a quantitative evaluation of payroll tax subsidies for low wage workers an equilibrium search approach abstract phelps phelps e 1994 low wage employment subsidies versus the welfare state american economic review 84 54 58 presented the case for a low wage subsidy policy since the mid 1990s france has experimented with this strategy this paper evaluates the effect of this policy on employment and also on output and welfare we construct an equilibrium search model incorporating wage posting and specific human capital investment where unemployment and the distribution of both wages and productivity are endogenous we estimate this model using french data numerical simulations show that the prevailing minimum wage allows a high production level to be reached by increasing training investment even though the optimal minimum wage is lower we show that payroll tax subsidies enhance welfare more than a reduction in the minimum wage when they are spread over a large range of wages in order to avoid specialization in low productivity jobs

an experimental examination of competitor based price matching guarantees we use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies our findings establish that when costs are symmetric price matching guarantees significantly increase market prices in markets with cost asymmetries guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference lesser use of guarantees combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior

price discrimination through offers to match price in this paper a firm discriminates between two classes of customer who have a different cost of information by coupling a list price with an offer to match the pr ice of any other shop if the list price elsewhere is lower the firm will be successful in discrimination the list price of each firm is increasing in the number of sellers and the total sales are decreasi ng in the number of sellers furthermore if sellers coordinate they discriminate more efficaciously and increase their profits by increa sing their total sales copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

an experimental and theoretical analysis of price matching refund policies abstract price matching refund policies or offers by firms to match competitor s prices are common in both consumer and industrial marketing much of the previous theoretical work in economics suggests that price matching refunds are associated with higher prices in contrast the trade press postulates that price matching policies are associated with lower prices given these inconsistent views regarding price matching policies the authors experimentally examine how consumers view and interpret such policies and then develop a model that incorporates these consumer interpretations as well as asymmetries across stores in the model the asymmetry across stores is the key to deriving the conditions under which a signaling equilibrium exists in the presence of price matching policies the critical point is that the competition reducing and price discrimination effects which seem to form the basis of most of the previous theoretical literature can be counteracted by the presence of differentiated firms

maximum likelihood estimation of search costs abstract in a recent paper hong and shum 2006 using price distributions to estimate search costs rand journal of economics 37 257 275 present a structural method to estimate search cost distributions we extend their approach to the case of oligopoly and present a new maximum likelihood method to estimate search costs we apply our method to a data set of online prices for different computer memory chips the estimates suggest that the consumer population can be roughly split into two groups which either have quite high or quite low search costs search frictions confer a significant amount of market power to the firms despite more than 20 firms operating in each of the markets we estimate price cost margins to be around 25 the paper also illustrates how the structural method can be employed to simulate the effects of the introduction of a sales tax

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

price matching in a model of equilibrium price dispersion some sellers announce openly to prospective buyers that they will match any competitor s lower price on similar products this practice is visible among many retailers of consumer durables such as tv sets stereo components cameras and personal computers in more covert and informal forms price matching is ubiquitous it exists whenever individual sellers of a product are known to be generally willing to lower their prices when confronted by prospective buyers who can demonstrate information of lower prices elsewhere attempts to demonstrate and verify such information usually constitute part of the haggling process one often wonders will prices consumers ultimately pay indeed be lower with such haggling will apparently aggressive price matching strategies result in lower or higher equilibrium prices this paper deals with an environment in which information is not perfect and buyers engage in costly sequential search it will be shown that with price matching prices ultimately charged to consumers are higher the crucial assumption here is that buyers marginal search cost increases with the number of searches already performed with this assumption the main idea driving our results is as follows in the presence of increasing marginal search cost price matching encourages search therefore there will be more prospective buyers who will have performed a larger number of searches their marginal search cost will be higher on the average thus firms will be able to take advantage of this and charge higher prices but why would price matching encourage search if marginal search cost is increasing the answer lies in that price matching implies costless recall in sequential search models with consumers facing a known price distribution and constant marginal search cost whether recall is costless or costly is immaterial for then consumers optimal strategy is a constant reservationprice strategy implying that prices rejected earlier will never be acceptable the desire to recall never arises so that it does not matter to the searcher whether recall is costly or costless in such an environment firms do not have the incentive to offer price matching but as rothschild 7 has cautioned us the two assumptions of costly and costless recall are not always interchangeable they are not when marginal search cost is increasing for then if a consumer having a price

on the competitive effects of price matching policies abstract this paper challenges the conventional wisdom that price matching policies lead to supracompetitive prices by reducing firms incentives to undercut rivals i argue that price matching and price beating policies are more appropriately viewed as a means of price discrimination and develop a model that demonstrates their use as such analysis of this model shows that in contrast to the results of the existing literature price matching and price beating may raise or lower equilibrium prices relative to the equilibrium in which firms may not adopt such policies

why do cooperatives emerge in a world dominated by corporations the diffusion of cooperatives in the u s bio ethanol industry 1978 2013 given the strong economic disincentives that exist why do cooperatives continue to emerge and why is it that in some communities these cooperatives are collocated with their commercial counterparts yet in others territorial partitioning occurs in this paper we develop a community ecology approach that integrates economic and sociological accounts of cooperatives in an attempt to reconcile these contradictory observations using a detailed panel data set for the county level founding process of cooperatives in the u s ethanol industry from 1978 to 2013 consistent with rational economic arguments we find that the founding rate of cooperatives decreases in the presence of high local corporate ethanol production capacity however this negative competitive interdependence is attenuated in local communities where 1 corporations represent a potential threat to the autonomy of local farmers 2 there is a generally anti corporate climate and 3 there is a well established organizational infrastructure supporting a cooperative ideology consistent with sociological theories that emphasize the mobilizing force of ideology these local conditions spur and facilitate collective action among farmers to establish cooperatives in response to the local diffusion of corporations we show further that the diffusion of plants owned by big business oil and agribusiness in communities characterized by a general anticorporate climate especially promotes greater ideological contestation and the mobilization of resources to form cooperatives

price matching guarantees are price matching guarantees anticompetitive we examine the incentives for price matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly the conventional explanation of price matching as facilitating cartel pricing finds some theoretical support but our model provides an additional explanation a price matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed consumers that a firm is low priced the credibility of the signal is assured by the behavior of informed consumers we contrast the testable implications of our model with those arising from two theories of price matching as anticompetitive and show that available evidence supports the signalling theory

informative advertising and product match abstract this paper studies informative advertising in a variety of market structures for which some consumers are informed about two differentiated products while other consumers are uninformed we characterize a unique symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in advertising and pricing and analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium remarkably total surplus is non monotonic in advertising in a duopoly market the equilibrium level of advertising may be more or less than socially optimal we also study the effect of a trade association and compare these results with the first best solution and a multiproduct monopolist

price match announcements in a consumer search duopoly using a model of sequential search we show that announcements to price match raise prices by altering consumer search behavior first price matching diminishes firms incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs second for consumers with positive search costs price matching lowers the marginal benefit of search inducing them to accept higher prices finally price matching can lead to asymmetric equilibria where one firm runs fewer sales and both firms tend to offer smaller discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium price increases grow in the proportion of consumers who invoke price matching guarantees and in the level of equilibrium asymmetry

unemployment human capital depreciation and unemployment insurance policy summary this paper presents a structural estimation of a life cycle model with unemployment risk the model allows for human capital depreciation during unemployment it is estimated using german and us household level data the data suggest that the adverse impact of unemployment on individual productivity is important in both countries but quantitatively more relevant in germany moreover simulations show that the combination of skill depreciation with the generous unemployment insurance system that was in place in germany until recently is a key factor in explaining the differences in labour market performance between these countries copyright 2012 john wiley sons ltd

advertising and consumer search in a duopoly model we consider a duopoly in a homogenous goods market where part of the consumers are ex ante uninformed about prices information can come through two different channels advertising and sequential consumer search we arrive at the following results first there is no monotone relationship between prices and the degree of advertising second advertising and search are substitutes for a large range of parameters third when the cost of either search or advertising vanishes the competitive outcome arises finally both expected advertised and non advertised prices are non monotonic in search cost one of the implications is that firms actually may benefit from consumers having low rather than high search costs

consumer search with asymmetric price sampling we explore asymmetries in the way consumers sample prices in a simple sequential search framework in equilibrium the price distribution of a firm catering to more local consumers first order stochastically dominates that of its rival prices rise in the degree of asymmetry

oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search n identical stores compete by choosing prices for a homogeneous good with constant marginal costs consumers search sequentially with perfect recall for the lowest price one class of consumers called shoppers have zero search costs while all other consumers have a positive search cost c there is a unique symmetric nash equilibrium price distribution with the property that it changes smoothly from marginal cost pricing when all consumers are shoppers and or c 0 and monopoly pricing when no consumers are shoppers remarkably as the number of stores increases the nash equilibrium becomes more monopolistic copyright 1989 by american economic association

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

on the use of low price guarantees to discourage price cutting abstract this paper formulates a novel test to assess whether and to what extent firms might be using low price guarantees to discourage their rivals from cutting prices the test is based on a comparison of paired observations of advertised prices that are set by competing firms at the same point in time on similar items where one price is set by a firm that has a low price guarantee and the other by a firm that does not have a low price guarantee using data on retail tire prices we find that the majority of paired observations involving firms that have price matching guarantees are consistent with what one would expect if firms were using them to discourage price cutting whereas the majority of paired observations involving firms that have price beating guarantees are not this suggests that price matching and price beating guarantees may be serving different purposes the evidence also suggests that guarantees that apply to advertised prices only may be serving different purposes than guarantees that apply to both advertised and selling prices

different selling strategies in bertrand oligopoly abstract i analyse a bertrand oligopoly game where firms can choose between selling strategies i price announcements ii price announcements and offers to price match i establish the set of nash equilibria and show that only the monopoly price nash equilibrium satisfies iterative dominance

matching own prices rivals prices or both many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals and extend their promise to include their own future prices that is many retailers combine elements of both price matching guarantees and retroactive most favored customer clauses this is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each practice independently has the potential to facilitate supracompetitive prices and thus one might think the two practices are substitutes in this paper we show that price matching guarantees and most favored customer clauses complement each other when offered unilaterally by a single firm and can lead to higher prices than either one could have facilitated by itself

corn ethanol plant investment a real options case study the objective of this article is to describe an investment decision using net present value and real options a case study describes the data and the corn ethanol industry so students can study a cooperative s decision of whether or not to invest in a new corn ethanol plant in 2015 nebraska an extensive set of information accompanies this case including spreadsheets with data computer software code lesson plans for teaching real options and net present value and an extensive teaching note

informative price advertising in a sequential search model the purpose of this paper is to study the role and implications of price advertising when shopping trips are costly to consumers to do so we introduce advertising into an optimal sequential search model information about prices is both gathered by consumers and disseminated by firms consumers search sequentially and stores advertise with various intensity when it is in their interest to do so our model has a unique equilibrium exhibiting priee dispersion the model generates predictions about the shape of the price distribution and firms advertising behavior we explore the effects of entry and find that when initial advertising costs at zero level of effort are precisely zero entry drives the equilibrium to the perfectly competitive outcome however when initial marginal advertising costs are positive entry drives prices higher and while the informed consumers almost surely locate competitive prices welfare does not necessarily increase finally we compare the effectiveness of the two informational channels when advertising costs shrink prices become competitive however when search costs shrink prices remain bounded above marginal production costs

price matching guarantees as a direct signal of low prices if consumers believe that stores offering price matching guarantees pmgs charge low prices high search cost consumers will purchase from pmg stores this leads pmg stores demand to be less pric

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

price matching guarantees and consumer search abstract this paper examines the effect of price matching guarantees pmgs on market outcomes in a sequential search model pmgs are simultaneously chosen with prices and some consumers shoppers know the firms decisions before buying while others non shoppers enter a shop before observing the price and whether or not the firm has a pmg in such an environment pmgs increase the value of buying the good and therefore increase consumers reservation prices this increase is so large that even after accounting for the possible execution of pmgs firms profits are larger in an equilibrium where pmgs are offered than in an equilibrium without pmgs we also consider the incentives of firms to choose pmgs and show that an equilibrium where all firms offer pmgs does not exist because of a free riding problem

truly costly sequential search and oligopolistic pricing we modify the paper of stahl 1989 stahl d o 1989 oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search american economic review 79 700 12 by relaxing the assumption that consumers obtain the first price quotation for free when all price quotations are costly to obtain the unique symmetric equilibrium need not involve full consumer participation the region of parameters for which non shoppers do not fully participate in the market becomes larger as the number of shoppers decreases and or the number of firms increases the comparative statics properties of this new type of equilibrium are interesting in particular expected price increases as search cost decreases and is constant in the number of shoppers and in the number of firms welfare falls as firms enter the market we show that monopoly pricing never obtains with truly costly search d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

ideological purity vs hybridization trade off when do islamic banks hire managers from conventional banking organizations that compete in institutional environments in which oppositional logics compete for dominance face a risk return trade off between maintaining ideological purity versus pragmatism by borrowing template elements from the rival ideology deviating from ideological purity might improve a firm s competitive strength however at the same time it might also undermine its very identity and legitimacy although such decisions are of strategic importance research about why how and where these trade offs are made is still limited we develop the argument that organizations will be more likely to deviate from ideological purity when the potential return of borrowing from the oppositional template exceeds the perceived risk of doing so the more organizations aspire to be ideologically pure the more they are constrained by the moral codes that define the category and therefore the higher the risk associated with deviating from purity however given the potential benefits of pragmatism pure or

a model of duopoly and meeting or beating competition this paper analyzes the use of meeting and beating competition clauses in duopoly markets a differentiated products price setting model is considered in which firms have the option of precommitting themselves to contracts which bind their own price to be some prespecified function of their competitor s price the analysis establishes conditions under which these contracts facilitate oligopoly coordination under which they result in price discrimination and under which they can actually be procompetitive

oppositional logics and the antecedents of hybridization a country level study of the diffusion of islamic banking windows 1975 2017 little is known about when and where hybrid organizations diffuse we argue that neo institutional perspectives which stress the constraining role of market categories and institutional logics ha

a consumer perspective on price matching refund policies effect on price perceptions and search behavior although price matching refund policies are common in many retail environments the impact of such policies on consumers has largely been ignored this article reports the results of three studies that examine price matching policies from a consumer perspective study 1 shows that consumers perceive price matching policies as signals of low store prices and that the presence of a refund increases the likelihood of discontinuing price search contrary to the predictions based on signaling theory in information economics studies 2 and 3 show that when search costs are low the number of stores searched increases in the presence versus absence of a price matching policy when search costs are high consumers appear to accept the price matching signal at face value and search less in the presence of a refund the article concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of the findings and suggesting directions for future research

research note consumer heterogeneity and competitive price matching guarantees price matching guarantees are widely used in consumer and industrial markets previous studies argue that they are a marketing tactic that facilitates implicit price collusion this is because once a store adopts this marketing tactic its rivals can no longer steal its customers by undercutting its price and hence they have little incentive to initiate price cuts while a store with price matching guarantees has no fear of losing customers to rivals price cuts it has every incentive to raise its own price to charge a higher price to its loyal consumers a growing body of legal literature uses this argument today to justify calls for antitrust actions against stores employing this marketing tactic however this theoretical conclusion baffles practitioners and industry experts in practice sellers typically embrace this marketing tactic in response to heavier competition and a growing bargain consciousness among shoppers the introduction of price matching guarantees by a store is frequently interpreted by industry observers as the initiation of a price war rather than a signal of price collusion this assertion is supported in many instances by the fact that stores that introduce price matching guarantees also roll back their prices and typically suffer subsequent loss of profits most ironically the favorite examples used by researchers to illustrate how price matching guarantees can enforce price collusion crazy eddie and nobody beats the wiz have subsequently either gone bankrupt or filed for federal bankruptcy protection in this study we show that price matching guarantees can indeed facilitate competition the expected prices and profits can be strictly lower when all stores adopt price matching guarantees than when they are not allowed to this is because the adoption of price matching guarantees generates not only a competition dampening effect which has been recognized in the literature but also a competition enhancing effect this latter effect comes from the fact that price matching guarantees encourage price search by those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are mindful of saving opportunities these consumers will have incentives to obtain the rival store s price when their favorite store offers price matching guarantees to avail themselves of the lowest possible price at their favorite store as a result price matching guarantees reduce the number of purchases at the store from those consumers who would have paid the full price and thus prompt a store to price more aggressively to bid for more incremental sales this competition enhancing effect can more than offset the competition dampening effect in markets where consumers differ in their price search costs and store loyalty thus our study casts doubt on the advisability of blanket prohibition on price matching guarantees our argument relies only on consumer segmentation and on the phenomenon of periodic sales both of which are common in retail markets we arrive at our conclusion by incorporating bargain shoppers and opportunistic loyals into the standard sales promotion models in contrast the past literature on price matching guarantees ignores the ubiquitous phenomenon of sales in retail markets and overlooks those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are alert to saving opportunities as a result it is troubled by two awkward conclusions on the one hand price matching guarantees simply remove rivals incentives to undercut in price and hence also their incentives to run sales this implies that the adoption of price matching guarantees in a market will eliminate the phenomenon of sales which is obviously counterfactual on the other hand in equilibrium no consumer actually invokes price matching guarantees as each player has incentives to close any price gap in the market this is obviously false based on our casual observations and our conversations with store managers theoretical research on the subject thus far has been overwhelmingly one sided and empirical or experimental studies are conspicuously lacking we hope that our conclusion will spark further research in both directions a healthy debate will broaden our perspective on an issue of great importance in formulating public policies and in managerial decision making

improving incentives in unemployment insurance a review of recent research abstract this paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved we are particularly concerned with three instruments i e the duration of benefit payments or more generally the time sequencing of benefits monitoring in conjunction with sanctions and workfare our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid a growing number of empirical studies including randomized experiments are in line with this conclusion