an interest group model of direct income redistribution an interest group model of the determinants of policies which directly re distribute income to low income persons is developed and tested the model assum es that altruistic taxpayers nonaltruistic taxpayers and needy beneficiaries f orm separate interest groups from which politicians seek support benefit levels depend on variables such as taxpayer income and the price of benefits but unlike median voter models the model also implies a role for interest group strengt h and competition between political parties the author uses latent variable met hods and data on the aid to families with dependent children program to demonstr ate empirical support forthe model copyright 1986 by mit press

group loyalty and the taste for redistribution interpersonal preferences preferences that depend on the characteristics of others are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior as an alternative approach this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences i show that self reported attitudes toward welfare spending are determined not only by financial self interest but also by interpersonal preferences these interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises and racial group loyalty individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises these findings help to explain why levels of welfare benefits are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

explaining interfirm cooperation and performance toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource based view and organizational economics interfirm cooperation and its performance implications are examined in the context of two widely cited theoretical approaches to organizations broadly speaking the resource based view suggests that firms seek to capitalize on and increase their capabilities and endowments whereas organizational economics asserts that firms focus on minimizing the costs of organizing although these perspectives agree on managers likely actions in many areas their predictions diverge when interfirm cooperation is considered we take a step toward reconciling these differences by positing that firms place resource based concerns in front of considerations from organizational economics when deciding whether or not to engage in interfirm cooperation we examined this prediction using data from 94 publicly held restaurant chains the results support our integrated view but also suggest that giving primacy to resource concerns detracts from the performance of some firms we derive several implications of these findings in an effort to guide subsequent inquiry copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

migration and income redistribution responsibilities this study examines whether afdc benefits determine or discourage state to state migration flows in the united states a pooled cross section time series model is developed to estimate afdc benefits in a state and recipients and whether benefits in one state affect benefits in other states a second model using data from the 1980 census and the panel study of income dynamics estimates migration of afdc recipients and the level of benefits in in migration and out migration states both models indicate that small but statistically significant amounts of migration occur which may be quite important but only in the long run movers although small in number are much more likely to move to a state with higher benefits states perceive this migration as important indicating that states should have less control and the federal government more control over income redistribution

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

welfare generosity the importance of administrative efficiency community values and genuine benevolence using 1988 1991 state level data a public expenditure model is estimated for benefits paid through the aid to families with dependent children afdc programme the paper investigates whether differences in programme efficiency community attitudes perceptions of the effects of afdc on recipient behaviour and tastes for redistribution explain the variation in public support for welfare across states

a politico economic theory of income redistribution this study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public good nature of redistribution and political scientists who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands we propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the american states the empirical analysis addresses determinants of the aid to families with dependent children guarantee adjusted for medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled we posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables such as per capita income and latent constructs such as liberal party control we specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the lisrel method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients the findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee

divestiture market valuation and strategy an empirical study of 78 divestitures examines the relationship between type of divestiture and financial market valuation it was found that divestitures linked to corporate or business level stra

children as income producing assets the case of teen illegitimacy and government transfers this paper develops a classical model of the teen fertility decision in the presence of public income transfers the theoretical model predicts that welfare payments will encourage fertility holding constant other economic opportunities and that better economic opportunities will discourage fertility considering the possible simultaneity of illegitimacy rates and benefit levels due to the collective choice process the authors confirm the theoretical models predictions with state level data from 1980 through 1990 the authors find that including fixed effects in the regression to control for unobserved differences between states does not sufficiently control for endogeneity after controlling for endogeneity real welfare benefits are strongly and robustly related to teen illegitimacy the point estimates of the elasticity with respect to changes in the illegitimacy rate are around 1 3 for white teens and 2 1 for black teens real wages for women with a high school education or less are negatively related to teen illegitimacy for white teens with an elasticity of around 0 4 finally male wages appear to have little effect on the illegitimacy rate for white teens but appear negatively correlated with the illegitimacy rate for black teens in some model specifications authors

the demand for welfare generosity this paper estimates economic models of the determinants of state benefit levels in the aid to families with dependent children afdc program using 1969 1992 data these models have been extensively researched however the existing literature has produced an unacceptably wide range of estimates using alternative econometric procedures this paper systematically examines both the specification assumptions underlying previous analyses as well as several additional specification issues it is therefore able to replicate and reconcile estimates from previous studies and to provide updated consensus estimates of the demand for welfare generosity it finds that changes in the average level of income within states have small but statistically significant positive effects on benefits with the confidence bounds on the elasticity extending from 0 11 to 0 82 changes in the effective price of redistribution are found to have at most weak negative effects with elasticities in the range of 0 14 to 0 02 these results are used to evaluate the effects of block grant provisions in the recently enacted welfare reform legislation

the management nexus of imperfect duty kantian views of virtuous relations reasoned discourse and due diligence a nexus of imperfect duty defined as positive commitments that have practical limits describes business behavior toward building affable and virtuous relations maintaining reasoned social discourse and performing the due diligence necessary for making knowledgeable business decisions a theory of the development and extent of the limits of these imperfect managerial duties is presented here a theory that in part explains the activities and personnel included under the firm s umbrella as a result the nexus of imperfect duty is shown to complement the perfect duty based nexus of contracts theory of the firm the existence of flexible trade offs involving these duties trade offs limited by contractual arrangements whether explicit or implicit is shown to be one of the advantages of imperfect duty for developing business relations

why stakeholder and stockholder theories are not necessarily contradictory a knightian insight the normative foundations of the investor centered model of corporate governance represented in mainstream economics by the nexus of contracts view of the firm have come under attack mainly by proponents of normative stakeholder theory we argue that the nexusof contracts view is static and limited due to its assumption of price output certainty we attempt a synthesis of the nexus of contracts and the knightian views which provides novel insights into the normative adequacy of the investor centered firm implications for scholarship and management practice follow from our discussion

american federalism welfare policy and residential choices the relationship between welfare benefit levels and the residential choices of the poor raises two issues for federalism in the united states do state benefit levels affect the residential choices of the poor do residential choices of the poor affect the level at which a state sets its benefit levels empirical studies have seldom studied the interconnection between these two issues this research estimates simultaneously the mutual effects of welfare benefits and poverty rates while controlling for other economic and political variables when benefit levels become high the size of the poverty population increases conversely when poverty rates become high benefit levels are cut the findings are consistent with the claim that state determined benefit levels distort policy and residential choices

the choice of organizational form the case of franchising abstract we examine companies that franchise some units and centrally operate own others the agency problems confronting these two organizational forms are analyzed testable hypotheses are developed the empirical results support the notion that owning versus franchising reflects a trade off among agency related problems the cost of monitoring store managers appears to be especially important in the own franchise decision the level of repeat business and initial investment requirements per unit also appear to be important

the effects of grants in aid on state and local expenditures abstract this paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures e g closed end grants the methods are applied to the afdc program the results show that because of the kinked nature of the grant formula 1 the present federal formula actually increases cross state inequality in afdc benefits 2 several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits and 3 the so called flypaper effect disappears

shareholder theory and kant s duty of beneficence this article draws on the moral philosophy of immanuel kant to explore whether a corporate duty of beneficence to non shareholders is consistent with the orthodox shareholder theory of the firm it examines the ethical framework of milton friedman s argument and asks whether it necessarily rules out the well being of non shareholders as a corporate objective the article examines kant s distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue the latter including the duty of beneficence and investigates their consistency with the shareholder theory the article concludes that it is possible within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of non shareholders furthermore shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral consequences of the firm s activities on non shareholding stakeholders

games the states don t play welfare benefits and the theory of fiscal federalism fiscal federalism theory predicts that states will behave strategically in welfare programs because voter demand for welfare is sensitive to tax price while the tax price itself changes because of welfare induced migration this paper tests these propositions on afdc in the united states for a panel from 1982 88 using new models for the determination of the recipiency ratio the tax price and composite neighbors the data do not support any substantial tax price elasticity of demand for welfare estimates of migration effects on tax price are found to be sensitive to specification copyright 1995 by mit press

aggressive tax avoidance by managers of multinational companies as a violation of their moral duty to obey the law a kantian rationale managers of multinational companies often favour an aggressive tax avoidance strategy that pushes the legal limits onto the advantage of shareholders and the disadvantage of the spirit of democratically legitimized tax laws the public and media debate whether such aggressive behaviour is immoral aggressive tax avoidance is a subset of the aggressive legal interpretations potentially observable in all fields which places little weight on the will of a democratically legitimized legislation a thorough ethical analysis based on the deontological approach of kant demonstrates that aggressive tax avoidance as a special case of operating on the edge of legal boundaries is potentially immoral applying the kantian contradiction of conception or will test shows that this maxim might not be conceived or willed as a general law of nature if all natural or legal persons aggressively interpret laws on all subjects and in every imaginable situation then central principles of the system of law we all rely upon would be severely compromised therefore aggressive tax avoidance by managers of multinational companies may violate the managers moral duty to obey not only the letter but also the intention or spirit of the law the validity of the argumentation depends critically on the formulation and interpretation of the respective maxims and on assumptions about the legal system preserving central elements of kantian philosophy the article demonstrates the complexity of a philosophical argumentation which tries to justify the moral intuitions that underpin the common negative evaluation of aggressive legal strategies in business

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

a social contract account for csr as an extended model of corporate governance i rational bargaining and justification this essay seeks to give a contractarian foundation to the concept of corporate social responsibility csr meant as an extended model of corporate governance of the firm it focuses on justification according to the contractarian point of view leaving compliance and implementation problems to a related article sacconi 2004b forthcoming in the journal of business ethics it begins by providing a definition of csr as an extended model of corporate governance based on the fiduciary duties owed to all the firm s stakeholders then by establishing the basic context of incompleteness of contracts and abuse of authority it analyses how the extended view of corporate governance arises directly from criticism of the contemporary neo institutional economic theory of the firm thereafter an application of the theory of bargaining games is used to deduce the structure of a multi stakeholder firm on the basis of the idea of a constitutional contract which satisfies basic requirements of impartial justification and accordance with intuitions of social justice this is a sequential model of constitutional bargaining whereby a constitution is first chosen and then a post constitutional coalition game is played on the basis of the unique solution given to each step in the bargaining model the quest for a prescriptive theory of governance and strategic management is accomplished so that i am able to define an objective function for the firm consistent with the idea of csr finally a contractarian potential explanation for the emergence of the multi fiduciary firm is provided

evaluating stakeholder theory this paper is the third in a series of four that is directed at understanding and assessing stakeholder theory for the purposes of business ethics it addresses the suitability and viability of the theory rejecting objections of a moral and efficiency sort based respectively on claims about property rights and the economic superiority of the alternative stockholder approach but accepting that implementation problems require limiting both the number of groupings admitted to stakeholder status and the degree of responsibility towards them the conclusion looks forward to the construction of a suitably limited version of the stakeholder approach in a fourth paper drawing upon this one and the previous two