consumer privacy in oligopolistic markets winners losers and welfare motivated by the unprecedented availability of consumer information on the internet we characterize the winners and losers from potential privacy regulation in the context of four commonly used oligopoly models a linear city model a circular city model a vertical differentiation model and a multi unit symmetric demand model we show that while there are winners and losers as a result of privacy enforcement the parties who stand to benefit and the parties who stand to lose as well as whether social welfare is enhanced or diminished largely depends on the specific economic setting under consideration

entry deterrence externalities and relative firm size most models of entry deterrence through preemptive investment consider either a monopolist or a cartel this suppresses an important question how does threat of entry affect capital choices of several noncolluding incumbents there are two opposing forces expanding capital to deter entry generates a public good to other incumbents but also increases the expanding firm s share of market output we address the trade off in a model of sequential entry with foresight where in the first stage capital choices are made sequentially and in the second stage the output interaction is cournot or competitive under competitive interaction we prove that the first entrant either admits all other potential entrants or deters all it never allows partial entry under cournot we find using simultaneous some rather surprising patterns easier entry can make the first entrant s capital larger or smaller the first entrant can be smaller than the second but is never less profitable the first entrant s profit is always reduced by increased entry threat but profits of other entrants can be increased

challenges of existing in a market as a small low quality producer this paper explores the strategy of a small firm entering a monopolist s market thereby creating a duopoly market the small firm avoids competing with the larger incumbent firm by producing a lower quality product at a lower price the model here establishes an equilibrium under a specific set of assumptions and examines how exogenous factors affect prices qualities and profits although the strategy might allow the firm to enter and earn a profit the market conditions may make this position much less desirable to that of the large firm for several reasons in the case explored here where tastes for the product are uniformly distributed the small firm s profit is about six percent of that of the larger firm the smaller firm is more severely threatened by the entrance of a third firm furthermore even if the smaller firm can cut costs its position is not well suited for exploiting such increases in efficiencies

divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units abstract existing game theoretic models of divisionalization and franchising treat each firm s number of competing units as a continuous variable we account for the integer constraint on divisions and show that the continuous case reasonably approximates the equilibria of the discrete game

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent evidence from the us federal reserve transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers we consider one potential cost the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions we construct a model that compares incentives for members with career concerns to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private we test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee asking whether the fomc s 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent we find evidence that this is indeed the case there has been much recent discussion of the advantages of transparency in agency relationships both in and outside of government while research has attempted to model this issue theoretically there has been less progress with empirical tests a problem due no doubt in large part to the fact that it is difficult to make before and after comparisons of a shift in transparency often no data are available on an agent s actions prior to the establishment of transparency in this article we focus on one specific type of transparency publishing verbatim transcripts of committee meetings and one specific reason why this type of transparency might not be desirable the possibility that the quality of deliberation on a committee will suffer if the deliberations take place in public we develop a theoretical model that helps to identify the potential costs of this type of transparency and we then test the model empirically using an original dataset on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee fomc our dataset is unique in that it records views expressed by policymakers at fomc meetings and not just their official votes our empirical tests focus in particular on the observed effect of the institutional change that occurred in 1993 when the fomc decided to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings after a delay of five years transparency is a particularly relevant issue in monetary policy because it is commonly argued that when central banks take actions such as publishing macroeconomic forecasts revealing individual votes on monetary policy committees or releasing minutes of meetings this will lead to improved economic outcomes while simultaneously facilitating democratic accountability 1

terrorist attacks analyst sentiment and earnings forecasts we examine whether exogenous and extremely negative events such as terrorist attacks and mass shootings influence the sentiment and forecasts of sell side equity analysts we find that analysts w

diagnosing discrimination stock returns and ceo gender a vast labor literature has found evidence of a glass ceiling whereby women are under represented among senior management a key question remains the extent to which this reflects unobserved differences in productivity preferences prejudice or systematically biased beliefs about the ability of female managers disentangling these theories would require data on productivity on the preferences of those who interact with managers and on perceptions of productivity financial markets provide continuous measures of the market s perception of the value of firms taking account of the beliefs of market participants about the ability of the men and women in senior management as such financial data hold the promise of potentially providing insight into the presence of mistake based discrimination specifically if female headed firms were systematically under estimated this would suggest that female headed firms would outperform expectations yielding excess returns examining data on s p 1500 firms over the period 1992 2004 i find no systematic differences in returns to holding stock in female headed firms although this result reflects the weak statistical power of our test rather than a strong inference that financial markets either do or do not under estimate female ceos jel j7 g14 j44

divisionalization with spatial differentiation abstract this paper assumes that firms can create independent divisions which compete in a market where the product is spatially differentiated our first result is that if the number of firms is exogenous and higher than some critical level then the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium converges to perfect competition when the cost of divisionalization converges to zero comparisons between the equilibrium level of divisionalization and the socially efficient are also obtained in this context on the other hand if we assume free entry and a fixed cost per firm then the subgame perfect equilibrium implies in some cases a natural oligopoly or monopoly

managerial incentives and the price effects of mergers most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders this paper relaxes that assumption when managers of a multi product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality there is a trade off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price coordination between the product divisions this makes some intra firm price competition optimal explaining why many multi product firms allow for competition between divisions when there are effort spillovers the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership even with some profit sharing intra firm price competition can reduce quality adjusted price which has important implications for antitrust policy

multidivisional firms internal competition and the merger paradox traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms insiders cooperate and maximize joint profits this approach has several unappealing results in quantity setting games for example mergers typically are not profitable for insiders but are profitable for non merging firms outsiders we take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another in quantity setting games with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders unprofitable for outsiders socially beneficial and involve in a non monopolizing merger a small number of firms finally we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices jel classification l000 entreprises multi divisionnelles concurrence interne et le paradoxe des fusions les modelisations conventionnelles des fusions suggerent que les entreprises fusionnees parties prenantes cooperent et maximisent leurs profits conjoints cette approche engendre plusieurs resultats contre intuitifs dans des jeux de concurrence par les quantites i e les fusions en general ne sont pas profitables pour les parties prenantes mais sont profitables pour des entreprises qui ne sont pas fusionnees les autres les auteurs adoptent une approche differente qui permet a l entreprise mere de jouer les parties prenantes l une contre l autre dans ce genre de jeu avec l approche adoptee les fusions sont profitables pour les parties prenantes non profitables pour les autres socialement benefiques et impliquent un petit nombre d entreprises dans une fusion qui ne cree pas un monopole finalement on trouve que la strategie optimale depend fondamentalement du fait que les entreprises se concurrencent par les prix ou par les quantites

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

cost manipulation games in oligopoly with costs of manipulating we analyze a class of two stage games where rival firms incur real resource costs in manipulating their marginal costs so as to influence the outcome of the game they want to play in stage two marginal costs may be manipulated by various means such as redistribution of productive assets choice of location or creation of an internal input market a general formulation of the game is provided and several applications are analyzed we show that the optimal allocation of resources within an oligopoly can be asymmetric even for ex ante symmetric firms this is an additional explanation of heterogeneity in oligopoly

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

capitalists and workers knowledge and the strategic role of investment within the firm does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm the formation of a firm frequently represents an attempt by an individual to secure a return on knowledge and we demonstrate that in this context there can be an incentive to precommit capital before contracting with other members of the firm that is to be the capitalist results are also obtained on the investment level and wage rate the key ingredient of the model is emergence of a product market entry threat from within the firm this contrasts with the anonymous external potential entrant prevalent in the literature

financial analyst characteristics and herding behavior in forecasting this study classifies analysts earnings forecasts as herding or bold and finds that 1 boldness likelihood increases with the analyst s prior accuracy brokerage size and experience and declines with the number of industries the analyst follows consistent with theory linking boldness with career concerns and ability 2 bold forecasts are more accurate than herding forecasts and 3 herding forecast revisions are more strongly associated with analysts earnings forecast errors actual earnings forecast than are bold forecast revisions thus bold forecasts incorporate analysts private information more completely and provide more relevant information to investors than herding forecasts

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

exclusion via non exclusive contracts we establish that non linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent s contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival the optimal contract we describe is a three part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent s marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities the optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry l exclusion par le biais des contrats non exclusifs nous etablissons que des contrats verticaux non lineaires peuvent permettre a un titulaire d exclure un rival en amont dans un cadre qui ne de pend pas de l exclusivite des contrats du titulaire avec les entreprises en aval ou des limites sur les canaux de distribution disponibles pour le titulaire ou un rival le contrat optimal que nous decrivons est un contrat de rabais en trois parties base sur la quantite pre voyant le versement d une indemnite a un distributeur en aval et un prix de gros marginal inferieur au cout marginal de l operateur historique pour des quantites suffisamment importantes le contrat optimal est robuste si on permet aux parties de renegocier les contrats en cas d entree

a theory of yes men this paper illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinion of their supervisors when firms use subjective performance evaluation this desire to conform arises endogenously from the firm s need to induce the worker to exert effort the author shows that firms may optimally eschew the use of incentive contracts to retain workers incentives for honesty the author illustrates that the incentive to conform implies inefficiencies even when workers are risk neutral and is likely to lead to more centralized decision making than in the absence of the desire to conform copyright 1993 by american economic association

information aggregation in debate who should speak first abstract privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a committee about the desirability of a public decision each individual wishes to appear well informed for any given order of speech committee members may herd by suppressing their true information with individuals of heterogeneous expertise optimizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information but not perfectly so it is not always optimal to use the common anti seniority rule whereby experts speak in order of increasing expertise a committee with more able experts may be afflicted by greater herding problems yielding a worse outcome

strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure abstract we consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival with linear input pricing at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship for either cournot or bertrand competition with a two part tariff for the input the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements but is reversed for cournot with strategic substitutes we analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival customer

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

strategic differentiation and strategic emulation in games with uncertainty when players who choose a common strategy face a common shock while players who choose different strategies face independent or imperfectly correlated shocks equilibrium choices exhibit differentiation respectively emulation when the sign of the cross partial derivative of the firms profit functions with respect to the realizations of the uncertain variables is negative respectively positive i consider a variety of applications including technology choice brand investments and r d races many of which can be characterized as two stage games in such games i demonstrate that differentiation is more likely to occur when the second stage game is a game of strategic substitutes

reputation and performance among security analysts members of the institutional investor all american research team supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when forecasts are matched by the corporation followed and by the date of brokerage house issuance this contemporaneous advantage is complemented by a timing advantage all americans supply forecasts more often than other analysts stocks returns immediately following large upward forecast revisions suggest that all americans impact prices more than other analysts however there is virtually no difference in returns following large downward revisions nevertheless the collective results suggest a positive relation between reputation and performance and assuming that all americans are better paid pay and performance

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

strategic entry deterrence recent developments in the economics of industry this paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence starting from bain s 1956 classical analysis a simple two stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry deterrence problem commitments credible threat and sub game perfection are illustrated in this context the various strategic variables that an incumbent firm can use to bar entry are discussed the issue of whether a group of incumbents can noncooperatively deter entry is taken up and some empirical evidence is reviewed copyright 1989 by blackwell publishers ltd

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

preemptive investment toehold entry and the mimicking principle this article explores the ability offirms to successfully enter against an initial monopolist by pursuing toehold entry sinking entry costs early and planning to produce only later we endow the incumbent with strongfirst mover advantages for example capital is the only input and is completely sunk and in each period the incumbent invests before entrants nevertheless the incumbent s profit can easily be negative if it tries to deter all entry when the market is growing the incumbent may need prohibitive capital in place early on because once toehold entry has occurred the incumbent s planned capital expansion might no longer be rational surprisingly even if market conditions remain stationary the incumbent may still allow some entry in the model some firms are always deterred showing that several firms can deter others more effectively than can a singlefirm the difference arises because onefirm cannot commit to mimicking the aggregate investment path that several independent firms would choose this mimicking principle offers a general perspective for understanding when a monopolist finds deterrence optimal

licensing the market for technology abstract in technology based industries incumbent firms often license their technology to potential competitors such a strategy is difficult to explain within traditional models of licensing this paper extends the literature on licensing by relaxing the assumption of a monopolist technology holder competition in the market for technology induces licensing of innovations and incumbent firms may find it privately profitable to license although their joint profits may well be higher in the absence of any licensing a strong testable implication of our model is that the number of licenses per patent holder decreases with the degree of product differentiation

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

multidivisional firms internal competition and comparative advantage baye et al meet neary abstract we present a tractable general equilibrium model to capture the effects of divisionalization on trade in oligopolistic industries divisionalization reduces the incentives for diversification in production the extensive margins of trade expand as a result of divisionalization facilitating specialization toward the direction of comparative advantage with exports rising in the case of domestic divisionalization and imports rising in the case of foreign divisionalization this effect of internal competition on specialization is magnified when competition between divisions is staggered the factor market effects of divisionalization domestic and or foreign strengthen the expansionary effects on the extensive margins of trade

do security analysts improve their performance with experience we investigate if sell side security analysts generate more accurate quarterly earnings forecasts and more profitable stock recommendations as their experience following a specific firm increases we measure firmspecific experience as the number of prior quarters for which the analyst has issued an earnings forecast for the firm if analysts improve their forecasting performance with repetition as suggested by the learning by doing lbd model an analyst s earnings forecasts will become more accurate with experience prior empirical work provides mixed evidence on whether analysts exhibit individual forecasting performance differences e g butler and

credible spatial preemption through reputation extension abstract judd 1985 rand journal of economics 16 153 166 shows that the results of previous models of brand proliferation and spatial preemption are substantially weakened if the incumbent does not have high exit costs this paper illustrates how an incumbent firm can make spatial preemption credible by extending reputation this is the case with product extensions which are new products but are linked to the successful reputation of another product already on the market it is proved that a product extension can make spatial entry preemption credible because its withdrawal in response to a competitor s new brand can have a negative reputational effect on the incumbent s original product

the economics of privacy the concept of privacy has received a good deal of attention from lawyers political scientists sociologists philosophers and psychologists but until recently very little from economists this neglect is on the mend see for example my 1978 1979a articles and forthcoming book chs 9 11 george stigler and in this paper i will report on the economic research on privacy in which i and others have been engaged some definitional clarification is necessary at the outset privacy is used today in at least three senses first it is used to mean the concealment of information indeed this is its most common meaning today second it is used to mean peace and quiet as when someone complains that telephone solicitations are an invasion of his privacy third it is used as a synonym for freedom and autonomy it is in this sense that the supreme court has used the word in subsuming the right to have an abortion under the right of privacy see my 1979b article pp 190 200 the third meaning of privacy need detain us only briefly to affix the term privacy to human freedom and autonomy as in jack hirshleifer is simply to relabel an old subject not to identify a new area for economic research the second meaning of the word privacy set out above invites a slightly novel application of economics it suggests an economic reason why certain cerebral workers have private offices and other manual workers do not why aversion to noise is associated with rising education and why certain low level invasions of a person s private space for example shoving a person roughly but without hurting him are tortious see my forthcoming book ch 10 but the range of economic applications in this area seems limited the first meaning of privacy set out above privacy as concealment of informationseems the most interesting from an economic standpoint there is a rich and growing literature on the economics of information it would seem that the same economic factors that determine search behavior by workers and consumers might also determine investments in obtaining and in shielding private information this insight emphasized in my 1978 article provides the starting point for the economic analysis of privacy to relate the economics of privacy to the economics of information in as clear a fashion as possible consider the example of the employer searching across employees and the employee searching across employers the employer is looking for certain traits in an employee that may not be obvious things like honesty diligence loyalty and good physical and mental health to the extent that the employee is deficient in one or more of these characteristics he has an incentivestrictly analogous to the incentive of a seller of goods to conceal product defectsto conceal these deficiencies that is he has an incentive to invoke a right of privacy if the employer tries to pry into his private life the concealment of personal characteristics in the employment contest retards rather than promotes the efficient sorting of employees to employers by reducing the amount of information available to the buyer in the labor market the employer it reduces the efficiency of that market the analysis can easily be generalized moreover to other markets some of them noneconomic in which private information is concealed an example is the marriage market the efficient sorting of females to males in that market is impeded if either spouse conceals material personal information the extended courtship that remains typical of the marriage market may be due in part to the efforts of prospective spouses to conceal their deficiencies from each other university of chicago law school

international telecom settlements gaming incentives carrier alliances and pareto superior reform liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists this view is seriously incomplete monopolists allied with carriers in liberalized countries can use these practices to reduce termination payments to nonalliance carriers thereby harming also consumers in liberalized countries by gaming regulations that require equal termination rates at both ends and proportional return the monopolist s traffic is allocated among carriers in proportion to their shares of traffic to its country we also present a simple bilateral settlements reform that eliminates gaming incentives and other proportional return distortions yet benefits both countries

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

an informational theory of privacy we develop a theory that explains how and when privacy can increase welfare without privacy some individuals misrepresent their preferences because they will otherwise be statistically discriminated against this chilling effect hurts them individually and impairs information aggregation the information gain from infringing privacy e g by electronic surveillance can be much smaller than expected ceteris paribus overall privacy is essential for any mechanism of information aggregation such as markets or a democratic society it is also redistributive like free speech privacy benefits some and hurts others

divisionalization and entry deterrence this paper assumes that incumbent firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry the main theoretical result is that such divisionalization ability leads perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries in contrast existing models of entry deterrence imply that informed incumbents even those with steadily decreasing average costs will often allow rational entry our result may explain why successful large scale entry by firms with no informational advantage is extremely rare the use of divisions to preempt entry may also explain why large firms in high profit oligopolies often divisionalize allowing their divisions to compete freely despite the negative pecuniary externality that each division imposes on others

self selection and the forecasting abilities of female equity analysts this paper investigates whether there are systematic differences between the forecasting style and abilities of female and male analysts and whether market participants recognize these differences my key conjecture is that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a perception of discrimination in the analyst labor market consistent with this conjecture i find that female analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts and their accuracy is higher in market segments in which their concentration is lower further the stock market participants are aware of the male female skill