anonymous markets and monetary trading abstract we study infinite horizon monetary economies characterized by trading frictions that originate from random pairwise meetings and commitment and enforcement limitations we prove that introducing occasional trade in centralized markets opens the door to an informal enforcement scheme that sustains a non monetary efficient allocation all is required is that trading partners be patient and their actions be observable we then present a matching environment in which trade may occur in large markets and yet agents trading paths cross at most once this allows the construction of models in which infinitely lived agents trade in competitive markets where money plays an essential role

a leviathan central bank modeling seigniorage in a money search model this paper studies the nature of optimal monetary policy under a utility maximizing monetary authority in a micro founded model of money based on lagos and wright 2005 such a monetary authority represents a monopoly private money supplier or situations where fiscal policy drives monetary policy and hence the name leviathan under no commitment i characterize an equilibrium with reputation concerns the centralized market interaction is modeled as an infinitely repeated game between the leviathan monetary authority a large player and the economic agents small players where the size of the players refers to the ability to influence aggregate outcomes this large small player dynamics pins down the equilibrium set of payoffs under the assumption that agents do not refuse to use money purely for coordination reasons the one shot game has a unique nash equilibrium with maximum inflation tax the set of equilibria is considerably enlarged in the infinite repetition of the game and equilibria with a lower inflation tax can also be supported by providing appropriate incentives to the money supplier

analysis of environmental efficiency variation in this article we develop and implement a methodology for analyzing the sources of variation in environmental efficiency across producers we formulate a two stage model in the first stage we use stochastic frontier analysis to estimate both technical and environmental efficiency in the second stage we again use stochastic frontier analysis to regress estimated environmental efficiency scores against a variety of technology physical environment and management variables in this stage we estimate the impact of each explanatory variable on environmental efficiency and we derive conditional estimates of environmental efficiency from the one sided error component we illustrate our methodology with an empirical application to a panel of dutch dairy farms we find evidence of relatively low levels of environmental efficiency and we find that environmental efficiency can be improved through a number of policy options including the provision of farmers with more insight into the nutrient balance of their farms

jockeying for position what it means and why it matters to regional development policy when places compete malecki e j 2004 jockeying for position what it means and why it matters to regional development policy when places compete regional studies38 1093 1112 the realization that places compete for investment has expanded in recent years to encompass competition among places for the attention of migrants tourists and media glow as well as investment the most competitive places have been multidimensional in their attractions and have made the transition to the knowledge based economy the latest priority is being placed on attracting mobile workers and mobile investment creative workers are the core of the knowledge economy and of its geographies such as intelligent places and learning regions knowledge metrics innovation indices and report cards are increasingly common each seemingly developed to sort the list of places in a different order lists or league tables of the best places for business to live retire and visit are key features of economies and societies whose factors of success

the regional geography of corporate patenting in information and communications technology ict domestic and foreign dimensions in the new techno socio economic conditions characterized by an increasing reduction of temporal and spatial barriers and further globalization of economic activity paradoxically geography seems to matter more than ever before this particularly applies to science based industries e g information and communications technology ict where links between corporate competitors and firm university and user producer relationships are crucial in the development and adoption of new flexible technologies using us patents granted to the largest european electronic firms this paper looks at the interplay between the patenting by domestic and european foreign electronics companies of research and development carried out in ict fields in german uk and italian regions the findings suggest that patenting is attracted to existing areas of industrial strength taking a form of cumulative causation nonetheless policy measures may be successful in reversing the trend sous de nouvelles conditions techno et soc

does agricultural extension pay a case study for a new crop lupins in western australia abstract compared to studies evaluating the benefits from agricultural research there are relatively few empirical studies of the net economic benefits of agricultural extension and even fewer that consider both public and private sector extension effort in this study we examine regional differences in the adoption of lupins in western australia wa in order to estimate the net economic benefits of public and private sector extension impacts of extension and other variables on adoption were analysed for 40 shires using multivariate regression analysis the results suggest that both public and private extension activities influenced farmer uptake of lupins particularly by bringing forward the start time of the diffusion curve economic benefits of extension based on the statistical analysis were combined with costs of extension estimated from public sector records and surveys of private sector extension agents and used to estimate the net present value of extension investments by the public and private sectors in the study area

a divisible search model of fiat money this paper extends the kiyotaki wright search model of fiat money to allow for divisible money and goods the extension allows me to examine the standard issues in monetary economics such as the neutrality and superneutrality of money by severing the artificial link in the kiyotaki wright model between the money supply and the number of money holders it is shown that money is neutral but not superneutral money growth generates a trading opportunity effect it changes the fraction of different agents in the economy and hence changes the probability with which agents have a successful match in addition money growth has a negative effect on the real money balance that is familiar in walrasian monetary models the balance of the two effects can imply a positive optimal money growth rate

prices versus quantities in fisheries models this paper discusses the conditions for generalizing the analysis in weitzman 1974 to fisheries it is shown that it is straightforward to generalize the analysis if the cost function is direct additively separable in stock size and catches this leads to the conclusion that the analysis holds for a schooling fishery with and without search costs but it might not hold for a search fishery a further result is that for a schooling fishery without search costs where the marginal cost function is steeper than the marginal benefit function taxes are likely to be preferred over individual transferable quotas

whither monetary economics i argue that monetary economics should be pursued by applying implementation theory to models which contain explicit frictions that make money essential the argument has two parts first i argue that models in which real balances are assumed to be productive models with money in utility or production functions or with cash in advance constraints contain hidden inconsistencies second i argue that the approach advocated is capable of providing new insights about some of the main issues in monetary economics the effects of monetary shocks the welfare cost of inflation and the roles of inside and outside money

repeated games with long run and short run players this paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long and short run players and little discounting because the short run players are unconcerned about the future each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction best response curves the natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values in fact this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player s choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but in contrast to standard repeated games the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents realized actions

globalisation competition and the politics of local economic development the study of urban politics in the us is now dominated by issues of local economic development these are situated analytically with respect to a more global space economy this is the new urban politics the central logic of the new urban politics is one of cities or communities competing for mobile capital this competition supposedly has adverse distributional consequences for those living in cities or communities three areas of critical contention are focused on the identity of the competing agents the concept of firm competition underpinning the central idea of mobile capitals and the distributional consequences of the competition for those capitals serious problems in abstraction and in the concept of capital adopted in this literature are identified

context dependent biodiversity conservation management regimes theory and simulations ecosystem degradation hasmotivated a search for successful conservation approaches the perceived failure of state directed protected areas in the tropics has prompted experimentation with community management and co management strategies numerous case studies suggest that none of these are effective universally there exists however little analytical or empirical work to identify under what conditions one arrangement will be more effective than another this paper develops a model of statedependent equilibrium conservation management design that identifies the comparative advantage of different managers in the interest of appropriately locating authority for conservation tasks as a function of prevailing biophysical economic and sociopolitical conditions

public benefits private benefits and policy mechanism choice for land use change for environmental benefits the choice of policy mechanisms for encouraging environmentally beneficial land use change should depend on the relative levels of private or internal net benefits and public or external net benefits a map of recommended policy mechanisms is developed depending on the relative levels of these variables positive incentives negative incentives and extension need to be targeted carefully to appropriate projects where private net benefits are closer to zero and or public net benefits are more extremely positive or negative technology development is suggested where private net costs outweigh public net benefits no action is recommended for many potential projects

endogenous supply of fiat money abstract we consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long lived self interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money we obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues we show however that monetary equilibria with no overissue do not exist when there is no commitment this happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough more generally we prove that in the absence of commitment overissue happens infinitely often in any monetary equilibrium we conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained with commitment

analysis of environmental efficiency variations a nutrient balance approach recent literature has argued that environmental efficiency ee which is built on the materials balance mb principle is more suitable than other ee measures in situations where the law of mass conversation regulates production processes in addition the mb based ee method is particularly useful in analysing possible trade offs between cost and environmental performance identifying determinants of mb based ee can provide useful information to decision makers but there are very few empirical investigations into this issue this article proposes the use of data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis techniques to analyse variation in mb based ee specifically the article develops a stochastic nutrient frontier and nutrient inefficiency model to analyse determinants of mb based ee the empirical study applies both techniques to investigate mb based ee of 96 rice farms in south korea the size of land fertiliser consumption intensity cost allocative efficiency and the share of owned land out of total land are found to be correlated with mb based ee the results confirm the presence of a trade off between mb based ee and cost allocative efficiency and this finding favouring policy interventions to help farms simultaneously achieve cost efficiency and mp based ee

the isomorphism of local development policy a case study of the formation and transformation of national development zones in post mao jiangsu china it is often the case although it has not been well documented that local governments aiming for economic growth tend to formulate and implement very similar or even identical policies this phe

economic inefficiency and environmental impact an application to aquaculture production abstract in industries characterized by frequent innovation and high productivity growth substantial variation in produced quantity and input use may occur leading to increased costs an effect that has received little attention is that inefficiency can exacerbate environmental impacts this effect is particularly important if environmentally damaging inputs are overused in addition to increasing firms costs such inefficiency can also increase the environmental impact of the firm s activity this makes the degree of inefficiency in an industry an issue for environmental regulators in this paper we estimate technical and allocative efficiency for a sample of norwegian salmon farmers our results show that both technical and allocative inefficiency on average are significant in explaining the level and variation in farm costs and that the main environmental impact due to inefficiency from the norwegian salmon aquaculture industry has its origin in technical inefficiency

when green isn t mean economic theory and the heuristics of the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness and opportunity cost abstract the conventional neoclassical economic wisdom argues that the opportunity costs of environmental regulations are high with negative implications for costs and profits and by implication for growth and per capita gross domestic product gdp the minority view that environmental controls induce cost offsets that minimise such opportunity costs is marginalised by the conventional wisdom which assumes that economic agents are x efficient in production a behavioral model of the firm is presented in this paper whereby x inefficiency in production prevails even in a world of perfect product market competition that is dominated by rational economic agents in this model environmental regulations affect both the level of x efficiency and the extent of technological change and greener firms can be cost competitive and profitable however private economic agents cannot be expected to adopt green economic policy independent of regulations since in this model there need not be any economic advantage accruing to the affected firms in becoming greener

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

valuing the environment as input review of applications to mangrove fishery linkages the following paper reviews recent developments in the methodology for valuing the role of wetlands in supporting economic activity the main focus will be on mangroves serving as a breeding ground and nursery habitat in support of coastal and marine fisheries as this particular ecological function of a mangrove system means that it is effectively an unpriced environmental input into fisheries then it is possible to value this contribution through applying the production function approach the first half of the paper overviews the procedure for valuing the environment as an input applied to the case of a wetland supporting a fishery both the static ellis fisher freeman approach and the dynamic approach developed by barbier and strand incorporating the intertemporal bioeconomic fishing problem are reviewed the second half of the paper discusses briefly two recent case studies of mangrove fishery valuation an application in south thailand which is based on the static ellis fisher freeman model and an application in campeche mexico which is based on the dynamic approach 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a contribution to the pure theory of money abstract this article analyzes a general equilibrium model with search frictions and differentiated commodities because of the many differentiated commodities barter is difficult in that it requires a double coincidence of wants and this provides a medium of exchange role for fiat currency we prove the existence of equilibrium with valued fiat money and show it is robust to certain changes in the environment rate of return dominance liquidity and the welfare implications of fiat money are discussed

the environment as a factor of production the authors develop a model of environmental resource use in production with an empirical analysis of how electric power companies consume and bank sulfur dioxide pollution permits the model considers emissions fuels and labor as variable inputs with quasi fixed inputs of permits and capital incorporating information from permit markets allows the authors to distinguish between user costs and asset shadow values their findings indicate that firms are holding stocks of pollution permits for reasons other than short term cost savings the results also reveal substantial substitution possibilities between emissions permits stocks and other factors of production the authors speculate that anticipated secondary markets for carbon offset inventories related to the flexibility mechanisms of the kyoto protocol will have similar effects for greenhouse gas emitting firms

the political economy of wildlife exploitation in this paper we analyze the exploitation of wildlife in a third world context in the model there are two agents an agency managing a habitat area of fixed size and a group of peasants the agency managing the habitat area has the legal right to exploit the wildlife while the local people hunt illegally introducing the concept of relative harvesting dominance we demonstrate that the stock utilization depends crucially on the prevailing economic and ecological conditions it is also shown that the existing property rights regime appears in different forms depending on these conditions

the value of environment across efficiency quantiles a conditional regression quantiles analysis of rangelands beef production in north eastern australia in agricultural systems the value of environmental inputs can be measured using the production function approach whereby the marginal contributions of factors are associated with a shadow value under perfect competition and rationality assumptions however empirical studies show that inefficiency in production is common indicating that the rationality assumption is not met furthermore substantial evidence exists to suggest that the contributions of environmental inputs in particular may be differentiated across the efficiency distribution this means that the frontier technology may not be an appropriate reflection of the technology in use by inefficient enterprises this article presents the use of conditional regression quantiles to consider how the value of environmental inputs measured by their contributions to production vary across efficiency quantiles we employed a case study of rangelands beef production in australia to consider how environmental health differentially contributes to production values across efficiency quantiles our approach generates detailed insights into the nature of environmentally sourced technical inefficiency and suggests that conditional quantile regression approaches are ideal for consideration of issues wherein substantial heterogeneity exists limiting the information content of conditional mean based analyses

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

on the private provision of fiat currency this paper considers whether fiat money can be provided by a revenue maximizing monopolist in an environment where money is essential two questions arise concerning the private supply of money is it feasible and is it optimal concerning the feasibility question i show that the revenue maximizing policy is time consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky concerning the optimality question the model suggests that any private organization of the market for fiat currency is suboptimal

friedman meets hosios efficiency in search models of money this article studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous search decisions we show that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value generate an inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades the friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and the hosios rule the second a monetary equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied when they cannot be satisfied simultaneously optimal monetary policy achieves only the second best we analyse the conditions under which the second best monetary policy exceeds the friedman rule

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

landing fees vs harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks a revised version of this paper was published in the journal of environmental economics and management volume 43 issue 2 march 2002 pages 325 338

do conservation auctions crowd out voluntary environmentally friendly activities research has shown that introducing external incentives to encourage pro social behavior such as monetary rewards or regulation may crowd out voluntary pro social activity this has implications for the appropriate design and use of such incentive based programs this study investigates motivational crowding out in the case of conservation auctions a relatively new tool that provides monetary incentives to encourage landowners to adopt environmentally friendly management practices our experimental evidence shows that the introduction and subsequent removal of a conservation auction significantly reduces voluntary provision of environmental quality via monetary donations to an environmental charity compared to a control group that does not experience an auction we also attempt to examine some economic theories of behavior that explain this effect according to either individual motivations or social interactions and our initial exploration finds that crowding out occurs regardless of whether or not participants have opportunities to interact with one another during the experiment

a note on permits standards and technological innovation abstract montero j environ econom manage 44 2002 23 contrasts the incentives to invest in new abatement technologies under different regulatory instruments and argues that one needs to consider the induced output effects that derive from lower abatement costs montero shows that once one takes into account these effects on output command and control instruments can generate stronger incentives to innovate than market based instruments this result rests on strategic output effects under command and control however he maintains that under perfectly competitive conditions market based instruments will continue to weakly dominate command and control regulation this note clarifies two issues raised by montero first i use montero s approach to show that in fact performance concentration standards will generate greater incentives to innovate than market based instruments in perfectly competitive markets one does not require strategic effects to get this result second montero abstracts from production costs and concentrates solely on abatement costs he implicitly assumes that marginal production costs are constant i show that some of montero s results change once increasing marginal production costs are considered when marginal costs are increasing the benefit of additional output is tempered and market based instruments again look more favorable

capturing the least costly way of reducing pollution a shadow price approach abstract the production analysis literature is increasingly concerned with estimating marginal abatement costs yet most studies do not emphasize the ways in which pollutants may be reduced and their costs which makes them unable to identify the least costly compliance strategy this paper utilizes the materials balance principle to relate pollution to the employment of material inputs a production model which allows input and output substitution downscaling of operations pollution control and emission permits purchases as compliance strategies is proposed and the implications of joint and non joint pollution controls for the trade off between pollutants and desirable outputs are considered marginal abatement costs reflecting the least costly way of compliance are derived by exploiting the duality between the directional distance function and the profit function