economics versus politics pitfalls of policy advice abstract the standard approach to policy making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy and maintains that if possible any market failure should be

radicalism versus gradualism an analytical survey of the transition strategy debate academic debate on a transition strategy for former socialist economies continues even a quarter century after the collapse of the communism in central and eastern europe and the former soviet union in this paper through an analytical survey of 137 preceding studies we present an overall picture of the debate and examine the relationship between the debate attitudes and the literature attributes in related studies we found that the radicalists maintain a consistent debate attitude from the viewpoints of time speed and policy sequence of economic transition while the debate attitude of the gradualists is more diversified we also found that there is another group of researchers that stays within the framework of the radicalism versus gradualism debate while at the same time keeping at arm s length from both the radicalists and the gradualists in addition our regression estimation of qualitative selection models provides interesting findings on the relationship between the debate attitudes and the literature attributes

almost budget balanced vcg mechanisms to assign multiple objects subsidy free vcg mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents the efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus over all profiles of non negative valuations the smallest efficiency loss l n p satisfies l n p l n n2 43n if pn is bounded away from 12 l n p converges to zero exponentially in n participation is voluntary in the optimal mechanism achieving l n p if p 1 but not if p 2 among voluntary mechanisms the optimal efficiency loss is not significantly larger than l n p if pn 12 but it does not converge to zero in n if pn 12

constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages a number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers while having to abide by the law of minimum wages firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what salary in such situations fair envy free allocations usually fail to exist to cope with this situation this paper proposes a new concept of fairness called constrained fairness among the set of constrainedly fair allocations the so called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular interest the reason for this is that the salaries are not only compatible with the minimum wages they are also optimal from the standpoint of cost minimizing firms and the assignment of jobs is efficient from the viewpoint of workers a convergent dynamic procedure that identifies constrainedly fair and minimal allocations is proposed furthermore strategic properties of the mechanism are derived and two notions of efficiency are evaluated

reform of the coal sector in an open economy the case of china cheap abundant and easy to transport and store coal has been produced and consumed to meet people s energy needs the last decade s growth in global coal use has been driven mainly by developing economies like china whose phenomenal economic growth has been powered by coal fired electricity and promoted by the export of manufactured goods a recent reform focus in china s coal sector is on coal taxation the paper develops a game theoretic model tailored to the context of china where coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy it finds that the adoption of special coal taxes is optimal for social welfare under most circumstances but may induce coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour in the process of privatisation the paper also cautions about potential resistance to the reform from consumers coal firms and government officials

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

worst case optimal redistribution of vcg payments in multi unit auctions abstract for allocation problems with one or more items the well known vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism aka clarke mechanism generalized vickrey auction is efficient strategy proof individually rational and does not incur a deficit however it is not strongly budget balanced generally the agents payments will sum to more than 0 we study mechanisms that redistribute some of the vcg payments back to the agents while maintaining the desirable properties of the vcg mechanism our objective is to come as close to budget balance as possible in the worst case for auctions with multiple indistinguishable units in which marginal values are nonincreasing we derive a mechanism that is optimal in this sense we also derive an optimal mechanism for the case where we drop the non deficit requirement finally we show that if marginal values are not required to be nonincreasing then the original vcg mechanism is worst case optimal

a solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good a benevolent planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants each valuing the object differently individuals have quasi linear preferences therefore the possibility of transfers is allowed a second best efficient mechanism is a strategy proof and anonymous mechanism that is not pareto dominated by another strategy proof and anonymous mechanism in this context we identify three conditions that are necessary and together with voluntary participation sufficient for a mechanism to be second best efficient this set includes mechanisms that destroy the good at certain profiles for domains comprising two individuals we provide an explicit characterization of the family of second best efficient mechanisms

international organizations and the political economy of reforms abstract we develop a simple dynamic model of policy reform that captures some of the determinants that underlie the differences between the reform paths taken by a number of countries since the early 1990s the model focuses on the interaction between domestic institutions and international organizations that promote reform on the one hand and the political incentives for reversing reforms on the other at equilibrium there are three types of reform paths a country can undergo a full scale lasting reform can carry out a partial but lasting reform or can go through cycles of reforms and costly counter reforms domestic institutions along with the incentives provided by international organizations determine the equilibrium path a politically myopic international organization may induce cycles of reforms and costly counter reforms thereby reducing the country s well being an international organization that only provides funds to promote reforms may have a less beneficial effect than one that assists the country with fresh funds to defend reforms when there is a risk of reversal international funds that promote reforms can also influence domestic institutions for example due to the intervention of an international organization countries could have incentives to dismantle institutions that build up reversal cost and or do not fully build their fiscal capacity

efficient collective decision making marginal cost pricing and quadratic voting we discuss the mechanisms related to quadratic voting from vickrey s counter speculation mechanism and his second price auction through the family of groves mechanisms and its most notable member the clarke mechanism to the expected externality mechanism goeree and zhang s mechanism the groves ledyard mechanism and the hylland zeckhauser mechanism we show that each mechanism that involves collective decisions has a quadratic aspect and that all of the mechanisms that we discuss are applications of the fundamental insight that for a process to be efficient all parties involved must bear the marginal social costs of their actions

implementation of the thompson mechanism this paper reconsiders the largely overlooked thompson insurance mechanism for public choice the mechanism s apparent defects can be remedied by a multi part mechanism that generates necessary information and corrects potential errors the added parts are a a sample of the population of eligible voters who prepare a program for all voters approval and b the vickrey clarke groves pivot mechanism one can use classical statistical methods to draw valid inferences from a population sample about the entire electorate preserving incentive compatibility and permitting efficient outcomes

double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint i consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant the objective is to select an assignment price pair that is envy free with respect to the agents true preferences i propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences i prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in nash and strong nash equilibrium the set of true envy free allocations

a political economy approach to the neoclassical gradualist model of transition a political economy approach to the neoclassical gradualist model of transition requires the exposition of what i define the primary elements of the model which are economic analysis definition of a good society speed political structure ideological structure and whether the initial conditions were incorporated in the model after the identification of the primary elements of the neoclassical gradualist model the next step is to identify secondary elements the desired changes with respect to price liberalization stabilization privatization institutional structure monetary policy and the financial system fiscal policy international trade and foreign aid and social policy the analytical framework developed makes possible to understand the neoclassical gradualist model from a new and more enlightening perspective we are better able to comprehend the complexities involved and the disagreements about the reform process the adoption of a gradual process of transition did not only involve specifying the required policies of a successful transition but also entailed a process a sequence by which the reforms should be introduced as such a process of transition consistent with the policies recommended by the neoclassical gradualists economists is developed the conclusion reveals the inconsistencies in the model copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2005

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

are incentives against economic justice abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains but is not restricted to quasi linear preferences we analyze the manipulability of the generalized money rawlsian fair gmrf solutions i we show that the nash and strong nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each gmrf solution coincide with the no envy solution in equilibrium efficiency is preserved according to agents true preferences ii a corollary is that the gmrf solutions naturally implement the no envy solution in nash and strong nash equilibria

managerial career concerns privatization and restructuring in transition economies abstract we set up a dynamic adverse selection model to explain how career concerns may induce managers in state owned enterprises soes to restructure their firms it is shown how government monopsony power over managers led to the ratchet effect under a socialist economy even under reforms coming short of privatization the introduction of a managerial labour market through privatization introduces competition for managers and eliminates the ratchet effect thereby inducing managers to restructure the model is consistent with the empirical evidence of soes restructuring in transition economies

the dynamics of reform and development in china a political economy perspective abstract to make economic reforms acceptable people in power need to be bought out however compensation is limited by the lack of commitment and liquidity under these constraints development may begin with modest reforms in some areas or sectors where investment opportunities are large and expected benefits from the pre reform system are small reform then may extend to other regions or sectors if the propagation process generates enough savings and proper coordination of economic actors takes place a drastic reform of institutions may then occur

veto players and the value of political control a theory with evidence from energy privatization we examine how veto players and the government s valuation of political control of economic activity affect the likelihood of privatization when the government ascribes a high value to political control veto players impede privatization because they would have to be compensated for their losses when the value of political control is low the government prefers to privatize enterprises that become difficult to control with multiple veto players we test the theory against data on energy privatizations in developing countries 1988 2008 oil prices offer a quantitative measure of the government s valuation of controlling the energy sector when oil prices are high the government has a keen interest in controlling the energy sector accordingly additional veto players reduce increase the likelihood of privatization in times of high low oil prices beyond illuminating the politics of privatization the results inform debates on the role of veto players in government policy

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

labor adjustment and gradual reform when is commitment important we analyze a model in which a government uses a second best policy to affect the reallocation of labor following a change in relative prices we consider two extreme cases in which the government has either unlimited or negligible ability to commit to future actions we discuss the factors that determine the importance of commitment ability and provide numerical examples the degree of commitment ability can alter the equilibrium policy both quantitatively and qualitatively in both extreme cases the dying sector is protected during the transition to a free market in order to decrease the amount of unemployment

competitive fair division several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players whose bids for the goods determine their prices an equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair division procedure called the gap procedure that ensures 1 nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good 2 pareto optimality though coupled with possible envy 3 monotonicity such that higher bids never hurt in obtaining a good 4 sincere bids that preclude negative utility and 5 prices that are partially independent of the amounts bid as in a vickrey auction a variety of applications are discussed

after the honeymoon on the economics and the politics of economic transformation this paper focuses on the obvious pareto improving programmes may fail to improve everyone s lot politically it has often been interpreted as a requirement that a majority should benefit from the change events in central and eastern europe suggest otherwise and cast doubt on the relevance of the median voter theorem the addition of minority discontents may result in major political difficulties that lead governments to avoid actions that generate strong minority objections as a result the technically best crafted plans may be rejected for political reasons in addition reform programmes which are ex ante politically acceptable may well become rejected ex post after they are implemented one solution is to introduce a heavy dose of egalitarian income distribution even if it runs against labour supply incentives this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the persistence of rationing following liberalization a theory for economies in transition abstract many economic theorists and policy makers argue that a rapid liberalization in which prices are allowed to equilibrate supply and demand is critical for a successful transition in the formerly socialist economies yet despite the advantages of market clearing prices many local governments in these economies have kept their prices for basic goods low and induced rationing in the state sector this paper develops a theory explaining why a local government chooses either a low state price that induces rationing or a higher price that clears the market the theory predicts that a necessary condition for a local government representing its constituents interests to set a market clearing price is that the private sector is monopolistic while a market clearing price in the state sector curtails private monopoly power it also implies that the state price is higher than in the rationing regime it is shown that a local government s marginal benefit of restraining private monopoly power is higher than the marginal costs of higher state prices when there is an increase in either state sector costs or private capacity this implies that a local government is more prone to set a market clearing price as its costs increase and as private capacity grows furthermore when there are at least two private firms and the private sector is monopolistic a local government that sets a market clearing price also stabilizes private sector pricing

democracy market liberalization and political preferences abstract we estimate the impact of market development and democratization on subjective political preferences we rely on the specific situation of frontier zones and the considerable regional variations in culture and economic development in the countries of the former socialist bloc for identification using a survey conducted in 2006 we find a positive and significant effect of democracy on support for a market economy but no effect of market liberalization on support for democracy hence in contrast with the conventional wisdom concerning the sequencing of political and economic reforms democratization may become a necessary condition to obtain public support for further economic liberalization

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the demand revealing process to distribute the surplus contrary to established frequently repeated proposition that its budget surplus cannot be distributed to taxpayers without disturbing the incentive compatibility of the demand revealing process drp the surplus can be distributed by reapplying the key concept of the drp there will remain an aggregate refund error that in a bayesian sense is random with zero mean and which vanishes o 1 n 2 as the economy becomes large through replication to dela with income effects when one does not restrict the domain of the mechanism to separable utility functions i suggest a variation of the drp that preserves its incentive compatibility wgeb n is finite

the timing of multilateral lending bargaining over the terms of multilateral lending can be a prolonged process we model failure to come to quick agreement as a screening device policy makers who find conditionality especially costly delay to signal their type we show that increased costs to not reaching agreement whether borne by borrowers or lenders can increase the chances of delay the imf s high profile involvement in recent crises in asia and russia illustrates the way international lenders and borrower governments delay to extract concessions loans from the fund and other international lenders such as the world bank and the united states treasury are accompanied by detailed requirements for policy changes borrower countries bargain hard on the package of reform measures they are obliged to adopt and standoffs in negotiations are common an example is the negotiations between the fund and the indonesian government beginning in autumn 1997 the fund was critical of the indonesian authorities failure to carry out a series of detailed structural reforms and hostile to the suharto government s expressed intention to introduce a currency board as a banker commented the more you talk about a currency board the more you delay the debt restructuring agreement it was not until april 1998 that an agreement was reached indonesia gave up on the currency board and the imf conceded that the government could continue subsidising food and energy a problem with the use of strategic delay to extract concessions is that the backdrop to such negotiations is often a worsening economic situation postponing agreement can severely exacerbate the costs to both borrowers and lenders if it leads to high inflation a loss of confidence in the banking system political backlashes or contagion the recent confrontation between indonesia and the fund raised the prospect of a break off of negotiations the indonesian rupiah fell by 25 the jakarta stock market declined by 20 prices skyrocketed and civil unrest worsened in this paper we use bargaining theory to analyse the timing of loan agreements between international lenders and governments in times of possible crises and rising costs of postponement our model works as follows a country approaches international lenders for a loan the lenders want as much reform as possible they propose a programme yielding economic benefits to the country that requires some amount of reform as a condition the country may accept the programme in which case we suppose reform occurs or it may reject the package in which case the lenders may revise their proposal

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

the costs of worker displacement this study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship a bargaining model is used to link wage tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship if information is good the profile will flatten as displacement approaches using psid data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981 wage tenure profiles are found not to change this suggests that either workers or both firms and workers are surprised by the displacement the present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker s share of firm specific capital is around 7 000 1980 dollars

divide et impera strategic underpricing in privatizations in several recent initial public offerings in privatization casesshares seemed to be severely underpriced in this paper weprovide a political economy explanation for this apparentunderpricing using a variant of grossmann and helpmann s 1996 model of special interest politics we demonstrate thatgovernments may raise their election chances by rationinginvestors because the resulting broader distribution of sharesmakes regulation that is favorable to the privatized firm morepopular somewhat surprisingly even revenues from theprivatization can be increased through rationing the model alsoexplains the common practice of bonus systems designed to preventinvestors from taking profits immediately

towards an equilibrium level of market reform how politics affects the dynamics of policy change in this article we examine the dynamics of economic reforms that are implemented by incumbent policy makers interested in maintaining their political power we use a sample of 86 countries over a time period going from 1980 to 2001 and find that the achievement of an equilibrium level of market liberalization is highly costly our results are robust to endogenity and model specification

optimal vcg mechanisms to assign multiple bads for the problem of assigning economic bads for example costly tasks or undesirable objects vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanisms achieve efficient allocations via money transfers however they can produce arbitrarily large budget surpluses or deficits we construct a performance index for a vcg mechanism to measure its budget surplus and deficit in the worst case using this index we develop mechanisms whose surpluses or deficits vanish as the number of participants increases for both cases of bads and goods we find that individual rationality creates an asymmetry between surplus and deficit particularly in the case of bads when the number of agents is large enough a minute amount of deficit can replace unit surplus to achieve a budget balance for the case of economic goods unit surplus can only be replaced with unit deficit regardless of individual rationality this result shows that the model with bads differs fundamentally from the model with goods

gradual green tax reforms abstract green tax reforms have become an important tool not only in protecting the environment but also in bringing about a more efficient tax system however reforms often imply accepting sacrifices in the short run and bring about the risk of potential political opposition within this framework the debate on whether to implement green tax reforms in one step or gradually becomes of great interest in this paper we use a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the spanish economy to evaluate different reforms that consist in increasing energy taxes and adjusting capital taxation in a revenue neutral framework our findings show that although an environmental dividend is always granted the existence of an efficiency dividend depends on the type of reform its size and how gradually it is implemented thus one step reforms that produce an efficiency dividend would imply large efficiency costs in the short run in this case the reform could only produce efficiency gains in the short run if it is implemented gradually although such gains would end up disappearing in the long run

the virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the transition to a market economy this paper presents a simplified model of sectoral restructuring in eastern europe a move towards allocative efficiency is desired by the reform minded government but the shift to higher productivity which such efficiency requires would lead to massive layoffs and labour reallocation in the transition period we look at the impact of political constraints unanimity and or majority worker approval on reform proposals when the government faces a heterogeneous workforce holding private information on relative outside opportunities when the budgetary consequences of exit compensations are so important as to make partial reforms preferable to full reforms gradualism emerges as the optimum in a dynamic context without government commitment it is also shown that under democratic majority rule a government in control of the agenda of reforms can win majority approval for plans which end up hurting majority interests intertemporally by threatening to switch majorities in future reform proposals this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

privatization technology choice and aggregate outcomes abstract we analyze the macroeconomic consequences of privatization policies in transition economies due to the particular market structure in those economies strategic completnentarities in restructuring of privatized firms occur giving rise to multiple macroeconomic equilibria restructuring and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes crucially depend on how property rights are distributed and which method of privatization is chesen firm sales to single or core investors may easily lead to bad equilibria without restructuring if employees are given profit claims this is so even if the workers give up parts of their wages as a compensation for stocks wage equity swaps contrary to conventional wisdom mass privatization can have favourable influence on micro economic efficiency and may therefore lead to a good aggregate outcome as an additional feature favouring mass privatization we argue that a big bang approach to privatization might lead to a favourable equilibrium

eliminating price supports a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes information and politically constrained government programs for eliminating price supports the issues which we examine in this model include i to what extent is it possible to reduce the size of oversubscribed industries in light of the information and political constraints that exist is a complete decoupling of a worker s compensation from her output possible or desirable ii which type of workers as characterized by their skill levels and outside employment opportunities remain in the industry iii which type of worker is harmed by the relocation program which coalitions of workers will oppose the reorganization

inertial credit and opportunistic arrears in transition in a transition economy enterprise restructuring may exhibit a laffer curve response to tighter credit as a result of rational collective inertia in the presence of a rigid production structure unenforceable contracts and high adjustment costs a contraction in credit finance subtracts more liquidity than enterprises can generate internally because unrestructured firms are forced to extend trade credit to illiquid buyers an increase in their number increases the availability of forced supplier credit in turn increasing the attractiveness of inertial behavior as trade credit cannot be enforced a critical mass of trade and wage arrears causes pressure for a collective bailout thus validating inertial behavior even by reformable firms

structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition abstract economies in transition are faced with a high degree of structural uncertainty i e uncertainty about which it is possible to learn through experience we study structural uncertainty s effects on a subsidy removal program subsidy removal causes unemployment but yields fiscal benefits and facilitates private sector growth when the policymaker does not know the speed with which the private sector absorbs the unemployed he will be driven toward a more decisive and therefore more informative policy the model also rationalizes policy reversals and implies that irreversibility constraints and political instability dampen the learning effect making policy more gradualist

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

the governance of exchanges members cooperatives versus outside ownership the paper compares co operative governance structure to outside ownership the distinction between the two lies in who has residual rights of control it is found that a co operative becomes relatively less efficient as the environment becomes more competitive and the interests of members become more skewed these ideas are applied to the governance of exchanges this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

downsizing and job insecurity this article offers an explanation of why firms downsizing patterns may vary substantially in magnitude and timing taking the form of one time massive cuts waves of layoffs or zero layoff policies the key element of this theory is that workers expectations about their job security affect their on the job performance in a situation where firms face adverse shocks the productivity effect of job insecurity forces firms to balance laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors commitment the cost of ensuring commitment differs between firms with different characteristics and determines whether workers are laid off all at once or in stages however if firms have private information about their future profits they may not lay off any workers in order to signal a bright future boosting worker s confidence jel j21 j23 d21 d82

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution it is well known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing however payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus which reduces social welfare we show that an asymptotically first best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

the political economy of transition the overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform what are the main insights from that theory how does it reflect the transition reality what have we learned and what do we still need to learn the present article will attempt to answer those questions

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

discretionary policy implementation and reform abstract regulatory agencies treaty negotiators and other delegates often possess considerable authority over the details of policy change i examine how such discretion can block a pareto improving reform when policy change requires the support of both the liberal and conservative factions gridlock reform and reform paradoxes all emerge as cases in a general model with perfect information a reformer with unknown policy preferences can facilitate escape from a gridlock equilibrium

the existence and uniqueness of optimal pollution policy in the presence of victim defense measures abstract it is to be expected that rational people defend themselves against pollution externalities at the very least through spatial separation from the source but even in the simplest models defensive behaviour generates nonconvexities multiple optima and inconclusive policy guidance this raises serious questions for the theory of environmental policy which have been largely ignored this paper derives a sufficient condition for a uniquely optimal emissions level in the presence of defensive activity the condition has an intuitive and in principal empirically testable interpretation two strategies for implementation are discussed an iterative tax rule and a non iterative demand revealing mechanism

tax reform and the political economy of the tax base abstract this paper studies the political prospects for reform in a model where the tax base and statutory rate are separate instruments of tax policy the model suggests that large changes in the tax code may be easier to enact than marginal reforms the tax base faces a tipping point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support reform at this tipping point tax reform is pareto improving politically feasible tax reform occurs when fiscal needs are large but may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal tax rates there is strategic complementarity in lobbying for tax exemptions resulting in multiple equilibria the model s main predictions are consistent with recent tax reforms in oecd countries

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

the political economy of restructuring and privatization in eastern europe this paper reports some of the recent research in the political economy of transition in central and eastern europe with special emphasis on restructuring and privatization this line of research is concerned with the political feasibility of reform packages and the effect of political constraints on the design of reforms political constraints appear to play a major role in economic transition 2 in poland transition started with a homogeneous solidarity led government enjoying great legitimacy l balcerowicz the finance minister who had launched reform in january 1990 had however to leave office and part of his policies are now being reversed parliament is fragmented government duration is becoming increasingly short workers are striking against privatization plans czechoslovakia is breaking up partly because the slovak population is not ready to follow the rhythm of reforms initiated by v klaus in prague the support for e gai dar s transition program in russia has dwindled among the population conservative forces are gathering momentum alarming neonazi manifestations in east germany are an indicator of the low tolerance of the population for the changes imposed on them some countries are doing better hungary is doing comparatively well with a more stable political situation and relative successes in reforms allowing it to attract foreign direct investment china is experiencing a rapid expansion of the non state sector and smooth advances in the reform process in a context of sustained economic growth qian and xu 1992 these two countries

the optimal speed of transition a general equilibrium analysis we present a benchmark model for the optimal speed of transition from a state owned to a private market economy based on the consumption savings decision in a closed economy we abstract from frictions to focus on the macroeconomic conditions for accumulation of private capital and closure or restructuring of state owned enterprises it is shown that hard budget constraints compensate for too slow speed of enterprise closure but that an excess speed of closure may slow down transition because of output contraction effects this will especially be the case if such a deviation occurs at early stages of transition

when order affects performance culture behavioral spillovers and institutional path dependence evidence suggests that the cultural context influences the performance of laws policies and political institutions descriptive accounts reveal that outcomes and behaviors often depend on the array of historical institutions this article presents a multi institutional framework that can account for those findings through path dependent behavioral spillovers individuals learn equilibrium behaviors when interacting in a new institutional setting initially some individuals choose behaviors that align with their behaviors in similar extant institutions creating a cultural context that can lead to inefficient outcomes the article shows how avoiding path dependence requires sequencing or designing institutions to maintain behavioral diversity optimal sequencing thus requires positioning institutions with clear incentives early in the sequence as well as avoiding strong punishments that can stifle attempts to break established behavioral patterns

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

pollution permits and compliance strategies abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spot and futures markets for tradeable pollution permits on the potential polluters compliance decisions polluters can buy permits invest in pollution abatement or else stop production or source out we show that stand alone spot markets induce excessive investment the introduction of a futures market reduces this incentive to invest but is not the optimal way to control pollution a menu of options on pollution rights possibly coupled with intertemporally bundled sales yields higher welfare because of its focus on long run demand elasticities and rent extraction this paper can be applied to a variety of situations such as demand side management public transportation bypass in telecommunications or forward sales by a private monopolist

do unemployment benefits promote or hinder job reallocation abstract according to recent and largely untested theories unemployment benefits ubs could improve the extent and quality of job reallocation even at the cost of increasing unemployment in this paper we use a new set of yearly panel data from a large number of countries to evaluate empirically the relationship between unemployment benefits and job reallocation unlike previous work assessing the effects of ubs on labor market stocks we focus on flows and rely on policy experiments notably the introduction from scratch of unemployment benefits in many countries we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to lessen the potentially important selection endogeneity and omitted variable problems we find a positive sizable and significant effect of the introduction of ubs on job reallocation arising mainly from the job destruction margin although this effect fades away over time these findings appear to be robust to changes in the countries in the sample control variables or estimation methods we discuss to what extent our results are consistent with equilibrium matching models with or without endogenous sorting of workers into jobs providing entitlement to ubs and stochastic job matching

success and failure of reform insights from the transition of agriculture this paper analyzes the linkages between the reform strategies in transition countries and economic performance the authors focus on agriculture because of the sharpness of the policy changes fundamental differences among countries and relative simplicity of agricultural relationships the authors document post reform performance in the transition countries of asia and europe the authors show how a pricing reform and subsidy reductions b land rights reform and policies that affect farm restructuring and c the presence institutions that facilitate exchange either markets or market substitutes affect output and productivity the paper ends with general lessons on reforms and transition

monetary policy during transition progress and pitfalls in central and eastern europe 1990 6 monetary policy rarely accomplished stabilization if sound fiscal policy had not already been established distinctions between different nominal anchors can be exaggerated any credit crunch owed more to micro distortions than to tight money initial stabilization did not always precede the resumption of growth but there is little evidence that more gradual transition would have made disinflation easier thereafter countries usually experienced large capital inflows whatever the ostensible exchange rate regime fiscal tightening and more exchange rate flexibility offer a sounder eventual response poor incentives and corporate governance in banks should have been anticipated subsequent improvements were slow and costly large investments in writing off bad debt and providing adequate resources for supervision made monetary transmission more reliable and hardened budget constraints through which the price mechanism could improve efficiency copyright 1997 by oxford university press

reforms lobbies and welfare a common agency approach citizens with heterogeneous tastes delegate to policy makers the authority to choose public policies they may try to influence legislators in various ways in this paper we assume that monetary lobbying and direct threats are the only instruments private individuals can use to influence the legislator we model the relationship between the citizens and a single policy maker as a common agency game lobbies offer a policy and a payment according to a truthful contribution schedule and the government takes the policy decision in the truthful equilibrium the government implements the social surplus maximizing policy introducing also direct threats we find that as far as both groups have an instrument to influence the legislator the efficiency result is robust we also show that when the lobby groups have asymmetric interests and political power not all groups necessarily participate in the auction in particular it turns out that one lobby or non lobby equilibria may arise and those equilibria are also efficient

trade capital and the transition in central europe the potential for export oriented growth and the impact of official capital injections is assessed for five central european countries in the years 1990 2000 by means of a neoclassical simulation model export growth is essential for the transition to a market oriented economy and the recovery of central europe implying the need for trade liberalization by both the east and the west if this condition is being met satisfactory gdp growth rates appear possible even without external financial support

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

speed of adjustment and self fulfilling failure of economic reform abstract an economic reform programme where inefficient public labour is laid off is considered the immediate effect is a lowering of wages and increased profitability in the private modern sector over time as capital accumulates in the modern sector wages and production increases big bang reform generates a sharp transitory drop in wages while gradual reform gives a more modest decline in the presence of a subsistence wage constraint popular resistance can cause the cancellation of big bang reform two arguments for gradualism can in that case be made first a more gradual reform requires a less abrupt drop in the wage and will therefore be feasible second the initial wage drop will be stronger if a cancellation of reform is expected and since cancellation is dependent on the severity of the initial wage drop multiple equilibria occurs the existence of multiple equilibria is dependent on the speed of reform sufficiently gradual programmes have a unique successful equilibrium

asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism abstract it is shown that the demand revealing mechanism creates only a negligibly small undesired deficit when the number of participants in the decision group in question is sufficiently large since the size of deficit is a measure of inefficiency and since the former is inevitable the states result demonstrates the approximate optimality of the mechanism

the political economy of fiscal consolidations in the context of recent research in political economy this paper addresses the policy problem of fiscal consolidation in terms of three types of issues i the macroeconomic effects of alternative strategies to consolidate ii the institutional setups conducive to a consolidation and iii the best strategy for implementing a consolidation in order to maximize its political feasibility one methodological feature of this survey is an emphasis on policy feasibility one methodological feature of this survey is an emphasis on policy issues in order to bridge the gap between the level of abstraction of politico economic models of fiscal policy and the issues faced by a policymaker when attempting a fiscal consolidation

what explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments such as roads and dams to promoting policy reform this change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment after nearly 20 years experience with policy based or conditional lending there have now been many studies of adjustment lending most of which take a case study approach many conclude that policy based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform the authors examine a database of 220 world bank supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail they find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time variables under the world bank s control resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions have no relationship with an adjustment program s success or failure what development agencies must do then is select promising candidates for adjustment support when the candidates is a poor selection devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform to improve its success rate with adjustment lending the world bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not that is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers to become more effective at supporting policy reform the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending

learning dynamics and support for economic reforms why good news can be bad support for economic reforms has often shown puzzling dynamics many reforms that began successfully lost public support this paper shows that learning dynamics can rationalize this paradox because the process of revealing reform outcomes is an example of sampling without replacement this concept challenges the conventional wisdom that one should begin by revealing reform winners it may also lead to situations in which reforms that enjoy both ex ante and ex post majority support will still not come to completion the framework can be used to explain why gradual reforms worked well in china where successes in special economic zones facilitated further reform whereas this was much less the case for latin american and central and eastern european countries

whither russia a review of andrei shleifer s a normal country in this review the author reflects on the heated debates around views about russia s postcommunist transition expressed in essays collected in new andrei shleifer s book a normal country russia after communism harvard university press 2005 which were initially published at different times during transition she focuses on the three questions that have been in the center of the debate among academics and policymakers what should the sequencing and the speed of reforms be should a country have political centralization for fiscal decentralization to be efficient is russia normal the author argues that russia s most recent history provides convincing evidence in support of the logic of political and economic transformation as it was understood by shleifer as early as the beginning of the 1990s

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

the imf s unmet challenges the international monetary fund is a controversial institution whose interventions regularly provoke passionate reactions we will argue that there is an important role for the imf in helping to solve information commitment and coordination problems with significant implications for the stability of national economies and the international monetary and financial system in executing these functions the effectiveness of the imf like that of a football referee depends on whether the players see it as competent and impartial we will argue that the fund s perceived competence and impartiality and hence its effectiveness are limited by its failure to meet four challenges concerning the quality of its surveillance of individual countries groups of countries and the global system the relevance of conditionality in loan contracts the utility of the fund s approach to debt problems and the fund s failure to adopt a system of governance that gives appropriate voice to different stakeholders these problems of legitimacy will have to be addressed in order for the imf to play a more effective role in the 21st century

capital accumulation unemployment and self fulfilling failure of economic reform abstract i consider fiscal reform and the consequences of expectations about reform cancellation the reform implies reduced taxes and the laying off of employees in an inefficient public sector if the resulting unemployment level declines sufficiently fast the reform is completed on the other hand if high unemployment levels prevail for too long the reform is cancelled cancellation affects the return on capital negatively hence expectations about cancellation will depress capital accumulation and increase the level of unemployment as a result multiple rational expectation equilibria may arise where expectations about cancellation prove self fulfilling the modelling framework is leontief technology in combination with ramsey optimization that exhibits simple and attractive algebra