economic deregulation days of reckoning for microeconomists economic deregulation of american industry is one of the most important experiments in economic policy of our time 1 in 1977 17 percent of u s gnp was produced by fully regulated industries 2 by 1988 following ten years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the transportation communications energy and financial industries that total had been cut significantly to 6 6 percent of gnp 3 the political forces behind the decision to change the market conditions under which roughly 600 billion of u s output is produced were strong and varied but according to political scientists martha derthick and paul quirk 1985 p 36 deregulation would never have occurred if economists especially microeconomists had not generally supported it through their research 4 in retrospect it is fair to ask were microeconomists able to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to explain regulation and its effects and to form predictions of deregulation s effects were they able to predict the actual effects of deregulation this paper surveys the evidence to address these questions and of

diversification incentives under price based and cost based regulation this article considers two schemes of regulationforfirms that serve both monopoly markets and markets subjected to substantial competition the first form cost based regulation combines elements of rate of return regulation on monopoly markets with filly distributed cost pricing much like the form of regulation currently in place in the domestic telephone industry the secondform price based regulation would establish rate caps on noncompetitive services and allow the firm to enter into competitive markets and charge whatever prices it might like in those markets models of both forms of regulation are developed and analyzed with respect to incentives for cost misreporting choice of technology cost reducing innovation choices of prices and output levels and diversification into competitive markets

avoiding non optimal management decisions by applying a three person inspection game abstract an inspection game models a conflict situation between an inspector and an inspectee the mathematical analysis aims to generate optimal behavior of the inspectee under the assumption that an undesirable action of the inspectee could otherwise be carried out strategically in this paper the controller s inspector s particular job is to audit a manager s inspectee s decision and to submit a report to the company s top managers for examination thus a conflict as regards the choice of behavioral actions of the manager the controller and the top management impends based on fandel and trockel 2011a this modified inspection game is discussed here for the first time as a three person game in the context of a manager s faulty decision that will unnecessarily add to the company s costs and that the top management understandably wishes to minimize we will first examine the conditions under which a nash equilibrium occurs in this three person game in which poor management poor monitoring and poor revision coincide we will then examine the effects that the penalties and bonuses exert on the nash equilibrium solution we will find that penalties and bonuses can neutralize each other in their effects on the improved decision making by the manager and the controller

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

free trade agreements in the americas are the trade effects larger than anticipated this paper argues that the competitive liberalisation of national governments of the past several decades reflects national governments expectations of larger trade impacts from regional economic integration agreements eias than typical ex ante economic models have suggested moreover we show that previous typically cross section ex post empirical evaluations of the effects of eias on trade have seriously over or underestimated the effects partly due to ignoring the endogenous self selection bias of country pairs into eias accounting for this bias we find that economic integration agreements in the americas have had much larger impacts on trade over the period 1960 2000 than previously found and the ex post estimates are less fragile than those in earlier cross section analyses the results shed further light on understanding the causes and consequences of the growth of regionalism in the world

is the growth of regionalism as significant as the headlines suggest lessons from agricultural trade the proliferation of regional trade agreements rtas has motivated a significant number of ex post econometric studies investigating their agricultural trade impacts the general conclusion is that rtas increase members trade by as much as 150 on average in this article we demonstrate that previous empirical work likely misrepresents the impact of rtas because of considerable heterogeneity in the depth of economic integration pursued by these agreements contrary to previous studies the results reveal that rtas are not universally trade creating and some agreements appear to provide very little benefit deep integration agreements on the other hand are largely responsible for the impressive agricultural trade flow increases reported in the literature testing the hierarchy of rtas largely confirms the theory the benefits of regionalism are an increasing function of the depth of economic integration

are preferential trading arrangements trade liberalizing or protectionist preferential trade arrangements and especially free trade agreements have mushroomed in importance in the 1990s this has revived research on the effects of these arrangements both on the welfare of the member countries and those excluded and on the momentum for further liberalization of the open multilateral trading system this paper reviews the analyses and evidence to date as to these effects showing that analytically anything can happen and that to date there has been insufficient experience to draw conclusions from empirical evidence

capital structure and investment in regulated network utilities evidence from eu telecoms this article analyzes the relationship between firm financial and investment decisions and regulatory outcomes in network industries where regulatory opportunism is often viewed to lead to underinvestment we develop a model to describe the effect of an increase in leverage on regulated rates retail as well as wholesale and company investment we then test the model s predictions using a panel of 15 eu public telecommunication operators ptos over the period 1994 2005 our results show that the data cannot reject the model s predictions that leverage positively affects regulated wholesale and retail rates as well as the ptos investment rate moreover since leverage does affect wholesale charges that alternative operators pay to access to the incumbent s network infrastructure we also find that an increase in leverage is followed by a decrease in the number of competitors and by an increase of the incumbent s market share this suggests that the use of debt to discipline the regulator s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated network industry may somewhat impair or delay retail market competition but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem

beyond the wto an anatomy of eu and us preferential trade agreements it is often alleged that ptas involving the ec and the us include a significant number of obligations in areas not currently covered by the wto agreement such as investment protection competition policy labour standards and environmental protection the primary purpose of this study is to highlight the extent to which these claims are true the study divides the contents of all ptas involving the ec and the us currently notified to the wto into 14 wto and 38 wto x areas where wto provisions come under the current mandate of the wto and wto x provisions deal with issues lying outside the current wto mandate as a second step the legal enforceability of each obligation is evaluated and judged on the extent to which the text specifies clear obligations among the findings are i ec agreements contain almost four times as many instances of wto x provisions as do us agreements ii but ec agreements evidence a very significant amount of legal inflation i e non legally enforceable provisions in the wto x category and us agreements actually contain more enforceable wto x provisions than do the ec agreements iii us agreements tend to emphasise regulatory areas more compared to ec agreements 2010 blackwell publishing ltd

impacts of free trade agreements on agricultural trade creation and trade diversion this paper evaluates agricultural trade creation and diversion effects of the most important free trade agreements ftas trade creation and diversion effects are estimated using a poisson pseudo maximum likelihood ppml estimator with various fixed effects to deal with heteroskedasticity and zero trade observations the analysis finds that ppml estimation is preferred to ols and the estimated impacts of ftas are different if zero trade observations are considered the asean china preferential trade agreement eu 15 eu 25 and southern african development community agreements have generated large increases in agricultural trade among their members

contract design and the control of quality in a conflictual environment this paper provides an approach to quality supply by a supplier and quality inspection by a producer which explicitly recognizes the inherently opposing interests these two parties may have the supplier and the producer are modeled as players in a nonzero sum game where the supplier can control the effort invested in the delivery of quality and the producer may or may not inspect incoming materials we study the effect of contract design e g stipulation of penalties for defective units on equilibrium behavior and identify conditions on the contract parameters which will result in the implementation of a cooperative solution

competition and investment in telecommunications this study examines the relationship between competition and investment by incumbert local exchange carriers ilecs in us telecommunications markets a panel data model and a dynamic panel data model that have not been used in previous studies are applied in this analysis results of the panel data model suggest that investment by ilecs is positively related to the market share of competitive local exchange carriers clecs and negatively to the absolute number of clecs however once the persistence in ilecs investment behaviour is controlled for using the dynamic model our measures of the existing competition from clecs at best have a weak effect on ilecs investment therefore while strengthening competition in the telecom sector may be key to restoring telecom investment it is uncertain that competition spurred by the mandatory sharing policy in this sector stimulates ilecs incentives to invest in new infrastructure

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

revisiting electricity liberalization and quality of service empirical evidence from new zealand abstractwhat effect does the firm structure have on the quality of service delivered by networks and infrastructure industries we answer this question by empirically assessing the impacts of complete vertical separation such as ownership unbundling on the quality of service delivered by a liberalized network industry electricity distribution utilities in new zealand are considered for this purpose and are analysed using panel data econometrics the results show robust evidence that ownership unbundling contributed to a fall in the duration and frequency of supply interruptions in electricity distribution however the results also show that unbundling has no effect on reducing distribution network losses these results overall highlight the nonsimple impacts of ownership unbundling on the quality of electricity distribution we suggest that the quality of service may largely improve when considered in the economic regulation of electricity networks than completely relying on specific reform measures

does entry regulation hinder job creation evidence from the french retail industry are product market and entry regulation key sources of low employment growth in many european countries we investigate this question in the context of the french retail trade industry since 1974 approval by regional zoning boards has been required for the creation or extension of any large retain store in france we exploit a unique database that provides time and region specific variation in boards approval decisions we show that stronger deterrence of entry by the boards increased retailer concentration and slowed down employment growth in france

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution it typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects to study these effects we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions monopolistic competition in the goods market which determines the size of rents and bargaining in the labor market which determines the distribution of rents product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers we show the effects of deregulation we then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation and recent macroeconomic evolutions in europe

is nafta plus an option in the north american agrifood sector with the implementation of the north american free t rade agreement naft a nearly complete there are concerns that the easy ga ins in efficiency have been achieved and that additional steps towards the economic integration of the

strategic sharing in regulatory regimes abstract a firm subject to price cap regulation pcr disciplines the regulator s choice of entry accommodation rule through a convex combination of earnings and effort sharing the first best level of cost reducing effort is not achieved in this model even under pure pcr

demand models for direct mail and periodicals delivery services results for a transition economy this article examines the demand for services of the slovenian national postal operator for the direct mail and periodicals market and separately for the direct mail market the main factors of the demand are found to be various price indicators with respect to individual market two income series and the variable of economic environment the results of our empirical analysis suggest that the price elasticity of demand on both markets is below zero the autonomy in price increases is limited due to positive cross price elasticity of demand for direct mail with regard to price fluctuations for tv commercials substitution effects on the direct mail market are even more evident with regard to price fluctuations for advertisements in magazines and daily papers an additional finding is that the demand on both markets varies seasonally in all models estimated by us finally coefficients of income elasticity of demand for direct mail services show that the total number of mail deliveries on the direct mail ma

regulation and investment use newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many oecd countries to provide evidence that regulatory reform of product markets is associated with an increase in investment a component of reform that plays a very important role is entry liberalization but privatization also has a substantial effect on investment sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are robust jel e22 l5

competition and the capital labor conflict abstract this paper analyzes the distributional effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition the focus is on the interaction between imperfect competition in product markets and bargaining in the labor market the main result is that while a uniform intensification of product market competition increases employment it may cause real wages to fall in the short run as well as in the long run this is especially likely if labor market regulations are favorable to workers therefore product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce each other politically and compensatory fiscal transfers may be needed in order to enact employment enhancing deregulation policies

determining all nash equilibria in a bi linear inspection game abstract this paper addresses a game between an inspection agency and multiple inspectees that are subject to random inspections by that agency we provide explicit easily computable expressions for all possible nash equilibria and verify that none is left out in particular our results characterize situations when there exists a unique nash equilibrium we also explore special features of the nash equilibria and the solution of the problem the inspection agency faces in a non strategic environment

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

fiscal policy profits and investment this paper evaluates the effects of fiscal policy on investment using a panel of oecd countries we find a sizeable negative effect of public spending and in particular of its wage component on profits and on business investment this result is consistent with different theoretical models in which government employment creates wage pressure for the private sector various types of taxes also have negative effects on profits but interestingly the effects of government spending on investment are larger than those of taxes our results can explain the so called non keynesian i e expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments jel e22 e62

do market regulations reduce investment evidence from european regions abstractdo market regulations reduce investment evidence from european regions regional studies this paper investigates the impact of market imperfections on non farm business sector investment in european regions for 1995 2007 using dynamic panel and generalized method of moments gmm methods for estimating a euler equation the results show that barriers to entrepreneurship and to trade and investment decrease the productivity of capital which has negative effects on european regions investment corruption leads to increased operational costs creates uncertainty and thereby deters investment greater labour market regulation also means higher labour costs hiring and firing regulation and employment protection and legislation indicators increase the productivity of capital which has positive effects on regional investment

a generalized design for bilateral trade flow models abstract this paper suggests a full interaction effects design to analyze bilateral trade flows this is illustrated with an unbalanced panel of bilateral trade between the triad eu15 usa and japan economies and their 57 most important trading partners over the period 1986 1997 our full interaction model finds empirical support for the new trade theory and linder s hypothesis we show that the omission of one or more interaction effects can result in biased estimates and misleading inference

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

debt and communications technology diffusion retrospective evidence this study has evaluated the relationship between debt in the capital structure of firms and the dynamics of broadband and digital technology adoption in the united states based on a large dataset on local exchange carriers in the united states over a contemporary historical fourteen year period from 1988 to 2001 using treatment effects modeling the impact of debt in impacting the levels of firms broadband deployment has been found to be negative and significant the primary source of debt in the sector has been in the form of arm s length corporate bonds and the assumptions of the monitoring hypothesis associated with such debt that lenders in the face of information and collective actions problems might not be able to control managers and hence invest less in highly technology intensive situations are supported by the data additionally the data set has been split into separate sets for two periods one between 1988 and 1995 for the period before the telecommunications act of 1996 came into force and the other set between 1996 and 2001 and the results have stayed consistent a test of the coefficients between the two periods has shown that the negative impact of leverage on broadband deployment has become stronger after the introduction of competition in the sector and this has suggested that the change in the institutional logics between the two periods has been of material impact in influencing lenders perceptions

barriers to entry and development we ask whether barriers to entry are a quantitatively important reason for the income gap between developing countries and the united states we develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the effects of barriers to entry and the other main distortions typically considered in the development literature we carry our model to the data and ask it to match the main development facts from the penn world table we find that this requires large barriers to entry in developing countries which account for about half of the income gap with the united states

competition imitation and growth with step by step innovation is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth this question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with step by step innovations in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future in contrast to earlier schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate here we find first that the usual schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition pmc is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition so that pmc has a positive effect on growth second that a little imitation is almost always growth enhancing as it promotes more frequent neck and neck competition but too much imitation is unambiguously growth reducing the model thus points to complementary roles for competition anti trust policy and patent policy

regulation and productivity performance the paper reviews theory and evidence on the ways in which regulation affects productivity outcomes in a context of endogenous growth it is argued that traditional measures of compliance costs miss the potentially most important impacts of regulation on productivity which occur through changes in incentives to invest and to innovate recent attempts to measure cross country variations in the strength of product market and employment regulation are considered and some weaknesses are highlighted nevertheless consistent with endogenous growth models there appears to he quite strong evidence that regulations which inhibit entry into product markets have an adverse effect on tfp growth in oecd countries although there are some discrepancies in the evidence on most measures the uk appears lightly regulated relative to france and germany and this may have contributed to a reduction in the recent past in the uk s tfp gap

the impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship evaluation of pakistan s access to justice programme abstract in 2002 the pakistani government implemented a judicial reform that cost 350 million or 0 1 of pakistan s 2002 gdp this reform did not involve increased incentives for judges to improve efficiency but merely provided them with more training nonetheless the reform had dramatic effects on judicial efficiency and consequently on entrepreneurship judges disposed of a quarter more cases and entry rate of new firms increased by half due to the reform using data from the world bank group entrepreneurship database our estimates suggest that this translates into an increase of pakistan s gdp by 0 5

does child labour displace schooling evidence on behavioral responses to an enrollment subsidy this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled does child labour displace schooling evidence on behavioral responses to an enrollment subsidy conducted between 1995 and 1996 in bangladesh the study observed that the subsidy increases schooling but its effect on child labour is ambiguous the subsidy increased schooling by far more than it reduced child labour substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy the reduction in the incidence of child labour by boys girls represents about one quarter eighth of the increase in their school enrollment rate

determinants of successful regional trade agreements abstract this paper investigates the determinants of the effectiveness of regional trade agreements rtas in enhancing bilateral trade characteristics of both the country pair and other rta members are found to significantly influence the trade creation effect of rtas however north north north south and south south rtas are found to have similar effects on trade

dynamics of price regulation we study the dynamics of price regulation for an industry adjusting to exogenous technological progress first we characterize the optimal capacity path and replacement cycles in a neoclassical investment model second we show that naive rate ofreturn regulation which ignores components of economic depreciation eventually results in a deficient level of capacity due to excessively high retail prices burdened by the need to recover the underdepreciated costs of historical investments third we explain how price cap regulation leads to more efficient capital replacement decisions compared to naive rate of return regulation and we show how finite price cap horizons distort capital replacement finally we interpret recent regulatory reforms in telecommunications markets

do regional trade agreements increase members agricultural trade the gravity model is used extensively to investigate the trade flow effects of regional trade agreements rtas a notable feature common to previous research is the use of aggregate trade data these studies typically report conflicting and even negative results of the effect of rtas on members trade using recent developments in the gravity equation suggested by baier and bergstrand 2007 and anderson and van wincoop 2003 this article demonstrates that rta effects on members trade depend fundamentally on whether the analysis focuses on agricultural or nonagricultural sectors on the particular agreement analyzed and on the length of the phase in period that characterizes almost all rtas copyright 2008 oxford university press

employment effects of product and labour market reforms are there synergies this article investigates the effect of product market liberalisation on employment allowing for interactions between policies and institutions in product and labour markets using panel data for oecd countries over the period 1980 2002 we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labour market regulation is high the data also suggest that product market liberalisation may promote employment enhancing labour market reforms

an intertemporal model of saving and investment this paper characterizes a market economy with infinitely long lived consumers and value maximizing firms which face costs of adjustment for capital the temporary equilibrium of this economy is similar to the short run equilibrium of standard macroeconomic models consumption is a function of wealth investment is related to the value of firms equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply is achieved by the endogenous adjustment of the sequence of current and future interest rates the dynamic behavior of output consumption and investment in this economy is the same as in an optimal growth model with adjustment costs the paper shows this equivalence and then uses it together with the equivalence of taxes to technological shocks to study the dynamic effects of fiscal policy

disaggregated trade and disaggregated currency unions a ranking of common currency effects andrew rose has long argued that a common currency has a large effect on increasing trade recently rose has called into question the reliability of this conclusion as new techniques have emerged for estimating gravity equations this article uses the sector specific gravity model developed by anderson and yotov 2010a to investigate if disaggregated trade can provide a reliable estimate of a common currency s effect disaggregating trade alone is insufficient to obtain a reliable estimate of a currency union regardless of econometric technique when the effect of a common currency on trade is uniform across all unions disaggregating the universe of currency unions with individual effects provides a reliable ranking of currency unions independent of estimation method by the effect that each union s currency has on increasing trade these rankings differ across sectors