economic deregulation days of reckoning for microeconomists economic deregulation of american industry is one of the most important experiments in economic policy of our time 1 in 1977 17 percent of u s gnp was produced by fully regulated industries 2 by 1988 following ten years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the transportation communications energy and financial industries that total had been cut significantly to 6 6 percent of gnp 3 the political forces behind the decision to change the market conditions under which roughly 600 billion of u s output is produced were strong and varied but according to political scientists martha derthick and paul quirk 1985 p 36 deregulation would never have occurred if economists especially microeconomists had not generally supported it through their research 4 in retrospect it is fair to ask were microeconomists able to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to explain regulation and its effects and to form predictions of deregulation s effects were they able to predict the actual effects of deregulation this paper surveys the evidence to address these questions and of

institutional determinants of power sector reform in pakistan the electricity supply sector in pakistan has performed poorly in recent years reforms were introduced in the mid 1990s to improve the sector but progressed slowly with no significant impacts on pre reform performance this study uses new institutional economics as a theoretical basis to elucidate reasons for the failure of power sector reforms in pakistan to make improvements interviews with 23 experts using q methodology generated 215 statements that were used as a q concourse of these 51 statements were selected for the q sample and ranked by 34 respondents depending on their importance analysis revealed four important discourses on the determinants of power sector reform failure in pakistan these included weak governance structure country and sectoral endowments inefficient regulator and unspecified political institutions or unfriendly political contexts the study recommends establishment of institutions that support a market based power supply sector and improvements to the contractual arrangements between stakeholders to reduce opportunistic behaviour

long run equilibrium in the empirical study of monopoly and competition long run equilibrium in the empirical study of monopoly and competition i introduction one of the central propositions of economic theory formulated by among others hirshleifer 1976 319 and malinvaud 1972 239 is that industry rates of return should equalize in the long run although the actual observed rates of profit at any point in time may differ between industries according to this proposition such differences should not persist 1 according to stigler 1963 55 economic analysis tells us that the rates of return in competitive industries will be strictly equal in long run equilibrium but this very concept of long run equilibrium reminds us that in a world where all events are not perfectly anticipated there will be a stream of unexpected disturbances that call for a stream of changes in the allocation of resources unanticipated shifts in consumers desires the impact upon international markets of wars and political events the irregular march of major advances in technology and others however rates of return in long run equilibrium are not directly observable and it is further unclear whether they can be proxied by averages and if so over what time periods bain 1951 309 recognized the problem true profits will seldom in individual cases exactly average through time to a long run equilibrium level but will be influenced by lagging response to and faulty anticipation of a never ending succession of dynamic changes because of this ambiguity there has been debate regarding the proper interpretation of empirical studies of rates of return and market structure numerous studies such as those by bain 1951 mann 1966 stigler 1963 sherman 1968 weiss 1963 and fuchs 1961 have found a positive correlation of rates of return with concentration ratios and barriers to entry however because these studies were cross sectional the concept of long run equilibrium was either ignored or proxied by short term industry averages bain for example considered a selection of four digit industries for the years 1936 40 the four year average was a proxy for long run equilibrium in the sense that persistence was defined as above average levels sustained over four years he found a weak positive relationship between concentration and these proxies stigler used three digit industries and chose ten year profit averages rather than four year proxies he also reported a weak relationship between profit rate and concentration likewise mann related ten year average industry rates of profit to concentration and barriers to entry and discovered a weak positive relationship brozen 1970 1971 critized these studies arguing that if they truly revealed that monopolistic structures caused above average profit rates to persist then these industries should be able to sustain high profit rates for longer than four to ten years when he examined the same industries in a later period he found that the high rates of profit tended to decline while the low profit rates tended to increase as time passed he concluded that bain and others had modeled long run equilibrium inadequately because the time periods considered in those studies were too short brozen also scrutinized the selection methods by which industries were included in the sample and claimed that the samples were biased toward overstating the effects of concentration while brozen argued that the positive relationships observed in prior studies were due to either sample bias or to disequilibrium he never undertook a study which might have helped settle the issue of whether profit rate differentials were persistent even after brozen studies published in the industrial organization literature were still cross sectional and the observed relationship between industry profit rates and market structure varied depending on the particular year chosen

privatization in latin america lessons for transitional europe abstract latin american economies are predominately private with functioning financial systems substantial purchasing power and widespread understanding of how markets work nevertheless transitional and latin american privatizers share similar problems poor performing state firms varied commitment to privatization technical difficulties and adverse macroeconomic conditions five lessons from latin america are particularly relevant for transitional economies a privatization can help foster competition b governments can build competent institutions for privatization despite weak capacity c labor can benefit without majority control d transparency and share distributions help win public support and e selling profitable efficient firms can benefit the economy

competition marginal cost tariffs and spot pricing in the chilean electric power sector abstract setting up competitiveness and privatizing the power sector has been an important goal of chilean energy policy since 1974 the new organization of the electric sector includes deconcentration of generating and distributing companies a new marginal cost and spot pricing system coordination of generating companies through an economic load dispatching centre eldc and a scheme for sharing transmission lines this paper describes why and how those tasks were carried out in chile

electricity consumption and economic growth exploring panel specific differences abstract in this paper we examine the long and short run dynamics between electricity consumption and economic activities using panel data of per capita electricity consumption and per capita gdp of 160 countries for the period of 1980 2010 accounting for the degree of electricity dependence and the level of urbanization furthermore in order to capture the differences in this relationship the full sample is divided into various subsamples based on countries income levels regional locations and oecd memberships this framework is argued and found to be appropriate since the causal links and inferences arising therefrom differ considerably among the subsamples which led us to conclude that the electricity growth nexus is highly sensitive to regional differences countries income levels urbanization rates and supply risks

productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital evidence from the cities abstract based on recent theoretical developments the argument is made that the average level of human capital is a local public good cities with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents after conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings this prediction is supported by data for standard metropolitan statistical areas smsas in the united states where the smsa average levels of formal education and work experience are used as proxies for the average level of human capital the alternative explanations of omitted smsa variables and self selection are evaluated an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity is computed

broken dreams unmet expectations of investors in the philippine electricity restructuring and privatization abstract over the last three decades privatization and restructuring of electricity sectors has been a hot topic the expectation was that prices would fall due to increased competition and that generators would become more innovative and efficient however the enthusiasm for deregulation wavered after events such as the debacle in california the fall of enron and the setbacks of ontario in the philippines comprehensive legislation was passed in 2001 but the implementation has been rather slow and controversial this paper looked at the allegation of politicizing power rates and found a logical alternative to the perceived conspiracy angle based on market data it is highly probable that depressed market rates was a result of coping mechanisms of new players trying to adjust to the restructured industry

electricity privatization the case of india abstract privatization is resorted to by developing country governments mainly to augment resource mobilization either on their own initiative or under the dictat of the world bank and less as a recipe for efficiency improvement the present paper discusses the electricity privatization in india as a case study and outlines the practical problems faced when the theoretical issues of privatization come up against the messiness of the real world such as high cost of private power compared to the low cost of public power and the goal conflicts of public and private utilities it suggests a different model to make privatization feasible

power sector reform in south asia why slow and limited so far although south asian developing countries had initiated some form of electric power sector reform in the 1990s often under external lending agency pressures not much progress has been made so far and there is hardly any noteworthy example of a successful reform in the region this paper provides a brief review of power sector reform efforts in five south asian countries and uses an institutional economics framework to identify the factors shaping the success of power sector reforms four factors namely instability of rule makers poor overall acceptance slow adaptation and poor transition management are identified and their effect on the reform process of south asia are analysed the paper finds that political instability has affected the power sector reform of the region making hard decisions difficult to take slow progress of reform has also affected the sector viability as signs of adverse effects on the power sector investment and performance are already visible

investments in education too much or not enough abstract this paper shows that both the external effects and overeducation approach use the same empirical wage equation to test empirical implications it proves that at least one of the approaches is invalid or needs other methods to test its implications

a theory of urban growth in an economy experiencing endogenous economic growth and exogenous population growth we explore two main themes how urbanization affects efficiency of the growth process and how growth affects patterns of urbanization localized information spillovers promote agglomeration and human capital accumulation fosters endogenous growth individual city sizes grow with local human capital accumulation and knowledge spillovers and city numbers generally increase which we demonstrate is consistent with empirical evidence we analyze whether local governments can successfully internalize local dynamic externalities in addition we explore how growth involves real income differences across city types and how urbanization can foster income inequality most nonagricultural production in developed countries occurs in metropolitan areas the underlying reasons why economic activity agglomerates into cities localized information and knowledge spillover also make cities the engines of economic growth in an we gratefully acknowledge support of the national science foundation grants sbr 9422440 and sbr9730142 for this research the work has benefited from conversations with harl ryder on the dynamics of the model and from comments by gilles duranton and participants in seminars at brown colorado and texas austin and a presentation at an isit seminar sponsored by the centre for economic policy research and the national bureau of economic research

privatization in rent seeking societies abstract four latin american countries have devoted particular attention though not equal action to privatization policies the implementation of which has shed considerable light on the dynamics of rent seeking societies the fact that democratization in some form is also underway in each of the four has intensified the interplay of forces that shape the implementation of privatization programs the experiences of mexico and chile in particular demonstrate how important it may be to privatize the private sector by reforming macroeconomic policies and opening the economy to external competition before or at least concurrently with tackling the privatization of the public sector the obstructive force of rent seeking behavior is shown most clearly in the argentine case while the brazilian experience is useful along with that of mexico as a reminder that rent seeking dynamics are not necessarily incompatible with structural transformation and high rates of growth

market reforms technocrats and institutional innovation abstract successful market reform projects require significant revision of government agencies institutional arrangements and policy making procedures in part to provide reformers autonomy from countervailing pressures this paper examines how such innovations facilitated reforms in mexico and argentina it finds executive leadership helped facilitate institutional change but that technocrat policymakers played more crucial roles than previously documented through rule changing instrument creating and strategizing behaviors they helped engineer their own autonomy and gained control of the policy agenda by changing the organization of decision making and the position they occupied in the bureaucracy these findings hold across distinct policy arenas and political systems

impact of reform and privatization on consumers a case study of power sector reform in orissa india abstract orissa is the first state in india to have undergone reform in the power sector with the government withdrawing its control the model of this reform is known as the wb orissa model the goal of this paper is to examine the impact of this reform on consumers of electricity which has been measured using multiple regression models the variables represent the parameters that consumers are most interested in and the regression coefficients represent the weights of the corresponding variables the data were collected using a survey methodology the impact of reform was found to be mixed some groups of consumers saw benefits while others felt a negative impact a focus group study was conducted to identify the variables of interest to consumers of electricity the model was used to estimate consumer benefit and was validated using primary data and structural equation modeling the study revealed beneficial aspects of reform and areas with no benefits

a cross country analysis of electricity market reforms potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract the paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries have better institutions than others we analyze this question by using an empirical econometric model based on poisson regression with cross section data covering 51 states in the us 13 provinces in canada and 51 other countries in the course of the study we check the validity of three important arguments of new institutional economics nie for the power market liberalization process the first argument is the path dependency to test its impact on the reform progress we try to explain whether the background of the chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms started or that of the governor minister responsible for energy policy at that time has an impact on the subsequent reform progress the second argument is the impact of democracy as an institution on the reform progress we look at the effect of two important indicators of democracy i e civil liberties and political rights on the reform progress the final argument of nie is about transaction costs we concentrate on the level of corruption in a country as one of the key factors that determine transaction costs and try to explore its impact on the reforms the results show that the backgrounds of the chairperson and the minister governor the level of democracy and corruption in a country are significantly correlated with how far reforms have gone in that country the negative relationship between reform progress and civil liberties may indicate that reforms may be limited in democratic countries with strong civil society institutions such as trade unions or other organized structures in the society that may consider reforms as harmful to their self interest

a firm level analysis of outage loss differentials and self generation evidence from african business enterprises abstract this study examines the outage loss differential between firms that engage in backup generation and those that do not unmitigated outage losses were estimated to be us 2 01 23 92 per kwh for firms engaging in self generation and range from us 1 54 to 32 46 per kwh for firms without self generation we also find that firms engaging in self generation would have suffered additional 1 183 outage losses had they not invested in self generation on the other hand firms without self generation would have reduced their outage losses by around 6 46 if they had engaged in self generation further analyses however reveal that although engagement in self generation reduced outage losses a firm engaging in self generation may still suffer a greater unmitigated outage loss relative to a firm without a backup generator the relative outage losses depend on the relative vulnerability of the operations of the two sets of firms to power interruption and the relative generating capacity of a self generating firm to its own required electricity loads policy reforms that allow firms whose operations are highly vulnerable to outages to make a binding contract with utilities in order to get preferential supply are recommended

getting reforms done in inhospitable institutional environments untying a gordian knot in india s power distribution sector when grand institutional reforms based on idealized models are stalled by the poor institutional environments and difficult politics which often surround large infrastructure systems in developing countries partial reforms whose design and implementation take into account the different interests of the key stakeholders can provide valuable and immediate benefits while moving these systems from low towards higher level equilibria strategically negotiated experimentally partial and purposefully hybrid these reforms are based on careful stakeholder analysis and strategic coalition building that avoid rigid positions based on idealized models our findings are based on a study of power sector reforms in india where we performed a micro level and in depth analysis of a partial and innovative experiment which has allowed private sector participation in electricity distribution within a hostile institutional environment

how investor portfolios shape regulatory outcomes privatized infrastructure after crises summary many developing countries privatized utilities during the 1990s their weak institutional environments however make them prone to crises that generate incentives for governments to renege on contractual commitments to investors to understand variation in post crisis regulatory outcomes in such contexts scholars must consider investors prior choices regarding portfolio structure investors facing high reputational costs from exit are more likely to remain following expropriation and those holding diverse assets in their contract jurisdiction to secure compensation these factors account for significant unexplained within sector and subnational variation for which we provide qualitative and quantitative evidence from argentina s water and electricity sectors following the 2001 crisis

electricity privatization revisited a commentary on the case for new initiatives in india abstract normally privatization is resorted to by different economies for different reasons resource mobilization introducing efficiency by promoting competition and for achieving commercial orientation often these are assumed to be independent objectives the indian experience is showing that they are quite interdependent and unless all the three objectives are tackled simultaneously privatization will not succeed specifically the poor financial performance of the state electricity boards and their lack of commercial orientation is applying a brake on investment in the power sector by foreign ipps similarly the government s approach to privatization without promoting competition through the so called memorandum of understanding is leading to high cost solutions and acrimonious public debates demanding transparency in decision making and review of those already made

the economics and politics of regulation this article provides a critical survey of the literature on the economics and politics of regulation after some conceptual clarifications the article surveys the evolution of perspectives on regulation during the post second world war period emphasizing especially the interactions between intellectual changes and real world economic and political developments it then looks at some themes that are neglected in the current literature the inevitability of regulation the need to create and not simply regulate markets distributional issues dynamic considerations and the politics of regulation and suggests that incorporating these themes more closely into the discussion will improve our understanding in this area copyright 1997 by oxford university press

the disinterest in deregulation in the analysis of the costs of monopoly power the usual experiment is to convert a competitive industry into a monopoly and observe the consequent change in consumer s surplus modern contributions have emphasized the deadweight cost of monopoly arnold harberger 1954 and the possibility of an associated rent seeking cost of monopoly gordon tullock 1967 the harberger cost of course refers to the lost consumer s surplus triangle the tullock cost concerns the role of competition for monopoly returns taken together and assuming that the competition for monopoly rents is perfect the total cost of monopoly power is a trapezoid the rectangle of monopoly profits plus the triangle of lost consumer s surplus richard posner 1975 in this paper we approach the monopoly problem in a different spirit we compare three states of the world competition regulation and deregulation in this setting we ask what happens if a monopoly is eliminated through deregulation our analysis suggests that because under most conditions tullock costs cannot be recouped the returns to deregulation are lower than previously thought rent seeking expenditures in the past leave the economy permanently poorer even if competition is restored to the industry in contrast the returns to preventing monopoly in the first place are relatively high in our model an insight afforded by the analysis is an explanation of the persistence of laws and regulations which appear to serve no interest in this regard the example of railroad regulation in the united states comes to mind the standard explanation for such regulation is either that voters and government decision makers are ignorant of basic economics or that a small interest group like railroad firms wins rents at the expense of uninformed or economically rational consumers of rail services who do not find it cost effective to seek deregulation we offer another and perhaps more plausible explanation for the persistence of regulation and the apathy of consumers about the costs of regulation namely the costs of such regulations are for the most part the original rent seeking expenditures that lead to the regulation in the first place and these costs are sunk abolishing so called uneconomic laws does nothing to recover these losses hence there is little political support from any quarter to return to the status quo ante in fact as we shall show such a deregulatory program can easily impose more costs than it is worth there are numerous examples of this point including tariffs and quotas of all sorts subsidies to farmers the postal monopoly organized labor s antitrust exemption the licensing of doctors and so forth the traditional explanations of these monopoly rights namely ignorance of economic common sense and special interest groups are neither sufficient nor necessary since the primary costs of these laws are rent seeking expenditures which are made prior to their passage there is simply little to be gained by changing them now gains would accrue in the form of reduced harberger costs costs would be borne in passing and implementing the deregulatory program it is not that the potential gainers from deregulation are large in number diffuse heterogeneous and face high organizational costs rather they do not exist to any degree interpreted in this light efforts by political action groups such as the right to work foundation stand to be a drain on society s resources they cannot produce anything unless they prevent further monopolization through regulation we do not of course mccormick and shughart clemson university clemson sc 29631 tollison center for the study of public choice george mason university fairfax va 22030 thanks go to james buchanan rex cottle and gordon tullock for helpful comments the usual caveat applies

south korean and taiwanese development and the new institutional economics the publication of books by both alice amsden and robert wade provide an opportune moment to reflect on the study of east asian development after an initial surge of interest beginning in the 1970s the field has reached a plateau and scholars recently have cast a wide net in searching for ways to extend the field in assessing the state of the art regarding the economic development of the east asian newly industrialized countries nics this review will treat three themes first i will argue that the focus on states versus markets is becoming stale and that much of the scholarly interest lies in the politics behind the economics second i argue that political scientists have underexplored the historical origins of korean and taiwanese capitalism and that such attention promises to strengthen both theories and explanations of development third i argue that the international system has been more important in promoting development in east asia than accounts in the first wave have recognized the purpose of this review is to assess the field reveal

the institutions and governance of economic development and reform why are the ambitions of economic development practitioners and reformers so often disappointed one answer is that development policymakers and reformers are congenital optimists another answer is that good plans are regularly defeated by those who occupy strategic positions an intermediate answer is that institutions are important yet are persistently neglected in the planning process the article takes a bottom up microanalytical approach to economic development and reform it examines the governance of contract investment and private ordering through the lens of transaction cost economizing and it assesses the efficacy of the de facto as against the de jure institutional environment with respect to credible commitments in effect institutional economists are cast in the role of archaeologists of economic reform and development with the task of unpacking the lessons of the past to inform choices and programs for the future

the transaction costs driving captive power generation evidence from india the 2003 indian electricity act incentivizes captive power production through open access in an attempt to harness all sources of generation yet we observe that only some firms self generate while others do not in this paper we give a transaction cost explanation for such divergent behavior using a primary survey of 107 firms from india we construct a distinct variable to measure the transaction specificity of electricity use the make or buy decision is then econometrically tested using probit model results are highly responsive to transaction specificity and the likelihood of captive power generation is positively related to it at the industrial level this explains why food and chemical firms are more likely to make their own electricity since the burden of poor grid supply is highest on smaller sized and high transaction specific firms the grid access policies need to account for firm level characteristics if government wants to incentivize captive power generation

energy consumption carbon emissions and economic growth nexus in bangladesh cointegration and dynamic causality analysis abstract the paper investigates the possible existence of dynamic causality between energy consumption electricity consumption carbon emissions and economic growth in bangladesh first we have tested cointegration relationships using the johansen bi variate cointegration model this is complemented with an analysis of an auto regressive distributed lag model to examine the results robustness then the granger short run the long run and strong causality are tested with a vector error correction modelling framework the results indicate that uni directional causality exists from energy consumption to economic growth both in the short and the long run while a bi directional long run causality exists between electricity consumption and economic growth but no causal relationship exists in short run the strong causality results indicate bi directional causality for both the cases a uni directional causality runs from energy consumption to co 2 emission for the short run but feedback causality exists in the long run co 2 granger causes economic growth both in the short and in the long run an important policy implication is that energy electricity as well can be considered as an important factor for the economic growth in bangladesh moreover as higher energy consumption also means higher pollution in the long run policy makers should stimulate alternative energy sources for meeting up the increasing energy demand

2 the institutional structure of production 1 prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1991 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

economic performance through time prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1993 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

regulation institutions and commitment in telecommunications a comparative analysis of five country studies within any system of utility regulation there is a tension between the ability to commit to a stable set of rules and the ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances countries differ in their institutional endowments and hence in the ways in which they can resolve this tension a first group of countries can design regulatory systems that afford the regulator substantial formal discretion to respond to changing circumstances and can use process to restrain arbitrary action a second group of countries can restrain arbitrary action only by calling on specific substantive rules and may have to sacrifice some flexibility to achieve credible commitment a third group may lack the domestic institutions to put in place a credible and workable regulatory system of any kind

international investment agreements and services markets locking in market failure summary bilateral investment treaties bits and investment chapters in preferential trade agreements have become popular measures to guarantee investor friendly policies while they reassure multinational firms they also constrain host country authorities in regulating markets to stimulate competition these problems are widespread in service industries characterized by significant economies of scale this paper presents case studies of the difficulties the chilean regulatory authorities faced in regulating the financial services telecom and energy industries it concludes that able regulators are necessary but that international agreements need to also leave enough policy space

micro adjustment toward long term equilibrium abstract a dynamic model is constructed in which the behavior of economic agents is based on adjustment decisions are made in disequilibrium prices respond to differences between supply and demand inventories capital is moved according to profitability differentials and money is issued by a bank which reacts to the general price level a proof of local stability of long term equilibrium with production prices is demonstrated we further distinguish between two aspects of the stability problem concerning the allocation of capital and relative prices stability in proportions and with respect to the general levels of activity and prices stability in dimension

does basic services privatisation benefit the urban poor some evidence from water supply privatisation in thailand access to safe water and sanitation has been a development priority for decades this is also included in the millennium development goal targets meanwhile privatisation of water supply continues to be a subject of intense debate particularly as to its effects on the urban poor the arguments for and against often reflect the intellectual divide between socialist ideals and neo liberal pragmatism key issues are access quality and price this paper reports findings from an investigation of thailand s first water supply privatisation scheme implemented in 1998 household level data for the poor defined by community and income status show a significant improvement in access to piped water despite an increase in the connection cost and monthly charges the associated benefits from access include improved water quality and service a promising plus is the prospect of improvement in tenure status for the households living in informal settlements

crisis and policymaking in latin america the case of chile s 1998 99 electricity crisis summary this article studies the effect of sectoral crises on policy reform by emphasizing the conflictive incentives generated by public demands for a solution on the one hand the crisis provides the opportunity for bypassing veto points for technical innovation on the other hand if simultaneous with increasing electoral competition it reduces the time horizons of policymakers and their propensity to adopt reforms of uncertain effects for them our research traces these on the chilean 1998 99 electricity crisis and assesses their impact on policy change through a comparative analysis of reform contents this article shows how electoral effects prevailed in the context of upcoming competitive elections suggesting the importance of introducing electoral competition in the study of crises effects on policymaking in the region our research strategy for tracing incentives and opportunities generated by crises can travel to other cases to further our understanding of crises effects on policymaking

the impact of surplus schooling on earnings some additional findings this paper examines the impact of overeducation or surplus schooling on earnings overeducated workers are defined as those with educational attainments substantially above the mean for their specific occupations two models are estimated using data from the 1980 census though our models data and measure of overeducation are different from those used by rumberger 1987 our results are similar our results show that overeducated workers often earn less than their adequately educated and undereducated counterparts

regulation of privatized utilities the chilean experience abstract the privatization of chile s public utilities has led to substantial new investment and improvements in internal efficiency however the limited information available to regulators combined with their insufficient technical capacity have combined to prevent efficiency increases being fully passed on to consumers in price reductions in fact drastic price cuts have occurred only where competition has emerged so achieving competition wherever possible should be the main policy goal competition can be enhanced by either modifying existing regulations as happened in long distance telecommunications or by a more active antitrust policy to achieve this the regulatory institutions clearly need strengthening

the dynamics of competition a restoration of the classical analysis the main purpose of this article is to show that it is possible to construct a model of competition based on the classical perspective smith ricardo and marx an analysis of the work of the classics is presented and their views of the workings of competition is contrasted with neoclassical and keynesian approaches a simple model with two commodities is constructed in which the stability of the classical long term equilibrium is shown under certain conditions this first model is developed to include the treatments of gravitation rationing deficiency in demand choice of the technology and three commodities copyright 1987 by oxford university press

efficiency assessment and benchmarking of thermal power plants in india abstract per capita consumption 1 of electricity in india is many folds lesser than canada usa australia japan chaina and world average even though total energy shortage 2 and peaking shortage 3 were recorded as 11 2 and 11 85 respectively in 2008 09 reflecting non availability of sufficient supply of electricity performance improvement of very small amount can lead to large contribution in financial terms which can be utilized for capacity addition to reduce demand supply gap coal fired thermal power plants are main sources of electricity in india in this paper relative technical efficiency of 60 coal fired power plants has been evaluated and compared using ccr and bcc models of data envelopment analysis target benchmark of input variables has also been evaluated performance comparison includes small versus medium versus large power plants and also state owned versus central owned versus private owned result indicates poor performance of few power plants due to over use of input resources finding reveals that efficiency of small power plants is lower in comparison to medium and large category and also performance of state owned power plants is comparatively lower than central and privately owned study also suggests different measures to improve technical efficiency of the plants

inventories and sticky prices more on the microfoundations of macroeconomics the role of inventories in making prices sticky is studied by analyzing a dynamic linear quadratic model of a monopoly firm facing stochastic demand but able to store its finished goods in inventory it is shown that in contrast to the usual presumption firms that exhibit the smallest output responses to demand fluctuations may also exhibit the smallest price fluctuations specifically firms which have very flexible inventory storage facilities or are subjected to very transitory demand shocks will rely on inventories as buffers and will change neither production nor price very much on the other hand firms which have very inflexible storage facilities or whose demand shocks are quite permanent will display large swings in both price and output the standard assumption about inventory carrying costs that has been used in the literature that they are linear is shown to imply that production is impervious to fluctuations in demand it is also established that prices may respond more strongly to positive demand shocks than to negative ones if it is impossible to hold negative inventories i e to have unfilled orders the model offers an explanation for stickiness in relative prices however under certain circumstances it may help explain the persistence of inflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the dynamic efficiency of regulatory constitutions in this article we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment rate of return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate of return regulation without such a commitment furthermore rate of return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion assuming that the regulator is unable to make state contingent transfer payments

can the production smoothing model of inventory behavior be saved the production smoothing model of inventory behavior has a long and venerable history and theoretical foundations that seem very strong yet certain overwhelming facts seem not only to defy explanation within the production smoothing framework but actually to argue that the basic idea of production smoothing is all wrong most prominent among these is the fact that the variance of detrended production exceeds the variance of detrended sales this paper first documents the stylized facts then it derives the production smoothing model rigorously and explains how the model can be amended to make it consistent with the facts finally it reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence and tries to draw some tentative conclusions

power sector reform in orissa an ex post analysis of the causal factors abstract from the early 1990s dramatic changes have been taking place in the structure of electricity supply industry esi worldwide the primary reasons for electricity sector reform has however been different for industrialised and developing countries the objective of this paper is to study and identify various factors leading to power sector reform in developing countries the restructuring of orissa state electricity board in india was used as a case study in identifying the various factors the factors that result in implementation of restructuring are a contextual factors they are the primary drivers for initiating reform the performance of the utility and the conditionalities of the lending agencies are contextual factors b trigger factor it is the determining factor that creates a compelling necessity to undergo restructuring the inability of the government to continue to support the utility acts as the trigger factor c facilitating factors they act as facilitators for initiating reform support of the government absence of a powerful lobby and the support of the top management are facilitating factors

subsidy policy and the enlargement of choice abstract development is the enlargement of people s choices optimal subsidy policy is intended to create the right incentives for each of the value chain participants this paper contends that the interest subsidy offered by the indian federal ministry of new and renewable energy for solar thermal systems through mainstream banking channels is superior in intent and outcome compared to the capital subsidy as currently offered for solar pv systems routed through government controlled delivery channels the interest subsidy enhances innovation improves service delivery and expands the range of product available to consumers enjoying a wide range of endowments thus leading to more inclusive development the simple monopoly model developed by atkinson atkinson ab capabilities exclusion and the supply of goods in basu k pattanaik p suzumura k editor choice welfare and development oxford university press 1995 is applied to the context of solar home systems to demonstrate price reduction and choice expansion in a liberalized market facilitated by an interest subsidy scheme

reforming small electricity systems under political instability the case of nepal this paper assesses the issues and options in reforming small electricity sector systems in general while citing nepal as a specific case political instability and increasing electricity demand are two major complicating factors in power sector reform of small systems such as that of nepal lessons from international experience suggest that measures such as cost reflecting pricing restructuring and independent regulation are important for the success of reforms in small systems the creation of an independent regulatory authority is more important than unbundling of the sector in the present context of nepal accounting separation of the main activities may be a pragmatic restructuring approach given the present political and market condition as the systems gradually grow larger vertical separation of the system and horizontal splitting of the generation segment and competition in organised wholesale market followed by privatisation remains an option in the long run