effects of cost changes on oligopolists profits this paper considers cost changes affecting all firms in a constantreturns to scale cournot oligopoly cost increases may paradoxically benefit some or even all firms whether a firm benefits or is harmed depends only on whether its market share exceeds a threshold level s on whether industry costs increase or decrease on the number of firms and on the elasticity of the demand curve s slope or equivalently the fraction of cost changes that are passed on conditions where industry structure alone determines the effect of cost changes on firms profits and conditions where cost increases necessarily harm some firms are developed this paper considers the effects of a change in cost on outputs and profits in an industry composed of firms with constant returns to scale these effects are easy to see in the extreme cases of monopoly and perfect competition but

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

heterogeneity in informal salaried employment evidence from the egyptian labor market survey summary this paper contributes to the continuing debates on the mechanisms driving labor market informality in developing countries by proposing an innovative way to discriminate between segmented and competitive markets an empirical analysis is applied to egyptian paid employment in the highly dynamic context of 1998 2006 the study is based on recent nonparametric methods applied to estimate the model with essential heterogeneity the model is extended to decomposing the treatment effects into unobserved and observed components the results show triple heterogeneity of workers on the egyptian labor market offering support to both segmented and competitive views on informal labor

unemployment in south africa the nature of the beast abstract unemployment in south africa is so widespread that it demands an explanation this paper examines a central question about south african unemployment why do the unemployed not enter the informal sector as is common in other developing countries the data do not support the idea that unemployment is largely voluntary the policy implications that government should diminish labor market segmentation and the obstacles to entering the productive informal sector may be relevant also to other developing countries with high unemployment

a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one sided incomplete information we characterize the sequential equilibria of a class of infinite horizon bargaining games with one sided incomplete information when the seller the uninformed party makes all the offers we prove a folk theorem every incentive compatible individually rational direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria introducing buyer counteroffers eliminates outcomes which are unfavorable to that party as the proportion of buyer offers increases the set of implementable mechanisms shrinks continuously when the proportion reaches one only the single outcome most favorable to the buyer remains thus depending on the offer structure sequentiality may or may not impose restrictions beyond static incentive compatibility

strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

effects of family background on earnings and returns to schooling evidence from brazil we investigate whether omitted family background variables are responsible for high returns to schooling estimated in brazil returns to schooling fall by about one third when parental schooling is added to wage equations surprisingly the schooling of fathers in law has larger effects on wages than the schooling of fathers on the basis of a model of assortative mating we interpret this as evidence that parental characteristics represent unobservable worker attributes rather than nepotism in the labor market we conclude that the family background bias in returns to schooling is modest and need not imply returns to family connections

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

home sourcing and closer value chains in mature economies the case of spanish manufacturing this paper offers a novel perspective on manufacturing home sourcing we present evidence that home sourcing occurs in the context of a new competitive environment where the relative importance of scale economies versus variety is altered and a recoupling of innovation and production within industrial ecosystems becomes desirable we look at the determinants of manufacturing home sourcing we find that r d intensive businesses with core non standardized products are more likely to switch sourcing of components to the home economy from abroad our findings provide evidence in favour of increasing trends towards closer value chains for knowledge intensive production suggesting that the possibilities for and potential impact of home sourcing have not been fully recognised as pathways to industrial and economic renewal in mature economies the implications for industrial policy are to focus on the resilience of existing national industrial ecosystems and their attractiveness and ability to integrate incoming business opportunities

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers this paper examines an infinite horizon bargaining model incorporating five features two sided incomplete information with potentially information revealing strategies an infinite horizon uncertainty concerning the potential gains from trade an illumination of interesting qualitative bargaining issues and plausible free from arbitrarily specified out of equilibrium conjectures equilibria these features motivated in the paper have powerful implications a nash equilibrium exists and is generically both unique and sequential comparative static implications of variations in the game s specifications are developed we find that natural indications of bargaining strength emerge from the model and establish the intuitive result that an increase in a player s relative bargaining strength makes that player more likely to capture the gains from bargaining

outside options and the failure of the coase conjecture a buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option abandoning their search or moving on to another seller we show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price contravening the coase conjecture we then embed the singleseller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual no haggling assumption jel c78 d42 d43 l12 l13 the coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment the idea is that for any given price high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers leading to negative selection in the demand pool accordingly the seller cuts its price over time causing high value buyers to delay their purchases the seller s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves reducing its overall profit gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 this idea of negative selection is robust versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear kahn 1986 when goods depreciate over time bond and samuelson 1984 when there is entry of new buyers sobel 1991 and when the buyers face future competition fuchs and skrzypacz 2010 in this article we show that the coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise we consider a seller who faces a buyer or a continuum of buyers with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option each period the seller chooses price p t the buyer then chooses to buy wait or exercise his option and terminate the game the outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product for example when waiting for the price of the iphone to fall a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor similarly when bargaining over the price of a car a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer the outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated for example after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar a tourist could start seeing local attractions

home or overseas an analysis of sourcing strategies under competition motivated by the recent backshoring trend this paper studies a sourcing game where competing firms may choose between efficient sourcing e g sourcing from overseas and responsive sourcing e g sourcing from a home country efficient sourcing usually provides a cost advantage whereas responsive sourcing allows a firm to obtain more accurate demand information when making procurement decisions by characterizing the equilibrium outcome we find some interesting results driven by the strategic interaction between the firms first a firm may still use efficient sourcing in equilibrium even when the cost advantage associated with efficient sourcing does not exist this is because the firm can dampen competition by reducing the correlation between its own demand information and the competitor s second a cost hike in efficient sourcing e g the rising labor cost in asia may benefit all the firms in the industry the reason is that the cost hike may alleviate competition by inducing a new equilibrium sourcing structure this paper also sheds some light on the recent backshoring trend first our analysis indicates that more firms will shift from efficient sourcing to responsive sourcing in equilibrium i e backshore if the market size shrinks the demand becomes more volatile or the sourcing costs rise simultaneously second a firm s backshoring behavior reduces the competition on the cost dimension but it also has an ambiguous informational impact on the other firms in the market in particular some firms may benefit from increased correlation of their demand information under cournot competition with substitutable products overall the backshoring behavior can be beneficial to all the firms sticking to their original sourcing strategies under certain conditions this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

does increasing women s schooling raise the schooling of the next generation the positive cross sectional relationship between the schooling of mothers and their children is substantially biased upward due to correlations between schooling and heritable ability as well as assortative mating an increase in the schooling of women would not have beneficial effects in terms of the schooling of children increased maternal schooling leads to reduced home time for mothers anticipating the consequences of investing in women s schooling requires attention to the role that schooling plays in the marriage market as well as to opportunities in the labor market for women

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain the importance of material flow management for a profit maximizing firm has been well articulated in the supply chain literature we demonstrate in our analytical model that a firm must also actively manage information flows within the supply chain which translates to controlling what it knows as well as what its competitors and suppliers know in our model of horizontal competition between an informed and an uninformed firm with a common upstream supplier material and information flows intersect through leakage of demand order information to unintended recipients as a result the informed firm s drive to control information flows within the supply chain can trigger operational losses through material flow distortion these losses can be so severe that the firm may prefer not to acquire information even when it is costless to do so our results underscore the importance of strategic information management actively managing the supply chain s information flows and making trade offs with material flows where appropriate to maximize profits

does sample selection bias affect the effect of family background on the returns to schooling evidence from korea this article examines the effect of family background on the returns to schooling in korea in doing so sample selection bias is controlled as the probability of being employed is affected by the schooling of family members the results of this study are different from previous studies which did not consider sample selection bias while the effect of family background on the returns to schooling was obvious in previous studies it is weakened with the control of sample selection bias this phenomenon is particularly strong for the wife moreover controlling sample selection bias increases the downward bias due to measurement error thus it is concluded from these findings that sample selection bias should be controlled to accurately estimate the effect of family background on the returns to schooling

the informal sector wage gap new evidence using quantile estimations on panel data abstractwe estimate the informal formal sector pay gap throughout the conditional wage distribution using panel data from brazil mexico and south africa we control for time invariant unobservables and identification stems from intersector movers we control for observables in a nonlinear way using propensity score reweighting and carefully check for potential measurement errors using similar definitions of informality we obtain consistent results for all three countries informally employed workers earn much less than formal workers primarily because of lower observable and unobservable skills estimates of the conditional wage gap show that they are also underpaid compared to their formal sector counterparts in all three countries the informal wage penalty is larger in the lower part of the conditional distribution and tends to disappear at the top i e the informal sector increases wage dispersion the magnitudes of these effects vary across countries with the largest penalties in lower cond

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

productive government expenditures and long run growth the purpose of this paper is to review some of the recent developments in endogenous growth models specifically our focus is on the growth effects of productive government spending in dynamic general equilibrium models we use a simple overlapping generations model as our basic framework and illustrate the role of taxes and spending we then examine several related issues nonrivalry in publicly provided goods existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium endogenous public policy ways of financing public expenditures composition of publicly provided goods and services and private alternatives finally we review some empirical results related to output elasticity of public capital and educational expenditures

strategic delay in bargaining with two sided uncertainty the role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite horizon alternating offer model of bargaining a buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly an equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer a bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains and hence makes concessions earlier on trade occurs whever gains from trade exist but due to the private information only after costly delay panmunjom korea upi the american general and the north korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut maj gen james b knapp negotiator for the united nations command unc was waiting for maj gen ri choonsun of the democratic people s republic of north korea to propose a recess they sat there arms folded for 42 hours not a word finally gen ri got up walked out and drove away evening bulletin philadelphia 11 april 1969

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

labour market segmentation a local labour market analysis using alternative approaches earlier studies have generally attempted to establish the presence or otherwise of labour market segmentation using a single technique using data drawn form the british social and economic life initiative sceli for six local labour markets this paper tests for segmentation using four different methods of analysis a simple career non career model cluster analysis and switching regressions the results in general suggest that explanatory power is not improved by analysing the labour market in different segments but this simple career model points to higher rewards for given characteristics in the career sector and the results of the switching regression model are consistent with duality in one of the six markets

pension design with a large informal labor market evidence from chile this article investigates the fiscal and welfare trade offs involved in designing a pension system when workers can avoid contributing by working informally using a life cycle model of labor supply and saving decisions i structurally estimate preferences and earnings opportunities in the formal and informal sectors using data on chilean households i find limited support for formal jobs rationing instead mandatory pension contributions significantly encourage informality policy experiments show that chile could lower minimum pension spending by 23 while guaranteeing the same income to retirees if the minimum pension s implicit tax rate was increased to 60

returns to education a further international update and implications this paper updates evidence on the returns to investment in education by adding estimates for new countries and refining existing estimates to bring the total number of country cases to over 60 the new cross country evidence confirms and reinforces earlier patterns namely that returns are highest for primary education the general curricula the education of women and countries with the lowest per capita income the findings have important implications for directing future investment in education which for efficiency and equity purposes should concentrate on these priority areas

efficient relocation of spectrum incumbents changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient to address this problem the fcc has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders often it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency in particular giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent we examine the experience of broadband pcs entrants in relocating microwave incumbents we conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum

labor market integration in urban ethiopia 1994 2004 abstractan analysis of panel data on individuals in a random selection of urban households in ethiopia reveals large sustained and unexplained earnings gaps between public and private and formal and informal sectors over 1994 2004 at the same time we find first that the rate of mobility increased in the two pairs of sectors sample transitions rates grew across survey waves while state dependence in sector choice decreased second the correlation between sector choice and earnings gaps increased over the same period in particular the correlation between comparative earnings and selection into the informal sector was high throughout the survey decade and increased in magnitude over the second half of the period these results suggest that ethiopia s urban labor markets might be integrating

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

prior to reshoring a duration analysis of foreign manufacturing ventures this paper throws light on the determinants of the duration of manufacturing offshore experiences by us and european firms prior to reshoring by applying survival analysis to a dataset of 249 offshoring experiences terminated with a relocation to the home country region we estimate the effects of different groups of survival determinants results highlight that contextual factors such as the industry the home country the host country and the size of the firm significantly affect the duration of offshoring experiences the likelihood of termination is in fact higher for the electronics and automotive industries for small firms for firms headquartered in europe and for offshoring to asia the analysis of the motivations for reshoring shows that quality issues experienced offshore emerge as the key factor giving rise to shorter offshore stays based on these empirical findings a set of testable propositions is developed in particular we conjecture that the likelihood of termination of offshore manufacturing and the return to the home country may be accelerated by technology based industries small firm sizes shrinking cost differentials and the psychic distance between home and host country the organizational archetypes and quality related motivations

human capital accumulation and endogenous public expenditures in this paper we present an overlapping generations model where individuals accu mulate human capital through formal schooling we model the role of the public sector in schooling as one of collecting taxes from households and providing inputs to the learning technology public expenditures on schools are determined endogenously under plausible restrictions our model s predictions qualitatively match the observations on schooling pub lic expenditures on education and student teacher ratios jel classification el 3 e62 accumulation de capital humain et depenses publiques endogenes dans ce memoire les auteurs presentent un modele de generations qui se chevauchent ofu les individus accumulent du capital humain via l education formelle le r6le du secteur public dans l education est defini comme celui de collecteur d imp6ts aupres des menages et de fournisseur d intrants dans la technologie d apprentissage les depenses publiques en education sont determinees de maniere endogene a partir de restrictions plausibles les predictions du modele s arriment qualitativement aux observations sur le monde scolaire aux depenses publiques en educa tion et aux ratios 6leves enseignants

dealer price discrimination in new car purchases evidence from the consumer expenditure survey this paper documents the variation in dealer discounts for new cars using transactions price data from the consumer expenditure survey consumer specific characteristics fail to explain dealer discounts whereas model market specific and purchase transaction variables e g first time purchase trade in and financing through dealer do explain them the results contradict earlier findings of race and gender discrimination based on a controlled experiment this contradiction is reconciled by examining the higher moments of the empirical discount distribution while mean and median markups do not vary by race and gender minority purchases are characterized by higher dispersion this may rationalize the disparate treatment of minorities by dealers documented in the controlled experiment

durable goods monopoly with incomplete information this article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist s marginal cost is private information we show that the coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem in any equilibrium in which the lowest cost seller s initial offer approaches her marginal cost the aggregate probability of trade must vanish however we also construct non coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model these stationary equilibria are comparatively efficient the results are equally applicable to the mathematically equivalent problem of sequential bargaining with two sided incomplete information where one party makes all the offers what are the consequences of monopoly in a market for a durable good present day understanding of this question divides into two strands of thought first the monopolist may effectively lack any ability to credibly precommit on her future output under this scenario the price will drop almost instantaneously to marginal cost apparently yielding the efficient outcome normally associated with perfect competition 1 second the monopolist may possess an explicit e g leasing the good rather than selling2 or implicit e g the maintenance of reputation3 device enabling her to adhere to an output restriction under such circumstances price will be maintained at a non competitively high level suggesting an outcome fraught with all the inefficiency of classical monopoly the conclusions of the first paragraph rest on analysis of a standard model in which the monopolist s payoff function is taken to be common knowledge a single firm with known constant marginal cost sells an infinitely durable good to consumers with a known distribution of valuations for the good 4 the firm has the ability to revise its posted price

informal employment in developing countries opportunity or last resort there is an ongoing debate among researchers and policy makers whether informal sector employment is a result of competitive market forces or labor market segmentation more recently it has been argued that none of the two theories sufficiently explains informal employment but that the informal sector shows a heterogenous structure for some workers the informal sector is an attractive employment opportunity whereas for others rationed out of the formal sector the informal sector is a strategy of last resort to test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we formulate an econometric model which allows for several unobserved segments within the informal sector and apply it to the urban labor market in cote d ivoire

optimal research for cournot oligopolists we extend the classical cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function by undertaking research firms can acquire private asymmetric information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision the model is a two stage game in the first stage research levels are chosen and in the second stage conditional on private research outcomes production decisions are made we find that for a linear continuous information structure there is a unique nash equilibrium to the game in the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well the model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

segmented labour markets theory and evidence this paper examines the possibility of accepting the labour market segmentation approach as a valid alternative to the classical and neo classical analysis of labour markets it consists of three main parts the urst part contains a historical analysis of both the distant and recent origins of the labour market segmentation hypothesis part two outlines the central ideas of both segmentationalists and radical theorists who attempted to explain the fragmented nature of labour markets and the importance of institutional and social inuuences upon pay employment and mobility of individual workers between different labour market sectors the third part examines the case for labour market segmentation using four alternative techniques and discusses the issue of mobility among different labour market segments it is thereby concluded that the lack of agreement among the segmented labour market theorists on both theoretical and methodological issues has prevented them from developing a consistent and convincing argument based on veriuable empirical evidence to validate their thesis

on strategic cost increases in a duopoly abstract this study determines whether duopolists can profit from imposed cost increases even if both firms are affected equally implicit in any analysis of strategic behavior is the assumption that firms are sufficiently sophisticated to anticipate the new industry equilibrium requiring each duopolist to have consistent conjectures abouts its rival s behavior we show that if the firms marginal cost curves are sufficiently flat increasing the slopes of these curves can raise profits the steeper marginal cost curves encourage regulatory coordination that is the rivals move closer to the joint profit maximizing outcome

family ties and labor markets in the united states and brazil we use comparable surveys from brazil and the united states to examine vertical and horizontal connections between families motivated by a model of assortative mating and intergenerational transmission of schooling and earnings we include the schooling of relatives in male wage equations we find that the effect offather in law s schooling is larger than the effect offather s schooling in brazil while the opposite is observed in the united states we interpret these effects as indicators of unobservable worker characteristics with differences in assortative mating and female labor market activity explaining the differences in the apparent effect of fathers and fathers in law in the two countries

sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies this paper studies the incentive for vertical information sharing in competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale we consider a model of two supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer selling to one retailer with the retailers engaging in cournot or bertrand competition for cournot retail competition we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when 1 the production diseconomy is large and 2 either competition is less intense or at least one retailer s information is less accurate a supply chain may become worse off when making its information more accurate or production diseconomy smaller if such an improvement induces the firms in the rival supply chain to cease sharing information for bertrand retail competition we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when 1 the production diseconomy is large and 2 either competition is less intense or information is more accurate under bertrand competition a manufacturer may be worse off by receiving information which is never the case under cournot competition information sharing in one supply chain triggers a competitive reaction from the other supply chain and this reaction is damaging to the first supply chain under cournot competition but may be beneficial under bertrand competition this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

segmented or competitive labour markets a normal roy model with four sectors is developed it allows to derive tests of several assumptions on the working of the labor market strongly or weakly competitive or segmented it shows that more important a feature of labor markets than segmentation is the presence of comparative advantages for individuals between the various economic sectors the model is applied to data on women s labor force participation in the main towns of colombia in 1980 it uses multivariate probit and tobit techniques copyright 1991 by the econometric society

supply management in multiproduct firms with fixed proportions technology this paper studies the supply management of a primary input where this input gives rise to multiple products in fixed proportions my objective is twofold first i study fixed proportions technol

informal employment in developing economies multiple heterogeneity abstractthis paper contributes to the literature on the nature of informal employment in developing economies drawing on the model with essential heterogeneity it offers a list of scenarios describing the behavioural patterns which informal workers follow the list nests not only classical patterns of a rationed formal sector versus an integrated labour market but also different patterns of rationing using non parametric techniques and data from a few african economies with different levels of development the paper proposes empirical case studies fitting various informality schemes developing economies show disparate patterns of allocation of workers and various patterns of rationing

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

caste discrimination and transaction costs in the labor market evidence from rural north india abstract this paper is an empirical attempt to quantify caste based discrimination in the labor market using household data taken from rural north india in the regression analysis transaction costs associated with entry into the labor market and reservation wages are estimated simultaneously along with market wages the estimation results provide evidence of the existence of transaction costs in the labor market and discrimination against backward classes with regard to access to regular employment in line with previous studies the results suggest that the achievements of india s reservation policy so far have at best been limited in addition a comparison between the estimates from the model employed in this paper and conventional reduced form approaches shows that discrimination in labor market entry is likely to be underestimated in the conventional reduced form approaches

human capital and earnings distribution in a developing country the case of prerevolutionary nicaragua this article examines how different patterns of human capital investments affect household earning and its major components in rural and urban areas of developing countries 1865 women aged 15 45 in the following 3 areas of prerevolutionary nicaragua supply data the central metropolis other urban areas and rural areas other urban area households have the highest average total income central metropolis households have the next highest and rural areas have the lowest urbanization is positively associated with both mean level of total earnings and with total income the authors examine 5 human capital variables womens schooling mens schooling womens health mens health and average household nutrition another variable cumulative work experience became apparent during modeling for women schooling increases labor force participation probability in urban but not rural areas nutrition has a positive impact in all 3 regions and past work experience has a significant impact health status has no effect standard human capital variables do not differ significantly between the central metropolis and other areas but sharply contrast between urban and rural areas for men there is less potential for increasing labor force participation through human capital investment although past work experience schooling and nutrition show significant effects the authors test 10 simulations of hypothetical changes in human capital distributions which involve increasing education improving nutritional status and improving health 4 conclusions are drawn 1 since changes from human capital variables on regional earnings distributions cannot be discerned from individual relations simulation is a useful tool for investigation 2 estimates of the gains toward distributional goals are needed compared to other investments 3 directing policies toward the target group is more cost effective than general measures and 4 policies should be targeted for households low in the overall distribution not just the poorest households

asymmetric information acquisition and behavior in role choice models an endogenously generated signaling game the authors employ a static homogeneous good duopoly model wherein firms can choose to produce in one of two periods the model allows agents to acquire information and then traces the impact of the information pattern on subsequent production behavior asymmetric information acquisition leads to a unique production role choice pattern the informed uninformed firm chooses to assume the leader s follower s role moreover if information is costly the typical equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information thus identical firms with identical opportunities choose to become asymmetrically informed and produce sequentially this is the unique refined equilibrium outcome copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

demand side and supply side explanations for barriers to labor market mobility in developing countries the case of guatemala the hypothesis of labor market segmentation is based on the existence of barriers to mobility between jobs because of these barriers wages of workers with similar characteristics are different from wages that would result from competition though the labor market segmentation hypothesis concerns mobility and access there have been few direct tests of the existence of restricted mobility in the labor market rather tests of labor market segmentation have focused on the presumed effects of restricted mobility in particular the presence of different reward structures across sectors is viewed as support for the segmentation hypothesis as a result much of the literature has concentrated on the appropriate comparison of the wages of workers by including controls for observable and unobservable characteristics

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

literacy sharing assortative mating or what labour market advantages and proximate illiteracy revisited abstract this paper explores the relationship between household literacy and the labour market outcomes of illiterate household members which basu narayan and ravallion 2002 report using household income and expenditure data from bangladesh bnr attribute a considerable wage premium for proximate illiterate women in off farm employment to labour productivity gains from intra household literacy sharing this wage premium also suggests that women may be more efficient recipients of literacy externalities than men we propose that any such relationship might not be due to higher labour productivity but may have other explanations such as systematically different and unobserved attributes of illiterate females married into literate households we also pay attention to the negative selection of illiterate females into non farm wage employment which contrary to received wisdom suggests that household literacy may not be unambiguously progressive for females we propose that the widely reported finding that

a test of dual labor market theory despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate policy response to the existence of poverty neither the proponents of dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive tests of the dual market hypothesis this paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual market theory 1 the existence of two distinct labor markets with different wage setting mechanisms and 2 the existence of barriers to mobility between the labor markets we find considerable support for both hypothesis estimation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two distinct wage equations the one which most workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital regression with significant returns to education and experience the other equation is flat with no returns to human capital these two equations resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the primary and secondary markets respectively further we present evidence that at least some non white workers are involuntarily confined to the secondary market this crowding of minority workers into the low wage labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white non white wage differences we interpret these results as providing empirical support for the dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wagemodels in addition combining the efficiency wage argument with the observation that much of the white non white wage difference is explained by the exclusion of non whites from the primary sector suggests an explanation for the persistance of wage differences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

strategic technology choice and capacity investment under demand uncertainty this paper studies the impact of competition on a firm s choice of technology product flexible or product dedicated and capacity investment decisions specifically we model two firms competing with each other in two markets characterized by price dependent and uncertain demand the firms make three decisions in the following sequence choice of technology technology game capacity investment capacity game and production quantities production game the technology and capacity games occur while the demand curve is still uncertain and the production game is postponed until after the demand curve is revealed we develop best response functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and a duopolist respond to a given flexibility premium we show that the firms may respond to competition by adopting a technology which is the same as or different from what the competitor adopts we conclude that contrary to popular belief flexibility is not always the best response to competition flexible and dedicated technologies may coexist in equilibrium we demonstrate that as the difference between the two market sizes increases a duopolist is willing to pay less for flexible technology whereas the decision of a monopolist is not affected further we find that a firm that invests in flexibility benefits from a low correlation between demands for two products but the extent of this benefit differs depending on the competitor s technology choice our results indicate that higher demand substitution may or may not promote the adoption of flexibility under competition whereas it always facilitates the adoption of flexibility without competition finally we show that contrary to intuition as the competitor s cost of capacity increases the premium a flexible firm is willing to pay for flexibility decreases

an analysis of intellectual property licensing strategy under duopoly competition component or product based abstract a component supplier holding patents can calculate the intellectual property licensing fees either as a percentage of sales prices of its customer manufacturers products i e product based strategy or as a percentage of the wholesale price of its component i e component based strategy selecting which strategy to license the patent plays a vital role in supply chain players strategic interactions especially when the downstream manufacturers compete this paper investigates which strategy is favored more by players of a supply chain which consists of a component supplier and two duopoly manufacturers the manufacturers are assumed to be heterogeneous in production cost but produce and competitively sell homogenous goods employing a supplier stackelberg game model we demonstrate that the component supplier prefers to implement the product based strategy nevertheless the manufacturers preferences are dependent on how effectively they produce products specifically the product based strategy could be favored by the manufacturer with a sufficiently high cost advantage over the rival furthermore we find that the supply chain players preferences of licensing strategy could be dependent on factors such as the market size the differences of the production costs and unit royalty fees when the products are imperfect substitutes

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

managing global sourcing inventory performance the use of global suppliers has increased considerably over the last three decades operations management theory establishes that global sourcing requires more units of inventory but since these units are often procured at a lower cost from global suppliers the capital invested in inventory and the consequent financial burden may increase or decrease with global sourcing this study provides rigorous firm level empirical evidence that links the global sourcing practices of public u s firms and their inventory investments we process bill of lading manifests customs forms to extract information on over half a million sea shipments from global suppliers to u s public firms and link this information with quarterly financial data from the compustat database we provide stylized facts on the participation of different firms and sectors in global trade using a simultaneous equation model we find that an increase in global sourcing results in an increase in inventory investment a 10 shift in sourcing from domestic to global suppliers increases the inventory investment by 8 8 for an average firm in our sample we also find that increasing the number of suppliers can mitigate this increase in inventory investment for example going from single to dual sourcing reduces inventory investment by about 11 we illustrate the use of our estimates to identify the impact of changing global sourcing strategy on inventory investment and operational performance metrics this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

global dual sourcing and order smoothing the impact of capacity and lead times after decades of offshoring production across the world companies are rethinking their global networks local sourcing is receiving more attention but it remains challenging to balance the offshore sourcing cost advantage against the increased inventories because of its longer lead time and against the cost and volume flexibility of each source s capacity to guide strategic allocation in this global network decision this paper establishes reasonably simple prescriptions that capture the key drivers we adopt a conventional discrete time inventory model with a linear control rule that smoothes orders and allows an exact and analytically tractable analysis of single and dual sourcing policies under normal demand distinguishing features of our model are that it captures each source s lead time capacity cost and flexibility to work overtime we use lagrange s inversion theorem to provide exact and simple square root bound formulae for the strategic sourcing allocations and the value of dual sourcing the formulae provide structural insight on the impact of financial operational and demand parameters and a starting point for quantitative decision making we investigate the robustness of our results by comparing the smoothing policy with existing single and dual sourcing models in a simulation study that relaxes model assumptions this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

are labor markets segmented in developing countries a semiparametric approach abstract we test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations using data from argentina s household survey and various definitions of informal employment we find that on average formal wages are higher than informal wages parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics however this approach suffers from several econometric problems which we address with semiparametric methods the resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant or negative neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors we invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal informal lines in developing nations such as argentina

the reemergence of segmented labor market theory according to dual labor market theory the labor market can be usefully described as consisting of two sectors a high wage primary sector with good working conditions stable employment and substantial returns to human capital variables such as education and experience and a low wage secondary sector with the opposite characteristics moreover primary jobs are rationed that is not all workers who are qualified for primary sector jobs and desire one can obtain one finally the sector of the labor market in which an individual is employed directly influences his or her tastes behavior patterns and cognitive abilities thus the dual labor market model or more generally segmented labor market models is simultaneously a description of the income distribution a claim about the absence of market clearing and a radical departure from the standard neoclassical assumption of fully rational actors and exogenously determined preferences while this last element is potentially the most interesting even its proponents fail to give it the attention it deserves and related work has not been incorporated into the segmented labor market model in this paper we therefore concentrate on the first two elements of the model segmented labor market theory was sufficiently popular in the late 1960 s and early 1970 s to be taken seriously by prominent mainstream labor economists however two influential and largely negative reviews glenn cain 1976 michael wachter 1974 portrayed the segmented labor market hypothesis as largely atheoretical and based at best on questionable statistical analysis it seems fair to say that even sympathetic mainstream critics felt that key insights from the segmented labor model could be incorporated into neoclassical analysis and that the remaining elements of the model did not form a sufficiently coherent theory to pose a challenge to the neoclassical model whatever the merits of this perception it is clear that advocates of the segmented labor market approach did not develop a formal theory which conformed to the standards of mainstream economists with some notable exceptions michael piore 1975 david gordon 1972 the work was atheoretical moreover the empirical methods used tended to fall outside the norm for example interviews observational studies and historical and institutional analysis advocates of the segmented labor market perspective mostly radical political economists chose instead to develop their own research program outside the mainstream the reemergence of segmented labor market theory is linked with the reversal of these two tendencies the theory has been pursued by economists using modern tools of imperfect information theory and state of the art econometrics as a result the approach has again attracted the attention of the mainstream even a few years ago it would have been a clairvoyant observer who predicted that lawrence summers would be working on a theoretical model of labor market duality with jeremy bulow 1986 that robert solow would count among his recent work a dual market model with ian mcdonald 1985 and that james heckman would publish an article in which he undertook an empirical test of a dual market model failed to reject the model and then devoted much of the rest of the article to attacking his and other tests of the dual labor market view see his article with v joseph hotz 1986 since the theoretical developments are largely associated with efficiency wage and departments of economics university of california berkeley ca 94720 and nber and boston university 270 bay state road boston ma 02215 and nber respectively this study was supported in part by nsf grant no ses 8606139 lang acknowledges support from a sloan faculty research fellowship dickens acknowledges support from the institute of industrial relations at berkeley

an investigation of the labor market earnings of panamanian males evaluating sources of inequality this paper presents empirical evidence on the determinants of labor market earnings and inequality for males in panama using newly available microdata we estimate earnings equations based on the measurement framework of mincer 1974 and compare them with those for other countries at various stages of economic development we present evidence on two aspects of inequality in less developed economies labor market segmentation and social stratification we present tests of the segmentation hypothesis including several of the dual labor market hypotheses and discuss their inherent ambiguity we also present evidence on the importance of family background for earnings determination and educational attainment

the performance of industrial sector voluntary climate programs climate wise and 1605 b abstract corporate voluntary climate programs have had limited evaluation the self selection of participants an essential element of such initiatives poses challenges to researchers because the decision to participate may not be random and may be correlated with outcomes this study aims to gage the environmental effectiveness of the industrial sector elements of two early voluntary climate change programs with established track records the u s environmental protection agency s climate wise and the u s department of energy s voluntary reporting of greenhouse gases program 1605 b particular attention is paid to the participation decision and how various assumptions affect estimates of program outcomes using propensity score matching methods applied to plant level census data overall the effects are modest reductions in fuel and electricity expenditures are no more than 10 percent and probably less than 5 percent virtually no evidence suggests either program has a statistically significant effect on fuel costs some evidence indicates that participation in climate wise led to a 3 5 percent increase in electricity costs that vanished after two years stronger evidence suggests that participation in 1605 b led to a 4 8 percent decrease in electricity costs that persisted for at least three years these results suggest that while voluntary programs can play some role in addressing climate change they are unlikely to bring about the kinds of steep reductions called for in the current debate

what determines success examining the human financial and social capital of jamaican microentrepreneurs abstract this research examines the performance of 215 informal microenterprises in jamaica studying the influence of human capital social capital and financial capital of the owners on their business profitability understanding the importance of particular relationships that result in successful micro businesses is important for a number of reasons first among many developing countries the growth of microenterprise provides the most visibly vibrant and growing economic activity although considerable effort and resources are being directed toward microenterprise promotion schemes empirical research on the subject is quite limited second economies in developing countries mirror many of the social and institutional problems existent in urban economically disadvantaged areas of the united states and other developed countries for these areas microenterprise may be an essential component of urban renewal and community development this study helps in identifying important characteristics of social and individual attributes that may be relevant to those attempting to strengthen this subsector finally this study seeks to provide insight into a dimension of microbusiness research for which there are limited data specifically the role that social capital plays among practicing entrepreneurs and owners this research found that different structural environments even within a singular and small economy may considerably alter the rates of return to human social and financial capital as a result the analysis of enterprises includes segmentation according to both the usage or not of employees and the sophistication of the technologies used several factors were determined to enhance the profitability of the businesses in all categories vocational training for example demonstrated consistently strong and positive effects mother s high occupational status a proxy for socioeconomic status and years of experience in the business were also consistently positive and strongly associated with increasing profits although additional starting capital played an important role for both the businesses with and without employees increasing amounts failed to differentiate the success of those firms that were already operating in the higher technological tier obtaining a small business loan acted in a similar manner enhancing the profitability of all firms except those segmented into a high technological tier one interpretation of this finding is that the role of technological choice is extremely important and appears to dwarf that of varying amounts of starting capital social capital as operationalized by frequent church attendance and marital status of the owner was found generally to increase the profitability of the business the data demonstrate that social networks play an important role in the success of these businesses and that conditions in the highest tier utilize social capital in a somewhat unique manner

credible pretrial negotiation pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information when a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court imposed judgment a central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff s threat to litigate is credible it is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient as a result the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected when this credibility constraint is binding traditional comparative static results are reversed in addition even though the defendant is being sued he wants the plaintiff s threat to be credible

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

the quality of schooling quantity alone is misleading although much research discusses the quantity of schooling as an effective impact on productivity and earnings most such research leaves out the idea of the quality of schooling which may cause biases in the estimated returns to schooling this paper consequently attempts to extend the standard mincerian approach to incorporate school quality as well as quantity it demonstrates how exclusion of quality in the standard procedure may cause biases in the estimated returns to years of schooling probably in the upward direction the paper explores the implications of this extension of the standard model for the case of young brazilian males it shows that the estimate of the private return to years of schooling using the preferred quality inclusive specification is only one half the estimate using the standard procedure indicating substantial upward bias in the standard estimates it further outlines a method for estimating a social return to quality and finds that it exceeds substantially the social return to quantity the paper then shows why this in turn suggests there may be an equity productivity trade off in schooling investments

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better forecasting retailer this paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand forecast information we show that the manufacturer s expected profit is convex in the retailer s forecasting accuracy the manufacturer benefits from selling to a better forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster if the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer s forecasting capability improves more generally the manufacturer tends to be hurt benefit by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative poor finally the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small