democracy visibility and public good provision we examine the role of visibility in influencing government resource allocation across a multiplicity of public goods we show that a visibility effect distorts governmental resource allocation such that it helps explain why governments neglect provision of essential public goods despite their considerable benefits we show that greater democratization widens the gap in resource allocation between more visible such as famine prevention versus less visible such as malnutrition prevention public goods up to an intermediate level of democracy beyond this level this gap decreases furthermore public goods with low visibility are prone to multiple equilibria in resource allocation with voter expectations being shown to be important

democracy and human capital formation education spending in latin america 1980 to 1997 this article examines the relationship between democratic representation and spending on education in latin america the authors assess the impact that democracy has on the distribution of resources between different levels of schooling and on total spending on education specifically they test whether democratic governments allocate a greater share of resources to primary education the level that benefits the largest segment of the electorate and that is most critical for human capital formation in developing countries using time series cross sectional analysis the authors find that democracies devote a higher percentage of their educational resources to primary education and that they maintain higher absolute spending levels on education in the aggregate thereby enhancing the prospects of human capital formation

the missing dimension of the political resource curse debate given the methodological sophistication of the debate over the political resource curse the purported negative relationship between natural resource wealth in particular oil wealth and democracy it is surprising that scholars have not paid more attention to the basic statistical issue of how to deal with missing data this article highlights the problems caused by the most common strategy for analyzing missing data in the political resource curse literature listwise deletion and investigates how addressing such problems through the best practice technique of multiple imputation affects empirical results i find that multiple imputation causes the results of a number of influential recent studies to converge on a key common finding a political resource curse does exist but only since the widespread nationalization of petroleum industries in the 1970s this striking finding suggests that much of the controversy over the political resource curse has been caused by a neglect of missing data issues

structural instability and the production smoothing model of inventories the production smoothing model of inventories implies that inventories labor inputs sales and factor input prices are cointegrated if sales and factor prices are i 1 with one cointegrating vector for each state variable held these propositions are tested in six nondurable goods industries all industries provide evidence of cointegration fewer quasi fixed factors are found than previous research often assumed estimates of cointegrating vectors provide implausible parameter estimates rank stability tests with fixed or seqentially chosen breakpoints indicate that the cointegrating matrix has unstable rank parameter estimates of cointegrating vectors do not provide much support for the production smoothing model of inventories

pressure groups and redistribution abstract the simple pressure group model of political redistribution can predict more with less restrictive assumptions instead of ready made pressure groups composed of individuals who vote their pocketbooks we posit heterogeneous agents each of whom decides which group to join and how much effort to expend on political activity our model then examines social affinity conditions that foster pressure group formation political sympathies based on social affinity imply testable effects of growth rate and income distribution on progressive transfers effects that prove substantial in pooled time series cross section regressions for 13 oecd countries 1960 1981

basic health care provision and under 5 mortality a cross national study of developing countries summary in two cross sections of developing countries under 5 mortality is found to be associated strongly with maternal and infant health program effort and with the share of births attended by trained personnel but never with any indicator of health care spending from the standpoint of reducing under 5 mortality then the main challenge in many developing countries may be less to raise overall public health spending or even the share of public health spending devoted to basic services than to assure that a very small absolute amount of revenue is spent effectively to raise access to or improve the quality of maternal and infant health care

social policy and mortality decline in east asia and latin america abstract since 1960 chile and costa rica have improved life expectancy and infant survival as much as south korea and taiwan despite growing more slowly suffering more income poverty and having more unequally distributed incomes this paper analyzes the origins and impact of the publicly funded social services that allowed chile and costa rica to achieve rapid reductions in the risk of early death despite relatively poor performance on income related indicators and explores how south korea and taiwan managed to achieve similar progress at reducing premature mortality despite making less deliberate efforts to fund social services for the poor

why has under 5 mortality decreased at such different rates in different countries controlling for socioeconomic and geographic factors under 5 mortality 5q0 in developing countries has been declining at about 2 7 per year a high rate of technical progress this paper adduces theoretical and empirical reasons for rejecting the usual specification of homogeneous technical progress across countries and uses a panel of 95 developing countries for the period 1970 2000 to explore the consequences of heterogeneity allowing country specific rates of technical progress sharply reduces the estimated income elasticity of 5q0 and points to country variation in technical progress as the principal source of the large cross country variation in 5q0 decline education levels and physician coverage also contribute and are less affected than income of allowing country variation in technical progress the paper concludes by decomposing 1970 2000 5q0 decline into its different sources for each country

randomized evaluations of educational programs in developing countries some lessons this paper reviews recent randomized evaluations of educational programs in developing countries including programs to increase school participation to provide educational inputs and to reform education it then extracts some lessons for education policy and for the practice and political economy of randomized evaluations

the determinants of mortality mortality rates have fallen dramatically over time starting in a few countries in the 18th century and continuing to fall today in just the past century life expectancy has increased by over 30 years at the same time mortality rates remain much higher in poor countries with a difference in life expectancy between rich and poor countries of also about 30 years this difference persists despite the remarkable progress in health improvement in the last half century at least until the hiv aids pandemic in both the time series and the cross section data there is a strong correlation between income per capita and mortality rates a correlation that also exists within countries where richer better educated people live longer we review the determinants of these patterns over history over countries and across groups within countries while there is no consensus about the causal mechanisms we tentatively identify the application of scientific advance and technical progress some of which is induced by income and facilitated by education as the ultimate determinant of health such an explanation allows a consistent interpretation of the historical cross country and within country evidence we downplay direct causal mechanisms running from income to health

impact of financial crises on poverty in developing world an empirical approach in this paper we adopt a cross country perspective to analyze the short term effects of currency banking and debt crises on poverty we employ multivariate fixed effects panel data analysis in order to examine whether and to what extent different types of financial crises impact the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap as measured by the world bank our findings suggest that out of the three categories of financial crises we identify it is currency crises that most significantly exacerbate both the incidence and depth of poverty in the short run we find evidence that banking crises are associated with an increase in the depth of poverty but not the incidence however this effect tends to be short lived while our analysis shows no direct effect of sovereign debt crises on short term poverty

does the median voter model explain the size of government evidence from the states despite an attempt by its own authors it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by meltzer and richard 1981 has had convincing empirical backing in this paper we adapt that model to a model of state government size the main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows government size as measured by the percentage of income devoted to government redistribution grows we test the model using panel data from the us states from 1979 1991 in contrast to the results found by meltzer and richard 1983 we find little evidence to support the model the results are robust to several model specifications and estimation techniques

the political economy of growth democracy and human capital democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy we argue that there are significant indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators in addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies we conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30 year panel of 128 countries we find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth rather we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in nonpoor countries t he relationship between democracy and economic growth has received considerable attention in recent years as yet however there is no consensus among analysts on the relationship between these two widely studied variables sound theoretical positions have been advanced suggesting that democracy is both an impediment and facilitator of growth careful quantitative tests of the relationship have produced contradictory results in our view existing studies fail to develop an adequate political theory of growth and as a result their empirical models are typically misspecified with competing arguments on both sides of the question many analysts merely add a variable for democracy to existing economic models and then look at the sign of the coefficient and its significance this is inadequate democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy we argue that there are important indirect effects of democracy on growth that are manifested through public health and education where economists typically use life expectancy and secondary school enrollment as proxies for human capital we expect that democracy will itself be an important determinant of the level of public services captured in these indicators thus in

international diversification strategies revisited from the risk perspective following roll roll r 1992 industrial structure and comparative behaviour of international stock market indices journal of finance 47 3 42 and heston and rouwenhorst heston s l rouwenhorst g k 1994 does industrial structure explain the benefits of international diversification journal of financial economics 36 3 27 researchers have decomposed stock returns into country and industry components evidence suggests that industry components have become more important in recent years but the reasons for this are unclear existing research concentrated mainly on stock returns in industrial countries in this paper we consider instead the decomposition of stock risks within emerging equity markets we provide a rationale for this procedure and its relationship to return decompositions the results provide new firm specific evidence on the debate over country and industry components their stability over time and the implications for portfolio diversification

effective foreign aid following civil war the nonstrategic desperation hypothesis when does aid foster development after civil war a testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development this article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic desperation hypothesis an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals paradoxically incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income ten year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970 96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis by focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals the nonstrategic desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war when institutions are weak

wealthier is healthier we estimate the effect of income on health using cross country timeseries data on health infant and child mortality and life expectancy and income per capita we use instrumental variables estimates using exogenous determinants of income growth to identify the pure income effect on health isolated from reverse causation or incidental association the long run income elasticity of infant and child mortality in developing countries lies between 0 2 and 0 4 using these estimates we calculate that over a half a million child deaths in the developing world in 1990 alone can be attributed to the poor economic performance in the 1980s

politics the state and basic human needs a cross national study this study examines ways that political processes influence the provision of basic human needs once the effects of aggregate national wealth are removed three general explanatory approaches are examined these are based on the size or strength of the national government the achievement ofdemocratic processes and the ideological orientation ofruling elites along a left right dimension these three approaches are analyzed by regressing an index of physical well being the pqli on measures drawn from each perspective for a sample of 1 16 contemporary nations the findings indicate that political attributes do indeed have an impact on the provision of basic needs even when controlling for aggregate social wealth democratic processes are related to positive welfare outcomes irrespective of state strength and ideological norms for regimes with a roughly centrist ideology state strength appears to make little noticeable difference one way or another for those on the left state strength promotes welfare performance for those on the right state strength is found to inhibit the provision of basic needs how do political processes affect the welfare of individuals this question in countless variants has motivated students of political economy at least since the advent of the modern nation state in its simplest form the empirical question becomes what kind of state achieves the highest level of welfare for its citizens although it may seem that there are as many answers as possible dimensions of states most analyses have centered on one or more of three general explanatory approaches the first focuses on the size or strength of the state apparatus as the essential ingredient in translating productive potential into welfare outcomes successful welfare performance hinges on the capability of the state because the state is considered the one social institution concerned with the material needs of the population as a whole a second model highlights procedural aspects of the political system rather than the budgetary strength of the state by linking successful welfare outcomes to the relatively even distribution of political power brought about by political democracy the third approach is distinguished from the other two by its emphasis on the ideological orientation usually on a left right continuum of ruling elites this model posits welfare

where has all the education gone cross national data show no association between increases in human capital attributable to the rising educational attainment of the labor force and the rate of growth of output per worker this implies that the association of educational capital growth with conventional measures of total factor production is large strongly statistically significant and negative these are on average results derived from imposing a constant coefficient however the development impact of education varied widely across countries and has fallen short of expectations for three possible reasons first the institutional governance environment could have been sufficiently perverse that the accumulation of educational capital lowered economic growth second marginal returns to education could have fallen rapidly as the supply of educated labor expanded while demand remained stagnant third educational quality could have been so low that years of schooling created no human capital the extent and mix of these three phenomena vary from country to country in explaining the actual economic impact of education or the lack thereof

poverty and famines an essay on entitlement and deprivation this book focuses on the causes of starvation in general and famines in particular the traditional analysis of famines is shown to be fundamentally defective and the author develops an alternative analysis

is democracy good for the poor many scholars claim that democracy improves the welfare of the poor this article uses data on infant and child mortality to challenge this claim cross national studies tend to exclude from their samples nondemocratic states that have performed well this leads to the mistaken inference that nondemocracies have worse records than democracies once these and other flaws are corrected democracy has little or no effect on infant and child mortality rates democracies spend more money on education and health than nondemocracies but these benefits seem to accrue to middle and upper income groups

how democracy affects growth abstract this paper introduces a new methodology to examine the empirical relationship between democracy and economic growth democratic institutions are assumed to affect growth through a series of channels we specify and estimate a full system of equations determining growth and the channel variables results suggest that democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of human capital and less robustly by lowering income inequality on the other hand democracy hinders growth by reducing the rate of physical capital accumulation and less robustly by raising the ratio of government consumption to gdp once all of these indirect effects are accounted for the overall effect of democracy on economic growth is moderately negative our results indicate that democratic institutions are responsive to the demands of the poor by expanding access to education and lowering income inequality but do so at the expense of physical capital accumulation

local capture evidence from a central government transfer program in uganda according to official statistics 20 percent of uganda s total public expenditure was spent on education in the mid 1990s most of it on primary education one of the large public programs was a capitation grant to cover schools nonwage expenditures using panel data from a unique survey of primary schools we assess the extent to which the grant actually reached the intended end user schools the survey data reveal that during 1991 1995 the schools on average received only 13 percent of the grants most schools received nothing the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians the data also reveal considerable variation in grants received across schools suggesting that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding we find that schools in better off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements as a result actual education spending in contrast to budget allocations is regressive similar surveys in other african countries confirm that uganda is not a special case

the effects of capital mobility trade openness and democracy on social spending in latin america 1980 1999 empirical studies measuring the impact of globalization on social spending have appeared recently in leading journals this study seeks to improve upon previous work by 1 employing a more sophisticated and comprehensive measure of financial openness 2 using a more accurate measure of trade openness based on purchasing power parities and 3 relying on social spending data that are more complete than those used by previous studies on latin america our estimates suggest that several empirical patterns reported in previous work deserve a second look we find that trade openness has a positive association with education and social security expenditures that financial openness does not constrain government outlays for social programs and that democracy has a strong positive association with social spending particularly on items that bolster human capital formation t he international integration of markets for goods and services over the past two decades is unprecedented amidst a broader context of international integration latin america has experienced the most dramatic change in its economic policy orientation since world war ii few regions have undergone as rapid and thorough an economic transformation how has economic integration affected the social welfare policies of latin american governments has it forced them to reduce spending on social programs in order to compete in the world economy or has it induced them to provide social safety nets for those hurt by economic competition has democratization in latin america compelled governments to spend more on social programs in relatively open economies

globalization domestic politics and social spending in latin america a time series cross section analysis 1973 97 this study examines the effects of globalization democratization and partisanship on social spending in fourteen latin american countries from 1973 to 1997 using a pooled time series error correction model the authors examine three sets of issues first following debates in the literature on oecd countries they want to know whether social spending has been encouraged or constrained by integration into global markets within this context they examine the extent to which such outcomes might be influenced by two additional sets of domestic political and institutional factors discussed in work on developed countries the electoral pressures of democratic institutions and whether or not popularly based governments are in power the authors show that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital markets this is the strongest and most robust finding in the study neither democratic nor popularly based governments consistently affect overall social spending the authors then disaggregate spending into social security transfers and expenditures on health and education they find that popularly based governments tend to protect social security transfers which tend to flow disproportionately to their unionized constituencies but they have a negative impact on health and education spending conversely a shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending which reaches a larger segment of the population the authors conclude by emphasizing the contrasting political logics of the different types of social spending

what can new survey data tell us about recent changes in distribution and poverty it has been claimed that in recent times the poor have lost ground both relatively and absolutely even when average levels of living have risen this article tests that claim using household surveys for 67 developing and transitional economies over 1981 94 it finds that changes in inequality and polarization were uncorrelated with changes in average living standards distribution improved as often as it worsened in growing economies and negative growth was often more detrimental to distribution than positive growth overall there was a small decrease in absolute poverty although with diverse experiences across regions and countries almost always poverty fell with growth in average living standards and rose with contraction

aid fragmentation or aid pluralism the effect of multiple donors on child survival in developing countries 1990 2010 while most policy makers and researchers stress the negative impact of aid fragmentation on development outcomes in recipient countries we argue that the greater diversity of perspectives entailed by higher multiplicity of donors can help select better policies we hypothesize a u shaped relationship countries with a moderate number of donors fare better than countries with either few or many donors the hypothesis is supported by a generalized method of moments gmm analysis of the relationship between health aid donors and child survival in 110 low and middle income countries during 1990 2010

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences