balancing terrorism and natural disasters defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort in this paper we apply game theory to identify equilibrium strategies for both attacker and defender in a fully endogenous model of resource allocation for countering terrorism and natural disasters the key features of our model include balancing protection from terrorism and natural disasters and describing the attacker choice by a continuous level of effort rather than a discrete choice i e attack or not interestingly in a sequential game increased defensive investment can lead an attacker to either increase his level of effort to help compensate for the reduced probability of damage from an attack or decrease his level of effort because attacking has become less profitable this can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of investments in protection from intentional attack and can therefore affect the relative desirability of investing in protection from natural disasters

securing the containerized supply chain analysis of government incentives for private investment to mitigate the threat that terrorists smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the united states through maritime containers the u s bureau of customs and border protection cbp inspects containers upon entry to domestic ports inspection driven congestion is costly and cbp provides incentives to firms to improve security upstream in the supply chain thereby reducing the inspection burden at u s ports we perform an economic analysis of this incentive program called customs trade partnership against terrorism c tpat modeling in a game theoretic framework the strategic interaction between cbp trading firms and terrorists our equilibrium results highlight the possibility that a properly run program can efficiently shift some of cbp s security burden to private industry these results also suggest that cbp may have the opportunity to use strategic delay as an incentive for firms to join analysis of comparative statics shows that with increasing capacity membership in c tpat systematically declines

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

mean reversion in real exchange rates evidence and implications for forecasting abstract the stationarity of real exchange rates over the recent flexible exchange rate period is an issue that has long bedeviled researchers in international finance using a constrained multivariate framework this paper provides the strongest evidence yet that real exchange rates were mean reverting over the 1973 93 period we also investigate shifts in long run real exchange rates which may be important for the purpose of forecasting out of sample forecasting shows that the random walk model is outperformed by a mean stationary model especially at long horizons in addition there are substantial forecasting benefits from using a multivariate approach

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

to bargain or not to bargain that is the question we use economic analysis in a simple game theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no negotiation strategy from the government viewpoint we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure i e expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents and whether to negotiate or not this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

rent seeking contests with incomplete information we consider rent seeking contests with two players who each have private information about their own cost of effort we consider both discrete and continuous distributions of costs and give results for each case focusing on existence of equilibrium

historical evolution and benefit cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision an evolutionary game analysis framework abstract the periodical fluctuation phenomenon appears in coal mine and other fields of government safety supervision the paper provides a theoretical explanation by building an evolutionary game model between coal mine industry and governmental supervision institutions moreover the paper provides a numerical example to demonstrate how the initial state and the costs or gains influence the fluctuation amplitude and the equilibrium position we find that the initial state and the payoffs of different strategies are the two main determinants of periodical fluctuation phenomenon the successful experience of coal mine safety supervision in china shows the importance of highly efficient government safety governance in developing countries

production and conflict models versus rent seeking models a production and conflict p c model and a rent seeking rs model are compared for one group two groups and k groups adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the p c model but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the rs model the total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within group and between group decisiveness productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role the collective action problem is more severe for the rs model as group size increases the ratio of within group to between group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the p c model while it increases convexly for the rs model adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in rs groups than in p c groups while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result the severe between group fighting in the p c model for many groups causes the p c model to be preferable for few groups while the rs model is preferable for many groups applications are considered to intergroup migration inside versus outside ownership divestitures mergers and acquisitions multidivisional versus single tier firms and u form versus m form of economic organization

the impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government a company allocates a resource between safety effort and production the government earns taxes on production the disaster probability is modeled as a contest between the disaster magnitude and the two players safety efforts the model illustrates that safety efforts are strategic substitutes and inverse u shaped in the disaster magnitude the company s safety effort increases and the government s safety effort decreases in taxation taxation can ameliorate companies free riding on governments safety efforts with sufficiently large production the government prefers and the company does not prefer raising taxation above 0 for the government an upper limit usually exists above which taxation cannot be profitably increased the model shows how both or no players exert safety efforts when the disaster magnitude is small and large respectively and how they free ride on each other s safety efforts when the disaster magnitude is intermediate the company free rides when the unit production cost is low so that the large profits outweigh the negative impact of the disaster with endogenized taxation determined by the government the tax rate decreases in the disaster magnitude the unit production cost the government s unit cost of safety effort and how the company is negatively affected by the disaster the tax rate increases in the company s resource and how the government is negatively affected by the disaster the tax rate is weakly u shaped in the company s unit safety effort the model is illustrated with numerical examples and with the oil spill disasters by bp in 2010 and by exxon valdez in 1989

to reveal or not to reveal strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation abstract within the bargaining literature it is widely held that negotiators should never reveal information that will lead to disclosure of their reservation prices we analyze a simple bargaining and search model in which the informed buyer can choose to reveal his cost of searching for an outside price which determines his reservation price to the uninformed seller we demonstrate that buyers can be made better off by revealing their search cost more interestingly we also find that depending on the assumed distribution of search costs sometimes buyers with relatively low search costs should reveal their private information whereas in other cases buyers with relatively high search costs should do so we then test our model experimentally and find that subjects behavior is not entirely consistent with theoretical predictions in general bargainers behavior is better explained by a bounded rationality model similar to fictitious play

defense against an opportunistic challenger theory and experiments abstract this paper considers a contest setting in which a challenger chooses between one of two contests to enter after observing the level of defense at each despite the challenger s chance of success being determined by a proportional contest success function the defenders effectively find themselves in an all pay auction that largely dissipates the value of the defended resources because the challenger will target the weaker defender however if the defenders form a protective alliance then their expected profits increase despite the fact that a successful challenge is theoretically more likely given the overall reduction in defense controlled laboratory experiments designed to test the model s predictions are also reported observed behavior is generally consistent with the comparative static predictions although challengers exhibit the familiar overbidding pattern defenders appear to anticipate this reaction and adjust their behavior accordingly

toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation this article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy economists quasi unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within an incomplete contract approach to political economy we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians ability to distribute rents insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

unique equilibrium in rent seeking contests with a continuum of types it is shown that rent seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium

the investment problem in terrorism evidence from early terrorist groups reveals a structural equivalence between extortion and terrorism this allows us to draw conclusions from the theory of extortion that can be applied to a theory of terrorism concerning the role of repeated play in the viability of extortion it also enables us to analyse the role of commitment in destroying the extortionary organization

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

on the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system first mover advantage vs robustness abstract it is commonly accepted in the literature that when facing with a strategic terrorist the government can be better off by manipulating the terrorist s target selection with exposing her defense levels and thus moving first however the impact of terrorist s private information may significantly affect such government s first mover advantage which has not been extensively studied in the literature to explore the impact of asymmetry in terrorist s attributes between government and terrorist on defense equilibrium we propose a model in which the government chooses between disclosure sequential game and secrecy simultaneous game of her defense system our analysis shows that the government s first mover advantage in a sequential game is considerable only when both government and terrorist share relatively similar valuation of targets in contrast we interestingly find that the government no longer benefits from the first mover advantage by exposing her defense levels when the degree of divergence between government and terrorist valuation of targets is high this is due to the robustness of defense system under secrecy in the sense that all targets should be defended in equilibrium irrespective of how the terrorist valuation of targets is different to government we identify two phenomena that lead to this result first when the terrorist holds a significantly higher valuation of targets than the government s belief the government may waste her budget in a sequential game by over investing on the high valued targets second when the terrorist holds a significantly lower valuation of targets the government may incur a higher expected damage in a sequential game because of not defending the low valued targets finally we believe that this paper provides some novel insights to homeland security resource allocation problems

purchasing power parity and unit root tests using panel data abstract this paper reports the results of unit root tests for real exchange rates using a panel framework this panel approach provides greatly improved power compared to conventional univariate time series unit root tests we obtain evidence supporting ppp over the recent flexible exchange rate period for g 6 and oecd countries we show explicitly that failure to find such evidence in previous research was due to the low power of the tests

conciliation counterterrorism and patterns of terrorist violence what causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows gov ernment concessions given this pattern why do governments ever conciliate terror ists i propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them leaving extremists in con trol governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their coun terterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises the model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror when moderates accept concessions the terms of negotiated settle ments the duration of terrorist conflicts incentives for moderate terrorists to radical ize their followers and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders the model is illustrated with an application to the israeli0 palestinian conflict

are real gdp levels nonstationary evidence from panel data tests potential nonstationarity of important macroeconomic variables and unit root tests are now a standard procedure in empirical analyses while there are many findings of unit roots in macroeconomic variables using the popular augmented dickey and fuller 1979 test this test has low power against near unit root alternatives recently panel data procedures have been proposed as an avenue to increased power this paper applies panel unit root tests to international real gdp and real gdp per capita data the results overwhelmingly indicate that international real gdp and real gdp per capita levels are nonstationary

non stationarities in macro economic time series further evidence and implications two sources of non stationarities in the mean of macro economic time series are investigated the empirical evidence for several countries clearly implies that differencing is to be preferred to the assumption of a deterministic linear time trend this result is somewhat weaker with respect to the analogous choice between seasonal differencing and seasonal dummy variables it is recommended that the time series properties of the variables considered in empirical work be carefully checked because the estimated relationships may heavily depend on the chosen detrending procedure les non stationarites dans ies chroniques macro economiques resultats supplmentaires et implications l auteur examine deux sources de non stationarite dans la mnoyenne des chroniques macroeconomiques les resultats d analyses de donnees pour plusieurs pays montrent clairement qu on doit preferer l usage d un processus de differences finies a l emploi d une tendance lineaire deterministe ce resultat est un peu moins robuste pour ce qui est du choix analogue entre l utilisation de differences saisonnieres par rapport a

are real exchange rates nonstationary evidence from a panel data test it is well documented that real exchange rates between the united states and many industrialized countries in the post bretton woods period are integrated this result implies that purchasing power parity ppp does not hold even as a long run relationship this paper demonstrates that the failure to reject the unit root hypothesis may result from the low power of existing univariate test procedures i test for unit roots in real exchange rates by employing a more powerful panel based procedure using both cpi and wpi real dollar exchange rate data i strongly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root my results provide overwhelming support for the long run ppp under the current float copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations this paper introduces contest efficiency as an alternative to rent dissipation when measuring efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations contest efficiency is defined as the expected proportion of the maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest and differs from rent dissipation because it values the expected winner of the contest therefore rent dissipation and contest efficiency may suggest contradictory conclusions when agents have asymmetric valuations this result is illustrated when comparing alternative equilibria in contests with asymmetric reimbursement and when analyzing the comparative static effect of a change in the relative benefit of two agents in a cournot nash contest

mean reversion in interest rates new evidence from a panel of oecd countries previous studies show that the standard univariate unit root tests cannot reject the hypothesis that interest rates follow integrated processes in this paper the authors pool interest rate data of twelve oecd countries and implement a multivariate test it is found that the unit root hypothesis can be decisively rejected copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

passenger profiling imperfect screening and airport security we present a theoretical model of airport searches the model extends previous work in the area in that detection conditional on search is imperfect the hit rates tests for racial bias developed in knowles persico and todd 2001 is shown to apply even in the presence of imperfections in monitoring we then study two channels for improving airport security better targeting and better detection we show that better targeting does not necessarily decrease the overall crime rate although it will decrease crime in the group that is targeted improved detection rates unambiguously decrease crime group speci c improvements in detection do not necessarily increase the number of searches for those groups the analysis is extended to allow for the possibility that criminal passengers disguise themselves as members of low crime groups

balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information concerns on security and congestion appear in security screening which is used to identify and deter potential threats e g attackers terrorists smugglers spies among normal applicants wishing to enter an organization location or facility generally in depth screening reduces the risk of being attacked but creates delays that may deter normal applicants and thus decrease the welfare of the approver authority manager screener in this paper we develop a model to determine the optimal screening policy to maximize the reward from admitting normal applicants net of the penalty from admitting bad applicants we use an m m 1 queueing system to capture the impact of security screening policies on system congestion and use game theory to model strategic behavior in which potential applicants with private information can decide whether to apply based on the observed approver s screening policy and the submission behavior of other potential applicants we provide analytical solutions for the optimal non discriminatory screening policy and numerical illustrations for both the discriminatory and non discriminatory policies in addition we discuss more complex scenarios including imperfect screening abandonment behavior of normal applicants and non zero waiting costs of attackers

a continuous model for multistore competitive location this paper presents a simple model to determine the location strategies of two retail firms planning to open a number of stores in a geographical market firms try to maximize their profit under a leader follower type competition in which the number of stores is made endogenous by the introduction of fixed costs a novel methodology is developed in which firms strategies are defined in terms of their location densities this methodology leads to a model that is solvable analytically and to several results on competitive location strategies first it is shown that if the follower decides to enter a market he enters at least as strongly as the leader second the leader can effectively deter entry even if she is severely cost disadvantaged however in some cases the leader is better off by allowing the follower to enter the market third the leader may also let the follower enter the market in some situations where she has a cost advantage it is also shown that in situations where both firms enter the market their location strategies are quite insensitive to model parameters

exploring the dynamics between terrorism and anti terror spending theory and uk evidence abstract recent years have seen governments restricting civic freedoms and legislating significant increases in spending to combat terrorist activities in this paper we investigate the relationship between anti terror spending and terrorism in line with previous findings in the empirical literature on terrorist activity our game theoretic model of the interaction between a benevolent government and a terrorist organization is suggestive of a non linear relation between terrorism and counter terrorism spending using uk data our empirical markov switching implementation provides evidence in favor of this approach the empirical results also show that the probability of transiting into a state with high terror is smaller if defense spending is high

asymmetric rent seeking with more than two contestants this article considers a rent seeking model with n asymmetriccontestants each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent oneof the n contestants is selected as the winner based ontullock s probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale a pure strategy nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated

modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple period attacker defender signaling game abstract in this paper we apply game theory to model strategies of secrecy and deception in a multiple period attacker defender resource allocation and signaling game with incomplete information at each period we allow one of the three possible types of defender signals truthful disclosure secrecy and deception we also allow two types of information updating the attacker updates his knowledge about the defender type after observing the defender s signals and also after observing the result of a contest if one occurs in any given time period our multiple period model provides insights into the balance between capital and expense for defensive investments and the effects of defender private information such as defense effectiveness target valuations and costs and also shows that defenders can achieve more cost effective security through secrecy and deception possibly lasting more than one period in a multiple period game this paper helps to fill a significant gap in the literature in particular to our knowledge no past work has studied defender secrecy and deception in a multiple period game moreover we believe that the solution approach developed and applied in this paper would prove useful in other types of multiple period games

on the role of psychological heuristics in operational research and a demonstration in military stability operations psychological heuristics are formal models for making decisions that i rely on core psychological capacities e g recognizing patterns or recalling information from memory ii do not necessarily use all available information and process the information they use by simple computations e g ordinal comparisons or un weighted sums and iii are easy to understand apply and explain the contribution of this article is fourfold first the conceptual foundation of the psychological heuristics research program is provided along with a discussion of its relationship to soft and hard or second empirical evidence and theoretical analyses are presented on the conditions under which psychological heuristics perform on par with or even better than more complex standard models in decision problems such as multi attribute choice classification and forecasting and in domains as varied as health economics and management third we demonstrate the application of the psychological heuristics approach to the problem of reducing civilian casualties in military stability operations finally we discuss the role that psychological heuristics can play in or theory and practice

multi objective stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information abstract water supply networks are infrastructures pivotal to economic development and living standards of which the increasing complexity and interdependencies have brought challenges for the protection and enhancement of water supplies we address the problem on how to defend water supply networks with hydraulic characteristics against an interdictor by building a multi objective stackelberg game model with incomplete information in this model the defender and the interdictor both considered as rational players choose a subset of network components to defend or interdict based on their payoffs the defender with incomplete information on the interdictor s efforts initiates to trade off the two objectives of maximizing the expected network satisfaction rate and of minimizing defense efforts whereas the interdictor with no information on network operational capacity follows to trade off the objectives of minimizing the expected network efficiency and of minimizing interdiction efforts the algorithm of determining the final optimal defense strategies is presented which consists of three steps 1 develop the strategy sets by the assessments of network vulnerability and resilience 2 analyze the equilibrium through a nested heuristic genetic algorithm and 3 determine the final optimal defense strategy based on the minimax regret approach a case study of d town water supply network demonstrates the practical significance of the proposed approach furthermore the impacts of the incomplete information are analyzed to provide suggestions on the defense strategy making

a game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes abstract we study a strategic two player sequential game between an attacker and defender the defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets the attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack this paper proposes a model for determining optimal resource allocation by combining game theory with a simple multi attribute utility model given a set of possible attributes representing goals or preferences we allow each player to choose a weight for each attribute where the subset of attributes with nonzero weights represents that player s preferences every countermeasure is given a score for its effectiveness at both mitigating the effects of an attack in terms of each attribute and reducing the probability of the success of an attack furthermore the consequences of each possible attack are scored in terms of each attribute the multi attribute utility aspect of this model uses these scores along with the players weights to form the basis of the utility or disutility for each player we find that i the zero sum game where the attacker s and defender s weights are identical results in the worst losses for the defender ii in general cases the defender s equilibrium strategy has the result of making the attacker indifferent between multiple attacks and iii the use of target independent countermeasures i e countermeasures which operate at national levels as opposed to operating at differing levels for each target can increase the cost effectiveness of countermeasures

anarchy and its breakdown anarchy defined as a system in which participants can seize and defend resources without regulation from above is not chaos but rather a spontaneous order however anarchy is fragile and may dissolve either into formless amorphy or into a more organized system such as hierarchy under anarchy each contestant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources anarchy is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort the decisiveness parameter is sufficiently low and incomes exceed the viability minimum these considerations explain many features of animal and human conflict

multiple breaks terms of trade shocks and the unit root hypothesis for african per capita real gdp summary this paper presents an investigation of the unit root hypothesis for per capita real gdp series in 46 african countries from maddison 2003 over the period spreading during 1950 and 2001 toward this end we employ highly flexible panel techniques which incorporate multiple mean and slope shifts in the output series our findings are clearly supportive of regime wise trend stationarity in output after 1 allowing for cross dependence and multiple breaks and 2 removing four countries that exert undue influence on the whole panel remarkably our main results hold true for alternative per capita real gdp proxies retrieved from the penn world table 6 2 as well as for different country groups constructed on the basis of the country s participation in regional integration processes interestingly the timing of the breaks broadly coincides with terms of trade shocks associated with large fluctuations in the price of primary commodities based on our results we draw some policy prescriptions that point to the need for managing adequately terms of trade booms and busts to avoid large swings in africa s aggregate output

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

the interplay between preemptive and defensive counterterrorism measures a two stage game a two stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented emphasizing the interaction between preemptive and defensive measures taken by two commonly targeted countries the preemptor is apt to be the high cost defender with the greater foreign interests a prime target country may also assume the preemptor role the analysis identifies key factors cost comparisons foreign interests targeting risks and domestic terrorism losses that determine counterterrorism allocations market failures associated with preemptive and defensive measures may be jointly ameliorated by a disadvantaged defender nevertheless the subgame perfect equilibrium will still be suboptimal since externalities are not fully internalized

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

are output fluctuations transitory according to the conventional view of the business cycle fluctuations in output represent temporary deviations from trend the purpose of this paper is to question this conventional view if fluctuations in output are dominated by temporary deviations from the natural rate of output then an unexpected change in output today should not substantially change one s forecast of output in say five or ten years our examination of quarterly postwar united states data leads us to be skeptical about this implication the data suggest that an unexpected change in real gnp of 1 percent should change one s forecast by over 1 percent over a long horizon

cointegration how short is the long run abstract when testing for cointegration and faced with short sample periods it is common for researchers to turn to more frequently sampled observations that is to move from annual to quarterly or monthly data in order to increase the number of observations we argue that such a gain in the degrees of freedom is more apparent than real essentially cointegration is a long run concept and hence requires long spans of data to give tests for cointegration much power rather than merely large numbers of observations using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate this for four popular tests for cointegration

an approximate solution to rent seeking contests with private information abstract we propose an approximate solution to rent seeking contests in which participants have heterogeneous and private valuations the procedure only requires common knowledge about the mean of the distribution of valuations we obtain a closed form expression for an agent s level of investment and subject it to comparative statics analysis we then assess the performance of the model and find that the proposed solution provides a remarkably effective approximation of the optimal solution for a wide range of parameter specifications

information in conflicts abstract we consider two player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value for settings where one player knows the value of the prize while the other only knows its prior distribution we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent in the special case of a lottery contest equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed

critical infrastructure protection using secrecy a discrete simultaneous game abstract in this research critical infrastructure protection against intentional attacks is modeled as a discrete simultaneous game between the protector and the attacker to model the situation that both players keep the information of their resource allocation secret we prove that keeping the information regarding protection strategies secret can obtain a better effect of critical infrastructure protection than truthfully disclosing it solving a game theoretic problem even in the case of two players has been known to be intractable to deal with this complexity after proving that pure strategy nash equilibrium solutions do not exist for the proposed simultaneous game a new approach is proposed to identify its mixed strategy nash equilibrium solution

insurance self protection and the economics of terrorism abstract this paper investigates the rationale for public intervention in the terrorism insurance market it argues that government subsidies for terror insurance have the effect of discouraging self protection and limiting the negative externalities associated with self protection cautious self protective behavior by a target can hurt public goods like national prestige if it is seen as giving in to the terrorists and may increase the loss probabilities faced by others by encouraging terrorists to substitute toward more vulnerable targets we argue that these externalities in protection are essential for normative analysis of government intervention in insurance markets and may also explain why availability problems in this market have engendered much stronger government responses than similar problems in other catastrophe insurance markets

security screening queues with impatient applicants a new model with a case study abstract security screening policies are critical in military contexts airports ports and visa issuance processes in order to minimize risks from terrorists smugglers fugitives and others however such screening procedures also increase congestion and inconvenience for normal applicants which may create a trade off for the authorities balancing between risk and congestion in this paper we develop a game theoretical model to investigate optimal screening policies that acknowledges the trade offs between risk congestion and abandonment behavior of the applicants to calculate the average waiting time in the screening queue with heterogeneous impatient applicants we use a two dimensional markov chain model as a case study we tackle the security screening process of us visa applications by conducting an online survey collected data shows some key aspects of applicant preferences such as abandonment behavior we conduct sensitivity analysis for our model we show that if the authorities take the abandonment behavior of the applicants into account beforehand they may achieve higher utility depending on the characteristics of applicants

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

revenge or continued attack and defense in defender attacker conflicts abstract existing literature has demonstrated that exacting revenge can have a self deterrence effect and a value of revenge effect the former means that each player will decrease effort when competing for a resource because of fear of a rival s revenge while the latter implies that each player will increase effort in the revenge period moreover the self deterrence effect could outweigh the value of revenge effect implying that revenge could be helpful in stabilizing conflicts a phenomenon known as the paradox of revenge we re examine the two effects and the paradox of revenge in defender attacker conflicts considering a scenario in which a defender and only the defender who was attacked in the first period takes revenge on the attacker in the subsequent period we demonstrate that whether or not these results hold depends on how much the defender values revenge and the difference between the two players efficiencies of effort more interestingly we show that a sufficiently large revenge value for the defender can deter an attack from the attacker in the first place

dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states abstract we consider a class of dynamic games in which each player s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players we develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state journal of economic literature classification numbers c63 c73

are real gdp levels trend difference or regime wise trend stationary evidence from panel data tests incorporating structural change the unit root hypothesis for international real gdp and real gdp per capita has been the subject of extensive investigation using panel methods that incorporate structural change we reject the unit root null in favor of the alternative of trend stationarity with one or two changes in the slope for two panels with postwar data and one or two changes in both the slope and the intercept for a panel with long horizon data we conclude that real gdp levels are better characterized as regime wise trend stationary than as either trend stationary without structural change or difference stationary with unit roots

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

the relevance of private information in mechanism design abstract recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information and are sufficiently risk neutral it is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents we show that these full rent extraction results hinge on the implicit assumption that the agents beliefs uniquely determine their preferences we present an example of the voluntary provision of a public good in which this assumption is relaxed and consequently even in highly correlated environments if agents beliefs do not uniquely determine their preferences then the extraction of the agents entire information rents is impossible

optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information abstract this paper models a decentralized firm under information asymmetry and effort disutility on the part of managers we assume that managers choose efforts before observing some private information however after the effort choice managers receive private information on their cost parameters which they report to the headquarters there exist many situations in which managers need to take efforts before obtaining private information for example the regular maintenance effort on the machine the effort on rd 2 under certain demand conditions managers cannot receive any information rent benefit for their private information even if they have the option to renege on the contract after obtaining their private information

optimal allocation of resources in airport security profiling vs screening this model examines the role of intelligence gathering and screening in providing airport security we analyze this problem using a game between the government and a terrorist by investing in intelligence gathering the government can improve the precision of its information in contrast screening can be used to search a passenger and thereby deter terrorist attacks we determine the optimal allocation of resources between these two strategies wherein we model the role of intelligence using the concept of supermodular precision one striking result is that under certain circumstances an increase in the investment in intelligence can induce a more devious terrorist to attack with a higher probability we also find that when there is a cost reducing innovation in the screening technology then the optimal investment in intelligence gathering can go either way however such an innovation unambiguously improves social welfare another interesting implication is that a developed economy would value intelligence inputs more than a developing economy we also examine the efficacy of a program such as precheck that allows some select passengers expedited screening in exchange for voluntarily revealing information about themselves our analysis shows that such a program can be used to cushion the adverse effect of budgetary shortages finally we also examine the role of enhanced punishment on the optimal level of intelligence we find that the result can go both ways if the initial level of punishment is high then any further enhancement reduces the optimal level of intelligence gathering however this result is reversed if the initial level of punishment is low

hiding in plain sight using signals to detect terrorists this paper studies the interaction between a governmental security agency as the transportation security agency or the immigration and naturalization service and a terrorist organization like al qaeda the governmental agency wants to stop the terrorists but first must infer whether a visa applicant or an airline passenger is a terrorist on the basis of some observable signal the terrorist organization s objective is to get past security to commit murder and mayhem we derive the equilibrium strategy for this signaling model and evaluate specific anti terrorist policies as the creation of the new homeland security agency and increased airport security screening

new panel unit root tests of ppp abstract we use the new panel unit root tests im k s pesaran m h shin y 1995 testing for unit roots in heterogenous panels wp 9526 dae university of cambridge revised march 1997 to analyse the stationarity of real exchange rates for the g10 economies and switzerland our results for monthly data 1973 96 indicate mean reversion in real exchange rates and a half life of under three years for one off shocks

activity and inactivity in a rent seeking contest with private information we consider a rent seeking contest in which one player has private information about his own valuation of the prize this valuation may be either high or low all other players have a known and identical valuation of the prize we present necessary and sufficient conditions under which the privately informed player exerts a positive or zero equilibrium effort

evidence on discrimination in consumer markets economists have contributed to the measurement of racial and ethnic discrimination in consumption and to the identification of its causes especially in housing markets and car sales to test the hypothesis that discrimination exists economists have turned to regression analysis and to audits a matched pair survey technique economists also have developed audit based measures of the incidence and severity of discrimination audit studies find continuing high levels of discrimination against minorities in the marketing of available housing and in car prices audit studies also find that discrimination can be caused both by economic agents prejudice and by their search for profits

is there a unit root in the inflation rate evidence from sequential break and panel data models summary using sequential trend break and panel data models we investigate the unit root hypothesis for the inflation rates of thirteen oecd countries with individual country tests we find evidence of stationarity in only four of the thirteen countries the results are more striking with the panel data model we can strongly reject the unit root hypothesis both for a panel of all thirteen countries and for a number of smaller panels consisting of as few as three countries the non rejection of the unit root hypothesis for inflation is very fragile to even a small amount of cross section variation 1997 john wiley sons ltd

global terrorism deterrence versus pre emption this paper analyses two anti terrorism policies when a targeted nation s people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad a country s deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs as the terrorist threat is deflected while its preemption decision typically gives external benefits when the threat is reduced for all potential targets with damages limited to home interests a country will overdeter while for globalized terror a country will underdeter pre emption is usually undersupplied leader follower behaviour is apt to lessen inefficiency for deterrence but worsen inefficiency for pre emption compared with simultaneous choice equilibrium allocations targeted nations can never achieve the proper counterterrorism policy through leadership ce memoire analyse deux politiques anti terrorisme quand la population et la propriete des nations visees sont en danger tant au pays qu a l etranger la decision de dissuasion d un pays entraine des avantages et des couts externes a proportion que la menace terroriste est evitee alors que la decision de preemption produit typiquement des avantages externes quand la menace est reduite pour toutes les cibles potentielles dans le cas de dommages limites aux cibles dans le pays un pays va etre portea sur dissuader alors que dans le cas de terreur globalisee un pays va etre portea sous dissuader la preemption est generalement sous offerte le comportement leader suiveur est susceptible de reduire l inefficacite de la dissuasion mais d empirer l inefficacite de la preemption par rapport a ce qui se passe quand les choix sont simultanes les nations visees ne peuvent jamais en arriver a la politique d anti terrorisme appropriee par la voie du leadership

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

searching for stationarity purchasing power parity under the current float abstract using panel data methods we investigate long run purchasing power parity by testing for unit roots in real exchange rates of industrial countries under the current float the evidence against the unit root hypothesis is stronger for larger than for smaller panels for monthly than for quarterly data and when the german mark rather than the united states dollar is used as the base currency while we find that accounting for serial correlation considerably weakens the evidence against the unit root null the results as a whole are consistent with long run purchasing power parity

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

allocation of cost savings in a three level supply chain with demand information sharing a cooperative game approach we analyze the problem of allocating cost savings from sharing demand information in a three level supply chain with a manufacturer a distributor and a retailer to find a unique allocation scheme we use concepts from cooperative game theory first we analytically compute the expected cost incurred by the manufacturer and then use simulation to obtain expected costs for the distributor and the retailer we construct a three person cooperative game in characteristic function form and derive necessary conditions for the stability of each of five possible coalitions to divide the cost savings between two members or among three supply chain members we use various allocation schemes we present numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of the demand autocorrelation coefficient and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation scheme

reputations for safety market performance and policy remedies this paper examines the provision of industrial safety in a competitive labor market under the assumption that it takes time for workers to learn about changes in safety levels at a firm it is shown that safety will in general be underprovided and that in some cases government enforced workmen s compensation can bring improvements the results hold even though in equilibrium all workers are perfectly informed about the level of safety prevailing at each firm and each is free to move to any firm he likes

unit root tests on real wage panel data for the g7 abstract using a unit root test for panel data we find that real wage innovations in most g7 economies are temporary rapidly mean reverting and have no permanent component results are sensitive to an identical cross equation restriction on all series

bounded rationality and the emergence of simplicity amidst complexity abstract the purpose of this essay is to explore the relationship between the simple and the complex in economics by anchoring our analysis on bounded rationality much of the conventional literature focuses on un bounded rationality of the rationality as consistency variety theorizing of bounded rationality tends to assume that the problem to be solved is independent of the nature of bounded rationality following the insights from the works of herbert simon and contributions from outside economics both bounded rationality and the environment are inextricably linked the boundaries between bounded rationality and its environment can shift the form in which bounded rationality is found depends on the complexity of the environment furthermore if local interactions between bounded rational agents result in the formation of hierarchies the complexity of the collective system will change whether this will occur depends on the nature of bounded rationality at the individual level

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation

manufacturer s revenue sharing contract and retail competition this paper investigates a revenue sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers the manufacturer as a stackelberg leader offers a revenue sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season under the offered contract terms the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer prior to the season and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season the process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the bayesian nash game on the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers the manufacturer designs the revenue sharing contract adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods the study finds that the provision of revenue sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price only contract however the benefits earned under the revenue sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price sensitivity factors the paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers lastly it investigates how the competition between retailers factor influences the decision making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability

the overvaluation of purchasing power parity abstract recent panel studies of purchasing power parity have reported strong evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates however these studies fail to control for cross sectional dependence in the data this failure has dramatic consequences raising the significance level of tests with a nominal size of 5 percent to as much as 50 percent it is shown in this paper that controlling for cross sectional dependence no evidence against the random walk null can be found in panels of up to 64 real exchange rates this finding cannot be attributed to low power as there is ample power in panels of this size to reject the unit root null