the birth of a new market the authors consider a sequential decision model in which entrepreneurs decide on whether to enter a potential new market individual entrepreneurs have private expectations about the new market s viability over time they learn about its viability from their own experience as well as that of earlier entrepreneurs the distribution of the private expectations is said to be heterogeneous if external prior beliefs about the market s viability exist the authors show that heterogeneity of expectations cuts both ways while it facilitates the birth of viable markets it also generates via the existence of extremal beliefs excessive entry in nonviable markets copyright 1994 by royal economic society

effluent regulation and long run optimality a regulator faced with free entry of firms is concerned not only with the implications of public policy for the discharges from a representative firm but also with the total pollution observed at the long run market equilibrium the regulator must take into account not only the effects of regulations upon the net marginal returns of the firm but must also consider the total profit of the firm and incentives for entry and exit this paper shows that effluent charges and tradeable effluent permits lead to long run optimality with entry of small firms the difference between firm payments and environmental damages is interpreted as the rent accruing to the environmental resource this result applies only to the competitive case with small polluters the analysis presented here allows a comparison and clarification of the literature on small and large polluters in a multi input framework with social damages dependent upon total effluents effluent charges are shown here to result in socially optimal entry confirming an assertion of baumol and oates 2 p 179 fn 161 and the important result of schulze and d arge 15 by taking average as well as marginal damages into account the effluent charge results in optimal firm scale levels and the correct input mix at the free entry market equilibrium the firm subject to an effluent tax will operate above or below the private minimum efficient scale depending upon whether average external costs exceed or are less than marginal external costs since public policy to reduce effluents is often directed at reducing the effluentgenerating activity some policy recommendations include a tax on the final output of the polluting firm in some theoretical analyses a relation between the output of the firm and the effluent level is identified and a pigouvian output tax is applied this approach should not be followed by policymakers since an output tax does not provide firms with the correct incentives for either input substitution or market entry it is shown that while a lump sum transfer is needed to provide correct entry incentives when a pigouvian output tax is applied no such transfer is needed if the tax is correctly applied to effluents contrary to 5 even if optimal firm scale and i thank the referees for helpful suggestions the support of the national science foundation under grant ses 82 19121 is gratefully acknowledged any errors are my responsibility 103

price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities we analyze trade between a perfectly informed price setting party seller and an imperfectly informed price taker buyer differently from most of the literature we focus on the case in which under full information it would be inefficient to trade goods of sufficiently poor quality we show that the unique equilibrium surviving d1 is characterized by market breakdown although trade would be mutually beneficial in some state of nature this occurs independently of the precision of the information available to the buyer the model thus implies that signaling through prices may exacerbate the effect of adverse selection rather than mitigate it under d1 the seller would always benefit from committing to prices that do not reveal her information we develop this intuition by analyzing the strategic advantages of price rigidities we show that price rigidities help restore trade and could even enhance effectiveness of prices as signals of quality

plant closings and exit behaviour in declining industries the plant closing and exit strategies of firms operating in a declining industry are examined a dynamic game theoretic model is utilized the perfectness criterion is used to restrict the set of nash equilibria there are two key equilibrium results first when firms have the same number of plants high cost plants close before lower cost plants second a larger firm i e a firm operating more plants begins closing plants before a smaller firm as long as cost differences are not large copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

endogenous market structure and competition in the 19th century american brewing industry abstract this study examines market structure and competition in the brewing industry in american frontier states around 1880 although comprehensive firm level data are unavailable available data provide information about the presence of firms in western frontier markets and characteristics of those markets the analysis uses these data in a discrete dependent variable econometric model to estimate the size of a market needed to support a certain number of breweries and the impact of market characteristics on market structure in addition the estimated market sizes needed to sustain different numbers of firms provide information about the competitive effects of entry in the early brewing industry the results indicate that the presence of second and third brewing firms significantly increased competition in a market implying that duopoly markets were not perfectly competitive moreover these findings suggest that brewing firms were not engaged in collusive behavior

monopolistic competition with experience goods this paper constructs a model of monopolistic competition where consumers cannot directly verify product quality prior to an initial purchase instead consumers base initial purchases on observed prices which perfectly signal firms qualities both in and out of equilibrium equilibrium quality is less than efficient but generally bounded away from the minimum quality with free entry observable product variety exceeds what would prevail with perfect information as repeat purchases become large relative to initial purchases or as firms become small relative to the size of the market equilibrium product quality rises and the market converges to the full information equilibrium

signalling product quality when is price relevant abstract price has long been regarded as performing a dual role in the demand for products with unknown quality it represents the opportunity cost of the product and is one of several signals which indicate quality we argue that when quality signals are stochastic not all of them will be used in particular there will be a critical price above below which price is used not used to signal quality at this price an individual s demand curve will be characterised by a reverse kink this helps explain recent results from demand analysis including those reported by abbe decarroux in this journal

competitive price and quality under asymmetric information we present an analysis of equilibrium in markets with asymmetrically informed consumers some consumers know both price and quality of all sellers whereas others know neither but may search among sellers the equilibrium correlation between price and quality generally increases with the level of information in the market and can be negative when this level is sufficiently small a meta analysis of the available empirical studies strongly supports the model s predictions

learning and capacity expansion under demand uncertainty a competitive dynamic model of entry into a new industry is set up and both its positive and normative aspects are studied the main assumptions are that entry is sequential that it occurs under imperfect information on the size of the market and that better information becomes available as time goes on the gradual improvement in information is due to the fact that later waves of entrants are able to observe the profitability of earlier entrants the major results reported here under suitable restrictions are that the equilibrium rate of entry is monotonically decreasing over time and that at any given point in time it is smaller than the socially optimal one when a new market opens as a result of a product being newly invented for instance or when an existing market starts to expand uncertainty with respect to its size is likely to prevail as a result of this uncertainty entry of firms into such markets typically will occur in waves some firms will enter initially while others will wait to see the consequences of that initial entry if the experience of early entrants is favourable entry will continue otherwise entry will cease hence with the introduction of a new product two phases are associated the growth phase typified by positive operating profits for existing firms and expansion of productive capacity due to entry of new firms and the mature phase typified by erosion of profits and fixed total productive capacity empiricists estimating the time pattern of investments during the growth phase have found an s shaped diffusion curve see mansfield 1986 and gort and klepper 1982 the purpose of the present paper is to theoretically characterize these time patterns and to investigate their welfare properties any attempt to model the type of entry described above must account for differences in both entry dates and resultant earnings in other words the theory must explain why the realized earnings of different cohorts of firms are not equal often such ex post differences are reconciled by assuming heterogeneity with respect to some latent underlying characteristic managerial ability for instance and attributing differences in earnings to differences in that characteristic in this paper instead earning differentials are attributable to luck only ex ante all firms are technologically identical and equally capable of forecasting market prospects and rationally acting upon those forecasts ex post some firms turn out to have entered at the right time and are for that reason more profitable the model developed in this paper analyzes a parametric example of a sequential entry problem in which the uncertainty over market size is gradually resolved over time in a bayesian setting in an environment of perfect competition and constant returns toscale a free entry equilibrium concept is introduced and the aggregate implications of the time path of investments are derived i then compare this actual time path to the optimum this comparison is interesting because the equilibrium is analysed under the

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

submarket dynamics and innovation the case of the us tire industry beginning in 1922 the rate of exit of us tire producers increased sharply and the industry began a severe and protracted shakeout just 5 years earlier the tire industry experienced a surge in entry that led to a rise of over 80 in the number of producers we propose an explanation for this episode based on the idea of industry submarkets which we incorporate in a model of shakeouts we test this theory and alternative explanations for the surge in entry and exit and the shakeout using a novel data set on patenting in tires and production in the early 1920s of the cord tire a key innovation we feature in our theory our analysis suggests that the development of a new submarket can open up opportunities for entry but also stimulate innovation and in the process reinforce the advantages of the leading incumbents accentuating the shakeout of producers copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

monopoly provision of product quality with uninformed buyers abstract this essay is concerned with a monopolist s incentives to provide high quality goods when some of its customers cannot observe quality prior to purchase we show that if all buyers have the same tastes for quality the monopolist will not try to take advantage of the poorly informed when tastes differ however some quality randomization may become profitable as a means to loosen binding self selection constraints the profitability of randomization is shown to depend upon the relative degrees of risk aversion of the buyers and on the convexity of the firm s cost of quality function we view our results as pointing to some potential benefits from imperfect quality control

the learning curve market dominance and predatory pricing sufficient conditions for id and iid are given in the case of two step learning in which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve after just two sales however examples are also constructed for the two step learning case in which neither id nor iid holds it is also shown that in equilibrium iid implies that learning is privately disadvantageous although it is socially advantageous finally introducing avoidable fixed costs and possible exit into the model yields a new theory of predatory pricing based on the learning curve hypothesis

symposium on the economics of liability son s liability is another s asset hence with every complaint that the u s liability system is imposing a crippling tax on suppliers of risky goods and services there also comes a cry that liability is essential to compensate the victims of accidents widespread visible concern about the liability crisis reached a peak during the mid 1980s without question there was a proliferation of lawsuits by those asserting their rights to recover for damages caused by others malpractice pollution defective products and so on with a consequent restructuring of economic activity as several of the authors in this symposium point out liability insurance premiums skyrocketed even as insurance coverage was reduced many people saw public parks and swimming pools closed for lack of liability insurance coverage less visible were the many decisions continuing to this day to withdraw products or set aside possible new products for fear of liability exposure while liability receives less press attention now than several years ago it remains an area that many suspect is sorely in need of reform and where economists have much to contribute the legal scope of liability has expanded markedly during the past 30 years raising the question of whether liability has become overly broad there are some signs that the pendulum is starting to swing the other way reducing the scope and expense of liability some states have imposed caps on punitive damages or have abolished joint and several liability which makes each defendant in a liability action potentially liable for the entire damages at the

certification and market transparency we provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency in a market with opaque product quality sellers use certification as a signaling device while buyers use it as an inspection device this difference alone implies that seller certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare under buyer certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency but because seller certification yields larger profits active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed these findings are robust and widely applicable to for instance patents automotive parts and financial products

on industry life cycles delay entry and shakeout in beer brewing abstract this paper proposes a new explanation for industry shakeout an event evident in the life cycle of many industries in which the number of firms drops significantly in a short interval of time based on an in depth analysis of the shakeout in the united states beer brewing industry between 1880 and 1890 we propose that industry shakeouts naturally follow periods of mass entry by firms similar patterns are evident in two other industries we briefly examine the us automobile and tire industries while entry rates fluctuate broadly in all these industries we find that the timing of exit for a given cohort of entrants is remarkably similar over time the exit hazard rate is peaked in the first two years of every cohort s life and drops dramatically to low and stable levels for subsequent ages in this sense mass exit follows mass entry and does not require a deep explanation it is the mass entry evident in the data for these industries that requires an explanation we propose a theoretical model of information accumulation to explain entry into an industry entrepreneurs are uncertain about the profitability of the industry and this uncertainty is resolved through sufficient accumulation of information regarding the fortunes of incumbent firms delay in entry occurs solely due to the fact that it takes time to accumulate sufficient information to support more entry the resulting entry pattern from simulations of the model looks much like that observed in the industries we study

business to business electronic commerce just as the industrial revolution mechanized the manufacturing functions of firms the information revolution is automating their merchant functions four types of potential productivity gains are expected from business to business b2b electronic commerce cost efficiencies from automation of transactions potential advantages of new market intermediaries consolidation of demand and supply through organized exchanges and changes in the extent of vertical integration of firms the article examines the characteristics of b2b online intermediaries including categories of goods traded market mechanisms employed and ownership arrangements and considers the market structure of b2b e commerce

overconfidence in the markets for lemons we extend akerlof s 1970 market for lemons by assuming that some buyers are overconfident buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale overconfident buyers do not update according to bayes rule but take the noisy signal at face value the main finding is that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection this stabilization however comes at a cost rational buyers are crowded out of the market

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

comparative analysis of firm demographics and survival evidence from micro level sources in oecd countries in this paper we present cross country evidence on firm size distribution firm demographic and post entry performance for 10 oecd countries we use harmonized firm level data drawn from business registers or social security records these data enable international comparisons and the identification of idiosyncratic country effects while average firm size differs across countries due to both sectoral specialization and within sector characteristics we find similar degrees of firm churning across countries in most of them about 20 of firms enter and exit most markets every year and about 20 40 of entering firms fail within the first 2 years of life however post entry growth of successful entrants is much higher in the usa than in europe which may be indicative of barriers to firm growth as opposed to barriers to entry

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

r d induced industry polarization and shake outs abstract we consider the standard two stage game of r d and cournot competition with ex ante identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that r d is characterized by mildly instead of strongly decreasing returns to scale we establish that only extreme r d levels are possible at equilibrium and that for a broad range of parameters equilibria are asymmetric in r d levels possibly leading one firm to endogenously exit this provides a simple link between returns to scale in r d and industry polarization including shake outs a novelty is that exit may be triggered by positive opportunities in a strategic setting given the original nature of our r d equilibrium a complete welfare analysis is conducted including a possible role for r d subsidies

price and quality in a new product monopoly in a signal extraction model of consumer behaviour higher prices signal higher quality products for a new product monopoly even without cost asymmetries across different qualities moreover higher quality products earn greater expected profits and the monopolist has an incentive to provide even transient improvements in quality finally the monopolist has a positive incentive to conduct market research about quality and produces more information than is socially optimal

ex post liability for harm vs ex ante safety regulation substitutes or complements this paper concerns the regulation of hazardous economic activities economists have generally viewed ex ante regulations safety standards pigouvian fees that regulate an activity before an accident occurs as substitutes for ex post policies exposure to tort liability for correcting extemalities this paper shows that where there is uncertainty there are inefficiencies associated with the exclusive use of negligence liability and that ex ante regulation can correct the inefficiencies in such a case it is efficient to set the safety standard below the level of precaution that would be called for if the standard were used alone jel 619

explaining the shakeout process a successive submarkets model this paper explains contemporaneous exit and entry in a new industry with a diffusion process across submarkets it allows a re interpretation of the shakeout process in some industries in a novel way the industry is a collection of initially inactive independent submarkets the timing of their activation is determined by an exogenous aggregate diffusion process new submarket opening attracts new entry however the post entry endogenous sunk investment requirement induced by innovations also forces much exit to follow entry the aggregate market thus has overlapping exit and entry and has a shakeout if the aggregate diffusion process follows a typical s shape

the limitations of pigouvian taxes as a long run remedy for externalities comment carlton and loury 1980 p 565 are the first to show that the competitive firm should operate in the range of decreasing returns to scale if the average pollution damage function is falling at the optimal output level or in the range of increasing returns if it is rising there is no reason however for them to conclude from their discovery that contrary to widely held beliefs use of a pigouvian per unit tax will not in general lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the long run p 559 c l prove that in general a tax upon the output of a polluting firm must be accompanied by a lump sum tax subsidy scheme this comment shows that a single per unit tax on emissions rather than output does lead to an efficient allocation of resources even where a single tax on output does not the model allows for emissions that are variable with respect to output as well as emissions that are independent of the level of output both of which cases are treated by c l c l p 560n observe that their results are unchanged if the problem is reformulated as one in which the number and output of firms of one industry affect the cost curves of other competitive industries following this suggestion a simple economy is assumed in which there are two industries whose total outputs x and y are produced by a variable and divisible number of firms n and m respectively the production of good y causes pollution that mixes uniformly throughout the airshed in which the economy is situated the total quantity of emissions per time period is

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

prices product qualities and asymmetric information the competitive case recent developments in the economics of information emphasize the informational content of prices we examine the degree to which prices convey information on product quality to uninformed agents under perfect competition we show that a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist when an equilibrium does exist the information on quality conveyed by prices depends on the shape of the average cost curves and the relative numbers of informed and uniformed agents

signaling with costly acquisition of signals in this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game beyond identifying equilibria which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements acting through restrictions on out of equilibrium beliefs and through trembles our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal

dynamic retail price and investment competition we develop a model of retail competition in which retailers select prices and investments in cost reduction an equilibrium is constructed in which several identical firms enter and then engage in a phase of vigorous price competition this phase is concluded with a shakeout as a low price low cost firm comes to dominate the market a central feature of the equilibrium is that low prices are complementary with large investments in cost reduction even though the dominant firm s price rises through time and initially may be below marginal cost we argue that an interpretation of predatory pricing may be inappropriate

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

entry exit and diffusion with learning by doing early entry has the advantage of higher revenues per unit of output early on late entry has the benefit of learning from the experience of earlier entrants and hence lower production costs the advantages are balanced off in a continuous time perfect foresight equilibrium competition generates s shaped diffusion and staggered entry and exit a monopolist will innovate less than a competitive industry but the innovation that he does do he will do sooner copyright 1989 by american economic association

business as usual market crashes and wisdom after the fact the authors present a three stage model of market dynamics in the first stage routine behavior tends to keep information of common interest trapped in private hands in the second stage private information reaches a threshold that triggers some agents to alter their behavior these actions release information to the market the final stage involves the market s response to this news as other participants react to the initial departure from routine behavior the authors present an application to industry investment they also outline applications to the international debt crisis to bank runs and to political upheavals copyright 1994 by american economic association

shakeouts and market crashes this article provides a microfoundation for the rise in optimism that seems to precede market crashes small young markets are more likely to experience stock price run ups and crashes we use a zeira rob type of model in which demand size is uncertain optimism then grows rationally if traders prior distribution over market size has a decreasing hazard such prior beliefs are appropriate if most new markets are duds and only a few reach a large size the crash occurs when capacity outstrips demand as an illustration for the period 1971 2001 we fit the model to the telecom sector

rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices a mean variance example abstract the paper uses an intertemporal mean variance model of the market for a dividend paying risky asset to analyse rational expectations equilibria when all agents condition their expectations on past rather than current prices the main result shows that if the time span between successive market periods is short the market will approximate full informational efficiency arbitrarily closely yet the returns to being informed are bounded away from zero this contrasts with the grossman stiglitz proposition that markets cannot come close to informational efficiency if the acquisition of information is costly

the devolution of declining industries in declining industries capacity must be reduced in order to restore profitability who bears this burden where production is all or nothing there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium the largest firms exit first ghemawat and nalebuff 1985 in this paper firms continuously adjust capacity again there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium all else equal large firms reduce capacity first and continue to do so until they shrink to the size of their formerly smaller rivals intuitively bigger firms have lower marginal revenue and correspondingly greater incentives to reduce capacity this prediction is supported by empirical findings

competition among entrepreneurs i examine a three stage model of schumpeterian competition among entrepreneurs in the initial entry stage entrepreneurs invest in innovation and establish firms in the next stage entrepreneurs choose prices strategically make irreversible investments and compete to serve consumers while faced with asymmetric information about each others innovations in the final creative destruction stage firms with better technologies remain in the market while firms with inferior technologies exit the market the model features strategic pricing by firms and the possibility of heterogeneous technologies remaining in the market the model provides a necessary and sufficient condition for creative destruction copyright 2010 the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the generalized war of attrition abstract we model a war of attrition with n k firms competing for n prizes in a natural oligopoly context the k 1 lowest value firms drop out instantaneously even though each firm s value is private information to itself in a standard setting context in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen even after giving up on its own preferred alternative each firm s exit time is independent both of k and of other players actions our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics solving the model is facilitated by the revenue equivalence theorem jel d43 d44 l13 o30

the life cycle of a competitive industry firm numbers first rise then later fall as an industry evolves this nonmonotonicity is explained using a competitive model in which innovation opportunities fuel entry and relative failure to innovate prompts exit equilibrium time paths for price and quantity also share features of the data the model is estimated using data from the u s automobile tire industry a particularly dramatic example of the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers

price signals quality the case of perfectly inelastic demand abstract this paper considers the pricing decision by a seller who has private information about quality demand is perfectly inelastic rectangular for example there may be a single buyer who wants exactly one unit and whose valuation is known by the seller it is noted that contrary to widespread belief separating equilibria do exist in this model allowing some trade of high quality products even when the average quality is low moreover by slightly perturbing demand we can use standard equilibrium refinements to uniquely select the best separating equilibrium outcome since the chosen outcome has a very simple structure regardless of the number of quality levels this model could be a useful workhorse in applications

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment we model investment as an n player game with a pure informational externality each player s payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature however because a player s action reveals his private information players wait to see what other players will do equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed we characterize the unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players we establish the following results i when the period length is very short the game ends very quickly and there is a form of herding or informational cascade which results in a collapse of investment ii as the period length increases the possibility of herding disappears iii as the number of players increases the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players adding more players simply increases the number who delay iv in the limit the time profile of investment is extreme a period of low investment followed either by an investment surge or a collapse

the survival of new plants start up conditions and post entry evolution abstract this paper examines the longevity of entrants we find size to be an important determinant of the chances of survival this being particularly relevant to de novo entrants as compared with entry by established firms current size is also found to be a better predictor of failure than initial size moreover our findings indicate that after controlling for size differences past growth matters for survival suggesting a partial adjustment process for firm size in the post entry period finally new plants are more likely to live longer if they enter growing industries or industries with little entry activity

bertrand competition when rivals costs are unknown the conclusions of the bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of asymmetric information about rivals costs asymmetric information eliminates the discontinuity in the bertrand model and significantly alters the properties of the market equilibrium in the bertrand nash equilibrium when rivals costs are unknown firms price above marginal cost and have positive expected profit the analysis is extended to franchise competition the market equilibrium is sensitive to market structure and yields incentives for entry copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

a dynamic model of entry and exit in a growing industry the potential demand in a new industry evolves over time demand is initially low but advertising by the industry s early entrants can speed up demand growth however there is intrinsic uncertainty of the demand level in each period and uncertainty of the demand evolution path which can be affected by the underlying economic environment we construct a dynamic model that features the stochastically and endogenously expanding demand of a new industry and we investigate the optimal entry and exit behavior of firms as the industry evolves we find that firms incentive to enter early depends critically on the cost that early entrants have to pay in developing the market when the cost is high and the benefit spills over to potential entrants firms have an incentive to wait and the probability of entry can increase with the number of incumbents under certain circumstances firms entry strategy is also influenced by the transition of economic states firms are more likely to enter under a state that shows the prospect of demand taking off soon we also find that in the early stage of an industry higher demand uncertainty can induce faster entry

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

consolidation by merger the uk beer market this paper examines the determinants of market structure in the uk brewing industry over 1949 1969 sutton sunk costs and market structure price competition advertising and the evolution of concentration 1991 points to technology and advertising races as two key drivers of market concentration this study uses an own built longitudinal data set of the population of firms and breweries and reveals the importance of institutional factors in explaining the dynamics of market structure the practice of tying outlets to brewers and legal restrictions on opening retail outlets together with a permissive policy towards mergers made acquisition of medium sized firms and brewery closure shortly after acquisition the main driving mechanism towards industry consolidation during this period the number of firms and plants fell sharply by 74 and 60 respectively and production rose by about 25 with no firm entry and just one new brewery opening as a result concentration increased and the market transformed from a highly fragmented one into a stable oligopoly

pigouvian penalty for oil spills abstract the imposition of ex ante taxes on expected spilled oil in addition to ex post payments for damages under tort liability would foster economic efficiency this paper begins the analysis of the joint approach with the case in which pigouvian taxes are used exclusively a model is developed in which the volume of spilled oil causing environmental damage is reduced first by spill prevention expenditures by shippers and then by clean up expenditures by the government the efficient pigouvian tax on expected spilled oil equals marginal environmental damage which equals the net marginal cost of prevention which equals marginal clean up cost

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

miracle on sixth avenue information externalities and search after a long dormant period lower sixth avenue in new york has undergone a rapid revitalisation we show that a simple search theoretic model with information spillovers can explain both the period of underuse and the rapid turnaround the model reduces to a simple equation which allows us to do comparative statics on the duration of vacancies we show how the solution reacts to changes in market structure and changes in search technology the model is suggestive of difficulties that may occur in many markets in which there are changes over time in the optimal use of resources at one time lower sixth avenue was one of the most fashionable retail centres in manhattan but the area collapsed as a retail centre when the affluent moved further uptown and to the suburbs today sixth avenue is in the midst of a rapid turnaround as reported in the sunday new york times by claudia

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed