on the efficiency of law a public choice perspective economists have not yet developed a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating transaction cost economics within a public choice perspective for predicting when there will be an efficiency problem with the law transaction cost reasoning and the rent seeking insight have not been applied systematically in a dynamic institutional context to evaluate when the law will be used to increase or not minimize problems of bounded rationality and opportunism this paper takes a first step at identifying and remedying this deficiency the paper first provides a critical review of relevant theoretical contributions made by becker 1983 1985 posner 1977 priest 1977 rubin 1977 1982 williamson 1975 1985 and others we then show how analysis of the efficiency of law can be synthesized into a broader whole by incorporating transaction cost economics more fully into existing understanding of rentseeking in the political realm thus within the public choice paradigm this paper develops a deeper transaction cost analysis of the efficiency of law building on prior research by the authors crew and rowley 1988a 1988b twight 1983 1988 the paper identifies variables that position legal rules on a spectrum that ranges from those that are predominantly transaction cost

cost efficiency and electricity market structure a case study of oecd countries the oecd electricity sector has witnessed significant institutional restructuring over the past three decades as a consequence many power generation utilities now act as unregulated companies that technically compete to sell power on an open market this paper analyses the performance in term of cost efficiency for electricity generation in oecd power sector while accounting for the impact of electricity market structures we employ the short run cost function in which capital stock is treated as a quasi fixed factor input empirical models are developed for the cost function as a translog form and analysed using panel data of 25 countries during the period 1980 to 2009 we show that it is necessary to model latent country specific heterogeneity in addition to time varying inefficiency the estimated economies of scale are adjusted to take account of the importance of the quasi fixed capital input in determining cost behaviour and long run constant returns to scale are verified for the oecd generation sector the research findings suggest there is a significant impact of electricity market regulatory indicators on cost in particular public ownership and vertical integration are found to have significant and sizable increasing impacts on cost thereby indicating policy lessons on the desirable ways to implement structural electricity generation reforms

multiproduct short run hospital cost functions empirical evidence and policy implications from cross section data economists and policymakers have been interested in hospital costs and the structure of hospital technologies for several decades now early interest was focused on the possibility of scale economies which implied increased efficiency for larger hospitals 6 8 12 13 18 20 while more recent interest has been stimulated by the inflationary spiral of hospital costs 1 15 17 22 as hospital costs have risen important policy questions concerning the impact on costs of the hospitals diagnostic case mix the hospitals admitting physicians the hospitals size and the hospitals efficiency have emerged and researchers have attempted to deal with these issues within the context of increasingly complex econometric models 1 2 5 24 27 however in attempting to analyze these important policy issues researchers have been forced to make two major types of compromises on the one hand appropriate data are often not available for estimating a well specified cost function e g information on admitting physicians and diagnostic case mix are often missing so that problems of specification error often plague the econometric results conversely in using imaginative ways to deal with data problems e g weighting in patient and out patient care to form a single index of hospital services 1 27 or estimating separate cost functions for each department in the hospital 2 researchers sometimes place unrealistic and unnecessary constraints on their econometric models the purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of several of the primary hospital characteristics mentioned above on the short run costs of hospitals within a theoretically consistent framework in the following discussion we also develop the theoretical

primal and dual capacity utilization an application to productivity measurement in the u s automobile industry capacity utilization measures have traditionally been constructed as indexes of actual as compared to potential output this potential or capacity output y can be represented within an economic model of the firm as the tangency between the short and long run average cost curves economic theoretical measures of capacity utilization cu can then be characterized as y y where y is the realized level of output these quantity or primal cu measures allow for economic interpretation they provide explicit inference as to how changes in exogenous variables affect cu additional information for analyzing deviations from capacity production can be obtained by assessing the dual cost of the gap in this article the definitions and representations of primal output and dual cost cu measures are formalized within a dynamic model of a monopolistic firm as an illustration of this approach to characterizing cu measures a model is estimated for the u s automobile industry 1959 1980 and primal and dual cu

quality of service efficiency and scale in network industries an analysis of european electricity distribution quality of service qos is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries in this article we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks from seven european countries we apply the stochastic frontier analysis method to multi output translog input distance function models to estimate cost efficiency and scale economies we show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly especially that smaller utilities efficiency seems to decrease our results emphasize that qos should be an integrated part of efficiency and economic analysis of regulated natural monopolies

economies of vertical integration in the swiss electricity sector over the last two decades several european nations have introduced reforms to their electricity sector generally these reforms require a legal and functional unbundling of vertically integrated companies these unbundling processes may reduce the possibilities that exist to fruitfully exploit the advantages of vertical integration the goal of this paper is to empirically analyze the presence of economies of scale and vertical integration in the swiss electricity sector economies of vertical integration between electricity production and distribution result from reduced transaction costs better coordination of highly specific and interdependent investments and less financial risk different econometric specifications for panel data including a random effects and a random coefficients model have been used to estimate a quadratic multi stage cost function for a sample of electricity companies the empirical results reflect the presence of considerable economies of vertical integration and economies of scale for most of the companies considered in the analysis moreover the results suggest a variation in economies of vertical integration across companies due to unobserved heterogeneity

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation its many dimensions from the perspective of market economics this new thrust was consolidated in 1976 by s peltzman who developed a formal market model in which regulations were viewed as commodities brokered via political markets in response to bids and counter bids by those who stood to gain or to lose from specific regulation outcomes the subsequent contribution by becker 1983 added insights and institutional flesh to the stigler peltzman embryo confirming regulation as an integral component of mainstream market economics an important implication of such contributions especially those from the chicago perspective is that regulation for the most part confirms resource efficiency within market process that political markets in the absence of entry barriers are just as effective as are competitive commodity markets in achieving economic efficiency defined within a comparative institutions framework nowhere is this complacency more apparent than in the conclusion drawn by becker 1983 from a detailed formal analysis of competition among pressure groups for political influence

a note on capacity utilization and measurement of scale economies this article investigates the measurement of returns to scale rts via a cost function in the presence of quasi fixed inputs caves christensen and swanson ccs proposed estimation of a variable cost function and derived a formula for computing rts from it this article extends the ccs results by a investigating the bias that would result from erroneously using a total cost function for measuring rts b indicating that the ccs procedure for measuring scale economies in the presence of quasi fixed inputs is inconsistent for the case of nonhomothetic production technology and c proposing an alternative procedure that allows one to evaluate rts at long run equilibrium points even when firms in the sample are in disequilibrium the similarity between this proposed method and the temporary equilibrium approach for measuring productivity growth is noted as well the empirical results on rts are compared among the three alternative methods total cost ccs variable cost and proposed long run equil

efficiency analysis of hydroelectric generating plants a case study for portugal abstract this paper estimates changes in total productivity breaking this down into technically efficient change and technological change by means of data envelopment analysis dea applied to the hydroelectric energy generating plants of edp the portugal electricity company the aim of this procedure is to seek out those best practices that will lead to improved performance in the energy market we rank the plants according to their change in total productivity for the period 2001 2004 concluding that some plants experienced productivity growth while others experienced a decrease in productivity the implications arising from the study are that edp should adopt an internal benchmark management procedure in order to evaluate the relative position of each hydroelectric generating plant and to adopt managerial strategies designed to catch up with the frontier of best practices as the frontier is shifting along the time constant efforts are needed in this respect along the time

an analysis of the spanish electrical utility industry economies of scale technological progress and efficiency abstract in this paper we propose a model to explain the behaviour of the spanish electrical utility industry during the period 1987 1997 under the then existing regulatory system marco legal estable the paper will study the presence of economies of scale the effect of technological progress and the differences in the efficiency of the different companies within the market the paper concludes that the spanish electrical utility industry was not in fact characterized by economies of scale during this period but witnessed a great improvement in efficiency within that period all the critical market factors remind stable

capacity utilization measures underlying economic theory and an alternative approach measures of industrial capacity utilization hereafter cu have been used extensively in helping to explain changes in the rate of investment labor productivity and inflation the cu measures have also been used to obtain indices of capital in use as distinct from capital stock in place a number of alternative measures of cu are periodically calculated and published the 1980 economic report of the president for example contains three series that by the federal reserve board the u s department of commerce bureau of economic analysis and the wharton school of finance other publicly available series are those prepared by mcgraw hill publishing company the u s department of commerce bureau of the census and rinfret boston associates inc although a host of cu measures is publicly available it is not at all clear how one should interpret changes over time in each measure or variations among them a principal reason underlying these interpretation problems is that the crucial link between underlying economic theory and the constructed measure of cu is weak one way in which this issue has manifested itself in the policy domain over the last five years has been with respect to the uncertain effects of dramatic increases in energy prices on capacity output and on cu each of the cu measures noted above is computed in such a way that explicitly ignores any role for energy prices yet several times during the last decade though growth to apparently high rates of cu had taken place investment and average labor productivity were much lower than expected and the rate of price increase much greater in brief during the last decade the explanatory power of alternative cu measures has dropped sharply some have conjectured that post opec energy price increases may have brought about major changes in the u s economy so that old quantitative relationships between measured cu and investment labor productivity and price inflation may have been altered substantially in order to assess effects of changes in pe on cu a re examination of the notion and measurement of cu is needed based on the framework of the economic theory of the firm that is the focus of this paper

environmental regulations and productivity growth the case of fossil fueled electric power generation this paper measures and analyzes the effect of sulfur dioxide emission restrictions on the rate of productivity growth in the electric power industry over the 1973 79 business cycle a firm specific measure of regulatory intensity is developed which depends on the severity of the emission standard the extent of enforcement and the unconstrained emission rate relevant to each utility the results indicate that emission regulations result in significantly higher generating costs primarily from the increased use of low sulfur fuels the average rate of productivity growth was reduced by 0 59 percentage points per year for constrained utilities

bringing wind energy to market wind energy is a rapidly growing source of renewable energy generation however the current extra market approach to its assimilation into the electric grid will not scale at deep penetration levels in this paper we investigate how an independent wind power producer might optimally offer its variable power into a competitive electricity market for energy starting with a stochastic model for wind power production and a model for a perfectly competitive two settlement market we derive explicit formulae for optimal contract offerings and the corresponding optimal expected profit as wind is an inherently variable source of energy we explore the sensitivity of optimal expected profit to uncertainty in the underlying wind process we also examine the role of forecast information and recourse markets in this setting we quantify the role of reserves in increasing reliability of offered contracts and obtain analytical expressions for marginal profits resulting from investments in improved forecasting and local auxiliary generation the formulae make explicit the relationship between price signals and the value of such firming strategies

on the measurement of capacity utilization capacity utilization is usually defined as the ratio of actual output to the output corresponding to 1 the minimum point on the short run average total cost curve and 2 the point of tangency between the long run average total cost and short run average total cost curves in practice however capacity utilization is often measured as the ratio of actual to the maximum potential output consistent with a given capital stock this paper demonstrates how to estimate the theoretical measures of capacity utilization and examines the correlation between three measures of capacity utilization and the mcgraw hill estimates of capacity utilization using data from a sample of u s privately owned electric utilities for 1961 83 copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy the mutually beneficial connection between industries and the governments that regulate them is the subject of a large literature led by stigler 1971 what has not been studied is how firms choose their desired policies from the set including entry barriers price floors subsidies and demand stimulation we take as given that government and incumbents from the supply and demand for regulation and explore the choice of political product

economies of scale in norwegian electricity distribution a quantile regression approach in this article we investigate scale economies in norwegian electricity distribution companies using a quantile regression approach to the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to apply this estimation technique when analysing scale economies we estimate the cost elasticities of the two output components network length and number of customers to calculate returns to scale our results show large potential of scale economies particularly for the smallest companies we also find that returns to scale is increasing over time these findings have important implications for policymakers when they are deciding the structure of the industry in the future

economies of scale and utilization in the swiss electric power distribution industry economies of scale and utilization in the swiss electricity distribution industry are analysed a translog variable cost function was estimated using panel data for a sample of 39 municipal utilities over the period 1988 1991 economies of both scale and utilization appear to exist in the distribution of electricity both for small medium and large sized utilities thus the empirical evidence suggests sub additivity of the cost function over the relevant range of output for the swiss electricity distribution utilities a necessary condition for a natural monopoly to exist

returns to scale from variable and total cost functions abstract estimates of the returns to scale from a variable cost function evaluated at the actual and optimal capital stocks and a total cost function are presented the estimates generally differ depending in part upon the output at which they are evaluated

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

regional differences in nuclear and fossil fuel generation of electricity previous research on electric gen eration costs has mainly relied on economy wide data this study disaggregates a broad sample into regions known to have marked differences in fossil fuel availability climate regulatory ef fects and other variables we find differences exist in generation costs among the studied re gions and nuclear power using estimates of scale economies and other measures we also find smaller minimum efficient size fossil fuel firms than previous studies based on recent cost information this study provides insights into several industry structure issues such as capac ity expansion competition input costs environ mental policy and transmission access jel q42

the impact of the automatic adjustment clause on fuel purchase and utilization practices in the u s electric utility industry the purpose of this paper is to examine the combined influence of the search and switching effects of the automatic fuel adjustment clause on the prices paid by utilities for the aggregate fuel input then given this combined effect an attempt is made to separate the individual influences of the two component effects findings indicate that the presence of an automatic fuel adjustment clause leads the regulated firm to pay a higher price for the aggregate fuel input than would be paid in the absence of the clause the severity of this aggregate fuel input than would be paid in the absence of the clause the severity of this aggregate fuel price differential is estimated to be on the order of 6 cents 10 sup 6 btu or approximately 10 of the average fossil fuel price moreover this aggregate effect is found to result from the induced disincentive to switch to less expensive fuels rather than the payment of higher prices for the individual component fuels 21 references 5 tables

factor substitution and economies of scale and utilisation in kuwait s crude oil industry abstract the cost structure of the crude oil industry in kuwait has been examined with specific focus on factor substitution and economies of scale and utilisation this has been done by estimating translog cost functions both long run and short run using time series data covering the period from 1976 to 1996 the results indicate that the implied production structure is non homothetic and the pattern of scale effect is labour saving but capital and material using the evidence also supports the presence of an induced exogenous technical change which is non neutral labour and capital using and material saving the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is positive implying that the two inputs are substitute the results also indicate the existence of diseconomies of scale in the production of crude oil but no economies or diseconomies of utilisation

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

resource rent taxation and benchmarking a new perspective for the swiss hydropower sector the electricity generation in switzerland is mainly based on hydropower 55 of total production the exploitation of water in the hydropower sector can generate significant so called resource rents these are defined by the surplus return above the value of capital labor materials and energy used to exploit hydropower in switzerland hydropower producers pay to the state a fixed fee per kw gross capacity with this system the substantial differences in costs revenues and in the production characteristics of the hydropower plants are not taken into account in this context the following paper has two main goals 1 to discuss the introduction in the swiss hydropower sector of a new payment system based on a resource rent tax 2 to propose a combination of a rrt system with a benchmarking analysis of the production cost obtained through the estimation of a stochastic frontier variable cost function we estimate a true random effects stochastic frontier variable cost function using panel data in order to overcome the asymmetric information problem in addition using the information on cost efficiency of the single companies we show how to introduce in the rrt scheme a benchmark system which gives incentives to minimize the production costs

efficiency and regulation of the slovenian electricity distribution companies abstract the slovenian energy law adopted in 1999 has opened the internal market to competition up to 64 of the final consumption the opening of the internal market to foreign competition is envisaged for 2003 with regard to the methodology of price regulation the energy law introduces the price cap regulation which aims to give firms incentive for cost reduction to provide information for effective price regulation we estimated a cost frontier function on a sample of slovenian electricity distribution utilities over the 1991 2000 period the estimated efficient frontier could be used by slovenian regulatory agency as a benchmark to regulate network access prices our results show that slovenian distribution companies are cost inefficient we have also proved the presence of increasing returns to scale with most utilities not achieving the minimum efficient scale thus the slovenian regulatory authority should consider how to induce mergers of small electricity distribution utilities into larger units

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

the effects of competition on publicly owned firms evidence from the municipal electric industry in the u s abstract previous studies have examined the effects of competition on privately owned firms this study examines the impact of competition on a sample of publicly owned electric utilities operating in the u s during 1961 1980 estimates from a translog variable cost function indicate that competitive firms had higher generating costs than monopolists ceteris paribus in addition it appears that operating costs would fall significantly if a single monopolist were to replace two competitors in a given market

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

reducing urban public transport costs by tendering lots a panel data estimation allotment is for urban authorities a governance strategy to reduce public transport costs it consists of dividing a network into several lots so as to multiply the number of calls for tender on the one hand gains should be obtained by increasing competition for the market and reducing the costs of obtaining accurate information on the other hand cutting a network into several parts is also expected to have negative consequences on production costs in terms of lower returns to scale many industry stakeholders believe that the latter element more than compensates for the former in this article we estimate a translog cost function with a panel of 141 french urban public transport networks our main conclusion is that scale economies are exhausted for a production of about 3 million vehicle kilometres per year therefore as far as returns to scale are concerned allotment would reduce the costs of public transport services for the main cities of our sample a second dividend for allotment is then presented and implies that the assumed trade off between returns to scale and increased competition is irrelevant

electric power distribution economies of scale mergers and restructuring electricity distribution is generally viewed as a natural monopoly and therefore as having the least potential for the kinds of reforms that have swept the electric power sector in many countries mergers among distribution companies and efforts at retail competition have nonetheless altered the operation of the distribution stage this research into us electric utilities uses a much larger and less selective data base than previously available to examine the scale properties of distribution with respect to output distance and customer numbers and for different functions within distribution it finds significant economies at low output levels holding system size and customer density constant but the cost gradient is otherwise modest it also finds that geographic size and customer numbers are quite important and that economies are significantly stronger for the infrastructure or wires business than for the marketing function performed by distribution utilities these results lend credence to effort

scale economies in electricity distribution a semiparametric analysis we estimate the costs of distributing electricity using data on municipal electric utilities in ontario canada for the period 1993 5 the data reveal substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale with minimum efficient scale being achieved by firms with about 20 000 customers larger firms exhibit constant or decreasing returns utilities which deliver additional services such as water sewage have significantly lower costs indicating the presence of economies of scope our basic specifications comprise semiparametric variants of the translog cost function where output enters non parametrically and remaining variables including their interactions with output are parametric we rely upon non parametric differencing techniques and extend a previous differencing test of equality of non parametric regression functions to a panel data setting copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

altruism the samaritan s dilemma and government transfer policy this paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor the framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk averse poor who face some possibility of loss the government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf with unconditional transfers the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss this reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects these may be avoided if the government makes in kind transfers of insurance copyright 1995 by american economic association

the sensitivity of productivity growth measures to alternative structural and behavioral assumptions an application to electric utilities 1951 1984 this article examines the sensitivity of three alternative multifactor productivity growth estimates for the electric utility industry during the 1951 1984 period the results indicate that multifactor productivity growth estimates are quite sensitive to the relaxation of various structural and behavioral assumptions first a benchmark measure is constructed along the lines suggested by solow 1957 this residual approach produces estimates that suggest a substantial decline in firm level productivity growth after the mid 1960s prior to obtaining the second and third estimates empirical tests of the structural and behavioral assumptions underlying a firm s operation are conducted first the structural assumption of constant returns to scale is rejected and the resulting long run scale adjusted multifactor productivity growth estimates are found to be consistently less than the residual estimates second the behavioral assumption of long run equilibrium is rejected comparing the long run scale ad

economies of scale and utilization in electricity generation in kuwait cost structure of electricity generation in kuwait has been examined with specific focus on the economies of scale and utilization this has been done by estimating a translog variable cost function using time series data covering the period from 1965 to 1990 the results indicate the existence of diseconomies of scale in the generation of electricity but no economies or diseconomies of utilization

regional differences in electricity distribution costs and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices abstract in this paper we estimate an average cost function for a panel of 59 swiss local and regional electricity distribution utilities as a basis for yardstick regulation of the distribution network access prices shleifer 1985 proposed yardstick competition in terms of price to regulate local monopolies producing a homogeneous good the regulated price for the individual firms depends on the average costs of identical firms the yardstick competition concept can also be applied to firms that produce heterogeneous goods if these goods differ only in observable characteristics to correct the yardstick for heterogeneity the regulator can use a multivariate estimation of an average cost function in the case of electricity distribution the heterogeneity of output consists mainly of different characteristics of the distribution service areas in this paper we follow shleifer s suggestion to estimate a multivariate average cost function that can be employed by the regulatory commission to benchmark network access prices at the distribution level several exogenous variables measuring the heterogeneity of the service areas were included in the cost model specification we find that the regional differences of the service areas e g area shares of forests agricultural areas or unproductive land and population density significantly influence electricity distribution costs

the impact of ownership unbundling on cost efficiency empirical evidence from the new zealand electricity distribution sector abstract several countries around the world have introduced reforms to the electric power sector one important element of these reforms is the introduction of an unbundling process i e the separation of the competitive activities of supply and production from the monopole activity of transmission and distribution of electricity there are several forms of unbundling functional legal and ownership new zealand for instance adopted an ownership unbundling in 1998 as discussed in the literature ownership unbundling produces benefits and costs one of the benefits may be an improvement in the level of the productive efficiency of the companies due to the use of the inputs in just one activity and a greater level of transparency for the regulator this paper analyzes the cost efficiency of 28 electricity distribution companies in new zealand for the period between 1996 and 2011 using a stochastic frontier panel data model a total cost function and a variable cost function are estimated in order to evaluate the impact of ownership unbundling on the level of cost efficiency the results indicate that ownership separation of electricity generation and retail operations from the distribution network has a positive effect on the cost efficiency of distribution companies in new zealand the estimated effect of ownership separation suggests a positive average one off shift in the level of cost efficiency by 0 242 in the short run and 0 144 in the long run

privatisation and the efficiency of decentralised electricity generation some evidence from inter war britain the privatization of the electricity supply industry in england and wales has established a decentralized system of supply this paper considers the efficiency of the decentralized interwar electricity supply industry a generalized stochastic frontier cost function is specificed enabling the estimation of returns to scale and inefficiency at plant level these estimates are used in turn to examine the efficiency of stations selected by the central electricity board to supply the national grid the results imply that a decentralized system was not only feasible but that the selection procedure was sensitive to efficiency differences at plant level copyright 1992 by royal economic society

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

toward a presumption of efficiency in politics in the preceding pages i have returned time and again to the idea that in the next quarter century the profession will devote more of its resources to an understanding of politics and of political organizations with a presumption that the behaviors and institutions we observe in the real world represent efficient responses to exogenously given constraints and to competitive forces that does not mean of course that normative preoccupations critical evaluations and reformist drives will not continue to motivate a good number of scholars that is to be expected and praised however i believe that in relative terms more attention will come to be given to understanding and less to re designing and reforming in this context the economic approach to politics will flourish and as an important carrier of these research results public choice will continue to play an indispensable role we can already see the future and it is promising