credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labor abstract this paper develops an overlapping generations general equilibrium model where inefficient child labor arises due to credit constraints it derives a positive relationship between inequality in the distribution of income and the incidence of child labor looking at policy implications it shows how trade sanctions against countries using child labor may fail to reduce the incidence of child labor it discusses some alternative policies to reduce the incidence of child labor

building the family nest premarital investments marriage markets and spousal allocations we develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by premarital investments the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching and endogenously determined sharing rules form the basis of intra household allocations by incorporating pre marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra marital sharing rules in particular we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre marital investments and intra household allocations are efficient the efficiency of both pre marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that for each couple the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market

individual versus joint taxation in models with household production in a recent paper piggott and whalley 1996 challenge the conventional wisdom that says that the individual rather than the household should be the unit of taxation and argue instead for joint taxation their point of departure is a point well taken the literature on which this wisdom is based in particular boskin and sheshinski 1983 ignores the existence of household production the general argument is a nice one in the theory of the second best in the absence of taxation of market wage income the marginal rates of technical substitution between primary and secondary labor in market and in household production would be equal to each other and the marginal rate of substitution between the market and household good would be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between them thus achieving pareto efficiency introduction of income taxation leads to a distortion of the relation between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation which is the focus of concern in the literature 2 and given the differing econo

child labor and agricultural shocks this paper examines the relationship between household income shocks and child labor in particular we investigate the extent to which transitory income shocks lead to increases in child labor and whether household asset holdings mitigate the effects of these shocks using data from a household panel survey in tanzania we find that both relationships are significant we investigate mechanisms that could account for these results including buffer stocks and borrowing

love and taxes and matching institutions we study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family everyone prefers a partner that has high income and is a perfect emotional match but compromises must often be struck a high income earner may abstain from marrying a low income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally because the highincome earner may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by the marriage redistributive income taxation may ease this problem income matching institutions that secure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution so that optimal redistribution is reduced we also introduce a divorce option redistributive taxation is shown both to further and stabilize marriage

child labor and schooling response to changes in coca production in rural peru abstract coca eradication and interdiction are the most common policies aimed at reducing the production and distribution of cocaine in the andes but little is know about their impact on households this paper uses the shift in the production of coca leaves from peru to colombia in 1995 to analyze the indirect effects of the anti coca policy on children s allocation of time after different sensitivity checks the results indicate that a decrease in coca production is associated with increases in work and hours children living in coca growing states devote to work within and outside the household with no effects on schooling outcomes these findings suggest a previously undocumented indirect effect of drug policies on household behavior

schooling search and spouse selection testing economic theories of marriage and household behavior the implications of the economic theories of marriage and of household fertility behavior are tested in a framework in which educational investment marital search and marital matches are responsive to marriage market conditions and the personal traits of individual agents some of which are unobserved by the econometrician implications are also derived and tested for the effects of longevity attractiveness preferences and labor and marriage market conditions on schooling marriage age and spouse choice the empirical results indicate that inattention to heterogeneity and martial selection leads to a false rejection of the economic theory of marriage but to a false acceptance of the value of time fertility hypothesis

cohabitation marriage and divorce in a model of match quality the objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships we develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation marriage and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships jovanovic s journal of political economy 87 1979 972 90 theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior implications of the model reveal what factors influence the decision to start a relationship what form this relationship will take and the relative stability of the various types of unions the structural parameters of the model are estimated using longitudinal data from a sample of female high school seniors from the united states new numerical methods are developed to reduce computational costs associated with estimation the empirical results have interesting interpretations given the structural model they show that a significant cause of cohabitation is the need to learn about potential partners and to hedge against future bad shocks the estimated parameters are used to conduct several comparative dynamic experiments for example we show that policy experiments changing the cost of divorce have little effect on relationship choices

marriage specialization and the gender division of labor we consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition in our formal model agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market we show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor this division is not pareto improving both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase

prices credit markets and child growth in low income rural areas in this paper it is argued that fluctuations in child growth in rural areas of bangladesh during and after severe floods in i988 can provide insight into the structure of credit markets a model of intertemporal resource allocation is developed and euler equations relating growth patterns of children to the cost of borrowing by household are then derived from the model the evidence indicates that although some of the variation in growth patterns over the relevant period may be attributed to variation in illness and the price of rice growth patterns for children in landless households were influenced by credit market imperfections this paper links two prominent strands of research in economic development the first strand examines the extent to which households in poor rural economies are able to protect themselves from the adverse weather and other shocks that importantly influence earnings in underdeveloped areas while it has long been thought that credit market imperfections and other forms of market failure make it difficult for poor individuals in these economies to smooth consumption both within and across years there remains some question about the magnitude and pervasiveness of these imperfections while there is evidence that fluctuations in economic conditions result in inefficient allocation of resources e g morduch 1990 rosenzweig and wolpin i993 some recent papers have emphasised the fact that consumption patterns of households in the same village comove in a manner consistent with the idea that a substantial fraction of idiosyncratic variation in income is effectively

in the same boat but not equals the heterogeneous effects of parental income on child labour this paper examines the impact of parental income on child labour the empirical literature has found conflicting results regarding whether poverty leads parents to send their children to work mos

on the taxation of trade within and between households abstract tax reform proposals affect individual welfares in ways which strongly depend on the nature of specialisation in household production and the pattern of trade within households variation in the degree of specialisation in domestic production across households strongly influences the impacts on individual tax burdens of a given tax reform the standard models of the economics literature cannot be used to analyse these issues because they ignore the two person nature of households and the existence of household production and trade this paper proposes a simple and tractable model to remedy this and uses it to analyse the impacts of the types of tax reform that have been the subject of recent policy debate

borrowing constraints and progress through school evidence from peru this paper investigates the effect of borrowing constraints on the timing of human capital investment in a developing country by looking at how quickly children with different family backgrounds progress through the primary school system in peru the main findings are that children start withdrawing from school earlier as indicated by repetition of grades in households with lower income and durable good holdings and when children are more closely spaced behavior also differs as predicted between children from households that appear to be borrowing constrained and those that appear unconstrained copyright 1994 by mit press

is child labor inefficient we build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare we assume that there is a trade off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects this occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect we also study the effects of a simple ban on child labor and derive conditions under which it may be pareto improving in general equilibrium we show that the implications of child labor for fertility are ambiguous

the efficient side of progressive income taxation abstract this paper examines allocative properties of progressive income taxation when individuals care about their relative income it shows that introducing a progressive income tax can yield a pareto improvement if pre tax income is evenly distributed implementing undistorted choices of working hours requires a progressive tax schedule and the optimal degree of progressivity decreases with pre tax income inequality

the bargaining family revisited we suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non cooperatively in a first stage while day to day allocation of time is determined later through nash bargaining but with non cooperative behaviour as the fall back one finding is that overinvestment in education may be even more of a problem in such a semi cooperative model than in a fully non cooperative one even though both the semi cooperative model and the fully non cooperative model predict overinvestment in education policy conclusions that follow from the two models are distinctly different jel classification d13 j24 les auteurs suggerent un modele de famille qui marchande ou les decisions d investissement en capital humain sont prises de maniere non cooperative dans un premier temps alors que l allocation du temps au jour le jour est determinee plus tard par un marchandage a la nash mais avec un comportement noncooperatif comme choix de second ordre on decouvre que le surinvestissement dans l education peut etre encore plus problematique dans un tel modele de semi cooperation que dans un modele de non cooperation meme si les deux modeles prevoient un surinves chtissement dans l education les conclusions au plan de la politique publique qui decoulent de ces deux modeles sont fort differentes

divorce remarriage and welfare a general equilibrium approach modern marriage markets display increasing turnover with less marriage but more divorce and remarriage as a consequence a large number of children live in single parent and step parent households we summarize here a general equilibrium approach that allows welfare evaluations in the absence of children we show that higher aggregate divorce may raise welfare because it facilitates remarriage even children may be better off in a high divorce remarriage environment because of stronger incentives for fathers to transfer money to the custodial mothers jel j1 j12 j13 k1 k10

education demand and age at school enrollment in tanzania in tanzania actual school enrollment takes place 2 or 3 years later on average than the legal enrollment age in this paper we develop a micro economic model that allows us to disentangle various explanations for such delays we simultaneously estimate enrollment age and schooling duration by maximum likelihood techniques using data from the human resource development survey carried out in tanzania in 1992 93 a particularly interesting result of our econometric analysis is that boys and girls follow fundamentally different patterns of schooling our model suggests that this could be due to different return from pre school training in the family s economic activities or it could be related to the wish to have girls ready to be married as early as possible

the policy analysis of child labor a comparative study the policy analysis of child labour c grootaert h a patrinos modelling the determinants of child labour c grootaert child labour in cote d ivoire k cartwright child labour in urban bolivia k cartwright h a patrinos child labour in the philippines c sakellariou a lall policies to reduce child labour c grootaert h a patrinos

income smoothing and consumption smoothing one way that risk averse households protect consumption levels is to borrow and use insurance mechanisms another way common in low income economies is to diversify economic activities and make conservative production and employment choices households thus tend toward limiting exposure only to shocks that can be handled with available credit and insurance typically both types of mechanisms are studied independently but much more can be learned by studying them together first we obtain a more complete picture of risks costs and insurance possibilities second it opens the way to considering biases in standard tests of credit and insurance

child labour in indonesian small industries abstract we analyse the geographic incidence of child labour in small manufacturing firms in indonesia at the village level our unique data set covers virtually all indonesian villages and urban neighbourhoods it allows us to distinguish between demand and supply side determinants of child labour we show by correcting for sample selection that a number of counterintuitive results child labour being unaffected by credit access and school proximity are the result of an interplay between supply and demand side determinants credit access and school proximity reduce child labour supply but simultaneously constitute positive location factors for firms thereby increasing the demand for child labourers to effectively reduce child labour growth oriented policies such as enhancing school and credit facilities should be complemented by policies specifically geared towards increasing school attendance

is informal risk sharing less effective for the poor risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance abstract poor farm households are less keen to adopt high risk high return technologies than rich households yet the poor are more vulnerable to income shocks we develop a model of endogenous risk taking to explain these facts in autarky poor households adopt less risky production plans and obtain lower expected returns but face higher relative risk than the rich the introduction of risk sharing generates negative risk externalities between agents at the first best the social planner imposes a homogeneous level of risk taking in the group at the second best risk taking is not enforceable and increases with insurance generating moral hazard interestingly the poor s risk taking behavior is more sensitive to insurance the social planner thus mitigates risk taking by applying a lower insurance coverage in poor groups the introduction of risk sharing therefore reinforces the gap between rich and poor in terms of expected income and absolute risk while the effect on relative risk is ambiguous

competing premarital investments this paper studies premarital parental investments in children s wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage by investing in their children s wealth parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry in large marriage markets the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition but equilibrium investments are not efficient

risk and insurance in village india comment the protection of poor households in high risk agrarian economies from shocks to their incomes has often been seen as a compelling motive for various forms of policy intervention including transfers of cash or food credit subsidies and public employment schemes for a survey see lipton and ravallion 1995 the desirability of such safety net policies clearly depends on how well pre existing risk sharing arrangements work while it is commonly thought that without effective policy intervention rural households are vulnerable to village wide shocks such as adverse prices or poor rains it is less clear to what extent risk sharing institutions within the village mitigate the effects of idiosyncratic income risk stemming for instance from ill health or localized crop damage 2 several recent papers have used household level data to implement tests of risk sharing that might inform such concerns 3 these tests are based on the proposition that with perfect risk sharing consumption at the household level should be insured against idiosyncratic risks and thus depend solely on the realization of the aggregate risk wilson 1968 diamond 1967 townsend 1994 tests this implication of perfect intra village risk sharing using longitudinal household data on consumptions and incomes for three villages in india he reports that the full insurance hypothesis provides a surprisingly good benchmark in that household consumptions co move and do not appear to be much influenced by contemporaneous own income our aim here is to examine the robustness of this potentially important finding we have two main concerns the first is that the specification townsend adopts potentially biases his test towards the null hypothesis of full insurance because it yields inconsistent estimates of the key test parameter under a plausible alternative we therefore estimate a different specification that generates consistent estimates under both the null and the alternative our second concern is that a particular form of measurement error in the consumption data townsend uses may have further biased his results toward the null hypothesis of full insurance to address this concern we use an instrumental variables procedure when we implement the test of consumption insurance with townsend s consumption data we also re estimate the test equations with a measure of consumption derived from the same underlying primary data by an alternate method finally townsend reports 1discussions with robert townsend stimulated our interest in this investigation the staff of the

smoothing consumption by smoothing income hours of work responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural india while research has demonstrated that farm households in developing economies are able to protect consumption from idiosyncratic crop shocks little evidence shows how this is achieved this paper examines the extent to which labor markets allow households to shift labor from farm to off farm employment and the extent to which such a shift explains the observed lack of correlation between consumption and idiosyncratic crop shocks the empirical analysis uses a novel measure of the idiosyncratic crop income shock which utilizes information on start of season cropping choices to more accurately estimate household expectations of weather

long term partnership formation marriage and employment of course marriage and employment are different nevertheless a worker looking for a job a rm looking for worker or a single person looking for a marriage partner face similar problems as all are seeking a long term partner indeed forming long term partnerships is a common occurrence in life there are many other examples business people search for other business people to form a pro table relationship bridge players seek to nd a suitable partners students search for a good university we would all like to nd a good friend etc the problem becomes signi cant if there are substantial differences in the return obtained from forming a partnership with different partners for example employers differ in the wages they offer or in the work environment they provide in such a situation a worker may reject some job offers similarly as many have learned to their cost some make better marriage partners than others the problem is two sided while a worker is evaluating a potential employer the employer is also evaluating the worker it is this two sided aspect of the problem that generates a signi cant interest a worker s willingness to accept employment at a rm depends not only on the characteristics of the rm but also the other possible options open to the worker the better an individual s opportunities elsewhere the more selective he or she will be in evaluating a potential partnership an academic who believes harvard may make an offer in the near future will be more selective in evaluating offers from lesser universities in this way expectations play a role if a single man believes that few if any women will nd him an acceptable marriage partner then he may accept the rst opportunity that presents itself partnership formation typically does not comply with a classic market situation where all participants know everything and all trades take place at zero cost finding a job nding a husband or wife or nding a business partner is a time consuming activity where opportunities typically arrive over time at uncertain intervals of time of course we can act in ways that in uence the arrival rate of potential partner workers go to employment agencies or read help wanted advertisements in newspapers singles of a certain age go to discos or join tennis clubs the literature on search and matching sm see mortensen 1982 and pissarides 1990 for early examples 1 provides an excellent framework for the economic journal 109 june f307 f334 royal economic society 1999 published by blackwell publishers 108 cowley road oxford ox4 1jf uk and 350 main street malden ma 02148 usa

does child labour displace schooling evidence on behavioral responses to an enrollment subsidy this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled does child labour displace schooling evidence on behavioral responses to an enrollment subsidy conducted between 1995 and 1996 in bangladesh the study observed that the subsidy increases schooling but its effect on child labour is ambiguous the subsidy increased schooling by far more than it reduced child labour substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy the reduction in the incidence of child labour by boys girls represents about one quarter eighth of the increase in their school enrollment rate

risk financial markets and human capital in a developing country this paper explores the link between financial market incompleteness and human capital accumulation we examine how child school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households using panel data from rural india to pinpoint market imperfections we study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic as well as to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks our main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self insurance but one which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average

marriage markets and assortative mating with household public goods theoretical results and empirical implications this paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage result from joint consumption of household public goods assuming transferable utility within marriage the paper proves that marriage markets will be characterized by positive assortative mating on wealth when spouses differ only in endowments and the gains to marriage result only from public goods when spouses differ in wages and household public goods are produced at home the results imply offsetting effects with public good economies creating an incentive for positive assortative mating on wages and gains from specialization creating an incentive for negative assortative mating on wages the results help explain the persistent lack of empirical support for becker s prediction of negative assortative mating on wages and have implications for empirical analysis of all joint living arrangement decisions

intergenerational mobility and marital sorting we use data from the german socio economic panel and the british household panel survey to estimate the extent of intergenerational economic mobility in a framework that highlights the role played by assortative mating we find that assortative mating plays an important role on average about 40 50 of the covariance between parents and own permanent family income can be attributed to the person to whom one is married this effect is driven by strong spouse correlations in human capital which are larger in germany than britain 2006 the authors journal compilation royal economic society 2006

household responses to economic and demographic shocks marginal logit analysis using indonesian data abstract we analyse the responses of indonesian households to demographic and economic shocks and examine how these responses vary in relation to the household s permanent income and the extent to which the shock is common across the community households respond in different ways to demographic and economic shocks economic shocks are more likely to result in a labour supply response from the household and this probability is further increased if the shock is common for rural households use of savings increases with permanent income the article also examines the role of the interviewer in influencing survey responses

an empirical investigation of asset pricing models using japanese stock market data abstract this article examines the empirical performance of the following asset pricing models i a time separable model ii abel s model with a consumption externality iii the time non separable model iv the consumption based recursive utility model and v the ad hoc factor pricing model the testing framework includes the hansen jagannathan volatility bounds test the hansen jagannathan specification error test and euler equation based generalized method of moments estimation the test evidence indicates that habit forming preferences are empirically supportable and provide a good characterization of the japanese security market data

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

family policy with non cooperative families we consider a non cooperative model of a family s time allocation between market work and providing a home produced family public good such as child care or care for the elderly the model predicts underprovision of the public good because of crowding out this does not necessarily warrant public provision in contrast to other approaches in family economics we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be pareto improving we also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving

income taxes and the marriage decision economic incentives have been found to play an important role in the marriage decision in developed and developing countries however the way in which the income tax treatment of the family affects these incentives has been routinely ignored this paper uses time series data for the united states from 1947 to 1988 to estimate the impact of economic factors including for the first time the tax consequences of marriage on the aggregate marriage rate the estimation results indicate that economic factors like income female wages and education play an important and statistically significant role in the marriage decision in particular the tax consequences of marriage clearly affect the marriage decision when income taxes increase with marriage the aggregate marriage rate declines however the magnitude of this impact is quite small this result suggests that some individuals respond to tax incentives in their marriage choices but that for many individuals taxes do not affect these decisions

geography of the family we study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents the firstborn child s location choice influences the behavior of the second born child and can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the other these strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with firstborn children locating further away from their parents than second born children we also analyze the location choices empirically using german data these data confirm our theoretical predictions jel h41 j10