rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

marriage market divorce legislation and household labor supply this paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply in our approach the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of distribution factors these factors are defined as variables that affect the household members bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set we extend the collective labor supply model developed by chiappori to allow for distribution factors we show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process the model is estimated using psid data for the year 1988 our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model also the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects

a note of the theory of international transfers abstract if each of n trading countries supplies each of several international public consumption goods then sufficiently small international transfers have no effect on the consumption production or welfare of any country

labor supply of husbands and wives a simultaneous equations approach labor supply functions for married men and women are formulated as a dynamic simultaneous equations system which is estimated using panel data controlling for fixed individual effects allows marginal labor supply responses to be disentangled from permanent patterns in hours worked due to assortative mating the results suggest that the labor supply of husbands and wives without pre school children is not jointly determined in the short run while families with young children exhibit strong interactions in work hours and negative cross earnings effects neither the joint utility model of family labor supply nor an ad hoc traditional family model is supported by these results the data are for the united states and concern 381 couples from the denver income maintenance experiment excerpt

revealed preference analysis of non cooperative household consumption we develop a revealed preference approach to analyse non unitary household consumption behaviour that is not cooperative or pareto efficient we derive global necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with the model we show that the conditions can be verified by means of relatively straightforward mixed integer programming methods which is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis our framework extends to tests for separate spheres and joint contribution to public goods an application to data drawn from the russia longitudinal monitoring survey demonstrates the empirical relevance of the non cooperative consumption model

garp for kids on the development of rational choice behavior in this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11 year old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference we find that choices by even the 7 year olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly 11 year olds do better still while college students do no better than 11 year old children we also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally we argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate but that it does develop quickly

computing cournot equilibrium through maximization over prices abstract this paper presents a characterization of internal cournot equilibrium based on first order conditions corresponding to profit maximization over prices this characterization may yield significant computational advantage as demand functions need not be inverted and simple first order conditions are obtained

an experiment on the pure theory of consumer s behaviour by checking whether consumer demand satisfies the axioms of revealed preference one can test the empirical validity of the neoclassical theory of consumer behaviour however applying the axioms to actual consumer purchase data is difficult if not impossible since it poses serious problems of both a methodological and a practical nature after commenting on the few existing empirical studies in this field we summarise the results from an experimental approach to revealed preference theory data were obtained through a controlled experiment that involved real consumption of the goods chosen we find that most subjects violated the axioms

an afriat theorem for the collective model of household consumption we provide a nonparametric revealed preference characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model while accounting for general possibly non convex individual preferences we establish a collective axiom of revealed preference carp which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality our main result takes the form of a collective version of the afriat theorem for rational behavior in terms of the unitary model this theorem has some interesting implications with only a finite set of observations the nature of consumption externalities positive or negative in the intra household allocation process is non testable the same non testability conclusion holds for privateness with or without externalities or publicness of consumption by contrast concavity of individual utility functions representing convex preferences turns out to be testable in addition monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public

opening the black box of intra household decision making theory and non parametric empirical tests of general collective consumption models we provide revealed preference tests of general collective consumption models that account for public consumption and externalities within the household we further propose a novel approach to model special cases of this model which imply alternative assumptions regarding the sharing rule our application uses the panel data from the russia longitudinal monitoring survey we find that the general model together with a large class of special cases cannot be rejected by contrast we do reject the standard unitary model since our tests are entirely nonparametric this provides strong evidence in favor of models focusing on intrahousehold decision making

nonparametric analysis of household labor supply goodness of fit and power of the unitary and the collective model abstract we compare the empirical performance of unitary and collective labor supply models using representative data from the dutch dnb household survey we conduct a nonparametric analysis that avoids the distortive impact of an erroneously specified functional form for the preferences and or the intrahousehold bargaining process our analysis focuses on the goodness of fit of the two behavioral models to guarantee a fair comparison we complement this goodness of fit analysis with a power analysis our results strongly favor the collective approach to modeling the behavior of multiperson households

estimating consumption economies of scale adult equivalence scales and household bargaining power how much income would a woman living alone require to attain the same standard of living that she would have if she were married what percentage of a married couple s expenditures are controlled by the husband how much money does a couple save on consumption goods by living together versus living apart we propose and estimate a collective model of household behaviour that permits identification and estimation of concepts such as these we model households in terms of the utility functions of its members a bargaining or social welfare function and a consumption technology function we demonstrate generic non parametric identification of the model and hence of a version of adult equivalence scales that we call indifference scales as well as consumption economies of scale the household s resource sharing rule or members bargaining power and other related concepts copyright 2013 oxford university press

the micro economics of group behavior general characterization abstract we study the demand function of a group of s members facing a global budget constraint any vector belonging to the budget set can be consumed within the group with no restriction on the form of individual preferences the nature of individual consumptions or the form of the decision process beyond efficiency moreover only the group aggregate behavior summarized by its demand function is observable we provide necessary and locally sufficient restrictions that fully characterize the group s demand function with and without distribution factors we show that the private or public nature of consumption within the group is not testable from aggregate data on group behavior

best nonparametric bounds on demand responses this paper uses revealed preference inequalities to provide the tightest possible best nonparametric bounds on predicted consumer responses to price changes using consumer level data over a finite set of relative price changes these responses are allowed to vary nonparametrically across the income distribution this is achieved by combining the theory of revealed preference with the semiparametric estimation of consumer expansion paths engel curves we label these expansion path based bounds on demand responses as e bounds deviations from revealed preference restrictions are measured by preference perturbations which are shown to usefully characterize taste change and to provide a stochastic environment within which violations of revealed preference inequalities can be assessed

the revealed preference approach to collective consumption behaviour testing and sharing rule recovery we present a revealed preference methodology for empirically analysing collective consumption behaviour first we introduce an integer programming ip methodology for testing data consistency with collective consumption models that account for publicly as well as privately consumed goods this ip methodology can include information on assignable quantities for private goods next we show that the ip methodology allows for recovering the personalized lindahl prices for the public goods and the personalized quantities for the private goods in turn this implies recovery of the sharing rule i e personalized income share levels an empirical application demonstrates the practical usefulness of the

the microeconomics of efficient group behavior identification1 consider a group consisting of s members facing a common budget constraint p 1 any demand vector belonging to the budget set can be privately or publicly consumed by the members although the intragroup decision process is not known it is assumed to generate pareto efficient outcomes neither individual consumptions nor intragroup transfers are observable the paper analyzes when to what extent and under which conditions it is possible to recover the underlying structure individual preferences and the decision process from the group s aggregate behavior we show that the general version of the model is not identified however a simple exclusion assumption whereby each member does not consume at least one good is sufficient to guarantee generic identifiability of the welfare relevant structural concepts

a cournot nash model of family decision making this paper models a two person family each family member is utility maximising yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family the two family members interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non cooperative or cournot nash game theoretic framework the cournot nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game the paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands a full analysis of the determinants of intra household resource allocation including the effect of varying household bargaining power and consideration of policy implications

household consumption when the marriage is stable we develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption we de ne a revealed preference characterization of e cient household consumption when the marriage is stable stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs we characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold consumption transfers but without assuming transferable utility we show that our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single consumption observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households the characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure including the sharing rule under the same minimalistic assumptions an application to dutch household data demonstrates the usefulness of our theoretical results we nd that the female gets a higher income share when her relative wage increases which we can give a structural interpretation in terms of outside options from marriage that vary with individual wages

non parametric analysis of multi output production with joint inputs we focus on analysing cost minimising production behaviour in multi output settings we distinguish between two approaches for modelling the use of joint inputs the cooperative approach assumes cost minimisation at the aggregate firm level while the non cooperative approach assumes cost minimisation at the level of the individual output division our framework extends the existing non parametric framework for analysing single output production an empirical application to the english and welsh drinking water and sewerage sector shows the practical usefulness of our framework specifically we compare the empirical validity of the cooperative and non cooperative models for describing the observed production behaviour

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

nonparametric engel curves and revealed preference this paper applies revealed preference theory to the nonparametric statistical analysis of consumer demand knowledge of expansion paths is shown to improve the power of nonparametric tests of revealed preference the tightest bounds on indifference surfaces and welfare measures are derived using an algorithm for which revealed preference conditions are shown to guarantee convergence nonparametric engel curves are used to estimate expansion paths and provide a stochastic structure within which to examine the consistency of household level data and revealed preference theory an application is made to a long time series of repeated cross sections from the family expenditure survey for britain the consistency of these data with revealed preference theory is examined for periods of consistency with revealed preference tight bounds are placed on true cost of living indices

intra household experiments a survey experiments with family groups are rare but since many decisions are taken at the household level or occur within the household it is an important area to investigate this paper provides a survey of the recent experimental work on intra household decision making i discuss some of the challenges involved in doing experiments with couples and families and consider major areas that remain yet to be explored while general themes from the research are still emerging four results repeatedly occur 1 the absence of efficiency in intra household decisions 2 joint decisions that are not a convex combination of individual decisions 3 individual behaviour is affected by opportunities for hiding actions from spouses and 4 deviations from standard models of microeconomics in line with those seen in the anomalies literature of individual decision making

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

the collective model of household consumption a nonparametric characterization we provide a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model for household consumption which includes externalities and public consumption next we establish testable necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with collective rationality that only include observed price and quantity information these conditions have a similar structure as the generalized axiom of revealed preference for the unitary model which is convenient from a testing point of view in addition we derive the minimum number of goods and observations that enable the rejection of collectively rational household behavior

noncooperative household demand we study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods deriving the counterpart to the slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true slutsky matrix in the unitary model we provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative

efficient intra household allocations a general characterization and empirical tests the neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members this paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member we make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts all we assume is that however decisions are made outcomes are efficient we refer to this as the collective setting we show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the slutsky matrix we also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made we apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from canada the tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two person households but not for one person households we also show that income pooling is rejected for two person households we then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data none of the collective setting restrictions are rejected we conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior

on the testable implications of collective choice theories we analyze collective choices in game forms from a revealed preference viewpoint we call the joint choice behavior of n agents nash respectively pareto rationalizable if there exist n preferences over the conceivable joint actions such that the joint actions selected from each game form coincide with the nash equilibria respectively the pareto optima of the corresponding game in the two agent case we show that every deterministic joint behavior which is nash rationalizable is also pareto rationalizable the converse is false we further identify general necessary and sufficient conditions for nash rationalizability of an n agent joint choice behavior we also define and characterize partial versions of the nash and pareto rationalizability requirements journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c92

a test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply this paper tests the unitary and the collective household labour supply models within a structural framework a nonlinear unrestricted household labour supply system is postulated and the set of parametric restrictions imposed by each model is derived our results generally reject the income pooling restrictions embodied in the unitary model also the symmetry of cross wage effects is rejected however the collective model is not rejected for groups with no pre school children

distributional effects in household models separate spheres and income pooling we derive distributional eects for a non cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour we consider the nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game our main result is that in general the two partners either choose to contribute to dierent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good the former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of lundberg and pollak 1993 the second outcome yields local income pooling a household will be in dierent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household any bargaining model with this non cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling we conclude that targeting bene ts such as child bene ts to one household member may not always have an eect on outcomes

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

collective labour supply with children we extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption we show how this model allows the analysis of welfare consequences of policies aimed at changing the distribution of power within the household our setting provides a conceptual framework for addressing issues linked to the targeting of specific benefits or taxes we also show that the observation of the labor supplies and the household demand for the public good allow one to identify individual welfare and the decision process this requires either a separability assumption or the presence of a distribution factor

consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts abstract this paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts earnings expectations mbe provide more frequent bad news management forecasts than firms with no established string of mbe particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic this suggests that firms with a consistent mbe record are more likely to guide analysts expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic the relation between management forecasts and mbe consistency is stronger after regulation fd

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth