reputation and impermanent types i consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm s type evolves according to a markov process with two states a tough type who always fights entry and a weak type who prefers to accommodate there exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough above that level as the number of markets t increases in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence when t is infinite then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the incumbent s payoff is bounded below her stackelberg payoff both results are in contrast to the outcome when the incumbent s type is fixed one interpretation is that reputation is not permanent but must be renewed occasionally

analyst reputation communication and information acquisition earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents opportunistic behavior however a recent study by morris argued that analysts experts reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors in this paper i examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned in equilibrium aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts as a result investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts type when the report is proven to be accurate therefore both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully the paper also derives conditions under which the analysts reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts equilibrium precision choices and investors welfare

consumer scores and price discrimination we study the implications of aggregating consumers purchase histories into scores that proxy for unobserved willingness to pay a long lived consumer interacts with a sequence of firms each firm relies on the consumer s current score a linear aggregate of noisy purchase signals to learn about her preferences and to set prices if the consumer is strategic she reduces her demand to manipulate her score which reduces the average equilibrium price firms in turn prefer scores that overweigh past signals relative to applying bayes rule with disaggregated data as this mitigates the ratchet effect and maximizes the firms ability to price discriminate consumers with high average willingness to pay benefit from data collection because the gains from low average prices dominate the losses from price discrimination finally hidden scores those only observed by the firms reduce demand sensitivity increase average prices and reduce consumer surplus sometimes below the naive consumer level

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

new parties and policy outcomes evidence from colombian local governments abstract in many democracies increasing political competition has changed the traditional party system and brought new parties into the political arena this study examines whether the presence of politicians from new parties affects the size of government measured by public spending and tax revenue the study focuses on colombian municipalities where new parties have been numerous and successful in recent years regression discontinuity estimates show that public spending and tax revenues are significantly higher in municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party using information about local politics and the features of the new parties i argue that this result is not associated with new party ideology but instead relates to new parties having lower probability of reelection which raises the incentives to increase short term rent seeking

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

the characteristics of individual analysts forecasts in europe abstract this study investigates the determinants of financial analysts forecasts differential accuracy in 14 different european stock markets using the i b e s detail history database i find that european financial analysts forecast accuracy is positively associated with analyst firm specific experience forecast accuracy is negatively associated with the number of countries followed by analysts and the age of the forecast surprisingly i find no relationship between forecast accuracy and analysts job experience and the size of the bank employing the analyst

macroeconomic forecasts and microeconomic forecasters in the presence of principal agent problems published macroeconomic forecasts by professional economists may not measure expectations forecasters may use their forecasts in order to manipulate beliefs about their ability i test a cross sectional implication of models of reputation and information revelation i find that as forecasters become older and more established they produce more radical forecasts since these more radical forecasts are in general less accurate ex post forecast accuracy grows significantly worse as forecasters become older and more established these findings are consistent with reputational factors at work in professional macroeconomic forecasts

on the job specific training and efficient screening employment relationships are governed by short term incomplete contracts and typically involve on the job screening and firm specific training this article studies a dynamic employment relationship with these features and identifies a potential conflict between the employer s twin objectives to screen and train the worker when the training technology is quite productive the employer may have to sacrifice from worker performance during the screening process the article thus offers an explanation for why firms may invest suboptimally on training which complements the standard inappropriable rents explanation based on ex post mobility of young employees

bureaucrats or politicians part ii multiple policy tasks abstract policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats this paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non elected bureaucrats politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short termism is an issue or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome we then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ

on the bad reputation of reputational concerns can reputational concerns do any good economists have shown how they lead agents to ignore valuable information to herd and to become overly risk averse we explore how they may be a social blessing an agent may exert effort to become informed about the uncertain benefits of a project a smart agent s efforts make him better informed a dumb agent s efforts are to no avail if an agent does not know his type reputational concerns are socially beneficial if an agent knows his type reputational concerns may be socially beneficial a dumb agent takes inefficient unconventional decisions to mimic a smart agent the latter exerts more effort in order not to be mistaken for a dumb this holds whether or not project rejection is a safe haven for the dumb

dynamic contracts with worker mobility via directed on the job search this article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on the job search in a frictional labor market the optimal long term contract exhibits an increasing wage tenure profile with increasing wages worker effort also increases with tenure these two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment given these results workers experience differing labor market transitions between employment unemployment and across different employers and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers abstract from author

bonuses and promotion tournaments theory and evidence standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses we combine classic and market based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles we use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the finnish economy our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature

first impressions matter signalling as a source of policy dynamics we provide the first direct empirical support for the importance of signalling in monetary policy by testing two key predictions from a novel structural model first all policymaker types should become less tough on inflation over time and secondly types that weigh output more should have a more pronounced shift voting data from the bank of england s monetary policy committee strongly support both predictions counterfactual results indicate signalling has a substantial impact on interest rates over the business cycle and improves the committee designer s welfare implications for committee design include allowing regular member turnover and transparency regarding publishing individual votes

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

systematic jump risks in a small open economy simultaneous equilibrium valuation of options on the market portfolio and the exchange rate abstract the valuation of stock options and currency options has witnessed an explosion of new development in the past 20 years these models set up either in a partial equilibrium or a general equilibrium framework have certainly enriched our understanding of option valuation in one way or the other however the main drawback of these models is that stock options and currency options are analyzed in separate contexts the co movement of the stock market and the currency market is absent from the option valuation analysis such co movement is extremely important and is best illustrated by the southeast asian financial crisis to overcome this drawback this paper uses an equilibrium model to investigate the joint dynamics of the exchange rate and the market portfolio in a small open monetary economy with jump diffusion money supplies and aggregate dividends it is shown that the exchange rate and the market portfolio are strongly correlated since both are driven by the same economic fundamentals furthermore options on the exchange rate and the market portfolio are evaluated in the same equilibrium context the analysis shows that parameters describing the same economic fundamentals have very different effects on currency and stock options

electoral competition and politician turnover abstract in this paper we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election we consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates abilities in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information we first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability rather than an established good candidate next we establish that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates i e each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters viewpoint

publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent evidence from the us federal reserve transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers we consider one potential cost the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions we construct a model that compares incentives for members with career concerns to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private we test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee asking whether the fomc s 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent we find evidence that this is indeed the case there has been much recent discussion of the advantages of transparency in agency relationships both in and outside of government while research has attempted to model this issue theoretically there has been less progress with empirical tests a problem due no doubt in large part to the fact that it is difficult to make before and after comparisons of a shift in transparency often no data are available on an agent s actions prior to the establishment of transparency in this article we focus on one specific type of transparency publishing verbatim transcripts of committee meetings and one specific reason why this type of transparency might not be desirable the possibility that the quality of deliberation on a committee will suffer if the deliberations take place in public we develop a theoretical model that helps to identify the potential costs of this type of transparency and we then test the model empirically using an original dataset on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee fomc our dataset is unique in that it records views expressed by policymakers at fomc meetings and not just their official votes our empirical tests focus in particular on the observed effect of the institutional change that occurred in 1993 when the fomc decided to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings after a delay of five years transparency is a particularly relevant issue in monetary policy because it is commonly argued that when central banks take actions such as publishing macroeconomic forecasts revealing individual votes on monetary policy committees or releasing minutes of meetings this will lead to improved economic outcomes while simultaneously facilitating democratic accountability 1

a model of adjuncts in higher education abstract we examine the phenomenon of the expanded use of non tenure track positions adjuncts and construct a supply side harris todaro model low adjunct wages are attributable to a hope rent from the gap between private opportunities and tenure track utility

two sided learning and the ratchet principle i study a class of continuous time games of learning and imperfect monitoring a long run player and a market share a common prior about the initial value of a gaussian hidden state and learn about its subsequent values by observing a noisy public signal the long run player can nevertheless control the evolution of this signal and thus affect the market s belief the public signal has an additive structure and noise is brownian i derive conditions for an ordinary differential equation to characterize equilibrium behavior in which the long run player s actions depend on the history of the game only through the market s correct belief using these conditions i demonstrate the existence of pure strategy equilibria in markov strategies for settings in which the long run player s flow utility is nonlinear the central finding is a learning driven ratchet principle affecting incentives i illustrate the economic implications of this principle in applications to monetary policy earnings management and career concerns

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

managerial career concerns and investments in information we extend the implicit incentives literature by analyzing how career concerns affect a riskneutral manager s decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it the manager has unknown ability that determines the probability with which a good project is available so the market updates ability assessments from project outcomes while project choice is efficient in equilibrium an unobservable investment in the precision of project evaluation allows the manager to control the probabilities of future reputational states this distorts his investment in precision above first best when project payoffs can be observed only on accepted projects

arm s length relationships without moral hazard i show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information jel d23 d82 d86 l20

career concerns contracts and effort distortions a two period career concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker s ability is analyzed contracts are unobservable but incomes are observable it is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

competence implies credibility the credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the central bank s conservatism we show that another trait of the central bank cb her competence at doing her job or reputation thereof can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent we analyze a static barro and gordon 1983 s game where the effects of monetary policy depend on an unknown state of the economy the cb forms her own private and imprecise view of this state that she may announce to p in a cheap talk game to explain and motivate her policy intentions the precision of the noise in the cb s view measures her competence the more accurate her assessment the clearer an idea she has about what to do the fineness of the equilibrium message space measures monetary policy s transparency in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game the cb credibly announces one of finite inflation targets that differ by at least a multiple of the inflation bias competence ratio if this ratio is too large the cb can credibly communicate only the direction of monetary policy as the cb s competence rises and this ratio falls p knows that the cb puts increasing weight on pursuing her objective targets relative to surprising expectations to stimulate output therefore the equilibrium message space becomes finer a more competent cb is also less likely to erroneously observe extreme realizations of the shocks so she is more able tofine tune expectations at times of business as usual

overconfidence ceo selection and corporate governance we develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager who sometimes makes value destroying investments has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to ceo under value maximizing corporate governance moreover a risk averse ceo s overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion overconfident ceos also underinvest in information production the board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident ceos finally sarbanes oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors but to reduce project investment

dynamic forecasting behavior by analysts theory and evidence abstract we develop a multi period learning model to examine the relation between analysts forecasting behavior and their performance in a competitive market for banking services the surplus and the analyst s payoff which is determined through bargaining are convex in her reputation the convexity of her payoff structure and the presence of employment risk lead to a u shaped relation between the analyst s forecast boldness and prior performance and a positive relation between forecast boldness and experience we find support for these predictions in our empirical analysis significant underperformers outperformers face higher lower employment risk and are more likely to issue bolder forecasts

challenger entry and voter learning we develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters given incumbent failure in office challenger entry is more likely but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed at the same time challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications how a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running depending on the electoral environment the model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting the incumbency advantage and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare while pointing to new interpretations of and future avenues for empirical research on elections

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

promotion signaling discrimination and positive discrimination policies this article studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability the model can account for statistical and taste based discrimination in the short run a positive discrimination policy is beneficial for workers in the middle of the ability distribution because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place instead workers of either high or low ability suffer from the policy in the long run the policy benefits all targeted workers the model can explain empirical findings about the effects of a gender quota on the boards of norwegian companies

dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection we study a novel dynamic principal agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection persistent as well as repeated in the model an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks one after the other upon arrival of each task the agent learns its level of difficulty and then chooses whether to accept or refuse each task in turn and how much effort to exert although his decision to accept or refuse a task is publicly known the agent s effort level is his private information we characterize optimal contracts and show that the per period utility of the agent approaches his per period utility when his skills are publicly known as the discount factor and the time horizon increase

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

what does ceos pay for performance reveal about shareholders attitude toward earnings overstatements if overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict pay for performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by sox our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002 to corroborate our interpretation we show that i ceo pay for performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements ii this cross sectional relationship weakens significantly after sox and iii the within firm decrease in pay for performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre sox shareholder benefits from overstatements

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

reflections on china s open policy towards foreign direct investment hayter r and han s s 1998 reflections on china s open policy towards foreign direct investment reg studies 32 1 16 china s open policy of kaifang zhengce assumes that foreign direct investment is an essential mechanism by which technological and other forms of know how regarding best practices can be transferred into the chinese economy yet this transfer cannot be assumed to the extent that the know how desired by china simultaneously defines the competitive advantage of multinational corporations kaifang zhengce is china s geopolitical strategy to resolve this paradox its key features involve combining an explicit spatial strategy within china and reliance on investment by overseas chinese especially firms based in hong kong yet these firms are not foreign as conventionally considered and their contribution to the modernization of china is greater than supposed hayter r et han s s 1998 des reflexions sur la politique d ouverture de la chine a l investissement etranger direct reg

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

politics information and the urban bias abstract governments in many ldcs skew public resources towards urban sectors despite a majority of citizens residing in rural areas this paper develops a novel political argument for this urban bias phenomenon in a framework where all voters rural and urban have equal voice but differ in their access to information we argue that this difference is sufficient to give governments an incentive to inefficiently over allocate resources towards urban areas the bias is shown to worsen during adverse economic times leading to increased migration we also examine how voter informativeness affects efficiency of the electoral process in weeding out incompetent governments

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

a model of the operation and development of a national oil company we present a model of the exploration and development activities of a national oil company noc which uses similar technology to a private firm to extract a depletable resource however unlike the private firm the noc may have a wider range of objectives than maximizing the present value of profits specifically we assume an objective function that balances firm profitability against a political desire to favor domestic consumer surplus and domestic employment we find that the non commercial objectives faced by a noc tend to reinforce each other in their effects on profitability the timing of cash flows and employment

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

m form hierarchy with poorly diversified divisions a case of khrushchev s reform in soviet russia we test the premise of the theoretical literature that m form political hierarchies are effective in creating yardstick competition between regional divisions only when those divisions have sufficiently diversified or similar industrial composition the reason for this is that the competition among poorly diversified inter related divisions creates incentives for regional leaders to pursue policies that inhibit industrial growth in neighboring regions in order to make their own region look better from the point of view of the center we use a unique episode in soviet history when a traditional soviet unitary form u form hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional form m form organization namely khrushchev s sovnarkhoz reform first we demonstrate that during this reform regional leaders were subjected to relative performance evaluation which created incentives to generate industrial growth second we show that these career concerns resulted in higher growth in regions with sufficiently diversified and therefore self contained economies and lower growth in highly specialized regions

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures