collateral heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium abstract this paper examines the argument that the availability of collateral rules out credit rationing a model of the credit market with ex ante asymmetric information and heterogeneous entrepreneurs attitudes toward risk is set up it is shown that due to the interplay between project choice and entrepreneurs preferences using collateral as a signal to screen safer projects may prove impossible instead a partially separating two contract equilibrium with rationing at one contract emerges contrary to previous theoretical research and consistently with conventional wisdom and systematic evidence the use of collateral is never negatively correlated with project risk

collateral and credit rationing a review of recent empirical studies as a guide for future research abstract the relationship between firms and banks often suffers from informational opacity that may result in credit rationing in theory providing collateral to the bank can have a mitigating effect on these informational asymmetries and thus solve the credit rationing problem even though collateral is already a widespread debt contract feature recent trends predict that in the future collateral will become even more important for informationally opaque firms the aim of this paper is twofold first we provide a review of the recently growing empirical research on collateral as a remedy for credit rationing second we would like to pinpoint gaps and limitations in current empirical research most studies contend with a flawed research design by not distinguishing between business and personal collateral and excluding other information opaqueness reducing tools such as the strength of the relationship between borrower and lender loan maturity and covenants we also discuss the limitations of using a single equation estimation method and the usefulness of incorporating interaction effects into the estimation models finally we provide suggestions for fruitful research avenues that would fill these gaps and enrich the empirical knowledge in this research domain

credit risk measurement developments over the last 20 years abstract this paper traces developments in the credit risk measurement literature over the last 20 years the paper is essentially divided into two parts in the first part the evolution of the literature on the credit risk measurement of individual loans and portfolios of loans is traced by way of reference to articles appearing in relevant issues of the journal of banking and finance and other publications in the second part a new approach built around a mortality risk framework to measuring the risk and returns on loans and bonds is presented this model is shown to offer some promise in analyzing the risk return structures of portfolios of credit risk exposed debt instruments

the incidence of secured debt evidence from the small business community critics claim that theories of secured debt fail to explain the widespread use of collateral because they incorrectly predict when a loan will be secured this paper provides the first rigorous statistical test of the transaction cost models of secured debt data from two samples of over 1 000 small business loans generally support the common set of predictions of these theories the incidence of secured debt is positively related to probability of default loan size loan maturity and marketability of assets changes in the legal and economic environment also alter firms decisions regarding the pledging of collateral

decomposing learning by doing in new plants the paper examines learning by doing in the context of a production function in which the other arguments are labor human capital physical capital and vintage as a proxy for embodied technical c

technology adoption learning by doing and economic growth abstract we develop a model in which firms choose which technologies to adopt as well as the timing of such adoptions in between adoptions a firm accumulates expertise in its technology which allows it to operate the technology more efficiently thus there is firm specific learning by doing for certain parameterizations of the model and appropriate initial distributions of technologies and expertise equilibria are characterized by positive and constant growth of per capita output and positive but nonconstant growth of each firm s output we find firms adoption decisions and output growth depend upon the efficiency of capital markets journal of economic literature classification numbers o41 o33

lending to small businesses the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems we investigate what determines the maturity of lines of credit to small businesses our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that shorter loan maturities serve to mitigate the problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information that are typical of small business lending we find that maturity is shorter for firm owners that have poor credit histories are older and less experienced and for firms that are more informationally opaque supporting the notion that collateral and maturity are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems we also find strong evidence that maturity increases with collateral pledges that personal collateral is associated with longer maturities than business collateral and that collateral types that better mitigate agency problems reduce the sensitivity of loan maturity to informational asymmetries and risk finally while it is argued that relationship lending may mitigate information asymmetry we find no relation between loan maturity and stronger firm creditor ties

vintage human capital and learning curves abstract i study a vintage human capital model in which long lived workers accumulate human capital following an exogenous learning curve different skill levels inside a vintage are complementary in production this makes the ex ante homogeneous workers enter different vintages the continuous time framework allows me to study the timing decision for the technology phase out differentially and to derive sharp characterization for wages and the distribution of workers in the dying technology i show how to posit and solve a planner s problem and construct equilibrium in this way consistent with empirical evidence i show that the experience premium is always positive but diminishes as a technology ages the connection between workers learning curves and the technology s progress curve is characterized

loan collateral decisions and corporate borrowing costs we examine the relation between borrowing costs and the presence of loan collateral we find the presence of collateral increases with default risk consistent with low quality borrowers reducing their risks and borrowing costs through the use of collateral by explicitly controlling for the interdependence between the decision to pledge collateral and borrowing costs we find that secured loans have predicted spreads substantially lower than if they had been made on an unsecured basis alternatively loans made on an unsecured basis have spreads not substantially different from if they had been secured the evidence suggests that collateral pledging decisions are generally consistent with borrowing cost minimization

vintage human capital growth and the diffusion of new technology we develop a model of vintage human capital in which each technology requires vintage specific skills we examine the properties of a stationary equilibrium for our economy the stationary equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous distribution of skilled workers across vintages the distribution is shown to be single peaked under general conditions there is a lag between the appearance of a technology and its peak usage a phenomenon known as diffusion an increase in the rate of exogenous technological change shifts the distribution of human capital to more recent vintages thereby increasing the diffusion rate

financing difficulties for smes and credit rationing an expanded model of mortgage loans with asymmetric information this article presents a new model of mortgage loans under reasonable assumptions a several key variables that affects the success of a project such as project risk total investment lending rate

secured lending and default risk equilibrium analysis policy implications and empirical results the authors examine collateral in a competitive equilibrium in which borrowers can choose hidden actions and may additionally possess hidden knowledge apart from explaining the widespread use of collateral despite deadweight costs they show that an increase in the riskless interest rate causes equilibrium loan rates and collateral requirements to increase a decline in the deadweight costs of collateral reduces the equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard and an increase in the borrower s project size reduces equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard some of these predictions are tested and found to be supported by the data copyright 1991 by royal economic society

do binary collateral outcome variables proxy collateral levels the case of collateral from start ups and existing smes this paper is designed to test whether the factors which affect the decision to collateralise business loans affect the level of collateralisation in the same manner if the level of collateralisation does matter the provision of collateral becomes more than a goodwill gesture to placate banks and more a device to ameliorate the risk of lending we use a thitherto unseen dataset from a u k retail bank comprising 4 618 transfers and start ups ts group who applied for business loans and overdrafts between january 1998 and january 2000 the control sample comprised 9 596 existing businesses from the same period our unique dataset permits an analysis of this kind for the first time because it contains a continuous variable for collateral unlike previous studies existing businesses exhibit a higher frequency binary outcome and level tobit outcome of collateral than the businesses who are start ups or have transferred from another bank only when distortions within the data are not controlled for these distortions negate the value of binary collateral variables factors such as business type and loan purpose are useful at explaining the likelihood of a borrower having his loan collateralised and the level of collateralisation for borrowers who provided collateral or not

the role of legal status in influencing bank financing and new firm growth this paper examines the characteristics of new firm founders who use loans and overdrafts from the clearing banks to finance initially their business bank lending to new firms appears unrelated to the personal characteristics of founders but related to whether individuals provide personal savings and the legal status of the business this contrasts with the factors which influence the growth of new firms here the founder s age employment status and birthplace are associated with larger firms the only variable which appears to influence consistently both bank lending and the employment growth in firms is whether or not the business is a limited company

experience vs obsolescence a vintage human capital model abstract i introduce endogenous human capital accumulation into an infinite horizon version of chari and hopenhayn s 1991 4 vintage human capital model returns to skill and tenure premia are highest in young vintages where skill is scarcest and agents accumulate human capital fastest as the vintage ages the skill premium decreases and vanishes entirely upon vintage death workers run through cycles of human capital accumulation their wages rise as they accumulate skill undergo downward pressure as the technology ages and finally drop sharply when the worker switches to a new technology the results are in line with german linked employer employee data tenure premia are highest in young establishments as well as in fast growing industries occupations and establishments a calibration exercise suggests that human capital accumulation is the most important determinant of workers wage profiles whereas changes to the price of skill and vintage productivity gains play a smaller quantitative role

financial markets and wages we study a labor market equilibrium model in which flrms sign optimal long term contracts with workers firms that are flnancially constrained ofier an increasing wage proflle they pay lower wages today in exchange of higher wages once they become unconstrained and operate at a larger scale in equilibrium constrained flrms are on average smaller and pay lower wages in this way the model generates a positive relation between flrm size and wages using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy we show that the key dynamic properties of the model are supported by the data jel classiflcation g31 j31 e24

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

the effect of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 on small business loan pricing abstract the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 contains several provisions that can affect the cost of producing loans for financial intermediaries in a competitive lending market the additional monitoring and expected foreclosure costs imposed by the change in the bankruptcy law should be passed on to the borrower using survey data from a sample of small business loans from commercial banks evidence is presented that the enactment of the new law resulted in higher contract rates of interest

product market competition and the financing of new ventures this paper examines the interaction between venture risk product market competition and the entrepreneur s choice between bank financing and venture capital vc financing under bank financing a debt type contract emerges as optimal which allows the entrepreneur to retain full control of the venture and thus yields strong effort incentives as long as the entrepreneur can service the debt repayment however this leads to liquidation in the case of default making the venture s success quite sensitive to exogenous even temporary shocks that may hinder debt repayment under vc financing an equity type contract emerges as optimal although it is not sensitive to exogenous shocks this contract requires the entrepreneur to share a fraction of the rents with the financier thus yielding lower effort incentives for the entrepreneur there exists a threshold level of venture risk such that bank financing is optimal if and only if venture risk is below that threshold product market competition increases the value of stronger entrepreneurial incentives and thus increases the maximum level of risk the entrepreneur is willing to take before switching from bank financing to vc financing this is a robust result that is shown to hold in various models of competition including the hotelling salop dixit stiglitz and cournot to bertrand switch this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

relationship lending and sme financing in the continental european bank based system this paper analyzes the relationship between banks and smes in the continental european bank based system we find that smes with longer bank relationships have enhanced access to loans but at the same time they bear a higher cost for their debt we also find that firms maintaining two bank relationships get the cheapest debt which establishes a limit for the degree of concentration of bank relationships our results also show that the existence of trust between firm and bank improves access to financing and reduces the borrowing costs whereas it increases the likelihood that guarantees will have to be provided as a consequence it seems that a relationship based on trust is a better strategy to improve smes access to finance than the establishment of longer or more concentrated relationships

financial distress and the business cycle in this paper we argue that firms financial distress should play a greater role in the macroeconomic analysis of the business cycle we provide a non technical account of a general equilibrium model that exhibits financially driven equilibrium cycles we show that the empirical evidence is widely supportive of the key hypothesis and implications of our approach we use the model in order to evaluate the effects of several policy measures it turns out that deepening the market for second hand capital goods subsidizing the interest payments of companies which start up when financial conditions are tight and bailing out some companies in default can indeed stabilize the economy by way of generalization we may say that the policy reaction to a financially driven bust should be accommodating

cross national differences in the rise in earnings inequality market and institutional factors this paper uses data from the luxembourg income study to explore the role of differences in supply shifts in explaining cross national differences in the rise in earnings inequality changes in returns to age and education are estimated for eight countries using a common specification of earnings functions across years and countries we find that the small overall increase in earnings inequality in many countries reflects large but offsetting changes in returns to skill and changes in inequality within age education cells furthermore these differences in returns to skill can largely be explained by differences in supply shifts

an evaluation of japan s first safeguards actions japan has been one of the major gatt wto member countries with relatively little experience in implementing protectionist measures however in april 2001 for the first time in its history japan invoked provisional safeguard measures against imports of welsh onions shiitake mushrooms and tatami mats mainly from china this paper reviews and evaluates the chain of events regarding these safeguard actions and considers the means by which japan might be able to deal with its trilemma policy problem involving how to coordinate the promotion of trade liberalisation the administration of wto consistent safeguards and responses to domestic political demands for protection the paper first attempts to review the theoretical rationale for implementing safeguard measures and counterarguments against these measures second it discusses the economic circumstances in which japan implemented the safeguard measures and evaluates these measures critically from the standpoint of economic efficiency and the political economy interests involved finally it concludes with a recommendation that the aforementioned trilemma policy problem in japan can be best addressed by means of the introduction of a well institutionalised domestic programme to provide adjustment assistance to ameliorate the displacement resulting from import surges

the analysis of causality in escape clause cases under section 201 of the trade act of 1974 the so called escape clause a domestic industry that is seriously injured can obtain temporary relief if imports are the substantial cause of such injury this paper develops a methodology to determine the change in a domestic industry s production as a result of changes in import supply demand and domestic supply and so determine whether or not an industry is entitled to section 201 relief this methodology is illustrated by application to two recent section 201 investigations wood shakes and shingles and nonrubber footwear copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

a dynamic model of endogenous trade policy empirical evidence suggests that past levels of protection are significant determi nants of current levels of protection we investigate dynamic interactions among interest groups and resulting endogenous links between current and future trade policies we explore these intertemporal links in a small open economy in which lobbying and tariff policies are the outcome of a dynamic game among factor owners the model can generate cycles with prolonged periods of free trade and or prolonged periods of restricted trade i e persistent trade policies an interesting aspect of the environment is the role of lobbying as a partial

commitment lending under asymmetric information theory and tests on u k startup data u k business startup data is used to examine the role of contract parameters in solving the bank s problem of lending under asymmetric information margins are found to be a direct function of the probability of failure and an inverse function of security for given loan size consistently with collateral being invoked to solve the moral hazard problem business survival is also found to be enhanced by owner equity inputs for given debt again consistent with a requirement for owner financial inputs to enhance unobservable effort security rises along with loan size and survival chances a finding consistent with a a firm loan size effect larger borrowers have lower marginal admin cost to the bank and with b positive borrower self selection better borrowers offer collateral because they are less likely to experience forfeiture observable business characteristics are found to play an important intermediary role in the solution to the moral hazard problem more mature proprietors have more experience business commitment assets for borrowing and the willingness to use them for loan collateral their contract parameters reflect these facts

the relationship between u k banks and their small business customers much emphasis is placed upon the benefits to both parties of a good relationship between banks and their small business customers having explained the significance of smes in the u k economy the papers goes on to consider briefly some of the arguments which underpin the rationale for these relationships the roles of information and communication are discussed and the poor co ordination between banks smes and their accountants is highlighted evidence from over 6 000 small businesses in response to the forum of private business survey in 1994 is then presented this demonstrates the strong positive association between more participative relationships and more positive perceptions of their banks by firms finally it is suggested that a virtuous circle of information and communication could be established if the parties cooperate in a systematic process of risk assessment

the determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements the paper examines the determinants of contract terms on bank revolving credit agree ments revolvers of medium large publicly traded companies we model the duration maturity secured status and pricing decisions within a simultaneous decision frame work thereby overcoming the biased and inconsistent estimates in prior single equation studies of debt contract terms we find strong interrelationships between contract terms with significant bi directional relationships between duration and secured status and be tween the all in spread and commitment fees and a unidirectional relationship from both duration and secured status to all in spread we also illustrate how several single equa tion studies of contract terms draw incorrect conclusions because of their inappropriate assumption that other contract terms and leverage were exogenous finally our results sup port the hypothesis that the setting of contract terms plays an important role in alleviating contracting problems

equilibrium wage tenure contracts in this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage tenure contracts and workers both employed and unemployed search for new job opportunities given workers are risk averse we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium all post a wage tenure contract that implies a worker s wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm as firms make different offers there is job turnover as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises this implies the increase in a worker s wage can be due to job to job movements as well as wage tenure effects further there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage we also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters

technological acceleration skill transferability and the rise in residual inequality this paper provides a quantitative theory for the recent rise in residual wage inequality consistent with the empirical observation that a sizable part of this increase has a transitory nature a feature that eludes standard models based on ex ante heterogeneity in ability an acceleration in the rate of quality improvement of equipment like the one observed from the early 1970s increases the productivity quality differentials across machines jobs in a frictional labor market this force translates into higher wage dispersion even among ex ante equal workers with vintage human capital the acceleration reduces workers capacity to transfer skills from old to new machines generating a rise in the cross sectional variance of skills and therefore of wages through calibration the paper shows that this mechanism can account for 30 percent of the surge in residual inequality in the u s economy or for most of its transitory component two key implications of the theory faster within job wage growth and larger wage losses upon displacement find empirical support in the data

organizational distance and use of collateral for business loans abstract this paper examines the effect of organizational distance i e distance between the headquarters of the bank that grants a loan and the location of the borrower on the use of collateral for business loans by spanish banks on the basis of the recent lender based theory of collateral inderst r mueller h m 2007 a lender based theory of collateral journal of financial economics 84 826 859 we find that for the average borrower the use of collateral is higher for loans granted by local lenders than by distant ones we also show that the difference in the likelihood of collateral in loans granted by local lenders relative to distant lenders is higher among older and larger firms than respectively younger and smaller firms we also find that banks use lending technologies that are different for near and for distant firms in response to organizational diseconomies

human capital and earnings distribution dynamics abstract earnings heterogeneity plays a crucial role in modern macroeconomics we document that mean earnings and measures of earnings dispersion and skewness all increase in us data over most of the working life cycle for a typical cohort as the cohort ages we show that i a human capital model can replicate these properties from the right distribution of initial human capital and learning ability ii differences in learning ability are essential to produce an increase in earnings dispersion over the life cycle and iii differences in learning ability account for the bulk of the variation in the present value of earnings across agents these findings emphasize the need to further understand the role and origins of initial conditions

business collateral and personal commitments in sme lending abstract using a database of sme credit approvals from a large belgian bank this paper extends the empirical evidence on the determinants of collateral by examining the determinants of business collateral simultaneously with the determinants of personal collateral commitments our results suggest that firm and relationship characteristics seem to be more important determinants of collateral commitment protection than loan and lender characteristics family firms are more likely to offer a higher degree of collateral commitment protection while introducing competition between banks decreases this likelihood the collateral requirement decreases in the length of the bank borrower relationship furthermore trade credit seems to have a signalling effect the lazy banks hypothesis was not supported our results suggest that beside risk arguments also commercial arguments help explain the pledging of collateral using a continuation ratio logit model we discover several differences in the determinants of the collateralisation decision and the determinants of the type of collateral commitments