intraurban residential mobility the role of transactions costs market imperfections and household disequilibrium abstract this paper presents a model of household residential search and mobility that focuses on microeconomic elements of household behavior and incorporates housing market features the model is cast explicitly in terms of a rigorous model of housing demand allowing the benefits from moving to be measured as the compensating income variation of the potential change in consumption the empirical results indicate that large changes in economic variables such as income and prices produce only small potential gains from moving and that a major factor in the moving decision is the magnitude of search and moving costs

carbon tax and opec s rents under a ceiling constraint we study the markov perfect nash equilibrium mpne of a game between oil importing countries who seek to maintain the atmospheric carbon concentration under a given ceiling and oil exporting countries the oil importing countries set a carbon tax and the oil exporting countries control the producer price we obtain implicit feedback rules and explicit non linear time paths of extraction carbon tax and producer price consumers are always able to reap some share of the scarcity and monopoly rents whereas producers partially pre empt the carbon tax only if the marginal damage under the ceiling is small we compare the mpne to the efficient open loop and cartel without tax equilibria

efficient methods of measuring welfare change and compensated income in terms of ordinary demand functions a utility maximizing consumer with a completely known system of ordinary demand functions q h p c is considered let p qo and p q be two arbitrary equilibrium situations the problem is to evaluate in which of the situations the utility is higher without knowing the utility function revealed preference theory tells that the ordinary demand functions which are in principle observable contain enough information to solve the problem remaining difficulties are therefore mainly computational we present how the compensated income c i c p qo and the compensated demand h p cl1 are calculated with arbitrary accuracy using only the ordinary demand system our two efficient algorithms also have interesting interpretations in terms of index numbers and consumer surplus measures

second best carbon taxation in the global economy the green paradox and carbon leakage revisited acceleration of global warming resulting from a future carbon tax is large if the price elasticities of oil demand are large and that of oil supply is small the fall in the world interest rate weakens this weak green paradox effect especially if intertemporal substitution is weak still social damages from greenhouse gases drop if the fall in oil supply and cumulative emissions is strong enough if the current carbon tax is set too low the second best future carbon tax is set below the first best too to mitigate adverse green paradox effects unilateral second best optimal carbon taxes exceed the first best taxes due to an import tariff component the intertemporal terms of trade effects of the future carbon tax increase current and future tariffs and those of the current tax lower the current tariff finally carbon leakage and globally altruistic and unilateral second best optimal carbon taxes if non kyoto oil importers price carbon too low are analysed in a three country model of the global economy

the effect of business risk on corporate capital structure theory and evidence under corporate and personal taxation we demonstrate that the relation between optimal debt level and business risk is roughly u shaped this result follows from the fact that the tax liability is an option portfolio that is long in the corporate tax option and short in the personal tax option therefore the net effect of a change in business risk on the optimal debt level depends upon the relative magnitudes of the resultant marginal changes in the values of these two options results of empirical tests offer support for the predicted u shaped relationship

an empirical examination of multinational corporate capital structure this paper examines whether there are systematic differences in the traditional capital structure determinants between mncs and dcs and if there are additional uniquely international factors that may help explain the capital structure choice of multinational corporations the results suggest that specific international factors such as political risk and exchange rate risk are relevant to the multinational capital structure decision that multinationals have higher agency costs than purely domestic firms and that international diversification does not lower earnings volatility for multinational corporations

bankruptcy risk and optimal capital structure this study finds shortcomings in empirical tests of the capital structure irrelevance hypothesis the alternative hypothesis is that firms choose value maximizing mixes of debt and equity on account of bankruptcy costs and the tax deductibility of interest payments based upon the cross sectional implications of the tax shelter bankruptcy cost hypothesis an alternative test of the irrelevance hypothesis is performed the test examines the relationship between failure rates and leverage ratios for 36 lines of business the results are inconsistent with the irrelevance hypothesis in their landmark paper modigliani and miller 26 demonstrate that under certain assumptions the market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure these assumptions include the absence of taxes transactions costs and bankruptcy costs recently miller 24 has argued that the introduction of corporate and personal taxes does not alter the capital structure irrelevance result in the absence of bankruptcy costs 1 the inclusion of bankruptcy costs generally considered in conjunction with the tax deductibility of interest payments has led others to conclude that capital structure will affect the value of the firm 2 in this case value maximizing firms may choose optimal capital structures consisting of both debt and equity there have been numerous attempts to discriminate empirically between the miller irrelevance mi hypothesis and the tax shelter bankruptcy cost ts bc hypothesis several are discussed in section i of this paper there it is argued that studies attempting to measure directly the effect of changes in capital structure on firm values are subject to serious complications and are unable to discriminate between the mi and ts bc hypotheses other studies focus on cross sectional implications of the mi and ts bc hypotheses the cross sectional tests are based on the assertion that bankruptcy costs may tend to induce firms with greater business risk to include less debt in their capital structures whereas the mi hypothesis does not predict such a relationship unfortunately the existence of positive bankruptcy costs is not sufficient to ensure that the ts bc hypothesis will predict the inverse relation

financial statement comparability and expected crash risk this study examines the impact of financial statement comparability on ex ante crash risk using the comparability measures of de franco et al 2011 we find that expected crash risk decreases with financial statement comparability and this negative relation is more pronounced in an environment where managers are more prone to withhold bad news we also provide evidence that comparability can mitigate the asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good news disclosures our results suggest that financial statement comparability disinclines managers from bad news hoarding which reduces investors perceptions of a firm s future crash risk

the monitoring rationale for dividends and the interaction of capital structure and dividend decisions abstract this paper develops an agency cost framework for the simultaneous determination of a firm s capital structure and dividend decisions in the model simultaneity is contingent on the applicability of easterbrook s 1984 monitoring rationale for paying dividends which in turn is hypothesized to depend on the existence of alternative sources of monitoring estimations of the rozeff 1982 specification for dividend payout for subsamples stratified according to the prevalence of non dividend monitoring mechanisms and growth induced capital market monitoring confirm the sample specific validity of the monitoring rationale a simultaneous system of equations is then estimated and consistent with our hypothesis simultaneity between capital structure and dividend decisions is observed only for the subsample in which the monitoring rationale for dividends is found applicable

the efficiency of demand oriented housing programs generalizing from experimental findings typical production oriented housing programs offer potential recipients a highly limited set of previously unattainable commodity bundles from the household s viewpoint such programs have been highly inefficient from society s viewpoint such housing programs are generally horizontally inequitable and inefficient given that housing programs are not likely to be fully cashed out and incorporated into general income maintenance could housing programs be restructured to increase their efficiency this paper examines this question results indicate that demand oriented housing programs are substantially more efficient than are production oriented programs in fact in the aggregate the former programs approach unrestricted cash payments in their transfer efficiency

cycles in nonrenewable resource prices with pollution and learning by doing we study how environmental regulation in the form of a cap on aggregate emissions from a fossil fuel e g coal interacts with the arrival of a clean substitute e g solar energy the cost of the substitute is assumed to decrease with cumulative use because of learning by doing we show that optimal energy prices may initially increase because of pollution regulation but fall due to learning and rise again because of scarcity of the resource finally falling after transition to the clean substitute thus nonrenewable resource prices may exhibit cyclical behavior even in a purely deterministic setting

pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic noncompetitive energy pricing abstract the literature on energy and carbon taxes is by and large concerned about the derivation of globally efficient strategies in contrast this paper considers the dynamic interactions between cartelized energy suppliers and a consumers government that collectively taxes energy carriers for pigouvian motives two different kinds of external costs are associated with energy consumption flow e g acid rain and stock externalities e g global warming the dynamic interactions between a consumers government and a producers cartel are modeled as a differential game with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in linear and nonlinear markov strategies the major implications are that the nonlinear solutions are pareto inferior to the linear strategies and energy suppliers may preempt energy taxation and thereby may raise the price at front however this effect diminishes over time because the producers price declines while taxes increase

dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms prices versus quantities abstract environmental regulators often have imperfect information about regulated firms abatement costs in this paper we compare taxes and emissions permits in a dynamic setting in which firms behave strategically the regulator updates policy over time based upon previous aggregate industry performance assuming that firms are not strategic we find that strategic firms facing an emissions tax have an incentive to overabate in order to obtain a lower tax in the future firms that trade emissions permits have a strategic incentive to reveal an artificially high permit price to obtain more permits in the future whether permits or taxes are preferred from a welfare standpoint depends upon how permit prices are determined taxes generate higher welfare when the low cost firm sets the permit price but permits generate higher welfare when the high cost firm sets the permit price

the structure and incentive effects of corporate tax liabilities this paper describes situations in which tax liabilities assume the form of a negative position in a call option this structure motivates an examination of the investment decisions of taxed corporations in the presence of risk it is shown that the structure of the tax liability creates an incentive to underinvest in more risky projects and an incentive for conglomerate merger these effects are then evaluated in the presence of conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders and under alternative assumptions about the tax code and about the timing of investment and financing decisions this paper makes an observation regarding the functional form assumed by the tax liabilities of corporations with potentially redundant deductions and evaluates its consequences for investment incentives interest and other deductions against taxable income can be taken for the most part only to the extent of that income in a single period model this gives the net tax liability a familiar structure it can be viewed as a call option where the exercise price on the call is the allowable deductions the tax paying entity holds a positive position in the assets which generate the taxable income and a negative position in a call option on those assets the analogy between options and the structure of tax liabilities calls attention to some interesting incentive effects concerning risk using their model of option valuation black and scholes 5 showed that the value of an option is increasing in the variance of the asset it is written on other authors have generalized this result and studied its implications for corporate financing see jagannathan 16 jensen and meckling 17 and green 15 the importance of the risk attributes of the underlying asset in option valuation suggests that taxation may have important incentive consequences for investment decisions involving risk it has been recognized in the public economics literature for some time that asymmetries in the tax schedule can affect risk taking behavior early papers by mossin 20 and stiglitz 25 studied individual portfolio decisions over a riskless and a risky asset our analysis differs from these in a number of respects the most important of these is our use of market valuation rather than expected utility in the decision maker s objective function this is surely a more appropri

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

carbon taxation opec and the end of oil abstract i develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development r d to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil in equilibrium the cartel is forced to deter the substitute which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time credible carbon taxes are below the pigovian level implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality much less capture resource rents without carbon pricing the importer curtails long run pollution using a costly r d programme normatively climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green r d programmes only

the flip side of financial synergies coinsurance versus risk contamination this paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs contrary to conventional wisdom separate financing dominates joint financing when risk contamination losses that are associated with the contagious default of a well performing project that is dragged down by the other project s poor performance outweigh standard coinsurance gains separate financing becomes more attractive than joint financing when the fraction of returns lost under default increases and when projects have lower mean returns higher variability more positive correlation and more negative skewness these predictions are broadly consistent with evidence on conglomerate mergers spinoffs project finance and securitization

can carbon tax eat opec s rents abstract we consider the optimal emission tax for a stock pollutant when the pollutant flow is also regulated by a resource exporting cartel we consolidate clarify and generalize a set of previous results to obtain clear isolation of the pigouvian and trade policy components of the tax because of the trade policy component the tax can shift more rents from the cartel than the pollution causes damage related costs this leads to the possibility that the pollution problem accompanied by the coordination of taxation can bring about net benefits at the expense of the cartel

liquidation costs and capital structure abstract we investigate the relation between liquidation costs of assets and composition of capital structure for firms that reorganized under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code firms with high liquidation costs emerge from chapter 11 with relatively low debt ratios the debt of these firms is more likely to be public and unsecured and to have less restrictive covenant terms these firms are also more likely to raise new equity capital assets with high liquidation costs thus lead firms to choose capital structures that make financial distress less likely

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

the grey paradox how fossil fuel owners can benefit from carbon taxation abstract this paper considers the distributional impact of optimal carbon taxation on fossil fuel owners a carbon emitting exhaustible resource competes with a dirtier abundant resource and a clean backstop a time dependent carbon tax is set to optimally use these resources under a cap constraint over co 2 atmospheric concentration as the cap is tightened the dirtier resource becomes less competitive compared to the exhaustible resource the competition effect but the timing and duration of extraction of the exhaustible resource is modified the timing effect we provide analytical expressions of these effects and determine conditions over size of reserves pollution contents extraction costs and demand elasticity such that the exhaustible resource owners profits increase as the ceiling is tightened calibrations for the transport and power sectors suggest that the profits of conventional oil and natural gas owners increase compared to a baseline without regulation for plausible carbon ceiling values

on the existence of an optimal capital structure theory and evidence one of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure the geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions by modigliani and miller 18 19 the general academic view by the mid 1970s although not a consensus was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy costs no sooner did this general view become prevalent in the profession than miller 16 presented a new challenge by showing that under certain conditions the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level since then there has developed a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting to reconcile miller s model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure e g deangelo and masulis 5 kim 12 and modigliani 17 the general result of this work is that if there are significant leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs agency costs of debt and loss of non debt tax shields and if the income from equity is untaxed then the marginal bondholder s tax rate will be less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing the firm s optimal capital structure will involve the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and various leverage related costs the upshot of these extensions of miller s model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage related costs are economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing the miller model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several timeseries studies which provide evidence on the existence of leverage related costs trczinka 28 reports that from examining differences in average yields between taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds one cannot reject the miller hypothesis that the marginal bondholder s tax rate is not different from the corporate tax rate however trczinka is careful to point out that this finding does not necessarily imply that there is no tax advantage of corporate debt if the personal tax rate on equity is positive indeed buser and hess 1 using a longer time series of data and more sophisticated econometric techniques estimate that the average effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically positive and is not of a trivial magnitude more importantly they document evidence that is consistent with the existence of significant leverage related costs in the economy

air passenger duties as strategic tourism taxation abstract there has been a recent debate on the rationale and economic impacts of air passenger duties apds linked to puzzling empirical results on this topic we argue that an approach from strategic tourism taxation can improve our understanding of these results apd set by origin countries of tourists can be viewed as an instrument for extracting economic rents that would otherwise be retained by tourism destinations a theoretical model of strategic taxation between an origin and two destinations is developed to illustrate this idea we find that countries strategies may end up with winners and losers or with all parties facing welfare losses the game outcome depends on countries market shares of profits and the substitutability between tourism services provided by different destinations the findings suggest that the economic impacts of apds recently evaluated in the literature might be biased because of the omission of other countries potential tax reactions

pyramidal groups and debt abstract this paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited liability of the holding company however when this behavior increases the cost of funds the holding might prefer to raise debt to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are insolvent after accounting for standard controls we find that holding companies in italian pyramids have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash flow share of the entrepreneur in the subsidiary does not play a significant role these findings are consistent with the implications of our model of group capital structure

interaction of debt agency problems and optimal capital structure theory and evidence e oeg more leverage always wcfsen tbe debt ageocy problem this paper ptesents a unified analysis that acconntb for both risk shifting and nixler iiivestiiient ddbt agency problems for firms with positive marginal volatility of investment defined as the change in cash flow volatility cone ponding to a change of itwestment scale equity holders risk shifting incentive will midgate the under investment problem this inqdies that coturary to ccmventional views the total agency cost of debt does not unifcsmly increase with leverage this model fiiither predicts tbat for mg growth firms in which the under investment problem is severe the optimal debt ratio is positively related to the marginal volatility of investmenl empirical results suppmt this prediction

optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock externalities abstract underlying some of the most pressing environmental problems are the interlinked resource and environmental stock externalities with threshold effects using a simple dynamic model it is shown how in the face of such externalities the static market based policy instruments such as pigouvian taxes should be modified it is shown that even if for an initial period there is going to be no pollution stock damage the optimal policy still requires that abatement begins immediately and at increasing rates simulation of the model for the case of fossil fuel burning and the consequent global warming shows that the optimal carbon tax and therefore the optimal control strategy is particularly sensitive to changes in the marginal abatement cost and the level of fossil fuel demand policy simulations contrast the optimal control policy with and estimate the welfare losses from alternative policies deriving from arbitrary tax paths the latter include i a no tax policy ii a constant carbon tax rate iii the european community s proposed carbon tax path and iv a delayed optimal tax path

the benefits of in kind government programs abstract in this paper i present a methodology to calculate the benefits of in kind programs such as public housing which restrict consumption of some goods to the levels offered by the government most previous studies begin with an a priori specification of the direct utility function i begin with the ordinary demand function and then integrate demand to recover the indirect utility function and the expenditure function i argue that this approach gives additional flexibility in choosing a functional form which best describes the data i then use this methodology to estimate the benefits of the u s government s section 8 housing program

leviathan governments and carbon taxes costs and potential benefits abstract this paper addresses positive aspects of the global warming debate that so far has been concerned by and large with normative issues the paper considers a consumers government that appreciates tax revenues as such leviathan in addition to conventional measures of welfare i e carbon taxes serve the dual purpose of correcting for externalities here global warming or more generally a stock externality from energy use and of raising revenues this government faces either a competitive or a perfectly cartelized supply the major findings are 1 i consumers may benefit from a leviathan government that appropriates some of the monopoly rent by deterring preemption to some extent 2 ii the leviathan motive raises initial taxes and thereby lowers initial emissions but increases the long run stock externality in a play with linear strategies 3 iii there exists a continuum of equilibria in nonlinear markov strategies which are however pareto inefficient compared with the linear strategies 4 iv but in case of a binding resource constraint nonlinear strategies are the only feasible ones

partial enclosure of the commons abstract we examine the efficiency distributional and environmental consequences of assigning spatial property rights to part of a spatially connected natural resource while the remainder is competed for by an open access fringe we refer to this as partial enclosure of the commons we obtain sharp analytical results regarding partial enclosure of the commons including 1 while second best it typically improves welfare relative to no property rights 2 all resource users can be made better off 3 positive rents arise in the open access area and 4 the resource maintains higher stocks under spatial heterogeneity we also characterize spatial regions that are ideal candidates for partial enclosure typically society should seek to enclose those patches with high environmental productivity and high self retention but whether high economic productivity promotes or relegates a patch may depend on one s objective

optimal fossil fuel taxation with backstop technologies and tenure risk abstract the paper derives the global welfare optimizing time path for a tax on fossil fuels causing a negative stock externality climate change under increasing marginal extraction cost and in the presence of an unlimited backstop resource causing no externality in a basic competitive case the optimal tax equals the pigou rate equivalent to the present discounted value of marginal damage costs we consider two separate types of tenure insecurity for resource owners and their impact on the tax implementing the optimal policy when insecure control is with respect to future ownership to the resource competitive extraction is higher than otherwise and the efficiency implementing tax exceeds the pigou rate when tenure insecurity instead implies possible expropriation holdup of investment in extraction capacity it deters extraction and the optimal tax is lower than the pigou rate

debt and taxes and uncertainty with a graduated personal tax schedule miller showed that there could be an equilibrium debt supply for the corporate sector as a whole in the presence of uncertainty there is also a unique debt equity ratio for each individual firm and this ratio is related to the firm s operational risk characteristics however if firms merge and spin off in response to tax incentives the identity of firms is ambiguous and only the corporate sector is a meaningful construct these arguments are developed in both discrete and continuous models that employ extensions of the arbitrage free pricing theory in his famous paper debt and taxes 1977 merton miller 11 showed that the original miller modigliani propositions on the irrelevance of capital structure were not necessarily overturned by considerations of taxation miller argued that with a broad enough span of progressivity in personal income taxation the corporate tax advantage to the issuance of debt would be offset by the disadvantage to investors of receiving ordinary income on personal account in equilibrium the differential rates of return on equity and debt would be such that the marginal investor would be indifferent between purchasing debt instruments or equity the margin would be determined by the total amount of debt issued by the corporate sector but in a competitive world it would be unaffected by the debt issued by any one firm as a consequence the total supply of corporate debt would be determined in equilibrium increasing to the point where aggregate corporate value was not enhanced by further debt financing but any individual firm would be looking at prices set at the margin and would find itself indifferent between issuing debt or equity the purpose of this article is to extend miller s argument by recognizing the differences between debt and equity when the environment is not certain we will not be concerned with what might be called corner questions i e with whether or not there is a marginal investor or an internal equilibrium to do so would obscure the basic points we have to make instead we will examine models that have internal equilibria and ordinary neoclassical marginal interpretations in related work de angelo and masulis 5 6 have also extended miller s analysis but their primary concern was with the effects of a more detailed treatment of the tax code and with the impact of bankruptcy we will deal with such matters only in passing our central concern is with the impact of uncertainty our main result is the finding that there is a relationship between the capital structure of the firm as induced by tax effects and ordinary beta measures

optimal stock trading with personal taxes implications for prices and the abnormal january returns abstract the tax law confers upon the investor a timing option to realize capital losses and defer capital gains with the tax rate on long term gains and losses being about half the short term rate the law provides a second timing option to realize losses short term and gains long term if at all our theory and simulation over the 1962 1977 period establish that taxable investors should realize long term gains in high variance stocks and repurchase stock in order to realize potential future losses short term tax trading does not explain the small firm anomaly but predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume which maps into a seasonal pattern in stock prices the january anomaly only if investors are irrational or ignorant of the price seasonality

testing theories of capital structure and estimating the speed of adjustment this paper examines time series patterns of external financing decisions and shows that publicly traded u s firms fund a much larger proportion of their financing deficit with external equity when the cost of equity capital is low the historical values of the cost of equity capital have long lasting effects on firms capital structures through their influence on firms historical financing decisions we also introduce a new econometric technique to deal with biases in estimates of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage we find that firms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed with a half life of 3 7 years for book leverage even after controlling for the traditional determinants of capital structure and firm fixed effects

on the measurement of welfare for market and nonmarket goods a numerical approach extending vartia s 1983 framework the paper presents a simple numerical approach to the measurement of welfare for market and nonmarket goods on the basis of an incomplete mixed demand system the method allows the determination of exact welfare measures it provides a flexible and well founded alternative to ad hoc methods based on consumer surplus

the value of the tax subsidy on risky debt the effect of corporate taxes on the market value of a levered firm continues to be a central issue in recent contributions in finance theory e g miller 1977 deangelo and masulis 1980 kim 1982 modigliani 1982 in these and other studies e g krause and litzenberger 1973 scott 1976 brennan and schwartz 1978 kim 1978 the relationship between market value and capital structure is established by formulating a tax subsidy function that specifies the partial effect of debt on the expected tax savings at the corporate level under the existing u s tax code a working assumption in most of these studies is that both principal and interest are tax deductible this assumption is made in the spirit of the original modigliani and miller 1963 formulation in which debt is taken to be perpetual and riskless indeed it is well known that the tax shield provided by the deduction of principal in a singleperiod framework has the same value as the tax shield from interest deductions in the case of perpetual and riskless debt under this assumption it is shown that in the absence of non debtthis paper examines the relationship between leverage and the value of the firm when non debt related tax shields are available and the corporate tax is levied as an income tax in a previous paper de angelo and masulis argue that in the presence of nondebt related tax shields the relationship between debt and firm value is concave resulting in an interior optimal capital structure when there is a tax induced differential in the cost of corporate debt their result derives from the fact that they assume the payment of debt principal and non debt related depreciation charges are deductible however the former deduction is consistent with a wealth tax while the latter is consistent only with an income tax we show that if the interest alone is deductible the debt firm value function is convex resulting in corner solutions to the capital structure problem the authors wish to thank richard castanias richard green lemma senbet and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and richard green and robert dammon for computational assistance

asset volatility and capital structure evidence from corporate mergers we exploit cross sectional variation in the predictable changes in asset volatility following corporate acquisitions to identify the effect of business risk on capital structure we find that postm

carbon leakage the green paradox and perfect future markets policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate instead of alleviate climate change green paradox in a two period three country general equilibrium model with finite endowment of fossil fuel one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second periods when that cap is tightened the extent of carbon leakage depends on the interaction of various parameters and elasticities conditions for the green paradox are specified all determinants of carbon leakage resulting from tightening the first period cap work in the opposite direction when the second period cap is tightened tightening the second period cap does not necessarily lead to the green paradox

global warming prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view abstract this paper investigates how the choices of the instruments affect the interactions in a stock externality game global warming between cartelized fossil fuel suppliers and consumers more precisely the paper studies the equilibria in markov strategies in a dynamic game with each player choosing either the quantity or the price strategy including short run first mover advantages indeed opec and its opponent iea have tried both instruments in the past and play currently in quantities given such a non competitive setting both players should prefer the price instrument therefore both players are expected to switch back to price and tax policies if global warming will be treated effectively

risks and financing decisions in the energy sector an empirical investigation using firm level data using a sample of 102 uk energy firms over the period 1981 2009 this paper empirically examines the effects of uncertainty on firms leverage decisions the results indicate that both firms specific and macroeconomic uncertainty have negative sizeable and statistically significant impacts on the uk energy sector firms target leverage the results also indicate that the profitability of energy firms plays an important role in uncertainty leverage relationship by changing the total effect of uncertainty on leverage while more profitable firms appear to reduce their leverage by a relatively large amount in response to increased macroeconomic uncertainty they are less likely to be affected by firm specific uncertainty these results suggest that stability in macroeconomic conditions and business activity is important to the stability of the capital structure of firms in the energy sector which would in turn be conducive to stability in their investments and production

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

substitution between biofuels and fossil fuels is there a green paradox we show that i subsidies for renewable energy policies with the intention of encouraging substitution away from fossil fuels may accentuate climate change damages by hastening fossil fuel extraction and that ii the opposite result holds under some specified conditions we focus on the case of subsidies for renewable resources produced under increasing marginal costs and assume that both the renewable resources and the fossil fuels are currently in use such subsidies have a direct effect and an indirect effect working in opposite directions the direct effect is the reduction in demand for fossil fuels at any given price the indirect effect is the reduction in the current equilibrium price for fossil fuels which tends to increase the amount of fossil fuels demanded whether the sum of the two effects will actually result in an earlier or later date of exhaustion of the stock of fossil fuels depends on the curvature of the demand curve for energy and of the supply curve for the renewable substitute

strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement carbon taxes versus cap and trade abstract this paper provides a first analysis of a policy bloc of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy faces a non policy fringe of other fuel importers and an exporter bloc and purchases offset from the fringe we compare a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme for the policy bloc in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe the policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap the optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price the domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small when the policy bloc is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower

strategic pigouvian taxation stock externalities and polluting non renewable resources este trabajo propone una extension del modelo de wirl y dockner 1995 disenado para analizar la interdependencia bilateral a largo plazo entre un cartel exportador de un recurso y una coalicion de paises importadores en primer lugar se incorporan los efectos agotamiento al analisis de las propiedades intertemporales de un impuesto pigouviano en segundo lugar se calculan los equilibrios feedback de stackelberg los resultados muestran que la dinamica del impuesto depende criticamente del nivel del dano medioambiental marginal ademas tambien demuestran que el impuesto definido por el equilibrio de nash perfecto de markov es un impuesto pigouviano neutral en el sentido que solo corrige la ineficiencia causada por la externalidad del stock sin embargo para el equilibrio feedback de stackelberg el impuesto es ventajoso para los paises importadores ya que la imposicion pigouviana estrategica reduce el poder de mercado del cartel

taxes capital structure and bondholder clienteles despite much recent progress financial theory has yet to explain the connection if any between the u s tax code and many observed characteristics of corporate bonds empirically why is there no single tax rate equating yields on corporate bonds with yields on tax exempt municipal bonds of apparently identical risks and maturities 2 specifically why does the spread in yields between corporate and municipal bonds divided by the yield on corporates a conventional measure of the marginal tax rate on corporates decrease with increasing risk and maturity more generally why are different types of bonds evidently held by clienteles of investors in tax clienteles for corporate bonds are identified in a competitive financial equilibrium under an asymmetric corporate income tax with interest preceding principal state contingent bonds with higher coupon yields are issued by firms with higher pretax cash inflows per dollar of nondebt tax shield purchased by investors in lower tax brackets and implicitly priced at lower marginal tax rates on these bonds all investors earn tax induced surpluses by contrast all other bonds have implicit tax rates typically equal to the corporate rate and yield for many investors no tax induced surpluses we gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of george constantinides kose john merton miller jim scott marti subrahmanyam and participants in seminars at baruch chicago columbia houston michigan nyu rutgers usc washington wharton the american finance association the western finance association and the johnson symposium on taxes and finance at wisconsin george constantinides was especially helpful 1 the most notable contribution is miller 1977 other recent papers include chen and kim 1979 kim lewellen and mcconnell 1979 deangelo and masulis 1980a 1980b taggart 1980 kim 1982 auerbach and king 1983 and talmor haugen and bornea 1985 black 1971 anticipates an equilibrium with clienteles 2 schaefer 1982a identifies tax induced clienteles of bondholders in the british gilt market van horne 1982 reports that implicit tax rates vary over time as the supply of discount bonds changes additional evidence is cited in trczinka 1982

theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand the main purpose of this paper is to review recent theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of housing demand in particular we ask what is known concerning the permanent income elasticity of housing demand vis a vis the current or measured income elasticity what is known concerning price elasticities what is the appropriate functional form for housing demand equations what is the role of demographic variables what is known concerning dynamic aspects of housing demand what appear to be the major sources of bias in existing estimates of demand equations

expenditure function estimates of the efficiency and distributive impact of indirect taxes in the united kingdom abstract this paper uses the expenditure function to consider the efficiency and distributional impact of indirect taxes in the united kingdom estimates of the parameters of the linear expenditure system of demand equations are employed to measure the compensating variation and equivalent variation costs of taxes on households in different income groups in addition distributional weights are used to consider the overall impact of different taxes and tax changes on social welfare finally we consider other types of demand system estimates which might be used in this kind of exercise

global warming with green and brown consumers in this paper i investigate how much green polluters mitigate the familiar dynamic tragedy of the commons global warming green consumers feel penalized pain for any consumption in excess of the social optimum this can arise for example from kant s categorical moral imperative interplays among and between green and brown consumers are investigated as differential games green preferences the heterogeneity of consumers and the irreversibility of emissions lead to discontinuous strategies associated with these are a number of non trivial and even puzzling features e g the possibility of another green paradox

trade with polluting nonrenewable resources abstract the paper considers nonrenewable resource extraction in a situation where the resource buyers have formed a government which applies emission taxation for slowing pollution accumulation and the sellers are competitive or a resource cartel the noncompetitive situation is studied as a stackelberg differential game which the cartel leads it is first assumed that extraction costs do not depend on the resource stock level and that the pollution stock does not decay in the time consistent and markov perfect equilibrium the sellers monopoly power vanishes asymptotically the sellers market power reduces the buyers emission tax at each point in time in the stackelberg equilibrium the emission tax is below the marginal present value of pollution damage if pollution decays and extraction costs depend on the resource stock level buyers have monopsony power and the ability of sellers to receive emission tax revenues is weakened when the rate of pollution decay is high the producer price falls below the pareto optimal level

the efficient estimation of econometric models with rational expectations the efficient estimation of econometric models with rational expectations by the substitution method usually entails the use of a non linear simultaneous equations estimator and hence is not very attractive computationally it is shown that for a wide class of problems efficient estimates can also be obtained with standard estimation methods if instead an errors in variables approach is used for many other problems although not providing fully efficient estimates because rationality is not imposed the errors in variables method will still have a strong appeal because otherwise it uses all of the structural information in the model unlike the substitution method when an incomplete information set is used it guarantees consistent estimates and it is easy to compute

estimating the welfare implications of in kind government programs a general numerical approach abstract the purpose of this paper is to present and apply a general methodology to estimate the welfare implications of in kind government programs on the basis of arbitrary systems of demand equations the method provides a useful alternative to more restrictive procedures that previously have been used in the literature as it allows complete flexibility with respect to the specification of demand functions the proposed procedures are applied to estimate the benefits and welfare costs of a belgian public housing program the results suggest that the estimated efficiency and equity implications of in kind programs may be quite sensitive to the specification of demand which provides additional justification for the use of the proposed methodology

the exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes a dynamic game approach this paper considers efficient and monopolistic extraction of non renewable energy resources when the resource consumption leads simultaneously to a stock externality global warming the case of monopolistic supply leads to a dynamic game between cartelised producers and a consumers government for this game we compute linear markov perfect strategies that are characterized by preemption of the tax at the wellhead when compared with the open loop solution unfortunately the general asymmetric two state variable model does not allow for an explicit analytical solution therefore a simplified version with one state variable neglecting depreciation of the stock of the pollutant is studied and a numerical example is presented it turns out that the simplified and analytically solved framework provides a good approximation of the initial phase of the transient behaviour but not of the long run

the response of firms leverage to risk evidence from uk public versus nonpublic manufacturing firms this article empirically investigates the effects of macroeconomic and firm specific risk on firms leverage the analysis is carried out for a large panel of public and nonpublic uk manufacturing firms over the period 1999 2008 our investigation provides evidence that uk manufacturing firms use less short term debt during periods of high risk however the leverage of nonpublic manufacturing firms is more sensitive to firm specific risk in comparison to their public counterparts while macroeconomic risk affects both types of firms similarly our investigation also shows that firms with high liquid assets reduce their leverage more less during periods of heightened firm specific macroeconomic risk jel c23 g32