how to improve the performance of carbon tax in china abstract the chinese government committed to controlling carbon dioxide co 2 emissions and promoting development of non fossil fuels thus it becomes a top priority for the government to develop effective climate policies against such background this paper develops a new multi country computable general equilibrium cge model with detailed energy disaggregation this study evaluates the impact of single policy instrument carbon tax and combined policy mixes in order to investigate driving factors affecting the policy performance the main findings are as follows firstly the driving factors can be classified into two types the first type of factors affects cost effectiveness significantly while the second type generates considerable effect on emission performance secondly cross border externalities function as important barriers to the co 2 emission reduction since they imply extra competitiveness loss and result in considerable carbon leakage finally this paper considers two integrated policy mixes wherein carbon tax revenue is recycled to reduce capital tax or support clean energy subsidy these policy mixes can improve both cost effectiveness and emission performance and thus perform better than carbon tax alone in this way carbon tax revenue can be used to improve the performance looking ahead complicated policy mixes are preferred to improve the performance of china s carbon tax

should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors abstract if some but not all countries are cooperating to reduce co2 emissions one could make the following argument a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors and therefore co2 emissions in the cooperating countries however this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy and since it is only total co2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate there is no point in a policy that simply relocates co2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy according to this line of reasoning carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy this paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods it is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods however informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors

making sense of the competitiveness debate the debate over national competitiveness is marked by some basic misperceptions with few exceptions those who use the term have a crude essentially mercantilist view of world trade in which competition among nations is just like competition between corporations not only do the authors and readers of reports on national competitiveness usually not understand comparative advantage they are unaware of the most basic adding up constraints economists however find it hard to believe that seemingly well informed people can really be this naive and assume that there must be more sophisticated ideas lying behind what they say the rationales offered by economists in turn offer false comfort to the would be sophisticates who like the term competitiveness they believe that they have transcended conventional economic theory when the fact is that they have failed to comprehend it in short the actual level of discussion is lower than any of the participants imagines copyright 1996 by oxford university press

the cross country implications of alternative climate policies abstract because of worldwide growing concerns about global climate change great interest has been expressed in the potential of alternative climate policies to reduce global carbon emissions in this paper we compare cross country implications of alternative climate policies including unilateral and multilateral climate policies our main findings are as follows firstly there are large differences in cross country effects of alternative unilateral climate policies when the same given carbon emission reductions are achieved in each abating country respectively meanwhile cross border externalities undermine efficiency of unilateral climate policies secondly there are significant differences in cross country implications of alternative multilateral climate policies when the same global emission reductions are allocated in several different ways among abating countries thirdly it is difficult to reach a stable global climate treaty since any abating country has the incentive to argue for small carbon emission reductions finally multilateral climate policies can reduce the negative impacts of cross border externalities but cannot cure all cross border externalities looking ahead it will be a great policy challenge for the world to reduce carbon emissions in a cost effective way

approximating infinite horizon models in a complementarity format a primer in dynamic general equilibrium analysis abstract we demonstrate the advantages of the complementarity formulation for approximating infinite horizon equilibria in neoclassical growth models as compared with techniques originally developed for optimal planning models the complementarity approach does not require an ex ante specification of the growth rate in the terminal period and is therefore suitable for models with endogenous growth or short time horizons we also consider approximation issues in models with multiple infinitely lived agents changes in net indebtedness over a finite period are estimated as part of the model to obtain a precise approximation of the infinite horizon equilibria with a small number of time periods

agriculture in recent development theory abstract this paper is a critical review of recent contributions to the literature on agriculture in development theory it considers and compares the main lines of advance made within neoclassical neo marxian and structuralist approaches recent neo marxian and structuralist studies of agrarian development reveal that traditional agriculture is neither stationary nor efficient that resource allocation cannot be separated from wealth distribution or production organization that forms of surplus appropriation do not necessarily follow the dictates of efficiency that the social relations of production may inhibit accumulation and determine the forms of technological change that the state s role in primitive accumulation is more economic than explicitly coercive political and that political and macroeconomic constraints preclude a simple get the prices right view of the intersectoral terms of trade the thrust of these developments is to challenge both neoclassical and some orthodox marxian formulations of agrarian development issues and add to the insights to be gleaned from a political economy of development

electricity prices and industrial competitiveness a case study of final assembly automobile manufacturing in the united states and canada this paper studies the real and perceived impacts of electricity pricing on competitiveness in the united states and canada financial analysis is combined with interviews to explore whether and how the cost of electricity affects competitiveness in one of north america s most important sectors automobile manufacturing the cost of electricity in top automobile manufacturing jurisdictions in canada and the us is captured over a six year period starting in 2010 at between approximately us 2 00 and 11 00 per vehicle the paper finds that the per vehicle gap between electricity costs in the most expensive automobile making jurisdiction in north america ontario and all others is quite small how then to explain the preoccupation of industry actors with electricity costs in ontario several reasons are suggested including media coverage the relatively narrow inventory of issues under local management control and mechanics of the pricing system itself the paper explains how the pricing system causes manufacturers to make decisions that depart from core mandates making things and generates the unintended effect of heightened scrutiny a combination of factors that has the effect of aggravating tension around electricity pricing and damaging perceived competitiveness

the effect of carbon tax on farm income comment olale et al environ resour econ 605 623 2019 argue that the introduction of a carbon tax substantially reduced farm income in the canadian province of british columbia in this comment we raise serious concerns with their data empirical methods and theory most importantly olale et al 2019 assume that the difference in farm income between british columbia and the rest of canada would have remained constant over time without the introduction of the carbon tax we provide evidence that this is unlikely to be true and show that their results disappear when we account for differential trends we conclude that the estimates in olale et al 2019 do not represent the effect of a carbon tax on farm income

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

an empirical analysis of risk incentives and the delegation of worker authority the authors empirically test prendergast s 2002 theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives using data from the 1998 british wers the authors investigate whether there is 1 evidence of a risk incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal agent model 2 evidence of a positive relationship between incentive pay and the delegation of worker authority 3 evidence of a positive relationship between risk and authority 4 support for the main testable implication of prendergast s model namely that the evidence favoring a risk incentives tradeoff should strengthen when authority controls are added to the empirical model the answers are affirmative for all four questions thereby providing evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with

addressing the competitiveness effects of taxing carbon in china domestic tax cuts versus border tax adjustments abstract this study focuses on the international competitiveness effects of levying a carbon tax in china based on a computable general equilibrium model this study analysed the impacts of a carbon tax on different sectors from the aspect of changes in market shares of domestic producers in the domestic markets and changes in exports the effects of different measures including domestic tax cuts and border tax adjustments in alleviating the unfavourable competitiveness impacts were also analysed and compared as were the impacts of different tax schemes on the macro economy sectoral profits and carbon emissions the results show that without any complementary measures a carbon tax would negatively shock the domestic market shares and exports of almost all tradable sectors and the profits of almost all sectors as for cushioning the unfavourable effects the domestic tax cuts are able to ease the negative impacts on the domestic market shares and exports of almost all tradable sectors moreover the unfavourable impacts of domestic tax cuts on both the macro economy and the sectoral profits are obviously smaller than those of the other schemes regardless of the use of the same tax rate or emission reduction amount among the border tax adjustment measures the best performance in general corresponds to the measure purely implementing adjustments on exports

international and sectoral variation in industrial energy prices 1995 2015 energy price rises for industry are a major political concern access to cheap energy is often considered a key factor for the competitiveness of industry to enable international comparisons and to foster further empirical research on the impacts of energy price or tax differentials on a wide range of outcomes such as international trade and investment patterns we construct sector level energy prices for 12 industrial sectors in 48 countries for the period 1995 to 2015 our prices are constructed as weighted averages of fuel specific prices by fuel consumption we provide guidelines for the use of our energy price data which is made available for download as well as a set of stylized facts on major trends and variations and illustrative applications

choice of contracts in turkish agriculture sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy have coexisted under extremely diverse settings for centuries from labor abundant south and east asia to land abundant west africa and the americas this fact has intrigued generations of economists since adam smith marshall s lucid exposition of the productive inefficiencies of sharecropping in the principles paved the way for a major effort to reconcile neoclassical theory with the reality of coexistence 1 another substantial segment of the literature condemned sharecropping as an exploitative mechanism in semifeudal societies and predicted its downfall 2 more recent theoretical treatments however hail the share contract as a simple yet ingenious arrangement that guarantees the second best outcome in environments characterized by risk input market imperfections and moral hazard 3 the intuition underlying this argument is widely accepted but has yet to yield a general explanation of the real world coexistence phenomenon nor should we expect such an explanation each country and historical episode has its unique climatic technological and institutional characteristics and different motives for the adoption of share contracts may dominate in different settings 4 it is troublesome in fact that our empirical knowledge is so thin given that our theory of agricultural contracts is so rich 5 one reason of course is that appropriate data are costly and difficult to collectfor contractual choice is stubbornly complex and is best observed at the individual agent or household level there has been empirical work but much of it has examined the well worn marshallian theme is sharecropping less efficient than self cultivation 6 our knowledge of the conditions under which different contracts are likely to arise is limited to a handful of studies on the indian subcontinent or the united states in this article i examine the determinants of contractual choice during the 1970s for samples of individual turkish landlords and tenants the data were drawn from a 1973 survey that was national in

european emission trading scheme and competitiveness a case study on the iron and steel industry abstract we quantify the impact of the european emission trading scheme ets on the two dimensions of competitiveness production and profitability for the iron and steel industry among those covered by the scheme this sector is one of the most exposed since it is both highly co 2 intensive and relatively open to international trade we also examine the robustness of these results to various assumptions marginal abatement cost curve trade and demand elasticities as well as pass through rates and updating of allocation rules of which the latter two are scarcely debated we conclude that for this sector competitiveness losses are small we prove this conclusion to be robust hence arguments against tightening the environmental stringency of the ets in phase ii are not justified on grounds of competitiveness loss our systematic sensitivity analysis allows us to identify the important assumptions for each output variable it turns out that pass through rates and updating rules are significant despite being often implicit and least debated in existing analyses

climate policy instruments and industry effects and potential responses in the swedish context efficient policy instruments for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases are essential for the realization of a successful climate policy general economic policy instruments have the potential for providing efficient emission reduction as they equalise marginal costs for emission reduction between different actors they also provide incentives for a great variety of responses such as energy efficiency improvements fuel substitution and reduced consumption of carbon intensive products however as a result of the fact that it has so far been impossible to implement policy instruments on a global scale these instruments are often adapted in such a way that some of their potential advantages are eliminated in this paper the possibility of different policy instruments to contribute to reductions in industrial co2 emissions while preserving the competitiveness of industry is evaluated theoretically the consequences of increasing the cost of co2 emission in various industrial sectors are also discussed attention is directed towards carbon taxes emission trading and regulation co2 taxes without tax reductions and emission trading with allocation through auctioning have theoretical advantages in a global climate regime but may lead to significant disadvantages if implemented in a single or a small groups of countries emission trading with free intensity based allocation would in this case have a major advantage in combining incentives for emission reductions through efficiency improvements and fuel substitution with little impact on production levels less

how large are the impacts of carbon motivated border tax adjustments on china and how to mitigate them shandong social science planning fund program 12djjj12 independent innovation foundation of shandong university iifsdu 2012gn038 ministry of education research of social sciences youth funded projects 13yjc790065 national natural science foundation of china 71203186 71173170 china postdoctoral science foundation 2013m530309 2012t50802

energy efficiency and economic growth a retrospective cge analysis for canada from 2002 to 2012 abstract the efficiency with which energy is used by firms and households has widespread impacts on economic activity which in turn has implications for environmental quality and energy security using a novel method that could be used for other jurisdictions we estimate the impact of energy efficiency improvements on canadian gdp employment economic structure and welfare from 2002 to 2012 we use a counterfactual back casting method with a sectorally and regionally disaggregated dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model in effect reverse calibrating the model from observed data to isolate the effects of energy efficiency we estimate that total energy efficiency improvements in canada during this period increased gdp by 2 0 0 19 yr employment by 2 5 0 24 yr and household welfare by about 1 5 0 15 yr additionally energy efficiency improvements reoriented economic structure from capital intense energy supply sectors to relatively labour intense manufacturing and services we find evidence of widespread rebound on an energy expenditure basis across most sectors and backfire where energy efficiency leads to absolute energy use increases in oil sands in situ extraction bitumen upgrading shale gas extraction lime production pulp paper and metal smelting but overall energy use is reduced by energy efficiency improvements over this period

multi task sharecropping contracts the italian mezzadria we use recent developments in the multi task principal agent methodology to study a sharecropping contract that was pervasive in central italy we distinguish between subsistence crops and cash crops we analyse the spillover effect from one crop to the other and we show that this reduces the ability of this sharecropping economy to adjust to a changed environment we trace the effects of the changes in agricultural prices in the second half of the nineteenth century finally we propose some explanation for the puzzling phenomenon of the reintroduction of many feudal clauses in the sharecropping contract when the rest of the italian economy was beginning to modernize copyright 1996 by the london school of economics and political science

transboundary effects of environmental policy markets and emission leakages abstract one of many explanations for environmental kuznets curves for rich countries can be that dirty production is relocated to economies with laxer abatement regimes if this is caused by national abatement policies environmental stresses are transferred to other countries further the economic costs of national abatement policies can be shared with foreigners to some extent both through a lower demand for imports and losses of market shares for foreign competitors that produce cleaner products we quantify effects internally and abroad of a growth induced unilateral carbon tax policy in a rich open economy we find that the environmental benefits fall and the economic costs rise when a global rather than a national perspective is employed

sharing monitoring and incentives marshallian misallocation reassessed a general equilibrium model is presented wherein wage labor requires monitoring in order to extract effort landlords may also elect to adopt sharetenancy contracts in which workers have an incentive to supply unsupervised effort two distortions exist monitoring costs in one sector and a share tax in the other efficiency statements require second best comparisons adopting more specific functional forms this mixed wage sharetenancy economy is technically efficient and provides greater benthamite social welfare than a wage only economy when private incentives lead to mixing the incidence of sharetenancy is hypothesized to increase with monitoring costs density of tenants per landlord and labor intensity of production

border tax adjustments in the climate policy context co2 versus broad based ghg emission targeting abstract using a multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium cge model this paper compares the efficiency distributional and emission leakage effects of border tax adjustments btas as part of unilateral climate policies that are based on carbon dioxide co2 only versus those based on all greenhouse gases ghgs simulation results suggest that the broad based ghg policies in general have lower efficiency costs and result in less re distributive effects btas bring modest efficiency gains with adverse distributional consequences the distributional impacts are smaller under broad based ghg policies compared to that based on co2 only however these are due to a wider variety of abatement options under multi gas policies rather than the btas per se the main difference between the two policies is distributional effects first co2 only based policies have worse impacts on fossil fuel exporters such as russia and relatively better outcomes for oil importers such as india and china compared to that of multi gas policies particularly when it involves large global emission reduction second sectoral coverage under btas also influences the differential outcomes for example brazil is worse impacted under ghg based policies if agriculture is brought under btas as two third of its emissions are non co2 based and agriculture is the primary source of these emissions

abusa the structural history of an economic contract this speculative essay seeks an interpretation of abusa a share cropping arrangement which has been of fundamental importance in the development of the ghanaian cocoa industry according to theoretical expectations such an arrangement is both inefficient and inequitable a pre modern or pre capitalist productive relationship which will inevitably yield to a pattern of fixed rents and wage labour here the role of abusa in the spectacular growth of the cocoa economy and in its recent decline is examined with reference to the development of individual contracts it is argued that this ontogenetic development of abusa is structured by the changing domestic circumstances of farm owner and farm worker their competing interests in a maturing cocoa farm are negotiated and expressed in a sequence of contractual arrangements which gives the worker increasing access to the land and the product of his own labour it is suggested that if the evolution of productive relations towards more evidently capitalist

the nature of the agricultural firm abstract models explaining the choice between rent wage and share contracts in agriculture abstract from the large variations within the classes of rent share and owner managed forms of organization regarding the extent to which a specific form accommodates specialization between labor and management as a result modern explanations of agricultural organizations are misleadingly dependent on risk aversion or the assumption that landowners have an absolute advantage in production decisions viewing the agricultural firm as a constitution instead of as a nexus of contracts facilitates an agency explanation of alternative organizational forms and their amenability to specialization

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

unilateral co2 reductions and carbon leakage the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model featuring six world regions with trade in energy and non energy goods is used to simulate the period from 1990 through 2100 in 10 year intervals the simulations explore the effect of unilateral action by the oecd to curb global co2 emissions unilateral cuts create incentives for free riding by non participating regions so that global emissions are reduced by less than the amount that the oecd cuts back its regional emissions carbon leakage occurs through two channels first basic materials production increases in unconstrained regions resulting in increased carbon intensity of gdp second reductions in oecd oil imports cause the world oil price to fall leading to an increased energy intensity in the non participant regions in this paper we use a general equilibrium model to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of oecd reductions in curbing global co2 concentrations

allocation of carbon permits within a country a general equilibrium analysis of the united kingdom abstract the kyoto agreement includes international trade in carbon permits from 2008 we have used a cge model to evaluate methods of allocating permits within the uk auctioning is broadly similar to a carbon tax with revenues recycled to reduce other distortions grandfathering some permits free to large firms would mean a loss of recycling and possibly give windfall profits to foreigners alternatively regularly revised allocation using best practice estimates would be similar to recycling revenue as an output subsidy such a system could allow much of the potential double dividend to be realised though an auction system might still be preferable

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

climate change policy market structure and carbon leakage abstract the 1997 kyoto protocol on climate change obliges the industrialized countries to initiate the international effort of abating anthropogenic greenhouse gas ghg emissions if such an initiative is to be taken the associated competitive effects may lead to significant relocation of developed countries energy intensive production this paper examines this issue i adopt an oligopolistic structure combined with increasing returns to scale production technologies to represent the strategic interaction among the firms producing energy intensive products this representation is then embedded within a multi regional computable general equilibrium model which in turn is used for quantifying these relocational effects the results suggest that significant relocation of energy intensive industries away from the oecd may occur depending on the type of market structure with leakage rates as high as 130 in which case ghg control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to higher global emissions

contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk we analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard on the part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique of cultivation in the presence of limited liability high powered incentive contracts such as fixed rental contracts will induce the farmer to adopt techniques of cultivation that are too risky from the point of view of the landlord on the other hand low powered incentive contracts such as fixed wage contracts will induce the farmer to supply too little effort we show that sharecropping contracts emerge as a natural solution to balance these two conflicting considerations

carbon taxation and market structure a cge analysis for russia abstract russia is one of the world s major sources of carbon based energy as well as one its most intensive users introducing carbon taxes can lead to a reduction in emissions and encourage investment in energy efficiency we investigate the economic effects of carbon taxes on the russian economy under perfect competition and a cournot oligopoly in output markets the main findings are i substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes can yield a strong double dividend in russia however welfare gains strongly depend on the labour supply elasticity and elasticities of substitution between capital labour and energy ii under the assumption of a cournot oligopoly with homogenous products and symmetric firms in the markets for natural gas petroleum and chemical products metals and minerals welfare costs of the environmental tax reform can be higher than under perfect competition this is because introducing carbon taxes leads to a reduction in already sub optimal output thereby exacerbating pre existing distortions arising from imperfect competition iii furthermore increases in energy costs can result in higher mark ups in some markets because of less competition resulting from firms exit

the assessment international competitiveness the concept of international competitiveness as applied to national economies is a popular one politicians businessmen and economists alike re fer to it in day to day discussion when looking at the external export import market share or trade balance performance of different countries indi cators are produced showing changes in or levels of various countries competitiveness e g the relative price or cost indices regularly published by the imf and the oecd or the absolute measures produced by organizations such as the geneva world economic forum and the lausanne institute for management development governments of ten instigate research on the matter as for instance in the case of the 1993 us competitiveness policy council orthe 1995 eu competitiveness advisory group yet it has recently been argued by paul krugman that competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies and the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous krugman 1994 p 44 apositionkrugman forcefully reaffirms in his contribution to this issue of the oxford review of economic policy

effects of technology on incentive design of share contracts do observed contracts have the properties predicted by the principal agent model with moral hazard in contract theory this paper tests the predictions of such an agency model in the context of sharecropping in north india the most well known explanation for sharecropping is based on the principal agent model with a trade off between risk and incentives even though sharecropping contracts are quite prevalent in rural areas of developing countries there is very little evidence on factors determining the instruments used to provide incentives in such contracts using information in the data giving rise to exogenous variation in technology across regions this paper tests for the effect of cultivation technology on the incentive structure of share contracts as predicted by the agency model existing empirical evidence on sharecropping seems to indicate that yield on sharecropped plots is lower than on owner operated plots i e there is an incentive problem or moral hazard radwan a shaban 1987 jean jacques laffont and mohamed s matoussi 1995 there is some informal evidence that landowners use various mechanisms to improve efficiency in sharecropping by participating in cost sharing and by repeating contracts robert m townsend and rolf a mueller 1994 examine the nature of these mechanisms in detail but their data do not permit econometric tests more generally though the principal agent model has been widely studied there is little existing empirical evidence for it michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 find that executive compensation is only weakly sensitive to firm performance in recent work rajesh k aggarwal and andrew a samwick 1999 find that executive s pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of firm s performance however their results are sensitive to the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms in the regressions as pierre a chiappori and bernard salanie 2003 note in a recent survey empirical work on contract theory using nonexperimental data needs to be careful in adequately correcting for underlying heterogeneity across agents otherwise the parameters of interest would be hard to interpret if such heterogeneity affects contract choice for example douglas w allen and dean lueck 1995 find no role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contracts but they do not take the heterogeneity across agents into account in a recent paper addressing the issue of heterogeneity across agents ackerberg and botticini 2002 find a significant role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contract after correcting for endogenous matching between landowners and tenants they find that wealthier tenants are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts in this paper we are able to address such estimation issues and check for the robustness of our results regarding the relationship between technology and the design of share contracts department of economics pennsylvania state university university park pa 16801 e mail pxp22 psu edu this paper derives from related work done earlier in my dissertation i am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions i thank james heckman lars stole robert townsend kala krishna and seminar participants for useful comments financial support from the andrew mellon foundation for both rounds of fieldwork is gratefully acknowledged any errors remain my own 1 see nirvikar singh 1991 for a survey of various theories of sharecropping including steven n cheung 1969 c h hanumantha rao 1971 joseph e stiglitz 1974 david newbery and stiglitz 1979 avishay braverman and stiglitz 1982 mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal 1985 and sudhir shetty 1988 a common feature of the different theories is an emphasis on uncertainty and asymmetric information 2 an exception is daniel a ackerberg and maristella botticini 2002 ackerberg and botticini differ from our paper in that they examine the role of tenant s risk aversion in the choice between fixed rental contract and share contract they do not examine share contracts per se 3 see john e core and wayne guay 2000

comparing policies to combat emissions leakage border carbon adjustments versus rebates we explore conditions determining which anti leakage policies might be more effective complements to domestic greenhouse gas emissions regulation we consider four policies that could be combined with unilateral emissions pricing to counter effects on international competitiveness a border charge on imports a border rebate for exports full border adjustment and domestic output based rebating each option faces different potential legal hurdles in international trade law each also has different economic impacts while all can support competitiveness none is necessarily effective at reducing global emissions nor is it possible to rank order the options effectiveness depends on the relative emissions rates elasticities of substitution and consumption volumes we illustrate these results with simulations for the energy intensive sectors of three different economies the united states canada and europe although most controversial full border adjustment is usually most effective but output based rebating for key manufacturing sectors can achieve many of the gains

european emissions trading and the international competitiveness of energy intensive industries a legal and political evaluation of possible supporting measures abstract the eu emissions trading directive is expected by european energy intensive industries to harm their competitiveness vis a vis non european competitors many additional measures have thus been proposed to level the playing field and to protect the competitiveness of european energy intensive industries within the larger effort of reducing europe s greenhouse gas emissions and of meeting its obligations under the 1997 kyoto protocol this article evaluates a range of proposed measures based on a set of political and legal criteria including environmental effectiveness the need to consider differentiated commitments responsibilities and capabilities conformity with world trade law and european union law and europe s overall political interests we discuss measures that could be adopted by the european union and its member states such as direct support for energy intensive industries restrictions of energy intensive imports into the european union through border cost adjustments quotas or technical regulations and cost reimbursement for affected developing countries we also analyse measures available to multilateral institutions such as the united nations framework convention on climate change and its kyoto protocol and the world trade organisation we conclude with a classification of the discussed measures with red unfeasible yellow potentially feasible or green feasible labels

why are there large differences in performances when the same carbon emission reductions are achieved in different countries great interest has been in unilateral climate policies given present difficulty of establishing stable global coordinated agreements in this paper we investigate underlining factors explaining large differences in performances when the same carbon emission reductions are achieved in different abating countries to this end we develop a new multi country general equilibrium model incorporating six countries or world regions two goods six production inputs capital mobility energy mobility and international trade meanwhile we adopt two performance indicators with carbon leakage representing environmental efficiency and carbon emission abatement costs revealing cost effectiveness our findings are as follows firstly there are large differences in performances among these unilateral climate policies as evidenced by large differences in leakage rates and carbon emission abatement costs secondly the new global climate treaties to replace the kyoto protocol should be able to induce more carbon emission reductions in countries with low carbon emission reduction costs since such setting contributes to global cost savings finally developed countries have high carbon emission abatement costs compared with large developing countries china and india in this paper implying that there should be trade off mechanisms between efficiency and equity regarding how to allocate carbon emission reductions among countries

impacts of climate policy on the competitiveness of canadian industry how big and how to mitigate competitiveness concerns have been at the forefront of climate policy debates in canada particularly as a result of its high energy intensity and significant exposure to international markets this paper uses a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to assess the likely impacts on sectoral competitiveness that would accompany efforts to meet greenhouse gas mitigation targets that have been set by the canadian government additionally it evaluates several design mechanisms that could be used to reduce the negative competiveness impacts associated with adoption of domestic climate policies the analysis suggests that several sectors would likely face significant competiveness challenges under a reference scenario in which permits are given to emitters in lump sum however it finds that competiveness impacts can be minimized by using output based recycling of permits or by using border tax adjustments

output based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour s backyard competitiveness leakage and welfare we investigate how in an open economy carbon taxes combined with output based rebating obr perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner analytical results suggest that whether the purpose of the obr policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare accounting for global emission reductions the obr rate should be positive in policy relevant cases numerical simulations for canada with the us as the neighbouring trading partner indicate that the impact of us policies on the obr rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the canadian obr policies if for a given us carbon policy canada s aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission intensive and trade exposed eite firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation we find that the necessary domestic obr rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies however if not only the canadian carbon tax but also an equally high us tax is introduced compensatory canadian obr rates will be up to 50 lower depending on the sector and on us obr policy if the policy objective is to increase economy wide allocative efficiency welfare of canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage the us policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable obr rates in canada practical choices of obr rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance thus output based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating eite industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy wide allocative efficiency

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

risk preferences and the economics of contracts t he literature of risk aversion and risk preference is one of the richest sources of ad hoc assumptions concerning tastes n o significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes such theories have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down they give the appearance of considered judgement yet really have only been ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures george j stigler and gary s becker 1977 p 89

comparing climate policies to reduce carbon emissions in china new huadu business school research fund national social science foundation of china 12zd059 shandong social science planning fund program 12djjj12 independent innovation foundation of shandong university iifsdu 2012gn038 ministry of education research of social sciences china postdoctoral science foundation 2013m530309

output based allocation of emissions permits for mitigating tax and trade interactions the allocation of tradable emissions permits has important efficiency as well as distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are taken into account we compare different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors lumpsum grandfathering output based allocation oba auctioning and among sectors historical emissions or value added shares the output subsidies implicit in oba mitigate tax interactions unlike grand fathering oba with sectoral distributions based on value added is similar to revenue recycling with auctioning oba based on historical emissions supports heavier polluters more effectively counter acting carbon leakage but at higher welfare costs less energy intensive sectors are also sensitive to allocation rules

carbon taxes with exemptions in an open economy a general equilibrium analysis of the german tax initiative abstract sectoral exemptions from environmental regulation are applied in many countries to avoid adverse adjustment effects in specific industries the problem with exemptions is that they can make environmental policy more costly our paper analyzes the welfare costs of exemptions in environmental policy together with the issue of unilateral carbon taxes in an open economy several countries within the eu have introduced or contemplated unilateral taxes to reduce anthropogenic co2emissions taxes which are unilaterally imposed in an open economy can have significant impacts on production and employment of energy and export intensive industries to save jobs by maintaining international competitiveness most co2taxation schemes include exemptions for energy and export intensive industries as a compromise between environmental objectives and employment in these sectors this paper shows that such compromises are costly as the tax base narrows the dead weight loss increases our calculations illustrate this point in the framework of a static general equilibrium model for west germany calibrated to 1990 data we evaluate the excess costs of exemptions as a means of saving jobs in specific industries relative to an alternative instrument a uniform carbon tax cum wage subsidy which achieves an identical level of national emissions and employment at a fraction of the cost

the impacts of carbon pricing on coastal megacities a cge analysis of singapore abstract pricing carbon is a widely used policy instrument for climate change mitigation quantitative analysis of carbon pricing are mainly conducted at the regional and national level rarely at the city level due to data availability as a representative of coastal megacities that are vulnerable to both climate change and climate policies singapore has announced to impose carbon tax on large direct emitters as a complementary mitigation option to technical measures a city level computable general equilibrium cge model is developed to simulate potential impacts of carbon pricing on the city including paying border carbon adjustment bca on exports or introducing a domestic carbon tax different sector coverages and carbon tax revenue recycling schemes are investigated for domestic carbon tax the simulation results show that a domestic carbon tax is a more cost effective option than paying bca given an identical carbon price at s 10 t co 2 gdp total exports and household consumption would decline less and average abatement cost is much smaller in the carbon tax scenarios compared to the bca scenario in terms of absolute emissions reduction a carbon tax that covers energy manufacturing and land transport sectors would be preferred making emissions around 2 7 lower than 2010 baseline level