resolving new keynesian anomalies with wealth in the utility function at the zero lower bound the new keynesian model predicts that output and inflation collapse to implausibly low levels and that government spending and forward guidance have implausibly large effects to resolve these anomalies we introduce wealth into the utility function the justification is that wealth is a marker of social status and people value status since people partly save to accrue social status the euler equation is modified as a result when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large the dynamical system representing the zero lower bound equilibrium transforms from a saddle to a source which resolves all the anomalies

relative wealth concerns and entrepreneurship we develop a model of entrepreneurship in which market frictions limit the possibilities for diversifying entrepreneurial risk a concern for relative standing arises even though individuals consume only standard commodities in contrast to complete markets an increase in sector specific aggregate risk increases entrepreneurship due to relative wealth concerns a change in the profile of the economy to include more risk averse people results in an even greater increase in entrepreneurship thus relative wealth concerns mitigate the reduction in entrepreneurship arising from the non diversifiability of entrepreneurial risk we examine the effects of uncertainty about economic policies such as market based reforms on entrepreneurship

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

the fetal origins hypothesis in finance prenatal environment the gender gap and investor behavior we find that differences in individuals prenatal environments explain heterogeneity in financial decisions later in life an exogenous increase in exposure to prenatal testosterone is associated with the masculinization of financial behavior specifically with elevated risk taking and trading in adulthood we also examine birth weight those with higher birth weight are more likely to participate in the stock market whereas those with lower birth weight tend to prefer portfolios with higher volatility and skewness consistent with compensatory behavior our results contribute to the understanding of how the prenatal environment shapes an individual s behavior in financial markets later in life received may 2 2014 accepted september 30 2015 by editor david hirshleifer

status in markets this project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market we consider a special box design market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices we manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures in the first a subject s score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status in another subjects are assigned randomly to a higher status or lower status group in both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher status sellers face lowerstatus buyers and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers across all sessions the higher status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus earning significantly more than their lower status counterparts

how can market mechanisms for forest environmental services help the poor preliminary lessons from latin america summary market mechanisms for forest environmental services are a new approach for conservation but there is also an increasing interest in the derived developmental benefits of these mechanisms we first propose a conceptual framework for future research on the livelihood impacts of environmental service markets we then review eight latin american case studies on carbon sequestration and watershed protection market initiatives finding positive local income effects in most cases more land tenure security and socioinstitutional strengthening in some cases but some negative effects also we recommend pro poor policy measures such as reducing smallholders transaction costs and removing inappropriate access restrictions

keep up with the winners experimental evidence on risk taking asset integration and peer effects the paper reports the result of an experimental game on asset integration and risk taking we find some evidence that winnings in earlier rounds affect risk taking in subsequent rounds but no evidence that real life wealth outside the experiment affects risk taking controlling for past winnings participants receiving a low endowment in a round engage in more risk taking we test a keeping up with the joneses hypothesis and find that subjects seek to keep up with winners though not necessarily with average earnings overall the evidence suggests that risk taking tracks a reference point affected by social comparisons

asset prices and institutional investors empirical evidence indicates that trades by institutional investors have sizable effects on asset prices generating phenomena such as index effects asset class effects and others it is difficult to explain such phenomena within standard representative agent asset pricing models in this paper we consider an economy populated by institutional investors alongside standard retail investors institutions care about their performance relative to a certain index our framework is tractable admitting exact closed form expressions and produces the following analytical results we find that institutions optimally tilt their portfolios towards stocks that comprise their benchmark index the resulting price pressure boosts index stocks while leaving nonindex stocks unaffected by demanding a higher fraction of risky stocks than retail investors institutions amplify the index stock volatilities and aggregate stock market volatility and give rise to countercyclical sharpe ratios trades by institutions induce excess correlations among stocks that belong to their benchmark index generating an asset class effect institutions finance their additional purchases of index stocks by taking on leverage a policy prescription that calls for a reduction in leverage while reducing the riskiness of institutional portfolios would also reduce the ability of institutions to tilt their portfolios towards index stocks depressing the index level

long run welfare under externalities in consumption leisure and production a case for happy degrowth vs unhappy growth in this paper we contribute to the debate on the relationship between growth and well being by examining an endogenous growth model where we allow for externalities in consumption leisure and production we analyze three regimes a decentralized economy where each household makes isolated choices without considering their external effects a planned economy where a myopic planner fails to recognize both leisure and consumption externalities but recognizes production externalities and a planned economy with a fully informed planner we first compare the balanced growth paths under the three regimes and then we numerically investigate the transition to the optimal balanced growth path we provide a number of findings first in a decentralized economy growth or labor or both are greater than in the regime with a fully informed planner and hence are sub optimal from a welfare standpoint second a myopic intervention which overlooks consumption and leisure externalities leads to more growth and labor than in both the decentralized and the fully informed regime third we provide a case for happy degrowth a transition to the optimal balanced growth path that is associated with downscaling of production a reduction in private consumption and an ongoing increase in leisure and well being

communication in repeated games with private monitoring abstract the paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed we address the following question what is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes the main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs when the discount factor tends to one contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at leasttwoother players journal of economic literatureclassification number c73

rank matters the impact of social competition on portfolio choice tournament incentives schemes have been criticized for inducing excessive risk taking among financial market participants in this paper we investigate how relative performance based incentive schemes and status concerns for higher rank influence portfolio choice in laboratory experiments we find that both underperformers and over performers adapt their portfolios to their current relative performance preferring either positively or negatively skewed assets respectively most importantly these results hold both when relative performance is instrumental for higher payoffs in a tournament and when it is only intrinsically motivating and not payout relevant we find no effects when no relative performance information is given

pre matching gambles abstract this paper investigates pre matching gambles and provides a new reason to gamble matching concerns examples of pre matching gambles include occupational choices before the marriage market college major choices before the labor market and portfolio management before attracting future clients in the financial market i show that people make risky investments they would not have made if not for their subsequent participation in a competitive matching market a fundamental and unique feature of the competitive matching market which i call the competitive matching effect induces gambling the paper also illustrates the relationship between social efficiency and inequality in this setting and shows how progressive taxation eliminates social inefficiency reduces inequality and generates government revenue

social comparisons and contributions to online communities a field experiment on movielens we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community we find that after receiving behavioral information about the median user s total number of movie ratings users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent when given outcome information about the average user s net benefit score above average users mainly engage in activities that help others our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision

status the distribution of wealth and growth we analyze a simple model of endogenous growth in which individuals care about both consumption and their rank in the distribution of wealth we show that the steady growth rate of the economy increases with both the strength of the status seeking motive and the initial equality of the wealth distribution contrary to the basic model of endogenous growth the equilibrium growth rate is not necessarily smaller than in the social optimum and we identify the circumstances under which the two coincide

status intertemporal choice and risk taking this paper takes the position that an individual s concern for relative status is expressed in her preferences we embed this hypothesis in an otherwise conventional model of economic growth and examine its consequences the model generates two kinds of equilibrium in the first all individuals always follow a deterministic consumption and investment strategy such a strategy must be linear in output is independent of payo s and technology and only depends on the discount factor this sort of equilibrium exists when the individual cares only about status and the individual production function is convex in investment in contrast the other kind of equilibrium involves convergence to a steady state in which there is persistent and endogenously generated gambling this kind of equilibrium exists in more plausible circumstances the individual has a utility function that may depend on consumption per se as well as implied status and individual production functions are concave we characterize the unique steady state in such a situation and prove that any dynamic equilibrium path must converge to it risk taking arises not from the presumption of a utility function with strictly convex segments as in friedman savage but naturally from a view of utility as depending on relative status our steady state is broadly consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and to gamble over upside risk and generates similar patterns of risk taking and avoidance across environments with quite di erent overall wealth levels finally in contrast to friedman 1953 endogenous risk taking here is generally pareto ine cient

decision making under uncertainty and the evolution of interdependent preferences abstract this paper finds support for the evolution of interdependent preferences under natural selection from a perhaps surprising source decision making under uncertainty individuals choose from sets of risky alternatives the lotteries may involve either idiosyncratic risk or aggregate uncertainty or both robson j econ theory 68 1996 397 424 gives the evaluation criterion for lotteries that maximizes reproductive value and shows that it does not satisfy the expected utility theorem cooper and kaplan j theoret biol 94 1982 135 151 have demonstrated that when lotteries are aggregate the optimal decision rule involves randomization this paper reexamines robson s evaluation criterion using it to solve for the optimal amount of randomization the solution is characterized and an interpretation is offered that links maximizing reproductive value to maximizing expected relative offspring it is shown that when agents preferences arise from their own offspring relative to the average within the population a game is constructed out of the choice of lotteries and that the unique nash equilibrium distribution of actions maximizes reproductive value journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d71 d81

merit approbation and the evolution of social structure in this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and from social approbation income is correlated with class approbation is given to an unobservable trait which must be signalled through the agent s social mobility i e class change mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving inheritance effort and ability thus social structure class composition is affected by individuals quest for approbation and we study how that affects the emergence and multiplicity of long run social organizations including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocracies specifically we observe that even though social mobility is driven purely by a meritocratic mechanism pure dynasties can emerge we then introduce a feedback between the size of the upper class and its income value so that effort levels and social structure are jointly endogenous we derive results on equilibrium effort levels and stationary when they exist social structures social organization can converge to a unique steady state multiple long run equilibria or cycles

relativity rank and the utility of income relative utility has become an important concept in several disjoint areas of economics i present a cardinal model of income utility based on the supposition that agents care about their rank in the income distribution and that utility is subject to adaptation over time utility levels correspond to the leyden individual welfare function while utility differences yield a version of the prospect theory value function thereby providing a new and shared derivation of each i offer an explanation of some long standing paradoxes in the wellbeing literature and an insight into the links between relative comparisons and loss aversion

nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors abstract we study a model of repeated games with imperfect monitoring where the payoff vector is observable in this situation any profitable deviation is detectable by all the players but the identity of the deviator may be unknown we design collective punishments directed against the set of potential deviators a particular class of signals is studied for which a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained journal of economic literature classification numbers c73

gender differentiation in risk taking behavior on the relative risk aversion of single men and single women we relate an observed difference between single men sm and single women sw in attitudes towards risk to the higher value assigned to social status by sm than by sw in the marriage market low status carries a harsher penalty for sm than for sw because when selecting a partner the social status of a man is more important to a woman than the social status of a woman is to a man correlating social status with relative wealth we show how intensified distaste at experiencing low relative wealth reduces relative risk aversion

taxing the rich affluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage this article studies an economy in which an inequality averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax avoidance technology with subadditive costs and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit subadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the top this in turn may trigger excessive risk taking when the avoidance technology consists in costly migration between two countries that compete fiscally we show that an endogenous increase in inequality due to risk taking makes progressive taxation more fragile which vindicates in turn risk taking and can lead to equilibria with regressive tax rates at the top and high migrations of wealth towards the smaller country

the evolution of engel curves and its implications for structural change theory the tendency for expenditure engel curves to flatten out at high income levels is frequently cited as evidence that major shifts in household spending patterns take place as households become more affluent empirically little has been done to examine i how pervasive this tendency is across the engel curves of different goods and services ii whether the rate at which engel curves flatten out may significantly change over time and iii how robust engel curves are in the face of changes in the income distribution of households using data from the uk family expenditure survey we find evidence that the tendency for engel curves to flatten out which we dub saturation is indeed widespread across a wide range of goods and services however a tendency for their shape to shift over time and for these shifts to co move with changes in the income distribution of households casts some doubt on whether the declining slope of engel curves can be used to predict slowdowns in the growth rate of demand for particular goods and services

social status in economic theory social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour this paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis of the origins and consequences of social status concerns first a selection of empirical research from a variety of scientific disciplines is discussed to underpin the further theoretical analysis i then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for status discuss the endogenous derivation of such preferences for relative standing and assess the different formalizations of these preferences subsequently the consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and settings the last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns for normative economics and public policy

why countries with the same technology and preferences can have different growth rates abstract a standard ak model of endogenous growth has been extended to allow for an intertemporal conflict between capitalists and workers for the dynamic game thus obtained an equilibrium solution in feedback nash markovian strategies have been computed however many equilibria in trigger strategies can dominate the former there are dominating strategies that depend on the country specific bargaining power of the workers versus capitalists they are both pareto optimal and subgame perfect this provides an explanation why countries which are completely identical in preferences technology and factor endowments can experience different long term growth rates

security design with status concerns abstract this paper provides a status based explanation for convertible securities an entrepreneur with status concerns inducing risk taking decides how to finance the firm and how to dynamically manage it solving analytically for the optimal security we find that it is substantially similar to a convertible security our model can explain why convertible securities are mainly issued by start ups and small firms as we show that their salient characteristics higher volatility and dynamic flexibility accentuate incentives to issue convertible securities we also provide analytical results relevant to quantifying how status concerns affect credit risk an established factor behind security choice

ranking games and gambling when to quit when you re ahead it is common for rewards to be given on the basis of a rank ordering so that relative performance amongst a cohort is the criterion in this paper we formulate an equilibrium model in which an agent makes successive decisions on whether or not to gamble and is rewarded on the basis of a rank ordering of the final position amongst competing players one application of this model is to the behavior of mutual fund managers who are paid depending on funds under management which in turn are greatly influenced by annual or quarterly rank orderings our model deals with a situation in which fund managers can elect either to pick stocks or to use a market tracking strategy in equilibrium the distribution of the final position will have a negative skew we explore how this distribution depends on the number of players the probability of success when gambling the structure of the rewards and on information regarding the performance of other players

social status and economic performance a survey abstract this survey combines ideas and results from sociology and economics recognizing that economic decisions are often shaped by social concerns and influences based on the sociological literature we define social status and describe its measurement we then describe the role of social status in economic analysis of saving and consumption wages and economic growth we review recent work on status determination in equilibrium including evolutionary models we conclude with some remarks on the need for further interaction between sociology and economics

a folk theorem for minority games we study a particular case of repeated games with public signals in the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms the players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro whence the name minority game the players in the same room do not recognize each other and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced we show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff and as an almost sure equilibrium payoff in particular we construct an inefficient equilibrium where with probability one all players choose the same room at almost all stages this equilibrium is sustained by punishment phases which use in an unusual way the pure actions that were played before the start of the punishment

social context and the utility of wealth addressing the markowitz challenge abstract paradoxically there is a demand for both risk and insurance markowitz markowitz h 1952 the utility of wealth journal of political economy 60 151 158 laid the foundation for an explanation to this paradox markowitz challenged future researchers to build upon his foundation an operational specification of the taste for wealth this paper addresses the markowitz challenge by building social context variables into his model of individual utility verifiable implications about gambling insuring and peer selection are derived from the augmented markowitz utility function

conspicuous consumption dynamics abstract we formalize veblen s idea of conspicuous consumption as two alternative forms of interdependent preferences dubbed envy and pride agents adjust consumption patterns gradually in the direction of increasing utility from an arbitrary initial state the distribution of consumption among agents with identical preferences converges to a unique equilibrium distribution when pride is stronger the equilibrium distribution has a right skewed density when envy is stronger the equilibrium is concentrated at a single point and the adjustment dynamics involve a shock wave that can be interpreted as a growing moving homogeneous middle class

relative standing comparisons risk taking and safety regulations abstract we study the question of how relative standing comparisons or status seeking influence risk taking when utility is separable in consumption and status the following results apply with non systematic risks more concern for status leads to more less risk taking when in a sense made precise in the paper the utility function is less more concave in status than in pure consumption with systematic risk risk taking always increases with the concern for status however status seeking always implies socially excessive risk taking thus suggesting a role for public regulation of risky choices

efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations this paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information under the assumption of independent types we construct an efficient incentive compatible mechanism that is also budget balanced in every period of the game our mechanism works in environments where in each period each agent observes her own realized outcome decision payoff from the previous period this extends the insight of mezzetti 2004 to the dynamic setting

direct conservation payments in the brazilian amazon scope and equity implications abstract this article looks into the scope and equity implications of applying payments for environmental services pes as a redd implementation mechanism in the brazilian amazon we establish a set of economic and institutional preconditions for pes to become a feasible and cost effective conservation mechanism we proceed with a macro scale spatial analysis and overlay of opportunity costs deforestation patterns carbon services and land tenure in order to assess where these conditions hold we then screen how the benefits of potential pes schemes might be distributed across different socioeconomic groups of service providers in different land tenure categories our economic quantitative analysis though sensitive to documented assumptions suggests that under current carbon prices the economic preconditions are in place to pay for avoided deforestation in over half of threatened forests over the next decade unfortunately the same optimism does not apply to institutional preconditions land grabbing insecure tenure overlapping claims and lacking information on private tenure constitute real medium term impediments to pes if payments were to accrue to current landholders regardless of current tenure insecurities large landowners who account for about 80 of all deforestation would reap the highest benefits though per capita benefits other tenure categories are also high schemes that closely align payments with opportunity costs are preferable for cost effectiveness and not necessarily more inequitable in outcomes essentially pes systems cannot substitute command and control measures the former depend on the latter for basic governance systems to secure effective rights of exclusion which land stewards essentially need in order to become reliable service providers

social status culture and economic performance in analysing the differences in productive capacity among economies it is usual to concentrate on the physical aspects of the population the different attributes of capital including human capital and on the available production technologies societies also differ in culture in ways which are relevant for economic performance the sociological literature recognises that different occupations have different social status and that workers benefit not only from the wage they receive but also from being associated with a particular occupation cultural differences among societies may translate into different status of occupations and can therefore affect the choice of education and occupation and consequently the equilibrium level of output and wages conversely the economic choices of individuals influence the social status of occupations in particular it is well established by sociological research that the social status of an occupation is influenced by economic attributes such as the average wage and the average level of education in the occupation a major objective of our work is to illustrate that sociological and economic approaches can be combined within a unified framework this is in contrast to some social scientists who view the two approaches as competing with each other phelpsbrown i 977 ch 4 in this paper we construct a simple general equilibrium model in which both wages and status are determined endogenously we show that changes in the demand for status triggered by changes in preferences or in income distribution influence the wage structure the level of aggregate output and economic welfare the link between status and aggregate output is created by the fact that differences in occupational status imply occupational wage differences among workers of the same skill the larger is the demand for status the larger is the wage gap and the lower is aggregate output our discussion of status is closely related to the economic analysis of discrimination against ethnic or racial groups becker i 97 i arrow i 973

land use intensification potential in slash and burn farming through improvements in technical efficiency abstract much attention is being paid to find alternative land use options in slash and burn sab farming or forest fallow based shifting cultivation systems the conservation objective is often twofold that is to discourage farmers from expanding into the forest frontier and to reduce the ecological damage from burning plots options include the total abandonment of forest plots the adoption of productivity increasing green revolution type technologies and the application of modern evergreen agroforestry knowledge this paper evaluates another alternative the intensification of land use by improving technical efficiency in farming this involves the reduction of land clearing while at the same time maintaining crop output levels and the local and traditional low input technology the potential for such land use intensification is empirically assessed with ecological and socioeconomic household data from yucatan mexico the methodology is based on both parametric and nonparametric output and input distance functions in addition the sources of inefficiency are addressed the results of the analysis suggest that on and off farm labour diversification can play a key role to help shifting cultivating households to improve their technical efficiency in farming and thus to help to intensify land use furthermore while the empirical results point towards the positive effect of soil fertility mainly determined by the length of forest fallows on crop output levels farmers appear to overcome the ecological constraint of farming in less fertile soils by being more technically efficient

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

the spirit of capitalism asset pricing and growth in a small open economy abstract conventional models of economic behavior have failed to account for a number of observed empirical regularities in macroeconomics and international economics this may be due to preference specifications in conventional models in this paper we consider preferences with the spirit of capitalism the desire to accumulate wealth as a way of acquiring status we analyze a number of potential effects of international catching up and the spirit of capitalism on savings growth portfolio allocation and asset pricing moreover we obtain a multi factor capital asset pricing model capm our results show that status concerns have non trivial effects on savings growth portfolio allocation asset prices and the foreign exchange risk premium

inequality and risk taking behaviour this paper investigates social in uences on attitudes to risk and ofiers an evolutionary explanation of risk taking by young low ranked males becker murphy and werning 2005 found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status here their model is generalised by use of the insight of hopkins and kornienko 2010 that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments while becker et al found that risk taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament further it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su ciently low thus the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are su ciently unequal finally as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling it can cause greater inequality of wealth

benefits and costs of deforestation by smallholders implications for forest conservation and climate policy deforestation is a leading cause of biodiversity loss and an important source of global carbon emissions this means that there are important synergies between climate policy and conservation policy the highest rates of deforestation occur in tropical countries where much of the land at the forest frontier is managed informally by smallholders and where governance systems tend to be weak these features must be considered when designing policies to reduce emissions from deforestation such as redd deforestation is often accompanied by fires that release large amounts of carbon dioxide these emissions are especially high in the case of peatlands which contain thick layers of carbon rich matter in this paper we derive marginal abatement cost mac curves using data from a farmer survey in sumatra where rates of peatland deforestation are high comparing these results with farmers stated willingness to accept payment not to clear forest to establish oil palm suggests that redd policies may be more expensive than mac estimates suggest the extent to which this is true depends on the types of soils being deforested

aspirations and inequality the premise of this paper is twofold first people s aspirations for their future wellbeing or that of their children aect their incentives to invest second the experiences of others help shape one s aspirations this paper marries a model of aspirations based choice with a simple theory of aspirations formation to study the relationship between aspirations and the distribution of income through its impact on investments aspirations aect economic mobility and the income distribution which in turn shape aspirations thus aspirations income and the distribution of income evolve jointly and in many situations in a self reinforcing way we study the consequences of this model for income distribution as well as for growth rates over dierent quantiles of the distribution we show that extreme equality is unstable moreover when the same aspirations are shared in a society polarization arises the theory we propose captures both the complacency stemming from low aspirations and the frustration resulting from aspirations that are too high as a result for commonly held aspirations growth rates have an inverted u shape along the income distribution

entrepreneurship access policy and economic development lessons from industrial organization abstract this paper explores some relationships between promotion of competition and economic development that arise from the impacts of entrepreneurial firms in this respect two sets of policies are critical for furthering economic development first to arrest the diversion of entrepreneurial talent towards non productive activities an increased emphasis on preserving rewards from productive innovation is needed through the protection of commercial freedom property rights and contracts second given that essential local inputs are vulnerable to monopolization and foreclosure fostering opportunities for grass roots entrepreneurship becomes paramount through a more activist supply side competition policy emphasizing access to essential business services and other required local inputs a key message is that the conventional sensitivity of policy concerns about the social welfare effects of foreclosure should be extended to a domain beyond the usual essential facilities of public utilities it should include access to many other elements of the business infrastructure that are taken for granted in mature market economies but that pose real barriers to productive entrepreneurship at the grass roots level in the context of development additions to the incipient empirical work in this area could yield substantial policy dividends

decentralized payments for environmental services the cases of pimampiro and profafor in ecuador abstract few payment for environmental services pes schemes in developing countries operate outside of the central state s umbrella and are at the same time old enough to allow for a meaningful evaluation ecuador has two such decentralised consolidated experiences the five year old pimampiro municipal watershed protection scheme and the twelve year old profafor carbon sequestration programme we describe and compare the two cases using a common pes definition and methodology drawing on both primary interview based information and secondary data we find that both schemes have been relatively effective in reaching their environmental objectives in terms of having probably high additionality levels and low leakage effects a strong focus on the targeted environmental service and a strong degree of conditionality seem to be two key factors explaining these achievements although neither scheme has targeted poverty alleviation or other side objectives both are likely to have improved pes recipients welfare mostly through higher incomes we highlight several observations with more generalised relevance and lessons for the design of pes schemes

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

the equilibrium distribution of income and the market for status this paper explores the implications for risk taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption in contrast to previous analyses we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market we show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a status good and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good the main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income status and consumption is the same that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner

asset returns and state dependent risk preferences we propose a consumption based capital asset pricing model with state dependent risk aversion the corresponding risk premium includes consumption risk and the risk associated with variations in preferences our model can be estimated without specifying the functional form linking risk aversion with state variables the estimates are based on markov chain monte carlo estimation of exact discrete time parameterizations for linear diffusion processes we find estimates for relative risk aversion that are reasonable by usual standards correlated with both consumption and returns and indicative of an additional preference risk of holding the assets

entrepreneurial activity risk and the business cycle abstract this paper analyzes a model in which the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity implies that the amount of such activity is procyclical and results in amplification and intertemporal propagation of productivity shocks in the model risk averse agents choose between a riskless project and a risky project with higher expected output the entrepreneurial activity agents who become entrepreneurs need to bear part of the project specific risk for incentive reasons more agents become entrepreneurs when productivity is high because agents are more willing to bear risk and need to bear less risk for incentive reasons furthermore cross sectional heterogeneity can be countercyclical

reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in cameroon assessing costs and benefits a new momentum is underway to account for emissions from avoided deforestation and degradation at the united nations framework convention on climate change unfccc this paper assesses the feasibility of one of the reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation redd mechanisms currently discussed namely that of compensated reduction in the case of cameroon here we assess the differential revenues that a farmer could get from 1 ha of land out of two alternative land uses shifting cultivation the traditional land use pattern in southern cameroon or carbon credits as compensation for the conservation of primary forest it is found that a break even price of 2 85 t of carbon dioxide equivalent would level shifting cultivation with compensated reduction this result suggests that at current carbon prices and independently form variations in the discount rate it could already be more profitable to preserve the primary forest rather than to log it in order to grow crops 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

diversification as a public good community effects in portfolio choice within a rational general equilibrium model in which agents care only about personal consumption we consider a setting in which due to borrowing constraints individuals endowed with local resources underparticipate in financial markets as a result investors compete for local resources through their portfolio choices even with complete financial markets and no aggregate risk agents may herd into risky portfolios this yields a pareto dominated outcome as agents introduce community risk unrelated to fundamentals moreover if some agents are behaviorally biased or cannot completely diversify their holdings rational agents may choose more extreme portfolios and amplify the effect

conspicuous spending and the income distribution of social groups using south african household expenditure data we analyze how the spending of a household on visible goods such as jewelry and clothes depends on the distribution of income within its social group we find that this spending is positively correlated with the share of peers who possess a similar income level to the household what we dub the local income share moreover we find that the spending of a household on visible goods is positively correlated with the average income of peers that are poorer than this household we interpret this as evidence for cascade effects through which income changes among the poorest in the social group can trigger adjustments in the visible spending patterns of the wealthy in line with previous research charles et al 2009 we also find that visible spending of a household is negatively correlated with the average income of its social group we present a simple model of status competition based on hopkins and kornienko 2004 that synthesizes these effects and can account for our results jel d12 d31 o12

pure rank preferences and variation in risk taking behavior abstract assuming that an individual s rank in the wealth distribution is the only factor determining the individual s wellbeing we analyze the individual s risk preferences in relation to gaining or losing rank rather than the individual s risk preferences towards gaining or losing absolute wealth we show that in this characterization of preferences a high ranked individual is more willing than a low ranked individual to take risks that can provide him with a rise in rank relative risk aversion with respect to rank in the wealth distribution is a decreasing function of rank this result is robust to incorporating the level of absolute wealth in the individual s utility function

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

taking stock a comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries abstract payments for environmental services pes are an innovative approach to conservation that has been applied increasingly often in both developed and developing countries to date however few efforts have been made to systematically compare pes experiences drawing on the wealth of case studies in this special issue we synthesize the information presented according to case characteristics with respect to design costs environmental effectiveness and other outcomes pes programs often differ substantially one from the other some of the differences reflect adaptation of the basic concept to very different ecological socioeconomic or institutional conditions others reflect poor design due either to mistakes or to the need to accommodate political pressures we find significant differences between user financed pes programs in which funding comes from the users of the es being provided and government financed programs in which funding comes from a third party the user financed programs in our sample were better targeted more closely tailored to local conditions and needs had better monitoring and a greater willingness to enforce conditionality and had far fewer confounding side objectives than government financed programs we finish by outlining some perspectives on how both user and government financed pes programs could be made more effective and cost efficient

the effects of risk preferences in mixed strategy equilibria of 2 2 games abstract we consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed strategy equilibria of 2 2 games provided such equilibria exist we identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion we find that at least moderate degrees of risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria

conspicuous consumption snobbism and conformism abstract we develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status in equilibrium the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends in an identifiable way on the number of consumers and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism the market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist we derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods

positional spending and status seeking in rural china focusing on a remote area in rural china we use a panel census of households in 26 villages to show that socially observable spending has risen sharply in recent years we demonstrate that such spending by households is highly sensitive to social spending by other villagers this suggests that social spending is either positional in nature i e motivated by status concerns or subject to herding behavior we also document systematic relations between social spending and changes in higher order terms of the income distribution we find that the implications of status seeking for spending are not unidimensional they vary across income groups and expenditure categories in particular and consistent with theories of rank based status seeking we find that the poor increase spending on funerals and gifts as competition for status intensifies in addition poor families of grooms expend more for wedding ceremonies as local income competition increases while the families of brides do not the welfare implications of spending in order to keep up with the joneses are potentially large particularly for poor households

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

individual vs aggregate preferences the case of a small fish in a big pond we study the relationship between the risk preferences of individuals and the risk preferences of the aggregate economy to emphasize the vast differences that can occur between individual and market preferences brought about through aggregation we assume an economy consisting entirely of risk seekers we show that such individuals can lead to an aggregate economy that is risk averse the converse is also true an aggregate economy that exhibits risk aversion does not imply an economy of individual risk averters an economy demanding a risk premium can be formed from individuals who do not demand such compensation understanding the relationship between the preferences of individuals and the preferences of the aggregate economy is crucial for understanding the connection between the behavioral finance literature which focuses on individual preferences and the asset pricing literature which focuses on aggregate prices we discuss empirical implications of these results this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

a computationally convenient diversity measure theory and application this paper introduces a computationally convenient measure of structural diversity based on absolute deviations between relative shares of individual groups forming a community a conceptual framework is developed some theoretical properties of the measure are derived and its close relation to the shannon index a widely used diversity measure is explored the paper also presents an empirical application involving this measure where optimum harvesting strategies are determined under diversity constraints and investigates the trade off between economic and environmental objectives for a mixed forest in indonesia

diversification and its discontents idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial risk in the quest for social status social status concerns influence investors decisions by driving a wedge in attitudes toward aggregate and idiosyncratic risks i model such concerns by emphasizing the desire to get ahead of the joneses which implies that aversion to idiosyncratic risk is lower than aversion to aggregate risk the model predicts that investors hold concentrated portfolios in equilibrium which helps rationalize the small premium for undiversified entrepreneurial risk in the model status concerns are more important for wealthier households consequently these households own a disproportionate share of risky assets particularly private equity and experience greater volatility of consumption consistent with empirical evidence diversification and risk sharing are fundamental principles of modern finance and macroeconomics however empirical evidence suggests that household portfolios are poorly diversified with many people reporting substantial holdings of a single stock for the wealthiest households large shares in closely held businesses constitute a particularly important source of risk e g heaton and lucas 2000a it is not surprising that entrepreneurs bear substantial undiversified risk since it is important for mitigating moral hazard and or adverse selection problems yet from a standpoint of portfolio theory entrepreneurship does not appear to be well compensated implying that many investors are willing to take poorly rewarded risks despite the availability of superior investment opportunities such as public equity that earns a large risk premium e g moskowitz and vissing j0rgensen 2002 hall and woodward 2007

assessing sustainable forest management under redd a community based labour perspective abstract reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus redd encourages economic support for reducing deforestation and conserving or increasing existing forest carbon stocks the way in which incentives are structured affects trade offs between local livelihoods carbon emission reduction and the cost effectiveness of a redd programme looking at first hand empirical data from 208 farming households in the bolivian amazon from a household economy perspective our study explores two policy options 1 compensated reduction of emissions from old growth forest clearing for agriculture and 2 direct payments for labour input into sustainable forest management combined with a commitment not to clear old growth forest our results indicate that direct payments for sustainable forest management an approach that focuses on valuing farmers labour input can be more cost effective than compensated reduction and in some cases is the most appropriate choice for achieving improved household incomes permanence of changes avoidance of leakages and community based institutional enforcement for sustainable forest management

social comparisons status and driving behavior abstract the establishment of desirable social norms is an integral part of a well functioning civil society while recent evidence has demonstrated that social comparison can affect behavior in a variety of contexts it is not clear what type of comparative social information is most effective using a large scale field experiment to study driving practices we sent text messages containing different types of social information to drivers in tsingtao china we find two types of social information to be particularly effective in reducing traffic violations the driving behavior of those similar to oneself and the driving behavior of those with high status cars our results indicate that the combination of descriptive norms with social status is a cost effective yet powerful intervention for establishing better driving behavior in emerging markets

reign in hell or serve in heaven a cross country journey into the relative vs absolute perceptions of wellbeing abstract questionnaires exploring the relativist vs absolutist perception of wellbeing are administered to 3883 students in eight different countries four low income countries bolivia brazil kenya and laos 1924 respondents and four high income countries italy sweden switzerland and the uk 1959 respondents our data reveal that wellbeing is perceived mainly in relative terms with the strength of relativism being higher for respondents in high income countries however when the satisfaction of some basic needs is at stake the absolutist concern becomes powerful personal characteristics such as gender and background of studies have a significant role in determining respondents perception of wellbeing finally additional insights emerge from our study interpersonal comparisons take place by looking both upward and downward along the income scale not only income ranking but also the magnitude of reference incomes plays a role and the perception of wellbeing is more elastic to absolute rather than relative income

individual well being in a dynamic perspective this paper explores the determinants of individual well being as measured by self reported levels of satisfaction with income making full use of the panel data nature of the german socio economic panel we provide empirical evidence for well being depending on absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework this finding holds after controlling for other influential factors in a multivariate setting the main novelty of the paper is the consideration of dynamic aspects individual s own history as well as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well being