the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

bank reserve requirements as an impediment to signaling bank reserve requirements as an impediment to signaling effective legal reserve requirements may hamper the private capital market s ability to price bank deposits in the model developed here the market has less information about bank assets than the banks have and a bank can therefore signal its superior information through its choice of excess reserves mandatory reserves can inhibit such signaling and therefore result in inefficient deposit pricing i introduction although the basic of fractional reserve banking were explained by edgeworth 1888 the rationale for legal reserve requirements as well as the details of their design have continued to evolve and the impetus for reform has been gathering momentum in recent years the time honored liquidity motivations as well as the more contemporary monetary control consideration have been widely debated and while the latter remains popular increasing skepticism has been expressed by benston 1978 greenbaum and kanatas 1982 laurent 1979 1981 robertson and phillips 1974 and starleaf 1975 among others like many of these papers this one questions the benefits of reserve requirements whereas most dispute their value as a monetary policy instruments however a new argument presented here shows that reserve requirements may subvert efficient deposit pricing and thereby aggravate asset quality and bank solvency problems the argument relates to the recent proposal that the private capital markets should play an expanded role in monitoring the exposure of banks we examine the potential of a commercial bank s excess reserves to signal asset quality in an environment without deposit insurance the results apply so long as deposit insurance remains incomplete and where the risk of each bank s assets is a priori unknown to all except the bank in such a setting the efficient pricing of deposit depends on a depositor s ability to ascertain the risk characteristics of the bank s assets it is shown that excess reserves can signal the unknown risk and thus resolve the informational asymmetry the ability to signal using excess reserves varies inversely however with reserve requirements thus reserve requirements may impede the ability of excess reserves to inform market participants reserve requirements are likely to impede signaling when i loan rates and reserve requirements are high or ii reserve requirements are low but a bank s deposit base is large reserve requirements are unlikely to impede signaling when banks are similar in their asset characteristics the underlying intuition is discussed in section iii excess reserves based signaling may be important because of its potential in facilitating the private sector s monitoring of banks we show that any effort to expand the private market s monitoring of bank asset quality through more accurate deposit pricing presupposes an appropriate regulatory milieu exposing large depositors to losses may be a precondition for expanding the role of the private capital markets but this analysis indicates that reserve requirements and or inappropriate discount window pricing can subvert such efforts the potential for conflict between the federal reserve focusing on monetary policy and the deposit insurers seeking to mitigate their monitoring burden and exposure is palpable thus the model clarifies the conditions necessary to engage the private market in monitoring bank asset quality through deposit pricing these requirements are formidable and the interdependence of regulatory constraints used for monetary policy and bank soundness purposes could frustrate programs based on piecemeal reform the model posits a risk neutral two period economy where each bank issues deposits and makes risky loans at the outset although asset quality varies across bank the choice of assets is not endogenous this is an important simplification since in general a bank s asset choice will impinge on the posited signaling problem

political decision making and the local provision of public goods the case of municipal climate protection in the us the municipal political decision making dynamic has typically been studied in regard to the provision of locally public goods and services whose benefits while diffuse are tied to a particular ge

multi dimensional screening a user s guide abstract multi dimensional screening models have many potential applications but economists have so far been hindered by the considerable technical difficulties involved in their resolution this paper studies the simplest formulation of the general screening model and we provide a complete solution to this case we then show how this model can be applied to multi product nonlinear pricing and to multi product monopoly regulation finally we discuss how the model has been applied to other economic situations of interest including auction design and optimal taxation

political cleavages and changing exposure to trade combining the classical theorem of stolper and samuelson with a model of politics derived from becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors a traditional three factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land labor and capital depending only on the given country s level of economic development and its land labor ratio a preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and contracting trade and of such specific cases as the german marriage of iron and rye u s and latin american populism and asian socialism suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis while the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation

ratifiable mechanisms learning from disagreement in a mechanism design problem participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo if equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players beliefs then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints we investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two stage process consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game we develop and illustrate a new concept ratifiability that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

dynamic natural monopoly regulation time inconsistency moral hazard and political environments this paper quantitatively assesses time inconsistency moral hazard and political ideology in monopoly regulation of electricity distribution we specify and estimate a dynamic model of utility regulation featuring investment and moral hazard we find that 1 there is under investment in electricity distribution capital aiming to reduce power outages 2 more conservative political environments have higher regulated returns and 3 more electricity is lost in distribution in more conservative political environments we quantify the value of regulatory commitment in inducing more investment conservative regulators mitigate welfare losses due to time inconsistency but worsen losses from moral hazard

incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non marketable good this good is valued by a single principal and there is a verifiable measure of the agent s performance crucially the agent is intrinsically motivated due to warm glow altruism in addition the agent s budget which is controlled by the principal must not be less than the monetary performance cost faced by the agent this gives rise to a limited liability constraint it also restricts the agent s ability to under report costs in such environment we determine the link between the agent s budget and performance our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal agent problem and to most in the literature on mission motivated organisations and public services provision

local institutions and the politics of urban growth this article uses a political market framework to analyze how the structure of local political institutions affects the relative political influence of development and environmental interests in the context of urban growth using panel data from 406 florida cities from 1998 to 2003 the empirical analysis finds important interaction effects between the structure of city executive branch institutions and interest group variables the economic and political forces driving urban growth do not operate identically in all cities they vary as a function of institutional context institutional structure helps determine which interest groups have their preferences reflected in local land use changes and development patterns the resulting patterns suggest a sustainability paradox wherein richer environmental interests push for the preservation of environmental amenities while at the same time accelerating the number of residential units built in a community

incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information a case study the purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy using data for a coal fired power plant each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum chosen by a regulator we look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission of an announcement of the tax formula of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility and of a tax cum subsidy scheme our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally we also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes the monetary side payments subsidy bonus required and to look for self financing schemes

world economic expansion and national security in pre world war i europe profound and rapid changes in the costs and risks of international trade are now widely acknowledged to be a potent source of domestic political conflict by altering the relative prices of goods available from world markets these changes alter the rewards that flow to different factors of production from different economic activities these distributional consequences of changing levels of trade in turn alter the configuration of interests in the domestic political economy strain existing political alignments and enable the construction of new political coalitions thus global changes in the economy such as the transportation and telecommunications revolutions in the nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries or the collapse of international trade and finance during the interwar years will have global consequences as they reverberate within and through the domestic politics of all countries that trade on world markets

optimal second degree price discrimination and arbitrage on the role of asymetric information among buyers the traditional theory of second degree price discrimination tackles individual self selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to conduct arbitrage we study the optimal sale mechanism that takes into account both individual and coalition incentive compatibility we show that the monopolist can achieve the same profit regardless of whether or not buyers can form a coalition although marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers of different types in the optimal sale mechanism they fail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information

international trade and domestic politics improving on rogowski s model of political alignments ronald rogowski s work offers valuable insight into the impact of changing trade exposure on domestic politics exploring the political implications of the well known factor endowments model of international trade theory rogowski argues that owners of relatively abundant productive factors will form a free trading coalition against owners of relatively scarce productive factors who will align in favor of protection rogowski s parsimonious three factor version of the factor endowments theory although offering valuable insight into the politics of less developed economies including today s developed economies in earlier centuries produces significant anomalies when applied to advanced economies intuitive logic and empirical research especially the leontief paradox suggest that the highly complex division of labor found in developed countries will confound the simplicity of the three factor model edward learner s multifactor model suggests solutions to the anomalies that afflict rogowski s simpler model when applied to recent politics in the united states and europe

measuring economies of vertical integration in network industries an application to the water sector this paper provides a framework that aims at distinguishing the technological economies of vertical integration from the vertical economies resulting from an inefficient input allocation due to upstream market imperfections to illustrate our analysis we use consistent panel data econometric methods to estimate cost functions on a sample of north american water utilities contrary to what has been found for other network industries electricity and gas for instance we show that the global and technological economies of vertical integration are not significant except for the smallest utilities

the organization and scope of agents regulating multiproduct industries abstract a mechanism design problem with two dimensional uncertainty is solved to derive the optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with private information about the marginal cost of producing two different goods the paper establishes that informational economies of scope or incentive complementarities arise when one firm produces both goods the regulator should weigh these economies against the benefits of relative performance incentives when choosing between integrated and decentralized organizations unless the marginal costs of the two products are sufficiently positively correlated the optimal ex ante policy gives control of both markets to a single firm journal of economic literature classification number s d82 l22 l51

the value of information and optimal organization the paper addresses the issue of optimal organization of production i compare three organizational forms centralization one agent produces difierent inputs decentralization each of the two agents produces a difierent input and contracts directly with the principal and delegation two agents produce difierent inputs the principal contracts with one of them only the optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity substitutability between the inputs in the flnal use the degree of complementarity substitutability also determines whether delegation is payofi equivalent to the two agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal in the context of delegation i consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor i also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists jel fields d2 d82 l23

toward a theory of the political entrepreneur evidence from local government political scientists have been increasingly interested in entrepreneurs individuals who change the direction and flow of politics in this research note we synthesize aspects of an economic approach to entrepreneurship with concepts used in political science we then tie these theoretical observations to the emergence of entrepreneurs in local governments and test components of our theory using observations from a large set of suburban municipal governments empirically we identify several conditions that affect the probability that an entrepreneur will emerge in a local government especially slack budgetary resources that the political entrepreneur can reallocate we also find that the probability with which an entrepreneur is found in local government is a function of the difficulty of overcoming collective action problems in a community

a contest with the taxman the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources abstract we develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified this setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place however we use the framework to investigate tax evasion we model tax evasion as a concealment detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority we show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest additionally we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources

both guns and butter or neither class interests in the political economy of rearmament astate that is confronted with a grave external threat has three basic options of response each of which involves certain trade offs first it can strengthen its military rearmament or internal balancing allows it to maintain its diplomatic freedom of action but its economy may suffer from the strain of accelerating the production of weapons of war second it can join forces with another power alliances may obviate the need for an arms buildup but they carry the risk that the state will be abandoned by its partners or drawn into undesired conflicts finally it can attempt to reconcile with its adversaries by conceding to some of their demands appeasement may be the least troublesome way to eliminate a threat but it is also the most risky because it transfers valued resources to a potential opponent after weighing these options the state should choose the policy or combination of policies that will provide an acceptable level of security at the lowest overall cost 1 the foregoing account is appealingly parsimonious but it captures only part of the story states are frequently racked by bitter internal debates over how to deal with international pressures and changes in their political leadership sometimes bring about sudden shifts in their behavior of the three strategies described above rearmament is often the most acutely divisive it requires a sharp increase in the extraction and mobilization of resources from society so it can become highly politicized some groups will inevitably bear a heavier burden than others and their discontent may eventually endanger the regime s hold on power or its ability to prepare for war to ensure domestic

regulation under asymmetric information in water utilities water utilities are reminiscent of network industries and are characterized by important fixed costs these factors contribute to a single firm serving an area justifying public intervention on pricing about one fourth of u s water utilities are private and subject to regulation regulators are unlikely to be perfectly informed and regulation is unlikely to be costlessly implemented these inherent imperfections have led economists to consider the incentive properties of regulatory procedures using the economics of information see david baron 1989 the empirical literature on regulation has focused on evaluating the effects of regulation on prices firms costs efficiency and innovation in such sectors as airlines electricity and energy as surveyed by paul l joskow and nancy l rose 1989 few of these empirical studies rely on the so called theory of regulation regarding the water industry there is an abundant literature on residential water demand firms cost and their efficiency given their public versusprivate nature relying on a model with asymmetric information and a sample of california water utilities frank a wolak 1994 assesses the consumer welfare loss due to asymmetric information and shows that the model with asymmetric information provides a superior description of the cost and demand data to the model under perfect information analyzing pricing for residential water is an important policy issue as the sector recently experienced price increases the problem is even more acute in california because of a high residential demand for water along with population growth water scarcity and the probability of severe droughts relying on a new dataset of 32 districts in california over the 1995 2000 period we analyze regulation of private water utilities for every district the california public utilities commission cpuc chooses a price for water an access fee per meter and a rate of return on capital to satisfy firms revenue requirements we assume that the cpuc is imperfectly informed about firms labor efficiency following david besanko 1984 and wolak 1994 we develop a model in which the firm s capital is used as a screening variable in particular the model has the features of a rate of return regulation we show how the rate of return and the access fee can be determined optimally to control firms rents we then adopt a structural approach to analyze the data a multistep estimator allows us to estimate the key parameters of the model the empirical results show price inelasticity an income effect slightly decreasing returns to scale and a concentration of efficient firms the computation of the optimal rate of return and access fee shows that the cpuc would tend to be cautious by allowing a lower than optimal rate and access fee relying on the estimated parameters a first experiment evaluates the cost of asymmetric information the price would be significantly lower resulting in a gain of consumer surplus a second experiment consists of simulating the outcome of an optimal price cap following the farid gasmi et al 2002 model the price cap became a popular regulatory tool in the 1980s such as for electricity though the incentives resulting in price cap regulation have been questioned by economists the counterfactual simulations show a price increase which results in a significant loss in consumer surplus the increase in firms profit does not however counterbalance this loss supporting the relevance of the actual rate of return mechanism

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

tariff regulation with energy efficiency goals we study the optimal tariff structure that could induce a regulated utility to promote energy efficiency by its customers given that it is privately informed about the effectiveness of its effort on demand reduction the regulator should optimally offer a menu of incentive compatible two part tariffs if the firm s energy efficiency activities have a high impact on demand reduction the consumer should pay a high fixed fee but a low per unit price approximating the tariff structure to a decoupling policy which strengthens the firm s incentives to pursue energy conservation instead if the firm s effort to adopt energy efficiency actions is scarcely effective the tariff is characterized by a low fixed fee but a high price per unit of energy consumed thus shifting the incentives for energy conservation on consumers the optimal tariff structure also depends on the cost of the consumer s effort in case the consumer can also adopt energy efficiency measures and on the degree of substitutability between the consumer s and the firm s efforts

the organization of regulated production complementarities correlation and collusion we analyze the choice between vertical separation vs and vertical integration vi when two regulated firms produce complementary inputs with correlated costs and are protected by ex post break even constraints first in the absence of collusion the regulator prefers vi vs for negative and weak positive respectively strong positive correlation second if the firms can collude under vs and know all costs then vs is equivalent to vi however if firms collude under asymmetric information then collusion does not affect the choice between vs and vi since the regulator takes advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information

optimal collusion proof auctions abstract we study an optimal collusion proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation despite their ability to collude on participation informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power the second best auction i e the optimal auction in a collusion free environment can be made collusion proof if at least one bidder is not collusive or there are multiple bidding cartels or the second best outcome involves a non trivial probability of the object not being sold regardless optimal collusion proof auction prescribes non trivial exclusion of collusive bidders i e a refusal to sell to any collusive bidder with positive probability

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

trade and insecure resources we construct a model of conflict and trade to study the consequences of interstate disputes over contested resources land oil water or other resources for arming welfare and trade flows different trade regimes imply different costs of such disputes in terms of arming depending on world prices free trade can intensify arming to such an extent that the additional security costs it brings swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or all rival states free trade though is always an equilibrium and sometimes is a dominant one with features of a prisoner s dilemma outcome furthermore contestation of resources can reverse a country s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict and where such conflict is present comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

on government structure and spending the effects of management form and separation of powers summary this paper contributes to the on going debate over how government form affects spending it broadens the previous focus on elected versus professional management to address the separation of legislative and executive powers the empirical results reveal spending differences between governments with separation of powers and those with unified powers only for southern counties of the us in addition for all regions and time periods professional or elected executive management does not significantly affect either municipal or county spending

the organization of supplier networks effects of delegation and intermediation in a one principal two agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal s interest if the agents supply substitutes it can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed

delegated monitoring versus arm s length contracting abstract this paper analyzes the optimal organization of input suppliers in a procurement context we discuss when a top firm chooses to induce information sharing and active coordination between its suppliers consolidation rather than having them contract at arm s length delegation in designing the organization the firm anticipates that different supplier networks have different costs of inducing information revelation from suppliers when the cost of information sharing varies the optimal organization exhibits various discrete degrees of consolidation there is excessive arm s length contracting compared to the case where the top firm controls this organizational choice itself the paper offers also a methodology to study in a unified framework various organizational forms separately analyzed in the literature

the political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry a similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the new economics of institutions the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity in this survey the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined in addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or where there are answers no strong evidence in support of them this essay then in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

optimal control of acid rain in a federation with decentralized leadership and information abstract we examine some aspects of the acid rain problem in the european union acid rain is a by product of electricity production and the eu is a federal system characterized by decentralized leadership that is regional governments are leaders and the center is a common follower regional governments design environmental policies and the center designs an interregional income redistribution policy in a setting with decentralized information information is decentralized in that an upwind regional power plant is privately informed about its technology we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game with decentralized leadership and information is constrained socially optimal

coordination and externalities abstract we analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly we consider a general multi agent situation with externalities among agents incomplete information and type dependent reservation utilities when the regulator optimally leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents centralized coordination reduces global activity coordination induces more activity when the principal optimally leaves rents to the most inefficient agents last if we impose budget balance our mechanism can also be interpreted as the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d62 d82 l51

interjurisdictional competition and local public finance assessing the modifying effects of institutional incentives and fiscal constraints analysts have sought for years to explain the variations in municipal expenditures across communities with only modest success however recent efforts combining core propositions from the leviat

the politics and economics of the new city debt his paper contrasts nonguaranteed city debt with taxation and general obligation debt drawing upon bureau of the census advisory commission on intergovernmental relations acir and municipal year book data the analysis shows that both per capita tax revenue and outstanding general obligation debt are best explained by background factors such as total population functional scope and region while fiscal strain plays a secondary role political structures in the shape of legal constraints on taxation and debt and of form of government do not account for patterns of these traditional revenue sources by contrast nonguaranteed debt is best explained by a model in which fiscal strain has a paramount role but with both legal constraints on taxing and regional differentiation contributing significantly to the explanation at least for data collected prior to 1978 the findings suggest a two tiered model of the revenue side of fiscal decision making with historical accommodations to powerful economic and demographic factors dominating taxing and general obligation debt while nonguaranteed debt serves as a flexible instrument of shorter term strategy

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

forms of government and climate change policies in us cities it has long been believed that council manager governments with professionally trained public managers are more efficiency oriented and insulated from political pressure than mayor council governments despite the general acceptance of this conventional wisdom empirical evidence to support the predicted differences in policy has been extremely hard to come by most studies have found no direct effect of form of government on expenditures or policy the effect of local institutions has been indirect working to amplify or reduce supplier or demander preferences in contrast this paper examines a unique dataset of sustainability efforts in governmental operations and the community and reports evidence that forms of government are an important direct influence on the approach that communities take to sustainability council manager government systems have a significant positive effect on efforts directed to governmental operations but a negative effect on community efforts

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

making meaningful commitments accounting for variation in cities investments of staff and fiscal resources to sustainability environmental sustainability is one of the great challenges of the 21st century a number of explanations have been advanced for why some local governments make strong commitments to sustainability while others do not most of the extant empirical research however has relied on models that employ only one or just a few of these explanations as a result empirical analyses do not encompass a comprehensive set of variables that account for alternative explanations this study begins to fill this lacuna by specifying an empirical model that examines six explanations for local commitment towards sustainability local sustainability priorities regional governance climate protection networks interest group support local fiscal capacity and characteristics of the local governing institution moreover we use the designation of human and financial resources specifically for sustainability to operationalise commitment this is a more substantive measure than has been used in previous studies we accomplish

robustly collusion proof implementation a contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion we show that agents collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents including both uncorrelated and correlated types in those circumstances any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion including the second best level can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior the collusion proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude provided that noncollusive agents incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism our collusion proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion