how do market reforms affect china s responsiveness to environmental policy a large percentage of total investment in china is allocated by the central government at below market interest rates in pursuit of non economic objectives this has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non performing loans threatening the future health of the chinese economy as a result reform of capital markets is a high priority of the chinese government at the same time the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues in this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax this allows us to assess how china s willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by china s current efforts to reduce investment subsidies we compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy we find that in the subsidized economy the tax interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy importantly we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy in fact for lower levels of reductions the carbon tax is actually welfare improving these results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition the carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies however the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies

are environmental taxes a free lunch issues in modelling the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes applied analysis of output and employment effects from revenue neutral environmental taxation depends critically on how the supply side of the economy is modelled despite the long history of theoretical and computable general equilibrium supply side models the empirical basis of much of this work has been quite weak until recently however most econometric attempts to capture factor substitution effects have not been based on theoretically consistent structures this paper examines the methodological issues that underlie these problems and compares the results of imposing environmental taxes in two different econometric modelling structures the implications of theories of endogenous technical progress on the simulation properties of such models are discussed and a simple empirically based model that embodies some of these features is presented

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

commuting transport tax reform and the labour market employer paid parking and the relative efficiency of revenue recycling instruments in this paper the welfare effects of a budget neutral increase in taxes on car commuters are studied in a model that takes into account the presence of employer paid parking at the workplace it is found that the presence of employer paid parking substantially increases the welfare effect of such a tax reform independent of the use of the revenues congestion taxes not only correct congestion externalities they also reduce the inefficiency caused by employer paid parking moreover different congestion effects of alternative recycling instruments and the presence of employer paid parking jointly imply that recycling the tax revenues via higher public transport subsidies may yield much more favourable welfare effects than previously believed it can easily outperform recycling the tax revenues via lower labour taxes finally cashing out parking costs to public transport users is found to generate substantial positive welfare effects numerical analysis confirms the theory

estimates from a consumer demand system implications for the incidence of environmental taxes abstract most studies suggest that environmental taxes are regressive making them less attractive policy options we consider the distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase using four incidence measures and under three scenarios for gas tax revenue use to incorporate behavioral responses we use consumer expenditure survey data to estimate a consumer demand system that includes gasoline other goods and leisure our estimates confirm that when revenues are not recycled a gasoline tax is regressive use of incidence measures that ignore demand responses however will substantially overstate this regressivity in contrast the differences between the equivalent variation and easier to implement consumer surplus measures are relatively small in addition our results suggest that using the additional gas tax revenue to fund labor tax cuts makes the policy substantially less regressive while using the revenue to fund lump sum transfers actually makes it progressive

investment incentives new money debt relief and the critical role of conditionality in the debt crisis external debt depresses investment and lowers economic growth below its potential through its negative effect on liquidity and expected profitability these effects can pull a country into a downward spiral in which both the debtor country and creditors lose this article considers the possibilities for revising contracts between a debtor and its creditors once a debt crisis has erupted the framework that we develop shows how various combinations of new money and cuts in debt and debt service affect a debtor country s welfare its debt repayments and the earnings of its creditors the analysis distinguishes between debtor countries that are willing and able to precommit credibly to an adjustment program and those that are not this distinction provides the basis for a discussion of conditional lending by the international financial institutions to provide incentives and sanctions that make credible a debtor s promises to invest copyright 1990 by oxford university press

how to make a carbon tax reform progressive the role of subsistence consumption this letter analyzes the distributional effects of a carbon tax reform when households must consume carbon intensive goods above a subsistence level the reform is progressive if revenues are recycled as uniform lump sum transfers in other cases it is regressive

public provision commodity demand and hours of work an empirical analysis the theoretical analysis of optimal commodity taxation is advanced but there is only limited empirical evidence to guide commodity tax policies with this paper we contribute to this body of literature by empirically examining using finnish consumption data the relation between working hours consumption demand and the use of publicly provided day care when labour income is controlled for in a non parametric way we find that capital income and housing expenses are negatively associated with working hours whereas the use of childcare is positively correlated with working hours these results provide arguments for taxing capital income and housing and for subsidizing day care

choosing the right instrument the role of public revenues for environmental policy this paper analyses the optimal choice of second best optimal environmental policies using a partial equilibrium model the paper first reconfirms the well known result that the existence of a double dividend in its weak definition favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income without uncertainty environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate in the presence of uncertainty however the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good in the second part the paper therefore analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty the paper shows that the first best choice rule between price and quantity regulation weitzman 1974 remains valid in a second best world with distortionary taxation

rescheduling of sovereign debt forgiveness precommitment and new money to meet contractual obligations on their external debt lenders generally responded by rescheduling these debts rather than declaring them to be in default but further commercial lending to these sovereigns has virtually ceased these borrowers now face an enormous debt overhang while their lenders face substantial losses on their international loan portfolios among the many proposals for addressing this crisis the relative desirability of debt forgiveness and new lending has been the focus of considerable debate the baker plan of 1985 emphasized additional funding coupled with growth oriented domestic policies rather than debt reduction lenders were encouraged to provide additional funds new money to help the impaired and indebted economies grow their way back to creditworthiness however lenders were reluctant to offer new funds that would increase the sovereign s debt burden without some assurance that future repayment would be likely with debt generally recognized as providing borrowers with a disincentive for investment 1 the emphasis has now shifted to the need for debt forgiveness on the part of the lenders and a commitment to internal adjustment by the borrowers both parties are viewed as benefitting by a reduction of the inherited debt and possibly the provision of additional funds if the sovereign borrower can commit itself to adopting policies that reduce internal consumption and

optimal loan contracts and floating rate debt in international lending to ldcs abstract most ldc debt is at floating interest rate and the wisdom of this choice is analyzed here for a prototype ldc complete insurance requires repayment to increase with export revenues and import prices since the latter variables are positively correlated with libor floating rate debt yields better risk sharing than fixed rate debt and induces more investment in the ldc when default is possible repayment becomes contingent on the cost of sanctions is renegotiation states and some renegotiation costs are likely to be incurred fixed rate debt would have reduced the occurrence of default in the 80s but only marginally

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

energy taxes in the netherlands what are the dividends in this paper the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral energy tax in the netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium age model the effects of a small user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms the model contains a great level of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators greenhouse effect acidification eutrophication and waste which is helpful for assessing environmental quality the results show that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non environmental welfare which is due to an improvement of the efficiency of the tax structure

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

planes ships and taxes charging for international aviation and maritime emissions international aviation and maritime transport account for a significant and growing share of global carbon emissions yet they are not only excluded from the kyoto agreement and all current carbon pricing schemes but do not even pay fuel excises of the type standard for other transport activities moreover each sector benefits from preferential tax treatment failure to charge vat on international aviation and the application of tonnage tax regimes rather than the normal corporate tax in maritime this paper considers the design of fuel charges in these sectors to address these distortions and quantifies their impact on emissions revenue and welfare showing amongst other things that the gain from offsetting the pre existing tax distortions may be as significant as those from reducing emissions it shows too how compensation schemes can be designed to protect the poorest countries a key ingredient in the politics of the issue given the practical need for wide applicability of such charges the real challenge is to amass the degree of international cooperation required especially strong for maritime failure of which to some degree explains their current under taxation and unsurprisingly to decide who gets the money technically these charges should if anything be rather easy to implement michael keen ian parry and jon strand

on environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage this paper addresses optimal taxation when therelationship between the consumption of a dirty good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers the main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty if on the other hand thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump sum tax in addition to the commodity tax it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion a similarresult emerges although for different reasons if the lump sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax

when environmental and redistribution concerns collide the case of electricity pricing abstract countries worldwide face major income inequality and environmental challenges however recent social upheavals reveal the conflict of interests induced by policies designed to address these concerns one example relates to residential electricity where volumetric grid charges and taxes may impede the affordability of electricity we develop and calibrate a model that captures the social planner s trade off between inequality aversion and environmental concerns we employ panel data on 105 000 households in the swiss canton of bern from 2008 to 2013 including electricity consumption household income and tax payment characteristics the results show that with inequity aversion and no negative environmental externalities electricity consumption should be subsidised by income tax revenue with negative environmental externalities or asymmetric information between the government and the utility end user electricity prices are shifted upwards for high degrees of inequality aversion the optimal electricity end user price is below the marginal cost even in the presence of negative environmental externalities

labor supply and the double dividend abstract a series of recent articles have argued that environmental taxes and cap and trade permit systems generate large distortions in the labor market the claim is made that the higher prices for dirty goods induced by these incentive based systems generate a tax interaction effect leading to reductions in labor supply that are generally on net welfare reducing for this reason it is argued a double dividend seldom exists however price level increases both by lowering family income and by reducing cross spousal wage substitution effects will tend to have offsetting positive impacts on labor supply these effects are large enough to convert negative labor supply responses to rising prices into positive ones the empirical literature also supports a positive relationship between price level increases and labor supply these observations cast doubt on a central critical assumption underlying the critique of the double dividend in the tax interaction effect literature

hics optimal trade openness and the modelling of the default penalty abstract aizenman suggests that highly indebted countries hics credit market policies should aim at increasing the degree of trade openness since in the social optimum openness is larger than in the competitive market outcome in this paper i show that when it is costly for creditors to impose sanctions on a defaulting country there is a penalty structure alternative to aizenman s which will be preferred by creditors aizenman s results on debtor s optimal openness and credit market policies may then be reversed

a note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities abstract i consider the problem of optimal taxation with externalities in a general setup encompassing most of optimal taxation models found in the literature it is demonstrated that when direct taxation of externalities is possible optimal taxes can be expressed as the sum of the optimal pigouvian taxes and the optimal taxes in a related problem without externalities regardless of what other tax instruments are available this result generalizes the so called principle of targeting

quadratic engel curves and consumer demand this paper presents a model of consumer demand that is consistent with the observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers in a long time series of expenditure surveys and is also able to provide a detailed welfare analysis of shifts in relative prices a nonparametric analysis of consumer expenditure patterns suggests that engel curves require quadratic terms in the logarithm of expenditure while popular models of demand such as the translog or the almost ideal demand systems do allow flexible price responses within a theoretically coherent structure they have expenditure share engel curves that are linear in the logarithm of total expenditure we derive the complete class of integrable quadratic logarithmic expenditure share systems a specification from this class is estimated on a large pooled data set of u k households models that fail to account for engel curvature are found ro generate important distortions in the patterns of welfare losses associated with a tax increase

revisiting the cost of protectionism abstract most studies of the welfare impacts of trade policy have ignored interactions between these policies and pre existing distortions from the income tax this paper demonstrates that when these interactions are taken into account the potential gains or losses from tariffs import quotas or voluntary export restrictions are significantly magnified however as long as the trade barrier doesn t generate rents for domestic households the optimal level of the trade barrier is unchanged from the first best case trade policies which do increase domestic rents either in the form of quota rents or rents to fixed factors in production suffer an additional efficiency cost and the optimal policy in this case is less strict than in the first best case

generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax theory this paper proposes to evaluate tax reforms by aggregating money metric losses and gains of different individuals using generalized social marginal welfare weights optimum tax formulas take the same form as standard welfarist tax formulas by simply substitut ing standard marginal social welfare weights with those generalized weights weights directly capture society s concerns for fairness without being necessarily tied to individual utilities suitable weights can help reconcile discrepancies between the welfarist approach and actual tax practice as well as unify in an operational way the most prominent alternatives to utilitarianism such as libertarianism equality of opportunity or poverty alleviation jel d60 d63 h21 h23 i38

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic

trade interdependence the international financial institutions and the recent evolution of sovereign debt renegotiations abstract this paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country s pattern of trade with commercial creditors home countries on the outcome of debt rescheduling negotiations the analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three way debt rescheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country its creditors and the international financial institutions ifis the paper also considers the effects of the ifi sovereign debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt rescheduling negotiations two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the ifi sovereign debt policy evolution

environmental taxation inequality and engel s law the double dividend of redistribution empirical evidence shows that low income households spend a high share of their income on pollution intensive goods this fuels the concern that an environmental tax reform could be regressive we employ a framework which accounts for the distributional effect of environmental taxes and the recycling of the revenues on both households and firms to quantify changes in the optimal tax structure and the equity impacts of an environmental tax reform we characterize when an optimal environmental tax reform does not increase inequality even if the tax system before the reform is optimal from a non environmental point of view if the tax system before the reform is calibrated to stylized data and is thus non optimal we find that there is a large scope for inequality reduction even if the government is restricted in its recycling options

comment on m hoel emission taxes versus other environmental policies the choice of the appropriate instrument in environmental policy is not only a question of theoretical importance it is also of considerable political relevance while environmental taxes are sometimes used to control pollution quotas and direct controls dominate in practice if this observed bias is only due to the nature of policymaking and not supported by economic reasoning politicians are not well advised to use quotas and direct controls instead of environmental taxes hoel discusses popular arguments that are often used by politicians in favour of direct controls and concludes that the results are typically not clear cut in this comment i would like to focus on the employment effects of revenue raising and nonrevenue raising instruments politicians as well as special interest groups often claim that emission taxes increase the cost of production thereby harming employment clearly in the face of high rates of unemployment in many industrialized countries potentially negative employment effects of environmental regulation raise political resistance to green policy the ongoing debate has put

marginal tax reform externalities and income distribution the paper examines welfare improving and revenue neutral directions marginal policy reforms for an economy with nonidentical individuals and an externality that has a feedback effect on the consumption of taxed goods it considers three types of policy instruments the indirect taxes the uniform poll transfer and public abatement this extends the framework set up by ahmad and stern 1984 bovenberg and de mooij 1994 and schob 1996 the theoretical model is illustrated for a specific externality namely congestion caused by peak car transport

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

how robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns abstract this paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework we characterize the drivers for non uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences quantitatively assessing the case of price based co2 emissions control in the u s economy we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax the deviation from uniform emissions pricing however becomes non negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target downstream vs upstream taxation pre existing distortionary taxes and parametric uncertainty in firms and households equilibrium tax responses

sovereign debt structural adjustment and conditionality abstract the lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure as a result a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure formalizing this argument we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt in certain circumstances it can eliminate debt overhang especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude it is however unable to restore first best when it is anticipated by lenders conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist debt rescheduling takes place periodically and conditionality continues indefinitely

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

substitution between clean and dirty energy inputs a macroeconomic perspective in macroeconomic models the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy inputs within the energy aggregate is a central parameter in assessing the necessary conditions for long run green growth using new sectoral data in a panel of 26 countries we formulate specifications of nested constant elasticity of substitution production functions that allow estimating this parameter for the first time we present evidence that it significantly exceeds unity a favorable condition for promoting green growth

optimal gasoline tax in developing oil producing countries the case of mexico this paper uses the methodology of parry and small 2005 to estimate the optimal gasoline tax for a less developed oil producing country the relevance of the estimation relies on the differences between less developed countries ldcs and industrial countries we argue that lawless roads general subsidies on gasoline poor mass transportation systems older vehicle fleets and unregulated city growth make the tax rates in ldcs differ substantially from the rates in the developed world we find that the optimal gasoline tax is 1 90 per gallon at 2011 prices and show that the estimate differences are in line with the factors hypothesized in contrast to the existing literature on industrial countries we show that the relative gasoline tax incidence may be progressive in mexico and more generally in ldcs

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement qualifications and explanations for differences from previous work are also presented

externalities and optimal taxation this paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem income and commodities in the presence of externalities the nature of the second best and the choice of the tax instruments are motivated by the informational structure in the economy the main results are i environmental levies linear or nonlinear differ in formula from pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods ii externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas linear and nonlinear for private goods iii externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear and iv a general income tax plus strictly pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution at any given consumption bundle

price elasticity of demand in the epex spot market for electricity new empirical evidence this paper provides estimates for the price elasticity of demand in the european power exchange epex day ahead market for electricity an institutional change in the year 2010 allows us to use wind speed as an instrumental variable for hourly spot market prices in order to deal with potential endogeneity problems the average price elasticity of demand covering the years 2010 2014 is about 0 43 and our results point to a decline in its absolute value over time

the real time price elasticity of electricity the real time price elasticity of electricity contains important information on the demand response of consumers to the volatility of peak prices despite the importance empirical estimates of the real time elasticity are hardly available this paper provides a quantification of the real time relationship between total peak demand and spot market prices we find a low value for the real time price elasticity which may partly be explained from the fact that not all users observe the spot market price if we correct for this phenomenon we find the elasticity to be fairly low for consumers currently active in the spot market if this conclusion applies to all users this would imply a limited scope for government intervention in supply security issues

biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax the carrot or the stick abstract this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the relative efficiencies of a revenue neutral biofuel subsidy and a gas tax in the presence of pre existing distortions and growing substitutability between fuels both policies are set to achieve a targeted reduction in gasoline use at the state level the model is then calibrated for a small open economy such as illinois which is one of the largest producers of biofuels such as ethanol in the u s the main result of the paper shows that raising the biofuel subsidy use reduces overall welfare by more than a higher gas tax both aimed to achieve a targeted reduction in pure gasoline the relative efficiency of the higher gas tax is primarily due to it exacerbating the pre existing distortion in the biofuel market by less than the subsidy moreover for current parameter estimates welfare improving policy combinations for achieving a targeted amount of energy security are higher gas taxes combined with lower biofuel subsidies and a lower tax on income however the preference for a gasoline labor tax swap shrinks as the elasticity of substitution between the two fuels rises

energy taxation and the double dividend effect in taiwan s energy conservation policy an empirical study using a computable general equilibrium model abstract faced with pressure from greenhouse gas reductions and energy price hikes the taiwan government is in the process of developing an energy tax regime to reflect environmental external costs and effectively curb energy consumption as well as mitigate co2 emissions through an adequate pricing system this study utilizes a cge model to simulate and analyze the economic impacts of the draft energy tax bill and its complementary fiscal measures under the assumption of tax revenue neutrality the use of energy tax revenue generated for the purpose of reducing income tax is the best choice with double dividend effects since it will effectively stimulate domestic consumption and investment and consequently mitigate the negative impacts of the distortionary tax regime the double dividend effect is less significant however when the supplementary measures being used are for government expenditure nevertheless all supplementary measures have effectively reduced energy consumption which means they have delivered at least the first dividend in the sense of co2 emissions control it has been verified in this study that having adequate public finance policy measures is the key to realizing the double dividend effect

environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers an application to energy consumption in france abstract this paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply consumption of polluting energy related and non polluting non energy goods and emissions it quantifies the model for the french economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second best tax regimes we find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage these goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality a lot secondly if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality correcting role they benefit all types although the gains are rather modest the gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well third setting the environmental tax at its pigouvian level rather than its optimal externality correcting cum redistributive level benefits the high income group at the expense of the low income groups fourth nonlinear taxation of polluting goods and nonlinear commodity taxation in general is a powerful redistributive mechanism fifth introducing environmental taxes in the current french tax system with its suboptimal income taxes results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well off persons

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

foreign banks and the dual effect of financial liberalization in emerging countries credit market liberalization is often motivated with the financial deepening generated by the entry of foreign financial institutions however there is a risk that liberalization may benefit internationally active export oriented businesses at the expense of domestically oriented ones this paper models a two sector economy in which foreign lenders are more efficient than local lenders at extracting value from internationally tradable collateral assets under some conditions the entry of foreign lenders eases entrepreneurs access to the credit market and raises asset prices and output but in other circumstances it reduces the depth of the credit market and depresses the price of nontradables and output liberalization can have a contractionary impact by inducing a reallocation of credit from the nontradables to the tradables sector

risk premia in the german day ahead electricity market revisited the impact of negative prices abstract this paper replicates the study by viehmann 2011 that investigated risk premia in the german day ahead electricity market from october 2005 to september 2008 while estimated sizes of risk premia can be replicated this paper does not reproduce respective standard errors leading to remarkable differences between the reported significance levels an extension with data of preceding years points to further differences with respect to size and statistical significance in addition this paper analyzes the impact of negative prices on risk premia negative electricity prices were introduced in 2008 at the european power exchange epex and in 2013 at the energy exchange austria exaa the results of an econometric analysis suggest that the introduction of negative prices has led to a decrease in risk premia when compared to the period of a positive price regime

the two part instrument in a second best world abstract standard pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions first many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two part instrument 2pi a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution it is a generalization of a deposit refund system drs second a different literature concerns the second best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions here we combine the two extensions by looking at the second best 2pi when government needs revenue is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller we find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions and we compare these to the rates in a first best model the tax subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect an environmental effect and a revenue effect the model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2pi we also discuss important caveats

optimal linear commodity taxation under optimal non linear income taxation abstract this paper analyzes optimal linear commodity taxes joint with non linear income taxes we provide optimal tax rules based on empirically observable elasticities earnings and commodity demands we demonstrate that commodities should be taxed subsidized if conditional on earnings doing so boosts labor supply as the critical role of commodity taxation is to alleviate distortions on labor supply caused by income taxation we extend the standard formula for optimal non linear income taxation for the presence of optimal linear commodity taxes we correct parts of the literature by showing that the optimal second best allocations derived by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 1980 cannot be supported by linear commodity taxes

intergenerational effects of a green tax reform for a more sustainable social security system abstract green tax reforms are popular in some circles not only because of their direct effect on reducing pollution but also because their revenue capacity may allow to reduce other more distortionary taxes despite their potential benefits the political implementation of green tax reforms is not straightforward changes in environmental taxes have different intergenerational effects which need to be taken into account when considering their political support among a country s population in this paper we analyze the economic and intergenerational welfare effects of introducing a green tax reform to ameliorate the spanish social security system we consider two types of energy taxes an energy consumption tax and an energy input tax we find that both types of reforms are favored by young individuals but rejected by older generations the number of generations supporting the reform depends crucially on the disutility that individuals derive from pollution suggesting that an increase in environmental awareness may be needed for green tax reforms to be politically viable

from regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental tax reforms european countries have increased their use of environmental tax instruments by designing new tax bases but many countries face opposition from public opinion for fear of the distributive consequences of these environmental tax reforms this paper sheds light on the distributive consequences of environmental tax policies when households are heterogeneous the objective is to assess whether an environmental tax reform could be pareto improving when the revenue of the pollution tax is recycled by a change in labor tax properties we show that whatever the degree of regressivity of the environmental tax alone it is possible to design a recycling mechanism that renders the tax reform more pareto efficient by simultaneously decreasing the wage tax and increasing its progressivity

redistribution and pollution taxes with non linear engel curves abstract this paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution the pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages moreover under general utility functions optimal pollution taxes should be set below the pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods however if engel curves are linear optimal pollution taxes should follow the first best rule for the pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods the often used quasi linear ces and stone geary utility functions all have linear engel curves if engel curves are linear and if pollution taxes are not optimised pareto improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the pigouvian tax simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a les demand system but deviate from the pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a piglog demand system

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

household energy prices and inequality evidence from german microdata based on the easi demand system abstract this paper studies the distributional effects of rising energy costs for households in contrast to most of the previous literature our specification differentiates between electricity and heating demand and still models other consumption goods in realistic detail we use a yet unexplored data set on household expenditures in germany and extend the recently developed easi demand system for the analysis of inequality and welfare at the individual and social level the easi system reveals non linearity of engel curves which when neglected can lead to biased estimates of distributional effects we find that increases in heating prices are more regressive than those in electricity furthermore current proposals for social tariffs are found to be less effective than targeted compensation schemes

computable general equilibrium model analysis of economywide cross effects of social and environmental policies in chile abstract the analysis of the linkages between development policies and social and environmental variables is a neglected area within the development literature this paper focuses on the key interrelations among the economic social and environmental elements of the sustainable development triangle a thorough review is undertaken of both social and environmental policies in chile underlining important economic growth and reforms using the static cge model ecogem chile the economywide impacts of several environmental social and combined policies are simulated for the chilean economy six different policies are simulated three environmental policies that impose different taxes on pm10 so 2 and no 2 emissions respectively the same tax on pm10 in a context of high unemployment one social policy that increases government transfers to households and a mixed social environmental policy package where the environmental tax on pm10 and the social transfer policy are simulated simultaneously the results show that environmental tax policies may have negative social effects using real disposable income by quintiles as proxy the impacts depend on the use of the new revenues and the status of employment taxing pm10 emission yields better environmental results than taxing so 2 and no 2 social policies do not show negative environmental impacts combined environmental and social policies improve results thus specific compensating social policies would improve environmental policy acceptance while also reducing poverty or strong income distribution disparities the evidence suggests that environmental policies may have social impacts but not vice versa the results show that the ecogem chile model is useful for analyzing systematically and holistically different economywide policies and their impact on the chilean economy winners and losers may be identified as well as the potential magnitude of gains and losses the results obtained are not all straightforward due to indirect effects

second best pigouvian taxation a clarification this paper argues that the search for a purely environmental component of a tax on goods or factors of production that impact the environment separate from its redistributive and distortive effects is fraught with difficulties the quest is often impossible because of the interconnectedness between labor supply consumption decisions and the environmental quality the paper differentiates between two conceptualization for the pigouvian tax that have been employed in the literature and argues that each has tried to isolate the environmental component in its own way one conceptualization due to cremer et al j public econ 70 343 364 1998 does so by ruling out direct feedback from changes in environmental quality on the incentive effect of the tax in the second conceptualization due to bovenberg and ploeg s j public econ 55 349 390 1994 incentive effects are ruled out by making consumers valuation of environmental quality independent of the labor supply this is achieved by assuming separability between labor supply and other goods including environmental equality to convey its message the paper studies the properties of optimal polluting and non polluting non labor input taxes in a mirrleesian model with endogenously determined wages

higher price lower costs minimum prices in the eu emissions trading scheme this paper examines the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system ets when some emissions are regulated outside of the ets we theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare using a numerical simulation model of the european union we find that moderate minimum prices in the eu ets can reduce the costs of eu climate policy by up to thirty percent we also find that due to tax interaction effects the optimal minimum price in the eu ets should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non ets sectors this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

redistribution and optimal mixed taxation in the presence of consumption externalities abstract the literature on externalities and optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of asymmetric information has so far been confined to the case where externalities are of the atmospheric type one of the main results from this literature has been that the so called additivity property discovered by sandmo sandmo a 1975 optimal taxation in the presence of externalities swedish journal of economics 77 86 98 holds true also in this more general context this paper extends previous analyses by considering a general model where even if there is only one externality generating good the externality is not constrained to be of the atmospheric type the model is sufficiently unrestrictive to admit a variety of interpretations for example it is possible to interpret it as reflecting the case of different types of agents being differently vulnerable to the same externality another possibility is to view agents of different types as not equally effective as externality generating units yet another interpretation can be in terms of positional goods we show that while the additivity property fails in general to hold conditions can be derived which are sufficient to recover it both with respect to the commodity tax structure and with respect to the shape of the income tax schedule moreover stressing one or the other of the aforementioned interpretations delivers different results for the validity of the additivity property

the present value criterion and environmental taxation the suboptimality of first best decision rules this paper examines the links between environmental taxes and distortionary taxation in a dynamic model of climate change and economic growth under first best conditions labor and capital would remain untaxed and carbon dioxide emissions would be taxed at a rate equal to the present value marginal cost they impose on future society setting the discount rate equal to the marginal productivity of capital under secondbest conditions however this decision rule substantially understates optimal emissions taxes when the resulting revenues are used to provide targeted cuts in distortionary taxes conversely relatively low emissions taxes are economically justified given lump sum revenue recycling

distributional impacts of carbon pricing a general equilibrium approach with micro data for households article i nfo many policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions have at their core efforts to put a price on carbon emissions carbon pricing impacts households both by raising the cost of carbon intensive products and by changing factor prices a complete analysis requires taking both effects into account the impact of carbon pricing is determined by heterogeneity in household spending patterns across income groups as well as heterogeneity in factor income patterns across income groups it is also affected by precise formulation of the policy how is the revenue from carbon pricing distributed as well as the treatment of other government policies e g the treatment of transfer payments what is often neglected in analyses of policy is the heterogeneity of impacts across households even within income or regional groups in this paper we incorporate 15 588 households from the u s consumer and expenditure survey data as individual agents in a comparative static general equilibrium framework these households are represented within the mit usrep model a detailed general equilibrium model of the u s economy in particular we categorize households by full household income factor income as well as transfer income and apply various measures of lifetime income to distinguish households that are temporarily low income e g retired households drawing down their financial assets from permanently low income households we also provide detailed within group distributional measures of burden impacts from various policy scenarios

the desirability of commodity taxation under non linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes abstract this paper revisits the atkinson stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non linear income taxation in a more general setup namely when tastes are heterogeneous this general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the atkinson stiglitz result is robust a small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure an application to the case of savings suggests that even in the presence of optimal non linear earnings taxation there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model

on international equity weights and national decision making on climate change abstract estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the aggregation of monetised impacts of climate change over people with different incomes and in different jurisdictions implicitly or explicitly such estimates assume a social welfare function and hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice we show that previous approaches to equity weighting are inappropriate from a national decision maker s point of view because domestic impacts are not valued at domestic values we propose four alternatives sovereignty altruism good neighbour and compensation with different views on concern for and liability towards foreigners the four alternatives imply radically different estimates of the social cost of carbon and hence the optimal intensity of climate policy

the effects of male and female labor supply on commodity demands we examine the effects of male and female labor supply on household demands and present a simple and robust test for the separability of commodity demands from labor supply using data on individual households from six years of the uk fes we estimate a demand system for seven goods which includes hours and participation dummies as conditioning variables allowance is made for the possible endogeneity of these conditioning labor supply variables we find that separability is rejected furthermore we present evidence that ignoring the effects of labor supply leads to bias in the parameter estimates

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods we study how the distribution of income among members of society and income inequality in particular affects social willingness to pay wtp for environmental public goods we find that social wtp for environmental goods decreases increases with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes complements we derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a policy site for illustration we quantify how social wtp for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in sweden and the world at large we find that the adjustment for income inequality can be substantial

comparing specific and ad valorem pigouvian taxes and output quotas when the production or use of a good creates an external cost an unregulated market produces a socially inefficient quantity of output one remedy for this inefficiency is to impose a pigouvian tax equal to the marginal external damage associated with the good in many circumstances privately optimizing agents facing a pigouvian tax make decisions that are consistent with the maximization of social welfare

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

tricks with hicks the easi demand system we invent implicit marshallian demands which combine desirable features of hicksian and marshallian demands we propose and estimate the exact affine stone index easi implicit marshallian demand system like the almost ideal demand aid system easi budget shares are linear in parameters given real expenditures however unlike the aid easi demands can have any rank and its engel curves can have any shape over real expenditures easi error terms equal random utility parameters to account for unobserved preference heterogeneity easi demand functions can be estimated using gmm or three stage least squares and like aid an approximate easi model can be estimated by linear regression

the double dividend second best worlds and real world environmental policy abstract the recent series of papers by bovemberg goulder parry and others argue that the double dividend is unlikely to exist because of second best problems they argue that the imposition of environmental tax in an economy already distorted by income taxes will further distort the economy by reducing incentives to supply labor our paper argues that this is not likely to be the case because of the restrictive assumptions made by these models and because of the role of the environment as a factor of production

pollution permits and environmental innovation abstract this paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation stand alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing technology pollution permits that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation they have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used when the innovation occurs options to pollute at a given striking price fare better than allowances because they create private incentives to phase out pollution in the case of innovation we characterize the social optimum and show that it can be implemented by issuing options to pollute inter alia finally the paper compares ex ante and ex post government procurement surprisingly ex post licensing by the innovator to the government may yield a higher licensing fee than an ex ante contract

optimal linear income taxation with general equilibrium effects on wages abstract the paper argues that the endogeneity of wages may make a considerable difference to optimal linear tax rates in this case there is not only the usual direct redistribution via the fiscal system but also the general equilibrium redistribution due to the change in wages depending on the elasticity of substitution of the production function and the labour supply elasticities these may be reinforcing or opposing it is shown that the general equilibrium effect may plausibly outweigh the direct effect so that net redistribution to the lower paid involves a wage subsidy financed by a lump sum tax

price and income elasticities of residential and industrial electricity demand in the european union this study examines the short and long run price and income elasticities of residential and industrial electricity demand in the european union between 1996 and 2016 instrumental variable models using the between estimator as well as dynamic panel models are employed to present robust estimates and to assess the impact of different methodologies on the reported elasticities the long run price elasticity of residential electricity consumption is estimated between 0 53 and 0 56 these elasticities are more inelastic than that of industrial electricity use which is reported between 0 75 and 1 01 the choice of different econometric methodologies has only moderate impact on the estimates while long run residential income elasticity estimates are moderately inelastic and estimated around 0 61 industrial electricity use tends to be closely tied to income with elasticities between 0 76 and 1 08 electricity demand in all sectors is highly price and income inelastic in the short run additionally population density temperatures and policy measures also influence sectoral electricity use the above estimates can aid the design of european energy and environmental policy

nonlinear tax incidence and optimal taxation in general equilibrium we study the incidence of nonlinear labor income taxes in an economy with a continuum of endogenous wages we derive in closed form the effects of reforming nonlinearly an arbitrary tax system by showing that this problem can be formalized as an integral equation our tax incidence formulas are valid both when the underlying assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or endogenous we show qualitatively and quantitatively that contrary to conventional wisdom if the tax system is initially suboptimal and progressive the general equilibrium trickle down forces may raise the benefits of increasing the marginal tax rates on high incomes we finally derive a parsimonious characterization of optimal taxes

linking trade and external debt strategies abstract despite the productive inefficiencies generated by policies of export promotion and of import substitution such development strategies can improve welfare when used in conjunction with a debt strategy export promotion can increase the availability of foreign finance and import substitution can reduce debt service when the latter strategy is optimal partial debt forgiveness increases the creditor group s payoff import substitution is more profitable with a large inherited debt high world interest rate low terms of trade and when creditors fail to reduce inherited debt

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

structural change and the kaldor facts in a growth model with relative price effects and non gorman preferences u s data reveal three facts 1 the share of goods in total expenditure declines at a constant rate over time 2 the price of goods relative to services declines at a constant rate over time and 3 poor households spend a larger fraction of their budget on goods than do rich households i provide a macroeconomic model with non gorman preferences that rationalizes these facts along with the aggregate kaldor facts the model is parsimonious and admits an analytical solution its functional form allows a decomposition of u s structural change into an income and substitution effect estimates from micro data show each of these effects to be of roughly equal importance

top incomes in the long run of history a recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid hence aggregate economic growth per capita and gini inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes we discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series including income definition and comparability over time and across countries tax avoidance and tax evasion we provide a summary of the key empirical findings most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks top income shares do not recover in the immediate postwar decades however over the last thirty years top income shares have increased substantially in english speaking countries and in india and china but not in continental european countries or japan this increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes as a result wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past finally we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open

indirect double regulation and the carbon etss linking the case of coal fired generation in the eu and china abstract double regulation of carbon emissions is a key policy concern in the context of climate change mitigation the existing literature on double regulation in an emissions trading system ets context has largely focused on the direct type when e g an ets and a carbon tax cover the same entity and has not yet discussed the indirect type when e g the ets and carbon tax cover two related entities in the same production consumption chain this paper seeks to contribute to the literature by identifying indirect double regulation ets tax on the coal fired generation in the eu and china specifically we scrutinized legal documents associated with the coal fired power and further presented the quantitative evidence of double carbon costs from the law economics analysis of indirect double regulation we derived implications of indirect double regulation for the abatement of coal fired power sector in its own jurisdiction and after a hypothetic linkage between the eu ets and chinese national ets for its linked partner in response policy suggestions are provided to mitigate potential competitive distortions but should differentiate distortions by sources

domestic taxes and the external debt laffer curve this paper highlights the role of the domestic tax system in determining the economic consequences of an external debt overhang the analysis indicates that fairly strong and probably unrealistic assumptions about the domestic tax system are needed to argue that the investment disincentives associated with the debt overlhang are large enough to place a country on the wrong side of the debt laffer curve a simple taxation scheme is specified and it is shown that a country can be on the wrong side of its debt laffer curve only if it is on the wrong side of its tax laffer curve

co2 stabilization may be a no regrets policy restricting co2 emissions requires changing today s consumption pattern away from energy and emission intensive commodities towards cleaner goods the cost of stabilizing co2 emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000 say as compared to a business as usual trend is estimated by several researchers to be on the order of 1 of gnp we will argue that the cost may be overestimated because of a too simple model describing the working of the economic system and the evaluation of welfare we demonstrate that by expanding a model to include the actual tax system and negative externalities the cost to present generations from restricting emissions by a co2 tax may be negative that is some reduction may actually correspond to a no regrets policy the reasons are inefficiencies in today s tax system and non optimal handling of negative externalities our analysis suggests that a co2 tax and reduced emissions will lessen such inefficiencies