negotiation and the ipo offer price a comparison of integer vs non integer ipos we investigate the pricing of 4 989 equity ipos with offer dates between 1981 and 2000 approximately three fourths of these ipos have integer offer prices average initial returns for ipos with integer offer prices are significantly higher 24 5 than those priced on the fraction of the dollar 8 1 this result is robust through time and after conditioning for other effects known to influence initial returns we hypothesize that integer vs fractional dollar ipos are the result of negotiations between the issuing firm and underwriter under this negotiation hypothesis the frequency of integer pricing should be an increasing function of the offer price and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the value of the firm empirical evidence supportive of the negotiation hypothesis is presented

global warming and hyperbolic discounting the use of a constant discount rate to study long lived environmental problems such as global warming has two disadvantages the prescribed policy is sensitive to the discount rate and with moderate discount rates large future damages have almost no effect on current decisions time consistent quasi hyperbolic discounting alleviates both of these modeling problems and is a plausible description of how people think about the future we analyze the time consistent markov perfect equilibrium in a general model with a stock pollutant the solution to the linear quadratic specialization illustrates the role of hyperbolic discounting in a model of global warming

optimal taxation and cross price effects on labor supply estimates of the optimal gas tax abstract this study estimates parameters necessary to calculate the optimal second best gasoline tax most notably the cross price elasticity between gasoline and leisure prior theoretical work indicates the importance of this elasticity but despite this almost none of the prior studies of commodity taxation and none of the studies on second best environmental regulation actually estimate it using household data we find that gasoline is a relative complement to leisure and thus that the optimal gasoline tax is significantly higher than marginal damages the opposite of the result suggested by the bulk of the prior literature indeed even if there were no externalities at all associated with gasoline the optimal tax rate would still be almost equal to the average gas tax rate in the u s following this approach to estimate cross price elasticities with leisure could strongly influence estimates of optimal rates for other important commodity or pollution taxes

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

penny wise and pound foolish the left digit effect in price cognition through five experiments we provide a cognitive account of when and why nine ending prices are perceived to be smaller than a price one cent higher first this occurs only when the leftmost digits of the prices differ e g 2 99 vs 3 00 second the left digit effect also depends on the numerical and psychological distances between the target price and a competing product s price the closer the two prices being compared the more likely is the left digit effect third the left digit effect is not restricted to the domain of prices it also manifests with other multidigit numbers

durable goods monopoly learning by doing and the coase conjecture abstract the coase conjecture states that if a durable goods monopolist can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently then in equilibrium she will charge the competitive price and the market will be saturated quickly this conjecture is shown to be refuted when production of the durable good is subject to learning by doing for the linear case it is shown that there exist a stationary strategy perfect equilibrium in which the monopolist charges competitive prices but the market is saturated slowly an interesting analogy between bargaining and durable goods monopoly with learning by doing is also pointed out

fuel taxes an important instrument for climate policy abstract this article shows that fuel taxes serve a very important role for the environment and that we risk a backlash of increased emissions if they are abolished fuel taxes have restrained growth in fuel demand and associated carbon emissions although fuel demand is large and growing our analysis shows that it would have been much higher in the absence of domestic fuel taxes people often assert that fuel demand is inelastic but there is strong research evidence showing the opposite the price elasticity is in fact quite high but only in the long run in the short run it may be quite inelastic which has important implications for policy makers had europe not followed a policy of high fuel taxation but had low us taxes then fuel demand would have been twice as large hypothetical transport demand in the whole oecd area is calculated for various tax scenarios and the results show that fuel taxes are the single most powerful climate policy instrument implemented to date yet this fact is not usually given due attention in the debate

oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets abstract most nash cournot oligopoly models of nonrenewable resources apply open loop equilibrium concepts and are based on physical resource depletion this paper studies feedback equilibria and economic depletion assuming affine quadratic functional forms the existence uniqueness and explicit solutions for the equilibria are derived for duopoly and n player oligopoly with multiple resource stocks for the cases of nonquadratic criteria we develop a numeric solution scheme for the nash feedback equilibrium this scheme is an application of a discrete time discrete state controlled markov chain approximation method originally developed for solving deterministic and stochastic dynamic optimization problems in our nash cournot equilibrium the degree of concentration in supply declines over time whereas the previous models with physical depletion and open loop equilibrium concepts predict that a nash cournot resource market will develop in the direction of monopoly supply

the coase conjecture need not hold for durable good monopolies with depreciation abstract we consider the optimal sales policy for a monopoly seller of a durable good in a non stationary rational expectations equilibruim with replacement sales we show that coase s conjecture that the monopolist will sell the competitive stock as period length approaches zero may not hold under these assumptions

stock price clustering and discreteness stock prices cluster on round fractions clustering increases with price level and volatility and decreases with capitalization and transaction frequency clustering is pervasive price clustering will occur if traders use discrete price sets to simplify their negotiations exchange regulations require that most stocks be traded on eighths clustering on larger fractions will occur if traders choose to use discrete price sets based on quarters halves or whole numbers an econometric model of clustering is derived and estimated projections from the results suggest that traders would frequently use odd sixteenths when trading low price stocks if exchange regulations permitted trading on sixteenths article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

durable goods oligopoly abstract this paper models a durable goods oligopoly as a differential game two cases are treated sales where firms cannot lease but must sell the good in question and leasing where firms do not sell but only rent in the sales case firms face increasing marginal cost of production and the good in question depreciates for this case a rational expectations feedback nash equilibrium is constructed for which monopoly or oligopoly output is less than the efficient level this gap between oligopoly and competitive output diminishes as the number of firms increases when firms can only lease the good the good is assumed not to depreciate and the monopoly level of steady state output is compared with the level of steady state output for a feedback equilibrium duopoly for this case the duopoly equilibrium has steady state output that is less than the corresponding efficient level but greater than the monopoly level the leasing model is shown to be isomorphic to the adjustment cost duopoly model of driskill and mccafferty journal of economic theory 49 1989 324 338

why would a durable good monopolist also produce a cost inefficient nondurable good abstract we develop both commitment and time consistent stationary policies for a monopolist who produces a mixture of goods distinguished by production costs and degree of durability under commitment only the cost efficient durable good is produced and the monopoly output is realized each period for the time consistent stationary case there is an interval for the degree of durability where only the durable good is produced and a higher non overlapping interval where both the cost efficient durable and the cost inefficient nondurable good are produced for any period length when the degree of durability is such that both durable and nondurable goods are provided combined output is less than the competitive output and decreases in the degree of durability approaching the single period monopoly output when both goods are produced the coase conjecture does not hold

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

dynamic duopoly with congestion effects abstract we analyze duopolistic competition between horizontally differentiated firms selling durable goods or services subject to congestion at each point of time new customers buy one unit of the commodity from one of the firms by comparing present prices and future congestion rates we study the linear markov equilibrium of this game which exists and is unique when firms are not too different the existence of negative consumption externalities is shown to soften the price competition moreover we show that the firm with the larger capacity has at the steady state a larger market share a higher price and a lower congestion rate the price of an entrant decreases gradually after entry while the price of the incumbent rises the faster the speed of convergence to the steady state is the stronger is the congestion effect

fuel efficiency improvements feedback mechanisms and distributional effects in the oil market we study the interactions between fuel efficiency improvements in the transport sector and the oil market where the efficiency improvements are policy induced in certain regions of the world we are especially interested in feedback mechanisms of fuel efficiency such as the rebound effect carbon leakage and the green paradox but also the distributional effects for oil producers an intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is introduced where opec core producers have market power we find that the rebound effect has a noticeable effect on the transport sector with the magnitude depending on the oil demand elasticity in the benchmark simulations we calculate that almost half of the energy savings may be lost to a direct rebound effect and an additional 10 to oil price adjustments in addition there is substantial intersectoral leakage to other sectors through lower oil prices in the regions that introduce the policy there is a small green paradox effect in the sense that oil consumption increases initially when the fuel efficiency measures are gradually implemented finally international carbon leakage will be significant if policies are not implemented in all regions we estimate leakage rates of 35 or higher when only major consuming regions implement fuel economy policies non opec producers will to a larger degree than opec producers cut back on its oil supply as a response to fuel efficiency policies due to high production costs

nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices abstract we discuss nonlinear strategies in an infinite horizon duopoly game with sticky prices where firms maximize their discounted sum of profit we construct a stationary feedback equilibrium without guessing value functions and feedback strategies that solve the hamilton jacobi equation for this purpose we study the auxiliary equation that is derived from the hamilton jacobi equation we show that the domain of the state space plays an crucial role in characterizing feedback equilibria and discuss several implications of this observation in particular we find that when the upper bound of the state space is not very high previously unknown feedback equilibria emerge

labor adjustment and gradual reform when is commitment important we analyze a model in which a government uses a second best policy to affect the reallocation of labor following a change in relative prices we consider two extreme cases in which the government has either unlimited or negligible ability to commit to future actions we discuss the factors that determine the importance of commitment ability and provide numerical examples the degree of commitment ability can alter the equilibrium policy both quantitatively and qualitatively in both extreme cases the dying sector is protected during the transition to a free market in order to decrease the amount of unemployment

priced on the note the case of japanese ipos this article examines the pricing of japanese ipos 54 26 are priced in 1 000 japanese yen increments the japanese yen jpy has denominations of banknotes and coins banknotes are in 1 000 2 00

the effects of transport regulation on the oil market does market power matter instruments used to regulate the consumption of oil in the transport sector include fuel taxes biofuel requirements and fuel efficiency standards however the effects that these have on oil consumption and price vary if market power is present in the oil market the directions of change in consumption and price might contrast with those in a competitive market as a result the market structure affects not only the effectiveness of the policy instruments used to reduce oil consumption but also the terms of trade and carbon leakage in particular reduced oil consumption as a result of increased fuel efficiency standards will unambiguously increase the price of oil under a monopoly

monopoly production of durable exhaustible resources we examine monopoly production of a durable exhaustible resource previous authors have implicitly assumed that the monopolist is able to make binding commitments about future decisions we consider the more plausible case in which the monopolist lacks this ability and must choose from dynamically consistent plans two models are considered a discrete time model in which there is a strictly finite initial stock of the resource and a continuous time model in which costs are an increasing function of cumulative production we find that as a general result monopoly leads to overconservation the monopolist who cannot precommit produces the efficient quantity ultimately but does so too slowly by contrast the monopolist who can precommit produces less than the efficient stock even in the limit we also find that increased importance of exhaustibility hastens the extraction of the resource copyright 1990 by the london school of economics and political science

price clustering on the shanghai stock exchange abstractwe investigate price clustering of intraday trades and negotiated block trades on the shanghai stock exchange sse from 2003 to 2009 prices of traded assets tend to cluster on certain final digits such as 0 and 5 in chinese culture 8 is associated with good luck and 4 with death so these numbers may be attractive or avoided we find that price clustering on the final digit of 0 is significantly higher during the morning call auction and early in the trading day we find no evidence of price clustering for the digit 8 but there is a significant dearth of prices ending in the inauspicious number 4 price clustering is significantly higher for negotiated block trades for which about 28 end with 0 multivariate analysis shows that price clustering is lower for more liquid firms but higher for firms with higher return volatility a higher price level or when the market is volatile our evidence supports the costly negotiation hypothesis our results also support the attraction hypothesis in t

network effects aftermarkets and the coase conjecture a dynamic markovian approach this paper investigates the expansion of the network of a monopolist firm that produces a durable good and is also involved in the corresponding aftermarket we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium of the continuous time dynamic game played by the monopolist and the forward looking consumers under the assumption that consumers benefit from the subsequent expansion of the network the paper contributes to the theoretical discussion on the validity of the coase conjecture analyzing whether coase s prediction that the monopolist serves the market in a twinkling of an eye remains valid in our setup we conclude that the equilibrium network development may actually be gradual contradicting coase s conjecture we find that a necessary condition for such a result is the existence of aftermarket network effects that accrue at least partly to the monopolist firm

gains from cartelisation in the oil market in this paper we ask whether opec still gains from cartelisation in the oil market despite low producer prices and a modest market share we apply two intertemporal equilibrium models of the global oil market one consisting of a cartel and a fringe and one describing a hypothetical competitive market comparing the outcome of these models we conclude that there are positive cartelisation gains of about 18 percent in the oil market in comparison with what pindyck 1978 found for the 1970s this may be considered as quite modest moreover we study whether the cartelisation gains to opec are altered by different moves by non opec producers or consumer countries generally we find that the relative cartelisation gains are unchanged one exception is exploration activities where we find that a major increase in non opec reserves could remove the cartelisation gains to opec completely in this case the opec countries could find themselves better off without the cartel

incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations in this paper we examine the problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in determining his optimal job assignment but which might also adversely affect his market value we show that spot contracts are optimal and generate the first best effort level when the manager is risk neutral when the manager is risk averse the optimal contact consists either of a partial insurance contract against downward revisions in compensation or a competitive spot contract depending upon the nature of prior information

quality and price personalization under customer recognition a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria abstract we present a model of market hyper segmentation where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products the firm offers a new price quality schedule after each commitment period lower consumer types may have an incentive to delay their purchases until next period to obtain a better introductory offer the monopolist counters this incentive by offering higher informational rents considering the dynamic game played by the monopolist and its customers we find that there is always a markov perfect equilibrium mpe in which the firm immediately sells the good to all customers offering the mussa rosen static equilibrium schedule to first time customers and getting full commitment profits however if the commitment period between two offers is long enough there is another mpe with gradual market expansion contrary to the coasian result for a durable good monopoly we find that in both equilibria the profit of the monopolist increases and the aggregate consumers surplus decreases as the interval of commitment shrinks the model yields policy implications for regulations on collection and storage of customers information

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

price clustering of chinese ipos the impact of regulation cultural factors and negotiation abstractduring june 2009 may 2012 the china securities regulatory commission csrc suspended window guidance that limits issue prices using this regime change as a natural experiment we test th

does britain or the united states have the right gasoline tax this paper develops an analytical framework to assess the second best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution congestion and accident externalities as well as interactions with the broader fiscal system we provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the us and the uk under a variety of parameter scenarios under our central parameter values the second best optimal gasoline tax is 1 01 gal for the us and 1 34 gal for the uk current tax rates are much lower than this in the us and higher in the uk the calculations are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions the congestion externality is the largest component in both nations revenue raising needs also play a significant role as do accident externalities and local air pollution potential welfare gains from reducing the current uk tax rate are estimated at nearly one fourth the production cost of all gasoline used in the uk even larger gains could be achieved by switching to a tax on vehicle miles with equal revenue yield for the us the welfare gains from optimizing the gasoline tax are smaller but those from switching to an optimal tax on vehicle miles are very large

urban congestion and developer precommitments unilateral solutions to dynamic inconsistency the sale of housing creates a dynamic inconsistency problem for residential developers who find it profit maximising to overdevelop an area once ownership of the existing housing stock has been transferred to local residents rational buyers lower the prices they are willing to pay in expectation of this future congestion it is therefore in the developers interest to attract higher prices by credibly precommitting themselves unilaterally to construction plans that are optimal for each housing tract if the externalities associated with congestion affect quality of life in neighbouring tracts however development will still exceed the efficient level the introduction of master planned communities where a single development company commits future developer builders to a plan for the construction of multiple contiguous housing tracts can create the expectation of future population densities that will be optimal on a city wide level

the cost of reducing gasoline consumption high nominal gas prices new awareness of threats to national security and growing concern about global warming have reignited discussion of ways to reduce gasoline consumption in the united states debate centers on changing two policies already in place the federal gas tax and corporate average fuel economy cafe standards two influential recent reports find that increasing the gas tax would attain a given reduction in gas consumption at lower cost than would tightening cafe standards national research council 2002 congressional budget office 2003 the gas tax has this advantage because it encourages not just increases in fuel efficiency but also reductions in miles driven in contrast cafe standards actually encourage more driving because increases in fuel efficiency reduce the cost of gas per mile driven we also compare the costs of the gas tax and cafe standard but take into account interactions with preexisting tax distortions many papers examine the effects of these tax interactions in other contexts but to our knowledge none of them considers the cafe standard see e g lars bovenberg and ruud de mooij 1994 ian parry 1995 lawrence goulder 1995 bovenberg and goulder 1996 parry et al 1999 don fullerton and gilbert metcalf 2001 these interactions reduce the cost of the gas tax but increase the cost of cafe thus expanding the cost advantage enjoyed by the gas tax this difference does not arise because the gas tax raises revenue while the cafe standard does not rather this result is similar to that in west and williams 2004a which showed that since gasoline and leisure are relative complements raising the gas tax will increase labor supply generating additional efficiency gains in this paper we estimate a consumer demand system using data from the consumer expenditure survey and the california air resources board and find that miles driven and leisure are relative complements thus the gas tax encourages labor supply by raising the cost per mile driven producing an additional efficiency gain conversely because cafe reduces the cost per mile it discourages labor supply and yields an additional efficiency loss while the induced changes in labor supply are tiny relative to the labor market they are still substantial relative to the gas market and thus have a dramatic effect on the relative costs of the two policies our point estimates imply that they reduce the social marginal cost of the gas tax starting from the status quo gas tax rate and ignoring the benefits of reduced gas consumption by almost 30 percent while increasing the marginal cost of cafe by nearly 60 percent this result implies that the case for raising the gas tax rather than tightening the cafe standard is far stronger than previous studies suggest indeed it strongly suggests that any tightening at all of the cafe standard would lower welfare unless the benefits of reduced gas consumption have been seriously underestimated

monopoly extraction of a durable non renewable resource failure of the coase conjecture the author studies a perfect information rational expectations markov equilibrium for the situation where a monopolist extracts a nonrenewable resource that is converted to a durable good even if short run extraction costs are constant the coase conjectur e fails provided that the depreciation rate of the durable good is positive copyright 1993 by the london school of economics and political science

the effects of the corporate average fuel efficiency standards in the us this paper examines the effects of the corporate average fuel economy standards cafe on automobile sales prices and fuel consumption first a discrete choice model of automobile demand and a continuous model of vehicle utilization are estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey for 1984 1990 next the demand side model is combined with a model of oligopoly and product differentiation on the supply side with these elements in place the effects of the cafe regulation are assessed through simulations and compared to the effects of alternative policy instruments such as an increase in gasoline tax

non linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game abstract we study non linear markov perfect equilibria in a two agent linear quadratic differential game in contrast to the literature owing to tsutsui and mino 1990 nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices journal of economic theory 52 136 161 we do not associate endogenous subsets of the state space with candidate solutions instead we use the catching up optimality criterion to address the possibility of infinitely valued value functions applying sufficiency conditions for existence based on those in dockner et al 2000 differential games in economics and management science cambridge university press cambridge yields the familiar linear mpe and a condition under which a continuum of non linear mpes exists these include as their limit a previously unreported piecewise linear mpe the condition relaxes with increasing patience allowing more efficient steady states thus suggesting a folk theorem for differential games as the lower state and control bounds go to the non linear strategies are eliminated

depreciation erodes the coase conjecture if a durable good monopolist produces at constant marginal costs and the good depreciates there exists a family of strong markov perfect equilibrium smpe one member of this family entails instantaneous production of the level of stock produced in a competitive equilibrium this is consistent with the coase conjecture other smpe in the family entail steady state production at a stock level lower than in the competitive equilibrium there may be a jump to these steady states or they may be approached asymptotically monopoly profits are positive in these equilibria and the coase conjecture fails

multiple equilibria in dynamic rational expectations models a critical review abstract multiple equilibria are a ubiquitous feature of dynamic rational expectations models researchers have been divided on the implications of this phenomenon some have viewed this as a reflection of reality and a possible explanation of a wide range of economic phenomena others have suggested various selection criteria for choosing one among the many equilibria this paper reviews the major selection criteria that have been proposed and through application to three well known models shows under what circumstances one might expect them to choose the same or different equilibria in addition this paper proposes a new criteria based on the limit of finite horizon equilibria and investigates its relation to the other criteria

unilateral co2 reductions and carbon leakage the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model featuring six world regions with trade in energy and non energy goods is used to simulate the period from 1990 through 2100 in 10 year intervals the simulations explore the effect of unilateral action by the oecd to curb global co2 emissions unilateral cuts create incentives for free riding by non participating regions so that global emissions are reduced by less than the amount that the oecd cuts back its regional emissions carbon leakage occurs through two channels first basic materials production increases in unconstrained regions resulting in increased carbon intensity of gdp second reductions in oecd oil imports cause the world oil price to fall leading to an increased energy intensity in the non participant regions in this paper we use a general equilibrium model to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of oecd reductions in curbing global co2 concentrations

do investors prefer round stock prices evidence from israeli ipo auctions abstract we find round number clustering in orders submitted by investors in israeli ipo auctions explanations offered for price clustering such as dealer collusion or implicit agreement to simplify negotiations cannot explain price clustering in this market therefore this is direct evidence that investors prefer round numbers

a theory of finitely durable goods monopoly with used goods market and transaction costs we construct a dynamic game to model a monopoly of finitely durable goods the solution concept is markov perfect equilibria with general equilibria embedded in every time period our model is flexible enough to simultaneously explain or accommodate many commonly observed phenomena or stylized facts such as concurrent leasing and selling active secondary markets for used goods heterogeneous consumers endogenous consumption patterns depreciation an infinite time horizon and nontrivial transaction costs within our model consumers have incentives to segment themselves into various consumption classes according to their willingness to pay and nontrivial transaction costs to sell used goods put strong constraints on consumers consumption sequences in time as a direct consequence of the finite durability the market power of the monopolist remains intact leasing manifests itself as a facilitator of price discrimination by debundling the durable good into new and used portions that are naturally bundled together under outright sales the concurrent leasing and selling reflects the degree of the comparative advantage the monopolist has over consumers in disposing used goods this comparative advantage which is partially exploited by the monopolist and partially shared by the consumers provides a sufficient mechanism to gain pareto improvement on the market

network externalities and the coase conjecture abstract this paper addresses two general questions first what is the effect of market structure on the development of a network in a dynamic model with rational expectations secondly is the intuition that network externalities are economies of scale on the demand side correct these questions are examined in a model of durable good production in the presence of network externalities two results are presented first the coase conjecture fails in its strongest sense when network benefits are increasing in the current network size secondly a committed monopolist may be socially preferable to a time consistent producer when network externalities are sufficiently large the analysis indicates an analogy between network externalities and learning by doing

the market power of opec 1973 2001 we apply a multi equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of opec as a whole or different sub groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973 2001 our results indicate that the producers outside opec can be described as competitive producers taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits the opec members do not fit the behaviour of price taking producers our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for opec underpin the potential market power of the producer group and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies on the other hand our findings indicate that neither opec nor different sub groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973 1994 however we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit opec core as from 1994 thus although opec clearly has affected the market price the producer g

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

environmental regulation in an open economy abstract environmental regulation by a large trading country affects the world price of traded commodities a series of second best environmental taxes are derived which explicitly incorporate trade effects for cases which depend on the type of externality the regulating country s commodity trade balance and the presence or absence of trade taxes in the regulated market a coordinated policy solution using both tax and tariff instruments also is derived the practical implications for domestic environmental policy making which emerge from the theoretical results are evaluated

do high oil prices matter evidence on the mobility behavior of german households focusing on travel survey data from germany this paper investigates the determinants of automobile travel with the specific aim of quantifying the effects of fuel prices and fuel economy the analysis is predicated on the notion that car mileage is a two stage decision process comprising the discrete choice of whether to own a car and the continuous choice of distance traveled to capture this process we employ censored regression models consisting of probit and ols estimators which allows us to gauge the extent to which sample selectivity may bias the results our elasticity estimates indicate a significant positive association between increased fuel economy and increased driving and a significantly negative fuel price elasticity which ranges between 35 and 41 taken together these results suggest that fuel taxes are likely to be a more effective policy measure in reducing emissions than fuel efficiency standards

durable goods monopoly increasing marginal cost and depreciation this paper combines increasing marginal cost and depreciation in a continuous time model of a durable goods monopolist in contrast to the case of increasing marginal cost but no depreciation analysed by kahn and the case of depreciation with constant marginal cost analysed by bond and samuelson steady state output in this model is less than in the competitive case a turnpike result shows that choice of a long enough time horizon can make the equilibrium path of output in a finite horizon game arbitrarily close to the path of the infinite horizon game

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

on comparing monopoly and competition in exhaustible resource exploitation abstract it is widely believed that exhaustible resource monopolies do not enjoy as much market power as standard non resource monopolies and may even produce in a socially optimal way we argue that this paradoxical result arises from an inappropriate comparison methodology when similar assumptions are applied to the resource and the conventional cases we show that the resource monopoly behaves as expected i e restricts supply

automobile externalities and policies this paper discusses the nature and magnitude of externalities associated with automobile use including local and global pollution oil dependence traffic congestion and traffic accidents it then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities including fuel taxes fuel economy and emissions standards and alternative fuel policies summarizing insofar as possible the welfare effects of those policies finally we discuss emerging pricing policies including congestion tolls and insurance reform and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

policy watch the economics of fuel economy standards one of the most hotly contested of all energy policy issues involves corporate average fuel economy or cafe standards for new cars and light duty trucks tighter standards would reduce gasoline consumption and hence both greenhouse gas emissions as well as this country s vulnerability to oil price shocks but they would also increase the price of new vehicles worsen traffic congestion and depending on how they are phased in possibly even reduce occupant safety these effects are amenable to economic analysis and we review the evidence to date bearing on this interesting and important question

patterns of rightmost digits used in advertised prices implications for nine ending effects analysis of the rightmost digits of selling prices in a sample of retail price advertisements confirmed past findings indicating the overrepresentation of the digits 0 5 and 9 the high cognitive accessibility of round numbers can account for the overrepresentation of 0 and 5 ending prices and suggests the existence of two effects that could account for the overrepresentation of 9 ending prices 1 a tendency of consumers to perceive a 9 ending price as a round number price with a small amount given back and 2 a tendency of consumers to underestimate a 9 ending price by encoding it as the first round number evoked during incomplete left to right processing analysis of the patterns of rightmost digits observed in the sample provides supportive evidence particularly for the second of these two 9 ending effects

imperfect durability and the coase conjecture this article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time we show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria a coase conjecture equilibrium a monopoly equilibrium and a reputational equilibrium when the depreciation rate is low the coase conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for intermediate values of the depreciation rate all three equilibrium types coexist when the depreciation rate is high the monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium consequently when selling a good of sufficiently low durability the monopolist does not lose any of her monopoly power furthermore the steady state output in the reputational equilibrium falls below the monopoly quantity hence in durable goods markets welfare losses due to monopoly power may be larger than in markets for perishables

are ipo allocations for sale evidence from mutual funds combining data on brokerage commissions that mutual fund families paid for trade execution between 1996 and 1999 with data on mutual fund holdings of initial public offerings ipos i document a robust positive correlation between commissions paid to lead underwriters and reported holdings of the ipos they underwrite moreover i find that the correlation is limited to ipos with nonnegative first day returns and strongest for ipos that occur shortly before mutual funds report their holdings when the noise introduced by flipping is smallest overall the evidence suggests that business relationships with lead underwriters increase investor access to underpriced ipos during the hot initial public offering market of the late 1990s the typical initial public offering ipo was significantly underpriced and oversubscribed and the first day returns earned by investors in these ipos received considerable public attention 1 the source of these first day returns and related questions

large shareholders monitoring and ownership dynamics toward pure managerial firms abstract we study ownership dynamics when the manager and the large shareholder both risk neutral simultaneously choose effort and monitoring level respectively to serve their non congruent interests we show that there is a wedge between the valuation of shares by atomistic shareholders and the large shareholder s valuation at the markov perfect equilibrium the large shareholder divests her shares if the incongruence of their interests is mild divestment is drastic all her shares are sold immediately if their interests diverge sharply the divestment is gradual in order to prevent a sharp fall in share price in the limit the firm becomes purely managerial

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a