repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

careers in ongoing hierarchies the probability that an unskilled worker can be successfully trained or screened to be a manager depends on the effort of the firm with positive hiring costs a firm prefers to train screen its own managers however the optimal size of the firm for productive efficiency may conflict with efficient managerial husbandry how a firm copes with the above constraint generates stochastic layoffs lateral mobility promotions diverse earnings profiles fast track jobs and up or out rules copyright 1994 by american economic association

status in markets this project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market we consider a special box design market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices we manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures in the first a subject s score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status in another subjects are assigned randomly to a higher status or lower status group in both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher status sellers face lowerstatus buyers and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers across all sessions the higher status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus earning significantly more than their lower status counterparts

german dominance in the ems evidence from interest rates abstract the paper presents an empirical analysis of german dominance and asymmetries in the ems based on a dynamic system of equations explaining national money market interest rates the hypothesis of strict german dominance of the ems is rejected however there are some noticeable asymmetries in the ems germany is a relatively strong player and has been the least dependent country in the early phase of the system since 1983 german independence has diminished in contrast france throughout and italy in the early phase of the ems have been relatively weak players in the system

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

two stage residual inclusion estimation addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling the paper focuses on two estimation methods that have been widely used to address endogeneity in empirical research in health economics and health services research two stage predictor substitution 2sps and two stage residual inclusion 2sri 2sps is the rote extension to nonlinear models of the popular linear two stage least squares estimator the 2sri estimator is similar except that in the second stage regression the endogenous variables are not replaced by first stage predictors instead first stage residuals are included as additional regressors in a generic parametric framework we show that 2sri is consistent and 2sps is not results from a simulation study and an illustrative example also recommend against 2sps and favor 2sri our findings are important given that there are many prominent examples of the application of inconsistent 2sps in the recent literature this study can be used as a guide by future researchers in health economics who are confronted with endogeneity in their empirical work

school supply constraints and children s educational outcomes in rural ghana abstract studies of school attainment often fail to acknowledge the possibility that prices for all schooling levels affect the decision to attend any one schooling level in developing countries the assumption that schooling costs are constant throughout the education cycle is manifestly untrue this paper concentrates on the empirical implications of introducing schooling costs that increase with schooling level the results suggest that the cost of advanced levels of education influences decisions at the primary school level the relative magnitude of the cross price elasticities suggests that cross price effects should not be ignored when designing educational user fees

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

capital controls and balance of payments crises abstract the theory of balance of payments crises shows that under perfect foresight a system of fixed exchange rate is not sustainable in the presence of diverging economic policies in this paper it is shown how and why capital controls succeed in maintaining the principle of a fixed but adjustable parity both cases of a devaluation and a revaluation are considered and a condition for a parity change to be credible is presented

assessing target zone credibility mean reversion and devaluation expectations in the erm 1979 1992 abstract the paper presents estimates of devaluation expectations for six erm currencies relative to the deutsche mark for the period march 1979 april 1992 both the simplest test and the drift adjustment method are used the simplest test adjusts interest rate differentials for the maximum and minimum expected rate of depreciation within the exchange rate band the drift adjustment method adjusts interest rate differentials by the estimated expected rate of depreciation within the band the latter method gives more precise estimates especially for short horizons and allows statistical inference and hypothesis testing expected rates of devaluation have generally fallen during the period still some devaluation expectations relative to the deutsche mark remain in 1992 except for the belgian luxembourg franc and the netherlands guilder expected rates of devaluation have fluctuated more than interest rate differentials

credibility and disinflation in the european monetary system analysis of interest differentials in the european monetary system has suggested a widespread lack of credibility of the exchange rate mechanism in the sense that in most countries the implicit expected rate of devaluation was significant and not far short of inflation differentials vis a vis the deutschmark we present and test a model in which prices reflect expectations of exchange rate behaviour the results provide mixed evidence that price setting in countries which participated in the erm was influenced by the exchange rate discipline

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

the power of incentives variable pay is usually defined as pay that is tied to some measure of worker output the most typical form of variable pay historically was the piece rate which was more prevalent during the early part of the 20th century than it is at the beginning of the 21st there is a resurgence in variable pay particularly as it relates to executives whose pay is tied to output through some mechanism like stock options or bonuses that depend on individual or firm performance why use variable pay the typical reaction is that variable pay provides incentives to put forth effort although true discrete pay schemes also generate incentives much of the confusion in the literature results from the use of the terms high powered and low powered incentives which connote difference in ability to elicit worker effort it is more informative to make distinctions between discrete and continuous pay and between inputbased and output based pay 2 pay structures can be summarized by the following equation

up or out rules in the market for lawyers we examine how up or out rules operate as a screening device in the market for lawyers using data on large new york law firms we show that firm growth is a slow and uncertain process because performance as an associate is not an especially informative signal about whether a lawyer will make a good partner and because the costs of mistaken promotion are relatively high a newly hired associate is unlikely to be a suitable partner and the screening process is relatively imprecise firm growth therefore contributes between 5 7 of the present value of profits of a law firm

seigniorage and the case for national money in countries with high rates of inflation there is typically movement away from the use of the local currency the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of using a local currency with emphasis on the seigniorage foregone by using a foreign money even if it should be desirable for a country to fix its exchange rate it still loses seigniorage if it does not use its own money the case for using a foreign money then turns largely on the superior discipline imposed on domestic policymakers by removing their control over the money supply alternative methods of imposing discipline are discussed estimates of the amount of seigniorage raised by different governments are presented seigniorage amounts in some cases to about 10 percent of government revenue estimates are also presented of both the annual flow and one time stock costs of giving up use of domestic currencies and instead using the dollar the flow cost is typically about 1 percent of gnp and the stock cost is around 10 percent of gnp

gaining and losing erm credibility the case of the united kingdom the model of this paper highlights two aspects of credibility signaling the type of government which is assumed not to be known and for any type the likelihood that if circumstances are sufficiently unfavorable a devaluation will be impossible to avoid since not to do so would go against the government s interests these two factors have opposite implications for the link between unemployment and interest differentials high unemployment signals a tough government but also makes it less likely that even a tough government will maintain an existing parity copyright 1995 by royal economic society

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

when to dollarize implicit in the debate over dollarization are two very different views of the sequencing of policy measures one view is that dollarization to work smoothly and yield more benefits than costs must wait on the completion of complementary reforms the other view is that dollarization need not wait on these other reforms because the very act of dollarizing will produce the changes needed to smooth the operation of the new regime in this paper i consider these arguments as they apply to the cases of labor market reform fiscal reform and financial sector reform i conclude that neither theory nor evidence suggests that removing all scope for an independent monetary policy will necessarily accelerate the pace of reform

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

status and incentives this article introduces status as reflecting an agent s claim to recognition in her work this is a scarce resource increasing an agent s status requires that another agent s status be decreased higher status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money better paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status the results are consistent with actual management practices i egalitarianism is desirable in a static context ii in a long term work relationship juniors compensation is delayed and iii past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization s hierarchy

the role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition workers routinely carry out activities that increase their productivity with their current employer for which they are not directly compensated for example a worker may be asked to develop relationships with clients or shop floor staff or he may develop a better understanding of how his firm operates firmspecific human capital of this type is difficult to quantify so that it is likely to be difficult to directly compensate the worker for its acquisition this paper is concerned with designing compensation schemes for employees to induce them to collect nonverifiable firm specific human capital if firms develop reputations for fairly compensating workers for skill collection the vagueness of these skills may not provide a significant incentive problem i consider the case where firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations as a result the acquisition of human capital is subject to a dual moral hazard problem first noted in kahn and huberman 1988 first a worker only collects skills if there is a promise of a higher wage if he does so second the employer has an incentive to claim that the worker has not collected these skills even when he in fact has in order to save on wage costs so on the one hand it is difficult to repay the worker after skills are collected as the firm has an incentive to renege however the worker cannot be repaid before collecting skills as he has no subsequent incentive to collect them following the institutional literature i assume that the firm can commit to a labor contract which attaches wages to different tasks the principal purpose of the paper is to show that the firm can use this ability to commit to a wage scale for different tasks to induce a worker to collect firm specific human capital in the presence of this dual moral hazard problem where the worker is rewarded for skill acquisition by promotion to another job assume that a worker can be assigned to one of two jobs d and

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

the role of policymakers reputation in the ems disinflations abstract it is frequently argued that the ems itself in connection with the high anti inflation reputation of the german bundesbank is responsible for the inflation reduction and convergence which member countries have experienced based on the game theoretical model of backus and driffill 1985 american economic review 75 530 538 an empirical measure of the government s reputation for fighting inflation is derived by using a bayesian learning approach time varying estimates of these counterinflation reputation measures are computed for the original ems member countries and for a control group of major non ems countries the paper finds that only the smaller ems participants have gained anti inflation reputation during the ems period

econometric issues in macroeconomic models with generated regressors the paper critically reviews the literature on the econometric issues raised by the use of generated regressors gr in empirical models the economic rationale for the use of gr is considered with examples being drawn from several macroeconomic examples including new classical macroeconomic ncm models which postulate monetary neutrality various estimation methods are discussed for models which include surprise or unexpected terms and the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are investigated drawing upon the work of mcaleer and mckenzie 1991 situations where the typically inefficient two step estimation 2se method will be efficient are highlighted problems of model misspecification and measurement errors are also investigated an empirical section highlights some of the dangers of using uncorrected 2se estimation results through a careful consideration of many recent attempts to test the ncm monetary neutrality hypothesis copyright 1993 by blackwell publishers ltd

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

the european monetary system list of figures list of tables preface 1 introduction niels thygesen part i the international environment 2 the european monetary system the dollar and the yen rudiger dornbusch discussion robert triffin discussion charles wyplosz part ii disinflation external adjustment and cooperation 3 monetary discipline and cooperation in the european monetary system a synthesis jacques melitz discussion jose vinals 4 the role of the exchange rate regime in a disinflation empirical evidence on the european monetary system francesco giavazzi and alberto giovannini discussion william branson 5 inflation and the european monetary system susan m collins discussion jean jacques rey 6 economic growth and exchange rates in the european monetary system their trade effects in a changing external environment stefano vona and lorenzo bini smaghi discussion david begg part iii exchange rates capital mobility and monetary coordination 7 exchange rates interest rates capital controls and the european monetary system assessing the track record michael j artis and mark p taylor discussion emil maria claassen and eric peree 8 the stability and sustainability of the european monetary system with perfect capital markets john driffill discussion daniel gros 9 competitiveness realignment and speculation the role of financial markets maurice obstfeld discussion marcus miller discussion herakles polemarchakis 10 interventions sterilisation and monetary policy in european monetary system countries 1979 87 cristina mastropasqua stefano micossi and roberto rinaldi discussion wolfgang rieke 11 monetary policy coordination within the european monetary system is there a rule massimo russo and giuseppe tullio discussion lucas papademos part iv the future of the european monetary system 12 the european monetary system a long term view tommaso padoa schioppa 13 a new phase in the european monetary system exchange rate constraint capital liberalisation and policy coordination a report of the conference panel discussion lamberto dini peter kenen rainer masera wolfgang rieke luigi spaventa and jacques waitzenegger index

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

the firm as the locus of social comparisons standard promotion practices versus up or out we suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns a firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker s status depends on past performance we investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies i standard promotion practices where agents have a job guarantee and ii up or out in which agents are fired when unsuccessful we show that up or out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve when success is less hard to achieve standard promotion practices are optimal provided the payoffs associated with success are moderate otherwise up or out is again optimal

transparency reputation and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates this paper shows that if the cost of importing foreign inflation and real exchange rate shocks are not too high then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate regime for a country with a credibility problem is a peg under which credibility is higher and inflation is lower than under a float this holds true although devaluations of the pegged rate are assumed to be costless the reason is that as realized inflation is not perfectly controllable planned inflation under a float is private information in contrast since the exchange rate can be perfectly controlled pegging resolves the private information problem is more transparent and makes reputation more effective

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

on the imperfect substitutability of policy regimes exchange rate targetting vs policy coordination abstract exchange rate targetting is always an imperfect substitute for explicit policy coordination but succeeds when economies are either structurally dissimilar with symmetric shocks or structurally symmetric with dissimilar shocks a joint commitment then generates economies of scale in interventions

distance to hospital and children s use of preventive care is being closer better and for whom i introduction this article examines the effect of distance to hospital on the utilization of preventive care among children many poor children lacking alternative providers rely on hospitals and clinics for preventive care moreover in many poor neighborhoods the majority of private doctors offices are located in buildings adjacent to a hospital thus hospitals indirectly serve to attract physician services that would otherwise be lacking in the neighborhood this pattern of service provision raises several concerns first it is inefficient for children to be receiving preventive care directly from hospitals because preventive care can be delivered more cheaply in doctors offices and doctors offices also provide greater continuity of care an index of quality second even when children are receiving care in a doctor s office adjacent to a hospital continuation of that service may be jeopardized if the hospital were to close in this study we use distance to hospital as a proxy for access to medical services to examine the effect of distance to hospital on the use of preventive care services if the use of these services falls with distance other things being equal then we interpret this as evidence of lack of access to alternative providers most previous studies of the effects of distance have concentrated on specific geographical areas and or hospitalizations for specific procedures we are therefore unaware of any previous studies that have focused on the effects of distance on the utilization of preventive care among children 1 we use a national sample of children created by matching records from the national longitudinal survey of youth s child mother nlscm file with the american hospital association s 1990 hospital survey we allow the effects of distance to vary with race ethnicity insurance status and degree of urbanicity we control for other factors that might affect utilization of preventive care by including a rich set of control variables and by estimating models that include either city dummy variables or mother fixed effects in particular city dummies control for unobserved differences across cities in public transportation services and population density mother fixed effects control for unobserved differences in preferences for preventive health care robust estimates across models allow us to rule out these alternative explanations for why distance to hospital might affect different groups differentially these innovations address the important question of whether children who rely on hospitals for preventive ca re do so because they lack access to other providers we find that distance to hospital has significant effects on access to preventive care only among central city black children for these children each additional mile from the hospital is associated with a 3 decline in the probability of having had a checkup from a mean baseline of 74 this effect is comparable to the 3 increase in the probability of having a checkup which is associated with having private health insurance coverage rather than being uninsured a striking result is that among these children the size of the distance effect is similar for both the privately insured and those with medicaid suggesting that even black urban children with private health insurance have difficulty obtaining access to preventive care outside the area around hospitals thus for this group questions of access to providers may be as important as insurance coverage in predicting use of preventive care ii children who rely on hospitals for primary care prior research suggests that children who are members of minorities uninsured covered by medicaid or residing in rural areas are all more likely to rely on hospitals for preventive care this section discusses each of these groups in turn bloom 1990 demonstrates that nationally black children are twice as likely as white children to receive care in an institutional setting such as a clinic or emergency room and that they are more likely to be attended by residents than by staff physicians

does distance matter for institutional delivery in rural india this article estimates the causal effect of distance to health facility on in facility birth in rural india taking into account the endogenous placement of the health facility we find that women living farther away from the health facilities are less likely to give birth at a health facility each additional kilometre from the nearest health facility is associated with a 4 4 decline in the probability of in facility birth policy simulation results indicate that providing access to a health facility within 5 km would increase institutional delivery by 10 overall our findings confirm that distance is an important barrier to in facility births in rural india

the efficient estimation of econometric models with rational expectations the efficient estimation of econometric models with rational expectations by the substitution method usually entails the use of a non linear simultaneous equations estimator and hence is not very attractive computationally it is shown that for a wide class of problems efficient estimates can also be obtained with standard estimation methods if instead an errors in variables approach is used for many other problems although not providing fully efficient estimates because rationality is not imposed the errors in variables method will still have a strong appeal because otherwise it uses all of the structural information in the model unlike the substitution method when an incomplete information set is used it guarantees consistent estimates and it is easy to compute

the phillips curve the persistence of inflation and the lucas critique evidence from exchange rate regimes comment we present evidence from the united states and the united kingdom that the persistence of price inflation is significantly higher under managed exchange rate regimes than under gold based fixed exchange rate regimes these differences are also reflected in expectations augmented phillips curves we use a two country macro model with forward looking price setters to demonstrate that higher monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange rate accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence the evidence does not contradict this hypothesis it supports the hypothesis of forward looking price setters and highlights the empirical significance of the lucas critique jel e31 e42 f33