fixing exchange rates a virtual quest for fundamentals abstract fixed exchange rates are less volatile than floating rates but the volatility of macroeconomic variables such as money and output does not change very much across exchange rate regimes this suggests that exchange rate models based only on macroeconomic fundamentals are unlikely to be very successful it also suggests that there is no clear tradeoff between reduced exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic stability

equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games this paper analyzes a general model of two player bargaining in the shadow of war where one player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war i derive conclusions about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints where these constraints hold regardless of the game form hence the qualitative results are game free i show that the higher the informed player s payoff from war the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling the dispute short of war and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war the latter result rationalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war i then provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the probability of war

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

uncertainty and incentives in crisis bargaining game free analysis of international conflict we study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict among our results we show that under some weak conditions there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war we also show that while uncertainty about the other side s cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations uncertainty about the other side s strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes along the way we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well known relationship between uncertainty the incentive to misrepresent and costly war we find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important

bargaining in the shadow of power abstract often a bargainer can use some form of power legal military or political to impose a settlement how does the outside option of being able to impose a settlement albeit at some cost affect the bargaining and how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers these questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to rubinstein s game of dividing a pie each actor can accept an offer make a counteroffer or try to impose a solution imposing a settlement is however costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost journal of economic literatureclassification number c72

survival of overconfidence in currency markets this paper tests the influential hypothesis that irrational traders will be driven out of financial markets by trading losses the paper s main finding is that overconfident currency dealers are not driven out of the market dealers with extensive experience are neither more nor less overconfident than their junior colleagues we set the stage for this investigation by providing evidence that currency dealers display two forms of overconfidence they underestimate uncertainty and they overestimate their professional success this is notable because one might have expected the opposite currency dealers face strong incentives for accuracy they have access to comprehensive information and they have extensive experience

the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in britain a lot of energy is currently being expended in trying to understand what has been happening to unemployment in britain and the rest of the developed world in this paper we look at this question in the british context by trying to confront some possible explanations with the data since the data we use are quarterly over rather a short period we are setting the explanations a very hard test most explanations tend to be rather casual and the theories underpinning them ill developed thus for example the so called real wage argument is based on the idea that real wages affect labour demand and that the equilibrium real wage bears some relatively stable relationship to output per head but how stable is not clear thus whether or not we can expect a well defined stable ceteris paribus dynamic relationship between real product wages as a proportion of output per head and unemployment is equally unclear so if such a relationship does not show up in a quarterly regression model this may not be that serious for the theory nevertheless we must look for the relationship for how else are we ever to discriminate between a plethora of conflicting views the primary emphasis in this paper is on the secular factors affecting unemployment rather than the cyclical variables consequently we shall not be concerned with developing a coherent theory of cyclical fluctuations and in the empirical work we shall control for the cycle simply by making use of those exogenous or predetermined variables which other work in this field suggests are important 2 the remainder of the paper is set out as follows the next section is concerned with specifying a model which generates a definition of equilibrium unemployment the outline of this model is a pair of equations determining the flows into and out of unemployment and these are specified in section ii which looks closely at the possible variables involved section iii then deals with the results and presents some general conclusions

ratifiable mechanisms learning from disagreement in a mechanism design problem participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo if equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players beliefs then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints we investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two stage process consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game we develop and illustrate a new concept ratifiability that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way

is incomes policy the answer to unemployment in western europe unemployment has remained obstinately high ever since 1975 what has prevented governments from reducing it the answer is simple if unemployment were reduced by normal methods inflation would rise it follows that the only way to cut the long run level of unemployment is to find some other way of controlling inflation no such device will be costless but if we could find any method that was less costly than unemployment we ought to adopt it maurice chevalier was asked in later life what he thought of old age it s not so bad he replied when you consider the alternative that was a true economist talking and it is also the spirit in which i shall approach the unhappy choices open to us my argument will proceed roughly as follows first imagine that a costless incomes policy is available then most people would probably agree that if inflation was too high a temporary incomes policy would be a good idea in order to get inflation down but what then when it was down we would still be left with far too high an unemployment rate only a permanent incomes policy can substantially reduce the non inflationary level of unemployment however against these benefits have to be set the costs of an incomes policy a conventional incomes policy which permanently suspended collective bargaining would be out of the question in a free society so we have to have an incomes policy that works by incentive rather than by regulation the best thing would be a tax on wage increases levied on employers and proportional to wage increases above a prescribed norm i shall spend some time discussing this tax using various different models of wage setting to explain how it would have its effect and finally i shall try producing a first draft of the operator s manual

bargaining and learning while fighting much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game ending costly lottery this article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse the model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power the analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly process literature i the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power ii it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty iii it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources and iv it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed

borrowed power debt finance and the resort to arms military expenditure is often funded by debt and war losers often repudiate some or all of their obligations since governments tend to repay their debt in peace or victory negotiated settlements become inefficient and can affect crisis bargaining and war termination i analyze a complete information model in which players can determine the distribution of power through their military allocations b efore attempting to reach a peaceful bargain i show that players might borrow to improve their military capabilities even when doing so will make it impossible to settle the dispute without fighting this new explanation for war is not driven by commitment problems or informational asymmetries but by the inefficiency of peace imposed by the need to repay the debt wa r is the result of actions that eliminate the bargaining range rather than inability to loc ate mutually acceptable deals in that range as the traditional explanation has it

risk aversion and incentive effects new data without order effects holt and laury 2002 used a menu of ordered lottery choices to make inferences about risk aversion under various payment conditions the main results of that paper were a subjects are risk averse even for relatively small payments of less than 5 b risk aversion increases sharply with large increases in the scale of cash payoffs and c there is no significant effect from increasing the scale of hypothetical payment with a few exceptions noted in the paper all treatments began with a low payment choice followed by a choice with hypothetical payments that had been scaled up by 20 50 or 90 followed by a real cash decision with the same high payment scale 20 50 or 90 followed by a single final low 1 real payment choice those in the 90 treatment could earn amounts ranging from 9 00 to 346 50 in this task as glenn w harrison et al 2004 correctly note this design confounds order and treatment effects since the high real payment choice was always completed after the low real and high hypothetical payment tasks in a new experiment reported below we first seek to replicate harrison et al s finding that the order effect participating in a low payment choice before making a high payment choice magnifies the scale effect in a second treatment each subject completes the menu of lottery choices under just one payment condition 1 or 20 real or hypothetical thereby eliminating any order effects i new data

the power to hurt costly conflict with completely informed states according to common explanations of war since war is costly and risky rational states have incentives to strike a bargain and avoid conflict war is then the result of private information about capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent this information or inability to make credible commitments fearon 1995 this article presents another rationalist explanation which does not depend on either of these mechanisms by modeling warfare as a costly bargaining process the paper demonstrates that inefficient fighting can occur in equilibrium under very general assumptions favoring peace specifically it is assumed that peace can be supported in equilibrium and that fighting brings no benefits to either state only costs despite the fact that there exist many agreements that pareto dominate the final settlement states are unable to agree to them and fighting can occur in equilibrium the equilibrium is driven by the ability of states to impose costs on their opponent and bear costs the power to hurt the opponent establishes a range of acceptable settlements and the existence of such a range makes inefficient equilibria possible the article suggests that 1 states may fight if they believe that seeking peace means accepting an unpalatable settlement and 2 a diminished ability to hurt the enemy is a major reason for war termination historical examples are provided to illustrate these results

information power and war ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed the probability of conflict goes to zero however conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender s reservation value i employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power centric theories of world politics balance of power and power transition theory the formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity information asymmetries are greatest thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power centric explanations of world politics

minority voting rights can maximize majority welfare i use condorcet s information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to enforce its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority special voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully and more participation means more information is aggregated which makes the majority better off this result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of lani guinier s arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation benefitting everyone

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

using survey data to test standard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferes we estimate extrapolative adaptive and regressive models of expectations static or random walk expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight in comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias no variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors expectations regarding exchange rates in the past expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way often by using the forward exchange rate there is however a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate in that the two may not be equal the gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate for example has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium if the aim

judgemental overconfidence self monitoring and trading performance in an experimental financial market we measure the degree of overconfidence in judgment in the form of miscalibration i e the tendency to overestimate the precision of one s information and self monitoring a form of attentiveness to social cues of 245 participants and also observe their behaviour in an experimental financial market under asymmetric information miscalibrated traders underestimating the conditional uncertainty about the asset value are expected to be especially vulnerable to the winner s curse high self monitors are expected to behave strategically and achieve superior results our empirical results show that miscalibration reduces and self monitoring enhances trading performance the effect of the psychological variables is strong for men but non existent for women

minimum wages and the demand for labor i formulate measures of the effective minimum wage based on broad definitions of the labor costs that face employers and use these measures in reestimating some simple equations relating the relative employment of youths and adults to the u s minimum wage using aggregate data for 1954 78 i then ground the model more closely in the theory of factor demand first by adding the relative wages of youths and adults to the equation describing their relative employment and then by specifying a complete system of demand equations for these two types of labor teen employment responds quite robustly to changes in the effective minimum in these specifications with an elasticity of 0 1 a translog cost function defined over young workers adults and capital shows that the effective minimum wage reduces employers ability to substitute other factors for young workers using both sets of results i find that a subminimum wage for youths would have increased their employment with at most a small loss of jobs among adults this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

domestic opposition and signaling in international crises this article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises it combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two party electoral choice one state has two strategic actors a government and an opposition party both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo the rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals the parties payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate the model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state s preferences this finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation

second order beliefs and the individual investor in a panel survey of individual investors we show that investors second order beliefs their beliefs about the return expectations of other investors influence investment decisions investors who believe others hold more optimistic stock market expectations allocate more of their own portfolio to stocks even after controlling for their own risk and return expectations however second order beliefs are inaccurate and exhibit several well known psychological biases we observe both the tendency of investors to believe that their own opinion is relatively more common among the population false consensus and that others who hold divergent beliefs are considered to be biased bias blind spot

bargaining in the shadow of war when is a peaceful resolution most likely this article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war should it take place i show that the aggressor s demand curve can be below the defender s offer curve that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war a simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

on us politics and imf lending abstract the political factors shaping imf lending to developing countries have attracted attention in recent empirical work this goes in particular for the role and influence of the us however scant formal modelling makes interpretation of empirical results difficult in this paper we propose a model in which the us acts as principal within the imf and seeks to maximize its impact on the policy stance of debtor countries we derive an optimal loan allocation mechanism which leads to the testable hypothesis that the probability of an imf loan is increasing in the amount of political concessions countries make a political concession is defined as the distance between a country s bliss point and its actual policy stance measured relative to the us we introduce a bliss point proxy and demonstrate that our hypothesis is strongly supported in the data moreover we show that not accounting for bliss points may lead to endogeneity bias in empirical work

causes of the current stagflation since 1975 labour slack has been unusually high in the oecd countries and yet inflation has not diminished the less favourable mix of unemployment and rate of change of inflation which we call stagflation is explained by a fall in the feasible rate of growth of real wages unmatched by a reduction in the constant term in phillips curve to investigate this mechanism conventional wage and price equations are estimated for 19 countries and then used for simulation stagflation has been caused in roughly equal amounts by rising relative import prices and by the fall in the rate of productivity growth in the basic model the phillips curve is assumed not to adapt to falls in feasible real wage growth but in a final section an adaptive wage equation is estimated which confirms that the process of adaptation is slow

capabilities uncertainty and resolve a limited information model of crisis bargaining this paper presents and solves a crisis bargaining game under limited information the sides alternate offers from three possible offers with war and its costs starting if the target s counteroffer is rejected the equilibrium of the model falls into four different cases these four cases are analyzed to determine how the sides communicate through their offers and how the costs of war initial beliefs misperceptions and distribution of capabilities drive the probabilities of a crisis and war the model demonstrates a joint selection bias misspecification problem in empirical studies of crises arising from the unobservable nature of beliefs several empirical studies of crisis bargaining are discussed in the light of this methodological problem new patterns of evidence are found that support the presence of the selection problem and their conclusions are reexamined

overconfidence and excess entry an experimental approach psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic about their futures e g shelly e taylor and j d brown 1988 neil d weinstein 1980 when assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait like driving ability ola svenson 1981 income prospects or longevity a vast majority of people say they are above the average although of course only half can be if the trait is symmetrically distributed this paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting entry into competitive games or markets many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years for example using plant level data from the u s census of manufacturers spanning 1963 1982 timothy dunne et al 1988 estimated that 61 5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79 6 percent exited within 10 years most of these exits are failures see also dunne et al 1989a 1989b d shapiro and r s khemani 1987

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

investor overconfidence and the forward premium puzzle we offer an explanation for the forward premium puzzle in foreign exchange markets based upon investor overconfidence in the model overconfident individuals overreact to their information about future inflation which causes greater overshooting in the forward rate than in the spot rate thus when agents observe a signal of higher future inflation the consequent rise in the forward premium predicts a subsequent downward correction of the spot rate the model can explain the magnitude of the forward premium bias and several other stylized facts related to the joint behaviour of forward and spot exchange rates our approach is also consistent with the availability of profitable carry trade strategies

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

meese rogoff redux micro based exchange rate forecasting meese rogoff redux micro based exchange rate forecasting by martin d d evans and richard k lyons this paper compares the true ex ante fore casting performance of a micro based model against both a standard macro model and a random walk in contrast to existing literature which is focused on longer horizon forecasting we examine forecasting over horizons from one day to one month the one month horizon being where micro and macro analysis begin to over lap over our three year forecasting sample we find that the micro based model consistently outperforms both the random walk and the macro model micro based forecasts account for almost 16 percent of the sample variance in monthly spot rate changes these results pro vide a level of empirical validation as yet unat tained by other models the forecasting experiment proposed by richard meese and kenneth rogoff 1983 re mains a benchmark against which exchange rate models are judged their result that structural macro models cannot outperform a naive random walk has proved robust over the decades yet the meese rogoff paper was never about forecasting in the true sense i e using tirrie f information to forecast exchange rates at t 1 b y using concurrent realized values of the forcing variables their regressions were more about concurrent explanation than about ex ante forecasting their only forecast ing element is in their reliance on ex ante data to estimate equation parameters which appro priately penalized models whose estimated pa rameters were unstable tion for the random walk nature of exchange rates is that there exists some unobserved fun damental that itself follows a random walk un observed being important because fundamentals proposed in most macro models do not follow random walks they offer a different explana tion one rooted in the asset approach to ex change rates and the present value relation that follows from it specifically they show that i f fundamentals are 1 1 but not necessarily ran dom walks then as the discount factor in the present value relation approaches 1 the ex change rate will follow a process arbitrarily close to a random walk intuitively given that an 1 1 process can be split into random walk and stationary components a discount factor near 1 means that most all of the weight is placed on fundamentals far into the future ex pectations of which are dominated by the random walk component charles engel and kenneth west 2004 2005 provide a valuable perspective on the forecastability of exchange rates one explana this paper takes the analysis of engel and west as an important reorientation of thinking and brings it to the natural next step specifi cally if there is little room for forecasting based on stationary components of fundamentals then one needs to focus on where all the action is namely exchange rate dynamics that come from expectational surprises though the sur prise part is by definition orthogonal to public information our micro based model shows that there should exist types of nonpublic infor mation that are useful for forecasting this part and where to look for these types of informa tion we then locate data on these types of nonpublic information and test whether they have true ex ante forecasting power we should evans department of economics georgetown uni versity washington dc 20057 and nber lyons haas school of business university of california berkeley c a 94720 1900 and nber we are grateful to ken west for his comments and to the national science foundation for financial support we refrain from using the word news because it has too strong an association with macro information that is public which even in the most careful of event studies explains less than 5 percent of exchange rate variation in total see torben andersen et al 2003

overconfidence subjective perception and pricing behavior abstract we study the implications of overconfidence for price setting in a monopolistic competition setup with incomplete information our price setters overestimate their abilities to infer aggregate shocks from private signals the fraction of uninformed firms is endogenous firms can obtain information by paying a fixed cost we find two results i overconfident firms are less inclined to acquire information relative to the rational benchmark ii prices might exhibit excess volatility driven by non fundamental noise we explore the empirical predictions of our model for idiosyncratic price volatility