bond liquidity premia recent asset pricing models of limits to arbitrage emphasize the role of funding conditions faced by financial intermediaries in the us the repo market is the key funding market then the premium of on the run u s treasury bonds should share a common component with risk premia in other markets

forward looking information in var models and the price puzzle abstract with a view to addressing the major disadvantage of the var model namely the inadequate description of the central bank reaction function we propose a var specification that proves successful in solving the price puzzle featuring in monetary vars for the us this specification consists in augmenting a standard var with two forward looking variables the federal funds futures rate or alternatively a money market forward rate reflecting monetary policy expectations and a composite leading indicator of economic activity these two variables appear to effectively control for the information set that the federal reserve may use in monetary policy decision making with this modification theory consistent responses to monetary policy shocks are obtained

stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers the regular case abstract we analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication e g vincent p crawford joel sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 and optimal delegation e g bengt holmstrom on the theory of delegation in m boyer r e kihlstrom eds bayesian models in economic theory north holland 1984 pp 115 141 a principal agent model with hidden information no monetary transfers and single peaked preferences we demonstrate that under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent s bias the optimal mechanism is deterministic we also provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism

idiosyncratic variation of treasury bill yields i document a dramatic increase in the importance of two types of variation in treasury bill yields beginning in the early 1980s the first is idiosyncratic variation in individual short maturity less than three months bill yields the second is a common component in treasury bill yields that is not shared by yields on other instruments such as short maturity privately issued instruments or longer maturity treasury notes and bonds some evidence suggests the first type reflects increased market segmentation these results have important implications for the calibration and testing of no arbitrage term structure models and interpreting tests of the expectations hypothesis united states treasury bill yields play a central role in economists efforts to understand the behavior of financial markets the focus on treasury bills is driven by the belief that bill yields can be viewed as benchmarks from which yields on other debt instruments are derived for example in no arbitrage models of the default free term structure the stochastic properties of the hypothetical instantaneous interest rate determine bond prices researchers often construct and evaluate these models using short maturity bill yields as proxies for instantaneous interest rates similarly bill yields are frequently used to test the expectations hypothesis of the term structure 2 economists standard pricing models for default risky securities also view treasury yields as building blocks in such models yields on default risky securities depend at least in part on the yields of default free securities and the underlying stochastic default process therefore yields on treasury bills have been used in studies of the effects of monetary policy on the business cycle not because bills are intrinsically critical to the economy but because

a model of target changes and the term structure of interest rates abstract we investigate the effects of short term rate targeting by the federal reserve on the term structure of interest rates and make contributions at two levels using a new series of interest rate targets made available by the federal reserve bank of new york we develop a family of models that highlight the implications of discrete changes in interest rate targets for the term structure of interest rates we show that spreads between short term rates and the overnight federal reserve funds rate are mainly driven by expectations of changes in the target not by the transitory dynamics of the overnight rate around the target hence the bias in tests of the expectations hypothesis that we document can be mainly attributed to the erroneous anticipation of future changes in monetary policy our modeling assumptions and newly available data make it possible to extract a series of market expectations of the next target change which are compared with a series of realized target changes

nonlinear mean reversion in the short term interest rate using a new bayesian method for the analysis of diffusion processes this article finds that the nonlinear drift in interest rates found in a number of previous studies can be confirmed only under prior distributions that are best described as informative the assumption of stationarity which is common in the literature represents a nontrivial prior belief about the shape of the drift function this belief and the use of flat priors contribute strongly to the finding of nonlinear mean reversion implementation of an approximate jeffreys prior results in virtually no evidence for mean reversion in interest rates unless stationarity is assumed finally the article documents that nonlinear drift is primarily a feature of daily rather than monthly data and that these data contain a transitory element that is not reflected in the volatility of longermaturity yields the drift of the short term interest rate is an important determinant of a wide variety of asset prices both inside and outside the boundaries of what is often called fixed income while volatilities may be estimated relatively accurately using high frequency observations of the short rate the short rate s extreme persistence makes identifying the true shape of the drift function a particularly elusive goal if our goal is merely to fit prices then the difficulty in estimating a drift function can be avoided by backing out implied drifts using a no arbitrage approach such as hull and white 1990 or heath jarrow and morton 1992 these methods bypass the true distribution entirely focusing on solving for the risk neutral drift function that is consistent with the cross section of bond prices if our goal however is to learn from prices and to be able to assess theories such as the expectations hypothesis that link short and long rates then estimating the drift function under the true measure is unavoidable in several recent articles a variety of sophisticated econometric techniques have been brought to bear on the problem in particular

political risk and the expectations hypothesis abstract this paper develops and empirically supports using 3 and 6 month interest rates a theory that political risk can explain the shifting term premia found in u s data we find that incorporating these political regime shifts yield results that support the expectations hypothesis

interest rate volatility and the term structure a two factor general equilibrium model we develop a two factor general equilibrium model of the term structure the factors are the short term interest rate and the volatility of the short term interest rate we derive closed form expressions for discount bonds and study the properties of the term structure implied by the model the dependence of yields on volatility allows the model to capture many observed properties of the term structure we also derive closed form expressions for discount bond options we use hansen s generalized method of moments framework to test the cross sectional restrictions imposed by the model the tests support the two factor model there are essentially two approaches to the modeling of the term structure of interest rates in continuous time the equilibrium approach pioneered by

china s official rates and bond yields abstract recent research shows that bond yields are influenced by monetary policy decisions to learn how this works in a bond market that differs significantly from those in the us and europe we model chinese bond yields using the one year deposit interest rate as a state variable we also include the spread between the one year market interest rate and the one year deposit interest rate as another factor the model is developed in an affine framework and closed form solutions are obtained we then test the model empirically with a markov chain monte carlo simulation procedure the results show that the new model that incorporates the official rate in china characterizes the changing shape of the yield curve well

pricing default swaps empirical evidence in this paper we compare market prices of credit default swaps with model prices we show that a simple reduced form model outperforms directly comparing bonds credit spreads to default swap premiums we find that the model yields unbiased premium estimates for default swaps on investment grade issuers but only if we use swap or repo rates as proxy for default free interest rates this indicates that the government curve is no longer seen as the reference default free curve we also show that the model is relatively insensitive to the value of the assumed recovery rate

voting power in the ec decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements abstract in this paper we study the voting power in the council of ministers of the ec the purpose of this paper is twofold first to evaluate the voting power for the member states of today s community and second to analyse the balance of power after two different enlargements of the community the analysis is based on the shapley shubik and the banzhaf power indices of simple cooperative games the modified version of the shapley shubik index is used to analyse how the sub systems of the ec can change the distribution of power in the decision making process

term premiums in bond returns abstract this paper examines expected returns on u s treasury bills and on u s government bond portfolios expected bill returns are estimated from forward rates and from sample average returns both estimation methods indicate that expected returns on bills tend to peak at eight or nine months and never increase monotonically out to twelve months reliable inferences are limited to treasury bills and thus to maturities up to a year the variability of longer term bond returns preempts precise conclusions about their expected returns

arbitrage and the expectations hypothesis this paper shows that all traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can be consistent with the absence of arbitrage if markets are incomplete a key implication is that the validity of the expectations hypothesis is purely an empirical issue the expectations hypothesis cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds one of the oldest and best known models in finance is the expectations hypothesis of the term structure introduced by fisher 1896 more than a century ago the expectations hypothesis has become a standard framework for explaining how yields of different maturities are related and it provides an important empirical benchmark from a theoretical perspective however the expectations hypothesis is not generally viewed as a viable model of the term structure in particular cox ingersoll and ross 1981 show that the traditional expectations hypothesis is actually a set of mutually exclusive propositions and offer a proof that most forms of the expectations hypothesis admit arbitrage recently mcculloch 1993 and fisher and gilles 1998 present counterexamples to the cox et al proof showing that the traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can be consistent with the absence of arbitrage they acknowledge however that their counterexamples are somewhat contrived and view them as economically implausible these results leave the impression that the expectations hypothesis is only consistent with the absence of arbitrage in pathological cases of little practical interest in this paper we argue that the expectations hypothesis is much more theoretically defensible than commonly believed an important point often overlooked is that the cox et al 1981 results are developed in an economic setting where bonds are redundant securities in the more realistic case where bond prices display security specific variation and there is mounting evidence of this traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can hold quite generally without arbitrage only weak conditions guaranteeing the existence of an equivalent martingale measure need be satisfied for the various forms of the expectations hypothesis to hold without arbitrage a key

macroeconomics and the term structure this paper provides an overview of the analysis of the term structure of interest rates with a special emphasis on recent developments at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance the topic is important to investors and also to policymakers who wish to extract macroeconomic expectations from longer term interest rates and take actions to influence those rates the simplest model of the term structure is the expectations hypothesis which posits that long term interest rates are expectations of future aver age short term rates in this paper we show that many features of the configuration of interest rates are puzzling from the perspective of the expectations hypothesis we review models that explain these anomalies using time varying risk premia although the quest for the fundamental macroeconomic explanations of these risk premia is ongoing inflation uncertainty seems to play a large role finally while modern finance theory prices bonds and other assets in a single unified framework we also consider an earlier approach based on segmented markets market segmentation seems important to understand the term structure of interest rates during the recent financial crisis jel e31 e43 e52 e58

the monotonicity of the term premium another look this paper reexamines existing evidence regarding the monotonicity of the term premium using a recently developed approach for testing inequality constraints we propose and conduct tests for whether the term premium is monotonic and reach different conclusions from those implied by individual t statistics on term premiums even under a bonferroni type adjustment our results generally support mcculloch s 1987 view that the liquidity preference hypothesis remains unrefuted

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

further analysis of the expectations hypothesis using very short term rates abstract longstaff longstaff f 2000 the term structure of very short term rates new evidence for the expectations hypothesis journal of financial economics 58 397 415 finds support for the expectations hypothesis at the very short end of the repurchase agreement repo term structure while other studies find calendar time based regularities cause rejection of the expectations hypothesis using longstaff s methods on a sample of repo rates that pre dates longstaff s sample we reject the expectations hypothesis for every maturity the pre longstaff sample repo data comes from a time period where the behavior of short term interest rates is similar to the long run average behavior of short term interest rates our results imply that expectations hold when rates are less volatile and or that we may be entering a period of lower volatility

asymmetric information and legislative rules some amendments we reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness when committees are heterogeneous full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule in contrast the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies when committees are homogeneous the situation is different all equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule furthermore the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence we also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization

special repo rates this article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements a repo rate is in effect an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument a special is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates this article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials this article characterizes competitive repurchase or repo markets and the equilibrium relationship between repo rates and the underlying cash market prices repurchase markets are often called financing markets since they are effectively vehicles for collateralized borrowing that are often used to finance the purchase of the underlying collateral this article provides causes and effects of specials meaning specific repo rates significantly below prevailing market interest rates for loans of similar maturity and credit risk the example of united states treasury instruments is emphasized because of the extensive use of the treasury repo market as a means of hedging against or speculating on changes in u s interest rates and because of the high incidence of specials in treasury repo rates numerous specific instru

what drives the swing voter in africa what makes african voters up for grabs existing approaches to the swing voter have several liabilities this article introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations the issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable africa using a count model estimation technique and original survey data from ghana s critical 2008 elections the analysis challenges the near consensus in african politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy when voters perceive politicians as providing collective developmental goods the efficacy of clientelism as a tool to win over voters is reduced many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collective goods thus contradicting the literature presenting these as mutually exclusive finally the analysis shows that incumbents do better when they provide collective goods even in highly clientelistic environments

preferred habitat for liquidity in international short term interest rates abstract risk shifting window dressing and a preferred habitat for liquidity have been offered as possible explanations as to why us money market rates are higher before the year end than afterwards the two hypotheses differ in the timing of the rate decline at the year end and the evidence on the timing of the decline supports the preferred habitat hypothesis in us money markets this paper extends this line of research to the behavior of international short term interest rates at year ends and quarter ends using london interbank offer rates libor for 11 different currencies the results suggest that the behavior of libor for five currencies the us dollar euro japanese yen swiss franc and german mark is consistent with year end or quarter end preferred habitats for liquidity other currencies do not demonstrate consistently distinct patterns in turn of the year and turn of the quarter yields none of the results provides any support for risk shifting window dressing

the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of very short term rates statistical tests and economic value this paper re examines the validity of the expectation hypothesis eh of the term structure of us repo rates ranging in maturity from overnight to three months we extend the work of longstaff 2000a in two directions i we implement statistical tests designed to increase test power in this context ii more importantly we assess the economic value of departures from the eh based on criteria of profitability and economic significance in the context of a simple trading strategy the eh is rejected throughout the term structure examined on the basis of the statistical tests however the results of our economic analysis are favorable to the eh suggesting that the statistical rejections of the eh in the repo market are economically insignificant

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

computing power indices for large voting games voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which different members have different numbers of votes although this approach to the measurement of power has been known for a long time its application to large games has been limited by the difficulty of computing these indices this paper presents a new method for computing power indices that combines exact methods with an approximate method due to owen this method is of most utility in situations where the number of players is large and the voting weights are concentrated in the hands of a small number of members

y2k options and the liquidity premium in treasury markets financial institutions around the world expected the millennium date change y2k to cause an aggregate liquidity shortage responding to the concern the federal reserve bank of new york auctioned y2k options to primary dealers the options gave the dealers the right to borrow from the fed at a predetermined interest rate using the implied volatilities of y2k options and the on off the run spread we demonstrate that the fed s action eased the fears of bond dealers contributing to a drop in the liquidity premium of treasury securities our analysis shows the link between the microstructure of government debt markets and the central bank s provision of liquidity we argue that y2k options and their effects on liquidity premium broadly conform to the economic theory on public provision of private liquidity

conditional time varying interest rate risk premium evidence from the treasury bill futures market existing studies of the term structure of interest rates often use spot treasury rates to represent default free interest rates however part of the premium in treasury rates is compensation for the risk that short sellers may default since treasury bill futures are default free they provide cleaner data to estimate the interest rate risk premium the mean excess return in defaultfree treasury bill futures is zero this suggests that the interest rate risk premium could be economically negligible we find that although the mean unconditional premium is zero futures returns contain economically and statistically significant time varying conditional interest rate risk premiums the conditional premium depends significantly positively on its own conditional variance and its conditional covariance with the equity premium the conditional premium is large in the volatile 1979 82 period but small afterwards

how much can marketability affect security values how marketability affects security prices is one of the most important issues in finance we derive a simple analytical upper bound on the value of marketability using option pricing theory we show that discounts for lack of marketability can potentially be large even when the illiquidity period is very short this analysis also provides a benchmark for assessing the potential costs of exchange rules and regulatory requirements restricting the ability of investors to trade when desired furthermore these results provide new insights into the relation between discounts for lack of marketability and the length of the marketability restriction

veto based delegation in a principal agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers i establish the veto power principle any incentive compatible outcome can be implemented through veto based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision this result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal 1 to design the default outcome and 2 to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent s decisions

market segmentation and the term structure of municipal yields an issue of considerable controversy in recent years is whether segmentation exists in the municipal bond market the presence of market segmentation suggests that securities can be subdivided into distinct groups according to some characteristic and there exists a lack of substitution between these groups on the part of borrowers and or investors 1 4 8 hendershott and kidwell 4 for example found evidence that market segmentation affected yields between regionally and nationally marketed municipal bond issues others contend that the municipal bond market is relatively efficient and no permanent segmentation effects can exist 2 9 most recently campbell 2 examined possible segmentation resulting from the large acquisitions of municipal securities by commercial banks and found that bank demand for municipal securities had no significant influence on the yield spreads between municipal bonds which differed in default risk term to maturity and tax treatment this is consistent with the argument that the combination of progressive personal income tax rates and fixed corporate income tax rates induces corporations to issue an amount of debt such that the marginal investor in taxable and tax exempt securities pays taxes at the full corporate rate 9 if segmentation does not exist two peculiar features of the term structure of municipal yields cannot be fully explained for one municipal yields have almost always increased monotonically with maturity this is true both for market averages of similarly rated municipal securities and for reoffering yields on individual serial

the term structure of interbank risk we infer a term structure of interbank risk from spreads between rates on interest rate swaps indexed to the london interbank offered rate libor and overnight indexed swaps we develop a tractable model of interbank risk to decompose the term structure into default and non default liquidity components from august 2007 to january 2011 the fraction of total interbank risk due to default risk on average increases with maturity at short maturities the non default component is important in the first half of the sample period and is correlated with measures of funding and market liquidity the model also provides a framework for pricing hedging and risk management of interest rate swaps in the presence of significant basis risk

beyond segmentation the case of china s repo markets this paper explores the reasons behind the discrepancy between interest rates in china s two repurchase agreement repo markets the interbank repo market and the exchange traded repo market the repo rates in the exchange market are at times significantly higher than those in the interbank market especially in the first three years of the 2000 2005 sample period while market segmentation clearly hinders arbitrage the causes of the repo rate discrepancy are related to the alternative investment opportunities available to market participants and to the volatility differences in the repo rates

when does coordination require centralization this paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag ers are privately informed and communicate strategically we consider a multi divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk the only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights we show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

the relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power in british companies a study of the application of power indices for simple g ames this paper reports an analysis of the relationships between shareholding and voting power distributions in a sample of british companies it applies two standard approaches to the measurement of power in simple games the shapley shubik and the banzhaf power indices the results indicate that power is more concentrated than ownership in every case a comparison of the two indices reveals that typically the banzhaf index gives a more concentrated power distribution for the shapley shubik index the power ratio for the largest shareholder is accurately described in terms of the size of holding and the concentration of the remainder the corresponding banzhaf power ratio is less dependent on these variables there is no association between power concentration and company size

municipal debt and marginal tax rates is there a tax premium in asset prices we study the marginal tax rate incorporated into short term municipal rates using municipal swap market data using an affine model we identify the marginal tax rate and the credit liquidity spread in 1 week tax exempt rates as well as their associated risk premia the marginal tax rate averages 38 0 and is related to stock bond and commodity returns the tax risk premium is negative consistent with the strong countercyclical nature of after tax fixed income cash flows these results demonstrate that tax risk is a systematic asset pricing factor and help resolve the muni bond puzzle

a daily view of yield spreads and short term interest rate movements daily data on short term interest rates are used to show how changes in federal reserve operating procedures have affected the term structure yield spreads were helpful in predicting short term interest rate movements during the nonborrowed reserves targeting period 1979 82 but not during the earlier federal funds targeting period since the adoption of contemporaneous reserves accounting in 1984 yield spreads have been informative about short term interest rate movements principally because of the interplay between the market determination of the overnight funds rate on reserve settlement wednesdays and the fed s apparent commitment to stabilizing the funds rate on other days copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

strategic transmission of costly information it is ofren the case that an individual s decision is at least partly based on information received from another and when the agents payoffs depend on both the former s decision and on the latter s information there is an incentive for the informed individual to attempt to bias the decision maker s decision in his or her favor by strategically manipulating the information transmitted in a seminal paper crawford and sobel 1982 hereafter c s study such strategic information transmission in the context of an abstract sender receiver game variants of the crawford and sobel model have been applied widely and as the application varies so often does the interpretation of type in some cases type refers to a preference parameter given by nature as for example in bargaining theory e g farrell and gibbons 1989 matthews 1989 whereas in other settings for instance legislative decision making or expert testimony type refers to more or less technical information concerning how decisions map into final consequences and as such is acquired information e g gilligan and krehbiel 1987 milgrom and roberts 1986 when the information has to be acquired it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly for otherwise there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed so long as the receiver can observe surely or at least accurately infer whether the sender is informed and so long as messages are cheap talk there is no issue here for strategic information transmission save whether to become informed at all however there are many circumstances when it is inappropri ate to assume the receiver has such knowledge one possibility is that a receiver may know that a sender has some relevant informa tion but be uncertain of the quality of this information a second perhaps more important possibility is that a receiver is unable to tell whether a potential sender is uninformed inter alia this problem constitutes the rationale for ignorance of the law being inadmissible as a legal defense were it admissible then informed miscreants would mimic uninformed transgressors leads voters to be skeptical of politicians claiming ignorance of illegal arms deals and makes the sec sensitive to problems in distinguishing insider trading from legitimate good judgement so there is an intrinsic asymmetry in that it is generally possible for say senders to verify possession of at least some information but it is typically prohibitively difficult to verify any lack of knowledge

the economics of clear advice and extreme options i study a principal agent model in which the agent collects information and then chooses a verifiable action i show that the principal can find it desirable to constrain the agent s action set even though there is no disagreement about the ranking of actions ex post the elimination or penalization of intermediate actions which are optimal when information is poor improves incentives for information collection i characterize optimal action sets when the agent is infinitely risk averse with respect to income shocks and optimal incentive schemes when the agent is risk neutral copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

new hope for the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates survey data on interest rate expectations permit separate testing of the two alternative hypotheses in traditional term structure tests that the expectations hypothesis fails and that expected future interest rates are ex post inefficient forecasts we find that the source of the spread s poor predictions of future interest rates varies with maturity at short maturities the expectations hypothesis fails at long maturities however changes in the yield curve reflect changes in expected future rates one for one an implication of the expectations hypothesis this result confirms earlier findings that long rates underreact to short rates but now it cannot be attributed to term premia if the attractiveness of an economic hypothesis is measured by the number of papers which statistically reject it the expectations theory of the term structure is a knockout most tests beginning with macaulay 1938 find no evidence supporting the expectations hypothesis 1 many cannot even reject statistically the alternative hypothesis that the spread between long and short rates contains no information about future interest rate changes 2 to make matters worse in u s postwar data future long rates tend to rise when short rates are above long rates since the expectations hypothesis would predict that long rates tend to fall the theory often does worse than even the naive model that future interest

liquidity taxes and short term treasury yields this article investigates differences in yields on identical treasury notes and bills and shows that they reflect differences in liquidity immediacy risk and taxes it proposes an empirical measure for differences in the liquidity risk of notes and bills the volatility ofthe underlying rate times the ratio of bills turnover to notes turnover because differential taxes affect sellers but not buyers of bills and notes the results reject free of informational problems the hypothesis that the notes demand curve is horizontal note bill yield differences also decrease with inventories of notes the less liquid asset

a defense of traditional hypotheses about the term structure of interest rates expectations theories of asset returns may be interpreted either as stating that risk premia are zero or that they are constant through time under the former interpretation different versions of the expectations theory of the term structure are inconsistent with one another but i show that this does not necessarily carry over to the constant risk premium interpretation of the theory i present a general equilibrium example in which different types of risk premium are constant through time and dependent only on maturity furthermore i argue that differences among expectations theories are secondorder effects of bond yield variability i develop an approximate linearized framework for analysis of the term structure in which these differences disappear and i test its accuracy in practice using data from the crsp government bond tapes in a well known article in this journal cox ingersoll and ross cir 4 reexamine and find wanting certain hypotheses about the term structure of interest rates a striking feature of cir s re examination is that it is entirely theoretical cir show that different versions of the pure expectations theory of the term structure which traditionally were regarded as equivalent are in fact inconsistent with one another when interest rates are random furthermore in a fairly general continuous time arbitrage pricing framework when interest rates are random all versions of the theory except one are incompatible with equilibrium at first sight cir s results appear to be devastating to traditional empirical work on the term structure they suggest that researchers must specify arbitrage pricing models with a small number of state variables before proceeding to empirical work such models must restrict not only the deterministic components

anticipations of monetary policy in financial markets in recent years financial markets appear better able to anticipate federal open market committee fomc policy changes beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s longer term interest rates and futures rates have tended to incorporate movements in the federal funds rate several months in advance in contrast to the largely contemporaneous response typically observed before that time after identifying these emerging trends the paper parses the enhanced predictability into a component that can be attributed to the autoregressive behavior of the funds rate and a nonautoregressive component the paper considers institutional developments in fomc policy making that may have contributed to each of these components including gradualism in adjusting the federal funds rate target and transparency regarding the setting of the target and future policy intentions

special repo rates an empirical analysis duffie 1996 examines the theoretical impact of repo specials on the prices of treasury securities and concludes that all else the same an issue on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue we examine this hypothesis and find strong evidence in support of it we also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with on the run issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect finally we investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to dealers are related to subsequent specialness and find that both variables are generally significant underlying the cash market for u s treasury securities is the financing or repo market at any given time the repo rate for most treasury issues the general collateral rate is the same but a few issues are typically on special an issue on special has associated with it a repo rate that is less than the prevailing general collateral rate as a result the owner of a security that is on special is able to obtain below market financing rates via a repurchase agreement duffie 1996 examines the theoretical causes of repo specials and their impact on the prices of treasury securities in the context of a general equilibrium model his primary conclusion is that specialness will be priced in the cash market meaning that all else the same an issue on special or likely to go on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue we investigate this hypothesis using data on repo specials and find clear evidence in support of it we conclude that specialness is priced and that the magnitude of the cash market premium reflects both the future duration and magnitude of repo specialness we also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with on therun issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect finally as a test of duffie s model we investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to nonbank primary dealers are related to subsequent specialness the evidence is consistent with predictions with both variables generally significant

continuity in mechanism design without transfers we adopt a mechanism design approach to model communication between a principal and a privately informed agent in the context where monetary incentives are not available we provide a simple condition on the distribution of the agent s type which ensures that the optimal mechanism is continuous with strict log concavity of the distribution there exists a unique optimal mechanism that is characterized

designing the voting system for the council of the european union this paper examines the system of qualified majority voting used by the council of the european union from the perspective of enlargement of the union it uses an approach based on power indices due to penrose 1946 banzhaf 1965 and coleman 1971 to make two analyses 1 the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness and 2 the question of how the threshold number of votes required for qmv should be determined it studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the nice treaty 1 no enlargement the eu comprising 15 member countries and 2 full enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates the proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine matter as the membership changes the analysis of how the threshold affects power shows the trade offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the council to act the main findings are 1 that the weights laid down in the nice treaty are close to being fair the only significant discrepancies being the under representation of germany and romania and the over representation of spain and poland 2 the threshold required for a decision is set too high for the council to be an effective decision making body

the term structure of very short term rates new evidence for the expectations hypothesis abstract empirical researchers have frequently rejected the expectations hypothesis the expectations hypothesis however has seldom if ever been tested at the extreme short end of the term structure where maturities are measured in days or weeks using overnight weekly and monthly repo rates i find that term rates are almost unbiased estimates of the average overnight rate this evidence provides new support for the expectations hypothesis

modeling the dynamics of chinese spot interest rates using the daily data of chinese 7 day repo rates from january 1 1997 to december 31 2008 this paper tests a variety of popular spot rate models including single factor diffusion garch markov regime switching and jump diffusion models we document that chinese spot rates are subject to both market forces and administrative forces garch regime switching and jump diffusion models capture some important features of the dynamics of chinese spot rates but all models under study are overwhelmingly rejected we further explore possible sources of model misspecification using diagnostic tests

a reexamination of traditional hypotheses about the term structure a comment an example of a continuous time economy is given whose general equilibrium term structure of interest rates obeys the expectations hypothesis for continuously compounded interest rates and returns contradicting the 1981 claim by cox ingersoll and ross that such an economy is mathematically impossible this example does not generate exploitable arbitrage opportunities of the type cox ingersoll and ross claim must arise the logarithmic expectations hypothesis as we call it it therefore an acceptable benchmark from which to measure term premia in continuous time term structure modeling the expectations hypothesis eh broadly construed postulates that expected returns on risk free bonds of different maturities are equal or equivalently that appropriately calculated forward interest rates equal expected future spot interest rates in comparing the expected returns on two bonds of different maturities however the returns may be compounded in any of four natural ways continuously to the shorter bond s maturity to the longer bond s maturity or to the nearest available future date it has long been understood that if the eh holds in terms of any one of these methods and if interest rates are stochastic jensen s inequality will in general preclude it from holding in terms of any of the other three in practice the convenience and simplicity of continuously compounded interest rates and returns have led many researchers e g roll 1970 mcculloch 1975 fama 1984 to use the first method and therefore what

the information content of eonia swap rates before and during the financial crisis abstract before august 2007 implied forward rates in the overnight interest swap rates closely reflected market expectations about the future path of the eonia and therefore about the future course of the ecb s monetary policy stance nevertheless this link was weakened considerably during the most acute episode of the financial crisis using the expectations hypothesis of the term structure as a benchmark model for the determination of the overnight interest swap rates we find that after may 2010 the monetary transmission mechanism was partially restored when the ecb implemented various unconventional measures in response to the financial crisis on the contrary liquidity and credit risks are still present in unsecured deposit markets distorting the pricing and transmission of the ecb monetary policy stance along the euribor rates these results should be of interest for regulators financial institutions and researchers in european money markets

optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary abstract this paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three tier principal intermediary agent hierarchy in this hierarchy monetary transfer is not feasible delegation is made sequentially and all players are strategic we characterize the optimal delegation mechanism it is shown that the single interval delegation a la holmstrom is optimal only when the intermediary is moderately biased otherwise as responses to the distortion caused by a biased intermediary the optimal delegation set may involve a hole thus multi interval delegation set would arise when subordinates have opposing biases this result sheds some light on policy threshold effects slight changes in the underlying state cause a jump in the policy responses

the monotonicity of the term premium abstract fama s evidence that the term premium on treasury securities is not monotonically increasing is found to depend entirely on the behavior of bid asked mean returns on 9 and 10 month bills and only during the subperiod 8 64 12 72 when transactions costs as reflected in the bid asked spread are taken into account there is found to be no way to exploit this non monotonicity the anomalous behavior of the quotations is attributed to the treasury s auctions of 9 month bills during the period 9 66 10 72 the hypothesis that the term premium is a monotonically increasing function of maturity remains unrefuted

the effect of the term auction facility on the london interbank offered rate abstract the term auction facility taf the first auction based liquidity initiative by the federal reserve during the global financial crisis was aimed at improving conditions in the dollar money market and bringing down the significantly elevated london interbank offered rate libor the effectiveness of this innovative policy tool is crucial for understanding the role of the central bank in financial stability but academic studies disagree on the empirical evidence of the taf effect on libor we show that the disagreement arises from mis specifications of econometric models regressions using the daily level of the libor ois spread as the dependent variable miss either the permanent or temporary taf effect depending on whether the dummy variable indicates the events of the taf or the regimes before and after an taf event those regressions also suffer from the unit root problem and produce unreliable test statistics by contrast regressions using the daily change in the libor ois spread are robust to the persistence of the taf effect and the unit root problem consistently producing reliable evidence that the downward shifts of the libor ois spread were associated with the taf the evidence indicates the efficacy of the taf in helping the interbank market to relieve liquidity strains

disappointment aversion term structure and predictability puzzles in bond markets we solve a dynamic equilibrium model with generalized disappointment aversion preferences and continuous state endowment dynamics we apply the framework to the term structure of interest rates and

repo market effects of the term securities lending facility the term securities lending facility tslf was recently introduced by the federal reserve to promote liquidity in the financing markets for treasury and other collateral we evaluate one aspect of the program the extent to which it has narrowed repo spreads between treasury collateral and lower quality collateral we find that tslf operations have precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads more refined tests indicate the market conditions and types of operations associated with the program s effectiveness various additional tests including a split sample test suggest that our findings are robust

when does coordination require centralization corrigendum the equations on page 153 of when does coordination require centralization which appeared in the march 2008 issue of the american economic review failed to print in their entirety the complete text of section iii decision making appears below

around and around the expectations hypothesis we show how to construct models of the term structure of interest rates in which the expectations hypothesis holds mcculloch 1993 presents such a model thereby contradicting an assertion by cox ingersoll and ross 1981 but his example is gaussian and falls outside the class of finite dimensional markovian mode ls we generalize mcculloch s model in three ways i we provide an arbitrage free characterization of the unbiased expectations hypothesis in terms of forward rates ii we extend this characterization to a whole class of expectations hypotheses and iii we show how to construct finite dimensional markovian and non gaussian examples in one form or another the expectations hypothesis has played a central role in the analysis of the term structure of interest rates perhaps the most common form of the expectations hypothesis is the so called unbiased expectations hypothesis u eh which asserts that forward rates equal the conditional expectations of future spot rates but other forms exist as well cox ingersoll and ross cir 1981 characterize a number of mutually incompatible forms of the expectations hypothesis besides the u eh including the local expectations hypothesis l eh under which the expected rate of return on all zero coupon bonds on all assets in fact equals the short term risk free rate see jarrow 1981 for a similar analysis of the various expectations hypotheses they consider cir claim that only the l eh is consistent with general equilibrium in continuous time models as well as in discrete time models with continuous compounding of yields mcculloch 1993 provides a counterexample to cir s claim his example is in the spirit of heath jarrow and morton hjm 1992 in the sense that it does not admit a representation in terms of a finite number of markovian state variables the setting in cir indeed mcculloch suggests that cir s claim may be true within their setting as we show it is not there is a weak version of the u eh according to which forward rates are biased predictors of future spot rates but the bias or term premium is a constant that only depends on the forecast horizon a regression of future spot rates on current forward rates produces a slope coefficient equal to fisher is with the board of governors of the federal reserve system and gilles is with bear stearns co the views expressed herein are the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the board of governors or the federal reserve system we thank greg duffee and huston mcculloch for extensive comments and an anonymous referee for suggesting improvements in the exposition

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

nominal term structure and term premia evidence from chile abstractthe downwards trend exhibited in chile s nominal term structure since 2003 has been a common pattern shared by other developed and developing economies to understand the behaviour of the nominal yield curve in chile we rely on an affine dynamic term structure model which allows the term structure to decompose into the expected short term interest rate related to the monetary policy expectation and the term premium we show that most of the fall of long term interest rates as well as its dynamics are related to the term premium rather than the expected short term interest rate moreover we find evidence that term premium is driven primarily by the us term premium and domestic nominal uncertainty derived from expected inflation

optimal limited authority for principal abstract this article studies a principal agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent we show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal biased toward the agent s preference generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain compared to no commitment limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent as a result it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent

the term structure of commercial paper rates this paper tests the expectations hypothesis in the market for commercial paper our main dataset which is new to the literature consists of daily indexes constructed from the actual market yields for nearly all commercial paper issued by u s corporations between january 1998 and august 2003 we show that the term premia built into commercial paper yields rise dramatically at year end causing the expectations hypothesis to be rejected however once we control for these predictable year end eects we nd the reverse that commercial paper yields largely conform with the expectations hypothesis