data watch research data in the economics of education economists have developed a wide variety of policy relevant empirical research projects that address the role of education in promoting individual and social welfare recent examples include studies on the impact of school spending on educational outputs the differences between public and private schools the effects of competition among schools the determinants of teacher quality the impact of unions on schools and the consequences of education finance reform one reason for the proliferation of such empirical studies has been the emergence of high quality micro level data on education in this paper we discuss three broad types of data sets data on educational institutions data on educational outcomes at the individual level and data sets from school reforms and experiments in each section we summarize some of the leading surveys discuss the general availability of the data and identify some but certainly not all of the research that has utilized these data this review is by no means exhaustive we have restricted our attention to analyses of data sets describing primary and secondary education moreover we emphasize data sets that are excellent sources of information but are less wellknown and utilized by economists in particular two obvious omissions from this review are the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy and the panel study of income dynamics psid both are broad based studies that track people over periods of time gathering information both on educational attainment and on many other issues as well

money back guarantees and market experimentation abstract we study the use of money back guarantees as a form of market experimentation in a market for experience goods with repeat purchases we show that extending the customer base in the second period by using a money back guarantee can be optimal only if a monopolist faces an uncertain distribution of buyers within the second period a money back guarantee allows the monopolist to discriminate between new and repeat purchasers while a pure price reduction does not thus whenever money back guarantees are feasible an optimal experimentation strategy includes a money back guarantee in the second period but not necessarily a price reduction

the impact of market structure and learning on the tradeoff between r d competition and cooperation this paper compares r d competition and cooperation when firms can devote resources to a safe investment or a risky r d investment when the discovery of a new product creates positive externalities on non discovering firms equilibrium investment flow ex ante investment and welfare under r d competition are less than or equal to what they are under research cooperation with negative externalities r d cooperation results in the same or lower ex ante investment than under r d competition and social welfare may also be less our results have relevance for empirical studies of the impact of r d cooperation on r d outcomes

how teachers unions affect education production this study helps to explain why measured school inputs appear to have little effect on student outcomes particularly for cohorts educated since 1960 teachers unionization can explain how public schools simultaneously can have more generous inputs and worse student performance using panel data on united states school districts i identify the effect of teachers unionization through differences in the timing of collective bargaining especially timing determined by the passage of state laws that facilitate teachers unionization i find that teachers unions increase school inputs but reduce productivity sufficiently to have a negative overall effect on student performance union effects are magnified where schools have market power

lotteries litigation and education finance 1 introductionhistorically the finance of public education in the united states has been largely based on revenue raised locally through property taxation however this system has been routinely criticized on the grounds that the resulting distribution of educational opportunity is inequitable and that it may lead us to forgo socially productive investments in education over the past several decades these concerns have motivated extensive litigation in almost every state challenging the constitutionality of property based education finance to date the supreme courts in 17 of these states have encouraged increased state aid to school districts by concluding that their current systems of education finance were indeed unconstitutional however over this same period 37 states have also turned to new state lotteries as a way to increase state funding for services like education there are two shared reasons that these disparate approaches to directing new resources to education might prove to be ineffective first it is by no means clear that these reforms would actually increase state or local educational spending state legislatures may respond slowly if at all to a court ruling that encourages increased aid furthermore states that earmark new lottery revenues for education may simply choose to then reduce their education appropriations from other sources and even if these reforms do increase state aid the effect on educational spending may be undone by reductions in education revenues raised from local and federal sources 1 second even if new state aid were to increase local education spending it is not clear that these new resources would be allocated in ways that actually improved school quality the extensive though controversial literature on educational productivity suggests that new resources would not be used effectively e g burtless 1996 this study provides novel empirical evidence on these policy relevant concerns by examining the consequences of two of the most recent and noteworthy education finance reforms in 1993 tennessee began court ordered education finance reforms while the neighboring stale of georgia simultaneously initiated a lottery explicitly designed to promote educational spending these policy experiments are partly of interest simply because of their narrow consequences for the patterns of educational finance and spending within these states however they are also likely to be of more general interest because they provide evidence on a question of importance to policymakers and voters everywhere specifically the consequences of these reforms provide evidence on how plausibly exogenous increases in available educational resources are actually spent though there is an extensive literature on educational productivity there is surprisingly little evidence on how school districts allocate resources 2 furthermore these evaluations may also prove of more general interest because each of these states adopted rather unique and interesting strategies to earmark new state aid for specific educational expenditures in tennessee the court ordered education finance reforms were accompanied by broader educational reforms designed to ensure the efficacy of the new state aid these measures included accountability measures for schools and school districts based on controversial value added measures of student test performance the phasing in of mandatory class size regulations and a high profile initiative to promote technological investments in classrooms georgia also attempted to earmark new lottery revenues for specific educational spending by promising new and highly visible educational initiatives i e helping outstanding pupils educationally hope scholarships prekindergarten prek programs and technological investments for classrooms the absolute and comparative success of these earmarking attempts can provide evidence to other communities that hope to promote spending on specific educational functions

learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions we study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others actions every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population the public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity the private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions we identify conditions such that the average learning curve is s shaped learning is slow initially intensifies rapidly and finally converges slowly to the truth we show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and under some conditions reduces welfare lastly optimal diffusion of information requires that agents strive to be different agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average

learning and capacity expansion under demand uncertainty a competitive dynamic model of entry into a new industry is set up and both its positive and normative aspects are studied the main assumptions are that entry is sequential that it occurs under imperfect information on the size of the market and that better information becomes available as time goes on the gradual improvement in information is due to the fact that later waves of entrants are able to observe the profitability of earlier entrants the major results reported here under suitable restrictions are that the equilibrium rate of entry is monotonically decreasing over time and that at any given point in time it is smaller than the socially optimal one when a new market opens as a result of a product being newly invented for instance or when an existing market starts to expand uncertainty with respect to its size is likely to prevail as a result of this uncertainty entry of firms into such markets typically will occur in waves some firms will enter initially while others will wait to see the consequences of that initial entry if the experience of early entrants is favourable entry will continue otherwise entry will cease hence with the introduction of a new product two phases are associated the growth phase typified by positive operating profits for existing firms and expansion of productive capacity due to entry of new firms and the mature phase typified by erosion of profits and fixed total productive capacity empiricists estimating the time pattern of investments during the growth phase have found an s shaped diffusion curve see mansfield 1986 and gort and klepper 1982 the purpose of the present paper is to theoretically characterize these time patterns and to investigate their welfare properties any attempt to model the type of entry described above must account for differences in both entry dates and resultant earnings in other words the theory must explain why the realized earnings of different cohorts of firms are not equal often such ex post differences are reconciled by assuming heterogeneity with respect to some latent underlying characteristic managerial ability for instance and attributing differences in earnings to differences in that characteristic in this paper instead earning differentials are attributable to luck only ex ante all firms are technologically identical and equally capable of forecasting market prospects and rationally acting upon those forecasts ex post some firms turn out to have entered at the right time and are for that reason more profitable the model developed in this paper analyzes a parametric example of a sequential entry problem in which the uncertainty over market size is gradually resolved over time in a bayesian setting in an environment of perfect competition and constant returns toscale a free entry equilibrium concept is introduced and the aggregate implications of the time path of investments are derived i then compare this actual time path to the optimum this comparison is interesting because the equilibrium is analysed under the

school expenditures and post schooling earnings evidence from high school and beyond studies based on inputs measured at the state level generally report that school expenditures have substantial effects on students adult wages whereas studies based on less aggregated measures report small effects the author uses wage data from high school and beyond to analyze this discrepancy and to estimate the effect of school expenditures on students post schooling earnings the author finds that the discrepancy in the literature stems mostly from two factors measurement error in district level expenditures and omitted state effects in the earnings regression the author also finds that the effect of school expenditures on earnings is significant but small a 10 increase in school spending would increase students adult wages by only 0 68 copyright 1996 by mit press

data watch the panel study of income dynamics by collecting annual economic and demographic information from a large and representative sample of u s households for over a quarter century the panel study of income dynamics has compiled a remarkably useful set of microdata this article describes the psid and how its unique longitudinal and in some cases intergenerational features have been used for studies of intertemporal models of labor supply wages employment and job tenure consumption poverty dynamics extended family behavior and the intergenerational transmission of economic status

did the tax revolt reduce school performance abstract this paper uses detailed school level data from 49 states to analyze the effects of tax revolt era property tax limitations on school services i find that limitations are associated with larger student teacher ratios and lower cost of living adjusted starting teacher salaries all else equal these results are robust to modelling the results as endogenous and using a variety of measures for whether the limitation binds at particular schools however i find no such evidence that schools subject to limitations have reduced their administrative costs furthermore i find that limitations are associated with lower student performance on mathematics science social studies and reading examinations all else equal

price competition for an informed buyer abstract this paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality the model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in hotelling s price competition game equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are relatively uninformative sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information and are nonmonotonic in the prior belief journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 d82 l15

experimentation in markets we present a model of entry and exit with bayesian learning and price competition a new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality we assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable as agents learn from the experiments of others informational externalities arise we determine the markov perfect equilibrium prices and allocations in a single market the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation if the new product is launched in many distinct markets the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows in multi agent learning situations informational externalities may reduce the number of experiments undertaken below the socially efficient level as buyers choose among new experience goods or firms decide whether to adopt a new technology the availability of information from others decisions gives rise to a free rider problem rather than perform a costly experiment herself a buyer may opt to wait and see how the market evaluates the new product in this paper we develop a simple market model of experimentation and analyse the informational effects in a model with buyers and sellers in contrast to the one sided experimentation problems we find that equilibrium experimentation often exceeds the pareto optimal level in two sided models the first model we consider is a dynamic duopoly in continuous time with homogeneous buyers two firms with differentiated products engage in price competition over time one product has a known value while the other is new and its true value is initially uncertain to all the parties in the model the value of the product is determined by the quality of the match between consumer preferences and product characteristics additional information is acquired only through repeat purchases in each period buyers observe a noisy signal of the true value of the product we assume that all signals are publicly observable and that all uncertainty is about a common value component with this assumption all buyers and sellers condition their behaviour on the same information and we can abstract from individual differences in past observations this is justified in economic situations where public data on other buyers choices is available and informative for example when choosing among providers of communication or transportation services such as mail delivery firms or airlines it is reasonable to rely on consumer reports and other published data in addition to one s private experience we also show that our model has an alternative interpretation as one where a flow of buyers make a once and

education finance reform and the distribution of education resources between 1971 and 1996 opponents of local funding for public schools successfully challenged the constitutionality of school finance systems in sixteen states using the variation across states in the timing of these cases the authors investigate the impact of reform on the distribution of school resources their results suggest that court ordered finance reform reduced within state inequality in spending by 19 to 34 percent successful litigation reduced inequality by raising spending in the poorest districts while leaving spending in the richest districts unchanged thereby increasing aggregate spending on education reform led states to fund additional spending through higher state taxes copyright 1998 by american economic association

the economic consequences of unwed motherhood using twin births as a natural experiment social scientists have long concluded that premarital childbearing exacerbates problems of both poverty and family instability out of wedlock and adolescent childbearing may reduce a mothers educational attainment lower the probability of her eventual marriage increase her probability of welfare recipiency and decrease family income the authors use an exogenous fertility event the birth of twins to estimate the economic effects of unplanned births the approach compares the economic outcomes of women experiencing premarital twin first births to those experiencing premarital single first births in the attempt to identify the consequences of an unplanned birth upon womens future fertility and marital decisions education labor force participation labor earnings welfare receipt and poverty status 1970 and 1980 us census micro data are used to identify twin births to unmarried women analysis found large short term effects of unplanned births on labor force participation poverty and welfare recipiency among unwed mothers but not among married mothers furthermore most adverse economic effects of unplanned motherhood dissipate over time for whites but larger and more persistent negative effects weigh upon black unwed mothers

entry and experimentation in oligopolistic markets for experience goods abstract we investigate a two period bertrand market in which one seller introduces an experience good the new product competes with an alternative good of known quality ex ante neither sellers nor consumers know the value of the new product while consumers can learn their valuation for the new good by actual consumption experimentation sellers cannot observe experimentation outcomes thus asymmetric information arises if the buyer experiments as a result the equilibrium is inefficient and too little entry occurs

optimal search for product information consumers often need to search for product information before making purchase decisions we consider a tractable continuous time model of gradual learning in which consumers incur search costs to learn further product information and update their expected utility of the product at each search occasion we characterize the optimal stopping rules for either purchase or no purchase as a function of search costs and of the importance informativeness of each attribute this paper also characterizes how the likelihood of purchase changes with the ex ante expected utility search costs and the importance informativeness of each attribute we discuss optimal pricing the impact of consumer search on profits and social welfare and how the seller chooses its price to strategically affect the extent of the consumers search behavior we show that lower search costs can hurt the consumer because the seller may then choose to charge higher prices discounting creates asymmetry in the purchase and no purchase search thresholds and may lead to lower prices if search occurs in equilibrium or higher prices if there is no search in equilibrium this paper also considers searching for signals of the value of the product heterogeneous importance of attributes endogenous intensity of search and social learning this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

private school vouchers and student achievement an evaluation of the milwaukee parental choice program in 1990 wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low income students to attend nonsectarian private schools controlling for individual fixed effects i compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the milwaukee public schools i find that students in the milwaukee parental choice program had faster math score gains than but similar reading score gains to the comparison groups the results appear robust to data imputations and sample attrition although these deficiencies of the data should be kept in mind when interpreting the results

learning and strategic pricing we consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time the true value of each seller s product to the buyer is initially unknown additional information can be gained only by experimentation for exogeneously given prices the buyer s problem is a multi armed bandit problem the innovation in this paper is to endogenize the cost of experimentation to the consumer by allowing for price competition between the sellers the role of prices is then to allocate intertemporally the costs and benefits of learning between buyers and sellers we examine how strategic aspects of the oligopoly model interact with the learning process all markov perfect equilibria mpe are efficient we identify an equilibrium which besides its unique robustness properties has a strikingly simple seemingly myopic pricing rule prices below marginal cost emerge naturally to sustain experimentation intertemporal exchange of the gains of learning is necessary to support efficient experimentation we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the equilibria

financial speculators underperformance learning self selection and endogenous liquidity we develop an equilibrium model of learning by rational traders to reconcile several empirical regularities cross sectionally most individual speculators lose money large speculators outperform small speculators past performance positively affects subsequent trade intensity most new traders lose money and cease speculation and performance shows persistence learning from trading generates substantial endogenous liquidity reducing bid ask spreads and the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on asset prices but amplifying the effects of real shocks introducing slightly overconfident traders increases bid ask spreads hurting all traders finally behavioral theories cannot reconcile all of these empirical regularities

strategic waiting for consumer generated quality information dynamic pricing of new experience goods in this paper we study the impact of consumer generated quality information e g consumer reviews on a firm s dynamic pricing strategy in the presence of strategic consumers such information is useful not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product but also to the firm the informativeness of the consumer generated quality information depends however on the volume of consumers who share their opinions and thus depends on the initial sales volume hence via its initial price the firm not only influences its revenue but also controls the quality information flow over time the firm may either enhance or dampen the quality information flow via increasing or decreasing initial sales the corresponding pricing strategy to steer the quality information flow is not always intuitive compared to the case without consumer generated quality information the firm may reduce the initial sales and lower the initial price interestingly the firm may get strictly worse off due to the consu

optimal experimentation in a changing environment this paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes and who maximizes profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time we show that there are two qualitatively very different regimes determined by the discount rate and the intensities of demand curve switching and the dependence of the optimal policy on these parameters is discontinuous one regime is characterized by extreme experimentation and good tracking of the prevailing demand curve the other by moderate experimentation and poor tracking moreover in the latter regime the agent eventually becomes trapped into taking actions in a strict subset of the feasible set

market diffusion with two sided learning we analyze the diffusion of a new product of uncertain value in a duopolistic market both sides of the market buyers and sellers learn the true value of the new product from experiments with it buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and sellers compete in prices the pricing policies and market shares in the unique markov perfect equilibrium are obtained explicitly the dynamics of the equilibrium market shares display excessive sales of the new product relative to the social optimum in early stages and too low sales later on the diffusion path of a successful product is s shaped

competitive targeted advertising over networks recent advances in information technology have allowed firms to gather vast amounts of data regarding consumers preferences and the structure and intensity of their social interactions this paper examines a game theoretic model of competition between firms that can target their marketing budgets to individuals embedded in a social network we provide a sharp characterization of the optimal targeted advertising strategies and highlight their dependence on the underlying social network structure furthermore we provide conditions under which it is optimal for the firms to asymmetrically target a subset of the individuals and establish a lower bound on the ratio of their payoffs in these asymmetric equilibria finally we find that at equilibrium firms invest inefficiently high in targeted advertising and the extent of the inefficiency is increasing in the centralities of the agents they target taken together these findings shed light on the effect of the network structure on the outcome of marketing co

unravelling the global city debate on social inequality a firm level analysis of wage inequality in amsterdam and rotterdam in this article an assessment is made of the consequences of globalisation for urban wage inequality using data on employers in the dutch cities of amsterdam and rotterdam it is shown that simpl

waterfall versus sprinkler product launch strategy influencing the herd a seller decides the price and sequence in which a product of unknown value is introduced to consumers consumers inspect the product before consumption and observe past prices and sales consumption at a high price is informative for later consumers as it indicates that the product is likely to be of high value i show that on an average prices decrease over time however expected revenue on an average rises over time for a high enough discount factor i find that for extreme beliefs the firm introduces the product to all consumers but for intermediate values the product is introduced only to one consumer

short run subsidies and long run adoption of new health products evidence from a field experiment short run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries how do they affect long run adoption a common fear among development practitioners is that one off subsidies may negatively affect long run adoption through reference dependence people might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later but for experience goods one off subsidies could also boost long run adoption through learning this paper uses data from a two stage randomized pricing experiment in kenya to estimate the relative importance of these effects for a new improved antimalarial bed net reduced form estimates show that a one time subsidy has a positive impact on willingness to pay a year later inherit to separately identify the learning and anchoring effects we estimate a parsimonious experience good model estimation results show a large positive learning effect but no anchoring we black then discuss the types of products and the contexts inherit for which these results may apply

monopoly pricing in the presence of social learning a monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences although initially uninformed about the product quality they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its effect on the seller s pricing decision consumers follow an intuitive non bayesian decision rule under conditions that we identify we show that consumers eventually learn the product s quality we show how the learning trajectory can be approximated in settings with high demand intensity via a mean field approximation that highlights the dynamics of this learning process its dependence on the price and the market heterogeneity with respect to quality preferences two pricing policies are studied a static price and one with a single price change finally numerical experiments suggest that pricing policies that account for social learning may increase revenues considerably relative to policies that do not this

asymmetric information information externalities and efficiency the case of oil exploration in this article we examine the efect of private information and information externalities on the ex post eficiency of investment in oil exploration we show that too much drilling tends to occur ifjirms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil and too little drilling occurs if the opposite is true bargaining with well defined property rights to the information externality can eliminate underinvestment but overinvestment remains a problem because firms have an incentive not to disclose their private information

impact of bayesian learning and externalities on strategic investment we investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns we examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which i a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and ii externalities exist between the investments of two firms we find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs in particular we find that contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move an increase in the rate of learning which tends to benefit the follower can hasten the first investment this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment we model investment as an n player game with a pure informational externality each player s payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature however because a player s action reveals his private information players wait to see what other players will do equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed we characterize the unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players we establish the following results i when the period length is very short the game ends very quickly and there is a form of herding or informational cascade which results in a collapse of investment ii as the period length increases the possibility of herding disappears iii as the number of players increases the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players adding more players simply increases the number who delay iv in the limit the time profile of investment is extreme a period of low investment followed either by an investment surge or a collapse

catholic schools dropout rates and educational attainment this paper examines the effect of catholic schooling on high school dropout rates and educational attainment particular attention is given to the effect of selection into the catholic school sector after adjusting for self selection we find that sophomores in the catholic schools are still substantially more likely to graduate with their class it is also shown that seniors in the catholic schools are not more likely to acquire more schooling than other seniors if selection is taken into account

finishing high school and starting college do catholic schools make a difference in this paper we consider two measures of the relative effectiveness of public and catholic schools finishing high school and starting college these measures are potentially more important indicators of school quality than standardized test scores in light of the economic consequences of obtaining more education single equation estimates suggest that for the typical student attending a catholic high school raises the probability of finishing high school or entering a four year college by thirteen percentage points in bivariate probit models we find almost no evidence that our single equation estimates are subject to selection bias

demand and supply in new markets diffusion with bilateral learning i explore the endogenous joint evolution of demand and supply in new markets firms and consumers learn in a bayesian fashion by observing the behavior of other firms and consumers respectively as a result endogenous information diffusion takes place on both sides of the market in equilibrium entry occurs in waves and its level depends on two distinct informational effects the model identifies an externality that provides a natural explanation for s shaped diffusion paths entry reveals information to the consumers about the value of the new product and thus early waves of entry affect the expected profitability of subsequent entry

competitive experimentation with private information the survivor s curse we study a winner take all r d race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention over time each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not the equilibrium displays a strong herding effect that we call a survivor s curse unlike in the case of symmetric information the two firms may quit the race nearly simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly