a dominance approach to the appraisal of the distribution of well being across countries abstract this paper proposes a dominance approach to study inequality of well being across countries we consider a class of well being indices based on the three attributes used in the hdi human development index indices are required to satisfy preference for egalitarian marginal distributions of income health and education alep substitution of attributes and priority to poor countries in allocating funds to enhance health and education we exhibit sufficient conditions for checking dominance over the defined class of well being indices we apply our method to country data from 2000 to 2005 the deterioration in health conditions in poor countries is why welfare improvements at the world level cannot be ascertained

is there a global market for convertible bonds prior to 1984 the stock price reaction to announcements of convertible issue in the domestic market was significantly negative while the reaction to issues on the eurobond market was smaller in absolute value and not consistently negative after 1984 this difference in stock price reactions seems to have disappeared the difference in abnormal returns before 1984 cannot be explained by existing signaling models of convertible bond issues it is consistent however with the hypothesis that american firms captured some of the tax advantage of eurobonds relative to domestic bonds before the change in u s withholding taxes in july 1984 copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

price commitment in search markets abstract this paper studies the formation of pricing rules in search markets at a cost each seller can commit himself to a fixed price if he takes no actions to preclude haggling his sales price is determined through bilateral negotiations with the buyer the selection of pricing rules exhibits strategic complementarities that may give rise to multiple equilibria differences in trading practices across countries and cultures may thus be consistent with equilibrium behavior in bazaar markets where the buyer s cost of switching sellers is relatively low most of the trade is conducted via bargaining and prices are close to the perfectly competitive outcome

the market reaction to international cross listings evidence from depositary receipts abstract this paper examines the stock price impact of international dual listings the sample consists of 181 firms from 35 countries that instituted their first depositary receipt program over the period 1985 1995 the market reaction to a depositary receipt program is larger in magnitude and more pervasive than previously reported the stock price reaction is related to choice of exchange geographical location i e emerging or developed markets and avenues for raising equity capital i e public versus private offerings

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

price dispersion with directed search we model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity constrained sellers sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price we study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up we characterize the sale price distribution parametrically studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares we also determine endogenously

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

state dependent pricing inflation and welfare in search economies abstract we investigate the welfare effects of inflation in economies with search frictions and menu costs we first analyze an economy where there is no transaction demand for money balances money is a mere unit of account we determine a condition under which strictly positive inflation is desirable we relate this condition to a standard efficiency condition for search economies second we consider a related economy in which there is a transaction role for money in the absence of menu costs the friedman rule is optimal in the presence of menu costs the optimal inflation rate is negative for our numerical examples provided menu costs are small a deviation from the friedman rule can be optimal depending on the extent of the search externalities

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

ethically robust comparisons of bidimensional distributions with an ordinal attribute abstract we provide foundations for robust normative evaluation of distributions of two attributes one of which is cardinally measurable and transferable between individuals and the other is ordinal and non transferable the result that we establish takes the form of an analogue to the standard hardy littlewood polya theorem for distributions of one cardinal attribute more specifically we identify the transformations of the distributions which guarantee that social welfare increases according to utilitarian unanimity provided that the utility function is concave in the cardinal attribute and that its marginal utility with respect to the same attribute is non increasing in the ordinal attribute we establish that this unanimity ranking of the distributions is equivalent to the ordered poverty gap quasi ordering introduced by bourguignon 12 finally we show that if one distribution dominates another according to the ordered poverty gap criterion then the former can be derived from the latter by means of an appropriate and finite sequence of such transformations

the eurobond market and corporate financial policy abstract on average significant positive abnormal returns are associated with eurobond issues during the period 1975 1985 the cross sectional and time series distributions of the abnormal returns are consistent with the hypothesis that impediments to the adjustment of asset supplies to new demand conditions are large enough to create profitable financing opportunities for firms our analysis demonstrates how profitable financing opportunities can persist on the eurobond market and when they are most likely to arise

the price effect of option introduction this paper examines the price effect of option introduction from 1974 to 1980 the introduction of individual options causes a permanent price increase in the underlying security beginning approximately three days before introduction the price effect appears to be associated with introduction and not announcement throughout the sample period excess returns volatility declines with option introduction systematic risk is unchanged there is a positive relation between the price increase and a measure of activity in the options market copyright 1989 by american finance association

incomplete information bargaining with outside opportunities we consider two kinds of outside opportunity that a seller of an indivisible good might have selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself in both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer s valuation and becomes more pessimistic over time when the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic she prefers the outside opportunity so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer despite the resulting finite horizon nature of negotiations the link between the buyer s willingness to accept an offer and the seller s eagerness to go outside generates multiple equilibria

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

announcement effects of convertible bond loans and warrant bond loans an empirical analysis for the dutch market abstract this study investigates the announcement effects of offerings of convertible bond loans and warrant bond loans using data for the dutch market the event study analysis shows that announcement effects of convertible bonds are associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns and that announcements of warrant bonds are associated with significant positive abnormal returns these findings are similar to the results for japanese hybrid debt as reported by kang et al 1995 kang j k kim y c park k j stulz r m 1995 journal of financial and quantitative analysis pp 257 270 and kang and stulz 1996 kang j k stulz r m 1996 review of financial studies pp 109 139 but they contrast with studies for the united states that generally find significant negative abnormal returns for convertible bond loans and insignificant negative abnormal returns for warrant bond loans our results cannot be attributed to differences in the corporate governance structures of the netherlands and the united states we find that the positive abnormal returns for the warrant bond loans are caused by the packaging of the announcements with other good firm specific news

equality of opportunity theory and measurement during the last third of the twentieth century political philosophers actively debated about the content of distributive justice the ruling ethical view of utilitarianism was challenged by various versions of equality of opportunities economists formulated several ways of modeling these ideas focusing upon how individuals are placed with respect to opportunities for achieving various outcomes and what compensation is due to individuals with truncated opportunities after presenting a review of the main philosophical ideas section 2 we turn to economic models sections 3 and 4 we propose a reformulation of the definition of economic development replacing the utilitarian measure of gdp per capita with a measure of the degree to which opportunities for income acquisition in a nation have been equalized finally we discuss issues that the econometrician faces in measuring inequality of opportunity briefly review the empirical literature section 6 and conclude section 7

price setting and competition in a simple duopoly model the paper studies a market in which there are two sellers and one buyer each agent wants to trade at most one unit of an indivisible commodity the sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving offers from one or both of them at any given time this model induces competitive and monopolistic outcomes for particular parameter values but other things being equal as the buyer becomes very patient the equilibrium price converges to the competitive one

the evolution of world inequality in well being in this paper we use the tools offered by the recent literature on multidimensional inequality measurement to investigate the evolution of the inequality in well being across different countries during 1975 2000 we focus on three important dimensions of life standard of living health and education inequality in the three dimensions shows a different trend during 1975 2000 we propose a flexible measure of well being to quantify the evolution of overall intercountry well being inequality the empirical results are sensitive to different normative choices on the trade offs between the different dimensions especially the concave transformation of income turns out to be decisive for the evolution of world inequality in well being

robust multidimensional poverty comparisons we demonstrate how to make poverty comparisons using multidimensional indicators of well being showing in particular how to check whether the comparisons are robust to aggregation procedures and to the choice of multidimensional poverty lines in contrast to earlier work our methodology applies equally well to what can be defined as union intersection or intermediate approaches to dealing with multidimensional indicators of well being to make this procedure of some practical usefulness the paper also derives the sampling distribution of various multidimensional poverty estimators including estimators of the critical poverty frontiers outside which multidimensional poverty comparisons can no longer be deemed ethically robust the results are illustrated using data from a number of developing countries

strategic pricing consumer search and the number of firms discover prices there are three distinct price dispersed equilibria characterized by low moderate and high search intensity the effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour expected prices price dispersion and welfare are sensitive i to the equilibrium consumers search intensity and ii to the status quo number of firms for instance when consumers search with low intensity an increase in the number of firms reduces search does not affect expected price leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare in contrast when consumers search with high intensity increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms a question that has received much attention in economic theory is how the number of competitors and market outcomes are related despite the existence of work showing the contrary see e g satterthwaite 1979 rosenthal 1980 the prediction that emerges from a market where firms interact in a cournot fashion has come to dominate economic thought namely that an increase in the number of competitors leads to larger aggregate production lower market price and improved market performance measured in terms of some social welfare criterion ruffin 1971 this paper challenges the generality of this belief by presenting an oligopoly model with consumer search where the equilibrium expected price may be constant increasing or nonmonotonic in the number of firms we present an economy with two types of consumers consumers who search for prices at no cost fully informed and consumers who must pay a fixed search cost for each price quotation they observe less informed 1 all buyers have the same willingness to pay for the good and buy either a single unit or nothing at all on the supply side of the market there are n firms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost we analyse a one shot simultaneous move game firms set prices and consumers decide how many prices to search for at the same moment in time our model is essentially an oligopolistic version of burdett and judd 1983 where some consumers search costlessly in this model consumers search using a fixed sample size search strategy i e they choose the number of prices to observe before receiving any offer nonsequential search is appealing when consumers find it more advantageous to gather price information quickly morgan and manning 1985 this occurs when the search outcome is observed with delay and delay is costly for instance an mba graduate looking for a job 1 the presence in the model of consumers who search costlessly captures the fact that some people have a

ex ante price offers in matching games non steady states a matching problem is considered in which sellers can publicly commit to a trading price that differs from the price at which buyers expect to trade elsewhere in the market when demand and supply are nearly equal the equilibrium ex ante price offer lies below the price associated with the nash bargaining split this relationship reverses when the level of excess demand is large sellers always have an incentive to make ex ante offers when prices elsewhere are determined by nash bargaining this can be interpreted to mean that nash bargaining is an unstable pricing institution copyright 1991 by the econometric society

the comparison of multi dimensioned distributions of economic status the literature on inequality measurement has been largely concerned with single dimensioned indicators this paper explores some of the issues which arise when there are several dimensions to inequality and these are not readily reduced to a single index concentrating particularly on the two dimensioned case we make use of results on multi variate stochastic dominance in portfolio theory extending these and applying them to the measurement of inequality the use of the dominance conditions is illustrated by an application to the international distribution of income and life expectancy

an empirical analysis of incremental capital structure decisions under managerial entrenchment abstract we study incremental capital structure decisions of dutch companies from 1977 to 1996 these companies have made 110 issues of public and private seasoned equity and 137 public issues of straight debt managers of dutch companies are entrenched for this reason a discrepancy exists between managerial decisions and shareholder reactions confirming zwiebel american economic review 1996 1197 1215 we find that dutch managers avoid the disciplining role of debt allowing them to overinvest however the market reactions show that this overinvestment behavior is recognized we do not find a confirmation of the adverse selection model of myers and majluf journal of financial economics 1984 187 221 this is probably due to the entrenchment of managers and the prevalence of rights issues

fixed or flexible wage setting in search equilibrium why do some vacancies offer a posted wage whereas others offer a negotiable wage the paper endogenizes the choice of wage policy in a standard sequential search model with heterogeneous workers in particular we identify circumstances such that there exists an equilibrium in which all firms negotiate wages we find that this equilibrium exists if and only if the labour market is sufficiently tight and worker heterogeneity is sufficiently large

robust multidimensional spatial poverty comparisons in ghana madagascar and uganda spatial poverty comparisons are investigated in three african countries using multidimensional indicators of well being the work is analogous to the univariate stochastic dominance literature in that it seeks poverty orderings that are robust to the choice of multidimensional poverty lines and indices in addition the study seeks to ensure that the comparisons are robust to aggregation procedures for multiple welfare variables in contrast to earlier work the methodology applies equally well to what can be defined as union intersection and intermediate approaches to dealing with multidimensional indicators of well being furthermore unlike much of the stochastic dominance literature this work computes the sampling distributions of the poverty estimators to perform statistical tests of the difference in poverty measures the methods are applied to two measures of well being the log of household expenditures per capita and children s height forage z scores using data from the 1988 ghana living standards study survey the 1993 national household survey in madagascar and the 1999 national household survey in uganda bivariate poverty comparisons are at odds with univariate comparisons in several interesting ways most important it cannot always be concluded that poverty is lower in urban areas in one region compared with that in rural areas in another even though univariate comparisons based on household expenditures per capita almost always lead to that conclusion

an analysis of the wealth effects of japanese offshore dollar denominated convertible and warrant bond issues offshore dollar denominated equity linked issues were a more important source of funds for japanese companies during the 1980s than domestic equity and straight debt issues combined using a sample of japanese equity linked offshore issues from 1977 to 1989 we find that the announcement of these issues is accompanied by a significant positive abnormal return this contrasts with evidence that u s equity linked issues have a significant negative stock price reaction we provide an explanation for the difference in stock price reactions between u s and japanese issues that is based on the greater influence on managers security issue decisions of long term investors and banks in japan than in the u s

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries we consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale if buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers this in turn induces the seller to bargain at length with buyers even if doing so is costly when the seller s cost of soliciting another round of offers is either very large or very small the seller credibly commits to an auction and experiences negligible bargaining costs otherwise there may be several rounds of increasing offers and significant seller losses in these situations an intermediary with a sufficiently valuable reputation and or weak marginal incentives regarding price can create value by credibly committing to help sell the object without delay

bargaining search costs and equilibrium price distributions this paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions consumers choose a seller at random and face search costs to switching to another store in the market equilibrium the prices at all stores are determined simultaneously as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game in this game the buyer has the outside option to search for another seller differences between the sellers types create price dispersions typically the number of active sellers increases with higher search costs the market equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium under perfect information when search costs become small