money growth output gaps and inflation at low and high frequency spectral estimates for switzerland abstract while central banks generally have abandoned monetary targeting many continue to attach weight to monetary aggregates in setting policy this raises the issue of how money can be combined with other variables when analysing inflation we decompose inflation in switzerland into two frequency bands and show that inflation is granger caused by monetary factors at low frequencies defined as those corresponding to periodicities of more than 4 years but is granger caused by the output gap at high frequencies we also estimate phillips curve models that are augmented by the low frequency components of the monetary factors

international economic structures government interests and international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies analysts have commonly argued that there has been a decline in international coordination of the kinds of policies that governments can use to manage the international payments imbalances that emerge when different governments pursue different macroeconomic policies the decline typically has been attributed to a posited decline in american hegemony in contrast this article argues that international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies trade and capital controls exchange rate policies balance of payments financing and monetary and fiscal policies was at least as extensive for much of the 1980s as it had been in the 1960s there was however a shift away from coordination of balance of payments financing and other policies that have limited direct consequences for domestic economic and political conditions and a concurrent shift toward coordination of monetary and fiscal policies that are critically important for domestic politics and economics this change is best explained as a consequence of changes in the structure of the international economy most important international capital market integration encouraged governments to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies because balance of payments financing and exchange rate coordination alone are insufficient to manage the enormous payments imbalances that emerge when capital is able to flow internationally in search of higher interest rates and appreciating currencies

squaring the circle the domestic sources of international cooperation most theorists of international affairs would argue that international cooperation is a good thing private regarding behavior creates efficiency but some public goods are needed for optimal results be they in producing peace or prosperity it is in the logic of markets and of decentralized systems such as international relations to undersupply those public goods arms races beggar thy neighbor economic policies environmental degradation these are but some examples of actions that take place in the absence of mechanisms to enforce cooperative agreements regimes that can punish defectors are able to do better a good security regime avoids arms races a good trade regime avoids tariffs a good monetary regime avoids aggressive devaluations and instability a good regulatory regime prevents particularistic mercantilism all these arrangements require international cooperation how do we get international cooperation in two ways first through a convergence of policy objectives agreement on the substance of what is sought in trade security or other issues second by credible commitment to institutions that manage policy disputes put in the negative nations conflict when they cannot agree on policy or when they are unable to sustain commitment to agreements that they may make for nations to cooperate on a trade or monetary regime they must agree to the regime convergence of policy preference and they must agree that they will not cheat and will adhere to the regime and to a process of resolving disputes that may occur credibility of commitment

business political power the case of taxation we examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in u s politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation we find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship with democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners how far corporations engage in electoral financing measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees is also influential the models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by bowles gordon and weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

partisan governments the international economy and macroeconomic policies in advanced nations 1960 93 this article examines the impact of parties domestic institutions and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time series cross section data from nineteen oecd countries for the years between 1960 and the mid 1990s the results are as follows partisan governments have affected alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets the pattern of macroeconomic management still their impact has varied over time partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange rate system in place after following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s oecd governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline by contrast taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings as financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s partisan and institution led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries

power and the control of capital this essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial asia and latin america and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources the stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who or what supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow

money income prices and interest rates including data from the 1980s sharply weakens the postwar time series evidence indicating significant relationships between money however defined and nominal income or between money and either real income or prices separately focusing on data from 1970 onward destroys this evidence altogether evidence indicating cointegration of real income and real money balances with due allowance for the effect of interest rates also deteriorates when the sample extends through the 1980s a positive finding is that the spread between the commercial paper rate and the treasury bill rate consistently contains highly significant information about future movements in real income copyright 1992 by american economic association

rating politics partisan discrimination in credit ratings in developed economies how does government partisanship influence sovereign credit ratings of developed countries given the convergence of fiscal and monetary outcomes between left and right governments in the past deca

interpreting euro area inflation at high and low frequencies abstract several authors have recently interpreted the european central bank s ecb s two pillar framework as separate approaches to forecast and analyse inflation at different time horizons or frequency bands the ecb has publicly supported this understanding of the framework this paper presents further evidence on the behaviour of euro area inflation using band spectrum regressions which allow for a natural definition of the short and long run in terms of specific frequency bands and causality tests in the frequency domain the main finding is that variations in inflation are well explained by low frequency movements of money and real output growth and high frequency fluctuations of the output gap

the vanishing liquidity effect of money on interest analysis and implications for policy this paper seeks to re examine the effects of money on interest rates the earlier literature on this topic determined fairly well the pattern of response of interest rates to changes in money growth the notable studies of cagan 1972 cagan and gandolfi 1969 and gibson 1970 served to establish the professions stylized pattern as presented in section i section ii presents new evidence on the subject and finds that the old empirical generalizations no longer hold specifically the results suggest that the initial liquidity effect of faster money growth is likely to be offset within the month following the monetary policy change sections iii and iv investigate the reasons for the changing pattern of monetary effects on interest rates and discuss the policy implications of the new pattern

limits on authoritarian imposition of policy failed ecuadoran military populism in comparative perspective does regime type affect policy outcomes do authoritarian regimes have greater policy discretion than democratic regimes the empirical evidence is ambiguous using two cases of failed military populism in ecuador the author argues that two authoritarian characteristics lack of participation in decision making and nonmobilization frustrated implementation of import substitution policies ironically groups expected to benefit most industrialists and urban workers provided the principal opposition although the regime needed their cooperation to implement policy neither group had assurance that its interests were protected thus political alliances require more than an exchange of policies for support regimes must make their commitments credible by permitting the participation in decision making and mobilization of groups whose cooperation is needed for policy implementation this conclusion is supported by a comparison to peru where a military regime encountered similar obstacles and argentina where

party politics governors and economic policy in this article we evaluate the role of elections in governors state tax policy making does it matter for state taxes whether the governor is a democrat or republican and whether she is eligible for re election or faces a binding term limit using a regression discontinuity design and a panel of u s states we find that the manner in which governors of different parties implement different tax policies turns crucially on the incumbent s eligibility for re election re electable democratic governors increase income taxes relative to similarly situated republicans yielding divergence between party policy positions however governors facing a binding term limit exhibit the reverse policy difference resulting in a movement of policy back together

a partisan model of government expenditure partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government budget deficits and debt but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is this paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions first a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies second changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos using data on 19 oecd countries from 1971 to 1999 the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis the results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior

state revenue extraction from different income groups variations in tax progressivity in the united states 1916 to 1986 we examine the conditions that affected the progressivity of the individual income tax in the united states between 1916 and 1986 a multivariate time series analysis shows how macroeconomic conditions state imperatives the organizational capacities of social classes and political conditions have affected the progressivity and the symbolic component of the income tax progressivity is measured by the difference between the effective tax rates paid by moderate income and very high income families the symbolic component of this tax is measured by the difference between the nominal tax rate and effective income tax rate paid by very high income families the results reveal that changes in tax progressivity are due largely to macroeconomic and state fiscal conditions such as unemployment economic development and budget deficits although the organizational capacities of social classes and political conditions such as labor organization and political participation also have effects changes in progressivity are due primarily to adjustments in the rates paid by very high income families however the impacts of these conditions on tax progressivity changed somewhat when the federal income tax was transformed into a mass tax during world war il finally political conditions have a relatively greater effect on the symbolic component of the income tax than on progressivity overall this analysis supports a structural theory of the state in which the influences of politics and social classes on revenue extraction are circumscribed by macroeconomic and state fiscal conditions

recent developments in macroeconomics underlying the existence of macroeconomics as a separate field of study are the phenomena of economy wide fluctuations of output and prices and sometimes persistent high levels of unemployment two basic views of macroeconomic behavior have persisted even as conceptual innovati ons and the application of more powerful analytic and empirical techn iques have brought significant changes in understanding of the macroe conomy copyright 1988 by royal economic society

partisan politics and fiscal policy does the partisan character of governing parties play a role in the formation of fiscal policy the conventional view is that the left tends toward excessive deficits whereas the right practices a more prudent fiscal policy however strong arguments have been advanced that whatever room existed previously for partisanship in fiscal policy making has been sharply reduced by developments in recent decades these issues are examined with a series of models that have been estimated using data from 14 organization for economic cooperation and development countries for the period from 1961 through 1991 the evidence suggests that the relationship between partisanship and fiscal policy is contingent on macroeconomic conditions the evidence also suggests that these differences have been reduced over recent decades

internationalization institutions and political change many analysts associate internationalization of markets with wide ranging changes in domestic politics an open polity approach shows how extant domestic institutions mediate in this relationship between internationally induced changes in domestic actors policy preferences on the one hand and national policy and institutional outcomes on the other the nature of labor unions and formal political institutions often results in political outcomes that differ significantly from those that would ensue if outcomes simply mirrored preference changes in addition while existing institutions may sometimes constrain governments from pursuing policies that would improve long term economic performance governments will often fail to change these institutions because of short term political considerations

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

on the political economy of welfare expansion a comparative analysis of 18 advanced capitalist democracies 1960 1971 this article elaborates the thesis that economic growth and various types of collective action by class linked actors determine the expansion and decline of welfare spending in rich capitalist democracies our multivariate model of this thesis specified to 1960 1971 growth rates in direct cash transfer payments as proportions of gross domestic product is supported strongly by regression analyses these indicate that economic growth notably facilitates transfer payment growth they also suggest that rightist party participation in government notably dampens welfare expansion while leftist centrist and christian democratic party participation in government are conducive to welfare expansion and they suggest that the political influences of both unions and large industrial corporations are conducive to growth in transfers payments as well in addition state authorities appear to augment welfare spending in response to working class protests strike activity and capital investment disinvestment activ

2002 lawrence r klein lecture liquidity and asset prices we broadly define liquid assets or monetary assets as any asset that can be readily sold in the market and can be held by a number of people in succession before maturity we ask in what environment is the circulation of liquid assets essential for the smooth running of the economy by developing a canonical model of a monetary economy i e where the circulation of liquid assets is essential we are able to examine the interaction between liquidity asset prices and aggregate economic activity

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

effects of government characteristics on fiscal deficits in 18 oecd countries 1961 1994 political economists studying industrialized countries have claimed that certain institutional characteristics of governments such as majority status the number of parties in government and stability affect levels of public deficits they have specifically argued that weak unstable governments produce higher deficits than strong stable ones the author tests the validity of such claims by examining empirical data from 18 organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries between 1961 and 1994 it is shown that evidence does not support the deficit prone weak governments thesis if anything there is some evidence to suggest that deficits are lower under what political economists call weak unstable governments such as minority governments coalition governments or less durable governments it is further shown that there is extremely limited evidence to support another line of argument that the strength stability of governments does not necessarily create deficits but does affec

asset prices and liquidity in an exchange economy i develop an asset pricing model in which financial assets are valued for their liquidity the extent to which they are useful in facilitating exchange as well as for being claims to streams of consumption goods the implications for average asset returns the equity premium puzzle and the risk free rate puzzle are explored in a version of the model that nests the work of mehra and prescott 1985

the failure of training in britain analysis and prescription in the last decade education and training et reform has become a major issue in many of the world s industrial powers one theme which runs throughout these reform initiatives is the need to adapt et systems to the changing economic environment these changes include the increasing integration of world markets the shift in mass manufacturing towards newly developed nations and the rapid development of new technologies most notably information technologies education and training are seen to play a crucial role in restoring or maintaining international competitiveness both on the macro level by easing the transition of the workforce into new industries and at the micro level where firms producing high quality specialized goods and services require a well qualified workforce capable of rapid adjustment in the work process and continual product innovation this paper will highlight the need for policy makers and academics to take account of the two way nature of the relationship between et and the economy

central banks at war war is expensive troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured when the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns credibility problem more difficult central banks enhance a government s ability to borrow by being the sole direct purchaser of government debt the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender this increases lenders confidence that the government will be punished in case of default making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest the sovereign dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank has an incentive to retain the bank data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign s borrowing costs particularly during times of war

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

globalization and the changing logic of collective action globalization transforms collective action in domestic and international politics as the scale of markets widens and as economic organization becomes more complex the institutional scale of political structures can become insufficient for the provision of an appropriate range of public goods a process of this sort occurred prior to the emergence of the modern nation state which itself constituted a paradigmatic response to this predicament today however a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state based collective action overlapping playing fields are developing made up of increasingly heterogeneous transnational local and intermediate arenas the residual state retains great cultural force and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried nevertheless the state s effectiveness as a civil association has eroded significantly and this may lead to a crisis of legitimacy

globalization and taxation challenges to the swedish welfare state many have argued that the increased international mobility of both capital and labor witnessed in recent years will force advanced capitalist democracies to cut taxes and thus ultimately roll bac

bourgeois revolutions the policy consequences of resurgent conservatism much of the literature on reform politics has focused on social democratic governments this article reexamines the dynamics of reform by concentrating on conservative governments in four advanced

redistribution pork and elections why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit many scholars focus on wedge issues such as religion or race but another explanation might be geographically based patronage or pork we examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide the dollar environments the model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution and under which rich voters support left wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution the model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs the model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior and it describes why right wing parties should have an advantage over left wing ones in majoritarian systems

electrical energy usage over the business cycle causality from macroeconomic conditions to electrical usage overall and in the residential commercial industrial and other sectors is examined the paper shows that changes in macroeconomic conditions cause significant changes in electrical usage in the commercial and industrial sectors and overall in addition the paper shows that causality occurs at business cycle frequencies and that there are asymmetries over the business cycle an implication is that forecasts used to assess the probability of exceeding capacity constraints should incorporate forecasts of macroeconomic conditions asymmetries over the cycle and how the commercial and industrial sectors will respond to such changes

small states in big trouble state reorganization in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s coalitions of politicians fiscal bureaucrats and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform the largest single nontradables sector in their society the state particularly the welfare state they exposed state personnel and agencies to market pressures and competition to reduce the cost of welfare and other state services the impetus for change came from rising foreign public and private debt rising public debt levels and expensive welfare states interacted to create a tax wedge between employers wage costs and workers received wages this undercut international competitiveness worsening current account deficits and leading to more foreign debt accumulation two factors explain variation in the degree of reorganization in each country differences in their electoral and constitutional regimes and the willingness of left parties to risk splitting their core constituencies introduction of market pressures is an effort to go beyond the liberalization of the economy common in industrial countries during the 1980s and both to institutionalize limits to welfare spending and to change the nature of statesociety relations away from corporatist forms of interest intermediation in short not just less state but a different state

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

explaining capital account liberalization in latin america a transitional cost approach in the past three decades governments around the world have lowered barriers to international capital flows this movement is widely attributed to the forces of globalization as developed nations moved toward relative convergence on international financial openness yet developing nations with much to gain from openness to foreign investment moved only hesitantly and inconsistently in this direction analysis of two decades of capital account liberalization in latin america and the oecd reveals that nations in latin america with weaker domestic financial sectors face higher risks of transitional dislocations following liberalization and move less aggressively toward openness in the oecd by contrast financial weakness is associated with greater movements toward capital account opening as transitional costs are lower and governments are better equipped to ameliorate them examination of the transitional costs of liberalization thus helps to explain how market pressures may impede rather than promote market oriented reform in latin america

the politics of structural change swedish social democracy and thatcherism in comparative perspective the 1930s and the 1980s were decades of significant political economic change in the capitalist democracies depression and the rise of the industrial working class created opportunities for the establishment of social democracy in the 1930s stagflation and the decline of the working class made possible waves of radical rightist reform however this article suggests that only governments that do not have to concentrate myopically on the exigencies of winning the next election have the political space to undertake structural changes the benefits of which may only be manifest in the medium term in turn successful reforms are likely to entail changes in underlying social structural conditions such as the strengthening or weakening of organized labor movements that both expand the electoral constituencies of the government s partisanpreferred policies and improve their macroeconomic efficacy these propositions are examined with respect to the construction social democracy in sweden in the 1930s and the

how constraining is capital mobility the partisan hypothesis in an open economy a growing literature argues that international financial integration has eliminated the possibility for distinct partisan macroeconomic strategies i test this hypothesis by reformulating the partisan hypothesis in an open economy context and conducting pooled timeseries analysis of budget balances real interest rates and capital controls for fourteen oecd countries between 1970 and 1994 the analysis provides little evidence that financial integration has eliminated distinct partisan macroeconomic policies under fixed exchange rates leftist governments run larger deficits than rightist governments and use capital controls to reduce interest rate premia under floating exchange rates leftist governments pursue looser monetary policies than rightist governments while partisan distinctions do weaken in the 1990s in countries with fixed exchange rates this is attributed to the recession of the early 1990s and to important institutional changes in the european union international financial integration therefore does not prevent governments from pursuing distinct partisan macroeconomic policies

death of the partisan globalization and taxation in south america 1990 2006 correcting the relative lack of attention to the revenue side of public finance this article examines to what extent globalization constrains partisan tax policy the author hypothesizes that political ideology is still a good predictor of taxation in the neoliberal era advancing this argument against the prominent globalization thesis that global economic pressures have supplanted political ideology as the driving force of revenue policy although research in developed democracies identifies a resilient link between partisanship and policy outcomes the impact of the drastic neoliberal transition on partisan policy making in the developing world remains poorly understood using time series cross section data to evaluate partisan taxation in south america the author finds that partisanship is a reliable indicator of tax revenue in the neoliberal era counterintuitively however the promarket right generates more tax revenue than the interventionist left the author argues that this previously unexpec

phoenix risen the resurrection of global finance of all the many changes of the world economy since world war ii few have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance a review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial globalization leaving much room for further research competing historical interpretations stressing the contrasting roles of market forces and government policies need to be reexamined for dynamic linkages among the variables they identify likewise impacts on state policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions and what policymakers can do about them finally questions are also raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally used for the study of international political economy and international relations more generally

performance in a hostile world economic growth in capitalist democracies 1974 1982 many recent studies argue that labor organization and government partisanship were important determinants of the economic performance of the advanced industrial democracies during stagflation they do not however take into account the potential impact on performance of position in the international economy the relationships reported may therefore be largely spurious even when the strong effects of international position most notably the extent of dependence on imported sources of oil were controlled for domestic political structures remained powerful determinants of economic performance during stagflation corporatist political economies dominated by leftist governments in which labor movements were densely and centrally organized and market political economies in which labor was much weaker and rightist governments were predominant performed significantly better than the less coherent cases in which the power of labor was distributed asymmetrically between politics and the market

liquidity monetary policy and the financial crisis a new monetarist approach a model of public and private liquidity integrates financial intermediation theory with a new monetarist monetary framework nonpassive fiscal policy and costs of operating a currency system imply that an optimal policy deviates from the friedman rule a liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from the friedman rule and there exists a permanent nonneutrality of money driven by an illiquidity effect financial frictions can produce a financial crisis phenomenon that can be mitigated by conventional open market operations working in an unconventional manner private asset purchases by the central bank are either irrelevant or they reallocate credit and redistribute income jel e13 e44 e52 e62 g01 liquidity is a class of assets that is useful in exchange some of these liquid assets are government liabilities federal reserve notes treasury bills and treasury notes some are private liabilities the deposit liabilities of banks and some asset backed securities for example conventional wisdom holds that the main role of a central bank is to manage public liquidity in a manner that controls inflation and enhances the provision of private liquidity and credit however the mechanism by which central bank actions work to perform this role still appears to be poorly understood as has been highlighted by the financial crisis and the ensuing policy responses the purpose of this paper is to build a model of public and private liquidity that captures the features of modern economies essential to the analysis of monetary policy and that can be used to shed light on some current monetary policy problems and questions what is a liquid asset and what roles do privately provided and publicly provided liquid assets play in exchange in a model where we capture these roles for liquid assets what are the implications for monetary policy under what circumstances can a liquidity trap occur how does monetary policy work when there is a positive quantity of excess reserves held by banks what does a financial crisis do to the supply of private liquidity and what should monetary policy do in response

room to move international financial markets and national welfare states a central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes to what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices i evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of interest rates this evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators including inflation rates and government deficit gdp ratios but not with micropolicy indicators such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories in these areas governments retain policymaking autonomy i conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination

veto points veto players and international trade policy much of the literature on foreign economic policy focuses on the preferences of societal groups to explain policy decisions here however the author emphasizes the effects of domestic political i

did globalization restrict partisan politics an empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries this paper evaluates empirically how in the course of globalization partisan politics affected social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries i introduce an updated indicator of government ideology and investigate its interaction with the kof index of globalization two basic results emerge first at times when globalization proceeded at an average pace partisan politics had no effect on social expenditures but leftist governments increased social expenditures when globalization was proceeding rapidly second policies differed in the 1980s and 1990s leftist governments pursued expansionary policies in the 1980s yet partisan politics disappeared in the 1990s but not because of globalization

the making of policy institutionalized or not this paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles their causes and their consequences in latin america finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies apts are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies the higher the potential damage they can cause the lower the wealth of the economy and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power moreover strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies for instance bribes by the rich and protests by the poor are likely to be countervailing forces and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions

political parties and the supply side of the economy the provision of physical and human capital in advanced economies 1960 90 theory partisan tenure of government in contrast to institutionalist and structural approaches is used to explain the nature of governmental strategies to affect the supply side of the economy the provision of the input factors capital and labor hypotheses supply side economic strategies are a function of the party in office left wing governments spend heavily in physical and human capital formation to raise the productivity of factors and the competitiveness of the economy rightwing governments rely instead on private agents to maximize economic growth the organization of the domestic political economy and the international economy which place heavy limits on the capacity of parties to affect the conduct of macroeconomic policies hardly constrain the choice of supply side economic strategies methods regression analysis of data for levels of public spending on gross fixed capital formation and on education in oecd nations from 1960 to 1990 results supply side policies conform to partisan preferences throughout the period examined the institutional configuration of the economy affected policies jointly with government partisanship until the oil shock but not afterwards economic openness does not constrain the choice of supply side policies

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

partisan politics and public finance changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies 1955 1989 this paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels the analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 oecd countries the results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model of special note is the distinction between the electorate and the government ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays the results also suggest contrary to conventional wisdom that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy

the return of the liquidity effect a study of the short run relation between money growth and interest rates in this article i use band pass filters to investigate the short run relationship between money growth and interest rates i find a negative correlation between short run movements in money growth and interest rates which i interpret as evidence that the liquidity effect dominates the anticipated inflation effect

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

campaign contributions as a commitment device we explore the idea that the influence of interest groups in elections may have positive economic effects since the investment decisions of firms determine economic growth and employment voters have a common interest in making their governments commit to policies that encourage private investments however governments may renege on promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist policies campaign contributions by firms tend to restrain the scope for such opportunism and provide a commitment device this is achieved if firms after the policy is chosen contribute to the governing party or to its rivals

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

the structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies the article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions there exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains when these conditions hold and a compromise is in force the role of the state consists in institutionalizing coordinating and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists the combination of private ownership of the instruments of production with representative political institutions based on widespread suffrage constitutes a compromise between workers who consent to the private appropriation of profit by owners of capital and capitalists who accept the democratic institutions through which workers can make effective claims for an improvement of their material conditions this form of societal organization was con

taxation corporate financial policy and the cost of capital the cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system the purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest via the cost of capital taking full account of important issues that arise independently from the question of taxation included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effects of inside and outside money on industrial production across spectral frequency bands this paper examines money income causality using band spectral filtering techniques the paper s central finding is that relatively low frequency movements in outside money are responsible for the relationship between money and economic activity this result is inconsistent with theoretical models in which unanticipated changes in money are responsible for movements in real activity reverse causality is also examined the results are not supportive of a strong feedback relationship from income to inside money however there is evidence of strong feedback from income to outside money

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

re use of collateral in the repo market this paper introduces a methodology to estimate the re use of collateral based on actual transaction data with a comprehensive data set from the swiss franc repo market we are able to provide the first systematic study on the re use of collateral we find that re using collateral was most popular prior to the financial crisis when roughly 10 of the outstanding interbank volume was secured with re used collateral furthermore we show that the re use of collateral increases with the scarcity of collateral by giving an estimate of the collateral re use and explaining its drivers the paper contributes to the on going debate on collateral availability

structural dependence of the state on capital a central claim of both marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society this is the theory of structural dependence of the state on capital using a formal model the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined we conclude that in a static sense the theory is false virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense policies that once in place redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

the liquidity coverage ratio and security prices abstract what is the added value of a security which qualifies as a high quality liquid asset hqla under the basel iii liquidity coverage ratio lcr in this paper we quantify the added value in terms of yield changes and as suggested by stein 2013 call it hqla premium to do so we exploit the introduction of the lcr in switzerland as a unique quasi natural experiment and we find evidence for the existence of an hqla premium in the order of 4 basis points guided by theoretical considerations we claim that the hqla premium is state dependent and argue that our estimate is a lower bound measure furthermore we discuss the implications of an economically significant hqla premium thereby we contribute to a better understanding of the lcr and its implications for financial markets

globalization taxation and burden shifting in latin america most researchers interested in the relationship between global markets and public policy focus on advanced industrial democracies in contrast we examine competing hypotheses as to globalization s effect on governments by expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing nations more specifically we investigate the relationship between international market integration and the evolving burden of taxation on capital as well as the subsequent response of markets to shifts in tax policy in latin america since the late 1970s consistent with our theoretical expectations we find that global market forces are more constraining vis a vis tax policy in latin america than in the world s wealthiest nations despite these market based pressures however national politics continue to influence tax policy in latin america in a manner consistent with findings on advanced industrial democracies as such developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate policy though within the context of a more strictly neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

global networks and domestic policy convergence a network explanation of policy changes national economies are embedded in complex networks such as trade capital flows and intergovernmental organizations igo s these globalization forces impose differential impacts on national economies depending on a country s network positions this article addresses the policy convergence divergence debate by focusing on how networks at the international level affect domestic fiscal monetary and regulatory policies the author presents two hypotheses first similarity in network positions induces convergence in domestic economic policies as a result of peer competitive pressure second proximity in network positions facilitates policy learning and emulation which result in policy convergence the empirical analysis applies a latent space model for relational dyadic data and indicates that position similarity in the network of exports induces convergence in fiscal and regulatory policies position similarity in the network of transnational portfolio investments induces convergence in fiscal policies and position proximity in igo networks is consistently associated with policy convergence in fiscal monetary and regulatory policies

left government policy and corporatism explaining the influence of partisanship on inequality the author argues that to understand the relationship between partisan government and equality two fundamental things need to be done separate the effects of partisanship on policy and of policy on the economy and assess the influence of government partisanship once the mediating role of corporatism is accounted for the main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between government partisanship policy and inequality at the lower half of the wage distribution the analysis is motivated by a puzzling finding in previous work the absence of government partisanship effects on earnings inequality the author focuses on the role of three different policies government employment the generosity of the welfare state and minimum wages the results show that government employment is a most significant determinant of inequality although it is affected by left government only when corporatism is low they also demonstrate that welfare state generosity does not affect inequality and in turn is not associated with left government finally they reveal that the effect of government partisanship on minimum wages and of minimum wages on inequality is completely conditional on the levels of corporatism these effects are only present when corporatism is low the author explains why specific policies do or do not affect earnings inequality and also why corporatism mitigates or magnifies the influence of government partisanship by explicitly exploring the determinants of policy and earnings inequality the article represents an important contribution to our understanding of how governments can promote redistribution

partisan governance women s employment and the social democratic service state the causes of the expansion and cross national variation in the provision of welfare state goods and services are examined social democratic governance is by far the most important determinant of the public delivery of services and is one of the most important determinants of the public funding of the provision of welfare state goods and services christian democratic governance is an important determinant of public funding of services but is not related to public delivery state structure is also an important determinant women s labor force participation is an important determinant of the expansion of public social welfare services net of other social political and historical factors the analysis also shows an interactive effect of women s labor force participation and social democratic governance on public delivery of welfare state services we conclude that public delivery of a wide range of welfare state services is the most distinctive feature of the social democratic welfare state and that this feature is a product of the direct and interactive effects of social democracy and women s mobilization

the effects of money growth on inflation and interest rates across spectral frequency bands band spectral regression techniques are used to identify the frequency bands that are most important in the relationships between money growth and inflation and between money growth and the nominal interest rate the results show that cycles in the growth rate of m1 from one to two years long produce higher frequency cycles in inflation and two distinct sets of higher frequency cycles in changes in the nominal interest rate the results support models where predictable changes in money growth produce liquidity and anticipated inflation effects on nominal interest rates copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

leading the left to the right populist coalitions and economic reform abstract democratic political parties with a history of commitment to statist economic policies face internal stresses when they come to power and preside over programs of wholesale economic liberalization how do such parties and coalitions avoid splintering and manage to maintain electoral support examining the recent experiences of argentina and mexico edward gibson suggests that one can understand these achievements by treating each party as a combination of two separate components performing distinct functions a metropolitan policy component and a peripheral or rural electoral component his framework travels well beyond latin america and helps illuminate the different politics underlying three recent waves of economic liberalization in sri lanka

two illustrations of the quantity theory of money of two central implications of the quantity theory of money that a given change in the rate of change in the quantity of money induces i an equal change in the rate of price inflation and ii an equal change in nominal rates of interest the illustrations were obtained by comparing moving averages of the three variables in question using quarterly u s time series for the period 1953 77 readers may find the results of interest as additional confirmation of the quantity theory as an example of one way in which the quantity theoretic relationships can be uncovered via atheoretical methods from time series which are subject to a variety of other forces or as a measure of the extent to which the inflation and interest rate experience of the postwar period can be understood in terms of purely classical monetary forces the theoretical background of the study is reviewed very briefly as it is familiar material in the next section the data processing methods are described and rationalized in section ii the illustrations

collateral values by asset class evidence from primary securities dealers using data on repurchase agreements by primary securities dealers we show that three classes of securities treasury securities securities issued by government sponsored agencies and mortgage backed securities can be formally ranked in terms of their collateral values in the general collateral gc market we then show that gc repurchase agreement repo spreads across asset classes display jumps and significant temporal variation especially at times of predictable liquidity needs consistent with the safe haven properties of treasury securities these jumps are driven almost entirely by the behavior of the gc repo rates of treasury securities estimating the collateral rents earned by owners of these securities we find such rents to be sizable for treasury securities and nearly zero for agency and mortgage backed securities finally we link collateral values to asset prices in a simple no arbitrage framework and show that variations in collateral values explain a significant fraction of changes in short term yield spreads but not those of longer term spreads our results point to securities role as collateral as a promising direction of research to improve understanding of the pricing of money market securities and their spreads jel g12 g23