credit constraints equity market liberalizations and international trade abstract this paper provides evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of international trade flows i exploit shocks to the availability of external finance and examine the impact of equity market liberalizations on the export behavior of 91 countries in the 1980 1997 period i show that liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets this result is not driven by cross country differences in factor endowments and is independent of simultaneous trade policy reforms moreover it obtains with equal strength in the full panel of countries as well as in both panel and event study analyses of countries which removed capital controls during the sample period finally the effects of liberalizations are more pronounced in economies with initially less active stock markets indicating that foreign equity flows may substitute for an underdeveloped domestic financial system similarly opening equity markets has a greater impact in the presence of higher trade costs caused by restrictive trade policies

banking deregulation and industry structure evidence from the french banking reforms of 1985 we investigate how the deregulation of the french banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets following deregulation banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities at the industry level we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms and a decline in concentration overall these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a schumpeterian process of creative destruction many economies around the world are characterized by heavily regulated bank

pre emptive corruption hold up and repeated interactions this paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance the firm may offer a bribe to pre empt the inspection corruption is unfeasible in the one shot game because of inspector hold up in an infinitely repeated game we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy in this model the most likely bribe givers are not the firms that benefit the most from the illegal behaviour furthermore strengthening anti corruption policies has ambiguous welfare effects because it improves compliance only among a subset of firms and increases monitoring effort

credit market imperfections and patterns of international trade and capital flows this paper offers two simple models to illustrate how corporate governance contractual enforcement and the balance sheet condition of the business sector etc can affect the patterns of international trade and capital flows in the presence of credit market imperfections jel d52 f15 f21 f40

the good the bad and the regulator an experimental test of two conditional audit schemes conditional audit rules are designed to achieve regulatory compliance with fewer inspections than required by random auditing a regulator places individuals into audit pools that differ in probability of audit or severity of fine and species transition rules between pools future pool assignment is conditional on current audit results we conduct an experiment to compare two specific schemes harrington s past compliance targeting and friesen s optimal targeting against random auditing we find a production possibility frontier between compliance and minimizing inspections optimal targeting generates the lowest inspection rates as predicted but random auditing the highest compliance past compliance targeting is intermediate

irs as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints the model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models in particular the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative also it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance the government can increase welfare by playing the role of loan shark to people whose borrowing is constrained on the private market

an economic analysis of tax amnesties abstract tax amnesties have frequently been justified as politically popular ways to generate increases in government revenue this paper examines the circumstances under which amnesties are likely to have a beneficial impact on revenue collections it concludes that while in general it may be correct to impose a reduced penalty on individuals who voluntarily disclose tax evasion shortlived amnesties of the type most frequently observed in practice are unlikely to generate genuinely additional revenue particularly when judged against the potential danger of reducing future tax compliance

facilitating the provision of farm credit the role of interlocking transactions between traders and zamindars in crop marketing systems in sindh abstract formal credit institutions in pakistan have largely failed to provide access to farm credit to small and medium scale landowners or zamindars this paper examines interlocked transactions between traders and landowners in the cotton and wheat markets in sindh that facilitate the provision of credit by traders it is concluded that the case examined provides an example where traders lend to landowners in a segment of the credit market that approximates competitive behavior without surplus extraction by traders key conditions resulting in this favorable outcome are the existence of both competition for market share and information sharing on borrowers between traders whether this outcome is also beneficial for other rural groups who may borrow from landowners in particular sharecropping tenants is independent of market relations between landowners and traders and is not determined here

graduated punishments in public good games a host of social situations feature graduated punishments we explain this phenomenon by studying a repeated public good game in which a social planner imperfectly monitors agents to detect shirkers agents cost of contributing is private information and administering punishments is costly a low punishment today imperfectly sorts agents by type only low cost agents contribute the planner uses this information optimally punishing tomorrow s alleged repeat shirkers harsher than rst time shirkers the threat of becoming branded as repeat oender allows the planner to use a very mild punishment for rst time shirkers attenuating the costs associated with administering punishments graduated punishments are consequently socially optimal as long as the population is not too homogeneous

quota enforcement in resource industries self reporting and differentiated inspections quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions however in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non compliance we develop an enforcement model of a quota regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget we propose a new enforcement system based on self reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history we use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self report excess extraction this system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction in addition inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare

can punishment generate specific deterrence without updating analysis of a stated choice scenario this study explores the specific deterrence generated by punishment in the context of regulatory violations with a focus on the distinction between upward revisions to future punishment parameters likelihood and severity and the experience of being penalized in order to avoid the pitfalls of empirically analyzing actual choices made by regulated entities e g measuring entities beliefs regarding the likelihood and size of future penalties our study examines behavior associated with a stated choice scenario presented within a survey distributed to the environmental managers of facilities regulated under the us clean water act this choice of respondents strengthens the external validity of our empirical results based on a variety of statistical methods our empirical results strongly and robustly reject the standard hypothesis that specific deterrence stems solely from upward revisions to punishment parameters while supporting the alternative hypothesis of experiential deterrence whereby facilities focus on recent experiences to shape their compliance behavior

why do manufacturing facilities introduce environmental management systems improving and or signaling performance abstract in this paper we explore the motivation for the introduction of environmental management systems and their certification a distinction is drawn between their role in bringing about better compliance or improved performance and as external indicators of good environmental practices to both other market participants and regulatory authorities drawing upon a database of approximately 4000 facilities in seven oecd countries empirical evidence is found for the role that both factors play in encouraging the adoption and certification of ems s but that the relative importance of different factors varies according to facility size

regulatory dealing revisiting the harrington paradox abstract despite the fact that i when the epa observes regulatory violations it rarely pursues the violator and ii the expected penalty faced by a violator who is pursued is small compared to the cost of compliance it is still the case that iii firms comply a significant portion of the time winston harrington harrington w 1988 enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted journal of public economics 37 29 53 provides a dynamic model consistent with this apparent paradox we offer an alternative rationalisation in a model of regulatory dealing in which the agency uses tolerance in some contexts to induce increased compliance in others the observed tolerance of the epa to non compliance may be a strategic response by the agency to a difficult enforcement environment rather than evidence that it has gone soft on pollution or been captured by industry interests we use the model to consider the impact of the growing trend towards citizen suits and ngo enforcement of regulation arriving at some unconventional conclusions we argue that the model is consistent with existing empirical analyses

threatened species as public goods and public bads an application to wild predators in sweden this paper discusses pareto efficient allocations of an environmental commodity which is both a public good and a public bad with an application to the scandinavian problem of conserving wild predators that are killing semi domesticated reindeer the paper begins by briefly outlining this conflict this is followed by a theoretical analysis employing a diagrammatic tool called the kolm triangle which is an analogue of an edgeworth box in an economy with a public good bargaining pareto improving reallocations and the shape of the pareto set are discussed using a simple model where one of the agents is involountarily contributing to a public good the paper concludes with an analysis of income loss compensations and incentives for illegal hunting of predators

inequality earnings and participation among the poor in rural india emphasising that there is a relative dimension to deprivation an attempt is made here to decompose income inequality among the rural poor into inequality in earnings per worker in participation rate and covariance of earnings per worker and participation rate from this decomposition the effects of small changes in inequality in earnings per worker and in participation rate on income inequality are evaluated the analysis is based on a cross section of rural households in 1970 71 the samples of poor cultivating households and poor casual agricultural labour households are analysed separately for each of two regions based on a classification of villages in terms of technological advancement

measurement error and state dependent pollution control enforcement abstract a two group model of state dependent enforcement is applied to identical firms which minimize the expected present value of costs and fines measurement error affects the probabilities of transitions between groups and the receipt of fines it is shown that state dependent enforcement can reduce social cost below the level attainable with static enforcement and that differentiation in both monitoring probabilities and standards may be optimal however setting fines for both groups at the maximum is likely to be optimal comparisons between models and alternative model interpretations are offered

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted a reconsideration under asymmetric information abstract harrington harrington w 1988 enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted journal of public economics 37 29 53 offers an explanation for how relatively high compliance rates might co exist with low expected fines his results are highly dependent on the assumptions that all firms are identical and their compliance costs are known this paper shows that harrington s results are not necessarily robust in a more general model where asymmetric information and uncertainty are present

forced commerce and agrarian growth abstract the paper explains why contractually interlocked agrarian markets differ from price and quantity adjustments under pressures of excess demand supply in neoclassical general equilibrium analysis such contractual interlocking arising say from the indebtedness of the peasants gives rise to a contrived system of forced commerce this commercial mode of exploitation not only exhibits unequal relations of economic power but more important it is also a mechanism for maintaining such unequal power structure often at the cost of retarding agrarian growth the paper thus emphasizes the need to understand the very notion of market exchange and commerce in backward agriculture from an unconventional viewpoint

penalty structures and deterrence in a two stage model experimental evidence multiperiod models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of becker 1968 generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining we present the first experimental test of a two stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures this prediction is based on the belief that if the penalty for the first offenses is sufficiently low the agent should commit the offense and continue to offend if undetected our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior jel c91 k42 k10

a reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted abstract harrington s 1988 model of state dependent enforcement of pollution standards indicates the potential for significant reductions in monitoring cost however this approach results in firms with identical pollution cost functions polluting at different levels and thereby failing to minimize control cost for a given total pollution reduction derivations indicate that a state independent approach with a modified standard will often yield a lower sum of pollution control and monitoring cost for a given level of pollution control

interlocking transactions obstacles precursors or instruments of agrarian capitalism abstract rural labor arrangements often change rapidly and in ways that prevailing theories cannot explain explicit understanding of the exercise of power in rural society sheds considerable light on how and why rural labor arrangements change in the course of economic development this paper shows how different labor tying arrangements embody exclusionary mechanisms that can serve as instruments of both labor management and social control macro political and economic conditions shape the ways in which these mechanisms operate and are in turn influenced by them viewing labor arrangements in this way helps resolve problems confronted by the prevailing theories and allows for a broader understanding of dynamic processes

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

indirect tax evasion and product efficiency though a number of papers have considered the issues of income tax evasion few have considered indirect tax evasion one of the exceptions is a paper which considers the very special case of a risk averse monopolist producer the present paper addresses the issue of indirect tax evasion in competitive markets evasion in such a market is shown to be associated with production inefficiency the results also suggest that laffer type curves could arise due to evasion

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

testing market integration new approaches with case material from the west bengal food economy given the inferential dangers of received methods a new methodology is introduced to provide a sequence of tests using weekly spot prices to examine the dynamic relationship of market commodity prices in three locations in west bengal tests suggest that the markets are integrated but a lower degree of integration of paddy and rice prices is identified the hypothesis of full market integration is rejected structural and institutional factors which affect the specifics of performance are identified physical isolation the institutional complexity of marketing systems and contractual forms the polarisation of assets assets specificity the institutional control of information and price formation the underdevelopment of linked markets and the idiosyncratic implementation of state regulatory policy and auto regulatory responses enter the explanation

niskanen effects in the california community colleges the regression results of this paper show that bureaucrats act to maximize both their outputs and their discretionary budgets as predicted by niskanen for demand constrained conditions but the evidence does not confirm the niskanen hypothesis concerning chronic oversupply by bureaus further the evidence here shows that the discretionary budgets of bureaus may not fall to zero as suggested by niskanen instead it would appear that given severe budget constraint bureaus may not produce an excess supply of output and may cut costs in an effort to maintain a positive discretionary budget balance

income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma based model of tax evasion abstract this paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma based model of tax compliance the paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge precisely multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous because the social coordination effect dominates the individual characteristics effect numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two step audit policies on the part of the tax agency under the presumption that the best or good equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria as a byproduct the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two step audit policy the equilibrium compliance and fiscal revenue is analyzed

permanent versus interim regulations a game theoretic analysis abstract when a regulator anticipates learning about the benefits or costs of regulations over time questions can be raised about the appropriate regulatory policy this paper compares permanent and interim regulations in a setting with initially uncertain pollution damages a fixed capital input and costly enforcement the analysis shows that neither policy is first best conditions under which one policy dominates the other are identified with the help of a simulation the results indicate that permanent regulations may be preferable to interim regulations even when there is substantial uncertainty about damages

emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking abstract in this laboratory experiment on emissions trading subjects face exogenous random emissions shocks after making production and emission control plans in some sessions subjects can bank their unused permits for future use after a reconciliation trading period following the shock realization subjects report their emissions to the regulatory authority and are placed in different inspection groups depending on their compliance history we identify important interactions between banking compliance and enforcement banking smoothes out the price variability arising from imperfect emissions control price stability comes at a cost however since noncompliance and emissions are significantly greater when banking is allowed

using competition to stimulate regulatory compliance a tournament based dynamic targeting mechanism abstract this article develops a tournament based dynamic targeting mechanism for achieving regulatory enforcement leverage in contrast to existing models which rely on a representative agent we model a game among a regulated group of agents possibly heterogeneous in their levels of a regulated activity that compete through their compliance decisions to avoid being targeted for future audits the empirical properties of the dynamic tournament are established using economics experiments in particular we test comparative statics highlight the importance of inducing competition through comparisons with a non competitive standards based targeting mechanism and demonstrate enforcement leverage through comparisons with simple random audits the experiments suggest that the dynamic tournament induces incentives consistent with theory and overall we find that introducing competition in the regulatory enforcement arena may have important advantages

noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets some extensions abstract this paper extends the results of previous research on transferable discharge permit tdp markets with noncompliant firms to make a specific comparison between standards and tdp systems when regulatory authorities are unable to achieve full compliance particular attention is given to the importance of the shape of the penalty function facing noncompliant firms the analysis indicates that under plausible penalty functions tdp markets may allow more pollution or a higher fraction of regulated firms out of compliance these results highlight the importance of implementation in the success of pollution control strategies relying on tdp markets

the competitive effects of credit constraints in the global economy as credit constraints exclude some firms from external finance and thus from market entry they affect prices and markups by altering the degree of competition lower credit constraints allow less productive firms to enter with the following consequences on the one hand more competition tends to reduce average prices but on the other hand less productive firms charge above average prices the overall effect is thus ambiguous we therefore formulate and structurally estimate a quantitative multi country version of the model to gauge the direction and magnitude of the effects of credit constraints in a model with variable firm specific markups over marginal costs in a sample of 11 european countries manufacturing sectors between 2000 and 2005 we find that an abolishment of credit constraints reduces markups by about 6 1 on average while average prices are predicted to increase by 1 6 the latter indicates that the effect of credit constraints on productivity dominates the one on competition

a model of optimal fines for repeat offenders abstract this paper analyzes optimal fines in a model in which individuals can commit up to two offenses the fine for the second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense there are four natural cases in the model defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the offense in the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first time offenders in another case it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders and in the two remaining cases the optimal penalty does not change

self service activities and formal or informal market services household can provide themselves with services in different ways generally a household can produce a service itself or buy it on a formal or informal market on an informal market services are sold at a price substantially lower than on a formal market because of tax evasion by both consumer and producer this article investigates the choices made by dutch households with respect to three services small home repairs car repair and maintenance and ladies hairdressing the analysis shows that the mode of provision of the services is influenced not only by financial considerations but also by the ability of the household to engage in home production skills for and attitudes towards home production and the availability of informal market services in the local area

honesty is sometimes the best policy this paper examines two central points in the economics of tax evasion if the taxation authorities have reason to believe that tax is being illegally evaded how far should they go in pursuit of the missing income and what roles should thoroughness of investigation and severity of penalties play in the pursuit of that income previous contributions have examined the positive economics of various control instruments on tax payers behaviouri the degree of threat or the level of policing required to enforce truthful reporting and the desirability of different types of policy in terms of tax payers expected utility some writers have investigated the design of sophisticated investigation schemes to maximise expected government receipts or to enforce truthful reporting at low resource cost the approach adopted here is to examine the desirability of various combinations of policy instruments in the context of an explicit model of social welfare it is not self evident that honesty is desirable from the point of view of the government if honesty is desirable it is not obvious that people should be forced to be completely honest and it is not obvious how they ought to be forced the desirability of an economic policy depends on two major issues which are sometimes left submerged the objectives of the government or its agents and the constraints under which such objectives must be pursued the objective is often assumed to be a simple form of ex ante expected utility this is surprising since value systems other than utilitarianism are frequently invoked in the design of tax systems and so it seems reasonable to

the enforcement of pollution control laws inspections violations and self reporting targeting is the practice of inspecting firms most likely to violate a regulation this paper provides empirical evidence on the role of targeting in regulatory compliance i propose that self reporting by a firm is used to demonstrate that firms are willing to cooperate the results indicate that there is a one quarter penalty period following a violation inspections are also determined by the economic situation of the surrounding community demonstrating that targeting opens the door to interest group influence inspections that detect violations encourage self reporting showing that firms demonstrate their desire to cooperate with regulators by disclosing violations

enforcement costs and regulatory reform the agency and firm response influenced by models of optimal law enforcement several authors have recently revised the work on efficient levels of regulatory control to accommodate the realities of underenforcement and imperfect compliance however most of these efforts have centered on either the enforcement agency or the firm and have largely ignored the decentralized nature of the enforcement process this paper extends these results by modelling both the firm and the local agency and by incorporating detection uncertainty and concealment activity each model is then evaluated with respect to the alternative regulatory regimes of direct controls and emission taxes

effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion we investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance we explore this through a formal leniency program in our experiment we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework we not only study the effect of the presence of such a mechanism on behavior but also the dynamic effect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency we find that in the presence of a leniency mechanism subjects collude and accept bribes less often while paying more taxes but there is no increase in bribe offers our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases the collusion and bribe acceptance rate and increases the collected tax yield it also does not encourage bribe offers in contrast the removal of the institutional mechanism does not induce negative effects suggesting a positive spillover effect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been removed

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement abstract i study whether incomplete enforcement of a regulation has any impact on the choice between price e g taxes and quantity e g tradeable quotas instruments results indicate that a second best design accounting for incomplete enforcement can be implemented equally well with either instrument as long as the benefit and cost curves are known with certainty if these curves are uncertain to the regulator however the quantity instrument performs relatively better than the price instrument the reason is that the effective amount of control under the quantity instrument is no longer fixed which makes this instrument come closer to a non linear instrument

implicit interest rates usury and isolation in backward agriculture the unusually high interest rates in many backward agricultural regions have been a source of some puzzlement to economists adding to this puzzle is the fact that these rates can take on a wide range of values often within the same region one important question is why arbitrage between sectors does not lead to more homogeneous and lower interest rates the traditional answer to this is in terms of lender s risk it is argued that moneylenders in backward regions face a great risk of default and once this is taken into account the effective interest rate turns out to be no higher than its counterpart in the organised sector consequently there is no real room for arbitrage and the high interest rates are equilibrium prices while this explanation may be of use in some situations it is in general inadequate and can even be misleading the reason which novelists describing rural india have repeatedly written about is that in these financial transactions the lender s risk frequently ranges from minimal to non existent because the personalised relation between the borrower and the lender enables the latter to extract the defaulted loan in the form of asset transfers from the borrower in a somewhat stylised manner these deals could be thought of as follows a peasant takes a loan from his employer keeping some of his assets like land a standing crop or even the promise of labour services as security or collateral a collateral price is then fixed this is the conversion price used to calculate the amount of collateral that has to be relinquished to the lender given a certain amount of default clearly the lower the collateral price the larger the quantity of collateral that the peasant has to forfeit hence the underpricing of collateral amounts to the charging of an implicit interest a widespread feature of rural credit markets reported in many diverse studies bardhan and rudra 1978 myint 1964 raj 1981 roth 1979 and sivakumar 1978 to mention just a few is the underpricing of collateral an interesting attempt to bring collateral explicitly into a model of usury was made by bhaduri 1977 see also 1983 who argued that one of the reasons why landlords raise interest rates is in fact to encourage default and to claim ownership of the asset kept as collateral a sharp contrast to the lender s risk model this hypothesis has deservedly received much attention 1

corporate environmentalism and environmental statutory permitting abstract studies have shown that despite infrequent inspections and low penalties for statutory violations a large fraction of firms comply with environmental restrictions what then motivates compliance i investigate this question by focusing on the length of time it takes environmental agencies to process and issue new source construction permits pursuant to clean air act regulations and new industrial discharge permits pursuant to clean water act regulations i find that plants or firms with fewer instances of noncompliance receive permits for major projects more quickly in addition i find that permit delays are sensitive to economic conditions as well such as local area unemployment as far as voluntary pollution control behavior is concerned i find that regulators that issue permits for plant modifications focus primarily on statutory compliance but when permitting new plant construction where there is no plant compliance history to go on voluntary pollutant releases do matter

economic returns to social power merchants finance and interlinkage in the grain markets of bangladesh abstract the paper describes contrasting forms of interlinked transaction and the exchange regimes in which they are situated in two rural areas of bangladesh a fast growing green revolution area and a slow growing backward area some interlinkages fix output and finance prices for producers others establish personalized monopsony in trade the implication for rates of return and vulnerability of the different forms of interlinked transaction are explored perverse risk transfer from less to more vulnerable parties is found particularly when interlinkages are combined the market structures described appear to emerge not from government intervention but from the uneven distribution of local power and are thus unlikely to be improved by structural adjustment reforms or by price focused policies

moral political economy and moral reasoning about rural india four theoretical schools compared this paper explores a pluralist approach to moral economy in two ways firstly as a review four major schools of thought on the rental of land in india are described i focus on their normative and ontic assumptions secondly noting that none of these schools is value neutral a plurality of six complex moral reasoning strategies emerge from this review the advantage of the social researcher doing an overview of these normative positions is that we can compare and contrast the meta criteria that are used the six moral reasoning strategies are a neoliberal growth strategy a human capabilities approach a redistribution approach a transformative approach a social equality approach and a pareto optimality approach the study of these six strategies leads toward the conclusion that more research on complex moral reasoning strategies is called for because combining them rapidly leads to difficulties scientific research can provide evidence to underpin and shape the moral reasoning that takes place in real world dialogues and debates

cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment abstract when pollutants are persistent and the polluter has private information regarding the occurrence of accidental releases and the cost of clean up we show that the penalty regime which most effectively protects the environment will involve penalties which are less than maximal the extent to which these penalties will be less than maximal is interestingly a non monotonic function of the persistence of the hazardous substance being handled with the highest penalties being appropriate in the case of pollutants of medium persistence our analysis complement consisting work which predicts that setting the penalties faced by some classes of violator below their maximal level may be compliance enhancing see for example harrington journal of public economics 1988 37 29 53 greenberg journal of economic theory 1984 32 1 13 kambhu journal of regulatory economics 1989 1 103 114

optimal pollution standards and non compliance in a dynamic framework in this paper we present a stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime at each time the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non compliance with the pollution limit and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions we derive two main results first we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases while both emissions and the level of non compliance decrease second we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm s capital investment is socially desirable we numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount which crucially depends on the severity of the fine in the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment

audit state dependent taxpayer compliance theory and evidence from colombia we develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts audit state dependent taxpayer compliance by distinguishing between forward looking versus myopic versus naive behavior we then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in colombia we find that subjects compliance rates increase with greater enforcement we also find more novel results fine rates should be increased after an audit and nudging myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority jel h26 c91

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

the economics of taxpayer compliance there is now a great deal of evidence suggesting that tax evasion is fairly widespread throughout european and north american economies estimates of the so called black economy indicate that perhaps 10 per cent of economic activity in these countries has been driven underground in the attempt to evade payment of tax for a detailed survey see pyle 1989 chs 2 4

bargaining in environmental regulation revisited abstract we explore the possibility that firms and regulators achieve cooperative agreements in environmental regulation we show that it is possible that firms choose cleaner technologies in exchange for reductions of the fines for non compliance with environmental standards interestingly the likelihood of achieving these agreements depends negatively on the monitoring costs positively on the external damages and non monotonically on the differences among the eligible technologies and the maximum sanctions for violating the standards

when is quality of financial system a source of comparative advantage abstract dominant theories of trade tend to ignore the role of finance as a source of comparative advantage on the other hand the finance literature places financial institutions as a driver of economic growth this paper unites these two competing schools of thought in a general equilibrium framework for economies with high quality institutions defined by the competitiveness of the financial sector the quality of corporate governance and the level of property rights protection finance is passive on the other hand for economies with low quality institutions the quality of the financial system is an independent source of comparative advantage interestingly the conventional measure of financial development the size of the financial market relative to gdp does not adequately capture the underlying quality of financial institutions in addition free trade may reduce the aggregate income in south financial capital tends to flow from south to north

corruption tax evasion and the laffer curve in a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators it is shown that in somecircumstances this may bring about laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue i e a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment further a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration these outcomes become more likely

the two part instrument in a second best world abstract standard pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions first many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two part instrument 2pi a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution it is a generalization of a deposit refund system drs second a different literature concerns the second best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions here we combine the two extensions by looking at the second best 2pi when government needs revenue is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller we find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions and we compare these to the rates in a first best model the tax subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect an environmental effect and a revenue effect the model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2pi we also discuss important caveats

incentive generating state dependent penalty system the case of income tax evasion abstract penalty systems can very often be looked upon as corrective measures established in order to eliminate or reduce costly externalities generated by optimizing economic agents hence penalties can be viewed as regulatory measures and their efficient structure should be of interest to economists we propose a dynamic incentive generating penalty system which if instituted may reduce at a given cost the generation of undesirable externalities the special case to which we refer is income tax evasion although our scheme should be applicable to any kind of externalities such as pollution of the environment violation of antirust laws and others which are created by repititive actions of economic agents

the desirability of a permanent tax amnesty abstract there are two main concerns about tax amnesty first if it is anticipated it may increase cheating and reduce the efficiency of the tax system second amnesty may be inequitable by letting cheaters off the hook however several federal governments currently hold a policy of long term or permanent tax amnesty in apparent defiance of these concerns this paper examines fully anticipated tax amnesty and finds that it is possible for a permanent tax amnesty to actually increase rather than decrease the efficiency and equity of the tax system

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

an experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement evidence suggests that a large majority of firms and individuals comply with regulations and tax laws even though the frequency of inspections and audits is often low moreover fines for noncompliance are also typically low when regulatory violations are discovered these observations are not consistent with static compliance models harrington 1988 modified these static models by specifying a dynamic game in which some agents have an incentive to comply even when the cost of compliance each period is greater than the expected penalty this paper reports a laboratory experiment based on the harrington model framework in which subjects move between two inspection groups that differ in the probability of inspection and severity of fine subjects decide to comply or not in the presence of low medium or high compliance costs enforcement leverage arises in the harrington model from movement between the inspection groups based on previous observed compliance and noncompliance our results indicate that consistent with the model violation rates increase when compliance costs become higher and as the probability of switching groups becomes lower behavior does not change as sharply as the model predicts however since violation rates do not jump from 0 to 1 as parameters vary across critical thresholds a simple model of bounded rationality explains these deviations from optimal behavior

community pressure for green behavior the desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to behave in an environmentally responsible manner firms may engage in corporate social responsibility csr to maintain community support and or to regain the support of a community where it has been lost it has been conjectured that such informal regulation could effectively replace formal intervention in some settings and usefully complement it in others we explore these conjectures with mixed results informal regulation is necessarily less efficient than a well designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behavior induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare the existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal calibration of a formal intervention in this case an environmental tax and may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally calibrated tax

subgame perfect punishment for repeat offenders i introduction the literature on optimal law enforcement typically assumes that the government can commit to sanction schemes 1 this means the government can use any set of threats to penalize wrongdoers in particular if a crime occurs the government actually sanctions the wrongdoers even though ex post it may have no incentive to do so potential wrongdoers believe that the government will carry out the threat at any cost and therefore do not engage in the act in the first place in this article i give up the assumption that the government can commit to whatever sanction scheme i consider the analysis of optimal sanctions without the possibility to commit important because judges often have a lot of discretion as to the size of the penalty they may for example adjust sanctions to the financial possibilities age education and so on of the wrongdoer accordingly i allow only for sanctions that the government actually wishes to implement should a crime have occurred ruling out full commitment changes the optimal enforcement schemes suppose for example the government does not care about the sanction as is typically assumed in the literature then it will not enforce the penalty if a crime has happened given that there is say a small cost of doing so the rational criminal will anticipate the ex post enforcement behavior of the government therefore she will commit the crime because the threat of being sanctioned is not credible once one drops the commitment assumption the typical deterrence equilibria of the law enforcement literature between potential wrongdoers and the government are based on empty threats in the language of game theory the equilibria are not subgame perfect or time consistent i study the problem of subgame perfect sanctions using the framework of emons 2003 agents may commit a crime twice the act is inefficient the agents are thus to be deterred the agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the possible sanction for the second offense and vice versa the agents may follow history dependent strategies that is commit the crime a second time if and only if they were were not apprehended the first time the government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension ignoring the government s commitment problem it is optimal to set the sanction for the first offense equal to the entire wealth of the agents while the sanction for the second offense equals zero the intuition is as follows a money penalty imposed for the second offense reduces the amount a person can pay for the first offense because the wealth available to pay penalties is assumed to be fixed over the two periods for that reason a higher probability event namely a first offense that is detected will be more effective use of the scarce money penalty resource than a lower probability event namely a second detected offense why is the probability of detection lower for the second rather than for the first crime simply because an agent faces the possibility of being sanctioned for the second crime if and only if he or she has already been sanctioned the first time for further results it is important to note that the optimal probability of apprehension increases with the benefit from the crimes this decreasing sanction scheme raises of course the issue of time consistency will the government really charge the agent the entire wealth when she was apprehended for the first crime knowing that then she will commit the second act for sure isn t it better for the government to renege and charge little for the first act so that the agent still has sufficient wealth to pay a sanction that deters the second crime given that the first act has been committed anyway that way the government can at least deter the second act to study this problem i consider a rent seeking government

to comply or not to comply pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning in this paper we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard a probability of inspection and a fine for non compliance in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly and the penalty may include gravity and non gravity components at the regulator s discretion under given penalties the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met non compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages interestingly the appropriate structure of the penalty under non compliance is highly progressive while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear if the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance

market institutions trust and norms exploring moral economies in nigerian food systems informal market institutions and small scale traders are responsible for feeding nigerian cities this study analyses a range of economic relationships and institutions that have evolved in the context of inadequate formal institutions such as banks and legal contracts through examining both personal relationships and institutional based trust the paper explores the role of moral norms trust is shown to be related to sanctions information on other parties and a range of norms that are drawn on both calculatively and habitually the perceived moralities of different forms of institution such as credit systems trader associations and commission agents are also examined

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts