farmer groups and input access when membership is not enough this paper explores the efficiency of a targeted fertilizer subsidy program administered differently in two nigerian states in 2009 an important dimension along which the otherwise similar programs differed was the fertilizer distribution strategy fertilizer distribution among program participants was done at the individual level for one set of farmers while the fertilizer was given indirectly through a group representative for the other set where fertilizer was given to a group representative for further distribution to members relatives of the farm group s president received more bags of fertilizer than others where fertilizer was given directly to farmers such results did not obtain this differential outcome suggests that while groups may facilitate the process of farmer identification and coordination elite capture and intra group dynamics may affect their efficacy for providing equal access to inputs for members two tier models enable us to model the potentially separate processes that determine participation in the voucher program and the amount of fertilizer received upon deciding to participate with intentions to adopt and scale up voucher programs in various food security and poverty alleviation programs across developing countries it is important to understand when and how farmer groups can affect the successful implementation of such programs

the optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer abstract this paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget constrained we consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function if the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint textbook monopoly pricing is optimal by contrast the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing to commit to a declining price sequence to require the buyer to disclose his budget or to offer financing journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d42 d45 d89 l12

the economics of the internet infrastructure and regulation the purpose of this article is to inform users regulators and economists about the basic economics of the internet focusing on regulation of its infrastructure it defines the internet and describes its development and organization it analyses the regulatory and competition issues associated with conveyance on the internet it then discusses three current puzzles of economic interest while the article reaches several conclusions the overall message is that much more work is needed in this area

allocating priority with auctions an experimental analysis there are many examples of markets where resources that were allocated ex ante must be rationed ex post two alternative methods of rationing are considered in this paper priority service see chao and wilson american economic review 77 1987 and wilson econometrica 57 1989 and proportional rationing see spulber international economic review 33 1992 an experimental environment is developed in which the two rules are implemented within two well known institutions the english and the uniform price sealed bid auctions under two different information conditions we find that priority service generates more efficient allocations than proportional rationing and the sealed bid auction performs better than the english both mechanisms and rationing rules are more efficient when there is a lack of common information

old problems in the new solutions politically motivated allocation of program benefits and the new fertilizer subsidies summary fertilizer subsidies have been reinstituted in many african countries with innovations seeking to avoid the downsides of past programs the new subsidy paradigm however does not address how to curtail political manipulation which exacerbated inefficiencies of previous programs this paper analyzes whether politics affected voucher allocations in ghana s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program we find that more vouchers were targeted to districts that the ruling party had lost in the previous presidential elections and more so in districts that had been lost by a higher percentage margin this evidence shows that a significant threat to the efficiency of fertilizer subsidies remains

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

optimal pricing in electrical networks over space and time an electrical system is modelled with a transmission network customers central generators and independent generators the system is subject to stochastic failures and stochastic demand parameters optimal spot prices are derived for the system they vary stochastically with space and time and depend on electrical load flow patterns the price difference between two locations or two voltage levels and the wheeling charge between them will change magnitude and sometimes sign over time as a function of events throughout the network current spatial pricing methods are significantly different from the spot price based methods derived here

time of use rates vs hopkinson tariffs redux an analysis of the choice of rate structures in a regulated electricity distribution company abstract recent proposals to restructure the electricity industry in north america may effect the disintegration of a vertically integrated company into several smaller entities including distribution companies discos we explore whether time of use tou pricing or a hopkinson tariff would be more suitable for a regulated disco focusing on the economic efficiency of these alternative rate structures we argue that a hopkinson tariff with demand subscription is superior to tou rates as it can better handle the limited load diversity of local transmission and distribution td demands made on the contemporary disco while finessing the problem of endogenous marginal costs of local td capacity

money new keynesian macroeconomics and the business cycle abstract we show in this paper that the typical modern business cycle cannot be reduced to the real business cycles archetype a monopolistic competition model with price adjustment costs affected by technological and monetary shocks better mimics the economic fluctuations in two countries with very different cyclical properties namely france and the united states in our model monetary shocks are necessary to reproduce the standard deviation of output the money output correlation the labour productivity worked hours relative standard deviation the labour productivity worked hours correlation and the mark up output correlation with two independent shocks one real more specifically defined than the solow residual and one nominal the model gives an answer to some empirical puzzles which were left unexplained by traditional rbc models

government fertilizer subsidy and commercial sector fertilizer demand evidence from the federal market stabilization program fmsp in nigeria abstract we examine how the previous fertilizer subsidy program in nigeria fmsp affected the demand for commercial fertilizer we apply an endogenous double hurdle model to a pseudo panel and cross section data of farm households the methodology accounts for potential endogeneity of commercial fertilizer price with subsidy our specification is also appropriate where few farmers report the use of both subsidized and commercial fertilizer we find that 100 kg of subsidized fertilizer supplied to a farm household reduced the probability of its participation into commercial fertilizer market by 10 21 points while not affecting fertilizer use upon participation

risk the financial market and macroeconomic equilibrium growing recognition of the importance of stock market phenomena to the real economy underscores the need for models linking exogenous uncertainty asset market performance and the rest of the economy in an optimizing framework without certainty equivalence this paper constructs a three agent model with continuous time stochastic variables uncertain private production and government expenditure and forward looking rational agents the growth rate of output physical capital accumulation financial asset returns and uncertain inflation are determined as functions of the exogenous uncertainty in the economy analysis of the model finds that increased risk associated with government policy often reverses in an explainable way the conventional comparative static predictions of nonstochastic macro models

uncertainty and monetary policy in a wage bargaining model in a wage bargaining model increased uncertainty concerning monetary and real aggregates is shown to give rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate moreover the equilibrium unemployment rate is found to depend on the choice of monetary policy regime as this choice affects the uncertainty wage setters face when setting the nominal wage rate it is also shown that the equilibrium inflation rate may depend on uncertainty in such a way that increased uncertainty gives rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate as well as a higher equilibrium inflation rate or what has been called stagflation

optimal nonlinear pricing and contingent contracts rationing of output may be required to allocate resources when it is costly to operate a system of spot markets in electric power markets for example interruptible service is the most frequently used form of capacity sensitive allocation after time of use pricing this paper examines the welfare properties and ease of implementation of alternative rationing rules and the pricing of contracts based on rationing rules the model allows for both demand and supply shocks the theoretical analysis is illustrated by application to curtailment rules and pricing in electric power markets rationing rules are a means of sharing risk and joint costs insurance provides a means of sharing the financial costs of random events however there are additional welfare gains to be obtained from pooling physical quantities of goods in the presence of random demand and supply see spulber 1985 by rationing goods the common costs of production or productive capacity can be reduced while also reducing individual risk this explains in part the extensive attention devoted to rationing of electric power electric power is subject to significant randomness in both supply and demand allocation mechanisms based on prices that adjust in real time on complete contingent contracts or on renegotiation of contracts in response to new information can involve prohibitive transaction costs avoidance of the need to ration would require inefficiently high capacity investment electric utilities must therefore employ rationing rules these rules must be

subsidy free pricing of interruptible service contracts abstract this article analyzes the issue of cross subsidy in the pricing structure of a utility offering interruptible service contracts utilizing a simple theoretical model in which available capacity is subject to random shocks we derive a set of sufficient conditions for the presence of subsidies in the pricing of priority service we find that low priority customers receive no subsidies whenever they pay prices in excess of variable costs a test for subsidies to high priority customers is derived that can be implemented utilizing available information extensions of the analysis are discussed

efficient pricing and investment in electricity markets with intermittent resources facing growing technological and environmental challenges the electricity industry needs effective pricing mechanism to promote efficient risk management and investment decisions in a restructured electricity market with competitive wholesale prices and traditionally regulated retail rates however there are technical and institutional barriers that prevent dynamic pricing with price responsive demand in regions with limited energy storage capacity intermittent renewable resources present special challenges this could adversely affect the effectiveness of public policies causing inefficient investments in energy technologies in this paper we present an updated economic model of pricing and investment in restructured electricity market and use the model in a simulation study for an initial assessment of renewable energy strategy and alternative pricing mechanisms a key objective of the study is to shed light on the policy issues so that effective decisions can be made to improve efficiency

simple menus of contracts in cost based procurement and regulation in an influential paper jean jacques laffont and jean tirole 1986 formulated a principal agent model of cost based procurement and regulation and showed that the principal can implement the optimal mechanism by offering the agent a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts two related problems with applying this theory in practice have been that the economic logic and the underlying mathematics involved in calculating the optimal menu are quite complex and the principal must be able to specify the agent s entire disutility of effort function in order to calculate the optimal menu as a result the model has not been widely used in practice to either calculate actual incentive contracts or even to develop useful qualitative guidance about the nature of the optimal solution and how it is affected by various economic factors the purpose of this paper is to show that dramatically simpler menus which are easy to understand and calculate and which have lower informational requirements can at least in some cases capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the fully optimal complex menu in particular this paper considers two item menus where one item is a cost reimbursement contract and the other item is a fixed price contract such menus are called fixed price cost reimbursement fpcr menus for the case where the agent s utility is quadratic and the agent s type is distributed uniformly it is shown that the optimal fpcr menu always captures at least three quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves where the gain is measured relative to the result of using a cost reimbursement contract this paper s research was originally motivated by a policy issue in defense procurement in the united states the department of defense dod purchases almost all major weapons systems from sole source contractors using contracting methods that essentially amount to using cost reimbursement contracts the best way to understand why dod uses costreimbursement contracting methods is that they perform precisely the function identified in laffont and tirole s principal agent model they guarantee in a situation that amounts to a bilateral monopoly that dod and the firm can reach an agreement i e they guarantee that the agent will always produce the good of course the use of cost reimbursement contracting methods

electricity rationing through a two stage mechanism analysis of interruptible service mechanisms has focused on the efficiency losses due to the absence of complete contingent contracts there exists a second type of inefficiency which to a large extent has been ignored it originates from the fact that the relative order or ranking of consumers willingness to pay for a given quantity generally varies throughout the contract period a more general model of electricity demand allowing for changes in the order of consumer willingness to pay for a given quantity is presented under such demand conditions the use of a two stage rationing mechanism is proposed rationing plans which maximize expected aggregate surplus are established in the first stage the second stage consists in a market for allocation rights to be operated once the states of nature are revealed allocations under this two stage mechanism are shown to be pareto superior to existing rationing plans directions for future research are discussed

the conduct of monetary policy and the natural rate of unemployment note the potential of monetary policy to affect the natural rate of unemployment is demonstrated for a disaggregated macroeconomic model in which it takes time for labor markets to eliminate excess supplies resulting from stochastic shocks the effect of aggregate output variability on the natural rate of unemployment is derived for the system in its stochastic steady state and illustrative calculations show the possible effects of varying the monetary policy rule copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

time consistency indexation and the costs of inflation abstract we examine the effects of indexation measures on inflation costs of inflation and economic welfare within the barro gordon journal of political economy 1983 91 589 610 model the main result is that wage indexation in addition to making the phillips curve steeper also reduces the marginal cost of inflation which is inflationary

inflation variability real wage variability and production inefficiency in recent years economists have paid considerable attention to the relation between the rate of inflation and its temporal variance the consensus emerging from this discussion is that there exists a strong positive relation between the inflation rate and its temporal variance see for example okun 1971 gordon 1971 jaffe and kleiman 1977 and foster 1978 clearly the increased variability of the inflation rate is likely to involve social costs that concern inefficiency in consumption and in production thus in his nobel lecture friedman 1977 says the growing volatility of inflation and the growing departure of relative prices from the values that market forces alone shall set combine to render the econoniic system less efficient p 470 in general the interpretation given to production inefficiency resulting from increased variability in the inflation rate is that of a reduction in output to a level lower than that occurring under price stability for example levi and makin interpret friedman s inefficiency argument thus from the two components of friedman s argument we have that high inflation accompanied by high variability of inflation will mean a lower output levi and makin 1980 p 1023 it is our purpose in this paper to elaborate on the concept of the production inefficiency caused by increased inflation variability iv where we focus on the variability in the real wage caused by inflation variability we suggest a concept of inefficiency of production that relates average changes in the use of labour to average changes in output specifically it is shown that iv alters output and or labour employment in a way that is inferior to the relation between output and employment under stable prices that we suggest is the crux of production inefficiency resulting from iv this production inefficiency will emerge as a result of iv independently of whether output rises or falls as a result of iv indeed our analysis will illustrate that mean output may increase or decrease so that by using output alone as an index of efficiency we may obtain the unlikely result that iv raises production efficiency one result we derive en route is that under plausible assumptions about the production function labour employment may on average rise with iv notwithstanding this we show that efficiency in production declines this result may be used as an interpretation of the inefficiency concept as used by friedman thus friedman says these developments clearly lower economic efficiency it is less clear what their effect is on recorded unemployment 1977 p 466 we proceed by considering the basic model and showing the ambiguity of the effect of inflation variability on mean output in section i in section ii we show that iv introduces a production inefficiency defined upon the

nominal rigidity and monetary uncertainty abstract a stochastic macromodel with dynamically optimising wage setting households is used to examine the effect on current macroeconomic variables of an anticipated increase in variability of the money stock there is a nominal rigidity in the form of a money wage set one period in advance in whose absence monetary uncertainty has no effect on current variables we show that for plausible parameterisations monetary uncertainty combined with nominal rigidity raises the nominal interest rate depressing aggregate demand and hence current price and output it also causes the wage to be set higher increasing the natural rate of unemployment

unemployment in britain male unemployment in britain has risen from around 2 per cent in the 1950s to around 17 per cent in 1985 see figure 1 the figures are for male unemployment because there is no consistent series for women 1 even more remarkably unemployment has fallen in only three years out of the last twenty 1973 1978 and 1979 to account for this we need a model that explains both changes in the natural or non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment nairu and deviations from it we use a three equation supply side model centred on the labour market this has two main features the first concerns the determination of employment in the short run the labour demand function that we use cuts through the fruitless debate now raging especially in europe as to whether current unemployment is classical or keynesian according to the classical view employment is too high because real wages are too high according to the keynesian view real wages are not binding and unemployment is high because the product market does not clear with prices too high relative to nominal demand the whole debate is set in the framework of perfect competition yet in perfect competition prices are set by impersonal forces and it is not clear what could possibly stop prices clearing the market it is much more reasonable to think of prices as being set by imperfectly competitive firms existing prices being the best they can think of given the demand they face in this context firms demand for labour will depend on both the real product wage and the level of real aggregate demand this is the demand function we estimate and it conforms both to common sense and to the data however this does not imply that employment can be made to grow without limit by pumping up real demand for in the medium term when price surprises are eliminated our model determines three variables employment real wages and real demand on the basis of three equations an employment equation a price equation and a wage equation thus in the medium term there is a natural level of employment and corresponding to this a natural level of real aggregate demand the second key feature of our model concerns the medium term determination of unemployment in the medium term the planned mark up of wages over prices in wage settlements must be consistent with the mark up of prices over wage costs in employers pricing behaviour for if wage setters try to set real product wages higher than is consistent with employers pricing behaviour this generates ever increasing inflation thus the key to understanding unemployment in the medium term is the behaviour of wage setters if events occur that push them towards too high real wages then unemployment has to rise to offset these influences we shall call these influences wage pressure variables or push factors and they are clearly crucial in understanding unemployment the variables here include the social security system employment protection

simple competitive internet pricing abstract it is widely recognised that pricing is required to control congestion on the internet one lesson that has emerged from many proposals is that any price system should be simple and robust to competition this is highlighted in the question currently under debate in the market for internet services should usage prices should be employed at all in a duopoly model with overall positive network effects it is shown that flat rate pricing can occur in equilibrium even when the costs of measuring variable demand are very small

information and usage of free access congestible facilities with stochastic capacity and demand we investigate the effect of information on users participation decisions at a free access congestible facility that is subject to unpredictable fluctuations in capacity and demand with demand isoelastic in user cost and user cost isoelastic in the ratio of demand to capacity optimal design capacity is larger with mean preserving spreads in capacity and demand if and only if demand elasticity is less than one expected welfare is greater with better information interestingly with nonconstant elasticity demand and or user costs information can be welfare reducing

do vouchers improve government fertilizer distribution evidence from nigeria government distribution of subsidized fertilizer in sub saharan africa is often characterized by cumbersome administrative processes and diversion of the product from the proclaimed beneficiaries this study uses propensity score matching techniques to analyze an input voucher program in nigeria that was meant to demonstrate an alternative and more efficient distribution mechanism for subsidized fertilizer we find that participants in the 2009 voucher program received more bags of subsidized fertilizer than nonparticipants and also paid significantly lower prices compared to those who purchased directly from the market on average however participating in the voucher program did not improve the timeliness of fertilizer receipt or the quality of the product where statistically significant participating in the program increased the likelihood that the product was received late and that some complaint about the product s quality was made as many developing countries particularly in sub saharan africa adopt the use of input vouchers or scale up already existing programs this study demonstrates when the distribution of subsidized fertilizer via vouchers improves farmers timely access to good and more affordable fertilizer it highlights some key issues to be considered in order to expand the dimensions of success of well targeted input voucher programs

monetary randomness and investment abstract this paper develops a neoclassical model in which the behavior of the money supply affects investment by affecting the real distribution of asset returns investment depends on wealthholders demand for capital a stochastic money growth rule influences portfolio choice by affecting the distribution of the inflation rate the variance of inflation matters to wealthholders because of the existence of assets with returns that are not indexed to changes in the price level money and bonds which are contracted in nominal terms in a rational expectations environment asset demands will thus be sensitive to the distribution of the money growth rate our principle conclusion is that an increase in the variance of the money growth rate lowers investment which complements tobin s 1965 result that an increase in the mean stimulates capital accumulation the paper also represents a step toward incorporating an asset market into a macroeconomic model in a manner which takes account of lucas 1976 criticism of econometric policy evaluation all variables in the model including asset return distributions are functions of technology preferences and the money supply rule further expectations are rational

subsidies and crowding out a double hurdle model of fertilizer demand in malawi this article uses a double hurdle model with panel data from malawi to investigate how fertilizer subsidies affect farmer demand for commercial fertilizer the article controls for potential endogeneity caused by the nonrandom targeting of fertilizer subsidy recipients results show that on average 1 additional kilogram of subsidized fertilizer crowds out 0 22 kg of commercial fertilizer but crowding out ranges from 0 18 among the poorest farmers to 0 30 among relatively nonpoor farmers this indicates that targeting fertilizer subsidies to the rural poor is likely to maximize the contribution of the subsidy program to total fertilizer use

priority service pricing investment and market organization tingent forward delivery contracts offered by a seller each customer s selection of one contract from the menu determines the customer s service order or priority in each contingency the seller rations supplies by serving customers in order of their selected priorities until the supply is exhausted or all customers are served various forms of priority service are widely

efficient and competitive rationing abstract the contracts that interest us here are called priority service contracts the salient feature of such contracts is that they specify each customer s priority in obtaining service that is they specify the tank order in which a customer is served out of the available supply until all customers are served or supply is exhausted such contracts essentially establish queues for customers in section 1 the author provides some background about priority service section 2 formulates a basic model and offer several illustrations also describes two main examples that motivate the theoretical development section 3 derives some key results that show how the prices of priority service contracts are designed to induce customers to self select efficient service orders in section 4 the author discusses various ways that state enterprises can organize markets that implement priority service efficiently in section 5 we study the operation of competitive markets for priority service section 6 concludes with some summary remarks two themes are emphasized one is that a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting priority service for absent spot markets the other is that oligopolistic firms may have insufficient incentives to offer efficient product diversity consequently allocative efficiency depends on entry of numerous firms even so dispersal of supplies among many firms can prevent productive efficiency when there are advantages from pooling supplies

monetary uncertainty in discrete time utility of money models abstract in a discrete time model higher variability of the future money supply affects current macroeconomic variables when beginning of period money is the argument of utility but not when end of period money is the effect is through the existence of a precautionary money demand

some economics of seasonal gas storage we propose a model of seasonal gas markets which is flexible enough to include supply and demand shocks while also considering exhaustibility the relative performances of alternative policies based on price caps and associated measures or tariffs are discussed we illustrate with structural estimates on us data how this theory can be used to give insights into the intertemporal incidence of policy instruments

the long run link between money growth and inflation is inflation always a monetary phenomenon many economists believe that the link between money growth and inflation in the u s has weakened over the last two decades due in part to the federal reserve s policy experiment in 1979 1982 and innovations in the financial sector of the economy i find that the long run relationship between money growth and inflation is strong in a statistical sense and important economically the key result is that the trend or growth component in cpi inflation is entirely due to the trend component of monetary base growth jel c32 e31 e51

two tier pricing of shared facilities in a free entry equilibrium we explore how well the market will provide shared facilities which are subject to congestion it is usually efficient to have multiple facilities because it is more efficient to spend resources on facilities than to endure crowding costs we assume firms can charge a membership price and a visit price we present a symmetric nash equilibrium in these two prices we show that ifthe number offirms is large the membership price will be small thus the membership price is a measure of market power when entry occurs in response to positive profit but such that entry is deterred by the prospect of negative profit in a symmetric nash equilibrium the endogenous number offirms is bounded below by one fewer than the efficient number thefees paid by a client converge to an appropriately defined competitive price as the economy is replicated

socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing abstract we investigate the behaviour of a social planner that secures the supply of a good e g an environmental benefit through contracting with private agents while the social planner seeks to maximise net social benefits she is also controlled with a fixed budget private agents are profit maximising and hold private information concerning their variable costs of production they also have known fixed costs of contracting we find that budget constraints and fixed costs change the optimal contract design in more than one way the social planner minimises costs rations high cost contracts to reduce fixed costs and information rents and distorts contracts for all agent types including low cost agents we find that rationing improves social welfare also even though social costs including tax distortion are explicitly taken into consideration they do not affect the design of optimal contracts when budgets are tight in those cases the budget constraint dominates the solution

costs prices and profitablity in uk manufacturing the 1984 input output tables make it possible to estimate directly the cost structure of any industrial sector the results of this calculation are presented for the non food manufacturing sector for the period 1970 87 this cost estimate is found to be part of a co integrating set with output prices in contrast to the specification implied by a cobb douglas production function the other elements of the equilibrium vector are an index of capacity utilization positively related to the mark up and the variance of inflation proxying inflation uncertainty which is negatively related import prices have an indirect effect on the mark up via demand

competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices abstract in this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts two variants of the model are studied one extends a model first analyzed by wolinsky rev econ stud 55 1988 71 84 in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers the other variant extends the model of mcafee econometrica61 1993 1281 1312 in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions the equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d82

the cyclical behavior of marginal cost and price the author examines the cyclical behavior of price marginal cost margins for u s manufac turing after 1956 short run marginal cost is markedly procyclical this is primarily due to procyclical overtime payments incurred beca use employment is not perfectly flexible in most industries output price fails to respond to the cyclical movement in marginal cost so price marginal cost margins are markedly countercyclical the res ults contradict business cycle theories that explain low production i n a recession by a high real cost of producing they support theories that explain low production in a recession by the inability of firms to sell their output copyright 1987 by american economic association

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

sticky goods prices flexible asset prices monopolistic competition and monetary policy a monetary general equilibrium asset pricing model with sticky goods prices is developed goods prices are set by monopolistically competitive firms that maximize stock market value equilibria with underutilization of resources excess capacity in some states result in contrast to previous monetary asset pricing models the degree of competition affects capacity utilization monetary policy can affect output and resource utilization in addition to real asset prices depending upon the amount of information available to the monetary authority

flexible and semiflexible consumer demands with quadratic engel curves in this paper we introduce three flexible consumer demand systems in which expenditures on goods are quadratic functions of income we view these alternatives as to the demand systems used heretofore in the empirical modeling of rank three demands namely those in which expenditure shares are quadratic functions of the logarithm of income curvature conditions required by theory can be imposed locally during the estimation for each and a semiflexible version can be estimated for illustrative purposes we estimate various forms of two of the systems using canadian data on seven categories of goods for the period 1947 to 1995

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

monetary growth innovations in a simple cash in advance asset pricing model abstract this paper contributes to the existing literature in the rational expectations cash in advance asset pricing general equilibrium model in two directions first we show that by allowing a variable velocity of circulation an increase in the conditional variance of the money growth process triggers an increase in the demand for money relative to stocks and bonds with a consequent reduction in stock and bond prices which is the opposite of the current result in the literature with constant unitary velocity second we explicitly show how the sequential markets and specific timing of information fits exactly into the notion of irreversibility in the sense that when faced with uncertainty agents might find optimal to delay decisions in order to wait for the arrival of new information

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

fertilizer subsidies political influence and local food prices in sub saharan africa evidence from nigeria abstract the last decade has seen a resurgence in the use of fertilizer subsidies in sub saharan africa however there is limited empirical evidence on the effects of fertilizer subsidy programs on local food prices using an instrumental variables approach we explore the effect of a fertilizer subsidy program on the seasonal growth rates of grain prices in nigeria our results suggest that the fertilizer subsidy program had very small effects on the growth rates of grain prices between the post planting and post harvesting seasons we also find that political influence played a role in the distribution of subsidized fertilizer we discuss how the weak effects on the price growth rates may be caused by low market orientation output market structures greater focus on farmers incomes low marginal productivity of fertilizer and politically influenced targeting

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty when a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices this article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing when there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist s optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price

do input subsidy programs crowd in or crowd out commercial market development modeling fertilizer demand in a two channel marketing system many governments in developing countries distribute fertilizer at subsidized prices in an effort to stimulate small farmers agricultural productivity and food security prior fertilizer demand studies have largely failed to account for the effects of government programs on farmers commercial purchases using a double hurdle model and nationally representative rural household panel data in zambia we distinguish between these sources and measure the contemporaneous crowding in and crowding out effects of government input programs on commercial fertilizer sales where the private sector is relatively active and average wealth is higher areas seemingly more likely to be targeted by government programs results indicate that subsidies have substantially crowded out the private sector in some cases to the point that such programs could actually lower overall fertilizer use on the other hand in poorer areas where the private sector is relatively inactive subsidies help to generate demand and crowd in private sector retailers empirical studies explicitly modeling farmers fertilizer purchase behavior within a dual marketing framework can provide important insights for agricultural policy discussions in developing countries

productivity and welfare effects of nigeria s e voucher based input subsidy program summary in an attempt to go beyond the so called smart subsidies nigeria has embarked on a potentially innovative mobile phone based input subsidy program that provides fertilizer and improved seed subsidies through electronic vouchers in this article we examined the productivity and welfare effects of the program using household level data from rural nigeria the article employed instrumental variable regression approach to control for the potential endogeneity of the input subsidy program our results suggest that the program is effective in improving productivity and welfare outcomes of beneficiary smallholders the size of the estimated effects suggests a large improvement in productivity and welfare outcomes moreover the distributional effects of the program suggest no heterogeneity effects based on gender and farm land size these results are robust to using alternative measurements of program participation the benefit cost ratio of 1 11 suggests that the program is marginally cost effective overall our results suggest that while improving average productivity is a good outcome for improving food security improving the distributional outcome of the program by targeting the most disadvantaged groups would maximize the program s contribution to food security and poverty reduction

increasing returns and the foundations of unemployment theory current approaches to macroeconomic theory divide roughly into two basic schools of thought one approach typically associated with rational expectations views the economy as basically at or near walrasian market clearing equilibrium in which case it becomes very difficult to explain away convincingly the undeniable persistence at times of involuntary unemployment another approach views the underemployed economy as being in a state of temporary fixed price disequilibrium in which case aside from having to repress suspicions that the essence of effective demand failure might not have to do with prices fixed at wrong values there is a lot of rationalising to be done about why profitable adjustments are so slow this paper argues that something like an internally consistent theory of steady state involuntary unemployment is possible and even plausible the cornerstone of this third approach is increasing returns to scale which blocks unemployed agents from breaking out of a low level equilibrium trap unless there is overall coordination or stimulation a simple model is presented which contains the basic ideas

communication and efficiency in auctions abstract we study auctions under restricted communication agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages we provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously we also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents

managing water supply shortage interruption vs pricing abstract supply shortage is a common problem faced by a consumer solutions for allocating the limited supply include rationing queuing interruption and pricing while previous research has examined the welfare losses generated by each solution there is little evidence on their relative magnitudes within a common framework the objective of this paper is tospecify a model of consumer behaviour under service interruption to estimate the exact welfare loss of service interruption the same model is used to estimate the loss of a price increase intended to resolve a supply shortage using water consumption data collected for hong kong we find that relative to pricing service interruption is inefficient for water shortage management

information and usage of congestible facilities under different pricing regimes uncertainty about usage conditions is common in many congestible facilities in this paper the authors consider the effects of providing information to prospective users under three regimes free access nonresponsive congestion tolling and responsive tolling based on current information with either free access or nonresponsive tolling better information can induce changes in usage that reduce expected social surplus but responsive tolling assures that better information is welfare improving the joint welfare gains from providing information and tolling can be larger or smaller than the sum of the gains from implementing each independently superadditivity is likely to obtain when demand is price elastic

on the equivalence of walrasian and non walrasian equilibria in contract markets the case of complete contracts this paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged in the first model contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets clear in the second model contract designers compete directly against one another by offering alternate contracts it is shown that walrasian allocations correspond with the equilibrium allocations in the model with direct competition when the number of traders is made large furthermore the expectational assumptions that drive the walrasian analysis coincide with off the equilibrium path conjectures in the problem with direct competition