are judges leading economic theory sunk costs the threat of entry and the competitive process in this paper we attempt to bring theoretical form to a particular entry argument that has found favor in the courts we suggest that sunk costs may not be a major impediment to entry when a group of customers can commit to an entry enhancing strategy buyers have strong incentives to adopt such strategies because they benefit directly from the resulting lower prices the simplest example involves a large buyer that is able to guarantee an entrant a market for its product long term contracts or even informal purchase commitments backed by customer reputation may also allow the entrant to obtain a guarantee of sufficient business to make the entry profitable once entry is thought likely to occur the existing competitors may be unwilling to attempt a price increase of any magnitude thus the threat of entry can maintain competitive prices even in the presence of sunk costs in section ii we motivate the analysis by discussing the current controversy over the role entry conditions play in an antitrust merger review then we discuss the necessary assumptions for a model of how the threat of entry can deter any price increase in the presence of sunk costs we note that these conditions are different from those commonly used in the economic literature

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

entry deterrence in stackelberg perfect equilibria this paper examines entry deterrence in a duopoly where the postentry game is stackelberg it is argued that in reality firms can use a broader range of precommitments than is allowed for in the literature this paper permits such precommitments and analyzes the perfect equilibria it also allows for the fact that there may be fixed costs associated not only with entry but with beginning production several interesting possibilities are explained including the existence of excess capacity and the holding of inventories even in the absence of any uncertainty copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the impact of decentralization of health services on health outcomes evidence from canada this article contributes to the limited empirical literature on the impact of decentralization on economic welfare by investigating the hypothesis that shifts towards more fiscal decentralization in health services would be accompanied by improvements in population health building on a conventional public finance model applied to health care this hypothesis is tested on a panel data of the highly decentralized canadian provinces during the period 1979 to 1995 the results of the exploratory empirical analysis presented in this article suggest that fiscal decentralization of health services in canada has had a positive and substantial influence on the effectiveness of public policy in improving a population s health over the period studied

income velocity and the variability of money growth evidence from less developed countries this paper examines whether the variability of money growth caused changes in income velocity of money in 30 less developed countries time series data show year to year variations in income velocity of money in these countries for the 1961 1990 period empirical results based on causality but complemented by variance decomposition tests show that money growth is the most important determinant in explaining the variability in income velocity in at least 20 of the 30 developing countries examined in this study in addition the causality results show that inflation rate granger causes income velocity of money in 21 countries but the variance decomposition results show inflation rate to be relatively more important in explaining the variability of velocity in eight countries similarly while real income granger causes velocity of money in 18 countries the results of the variance decomposition tests show real income to be relatively more important as a determinant of income velocity in two countries over

advertising sunk costs and barriers to entry this paper tests hypotheses about the entry deterring effects of advertising the model isolates three separate effects of advertising on entry the effect on the irrecoverable costs of entry the effect on the uncertainty underlying the entry environment and the effect on the measured rates of profit we find that advertising impedes entry since necessary advertising expenditures give rise to a sunk cost which raises the risk of entry however we also find a countervailing force due to advertising in that the entrant perceives a greater likelihood of success in markets where advertising is important our analysis shows that the overall impact of advertising on entry is positive

location choice product proliferation and entry deterrence within a slightly modified version of hotelling s model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise we show that entry deterrence although optimal need not be achieved through product proliferation in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation we also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry

contestability queues and governmental entry deterrence this paper demonstrates that a perverse kind of entry deterrence can result when government subsidized production is combined with non price rationing in the form of queuing even though queuing leads to a total cost to the consumer not including the tax cost that is higher than the cost of an unsubsidized private supplier and even though the government s money price is rigid the market is not contestable the key to the result is that the waiting cost portion of the consumer s acquisition cost declines immediately upon entry and losses would be forced upon the entrant privatization would negate the entry deterrence thus leading to entry increased output at lower full prices lower average production costs decreased waiting costs increased profits and increased consumer surplus

noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry deterring signal recent work has investigated the effect of a potential entrant s uncertainty about postentry profits on the likelihood of his entering the market it has always been assumed that the potential entrant knows the type of postentry solution but lacks information on cost or as to whether the postentry solution will be cooperative or noncooperative we find that entry is more likely the greater is the preentry profit rate in equilibrium the threat of entry then forces the incumbent firms to act more competitively to deter entry

fiscal decentralization chinese style good for health outcomes summary this study analyzes the effect of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes in china using a panel data set with nationwide county level fiscal data we find that more fiscally decentralized provinces have lower infant mortality rates than provinces that are the main spending authority if certain conditions are met key among those conditions are the county governments own fiscal capacity and intergovernmental transfers local spending responsibilities need to be matched with county governments own fiscal capacity when the county s government relative spending responsibility is held constant the ability to spend on local public goods and health outcomes depend upon intergovernmental transfers

monetary stability and interest free banking the case of iran previous research has suggested that islamic banking systems may be more stable than western systems however this contention has only been tested empirically for the case of tunisia a country with no significant history of islamic banking this paper replicates the study done on tunisia for the case of iran a country with some history of islamic banking the results are mixed with some evidence both for and against the hypothesis of greater stability for islamic banking it is suggested that a good deal more work must be done to prove claims about the relative stability of islamic banking

excess capacity and entry some empirical evidence recent articles by spence i977 dixit i979 and schmalensee i98i have elaborated on wenders i97i1 proposition that excess capacity can act as a barrier to entry the intent of all of these treatments is to suggest that firms may rationally invest in excess capacity with the expectation that excess capacity will be seen by potential entrants either as a signal of aggressive intent or as a credible threat 2 when excess capacity does not lead to creation of a credible threat it may still act as a barrier to entry by shifting the risk return perceptions of potential entrants enough to divert the potential entrants investments into other industries 3 alternatively investment in excess capacity by incumbent firms may reduce the prospects of an active market for the used equipment of a defunct entrant and thereby help to convert fixed costs into sunk costs consequently raising entry barriers 4 this paper represents an exploratory effort to investigate empirically the prevalence and efficiency of excess capacity in deterring entry first a simple and traditional model of entry is presented this is followed by the description of the data used to explore the excess capacity investment concept a combined results and comments section follows the description of the data

the islamic interest free banking system some empirical evidence 1988 the islamic interest free banking system some empirical evidence applied economics vol 20 no 3 pp 417 425

limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking abstract this paper extends an earlier paper by the author in which there were two economic agents an established firm and a potential entrant operating under complete information each agent being assumed to know the profit functions of both firms the present paper extends some of the results of the earlier work to a model in which it is not known with certainty to either agent what the profit functions would be after the entrant would come into the market

public sector banking efficiency and economic growth in india abstract this paper develops a framework that integrates harrod domar growth model and mckinnon shaw hypothesis via molho s dynamic adjustment mechanism the model is used to determine the impact of bank nationalization through aggressive bank branch expansion programs and priority sector credit allocation on india s financial savings investment productivity and gdp the empirical findings indicate that the bank nationalization policy has been a mixed blessing the aggressive bank branch program since 1969 resulted in an increased in savings investment productivity of capital and gdp however the priority sector credit allocation policy did not fully achieve its desired goals

a theory of market structure with sequential entry this article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry we characterize the perfect nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions first equilibria never involve excess capacity second a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are positive when computed myopically i e with no further entry third the equilibrium number of firms is the smallest number that can deter entry fourth aggregate output in equilibrium is no smaller than the limit output we calculate some explicit solutions to the model and examine comparative static properties

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

would hotelling kill the electric car in this paper we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource owning firms when technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning by doing resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology we show that in such a context it is not necessarily the case that scarcity driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted rather we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions we show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

strategic investment and the co existence of labour managed and profit maximising firms the authors examine firm profitability in mixed duopoly equilibrium with one labor managed lm firm and one profit maximizing pm firm and with strategic investment conventional wisdom suggests that firms deviating from profit maximization will suffer forced exit in the long run the authors reverse this conclusion in mixed lm pm duopoly with strategic investment no equilibrium can have both firms making zero profits and pm profitability implies lm profitability but not the converse adverse parameter shifts would cause the pm firm to exit first empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction of robust market survivability of lm firms

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

holding excess capacity to deter entry in a labour managed industry this paper considers the dixit model of entry deterrence and adapts it to the case in which firms are maximizing surplus per worker rather than profits the properties of this model are analogous but not identical to those of the dixit model of particular interest is the possibility that the best response functi ons may be positively sloped even though demand satisfies that a firm s marginal revenue is decreasing in rival firms output this possibil ity implies the existence of perfect equilibria in which the incumbent holds excess capacity which is not possible in the dixit model give n the above condition

demand for money in sri lanka during the post 1977 period a cointegration and error correction analysis this paper investigates the long run demand for money and short run dynamics of the long run money demand function for sri lanka during the post 1977 period while m1 is cointegrated with real income nominal interest rate short term foreign interest rate and real effective exchange rate m2 is not this suggests that monetary authorities should emphasize the narrow definition of money for monetary control the one year fixed deposits rate is cointegrated with m1 indicating the opportunity cost of holding money although the inflation rate is not cointegrated with m1 it seems to be an important determinant of the demand for m1 in the short run results also suggest that the short term foreign interest rate and the exchange rate can have important implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy monetary authorities must consider the response of domestic money demand to these external factors when formulating future monetary policies

income velocity of money in agricultural developing economies t he response of income velocity of money to economic growth has implications for monetary planning in a developing economy velocity is the ratio of nominal income to money stock and decreases only if money stock rises at a faster rate than nominal income a well known hypothesis in this context is that of friedman 1959 which states that in countries experiencing a secular rise in real income per capita the stock of money generally rises over long periods at a decidedly higher rate than does money income i e velocity declines ezekiel and adekunle 1969 and melitz and correa 1970 in their international crosscountry comparisons have found evidence largely in favour of the friedman hypothesis this in its turn has strengthened the hope for active growthoriented monetary planning the extent of resources that can be transferred for investment purposes through non inflationary monetary expansion increases as development proceeds cross section studies involving developed and developing economies do not provide satisfactory indications of what happens to velocity over time in any individual developing economy firstly velocities have not behaved uniformly in all the developing economies secondly international cross country comparisons do not adequately explain why velocity changes in any individual economy is it because money is a luxury good i e income elasticity of demand for money is greater than unity to the agents in the economy is it because economic development brings about structural changes in the economy which lead to the observed behaviour of velocity is it because monetary habits change in a systematic way it is important to have time series analyses of developing economies to provide answers to such questions for example in a study of malaysia and singapore short 1973 found that though velocity did move inversely to per capita income this negative impact was overpowered by the change in monetary habits which the increase in bank offices caused the aim of this paper is to analyse the temporal behaviour of income velocity of money in agricultural developing economies in the literature on velocity and demand for money in developing economies attention is focussed mainly on three issues i the incomeelasticity of demand for money and in particular whether money is a luxury good or not ii the growth of monetisation and changes in monetary habits and iii the effect of the cost of holding money one important factor which has suffered total neglect is the role of sectoral differences in money demand behaviour and the structural shifts in the sectoral composition of income that accompany development money demand behaviour may vary across sectors this is true not only in developing economies but also in developed economies for example goldfeld 1976 has found that the business sector and the household sector in the united states have different money demand functions an implicit specification error is committed in the aggregative money demand or velocity equation whenever the sectoral income composition factor is omitted on a priori grounds this factor should have special significance in developing economies where sectoral shares in national income change over time in the absence of flow offunds accounts and adequate data on sectoral money holdings for most of the developing economies direct estimation of sectoral demand functions is not possible thus an aggregative specification which incorporates the sectoral income composition factor is necessary to analyse the behaviour of velocity

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

decentralisation and government provision of public goods the public health sector in uganda while many developing countries have devolved health care responsibilities to local governments in recent years no study has examined whether decentralisation actually leads to greater health sector allocative efficiency this paper approaches this question by modeling local government budgeting decisions under decentralisation the model leads to conclusions not all favourable to decentralisation and produces several testable hypotheses concerning local government spending choices for a brief empirical test of the model we look at data from uganda the data are of a type seldom available to researchers actual local government budgets for the health sector in a developing country the health budgets are disaggregated into specific types of activities based on a subjective characterisation of each activity s publicness the empirical results provide preliminary evidence that local government health planners are allocating declining proportions of their budgets to public goods activities

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

caveat innovator strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions abstract the assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction the assumption underlying earlier strategic models that the entrant does not know the incumbent s payoffs after strategic have been tested does not appear to apply instead strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns in this environment strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry

inflation in open economies abstract this paper relates the time consistent inflation rate to the degree of trade openness of an economy the mechanism linking the welfare effects of monetary surprises and hence the incentives to inflate to openness does not rely on a large country terms of trade effect but rather is due to imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity in the non traded sector the empirical evidence supports the main predictions of the model 1997 elsevier science b v

centralization and the size of government in canada the determinants of the growth of government in canada over the period 1926 90 are examined of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector s share of gdp unlike other studies using time series data the effect of decentralization toward the provincial state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government

the persistence of monopoly an investigation of the effectiveness of the united kingdom monopolies commission a sample of twenty eight markets investigated by the uk monopolies and mergers commission is taken and market share changes are analysed for subsequent erosion of dominance the evidence points to a modest erosion for leading firms but only rarely to a loss of leadership although there is no significant difference between the rates of decline for leading firms in the mmc sample and a control group the achievement of some erosion of dominance in markets where entry barriers were reduced may represent some limited success for competition policy