cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

technological leadership and persistence of monopoly under endogenous entry static versus dynamic analysis abstract we build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm leader invests in an innovation process facing the subsequent entry of other firms followers we identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the initial oligopoly situation to undertake pre emptive r d investment strategic predation eventually resulting in the elimination of all followers compared to a static model the dynamic one provides new insights into the leader s intertemporal investment choice its optimal decision making and the dynamics of the market structure over time we also contrast the leader s investment decisions with those of the social planner

from mind to market a global dynamic analysis of r d existing models of rd the path to the saddle point steady state is never globally optimal we also sketch some tentative policy implications of our analysis

horizontal mergers with free entry abstract we consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit in contrast to much of the previous literature on mergers our model yields predictions that seem intuitively reasonable with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number of industry participants are beneficial even under quantity competition there is no free rider problem in that insiders always benefit more than outsiders and quantity setting and price setting games yield similar predictions about profitability we also derive two welfare results that hold under quantity competition with homogeneous goods if the initial no merger equilibrium is symmetric then with free entry 1 a horizontal merger has no impact on the equilibrium price and 2 all privately beneficial mergers are socially beneficial

a ranked voting system using a dea ar exclusion model a note abstract this paper addresses ranked voting systems to determine an ordering of candidates in terms of the aggregate vote by rank for each candidate it is shown that specifying nothing arbitrary we can obtain a total ordering of candidates by using a dea ar data envelopment analysis assurance region exclusion model explaining the evaluation criterion used to rank candidates it is concluded that we may consider the system proposed at least as an alternative to determine an ordering of candidates

the unilateral incentives for technology transfers predation and deterrence by proxy abstract joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage we find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to deter entry or force exit we determine that with free entry such transfers are profitable and further it may be optimal to predate or deter every firm possible so that a market with many firms can become a duopoly while consumers are harmed by such action production efficiency normally increases sufficiently so that welfare increases

intellectual property rights violations and spillovers in north south trade abstract the article examines the role of technological spillovers when northern and southern firms compete in quantities on the common world market and when only the northern firm is supposed to conduct innovative activity the intensity of spillovers is interpreted as an indicator of the strength of intellectual property rights ipr protection in this light the paper reconsiders the questions raised in the recent economic analysis of ipr protection in north south relations when and whether the southern countries benefit in welfare terms from protecting ipr how the north fares in this story how large is the conflict between the north and south and what is the optimal level of ipr protection at the world level the paper shows that the common belief that the south generally benefits from relaxing ipr protection while the north is worse off does not carry over in the applied duopoly model with spillovers in this respect the congruence of interests between north and south with respect to southern ipr protection regime should not be an exceptional or even impossible state of affairs

state infrastructure and productive performance recent research on productivity growth has focused on public infrastructure and its impact on economic growth and productivity the authors construct a model of firms technology and behavior taking advantage of the analytical framework provided in the cost function based applied production theory literature and apply it to state level data for u s manufacturing they find that infrastructure investment provides a significant return to manufacturing firms and augments productivity growth the net benefits of infrastructure investment may or may not be positive depending upon the social costs of infrastructure investment and the relative growth rates of output and infrastructure copyright 1996 by american economic association

productivity enhancing public investment and benefit taxation the case of factor augmenting public inputs government expenditure on public inputs such as human capital formation and public infrastructure can significantly affect productivity an interesting and highly relevant policy question is whether such expenditure should be financed according to the benefit taxation principle focusing on factor augmenting public inputs in this paper we derive the specification of the appropriate set of benefit taxes rather than fall on industries according to the degree to which the public input increases their productivities these taxes must take the form of differential taxes on factor incomes jel classification h21 h54 les investissements publics accroissant la productivite et l imposition des avantages le cas des intrants publics qui augmentent la productivite des facteurs de production les depenses gouvernementales en intrants publics comme la formation de capital humain ou les infrastructures publiques peuvent affecter de maniere significative la productivite une question interessante et pertinente de politique publique est de savoir si des telles depenses devraient etre financees a l aide d un impot sur les avantages ainsi derives mettant l accent sur les intrants publics qui augmentent la productivite des facteurs ce memoire definit la specification des impots appropries sur les avantages tires de l investissement public plutot que de retomber sur les industries selon le degre d accroissement de productivite qui s ensuit ces impots doivent prendre la forme de taxes differentielles sur les revenus des divers facteurs de production

an alternative approach to monetary aggregation in dea this paper proposes a set of alternative dea based money indices that are proved to be both theoretically and empirically competing monetary aggregates since they perform as good as the divisia aggregates based on all the results concerning causality forecasting and money demand we conclude that dea money aggregates prove to be at least competing alternatives to the divisia aggregates and hence suggest that these new aggregates may be considered along with the existing weighted monetary aggregates like the divisia ones given the inherent benefit of the doubt weighting mechanism underlying the dea models where the optimal weight assigned by dea to each monetary asset reflects the ongoing financial innovation and the reserve bank of india s policy priority in the distribution of total liquidity we feel that the dea money indices can truly capture the liquidity better with ongoing financial innovations in the economy

prioritization models for frontier decision making units in dea abstract data envelopment analysis dea has received significant attention in recent years as a tool for measuring the relative efficiency of each member of a set of decision making units dmus typically a relatively large proportion of the dmus will be credited with an efficiency score of 1 with no clear means of discriminating among such units in a number of applications however it may be necessary to select a winning dmu from this set of frontier units this paper examines various conditions that are imposed on the multipliers in a dea analysis in each case an approach is suggested for breaking ties on the frontier

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

endogenous market structures and innovation by leaders an empirical test models of competition for the market with endogenous market structures show that contrary to the arrow view an endogenous entry threat induces the average firm to invest less in r d and the incumbent leader to invest more we test these predictions using a unique dataset for the german manufacturing sector the mannheim innovation panel in line with our predictions endogenous entry threats as perceived by the firms in survey data reduce r d intensity for an average firm but they increase it for an incumbent leader these results hold after a number of robustness tests with instrumental variable regressions

when do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods abstract it is often argued that the optimal level of public good provision is below the first best level as long as the government s expenditures have to be financed by distortionary taxes i examine this hypothesis and show that it is correct in a representative consumer economy if i the public good is normal and ii private commodities are normal and gross substitutes otherwise counterexamples can be constructed these results hold also with heterogeneous households provided that equity considerations are ignored in general however distributional objectives may lead to a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best

endogenous market structures and the business cycle we propose a flexible prices model where endogenous market structures and search and matching frictions in the labor market interact endogenously the interplay between firms endogenous entry strategic interactions among producers and labor market frictions represents a strong amplification channel of technology shocks on labor market variables and helps addressing the unemployment volatility puzzle consistently with u s evidence new firms create a large fraction of new jobs and grow faster than more mature firms net firms entry is procyclical and the price mark up is countercyclical

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

firm expansion size spillovers and market dominance in retail chain dynamics we develop and estimate a dynamic game of strategic firm expansion and contraction decisions to study the role of firm size in future profitability and market dominance modeling firm size is important because retail chain dynamics are more richly driven by expansion and contraction than de novo entry or permanent exit additionally anticipated size spillovers may influence the strategies of forward looking firms making it difficult to analyze the effects of size without explicitly accounting for these in the expectations and hence decisions of firms expansion may also be profitable for some firms while detrimental for others thus we explicitly model and allow for heterogeneity in the dynamic link between firm size and profits as well as potential for persistent brand effects through firm specific unobservable factors as a methodological contribution we surmount the hurdle of estimating the model by extending a two step procedure that circumvents solving the game the first stage combines semipar

simpler is better predicting consumer vehicle purchases in the short run abstract when agencies such as the us environmental protection agency epa establish future greenhouse gas emissions standards for new vehicles forecasting future vehicle purchases due to changes in fuel economy and prices provides insight into regulatory impacts we compare predictions from a nested logit model independently developed for us epa to a simple model where past market share predicts future market share using data from model years 2008 2010 and 2016 the simple model outperforms the nested logit model for all goodness of prediction measures for both prediction years including changes in vehicle price and fuel economy increases bias in forecasted market shares this bias suggests price increases are correlated with unobserved increases in vehicle quality changes in preferences or brand specific changes in market size but not cost pass through for 2010 past shares predict better than a nested logit model despite a major shock the economic disruption caused by the great recession observed share changes during this turbulent period may offer upper bounds for policy changes in other contexts the largest observed change in market share across the two horizons is 6 6 for manufacturers in 2016 and 3 4 for an individual vehicle in 2010

endogenous market structures and contract theory delegation principal agent contracts screening franchising and tying abstract i study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous they concern 1 contracts of managerial delegation to non profit maximizers 2 incentive principal agent contracts in the presence of moral hazard on cost reducing activities 3 screening contracts in case of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers 4 vertical contracts of franchising in case of hold up problems and 5 tying contracts by monopolists competing also in secondary markets firms use always these contracts to strengthen price competition and manage to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry

partnership dissolution with interdependent values we study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed in contrast with the case of private values cramton gibbons and klemperer 1987 in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal there exists a wide class of situations in which full efficiency cannot be reached in these cases i the subsidy required to restore the first best is minimal when the entire ownership is allocated initially to one of the parties and ii ruling out external subsidies the second best welfare is maximized when one of the parties initially has full ownership

a data envelopment model for aggregating preference rankings this paper presents a general model for aggregating votes from a preferential ballot the thrust of the model is to accord each candidate a fair assessment in terms of his overall standing vis a vis first place second place kth place votes the form of the model is a combined index j 1kwjvij where vij is the number of the jth place votes received by the ith candidate the weights wj are assumed to form a monotonically decreasing sequence with wj wj 1 dj e these constraints correspond to the assurance region ar side constraints in the dea framework the properties of the model are examined in terms of this discrimination intensity function d and in the special case that dj e e our model is shown to be equivalent to the consensus models of borda and kendall

market share dynamics and the persistence of leadership debate this paper introduces a novel analysis of the classic persistence of leadership question and applies it to a newly constructed dataset for japanese manufacturing the analysis rests on an appeal to an empirical scaling relationship between current market share and the variance of changes in market share this relationship provides a powerful model selection criterion for candidate models of market share dynamics it also makes it feasible even in small datasets to test directly for the properties of the first passage times corresponding to loss of leadership

the persistence of market leadership evidence from japan this article explores the persistence of market leadership in japanese manufacturing industries over the period 1975 2004 by applying survival data techniques we examine how long market leadership persists and how the duration of market leadership varies according to industry specific characteristics our findings indicate that market leaders maintain their leadership positions for on average 20 years from 1975 in japanese manufacturing industries we provide evidence that market leadership tends to persist in capital intensive and legally cartelized industries whereas it is less likely to persist in demand volatile r d intensive and import intensive industries copyright 2009 the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

public investment optimal provision of hicksian public inputs a considerable portion of government spending is devoted to commodities that are not public goods but that directly affect production possibilities examples include public infrastructure like roads and dams educational facilities and research projects in basic science and some forms of information such commodities are public inputs in a small open economy context the focus of this paper is on those that are hicksian in nature an interesting decomposition of the beneficial impact of a hicksian public input is developed then first best and second best optimality conditions for public inputs that are comparable to those for collective consumption goods are derived

distortionary taxation and optimal public spending on productive activities mutsumi matsumoto using a general equilibrium model with endogenous factor supplies this article investigates the provision of factor augmenting public inputs such inputs are intermediate goods that affect production functions in a collective manner and give rise to increasing returns unlike with collective consumption goods deviation from the first best condition for a public input is inappropriate if taxes are set optimally when taxes are not optimal a second best rule must include a feedback effect on revenue as well as the deadweight cost of taxes implications for benefit cost analysis and for interpretation of estimates of the social returns to public capital are explored jel h21 h54 o4 i introduction government spending on public infrastructure and on human capital formation are often cited as important contributing forces to economic growth with reference to less developed economies isham and kaufmann 1999 show that the returns from public infrastructure investments are very high where the overall policy regime is basically sound turning to human capital psacharopolous and woodhall 1985 point out the sizable excess of social over private returns from education temple 1999 indicates that the importance of these public investments and others like them for example research and development is not limited to less developed countries appropriate levels are important across all economies the key characteristic of these sorts of commodities is that they exhibit positive externalities across productive entities in short they may be categorized as public intermediate goods or public inputs although such commodities are beneficial they are also costly spending on them takes a large portion of p ublic budgets moreover government financing of these costs typically involves the use of distortionary taxes those taxes create excess burden the magnitudes of which may be substantial for instance in an influential contribution browning 1987 21 suggests the marginal excess burden of taxes on labor income ranges from 31 8 to 46 9 the crux of this article is the relevance of distortionary taxes to decisions about public input expenditure bruce 1998 457 and musgrave et al 1987 288 89 suggest the incorporation of the deadweight cost of taxation as a cost when evaluating public projects boardman et al 1996 62 64 in their authoritative benefit cost text recommend the inclusion of deadweight loss in the assessment of net benefits of tax funded public projects these recommendations are intuitively appealing they are also consistent with the second best expenditure condition for spending on public consumption goods atkinson and stern 1974 show that marginal cost of a public consumption good must include the excess burden of the tax system indeed some of the most important recent empirical work on the returns from public capital have assessed those returns after netting out the deadweight loss of the tax system see morrison and schwartz 1996 and nadiri and mamuneas 1994 this article investigates the theoretical basis for deviating from the first best rule for public input provision when taxes are distortionary 1 one finding is that despite the deadweight losses a second best rule for public inputs should not be followed when taxes are set optimally the first best condition remains appropriate in effect the production efficiency theorem of diamond and mirrlees 1971 extends to a public input economy however and importantly for actual policy when taxes are not optimal then not only the excess burden but the impact of the public input on the government s budgetary position must be taken into account these qualifications need to be incorporated into empirical studies and benefit cost analysis ii the model the analysis makes use of a general equilibrium model of a competitive economy in which factor supplies are variable and there is a public input

how many firms should be leaders beneficial concentration revisited we investigate how the number of stackelberg leaders and followers aects economic welfare first we discuss the model with m leaders and n m followers compete in a homogeneous good market daughety 1990 nds that under constant marginal costs the stackelberg model m2 0 n yield a higher welfare than the cournot model m 0 or

a dynamic game of r and d patent protection and competitive behavior a theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to r and d in an n firm industry is developed using differential games this technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem static game theory and optimal control the use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the nash equilibrium in investment rules this paper addresses the problem of resource allocation to research and development among the important issues that a firm engaging in r and d must evaluate are uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation the possibility of a protracted development period the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market in what follows we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of r and d enumerated above we will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis determining the nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms the availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed the impact of increasing rivalry on nash equilibrium investment in r and d depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards if patent protection is perfect then increasing the number of nash rivals results in increased r and d effort however when imitation is rewarded the opposite may be true finally some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below