the effect of imf lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises abstract this paper explores empirically how the adoption of imf programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term we find that imf programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1 5 2 percentage points these results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously furthermore imf programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of imf triggered debt runs however are also possible

private investment and sovereign debt negotiations the author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by j bulow and k rogoff all agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information the main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of but is not identical to its representative citizen this seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminacy of bargaining outcomes including some of the sunspots type agreement may be delayed for many periods and marginal debt may not be worthless copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

adoption of an imf programme and debt rescheduling an empirical analysis the existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an imf programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial and official creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model if countries who have arrangements with the imf are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an imf programme could work as a sort of signal of a country s good willingness which is thus rewarded with the debt relief the results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an imf programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a signaling model of foreign direct investment attraction abstract foreign direct investors face uncertainty about government s type of the host country in a two period game we allow the host country s government to mitigate such uncertainty by sending a signal through fiscal policy our main finding states that a populist government may mimic a conservative one in order to attract foreign direct investment fdi and this choice depends mainly on its impatience degree and the originally planned fdi stock we highlight the role of the government s reputation in attracting foreign capital and thus provide some policy implications moreover our model explains why some governments considered to be populist adopt conservative policies in the beginning of its terms of office

did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates a reconciliation and new results application of the coase theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from a consent divorce regime to no fault unilateral divorce laws should not affect divorce rates each iteration of the empirical literature examining the evolution of divorce rates across us states has yielded different conclusions about the effects of divorce law liberalization i show that these results reflect a failure to jointly consider both the political endogeneity of these divorce laws and the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the political regime taking explicit account of the dynamic response of divorce rates to the policy shock i find that liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade but that this increase was substantially reversed over the next decade that said this increase explains very little of the rise in the divorce rate over the past half century both administrative data on the flow of new divorces and measures of the stock of divorcees from the census support this conclusion these results are suggestive of spouses bargaining within marriage with an eye to their partner s divorce threat

organizing debt relief the need for a new institution the banks they extended large short term credits to mexico then put pressure on the banks to reschedule mexican debt and lend more to mexico once the international monetary fund had endorsed the policies that mexico would follow to deal with its problems this was the birth of the case by case approach to the debt problem it was predicated implicitly on the belief that debtors faced a short term problem arising from an unusual combination of worldwide recession and high interest rates brought on by a shift in the policy stance of the major industrial countries on this view it was eminently sensible for debtors to take on more debt temporarily in order to pay interest on their existing debts the problem was still with us three years later however and the case by case approach was in trouble the world economy was growing again and interest rates had fallen but the debtor s export earnings were not growing and their governments were increasingly reluctant to deal with the imf which was asking for more austerity but providing less fund credit the banks were willing to reschedule larger amounts of debt for longer intervals but would put up new money only for the largest debtors

does multilateral lending aid capital accumulation role of intellectual capital and institutional quality abstract this paper investigates whether multilateral lending is more effective in accumulating capital in countries with a higher level of innovation specifically we examine the role of the world bank or imf financing on the capital stock using data from 175 countries over the period 1970 2017 while considering different types of long term external flows namely fdi and debt we find that fdi as a long term inflow influences domestic capital stock positively but non g7 countries even with a higher level of innovation are unable to benefit from greater fdi flows in boosting their capital stock which we explain considering institutional quality differences across countries with regard to foreign debt flows the multilateral lending only benefits the borrowing country if it has a greater level of intellectual capital or if those funds are used in financing innovative activities as opposed to short term imf loans world bank lending tends to be directed more towards long term development goals thereby helping boost productive capital exploiting a policy intervention with trips agreement the paper uncovers that countries with better institutional quality and greater innovation generate a higher level of capital stock

debt buybacks signal sovereign countries creditworthiness theory and tests the authors show that debt buybacks could convey valuable information about indebted countries willingness to invest and increase debt repayment when creditors are less informed than debtors in an informational equilibrium unwilling countries do not repurchase a part of their debt but willing countries do and creditors increase debt repayments by offering reliefs only to those countries that repurchase data show that creditors systematically grant debt reliefs only to countries with buyback programs and a country s secondary market debt price is higher when it has a buyback program than if it does not copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

mutual holding companies evidence of conflicts of interest through disparate dividends abstract the mutual holding company mhc structure establishes a dual class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends we show that mhcs are priced higher than comparable non mhcs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation we also show that mhc thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non mhc thrifts and that an office of thrift supervision ots ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends these results have policy implications of special significance given that the ots reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the mhc structure in the financial service industry

default settlement and signalling lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt this paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments this implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement but after varying periods of exclusion copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the impact of imf programs on asset values abstract this paper provides evidence on the effectiveness of the imf by examining the impact of its program on wealth we analyze all imf press releases about forthcoming aid for 16 emerging countries during the period 1989 1999 together with references in the financial times to possible imf support using event study methodology we measure the impact of these announcements on the prices of a number of assets including equities currencies domestic and foreign bank stocks and sovereign debt our findings suggest that neither the imf announcements nor the ft news have a measurable effect on asset values the exceptions are the announcements in the ft that suggest imf support is less likely to be forthcoming in these cases we observe negative abnormal returns

signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information abstract in this paper an informational asymmetry exists between investors and the issuer of an initial public offering about the value of the security to avoid market failure a solution is proposed in which the issuer makes a disclosure about firm value that is verified by an investment banker the investment banker enters into a contingent contract with investors which imposes a penalty if the ex post observable cash flow indicates fraudulent disclosure a bivariate signalling model is formulated and solved and testable implications are derived from comparative statics analysis

sovereign debt structural adjustment and conditionality abstract the lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure as a result a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure formalizing this argument we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt in certain circumstances it can eliminate debt overhang especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude it is however unable to restore first best when it is anticipated by lenders conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist debt rescheduling takes place periodically and conditionality continues indefinitely

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance abstract i analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt i show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare however with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs private lenders profits multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit

voting technology political responsiveness and infant health evidence from brazil this paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in brazilian elections estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual error ridden and uncounted votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology s phase in across states over time suggest that as predicted by political economy models it shifted government spending toward health care which is particularly beneficial to the poor positive effects on both the utilization of health services prenatal visits and newborn health low weight births are also found for less educated mothers but not for the more educated

capital gains tax rates and the cost of capital for small business evidence from the ipo market abstract we examine the issue prices of small initial public offerings around the 1993 tax law change that reduced the capital gains tax on qualified small business stock we compare the actual issue price of new stock with a benchmark price that is not affected by the change in capital gains tax we find that after controlling for ipo underpricing the issue prices of qualifying small business stock after the tax rate change are significantly higher than the issue prices before the change a control sample of nonqualifying firms shows no significant difference in issue prices

the imf and precautionary lending an empirical evaluation of the selectivity and effectiveness of the flexible credit line abstract this paper provides an empirical evaluation of the flexible credit line fcl the imf s prime precautionary lending instrument since 2009 to which so far only mexico colombia and poland have subscribed we consider both questions of selectivity and effectiveness first which variables explain the three countries participation in fcl arrangements and second to which extent has the fcl delivered on its promise of boosting market confidence in its respective users based on a probit analysis we show that fcl selectivity can be explained by both demand and supply side factors the probability of participation in the fcl was greater in countries that experienced larger prior exchange market pressures that had lower bond spreads and inflation that accounted for higher shares in us exports and that exhibited a higher propensity of making political concessions to the us using a synthetic control approach we find evidence for some but generally limited beneficial effects on sovereign bond spreads and gross capital inflows into the three fcl countries overall our results suggest that any economic stigma that may prevent eligible countries from entering into an fcl arrangement is unwarranted conversely the apparent link of fcl participation with us interests is not conducive to overcoming political stigma

recent experience with commercial bank debt reduction has the menu outdone the market abstract debt reduction at market terms has been criticized as too expensive from the point of view of the debtor the recent reduction agreements following the menu approach are partially concerted but they also possess some elements of voluntariness this raises two issues a what is the conceptual justification for such financial arrangements and b based on recent evidence to what extent have these arrangements reduced the cost of debt reduction in a review of six recent menu driven debt reduction agreements we find that the debtors achieved a far better financial result than would have been feasible with simple market buybacks

comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract abstract each period a firm must carry out an indivisible project the cost of which depends on the firm s constant efficiency and its variable level of effort only the cost is observed by the regulator who has to choose the incentive scheme the optimal dynamic mechanism is derived under possible commitment of the regulator over time then under non commitment it is shown that there are four types of continuation equilibria also the profile of effort levels is compared to the commitment case finally some numerical comparative statics is performed and it is shown that all types of equilibria can be optimal

sovereign debt buybacks can lower bargaining costs abstract i consider models were bargaining costs between debtors and creditors are large when debts are large the reason is that creditors are willing to spend more resources convincing the debtor that they are tough when they have more at stake also the sanctions which are sometimes triggered when bargaining fails to produce an agreement are larger when debts are larger in both cases debt repurchases by highly indebted sovereign nations can be advantageous for all parties moreover donors who subsidize buybacks can increase overall welfare more than donors who make direct gifts

debt write downs and debt equity swaps in the two sector model abstract debt overhang models have motivated the possibility of pareto improving market based debt reduction schemes through the assumption that creditors can seize debtor output under default these models usually reach the conclusion that both debtor financed debt repurchases and debt equity swaps are not in the interest of debtor nations this paper re examines these conclusions for a debtor nation that also has a safe sector which is unexposed to seizure debt overhangs are then shown to distort the composition of investment in the debtor nation nominal debt reductions mitigate these distortions enhancing the potential for pareto improving debt equity swaps

sovereign debt a primer the troublesome debts of many developing countries have spawned much literature on why countries borrow on what debt contributes to growth on why countries repay and on how to deal with existing debt the author provides an analytical primer on the following aspects of sovereign debt 1 the basic accounting concepts associated with debt and some data associated with external borrowing 2 debt as a component of an optimizing model of borrowing in a competitive loan market when the borrower faces an intertemporal budget constraint 3 debt as a component of recent models of endogenous growth 4 problems arising from sovereign risk including problems of liquidity enforcement and revenue raising to finance repayment 5 incentives to repay 6 options available to a creditor whose debtor is unwilling to meet current debt service obligations and 7 debt buybacks the author concludes that in the absence of any efficiency cost imposed by outstanding debt how much a buyback benefits the borrower depends on how much buying back debt reduces what is available for repayment later the author also concludes that if there are efficiency losses associated with debt debt forgiveness can benefit both a debtor nation and its creditors contrary to claims in the literature this outcome does not require that a reduction in the face value of debt raise its market value and the debtor benefits even though the buyback raises the market price of the debt

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

signalling by underwriter retention rate in the ipo market underwriters in taiwan have to purchase 10 25 of shares offered in initial public offerings ipos for their own accounts we present a signalling model showing that the underwriter retention rate can serve as a signal of firm value to investors because underwriters are investors as well this mechanism can reduce information asymmetry between issuers and investors the model shows that when underwriters retain more proportion of ipo shares in equilibrium the initial return is greater and the subscription success rate is lower we further test the propositions using 616 ipo firms in taiwan for the period 1998 2004 overall the empirical results support the propositions developed from the signalling model

catalysing private capital flows do imf programmes work as commitment devices in this article we examine whether imf programmes influence the ability of developing country issuers to tap international bond markets and if they improve spreads paid on the bonds issued we find that fund programmes do not provide a uniformly favourable signalling effect instead the evidence is most consistent with a positive effect of imf programmes when they are viewed as likely to lead to policy reform and when undertaken before economic fundamentals have deteriorated significantly the size of the fund s programme matters but the credibility of a joint commitment by the country and the imf appears to be critical enhancing its members access to international capital markets is widely regarded as an important objective of the international monetary fund imf or fund though the objective is not an explicitly stated purpose in the fund s articles of agreements the flow of international capital is essential to such stated purposes as the stability of the international monetary system efficient trade and productive resource use and to providing confidence when a member country experiences difficulties with its balance of payments 1 the fund s interest in private international capital flows has moreover increased over the last decade reflecting this evolution the fund s former managing

counterpart funding requirements and the foreign aid procyclicality puzzle official development assistance is a key source of external finance in many developing countries a striking feature of these aid flows is their positive correlation with business cycles in recipient countries this pattern is puzzling in that it reinforces recipients already strong and costly macroeconomic fluctuations we propose a simple model of investment financing and aid provision under asymmetric information that rationalizes such a pattern we assume that donor agencies and recipient governments value projects differently and that donors know less than recipients do about project characteristics we show that donors can make a recipient government identify high return projects by requiring that the latter contribute some of its own funds to projects providing these matching grants or counterpart funds is less affordable for recipients during economic downturns which leads to aid procyclicality our model produces aid contracts consistent with those used by aid agencies rationalizes observed aid patterns and yields a rich set of testable empirical predictions

secret buy backs of ldc debt we analyze the buy back of its debt by an ldc contrary to previous analyses of this subject we assume that the debtor can hide its transactions behind the veil of a fictitious operator the banks we assume cannot discriminate intra bank transactions from buy backs by the debtor itself with this assumption the lenders set the price by rationally taking account of the country s incentive to repurchase its debt will the debtor undertake a buy back of its debt the answer is a qualified yes large buy backs will take place

budget support versus project aid a theoretical appraisal should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid to answer this question we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality we show that budget support is preferable to project aid when the preferences of donors and recipients are aligned and when assistance is small relative to the recipients own resources furthermore when donors cannot observe the recipient s type they may impose higher levels of conditionality to separate committed governments from uncommitted ones

new issues on the u k unlisted securities market the ability of entrepreneurs to signal firm value the present paper investigates whether small firm entrepreneurs are able to signal the value of their firms to potential investors when seeking a listing on the u k unlisted securities market usm the signals considered are the percentage of equity retained by the original entrepreneurs the net proceeds raised by an issue the choice of advising agents to an issue the disclosure of an earnings forecast and the level of underpricing of the new issue in addition the possible interactions between the individual signals are considered and included in the analysis the results of the empirical analysis suggest that firm value is positively and significantly related to the percentage of retained equity and the net proceeds raised thus suggesting therefore that stock markets will invest at higher values ceteris paribus if entrepreneurs indicate confidence in their enterprises via levels of equity retention and the funds they intend to invest in future projects

signaling and the valuation of unseasoned new issues a comment in the march 1982 issue of this journal david downes and robert heinkel 1 present an empirical examination of the role of signaling in the valuation of initial public offerings of common stock for a large sample of unseasoned new issues they examine the leland pyle 2 signaling hypothesis that firm value should be positively related to the fraction of equity retained by the original shareholders downes and heinkel conclude that the data are consistent with the leland pyle signaling hypothesis in this comment i present a more complete test of the leland pyle signaling model i also present two alternative explanations for the positive empirical relation between firm value and insider holdings which i label the agency hypothesis and the wealth effect hypothesis i find that the testable implications of the agency hypothesis are supported while the evidence is ambiguous with respect to the testable implications of the wealth effect and signaling hypotheses

sovereign debt repurchases no cure for overhang troubled debtor countries do not gain by repurchasing external bank debt at market discount even if a buyback would stimulate investment by relieving debt overhang the reason is that buybacks allow creditors to reap more than 100 percent of any efficiency gains that might result from increased investment we show that open market buybacks provide a benchmark for evaluating more complex negotiated buyback deals by comparing any given deal with a hypothetical market buyback of the same size one can derive upper and lower bounds on the gain to the country we apply our model to the 1990 mexican debt deal

imf conditionality as a screening device a theoretical model is developed in which adoption of an imf programme signals a country s productivity it is assumed that there are two types of country one with a high return on investment and the other with a low return the country s type is known only to itself in the presence of a debt overhang the high productivity country may choose not to undertake the investment despite it being socially efficient to do so in this case the creditor would like to offer the country some debt reduction but the low productivity type will also benefit from the debt reduction this problem can be avoided if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback in order to gain the debt relief only the high productivity type would be prepared to sacrifice current resources for the debt reduction and thus a separation of the types is achieved this is similar to an argument found in acharya and diwan 1993 we argue however that it is unlikely that a heavily indebted country will have sufficient resources for a buyback if the country is credit constrained an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an imf programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an imf loan this mechanism can be the equilibrium outcome even if the programme creates only disutility for the country s policy makers

money talks supplementary financiers and international monetary fund conditionality what explains the changes in international monetary fund imf conditionality i argue that imf conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers the imf regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances as a result these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the imf and the design of its conditionality programs i consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier private financial institutions on imf conditionality conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements coded according to their terms and two case studies

rescheduling of sovereign debt forgiveness precommitment and new money to meet contractual obligations on their external debt lenders generally responded by rescheduling these debts rather than declaring them to be in default but further commercial lending to these sovereigns has virtually ceased these borrowers now face an enormous debt overhang while their lenders face substantial losses on their international loan portfolios among the many proposals for addressing this crisis the relative desirability of debt forgiveness and new lending has been the focus of considerable debate the baker plan of 1985 emphasized additional funding coupled with growth oriented domestic policies rather than debt reduction lenders were encouraged to provide additional funds new money to help the impaired and indebted economies grow their way back to creditworthiness however lenders were reluctant to offer new funds that would increase the sovereign s debt burden without some assurance that future repayment would be likely with debt generally recognized as providing borrowers with a disincentive for investment 1 the emphasis has now shifted to the need for debt forgiveness on the part of the lenders and a commitment to internal adjustment by the borrowers both parties are viewed as benefitting by a reduction of the inherited debt and possibly the provision of additional funds if the sovereign borrower can commit itself to adopting policies that reduce internal consumption and

signalling and the valuation of unseasoned new issues revisited this paper provides further empirical evidence on the relation between entrepreneurial ownership retention and the initial value of unseasoned common shares a canadian data set is employed to estimate the various empirical specifications used in previous studies and to examine additional variables suggested by recent developments in the theoretical literature the estimation is carried out using a more general procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity in contrast to previous findings the entrepreneurial ownership reten tion signal does not possess statistical significance in any ofthe models examined

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

imf lending programs participation and impact abstract participation in imf programs has been an option that more and more developing countries have exercised in recent years in this paper a detailed analysis of such participation over the period 1976 1986 provides a number of insights into the motivations for and the macroeconomic effects of such participation participation is driven by a combination of past performance present external influences and sluggish adjustment of developing countries the ability to predict which countries will participate in the imf program is quite good with nearly 90 percent of variation in such choices accounted for by the explanatory variables employed increased participation has as contemporaneous effects a reduction in economic growth and domestic investment and an improvement in the current account lagged effects of increased participation on economic growth and domestic investment are positive and in most estimates quantitatively greater than the contemporaneous effects there is also evidence of significantly lower public investment an increased budget surplus and real depreciation of the exchange rate with increased participation results for domestic credit creation and government current expenditure although they have a sign consistent with more austere policy cannot be shown to be significantly different from those not participating

how can imf policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities abstract costly crisis prevention has positive external effects which leads to free riding of governments on each other s efforts ordinary imf loans aggravate existing externalities reinforcing the under investment problem we consider the reform proposals of the meltzer commission in both loan and insurance models and show how the imf can eliminate country moral the efficiency ensuring loan policy accounts for given externalities and involves effort contingent discounts on interests or the extension of credit volume similar results hold for the insurance framework ex ante participation requires that smaller countries be subsidized by large ones or that imf policy consider distributional aspects in addition to efficiency

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

financing vs forgiving a debt overhang abstract this paper examines the tradeoffs facing creditors of a country whose debt is large enough that the country cannot attract voluntary new lending if the country is unable to meet its debt service requirements out of current income the creditors have two choices they can finance the country lending at an expected loss in the hope that the country will eventually be able to repay its debt after all or they can forgive reducing the debt level to one that the country can repay the post 1983 debt strategy of the imf and the us has relied on financing but many current calls for debt reform call for forgiveness instead the paper shows that the choice between financing and forgiveness represents a tradeoff financing gives the creditors an option value if the country turns out to do relatively well creditors will not have written down their claims unnecessarily however the burden of debt distorts the country s incentives since the benefits of good performance go largely to creditors rather than itself the paper also shows that the tradeoff itself can be improved if both financing and forgiveness are made contingent on states of nature that the country cannot affect such as oil prices world interest rates etc

bank lending and initial public offerings abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that banking relations are a signal about firm value we argue that bank processing of asymmetric information and external monitoring of corporate activities reduce the ex ante uncertainty of investors about firm value we demonstrate that the existence of bank debt and or lines of credit lowers the expected initial return associated with initial public offerings the empirical results are robust with respect to the inclusion of variables which reflect other mechanisms that can ameliorate ex ante uncertainty our work adds to the body of evidence that supports the hypothesis that intermediaries provide valuable asset services to corporate borrowers

solvency runs sunspot runs and international bailouts abstract this paper introduces a model of intervention by an international financial institution ifi under asymmetric information the ifi is unable to distinguish between runs due to fundamentals and those which are the result of pure sunspots however it maximizes global welfare by offering a relending package consistent with generating a separating equilibrium where voluntary creditor participation implies that underlying fundamentals are good the need for direct ifi lending in the package is shown to depend on the commitment capacity of creditors this adverse selection problem provides an alternative rationale for bagehot s principle of last resort lending at high rates of interest to the moral hazard motivation commonly found in the literature

debt buybacks debt reduction and debt rescheduling under asymmetric information in the early nineties there was a significant recovery of many debtridden economies after the shift in debt policy implicit in the socalled brady plan yet the use of scarce resources from debtor countries to buy back part of their debts remains a controversial feature of this plan we use a multiperiod model of debt overhang to show that under asymmetric information this transfer of resources emerges naturally as part of the shift from a strategy of debt rescheduling to one of debt reduction after nearly a decade of suffering from debt ridden economies in the early nineties many countries with large external debts finally reduced their debt service ratios regained access to spontaneous private financing and achieved higher growth and lower inflation imf 1993 many analysts have since attributed at least part of this success to the shift in the international debt strategy in 1989 which took a new direction with the so called brady initiative l a rather controversial feature of this initiative was the use of scarce resources from the debtor countries to buy back part of their debt there are two reasons why this use of a country s resources seems unwise first capital has more value in the debtor country than abroad thus transferring additional current resources from the country to its creditors at fair prices would appear to be welfare reducing second contrary to the idea that by repurchasing its debt in the open market a debtor country benefits from the discount price bulow and rogoff 1988 1991 prove under assumptions that include symmetric information that these buybacks hurt the country since the purchase price2 incorporates and transfers to the seller all the benefits caused by a reduced debt 3

sovereign risk and secondary markets conventional wisdom says that in the absence of default penalties sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade we show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets without this assumption foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties this result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly to reduce its effects one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets jel f34 g12 g15

the relationship between ownership financing decisions and firm performance a signaling model we develop a signaling model to show how adverse selection and moral hazard interact to determine a firm s ownership structure and financing and investment decisions endogenously testable implications are derived regarding the relationship between insider ownership performance measures such as tobin s q ratio and elements of financial structure such as the debt equity ratio

estimation of time varying average treatment effects using panel data when unobserved fixed effects affect potential outcomes differently this paper proposes a new approach to estimate the time varying average treatment effect using panel data to control for unobserved fixed effects the approach allows identifying the average treatment effect on the entire population even if the fixed effects affect potential outcomes under treatment and no treatment differently which can cause heterogeneity in treatment effects among unobserved characteristics note that a popularly used standard difference in differences approach can only identify the average treatment effect on the treated moreover the proposed approach allows time varying treatment effects the approach exploits panel data with a specific structure in which the treatment exposure expands to the entire population over time i apply the proposed approach to estimate the effect of the introduction of electronic voting technology for the reduction of residual votes in brazilian elections

empirical assessment of the impact of auditor quality on the valuation of new issues abstract this paper reports empirical tests of an hypothesized positive relation between audit quality and firm specific risk that is predicted by datar feltham and hughes 1991 theoretical analysis of auditor choice when firms go public three types of proxies for ex ante firm specific risk are used to test this relation regression coefficients that theory relates to the firm specific risk ex ante proxies available from prospecti and ex post variances in returns results from the first are moderately consistent with our hypothesis while those from the latter two are either mixed or contrary