sustainability of the friedman rule in an international monetary policy game this article develops a two country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector we prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the friedman rule when governments lack such ability to commit we find that the friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open economy model than in the closedeconomy model of ireland jel e31 e52 e61 one recurring theme in the analysis of policy making is that in many situations policymakers can benefit from the opportunity to make a binding commitment to restrict their activities one such situation is what is known as the time consistency problem in monetary policy making a government or its monetary authority out of good intention may find it beneficial to generate unexpected inflation to fix some nonmonetary distortion in the economy for example goods market inefficiency due to monopoly power that is characterized by higher than efficient product prices this first best monetary policy however is not time consistent in the sense that firms foresee the government s incentive to impose monetary surprises and set their nominal prices at a higher level as a result the government s attempts to remedy the

time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

fiscal policy coordination with demand spillovers and unionised labour markets we explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure we have three countries two are in a monetary union the emu the labour markets of both the emu countries are unionised and there is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium we explore the intra and intercountry effects of changes in bargaining power we then examine optimal government expenditures in each emu country we find that there is a positive spillover and that expenditures are strategic complements the coordinated equilibrium involves higher expenditure than the uncoordinated equilibrium

global warming and hyperbolic discounting the use of a constant discount rate to study long lived environmental problems such as global warming has two disadvantages the prescribed policy is sensitive to the discount rate and with moderate discount rates large future damages have almost no effect on current decisions time consistent quasi hyperbolic discounting alleviates both of these modeling problems and is a plausible description of how people think about the future we analyze the time consistent markov perfect equilibrium in a general model with a stock pollutant the solution to the linear quadratic specialization illustrates the role of hyperbolic discounting in a model of global warming

politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets we analyze a golden rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and most u s states do today we study an overlapping generations economy where majorities choose durable and nondurable public goods in each period when demographics imply even moderate departures from ricardian equivalence the golden rule substantially improves efficiency examples calibrated to u s demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics

bailouts time inconsistency and optimal regulation a macroeconomic view a common view is that bailouts of firms by governments are needed to cure inefficiencies in private markets we propose an alternative view even when private markets are efficient costly bankruptcies will occur and benevolent governments without commitment will bail out firms to avoid bankruptcy costs bailouts then introduce inefficiencies where none had existed although granting the government orderly resolution powers which allow it to rewrite private contracts improves on bailout outcomes regulating leverage and taxing size is needed to achieve the relevant constrained efficient outcome the sustainably efficient outcome this outcome respects governments incentives to intervene when they lack commitment

why hasn t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom some quantitative lessons from the eu abstract the integration of european financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes the years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results instead of the dreaded race to the bottom in capital taxes the uk lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of france germany and italy while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries the uk increased its labor tax marginally but the other countries increased theirs sharply this paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices wealth distribution and fiscal solvency tax competition is modeled as a one shot game over time invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to european data the calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes the solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency there is no race to the bottom and the nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes in contrast if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency competition over capital taxes triggers a race to the bottom but this outcome entails large welfare gains surprisingly the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments

the role of options in the resolution of agency problems a comment the aim of the contracting literature in economics is to explain observed contractual arrangements or organizations as minimizing the costs of incentive conflicts in the agency cost literature of financial economics the contractual arrangement at issue is the mix of securities held by inside management of a firm and outside suppliers of capital the ownership structure of the firm in jensen and meckling s 8 terminology in explaining the ownership structure of a corporation jensen and meckling focus on two sources of agency or incentiveconflict costs a the manager s tendency to consume excessive perquisites and b the manager s tendency to invest in prospects of high risk so as to effect an ex post transfer from bondholders to stockholders a recent article in this journal by haugen and senbet 61 examines the role of stock options in resolving these agency problems and claims to show in particular that a call option in the insider portfolio can eliminate the first type of agency costs this article re examines the role of options in the resolution of agency problems we argue in section i that options cannot eliminate the agency problem of excessive perquisite consumption contrary to haugen and senbet the essential point is that unless outside financing can be provided entirely by riskless debt then outsiders must have a residual claim on the net income of the firm in some states of the world outsiders therefore share in the costs of increased perquisite consumption whatever the ownership structure of the firm this negative externality means that excessive perquisite consumption is inevitable the question remains do call options nonetheless have a role in the mitigation of agency costs an insider portfolio consisting only of equity leaves the manager with the same proportion of residual claim in each state of the world we show using a formal principal agent model that the efficient insider s share of profits is relatively high in favorable high profit states of the world insider call options arise as means of transferring residual claim to the manager in favorable states of the world relative to low profit states the basic agency model has been solved in substantial generality by holmstrom 7 and others we employ here a more specific model that draws on the techniques developed by green and kahn 4 and that is an extension to continuous states of the finite state model of sappington 12 the extension allows a simple characterization of the optimal contract a characterization that

is a policy of free movement of workers sustainable this paper studies the costs and benets of the adoption of the policy of free movement for workers for the countries to agree on uncontrolled movement of workers the short run costs must be outweighed by the long term benets that result from better labor market exibility and income smoothing we show that such policies are less likely to be adopted when workers are impatient and less risk averse workers when production technologies display decreasing returns and when countries trade a share of their products

alternative approaches to valuing intangible health losses the evidence for multiple sclerosis abstract this study uses both risk risk and risk dollar approaches to assess intangible health losses associated with multiple sclerosis ms using an estimation approach that adjusts for potential perceptional biases that may affect the expressed risk tradeoffs we estimated parameters of the utility function of persons with and without ms as well as the degree of subjects overestimation of the probability of obtaining ms the sample included subjects from the general population and persons with ms we found that marginal utility of income is lower in the state with ms than without it however the difference in marginal utility in the two states was greater for persons without ms than for those with the disease persons with ms overestimated the probability of acquiring ms to a greater extent than did persons within ms correcting for overestimation of this probability the value of intangible loss of a statistical case of ms derived from responses of the general population was us 350 000 to us 500 000 persons with ms were willing to pay somewhat more than this d80 i18 j17

an investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy this paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment the monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans to be tempted to renege on them and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector by interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the lack of credibility of the monetary policy authority we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility our main finding is that in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility in our benchmark calibration a commitment expected to last for only 6 quarters is enough to bridge 75 of the welfare gap between discretion and commitment this seems to justify the well known concern of monetary policy makers about their credibility even in a world with limited access to commitment technologies

the terms of trade and the international coordination of fiscal policy this paper develops an example of a noncooperative game between fiscal authorities in two countries the key strategic link between countries is the terms of trade an equilibrium without cooperation is characterized by excessive tax rates and public spending levels in each country the outcome is analogous to the nash equilibrium of the static optimal tarif game in trade theory but in this model there is also a dynamic distortion caused by noncooperative behaviour this dynamic distortion depresses capital accumulation and reduces the equilibrium capital stock in each country numerical examples suggest a significant welfare benefit of cooperation

pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities abstract this paper studies pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two state markov process the study yields three main results first when individuals are risk neutral in any period the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability in addition the degree to which these perpetual low ability types have their earnings distorted decreases over time converging to zero if the time horizon is long enough second the earnings distortions are continuous with respect to the degree of risk aversion at the risk neutral solution third pareto efficient income tax systems can be time consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large the condition for time consistency suggests a novel theoretical reason why the classic equity efficiency trade off may be steeper in a dynamic environment than previously thought

fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy governments are present biased toward spending fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks we compare coordinated rules chosen jointly by a group of countries to uncoordinated rules if governments present bias is small coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates however if the bias is large coordinated rules are slacker countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates surplus limits enhance welfare and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest

banking panics and policy responses we study how banking panics unfold in av ersion of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model with limited commitment as is well known the banking authority could eliminate the possibility of a run on the banking system by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start once a run is under way however the banking authority will choose to reschedule rather than suspend payments we construct equilibria in which depositors run on the banking system with positive probability and we show that an equilibrium bank run in this setting is necessarily partial with only some depositors participating we also show that a run naturally occurs in waves with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further policy response from the banking authority the number of waves that occur in equilibrium is stochastic and can be arbitrarily large

growth and the dynamics of trade liberalization abstract this paper develops a model of ongoing trade liberalization as a self enforcing equilibrium in a game between governments economic growth is a critical ingredient in successful trade liberalization but differences in national growth rates have profound differences on the sustainable tariff equilibria of the game if international technology spillovers are not concentrated in high growth sectors faster growing countries will be more protectionist setting higher tariffs and liberalizing trade at a later date but with spillovers more concentrated in high growth sectors faster growing countries may be less protectionist differences in growth rates lead the process of trade liberalization to be far from reciprocal a sustainable trade liberalization may actually involve one country pursuing a unilateral policy of free trade even though its trading partner imposes tariffs against it

uncertain medical expenses and precautionary saving near the end of the life cycle this paper introduces a dynamic structural model of household consumption decisions in which elderly families consider the effects of uncertain future medical expenses when deciding current levels of consumption the model with uncertain medical expenses implies a potentially important role for precautionary saving incentives to explain slow rates of dissaving among elderly americans during retirement rather than just simulating the stochastic dynamic model preference parameters are estimated using panel data on health wealth and expenditures for retired families the health uncertainty model predicts consumption levels closer to observed expenditures than a life cycle model with uncertain longevity however elderly families typically dissave their financial assets more slowly than even the baseline health uncertainty model predicts is optimal

time consistent public expenditures in this paper we study the optimal choice of public expenditures when there is no way of committing to future policy and reputational mechanisms are not operative this amounts to conflning our attention to markov equilibria the environment is a neoclassical growth model where consumers derive utility from a public good this environment gives rise to a dynamic game between successive governments and the private sector and this game is made interesting by the presence of a state variable the capital stock we characterize equilibria in terms of an intertemporal flrst order condition a generalized euler equation gee for the government and we use this condition both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computation the gee reveals how the government optimally trades ofi tax wedges over time it also allows us to discuss in what sense a current government may be strategically in uencing future governments in their taxation decisions for a calibrated economy we flnd that when the tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any moment in time the government still refrains from taxing at high rates in order to smooth distortions over time as a result the economy is far from the mix of public and private goods that would be optimal in a static context in return the savings distortion is not very severe and the capital stock is quite high

delegation time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium this paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government s strategy the method of chari and kehoe 1990 sustainable plans journal of political economy 98 4 783 802 is applied to characterize the entire set of sustainable outcomes countering mccallum s 1995 two fallacies concerning central bank independence american economic review 85 2 207 211 second fallacy delegation is able to eliminate the time inconsistency problem with the commitment policy being sustained under discretion for any intertemporal discount rate

international interdependencies in fiscal stabilization policies abstract trade links imply that business cycle fluctuations are transmitted among trade partners to the extent that fiscal policy can mitigate business cycle fluctuations international interdependencies in stabilization policies arise we analyse in a two country general equilibrium model the role of fiscal policy in mitigating risk or providing implicit insurance in the presence of capital market imperfections and adjustment failures rigid wages it is shown that there is a welfare case for an active stabilization policy and that it is larger in the presence of adjustment failures rigid wages non cooperative policy decisions imply inefficiencies in fiscal stabilization policies which in the case of flexible wages may imply too much stabilization whereas stabilization is always insufficient in the case of rigid wages

optimal sustainable monetary policy in recent monetary policy literature optimal commitment policy or its variant from a timeless perspective has been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment regardless of its time consistency problem called a stabilization bias with an optimizing model used in the literature we examine sustainable equilibrium of chari and kehoe 1990 and study optimal sustainable policy the policymaker s strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium in the absence of commitment technologies calibrated versions of the model show that the ramsey equilibrium generated by optimal commitment policy is not achievable suggesting that optimal sustainable policy is the desirable policy benchmark from the viewpoint of policy operationality the latter policy involves some issues due to its dependence on the entire history of lagrange multipliers on a sustainability constraint as a guidepost for actual policy conduct that contains no such issues and attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does we propose a sustainable policy conducted by following a policy rule that achieves the best markov equilibrium

sustaining policy cooperation between economies of different size abstract i consider an example of a two country model featuring national heterogeneity and demonstrate that heterogeneity plays an important role for the countries gains from international policy cooperation and just as important for the incentives to break the cooperative agreement i find that national heterogeneity unambiguously reduces trigger strategies support for policy cooperation in other words the more countries differ the harder it is to sustain policy cooperation

time consistent control in non linear models abstract the paper shows how to use optimal control to compute optimal time consistent markovian government policies in nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium models it extends cohen and michel s 1988 results for the linear quadratic case the method involves replacing private agents costate variables with flexible functions of current state variables in the government s maximization problem the functions hold in equilibrium to an arbitrarily close approximation they can be found numerically by perturbation or projection methods a stochastic model of optimal public spending illustrates the technique

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

the international ramifications of tax reforms supply side economics in a global economy this paper studies tax reforms in a dynamic model of a global economy calibrated to current u s and european tax policies world capital markets add consumption smoothing and income redistribution effects that alter closed economy predictions in the absence of taxes on foreign interest welfare gains of eliminating u s income taxes are enlarged by up to 34 percent at the expense of european losses caused by transitional declines in consumption and leisure and a permanent capital outflow in contrast if foreign interest is taxed the same tax reform reduces u s welfare 0 7 percent and increases european welfare 1 8 percent copyright 1998 by american economic association

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

the suspension of the gold standard as sustainable monetary policy abstract this paper models the gold standard as a state contingent commitment technology that is only feasible during peace monetary policy during war when the gold convertibility rule is suspended can still be credible if the policymaker s plan is to resume the gold standard in the future the dsge model developed in this paper suggests that the resumption of the gold standard was a sustainable plan which replaced the gold standard as a commitment technology and made monetary policy time consistent trigger strategies support the equilibrium private agents retaliate if a policymaker defaults on its plan to resume the gold standard

nonlinear capital taxation without commitment we study efficient nonlinear taxation of labor and capital in a dynamic mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints policies are chosen sequentially over time without commitment our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

learning from a piece of pie we investigate the empirical content of the nash solution to two player bargaining games the bargaining environment is described by a set of variables that may affect agents preferences over the agreement sharing the status quo outcome or both the outcomes i e whether an agreement is reached and if so the individual shares and the environment including the size of the pie are known but neither are the agents utilities nor their threat points we consider both a deterministic version of the model in which the econometrician observes the shares as deterministic functions of the variables under consideration and a stochastic one in which because of latent disturbances only the joint distribution of incomes and outcomes is recorded we show that in the most general framework any outcome can be rationalized as a nash solution however even mild exclusion restrictions generate strong implications that can be used to test the nash bargaining assumption stronger conditions further allow to recover the underlying structure of the bargaining and in particular the cardinal representation of individual preferences in the absence of uncertainty an implication of this finding is that empirical works entailing nash bargaining could and should use much more general and robust versions than they usually do copyright 2012 oxford university press

health and consumption preferences estimating the health state dependence of utility using equivalence scales abstract this paper estimates health state dependence of utility in europe for identification we introduce a new method using insights from the research domain of living standards we estimate how much extra or less income is needed to maintain the same level of material wellbeing after a health shock and we derive a simple relation between this estimate and the health state dependence parameter the results show positive health state dependence this is not driven by medical expenditures and is robust across alternative specifications and health measures interestingly for cognitive limitations we find negative health state dependence presumably resulting from a decreased ability to plan

time inconsistency and free riding in a monetary union in monetary unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free rider problem in the setting of non monetary policies the free rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation free riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non monetary policies without a time inconsistency problem the union has no free rider problem then constraints on non monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful this theory is here detailed and applied to several non monetary policies labor market policy fiscal policy and bank regulation

life cycle preferences over consumption and health when is cost effectiveness analysis equivalent to cost benefit analysis this paper studies life cycle preferences over consumption and health status we show that cost effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost benefit analysis if the lifetime utility function is additive over time multiplicative in the utility of consumption and the utility of health status and if the utility of consumption is constant over time we derive the conditions under which the lifetime utility function takes this form both under expected utility theory and under rank dependent utility theory which is currently the most important nonexpected utility theory if cost effectiveness analysis is consistent with cost benefit analysis it is possible to derive tractable expressions for the willingness to pay for quality adjusted life years qalys the willingness to pay for qalys depends on wealth remaining life expectancy health status and the possibilities for intertemporal substitution of consumption

optimal fiscal policy in open economies with labour market distortions abstract we set up a general equilibrium model with unemployment owing to distortions in the labour market it is shown that a public expansion financed by a distortionary income tax may give rise to a decrease in unemployment even if public goods are pure waste such an expansion may give rise to an increase in welfare if it is associated with a decrease in unemployment since part of the gain from a fiscal expansion is achieved at the expense of welfare in other countries non cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary

estimation of state dependent utility functions using survey data surveys of individual s risk dollar trade offs illuminate not only the local trade off rates but also can be used to address more fundamental questions about the structure of utility functions this largely unexplored empirical area is investigated by developing an econometric technique to estimate utility functions based on survey data on risk dollar trade offs for minor health effects the empirical tests indicate that for all but one of the temporary health effects considered consumers treat injuries as tantamount to a drop in income implying that the health impact does not alter the structure of the utility function in a fundamental way copyright 1991 by mit press

intangible investment and ramsey capital taxation the standard analysis of optimal fiscal policy aggregates different types of assets into a unique capital good and all types of capital taxes into a unique capital tax this paper considers a disaggregated framework an economy with corporate and dividend taxes where firms invest in both tangible and intangible assets which can be expensed or sweat in our setup firms can always respond to changes in the timing of taxation we find that the optimal long run policy features zero corporate taxes and positive dividend taxes with labor and dividend taxes being identical moreover the initial capital levy is relatively small

the value of life and the rise in health spending over the past half century americans spent a rising share of total economic resources on health and enjoyed substantially longer lives as a result debate on health policy often focuses on limiting the growth of health spending we investigate an issue central to this debate is the growth of health spending a rational response to changing economic conditions notably the growth of income per person we develop a model based on standard economic assumptions and argue that this is indeed the case standard preferences of the kind used widely in economics to study consumption asset pricing and labor supply imply that health spending is a superior good with an income elasticity well above one as people get richer and consumption rises the marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly spending on health to extend life allows individuals to purchase additional periods of utility the marginal utility of life extension does not decline as a result the optimal composition of total spending shifts toward health and the health share grows along with income in projections based on the quantitative analysis of our model the optimal health share of spending seems likely to exceed 30 percent by the middle of the century

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

monetary and fiscal policies interaction in monetary unions in this paper the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed by adopting the concept of symbiosis as a starting point the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty policy makers preferences and targets then the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination is addressed the analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered for the generation of the policy mix as a final step the paper discusses the main results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union all the reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional implications for the european monetary union

intertemporal cournot and walras equilibria an illustration in an intertemporal general equilibrium framework we compare a cournot equilibrium to the walras equilibrium the cournot agents trade and invest less than the walras agents this generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of cournot agents tends to infinity a larger number of strategic cournot agents implies that the amount of trade relative to their aggregate consumption increases i e it moves towards the walrasian amount but their investment relative to the stock decreases i e it moves away from the walrasian amount s il y avait 3 4 n producteurs en concurrence la valeur de

the utility of health and wealth abstract tradeoffs between health and wealth are among the most important decisions individuals make and are central to social and economic policy yet only a few studies have investigated the utility of health and wealth empirically this paper investigates this utility function both theoretically and empirically we conduct detailed personal interviews with 180 cancer patients and also obtain questionnaires from 132 diabetes patients we find strong support for the utility function u h w h log w where h denotes health and w denotes wealth

when do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union abstract this paper offers a framework to study strategic interactions between private players national fiscal authorities and a common central bank in monetary unions we establish general conditions in terms of restrictions on spillover effects of actions by private and public players under which games that differ in the degree of cooperation and commitment can admit the same equilibrium outcome we use these conditions to characterize benchmark results on the irrelevance of cooperation and commitment established in recent literature moreover we show for a general setting in which the benchmark results do not apply that gains from fiscal cooperation depend on the number of countries and increase as this number gets larger

uncertain health and survival effects on end of life consumption this article analyzes the impact of health and survival uncertainty on the saving and consumption decisions of retirees a dynamic programming approach is used to model the household s planning problem the utility parameters are estimated using panel data we find that a fall into poor health raises the marginal utility from consumption simulations are used to indicate the effects of falling into poor health and loss of spouse they reveal a large transfer from the healthy to the sick partner and a strong dependence of saving on the survivor benefits suggesting that concern about the surviving spouse is an important motive for saving

optimal monetary policies and policy interdependence in the world economy the literature on strategic policy interactions has focused on the implications of alternative strategic policy interactions cooperative versus noncooperative for equilibrium macroeconomic policies given the state of the world economy this paper asks how changes in world economic conditions alter equilibrium policies given the nature of policy interdependence among nations the paper considers a world economy comprised of two countries operating under a system of flexible exchange rates both governments act noncooperatively and choose the rate of growth of their money supply so as to maximize the utility of their country s residents given the rate of growth of the other country s money supply the resulting nash equilibrium rates of growth of the home and foreign money supplies are determined and the dependence of international differences in money growth and inflation rates on international differences in technology jel e52 e60 f41 f42 the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies has been studied a great deal by economists however policy interdependence how one country s policies depend on the policies enacted by other countries has only recently begun to be explored hamada s 1976 paper was one of the first major contributions in this regard hamada considered a world economy comprised of n countries operating under a fixed exchange rate system in which policymakers set domestic credit growth so as to maximize an objective function depending on inflation and the rate of accumulation of international reserves using this framework hamada demonstrated that in equilibrium optimal domestic credit policies are generally not pareto efficient when they are chosen noncooperatively but are pareto efficient when they are set cooperatively in subsequent work hamada 1979 1985 has elaborated on this and various other aspects of cooperative and noncooperative monetary policies under both fixed and flexible exchange rates many others have followed hamada s lead by comparing the properties of cooperative and noncooperative monetary policies eichengreen 1985 for instance considers discount rates as the instrument of monetary policy and examines issues of leadership and cooperation during the interwar years under the gold standard oudiz and sachs 1985 have used simulation methods to

on the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union the desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies if it can commit then debt constraints can only impose costs if it cannot commit then fiscal policy has a free rider problem and debt constraints may be desirable this type of free rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem

endogenous trade policy and the gains from international financial markets abstract this paper examines the interaction between international financial markets and trade policy when trade policy is endogenous there is a secondary gain from opening up financial markets in addition to the direct risk sharing benefits by breaking the direct link between the terms of trade and welfare international portfolio diversification can allow for a lower level of trade protection in a tariff game between governments we apply the model to an estimation of the welfare gains from international financial markets our results show that these indirect trade gains from financial markets are likely to be much larger than the direct risk sharing gains in the tariff game with financial markets however there are multiple equilibria while one equilibrium allows for complete diversification and complete free trade there are other equilibria in which there is limited diversification and a high level of average protection

capital taxation under political constraints this paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform a policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform thus sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or u shaped so that savings are subsidized for the poor and or the middle class but are taxed for the rich u shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals political behavior is purely determined by economic motives

sequential equilibria in a ramsey tax model this paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a ramsey tax model more generally it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households by selectively incorporating euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

measurement of health state utilities for economic appraisal health status measurement for use in economic appraisal of health care programmes is reviewed in this paper with particular emphasis on utility measurement a framework for economic appraisal is presented displaying the various components that must be measured and showing how the three forms of analysis cost effectiveness analysis cost benefit analysis and cost utility analysis relate to the framework and to each other one of the components in the framework is health status it can be measured using ad hoc numeric scales willingness to pay receive or health state utilities the determination of health state utilities is reviewed covering the following issues alternative sources of utilities health state descriptions multi attribute utility approach determination of appropriate subjects utility aggregation and accuracy three measurement techniques for health state utilities are described in detail rating scale standard gamble and time trade off the use of these methods is described for both chronic and temporary health states and for both health states considered better than death and those considered worse than death

political economy of ramsey taxation abstract we study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self interested politician who cannot commit to policies we show that as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens the chamley judd result of zero long run taxes holds in contrast if the politician is less patient than the citizens the best subgame perfect equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long run capital taxation

fixed versus flexible exchange rates which provides more fiscal discipline abstract conventional wisdom holds that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates in this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority the claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg hence under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well the difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate hence bad behavior today leads to punishment today if fiscal authorities are impatient flexible rates by forcing the costs to be paid up front provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent the recent experience of sub saharan countries supplies evidence that matches the predictions of the model

monetary conservatism and fiscal policy abstract does an inflation conservative central bank a la rogoff 1985 remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy to provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy with monopolistic distortions monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility we find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending the optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation a conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable when fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked

standard gamble time trade off and rating scale experimental results on the ranking properties of qalys this paper compares the relative performance of quality adjusted life years qalys based on quality weights elicited by rating scale rs time trade off tto and standard gamble sg the standard against which relative performance is assessed is individual preference elicited by direct ranking the correlation between predicted and direct ranking is significantly higher for tto qalys than for rs qalys and sg qalys this holds both based on mean spearman rank correlation coefficients calculated per individual and based on two social choice rules the method of majority voting and the borda rule undiscounted tto qalys are more consistent with direct ranking than discounted tto qalys

how social security and medicare affect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets this paper provides an empirical analysis of how the u s social security and medicare insurance system affect the labor supply of older males in the presence of incomplete markets for loans annuities and health insurance we estimate a detailed dynamic programming dp model of the joint labor supply and social security acceptance decision focusing on a sample of males in the low to middle income brackets whose only pension is social security the dp model delivers a rich set of predictions about the dynamics of retirement behavior and comparisons of actual vs predicted behavior show that the dp model is able to account for wide variety of phenomena observed in the data including the pronounced peaks in the distribution of retirement ages at 62 and 65 the ages of early and normal eligibility for social security benefits respectively we identify a significant fraction of health insurance constrained individuals who have no form of retiree health insurance other than medicare and who can only obtain fairly priced private health insurance via their employer s group health plan the combination of significant individual risk aversion and a long tailed pareto distribution of health care expenditures implies that there is a significant security value for these individuals to remain employed until they are eligible for medicare coverage at age 65 overall our model suggests that a number of heretofore puzzling aspects of retirement behavior can be viewed as artifacts of particular details of the social security rules whose incentive effects are especially strong for lower income individuals and those who do not have access to fairly priced loans annuities and health insurance

a review of interest and prices foundations of a theory of monetary policy by michael woodford this is a review article of interests and prices foundations of a theory of monetary policy princeton university press 2003 by michael woodford

time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity abstract i characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion firms have the option to increase their frequency of price change at a cost in response to higher inflation previous studies which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes find two time consistent equilibria one with low inflation the other with high inflation in contrast when price rigidity is endogenous the high inflation equilibrium ceases to exist hence time consistent equilibrium is unique this result depends on two features of the analysis 1 a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost of price change and 2 the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of price rigidity

the public sector and international integration abstract how does international integration affect public sector activities optimal public sector activities are shown to depend positively on a gains from trade effect and ambiguously on the standard distortion effect the bias in non cooperative policies may be strengthened by integration