distributed energy infrastructure paradigm community microgrids in a new institutional economics context abstract this paper provides a theoretical framework based on new institutional economics nie concepts to guide the development of community microgrids given limited application thus far of such energy systems this paper also draws on empirical studies and experiences from the planning and development of other public community infrastructure and utility services in the development of this framework it links an efficient ownership and governance structure with transactional characteristics such as asset idiosyncrasy frequency and uncertainty defined in section 3 1 the key role of the customers and the microgrid service provider and more specifically their bilateral monopoly relationship and its effects on the choice of institutional structure is highlighted the paper examines the optimum conditions for public private or hybrid financial ownership and for unified or network governance through long term contracting this allows ex ante investment uncertainty and ex post appropriation risks to be efficiently managed the analysis suggests that long term contract completeness future demand for electricity and level of uncertainty are the determining factors in the selection of institutional structure this has significant real world implications for the communities seeking to achieve electricity self sufficiency and environmental benefits through community microgrids service providers and other private or public actors

unemployment rates and political outcomes an incentive for manufacturing a political business cycle in recent years the interdependence of politics and economics has received an increasing amount of attention by both economists and political scientists the explanation for this interest lies in the rediscovery of political economy and may be at least partly due to the recent experiences that governmental advisors have had with simultaneously increasing inflation and unemployment conventional macroeconomic approaches have failed to pin point causes for the stagflation and to provide methods for solving the problem the traditional economic policies may have failed in part because these traditional solutions were simply not plausible in the political environments in which they were proposed it is the intent of a growing body of work to develop macromodels with endogenous political sectors the inference made in this literature is that 1 the economy can be manipulated or affected by a political sector and that 2 there is an incentive for the political sector to manipulate the economy this literature has however just begun to formalize the interaction of the political and economic sectors and empirical work is virtually nonexistent the purpose of this paper is to present some evidence on these two inferences in section 1 the first inference is examined in section ii literature on which the first inference is based is reviewed and evidence on the possible incentive to create such a cycle is presented in section iii concluding remarks are offered

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

the electoral impact of economic conditions who is held responsible a variety of recent research has dealt with the impact of economic conditions on congressional elections the underlying assumption of this research has been that the effects of economic fluctuations are distributed evenly across members of the president s party by focusing on subgroups of congressional candidates we demonstrate that the importance of economic conditions varies widely specifically we show that the aggregate electoral margins of incumbents are far more responsive to economic conditions than are those for nonincumbents and that among in party incumbents the relationship is stronger among those with higher levels of tenure further we demonstrate that the previous lack of individual level confirmation of the aggregate relationship has been due to a failure to control for the contextual effects implied by our conditional aggregate analysis with controls for district incumbency we find a relationship between retrospective personal financial condition and vote choice that mirrors the aggregate relationship between retrospective performance of the national economy and congressional vote totals

the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

trade credit bank lending and monetary policy transmission this paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy most models of the transmission mechanism allow the firm to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion in our model we introduce trade credit as an additional source of funding we predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in market and bank lending and an increase in trade credit this is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16 000 manufacturing firms

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

an economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments abstract an economic rationale is provided for the competitive equilibrium deployment of commitment and usage fees in loan commitment pricing it is shown that under perfect information assessing both fees rather than just one permits optimal risk sharing when the borrower is privately informed about its probability of future commitment utilization commitment and usage fees can be used to induce borrowers to identify themselves by self selection through contract choice the equilibrium characterized here is dissipative and thus raises the usual existence questions which are addressed in the paper

an equilibrium politico economic model an equilibrium politico economic model i introduction recent empirical studies by alesina and sachs 1986 and haynes and stone 1987 have found that political elections have significant implications for the time paths of employment and inflation explnations of this phenomenon fall into two general categories political business cycle theories and partisan theories in political business cycle models it is assumed that the government has both the ability and desire to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes partisan theories suggest that if competing parties follow different policies it is the surprise of an election result that causes a response from the economy however partisan theories can only explain why different parties experience different levels of employment and output early in an electoral term here a partisan model is developed in which economic and political shocks before an election have asymmetric effects on inflation employment and voting behavior depending on which party is in power and which economic variables effect voting ii political structure and voting two political parties compete periodically for control of the government the parties are distinguished by their expected monetary growth rates denoted mu sup h high and mu sup l low the electorate consists of a continuum of voters distributed uniformly on the interval p p individuals located closer to p are more favorably pre disposed to party h let x sub t be an index of the relative popularity of the parties at time t if x sub t 0 party h has a plurality of support if x sub t in nonelection years the expected monetary growth rate will be the incumbents trend rate while in election years it will be the probabilistically weighted average of the two parties expected monetary growth rates iii economic structure the economy is described by a rational expectations macro model unemployment is determined by the surprise phillips curve u sub t eta sub 0 eta sub 1 sub t 1 pi sup e sub t pi sub t epsilon sub t where sub t 1 pi sup e sub t denotes expected inflation and epsilon sub t a real shock distributed epsilon sub t is approx n 0 sigma sup 2 sub epsilon independent over time eta sub 0 is greater than 0 and eta sub 1 is greater than 0 are constants eta sub 0 is the natural rate the rate of inflation is given by pi sub t mu sup s sub t mu sup d sub t where mu sup s sub t and mu sup d sub t are respectively the growth rates of the nominal money supply and demand for real beginning of period cash balances

organisation and governance of urban energy systems district heating and cooling in the uk a number of uk urban authorities are developing combined heat and power chp with district heating and cooling dhc networks as a means to achieve local sustainable and affordable energy and to contribute to economic regeneration findings from case study research in three uk cities are used to explore the local energy governance and organisation lego models adopted in the context of privatised centralised energy markets local developers are reliant on sources of social capital to make systems work given limited support from public policy and limited access to finance local actors drawing on non local community energy and commercial and technical networks of expertise work to introduce the technology into strategic planning establish its legitimacy and the legitimacy of a form of multi organisation suited to numerous stakeholders secure finance negotiate risks and responsibilities and engage with energy markets designed for large scale centralised provision for dhc to make a fully effective contribution to uk sustainable urban energy a more supportive government policy framework offsetting the difficulties of a centralised energy market will be needed to maximise the benefit of locally knowledgeable action the policy framework must be responsive to the specificity of locally appropriate configurations of actors and material infrastructure

general economic conditions and national elections the fact that economic conditions influence voters is a leading commonplace of conversation in election years the question is is this fact in fact a fact despite the overwhelming popularity of the fact it has received neither an explicit theoretical analysis presumably because it is so obvious that economic adversity should create political adversaries nor until recently a satisfactory statistical analysis gerald h kramer has presented a multivariate analysis of congressional elections which would strongly suggest that fluctuations in the rate of unemployment have no appreciable effect upon elections but that fluctuations in per capita real income are influential in the following pages i propose to 1 reaffirm his finding on the electoral unimportance of ordinary fluctuations in unemployment 2 argue that contrary to kramer fluctuations in real income also do not have important electoral effects and 3 present an argument based upon rational voter behavior for the unimportance of general economic conditions in national elections

matching markets with adverse selection abstract this paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of rothschild and stiglitz quart j econ 90 1976 629 the major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open ended and constantly refilled by new participants e g by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market the major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts as frictions become small we show that the least cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome regardless of the distribution of types among entrants moreover we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique

economic voting and the symbolic politics argument a reinterpretation and synthesis economic voting is generally regarded as a straightforward political demand for the amelioration of economic grievances this assumption about motives underlies the implicit theories of politicians and the imputations of interests to voters in aggregate time series models several recent articles have argued that voting is not self interested but a manifestation of symbolic preferences at the level of the collectivity this article places the dispute between personal and collective decision referents into the broader perspective of a multi stage model of information processing and decision making personal and collective decision referents are shown to define the poles of a continuum and several hypotheses are derived to predict the relative weights assigned to each in the voter s calculus the model is used in analyses of both the public s evaluations of incumbent economic management and economic voting in different electoral arenas by varying issue publics designed to maximize comparability with aggregate studies this research includes both objective and subjective measures of economic conditions and indexes changes in personal conditions over time from panel data

financial intermediary capital we propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households that is have a collateralization advantage intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can lend out of their own net worth the net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity such as investment and financing the accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector the model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch namely their severity their protractedness and the fact that the severity of the credit crunch itself affects the severity and persistence of downturns the model captures the tentative and halting nature of recoveries from crises

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

size and performance of banking firms testing the predictions of theory abstract in recent years two important literatures on the theory of banking firms have developed one examines the economic functions of banks in environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed another considers the incentive effects moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance both theories make predictions about the relation between banking firm size and performance an empirical analysis of large bank holding companies investigates measures of market valuation and risk of failure limited support is provided for either set of theoretical predictions

on the quantification of the network capacity deferral value of distributed generation this paper presents an approach to the quantification of the distribution network capacity deferral value of distributed generation dg besides different technical benefits such as reliability and power quality improvement there are a number of economic benefits related to dg the most important of which being the end user electricity bill reduction capability however since the onset of the implementation of these technologies the potential of dg to defer investments on distribution wires and transformers was soon realized to the point that non wire solutions are now considered as an alternative to network upgrades in this work a first approximation to the capacity deferral benefits brought about by dg is obtained such approach can be the starting point towards the development of a framework of credits to the owners of dg that fully and fairly recognize the deferral benefits provided to the utility the financial performance of investments on these important technologies can be then improved thus broadening dg as a viable market alternative for customers and utilities

does there exist a political business cycle a box tiao analysis theories of the political business cycle are by now common they range from the elegant theoretical work of nordhaus 1975 to the essentially empirical work of tufte 1978 they all assume that politicians manipulate the economy to aid their reelection efforts in particular politicians manipulate macroeconomic policy to create a boom just before election day golden and poterba 1980 provide an excellent review of this literature both tufte and nordhaus provide casual evidence for the existence of a political business cycle using inflation and unemployment rates as indicators of macroeconomic outcomes tufte and nordhaus predict at a minimum that unemployment should be decreasing before election day if presidents are really manipulating the economy very well then unemployment should be at a minimum in the october before the election and hence should be rising after the election in the nordhaus version the economy pays for the pre election boom with a post election surge in the inflation rate nordhaus also suggests that the president should engineer a recession early in his term to reduce inflationary expectations tufte 1978 20 presents graphs of the unemployment series and claims that visual examination shows them to be generally consistent with the hypothesis however he provides no statistical tests of the hypothesis nor does he estimate the quantitative impact of elections on unemployment tufte does not examine the inflation series nordhaus restricts himself to comparing unemployment rates in the two years preceeding and following an election with a simple nonparametric test supporting the hypothesis the literature provides several good empirical tests of the political business cycle hypothesis both paldam 1979 and mccallum 1978 test for the existence of four year cycles and find none however they do not test for discontinuous changes in the series around election day golden and poterba examine whether the use of policy instruments changes near election day and

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

a theory of corporate capital structure and investment this article uses a general equilibrium framework to explore the origins and limitations of financial intermediaries in the model investors have a generic lending technology that they can improve at a cost those who upgrade become intermediaries to exploit their advantage however conflicts with depositors will limit the banks market presence and they will only lend to moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash rich corporations the article also analyzes the extent to which investors adopt the superior lending technique the nature of bank competition and how corporate and bank conditions affect interest rates and investment copyright 2004 oxford university press

microprudential regulation in a dynamic model of banking this paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity undertake maturity transformation are exposed to credit and liquidity risks and face financing frictions we show that 1 there exists an inverted u shaped relationship between bank lending welfare and capital requirements 2 liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending efficiency and welfare and 3 resolution policies contingent on observed capital such as prompt corrective action dominate in efficiency and welfare terms noncontingent capital and liquidity requirements

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

presidential popularity and macroeconomic performance are voters really so naive f ollowing the pioneering work of kramer 1971 numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between the macroeconomic performance of political administrations and their popularity or vote getting ability kramer s work showed that the aggregate congressional vote for an incumbent party can be explained rather well by variables indicating recent economic performance subsequent works have extended kramer s research by explaining presidential vote or gallup poll popularity data with similar models on one point almost all of these studies agree 2 votes and popularity can be explained well by models which suppose that voters judge policymakers on the basis of retrospective evaluation of past macroeconomic outcomes most authors interpret their results as being supportive of the hypothesis of rational voters since the evidence indicates that voting decisions are not based purely upon personalities party affiliation or chance kramer argued that if voters regard past macroeconomic performance of an administration to be indicative of future performance then a concern with past performance indicates a concern for future performance voters who simply extrapolate from the past to predict the future are rather naive however a sophisticated voter who has an understanding of the important intertemporal constraints embodied in the structure of the economy would be able to forecast future consequences of current policy choices more accurately than one who simply extrapolates if votes and popularity are simply functions of past outcomes then voters must either be ignorant of the basic structure of the economy or unconcerned with the future the supposition that voters are so naive might run counter to the intuition of most economists who generally assume individual rationality as a central behavioral postulate nevertheless the empirical results noted above have been accepted by many as evidence that voters do misperceive their own long run interest the implications of the naive voter hypothesis for macroeconomic policymaking are disturbing nordhaus 1975 has developed a model which shows that voter naivete can encourage vote maximizing politicians to induce political business cycles and an inflationary bias there is some but not unanimous empirical support for the existence of politically motivated business cycles and casual empiricism also suggests that politicians themselves believe in the naive voter 3 while studies show that empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that voters are concerned with the recent past the results do not reject a sophisticated voter hypothesis none of the aforementioned studies has tested a model consistent with a sophisticated voter hypothesis i e a model in which voters understand what outcomes are feasible in the long and short runs and are concerned with future as well as current and past economic performance in this paper we develop such a model and estimate it using gallup poll data on presidential popularity results of this model are compared to results from a naive voter model similar to those employed in previous research received for publication february 4 1982 revision accepted for publication july 30 1982 university of south carolina i am grateful for helpful comments provided by ray fair douglas hibbs william keech daniel richards abel l da costa fernandes and an anonymous referee i also wish to thank william keech for providing me with the gallup poll data on presidential approval rates aurel schubert provided excellent research assistance fair 1978a bloom and price 1975 arcelus and meltzer 1975 and pollard 1981 a 1981 b have all estimated models to explain voting while frey and schneider 1978 and hibbs i 982a 1982b have developed models to explain presidential popularity 2 an exception is provided by arcelus and meltzer 1975 3nordhaus 1975 and tufte 1978 have provided evidence of political business cycles for a number of western democracies and frey and schneider 1978 and maloney and smirlock 1981 have estimated policy reaction functions suggesting that the timing of elections affects policymaking see tufte for a discussion of casual empirical evidence indicating that politicians believe that current economic conditions affect electoral outcomes

social preferences inflation unemployment and political business cycles econometric evidence for the reagan presidency it is now common for theoretical analyses of macroeconomic policy to assume that the public s social preferences between inflation and unemployment may be represented by an indifference map that is concave to the origin and most assume that the functional form is quadratic we estimate such a quadratic social preference function we proxy public satisfaction by the public s rating of presidential performance using gallup poll data 2 such data have been widely used by both economists and political scientists in analyses of the economic and non economic determinants of presidential popularity 3 as we have found 33 that over the period 1953 to 1988 there have been structural shifts in the relationship between presidential popularity and inflation and unemployment we limit our analysis to only one presidency the reagan administration

social acceptance of renewable energy innovation an introduction to the concept this paper introduces the special issue on social acceptance of renewable energy innovation it is a collection of best papers presented at an international research conference held in tramelan switzerland in february 2006 while there are ambitious government targets to increase the share of renewable energy in many countries it is increasingly recognized that social acceptance may be a constraining factor in achieving this target this is particularly apparent in the case of wind energy which has become a subject of contested debates in several countries largely due to its visual impact on landscapes this paper introduces three dimensions of social acceptance namely socio political community and market acceptance factors influencing socio political and community acceptance are increasingly recognized as being important for understanding the apparent contradictions between general public support for renewable energy innovation and the difficult realization of specific projects the third dimension market acceptance has received less attention so far and provides opportunities for further research particularly from management scholars

is the political business cycle really dead a decade ago in this journal mccallum 26 proclaimed the theory of the political business cycle 30 25 17 to be dominated by the emergence of the rational expectations literature 23 24 34 clearly the two theories are inconsistent when a strong view of rational expectations sees governments unable to manipulate real variables to create booms in election years since then new developments in macroeconomics have occasioned serious doubts as to whether the strong version of rational expectations is supported by the data 28 2 1 31 12 furthermore new advances in the political business cycle literature 36 4 have attempted to reconciliate the two theories by emphasizing that expectation errors may result from the presence of party dependent policy reaction functions and uncertainty about election outcomes the purpose of this paper is to step back and reconsider whether or not the empirical evidence presented by mccallum favoring rational expectations for the u s was really that strong and could be generalized to other countries here the u k given that the rational expectations hypothesis has been rejected at least in the strong mccallum and sargent version 26 34 it

business cycles and the political process the interrelationship between the political sector and the macroeconomy in democratic societies has been examined extensively in recent years research in this area has generally been concerned with two issues first following the lead of kramer 16 various authors have examined the impact of economic conditions on congressional 1 13 21 24 and presidential elections 4 5 the results at the congressional level have been mixed but it is reasonably safe to conclude that economic conditions do affect presidential elections the second issue and the one of primary concern in this study has dealt with the development of models of politico economic interaction the basic concept in these models is that an administration s popularity and therefore the probability of staying in power depends critically on economic conditions knowing this the administration seeks to manipulate the economy in order to maintain power the use of economic tools for political goals by governments is well established in the literature theoretical contributions by nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 have demonstrated the potential for a politically motivated business cycle in a world of politico economic interaction empirical support for the existence of such a cycle is provided by the work of frey and schneider 7 8 9 the main purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the political business cycle that generates empirically testable proposition the goal is to integrate the theoretical conclusions of a formal model similar to the nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 framework with the empirical support provided by frey and schneider 7 8 9 the possibility of a political business cycle is important for several reasons in macroeconometric models government policy that is endogenous to the system is usually treated as if it were exogenous this may cause serious misspecification errors further forecasts of the future course of economic events which depend heavily on government action will be inaccurate unless the political motivations of governments are considered

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the economics of organization the transaction cost approach the transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way the approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries as between firms and markets and to the organization of internal transactions including the design of employment relations the approach is compared and contrasted with selected parts of the organization theory literature

presidential popularity and the economy abstract this study tests the hypothesis that the sensitivity of the president s popularity to economic events differs across distinct demographic groups assuming that presidental popularity is negatively related to both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate the electorate is disaggregated according to sex age race education income and political affiliation and separate regressions are estimated for the individual subgroups using quarterly data covering 1976 through 1988 statistically significant differences in the marginal effects of unemployment and inflation on presidential approval are discovered for the various subgroupings

investment in electricity infrastructure in a small isolated market the case of ireland climate policy is driving an extensive deployment of wind generation in the irish electricity market this study evaluates the cost of increasing wind generation both to the system as a whole and to consumers for 2020 we consider different scenarios on fuel and carbon dioxide permit prices and the extent of electricity interconnection with great britain for a small and isolated electricity system such as ireland a high penetration of wind is economically sound only with increased interconnection to great britain since wind generation would otherwise be curtailed not surprisingly for low fuel prices the least cost scenario contains low levels of wind generation whereas the opposite is true for high fuel prices the findings highlight the importance of interconnection and its operation and governance copyright 2009 oxford university press

incomplete markets labor supply and capital accumulation we explore the accumulation of capital in the presence of limited insurance against idiosyncratic shocks borrowing constraints and endogenous labor supply in the exogenous labor supply case e g aiyagari 1994 huggett 1997 the presence of limited insurance increases the demand for savings for precautionary reasons as a consequence capital and output are higher under incomplete markets we show that if labor hours are endogenous labor supply is likely to be lower under incomplete markets because those agents who experience a high shock to productivity are ex post richer and they work fewer hours in some cases this wealth effect can overcome the aggregate precautionary savings and give rise to lower savings and output under incomplete

enabling private sector investment in microgrid based rural electrification in developing countries a review access to electricity is widely recognized as an important factor for economic and social development low rates of access particularly in remote rural areas in regions such as sub saharan africa south asia and southeast asia have led developing nations and international organizations to set ambitious goals to expand the reach of electricity decentralized solutions such as microgrids have been proposed as cost effective solutions to reaching communities located far from central grid infrastructure lack of capital from public and donor sources has severely impeded achieving access goals leading to calls for greater private sector participation in electrification activities however due to the high level of risk associated with decentralized electrification projects in low income areas marginal expected returns on investment and a lack of clear and effective public policy the private sector has not shown significant interest in participating in such projects the purpose of this paper is to review barriers to private sector participation in decentralized electrification projects and to identify solutions that have been implemented and proposed to overcome these barriers the barriers discussed include unsecure revenue streams inability to finance projects and long term project risks such as grid encroachment the range of interventions and business models reviewed include methods to secure reliable demand subsidy models risk guarantees and different revenue models this paper does not include an analysis of the effectiveness of the different interventions described future research should evaluate the relative costs and benefits of these interventions in order to provide robust policy guidance to decision makers in developing countries

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

access to finance an unfinished agenda recent data compilations show that many poor and non poor people in many developing countries face a high degree of financial exclusion and high barriers in access to finance theory and empirical evidence point to the critical role that improved access to finance has in promoting growth and reducing income inequality an extensive literature shows the channels through which finance promotes enterprise growth and improves aggregate resource allocation there is less evidence at the household level however and on the effectiveness of policies to overcome financial exclusion the article summarizes recent efforts to measure and analyze the impact of access to finance and discusses the unfinished research agenda

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

revisions to us labor market data and the public s perception of the economy using the monthly employment situation reports for 1994 2013 this paper studies the revisions to us employment data the paper shows that the first press release underestimates net job creation in expansions and overestimates it in downturns the errors in reporting the data on the labor market can distort the public s perception about the stance of the labor market and have some political consequences this is well reflected by the finding that the job approval rating of president obama the index of consumer confidence and the economic conditions index of gallup have all been responding to the initial news on the us labor market as they were published in the employment situation reports

what role for network governance in urban low carbon transitions many cities around the world have taken a pioneering role in tackling climate change and they will be key players in a possible transition to a future low carbon society however cities are at the same time constrained and act in a world of multi level governance where local decision makers are dependent on both higher political levels and other actors in society in this situation network governance has emerged as a promising new mode of governance where cities can increase both the legitimacy and implementation capacity of an ambitious climate agenda in network governance the municipality is a facilitator rather than commander and implementer however there are also some important potential problems with network governance relating to its democratic legitimacy politics increasingly carried out by closed elites and its capacity to lead to radical change networks of established interests tend to preserve status quo the aim of this paper is to critically analyse the role of network governance in urban low carbon transitions the paper builds on original empirical research from the swedish context which is supplemented by experience found in the literature from other cases the paper draws from and merges two different theoretical perspectives on governance network governance and transition governance the literature on network governance asks whether this mode of governance is legitimate and effective while the literature on transition governance explores what governance configurations are needed in order to steer towards a low carbon transition the findings of the paper show that the effects of network governance are mixed both regarding its policy outputs and its democratic legitimacy on the implications of network governance for urban low carbon transitions it is argued that while network governance can contribute to niche developments and innovation at the urban level the elitist character of networks risks maintaining existing unsustainable patterns and defining possible urban futures in too narrow terms

the benefits of relationship lending in a cross country context a meta analysis relationship lending may create benefits for borrowers by reducing information asymmetries however empirical evidence is mixed we conduct a meta analysis to summarize and explain the heterogeneity in the results in the literature using hand collected information from 101 studies in the united states europe asia and latin america from 1970 to 2010 we find that strong relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers but lending outcomes differ across the relationships dimensions long lasting exclusive and synergy creating bank relationships are associated with higher credit volume and lower loan rates these benefits are more likely in the united states and in countries where bank competition is high they are not related to the importance of small and medium sized enterprises in an economy suggesting that prevalence of relationship lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits our inferences are robust when we control for observed systematic heterogeneity in the original

is there news in the prime rate using intraday data we find that bank announcements of changes in the prime rate have significant effects on dow jones stock price indexes and yields in the treasury bill futures market we find comparable effects using daily data for indexes of share prices of banks and financial firms as well as interest rates on various maturities of government securities our evidence is consistent with the view that banks have a comparative advantage in processing private information gained through bank borrower relations and the regulatory supervision process

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge

effect of the number of banking relationships on credit availability evidence from panel data of spanish small firms this paper investigates how the choice between single or multiple banking relationships affects credit availability for a complete panel of small and medium sized spanish firms the results seem to indicate the existence of rationing since a substitution relation has been found between trade and bank credit we also analyse the relationship between the level of indebtedness and the interest rate for each group of firms the results show that those smes that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain fewer funds for the same increase in the interest rate which indicates that these companies have more financial restraints