rules stability and growth abstract this paper examines two systems of fiscal redistribution in the context of a growing economy subject to unexpected shocks rules and discretion under the former system the tax system is in place and is known to households contemplating investment decisions under the second redistribution is decided upon only after the investment decisions have been made i find that rules always lead to faster capital accumulation and growth but political support for them is only likely to occur in a stable economy income inequality adversely affects the likelihood of adopting rules especially so in an unstable economy

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

pressure groups and public expenditures the flypaper effect reconsidered a model of government budgeting is developed in which lobbying by interest groups can divert the allocation of funds away from the one preferred by the median voter the model is applied to state and local governments to show that the flypaper effect the tendency for lump sum grants to increase public expenditures by more than an equivalent increase in the community s pretax income can be explained without the customary assumption of voter fiscal illusion furthermore the model predicts variation in the extent of the flypaper effect among expenditure categories as found in previous empirical studies

agricultural extension transactions costs and supply response discussion henning henningsen and henningsen 2011 develop an elegant and appropriate model which is used to investigate the relationship between networks and individual transaction costs as well as to use polish data to empirically estimate the impact of networks on farmers transaction costs in both agricultural input and output markets the strength of the paper lies in its theoretical portion and thus my comments are focused mainly on the empirical portion first off while this may be due to the page limit the empirical part is much less transparent than the theoretical part in order to isolate the impact of networks on transactions it is important to control for other potential factors such as road access and market size which may also affect transaction costs the paper is rather ambiguous with respect to this point second the paper claims that the empirical findings support the central hypotheses as derived from the theoretical model assuming inputs are locally traded and outputs are globally traded as to this point it would be nice to cite some evidence to back up this assumption for instance it is not apparent why outputs such as livestock should be traded globally while input markets such as pesticides should be traded locally third suppliers often take advantage of the network effects by clustering together many agricultural or industrial productions are cluster based porter 2000 long and zhang 2011 in a cluster the inherent fierce competition and easy information flow cause price to become transparent this makes it almost impossible for either buyers or suppliers to cheat on prices the competitive

the tragedy of the commons and economic growth why does capital flow from poor to rich countries we analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock we show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons we use this model to analyze capital flight in many poor countries property rights are not well defined since safe bank accounts in rich countries the inferior technology are available to citizens of these countries they engage in capital flight we show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare

voracious transformation of a common natural resource into productive capital i analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights i obtain a feedback nash equilibrium to the dynamic common pool problem and obtain political variants of the hotelling depletion rule and the hartwick saving rule resource prices and depletion occur too fast so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high the power struggle boosts output but depresses sustainable consumption genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society world bank estimates may be too optimistic

tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries abstract based on a sample of 56 countries we show that fiscal policy in the g7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical i e fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times to explain this puzzle we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending given this distortion a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base as is the case for developing countries will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy

voracity vs scale effect in a growing economy without secure property rights abstract this paper extends the standard model of growth with insecure property rights by introducing variable labor supply and increasing returns to scale it is assumed that capital stock is jointly owned by multiple interest groups and that each group participates in production activities by supplying its labor force in this setting there are two opposing factors that affect growth over consumption in the absence of secure property rights and the scale effect due to the presence of increasing returns the growth performance of the economy thus depends on which factor dominates

intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending this paper tests the predictions that i sub central government expenditures are procyclical and ii sub central government expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than central government spending the predictions are based on the importance of voracity effects and on the proposition that they are systematically more pervasive if spending is financed by intergovernmental transfers evidence from 23 oecd countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates that sub central government spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure

the flypaper effect what happens to a state s spending when it receives an unconditional grant from the federal government the standard theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in spending will be the same as that generated by an equivalent increase in local incomes or roughly 5 10 percent for most states in contrast numerous empirical analyses have found that spending increases by much more with some estimates near 100 percent this result is known as the flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where it hits the authors review this evidence as well as other studies that find similar behavior in firms

a dynamic model of conflict and appropriation abstract this paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by hirshleifer 1991 1995 and skaperdas 1992 to an infinite horizon differential game our aim is to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among a smaller group of agents in an intertemporal context the model yields the conclusion that there exists a unique linear nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategy even when strategies are defined over the entire state space we demonstrate that partial cooperation can be seen as a long run response to conflict moreover a decrease in the effectiveness of appropriation the depreciation rate of a common pool stock the rate of time preferences or an increase in the degree of noise improves the degree of partial cooperation and thus welfare in an anarchic society

adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries a survey this paper reviews various studies which have provided a description and possible explanation to patterns of innovation adoption in the agricultural sector the survey points out that the tendency of many studies to consider innovation adoption in dichotomous terms adoption nonadoption may not be appropriate in many cases where the actual decisions are defined over a more continuous range more attention needs to be given to the socio cultural and institutional environment in area studies so that their interrelation with economic factors affecting adoption can be inferred the presence of several interrelated innovations is another aspect that needs to be considered more carefully in future research since a number of simultaneous decisions may be involved furthermore the possibility of regular sequential patterns in adopting components of a new technological package should be specifically addressed in future studies finally the impact of differential adoption rates on land holding distribution merits attention in future research

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

fiscal policy and monetary integration in europe fiscal policy economists policy makers and the media often argue that the maastricht treaty and the stability and growth pact make it difficult for governments of emu countries to stabilize their economies with appropriate fiscal policy and to provide adequate public investment our empirical analysis offers little support to this view discretionary budget deficits have actually become more counter cyclical in emu countries after the maastricht treaty as well as in the other eu and non eu industrialized countries we study and while public investment has declined recently in emu countries a similar tendency is apparent in other countries and started well before the maastricht treaty was signed jordi gali and roberto perotti

budget deficits and social protection cyclical government expenditure in the oecd countercyclical government spending offers social protection to the vulnerable when economies move into recession this paper questions the extent to which governments are able to spend countercyclically and the extent to which social expenditures are likely to be countercyclical an analysis of public spending in oecd countries 1980 2005 suggests countercyclical social protection is constrained by the limits to public borrowing and the degree of political polarization

social polarization fiscal instability and growth abstract we present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization of preferences plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse in a highly polarized society a deficit occurs endogenously fiscal spending path becomes more volatile output collapses and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output one novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit the magnitude of fiscal volatility and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization this is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers or socio economic groups to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting polarization effect thereby we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth moreover we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting

fiscal spending and economic growth some stylized facts using an event analysis this paper complements the cross country approach to the study of fiscal correlates of growth data on fiscal expenditures and growth for a database of 140 countries 118 developing countries over 1972 2005 are reorganized around turning points providing a summary but encompassing description of what is in the data for this sample the probability of occurrence of a fiscal event is about 10 and the probability of a growth event once a fiscal event had occurred is around 26 for developing countries fiscal events followed by growth events occur under situations of i significantly lesser deficit ii fewer resources devoted to non interest general public services and iii shift in primary expenditures toward transport communication after controlling for the growth inducing effects of positive terms of trade shocks and of trade liberalization reform probit estimates indicate that a growth event is more likely to occur in a developing country when surrounded by a fiscal event moreover the probability of occurrence of a growth event in the years following a fiscal event is greater the lower is the associated fiscal deficit confirming that success of a growth oriented fiscal expenditure reform is associate with a stabilized macroeconomic environment through limited primary fiscal deficit

eliminating price supports a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes information and politically constrained government programs for eliminating price supports the issues which we examine in this model include i to what extent is it possible to reduce the size of oversubscribed industries in light of the information and political constraints that exist is a complete decoupling of a worker s compensation from her output possible or desirable ii which type of workers as characterized by their skill levels and outside employment opportunities remain in the industry iii which type of worker is harmed by the relocation program which coalitions of workers will oppose the reorganization

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

fiscal federalism and procyclical spending the cases of argentina and brazil este trabajo estudia las fuentes de la prociclicalidad del gasto para gobiernos subnacionales en argentina y brasil encontramos que los esquemas de coparticipacion de los impuestos explican solo una parte menor de la prociclicalidad de los recursos de las entidades subnacionales siendo la mayor parte explicada por la prociclicalidad de los propios recursos esto es especialmente visible cuando esa prociclicalidad se mide relativa al producto de cada entidad subnacional usando evidencia de corte transversal para distintas jurisdicciones podemos concluir que a su vez la prociclicalidad del gasto resulta de la prociclicalidad de los recursos mediante el llamado voracity effect la conclusion es que el debate sobre la prociclicalidad del gasto de entidades subnacionales debiera concentrarse mucho mas en mejorar los sistemas impositivos locales que en cambiar los regimenes de coparticipacion

the impact of education on subjective discount rate in ugandan villages abstract heterogeneity in time discounting may reinforce the existing barriers to save and invest faced by rural populations in developing countries we elicit a subjective discount rate for a varied sample of ugandan villagers in accordance with other studies we have found the discount rate to decrease with education we examine this correlation further by testing the causal effect of education and exploit two different sources of its variation school frequency across villages and the number of the respondents school going years that overlap with the era of the dictator idi amin s rule for men we find that education has a significant impact on their discount rate similar in magnitude for both types of instruments and robust to observable characteristics this finding highlights the importance of education in development

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

peasant household behaviour with missing markets some paradoxes explained a model of peasant household behavior under varying degrees of household specific food and labor market failures is constructed to show that these structural features can explain several well known patterns of peasant response which have often been attributed to peculiar motives presumed specific to peasants the model explains sluggish response to cash crops prices and high instability in perceived food and labor scarcities the key role of manufactured consumer goods prices in stimulating peasants effort in cash crops production the effectiveness of taxation as opposed to incentives in stimulating cash crops production and the key role of technological change in food production to enhance cash crop production results are obtained analytically in the case of one market failure and by numerical simulation with more than one

returns to spending on agricultural extension the case of the national agricultural advisory services naads program of uganda the aim of this paper is to assess the direct and indirect impacts of the agricultural extension system of uganda the national agricultural advisory services naads program on household agricultural income data from two rounds of surveys of ugandan rural farm households conducted in 2004 and 2007 as well as different program evaluation methods and model specifications are used to estimate impacts and compute a rate of return the direct and indirect impact of the program is estimated at 37 95 and 27 55 increase in per capita agricultural gross revenue between 2004 and 2007 for households participating directly and indirectly in the program respectively compared to nonparticipants the rate of return on the program s expenditures is estimated at 8 49 the program has been relatively more effective among male headed larger and asset poor households as well as those taking up noncrop high value enterprises and living further away from financial services all weather roads and markets or located in the eastern and northern regions policy implications of the results are drawn

policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars a two region model abstract we develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two region setup to counteract the overexploitation of the resource the tragedy of commons that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies we compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve or assigns territorial user rights to the players we show that when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and in addition they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players conversely in a context of higher harvesting effort the intervention can help to safeguard the resource preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players

locus of control and technology adoption in developing country agriculture evidence from ethiopia abstract we investigate the implication of farmers locus of control on their technology adoption decisions our empirical analysis is based on two longitudinal surveys and hypothetical choice exercises conducted on ethiopian farmers we find that locus of control significantly predicts farmers technology adoption decisions including use of chemical fertilizers improved seeds and irrigation we show that individuals with an internal locus of control have higher propensity of adopting agricultural technologies we observe these empirical regularities in both datasets and for both revealed measures of farmers technology adoption decisions as well as farmers hypothetical demand for agricultural technology the results hold even in a more conservative fixed effects estimation approach assuming locus of control as time variant and dynamic behavioral trait these findings provide behavioral and psychological explanations for the low rates of adoption of profitable agricultural technologies in sub saharan africa our results highlight that improving farmers non cognitive skills locus of control may facilitate technology adoption and agricultural transformation more generally the results suggest that anti poverty policies that only focus on relaxing short term external constraints including physical access to markets and technologies may not sufficiently alleviate agricultural underinvestment

why do more polarized countries run more procyclical fiscal policy abstract we study the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy to explain why some countries exhibit procyclical fiscal policy stances being expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times we develop a model that links the polarization of preferences over fiscal spending to the procyclicality bias we then present evidence that social polarization as measured by income inequality and educational inequality is consistently and positively associated with fiscal procyclicality even after controlling for other determinants from existing theories we also find a strong negative impact of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

procyclical government spending patterns of pressure and prudence in the oecd this paper tests for differences in the cyclicality of government spending across functional categories evidence from 20 oecd countries suggests that procyclicality is more likely in smaller functional budgets but capital spending is more likely to be procyclical for the larger spending categories

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen participation the contradictions of uganda s decentralization program abstract uganda s ambitious decentralization program is analyzed in terms of a dual mode system of local governance under a technocratic mode conditional funding from the center is earmarked for particular programs but with little local participation in contrast the patronage mode is an elaborate system for local bottom up planning but with limited resources which are largely consumed in administrative costs and political emoluments along with the spoils of a committee system controlling contracts and appointments these resources provide the means for building political alliances and loyalty in the absence of a culture of transparency and civic engagement to assure downward accountability it remains to be seen whether decentralization can promote both efficient service delivery and local empowerment simultaneously

the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy evidence from the oecd this paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in scal policy in particular we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across oecd countries in line with leading theories of scal cyclicality we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical scal policies wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect scal cyclicality

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

networks and transaction costs based on the well known fact that social networks can provide effective mechanisms that help to increase the trust level between two trade partners we apply a simple game theoretical framework to derive transaction costs as a high risk of opportunistic behavior in a repeated trade relation determined by the density and size of trading networks in the empirical part of the paper we apply a two stage procedure to estimate the impact of social network structures on farm s transaction costs observed for different input and output markets at a first stage we estimate a multiple input multiple output stochastic ray production function to generate relative shadow prices of three inputs and two outputs traded by farms at a second stage a structural equation system is derived from the first order conditions of farm s profit maximization to estimate simultaneously the of commodity specific transaction cost functions for all traded farm inputs and outputs estimation results based on a sample of 315 polish farms imply a significant influence of social network structures on farm s transaction costs moreover estimated transaction costs correspond to a reasonable amount of farm specific shadow prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

specification and estimation of stochastic multiple output production and technical inefficiency this paper presents a primal based approach for specification and estimation of multiple output production frontiers that allows simultaneous identification and estimation of determinants of technical inefficiency the proposed model extends the technical efficiency effects model by battese and coelli 1995 to general multiple output technologies an empirical application using swedish health care panel data from the years 1989 1994 is included the key issue is to test for the effects on technical efficiency of an organizational reform implemented with the primary purpose to increase efficiency the results reveal no significant effect on technical efficiency of the reform but evidence of overall decreased technical efficiency and technical progress in the provision of health care over the studied time period are found

trade expansion and contract enforcement consider a world of traders separated in geographic economic or social space honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders but frequencies of meetings and information flows about cheating have local bias honesty is self enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world the extent of self enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self governing small community intermediate size worlds fare worst

public investment and real price supports abstract the social rate of return to public investment in industries with fixed real price supports is studied using a simple general equilibrium model fixed real price supports are shown to enhance the likelihood of immiserizing growth due to capital accumulation or technological innovation in the supported sector general conditions under which an intervention price will induce a negative social rate of return to public investment are derived

procyclical government spending a public choice analysis procyclical government spending occurs when government expenditures increase at a faster rate than income in an economic upturn but fall at a faster rate in a recession voracity effects occur when competition for increased spending proves more effective as national income increases public choice theory can be applied to describe the distribution of fiscal power across different tiers of government to shed insight into competition for intergovernmental transfers politicians have electoral incentives to press for intergovernmental transfers but they also have electoral incentives to signal their ability to manage the economy with this mix of incentives the prediction is that intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical and that sub central government spending will be more procyclical than central government spending public choice analysis of pressure for increased public spending predicts a specific pattern of cyclical government spending this pattern can be observed when analyzing government expenditures in 20 oecd countries between 1995 and 2006

debt sustainability and procyclical fiscal policies in latin america the computation of structural primary balances for the nine main latin american countries and the comparison of their changes with their cyclical position during the period 1981 2004 confirm that fiscal policy is procyclical in the region from this evidence the paper shows strong evidence that the fiscal behavior is closely linked to the financial vulnerability position of the economies and in particular to the perception on the sustainability of public debt the current threshold balance defined as the primary balance that would render the debt stable under the existing economic and financial conditions is used as our gauge for measuring debt sustainability concerns at each point in time the empirical analysis reveals that fiscal stance tightens when the perceptions of debt sustainability worsen that the impact is stronger the less sustainable debt is perceived and that when controlling for these effects fiscal policy loses its procyclical stance the results are robust to different specifications and estimation methods

output fluctuations and fiscal policy u s state and local governments 1978 1994 abstract we study the cyclical properties of u s state and local government fiscal policy the budget surpluses of both are procyclical over short and medium term horizons procyclical surpluses are the result of strongly procyclical revenue and weakly procyclical expenditure these results hold whether aggregate u s wide fluctuations are controlled for or not federal grants to state and local governments are procyclical but this is due to aggregate output fluctuations with respect to state level output fluctuations federal grants are countercyclical the budget surpluses of trust funds and utilities are also procyclical but there is no evidence that this effect is stronger in states where balanced budget rules are tighter the cyclical patterns of state and local budget surpluses are affected by various political institutions for example budget surpluses are less procyclical in conservative states in an election year that occurs in good times state governments refrain from accumulating a larger surplus in bad times no such asymmetry between election and non election years is apparent

the flypaper effect identifying areas for further research the flypaper effect literature dates back three decades it is overwhelmingly neo classical in approach attempting to improve the median voter demand model and or temper it with public choice supply side perspectives whilst this approach provided valuable early substantial analytical insights more recent papers seem to have contributed only marginally to an understanding of the flypaper effect if indeed it exists at all hence as well as providing a long overdue comprehensive review of the literature on the flypaper effect this paper identifies more productive avenues for further research

government science and technology budgets in times of crisis abstract following a recent paper by filippetti and archibugi filippetti a archibugi d 2011 innovation in times of crisis national systems of innovation structure and demand research policy 40 2 179 192 this article aims to contribute to the sparse literature on the impacts of the recent economic downturn on the government expenditures and innovative activities of the countries of the enlarged european union eu 27 using eurostat s socio economic objectives i e the nomenclature for the analysis and comparison of scientific programmes and budgets nabs 2007 classification this paper addresses the impact of the recent economic downturn on governments science and technology s t budgets across the 27 eu countries most countries followed a pro cyclical pattern where the government s t budgets in most nabs shrunk along slowing gross domestic product growth in similar pace with total government expenditure the new member states of eastern europe were the most affected

strategies for sustainable agricultural development in the ethiopian highlands this paper investigates the impacts of population growth market access agricultural credit and technical assistance programs land policies livelihood strategies and other factors on changes in land management natural resource conditions and human welfare indicators since 1991 in the northern ethiopian highlands based on a survey of 198 villages we find that population growth has contributed significantly to land degradation poverty and food insecurity in this region in contrast better market access and some credit and technical assistance programs were associated with improvement or less decline in land quality wealth and food security suggesting the possibility of win win win development outcomes with appropriate interventions land redistribution was associated with adoption of inorganic fertilizer but also with declining use of fallow and declining soil fertility we find also that different land management practices are adopted where different livelihood strategies are pursued suggesting the importance of considering livelihood strategies in technical assistance programs development strategies should be tailored to the different comparative advantages of different locations no one size fits all strategy will work everywhere this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

volatility of development aid from the frying pan into the fire summary the paper building on the authors previous analysis examines the relative volatility of aid flows into developing countries and their domestic revenue using new data and three alternative measures of aid instability relative volatility vis a vis fiscal revenue unpredictability of aid disbursement relative to commitments and failure of aid to smooth fluctuations in aggregate income it finds that the volatility of aid flows is still much greater than that of domestic revenue and that this difference is not decreasing especially in very poor aid dependent countries this high volatility of inflows makes the macroeconomy hard to manage further the influence of aid has been procyclical and not countercyclical aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance mechanism we argue that to counter these unwelcome trends donors need to be able to respond more speedily and effectively to large adverse shocks and their conditionalities need to become more flexible possibilities explicitly discussed elsewhere in this special section

to invest or insure how authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness in this article the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways first dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon second dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth repression and private pay offs to political opponents third dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001 the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short

innovation grants to smallholder farmers revisiting the key assumptions in the impact pathways grant funds specifically targeted to smallholder farmers to facilitate innovation are a promising agricultural policy instrument they stimulate smallholders to experiment with improved practices and to engage with research extension and business development services providers however evidence on impact and effectiveness of these grants is scarce partly because attribution of changes in practices and performance to the grant alone is challenging and the grant is often invested in innovation processes that benefitted from other support in the past we discuss three modalities vouchers business development matching grants and farmer driven innovation support funds our review points to an important and transversal outcome area of innovation grant systems the creation of human and social capital to sustain creative thinking and innovative practices harmonising measurement on these outcomes could enhance the usefulness and comparability of impact studies and facilitate benchmarking of different policy options for smallholder innovation

the curse of the haven the impact of multinational enterprise on environmental regulation abstract we analyze the behavior of multinational enterprises in the context of resource rich and poor countries and regarding high and low income countries we depart from the pollution haven hypothesis and the resource curse the pollution haven hypothesis states that multinational enterprises move their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation the resource curse holds that economic growth in countries abundant in natural resources is reduced we find that more polluting firms are relatively more often located in countries with weak environmental regulation however multinational enterprises do not have a significant impact on environmental regulation in the host country it appears that it is mainly the quality of institutions that drives both the pollution haven and the resource curse

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

the competitive externalities and the optimal seignorage this study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decisionmakers who can effectively print more money via the central bank the author derives the sequential rational expectation equilibrium and shows that the presence of competing decisionmakers increases the inflation rate and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax laffer curve the analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces where the centralized government system is weak similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

trust in triads effects of exit control and learning this paper provides theoretical background for some effects of social networks on trust we study the implications of a model with rational actors in two settings with three actors in the first setting there are two trustees who are involved in transactions with one truster implying that the truster has an exit option in the second setting two trusters play with one trustee which gives the trusters options for voice i e complaining and informing each other about the trustee s behavior we compare these models with a baseline model in which there is only one truster and one trustee it turns out that the opportunities for placing and honoring trust do not change for the exit model compared to the baseline model the opportunities for trust in the voice model differ from the baseline model only if both trusters inform each other at a rate that is high enough only if the possibilities for receiving information and transmitting information are large enough for both trusters trust will increase due to the information exchange possibilities in the voice model

reversal of fortune immiserizing technical change in agriculture several recent studies have reported the possibility of immiserizing technical change in agriculture in these studies the interaction of government commodity policy and technical change has been shown potentially to lead to a loss of national welfare a negative rate of return to research the purpose of this paper is to tie these recent results to the earlier results of bhagwati and johnson on immiserizing growth technical change and to offer a more general condition for describing the impacts of distortions on the benefits from technical change

agricultural pricing and public investment abstract aggregate agricultural supply is price inelastic but responsive to investment in agricultural infrastructure irrigation roads research extension thus the government should tax agriculture and finance infrastructure although unlikely to pay for itself directly it will increase taxable agricultural surplus but by raising rural living standards and therefore the supply price of urban labour it reduces urban tax revenue its marginal social product is therefore overstated when measured at world prices though understated at distorted agricultural prices with scale economies in industry the case for taxing and investing in agriculture is strengthened it may allow the economy to escape stagnation

as good as the networks they keep improving outcomes through weak ties in rural uganda abstractwe examine an intervention randomized at the village level in which female farmers invited to a single training session were randomly paired with farmers whom they did not know and encourag

the political resource curse this paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians both with theory and data the theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates the data refer to brazil where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design the empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor these and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory jel d72 d73 h77 o17 o18

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

oil windfalls and export diversification in oil producing countries evidence from oil booms abstract this paper examines the factors behind export diversification in oil countries specifically we investigate the impact of oil booms on export diversification through an empirical framework the paper finds that economy s export structure before the oil boom determines whether oil windfalls might affect the diversification process thus an oil boom negatively affects export diversification only if countries initially exhibit low levels of diversification in countries with a high level of diversification before the boom an oil boom has no impact on diversification these results are based on a large sample of 134 countries and are robust to various sensitivity analyses they are corroborated with data from the manufacturing sector which show that oil booms only reduce diversification in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom

status concern and the exploitation of common pool renewable resources we examine the impact of social status concern in a common pool renewable resource oligopoly a small number of players share access to a common pool resource and sell their production in a common market where they are oligopolists we depart from the mainstream literature on common pool resource oligopolies by considering that each player cares about her social status we allow for two channels to impact a player s welfare harvest and profits under the first channel a player has a bump in her utility when her harvest is larger than the average harvest of the rest of the players in this case we show that the presence of this channel exacerbates the tragedy of the commons under the second channel a player enjoys a bump in her utility if she manages to earn more profits than the average profits of the other players in this case we show that social status concern may temporarily alleviate the tragedy of the commons it results in a decrease of extraction over an interval of stock sizes

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no