optimal incentive schemes when only the agents best output matters to the principal standard principal agent models assume that the principal s payoff is a function of the total output of all agents in many real world situations however the principal s payoff is based solely on the best of the agents outputs e g the first agent to make an innovation the most creative advertising campaign or the cheapest product design the results obtained from such a model differ from the standard results in a number of respects for instance even when identical agents perform identical tasks the optimal incentive scheme will often differ across agents also the principal may want to increase the variance of the agents output or reduce the correlation of output across agents even when the agents are risk averse

the effect of political risk on the forward exchange bias the case of elections abstract the unsuccesful search for explanations of the forward bias has concentrated on variables suggested by traditional models of risk political news although important to foreign exchange traders has not been considered as a determinant of the forward bias i present a model in which the forward bias changes when the governing party changes elections in major industrial countries provide a natural test of the model the forward bias changed as predicted after half of the 13 elections in canada france the united kingdom and the united states between 1973 and 1985 politics provides useful information for foreign exchange traders which economists should not ignore

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

democratic processes political risk and foreign exchange markets 3i6 foreign exchange markets are among the deepest and widest financial markets in the world technological innovations and market liberal ization have made currency markets enormous by 1992 the vol ume of transactions topped over 1 trillion each day moreover economic agents can trade currencies with shocking speed during the september 1992 e m s crisis british monetary authorities expended over two billion dollars to support the pegged value of the pound in only a few hours the behavior of these currency markets can affect not only trade flows and in ternational investment key determinants of economic performance but also political outcomes consequently exchange rates have become a highly salient issue both at the domestic and international levels indeed some political economists assert that rapidly adjusting international markets may overwhelm the ability of policymakers to control policy and according to the most extreme view thwart any meaningful democracy understanding how currency markets behave therefore is fundamental step to assess accu rately how the internationalization of economic activity influences demo cratic politics we investigate how democratic political events affect currency markets by focusing on the relationship between the spot and forward exchange rate markets the efficient markets hypothesis implies that the forward ex change rate the price of the currency deliverable thirty days in the fu ture should be an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate that is today s thirty day forward rate should on average accurately pre dict the spot exchange rate one month from today empirical studies how ever conclude that the forward rate is often a biased predictor of future ex change rate changes many economic models attribute this bias to a risk premium where currency traders demand a higher return for holding the currency

time preference and international lending and borrowing in an overlapping generations model two economies represented by diamond type overlapping generations models and differing only in their pure rates of time preference are joined together capital formation balance of payments behavior and welfare are compared under autarky and openness with a positive natural rate of growth the low time preference country runs a current account surplus in the steady state but not necessarily outside it if preexisting capital is not shiftable between countries integration in the world economy makes the high time preference country worse off in the short run the ranking of stationary utility levels under autarky and openness is ambiguous

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

beggar thy neighbour exchange rate regime misadvice from misapplications of mundell 1961 and the remedy economists invoke mundell 1961 in arguing for the general policy of a flexible exchange rate regime as a means of restoring equilibria after shocks but there is a discrepancy between the intent of the general policy and attempts at its implementation as identified by specific changes in exchange rates when we assemble the set of specific changes called for by distinct economists operating as advocates for individual countries these are uniformly in the form of beggar thy neighbour advice i e travesties of objectively identifying disequilibria and a menace to international cooperation and peace this paper traces the unintended travesties to problems of complexity and uncertainty problems that implicitly are assumed absent in mundell 1961 rendering the situation so simple that equilibria are transparent the problems remained essentially unaddressed when economists extended mundell 1961 via expected utility theory since this theory also ignores the impossibility of maximising and the complexities of central bankers private firms and others in doing the evaluation stage in reaching decisions the problems can be overcome by modelling within skat the stages of knowledge ahead theory this paper points to experimental evidence in support of the view that under all sorts of disequilibrating shocks currency unions outperform flexible currencies by eliminating the inefficiencies generated by exchange rate uncertainty

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

financial interdependence and the state international monetary relations at century s end as the twentieth century draws to a close one can find sharply contrasting views among leading scholars on almost every key issue in positive international political economy how strong are international as opposed to domestic influences on policy how important are issues of national security high politics versus economic considerations low politics what role do institutions international and domestic play in influencing and constraining the behavior of governments why is international cooperation rare but not unheard of the list goes on and on

are currency crises self fulfilling abstract this paper studies the respective roles of the fundamentals and self fulfilling speculation in currency crises we first present a model of a fixed exchange rate system in which self fulfilling speculation can arise following a bifurcation in the fundamentals we then estimate the model in the case of the 1992 3 crisis of the french franc and find some evidence that self fulfilling speculation was at work

politics and exchange rate forecasts abstract standard exchange rate models perform poorly in out of sample forecasting when compared to the random walk model we posit part of the poor performance of these models may be due to omission of political factors we test this hypothesis by including political variables that capture party specific election specific and candidate specific characteristics surprisingly we find our political model outperforms the random walk in out of sample forecasting at 1 12 month horizons for the pound dollar mark dollar pound mark and the trade weighted dollar mark and pound exchange rates

on disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry we study how a contest organizer who seeks to maximize participant effort should disclose the information on the actual number of contestants in an imperfectly discriminatory contest with stochastic entry when each potential contestant has a fixed probability of entering the contest the optimal disclosure policy depends crucially on the properties of the characteristic function h f f where f is the impact function the contest organizer prefers full disclosure full concealment if h is strictly concave strictly convex however the expected equilibrium effort is independent of the prevailing information disclosure policy if a linear h tullock contest applies

macroeconomic dynamics in a multi country economy a dynamic optimization approach using a multicountry model with perfect foresight dynamic optimization by infinitely lived households the authors analyze the dynamics of macroeconomic nonmonetary and monetary variables the authors show that the most patient country initially accumulates foreign debt but eventually decumulates this debt and becomes a creditor it monotonically increases its consumption and experiences monotonic price and exchange rate appreciation the moderately patient country initially accumulates foreign assets but eventually decumulates them and becomes a debtor its consumption also follows a humped path the least patient country monotonically decumulates foreign assets lowers its consumption and experiences rising inflation and exchange rate depreciation copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

time patience and specialization patterns in the presence of asset trade specialization patterns in an open economy two sector growth model with endogenous capital accumulation are examined in the presence of free international lending and borrowing without free international lending and borrowing it is known that whereas the less time patient country decumulates real capital the more patient country accumulates real capital and eventually specializes in a capital intensive industry however free trade of international financial assets causes a dramatic change in long run specialization patterns in this case the less patient country may well specialize in the capital intensive industry and the more patient country in the labor intensive industry

european monetary upheavals the european monetary system was thrown into disarray by the speculative crises from september 1992 to august 1993 the consequent widening of the permitted bands of fluctuation from 2 25 to 15 has added to the uncertainty in the european economic environment and cast doubt on the strategy for monetary unification set out in the maastricht treaty this book provides a response to the new situation from a variety of economic perspectives it includes analyses of the upheavals themselves separate chapters on monetary policy in france germany and the uk and discussions of implications for the future the papers are written by academic contributors from the usa and europe as well as the uk the book also includes a panel discussion in which economists from national and international institutions debate the future of european monetary integration

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

carrots and sticks prizes and punishments in contests i introduction contests are widely used to model political lobbying sports competitions job promotions and r d races in most cases the contest s organizer has some control over the structure of rewards and punishments teachers determine who passes and who fails the exam a company sets rules about promotions and layoffs and sport governing bodies choose the number of teams advancing to a higher league and the number of those relegated to a lower one in this paper we characterize the optimal prize structure in a contest where the designer can use both rewards carrots and punishments sticks in order to motivate participants to exert effort 1 although both rewards and punishments are part of many existing incentive contracts the literature on contests focused on the incentive role of rewards because a contest that uses some punishments can be replicated by one that uses only rewards and yields the same incentives but this equivalence breaks down if the contest designer faces a budget constraint and if both rewards and punishments are costly the main focus of the present paper is to study contest design when the designer is budget constrained and it is costly to punish or reward players costly punishments appear in many situations for example in labor tournaments a firm usually incurs costs when firing workers who perform poorly e g worker compensation production disruption loss of clients and usually face search and replacement costs e g think about a faculty denying tenure to some candidates in other instances punishments are less costly to implement e g relegation in sport tournaments and we also briefly deal with this set up we assume here that the designer has a limited budget which means that costly punishments cannot be arbitrarily high subject to her budget constraint the designer determines the number and size of prizes punishments in order to maximize the participants expected total effort in particular some prizes can be positive rewards or negative punishments given the prize structure players choose their effort levels in order to maximize their expected payoff it is important to note that in a contest with n participants the marginal effect of each of n prizes on the participants total effort is different and can be either positive or negative if the marginal effect of the k th prize is positive its value given a budget constraint should be positive reward or zero and if the marginal effect is negative its value should be negative punishment or zero thus given that the contest designer has a limited budget he will prefer to distribute the entire prize sum to the prize with the highest marginal effect on the participants total effort relative to its cost in this paper we show that the relative effectiveness of punishments compared to rewards crucially depends on the curvature of the distribution of player abilities exploiting results about normalized spacings among order statistics developed by barlow and prochan 1966 we first revisit one of the main results in moldovanu and sela 2001 if punishment is not feasible the optimal prize structure offers a single reward to the top performer if rewards are not feasible we then show that the designer should only punish the player with the lowest performance if the distribution of abilities has an increasing hazard or failure rate if this last condition is not satisfied more punishments may be optimal if the designer can punish as well as reward the optimal prize structure will depend on the relative marginal cost of punishments and on the distribution of the players abilities for example if the marginal cost of punishments is the same as the marginal cost of rewards it is optimal to punish the worst performing player if the distribution of abilities is convex if that player is punished even high types will work hard to avoid performing worst because they know that there is a relatively high probability that competitors also have high types

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

optimal punishment in contests with endogenous entry abstract we study optimal punishment in an all pay contest with endogenous entry where the participant with the lowest performance may be punished when a small punishment is introduced the lowest ability players drop out and those of medium ability exert less effort while only the highest ability players exert more effort a sufficient condition is given for the optimal punishment to be zero if the objective is to maximize the expected total effort as cost functions become more convex punishment becomes less desirable when the objective is to maximize the expected highest individual effort a positive punishment is desirable under much weaker conditions

spill over effects of supply side changes in a two country economy with capital accumulation abstract using a two country dynamic optimization model with capital accumulation we explore the effect of such supply side changes as a rise in productivity and a reduction in the corporate tax rate on the equilibrium path and the welfare of two countries the welfare effect consists of a tax distortion term and a wealth term those supply side changes in the creditor country increase its welfare but unambiguously decrease the debtor country s welfare as capital moves from the debtor country to the creditor country

political parties and monetary commitments we argue that political parties will choose monetary institutions in order to help them win elections and retain office increased levels of economic openness in the industrial democracies have complicated the pursuit of office by altering the policy preferences of constituents and decreasing the ability of cabinet ministers to deliver promised economic outcomes we contend that monetary commitments can help political parties manage diverse constituent interests restore policy effectiveness and ultimately maintain their position in office therefore we expect that fixed exchange rates and central bank independence can improve cabinet durability especially under conditions of economic openness in the first section we discuss how fixed exchange rates and central bank independence can insulate cabinets from the political shocks of increased economic openness to determine the political value of these commitments we then test the effect of exchange rate commitments and central bank independence on cabinet durability in the second section in the third section we use the results of our statistical models to generate expected cabinet durability for the countries in our sample under alternative institutional configurations by comparing the expected durabilities we show that most monetary reforms have helped or at least not hurt expected cabinet durability

on the international capital ownership pattern at the turn of the twenty first century abstract this paper studies the trends of current accounts and accompanying capital movements from a growth theoretic perspective and to predict the credit debt structure among major industrialized countries the united states japan and west germany at the turn of the twenty first century the past movements of national saving and investment support the habitat view by feldstein and horioka that the supply of savings create investment where it is generated rapid increases in the united states foreign debt may imply however the relevance of the traditional view that capital moves so as to equate its rate of returns the simulation exercises shows that the ratio of external debt to capital stock in the united states will rise to 30 40 over the long run in absence of the recovery of its saving ratio to the historical standard in the 1970s

optimal prize structures in elimination contests abstract we consider multi stage elimination contests where agents efforts at different stages generate some output for the principal depending on the output function various prize structures can be optimal if the output function depends much more on efforts applied at later stages than on those applied at the earlier ones the optimal prize structure can be non monotone that is at some stages prizes fall and the agents who are more successful may earn less necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of such structures are provided we also show that for any increasing prize shape there exists an output function such that this prize shape is optimal further we consider the case of limited liability where the principal is not allowed to use negative prizes but can choose a contest success function csf there is always an efficient equilibrium under which the principal is able to extract the full surplus from the agents and the corresponding optimal prize structure is always increasing moreover under some plausible assumptions the optimal csf is necessary convex which corresponds to the most frequently used prize schemes in practice

the assessment macroeconomic policy after emu in this paper we discuss the emergence of the new european macroeconomic structure within emu we focus on three important elements the wage fixing authorities in each country the fiscal authorities in each country and the single european central bank ecb we identify serious problems which might arise in coordinating both the wage setters and the fiscal authorities and argue that these problems could be exacerbated if the ecb conducts monetary policy inappropriately in the light of this we provide recommendations for the conduct of monetary policy by the ecb the paper also briefly discusses financial stability issues and the interaction between the countries in emu and the rest of the world copyright 1998 by oxford university press

the american political economy macroeconomics and electoral politics here is the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on relationships between the economy and politics in the years from eisenhower through reagan extending and deepening his earlier work which had major impact in both political science and economics hibbs traces the patterns in and sources of postwar growth unemployment and inflation he identifies which groups win and lose from inflations and recessions he also shows how voters perceptions and reactions to economic events affect the electoral fortunes of political parties and presidents hibbs s analyses demonstrate that political officials in a democratic society ignore the economic interests and demands of their constituents at their peril because episodes of prosperity and austerity frequently have critical influence on voters behavior at the polls the consequences of eisenhower s last recession of ford s unwillingness to stimulate the economy of carter s stalled recovery were electorally fatal whereas johnson s nixon s and reagan s successes in presiding over rising employment and real incomes helped win elections the book develops a major theory of macroeconomic policy action that explains why priority is given to growth unemployment inflation and income distribution shifts with changes in partisan control of the white house the analysis shows how such policy priorities conform to the underlying economic interests and preferences of the governing party s core political supporters throughout the study hibbs is careful to take account of domestic institutional arrangements and international economic events that constrain domestic policy effectiveness and influence domestic economic outcomes hibbs s interdisciplinary approach yields more rigorous and more persuasive characterizations of the american political economy than either purely economic apolitical analyses or purely partisan politicized accounts his book provides a useful benchmark for the advocacy of new policies for the 1990s a handy volume for politicians and their staffs as well as for students and teachers of politics and economics

exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks this paper evaluates the causes and consequences of episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets using data from 1959 through 1993 for twenty oecd countries we consider the antecedents and aftermath of devaluations and revaluations flotations fixings and speculative attacks which may not be successful we find that realignments of fixed exchange rates are alike devaluations are preceded by political instability budget and current account deficits and fast growth of money and prices revaluations are mirror images of devaluations speculative attacks resemble devaluations but money growth and inflation are more endemic and there is no last minute attempt to tighten monetary policy in contrast few consistent correlations link regime transitions like flotations or fixings to macroeconomic or political variables transitions between exchange rate regimes are largely idiosyncratic and are neither consistently provoked ex ante by systematic imbalances nor typically justified ex post by subsequent changes in policy we conclude that there are no clear early warning signals of many speculative attacks and no easy solutions for policy makers barry eichengreen andrew k rose and charles wyplosz

the lifetime of a unilateral target zone some extended results abstract in dumas and svensson journal of international economics 36 1994 467 the lifetime of a krugman quarterly journal of economics 106 1991 669 682 type target zone model is found to be extremely long this paper shows that the lifetime of the identical target zone regime can be much lower when real disturbances occur in particular the mean lifetime is found to be very low when real disturbances occur and the real exchange rate elasticity of the demand for domestic goods is very low it is also shown that allowing for monetary disturbances to have real effects has very little effect on the lifetime the results indicate the conditions under which real disturbances might trigger currency crises

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

measures of cabinet durability a conceptual and empirical evaluation the measurement of cabinet durability depends on the events that are considered to end the life of a cabinet such as a change in the parties composing it a change in its coalitional status a change of prime minister a cabinet resignation or a parliamentary election seven such events used in the literature are critically reviewed in this article the five most important measures are then correlated with each other and with the three independent variables one party versus coalition cabinets minimal winning versus oversized coalitions and the number of parties in the party system that are frequently used to explain cabinet durability all five measures turn out to be closely related to each other and all are basically acceptable but the simplest measure based solely on changes in the party composition of the cabinet yields the best results

macroeconomic policy exchange rate dynamics and optimal asset accumulation the paper develops a model of exchange rate and current account determination for a small economy peopled by infinitely lived utility maximizing households in this setting a central bank purchase of foreign exchange has no real effects when central bank foreign reserves earn interest at the world rate and proceeds are returned to the public in contrast an increase in the monetary growth rate does have real effects even in the long run the model developed here implies that an increase in government spending may lead to a surplus on current account the external adjustment process predicted by the model is one in which consumption real balances and external assets all rise or fall simultaneously

digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back