devaluation investment and growth in ldcs abstract this paper examines the short and long run effects of devaluation in a model where following structuralist theories investment is treated as output of a composite good produced by combining domestic and imported components in fixed proportions introducing investment goods of this type alters a number of results most notably the marshall lerner condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for an expansionary outcome and under simple and plausible conditions a devaluation may worsen the payments balance

on avoiding bank runs abstract can bank runs be avoided and should they be avoided i analyze a banking environment where bank runs can occur as a result of negative signals about the bank s investments in this environment banks can make sure that runs do not occur by designing the deposit contract appropriately i show that there are conditions under which it is profit maximizing for the bank to avoid runs and others under which occasional runs are part of optimal bank behavior i also compare the banking arrangement to an arrangement based on trading in equity

debt maturity and the international financial architecture this paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture the analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks the paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates such as international lending in last resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries jel f34 o19

adjustment trade policy and investment slumps evidence from africa abstract this paper presents a model of investment in six african economies over the 1970s and 80s paying particular attention to the impact of the policy reforms which have accompanied structural adjustment programmes a priori the impact of trade reform on investment can be positive or negative in practise there is some evidence that it might be negative

the common pool dilemma of global public goods lessons from the world bank s net income and reserves the function of international organizations ios as suppliers of international or global public goods gpgs has received increasing attention in recent years but in a world with many claimants and limited resources gpgs are more likely to have common pool properties than be pure public goods the paper develops a joint products model of public goods supply by international organizations examining how specific institutional features of international organizations affect the supply of gpgs the sources and distribution of the world bank s net income the single largest source of discretionary funds available annually to an io are used as the lens to analyze the issue the paper examines the tension between control rights on net income which reside primarily with nonborrowing shareholders and the sources of net income which largely lie with minority borrowing shareholders the analysis suggests that while the joint product model of member country support for international organizations has much merit institutional features that were incorporated when these institutions were established sharply affect both the absolute magnitude and the distribution ratio of the benefit streams

pricing a network good to deter entry of a network good we show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a preemptive function similar to that of an investment in capacity if the entrant s good is incompatible with the incumbent s good and there are network externalities in demand consequently the threat of entry can lead the incumbent to set low prices we identify some factors that should be considered in thinking about the welfare eiects of entry deterrence in this and similar models i introduction both sides in us v microsoft seem to agree that microsoft s pricing of windows does not correspond to short run pro t maximization by a monopolist schmalensee s direct testimony argues that microsoft s low prices are due at least in part to its concern that higher prices would encourage other rms to develop competing operating systems while this idea may seem intuitive it has been seen as controversial by some commentators e g hall and hall 1999 because neither side has proposed a formal model where such limit pricing would make sense in response this paper develops a highly simpli ed model of complete information limit pricing based on the idea that the installed base of a network good can ll a preemptive role similar to that of investment in physical capacity to model the role of the incumbent s installed base we assume that there are overlapping generations of consumers each of whom lives for two periods and purchases only when young we also assume there are only two types of consumers and we further assume that the distribution of values is such that the incumbent s steady state pro t is highest when it

the case for gdp indexed bonds gds indexed bonds this paper seeks to revive the case for countries to insure against economic growth slowdowns by issuing bonds indexed to the rate of growth of gdp we show that gdp indexed bonds could provide substantial benefits in reducing the likelihood of default crises and allowing countries to avoid pro cyclical fiscal policies we simulate the effects of gdp indexed bonds under different assumptions about fiscal policy reaction functions and their output effects and find that they could substantially reduce the likelihood of debt gdp paths becoming explosive the insurance premium would likely be small because cross country comovement of gdp growth rates is low and cross country gdp growth risk is thus largely diversifiable for an investor holding a portfolio of gdp indexed bonds potential obstacles to the emergence of a market for these bonds include the verifiability of gdp data the trade off between insurance and moral hazard and the need for liquidity theory and past experience suggest that financial innovation often requires official intervention and its timing and form are difficult to predict we discuss institutional fixes and suggest an approach for attempting to start up a market eduardo borensztein and paolo mauro

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

african economic development in a comparative perspective conventional explanations of poor african economic performance generally fail to pay adequate attention to causal mechanisms of growth decline and stagnation many african countries experienced investment booms after independence but in contrast to east asian newly industrialising economies these were not sustained owing to failure to establish a virtuous growth circle involving complementary increases in savings and exports structural adjustment programmes dismantled stat mediated mechanisms of accumulation without putting viable alternatives in place and failed to tackle the structural constraints which impede productivity growth in agriculture a new policy approach drawing on the experience of both post colonial and adjustment periods is necessary copyright 2001 by oxford university press

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

evaluating the impact of world bank structural adjustment lending 1980 87 this article attempts to evaluate the world bank s programme aid in the form of structural adjustment loans with emphasis on the distinction between the influence of programme finance and the influence of the policy conditions attached to this finance the rate of return on world bank programme aid measured in terms of the impact of gdp growth rates is found to have been disappointing the study also identifies a negative correlation between structural adjustment loans and investment it was also found that the bank programme aid s strongest beneficial effect has been on the balance of payments current account both via the stimulation of exports and via the curbing of imports

bail out or work out theoretical considerations this paper assesses various crisis resolution proposals using a theoretical model of liquidity and solvency crisis the model suggests that payments standstills and last resort lending are an equally efficient means of dealing with liquidity crises while coordinated lending through creditor committees is second best debt write downs are preferred to subsidised imf financing when dealing with solvency crises because of the negative moral hazard implications of the latter tool finally the model suggests that international bankruptcy court proposals may be superior to existing contractual approaches in securing such write downs on many measures the incidence of international financial crises increased in the last part of the twentieth century bordo et al 2001 but it is not just the incidence of financial crises that has altered in recent years so too has their nature the recent crises in mexico across south east asia russia brazil turkey and argentina were clearly rooted in the capital rather than current account of the balance of payments we appear to have entered an era of capital account crises imf 2002 theoretical models of financial crisis have developed in lockstep with crisis experience a third generation of models of financial crisis has emerged chang and velasco 1998 krugman 1999 these models combine imperfections in fundamentals as suggested by so called first generation models and fragility in expectations as suggested by second generation models to explain crises under the third generation approach capital account crises can originate in either fundamentals or expectations we have solvency as well as liquidity capital account crises

a note on chui gai and haldane s sovereign liquidity crisis analytics and implications for public policy this note corrects the welfare calculations in chui gai and haldane s paper on sovereign liquidity crisis chui m gai p haldane a g 2002 sovereign liquidity crisis analytics and implications for public policy journal of banking and finance 26 519 544 we show that the exact formula not only dramatically reduces the computed welfare consequences from 66 of ex ante expected output to roughly 13 but also changes the direction of some reported comparative static results in addition we clarify the difference between fundamentals driven and belief driven welfare costs and extend some of the sensitivity calculations

co ordination failure moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures we study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co ordination and debtor moral hazard solving the sovereign debtor s incentives leads to excessive rollover failure by creditors when sovereign default occurs we discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures involving contractibility of sovereign debtor s payoffs suspension of convertibility in a discovery phase and penalties in case of malfeasance in relation to the current debate this is more akin to the imf s sovereign debt restructuring mechanism than the collective action clauses promoted by others

optimal policy and network effects for the deployment of zero emission vehicles abstract we analyze the impact of indirect network effects in the deployment of zero emission vehicles in a static partial equilibrium model in most theoretical analyses direct and indirect effects are conflated and relatively few authors have explicitly considered indirect network effects we also introduce the market power of vehicle producers and scale effects in the production function the model exhibits a multiplicity of local social critical points and market equilibria suggesting a possibility of lock in the optimal two subsidies for vehicles and stations are derived so that the pareto dominating market equilibrium would coincide with the social optimum configurations associated with different values of the parameters are explored to revisit the policy issues at various stages of deployment of hydrogen and battery electric vehicles

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

network externality an uncommon tragedy economists have defined network externality and have examined putative inframarginal market failures associated with it this paper distinguishes between network effects and network externalities where the latter are market failures the authors argue that while network effects are important network externalities are theoretically fragile and empirically undocumented some network externalities are merely pecuniary network ownership or transactions among network participants can internalize some network effects the type of market failure that has been associated with these externalities is a transition problem that has little to do with externality

sovereign defaults information investment and credit abstract why would a sovereign government immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default ever repay foreign creditors and correspondingly why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns this paper finds general conditions under which even in the absence of sanctions lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game furthermore it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria in this way it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations the two classical explanations are necessary to enforce repayment information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results the repayment default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy governments repay to affect agents expectations about them a default through its effect on expectations about fundamentals can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets governments repay to avoid these costs but may default in equilibrium when hit by a negative shock

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

would hotelling kill the electric car in this paper we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource owning firms when technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning by doing resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology we show that in such a context it is not necessarily the case that scarcity driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted rather we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions we show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy

liquidity provision banking and the allocation of interest rate risk abstract the paper studies the efficient allocation of technology induced interest rate risk and the implications of such risk for efficient liquidity provision complete immunization against interest rate risk is shown to be undesirable as it precludes the exploitation of favourable reinvestment opportunities under the assumptions of diamond dybvig 1983 interest induced valuation risks of long term assets should be born by early withdrawers reinvestment opportunity risks of short term assets by late withdrawers efficient liquidity provision thus entails no shifting of interest rate risk in the absence of additional moral hazard second best allocations can be implemented through unregulated competition among banks

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

crisis costs and debtor discipline the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises abstract recent debate on the reform of the international financial architecture has highlighted the potentially important role of the official sector in crisis management we examine how such public intervention in sovereign debt crises affects efficiency ex ante and ex post our results shed light on the scale of capital inflows and the implications for debtor country output of such a regime the efficacy of measures such as officially sanctioned stays on creditor litigation depend critically on the quality of public sector surveillance and the size of the costs of sovereign debt crises

financial liberalisation and private investment evidence from turkey abstract the paper tests for shifts in aggregate private investment functions for turkey as a consequence of financial liberalisation in the early 1980s results for a neoclassical model in error correction form suggest that the short run dynamics of investment were altered by financial liberalisation with reduced sensitivity to the availability of credit but with no evidence of increased sensitivity to the cost of capital estimation of an euler equation model indicates that credit constraints remained binding after liberalisation we interpret this as evidence of significant structural change to private investment functions after financial liberalisation but with credit constraints continuing to operate

sovereign liquidity crises analytics and implications for public policy abstract this paper offers an analytical framework with which to assess some recent proposals for strengthening the international financial architecture we develop a model of sovereign liquidity crises that reflects two sources of financial stress weak fundamentals and self fulfilling expectations we examine the nature of the underlying co ordination game and investigate the properties of the unique equilibrium in so doing we are able to characterise the welfare costs of belief driven crises which we find to be potentially significant we also evaluate some recent policy proposals including prudent debt and liquidity management capital controls greater information disclosure and the efficacy of monetary policy tightening in the midst of crisis

dynamic price competition with network effects i consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate and firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices i derive a series of results pertaining to a existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria b monotonicity of the pricing function e g larger networks set higher prices c network size dynamics increasing dominance vs reversion to the mean and d firm value how it varies with network effects finally i apply my general framework to the study of termination charges in wireless telecommunications i consider various forms of regulation and examine their impact on firm profits and market share dynamics

pricing growth indexed bonds abstract growth indexed bonds have been suggested as a way of reducing the procyclicality of emerging market countries fiscal policies and the likelihood of costly debt crises investor attitude surveys suggest that pricing difficulties are seen as a considerable obstacle in an effort to reduce such concerns this article presents a simple way of pricing growth indexed bonds as a pleasant by product the analysis tracks the quantitative implications of an increase in the share of growth indexed bonds in total debt measuring the ensuing decline in the probability of default and the reduction in the spreads at which standard bonds can be issued

network effects and environmental externalities do clean technologies suffer from excess inertia abstract we study the diffusion of a clean substitute to a dirty durable in a dynamic model consumer utility of both durables increases in their respective market shares due to network effects first we characterize the optimal dirty good tax the tax should achieve a long run optimal division of the market between the two goods along the transition path to this steady state the optimal tax depends on the current and future market shares of the clean durable thus even if the marginal environmental damage from an additional dirty durable is constant the optimal tax should not be constant second we study whether excess inertia can occur if the emission tax is not optimally set we then find that a constant tax that only accounts for the environmental damage caused by the dirty good may lead to excess inertia excess inertia could happen even if the clean technology is proprietary and the technology owner has incentives to sponsor the initial market diffusion of the technology

no man is an island social coordination and the environment humans are fundamentally social social activities require coordination possibly leading to multiple equilibria in the form of self reinforcing patterns of herd behavior when alternative equilibria differ substantially with respect to environmental damage they represent virtuous and vicious cycles from an environmental perspective such cycles can be sustained by network effects social pressure to conform or other mechanisms directly or indirectly yielding coordination benefits breaking the vicious cycles can be an important task for environmental policies i present a stylized model of social coordination with environmental externalities using it to discuss how environmental policies may help agents coordinate in more environment friendly ways

institutions and the external capital structure of countries abstract a widespread view holds that countries that finance themselves through foreign direct investment and portfolio equity rather than bonds and loans are less prone to crises but what determines countries external capital structures in a cross section of advanced economies emerging markets and developing countries we find that equity like liabilities as a share of countries total external liabilities are positively and significantly associated with indicators of educational attainment openness natural resource abundance and especially institutional quality these relationships are robust to attempts to control for possible endogeneity suggesting that better institutional quality may help improve countries external capital structures

currency crises and the stock market empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis we explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies our focus is two fold first the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market induced currency crises second we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run up to a currency crisis this new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994q1 2007q4

adjustment with a fixed exchange rate cameroon cote d ivoire and senegal as members of the cfa franc zone cameroom cote d ivoire and senegal cannot use the nominal exchange rate as a tool of macroeconomic adjustment this article considers these countries responses to the commodity and oil price shocks of the 1970s in light of this and other institutional constraints using a two sector model it shows that there exist instruments that in principle permit the real exchange rate depreciation necessary for adjusting to macroeconomic imbalances the authors interpret the very different adjustment experiences of the three countries despite their common economic structure and institutional setting in terms of different uses of these instruments alternative assumptions about the labour market leave the qualitative nature of the results unaltered statistical analysis of data from the three countries confirms the model s linking of the current account and real exchange rate with the instruments of adjustment

fiscal dependence on trade taxes and trade policy reform the article focuses on fiscal implications of structural adjustment loans sals from an a priori standpoint and by reference to the experience of five countries three of these countries have had revenue enhancement after trade policy reforms and the other two cases experienced revenue depletion the central point which emerges from the study is that it is not clear that trade liberalisation leads to fiscal enhancement or fiscal depletion both a priori the orising and country analyses demonstrate that a range of outcomes is possible depending upon initial conditions and the components of any reform package

financial determinants of domestic investment in sub saharan africa evidence from panel data abstract this study investigates the effects of financial development on domestic investment in a sample of 30 sub saharan african countries it is based on a dynamic serial correlation investment model including various indicators of financial development controlling for country specific fixed effects and nonfinancial factors of investment the results indicate a positive relationship between domestic investment total investment and private investment and various indicators of financial development higher financial development leads to higher future levels of investment implying a potent long run effect of financial development on domestic investment the findings imply that financial development can stimulate economic growth through capital accumulation

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation

financial crises and coordination failure a comment abstract the three papers of this session link financial crises explicitly or implicitly to coordination failure in bryant journal of banking and finance 2002 the possibility of coordination failure is due to complementarity in the productive technology in chui et al journal of banking and finance 2002 foreign lenders to a small country fail to coordinate on the optimal strategy rolling over short term loans finally amable et al journal of banking and finance 2002 implicitly introduce coordination failure through a production function with external increasing returns to scale this sort of thick markets externality can be viewed as a reduced form that stands for coordination problems in a non walrasian economy