsto higher spending are characterized it is argued that theconventional view that divestiture caused higher levels ofspending only holds if decentralization created barriers tolobbying and political bargaining across different committees in addition the role of specialized committee knowledge isexamined

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

investment policy in family controlled firms abstract we explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy our analysis centers on two incentives risk aversion and extended investment horizons which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake we find that family firms devote less capital to long term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures when dividing long term investment into its two components of r d and capital expenditures we note that family firms relative to nonfamily firms prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier r d projects additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of r d investment relative to nonfamily firms overall all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk across all family sub types affects corporate r d spending and capital expenditures

understanding how land is exchanged co ordination mechanisms and transaction costs this paper seeks to increase our understanding of how land is exchanged between suppliers and demanders most current land price theories and the land use models which are derived from them assume that co ordination between suppliers and demanders is achieved through the price mechanism there are however other possible co ordination mechanisms including imposed rules and mutual trust in order to take account of these the effect of institutions has to be included in the theories transaction cost economics as one strand of institutional economics seeks to explain which co ordination mechanism is chosen in practice in this paper the application of these ideas is illustrated with findings from a detailed survey of how dutch housing associations acquire land it appears that these housing associations choose to acquire land through the mechanism of mutual trust when there is a network in place which they can use and to acquire through the market when that mechanism is not available this applicat

coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions abstract the aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective international environmental agreements we emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues we argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries i e setting the rules of the negotiation game and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

the economics of organization the transaction cost approach the transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way the approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries as between firms and markets and to the organization of internal transactions including the design of employment relations the approach is compared and contrasted with selected parts of the organization theory literature

navigating institutional change the accord rogernomics and the politics of adjustment in australia and new zealand this article uses a transactions approach to examine the ability of governments to develop and sustain negotiated solutions to major economic challenges where actors are embedded in long term repeated interaction have long time horizons and invest in monitoring and enforcement technologies effective political exchange is more likely in good transactions environments policy bargains will be more easily renegotiated and therefore more flexible and durable to examine the expectations the author looks to the puzzle posed by events in australia and new zealand 1983 1996 facing similar macroeconomic crises and with historically similar wage bargaining institutions and levels of union density both elect labor governments which then make opposite choices a negotiated solution emerged in australia but not in new zealand relying on the secondary literature and interviews with key actors the author finds support for the transactions approach findings here point to ways in which to broaden the study of

when ideas trump interests preferences world views and policy innovations the contemporary approach to political economy is built around vested interests elites lobbies and rent seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public the role of ideas in shaping those interests is typically ignored or downplayed yet each of the three components of the standard optimization problem in political economy preferences constraints and choice variables rely on an implicit set of ideas once the manner in which ideas enter these frameworks is made explicit a much richer and more convincing set of results can be obtained in particular new ideas about policy or policy entrepreneurship can exert an independent effect on equilibrium outcomes even in the absence of changes in the configuration of political power

blockchain and the evolution of institutional technologies implications for innovation policy abstract for the past century economists have proposed a suite of theories relating to industrial dynamics technological change and innovation there has been an implication in these models that the institutional environment is stable however a new class of institutional technologies most notably blockchain technology lower the cost of institutional entrepreneurship along these margins propelling a process of institutional evolution this presents a new type of innovation process applicable to the formation and development of institutions for economic governance and coordination this paper develops a replicator dynamic model of institutional innovation and proposes some implications of this innovation for innovation policy given the influence of public policies on transaction costs and associated institutional choices it is indicated that policy settings conductive to the adoption and use of blockchain technology would elicit entrepreneurial experiments in institutional forms harnessing new coordinative possibilities in economic exchange conceptualisation of blockchain related public policy an innovation policy in its own right has significant implications for the operation and understanding of open innovation systems in a globalised context

revisiting legal realism the law economics and organization perspective the contrast between american legal realism which ran itself into the sand schlegel 1979 p 459 and the law and economics movement which is perhaps the most important development in legal thought in the last quarter century posner 1986 p xix is dramatic that the one foundered while the other flourished is explained in large measure by the absence of an intellectual framework for legal realism and the use by law and economics of the powerful framework of neoclassical economics

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

the political economy of inflation labour market distortions and central bank independence using the citizen candidate model we study the government s choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment we derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence the post election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher consistent with evidence for oecd countries many democratic societies delegate key tasks to non elected and independent institutions a prominent example being independent central banks the belief in the advantage of central bank independence is nursed by the cross country evi

do short term objectives lead to under or overinvestment in long term projects we examine managerial investment decisions in the presence of imperfect information and short term managerial objectives prior research has argued that such an environment induces managers to underinvest in long run projects we show that short term objectives and imperfect information may also lead to overinvestment and we identify how the direction of the distortion depends upon the type of informational imperfection present when investors cannot observe the level of investment in the long run project suboptimal investment will be induced when investors can observe investment but not its productivity however overinvestment will occur there has been in recent years substantial public debate on the question of whether the long run investment decisions of the managers of publicly traded companies may be distorted by market pressures recent work by economists has tried to identify the potential source and nature of such distortions research has naturally focused on situations that are characterized by i short term managerial objectives the managers are concerned not only with the firm s long run stock price but also with the firm s short run stock price due to incentive schemes or the fear of losing control and ii imperfect information the market has less information than the firm s managers about the firm s long run projects the results of this research have indicated that in some situations short term objectives and imperfect information may lead to underinvestment in long run projects this paper seeks to extend prior work on the effects of short term objectives and imperfect information on long run investment decisions we demonstrate that imperfect information together with an emphasis on a firm s short run valuation may lead not only to underinvestment but also to overinvestment in long run projects the direction of the distortion depends

real economy effects of short term equity ownership investor time horizon varies by company industry and economic system in this article we explore the importance of this variation by studying the impact of shareholder time horizon on the investment decisions of the firms they own and externalities on the wider market we demonstrate theoretically that short term shareholders cause boards to care about the path of the stock price rationalising firms pursuit of investments for signalling reasons at the expense of long term value we demonstrate that short termism has spillover effects leading to higher costs of equity capital bubbles in the price of input assets and predictable excess returns we build testable cross country hypotheses and evaluate these using existing evidence coupled with a new dataset on owner duration of us and germanic firms

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

constrained discretion in uk monetary and regional policy mcvittie e and swales j k 2007 constrained discretion in uk monetary and regional policy regional studies 41 h m treasury claims that the notion of constrained discretion which directs the effective operation of uk monetary policy applies equally to other delegated and devolved policies such as the use of regional development agencies in the delivery of english regional policy a transaction cost politics perspective is used to argue that the delegation of responsibility for monetary stabilization raises principal agent issues quite different to those encountered in the delegation of the responsibility for regional regeneration in particular the effectiveness and transparency that characterize present day monetary policy cannot be expected in regional policy further the institutional arrangements that accompany the operation of regional development agencies in england should be critically reviewed mcvittie e et swales j k 2007 la notion de discretion entravee dans les poli

meso economic filters along the policy chain understanding the links between policy reforms and rural poverty in latin america abstract the paper clarifies the meso economy concept by defining it as comprising both the market mechanisms and administrative procedures through which policy decisions and market signals trickle down to the household level three main bodies of literature are reviewed the policy oriented literature in which the meso economy was initially considered the transaction cost approach analyzing market and policy failures and the micro economy level of agricultural household models the paper develops a synthesis of macro meso and micro economic perspectives which focuses on the roles played by three levels of filters intervening along the policy chain implications for policy and research are drawn

local government consolidations the impact of political transaction costs local government in norway comprises a large number of small municipalities cost efficiency can be improved by consolidating local authorities and central government has designed a framework to stimulate voluntary mergers existing theories suggest that political transaction costs will impede consolidations 1 generous grants compensate diseconomies of scale central government has promised small municipalities that grant levels will be maintained but policy promises may not be credible 2 property rights to local revenues are nullified when consolidations have been implemented high revenue municipalities will therefore go against merger with a poorer neighbor 3 a consolidated local council may be composed of different political parties and it may therefore pursue other policies than an existing council expected changes in party strength can lead municipalities to oppose a proposed consolidation 4 senior politicians are less likely to support mergers particularly if they come from small polities

common agency contracting and the emergence of dqopen science dq institutions the cold war s ending has brought mounting pressures to recognize national science and technology research systems yet by comparison with what has been learned already concerning institutional arrangements and business strategies affecting corporate rd investments surprisingly little is known about the economic origins and effects of the corresponding institutional infrastructures shaping the world of academic science and the organization and conduct of publicly supported rd more generally the desirability of closing this particular lacuna in the economics and economic history literatures has been just as evident to economists concerned with extending the analysis of modern institutions as to those who have begun to approach the whole area of science and technology studies from the perspectives and methods of industrial organization economics 1 even before the new economics of science had begun to direct attention to such a program douglass north 1990 p 75 saw a significant challenge and a promising opportunity in explicit exploration of the connecting links between institutional structures and incentives to acquire pure knowledge the research reported here has accepted that challenge see also the other papers in this session timothy lenoir 1998 christophe lecuyer 1998 and marjory s blumenthal 1998 it is focused upon key episodes in the institutional evolution of public science and its complex and changing relationship to the other organizational spheres of contemporaneous scientific activity those in which research was conducted under proprietary rules for industrial profit goals and defense related science and engineering knowledge was sought under conditions of restricted access to information concerning methods findings and their actual and potential applications

credibility and reputation building in the developmental state a model with east asian applications abstract we use a game theoretic model to analyze the role of credibility reputation and investment coordination in a developmental state our model focuses on why a soft state serving narrow social groups so often obtains in less developed countries and under what conditions a hard or developmental state can emerge the model highlights the dilemma that although state and private sector alike may want economic growth both must simultaneously invest to achieve it but the equilibrium outcome analogous to the prisoner s dilemma is investment by neither even when initial conditions are favorable and a state is potentially developmental with the genuine capability to elicit private sector investment this may not materialize and an equilibrium of low or no investment will prevail to avoid this deadlock and foster growth the successful developmental state must demonstrate commitment by promoting its developmental credentials through a process of reputation building a consequent incentive to act tough together with seeming advantages of authoritarianism in implementing the developmental state may help to explain why it is often associated with an authoritarian political system

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

accounting information disclosure and the cost of capital in this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital despite the forces of diversification we build a model that is consistent with the capital asset pricing model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated we demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital both directly and indirectly the direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm s assessed covariances with other firms cash flows which is nondiversifiable the indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm s real decisions which likely changes the firm s ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market we show that this effect can go in either direction but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital

the theory of the firm as governance structure from choice to contract the propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists one reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why the prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle as developed herein the lessons of organization theory for economics are both different and more consequential when examined through the lens of contract this paper examines economic organization from a science of contract perspective with special emphasis on the theory of the firm

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information abstract we present a finite period general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information we say that a rational expectations equilibrium exhibits a strong bubble if the price is higher than the dividend with probability one we show that necessary conditions for a strong bubble to occur are that 1 each agent must have private information in the period and state in which the bubble occurs 2 each agent must be short sale constrained at some period in the future with positive probability and 3 agents trades are not common knowledge we present examples of bubbles when the necessary conditions are satisfied journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d52 d82 d84 g12 g14

an endogenous policy model of hierarchical government endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents each enjoying some degree of autonomy in this paper policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy a legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups the combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group s depends on the exchange between the same interest group s and the agent at the other tier our results concerning multi tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one tier lobbying in particular the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies moreover the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier it is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures like federations or firms

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

incentives choice and accountability in the provision of public services this paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profitoriented market model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the u k it uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission and discusses how decentralized service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non profits we also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality

information sharing in common agency when is transparency good when should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about the agent s unobservable effort for producing a public good in a model with two principals who offer linear incentive schemes we show that information sharing always increases total expected welfare if the principal who is less informed about the agent s effort also cares more about the agent s output if the less informed principal cares somewhat but not too much less than the other principal about the agent s output information sharing reduces total expected welfare in our model the efficient information regime emerges as an equilibrium outcome

a theory of jurisdictional assignments in bureaucracies 1 what determines the allocation of tasks among government agencies this paper develops a formal model of task allocation that argues that jurisdictions are strategically designed to achieve legislative goals in the model agencies choose unobservable policies and political outcomes are a noisy indicator of these choices the legislature therefore faces a compliance issue when the agencies policy preferences are different from its own the legislature exerts control by defining agency jurisdictions setting ex ante budgets and choosing ex post contractual inducements the principal result is that tasks will be consolidated under a single roof when that agency prefers lower levels of policy than the legislature in other cases separating tasks prevents resources from being allocated in a manner undesirable for the legislature

conflict resolution and social protection in an era of globalisation external dimensions to europe s social policy globalisation has marginalised many nations in the south there are systematic mechanisms via which this occurs it has also raised inequality between nations and polarised the world into rich and poor nations accompanying international economic marginalisation a simultaneous growth in violent internal conflict has taken place in developing countries from both the standpoint of common humanity and security considerations the marginalising and unequalising effects of globalisation need to be abated via measures to protect the vulnerable this will also help to stem the tide of internal conflict in the developing world in this connection europe along with its policies and interventions can be of value

modeling opec behavior theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions abstract theories of opec such as price leadership cartel or game theoretic models suggest an incentive for opec members to expand their production capacity well above current levels in order to maximize revenues yet individual opec members consistently explore for and develop oil fields at a level well below their potential the cause of low oil exploration and development efforts among opec members and even some non opec members may have to do with risk aversion this paper describes an alternative theory for opec behavior based on risk aversion using a two piece non neumann morgenstern utility function similar to fishburn and kochenberger 1979 decision science 10 503 518 and friedman and savage 1948 journal of political economy 56 the model shows possible low oil production behavior

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51

a behavioral understanding of investment horizon and firm performance observers have argued that firms overly emphasize short term results at the expense of long run value using a behavioral perspective we analyze three hypotheses related to this general argument first we examine the association of investment time horizons with firm performance contributing new theory that argues for a quadratic rather than linear association second because the tendency toward immediate results could reflect stock market pressures we consider how the interaction of investor patience and firm horizon relates to firm performance third we examine the argument s implication that most firms have investment horizons at a level where marginal increases in horizon associate positively with firm performance measuring horizon as the expected useful lives of capital expenditures we find empirical support for the hypothesized quadratic relation in a large scale multiyear sample of u s publicly held manufacturing firms and confirm that a majority of firms have horizons in the region where our models predict increases in horizon positively influence performance we also find that the most positive returns occur when long horizon investments are aligned with investor patience