expectations exchange rates and monetary theory the case of german hyperinflation abstract this paper tests some of the structural coefficient restrictions on goods price equations and foreign exchange rate equations implied by the monetary theory of exchange rates the data are from the german hyperinflation 1922 1923 the results of the tests broadly support the monetary theory of exchange rates and they also support the hypothesis that the foreign exchange market was efficient during this period however the much higher residual volatility in foreign exchange prices is not explained by the monetary theory

multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders in the last few years governments in many parts of the world have aggressively sought to privatize socially held assets this wave of privatization has included the sale of industrial enterprises in the former soviet union and eastern europe the sale of public transportation systems in britain and scandinavia and the sale of radio spectra in the u s both the enormity and the importance of these sales have naturally led to an examination of how best to accomplish this task auctions have been proposed and have frequently been used as time honoured convenient and attractive mechanisms for such sales this in turn has led to a revival of interest in the theory of auctions particularly those involving multiple objects the magnitude of these privatization sales has meant that in many instances it is realistic to consider that buyers may run up against liquidity or borrowing constraints the presence of these financial constraints introduces important differences into traditional auction theory for instance pitchik and schotter 1986 and che and gale 1996 1998 have shown that when bidders are subject to such constraints the conclusion of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds when multiple objects are auctioned in the presence of budget constraints it may be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object with a view to raising the price paid by his rival and depleting his budget so that the second object may then be obtained at a lower price in effect a bidder may wish to raise a rival s costs in one market in order to gain advantage in another thus unlike in traditional auction theory a particular bidder s payoff is affected by the price paid by a rival bidder it is important to note that this effect comes into play only when several objects are sold

inflation and currency depreciation in germany 1920 1923 a dynamic model of prices and the exchange rate this paper presents a dynamic model of the german hyperinflation explaining prices the exchange rate and the money supply in the model estimated simultaneously the nominal exchange rate is allowed to diverge from purchasing power parity in the short run the monetary approach to exchange rate determination and the quantity theory of money are assumed to be valid in the long run the dynamic adjustment of prices and the exchange rate to monetary disturbances is made explicit and currency substitution between domestic and foreign currency is introduced explicitly the problem of the autocorrelation of the residuals of the money demand function found in previous studies is resolved the fit of inflation and exchange rate changes is very satisfactory and the speed of adjustment of the exchange rate to monetary disturbances is found to be much higher than for prices copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

exchange rate and price dynamics under adaptive and rational expectations an empirical analysis abstract while the concept of rational expectations has become a central tenant of open economy macroeconomic modeling frankel and froot 1990a using survey data find that exchange rate expectations are either extrapolative or regressive we estimate structural and semi structural open economy macroeconomic models with static adaptive and rational expectations to empirically investigate these questions the two major results of the paper are first that the restrictions imposed by static expectations are overwhelmingly rejected in favor of either adaptive or rational expectations and second that it is not possible to choose empirically between rational and adaptive expectations jel f31

buying votes vs supplying public services political incentives to under invest in pro poor policies this paper uses unique survey data to provide for the first time in the literature direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics ruling out alternate explanations such as for example poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes the data come from the philippines a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections the data reveal a significant robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services in places where households report more vote buying government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children and quite strikingly as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance a higher percentage of children are severely under weight

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

stochastic asymmetric blotto games an experimental study we consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a blotto game players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items the winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies we analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the blotto games literature that have not been previously compared i players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and ii players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items we report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

a strategic approach to multiple estate division problems abstract the classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates in the finite estate case the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate which may differ across estates in the more general infinite estate problem players have arbitrary preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded as an estate a strategic estate game is formulated in which each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the estates resulting in individual claims per estate each estate is then divided according to some allocation rule the paper focuses on existence and on computational aspects of nash equilibria in finite and infinite estate games with some focus on the proportional allocation rule for this rule it also studies pareto optimality and envy freeness of equilibrium allocations

contests with limited resources abstract many interesting phenomena electoral competition r d races lobbying are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources specifically the following game is analyzed two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests the players have limited resources budgets and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests in each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize mixed strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical blotto game are analyzed

contests with a constrained choice set of effort abstract we consider a symmetric two player contest in which the choice set of effort is constrained we apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that under standard assumptions there exists a unique nash equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium perhaps surprisingly this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations

the endogeneity of money during the german hyperinflation a reappraisal this paper provides evidence that casts doubt on the conclusioon of several studies of the german hyperinflation that since government raised most of its revenue from money creation the money supply process was endogenous this conclusion in the literature is based on the assumption that the money supply and the price level can be described by linear arima models it is shown here that the linearity assumption is violated by the data and that relaxing this assumption reverses the earlier results the paper provides additional evidence in support of the finding that the money supply process may be exogenous

expectations in the german hyperinflation reconsidered abstract data on forward foreign exchange rates during the german hyperinflation after world war i provide direct observations of expected changes in the spot rate although levels of these forward rates seem to be efficient predictors of the spot rate the predicted changes in the spot rate are biased downward substantially and do not meet the specific conditions of rationality indeed the bias in the forward rate predictions is similar to bias in adaptive expectations of the spot rate the behavior of the forward rate can be rationalized as a gradual market adaptation to a new regime of volatile and escalating inflation reasonably represented by adaptive expectations the strict definition of rational expectations needs to be broadened to allow for the difficulty of distinguishing between permanent and transitory shocks

vote trading with and without party leaders two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority individuals have different privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money we study theoretically and experimentally the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market the theory has strong predictions in both cases trading falls short of full efficiency but for opposite reasons with group leaders the minority wins too rarely with market trades the minority wins too often as a result with group leaders vote trading improves over no trade with market trades vote trading can be welfare reducing the theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

the persistence of the peso problem when policy is noisy abstract the peso problem the market s belief that a discrete event may occur has frequently been blamed for the persistence of on average mistaken forecasts of macroeconomic variables this paper demonstrates how beliefs that a policy process may have switched can induce apparent ex post biased forecasts of exchange rates even after the switch has occurred furthermore during this peso problem period exchange rates may appear to contain a speculative bubble component since they will systematically deviate from the levels implied by observing fundamentals ex post and the conditional variance of exchange rates will exceed the variance implied by observing fundamentals

power brokers middlemen in legislative bargaining abstract we study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers we establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon we show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes and can be inefficient to fulfill this role the middleman s policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible but the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change the results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies

or forum blotto politics this paper considers abstract election games motivated by the united states electoral college there are two political parties and the electoral votes in each state go to the party that spends the most money there with an adjustment for a head start that one party or the other may have in that state the states have unequal numbers of electoral votes and elections are decided by majority rules each party has a known budget and much depends on the information that informs how that budget is spent three situations are considered 1 one party s spending plan is known to the other 2 spending is gradually revealed as the parties spend continuously in time and 3 neither side knows anything about the other s spending the last situation resembles a blotto game hence the title

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

using survey data to test standard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferes we estimate extrapolative adaptive and regressive models of expectations static or random walk expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight in comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias no variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors expectations regarding exchange rates in the past expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way often by using the forward exchange rate there is however a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate in that the two may not be equal the gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate for example has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium if the aim

do prediction markets aid defenders in a weak link contest abstract laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states moves of nature however in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival this is particularly important in aggressor defender contests this paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor s action the results of the experiments indicate that the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender s win rate prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors decisions that is not being exploited by defenders and the existence of a prediction market does not alter the behavior of the aggressor whose behavior is being forecast

impact of household consumption on co2 emissions danish household consumption increased by 58 over the period 1966 1992 while co2 emissions only increased by 7 using decomposition analysis we investigated the global co2 impact of danish household consumption from 1966 to 1992 our conclusion is that overall growth in private consumption but not changes in the composition of consumption is the key to understanding the increase in co2 emissions however the effect of growth in private consumption has been partly offset by substantial energy conservation in the energy supply and manufacturing sectors

apples to kangaroos a framework for developing internationally comparable carbon emission factors for crop and livestock products abstract consumption based greenhouse gas accounting which encompasses emissions from a nation s domestic final consumption as well as emissions embodied in imports is gaining favor in the climate change literature for its effectiveness and consideration of equity unfortunately the calculation of emissions embodied in the trade of agricultural food products is hindered by a lack of consistent and comparable emission factors food import quantities for every country are readily available through the united nations food and agriculture organization unfortunately the carbon emission factors necessary to calculate the embodied emissions in imported foods are largely unavailable or unreliable for many countries on top of this different methodologies for determining carbon emission factors provide varying estimates based on different assumptions the differences in these assumptions and methodologies can mean that attempts to compare and combine emissions based on factors from different countries become less of a comparison of apples to apples and more of an apples to oranges or even apples to kangaroos exercise this study proposes a method to combine the food and agriculture organization s available greenhouse gas data production data and agricultural yields and scaling it against benchmarks in the literature to estimate a time series of crop and livestock carbon emission factors that are internally consistent within the food and agriculture organization s data set and comparable from nation to nation the framework provided is then used to produce a sample set of carbon emission factors for chinese agricultural import suppliers to determine the embodied greenhouse gases in china s food imports

liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests abstract we analyze the effects of future liquidity constraints on contestants investment in a dynamic contest model contestants invest in two consecutive contests to win a prize in each period the loser of the first period contest can be liquidity constrained in the second period due to too little remaining wealth the winner of the first contest can reinvest the prize in the second contest we show that future liquidity constraints mainly affect the imbalance of the contest in the future but not today surprisingly larger contest prizes decrease contestants future investments and amplify the imbalance of future contests however the contest organizer can reduce this imbalance by increasing the share of the prize money in the second contest

promises and pitfalls in environmentally extended input output analysis for china a survey of the literature abstract as the world s largest developing economy china plays a key role in global climate change and other environmental impacts of international concern environmentally extended input output analysis ee ioa is an important and insightful tool seeing widespread use in studying large scale environmental impacts in china calculating and analyzing greenhouse gas emissions carbon and water footprints pollution and embodied energy this paper surveys the published articles regarding ee ioa for china in peer reviewed journals and provides a comprehensive and quantitative overview of the body of literature examining the research impact environmental issues addressed and data utilized the paper further includes a discussion of the shortcomings in official chinese data and of the potential means to move beyond its inherent limitations

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

a model of speculative efficiency with news error components this paper proposes a theoritical model to assess of news on the spot forward exchange rate relationship and thereby predicts of the impact of news on the exchange rate two types of news are analysed rational expectations type innovations and announcement effects form newspapers by using historical data form a time period which includes the german hyperinflation of the early 1920s an estimate from of the model is derived which is substantially simpler than the version requried using contemporary data preliminary results support the main theoretical predictions but also cast some doubt on a literal interpretation of the exchange rate model plus rational expectations

information alliances in contests with budget limits we study the role of information exchange that may occur in alliances in a contest without noise contestants learn their own limits of what they can spend in a contest they may also form alliances and learn the limits of all players who are within the same alliance then they decide independently about their own contest efforts alliance formation for the purpose of information exchange is beneficial for members of the same alliance and neutral for all other players also a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members further we identify and discuss the set of stable alliance combinations

violence bribery and fraud the political economy of elections in sub saharan africa post soviet african democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation vote buying and ballot fraud we propose a model of electoral competition where although some voters oppose violence it is effective in intimidating swing voters we show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence which corresponds to a terrorism strategy similarly a nationally weak incumbent will use repression however a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud we discuss the applicability of the model to several african elections

patent competition rent dissipation and the persistence of monopoly the role of research budgets abstract the paper investigates how patent rights can contribute to the persistence of monopoly patent competition is modelled as a dollar auction game between two firms incumbent and entrant any bid expenditure on r d in the game constitutes sunk cost whose total amount is constrained by fixed research budgets the explicit solution subgame perfect equilibrium determines who wins the patent and how the winning expenditures depend on order of play and budgets of firms the entrant can win if he moves first and has the higher budget rent may or may not be dissipated by the competition

competing for loyalty the dynamics of rallying support abstract we consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group we focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially we show that competition reduces agents welfare with public goods or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents and increases agents welfare with public bads we apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers vote buying and exclusive deals jel d42 d62 d72 d82 g34 h41

changing beliefs and systematic rational forecast errors with evidence from foreign exchange this paper addresses a new interpretation to the appearance in the early 1980s of systematic errors in forecasting the dollar exchange rate following a change in the process of a fundamental variable market participants revise their beliefs about the process using bayes rule since the market does not immediately recognize the change forecast errors are on average wrong during a period when the market is rationally learning for conservative parameter values the learning behavior of the dollar exchange rate in the early 1980s appears consistent with about half of the dollar s underprediction implied by the forward market copyright 1989 by american economic association

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

can a corrupt ruling party win a re election through vote buying abstractin many developing countries it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes we develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party s chances of being re elected the results show because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle

value for money vote buying and politician accountability abstract the prevalence of vote buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected in this paper we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the u s and kenya we find that vote payments reduce voters willingness to hold politicians accountable holding fixed politician identity voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent seeking and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted unsurprisingly the politician then engages in a higher level of rent seeking a simple model of multi faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings

the demand for money the reform effect and the money supply process in hyperinflation the evidence from greece and hungary ii reexamined newly uncovered data on money and prices in greece and hungary duri ng their hyperinflations are used to reestimate the cagan money demand equation and to repeat the sargent and wallace causality tests it is no longer necessary to exclude observations at the end of each episo de on the premise that they represent the response to an anticipated monetary reform the results for each country now conform to the sargent and wallace findings for most other hyperinflation episodes that causality runs from prices to money i e that money is endogenous copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

china s foreign trade and climate change a case study of co2 emissions abstract the globalization of trade has numerous environmental implications trade creates a mechanism for consumers to shift environmental pollution associated with their consumption to other countries carbon leakage exerts great influences on international trade and economy applying an input output approach the paper estimates the amount of carbon dioxide co2 embodied in china s foreign trade during 1997 2007 it is found that 10 03 26 54 of china s annual co2 emissions are produced during the manufacture of export goods destined for foreign consumers while the co2 emissions embodied in china s imports accounted for only 4 40 1997 and 9 05 2007 of that we also estimate that the rest of world avoided emitting 150 18 mt co2 in 1997 increasing to 593 mt in 2007 as a result of importing goods from china rather than manufacturing the same type and quantity of goods domestically during 1997 2007 the net additional global co2 emissions resulting from china s exports were 4894 mt then the paper divides the trade embodied emissions into scale composition and technical effect it was found that scale and composition effect increased the co2 emissions embodied in trade while the technical effect offset a small part of them finally its mechanism and policy implications are presented

the dynamics of majoritarian blotto games abstract we study colonel blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective for a large class of contest success functions the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player s overall budget as a consequence a player s chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player has accumulated in prior battles this result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective we also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget for many contest success functions if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended game resembles an all pay auction without noise

multi battle contests an experimental study this study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi battle contests in simultaneous contests subjects make positive bids in each battle 80 of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries however 35 of the time subjects make positive bids in only two instead of all three battles and they significantly overuse moderately high bids in sequential contests theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles contrary to this prediction subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles consequently instead of always ending in the second battle contest proceeds to the third battle 38 of the time finally in both simultaneous and sequential settings subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted resulting in negative expected payoffs

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

backward induction in the wild evidence from sequential voting in the us senate in the us senate roll calls are held in alphabetical order we document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet to speak to the mechanism behind this result we develop a simple model of sequential voting in which forward looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues estimating our model structurally we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play we also consider but ultimately dismiss alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying

competition for a majority we define the class of two player zero sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved for such games we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game maximin and minimax strategies for the players and a nash equilibrium if all discontinuities favor one player then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy a property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium and that the resulting value is invariant games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and equilibria for voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy we provide tie breaking rules and assumptions about voters preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability these assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters or with no dimensional restriction if the electorate is sufficiently large each colonel blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers in this case for simple majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties

war and conflict in economics theories applications and recent trends we review the main economic models of war and conflict these models vary in details but their implications are qualitatively consistent highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings recent empirical literature employing both laboratory and field data in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory however this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict we finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

agricultural ch4 and n2o emissions of major economies consumption vs production based perspectives abstract agriculture is one of the most important sectors for global anthropogenic methane ch4 and nitrous oxide n2o emissions while much attention has been paid to production side agricultural non co2 greenhouse gas anghg emissions less is known about the emissions from the consumption based perspective this paper aims to explore the characteristics of agricultural ch4 and n2o emissions of global major economies by using the latest emission data from the food and agriculture organization corporate statistical database faostat and the recently available global multi regional input output model from the world input output database wiod the results show that in 2014 the 42 major economies together accounted for 60 7 and 65 0 of global total direct and embodied anghg emissions respectively the consumption based anghg emissions in the us japan and the eu were much higher than their production based emissions while the converse was true for brazil australia and india the global average embodied anghg emissions per capita was 0 7 t co2 eq but major developing countries such as china india indonesia and mexico were all below this average value we find that the total transfer of embodied anghg emissions via international trade was 622 4 mt co2 eq 11 9 of the global total china was the largest exporter of embodied anghg emissions while the us was the largest importer most developed economies were net importers of embodied emissions mexico us china us china eu china japan china russia brazil eu india eu and india us formed the main bilateral trading pairs of embodied emission flows examining consumption based inventories can be useful for understanding the impacts of final demand and international trade on agricultural ghg emissions and identifying appropriate mitigation potentials along global supply chains

redistributive politics with distortionary taxation abstract this paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments we present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of myerson r myerson incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems amer polit sci rev 87 1993 856 869 and lizzeri and persico a lizzeri n persico the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives amer econ rev 91 2001 225 239 two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes we solve for the case of both targetable and non targetable taxes we prove that there is an imperfect efficiency targetability trade off on the tax side politicians prefer targetable taxes over non targetable ones especially when the latter are less efficient yet targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non targetable taxes

money credit and wages in hyperinflation post world war i germany an important feature of the german hyperinflation is the way in which accelerating monetization of both government and private debt by the reichsbank fueled the inflation process the stimulus to private credit demand arising from more rapid adjustment of money wages over this period is often ignored however the present empirical results strongly support the importance of wage pressures in augmenting fiscal influences on nominal money growth during 1920 1923 our findings also suggest that wage claims provided the main conduit through which higher inflationary expectations were accommodated by faster rates of monetary expansion

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

suspiciously timed trade disputes abstract this paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes focusing on wto disputes filed by the united states during the 1995 2014 period we find that u s presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re election moreover u s trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states to explain these regularities we develop a theoretical model in which re election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity

pork barrel politics targetable policies and fiscal federalism this article utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific local projects to analyze the inefficiencies that arise under differing levels of targetability in both taxes transfers and local projects the ability to tactically target taxes transfers and or local projects leads political parties to engage in pandering to favored groups however in equilibrium we find that greater targetability in the set of available policies actually intensifies the competition between the political parties and so increases efficiency in the provision of local projects jel d72 h41

distributive politics with vote and turnout buying the objective of this paper is to model the incumbent s allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying persuasion and turnout buying mobilization the existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts this paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party a third option should be taken into account in fact the optimal allocation of resources rather than focusing on safe or swing districts should target opposition strongholds that is the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored the intuition for this result is simple since the incumbent does not know individual preferences he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts all voters in a given district look identical to him hence when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters who would have voted for him anyway

quo vadis mrio methodological data and institutional requirements for multi region input output analysis abstract in order to understand wider sustainability impacts of consumption and to successfully promote and implement sustainable consumption and production policies there is a need to capture the whole life cycle impact of products and services across international supply chains multi region input output mrio databases are a well described and suitable foundation for global sustainability analyses addressing a wide range of policy and research questions in this paper we reflect on the reasons for the recent boom in mrio compilation summarise the current state of development and discuss future options for mrio analysis we list in detail the requirements for efficient and effective mrio research and propose systemic and institutional changes we deliberately try to go beyond existing ambitions for mrio compilation and thus intend to stimulate discussion and to lay out the options for the future of mrio research

three object two bidder simultaneous auctions chopsticks and tetrahedra symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games the games all have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first price sealed bid auctions for identical objects information is complete and the bidders marginal valuations increase for the second object and then decrease for the third in all cases the support of the mixture that generates the equilibrium is two dimensional and it surrounds a three dimensional set of best responses this appears to be a previously unknown structure

beyond chopsticks symmetric equilibria in majority auction games majority auction games are simultaneous sealed bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction more than a half of the objects each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it symmetric equilibria having simple intuitive forms are shown to exist in first price second price and all pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large this contrasts with earlier results for the two bidder pure chopstick majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated

multi player race abstract we present a model of race with multiple players and study players effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium we show that in equilibrium once any two players win one battle each the remaining players do not exert any effort anymore this turns the continuation game into a two player race this is different than the results in previous two player models of race which report that all states of the game are reached with positive probabilities we also provide a set of comparative static results on the effects of the number of players and the victory threshold

sequential nonzero sum blotto allocating defensive resources prior to attack abstract the strategic allocation of resources across multiple fronts has long been studied in the context of blotto games in which two players simultaneously select their allocations however many allocation problems are sequential for example a state trying to defend against a terrorist attack generally allocates some or all of its resources before the attacker decides where to strike this paper studies the allocation problem confronting a defender who must decide how to distribute limited resources across multiple sites before an attacker chooses where to strike unlike many blotto games which only have very complicated mixed strategy equilibria the sequential nonzero sum blotto game always has a very simple pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium further the defender always plays the same pure strategy in any equilibrium and the attacker s equilibrium response is generically unique and entails no mixing the defender minmaxes the attacker in equilibrium even though the game is nonzero sum and the attacker strikes the site among its best replies that minimizes the defender s expected losses

the role of co2 embodiment in us china trade abstract this study examines the influence of us china trade on national and global emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the three basic questions are as follows 1 what amount of co2 emissions is avoided in the us by importing chinese goods 2 how much are co2 emissions in china increased as a result of the production of goods for export to the us and 3 what are the impacts of us china trade on global co2 emissions our initial findings reveal that during 1997 2003 1 us co2 emissions would have increased from 3 to 6 if the goods imported from china had been produced in the us 2 about 7 14 of china s current co2 emissions were a result of producing exports for us consumers and 3 us china trade has increased global co2 emissions by an estimated 720 million metric tons we suggest that the export of us technologies and expertise related to clean production and energy efficiency to china could be a win win strategy for both countries for reducing their trade imbalance and mitigating global co2 emissions improved international accounting methodologies for assigning responsibility for co2 emissions must be designed to account for the dynamic nature of international trade

a blotto game with incomplete information we consider a blotto game with incomplete information a pure strategy symmetric monotonic bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed

buying shares and or votes for corporate control we explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests our basic set up and the nature of the questions continue the work of grossman and hart 1980 harris and raviv 1988 and blair golbe and gerard 1989 we consider three cases with respect to the allowable price offers for shares and for votes when they can be traded separately unrestricted price offers quantity restricted price offers and price offers contingent on winning our main results are characterizations of the equilibria and of the circumstances under which vote buying is harmful we show that allowing votes to be traded separately of shares results in inefficiencies in all the cases we study similarly allowing quantity restricted offers is also harmful but allowing conditional offers is not in itself detrimental to efficiency the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the analysis of takeover games with atomless shareholders it provides a way of dealing with asymmetric equilibria that must be dealt with for a complete analysis and it proves existence of an equilibrium copyright 2012 oxford university press

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

hyperinflation the exchange rate and endogenous money post world war i germany revisited abstract we re examine the interaction of domestic and external factors in the german hyperinflation by extending frenkel s monetary model of the exchange rate to incorporate 1 endogeneity of the money supply with respect to government debt expected inflation and money wages 2 the direct impact of exchange rate depreciation on the domestic price level and 3 endogenous wage determination four equation estimates support each extension of the monetary model it appears that government deficit finance the collapse of the exchange rate and the monetary transmission of the wage price spiral were all crucial contributors to the price explosion

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press