optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect and the observed value of inventory information the tendency of orders to increase in variability as one moves up a supply chain is commonly known as the bullwhip effect we study this phenomenon from a behavioral perspective in the context of a simple serial supply chain subject to information lags and stochastic demand we conduct two experiments on two different sets of participants in the first we find the bullwhip effect still exists when normal operational causes e g batching price fluctuations demand estimation etc are removed the persistence of the bullwhip effect is explained to some extent by evidence that decision makers consistently underweight the supply line when making order decisions in the second experiment we find that the bullwhip and the underlying tendency of underweighting remains when information on inventory levels is shared however we observe that inventory information helps somewhat to alleviate the bullwhip effect by helping upstream chain members better anticipate and prepare for fluctuations in inventory needs downstream these experimental results support the theoretically suggested notion that upstream chain members stand to gain the most from information sharing initiatives

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

reference points in revenue sharing contracts how to design optimal supply chain contracts abstract coordinating supply chains is an important goal for contract designers because it enables the channel members to increase their profits recently many experimental studies have shown that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account when choosing the type of contract and specifying the contract parameters in this paper we analyze behavioral aspects of revenue sharing contracts we extend the classical normative decision model by incorporating reference dependent valuation into the decision model and show how this affects inventory decisions we conduct different lab experiments to test our model as a result human inventory decisions deviate from classical normative predictions and we find evidence for reference dependent valuation of human decision makers we also show how contract designers can use the insights we gained to design better contracts

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

impulse balance in the newsvendor game abstract one striking behavioral phenomenon is the pull to center bias in the newsvendor game facing stochastic demand subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand we show that the impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a simple ex post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition predicts the pull to center bias and other more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game

game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis list of figures list of authors introduction j f mertens a the core and the bargaining set i general equilibrium and cooperative games basic results e allen s sorin ii core convergence in perfectly competitive economies r m anderson iii economies with atoms j f mertens iv bargaining sets r vohra b the value v the shapley value r j aumann vi value of games with a continuum of players a neyman vii the tu value the non differentiable case j f mertens addendum the shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist f lefevre viii the harsanyi value s hart ix value equivalence theorems the tu and ntu cases s hart x economic applications of the shapley value r j aumann c the cooperative approach to large markets and games xi an axiomatic approach to the equivalence phenomenon p dubey a neyman xii large games and economies with effective small groups m h wooders d the non cooperative approach xiii strategic market games a survey of some results p dubey xiv from nash to walras equilibrium e allen h polemarchakis xv correlated and communication equilibria j f mertens xvi notes on correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium j peck xvii implementation with plain conversation s sorin

the effect of payment schemes on inventory decisions the role of mental accounting does the payment scheme have an effect on inventory decisions in the newsvendor problem keeping the net profit structure constant we examine three payment schemes that can be interpreted as the newsvendor s order being financed by the newsvendor herself scheme o by the supplier through delayed order payment scheme s and by the customer through advanced revenue scheme c in a laboratory study we find that inventory quantities exhibit a consistent decreasing pattern in the order of schemes o s and c with the order quantities of scheme s being close to the expected profit maximizing solution these observations are inconsistent with the expected profit maximizing model contradict what a regular or hyperbolic time discounting model would predict and cannot be explained by the loss aversion model instead they are consistent with a model that underweights the order time payments which can be explained by the prospective accounting theory in the mental accounting literature a second study shows that the results hold even if all physical payments are conducted at the same time suggesting that the framing of the payment scheme is sufficient to induce the prospective accounting behavior we further validate the robustness of our model under different profit conditions our findings contribute to the understanding of the psychological processes involved in newsvendor decisions and have implications for supply chain financing and contract design this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

opportunity cost neglect to properly consider the opportunity costs of a purchase consumers must actively generate the alternatives that it would displace the current research suggests that consumers often fail to do so even under conditions promoting cognitive effort various cues to consider opportunity costs reduce purchase rates and increase the choice share of more affordable options sensitivity to such cues varies with chronic dispositional differences in spending attitudes we discuss the implications of these results for the marketing strategies of economy and premium brands

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

correlated equilibrium in stochastic games we study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games the correlation devices that we use are either autonomous they base their choice of signal on previous signals but not on previous states or actions or stationary their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage we prove that any n player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff when the game is positive and recursive a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

contract preferences and performance for the loss averse supplier buyback vs revenue sharing prior theory claims that buyback and revenue sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier retailer setting this suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts however the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues i e losses and gains vary significantly between the contracts suggesting the supplier s preference of contract type and associated contract parameter values may vary with the level of loss aversion we investigate this phenomenon through two studies the first is a preliminary study investigating whether human suppliers are indeed indifferent between these two contracts using a controlled laboratory experiment with human subjects taking on the role of the supplier having to choose between contracts we find that contract preferences change with the ratio of overage and underage costs for the channel i e the newsvendor critical ratio in particular a buyback contract is preferred for products wit

the bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets a well established phenomenon of consumer buying behavior is that consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference point and exhibit loss aversion i e their propensity to buy is more negatively affected by prices above the reference point than it is positively affected by prices below the reference point the objective of this paper is to analytically examine how the competitive strategy and profitability of firms are affected by the presence of consumer loss aversion in the price dimension although we assume that consumer loss aversion increases consumer propensity to search for lower prices we find that it does not necessarily lead to lower prices or profits when firms compete over multiple periods and when the consumer reference price in subsequent periods is affected by current prices specifically consumer loss aversion could lead to higher prices and profits when consumer valuation is sufficiently high relative to search costs and the proportion of consumers with positive search costs is in an intermediate range we also show that when forward looking firms incorporate the negative effect of price promotions on future profits the equilibrium range of price promotions may actually increase

consumer uncertainty and purchase decision reversals theory and evidence this research examines how prepurchase information that reduces consumer uncertainty about a product or service can affect consumer decisions to reverse an initial product purchase or service enrollment decision one belief commonly held by retailers is that provision of greater amounts of information before the purchase reduces decision reversals we provide theory and evidence showing conditions under which uncertainty reducing information provided before the purchase decision can actually increase the number of decision reversals predictions generated from an analytical model of consumer behavior incorporating behavioral theory of reference dependence are complemented by empirical evidence from both a controlled behavioral experiment and econometric analysis of archival data combined the theory and evidence suggest that managers should be aware that their information provision decisions taken to reduce decision reversals may actually increase them data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mksc 2015 0906

research note vertical information sharing in a volatile market when demand is uncertain manufacturers and retailers often have private information on future demand and such information asymmetry impacts strategic interaction in distribution channels in this paper we investigate a channel consisting of a manufacturer and a downstream retailer facing a product market characterized by short product life uncertain demand and price rigidity assuming the firms have asymmetric information about the demand volatility we examine the potential benefits of sharing information and contracts that facilitate such cooperation we conclude that under a wholesale price regime information sharing might not improve channel profits when the retailer underestimates the demand volatility but the manufacturer does not although information sharing is always beneficial under a two part tariff regime it is in general not sufficient to achieve sharing and additional contractual arrangements are necessary the contract types we consider to facilitate sharing are profit sharing and buyback contracts

designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers does the framing of the fixed fee matter the format of pricing contracts varies substantially across business contexts a major variable being whether a contract imposes a fixed fee payment this paper examines how the use of the fixed fee in pricing contracts affects market outcomes of a manufacturer retailer channel standard economic theories predict that channel efficiency increases with the introduction of the fixed fee and is invariant to its framing we conduct a laboratory experiment to test these predictions surprisingly the introduction of the fixed fee fails to increase channel efficiency moreover the framing of the fixed fee does make a difference an opaque frame as quantity discounts achieves higher channel efficiency than a salient frame as a two part tariff although these two contractual formats are theoretically equivalent to account for these anomalies we generalize the standard economic model by allowing the retailer s utilities to be reference dependent so that the up front fixed fee payment is perceived as a loss and the subsequent retail profits as a gain we embed this reference dependent utility function in a quantal response equilibrium framework where the retailer is allowed to make decision mistakes due to computational complexity the key prediction of this behavioral model is that channel efficiency decreases with loss aversion for sufficiently nash rational retailers consistent with this prediction the estimated loss aversion coefficient is 1 37 in the two part tariff condition significantly higher than 1 27 in the quantity discount condition at the same time loss aversion dominates contract complexity in explaining the data lastly we conduct a follow up experiment to confirm the central role of loss aversion as a behavioral driver in one condition the retailer becomes less loss averse when we temporally compress the fixed fee payment and the realization of retail profits which supports the loss aversion theory in the other condition the retailer s contract acceptance rate does not decline when we reward the manufacturer a higher cash payment for each experimental point earned which rules out the competing hypothesis that the retailer rejects contract offers due to fairness concerns

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

rethinking and reshaping the climate policy literature review and proposed guidelines abstract addressing climate change represents a governing the climate commons on a global scale the tragedy of the commons might better be described as the failure of governing the commons hardin s solutions were centralized government and private property which have long been criticized as oversimplified however governing the unprecedented climate commons there is only a global federalism of climate policy the kyoto protocol the kyoto cannot keep atmospheric co2 level below 450 ppm rising 2 c some key evidences of the kyoto failures are identified the kyoto failures do not indicate that the kyoto is a wrong tool of centralized government instead the kyoto failures are derived from the fact that the only centralized government cannot effectively govern the commons which have been proven by the efforts of governing the commons last four decades here we propose a wide diversity of governance systems for climate common to addressing global warming the multi level and multi scale governing system includes but is not limited to i starting at home ii emphasizing the local approach iii efforts of global level focusing these top emitters iv improved information sharing v privatizing the property of climate to avoid free riders vi combination mitigation with adaptive vii improved ecology services to expand carbon sinks we argue that the kyoto failures indicate again that reliance on a single solution may result in more of a problem than a solution in governing the common therefore continuing to wait for another global federalism of climate policy may lead to missing the chance to make significant mitigations and adaptations in time to battling the climate change post 2012 multi level and multi scale approaches could make a difference in collective action for governing the climate commons to meet climate challenge

continuous time stochastic games abstract we study continuous time stochastic games with a focus on the existence of their equilibria that are insensitive to a small imprecision in the specification of players evaluations of streams of payoffs we show that the stationary namely time independent discounting game has a stationary equilibrium and that the discounting game and the more general game with time separable payoffs have an epsilon equilibrium that is an epsilon equilibrium in all games with a sufficiently small perturbation of the players valuations a limit point of discounting valuations need not be a discounting valuation as some of the mass may be pushed to infinity it is represented by an average of a discounting valuation and a mass at infinity we show that for every such limit point there is a strategy profile that is an epsilon equilibrium of all the discounting games with discounting valuations that are sufficiently close to the limit point

a sequential selection game with vetoes we study a selection game between two committee members the players they interview candidates sequentially and have to decide after each interview whether to hire the candidate or to interview the next candidate each player can either accept or reject the candidate and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her he can cast a veto the candidate is hired if accepted by at least one player and not vetoed the total number of vetoes available for each player are fixed in advance we prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium if there are a finite number of candidates types for a general candidate distribution we prove the existence of a subgame perfect e equilibrium we exhibit situations in which a player prefers that the other player would have an extra veto and even prefers to give one of his vetoes to the other player

cognitive hierarchy in capacity allocation games we examine a supply chain with a single supplier and multiple retailers to predict retailers actual ordering behaviors if retailer orders exceed supplier capacity a proportional rationing rule applies to capacity allocation among retailers we propose a behavior model based on cognitive hierarchy theory in which retailers with different levels of strategic reasoning capabilities form heterogeneous beliefs about other players capabilities when choosing their orders this behavioral model yields three interesting predictions first retailers orders increase as the number of retailers decreases or the supplier s production capacity shrinks second the orders tend to increase as the retailer population becomes more sophisticated third retailers profits first increase in relation to their strategic reasoning capabilities and then decrease indicating an inverted u shaped relationship between profits and strategic reasoning capabilities we experimentally examine the capacity allocation game with p

reference dependence in multilocation newsvendor models a structural analysis we propose a behavioral theory to predict actual ordering behavior in multilocation inventory systems the theory rests on a well known stylized fact of human behavior people s preferences are reference dependent we incorporate reference dependence into the newsvendor framework by assuming that there are psychological costs of leftovers and stockouts we also hypothesize that the psychological aversion to leftovers is greater than the disutility for stockouts we then experimentally test the proposed theory in both the centralized and decentralized inventory structures using subjects motivated by substantial financial incentives consistent with the proposed theory actual orders exhibit the so called pull to center bias and the degree of bias is greater in the high profit margin than in the low profit margin condition these systematic biases are shown to eliminate the risk pooling benefit when the demands across store locations are strongly correlated because the proposed model nests the standard inventory and ex post inventory error minimization theories as special cases one can systematically evaluate the predictive power of each alternative using the generalized likelihood principle we structurally estimate all three theories using the experimental data and the estimation results strongly suggest that the proposed behavioral theory captures actual orders and profits better we also conduct two experiments to validate the behavioral model by manipulating the relative salience of the psychological costs of leftovers versus that of stockouts to alleviate the pull to center bias

decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution experimental evidence in the newsvendor problem a decision maker orders inventory before a one period selling season with stochastic demand if too much is ordered stock is left over at the end of the period whereas if too little is ordered sales are lost the expected profit maximizing order quantity is well known but little is known about how managers actually make these decisions we describe two experiments that investigate newsvendor decisions across different profit conditions results from these studies demonstrate that choices systematically deviate from those that maximize expected profit subjects order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit products these results are not consistent with risk aversion risk seeking preferences prospect theory preferences waste aversion stockout aversion or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs two explanations are consistent with the data one subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce ex post inventory error the absolute difference between the chosen quantity and realized demand two subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias feedback and training did not mitigate inventory order errors we suggest techniques to improve decision making

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

how psychological should economic and marketing models be abstract the authors discuss the potential of making the recently developed behavioral economics models even more psychological by 1 increasing their context specificity 2 allowing different people to have different model parameters and 3 capturing the underlying psychological processes more explicitly they show that some of these models already make room for understanding context specificity and heterogeneity and they discuss new ways to enrich the models along those two dimensions the task of adding process details is more challenging in simple mathematical forms because these models must serve as building blocks for aggregate market models

social loss aversion and optimal contest design when managers are designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople service employees franchisees or product development teams a key question is what should the optimal proportion of winne