quality choice of multiproduct monopolist and spill over effect abstract this paper considers the cost relatedness between qualities that are generally taken as being mutually independent in the standard self selection models unlike the standard results the quality distortion occurs in all qualities offered to both types of consumers and interestingly the direction of that distortion is determined by the rate of the marginal cost down from the spill over effect even a pooling menu may occur

long run effects of public sector sponsored training in west germany between 1991 and 1997 west germany spent on average about 3 6 bn euro per year on public sector sponsored training programmes for the unemployed we base our empirical analysis on a new administrative data base that plausibly allows for selectivity correction by microeconometric matching methods we identify the effects of different types of training programmes over a horizon of more than seven years using bias corrected weighted multiple neighbours matching we find that all programmes have negative effects in the short run and positive effects over a horizon of about four years however for substantive training programmes with duration of about two years gains in employment probabilities of more than 10 points appear to be sustainable but come at the price of large negative lock in effects

punitive sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work in the netherlands the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency if they do not then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed this article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients we find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work

monopoly and product quality abstract this paper points out that without restrictions on the cost function distribution of consumer types and on the extent of market coverage the standard parameterization of preferences cannot by itself guarantee that a monopolist would choose a separating menu moreover there may not be any quality distortion

technological advances transaction costs and consumer welfare consumers incur many transaction costs in purchasing and using most products this paper examines the effects of a reduction in such consumer transaction costs caused by market level technological advances using a model in which consumers are simultaneously heterogeneous in their transaction costs and in their marginal valuations of product quality this paper highlights two mechanisms that can cause such reductions in consumer transaction costs to lower consumer surplus and reduce consumer share of the total social surplus specifically market level technological advances reduce different consumers transaction costs by different amounts and increase their reservation prices by different amounts which can lead to i product design changes that many current consumers do not like and ii homogenization in consumer reservation prices that allows a seller to extract more surplus through its pricing policy this paper also shows that consumers may be better off with seller induced higher consumer transaction costs finally the paper shows how depending on the nature of the quality production process such reductions in consumer transaction costs can either lower or raise product qualities and consumer prices

quality discrimination among income constrained consumers abstract this paper provides a complete characterization of equilibrium menus offered by a monopolist to the income constrained consumers in a vertically differentiated market even when all consumers have the same marginal willingness to pay the monopolist can profitably discriminate between them provided they have different binding budget constraints

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal pricing and quality choice of a monopolist under knightian uncertainty abstract this paper analyzes a simple vertical product differentiation model with demand uncertainty and derives a risk neutral monopolist s optimal market entry timing her optimal pricing and optimal quality choice by incorporating knightian uncertainty irreversibility and flexibility in quality enhancing investment into a continuous time stochastic model it is shown that an increase in knightian uncertainty induces decreases in the optimal price the optimal quality and the value of undertaking the quality enhancing investment by the monopolist the social optimal entry timing pricing and quality are also analyzed

a comparison of optimal tariffs and welfare under no lobbying domestic lobbying and domestic foreign lobbying whether and what type of the lobbying induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare we show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying the domestic foreign lobbying may achieve the lowest tariff and may also realise the highest welfare for the domestic country our finding provides a theoretical explanation to the prevalent lobbying competition between asian firms and us firms in usa recently we argue that the domestic foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in the domestic country and lobbying competition may be one of the strongest forces pushing for trade liberalisation

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

wto tariff commitments and temporary protection complements or substitutes abstract there is a long held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection tp measures are substitutes despite this prediction there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping safeguard and countervailing duties based on recent theoretical advances i argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing tp measures is instead tariff overhangs the difference between wto bound and applied tariffs lower tariff overhangs constrain countries to raise their mfn applied rates without legal repercussions independent of past tariff changes using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 wto member countries during the period 1996 2014 i find strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and tp activity this result implies that tariff overhangs and tp measures are substitutes vindicating the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative protection instruments

the effect of benefit sanctions on the duration of unemployment this paper investigates the effectiveness of unemployment benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration swiss data on benefit sanctions allow us to separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements from the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction moreover public employment services are given substantial leeway in setting the monitoring intensity results indicate that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of unemployment of the nonsanctioned jel j64 j65 j68

is the threat of reemployment services more effective than the services themselves evidence from random assignment in the ui system we examine the effect of the worker profiling and reemployment services system this program profiles unemployment insurance ui claimants to determine their probability of benefit exhaustion and then provides mandatory employment and training services to claimants with high predicted probabilities using a unique experimental design we estimate that the program reduces mean weeks of ui benefit receipt by about 2 2 weeks reduces mean ui benefits received by about 143 ana increases subsequent earnings by over 1 050 most of the effect results from a sharp increase in early ui exits in the treatment group relative to the control group jel j650

the impact of being offered and receiving classroom training on the employment histories of disadvantaged women evidence from experimental data we address two questions using experimental data on disadvantaged women first what is the impact of being offered jtpa classroom training on the duration of unemployment and employment second what is the effect of actually participating in this training on the length of such spells belonging to the treatment group shortens unemployment spells but has no effect on employment spells actually participating in training has a larger positive effect on the exit rate from unemployment than the effect of simply being a member of the treatment group ignoring the endogeneity of actual training in estimation substantially underestimates its effect

quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly in the mussa and rosen model j econ theory 18 1978 301 of vertical differentiation a monopolist may optimally choose to underprovide quality if consumers are allowed to buy several units of the indivisible good even if quality provision involves no cost of any sort c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

when to initiate an international vertical merger the impact of negative demand shock this paper develops an extended hotelling type product and technology differentiated model with two upstream and two downstream firms the us upstream respectively downstream firm is technologically more advanced than the chinese upstream respectively downstream firm the locations of the upstream firms and the us downstream firm are fixed and the chinese downstream firm chooses its product location the downstream firms compete with each other in us market we aim to explore the conditions under which an international vertical merger between the chinese downstream firm and the us upstream firm occurs and its welfare implications we show that the incentive for the chinese downstream firm to initiate a technology acquiring international vertical merger crucially depends on the market conditions of the united states as compared to exporting or domestic vertical merger international vertical merger is by no means an optimal choice for the chinese downstream firm when there is no negative demand shocks to us market this result remains to hold when the us downstream firm also has the option of initiating a merger with the us upstream firm nevertheless in the case of a negative demand shock a profitable international vertical merger may occur however such mergers worsen the social welfare of the united states

strategic interaction among nations negotiable and non negotiable trade barriers trade policy is modelled as a two stage game between governments governments choose a negotiable trade barrier in the first stage of the game which is co operative the level of this barrier is treated as a binding commitment in the second stage of the game where the non negotiable trade barrier is chosen non co operatively hence governments choose trade barriers during negotiations with a view to influencing the equilibrium of the non co operative game to follow this proves to be a convenient framework in which to analyse the idea that trade agreements contain loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments trade negotiations induce substitution toward less efficient instruments of protection but are nevertheless welfare improving as long as the negotiations are relevant i e the negotiable barrier is actually in use and the two instruments are not perfect substitutes

the threat effect of active labour market programmes in this paper we estimate the threat effect of active labour market programmes almps for a sample of unemployed men in denmark threat effects of such programmes capture the impacts of a system of almps prior to actual participation rational economic agents make search decisions based on the expected discounted value of unemployment and the perceived risk of future participation in programmes may affect job search behaviour early in the unemployment spell we find a strong and significant threat effect which is shown to reduce average unemployment duration by two and a half weeks

a comment on a model of vertical product differentiation in a duopoly model with vertical differentiation if the firms do not cover the market the lower quality firm chooses a quality level exactly 4 7 of that of the higher quality firm and chooses a price that is 2 7 of the price of the higher quality firm copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

the incidence of visible underemployment evidence for trinidad and tobago this article presents an empirical analysis of the incidence of visible underemployment in trinidad and tobago visible underemployment consists of workers who work less than the normal duration of working hours but are willing and available to work more we find that compared to other groups of the labour force the visibly underemployed tend to be less educated and are more likely to work in the private sector we also find that their revealed behaviour is consistent with their desire for more hours only about 50 per cent of the visibly underemployed are able to find full time employment within three months and little except firm size helps predict who will

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

unemployment insurance rules joblessness and part time work developed and under general conditions an increase in the disregard is shown to increase both the part time and overall re employment hazards data from the current population survey s displaced worker supplements are used to test these predictions estimates from a competing risks model with correlated risks and time varying coefficients shows that increasing the disregard significantly increases the conditional probability of part time re employment during the first three months of joblessness

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

information shocks and the empirical evaluation of training programs during unemployment spells we study the role of notifications in the evaluation of training programs for unemployed workers using a unique administrative data set containing the dates when information is exchanged between job seekers and caseworkers we address three questions do information shocks such as notification of future training have an effect on unemployment duration what is the joint effect of notification and training programs on unemployment can ignoring information shocks lead to a large bias in the estimation of the effect of training programs we discuss these issues through the lens of a job search model and then conduct an empirical analysis following a random effects approach to deal with selectivity we find that notification has a strong positive effect on the training probability but a negative one on the probability of leaving unemployment this attraction effect highlights the importance of accounting for notifications in the evaluation of active labor market policies

quality and congestion in environmental goods the road to the wangapeka abstract an increasing complaint heard among new zealand residents is that their enjoyment of local environmental resources is being diminished by increased congestion from foreign visitors this paper considers a model of vertical differentiation in which foreign high value and domestic low value consumers incur congestion costs in using a common resource we demonstrate that reducing quality in the face of increased foreign demand is optimal absent discriminatory prices but not otherwise we also consider the provision of multiple environmental goods and demonstrate that providing differential qualities may be optimal even if domestic consumers do not use the high quality resources at all

on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas under duopoly abstract the purpose of this paper is to use a conjectural variation approach to examine the equivalence of tariffs and quotas set so as to result in the same equilibrium quantity of imports we have demonstrated that whether tariffs and quotas are equivalent depends crucially upon the particular value of the conjectural variations specifically in the case of equal import tariffs and quotas the equivalence holds only in the cournot case otherwise the domestic price is lower or higher under quotas depending upon whether competition is less or more competitive than cournot

evidence of treatment spillovers within markets this paper provides a method to infer the presence of treatment spillovers within markets where a fraction of agents is treated we model individual outcomes as functions of the assigned treatment status and the distribution of assigned treatments in a market we develop a two step identification and estimation method focusing first on the treatment distribution among individuals within markets and then on the treatment distribution across markets we apply our approach to training programs for unemployed individuals in france using rich administrative data our results provide evidence of interactions within local labor markets as potential individual outcomes vary with the proportion of treated individuals

active labor market policy effects in a dynamic setting this paper develops and implements a method to identify and estimate treatment effects in a dynamic setting where treatments may occur at any point in time by combining the standard matching approach to the timing of events approach it demonstrates that the effect of the treatment on the treated at a given date can be identified although non treated may be treated later in time the approach builds on a no anticipation assumption and the assumption of conditional independence between the duration before treatment and the duration before exit to illustrate the approach the paper studies the effect of training for unemployed workers in france using a rich register data set training has little impact on unemployment duration the contamination of the standard matching estimator due to later entries into treatment is large if the treatment probability is high

nonparametric instrumental variable methods for dynamic treatment evaluation we develop a nonparametric instrumental variable approach for the estimation of average treatment effects on hazard rates and conditional survival probabilities without model structure we derive constructive identification proofs for average treatment effects under noncompliance and dynamic selection exploiting instrumental variation taking place during ongoing spells we derive asymptotic distributions of the corresponding estimators this includes a detailed examination of noncompliance in a dynamic context in an empirical application we evaluate the french labor market policy reform pare which abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced additional active labor market policy measures the estimated effect of the reform on the survival function of the duration of unemployment duration is positive and significant neglecting selectivity leads to an underestimation of the effects in absolute terms

the effect of active labor market programs on not yet treated unemployed individuals labor market programs may affect unemployed individuals behavior before they enroll such ex ante effects are hard to identify without model assumptions we develop a novel method that relates self reported perceived treatment rates and job search behavioral outcomes like the reservation wage to each other among newly unemployed workers job search theory is used to derive theoretical predictions to deal with effect heterogeneity and selectivity the effects of interest are estimated by propensity score matching we apply the method to the german active labor market program system using a novel data set including self reported assessments of the variables of interest as well as unusually detailed information on behavior attitudes and past outcomes we find that the system generates a negative ex ante effect on the reservation wage and a positive effect on search effort jel j64 c21 d83 d84

do agricultural outputs of partly autarkic peasants affect their health and nutrition evidence from rwanda abstract in rural areas of less developed countries because of market imperfections the health and nutritional status of peasants may directly depend on the production levels of specific agricultural goods rather than solely on income levels this channel of health and nutrition determination has never been studied in order to assess and test the empirical possibility of this channel we estimate the responses of health and nutritional status of autarkic agricultural households in rwanda with respect to differences in socio demographic characteristics and the main agricultural outputs and inputs while controlling for local environment and sampling scheme several food outputs are found to have a positive influence on health and nutrition whereas the production of traditional beers has a negative impact moreover greater land negatively affects health and nutrition conditionally on agricultural production perhaps because of a larger relative workload for households who have a large farm an alternative interpretation of the estimates is that they inform on the validity of the common hypothesis of perfect agricultural input output markets with no effect of agricultural inputs outputs on health and nutrition status this hypothesis is rejected

a model of substitution of non tariff barriers for tariffs in this paper some coherent explanations are suggested for tariff reductions and substitution of non tariff barriers for tariffs taking into account both organized special interests and unorganized consumer interests the focus is on how the presence of informed consumers affects the political equilibrium choice of trade policy three effects are identified that interact with each other as an incumbent government substitutes a ntb for a tariff and among other things it is found that an increase in foreign competition will not cause the government to substitute ntbs for tariffs but a rise in the government s valuation of political contribution might do so jel classification f13 d72 ce memoire propose des explications coherentes de la reduction des droits de douane et de la substitution de barrieres non tarifaires bnt pour les droits de douane dans un cadre d analyse qui tient compte des groupes d interet organises et de la desorganisation des groupes de consommateurs l analyse insiste sur l impact de consommateurs informes sur les choix politiques qui sous tendent la politique commerciale le memoire identifie trois effets effet de bienetre social effet de lobbying effet d information qui jouent au moment ou un gouvernement substitue une barriere non tarifaire a un droit de douane on montre entre autres choses qu un accroissement de la concurrence etrangere n engendre pas de substitution de bnt pour un droit de douane mais qu un accroissement de la valeur accordee aux contributions electorales peut fort bien avoir cet effet

why can t countervailing duties deter export subsidization abstract this paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former to explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the gatt conform countervailing duty measures factors such as delay in retaliation the gatt constraint on the amount of countervailing duties and voluntary export restraints must be considered we find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization