inflation announcements and social dynamics this paper investigates the eectiveness of central bank communication when rms have heterogeneous ination expectations that are updated through social dynamics the bank s credibility evolves with these dynamics and determines how well its announcements anchor expectations we show that trying to eliminate high ination by abruptly introducing a low ination target can lead to short term overshooting

forward exchange bias hedging and the gains from international diversification of investment portfolios abstract the gains to the us investor from international diversification of investment portfolios are examined for portfolio strategies that hedge and strategies that do not hedge exchange rate risk via the interbank forward market using the sharpe performance index and stochastic dominance as performance measures almost all the unhedged strategies outperformed the hedged strategies for 1985 1988 the opposite held for 1981 1984 the results are explained by the biasedness of forward rates in predicting future spot rates jel f30

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

global value chain governance a relational perspective global value chain gvc governance is an established field within international business research yet the relational aspects of gvcs have to date garnered less scholarly attention than have efficiency considerations this conceptual study s objective is to explore the relational dynamics of gvc governance using an internalization theory perspective and by linking gvc research with insights from the business network literature gvcs are argued to be a distinct form of asymmetrical networks associated with economizing and capability creation features as well as costs the orchestrating firm can thus enhance efficiency outcomes of the gvc using social mechanisms similar to those adopted by core actors in a business network in the study six such mechanisms were identified 1 selectivity 2 inclusion of non business intermediaries 3 joint strategizing 4 relational capital 5 multilateral feedback and 6 rules for equitable value distribution while safeguarding the gvc s efficiency the above social mechanisms are associated with challenges and limitations and therefore do not guarantee international competitive success however deployed in an integrative fashion these social mechanisms facilitate coordination thus economizing on bounded rationality reduce the hazards of imperfect effort by partners thus economizing on bounded reliability and foster innovation and new capability development

information acquisition dissemination and transparency of monetary policy this paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary author ity s policies each firm s payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions the policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference high quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announce ments however this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority jel classification e52 e58

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

transparency and economic policy we provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability transfers are partly financed through government debt and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems the model provides an explanation of fiscal churning it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods from the policy perspective the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues we show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency transparency of spending is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

the global value chain and internalization theory in a research note in this issue strange and humphrey discuss how a global value chain gvc approach serves to usefully move internalization theory towards a better understanding of the increasingly important middle ground between markets and hierarchies in the contemporary highly globalized international business scene after a brief recount of their main arguments we argue that their discussion needs to the extended as it does not adequately recognize important differences between internalization theory and the gvc approach specifically the approaches differ on the notions of efficiency opportunism and level of analysis we then argue that internalization theory can benefit from the systemic view implied in the gvc approach and discuss the role of trust as a coordinating mechanism in international business this leads to a more general discussion of internalization theory and the difficulty of encompassing dynamic considerations such as learning and foreign operation mode combinations and flexibility within value chain interdependencies we conclude with a research agenda that flows from our discussion

foreign exchange intervention how to signal policy objectives and stabilise the economy abstract within a simple model of monetary policy for an open economy we study how foreign exchange intervention may be used as a costly signal of the policy makers objectives our analysis indicates that i foreign exchange intervention typically stabilises the national economy reducing the fluctuations of employment and output ii this result is sensitive to the institutional structure of decision making in that a larger stability gain is obtained when foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy are kept under the jurisdiction of different governmental agencies

inflexible rules in incentive problems in practice contracts involve standard terms or rules allowing for variations only under exceptional circumstances we develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature even in the absence of transactions costs rules arise when an agent has countervailing incentives to misrepresent private information these incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante applications in regulatory labor and legal settings

the case for open market purchases in a liquidity trap prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short term nominal interest rate renders open market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals we show that even were this the case there remains a powerful argument for large scale open market operations as a fiscal policy tool as we also demonstrate however this same reasoning implies that open market operations will be beneficial for stabilization as well even when the economy is expected to remain mired in a liquidity trap for some time thus the microeconomic fiscal benefits of open market operations in a liquidity trap go hand in hand with standard macroeconomic objectives motivated by japan s recent economic experience we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of open market operations for an economy in japan s predicament we argue japan can achieve a substantial welfare improvement through large open market purchases of domestic government debt

monetary mystique secrecy and central banking abstract the paper contains a discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy it documents the federal reserve s defense of secrecy as argued in a recent freedom of information act suit the federal reserve s arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed the discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial

the equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy we examine a central bank s endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency under both commitment and discretion we argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency for the choice of control under discretion maximum degree of control is the only equilibrium for the choice of transparency under commitment a su ciently patient bank with su ciently low average in ation bias will always choose minimum transparency thus a maximum feasible degree of control with a minimum degree of transparency is a likely outcome the bundesbank and the federal reserve system are arguably examples of this jel classi cation e52 e58

portfolio performance and the euro prospects for new potential emu members abstract entering the emu removes currency risk for assets originating in the euro area while diversification opportunities are likely reduced taking the perspective of an investor in one of the 12 countries that joined the eu in 2004 2007 we contrast actual optimal composition of international equity holdings against two artificial scenarios costless hedging against exchange rate risk and presuming the local market to be part of the emu state specific optimal portfolios are determined from realized covariances for the period 2000 2006 optimized risk is found smaller under currency unification and implied sharp ratios signal significant benefits of emu participation

comment on forward guidance communication commitment or both by marco bassetto forward guidance can be cheap talk in an infinitely repeated game with the public asymmetric information is necessary for cheap talk to be useful the central bank can build credibility over time to make cheap talk credible when to use forward guidance instead of general transparency remains unclear adding a lower bound on interest rates does not change the main conclusions

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

when and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information abstract this paper analyzes the role of noisy or imprecise announcements in mitigating the basic credibility problem in monetary policy based on a model where the monetary authority s private information gives rise to an unavoidable trade off between flexibility and credibility the analysis finds that noisy announcements can serve as a meaningful form of communication to make that trade off more favorable however such talk is not cheap the analysis predicts that those central banks who can speak more precisely are those who are less likely to speak at all

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

do countries falsify economic data strategically some evidence that they might we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their economic data in a strategic manner among those suspected are countries with fixed exchange rate regimes high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model we also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in africa middle east eastern europe and latin america release economic data of questionable veracity our evidence calls for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing independent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data

bayes stein estimation for portfolio analysis in portfolio analysis uncertainty about parameter values leads to suboptimal portfolio choices the resulting loss in the investor s utility is a function of the particular estimator chosen for expected returns so this is a problem of simultaneous estimation of normal means under a well specified loss function in this situation as stein has shown the clas sical sample mean is inadmissible this paper presents a simple empirical bayes estimator that should outperform the sample mean in the context of a portfolio simulation analysis shows that these bayes stein estimators provide significant gains in portfolio selection problems

central bank secrecy in the foreign exchange market abstract this paper argues that with sticky goods prices and a forward looking exchange rate the central bank will only want a partial dissemination of its information about shocks to the economy it is shown that in such a model the central bank may prefer to intervene secretly in the foreign exchange markets when responding in anticipation of future shocks but openly when reacting to current shocks the model thus provides a rationale for secrecy in central bank foreign exchange operations the model also elucidates the relationship between the signaling and portfolio balance channels of sterilized intervention

optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information svensson 2006 argues that morris and shin s 2002 analysis is contrary to what is claimed actually pro transparency this paper re examines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework recognizing that central banks impact on the economy not only indirectly via their public announcements but also directly through their policy actions we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention our results strengthen morris and shin s conclusions considerably in particular we find that public disclosure of the central bank s information is always undesirable

forward guidance communication commitment or both abstract forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment odyssean by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information delphic i analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages without private information the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements pure odyssean forward guidance is redundant with private information communication can have social value forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank s private information about its own preferences or beliefs

global value chains a review of the multi disciplinary literature this article reviews the rapidly growing domain of global value chain gvc research by analyzing several highly cited conceptual frameworks and then appraising gvc studies published in such disciplines as international business general management supply chain management operations management economic geography regional and development studies and international political economy building on gvc conceptual frameworks we conducted the review based on a comparative institutional perspective that encompasses critical governance issues at the micro gvc and macro levels our results indicate that some of these issues have garnered significantly more scholarly attention than others we suggest several future research topics such as microfoundations of gvc governance gvc mapping learning impact of lead firm ownership and strategy dynamics of gvc arrangements value creation and distribution financialization digitization the impact of renewed protectionism the impact of gvcs on their macro environment and chain level performance management

what lies between market and hierarchy insights from internalization theory and global value chain theory in this paper we suggest that internalization theory might be extended by incorporating complementary insights from gvc theory more specifically we argue that internalization theory can explain why lead firms might wish to externalize selected activities but that it is largely silent on the mechanisms by which those lead firms might exercise control over the resultant externalized relationships with their gvc partners we advance an explanation linking the choice of control mechanism to two factors power asymmetries between the lead firms and their gvc partners and the degree of codifiability of the information to be exchanged in the relationship

learning the ramsey outcome in a kydland prescott economy abstract we study if adaptive learning by a central bank cb in the kydland and prescott environment can steer the economy to the pareto optimal outcome our cb evaluates its potential strategies regarding the announced and the actual inflation rate through expectations of the performance of these strategies formed thanks to its mental model of the economy this model is forward looking and adaptive at the same time as a starting point we follow arifovic et al 2010 and initially assume that there are two types of agents believers who set their inflation forecast equal to the announced inflation and non believers who form static optimal forecast coupled with a forecast error correction mechanism our results show that the economy can reach near ramsey outcomes most of the time in the absence of believers the economies almost always converge to the ramsey outcome in their experiments with human subjects arifovic and sargent 2003 showed that experimental economies reach and stay close to the ramsey outcome most of the time giving support to the just do it policy recommendation in light of the experimental findings our model is of particular interest as it is the only agent based or adaptive learning model that consistently selects the ramsey outcome in this context

on the long term effectiveness of exchange rate communication and interventions abstract exchange rate communication has come to play an increasingly important role as a policy tool for monetary authorities over the past decade the paper assesses the strategies and the long term effectiveness of communication as well as actual interventions the empirical results for the g3 economies indicate that communication has not only exhibited a significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates but also has moved forward exchange rates up to a horizon of 6 months in the desired direction moreover communication is found to reduce exchange rate volatility and uncertainty whereas actual interventions tend to raise it overall this underlines a key difference between these two policy tools and suggests that communication tends to be a fairly effective policy tool over the medium term

monetary economics a review essay in this essay i define money to be whatever objects serve as generally acceptable media of exchange and i define monetary economics to be the study of the causes and economic consequences of the monetization of exchange that is of the use of media of exchange these definitions lead me to specify the distinctive objectives of monetary economics to be to understand 1 the monetization of exchange and its relation to the technologies of production and of exchange 2 the form that money takes and especially the viability of fiat money 3 the determination and significance of the real value of units of money and 4 the relation between the nominal quantity of money and aggregate economic activity the essay tries to acquaint the reader with the contents of the recently published handbook of monetary economic as they relate to these objectives of monetary economics and offer some critical thoughts on selected unsettled issues in monetary economics that my reading of the handbook suggested this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

coherence and the credibility of convertibility announcements abstract the recent devaluation crisis in mexico and its tequila effect elsewhere illustrate that two credibility problems associated with convertibility policies currency boards are announcements that violate truth telling and a non zero probability of policy failure we derive the trade off between these problems when announcements resemble cheap talk the strategic uncertainty created by this trade off implies that both the government and investors should recognize the presence of fed watchers who exploit any policy inconsistency for their own gain in this context credibility can be restored if the policy is coherent if it eliminates the marginal benefits for fed watching jel e63 e58 f40 1997 published by elsevier science ltd

government intervention and strategic trading in the u s treasury market we study the impact of permanent open market operations pomos by the federal reserve on u s treasury market liquidity using a parsimonious model of speculative trading we conjecture that i this form of government intervention improves market liquidity contrary to conclusions drawn by existing literature and ii the extent of this improvement depends on the market s information environment evidence from a novel sample of federal reserve pomos during the 2000s indicates that bid ask spreads of on the run treasury securities decline when pomos are executed by an amount increasing in proxies for information heterogeneity among speculators fundamental volatility and pomo policy uncertainty consistent with our model

central bank communication and monetary policy a survey of theory and evidence over the last two decades communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy these real world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication mostly empirical and almost all of it written in this decade we survey this ever growing literature the evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve central banks macroeconomic objectives however the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy

matriculation in u s economics ph d programs how many accepted americans do not enroll using a sample of 26 u s economics ph d programs in fall 2003 we estimate that only about 12 percent of the u s and canadian students accepted for doctoral study did not enroll in any u s economics ph d program in fall 2003 or fall 2004 it is not possible to increase the supply of new ph d economists substantially by closing the sale on accepted applicants additional qualified applicants are needed nonmatriculants are remarkably similar to enrollees in demographics prior education test scores and fields of special interest but express less interest in economic research and are less likely to have been offered financial aid an expected financial aid deficiency was also the most cited reason for deciding not to matriculate followed by how long it takes to earn an economics ph d and the expectation of higher lifetime earnings in a career other than economics most who decided against an economics ph d enrolled in an alternative graduate program this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

preliminary evidence on the determinants of federal reserve open market operations in the absence of a fixed policy rule the federal reserve bank fed has significant discretion in setting monetary policy the existence of professional fedwatchers attests to the fact that fed policy actions are difficult to interpret recent literature has focused on the motivations behind fed policy making and the need for secrecy and ambiguity we investigate one aspect of fed behavior the propensity of the fed to buy and sell government securities beyond that required to implement stated policies milton friedman 1982 26 called attention to this issue when he wrote

the benefits from international diversification for nordic investors abstract in this paper we investigate the magnitude of the benefits from international diversification from the nordic point of view special attention is paid to whether potentially increased co movement of stock markets together with more volatile nordic currencies have resulted in decreased benefits from international diversification towards the end of the 1980s moreover the paper presents evidence on the benefits from international diversification for a currency which has recently started its free float the finnish markka fim we find significant increases in stock market co movement both unhedged ex ante strategies as well as strategies hedged for exchange rate risk are investigated revealing substantial benefits from international diversification for the nordic countries however we obtain mixed results concerning the question of the optimality of hedging

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

the effect of gnp announcements on fluctuations of gnp growth abstract this paper is an empirical study of the degree in which perceptions affect the evolution of the economy we study the effects of the announcements that the government makes on gnp growth these announcements are subject to a substantial degree of noise and its accuracy improves with time a revised number is published several years after the first announcement was made public we consider that the final revision is the true value of gnp growth we show that once announcements are taken into account the true value of gnp growth at time t has no predictive power in determining growth at any future time all the predictive power lies in the announcements and not in the true level of growth actually we show that the variable that determines future growth is the unexpected part of the announcements we also show that announcements affect growth via aggregate investment

competence implies credibility the credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the central bank s conservatism we show that another trait of the central bank cb her competence at doing her job or reputation thereof can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent we analyze a static barro and gordon 1983 s game where the effects of monetary policy depend on an unknown state of the economy the cb forms her own private and imprecise view of this state that she may announce to p in a cheap talk game to explain and motivate her policy intentions the precision of the noise in the cb s view measures her competence the more accurate her assessment the clearer an idea she has about what to do the fineness of the equilibrium message space measures monetary policy s transparency in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game the cb credibly announces one of finite inflation targets that differ by at least a multiple of the inflation bias competence ratio if this ratio is too large the cb can credibly communicate only the direction of monetary policy as the cb s competence rises and this ratio falls p knows that the cb puts increasing weight on pursuing her objective targets relative to surprising expectations to stimulate output therefore the equilibrium message space becomes finer a more competent cb is also less likely to erroneously observe extreme realizations of the shocks so she is more able tofine tune expectations at times of business as usual

experimental evidence on the evolution of the meaning of messages in sender receiver games an experiment this paper experimentally investigates the evolution of message meanings when talk is cheap we consider communication between a privately informed sender and a receiver when the sender s message does not affect payoffs directly sender receiver games introduced by jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 and vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 provide the simplest stylized environment in which communication is essential communication is the only way to link the receiver s action to the sender s private information in addition sender receiver games have been widely used to study communication in accounting economics finance and political science intuition strongly suggests that effective communication will evolve when the players interests are closely aligned however there is always a nash equilibrium in which the sender randomizes uniformly across all messages such babbling equilibria are proper roger b myerson 1978 blume 1994 and even strategic stability elon kohlberg and jeanfrancois mertens 1986 does not rule out uninformative equilibria in general in response a literature developed that formulates equilibrium selection criteria by appealing to the existence of a commonly understood language matthew rabin 1990 steven a matthews et al 1991 joseph farrell 1993 that can be used to formulate credible deviations from equilibrium unfortunately the selection criteria from this literature are frequently strong enough to remove all equilibria from consideration in addition these arguments are vulnerable to stiglitz s observation in koo cho and david m kreps 1987 that successful deviations from equilibrium may induce further deviations which in turn may undermine the credibility of the original deviations both problems can be avoided by a dynamic approach as in rabin and sobel 1996 we also adopt a dynamic perspective but do not require messages to have a priori meanings instead distinct meanings may emerge endogenously this is important for communication across cultures and for language change 2 we are guided by recent results of blume department of economics university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 dejong department of accounting university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 kim department of economics sung kyun kwan university seoul 110 745 korea sprinkle department of accounting university of wisconsin madison wi 53706 we thank joyce berg vince crawford robert forsythe joel horowitz deirdre mccloskey forrest nelson larry samuelson gene savin joel sobel and especially two anonymous referees for their advice and suggestions we benefitted from comments and discussions resulting from presentations at the 1994 summer meetings of the econometric society the 1996 social learning workshop at suny stony brook the io me gt workshop at the university of iowa the university of bonn the university of bielefeld the center for economic research at tilburg university ohio state university seoul national university and texas a m university we are grateful for financial support from the college of business administration at the university of iowa the ira b mcgladrey institute and the national science foundation

exchange rate uncertainty forward contracts and international portfolio selection in this paper ex ante efficient portfolio selection strategies are developed to realize potential gains from international diversification under flexible exchange rates it is shown that exchange rate uncertainty is a largely nondiversiflable factor adversely affecting the performance of international portfolios therefore it is essential to effectively control exchange rate volatility for that purpose two methods of exchange risk reduction are simultaneously employed multicurrency diversification and hedging via forward exchange contracts the empirical findings show that international portfolio selection strategies designed to control both estimation and exchange risks almost consistently outperform the u s domestic portfolio in out of sample periods since grubel 11 applied modern portfolio theory mpt to international investment various authors such as levy and sarnat 17 solnik 20 and lessard 16 have examined the gains from international diversification of investment portfolios for the purpose of establishing the gains from international diversification these studies constructed international portfolios using historical risk and return data from a period of fixed or relatively stable exchange rates and showed that internationally diversified portfolios dominated purely domestic portfolios in terms of mean variance efficiency from the standpoint of today s investors however the previous studies fail to offer operational guidance for international diversification for two important reasons first it is now questionable whether the past findings are still relevant under the current flexible exchange rate regime second by being ex post in nature the past studies ignored the issue of estimation risk or parameter uncertainty and therefore may have overstated the realizable portion of the potential gains from international diversification fluctuating exchange rates are likely to mitigate the potential gains from international diversification by making investment in foreign securities more risky as will be shown later a fluctuating exchange rate contributes to the risk of foreign investment not only through its own variance but also through its positive covariances with the local stock market returns during our sample period of 1980 through 1985 for example exchange rate volatility is found to account for about fifty percent of the volatility of dollar returns from investment in the stock markets of such major countries as germany japan and the u k furthermore the exchange rate changes vis a vis the u s dollar are found to be

information sharing and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market abstract this paper develops a model of information sharing among heterogeneously informed agents and it uses the model to examine a rationale for intervention in the foreign exchange market the model shows that in a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium some agents can gain by sharing among themselves private information about transitory exchange rate disturbances in this setting a central bank can affect the exchange rate by aggregating and disseminating agents information the paper also illustrates the usefulness of intervention as a way to transmit that information

the advantage to hiding one s hand speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market abstract we analyze an asymmetric information model of sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market we characterize an equilibrium in which a central bank with inside information about its exchange rate target trades with risk averse speculators who have private information about future spot rates the model identifies circumstances in which perverse responses to intervention will be observed i e the domestic currency depreciates when the central bank purchases it and it provides conditions under which the exchange rate will be highly sensitive to intervention the model also provides an explanation for two forms of policy secrecy i secrecy about the scale of an intervention operation is always desirable ii secrecy about the target is sometimes desirable

communication and monetary policy recent trends toward greater central bank independence and the adoption of formal inflation targeting by several countries have served to emphasize the importance of communication policy in this paper we explore some of the economic effects of public information that arise whenever public information serves the dual role of conveying fundamental information as well as serving as a focal point for better coordination more precise public information is a double edged tool while it is very effective in influencing actions through coordination sometimes it can be too effective and coordinate actions away from fundamentals copyright 2002 oxford university press

discretion wage indexation and inflation it is now well understood that discretionary policy making frequently leads to socially sub optimal outcomes this point was first made by kydland and prescott 12 using an example of a monetary policy game they argued that in the presence of output distortions in the economy the monetary authority has an incentive to renege on earlier promises to maintain price stability by expanding the money supply in order to create unexpected inflation thereby increasing output and employment since private wage setters form expectations rationally this policy action is anticipated and in equilibrium leads to excessive inflation without any resulting change in output or employment consequently in the absence of enforceable policy rules the time consistent discretionary monetary path produces a socially sub optimal inflation rate this form of policy behavior has important implications for the decisions of private agents such as their choice of the degree of wage indexation however most work in the literature on endogenous wage indexation stemming from the seminal paper by gray 10 has analyzed the equilibrium indexation choice assuming either a constant money growth rule 1 or a monetary rule involving lagged or contemporaneous feedback 8 17 only the recent papers by devereux 5 6 have attempted to examine the implications of time consistent discretionary monetary policy for endogenous wage indexation the informational structure he considers has the monetary authority setting the money stock prior to the realization of shocks so that the authority has no information regarding current period disturbances when determining its course of action this assumption precludes any contemporaneous attempt by the monetary authority to stabilize output or the price level devereux reaches the conclusion that wage setters who are aware of the authority s policy decision will find it optimal to index positively to unanticipated price level surprises since none of the aggregate shocks are offset directly by the monetary authority thus the informational environment confronting the authority influences the degree of indexation and subsequently the manner in which aggregate demand and supply variability impinge upon social welfare

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

when does coordination require centralization this paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag ers are privately informed and communicate strategically we consider a multi divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk the only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights we show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

market distortions and government transparency in this paper we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions we first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information our key result is that distortions limit communication even if transparency is ex ante pareto superior to opaqueness it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high we next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions jel d82 e61

optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information abstract this paper examines the optimal behavior of a policymaker who is able to precommit labelled strong when the public entertains the possibility that he is either strong or weak unable to precommit the main result is that in the presence of doubts about their type it is optimal even for strong policymakers to partially accommodate inflationary expectations this contrasts with vickers 1986 who finds that when strength is conceived in terms of the relative concern for employment the strong policymaker inflates less under incomplete than under full information the paper also provides a theory of endogenous announcements

reputation and credibility in the european monetary system ems credibility axel weber this article provides a quantitative assessment of the credibility of the european monetary system during the disinflation period of the 1980s the results contradict the widely held view that the ems has operated as a dm zone it is shown that after a brief early phase the ems has functioned as a bipolar system with a hard currency option supplied by the german bundesbank and a soft currency option offered by the banque de france whilst from the onset the netherlands have chosen the hard currency option at least in a first stage the remaining smaller economies belgium denmark and ireland adopted the soft currency alternative at a later stage of the ems however the soft currency block has disintegrated and some countries most noticeably ireland and to a lesser extent france have shifted towards the hard currency standard it is argued that this increased tightening of the ems provides a favourable starting condition for the transition to economic and monetary union

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

learning and communication in sender receiver games an econometric investigation this paper compares the performance of stimulus response sr and belief based learning bbl using data from game theory experiments the environment extensive form games played in a population setting is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games both the sr and bbl models fit the data reasonably well in common interest games with history while the test results accept sr and reject bbl in games with no history and in all but one of the divergent interest games estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the results may be subject to convergence bias

learning benevolent leadership in a heterogenous agents economy abstract this paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talk announcements in an agent based dynamic extension of the kydland prescott model in every period the policy maker makes a non binding inflation announcement before setting the actual inflation rate it updates its decisions using individual evolutionary learning the private agents can choose between two different forecasting strategies they can either set their forecast equal to the announcement or use an adaptive learning scheme to potentially forecast the true inflation they switch between these two strategies as a function of information about the associated payoffs they obtain through word of mouth choosing always the currently most favorable one while all agents using the first strategy make the same forecast those using the second strategy may generate different individual forecasts in spite of the complexity of the environment the boundedly rational policy maker learns to sustain a situation with a positive but fluctuating fraction of believers this outcome is pareto superior to the outcome predicted by standard theory interestingly enough the actions taken by the policy maker undergo marked qualitative changes as a function of the prevailing heterogeneity among and learning characteristics of the private agents

talk is cheap although friedrich a von hayek leonid hurwicz and others stressed how the price system communicates private information on preferences technology and endowments our main means of communication is surely words but it is unclear whether mere words can be trusted absent outside sanctions for lying such as perjury law or a valuable reputation for honesty talk is cheap the perspective of the standard theory of signaling seems to suggest that cheap talk should be uninformative but this is misleading cheap talk can sometimes convey information and affect real payoffrelevant actions yet cheap talk s power is limited for example even given an unlimited chance to talk rational people may not reach an equilibrium or may not escape a bad one a growing literature in game theory political science and economics which i cannot survey here studies what cheap talk can and cannot do here i merely sketch some themes

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

bargaining over agricultural property rights discretion are malleable shifting as collective values and policies evolve over time the costs of resolving conflicts over property rights in water quality air quality wildlife habitat scenic vistas and other commons resources have the potential to be enormous innes policies to address these disputes determine which costs will be borne by whom and have broad ramifications for agriculture and environmental quality in this article i explore the process of bargaining over disputed rights to natural resources emphasizing the role of costs and delays in signaling information so that expectations may converge and voluntary settlements may be achieved economists traditionally focus on the economics of alternative outcomes resource allocations not on the processes for achieving those outcomes property rights disputes present a challenge for economists whose efficiency oriented tools do not indicate which interests ought to be favored or which starting point to use in evaluating the impacts of a change in entitlements nevertheless economic expertise is needed to devise effective institutional incentives for resolving disputes and to identify the distributional consequences of alternative dispute resolution processes the article concludes with observations on a constructive role for economists in this arena perceived fairness and property rights conflicts

strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information optimal targeting periods this paper analyzes a multiperiod monetary targeting procedure as a possible resolution to the credibility problem in pol icy when the monetary authority has some private information by limitin g the degree of flexibility permitted in policy this procedure mitiga tes the credibility problem as the length of the targeting horizon decreases the severity of the credibility problem falls but at the expense of weakening the monetary authority s ability to pursue its stabilization goals based on model simulations the analysis studi es the determinants of the optimal targeting horizon that balances the benefits of flexibility and discipline in policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

the advantage of hiding both hands foreign exchange intervention ambiguity and private information this paper analyzes a dynamic exchange rate policy game in which the central bank has private information about its short term exchange rate target on the one hand and in which the market is faced with a certain degree of ambiguity concerning the actual intervention volume on the other sterilized interventions are shown to derive their effectiveness from the fact that they transmit information about the short term exchange rate target to the market in this respect we provide an explanation for the presumed inconsistency between intervention secrecy and the effectiveness of the signalling channel since our model predicts that interventions will be more effective on average if the central bank retains some degree of ambiguity moreover it is also shown that sterilized interventions will not exert a lasting effect on the exchange rate finally we have also investigated the extent to which some political and economic parameters determine the size of the intervention bias

international portfolio diversification with estimation risk international portfolio diversification has long been advocated as a way of enhancing average returns while reducing portfolio risk for the investor who considers diversifying into foreign securities this proposition however relies on the assumption that the required inputs to the classical mean variance analysis are known with certainty typically expected returns variances and covariances are simply replaced by their ex post sample values and the optimal portfolio is derived without mentioning the uncertainty inherent in these parameter values but the rational investor should take this uncertainty into account when forming expectations and probably will consider estimators that are less subject to estimation error than the classical sample mean this paper investigates alternative estimators of expected returns and their implications for the alleged gains from diversification an important observation is the crucial influence that errors in estimating expected returns have on portfolio analysis a closer examiprevious studies of international portfolio diversification have relied on ex post meanvariance analysis without considering the problem of estimation risk typically past averages are substituted for expected returns and no allowance is made for the uncertainty inherent in these parameter values first i demonstrate the shortcomings of such an approach and second i investigate another method of estimating expected returns initially proposed by stein by shrinking the sample averages toward a common mean i find that the out of sample performance of the optimal portfolio is substantially increased one of the implications of this method is that the classical conclusions vastly overestimate the possible gains in average returns instead benefits from diversification are more likely to accrue from a reduction in risk this paper draws on part of my dissertation at the university of chicago i am grateful to arnold zellner michael mussa george constantinides and especially john bilson for useful discussions and comments numerous improvements were also suggested by the referee this research received the generous financial support of the college interuniversitaire d etudes doctorales dans les sciences du management

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

equilibrium exchange rate hedging we assume a world like the one that gives the capital asset pricing model but with many goods and many countries we assume that investors in a given country have homothetic utility functions with the same weights and a currency that has a sure endof period value using a price index with those weights siegel s paradox derived from jensen s inequality makes investors want a positive amount of exchange risk when average risk tolerance is the same across countries every investor will hold the same mix of market risk through the world market portfolio of all assets and exchange risk in a diversified basket of foreign currencies in fact the ratio of exchange risk to market risk is equal to the average investor s risk tolerance we can write the ratio of exchange risk to market risk and the fraction of the market s exchange risk that investors hedge as depending on an average of world market risk premia an average of world market volatilities and an average of exchange rate volatilities the weights in these averages are the same as the weights of the different countries in the currency basket given these averages the ratio and the fraction hedged will not depend directly on exchange rate means or covariances in equilibrium we can use the ratio of exchange risk to market risk to measure average risk tolerance in this model risk tolerance is observable

strategic central bank communication discourse analysis of the bank of japan s monthly report abstract we conduct a discourse analysis of the bank of japan s monthly report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles we find that ambiguous expressions tend to appear more frequently with negative expressions and this tendency is more pronounced in recessions this suggests that the central bank communicates strategically by obfuscating the reports when their private information is unfavorable

international macroeconomic policy coordination when policymakers do not agree on the true model the authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model t wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the nash noncooperative solution however the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction these points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models out of 1 000 possible combina tions of models that could represent u s beliefs non u s beliefs and the true model monetary coordination improves u s welfare in on ly 546 cases copyright 1988 by american economic association

the macroeconomic effects of false announcements suppose that the government were to announce the economy will be booming in six months and this announcement is based on false data what effect would such an announcement have on future aggregate activity this paper employs revisions of the series of leading economic indicators to test the hypothesis that such an announcement would have a positive effect on future activity we find that the evidence is generally consistent with the hypothesis and that for the time period 1976 1988 the expectational shocks measured by these revisions explain over 20 percent of the fluctuation in the quarterly growth rate of industrial production

block holding and keiretsu in japan the effects of capital markets liberalization measures on the stock market abstract long term block holding among large industrial corporations and financial institutions is prevalent in japan little is known about the implications of such business practice on portfolio returns we document the portfolio relationships of parent firms sub firms and specific industry portfolios and we hypothesize that these relationships have changed substantially in japan using certain measures for evaluating portfolios and mean variance spanning we test the hypothesis our empirical results suggest that market efficiency and integration of the japanese stock market may have been greatly enhanced by the japanese government s capital markets liberalization measures implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s

the monetary approach to exchange rate in an efficient foreign exchange market tests based on volatility the variance bounds on exchange rate movements implied by the monetary approach to exchange rate in an efficient foreign exchange market is shown to be violated by sample data the paper also presents evidence showing that the forecast errors implied by the monetary model can be forecasted using historical data the results are interpreted to suggest either the incompatibility of the monetary approach with sample data or an inefficient foreign exchange market or both models of exchange rate determination based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments imply when coupled with an interest rate parity relation and the assumption of an efficient foreign exchange market that exchange rates are related to a long average of money stocks differentials 1 2 the long average is analogous to the difference across countries of the long average of expected future money stocks which was supposed to characterize the price level of a single country see e g sargent and wallace 20 since long averages are known to have certain smoothing properties it appears that the observed volatility of exchange rates may be inconsistent with these models thus alternative tests of the models may be produced which rely on those properties the aim of this paper is to determine if the observed volatility is consistent with those properties the paper is the first to use tests based on the volatility of the exchange rate in an efficient market model of the monetary approach the first set of tests is based on the property of implied variance bounds for exchange rate movements and the second set consists of the more familiar efficient market tests of forecastability the empirical results violate these two sets of tests of the model thus casting doubt on the model even though the claim that exchange rates are too volatile has been commonly made few direct attempts have been made in the past to determine the validity of the claim some studies have presented estimates of variances of spot and forward rates but lacking an objective criterion to determine what constitutes

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

can the government talk cheap communication announcements and cheap talk a great deal of attention has recently been focused on communication in economic contexts while some models of credible announcements have been based on reputational forces or penalties imposed by third parties as in sobel 21 and cothren 4 several recent papers have addressed the possibility of communication through cheap talk that is talk in situations with no explicit penalties for deception perhaps the most prominent application of cheap talk in the literature is the recent model of federal reserve announcements by stein 22 this paper will show that cheap talk equilibria of the sort modeled by stein and others often depend in a fundamental way on implausible discontinuities in public responses to government announcements that is cheap talk equilibria are frequently only possible if certain infinitesimally small changes in government announcements are capable of causing large discontinuous changes in public expectations and behavior intuitively if public expectations are a continuous function of government announcements then the government can fine tune these expectations the government will therefore often be tempted to deviate from the cheap talk equilibrium announcements in order to manipulate expectations this causes the equilibrium to unravel discontinuous public reactions sometimes prevent these equilibria from unraveling because they convert continuous choice problems which allow manipulative fine tuning into discrete choice problems where such fine tuning is impossible these discontinuities are implausible however and this may often rule out cheap talk as a realistic model of governmental policy announcements 2

what matters when the impact of ecb communication on financial market expectations this article analyses financial markets reaction to european central bank s ecb communication we apply a novel indicator that quantifies the contents of the ecb s introductory statements and allows disentangling ecb statements on prices the real and the monetary sector we provide evidence that it matters what issue the ecb is speaking about especially the ecb s statements on price developments represent important news to financial markets it also matters when the ecb affects markets communication drives maturities above 4 months