rebates matches and consumer behavior an experiment conducted to examine the effects of different discount formats on consumer purchases is reported participants made a series of purchase decisions for chocolate bars given 1 rebates from the listed price 2 matching quantities of chocolates for each bar purchased and 3 simple price reductions contrary to standard theoretical predictions and consistent with results in the context of charitable contributions by eckel and grossman 2003 we find that participants purchase significantly more chocolate bars under a matching sales format than under a comparable rebate format inattention to the net consequences of decisions as well as some rebate aversion explain the preference for matching discounts

garp for kids on the development of rational choice behavior in this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11 year old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference we find that choices by even the 7 year olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly 11 year olds do better still while college students do no better than 11 year old children we also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally we argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate but that it does develop quickly

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

we will be right with you managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk delay announcements informing customers about anticipated service delays are prevalent in service oriented systems how delay announcements can influence customers in service systems is a complex problem that depends on both the dynamics of the underlying queueing system and on the customers strategic behavior we examine this problem of information communication by considering a model in which both the firm and the customers act strategically the firm in choosing its delay announcement while anticipating customer response and the customers in interpreting these announcements and in making the decision about when to join the system and when to balk we characterize the equilibrium language that emerges between the service provider and her customers the analysis of the emerging equilibria provides new and interesting insights into customer firm information sharing we show that even though the information provided to customers is nonverifiable it improves the profits of the firm and the expected utility of the customers the robustness of the results is illustrated via various extensions of the model in particular studying models with incomplete information on the system parameters allows us also to highlight the role of information provision in managing customer expectations regarding the congestion in the system further the information could be as simple as high congestion low congestion announcements or it could be as detailed as the true state of the system we also show that firms may choose to shade some of the truth by using intentional vagueness to lure customers

dynamic pricing for network service equilibrium and stability consider a data communication network owned and operated by a single organization the network has an infinite number of small users and is managed by a system manager sm whose objective is to maximize the net value of the system as a whole the objective of this paper is to study pricing mechanisms that induce the optimal arrival rates when the sm has no full knowledge of the demand in advance we investigate the system behavior under three alternative dynamic pricing rules and users expectations models and characterize the equilibrium and its stability conditions

the permanent income hypothesis estimation and testing by instrumental variables the permanent income hypothesis with rational expectation is restated estimated and tested by an instrumental variables technique on the postwar u s aggregate time series data the hypothesis is accepted on a consumption series which includes service flows from consumer durables if the consumption series is the one in the national income and product accounts the hypothesis is decisively rejected an explanation is suggested to reconcile the conflicting test results

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

efficient secrecy public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy this paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy conventional audience cost models suggest that state leaders must go public to reveal information in interstate crises because leaders cannot enhance their credibility by tying their hands if domestic audiences cannot observe their private signals i present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience the equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat albeit of limited credibility can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational ine cacy because secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war the logic of e cient secrecy may shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises the alaska boundary dispute illustrates this logic

a note on cheap talk and burned money abstract austen smith and banks cheap talk and burned money j econ theory 91 1 2000 1 16 study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of crawford and sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 i identify an error in the main theorem of austen smith and banks and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications i also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning this strengthens a result of austen smith and banks but uncovers other errors in their analysis finally an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct

setting customer expectation in service delivery an integrated marketing operations perspective service firms have increasingly been competing for market share on the basis of delivery time many firms now choose to set customer expectation by announcing their maximal delivery time customers will be satisfied if their perceived delivery times are shorter than their expectations this gap model of service quality is used in this paper to study how a firm might choose a delivery time commitment to influence its customer expectation and delivery quality in order to maximize its market share a market share model is developed to capture 1 the impact of delivery time commitment and delivery quality on the firm s market share and 2 the impact of the firm s market share and process variability on delivery quality when there is a congestion effect we show that the choice of the delivery time commitment requires a proper balance between the level of service capacity and customer sensitivities to delivery time expectation and delivery quality we prove the existence of nash equilibria in a duopolistic competition and show that this delivery time commitment game is analogous to a prisoners dilemma

liquidity constraints and the substitutability between private and government consumption the role of military and non military spending i introduction using data for a number of economies we investigate i the relationship between private consumption and two types of government spending military and non military and ii the severity of liquidity constraints because of their importance for macroeconomic modeling in theory and practice 1 both issues have been the subjects of considerable theoretical and empirical investigation on the issue of liquidity constraints the most influential research has relied on hall s 1978 euler equation approach to the permanent income hypothesis in an attempt to reconcile hall s and flavin s 1981 methodologies hayashi 1982 modified hall s martingale result to allow for the possibility that a subset of consumers are liquidity constrained and showed that liquidity constraints can result in consumption s excess sensitivity to current income campbell and mankiw 1989 1990 1991 and jappelli and pagano 1989 have applied hayashi s methodology using data from the u s and several other oecd countries on the substitutability issue aschauer 1985 has modified hall s euler equation to allow for substitutability between government spending and private consumption and found that the two are substitutes for the u s karras 1994 however using a similar approach and data for 30 countries concludes that private and government consumption are better described as complementary or unrelated liquidity constraints and substitutability have been combined in studies by graham and himarios 1991 cushing 1992 and graham 1993 using u s data and by evans and karras 1996 for a number of countries a crucial limitation of most of these studies is the use of aggregate government consumption data which counterintuitively imposes a common substitutability parameter on all components of government spending 2 using recently available time series data for a large number of countries the present paper relaxes this restriction by decomposing government consumption into military and non military components enabling us to separately identify their relationship to private consumption the allocation of government consumption between military and non military functions has varied greatly across countries the appendix reports the average size of military and non military government shares in gdp as well as the military non military ratio by country over the 1970 1989 period average military expenditure as a fraction of gdp for example has ranged in our sample from 0 11 in mexico to 12 30 in jordan similarly the fraction of government consumption absorbed by military expenditure has ranged from 1 09 in mauritius to 66 82 in poland this sizable variability is promising in terms of cross sectional identification power but it also suggests that the estimated parameters must not be assumed to be common across countries the estimated model is derived in section ii which combines liquidity constraints and substitutability by nesting the approaches of hayashi 1982 and aschauer 1985 in the same section we discuss data sources and the estimation strategy which permits the estimated parameters to vary by country in a way that helps determine how they are influenced by country specific factors section iii estimates the model for a panel of the 66 countries for which annual data on all series are available for the 1970 1989 period the paper s main conclusions are given in section iv ii methodology and data we assume that consumers in economy i at time t derive utility from effective consumption c sup which we define as 1 mathematical expression omitted where c is private consumption g sup m and g sup nm are the military and non military components of government consumption the parameters theta sup m and theta sup nm measure the degree of substitutability between c and g sup m and c and g sup nm respectively

do antitrust laws facilitate collusion experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies bertrand supergames with non binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets the experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication zero cost low cost and high cost prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly moreover costly communication decreases the number of messages but more importantly it enhances the stability of collusive agreements mccutcheon 1997 presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of mccutcheon s 1997 argument the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

certainty equivalence and the excess sensitivity of private consumption for a panel of oecd countries we show that the magnitude of the estimate for the excess sensitivity of private consumption to current income cannot be explained by a model based on certainty equivalence

the price elasticity of charitable giving new experimental evidence abstract we examine the charitable giving decisions of donors under two subsidy mechanisms rebate and matching and we calculate the price elasticity of giving we implement an online survey using the amazon mechanical turk platform participants are asked to make a series of allocation decisions between themselves and a charity of their choice we vary endowment and subsidy rates in line with the literature the results show that contributions under matching subsidies are significantly higher than contributions under rebate subsidies participants who usually make a donation are more likely to give and are less responsive to price changes moreover the probability of giving increases monotonically along with subsidy rates

cheap talk games may have unique informative equilibrium outcomes abstract we demonstrate that cheap talk games can have unique informative equilibrium outcomes by providing an example of an infinite action bayesian game which absent cheap talk does not possess an equilibrium

subsidizing charitable giving with rebates or matching further laboratory evidence we examine two different ways to subsidize charitable giving by a rebate returning a portion of the donation to the giver or by a match adding additional donations to the giver s donation in previous experimental research we have shown that participants give more to charity under the match than under an equivalent rebate the previous within subject experimental design required participants to make a series of decisions under both types of subsidy each decision consisted of an allocation of an endowment between the subject and a charity chosen by the subject from a specified list this article examines whether that result is an artifact of the previous within subjects design subjects may have failed to fully distinguish the two types of subsidy in the current article we report results from a between subjects design where participants are required to make only one type of decision involving rebates or involving matching subsidies our results confirm previous findings

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

the impact of delaying the delay announcements many service providers use delay announcements to inform customers of anticipated delays however this information is usually not provided immediately but after a short period of time spent either waiting or occupied by the system the focus of this paper is on the impact of this postponement on the ability of the firm to influence customer behavior by communicating nonverifiable congestion information to its customers as well as on the profits and utilities for the firm and the customers respectively we show that this postponement can actually help the firm create credibility and augment the resulting equilibrium however in other settings this delay can also detract from the resulting equilibrium furthermore we show that whenever credibility is created it improves not only the profit for the firm but also the customers overall utility under certain settings

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

how effective is fiscal policy in raising national saving while fiscal adjustment is commonly viewed as the cornerstone of macroeconomic stabilization the effectiveness of alternative fiscal instruments in raising national saving is still poorly understood this paper enters the debate by estimating a private consumption function that allows for two types of agents finite horizons and liquidity constraints and nests three different consumption hypotheses using a large panel data set that includes both industrial and developing countries we reject full ricardian equivalence we also find substantial differences between industrial and developing countries regarding both the extent of ricardian offsetting and the degree to which the government budget constraint is internalized

costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements abstract this paper formulates a continuous time information transmission model in which an altruistic sender privately observes a stochastic state variable and incurs a communication cost when she broadcasts a message we characterize the sender s optimal announcement strategy using an ordinary differential equation we prove the optimality of the sender s strategies using a martingale verification argument and show that the sender s optimal strategy involves sending discrete messages furthermore we apply the model to the timing decision of credit rating announcements and provide a framework to study various aspects of rating announcements such as the probability of rating reversals and the expected time before a rating change

persuasion with communication costs this paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report contrary to previous literature it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by milgrom 1981 is relatively robust to costly reporting a separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs intuitively the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation with reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria for example a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high finally a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report as long as this cost is not too high

cheap talk can matter in bargaining this paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation the intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model instead if good faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the probability of continued negotiation our cheap talk equilibrium features bargaining behavior that could not be equilibrium behavior in the absence of talk

tax misperceptions and the effect of informational tax nudges on retirement savings despite subjects being informed about tax rules before making saving decisions we find using laboratory experiments that deferred taxation results in after tax pensions that are approximately 25

using laboratory experimental auctions in marketing research a case study of new packaging for fresh beef this paper illustrates the use of laboratory experimental auctions in a pretest market research program for new products we review the experimental auctions literature discuss the range of auction mechanisms available and present the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular mechanism for a laboratory pretest market we then present a step by step example of how a theoretically incentive compatible auction mechanism fifth price sealed bid was used in a laboratory pretest market for vacuum packaged beef based on the illustration we discuss the potential for using laboratory experimental auctions in pretest market research we present the limitations that may be encountered in such applications and outline research aimed at improving the behavioral properties of the technique

waiting time and decision making is time like money time is a resource as such consumers have to make decisions regarding their use of time in the purchase and consumption of goods and services using prospect theory and mental accounting as theoretical frameworks this article investigates whether consumers treat time like money when they make decisions in a series of studies we found that the value of consumers time is not constant but depends on contextual characteristics of the decision situation our results also suggest that in deterministic situations people make decisions involving time losses in a manner consistent with the convex loss function proposed by prospect theory however in decision making under conditions of risk people seem to make risk averse choices with respect to decisions in the domain of time in contrast to the risk seeking behavior often found with respect to decisions involving losses of money we discuss the nonfungibility of time as an explanation for the discrepancy between decisions involving time and those involving money

savings incentives for low and moderate income families in the united states why is the saver s credit not more effective this paper uses data from the largest tax preparer in the united states to estimate the impact of the saver s credit a us federal program providing financial incentives to encourage retirement savings on the decision to contribute to an ira it finds significant but very modest effects this is contrasted with results from a field experiment showing much larger impacts of clearly presented matching incentives various explanations are discussed for why the saver s credit is not more effective jel h00 h31 c93 d14

spending time versus spending money we find systematic differences in the way that people spend time versus money ex post people are able to more easily accommodate negative outcomes by adjusting the value of their temporal inputs ex ante people are willing to spend more time for higher risk higher return options whereas when spending money the pattern is reversed and the more standard pattern of increasing risk aversion is observed although accurate assessment of the opportunity costs of time is key to making good decisions ambiguity in the value of time promotes accommodation and rationalization

optimal limited authority for principal abstract this article studies a principal agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent we show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal biased toward the agent s preference generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain compared to no commitment limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent as a result it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent

secrecy two sided bias and the value of evidence abstract we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and or a pooling equilibrium as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling we also characterize all nonseparating equilibria and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters