testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

empirical implications of alternative models of firm dynamics abstract this paper considers two models of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms idiosyncratic or firm specific sources of uncertainty and discrete outcomes exit and or entry both the characteristics of firm level panel data sets and the nature of the questions we characteristically ask of them imply that models with these features are likely to underlie most detailed empirical work on microdata sets the models we consider are a bayesian learning model due to jovanovic 20 and a model of research and exploration due to ericson and pakes 11 the paper provides a simple set of empirical procedures to help determine which if either of these two models might be appropriate for alternative data sets we conclude by checking for the implications of the two models on an eight year panel of wisconsin firms the results indicate that one model is consistent with the data on manufacturing firms while the other is consistent with the data on retail trade journal of economic literature classification numbers c52 l60 l80

asset pricing and asymmetric reasoning we present a theory and experimental evidence on pricing and portfolio choices under asymmetric reasoning we show that under asymmetric reasoning prices do not reflect all types of reasoning some agents who observe prices that cannot be reconciled with their reasoning switch from perceiving the environment as risky to perceiving it as ambiguous if they are ambiguity averse these agents become price insensitive results from an experiment show that consistent with the theory i without aggregate risk mispricing decreases as the fraction of price sensitive agents increases and ii with aggregate risk price insensitive agents trade to more balanced portfolios

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

short sale constraints divergence of opinion and asset values evidence from the laboratory the overvaluation hypothesis miller 1977 predicts that a stocks are overvalued when there are short selling restrictions and that b the overvaluation is increasing in the degree of divergence of opinion we design an experiment that allows us to test these predictions in the laboratory our results support the hypothesis that prices are higher in the presence of short selling constraints the overvaluation does not depend on the degree of divergence of opinion

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

relating inertia and experience in technology markets an analysis of households personal computer choices this article empirically analyses how households pc purchasing behaviours change with market experience we find that households generally exhibit inertia in their pc purchases the level of inertia is increasing as a function of experience on the pc market and for households switching brands the likelihood of buying a lesser known brand increases with experience regardless of the brand of the previous purchase these findings are consistent with the predictions of a simple learning model and extend our understanding of how market experience affects purchasing behaviour to an important technology product with implications that may apply to other similar products

cast demographics unobserved segments and heterogeneous switching costs in a television viewing choice model abstract an accurate television viewing choice model is an important tool for television executives and advertisers the authors present a new viewing choice model which differs from the traditional rust alpert model in three ways 1 it introduces a new show characteristic the demographic characteristics of a show s cast 2 it allows the preferences over the traditional show categories to be a function of both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and 3 it allows the cost of switching among the viewing alternatives to vary across show types and individual characteristics cross validated predictive testing shows that this model fits the data better than the rust alpert model does furthermore the authors demonstrate that network executives can improve ratings by using this model the authors predict that by following their scheduling strategies in particular by broadcasting comedies after 10 00 p m abc cbs and nbc could have increased their average ratings by 12 9 7 5

information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders this paper studies information aggregation in dynamic markets with a finite number of partially informed strategic traders it shows that for a broad class of securities information in such markets always gets aggregated trading takes place in a bounded time interval and in every equilibrium as time approaches the end of the interval the market price of a separable security converges in probability to its expected value conditional on the traders pooled information if the security is non separable then there exists a common prior over the states of the world and an equilibrium such that information does not get aggregated the class of separable securities includes among others arrow debreu securities whose value is 1 in one state of the world and 0 in all others and additive securities whose value can be interpreted as the sum of traders signals

dynamic price competition in auto insurance brokerage we analyze brazilian data on auto insurance and document that a about 20 of policies are sold without brokerage commission b over 40 are sold at the highest fee allowed and c the remaining contracts are associated with a spread out distribution of fees static models cannot rationalize these findings we develop a dynamic model of price competition with search and switching costs that reproduces them we use the equilibrium structure to estimate the model parameters and infer the brokers expected earnings the frequency that insurees switch brokers and the counterfactual effects of a price ceiling policy

affecting policy by manipulating prediction markets experimental evidence abstract documented results indicate prediction markets effectively aggregate information and form accurate predictions this has led to a proliferation of markets predicting everything from the results of elections to a company s sales to movie box office receipts recent research suggests prediction markets are robust to manipulation attacks and resulting market outcomes improve forecast accuracy however we present evidence from the lab indicating that single minded well funded manipulators can in fact destroy a prediction market s ability to aggregate informative prices and mislead those who are making forecasts based upon market predictions however we find that manipulators primarily influence market trades meaning outstanding bids and asks remain informative

rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets the idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization hurwicz 1972 and rational expectations lucas 1972 we report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations in two of the three series one in which participants trade a complete set of arrow debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium

judgemental overconfidence self monitoring and trading performance in an experimental financial market we measure the degree of overconfidence in judgment in the form of miscalibration i e the tendency to overestimate the precision of one s information and self monitoring a form of attentiveness to social cues of 245 participants and also observe their behaviour in an experimental financial market under asymmetric information miscalibrated traders underestimating the conditional uncertainty about the asset value are expected to be especially vulnerable to the winner s curse high self monitors are expected to behave strategically and achieve superior results our empirical results show that miscalibration reduces and self monitoring enhances trading performance the effect of the psychological variables is strong for men but non existent for women

inertia and variety seeking in a model of brand purchase timing previous research on state dependence indicates that a brand s purchase probabilities vary over time and depend on the levels of inertia and variety seeking and on the identity of the previously purchased brand brand choice probabilities obtained from models such as the logit and the probit are however fixed over time conditional on the previous brand purchased and on the levels of marketing variables consequently state dependence has largely been studied as a time invariant phenomenon in brand choice models with the levels of inertia and variety seeking assumed to be constant over time to account for the time varying nature of state dependence would require a model in which brand switching probabilities depend upon interpurchase times one modeling framework that can account for this dependence is based on the hazard function approach the proposed approach works as follows all other factors being equal an inertial household purchasing a brand on a particular occasion is most likely to repurchase that brand on the next occasion if the household switches it will be to a brand located perceptually close in attribute space to the previously purchased brand in other words an inertial household has the highest switching hazard for the same origin and destination brands with a progressively lower hazard rate for brands perceptually located farther and farther away from the origin brand the amount by which the hazard is lowered depends upon the perceptual distance and the inertia level of the household on the other hand if the household is variety seeking the most likely brand purchased would be a brand located farthest away from the previously purchased brand in attribute space in other words the hazard rate of repurchase is the lowest with the rate increasing with the distance of the destination brand from the origin brand and the level of that household s variety seeking tendency the effects of inertia and variety seeking are therefore incorporated at the attribute level into a brand purchase timing model in doing so we attempt to provide greater insight into the nature of state dependence in models of purchase timing our model and estimation procedure will enable us to distinguish between households that are inertial and those that are variety prone in addition to accounting for state dependence the model also accounts for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity among households in their brand preferences and in their sensitivities to marketing activities a majority of studies in marketing using the hazard function approach to investigate purchase timing have not accounted for heterogeneity in marketing mix effects the study integrates recent methods that incorporate the effects of inertia and variety seeking in brand choice models with a semi markov model of purchase timing and brand switching the proposed model enables us to 1 infer market structure via a perceptual map for the sample households and 2 investigate implications for the introduction of a line extension we provide empirical applications of the proposed method using three different household level scanner panel data sets we find that differing levels of inertia and variety seeking characterize the three data sets the findings are consistent with prior beliefs regarding these categories in addition our results indicate that the nature of interbrand purchase timing behavior depends upon the extent of inertia or variety seeking in the data we are also able to characterize the structure of the three product markets studied this provides implications for interbrand rivalry in the market further we demonstrate how the model and results can be used to predict the location of a line extension in the perceptual space of households finally we obtain implications for the timing of brand promotions

the informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets abstract when can policy makers use policy relevant information from financial market prices and how does policy affect price informativeness i analyze a novel setting with noise where a policy maker tries to infer information about a state variable from prices to improve policy decisions and policy in turn affects asset values i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of information revelation in equilibrium which might not be possible if the policy reaction to prices punishes traders for revealing their information if the policy maker is uninformed then policy objectives do not change price informativeness but they do if the policy maker has independent information about the state i also analyze policy maker transparency and find that policy makers with objectives having a large impact on asset values should publish their information before trading to make prices more informative in other cases intransparency can be optimal

underreaction to fundamental information and asymmetry in mispricing between bullish and bearish markets an experimental study abstract in contrast to existing literature we implement experimental asset markets with fluctuating fundamental values following a stochastic process therefore we can measure traders behavior in both bullish and bearish markets we observe underreaction of price changes to changes in fundamental value which induces overvaluation in bearish and undervaluation in bullish markets we also find an asymmetry between markets with bullish fundamental values and those with bearish ones as the former markets show a higher degree of informational efficiency the reason for the observed underreaction lies in the relatively large volatility of the underlying fundamental value process

bubbles and financial professionals the efficiency of financial markets and their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates yet little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency we run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502 students we find that professional markets with bubble drivers capital inflows or high initial capital supply are susceptible to bubbles although they are more efficient than student markets in mixed markets with students bubbles also occur but professionals act as price stabilizers we show that heterogeneous price beliefs drive overpricing especially in bubble prone market environments

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

using market information in prudential bank supervision a review of the u s empirical evidence in principle market and government supervision provide alternative devices for controlling governing any type of corporation most national governments have instituted nonmarket regulatory mechanisms for banking firms on the grounds that market based mechanisms do not adequately discipline banks but what evidence supports this assessment why must governments assure bank solvency but not the solvency of other firms government oversight naturally displaces private efforts to evaluate and control financial firms moreover if the banking business changes over time as it assuredly has in the past decade or two the best combination of government and private supervision may change concurrently this paper reviews and evaluates the growing empirical literature on private investors abilities to assess the financial condition of banking firms the evidence supports the proposition that market investors and analysts could reasonably provide a greater proportion of corporate governance services for large traded u s financial firms

identifying the hand of past distinguishing state dependence from heterogeneity a basic problem in social science is to ascertain the importance of initial endowments on subsequent outcomes of a dynamic process interest in this topic centers on two distinct issues a do initial endowments have a temporally persistent effect on outcomes i e is there heterogeneity b are the effects of initial endowments attenuated or accentuated by subsequent experiences of the process being studied or by related processes i e is there state dependence these two questions show up in a variety of contexts 1 the importance of family background on a person s subsequent education and earnings is a hotly debated topic do market or nonmarket mechanisms reinforce or diminish initial endowments 2 the incidence of criminal activity is concentrated among a small population of repeated offenders are certain persons prone to criminality or does crime breed crime 3 are persons who experience unemployment more likely to experience future unemployment due to loss of work experience or market stigma 4 does early entry into an industry confer an advantage of incumbency or does it merely proxy the basic managerial and innovative ability of early entrants many formal models of state dependent processes or processes with persistent effects of initial conditions have been formulated invariance of steady states to initial endowments was viewed as a desirable feature of an economic model in the 1960 s and 1970 s path dependent synergism and nonergodicity are fashionable features of models today is the choice between models with long run dependence on initial conditions and those without solely a matter of intellectual esthetics can data discriminate between these two classes of models how many economically extraneous statistical regularity conditions have to be imposed in order to distinguish between these models how many and what kind of maintained assumptions are required in order to let the data speak on these important questions in this paper i focus on one nonergodic model that receives much attention in the literature the model of duration dependence and heterogeneity discussed by herbert silcock 1954 and also examined by tony lancaster 1979 chris elbers and geert ridder 1982 myself and burton singer 1984 and myself and bo honore 1989

information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering summarizing and aggregating diffuse information by governments and businesses alike critics worry that these markets are susceptible to price manipulation by agents who wish to distort decision making we study the effect of manipulators on an experimental market we find that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy subjects without manipulation incentives compensate for the bias in offers from manipulators by setting a different threshold at which they are willing to accept trades

paying attention or paying too much in medicare part d we study whether people became less likely to switch medicare prescription drug plans pdps due to more options and more time in part d panel data for a random 20 percent sample of enrollees from 2006 2010 show that 50 percent were not in their original pdps by 2010 individuals switched pdps in response to higher costs of their status quo plans saving them money contrary to choice overload larger choice sets increased switching unless the additional plans were relatively expensive neither switching overall nor responsiveness to costs declined over time and above minimum spending in 2010 remained below the 2006 and 2007 levels

tenure dependence in consumer firm relationships an empirical analysis of consumer departures from automobile insurance firms a typical pattern in markets featuring long term consumer firm relationships is for departure probabilities to decline with tenure a crucial question is whether this actually implies increasing consumer preference for firms if so firms should actively try to convince consumers to remain through the early periods of the relationship and should enter new markets quickly however the pattern can also be explained by selection on unobserved heterogeneity the challenge is to use the data available in these markets generally details on the consumers of one firm to distinguish between these explanations i rely on individual price histories in auto insurance findings include an economically relevant level of both relationship effects and heterogeneity but a much more important role for heterogeneity

how much information is incorporated in financial asset prices experimental evidence we propose a new estimation method and use experimental data from multiple double auction experiments in the literature to directly estimate how much information is incorporated in financial market prices we find that public information is almost completely reflected in prices but that surprisingly little private information less than 50 is incorporated in prices our estimates therefore suggest that while semi strong informational efficiency is consistent with the data financial market prices may be very far from strong form efficiency we compare our estimates with beliefs of economists surveyed at the econometric society meetings and find that economists and finance researchers alike expect market prices to reflect considerably more private information than what we estimated

modeling heterogeneity and state dependence in consumer choice behavior in frequently purchased consumer goods markets consumer brand choices exhibit substantial persistence across purchase occasions in this article i estimate a choice model that admits of both heterogeneity in preferences and true state dependence as sources of this persistence using nielsen scanner data on ketchup i find evidence for true state dependence in the choice process even after controlling for a rich heterogeneity structure simulation of the model indicates that the long term effect of a promotion induced purchase on future purchase probabilities is positive but small

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

inflation and central bank independence conventional wisdom redux until recently there existed a broad consensus that an important institution for combating inflation is a central bank insulated from political influence this conventional wisdom has been challenged by among others campillo and miron 1997 who present evidence purporting to show that if an inflation regression equation is expanded to include not only their proxy for central bank independence cbi but other regressors as well then the negative correlation between inflation and cbi vanishes the present paper argues that allegations of the demise of this nexus should not be accepted uncritically this paper which reports the results of an analysis of covariance structures finds a strong negative relationship between inflation and cbi

determinants of investor expectations and satisfaction a study with financial professionals abstract we investigate determinants of price expectations and satisfaction levels of financial professionals and students in experiments with 150 professionals and 576 students we systematically vary price paths according to the final return positive or negative and the way in which the final return is achieved upswing followed by downswing or vice versa professionals show the most optimistic price expectations and are most satisfied if assets fall in price first and then recover in addition professionals price expectations are highest after positive returns among students qualitatively similar patterns emerge but professionals price expectations are less prone to framing effects

services as experience goods an empirical examination of consumer learning in automobile insurance accurate is information at initial purchase how rapidly do consumers learn from product experiences and how much impact does learning have on purchase decisions i answer these questions for the case of automobile insurance using a panel of 18 595 consumers from one firm my principal findings are patterns of consumer departures following claims point to learning consumers enter the firm overly optimistic about its quality and are generally disappointed by experience and the impact of learning is mitigated by the slow arrival of claims and the development of lock in jel d12 d83 g22 l15

corporate prediction markets evidence from google ford and firm x despite the popularity of prediction markets among economists businesses and policymakers have been slow to adopt them in decision making most studies of prediction markets outside the lab are from public markets with large trading populations corporate prediction markets face additional issues such as thinness weak incentives limited entry and the potential for traders with biases or ulterior motives raising questions about how well these markets will perform we examine data from prediction markets run by google ford motor company and an anonymous basic materials conglomerate firm x despite theoretically adverse conditions we find these markets are relatively efficient and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25 reduction in mean squared error the most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at google the inefficiencies that do exist generally become smaller over time more experienced traders and those with higher past performance trade against the identified inefficiencies suggesting that the markets efficiency improves because traders gain experience and less skilled traders exit the market

unemployment dynamics and duration dependence a major issue in the analysis of unemployment durations concerns distinguishing genuine duration dependence of the exit rate out of unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity we present a method for the nonparametric estimation of both phenomena designed to be applicable to time series data on aggregate outflows from different duration classes the model explicitly takes into account that individual exit rates are affected by the business cycle and by seasonal effects the method is applied to u s data we find diverging duration effects among black and white individuals however except for white males duration dependence is dominated by unobserved heterogeneity

prediction markets in the laboratory prediction markets are becoming an ever more popular method for aggregating disparate information companies use prediction markets to forecast sales release dates and other internal activities recently several well known economists have argued that government ought to eliminate impediments to unleashing the power of prediction markets broadly this survey paper looks at the laboratory experiments which provide part of the scientific justification for using prediction markets these systems work because people who have private knowledge can use this insider information in the market but doing so causes the price to reflect these data starting with early experiments that show markets can under certain circumstances aggregate information we discuss the robustness of prediction markets to various design features we also discuss places where performance does not match rhetoric and briefly look at experimental comparisons of alternative information aggregating institutions another issue consistently raised regarding the implementation of prediction markets is the degree to which traders can manipulate prices and thus the information gleaned by following a series of experiments on manipulation we present the circumstances that are and are not sufficient for manipulation attempts to be successful finally we offer suggestions on where we believe future experiments are needed in this area

do prediction markets produce well calibrated probability forecasts this article presents new theoretical and empirical evidence on the forecasting ability of prediction markets we develop a model that predicts that the time until expiration of a prediction market should negatively affect the accuracy of prices as a forecasting tool in the direction of a favourite longshot bias that is high likelihood events are underpriced and low likelihood events are over priced we confirm this result using a large data set of prediction market transaction prices prediction markets are reasonably well calibrated when time to expiration is relatively short but prices are significantly biased for events farther in the future when time value of money is considered the miscalibration can be exploited to earn excess returns only when the trader has a relatively low discount rate