exploration and extraction in a duopoly exhaustible resource market exploration for an exhaustible natural resource is valuable because it produces information about the resource stock i model a duopoly exhaustible resource industry with imperfect information about stock size as a two period game where each period is made up of an exploration stage and an extraction stage i derive the value of gaining information about stock size prior to committing to an extraction plan both for the exploring firm and for the rival i show that an exploring firm would prefer on average to keep exploration information private but that industry profit is higher when information is made public le processus d e xploration et d extraction dans un marche de ressource naturelle non renouvelable oui il y a un duopole le processus d exploration est utile parce qu il permet de produire des renseignements quant a la taille du stock d une ressource naturelle non renouvelable l auteur examine un modele de duopole dans un jeu a deux p6riodes pour une industrie de ressource naturelle non renouvelable l information est imparfaite quant a la taille du stock de resource et chacune des deux p6riodes a un stage d exploration et un stage d extraction l auteur d6rive la valeur de l information additionnelle qujant a la taille du stock de ressource avant de s etngager dans un plan d extraction a la fois pour l entreprise exploratrice et pour l entreprise rivale on montre que l enterprise exploratrice va pr6f6rer en moyenne garder l information priv6e mais que les profits dans l industrie sont plus 6lev6s quand l information est rendue publique

information disadvantage in linear cournot duopolies with differentiated products abstract we focus on a class of linear cournot duopolies with differentiated products and prove that whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage depends on firms information setup specifically we show that when the cross effects are common value the uninformed firm that commits to quantity will not have lower ex ante profits than a firm that has complete information about its cross effects this result contrasts to the information advantage that holds in the same duopolies with independent cross effects

on the undesirability of commodity taxation even when income taxation is not optimal abstract an important result due to atkinson and stiglitz 1976 atkinson a b stiglitz j e 1976 the design of tax structure direct versus indirect taxation journal of public economics 6 55 75 is that differential commodity taxation is not optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax given weak separability of utility between labor and all consumption goods this article demonstrates that this conclusion holds regardless of whether the income tax is optimal in particular given any commodity tax and income tax system differential commodity taxation can be eliminated in a manner that results in a pareto improvement also differential commodity taxation can be proportionally reduced so as to generate a pareto improvement in addition for commodity tax reforms that neither eliminate nor proportionally reduce differential taxation a simple efficiency condition is offered for determining whether a pareto improvement is possible

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

uncertainty and optimal taxation in defense of commodity taxes abstract this paper re examines the theory of optimal commodity taxation in the presence of a linear income tax under wage uncertainty there are two categories of goods the consumption levels in one group are committed to before the resolution of uncertainty and those of the other after the paper i characterizes the structure of the optimal commodity taxes in view of the insurance they provide against random wage movements ii proves that optimal taxation requires a mix of differential commodity taxes and a uniform lump sum tax and iii demonstrates that the post uncertainty goods should face a positive tax rate which is higher than the tax rate on the pre committed goods

re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

information acquisition as business strategy information acquisition activities such as accounting disclosure financial analysis and marketing research are major concerns in moder business administration business enterprises often invest enormous amounts of time and money in obtaining information for the various tasks of decision making a growing literature is devoted to addressing the role of information in the production decision and the market structure however little effort has been devoted to understanding information acquisition as an essential part of business strategy the purpose of this paper is to analyze information gathering as a competition strategy of manufacturing firms and to examine its implications for the welfare of society li mckelvey and page 13 and vives 20 use a two stage game model to study the information acquisition of oligopolistic firms however these authors ignore the strategic aspect of information acquisition in both 13 and 20 firms are symmetric and produce a homogenous good therefore the equilibrium is also symmetric all firms gather the same amount of industrywide information we generalize 13 in several ways we allow firms to produce differentiated products and to use the information they acquire to contest the product market moreover the information in our model can be partly firm specific and partly industry wide we adopt a convex information cost function more general than that of 13 therefore 13 can be interpreted as a special case of the model presented here novshek and sonnenschein 14 gal or 6 vives 19 and li 12 study the possibility of trading or sharing the exogenous industry wide information about demand okada 15 fried 4 li 12 shapiro 18 and seidmann 17 examine the incentive for disclosing exogenous firm specific information about costs in an oligopoly 2 we extend the analysis in this literature

strategic considerations the pecking order hypothesis and market reactions to equity financing myers and majluf 1984 showed that in a world of asymmetric information managers of overvalued firms issue equity while managers of undervalued firms use cash if available this paper shows that in a multiperiod world managers of undervalued firms may find it optimal to issue stock even though cash is available consequently the market does not interpret all announcements of equity issues as signals of firm overvaluation the paper also generates predictions regarding the effect of information asymmetry and investment oppor tunities on i dividend policy and ii the cross sectional distribution of market reactions when an equity issue is announced

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

strategic transparency and informed trading will capital market integration force convergence of corporate governance dominant investors can influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information collection under strategic competition transparency results in higher variability of profits and output thus lenders prefer less transparency since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position while equity holders prefer more market interaction creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms thus entry by transparent competitors will improve price informativeness moreover as the return to information gathering increases with liquidity increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank control to keep firms opaque

disclosure strategies for pollution control disclosure strategies which involve public and or private attempts to increase the availability of information on pollution form the basis for what some have called the third wave in pollution control policy after legal regulation the first wave and market based instruments the second wave while these strategies have become common in natural resource settings forest certification and organic farming for example they are less familiar in a pollution control context yet the number of applications in that context is now growing in both oecd and developing countries this survey will review what we know and don t know about the use of disclosure strategies to control pollution and conclude with the author s sense of where further research would be particularly helpful

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

information sharing information free riding and capital structure in oligopolies we study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association focusing on the case of cournot competition with demand uncertainty we find that the standard result for all equity firms that information will not be shared may be reversed when one firm has better access to information than the other leverage may be a way for the latter firm to free ride on the former firm s information with ex ante symmetric firms a trade association will be formed even if information sharing does not occur

redistribution and social insurance we study optimal redistribution and insurance in a life cycle economy with private idiosyncratic shocks we characterize pareto optima show the forces determining optimal labor distortions and derive closed form expressions for their limiting behavior the labor distortions for high productivity shocks are determined by the labor elasticity and the higher moments of the shock process the labor distortions for low productivity shocks are determined by the autocorrelation of the shock process redistributive objectives and past distortions in a model calibrated using newly available estimates of idiosyncratic shocks the labor distortions are u shaped and the savings distortions generally increase in current earnings jel d82 d91 h21 h23 i38 j22 j24

adjustment costs durables and aggregate consumption abstract previous tests of the permanent income hypothesis pih have focused on either non durables or durables expenditures in isolation this paper studies consumer purchases of non durables and durables as the outcome of a single optimization problem it is shown that with non separability in utility the presence of adjustment costs of changing durables stocks may affect the time series properties of both components of expenditure an econometric test of the pih based on the model developed in the paper is both more efficient and less prone to bias than those in some previous studies however this test confirms earlier rejections of the pih in aggregate quarterly data

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

communication in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper studies communication in a static cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs we investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk and show that when these conditions are violated it may be possible to construct informative cheap talk equilibria if the firms can communicate through a third party communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk is impossible we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium for the firms

the role of debt and perferred stock as a solution to adverse investment incentives we analyze the optimal mix of debt common equity and preferred equity in a model with an investment opportunity and asymmetric information about its quality and show that an all equity financed firm will overinvest issuing the appropriate amount of debt before the project becomes available resolves this overinvestment problem introducing a second motive for debt such as taxes leads to a role for preferred stock as a means of enhancing the firm s debt capacity by creating additional incentives to invest we derive an opti mal capital structure involving debt preferred stock and common stock this paper examines the ifnpact of a firm s capital structure on its subsequent investment decisions we assume that a firm s equityholders receive private information about the quality of a project that must be funded externally before the project becomes available and before the information asymmetry exists however the equityholders can choose a capital structure from among debt preferred stock and common stock we show that a subsequent informational asymmetry about project quality induces fully equity financed firms to overin vest that is to accept some negative net present value investments this overin vestment will be reflected in security values prior to the investment we then demonstrate that an appropriate initial debt issue eliminates this suboptimal in vestment behavior and results in an optimal initial debt equity ratio not based upon taxes bankruptcy costs or other exogenous factors we then allow for a corporate tax advantage to debt that leads the firm to issue additional debt however the additional debt creates an underinvestment problem we demonstrate that preferred stock has features that generate incen tives for equityholders to invest and so preferred stock enhances the firm s debt capacity i e the firm can issue more debt in conjunction with preferred stock without creating an underinvestment problem

how should capital be taxed this survey discusses how capital should be taxed in advanced economies we review the theoretical optimal tax literature survey empirical studies on the distribution of capital and the distortion

indirect taxation is superfluous under separability and taste homogeneity a simple proof indirect taxation is of no use when nonlinear income taxation is available in an economy where everyone has the same taste for goods an elementary proof of this result due to atkinson and stiglitz atkinson a stiglitz j 1976 the design of tax structure direct versus indirect taxation journal of public economics 6 55 75 is provided

insurance and taxation over the life cycle we consider a dynamic mirrlees economy in a life cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement individual productivity evolves as a markov process and is private information we use a first order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour income tax rate when productivity is an ar 1 our formula resembles an ar 1 with a trend where i the auto regressive coefficient equals that of productivity ii the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the frisch elasticity of labour and iii the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth the last property implies a form of short run regressivity our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights the average labour tax rises from 0 to 37 over 40 years whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12 to 0 at retirement we compare the second best solution to simple history independent tax systems calibrated to mimic these average tax rates we find that age dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains in this way our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems copyright 2013 oxford university press

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

licensing a non drastic innovation under double informational asymmetry this paper deals with the problem faced by a patentee owning a new production process whose value is unknown ex ante the patentee must license the new technology to users in order to profit from it and each potential licensee has production costs using the technology that are unknown to everyone until after contracting at which point each licensee gets private information about her own costs moreover the patentee cannot observe outputs of potential licensees and therefore must use lump sum rather than per unit royalty schedules to license the technology in this setting the optimal licensing scheme from both the industry and the innovator viewpoints is defined as well as the socially optimal dynamic industrial structure to market the technology welfare aspects of regulation on patents length are also discussed in this context

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment a three stage game of production technology signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non observable by consumers the only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it however a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost by assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level finally and importantly under restrictive conditions on labeling cost ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy however ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point

which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax the analysis takes as its point of departure a continuum of consumers economy in which an optimum income tax exists and is the only tax instrument in operation the welfare effects of introducing small excise taxes to supplement the income tax are then explored essential in this context are changes in the tax distortions of work incentives it is shown that a commodity should be taxed or subsidized depending on whether it is positively or negatively related to leisure in a sense which is precisely defined the results are related to earlier contributions to the literature on direct versus indirect taxation the history of debates on the proper roles of direct and indirect taxation goes back at least to the days of gladstone as well described by atkinson 1977 the prevailing political opinion of the balance between the two types of taxes has varied over time at present the swing in a number of european countries seems to be in favour of reforms towards tax systems which rely more heavily on indirect taxation and less on income taxation in view of this long economic political record it is not surprising that the choice between income tax and commodity taxes has also become an important subject in tax theory an early contribution to the understanding of this issue was corlett and hague 1953 54 their main model considers a three good economy containing leisure and two taxed commodities there is only one consumer or a population of identical consumers labour is the only source of income producer prices are fixed the government s revenue requirement is given the starting point of the analysis is a situation in which the two commodities are taxed at uniform rates the question which is analyzed is then how the government can raise welfare by slightly differentiating the tax rates the answer which is derived is that the consumer good which is the stronger substitute for labour complement with leisure should be taxed at

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

information as regulation the effect of community right to know laws on toxic emissions abstract there is growing academic and policy level interest in the use of information as quasi regulatory mechanisms such as toxic release inventory tri and green labels mandatory disclosure requirements have been touted as market based incentives that may affect firm behavior we provide new evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure requirements by examining firm behavior in response to disclosures of tri emissions we find that firms with the largest stock price decline on the day this information became public subsequently reduced emissions more than their industry peers this is consistent with the view that financial markets may provide strong incentives for firms to change their environmental behavior

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems abstract in this paper we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills which evolve stochastically over time we require agents preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor however we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation in this environment we derive a generalized version of the inverse euler equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative we also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature we show that under weak conditions it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear and taxes transfers are history dependent only at retirement the average asset income tax in this system is zero

information sharing between vertical hierarchies abstract when do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information we show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents information with small externalities principals share information when externalities and correlation have opposite signs and do not share information when externalities and correlation have the same sign in this second case principals face a prisoners dilemma since they obtain higher profits by sharing information

a dynamic model of housing demand estimation and policy implications in the u s macroeconomic policy makers are concerned about how consumers will respond to falling incomes nominal home prices falling income rising mortgage interest rates and tightening credit standards in order to address these questions we estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of housing demand in the model consumers maximize expected discounted lifetime utility from housing services and a composite consumption good the model allows for realistic features of the housing market including non convex adjustment costs from buying and selling a home and credit constraints from minimum downpayment requirements we use the forward simulation procedure of bajari benkard and levin 2007 to estimate the structural parameters especially the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing services using data from the panel study of income dynamics given the estimated model parameters we simulate the partial equilibrium consumption and housing and

too much information sharing welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly by using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations we study how oligopolists information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade off in cournot oligopoly on the one hand it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision as the literature shows on the other hand information sharing increases the firms incentives to acquire information and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms information interestingly the latter effect may dominate the former effect

on the taxation of durable goods this paper proposes a mirrleesian theory of commodity taxation in the presence of durable goods nondurable goods should be taxed uniformly provided that the preferences over nondurable consumption are weakly separable from labor effort a uniform taxation across all goods is optimal if the utility from durable consumption is linear and the preferences are additively separable between durable goods nondurable goods and labor effort if those conditions are not met wealth effects and substitution effects justify the use of differential commodity taxes to characterize the sign of the tax differential the paper exploits a substitution euler equation that links the marginal rate of substitution between durable and nondurable consumption across time finally an application of this theory suggests that housing investment should face higher tax rates than nondurable consumption

information sharing with capacity uncertainty the case of coffee when faced with uncertain capacity constraints coumot oligopolists face two problems should they share information once it becomes known to them and can quantity collusion be sustained this paper shows that agreeing to reveal information does not always increase expected profits as it does in previous models in which the uncertainty is a constant marginal cost parameter this paper also demonstrates that when collusion is not enforceable and information cannot be reliably shared trigger strategies can support equilibrium profits greater than cournot profits when demand is known and supply is uncertain a situation found in agricultural markets such as coffee partage de l information quand la capacite de production est incertaine le cas du cafe quand ils sont en face de contraintes incertaines sur la capacite de production les oligopoleurs a la coumot font face a deux problemes devraient ils partager l information quand elle devient connue et est ce que la collusion via les quantites est viable ce memoire montre que se mettre d accord pour partager l information n augmente pas toujours les profits anticipes comme c est le cas dans des modeles anterieurs oiu l incertitude est un parametre constant du couft marginal on montre aussi que quand la collusion n est pas vigoureusement policee et que l information ne peut pas etre fiablement partagee des strategies gachettes peuvent enclencher des profits plus grands que ceux que produisent la strategie cournot quand la demande est connue et que l offre est incertaine une situation que l on retrouve justement dans des marches de produits agricoles comme le cafe

a dynamic model of housing demand estimation and policy implications a dynamic model of housing demand using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid we specify estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of housing demand our model generalizes previous applied econometric work by incorporating realistic features of the housing market including non convex adjustment costs from buying and selling a home credit constraints from minimum downpayment requirements and uncertainty about the evolution of incomes and home prices we argue that these features are critical for capturing salient features of housing demand observed in the psid after estimating the model we use it to simulate how consumer behavior responds to house price and income declines as well as tightening credit these experiments are motivated by the u s recession starting in december of 2007 that saw large falls in home prices large negative income shocks for many households and tightening credit standards in the short run relatively few households adjust their housing stock households respond instead by reducing non housing consumption and reducing wealth because they wish to avoid losing their home and the associated adjustment costs households that adjust in the short run are those hit with a series of bad shocks such as a negative income shock and a home price decline a larger proportion of households do adjust their consumption in the long run increasing their housing stock since housing is less expensive however such changes may occur several years after the shocks listed above

the desirability of commodity taxation under non linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes abstract this paper revisits the atkinson stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non linear income taxation in a more general setup namely when tastes are heterogeneous this general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the atkinson stiglitz result is robust a small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure an application to the case of savings suggests that even in the presence of optimal non linear earnings taxation there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model

toxics release information a policy tool for environmental protection abstract this study examines investor reactions to the repeated public disclosure of environmental information about firms in the chemical industry and the effectiveness of this information as a decentralized mechanism for deterring their pollution by allowing investors to benchmark the performance of firms repeated provision of the toxics release inventory led firms to incur statistically significant negative stock market returns during the one day period following the disclosure of that information in the years 1990 1994 these losses had a significant negative impact on subsequent on site toxic releases and a significant positive impact on wastes transferred off site but their impact on total toxic wastes generated by these firms is negligible

uncertainty optimal taxation and the direct versus indirect tax controversy this paper examines how the presence of uncertainty affects the design of tax policy when both indirect taxes and a general income tax are available to the government there are two categories of goods the consumption levels in one group are committed to before the resolution of uncertainty and those of the other after the paper proves that contrary to a b atkinson and j e stiglitz s 1976 result differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of optimal tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods copyright 1995 by royal economic society

durable consumption and asset management with transaction and observation costs this paper provides a contribution to the recent growing literature on rational inattention we start by testing the implications of recent rational inattention models of asset management liquidity holdings and savings using two novel datasets some predictions of these models are at odds with the data which motivates us to introduce a new model that shifts the focus from non durable to durable consumption and features both information and adjustment costs the focus on non durable consumption which departs from the previous literature is key to improve the fit of the model the investor s behavior in our setup combines elements of what the literature refers to as state dependent and time dependent adjustments the model allows us to quantify the information and transactions costs that are consistent with observed patterns of information review and asset trades a calibration of the model shows that very small information costs are sufficient to reproduce the relatively high frequency of observation that is found in the data we test a novel prediction of the model on the relationship between assets trades and durable goods trades and find it aligned with the data

incentives for information production and disclosure in a duopolistic environment this paper examines the nature of the equilibrium solution to the duopoly problem under various incomplete information structures and the incentives to produce and disclose information attention is focused on the duopolists cost functions the results indicate that disclosure of such information is generally beneficial to the duopolists

a pareto improving commodity tax reform under a smooth nonlinear income tax abstract this paper analyzes the welfare effects of commodity tax reform in an economy with a nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes the main result is that we can find a tax reform program that improves every consumer s utility in the pareto sense unless efficiency loss in the economy is minimized under incentive compatibility the tax reform rule proposed here applies to a broad class of economies with arbitrary smooth income taxes the expenditure function approach makes our analyses clear and simple some intuition is presented on the role of commodity taxation in a mixed tax economy the relationship with previous work in optimal tax and tax reform theory is also discussed we extend our result to the case where the government spends tax revenue to provide a public good

cross jurisdictional income shifting by u s multinationals evidence from international bond offerings we examine whether tax incentives influence where u s multinationals locate their interest deductions worldwide our sample includes international bond offerings by u s multinationals during 1987 1997 denominated in the currencies of australia canada france germany italy japan or the united kingdom our results suggest that u s multinationals debt location decisions take into account the effect of jurisdiction specific tax loss carryforwards and binding foreign tax credit limitations on the value of debt tax shields our results are also consistent with u s multinationals locating interest deductions in different tax jurisdictions as a mechanism to achieve tax motivated income shifting

dynamic optimal taxation with private information we study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history dependent yet we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems the market structure in these economies is similar to that in bewley 1986 agents supply labour and trade risk free claims to future consumption subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics an agent s accumulated stock of claims or wealth and her current labour income we show that optimal taxes are generally non linear and non separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences this paper studies optimal taxation in a class of dynamic economies with private information we consider an environment in which agents preferences are defined over consumption and labour and each agent receives a privately observed sequence of i i d preference shocks incentivecompatibility constraints stemming from private information imply that socially optimal or constrained efficient allocations in this environment are complicated and history dependent yet we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems the market structure in these economies is identical to that in bewley 1986 huggett 1993 or aiyagari 1994 agents can trade current consumption for claims to future consumption subject to a budget constraint and a borrowing limit these claims have a non contingent pre tax return crucially taxes are conditioned upon only two observable characteristics of an agent current wealth given by the agent s accumulated stock of claims and current labour income they do not depend on any other aspect of an agent s past history most models of dynamic optimal taxation follow the ramsey approach in which the set of fiscal instruments available to the government is exogenously specified 1 linear labour and capital income taxes are typically included in this set while lump sum taxes are ruled out the exclusion of the latter is justified by appealing to incentive or administrative constraints but these are not explicitly modelled these exogenous restrictions on fiscal instruments represent frictions that the government seeks to ameliorate through its optimal choice of tax rates the approach we adopt in this paper builds on the optimal taxation literature initiated by mirrlees 1971 mirrlees assumes that agents receive privately observed shocks to their

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

empirical tax research in accounting this paper traces the development of archival microeconomic based empirical income tax research in accounting over the last 15 years the paper details three major areas of research i the coordination of tax and non tax factors ii the effects of taxes on asset prices and iii the taxation of multijurisdictional international and interstate commerce methodological concerns of particular interest to this field also are discussed the paper concludes with a discussion of possible directions for future research r 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification m41 h25 k34 g32 f23

on the use of heuristics to approximate competitors private information abstract firms often lack knowledge of the nature of the uncertainty they or their opponents face and use heuristics or approximations to determine their strategy we define and analyze one type of heuristic strategy in which firms choose strategies based on the expectation of their opponents private information rather than the full information about the distribution of that private information we find that in equilibrium the degree to which the heuristic strategy differs from the bayesian strategy depends on 1 the convexity of a firm s marginal profits with respect to their opponents private information and 2 whether firm strategies are complementary or substitutable under certain conditions firms equilibrium profits are greater when all firms use heuristics than when all firms use the full information our results provide insight into incentives firms may have to either facilitate or impede access to industry information

foreign tax credit limitations and capital structure decisions this paper extends prior studies by collins and shackelford 1992 and froot and hines 1995 that investigate the impact of foreign tax credit ftc limitations on firms capital structure decisions binding ftc limitations reduce the marginal tax benefit of domestic interest deductions and provide incentives for firms to substitute equity financing for domestic debt collins and shackelford 1992 document a positive relation between the impact of ftc limitations and changes in firms preferred stock accounts during 1986 89 froot and hines 1995 unable to isolate domestic debt changes document that firms with excess ftcs decreased their worldwide debt growth in 1986 91 but they do not find evidence that ftc limitations influence a shift away from debt and into preferred stock financing thus these two studies find conflicting evidence regarding whether ftc limitations influence firms to use preferred stock as a financing vehicle and neither study provides direct evidence regarding a decline in domestic debt or a potential common

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

optimal income taxation when asset taxation is limited several frictions restrict the government s ability to tax assets first it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets second agents can resort to nonobservable low return assets such as cash gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too high this paper shows that limitations in asset taxation have important consequences for the taxation of labor income we study a simple dynamic moral hazard model of social insurance with observable and nonobservable saving decisions we find that optimal labor income taxes become less progressive when the ability to tax savings is limited

monopoly competition and information acquisition abstract an incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand but can acquire public information at a cost we determine how an entry threat affects the firm s information acquisition if returns to scale are constant and the state contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases then entry reduces information acquisition if however either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns or if the state contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion then entry can increase information finally entry can hurt consumers although entry always increases output it can decrease information consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly

dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments a survey abstract in this paper i survey and discuss recent developments on the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced abatement technology a main conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that under competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and control moreover taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the regulator is myopic if the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it optimally regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices taxes and policies by setting quantities issuing tradable permits are almost equivalent the literature also shows that under competitive conditions there is no difference between auctioning permits and grandfathering moreover timing and commitment of environmental policy is not crucial for adoption under competitive conditions commitment has positive incentive effects however if an r d sector has market power in the presence of market imperfections the ranking of the different policy instruments is ambiguous

using tax return data to simulate corporate marginal tax rates abstract we document that simulated corporate marginal tax rates based on financial statement data shevlin t 1990 estimating corporate marginal tax rates with asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses the journal of the american taxation association 11 51 67 graham j 1996a debt and the marginal tax rate journal of financial economics 41 41 73 are highly correlated with simulated rates based on corporate tax return data we provide algorithms that can be used to estimate the book or tax simulated rates when they are not available we find that the simulated book marginal tax rate does a better job of explaining financial statement debt ratios than does the analogous tax return variable and discuss how the book simulated rate is likely to be an appropriate measure in settings with global long term considerations

optimal linear commodity taxation under optimal non linear income taxation abstract this paper analyzes optimal linear commodity taxes joint with non linear income taxes we provide optimal tax rules based on empirically observable elasticities earnings and commodity demands we demonstrate that commodities should be taxed subsidized if conditional on earnings doing so boosts labor supply as the critical role of commodity taxation is to alleviate distortions on labor supply caused by income taxation we extend the standard formula for optimal non linear income taxation for the presence of optimal linear commodity taxes we correct parts of the literature by showing that the optimal second best allocations derived by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 1980 cannot be supported by linear commodity taxes

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

optimal taxation in a habit formation economy abstract this paper studies habit formation in consumption preferences in a dynamic mirrlees economy we derive optimal labor and savings wedges based on a recursive approach we show that habit formation creates a motive for subsidizing labor supply and savings in particular habit formation invalidates the well known no distortion at the top result we demonstrate that the theoretical findings are quantitatively important in a parametrized life cycle model average labor and savings wedges fall by more than one third compared with the case of time separable preferences

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

adjustment of consumers durables stocks evidence from automobile purchases this paper tests an optimal s s rule in household durable purchases and examines directly the resulting aggregate expenditure dynamics the observed decision rule responds to income uncertainty and growth as predicted by an s s model resulting from transactions costs tests against liquidity constraints find that about half the households purchase according to an optimal s s rule aggregating the s s rule over households produces a cross section distribution of durables holdings the empirical distribution is similar to that predicted theoretically as is its response to aggregate shocks furthermore simulations of aggregate expenditure based on the household distribution exhibit dynamics consistent with those observed in the 1980s

housing over time and over the life cycle a structural estimation we estimate a structural model of optimal life cycle housing and nonhousing con sumption in the presence of labor income and house price uncertainties the model postulates constant elasticity of substitution between housing service and nonhousing consumption and explicitly incorporates a housing adjustment cost our estimationts the cross sectional and time series household wealth and housing proles from the panel study of income dynamics 1984 to 2005 reasonably well and suggests an intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption of 0 487 the low elasticity estimate is largely driven by moments conditional on state house prices and moments in the latter half of the sample period and is robust to different assumptions of housing adjustment cost we then conduct policy analyses in which we let house price and income take values as those observed between 2006 and 2011 we show that the responses depend importantly on the housing adjustment cost and the elasticity of sub stitution between housing and nonhousing consumption in particular compared with the benchmark the impact of the shocks on homeownership rates is reduced but the impact on nonhousing consumption is magnied when the house selling cost is sizable or when housing service and nonhousing consumption are highly substitutable

tax and regulatory motivations for issuing non voting non convertible preferred stock this paper extends prior studies that attempt to explain the existence of unique securities particularly engel erickson and maydew 1999 by investigating why firms issue non voting non convertible preferred stock ps instead of other securities we find that the choice of ps is influenced by tax and regulatory changes imposed by the tax reform act of 1986 tra86 and the 1989 basle banking accord as well as various firm specific incentives we find that industrials issue ps to preserve tax attributes by avoiding an ownership change and to maximize foreign tax credit utilization in addition we find that the regulatory requirements of the basle accord influence the choice by banks to issue ps finally we show that although firms could have issued alternative securities that would have allowed them to achieve the same tax or regulatory goals firm specific factors limit their ability to do so for example firms can also avoid triggering an ownership change by issuing straight debt however financial distress considerations may constrain their ability to issue additional debt therefore we demonstrate that the final choice of ps is influenced by a combination of tax regulatory and firm specific incentives

explicit and implicit tax effects of the r d tax credit this paper investigates the effects of the 1981 research and development r d tax credit first by examining the impact of the credit on the level of r d investment and second by estimating the magnitude of the implicit tax created by the credit the two effects are interrelated because an increase in the level of r d investment will increase the demand for r d inputs thus reducing the pretax rate of return from r d activity 1 i test the credit s investment effect using a time series r d spending model that includes both factors from the industrial organization literature to control for nontax effects and an r d credit usability variable to capture the incentive created by the credit previous research has produced mixed evidence on whether the credit had any positive

public policy towards r d in oligopolistic industries the importance of determining optimal policy towards r d cannot be exaggerated given the worldwide interest in fostering r d and given the significant differences between european and u s policies towards interfirm cooperation on r d moreover the problem is an inherently difficult one because of the complex nature of the r d process since r d is a component of fixed costs industries where it is important tend to be concentrated hence r d policy must go hand in hand with competition policy at the same time r d is like any form of investment in that it precedes the production stage hence issues of time consistency and strategic commitment inevitably arise in considering the choice of r d policy finally r d by one firm typically leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms so that r d exhibits many of the character department of economics university college dublin belfield dublin 4 ireiatid for helpful discussions and comments we are grateful to two anonymous referees to pedro bartos steve martin massimo motta and damien neven and to participants at seminars in birmingham st andrew s and warwick at a cepr workshop on r d spillovers in lausanne at erwit 94 in caslel gandolfo eea 95 in prague the 1996 conference on industrial economics at universidad carlos iii de madrid and a meeting of the dublin economics workshop this paper was produced as part of the international economic performance programme of the centre for economic performance london school of economics supported by the u k esrc an earlier version was circulated as cepr discussion paper no 1243 see alexis jacquemin 1988 and stephen martin 1996 istics of a public good albeit one that is mostly privately produced tbe degree to which such spillovers occur and can be internalized is another crucial influence on the desirable pattem of intervention