wages and productivity growth in a dynamic monopoly abstract this paper studies the intertemporal problem of a monopolistic firm that engages in productivity enhancing innovations to reduce labor costs the optimal innovation policy is not monotone and the rate of productivity growth is the highest when the firm s size is in some intermediate range as long as its initial productivity is not too low the firm eventually reaches a steady state where the rate of productivity growth is identical to the rate of wage growth productivity dependent wage differentials do not affect productivity growth in the steady state they increase however the firm s long run equilibrium cost level

mexico and the brady plan mexico has throughout the 1980s been centre stage in the debates and events shaping the sovereign debt problem caught between a sudden collapse of its terms of trade and rising world interest rates mexico suspended debt service payments in august 1982 and ushered in what has since become known as the debt crisis in the following years lending to ldcs dried up and debtor countries were increasingly forced to run high trade surpluses to effect ever growing transfers from poor back to rich countries in the face of falling growth rates and rising inflation in the high debt countries then secretary of the treasury baker proposed the baker plan in return for economic reforms high debt countries would get new access to medium term new loans in addition to rolling over of amortization of old loans new loans had to come both from commercial creditors and the official lending institutions with access to capital markets restored the economic reforms would it was hoped allow the debtors to grow out of debt but experience in the high debt countries showed that the original hopes of the proponents of the baker plan went unfulfilled net transfers out of the borrowing countries went up rather than down as

the policy preferences of the us federal reserve in this paper we model and explain us macroeconomic outcomes subject to the discipline that monetary policy is set optimally exploiting the restrictions that come from optimal policymaking we estimate the parameters in the federal reserve s policy objective function together with the parameters in its optimization constraints for the period following volcker s appointment as chairman we estimate the implicit inflation target to be around 1 4 and show that policymakers assigned a significant weight to interest rate smoothing we show that the estimated optimal policy provides a good description of us data for the 1980s and 1990s

corporatism and unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s a number of studies have found an association between corporatist institutions and low unemployment in the 1970s and or 1980s three gaps in our understanding of corporatism s labor market effects are addressed here 1 which of the two principal forms of corporatism corporatist wage setting or union participation in economic policymaking or both generates these effects 2 what are the causal mechanisms 3 did these effects continue in the 1990s in the face of globalization restrictive monetary policy growing dissension within labor movements and related developments the impact of corporatism across 16 affluent oecd countries in the 1980s and 1990s is assessed using pooled time series cross section analysis the results suggest that wage coordination was conducive to low unemployment in the 1980s because it fostered moderation in labor costs spurred faster economic growth and encouraged governments to more aggressively pursue policies to reduce unemployment in the 1990s this effect disappeared largely because unemployment outcomes in low wage coordination countries improved rather than because unemployment outcomes in high wage coordination countries deteriorated union participation in economic policymaking was associated with low unemployment throughout the two decades conditional on the presence of leftist government union participation appears to have had this effect mainly via government policy

globalization and the great u turn income inequality trends in 16 oecd countries the debate on the resurgence of income inequality in some advanced industrial societies has often focused on the impact of an increasingly integrated world economy typified by growing capital mobility heightened international competition and an increase in migration this study represents one of the first systematic cross national examinations of the role of globalization in the inequality u turn results indicate on the one hand that total inequality variation is principally affected by the percentage of the labor force in agriculture followed by the institutional factors union density and decommodification and only then by globalization on the other hand longitudinal variation in inequality while still dominated by the percentage of the labor force in agriculture is also principally affected by aspects of globalization such as southern import penetration and direct investment outflow and to a lesser extent by migration in other words globalization explains the longitudinal trend of inc

employment policies wage formation and trade union behavior in a small open economy a model of trade union determined wages is developed which provides an explanation of underemployment based on optimizing behavior it is shown that fiscal policy will in general affect employment under perfect foresight and immediate wage flexibility future consequences of short run stabilization policies are discussed ratchet effects with respect to government expenditure and game theoretic interdependence between government and trade union behavior are emphasized if the trade union takes short run policy measures in order to increase employment as an indication of an employment stabilization rule the future behavior of the trade union changes and the result may be a decrease in long run employment

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

more on tax perception and labour supply the spanish case abstract we estimate the marginal tax rate perceived by married spanish males the results suggest the existence of prominent divergences between subjective perception and formal income tax rules the efficiency and welfare implications of this tax rate gap are also assessed

unemployment institutions and reform complementarities re assessing the aggregate evidence for oecd countries there is no or limited consensus on the quantitative impact of institutions on unemployment which has led some to question the case for structural reforms recent studies suggest also that institutions interact with each other and cannot be analysed in isolation in this paper we estimate a standard reduced form model to explore the institutional determinants of unemployment and assess its robustness using a large battery of robustness checks we show that although the impact of each individual policy varies across countries due to policy interactions the simple linear model can be used to draw inferences for countries with an average mix of institutions the model is then extended to encompass systemic interactions in which individual policies interact with the overall institutional framework we find relatively robust evidence of broad reform complementarities

assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply recent surveys on the labor supply responses of men document a divergence in the estimates of substitution and income effects obtained using various estimation approaches generally studies accounting for nonlinear tax schedules in a static setting via a piecewise linear approach produce estimates that typically imply higher substitution and lower income responses than are suggested by empirical work applying other approaches this paper demonstrates that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer choice problem with nonlinear budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into behaviorally meaningful restrictions these constraints arise not as a consequence of economic theory but instead as a requirement to create a properly defined statistical model in the analysis of piecewise linear budget sets the implicit constraints required by maximum likelihood in estimation amount to imposition of slutsky conditions at all wage income combinations associated with kink points in the analysis of differentiable budget sets the tacit constraints invoked by maximum likelihood also involve inequality restrictions on slutsky terms the empirical work presented in this study supports the contention that these implicit constraints play a major role in explaining the discrepancies in estimates found in the literature on men s labor supply

union structure and firms incentives for cooperative r d investments we examine how different unionisation structures and the spillovers of r d activities affect r d investments and fi rms incentives to form ar esearch joint venture we find that whenever firms invest non cooperatively an industry union increases r d investments if industry specific spillovers are low in case of a research joint venture investments are always higher under firm level unions we also find that firms incentives to form a research joint venture are stronger when they face an industry union if spillovers are low rigidities in the labour market such as high unemployment benefits or and a central union have negative effects on employment output and profits and hinder the diffusion of the efficiency created by a rjv to consumers and employees integrated labour market and r d policies are also discussed

the dynamics of trade unionism and national economic performance i test two theories of the political processes of trade unions the first argues that wage moderation depends on a centralized labor movement the second contends that institutional conditions permitting unions coordination of bargaining strategies is sufficient coordination is most likely to he achieved when there are small number of unions that do not compete for members that is when union monopoly is high important empirical anomalies may be resolved by analyzing the effects of union centralization and monopoly separately rather than combining them into a composite index of corporatism reanalyzing comparative data from organization of economic cooperation and development countries between 1963 and 1985 largely corroborates the hypothesis that monopoly is more important than either centralization or composite indices of corporatism for national economic performance the conceptual rationale underlying indices of corporatism should be reexamined

centralisation employment and wage dispersion this paper is about bargaining institutions and their influence on wage dispersion and employment using novel statistical measures it compares labor market performance in seventeen oecd countries since 1973 it concludes that countries with highly centralized wage bargaining have generally achieved the best performance combining high employment with low wage dispersion thereby avoiding certain major inequalities prevalent elsewhere the paper also presents a formal model of bargaining based on the work of l calmfors and j driffill 1988 simulations are used to illustrate how this model generates the kind of outcomes described in the empirical part of the paper copyright 1992 by royal economic society

wage dispersion and productive efficiency evidence for sweden the swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized solidarity bargaining followed by substantial decompression of wages after central bargaining broke down supplies observations well suited to empirical evaluation of arguments about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution we obtain no results supporting fairness morale and cohesiveness theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity reduction of interindustry wage differentials evidently did however contribute positively to aggregate output and productivity growth most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago

against the wind bargaining recentralisation and wage inequality in norway 1987 91 in the late 1980s norway s labour market experienced similar supply and demand shifts for skills to other countries but unlike other oecd nations norway s wage setting system became more centralised the pay distribution in norway became more compressed at the bottom from 1987 to 1991 while low wage workers in other countries lost ground relatively using norwegian microdata for 1987 and 1991 i found that changing labour market prices helped cause this wage compression further the less educated had declining relative overall employment but increasing relative public sector employment both possible labour market responses to the wage compression

union egalitarianism as income insurance it is a common observation that unions often try to compress the wage distribution among their members as compared with the productivity distribution a troublesome aspect of standard theories of redistributive unions is the question why high productivity workers choose to enter the union in the first place this paper develops and explores the implications of an alternative insurance rationale for egalitarian wage objectives apart from providing a simple explanation of why heterogeneous union members may agree on egalitarian wage policies it also suggests a more guarded attitude toward the welfare costs of pay compression copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

delays in renewal of labor contracts theory and evidence in many countries an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often protracted delay before the new contract is signed our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay it emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty the model is tested using israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent the empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model thus nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay and real uncertainty to decrease the delay but less in the public than in the private sector

classical unemployment accommodation policies and the adjustment of real wages a model of wage formation and stabilization policy in economies with strong trade unions is developed the analysis provides a theoretical underpinning for the assertion that accommodation policies may cause wage inflation and ultimately reduce employment various methods of accomplishing a real wage adjustment are discussed i a policy of complete nonaccommodation 2 continued accommodation policies but with lower employment targets 3 social contracts and 4 tax based incomes policies tip

the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of married men in sweden abstract this paper presents labor supply functions estimated on a sample of prime age swedish males the model used takes account of the nonlinear character of individuals budget sets caused by the progressive income tax it also allows preferences to vary between individuals calculations with the estimated functions using a partial equilibrium framework indicate a sizeable effect of the income tax on hours of work the average expected deadweight loss of the income tax is found to be approximately 20 percent of tax revenue

macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining an international perspective this paper critically reviews the research on how collective bargaining systems influence macroeconomic performance in industrialized countries the review considers effects of bargaining level coordination and corporatist institutional arrangements key empirical results turn out to be quite fragile and much of the paper explores issues of measurement and specification that account for the fragility the paper concludes that complementarities between key institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions and it suggests research strategies

flexible inflation forecast targeting evidence from canada we test whether the bank of canada pursues a flexible inflation forecast target one that weights output growth as well as inflation for the period 1996 2007 we find evidence that the bank did effectively pursue such a target over the forecast horizon of 12 to 18 months we find the relative weight that the bank gives to output growth in its target to be positive and statistically significant within the range of 0 2 to 0 4 resume la poursuite de cibles de prevision d inflation flexibles resultats pour le canada on met au test la proposition a savoir si la banque du canada poursuit une cible flexible de prevision d inflation une cible qui tient compte de la croissance du produit tout autant que l inflation pour la periode 1996 2007 les resultats montrent que la banque a poursuivi une cible sur un horizon de prevision de 12 a 18 mois on montre que la ponderation relative que la banque donne a la croissance du produit dans son ciblage est positive et statistiquement significative dans l eventail entre 0 2 et 0 4

union wage differentials product market influences and the division of rents this paper examines the extent to which product market conditions limit the ability of trade unions to establish wage differentials over nonunion pay the mean union pay differential is estimated to be of the order of 8 percent to 10 percent in establishments with some degree of product market power but zero in establishments facing competitive product market conditions when competitive conditions are faced a preentry closed shop and high union coverage of the industry are both required it is estimated that only 5 percent of the establishments in which there are significant differentials over nonunion pay face generally competitive product market conditions copyright 1990 by royal economic society

collective bargaining firm heterogeneity and unemployment abstract we compare labor market outcomes under firm level and sector level bargaining in a one sector mortensen pissarides economy with firm specific productivity shocks our main theoretical results are two fold first unemployment is lower under firm level bargaining due both to a lower job destruction rate and a higher job finding rate key to this result is the interplay between firm heterogeneity and wage compression under sector level bargaining second introducing efficient opting out of sector level agreements suffices to bring unemployment down to its level under decentralized bargaining

inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule the purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss in ation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules the paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of in ation targeting compares in ation targeting to other monetary policy rules and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the european system of central banks jel classi cation e42 e52

the incidence of income tax on wages and labour supply in the simple framework of a static model for equilibrium wages and labour supplies we show that the incidence of income tax on equilibrium wages can be measured independently from the individual

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

estimating the perceived tax scale within a labor supply model the swedish marginal tax scale is too complex to be known in detail by individuals this paper indicates that perceived tax scales can be estimated jointly with a labor supply equation the differe

modeling inflation dynamics a critical review of recent research in recent years a broad academic consensus has arisen around the use of rational expectations sticky price models to capture inflation dynamics these models are seen as providing an empirically reasonable characterization of observed inflation behavior once suitable measures of the output gap are chosen and moreover are perceived to be robust to the lucas critique in a way that earlier econometric models of inflation are not we review the principal conclusions of this literature concerning 1 the ability of these models to fit the data 2 the importance of rational forward looking expectations in price setting and 3 the appropriate measure of inflationary pressures we argue that existing rational expectations sticky price models fail to provide a useful empirical description of the inflation process especially relative to traditional econometric phillips curves of the sort commonly employed for policy analysis

wage setting measures a survey and assessment wage setting has been one of the most heavily studied institutions in the field of comparative political economy over the past two decades and quantitative measures of wage setting arrangements have played a major role in this research yet the proliferation of such measures in recent years presents researchers with a sizable array from which to choose in addition some scholars are rather skeptical about the validity and or reliability of these measures this article offers a survey and assessment of fifteen wage setting measures it attempts to answer questions about 1 how these indicators differ from one another in conceptualization and measurement strategy 2 which are the most valid and reliable 3 the strengths and weaknesses of measures of wage centralization versus those of wage coordination 4 particular countries or time periods for which there are noteworthy discrepancies in scoring 5 how sensitive empirical findings are to the choice of wage setting measure

counterinflationary policy in a unionised economy with nonsynchronised wage setting a model of the determination of wages and employment in a unionised economy with nonsynchronised wage setting is presented in this paper it is shown that a monetary deflation can lead to prolonged unemployment even though the unions act rationally and with full information about the change in policy the model generates a statistical phillips curve in which the rate of change of money wages depends on the anticipated growth rate of the money supply and on disequilibrium unemployment conventional incomes policies are shown to have desirable social effects but run counter to the perceived self interest of the trade unions and are therefore likely to be resisted taxes on wage increases have desirable long run effects but do not appear able to reduce the transitional unemployment costs of monetary deflation

labour market regulation industrial relations and technological regimes a tale of comparative advantage in this paper we present comparative evidence from oecd countries concerning the impact of labour market institutions and regulations on technological specialization the interplay between the degree of labour market flexibility the system of industrial relations and the knowledge base of different industries determines the viability of different human resource strategies thereby shaping the patterns of comparative advantage our empirical results show that countries with coordinated industrial relations systems and strict employment protection tend to specialize in industries with a cumulative knowledge base we argue that two mechanisms explain these patterns the larger the scope for resorting to internal labour markets the lower the adjustment costs imposed by labour market regulation furthermore employment protection and coordinated industrial relations regimes by aligning workers and firms bjectives encourage firm sponsored training as well as the accumulation of firm specific competencies allowing firms to fully exploit the potential of the internal labour market copyright 2002 oxford university press

institutions and performance in european labour markets taking a fresh look at evidence this paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions and offers new empirical eu based evidence on the impact of labour market reforms on employment and labour market adjustment although the literature traditionally treats labour market institutions as exogenous attention shifted recently towards understanding the underlying causes of specific institutional arrangements as a consequence the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design exploiting these interactions wisely and identifies general principles for achieving an efficient policy design at both macro and micro levels although empirical evidence does not show a major change in terms of intensity of labour market reform after the setting of the economic and monetary union and the creation of the euro the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of vulnerable groups tend to have been successful both in raising their employment and increasing labour market adjustment

the decentralization of collective bargaining a literature review and comparative analysis the author reviews evidence that the bargaining structure is becoming more decentralized in sweden australia the former west germany italy the united kingdom and the united states although in

the econometrics of nonlinear budget sets traditional empirical analysis of consumer demand has usually made the assumption of linear budget sets that is the consumer is assumed to purchase any desired quantity at a constant price subject to a budget constraint the major exception to this framework is the analysis of demand when some goods are rationed 2 in the rationed case the price is constant up to a quantity limit in contrast to the rationed case here i consider the situation where the price varies with the amount of the good purchased empirical situations with nonconstant prices come readily to mind and of course they have received much recent attention from theorists since mirrlees 44 paper on optimal nonlinear taxation the following examples are meant to give a partial listing of cases when nonlinear budget sets occur i electricity prices many electric utilities engage in declining block pricing that is the marginal price of successive kwh s of electricity decrease at a given number of points determined by total demand thus the budget set is piecewise linear houthakker 36 was the first to propose an approach to this problem taylor 51 analyzes the problem at length and hausman kinnucin and mcfadden 31 use an instrumental variables estimator to provide consistent estimates of the demand function

cumulative effects of labor market distortions in a developing country abstract this paper considers a small open economy with an input output industrial structure that creates vertical linkages and multiple equilibria an imperfect labor market is introduced by assuming unionized labor it is shown that a deregulation of the labor market may trigger a large discontinuous expansion of industrial output as reduced wage costs start a circular cumulative process in which expansions of the up and downstream industries promote each other centralization of collective bargaining may however also be conducive to industrialization

institutions partisanship and inequality in the long run it has been widely suggested by political scientists and economists based on empirical evidence for the period since 1970 that the institution of centralized wage bargaining and the presence of a government of the left are associated with lower levels of income inequality the authors make use of new data on top income shares as well as long run series on wage inequality to examine the effects of partisanship and wage bargaining over a much longer time period nearly the entire twentieth century their empirical results provide little support for the idea that either of these two factors is correlated with income inequality over this period they then show that a closer look at the introduction of centralized wage bargaining in individual countries during the middle part of the twentieth century reveals that in countries that moved to centralize wage bargaining income inequality had already been trending downward well before the institutional change that the move to centralized bargaining did not alter this trend and that these changes in income inequality were also observed in countries that did not adopt centralized wage bargaining at this time the results suggest that there were alternative institutional paths to reduced income inequality during most of the twentieth century this raises the possibility that either structural economic changes or commonly shared economic and political events such as world wars and economic crises may ultimately be more important for understanding the evolution of income inequality than are the institutional or partisan characteristics commonly considered to be decisive by political scientists

identification weak instruments and statistical inference in econometrics we discuss statistical inference problems associated with identification and testability in econometrics we consider inference in non parametric models and weakly identified structural models weak instruments we point out that many ill defined statistical problems such as non testable hypotheses occur in these areas and are typically associated with asymptotic approximations in non parametric models such problems include testing moments and inference under heteroscedasticity or serial dependence of unknown form for weakly identified structural models difficulties are typically associated with improper pivots and we review recent developments aimed at proposing more reliable procedures including alternative proposed statistics bounds projection split sampling conditioning monte carlo tests jel classification c1 c12 c14 c15 c3 c5 identification instruments faibles et inference statistique en econometrie nous analysons les problemes d inference associes a l identification et a la testabilite en econometrie nous considerons l inference dans les modeles non parametriques et les modeles structurels faiblement identifies instruments faibles nous remarquons que beaucoup de problemes mal poses tels que des hypotheses non testables apparaissent dans ces domaines et que ceux ci sont typiquement associes a l emploi d approximations asymptotiques dans les modeles non parametriques de tels problemes incluent les tests sur les moments et l inference sous heteroscedasticite ou dependance serielle de forme non specifiee dans les modeles structurels faiblement identifies ces difficultes sont habituellement associees a l emploi de fonctions pivotales impropres et nous presentons un survol des methodes recentes ayant pour objectif d obtenir des procedures plus fiables ce qui comprend les differentes statistiques proposees l emploi de bornes la subdivision d echantillon les techniques de projection le conditionnement et les tests de monte carlo

product market reforms labour market institutions and unemployment we analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment and wages and how this depends on labour market institutions we use differential changes in regulations across oecd countries over the 1980s and 1990s to identify the effects of competition we find that increased product market competition reduces unemployment and that it does so more in countries with labour market institutions that increase worker bargaining power the theoretical intuition is that both firms with market power and unions with bargaining power are constrained in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product market we also find that the effect of increased competition on real wages is beneficial to workers but less so when they have high bargaining power intuitively real wages increase through a drop in the general price level but workers with bargaining power lose out somewhat from a reduction in the rents that they had previously captured

union density and varieties of coverage the anatomy of union wage effects in germany collective bargaining in germany takes place at either industry or firm level and bargaining coverage is much higher than union density the share of a firm s employees covered can vary between 0 and 100 suggesting that researchers should distinguish union density coverage at the firm level and coverage at the individual level using linked employer employee data the authors estimate ols and quantile regressions of wages on these dimensions of union influence they find that a higher share of employees in a firm covered by industrywide or firm specific contracts is associated with higher wages but find no clear cut effect on wage dispersion yet holding coverage at the firm level constant individual coverage is associated with lower wages and less wage dispersion higher union density reinforces the effects of coverage but for employees in firms without coverage density s effect is negative and thus compresses the wage distribution in firms without coverage

collective wage bargaining and the role of institutional stability a cross national comparison of macroeconomic performance since the advent of the economic crisis interest in the efficacy of collective wage bargaining institutions has increased as the labour market was required to bear the burden of economic adjustment and became an important policy field for institutional reform in many countries in this article the role of institutional stability trust and certainty for the efficacy of collective bargaining systems is investigated and their effects on macroeconomic outcomes inflation and unemployment are analysed we argue that stability of the institutional framework of collective bargaining is of major importance for its efficacy as it reduces uncertainty and provides the necessary basis for trust among bargaining actors thus we hypothesise that institutional change and instability are associated with significant transaction costs and have at least temporarily negative effects on economic outcomes the hypotheses are confirmed by an empirical analysis which uses data of 34 industrialised countries from 1965 to 2014

does collective wage bargaining restore efficiency in a search model with large firms existing search and bargaining models show that firms hire an inefficiently large number of workers we ask whether decentralised collective wage bargaining may result in a second best allocation collective bargaining restores efficiency when the bargained wage is independent of employment conditions that we characterise firms then behave as if collective bargaining was over both wages and employment thus linking the large firm search and bargaining environment to the efficient bargaining model mcdonald and solow 1981 under more realistic conditions workers can bargain for a share of output so that the wage is then a function of employment in equilibrium firms are too large and firm entry is inefficient

monetary regimes and the co ordination of wage setting abstract a recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction however in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co ordinate their wage setting the present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco ordinated wage setting thus lowering unemployment in the unco ordinated outcome it also reduces wage setters incentives to co ordinate it is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment via the strengthening of the wage setters incentives to co ordinate

what is wrong with taylor rules using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules it is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule e ither ageneral targeting rule explicit objectives for monetary policy or a specific targeting rule a criterion for the forecasts of the target variables to be fulfilled essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extramodel information are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium

identifying a policymaker s target an application to the bank of canada we develop a new way to test hypotheses about policymakers targets and imple ment that test for canadian monetary policy for example if the bank of canada is targeting a 2 per cent inflation rate and if the bank s instrument takes eight quarters to affect inflation then deviations of inflation from 2 per cent should be uncorrelated with the bank s informa tion set lagged eight quarters we show that there was a major change in the bank s objec tives near the time when formal inflation targets were announced and that the bank has indeed been targeting inflation since then jel code e52 e61

unions employers associations and wage setting institutions in northern and central europe 1950 1992 the eight countries examined in this study austria belgium denmark finland germany the netherlands norway and sweden have long been viewed as exemplifying corporatist industrial relations

wage settlements and wage setting results from a multi level model which dimensions of wage setting differ across establishments applying collective contracts and uncovered establishments the empirical analysis reported here utilizes german linked employer employee data for the years 1990 1995 and 2001 and is restricted to workers without supervisory functions in larger manufacturing firms results show that the expected wage of an average worker is higher in firms applying collective contracts while returns to human capital and the gender wage gap are reduced moreover during the 1990s these effects became stronger

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union