the environmental kuznets curve environmental protection policy and income distribution abstract the effect of economic growth on pollution emissions differs substantially among high income countries i address this issue by analyzing public environmental policy decisions individual heterogeneity relative income effect and the political framework in which policy decisions are taken determine the emergence of the downward sloping segment of the environmental kuznets curve ekc income inequality produces a gap between the country s ability to pay for environmental protection and a country s willingness to pay i test this result by using oecd data on public r d expenditure for environmental protection the conclusion is that contrary to the ek hypothesis moments of the income distribution function other than the mean may be important for the emergence of a virtuous path of sustainable growth in high income countries

dynamic pricing of perishable assets under competition we study dynamic price competition in an oligopolistic market with a mix of substitutable and complementary perishable assets each firm has a fixed initial stock of items and competes in setting prices to sell them over a finite sales horizon customers sequentially arrive at the market make a purchase choice and then leave immediately with some likelihood of no purchase the purchase likelihood depends on the time of purchase product attributes and current prices the demand structure includes time variant linear and multinomial logit demand models as special cases assuming deterministic customer arrival rates we show that any equilibrium strategy has a simple structure involving a finite set of shadow prices measuring capacity externalities that firms exert on each other equilibrium prices can be solved from a one shot price competition game under the current time demand structure taking into account capacity externalities through the time invariant shadow prices the former reflects the transient demand side at every moment and the latter captures the aggregate supply constraints over the sales horizon this simple structure sheds light on dynamic revenue management problems under competition which helps capture the essence of the problems under demand uncertainty we show that the equilibrium solutions from the deterministic game provide precommitted and contingent heuristic policies that are asymptotic equilibria for its stochastic counterpart when demand and supply are sufficiently large this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

conformity and the demand for environmental goods the existing literature on eco labeling and green consumerism has been framed within a classical market context where price and quality are the drivers of consumer choice however it seems possible that consumers are also concerned about the choices made by other consumers in fact it is unclear that people s consumption decisions are made independently of social context for instance under the desire to conform to certain social norms or in the presence of status concerns some individuals may be willing to pay a higher price premium for green products the more widespread green consumerism is in society we test this hypothesis using a choice experiment where the respondents were asked to choose among coffee products varying with respect to their share of ecological beans share of fair trade beans and price three treatments were used differing only in the information given about the choices made by other consumers we find different responses to the treatments across individuals and we can only confirm our hypothesis of conformity for women although men appear to have stronger preferences for ecological coffee than women have

quality and competition in recent years the practitioner literature in operations management has seen a dramatic surge in articles on quality management it reflects the increased emphasis on quality by u s firms which has been attributed largely to increased competition faced by them the question of how quality is influenced by competitive intensity however has not received much attention either in the practitioner or the academic research literatures the notion of competitive intensity itself has not been defined precisely in this paper we develop formal models of oligopolistic competition to investigate whether equilibrium levels of quality increase as competition intensifies we consider three different competitive settings i asymmetric duopolistic competition where the dominant firm s intrinsic demand potential decreases ii a symmetric duopoly where the firms are precluded from cooperating in setting quality levels and iii symmetric oligopolistic competition where the number of firms increases we find that the relation between equilibrium quality and competitive intensity depends on what is understood by increased competition and in addition the relation is contingent on the values of parameters describing the cost and demand structure for the industry

endogenous international joint ventures and the environment abstract this paper examines the welfare effects of emission taxes under a choice between an international joint venture jv and a full ownership fdi foreign direct investment by parent firms from a developed country the north and a developing country the south as well as their location and share decisions if the south has a poor abatement technology its best policy is to impose a relatively high emission tax to attract a full ownership fdi if it has a good abatement technology the best policy is to impose a relatively low emission tax to attract the jv furthermore deregulation of foreign ownership of the jv improves the quality of the environment

multinomial logit market share models equilibrium characteristics and strategic implications we specify and analyze the conditions under which the mnl market share models are appropriate for equilibrium analysis our results show that a linear price response function as is often used in empirical research in conjunction with the typical concavity assumed in a large range of marketing response functions would yield an interior equilibrium solution we then consider the optimal reactions on pricing and marketing spending to entry and potential market expansion in the context of the mnl models we demonstrate that the entry of a new brand evokes a decrease in the equilibrium prices of the existing brands as a defensive reaction this is true in both an expanding market as well as a fixed market however while new entry into a fixed market would trigger the incumbents to lower the marketing expenditure we show that firms tend to raise marketing activities as they experience market expansion consequently there exist distinct possibilities that marketing efforts for the existing brands increase in view of entry in an expanding market further managerial and marketing implications for endogeneity of the number of firms are explored

endogeneity in brand choice models applications of random utility models to scanner data have been widely presented in marketing for the last 20 years one particular problem with these applications is that they have ignored possible correlations between the independent variables in the deterministic component of utility price promotion etc and the stochastic component or error term in fact marketing mix variables such as price not only affect brand purchasing probabilities but are themselves endogenously set by marketing managers this work tests whether these endogeneity problems are important enough to warrant consideration when estimating random utility models with scanner panel data our results show that not accounting for endogeneity may result in a substantial bias in the parameter estimates

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one manufacturer and one retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor this paper develops an information revelation mechanism model of a one manufacturer and one retailer supply chain facing an outside integrated competitor under demand uncertainty we investigate how the manufacturer designs a wholesale price order quantity contract to induce the retailer to report his risk sensitivity information truthfully we try to explore the effects of the outside competitor and the risk sharing rule on the optimal price service level decisions of the retailer and the optimal wholesale prices of the manufacturer we find that the strategic interaction plays an important role in the effect of risk sensitivity on the order quantity for the retailer when the fraction of the risk cost shared by the manufacturer is sufficiently large small the optimal wholesale price for the high risk averse retailer is higher lower than that for the low risk averse retailer

eco labeling and horizontal product differentiation this paper investigates the impact of eco labels on the abatement of emissions in a market with horizontal product differentiation a distinction is made between an end of pipe abatement method and a clean technology approach in the former case underinvestment is likely to occur even if the marginal willingness to pay for abatement of consumers is equal to the social marginal benefit of abatement the level of abatement depends on the number of firms and on the number of consumers for a large market with few firms overinvestment in abatement is also possible clean technology abatement achieves a first best level regardless of market size if all consumers have a marginal willingness to pay for abatement equal to its social benefit

product and price competition with satiation effects consumers become satiated with a product when purchasing too much too quickly how much is too much and how quickly is too quickly depends on the characteristics of the product relative to the time interval between consumption periods knowing that consumers allocate their budget to products that generate less satiation effects retailers should then choose to sell products that induce minimal satiation but usually this is operationally more costly to study this trade off we provide an analytical model based on utility theory that relates customer consumption to price and satiation in the context of multiple competing retailers we determine the purchasing pattern over time and provide an explicit expression to determine the consumption level in steady state we derive market shares and show that they take the form of an attraction model in which the attractiveness depends on price and product satiation we use this to analyze the competition between firms that maximize long term average profit we characterize the equilibrium under three scenarios i price only competition ii product only competition and iii price and product competition the results reveal the interplay between a key marketing lever price and the firm s ability to offer products that generate less satiation in particular we show that when a firm becomes more efficient at reducing satiation its competitor may benefit if competition is on product only but not if it is on price and product we also find that when satiation effects are not managed a firm s profit may be significantly reduced while a strategic competitor can largely benefit this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

optimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms this study explores an optimal pre committed or ex ante environmental tax policy in a three stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants after the government has chosen the optimal emission tax rate we show not only that the optimal emission tax is non decreasing with the declining cost of relocation e g setup or fixed costs or else the progress of globalization but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country causing the resulting welfare to decline as a consequence the domestic welfare varies in a non monotonic way we also show that such a counterintuitive non monotonic relationship does not arise under time consistent ex post emission taxes

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

optimal tax policy under environmental quality competition this paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality the first best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax or a subsidy for buying green products the first best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality regardless of environmentally conscious consumers if only one instrument is available the second best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality a uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough

price competition under mixed multinomial logit demand functions in this paper we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit demand functions under affine cost functions in these models the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments we characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate independent firm we identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure nash equilibrium exists and the set of nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first order condition equations a property of essential importance to empirical studies this condition specifies that in every market segment each firm captures less than 50 of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that under the condition is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors prices we show that under a somewhat stronger but still broadly satisfied version of the abov

the choice theory approach to market research this paper surveys economic choice theory stressing developments that permit use of data from psychometric and conjoint experiments to produce market demand forecasts alternatives to the widely used multinomial logit model are summarized and a new method for estimating multinomial probits is described an integration of choice models with attitudinal scaling and perceptual mapping within a latent variable system is described estimation of such systems under either random effects or fixed effects descriptions of heterogeneity across individuals is discussed issues in the use of choice models to describe responses from conjoint experiments are presented new regression diagnostic tests for the consistency of multinomial logit representations are discussed

manufacturer incentives to improve retail service levels in this paper we provide a solution to the problem of how a manufacturer can provide an incentive to a separately owned retailer to raise its service level above the level it would choose on its own we analyze the effects the manufacturer s incentive has on the individual profits of the retailer and manufacturer as well as their joint profits our work is an application of game theory in which we tackle the problem posed by separate ownership of the two firms and the resulting conflict over the gains from cooperation we utilize a plausible model of service sensitive demand one which is relatively free of ad hoc assumptions our approach has the strength that it proposes a credible solution to the problem of manufacturer retailer cooperation when profits are sensitive to retail service levels our results indicate that the optimal level of incentive for the manufacturer and the resulting shares of the manufacturer and retailer in increased profits are particularly sensitive to the underlying variability of demand and to the relative variability of additional demand induced by higher service levels

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

a theoretical basis for the environmental kuznets curve abstract this paper attempts to explain the environmental kuznets curve ekc or inverted u shaped relationship between income and environmental degradation in the framework of endogenous growth model considering a closed economy one part of capital is used for commodity production which generates pollution that degrades existing environment and the remaining part is used for abating pollution i e upgrading environment sufficient abatement activity improves restores environmental quality a sufficient abatement activity associated with commodity production could only lead optimally towards steady state the ratio of allocation of capital between two sectors production and abatement is fixed along the optimal path but it varies along the non optimal path that exists in the off steady state in the economy allocation of capital for abatement activity varies over time thus a change from insufficient to sufficient allocation of capital i e investment for abatement activity is the basis for an inverted u shaped relationship between environmental quality and economic growth

on sales effort and pricing decisions under alternative risk criteria abstract in the literature different risk criteria are proposed for risk averse decision making but it is often unclear which risk criteria should be used and what their differences may be this study investigates this problem when a risk averse make to order firm decides its pricing and sales effort two factors affecting demand we consider alternative risk criteria commonly used in the literature namely expected utility theory eut mean variance mv mean semideviation ms value at risk var conditional value at risk cvar and loss aversion la we find that all of these criteria lead to similar qualitative behaviors regarding how risk loss averse decisions deviate from risk neutral ones a particularly interesting result is that the form of demand randomness i e additive or multiplicative can completely reverse the effect of risk loss aversion in certain cases we also find that the risk aversion models i e eut mv ms var and cvar are essentially equivalent in inducing the same set of optimal solutions under adverse market states however loss aversion is a mild version of risk aversion in that the la model can only lead to a subset of the solutions generated by other models these results may not be valid for other applications such as the newsvendor pricing problem so we can conclude that the relationship between alternative risk criteria is case sensitive and should be evaluated more carefully

a static approximation for dynamic demand substitution with applications in a competitive market we propose a static approximation of dynamic demand substitution behavior based on a fluid network model and a service inventory mapping this approximation greatly enhances our ability to analyze the interdependent inventory service price and product assortment decisions in noncompetitive and competitive scenarios with demand substitution we demonstrate that the approximation is well behaved and then apply it to two previously intractable applications first we study a price and service competition between single product retailers after establishing a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium we find that competition results in lower price higher demand and a higher level of inventory we also observe that the aggregate profit and inventory level increase to positive constants as the number of retailers goes to infinity second we study a duopolistic competition on price service and product assortment we establish a pure strategy nash equilibrium for the product assortment competition and identify a condition for uniqueness we find that competition on both price and product assortment results in lower price and less variety for each competitor but the total number of products and the aggregate inventory level in a duopoly market are both likely to be higher than in a monopolistic market

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

cooperation among competitors a comparison of cost sharing mechanisms abstract in this paper we investigate the consequences of using outcome based versus ex ante based cost sharing mechanisms in terms of competing firms profitability and total welfare we consider two firms making a joint expenditure which can positively affect firms demand and or unit operating costs while competing in the final market by setting either price or quantity we compare two outcome based cost sharing mechanisms i e quantity proportional qp and total margin proportional tm with the more competitive fixed share fs mechanism where cost sharing is set up on an ex ante basis we show that outcome based mechanisms and even a fully collusive behavior induced by the optimal cost sharing mechanism might actually enhance total welfare as compared with the more competitive fs mechanism we also find that although the fs mechanism is never more preferable than the tm mechanism it can lead to higher profits than the qp mechanism when competition is mild these results can support firms cooperating with competitors in the choice of the cost sharing mechanism as well as provide important implications to policy makers

statistical learning of service dependent demand in a multiperiod newsvendor setting we study an inventory system wherein a customer may leave the seller s market after experiencing an inventory stockout traditionally researchers and practitioners assume a single penalty cost to model this customer behavior of stockout aversion recently a stream of researchers explicitly model this customer behavior and support the traditional penalty cost approach we enrich this literature by studying the statistical learning of service dependent demand we build and solve four models a baseline model where the seller can observe the demand distribution a second model where the seller cannot observe the demand distribution but statistically learns the demand distribution a third model where the seller can learn or pay to obtain the exact information of the demand distribution and a fourth model where demand in excess of available inventory is lost and unobserved interestingly we find that all four models support the traditional penalty cost approach this result confirms the use of a state independent stockout penalty cost in the presence of demand learning more strikingly the first three models imply the same stockout penalty cost which is larger than the stockout penalty cost implied by the last model

price competition for retailers with profit and revenue targets abstract price competition for retailers has been extensively studied in the literature assuming the objective of expected profit maximization in this paper we make a major contribution by studying price competition for retailers with both profit and revenue targets consequently each retailer maximizes her profit and revenue probability namely the probability of achieving the profit and revenue targets simultaneously more specifically we analyze a scenario where two competing retailers purchase a perishable product from a common supplier and sell to a common market employing the isoelastic demand model we derive the closed form solutions of the optimal order quantity the optimal selling price and the maximal profit and revenue probability for each retailer it is shown that when revenue is a relevant performance measure positive and non positive salvage values lead to different optima for competing retailers moreover as price elasticity and or price competition intensity becomes higher the optimal retail price decreases and the optimal order quantity increases for each retailer

environmental policy in a green market this paper studies the impact of some frequently used environmental policies in a duopolistic market where purchasers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods when consumers differ in their environmental awareness a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium the higher the average willingness to pay for the good the lower are variants unit emissions but the higher are industrial aggregate effluents a maximum unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants but boosts firms sales and consequently increases industrial aggregate emissions as a result social welfare may be reduced we also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges including differentiation of charges

joint pricing production decisions in supply chains of complementary products with uncertain demand consider n manufacturers each producing a different product and selling it to a market either directly or through a common retailer the n products are perfectly complementary in the sense that they are always sold and consumed jointly or in sets of one unit of each demand for the products during a selling season is both price sensitive and uncertain each of the n manufacturers faces the problem of choosing a production quantity and a selling price for his product two settings are considered regarding the decision sequence of the n manufacturers they are either simultaneous or sequential the retailer when present employs a consignment sales contract with revenue sharing to bind her relationship with the manufacturers and to extract profit for herself using a multiplicative demand model in this paper we fully characterize individual firms decisions in equilibria under each of the two game settings and derive closed form performance measures both for the channel and for individual channel members these closed form solutions allow us to explore the effects of channel structure and parameters on firms decisions and performance that lead to conclusions of managerial interest

does environmental dumping lead to delocation environmental dumping is often viewed as an instrument used by some countries in the attempt to attract foreign investments stated otherwise the delocation of firms would be a major outcome of a stiff environmental policy in this paper we study the impact of a strict anti pollution policy pursued by a government on domestic firms locational decisions and determine the main variables that interact with such a policy some preliminary welfare implications are also provided

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

inequality as a cause of environmental degradation abstract this paper advances two hypotheses first the extent of an environmentally degrading economic activity is a function of the balance of power between the winners who derive net benefits from the activity and the losers who bear net costs second greater inequalities of power and wealth lead all else equal to more environmental degradation

dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost an alternating move approach abstract this article studies a two firm dynamic pricing model with random production costs the firms produce the same perishable products over an infinite time horizon when production or operation costs are random in each period each firm determines its price and production levels based on its current production cost and its opponent s previous price level we use an alternating move game to model this problem and show that there exists a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium in production and pricing decisions we provide a closed form solution for the firm s pricing policy finally we study the game in the case of incomplete information when both or one of the firms do not have access to the current prices charged by their opponents

technical note robust newsvendor competition under asymmetric information we generalize analysis of competition among newsvendors to a setting in which competitors possess asymmetric information about future demand realizations and this information is limited to knowledge of the support of demand distribution in such a setting traditional expectation based optimization criteria are not adequate and therefore we focus on the alternative criterion used in the robust optimization literature the absolute regret minimization we show existence and derive closed form expressions for the robust optimization nash equilibrium solution for a game with an arbitrary number of players this solution allows us to gain insight into the nature of robust asymmetric newsvendor competition we show that the competitive solution in the presence of information asymmetry is an intuitive extension of the robust solution for the monopolistic newsvendor problem which allows us to distill the impact of both competition and information asymmetry in addition we show that contrary to the intuition a competing newsvendor does not necessarily benefit from having better information about its own demand distribution than its competitor has

is environmental dumping greater when plants are footloose concerns have been expressed that in a global market place with mobile capital national governments will have incentives to set weak environmental policies environmental dumping to protect the international competitiveness of their domestic firms and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants may be relatively footloose so that governments are concerned to prevent capital flight in this paper we investigate whether the mobility of firms does indeed increase incentives for environmental dumping we do this by taking a simple model of imperfect competition and comparing the environmental policies that would be set by non cooperative governments for two different move structures where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate the exogenous location case or market share game and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate the endogenous location case or location game this raises an important modelling issue for it is natural in the market share game that governments would set different environmental policies depending on the number of firms that locate in their countries and if we are to compare just the effect of different move structures then in the location game we should also allow governments to condition their environmental policies on the number of firms that locate in them contrary to previous models of the location game where governments set a single instrument independent of the number of firms that locate in their countries we show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game may be greater or less than in the location game depending in particular on the degree of substitution between products of the firms and hence the intensity of market competition we also show that there is more environmental dumping in the location game when governments use a single instrument than when they condition their instruments on the number of firms that locate in their countries

competition under generalized attraction models applications to quality competition under yield uncertainty we characterize the equilibrium behavior in a broad class of competition models in which the competing firms market shares are given by an attraction model and the aggregate sales in the industry depend on the aggregate attraction value according to a general function each firm s revenues and costs are proportional with its expected sales volume with a cost rate that depends on the firm s chosen attraction value according to an arbitrary increasing function whereas most existing competition papers with attraction models can be viewed as special cases of this general model we apply our general results to a new set of quality competition models here an industry has n suppliers of a given product who compete for the business of one or more buyers each of the suppliers encounters an uncertain yield factor with a given general yield distribution the buyers face uncertain demands over the course of a given sales season the suppliers compete by selecting key characteristics of their yield distributions either their means their standard deviations or both these choices have implications for their per unit cost rates

pollution havens and industrial agglomeration abstract this paper examines the pollution haven hypothesis using a spatial economy model of two countries and two sectors the manufacturing sector generates cross border pollution which reduces cross sectoral productivity of agricultural goods and lowers local income we derive a demand reducing effect that discourages firms to move to the country with laxer environmental regulations in the absence of any comparative advantage our analysis also demonstrates that manufacturing agglomeration forces can alleviate the pollution haven effect a pollution haven may not arise if environmental regulation is slightly more stringent in the larger country

inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination this paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting a manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates we show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions when the product is highly perishable retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories vertical price floors or inventory buybacks subsidies for unsold inventory can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions when the product is less perishable the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives

the cultural transmission of environmental values a comparative approach this paper investigates the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes are partly determined by a cultural component our analysis tackles this issue both theoretically and empirically in the theoretical section of the paper we describe a model of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits in the empirical section we use survey data from the european values study to empirically identify this cultural component in environmental attitudes we use a comparative approach that exploits variations associated with european migration flows our findings suggest that culture has a persistent and statistically significant impact on the environmental values of migrants differences in environmental attitudes among migrants can be traced back to social values that persist in their countries of origin we also show that environmental attitudes are resilient to incentives derived from the external environment environmental conditions migrants have been exposed to in their countries of origin do not have a significant impact on their preferences when living in the host country our empirical findings are robust to a number of alternative assumptions and present interesting dimensions of heterogeneity concerning the cultural transmission process these results imply that in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to effective policy formation

the role of inventory in delivery time competition the paper operationalizes the notion of shortage cost by considering the behavior of customers and competing firms and examines the role of inventory in response time competition we start with a single firm production control model in which customers are characterized by their preferences of price quality and delivery time the optimal production inventory policy and the optimal choice between make to order and make to stock operations are determined in simple newsboy like formulas the basic model is then extended to an n firm market game in which firms compete for orders from the aspect of early delivery one could think of this setting as an oligopoly racing market the analysis shows that competition can breed a demand for produce to stock just as other economic phenomena such as economies of scale uncertainty or seasonality can induce make to stock and that delivery time competition increases the buyer s welfare while decreasing the producer s welfare

sequential correlated equilibria in stopping games in many situations such as trade in stock exchanges agents have many opportunities to act within a short interval of time the agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance but coordination during the game consumes too much time an equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to handle mistakes made by players in this paper we present a new solution concept for infinite horizon dynamic games which is appropriate for such situations a sequential normal form correlated approximate equilibrium under additional assumptions we show that every such game admits this kind of equilibrium

asymmetric consumer learning and inventory competition we develop a model of consumer learning and choice behavior in response to uncertain service in the marketplace learning could be asymmetric that is consumers may associate different weights with positive and negative experiences under this consumer model we characterize the steady state distribution of demand for retailers given that each retailer holds a constant in stock service level we then consider a noncooperative game in steady state between two retailers competing on the basis of their service levels the demand distributions of retailers in this game are modeled using a multiplicative aggregate market share model in which the mean demands are obtained from the steady state results for individual purchases but the model is simplified in other respects for tractability our model yields a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium we show that asymmetry in consumer learning has a significant impact on the optimal service levels market shares and profits of the retailers when retailers have different costs it also determines the extent of competitive advantage enjoyed by the lower cost retailer

a general equilibrium model for industries with price and service competition this paper develops a stochastic general equilibrium inventory model for an oligopoly in which all inventory constraint parameters are endogenously determined we propose several systems of demand processes whose distributions are functions of all retailers prices and all retailers service levels we proceed with the investigation of the equilibrium behavior of infinite horizon models for industries facing this type of generalized competition under demand uncertainty we systematically consider the following three competition scenarios 1 price competition only here we assume that the firms service levels are exogenously chosen but characterize how the price and inventory strategy equilibrium vary with the chosen service levels 2 simultaneous price and service level competition here each of the firms simultaneously chooses a service level and a combined price and inventory strategy 3 two stage competition the firms make their competitive choices sequentially in a first stage all firms simultaneously choose a service level in a second stage the firms simultaneously choose a combined pricing and inventory strategy with full knowledge of the service levels selected by all competitors we show that in all of the above settings a nash equilibrium of infinite horizon stationary strategies exists and that it is of a simple structure provided a nash equilibrium exists in a so called reduced game we pay particular attention to the question of whether a firm can choose its service level on the basis of its own input characteristics i e its cost parameters and demand function only we also investigate under which of the demand models a firm under simultaneous competition responds to a change in the exogenously specified characteristics of the various competitors by either i adjusting its service level and price in the same direction thereby compensating for price increases decreases by offering improved inferior service or ii adjusting them in opposite directions thereby simultaneously offering better or worse prices and service

end of pipe or cleaner production how to go green in presence of income inequality and pro environmental behavior in this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned in particular consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product but also its environmental impact this environmental valuation has a positional content consumers attach a positive attribute to the green product while penalizing the brown one in this context we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end of pipe abatement efforts we find that the interplay between the intensity of market competition consumers income disparity and environmental concern can play a crucial role in directing the green producer towards one or the other technological choice more precisely the adoption of cleaner production technologies can be discouraged by low average income and by tough competition while it can be spurred by the moral social incentive towards pro environmental behavior

combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty this paper addresses the simultaneous determination of pricing and inventory replenishment strategies in the face of demand uncertainty more specifically we analyze the following single item periodic review model demands in consecutive periods are independent but their distributions depend on the item s price in accordance with general stochastic demand functions the price charged in any given period can be specified dynamically as a function of the state of the system a replenishment order may be placed at the beginning of some or all of the periods stockouts are fully backlogged we address both finite and infinite horizon models with the objective of maximizing total expected discounted profit or its time average value assuming that prices can either be adjusted arbitrarily upward or downward or that they can only be decreased we characterize the structure of an optimal combined pricing and inventory strategy for all of the above types of models we also develop an efficient value iteration method to compute these optimal strategies finally we report on an extensive numerical study that characterizes various qualitative properties of the optimal strategies and corresponding optimal profit values

an elasticity approach to the newsvendor with price sensitive demand we introduce a measure of elasticity of stochastic demand called the elasticity of the lost sales rate which offers a unifying perspective on the well known newsvendor with pricing problem this new concept provides a framework to characterize structural results for coordinated and uncoordinated pricing and inventory strategies concavity and submodularity of the profit function as well as sensitivity properties of the optimal inventory and price policies are characterized by monotonicity conditions or bounds on the elasticity of the lost sales rate these elasticity conditions are satisfied by most relevant demand models in the marketing and operations literature our results unify and complement previous work on price setting newsvendor models and provide a new tool for researchers modeling stochastic price sensitive demand in other contexts

logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior an equilibrium framework discrete choice models of demand have typically been estimated assuming that prices are exogenous since unobservable to the researcher product attributes such as coupon availability may impact consumer utility as well as price setting by firms we treat prices as endogenous specifically prices are assumed to be the equilibrium outcomes of nash competition among manufacturers and retailers to empirically validate the assumptions we estimate logit demand systems jointly with equilibrium pricing equations for two product categories using retail scanner data and cost data on factor prices in each category we find statistical evidence of price endogeneity we also find that the estimates of the price response parameter and the brand specific constants are generally biased downward when the endogeneity of prices is ignored our framework provides explicit estimates of the value created by a brand i e the difference between consumers willingness to pay for a brand and its cost of production we develop theoretical propositions about the relationship between value creation and competitive advantage for logit demand systems and use our empirical results to illustrate how firms use alternative value creation strategies to accomplish competitive advantage

price competition when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity it has long been recognized that the pleasure of consuming a good may be affected by the consumption choice of other consumers in some cases social pressures may lead to conformity in some others individuals may feel the need of exclusiveness under the form of vanity such externalities have proven to be important in several markets however the market implication of these externalities are still unclear to investigate them we propose to combine the consumption externality model and the spatial duopoly model when conformity is present but not too strong both firms remain in business but price competition is fiercer and results in lower prices the market share of the large firm increases with the population size as the population keeps rising the large firm may serve the entire market and set a price that has the nature of a limit price when conformity is strong enough different equilibria may exist in most of these equilibria a single firm captures the whole market at the other extreme when vanity is at work price competition is relaxed

finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements i present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure strategy nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities this is the first non trivial algorithm for finding all pure strategy nash equilibria

optimal inventory policies under service sensitive demand the service level provided by a retailer influences demand and sales in several ways in the short run sales can fall short of demand when customers experience stockouts and choose not to backorder in the long run demand itself may decline as customers who experience excessive stockouts shift permanently to more reliable sources the traditional approach to determining inventory policies assumes a fixed stockout cost attributable to each stockout occasion in practice stockout costs are difficult to determine at least in part because they reflect the long term loss of demand due to inadequate service in this paper we model the response of long run demand to the service level of the retailer and determine optimal order up to inventory policies in the presence of service sensitive demand we show under what conditions inventory policy is sensitive to both the mean and the variance of long run demand

a note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit abstract it is widely accepted that one of the most important characteristics of an effective pollution control policy is to provide firms with credible incentives to make long run investments in r d that can drastically reduce pollution recognizing that a government may be tempted to revise its policy design after innovations become available this note shows how the performance of two policy instruments prices uniform taxes and quantities tradeable pollution permits differ in such a setting i also discuss the gains from combining either instrument with subsidies to adopting firms

income inequality and the development of environmental technologies within rich countries a large dispersion in the capacity of generating environmental innovations appears correlated to the level of inequality previous works analyze the relationship between inequality and environmental quality in a static setting this paper builds a dynamic model more suitable to analyze technological externalities driven by the emergence of a new demand for green products under fairly general assumptions on technology and preferences we show that 1 the relationship between inequality and environmental innovation is highly non linear and crucially depends on per capita income 2 an excessive inequality harms the development of environmental technologies especially in rich countries key to our results is the fact that externalities generated by pioneer consumers of green products benefit the entire population only for relatively low income distances the empirical analysis robustly confirms our theoretical results that is whereas for rich countries inequality negatively affects the diffusion of innovations per capita income is paramount in poorer ones

backorder penalty cost coefficient b what could it be abstract the classical economic order quantity eoq model with planned penalized backorders pb relies on postulating a value for the backorder penalty cost coefficient b which is supposed to reflect the intangible adverse effect of the future loss of customer goodwill following a stockout recognizing that the effect of the future loss of customer goodwill should be not a direct penalty cost but a change in future demand schwartz 1966 a new approach to stockout penalties management science 12 12 b538 b544 modified the classical eoq pb model by eliminating the backorder penalty cost term from the objective function and assuming that the long run demand rate is a decreasing strictly convex function of the customer s disappointment factor defined as the complement of the demand fill rate following a stockout which in turn is an increasing strictly convex function of the demand fill rate he called the new model a perturbed demand pd model schwartz provided convincing justification for his pd model and presented several variations of it in a follow up paper but he did not solve any of these models in this paper we solve schwartz s original pd model and its variations and we discuss the implications of their solutions thus filling a gap in the literature left by schwartz moreover having been convinced that schwartz s approach is more valid than the classical approach for representing the effect of the loss of customer goodwill following a stockout but also recognizing that the classical approach is far more popular than the pd approach because of its simplicity and because of tradition we use the solution of the pd model to infer the value of b in the classical model thus providing one possible answer to the question what could b be a noteworthy implication of the solution of schwartz s original pd model is that the optimal fill rate is always 0 or 1 rendering the inferred value of b in the classical model 0 or respectively suspecting that the property of the pd function which is most likely responsible for producing this bang bang type of result is strict convexity we show that for the case where the pd function is proportional to an integer power say n of the fill rate the optimal fill rate is always 0 or 1 if and only if n 1 in which case the pd function is strictly convex in the fill rate

environmental policy when market structure and plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region two firm model is developed in which firms choose the number and the regional locations of their plants both firms pollute and market structure is endogenous to environmental policy there are increasing returns at the plant level imperfect competition between the home and the foreign firm and transport costs between the two markets at critical levels of environmental policy variables small policy changes cause large discrete jumps in a region s pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a plant or shifts production to from a foreign branch plant the implications for optimal environmental policy differ significantly from those suggested by traditional pigouvian marginal analysis

strategic quality competition and the porter hypothesis abstract this paper offers new support for the porter hypothesis within the context of a quality competition framework we use a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which two firms simultaneously choose to produce either a high environmentally friendly quality or low standard quality variant of a good before engaging in price competition in this simple setting we show that a nash equilibrium of the game featuring the low quality good can be pareto dominated by a different strategy profile in which both firms opt in favour of the green product our analysis demonstrates that in such a case both firms stand to profit from the introduction of a rule penalizing any firm refusing to produce the environmentally friendly product we also find that consumers themselves may benefit from such regulations this is always the case when shifting from low quality to high quality production brings about a cost efficiency improvement

after sales service competition in a supply chain does uncertainty affect the conflict between profit maximization and customer satisfaction abstract after sales services are a key strategic tool in the durable consumer product market they allow a manufacturer and a retailer to capture more sales and profit less obvious however is how the uncertainty of the customer s needs for after sales services influences after sales service decisions as an extension of kurata and nam s 2010 international journal of production economics 127 1 136 146 work in this paper we explore the effect of uncertainty on after sales service decisions by comparing several information structures in a two stage supply chain the model presented in this paper demonstrates that uncertainty may temporally alleviate the discrepancy between customers optimal service level and a firm s service decisions based on maximizing profits referred to here as accidental outperformance however ultimately uncertainty will never improve supply chain performance we determine probabilities that such accidental outperformance may mislead the firm into making erroneous after sales service decisions due to misunderstandings regarding uncertainty in addition our analysis shows that a firm s effort to provide efficient service operations will increase the chance of accidental outperformance based on the analytical results we also provide several practical insights for business

optimal quality and quantity provisions for centralized vs decentralized distribution market size uncertainty effects abstract we provide insights on how market size uncertainty affects the optimal quality quantity provision in distribution channels when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for product quality in this context we denote the difference between the manufacturer s optimal quality quantity provision for a centralized channel and its optimal analog for a decentralized channel as the quality quantity differential we find that market size uncertainty creates or increases the quantity differential but it does not affect the differential s polarity in contrast market size uncertainty decreases the quality differential and it does so to the extent that depending on the level of consumer heterogeneity it reverses the differential s polarity moreover we find that the higher the inherent uncertainty level the more pronounced are the effects we likewise find that the effects of market size uncertainty are amplified if the notion of consumer heterogeneity is replaced with retail level competition

price versus production postponement capacity and competition this article presents a comparative analysis of possible postponement strategies in a two stage decision model where firms make three decisions capacity investment production inventory quantity and price typically investments are made while the demand curve is uncertain the strategies differ in the timing of the operational decisions relative to the realization of uncertainty we show how competition uncertainty and the timing of operational decisions influence the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value in contrast to production postponement price postponement makes the investment and production inventory decisions relatively insensitive to uncertainty this suggests that managers can make optimal capacity decisions by deterministic reasoning if they have some price flexibility under price postponement additional postponement of production has relatively small incremental value therefore it may be worthwhile to consider flexible ex post pricing before production postponement reengineering while more postponement increases firm value it is counterintuitive that this also makes the optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty we highlight the different impact of more timely information which leads to higher investment and inventories and of reduced demand uncertainty which decreases investment and inventories our analysis suggests appropriateness conditions for simple make to stock and make to order strategies we also present technical sufficiency and uniqueness conditions under price postponement these results extend to oligopolistic and perfect competition for which pure equilibria are derived interestingly the relative value of operational postponement techniques seems to increase as the industry becomes more competitive

unilateral climate policy and foreign direct investment with firm and country heterogeneity we analyse the effects of unilateral climate policy in a two country two firm model with endogenous plant location and heterogeneity in both country size and firm s characteristics the effectiveness of unilateral climate policy is shown to depend on the joint effect of country and firm heterogeneity and on their impact on equilibrium location choice for being effective and not leading to production relocation in the long run unilateral climate policy should be moderate implemented by a sufficiently larger area and complemented by mechanisms promoting the international transfer of clean technologies the model indicates that the smaller area cannot take the lead in global climate mitigation for a protracted time period finally when the local community is not environmentally concerned the unilateral policy unambiguously makes the society worse off

tax subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers abstract we study policy measures to improve environmental quality in the presence of environmentally aware consumers we consider two sets of policy instruments uniform policies for the firms and policies that discriminate between the firms based on their environmental quality for the latter set either the better performer is rewarded with a subsidy or the worse performer is punished with a tax we find that while a uniform subsidy policy improves average environmental quality a uniform tax policy worsens it further while a discriminatory subsidy policy reduces total pollution and enhances aggregate welfare a discriminatory tax policy may increase total pollution and may reduce aggregate welfare

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

timing and commitment of environmental policy adoption of new technology and repercussions on r d we investigate the interplay between environmental policy incentives to adoptnew technology and repercussions on r d we study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in r d and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms we consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies ex post taxation or issuing permits interim commitment to a tax rate a quota of permits after observing r d success but before adoption and finally two types of ex antecommitment before r d activity one with a unique tax rate quota of permits the other one with a menu of tax rates permit quotas we study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare in particular we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes

demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer this paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption we consider two coordination schedules linear quantity discount schedule and groves wholesale price schedule we find that under the linear quantity discount schedule the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption for each case of the disrupted amount of demand the higher the market share of the dominant retailer the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule while the higher its fraction of the supply chain s profit will be under groves wholesale price schedule when the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer however when the production cost is sufficiently large groves wholesale price schedule is always better we also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain s profit

when is servitization a profitable competitive strategy abstract although servitization has emerged as a new competitive strategy for manufacturers there has been little research about product level servitization we investigate the competition between two channels one separately providing both goods and services and the other providing inseparable servitized goods through a game theoretic approach two critical parameters to understand competition between the two channels will be proposed 1 service dependency a degree of dependency of physical goods upon services and 2 channel substitutability a degree of substitution between conventional channels and servitized one the study reveals that the servitization strategy is a better choice for a manufacturer selling physical goods only when the goods require a higher level of service i e high service dependency and when the competition between the two channels is more severe i e high channel substitutability in addition obtaining cost efficiency is found to be an important factor to achieve higher competitive advantage over the other channel