an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

failures in contingent reasoning the role of uncertainty we propose a new channel to account for the difficulties of individuals with contingent reasoning the presence of uncertainty when moving from an environment with one state of known value to one with multiple possible values two changes occur first the number of values to consider increases second the value of the state is uncertain we show in an experiment that this lack of certainty or the loss of the power of certainty impedes payoff maximization and that it accounts for a substantial portion of the difficulties with contingent reasoning

we the rich inequality identity and cooperation abstract inequality not only generates status differentials between rich and poor individuals it also generates status differentials between groups of different composition and income level we organise the social structure within which groups are embedded to manipulate their composition and relative status thus inducing weaker or stronger group identities in their members via the processes of social categorization identification and comparison we therefore manipulate the fundamental components of group identity rather than resorting to ad hoc identity reinforcement tasks how strongly individuals identify with each group will ultimately determine the degree of cooperativeness within the group and the whole society we find that the impact of inequality on social cooperativeness is not trivial cooperation varies with the strength of the group s identity as predicted by social identity theory in particular high endowment homogeneous groups cooperate most and increasingly over time low endowment homogeneous groups display intermediate levels of cooperation heterogeneous groups cooperate least a result driven by lack of cooperation on behalf of the rich as endowment sizes and groups are exogenously allocated we argue that our findings are a lower bound for the effects generated where endowments and groups are endogenously determined in or outside of the laboratory

social identity and social free riding abstract we model individual identification choice as a strategic group formation problem when choosing a social group to identify with individuals appreciate high social status and a group stereotype to which they have a small social distance a group s social status and stereotype are shaped by the exogenous individual attributes of its members and hence endogenous to individuals choices unless disutility from social distance is strong enough this creates a strategic tension as individuals with attributes that contribute little to group status would like to join high status groups thereby diluting the latters status and changing stereotypes such social free riding motivates the use of soft exclusion technologies in high status groups which provides a unifying rationale for phenomena such as hazing rituals charitable activities or status symbols that is not taste based or follows a standard signaling mechanism

information rigidities inflation perceptions and the media lessons from the euro cash changeover the objective of theoretical models of information rigidities is to capture the fact that people are constrained in their ability to acquire and process all available information given that most people obtain their information about the economy from the media press coverage of the economy may exert an influence on peoples attitudes this paper tests for this influence by examining consumers inflation perceptions in the aftermath of the euro cash changeover which serves as a natural experiment using a new data set that quantifies the intensity and tone of media reports we document that media reporting has had a statistically significant and economically meaningful impact on inflation perceptions and contributed to their sharp rise in the aftermath of the euro cash changeover and to the divergence between inflation perceptions and actual inflation rates jel e53 d83

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

the impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement evidence using random assignment to real social groups due to incomplete contracts efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non selfish actions such as cooperating when there is no incentive to do so or punishing inefficient actions by others organizations also constitute a social boundary or group we investigate whether this social aspect of organizations has an important benefit fostering unselfish cooperation and norm enforcement within the group but also whether there is a dark side in the form of hostility between groups our experiment provides the first evidence free from the confounding effect of self selection into groups individuals are randomly assigned to different platoons during a four week period of officer training in the swiss army we conduct choice experiments simultaneous prisoner s dilemma games with and without third party punishment in week three random assignment significantly increases willingness to cooperate with fellow platoon members assignment does not lead to hostility in the sense of vindictive punishment of outsiders but does affect norm enforcement enhancing willingness to enforce a norm of cooperation towards fellow platoon members this suggests that the social aspect of organizations motivates efficient behavior even when ordinary incentives fail and helps to explain practices designed to foster social ties or group identification within an organization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

monetary shocks in models with inattentive producers we study models where prices respond slowly to shocks because firms are rationally inattentive producers must pay a cost to observe the determinants of the current profit maximizing price and hence observe them infrequently to generate large real effects of monetary shocks in such a model the time between observations must be long and or highly volatile previous work on rational inattentiveness has allowed for observation intervals that are either constant but long e g caballero 1989 or reis 2006 or volatile but short e g reis s 2006 example where observation costs are negligible but not both in these models the real effects of monetary policy are small for realistic values of the duration between observations we show that non negligible observation costs produce both of these effects intervals between observations are infrequent and volatile this generates large real effects of monetary policy for realistic values of the average time between observations

asymmetric information and rational expectations when is it right to be wrong abstract in this paper we examine the effects of private agents being less than fully rational in their expectations we examine this in the context of monetary policy where the central bank may have uncertain preferences either by choice or by necessity the new feature is that we allow the public to react in two different ways they either form rational expectations and internalize the uncertainty about the central bank s preferences in full or alternatively and if this process of internalization is costly it forms a best guess regarding those preferences this implies a certainty equivalence strategy applied to the preference parameters as those parameters enter the decisions non linearly a systematic error emerges we examine the magnitude of the resulting error in inflation and output following the assumption of certainty equivalence under all reasonable levels of uncertainty this error turns out to be small but involves trading a deflation bias against the cost of gathering the information needed for the full information rational expectations solution

sticky information phillips curves european evidence we estimate the sticky information phillips curve model of mankiw and reis 2002 using survey expectations of professional forecasters from four major european economies our estimates imply that in ation expectations in france germany and the united kingdom are updated about once a year in italy about once each six months

decision making with naive advice in many of the decisions we make we rely on the advice of others who have preceded us for example before we buy a car choose a dentist choose a spouse find a school for our children sign on to a retirement plan etc we usually ask the advice of others who have experience with such decisions the same is true when we make major financial decisions here people easily take advice from their fellow workers or relatives as to how to choose stock balance a portfolio or save for their child s education although some advice we get is from experts most of the time we make our decisions relying only on the rather uninformed word of mouth advice we get from our friends or neighbors we call this aive advice in this paper i will outline a set of experimental results that indicate that word of mouth advice is a very powerful force in shaping the decisions that people make and tends to push those decisions in the direction of the predictions of the rational theory

earnings quality in uk private firms comparative loss recognition timeliness abstract uk private and public companies face substantially equivalent regulation on auditing accounting standards and taxes we hypothesize that private company financial reporting nevertheless is of lower quality due to different market demand regulation notwithstanding a large uk sample supports this hypothesis quality is operationalized using basu s 1997 time series measure of timely loss recognition and a new accruals based method the result is not affected by controls for size leverage industry membership and auditor size or by allowing endogenous listing choice the result enhances understanding of private companies which are predominant in the economy it also provides insight into the economics of accounting standards

the bright side of managerial over optimism human estimation and inference are subject to systematic biases such as overconfidence and over optimism in contrast to prior research that has identified multiple negative consequences of these biases we focus on positive effects we empirically examine a setting in which over optimism a is a related but different bias from overconfidence b emerges dynamically in a rational economic framework and c generates higher managerial effort importantly this additional effort improves firm profitability and market value

inequality social sanctions and cooperation within south african fishing communities abstract we explore the effect of income inequality and social attitudes on cooperation and sanctioning in nine south african fishing communities where allocation of fishing rights via quota and permits have been unequal and controversial we use a linear public goods experiment design with heterogeneous endowments and peer sanctioning in the punishment treatment aggregate contributions towards the public good are significantly higher amongst unequal groups with low endowment players contributing the greatest endowment share sanctioning is significantly lower in unequal groups but demand for punishment is similar irrespective of differences in relative costs free riding drives punishment but retaliation is another important motivator specifically in unequal groups in equal groups antisocial punishment of cooperators is more common the effect of real wealth and inequality on contributions and punishment is less salient possibly due to real wealth not being discernible in the experimental context interestingly social attitudes are important in explaining sanctioning behavior indicating that distrust in formal institutions and specifically in the top down quota allocation process may have a significant impact on behavioral outcomes and the effectiveness of community sanctioning mechanisms

a quantitative comparison of sticky price and sticky information models of price setting i estimate sticky price and sticky information models of price setting for the united states via maximum likelihood techniques reaching several conclusions first the sticky price model fits best and captures inflation dynamics as well as reduced form equations once hybrid behavior is allowed second the importance of hybrid behavior in sticky price models is potentially consistent with a role for some information imperfections such as sticky information as a complement to nominal price rigidities finally the favorable results herein for the hybrid sticky price model when evaluated by statistics that summarize the relative fit of different models is consistent with the existing literature that is both supportive and dismissive of such models as this literature has largely ignored fit in evaluating such models many previous studies have focused on ancillary issues such as the standard errors associated with certain parameters or granger causality tests that may not provide much information about sticky price models

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

international evidence on the efficacy of new keynesian models of inflation persistence in this paper we take an agnostic view of the phillips curve debate and carry out an empirical investigation of the relative and absolute efficacy of calvo sticky price sp sticky information si and sticky price with indexation models spi with emphasis on their ability to mimic inflationary dynamics in particular we look at evidence for a group of 13 oecd countries and we consider three alternative measures of inflationary pressure including the output gap labor share and unemployment we find that the calvo sp and the si models essentially perform no better than a strawman constant inflation model when used to explain inflation persistence indeed virtually all inflationary dynamics end up being captured by the residuals of the estimated versions of these models we find that spi model is preferable because it captures the type of strong inflationary persistence that has in the past characterized the economies of the countries in our sample however two caveats to this conclusion are that improvement in performance is driven mostly by the time series part of the model i e lagged inflation and that the spi model overemphasizes inflationary persistence thus there appears to be room for improvement via either modified versions of the above models or via development of new models that better track inflation persistence

discussion of the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition the accrual process is central to financial accounting accruals adjust cash flows to reported earnings and form the building blocks for the balance sheet given the importance of accruals to financial accounting it is surprising how sparse the modeling of the overall accrual process has been within the literature until recently the state of the art empirical approach modeled total accruals as a function of the change in sales and property plant and equipment pp e jones 1991 recently working capital accruals have been more formally modeled as a function of firms selling activity and past present and future operating cash flows e g dechow kothari and watts 1998 dechow and dichev 2002 ball and shivakumar incorporate conditional conservatism an important feature of the earnings process into existing accruals models specifically they recognize that accruals are expected to be an asymmetric function of firm performance in which economic losses are captured by the accruals process in a more timely manner than gains their evidence documents a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses and gains and demonstrates that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have superior explanatory power the authors innovation advances

management by the numbers a formal approach to deriving informational and distributional properties of unmanaged earnings we explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of earnings frequency distributions under the assumption that managers use unbiased accounting information to sequentially decide on real options their firms have and report generated earnings truthfully with the market pricing the firm based on those reported earnings we generate benchmarks against which empirically observed earnings returns relations and aggregate earnings distributions can be evaluated this parsimonious model shows a coherent set of results reported losses are less persistent than reported gains decision making diminishes the s shaped market response to earnings and earnings relate to returns asymmetrically in the way documented by basu 1997 furthermore the implied frequency distribution of aggregate earnings is neither symmetric nor necessarily single peaked instead it may exhibit a kink at zero and look similar to the plots reported by burgstahler and dichev 1997 however within our model none of these phenomena are due to reporting noise bias or some undesirable strategic managerial behavior they are the natural consequences of using past earnings as the basis for value increasing managerial decision making that in turn generates the future earnings on which future decisions will be based

social identity and inequality the impact of china s hukou system abstract we conduct an experimental study to investigate the causal impact of social identity on individuals performance under incentives we focus on china s household registration hukou system which favors urban residents and discriminates against rural residents in resource allocation our results show that making individuals hukou identity salient significantly reduces the performance of rural migrant students relative to their local urban counterparts on an incentivized cognitive task and consequently significantly lowers their relative ranking in the earnings distribution under the piece rate regime however the impact of hukou identity salience is insignificant in the tournament regime suggesting that its negative effect on migrant students performance may be mitigated when competition is introduced the results demonstrate the impact of institutionally imposed social identity on individuals economic performance and potentially on inequality

estimation and empirical properties of a firm year measure of accounting conservatism we estimate a firm year measure of accounting conservatism examine its empirical properties as a metric and illustrate applications by testing new hypotheses that shed further light on the nature and effects of conservatism the results are consistent with the measure c score capturing variation in conservatism and also predicting asymmetric earnings timeliness at horizons of up to 3 years ahead cross sectional hypothesis tests suggest firms with longer investment cycles higher idiosyncratic uncertainty and higher information asymmetry have higher accounting conservatism event studies suggest increased conservatism is a response to increases in information asymmetry and idiosyncratic uncertainty

frictions or mental gaps what s behind the information we don t use and when do we care consumers suffer significant losses from not acting on available information these losses stem from frictions such as search costs switching costs and rational inattention as well as what we call mental gaps resulting from wrong priors worldviews or relevant features of a problem not being top of mind most research studying such losses does not empirically distinguish between these mechanisms instead we show that most highly cited papers in this area presume one mechanism underlies consumer choices and assume away other potential explanations or collapse many mechanisms together we discuss the empirical difficulties that arise in distinguishing between different mechanisms and some promising approaches for making progress in doing so we also assess when it is more or less important for researchers to distinguish between these mechanisms approaches that seek to identify true value from demand without specifying mechanisms behind this wedge are most useful when researchers are interested in evaluating allocation policies that strongly steer consumers towards better options with regulation traditional policy instruments and defaults on the other hand understanding the precise mechanisms underlying consumer losses is essential to predicting the impact of mechanism policies aimed primarily at reducing specific frictions or mental gaps without otherwise steering consumers we make the case that papers engaging with these questions empirically should be clear about whether their analyses distinguish between mechanisms behind poorly informed choices and what that implies for the questions they can answer we present examples from several empirical contexts to highlight these distinctions

choosing between time and state dependence micro evidence on firms price reviewing strategies because of recent findings based on survey data it is now well known that firms differ from each other with respect to their price reviewing strategies while some firms review their prices at fixed intervals of time others prefer to perform price revisions in response to changes in economic conditions some theories have been suggested to explain this however empirical evidence on the relative importance of the factors that determine the different strategies of firms is virtually non existent in this paper we help to fill this gap by investigating the factors that explain why firms follow time dependent state dependent or both time and state dependent price reviewing rules we find that the strategies of firms vary with firm characteristics that have a bearing on the importance of information costs with the variability of the optimal price and with the sensitivity of profits to non optimal prices

the expected price of keeping up with the joneses abstract inflation expectations elicited in surveys have been found to exhibit large dispersion across individuals although several explanations have been proposed none fully explain this puzzle we explore in this paper a new behavioral factor social comparison using original survey data we find that respondents who feel they are falling behind compared to their peers report significantly and substantially higher inflation expectations we argue that this result is consistent with an experience based belief formation model in which those unable to keep up with the joneses overweight the high prices of aspiration goods they are unable to purchase

mandatory minimum contributions heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public good provision abstract in a public good experiment with heterogeneous endowments we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair share rule of equal contributions relative to one s endowment hofmeyr et al 2007 keser et al 2014 are influenced by minimum contribution requirements we consider three different schedules fixmin requiring the same absolute contributions relmin requiring the same relative contributions and progmin requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment we find that minimum contributions exert norm giving character and may lead to an increase in average group contributions this is especially true for the progressive schedule on the individual level this schedule leads to higher relative contributions by the wealthier players and thus violates the fair share norm on the group level it leads to the highest contribution level and the lowest inequality in total profits as measured by the gini index

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

foundations for optimal inattention abstract this paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information an optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation net of a cognitive cost of attention the main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention observing these choices permits unique identification of the agent s utility index the information to which she pays attention her attention cost and her prior whenever information is costly

conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods we compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations subjects in the partners conditi on contribute from t he first period on significantly more to the publi c good than subjects in the strangers conditi on in the strangers conditi on contributions show a continual decay whil e in the partners conditi on contributions fluctuate on a high level until t hey decrease in the final periods we interpret subjects behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future oriented and reactive behavior

inattentive professional forecasters abstract using the ecb survey of professional forecasters to characterize expectations at the micro level we emphasize two new facts forecasters i fail to systematically update their forecasts and ii disagree even when updating it is moreover found that forecasters have predictable forecast errors these facts are qualitatively supportive of recent models of inattention and suggest a setup where agents imperfectly process information due to both sticky information a la mankiw reis and noisy information a la sims however building and estimating such an expectation model we find that it cannot quantitatively replicate the error and disagreement observed in the data

what can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities a lot we derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers firms central bankers and professional forecasters we document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information the dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities

actively learning by pricing a model of an experimenting seller this article presents a model of a rational seller who is actively learning the slope of his demand curve via his pricing strategy consequently this seller optimally experiments with his price resulting price patterns show a tendency for discreteness as observed in the data which has proved to be a major challenge to most price setting models the experimentation motive can also replicate the observation that prices are more volatile than costs as well as the presence of many idiosyncratic price changes in the data it can do so without a need to assume the existence of large idiosyncratic shocks

robustly strategic consumption portfolio rules with informational frictions this paper provides a tractable continuous time constant absolute risk aversion gaussian framework to explore how the interactions of fundamental uncertainty model uncertainty due to a preference for robustness and state uncertainty due to information processing constraints rational inattention affect strategic consumption portfolio rules and precautionary savings in the presence of uninsurable labor income specifically after solving the model explicitly i compute and compare the elasticities of strategic asset allocation and precautionary savings to risk aversion robustness and inattention furthermore for plausibly estimated and calibrated model parameters i quantitatively analyze how the interactions of model uncertainty and state uncertainty affect the optimal share invested in the risky asset and show that they can provide a potential explanation for the observed stockholding behavior of households with different education and income levels this paper was accepted by neng wang finance

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

investment dynamics and earnings return properties a structural approach we propose the standard neoclassical model of investment under uncertainty with short run adjustment frictions as a benchmark for earnings return patterns absent accounting influences we show that our proposed benchmark generates a wide range of earnings return patterns documented in accounting research notably our model generates a concave earnings return relation similar to that of basu 1997 and predicts that the earnings return concavity increases with the volatility of firms underlying shock processes and decreases with the level of firms investments we find strong empirical support for these predictions overall our evidence suggests that our proposed benchmark is useful for understanding the joint dynamics of variables of interest to accounting research e g earnings returns investment market to book absent accounting influences a necessary precondition for inferring the effects of accounting from these dynamics

investment dynamics with information costs investment in physical capital at the micro level is infrequent and large or lumpy the most common explanation for this is that firms face non convex physical adjustment costs the model developed in this paper shows that information costs make investment lumpy at the micro level even in the absence of non convex adjustment costs when collecting and processing information is costly the firm optimally chooses to do it sporadically and to be inactive most of the time this behavior results in infrequent and possibly large capital adjustments the model fits plant level investment rate moments well and it also matches some higher order moments of aggregate investment rates keywords investment dynamics information costs inattentiveness lumpy investment jel classification d21 d83 d92 e22

focusing effect and the poverty trap abstract i build a dynamic consumption savings model in which agents choices are distorted by the focusing effect agents overweight the utility of goods in which their options differ more i show that the consumption savings choice depends both on the marginal return on savings and on the total return on savings implying that the incentive to save may increase with the initial level of wealth as a consequence a salience based poverty trap may exist when the marginal return on savings is sufficiently high and sufficiently flat i also consider the case of a perfect credit market and show that a poverty trap may emerge when the salience of consumption is bounded above i discuss policy implications in particular imposing upon an agent a punishment for decreasing savings below a threshold leads to a higher level of savings even when the threshold triggering the punishment is not binding

bounded rationality lifecycle consumption and social security abstract this paper explores an overlapping generations model of bounded rationality in which consumers only foresee the future over a subset of their life span we focus in particular on whether the model can in general equilibrium produce a hump shaped lifecycle consumption profile with a peak that matches data for the average u s consumer for a simple four period model we show that an increasing income profile along with exogenously imposed retirement are sufficient to induce a hump with no other mechanism that can account for a hump besides bounded rationality the model best fits the salient features of consumption data with a planning horizon of 20 years which is well supported by the behavioral evidence found in surveys on retirement planning finally we show that the age of the consumption peak is robust to the introduction of social security mortality risk and another species of bounded rationality quasihyperbolic discounting moreover social security can be welfare improving with a short planning horizon we can calibrate the model to jointly explain the timing of the consumption hump and the optimality of the current social security system with quasihyperbolic discounting instead we can calibrate the model so the current social security system is optimal but we cannot also account for the timing of the consumption hump if we add quasihyperbolic discounting in addition to a short planning horizon the present bias has a negligible effect in equilibrium

identity economics 2016 where do social distinctions and norms come from abstract identity economics provides a framework to analyze economic outcomes by establishing people s identities not just pecuniary incentives as primary motivations for choice the heart of the framework is social difference and norms this paper engages the emerging economic research into sources of divisions and norms individuals families schools governments and social movements the task at hand is to further to develop the micro foundations of identity in order to build a socially framed understandings of human motivation that will yield more robust accounts of behavior and institutions and yet better predictions of the implications of policy

asymmetric timeliness of earnings market to book and conservatism in financial reporting abstract using an accounting conservatism theory that reflects accounting s role in practice we investigate the relation between two extensively used measures of conservatism asymmetric timeliness of earnings and the market to book ratio mtb we predict and observe that when asymmetric timeliness is measured cumulatively over long periods its relation with end of period mtb is positive when asymmetric timeliness is measured over short periods its dependence on beginning of period composition of equity value ev is responsible for its negative association with mtb further asymmetric timeliness appears to measure conservatism more efficiently when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple periods

narrow bracketing and dominated choices an experiment by tversky and kahneman 1981 illustrates that people s tendency to evaluate risky decisions separately can lead them to choose combinations of choices that are first order stochastically dominated by other available combinations we investigate the generality of this effect both theoretically and experimentally we show that for any decisionmaker who does not have constant absolute risk averse preferences and who evaluates her decisions one by one there exists a simple pair of independent binary decisions where the decisionmaker will make a dominated combination of choices we also characterize as a function of a person s preferences the amount of money that she can lose due to a single mistake of this kind the theory is accompanied by both a real stakes laboratory experiment and a large sample survey from the general u s population replicating tversky and kahneman s original experiment where decisionmakers with prototypical prospect theory preferences will choose a dominated combination we find that 28 of the participants do so in the survey we ask the respondents about several hypothetical large stakes choices and find higher proportions of dominated choice combinations a statistical model that estimates preferences from the survey results is best fit by assuming people have utility functions that are close to prospect theory value functions and that about 83 of people bracket narrowly none of these results varies strongly with the personal characteristics of participants we also demonstrate directly that dominated choices are driven by narrow bracketing when we eliminate the possibility of narrow bracketing by using a combined presentation of the decisions the dominated choices are eliminated in the laboratory experiment and are greatly reduced in the survey

social background cooperative behavior and norm enforcement studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries furthermore differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross cultural studies recently we present data which prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town for this end a unique data set was created based on public goods experiments conducted in cape town south africa most of the differences in behavior can however be explained by variables accounting for social capital and social environment such as trust or household violence

setting the right prices for the wrong reasons we consider a model of nominal price adjustment with firm specific and aggregate shocks to economic fundamentals and incomplete dispersed information firms update their expectations about fundamentals based on their own cash flows revenues and wages we show that in a model with realistic levels of product level price dispersion the firms inference about aggregate shocks is very gradual yet in the aggregate prices adjust rapidly in response to aggregate nominal shocks when an aggregate shock occurs firms mistakenly attribute it to firm specific shocks but adjust prices nevertheless since the exact nature of the shock matters little for its optimal pricing decision

association between accounting performance measures and stock prices a test of the life cycle hypothesis abstract this paper posits that stock market response to two accounting performance measures sales growth and capital investment is a function of firm life cycle stage firms are grouped into various life cycle portfolios using dividend payout sales growth and age as predicted the empirical results indicate a monotonic decline in the response coefficients of unexpected sales growth and unexpected capital investment from the growth to the stagnant stages additional analysis suggests that this relation is not driven by a firm size effect risk differences or measurement error in the proxies for performance measures

statistical testing of bounded rationality with applications to the newsvendor model abstract in this paper we define bounded rationality in terms of probabilistic cost efficiency this establishes a framework where bounded rationality can be examined rigorously by statistical methods we apply this theory to data from laboratory experiments on the newsvendor model we enter into a theoretical discussion of the classical pull to center effect and explain why underorders are typically larger than overorders

discussion of an economic framework for conservative accounting and bushman and piotroski 2006 abstract we offer an economic framework for generating predictions about the demand for conservative accounting reports we define conservatism as more timely recognition of losses than gains as a result of the costs and benefits of reporting verifiable information by managers and or firms being asymmetric we also discuss bushman and piotroski s interpretation of the speeds of good news recognition and incremental bad news recognition in basu type regressions as separate signals about accounting conservatism finally we suggest avenues for future research that seeks to investigate the links between institutions and contracts and between contracts and conservatism

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

asymmetric timely loss recognition adverse shocks to external capital and underinvestment evidence from the collapse of the junk bond market abstract using the collapse of the junk bond market in the early 1990s as an exogenous shock to external capital i document in both difference in differences and triple difference designs that speculative grade firms that recognize economic losses in a timely manner experience a smaller reduction in investment following the collapse the effect is more pronounced for speculative grade firms with a low level of asset liquidation value using the excess bond premium as a proxy for fluctuations in the supply of capital i also extend the generalizability of my findings to a broader sample of 84 421 firm years over the 1972 2011 period

econometrics of the basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient and accounting conservatism a substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks news and how it depends on various market political and institutional variables studies typically assume the basu 1997 asymmetric timeliness coefficient the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise linear regression of accounting income on stock returns is a valid conditional conservatism measure we analyze the measure s validity in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags and with noise we demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments such as the length of the firm s operating and investment cycles and its degree of diversification we particularly examine one characteristic the extent to which unbooked information such as revised expectations about rents and growth options is independent of other information and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market to book ratio we also conclude that much criticism of the basu regression misconstrues researchers objectives

cash flow asymmetry causes and implications for conditional conservatism research earnings asymmetric timeliness captures both accrual and operating cash flow cfo asymmetric timeliness because recognition of operating cash flows does not reflect differential verification thresholds for recognizing unrealized gains versus losses cfo asymmetry adds noise or bias to tests of conditional conservatism we show that cfo asymmetry is predictable in the cross section and varies systematically with life cycle characteristics removing cfo from earnings and using accruals based measures of asymmetric timeliness eliminates several biases that prior studies have attributed to other sources moreover accrual asymmetric timeliness varies in the cross section as theory predicts going forward we recommend researchers use accruals based asymmetric timeliness measures when testing for conditional conservatism

behavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection i propose a new solution concept behavioral equilibrium to study environments with players who are naive in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players actions a behavioral equilibrium requires that i players have no incentives to deviate given their beliefs about the consequences of deviating ii these beliefs are consistent with the information obtained from the actual equilibrium play of all players and iii when processing this information naive players fail to account for the correlation between other players actions and their own payouncertainty i apply the framework to certain adverse selection settings and show that contrary to the received literature the adverse selection problem is exacerbated when naive players fail to account for selection more generally the main distinguishing feature of the framework is that in equilibrium beliefs about both fundamentals and strategies are jointly restricted consequently whether a bias may arise or not is determined endogenously in equilibrium jel c72 d82 a large literature presents evidence that psychological and cognitive biases aect people s be havior this evidence raises some questions what are the eects of these biases and can they persist at all in economic settings where people strategically interact with each other and have the opportunity to learn from their experience 1 in this paper i introduce a game theoretic equilibrium framework to study these questions in the context of a particular bias people s failure to take into account the informational content of other people s actions i apply the framework to a class of games that arises naturally in adverse selection settings and then show that the adverse selection

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting