is protectionism on the rise assessing national trade policies during the crisis of 2008 to understand the role of trade policies in the crisis of 2008 this paper constructs the overall trade restrictiveness indices for a wide range of countries using their tariff schedules in 2008 and 2009 the index summarizes the trade policy stance of a country taking into account the share of each good in trade as well as its corresponding import demand elasticity results show that there is no widespread increase in protectionism via tariff policies since the global financial crisis has unfolded while many countries have adjusted tariffs upward on selected products only a handful of countries such as malawi russia argentina turkey and china focus on products that have significant impacts on trade flows the united states and the european union by contrast rely mainly on anti dumping duties to shield domestic industries overall while the rise in tariffs and anti dumping duties in these countries may have jointly caused global trade to drop by as much as us 43 billion during the crisis period it explains less than 2 percent of the collapse in world trade

could tariffs be pro cyclical abstract conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter cyclical we analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied mfn tariffs using a disaggregated product level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011 strikingly and counter to conventional wisdom we find that tariffs are pro cyclical further investigation reveals that this pro cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries tariffs are acyclical in developed countries we present evidence that pro cyclical market power drives the pro cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy

inserting gm products into the food chain the market and welfare effects of different labeling and regulatory regimes the purpose of this article is to examine the system wide effects of the introduction of genetically modified gm products with and without labeling and to compare these two regimes to a third regime where gm products are not present either because they have not yet been developed or because they have been banned for each regime the decisions and welfare of consumers producers and life science companies are examined the article explicitly incorporates the consumer response to the introduction of gm technology and considers different market structures of the life science sector

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

trade gmos and environmental risk are current policies likely to improve welfare food with inputs from genetically modified organisms gmos has met considerable skepticism among european union eu consumers the eu import ban on gm food has triggered a great deal of controversy and has been partly replaced by a mandatory labeling scheme although there is no measure in the general agreement on tariffs and trade that directly addresses the use of product labeling wto and others have been skeptical to mandatory product labeling on the grounds that they may be used as hidden protectionism hampering global welfare this study has two foci first we examine how different policies for the production and use of gmos might influence the market outcome in consumer food markets second we evaluate the welfare effects of the policy measures we find that mandatory labeling often increases domestic welfare and may also enhance global welfare on the other hand a trade ban is more likely to decrease global welfare

innovation and trade with endogenous market failure the case of genetically modified products a partial equilibrium two country model is developed to analyze implications from the introduction of genetically modified gm products in the model innovators hold proprietary rights farmers are competitive adopters some consumers deem gm food to be inferior in quality to traditional food and the mere introduction of gm crops affects the costs of non gm food because of costly identity preservation among the results derived it is shown that although gm innovations have the potential to improve efficiency some groups can be made worse off indeed it is even possible that the costs induced by gm innovations outweigh the efficiency gains

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

the role of business subsidies in job creation of start ups gazelles and incumbents this study contributes to the empirical literature concerning the role of business subsidies in job creation our empirical analysis using an extensive firm level data suggests that the impact of business subsidies on employment growth differs more between high growth start ups and other firms than between start ups and incumbents on average all subsidies relate positively to the contemporary employment growth for both start ups and incumbents furthermore after subsidy reception the employment of both start ups and older incumbents receiving employment or other subsidies grows more than that of non subsidized firms however we find that business subsidies do not provide a significant additional boost to either contemporary or after subsidy growth for young high growth companies there are apparently some other factors that promote growth in young high growth firms these factors help foster strong growth in many cases with or without subsidies

optimal tax policy under environmental quality competition this paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality the first best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax or a subsidy for buying green products the first best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality regardless of environmentally conscious consumers if only one instrument is available the second best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality a uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough

commodity taxation in a differentiated oligopoly the authors introduce commodity taxation into a vertical differentiation model with endogenous product selection they show that a uniform ad valorem tax lowers both qualities distorts the allocation of consumers between firms and lowers the consumer prices of both variants a small uniform tax is always welfare improving over the no tax equilibrium a differentiation of tax rates may or may not be desirable on welfare grounds if a welfare improvement is possible through a nonuniform tax it is always the high quality variant that must be taxed at a higher rate copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

testing the endogeneity of tariff policy in the u s abstract endogenous tariff theory suggests tariffs are created in response to self interested political pressure using a varma model covering the period 1890 1970 in the u s we show that macroeconomic variables which proxy political pressure granger cause the tariff

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

heterogeneity and aggregation implications for labor market fluctuations we demonstrate that aggregate employment and consumption can increase without a corresponding movement in productivity in a model with heterogeneous agents where the only aggregate disturbance is a productivity shock the interaction between incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor results in a low employment productivity correlation and creates a time varying wedge between the marginal rate of substitution for commodity consumption and hours and productivity our results caution against viewing the measured wedge as an inefficiency due to a failure of labor market clearing or as a fundamental driving force behind business cycles jel d31 e32 j22 j24 j31

taxes and subsidies for pollution intensive industries as trade policy abstract this paper constructs a model of international oligopoly with negative externalities in production in which optimal environmental policy responses to foreign emission tax and subsidy programs can be calculated it is shown that by granting subsidies for abatement efforts or for a heavily taxed polluting input domestic net welfare is improved by capturing a greater share of the world market since the subsidy programs are supposed to improve the quality of the global environment they can be justified on environmental grounds in addition we show that a pigouvion emission tax restores efficiency in natural resource allocation whereas subsidy programs are in principle used as instruments in imperfectly competitive international markets

the effect of the canada us free trade agreement on canadian multilateral trade liberalization in this paper show that the canada us free trade agreement cusfta tariff preferences have triggered a decline in canadian external tariffs explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998 next we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the us firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in canada this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the us and canada finally we estimate the effect of the cusfta on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity resume l effet de l accord de libre echange canada u s sur la liberalisation multilaterale du commerce canadien dans ce texte on montre que les preferences tarifaires de l accord de libre echange canada us alecus ont declenche un declin dans le niveau des droits de douane externes canadiens et expliquent une reduction de deux points de pourcentage dans le tarif moyen entre 1989 et 1998 ensuite on decouvre que les industries qui generent le moins de rentes des exportations vers les etats unis font l experience de reduction de tarifs plus importante au canada ce resultat revele une cooperation dans les politiques commerciales entre canada et etats unis enfin on evalue l effet de l alecus sur l intensite du lobbying industriel a propos de la politique commerciale au canada et on decouvre qu il n existe pas de relation entre la liberation preferentielle du commerce et l intensite de l activite de lobbying

estimating the public value of conflicting information the case of genetically modified foods environmental groups have be food products other than those that norcome the chief antagonists toward agricultural bio mally carry allergens see friends of the technology innovations they demonstrate and dis earth 2001 greenpeace international 2001 seminate private information with the objective of through press releases web sites and pro changing the behavior of consumers and productests environmental ers we use experimental auctions with adult u s groups have been succonsumers and show that this information reduces cessful at publicizing their negative views significantly the demand for genetically modified on gm foods and affecting consumers and gm food products and that it has significant producer s behavior 2 public good value an average of 3 cents per prod environmental groups share the costs uct purchased or roughly 2 billion annually we of producing negative gm information 3 also show that the dissemination of independent third party information about agricultural biotech their members benefit collectively from nology dissipatesmost of the public good value of reductions in demand for gm products negative gm product information

consumer benefits of labels and bans on gm foods choice experiments with swedish consumers the european union has been relatively cautious about using biotechnology in food production a label regime combined with the right of individual member states to ban introduction of new genetically modified gm strains means that gm food products in effect are banned in many countries we show how it is possible to empirically test whether a ban can be motivated by reference to potential negative externalities this is followed up by results from a choice experiment we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal wtp for a ban and a labeling scheme

estimating the market effect of a food scare the case of genetically modified starlink corn abstract in 2000 a genetically modified corn variety called starlink that was not approved for human consumption was discovered in the food corn supply to estimate the price impact of this event on the u s corn market we develop the relative price of a substitute method this method applies not only to the starlink event but also to rare events in other markets we find that the contamination led to a 6 8 discount in corn prices and that the suppression of prices lasted for at least a year

toward a business cycle model of tariffs a modified interest group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations this model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations the united states great britain and germany empirical analysis lends strong support to the model s central thesis that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle tariff changes occurring in the three nations with the exception of british tariff increases generally conform to the expectations of the model furthermore business cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability

u s trade policies in a changing world economy this collection of original essays focuses on issues of international trade and trade policy in a world that is undergoing structural adaptation and in the face of a serious increase in the us trade deficit they bring a new consolidation of analytical perspective to a wide variety of current trade policy issues in their overview chapter alan v deardorff and robert m stern discuss developments in trade and protectionism review the case for free trade and address the arguments in favor of trade intervention rudiger dornbusch and jeffrey frankel analyze the macroeconomic setting in which changes have been made in us tariffs and ntbs stephen p magee and leslie young develop a model of endogenous protection and use it to search for microeconomic and macroeconomic variables that may help to explain changes in tariff and nontariff protection in the us since 1900 paul krugman takes up the question of identifying strategic sectors and the extent to which international competition and national government policies may affect the returns to such sectors under conditions of imperfect competition or when externalities are present avinash dixit analyzes the responses that the us might make to other countries trade policies in terms of how these policies affect us real national income and national security he concludes that the us could use strategic advance responses to alter other countries trade policies in a mutually beneficial way richard n cooper evaluates trade policy as foreign policy by looking at changes through three periods of us history t n srinivasan scrutinizes the national defense argument for government intervention in foreign trade john h jackson in discussing alternative negotiation approaches for the conduct of us trade policies observes that the pursuit of multilateralism may be frustrating and that what may be needed instead is a minilateral approach to trade liberalization in conclusion w max corden offers a package of rules that he believes may be both desirable and possible for the international trading system to attain robert m stern is professor of economics at the university of michigan and director of the institute of public policy studies he is coauthor with allan v deardorff of the michigan model of world production and trade mit press 1985

private vs public regulation political economy of the international environment minimum standards set by a world environmental organization weo and ngo labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection we explore the potential inter play between these two approaches when the weo is subject to pressure from producers we find that if weo and ngo schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an ngo alternative increases industry resistance to weo proposals and this may reduce welfare if however the schemes are run in parallel existence of the ngo lessens producer opposition to weo activities this allows the weo to be bolder in its proposals which is good for welfare

tax subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers abstract we study policy measures to improve environmental quality in the presence of environmentally aware consumers we consider two sets of policy instruments uniform policies for the firms and policies that discriminate between the firms based on their environmental quality for the latter set either the better performer is rewarded with a subsidy or the worse performer is punished with a tax we find that while a uniform subsidy policy improves average environmental quality a uniform tax policy worsens it further while a discriminatory subsidy policy reduces total pollution and enhances aggregate welfare a discriminatory tax policy may increase total pollution and may reduce aggregate welfare

eco labels trade and protectionism eco labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes we analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm the environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm while both firms can adopt the eco label pollution is production related and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an environmentally friendly way our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco label and get both firms to adopt the label instead of setting an environmental standard however to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous in particular if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard on the other hand if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard