war peace and the size of countries this paper studies the relationship between international con ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and non peaceful confrontations are possible we show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood bene ts and costs of con ict and war we also study the role of international law and show how better de ned international property rights may lead to country breakup and more numerous local con icts

development of smes and heterogeneity of trajectories the case of biotechnology in france biotechnology is an emergent sector based on the creation of research intensive small and medium enterprises smes while some smes are growing most of them remain small even those set up several years ago what is the pattern of development of the biotech sector what are the patterns of development of firms studies on the development of high tech smes have focused on a business model in which entrepreneurs rely on growth forecasts to persuade capital investors business angels and venture capitalists to invest in a radical innovation project firms aim for a world market to industrialise their innovation and initial public offering ipo enables initial investors to make profits that offset risky initial investment while this model is appealing it is simply one of the possible models of biotechnology development some firms are not designed to experience exponential growth and choose to target local markets moreover not all firms have the ambition of being listed on the stock exchange based on an in depth analysis of the business and development of 60 french biotech smes this article identifies two business models by defining the development trajectories of each of these models it highlights the temporary nature of the emergent model

war is in the error term at least since thucydides students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war rationalist explanations assume purposive action states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive durable and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war i show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante both to us as researchers and to the participants thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically however the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables however detailed the explanation serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives we can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic for example we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance the need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight otherwise states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty it has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic war is literally in the error term

economic theories of the break up and integration of nations abstract this paper surveys the recent political economy literature on the size distribution of nations the main themes of this literature are 1 a the spread of democracy leads to the creation of too many sovereign states 2 b the extent of factor mobility plays a key role in determining the incentives towards separation or integration 3 c economic integration through the development of international trade may require greater political integration to create and effectively maintain a level playing field in international trade at the same time economic integration by reducing the economic costs of separation increases the incentives towards political separation

nation states vs united empire effects of political competition on economic growth is political fragmentation i e nation states more favorable to economic growth than political unification i e a united empire this study develops an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification under unification the economy is vulnerable to excessive leviathan taxation and possibly subject to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations under fragmentation the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense if capital mobility is above below a threshold then fragmentation unification would favor growth and this threshold is increasing in the degree of defense competition and decreasing in the costs of heterogeneity

anarchy and its breakdown anarchy defined as a system in which participants can seize and defend resources without regulation from above is not chaos but rather a spontaneous order however anarchy is fragile and may dissolve either into formless amorphy or into a more organized system such as hierarchy under anarchy each contestant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources anarchy is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort the decisiveness parameter is sufficiently low and incomes exceed the viability minimum these considerations explain many features of animal and human conflict

the breakup of nations a political economy analysis this paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations in each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting a basic trade off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted the model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies the main results of the paper are i when income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small separation occurs in equilibrium and ii when all factors of production are perfectly mobile all incentives for separation disappear i introduction following the demise of communism the entire map of europe from the atlantic coast to the urals is being redrawn and issues of separation unification and the redrawing of borders are yet again at the forefront of european concerns many of the issues raised by this process are primarily of a political cultural or linguistic nature however there are also economic considerations that bear on this problem the objective of this paper is to analyze some important economic and political determinants of the process of unification and separation of democratic nations the starting point of our analysis is to suppose that from an economic efficiency point of view separation of nations is never desirable a unified nation is always more efficient since free trade among regions is guaranteed duplication costs in defense and law enforcement are avoided and local public goods provision such as transportation and communication networks or common standards can be coordinated furthermore any benefits of decentralization that might be obtained in a world with several nations may also be achieved within a unified nation by replicating the administrative structure of the world with several

economic theories of political dis integration abstract this paper surveys the recent political economy literature on countries incentives to form international unions and or to disintegrate in smaller jurisdictions the main factors that affect these incentives are i economic integration ii the international order iii international spillovers and iv the institutional setting some implications are drawn for the current debate in europe on the political effects of economic integration on the enlargement process and on the distribution of prerogatives between the european union and national governments

war politics an economic rational voter framework the frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the united states is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president s first term than in other periods the authors develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle war decisions and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events an incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage with some probability his reelection this obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry copyright 1995 by american economic association

domestic politics and international conflict this paper explores the interactions between domestic politics and international conflict the analysis shows that electoral uncertainty associated with competition between political parties each representing a specific group of the electorate imparts a negative bias on the nation s military spending given military spending by other nations in turn electoral uncertainty lowers other nations incentive to arm as well in this context democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible precommitment mechanism that reduces the severity of conflict between nations and thereby increases the amount of resources available globally for consumption copyright 1994 by american economic association

economic integration and political disintegration in a world of trade restrictions large countries enjoy economic benefits because political boundaries determine the size of the market under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small homogeneous political jurisdictions this paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries and successfully tests two implications of the model firstly the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade secondly the history of nation state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime

war and democracy we present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by immanuel kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true the desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an incentive to initiate conflict and salvage their position with some probability an equilibrium with positive war frequency is sustained even if all nations were to adopt representative democratic institutions and even in the absence of an appropriative motive for war

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

conflict defense spending and the number of nations abstract this paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict we examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships the model is consistent with three observations first breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts second the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries third the size of the peace dividend the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world is limited by the process of country breakup

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

togetheror separately issues on the costs and benefits of political and fiscal unions abstract around the world one observes a tendency toward political separatism the economic literature generally but not always emphasizes several benefits of large fiscal and therefore political jurisdictions in this paper we discuss several politico economic arguments which reconcile this tension between normative economic models and empirical observations

on the number and size of nations this paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes and in different economic environments with more or less economic integration we focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations our model implies that i democratization leads to secessions ii in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries iii the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration

toehold strategies takeover laws and rival bidders abstract prior to the announcement of a tender offer the bidding firm is legally allowed to acquire shares in the open market subject to some limitations these pre announcement purchases are known as toeholds this paper presents a simple model that describes the bidder s optimal toehold acquisition strategy within an environment that closely parallels the present legal institutions the model shows that toeholds and bids interact in a complex manner even without the presence of asymmetric information by examining a simple environment the paper provides a useful alternative hypothesis for tests of other presumably more complex models one of the main implications of our model is that if no competing bidders are expected no toeholds should be purchased the paper also demonstrates that the correct specification of an empirical model can be critical for example under some parameter values toehold purchases may exhibit a negative cross sectional correlation with the pre announcement run up in the stock price this occurs even though prices are strictly increasing the size of the toehold several implications concerning various aspects of merger legislation are considered for example we demonstrate that a rule similar to a fair price provision has the desirable property that a second bidder arrives and wins if and only if he places a higher value on the target than the initial bidder

population size and civil conflict risk is there a causal link does an expansion of the population size expose nation states to a higher risk of suffering from civil conflict obtaining empirical evidence for a causal relationship is difficult due to reverse effects and omitted variable bias this article addresses causality issues by using randomly occurring drought as an instrumental variable to generate exogenous variation in population size for a panel of 37 sub saharan countries over the period 1981 2004 instrumental variable estimates yield that a 5 increase in population size raises the risk of civil conflict by around six percentage points

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

communication coordination and nash equilibrium i note a methodological problem in studying the role of pre play communication in ensuring equilibrium to deal with this problem i define a solution concept for the extended game in which talk is followed by play that is intermediate between nash equilibrium and rationalizability in some games our solution concept implies a nash outcome while in others it does not