assessing the fdic s premium and examination policies using soviet put options abstract the fdic s total liability for insuring a bank s deposits during a fixed period diminishes as the frequency of examinations increases since a marginally solvent bank can be closed while losses are small the paper develops a technique for pricing the insurance liability over a fixed period during which there are multiple examinations under current policy most banks are examined annually and reviewed every six months at which time the fees for insurance may be adjusted since the current schedule of fees allows only a narrow range and a few discrete levels the fdic typically retains some positive or negative residual liability in each six month period and for the entire year we show how to estimate this net liability the calculations of total and net liability are illustrated for a sample of large banks

capital market segmentation and u s farm real estate pricing in this paper we present and test a segmented capital market equilibrium we extend the traditional capm by explicitly considering barriers to the flow of external equity capital into farm real estate markets the empirical results provide a plausible explanation as to why the traditional arbitrage based pricing models fail to explain equity pricing in farmland markets

bank spread with uncertain deposit level and risk aversion abstract this paper derives a model of the banking firm under uncertainty and risk aversion the selection of the bank s optimal spread between loan and deposit rates is emphasized the model s results provide some implications for bank asset quality capital regulation and deposit insurance for example it is shown that increases in the level of equity capital tend to increase the bank s spread under dara this implies an improvement in bank asset quality on the other hand as the deposit supply function becomes more volatile the bank s spread narrows which implies a decline in the quality of the bank s assets

the pricing of options on assets with stochastic volatilities one option pricing problem that has hitherto been unsolved is the pricing of a european call on an asset that has a stochastic volatility this paper examines this problem the option price is determined in series form for the case in which the stochastic volatility is independent of the stock price numerical solutions are also produced for the case in which the volatility is correlated with the stock price it is found that the black scholes price frequently overprices options and that the degree of overpricing increases with the time to maturity one option pricing problem that has hitherto remained unsolved is the pricing of a european call on a stock that has a stochastic volatility from the work of merton 12 garman 6 and cox ingersoll and ross 3 the differential equation that the option must satisfy is known the solution of this differential equation is independent of risk preferences if a the volatility is a traded asset or b the volatility is uncorrelated with aggregate consumption if either of these conditions holds the risk neutral valuation arguments of cox and ross 4 can be used in a straightfoward way this paper produces a solution in series form for the situation in which the stock price is instantaneously uncorrelated with the volatility we do not assume that the volatility is a traded asset also a constant correlation between the instantaneous rate of change of the volatility and the rate of change of aggregate consumption can be accommodated the option price is lower than the blackscholes b s 1 price when the option is close to being at the money and higher when it is deep in or deep out of the money the exercise prices for which overpricing by b s takes place are within about ten percent of the security price this is the range of exercise prices over which most option trading takes place so we may in general expect the b s price to overprice options this effect is exaggerated as the time to maturity increases one of the most surprising implications of this is that if the b s equation is used to determine the implied volatility of a near the money option the longer the time to maturity the lower the implied volatility numerical solutions for the case in which the volatility is correlated with the stock price are also examined the stochastic volatility problem has been examined by merton 13 geske 7 johnson 10 johnson and shanno 11 eisenberg 5 wiggins 16 and

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

the distribution of foreign exchange price changes trading day effects and risk measurement this study investigates the nature of price changes in a variety of major and minor foreign exchange markets the results suggest that the log of price changes over one trading day intervals seems to follow a non normal stable distribution function different measures of location and to lesser extent scale are present for different days of the week dollar denominated price changes are high on mondays and wednesdays and low on thursdays and fridays for all currencies the wednesday thursday result is consistent with the settlement procedures used in foreign exchange transactions in the dollar the friday monday result is consistent with an increase in demand for the dollar prior to the weekend this study offers some previously unavailable results on the nature of price changes in a certain set of speculative markets in particular this is a study of the distributional characteristics of daily and weekly price changes for a number of major and minor foreign exchange markets the results document the existence of non normal stable distributions for price changes in foreign exchange markets these price change distributions differ by day of the week in ways that are only partly attributable to the institutional structure of the market the results of the study are interpreted within the context of understanding how foreign exchange markets operate and within the context of prior studies of stock market data concerned with summarizing the probability distribution of price changes for different intervals including days of the week since bachelier s 1 original treatise that contained the proposition that speculative market prices follow a process that could be described by a normal distribution there have been numerous alternative attempts to describe the stochastic processes which characterize speculative market prices these studies have not resulted in any generalized description of the probability distribution of price changes in such markets indeed the evidence suggests substantial differences in the process among various types of financial instruments the failure to achieve consensus can be traced to the lack of robustness in the statistical procedures employed to estimate processes and to differences in the underlying institutional or economic arrangements which are unique to that market the possibility of differences in the information set used to assess value or differences in technology for transmitting information makes it important to secure additional

risk shifting incentives of depository institutions a new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform abstract we characterize the risk shifting incentives of a depository institution as arising fundamentally from the existence of limited liability and the associated convex payoff to equity holders this risk incentive feature is unchanged by deposits being insured and hence excessive risk taking by depository institutions is not solely attributable to the flat rate insurance premium consequently the incentive problem cannot be resolved through a risk based insurance premium contrary to the prevailing view we propose a solution that eliminates risk shifting through an optimal tax structure and specify a corresponding insurance premium that is revenue neutral from the social planner s regulator s standpoint the solution is derived in the context of a social objective function that trades off the benefits of liquidity services by banks and the unique informational role of bank loans with the costs of investment distortions engendered by risk shifting

risk based capital requirements and bank portfolio risk abstract we construct a linear programming model and analyze the effectiveness of r b capital adequacy standards when bank deposits are fully insured we derive a set of optimal asset risk weights given a constraint in raising equity and using these weights the r b capital plan is an effective regulation mechanism without a constraint on equity maximum leverage restrictions and r b capital plans are mutually exclusive alternatives as we deviate from the optimal risk weights a combination of a leverage restriction and a r b equity ratio seems to be the more appropriate approach to controlling bank portfolio risk

another look at returns to agricultural and nonagricultural assets this paper presents econometric tests of whether mean returns on agricultural assets have been higher or lower than those on comparable risk assets in nonagricultural capital markets the tests are based on alternate maintained hypotheses that the capital asset pricing model capm or the arbitrage pricing theory apt characterize nonagricultural asset returns results indicate that mean returns to farmer operators have been lower than those to owners of comparable risk nonagricultural assets and that mean returns to farmland owners have been higher than those to owners of comparable risk nonagricultural assets

bank risk dynamics and distance to default we adapt structural models of default risk to take into account the special nature of bank assets the usual assumption of log normally distributed asset values is not appropriate for banks typical bank assets are risky debt claims which implies that they embed a short put option on the borrowers assets leading to a concave payoff this has important consequences for banks risk dynamics and distance to default estimation due to the payoff non linearity bank asset volatility rises following negative shocks to borrower asset values as a result standard structural models in which the asset volatility is assumed to be constant can severely understate banks default risk in good times when asset values are high bank equity payoffs resemble a mezzanine claim rather than a call option bank equity return volatility is therefore much more sensitive to big negative shocks to asset values than in standard structural models

an incentive approach to banking regulation we examine the optimal design of a risk adjusted deposit insurance scheme when the regulator has less information than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank s assets adverse selection and when the regulator is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are being directed away from normal operations toward activities that lower asset quality moral hazard under a socially optimal insurance scheme 1 asset quality is below the first best level 2 higher quality banks have larger asset bases and face lower capital adequacy requirements than lower quality banks and 3 the probability of failure is equated across banks perihaps t he most troubling aspect of the current deposit insurance system is the distortions caused by the pervasive use of an insurance premium that is independent of risk the undesirable incentives that result when such a system is employed in a world with imperfect information have long been recognized in the literature of particular concern is the incentive banks have to increase the risk of their portfolio in order to maximize the value of the deposit insurance provided in some respects this problem is similar to the incentives generated by corporate debt however the solution to this problem may be different in a banking context because the creditors include the deposit insurer who has the power to regulate the banks conceivably regulation may be able to mitigate the informational problem at hand in this paper we examine some of the tradeoffs that arise in the design of a regulatory system for banks

forbearance deposit insurance pricing and incentive compatible bank regulation abstract this paper examines the incentive compatible role of regulatory forbearance policy in the context of optimal bank regulation under moral hazard we show that when a bank s asset portfolio returns have market risk the regulator can influence the bank s choice of ex ante risk by delaying the closure of an insolvent bank the optimal closure policy involves co ordinating the closure decision with market wide performance such a policy may significantly alleviate the bank s ex ante risk shifting problem furthermore even fixed rate deposit insurance can be optimal when combined with a sound forbearance policy and a minimum capital standard

capital regulation and deposit insurance abstract a model of deposit insurance in which the bank closure rule can systematically deviate from the economic insolvency condition used in earlier models is developed simulation of that model for plausible parameter values suggests that the failure to close banks on a timely basis has a profound effect in increasing the insurer s liability the implications of these results for capital regulation are discussed

how does the stock market view bank regulatory capital forbearance policies during the subprime crisis the fdic has shown once again laxity in resolving and closing insolvent institutions ronn and verma 1986 call the tolerance level below which a bank closure is triggered the regulatory policy parameter we derive a model in which we make this parameter stochastic and bank specific to infer the stock market view of the regulatory capital forbearance value for 565 u s listed banks during 1990 to 2012 the countercyclical forbearance fraction in capital most substantial in recessions could represent 17 on average of the market valuation of bank equity and could go as high as 100

the economics of workout lending lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans a model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially useful from socially wasteful workout loans the analysis is extended to examine two collective action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower the paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets theories of financial intermediation predict that bank loans should not be marketable because of moral hazard problems banks will not conduct credit risk analysis or monitor borrowers if they are not at risk for failing to perform these services throughout most of history bank loans have not in fact been marketable yet by the end of the 1980 s the amount of commercial and industrial loan sales outstanding had grown to over 250 billion from trivial amounts at the beginning of the decade to explain the opening of this loan sales market we present a model of incentive compatible loan sales that allows for implicit contractual features between loan sellers and loan buyers we then test for the presence of these features using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales

misspecification of capital asset pricing this study documents empirical anomalies which suggest that either the simple one period capital asset pricing model capm is misspecified or that capital markets are inefficient in particular portfolios based on firm size or earnings price e p ratios experience average returns systematically different from those predicted by the capm furthermore the abnormal returns persist for at least two years this persistence reduces the likelihood that these results are being generated by a market inefficiency rather the evidence seems to indicate that the equilibrium pricing model is misspecified however the data also reveals that an e p effect does not emerge after returns are controlled for the firm size effect the firm size effect largely subsumes the e p effect thus while the e p anomaly and value anomaly exist when each variable is considered separately the two anomalies seem to be related to the same set of missing factors and these factors appear to be more closely associated with firm size than e p ratios

regulatory arbitrage in cross border banking mergers within the eu expanding the cross country footprint of an organization s profit making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe this paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that differences in the size and character of safety net benefits available to banks in individual eu countries help to account for cross border merger activity our results suggest that central bankers need to develop statistical procedures for assessing the consequences of differences in supervisory strength and weakness in partner countries we believe that the methods used here can help in this task

a dynamic analysis of land prices a dynamic model of land prices is developed it derives arbitrage asset prices under nonadditive dynamic preferences risk aversion and transaction costs the model nests as special cases risk neutrality time additive preferences the static capital asset pricing model capm as well as the dynamic consumption based capm the model is applied to the analysis of u s land prices for the period 1950 96 the econometric results provide evidence showing that u s land price patterns are inconsistent with risk neutrality or with the static capm model no strong evidence was found against time additive preferences the econometric findings indicate that both risk aversion and transaction costs have significant effects on land prices

ownership structure market discipline and banks risk taking incentives under deposit insurance the paper studies the effects of market discipline by creditors and ownership structure on banks risk taking in the presence of partial deposit insurance an agency cost model explains how the effects of creditor discipline and shareholder control arc interdependent the non monotonic effect of shareholder control and the role of leverage panel regressions on several hundred banks worldwide 1995 2005 confirm a negative individual risk effect of creditor discipline and the expected convex effect of shareholder control increased shareholder control significantly strengthens the negative effect of market discipline on asset risk but joint effects on overall default risk are limited c 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

the empirical foundations of the arbitrage pricing theory abstract this paper uses maximum likelihood factor analysis of large cross sections to examine the validity of the arbitrage pricing theory apt we are unable to explain the expected returns on firm size portfolios although we do explain the expected returns on portfolios formed on the basis of dividend yield and own variance where risk adjustment using the usual capm market proxies fails we also compare alternate versions of the apt and sharply reject the hypothesis that basis portfolios formed to mimic the factors span the mean variance frontier of the individual assets

market based risk adjusted examination schedules for depository institutions abstract among deposit insurance reforms considered by economists and policymakers have been prompt resolution of problem institutions risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums and risk adjusted capital requirements some economists have further suggested that risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums or capital ratios be calculated by applying option pricing models to stock market data alternatively the option methodology could be used to establish a risk based examination schedule whereby riskier banks would be examined on a more frequent basis such an examination schedule would be consistent with prompt resolution strategies since it would relate the frequency of examination and closeness of supervision to banks riskness this paper demonstrates how a risk adjusted examination schedule could be derived the paper also considers alternatives to the assumptions regarding examination policies made in standard applications of the option model which may not be valid for the sample periods previously used it discusses potential resulting biases and ways to mitigate their effects

fair value disclosures by bank holding companies abstract this paper examines the value relevance of fair value data disclosed under sfas 107 by banks for 1992 and 1993 collectively the evidence suggests differences between fair and book values of financial instruments are associated with market to book ratios however fair value disclosures for financial instruments other than securities are value relevant only in limited settings in addition only in 1992 are fair value variables associated with market to book ratios after incorporating existing historical cost information further analysis suggests the weaker 1993 results are not necessarily due to increased measurement error in fair value numbers

bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework abstract the barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank the regulator insurer of a bank owns a down and in call option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost raising the regulatory barrier critical asset level triggering bank closure leads to a transfer of wealth from stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk empirical tests on a sample of 152 one bank holding companies show that regulatory barriers are priced in the stock market and are inversely related to tier 1 leverage ratios

regulatory and economic solvency standards for internationally active banks abstract one of the most important policy issues for financial authorities is to decide at what level average capital charges should be set the decision may alternatively be expressed as the choice of an appropriate survival probability for representative banks over a horizon such as a year often termed a solvency standard this article sheds light on the solvency standards implied by current and possible future g10 bank regulation and on the economic solvency standard that banks choose themselves by their own capital setting decisions in particular we employ a credit risk model to show that the survival probability implied by the 1988 basel accord is between 99 0 and 99 9 we then demonstrate that if a new basel accord were calibrated to such a standard it would not represent a binding constraint on banks current operations since most banks employ a solvency standard higher than 99 9 to show this we employ a statistical analysis of bank ratings adjusted for the impact of official or other support as well as credit risk model calculations lastly we advance a possible explanation for the conservative capital choices made by banks by showing that swap volumes are highly correlated with credit quality for given bank size this suggests that banks access to important credit markets like the swaps markets may provide a significant discipline in the choice of solvency standard

the managerial regulatory and financial determinants of bank merger premiums this paper analyzes the managerial regulatory and financial determinants of us bank merger premiums we use both individual acquirer and target bank characteristics we also examine state regulation of acquirer and target banks from a geographically dispersed population allowing us specifically to test the effect of a varied state regulatory menu the study finds merger premiums to be related to the characteristics of both acquirer and target banks and the regulatory environments in both acquirer and target bank states we also find evidence that the separation of ownership and control in acquirer and target banks has a significant effect on merger premiums in the last decade the pace of mergers in the us banking industry has been impressive this growth in the number of bank mergers has largely been due to the changing economic and regulatory environment with the reduction in the severity of enforcing strict antitrust guidelines by the reagan administration and more importantly the gradual removal of geographical restrictions by individual states on bank expansion the environment for bank mergers has never been so conducive since the regulatory restrictions are likely to be further relaxed with an increasing number of states permitting interstate banking in the early 1990s the number and dollar value of bank mergers is certain to accelerate accordingly it is important to improve our understanding of bank mergers this paper examines the financial regulatory and managerial determinants of bank merger premiums in examining the financial determinants of the merger premiums we include the financial characteristics of the target banks and the franchise value of its banking market because bank mergers are carefully regulated by state laws we also analyze the regulation in the banks states we examine the state regulation of acquirer and target banks

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

interactivity and soft computing in portfolio management should farmers own food and agribusiness stocks this article proposes a fully integrated and interactive elicitation optimization procedure for portfolio management a soft computing approach based on fuzzy logic is developed as an alternative to the traditional mean variance model and compromise programming approach the models are applied to farmers to examine whether they should buy publicly traded food and agribusiness firms stocks rather than invest in a broader market stock portfolio results suggest that investments in publicly traded food and agribusiness stocks allow farmers to capture additional benefits beyond those of simply diversifying in the broader market copyright 2002 oxford university press

adaptation to land constraints is africa different since the seminal works of malthus and boserup scientists have long debated the impact of population growth and land constraints on the wellbeing of rural people today these concerns are particularly relevant to africa with its rapid population growth very small farms and chronic food insecurity in this paper we examine adaptation to falling land labor ratios using a comprehensive theoretical framework in which households faced with binding land constraints can respond in three ways intensifying agricultural production diversifying out of agriculture and reducing fertility rates using cross country data and drawing upon the existing literature we reach three conclusions first population density is associated with reduced fallows and more intensive use of land but not fertilizer use or irrigation indicating major challenges in achieving sustainable intensification or agricultural productivity growth second there is little evidence of successful non farm diversification in response to land pressures in africa from domestic or international income sources third rural africans in land constrained countries desire smaller families but have thus far benefited little from family planning policies these findings underscore the need for a coordinated multi sectoral approach to sustainably reduce poverty in the region

food and population d gale johnson and the green revolution during his distinguished career d gale johnson addressed food and population issues in a number of papers and books food and population issues were featured in both his 1997 ely lecture and in his 2000 presidential address to the american economic association on these occasions he made the following observations 1 plant and animal breeding programs in the agricultural experiment stations brought major changes to agriculture in the twentieth century in the first half of the twentieth century these programs produced important productivity gains in the industrialized developed countries with some achievements in sugar tea coffee and spices in tropical developing countries where both crop genetic improvement cgi and animal genetic improvement agi gains were achieved during the second half of the twentieth century particularly after 1965 cgi gains in developing countries produced a green revolution affecting most developing countries 2 the green revolution and related agricultural productivity gains prevented a malthusian outcome in global food markets in the wake of the major population expansion realized in virtually all developing countries after world war ii this malthusian outcome in the form of high food prices and land scarcity with attendant high land rents and prices did not occur in the increasingly globalized economy world prices of most agricultural crops in real terms declined after 1950 3 many developing countries particularly in africa however have not realized a green revolution these countries have also not achieved significant improvements in per capita income although virtually all developing countries have realized improvements in child mortality rates child malnutrition rates and life expectancy 4 esther boserup in work on africa suggested that increases in population density in rural areas were associated with changes in technology d gale johnson suggested that a political boserup effect was operative in many countries this boserup effect operated such that countries with low population densities invested little in cgi programs as population increased cgi investments increased in this article i will review green revolution evidence and relate this evidence to these observations the green revolution is somewhat arbitrarily dated from 1965 when high yielding or modern varieties mvs of both wheat and rice were first widely adopted in developing countries these mvs are associated with the first two international agricultural research centers iarcs the international rice research institute irri located in the philippines and the international center for the improvement of wheat and maize cimmyt located in mexico but plant breeding programs in some developing countries were relatively advanced for some crops before 1965 section i of the article discusses these pre green revolution developments section ii provides a descriptive overview of the production of mvs by region this overview emphasizes the diversity in rates of mv development by crop and relates this diversity to pre green revolution conditions section iii reports an empirical study of the impact of iarc germplasm in the form of second generation iarc crossed mvs and breeding lines on the productivity of national agricultural research system nars plant breeders the political boserup effect hypothesis is also tested in section iii section iv describes the adoption of mvs and reports estimates of the productivity impacts of the green revolution section v provides a brief comment on the fact that we have mass poverty in some countries in a world awash with grain the final section of the article summarizes the perspective that d gale johnson brought to the public science system serving agriculture in developing countries excerpt

option pricing when the variance is changing the monte carlo method is used to solve for the price of a call when the variance is changing stochastically

deregulation and bank financial policy the standard view that banks can value maximize by exploiting non risk rated deposit insurance ignores the potential loss of a valuable bank charter due to insolvency recognition of this effect changes the bank s optimal financial policy and can induce extreme risk averting as well as risk taking behavior however as the value of the bank charter falls the risk taking strategy is more apt to dominate therefore current deregulation of the banking industry by easing entry and devaluing charters holds the potential for increases in the incidence of insolvency unless offsetting policies are instituted

bank regulation and monetary policy the depository institutions deregulation and monetary control act 1980 and the garn st germain depository institutions act 1982 are the two most significant pieces of bank legislation since the 193os their significance stems from the fact that they have sought to roll back a number of the regulations and restrictions imposed on bank activity and competition in the 1933 80 period among the important provisions of these acts are a gradual elimination of regulation q ceilings on time and savings deposits by march 1986 the amelioration of state imposed usury ceilings on loans the nationwide provision of interest bearing transaction type accounts negotiable order of withdrawal now and super now accounts permission for thritts to expand into bank like products such as commercial and industrial loans consumer loans and credit cards and the development of new types of savings accounts such as mmdas l in addition to legislative deregulation we have also witnessed homemade deregulation as banks have sought to exploit often with great success loopholes in the bank holding

a framework for assessing credit risk in depository institutions toward regulatory reform abstract this paper develops and illustrates a new method for evaluating the credit risk borne by depository institutions that may prove to be an important element in a regulatory mechanism sensitive to risk in our framework depository institutions are forced to bear the costs of their risk exposure and hence to internalize this cost when extending loans using various loan portfolios and alternative macroeconomic scenarios we present numerical calculations demonstrating the ability of our framework to capture variations in risk exposure and highlighting the significance of portfolio concentrations these calculations are based on an important new source of information that permits an econometric analysis of loan losses by industry

correlated default risks and bank regulations bank regulatory design relies critically on bank risk modeling traditionally the bank s aggregate value is assumed to obey an exogenously specified process e g a lognormal diffusion we demonstrate that this assumption is generally invalid given the truncated and correlated payoff structure of individual bank loans instead the bank s aggregate terminal payoff is significantly left fat tailed this skewness remains even when the bank holds an infinitely large number of loans in its portfolio unless they are uncorrelated by ignoring skewness in bank payoffs deposit insurance premia and capital requirements have traditionally been significantly mis calculated

wealth and risk effects of adopting deposit insurance in canada evidence of risk shifting by banks and trust companies this paper confirms that adopting explicit deposit insurance expanded risk shifting incentives for canadian banks and trust companies by transferring responsibility for monitoring non systematic risk to the canadian deposit insurance corporation cdic deposit insurance eliminated the compensation previously paid to large block stockholder monitors this transfer fueled a redistribution of insured institution stock from poorly diversified large block shareholders to diversified investors also subsequent changes in market volatility support the hypothesis that cdic insurance and the absorption of catastrophic risk it provided reduced systematic risk in the stock market as a whole even as it increased non systematic risk in the banking and trust company sector

the implied reserves of the bank insurance fund abstract option models of deposit insurance pricing view assessment rates as put option premiums however such models ignore the risk of guaranty fund default this paper attempts to link risk based premiums with guaranty fund reserves in a partial equilibrium setting by employing a methodology based on options with credit risk the value of full insurance per coverage period is expressed as a standard options premium and is decomposed into two parts the explicit part is due to the available assets reserves of the guaranty fund while the implicit part comes from federal support contingent on the adequacy of reserves at the end of the coverage period implied reserves are derived under an exogenous insurance coverage rate as a policy parameter the method is illustrated on a sample of 40 large bank holding companies and an extension to the case of several insured banks is provided

a simple approach to better deposit insurance pricing abstract we examine the ability of simple insurance pricing schedules to match premiums with the values derived from a contingent claim model of deposit insurance we use a quadratic loss function to compare a flat rate pricing system to alternative pricing schedules incorporating measures of risk a simple two bracket schedule that distinguishes between high and low capitalization is a substantial improvement a pricing schedule under which the rate paid by low capital banks depends on their degree of undercapitalization is better still in addition the gains from using market value measures of capital rather than book value are great

a unified beta pricing theory abstract this paper derives ross s mutual fund separation theory and a new equilibrium version of ross s arbitrage pricing theory as special cases of a general theory the paper also reveals that the two theories are identical in their predictions of asset prices and portfolio returns the capital asset pricing model a restricted case of the mutual fund separation theory receives special treatment

arbitrage pricing capital asset pricing and agricultural assets a new asset pricing model the arbitrage pricing theory has been developed as an alternative to the capital asset pricing model the arbitrage pricing theory model is used to analyze the relationship between risk and return for agricultural assets the major conclusion is that the arbitrage pricing theory results support previous capital asset pricing model findings that the estimated risk associated with agricultural assets is low this conclusion is more robust for the arbitrage pricing theory application because it provides a better explanation of the relationship between risk and returns than does the capital asset pricing model

optimal bank reorganization policies and the pricing of federal deposit insurance optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits and interest rate on deposits the economy s risk free interest rate and the regulators bank audit administration costs under competitive conditions the threshold assets to deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank s risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank s current assets to deposits ratio should regulatory agencies close reorganize an ailing federally insured financial institution if so when the recent record rate of failures of savings and loans associations s ls has renewed the urgency of this question the regulatory agencies are empowered but not required to reorganize financial institutions that are statutorily insolvent i e have zero or negative regulatory net worth recently regulators have in many instances permitted insolvent financial institutions to remain in operation 2 also while debating on the increase of the proposed funding of the federal deposit insurers the u s congress argued whether it would be desirable and if so when to close more s ls thus when regulators should close a troubled financial institution has become a major question of bank regulatory policy while the existing academic literature provides powerful insights into the structure and pricing of the insurers liability this literature offers very little guidance regarding the timing of bank reorganizations 3 indeed to the best of our knowledge the value of the federal

risk based capital adequacy standards for a sample of 43 major banks abstract the paper extends the option theoretic framework for the estimation of risk adjusted deposit premiums to the calculation of risk based capital adequacy standards based on market data for equity and the book value of debt the model solves for the market value of the capital infusion required to lower the implied deposit premium to acceptable levels of risk this capital infusion can then be translated into market value capital adequacy standards and book value capital asset ratios the determination of which is within the current statutory discretion of regulatory agencies the model is empirically applied to a sample of 43 major u s banks

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

capital and risk in property liability insurance markets abstract this paper investigates the capital and portfolio risk decisions of property liability insurance firms a theoretical model based on option pricing theory is developed which predicts a positive relationship between insurer capital and risk as firms balance these two factors to achieve their desired overall insolvency risk the implications of the model are then tested empirically using a simultaneous equations methodology the results support the predictions of the model they also provide evidence that managerial incentives play a role in determining capital and risk in insurance markets the findings have significant implications for insurance solvency regulation

a market evaluation of the risk based capital standards for the u s financial system abstract this paper evaluates u s risk based capital guidelines by comparing stock market measures of institutions risk with current regulatory risk based capital measures the first part of the evaluation compares overall market and regulatory risk based capital measures of current capital adequacy required capital and the capital infusion required to meet the capital requirement the second part compares regulatory risk weights on individual risk categories with market determined risk weights the results suggest that the market and risk based capital standards agree to some extent on the adequacy of institutions current capital and required capital infusion but that their measures of asset risk are not positively correlated further the 100 percent risk category for banks and the 50 and 200 percent categories for s ls do distinguish activities that are riskier by market measures however the market model makes limited distinctions among the other categories in addition the results suggest that some off balance sheet activities for banks may reduce asset risk

a comparison of inflation forecasts interest rate models provide slightly better monthly forecasts and substantially better eight and fourteen month forecasts of inflation than a univariate time series model the livingston surveys underestimate eight and fourteen month inflation rates especially during the high inflation period of 1978 81 in contrast eight and fourteen month inflation forecasts extrapolated from one month interest rates show little bias and track ex post eight and fourteen month inflation rates better than the survey forecasts

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

does the debt market assess large banks risk time series evidence from money center cds abstract uninsured bank liabilities should offer a promised yield that compensates depositors for their expected default losses however the conjectural guarantees available to large u s banking firms makes it questionable whether large depositors should or do feel themselves exposed to credit risk prior papers have evaluated the determinants of bank risk premia using cross sectional data with relatively inconclusive results this paper investigates the same issue in a methodologically independent fashion using time series data on specific banks daily offering rates during the period may 1982 through july 1988 we find that cd rates paid by large money center banks include significant default risk premia

charter value minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium abstract this paper shows that leaving insolvent banks with large enough charter values open can be optimal and derives normative bank closure reorganization policies based on the liquidation value of assets and the charter value the charter value of a bank is broadly defined as the value that would be foregone due to a closure our simulations of risk taking show that an optimal forbearance for an insolvent bank with a large enough charter value alleviates the moral hazard problem this is because increasing the risk raises the probability of losing the charter value although it generates a moral hazard gain

deposit insurance and risk taking behavior in the credit union industry abstract this paper examines the relationship between deposit insurance and risk taking behavior within the credit union industry time series tests employing industry average financial ratios for federal and state credit unions did not support the increased risk taking hypothesis although federal credit union capital declined immediately following the adoption of deposit insurance this was most likely the result of reduced capital requirements not deposit insurance liquidity and loan delinquency ratios had a negative time trend coefficient implying a decline in risk taking behavior during the post insurance period cross sectional test results employing iowa state chartered credit union data indicated that insured credit unions were better capitalized and more liquid than their uninsured counterparts overall there was no evidence that the adoption of deposit insurance increased the risk taking behavior of credit unions

aggregate deposit insurance funding and taxpayer bailouts abstract recent events have focused attention on the fragility of the federal deposit insurance funds and made redesign of the insurance system an active policy issue this paper explores the implications of different rate structures for the long term solvency of the fund using two simulation techniques based on historical loss distributions three findings stand out 1 under the former 8 33 bp premium rate as well as under the 15 bp premium rate mandated as the new long run target or default premium rate by both firrea and the fdic assesment rate act of 1990 the probability that the fund could become insolvent over a given 55 year period is higher than previously recognized 2 raising the effective cap on the fund to as low as 2 5 of deposits can substantially reduce the probability of insolvency without further increasing the premium rate and 3 the anticipated temporary 1991 premium rate of 19 5 bp implies a quite low probability of insolvency

financial institution structures in a developing two tier banking system an empirical perspective from eastern europe abstract an empirical analysis of the structure of hungarian financial institutions reveals them to be very profitable across all groupings although capital and liquidity ratios are on average low in comparison to west german standards the capital adequacy problems appear to be concentrated in the former affiliates of the central bank the thinness and underdevelopment of the hungarian securities market may hinder the capacity of the institutions to raise liquidity and capital ratios as well as inhibit the emergence of competitors seeking high levels of profitability

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

moving toward risk based deposit insurance premiums in the european union the case of spain this article provides a scenario based analysis of how the european union proposal for a new funding model for deposit insurance systems diss would affect the spanish banking sector we examine the risk profiles of commercial banks savings banks and credit cooperatives over the period 2007 to 2011 and compare the contributions to the deposit insurance fund dif under the current flat rate regime with those that would have occurred under the new risk sensitive system we find that a risk based scheme could provide an incentive for sound management by reducing the premiums for credit institutions with better risk profiles we also conclude that the proposed reform may help to mitigate the moral hazard associated with larger credit institutions

a multi attribute comparative evaluation of relative risk for a sample of banks abstract this paper proposes a comparative analysis of five different attributes of commercial banks liabilities that may be thought of as either directly measuring the default risk or are perceived by the market as impacting upon that default risk two of these attributes are credit ratings assigned by moody s and standard and poor s to debt issues the third attribute that we consider is yield to maturity which is typically assumed to be positively related to default risk the fourth attribute that is proposed is the fair value risk adjusted deposit insurance premium derived from option theoretic modeling and estimated from the daily data on equity prices finally we propose a term structure adjusted difference in yield between the risky debt and default free government debt as a more precise and theoretically sound measure of the default risk premium and develop a methodology for eliciting it on a composite basis for a given bank from the market prices of its various bond issues this term structure adjusted risk premium provides an analytical approximation to the valuation of corporate bonds call features and sinking fund provisions in view of the ordinality of the credit ratings given by the investment agencies spearman s rank correlation coefficient is employed as an analytical tool the analysis

the distributional impact of foreign deposits on federal deposit insurance premia abstract rapid growth of deposits in u s foreign bank branches and current u s government policies have combined to create a new inequality in the deposit insurance system our research shows that smaller banks are substantially subsidizing the insurance costs of the larger multinational institutions when insurance premiums are viewed in the context of an implicit tax it is highly regressive with the wealth transfer growing over time recent reform proposals do not fully address important international influences and therefore underestimate the scope of the problem

a note on the existence and characteristics of fair deposit insurance premia abstract this paper treats the fair deposit insurance premium as a fixed point of the value of insurance per dollar of deposits using the standard model of the value of deposit insurance and treating the premium as an up front cost to a bank it is shown that the fixed point premium exists and is unique under fairly general conditions it is shown that ignoring the premium as an up front cost may lead to underestimation of the fair premium in addition the fixed point model suggests that premium rates should vary with the ratio of deposits to total liabilities

optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation and deposit insurance this paper examines the relationships among capital regulation deposit insurance and the optimal bank interest margin in a model where loan losses are the source of uncertainty changes in capital regulation or deposit insurance premiums have direct effects on the bank s interest margin an increase in bank capital requirement or in deposit insurance premiums results in a reduced interest margin under nonincreasing risk aversion comparative static analysis also explores the relation between asset quality and interest margin it is shown that a mean preserving spread of the distribution of loan losses results in a reduced margin

maintaining adequate bank capital an empirical analysis of the supervision of european banks abstract during the recent financial crisis many large banks losses were absorbed by their sponsoring governments despite the fact that these banks complied with basel standards for adequate capital we illustrate a serious supervisory problem by demonstrating that large european banks reported regulatory capital measures often far exceeded their loss absorbing capacity during 1997 2011 the cumulative value of government guarantees thereby extended to the largest 25 european banks over that period amounts to nearly 1 4 trillion corresponding to an average of 28 5 of the banks equity market values we show that early regulatory attention to declining equity value can substantially reduce the social cost of dealing with bank losses this research is particularly relevant for european institutions at the present time as the european union deals with joint solvency concerns about its banks and its governments

capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks abstract how bankers choose the riskiness of their individual assets is an important question it is well known that fixed premium deposit insurance leads a bank to prefer a high variance asset portfolio but its effect on individual asset choice has not been carefully evaluated this paper demonstrates how bank examination procedures and capital adequacy standards can make the value of a bank s deposit insurance contract concave in individual asset risks insured bankers may therefore have a rational preference ceteris paribus for relatively safe individual loans even while they prefer risky portfolio returns the model s implications for loan securitization and the federal regulators new risk based capital standards are discussed

interest risk sensitive deposit insurance premia stable ach estimates abstract the parameters of interest rate uncertainty are estimated by maximum likelihood for the period 1952 1982 and used to evaluate bank or thrift deposit insurance as a function of duration mismatching capital asset ratio and the recent history of interest rate forecasting errors homoskedasticity is overwhelmingly rejected in favor of adaptive conditional heteroskedasticity ach even after removing this heteroskedasticity normality gives much lower likelihood than paretian stable distributions with characteristic exponent in the range 1 614 to 1 714 the conditional deposit insurance values fluctuate by factors in excess of 300 for some duration gaps over the past three decades

returns to farm real estate revisited barry s research on farm real estate returns suggests that when farm assets are viewed as a part of the nation s wealth portfolio returns are not persistently low as is commonly asserted in policy debates this paper extends barry s research by explicitly accounting for the effects of uncertain inflation using a broader market proxy and lengthening the sample period the results suggest farm real estate offers only slight not substantial premiums above those for systematic risk contributes little systematic risk to a well diversified portfolio and exhibits substantial risk due to uncertain inflation

the pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies the paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis despite of the potential moral hazard problems we argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance especially when the insured institution is insolvent applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option we first derive a closed form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies then we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for the properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk based pricing scheme

banks non traditional activities under regulatory changes impact on risk performance and capital adequacy using the big six canadian chartered banks quarterly financial statements and daily stock market data from 1982 to 2018 we examine the impact of non interest income on canadian banks risk perfor

market valuation of bank assets and deposit insurance in canada we examine a sample of canadian banks and use option pricing theory to infer the market value of a bank s assets from the observed market value and volatility of its equity we find that market value estimates are significantly different from corresponding book values these differences vary significantly across banks suggesting that market values provide bank specific information not found in book values we also derive that risk adjusted deposit insurance premia for these banks our results suggest that the current fixed rate deposit insurance premium system has resulted in significant

econometric modeling of the capitalization formula for farmland prices an econometric model is formulated to explain the dynamic behavior in farmland prices a second order rational distributed lag on net crop share rents received by landlords captures the dynamic movements of prices and performs well in conditional post sample forecasts the adjustment path of land prices in response to a perturbation in rents is a protracted dampened cycle the implicitly estimated tax free capitalization rate on rent associated with equilibrium land price is 4 0 neither the expected rate of inflation nor an exponential trend on rent expectations has a significant effect on land prices