attention misallocation social welfare and policy implications we examine how agents allocate attention between private and public signals to reduce the uncertainty about observation noises when coordination is an important concern in this setting the attention allocation may not be monotone in endowed attention capacity agents may decrease their attention on or even ignore the more accurate signal when capacity increases as a result social welfare may decrease when they have more attention to process information and it can be even higher when agents possess a finite amount of capacity than when they have an infinite amount of capacity we derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge and study the implications of equilibrium multiplicity for macroeconomic policies

the strategic implications of scale in choice based conjoint analysis choice based conjoint cbc studies have begun to rely on simulators to forecast equilibrium prices for pricing strategic product positioning and patent copyright valuations whereas cbc research

political motivations and electoral competition equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence we study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of nash equilibria of a classical one dimensional majority rule election game with two candidates who might be interested in power as well as in ideology but not necessarily in the same way apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two sided policy differentiation outcome the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations called one sided and probabilistic policy differentiation respectively our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power resp ideology and the uncertainty about voters preferences the theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a series of laboratory experiments as we observe convergence to the nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the individual levels in all treatments and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory

pollution markets with imperfectly observed emissions i study the advantages of pollution permit markets over uniform emission or technology standards when the regulator has incomplete information on firms emissions and costs of production and abatement e g air pollution in large cities because the regulator observes only each firm s abatement technology but neither its emissions nor its output there are cases in which standards can lead to lower emissions and hence welfare dominate permits if permits are optimally combined with standards in many cases this hybrid policy converges to the permits alone policy but almost never to the standards alone policy

boundedly rational nash equilibrium a probabilistic choice approach we propose an equilibrium for n person finite games based on bounded rationality using the legit model of discrete choice theory at equilibrium each player uses appropriate choice probabilities given those used by the others rationality is parameterized on a continuum from complete rationality to uniform random choice results on the existence of equilibrium and on convergence to nash as rationality becomes perfect are similar to results due to mckelvey and palfrey we identify conditions such that for a given rationality parameter range the path of choices over time when the players use fictitious play converges to equilibrium c 1997 academic press

the principle of minimum differentiation revisited return of the median voter we study a linear location model hotelling 1929 in which n with n 2 boundedly rational players follow noisy myopic best reply behavior we show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center re establishing the principle of minimum differentiation that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses thus our analysis of the best response dynamics shows that when considering market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

spatial heterogeneity contract design and the efficiency of carbon sequestration policies for agriculture abstract in this paper we develop methods to investigate the efficiency of alternative contracts for carbon c sequestration in cropland soils taking into account the spatial heterogeneity of agricultural production systems and the costs of implementing more efficient contracts we describe contracts being proposed for implementation in the united states and other countries that would pay farmers for adoption of specified practices per hectare contracts we also describe more efficient contracts that would pay farmers per tonne of soil c sequestered and we show how to estimate the costs of implementing these more efficient contracts in a case study of a major agricultural region in the united states we confirm that the relative inefficiency of per hectare contracts varies spatially and increases with the degree of spatial heterogeneity the results also show that per hectare contracts are as much as five times more costly than per tonne contracts a degree of inefficiency similar to that found in assessments of command and control industrial emissions regulations measurement costs to implement the per tonne contracts are found to be positively related to spatial heterogeneity but are estimated to be at least an order of magnitude smaller than the efficiency losses of the per hectare contract for reasonable error levels this finding implies that contracting parties could afford to bear a significant cost to implement per tonne contracts and achieve a lower total cost than would be possible with the less efficient per hectare contracts

existence and computation of mixed strategy nash equilibrium for 3 firms location problem location problems of firms on a closed interval were introduced by hotelling 3 and later investigated by eaton lipsey 2 firms sell a homogeneous product at a fixed price customers distributed along the interval buy one unit each from the firm nearest to them and firms aim to maximize the number of their customers it is well known that where the customers are evenly distributed along the interval and the number of firms is other than 3 the location problem has a pure strategy nash equilibrium see 2 the case of 3 firms is peculiar in that no pure strategy nash equilibrium exists for in any situation one of the extreme firms not located between the other two can increase its revenue by either moving towards or away from the other two firms the existence of mixed strategies is not obvious because the payoff functions are discontinuous whenever two or more firms are located at the same point in a recent paper dasgupta and maskin 1 investigate a class of games all derived from economic problems and all with some discontinuities in their payoff functions they demonstrate that the discontinuities in the payoff functions do not prevent the existence of mixed strategies nash equilibria in the games investigated in particular location problems of the type described earlier have such weak discontinuities and hence possess a mixed strategy nash equilibrium although their proof is constructive offering a method of approaching these equilibria as a limit of equilibria of finite games the equations involved very quickly become unmanageable in this note we compute a mixed strategy nash equilibrium for the 3 firms location problem let the customers be evenly distributed along 0 1 then a mixed strategy is a probability measure over 0 1 the symmetry of the problem suggests that the solution will be doubly symmetric in that all firms choose the same mixed strategy and that this strategy is symmetric around symmetric locations are given the same probabilities dasgupta and maskin confine their analysis to doubly symmetric solutions and prove that the strategies in any doubly symmetric equilibrium are atomless given the symmetric nature of the game and following the analysis of dasgupta and maskin we shall confine ourselves here to such doubly sym

hotelling s spatial competition as a model of sales abstract hotelling s spatial competition model is used to explain the existence of sales it is shown that 1 an equilibrium in randomized strategies exists when a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist 2 with more dissimilarity among brands prices are chosen from a wider interval

a note on best response dynamics we investigate the relationship between the continuous time best response dynamic its perturbed version and evolutionary dynamics in relation to mixed strategy equilibria we find that as the level of noise approaches zero the perturbed best response dynamic has the same qualitative properties as a broad class of evolutionary dynamics that is stability properties of equilibria are robust across learning dynamics of quite different origins and motivations journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d83

the east end the west end and king s cross on clustering in the four player hotelling game nicolaas j vriend i introduction despite the popularity of simple location models in industrial economics and voting theory in the tradition following hotelling 1929 and despite the recent rise of the experimental method in economics there have been only few experimental tests of such models brown kruse et al 1993 and brown kruse and schenk 1999 study models with elastic demand while collins and sherstyuk 2000 focus on the simpler case which we address too where demand is inelastic collins and sherstyuk implement a model with three agents who choose locations on a line segment with a uniform density of consumers who due to the assumption of inelastic demand can also be seen as voters with one vote each it is well known that this game has no pure strategy equilibrium see eaton and lipsey 1975 normalizing the line segment to the unit interval the unique mixed strategy equilibrium prescribes uniform randomization over the middle two quarters for all firms see shaked 1982 as it is a well established fact that experimental subjects have difficulties in randomizing see for example rapoport and budescu 1997 it is not very surprising that collins and sherstyuk do not find strong support for the equilibrium hypothesis their empirical distribution of choices is m shaped and has a considerably larger support than the equilibrium distribution in this study we analyze the case of four agents with uniform consumer density and inelastic demand as the equilibrium of this case implies that two firms locate at the edge of the first and second quarters and the other two at the edge of the third and fourth quarters this setup seems ideal for the investigation of various matters first there is no other number of agents where the equilibrium prediction has a better chance to be valid 1 with three competitors the unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed with five the unique equilibrium configuration is asymmetric and implies unequal payoffs and with six and more agents the equilibrium configurations cease to be unique thus only the two and the four agent cases yield unique pure and symmetric equilibrium configurations that give identical payoffs to all agents second the equilibrium in the four agent case has a property that makes it interesting from a behavioral and empirical point of view not only the focal midpoint is empty but the whole middle segment of the linear city is empty as well that is notwithstanding the nice theoretical properties the equilibrium is not entirely intuitive and is also conflicting with casual empirical evidence there are no cities without shops in the center nor are there democracies without parties located in the political middle ground the picture we will discern in our experimental data can be summarized in the following experimental result in the four seller case the equilibrium prediction is of substantial but limited help about one third of all choices are clustered around the equilibrium locations but in no session do we observe convergence to equilibrium at the same time the focal midpoint exerts a considerable attraction with almost 10 of all choices clustered around it consumers profit from this considerably in the form of lower transportation costs the remainder of the article is organized as follows in section ii we give a theoretical account of the model we implement in section iii we present the experimental design in section iv we analyze the results and explain the data and section v concludes ii theory consider a linear city in which four firms produce a good at constant marginal cost the price of the good is fixed due to some unmodeled features of the market consequently costs can be normalized to zero and the price to one to sell the goods the firms simultaneously choose a location on the unit interval 0 1

designing efficient markets for carbon offsets with distributional constraints abstract this paper presents an assessment of the relative efficacy of three key instruments baselines trade ratios and limits which are under policy discussion in the design of carbon offset programs we rank the instruments by their implications for total emissions economic efficiency and efficiency gain relative to a distributional transfer from capped to uncapped sectors we find that the baseline is the best instrument for maximizing welfare as it directly reduces the share of offsets that are non additional and that second best policies do not sacrifice much welfare relative to the standard first best policy prescription

discrete choice and variable returns to scale in previous studies of the probabilistic theory of qualitative choice e g marschak 1960 and mcfadden 1974 it has been assumed that an individual chooses among various alternatives with their utility levels independent of the number of individuals who choose each alternative there are however many examples in which the utility of a choice depends on the number of individuals who make the same choice for instance the utility of a given spatial choice may depend upon the number of others who choose neighboring locations neighborhood utility may decrease crowding or it may increase agglomerative economies with population size a second example is the automobile traveler s choice of routes the benefit of one route choice over another due to congestion depends on the number of drivers who choose the same route both of the examples suggested above deal with spatial choices of a particular kind but there are even examples from the more traditional macroeconomic theory one such example is of a product produced under variable returns to scale by a number of different sellers the price that each seller charges will depend upon the number of his customers if a buyer must choose to purchase from only one seller the price paid and thus utility will depend upon the total number of buyers choosing the same seller in all of the examples cited a reasonable model of choice is one that postulates uncertainty about the actual utility of each alternative the point of view is that a chooser s notional utility about each choice is a random variable in this case it is not certain which alternative will be chosen but the chosen alternative is the one with the greatest perceived utility it follows therefore that the probability that a given alternative is chosen is the probability that the utility perceived to be associated with it is larger than the utility perceived to be associated with any other alternative

scale and transfers in international emissions offset programs abstract voluntary emissions offset programs between developing and industrialized countries suffer from adverse selection because participants will self select into the program in contrast pure subsidies for mitigation lead to full participation and hence efficiency but require large financial transfers which make them unattractive to industrialized countries we present a simple model to demonstrate the impact of three policy options on the performance of offset programs 1 baseline scale increases 2 offset discounting and 3 setting stringent baselines with baseline scale increases entire political jurisdictions such as regions or nations are assigned a single aggregate baseline and must choose whether to participate as one entity we find that increasing scale both improves efficiency and reduces transfers from offset buyers to sellers offset discounting means paying less than the value of abatement and can be paired with trading ratios between offsets and allowances in a cap and trade system we show that discounting is inefficient but can make offsets more attractive to industrialized countries setting stringent baselines also involves a tradeoff between efficiency and transfers we finally show that pareto efficient policies that are individually rational for buyers and sellers entail some combination of discounting and or stringent baselines offset policies are never first best but can be efficiency improving especially with increased scale

taxes and agglomeration economies how are they related to nonprofit firm location author affiliation teresa d harrison department of economics drexel university 3141 chestnut street philadelphia pa 19104 usa tharrison drexel edu1 introductionnonprofits are an ever increasing component of the u s economy from 1997 2001 employment growth in the nonprofit sector averaged 2 5 outpacing both the business 1 8 and the government sectors 1 6 moore 2004 much of this growth stems from new nonprofits yet few studies have investigated possible determinants of nonprofit entry and location decisions most of these studies focus on demand side factors wolch and geiger 1983 downes and greenstein 1996 bielefeld murdoch and waddell 1997 for example downes and greenstein 1996 focus on demographic and religious characteristics of the surrounding community and its relation to private school location in this paper i use firm level data and focus on potentially important supply side variables tax rates and agglomeration economies most nonprofits are exempt from corporate sales and property taxes hansmann 1987 and gulley and santerre 1993 find evidence that higher corporate property and sales taxes are positively related to nonprofit market share however market share measures obfuscate the dynamics of the industry in terms of entry and exit rates if market share for nonprofits increases in response to higher tax rates this could be because new nonprofits are entering or because for profits are leaving the industry identifying these two cases is impossible with market share data using nonprofit tax return data i examine the relation between these tax exemptions and state county location decisions of new nonprofits to my knowledge this is the first paper to study these interactions at the individual firm level nonprofits also receive tax favored status due to the individual tax deduction on charitable contributions gentry and penrod 1998 employees of and donors to the nonprofits will be affected by the individual tax rates this in turn alters the costs to the nonprofit of location in a high or low tax area unlike previous studies i therefore investigate the relation between individual marginal tax rates and nonprofit location another potential supply side determinant of firm location decisions is the existing firm concentration in the area the potential economies of scale generated by proximity to other firms have been extensively examined in for profit industries 1 previous studies have generally found a positive relation between agglomeration and location carlton 1983 bartik 1985 woodward 1992 gius and frese 2002 rosenthal and strange 2003 to my knowledge bielefeld et al 2004 is the only study that examines nonprofit agglomeration finding evidence of agglomeration in dallas texas this warrants additional examination because nonprofit output is generally service driven and less mobile thus agglomeration implies greater direct competition making market saturation a larger issue in the nonprofit market using a nationwide dataset i examine how location and existing firm concentration are related and explore the potential presence of market saturation i also investigate possible differences between inter and intra industry agglomeration my results provide new insight into nonprofit firm behavior in most cases higher tax rates are associated with new firm location but the results for corporate and property taxes vary across the sample years i find that individual tax rates are an important consideration for nonprofits and are positively correlated to location my analysis also contributes to the literature by examining how the sensitivity to tax rates varies according to the sources of revenues for the institution firms that depend highly on individual donations are more likely to locate in high individual tax states while nonprofits with large mission related revenues are more sensitive to the property tax rate

schelling s spatial proximity model of segregation revisited schelling schelling t c 1969 models of segregation american economic review papers and proceedings 59 488 493 schelling t c 1971a dynamic models of segregation journal of mathematical sociology 1 2 143 186 schelling t c 1971b on the ecology of micromotives the public interest 25 61 98 schelling t c 1978 micromotives and macrobehavior new york norton presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents preferences i e no agent preferring the resulting segregation we examine the robustness of schelling s model focusing in particular on its driving force the individual preferences we show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration best response dynamics may lead to segregation this raises some doubts on the ability of public policies to generate integration through the promotion of openness and tolerance with respect to diversity we also argue that the one dimensional and two dimensional versions of schelling s spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation

the economics of product variety a survey demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant the full degree of variety potentially demanded will not in general be supplied because scale economies even to a small degree mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants the economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum the survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms generalized monopolistic competition tracing modern developments in both the chamberlinian and hotelling traditions the latter has been particularly fruitful due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics the emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures including strategic market preemption although most work has been in a full information context there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information either by consumers to properties of the firms products or firms as to consumers demands

pricing monitoring uncertainty in climate policy this article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy namely prescribing uncertainty setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount our model of the behavior of profit maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty however in the presence of information asymmetry monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection in a mandatory policy prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level for voluntary mechanisms such as carbon offsets allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry these conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action other than carbon our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry which results in heterogeneity in the agents benefits from abatement generalizes the classical trade off between production efficiency and information rents

theory and experiments on spatial competition we present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market identical consumers with non increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line we solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor the set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs in laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes non binding communication led to collusion

the logit model of monopolistic competition brand diversity one of the important issues in the literature on monopolistic competition concerns whether the free entry equilibrium will provide sufficient variety of differentiated brands this paper examines variety issue using the logit choice model to capture brand differentiation the consumption value of each brand is drawn from the extreme value distribution and the consumer then purchases the brand with the highest value with the resulting demand structure the authors find that monopolistic competition results in two few firms and thus too few brands from the viewpoint of consumers this result supports the findings of other models with symmetrically differentiated brands copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

information choice technologies theories based on information costs or frictions have become increasing popular in macroeconomics and macro finance the literature has used various types of information choices such as rational inattention inattentiveness information markets and costly precision using a unified framework we compare these different information choice technologies and explain why some generate increasing returns and others particularly those where agents choose how much public information to observe generate multiple equilibria the results can help applied theorists to choose the appropriate information choice technology for their application and to understand the consequences of that modeling choice

spatial competition with three firms an experimental study the paper reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem we compare the subjects behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium calculated by shaked 1982 overall the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction however the subjects locations were significantly more dispersed than predicted by the theory three alternative explanations of this phenomenon inexperience approximate equilibrium behavior and risk aversion are suggested and evaluated for their predictive power special attention is paid to risk aversion

optimal design of a phase in emissions trading program abstract this paper studies a phase in emissions trading program with voluntary opt in possibilities for non affected firms and derives optimal permits allocations to affected and opt in firms when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs the regulator faces a trade off between production efficiency minimization of control costs and information rent extraction reduction of excess permits allocated to opt in firms the first best equilibrium can be attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt in firms otherwise a second best equilibrium is implemented the latter is sensitive to uncertainty in control costs and benefits

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

consumer inertia choice dependence and learning from experience in a repeated decision problem abstract understanding when and how individuals think about real life problems is a central question in economics this paper studies the role of inertia inattention state dependence and learning the empirical setting is a tariff experiment when optional measured tariffs for local telephone calls were introduced unanticipatedly we find that consumers tend to align their choices of tariff and telephone use levels correctly despite low potential savings mistakes are not permanent as individuals actively engage in tariff switching in order to reduce the monthly cost of telephone service ignoring unobservable heterogeneity and the endogeneity of past choices would have reversed these results

market research and innovation strategy in a duopoly we model a duopoly in which ex ante identical firms must decide where to direct their innovation efforts the firms face market uncertainty about consumers preferences for innovation on two product attributes and technology uncertainty about the success of their research and development r d investments firms can conduct costly market research before setting r d strategy we find that the value of market information to a firm depends on whether its rival is expected to obtain this information in equilibrium consequently one firm may forgo market research even though its rival conducts such research and learns the true state of demand we examine both vertical and horizontal demand structures with vertical preferences firms are a priori uncertain about which attribute all consumers will value more in this case a firm that conducts market research always attempts innovation on the attribute it discovers that consumers prefer and expends more on r d than a rival that has not conducted market research with horizontal preferences distinct segments exist each caring about innovation on only one attribute and firms are a priori uncertain how many consumers each segment contains in this case a firm that conducts market research may follow a niche strategy and attempt innovation to serve the smaller segment to avoid intense price competition for the larger segment a firm that conducts market research may therefore invest less in r d and earn lower postlaunch profits than a rival that has forgone such research

product differences and prices abstract under assumptions following hotelling s 1929 paper stability in competition the possibility of constructing an example in which equilibrium prices exist everywhere and the two merchants display tendencies to agglomerate is ruled out

endogenous information acquisition in coordination games in the context of a beauty contest coordination game in which payoffs 1 depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and 2 from the average action players choose how much costly attention to pay to vari 3 ous informative signals each signal has an underlying accuracy how precisely it 4 identifies the state and a clarity how easy it is to understand the unique linear 5 equilibrium has interesting properties the signals which receive attention are the 6 clearest available even if they have poor underlying accuracy the number of sig 7 nals observed falls as the complementarity of players actions rises and if actions 8 are more complementary the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium 9 is more public in nature the consequences of rational inattention constraints on 10

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

agri environmental schemes adverse selection information structure and delegation this work analyzes alternative designs of agri environmental schemes and how different incentive mechanisms impact on their overall efficiency it focuses on spatial targeting and delegation in an asymmetric information context first the optimal contract under adverse selection is modeled this model underlines the trade off between information rents and allocative efficiency the impact of spatial targeting is then addressed disaggregated information structures increase the optimal efforts asked of the farmers it may also involve higher information rents and may reduce the net contributions of some farmers finally the consequences of delegating authority within the principal agent relationship are investigated the results illustrate that spatial targeting and delegation when combined have asymmetric impacts on farmers payoffs

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

informational frictions and commodity markets this paper develops a model with a tractable log linear equilibrium to analyze the effects of informational frictions in commodity markets by aggregating dispersed information about the strength of the global economy among goods producers whose production has complementarity commodity prices serve as price signals to guide producers production decisions and commodity demand our model highlights important feedback effects of informational noise originating from supply shocks and futures market trading on commodity demand and spot prices our analysis illustrates the weakness common in empirical studies on commodity markets of assuming that different types of shocks are publicly observable to market participants