getting credit to high return microentrepreneurs the results of an information intervention small scale entrepreneurs typically cite access to finance as the most important constraint to growth recent randomized experiments have shown the return to capital to be very high for the average microenterprise in sri lanka an intervention was designed to improve access to credit among these high return microenterprises without subsidizing interest rates or requiring group lending the intervention consisted of information sessions providing details of the microfinance loan product offered by a regional development bank and a reduction from two to one in the number of personal guarantors required for these loans ten percent of the microenterprises invited to the information meetings received a new loan doubling the proportion of firms receiving loans over this period however the loans do not appear to be going to particularly high return firms but rather to firms with more household assets many more firms will like loans but are constrained by an inability to find personal guarantors and by other bureaucratic procedures the results suggest that information alone is unlikely to be enough for most firms and point to the need for credit bureaus that cover microfinance loans and for continuing innovation in loan products that can reach the urban microenterprise sector

evolution of the economics of agricultural policy agricultural economists helped develop farm programs to respond to the dire economic situation of the 1920s and 1930s some early authors appreciated that such policies created problems in markets for commodities and inputs over time our understanding of agricultural issues and policies has deepened through the application of improved models and tools of analysis to more extensive data we have developed better answers to old questions and have responded to changing policy instruments market contexts and policy concerns this article traces the evolution of our deepening economic understanding of the causes and consequences of agricultural policy

decomposing input adjustments under price and production uncertainty a decomposition of input adjustments for stochastic technologies is developed and applied to the case of actuarially fair production insurance the decomposition consists of a pure risk effect and an expansion effect which are analagous to the hicks allen decomposition familiar from consumer theory

optimum area yield crop insurance cet article determine le contrat optimal d assurance dont l indemnite depend du rendement agrege sur recoltes d un bassin de production le schema optimal d assurance est base sur le coefficient individuel de regression qui mesure la sensibilite du rendement agrege a des variations du rendement agrege une indemnite est versee lorsque le rendement agrege est inferieur superieur a un rendement critique si le coefficient de regression est positif negatif le contrat optimal contient une franchise evanescente si le coefficient de regression est superieur a l unite

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

informal firms in developing countries entrepreneurial stepping stone or consolation prize the potential dynamic benefits of a firm having the option to adopt informal status are analysed informality may be a stepping stone without which formality may never be achieved this result is obtained for a broad range of realistic parameter values suggesting a potential dynamic case for government support of informal firms informality may alternatively play a converse role as a consolation prize with a firm only entering an industry formally because it recognizes that if profitability is disappointing it can switch to informality however this result is obtained for a range of parameter values so narrow as to be of no practical significance

coming out of the shadows estimating the impact of bureaucracy simplification and tax cut on formality in brazilian microenterprises abstract this paper evaluates the impact of a program of bureaucracy simplification and tax reduction on formality among brazilian microenterprises the simples program we document an increase of 13 percentage points in formal licensing among retail firms created after the program when compared to firms in ineligible sectors the impact on retailers is robust to a series of tests we find no impact on construction transportation services and manufacturing sectors

the impacts of multiperil crop insurance on indonesian rice farmers and production this article analyzes the effect of multiperil crop insurance policy for risk averse indonesian rice farmers located in tuban and gresik regencies of the east java province based on the model comparative static analysis of a change in policy variables coverage levels and premium subsidies on input use through the coupling wealth and insurance effects are presented the comparative static results are largely ambiguous and left as empirical questions consequently the model is numerically simulated to quantify the effects of different coverage levels and subsidy rates on input use expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalents the empirical analysis shows that mpci crop insurance results in a decline in expected yield for coverage levels above about 82 5 for both regencies furthermore higher subsidy rates amplify the reduction in input use and yield therefore incomplete coverage with relatively low premium subsidies is the best policy to minimize the impact on input use and yield however from the farmers perspective the optimal policy combination results from the highest coverage level and subsidy which offer the largest expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalent

a competitive model of the informal sector abstract in developing nations formal workers tend to be more experienced more educated and earn more than informal workers these facts are often interpreted as evidence that low skill workers face barriers to entry into the formal sector yet there is little empirical evidence that such barriers are important this paper describes a model where in equilibrium the characteristics of formal and informal workers differ systematically even though labor markets are perfectly competitive the informal sector emphasizes low skill work as in the data because informal managers have access to less outside financing and choose to substitute low skill labor for physical capital

crop insurance in a political economy an alternative perspective on agricultural policy lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress this article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post disaster relief and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails absent ex ante government policy ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under production by operating farmers ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance price supports and a program participation fee copyright 2003 oxford university press

can informal firms hurt registered smes access to credit using firm level survey responses from 2009 to 2012 we examine whether competitors from the informal sector affect the credit constraints of registered smes in 86 countries worldwide we also investigate the role played by the quality of institutional environment in exacerbating or in alleviating such effect a weak quality of institutional environment strengthens inter linkages between the formal and the informal sectors increases the costs and decreases the benefits assumed by formal firms and reduces the costs attributed to informality moreover it also results in a large informal economy which influences perceptions about the substitutability between formal and informal goods and law evasion our findings indicate that registered smes facing competition from informal firms are more likely to be credit constrained than other formal smes that are not confronted with such competition this result is consistent with the parasite view and the entrepreneurial perspective of informality which assert that informal firms are capable of competing against registered smes and hurting the latter s profits further we find that such adverse impact manifests only in countries with weak rule of law and high degree of corruption and bureaucracy our results also show that registered micro and small firms are more likely to be affected by the presence of informal firm competitors than medium sized firms this is because the benefits of formality that include access to credit from financial institutions increase with firm size on the whole our findings suggest that governments must enhance their role in increasing access to credit to smaller firms and in providing incentives for informal firms to be integrated in the formal economy moreover in order to achieve inclusive growth our results highlight the importance of improving the business environment which affects all entrepreneurs

crop insurance acreage decisions and nonpoint source pollution the redirection of farm policy in the 1996 farm bill has generated much interest in seeking environmentally friendly and economically viable ways to protect farm income agricultural insurance has been suggested as such an instrument this article estimates the effect of crop insurance on crop mix and the resulting change in chemical use in the central nebraska basin providing corn insurance will shift land from hay and pasture to corn which will increase chemical use at the extensive margin this extensive margin effect dominates the effect of crop insurance on the application rate leading to an increase in total chemical use

the benefits of formalization evidence from vietnamese manufacturing smes summary based on unique panel data consisting of both formal and informal firms this paper uses a matched double difference approach to examine the relationship between legal status and firm level outcomes in micro small and medium manufacturing enterprises smes in vietnam controlling for determining factors and observable time variant factors that may simultaneously influence the decision to formalize and subsequent firm performance we find evidence that becoming officially registered leads to an increase in profits and investments and a decrease in the use of casual labor improved contract conditions for workers thus we conclude that formalizing is beneficial both to firms and the workers in these firms

risks and farmers investment in productive assets in nigeria the majority of farmers in sub saharan africa ssa lack the means to mitigate the impact of risks associated with rainfall and commodity prices due to capital constraints and the imperfect insurance market in these countries because most ssa farmers are risk averse they may be willing to invest in productive assets that can mitigate the impacts of such risks if their capital constraints are relaxed through external financial assistance we test this hypothesis by using panel data on investment behavior of nigerian farmers who received financial assistance on productive assets the empirical results show that farmers facing higher rainfall risks are more likely to invest in irrigation pumps that can mitigate the impact of rainfall risks while those facing higher risks of white gari price are more likely to invest in milling machines that enable them to process cassava into flour instead of gari which supports our hypothesis

financial and legal constraints to growth does firm size matter using a unique firm level survey database covering 54 countries we investigate the effect of financial legal and corruption problems on firms growth rates whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size it is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial legal and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most there is only a weak relation between firms perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth we also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

modelling the informal sector formally abstract the theoretical characterization of formal informal sector dualism by labor market dualism is integrated with its empirical characterization by size dualism by supposing that the minimum formal sector wage is only enforced for firms greater than a certain size a firm s size varies directly with the talent of its enterpreneur manager and the choice between formal and informal sector entrepreneurship is determined endogenously it is then shown that the size gap between the smallest formal sector firm and largest informal sector firm varies directly with the formal informal sector wage differential which in turn is shown as expected to increase the further is the minimum wage above the market clearing wage the comparative statics of changes in the size of the firm above which the minimum wage is enforced are also examined

categorizing risks in the insurance industry this paper analyzes the welfare implications of imperfectly categorizing risks in the insurance industry under conditions of asymmetric information firms initially unable to distinguish the risk type of individuals are provided with imperfect information concerning risk membership the paper then compares various wilson type equilibria to determine the welfare implications of firms imperfectly categorizing risks it is shown that only in the case where the initial equilibrium is of the nash no subsidy type is there a pareto type improvement in welfare

the design of an optimal insurance policy almost every phase of economic behavior is affected by uncertainty the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms the most apparent and familiar form for shifting risks is the ordinary insurance policy previous insurance decision analyses can be divided into those in which the insurance policy was exogenously specified see john gould jan mossin and vernon smith and those in which it was not see karl borch 1960 and kenneth arrow 1971 1973 in this paper the pioneering work of borch and arrow the derivation of the optimal insurance contract form from the model is synthesized and extended

financing patterns around the world are small firms different using a firm level survey database covering 48 countries we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources including leasing supplier development and informal finance small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance especially bank finance protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms mainly due to its effect on bank finance small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms we also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms finally we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries

finance and growth for microenterprises evidence from rural china using a survey dataset of chinese rural households we find that access to external finance is positively associated with the decision to become entrepreneur and the initial investment for microenterprises also we find that use of informal finance especially financing from friends and family is positively associated with sales growth of microenterprises with employees but not of self employed we do not find any significant relationship between the use of formal finance and firm growth our findings underline the importance of finance for entrepreneurship and microenterprise growth and the role of informal finance in the absence of efficient formal financial institutions

valuing agricultural insurance this paper proposes a method for estimating a farmer s stochastic discount factor that is independent of his or her risk preferences and shows that that stochastic discount factor is appropriate for calculating a farmer s willingness to pay for a crop insurance product an empirical example illustrates how production and price data might be combined with returns data to permit econometric estimation of the stochastic discount factor and the implications of those illustrative results are briefly discussed

corruption and microenterprises in russia abstract in russia compliance with the rules and regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life has created a hostile environment for microenterprises more serious than the regulations per se however is the potential niche they create for opportunistic behavior by regulatory authorities in russia the regulatory state has created a corrupt cadre of government bureaucrats who frequently engage in rent seeking behavior while enforcing regulations firms are not uniformly affected by corruption however this paper shows empirical evidence of differential incidence of extortion based on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics corruption in russia is similar to a regressive tax and acts as a disincentive to innovation and growth it may induce technologically inefficient production decisions and can dilute economies of scale and scope

further toward a theory of agricultural insurance the economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that given full information pareto optimal insurance contracts are actuarially fair provide full coverage and differ for each individual the information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection prevent pareto optimality from being attained several second best solutions to these problems are applied to agricultural insurance it is shown that information collection and the application of contract design principles are second best solutions which may achieve the benefits of insurance at less cost than the current practice of public subsidies in theory agricultural insurance is an efficient risk sharing mechanism in practice however agricultural insurance has been a costly means of transferring risk from farmers to governments and or other insurers to induce farmers to participate in agricultural insurance governments have borne significant subsidy costs hazell pomareda and valdes p 295 in a recent study ahsan ali and kurian aak concluded that public subsidies are necessary to make agricultural insurance viable they also showed that insurance will increase output relative to a case with no insurance thus insurance is beneficial particularly in less developed countries where increasing food supplies is a policy goal for this reason they concluded that public subsidization of insurance also is desirable their conclusions are derived from a simplified model of production with one output and one input in this article we consider a more general production model with multiple inputs and outputs we show that aak s conclusion about the benefits of insurance may not hold depending on the nature of the inputs and outputs as defined by the production function carl h nelson is an assistant professor of agricultural economics

production efficiency of british building societies the purpose of this paper is to examine the relative efficiency of british building societies and to find out whether efficiency factor is the driving force behind the merging of small building societies efficiency indices for societies are derived from a 1981 sample of cross section data the results indicate wide disparities in efficiency these differences are not related to the size of building societies but apparently to managers skill and motivation

toward a theory of agricultural insurance in this paper we develop a theory of crop insurance we start by reaffirming the risk spreading role of competitive crop insurance markets it is argued however that once the problems of imperfect information are recognized a competitive crop insurance market may not exist at all two candidates present themselves first is market insurance with the public sector as a source of costly information gathering and dissemination and second is the direct provision of crop insurance by the public sector we focus on the latter and develop a model of public insurance as a decentralized plan where the farmer determines factor utilization taking the insurance contract as given in turn the insurance agency taking factor utilization as determined by the farmer chooses the optimal contract so as to maximize the value of aggregate output in the economy

the pricing of revenue assurance a theoretical model to value gross revenue assurance under one of the popular proposals facing u s policy makers is developed the approach makes use of a fundamental paradigm of asset valuation and stochastic calculus because farm level gross revenue is not a traded asset equilibrium arguments must be made to specify the partial differential equation characterizing the value of the assurance an example solution is presented under the assumption of lognormally distributed gross revenue county level data for a variety of crops are used to examine empirically the pricing ability of the model

regulation of entry labor market institutions and the informal sector abstract this paper develops a two sector matching model that incorporates the main features of latin american labor markets it has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries the model is numerically solved using brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed reducing formal sector s entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare thus the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal

technological uncertainty and the theory of the firm several recent articles 1 6 have generalized the theory of the firm to incorporate price uncertainty and risk aversion it is now well known that the risk averse entrepreneur will select that level of output at which the expected price equals the marginal cost plus the marginal risk premium leland 5 provides a similar generalization given demand uncertainty however in each case the assumption of a well specified technology is maintained this paper complements and generalizes the earlier work on the theory of the firm by investigating the effect which technological uncertainty has on the firm s optimal production decision like the earlier work on the theory of the firm we show that the firm selects the level of input at which the expected marginal productivity equals the factor price plus the marginal risk premium unlike the earlier work we show that the sign of the marginal risk premium is not always positive and that it depends on the structure of the firm s technology we show that the distinction between price and technological uncertainty is important because each can lead to different implications for firm behavior like its predecessors the model of the firm presented here assumes a single ownerentrepreneur who makes the production decision we modify the baron and sandmo models by assuming that the entrepreneur knows the cost of each production decision but not the output as a result the entrepreneur s decision yields a random variable denoting output and a linear transformation of it denoting profit the entrepreneur chooses the random variable denoting profit to maximize his expected utility there are at least three distinct ways in which our notion of technological uncertainty may be interpreted first the entrepreneur may not know the location of the production surface in this case each production decision yields a random output an increase in the

agricultural insurance and soil depletion in a simple dynamic model we study the effects of agricultural insurance on farm production choices soil depletion and the environment when there are two related risks one in short to medium run production revenues and the other in land value the analysis considers pure and truncating insurance programs that stabilize linear combinations of short run revenue risk and land price risk production revenue stabilizing insurance is often found to elicit increased farmer output thus exacerbating environmental externalities and causing further soil depletion land value stabilizing insurance typically elicits lower output thus mitigating environmental externalities and pushing farmers closer to their complete insurance output levels

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

insurability and moral hazard in agricultural insurance markets pareto optimal and constrained pareto optimal all risk insurance contracts are studied conditions required for emergence of competitive insurance markets are isolated and discussed full insurance contracts are shown to be dominated by contracts involving coinsurance and deductibles if insurers are pseudo risk averse the effect of moral hazard on all risk agricultural insurance indemnity schedules is examined results for indemnity schedules under moral hazard and constant absolute risk aversion show that providing farmers with the incentives to take appropriate actions may imply lower deductibles in the presence of moral hazard than in the absence of moral hazard

lurking in the shadows the informal sector and government policy abstract this paper develops a dynamic model that sheds light on the evolution of the informal sector we show how tax rates and enforcement policies influence the size of this sector and how the sector naturally declines as an economy transitions towards steady state we find small changes in the tax rate cause measurable changes in the size of informal employment but modest changes in enforcement have negligible effects these results suggest that while reductions in the tax rate combined with increased enforcement reduce the size of the informal sector tax rate reductions and penalties for evasion are the most effective

systemic risk reinsurance and the failure of crop insurance markets without affordable reinsurance private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail because systemic weather effects induce high correlation among farm level yields defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms using an empirical model of the u s crop insurance market we find that u s crop insurer portfolios are twenty to fifty times riskier than they would be otherwise if yields were stochastically independent across farms we also find that area yield reinsurance contracts would enable crop insurers to cover most of their systemic crop loss risk reducing their risk exposure to levels typically experienced by more conventional property liability insurers copyright 1997 oxford university press

the size and development of the shadow economy an empirical investigation from states of india abstract using the state level data from india this paper investigates the size of the hidden economy in indian states over the period 1974 75 to 1995 96 our analysis has shown that after liberalization of the indian economy in 1991 92 the growth in the size of the hidden economy has decreased on an average our results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy is approximately 4 less in scheduled election years than in all other years we also demonstrate that the growth is significantly lower in those states where the coalition government is in power an increased growth of newspapers and the literacy rates translate to cleaner governance e g to fewer amounts of shadow economy activities in the economy