channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three layer supply chain abstract this paper analyzes coordination of a manufacturer distributer retailer supply chain where the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility csr in manufacturer stackelberg game setting the paper proposes a contract bargaining process to resolve channel conflict and to distribute surplus profit among the channel members the contract bargaining process consists of two wholesale price discount nash bargaining one between the distributer and the retailer based on the outcome of that between the distributer and the manufacturer although the contract bargaining process cuts out channel conflict and distributes surplus profit the wholesale prices are quite different from those of a pure profit maximizing supply chain the wholesale price of the manufacturer is less than its marginal production cost above a threshold of csr even it is negative for the manufacturer s heavy csr practice so the manufacturer s profit may be negative the behavior of the wholesale price of the distributer is same as that of the manufacturer but for higher threshold of csr

competitive nonlinear tariffs abstract this paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs i e those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased to the case of a symmetric oligopoly competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a cournot framework various equilibria are obtained which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors strategies buyers are classified by type each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff the phenomena of buyer self selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in cournot models both appear in the results

job search and the effect of urban structure on unemployment and married female participation rates a model of urban job search is presented concentrating on the skill level of the seeker the implications for the effect of urban structure on intra urban unemployment and married female participation rate differentials are examined it is found using census data for greater london that urban structure represented by the intra urban distribution of jobs per worker as derived from the job search model has the predicted effects on unemployment and participation rates after allowing for other determinants of these rates the paper concludes with some implications for urban manpower policy

a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits in this paper the joint problem of ordering and offering price discount by a supplier to his sole major buyer is analyzed the objective is to induce the buyer to alter his order schedule and size so that the supplier can benefit from lower set up ordering and inventory holding costs we generalize the quantity discount pricing model of monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 6 720 726 to 1 explicitly incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and 2 relax the implicit assumption of a lot for lot or order for order policy adopted by the supplier an algorithm is developed to solve the supplier s joint ordering and price discount problem

coordination of supply chains by option contracts a cooperative game theory approach manufacturer retailer supply chains commonly adopt a wholesale price mechanism this mechanism however has often led manufacturers and retailers to situations of conflicts of interest for example due to uncertain market demand retailers prefer to order flexibly from manufacturers so as to avoid incurring inventory costs and to be able to respond flexibly to market changes manufacturers on the other hand prefer retailers to place full orders as early as possible so that they can hedge against the risks of over and under production such conflicts between retailers and manufacturers can result in an inefficient supply chain motivated by this problem we take a cooperative game approach in this paper to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer retailer supply chain using option contracts using the wholesale price mechanism as a benchmark we develop an option contract model our study demonstrates that compared with the benchmark based on the wholesale price mechanism option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve pareto improvement we also discuss scenarios in which option contracts are selected according to individual supply chain members risk preferences and negotiating powers

nonlinear pricing in markets with interdependent demand this paper provides a mathematical framework for modeling demand and determining optimal price schedules in markets which have demand externalities and can sustain nonlinear pricing these fundamental economic concepts appear in the marketplace in the form of mutual buyers benefits and quantity discounts the theory addressing these aspects is relevant to a wide variety of goods and services examples include tariffs for electronic communications services pricing of franchises and royalty fees for copyrighted material and patents this paper builds on several previous results from microeconomics and extends nonlinear pricing to markets with demand externalities the implications of this price structure are compared to results obtained for flat rates and two part tariffs in a similar context a case study is described in which the results were applied to planning the startup of a new electronic communications service

arbitrating a dispute a decision analytic approach many collective decision making and bargaining situations can be described through the set of the feasible joint evaluations of all conceivable settlements attention should then be restricted to that subset pareto optimal frontier from which no joint gains are possible hence the focal issue becomes which element of the pareto optimal subset should be chosen as a solution to the dispute this paper proposes an arbitration procedure to address this issue the proposed approach decision analytic in its nature is inspired by lavalle s lavalle i h 1978 fundamentals of decision analysis holt rinehart and winston new york allocation function approach which is not specific on how to obtain an allocation function and by eliashberg and winkler s eliashberg j r l winkler 1981 risk sharing and group decision making management sci 27 november 1221 1235 work which does not accommodate probability differences within the group after the new approach is presented its implications are examined for some likely scenarios and examples are considered

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

on the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence abstract this paper examines the strategic role of high levels of debt and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into monopolistic markets in the context of an infinite horizon entry game we show that if a potential entrant has access to debt financing with limited liability the unique sub game perfect equilibrium involves the entrant successfully issuing a high level of debt entering the market and being met with cooperation if in addition to the entrant the incumbent also has access to debt with limited liability it will be highly levered and will completely pre empt any entry in equilibrium finally if the incumbent faces a variety of potential entrants with differing abilities to capture market shares its optimal capital structure will help pre empt the entry of the tougher entrants while allowing the weaker ones to share the market the results of extreme leverage are also shown to hold in an alternative formulation analyzed by kreps and wilson 1982 and milgrom and roberts 1982 and thus are robust to model specifications the empirical implications and possible application to high leverage industries are briefly discussed

discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price sensitive demand abstract in this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of quantity discounts and volume discounts as coordination mechanisms in distribution channels with demand that is price sensitive we consider a single vendor single retailer distribution channel demand for the product arises only at the retailer the demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be deterministic but price elastic the retailer in turn buys the product from the vendor the vendor and the retailer act independently and rationally each maximizing their own respective profit the equilibrium point that specifies the vendor s and buyer s inventory and pricing policy is determined by the solution to a stackelberg game we consider the cases when quantity discount and volume discount respectively are offered we develop methods to determine the optimal discount policy for these cases we then consider the case where both volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously and develop a method to determine the optimal simultaneous discount offer the relative performance of the alternative discount schemes is then evaluated through a numerical study the results of the study demonstrate that the effectiveness of volume discount as a coordination mechanism is higher when the sensitivity of demand to price changes is higher the effectiveness of quantity discount on the other hand is higher with lower price sensitivity of demand finally the results also demonstrate that perfect coordination is achieved when volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously

a fuzzy mathematical model for the joint economic lot size problem with multiple price breaks abstract this paper applies fuzzy mathematical programming to solve the joint economic lot size problem with multiple price breaks in order to entice the buyer to increase the order quantity it is a common practice for the seller to offer quantity discounts to the buyer from the system viewpoint the joint cost for the seller and buyer can be minimized only when the buyer increases his economic order quantity the problem is how to determine the number of price breaks as well as the quantity discount and order quantity at each price break to achieve the optimal joint cost fuzzy mathematical programming provides a very efficient algorithm to solve the above problem simultaneously from the perspectives of the seller and the buyer another common problem in joint economic lot size model is how to split the system profit between the seller and the buyer whereas the traditional approach to this problem is to divide the profit based on a certain ratio determined by the bargaining power of both parties fuzzy mathematical programming can achieve the same satisfaction level to both parties based on their respective cost functions

market segmentation self selection and product line design the purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of market segmentation based on consumer self selection the extant theory is based on the third degree price discrimination model of pigou central assumptions of which are that the firm can directly address individual segments and isolate them by using consumer self selection i am relaxing these assumptions in the context of a monopolist designing a product line i show that this relaxation has significant implications for how the products and prices are chosen and what they look like in particular segments may be aggregated even though there are no economies of scale furthermore consumer self selection enables us to model cannibalization and competition among firms

modeling quantity discounts under general price sensitive demand functions optimal policies and relationships this paper presents models for determining optimal all unit and incremental quantity discount policies and investigates the effect of quantity discounts on increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions under general price sensitive demand functions the paper develops optimal quantity discount policies investigates their interrelationships and their benefits to both the supplier and the buyer and gains managerial insights for the scenarios of maximizing the supplier s profit and the joint profit we develop simple and efficient solution approaches for determining the all unit and the incremental optimal decision policies for general price sensitive demand functions we have three main findings first with price sensitive demand there are two incentives in offering quantity discounts increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions in most cases increasing demand dominates in justifying the offering of quantity discounts second using a single lot size associated with all efficient transactions as with the constant demand case does not hold with the price sensitive demand case third the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in benefiting both the supplier and the buyer

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

a bargaining model for a first time interaction under asymmetric beliefs of supply reliability we consider the case of a first time interaction between a buyer and a supplier who is unreliable in delivery the supplier declares her estimate of the ability to meet the order obligations but the buyer may have a different estimate which may be higher or lower than the suppliers estimate we derive the nash bargaining solution and discuss the role of using a down payment or nondelivery penalty in the contract for the case of buyer overtrust the down payment contract maximizes channel profits when the suppliers estimate is public information if the suppliers estimate is private information a nonsymmetric contract is shown to be efficient and incentive compatible for the case of buyer undertrust the contract structure is quite different as both players choose not to include down payments in the contract when delivery estimates are public information a nondelivery penalty contract is able to maximize channel profits if the buyer uses the suppliers estimate in making the ordering decision if estimates are private information channel profits are maximized only if the true estimates of both players are not far part we also discuss the effect of different risk profiles on the nature of the bargaining solution in three extensions of the model we consider the following variants of the basic problem first we analyze the effect of early versus late negotiation on the bargaining solution then we study the case of endogenous supply reliability and finally for the case of repeated interactions we discuss the impact of updating delivery estimates on the order quantity and negotiated prices of future orders

production inventory games a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games in this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production inventory problems several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed each agent has its own unit production inventory holding and backlogging cost cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost we prove that the resulting cooperative game is totally balanced and the owen set reduces to a singleton the owen point based on this type of allocation we find a population monotonic allocation scheme for this class of games finally we point out the relationship of the owen point with other well known allocation rules such as the nucleolus and the shapley value

single supplier multiple buyer supply chain coordination incorporating buyers expectations under vertical information sharing abstract we address the coordination problem in a single supplier multiple buyer supply chain the supplier wishes to coordinate the supply chain by offering quantity discounts to obtain their complete cost information the supplier exchanges his own cost parameters with buyers leading to vertical information sharing the supplier thinks that the buyers as they have access to supplier s setup and holding cost information may demand a portion of the anticipated coordination savings based on the partial information they hold about the cost structure of the entire supply chain we model each buyer s expectations based on her limited view of the entire supply chain which consists of herself and the supplier only these expectations are then incorporated into the modeling of the supply chain which results in a generalization of the traditional stackelberg type models we discuss alternative efficiency sharing mechanisms and propose methods to design the associated discount schemes that take buyers expectations into account in designing the discount schemes we consider both price discriminatory and non price discriminatory approaches the study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers expectations into a constrained stackelberg structure and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the supplier s replenishment period in choosing their order quantities the numerical analysis of the coordination efficiency and allocation of the net savings of the proposed discount schemes shows that the supplier is still able to coordinate the supply chain with high efficiency levels and retain a significant portion of the net savings

a cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts quantity discounts offered by a monopolist are considered in the context of a bargaining problem in which the buyer and the seller negotiate over the order quantity and the average unit price all units and incremental quantity discounts that permit transaction at a negotiated outcome are described the effects of risk sensitivity and bargaining power on quantity discounts are discussed for alternative bargaining models

price negotiation between supplier and buyer under uncertainty with fixed demand and elastic demand abstract negotiation between a supplier and a buyer is complicated when they face uncertainty in addition the timing problem for them to reach agreement becomes more difficult when the buyer faces elastic demand this paper proposes a negotiation model representing a supplier and a buyer under uncertainty about the supplier s cost and the buyer s revenue when the buyer faces fixed and elastic demand the agreement thresholds the critical point for them to reach an agreement and trade zones the possible contract price scope between them are determined using real options approach comparisons of agreement thresholds and trade zones under uncertainty with fixed demand and elastic demand are made when the reliability of the supplier and the market risk are varied the results indicate that the agreement threshold is lower and the trade zone is wider when the buyer faces elastic demand the results also indicate that the agreement threshold becomes lower and the trade zone becomes wider when the reliability of the supplier is improved independent of the buyer facing fixed or elastic demand moreover with the market risk increasing the agreement threshold becomes lower and the trade zone becomes wider when the buyer faces elastic demand while the agreement threshold becomes higher and the trade zone becomes narrower when the buyer faces fixed demand the results of this paper could help a supplier and a buyer to make better negotiation decisions when facing uncertainty under different demand conditions

higher prices for larger quantities nonmonotonic price quantity relations in b2b markets we study a microprocessor company selling short life cycle products to a set of buyers that includes large consumer electronic goods manufacturers the seller has a limited capacity for each product and negotiates with each buyer for the price our analysis of their sales data reveals that larger purchases do not always result in bigger discounts instead the discount curve is like an n while existing theories cannot explain this nonmonotonic pattern we develop an analytical model and show that the nonmonotonicity is rooted in how sellers value capacity when negotiating with a buyer large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity however satisfying midsized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity which is often too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers we briefly discuss the implications for capacity rationing and posted pricing as well as potential appl

supplier pricing and lot sizing when demand is price sensitive abstract the problem of co ordination between a vendor and a buyer is formulated as a two person fixed threat bargaining game the vendor decides on his lot size and the price schedule he is to offer to the buyer the buyer decides upon his lot size and the selling price in the market we have characterized pareto efficient solutions and the nash bargaining solution for the problem we have also proposed two pricing schedules for the vendor who is supplying to a large population of buyers the first one is based upon profit sharing the second one resembles the classical all unit quantity discount schedule we have thus provided for the supplier a procedure for setting all unit quantity discount schedule

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function