the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

trade interdependence the international financial institutions and the recent evolution of sovereign debt renegotiations abstract this paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country s pattern of trade with commercial creditors home countries on the outcome of debt rescheduling negotiations the analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three way debt rescheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country its creditors and the international financial institutions ifis the paper also considers the effects of the ifi sovereign debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt rescheduling negotiations two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the ifi sovereign debt policy evolution

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

pro poor targeting and accountability of local governments in west bengal a commonly alleged pitfall of decentralization is that poverty socio economic inequality and lack of political competition allow local elites to capture local governments this hypothesis is empirically examined using a longitudinal sample of 89 west bengal villages concerning targeting of credit agricultural input kits employment programs and fiscal grants spanning the period 1978 98 higher poverty land inequality and low caste composition of the poor was associated with negligible adverse effects on targeting of private goods to the poor within villages but with lower employment generation out of allotted funds and significantly lower allocation of resources to the village as a whole political competition or literacy levels among the poor were not systematically related to targeting

buying votes vs supplying public services political incentives to under invest in pro poor policies this paper uses unique survey data to provide for the first time in the literature direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics ruling out alternate explanations such as for example poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes the data come from the philippines a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections the data reveal a significant robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services in places where households report more vote buying government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children and quite strikingly as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance a higher percentage of children are severely under weight

time to build and capacity choice abstract this paper studies how demand uncertainty and time to build interact in affecting irreversible investment activity using impulse control methods we find the optimal timing and size of investment for a firm such as an electric utility that considers expanding its capacity in order to meet an uncertain demand when the construction lag is short uncertainty delays investment while increasing its size once it takes place however for comparatively long and realistic times to build the sensitivity to uncertainty is drastically reduced and the results can even be reversed more uncertainty can speed up investment and reduce its size

overdrafts and the demand for money this paper presents a stochastic analysis of the demand for interest bearing money such as now accounts when overdrafting is allowed at some penalty rate it is shown that the short run interest elasticity of money demand is probably large in absolute value and negative but in the long run this elasticity is much smaller or even positive it is also argued that current definitions of the monetary aggregates which exclude unused credit may spuriously generate instability of money demand an alternative definition of money stock is suggested and seems to be conceptually more satisfying copyright 1990 by american economic association

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data this article examines the usefulness of stock returns in measuring the effects of regulation when the dates on which market expectations change are not known and standard sources e g the wall street journal are used to choose announcement dates twenty major changes in regulatory constraint since 1887 are considered tests using either monthly or daily data are found to have surprisingly little ability to detect the effects of regulation the evidence shows that formal regulatory announcements are generally anticipated in cases where it is unclear when expectations change

cash burns an inventory model with a cash credit choice abstract a dynamic cash management model is analysed where agents choose whether to pay with cash or credit at every point in time in the model credit usage depends on the current stock of cash a novel result that matches recent micro evidence on households payment choices the optimality of such a decision rule is novel and cannot be obtained by models where cash credit decisions are made at the beginning of each period we discuss how to use the model to account for cross country evidence on the intensity of credit usage and for several statistics on the size and frequency of cash withdrawals the model is used to assess the household s welfare cost of phasing out cash

enforcement for sale lobbying for water in pakistan s indus basin abstract surface irrigation is a common pool resource subject to over exploitation by upstream users we ask to what extent state enforcement of de jure water allocations designed to ensure adequate irrigation to downstream users is up for sale unique data on the land ownership of nearly a quarter million irrigators in pakistan s vast indus basin watershed provide a measure of political influence consistent with an influence driven model the decline in water availability and land values from head to tail is accentuated along channels having greater lobbying power at the head and attenuated along channels having greater lobbying power at the tail our paper shows how power disparities can be leveraged through the administrative state to capture valuable common resources

decentralization and efficiency of subsidy targeting evidence from chiefs in rural malawi abstract lower income countries spend vast sums on subsidies beneficiaries are typically selected via either a proxy means test pmt or through a decentralized identification process led by local leaders a decentralized allocation may offer informational advantages but may be prone to elite capture we study this trade off in the context of two large scale subsidy programs in malawi for agricultural inputs and food decentralized to traditional leaders chiefs who are asked to target the needy using household panel data we find that nepotism exists but has only limited mistargeting consequences importantly we find that chiefs target households with higher returns to farm inputs generating an allocation that is more productively efficient than what could be achieved through strict poverty targeting this could be welfare improving since within village redistribution is common productive efficiency targeting is concentrated in villages with above median levels of redistribution

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

inherited trust and growth this paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation we show that inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants is sig nificantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears we thus use the inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants as a time varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin this strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects jel n11 n12 n31 n32 o47 z13

cash transfers clientelism and political enfranchisement evidence from brazil abstract this paper uses brazil s bolsa familia to show that redistributive policies that are shielded from the influence of political intermediaries can reduce incumbency advantage for mayors increase both electoral competition and candidate quality reduce support for clientelistic parties and lead incumbents to increase redistributive spending the paper exploits a nonparametric multivariate regression discontinuity design and employs a novel identification strategy for the variation in program coverage the theory proposes that cash transfers by reducing the vulnerability of poor voters make clientelism a less attractive strategy to incumbent mayors consequently incumbents reallocate effort away from the practice into public good distribution

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries we study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program while governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales but interregional targeting may deteriorate as central grants to high poverty regions shrink owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions

politician family networks and electoral outcomes evidence from the philippines we demonstrate the electoral importance of politician family networks and provide evidence of the mechanisms behind the relationship we use a 20 million person dataset allowing us to reconstruct intermarriage networks for over 15 000 villages in 709 municipalities in the philippines we show that politicians are disproportionately drawn from more central families and that controlling for candidate fixed e ects candidates receive a higher vote share in villages where their families are more central we present evidence that centrality confers organizational and logistical advantages that facilitate clientelistic transactions such as vote buying and do not operate through popularity name recognition or through the choice of policies more aligned with their constituents preferences

the demand of liquid assets with uncertain lumpy expenditures abstract we consider an inventory model for a liquid asset where the per period net expenditures have two components one that is frequent and small and another that is infrequent and large we give a theoretical characterization of the optimal management of liquid asset as well as of the implied observable statistics we use our characterization to interpret some aspects of households currency management in austria as well as the management of demand deposits by a large sample of italian investors

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

on the instability of long run money demand and the welfare cost of inflation in the united states we evaluate the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation accounting for instabilities in the long run money demand for the u s over the period 1900 2013 we extend the analysis and reassess the results reported in lucas 2000 and ireland 2009 also considering the recent theoretical contributions of lucas and nicolini 2015 and berentsen et al 2015 breaks in the long run money demand give rise to regime dependent welfare cost estimates we find that the welfare cost is about 0 1 of annual income over 1976 2013 as compared to 0 8 over 1945 1975 overall these values are substantially lower than those reported in the literature

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

history institutions and economic performance the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in india we analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the british in india and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators these areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices

on the relation between reschedulings and bank value the effect of developing country loan reschedulings on large u s banks is investigated using an event study methodology the major finding concerns the evolving nature of the impact of loan reschedulings during 1978 80 reschedulings had a positive effect on bank returns in contrast to the negative impact found for the 1981 83 period an explanation for these results is provided by a model of the rescheduling process that recognizes the noncompetitive aspects of rescheduling negotiation copyright 1989 by american economic association

colonialism and modern income islands as natural experiments abstract using a new database of islands throughout the atlantic pacific and indian oceans we find a robust positive relationship between the number of years spent as a european colony and current gdp per capita we argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience we instrument for length of colonization using variation in prevailing wind patterns we argue that wind speed and direction had a significant effect on historical colonial rule but do not have a direct effect on gdp today the data also suggest that years as a colony after 1700 are more beneficial than earlier years we also find a discernable pecking order among the colonial powers with years under u s british french and dutch rule having more beneficial effects than spanish or portuguese rule our finding of a strong connection between modern income and years of colonization is conditional on being colonized at all since each of the islands in our da

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

value for money vote buying and politician accountability abstract the prevalence of vote buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected in this paper we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the u s and kenya we find that vote payments reduce voters willingness to hold politicians accountable holding fixed politician identity voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent seeking and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted unsurprisingly the politician then engages in a higher level of rent seeking a simple model of multi faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings

the reaction of bank stock prices to the international debt crisis abstract in this paper we develop a cross sectional regression approach to estimate the impact of foreign loan exposure on the pricing of u s bank stocks a new approach is required because news about foreign loan problems may arrive incremently over time rather than reaching the market on a few specific dates the way earnings and dividend announcements do consistent with this interpretation we find that foreign loan exposure had a significant impact on the pricing of u s bank stocks during the years 1982 and 1983 but that the stock prices adjusted continually over the two year period rather than jumping on a few particular days

rural reforms and agricultural growth in china this paper employs province level panel data to assess the contributions of decollectivization price adjustments and other reforms to china s agricultural growth in the reform period decollectivization is found to improve total factor productivity and to account for about half of the output growth during 1978 84 the adjustment in state procurement prices also contributed positively to output growth its impact came mainly from the responses in input use the effect of other market related reforms on productivity and output growth was very small reasons for slowdown in agricultural growth after 1984 are also analyzed copyright 1992 by american economic association

some empirical tests of the theory of arbitrage pricing we estimate the parameters of ross s arbitrage pricing theory apt using daily return data during the 1963 78 period we compare the evidence on the apt and the capital asset pricing model capm as implemented by market indices and find that the apt performs well the theory is further supported in that estimated expected returns depend on estimated factor loadings and variables such as own variance and firm size do not contribute additional explanatory power to that of the factor loadings

the international debt crisis and bank security returns in 1982 this research investigates the reaction of bank security returns to the 20 august 1982 mexican request for the rescheduling of its external debt empirical results show that the reaction of bank stocks was rapid and significantly negative within six days of the published announcem ent prices had adjusted to reflect levels of individual bank exposure which re futes the much longer time impliedin other studies of this event the authors c onclude that the marketreaction was essentially efficient rational and orderly copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

demand for cash with intra period endogenous consumption abstract we extend the literature on the demand for money by relaxing the assumption of a constant rate of consumption although total consumption is still fixed over the period agents can choose more than one rate of consumption and cash depletion in the period to minimize the cost of money management consistent with empirical evidence we find that agents do not smooth intra period consumption instead their rate of consumption will be positively related to their cash position this positive correlation depends on the volatility of the consumption process

collectivization and china s agricultural crisis in 1959 1961 the agricultural crisis in china in 1959 61 after the initial success of the collectivization movement resulted in 30 million extra deaths in this paper a game theory hypothesis proposes the main cause of this catastrophe i argue that because of the difficulty in supervising agricultural work the success of an agricultural collective depends on a self enforcing contract in which each one promises to discipline oneself a self enforcing contract however can be sustained only in a repeated game in the fall of 1958 the right to withdraw from a collective was deprived the nature of the collectivization was thus changed from a repeated game to a one time game as a result the self enforcing contract could not be sustained and agricultural productivity collapsed the empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis

clientelism in indian villages abstract we study the operation of local governments panchayats in rural maharashtra india using a survey that we designed for this end elections are freely contested fairly tallied highly p

homogeneity and the transactions demand for money the paper presents the properties of money demand implied by the frenkel jovanovic 1980 inventory model without approximation the money demand function is implicitly defined by the first order condition of the model from the implicit function we show that the elasticities of money demand satisfy a set of homogeneity conditions we also show that increasing transactions cost increases the cash flow elasticity the interest elasticity in absolute value and the uncertainty elasticity but decreases the transactions cost elasticity if the ratio of cash flow uncertainty to the transactions variable is small then the interest elasticity is greater than 1 2 in contrast it lies between 71 and 1 2 when the approximation method is applied

economic history and modern india redefining the link this paper argues that to restore the link between economic history and modern india a different narrative of indian economic history is needed an exclusive focus on colonialism as the driver of india s economic history misses those continuities that arise from economic structure or local conditions in fact market oriented british imperial policies did initiate a process of economic growth based on the production of goods intensive in labor and natural resources however productive capacity per worker was constrained by low rates of private and public investment in infrastructure excessively low rates of schooling social inequalities based on caste and gender and a delayed demographic transition to lower birthrates and the resultant heavy demographic burden placed on physical capital and natural resources

arbitrage pricing theory as a restricted nonlinear multivariate regression model iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression estimates by replacing the unknown random factors of factor analysis with observed macroeconomic variables the arbitrage pricing theory apt is recast as a multivariate nonlinear regression model with across equation restrictions an explicit theoretical justification for the inclusion of an arbitrary well diversified market index is given using monthly returns on 70 stocks iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression techniques are employed to obtain joint estimates of asset sensitivities and their associated apt risk prices without the assumption of normally distributed errors these estimators are strongly consistent and asymptotically normal with the additional assumption of normal errors they are also full information maximum likelihood estimators classical asymptotic nonlinear nested hypothesis tests are supportive of the apt with measured macroeconomic factors

the political class and redistributive policies we study the eect of the composition of the political class on the size of government first we use a citizen candidate model to show that the extension of surage may be inconsequential for government spending when there are pre existing stricter requirements for holding oce we then test this prediction empirically using data from the 13 u s original colonies we nd that the extension of the franchise did not aect government spending or the composition of the political class however the subsequent elimination of economic qualications to hold oce increased government spending and enriched the class heterogeneity

behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture in this essay we develop a framework for analysing the major institutions governing the production and exchange of output and the primary factors of production in rural areas the analysis incorporates general considerations of risk and information constraints jointly with the principal material attributes of agriculture and of agricultural production factors the framework is used to analyse barriers to the existence of the major intertemporal and factor markets it is applied specifically to land scarce environments for which it provides an internally consistent explanation for many of the well documented institutional features of such settings in addition the analysis provides new implications for among other phenomena the inter relationships among ownership holdings operational scale family size and factor productivity for the scarcity of animal rental markets and use of animals as collateral for the renting out of land by small landowners and for the existence of plantations for certain crops

clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin the author conducted a field experiment in benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior in collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters using the survey data collected after the elections the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to clientelism or public policy messages treatment groups with voting behavior in the other villages control groups the author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates the author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the south but a negative and significant effect in the north in addition public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates finally the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters

money demand function estimation by nonlinear cointegration conventionally the money demand function is estimated using a regression of the logarithm of money demand on either the interest rate or the logarithm of the interest rate this equation is presumed to be a cointegrating regression in this paper we aim to combine the logarithmic specification which models the liquidity trap better than a linear model with the assumption that the interest rate itself is an integrated process the proposed technique is robust to serial correlation in the errors for the usa our new technique results in larger coefficient estimates than previous research suggested and produces superior out of sample prediction copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

chiefs economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone we study the effect of constraints on chiefs power on economic outcomes citizens attitudes and social capital a paramount chief in sierra leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by british colonial authorities in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families chiefs face less political competition and development outcomes are significantly worse today variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism paradoxically with fewer ruling families the institutions of chiefs authority are more highly respected and measured social capital is higher we argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press