contingent capital tail risk and debt induced collapse we study the design and incentive effects of contingent convertible debt with contingent convertibles the endogenous bankruptcy boundary can be at either of two levels one with lower default risk or one at which default precedes conversion an increase in debt moves the firm from the first regime to the second a phenomenon we call debt induced collapse setting the conversion trigger sufficiently high avoids this hazard given this condition we investigate the effect of contingent capital and debt maturity on optimal capital structure debt overhang and asset substitution we calibrate the model to large banks during the financial crisis received april 10 2015 editorial decision march 20 2017 by editor leonid kogan

bank equity and macroprudential policy abstract this paper proposes an alternative macroprudential policy in the framework of gertler et al 2012 in their model the central bank subsidizes bank outside equity where the subsidy rate is determined by the shadow cost of the deposit we find that the alternative rule in which the subsidy rate responds to the aggregate bank outside equity ratio is welfare improving because it has a better stabilization effect on the bank asset deterioration after a financial shock we disentangle different channels through which macroprudential policies affect the economy and demonstrate that the better stabilization in the post crisis economy has a positive effect on the economy in normal times through security prices

bank capital and the macroeconomy policy considerations we develop a macroeconomic model in which the balance sheet liquidity condition of financial institutions plays an important role in the determination of asset prices and economic activity the financial intermediaries in our model are required to make investment commitments before a complete resolution of idiosyncratic funding risk that can be addressed only by costly refinancing forcing them to behave in a risk averse manner the model shows that the balance sheet condition of intermediaries can drive asset values away from their fundamentals causing aggregate investment and output to respond to shocks to intermediaries we use this model to evaluate several public policies designed to address balance sheet problems at financial institutions with regard to short run policies we find that capital injections conditioned upon voluntary recapitalization can be a more effective tool than direct lending asset purchases with regard to long run policies we demonstrate that higher capital requirements can have sizable short run effects on economic activity and that a long transition period helps avoid undesirable side effects finally we show that the mariginal effects of policies can be larger during crises because of the nonlinear interactions between some financial frictions and policy actions

from cash in the market pricing to financial fragility we review some recent research that explores the relationship between asset price volatility and financial fragility when markets and contracts are incomplete jel e5 g2

what do we know about the effects of macroprudential policy the literature on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools is still in its infancy and has so far provided only limited guidance for policy decisions in recent years however increasing efforts have been made to fill this gap progress has been made in embedding macroprudential policy in theoretical models there is increasing empirical work on the effect of some macroprudential tools on a range of target variables such as quantities and prices of credit asset prices and on the amplitude of the financial cycle and financial stability in this paper we provide a critical review of recent progress in theoretical and empirical research on the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments

understanding the shift from micro to macro prudential thinking a discursive network analysis macro prudential thinking and its emphasis on endogenously created systemic risks marginal in the banking regulation discourse until the mid 2000s has become central post crisis this paper analyzes this intellectual shift by using discourse and citation network analysis of the most cited scholarly works on banking regulation and systemic risk from 1985 to 2014 and six in depth interviews with central scholars it demonstrates that the predominance of formalism particularly partial equilibrium analysis in studies on banking regulation pre crisis impeded economists engagement with the endogenous sources of systemic risks discussed in the systemic risk sample these studies excluded observed phenomena that could not be accommodated in mathematical models largely ignoring contributions based on historical and practitioners styles of reasoning post crisis while informal analyses gain prominence in studies on banking regulation attempts to conceptualize systemic risk as a negative externality indicate the persistence of formalism and equilibrium thinking and its concomitant epistemological limitations that stymie theoretical progress

the pension costs from a defined benefit to individual pension accounts do they cost more in the case of taiwan this article develops a market based liability valuation model to price individual pension costs of a defined benefit db pension plan the purpose is to compare them with the new labour pension plan individual pension accounts ipas in the case of taiwan the results based on the numerical approach show that the new ipas cost a company more than the old db plan except if the average wage growth relative to the risk free interest rate is high enough

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

the macroeconomics of modigliani miller abstract we examine the validity of a macroeconomic version of the modigliani miller theorem by this we mean that different capital structures can occur in equilibrium and that all of them are associated with the same allocation of commodities and the same welfare we develop a general equilibrium model with two production sectors risk averse households and financial intermediation by banks banks are funded by safe deposits and outside equity and monitor borrowers in lending two sets of equilibria emerge these sets differ with regard to the debt equity ratios of banks investment in risky technologies bank defaults and whether first best allocations are attained hence the macroeconomic version of the modigliani miller theorem fails to hold imposing minimum equity capital requirements however eliminates all inefficient equilibria and guarantees the validity of the macroeconomic version of the modigliani miller theorem

microprudential regulation in a dynamic model of banking this paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity undertake maturity transformation are exposed to credit and liquidity risks and face financing frictions we show that 1 there exists an inverted u shaped relationship between bank lending welfare and capital requirements 2 liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending efficiency and welfare and 3 resolution policies contingent on observed capital such as prompt corrective action dominate in efficiency and welfare terms noncontingent capital and liquidity requirements

procyclical leverage and value at risk the availability of credit varies over the business cycle through shifts in the leverage of financial intermediaries empirically we find that intermediary leverage is negatively aligned with the banks value at risk var motivated by the evidence we explore a contracting model that captures the observed features under general conditions on the outcome distribution given by extreme value theory evt intermediaries maintain a constant probability of default to shifts in the outcome distribution implying substantial deleveraging during downturns for some parameter values we can solve the model explicitly thereby endogenizing the var threshold probability from the contracting problem

the lehman sisters hypothesis markdownabstract abstract this article explores the lehman sisters hypothesis it reviews empirical literature about gender differences in behavioral experimental and neuro economics as well as in other fields of behavioral research it discusses gender differences along three dimensions of financial behavior risk aversion and response to uncertainty ethics and moral attitude and leadership the article argues that gender stereotypes are influential in finance constraining women to achieve top positions in banking and sustaining a strong masculine culture at the same time the analysis indicates that the few women who make it to the top tend to perform on average better than men in particular under uncertainty this is explained by a combination of gender beliefs gender stereotypes gender identity and flexible biological processes although further research is necessary the existing empirical literature would support a plea for having more rather than less women in financial trade risk management and at the top of the financial sector

how does the stock market view bank regulatory capital forbearance policies during the subprime crisis the fdic has shown once again laxity in resolving and closing insolvent institutions ronn and verma 1986 call the tolerance level below which a bank closure is triggered the regulatory policy parameter we derive a model in which we make this parameter stochastic and bank specific to infer the stock market view of the regulatory capital forbearance value for 565 u s listed banks during 1990 to 2012 the countercyclical forbearance fraction in capital most substantial in recessions could represent 17 on average of the market valuation of bank equity and could go as high as 100

reflections on northern rock the bank run that heralded the global financial crisis in september 2007 television viewers and newspaper readers around the world saw pictures of what looked like an old fashioned bank run that is depositors waiting in line outside the branch offices of a united kingdom bank called northern rock to withdraw their money the previous u k bank run before northern rock was in 1866 at overend gurney a london bank that overreached itself in the railway and docks boom of the 1860s bank runs were not uncommon in the united states up through the 1930s but they have been rare since the start of deposit insurance backed by the federal deposit insurance corporation in contrast deposit insurance in the united kingdom was a partial affair funded by the banking industry itself and insuring only a part of the deposits at the time of the run u k bank deposits were fully insured only up to 2 000 pounds and then only 90 percent of the deposits up to an upper limit of 35 000 pounds when faced with a run the incentive to withdraw one s deposits from a u k bank was therefore very strong for economists the run on northern rock at first seemed to offer a rare opportunity to study at close quarters all the elements involved in their theoretical models of bank runs the futility of public statements of reassurance the mutually reinforcing anxiety of depositors as well as the power of the media in galvanizing and channeling that anxiety through the power of television images however the storyline of the northern rock bank run does not fit the conventional narrative on september 13 2007 the bbc s evening television news broadcast first broke the news that northern rock had sought the bank of england s support the next morning the bank of england announced that it would provide emergency liquidity support it was only after that announcement that is after the

learning and the dynamics of consumer unsecured debt and bankruptcies during the great moderation the consumer unsecured debt to income ratio nearly doubled and the personal bankruptcy filing rate more than quadrupled this historically tranquil period ended in 2008 with a severe recession and a protracted credit crunch we develop a theory of learning in which consumers and lenders adjust their beliefs about the riskiness of the economic environment over time in response to the realized sequence of aggregate shocks and then embed it into an otherwise standard quantitative model of consumer default simulations of the model suggest that learning can explain as much as half of the recent boom and bust cycle in consumer unsecured debt and a modest fraction of the rise in bankruptcy filings prior to 2005

testing macroprudential stress tests the risk of regulatory risk weights we compare the capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests to that o fa benchmark methodology the v lab stress test that employs only publicly available market data we find that when capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk weighted assets the ranking of financial institutions is not well correlated to the ranking of the v lab stress test whereas rank correlations increase when required capitalization is a function of total assets we show that the risk measures used in risk weighted assets are cross sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk as they do not account for the risk that risk will change furthermore the banks that appeared to be best capitalized relative to risk weighted assets were no better than the rest when the european economy deteriorated into the sovereign debt crisis in 2011

inequality household debt and financial instability an agent based perspective abstract our paper contributes to the literature on the causes of the 2007 2008 financial crisis in the united states by means of an agent based model we replicate an artificial credit network economy in order to assess the impact of growing income inequality in the presence of peer effects and home equity borrowing we show that the resulting debt financed consumption boom jeopardises the stability of the economic system thus paving the way for a financial crisis our model includes a behavioural rule for consumption based on expenditure cascades a hierarchical structure of household finance an articulated credit market with collateralised consumption loans and mortgages and a simple housing market results show that the model is able to capture the economic and social pressure of inequality on low and middle income households that pushes them to increase their consumption via home equity extraction rising non performing loans lead to higher bad debt on the banks balance sheets and consequently to the emergence of a crisis as an endogenous dynamic

business housing and credit cycles summary we use multivariate unobserved components models to estimate trend and cyclical components in gross domestic product gdp credit volumes and house prices for the usa and the five largest european economies with the exception of germany we find large and long cycles in credit and house prices which are highly correlated with a medium term component in gdp cycles differences across countries in the length and size of cycles appear to be related to the properties of national housing markets the precision of pseudo real time estimates of credit and house price cycles is roughly comparable to that of gdp cycles

bank capital regulation and structured finance we construct a model in which bank capital regulation and financial innovation interact innovation takes the form of pooling and tranching of assets and the creation of separate structures with different seniority different risk and different capital charges a process that captures some stylized features of structured finance regulation is motivated by the divergence of private and social interests in future profits capital regulation lowers bank profits and may induce banks to innovate in order to evade the regulation itself we show that structured finance can improve welfare in some cases however innovation may also be adopted to avoid regulation even in cases where it decreases welfare

stimulating housing markets we study temporary fiscal stimulus designed to support distressed housing markets by inducing demand from buyers in the private market using difference in differences and regression kink research designs we find that the first time homebuyer credit increased home sales by 490 000 9 8 median home prices by 2 400 1 1 per standard deviation increase in program exposure and the transition rate into homeownership by 53 the policy response did not reverse immediately instead demand comes from several years in the future induced buyers were three years younger in 2009 than typical first time buyers the program s market stabilizing benefits likely exceeded its direct stimulus effects

a macroprudential approach to financial regulation many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely microprudential in nature a microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions by contrast a macroprudential approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole in the aftermath of the crisis there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction in this paper we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks is likely to be fragile we begin by identifying the key market failures at work why individual financial firms acting in their own interests deviate from what a social planner would have them do next we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures we conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the united states and to proposed global banking reforms

money as meta rule buchanan s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability this paper explores james buchanan s contributions to monetary economics and argues these contributions form the foundation of a robust monetary economics paradigm while often not recognized for his contributions to monetary economics buchanan s scholarship offers important insights for current debates especially the renewed interest in narrow banking in the wake of the financial crisis we argue that the post 2007 crisis milieu creates a unique opportunity to recognize as buchanan did the vital role that money plays in the market as the grammar of commerce that recognition makes the need for more fundamental reform of our monetary regimes at the constitutional level more apparent making buchanan s work on monetary constitutions more relevant than ever before we then discuss how adopting buchanan s monetary framework can improve both monetary scholarship and institutions

reputation risk taking and macroprudential policy abstract this paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities in our model unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market we show that across the system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong

bank capital and credit market competition will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels abstract this paper establishes a theoretical model to study the relationship between credit market competition and bank capital in the model bank capital can alleviate the debt overhang problem and the extent to which banks can enjoy the gain of holding capital is decreasing in the competitive pressure in the credit market it is shown that credit market competition reduces banks incentive to hold capital deposit insurance also induces banks to hold less capital in addition bank capital regulation is welfare improving and banks may voluntarily hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums

winter is possibly not coming mitigating financial instability in an agent based model with interbank market abstract we develop a macroeconomic agent based model to study how financial instability can emerge from the co evolution of interbank and credit markets and the policy responses to mitigate its impact on the real economy the model is populated by heterogenous firms consumers and banks that locally interact in different markets in particular banks provide credit to firms according to a basel ii or iii macro prudential frameworks and manage their liquidity in the interbank market the central bank performs monetary policy according to different types of taylor rules we find that the model endogenously generates market freezes in the interbank market which interact with the financial accelerator possibly leading to firm bankruptcies banking crises and the emergence of deep downturns this requires the timely intervention of the central bank as a liquidity lender of last resort moreover we find that the joint adoption of a three mandate taylor rule tackling credit growth and the basel iii macro prudential framework is the best policy mix to stabilize financial and real economic dynamics however as the liquidity coverage ratio spurs financial instability by increasing the pro cyclicality of banks liquid reserves a new counter cyclical liquidity buffer should be added to basel iii to improve its performance further finally we find that the central bank can also dampen financial instability by employing a new unconventional monetary policy tool involving active management of the interest rate corridor in the interbank market

jointly optimal regulation of bank capital and liquidity in an economy with financial frictions banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints which require less information than pigouvian taxes the liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of basel iii can implement efficiency additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly micro and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes optimally macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk

banking finance and the role of the state this paper provides an overview of the issue it considers the existing structure of financial regulation the deficiencies that were encountered during the financial crisis and the proposed reforms it discusses whether these are likely to be adequate and argues that there are fundamental failures in product markets capital markets and government relations with financial institutions highlighted in the articles in this issue that question whether current reforms will prove sufficient in particular the article argues that a clearly defined partnership between the state and the banking system needs to be established by which the state protects certain core components of the banking system that perform key functions in an economic system and well specified rules are put in place to avoid renegotiation and lobbying copyright 2011 oxford university press

bubbles and crises the role of house prices and credit this paper utilizes quarterly panel data for 20 oecd countries over the period 1975 q1 2014 q2 to explore the importance of house prices and credit in affecting the likelihood of a financial crisis

the shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management we study the role that repos play in a bank s financing structure in our model the bank s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos long term debt deposits and equity repos are a cheap source of funding but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk we show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect shadow costs on the bank s shareholders first it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk second it adds to the cost of long term debt financing these shadow costs limit the bank s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding this effect is however weakened under poor returns on risky assets access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule we also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank s reliance on repos

a blessing in disguise banking crises and institutional change weak economic growth is a contributing factor behind many banking crises in this paper we test whether banking crises cause long term institutional change aimed at improving macroeconomic performance and thus indirectly reduce the risk of future crises our dataset consists of 22 developed and 34 developing countries covering the period from 1985 to 2009 the results show that banking crises cause institutional change if gdp growth is below potential growth during the crisis approximately 40 of the change in institutional quality during the considered period occurred after a banking crisis these results hold for both developed and developing countries

the federal reserve and panic prevention the roles of financial regulation and lender of last resort this paper surveys the role of the federal reserve within the financial regulatory system with particular attention to the interaction of the fed s role as both a supervisor and a lender of last resort the institutional design of the federal reserve system was aimed at preventing banking panics primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window this new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s after which the fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create stigma for window borrowing policies that contributed to the panics of the great depression the legislation of the new deal era centralized fed power in the board of governors and over the next 75 years the fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks nevertheless prior to the recent crisis the fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort with the latter role weakened further by stigma the fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly as the fed begins its second century there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention

simple banking profitability and the yield curve how does bank profitability vary with interest rates we present a model of a monopolistically competitive bank subject to repricing frictions and test the model s predictions using a unique panel data set on uk banks we find evidence that large banks retain a residual exposure to interest rates even after accounting for hedging activity operating through the trading book in the long run both level and slope of the yield curve contribute positively to profitability in the short run however increases in market rates compress interest margins consistent with the presence of nonnegligible loan pricing frictions

transatlantic systemic risk in this paper we study systemic risk for the us and europe we show that banks exposures to common risk factors are crucial for systemic risk we come to this conclusion by rst showing that relations between us and european banks are smaller than within each region we then show that european banks react more strongly to the onset of the nancial crisis than us ones regarding the consequences of systemic risk we show that dependence between the banking sector and a wide range of real sectors is limited our results imply that regulators and supervisors should address international bank dependencies arising from common risk factors while recessions in real sectors due to bank defaults should be a secondary concern

the safe asset banking equilibrium and optimal central bank monetary prudential and balance sheet policies abstract a simple equilibrium model is presented which permits the joint study of optimal central bank prudential monetary and balance sheet policies in the pre and post 2008 crisis periods it explains the new policies the purchase of risky securities qe payment of interest on reserves ir and use of reverse repo rrp as the response to the lack of safe assets in the economy and shows why these policies were not needed to achieve optimality before 2008 but were needed for the 2008 crisis and thereafter

deleveraging and monetary policy japan since the 1990s and the united states since 2007 japan s deleveraging became serious because the negative feedback loop was japan s deleveraging became serious because the negative feedback loop was not contained in its early stage of development the japanese government did not not contained in its early stage of development the japanese government did not act promptly to recapitalize banks that were suffering from the erosion of their act promptly to recapitalize banks that were suffering from the erosion of their capital buffer due to their large holdings of stocks as a result japan s banks only capital buffer due to their large holdings of stocks as a result japan s banks only slowly recognized bad loans while stopping lending to promising new projects slow slowly recognized bad loans while stopping lending to promising new projects slow but protracted asset sales resulted in a long period of asset price declines nonfi nanbut protracted asset sales resulted in a long period of asset price declines nonfi nancial companies perceived the deterioration of their balance sheets as permanent cial companies perceived the deterioration of their balance sheets as permanent and cut spending drastically as japan s economy stagnated the total amount of bad and cut spending drastically as japan s economy stagnated the total amount of bad loans turned out to be much larger than initially estimated loans turned out to be much larger than initially estimated

do contractionary monetary policy shocks expand shadow banking summary using var models for the usa we find that a contractionary monetary policy shock has a persistent negative impact on the level of commercial bank assets but increases the assets of shadow banks and securitization activity to explain this waterbed effect we propose a standard new keynesian model featuring both commercial and shadow banks and we show that the model comes close to explaining the empirical results our findings cast doubt on the idea that monetary policy can usefully get in all the cracks of the financial sector in a uniform way

the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation we assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and as a precaution hold capital buffers we find that under cyclically varying risk based capital requirements e g basel ii banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions yet these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession we show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying basel ii can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks long run solvency targets

labour s record on financial regulation in 1997 the new labour government launched major initiatives in the area of financial regulation setting up the financial services authority as a comprehensive regulatory body supported by the legislative framework of the financial services and markets act 2000 we evaluate the labour government s record on financial regulation in terms of its achievements and failures especially in dealing with the global financial crisis that started in 2007 while we identify some clear flaws in regulatory design and enforcement our evaluation highlights some inherent difficulties of financial regulation

monetary policy and risk taking abstract we assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk taking channel monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk we first present var evidence confirming that this channel exists and is particularly significant on the bank funding side then to rationalize this evidence we build a macroeconomic model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure deposits vs capital and risk level a monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk in turn higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output

field experiments in the developed world an introduction field experiments represent a relatively new area in economics to understand the causal links from one variable to another they have been used by academics to help answer interesting and policy relevant questions in the developed world relating to educational attainment tax avoidance consumer finance negative externalities charitable giving and labour market contracts in this paper we bring together the key ideas behind the different variants of field experiments how field experiments have been used to test theory their limitations and the new areas currently being opened up by field experiments

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

does the internet defy the law of gravity abstract we show that gravity holds in the case of digital goods consumed over the internet that have no trading costs therefore trade costs cannot fully account for the effects of distance on trade in particular we show that americans are more likely to visit websites from nearby countries even controlling for language income immigrant stock etc furthermore we show that this effect only holds for taste dependent digital products such as music games and pornography for these a 1 increase in physical distance reduces website visits by 3 25 for non taste dependent products such as software distance has no statistical effect

capital regulation under price impacts and dynamic financial contagion abstract we construct a continuous time model for price mediated contagion precipitated by a common exogenous stress to the banking book of all firms in the financial system in this setting firms are constrained so as to satisfy a risk weight based capital ratio requirement we use this model to find analytical bounds on the risk weights for assets as a function of the market liquidity under these appropriate risk weights we find existence and uniqueness for the joint system of firm behavior and the asset prices we further consider an analytical bound on the firm liquidations which allows us to construct exact formulas for stress testing the financial system with deterministic or random stresses numerical case studies are provided to demonstrate various implications of this model and analytical bounds

macroprudential policy central banks and financial stability evidence from china abstract we study the chinese experience and provide evidence that central banks can play an active role in safeguarding financial stability the narrative approach is used to disentangle macropudential policy actions from monetary actions we show that reserve requirements window guidance supervisory pressure and housing market policies can be used for macroprudential purposes our var estimates suggest that well targeted macroprudential policy has immediate and persistent impact on credit but no statistically significant impact on output macroprudential policy can be used to retain financial stability without triggering an economic slowdown or as a complement to monetary policy to offset the buildup of financial vulnerabilities arising from monetary easing a well designed mix of these two policies helps to achieve both macroeconomic and financial stability objectives which however requires central banks to maintain a multi instrument framework

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

between scylla and charybdis income distribution consumer credit and business cycles we introduce a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous households and an aggregate banking sector in order to analyze the impact of rising income inequality under different credit scenarios growing inequality produces debt led consumption boom dynamics when the banking sector is characterized by a lower capital requirement and a higher willingness to lend instead when inequality rises but the banking sector is highly regulated aggregate demand and output fall our results also yield new insights on the appropriate fiscal policy reaction to stabilize the economy acting on the progressivity of the tax system seems more effective than a proactive countercyclical fiscal policy jel c63 d31 e62 g01

capital regulation and the macroeconomy empirical evidence and macroprudential policy abstract we present new evidence on the macroeconomic effects of changes in microprudential bank capital requirements using confidential regulatory data from the basel i and ii regimes in the united kingdom our central result is that an increase in capital requirements lowered lending to firms and households reduced aggregate expenditure and raised credit spreads a financial accelerator effect is found to have amplified the macroeconomic responses to shifts in bank credit supply results from a counterfactual experiment that links capital requirements to house prices and mortgage spreads indicate that tighter macroprudential policy would have had a moderating effect on house price and mortgage lending growth in the early 2000s with easier monetary policy acting to offset its contractionary effects on output