interpreting economic time series this paper explores some of the implications for econometric practice of the principle that people s observed behavior will change when their constraints change in dynamic contexts a proper definition of people s constraints includes among them laws of motion that describe the evolution of the taxes they must pay and the prices of the goods that they buy and sell changes in agents perceptions of these laws of motion or constraints will in general produce changes in the schedules that describe the choices they make as a function of the information that they possess until very recently received dynamic econometric practice ignored this principle the practice of dynamic econometrics should be changed so that it is consistent with the principle that people s rules of choice are influenced by their constraints this is a substantial undertaking and involves major adjustments in the ways that we formulate estimate and simulate econometric models

analysis of policies to reduce oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from the us transportation sector abstract even as the us debates an economy wide co 2 cap and trade policy the transportation sector remains a significant oil security and climate change concern transportation alone consumes the majority of the us s imported oil and produces a third of total us greenhouse gas ghg emissions this study examines different sector specific policy scenarios for reducing ghg emissions and oil consumption in the us transportation sector under economy wide co 2 prices the 2009 version of the energy information administration s eia national energy modeling system nems a general equilibrium model of us energy markets enables quantitative estimates of the impact of economy wide co 2 prices and various transportation specific policy options we analyze fuel taxes continued increases in fuel economy standards and purchase tax credits for new vehicle purchases as well as the impacts of combining these policies all policy scenarios modeled fail to meet the obama administration s goal of reducing ghg emissions 14 below 2005 levels by 2020 purchase tax credits are expensive and ineffective at reducing emissions while the largest reductions in ghg emissions result from increasing the cost of driving thereby damping growth in vehicle miles traveled

sensitivity analyses of anomalies in developed stock markets abstract the literature on anomalies in developed stock markets produces no consensus on specification this study uses extreme bound analysis eba to evaluate the robustness of 15 stock return anomalies given data covering 16 developed markets from may 1984 to march 1999 two factors are sturdy according to the extreme decision rule in the panel design d p and momentum under a less stringent eba criterion long run lagged returns country risk and the january effect are also robust time series eba for individual markets produces one robust result according to relaxed decision rules across a majority of cases long run government bond yields

on the electrification of road transport learning rates and price forecasts for hybrid electric and battery electric vehicles abstract hybrid electric vehicles hevs and battery electric vehicles bevs are currently more expensive than conventional passenger cars but may become cheaper due to technological learning here we obtain insight into the prospects of future price decline by establishing ex post learning rates for hevs and ex ante price forecasts for hevs and bevs since 1997 hevs have shown a robust decline in their price and price differential at learning rates of 7 2 and 23 5 respectively by 2010 hevs were only 31 22 2010 kw 1 more expensive than conventional cars mass produced bevs are currently introduced into the market at prices of 479 171 2010 kw 1 which is 285 213 2010 kw 1 and 316 209 2010 kw 1 more expensive than hevs and conventional cars our forecast suggests that price breakeven with these vehicles may only be achieved by 2026 and 2032 when 50 and 80 million bevs respectively would have been produced worldwide we estimate that bevs may require until then global learning investments of 100 150 billion which is less than the global subsidies for fossil fuel consumption paid in 2009 these findings suggest that hevs including plug in hevs could become the dominant vehicle technology in the next two decades while bevs may require long term policy support

smooth trading with overconfidence and market power we describe a symmetric continuous time model of trading among relatively overconfident oligopolistic informed traders with exponential utility traders agree to disagree about the precisions of their continuous flows of gaussian private information with enough disagreement an equilibrium exists in which prices reveal the average of all traders signals immediately but traders continue to trade gradually towards target inventories the price is a linear function of a trader s inventory the derivative of a trader s inventory and the average other traders valuations prices reflect a keynesian beauty contest faster than equilibrium trading generates flash crashes jel d8 d43 d47 g02 g14

financial contracting under extreme uncertainty an analysis of brazilian corporate debentures abstract economic volatility high transaction costs and fragile institutions hinder financial contracting in emerging markets these conditions characterize the economy of brazil yet a nascent corporate bond market thrives i analyze 50 brazilian indenture agreements and find that sample debentures are characterized by i features that mitigate inflation risk for investors ii contingent maturity mechanisms that provide periodic opportunities for exit or renegotiation iii a paucity of covenants that restrict the debtor s investment financing and dividend decisions and iv self enforcement mechanisms that avoid reliance on inefficient institutions analysis of these features enhances our understanding of contracting in emerging economies

financing the small firm this study presents a framework to delineate financing the small firm special consideration is given to small firms unique financing sources such as trade and bank credit entrepreneur s own resources informal investment and venture capital the small firm has limited or no access to many traditional debt and equity markets that supply long term financing to the corporate world and therefore operates in segmented and imperfect financial markets the links between small firms financing opportunities and managerial goals are traced from the start up stage through establishing a mature firm as the small firm matures it operates in a broader financial market this study establishes the foundation for future empirical research

a strategic analysis of sinking fund bonds abstract unlike most securities the pricing of sinking fund bonds is influenced by the distribution of ownership which summarizes the extent to which the market is cornered the effect of the distribution of ownership on the pricing of sinking fund bonds is examined by an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend upon the size of the investor s position this framework is used to contrast the valuation of sinking fund bonds with the valuation of amortizing bonds and straight debt we show that it is generally incorrect to view sinking fund bonds as being equivalent to serial bonds

default risk yield spreads and time to maturity this paper extends the default model of yield spreads for bonds by showing that in gen eral they are a complex function of maturity and in particular are not always monotoni cally increasing contrary to what one traditional view suggests our results may help explain the apparently conflicting empirical results found in the literature

the choice of call provision terms evidence of the existence of agency costs of debt an examination of the provisions of bond issues reveals that most bonds prohibit firms from calling the issue during the initial years after which time the bond can be called at the option of the firm a substantial number of firms however also reserve the right to call the issue during this initial period for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate the additional flexibility which accompanies the option of early redemption can be used to reduce the agency costs of debt associated with future investment opportunities informational asymmetry and the risk incentive problem using a sample of newly issued bonds statistical tests are performed to show that there are in fact differences between firms which do and do not reserve the right of early redemption this paper shows that these differences provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use the option of early redemption to reduce agency costs one of the decisions which a firm must make when it floats a bond issue concerns the use of a call provision if a call provision is included in the bond then the terms of the call provision must be specified such as the years to the first call the initial call price the call price in subsequent years and the circumstances under which a call provision can be used previous work in the area of call provisions focused on fluctuations in interest rates as the reason for their existence it was shown by krause 12 however that in an efficient capital market any call provision decision based on interest rate uncertainty is irrelevant recent work in agency theory has shown that the existing contractual relationships between bondholders and stockholders may not be a zero sum game under these circumstances such financing decisions as capital structure debt maturity and call provisions may not be irrelevant an examination of the call provisions of currently outstanding bond issues reveals an institutional feature which is often overlooked many bonds have a standard call provision which restricts the firm from calling the issue for a stated number of years followed by a period during which firms have the option to call the bond at a stated call price another group of bond issues however contain a two tiered type of call provision which allows the corporation to call the bond for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate during the initial years of the life of the bond after this initial period the firm has the option of calling the bond issue for any purpose

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

callable bonds reinvestment risk and credit rating improvements role of the call premium we identify the call premium in nonconvertible callable bonds as an effective contracting provision to address agency conflict due to reinvestment risk and credit rating improvements we analyze 4 495 bonds issued between 1980 and 2012 when interest rates are high a majority of investment grade issues and almost the entire subset with long maturities 20 years include a call premium when interest rates are low virtually all investment grade issues with long and short maturities are callable at par high yield issues are limited to short maturities by about 4 1 they include a call premium regardless of interest rate levels

the eurobond market and corporate financial policy abstract on average significant positive abnormal returns are associated with eurobond issues during the period 1975 1985 the cross sectional and time series distributions of the abnormal returns are consistent with the hypothesis that impediments to the adjustment of asset supplies to new demand conditions are large enough to create profitable financing opportunities for firms our analysis demonstrates how profitable financing opportunities can persist on the eurobond market and when they are most likely to arise

bankruptcy and agency costs their significance to the theory of optimal capital structure we support and generalize our original results 1978 in light of potential impediments to a pure market solution to agency problems and potential causal links between liquidation and bankruptcy in the case of bankruptcy costs market impediments are easily elimi nated through the inclusion of simple provisions in corporate charters and bond inden tures further we demonstrate that recent attempts to link liquidation costs to capital structure are without merit if the firm is to be liquidated on the basis of a rule other than one that maximizes the total value of all the claimants arbitrage profits arise and informal reorganization will discipline management to follow the liquidation rule that is optimal for existing securityholders also we find that the pure market solution is not readily generalizable to other classes of agency problems particularly the risk incentive problem how ever the alternative solution of the risk incentive problem through complex financing contracting may be useful in explaining complexities in contemporary financial contracts in a previous paper 1978 we employed arbitrage arguments to show that in a well functioning market bankruptcy costs are an insignificant determinant of a firm s capital structure we also pointed out that the decision to liquidate and its associated costs can be separated from the event of bankruptcy moreover any costs actually associated with the event of bankruptcy must be limited to the costs associated with an informal reorganization of the capital structure in the capital market prior to default these results were argued to hold under a com plex environment with multiple periods multiple securities and heterogeneous expectations we concluded that bankruptcy costs would be a significant deter minant of capital structure only in the face of irrationality on the part of market participants or unavoidable impediments to the arbitrage process since the publication of our paper there has been an accumulation of the

financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds the financial contracting in private placement bonds and publicly offered bonds are different our data show that private placement bonds are more likely to have restrictive covenants than public bonds private placement bonds are also more likely to be issued by smaller and riskier firms for investment grade firms that issue bonds in both markets our analysis shows that firms select the bond type to minimize financing costs we find significant differences in the pricing of private placement and publicly offered bonds and some of these differences appear to be related to the different institutional features between the two markets

the relative tax benefits of alternative call features in corporate debt this paper examines the differential tax treatment of the borrower and lender at the time debt is called as a potential explanation for the widespread existence of call provisions in corporate debt this tax effect alone cannot explain the standard call feature because greater tax benefits may be derived for bonds callable at market prices the equilibrium implications of the model allowing for tax arbitrage opportunities both at the corporate level and the individual level also are considered

the determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues we document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7 369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993 our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum this pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation but are screened out of the long term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution traditionally capital structure research has focused on how much of a firm s future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders instead of equityholders an equally important issue is when future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders a firm that finances its projects with short term debt risks serious financial difficulty if the debt cannot be extended similarly a firm that finances its activities with long term debt can sacrifice profits by needlessly risking mismanagement of resources after cash flows are returned from investments but before they are due to debtholders this study investigates the factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their liabilities we document the determinants of the maturity of 7 368 public debt issues made by u s corporations between 1982 and 1993 our empirical tests are based on existing theoretical models that relate the maturity of a firm s borrowings to the riskiness of its cash flows the time until investments pay off the quality of information held by outsiders the expected

debt financing under asymmetric information the authors analyze the optimal design of debt maturity coupon payments and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information they show that if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around long term cash flows firms finance with coupon bearing long term debt that partially restricts dividend payments if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near term cash flows and there exists considerable refinancing risk firms finance with coupon bearing long term debt that does not restrict dividend payments finally if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across dates firms finance with short term debt

the optimality of call provision terms there is substantial variation in fixed price call provision terms call price premium and call protection i investigate determinants of call price call protection and estimated call option value

callable bonds a risk reducing signalling mechanism a comment the existence of callable bonds has been somewhat of a puzzle the call feature provides firms with a valuable interest rate option but the value of this option should be exactly offset by the creditor s demand for a higher interest rate as compensation one explanation for the call provision from myers 4 bodie and taggart 3 and barnea haugen and senbet 2 is that callable bonds may be used to reduce some agency costs another explanation from robbins and schatzberg 5 is that callable bonds can signal a firm s better prospects in the presence of asymmetric information one possible problem with the agency cost and signalling explanations of callable bonds is that short term debt may serve the same functions in all four studies indeed short term debt is equivalent to long term debt in the theoretical sections of the agency cost studies however robbins and schatzberg hereafter rs suggest that short term debt fails to provide the risk sharing opportunities inherent in callable bonds thus they suggest that a signalling explanation provides a unique role for callable bonds one limitation of rs s results is that they are based on an example that makes a series of strong assumptions about a two stage lottery faced by good news and bad news firms in order for their model to have general applicability it would be desirable to demonstrate that their results hold under more general assumptions the results of this study suggest that their findings cannot be generalized without further assumptions callable bonds do not yield a separating equilibrium result when only a minor change is made in two of the lottery probabilities suggesting that their results are far from robust to minor changes in assumptions moreover callable bonds may fail to generate a separating equilibrium even for some good news firms that conform to rs s original model because bad news firms that do not meet their assumptions may attempt to mimic good news firms that do the risk sharing result is also very sensitive to the specific assumptions made by robbins and schatzberg specifically callable bonds increase the risk borne by management if one change is made in the numeric values of one of the lottery payouts the paper begins with a review of the relevant portions of robbins and schatzberg s model section ii provides a counterexample in which callable bonds fail to provide a separating equilibrium section iii provides a counterexample in which callable bonds fail to provide risk sharing debt and the paper concludes with a summary

callable bonds a risk reducing signalling mechanism a reply robbins and schatzberg 3 hereafter rs argued that callable bonds constitute a risk reducing signalling mechanism wall 6 hereafter wall responds that there exist examples quite similar to the one presented in rs for which short term debt proves to be a superior instrument in wall s first example short term debt can signal good prospects although callable bonds cannot a second example purports to show strictly superior risk reduction capabilities when either short term debt or callable bonds can signal wall contends therefore that the class of problems for which callable bonds serve as a risk reducing signalling mechanism lacks generality in this reply we restrict our notion of what it means for securities offering to be risk reducing at the same time that it signals in doing so we find that wall s first example is one from a broad class of problems for which it is impossible both to reduce risk and to signal the fact that callable bonds are not optimal for this problem is thus quite consistent with the idea that callable bonds constitute a risk reducing signalling mechanism furthermore we demonstrate that no power should be ascribed to wall s second example for it rests upon failure to note a subtle point in rs short term debt is strictly superior in the second example only if we do not allow the firm to overcapitalize its investment project if as in rs we do allow securities offerings that raise excess capital the excess to be placed in a riskless investment opportunity we can obtain a callable bonds contract that equals the performance of short term debt if we introduce new corporate strategic behavior that seeks additional enhancement of the corporate manager s decision making namely selling off risky projects once information about prospects becomes symmetric callable bonds prove strictly superior before providing these results we begin by demonstrating that wall s assertions are automatically questionable because short term debt is equivalent to a degenerate subclass of callable bonds

an equilibrium analysis of debt financing under costly tax arbitrage and agency problems in his recent paper merton miller 12 extends the notion of tax induced differential returns on securities into a general equilibrium framework in which firms make adjustments in the supply of corporate debt in an environment of progressive personal taxation the interest rates on taxable corporate bonds are greater than rates on tax exempt securities so as to compensate investors for the associated tax burden on the supply side value maximizing firms have an incentive to issue additional debt so long as the personal tax induced compensation is less than the tax savings from interest payment deductions at the corporate level miller argues that in the final equilibrium the interest rate differential between taxable and tax exempt bonds exactly reflects the tax advantage of debt financing at the corporate level thus the tax subsidy disappears in its entirety and we are back to an environment in which corporate leverage is inconsequential to the value of any particular firm what emerges in equilibrium is merely an optimal debt equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole 1 miller derives this invariance proposition under the following assumptions 1 progressive personal tax rates reach a maximum at a level beyond the corporate tax rate 2 no tax arbitrage by individuals and firms is allowed 3 there is a personal tax rate differential in favor of income from stocks and 4 the opportunity for riskless borrowing and lending exists 2 indeed miller s equilibrium analysis is based on a zero effective personal tax rate on income from stocks but

on the relevance of debt maturity structure in this paper we present a tax induced framework to analyze debt maturity problems we show that under some modifications of the existing u s tax code debt maturity is irrelevant even in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs that yield an optimal capital structure if this restrictive structure is relaxed and assuming the miller 15 equilibrium does not prevail tax reasons would usually imply the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure if there exists a gain from leverage then an increasing term structure of interest rates adjusted for default risk results in long term debt being optimal a decreasing term structure under similar circumstances renders short term debt optimal in the absence of agency costs a miller 15 type result emerges at equilibrium and irrelevance prevails we also argue that agency costs could again reverse the irrelevance and imply a firm specific optimal debt maturity structure there has been extensive discussion in the literature concerning the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure kraus 13 states without proof that efficient capital markets preclude the existence of an optimal debt maturity stiglitz 20 demonstrates the irrelevance of debt maturity but in an economic environment in which the entire financing decision is irrelevant due to the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs in contrast morris 16 argues that the issuance of short term debt can reduce the risk to stockholders and thereby increase equity value if the covariance between the net operating income and future interest rates is positive this result by morris is obtained even in the absence of taxes and when there is no probability of default the discrepancy between morris and stiglitz arises because morris uses the bogue and roll 31 multiperiod capital asset pricing model to incorporate uncertain future interest rates which implicitly assumes that investors cannot diversify away intertem

corporate behavior in adjusting to capital structure and dividend targets an econometric study this study of financing decisions by u s corporations examines the issuance of long term debt issuance of short term debt maintenance of corporate liquidity issuance of new equity and payment of dividends given costs and imperfections inherent in markets a firm s financial behavior is characterized as partial adjustment to long run financial targets individual firm data are used so that speeds of adjustment are allowed to vary by company and over time the results suggest that financial decisions are interdependent and that firm size interest rate conditions and stock price levels affect speeds of adjustment this study of financing decisions by u s corporations examines the issuance of long term debt short term debt and equity the maintenance of corporate liquidity and the payment of dividends the firm s financial behavior is characterized as partial adjustment to long run financial targets and individual firm data 1966 1978 are used to estimate firm specific time varying speeds of adjustment the results suggest that financial decisions are interdependent and that firm size interest rate conditions and stock price levels affect speeds of adjustment also the estimated coefficients are more plausible than the very small taggart 28 or very large spies 26 values found in earlier studies section i of the paper introduces the general model in section ii a tractable empirical model is developed section iii presents the data to be used in the study and discusses econometric issues in section iv results and conclusions are offered

determinants of small firm debt ratios an analysis of retail panel data in this paper the relevance of some debt ratio determinants from the recent theory of finance is empirically investigated in a small business sector the data used in this study consist of average financial data of 27 shoptypes in 20 different years covering a period of 24 years the panel character of the data facilitates the use of analytical techniques aimed at reducing or avoiding the biasing effect of omitted variables on the outcomes the main conclusion is that the theoretical determinants appear indeed to be relevant for the small business sector investigated here but the influences encountered in the analyses are far less straightforward than the hypothesized effects in the theory influences on total debt are frequently found to be the net effects of opposite influences on long and short term debt and some variables show large time and industry specific effects further distinct patterns in the time specific effects were found

debt maturity and asymmetric information evidence from default risk changes asymmetric information models suggest that a borrower s choice of debt maturity depends on its private information about its default probabilities that is borrowers with favorable information prefer short term debt while those with unfavorable information prefer long term debt we test this implication by tracing the evolution of debt issuers default risk following debt issuances we find that short term debt issuance leads to a decline inborrowers asset volatility and an increase in their distance to default the opposite is true for long term debt issues the results suggest that borrowers private information about their default risk is an important determinant of their debt maturity choices

the call sinking fund and term to maturity features of corporate bonds an empirical investigation do bond issuing firms attempt to choose the call sinking fund and term to maturity features of bonds to improve shareholder wealth this paper develops and tests two hypotheses about the determinants of bond features using a conditional logistic model the model is estimated on a sample of bonds issued between 1982 and 1986 model estimates show that a bond s call sinking fund and term to maturity features are statistically related to the issuing firm s retention ratio ratio of convertible to long term debt two year change in net operating income and whether the firm is listed on the nyse and included in the s p400 these findings support the view that firms financing highquality projects but facing information asymmetries choose shorter term medium term callable bonds with and without the sinking fund feature

the third oil price surge what s different this time the period from 2003 to 2008 was marked by an oil price increase comparable to the two oil price crises in the 1970s this paper looks in detail at the situation of the oil price crises 30 years ago and compares them along various aspects on the demand and supply side with the recent price increase to identify similarities and differences while both oil price crises in 1973 and 1979 1980 were ultimately caused by supply actions of members of the organisation of petroleum exporting countries opec all three oil price crises were preceded by high demand growth other aspects that favoured a high oil price in all three cases were low investments in new oil fields as a consequence low spare capacity and a weak us dollar in addition the recent oil price surge has been characterised by a high global refinery utilisation and refineries that did not adapt fast enough to the rising demand for lighter oil products moreover broader geopolitical uncertainties combined with risks associated with the oil trade helped push the oil price into a triple digit zone speculation played only a limited and temporary role in accelerating price movements during the recent price increase

flattening of bond yield curves for long maturities the paper presents a theoretical proof that flattening of yield curves for par bonds is inevitable for long maturities this proof implies that behavioral explanations of flattening are unnecessary the proof also implies that the use of yields to maturity of couponbearing bonds to estimate the true term structure as well as forward rates for long maturities has potentially infinite bias suggesting that a greater effort should be made to directly estimate the true term structure in empirical work empirically observed bond yield to maturity curves have consistently been found to become flat for long maturities as evidenced by the empirical work of durand 6 7 8 malkiel 15 and the treasury bulletin 25 a concise summary of this evidence is contained in malkiel 15 he presents three dimensional graphs of corporate bond yield curves from 1900 to 1965 15 pp 8 9 and two dimensional graphs of yield curves for u s government securities for the period 1953 66 15 p 13 both of these show that flattening of yield curves occurs consistently for long maturities more recent u s government bond yield curves in the treasury bulletin exhibit a similar flatness for long maturities malkiel 15 considered flattening of yield curves for long maturities to be an important desiderata that a theory of the term structure must fulfil he said that a term structure theory must account for the pervasive tendency of the yield curve to level out as term to maturity increases and to develop what is called a shoulder irrespective of the general shape in the early maturities slopes with large absolute values occur only in the early maturities 15 p 16 malkiel has suggested that the shape of yield curves depends on the sensitivity of bond price to changes in interest rates according to malkiel s viewpoint if long term bonds of different maturities have essentially the same price sensitivity to interest rate changes yield curves would tend to be flat for long maturities in another viewpoint lutz 14 has said that the flattening of yield curves is the result of constant long term forward rates for long maturities this view would be justified if investors would use the same forecasted rate as the best predictor of all distant rates because of the uncertainties attached to expectations of future rates in different but distant future periods the major innovative result of our paper is a formal proof that flattening of yield curves for par bonds is inevitable for long maturities the power of this proof is that no assumptions are required about forward rates zero coupon

reducing dependence on oil how policy entrepreneurs utilize the national security agenda to recruit government support the case of electric transportation in israel policy entrepreneurs are individuals who exploit an opportunity in order to influence political results for their own benefit we use the policy entrepreneurship literature as a theoretical lens for understanding how local players in the policy arena can use a national security agenda in order to promote an energy policy they desire using a case study approach we explain how an israeli electric vehicle company better place identified israel s acute national security priority to cut its dependence on oil and leveraged it along with environmental arguments to make the case for their approach to transportation our analysis also demonstrates how policy entrepreneurs collaborate with israeli bureaucrats senior politicians and lobbying groups to create a national shift toward electric cars

similarities and differences in small and large corporation beliefs about capital structure policy theoretical researchers posit many factors that affect a firm s capital structure decisions theory also suggests that these influences will have different impacts on small and large firms however empiricists face difficulties in testing these hypotheses due to problems of quantifying the motivations expectations and preferences prevalent in the various theories

callable bonds a risk reducing signalling mechanism the theory of financial economics has failed to distinguish advantages of callable bonds from those of short term debt this paper shows that either type of borrowing can signal a firm s better prospects but that short term debt does so at the cost of weakened risk sharing with capital markets by issuing either equity or long term non callable debt a firm with poor investment opportunities will not pool its prospects with those of a better firm but equity produces superior risk sharing perhaps this explains the almr ost complete absence of long term non callable bonds from observed corporate capital structures financial theory has found only moderate success in explaining the routine inclusion of call provisions among the covenants of corporate bonds in the absence of market imperfections or incompleteness the incremental compensation promised to bondholders should exactly offset the value of the call provision retained by equityholders indifference should obtain 1 nevertheless it is hard to accept indifference as an explanation given the near universality of call provisions in corporate bond contracts in this paper we argue that in the presence of asymmetric information about investment quality corporate managers can signal their firm s better prospects by issuing bonds that include call provisions our major result shows that this signalling mechanism can be more attractive to risk averse managers than would be the choice of short term debt which could also serve to signal furthermore we demonstrate that non callable corporate debt is a dominated security that is both it and equity signal bad news but equity provides risk sharing this finding helps to explain the relative absence of long term non callable debt from corporate financial markets previous attempts to explain the prevalence of call provisions in corporate bond contracts fall into four categories two categories involve pure wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders in these constant sum environments a gain to one group constitutes a loss to the other in the first category managers possess private information with regard to future interest rate movements issuing callable bonds will capture gains for stockholders when anticipated drops

government support for economic agendas in developing countries a behavioral model abstract a behavioral model of the roles played by the key actors in the political system of a developing country is developed and experimented with to understand circular cause and effect relationships shaping government commitment to economic development agendas the model shows that an authoritarian government whether compassionate or otherwise will be unable to provide continued support for an economic agenda since its need to increase control will eventually take priority over the need to increase public welfare