structural causes and regime consequences regimes as intervening variables international regimes are defined as principles norms rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area as a starting point regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables standing between basic causal factors and related outcomes and behavior there are three views about the importance of regimes conventional structural orientations dismiss regimes as being at best ineffectual grotian orientations view regimes as an intimate component of the international system and modified structural perspectives see regimes as significant only under certain constrained conditions for grotian and modified structuralist arguments which endorse the view that regimes can influence outcomes and behavior regime development is seen as a function of five basic causal variables egoistic self interest political power diffuse norms and principles custom and usage and knowledge

matching with waiting times the german entry level labor market for lawyers abstract we study the allocation of german lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee ships because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated the currently used berlin mechanism is not weakly pareto efficient does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements we introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature using waiting time as the contractual term the resulting mechanism is strategy proof weakly pareto efficient eliminates justified envy and respects improvements we extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time

the spread of municipal reform temporal spatial and social dynamics the adoption of commission and managerial administrative structures and their subsequent abandonment by the 267 largest american cities during the period 1900 1942 is studied using event history methods full period equations show no significant direct effect of percentage catholic culture clash or population size hierarchical diffussion and only a modest impact of city age modernization a strong effect from average annual manufacturing wages is found but in a direction contrary to that posited by the class conflict hypothesis the variable affecting transition rates most strongly appears to be regional adoption percentages an indicator of neighborhood diffusion these findings suggest revisions of the conventional image of the municipal reform experience

walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

in search of smoking guns what makes income inequality vary over time in different countries we investigate the forces affecting the distribution of income by analyzing an unbalanced panel of information for 16 industrialized countries for the years 1966 through 1994 income inequality is measured with the gini coefficient of equivalent disposable income individuals are the unit of analysis the statistical analysis uses panel methods the results suggest that many factors affect the development of income inequality some factors are strictly economic a decreased industrial sector generally fosters inequality and some support is found for the view that increased trade of manufactured goods from developing countries is also a factor other forces are outside a strictly defined market sphere low inequality is found when a large proportion of the labor force belongs to a trade union and also when there is a large public sector in addition demographic circumstances are important since the proportion of the population under age 15 has a positive effect on inequality we find however no association between the unemployment rate and inequality

near feasible stable matchings with couples the national resident matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals with couples stable matchings need not exist nevertheless for any student preferences we show that each instance of a matching problem has a nearby instance with a stable matching the nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals in this perturbation aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four the capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two

on stable and strategy proof rules in matching markets with contracts abstract this paper studies stable and one sided strategy proof rules in many to one matching markets with contracts not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand we obtain the following results first the number of stable and strategy proof rules is at most one second the doctor optimal stable rule whenever it exists is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy proof rule third a stable and strategy proof rule whenever it exists is second best optimal for doctor welfare in that no individually rational and strategy proof rule can dominate it this last result is further generalized to non wasteful and strategy proof rules due to the weak assumptions our analysis covers a broad range of markets including cases where a unique stable and strategy proof rule is not equal to the one induced by the cumulative offer process or the deferred acceptance algorithm

redesigning the israeli psychology master s match we report on the centralization of a two sided matching with contracts market in which pre existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition the ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design the new mechanism is stable and strategy proof for applicants it is well accepted by both sides of the market our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes

substitutes and stability for matching with contracts we consider the matching problem with contracts of hatfield and milgrom 2005 and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes we show that bilateral substitutes is a sucient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework however the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition and there does not necessarily exist a doctor optimal stable allocation under a slightly stronger condition unilateral substitutes the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors preferences but there does exist a doctor optimal stable allocation and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered

market failure in incentive based regulation the case of emissions trading abstract among the existing evaluations of the us epa s emissions trading program a consensus has emerged while the program has resulted in significant cost savings it has not even approximately achieved a cost effective allocation of the control responsibility the cost savings have been smaller and the trades fewer than might have been expected at the outset of the program in this article we explore one hypothesis which purports to explain the divergence between the cost minimizing and the observed pattern of trades for nonuniformly mixed pollutants the trading process hypothesis attributes some significant proportion of this divergence to the nature of the process by which emission reduction credits are traded under the bubble policy an examination of actual bubble trades reveals that the actual trading process is sequential and bilateral and hence differs considerably from the implicit process modeled in the existing empirical studies simulations of this more realistic trading process suggest that the resulting equilibria deviate considerably from cost effective allocations of the control responsibility

on the correspondence of contracts to salaries in many to many matching abstract in this note i extend the work of echenique 2012 to show that a model of many to many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many to many matching with wage bargaining whenever 1 all agents preferences are substitutable and 2 the matching with contracts model is unitary in the sense that every contractual relationship between a given firm worker pair is specified in a single contract conversely i show that unitarity is essentially necessary for the embedding result

erratum standards versus standards the effects of different pollution restrictions when economists refer to pollution standards they almost universally mean uniform restrictions on pollution emissions e g william j baumol and wallace e oates 1975 ch 13 susan rose ackerman 1973 david besanko 1978 however in practice standards take many forms not only emissions restrictions but restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input restrictions on the use of a polluting input or mandated use of a particular pollution control technology these specifications of regulations will have a variety of effects on a firm s resource allocation decisions for instance allowing pollution per unit of output as the standard instead of directly restricting the level of pollution gives the firm some choice in addition to reducing pollution it can increase its output to dilute the pollution this paper examines the effects of five different forms of pollution standards on input decisions the level of production and firm profits the results show that the different standards by providing firms with different incentives change the firm s allocation decisions and affect the relative profitability of the standards section i reviews the existing literature on the incentives of different instruments the following section describes the model to be used five different forms of pollution constraints are individually examined in section iii using a graphical approach their relative effects as well as some special cases are assessed in section iv finally section v raises the case of different standards when firms are not identical

stability in large matching markets with complementarities labor markets can often be viewed as many to one matching markets it is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets a stable matching may not exist we study large random matching markets with couples we introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market a stable matching will be found with high probability if however the number of couples grows at a linear rate with constant probability not depending on the market size no stable matching exists our results explain data from the market for psychology interns

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

double dipping in environmental markets abstract there is an increasing tendency to use markets to induce the provision of environmental services as such markets increase in scope potential market participants might sell multiple environmental services the question we consider here is whether participants in such markets should be allowed to sell credits in more than one market simultaneously some have argued in favor of such double dipping because it would make the provision of environmental services more profitable in practice however most programs do not allow double dipping we show that if the optimal level of pollution abatement is sought then double dipping maximizes societal net benefits however if pollution policies are set in a piecemeal fashion then the caps for each market are unlikely to be optimal and in this second best setting a policy prohibiting double dipping can lead to greater social net benefits we explore conditions under which a single market policy is preferred or equivalently where piecemeal policies are likely to yield particularly inefficient outcomes

international human rights a regime analysis after laying out a typology of international regimes eight international and regional human rights regimes are analyzed in order to 1 examine the utility of regime analysis in noneconomic issue areas and 2 assess the nature extent and evolution of international cooperation on human rights there has been a remarkable growth of international action since 1945 when human rights were not even widely accepted as a legitimate issue area this growth can be explained largely by expanding perceptions of moral interdependence and community increased national commitment the growing ideological appeal of human rights and changes in the distributions of international power these same factors however suggest only limited future growth on a broader theoretical plane the case of human rights suggests a significant if limited and principally heuristic utility for regime analysis especially to the extent that international relations is becoming increasingly concerned with specific issues

matching with contracts comment the theory of two sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and its relevance to the design of real world institutions the medical residency matching mecha nism in the united states the national resident matching program nrmp and student assign ment systems in new york city and boston are important mechanisms designed by economists using the theory 1 hatfield and paul r milgrom 2005 present a unified framework of matching with contracts which includes the two sided matching and package auction models as well as a simplified version of a labor market model of alexander kelso and vincent p crawford 1982 as special cases they introduce the substitutes condition of contracts which is an adaptation of the substitutability condition in the matching literature roth and marilda a oliveira sotomayor 1990 to matching with contracts they show that there exists a stable allocation if contracts are substitutes for hospitals and that a number of other results in matching generalize to problems with contracts they further claim that the substitutes condition on individual hospitals prefer ences is necessary to guarantee the existence of a stable allocation for all possible singleton preferences of others that is if contracts are not substitutes for a hospital then there exists a preference profile of other hospitals with single job openings and doctors such that there exists no stable allocation we show that this last claim of hatfield and milgrom 2005 does not hold in general the counterexample we present involves a hospital which has two different kinds of positions and the preferences of the hospital are a combination of preferences of these two positions while the substitutes condition does not hold for that hospital we adopt a technique developed by bettina klaus and flip klijn 2005 and show that there exists a stable allocation we then present the weak substitutes condition which we show is necessary to guarantee existence of stable allocations the modified result we present as well as the original contribu tion of hatfield and milgrom 2005 suggest a connection between the substitutes condition and stability 2

inequality in the world polity the structure of international organization recent research reveals strong effects of involvement in international organizations on state policies but much of this research downplays inequality in world political participation and there is only a limited understanding of what explains world polity ties using data on memberships in intergovernmental and international non governmental organizations igos and ingos for 1960 through 2000 this study analyzes inequality in the world polity igo ties are fairly evenly distributed but the level of inequality in ingo ties is as high as the level of world income inequality since 1960 inequality in ties to igos decreased sharply but inequality in ties to ingos remained more stable a conflict centered model of the world polity is developed here that explains world political participation as a function of material and symbolic conflict rich core western states and societies have significantly more ties to the world polity than do others powerful states dominate igos less now than they did in 1960 but rich core western societies have grown more dominant in the ingo field

prices versus quantities versus hybrids in the presence of co pollutants we investigate the optimal regulation of a pollutant given its abatement interaction with another pollutant under asymmetric information about firms abatement costs we take a policy relevant second best approach by assuming that the co pollutant is regulated exogenously but perhaps not efficiently our focus is on optimal policy choice in this setting and we derive rules for determining whether a pollutant should be regulated with an emissions tax an emissions market or a market with price controls given the regulation of its co pollutant we find that the policy choice for a pollutant is unaffected by its interaction with a co pollutant that is controlled with a fixed number of tradable permits because changes in emissions of the primary pollutant do not affect aggregate emissions of the co pollutant however when a co pollutant is controlled with a tax the policy choice for the primary pollutant must account for its effect on expected co pollutant damage through changes in the variance of co pollutant emissions consequently standard conclusions about the environmental policy choice problem must be modified in this case our results have important implications for designing policies for greenhouse gases under uncertainty

stable and strategy proof matching with flexible allotments we introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross division hiring restrictions our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints building upon our recent work on observable substitutability we show that multi division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy proof matching these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy proof matching is possible

fair implementation of diversity in school choice many school districts have objectives regarding how students of different races ethnicity or religious backgrounds should be distributed across schools a growing literature in mechanism design is introducing school choice mechanisms that attempt to satisfy those requirements we show that mechanisms based on the student proposing deferred acceptance may fail to satisfy those objectives but that by using instead the school proposing deferred acceptance together with a choice function used by the schools which incorporates a preference for satisfying them can optimally approximate the diversity objectives while still satisfying an appropriate fairness criterion we provide analytical results which show that the proposed mechanism has a general ability to satisfy those objectives as opposed to some currently proposed mechanisms which may yield segregated assignments

the market for tradable renewable energy credits abstract as states seek to foster the development of renewable energy resources some have introduced renewable portfolio standards rpss which require retailers of electricity to derive a specified amount of their energy supply from renewable energy resources rpss in texas arizona wisconsin and nevada allow for or require the use of tradable renewable energy credits the price of such credits is expected to reflect the cost premium for generating electricity from renewable resources relative to the market price of conventionally generated electricity using the market to trade renewable energy credits exposes buyers and sellers to risks of imperfect information poor performance and opportunism these risks can be managed through contractual arrangements and regulatory requirements pertaining to property rights in credits pricing term of the contract and assurance of performance

stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks we introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts we find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi linear the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure furthermore the set of stable outcomes is essentially equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria and all stable outcomes are in the core and are efficient by contrast for any domain of preferences strictly larger than that of full substitutability the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed

stability and strategy proofness for matching with constraints a problem in the japanese medical match and its solution real matching markets are subject to constraints in the united states the accreditation council for graduate medical education regulates the total number of medical residents in each specialty in some public school districts multiple school programs often share one school building so there is a bound on the total number of students in these programs in addition to each program s capacity because of the building s physical size 1 the japanese government introduced a new medical matching system in 2009 that imposes a regional cap in each of its 47 prefectures which regulates the total number of medical residents who can be employed in each region based on kamada and kojima 2011 this paper studies matching markets with such constraints by examining in great detail the japan residency matching program jrmp the clearinghouse program for the japanese medical matching market 2 specifically we argue that the new system introduced in 2009 the jrmp mechanism has problems in terms of stability and strategy proofness and provide an alternative mechanism that does better the new system was introduced as a response to the criticism that the formerly used mechanism the deferred

contracts versus salaries in matching a general result abstract it is shown that a matching market with contracts can be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker conditions than substitutability of contracts in particular the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet to branch matching as an application of the embedding result a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where contracts are unilateral substitutes for firms

the law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two sided matching market abstract in the college admission problem we show that the student optimal stable matching is weakly pareto optimal for students if colleges preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand we also show that both of these properties are important for the result

sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions this paper considers a housing market with price restrictions on such markets the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles this vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy proof allocation mechanism the main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps these sequences are demonstrated to play key roles in an english auction and a dutch auction respectively for the considered housing market with price restrictions less

group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts abstract hatfield and milgrom hatfield john william milgrom paul r 2005 matching with contracts amer econ rev 95 913 935 present a unified model of matching with contracts which includes the standard two sided matching and some package auction models as special cases they show that the doctor optimal stable mechanism is strategy proof for doctors if hospitals preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand we show that the doctor optimal stable mechanism is group strategy proof for doctors under these same conditions that is no group of doctors can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences we derive as a corollary of this result that no individually rational allocation is preferred by all the doctors to the doctor optimal stable allocation

comparative democracy the economic development thesis in comparative politics an established finding that economic development fosters democratic performance has recently come under challenge we counter this challenge with a dynamic pooled time series analysis of a major but neglected data set from 131 nations the final generalized least squares autoregressive moving averages estimates n 2 096 appear robust and indicate strong economic development effects dependent in part on the nation s position in the world system for the first time rather hard evidence is offered on the causal relationship between economics and democracy according to granger tests economic development causes democracy but democracy does not cause economic development overall the various tests would seem to advance sharply the modeling of democratic performance

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

reserve design unintended consequences and the demise of boston s walk zones we show that in the presence of admissions reserves the effect of the precedence order i e the order in which different types of seats are filled is comparable to the effect of adjusting reser

emissions trading ercs or allowances emissions trading takes place from two alternative baselines 1 emission reduction credits ercs in which the baseline is existing regulations which are often activity based or 2 cap and trade which specifies the total allowable emissions this paper examines the effects of these two tradable permit systems on marginal and average costs for the firm using electricity generation as an example the erc system subsidizes the activity level to which it is tied and fails to incorporate the full cost of external harm into the product price if the permit limit is chosen ef ficiently the cap and trade system is more effi cient

income inequality development and dependence a reconsideration we reconsider the role of foreign investment in income inequality in light of recent critiques that question the results of quantitative cross national research on foreign capital penetration we analyze an unbalanced cross national data set in which countries contribute different numbers of observations with a maximum of 88 countries and 488 observations dated from 1967 to 1994 random effects regression models that control for unmeasured country heterogeneity are used to investigate effects of foreign capital penetration on inequality measured as the gini coefficient against the background of an internal developmental model of inequality we adapt firebaugh s 1992 1996 critique of the literature on the effect of foreign investment on economic growth to the study of income inequality and find that the stock of foreign direct investment has an effect on inequality that is independent of the mechanisms identified by firebaugh we explore tsai s 1995 claim that the effect of foreign capital penetration is spurious and find that foreign stock has a significant positive effect on inequality net of region specific differences an alternative interpretation of the findings of the foreign investment inequality literature is discussed in light of the discovery of an inverted u shaped relationship between income inequality and foreign investment stock per capita we conclude that thinking on the relationship between income inequality and investment dependence should be revised in light of an investment development path relating the inflow and outflow of foreign capital to economic development

abortion liberalization in world society 1960 2009 controversy sets abortion apart from other issues studied by world society theorists who consider the tendency for policies institutionalized at the global level to diffuse across very different countries the authors conduct an event history analysis of the spread however limited of abortion liberalization policies from 1960 to 2009 after identifying three dominant frames a women s rights frame a medical frame and a religious natural family frame the authors find that indicators of a scientific medical frame show consistent association with liberalization of policies specifying acceptable grounds for abortion women s leadership roles have a stronger and more consistent liberalizing effect than do countries links to a global women s rights discourse somewhat different patterns emerge around the likelihood of adopting an additional policy controlling for first policy adoption even as support for women s autonomy has grown globally with respect to abortion liberalization persistent powerf

contracts versus salaries in matching workers and firms may bargain over general multidimensional contracts they may negotiate over health benefits housing retirement plans etc substitutes on the other hand is the assumption commonly placed on firms preferences to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms in this paper i show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes bargaining over contracts can be embedded into a model of bargaining over wages the economics of the embedding is straightforward except for a small twist when a firm and a worker negotiate over a contract they may bargain over many dimensions however the pareto frontier of contracts is in a sense one dimensional what is better for the worker is worse for the firm so pareto optimal contracts may be viewed as salaries with the better contracts for the firm meaning lower salaries and the better contracts for the worker meaning higher salaries the twist is that a firm s ranking over contracts might be affected by the firm s other hires for example health plan a may be better than b for a firm if it has many employees but b beats a if it has few when contracts are substitutes it turns out that the ranking is not affected in this way hatfield and milgrom 2005 present a model of two sided worker firm matching with contracts a firm will hire a collection of workers and will negotiate a contract with each one of them the model is a generalization of kelso and crawford 1982 where each firm and each worker negotiate a wage 1 kelso and crawford show that when firms demands satisfy gross substitutes the core of the matching market is nonempty hatfield and milgrom show that when the firms preferences over contracts satisfy their notion of substitutes the core of the market is nonempty i show that hatfield and milgrom s model can be embedded into the model of kelso and crawford hatfield and milgrom s assumption of substitutability enables an embedding where firms demands for workers satisfy kelso and crawford s notion of gross substitutes as a result the nonemptiness of the core follows from the argument in kelso and crawford and their salary adjustment algorithm finds a stable matching of workers to firms and a vector of supporting salaries hatfield and milgrom s paper is an elegant analysis of two sided matching it simplifies matching models and makes their relationship to auction models more transpar ent their paper contributes much more than showing the nonemptiness of the core when firms and workers can sign general contracts and my result does not diminish

il legal assignments in school choice in public school choice students with strict preferences are assigned to schools schools are endowed with priorities over students incorporating constraints from different applications priorities are often modelled as choice functions over sets of students it has been argued that the most desirable criterion for an assignment is stability there should not exist any blocking pair no student shall prefer some school to her assigned school and have higher priority than some student who got into that school or the school has an empty seat we propose a blocking notion where in addition it must be possible to assign the student to her preferred school we then define the following stability criterion for a set of assignments a set of assignments is legal if and only if any assignment outside the set is blocked with some assignment in the set and no two assignments inside the set block each other we show that under very basic conditions on priorities there always exists a unique legal set of assignments and that this set has a structure common to the set of stable assignments i it is a lattice and ii it satisfies the rural hospitals theorem the student optimal legal assignment is efficient and provides a solution for the conflict between stability and efficiency

gender the welfare state and public employment a comparative study of seven industrialized countries using data from the luxembourg income study lis the authors explore the influence of government employment on the gender gap in earnings in seven countries they address four questions on the effects of public sector employment on the gender gap in earnings 1 do governments offer jobs that are comparatively high paying 2 does public employment benefit some workers such as low paid workers more than others 3 are public sector employment advantages explained by differences in worker characteristics and the occupational mix 4 what is the effect of public employment its extent and its pay structure on gender gaps in wages the results indicate marked variation across liberal conservative and social democratic welfare states but reveal a number of uniformities as well in most of the seven countries in the sample public sector workers earn more on average than do workers in the private sector and most earnings advantages are concentrated on the low end of the earnings distribution the effect of public employment on the overall gender gap in wages is limited in most countries the authors discuss the implications of these results for theory and research on gender and the welfare state

the origins of human rights regimes democratic delegation in postwar europe the e ftieth anniversary of the un universal declaration on human rights marks an appropriate moment to reconsider the reasons why governments construct international regimes to adjudicate and enforce human rights such regimes include those established under the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms echr the inter american convention on human rights and the un covenant on civil and political rights these arrangements differ from most other forms of institutionalizedinternational cooperation in both their ends and their means unlike international institutions governing trade monetary environmental or security policy international human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities in contrast to most international regimes moreover human rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action although most arrangements formally empower governments to challenge one another such challenges almost never occur the distinctiveness of such regimes lies instead in their empowerment of individual citizens to bring suit to challenge the domestic activities of their own government independent courts and commissions attached to such regimes often respond to such individual claimsby judging that the applicationof domestic rules or legislationviolates international commitments even where such legislationhas been

inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations 1981 1992 hardly anyone expects public institutions to die yet a census reveals that fully one third of the international governmental organizations igos in existence in 1981 had in fact become defunct by 1992 most eastern bloc and many regional developing country organizations vanished or became inactive during this period a slightly larger number of new organizations was born not governments but other igos spawned most of the new offspring wealthy democratic countries increased their igo memberships while poor unstable countries increasingly dropped out this bifurcation was accompanied by greater reliance by all on a set of core universal membership institutions dominated by western values functionalism organizational ecology and realism each partly help us to understand these trends but leave important dynamics unexplained

unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many to one matching with contracts abstract we prove that the unilateral substitutability property introduced in hatfield and kojima 2010 implies the substitutable completability property from hatfield and kominers 2014 this paper provides a novel linkage between these two sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable matching in many to one matching markets with contracts a substitutable completion of a preference is a substitutable preference created by adding some sets of contracts to the original preference order we provide an algorithm which when operated on the unilaterally substitutable preferences produces such a substitutable completion thus it provides a constructive proof of the connection between the two properties

some further properties of the cumulative offer process we investigate extension resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process cop extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched resource monotonicity on the other hand requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors the cop becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes us satisfying an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition irc this result implies that the cop is population monotonic under us and the irc we then turn to the respecting improvements property which states that no doctor should be harmed if some of his contracts become more popular with an additional law of aggregate demand condition we show that the cop respects improvements

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

buybacks with costly participation abstract posted price offers and first price auctions along with the multi unit discriminatory auction extension are two widely used mechanisms for allocating conservation contracts the choice between the two typically hinges on the trade off between the posted price s simplicity and the potential revenue gains of the auction in this paper we introduce a novel mechanism that attempts to bridge the gap between the performance of posted price offers and auctions a two price and lottery schedule combines the simplicity of the former with some of the flexibility of the latter using a model that incorporates agents cognitive and information costs of bidding we analyze how the ranking of allocative efficiency and cost effectiveness between the mechanisms varies as the wedge of participation costs increases when the number of bidders is endogenously determined by participation costs bid shading associated with a lack of competition in the auction compromises its cost effectiveness vis a vis the posted price and the lottery schedule we use data from three recent buybacks for fishing licenses conducted in maryland to calibrate our model and identify conditions under which the two price schedule outperforms the other mechanisms

matching with branch of choice contracts at the united states military academy branch selection is a key decision in a cadet s military career cadets at usma can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement this real life matching problem lls an important gap in market design literature although priorities fail a key substitutes condition the agent optimal stable mechanism is well dened and in contrast to the current usma mechanism it is fair stable and strategy proof adoption of this mechanism benets cadets and the army this new

understanding preferences demand types and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities we propose new techniques for understanding agents valuations our classification into demand types incorporates existing definitions substitutes complements strong substitutes etc and permits new ones our unimodularity theorem generalises previous results about when competitive equilibrium exists for any set of agents whose valuations are all of a demand type for indivisible goods contrary to popular belief equilibrium is guaranteed for more classes of purely complements than of purely substitutes preferences our intersection count theorem checks equilibrium existence for combinations of agents with specific valuations by counting the intersection points of geometric objects applications include matching and coalition formation and the product mix auction introduced by the bank of england in response to the financial crisis

a comparison of emission taxes and permit markets for controlling correlated externalities this paper provides an answer to the question are emission taxes an efficient and self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated externalities we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions this mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection we find that unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self enforcing

optimal design of a phase in emissions trading program abstract this paper studies a phase in emissions trading program with voluntary opt in possibilities for non affected firms and derives optimal permits allocations to affected and opt in firms when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs the regulator faces a trade off between production efficiency minimization of control costs and information rent extraction reduction of excess permits allocated to opt in firms the first best equilibrium can be attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt in firms otherwise a second best equilibrium is implemented the latter is sensitive to uncertainty in control costs and benefits

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

credible group stability in many to many matching problems abstract it is known that in two sided many to many matching problems pairwise stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations unlike in many to one matching problems blair 1988 in this paper we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise responsive preferences a credibly group stable matching is immune to any executable group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability under the same preference restriction we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition proof nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic form game

relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts in the many to one matching model with contracts i provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation these new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts

sovereignty relinquished explaining commitment to the international human rights covenants 1966 1999 this article examines whether the content of the international human rights covenants and the costs associated with their ratification influence the decision of countries to join the author evaluates three theoretical perspectives rationalism world polity institutionalism and the clash of civilizations with data for more than 130 countries between 1966 and 1999 rationalists contend that treaty ratification is tightly coupled with internal sovereignty arrangements human rights practices and ideological commitments all of which become more important as treaty enforcement strengthens world polity institutionalists expect ratification to be loosely coupled with a country s conduct or its political ideological or cultural commitments although this gap narrows as compliance is more effectively enforced a civilizations approach predicts tight coupling between ratification and cultural values regardless of the mechanisms in place for enforcing compliance results lend partial support to rationalism a

cumulative offer process is order independent this note shows that in the matching with contracts model the outcome of the cumulative offer process is order independent if every hospital has a choice function that satisfies the bilateral substitutability condition and the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

bidding for army career specialties improving the rotc branching mechanism motivated by the low retention rates of us military academy and reserve officer training corps graduates the army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could bid 3 years of additional service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired branches the full potential of this incentives program is not utilized because of the rotc s deficient matching mechanism i propose a design that eliminates these shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the army has identified in contrast to the rotc mechanism my design utilizes market principles more extensively and it is a hybrid between a market mechanism and a priority based allocation mechanism