put call parity and arbitrage bounds for options on grain futures many arbitrage opportunities have become available for market participants since the inception of trading in options central to many of these is the put call parity relationship if this condition is violated arbitrage profits could be earned this paper examines arbitrage possibilities between put and call options on grain futures using two different tests one is a test of market efficiency over the duration of trading and the other evaluates arbitrage bounds on individual trading days in general the results suggest that the options markets on grain futures are not completely efficient however violations varied substantially across contracts and through time

input demand under yield and revenue insurance previous studies disagree on the effects of insurance on fertilizer application rates the effect of increased fertilizer on the probability of low yields primarily determines whether fertilizer and insurance are substitutes or complements we estimate conditional distributions of corn yields to determine if the technical relationship between yields and fertilizer supports the hypothesis that insurance increases optimal application rates our results indicate no support for this hypothesis at all nitrogen fertilizer rates and reasonable levels of risk aversion nitrogen fertilizer and insurance are substitutes suggesting that those who purchase insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications

the econometrics of damage control why specification matters the contribution of damage control agents to production differs fundamentally from that of standard inputs lands labor capital this paper develops an econometric model based on the key characteristics of damage control agents and examines its properties it demonstrates that standard production function specifications overestimate damage control agent productivity and have erroneous implications for the evolution of damage control agent productivity and use in response to changing environments e g the spread of pest resistance it also proposes several alternative specifications and discusses methods for estimating them

input use decisions with greater information on crop conditions implications for insurance moral hazard and the environment emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater information on crop conditions this greater information occurs by providing improved predictions of crop yields using remote sensing and crop simulation models and by allowing farms to apply inputs within the growing season when some crop conditions are already realized we use a stylized model with uncertainty in yield and price to examine how greater information on crop conditions i e a forecast affects input use for insured and uninsured farms we show that moral hazard decreases farms apply more inputs as the forecast accuracy improves when the forecast indicates good yields and vice versa when the forecast indicates bad yields in the long run moral hazard decreases in response to an improvement in forecast accuracy even though moral hazard decreases in the long run indemnity payments are likely to increase in the long run driven by the increase in moral hazard when the forecast indicates bad crop conditions we use the results of our model to discuss the potential impact of different technologies and types of inputs on the federal crop insurance program and the environment

insurance moral hazard and chemical use in agriculture this paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers fertilizer and pesticide use in the u s midwest crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of moral hazard insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers results suggest that insurance exerts considerable influence on corn farmers chemical use decisions those purchasing insurance applied significantly more nitrogen per acre 19 spent more on pesticides 21 and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides 7 and 63 than did those not purchasing insurance these results suggest that both fertilizer and pesticides may be risk increasing inputs

slotting allowances as a facilitating practice by food processors in wholesale grocery markets profitability and welfare effects slotting allowances which are lump sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in return for various retail concessions are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets this article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously have been ignored the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements and the effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus slotting allowances motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices and this raises farm surplus increases total producer surplus and improves consumer welfare in the food system

decoupled farm payments and the role of base acreage and yield updating under uncertainty we analyze the coupling effect of expectations about base acreage and yield updating in future farm policy on production decisions in the presence of price yield and policy uncertainty for a risk averse farmer producing a single crop the farmer receives market revenue and government payments using stochastic dynamic programming optimum decisions under present value calculations positively link current acreage and fertilizer decisions to future government payments through expected updates of base acreage and yield in the future regime moving from a zero probability of updating to a probability of one increases optimum acreage and yield by 6 25 and 0 134 respectively copyright 2010 oxford university press

imperfect competition functional forms and the size and distribution of research benefits abstract the effects of functional forms for supply and demand on the size and distribution of the returns to research are examined under a range of forms of competition under perfect competition the choice of functional form is relatively unimportant for the estimation of research benefits under imperfect competition the combination of the choice of functional forms for supply and demand and the nature of the research induced supply shift can have profound implications for the results functional form plays a much more important role than in the competitive model the most important contrast is between the constant elasticity model and the linear model along with various cases of a generalized linear model these findings are illustrated using a combination of analytical results and numerical simulations

optimal commodity promotion when downstream markets are imperfectly competitive we investigate the optimal collection and expenditure of funds for agricultural commodity promotion in markets where the processing and distribution sectors may exhibit oligopoly and or oligopsony power the conditions that characterize optimal advertising intensity under perfect competition for funds generated from either per unit or lump sum taxes do not in general hold when marketing is imperfectly competitive simulation analyses show that imperfect competition always reduces farmers optimal advertising expenditure and that an imperfectly competitive marketing sector may capture half or more of the benefits from the funds that are expended copyright 2002 oxford university press

impacts of federal crop insurance on land use and environmental quality this article integrates economic and biophysical models to assess how federal crop revenue insurance programs affect land use cropping systems and environmental quality in the u s corn belt region the empirical framework includes econometric models that predict land conversion and crop choices at the parcel level based on expectation and variance of crop revenues land quality climate conditions and physical characteristics at each site the predictions are then combined with site specific environmental production functions to determine the effect of revenue insurance on nitrate runoff and leaching soil water and wind erosion and carbon sequestration results suggest that federal crop insurance has on average a small effect on conversions of non cropland to cropland and somewhat more significant impacts on crop choice and crop rotation these changes in cropping systems have on average small impacts on agricultural pollution

the effect of farm supply shifts on concentration and market power in the food processing sector in this paper we examine the marginal impact of changing farm supply on the market structure of the downstream food processing sector we develop a theoretical model that allows for cost differences among processors and endogenizes downstream entry and exit comparative statics results are consistent with several well established trends in the food processing sector in particular the analysis demonstrates that increasing concentration in the food processing sector is consistent with decreasing market power indeed we find that when the farm supply curve shifts outward an increase in concentration can only occur when there is a decrease in market power

crop insurance acreage decisions and nonpoint source pollution the redirection of farm policy in the 1996 farm bill has generated much interest in seeking environmentally friendly and economically viable ways to protect farm income agricultural insurance has been suggested as such an instrument this article estimates the effect of crop insurance on crop mix and the resulting change in chemical use in the central nebraska basin providing corn insurance will shift land from hay and pasture to corn which will increase chemical use at the extensive margin this extensive margin effect dominates the effect of crop insurance on the application rate leading to an increase in total chemical use

the effects of imperfect competition on the size and distribution of research benefits studies of agricultural research benefits usually assume perfectly competitive markets studies that have allowed for market power of agribusiness firms have generally assumed unrealistic pure monopsony or monopoly behavior this paper allows for processing firms to exhibit a range of degrees of oligopsony power in buying raw farm products and oligopoly power in selling processed farm products the results indicate that different types of research induced technical change can exacerbate or ameliorate distortions from the exercise of market power by agribusiness firms which affects the size and especially the distribution of research benefits

price analysis risk assessment and insurance for organic crops the agricultural risk protection act of 2000 recognized organic farming as a good farming practice making federal crop insurance coverage available for organiccrops and taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the organic production system inaddition to the production risks covered for conventional producers organic farmerswho sign up for coverage are compensated for production losses from damage due toinsects disease and or weeds however the incorporation of organic production intothe crop insurance rating structure has been limited organic producers are charged anarbitrary 5 premium surcharge over conventional crop insurance the actuarialfairness of this premium is at least questionable in addition in the case of crop failure organic farmers receive compensation based on the prices of conventionally producedcrops thus price premiums that organic producers are able to obtain in the market arenot compensated for under the current insurance policy structure the food conservation and energy act of 2008 which amends part of thefederal crop insurance act was written to investigate some of these claims requiringthe u s department of agriculture to examine the currently offered federal cropinsurance coverage for organic crops as described in the organic policy provisions of theact title xii such provisions established the need to review among other things theunderwriting risk and loss experience of organic crops determine whether significant consistent or systematic variations in loss history exist between organic and nonorganicproduction and modify the coverage for organic crops in accordance with the results here we present the major findings of three analyses we performed on keyelements of the insurance of organic crops prices yields and revenue in an effort tocontribute to the design of an organic crop insurance policy that covers organicproducers according to their idiosyncratic risks

a nonparametric analysis of the influence of research on agricultural productivity nonparametric productivity analysis is extended by modeling technical progress as a function of public and private research expenditures results indicate that 30 year lags are required to fully capture the effects of public research expenditures on u s agricultural productivity compared to public research private research has a stronger influence on farm productivity in the short term but a smaller influence in the longer term the internal rate of return is 0 28 for public research and 0 17 for private research

the planting real option in cash rent valuation after entering into a farmland cash rent contract in the fall a tenant farmer has flexibility over the spring crop choice and the input application level failure to account for these options will bias estimates of what farmers should pay to rent land applying monte carlo simulation methods this study investigates the option values for these choices a multivariate gaussian copula mgc is employed to account for dependence among yields and prices results show that the average cash rent valuation for the real option approach is 33 6 higher than that for the conventional net present value npv method in which the input intensity option is 0 9 crop planting sequence is shown to impact the real option value

budgetary and producer welfare effects of revenue insurance legislation passed in 1996 changed the way the u s federal government acts to reduce risks faced by u s crop products the authors compare the new alternative forms of revenue insurance to the 1990 deficiency payment program and to a no program alternative they estimate the effects of the alternative polices on the acreage allocations of a representative farm on the expected government cost and on producer welfare simulation results indicate that a revenue insurance scheme that guarantees 75 percent of expected revenue to risk averse produced could provide approximately the same level of benefits as the 1990 program at as little as one fourth the cost

effects of crop insurance premium subsidies on crop acreage crop insurance premium subsidies affect patterns of crop acreage for two reasons first holding insurance coverage constant premium subsidies directly increase expected profit which encourages more acreage of insured crops direct profit effect second premium subsidies encourage farms to increase crop insurance coverage with more insurance coverage farms obtain more subsidies and farm revenue becomes less variable as indemnities offset revenue shortfalls so acreage of insured crops likely increases indirect coverage effect by exploiting exogenous policy changes and using approximately 180 000 county crop year observations we estimate the sum of these two effects of premium subsidies on the pattern of u s acreage across seven major field crops we estimate that a 10 increase in the premium subsidy causes a 0 43 increase in the acreage of a crop in a county holding the premium subsidy of its competing crop constant taking into account the small share of premium subsidies in expected crop revenue this subsidy impact is analogous to an own subsidy acreage elasticity of 1 24 which exceeds own price acreage elasticity estimates in the literature one explanation for the larger acreage response to premium subsidies is that insurance causes an indirect coverage effect in addition to a direct profit effect

analysis of a supply control program under uncertainty and imperfect competition chinese cabbage in taiwan researchers have often attributed the farm wholesale price spread after adjusting for marketing costs as compensation for marketing firms risk bearing however price spreads in excess of marketing costs can also be due to marketing firms exercise of market power in settings where both imperfect competition and marketer risk aversion are plausible a modeling framework must be sufficiently general to accommodate both types of behavior this article develops and estimates such a model in the context of fresh produce marketing and develops the implications for analysis of supply control programs the model is applied to the production and marketing of chinese cabbage in taiwan and specifically to the analysis of supply control programs implemented in this industry by the taiwanese government the empirical results provide little support for the hypothesis that marketing firms exhibit risk averse behavior but they do show that marketing firms exercise oligopsony power in procurement of the product from farmers and that this power is positively related to the quantity supplied in each market period this provides a heretofore unexplored impetus for supply controls intended to raise producer incomes however such controls are also rendered less effective by imperfect competition because marketing firms capture part of the benefits from supply reduction

depressed demand for crop insurance contracts and a rationale based on third generation prospect theory when actuarially fair insurance for a major risk is available then standard economic theory posits that those subject to the risk should insure in agriculture it is common for producers to decline contract offers where presubsidy premiums just cover average losses and subsidies are substantial this paper seeks to shed light on why demand is curtailed in a mail survey of u s corn and soybean producers we solicited willingness to pay wtp for actuarially fair insurance at different coverage levels we find demand to be so low that median wtp is no larger than fair premium when adjusted down by current subsidy rates which pay for one half or more of most premium charges wtp as a share of the fair rate is especially low when risk of loss is high there is limited evidence that respondents appreciate the convex relationship between coverage level and expected indemnity payoff third generation prospect theory is shown to be consistent with observed findings in particular a strong distaste for paying premium can be rationalized by loss aversion furthermore when high revenue outcomes are more likely than not that is negative skewness then higher loss aversion greater decision weight distortions and greater risk aversion will decrease wtp

nonparametric estimation of crop insurance rates revisited with the crop insurance program becoming the cornerstone of u s agricultural policy recovering accurate rates is of paramount interest lack of yield data presents by far the most fundamental obstacle to recovery of accurate rates thisarticle employsnew methodology to estimate conditional yield densities and derive the insurance rates in our application we find the nonparametric kernel density estimator requires an additional twenty six years of yield data to estimate the shape of the conditional yield dens itiesasaccurately asthe recently developed empirical bayesnonparametric kernel density estimator such methodological improvements can significantly aid in ameliorating the data problem recovering accurate premium ratesis paramount to the actuarial soundness of the crop insurance program a program which hasgained prominence in the overall u s agricultural policy agenda the 1996 federal agricultural improvement and reform fair act signaled a new policy environment under which farmerswould be s to market forces under this policy regime crop insurance remains in some respects one of the only government subsidized income stabilizing mechanisms available to agricultural producers in addition it appears that current political forcesare in the proces sof fashioning crop insurance as the cornerstone of u s agricultural policy consider the 1999 state of the union address in which the president stated

regulating nitrogen pollution with risk averse farmers under hidden information and moral hazard we consider a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer involving hidden information moral hazard and risk sharing the representative farmer faces a production risk originating from nitrogen leaching and privately observes the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen only after the regulation contract is signed the latter specifies a transfer and a nitrogen quota whose decomposition by the farmer among different production stages is unknown to the regulator we first characterize the optimal solution to the regulator s problem the sequential decision model is estimated on french crop production data and the results are used to calibrate and simulate the optimal contract

futures hedging under price basis and production risk we consider the hedging problem of a firm that has three sources of risk price basis and yield uncertainty an exact solution for the optimal futures hedge is derived under the assumption that the three random variables are jointly normally distributed and that utility is of the cara type unlike the mean variance approximation applied in previous research we show that the optimal hedge does depend on risk attitudes even when the agent perceives the futures price as being unbiased the theoretical results are applied empirically to the problem of hedging soybean production in iowa the exact solution relying on cara and normality is compared with numerical solutions under lognormal distributions and crra utility

returns to public investments in agriculture with imperfect downstream competition a multiple market framework is developed to measure the size and distribution of research benefits the model considers an upstream raw product market and a downstream finished product market and allows for imperfect competition in the intermediary food processing sector a central conceptual result is derived an increase in raw product output is a sufficient condition for costreducing innovations in the farm sector to increase social welfare a special case of linear farm supply and isoelastic processing production functions reveals that necessary conditions for welfare to decrease are a convergent farm supply shift an oligopsonistic upstream market configuration and increasing returns to scale processing technology a basic goal of public agricultural research is to reduce the costs of farm production toward this end governments have invested considerable resources to improve basic scientific knowledge develop novel technologies and facilitate the adoption of modern plant varieties and farming methods economists have generally concluded that public investments in agriculture have achieved remarkable success in lowering the marginal cost of farm production due in large part to the effectiveness of land grant research and extension activities chavas and cox cochrane as a result of these cost changes public agricultural investments have been shown to yield impressive social rates of return in numerous studies for a survey of this literature see alston norton and pardey several recent papers have shown that imperfect competition in the downstream processing sector can affect both the size and the distribution of welfare changes dryburgh and doyle consider the impact of technical innovation in a multimarket study of the british dairy industry under alternate downstream in

rules versus discretion in food storage policies this article compares various policies in a rational expectations food storage model with risk averse consumers and missing insurance markets calibrated to represent a developing country i consider an optimal storage policy under discretion and two optimal simple rules a constant private storage subsidy and a price band the storage subsidy achieves welfare gains similar to the discretionary policy the price band maximizing social welfare is a price peg scheme the floor and ceiling prices are the same and the capacity constraint represents 11 of the steady state production level this price band achieves three quarters of the gains from the optimal policy under discretion

measuring the marginal cost of nonuniform environmental regulations a method is presented for measuring the marginal welfare cost of environmental regulations affecting agriculture the method incorporates output market effects and recognizes diversity in production conditions among crops regions and seasons an important advantage of the method is that only regional outputs and changes in regional production costs are needed to calculate deadweight loss thus simplifying the measurement of welfare changes this feature of the model is significant since the complexity and substantial data requirements of most existing impact models cause many environmental regulations to be enacted with inadequate analysis of their economic impacts the method also disaggregates welfare impacts by crop place and time thus encouraging the implementation of nonuniform interventions that achieve a given level of environmental quality more efficiently than uniform policies

ex post moral hazard in prevented planting this article analyzes the existence of moral hazard in prevented planting pp in the united states the pp provision is defined as the failure to plant an insured crop by the final planting date due to adverse events if the farmer decides not to plant a crop the farmer receives a pp indemnity late planting lp is an option for farmers to plant a crop while maintaining crop insurance after the final planting date crop insurance may alter farmers behavior in selecting pp or lp and could increase the likelihood of pp claims even though farmers can choose lp this study finds evidence that a farmer with higher insurance coverage tends to choose pp more often ex post moral hazard spatial panel models attest to the existence of the ex post moral hazard in pp empirically empirical results show that the pp ratio has a positive relationship with insurance coverage in the case of corn production

nominal income targeting versus money growth targeting in an endogenously growing economy abstract we find that local indeterminacy more easily emerges under a regime of nominal income targeting both targeting regimes are equally effective in influencing economic growth and inflation the results thus favor money growth over nominal income as a nominal anchor

measuring research benefits in an imperfect market reply to holloway voon s original claim voon 1994 was that the benefits of generating through research a parallel shift in a monopolist s marginal cost curve exceeded the benefits from generating the same shift if the curve represented the market supply curve for a competitive industry as we noted in a subsequent comment this result was wrong with voon s error being due to the use of incmrect normalization procedures in his simu lation analysis we further articulated the general principle that welfare from an innovation in a mono poly industry would be greater than in a structurally equivalent competitive industry if and only if the deadweight loss due to monopoly decreased as a consequence of that innovation finally we opined that this condition will normally not be met in mono poly or other imperfectly competitive structures because in seeking to capture benefits from the inno vation a monopoly or oligopoly industry will generate less output expansion than would occur under perfect competition thereby causing the deadweight loss to increase

genetic improvements in major us crops the size and distribution of benefits the distribution of welfare gains of genetic improvements in major us crops is estimated using a world agricultural trade model multi market welfare estimates were 75 larger than estimates based on the price exogenous change in revenue method frequently used by plant breeders annual benefits of these genetic improvements range from us 400 600 million depending on the supply shift specification of this 44 60 accrues to the us 24 34 accrues to other developed countries developing and transitional economies capture 16 22 of the welfare gain the global benefits of a one time permanent increase in us yields are us 8 1 billion discounted at 10 and us 15 4 billion discounted at 5 gains to consumers in developing and transitional economies range from us 6 1 billion 10 discount rate to us 11 6 billion 5 discount rate

marketing contracts and crop insurance contracts between farmers and intermediaries and crop insurers are important means for farmers to mitigate risks in modern u s agriculture in this paper we investigate the effect of crop insurance enrollment on contract terms and farmers participation in marketing contracts following ligon 2003 we set up a mechanism design framework to demonstrate an intermediary s contract design problem where farmers are assumed to be utility maximizing agents we depict farmers optimal choices of insurance coverage using the specification developed by babcock 2012 our model shows that improved terms of crop insurance lower premiums higher subsidies make contracts less appealing to farmers as mechanisms for mitigating risk therefore intermediaries may revise their contract offers so that they are more attractive however improvements in contract terms are limited by their cost to the intermediaries and will not lead to expanded participation in contracts

measuring returns to an innovation in an imperfectly competitive market application to mechanical harvesting of processing tomatoes in taiwan in this paper we develop and apply a general imperfect competition model to evaluate returns to a cost reducing innovation most related work has applied models of perfect competition results demonstrate that welfare estimates derived from a model of perfect competition may be seriously distorted when the relevant market is imperfectly competitive application to mechanical harvesting of processing tomatoes in taiwan reveals the potential for significant benefits to adoption of mechanical harvesting in taiwan however farmers incentives to adopt the harvester are attenuated because total benefits are reduced by oligopsony power in tomato procurement and imperfectly competitive processors will capture a large share of the benefits that remain in this paper we analyze the welfare impacts of mechanical harvesting of processing tomatoes in taiwan a key distinguishing feature of the study relative to previous empirical work on returns to innovations is that it permits market power to be exhibited in both the markets for the raw agricultural product and the processed product outputs indeed the empirical results find significant processor market power in taiwan in both the procurement of raw tomatoes and the sale of processed products in the domestic market the study demonstrates that welfare estimates derived from a model of perfect competition may be seriously distorted when in fact the relevant markets are imper

supply analysis in an oligopsony model primary agricultural markets are often characterized by oligopsony this paper investigates the effect of an agricultural product supply shift on the equilibrium prices and quantities of farm products purchased by food processors and on profits of food processors the principal comparative static result indicates that under oligopsony qualitative implications of a disturbance in the supply of raw input differ from that under perfect competition and monopsony effects of other disturbances are identical in sign to the perfectly competitive case although magnitudes may differ implications for supply estimation and agricultural policy analysis are briefly discussed

does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design empirical evidence from the thai jasmine rice market in the oligopsony market farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results in this paper we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program ppp a generous price support program in the thai jasmine rice market with an imperfect competition model we develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation we then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters finally we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001 2002 2015 2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the ppp we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power we also find that the ppp is inefficient but effective in income redistribution moreover the program benefits both farmers and consumers with better policymaking decisions the ppp can be efficient by setting a suitable support price therefore our results show that in the case of the thai jasmine rice market the generally accepted wisdom about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market