money and prices under uncertainty we study whether monetary economies display nominal indeterminacy equivalently whether monetary policy determines the path of prices under uncertainty in a simple stochastic cash in advance economy we find that indeterminacy arises and is characterized by the initial price level and a probability measure associated with state contingent nominal bonds equivalently monetary policy determines an average but not the distribution of inflation across realizations of uncertainty the result does not derive from the stability of the deterministic steady state and is not affected essentially by price stickiness nominal indeterminacy may affect real allocations in cases we identify our characterization applies to stochastic monetary models in general and it permits a unified treatment of the determinants of paths of inflation copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

a theory of retail pricing until recently the retail enterprise the shop has been comparatively neglected by economic theorists partly because they assigned little role to retailing the growth of interest in the problem in recent years reflects the development of models of imperfect information and the revival of interest in location theory pricing theory for the retail enterprise however remains a neglected area after surveying existing models of retailing the paper concentrates on the idea that the shop saves its customers costs by assembling goods in one place this introduces an essential non convexity and importantly affects the conditions under which shops compete with each other and the constraints on their price setting under the admittedly unrealistic assumption of full buyer information a theory of retail pricing is developed retail prices are frequently regarded as exceptions both to the law of costs and generally to every rational process of price formation which is all the more remarkable since these prices are the only ones which are of direct interest to the consumer and which are directly influenced by consumption knut wickselt

pricing in a customer market in standard pricing models movements in demand are partially offset by price responses in a customer market however price markups may decrease with high demand thus price may magnify rather than stabilize demand movements i consider a monopolist selling a good of which first time consumers are uncertain repeat customers know that the product works the monopolist trades the objectives of exploiting past customers and attracting new ones in a period with many new potential customers the monopolist gives more weight to attracting and lowers its markup last i examine some evidence on whether expansions are periods with disproportionately many new customers

optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with home bias we analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in consumption peculiar to our framework is the application of a ramseytype analysis to a model of the recent open economy new keynesian literature we show that home bias in consumption is a su cient condition for inducing the monetary policy maker of an open economy to deviate from a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some optimal degree of exchange rate stabilization we focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case of rms setting prices one period in advance and in a gradual fashion subject to adjustment costs while the rst setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias as an independent source of equilibrium

the contribution of nonhomothetic preferences to trade abstract this paper estimates the economic significance of preference nonhomotheticity in international trade tastes are assumed to be identical but budget shares depend on per capita income a linear expenditure system is estimated for 34 countries over 11 commodity aggregates a counterfactual exercise is conducted to estimate the volume of trade caused by deviations from homotheticity the results indicate that nonhomothetic preferences may account for as much as one quarter of interindustry trade flows

openness and optimal monetary policy abstract we show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate above and beyond the size of trade flows using an analytically tractable small open economy model we characterize the impact of the trade composition on the policy trade off and on the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for price misalignments contrary to models where openness can be summarized by the degree of home bias we find that openness can be a poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies using input output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non tradable content of final demand components and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production the estimates are used in a richer small open economy dsge model to quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports we find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non traded goods in final demand

the timing and magnitude of retail store markdowns evidence from weekends and holidays we examine daily prices of eight goods at seventeen retail stores collected in ann arbor michigan over a four month period from november 1 to february 28 we focus on weekly and seasonal price patterns and on the frequency of price markdowns or sales there were frequent markdowns in the intensive shopping period prior to christmas and a tendency for such sales to occur on weekends we interpret these findings as evidence that a significant number of markdowns are timed to occur when shopping intensity is exogenously high we complement the imperfect information based motives for sales in the literature by contributing an additional element based on the role of bulk shopping and increasing returns in the shopping technology

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

strategic pricing models and interpretation of price war data abstract price wars cartel breakdowns and other seemingly disequilibrium pricing phenomena are examined questions of interest include when do breakdowns occur how long do they last what determines their severity and are they characterized by increased cross sectional price dispersion and or temporal price volatility the first half of the paper explains how the choice of punishment strategy the specification of the stochastic shocks to the system and the assumptions regarding observability determine the pricing dynamics implicit in several theoretical price war models theories are classified into imperfect monitoring models in which players actions cannot be observed learning models in which structural parameters are unknown to the players and cyclical models in which observability is perfect but business cycles affect the difficulty of colluding the second half in contrast examines data on prices actually set by firms in industries which are subject to periodic wars when the models are confronted with the data we can see how well oligopoly theory explains the behavior of the firms in these industries the object of the exercise is not to pick a winner instead the role of industry characteristics in determining pricing dynamics is assessed and the reasons why simple models may fail to explain complex pricing patterns are examined finally directions for future research are suggested by the empirical regularities which are uncovered

price stability in open economies this paper studies the conditions under which price stability is the optimal policy in a two country open economy model with imperfect competition and price stickiness special conditions on the levels of country specific distortionary taxation and the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution need to be satisfied these restrictions apply to both cooperative and non cooperative settings most importantly we show that cooperative and non cooperative solutions do not coincide despite market completeness and producer currency pricing in this framework our analysis suggests a role for international policy coordination

food processor price behavior firm level evidence of sticky prices firms in imperfectly competitive markets face direct and indirect costs when changing product prices the latter costs reflect uncertain changes in revenue and market share resulting from the actions of rival firms rosett s friction model is applied to firm level data to provide estimates of the indirect costs of changing prices for a major processor of frozen concentrated orange juice results indicate that indirect costs cause significant price rigidity additionally the hypothesis that prices are equally rigid for upward and downward changes could not be rejected

volatility growth and welfare this paper constructs an endogenous growth model driven by self ful lling expectation shocks to explain the stylized fact that the average growth rate of gdp is related negatively to volatility and positively to capacity utilization the implied welfare gain from further stabilizing the u s economy is about a quarter of annual consumption which is consistent in order of magnitude with estimates based on the empirical studies of ramey and ramey 1995 and alvarez and jermann 2004 hence policies designed to reduce uctuations can generate large welfare gains because smaller uctuations are associated with permanently higher rates of growth

optimal interest rate stabilization in a basic sticky price model this paper studies optimal monetary policy with the nominal interest rate as the single policy instrument firms set prices in a staggered way without indexation and real money balances contribute separately to households utility the optimal deterministic steady state under commitment is the friedman rule even if the importance assigned to the utility of money is small relative to consumption and leisure we approximate the model around the optimal steady state as the long run policy target optimal monetary policy is characterized by stabilization of the nominal interest rate instead of inflation stabilization as the predominant principle

unions power collective bargaining and optimal monetary policy we study ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a model with sticky prices and unionized labour markets collective wage bargaining and unions monopoly power dampen wage uctuations and amplify employment uctuations relatively to a dnk model the optimal

meatpacker conduct in fed cattle pricing an investigation of oligopsony power market power in regional fed cattle markets is measured with an econometric model which links behavior of the margin between boxed beef and fed cattle prices to an economic model of conduct a noncooperative game theoretic model suggests that for tacitly collusive pricing behavior to persist in equilibrium oligopsonists must follow a discontinuous pricing strategy meatpackers pay low prices for cattle during cooperative phases and purchase cattle aggressively during noncooperative phases tests for cooperative noncooperative conduct and measures of market power are presented fed cattle prices in four direct trade regions in the central united states are examined evidence of cooperative noncooperative conduct is present in all markets but has declined over time varying conduct across markets and over time suggests it is important to continue monitoring fed cattle markets to assure a competitive environment

subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial abstract this paper is concerned with infinitely repeated duopoly games with discounting a question which has been open since friedman s rev econ stud 35 1968 257 272 reaction function article is settled for a general class of games the question is wheter nontrivial reaction function equilibria can be subgame perfect this question is answered in the negative such equilibria must be trivial in the sense of prescribing the stage game noncooperative equilibrium actions in every period independent of prior history

gaps and triangles we derive principles of optimal short run monetary policy in a real business cycles model with money and prices set in advance the optimal allocation is achieved under the friedman rule however given that policy the allocation is indeterminate we move away from the friedman rule take the interest rate path as exogenous and characterize the optimal money supply policy we identify the conditions under which it is optimal to replicate the allocation under exible prices in general sticky prices provide the planner with tools to improve upon a distorted exible prices allocation

menu costs and the neutrality of money a model of endogenous price adjustment under money growth is presented firms follow s s pricing policies and price revisions are imperfectly synchronized in the aggregate price stickiness disappears and money is neutral the connection between firm price adjustment and relative price variability in the presence of monetary growth is also investigated the results contrast with those obtained in models with exogenous fixed timing of price adjustment

optimal central bank lending abstract we analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model with open market operations the central bank sets the policy rate and can additionally control the amount of money by rationing money supplied against eligible securities optimal policy under money rationing is shown to enhance welfare in the long run and in the short run compared to a conventional optimal policy regime where money supply is not rationed and satiates money demand specifically this property is shown to apply when privately issued debt is eligible in open market operations which allows the central bank to separately alter costs of borrowing and the size of transactions for which money is required

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

price behavior in a dynamic oligopsony washington processing potatoes punishment strategies are necessary to sustain a collusive oligopsony in a repeated game context when demand is uncertain and only market variables are observable this article proposes a test for tacit collusion among potato processors in washington state using a dynamic regime switching model estimated with a finite mixture method the results support the existence of punishment and collusive regimes and show the welfare losses due to anti competitive behavior on the part of processors to be significant processors oligopsony power is enhanced by higher domestic production imports and existing stocks but it is ameliorated by high capacity utilization rates and exports copyright 2001 oxford university press

commercial policy and imperfect discrimination by a foreign monopolist this paper examines the effects of commercial policy and the qualit y of imports that are supplied by a multiproduct foreign monopolist th e author finds that a specific quota on some imported products leads to upgrading of the quality of imports and enhances national welfare a specific tariff which does not lead to a decrease in the varieties of imported products does not affect the quality of imports and result s in enhanced national welfare in contrast an ad valorem tariff leads to lower qualities of imported goods and lowers consumer surplus a general quota is undesirable since it results in a lower quality of imports and lower national warfare copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the incidence and duration of price wars the purpose of this paper is to test some theoretical predictions about the incidence and duration of price wars when these price wars are viewed as an enforcement device to maintain a cooperative or tacitly collusive agreement in an uncertain environment the theoretical model of green and porter i984 and porter i983a predicts that price wars should be triggered by unanticipated demand fluctuations and that they will be more frequent the greater the number of firms in the industry or the greater the degree of market concentration correspondingly the optimal duration of price wars is also affected by the number of firms the tests employ weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel henceforth referred to as the jec from i88o to i886 porter i 983b and lee and porter i 984 previously used this data in order to identify periods in which price wars occurred and to test whether pricing behavior in cooperative periods was consistent with predictions of the theoretical model the present paper will look more closely at the price wars themselves in order to test another set of predictions about their incidence and duration section 2 summarizes the theoretical model in more detail with emphasis on markets with price setting firms the models in green and porter i984 and porter i 983a consider quantity setting firms but the railroads in the jec chose prices not quantities the distinction has some bearing on the econometric work but the basic ideas from the theory still apply there is a brief description of thejec and the data set in section 3 empirical results are covered in section 4 and section 5 contains some concluding comments

the monetary transmission mechanism is it relevant for policy we study environments with sticky prices wages or portfolios where it is feasible and optimal to use monetary policy to replicate the allocation under full flexibility in these environments the optimal policy does not depend on the scope of the frictions in this sense the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy so asymmetries in the strength of the transmission mechanisms do not impose a cost on a common policy jel e31 e41 e58 e62

monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy this paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities it shows that the utility based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation output gap and real exchange rate the presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility when domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime the reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low

retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism previous theoretical explanations for retail price fixity show that fixed retail prices can be consistent with either competitive or imperfectly competitive behavior we develop a conceptual model of retail pricing wherein fixed price points are facilitating mechanisms for tacit collusion a non cooperative equilibrium in fixed retail prices is supported through credible threats to revert to nash pricing if cheating is suspected we test the implications of this model using a two stage ordered probit approach in weekly supermarket pricing data the results show that price fixity does support collusive equilibria among retailers but other factors may also explain retail price behavior

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

quality choice trade policy and firm incentives quality choice is examined in a duopoly with one foreign and one domestic firm where consumers have similar preferences for quality but different preferences for brands firms make quality commitments prior to choosing price and policy intervention assumes several forms the policy conclusions depend on whether firms face set up costs in raising product quality in the absence of set up costs both domestic and foreign firms make socially optimal quality choices in the presence of set up costs the foreign firm and often the domestic firm sets quality below the socially optimal level incomplete information alters these conclusions however copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

optimal fiscal and monetary policy equivalence results in this article we analyze the implications of price setting restrictions for the conduct of cyclical fiscal and monetary policy we consider standard monetary economies that differ in the price setting restrictions imposed on the firms we show that independently of the degree or type of price stickiness it is possible to implement the same efficient set of allocations and that each allocation in that set is implemented with policies that are also independent of the price stickiness in this sense environments with different price setting restrictions are equivalent

oligopolistic competition and international trade quantity and quality restrictions abstract we examine trade restrictions such as quantity and quality limitations on imports in an oligopolistic industry consisting of foreign and domestic firms we find that the effects of trade policy hinge on the location of the quality produced by the firms in the quality spectrum a quota leads to positive protection while minimum quality standards leads to negative protection furthermore minimum standards lower national welfare and a quota has an ambiguous effect on welfare

ramsey monetary policy with labor market frictions abstract traditional new keynesian models prescribe that optimal monetary policy should aim at price stability in the absence of a labor market frictions the monetary authority faces no unemployment inflation trade off the design of optimal monetary policy is analyzed here for a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions in the labor market optimal policy features deviations from price stability in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks when the hosios 1990 on the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment review of economic studies 57 2 279 298 condition is not met search externalities make the flexible price allocation unfeasible optimal deviations from price stability increase with workers bargaining power as firms incentives to post vacancies fall and unemployment fluctuates above the pareto efficient one

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

strategic monetary policy in interdependent economies gains from coordination reconsidered abstract there is a wide acceptance that gains to international monetary policy coordination are small at best and that the need of policy coordination is questionable this conclusion however follows from the underlying presumption that monetary policy is concerned with the stabilization of macroeconomic fluctuations only this paper presents a general short run monetary policy analysis within a familiar two country new open economy macroeconomics noem framework where national monetary policy involves the choice of a deterministic growth trend of money supply average inflation rate and stochastic state dependent deviations of actual money supply from the deterministic trend stabilization strategic beggar thy neighbor considerations induce the deviation of both policy choices from their socially optimal values the gains from international coordination of the average inflation rate are of first order and hence larger than the gains from the coordination of the stabilization policies which are of second order

sticky price and limited participation models of money a comparison abstract we provide new evidence that models of the monetary transmission mechanism should be consistent with at least the following facts after a contractionary monetary policy shock the aggregate price level responds very little aggregate output falls interest rates initially rise real wages decline by a modest amount and profits fall we compare the ability of sticky price and limited participation models with frictionless labor markets to account for these facts the key failing of the sticky price model lies in its counterfactual implications for profits the limited participation model can account for all the above facts but only if one is willing to assume a high labor supply elasticity 2 percent and a high markup 40 percent the shortcomings of both models reflect the absence of labor market frictions such as wage contracts or factor hoarding which dampen movements in the marginal cost of production after a monetary policy shock 1997 elsevier science b v

optimal pricing with costly adjustment evidence from retail grocery prices in many theoretical models it is assumed that there are costs associated with adjusting prices in this paper the existence type and magnitude of such costs are investigated empirically a discrete choice dynamic programming model that nests fixed and variable costs is developed and econometric estimates of the adjustment cost function are obtained the data used to implement the model consist of weekly retail prices and sales of three brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small u s town the study has several distinguishing characteristics first the data are highly disaggregate at the level of brand and store second variables are sampled at weekly intervals third the model nests fixed and variable adjustment costs and can therefore determine their relative importance finally the discrete choice model is both structural and dynamic

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

optimal monetary policy rules with labor market frictions abstract this paper studies optimal monetary policy rules in a framework with sticky prices matching frictions and real wage rigidities optimal policy is given by a constrained ramsey plan in which the monetary authority maximizes the agents welfare subject to the competitive economy relations and the assumed monetary policy rule i find that the optimal rule should respond to unemployment alongside with inflation this is so since models with matching frictions unlike standard new keynesian models feature a congestion externality that makes unemployment inefficiently high a strong response to inflation remains optimal while a response to output is always welfare detrimental

tariffs versus quotas with endogenous quality this paper analyzes the effects and desirability of tariffs quotas and quality controls when the quality of the imported good is endogenous and the foreign producer is a monopolist a crucial determinant of the direction of these effects is shown to be the valuation of increments in quality by the marginal consumer relative to that of all consumers on average a way of comparing infinitesimal equivalent policies is developed and used to compare import equivalent policies

pricing to market price discrimination or product differentiation we employ a vertical differentiation model to examine the potential bias in pricing to market results when using export unit values aggregating differentiated products our results show that i false evidence of pricing to market is always found when using unit values whether the law of one price holds or not and ii the size of the bias increases with the level of product differentiation our simulation results support those conceptual findings thus some of the positive pricing to market results in the literature could be an artifact of the product heterogeneity embodied in unit values rather than evidence of imperfect competition

optimal monetary policy with endogenous entry and product variety deviations from long run price stability are optimal in the presence of endogenous entry and product variety in a sticky price model in which price stability would be optimal otherwise long run inflation deflation is optimal when the benefit of variety to consumers falls short of exceeds the market incentive for creating that variety the desired markup price indexation exacerbates this mechanism plausible preference specifications and parameter values justify positive long run inflation rates however short run price stability around this non zero trend is close to optimal even in the presence of endogenously time varying desired markups that distort the intertemporal allocation of resources

sticky prices in a dynamic oligopoly an investigation of s s thresholds abstract the strategic implications of costly price adjustment are investigated empirically i assume that managers are engaged in a state space game and ask if the dynamic considerations that arise when they condition their choices on the state cause prices to be more or less rigid than when players use more myopic pricing rules the answer to this question depends on a parametric specification of the problem that lends itself to empirical assessment the micro panel data used to investigate this issue consist of weekly prices sales costs and promotional activity for three brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small us town i find that in this market strategic behavior exacerbates price rigidity the thresholds are wider and the time between changes is longer than would be observed in a more myopic setting

monetary policy and labor market frictions a tax interpretation replicating the flexible price allocation in models with nominal rigidities and labor market frictions that lead to an inefficient matching of unemployed workers with job vacancies even if feasible is generally not desirable we characterize the tax instruments that implement the first best allocation and examine the trade offs faced by monetary policy if these tax instruments are unavailable our tax interpretation helps explain why the welfare cost of inefficient labor market search can be large while the incentive to deviate from price stability is small gains from deviating from price

the role of countercyclical monetary policy when firms set nominal prices in advance optimal monetary policy insulates aggregate output against shocks to demand it can do so however by following the constant money growth rule advocated by milton friedman it need not respond to the shocks in an actively countercyclical way in addition to the extent that output fluctuations are driven by shocks to supply money growth should be procyclical

poole in the new keynesian model abstract we study the properties of alternative central bank targeting procedures within the standard new keynesian model we find that poole s famous insights concerning the output stabilization properties of money and interest rate targeting obtain when intertemporal substitution is low and that output volatility rankings do not induce similar welfare rankings unlike the popular presumption money targeting always fares better for money demand shocks for fiscal shocks money targeting does better for low and worse for high degree of intertemporal substitution the opposite pattern obtains for supply shocks

oligopolistic competition and optimal monetary policy abstract this paper studies optimal monetary policy in a dsge model with supply side strategic complementarity as arising from oligopolistic competition and nominal rigidities firms oligopolistic rents induce inefficient fluctuations through both intra temporal and intertemporal time varying wedges optimality requires the use of state contingent inflation taxes to smooth and reduce firms rents hence under optimal ramsey policy ppi deviates significantly from zero a comparison of welfare costs for a set of operational rules relatively to the ramsey plan shows that targeting the output gap the mark up and the asset price improves upon a rule with aggressive response to inflation

price rigidities and market structure conventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of keynesian unemployment is the observed rigidities of wages and prices what has been lacking however is a satisfactory theory or conjunction of theories which explains how wages and prices can be at non market clearing levels the objective of this paper is to sketch out several alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon each in contrast with keynesian theory is consistent with the observation that as the economy goes into a recession real product wages do not increase and may in fact decrease all of the theories assume rational profit maximizing firms and all entail some important departure from the standard competitive paradigm the first three explanations represent minor adaptations of standard models

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

price adjustment and market structure abstract this paper shows how the extent of price inertia depends on the form of market competition we first establish that the speed of price adjustment depends on the curvature of the profit function in the region around the optimum price we then show how this depends on market structure we prove the following results 1 1 the speed of price adjustment depends positively on the price elasticity of demand 2 2 the speed of price adjustment depends positively on the number of firms in a market and 3 3 the speed of price adjustment depends negatively on the degree of collusion between firms

monetary and macroprudential policies in a leveraged economy we examine the optimal monetary policy in the presence of endogenous feedback loops between asset prices and economic activity when macroprudential policies can also be pursued absent macroprudential policies the optimal monetary policy leans against asset prices and can be closely approximated using a speed limit rule that responds to the growth of financial variables an endogenous feedback loop is crucial for this result price stability is otherwise quasi optimal similarly a simple macroprudential rule that links reserve requirements to credit growth dampens the endogenous feedback loop and leads to near price stability state contingent taxes on lending are shown to be welfare improving

monetary conservatism and fiscal policy abstract does an inflation conservative central bank a la rogoff 1985 remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy to provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy with monopolistic distortions monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility we find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending the optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation a conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable when fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal