regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

battery electric vehicles looking behind to move forward abstract it is getting increasingly crucial for policymakers to acquire reliable price forecasts for battery electric vehicles bevs to make choices and set priorities here we examine the prospects for the wide deployment of bevs following an ex post analysis of their learning rate and an ex ante forecast of their price up to 2040 we make a clear distinction between the mainstream of bevs and a hypothetical group of bevs that are technically on a par with internal combustion vehicles icvs to do so we introduce a new index in which the driving range and max speed of a vehicle are coupled together i e the mobility diffusion coefficient we highlight different shares of battery packs i e 19 1 and the ensemble of electrification components e g battery pack electric motor power electronics i e electrification cost 52 2 in the price of a bev our price projections suggest that there is no prospect of breakeven between bevs and icvs before 2040 for both groups of bevs because the current learning rates of 9 2 and 15 1 for the price and electrification costs respectively of bevs strong and long term support from policymakers is required to ensure competitiveness of bevs with icvs in the near future

on the electrification of road transport learning rates and price forecasts for hybrid electric and battery electric vehicles abstract hybrid electric vehicles hevs and battery electric vehicles bevs are currently more expensive than conventional passenger cars but may become cheaper due to technological learning here we obtain insight into the prospects of future price decline by establishing ex post learning rates for hevs and ex ante price forecasts for hevs and bevs since 1997 hevs have shown a robust decline in their price and price differential at learning rates of 7 2 and 23 5 respectively by 2010 hevs were only 31 22 2010 kw 1 more expensive than conventional cars mass produced bevs are currently introduced into the market at prices of 479 171 2010 kw 1 which is 285 213 2010 kw 1 and 316 209 2010 kw 1 more expensive than hevs and conventional cars our forecast suggests that price breakeven with these vehicles may only be achieved by 2026 and 2032 when 50 and 80 million bevs respectively would have been produced worldwide we estimate that bevs may require until then global learning investments of 100 150 billion which is less than the global subsidies for fossil fuel consumption paid in 2009 these findings suggest that hevs including plug in hevs could become the dominant vehicle technology in the next two decades while bevs may require long term policy support

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

satisfaction guaranteed or money partially refunded efficient refunds under asymmetric information refunds are modelled as a competitive market response to asymmetric information firms have private information on their choice of product quality and compete by offering price and refund contracts consumers who care about quality draw inferences about the quality offered by the various firms from observed contracts conditions under which a revealing market equilibrium emerges are specified and the equilibrium quality and contract s characterized the model predicts that when product risk is not insurable consumers with higher incomes will pay higher prices for higher quality goods with higher refunds if the product fails

gratitude conscience and reciprocity models of supplier motivation when quality is non contractible abstract standard game theoretic models that apply principal agent problems to analyse buyer supplier relations have postulated that in a single period game the agent will not choose non contractible quality however evidence exists that suppliers or service providers choose costly quality in non contractible dimensions even in absence of reputation concern if they are offered a premium such actions violate the axiom of individual rationality and are not subgame perfect in standard game theory wherein only material payoffs are considered this paper builds three models of supplier behaviour in a single period stackelberg like buyer supplier game by using the framework of psychological game theory and explains supplier motivations to choose quality on non contractible dimensions in absence of any reputation effect if the buyer offers a price higher than the market price the supplier may be motivated to choose non contractible quality due to a sense of gratitude or because of his conscience or in order to reciprocate kindness the results show that maximum possible quality is chosen by the supplier only in the presence of a sufficiently strong sense of gratitude or a sufficiently strong conscience however the buyer is better off with a fair supplier who is motivated to reciprocate than a supplier having a very poor sense of gratitude or one having a weak conscience because the buyer can choose an optimal premium above market price to ensure that a fair and reciprocal supplier chooses an optimal quality

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

visits to the client when competing for new consulting contracts sourcing information or influencing the client consulting firms cfs sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts one frequently used strategy by cfs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders the reasons to the visits are 1 to influence the client in his decision making e g marketing bribing and or 2 to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted using a unique database on individual export proposals submitted to emerging markets which of these two reasons is the most important is examined empirically the estimations show that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits although it is not possible to determine whether this influence takes the form of bribing or marketing all conditions necessary for bribes to occur are fulfilled

inflation and savings international evidence on inflation induced income losses the fall in the average propensity to consume a p c in the i970s in most industrialised countries has been the subject of much debate it has been ascribed to a wide variety of causes most important it has been widely interpreted as a typical example of a situation in which economic forecasting has failed simply because it did not take into account the psychological effects of rapid changes in the economic environment given the inability of economists to predict sudden changes in consumer expectations these would naturally set severe limits to the usefulness of economic forecasting this paper takes a different approach to the problem it contends that the true fall in the a p c has been considerably lower than indicated by the statistics the argument runs roughly as follows the increase in the rate of inflation has led to a net transfer of real resources away from the personal sector this transfer was due to the fall in the real value of net monetary assets held by the personal sector and issued by the public and business sectors of the economy consumers considered this fall as negative income and adjusted their expenditure accordingly the definition of personal sector disposable income used in the national accounts statistics does not include such a correction in inflationary periods this leads to a large overestimate of true personal sector disposable income given this overestimate of the denominator it is hardly surprising that measured c y should fall when the rate of inflation rises the simplicity of this theory indicates that it can quite easily be subjected to empirical testing the tests proposed in this paper are based on a novel specification of the consumption function developed by davidson et al i978 henceforth dhsy this function has a solid theoretical foundation good statistical properties and allows both shortand long run phenomena to be easily incorporated in an acceptable manner simple theoretical considerations indicate roughly how one should go about measuring true income this corrected measure of income can be incorporated into the consumption function to be estimated in such a way that the coefficient of the correction term is endogenously determined in the regression the statistical properties of the resulting regressions are the evidence leading to a rejection or tentative acceptance of the theory

why corporations insure corporations insure to reduce the shirking information problem of joint production insurance encourages specialization in ownership increasing the returns to monitoring and lowering shareholders demand for a more diversified portfolio it enhances the credibility of specific capital as a performance bond and it lowers the cost to shareholders of compensating other members of the team for investing in firm specific assets tax and other factors may further encourage individual corporations to insure

is antitrust enforcement effective in a paper in this journal block nold and sidak 1981 tried to determine the impact of antitrust enforcement on horizontal price fixing after examining data on white bread markups in 20 u s cities they concluded that the enforcement activity of the department of justice against wholesale bakers had both remedial and deterrent effects in this paper i question the authors empirical results for three reasons they used bureau of labor statistics bls retail prices in computing bread markups however the white bread priced by the bureau changed quality over the sample period when a proxy for this quality change is included in the authors specification one deterrent effect disappears second the bread markups are sensitive to the pricing decisions made by grocery retailers when a proxy for retail pricing decisions is included in the model the deterrent effects are weaker finally the significance of the remedial effect depends on a single observation and this observation was affected by the two problems just stated

on the economic rationale for codetermination law abstract this paper develops a positive efficiency economic case for codetermination law resting on the correction of labor and capital market and organizational failures a legally mandated codetermination structure is shown to provide employee checks on several structural incentives for management opportunism codetermination is shown to offer advantages for technical efficiency skill development and knowledge generation through its protection of specific human capital investments financial markets cannot enforce codetermination due to a set of free rider problems

assessing the progress toward lower priced long range battery electric vehicles abstract the aim of this study is to show the progress in attributes and prices of battery electric vehicles bev and to analyse in which market segments long range bev can be produced at comparable cost to conventional cars we assess 48 models available to consumers since 1997 collecting data on attributes weight and vehicle prices we also provide an analysis of recent progress in battery pack costs based on this data the share of bev vehicle price that is related to the battery pack is modelled to illustrate future progress we estimate when it is possible to produce a bev with a 200 mile range in a given price percentile we find that the price percentile where the price of a bev is comparable to conventional cars changes in a nonlinear way when battery pack costs fall below 200 250 usd kwh furthermore we show that battery pack costs of 150 usd kwh could imply that production costs of a bev with a 200 mile range are cost competitive for almost 50 of the us car market segments by 2020 finally the most critical conditions for this development are discussed and assessed by sensitivity analysis applying conservative values to our model

two part pricing for experience goods in the presence of adverse selection abstract because customers learn something when they purchase an experience good for the first time a firm selling experience goods may face different demand curves from new and repeat customers the firm can exploit these differences by using a two part pricing strategy to price discriminate between new and repeat customers the firm may also use a two part pricing strategy to mitigate the information problems of adverse selection when its quality is uncertain the analysis is particularly applicable to service markets where customers and firms seek long term relationships and firms maintain customer records which facilitate price discrimination

physician price fixing under the sherman act an indirect test of the maricopa issues the expression price fixing usually indicates an attempt by competitors to put a floor under the minimum price they will charge but a recent decision of the supreme court arizona v maricopa county suggests that attempts to fix maximum prices are equally economically objectionable in this paper i propose an explanation of simultaneous minimum and maximum price fixing i also investigate empirically the distribution of physicians fees in a closely related instance of alleged physician price fixing the data reject any inference of successful price fixing and instead conform to the usual predictions of the economics of costly market information

limits to institutional reforms the essay draws on the theory of macro economic policy as it has evolved to discuss implicit policy determinism in the new economics of institutions the extension of rational choice methods to new levels of analysis such as micropolitics macropolitics political macroeconomics and microfoundations of cooperation has apparently reduced the policy choice set and diminished the role of experts all outcomes reflect constrained maximization by rational agents the essay argues however that scarcity of knowledge leads to incomplete and variable policy models and that competition among policy models creates a role for experts in social change

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

productivity change technical progress and relative efficiency change in the public accounting industry we present evidence on components of productivity change in the public accounting industry toward the end of the 20th century using revenue and human resource data from 64 of the 100 largest public accounting firms in the united states for the 1995 1999 period we analyze productivity change technical progress and relative efficiency change over time the average public accounting firm experienced a productivity growth of 9 5 between 1995 and 1999 we find support for the hypothesis that technical progress rather than an improvement in relative efficiency was the reason for this productivity growth firms that were early movers into management advisory services mas and those that emphasized growth in mas over growth in the traditional audit and tax services enjoyed significantly higher productivity growth than their peers these firms also contributed significantly more to the industry s technical progress

market failure government failure and the private supply of public goods the case of climate controlled walkway networks two opposing models of public goods undersupply are those of market failure and government failure empirical work on the relative explanatory power of these two frameworks has been limited by the scarcity of acceptable data the case of climate controlled walkways in major urban cores is a rare instance where such difficulties can be overcome we investigate the supply of ccws in 55 large city cores in north america we find that 1 ccw networks are well supplied by market forces when 2 such forces are not frustrated by government policy we also find evidence that 3 rules based regimes dominate discretion based regimes these results are consistent with the position that the government failure paradigm is a viable alternative to the traditional market failure paradigm

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

codetermination and the modern theory of the firm a property rights analysis during the postwar period state sponsored codetermination programs have become increasingly important and by now are firmly established in most countries of western europe conventional wisdom suggests that this growth of reform legislation is part of a broad social movement designed to advance industrial democracy and enlarge the power of labor to influence corporate policy certainly there is no doubt that significant institutional change has taken place but since reorganization has been motivated more by political considerations than by any fundamental rethinking of the theory of the firm questions still exist concerning the effects the new system may have on economic behavior there are in fact serious doubts about the efficiency of mandatory codetermination various writers have suggested that the type of codetermination legislation found in europe may force firms to adopt organizational structure that would not be selected voluntarily by wealthwhen workers finance firm specific investments they supply one part of the total capital stock needed by the firm for production it is arguable then that worker investors should be regarded as equity holders and be granted control and income rights in the enterprise this article seeks to explain the property rights structure that such a codetermined firm must possess to be efficient and to determine the conditions under which this organizational form is likely to emerge under a voluntary contracting process compared to a legally mandated codetermined firm of the european type the voluntary variant shows clear superiority specifically it tends to promote productivity enhancing incentives relatively lower transaction costs and a more rational allocation of risk special thanks go to armen alchian who has provided encouragement advice and key ideas concerning the nature of the firm the article was written during my residence at the center for the study of the new institutional economics university of the saarland west germany 1985 financial assistance was received from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft and is gratefully acknowledged

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

investing to cooperate theory and experiment we study theoretically and in a lab experiment investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent in our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents the investment stochastically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period we show that more volatile returns make investment more difficult in the absence of legal protection and might force the investor to invest more to guarantee cooperation experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings

competition and the incentive to produce high quality previous literature indicates that when quality is a choice variable firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers the strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered this paper finds that when firms compete for market share perfect equilibria in which firms produce high quality goods need not exist competition for customers can eliminate the price premium needed to induce firms to maintain a reputation for high quality production in this case economists and policy analysts should pay greater attention to the interaction among firms and the institutions such as professional associations that structure interfirm relations when considering whether firms have an incentive to produce high quality goods

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

the market value of rarity abstract most theories of demand assume that consumers value the characteristics of products but are unconcerned with how many other consumers also consume the product however several theories of demand argue that consumers can value the exclusivity of possessing a rare object we test this implication on a particular collectible rare coins our paper examines the case of coins of a given type and identical quality that have mintages in different quantities this allows us to exclude the common case in which rarity or price itself is an indicator of quality for our sample rarer coins command higher prices rarity in the form of original mintage more strongly influences the market price than does collectibility as represented by the rarest coins of each mint mark or year we also point out that here may be other goods such as automobiles for which rarity may influence market demand

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

imperfect competition and reputational commitment abstract competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality these are self sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment and on current costs of sustaining it competition can affect these three elements at different rates

marital division of labor with risk of divorce the role of voice enforcement of contracts it is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce implicit marital contracts by voice therefore in the present model divorce has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for such voice enforcement is weakened moreover perhaps surprisingly i find that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic

a constitutional interpretation of the firm when members of a firm make firm specific investments they will earn rents potential rent seeking on the part of the owner of the firm and other employees reduces the value of an employee s firm specific investment and as a result reduces the level of those investments in this context the firm can be thought of as a set of interdependent relationships where the actions of any one individual can affect the rents of all others the owner of the firm will desire to set up an institutional arrangement to protect the individual s property rights in specific investments as part of his effort to maximize profit establishing this institutional arrangement is similar to the establishment of a constitution by the state or other organization this constitution protects the property rights of the members of the firm and as a result encourages the creation of property that is the firm specific investments the constitution of a firm consists of a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its various members as well as mechanisms for enforcing and monitoring these contracts as a practical matter it is obvious that workers normally do not enjoy costless or near costless mobility and thus an ordinary at will employment contract may no longer be sufficient to induce workers to join a firm if in order to function productively within an enterprise individuals have to accumulate and pay for firm specific capital assets the simple neoclasical logic fails furubotn 1988 167

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

the consumption function in macroeconomic models a comparative study 1984 the consumption function in macroeconomic models a comparative study applied economics vol 16 no 6 pp 799 838

can private learn from public governance corporate governance is importantly based on agency theory and relies on extrinsic incentives to align the interests of managers employees and shareholders this article argues that in view of recent corporate scandals private governance can learn from public governance 1 goaloriented intrinsic motivation of agents should be supported by fixed incomes and an extensive selection process of employees 2 extrinsic but non monetary incentives e g conferring orders and titles can be used 3 the power of actors should be restricted by a clear division of power appropriate rules of succession and institutionalised competition for positions in firms

the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms our study investigates the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms we argue that in early relationships the level of expected cooperative norms in an exchange is the result of a calculative process facilitated by transaction attributes joint transaction specific investments and observability the greater the level of these two exchange attributes the greater the level of cooperative exchange norms all else being equal we further argue that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms can deviate from the expected level because the development of such norms is the result of social processes that management cannot directly and fully control this gap between realized and expected norms affects exchange performance performance suffers when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms falls below the expected level but overshooting expectations lays a critical groundwork for repeat transactions the analysis of a survey of 182 collaborative r d alliances provides initial support for our theory

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

an empirical examination of government expenditures and the ex ante crowding out effect for the british economy the conventional macroeconomic view that consumers make their consumption decisions without regard for goods provided by the government has been examined in the literature moreover the line of research that questions this conventional view argues that this separation does not have a firm theoretical backing if consumers take government expenditures into account when maximizing their utility functions then the effects of fiscal policy actions will tend to appear weaker than those suggested by most conventional analyses the examination of this issue should therefore have far reaching political as well as economic implications within the context of traditional fiscal policies this paper will empirically examine the ex antecrowding out effect of government expenditures upon private consumption expenditures for the british economy an aggregate consumption function is derived and estimated in the context of a simultaneous equations model based on intertemporal consumption theory the empirical results sho

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does it pay to change your company s name a stock market perspective a company s name is commonly considered to be an integral part of its image just like the quality of its products or the quality of its technical services changing a company s name is a major policy decision contemplated by many firms and actually implemented by some each year this paper attempts to examine albeit indirectly whether a name change can improve the profit performance of a firm and what type of firm is more likely to succeed in doing so we use the event study methodology developed in finance to examine the above questions with respect to 58 corporations that changed their names in 1981 1985 our findings are that for most of the firms name changes are associated with improved performance and that the greatest improvement tends to occur in firms that produce industrial goods and whose performance prior to the change was relatively poor evidence that industrial good producers are also heavy users of corporate advertising lends further credence to this finding our findings do not support however the contention that the new name per se will enhance demand for the firm s products rather it seems that the act of a name change serves as a signal that other measures to improve performance such as changes in product offerings and organizational changes will be seriously and successfully undertaken the rationale behind why such a signal is sent and why it is believed is discussed

the reputational penalties for environmental violations empirical evidence abstract this paper examines the sizes of the fines damage awards remediation costs and market value losses imposed on companies that violate environmental regulations firms that violate environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity the losses however are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed and in the cross section the market value loss is related to the size of the legal penalty thus environmental violations are disciplined largely through legal and regulatory penalties not through reputational penalties

product complementarities capabilities and governance a dynamic transaction cost perspective the organization and governance of the transactions that comprise a bundling arrangement depend on the distribution of capabilities among firms and the amount of time during which the window of opportunity for earning rents is expected to remain open firms engaged in inter firm collaboration must undertake support transactions related to billing marketing customer support and product repair these support transactions differ from the core transactions that have traditionally been perceived as sufficient to provide a product bundle since support transactions create costs of their own the market may turn out to be an expensive means of governing collaborative arrangements undertaken for bundling purposes the telecommunications service sector provides an illustration copyright 1997 by oxford university press

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

earning through learning in legislatures this inquiry applies gary becker s theoretical notions of general and specific training to the experiential learning that occurs within political institutions in particular the u s congress in the process we isolate economic facets of these legislative experiences that influence the rental value of human capital derived from congressional training we identify four factors that structure legislators post elective wages pre congressional salary year of entry tenure and variables closely related to general training in congress specifically assignment to powerful legislative committees acquisition of broad skill packages investment in expanding skill set proficiencies and to a lesser extent life cycle driven declines in such investments