budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

districting and government overspending theories of government spending driven by a common pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government this paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the united states the main finding is that when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity the results also show that at large electoral systems do not and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do break this relationship

an empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction the case of business income taxes in canada both federal and provincial governments in canada levy corporate taxes on busi nesses in their jurisdictions which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax exter nalities within the federation using a simple model of interdependent tax choices we estimate tax setting functions for the federal government ontario quebec and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces we find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax inter actions provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces

heterogeneous vertical tax externalities and macroeconomic effects of federal tax changes the role of fiscal advantage abstract how do state tax rates respond to federal tax shocks this paper presents a novel mechanism of heterogeneous vertical tax externalities across state levels of fiscal advantage showing that tax increases can be expansionary even without their reinvestment states rich in natural resources have a fiscal advantage in the inter state competition over production factors which allows them to respond better to increases in federal taxes and consequently attract capital from other parts of the nation we add heterogeneity in fiscal advantage levels to an otherwise standard model of vertical tax externalities and horizontal tax competition the model shows that irrespective of federal redistribution the contractionary effect of a federal tax increase can be overturned in fiscally advantaged states through an increase in their tax base using the case of the u s and narrative based measures of federal tax shocks a la romer and romer 2010 we provide empirical evidence for the various aspects of this mechanism specifically our baseline estimates indicate that controlling for federal transfers a 1 increase in the gdp share of capital related federal taxes at the beginning of a year increases the growth rate of the per capita tax base by approximately 0 7 in high fiscal advantage states at the end of it

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

money and the dispersion of relative prices a price dispersion equation is tested with data from the german hyperinflation the equation is derived from a version of lucas s and barro s partial information localized market models in this extension different excess demand elasticities across commodities imply a testable dispersion equation in which the explanatory variable is the magnitude of the unperceived money growth in order to test this hypothesis a price dispersion series is constructed and a measure of the unperceived part of money growth is estimated the model receives support from the empirical analysis although it is evident that unincluded variables have important effects on price dispersion

parametric efficiency tests economies of scale and input demand in u s electric power generation duality theory has been applied increasingly in recent years to study the structure of production a major advantage of using duality theory is that systems of input demand equations can be derived by simple differentiation facilitating the use of flexible functional forms also use of duality theory makes it possible to choose a representation of the technology which has desirable properties for estimation such as exogeneity of the regressors however the use of a dual representation of production structure is appropriate only if the corresponding maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior e g cost minimization or profit maximization is valid the perceived advantages of the dual approach to studying production structure have led to some applications in which the maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior is unlikely to be appropriate for example neoclassical cost functions have been used to study the characteristics of production in regulated industries despite an extensive theoretical literature indicating that a profit maximizing regulated firm would not minimize costs subject to market prices 2 in this paper we propose a generalized cost function that retains the principal advantages of the neoclassical cost function but does not require that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis in our model firms are assumed to base their production decisions on unobservable shadow prices which reflect the effects of regulation on the effective prices of inputs parametric tests for cost minimization are obtained by expressing shadow prices as functions of market prices the generalized cost function is estimated with data for regulated electric utilities the parametric restrictions corresponding to cost minimizing behavior subject to market prices are rejected implying that the use of a neoclassical cost function is not appropriate in this application 3

local intergovernmental competition and the law of 1 n this article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal law of 1 n and leviathan theories which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases and the costs of distributive politics which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases using a panel of u s state and local government spending data empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the leviathan model is partially offset by the law of 1 n this result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature

relative price changes and exchange rate determination with slow price adjustment an empirical analysis the general purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically sectoral price adjustment in the exchange rate adjustment process relative price changes may occur within a sector between countries and within a country between sectors our main objective is to test the hypothesis that both kinds of relative price changes occur in the adjustment process to disturbances in money demand and supply in particular we expect that the relative prices among goods of different tradedness ranging from perfectly traded to non traded goods are affected by such disturbances our second objective is to test empirically whether the nature of exchange rate adjustment is affected by the average speed of sectoral price adjustment towards the law of one price and whether the exchange rate overshoots purchasing power parity after monetary disturbances we build on a model developed by dornbusch 6 and extended by mussa 17 they argue that the exchange rate may overshoot its purchasing power parity level after monetary disturbances as a result of slow price adjustment in the market for domestically produced goods the price of imported goods follows the law of one price we modify the dornbusch mussa model to distinguish between domestically produced goods for which the law of one price may hold to different degrees relative price changes in the adjustment process to monetary disturbances have gained

the economic environment and public enterprise behaviour belgian railroads 1950 86 the purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of variations in the economic environment on allocatively inefficient behaviour by public enterprises and to measure the implications of both allocative and technical inefficiency for the firm s costs and factor use empirical results for the belgian railroad company suggest the importance of unemployment and the pressure experienced by managers to reduce the deficit as explanatory variables of allocative inefficiency the implications of inefficiencies for factor use are found to be substantial although the associated costs are quite small

the relationship between relative prices and the general price level it is very nearly a truismi amaong neoclassical economists that the public is wont to confuse changes in the general price level with relative price changes correspondingl y one might speak of the independence between the two as one of the central postulates of the neoclassical tradition william stanley jevons was aml ong the first to identify this basic dichotomin economic life as well as to attempt to explain the ordinary citizen s seenming incapacity to understand it

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

exchange rate dynamics an empirical investigation this paper estimates a reduced form exchange rate equation whose estimates are used to address questions on exchange rate overshooting intermediate run exchange rate dynamics and long run proportionality relationships between relative money supplies and exchange rates based on swiss u s data from the period 1973 79 the major findings are that following a monetary shock there is short run exchange rate overshooting by a factor of about two and that subsequent exchange rate adjustments to a new long run equilibrium take longer than 2 years and exhibit nonmonotonic patterns

testing efficiency hypotheses in joint production a parametric approach n recent years a great deal of research has been directed to the modelling and measurement of technical and allocative efficiency in production with few exceptions this research has been restricted to single product firms however recent developments in duality theory have facilitated the extension of this research to multi product firms the main purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the multiproduct firm in which the possibilities of both technical and allocative inefficiency are incorporated in an econometrically useful way the first model we develop includes a nonneutral2 type of technical inefficiency and three distinguishable types of allocative inefficiency output mix input mix and scale each type of inefficiency is costly to the firm in the sense that each causes a reduction in profit beneath the maximum value attainable under full efficiency the cost of each type of inefficiency depends on the magnitude of the inefficiency and the structure of the underlying production technology in the second model we develop technical inefficiency remains nonneutral but allocative inefficiency is not generally decomposable into output mix input mix and scale components however both technical and allocative inefficiency remain costly to the firm the cost of each type of inefficiency depending on its magnitude and the structure of the underlying production technology we model the technology of a competitive profit maximizing multi product firm with the dual profit function this enables us to use hotelling s lemma to generate a system of profit maximizing output supply and input demand equations these equations are then modified to allow for the possibility of technical and three types of allocative inefficiency a virtue of using the profit function to represent production technology is that it permits a straightforward comparison of maximum profit under full efficiency with actual profit and with the profit that would result from any combination of the four types of inefficiency this enables us to allocate the cost of inefficiency to each of four components our model of inefficiency is parametric and is embedded in a generalized leontief profit function although any flexible specification of the profit function can be used the model is developed in sections ii iv estimation of the model is considered in section v an empirical example designed to illustrate the workings of the model is discussed in section vi section vii concludes

public production and shadow pricing in a model of disequilibrium in labor and capital markets abstract this paper develops second best rules for public investment and employment in various regimes of disequilibrium on the capital and the labour markets the model used is very simple so as to imply rules which can easily be interpreted and contrasted with the current literature on the subject another issue considered is that of possible changes of regimes within a process of welfare improvement involving adjustments in the public production plan it is dealt with through a numerical example which points out that such changes can indeed occur

exchange rate dynamics sticky prices and the current account rational expectations exchange rate models have been of two principal types flexible price models and sticky price models the flexible price models may be further divided into those where current account based wealth effects are an important driving force in exchange rate dynamics and those where such effects are ignored 1 notably the literature includes few sticky price models incorporating current account based wealth effects 2 two reasons for the scarcity of such models are a the belief that current accountbased wealth effects are empirically unimportant for exchange rates and b that a model endogenizing exchange rate movements sticky price movements and current account based wealth effects is relatively difficult to analyze we note though that recent empirical work e g meese and rogoff 1983 has called into question the empirical importance of the standard determinants of exchange rates consequently the criterion of empirical relevance has not yet distinguished among models of exchange rates in connection with reason b note that a rational expectations sticky price exchange rate model where current account based wealth

real exchange rate effects of monetary shocks under fixed and flexible exchange rates abstract we analyze how the real exchange rate effects of monetary and real shocks depend on the exchange rate regime within a two country rational expectations model with confusion about money and real shocks the model demonstrates that the real exchange rate effect of unanticipated monetary shocks is negatively related to the variance of the domestically created money supply growth and that the effects of increasing domestic money variance on the real exchange rate are less under a fixed rate regime than under a flexible rate regime

inventories and sticky prices note in a recent contribution to this review alan blinder provides an interesting analysis of the relationship between optimal inventory decisions and the process of price adjustment arguing that inventory permits separation of production and sale decisions and allows the firm greater flexibility in responding to anticipated demand disturbances blinder shows that the responsiveness of relative prices depends critically upon the cost of storage and the temporal structure of the demand shocks few economists would fault the intuitive substance of blinder s basic proposition and the proposition is justified with characteristic precision the analysis however is considerably less general than blinder maintains the formal argument of his paper relies upon a simple model of a monopolist capable of backlogging orders and storing unsold goods as the model is constructed order backlogs assume a role of fundamental importance in any stationary equilibrium this feature of the model vitiates blinder s extension of his result to situations in which order backlogs are prohibited the basic monopoly model developed in sections i and ii of blinder s paper places no restriction upon the sign of inventory negative inventory is interpreted as net unfilled orders while no distinction is drawn between reductions in gross inventory and additions to the order backlog as a result the cost of holding inventory is symmetric around an arbitrary minimum point the only role of inventory is to permit the time paths of production and sales to differ gross inventory allows production to antedate sales while order backlogs generate revenue before production costs are borne under these circumstances if future costs and revenues are discounted it is natural to expect any stationary equilibrium level of net inventory to be negative this can be shown to be true of blinder s model it is useful to distinguish in general between the nonstochastic stationary level of inventory n and the stochastic stationary level n the former is realized when the current expected demand disturbance eo is zero and production equals sales the latter which differs from customary usage represents the level of inventory expected to prevail when adjustment to the current nonzero expected demand disturbance is complete if the demand disturbance is not a random walk so that p 1 in blinder s 5 the two equilibria coincide relatively little attention is devoted to either stationary solution because blinder s main interest is in the optimal current solution level n1 the stochastic stationary level is crucially important however since it represents the goal toward which the current choice must provide an optimal first step to verify that both nand n are negative whenever production is strictly positive note that blinder s necessary condition 7 with the coefficient cl set equal to zero together with the definition of xa as the deviation of the shadow value of inventory q from its nonstochastic stationary value q implies

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

piling on multilevel government and the fiscal common pool this article discusses the common pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area contrary to the traditional tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency i argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in overfishing from the shared tax base i test the model empirically using data from u s counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector substantively the overlap effect amounts to roughly 10 of local revenue

shadow prices for project evaluation under alternative macroeconomic specifications for purposes of social cost benefit analysis a project may be viewed as a disturbance to the economy displacing it from some initial equilibrium to a new one but the new configuration will depend on which particular variables adjust to restore equilibrium this paper examines the shadow prices for project evaluation under alternative assumptions about how equilibrium is restored when the government reacts by altering its foreign exchange reserves the shadow prices coincide with those advocated in the manuals on social cost benefit analysis however if the government adjusts its domestic expenditures or tariff rates the shadow prices will differ from those of the manuals except insofar as the relative shadow prices of tradeables remain their relative border prices the paper first presents the model followed by two cases in which domestic prices and wage rates do not vary because ad valorem tariffs are fixed and one case in which they are endogenous

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

the effects of lump sum subsidies on the structure of production and productivity in regulated industries abstract the theoretical model developed in this paper indicates that a lump sum subsidy granted to a monopolist facing a binding rate of return constraint will result in a higher level of capital employed and output produced furthermore production costs at any level of output will be higher compared to the pre subsidy situation the empirical results emanating from the application of the model to the bus transport sector indicate that lump sum subsidies have been factor biased and have led to higher costs as predicted by the model the average rate of productivity growth has been reduced by 0 60 percentage points per year as a direct result of the lump sum subsidy

vertical externalities in tax setting evidence from gasoline and cigarettes abstract a common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property consequently state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses we find that when the federal government increases taxes there is a significant positive response of state taxes for example a 10 cent per gallon increase in the federal tax rate on gasoline leads to a 3 2 cent increase in the state tax rate

a model of exchange rate dynamics this model treats the exchange rate as an asset price that depends on expectations concerning exogenous real and monetary factors that will affect relative prices and absolute price levels in future periods changes in exchange rates reflect both expected changes in these exogenous factors and changes in expectations occasioned by new information the model explains the random component in exchange rate behavior the source of divergences from purchasing power parity the anticipatory response of exchange rates to future expected disturbances and the causes of exchange rate overshooting

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

a simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate pac contributions the results presented in the previous section tend to confirm the hypothesis that committee assignments shape the pattern of corporate pac contributions this note corroborates existing research on corporate pacs at a significantly lower level of aggregation than the samples on which existing research has been conducted further because a nonparametric test was used rather than the more standard regressional analysis these results should increase our confidence that the essential institutions of government affect and engender responses by economic agents

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2