the complex evolution of a simple traffic convention the functions and implications of habit this chapter presents an agent based simulation of the emergence of a traffic convention concerning whether to drive on the left or the right of the road the interaction between agents and structures involves causal influences in two directions showing how agents constitute institutions and how institutions can have reconstitutive causal effects on individuals

variations in trading volume return volatility and trading costs evidence on recent price formation models patterns in stock market trading volume trading costs and return volatility are examined using new york stock exchange data from 1988 intraday test results indicate that for actively traded firms trading volume adverse selection costs and return volatility are higher in the first half hour of the day this evidence is inconsistent with the admati and pfleiderer 1988 model which predicts that trading costs are low when volume and return volatility are high interday test results show that for actively traded firms trading volume is low and adverse selection costs are high on monday which is consistent with the predictions of the foster and viswanathan 1990 model academics investors and regulators alike are now intensively focused upon understanding the volatility of asset returns and its relation to trading volume this interest was undoubtedly piqued by the market break of october 1987 a time during which volatility and trading volume reached unprecedented levels but even beforehand researchers observed regular differences in the return process for various hours of the day and days of the week research concerning temporal patterns in stock market volatility and volume falls in two groups studies that document observed patterns and studies that develop models to predict patterns among the studies in the first group are oldfield and rogalski 1980 french and roll 1986 stoll and whaley 1990 harris 1986 and wood mcinish and ord 1985 who report evidence on seasonalities in daily and weekly return variances among the regularities that have been documented using interday data is that volatility is higher when the market is open than when it is closed oldfield and rogalski 1980 french and roll 1986 and stoll and whaley 1990 for example point out significant differences in return volatility between trading

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

bargaining in the shadow of power abstract often a bargainer can use some form of power legal military or political to impose a settlement how does the outside option of being able to impose a settlement albeit at some cost affect the bargaining and how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers these questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to rubinstein s game of dividing a pie each actor can accept an offer make a counteroffer or try to impose a solution imposing a settlement is however costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost journal of economic literatureclassification number c72

inventory announcements jump dynamics volatility and trading volume in u s energy futures markets abstract this paper applies nonparametric methods to identify jumps in daily futures prices and intraday jumps surrounding inventory announcements of crude oil heating oil and natural gas contracts traded on the new york mercantile exchange the sample period of our intraday data covers january 1990 to january 2008 we have obtained several interesting empirical results 1 large volatility days are often associated with large jump components and large jump components are often associated with the energy information administration s inventory announcement dates 2 the volatility jump component is less persistent than the continuous sample path component 3 volatility and trading volume are higher on days with a jump at the inventory announcement than on days without a jump at the announcement furthermore the intraday volatility returns to normal faster following inventory announcements with jumps than after announcements without jumps

is the corn futures market noisier the impact of high frequency quoting the paper pioneers research on high frequency hf quoting noise in electronically traded agricultural futures markets hf quoting quickly cancelling posted limit orders and replacing them with n

delay and settlement in litigation delay in litigation is a policy concern in many jurisdictions little evidence is available on the causes of such delay however we present a version of spier s 1992 bargaining model of litigation and derive directly a functional form for the conditional probability of case settlement we then estimate this and test predictions about the effects of legal costs and uncertainty over damages and liability on the conditional probability of settlement using data from negligence claims against several nhs trusts our results provide a direct test of the model and shed light on the causes of settlement delay in england

imperfect patent protection and innovation the paper studies the effect of strengthening protection on r d incentives in the context of process innovation it shows that for non drastic innovations that do not render the pre existing technology obsolete the innovator might favor imitation if the expected royalty rate determined by the court is sufficiently high since imitation is discouraged for very high levels of patent protection r d investment is maximized for an intermediate level of patent strength this finding provides a theoretical explanation for emerging empirical evidence questioning the effectiveness of strengthening protection on innovation incentives it also serves as a justification for the imperfections of the existing patent system that allows for some infringement

optimal awards and penalties when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs this article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs optimality is defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest litigation cost our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive in contrast to common practice in the united states by penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising the award to winning plaintiffs relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not penalized it is possible to discourage relatively low probability of prevailing plaintiffs from suing without discouraging relatively high probability plaintiffs and thereby to achieve the desired degree of deterrence with lower litigation costs

pretrial bargaining with asymmetric information unilateral versus bilateral payoff relevance author affiliation amy farmer amyf walton uark edupaul pecorino ppecorin cba ua edu acknowledgment we would like to thank akram temimi and two anonymous referees for providing helpful comments on the article 1 introductionasymmetric information is a leading explanation for bargaining failure and the role of asymmetric information has been extensively analyzed in the civil litigation literature 1 most of this literature concerns information that has bilateral payoff relevance in the sense that the information in question affects the expected payoff at trial of both the plaintiff and defendant when there is bilateral payoff relevance trials may be predicted in the equilibrium of the bargaining game regardless of whether the informed or uninformed party makes the offer in this article we analyze information that has unilateral payoff relevance meaning that it affects the expected payoff of one of the two parties to the dispute but not the other as an example suppose the plaintiff has private information on her risk preferences this affects her expected payoff at trial but not the defendant s when there is unilateral payoff relevance there are never inefficient trials in the equilibrium of the game where the informed party makes the offer 2 however there may still be costly disputes in the equilibrium of the game in which the uninformed party makes the offer examples of information with bilateral payoff relevance include information on the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial and information on the amount of the judgment to be awarded at trial in the event the plaintiff is victorious in both cases the information clearly affects the expected payoff of both the plaintiff and defendant at trial and these are the types of informational asymmetry considered most often in the literature what type of information has only unilateral payoff relevance one example mentioned above is information on risk preferences farmer and pecorino 1994 swanson and mason 1998 and heyes rickman and tzavara 2004 all examine asymmetric information on risk preferences within the context of the screening model in which the uninformed party makes the offer 3 in each case trials are predicted in the equilibrium of these models as long as trials are not too costly for the participants however other types of information also have only unilateral payoff relevance a large literature on the ultimatum game has provided convincing evidence that under certain circumstances individuals will express a preference for being treated fairly 4 this preference may be expressed specifically by the percentage of her own court costs a player is willing to concede to her opponent via his settlement offer 5 since this preference is not observable and presumably differs across individuals the proposer in a screening game must decide how much of the joint surplus of settlement he will attempt to extract without knowledge of how low he can go before triggering a rejection suppose the judgment is 100 000 and the plaintiff s court costs are 30 000 a plaintiff without a taste for fairness will accept an offer of 70 000 rather than proceed to trial a plaintiff with a taste for fairness might as an example accept no less than 90 000 the defendant then must choose between an offer of 90 000 and 70 000 without knowledge of whether the other party has a taste for fairness or not the defendant will make the low offer if he believes it will be accepted with a sufficiently high probability if the plaintiff does indeed have a taste for fairness she will reject the low offer and a trial will result presumably a mechanism along these lines explains the persistence of disputes in ultimatum game experiments another example of information with unilateral payoff relevance is the degree of litigiousness which can be modeled as differences in perceived court costs on the part of the plaintiff eisenberg and farber 1997

what money canʼt buy efficient mechanism design with costly signals i study the ex ante efficient allocation of a set of quality heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk neutral agents agents have independent private values which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality the designer faces a trade off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening because the cost sustained is wasted the optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distributes objects to higher ranked agents the ranking is independent of the scarcity of objects or the extent of their heterogeneity if the hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing agents are ranked according to their expected values if hazard rates are decreasing and agents are symmetric the objects are allocated to the agents that sustain the highest costs in general optimal mechanisms combine both pooling and screening of values

price formation and liquidity in the u s treasury market the response to public information the arrival of public information in the u s treasury market sets off a two stage adjustment process for prices trading volume and bid ask spreads in a brief first stage the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price change with a reduction in trading volume demonstrating that price reactions to public information do not require trading the spread widens dramatically at announcement evidently driven by inventory control concerns in a prolonged second stage trading volume surges price volatility persists and spreads remain moderately wide as investors trade to reconcile residual differences in their private views how do financial markets form prices and provide liquidity when information arrives efforts to address this issue have led to an extensive microstructure literature on equity markets and to a lesser extent on the foreign exchange fx market relatively little work has focused on the u s treasury market however in spite of its importance in its own right and the advantages it offers as an alternative testing ground for microstructure hypotheses

efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs abstract this paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade to be feasible when trader beliefs can be statistically dependent allowing for dependent beliefs produces equilibrium and comparative statics behavior that differs qualitatively from that observed in bilateral trade models in which traders have independent beliefs

bargaining with asymmetric information an empirical study of plea negotiations this paper empirically investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining the analysis is based on the model of bargaining with asymmetric information by bebchuk 1984 i provide conditions for the nonparametric identification of the model propose a consistent nonparametric estimator and implement it using data on criminal cases from north carolina employing the estimated model i evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases my results indicate that lower mandatory minimum sentences could greatly reduce the total amount of incarceration time assigned by the courts but may increase conviction rates in contrast the broader use of non incarceration sentences for less serious crimes reduces the number of incarceration convictions but has a very small effect over the total assigned incarceration time i also consider the effects of a ban on plea bargains depending on the case characteristics over 20 percent of the defendants who currently receive incarceration sentences would be acquitted if plea bargains were forbidden

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

price reversals bid ask errors or market overreaction abstract we show that bid ask errors in transaction prices are the predominant source of apparent price reversals in the short run for nasdaq firms once we extract measurement errors in prices caused by the bid ask spread we find little evidence of market overreaction on the contrary we find that security returns are positively and not negatively autocorrelated we also show that bid ask errors lead to substantial spurious volatility in transaction returns about half of measured daily return variances can be induced by the bid ask effect

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

roughing it up including jump components in the measurement modeling and forecasting of return volatility a rapidly growing literature has documented important improvements in financial return volatility measurement and forecasting via use of realized variation measures constructed from high frequency returns coupled with simple modeling procedures building on recent theoretical results in barndorff nielsen and shephard 2004a 2005 for related bi power variation measures the present paper provides a practical and robust framework for non parametrically measuring the jump component in asset return volatility in an application to the dm exchange rate the s p500 market index and the 30 year u s treasury bond yield we find that jumps are both highly prevalent and distinctly less persistent than the continuous sample path variation process moreover many jumps appear directly associated with specific macroeconomic news announcements separating jump from non jump movements in a simple but sophisticated volatility forecasting model we find that almost all of the predictability in daily weekly and monthly return volatilities comes from the non jump component our results thus set the stage for a number of interesting future econometric developments and important financial applications by separately modeling forecasting and pricing the continuous and jump components of the total return variation process

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

the short run dynamics of the price adjustment to new information we examine how prices in interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets adjust to the new information contained in scheduled macroeconomic news releases in the very short run using 10 second returns and tick by tick data we find that prices adjust in a series of numerous small but rapid price changes that begin within 10 seconds of the news release and are basically completed within 40 seconds of the release there is some evidence that prices overreact in the first 40 seconds but that this is corrected in the second or third minute after the release while volatility tends to be higher than normal just before the news release there is no evidence of information leakage in our analysis we correct for the biases created by bid ask spreads and tick by tick data

contests with multi tasking the standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented multi dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure mitigating one of its main advantages simplicity in this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize the amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player we look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest per dimension and totally and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions the standard tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework

pre harvest price expectations for corn the information content of usda reports and new crop futures this article examines the puzzle of why futures prices continue to react to usda crop reports despite the fact that reports appear to be no longer newsworthy that is provide no better production estimates than private forecasts the information value of reports is measured in terms of their influence on rational agents harvest time corn price expectations which are uncovered using a hamilton type modeling approach results show that reports are still newsworthy as they would contribute to agents price expectations if released a day early thus futures price reactions which closely reflect price expectations are rational and consistent with efficient markets hypothesis copyright 2008 oxford university press

intraday market effects in electronic soybean futures market during non trading and trading hour announcements abstractthis article investigates market reactions to major united states department of agriculture announcements during non trading and trading hours in the soybean futures market using microstruc

how markets process information news releases and volatility we examine the impact of scheduled macroeconomic news announcements on interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets we find these announcements are responsible for most of the observed time of day and day of the week volatility patterns in these markets while the bulk of the price adjustment to a major announcement occurs within the first minute volatility remains substantially higher than normal for roughly fifteen minutes and slightly elevated for several hours nonetheless these subsequent price adjustments are basically independent of the first minute s return we identify those announcements with the greatest impact on these markets we examine the impact on interest rate and foreign exchange markets of scheduled macroeconomic news releases such as the employment report the consumer price index cpi and the producer price index ppi many market participants believe that such announcements have a major impact on financial markets indeed a small industry devoted to predicting the figures to be released in upcoming releases has evolved in recent years with the exception of the weekly money supply figures however the impact of such announcements on financial markets has received scant attention 1 this is doubly surprising given the considerable research interest in market volatility since these news releases are a potential source of much of this volatility consider for instance figure 1 as shown there prices in interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets are much more volatile between 8 30 and 8 35 a m eastern time et than during any other five minute trading period including

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

the costs of inefficient bargaining and financial distress abstract this study provides the first large sample analysis of the stock market reactions to interfirm litigation when a suit is filed the common stock of the typical defendant declines by about 1 while the plaintiff experiences no significant gains for the average pair of firms the combined drop in value upon filing is 21 million much of the loss is regained if the suit is settled the findings suggest that bargaining among firm claimants sometimes leads to very inefficient outcomes part of the leakage is explained by the costs of increased financial distress imposed on the defendant

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

how the equity market responds to unanticipated events we examine the market reaction of prices volume spreads and trading location when firms experience events that are totally unanticipated by the equity market in terms of both timing and content we find that the response time is longer than previous studies have reported selling pressure wider spreads and higher volume remain significant for over an hour we also find an immediate price reaction for overnight events however the market takes longer to react to events that occur when it is open these findings may shed light on the efficacy of trading halts

pretrial bargaining and the design of fee shifting rules legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation or fee shifting rules provide powerful incentives for settlement within the context of a direct revelation mechanism the fee shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court s award to the pretrial announcements this mechanism resembles rule 68 of the federal rules of civil procedure and other offer based rules in a simple extensive form game if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages probability of prevailing then rule 68 increases decreases the settlement rate

on the evolution of prize perceptions in contests abstract we apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players perceived prize valuations in contests evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize s material value and induce overexpenditure we establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences

litigation and settlement under the english and american rules theory and evidence in contrast to the american rule whereby each party bears its own costs the english rule requires losers at trial to pay the winner s legal fees up to a reasonable limit we develop six hypotheses regarding how these two cost allocation rules might affect settlements and litigated outcomes through changes in i the selection of cases reaching the settle versus litigate stage and ii behavior thereafter using data from florida which applied the english rule to medical malpractice claims during the period 1980 85 we examine the rules effects on the probability of plaintiffs winning at trial jury awards and out of court settlements the english rule increased plaintiff success rates at trial average jury awards and out of court settlements our interpretation of these findings emphasizes that the overall quality of the claims reaching the settle versus litigate stage must improve to generate the combination of effects observed

the behavior of bid ask spreads in the electronically traded corn futures market this is the first paper to analyze liquidity costs in agricultural futures markets based on the observed bid ask spread bas faced by market participants the results reveal a highly liquid corn market that mostly offers order execution at minimum cost the bas responds negatively to volume and positively to price volatility but also affects volume traded and price volatility while statistically significant these responses on a cents bushel or a percentage basis are generally small liquidity costs are also virtually impervious to short term changes in demand for spreading and trend following trader activity as well as differences from day of the week changes in market activity much larger cents bushel and percentage changes in bas occur during commodity index trader roll periods and on usda report release days the roll period findings indicate a sunshine trading effect while announcement effects identify the importance of unexpected information and adverse selection on order execution costs overall our research demonstrates that the transition to electronic trading in the corn futures market has led to low and stable liquidity costs despite the market turbulence in 2008 2009

litigation liability and incentives for care abstract in this paper potential injurers are subject to a negligence standard and differ in cost of taking care in the event of accident the injurer s degree of care is private information in litigation that follows award of damages for pain and suffering will lead to a general increase in care and hence reduce the likehood of accident a tighter negligence standard will lead some potential injurers to take more care and others to take less adoption of a rule under which the loser at trial must pay the litigation costs of the winner will reduce the pressure for punitive damages

the value of public information in commodity futures markets abstract the informational value of u s department of agriculture usda corn and soybean production forecasts is investigated for the period 1971 1992 three tests of informational content are applied overall the results suggest usda corn and soybean forecasts provide valuable information to participants in commodity futures markets this value does appear to have declined especially since the mid 1980s

litigation and settlement under two sided incomplete information this paper deals with a simple game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information parties are assumed to have the choice between settling their dispute out of court or resorting to costly litigation the set of sequential equilibria is characterized and conditions are given under which an efficient equilibrium does exist efficient equilibria however will be ruled out by various tests of refinement a comparative statics analysis is carried out with respect to the quality of private information which parties are assumed to receive before any moves have to be made

quantifying the wasde announcement effect this article uses a two stage gls model to quantify the world agricultural supply and demand estimates wasde announcement effect for cotton soybeans and hard winter wheat controlling for important factors associated with commodity price volatility the information presented by the overlapping nature of futures contracts is exploited to estimate conditional effects by month inventory conditions and delivery horizon results in this article show that the wasde announcement effect persists across contract positions is not limited to months that include nass crop survey data is amplified during low carryover periods for soybeans and wheat and is rapidly incorporated into futures prices

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

are harvest forecasts news usda announcements and futures market reactions futures market price data for maize and soyabeans are used to examine reactions to us department of agriculture harvest forecasts these forecasts are widely known and reasonably accurate so failure to find significant reaction would indicate that the usda did not contribute additional news relative to information already possessed by traders various t tests f tests and nonparametric chi square tests indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no significant difference between means of absolute values or variances of changes in closing prices on days following a usda announcement and other days thus the data indicate that significant information is contained in the forecasts

a generalized tullock contest we construct a generalized tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes own effort and the effort of the rival this structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels

the emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade a behavioral model without reputational effects abstract the present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property rights protection because they expect enough income from such action we develop a behavioral explanation according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance size and wealth of merchant guilds in the medieval era in western europe as well as a somewhat surprising effect of volatile price structures we add to prior research by showing that even uncoordinated embargo pressures among multiple guilds could get medieval rulers to offer high levels of property rights protection

delay in contests abstract why is there delay in contests in this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of carl von clausewitz to explain delay for a given contest technology delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate and if the additional cost of investment in future strength is low

are corn futures prices getting jumpy the article sheds light on price jump risk in corn futures prices in the era of electronic trading and after the shift to real time announcement of usda reports using intraday prices from 2008 to 2015 we employ a nonparametric test to detect jumps and variance analysis to assess the relative importance of jump risk real time trading of major usda reports has substantially increased the frequency and clustering of price jumps and results in higher market liquidity costs in contrast although the presence of jumps on non announcement days has doubled recently their magnitude has declined as have transactions costs during their occurrence the largest jump risk or execution risk is experienced by high frequency traders due to heightened microstructure noise during price jumps however traders holding long term market positions are only minimally affected by increased jump risk

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

comparative analysis of litigation systems an auction theoretic approach a simple auction theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court the court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys this framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems the british rule continental rule american rule and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model

restricted coasean bargaining we investigate the efficiency of coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes when property rights are costly to defend appropriate we find bargaining restrictions may be pareto superior to unconstrainedvoluntary exchange under cost uncertainty over the harmful activity we show an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient bargaining restrictions for an all pay auction we find conditions where precluding bargaining is always ex ante preferable to unrestricted bargaining for cases where the restrictions are contested we show conditions for the continuing existence of welfare improvements

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

public information arrival and volatility of intraday stock returns abstract this study employs firm specific announcements as a proxy for information flows and investigates the information volatility relation using high frequency data from the australian stock exchange our analysis reveals a positive and significant impact of the arrival rate of the selected news variable on the conditional variance of stock returns even after controlling for the potential effects of trading volume and high opening volatility furthermore the inclusion of the news variable in the conditional variance equation of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic model also reduces volatility persistence especially with intraday data combined with the evidence that news arrivals display a very strong pattern of autocorrelation our results are consistent with the mixture of distribution hypothesis which attributes conditional heteroscedasticity of stock returns to time dependence in the news arrival process