you can t save alone commitment in rotating savings and credit associations in kenya abstract this article examines one reason why individuals develop and maintain local level financial savings organizations known as rotating savings and credit organizations or roscas economic theories suggest that individuals form roscas to finance the purchase of a lumpy durable good in response to intrahousehold conflict over savings or to provide themselves with insurance the article proposes an additional hypothesis for rosca participation saving requires discipline and some roscas may be formed to provide a collective mechanism for commitment in the presence of time inconsistent preferences data from 70 roscas located in western kenya indicate that the commitment hypothesis is plausible and broadly consistent with the design and patterns of participation in these roscas as many rosca participants put it you can t save alone

group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations a development perspective abstract financial self help groups in low income countries consist of two basic types rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations or roscas and ascras in the ascra funds are not immediately withdrawn but are left to grow for loan making comparing the two groups the author finds similarities and differences efforts to rectify the rosca s shortcomings have prompted many innovations and given birth to a hybrid preserving the best of both types in constant adaptation to changing environments

keep your friends close the effect of local social networks on child human capital outcomes abstract social networks can affect demand for human capital investments by relaxing household time or budget constraints or by defining and reinforcing human capital preferences however empirically identifying the effect of social networks on human capital investment is usually problematic because households self select their networks in ways that may be correlated with their abilities to make these investments in northern ugandan internally displaced persons camps networks were not entirely self selected rebel activity which forced households into camps in 2002 disrupted pre existing social networks in ways that were exogenous to household human capital preferences this paper uses the exogenous variation in network disruption to identify a positive impact of networks on children s long term nutritional outcomes

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

the economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation this paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations roscas detailed evidence from roscas in a kenyan slum nairobi suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income to explain this phenomenon we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption the empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in kenya

banking the poor via savings accounts evidence from a field experiment abstract in a setting with low penetration of bank accounts i randomly gave access to bank accounts with zero fees at local bank branches to a large sample of female household heads in nepal the zero fees and physical proximity of the bank led to high take up and usage rates compared to similar studies in other settings however impact on income aggregate expenditures and assets are too imprecisely estimated to draw a conclusion i do find reallocation of expenditures across categories e g more spending on education and meat and fish and less on health and dowries and higher ability to cope with shocks on qualitative outcomes i find households report that their overall financial situation has improved the lack of a clear story on mechanisms yet strong result on aggregate self perception of financial wellbeing is consistent with access to quality savings accounts leading to household improvements via multiple mechanisms

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

saving more in groups field experimental evidence from chile abstract we test the impact of a peer group program on savings in a sample of microcredit clients we conduct two randomized trials among these 2687 microcredit clients the first finds that a savings group treatment which combines public goal setting monitoring in the group and non financial rewards increases savings in a new savings account significantly the number of deposits grows 3 7 fold and the average balance almost doubles in contrast a more classical measure a substantially increased interest rate has no effect for most participants and raises the savings balance only for the very top of the distribution a second experiment conducted a year later tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that effects of similar size can be achieved through feedback text messages without meetings rewards or peer pressure given that participants are borrowing at 90 apr we discuss how and when saving more could be harmful or beneficial

rotating saving and credit associations in rural east africa abstract theoretical arguments suggest that rotating savings and credit associations roscas improve welfare by reducing the utility cost of saving for a consumer durable data from two communities in east africa reveal major differences in the incidence of roscas participation arising conjecturally from differences in the relative depths of market penetration and perceptions about the efficacy of alternative strategies for compensating for failures in the financial markets participation in roscas in these communities is partly driven by the need to raise school fees meet medical expenses and buy food roscas funds are also used to start or promote small businesses and acquire assets including livestock households owning smaller landholdings and those enjoying higher expenditures are more likely to participate in roscas the number of schemes in which a household participates is closely related to the main uses of roscas funds while contributions and value of receipts are determined by total expenditures and frequency of turns respectively

ethnic diversity social sanctions and public goods in kenya abstract this paper examines ethnic diversity and local public goods in rural western kenya the identification strategy relies on the stable historically determined patterns of ethnic land settlement ethnic diversity is associated with lower primary school funding and worse school facilities and there is suggestive evidence that it leads to poor water well maintenance the theoretical model illustrates how inability to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads to collective action failures and we find that school committees in diverse areas do impose fewer sanctions on defaulting parents we relate these results to the literature on social capital and economic development and discuss implications for decentralization in less developed countries

the international convergence of inflation rates during fixed and floating exchange rate regimes abstract according to the assets approach to the balance of payments exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime inflation must grow at the same rate in each of the participating countries at least in the long run the model implies that reserve currency inflation causes world inflation the mechanism by which inflation is transmitted when currencies are allowed to float is more complex the long run international convergence of inflation is studied using modern time series techniques on post war data from the g 7 countries the evidence on the convergence of inflation during the fixed regime portion of the sample is strong and consistent with the notion of reserve currency causality i e from the us to the rest of the world the evidence of convergence over the floating portion of the sample is also quite strong but no single currency can be characterized as the common underlying source of world inflation implying the inflation rates are endogenous

the role of roscas lumpy durables or event insurance abstract the stylised representation of roscas in recent theoretical work as a device driven by impatience for lumpy consumer durables misses the important insurance role of this pervasive informal financial institution in the developing world that insurance role explains why roscas with concurrent bidding are the dominant means of determining the sequence and pricing of allocations in roscas so structured the recipient and the implied interest rate for each period s allotment are determined by competitive bids at the time of distribution we use an example of an actual bidding rosca to demonstrate the extent of unpredictable needs for funds as reflected in the volatility of interest rates implicit in winning bids

exploring gendered behavior in the field with experiments why public goods are provided by women in a nairobi slum abstract women and particularly women in all female groups appear to be especially adept at providing public goods in developing countries we use a one shot public goods game to explore the effect of sex and a group s sex composition on the voluntary provision of public goods in a nairobi slum sex heterogeneity hurts the voluntary provision of public goods because women but not men contribute less in mixed sex than same sex groups women contribute as much as men in same sex groups this result is driven by women s pessimism and men s optimism about others contributions in mixed sex groups rather than by gendered social preferences

collusion and predation under almost free entry abstract this study investigates the degree of cooperation that firms can support in the absence of significant barriers to entry a free entry subgame perfect equilibrium is defined by q n where q is the collusive output rate and n is the number of active firms such that there is no incentive for an active firm to deviate output from q and there is no incentive for a potential entrant to enter the industry it is shown that for all n 1 if the discount factor is sufficiently high there exists a free entry equilibrium in which active firms sustain a non trivial degree of cooperation cooperation is supported by active firms credibly threatening to respond to entry with a period of aggressive competition

rural financial markets in developing countries their use and abuse until recently the use of agricultural credit as a developmental tool seemed clear and straightforward most concerned people believed that increases in the volume of cheap credit were necessary to boost agricultural production and that the rural poor could be brought into the mainstream of development through supervised credit programs it seemed that certain ideal types of rural credit institutions offered the promise of meeting farmers credit needs and that experience in the industrialized countries with cooperatives and specialized agricultural finance institutions could be effectively transplanted to low income countries this collection of readings highlights facets of rural financial markets that have often been neglected in discussions of agricultural credit in developing countries it moves beyond a narrow concern with the simple provision of credit to a broad consideration of the performance of rural financial markets and of ways to improve the quality and range of financial services for low income farmers it reflects new thinking on the design administration evaluation and policy framework of rural finance and credit programs in developing countries

mutual insurance as an elusive concept in traditional rural communities during the last two decades economists have paid increasing attention to the role of informal risk sharing arrangements as a privileged way through which traditional rural communities can achieve a significant degree of protection against income fluctuations and other hazards beyond their control this article however argues that when they enter into such arrangements members of these communities are guided by a principle of balanced reciprocity they expect a return from any contribution or payment they make rather than by a true logic of mutual insurance more precisely they do not conceive of insurance as a game where there are winners and losers and where income is redistributed between lucky and unlucky individuals none the less traditional agrarian societies have proven able to develop a restricted range of sustainable forms of mutual insurance that avoid the aforementioned problem

the home economics of e money velocity cash management and discount rates of m pesa users m pesa a service operated by the mobile phone network safaricom in kenya allows users to deposit money onto their telephone handsets transfer e money to another user with a simple text message and withdraw cash at one of thousands of outlets throughout the country the system is safer cheaper and far faster than the money transfer systems that it replaced although only five years old m pesa has achieved remarkable penetration into the kenyan economy as of september 2011 there were 32 000 m pesa outlets at which individuals could exchange cash for e float or vice versa in a country that as of 2009 had 491 bank branches 500 postbank branches and 352 atms mas and ng weno 2009 in the six month period april september 2011 the volume of transfers was ksh 314 billion compared to nominal gdp of ksh 2 99 trillion that year for the period from which our data are drawn the market exchange rate was approximately 75 ksh dollar and the ppp exchange rate was approximately 35 ksh dollar at present m pesa is primarily a money transfer system however it has the potential to evolve in two exciting directions first as a gateway via which unbanked households can access financial services and second as a transaction medium with e money partially replacing cash 1 even in its current form however m pesa represents a dramatic change in the economic environment of kenyan households further data on how households use m pesa allows for insight into the objectives of and constraints on their money management choices and consumption more generally

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations supported by the center for energy policy studies m i t and the japanese corporate associates program at the kennedy school of government

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

commitment savings in informal banking markets abstract i study the provision of commitment savings by informal banks to sophisticated hyperbolic discounters since a consumer is subject to temptation in the period that he signs a contract banks might exploit his desire for instant gratification even as they help him to commit for the future without banking savings decisions and welfare are not monotonic in the degree of time inconsistency consequently commitment savings will lower welfare for moderately time inconsistent agents if loan contracts are enforceable pure commitment savings will disappear this will further lower welfare if the lender is a profit maximizing bank but raise welfare if the lender is a welfare maximizing ngo finally i consider the coexistence of a bank and ngo there will be zero takeup of ngo provided commitment savings if there is competition from a moneylender but the ngo s offer will raise the agent s reservation utility thus reducing the surplus that can be extracted by the moneylender

rotating savings and credit associations when participants are risk averse we model rotating savings and credit associations roscas among risk averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks a random rosca is not advantageous whereas a bidding rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion the payoff scheme of a bidding rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries the risk sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk sharing contract and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

the anatomy of an informal financial market rosca participation in taiwan abstract little is known about informal financial markets in developing countries this paper analyzes participation in rotating savings and credit associations using a national household survey from taiwan we find that participation is highest among high income households there is some evidence that income stability may play a role as well life cycle differences suggest a role in funding durables purchases our evidence indicates that roscas may be an alternative savings device to the formal financial sector

psychological characteristics and household savings behavior the importance of accounting for latent heterogeneity abstract we employ a finite mixture model with maximum likelihood ml estimation to analyze latent heterogeneity in the relationship between psychological characteristics and household savings behavior in a one step ml estimation approach we estimate a class membership model and a behavioral model of the classes jointly adopting this approach enables us to simultaneously assess how socio demographic characteristics affect class membership probabilities and estimate class specific regression coefficients to test whether psychological characteristics predict savings behavior differently across latent classes we apply this approach to a representative sample of uk households n 3382 and identify two different latent classes striving versus established households we find that the relationship between psychological characteristics and savings behavior differs across these two classes demonstrating the importance of accounting for latent heterogeneity when studying the drivers of savings behavior our results have implications for policymakers attempting to improve household savings behavior