trust trustworthiness and information sharing in supply chains bridging china and the united states whether and how trust and trustworthiness differ between a collectivist society e g china and an individualistic one e g the united states generates much ongoing scientific debate and bears significant practical values for managing cross country transactions we experimentally investigate how supply chain members countries of origin china versus the united states affect trust trustworthiness and strategic information sharing behavior in a cross country supply chain we consider a two tier supply chain in which the upstream supplier solicits demand forecast information from the retailer to plan production but the retailer has an incentive to manipulate her forecast to ensure abundant supply the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the supply chain and supplier s capability to determine the optimal production quantity affect the efficacy of forecast sharing and the resulting profits we develop an experimental design to disentangle these three aspects and to allow for real time interactions b

on the fixed nature of sharecropping contracts newbery and stiglitz i979 suggest four stylised facts of sharecropping which theories should attempt to explain the first is the persistence of sharecropping and its coexistence with fixed rental and wage markets under a variety of conditions over centuries of time the second is that in modern developed economies there appears to be a decline in share tenancy thirdly share tenancy is often but not alwavs associated with lower productivity than fixed rental land finally in many economies contracts involve shares of around one half for landlord and tenant this does not vary from contract to contract and does not seem to be the object of negotiation smith i776 and many subsequent authors have likened sharecropping to a tax they argue that under this type of contract tenants choose their labour supply to equate their marginal disutility of labour with their proportionate share of the marginal product instead of the full marginal product they therefore regard sharecropping as an inefficient form of land tenure however this view is difficult to reconcile with the first observation given the coexistence of fixed rent and share contracts it is reasonable to expect that if share contracts were relatively inefficient they would quickly die out this does not appear to have happened more recently it has been argued most notably by cheung i969 that if there is certainty and transactions costs are the same for all contracts then provided a share contract specifies the labour supply of the tenant it leads to the same efficient allocation of resources as a fixed rent or wage contract cheung has used this result as the basis of an explanation for coexistence he suggests that the transaction costs for share contracts are higher than for wage and fixed rent contracts however share contracts have the advantage that they allow the risk to be shared between the landlord and tenant whereas with fixed rent contracts the tenant bears all the risk and with wage contracts the landlord does given varying degrees of risk aversion among landlords and tenants it is possible that for some parties the risk sharing advantages outweigh the transaction cost disadvantages so that they will prefer share contracts whereas with others the reverse is true one problem with this argument raised by stiglitz i974 and newbery i977 is that given constant returns to scale the risk sharing properties of share contracts can be attained with mixtures of fixed rent and wage contracts if these do indeed have lower transaction costs share contracts would not then be observed

adapting contract theory to fit contract farming this article discusses the current state of contract theory and its usefulness for conceptualizing issues related to agricultural contracting i will discuss the limitations of existing theory for applied work and what methodological improvements are needed to enhance the usefulness of the theory to agricultural economists one pervasive problem is that the canonical economic literature on contracts is rather fragmented and the various methodological strands are narrow in their focus as such there is a need for agricultural economists to engage in methodological research to develop applied contracting models that can capture higher order features of real world agricultural contracts while delivering generalizable comparative statics predictions the need for such research is obvious as contracting continues to expand along the entire modern food marketing channel in the latter part of this article i develop a simple model to illustrate how classic methodological approaches can be combined with recent developments in contract and game theory to construct applied theory models that are useful for capturing some important features of agricultural contracts

production contracts and productivity in the u s hog sector this article measures the impact of contracting on partial and total factor productivity and the production technology of u s hog operations a sample selection model accounts for the fact that unobservable variables may be correlated with both the operators decision to contract and farm productivity results indicate that the use of production contracts is associated with a substantial increase in factor productivity and represents a technological improvement over independent production results also identify determinants of farmers decisions to contract and other factors influencing farm the rapid increase in the use of production contracts is a notable feature of the structural change taking place in the us hog industry between 1992 and 1998 the portion of feeder pig to finish hog operations using production contracts increased from 11 to 34 while the share of output produced under contract increased from 22 to 63 mcbride mcbride and key production contracts offer several potential advantages over independent production that could explain their growing prevalence contracts may serve to lower transaction costs associated with search negotiation and transfer reduce asymmetric information between growers and processors about product quality improve coordination of product delivery and lower income risk for growers in addition contracting may raise farm productivity by improving the quality of managerial inputs by speeding the transfer of technical information to growers or by facilitating growers access to credit thereby permitting the adoption of newer more efficient technologies in this article we focus on identifying and measuring the farm level productivity gains if any that can be attributed to contracting the recent growth in contracting does not necessarily imply that contracts are associated with higher farm productivity the increase in the use of contracts may have been propelled

expanding the solution set organizational economics and agri environmental policy abstract the market failure paradigm dominates agri environmental research and policy organizational economics provides an alternative framework for analyzing agri environmental problems and points to alternative solutions in this paper the traditional approach of creating markets for environmental goods and services is critiqued and set aside to provide space for an organizational analysis from an organizational perspective the relationship between the state and agricultural agents is viewed as grounded in an over arching exchange relationship including elements of cooperation and trust such a collaborative exchange relationship may prove useful in supporting exchange between agricultural agents and the state leading to the provision of ecological goods and services highlighting the potential of organizational economics the analysis suggests that agri environmental research and policy go further in accounting for and investigating the unique organizational modes of exchange governing the production of food fiber and ecological goods and services

effects of regulation and capital market imperfections on the dynamic behavior of a firm the well known result in the theory of a regulated firm known as the averch johnson effect is that a profit maximizing firm subject to rate of return regulation uses an inefficiently high capital labor ratio to produce its chosen level of output numerous contributions in the literature have been instrumental in clarifying the implications and generalizing the model 1 these contributions however have been mostly couched within a static framework few attempts have been made to investigate the effect of rate of return regulation on the dynamic behavior of the firm in particular its investment plans 2 neoclassical models of investment often assume that the rate of investment under

has the averch johnson effect been theoretically justified abstract in this paper we show that the averch johnson effect of overcapitalization by a regulated monopoly does not obtain when the firm operates in the decreasing cost range of output we develop a dynamic adjustment cost model of the firm and apply a recent result by brock and dechert for non concave hamiltonians to solve for the optimal investment policy for the firm with a phase diagram analysis we are able to make sharp comparisons between the regulated and unregulated cases in particular we show that investment by a regulated firm is lower than that of an unregulated firm even when the rate of return constraint is not binding

organizational commitment in a mixed oligopoly agricultural cooperatives and investor owned firms a number of agricultural cooperativeorganizations prominent examples includetri valley growers and the saskatchewanwheat pool currently face considerable nancialand organizationalchallenges externally these challenges include a grow ing concentration in a number of sectors e g beef and pork packing and a greater preva lence of vertical integration and contracts internally cooperatives co ops encountergreater heterogeneity among members greater property rights problems cook anda decline in member commitment fulton1999 this latter factor has been cited asone reason for the declining market shareand poor nancialperformance of a numberof co ops fulton and gibbings the purpose of this article is to examinethe issue of member commitment in the con text of a mixed oligopoly where co ops andinvestor owned rms iofs compete witheach other in supplying a consumer good

simulating the impacts of contract supplies in a spot market contract market equilibrium setting this article embeds a principal agent model within a market equilibrium model of contract and cash markets to analyze the impact of contracting on the spot market for hogs the equilibrium model incorporates both quality differentiation in the contract market and an endogenously determined cash market price for three types of contracting scenarios market equilibrium conditions are derived and results are presented for a numerical example contrary to some empirical results our model shows that the increased supply of hogs under typical formula price contracts can increase or decrease the cash market price depending on the relative size of overall contract supplies

information asymmetry and traceability incentives for food safety abstract we define traceability by its precision that is the probability of finding the source of a problem we consider a downstream food processor firm principal that sets traceability precision and contingent payments so to induce homogeneous upstream suppliers agents to exert the principal s preferred level of food safety effort we focus on cases in which food safety crises originate from defects in raw material provided by upstream firms to analytically show that high precision can substitute for high intensive contingent payments and vice versa and thus traceability is not an unequivocal signal for safer food contrary to previous results in the literature we also show that government regulation based on mandatory traceability with sanctions may not necessarily lead to safer food while increasing the food processor s costs finally we use our analytical results to give managerial feedbacks for firms adopting and considering traceability

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

organizational structure redistribution and the endogeneity of cost cooperatives investor owned firms and the cost of procurement abstract as an organizational type cooperatives are in general not the dominant form of enterprise nevertheless cooperatives and cooperative like organizations do play important roles in a number of sectors suggesting that in some circumstances they are more efficient than other business forms this paper explores the importance of membership goals on the relative efficiency of the cooperative form of organization the cooperative cost and hence production efficiency advantage is directly linked to the goal alignment between the cooperative and its members and is influenced by the extent of income redistribution between members and the degree of rent seeking that takes place in the organization when there is no aversion to income inequality the members produce at their first best levels however as aversion to inequality rises the production profile of the members converges to the production profile generated when the members face an iof regarding rent seeking if the more less efficient members are able to get their profits valued more total output is increased decreased as a consequence consumers may benefit from the lobbying that occurs inside a cooperative where the powerful members are the most efficient agents

the transition to modern agriculture contract farming in developing economies recent years have seen considerable interest in the impact of contract farming on farmers in developing countries motivated out of belief that contract farming spurs transition to modern agriculture in this article we provide a thorough review of the empirical literature on contract farming in bo

existence of coordinating transshipment prices in a two location inventory model we consider a two location production inventory model where each location makes production decisions and is subject to uncertain capacity each location optimizes its own profits transshipment at a cost is allowed from one location to another we focus on the question of whether one can globally set a pair of coordinating transshipment prices i e payments that each party has to make to the other for the transshipped goods that induce the local decision makers to make inventory and transshipment decisions that are globally optimal a recent paper suggests for a special case of our model that there always exists a unique pair of coordinating transshipment prices we demonstrate through a counterexample that this statement is not correct and derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which it would hold we show that in some conditions coordinating prices may exist for only a narrow range of problem parameters and explore conditions when this can happen finally we study the effects of demand and capacity variability on the magnitude of coordinating transshipment prices

labor contracting and a theory of contract choice in california agriculture we present a model of labor contracts where seasonality the sensitivity of output to labor quality and work intensity and the relative advantages of labor contractors in recruitment and growers in supervision of seasonal farm workers determine the choice of employment contract differences in the optimal means of extracting work result in lower wages paid under labor contracting than direct hiring we derive and estimate the probability of labor contracting and wages as functions of worker and job characteristics using data on california farm workers and employers from estimated expected wages our results indicate that successful unionization or reducing the flow of undocumented workers into california agriculture both would reduce contracting and increase wages

transaction costs institutional arrangements and inequality outcomes potato marketing by small producers in rural peru summary we explore the distributional effects of lowering transaction costs to allow access to improved market opportunities for small farmers in the peruvian highlands we find that when new marketing opportunities arise those that have more land are better educated and are well organized are able to deal with the complexities that the new contractual arrangements entail although this on average implies an increase in net income for small farmers it also affects the distribution of earnings generating a more polarized small farmer economy to counteract this effect and reduce inequality in the opportunities of less endowed small farmers complementary policies need to be put in place

repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations abstract we study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments in every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization after observing the actual demand each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period while in a single shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals we show that it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times we also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers order quantities and discount factors when n is large finally we provide conditions under which a system optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers and develop a contract for achieving a system optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

redesigning cooperative boundaries the emergence of new models in a mid 1990s aaea invited paper session the presenters and discussants posited challenges and opportunities for agricultural cooperation fulton hypothesized that forces external to the cooperative especially technology and member individualism would increasingly emerge as obstacles to success in north american agricultural cooperatives cook hypothesized forces internal to the cooperative especially potential negative consequences of vaguely defined property rights would challenge cooperative organizational growth in subsequent years three strategic choices were identified as potentially efficient that is the option to exit either the sector or the organizational form to continue strategically and structurally with moderate changes to organization form or to shift to a more radical form of organizational structure this article and session attempt to describe and analyze organizational design initiatives adopted since the mid 1990s this article complements and expands a typology of discrete institutional arrangements i e cooperative models based upon a broad definition of ownership rights comprising residual claim and control rights chaddad and cook we argue that cooperative models may be distinguished by how ownership rights are defined and assigned to economic agents tied contractually to the firm members patrons and investors in addition we develop a set of observations that suggest a research agenda based on a new institutional approach

optimal investment policy of the regulated firm abstract the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal investment behaviour of a regulated firm and to show that the averch johnson effect of overcapitalization does not necessarily occur in a dynamic model under the assumption of concave revenue function there may be three cases of undercapitalization overcapitalization and neutralization as the result whether the averch johnson effect appears or not is crucially dependent on the regulated rate of return and the firm s planning horizon

managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information abstract consider a firm that controls inventory centrally for two separate markets that are managed by regional managers having local demand information the central planner provides a dedicated inventory level to each market to ensure a minimum service level but can reallocate inventory once associated demands are filled how should such a firm solicit regional managers to share their local information so inventory levels can be set efficiently in this paper we study a forecast sharing game in such a firm where demand information lies within regions and inventory is managed by a central decision maker we show that incentives are misaligned and truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium we study two potential ways to improve the system a regional managers directly place orders rather than simply passing demand forecasts or b a pricing scheme for inventory reallocations is imposed we show that under direct ordering a unique pure strategy bayesian nash equilibrium exists and makes retailers place orders based on their true forecasts although the requested order quantities are not system optimal e g some inventory pooling benefits are lost under an endogenous transfer pricing mechanism set by the central planner we find that a first best truth telling equilibrium is possible under certain conditions we conduct a numerical study to examine the different cases and find that when the critical fractile is high direct ordering results in lower inventories while the reverse is true when the critical fractile is low expected profit comparisons show the value of local information

agribusiness economics and management agribusiness scholarship emphasizes an integrated view of the food system that extends from research and input supply through production processing and distribution to retail outlets and the consumer this article traces development of agribusiness scholarship over the past century by describing nine

a coordinating contract for transshipment in a two company supply chain we study a supply chain with two independent companies producing an identical product and cooperating through transshipment previous studies of this chain show that only under certain conditions linear transshipment prices could be found that induce the companies to choose the first best production quantities moreover even if such transshipment prices do exist they result in a unique division of total expected profit and thus they cannot accommodate arbitrary divisions of the profit using the generalized nash bargaining solution we derive coordinating transshipment prices that always give rise to a coordinating contract for the chain this contract relies on an implicit pricing mechanism

measuring benefits from a marketing cooperative in the copper river fishery the degradation of product quality is one form of rent dissipation resulting from incomplete property rights in fisheries industry structure and information asymmetries can also lead to underinvestment in product quality even when property rights are well defined in this article we empirically examine whether the voluntary formation of a marketing cooperative was able to mitigate market failures that led to the production of inferior quality fish specifically we use a difference in differences estimation strategy to measure the impact that the copper river fishermen s cooperative an alaskan salmon marketing cooperative had on ex vessel salmon prices and salmon quality measures we find that the cooperative was able to improve product quality as well as attract and sustain a higher price for its salmon our findings provide empirical support for many of the key tenets of cooperative theory specifically we find evidence that marketing cooperatives can address existing market failures that marketing cooperatives can have advantages in high quality product markets and that over time as a result of their success marketing cooperatives may lead to lasting producer benefits even though they become obsolete due to nonmember free riding

technical note robust newsvendor competition under asymmetric information we generalize analysis of competition among newsvendors to a setting in which competitors possess asymmetric information about future demand realizations and this information is limited to knowledge of the support of demand distribution in such a setting traditional expectation based optimization criteria are not adequate and therefore we focus on the alternative criterion used in the robust optimization literature the absolute regret minimization we show existence and derive closed form expressions for the robust optimization nash equilibrium solution for a game with an arbitrary number of players this solution allows us to gain insight into the nature of robust asymmetric newsvendor competition we show that the competitive solution in the presence of information asymmetry is an intuitive extension of the robust solution for the monopolistic newsvendor problem which allows us to distill the impact of both competition and information asymmetry in addition we show that contrary to the intuition a competing newsvendor does not necessarily benefit from having better information about its own demand distribution than its competitor has

dynamic behavior of the firm with adjustment costs under regulatory constraint abstract this paper investigates the optimal investment behavior of the regulated profit maximizing firm in a dynamic context the modern adjustment cost approach to investment is incorporated into the theory of a regulated firm which has typically been discussed in a static framework this paper thus generalizes the well known averch johnson thesis which is proved in the static context the paper investigates both the finite and infinite horizon cases

process innovation activity in a mixed oligopoly the role of cooperatives this article develops a sequential game theoretic model of heterogeneous producers to examine the market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in process innovation activity in the agricultural sector the analysis examines an open membership input supplying cooperative co op that maximizes member welfare and finances its innovation activity through retained earnings analytical results show that the presence of the co op can increase the arrival rate of innovations while reducing the price of agricultural inputs cooperative involvement in innovation activity can thus be welfare enhancing and socially desirable with its effectiveness being determined by the degree of producer heterogeneity and the size of innovation costs

marketing cooperative vs commission agent the turkish dilemma on the modern fresh fruit and vegetable market in turkey the wholesale markets law was enacted in 1995 to facilitate small scale growers access to the fresh produce market cooperatives and commission agents have thus become the main marketing structures available to small scale fresh produce growers to supply supermarkets and comply with their new requirements in this paper we question the advantages and disadvantages that confront small farmers with respect to those marketing structures to allow for market matching or quality upgrading drawing on ownership and transaction cost arguments we use an analytical framework to identify and compare the costs of these marketing organizations based on data collected through a large number of interviews with stakeholders we show that commission agents and credit cooperatives tend to be more efficient than traditional cooperatives as regards sales performance and decision costs however the lack of apparent competition between commission agents does not allow for sufficient provision of incentives for producers to invest in high quality production consequently credit cooperatives are the only structure progressively turning to strategies of quality upgrading and supermarket supply the flipside of such strategies is that they may lead to the marginalization of small scale farmers

sharing monitoring and incentives marshallian misallocation reassessed a general equilibrium model is presented wherein wage labor requires monitoring in order to extract effort landlords may also elect to adopt sharetenancy contracts in which workers have an incentive to supply unsupervised effort two distortions exist monitoring costs in one sector and a share tax in the other efficiency statements require second best comparisons adopting more specific functional forms this mixed wage sharetenancy economy is technically efficient and provides greater benthamite social welfare than a wage only economy when private incentives lead to mixing the incidence of sharetenancy is hypothesized to increase with monitoring costs density of tenants per landlord and labor intensity of production

testing between competing models of sharecropping the marshallian approach assumes a prohibitively high cost of monitoring the sharecropper s activities while the monitoring approach argues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers activities i present new evidence using detailed data collected from eight indian villages most tenants own some land of their own this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements the differences in input and output intensities on owned minus sharecropped land of the same household are found to be sizable and significant suggesting a rejection of the monitoring approach and supporting the notion of the marshallian productive inefficiency of sharecropping

pooling access and countervailing power in channel governance fruit and vegetable marketing organization the greenery has experienced various governance structure changes like horizontal merger forward integration and the emergence of grower associations a multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling access and countervailing power this model does not only explain the changes at the greenery but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors

input versus output monitoring who is the residual claimant abstract we observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal agent relationship we show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by the identity of the residual claimant of the principal agent relationship the principal will find input monitoring more efficient if the principal is the residual claimant and he will find output monitoring more efficient if the agent is the residual claimant if residual claimancy is a choice the principal will be the residual claimant under input monitoring under output monitoring residual claimancy is not an issue if both residual claimancy and the monitoring instrument can be chosen the principal will choose to monitor input and to be the residual claimant journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l22

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

marketing cooperatives and financial structure a transaction costs economics analysis the relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative mc and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective a mc receives less favourable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds this is a serious threat to the survival of a mc in a market where efficient investments are characterised by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production a mc is predicted to be an efficient organisational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production

optimal dynamic investment policies under concave convex adjustment costs the paper considers a dynamic investment model of a monopolistic firm facing adjustment costs that are concave convex in the rate of gross investment the firm wishes to maximize the discounted stream of dividends over a finite planning horizon plus the terminal value of the stock of equity the problem of finding an optimal investment path is solved by combining results from a nonstandard model with concave adjustment costs with results from the standard model with convex adjustment costs the results are presented in phase diagrams and are economically interpreted the solution involves the use of a chattering control and we discuss various approaches to avoid the occurrence of such a control policy

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

the nature of the farm abstract using a model based on a trade off between moral hazard incentives and gains from specialization this paper explains why farming has generally not converted from small family based firms into large factory style corporate firms nature is both seasonal and random and the interplay of these qualities generates moral hazard limits the gains from specialization and causes timing problems between stages of production by identifying conditions in which these forces vary we derive testable predictions about the choice of organization and the extent of farm integration to test these predictions we study the historical development of several agricultural industries and analyze data from a sample of over 1 000 farms in british columbia and louisiana in general seasonality and randomness so limit the benefits of specialization that family farms are optimal but when farmers are successful in mitigating the effects of seasonality and random shocks to output farm organizations gravitate toward fa

cooperation between multiple news vendors with transshipments we study a situation with n retailers each of them facing a news vendor problem i e selling to customers over a finite period of time product with a short life cycle such as fashion groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders followed by transshipments after demand realization is known we analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game called a general news vendor game for such a situation with n retailers we concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news vendor games our main result states that general news vendor games have non empty cores

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

broiler production contracts as a multi agent problem common risk incentives and heterogeneity the broiler industry presents two puzzles regarding production contracts why do processors control growers inputs and why do they use a statistically insufficient estimator to calculate growers compensation this paper provides an agency theoretic framework that explains these puzzles in terms of processors response to grower heterogeneity and production risk and to grower risk aversion processors control inputs to reduce the information rents paid to agents by forcing agents to bear additional income risk through the use of an imprecise estimator processors can increase profits due to the combined moral hazard adverse selection nature of the informational problem

economics of agricultural supply chain design a portfolio selection approach agrifood firms in a globalizing and competitive market both in developing and developed countries often undertake innovations in products and technologies innovators such as firms and other agents develop supply chains to accommodate the nature of the innovations in this article we analyze an innovator s supply chain design problem the design of the supply chain involves three sets of decisions the first is how much to produce the second involves how to undertake production and how many resources to allocate to the production of feedstock agricultural products that are inputs for processing processing and marketing the third set involves deciding on the amount of feedstock to be obtained through contracts with farmers we show that the innovator determines its overall level of production by taking advantage of its monopoly power derived from the innovation in the output market and behaves as a monopsony in buying feedstock from contractors these decisions are constrained by the marginal cost of capital and the properties of production and marketing technologies when the innovator is risk averse risks in farm production processing and marketing will affect both processed output and the share of feedstock bought through contracts

vertical integration in west africa s cotton industry are parastatals a second best solution this article provides a framework to compare market outcomes among vertically integrated monopsonies in the cotton sector of west africa and alternative more competitive market structures based on a principal agent framework in the presence of factor market constraints as well as capital market failure efficiently operated cotton parastatals increase sector welfare and efficiency by providing input credits in equilibrium outcomes with the principal agent model suggest growers receive the reservation income to participate in cotton production while the principal cotton company extracts the surplus above the reservation income competitive markets entail more equitable distribution of benefits than with parastatal vertical integration but credit and factor market constraints can still persist promotion of a competitive market system will not support cotton productivity growth unless stakeholders pursue complementary programs to develop credit markets and research and extension institutions in the presence of current market failures parastatals may be a second best solution

the future of u s agricultural cooperatives a neo institutional approach thirty years ago helmberger speculated that industrialization of agriculture would lead to the demise of farmer cooperatives helmberger 1966 p 1434 in responding to helmberger s prediction abrahamsen countered by suggesting that as industrialization of agriculture evolved cooperatives would increasingly become the farmer s integrating agency abrahamsen p 1442 in this paper i examine these two divergent opinions by a briefly describing the structural and strategic evolution of u s farmer cooperatives since the helmberger and abrahamsen h a forecasts b utilizing recent developments in neo institutional economic organizational economic theory to generate hypotheses regarding structural and strategic shifts in u s agricultural cooperatives and c further applying neo institutional economics to speculate what the future might hold for u s producerowned and controlled agricultural cooperatives

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

newsvendor competition under asymmetric cost information abstract we study the newsboy duopoly problem under asymmetric cost information we extend the lippman and mccardle 1997 of competitive newsboy to the case where the two firms are privately informed about their unit costs the market demand is initially split between two firms and the excess demand for each firm is reallocated to the rival firm we show the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium and characterize its structure the equilibrium conditions have an interesting recursive structure that enables an easy computation of the equilibrium order quantities presence of strategic interactions creates incentives to increase order quantities for all firm types except the type that has the highest possible unit cost consequently competition leads to higher total inventory in the industry however contrary to intuition this is only true when the firms are non identical a firm s equilibrium order quantity increases with a stochastic increase in the total industry demand or with an increase in his initial allocation of the total industry demand we demonstrate our model and results in an application in a dual sourcing procurement setting using data that obtained from a large manufacturing company finally we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the game for the special case of uniform demand and linear market shares

reading the fine print in agricultural contracts conventional contract clauses risks and returns one distinguishing feature of ongoing struc tural change in agriculture is increasingvertical coordination between agriculturalproducers and processors much of which hascome through agricultural production andmarketing contracts agricultural economists extension agents legal aid groups and othershave sought to provide farmers with infor mation that enables them to make informeddecisions regarding contract use while allsensible advice begins with suggesting thata farmer consult his or her attorney and ac countant before signing numerous outreachpublications provide information regardingspeci c contract provisions see for example holman feuz and baltensperger 2006 kunkel and larison 2006 of ce of the illinoisattorney general 2005 in contrast to the relatively comprehensiveanalysis in such outreach efforts agriculturaleconomists theoretical analyses of speci cagriculturalcontractprovisionshavetendedtofocusoncontractualprovisionsregardingcom pensation and to some extent on input provi sion when comparing the average theoreticalmodel to an actual agricultural contract thereare pages of the contract that do not appear inthe model at all much of the material omitted in theoreti cal analyses of agricultural contracts is boil erplate boilerplate is standardized contractterms that are used in multiple contacts these

implications of nash bargaining for horizontal industry integration this article shows how horizontal industry integration can arise from transferable asymmetry of technologies and endowments the nash bargaining solution suggests that greater technological diversity among coordinating parties yields greater gains from horizontal integration the framework fits the case where a firm with a superior technology franchises the technology by horizontal integration the results appear to fit hog production where integration has been primarily horizontal and in part broiler production where integration has been both vertical and horizontal specifically technology has been shared through uniform genetic traits fine tuned feed rations and veterinary services specified in grower contracts

the health of farmer based organisations in ghana organisational diagnostics and governance implications abstractin this paper we use primary data on 500 ghanaian fbos collected through semi structured interviews and risky dictator games rdg to test the validity of the cooperative life cycle theory and formulate a measure of cooperative health we first define cooperative health as the alignment of heterogeneity in risk preferences and the effectuation of collective investments we then use cluster and correlation analysis to categorize fbos on the basis of their health and correlate these typologies with various performance indicators our findings reveal that organizational health is generally low as there are only a few organizations that manage to provide member farmers with both risk sharing and cost saving opportunities further healthier fbos experience stronger growth in membership while health is lower in fbos that have been established for the purpose of benefitting from external incentives

transactions costs and the efficient organization of production a study of timber harvesting contracts a transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber harvesting contracts predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from north carolina the empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk based model the transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures

do landlord tenant relationships influence rental contracts for farmland or the cash rental rate a considerable portion of north america s farmland is rented out by nonfarmer landlords our survey of farmers in southern ontario canada provides a refined understanding of who these landlords are and whether variations in landlord tenant relationships influence rental contract choice and or the magnitude of cash rent we find that crop share arrangements are more likely to emerge among family relations however we do not find strong evidence that family relations explain variation in the magnitude of cash rental rates

optimal and approximate policies in multiperiod multilocation inventory models with transshipments this paper examines the effects on the optimal ordering policy and its cost of allowing for interactions among retail outlets specifically transshipments are allowed as recourse actions occurring after demands are realized but before they must be satisfied the resultant savings in holding and shortage costs are balanced against the costs of transshipment a base stock ordering policy is optimal for this model if the final period base stock order up to point is nonnegative then it will be the base stock order up to point for all periods unfortunately it can be found analytically only for two special cases where either the cost parameters are equal at every outlet or there are only two outlets these two special cases are used to validate a heuristic solution technique employing monte carlo integration which is then compared to an easily calculated base policy in order to gauge the contribution of this model the additional savings from using this heuristic policy are significant particularly for problems with many retail outlets and low transshipment costs

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

cooperative pricing and scale efficiency the case of korean rice processing complexes unlike most investor owned enterprises cooperatives often have freedom to choose among a variety of firm objectives using 2002 2008 plantand province level data we ask in the present article which of several alternative maximands a korean cooperative rice processing firm pursues in contrast to earlier studies farmer member supply functions are incorporated into the cooperative s optimization framework we show that only large cooperative firms have operated at efficient scale while small and medium sized ones have been scale inefficient because the latter operate where scale returns are increasing mergers of small and medium sized cooperatives likely would be cost reducing and member return enhancing

setting the right incentives for global planning and operations we study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing and local demand management the stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units and the firm relies on the business units forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations we propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer an appealing refinement of nash equilibrium moreover these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions after analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand

what to show on the wine labels a hedonic analysis of price drivers of sicilian wines unlike previous literature we construct a hedonic model of wine price that incorporates all the main categories of variables simultaneously to enable a better evaluation of their importance on wine price formation a comprehensive model has the advantage of providing more reliable estimates of the attributes implicit prices thereby facilitating firms pricing and improving effectiveness of wine production and marketing decisions we utilize two different datasets of sicilian wines collecting data from influential wine guides our results suggest that wine price strongly depends on objective features such as vintage alcoholic content geographical origin grape variety producer size and cellaring potential in addition use of containers like tonneaux and barrique positively affects prices whereas use of concrete containers has a negative influence no univocal indications emerge with regard to the effect of the type of company type of viticulture and firm age as for sensorial characteristics our a

regulatory lag and deregulation with imperfectly adjustable capital abstract the dynamic effects of regularity lag and deregulation on the behavior of a firm with imperfectly adjustable capital are examined given adjustment costs and irreversible investment the firm reacts in advance to anticipated changes in regulation in the regulatory lag case capital increases after regulation is imposed the averch johnson effect is observed before regulation but not necessarily afterwards sufficient conditions are given for the capital bias to increase the regulated firm may choose inputs reflecting either a labor or capital bias in anticipation of deregulation sufficient conditions are given for the capital bias to be lessened by deregulation

marketing contracts and crop insurance contracts between farmers and intermediaries and crop insurers are important means for farmers to mitigate risks in modern u s agriculture in this paper we investigate the effect of crop insurance enrollment on contract terms and farmers participation in marketing contracts following ligon 2003 we set up a mechanism design framework to demonstrate an intermediary s contract design problem where farmers are assumed to be utility maximizing agents we depict farmers optimal choices of insurance coverage using the specification developed by babcock 2012 our model shows that improved terms of crop insurance lower premiums higher subsidies make contracts less appealing to farmers as mechanisms for mitigating risk therefore intermediaries may revise their contract offers so that they are more attractive however improvements in contract terms are limited by their cost to the intermediaries and will not lead to expanded participation in contracts

leadership and the provision of safe food modern food production typically involves many interacting stages and two or more decision makers there is reason to believe that inputs in determining quality likely complement and it is not possible to regulate many of these inputs in a food production system possessing these characteristics we show that leadership by one or more firms through communicating actions may be used as a mechanism to increase overall food quality as there may be no private incentive to lead there may be strategic merit in assigning liability through legislation we also suggest the possibility that genetics are leadership instruments in hog production systems copyright 2001 oxford university press

ownership structure in agrifood chains the marketing cooperative globalization technological developments and consumer concerns press farmers and food producers to enhance product innovation and to seek more efficient production and distribution structures these changes in agrifood markets shift the relative importance of the investments by different chain partners it may therefore be necessary to change the allocation of ownership of essential assets to induce agents to make those investments that generate the chain optimum this article analyzes the impact of ownership structure on investments in a three tier supply chain from an incomplete contracting perspective circumstances are determined in which a marketing cooperative is the unique first best ownership structure

social interactions and product quality the value of pooling in cooperative entrepreneurial networks why do cooperatives often pay a pooled price despite the free riding incentives it entails in this paper we highlight that a cooperative is an enterprise owned by a network of entrepreneurial members by taking explicitly into account the social interactions among entrepreneurial members and the impact of social ties on members product quality provisions we identify the circumstances when pooling is efficient it is shown that social interactions mitigate the free riding effect of pooling and that the amount of members social interactions depends upon and increases with the cooperative s pooling ratio we show that the complete pooling policy is not only economically efficient but also socially advantageous when the context of the cooperative is conducive to frequent social interactions among members

tenancy choice in a competitive framework with transactions costs the choice between wage labor and sharecrop contracts is analyzed in a model that avoids both the pitfalls of previous models inefficiency of sharecropping and indeterminacy by introducing transactions costs with appropriate nonlinearities plantation data from the american south provide empirical support for the hypothesized nonlinearity in transactions costs and simultaneous determination of direct supervision and contractual choice