radicalism versus gradualism an analytical survey of the transition strategy debate academic debate on a transition strategy for former socialist economies continues even a quarter century after the collapse of the communism in central and eastern europe and the former soviet union in this paper through an analytical survey of 137 preceding studies we present an overall picture of the debate and examine the relationship between the debate attitudes and the literature attributes in related studies we found that the radicalists maintain a consistent debate attitude from the viewpoints of time speed and policy sequence of economic transition while the debate attitude of the gradualists is more diversified we also found that there is another group of researchers that stays within the framework of the radicalism versus gradualism debate while at the same time keeping at arm s length from both the radicalists and the gradualists in addition our regression estimation of qualitative selection models provides interesting findings on the relationship between the debate attitudes and the literature attributes

central bank design abstract starting with a blank slate how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the united states this paper explores the question of how to design a central bank drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the fed got to be what it is today or the short term political constraints it has faced at various times the goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design

the contingent governance of teams analysis of institutional complementarity the first purpose of this paper is to design a model of governance structure called the contingent governance which can control the free riding problem in teams in the second best manner the second is to show by a new method of comparative static analysis that the effectiveness of the contingent governance may be enhanced by complementary institutional arrangements of the imperfect labor market and bank centered financial system the paper discusses the implications of such institutional complementarity for the dynamic change of the japanese main bank system and financial system design of transitional economies copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

forecasting and trading monetary policy effects on the riskless yield curve with regime switching nelson siegel models abstract we use 1982 2014 data on the us riskless yield curve to show that regime switching dynamics in nelson siegel factor models extended to encompass variables that summarize the state of monetary policy lead to superior predictive accuracy such spread in forecasting power turns out to be statistically significant even controlling for parameter uncertainty and sample variation exploiting regimes we obtain evidence that the increase in predictive accuracy is stronger during the great financial crisis when monetary policy underwent a significant sudden shift although more caution applies in comparisons to a naive random walk benchmark over a few sub samples and when transaction costs are accounted for we report that the increase in predictive power owed to the combination of regimes and of variables that capture the stance of unconventional monetary policies is tradeable we devise and test butterfly strategies that exploit the forecasts from the models and obtain evidence of risk adjusted profits both per se and in comparisons to simpler models

reform of the coal sector in an open economy the case of china cheap abundant and easy to transport and store coal has been produced and consumed to meet people s energy needs the last decade s growth in global coal use has been driven mainly by developing economies like china whose phenomenal economic growth has been powered by coal fired electricity and promoted by the export of manufactured goods a recent reform focus in china s coal sector is on coal taxation the paper develops a game theoretic model tailored to the context of china where coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy it finds that the adoption of special coal taxes is optimal for social welfare under most circumstances but may induce coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour in the process of privatisation the paper also cautions about potential resistance to the reform from consumers coal firms and government officials

monetary policy with interest on reserves abstract i analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet i show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime so i base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level i find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate and determine expected inflation with sticky prices monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation the conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal monetary policy contraction i show how conventional new keynesian models also imply strong monetary fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs i address theoretical controversies a concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime

natural monopoly in portuguese telecommunications the purpose of this paper is to show an empirical test of subadditivity based on a sufficient condition namely transray convexity coupled with global economies of scale which has not been commonly used in the literature we use this sufficient condition to test the hypothesis of subadditivity of the cost function in the largest portuguese telecommunications firm ctt and find that the market for telecommunications services in portugal was a natural monopoly in the period analysed

a political economy approach to the neoclassical gradualist model of transition a political economy approach to the neoclassical gradualist model of transition requires the exposition of what i define the primary elements of the model which are economic analysis definition of a good society speed political structure ideological structure and whether the initial conditions were incorporated in the model after the identification of the primary elements of the neoclassical gradualist model the next step is to identify secondary elements the desired changes with respect to price liberalization stabilization privatization institutional structure monetary policy and the financial system fiscal policy international trade and foreign aid and social policy the analytical framework developed makes possible to understand the neoclassical gradualist model from a new and more enlightening perspective we are better able to comprehend the complexities involved and the disagreements about the reform process the adoption of a gradual process of transition did not only involve specifying the required policies of a successful transition but also entailed a process a sequence by which the reforms should be introduced as such a process of transition consistent with the policies recommended by the neoclassical gradualists economists is developed the conclusion reveals the inconsistencies in the model copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2005

managerial career concerns privatization and restructuring in transition economies abstract we set up a dynamic adverse selection model to explain how career concerns may induce managers in state owned enterprises soes to restructure their firms it is shown how government monopsony power over managers led to the ratchet effect under a socialist economy even under reforms coming short of privatization the introduction of a managerial labour market through privatization introduces competition for managers and eliminates the ratchet effect thereby inducing managers to restructure the model is consistent with the empirical evidence of soes restructuring in transition economies

central banks and financial stability rediscovering the lender of last resort practice in a finance economy the purpose of our paper is to assess whether central banks have adopted new practices of lending in last resort during the 2007 09 financial crisis we compare the current period with the classical period both featured by a finance economy with developed financial markets and unregulated institutions beyond the differences determined by the monetary regime and concerning the central bank rate policy we find similarities such as the enlargements of the set of counterparties and eligible collateral assets since the credit system is based on financial markets and innovations central banks have a wider involvement that goes beyond a narrow conception of the lender of last resort that prevailed under a regulated banking system we conclude that the historical roots of financial stabilisation by central banks in a finance economy have just been rediscovered and that the functions of lender of last resort and market maker of last resort may be analytically integrated copyright oxford university press

social welfare loss due to second best pricing an application to the portuguese telecommunications the telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing in such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm the second best pricing scheme the possible welfare losses due to second best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs prices and demand elasticities this paper analyses to what extent the second best pricing has been achieved in the portuguese telecommunications firm ctt over the period 1950 150 1984 as well as the magnitude of the price cost margins and welfare losses created we obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale a welfare loss estimate of 1 of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40 greater than marginal cost we concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfar

privatization in eastern europe irreversibility and critical mass effects abstract this paper proposes a model to shed light on two important policy features of privatization in central and eastern europe the idea of a necessary critical mass of privatization on one hand and the great difficulties encountered in the actual privatization process on the other the model incorporates a positive externality related to the size of the private sector multiple equilibria may arise for political and economic reasons policies of free distribution are analysed with the model they may eliminate the danger of policy reversals due to excess unemployment but may at the same time increase the relative cost of restructuring leading in some cases to pareto inferior outcomes

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

after the honeymoon on the economics and the politics of economic transformation this paper focuses on the obvious pareto improving programmes may fail to improve everyone s lot politically it has often been interpreted as a requirement that a majority should benefit from the change events in central and eastern europe suggest otherwise and cast doubt on the relevance of the median voter theorem the addition of minority discontents may result in major political difficulties that lead governments to avoid actions that generate strong minority objections as a result the technically best crafted plans may be rejected for political reasons in addition reform programmes which are ex ante politically acceptable may well become rejected ex post after they are implemented one solution is to introduce a heavy dose of egalitarian income distribution even if it runs against labour supply incentives this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

democracy market liberalization and political preferences abstract we estimate the impact of market development and democratization on subjective political preferences we rely on the specific situation of frontier zones and the considerable regional variations in culture and economic development in the countries of the former socialist bloc for identification using a survey conducted in 2006 we find a positive and significant effect of democracy on support for a market economy but no effect of market liberalization on support for democracy hence in contrast with the conventional wisdom concerning the sequencing of political and economic reforms democratization may become a necessary condition to obtain public support for further economic liberalization

financialisation institutions and financing constraints in developing countries the paper uses a consistent firm level data from the world banks enterprise surveys to explore the impact of financialisation in the economy on firms access to finance in 138 developing countries access to finance reflects survey based firms perceptions of external financing constraints financialisation is proxied by consistent cross country measures of financial depth these proxies capture separately the role of bank based versus market based financing firm sector and country level information is jointly used for the analysis firm specific characteristics and economic and non economic national factors are included as controls the results show that the proxies of financialisation are broadly robust predictors of financing constraints of firms in developing countries however the magnitude of the financialisation effect varies between bank based and market based channels of financing as well as between low and high income countries and it is influenced by social institutional and religious factors

optimal pricing of the portuguese telephone service a first attempt is made at finding the optimal two part tariff for portugese telephone service a theoretical model of consumer demand is presented and the two part tariff which maximizes social welfare is derived the model is then calibrated using portugese data and previous econometric studies the optimal long run two part tariff consists of an access charge that is close to twice the marginal cost of access and a usage charge 25 above the marginal cost of use the level of the optimal two part tariff depends mainly on the marginal cost of taxation and on an index of aversion to inequality the structure of the optimal two part tariff depends mainly on the ratio between the marginal consumer s usage level and the average usage level although the cost estimates are very tentative the results suggest that the 1986 usage charge was greater than optimum no similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the acces charge

looking at the cost side of monopoly welfare loss under oligopoly is defined as that part of consumer surplus which is lost and not regained by higher profits in a model with asymmetric firms this implies that the total welfare loss consists of the deadweight loss triangle plus a cost side inefficiency effect due to the fact that in imperfect markets not all firms utilize the lowest cost technique using a flexible cv model we calculate these effects empirically for two relatively homogeneous industries pulp paper and cement the deadweight loss triangles are shown to be smaller than the cost difference effect the staircase for these industries

reform without losers an interpretation of china s dual track approach to transition this paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient pareto improving economic reform that is reform achieving efficiency without creating losers the approach based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market can be understood as a method for making implicit lump sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform the model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency we examine how the dual track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in china

optimal central bank lending abstract we analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model with open market operations the central bank sets the policy rate and can additionally control the amount of money by rationing money supplied against eligible securities optimal policy under money rationing is shown to enhance welfare in the long run and in the short run compared to a conventional optimal policy regime where money supply is not rationed and satiates money demand specifically this property is shown to apply when privately issued debt is eligible in open market operations which allows the central bank to separately alter costs of borrowing and the size of transactions for which money is required

gradual green tax reforms abstract green tax reforms have become an important tool not only in protecting the environment but also in bringing about a more efficient tax system however reforms often imply accepting sacrifices in the short run and bring about the risk of potential political opposition within this framework the debate on whether to implement green tax reforms in one step or gradually becomes of great interest in this paper we use a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the spanish economy to evaluate different reforms that consist in increasing energy taxes and adjusting capital taxation in a revenue neutral framework our findings show that although an environmental dividend is always granted the existence of an efficiency dividend depends on the type of reform its size and how gradually it is implemented thus one step reforms that produce an efficiency dividend would imply large efficiency costs in the short run in this case the reform could only produce efficiency gains in the short run if it is implemented gradually although such gains would end up disappearing in the long run

the virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the transition to a market economy this paper presents a simplified model of sectoral restructuring in eastern europe a move towards allocative efficiency is desired by the reform minded government but the shift to higher productivity which such efficiency requires would lead to massive layoffs and labour reallocation in the transition period we look at the impact of political constraints unanimity and or majority worker approval on reform proposals when the government faces a heterogeneous workforce holding private information on relative outside opportunities when the budgetary consequences of exit compensations are so important as to make partial reforms preferable to full reforms gradualism emerges as the optimum in a dynamic context without government commitment it is also shown that under democratic majority rule a government in control of the agenda of reforms can win majority approval for plans which end up hurting majority interests intertemporally by threatening to switch majorities in future reform proposals this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

eliminating price supports a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes information and politically constrained government programs for eliminating price supports the issues which we examine in this model include i to what extent is it possible to reduce the size of oversubscribed industries in light of the information and political constraints that exist is a complete decoupling of a worker s compensation from her output possible or desirable ii which type of workers as characterized by their skill levels and outside employment opportunities remain in the industry iii which type of worker is harmed by the relocation program which coalitions of workers will oppose the reorganization

structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition abstract economies in transition are faced with a high degree of structural uncertainty i e uncertainty about which it is possible to learn through experience we study structural uncertainty s effects on a subsidy removal program subsidy removal causes unemployment but yields fiscal benefits and facilitates private sector growth when the policymaker does not know the speed with which the private sector absorbs the unemployed he will be driven toward a more decisive and therefore more informative policy the model also rationalizes policy reversals and implies that irreversibility constraints and political instability dampen the learning effect making policy more gradualist

downsizing and job insecurity this article offers an explanation of why firms downsizing patterns may vary substantially in magnitude and timing taking the form of one time massive cuts waves of layoffs or zero layoff policies the key element of this theory is that workers expectations about their job security affect their on the job performance in a situation where firms face adverse shocks the productivity effect of job insecurity forces firms to balance laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors commitment the cost of ensuring commitment differs between firms with different characteristics and determines whether workers are laid off all at once or in stages however if firms have private information about their future profits they may not lay off any workers in order to signal a bright future boosting worker s confidence jel j21 j23 d21 d82

monetary policy in exceptional times this paper describes the way in which the european central bank ecb the federal reserve and the bank of england conducted monetary policy since the beginning of the financial crisis in august 2007 we argue that both quantitative easing and the other non standard measures introduced by central banks that changed the composition of the asset side of their balance sheets so called qualitative easing acted mainly through their effects on interest rates and in particular on money market spreads rather than solely through quantity effects in terms of the money supply we perform a quantitative exercise on the euro area which estimates the effect of the reduction of these spreads to the broader economy michele lenza huw pill and lucrezia reichlin

the political economy of transition the overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform what are the main insights from that theory how does it reflect the transition reality what have we learned and what do we still need to learn the present article will attempt to answer those questions

overcoming the zero bound on interest rate policy the paper proposes three options for overcoming the zero bound on interest rate policy a carry tax on money open market operations in long bonds and monetary transfers a variable carry tax on electronic bank reserves could enable a central bank to target negative nominal interest rates a carry tax could be imposed on currency to create more leeway to make interest rates negative quantitative policy monetary transfers and open market purchases of long bonds could stimulate the economy by creating liquidity broadly defined a central bank needs more fiscal support than usual from the treasury to pursue quantitative policy at the interest rate floor

central banking in the credit turmoil an assessment of federal reserve practice abstract central banking is understood in terms of the fiscal features of monetary credit and interest on reserves policies monetary policy expanding reserves by buying treasuries transfers all revenue from money creation directly to the fiscal authorities credit policy selling treasuries to fund loans or acquire non treasury securities is debt financed fiscal policy interest on reserves frees monetary policy to fund credit policy independently of interest rate policy an ambiguous boundary of responsibilities between the fed and the fiscal authorities contributed to economic collapse in fall 2008 accord principles are proposed to clarify fed credit policy powers and secure its independence on monetary and interest rate policy the fed needs more surplus capital from the fiscal authorities to be fully flexible against both inflation and deflation at the zero interest bound

in search of homo economicus behavioral experiments in 15 small scale societies we can summarize our results as follows first the canonical model is not supported in any society studied second there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross cultural research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments third group level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games fourth individual level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups fifth behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies

imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound as the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a new keynesian model during a large recession we characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect confronting monetary policy communication of the u s federal reserve and the swedish riksbank with such a framework the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

history expectations and leadership in the evolution of social norms we study the evolution of a social norm of cooperation in a dynamic environment each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game social norms emerge as patterns of behaviour that are stable in part due to agents interpretations of private information about the past influenced by occasional commonly observed past behaviours for sufficiently backward looking societies history completely drives equilibrium play leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation in more forward looking societies there is a pattern of reversion whereby play starting with high low cooperation reverts towards lower higher cooperation the impact of history can be countered by occasional prominent agents whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation

discretionary policy implementation and reform abstract regulatory agencies treaty negotiators and other delegates often possess considerable authority over the details of policy change i examine how such discretion can block a pareto improving reform when policy change requires the support of both the liberal and conservative factions gridlock reform and reform paradoxes all emerge as cases in a general model with perfect information a reformer with unknown policy preferences can facilitate escape from a gridlock equilibrium

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

economic performance through time prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1993 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the political economy of restructuring and privatization in eastern europe this paper reports some of the recent research in the political economy of transition in central and eastern europe with special emphasis on restructuring and privatization this line of research is concerned with the political feasibility of reform packages and the effect of political constraints on the design of reforms political constraints appear to play a major role in economic transition 2 in poland transition started with a homogeneous solidarity led government enjoying great legitimacy l balcerowicz the finance minister who had launched reform in january 1990 had however to leave office and part of his policies are now being reversed parliament is fragmented government duration is becoming increasingly short workers are striking against privatization plans czechoslovakia is breaking up partly because the slovak population is not ready to follow the rhythm of reforms initiated by v klaus in prague the support for e gai dar s transition program in russia has dwindled among the population conservative forces are gathering momentum alarming neonazi manifestations in east germany are an indicator of the low tolerance of the population for the changes imposed on them some countries are doing better hungary is doing comparatively well with a more stable political situation and relative successes in reforms allowing it to attract foreign direct investment china is experiencing a rapid expansion of the non state sector and smooth advances in the reform process in a context of sustained economic growth qian and xu 1992 these two countries

unconventional monetary policy the assessment the uncon ventional monetary policy measures adopted by the major central banks in the period since 2008 are discussed in this paper we highlight some important differences between quan titative easing and conventional monetary policy and then evaluate the mechanisms through which quantitative easing may propagate to financial markets and the real economy drawing on perspec tives from monetarist and new keynesian theory additional measures intended to supplement or strengthen the effects of pure quantitative easing often termed unconventional unconventional monet ary policy are also assessed in our discussion we relate the various articles in this issue to some of the key research questions posed in relation to unconventional monetary policy

global implications of national unconventional policies abstract financial integration in the markets for banks assets and liabilities makes balance sheet constraints highly correlated across countries resulting in a high degree of financial and macroeconomic interdependence likewise under financial integration unconventional policies aimed at stabilizing domestic financial and credit conditions could entail large international spillovers therefore stabilization by one country will also benefit other countries reducing incentives to implement credit policies in a classic free riding problem especially when these policies entail domestic costs we show that this outcome can emerge in an open economy model featuring financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints

when order affects performance culture behavioral spillovers and institutional path dependence evidence suggests that the cultural context influences the performance of laws policies and political institutions descriptive accounts reveal that outcomes and behaviors often depend on the array of historical institutions this article presents a multi institutional framework that can account for those findings through path dependent behavioral spillovers individuals learn equilibrium behaviors when interacting in a new institutional setting initially some individuals choose behaviors that align with their behaviors in similar extant institutions creating a cultural context that can lead to inefficient outcomes the article shows how avoiding path dependence requires sequencing or designing institutions to maintain behavioral diversity optimal sequencing thus requires positioning institutions with clear incentives early in the sequence as well as avoiding strong punishments that can stifle attempts to break established behavioral patterns

ben bernanke and bagehot s rules former federal reserve chairman ben bernanke has claimed that the fed s bank bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis were consistent with walter bagehot s rules for a lender of last resort this paper demonstrates bernanke s claims to be mistaken first we outline bagehot s doctrine for a classical lender of last resort next we discuss bernanke s theory of bank bailouts and his statements regarding the fed s role in the 2008 bank bailouts finally we examine the bailouts and demonstrate that contrary to bernanke s claims the fed s actions were not consistent with bagehot s rules for a lender of last resort

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

case based decision theory this paper suggests that decision making under uncertainty is at least partly case based we propose a model in which cases are primitive and provide a simple axiomatization of a decision rule that chooses a best act based on its past performance in similar cases each act is evaluated by the sum of the utility levels that resulted from using this act in past cases each weighted by the similarity of that past case to the problem at hand the formal model of case based decision theory naturally gives rise to the notions of satisficing decisions and aspiration levels

success and failure of reform insights from the transition of agriculture this paper analyzes the linkages between the reform strategies in transition countries and economic performance the authors focus on agriculture because of the sharpness of the policy changes fundamental differences among countries and relative simplicity of agricultural relationships the authors document post reform performance in the transition countries of asia and europe the authors show how a pricing reform and subsidy reductions b land rights reform and policies that affect farm restructuring and c the presence institutions that facilitate exchange either markets or market substitutes affect output and productivity the paper ends with general lessons on reforms and transition

political support for reforms economics of voting in transition countries i analyze the relationship between economics and politics across eight parliamentary elections in four transition countries the czech republic hungary poland and slovakia i argue that support for reform reflects the balance between positive and negative effects of the reform accordingly i identify economic groups that support or oppose the reform the former are private entrepreneurs white collar workers and university educated voters the latter are the unemployed retirees and blue collar and agricultural workers this general pattern holds both within countries and across countries and across tenures of different governments in contrast with the responsibility hypothesis voters in the transition countries are found to be forward looking not retrospective

reforms lobbies and welfare a common agency approach citizens with heterogeneous tastes delegate to policy makers the authority to choose public policies they may try to influence legislators in various ways in this paper we assume that monetary lobbying and direct threats are the only instruments private individuals can use to influence the legislator we model the relationship between the citizens and a single policy maker as a common agency game lobbies offer a policy and a payment according to a truthful contribution schedule and the government takes the policy decision in the truthful equilibrium the government implements the social surplus maximizing policy introducing also direct threats we find that as far as both groups have an instrument to influence the legislator the efficiency result is robust we also show that when the lobby groups have asymmetric interests and political power not all groups necessarily participate in the auction in particular it turns out that one lobby or non lobby equilibria may arise and those equilibria are also efficient

trade capital and the transition in central europe the potential for export oriented growth and the impact of official capital injections is assessed for five central european countries in the years 1990 2000 by means of a neoclassical simulation model export growth is essential for the transition to a market oriented economy and the recovery of central europe implying the need for trade liberalization by both the east and the west if this condition is being met satisfactory gdp growth rates appear possible even without external financial support

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

speed of adjustment and self fulfilling failure of economic reform abstract an economic reform programme where inefficient public labour is laid off is considered the immediate effect is a lowering of wages and increased profitability in the private modern sector over time as capital accumulates in the modern sector wages and production increases big bang reform generates a sharp transitory drop in wages while gradual reform gives a more modest decline in the presence of a subsistence wage constraint popular resistance can cause the cancellation of big bang reform two arguments for gradualism can in that case be made first a more gradual reform requires a less abrupt drop in the wage and will therefore be feasible second the initial wage drop will be stronger if a cancellation of reform is expected and since cancellation is dependent on the severity of the initial wage drop multiple equilibria occurs the existence of multiple equilibria is dependent on the speed of reform sufficiently gradual programmes have a unique successful equilibrium

macroprudential policy central banks and financial stability evidence from china abstract we study the chinese experience and provide evidence that central banks can play an active role in safeguarding financial stability the narrative approach is used to disentangle macropudential policy actions from monetary actions we show that reserve requirements window guidance supervisory pressure and housing market policies can be used for macroprudential purposes our var estimates suggest that well targeted macroprudential policy has immediate and persistent impact on credit but no statistically significant impact on output macroprudential policy can be used to retain financial stability without triggering an economic slowdown or as a complement to monetary policy to offset the buildup of financial vulnerabilities arising from monetary easing a well designed mix of these two policies helps to achieve both macroeconomic and financial stability objectives which however requires central banks to maintain a multi instrument framework

optimal pricing of local telephone service although payment for nearly all other goods and services including toll long distance telephone calls increases with greater consumption nearly 90 percent of the residential telephone subscribers and more than half the business subscribers in the united states now pay a flat monthly rate for local calls see larry garfinkel recently however the telephone companies and regulatory commissions have been moving cautiously toward imposing usage charges for local telephone calls there is renewed interest in what is currently termed usage sensitive pricing t usp it is due to the combined forces of inflation increased local usage and competition from independent firms that sell telephone terminal equipment and supply private toll lines to business customers under usp the pricing of such services as telephone installation directory assistance and minutes of calling is based on incremental rather than average costs since world war ii technological advances have benefited long distance far more than local telephone calling development in microwave communications coaxial cable satellites and waveguides have dramatically lowered the costs of long distance transmission in contrast the costs of local service have moved upward since the late 1960 s at a rate not far below the general price index see at t 1975 faced with a continuing stream of requests for local telephone rate increases state regulatory commissions are finding the concept of tying prices to usage increasingly attractive at t and some of the independent telephone carriers are beginning to test usp plans in several cities with flat rate tariffs increases in local calling add to carrier costs but not to their revenues the local calling rate per subscriber has increased by an average of 2 percent for the past seven years at t s chairman has stated we are moving more and more in the direction of usage sensitive pricing see washington star news p a12 and according to newspaper accounts of at t management documents the bell system plans to phase out flat rate telephone service and begin charging for each local call in major metropolitan areas in 1978 80 see seattle postintelligencer pp 1 10 still regulatory commissions consumer groups and the carriers themselves remain cautious about requiring usage sensitive tariffs for all subscribers the prospective gains from prices more closely related to costs are at least partially offset by the added costs of metering equipment and billing most telephone subscribers prefer flat rates according to bell system marketing surveys see garfinkel p 28 and it is by no means clear which groups of subscribers will be helped and which harmed by such revisions in local tariff structures will the poor end up paying more because they use their phones more should different prices be charged for calls at different times of day on what bases should the monthly and per call rates be determined the purpose of this paper is to sort out some of the questions of economic efficiency and equity that arise when changes are considered in the methods of pricing local telephone services in section i i construct a department of economics the rand corporation and the international institute of management berlin this study was supported under a grant from the john and mary r markle foundation i am indebted to walter s baer for numerous contributions to this paper to s c littlechild and patricia munch and to the managing editor and a referee of this review for critical and constructive review of a draft i have benefited as well from the comments and suggestions of james h alleman stanley m besen william s comanor john m drew leland l johnson john a kay edward d lowry carl pavarini john rolph ralph turvey and chris witze bryant mori assisted with the computer programming see my 1976 paper for a more extensive version of this paper which also discusses optimal flat rate and optimal peak load tariffs

the banking panics in the united states in the 1930s some lessons for today in this paper we discuss the lessons learned from the us banking panics in the 1930s for the response by the federal reserve to the crisis of 2008 we revisit the debate over illiquidity versus insolvency in the banking crises of the 1930s and provide empirical evidence that the banking crises largely reflected illiquidity shocks in the recent crisis the fed under bernanke had well learned the lesson from the banking panics of the 1930s of conducting expansionary monetary policy to meet demands for liquidity however unlike in the 1930s the deeper problem of the recent crisis was not illiquidity but insolvency and especially the fear of insolvency of counterparties a number of virtually insolvent us banks deemed too big and too interconnected to fail were rescued by fiscal bail outs

perils of unconventional monetary policy abstract unconventional monetary policy by relaxing restrictions on the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank compromises control over the stochastic path of inflation or in open economies over the stochastic path of exchange rates if the composition of the balance sheet is unrestricted then the path of inflation is indeterminate this is the case under pure quantitative easing where the target is the size of real money balances in contrast credit easing policies restrict the composition of the portfolio by targeting a specific expansion in the maturity profile of bonds bought and thus can implement a determinate path of inflation the composition of the portfolios traded by monetary fiscal authorities also determines premia in asset and currency markets

gradualism versus big bang speed and sustainability of reforms a beneficial reform may be blocked by a majority if it is implemented by a big bang but the same reform may succeed with an optimally designed gradualist approach a gradualist approach can sometimes split opposition force and is in this sense more politically sustainable on the other hand if both approaches are politically preferred to no reform a big bang is often preferred to gradualism in terms of both political support as well as economic efficiency

learning dynamics and support for economic reforms why good news can be bad support for economic reforms has often shown puzzling dynamics many reforms that began successfully lost public support this paper shows that learning dynamics can rationalize this paradox because the process of revealing reform outcomes is an example of sampling without replacement this concept challenges the conventional wisdom that one should begin by revealing reform winners it may also lead to situations in which reforms that enjoy both ex ante and ex post majority support will still not come to completion the framework can be used to explain why gradual reforms worked well in china where successes in special economic zones facilitated further reform whereas this was much less the case for latin american and central and eastern european countries

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

whither russia a review of andrei shleifer s a normal country in this review the author reflects on the heated debates around views about russia s postcommunist transition expressed in essays collected in new andrei shleifer s book a normal country russia after communism harvard university press 2005 which were initially published at different times during transition she focuses on the three questions that have been in the center of the debate among academics and policymakers what should the sequencing and the speed of reforms be should a country have political centralization for fiscal decentralization to be efficient is russia normal the author argues that russia s most recent history provides convincing evidence in support of the logic of political and economic transformation as it was understood by shleifer as early as the beginning of the 1990s

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

the imf s unmet challenges the international monetary fund is a controversial institution whose interventions regularly provoke passionate reactions we will argue that there is an important role for the imf in helping to solve information commitment and coordination problems with significant implications for the stability of national economies and the international monetary and financial system in executing these functions the effectiveness of the imf like that of a football referee depends on whether the players see it as competent and impartial we will argue that the fund s perceived competence and impartiality and hence its effectiveness are limited by its failure to meet four challenges concerning the quality of its surveillance of individual countries groups of countries and the global system the relevance of conditionality in loan contracts the utility of the fund s approach to debt problems and the fund s failure to adopt a system of governance that gives appropriate voice to different stakeholders these problems of legitimacy will have to be addressed in order for the imf to play a more effective role in the 21st century

the effect of conventional and unconventional monetary policy rules on inflation expectations theory and evidence this paper has three parts part 1 constructs a classical economic model of inflation augmented by a complete set of financial markets i call this the core monetary model part 2 develops a series of calibrated examples to illustrate how the core monetary model explains the history of inflation after wwii and part 3 provides evidence to show that the unconventional monetary policy followed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis was effective in stabilizing inflation expectations the core monetary model provides a unified framework to explain how an interest rule can be used to control inflation in normal times and to explain the purpose of unconventional monetary policy when policy attains the zero lower bound i argue that management of the variation in the composition of the fed s balance sheet is an important tool in a central bank s arsenal that can be used to help prevent deflation in the wake of a financial crisis

how to reform a planned economy lessons from china the countries of eastern europe and the former soviet union have been flooded with advice from the west on how to liberalize their planned econo mies this advice is unfortunately offered in an empirical vacuum no one knows how these econo mies will react to the proposed liberalization meas ures there exists however a neglected source of information china offers a long time series of data over a decade s worth on the effects of reforms on a planned economy china s reforms were gradual but their cumulative effect has been large and they have been remarkably successful china s experiments provide some practical les sons on what kinds of reforms can work elsewhere the dominant school of thought among economists favours the big bang policy of reforming quickly and according to a comprehensive plan partial reforms in this view are useless they will be negated by the remnants of the planning system the proponents of big bang reform have been influential with poland czechoslovakia and rus sia announcing plans for a rapid transition to capi talism

capital accumulation unemployment and self fulfilling failure of economic reform abstract i consider fiscal reform and the consequences of expectations about reform cancellation the reform implies reduced taxes and the laying off of employees in an inefficient public sector if the resulting unemployment level declines sufficiently fast the reform is completed on the other hand if high unemployment levels prevail for too long the reform is cancelled cancellation affects the return on capital negatively hence expectations about cancellation will depress capital accumulation and increase the level of unemployment as a result multiple rational expectation equilibria may arise where expectations about cancellation prove self fulfilling the modelling framework is leontief technology in combination with ramsey optimization that exhibits simple and attractive algebra