some macroeconomic implications of alternative compensation systems a basic theme of this paper is the idea that some structural reform of employee compensation arrangements is necessary to make reasonable price stability compatible with reasonably full employment in this view even the best designed macroeconomic policies are much too aggregative to get at the heart of the stagflation problem the ultimate solution involves going inside the workings of a modern capitalist economy and correcting the underlying structural flaw directly on the level of the individual firm stagflation represents an especially intractable policy dilemma for macroeconomics without a decisive tendency of the economic system to remain near full employment there is a strong prima facie case for fighting recessions by exogenously stimulating aggregate demand but the usual keynesian expansionary policies tend to impart an inflationary inertia that is difficult to choke off and of course the basic strategy for fighting inflation is to cool down the economy by restrictive monetary and fiscal policy thereby increasing unemployment and closing the viscous circle because the practical macroeconomic policies for dealing with unemployment and inflation are so diametrically opposed stagflation is a pervasive structural problem when for whatever reason there is basically an unfavourable short run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation economic policy tends to vacillate between expansion of demand to fight unemployment and restriction of demand to fight inflation polarising the electorate and distracting society from dealing effectively with its underlying real economic problems even the difficulty of attaining external balance in foreign accounts is largely a spillover into the international payments arena of an inability to achieve an acceptable internal balance between full employment and price stability this paper takes what might be called a comparative systems approach to the problem of stagflation at the heart of modern industrial capitalism is an incredibly complicated system of overlapping monopolistic competitors 2 a starting point for the paper is the realisation that the coordination difficulty which can cause some systems to suffer involuntary unemployment is not inherent in laissez faire private enterprise per se it is closely tied to one particular property of a conventional wage payment system namely compensation of each firm s employees is stuck to an outside numeraire whether money or a cost of

calculating and using second order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models we describe an algorithm for calculating second order approximations to the solutions to nonlinear stochastic rational expectations models the paper also explains methods for using such an approximate solution to generate forecasts simulated time paths for the model and evaluations of expected welfare differences across different versions of a model the paper gives conditions for local validity of the approximation that allow for disturbance distributions with unbounded support and allow for non stationarity of the solution process

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

the macroeconomic consequences of raising the minimum wage capital accumulation employment and the wage distribution we study the quantitative impact of a rise in the minimum wage on macroeconomic outcomes such as employment the stock of capital and the distribution of wages our modeling framework is the large firm search and matching model our comparative statics are in line with previous empirical findings a moderate increase in the minimum wage barely affects employment while it compresses the wage distribution and generates positive spillovers on higher wages the model also predicts an increase in the stock of capital next we perform the policy experiment of introducing a 10 dollar minimum wage our results suggest large positive effects on capital 4 0 and output 1 8 with a decrease in employment by 2 8 the introduction of a 9 dollar minimum wage would instead produce similar effects on capital accumulation without harming employment

asymmetric effects of oil price uncertainty on corporate investment abstract using a comprehensive data set of a large panel of us firms over 1984 2017 we show that the negative effect of crude oil price return uncertainty on investments is asymmetric in particular we show that investment is more significantly reduced following the volatility of positive oil price changes than that of negative changes and this asymmetric effect is more pronounced in small firms in addition we find that the asymmetric effect is stronger in the crude oil and gas producing companies where the effect of the volatility of negative oil price changes is greater than that of positive oil price changes we also find that the impact of positive or negative oil price change uncertainty on investments substantially differs across different industries the results are quite robust to the way in which we measure the investment and oil price uncertainty and to alternative regression methods

equilibrium price dispersion with sequential search abstract the paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers buyers search sequentially for sellers but do not meet every seller with the same probability specifically a fraction of the buyers meetings lead to one particular large seller while the remaining meetings lead to one of a continuum of small sellers in this environment the small sellers would like to set a price that makes the buyers indifferent between purchasing the good and searching for another seller the large seller would like to price the small sellers out of the market by posting a price that is low enough to induce buyers not to purchase from the small sellers these incentives give rise to a game of cat and mouse whose only equilibrium involves mixed strategies for both the large and the small sellers the fact that the small sellers play mixed strategies implies that there is price dispersion the fact that the large seller plays mixed strategies implies that prices and allocations vary over time we show that the fraction of the gains from trade accruing to the buyers is positive and nonmonotonic in the degree of market power of the large seller as long as the large seller has some positive but incomplete market power the fraction of the gains from trade accruing to the buyers depends in a natural way on the extent of search frictions

bargaining orders in a multi person bargaining game abstract this paper studies a complete information bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of different sizes or bargaining strengths the bargaining order is determined endogenously with a finite horizon there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the buyer purchases in order of increasing size from the smallest to the largest with an infinite horizon if the sellers have sufficiently different sizes there is a unique equilibrium outcome which has the same bargaining order if the sellers have similar sizes with an infinite horizon there may be multiple equilibrium outcomes with different bargaining orders

creative destruction and firm specific performance heterogeneity traditional u s industries with higher firm specific stock return and fundamentals performance heterogeneity use information technology it more intensively and post faster productivity growth in the late 20 th century we argue that this mechanically reflects a wave of schumpeter s 1912 creative destruction disrupting a wide swath of industries with successful it adopters unpredictably undermining established firms this validates endogenous growth theory models of creative destruction e g aghion and howitt 1992 and suggests intensified creative destruction as explaining findings associating greater firm specific performance variation with higher per capita gdps economy growth rates accounting standards financial system development and property right protection

organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining comment the authors consider a wide number of applications of an intrafirm bargaining game within organizations where employees and the firm engage in wage negotiations under their presumption that contracts cannot bind employees to the organization the resulting stable wage and profit profiles give rise to an objective function for the firm that places weight on inframarginal profits in an economically significant manner the authors in turn employ this methodology to explore applications of organizational design hiring and capital decisions training and cross training the importance of labor and asset specificity managerial hierarchies preferences for unionization responses to competition and internal capital budgeting copyright 1996 by american economic association

cyclical dynamics in idiosyncratic labor market risk is individual labor income more risky in recessions this is a difficult question to answer because existing panel data sets are so short to address this problem we develop a generalized method of moments estimator that conditions on the macroeconomic history that each member of the panel has experienced variation in the cross sectional variance between households with differing macroeconomic histories allows us to incorporate business cycle information dating back to 1930 even though our data do not begin until 1968 we implement this estimator using household level labor earnings data from the panel study of income dynamics we estimate that idiosyncratic risk is i highly persistent with an annual autocorrelation coefficient of 0 95 and ii strongly countercyclical with a conditional standard deviation that increases by 75 percent from 0 12 to 0 21 as the macroeconomy moves from peak to trough

bargaining binding contracts and competitive wages in a model where many workers bargain with one firm and sign binding contracts we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if the production function satisfies decreasing return

offshoring and unemployment the role of search frictions labor mobility abstract in a two sector general equilibrium model with labor market search frictions we find that the wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases upon offshoring in the presence of perfect intersectoral labor mobility if as a result labor moves to the sector with the lower or equal vacancy costs there is an unambiguous decrease in economywide unemployment with imperfect intersectoral labor mobility unemployment in the offshoring sector can rise with an unambiguous unemployment reduction in the non offshoring sector imperfect labor mobility can result in a mixed equilibrium in which only some firms offshore with unemployment in the offshoring sector rising

hospital systems and bargaining power evidence from out of market acquisitions competition analyses generally restrict their attention to how mergers alter concentration in the relevant consumer market studying hospital competition by focusing on the local patient market may be misleading however as multi market hospital systems often play an important role in the price negotiations of their members with managed care organizations we focus on out of market hospital mergers to investigate the cross market effects of system membership on member hospital reimbursement rates based on acquisitions occurring across the united states during 2000 2008 we find that hospitals exhibit significant increases of around 14 in their net reimbursement rates after becoming affiliated with an out of market system compared to independent stand alone hospitals we find no evidence that the price effect results from changes in patient case mix the cost of providing care generally or hospital quality the findings reveal that systems can impact the market power of hospitals in ways that have not been considered in recent antitrust analysis

investment options and bargaining power the eurasian supply chain for natural gas we use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipeline network determines the power structure in the supply chain for russian gas if the assessment is narrowly focused on the abilities to obstruct flows in the existing system the main transit countries belarus and ukraine appear to be strong if investment options are accounted for however russia achieves clear dominance we show that options to bypass one of the transit countries are of little strategic importance compared to russia s direct access to its customers through the baltic sea comparing the results of our calibrated model with empirical evidence obtained from transit and import agreements we find that the shapley value explains the power of major transit countries better than the core and the nucleolus

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

on the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations abstract the preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined it is shown that the buyer weakly prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history with substitute goods such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head to head competition with complementary goods strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers their price offers have short deadlines and or goods are weak complements sellers strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated

fooling all of the people some of the time a theory of endogenous sequencing in confidential negotiations we analyse a bargaining game in which one party called the buyer has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants called sellers when the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers goods are highly complementary efficient non dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences in these equilibria the buyer can obtain higher pay offs than in pure strategy equilibria or in public negotiations the degree of sequencing uncertainty that maximizes buyer pay offs is inversely related to the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers

wage compression within the firm evidence from an indexation scheme we revisit the role of labour market institutions by showing how they affect the sharing of firm specific rents between employers and employees we look at an italian wage indexation mechanism scala mobile that compressed the distribution of wages imposing real wage increases at the bottom of the distribution after developing a simplified version of a search model with intra firm bargaining and on the job search we document that skilled workers received lower wage adjustments when employed at firms with many unskilled workers and they tended to move towards more skill intensive firms moreover the system drove the least skill intensive firms out of the market

business to business bargaining in two sided markets abstract bargaining regularly takes place on the business to business side of two sided markets however little is known about the consequences of these negotiations in this paper we allow the platform or a policy maker to choose between a standard design offering posted prices to both sides or a design with bargaining offering a posted price to consumers and negotiating with at least some firms we find that the platform pursues negotiations when it has a strong bargaining position and does so by targeting firms with the largest network effects while this behavior may appear exploitive we show that profits and welfare often align across platform designs this alignment stems from how bargaining incentivizes the platform greater platform bargaining power allows the platform to extract more of the network surpluses since it can convert more of the firm surplus into profits and this incentivizes the platform to draw in greater participation generating greater welfare these results suggest that platform and policy maker preferences often align in this setting

collusion exclusion and inclusion in random order bargaining this paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random order value e g the shapley value collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them say i this contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion which lets i exclude j s resource but not use it himself and inclusion which lets i use j s resource but not exclude j from it this representation yields a third difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion generalizing existing results for specific games namely collusion is profitable unprofitable when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased by other players

technology shocks and job flows we consider a version of the solow growth model where technological progress can be investment specific or investment neutral the labour market is subject to search frictions and the existing productive units may fail to adopt the most recent technological advances technological progress can lead to the destruction of technologically obsolete jobs and cause unemployment we calibrate the model to replicate the high persistence that characterizes the dynamics of firms neutral technology and the frequency of firms capital adjustment we find that neutral technological advances increase job destruction and job reallocation and reduce aggregate employment investment specific technological advances reduce job destruction have mild effects on job creation and are expansionary hence neutral technological progress prompts schumpeterian creative destruction while investment specific technological progress operates essentially as in the standard neoclassical growth model using structural var models we provide support to the key dynamic implications of the model copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

markets for ownership the prevailing economic theory of the firm based on a property rights perspective has demonstrated that ownership by dispensable outside parties is an inefficient outcome relative to ownership by productive agents in order to better understand observed patterns of ownership this paper considers the outcome of ma rkets for ownership that operate prior to production taking place the main result is that outside parties will often become the equilibrium asset owners this is precisely because but for ownership such parties would not earn rents in contrast productive agents earn rents even when they do not own assets given that their contribution is complementary with other productive agents their willingness to pay for ownership is less than that of an outside party this result is robust to the introduction of moderate levels of inefficiency arising from outside ownership and to a consideration of opportunities for re sale before production begins the main conclusion drawn is that the nature of the operation of markets for ownership stands alongside incentive effects as important predictors of firm boundaries journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 l22

the 1929 stock market irving fisher was right many stock market analysts think that in 1929 at the time of the crash stocks were overvalued irving fisher argued just before the crash that fundamentals were strong and the stock market was undervalued in this article we use growth theory to estimate the fundamental value of corporate equity and compare it to actual stock valuations our estimate is based on values of productive corporate capital both tangible and intangible and tax rates on corporate income and distributions the evidence strongly suggests that fisher was right even at the 1929 peak stocks were undervalued relative to the prediction of theory

labor market volatility in the search and matching model the role of investment specific technology shocks abstract shocks to investment specific technology have been identified as a main source of u s aggregate output volatility in this paper we present a model with frictions in the labor market and explore the contribution of these shocks to the volatility of labor market variables namely unemployment vacancies tightness and the job finding rate thus our paper contributes to a recent body of literature assessing the ability of the search and matching model to account for the large volatility observed in labor market variables to this aim we solve a neoclassical economy with search and matching where neutral and investment specific technologies are subject to shocks the three key features of our model economy are i firms are large in the sense that they employ many workers ii adjusting capital and labor is costly iii wages are the outcome of an intra firm nash bargaining problem between the firm and its workers in our calibrated economy we find that shocks to investment specific technology explain 40 of the observed volatility in u s labor productivity moreover these shocks generate relative volatilities in vacancies and the workers job finding rate which match those observed in u s data relative volatilities in unemployment and labor market tightness are 55 and 75 of their empirical values respectively

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

breakdown in multilateral negotiations abstract we analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions in contrast to preexisting literature we do not normalize the parties reservation utilities to zero we show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome even if only two sellers are present

holdups and overinvestment in capital markets abstract this paper considers a decentralized capital market characterized by trading frictions in which firms and suppliers need to make investment decisions before meeting with each other and bargaining over the price of capital the resulting holdup problem provides firms with a strategic incentive to overaccumulate capital so as to reduce their marginal productivity and thus the bargained price in equilibrium this strategic incentive can outweigh the usual distortionary effects of holdup problems that on their own would lead to underinvestment thus resulting in the economy to overinvest in a setting with both capital and labor the holdup problem in capital markets interacts with holdup problems in labor markets this presents firms with a trade off that has non trivial equilibrium effects and that depending on the substitutability of capital and labor and the firm s bargaining power in each market can mitigate or exacerbate the overinvestment result

the union threat this paper studies the impact of unions on wage inequality output and unemployment to do so it proposes a search and matching model of union formation in which unions arise endogenously through a voting process within firms in a union firm workers bargain their wages collectively in a nonunion firm each worker bargains individually with the firm because of this wage setting asymmetry a union lowers the profit of a firm and compresses the wage distribution of the workers furthermore to prevent unionization nonunion firms distort their hiring decisions in a way that also lowers the dispersion of wages after being calibrated on the united states the model shows that even though a partial equilibrium estimate would predict a small impact of unions on inequality removing the threat of unionization increases the variance of wages substantially completely outlawing unions increases wage inequality further moreover outlawing unions increases welfare and output and lowers unemployment these results suggest that even with a small membership unions might have a significant impact on the economy through general equilibrium mechanisms and the way they distort firms decisions i am greatly indebted to nobuhiro kiyotaki esteban rossi hansberg and oleg itskhoki for their invaluable advice and support throughout this project special thanks go to esteban for suggesting the title i also wish to thank manuel amador orley ashenfelter francisco buera jeff campbell pablo fajgelbaum henry farber baris kaymak david lee thomas lemieux benjamin moll justinas pelenis edouard schaal andrew shephard christopher sims liz tennant as well as seminar participants at princeton university and the chicago fed rookie seminar for helpful comments and suggestions i gratefully acknowledge financial support from the fonds quebecois de recherche sur la societe et la culture email mtascher princeton edu address 001 fisher hall department of economics princeton university princeton nj 08544 for the most recent version go to http sites google com site mathtd

optimal fiscal policy with labor selection this paper characterizes long run and short run optimal scal policy in the labor selection framework quantitatively the time series volatility of the labor income tax rate is orders of magnitude larger than the tax smoothing results based on walrasian labor markets but is a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching labor markets to understand these results in terms of model primitives we develop a welfare relevant analytic concept of externalities for the selection model which we label tightness this concept of tightness is the source of the decentralized economy s inecient cross sectional wage premia between the average newly hired worker and the marginal newly hired worker compared to the traditional concept of labor market tightness in the search and matching literature this new concept of tightness plays a highly similar role and like in the matching model is crucial for understanding eciency and optimal policy

power in a theory of the firm transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers power to agents who make specific investments past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the firm does this within the contractibility assumptions of this literature we identify a potentially superior mechanism the regulation of access to critical resources access can be better than ownership because i the power agents get from access is more contingent on their making the right investment and ii ownership has adverse effects on the incentive to specialize the theory explains the importance of internal organization and third party ownership

the effectiveness of hiring credits this article analyses the effectiveness of hiring credits using comprehensive administrative data we show that the french hiring credit implemented during the great recession had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages relying on the quasi experimental variation in labour cost triggered by the hiring credit we estimate a structural search and matching model simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features it was non anticipated temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages we estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits either countercyclical or time invariant in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

superstars and mediocrities a solution based on personal income taxation abstract the markets for talent often produce large income inequality and therefore raise political attention while such inequality can be due to superstar dynamics or factor complementarities tervio superstars and mediocrities market failure in the discovery of talent the review of economic studies 2009 first proposed a market failure that was previously unknown to the literature pointing to long term contracts as a solution i extend the model in tervio 2009 to include personal income tax policy reforms and demonstrate that tax design can be employed as a solution to the market failure when long term contracts are unfeasible with reasonably small enough entry payments that novice workers would sustain to compensate employers for the possibility to be discovered as high talent types both a progressive tax and a tax incentive on entry wages are found effective the tax incentive on entry wages though can be used even with very large deductible entry payments and with overall negative net entry wages

tenure experience human capital and wages a tractable equilibrium search model of wage dynamics we develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers allowing for human capital accumulation employer heterogeneity and individual level shocks wage growth is decomposed into contributions of human capital and job search within and between jobs human capital accumulation is largest for highly educated workers the contribution from job search to wage growth both within and between job declines over the fi rst ten years of a career the job shopping phase of a working life after which workers settle into high quality jobs using outside o ffers to generate gradual wage increases thus reaping the bene fits from competition between employers

investment options and the business cycle abstract this paper extends r mehra e c prescott recursive competitive equilibrium the case of homogeneous households econometrica 48 1980 1365 1380 to a production economy with two capital goods it is an rbc model in which each unit of investment requires a new idea an option when options are scarce new capital is harder to put in place and the value of old capital rises thus the stock market and tobin s q are negative indexes of intangibles during a boom q rises gradually as options are used up because investment represents an exercise of options it has an intertemporal substitution tradeoff that is absent from the adjustment cost model equilibrium may be efficient even without markets for knowledge the stock market may suffice

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

capital reallocation and liquidity this paper studies the cyclical properties of capital reallocation and the frictions which inhibit such reallocation we show that the amount of capital reallocation and the benefits to reallocation vary at the business cycle frequency the amount of capital reallocation is procyclical in contrast the benefits to capital reallocation appear countercyclical we measure the amount of reallocation using data on flows of capital across firms and the benefits to capital reallocation using several measures of the cross sectional dispersion of the productivity of capital we then study a calibrated model of an economy where capital reallocation is costly and impute the cost of reallocation which is consistent with the amount of and benefits to reallocation in the data we find that the cost of reallocation needs to be substantially countercyclical to be consistent with the observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion the cyclical variation in this cost is interpreted as variation in the liquidity of capital broadly defined since physical costs are unlikely to vary countercyclically

a theory of wages and labor demand with intra firm bargaining and matching frictions this article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within firm strategic bargaining we yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital the solution exhibits overemployment we show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power similarly the hold up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital beyond the neo classical analysis firms are the field of several strategic interactions between capital owners and labor between marginal employees and incumbents and more generally between different groups with various bargaining positions within the firm it is usually considered that the bargaining power of workers entails an employment level that is lower than in a competitive labor market and any increase in the bargaining power of workers raises unemployment these results are true for a wide class of models and notably in the now standard framework to analyze unemployment namely search and matching models of pissarides 2000 however stole and zwiebel 1996a 1996b show that the above results are totally changed in the intra firm bargaining model where employees engage in individual wage negotiation with the firm in fact under the assumption that contract incompleteness does not enable either party to commit to future wages and employment decisions they show that intra firm bargaining yields no rent for employees and gives rise to overemployment compared to a competitive labor market the basic idea of stole and zwiebel is that a firm with a diminishing marginal productivity of labor can decrease the bargained wage which increases in the marginal productivity of labor by raising employment in stole and zwiebel s setting firms overemploy strategically up to the point where workers get their reservation wage

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

coalitional bargaining games with random proposers theory and application abstract we consider a non cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference we characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core the model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient

dynamic forecasting behavior by analysts theory and evidence abstract we develop a multi period learning model to examine the relation between analysts forecasting behavior and their performance in a competitive market for banking services the surplus and the analyst s payoff which is determined through bargaining are convex in her reputation the convexity of her payoff structure and the presence of employment risk lead to a u shaped relation between the analyst s forecast boldness and prior performance and a positive relation between forecast boldness and experience we find support for these predictions in our empirical analysis significant underperformers outperformers face higher lower employment risk and are more likely to issue bolder forecasts

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

time to build capital revisiting investment cash flow sensitivities a large body of empirical work has established the significance of cash flow in explaining investment dynamics this finding is further taken as evidence of capital market imperfections we show using a perfect capital markets model that time to build for capital projects creates an investment cash flow sensitivity as found in empirical studies that may not be indicative of capital market frictions the result is due to mis specification present in empirical investment q equations under time to build investment in addition time aggregation error can give rise to cash flow effects independently of the time to build effect importantly both errors arise independently of potential measurement error in q evidence from a large panel of u k manufacturing firms confirms the validity of the time to build investment channel

is lumpy investment relevant for the business cycle the lumpiness of investment activity at the plant level is a well established fact previous research has suggested that such discrete and occasional adjustments have significant aggregate implications in particular it has been argued that changes in plants willingness to invest in response to aggregate shocks can at times generate large movements in total investment demand in this study i reassess these predictions in a general equilibrium environment specifically assuming nonconvex costs of capital adjustment i derive generalized s s adjustment rules yielding lumpy plant level investment within an otherwise standard equilibrium business cycle model in contrast to previous partial equilibrium analyses model results reveal that the aggregate effects of lumpy investment are negligible in general equilibrium households preference for relatively smooth consumption profiles offsets changes in aggregate investment demand implied by the introduction of lumpy plant level investment as a result

the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty when investment opportunities are endogenous this paper develops a general equilibrium model to study the impact of aggregate fluctuations in idiosyncratic volatility that incorporates the endogenous determination of investment opportunities by making investment options more valuable an increase in volatility encourages the creation of new investment options i find the response of the economy to a volatility shock depends on how investment opportunities are obtained if potential entrants are allowed to invest in new idiosyncratic technologies thereby acquiring options for further investment the volatility shock increases overall investment and results in an economic boom on the other hand if such an investment in option creation is precluded and investment opportunities are exogenously given the volatility shock decreases aggregate investment

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

capital mobility and asset pricing we present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each investment in that market with the greatest amount of capital earns the lowest risk premium intermediaries optimally trade off the costs of intermediation against fees that depend on the gain they can offer to investors for moving their capital to the market with the higher mean return the bargaining power of an investor depends on potential access to alternative intermediaries in equilibrium the speeds of adjustment of mean returns and of capital between the two markets are increasing in the degree to which capital is imbalanced between the two markets and can be reduced by competition among intermediaries

wage dispersion in the search and matching model the simplicity of the canonical search and matching model offers many advantages for the purpose of understanding the determinants and dynamics of unemployment however the spe cial assumption that a firm is composed of a sin gle worker and employer or that the production technology is linear is limiting lars a stole and jeffrey zwiebel 1996 asher wolinsky 2000 and elhanan helpman and oleg itskhoki 2008 generalize the original model to the case of many workers in a firm with a technology characterized by diminishing returns to labor they find that all employers pay the same wage in steady state equi librium when only unemployed workers search i extend their model by allowing for search on the job and show that a unique dispersed wage steady state equilibrium also exists with the prop erty that more productive employers pay more and are larger furthermore inefficient over employment characterizes the single wage equi librium but employment is lower in the dispersed wage equilibrium because employers face stiffer competition as a consequence the dispersed wage equilibria can be more efficient there is a close relationship between the equi libria of the search and matching model studied in this paper and those of the dynamic monopsony models of peter a diamond 1971 kenneth burdett and kenneth l judd 1983 and burdett and dale t mortensen 1998 the single wage equilibrium is the analogue of the diamond equi librium while a dispersed wage equilibrium exists when employed workers search for essentially the same reason as in the burdett mortensen model namely there exists a nondegenerate interval of wages and a continuous distribution of vacancies over the interval such that the common

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

does contracting out increase the efficiency of government programs evidence from medicaid hmos state governments contract with health maintenance organizations hmos to coordinate medical care for nearly 20 million medicaid recipients identifying the causal effect of hmo enrollment on government spending and health care quality is difficult if as is often the case recipients have the option to enroll in a plan to estimate the average effect of hmo enrollment this paper exploits county level mandates introduced during the last several years in the state of california that required most medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan the empirical results demonstrate that the resulting switch from fee for service to managed care was associated with a substantial increase in government spending but no corresponding improvement in infant health outcomes the findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that hmo contracting has reduced the strain on government budgets

the layoff rat race we investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs after investments are made firms may have to lay off workers and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates greater skill investments especially in specific human capital contribute more to a firm s bottom line so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last we show that as long as workers bargaining positions are not too weak workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities indeed workers over invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough even though they only receive a share of any investment more generally we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms the probability that a firm will downsize and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy

lost generations of firms and aggregate labor market dynamics abstract can the unprecedented lack of startups during the u s great recession have persistently negative effects while fewer firms hiring workers can mechanically reduce employment for many years this may be offset by feedback effects on lower wages slacker labor markets and higher profits an estimated model of firm dynamics and frictional labor markets suggests that such feedback effects are too weak to offset the direct impact of fewer startups had firm entry remained constant during the great recession output would have recovered 4 6 years earlier and unemployment would have been 0 5 percentage points lower even 10 years after the crisis

buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations we study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides in case of a bilateral disagreement flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment a larger buyer pays a higher per unit price when buyers bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low and a lower price otherwise an analogous result holds for sellers these predictions and the implications of different technologies are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power

promotion turnover and compensation in the executive labor market this paper develops a generalized roy model with human capital accumulation moral hazard and career concerns we identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives the structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm size pay gap we find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size certainty equivalent pay decreases with firm size in larger firms and for more highly ranked executives weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums this risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm size gap in total compensation larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives finally the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant but their collective effect on firm size pay differentials nets out

solving heterogeneous agent models by projection and perturbation the paper proposes a numerical solution method for general equilibrium models with a continuum of heterogeneous agents that combines elements of projection and of perturbation methods the basic idea is to solve first for the stationary solution of the model without aggregate shocks but with fully specified idiosyncratic shocks afterwards one computes a first order perturbation of the solution in the aggregate shocks this approach allows to include a high dimensional representation of the cross sectional distribution in the state vector the method is applied to a model of household saving with uninsurable income risk and liquidity constraints techniques are discussed to reduce the dimension of the state space such that higher order perturbations are feasible

urban spatial structure transport related emissions and welfare in this paper we study the effects of urban design on pollution and welfare we build a theoretical model of residential choices with pollution externalities arising from commuting where the size of the central business district cbd and the demand for housing are endogenous we show that a polycentric city is desirable from welfare and ecological perspective provided that travel speed and or the number of roads directly connected with the cbd are sufficiently high the spatial extension of cities remains the critical variable to curb transport related urban pollution

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

labor market institutions and wage inequality the authors investigate how labor market institutions such as unemployment insurance unions firing regulations and minimum wages have affected the evolution of wage inequality among male workers results of estimations using data on institutions in eleven oecd countries indicate that changes in labor market institutions can account for much of the change in wage inequality between 1973 and 1998 factors found to have been negatively associated with male wage inequality are union density the strictness of employment protection law unemployment benefit duration unemployment benefit generosity and the size of the minimum wage over the 26 year period institutional changes were associated with a 23 reduction in male wage inequality in france where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter but with an increase of up to 11 in the united states and united kingdom where unions became less powerful and in the united states minimum wages fell

vertical bargaining and retail competition what drives countervailing power this article investigates the effects of changes in market concentration on the equilibrium prices in a supply chain results are derived from a theoretical model of bilateral bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition whether countervailing buyer power arises in the form of lower input prices following greater concentration downstream depends on the pass through rate of input prices to retail prices countervailing buyer power generally does not translate into lower retail prices because of heightened market power at the retail level

exclusive contracts foster relationship specific investment exclusive contracts prohibit one or both parties from trading with anyone else contrary to earlier findings we show that investments that are specific to the contracting parties may be encouraged by exclusivity results depend on the nature of investments and the bargaining solution the major part of the analysis shows that exclusivity deals designed to assure the supply of essential inputs promote investment infinite penalties for breach even if ex post renegotiable may result in excessive investment in which case a positive but finite damage payment yields the first best outcome

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

bargaining ability and competitive advantage empirical evidence from medical devices in markets where buyers and suppliers negotiate supplier costs buyer willingness to pay and competition determine only a range of potential prices leaving the final price dependent on other fac

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

buyer power and intrabrand coordination we analyze the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a contracting situation where rival retailers offer contracts to a manufacturer in contrast to bernheim and whinston 1998 who study the situation in which competing manufacturers offer contracts to a common retailer we find that two part tariffs even if contingent on exclusivity or not do not suffice to implement the monopolyoutcome richer arrangements including e g conditional fixed fees and upfront payments are thus required to internalize all contracting externalities the welfare implications are ambiguous on the one hand richer contracts ensure that no efficient retailer is excluded on the other hand they allow firms to maintain monopoly prices despite intrabrand competition simulations suggest that the latter effect may be more significant

the role of automatic stabilizers in the u s business cycle most countries have automatic rules in their tax and transfer systems that are partly intended to stabilize economic uctuations this paper measures how eective they are at lowering the volatility of u s economic activity we identify seven potential stabilizers in the data and include four theoretical channels through which they may operate in a business cycle model calibrated to the u s data the model is used to compare the volatility of output in the data with counterfactuals where some or all of the stabilizers are shut down our rst nding is that proportional taxes like sales property and corporate income taxes contribute little to stabilization our second

a multisectorial matching model of unions abstract we develop an equilibrium matching model where unions have an important institutional presence monopolistic competition characterizes the goods market where only some sectors are unionized thus the model can vary the coverage of collective bargaining it can vary the degree of coordination between unions and alternatively consider national and sectorial unions calibration to the union premium implies a workers rent extraction parameter much lower than assumed in the matching literature we introduce unemployment insurance to study the interactions of policies with unions and find that unions only push for more generous benefits if this does not entail higher payroll taxes

what do we know about investment under uncertainty recent theoretical developments relating to investment under uncertainty have highlighted the importance of irreversibility for the timing of investment expenditures and their expected returns this has subsequently stimulated a growing empirical literature which examines uncertainty and threshold effects on investment behaviour this paper presents a review of this literature a variety of methods have been used to investigate the empirical implication of irreversibility in investment the majority focusing on the relationship between investment flows and proxy measures of uncertainty a general conclusion is that increased uncertainty at both aggregate and disaggregate levels leads to lower investment rates this suggests that there is an irreversibility effect under which greater uncertainty raises the value of the call option to delay a commitment to investment this effect appears to dominate any positive impact on investment arising from the fact that greater uncertability under certain circumstances increases the marginal profitability of capital the methods used raise a number of issues which call into question the reliability of the findings and these are addressed in the paper however if such irreversibility effects are present then their omission from traditional investment models casts doubt on the efficacy of such specifications jel classification d81 d92 e22

employment flows capital mobility and policy analysis this article extends hopenhayn and rogerson s analysis of firing taxes by introducing a flexible form of capital and considering transitionary dynamics the article finds that capital is not important for understanding the long run and welfare effects of firing taxes however capital is crucial for determining the short run consequences of eliminating this type of policy

foreign labor costs and domestic employment what are the spillovers abstract this paper studies the international spillover effects of country specific labor cost changes in the presence of labor market frictions a two country model with search frictions predicts that a cut in foreign labor costs leads to an increase in domestic employment driven by a positive terms of trade effect on job creation i find empirical evidence in support of this positive spillover effect the terms of trade channel and the dependence on the degree of labor market rigidity this is done by a panel regression that estimates the effect of exogenous variation in foreign unit labor costs instrumented by changes in foreign statutory social security contribution rates on domestic employment and output