a bargaining approach to profit sharing in joint ventures profit sharing arrangements in joint ventures are analyzed as a bayesian bargaining game between two parents with incomplete information about each other s cost function for inputs provided using the mathematics of mechanism design this article explores the sensitivity of the bargaining agreement to the timing of private information about costs a condition on demand and costs is derived under which the balanced budget constraint does not preclude the joint venture from achieving an ex post efficient level of production the proposed mechanism is then extended to the second best environment under the criteria of 1 ex ante optimality and 2 r b myerson s axiomatic neutral bargaining solution the direct revelation mechanisms are interpreted as corresponding indirect transfer pricing mechanisms a major result is that in all cases the outcome calls for equal allocation of realized joint venture net profit copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

short term inflation expectations evidence from a monthly survey note the assumption that economic agents have rational expectations is commonplace in studies of macroeconomic policy and asset market behavior research examining observable expectations from surveys however has generally found that the data reject the rational expectations hypothesis friedman 1980 reports that forecasts of long term interest rates from surveys of financial market participants are not rational figlewski and wachtel 1981 note that most investigators of the livingston survey data on economists inf lation expectations conclude that these data do not conform to the rational expectations hypothesis british survey data on the inflation expectations of consumers analyzed by evans and gulamani 1984 and on the inflation expectations of business firms examined by pesaran 1985 also appear inconsistent with rational expectations the failure of survey data to pass tests of rationality have led researchers such as mishkin 1983 to question the usefulness of survey data to proxy expectations this paper examines a different source of expectations data namely the surveys of money market participants conducted by money market services inc mms data from the mms surveys have been widely used in studies of how asset prices respond to unanticipated changes in economic variables recent papers by urich and wachtel 1984 pearce and roley 1985 and smirlock 1986 employ the median predicted inflation rate from the mms survey to construct a measure of the unexpected component of inflation announcements

empirical evidence on inflation expectations in the new keynesian phillips curve abstract we review the main identification strategies and empirical evidence on the role of expectations in the new keynesian phillips curve paying particular attention to the issue of weak identi

sector choice multiple job holding and wage differentials evidence from poland this article uses data from poland to investigate the role played by wage differentials between the public and private sectors in influencing sector choice and the decision to moonlight standardising for worker characteristics and allowing for sector selection effects we find i a substantial private sector wage premium ii wage differentials are a significant determinant of sector choice and iii the desire to moonlight is particularly strong among those who face the greatest wage gap that is university educated employees

expectations as a source of macroeconomic persistence evidence from survey expectations in a dynamic macro model abstract embedding survey expectations in a standard dsge model helps to identify key slope parameters in standard relationships dramatically reduces the need for lagged dependent variables often motivated by price indexation and habit formation and obviates the need for autocorrelated structural shocks in the key equations formal statistical tests demonstrate that much of the persistence in aggregate data is better accounted for by slow moving expectations rather than by habits indexation and autocorrelated structural shocks

direct evidence on sticky information from the revision behavior of professional forecasters we provide direct evidence on the sticky information model of mankiw and reis 2002 by examining how frequently individual professional forecasters revise their forecasts we draw interest rate and unemployment rate forecasts from the monthly wall street journal surveys conducted between 2003 and 2013 consistent with the sticky information model we find that forecasters frequently leave their forecasts unrevised but find evidence that revision frequency increases following larger changes in the information set we also find revision frequencies became more sensitive to new information after the 2008 financial crisis but only weak evidence that frequent revisers forecast more accurately

inflation dynamics the role of expectations the modelling of expectations and its degree of backward looking behaviour are issues of main concern in the in ation dynamics research agenda one approach in the literature is to use expectations from surveys as an approximation to actual expectations this method avoids particular assumptions on expectations and their degree of rationality we estimate the phillips curve allowing for a simultaneous role of rational and survey expectations we formulate both a generalization of the usual phillips curve and a structural version in the spirit of gal and gertler 1999 we flnd that marginal cost determines in ation while the role of detrended output appears to be problematic we also flnd that survey expectations are an important component of in ation dynamics but they do not fully re ect economic agents rationality a signiflcant level of rationality is found even when controlling for survey expectations jel classiflcation e31

making weak instrument sets stronger factor based estimation of inflation dynamics and a monetary policy rule the problem of weak identification has recently attracted attention in the analysis of structural macroeconomic models using robust methods can result in large confidence sets making precise inference difficult we overcome this problem in the analysis of the hybrid new keynesian phillips curve and a forward looking taylor rule by employing stronger instruments we suggest exploiting information from a large macroeconomic data set by generating factors and using them as additional instruments this approach results in stronger instrument sets and hence smaller weak identification robust confidence sets it allows us to conclude that there has been a shift toward more active monetary policy from the pre volcker regime to the volcker greenspan tenure

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal the case of private values we analyze the principal agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three stage noncooperative game contract proposal acceptance refusal and contract execution we assume that the information does not directly affect the agent s payoff private values equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique moreover it is pareto optimal for the different types of principal the principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information equilibrium allocations are the walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints

testing the rationality of inflation forecasts from survey data another look at the src expected price change data this paper develops a unified econometric approach for testing the rationality of expectations from survey data series the paper employs the estimation techniques of hansen 1982 and eichenbaum hansen and singleton 1982 to conduct tests of unbiasedness efficiency and orthogonality for the src expected price change data in contrast to the existing literature the analysis takes careful account of serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity in the disturbance terms the results do not reject the properties of unbiasedness efficiency or othogonality for this survey data series copyright 1989 by mit press

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

price dynamics and production lags this paper provides a new explanation of why inflation is sluggish in response to aggregate demand shocks and why aggregate output changes as result of such shocks we argue that these phenomena are related to lags between inputs and outputs in the production process production lags for short the broad intuition is that production activities in a modern economy are interconnected through complex input output relations with production lags within individual firms and that it takes considerable time for cost and price changes to penetrate the entire input output system our analysis provides a rationale for a prolonged inverse relation between inflation and unemployment the paper suggests that the interaction of inflation persistence and unemployment persistence may offer a possible explanation of high and prolonged european unemployment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

household versus economist forecasts of inflation a reassessment note in a recent article in this journal gramlich 1983 concluded that the mean inflation forecasts from the university of michigan survey research center src surveys of households were in the years 1956 1980 more accurate and more rational than the mean inflation forecasts from livingston s philadelphia inquirer surveys of professional economists these paradoxical elndings have proved robust with respect to improvements in testing procedures bryan and gavin 1986a 1 986b the purpose of this note is not to cast doubt on the result themselves but to urge caution in their interpretation with respect to forecast accuracy we show that while the average forecast from the src is indeed more accurate than the average forecast from the livingston survey the forecast of a typical household is much less accurate than that of a typical economist the apparent superiority of the src survey is entirely due to its larger

information rigidity and the expectations formation process a simple framework and new facts we propose a new approach to test the full information rational expectations hypothesis which can identify whether rejections of the null arise from irrationality or limited information this approach quantifies the economic significance of departures from the null by quantifying the underlying degree of information rigidity applying this approach to u s and international data of professional forecasters and other agents yields pervasive evidence consistent with models of imperfect information furthermore the proposed approach sheds new light on policies such as inflation targeting and those leading to the great moderation affecting expectations finally we document evidence of state dependence in the expectations formation process

experimental evidence on the persistence of output and inflation this article presents experimental evidence from a monetary sticky price economy in which output and inflation depend on expected future inflation rational inflation expectations do not allow for persistent deviations of output and inflation following a monetary shock in the experimental sessions however output and inflation display considerable persistence and regular cyclical patterns

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

social capital and entrepreneurial activity a pseudo panel approach abstract this paper uses a pseudo panel approach at an age based cohort level to investigate the extent to which social capital accounts for differences in entrepreneurial activities the findings suggest that trust measured by trust either in strangers or in public institutions facilitates entrepreneurship we also find that parents emphasis on individual achievement relative to interpersonal relations in raising their child is positively associated with entrepreneurship evidence suggests that both social norms and networks influence entrepreneurship these results do not change when we use social capital measured at the national level

the economics of moonlighting a double self selection model the model proposed here for obtaining the labor supply functions of moonlighters uses a double self selection system to explore the husband s decision to moonlight together with his wife s decision to work subsequently the labor functions are classified under two regimes depending on whether the wife works the model is estimated based on a cross section of 4 448 married couples from the survey of income and program participation wave 2 i find that the household production time of husbands and wives are substitutes and that specific human capital deters moonlighting copyright 1990 by mit press

the genesis of inflation and the costs of disinflation this essay asks how high inflation arises and why it is costly to eliminate specifically the paper discusses the roles of price rigidity and credibility problems in explaining the costs of disinflation the puzzle of persistent inflation triggered by onetime macroeconomic shocks and the case for returning to adaptive expectations in theories of inflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a quantitative comparison of sticky price and sticky information models of price setting i estimate sticky price and sticky information models of price setting for the united states via maximum likelihood techniques reaching several conclusions first the sticky price model fits best and captures inflation dynamics as well as reduced form equations once hybrid behavior is allowed second the importance of hybrid behavior in sticky price models is potentially consistent with a role for some information imperfections such as sticky information as a complement to nominal price rigidities finally the favorable results herein for the hybrid sticky price model when evaluated by statistics that summarize the relative fit of different models is consistent with the existing literature that is both supportive and dismissive of such models as this literature has largely ignored fit in evaluating such models many previous studies have focused on ancillary issues such as the standard errors associated with certain parameters or granger causality tests that may not provide much information about sticky price models

the new keynesian phillips curve from sticky inflation to sticky prices the new keynesian phillips curve nkpc model of inflation dynamics based on forward looking expectations is of great theoretical significance in monetary policy analysis empirical studies however often find that backward looking inflation inertia dominates the dynamics of the short run aggregate supply curve this inconsistency is examined by investigating multiple structural changes in the nkpc for the u s between 1960 and 2005 employing both inflation expectations survey data and a rational expectations approximation we find that forward looking behavior plays a smaller role during the high and volatile inflation regime to 1981 than in the subsequent period of moderate inflation providing empirical support for sticky price models over the last two decades a break in the intercept of the nkpc is also identified around 2001 and this may be associated with u s monetary policy in that period

inflation expectations and behavior do survey respondents act on their beliefs we compare the inflation expectations reported by consumers in a survey with their behavior in a financially incentivized investment experiment the survey is found to be informative in the sense that the beliefs reported by the respondents are correlated with their choices in the experiment more importantly we find evidence that most respondents act on their inflation expectations showing patterns consistent with economic theory respondents whose behavior cannot be rationalized tend to have lower education and lower numeracy and financial literacy these findings help confirm the relevance of inflation expectations surveys and provide support to the microfoundations of modern macroeconomic models

behavioral heterogeneity in u s inflation dynamics in this article we develop and estimate a behavioral model of inflation dynamics with heterogeneous firms in our stylized framework there are two groups of price setters fundamentalists and rando

is inflation sticky abstract new keynesian sticky price models predict that monetary policy can affect real variables however they also predict that inflation can be reduced without depressing output or employment in fact bringing down inflation is costly presenting a challenge to the new keynesian model two departures from the new keynesian model predict costly disinflation one assumes sticky inflation rather than sticky prices while the other assumes less than perfectly rational expectations taking into account information from surveys of inflation expectations i find the evidence suggests that inflation is not sticky and that inflation expectations are less than perfectly rational

menu costs and the neutrality of money a model of endogenous price adjustment under money growth is presented firms follow s s pricing policies and price revisions are imperfectly synchronized in the aggregate price stickiness disappears and money is neutral the connection between firm price adjustment and relative price variability in the presence of monetary growth is also investigated the results contrast with those obtained in models with exogenous fixed timing of price adjustment

an undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values in a class of informed principal problems with common values we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation it is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret it always exists is unique and continuous in the priors it is undominated i e efficient among the different types of the principal subject to the agent s interim participation constraint it is a perfect bayesian equilibrium of the three stage game in myerson 16 and maskin and tirole 14 it dominates the rsw allocation as defined in maskin and tirole 14 and coincides with it when the latter is undominated it is the unique neutral optimum as defined in myerson 16 when there are only two types when the assured allocation is separating then it is a neutral optimum with three or more types it is an equilibrium of a game of competition in a market with adverse selection

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

a signaling based theory of contractual commitment to relationships abstract in this paper i present signaling as an explanation for how and why parties commit to relationships when they initially contract about the terms of those relationships two forms of contractual commitment to a relationship are considered a promise to trade in the future contracted quantity and a promise not to trade with anyone else contracted exclusivity a party is said to commit more to a relationship if it commits initially to trade a higher quantity and or to a higher level of exclusivity i characterize equilibrium contracts and therefore commitment both the ability to signal information through an exclusivity commitment and whether the informed party commits more to the relationship when the relationship is more likely to succeed depend on the source of the asymmetry of information

inflation expectations in euro area phillips curves abstract we analyze the information content of alternative inflation expectations measures including those from consumers firms experts and financial markets in the context of open economy phillips curves we adopt a thick modeling approach with rolling regressions and we assess the results of an out of sample conditional forecasting exercise by means of meta regressions the information content varies substantially across inflation expectations measures in particular we find that those from consumers and firms are better at predicting inflation if compared to those from experts and especially those from financial markets

secondary job holding in germany since 2003 the number and ratio of multiple jobholders has more than doubled although the german labour market has been experiencing a strong and sustained upswing this study analyses multiple j

renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts we analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal agent model contract renegotiation offers are made by the agent a refinement is imposed on the principal s beliefs if precisely one action is optimal with respect to both the principal s and the agent s contracts the principal believes that that action has been taken with the refinement imposed perfect bayesian equilibrium allocations are identical to the second best in the classical principal agent model without renegotiation when renegotiation is led by the agent and when equilibria satisfy the refinement equilibrium allocations are ex ante efficient incentive contracting is a common mechanism for promoting ex ante investments and for avoiding ex post opportunistic behaviour in a long term or continuing economic relationship the classical principal agent model holmstrom 1979 grossman and hart 1983 is a natural framework for this class of problem in such a model a risk averse agent performs an action on behalf of a risk neutral principal the agent s action is unobservable and affects the principal s revenue in a random fashion the derivation and characterization of efficient compensation schemes have been the major focus in the principal agent literature generally the incentives to motivate a costly action from the agent take the form of profit sharing the agent s reward is made contingent on his random performance outcomes

multiple job holding among male workers in greece livanos i and zangelidis a multiple job holding among male workers in greece regional studies this paper studies the incidence of multiple job holding in greece and contributes to the literature by examining its determinants its variance across different regions and the effect of the business cycle on its occurrence the empirical analysis highlights the importance of both pecuniary and non pecuniary motives behind multiple job holding and reveals significant variations in its incidence across regions with areas that have a large primary sector having higher multiple job holding rates finally multiple job holding is found to be pro cyclical with the probability of holding a second job estimated to increase during economic expansion livanos i et zangelidis a les emplois multiples masculins en grece regional studies l article cherche a etudier la frequence des emplois multiples en grece et contribue a la documentation en examinant ses determinants sa variance a travers les diverses regions

signaling quality with increased incentives previous work on informed principal problems with moral hazard suggested that the principal should signal project quality by retaining a larger share of the project and hence lowering incentives for the agent we show that this view is incomplete if project quality and effort are complements and effort is more valuable for high quality projects a principal with a high quality project may separate from a principal with a low quality project by increasing incentives for the agent this holds with a risk neutral agent who is protected by limited liability as well as with a risk averse agent and unlimited liability a dynamic version of our model in which the agent learns project quality in later periods provides an explanation for the use of initially reduced royalty rates in business format franchising contracts

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

what can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities a lot we derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers firms central bankers and professional forecasters we document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information the dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities

new evidence on inflation persistence and price stickiness in the euro area implications for macro modeling this paper evaluates new evidence on price setting practices and inflation persistence in the euro area with respect to its implications for macro modeling it argues that several of the most commonly used assumptions in micro founded macro models are seriously challenged by the new findings jel e31 e52

optimal monetary policy when agents are learning abstract we derive optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model when private agents follow adaptive learning we show that this slight departure from rationality has important implications for policy design the central bank faces a new intertemporal trade off not present under rational expectations it is optimal to forego stabilizing the economy in the present in order to facilitate private sector learning and thus ease the future intratemporal inflation output gap trade offs the policy recommendation is robust the welfare loss entailed by optimal policy under learning if the private sector actually has rational expectations is much smaller than if the central bank mistakenly assumes rational expectations when in fact agents are learning

efficiency and formation of expectations evidence from the european investment survey the european commission conducts an annual survey regarding planned and realized business fixed investment across various manufacturing sectors in euroland in this study we investigate the predictive content of survey based expectations on investment in addition we empirically test the rationality of respondents both in a time series as well as in a panel context according to our results based on pooling the data efficiency is rejected since expectations are biased predictors of actual outcomes furthermore expectations revisions are found to be correlated with components of the information set known at the time of decision making finally our results qualify regressive expectations as the mechanism that more adequately describes the formation of expectations

new keynesian economics and the phillips curve models with sticky prices are an important part of new keynesian economics the author shows that several of the new keynesian models imply a formulation that is similar to the expectations augmented phillips curve of milton friedman and edmund phelps he then presents new estimates of the new keynesian phillips curve the author uses two proxies for price expectations survey based measures and an econometric based measure originally developed by bennett mccallum 1976 overall the results are consistent with the model but the survey based results are more precise suggesting that the surveys may be better measures of actual expectations copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

heterogeneous inflation expectations and learning using the panel component of the michigan survey of consumers we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations but only for 1 year ahead inflation public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations even controlling for life experience inflation and public information idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents women ethnic minorities and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information and give less importance to recent movements in inflation

multiple job holding in the united kingdom evidence from the british household panel survey this article examines the determinants of multiple job holding in the uk we address these issues using data from the first 11 waves of the british household panel survey bhps which covered the period from 1991 to 2001 evidence from the bhps does not support the hypotheses of main job hours constrained and main job insecurity we argue that the incentive for moonlighting in the uk is due to financial pressures and the desire for heterogeneous jobs the empirical work is carried out separately for men and women

optimal fiscal policy under learning abstract this paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy when agents learn about future taxation a benevolent and fully rational government chooses taxes on labor income and state contingent bonds to finance public spending considering that private agents form their expectations through a learning algorithm facing a trade off between distortionary taxes and distorted expectations the ramsey planner chooses the policy that minimizes the total cost of distortions the analysis produces two main results first the government will use fiscal variables to manipulate expectations reducing taxes and issuing debt at times of pessimism and doing the opposite at times of optimism this speeds up learning second the expectation dependent fiscal plan is also history dependent and it prescribes taxes that are not as smooth and more persistent than under rational expectations these findings are robust to alternative learning algorithms

informed seller with taste heterogeneity consider a seller with a single indivisible good facing a buyer whose willingness to pay depends on his privately known taste and on product characteristics privately known by the seller what selling procedure can arise as an equilibrium of the game in which the seller strategically chooses mechanisms conditional on his information we characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes and establish that ex ante revenue maximizing mechanisms are in this set there is generally a continuum of revenue ranked equilibrium outcomes focusing on the revenue maximizing equilibrium we show that the seller in general benefits from private information and does not benefit from committing to a disclosure or a certification technology we also provide conditions under which the privacy of the seller s information does not affect revenue

testing the rationality of price forecasts new evidence from panel data this paper tests the rationality of individual price forecasts in a panel of professional forecasters here unlike in most previous studies rationality is not rejected the results here differ because 1 using individual forecasts avoids aggregation bias 2 comparison of forecasts to initial data avoids bias due to data revision 3 the professional forecasters have economic incentives to state their expectations accurately and 4 a new covariance matrix estimator consistent when forecast errors are correlated across individuals is used copyright 1990 by american economic association

the puzzling pattern of multiple job holding across u s labor markets multiple job holding mjh rates differ substantially across u s regions states and metropolitan areas rates decrease markedly with respect to labor market size these patterns have been largely overlooked despite being relatively fixed over at least the past 20 years this article explores explanations for these persistent differences we account for roughly two thirds of the mean absolute deviation in mjh across local labor markets msas the results suggest that variation in mjh across labor markets is driven by labor market differences in job opportunities and worker preferences most important in explaining variation in mjh are msa industry and occupation structure ancestry shares commute times and to a lesser extent labor market churn

the eurozone expected inflation an option s eyes view abstract we estimate inflation risk neutral densities rnds in the euro area using inflation swaps and caps floors options and introduce a parsimonious approach to jointly estimate the rnds across horizons thus we obtain daily implicit rnds for forward measures such as the 5 year on 5 year inflation rate which although not directly traded in the market is a key reference for monetary policy then we discuss several indicators derived from the information content of those historical rnds that are relevant for policy makers and compare them in light of the ecb s decisions and communication since 2009 specifically we study the evolution of tail risks associated with deflation and high inflation the balance of inflation risks risk aversion and how forward inflation rates react to the ecb s non conventional monetary policies longer term refinancing operations ltro securities market programme smp asset purchase programme app and its variants and extensions

hybrid entrepreneurship and public policy the case of firm entry deregulation hybrid entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs who are simultaneously working as paid employees although they constitute a systematic and large part of new firm creation their possibly distinct responsiveness to public policy is not yet studied arguing for the need to consider hybrid entrepreneurs in public policy we analyze the introduction of one stop shops for faster and simplified firm registration in mexico we find that hybrid entrepreneurs are more responsive to changes in entry regulation than full time entrepreneurs while both the best and least educated people respond to the reform the effect is most pronounced for highly educated hybrid entrepreneurs

moonlighting multiple motives and gender differences this paper examines the incidence and reasons for moonlighting with a focus on gender differences the study specifies and estimates a bivariate probit model of labour supply and the decision to hold more than one job it is found that the factors leading men and women to moonlight are similar a wage decomposition analysis reveals that 93 percent of the differential between male and female moonlighters wages is not explained by differences in characteristics and little connection is found between an individual s human capital and their moonlighting wage finally it is found that moonlighters are less likely to report their income

using survey data of inflation expectations in the estimation of learning and rational expectations models do survey data on inflation expectations contain useful information for estimating macroeconomic models i address this question by using survey data in the new keynesian model by smets and wouters 2007 to estimate and compare its performance when solved under the assumptions of rational expectations and learning this information serves as an additional moment restriction and helps to determine the forecasting model for inflation that agents use under learning my results reveal that the predictive power of this model is improved when using both survey data and an admissible learning rule for the formation of inflation expectations

union wage settlements during a disinflation this paper examines the role of union wage contracts in the persistence of inflation and the implication of these contracts for the problem of disinflation in the united states a quantitative model of overlapping con tracts explicitly oriented toward the major union sector is developed the model takes account of expectations of future wage price and employment conditions as in more aggregated models that have been used in macroeconomic research in addition the distribution of workers according to contract length as well as deferred wage increases and escalator clauses are explicitly used in the model the main aim of the model is to determine the constraints which these contracts impose on disinflation paths the model indicates that the maximum speed of disinflation is extremely slow in the early phases if a rise in unemployment is to be avoided but increases considerably before the new lower rate of inflation is reached the disinflation path is considerably slower than that observed after hyperinflation periods however the existence of a path of inflation reduction raises questions about whether the institution of union wage con tracts is really the direct cause of costly disinflations or whether their influence works indirectly by raising credibility problems about a monetary disinflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

informed principal with correlation in this paper we analyze a simple two sided adverse selection model with one principal and one agent they are both risk neutral and have private information about their type we also assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with the one of the agent the main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public the principal can design such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative signal on the agent s one we fully characterize the equilibrium of the principal agent game in which different types of principal offer the same menu of contracts that leave the agent uninformed about the principal s type this gives more freedom to the principal when setting the transfers because the agent s constraints need to hold only at an interim stage the principal gains from a peculiarity of the correlated environment different types of agent have different beliefs about the probability distribution over the states of the world

labor supply preferences hours constraints and hours wage tradeoffs in a labor market with tied hours wage packages and wage dispersion for a particular type of job constrained workers may be willing to sacrifice wage gains for better hours when changing jobs likewise workers may accept jobs offering undesirable hours only if the associated wage gains are large we investigate this issue empirically by examining whether overemployment and underemployment on the initial and new job affects the relation between hours changes and wage changes for quitters our results generally support the view that an individual requires compensation to work in a job that given the individual s particular preferences offers unattractive hours

fitting observed inflation expectations abstract the paper provides evidence on the extent to which inflation expectations generated by a standard christiano et al 2005 smets and wouters 2003 type dsge model are in line with what observed in the data we consider three variants of this model that differ in terms of the behavior of and the public s information on the central banks inflation target allegedly a key determinant of inflation expectations we find that i time variation in the inflation target is needed to capture the evolution of expectations during the post volcker period ii the variant where agents have imperfect information is strongly rejected by the data iii inflation expectations appear to contain information that is not present in the other series used in estimation and iv none of the models fully capture the dynamics of this variable

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

new tests of the new keynesian phillips curve abstract lagged dependent variables typically play an important role in empirical models of inflation do these lags reflect backward looking inflation expectations or do they proxy for rational forward looking expectations as in the new keynesian phillips curve gali and gertler 1999 inflation dynamics a structural econometric analysis journal of monetary economics 44 195 222 attempt to answer this question using gmm to estimate specifications incorporating both lagged and future inflation they report small coefficients on lagged inflation and conclude that the new keynesian model provides a good first approximation to inflation dynamics we show that these tests have low power against alternative backward looking specifications and demonstrate that their results are also consistent with a backward looking phillips curve using an alternative approach we find that the new keynesian pricing model cannot explain the importance of lagged inflation in standard inflation regressions and find that forward looking terms play a very limited role in explaining inflation dynamics

is it all about money an examination of the motives behind moonlighting multiple job holding is an important labour market phenomenon in this article we examine individuals motives for multiple job holding specifically we estimate an empirical model of the motivation for moonlighting assuming that individuals hold a second job for either financial or for nonpecuniary motives our results contribute to a better understanding of multiple job holding we find that multiple job holding is used by individuals as a way to deal with the financial difficulties or the increased financial commitments in their household individuals are more likely to moonlight for money in the early stages of their adult life finally individuals with more labour market experience are more likely to moonlight for pecuniary than nonpecuniary reasons

inflation dynamics and subjective expectations in the united states i introduction this paper analyzes the ability of sticky price models to explain the dynamics of u s inflation when using survey data as proxies for inflation expectations testing sticky price models with survey expectations is attractive since to the extent that survey data correctly capture agents expectations they allow to disregard issues related to the specification of agents expectations functions one neither has to impose untested orthogonality restrictions as required when estimating under the assumption of rational expectations nor has to make restrictive assumptions about the precise form of nonrationality present in agents forecast functions this allows to focus on the question whether the economic models under consideration are correctly specified previous tests of sticky price models performed under the assumption that agents hold rational expectations have generated mixed results prominently fuhrer and moore 1995 have reported that sticky price models do not generate sufficient stickiness for inflation when the output gap is used as a measure of real marginal costs recent evidence however has shown that the empirical performance depends crucially on how one measures real marginal costs the main determinant of inflation according to sticky price models for instance gall and gertler 1999 and sbordone 2002 show that sticky price models perform well once marginal costs are approximated by average unit labor costs 1 it makes an important difference whether sticky price models successfully explain inflation dynamics as a function of output behavior or they relate inflation dynamics to the behavior of unit labor costs given that the ultimate objective is a model explaining the joint behavior of output and inflation the latter case would require an additional empirically plausible theory linking the dynamics of unit labor costs to the behavior of output this paper studies whether the currently popular new keynesian phillips curve nkpc which can be derived from calvo 1983 style sticky price models is able to explain a relationship between inflation on the one hand and output or unit labor costs on the other hand thus we let the data speak whether a theory linking output to costs is warranted once expectations are approximated by data reported in the survey of professional forecasters our main finding is that the nkpc performs equally well with both measures of marginal costs output and unit labor costs whatever measure is used the estimate of the quarterly discount factor is close to one and the point estimate of the degree of price stickiness implies that firms reset their prices roughly every five quarters on average these results suggest that potential nonrationalities in expectations as they show up in surveys have biased previous estimates using output as a measure for marginal costs quite surprisingly the same nonrationalities do not seem to play a role when using unit labor costs here our estimates confirm the results obtained by gall and gertler 1999 and sbordone 2002 who assumed rational expectations we show that the reason for this finding is that approximating the agents information set using the unit labor cost variable rests on more solid grounds than approximating it using the output variable in particular the survey data suggest that the hypothesis of rational expectations implies a too high correlation between lagged output and future inflation expectations we show that this causes the coefficient estimate for output to become negative contrary to what is implied by theory these results suggest that once one takes account of potentially nonrational expectations via survey expectations sticky price models are able to establish a close link between output dynamics and the behavior of inflation to assess the robustness of this finding we include into the price equation lags of various variables and test for their significance

monetary policy rules and the indicator properties of asset prices abstract we investigate relationships between asset prices and inflation in a modern keynesian model in which monetary policy controls inflation by manipulating the federal funds rate the indicator properties of asset prices are quite sensitive to the monetary policy rule including the asset prices themselves in the reaction function can invert the sense of the indicator properties targeting the asset prices is tantamount to targeting the real interest rate when all of the weight in the reaction function is placed on asset prices the real rate converges so rapidly that policy loses control of inflation

price inertia and policy ineffectiveness in the united states 1890 1980 this paper introduces a new approach to the empirical testing of the lucas sargent wallace lsw policy ineffectiveness proposition which compares the lsw hypothesis with an alternative that states that prices respond fully in the long run but only gradually in the short run to nominal aggregate demand disturbances the empirical equations estimated for a new set of quarterly data extending back to 1890 exhibit uniformly high responses of real output and low responses of price changes to anticipated changes in nominal gnp the paper compares and tests three alternative methods of introducing persistence effects into the lsw framework

superior information income shocks and the permanent income hypothesis according to the permanent income hypothesis with quadratic preferences households save for a rainy day the transitory component of income innovations and consume entirely the permanent one the m

models of inflation expectations formation a comparison of household and economist forecasts comment in the third section of his paper models of inflation expectations formation a comparison of household and economist forecasts gramlich 1983 presents statistics suggesting that two survey measures of inflation expectations are biased and inefficient in this comment we show that the main results presented in his table 1 are generated using a misspecified model when the specification error is corrected we find that the michigan survey of household inflation expectations passes the standard tests for unbiasedness and weak tests for efficiency 1 however there remains doubt about the properties of the inflation expectation series derived from the livingston survey of professional economists 2 the particular results we review were presumably generated from ordinary leastsquares ols estimation of the following equation equation 2 in gramlich