taxation and international migration of superstars evidence from the european football market we analyze the effects of top tax rates on international migration of football players in 14 european countries since 1985 both country case studies and multinomial regressions show evidence of strong mobility responses to tax rates with an elasticity of the number of foreign domestic players to the net of tax rate around one around 0 15 we also find evidence of sorting effects low taxes attract highability players who displace low ability players and displacement effects low taxes on foreigners displace domestic players those results can be rationalized in a simple model of migration and taxation with rigid labor demand jel f22 h24 h31 j44 j61 l83

international institutions and the volatility of international trade during the past half century states have established a large number of international trade institutions both multilateral and regional in scope the existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers namely reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country s output to terms of trade shocks governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions particularly the world trade organization wto and preferential trading arrangements ptas we hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce we further hypothesize that because market actors prefer price stability trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability this article conducts the first large scale multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001 the tests provide strong support for our arguments ptas and the wto regime significantly reduce export volatility in so doing these institutions also increase export levels

on the relationship between corruption and migration empirical evidence from a gravity model of migration this paper shows the relationship between corruption and migration in particular countries with much corruption are shown to encourage emigration and discourage immigration because they provide worse and unpredictable economic conditions more insecurity and a lower quality of life this hypothesis is confirmed empirically with a cross sectional dataset with bilateral migration data covering 230 countries well known implications of the gravity model are confirmed here larger populations a common language and a common border increase migration while distance between two countries decreases migration furthermore education gdp per capita inflation in the destination country as well as corruption and education in the origin country can robustly explain migration corruption thus appears to be a push factor of migration

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

factor proportions in israel s manufacturing trade 1965 1982 abstract this paper tries to explain changes in the foreign trade patterns of israel s manufacturing sector in terms of changes in relative factor use during the period 1965 1982 although the sector s comparative advantage lay in labor intensive goods in most of this period changes in net exports were correlated positively with changes in human and physical capital use and negatively with changes in labor use this was due to the expansion of capital intensive exports

a note on the tiebout tullock hypothesis the period 1975 1980 numerous earlier studies have for the most part found empirical support for the tiebout tullock hypothesis for the periods of the 1950s and 1960s the present study draws on more recent data including the 1980 census of the population to find additional new support for the tiebout tullock hypothesis apparently there is strong evidence to indicate that for the period 1975 1980 geographic differentials in state and local government tax and expenditure policies significantly influenced geographic mobility migration these findings should be of special importance and interest to policymakers in view of the fact that internal migration is the single most important determinant of population and labor force redistribution in the united states

a gravity model analysis of international migration to north america this study examines the influence of political economic and demographic factors on the size and composition of migration flows to north america a modified gravity model is specified and adjusted to include immigration regulations and characteristics specific to the origin and destination countries for empirical test of the model the time period of study is from 1976 1986 and 70 countries are covered for a total of 1540 observations of migration flows to canada and the usa the results reveal that the population of origin countries and the income of destination countries are two major determinants of migration to north america high population areas of asia and latin america provided a large share of the immigrants domestic restrictions on political and civil freedom in origin countries are found to significantly impair migration to north america

the mouse that roared taiwan s management of trade relations with the united states this analysis seeks to contribute to the growing literature on the subject of the weak in the world of the strong it examines taiwan s attempts to cope with u s commerical pressure in view of its mounting bilateral trade surplus in the recent years 10 6 billion in 1985 and 6 2 billion in the first half of 1986 taiwan s past ability to achieve relatively favorable outcomes in its commerical dealings with the united states is explained at two levels at the more micro level of bargaining tactics used by the weak in managing the strong attention is directed to taiwan s resort to 1 problem redefinition 2 damage limitation 3 exploring loopholes 4 linkage politics and 5 transnational coalitions these measures are complemented by more long term and basic economic adaptation termed positive adjustment at the more macro level two prerequisites suggested by yoffie 1983 for successful adaptation in a protectionist and competitive economic environment are discussed 1 taiwan s policy

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

regimes and the limits of realism regimes as autonomous variables two distinct traditions have developed from structural realist perspectives the first the billiard ball version focuses purely on interaction among states the second the tectonic plates version focuses on the relationship between the distribution of power and various international environments it is the latter tradition that suggests why regimes may be important for a realist orientation however it also opens the possibility for viewing regimes as autonomous not just as intervening variables there may be lags between changes in basic causal variables and regime change there may be feedback from regimes to basic causal variables both lags and feedback suggest an importance for regimes that would be rejected by conventional structural arguments

does emigration reduce corruption we study the effects of emigration on bribery experience and attitudes towards corruption in the migrants countries of origin using data from the gallup balkan monitor survey and instrumental variable analysis we find that having relatives abroad reduces the likelihood of bribing public officials renders bribe taking behavior by public officials less acceptable and reduces the likelihood of being asked for bribes by public officials receiving monetary remittances does not change the beneficial effects regarding bribe paying and attitudes toward corruption however remittances counteract the beneficial effect on bribe solicitations by public officials overall our findings support the conjecture that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination to source countries

hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in europe although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime as an example great britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century but britain s behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability i advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a political business cycle

global linkages and domestic politics trade reform and institution building in india in comparative perspective this article examines how the world trade organization wto affects institutional development and policy responses in india india is a country traditionally resistant to external pressures but in

cultural baggage do immigrants import corruption do immigrants undermine culture in a way that destroys productivity in destination countries some scholars have argued that because immigrants come from countries with dysfunctional social capital norms and institutions they will import it and pollute the social capital in destination countries one potential channel through which this could occur is corruption we examine stocks and flows of immigrants over a 20 year time period to see if corruption increased in destination countries we generally find that immigration is not associated with increases in corruption additionally we find that immigration tends to decrease corruption in destination countries with low levels of corruption or high levels of economic freedom

testing theories of regime change hegemonic decline or surplus capacity two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors a theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector the history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes however a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change surplus capacity in the absence of a hegemon creates the conditions necessary for change

the concentration of capabilities and international trade over the course of the previous two decades political scientists have become increasingly interested in the relationship between international politics and global trade much of the literature on this topic centers on the effects of a hegemonic distribution of power on commerce hegemonic stability theorists argue that hegemony is a necessary condition for the existence of a liberal economic order and that in the absence of a hegemon a liberal international economy is particularly difficult to establish and maintain however a growing number of theoretical and empirical critiques have been leveled against the gemonic stability theory and the issue of whether hegemony helps shape patterns of global trade continues to be the topic of heated debate

migration and institutions exit and voice from abroad a rapidly growing body of research examines the relationship between migration and institutions three strands of studies can be distinguished some studies focused on the role of domestic and foreign institutions in the decision to migrate others were interested by the impact of migration on institutional reforms in migrants countries of origin while the effect of migration on destination countries is largely documented recent studies focus on how migrants affect social and informal institutions in the destination countries this survey puts together these three strands of literature with three purposes first we offer a short definition and synthetic typology of institutions which provide a guide to understand several studies summarized and their results second our analysis is presented following the analytic framework exit voice and loyalty of hirschman in order to highlight the brain grain phenomenon for developing countries from an institutional point of view third we review the limited existing work on the very timely topic whether migrants are harmful or not to institutions in the host countries

regulation and growth why some countries grow faster than others is one of the most important questions in economics solving this puzzle has the obvious appeal of improving the living standards for a significant proportion of the world population we go further towards answering this question by studying a major determinant of growth regulations governing business activity our results also have significant implications for policy they suggest that countries should put priority on reforming their business regulations when designing growth policies measures of institutions currently used in the growth literature indicate the extent of problems but not how to resolve them by contrast the indicators in the doing business database are directly linked to specific reforms for example the procedures to register a business or property can be cut by combining them at a one stop shop for businesses establishing a credit bureau or reducing mandated severance pay for workers will also improve performance on the business regulations index our findings imply that identifying and implementing such reforms can accelerate economic growth

industry the state and the new protectionism textiles in canada and france in this article we address two questions pertinent to the debate on the relationship between industrial restructuring and the new protectionism first does the appearance of industry specific trade barriers necessarily indicate an attempt to preserve those traditional sectors in which advanced capitalist states no longer enjoy a comparative advantage second are all advanced capitalist states equally susceptible to protectionist pressures or will neomercantilist states given their established capacity for sectoral intervention find such pressures easier to resist than their liberal counterparts after analyzing recent changes in textile technology and in the pattern of international competition in the textile industry we examine the response of two states the relatively liberal canadian state and the neomercantilist french state to this complex set of changes the textile case indicates that it is a mistake to assume that states have but two options protect or adjust links may be established between hightechnology and traditional industries that make it possible for inputs from the former to restore the competitive position of the latter if such links are forged then states may use trade barriers to allow producers time to adjust french and canadian textile policies reveal the conditions under which such states although constrained by established policy networks are nevertheless induced to respond in similar fashions to contemporary changes in the world economy

the determinants of international migration unbundling the role of economic political and social institutions international migrants may relocate because of economic political and social factors in their origin or destination countries using global bilateral migration flows from 103 countries over the period 1990 2000 we explore whether emigrants self select based on economic political and social institutions our study adds social dimension as a potential determinant of migration and separates the pull and push effects of political economic and social institutions our results indicate that economic political and social institutions are significant pull factors of migration economic freedom has the most substantial pull effect followed by the political institutions social institutions have the weakest pull effect on migration moreover economic and social institutions are significant push factors of migration while political institutions do not show any push effect furthermore educated migrants are more sensitive to the destination economic political and social institutions than less educated migrants and less educated migrants are more sensitive to the social institutions at the origin

hit and they will run the impact of terrorism on migration abstract we analyze the influence of terrorism on migration for 152 countries during 1976 2000 we find robust evidence that terrorism is among the push factors of skilled migration whereas it is not robustly associated with average migration

coordination and collaboration regimes in an anarchic world the study of regimes can contribute to our understanding of international politics only if regimes represent more than international organizations and less than all international relations the conceptualization of regimes developed here accepts the realist image of international politics in which autonomous self interested states interact in an anarchic environment yet there are situations in which rational actors have an incentive to eschew unconstrained independent decision making situations in which individualistic self interested calculation leads them to prefer joint decision making regimes because independent self interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes these situations are labeled dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions to deal with these states must collaborate with one another or coordinate their behavior respectively thus there are different bases for regimes which give rise to regimes with different characteristics coordination is self enforcing and can be reached through the use of conventions collaboration is more formalized and requires mechanisms both to monitor potential cheating and to insure compliance with the regime the article elucidates the assumptions of such an interest based approach to regimes assimilates alternative explanations into this framework and develops the implications for regime maintenance and change

growth waves systemic openness and protectionism there is a distinctively repetitive quality about trade policy problems domestic economic growth slows producers seek protection against foreign competitors and national decision makers raise barriers to trade while at the same time criticizing their counterparts in other governments for engaging in similar practices because trade is one of the more important topics in international and comparative political economy and because this scenario has played itself out more than a few times it is not surprising that a number of theorists have sought to model the underlying processes thought to produce movements toward and away from protectionism by now a variety of different types of approaches ranging from the cognitive to the systemic have been tried systemic structure ideas and ideology surplus capacity business cycles and shifts in elite orientation and domestic coalitions in response to external crises have been emphasized as principal theoretical foci our position is that the different levels of analysis and alternative foci all have merit and utility what they lack is an appreciation for the underlying systemic processes that link together these various facets of the political economy we seek to develop a theoretical argument that explicates these underlying processes the argument centers on recurring growth waves characterized in alternating pattern by the ascent of system leaders and the subsequent successful attempt of technological followers to catch up with the leaders the downturns of the growth waves produce conditions favoring protectionism but we contend the form and the intensity of protectionism that are likely to be produced will depend on which of the two types of growth waves is in progress ascent waves are characterized by the emergence of new technological leaders and a consequent increase in the gap between the leaders and the technological followers during the periods of structural transition and intense

rationality of migration the paradigm of a rational individual acting on the earnings enhancing benefits of migration is subjected to statistical scrutiny using data from turkey results with robust selectivity correction support the rationality hypothesis both migrants and nonmigrants chose the option in which they had comparative advantage however the estimated gain from moving is negative for a substantial portion of migrants whereas a minority realize very high returns this suggests that migration is a lottery individuals are willing to invest in a proposition that has a high probability of yielding negative returns because of the potential for a very large payoff

cooperation in the liberalization of international trade after hegemony what nations dwell in perpetual anarchy for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests because as states they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises the possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off yet at other times states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy

on the importance of public choice in migration models abstract recent general equilibrium tiebout models that use single crossing indifference curves to establish a migration equilibrium incorporate both voting and migration decisions these models have concentrated on the important question of the existence of an equilibrium but the incorporation of both voting and migration has important efficiency consequences as well this paper demonstrates the important effect of the interaction of voting and migration on efficiency conditions by showing that head taxes which are generally considered to provide efficient migration incentives with constant marginal congestion costs do not provide incentives for efficient migration decisions unless the public choice mechanism results in optimal public service provision within jurisdictions

international migration and the role of institutions we study the determinants of international migration with special attention to the role of institutional factors other than economic and demographic fundamentals we evaluate the impact of political institutions and of those institutions specifically targeted at attracting migrants for a dataset on 19th century migration we find that economic and demographic differentials play a major role but that the quality of institutions also matter we produce evidence that both political and migration institutions represent significant factors of attraction even after controlling for their potential endogeneity through a set of instruments exploiting colonial history and the institutions inherited from the past

empirical determinants of corruption a sensitivity analysis many variables have been proposed by past studies as significant determinants of corruption this paper asks if their estimated impact on corruption is robust to alteration of the information set a global sensitivity analysis based on the leamer s extreme bounds analysis gives a clear answer five variables are robustly related to corruption corruption is lower in richer countries where democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period and the population is mainly protestant corruption is instead higher where political instability is a major problem finally a country s colonial heritage appears to be a significant determinant of present corruption

does flexibility promote cooperation an application to the global trade regime do flexibility provisions in international agreements clauses allow ing for legal suspension of concessions without abrogating the treaty promote coop eration recent work emphasizes that provisions for relaxing treaty commitments can ironically make states more likely to form agreements and make deeper conces sions when doing so this argument has particularly been applied to the global trade regime the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and its successor the world trade organization wto yet the field has not produced much evidence bearing on this claim our article applies this claim to the global trade regime and its chief flexibility provision antidumping in contrast to prior work this article explic itly models the endogeneity and selection processes envisioned by the theory we find that states joining the wto are more likely to adopt domestic antidumping mech anisms likewise corrected for endogeneity states able to take advantage of the regime s principal flexibility provision by having a domestic antidumping mecha nism in place are significantly more likely to 1 join the wto 2 agree to more tightly binding tariff commitments and 3 implement lower applied tariffs as well

is corruption an efficient grease this paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework it analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency corruption and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries both developed and developing using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective it may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective we thus find evidence for the grease the wheels hypothesis in its weak and strong forms

trade gaps analytical gaps regime analysis and international commodity trade regulation studies of international regimes have sought to describe international collaborative arrangements in more systematic terms than in the past and to analyze their development in terms of major schools of international relations theory this article refines the commonly used definition of regimes and elucidates the major hypotheses of one theoretical school structural realism the strength and nature of the international commodity trade regime are systematically described and their development is analyzed in terms of the major hypotheses of structural realism in large part these hypotheses are supported by the analysis of what is a relatively weak international regime

automobiles in international trade regime change or persistence the concept of a regime is frequently used to describe and explain behavior in international political economy peter cowhey and edward long attempting to test theories of surplus capacity and hegemonic decline advanced a version of a regime governing international trade in automobiles which was fundamentally liberal from 1966 to 1975 but then collapsed into protectionism their diagnosis is mistaken however because the trade regime for autos was neither as liberal as they assert during the 1950s and 1960s nor as protectionist as they believe it has become in the 1980s the discussion focuses on a new definition of the auto trade regime based on four fundamental rules that have persisted since the 1950s by examining data on auto imports since 1955 on a region by region basis it becomes clear that the trade expansion of the postwar years was not based on a global liberalization of the trade regime but on carefully managed regional arrangements that favored imports within the region or extra regional imports that did not threaten domestic producers the flurry of restraints on japanese imports in recent years is not a collapse into protectionism but a reinforcement of the fundamental regime rules the auto industry case illustrates the tendency of analysts to underestimate protectionist elements in industry trade regimes and to overestimate the amount of changes that take place in their fundamental rules

high tech and productivity evidence from israeli industrial firms abstract the main purpose of this study is to characterize and analyze high technology industrial firms a technology index is constructed and used to classify firms the largest concentration of hightech firms is israel is found in electronics and transport equipment industries and the lowest in textiles and clothing high tech firms appear to be more productive more export oriented pay higher wages and earn higher rates of return than low tech firms the fact that high tech firms in israel are export oriented is shown to be consistent with the international trade theories of comparative advantage and strategic rent seeking

the unraveling of the multi fiber arrangement 1981 an examination of international regime change as competition between newly industrializing and advanced industrialized countries has increased trade protection has become a key issue in textile and apparel trade international regimes to regulate trade intervention have existed since the early 1960s the 1981 renewal of the multi fiber arrangement poses two puzzles first why did countries choose to continue to manage conflict through an international regime rather than through some other arrangement second why did the regime become weaker and more protectionist than in the past an international structure approach suggests that regimes are wanted to prevent arrangements in larger systems from being undermined to control the behavior of other countries and to reduce information costs variation in regime strength can be explained by asymmetry in the distribution of capabilities in various systems the nature of the regime is influenced by changes in international competition and by nesting a domestic structure approach on the other hand focuses on the relationships between state and societal groups the commission and member states in the case of the eec the relative strength of groups affects national policies and the development and characteristics of regimes a processtracing examination of international textile negotiations emphasizing the response of decision makers to structural constraints and incentives allows us to ascertain the relative influence of international and domestic structures on the negotiations and outcomes

the transformation of trade the sources and effects of regime change regimes can be analyzed both as outcomes to be explained and as mediating social institutions that affect international transactions in the case of postwar trade the changing outcomes can be predicted simply and with rough accuracy by a hegemonic model yet that model cannot explain the continuing reduction of tariffs the development of new nontariff codes and the persistence of crucial norms rules and institutions these durable features of modern trade suggest that the logic of regime maintenance is distinct from that of regime initiation nor can the hegemonic model account for the regime s highly uneven weakening the most prominent trade barriers are in mature basic industries the least prominent are in industries with differentiated products and extensive research and development expenditures one explanation which usefully complements a hegemonic model is that sectors differ systematically in their capacity to adapt competitively to imports and hence in their need to preserve their position by trade barriers despite the regime s uneven weakening trade volumes have continued their secular growth in sectors where the regime remains strong it has stimulated two way trade in similar products intraindustry trade where the regime is weaker new nontariff barriers diminish hypothetical trade growth but rarely aim at a permanent rollback in market shares or trade volume

roads to follow regulating direct foreign investment the united states faces a formidable and growing economic challenge from japan over the last decade the american state has characteristically responded to the loss of domestic market dominance in the manufacturing sector to foreign firms by invoking the principles of free and fair trade in order to delegitimate this foreign competition and legitimate the imposition of trade barriers designed to encourage the investment of multinational corporations mncs in the united states these tactics have largely succeeded in attracting investment and thus aided domestic employment and the balance of trade the short term benefits however have been achieved at long term unforeseen undesirable economic and political costs in terms of both the balance of payments and state autonomy alternative state responses to the threat posed by japanese mncs while consistent with principles of free trade challenge the traditional liberal conception of the scope and domain of state behavior and provide more effective policies in achieving both short and long term objectives this article draws on data relating to the treatment of subsidiaries of american automobile manufacturers by european governments with competing indigenous producers in specifying two variables critical to identifying policy alternatives first the degree of access granted by the state to foreign firms limited or unlimited access and second the type of support provided by the state to domestic firms discriminatory or nondiscriminatory intervention the analysis suggests that there are four possible policy combinations which generally reflect the four different postwar state policies pursued by west germany france britain and the united states of these four the combination employed by west germany has proved most effective in pursuing policies consistent with liberal trade principles while reconciling short term employment and fiscal goals with the broader long term objectives of sustaining state autonomy and balance of payments surpluses in the face of foreign competition british policies which have consistently proved the most ineffective have sacrificed long term objectives for short term ones as a result of structural changes during the 1970s the american state s chosen policy combination was altered and now replicates the traditional british formula the united states therefore risks comparable economic and political consequences

net migration and state labor market dynamics existing empirical estimates of net migration models are not identified because they lack an explicit measure of expected future conditions i find that using actual one period ahead net migration at the state level to control for expectations reduces the strength of the relationship between current wages and net migration by more than one third i use the case of michigan to show how existing empirical models mischaracterize the response of migration to shocks that are expected to be transitory i add migration to a labor market model and simulate responses to permanent and transitory demand shocks

toward a business cycle model of tariffs a modified interest group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations this model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations the united states great britain and germany empirical analysis lends strong support to the model s central thesis that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle tariff changes occurring in the three nations with the exception of british tariff increases generally conform to the expectations of the model furthermore business cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability

the gatt and the regulation of trade barrier regime dynamics and functions since the second world war complex and changing sets of norms and rules have governed trade relations among most countries they have largely originated from a unique and accidental international organization the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt we have labeled these norms rules and decision making mechanisms the gatt regime or global trade barriers regime the importance that gatt members have attached to certain norms has shaped the regime s procedural mechanisms rules and implementation of rules classifying those norms as sovereignty or interdependence norms we posit that the strength or autonomy of the regime can be established by analyzing the prominence of the interdependence norms in the issue area we close by exploring some of the functions of the regime in international trade and political relations

rocks hard places and the new protectionism textile trade policy choices in the united states and japan why have advanced industrial countries responded with different types of protectionist policy to postwar international competition and the resulting societal pressure for state action in contrast to the across the board tariff wars of the 1930s postwar protectionism is a patchwork of tariffs unilateral and nonunilateral quotas administrative restrictions state subsidies and production cartels arguments based on international economic structure international regimes statist approaches and domestic structure all appear to have difficulty in accounting for divergent trade policy choices this article introduces a more nuanced identification and integration of the international and domestic sources of the new protectionism an examination of textile trade policy in the united states and japan reveals that when state policymakers face conflicting international constraints and domestic pressure over the use of overt types of protectionist policy the greater the domestic pressure the more overt the policy response

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

tariffs and trade fluctuations does protectionism matter as much as we think despite the widespread assumption that tariffs reduce trade volume in the short term it is conceivable that long term expansion and contractions in trade actually drive tariff levels a granger causality analysis performed on british u s french german japanese and a systematic aggregate data on gdp tariff levels encompassing the 1854 1990 period finds mixed support for both the short and long term interpretations in general the antecedence of trade on protectionism predominates over the antecedence of protectionism on trade one implication is that the long term context should not be ignored in analyzing short term dynamics

hegemons ios and markets the case of the substitution account for eighteen months between 1978 and 1980 the international monetary fund and imf members attempted to reform the international monetary system by establishing a substitution account designed to enhance the stability of the monetary system the proposed substitution account would have accepted dollar deposits from foreign central banks in return issuing certificates denominated in special drawing rights the collapse of negotiations about the account in early 1980 confirms the hypothesis of hegemonic stability theorists that the distribution of systemic costs is problematic in the absence of a hegemonic power the case thereby qualifies recent assertions that a small group of nations can supply stability to the international economy however two factors outside the realm of hegemonic theory also helped produce the outcome of the negotiations the division of power within the united states between congress and the executive and changes in international market conditions during 1979 and early 1980

protectionism and world politics much unwarranted gloom and doom has been written of late about the new protectionism it has been widely held to be a major hindrance to third world development an obstacle in the path of world economic recovery and even a threat to good international relations the facts about trade in recent years suggest a different story and the need to look far more critically at some of the myths propounded by liberal economists for it was not protectionism that was responsible for starting the depression of the 1980s any more than that of the 1930s then as now it was financial uncertainty and the consequent shrinkage of credit that slowed both growth and trade nor is protectionism a serious menace not only has it failed to stop the flood of industrial exports from asian countries there afe good reasons of state and corporate self interest why it need not be feared in the future far from being a threat to the international economic order as imf and gatt ideologues would have us believe bilateral trading agreements between states and corporations are sustaining continued growth in trade despite financial disorder

disciplining trade finance the oecd export credit arrangement the salience of tariffs quotas and other import restrictions in current discussions of trade policy obscures what may well become a more significant form of government intervention subsidized export promotion over the past two decades subsidized trade finance has been one of the most widely used instruments of export promotion this article offers an historical description and a theoretical explanation for the success of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd export credit arrangement an international regime restricting the provision of subsidized trade finance the explanation emphasizes three factors the structure of government institutions the relative power of states and the functional value of information more generally the analysis demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of monocausal explanations of international cooperation and the advantages of explanations based on a conception of international cooperation as a multistage process each stage of which may be explained by a separate theory

union relative wage effects a survey of macro estimates this paper surveys union wage effect estimates drawn from empirical cross section wage equations fitted to macro aggregated data in 34 post 1963 studies containing such equations each estimate is the partial derivative of the dependent wage variable in logarithmic units with respect to the extent of unionism fraction unionized variable in the equation this paper shows that these estimates contain a mixture in uncertain ratio of the union nonunion wage differential or wage gap on the one hand and an extent of unionism effect on the other therefore the macro estimates should not be interpreted as wage gap estimates

the dynamics of negotiated protectionism r ecent protectionism by the united states has principally taken the form of negotiated barriers to trade such as voluntary export restraints these barriers tend to evolve over time and to display three patterns which we label institutionalized temporary and sporadic protectionism cartel theory and studies of the politics of protection suggest that the dynamics of negotiated protectionism will depend on three variables the barriers to entry into an industry the size of the domestic industry and the exit barriers for domestic firms low barriers to entry will lead to institutionalized protectionism when the domestic industry is large and exit difficult temporary protectionism results when the domestic industry is small and exit easy and sporadic protectionism is likely when barriers to entry are high brief studies of u s protectionism in textiles and apparel steel footwear televisions and automobiles illustrate the value of this framework t rade protectionism has often been thought of as a unilateral act by a sovereign state yet much protectionism during the 1970s and 1980s has been negotiated rather than unilaterally imposed voluntary export restraints vers and similar arrangements have become the preferred means by which the united states has sought to cartelize industrial sectors threatened by imports such negotiated protectionism has been particularly evident in five industries in the united states during part or all of the last quarter century in textiles and apparel steel footwear television sets and autos the united states has negotiated trade restrictions with numerous foreign exporters while the u s government has occasionally provided unilateral measures of protection for small industries all u s administrations since world war ii have been reluctant to countenance general schemes of protection for major industries yet beginning with the eisenhower administration s negotiations in textiles in 1956 virtually every u s president has actively sought vers for economically and politically sensitive industrial sectors

applying most different systems designs comparing development policy in alabama and jamaica in every polity development policy choices often remain either implicit or largely ignored whereas economic growth can be measured with some precision development policy choices continue to cons

bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth there appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered however on the link between corruption government and growth the paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth balanced growth is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital which engenders growth and accumulating political capital which mainly assures bureaucratic power the analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long term growth under alternative political regimes some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically