do merging local governments free ride on their counterparts when facing boundary reform the western world exhibited a significant trend towards larger local governments in the twentieth century which was driven to a large extent by boundary reforms boundary reforms can provide economic benefits but may also give rise to costs driven by opportunistic political behavior this study uses a swedish compulsory reform to test for such behavior the reform gives a local government the incentive to accumulate debt before a merger takes place since the taxpayers in the new locality will share the cost the strength of the incentive to free ride is determined by the population size of the initial locality relative to that of the new locality i find an economically large and statistically significant free riding effect

do parties matter estimating the effect of political power in multi party systems abstract when there are more than two parties policy outcomes are typically the result of a bargaining process we investigate whether changes in political power for various parties have an effect on tax policies we use an instrumental variable approach where close elections provide the exogenous variation in our variable of interest voting power in order to isolate close elections in a proportional election system we develop a new simulation algorithm using data from german municipalities in the state of bavaria our estimation results suggest that political power does matter for policies somewhat surprisingly the center left party spd is found to lower all three locally controlled taxes whereas the greens increase both property taxes considerably these results remain robust across a range of specifications our partisan effect for the spd is also confirmed by a simple regression discontinuity estimation using mayoral elections

smuggling and price disparity abstract this paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of smuggling legal trade and price disparity defined as a domestic price which exceeds is less than the return from legal export import these phenomena have been found to characterize indonesian smuggling a framework is presented in which legal trade is used to cloak smuggling activity with the implication that the greater the volume of legal trade the less the costs of smuggling this model is then used to explain the observation noted above and to show that smuggling may be welfare increasing vis a vis the non smuggling situation and that even if the suppression of smuggling is costless tax revenue maximization may require a positive level of smuggling in addition the model is applied to coffee and rubber exports from indonesia

contrast explanation in economics its context meaning and potential in this article we place tony lawson s account of contrast explanation in context lawson s development of it is given meaning both by the roots of the approach in his work on social ontology and the state of economics that provides the grounds for the critique contained in that social ontology this is important because such an approach to explanation is not new most notably van fraassen and garfinkel have developed it in particular ways and for particular purposes within the philosophy of science and social theory setting out the different ways in which the contrastive approach has been developed is useful for identifying what is different about lawson s approach its potential and limits lawson s proposal is more modest and focusses on causal investigation in a manner that flows from his approach to social ontology contrast explanation provides a substitute for controlled experiments and facilitates identifying social mechanisms it also enables exploration of the manifold presuppositions of our explanatory questions we argue that this is a useful and important contribution to overcoming some of the many problems economics faces

foreign competition immigration and structural adjustment abstract the paper uses the ricardo viner r v model to investigate the relationship in a capital abundant economy between trade competition and immigration in doing so it derives new results for the r v model especially on the welfare implications of migration with and without an initial tariff

snobbery racism or mutual distaste what promotes and hinders cooperation in local public good provision a political jurisdiction may decide to cooperate in public schooling provision with its neighbors or remain independent the determinants of the consolidation decision are compared for the richer and the poorer and for the whiter and the less white jurisdiction in each potential consolidation pair property values and scale economies matter most however poorer jurisdictions prefer merging with richer ones that are less white than themselves whiter jurisdictions prefer to consolidate with less white ones of similar income less white jurisdictions are more open to consolidation with whiter ones if their incomes differ in either direction traditional club theory predictions are not supported

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

tiebout with politics capital tax competition and constitutional choices this paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation we describe a non cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes we show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries and even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction

income distribution political instability and investment abstract this paper successfully tests on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960 85 the following hypotheses income inequality by fuelling social discontent increases sociopolitical instability the latter by creating uncertainty in the politico economic environment reduces investment as a consequence income inequality and investment are inversely related since investment is a primary engine of growth this paper identifies a channel for an inverse relationship between income inequality and growth we measure socio political instability with indices which capture the occurrence of more or less violent phenomena of political unrest and we test our hypotheses by estimating a two equation model in which the endogenous variables are investment and an index of socio political instability our results are robust to sensitivity analysis on the specification of the model and the measure of political instability and are unchanged when the model is estimated using robust regression techniques

the decision to regionalize in the provision of education an application of the tiebout model abstract in the standard tiebout equilibrium consumers sort themselves into an array of communities which cater to the specific preferences of their residents for public services given congestibility of these services the efficient size of a community minimizes the average cost of provision in reality communities provide several services each with a different optimal scale a common response to this situation is for communities to jointly provide some services while retaining local control over others this paper theoretically examines the conditions under which joint provision of education or regionalization will occur in a tiebout framework a case study is used to illustrate the results of the model

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

american and european economics and economists america and europe differ with regard to what economics is understood to be how it is practiced and how professional academic economists behave specifically 1 american u s and canadian economists contribute by far the largest share of journal publications and are cited much more often than european economists while west european economists consider other aspects of their professional activities more relevant in particular participating in local and national affairs 2 economic research by americans tends to focus on abstract issues defined within the profession itself and involves fads while the activities of european economists though not necessarily their research are more concerned with practical issues and follow a more steady course and 3 american academics are geared to postgraduate teaching while in europe they are mostly engaged in undergraduate teaching these differences can be explained by the different market conditions faced by american and european economists in america the academic market is much larger and the degree of government intervention is typically much smaller this paper explores how this leads to different focuses for european and american economists in addition it asks whether the ongoing economic unification in europe may not alter these patterns

not your grandfather s imf global crisis productive incoherence and developmental policy space the response by the international monetary fund imf and developing country national governments to the current global financial crisis represents a moment of what i term productive incoherence which has displaced the constraining neoliberal coherence of the past several decades productive incoherence refers to the proliferation of inconsistent and even contradictory strategies and statements by the imf that to date have not congealed into any sort of new organised regime those who see continuity at the imf emphasise the reassertion of the imf s authority the reiteration of pro cyclical policy adjustment and the maintenance of existing governance patterns within the institution in contrast evidence of discontinuity includes a world now populated by increasingly autonomous states in the south the normalisation of capital controls and fund conditionality programmes that are inconsistent in key respects in the face of this evidence it is best to understand the current conjuncture as an interregnum that is pregnant with new development possibilities

the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems a quasi experimental study having two votes for the same election or two simultaneous elections with different electoral systems provides a golden opportunity to ascertain the impact of the electoral system and to sort out t

term length and the effort of politicians we evaluate the eects of a fundamental lever of constitutional design the dura tion of public o ce terms we present a simple model grounded in interviews with legislators and highlight three forces shaping incentives to exert legislative eort we exploit two natural experiments in the argentine congress where term lengths were assigned randomly to ascertain which forces are empirically dominant results for separate measures as well as an aggregate index of legislative eort show that longer terms increase eort shorter terms appear to discourage eort not due to campaign distractions but due to an investment payback logic when eort yields returns over multiple periods longer terms yield a higher chance of capturing those returns a broader implication is that job stability may promote eort despite making individuals less accountable rossi acknowledges nancial support from grant pict 2007 787 we thank the editor marco

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

how to pay for the peace a theoretical framework with references to african countries this paper analyses a simple game theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some gifts to his opponents as a means to defend his position in power if the government is a cournot nash player then there is no gift in equilibrium and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defence expenditures however if the government is a stackelberg leader then he will use the gift as a tool in his policy for staying in power

the breakup of nations a political economy analysis this paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations in each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting a basic trade off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted the model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies the main results of the paper are i when income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small separation occurs in equilibrium and ii when all factors of production are perfectly mobile all incentives for separation disappear i introduction following the demise of communism the entire map of europe from the atlantic coast to the urals is being redrawn and issues of separation unification and the redrawing of borders are yet again at the forefront of european concerns many of the issues raised by this process are primarily of a political cultural or linguistic nature however there are also economic considerations that bear on this problem the objective of this paper is to analyze some important economic and political determinants of the process of unification and separation of democratic nations the starting point of our analysis is to suppose that from an economic efficiency point of view separation of nations is never desirable a unified nation is always more efficient since free trade among regions is guaranteed duplication costs in defense and law enforcement are avoided and local public goods provision such as transportation and communication networks or common standards can be coordinated furthermore any benefits of decentralization that might be obtained in a world with several nations may also be achieved within a unified nation by replicating the administrative structure of the world with several

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

of mice and men automated valuation models and the valuation profession the rise in the use of automated valuation models avms poses questions about the long term survival of the property valuation profession avms provide quick and cheaper valuations which in this v

electoral vulnerability and size of local governments evidence from voting on municipal mergers abstract we analyze how anticipated changes in the electoral vulnerability of municipal councilors affect their voting behavior over municipal mergers the electoral vulnerability changes due to a merger because it changes the composition of political competitors and the number of available seats in the next election we use this variation for identification and find that the smaller the increase in the electoral vulnerability of a councilor the more likely he is to vote for the merger the documented effect is not driven by the behavioral response of the voters or by party line considerations the councilors desire to avoid personal electoral competition may lead to sub optimally small municipalities from the local citizens point of view

the institutional framework and economic development the compound growth rates of per capita output and farrell type efficiency measures for 115 market economies over the period 1960 80 were compared with measures of political civil and economic liberty it was found that the institutional framework has significant and large effects on the efficiency and growth rate of economies politically open societies which subscribe to the rule of law to private property and to the market allocation of resources grow at three times the rate and are two and one half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are abridged

a spatial merger estimator with an application to school district consolidation abstract this paper develops a spatial merger estimator to explain political integration generally and then applies this method to a wave of school district mergers in the state of iowa during the 1990s our estimator is rooted in the economics of matching and thus accounts for three important features of typical merger protocol two sided decision making multiple potential partners and spatial interdependence rather than simply explaining when a particular region is likely to experience a wave of political integration our method allows us to explore the factors driving which specific subregional mergers take place this allows us to explore how those districts that merge choose with which of their neighbors to do so our results highlight the importance of state financial incentives for consolidation economies of scale diseconomies of scale and a variety of heterogeneity measures in this particular application we also demonstrate the power of our estimator relative to existing estimators to detect a statistically significant role for heterogeneity factors while our application is limited to school district consolidation our method can be adapted to include the salient features of many spatial integration problems

municipal preferences for state imposed amalgamations an empirical study based on the swedish municipal reform of 1952 this paper concerns municipal preferences for state imposed municipal amalgamations focusing on factors that may explain municipal acceptance of or objection to a state imposed amalgamation deci

political business cycles democratization and economic reform the case of africa abstract this paper presents cross country evidence that political business cycles are alive and well in the nascent democracies of the developing world africa provides fertile ground for the study of political business cycles this paper uncovers systematic electorally timed interventions in five monetary and four fiscal policy variables in a panel of african countries these findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory if africa s increasingly frequent elections are associated with reversals of fiscal and monetary policy reform there is a potential conflict between political and economic reform

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

the great crash of 2008 and the reform of economics the 2008 economic crash led to remarkable shifts of opinion among world leaders does this crisis create favourable conditions for the reform and revitalisation of economics itself from a subject dominated by mathematical techniques to a discipline more oriented to understanding real world institutions and actors and why were warnings of financial collapse not heeded recent shortcomings are partly related to the global triumph of market individualist ideology and partly to the exaggerated roles of modelling and quantification these failures of economics are partly peculiar to the discipline and also a result of other wider institutional and cultural forces

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

long live democracy the determinants of political instability in latin america abstract we investigate the underlying causes of political instability in a panel of 18 latin american countries from 1971 2000 we test whether regime type regime durability factionalism income inequality ethnic diversity ethnic discrimination regional spillover effects urban growth and macroeconomic variables matter for instability we find several important results 1 democracy has a significant negative effect on instability that is robust to several alternative specifications 2 factionalised political systems experience higher instability 3 income inequality ethnic fractionalisation and urban growth have important nonlinear effects on instability and 4 of the macroeconomic variables we study only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on instability

why don t the bailouts work design of a new financial system versus a return to normalcy the innovative support measures introduced by the us central bank and treasury in response to the current crisis to bolster bank balance sheets have had little success in restoring liquidity to financial markets these policies mirror similar policies employed in the 1930s in the usa and the 1990s in japan in both cases with little impact this paper identifies three policies impacting incomes rather than prices the assessment of system failure and proposals for system design that were employed in dealing with prior financial crises that they have not been introduced in response to the present crisis may explain why current measures have not yet had their intended impact of restoring bank lending to the productive economy

import competition international factor mobility and lobbying responses the schumpeterian industry case abstract this paper analyzes the different responses of economic agents to import competition in seeking policy intervention economic agents are divided into three groups capitalists workers and the government the following output restoring policies are considered protection capital importation labour importation and technology importation the paper concentrates on capital intensive technologically progressive industries using both the heckscher ohlin samuelson and the jones neary factor specific models

government and economic growth in the less developed countries an empirical study for 1960 1980 adam smith founded modern economics with a powerful argument that free markets are the best route to prosperity and economic growth his conclusion has been studied and debated by economists ever since including nobel prize winners friedman hayek kuznets lewis myrdal and schultz whatever economists have concluded since world war ii the majority of the less developed countries seem to have opted for extensive government regulation of the private sector and for a large public sector has the large government role slowed or accelerated the growth of ldcs obviously this is an important issue this study looks at government expenditure revenue raising and regulation greater emphasis is put on expenditure because 1 the revenue raised is presumably a function of the level of expenditure and 2 there are few internationally comparable measures of regulation there are virtually no empirical studies of the general impact of government on economic growth an extensive literature search turned up only three papers gemmell analyzed the impact of nonmarket sector growth on various measures of macroeconomic performance for 27 ldcs and developed countries for 1960 and 1970 he drew no general conclusions about the relation between the size of the nonmarket sector and economic growth marsden found a negative relation between tax gdp ratios and economic growth for a cross section of 20 ldcs and developed countries for the 1970 79 period 2 i found a negative relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the growth of per capita gdp for a cross section of 96 ldcs and developed countries over various time periods between 1961 and 1976 3 this paper extends the approach used in my 1983 article

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

socially optimal districting a theoretical and empirical exploration this paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections in the model districting matters because it determines the seat vote curve which describes the relationship between seats and votes the paperrst characterizes the optimal seat vote curve and shows that under a weak condition there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship the paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting this is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect u s state legislators during the 1990s

political jurisdictions in heterogeneous communities we investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population we consider heterogeneity in income race ethnicity and religion and we test the model using american school districts school attendance areas municipalities and special districts we find strong evidence of a trade off between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity we also find evidence of a trade off between economies of scale and income heterogeneity conversely we find little evidence that ethnic or religious heterogeneity shapes jurisdictions to clarify the direction of causality between heterogeneity and jurisdictions we exploit shocks to racial heterogeneity generated by the two world wars

corruption and microenterprises in russia abstract in russia compliance with the rules and regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life has created a hostile environment for microenterprises more serious than the regulations per se however is the potential niche they create for opportunistic behavior by regulatory authorities in russia the regulatory state has created a corrupt cadre of government bureaucrats who frequently engage in rent seeking behavior while enforcing regulations firms are not uniformly affected by corruption however this paper shows empirical evidence of differential incidence of extortion based on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics corruption in russia is similar to a regressive tax and acts as a disincentive to innovation and growth it may induce technologically inefficient production decisions and can dilute economies of scale and scope

externalities vs internalities a model of political integration abstract decentralized government leads to inter regional externalities whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem centralized government entails other costs in particular a neglect for minority interests the paper models formally the trade off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem

the political economy of development a cross national causality test of development democracy growth hypothesis the empirical investigation of the development democracy growth hypothesis estimates positive correlations and causal associations between development and democracy and democracy and growth among the preconditions for the emergence of democracy market and culture show strong and highly significant positive effects which are largely transmitted directly development affects democracy directly and indirectly via education and investment the positive causal association between democracy and growth is transmitted both directly and indirectly via labor and welfare accordingly the hypothesized compatibility between economic development and political democracy is confirmed while rejecting the trade off between political democracy and economic growth

sociopolitical and economic dimensions of development a cross section model 1 of the most important requisites of development is to cultivate those conditions which are appropriate for the generation of a surplus the distribution of which in turn usually generates friction among the various social classes and factions that advance claims to it thus modernization being a process of change has economic social political and institutional dimensions and the changes can result in sociopolitical instability which affects the continuation of the ability of the economy to grow and of the society to develop the objective of this paper is to test for a feedback mechanism that links all the dimensions of modernization together and the introduction of variables that can reflect it in a model and to present some results of an econometric investigation that recognizes this interaction estimation for the model is based on a sample of 104 noncommunist countries for the year 1967 that includes economic and noneconomic variables the model is used to predict the values of the per capita income and gross capital formation both within and outside of the sample period its predictive ability is remarkable as the statistics represented in the tables and charts demonstrate the model is also used in a number of simulations reflecting a variety of social and political conditions and scenarios in this relation it is found for example that the social and political atmosphere has profound effects on the economic evolution of a society the sociopolitical gap defined as the difference between actual sociopolitical envirnoments characterized by various degrees of instability and the sociopolitically stable environment characterized by no sociopolitical violence retards the development process the presence and the magnitude of this gap as well as the various trade offs lead the author to a conclusion of guarded pessimism in relation to the choices and future of developing countries an appendix lists the types of political violence identified as variables

the political economy of inaction abstract this paper develops a simple model of political inaction in a two party democracy i e it shows the conditions under which both parties will prefer to live with an unsatisfactory and inefficient status quo rather than to raise an issue the risk of raising the issue to either party is the fear of ending up with the other party s policy for example by losing the electron regarded as even worse than the status quo the model shows that the problem is likely to be particularly serious the more evenly matched is political competition the more risk averse the parties the less voters trust the parties the more divided is public opinion and the more important the issue the model is illustrated with a number of examples of real world inaction e g on fiscal deficits abortion the transition to socialism and the fall of the weimar republic in general the analysis also suggests that over a range more representation of political viewpoints implies a smaller likelihood of political action so that democracy implies a tradeoff between representation and the capacity for political action

the welfare consequences of directly unproductive profit seeking dup lobbying activities price versus quantity distortions abstract this paper is a contribution to the growing literature on the theory of what bhagwati 1982 has christened the theory of dup activities these are activities that use up real resources in making profits i e income without producing directly or indirectly a good they result therefore in the contraction of the availability set defined on goods for one generic subset of such dup activities namely distortion triggered lobbying activities the paper establishes asymmetrical propositions on the possibility of such dup lobbying resulting in a paradoxical improvement of welfare

sociopolitical instability and the behavior of savings in less developed countries the paper argues for the introduction of sociopolitical instability as a factor in explaining saving behavior it also provides empirical evidence in regard to the quantitative and qualitative relationship between these two variables the empirical results point towards an inverse relationship between sociopolitical instability and savings our estimates are based on a sample of 7 observations from 60 countries a new pooling procedure is used to address the problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

democracy and development a theoretical framework a simple framework is set up to discuss the relationship between democracy material welfare and development democracy is regarded both as a good in its own right and as an input in the production of material welfare the optimum level of democracy is then related to the level of development at the optimum point the marginal cost of democracy in terms of foregone output is positive and growth is a decreasing function of the level of democracy deviations from the optimum path are described as either repressive or populist democratization is not unambiguously an optimal response to exogenous shocks

political systems and distortions an empirical study this paper studies empirically why price distortions are more prevalent in some countries than in others we find no significant difference between democracies and dictatorships but frequent regime changes reduce distortions political systems factional subordinate that encourage redistributive activities rda tend to have more distortions allowing for different effects of rda in democracies and dictatorships there is a positive and significant effect of rda on distortions in dictatorships in democracies distortions destroying lobbying seems more important since no significant relation between rda and distortions can be found

on the number and size of nations this paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes and in different economic environments with more or less economic integration we focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations our model implies that i democratization leads to secessions ii in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries iii the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

electoral bias and policy choice theory and evidence this paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice we tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory the usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in england the results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies

a unified method of evaluating electoral systems and redistricting plans we derive a unified statistical method with which one can produce substantially improved definitions and estimates of almost any feature of two party electoral systems that can be defined based on district vote shares our single method enables one to calculate more efficient estimates with more trustworthy assessments of their uncertainty than each of the separate multifarious existing measures of partisan bias electoral responsiveness seats votes curves expected or predicted vote in each district in a legislature the probability that a given party will win the seat in each district the proportion of incumbents or others who will lose their seats the proportion of women or minority candidates to be elected the incumbency advantage and other causal effects the likely effects on the electoral system and district votes of proposed electoral reforms such as term limitations campaign spending limits and drawing majority minority districts and numerous others to illustrate we estimate the partisan bias and electoral responsiveness of the u s house of representatives since 1900 and evaluate the fairness of competing redistricting plans for the 1992 ohio state legislature

size democracy and the economic costs of running the political system the search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought given the validity of arguments for and against small units one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes however the reform trend is uniform units often at the local level are amalgamated to harvest scale effects the purpose of this article is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems our testing ground is a recent danish reform it allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms the reform was directed by the central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities whereas 32 municipalities were left untouched we thus have a quasi experiment with pre and posttreatment observations for both an experiment and a control group our findings show that scale effects measured as administrative costs per inhabitant are considerable

donor bias towards small countries an overlooked factor in the analysis of foreign aid and economic growth the consensus of the literature is that international cross sectional data do not reveal a stable relationship between foreign aid and economic growth a conclusion which weakens the case for giving aid however previous econometric analysis has not made allowance for the fact that larger countries grow faster but receive less aid in this paper it is demonstrated that when due allowance is made for the effects of country size a positive and significant relationship between aid and growth can be shown to exist

shades of brown and green party effects in proportional election systems small parties play an important role in proportional election systems for exam ple the emergence and electoral success of environmental and anti immigration parties have constituted one of the central changes in the political landscape in europe over the last three decades but we do not know if this has actually had any implications for policy since no methods exist for credibly estimating the eect of legislative represen tation in proportional election systems because party representation is not randomly assigned both observable and unobservable factors in uence policy outcomes as well as party representation using a part of the legislative seat allocation that is as good as random i estimate the causal eect of party representation on immigration policy environmental policy and tax policy i use data swedish municipalities where key poli cies for each policy area are under direct jurisdiction of the municipal councils the results show that party representation has a large eect on the rst two policies but not on the tax policy

the journals of economics we examine the principal journals of economics with particular attention to the communication between journals as reflected by the network of interjournal citations during 1987 90 and the changes over the past century in the characteristics of the authors and the techniques they have used the numerical results and those of the statistical modeling of these results reinforce the importance of economic theory as an exporter of intellectual influence to applied economics the study includes an examination of the degree of specialization among different subfields of economics a statistical model is presented for measuring the flow of intellectual influence as measured by citations in terms of simple univariate scores

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

out of the corridor keynes and the crisis we should learn from keynes to focus on the macroproblems of our day today s problem is the financial crisis and the resulting great recession neither the standard keynesian policies of decades past nor the monetary policy doctrine of recent years provides useful solutions dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory is part of the crisis wreckage but turning to old or to new keynesian theory will be of little use a balance sheet recession requires that policy address the problems in the private sector s capital as well as its income accounts we need serious theoretical work on problems of system stability using for example agent based methods monetary theory needs to develop analysis of processes in which intertemporal budget constraints are violated network theory will be useful in that quest

distortion triggered lobbying and welfare a contribution to the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities abstract the paper considers the normative implications of lobbying for non exclusive income generated by an exogenously specified policy intervention such lobbying activities are a subset of what bhagwati has termed directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities it is demonstrated that the welfare effects of lobbying triggered by a policy distortion depend critically on whether the direct impact of the policy constraint is on price or an quantity it is also shown that several standard comparative static welfare analyses of alternative policy distorted states are significantly affected once the policy intervention is assumed to be continuously accompanied by lobbying for the associated non exclusive income