pension portability and labor mobility evidence from the survey of income and program participation abstract the evidence presented in this paper casts doubt on the proposition that pension backloading is responsible for the low job mobility rates observed for pension covered workers it corroborates earlier findings by the authors based on different data that pension covered jobs offer higher levels of compensation than workers can obtain elsewhere and it is this compensation premium rather than non portability that accounts for lower turnover among pension covered workers this evidence is further bolstered by the finding that defined contribution plans which are not backloaded and defined benefit plans bear similar negative relations to mobility

proprietary public finance and economic welfare abstract we develop a positive theory of public finance in which the objective of tax and spending policy is to extract rents for the incumbent ruler the analysis shows how dependence of the incumbent ruler s survival probability on his tax and spending policy can lower the equilibrium tax rate and increase the equilibrium amount of spending on productive public services but only until the minimum credible tax rate which depends on the ruler s endogenous survival probability becomes a binding constraint the central result of the analysis is that if a relatively benevolent tax and spending policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability then the ruler s equilibrium policy is relatively benevolent

the privatization of electricity distribution in turkey a legal and economic analysis this paper analyzes the recent regulatory reform in the turkish electricity distribution market from a legal and economic perspective we highlight tensions between the judiciary politicians and bureaucracy and discuss their economic consequences the paper engages in a discussion of economic consequences of legal procedures we stress interactions between legal decisions and economic institutions the historical positions of the constitutional court and danistay council of state on privatizations have been ambivalent and it is hard to qualify them as an incentive for privatization and reform despite some recent liberal decisions we address reasons behind their decisions and offer some suggestions toward improving the privatization process

discriminatory dealing with downstream competitors evidence from the cellular industry one concern about regulated monopolies entering unregulated vertically related markets is that they will discriminate against competitors of their unregulated affiliates however prohibiting regulated monopolies from offering related goods may preclude production by the most efficient provider we take advantage of variation across geographic cellular phone markets in the us to examine the effect of integration on output quality and prices we find some evidence consistent with efficiencies greater concentration of lines to users is associated with greater output and higher quality and some consistent with discrimination greater interconnection facility ownership concentration is associated with lower output and quality

the frontier of telecommunications deregulation small countries leading the pack interconnection equal access unbundling and industry structure are four key determinants of facilities based competition in telecommunications using these building blocks this paper analyzes the differences in telecommunications regulatory regimes in australia chile guatemala and new zealand assessing the effect on competition and consumer welfare some regulation is necessary as incumbents can prolong their market power after demonopolization by exploiting positive externalities inherent to telecommunications networks the authors emphasize the superiority of market mechanisms over traditional regulatory processes to achieve efficient transactions among operators such market mechanisms need clear rules and credible enforcement

confidence building and politics in privatization some evidence from spain abstract this paper analyzes privatization on the stock market and has two main findings first sips underpricing is consistent with the confidence building hypothesis derived from political risk under asymmetric information larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization which is consistent with the hypothesis that governments use underpricing to be credible privatizators second evidence gives support to the hypothesis that explicit political motives influence the design of privatization which is affected by the political majority

pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries abstract we characterize the optimal access price and retail price for a vertically integrated incumbent supplier v that faces limited competition from a new entrant in the retail sector the optimal prices provide v with a relatively high wholesale profit margin and a relatively low retail profit margin consequently v has no incentive to raise the costs of its retail rival

changes in the distribution of housing wealth in great britain 1985 91 during which time sizeable real capital gains accrued to owner occupiers particularly those who were already owner occupiers at the start of this period the paper constructs housing wealth estimates disaggregated by household from the 1985 ghs and 1991 bhps wave 1 in order to explain the distributional consequences of the housing market experience the paper finds that there has been a modest increase in housing wealth inequality but one that is more pronounced for gross housing wealth compared with equity this growth has been offset by the growth in owner occupation and the benefits of the council house right to buy scheme

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

cable franchise renewals do incumbent firms behave opportunistically systematic empirical evidence has heretofore been lacking on the extent to which supplier opportunism at the time of contract renewal is a fundamental problem associated with franchise bidding schemes at least for the case of local cable television distribution this article suggests several theoretical reasons why bad behavior by an incumbent supplier may be the exception rather than the rule and a simple test for supplier opportunism at the time of franchise renewal the simple test is employed to empirically analyze the terms of trade in a cross sectional sample of recent cable franchise renewal contracts

job tenure and asset holdings the paper examines the impact of housing equity and occupational pension scheme membership on job tenure using job duration data from the 1985 general household survey appropriate hazard functions are constructed and estimated housing equity data is constructed from ghs with appropriate adjustment for selection on house movers housing equity has a negative impact on male job tenure which is more pronounced the longer the job lasts in contrast pension scheme membership raises average tenure in accordance with other studies but the results show variation according to pension scheme characteristics

contracting with qualified suppliers in an extension of the laffont tirole model a buyer fully qualifies a set of suppliers ex ante and awards production to the most efficient ex post the buyer s incomplete information about production costs biases ex ante market structure in favor of a greater number of qualified suppliers further extensions that allow product differentiation and learning by doing suggest explanations for split production awards and less than fully qualified suppliers it may be difficult to specify ex ante precisely how the assets will be employed in production grossman and hart 1986 once relationship specific assets are in place the characteristics of the transaction and the gains from trade will be determined by ex post contracting between the buyer and the seller a safeguard for the buyer is to contract with more than one potential supplier to invest in the relationship specific assets required for production then after production require ments become clear the buyer can structure a competition between these suppliers for the right to produce this article analyzes when a second sourcing policy is desirable and how the buyer should structure it asanuma s 1989 description of the two vendor policy of automobile manufac turers in japan provides a context for the analysis japanese automobile manufac turers contract out for various kinds of components for example headlamps brakes or steering columns the common practice is to purchase each component from a small and relatively stable group of qualified suppliers with the purposes of assuring supply and of creating competition moreover for a particular part for a particular model there is a tendency for an automobile manufacturer to purchase from a single supplier in the group for the life of the model my understanding from interviews and the trade press is that u s automobile manufacturers also sole source from a select group of qualified suppliers but with

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

the administrative foundations of self enforcing constitutions current theories of the rule of law argue that public officials respect rights if the citizens are coordinated on an equilibrium in which they collectively resist abuse constitutional rules are means to coordinate on this equilibrium in past and present states however constitutional rules often have no effect on the rule of law this paper suggests an alternative view of the origin and development of the rule of law instead of considering constitutional rules as coordination devices for citizens at large history suggests considering them as manifestations of equilibria with rulers constrained by administrators required to implement policy analysis of the administrative foundations of self enforcing constitutions may be the key to a theory and policy that would foster the rule of law in developing countries and those in transition in particular constitutional reforms might benefit from focusing on altering the equilibrium distribution of administrative capacity and power providing incentives to the administratively powerful to check predation by each other and the central authorities and to align administrators interests with social welfare

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

pricing regulation under bypass competition we analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long distance carriers we first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and has access to an additional technology bypass more efficient for large customers we then study how competition in bypass affects the optimal nonlinear pricing policy and the resulting allocation when transfers are allowed between the regulator and the network operator bypass competition benefits consumers at the expense of the taxpayer otherwise it benefits large consumers but hurts small ones

government clubs and constitutions abstract this paper analyzes constitutional effectiveness the degree to which constitutions can be enforced in the system of government vs the system of clubs i argue that clubs have residual claimants on revenues generated through constitutional compliance operate in a highly competitive environment and permit individuals to sort themselves according to their governance needs these features make their constitutional contracts self enforcing government lacks these features so its constitutional contract is not institutional augmentations that make government more club like such as federalism democracy and limited government scope improve government s constitutional effectiveness but constitutional effectiveness remains superior in the system of clubs

a structural dynamic analysis of job turnover and the costs associated with moving to another job this paper provides an empirical analysis of the labor market behavior of employed individuals using a structural on the job search model the costs associated with moving to another job are allowed to be nonzero and may depend on the wage level it is shown that under certain conditions the optimal strategy has the reservation wage property the model is estimated using data on job durations and subjective responses concerning the search strategy the results reveal some strong sources of inflexibility of the labor market copyright 1992 by royal economic society

designing a private industry government auctions with endogenous market structure abstract this paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure doupoly dual sourcing monopoly sole sourcing or government owned production are a function of the bids in designing the optimal mechanism the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus producer surplus and revenue under incomplete information doupoly is implemented less frequently and government production more frequently than under complete information when bidders are symmetric the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second price auction applications to privatization deregulation and defense procurement are discussed

state owned and privately owned firms an empirical analysis of profitability leverage and labor intensity for some it is an article of faith that governmentowned firms must be less efficient or at least less profitable than privately owned firms maxim boycko et al 1996 argue that politicians cause government owned firms to employ excess labor inputs anne o krueger 1990 suggests that such firms may be pressured to hire politically connected people rather than those best qualified to perform desired tasks more generally government owned firms are thought to forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political objectives such as wealth redistribution in addition the residual cash flow claims of these firms are not readily transferable like the shares of a private corporation this impairs residual claimant incentives to monitor managers and ultimately degrades firm performance as a consequence one expects government owned firms to be technically less efficient and therefore less profitable than private firms the implication is that in competitive markets without significant externalities private ownership is the superior organizational form the view that government firms are inherently less efficient than private ones however remains controversial among economists john vickers and george yarrow 1991 among others point out that agency problems arise in private firms as well as public ones in most large private corporations managers own little of the stock because monitoring managers is costly a divergence arises between their objectives and those of private shareholders private shareholders typically hold a small stake in any one firm and it may not pay any shareholder to bear the cost of monitoring management it follows from this discussion that whether government firms are more or less efficient than private firms is primarily an empirical issue to date the body of empirical evidence is mixed in this paper we report further empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of public and private enterprises we build on previous work by studying larger samples over longer time periods and by allowing for additional factors that influence firm performance in particular our analysis controls for time series variation in the general level of economic activity that may otherwise confound performance comparisons between government and private firms 2 we approach the issue in two different ways first using accounting numbers we conduct a large sample cross sectional comparison of government owned and privately owned corporations this comparison is similar in design to that of boardman and vining 1989 but our sample is three times the size of theirs and includes three

the new economics of regulation ten years after the new economics of regulation is an application of the principal agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms after a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed a survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules the auctioning of incentive contracts the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment and the hierarchical problems in regulation empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion

access pricing and competition abstract in many industries electricity telecommunications railways the network can be described as a natural monopoly a central issue is how to combine the necessary regulation of the network with the organization of competition in activities which use the network as an input and are potentially competitive generation of electricity value added services road transportation in this paper we derive access pricing formulas in the framework of an optimal regulation under incomplete information first we study how access pricing formulas take into account the fixed costs of the network and the incentive constraints of the natural monopoly over the network second we examine the difficulties coming from the accounting impossibility to disentangle costs of the network and costs of the monopoly s competitive goods third the analysis is extended to the cases where governmental transfers are prohibited where the competitors have market power and where competitors are not regulated fourth the possibility some consumers bypass the network is taken into account finally the role of access pricing for inducing the best market structure is assessed the conclusion summarizes our results and suggests avenues of further research

job duration seniority and earnings an important stylized fact about labor markets is that workers with longer seniority with their current employer have higher earnings than other workers with the same total labor market experience this study shows that workers in longer jobs earn more throughout than workers in a series of shorter jobs and that the measured positive cross sectional return seniority is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker the job or the worker employer match the implication is tha t earnings do not in fact rise very much with seniority copyright 1987 by american economic association

what does it take for a roving bandit settle down theory and an illustrative history of the visigoths a roving bandit provides exclusive rivalrous collective goods to members of its in group a stationary bandit further provides inclusive non rivalrous public collective goods to the out group the inclusive goods are an input to the production of the exclusive goods enjoyed by the in group as such the transition from roving to stationary bandit is likely to involve the redefinition of the in group its collective interest and the type of goods that it provides to illustrate these points i employ a case study of the roving visigothic confederacy as it evolved during the fourth and fifth centuries towards the stationary visigothic kingdom the illustration provides insights into why competition amongst roving bandits does not always or often lead to the emergence of a non predatory state

on the irrelevance of input prices for make or buy decisions this paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make or buy decisions because of strategic downstream considerations entrants may always undertake efficient make or buy decisions regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

two bandits or more the case of viking age england the olsonian distinction between roving and stationary bandits outlines the rationale behind the transition from anarchy to the emergence of the predatory state this two bandit model may however be expanded to include more bandit types in the case of viking age england local english kings were unable to monopolize violence and defend their realms against competing viking raiders as the vikings time horizon grew so did the accumulated value of more formal taxation and bandit types evolved in four steps the first step is the olsonian roving bandit who executed viking hit and run attacks and plunders during the second half of the tenth century the second step is the gafol bandit gafol is payment for leaving paid to among others swein forkbeard the third step is the heregeld bandit heregeld is a tax to support an army for hire most notably thorkell the tall s the fourth step is the olsonian stationary bandit i e the strongest military leader among the vikings cnut the great settled down as the new king overall the olsonian two bandit model can be expanded to a four bandit staircase model in which the new gafol and heregeld bandit types explain the steps from anarchy and short run raiding to long run formal taxation in a predatory state

trigger price regulation we consider the difficulty of achieving efficient prices and investments when returns on a public utility s projects are vulnerable to opportunistic ratemaking we model the long term relationship between a firm and its regulator as a time dependent supergame in which the regulator sets price ceilings to maximize surplus and the firm invests to maximize profit we find history dependent strategies that support self enforcing mutually beneficial equilibria equilibrium payoffs are close to the planning solution provided interest rates are small enough and capital depreciates fast enough we concentrate on trigger price regulation where in response to inefficient behavior the regulator cuts price down to operating cost and the firm curtails investment this mechanism performs well even with production economies and with restrictions on players threats

regulation vertical integration and sabotage we consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a bertrand competitive differentiated products downstream industry to 1 vertically integrate forward and 2 raise its downstream rivals costs through non price activities which we characterize generally as sabotage we examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price we find that while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation welfare effects are also explored

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the economics of career concerns part ii application to missions and accountability of government agencies the paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies officials incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions a lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy the paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives last the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on government bureaucracies 1999 the review of economic studies limited

collusive conduct in duopolies multimarket contact and cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry the deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition one example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the united states where the fcc created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes we find that cross ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining non competitive prices

regulating without cost information the incremental surplus subsidy scheme the authors propose a regulatory mechanism called the incremental surplus subsidy iss scheme that can be implemented even when the regulato r has no knowledge of the monopolist s cost structure the regulator need only share the firm s knowledge of demand which may be imperfec t and be able to observe with a lag the firm s expenditures the i ss scheme induces the firm to set marginal cost prices to minimize p roduction costs and to undertake efficient investment levels it als o severely limits the firm s rents and eliminates them altogether if the firm s discount rate is known copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

interpreting panel data on job tenure tenure responses in the panel study of income dynamics psid and the national longitudinal surveys are often inconsistent with calendar time these inconsistencies pose special problems in the psid because job changes cannot be identified directly so researchers must infer them from error ridden tenure data we use alternative rules for partitioning psid data into jobs and then estimate several wage and mobility models to assess the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the partitioning method we also assess the importance of replacing raw tenure data with imputed measures that are internally consistent

when does privatization work the impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies this paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of central europe while controlling for various forms of selection bias it argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control in particular privatization to outsider but not insider owners has significant performance effects where privatization is effective the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced but there is no comparable effect on cost reduction overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring

the financial and operating performance of privatized firms during the 1990s this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 85 companies from 28 industrialized countries that were privatized through public share offerings for the period from 1990 through 1996 we document significant increases in profitability output operating efficiency and dividend payments and significant decreases in leverage ratios for our full sample of firms after privatization and for most subsamples examined capital expenditures increase significantly in absolute terms but not relative to sales employment declines but insignificantly combined with results from two previous directly comparable studies these findings strongly suggest that privatization yields significant performance improvements during the past two decades the privatization of state owned enterprises has moved from being a radical almost desperate policy initiative of the thatcher government in britain to being an accepted economic policy for governments of all ideological stripes according to gibbon 1998 860 billion has been raised by governments worldwide through privatizations with the bulk of this total coming since 1987 and at least one commentator roche 1996 predicts that no less than 6 trillion will be raised through privatizations over the next two decades in 1997 alone sales of public enterprises totaled a record 161 billion worldwide with more than 110 billion of the total coming during the second half of the year and 1998 s total of almost 140 billion indicates that the pace shows no sign of slackening as we approach a new millennium

predator or prey parasitic enterprises in economic development abstract in many developing and transition economies mafia like activities are rampant extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives incorporated in a model of industrialization bimodal club convergence may result economies may get stuck in a predators club characterized by a vicious cycle of poverty and predation societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club poor societies with a high flow of new entrepreneurs however may grow out of the trap and join the rich producers club

an introduction to applicable game theory this paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists i try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts there are four kinds of games static or dynamic and complete or incomplete information complete information means there is no private information the corresponding solution concepts are nash equilibrium in static games of complete information backwards induction or subgame perfect nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information bayesian nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete information and perfect bayesian or sequential equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information the main theme of the paper is that these solution concepts are closely linked as we consider progressively richer games we progressively strengthen the solution concept to rule out implausible equilibria in the richer games that would survive if we applied solution concepts available for simpler games in each case the stronger solution concept differs from the weaker concept only for the richer games not for the simpler games

optimal bypass and cream skimming this paper develops a normative model of regulatory policy toward bypass and cream skimming it analyzes the effects of bypass on second degree price discrimination on the rent of the regulated firm and on the welfare of low demand customers it shows that pricing under marginal cost may be optimal for the regulated firm excessive cream skimming occurs if access to the bypass technology is not regulated and the prohibition of bypass may increase or decrease the regulated firm s rent jel 026 613 the regulation of natural monopolies is often associated with policies toward competition including restrictions on entry this paper is concerned with a common form of competition which threatens the regulated firm on its most lucrative markets examples abound in the telecommunications industry the development of microwave radio and communication satellites in the 1960 s introduced the possibility that big telecommunication customers might bypass the major common carrier att and the 1978 natural gas policy act in the united states has created the possibility for industrial plants to bypass the local distribution utilities by building direct connections to the pipelines gas producers or intermediaries

residential mobility housing equity and the labour market henley a g 1998 residential mobility housing equity and the labour market economic journal 108 447 414 427

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

behind the revolving door a new view of public utility regulation regulatory officials frequently work for firms they regulate after they leave office this revolving door has been the subject of much scrutiny owing to the natural suspicion of corruption in a time dependent supergame i take a strategic look behind the revolving door and find it can lead to improved performance of regulated industries when firm managers and regulators have finite and concurrent terms investment incentives are minimal staggered terms and revolving doors can result in improved performance of regulated firms when each side s actions at each date are contingent on past outcomes

repeated auctions of incentive contracts investment and bidding parity with an application to takeovers this article considers a two period model of natural monopoly and second sourcing the incumbent supplier invests in the first period after observing the incumbent s first period performance the buyer may break out in the second period the investment may or may not be transferable to the second source and it may be monetary or take the form of human capital we determine whether the incumbent should be favored at the reprocurement stage and how the slope of his incentive scheme should evolve over time we find that the gains from second sourcing are not so large as one might hope finally we reinterpret the second source as a raider and the breakout as a takeover we discuss the desirability of defensive tactics and obtain a rich set of testable implications concerning the size of managerial stock options the extent of defensive tactics the firm s performance and the probability of a takeover

optimal procurement mechanisms we analyze optimal mechanisms in environments where sellers are privately informed about quality a methodology is provided for deriving conditions that are necessary and sufficient to determine when two simple trading environments maximize either social or private surplus the commonly used auction mechanism is frequently inefficient in procurement environments often the optimal mechanism is simply to order potential suppliers and to tender take it or leave it offers to each sequentially we completely characterize the environments in which either mechanism is optimal in doing so we develop a general methodology that determines when and if a given trading institution is optimal

the value allocation of an economy with differential information we analyze the shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information since the intent of the shapley value is to measure the sum of the expected marginal contributions made by an agent to any coalition that he she belongs to the value allocation of an economy with differential information provides an interesting way to measure the information advantage of an agent this feature of the shapley value allocation is not necessarily shared by the rational expectation equilibrium thus we analyze the informational structure of an economy with differential information from a different and new viewpoint

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the influence of pensions on job mobility in this paper we construct a model of the loss of firm specific capital suffered by employees with occupational pensions who change job the simplest loss function may be represented as the product of job tenure and years to retirement estimates of logit equations for individual job search in great britain suggest that the effect of pension status can be satisfactorily captured by this simple loss function these equations and others for job turnover indicate that membership of an occupational pension scheme substantially reduces job mobility

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

rational bandits plunder public goods and the vikings the paper applies and extendsinsights from mancur olson s study of statemaking to the vikings in a world ofroving bandits a sub optimal provision ofpublic goods exists most notably ofsecurity roving banditry leads toover plundering and zero profits for theplunderers which makes stationary banditryprofitable the most efficient banditsmonopolize violence begin to tax andprovide some amounts of public goods inorder to stimulate economic growth theanalysis demonstrates how the vikings activities and settlements are consistentwith such an explanation with the dynamicsof the process being reflected in thevariation in the number of raids and theamount of wealth extracted

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

what are occupational pension plan entitlements worth in britain the acquisition of rights by workers in private pension plans underpins retirement behaviour recruitment policy and wage structure but there is controversy as to how these individual pension rights should be valued the paper combines four data sets to calculate pension entitlements for a sample of 3000 british workers in 1987 expected scheme tenure is a key variable in valuation younger workers and women face greater initial uncertainty as to their pension outcomes which is resolved as job tenure lengthens given the distribution of tenure durations many employees would obtain higher returns in defined contribution schemes than in a typical final salary defined benefit plan

diversification incentives under price based and cost based regulation this article considers two schemes of regulationforfirms that serve both monopoly markets and markets subjected to substantial competition the first form cost based regulation combines elements of rate of return regulation on monopoly markets with filly distributed cost pricing much like the form of regulation currently in place in the domestic telephone industry the secondform price based regulation would establish rate caps on noncompetitive services and allow the firm to enter into competitive markets and charge whatever prices it might like in those markets models of both forms of regulation are developed and analyzed with respect to incentives for cost misreporting choice of technology cost reducing innovation choices of prices and output levels and diversification into competitive markets

revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion in this article i study how the presence of a revolving door and potential collusion between a regulator and a regulated firm affect the regulator s performance incentives contrary to the conventional wisdom these seemingly undesirable features of the regulatory system may serve the interests of the government because i the regulator s efforts to enhance her industry qualifications may have a complementary effect on her regulatory performance and ii the regulator may become more aggressive in regulation so as to signal her industry qualifications to the firm collusion between a regulator and a firm also can be beneficial because a regulator may increase her monitoring effort in order to increase the chance of achieving a profitable side contract with the firm and side contracting may not always succeed

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51

the quit propensity of married men this paper hypothesizes that the quit propensity of married men rises with an increase in their wives income assuming that individuals are risk averse and that quitting is risky the wife s income increases the husband s expected value of quitting by reducing the variance of expected family income using the longitudinal data from the michigan panel study of income dynamics psid the wife s income is found to have a large effect on quits the average husband s quit rate increases by about 45 when the wife s income rises from zero to two thirds that of the husband s the wife s income effect nearly offsets the negative effect that marriage typically has on male quit rates

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed