technological specialization and the decline of diversified firms we document a strong decline in corporate diversification activity since the late 1970s and we develop a dynamic model that explains this pattern both qualitatively and quantitatively the key feature of the model is that synergies endogenously decline with technological specialization leading to fewer diversified firms in equilibrium the model further predicts that segments inside a conglomerate should become more related over time which is consistent with the data finally the calibrated model also matches other empirical magnitudes well output growth rate market to book ratios diversification discount frequency and returns of diversifying mergers and frequency of refocusing activity

measuring image spillovers in umbrella branded products umbrella branding the practice of labeling more than one product with a single brand name is commonly used by multiproduct companies spillovers occur when information about one product affects the demand for other products with the same brand name this article provides a methodology to analyze spillovers and uses it to measure two instances of spillover effects the study shows that negative spillovers resulted from the audi 5000 s problems with sudden acceleration and that positive spillovers resulted from jaguar s first major model change in seventeen years copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

recursive non expected utility connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity abstract i study how risk preferences and the level of ambiguity influence ambiguity attitudes in uzi segal s recursive second order non expected utility model it is shown that the negative certainty independence axiom for risk preferences is equivalent to a global form of ambiguity aversion that entails ambiguity averse behavior irrespective of the state space and the decision maker s second order belief thus the second order version of the cautious expected utility model is the only subclass of segal s theory that robustly predicts ambiguity aversion moreover a mean preserving spread operation over second order beliefs which corresponds to a particular way of increasing the level of ambiguity is equivalent to increasing the relative strength of ambiguity aversion for each possible specification of risk preferences within the cautious expected utility model an application of the latter result establishes a negative relation between participation rates in an asset market and the level of ambiguity concerning the distribution of returns

applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion the paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer the construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the yitzhaki version of the allingham sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion recent approaches have applied non expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction the models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the yitzhaki model

optimism pessimism and financial bubbles this paper shows that it is possible to extend the scope of the existence of rational bubbles when uncertainty is introduced associated with rank dependent expected utility this rdu assumption can be viewed as a transformation of probabilities depending on the pessimism optimism of the agent the results show that pessimism favors the existence of deterministic bubbles when optimism may promote the existence of stochastic bubbles moreover under pessimism the rdu assumption may generate multiple bubbly equilibria the rdu assumption also leads to new conditions ensuring the absence of pareto optimality of the competitive equilibrium without bubbles these conditions still govern the existence of bubbles

cautious risk takers investor preferences and demand for active management actively managed mutual funds have distinct return distributions from their passive benchmarks and our theoretical analysis using tail sensitive risk preferences suggests that active value and growth funds may serve to reduce downside risk and capture upside potential respectively furthermore tail sensitivity measures estimated from the empirical pricing kernel have significant explanatory power for active fund flows even after controlling for business cycles and market wide sentiment finally active funds unlike their passive counterparts have exposures to option strategies hedging downside risk or capturing upside potential

risk rationality and time diversification the validity of the concept of time diversification is the subject of long running debate supporters of the concept argue that risk decreases as investment horizon increases detractors suggest that the concept is false on the face of it we argue that time diversification is consistent both theoretically and empirically with current conceptions of risk and rationality and we also note the implications of changes in investment horizon for stock market behavior

are preferences monotonic testing some predictions of regret theory in this paper the authors demonstrate that the assumption of regret aversion which has been invoked in regret theory to explain several well documented violations of expected utility theory also implies the existence of strict preferences between some stochastically equivalent actions and implies certain systematic violations of monotonicity the authors report an experimental test of these predictions they find that while choices between stochastically equivalent actions are entirely consistent with expected utility theory there is clear evidence of the monotonicity violations predicted by regret theory copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions abstract we study the properties of dutch auctions in an independent private value setting where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their payoffs by the worst case from a set of probabilistic scenarios in contrast to static auction formats participants in the dutch auction gradually learn about the valuations of other bidders we show that the transmitted information can lead to changes in the worst case distribution and thereby shift a bidder s payoff maximizing exit price over time we characterise the equilibrium bidding function in this environment and show that the arriving information leads bidders to exit earlier at higher prices as a result the dutch auction systematically generates more revenue than the first price auction

on the consensus effect abstract individuals often tend to conform to the choices of others in group decisions compared to choices made in isolation we show that this behavior which we term the consensus effect is equivalent to a well known violation of expected utility namely strict quasi convexity of preferences which is shared by many popular non expected utility models in contrast to the equilibrium outcome when individuals are expected utility maximizers quasi convexity of preferences imply that group decisions may fail to properly aggregate preferences and strictly pareto dominated equilibria may arise

vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities abstract when decision makers maximize expected utility with rank dependent probabilities and the object being auctioned is a risky prospect then with independent private value vickrey auctions lose their demand revealing property moreover they might be non pareto optimal

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

noncooperative bargaining hostages and optimal asset ownership this paper re examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels it obtains some results which contradict findings by sanford j grossman oliver d hart and john moore in particular it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser s investment incentive the difference between this paper and those authors papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining this paper also clarifies the role of relationship specific investments as a cause of integration copyright 1998 by american economic association

bargaining and boldness abstract we study a multiperson bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of shaked s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown if preferences are smooth then as the risk of breakdown vanishes the limiting outcome is one in which bargainers are equally marginally bold where a bargainer s marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a marginal improvement in his position under smoothness any ordinal nash solution is an equally marginally bold outcome however unlike the concept of the ordinal nash solution a unique equally marginally bold outcome exists in natural cases in particular if all bargainers have risk averse preferences of the rank dependent expected utility type for these preferences the equally marginally bold outcome maximizes a bargaining power adjusted asymmetric nash product where the degree of asymmetry is determined by the disparity in the marginal valuation of certainty among bargainers journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d81

the firm as a dedicated hierarchy a theory of the origins and growth of firms in the formative stages of their businesses entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect rather than steal the source of organizational rents we study how the entrepreneur s response to this problem determines the organization s internal structure growth and its eventual size large steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries and will have seniority based promotion policies by contrast e at hierarchies will prevail in human capital intensive industries and will have up or out promotion systems furthermore e at hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies the model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets at the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea good customer relationships a new tool or superior management technique a fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the cooperation of the many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated by the enterprise the risk of being expropriated however is always inherent in production in particular the entrepreneur has to give her employees whom we call managers close proximity or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce effectively for example a manager has to understand the idea be in contact with the key customers and suppliers or even learn the entrepreneur s unique managerial techniques in order to work effectively but access also gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur managers may steal the idea walk away with clients or mimic the entrepreneur s management style and start up a rival concern the greater the access a manager has the more he can appropriate and the more effectively he can compete this paper explores the role of organizational design in

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

existence and uniqueness of ordinal nash outcomes abstract in this paper we present necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of ordinal nash outcomes these outcomes are derived from the ordinal nash solution a reinterpretation and an extension of the nash bargaining solution that allows bargainers to have preference relations that are more general than expected utility our task is undertaken by the construction of a new notion called induced utilities journal of economic literature classification number c78

information revelation in the property right theory of the firms abstract i incorporate revelation of asymmetric information through shared ownership partnership into the property right theory of the firms shared ownership is optimal as a joint result of mitigating hold up and inducing truthful information revelation due to the incomplete contracting nature shared ownership is incentive compatible if it induces truthful information revelation within the relationship as well as when the relationship breaks off the equilibrium path incentive compatibility results in the optimality of partnership even for the most efficient type of the informed party inefficient investment thus arises the level of shared ownership depends on the relative magnitude of the information rent effect and the hold up effect shared ownership is robust to semi truthful information revelation under which hold up occurs in equilibrium with an endogenously determined probability related to the revelation strategy

the impact of income components on the distribution of family incomes attempts have recently been made to assign inequality contributions to various components of income this paper discusses the issues involved in such assignments and highlights the problems that follow from having a number of possible decomposition rules u s data on the distribution of family incomes are used to examine the relative influence of these income components and to evaluate empirically the performance of different decomposition rules a wide range of inequality contributions can be obtained even when restricted to only naturally derived decomposition rules some of the results are plainly absurd and serve to warn against the indiscriminate use of decomposition formulae without first investigating their properties

the validity of qalys under non expected utility this paper examines applications of non expected utility in the health domain the most widely used utility model in health economics the time linear qaly model assumes i separability of quality of life and life duration and ii linearity of the utility for life duration we perform new tests which are robust to violations of expected utility of these two assumptions the data support separability but show that the utility for life duration is concave rather than linear the finding of concave utility may not be surprising in itself the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate this empirically without being invalidated by violations of expected utility it has by now been widely recognised that expected utility is not valid as a descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty the descriptive violations of expected utility have led to the emergence of several non expected utility theories the increasing importance of non expected utility makes it necessary to reassess applications that were previously based on expected utility examples of such reassessments include karni and safra 1989 crawford 1990 and dekel et al 1991 for game theory machina 1995 and wakker et al 1997 for insurance theory and cubitt and sugden 1998 for the evolution of preferences see starmer 2000 for a review the present paper examines applications of non expected utility in the health domain we focus on the main utility model in health economics the quality adjusted life years qaly model and present new theoretical foundations for and empirical tests of this model under non expected utility qalys provide a simple way to combine the two dimensions of health life duration and health status into a single utility index they are intuitively appealing which facilitates communication to policy makers and analytically tractable which explains their widespread use in practical studies a disadvantage of qalys is that they only represent individual preferences over health under strong assumptions if these assumptions do not hold then the use of qalys may lead to incorrect policy recommendations to gain insight into the validity of qalys it is necessary to assess the restrictiveness of the assumptions that the qaly model imposes in the most common version of the qaly model the time linear qaly model the utility of the health outcome of spending t years in health state q is equal to tv g where v is a utility function over health states that is in the time linear qaly model the utility for duration is linear it is well known that under expected utility linearity of utility implies risk neutrality as it turns out risk neutrality with

credit markets with imperfect information risk aversion versus pessimism abstract stiglitz and weiss 1981 credit rationing is embedded within rank dependent expected utility theory our results show that sufficient pessimism or sufficient risk aversion by borrowers may eliminate adverse selection moreover lender optimism may eliminate credit rationing even when adverse selection exists

payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk abstract this paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of yaari s econometrica 55 1987 95 dual theory of choice under risk it is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions

auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders abstract we investigate bidders and seller s responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in the first price auction fpa and the second price auction spa with independent private valuations we model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model we find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the fpa are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the spa and prefer the spa to the fpa if bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the fpa and prefers the fpa to the spa

existence and dynamic consistency of nash equilibrium with non expected utility preferences sufficient conditions for the existence of a nash equilibrium are given when preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption rcla without rcla decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the same probabilities of final outcomes therefore the conditions depend on how players perceive the game whether they view themselves as moving first or second we also review conditions under which the equilibria will be dynamically consistent

a dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity we study the question of auction design in an ipv setting characterized by ambiguity we assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion in particular they are represented by the epsilon contamination model we show that a simple variation of a discrete dutch auction can extract almost all surplus this contrasts with optimal auctions under ipv without ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with ambiguity in all of these types other than the lowest participating type obtain a positive surplus an important point of departure is that the modified dutch mechanism is dynamic rather than static establishing that under ambiguity aversion even when the setting is ipv in all other respects a dynamic mechanism can have additional bite over its static counterparts a further general insight is that the standard revelation principle does not automatically extend to environments not characterized by subjective expected utility

the probability premium a graphical representation we illustrate that pratt s probability premium can be given a simple graphical representation allowing a direct comparison to the equivalent but more prevalent concept of risk premium under expected utility we also show that the probability premium s graphical representation under the dual theory mimics that of the risk premium under expected utility

dynamic consistency revelations in auctions and the structure of preferences analyzing the optimal bidding behaviour in ascending bid auctions and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values we show that expected utility maximizing behaviour is equivalent to a dynamically consistent bidding in ascending bid auctions b the equivalence of the optimal bids in ascending bid auctions and in second price sealed bid auctions c bidding the value of the object in second price sealed bid auctions in addition the optimal bid in ascending bid auctions equals the value of the object if and only if the bidder s preferences on lotteries are both quasi concave and quasi convex

cumulative prospect theory option returns and the variance premium the variance premium and the pricing of out of the money otm equity index options are major challenges to standard asset pricing models we develop a tractable equilibrium model with cumulative prospect theory cpt preferences that can overcome both challenges the key insight is that the variance premium can be written as the expected return on a portfolio of otm call and put options and the probability weighting feature of cpt can explain the puzzlingly low returns observed for these options using gmm on a sample of u s index option returns between 1996 and 2010 we show that the cpt model ts well observed option prices and therefore the variance premium in a dynamic setting probability weighting and time varying equity return volatility combine to match the observed time series pattern of the variance premium

a theory of subjective compound lotteries abstract we develop a savage type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries our theory permits issue preference that is agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues hence we establish subjective foundations for the anscombe aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities we define second order risk as risk that resolves in the first stage of the compound lottery and show that uncertainty aversion implies aversion to second order risk which implies issue preference and behavior consistent with the ellsberg paradox

strotz meets allais diminishing impatience and the certainty effect abstract decision makers tend to exhibit a higher degree of impatience when considering a delay to an immediate reward than when contemplating an identical delay to an equal future reward this work argues that diminishing impatience originates from the distinction between the certain present and the risky future a simple functional representation of preferences exhibiting time inconsistency when the future is uncertain is derived experimental evidence which is inconsistent with other formulations that account for diminishing impatience supports the proposed approach the new theory uncovers a tight relation between diminishing impatience and well known behavioral regularities in choice under risk and uncertainty jel d12 d81

many good choice axioms when can many good lotteries be treated as money lotteries abstract without the independence axiom a weaker substitution axiom adi is necessary for the preferences over money lotteries induced by the money metric utility function to be well behaved given adi the agent s preferences over many good lotteries can be reconstructed from knowledge of preferences over money lotteries and over sure multivariate outcomes moreover other substitution properties of underlying many good lottery preferences are inherited by the money lottery preferences we analyze the formal and intuitive nature of adi and conclude that analysis of choice under uncertainty without adi cannot be one dimensional

revenue non equivalence between the english and the second price auctions experimental evidence under second price sealed bid auctions when bidders have independent private valuations of a risky object submitting one s valuation is no longer dominant for non expected utility bidders this yields a breakdown in revenue equivalence between english auctions and second price auctions for non expected utility bidders in an experimental auction market selling a single risky object we find that an english auction yields higher seller revenue than the corresponding second price auction further the direction of revenue difference is supported by nash equilibrium bidding behavior of betweenness conforming non expected utility bidders under the additional hypothesis of bidders displaying a weak form of allais type behavior

stochastic dominance in regret theory the regret theory of choice under uncertainty is known to admit intransitivities in preference relations in this paper the stochastic dominance properties of the theory are examined it is shown that the usual definition of first stochastic dominance is not satisfied by regret theoretic preferences and that in general violations of first stochastic dominance are not merely permitted but required an exact characterization of the stochastic dominance rule corresponding to regret theoretic preferences is presented this concept is weaker than the usual definition but stronger than the notion of statewise dominance in which one prospect yields a preferred outcome with probability 1 theories of choice under uncertainty have proliferated in recent years after a long period in which the expected utility eu approach of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 was pre eminent the breakdown of the dominance in eu theory reflects the increasing body of evidence that the choices made by many people systematically violate the predictions of the theory the axiomatic foundations of the theory and in particular the independence axiom have also received severe questioning ever since the famous critique of allais 1953

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

what s in a name reputation as a tradeable asset the author develops a model in which a firm s only asset is its name which summarizes its reputation and studies the forces that cause names to be valuable tradable assets an adverse selection model in which shifts of ownership are not observable guarantees an active market for names with either finite or infinite horizons no equilibrium exists in which only good types buy good names the reputational dynamics that emerge from the model are more realistic than those in standard game theoretic reputation models and suggest that adverse selection plays a crucial role in understanding firm reputation

first author conditions this paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name ordering on academic papers in economics in a context in which market participants are interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors it is an equilibrium for papers to use alphabetical ordering moreover it is never an equilibrium for authors always to be listed in order of relative contribution in fact we show via an example that the alphabetical name ordering norm may be the unique equilibrium althoug multiple equilibria are also possible finally we charaterize the welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibrium and show it to produce research of lower quality than is optimal and than would be achieved if coauthors were forced to use name ordering to signal relative contribution

discounting behavior a reconsideration we re evaluate the theory experimental design and econometrics behind claims that individuals exhibit non constant discounting behavior theory points to the importance of controlling for the non linearity of the utility function of individuals since the discount rate is defined over time dated utility flows and not flows of money it also points to a menagerie of functional forms to characterize different types of non constant discounting behavior the implied experimental design calls for individuals to undertake several tasks to allow us to identify these models and to several treatments such as multiple horizons and the effect of allowing for a front end delay on earlier payments the implied econometrics calls for structural estimation of the theoretical models allowing for joint estimation of utility functions and discounting functions using data collected from a representative sample of 413 adult danes in 2009 we draw striking conclusions assuming an exponential discounting model we estimate discount rates to be 5 6 on average this is significantly lower than all previous estimates using controlled experiments we also find no evidence to support quasi hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting and only modest evidence to support other specifications of non constant discounting furthermore the evidence for non constant discounting while statistically significant is not economically significant in terms of the size of the estimated discount rates we undertake extensive robustness checks on these findings including a detailed review of the previous comparable literature

the nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions abstract a simple derivation of the non expected utility nash outcome as defined in rubinstein et al 1992 rubinstein a safra z thomson w 1992 on the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences econometrica 60 1171 1186 is given for the class of decision weight utility functions conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

does asset ownership always motivate managers outside options and the property rights theory of the firm this paper studies the grossman hart moore ghm property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating offers bargaining when managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation the ghm results obtain if taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining outcomes are very different sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with sometimes independent assets should be owned together sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately

household portfolio diversification a case for rank dependent preferences the proliferation of novel preference theories in financial economics is hampered by a lack of non experimental evidence and by the theories additional complexity which has not been shown to be critical in applications in this article i present arguments in support of preferences with rank dependency using the survey of consumer finances data i document two widespread patterns inconsistent with expected utility i many households simultaneously invest in well deversified funds and in poorly diversified portfolios of stocks and ii some households with substantial savings do not invest anything in equities i show that portfolio choice models with rank dependent preferences plausibly parameterized and under fully rational assumptions are quantitatively consistent with the observed diversification these results call for further efforts to integrate the models of rank dependent preferences in portfolio theory and asset pricing the decision theoretic literature has long acknowledged the shortcomings of the expected utility theory of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 several generalizations of the theory are inspired by the experimental evidence and aimed at improving its descriptive accuracy however there are few applications of new models of preferences in finance and expected utility continues to dominate the field 1 two principal hurdles slow the proliferation of novel preferences in financial economics first the lack of empirical non experimental or field data confirming that the behavior motivating non expected utilities is widespread outside the laboratory settings second the additional and often significant complexity of the alternative preferences which has not been shown to be critical in applications where the models based on expected utility fall short of reasonable predictions this article presents empirical and theoretical this paper was previously circulated under the title household portfolio diversification the paper has benefited from the comments of shlomo benartzi luca benzoni markus brunnermeier john dickhaut maria perozek raj singh hersh shefrin and workshop participants at minnesota finance bag lunch 2003 wharton conference household financial decision making and portfolio choice and 2003 summer meetings of econometric society i would like to thank cam harvey the editor and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions a special thanks to jack kareken for comments and editorial help on an earlier draft i am grateful to donna zerwitz for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author address correspondence to valery polkovnichenko finance 3 122 csom 319 19 th

the invention of the independence condition for preferences this paper discusses the history and interrelations of three central ideas in preference theory the independence condition in decision under risk the sure thing principle in decision under uncertainty and conjoint independence for multiattribute decisions and consumer theory independence was recognized as an important component of decision under risk in the late 1940s by jacob marschak john nash herman rubin and norman dalkey and first appeared in publication in marschak marschak j 1950 rational behavior uncertain prospects and measurable utility econometrica18 111 141 and nash nash j f 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica18 155 162 the sure thing principle can be credited to savage savage l j 1953 une axiomatisation du comportement raisonnable face i l incertitude colloq internal centre national rech sci 40 econometrie 29 40 savage l j 1954 the foundations of statistics wiley new york 2nd edn dover new york 1972 conjoint independence for consumer theory was introduced by sono sono m 1943 the effect of price changes on the demand and supply of separable goods in japanese kokumin keisai zasshi74 1 51 and leontief leontief w w 1947a a note on the interrelation of subsets of independent variables of a continuous function with continuous first derivatives bull amer math soc 53 343 350 leontief w w 1947b introduction to a theory of the internal structure of functional relationships econometrica51 361 373 a form of it can also be recognized in samuelson samuelson p a 1947 foundations of economic analysis harvard university press cambridge ma presented earlier in samuelson samuelson p a 1940 foundations of analytical economics the observational significance of economic theory ph d dissertation harvard university boston ma independence and the sure thing principle are equivalent for decision under risk but in a less elementary way than has sometimes been thought the sure thing principle for decision under uncertainty and conjoint independence are identical in a mathematical sense the mathematics underlying our three preference conditions has an older history the independence condition for decision under risk can be recognized in the characterization of associative means and conjoint independence for multiattribute decisions in solutions to the generalized associativity functional equation

the boundaries of firms as information barriers when contracts are incomplete the property rights theory of firms suggests that ownership of physical assets provides better outside options which in turn strengthen the owner s incentives to invest in the enterprise this approach is less suitable for human capital firms such as management consulting that lack physical assets this article develops an alternative theory for integration that sheds light on the boundaries of human capital firms in particular when a relationship between parties includes large potential externalities reducing the outside option of each party will be beneficial integration provides this reduction by blurring the contribution of individual parties within the firm and thus lowering their independent market valuation unlike some results in the property rights literature the results here are robust to variations in ex post bargaining solution

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

brand extension as informational leverage the marketing literature refers to the concept of brand capital and provides empirical evidence that firms with a large stock of well established brands have an advantage in introducing new products this paper develops a theory of brand extension as a mechanism for informational leverage in which a firm leverages off a good s reputation in one market to alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry encountered in other markets it is shown that brand extension helps a multi product monopolist introduce a new experience good with less price distortion thus the paper provides a theoretical foundation for the concept of brand capital

choice under uncertainty evidence from ethiopia india and uganda we review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in ethiopia india and uganda using these data we estimate that just over 50 of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately however when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory

seeking a comprehensive measure of economic well being annuitisation versus capitalisation abstract biases in inequality measures arise when components of comprehensive measures of economic well being are estimated using cross section data biases under annuitisation are small and bounded unlike biases under capitalisation this recommends the annuity over the capitalisation approach

partnership firms reputation and human capital in human capital intensive industries where it is difficult to contract upon the training effort of skilled agents a socially suboptimal level of training may occur we show how partnership organisations can overcome this problem by tying human and financial capital partnerships are opaque so that the willingness of clients to pay depends upon reputation partnerships are illiquid and partners must stay with the firm until clients discover their type and update the firm s reputation this renders unskilled agents who will aversely affect reputation unwilling to accept partnerships skilled agents therefore train the next generation so as to ensure that there is an adequate market for their own shares we comment upon the salient differences between partnerships and joint stock firms

international income mobility abstract we perform a novel analysis of the international mobility of per capita gnp we find general but not unambiguous support for the notion that world income mobility increased between 1972 and 1992 counterpointing the increased inequality over this period

optimism and pessimism in games this paper considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations it extends the earlier literature by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity ambiguity is modelled by ceu preferences we propose a new solution concept for players who may express ambiguitypreference then we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity attitude in games with strategic complements this gives a precise statement of the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour

stochastic dominance analysis without the independence axiom we characterize the consistency of a large class of nonexpected utility preferences including mean variance preferences and prospect theory preferences with stochastic orders for example stochastic dominances of different degrees our characterization rests on a novel decision theoretic result that provides a behavioral interpretation of the set of all derivatives of the functional representing the decision maker s preferences as an illustration we consider in some detail prospect theory and choice acclimating preferences two popular models of reference dependence under risk and we show the incompatibility of loss aversion with prudence this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

portfolio choice in personal equilibrium abstract this paper finds that in portfolio choice where reference point arises endogenously in personal equilibria investors behave as if they had a concave probability weighting function this finding establishes a link between the reference dependent utility and the rank dependent utility theories

the use of cross section microdata in life cycle models an application to inequality theory in nonstationary economies this paper examines the appropriate use of cross section microdata in life cycle models drawing upon recent empirical work based upon panel data we illustrate how these results can be used as priors to generate a distribution of life cycle earnings such a surrogate distribution can be shown to possess the same properties as actual distributions we focus attention particularly upon the treatment of economic growth and the unobservable components of earnings in the final section of the paper we show how such distributions might be used in inequality analysis