business bluffing reconsidered imagine that i walk into a car dealership and tell the salesperson that i absolutely cannot pay more than 10 000 for the car that i want and imagine further she tells me that she absolutely cannot sell the car for less than 12 000 assuming that neither one of us is telling the truth we are bluffing about our reservation prices the price above or below which we will no longer be willing to make the transaction this is certainly a common practice and moreover is most likely minimally prudent whether our negotiating adversary is bluffing or not it will always be in our interest to bluff discussions of bluffing in business commonly invoke reservation prices but need not one could misrepresent his position in any number of areas including the financial health of a company poised for merger the authority that has been granted to him by the parties that he represents or even one s enthusiasm about a project the goal of bluffing is quite simple to enhance the strength of one s position during negotiations bluffing has long been a topic of considerable interest to business ethicists 1 on the one hand bluffing seems to bear a strong resemblance to lying and therefore might be thought to be prima facie impermissible on the other many people have the intuition that bluffing is an appropriate and morally permissible negotiating tactic given this tension what is the moral standing of bluffing in business the dominant position has been that it is permissible and work has there fore been done to show why the apparent imper missibility is either mismotivated or illusory two highly influential papers have taken different approaches to securing the moral legitimacy of bluffing the first by albert carr argued that bluffing in business is analogous to bluffing in poker and therefore should not be thought to be impermissible insofar as it is part of the way that the game is played the second by thomas carson presented a more subtle argument wherein the author reconstrued the concept of lying to require an implied warrantability of truth and since business negotiations instantiate a context wherein claims are not warranted to be

payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice abstract by using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers attitudes toward each payment method we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity we find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types our policy experiments suggest that for the sub population who hold both credit and debit cards removing rewards would increase their share of paper based payment methods i e cash and checks measured in terms of in store transactions by no more than 4 percentage points

value function approximation in the presence of uncertainty and inequality constraints an application to the demand for credit cards abstract we present an algorithm for approximating the solution to discrete time stochastic dynamic programs with inequality constraints the algorithm exploits the state preference approach to choice under uncertainty to reduce the dimensionality of the state space and polynomial approximation to improve computational efficiency it is particularly useful in financial applications involving liquidity and credit constraints and more than one asset the algorithm provides information about the derivatives of the value function and therefore risk aversion along with asset demands

risk based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans abstract by focusing on observable default risk s role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid 1990s it tests three resulting predictions first the premium paid per unit of risk should have increased over this period second debt levels should have reacted accordingly third fewer high risk households should have been denied credit further contributing to the interest rate spread between the highest and lowest risk borrowers for people obtaining loans the premium paid per unit of risk did indeed become significantly larger after the mid 1990s for example for a 0 01 increase in the probability of bankruptcy the corresponding interest rate increase tripled for first mortgages doubled for automobile loans and rose nearly six fold for second mortgages additionally changes in borrowing levels and debt access reflected these new pricing practices particularly for secured debt borrowing increased most for the low risk households who saw their relative borrowing costs fall furthermore while very high risk households gained expanded access to credit the increases in their risk premiums implied that their borrowing as a whole either rose less or sometimes fell

permanent income hypothesis in emerging markets some brazilian evidence abstract this paper uses a dataset from one of the largest credit card issuers in brazil to investigate the extent of credit constraints for one of the world s largest emerging market economies in order to deal with the endogeneity problem from an observational dataset an identification strategy based on the issuer actual policies was used to better identify the long run effects of a credit card limit increase on debt the results point to a long run effect of credit limit on credit card debts of 0 1144 a similar size to the ones found in gross and souleles 2001 this value indicates the permanent income hypothesis is rejected for this sample and some evidence supporting a variation of buffer stock behavior is found furthermore results indicate the degree of heterogeneity in effects is much higher than similar results for developed countries lending credence to the conclusion credit constraints are much stronger for lower income groups this conclusion is in line to previous studies in brazil such as de lucinda and vieira 2014

allhoff on business bluffing the moral status of business bluffing is a controversial issue on the one hand bluffing would seem to be relevantly similar to lying and deception because of this business bluffing can be taken to be an activity that is at least prima facie morally condemnable on the other hand it has often been claimed that in business bluffing is part of the game and that therefore there is nothing morally questionable in business bluffing in a recent issue of this journal fritz allhoff puts forward a novel defence of business bluffing in this article i will examine allhoff s arguments for the moral acceptability of business bluffing and argue that they are implausible

which road leads to stable money demand this paper denies that the demand for money function is any more unstable than other demand functions and maintains that the controversies regarding unstable money demand are produce by poor methodology that is not shared by other areas of the field of economics when investigating demand function properties this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the real costs of credit access evidence from the payday lending market using geographic differences in the availability of payday loans i estimate the real effects of credit access among low income households payday loans are small high interest rate loans that constitute the marginal source of credit for many high risk borrowers i find no evidence that payday loans alleviate economic hardship to the contrary loan access leads to increased difficulty paying mortgage rent and utilities bills the empirical design isolates variation in loan access that is uninfluenced by lenders location decisions and state regulatory decisions two factors that might otherwise correlate with economic hardship measures further analysis of differences in loan availability over time and across income groups rules out a number of alternative explanations for the estimated effects counter to the view that improving credit access facilitates important expenditures the results suggest that for some low income households the debt service burden imposed by borrowing inhibits their ability to pay important bills copyright 2011 oxford university press

how effective are rewards programs in promoting payment card usage empirical evidence card issuers have mainly relied on rewards programs as their main strategy to increase usage however there is scarce evidence on the effectiveness of these programs this paper is addressing two topics which could have important managerial and public policy implications i it estimates the impact of rewards on the use of cards and ii it quantifies their economic effects in terms of the cash substitution we find that rewards may significantly modify choice for card payments their economic impact also varies significantly across types of rewards and merchant activities additionally rewards seem to be more effective for debit cards

modeling structural and temporal variation in the market s valuation of banking firms hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm s net worth diverges from its economic value such unbooked capital has on balance sheet and off balancesheet sources this paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants in effect the analysis expands the twoindex model by endogenizing the market and interest rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on balance sheet and off balance sheet elements for a sample of banks during 1975 1985 the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital to the extent that an accounting representation of a firm s net worth diverges from its economic value the firm is said to have hidden capital two sources of hidden capital exist accountants misvaluations of portfolio positions that accounting principles designate as on balance sheet items and the systematic neglect of off balance sheet sources of value that these principles do not permit to be formally booked this paper develops a model for estimating both types of hidden capital the model makes direct use of accounting information on the bookable positions of a firm and separates bookable from unbookable sources of value we use regression analysis to partition the market value of a firm s stock i e its market capitalization mv into two components recorded capital reserves and unrecorded or hidden net worth hidden capital is in turn allocated between values that are unbooked but bookable through asset turnover or writedowns on a historical cost balance sheet under generally accepted accounting principles gaap and values which gaap currently designates as an unbookable offbalance sheet item we estimate the net unbooked value of on balance sheet positions by estimating an intermediate variation ratio k this variable expresses the ratio of the market value to the book value of the collected components of a firm s bookable

should collective bargaining and labor relations be less adversarial in this paper i argue that the poker analogy is unsuitable as a model for collective bargaining negotiations using the poker game analogy is imprudent its use undermines trust and ignores the cooperative features of business and its use fails to take into account the values of dignity and fairness which should characterize labor management negotiations i propose and defend a model of ideal family decision making as a superior model to the poker game

network effects on cash card substitution in transactions and low interest rate regimes we develop a nash game on the adoption of a new eftpos electronic fund transfer at point of sale card payment media given cash is dispensed by a competitive atm automated teller machine network equilibrium conditions when cash and card use coexist entail a specific relationship between the card network coverage parameter super k and the proportion of cash financed expenditures we derive a payments innovation technology constrained transactions demand for money which is highly interest rate sensitive in low interest rate regimes data on cash card use in the uk 1990 97 is used to calibrate the model

regulate one service tame the entire market credit cards in turkey abstract in credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services two regulations were recently enacted in the turkish credit card market one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006 by employing the well known panzar and rosse 1982 panzar and rosse 1987 method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 turkish banks between 2002 and 2008 we investigate the extent of banks market power in the turkish credit card market before and after the regulations unlike most of the existing literature which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them we consider the entire market by taking both services into account fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations although the first regulation did not have much impact the second led to rises in both banks total revenues and competition in the entire market

the emergence and regulation of contingent commitment banking abstract in but a relatively few years banking has changed considerably now it is very much a business of making contingent promises or commitments and even just a decade ago it was not recognizing change is apparently easier though than accounting for it or than not worrying about it in this paper an attempt is made to account for the change from traditional to contingent commitment banking an attempt which must however be regarded as less than brilliantly successful and responding to the concern that has been expressed by among others federal reserve officials it is argued that even if banking keeps on changing until the last vestige of the traditional has disappeared the federal reserve need not in the end be less effective as the u s monetary authority than it is at present there is also a concern shared by some federal reserve officials that if change persists then unless bank regulatory policy is altered appropriately financial stability will be increasingly threatened that could be but as is argued in the paper it is far from obvious that more capital and or a risk adjusted capital requirement will make bank failures rarer than they otherwise would be

consumption and the means of payment an empirical analysis for the united kingdom we estimate a model of consumption and money holdings with multiple means of payment using data for the united kingdom the model describes a technology for transactions where money and credit are imperfect substitutes it allows us to identify shocks to the transactions technology we evaluate the value of long term changes in the payments systems to the representative consumer as well as the welfare cost of inflation from 1977 to 1998 the estimates allow us to evaluate the welfare costs of inflation of this period the model also has implications for consumption smoothing in response to monetary shocks

competition and risk in south east asian commercial banking this article investigates the effects of competition on bank risk taking behaviour in four south east asian countries indonesia malaysia philippines and vietnam our main finding is that competition does not increase bank risk taking behaviour and the results appear robust to different model specifications estimation approaches and variable construction we also find that concentration is inversely related to bank risk whereas regulatory restrictions positively influence bank risk taking

on competition risk and hidden assets in the market for bank credit cards abstract the market for credit cards has been the subject of recent attention and controversy because of high profits earned on credit cards and substantial premiums on the resale of credit card receivables this paper estimates risk return profiles for credit card banks and explores the role of intangible assets in determining resale premiums on credit card receivables in addition the effects on the resale market of securitization and the opportunity cost of acquiring new accounts are analyzed using alternative measures of risk and alternative control groups we find for the years 1989 to 1995 that credit card banks earned significantly higher returns on assets but that these returns were associated with greater risk taking analysis of premia for the years 1993 to 1995 suggest that acquiring banks pay higher premia for mid sized regional accounts than for larger national portfolios perhaps because of richer cross selling opportunities

the demand for credit cards evidence from the survey of consumer finances i introduction the credit card market has expanded rapidly over the past 20 years in 1983 65 of households held at least one card by 1998 about 74 did so the size of real balances on these cards more than tripled in this period analysts have proposed a number of explanations for the increase but untangling the main causes is complicated by the unique nature of the credit card financial product an individual who obtains a credit card has obtained the right to borrow a certain amount called the limit with no questions asked under predetermined payback rules thus credit cards involve both assets and liabilities the available limits are best thought of as assets which can be used by a consumer to hedge against future income shortfalls or just to facilitate paying for goods and thereby reducing the need to carry cash the asset and limit components of credit cards makes them similar to financial instruments for example the asset component is essentially an option a subject that has been studied extensively in the corporate finance literature the seminal work is black and scholes 1973 who developed a method for valuing an option washam and davis 1998 extend this method to the problem of valuing the liquidity of credit resources this body of literature suggests that for some people a credit card can be viewed as a source of liquid funds for business purposes moreover once a credit card is used it becomes a debt liability in effect these are loans that the user has taken on to cover an income shortfall or simply to make a purchase for which borrowing makes sense again a corporate equivalent would be line of credit borrowing see myers 1989 or miller et al 1998 for an introduction these similarities raise the question of what sort of sample one should analyze for a study of consumer use of credit cards in all likelihood many average consumers who use credit cards are actually business entrepreneurs who use the cards to finance small business considering that wealth is an important element of any study of credit cards one faces the further problem that small business wealth is hard to measure accurately some research lindh and ohlsson 1998 suggests that access to liquid credit such as credit cards can make the difference between becoming self employed or not dunn and holtz eakin 2000 argue that family financial capital can ease the transition to self employment although they do not discuss credit availability in their study their results are strong evidence that credit cards would also ease that transition other studies that focus on the role of liquid credit and entrepreneurial activity include meyer 1990 blanchflower and oswald 1998 cox and japelli 1990 and evans and jovanovich 1989 our focus here is not on the use of credit cards as a business financing tool however it is apparent from this literature that business finance certainly plays a powerful role in determining the use of credit cards by some owners the research suggests that entrepreneurs would be more likely to be using credit cards for financing business rather than for consumer purposes for this reason it is important to separate the self employed from the non self employed in our sample looking specifically at consumers the unusual nature of the credit card financial product raises interesting questions for empirical researchers who hope as we do to provide some estimates of the responsiveness of the credit card demand to standard price and income effects the object of this article is to raise these questions and then answer some of them estimating regression models using data from the survey of consumer finances scf specifically we make two empirical approaches first we model credit card demand as a two stage process with a consumer obtaining limits in the first stage and then borrowing some fraction of those limits in the second

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

the intertemporal dynamics of consumer lock in this article examines how dynamic changes in information cost structure and time preferences affect consumers search and switching behavior over time and lead to lock in the information cost structure is conceptualized as a trade off of initial setup costs and ongoing usage costs lock in is defined as consumers decreased propensity to search and switch after an initial investment which is determined both by a preference to minimize immediate costs and by an inability to anticipate the impact of future switching costs the results of three experiments support the proposed mechanism experiment 1 shows that a small initial investment is sufficient to produce lock in experiment 2 shows that the results of a prior investment on lock in are not due to psychological commitment but to a shift in relative costs of incumbent and new options experiment 3 shows that respondents fail to anticipate how their prior investment will lock them in

competition and pricing in the credit card market many credit card issuers charge fixed rates that remain the same for three to five years while the rest charge variable rates that are indexed to market rates the presence of these two distinct rate types forces prices at firms selling an otherwise identical product to move asynchronously variable rates move one for one with the index while fixed rates stay constant empirical and theoretical analysis shows that this pricing structure provides an explanation for the simultaneous yet seemingly contradictory existence of high rate cost margins and aggressive non price competition for new customers a phenomenon that existed in the credit card market in the early 1990s

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association