the distribution of earnings in an equilibrium search model with state dependent offers and counteroffers we construct an equilibrium job search model with on the job search in which firms implement optimal wage strategies under full information in the sense that they leave no rent to their employees and counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms productivity dispersion across firms results in wage mobility both within and across firms workers may accept wage cuts to move to firms offering higher future wage prospects equilibrium productivity dispersion across ex ante homogeneous firms can be endogenously generated productivity dispersion then generates a nontrivial wage distribution which is generically thin tailed as typically observed in the data

compensating differentials and self selection an application to lawyers this paper models individual choice between two types of jobs as dependent on the difference in potential earnings and on preferences for nonpecuniary the model leads to simultaneous estimation of earnings and job choice functions in a manner that takes account of self selection of individuals into the sector of highest utility an application to lawyers choosing between private and public interest law casts doubt on the notion that public interest lawyers are accepting substantially lower earnings by virtue of their choice an impression derived from estimation of earnings functions without accounting for self selection the estimation technique also takes proper account of the choice based nature of the sample which appears to be important

estimating a simultaneous search model the primary goal of this article is to specify and estimate a structural simultaneous search model and then determine the empirical importance of simultaneous search the results indicate that new labor force entrants search simultaneously a secondary goal is to identify and estimate job offer arrival rates and wage offer rejection probabilities separately the results indicate that a significant portion of unemployment spells are caused by slow arrival rates but policies intended to speed arrival rates would increase the average length of unemployment spells

hedonic wages and labor market search this article investigates the consequences of labor market search for the theory of hedonic wages we find that the introduction of search has surprising consequences for the theory of hedonic wages in particular we demonstrate that the equilibrium distribution of wage and nonwage amenity bundles generally bears little resemblance to workers underlying preferences a consequence of this analysis is that estimates of workers marginal willingness to pay derived from the conventional hedonic wage methodology are biased in addition we demonstrate that search generates differences between firm level and employee level data that can cause substantial deviations in the estimates of hedonic wage equations

the distribution of federal grants in aid the increasing importance of pacs relative to state and local political parties this paper examines the role of political influence in the distribution of federal grants in aid to state and local governments grants are assumed to be traded for the political capital of state and local politicians and interest groups as the value of the political capital each group has to offer varies the payoff in the form of grants should likewise vary for the ten year period 1974 83 a period of declining relative importance for state and local political parties and of rising relative importance of pacs it is hypothesized that the return to state and local political party capital would be declining while the return to the political capital of pacs would be constant or increasing the empirical evidence presented offers support for this hypothesis

job search hours restrictions and desired hours of work a structural empirical job search model is presented that incorporates the labor supply decision of individuals the arrival of a job offer is modeled as a random draw from a wage hours offer distribution subjective information is used on desired working hours to identify optimal hours from offered hours policy simulations are performed to address several policy questions does a decrease in unemployment benefits lead to the acceptance of jobs with less preferred working hours how does a decrease in the length of the standard working week affect the job acceptance behavior of the unemployed

the determinants of black white differences in early employment careers search layoffs quits and endogenous wage growth this paper studies the transition from school to full time employment and subsequent labor mobility during the first five postschooling years for several recent cohorts of black and white male terminal high school graduates using unique data from the 1979 youth cohort of the national longitudinal surveys of labor market experience a constrained optimization model of labor force dynamics is implemented empirically integrating features of models previously described in the literature the estimates of the model provide quantitative evidence on underlying structural differences in labor market constraints faced by blacks and whites for example while blacks have overall a substantially smaller wage return to work experience and face a less disperse wage offer distribution blacks face a higher probability of receiving job offers

distributive politics and the allocation of federal grants understanding the dynamics of policy distribution requires an appreciation of federal grant programs that have achieved a prominent place in nearly all areas of domestic policy the theoretical literature on distributive politics however focuses almost exclusively on a centralized top down view of policy distribution by examining the role of presidents legislators and bureaucrats scholars have ignored participants who have become key actors in the distribution of federal expenditures the recipient jurisdictions this analysis of the allocation patterns under six federal programs shows that local governments exert important influences on the distribution of federal grants and that the distributional patterns and their determinants vary over time the analysis also points out the importance of disaggregation by focusing on programs and recipient jurisdictions as opposed to total federal expenditures and regions states or congressional districts

search and nonwage job characteristics this paper quantifies the importance of nonwage job characteristics to workers by estimating a structural on the job search model the model generalizes the standard search framework by allowing workers to search for jobs based on both wages and job specific nonwage utility flows within the structure of the search model data on accepted wages and wage changes at job transitions identify the importance of nonwage utility through revealed preference the estimates reveal that utility from nonwage job characteristics plays an important role in determining job mobility the value of jobs to workers and the gains from job search

a dynamic analysis of educational attainment occupational choices and job search this article examines career choices using a dynamic structural model that nests a job search model within a human capital model of occupational and educational choices wage growth occurs in the model because workers move between firms and occupations as they search for suitable job matches and because workers endogenously accumulate firm and occupation specific human capital simulations performed using the estimated model reveal that both self selection in occupational choices and mobility between firms account for a much larger share of total earnings and utility than the combined effects of firm and occupation specific human capital

job and wage mobility with minimum wages and imperfect compliance we propose a job search model with minimum wage regulations and imperfect compliance to explain the doubling of the mean and variance of hourly earnings of white males during the first 18 years of labor market experience the model encompasses job mobility and on the job wage growth as sources of wage dynamics and is estimated by simulated generalized method of moments using data from the national longitudinal survey of youths 1979 our estimates provide a good fit for the observed levels and trends of the main job and wage mobility data and for the increase in the mean and variance of wages over the life cycle as well as for the fall in the fraction of workers paid below the minimum wage job mobility explains 40 50 of the observed wage growth increases in the minimum wage and or compliance deliver small effects on the wage distribution and the nonemployment rate

political and economic influences on the bureaucratic allocation of federal funds the case of urban development action grants abstract the distributive theory of politics predicts that federal budget allocations will be responsive to the committee position of congressmen and their majority minority party status but such political allocations are less likely where bureaucrats rather than legislators make the allocative decisions in such cases we must take into account bureaucratic motivations as well niskanen s bureaucratic budget maximization theory emphasizes such bureaucratic maximands and the efficient production of output or activity by the budget constrained bureau in this paper the two theories are tested using data from the urban development action grant program a capital subsidy program operated by the department of housing and urban development a set of political and bureaucratic decision criteria is employed as independent variables in a series of logit and tobit models in order to predict the likelihood of projects being funded and the amounts they will receive the political criteria are not significant in any specifications but the bureaucratic criteria suggest an investment maximizing risk avoidance strategy on the part of hud bureaucrats thus the results support the niskanen theory but do not support the distributive theory

the pervasive absence of compensating differentials we study the relation between individual preferences for job amenities e g type of work job security and compensating wage differentials in cross section to this end we estimate a partial equilibrium job search model on panel data from eight european countries there are five non wage job characteristics and two sources of job to job mobility on the job search and reallocation shocks we also allow for two types of unobserved heterogeneity we find strong preferences for amenities especially job security yet these preferences do not translate into significant wage differentials in cross section counterfactual experiments show that one would need extremely low levels of search frictions for compensating differentials to arise lastly a similar exercise on the distribution of job change outcomes reveals the role of constrained job to job mobility in the absence of compensating wage differentials copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

legislators bureaucrats and locational decisions our government allocates an ever increasing proportion of the national output national state and local government appropriate directly over one third of the gross national product indirectly they affect how a considerable proportion of the rest is allocated by means of extensive regulations and prohibitions and through positive inducements offered in the tax code the expanding size and scope of governmental activities impel social scientists to develop better explanatory models of government behavior understanding how and why governments make the choices they do is increasingly important for understanding everything from the performance of the national economy to the changing fortunes of businesses cities and regions this paper investigates the world of government spending specifically it explores how the federal government makes decisions about the geographic allocation of expenditures the central questions are does it make any difference how such decisions are made do legislators make significantly different decisions from bureaucrats does it matter whether one employs allocational formulas rather than making individual case by case decisions decisions about geographic allocation may appear peripheral and insignificant compared to obviously central decisions such as the proper ends of government appropriate means to those ends priorities among competing programs and the relative sizes of the public and private sectors this view is mistaken first geographic decisions are important in their own right federal expenditures have an enormous impact on the fortunes of localities and regions on the health of their economies and on the quality of life for their inhabitants since the federal government spends nearly a quarter of national output the differential geographic effects of that spending cannot be ignored any more than one could ignore its differential effects by income or race second decisions about ends means priorities and governmental size are not made independently from decisions about geographic allocation in fact choices about the former are often impossible without simultaneously resolving issues about the geographic allocation of benefits some have argued

short run and long run elasticities for canadian consumption of alcoholic beverages an error correction mechanism cointegration approach elasticities for beer wine and spirits are estimated for each of the provinces of canada over the period 1956 83 using unrestricted dynamic regressions modeled after the error correction mechanism alternative long run estimates are also obtained from cointegrating regressions estimates vary markedly across provinces and suggest that increases in price will reduce consumption of all beverages in the short run but in the long run no evidence is found that spirits use is price sensitive increases in the legal drinking age reduce consumption in the short run but there is little indication of a long run effect the estimated income elasticity of beer is small while the estimated income elasticities for spirits and wine are substantially larger especially in the long run coauthors are ernest h oksanen michael r veall and deborah fretz copyright 1992 by mit press

the political economy of intergovernmental grants evidence from a maturing democracy we evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in portugal as it matured from a young to an established democracy using a large and unexplored dataset we show that political variables condition the granting system and that their importance changed over time while tactical manipulation in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early years of democracy opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years we argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political environment and to the electorate s lack of information on intergovernmental grants

oligopsony and monopsonistic competition in labor markets we argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets using a simple model with job differentiation and preference heterogeneity we illustrate how such models can be employed to explain the existence of wage dispersion the persistence of labor market discrimination market failures in the provision of training and the anomalous employment effects of minimum wages

minimum wages for ronald mcdonald monopsonies a theory of monopsonistic competition recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment we develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages and our predictions fit the empirical results closely under monopsonistic competition we find that a rise in the minimum wage raises employment per firm causes firm exit and may increase or reduce industry employment minimum wages increase welfare if they raise industry employment but welfare effects are ambiguous if employment falls

estimating workers marginal willingness to pay for job attributes using duration data this paper develops and applies a method for estimating workers marginal willingess to pay for job attributes when workers job choices are characterized by imperfect information and labor market search as an application this paper analyzes the job durations of white males using data from the national longitudinal survey youth cohort and the dictionary of occupational titles estimates of workers willingness to pay derived from the job duration model are compared with those derived from an hedonic wage model

giving the people what they want the distribution of earmarks in the u s house of representatives the common wisdom in journalistic accounts of earmarking is that congress distributes earmarks on a purely political basis without any consideration for the demand for federal spending academic accounts similarly argue that factors internal to congress are preeminent in determining where earmarks go even more than for other types of pork barrel spending using earmarks appearing in the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bills i search for both chamber based and demand side determinants of the distribution of earmarks i find that both types of factors are significantly related to the number of earmarks that a house member receives this result indicates that even while earmarking members of congress are at least minimally responsive to voter preferences and calls into question whether earmarks should be treated as an outlier within the universe of spending allocation mechanisms

congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays the literature on the organization of the united states congress has been dominated by distributive and informational theory one important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork barrel activities here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork barrel is alive and well in the contemporary united states congress we focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts finding strong and systematic evidence of pork barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization

the empirical content of the job search model labor mobility and wage distributions in europe and the us abstract job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other this paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a three year panel of individual worker data covering 10 european countries and the u s we find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well this also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions our results suggest that cross sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the magnitude of labor market frictions as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model finally we use our results in a cross country comparison of the intensity and nature of job to job turnover we arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity we further show that the nature of job to job turnover is very different between those two groups turnover is predominantly voluntary in low turnover countries whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high turnover countries

an equilibrium model of health insurance provision and wage determination we investigate the effect of employer provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic welfare using a search matching and bargaining framework in our model health insurance coverage decisions are made in a cooperative manner that recognizes the productivity effects of health insurance as well as its nonpecuniary value to the employee the resulting equilibrium is one in which not all employment matches are covered by health insurance wages at jobs providing health insurance are larger in a stochastic sense than those at jobs without health insurance and workers at jobs with health insurance are less likely to leave those jobs even after conditioning on the wage rate we estimate the model using the 1996 panel of the survey of income and program participation and find that the employer provided health insurance system does not lead to any serious inefficiencies in mobility decisions

identification of search models using record statistics this paper shows how record value theory a branch of statistics that deals with the timing and magnitude of extreme values in sequences of random variables can be used to recover features of the wage offer distribution in conventional search models using national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy wage data i show that the data are not compatible with specifications for the offer distribution characterized by extreme negative skewness in addition i show that my approach can be used to construct a bound on the returns to job seniority my results suggest that job seniority plays only a minor role in the wage growth of the workers surveyed in the nlsy copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

the economics of choice in the allocation of federal grants an empirical test in this paper we have provided strong evidence in favor of the niskanen model of bureaucratic behavior and against the public interest hypothesis by considering the selection process used by hud in awarding urban development action grants specifically we did not find that any distress measures specified in regulations dealing with the program were statistically significant in explaining the awarding of grants the only consistently significant factors of those considered were the level of private commitment to the project and the ratio of private funds committed to total amount requested we argue that use of these variables especially the latter as primary selection criteria by hud bureaucrats reflects their desire to enhance their budgetary environment by making what the market perceives to be the best investments available to them avoiding risk and spreading available udag funds as widely as possible

budget maximizing governmental agencies an empirical test niskanen s theory of government budgeting involving powerful agencies interested in maximizing their budgets through bargaining with a weak poorly informed governmental sponsor has received wide recognition this paper presents the first direct empirical tests of niskanen s ideas one implication of niskanen s model of budgeting is that the demand for public services will appear to be elastic niskanen s model also implies restrictions on the elasticity of the derived demand for labor in the public sector neither set of predictions is supported by existing empirical research on government activity

labour market structure and inequality a comparison of italy and the u s markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian using a model of off and on the job search and event history individual level data for italy and the u s we show that while the cross sectional wage distributions of young italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white u s males the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the u s than it is in italy our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of long run welfare in the u s and a high level of cross sectional inequality

search for nonwage job characteristics a test of the reservation wage hypothesis previous structural models of job search behavior have been based upon the reservation wage property this article provides estimates of a more general search model that nests models with the reservation wage property the estimates lead to rejection of the reservation wage property the model includes hours of work in the utility function but other nonwage job characteristics can be included as well an experiment based on the estimated parameters indicates that a significant proportion of job offers would be mistakenly predicted to be accepted or rejected under the restrictions implied by the reservation wage property