optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

trends in household saving don t justify tax incentives to boost saving despite diverse trends in household saving in oecd countries many governments are introducing tax incentives designed to boost saving by particular groups such schemes have been justified by many trends including increasing income inequality ageing populations and greater cross border competition it is dangerous however to base policy on what is happening to aggregate household saving alone first personal saving should be viewed within a lifecycle context saving may look inadequate today but households may already have made plans to redress this in future second data on aggregate saving conceal significant differences between different household groups only disaggregation yields reliable inferences on which policy can be based in particular it is impossible to assess the consequences of demographic changes without analysis that distinguishes between different generations we reassess household saving by computing the evolution of lifetime profiles of consumption income and saving of different cohorts over time and then analyse the effect of demographic and other changes we find little evidence for the assertion that tax incentives to promote national saving are needed now to stave off a future drought in household saving

international differences in saving the adequacy of national saving has taken on increasing importance in an era of large external imbalances among the major industrial countries at least among economists current account imbalances are seen as largely the outcome of domestic patterns of saving and investment rather than trade practices thus the low level of saving in the united states rather than a failure of japan to open its economy is the primary cause of the u s current account deficit most of the discussion of the decline of u s saving has focused upon the emergence of a large government budget deficit in the 1980s and has largely ignored an equally large decline in an already low level of private saving at the same time much of what we think we know about private saving behavior and the potential effectiveness of various policies to influence it are dominated by experience only within our own country but many of the factors in which we are most interested have exhibited very limited historical variation within the united states and of necessity the conclusions are ambiguous the purpose of this note is to make use of an underutilized data source that provides information on the saving and investment of the industrial countries within a common accounting framework to examine the pattern of change over time and the similarity of response to various economic disturbances in the 1970s and 1980s the basic annual data are drawn from the system of national accounts sna submitted by the individual member countries to the oecd for the period 1960 87 while the original analysis was undertaken for the seven largest nations plus a representative set of six smaller countries but the summary reported here is limited to the united states japan and an aggregate of nine european countries the data are presented within a simple accounting framework that relates the current account surplus ca to the difference between domestic saving s and domestic investment i domestic saving and investment can be further subdivided into their public and private components

differences in managerial values a study of u s hong kong and prc managers in this study of convergence divergence of managerial values four western developed measures machiavellianism locus of control intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism and the four dimensions of the eastern developed chinese value survey confucian dynamism human heartedness integration and moral discipline were the measures used the findings indicate that often times both culture and the business environment interact to create a unique set of managerial values in a country

better product at same cost lower sales and lower welfare we consider a high quality dominant firm facing a low quality competitive fringe we show that the dominant firm s quantity is weakly increasing in its quality if and only if its marginal cost weakly exceeds that of the fringe otherwise it is strictly decreasing in quality this result is driven by the fact that a quality increase causes the marginal revenue curve to rotate clockwise rather than shift outwards and at a height equal to the fringe firms marginal cost this fact combined with the dominant firm s mr mc condition determines the result for closely related reasons the effect of a quality increase on consumer welfare also depends on the relationship between the costs it is possible that all consumers are weakly better off that some are better off and some worse off or that all are weakly worse off we also consider several extensions and variations of the model

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

does globalization affect growth evidence from a new index of globalization the study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions economic integration social integration and political integration using panel data for 123 countries in 1970 2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth as the results show globalization indeed promotes growth the dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries although less robustly information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect

unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents in this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions we distinguish two cases i when actions are mutually observable among agents ii when actions are not observable at all in i there is a mechanism in which the first best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium in ii we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules however we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi stage mechanism that has a unique second best perfect bayesian equilibrium

globalization and household saving is there a link abstractthis article proposes that globalization can affect household saving in the long run in a number of ways social interactions between different cultures can induce value changes which can result in shifts in consumption and saving behaviour international trade allows consumers to have easier access to status goods stimulating consumption and dampening saving extending from veblen s conspicuous consumption theory saving may also decrease when globalization leads to greater population mobility and fosters urbanization thus enhancing the importance of consumption as a way to display wealth in addition financial globalization reduces credit constraints and allows households to save less using cross country data from the united nations un the oecd and other sources this article finds evidence that household saving declines as globalization deepens especially in the social and cultural dimensions

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty an overview we review different generic conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships their logical relationship is explored two kinds of conditions are considered however the property for an action profile to be compatible plays a crucial role in both kinds also two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition

the determinants of household and private savings in thailand a broad set of possible determinants of household and private savings behaviour is examined through an in depth case study of thailand during the period 1960 to 2004 results suggest that an increase in economic growth inflation and terms of trade all have a significant positive impact on household and private saving rates in contrast the availability of bank credit tends to reduce household and private saving rates while an increase in both old and young dependency has a negative impact on household and private saving rates the magnitude of the impact on the former is far greater than that on the latter furthermore public saving seems to crowd out household and private saving but less than proportionately this reflects a possible role of fiscal policy in increasing national savings in the economy over and above these variables corporate saving is another important determinant of household saving an increase in the former brings about a significant reduction in the latter

the impact of natural culture and economic ideology on managerial work values a study of the united states russia japan and china this study assesses the impact of economic ideology and national culture on the individual work values of managers in the united states russia japan and china the convergence divergence crossvergence cdc framework was used as theoretical framework for the study while the schwartz value survey svs was used to operationalize over investigation of managerial work values across these four countries the findings largely support the crossvergence prospective while also confirming the role of national culture implications from the findings are drawn for the convergence divergence crossvergence of values as well as for the feasibility of multidomestic or global strategies for a corporate culture

international evidence on how income inequality and credit market imperfections affect private saving rates abstract this paper empirically examines the hypothesis that income distribution exerts an independent effect on private saving rates across countries and tests particular channels for income inequality to affect private saving rates cross sectional and panel regression results show that inequality has a robust positive effect on private saving rates that depends on financial market development and credit available to the private sector the paper thus identifies credit market imperfections as the likely reason for the inequality private saving link the data provide no evidence supporting a subsistence channel for inequality to affect private saving as suggested by nonhomothetic utility functions

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

does income inequality raise aggregate saving this paper reviews analytically and empirically the links between income distribution and aggregate saving consumption theory brings out a number of direct channels through which income inequality can affect overall household saving positively in most cases however recent political economy theory points toward indirect negative effects of inequality through firm investment and public saving on aggregate saving on theoretical grounds the sign of the saving inequality link is therefore ambiguous this paper presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between income distribution and aggregate saving based on a new and improved income distribution database for both industrial and developing countries the empirical results using alternative inequality and saving measures and various econometric specifications on both cross section and panel data provide no support for the notion that income inequality has any systematic effect on aggregate saving these findings are consistent with the theoretical ambiguity q 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

determinants of household saving in the g 7 countries recent evidence this paper employs data from the last four decades to analyse major determinants of household saving for the group of seven g 7 nations particular attention is paid to the effects of interest rates government saving and social security contributions regression analysis is used to control for the effects of both the level and changes in income per capita and inflation

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

correlation and relative performance evaluation this paper reexamines the issue of relative versus joint incentive schemes in a multi agent moral hazard framework the model allows a full analysis of the information and dependence structure an important result is that the widespread notion that greater correlation in outcomes calls for more competition is not robust first when the dependence structure is effort sensitive the optimal incentive scheme in general mixes elements of relative evaluation and joint evaluation second under limited liability higher equilibrium correlation tends to make joint performance evaluation more desirable examples are provided regarding incentives in firms finance and innovation

implementing coordinated team play abstract this note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination the mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

decentralization and collusion abstract we consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project share information not available to the principal and can collude due to limited liability the coase theorem does not apply the distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard the optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way decentralization without using message games journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l14 l22

saving in developing countries this article reviews the current state of knowledge on the determinants of saving rates presenting the main findings and contributions of the recently completed world bank research project saving across the world the article discusses the basic design of the research project and its core database the world saving database it then summarizes the main project results and places them in the context of the literature on saving identifying the key policy and nonpolicy determinants of private saving rates special attention is paid to the relationship between growth and saving and the impact of specific policies on saving rates the article concludes by introducing the studies included in this special issue

a simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings abstract this paper studies a multiagent moral hazard setting we resolve the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting while employing a solution concept that makes less demanding behavioral assumptions than nash a simple mechanism is constructed that approximately implements the second best solution in two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies under our mechanism the agents best reply correspondences are well defined a small message space is employed and the messages can be interpreted as divisional forecasts journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

coalitions incentives and risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting it is shown that the principal can implement given efforts via non individualistic incentive contracts at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result for there is no coalition proof revelation mechanism improving the principal s welfare journal of economic literature classification number d82