political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

how much should central banks talk a new argument abstract more openness in central bank decision procedures may increase inflation uncertainty for players on financial markets when it leads to less wage discipline and higher average inflation

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem abstract this paper addresses three problems with reputational equilibria in the barro gordon monetary policy game the multiplicity of equilibria the coordination problem and a chisel prone credibility problem a chisel proof credibility condition ensures that in response to a small deviation from the low inflation rate by the central bank it never pays for the private sector to acquiesce if the private sector can coordinate then a low but nonzero inflation outcome can be supported as a subgameperfect and chisel proof credible noncooperative equilibrium for an atomistic private sector the result can still hold in a game between successive monetary administrations

a search theoretic approach to monetary economics the essential function of money is its role as a medium of exchange the authors formalize this idea using a search theoretic equilibrium model of the exchange process that captures the double coincidence of wants problem with pure barter one advantage of the framework described here is that it is very tractable the authors also show that the model can be used to addre ss some substantive issues in monetary economics including the potenti al welfare enhancing role of money the interaction between specializat ion and monetary exchange and the possibility of equilibria with multip le fiat currencies copyright 1993 by american economic association

exchange rate policy wage formation and credibility abstract since the collapse of the bretton woods system some european countries have pursued discretionary exchange rate policies in order to maintain or enhance the international competitiveness of the traded goods sector these countries which typically feature centralized wage setting have also tended to experience high nominal wage increases the overall outcome may be described as a devaluation wage spiral this paper applies two models of repeated games to analyze the strategic interaction between an exchange rate setting policy maker and a wage setting trade union it is shown how a devaluation wage spiral may result from a conflict of interest over the real wage it is also shown how reputational forces may provide a way out of the devaluation wage spiral

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

how will emu affect inflation and unemployment in europe this paper explores how european monetary union will change the wage setting behavior of national labor unions we derive the impact of national inflation aversion and labor militancy on the performance of national labor markets under different monetary arrangements a common central bank raises inflation and unemployment if it acts as conservatively as national central banks however unemployment falls in countries that previously tied their monetary policy to the bundesbank we also examine the composition of emu and the influence of national labor market legislation jel classification e24 f02 f33

a divisible search model of fiat money this paper extends the kiyotaki wright search model of fiat money to allow for divisible money and goods the extension allows me to examine the standard issues in monetary economics such as the neutrality and superneutrality of money by severing the artificial link in the kiyotaki wright model between the money supply and the number of money holders it is shown that money is neutral but not superneutral money growth generates a trading opportunity effect it changes the fraction of different agents in the economy and hence changes the probability with which agents have a successful match in addition money growth has a negative effect on the real money balance that is familiar in walrasian monetary models the balance of the two effects can imply a positive optimal money growth rate

coordination versus flexibility in wage formation a focus on the nominal wage impact of productivity in germany greece ireland portugal spain and the united states wage coordination between countries of the european monetary union emu aims at aligning nominal wage growth with labour productivity growth at the national level we analyse the developments in germany the emu s periphery countries greece ireland portugal and spain along with the united states over the period 1980 to 2010 apart from the contribution of productivity to nominal wages we take into account the contributions of prices unemployment replacement rates and taxes by means of an econometrically estimated nonlinear equation resulting from a wage bargaining model we further study the downward rigidities of nominal wages the findings show that in past times of low productivity price inflation and reductions in unemployment still put significant upward pressure on nominal wage growth the periphery countries are far from aligning nominal wage growth with productivity growth german productivity is a major wage determinant but surely not the only one within the context of a free bargaining

monetary institutions monopolistic competition unionized labor markets and economic performance recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy but not both this leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness we evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework we find that i the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation and ii for plausible values of this relative aversion and more than one union social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank we also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation

money and the gains from trade this article studies the role of money in environments where in each meeting there is a double coincidence of real wants traders who meet at random finance their purchases through current production the sale of divisible money or both it is shown that in the absence of valued money if traders have asymmetric tastes for each other s good they produce and exchange socially inefficient quantities with valued money however traders exchange efficient quantities if the asymmetry of tastes is not too large it is shown that the gains from trade in the monetary economy are strictly greater than those in the corresponding barter economy that the friedman rule holds and that the allocation of resources in the monetary economy converges to the allocation in the barter economy as the growth rate of the money supply is increased

large labour unions and terms of trade externality this paper shows that large labour unions reduce the incentive for uncoordinated monetary policies to improve the terms of trade this finding implies that concentrated labour markets significantly affect the optimal policy prescription in an open economy

elections and capital flows this paper investigates the extent to which elections affect capital flows i find little evidence of political capital flow cycles in advanced economies in emerging and developing countries however presidential elections significantly lower preelection foreign direct investment fdi inflows but have no effect on other types of capital flows furthermore i find evidence that these cycles are not caused by economic crises related to elections or preelection manipulation of policy variables these results suggest that uncertainty about future government policies which should have greater impact on more irreversible forms of capital flows like fdi may be an important factor in generating this cycle

labour markets and monetary union a strategic analysis this paper shows that the effects of a monetary union depend on several labour market features in particular the switch from national monetary policies to a common monetary policy usually affects both inflation and unemployment even when all structural parameters of the economy and of unions and policymakers preferences remain the same the benchmark case of a monetary union between identical countries suggests that the switch to a monetary union is likely to make labour unions more aggressive increasing unemployment qualifications to this result are provided under alternative institutional scenarios like cross country asymmetries pre union erm membership and wage leadership

on the efficiency of monetary exchange how divisibility of money matters abstract we use alternative assumptions about the divisibility of goods and money and the ability of agents to use lotteries on money to investigate to what extent the indivisibility of money is the cause for the typically inefficient production and consumption decisions in search theoretic models of money our framework potentially generates three types of inefficiencies the no trade inefficiency where no trade takes place even though it would be socially efficient to trade and the too much trade and too little trade inefficiencies where the quantities produced and exchanged are either larger or smaller than what the solution to a social planner s problem would mandate it is shown that while the no trade and the too much trade inefficiencies are caused by the indivisibility of money the too little trade inefficiency remains even when money is divisible unless it is sufficiently valued

bargaining structure and economic performance in the open economy abstract it seems nowadays accepted that both centralized wage bargaining and negotiation at the firm level perform better than sectoral wage bargaining this is because sectoral unions have enough market power to raise wages but do not internalize all the effects of their actions however the ranking may be different in an open economy facing a less than infinitely elastic foreign demand because raising wages improves the country s terms of trade as in the optimal tariff argument as a result welfare is higher in the centralized setting while sectoral bargaining is better than full decentralization when imported goods represent a large share of total consumption

macro prudential governance and central banks facts and drivers abstract the great crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability central banks are always part of macro prudential settings but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision the issue is then genuinely empirical are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank s role in macro prudential governance we identify three potential drivers micro supervision involvement monetary policy discretion overall institutional independence and test for their relevance by analysing current institutional settings in 31 advanced and emerging market economies we find that central bankers already in charge of micro supervision and less politically independent are more likely to get extended macro prudential powers the same is true if they have low monetary policy discretion being constrained by a monetary stability objective we interpret these results by using a political economy perspective

did the fed raise interest rates before elections the literature on political business cycles focuses on elected incumbents and neglects the incentives of appointed officials we present evidence of rate hikes before elections when the chair of the us federal reserve is from a different party than the incumbent president this finding contrasts with the traditional belief that an inappropriate policy rate bias implies a more expansive pre election policy stance we also find weak evidence that rates are lowered when the chair and president are from the same party the evidence that ideological preferences of the chair matter remains even when we control for career motives

does the fed contribute to a political business cycle in contrast to findings of other studies evidence is presented to support the existence of a federal reserve induced political monetary cycle that corresponds to the u s presidential election cycle using various taylor rules we find support for the view that fed policy turns significantly more expansionary in the seven quarters prior to the election but only when the fed chair and incumbent presidential party have partisan affiliations

what starts inflation evidence from the oecd countries we use a pooled cross country time series framework to study the factors associated with the start of 73 inflation episodes in oecd countries since 1960 we find that policy makers pursuit of high real growthtargets and national elections were important factors in initiating inflation episodes u s inflation turns out to be a triggering event for simultaneous outbreaks of inflation across countries several other explanations for inflation starts including increases in the natural rate of unemployment oil price shocks changes in the political orientation of governments and government debt policy are not supported by the data

the impact of government deficits on money growth in developing countries abstract this paper investigates the relationship between government budget deficits and money growth in the developing countries for which reliabile data exist it is sometimes suggested that it is more likely that money growth follows debt growth in developing countries due to the embryonic state of capital markets and because the central bank generally comes under direct control of the minister of finance our results provide only mixed support for this contention however in the majority of countries in our sample there is no evidence that government deficits affect money growth for high inflation years there seems to be more support for a relationship between deficits and money growth

macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries some stylized facts this paper documents the main stylized features of macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycle regularities for a group of 12 developing countries cross correlations between domestic industrial output and a large group of macroeconomic time series including government revenue and expenditure wages inflation money velocity private sector credit international trade and exchange rates are presented the effects of industrial country economic conditions on output fluctuations in these countries are also analyzed the robustness of the results is examined using three detrending procedures a modified hodrick prescott filter the baxter king band pass filter and a nonparametric technique overall the results show some similarities between macroeconomic fluctuations in developing and industrial countries e g procyclical real wages and counter cyclical variation in government expenditure but also some important differences in business cycle characteristics e g countercyclical variation in the velocity of monetary aggregates

an integrated test for electoral cycles in the u s economy this paper offers the first integrated test of the electoral model of business cycles the test begins with unrestricted estimates of presidential electoral patterns in u s economic outcomes real gnp unemployment and inflation and policies money growth and the adjusted budget surplus these estimates are then used to determine whether the estimated electoral patterns in macropolicy yield predicted electoral patterns for macro outcomes that are consistent with estimates of both actual electoral patterns in outcomes and voting behavior the results indicate that four year electoral cycles in macroeconomic outcomes and policies are strongly significant for the united states for the period 1951i to 1986ii copyright 1989 by mit press

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies the effect of increased capital mobility on the national control of macroeconomic policy continues to be a topic of debate empirical contributions to this debate share the assumption that domestic macroeconomic policy is driven by either partisan or countercyclical motivations and that the effects of international financial flows have roughly similar effects in all countries this article reevaluates the integration hypothesis in a framework in which manipulations of the macroeconomy derive from opportunistic motivations the article emphasizes the ways in which prior institutional choices effect the way these motivations are translated into actions evidence from individual country and pooled time series tests suggests that opportunistic cycles are less likely to occur when 1 a government maintains a fixed exchange rate in the presence of highly mobile capital or 2 when the central bank enjoys above average independence

a contribution to the pure theory of money abstract this article analyzes a general equilibrium model with search frictions and differentiated commodities because of the many differentiated commodities barter is difficult in that it requires a double coincidence of wants and this provides a medium of exchange role for fiat currency we prove the existence of equilibrium with valued fiat money and show it is robust to certain changes in the environment rate of return dominance liquidity and the welfare implications of fiat money are discussed

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

elections and the fed is there a political monetary cycle to understand the political causes of macroeconomic policy it is necessary to examine the institutions that actually make such policy and the incentives those institutions face an explanation of the political causes of united states monetary policy must treat the various institutions that are influential in the monetary policy process which are at a minimum the federal reserve fed and the executive including the president the treasury department and other advisors in the executive office of the president the reelection motive has proven useful in modeling presidential incentives in this article i investigate whether electoral incentives associated with the theory of the political business cycle pbc can help to explain the behavior of the fed over the last quarter century the political business cycle has had a curious hold on modern political economy while the empirical evidence in favor of the cycle is far from overwhelming its theoretical importance leads to continuing empirical

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

the impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations this paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections we do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks we do find evidence however in developing countries that lack central bank independence furthermore we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election related fiscal expansions this suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles

friedman meets hosios efficiency in search models of money this article studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous search decisions we show that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value generate an inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades the friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and the hosios rule the second a monetary equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied when they cannot be satisfied simultaneously optimal monetary policy achieves only the second best we analyse the conditions under which the second best monetary policy exceeds the friedman rule

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

the phillips curve the persistence of inflation and the lucas critique evidence from exchange rate regimes comment we present evidence from the united states and the united kingdom that the persistence of price inflation is significantly higher under managed exchange rate regimes than under gold based fixed exchange rate regimes these differences are also reflected in expectations augmented phillips curves we use a two country macro model with forward looking price setters to demonstrate that higher monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange rate accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence the evidence does not contradict this hypothesis it supports the hypothesis of forward looking price setters and highlights the empirical significance of the lucas critique jel e31 e42 f33

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed