international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

do the russians really save that much alternate estimates from the russian longitudinal monitoring survey we use a new independent survey of 4000 russian households the russian longitudinal monitoring survey or rlms to study their saving behavior the rlms household saving rate 12 is less than half the official figure 29 despite the massive changes of the transition the russian household saving rate of 1994 cannot be shown to be different from that of 1976 the patterns of russian household saving differ from international experience its paradoxical u shaped saving age relationship may be explained by the dramatic deterioration of life expectancies of middle aged russians

constrained efficiency in the neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we investigate the welfare properties of the one sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first order condition of a constrained planner s problem this condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low the factor composition of income of the consumption poor using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature we illustrate that there can be either over or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long run distribution of wealth for the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking it has much too low a steady state capital stock

rational heuristics expectations and behaviors in evolving economies with heterogeneous interacting agents we analyze the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations and action rules within an agent based model populated by heterogeneous interacting firms agents have to cope with a complex evolving economy characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change imperfect information coordination hurdles and structural breaks in these circumstances we find that neither individual nor macroeconomic dynamics improve when agents replace myopic expectations with less naive learning rules our results suggest that fast and frugal robust heuristics may not be a second best option but rather rational responses in complex and changing macroeconomic environments jel c63 d8 e32 e6 o4

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

federal lending and the market for credit abstract federal lending is an important but unrecognized feature of modern credit markets this paper analyzes the effects of credit interventions on credit allocation and economic efficiency the underlying model posits asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and allows for market clearing rationed or redlined equilibria principal results include unsubsidized credit interventions are neutral the relative effectiveness of alternative lending instruments depends on whether rationing occurs interactions among programs can have perverse effects and even without an informational advantage the government may enact welfare improving credit policies under certain conditions

enforcing international trade agreements with imperfect private monitoring to analyse the role that the world trade organization wto plays in enforcing international trade agreements this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies pts under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country s concealed trade barriers it identifies the condition under which countries can restrain the use of concealed barriers based on pts and establishes that countries will not reduce the cooperative protection level to its minimum attainable level under the optimal pts this paper then considers third party trigger strategies tts under which the wto allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on the wto s judgement about potential violations by comparing the optimal pts and optimal tts it demonstrates that the wto facilitates a better cooperative equilibrium by changing the nature of punishment triggering signals from private to public which in turn enables countries to use a more efficient punishment such as an asymmetric and a minimum punishment

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

the ramsey problem for congestible facilities abstract in recent years a new set of models drawing on vickrey 1969 has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities these models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers time of use decisions and the congestion technology standard models in contrast simply assume the general form of the cost function we apply the new approach to analyze the ramsey problem for a congestible facility and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology

self enforcing trade agreements and lobbying abstract in an environment where international trade agreements must be enforced via promises of future cooperation the presence of an import competing lobby has important implications for optimal punishments when lobbies work to disrupt trade agreements a nash reversion punishment scheme must balance two conflicting objectives longer punishments help to enforce cooperation by increasing the government s costs of defecting but because the lobby prefers the punishment outcome this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it political pressure to break the agreement thus the model generates an optimal length for nash reversion punishments and it depends directly on the political influence of the lobbies trade agreement tariffs are shown to be increasing in the political influence of the lobbies as well as their patience levels

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

a political economy theory of trade agreements we develop a model where trade agreements in addition to correcting terms of trade externalities help governments to commit vis a vis domestic industrial lobbies the model allows us to explore how the characteristics of the political environment aect the structure of the trade agreement and the extent of trade liberalization the model also highlights the role of intersectoral capital mobility in determining trade liberalization in a dynamic extension of the model we explore the extent to which trade liberalization occurs gradually and how its speed depends on the fundamentals of the problem

the assessment household saving issues in theory and policy in this assessment we discuss the issues raised by the papers in this issue of the oxford review of economic policy in the context of economic models of household consumption and saving we also provide a discussion of what we consider to be some important areas in the current debate surrounding theories and evidence regarding saving behaviour we highlight the differences that arise from considering partial as opposed to general equilibrium models and in looking at developed as opposed to developing countries we also discuss current policy issues relating both to the adequacy of household saving and to the distribution of saving across households or across asset types as well as the need for more microdata on saving and asset holding

a bargaining theory of inefficient redistribution policies when two policies are available to achieve the same goal why is the relatively inefficient one often observed we address this question in the context of policies used to redistribute income towards special interest groups sigs in a two stage model in the first stage the set of constraints on policy instruments is chosen in the second stage the government and sigs bargain over the level of the available transfer policies restrictions on the use of efficient policies and the use of inefficient ones reduce the surplus over which sigs and governments can bargain there is however an offsetting effect not generally recognized in models of inefficient redistribution an improvement in the government s bargaining position which allows it to capture a larger share of the surplus we show that this positive effect for the government dominates under plausible conditions inefficient policies are the equilibrium outcome under alternative first stage mechanisms for policy selection such as the election of policymakers or in some cases bargaining between sigs and the government jel classification d7 f13 c70 h23

information constrained optima with retrading an externality and its market based solution this paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states both with retrading in ex post spot markets the interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality unless preferences have special restrictive properties the externality is internalized by allowing agents to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the spot price or interest rate over and above contracting on actions and outputs then competitive equilibria are equivalent with the appropriate notion of constrained pareto optimality examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals or price islands created endogenously in equilibrium

policy choice theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements abstract why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose we address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups sigs by focusing on a set of important policies tariffs and non tariff barriers ntbs in our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient ntbs commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic sigs using detailed data we find support for several of the model s predictions including i tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of ntbs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions ii tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a sig thus the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

a long run perspective on saving historical estimates of long run gross savings rates are provided for 11 countries which represent about 48 per cent of world product in real terms and close to half of world savings even though savings rates declined over the past decade in nine of the 11 countries present rates are usually well above their prewar levels factors which influence savings rates are also examined

purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism cost sharing rules for paying physicians have been advanced as a way of generating incentives for the provision of quality care while recognizing their potential negative effects on production efficiency however the optimal sharing rate typically depends on the degree to which the physician acts in the interest of the patient what we identify as the physician s altruism since the degree of altruism is likely to vary across physicians and to be private information the standard rules for setting the cost sharing rate are unlikely to be optimal this paper derives conditions for the optimal non linear cost sharing mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information about altruism and shows how it can sometimes be implemented through a menu of linear cost sharing schemes the model can be used to rationalize the design of the fund holder system for general practictioners that operated in the 1990s in the united kingdom

capital regulation and credit fluctuations we provide a rationale for imposing counter cyclical capital ratios on banks in our simple model bankers cannot pledge the entire future revenues to investors which limits borrowing in good and bad times complete markets do not sufficiently stabilize credit fluctuations as banks allocate too much borrowing capacity to good states and too little to bad states as a consequence bank credit output capital prices or wages are excessively volatile imposing a stricter capital ratio in good states corrects the misallocation of the borrowing capacity increases expected output and can be beneficial to all agents in the economy although in our economy all agents are risk neutral counter cyclical capital ratios are an effective stabilization tool to ensure this effectiveness capital ratios have to be based on ex ante equity capital as classical capital ratios can be bypassed

understanding the mechanisms of economic development in this paper i advocate the investigation testing and modification of mechanisms as a progressive empirical research strategy for the field of economic development and other areas of applied economics i discuss three lines of work that have elucidated mechanisms that are relevant for development 1 connections between saving and growth 2 the determinants of commodity prices which are a key source of income for many developing countries and 3 some unexpected puzzles that arise in considering the linkages between income and food consumption in each case my discussion illustrates the positivist approach to the hypotheticodeductive method in this approach mechanisms are proposed key predictions derived and tested and if falsified the mechanisms are rejected or modified if the predictions of a mechanism are confirmed if they are sufficiently specific and if they are hard to explain in other ways we attach additional credence to the mechanism albeit provisionally since later evidence may undermine it sometimes the falsifications can be repaired by changing supplementary assumptions and sometimes they involve long steps backwards where the model is abandoned and often there is disagreement about which is the correct response but the end result is an accumulation of useful knowledge and understanding

saving and growth evidence from micro data abstract this paper examines whether the observed cross country correlation between aggregate saving rates and economic growth can be explained by models in which higher growth increases saving rates rather than the other way around there are two explanations why higher growth might increase saving first life cycle theory implies that higher growth will increase the life time wealth of younger savers relative to older dissavers thereby increasing the aggregate saving rate second models of consumption with habit formation imply that consumption responds slowly to unexpected income growth so unanticipated growth can produce a higher saving rate at least in the short run i assess these explanations using time series of cross sections of household surveys from four countries the us britain taiwan and thailand i find evidence that higher growth will produce only small increases in aggregate saving rates

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

what do we learn from recall consumption data in this paper we use two complementary italian data sources the 1995 istat and bank of italy household surveys to generate householdspecific nondurable expenditure in the bank of italy sample that contains relatively high quality income data we show that food expenditure data are of comparable quality and informational content across the two surveys once we properly account for heaping rounding and time averaging we therefore depart from standard practice and rely on the estimation of an inverse engel curve on istat data to impute nondurable expenditure to bank of italy observations and show how we can use these estimates to analyze consumption age profiles conditional on demographics our key result is that predictions based on a standard set of demographic and socioeconomic indicators are quite different from predictions that also condition on simulated food consumption in the sense that their age profile is less in line with the implications of the standard consumer intertemporal optimization problem

a theory of the stakeholder corporation there is a widely held view within the general public that large corporations should act in the interests of a broader group of agents than just their shareholders the stake holder view this paper presents a framework where this idea can be justified the point of departure is the observation that a large firm typically faces endogenous risks that may have a significant impact on the workers it employs and the consumers it serves these risks generate externalities on these stakeholders which are not inter nalized by shareholders as a result in the competitive equilibrium there is under investment in the prevention of these risks we suggest that this under investment problem can be alleviated if firms are instructed to maximize the total welfare of their stakeholders rather than shareholder value alone stakeholder equilibrium the stake holder equilibrium can be implemented by introducing new property rights employee rights and consumer rights and instructing managers to maximize the total value of the firm the value of these rights plus shareholder value if there is only one firm the stakeholder equilibrium is pareto optimal however this is not true with more than one firm and or heterogeneous agents which illustrates some of the limits of the stake holder model

decomposition of new venture growth into firm age survey period and vintage effects firm data are accumulated on a yearly basis in view of the linear relationship of firm age foundation year survey year the fluctuations of firm data classified by age and period cannot be decomposed into age period and cohort foundation year effects three decomposition methods are briefly reviewed and applied to japanese data on new ventures founded since 1995 regarding sales and employment growth the age effect is the largest with a downward trend and the cohort effect is negligible regarding labour productivity the age effect indicates upward movements and the cohort effect is negligible the reason of the negligible cohort effect is discussed

on the role of retaliation in trade agreements this paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements it shows that in the presence of private information retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments in particular it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium we argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms of trade externalities within the current world trading system though in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal the model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies

a theory of managed trade this paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of normal trade volume coupled with episodes of special protection when trade volumes surge this dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game facing volatile trade swings high trade volume leads to a greater incentive to defect unilaterally from cooperative tariff levels therefore as the volume of trade expands the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check copyright 1990 by american economic association

multiple bgps in a growth model with habit persistence this paper establishes multiple balanced growth paths in an otherwise standard competitive growth model without externality or distortions and with households preference dependent upon how his her consumption compares to a habit stock formed by his her own past consumption the key feature in our model is that consumption forms habits in combination with existing habits this model establishes multiple equilibria because habit persistence induces an internal intertemporal complementarity effect among consumption flows with current consumption reinforcing future consumption as a result there exist two balanced growth paths with one path exhibiting low consumption and habits and high economic growth and the other path exhibiting high consumption and habits and low growth that is not necessarily a development trap both steady states are saddles but global indeterminacy arises where a high balanced growth path co exists with a low balanced growth path where the two equilibrium paths cannot be pareto ranked and history need not matter for the selection of the equilibrium path

the societal benefit of a financial transaction tax we provide a novel justification for a financial transaction tax for economies where agents face stochastic consumption opportunities a financial transaction tax makes it more costly for agents to readjust their portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets in response to liquidity shocks which increase both the demand for and the price of liquid assets the higher price improves liquidity insurance and welfare for other market participants we calibrate the model to u s data and find that the optimal financial transaction tax is 1 6 and that it reduces the volume of financial trading by 17

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

policy watch antitrust goes to college it may have come as a shock to many economists especially those in academia to learn that the antitrust division of the u s department of justice doj has been investigating alleged price fixing and information exchange of financial aid among 23 prestigious east coast colleges and universities these schools include the ivy overlap group mit brown columbia cornell dartmouth harvard university of pennsylvania princeton and yale and the pentagonal sisters group amherst barnard bowdoin bryn mawr colby mount holyoke middlebury smith trinity tufts vassar wesleyan and williams we have no specific knowledge concerning the possible validity of these allegations or expertise about their legality rather in this article we wish to present the potential applicability of current antitrust doctrines to colleges and their conduct and the possible defenses that they might raise to justify their actions

does economic diplomacy work a meta analysis of its impact on trade and investment we review the literature on economic diplomacy and provide a meta analysis of 32 empirical studies published in 1986 2011 that deal with the trade and investment impact of economic diplomacy embassies consulates other diplomatic facilities investment and export promotion offices trade and state visits controlling for differences in research design methodology time frame and manner of data we find a positive and significant effect of economic diplomacy on international economic flows with the exception of state visits and that this is true in a sample of 627 t statistics analysed with ols and for a larger sample of 963 reported significance levels analysed with logit thus illustrating robustness with respect to sample and estimation technique our analyses show that reported effects of economic diplomacy on trade and investment in individual studies are sensitive to model specification the primary studies that investigate only one source country are less likely to report significant positive effects compared to other sciences economic studies are less likely to report significantly positive effects of economic diplomacy primary studies lump embassies and consulates general into one indicator miss that these instruments differ significantly embassies consulates and agencies should thus be included as separate instruments in future research

asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information the authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible individually rational and nearly efficient the main theorem covers both the case in which aggregate uncertainty remains when the economy is replicated and the case in which replication eliminates aggregate uncertainty in addition the authors demonstrate how their theorem does or does not apply to standard asymmetric information problems such as the buyer s bid double auction problem akerlof s lemons problem and insurance with asymmetric information copyright 1992 by the econometric society

government involvement in the corporate governance of banks on march 18 1976 the swedish parliament voted on a bill that if approved would have substantially increased both the scale and scope of government representation on bank boards since parliament was hung the outcome of the vote was decided by a lottery we exploit this lottery to study the causal effect on shareholder value of government involvement in the corporate governance of banks we find that the rejection of the bill resulted in positive abnormal returns that persisted in the following days our results suggest that unsolicited government involvement in the corporate governance of banks is harmful for owners jel codes g14 g34 g38

all for one or all for three empirical evidence of paradox theory in the triple bottom line abstract we empirically examine the triple bottom line of a sample of 746 firms from 2003 to 2013 the business case for sustainability advocates for corporate responsibilities only if they strengthen profits in contrast paradox theory states that managers should embrace the tensions between multiple bottom lines seeking simultaneous benefits combining data from kld and compustat we find strong supporting evidence for paradox theory first the findings suggest that the three components of the triple bottom line move in tandem rather than being mutually exclusive where high poor performance in one dimension relates to high poor performance in the other two dimensions regardless of the economic conditions second using the great recession as an exogenous shock we find supporting evidence for paradox theory lastly we link paradox theory and its implication on market valuation we find that the more components achieved at a high level the higher the market valuation with the valuation increasing per component achieved we conclude that the traditional focus on scarcity and the mutual exclusivity of sustainability goals is not empirically supported in our study instead we find compelling evidence for the abundance perspective of paradox theory and the simultaneous achievement of sustainability goals our results highlight that in viewing three bottom lines managers should embrace any ostensible tensions to find creative ways to address all three instead of all for one

where modern macroeconomics went wrong this paper provides a critique of the dsge models that have come to dominate macroeconomics during the past quarter century it argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong microfoundations which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour e g incorporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics inadequate modelling of the financial sector meant they were ill suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis and a reliance on representative agent models meant they were ill suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality the paper proposes alternative benchmark models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them

toward a stakeholder theory of the firm the saturn partnership this paper seeks to engage the organization theory community in contemporary debates over the role of the corporation in american society by using the case of the saturn corporation to develop and illustrate a stakeholder theory of the firm one normative and three positive questions are posed for a stakeholder theory the normative question is why should stakeholder models be given serious consideration at this moment in history the positive questions are 1 under what conditions is a stakeholder firm likely to emerge in the united states 2 what are the critical determinants of performance in a stakeholder firm and 3 what will determine the sustainability and diffusion of this organizational form in the american environment the history design features and dynamics of the labormanagement partnership at saturn are used to illustrate and interpret a specific case of employees as stakeholders saturn s original mission governance structure and internal processes fit the characteristics of a stakeholder firm employees establish themselves as influential definitive stakeholders by using their knowledge to improve organizational performance the local union likewise contributes to firm performance by organizing workers into a dense social network that contributes to problem solving conflict resolution and quality improvement however the legal and political environment in which the firm operates produces considerable uncertainty over the sustainability and diffusion of saturn s features in particular and the stakeholder organizational form in general additional hypotheses and research questions are proposed to continue theory building around the more general model of the stakeholder firm researchers are encouraged to take up the analysis of stakeholder models and thereby contribute to the contemporary and future debates over the role of the corporation in american society

gatt a cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime abstract as global tariff rates have fallen the use of nontariff barriers to trade have become more prevalent one incentive for a country to depart from free trade is to levy the optimal tariff in order to maximize domestic welfare the gatt was designed to maintain free trade through a system of managed retaliation as is well known in a game theoretic trade model of tariffs with no uncertainty free trade is an equilibrium outcome however with the introduction of uncertainty and asymmetric information it is shown that the equilibrium outcome s has each country imposing nontariff barriers to trade

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of free trade areas we consider the impact of the formation of free trade agreements on multilateral tariff cooperation we assume that countries are limited to selfenforcing multilateral arrangements that balance the gains from deviating against the costs of an ensuing trade war we find that the emergence of free trade areas will be accompanied by a temporary retreat from liberal multilateral trade policies as the initial balance supporting multilateral cooperation is upset eventually however as the full impact of the emerging free trade agreement on multilateral trade patterns is felt this initial balance tends to reemerge and liberal multilateral trade policies can be restored

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

endogenous public information and welfare in market games this paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition pricecontingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information a payoff pecuniary externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality the impact of the first depends on whether competition is of the strategic substitutes or complements variety and the second induces agents to put too little weight on private information we find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very strong agents put too much weight on private information and prices are too informative this will happen in the normal case where the allocational role of price prevails over its informational role under strategic complementarity there is always under reliance on private information the welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information the analysis provides insights into optimal business cycle policy and a rationale for a tobin like tax for speculators in financial markets

growth and saving among individuals and households the lifecycle theory of saving and consumption predicts that changes in an economy s rate of economic growth will affect its aggregate saving rate by changing the lifetime resources of younger people relative to older people however studies that track the saving behavior of cohorts of household heads over time as they age have yielded estimates of age saving profiles that are too flat for growth to have much effect on the aggregate saving rate one problem with the cohort approach is that multigenerational households are common in many counties and the age saving profiles of households may be quite different from the age saving profiles of individuals that make up households in this paper we propose a method for estimating individual age saving profiles using household data this method is applied to data from taiwan and thailand we find that the individual method yields results that are more favorable to the lifecycle model these results imply that changes in the rate of economic growth may in som

measuring and understanding behavior welfare and poverty angus deaton delivered his prize lecture on tuesday 8 december 2015 at the aula magna stockholm university these are the lecture slides this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do consumers respond to future income shocks evidence from social security reform in taiwan abstract a prediction of the basic permanent income hypothesis life cycle model is that an unexpected increase in future income produces an immediate increase in current consumption this paper tests that prediction using data from taiwan the 1985 labor standards law granted all employees in covered industries a windfall retirement severance benefit my results indicate that consumption did not increase immediately for those who were granted the windfall relative to those who received no windfall moreover consumption for those receiving a greater windfall did not increase relative to those who were granted less

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement abstract this paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions such as the wto play a central role in supporting credible enforcement in our model countries engage in ongoing negotiations and as a consequence cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions by using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation despite the lack of coercive power the occurrence of costly trade disputes and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify and condition on events that may lead to trade disputes

jointly optimal regulation of bank capital and liquidity in an economy with financial frictions banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints which require less information than pigouvian taxes the liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of basel iii can implement efficiency additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly micro and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes optimally macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk

integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance abstract this paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment this paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration we show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension funded self insurance this system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives we also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other

dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non cooperatively countries know their own level of protection but not the other country s level of protection using import trigger strategies cooperation in the form of low tariffs can be supported although there are periodic reversionary high tariff episodes however if terms of trade trigger strategies are used cooperation does not occur

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices we provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection we then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance such variation together with quantity data allows us to estimate the demand for insurance the same variation together with cost data allows us to estimate how insurers costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price the slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and the nature of selection and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare we illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employerprovided health insurance from one specific company we detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small in both absolute and relative terms

on the public choice critique of welfare economics the public choice literature urges the welfare economist to anticipate how political forces will shape the levels of new policy instruments when government intervenes in a new way this paper argues that the welfare economist should also recognize that new interventions may impact the politically determined levels of existing policy instruments it shows how the introduction of a new instrument can lead to shifts in political coalitions or compromises in existing areas of conflict that can produce significant changes in existing policies such spillover effects can provide new arguments for introducing particular policy interventions even a policy instrument without an obvious welfare economic rationale can change voter coalitions and shift the policy equilibrium in a welfare improving direction

capital market liberalization economic growth and instability summary this paper reviews briefly the arguments for capital market liberalization and identifies their theoretical and empirical weaknesses this provides the foundations for the argument for intervention in short term capital flows the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the various ways in which such interventions may be implemented 2000 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

free trade and laissez faire has the wheel come full circle this paper notes that there is a need to get to a fourth stage in the evolution of the relationship of free trade to laissez faire going beyond the three stages identified in max cordon s magisterial book trade policy and economic welfare in the first stage free trade was a special case of the argument for laissez faire in the second stage many arguments for protection arose with various qualifications to the case of free trade and laissez faire in the third stage the link between free trade and laissez faire was broken and in the theory of domestic distortions it was noted that all arguments for protection except in the case of monopoly power in trade were second best arguments moreover it was possible to devise measures such as taxes and subsidies that reduced the distortion through government intervention but noting that government intervention itself carries with it problems of rent seeking and directly unproductive activities as well as the taking into the proper role of government laissez faire seems the best policy hence the need for a fourth stage in the evolution of free trade and laissez faire to link them together again

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions abstract we study the implications of customs union formation for multilateral tariff cooperation we model cooperation in multilateral trade policy as self enforcing in that it involves balancing the current gains from deviating unilaterally from an agreed upon trade policy against the future losses from forfeiting the benefits of multilateral cooperation that such a unilateral defection would imply the early stages of the process of customs union formation are shown to alter this dynamic incentive constraint in a way that leads to a temporary honeymoon for liberal multilateral trade policies we find however that the harmony between customs unions and multilateral liberalization is temporary eventually as the full impact of the emerging customs union becomes felt a less favorable balance between current and future conditions re emerges and the liberal multilateral policies of the honeymoon phase cannot be sustained

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

three s a crowd third parties and wto dispute settlement in spite of the recent failure of two referendums the drafting of a constitution for the second biggest economic power in the world the european union eu remains a major event in the history of european integration whether the constitution or a revised version of it will come into force or not several important questions emerge how did an increased number of twenty five member states reach a conclusion whereas a lower number of fifteen had failed at previous intergovernmental attempts in particular how did the constitutional convention differ from previous intergovernmental conferences igcs at which the eu exclusively bargained its treaty documents in the past how can one explain the outcomes of the convention which proposes redistribution of power and resources among twenty five or more member states this article uses the positions of the delegates of the eu s constitutional convention to examine bargaining in a setting with few formal rules the authors use theoretical insights from a spatial model and new survey data to determine the implicit voting rule used at the convention they find that the convention differed from previous igcs because the convention was governed by consensus whereas previous eu bargains on treaties had always required unanimous support the level of consensus was higher than simple majority rule but lower than unanimity since this threshold impacted who won and who lost at the convention the authors also examine the sources of bargaining power such as delegates distance to the status quo distance to the median population size and domestic constraints the results confirm several findings in the eu bargaining and two level game literature for example that actors closer to the status quo hold a stronger bargaining position and that actors from larger member states are neither more likely nor less likely to win at the negotiating table than are actors from smaller states the findings on the irrelevance of domestic constraints also indicate why the popular votes in france and the netherlands failed

the joint design of unemployment insurance and employment protection a first pass unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation in this paper we argue that they are tightly linked and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model with risk averse workers risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity we show that in the first best unemployment insurance comes with employment protection in the form of layoff taxes indeed optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits we then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best limits on insurance limits on layoff taxes ex post wage bargaining and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers we show how the design must be modified in each case finally we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals from the financing of unemployment insurance to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

smoking skydiving and knitting the endogenous categorization of risks in insurance markets with asymmetric information we analyze the efficiency and market equilibirum effects of endogenous categorization where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propersities and we show that the use of such categorization may permit the attainment of first best allocations as competitive nash equilibria the optimal insurance premium involves a trade off between the use of categorization to correct moral hazard externalities generated by the consumption of the product and the use of differential consumption to sort heterogeneous consumers thereby mitigating the social costs of adverse selection the efficiency consequences of taxing or subsidizing aggregate as opposed to individual consumption is also considered

classifying monetary economics fields and methods from past to future we propose a simple yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of monetary economics it comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that expand within and across these fields the elements of our scheme are not found together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization our intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness we rather suggest a viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge our hope is to stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary economics at large

reversal of fortunes the rise and fall of lifetime earnings of iranian men abstractthe islamic revolution of 1979 the 8 year war with iraq 1980 88 and the collapse of oil prices in 1986 dealt huge blows to iran s economy in this article we use a pseudopanel constructed from annual multiple surveys during 1984 2004 to analyze changes in cohort earnings and consumption through these tumultuous times using well known techniques we decompose the changes in median cohort earnings of men into cohort age and year effects our results show that cohorts born before 1950 who were well into their careers at the time of the revolution enjoyed a steady increase in lifetime earnings however those born after the mid 1960s who started their careers during the revolution and the war with iraq experienced losses relative to previous cohorts in contrast to earnings per capita expenditures do not indicate a declining cohort trend for younger cohorts when we restrict the year effects to cyclical variation only the cohort effects show a rising trend we interpret the difference in

demographic change and the uk savings rate microeconomic data are used to explore the effects of a changing age structure on the uk s aggregate personal savings rate the findings suggest that changes to the population s age structure have had detectable sustained but relative to the yearly changes observed in the savings rate over the previous century modest effects on aggregate personal sector savings it is estimated that the projected changes to the uk s age structure over the next 40 years are likely to raise the uk s savings rate but by no more than two percentage points no basis is found for the view that the aggregate savings rate will decline as a result of the anticipated ageing of the uk population

age period cohort decomposition of aggregate data an application to us and japanese household saving rates this paper compares two methods of analyzing aggregate data that is classified by period and age because there is a linear relationship among age period and cohort it is not possible to distinguish the separate effects without employing an identifying assumption the first method which is applied in the economics literature assumes that period effects are orthogonal to a linear time trend the second method which is applied in the statistics literature assumes that the effect parameters change gradually simulation results suggest that the performances of both methods are comparable the results of applying the second method to household saving rates suggest that period effects had a negligible influence in the united states but considerable influence in japan copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

land taxes output taxes and sharecropping was henry george right economists have generally argued that if a land tax is administratively feasible then to increase efficiency it should be used to the exclusion of output taxes this article shows that underlying this policy prescription is the assumption that institutions for pooling and spreading production risks are perfect when account is taken of the imperfections in those institutions some use of output taxes will be pareto superior to a pure land tax regime and may induce higher output as well henry george was wrong these results generally apply even when the land tax is indexed to regional output and when land is farmed under sharecropping even in these cases a move from a pure land tax to a mix of land and low output taxes will reduce pre existing distortions in both consumption and production arising from the imperfection in risk markets

wage structure as implicit insurance on human capital in developed versus underdeveloped countries abstract this paper explores the role of wage structure as implicit insurance on human capital it illustrates how smaller wage differentials in the developed world can be welfare enhancing by acting as implicit insurance while larger wage differentials in underdeveloped countries make investments in human capital riskier in other words with smaller wage differentials the students in a developed country are insured against poor educational outcomes through the existence of well paid alternative employments which are not present in the economy of a less developed country this result arises as multiple equilibria in a general equilibrium model when there are no insurance markets for human capital

explaining the wealth holdings of different cohorts productivity growth and social security in this paper we explore the reasons why different generations accumulate different amounts of wealth we use basic economic theory to propose two indicators of the economic conditions under which households accumulate wealth the first one represents productivity differences across cohorts the aggregate level of gross national product per capita around the time the head of the household entered the labor market the second measure summarizes the changes in social security during the head of household s working life using panel data from the dutch socio economic panel we show that productivity growth can explain all the cohort effects present in income data while productivity growth and the generosity of social security can explain all the cohort effects present in household net worth we also find a limited offset of social security on wealth holdings

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding