which reforms work and under what institutional environment evidence from a new data set on structural reforms abstract are structural reforms growth enhancing is the effectiveness of reforms constrained by a country s distance from the technology frontier or by its institutional environment this paper takes a new and comprehensive look at these questions by employing a novel data set that includes several kinds of real trade agriculture and networks and financial domestic finance banking securities and capital account reforms for an extensive list of developed and developing countries going back to the early 1970s first pass evidence based on growth breaks analysis and on panel growth regressions suggests that on average both real and financial sector reforms are positively associated with higher growth however on several occasions botched reforms resulted in growth disasters more important the positive reform growth relationship is shown to be highly heterogeneous and to be influenced by a country s constraints on the authority of the executive power and by its distance from the technology fro

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

consensus building how to persuade a group many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups the paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal adopting a mechanism design approach to communication it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others the paper unveils the factors such as the extent of congruence among group members and between them and the sponsor and the size and governance of the group that condition the sponsor s ability to maneuver and get his project approved

borrowing constraints human capital accumulation and growth abstract borrowing constraints increase aggregate savings and therefore may increase growth this paper argues however that by reducing human capital accumulation borrowing constraints also have negative effects on growth these effects are discussed in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth empirical evidence for oecd and developing countries lend support to the main predictions of the model

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

cheap children and the persistence of poverty this paper develops a theory of fertility that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty within and across countries if educated individuals have a comparative advantage in raising educated children then parental fertility choice is shown to give rise to a poverty trap in which the poor choose high fertility rates with low investment in child quality moreover the impact of child quality choice on economic performance is amplified by the diluting effect of higher fertility on physical capital accumulation the theory proposes insights regarding the effects of inequality globalisation and life expectancy on economic growth and demographic transitions this paper develops a theory of fertility and child educational choice that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty within and across countries the joint determination of the quality education and quantity of children in a household is studied under the key assumption that individuals productivity as teachers increases with their own human capital in contrast the minimum time cost associated with raising a child regardless of the child s quality the quantity cost is not affected by parental education as a result the price of child quantity relative to the price of child quality increases with individuals wages in particular for low wage individuals for whom the opportunity cost of time is low children of minimal quality are cheap this assumption therefore generates a comparative advantage for the poor in child quantity whereas high wage educated individuals have a comparative advantage in raising quality children consistent with the well known evidence poor households thus choose relatively high fertility rates with relatively low investment in their offspring s education and therefore their offspring are poor as well in contrast high income families choose low fertility rates with high investment in education and therefore high income persists in the dynasty evidence from the us provided by hanushek 1992 suggests that a trade off between quantity and quality of children does indeed exist hanushek argues that movements in family size could explain over half the variance in some test scores and that the elasticity of achievements with respect to the number of children in the family is 0 03 implying that the annual achievement growth of each child in a family will fall about 2 when a second child is added and about 0 5 when a sixth child is added 1

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

persuasion bias in science can economics help we investigate the impact of conflicts of interests on randomised controlled trials in a game theoretic framework a researcher seeks to persuade an evaluator that the causal effect of a treatment outweighs its cost to justify acceptance the researcher can use private information to manipulate the experiment in three alternative ways i sampling subjects based on their treatment effect ii assigning subjects to treatment based on their baseline outcome or iii selectively reporting experimental outcomes the resulting biases have different welfare implications for sufficiently high acceptance cost in our binary illustration the evaluator loses in cases i and iii but benefits in case ii

agriculture diffusion and development ripple effects of the neolithic revolution are the effects of the neolithic revolution still impacting on incomes across the world today i find strong support for this proposition using new country specific estimates of the timing of the agricultural transition and provide evidence that the differences are due to how technological diffusion is accounted for a correction for world migrations since 1500 significantly improves the fit transition year also helps to explain income in 1500 itself and an alternative measure of pre modern development state history has similar ability to predict income in 1500 and 1997

why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth with convex technologies progressive transfers increase aggregate output because marginal returns become more equalized across investment opportunities we argue that this reasoning may not hold in general equilibrium since the investment functions are concave in wealth reducing inequality increases capital demand and the interest rate hence through the impact on capital costs shifting wealth from the rich to the middle class depletes the poorest investors access to credit but because the poor face the highest marginal returns the net effect on output may be negative we find however that redistributing towards the bottom end of the distribution has a clear positive impact finally we discuss the implications of our theoretical findings for future empirical research

fractionalization and the size of government i study the effect of voters with a group based social conscience voters care more about the well being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population within a model of political tax determination both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution inequality between groups has the opposite effect these results hold even if a poor group forms a majority using a panel constructed from us micro data i find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

credit constraint and human capital investment an empirical analysis using brazilian household budget survey abstractthis article is a first step towards understanding the relationship between credit market imperfections and inequality of opportunity in skill formation the main goal is to investigate the effects of the credit constraint on the optimal human capital decision in terms of degree of schooling taking into account the household preferences for education our starting point is a theoretical model of human capital investment decision with credit constraint following a previous model in the literature we propose a reduced form approach that estimates the relation between education decision and initial wealth in brazil our empirical analysis is conducted using data from a brazilian household budget survey pesquisa de orcamentos familiares for years 2002 2003 and 2008 2009 our results point out that education decision is in fact credit constrained the empirical results show a strong and highly significant effect of wealth on educational level of children teenagers and adults even controlling b

inequality control rights and rent seeking sugar cooperatives in maharashtra this paper presents a theory of rent seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members the two key assumptions are constraints on lump sum transfers from poorer members and disproportionate control rights wielded by wealthier members transfers of rents to the latter are achieved by depressing prices paid for inputs supplied by members and diverting resulting retained earnings the theory predicts that increased heterogeneity of landholdings in the local area causes increased inefficiency by inducing a lower input price and a lower level of installed crushing capacity predictions concerning the effect of the distribution of local landownership on sugarcane price capacity levels and participation rates of different classes of farmers are confirmed by data from nearly 100 sugar cooperatives in the indian state of maharashtra over the period 1971 93

the political economy of wealth and interest we study the relationship between wealth redistribution and the allocation of firm ownership the economy s wealth distribution affects the equilibrium interest rate and the allocation of entrepreneurial rents when wealth determines agents ability to borrow this leads to an unconventional voting behaviour of the politically decisive middle class the political preferences of middle and upper class voters coincide when redistribution only has an adverse interest rate effect middle class voters vote with the lower class if redistribution gives access to entrepreneurial rents technology may strongly affect political outcomes greater inequality amplifies the interest rate effect and may lead to less redistribution

persistent inequality an explanation based on limited parental altruism abstract this paper proposes an alternative theory for the observed persistence in income inequality across households a theory based on limited parental altruism we argue that the degree of parental altruism is limited by the economic status of the parent a poor parent not only has less ability but also has less willingness to invest in children s human capital formation this generates a non linearity in such investment expenditures as a result initial income differences may perpetuate over time even with convex technology and convex preferences in this context we also compare the efficacy of the public vis a vis the private education system from the perspective of long run growth

educational opportunity and income inequality affordable higher education is and has been a key element of social policy in the united states with broad bipartisan support financial aid has substantially increased the number of people who complete university generally thought to be a good thing we show however that making education more affordable can increase income inequality the mechanism that drives our results is a combination of credit constraints and the signaling role of education first explored by spence 1973 when borrowing for education is difficult lack of a college education could mean that one is either of low ability or of high ability but with low financial resources when government programs make borrowing easier or tuition more affordable high ability persons become educated and leave the uneducated pool driving down the wage for unskilled workers and raising the skill premium

the influence of macroeconomic factors on personal income distribution in developing countries a parametric modelling approach this article examines the influence of macroeconomic factors on personal income distribution in developing countries using a parametric modelling approach the technique is based on the selection and estimation of a theoretical parametric model a dagum distribution which fits accurately to the empirical income distributions of the countries examined the parameters of the model specifically related to inequality are subsequently used as dependent variables in econometric models in order to examine the impact that certain macroeconomic variables gdp growth inflation employment and real interest rates have on inequality the results reveal that gdp growth employment rate and real interest rate are the macroeconomic factors with greater impact in shaping personal income distribution in developing countries

the finance and growth nexus revisited we find that an expansion of credit has a positive effect on per capita output growth only up to a point beyond this threshold the impact of finance on growth is not statistically significant anymore we show however that the estimated non linear relationship may stem from the omission of factors not considered in the literature so far these factors may have a negative impact on growth in mature financial systems and include the magnitude of financial cycles as well as the importance of non intermediation activities in banks business models

on the long run evolution of inheritance france 1820 2050 this paper attempts to document and account for the long run evolution of inheritance we find that in a country like france the annual flow of inheritance was about 20 25 of national income between 1820 and 1910 down to less than 5 in 1950 and back up to about 15 by 2010 a simple theoretical model of wealth accumulation growth and inheritance can fully account for the observed u shaped pattern and levels using this model we find that under plausible assumptions the annual bequest flow might reach about 20 25 of national income by 2050 this corresponds to a capitalized bequest share in total wealth accumulation well above 100 our findings illustrate the fact that when the growth rate g is small and when the rate of return to private wealth r is permanently and substantially larger than the growth rate say r 4 5 vs g 1 2 which was the case in the 19th century and early 20th century and is likely to happen again in the 21st century then past wealth and inheritance are bound to play a key role for aggregate wealth accumulation and the structure of lifetime inequality contrarily to a widely spread view modern economic growth did not kill inheritance

dualism and macroeconomic volatility this paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that shows that combining capital market imperfections together with unequal access to investment opportunities across individuals can generate endogenous and permanent euctuations in aggregate gdp investment and interest rates reducing inequality of access may be a necessary condition for macroeconomic stabilization moreover countercyclical escal policies have a role to play in our model savings are underutilized in slumps because of the limited debt capacity of potential investors therefore the government should issue public debt during recessions in order to absorb those idle savings and enance investment subsidies or tax cuts for investors the most important single fact about saving and investment activities is that in our industrial society they are generally done by different people and for different reasons for years there might tend to be too little investment leading to deeation losses excess capacity and unemployment for other years there might tend to be too much investment leading to periods of chronic ineation unless prudent and proper public policies in the escal and monetary eelds are followed paul a samuelson economics 8th edition 1970 pp 196 198

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

immiserizing deindustrialization a dynamic trade model with credit constraints abstract the paper develops an open economy dynamic model with bequests and credit constraints the agricultural sector uses only labor the industrial sector needs an indivisible investment under autarky productive agriculture provides the funds needed for investment in industry and in equilibrium credit constraints are not binding if agriculture is not sufficiently productive the price of the industrial good must be high enough to make the industrial sector sustainable in an open economy if the country has the comparative advantage in agriculture deindustrialization may occur over time deindustrialization is welfare reducing when the negative wealth distributional effects swamp the gains from trade

the interactive effects of human capital and quality of life on economic growth abstractto bridge the gap in the quality of life qol and economic growth literature and understand the reinforcing effects of qol and human capital on economic development we examine the interactive effects of these two factors on wage growth from 2000 to 2007 at the county level across the united states first a rosen roback model is employed to estimate implicit values of amenities including climate clean air and other natural attributes which are used to generate qol indices second qol human capital represented by the share of college graduates and their interaction serve as key variables in the wage growth model an instrumental variable approach and location fixed effects are used to address endogeneity of human capital and control for location specific unobservable characteristics results suggest that human capital and qol significantly contribute to economic growth and the growth effects are even larger in nonmetropolitan counties importantly we find that the effect of human capital on

land and the transition from a dual to a modern economy tenurial contracts in agriculture can be an initial source of wealth accumulation for dynasties of poor credit constrained individuals the income from such contracts can be invested in education of offspring who then can find work in the formal manufacturing sector this process allows the economy to develop into a modern economy with a large manufacturing sector an excessive number of poor individuals competing for scarce land however drives up the rental price of land which then slows the process of accumulation and forces the economy to converge to a less efficient dual equilibrium in such cases a policy of land redistribution coupled with a temporary education subsidy may be needed to push the economy to a modern equilibrium

evaluation of financial liberalization a general equilibrium model with constrained occupation choice the objective of this paper is to assess both the aggregate growth effects and the distributional consequences of financial liberalization as observed in thailand from 1976 to 1996 a general equilibrium occupational choice model with two sectors one without intermediation and the other with borrowing and lending is taken to thai data key parameters of the production technology and the distribution of entrepreneurial talent are estimated by maximizing the likelihood of transition into business given initial wealth as observed in two distinct datasets other parameters of the model are calibrated to try to match the two decades of growth as well as observed changes in inequality labor share savings and the number of entrepreneurs without an expansion in the size of the intermediated sector thailand would have evolved very differently namely with a drastically lower growth rate high residual subsistence sector non increasing wages but lower inequality the financial liberalization brings welfare gains and losses to different subsets of the population primary winners are talented would be entrepreneurs who lack credit and cannot otherwise go into business or invest little capital mean gains for these winners range from 17 to 34 percent of observed overall average household income but liberalization also induces greater demand by entrepreneurs for workers resulting in increases in the wage and lower profits of relatively rich entrepreneurs of the same order of magnitude as the observed overall average income of firm owners foreign capital has no significant impact on growth or the distribution of observed income

random earnings differences lifetime liquidity constraints and altruistic intergenerational transfers abstract this paper develops a model of private savings behavior in which households care about their descendants cannot have negative net worth and have lifetime earnings depending on random draws from an exogenous distribution of abilities the elements interact very lucky parents are likely to leave large estates constrained children are unusually likely to receive intergenerational transfers the paper proves the existence of a stationary cross sectional distribution of wealth endogenously determines where liquidity constraints will bind and shows that the long term interest rate must be such that ricardian neutrality fails its last section generates several illustrative numerical simulations

the 2005 lawrence r klein lecture emergent class structure this article presents a model of the emergent class structure in which a society inhabited by inherently identical households may be endogenously split into the rich bourgeoisie and the poor proletariat for some parameter values the model has no steady state where all households remain equally wealthy in this case the model predicts emergent class structure or the rise of class societies even if every household starts with the same amount of wealth the society will experience symmetry breaking and will be polarized into two classes in steady state where the rich maintain a high level of wealth partly due to the presence of the poor who have no choice but to work for the rich at a wage rate strictly lower than the fair value of labor the nonexistence of the equal steady state means that a one shot redistribution of wealth would not be effective as wealth inequality and the class structure would always reemerge thus the class structure is an inevitable feature of capitalism for other parameter values on the other hand the model has the unique steady state which is characterized by perfect equality in this case the model predicts dissipating class structure or the fall of class societies even if the society starts with significant wealth inequality labor demand by the rich employers pushes up the wage rate so much that workers will escape from the poverty and eventually catch up with the rich eliminating wealth inequality and the class structure in the long run in an extension we introduce self employment which not only provides the poor with an alternative to working for the rich but also provides the rich with an alternative to investment that creates jobs due to this dual nature of self employment the effects of self employment turn out to be quite subtle yet within the present framework it is possible to offer a complete characterization of the steady states even in the presence of self employment

the institutional foundations of inequality and growth abstract after a decade of research the effect of inequality on long run economic growth remains unresolved in part because researchers have treated omitted variable bias as an estimation problem rather than a deeper question of causality in this article we argue that the key omitted variable is the quality of economic institutions using both cross country and panel data specifications we find no direct effect of inequality on growth in the long run rather the protection of property rights simultaneously raises growth rates and reduces income inequality we interpret these findings as evidence that insecure property rights disproportionately disadvantage the poor

asset bubbles economic growth and a self fulfilling financial crisis abstract a tractable model in which asset bubbles can exist in spite of infinitely lived agents is presented an intrinsically useless asset has a positive value and raises welfare because it helps investors with idiosyncratic productivity to obtain more credit in imperfect financial markets however the bubbly equilibrium is only the second best moreover bubbles may burst and this leads to recessions the model s analytical solution allows for the study of many policies we find that a policy of purchasing the asset avoids financial crises but nevertheless results in the second best outcome a policy that taxes depositors and subsidizes investors both prevents crashes and achieves the first best outcome

pareto superiority of unegalitarian equilibria in stiglitz model of wealth distribution with convex saving function this paper extends the conclusions obtained by stiglitz and others about the asymptotic wealth distribution in the neo classical growth model when the saving function is convex it is shown not only that locally stable two class unegalitarian equilibria may exist along with the egalitarian equilibrium but also that they necessarily are pareto superior to it more generally the paper also analyzes the class of pareto optimal unegalitarian equilibria

r d implementation and stagnation a schumpeterian theory of convergence clubs we use schumpeterian growth theory to account for the divergence in per capita income that has taken place between countries since the mid 19th century as well as for the convergence that took place amongst the richest countries during the second half of the 20th century the argument is based on the premise that technological change underwent a fundamental transformation in the 19th century associated with new scientific ideas and the increasingly scientific content of new technologies countries then sorted themselves into three convergence groups r d implementation and stagnation a country s group membership depends on initial conditions as well as on fundamentals

limited enforcement financial intermediation and economic development a quantitative assessment we present a model of economic development where the importance of financial differences caused by limited enforcement can be measured economies where enforcement is poor direct less capital to the production sector and employ less efficient technologies calibrated simulations reveal that the resulting effect on output is large furthermore the model correctly predicts that the average scale of production should rise with the quality of enforcement finally we find that the importance of limited enforcement rises with the importance of capital in production

wealth constraints lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation abstract in esteban and ray 1999 inequality public allocation and development mimeo we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from some productivity enhancing government action infrastructures direct subsidies permissions in short the government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the agents that will make the best use of them as revealed by the intensity of their lobbying if the marginal cost of resources varies with wealth the amount of information transmitted through lobbying will depend on the degree of inequality in this paper we summarize the main approach and examine the special case of equal wealth we show that the nature of signaling equilibria is critically affected by per capita wealth

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

disclosure and choice an agent chooses among projects with random outcomes his payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer s expectation of the outcome with some probability the agent will be able to disclose some information about the true outcome to the observer we show that choice is inefficient in general we illustrate this point with a characterization of the inefficiencies that result when the agent can perfectly disclose the outcome with some probability and can disclose nothing otherwise as in dye 1985a in this case the agent favours riskier projects even with lower expected returns on the other hand if information can also be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information excessively risk averse when the challenger has better access and efficient otherwise we also characterize the agent s worst case equilibrium payoff we give examples of alternative disclosure technologies illustrating other forms the inefficiencies can take for example in a two dimensional setting we demonstrate a hitting for the fences effect where the agent systematically focuses on the harder dimension at the expense of success on the easier

is income inequality harmful for regional growth evidence from the european union this article examines the relationship between income inequality and economic growth in the regions of several european union countries over the period 1993 2002 using the information provided by the european community household panel taking into consideration the relevance of spatial effects in this context different versions of a spatial econometric model are estimated the results indicate that the degree of income dispersion is negatively associated with regional growth this finding is in fact robust to various alternative specifications including a number of additional explanatory variables such as initial per capita gdp the sectoral composition of economic activity human capital stock population density and market potential furthermore the observed negative correlation between income inequality and economic performance does not depend on the specific measure used to quantify the degree of income dispersion

human capital risk and economic growth this paper develops a tractable incomplete markets model of economic growth in which households invest in risk free physical capital and risky human capital the paper shows that a reduction in uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk decreases physical capital investment but increases human capital investment growth and welfare a quantitative analysis based on a calibrated version of the model reveals that these effects are substantial and of the same order of magnitude as the effects of distortionary income taxation the analysis further suggests that government sponsored severance payments to displaced workers increase growth and welfare even if these payments have to be e nanced through distortionary income taxation

inequality and growth uncovering the main conclusions from the empirics abstractthis paper is a critical survey of the empirical literature on the effects of inequality on economic growth we conclude that it is most likely that the disparities found in the results are due to differences in the type of countries and time periods included in the samples the variable used to measure inequality the structure of the data and the estimation techniques these findings suggest that the mechanisms that link inequality to growth are likely to operate differently in different circumstances an element that may offer important guidelines for both policy makers and researchers

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

is democracy more expropriative than dictatorship tocquevillian wisdom revisited abstract we reexamine the incentive effect of political democracy on the tax rate by defining a political regime over two dimensions the extent of the franchise and the extent that the redistribution of tax revenues is biased towards the rich standard tocquevillian models assume that even if there is limited franchise there is no redistribution bias from this it follows that democracy is more expropriative than oligarchy because a poorer median voter opts for higher taxes introducing the realistic assumption of a redistribution bias we find a countervailing effect democratization decreases exploitation by the rich on the disenfranchised poor since tax revenues are redistributed over a larger base the median voter may gain less from redistributive taxation we call this the olson effect

who benefits from financial development new methods new evidence abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the impact of financial development on economic growth by using recently developed kernel methods that allow for heterogeneity in partial effects nonlinearities and endogenous regressors our results suggest that while the positive impact of financial development on growth has increased over time it is also highly nonlinear with more developed nations benefiting while low income countries do not benefit at all we also conduct a novel policy analysis that confirms these statistical findings in sum this set of results contributes to the ongoing policy debate as to whether low income nations should scale up financial reforms

the optimal amount of discretion to allow in disclosure in this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some but not all of his information the optimal amount of discretion to allow the informed party is studied that is should the informed party be allowed unlimited discretion in choosing which elements of his information set to disclose or should restrictions be imposed that limit this discretion the model is formulated in the spirit of a persuasion game it is demonstrated that under certain circumstances rules that limit discretion increase the informativeness of disclosures and thus improve economic decisions

current account imbalances and systemic risk within a monetary union abstract the aim of this paper is to cast light on possible influences of current account imbalances on the escalation of systemic risk which hit the eurozone the hypothesis which was set up by examining empirical evidence points to heterogeneity across the macroeconomic conditions prevailing in different clusters of emu countries given the strengthened financial and real interconnections across the emu countries the capital flows triggered by widening distances between surplus and deficit trade balances and also between sound and deteriorating public budgets represent an important factor magnifying systemic risk and contagion the econometric estimates we conducted concern two sub periods the two decades from the launch of the ems in 1979 to 1999 and the first twelve years 1999 2010 of the monetary union the findings sound as a confirmation that the strengthened financial and real interconnections across the emu countries instead of facilitating convergence among the core and the peripheral economies have magnified and mutually reinforced imbalances the divide between surplus and deficit countries the backward emu countries running larger current account deficits and the more advanced countries accumulating larger current account surpluses have brought about increasing capital outflows from the periphery to pay for excess imports from the core conversely increasing capital flows were invested by the banks of the core countries in the periphery s public bonds

policies and impact an analysis of village level microfinance institutions this paper uses variation in policies and institutional characteristics to evaluate the impacts of village level microfinance institutions in rural thailand to identify impacts we use policies related to the successful unsuccessful provision of services as exogenous variation in effective financial intermediation we find that institutions particularly those with good policies can promote asset growth consumption smoothing and occupational mobility and can decrease moneylender reliance specifically cash lending institutions production credit groups and especially women s groups are successful in providing intermediation and its benefits to members while buffalo banks and rice banks are not the policies identified as important to intermediation and benefits the provision of savings services especially pledged savings accounts emergency services and training and advice surprisingly much publicized policies such as joint liability default consequences or repayment frequency had no measured impacts jel 012 016

a theory of environmental risk disclosure abstract the regulation of environmental risks increasingly emphasizes the awareness and empowerment of stakeholders the success of this approach however seems to depend crucially on the quality of environmental disclosures in this paper we investigate the amount and quality of the information that would be voluntarily delivered to some stakeholder by a potential polluter we find that information may be hazier when the stakeholder is confident or naive a priori the cost of analyzing the received reports increases little with their complexity or a polluter s net expected payoff from undertaking an industrial activity that would turn out to be unsafe is small a worried stakeholder and a low cost of producing more accurate figures on the other hand favor disclosure of high quality information by delivering information of very good quality safe firms can set themselves apart more easily from dangerous ones the higher the relative ex post payoff from their current industrial activity implications of this framework for the scope and design of public programs of environmental disclosure are briefly examined

financial market imperfections labour market imperfections and business cycles a greenwald stiglitz 1993a style rational expectations business cycle model is introduced in which uncorrelated productivity shocks or monetary shocks generate autocorrelated employment fluctuations due to financial constraints the propagation mechanism is carefully modelled because of capital market imperfections only standard debt contracts are traded firms labour demand changes in response to changes in their balance sheet position because of labour market imperfections efficiency wages employment and unemployment fluctuate in response to shifts in labour demand the virtue of the model is its simplicity despite the fact that unemployment is endogenous the dynamic behaviour of the model under rational expectations can be characterised analytically

credit constraints competition and meritocracy this paper studies a simple model of the talent ownership mismatch or failure of meritocracy brought about by credit market imperfections that prevent the transfer of control over productive assets from the untalented rich to the talented poor we present two main insights first there may be multiple equilibria in the degree of meritocracy second the severity of the misallocation of talent depends on the degree of concentration on the good market hence reforms that improve the workings of the credit market such as better enforcement of contracts and reforms that reduce concentration such as deregulation are to some degree substitutes in bringing about greater meritocracy we also examine which reform strategy is more likely to enhance efficiency without violating political constraints jel g3 o10 o47

financial deepening inequality and growth a model based quantitative evaluation we propose a coherent unified approach to the study of the linkages among economic growth financial structure and inequality bringing together disparate theoretical and empirical literature that is we show how to conduct model based quantitative research on transitional paths with analytical and numerical methods we calibrate and make tractable a prototype canonical model and take it to an application namely thailand 1976 96 an emerging market economy in a phase of economic expansion with uneven financial deepening and increasing inequality we look at the expected path generated by the model and conduct robustness experiments because the actual path of the thai economy is imagined here to be just one realization of many possible histories of the model economy we construct a covariance normalized squared error metric of closeness and find the best fit simulation we also construct a confidence region from a set of simulations and formally test the model we broadly replicate the actual data and identify anomalies robert m townsend is a professor at the university of chicago and a consultant at the federal reserve bank of chicago kenichi ueda is an economist at the international monetary fund the views expressed in this paper are those of authors and do not necessarily represent those of the frb chicago the federal reserve system or the imf we thank the national statistics office of thailand for permission to use the ses data we received helpful comments from robin brooks fabio canova marco cagetti larry christiano angus deaton paul evans jess gaspar hyeok jeong ashok mody tomoyuki nakajima hajime takizawa chris udry annette vissing jorgensen and the participants of the nber general equilibrium conference at new york university the conference honoring rolf r mantel in argentina seminars at cornell university grips hitotsubashi university ohio state university oxford university and the imf as well as the imf conference on macroeconomic policy and poverty reduction we are especially indebted to the editors and referees townsend acknowledges financial support from the nsf and nichd we thank natalia ramondo for excellent research assistance

the injustice of inequality in many countries the operation of legal political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit this subversion takes the form of corruption intimidation and other forms of influence we present a model of such institutional subversion focusing specifically on courts and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion we then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country as well as for capital accumulation and growth we illustrate the model with historical evidence from gilded age united states and the transition economies of the 1990s we also present some cross country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model

some consequences of credit rationing in an endogenous growth model an endogenous growth model is developed where all investment is financed via credit extension there is also an adverse selection problem in loan markets so that in equilibrium credit rationing arises endogenously the result is that equilibrium levels of credit rationing and real growth rates are jointly determined in this context several changes in the environment can have unusual consequences for instance improvements in the technology for producing capital can reduce growth because of their adverse impacts on credit rationing for similar reasons various government investment subsidies can be growth reducing this phenomenon is often observed empirically

disclosure decisions by firms and the competition for price efficiency this paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied it is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal this is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure this paper develops a model of the relationship between firms investment decisions and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied the costs of disclosure are twofold first there are costs of producing and disseminating the information included here are opportunity costs of firms employees auditing and legal expenses costs of printing and distribution and costs associated with the release of any proprietary information second there are traders costs of assimilating the information for instance while it is not very costly to obtain a firm s 8 k and 10 k once produced it is quite costly to understand the implications of their contents while the former costs have been recognized in the literature on disclosure the latter costs have not that is while traders are sometimes viewed as having access to some costly information the information contained in firms disclosures is typically taken to be costlessly observed by all see for instance diamond 1985 and dye 1987 1 taking traders costs of learning the information content of firms disclosures into account leads to new conclusions regarding incentives to expend resources on disclosure in particular it is shown that firms may spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal this overdisclosure results from firms competing for the attention of traders this is an interesting result given the public policy concern that firms on their own will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal

near sighted justice chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court we identify conditions where the court should sometimes err in determining which firms should be liquidated such errors affect actions by both good and bad entrepreneurs we first characterize the optimal error rate without renegotiation when creditors and debtors can renegotiate to circumvent an error riven court for one class of actions a blind court that ignores all information is optimal for another class the court should place the burden of proof on the entrepreneur the robust feature is that the court should sometimes err chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court it is often unclear whether it is socially optimal for a bankrupt firm to be reorganized as a continuing entity or whether it should be liquidated and the proceeds from liquidation distributed if creditors and debtors cannot reach a settlement then the bankruptcy court may impose one this paper asks the following questions is it always optimal for the court to make the right decision if liquidation is efficient should the court always mandate liquidation if the bankrupt firm could be a profitable entity should the court always allow it to restructure under the existing management and continue or is it optimal for the court to sometimes make mistakes how does the possibility of negotiated settlements affect the optimal design of the court at one level the answers to these questions are straightforward in a world where more accurate appraisals of a firm s quality are more costly the optimal allocation by a court of resources to evaluate the bankrupt firms will always reflect trade offs between the marginal costs of better appraisals and the marginal benefit of decision making based on more accurate appraisals in this paper we show that a court should also consider how the probability that it misidentifies the quality of a bankrupt firm affects the ex ante behavior of management and hence the probability that the firm becomes bankrupt

wage gaps factor shares and real wages the relationships which link real wages capital intensity and factor shares are tested as a prelude to tests of the relationship between wage rigidities and labour market institutions evidence from seven countries indicates that the evolution of factor shares is well explained by changes in capital intensity which is itself well explained by product wages and technical progress a key implication is that changes in full employment capital labour ratios have been the dominant reason for the longer run decline of profit shares in europe and japan relative to the united states it follows that changes in cyclically adjusted factor shares provide little or no information regarding the gap between the actual real wage and its full employment value

income distribution borrowing constraints and redistributive policies this paper sheds light on the relationship between income inequality and redistributive policies and provides possible guidance in the specification of empirical tests of such a relationship we model a two period economy where capital markets are imperfect and agents vote over the level of taxation to finance redistributive policies that enhance future productivity in this context we show that the pivotal voter is not necessarily the agent class with median income in particular the poor who are more likely to be liquidity constrained may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution the effects of an increase in income inequality on the level of redistribution turn out to depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class empirical results from a panel of 22 oecd countries provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main theoretical implications

financial distress and underemployment a reasonable model of the labour market over the business cycle should predict among other things that a in very low states of product demand there may be too little employment from an efficiency perspective but as the state improves employment will increase until ultimately it is efficiently deployed and b in low states of demand a worker s welfare level will be low and as the state of the world improves so will the worker s welfare except possibly at high levels of demand where the worker s utility may start to fall surprisingly there does not exist a labour contract based model that is consistent with predictions a and b in fact the standard results in the literature are if leisure is a normal good then there will be too much employment in essentially all states of the world and the welfare of the worker declines as the state of the world improves in this paper a labour contracting model is constructed that is consistent with the above mentioned predictions two necessary ingredients in the model are the possibility of financial distress in low demand states and partial provability in contracting financial distress can be viewed as frustrating renegotiation and thus inefficient outcomes are possible in equilibrium partial provability the ability of an informed player to make verifiable claims or statements to an uninformed player eliminates certain kinds of inefficient outcomes in particular it eliminates the possibility that in equilibrium there is too much employment this last result is interesting in itself because it is commonly believed that normality of leisure necessarily implies that labour contracting models will generate employment levels that are too high from an efficiency perspective

who gains from non collusive corruption non collusive corruption i e corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity is particularly widespread in low income countries we build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption we find that credit market imperfections by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials however non collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs if borrowing is limited bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business but this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets

implementation with partial provability we extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence we show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences including state dependent with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f if transfers can be large f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption for both results transfers only occur out of equilibrium the use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others preferences our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost

idiosyncratic production risk growth and the business cycle we introduce a neoclassical growth economy with idiosyncratic production risk and incomplete markets each agent is an entrepreneur operating her own technology with her own capital stock the general equilibrium is characterized by a closed form recursion in the cara normal case incomplete markets introduce a risk premium on private equity which reduces the demand for investment as compared to complete markets the steady state can thus have both a lower capital stock due to investment risk and a lower interest rate due to precautionary savings furthermore the anticipation of high real interest rates in the future feeds back into high risk premia and low investment in the present thus slowing down convergence to the steady state our results highlight the importance of private risk premia for capital accumulation and business cycles

strategic environmental disclosure evidence from the doe s voluntary greenhouse gas registry abstract although mandatory disclosure programs have been studied extensively strategic voluntary environmental disclosures by firms are not well understood we study the motivations for and impacts of firms strategic disclosure of greenhouse gas reductions to the us government we first model firms joint abatement and disclosure decisions incorporating both economic and political incentives we then use data from the department of energy s voluntary greenhouse gas registry to compare reported reductions to actual emissions we find that participants in the program engage in highly selective reporting in the aggregate they increase emissions over time but report reductions in contrast non participants decrease emissions over time participants tend to be large firms facing strong regulatory pressure pressure from environmental groups reduces the likelihood of participation suggesting such groups viewed the program as a form of greenwash participating in the 1605 b program had no significant effect on a firm s changes in carbon intensity over time

the development and structure of financial systems abstract firms raise external finance via monitored bank loans and non monitored borrowing in a dynamic general equilibrium model access to credit and each type of financing depend on the wealth distribution due to moral hazard we study the depth of credit markets financial development and conditions under which the financial system relies more on either type of external finance financial structure initial inequality investment size and institutional factors determine the level of financial development while financial structure is shaped by the investment technology and legal and financial institutions the model s predictions are consistent with historical and recent development experience

entrepreneurial talent occupational choice and trickle up policies we study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection the severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs which is working for wages this links credit product and labor markets a rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem these multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria if it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones however if screening is possible e g if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

the self perpetuation of biased beliefs to overcome strong prior beliefs strong evidence to the contrary is needed if a person is predisposed to choosing a certain action the advice from an advisor who sets a low threshold for recommending the alternative action is not of much use the preference for like minded advisors who supply coarse information implies that the advice a person receives is likely to reinforce his existing priors this effect can lead to polarisation of opinion and the emergence of self serving beliefs the learning process is prolonged and the induced short run bias can become perpetual if information is costly

dollars dollars everywhere nor any dime to lend credit limit constraints on financial sector absorptive capacity we exploit an unexpected inflow of liquidity in an emerging market to study how capital is intermediated to firms we find that backward looking credit limit constraints imposed by banks make it difficult for firms to borrow despite readily available bank liquidity healthy aggregate demand and a sharply falling cost of capital the resulting aggregate failure to extend and retain capital in the economy suggests that agency costs that force banks to rely on sticky balance sheet based credit limits prevent emerging economies from effectively intermediating capital

redistribution as a selection device abstract this paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent it argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy s surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects moreover the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a pareto improvement although all agents are non satiable an agent s entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production i find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs ability the new equilibrium is characterized by i the selection of better entrepreneurs ii a higher riskless rate of return on capital iii lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and iv the fact that all agents are better off

economic growth and the quantity and distribution of education a survey the focus of this survey is to discuss different attempts at incorporating the distributional dimension of human capital into the theoretical and empirical growth framework we present a series of models which deviate from the direct link between the aggregate or average level of human capital and economic growth in that they introduce the distribution of education as a new element in explaining the relationship under investigation after surveying the theoretical literature we present recent empirical work on the relation between economic performance and the average level as well as the distribution of education respectively

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

factor shares and inequality in the uk trends in factor shares in both national and household income are estimated from the national accounts and compared to those derived from the fes household survey in order to obtain more reliable measures of the contribution of changes in factor shares to the contemporary growth in income inequality the national accounts indicate that upward trends in the shares of investment related and self employment incomes have contributed directly to the rise in inequality during the past 20 years though to a generally secondary extent until 1986 at least the paper outlines the importance and the difficulty of including appropriate measures of capital gains and private benefit income in estimates of household investment related income whether the national accounts or household surveys are used for evidence indicating the continuing value of national income shares as a guide to the longer run implications of factor shares for inequality copyright 1996 by oxford university press