inflationary bias of the federal reserve system the creation of the federal reserve system coincides with a turning point in the inflationary history of the united states before 1914 there was no overall trend in the price level generally during war time periods the consumer price index increased significantly but during the intervening periods prices gradually declined to approximately their former levels however since the creation of the fed there has been an unmistakable and almost continuous upward trend in prices l

bureaucratic theory and the choice of central bank goals economists have frequently asserted that central bank priorities among economic goals have not been appropriate to the public s desires for example one interpretation of the results of reuber s pioneering study of central bank preferences was that the bank of canada s reactions reflect the placing of a very heavy implicit weight on price stability compared with higher employment presumably based on a judgement about the relative economic costs of more unemployment and more price inflation the evidence examined on the relative economic costs of price inflation and unemployment suggests that the economic costs of inflation are not as high relative to the costs of unemployment as the reactions and statements of the authorities have implied reuber p 132 1

impact of energy efficiency incentives on electricity distribution companies an analysis is made of the impact of diverse regulatory mechanisms and financial incentives that aim at conciliating the interests of the regulating entity and distribution companies while tending towards the implementation of energy efficiency policies on the power distribution sector to assess the outcome of the power distributors on a given regulatory scenario a production possibility model based on data envelopment analysis is developed the methodology used adapts results gathered from international case studies in order to ascertain the efficiency degree achieved by each regulating scheme the analysis is subsequently applied on four representative companies of the chilean power distribution sector undergoing different energy efficiency levels required by the regulator the results reveal that the introduction of white certificates of energy efficiency outperforms the other methods considered as it succeeds on eliminating the disincentives at a minimal economic impact comparing the energy production revenue decoupling mechanisms with the investment of the 1 in energy efficiency programs yields that the first method achieves betters results provided that the regulator sets energy efficiency goals below 4 a year whereas the second method is more effective concerning the global impact on the distributors

research activities and budget allocations among federal reserve banks this paper applies the theory of bureaucracy to the internal operation of the federal reserve system according to the bureaucratic model the board of governors will use budget allocations to the individual reserve banks as a means of controlling their provision of information by examining the research publications of reserve banks we find two banks which began providing adverse publicity for the system in recent years the empirical analysis reveals that the budgets of these banks have decreased following the changes in research agendas

changing one s mind when the facts change incentives of experts and the design of reporting protocols experts often collect and report information over time what reporting protocol elicits the most information here a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability who observes two signals about the state of the world the signals differ in initial quality and unlike previous work differ in quality improvement the paper finds that mind changes inconsistent reports can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster also sequential reports dominate when the principal s decision is very sensitive to information a single report dominates if the mediocre agent s signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre

federal reserve independence abstract the federal reserve is always called an independent agency the term independent is rarely defined the only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on chairman martin s statement that the federal reserve is independent with the government not independent of the government martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the federal reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by congress and signed by the president financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when congress approved the federal reserve act in 1913 in fact the federal reserve has supported treasury operations many times i conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the taylor rule but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside

a public choice theory of the great contraction further evidence in recent issues of this journal perhaps no other paper has inspired as intense interest as our anderson shughart and tollison 1988 challenge to the friedman schwartz 1963 mistake theory of the great contraction in that article we advanced an hypothesis of fed behavior grounded in the political self interests of the banking system s regulators and their overseers in congress specifically we argued that the fed obtained two important benefits from the massive contraction in the money supply over which it presided between late 1929 and the middle of 1930 first because of the differentially higher failure rates of nonmember banks during this period the proportion of the commercial banking industry under the fed s control increased dramatically the second benefit came in the form of a change in the fed s method of finance which freed the board of governors from the normal congressional budgetary process putting the great contraction in interest group terms we suggested that during 1929 1933 the fed was acting rationally as the agent of congressmen serving on important oversight committees who in turn were representing the interests of the member banks in their states and districts we tested this hypothesis using bank failure rate data across states and found that holding other things equal the failure rates of nonmember banks in the early 1930s were significantly higher in states with representation on the house banking

inflationary bias of the federal reserve system a bureaucratic perspective abstract the federal reserve system does not receive a budget from congress but instead finances its operation from interest payments on its government security portfolio this peculiar financing arrangement provides the foundation for a bureaucratic model of federal reserve official behavior the empirical section tests the bureaucratic model by analysing the fed s expenditure record since 1947 and its policy actions during periods of constitutional revision

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

anti herding and strategic consultation in this paper i analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others i find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to anti herding i e they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others recommendations i also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless moreover advisers to the decision maker may not report their information truthfully even if the advisers care only about the outcome they bias their recommendation since they anticipate inefficient anti herding behavior by the decision maker

decision making in committees transparency reputation and voting rules in this paper i analyze the effect of the transparency of the decision making process in committees on the decisions that are eventually taken i focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns so that each member tries to enhance his own reputation when the decision making process is secretive the individual votes of the committee members are not exposed to the public but only the final decision thus individuals are evaluated according to the group s decision i find that in such a case group members are induced to comply with preexisting biases for example if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform individuals vote more often against reforms and exacerbate the conservatism of the voting rule when the decision making process becomes transparent and individual votes are observed this effect disappears and such committees are then more likely to accept reforms i also find that coupled with the right voting rule a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

well informed intermediaries in strategic communication this paper studies how a sender with private information can influence the decisionmaker through well informed intermediaries both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased with the objective type assumed to pass on the most accurate information while the biased type wanting to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective although using one s own information is a sign of objectivity the biased intermediary selectively incorporates the sender s information to push his agenda and his truth telling incentives always decrease in those of the biased sender s hence measures raising the sender s reputation cost worsen the intermediary s distortion and may make the decisionmaker strictly worse off in contrast the biased sender s and the intermediary s truth telling incentives are strategic complements if they report simultaneously

who should administer energy efficiency programs the restructuring of the u s electricity industry created a crisis for ratepayer funded energy efficiency programs this paper briefly describes the reasons for the crisis and some of its consequences then the paper focuses on issues related to program administration and discusses the relative merits of entities utilities state agencies and non profit corporations that might be administrators four criteria are developed for choosing among program administration options compatibility with public policy goals effectiveness of the incentive structure ability to realize economies of scale and scope and contribution to the development of an energy efficiency infrastructure we examine one region the pacific northwest and three states new york vermont and connecticut which have made successful transitions to new governance and or administration structures attention is also given to california where large scale energy efficiency programs have continued to operate despite the fact that many of the key governance administration issues remain unresolved we observe that no single administrative structure for energy efficiency programs has yet emerged in the us that is clearly superior to all of the other alternatives we conclude that this is not likely to happen soon for three reasons first policy environments differ significantly among the states second the structure and regulation of the electric utility industry differs among the regions of the us third market transformation and resource acquisition two program strategies that were once seen as alternatives are increasingly coming to be seen as complements energy efficiency programs going forward are likely to include elements of both strategies but the administrative arrangements that are best suited to support market transformation may be different from the arrangements that are best for resource acquisition

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

a theory of yes men this paper illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinion of their supervisors when firms use subjective performance evaluation this desire to conform arises endogenously from the firm s need to induce the worker to exert effort the author shows that firms may optimally eschew the use of incentive contracts to retain workers incentives for honesty the author illustrates that the incentive to conform implies inefficiencies even when workers are risk neutral and is likely to lead to more centralized decision making than in the absence of the desire to conform copyright 1993 by american economic association

the ruthless fed a critique of the ast hypothesis this paper examines the hypothesis that the great contraction was the result of rational rent seeking by members of the federal reserve system in contrast to the ast hypothesis evidence on the share prices of member banks that survived the contraction suggests that the owners of these banks suffered an absolute decline in real wealth and a decline relative to a broad spectrum of other investment alternatives furthermore monetary surprises had no statistically discernible effect on the share prices of these banks this evidence conflicts with the notion that rational rent seeking would lead the owners of member banks and their bureaucratic conspirators in the federal reserve system to unleash a policy with the goal of contracting the money supply by 35 percent

regional differences in electricity distribution costs and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices abstract in this paper we estimate an average cost function for a panel of 59 swiss local and regional electricity distribution utilities as a basis for yardstick regulation of the distribution network access prices shleifer 1985 proposed yardstick competition in terms of price to regulate local monopolies producing a homogeneous good the regulated price for the individual firms depends on the average costs of identical firms the yardstick competition concept can also be applied to firms that produce heterogeneous goods if these goods differ only in observable characteristics to correct the yardstick for heterogeneity the regulator can use a multivariate estimation of an average cost function in the case of electricity distribution the heterogeneity of output consists mainly of different characteristics of the distribution service areas in this paper we follow shleifer s suggestion to estimate a multivariate average cost function that can be employed by the regulatory commission to benchmark network access prices at the distribution level several exogenous variables measuring the heterogeneity of the service areas were included in the cost model specification we find that the regional differences of the service areas e g area shares of forests agricultural areas or unproductive land and population density significantly influence electricity distribution costs

a public choice theory of the great contraction the conventional chicago wisdom about the great contraction is that it was the result of a massive policy failure according to this view the collapse of the economy was brought about mostly by the fact that the monetary policymakers of the day were more concerned with internal power struggles than with supplying reserves to member banks an explanation which with apologies to professor stigler must have elicited uproarious laughter at the bankers club it has been our purpose in this paper to suggest an alternative theory briefly stated the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the fed from 1929 to 1933 was motivated by the economic interests of member banks the fed s policy produced a massive differential failure rate between member and nonmember banks in which the latter were eliminated at a rate at least five times higher than the former fed member banks faced substantially less competition in the banking market after the house cleaning than before although all banks suffered net losses in the short run in the long run member bank profitability was enhanced by the reduction in the number of nonmember competitors at the same time the fed itself benefitted from a substantial increase in the proportion of the total banking system within its bureaucratic jurisdiction and from a change in its method of finance putting the great contraction in interest group terms we suggested that the fed was acting as the agent of congressmen serving on important oversight committees who in turn were representing the interests of the member banks in their states due to interstate branching restrictions the state is the relevant geographic market within which banks compete we tested this hypothesis using bank failure rate data across states and found that holding other things equal the failure rates of nonmember banks in the early 1930s were significantly higher in states with representation on the house banking and currency committee of course not even friedman and schwartz 1963 299 301 argue that fed policy was the sole direct cause of the great contraction but instead maintain that the fed acted in such a way as to take a relatively severe contraction and turn it into by far the most severe business cycle contraction in the whole of u s history but to the extent that the great contraction was worsened by fed policy and this in turn led to the succession of events called the great depression the latter was a side effect of economically rational interests of federal reserve member banks to say the least this would appear to have been an enormously inefficient method of obtaining the postulated benefits certainly there were other less costly methods available by which member banks could have reduced the number of their nonmember rivals this is perhaps the most difficult problem our theory of the great contraction confronts we can offer two responses first although the literature on the great depression tends to focus on fluctuations in national macroeconomic aggregates e g the money supply unemployment and so on it is clear that the severity of the depression differed radically across states states with relatively large agricultural sectors tended to be especially hard hit suffering the highest rates of unemployment and the most significant numbers of bank failures by contrast states in some other areas most notably new england and the southeast seemed to be less seriously affected we note that in some of our regressions the number of nonmember bank failures was negatively and significantly related to state unemployment rates in 1934 this is certainly not conclusive evidence but it does suggest a pattern of differential costs associated with the great contraction that is the costs of providing benefits to federal reserve member banks in states with representation on the relevant oversight committees may have fallen more heavily on the economies of states not so represented if so this would cast a very different light on the actual costs of these policies to the relevant political decision makers second the potential dilemma in this case is no worse than that encountered in the application of the economic theory of politics to many other kinds of government behavior economists since adam smith have ascribed protectionist trade policies to the influence of special interest groups who benefit modestly at the cost of relatively huge economic inefficiencies many other government actions that might be plausibly explained from an interest group perspective would similarly seem to involve costs to the economy which grossly outweigh the benefits special interests might reasonably expect presumably even in such seemingly extreme cases marginal benefits equal marginal costs to the relevant actors some writers have suggested that the political marketplace in modern democracies is characterized by much larger transactions costs than are normally encountered in ordinary markets see demsetz 1982 this might help explain the seemingly huge discrepancies we observe between apparent concentrated benefits and diffused costs in depression era monetary policy in any event this problem is not peculiar to our theory but is shared by many applications of the interest group model of government it is worth emphasizing that the events we have described do fall into the interest group model s stylized depiction of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs moreover without having a complete picture of all of the options available to the monetary policymakers we cannot be sure that any of the alternatives was in fact more efficient we do know the path that was chosen and that contrary to the conventional wisdom this path had a rationally motivated interest group basis

dea efficiency for the determination of the electric power distribution added value the application of data envelopment analysis methodology is formulated as a tool to determine the distribution added value required in the tariff fixation processes of electrical power distribution that use the concept of model firm as a regulatory basis in order to increase the reliability of the obtained results a bootstrap technique is applied its application is illustrated within the framework of the latest regulatory process in chile

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds