factors influencing the incidence of bribery payouts by firms a cross country analysis this article explores micro and macro level variables that influence the incidence of bribery payouts by firms a rich data set with information from 55 countries was utilized to achieve this objective results of logit regression models indicate that there are a number of micro and macro level factors that significantly affect the incidence of bribery payouts this suggests that it is not only the characteristics of a firm but also the environment of doing business that affect the firm s bribery decision the results of this study provides information that may help firms develop strategies to reduce corruption in their respective industries and thereby improve their image of corporate social responsibility the analysis also points to possible policy directions that governments could undertake in order to reduce the incidence of bribery in their country

the rule of law and economic growth where are we summary it is widely assumed that the rule of law is essential for economic growth however the rule of law is clearly a multidimensional concept encompassing a variety of discrete components from security of person and property rights to checks on government and control of corruption we review the theory underlying these different causal mechanisms linking the rule of law to economic growth and provide an introduction to some outstanding measurement issues we find that the correlation among different components of the rule of law concept are not tight among developing countries and that some inferences about the effects of property rights protection may not be warranted

is the efficiency wage efficient the social norm and organizational corruption the effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption we model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem we find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect the snowball effect which intensifies the corruption effect this intensified effect due to the snowballing character of social norms may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm jel classification d82 j41

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

corruption norm violation and decay in social capital the paper studies the link between corruption and social capital measured as trust using data from a lab experiment subjects play either a harassment bribery game or a strategically identical but differently framed ultimatum game followed by a trust game in a second experiment we elicit social appropriateness norm of actions in the bribery game and ultimatum game treatments our experimental design allows us to examine whether subjects who have been asked to pay a bribe are less likely to trust than those in an isomorphic role in the ultimatum game we also uncover the underlying mechanism behind any such behavioral spillover results suggest that a there is a negative spillover effect of corruption on trust and the effect increases with decrease in social appropriateness norm of the bribe demand b lower trust in the bribery game treatment is explained by lower expected return on trust c surprisingly for both the bribery and ultimatum game treatments social appropriateness norm violation engenders the decay in trust through its adverse effect on belief about trustworthiness

corruption s direct effects on per capita income growth a meta analysis corruption is a symptom of weak institutional quality and could have potentially adverse effects on economic growth however heterogeneity in reported findings makes it difficult to synthesize the evidence base with a view to test competing hypotheses and or support evidence based policy and practice to address this issue we have extracted 327 estimates of corruption s direct effect on per capita gdp growth from 29 primary studies following a peer reviewed and pre published systematic review protocol precision effect and funnel asymmetry tests indicate that corruption has a negative effect on per capita gdp growth after controlling for publication selection bias and within study dependence however multivariate meta regression analysis results indicate that the overall effect is not robust to inclusion of moderating variables through a general to specific procedure for model specification we report that the marginal effect of corruption on per capita gdp growth is more adverse when the primary study estimates relate to long run growth are based on low income country data only and extracted from journal papers the effect is less adverse in studies that use the international country risk guide corruption perceptions index and in those reporting estimates from two stage least squares estimations

legislative organization and pollution taxation the role of political institutions in shaping public policy has been analyzed in isolation from corruption and legislative organization specifically bicameralism has received minimal attention we analyze pollution taxation when decisions are influenced by several veto players such as legislative chambers our theory predicts that an increase in the number of veto players e g moving from uni to bi cameralism pushes the pollution tax towards the social optimum with the effect being conditional on corruption as such dispersion around the optimal tax is lower under bicameralism empirical tests using data from 86 countries support the theory

bad loans to good friends money politics and the developmental state in south korea why has the literature on asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in south korea how can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in south korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999 politics is central to the answer in this study i make two arguments first money politics was extensive in south korea both during and after the high growth era second political not economic considerations dominated policymaking this study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987 while during the park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control the transition to democracy altered the basic business state relationship allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions the political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state

the role of the family in immigrants labor market activity an evaluation of alternative explanations comment most research on the labor market outcomes of immigrants has studied the behavior of individuals focusing primarily on the wage assimilation process or the excess returns to experience which immigrants obtain in their destination country s labor market e g barry r chiswick 1978 george j borjas 1985 recently however attention has been directed to analyzing immigrant labor market outcomes in a family context an approach which combines information about an individual s own labor market opportunities and the family context in which labor market decisions take place in a previously published paper in this review michael baker and dwayne benjamin 1997 evaluate alternative explanations for the observed labor supply patterns of canadian immigrants in the 1986 1991 period specifically when immigrant husbands arrive in canada they typically work less than comparable natives however immigrant wives work more than natives other things equal with assimilation the labor supply of immigrant husbands eventually catches up to that of natives while immigrant wives labor supply falls relative to comparable natives and is ultimately overtaken by that of natives the authors take these patterns to be most consistent with a family investment model in this scenario upon arrival husbands invest in their human capital while wives work to provide the family with liquidity during this investment period with increased time in canada husbands labor supply increases rapidly due to their growing skills in the canadian labor market while wives labor supply falls off in part because they originally took dead end jobs upon arrival in order to finance their husbands investments in human capital interestingly while most of the findings reported by baker and benjamin are consistent with the family investment model their estimated wage equations are not although they do not comment on this in discussing the appropriateness of the family investment model specifically they find similar rates of wage assimilation for husbands and wives this finding suggests roughly equal propensities to invest in one s own human capital for both groups this is contrary to the family investment hypothesis and does not match their story of dead end jobs for wives and large human capital investments of their husbands an alternative possible explanation for the patterns observed by baker and benjamin involves a simple price model in which the observed labor supply patterns reflect laborsupply responses to each spouse s wages for example the initially high but eventually falling level of wives labor supply relative to comparable natives could be a response to their husbands initially low but rising wages while this reasoning like the family investment model is broadly consistent with the data the authors conclude that the simple price model cannot be the entire explanation since in order to explain the full labor supply patterns of immigrants it would require unrealistically high labor supply elasticities and further that the assimilation patterns noted above remain even when wages of husband and wife are controlled blau school of industrial and labor relations cornell university 265 ives hall ithaca ny 14853 and nber and cesifo kahn school of industrial and labor relations cornell university 264 ives hall ithaca ny 14853 and cesifo moriarty school of industrial and labor relations cornell university ilr graduate student mailboxes ives hall ithaca ny 14853 souza faculdade de economia administracao e contabilidade university of sao paulo avenida professor luciano gualberto 908 cidade universitaria predio fea 1 sao paulo sp 05508 brazil the authors thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions portions of this paper were written while blau and kahn were visiting scholars at the russell sage foundation to which they are grateful for research support

a comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets abstract this paper compares bribery to competitive bidding in a government purchasing context while competitive bidding is one method of procurement bribery is a common alternative in many third world countries although bribery is often considered to be the ethical antithesis of competitive bidding the analysis shows there is a fundamental isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the transaction

corruption centralization and the shadow economy in their pioneering work on corruption shleifer and vishny 1993 find that a centralized bureaucracy results in lower bribes our paper extends the analysis to economies with formal and informal sectors when corrupt officials operate in both sectors bureaucratic centralization is beneficial when confined to the formal sector however we show that crosssector centralization can result in higher bribes and lower welfare furthermore contrary to choi and thum 2005 we demonstrate that depending on the organization of the bureaucracy and the productivity of the informal sector the presence of the shadow economy may have adverse effects on corruption and welfare

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

wage setting patterns and monetary policy international evidence abstract systematic differences in the timing of wage setting decisions among industrialized countries provide an ideal framework to study the importance of wage rigidity for the transmission of monetary policy synchronization in wage setting decisions is prevalent in japan and the united states yielding varying degrees of wage rigidity within the year instead in france germany and the united kingdom decisions are more uniformly spread over time exploiting within year variation in the timing of wage setting decisions in these economies we find support for the long held but scarcely tested view that wage rigidity plays a critical role in the transmission of monetary policy

economic growth with endogenous corruption an empirical study the effect of corruption on the rate of economic growth for a panel of countries during 1984 2007 is investigated using recent improvements in dynamic panel data techniques to control for the endogeneity of corruption and investment corruption has a significant effect on the growth rate of real per capita income this effect is non linear

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

threshold effects of corruption theory and evidence summary we examine the impact of corruption on the quality of public infrastructure we propose a model in which private vendors supply governments with inputs necessary for the production of public goods asymmetric information between the two parties creates opportunities for vendors to earn profits these profits can be re distributed to government bureaucrats without impacting on the contractual form as long as firms do not operate at a loss thus corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods only when it crosses a threshold these results are examined in a sample of up to 125 countries consistent with our theory we find strong evidence of a corruption threshold

some results for the comparative statics of steady states of higher order discrete dynamic systems abstract higher order discrete dynamic systems arise naturally in many economic models in which the problem at hand requires an explicit treatment of dynamics involving lags of more than one period in studying such models one type of analysis that economists are often interested in is the assessment of the signs and the magnitudes of the effects of a change in the parameters of the dynamic system on the stable steady states of the system this paper presents some results for such comparative statics analysis brief remarks explain the results and illustrate their potential economic usefulness

organized crime corruption and punishment we analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment when bribing costs are low that is badly paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates indeed beyond a threshold further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime

changes in the labor supply behavior of married women 1980 2000 using march current population survey data we investigate married women s labor supply from 1980 to 2000 we find a large rightward shift in their labor supply function for annual hours in the 1980s with little shift in the 1990s these shifts account for most of the slowdown in the growth of labor supply during this period a major development was the dramatic decrease in the responsiveness of married women s labor supply to their own and husbands wages their own wage elasticity fell by 50 56 while their cross wage elasticity fell by 38 47 in absolute value

the impact of corruption on entry strategy evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies with globalization and the growth in emerging economies multinational enterprises mnes now frequently confront challenges associated with corrupt governments already a growing body of research has demonstrated that corruption significantly reduces a countrys aggregate inflows of foreign direct investment through its effects on firm performance we move the analysis of corruption from aggregate financial flows toward managerial theory and practice by examining how firms adjust their strategy for entering foreign markets in corrupt environments and how different types of corruption affect firms choices building on institutional theory we predict that mnes will respond to pervasive and arbitrary corruption in a host country by selecting particular types of equity and nonequity modes of entry using data on 220 telecommunications development projects in 64 emerging economies we find that firms adapt to the pressures of corruption via short term contracting and entry into joint ventures we also find that the arbitrariness surrounding corrupt transactions has a significant impact on firms decisions in addition to the overall level of corruption in contrast to extant research we show that mnes use nonequity entry modes or partnering as an adaptive strategy to participate in markets despite the presence of corruption

the rise in the disability rolls and the decline in unemployment between 1984 and 2001 the share of nonelderly adults receiving social security disability insurance income di rose by 60 percent to 5 3 million beneficiaries rapid program growth despite improving aggregate health appears to be explained by reduced screening stringency declining demand for less skilled workers and an unforeseen increase in the earnings replacement rate we estimate that the sum of these forces doubled the labor force exit propensity of displaced high school dropouts after 1984 lowering measured u s unemployment by one half a percentage point steady state calculations augur a further 40 percent increase in the rate of di receipt

changes in labor force participation in the united states the labor force participation rate in the united states increased almost continuously for two and a half decades after the mid 1960s pausing only briefly during economic downturns the pace of growth slowed considerably during the 1990s however and after reaching a record high of 67 3 percent in the first quarter of 2000 participation had declined by 1 5 percentage points by 2005 this paper reviews the social and demographic trends that contributed to the movements in the labor force participation rate in the second half of the twentieth century it also examines the manner in which developments in the 2000s reflect a break from past trends and considers implications for the future

a note on competitive bribery games abstract within a competitive bribery game in which each player has incomplete information we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium which is symmetric similar results hold for another bribery game form that prevails in the literature implications for corrupt practices in relation to economic development are also discussed

wage interactions comparisons or fall back options this paper examines the degree to which the importance of wages elsewhere in wage determination stems from comparisons made by workers as opposed to re ecting unions fall back options in the bargaining process the di culty of distinguishing these hypotheses is shown in the context of a bargaining model

national culture and corporate debt maturity abstract we investigate the influence of national culture on corporate debt maturity choice based on the framework of williamson we argue that culture located in social embeddedness level can shape contracting environments by serving as an informal constraint that affects human actors incentives and choices in market exchange we therefore expect national culture to be related to debt maturity structure after controlling for legal political financial and economic institutions using hofstede s four cultural dimensions uncertainty avoidance collectivism power distance and masculinity as proxies for culture and using a sample of 114 723 firm years from 40 countries over the 1991 2006 period we find robust evidence that firms located in countries with high uncertainty avoidance high collectivism high power distance and high masculinity tend to use more short term debt we interpret our results as consistent with the view that national culture helps explain cross country variations in the maturity structure of corporate debt

an efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery abstract governments often allocate commodities at low prices and on a first come first served basis rationing by waiting while bureaucrats who distribute the commodities usually take bribes a model is developed to classify the efficiency implications of bribery and socially optimal pricing schemes in rationing by waiting if the rationed good and individual income spent on other goods other income are complements then bribery may enhance allocative efficiency and a dual pricing scheme can augment social welfare however if the rationed commodity and other income are substitutes then bribery may not improve allocative efficiency and distributing the rationed commodity free is socially optimal

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

learning from the behavior of others conformity fads and informational cascades learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior for example why do people tend to converge on similar behavior why is mass behavior prone to error and fads the authors argue that the theory of observational learning and particularly of informational cascades has much to offer economics business strategy political science and the study of criminal behavior

patterns of work across the oecd market work per person of working age differs widely across the oecd countries and there have been some significant changes in the last forty years how to explain this pattern taxes are part of the story but much remains to be explained if we include all the elements of the social security systems like early retirement benefits sickness and disability benefits and unemployment benefits then we can capture some aspects of the overall pattern but still a lot remains unexplained the story favoured by alesina et al cepr dp 5140 2005 is that the nexus of strong unions generous welfare and social democracy implies both high taxes and pressure in favour of work sharing in response to adverse shocks this story however falls foul of the simple fact that most scandinavian countries now do much more work than the french and germans despite having stronger unions more generous welfare higher taxes and more social democracy ultimately we are forced into the position that there is no simple story some of the broad patterns can be explained but there remain country specific factors which are hard to identify but lead to substantial differences from one country to another

empowering poor people through public information lessons from a movie in rural india abstract mass public information campaigns have promised to empower poor people but do they deliver on that promise we designed and implemented a trial information campaign in poor rural areas of india in the form of an entertaining movie that teaches people their rights under a large national antipoverty program in randomly assigned villages the movie brought significant gains in knowledge and more positive perceptions about the scheme and village life relative to control villages but objectively measured outcomes showed no gain the movie changed perceptions but not reality we conclude that information is not the key constraint in this context

estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets business groups confederations of legally independent firms are ubiquitous in emerging economies yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms we conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs in doing so we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets argentina brazil chile india indonesia israel mexico peru the philippines south africa south korea taiwan thailand and turkey we find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups moreover membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine this runs contrary to the wisdom conventional in advanced economies that unrelated diversification depresses profitability overall our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

the sensitivity of an empirical model of married women s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions this study undertakes a systematic analysis of several theoretic and statistical assumption s used in many empirical models of female labor supply using a singl e data set psid 1975 labor supply data the author is able to replic ate most of the range of estimated income and substitution effects fo und in previous studies in this field he undertakes extensive specif ication tests and finds that most of this range should be rejected du e to statistical and model misspecifications the two most important assumptions appear to be the tobit assumption used to control for sel f selection into the labor force and exogeneity assumptions on the wi fe s wage rate and her labor market experience copyright 1987 by the econometric society

winning isn t everything corruption in sumo wrestling although the theoretical literature on corruption is well developed empirical work in this area has lagged because it has proven difficult to isolate corrupt behavior in the data in this paper we look for evidence of corruption in an unlikely place the highest echelons of japanese sumo wrestling this paper provides strong statistical evidence documenting match rigging in sumo wrestling a non linearity in the incentive structure of promotion leads to gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record and their opponents we show that wrestlers win a disproportionate share of the matches when they are on the margin increased effort can not explain the findings winning on the bubble is more frequent when the two competitors have met often in the past success on the bubble tends to rise over the course of a wrestler s career but declines in his last year consistent with the game theoretic predictions wrestlers who are victorious when on the bubble lose more frequently than would be expected the next time they meet that opponent suggesting that part of the payment for throwing a match is future payment in kind systematic differences across wrestling stables suggest that the stables play a role in facilitating the corruption in times of increased media scrutiny the match rigging disappears this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

wages and participation during the last 25 years annual hours worked by prime aged men fell by the equivalent of six 40 hour workweeks the reduction was more pronounced among those younger than among mid age workers among black men than among white men and among those with less schooling thus hours worked not only fell but showed increased dispersion increases that paralleled the growth in wage dispersion that has become so familiar to students of trends in wages the argument advanced here is that the correspondence is not coincidental the changes in hours worked are simply the labor supply responses that follow the changes in the structure of wages

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

fluidity of regulation csr nexus the multinational corporate corruption example corporate social responsibility csr is a relatively undeveloped concept despite its increasing importance to corporations one difficulty is the possible inexactness of csr another is the apparent reluctance by regulatory authorities and policy makers to intervene in the area this is largely a result of inhibitions created by traditional approaches to company law with emphasis on shareholder protection and financial disclosure the consequence is the stultification of independent development of csr by tying social issues to financial performance this attitude might not be unconnected to the theoretical and practical challenges in justifying csr and defining its scope the underlying impediment is a factual and theoretical failure to distinguish instrumental and pure ethical csr this article demonstrates that ethical csr highlights the role of regulation and a principal stance is that regulation is neither incompatible nor irreconcilable with ethical csr the article argues that cognizance of the intrinsic moral justification of pure csr is required for delineating the scope of csr as well as for clarifying the desirability and extent of its regulation it argues that the dynamic history and visage of multinational corporate corruption illuminates the fluidity of the regulation csr relationship the current and widening backlash against transnational corporate corruption is arguably a demonstration of the position that regulation and csr are not mutually exclusive and absolute concepts this article submits that recognition and application of this ethical and instrumental csr distinction is fundamental to the development of csr and resolution of connected questions of regulation

the market for public office why the indian state is not better at development abstract how and why officials are transferred from one post to another can in india does have far reaching consequences for the effectiveness of public service organizations such as irrigation agriculture forestry and soil conservation departments the transfer mechanism used in many departments of indian states involves a kind of internal labor market a truer market than in the way that term is often used by labor market economists it allows pressures for corrupt behavior to bear down on the incumbents of certain posts and itself amplifies those pressures frequently the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments why is the indian state not better at promoting development to an important degree because of the corruption transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

the duality of crony corruption in economic transition toward an integrated framework in order to shed light on the issue of crony corruption in the context of economic transition i focus on the puzzle of china s unique experience of economic transition characterized by the duality forms and effects of crony corruption underlying local corporatism in a dual track i e market and political tracks transition i argue that the duality of local corporatism derives from the duality of crony corruption first the early form of local corporatism as state business public alliance is embedded in informal crony corruption as positive for the purpose of wealth growth in the initial phase of economic transition with public and private interests aligned as compatible second the later form of local corporatism as official manager private collusion is embedded in quasi formal crony corruption as negative for the purpose of wealth transfer in the later phase with public and private interests in conflict as incompatible the duality of crony corruption in the two phases of economic transition is caused by the interplay between formal and informal factors and between economic and political factors my contribution is twofold first i explain china s transition in terms of crony corruption underlying local corporatism second i develop an integrated framework of crony corruption concerning its content process antecedent and consequence

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

business culture and tax evasion why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist abstract this paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria in bad equilibria high cheating and corruption increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures as tax evasion and corruption become more common they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered a third externality that between firms and inspectors is the source of the perverse effect more cheating by firms is good for bribe taking inspectors and more bribe taking inspectors are good for cheating firms

bipolar multicandidate elections with corruption the goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority s preference on policy questions but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders we consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria among a wide class of single winner scoring rules only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

emerging technologies and ethics a race to the bottom or the top does national success with an emerging technology require ethical sacrifices this question is considered through the simultaneous consideration of ethics investment and outcomes in the nine jurisdictions that are making the largest investments in nanotechnologies an important emerging technology it is found that while ethical environment has no notable effect on pure and applied research a more positive ethical environment is associated with measures associated with invention and commercialization in summary a race to the top supports invention and commercialization of emerging technologies a critical finding as it suggests that issues such as corruption and regulation could be critical in limiting the extraction of social and economic benefit from emerging technologies like nanotechnologies

institutional framework and economic development international evidence this paper examines the effect of quality of the institutional framework on economic development our empirical results support the hypothesis that good institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth the positive effect of institutional quality is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom our results also indicate that good institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence we infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation but also freedom to choose and institutional support

wage inequality and family labor supply using the march current population surveys and the 1960 census this article describes earnings and employment changes for married couples in different types of households stratified by the husband s hourly wage while declines in male employment and earnings have been greatest for low wage men employment and earnings gains have been largest for wives of middle and high wage men these findings cast doubt on the notion that married women have increased their labor supply in the recent decades to compensate for the disappointing earnings growth of their husbands

greater wage inequality reduces average hours of work i argue that rising inequality in offered wages lowers average working hours if labour supply is concave in wages a decrease in the working hours of low paid workers is greater than an increase in working hours of high paid workers furthermore due to low market opportunities some low paid workers may leave the labour force using cps morg data for prime age men i find evidence in support of this explanation i establish empirically the concavity of the labour supply and find evidence that after controlling for the average wage wage inequality has a negative effect on labour supply

costs of distrust the virtuous cycle of tax compliance in jordan tax compliance has been extensively researched yet the classic question why do people pay taxes remains unanswered in jordan tax evasion is widespread the state and citizens have been trapped in a continuous hide and seek game which has taken the form of a virtuous cycle this paper investigates tax evasion along with the most noticeable features of the jordanian tax system it also highlights how the virtuous cycle of tax evasion has been established and what could possibly be a way out of it we argue that sociocultural values are the most prominent cause for tax evasion that is the procedures of state formation and functionality in jordan have created mutual distrust between the state and its citizens having been raised in a community characterized by deep distrust tax evasion is no longer considered immoral by substantial numbers of the jordanian population we argue that successive governments need to create a high trust based culture and formulate strategies that serve to acquire normative ethical values in order to enhance voluntary compliance the way to accomplish this necessity is through enforcing the state s transparency and accountability the taxation system needs to concentrate on income tax rather than raise tax rates on essential commodities to collect substantial tax revenues thus further reform of the taxation system along with a reduction in tax incentives need to be considered moreover lowering the exceptionally high personal income tax threshold would bring jordan in line with its peers expand the base and introduce more progressivity there would also be a scope to introduce a minimum tax based on sales as a tool to address tax evasion

changes in relative wages and family labor supply the large changes in relative wages that occurred during the 1980s provide fertile ground for studying the behavioral responses of married couples to the wage changes of husbands and wives i find estimates of own wage and cross wage elasticities for men that are very small the own wage elasticity for women is positive and the cross wage elasticity for women suggests a strong negative response of female labor supply to changes in their husband s wages family labor supply behavior determines how changes in individual wage rates translate into family earnings changes the responses of women to changes in their husband s wages attenuated somewhat the increases in individual wage inequality at the family level the results suggest that the earnings of the wives of low income men would actually have fallen over the decade if women s labor supply did not respond to changes in their husbands wages however assortative mating implies that wage changes of husbands and wives are correlated and so family earnings inequality still grew during the decade of the 1980s

how corruption influences foreign direct investment a panel data study abstract this article analyzes the sign and development of the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment fdi economic theory distinguishes grabbing hand corruption from helping hand corruption the former suggests a negative impact of corruption on fdi the latter one a positive effect empirically we apply a data set of 21 home and 59 developed and less developed host countries covering between 1983 and 1999 to investigate the corruption impact we employ a panel data model that particularly refers to the knowledge capital model of multinational activity we find a negative relationship between corruption and fdi this in turn suggests that the helping hand effects of corruption are outweighed by the grabbing hand effects further we observe that corruption is an important impediment of fdi in developed economies but not in less developed ones finally we demonstrate that the importance of corruption has decreased over the years

persistence of corruption some theoretical perspectives summary the paper examines how pervasive corruption can be persistent despite the presence of anti corruption measures and incentives corruption has a strong tendency to persist in the first part we discuss how a high level of corruption or a low level of compliance can be an equilibrium outcome in such a case corruption becomes the social norm in the second part of the paper we use ides from evolutionary game theory to discuss how corrupt behavior can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different individual behavioral norms

who gains from non collusive corruption non collusive corruption i e corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity is particularly widespread in low income countries we build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption we find that credit market imperfections by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials however non collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs if borrowing is limited bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business but this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

international integration and national corruption we argue that greater degrees of international integration lead to lower levels of corruption which we define as the misuse of public office for private gain we theorize that international factors affect a country s level of corruption through two principal channels one acts through economic incentives altering for various actors the costs and benefits of engaging in corrupt acts the second mode is norma tive prevailing norms in international society delegitimate and stigmatize corrup tion countries that are more integrated into international society are more exposed to economic and normative pressures against corruption we therefore test the fol lowing hypothesis the more a country is tied into international networks of ex change communication and organization the lower its level of corruption is likely to be the analysis of data from approximately 150 countries strongly confirms our expectation

how corruptible are you bribery under uncertainty abstract we model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials we investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one s potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in bribery and consequently the equilibrium level of corruption in the society we assume that the cost of engaging in corruption is subject to strategic complementarities which may lead to multiple corruption equilibria we find that corruption is lowest when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other s corruptibility and have asymmetric bargaining powers our uncertainty result provides theoretical support in favor of anti corruption strategies such as staff rotation in public offices aimed at decreasing the social closeness of bribers and bribees our bargaining power result suggests that under uncertainty monopolistic public good provision has the same corruption reducing effect as competitive public good provision

corruption across countries and regions some consequences of local osmosis abstract large and persistent differences in corruption across comparable countries is a challenging research issue even more intriguing are such differences across regions within the same country because the typically considered socioeconomic and governance characteristics are generally more similar across such regions than across different countries this paper s principal theme is that individuals perceptions of their environments are influenced by the realities that they have faced in the past these perceptions affect their current and future actions which in turn influence the current and future realities an articulation and analysis of these dynamics yields significant observations concerning individuals behavior and societal outcomes

ten years of manufacturing wage settlements 1979 89 the purpose of this paper is to examine the pattern wamed in 1985 and outcomes of wage settlements in british there seems to be neither a social nor economic rationale manufacturing industry during the 1980s the period for the present level of pay settlements the combination since 1979 represents the longest sustained period f very unemployment and a union movement in of free collective bargaining in the post war years disarray might have been expected to cause manage with the removal of explicit norms or guide posts ment t0 lake a ralher hard nosed attitude t0 labour to the outcome of periodic negotiations over wage costs financial times leader the pantomime over pnv nnvpmhpr 1 changes the pattern of wage increases generated by y the process of company and plant level pay settlements this paper addresses the outcomes of pay determi should reveal a great deal about the behaviour of nation since the return to free collective bargaining and influences that bear on pay determination and seeks to focus on the influences impacting on despite the absence of incomes policy throughout or the rationale for those outcomes and looks at the 1980s the outcome of wage negotiations none how these have changed over the last decade

bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth there appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered however on the link between corruption government and growth the paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth balanced growth is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital which engenders growth and accumulating political capital which mainly assures bureaucratic power the analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long term growth under alternative political regimes some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically

emulation inequality and work hours was thorsten veblen right we investigate the manner in which a desire to emulate the rich influences individuals allocation of time between labour and leisure greater inequality inducing longer work hours as a result data on work hours in ten countries over the period 1963 98 show that greater inequality is indeed associated longer work hours these veblen effects are large and the estimates are robust using country fixed effects and other specifications because consumption inequality is a public bad a social welfare optimum cannot be implemented by a flat tax on consumption but may be accomplished by more complicated progressive consumption taxes at the close of the nineteenth century thorsten veblen proposed what he termed pecuniary emulation as the foundation of a theory of consumption spending he maintained is driven by relative status considerations that is by the desire to be a particular type of person as much as bythedesire to enjoytheconsumer goodsper se the joneses with whom one had to keep up were not the neighbours but the rich theirleveloflivingbecamethenever attainableobjectiveinaconsumptionarmsrace among the less well to do in the theory of the leisure class he wrote the motive is emulation the stimulus of an invidious comparison especially in any community in which class distinctions are quite vague all canons and reputability and decency and all standards of consumption are traced back by insensible gradations to the usages and thoughts of the highest social and pecuniary class the wealthy leisure class 1934 p 81 while valued by some economists as capturing common sense aspects of consumption as a form of status seeking veblen s view of social preferences was soon eclipsed by the simpler and more tractable neoclassical theory of the consumer relegated to the underworld of economics veblen s ideas have nonetheless resonated over the ensuing years in the writing of duesenberry 1949 leibenstein 1950 and galbraith 1958 at the middle of the past century and schor 1998