basket cases tax incentives and international joint venture participation by american multinational firms abstract this paper examines the impact of the u s tax reform act of 1986 tra on international joint ventures by american firms the tra mandates the use of separate baskets in calculating foreign tax credits on dividends received from each foreign corporation owned 50 or less by americans which greatly reduces the attractiveness of joint ventures especially those in low tax foreign countries since the effect of the tra on joint ventures varies with foreign tax rates the country level pattern of subsequent joint venture activity illustrates the sensitivity of organizational form to tax considerations the evidence indicates that american participation in international joint ventures fell sharply after 1986 particularly in low tax countries moreover joint ventures in low tax countries use more debt and pay greater royalties to their american parents after 1986 reflecting their incentives to economize on dividend payments

but who will monitor the monitor suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations what about the monitor s deviations to address this question i propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor s observations are not only private but costly too i also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform in doing so i emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games jel c78 d23 d82 d86

some comments on free riding in leontief partnerships hans k hvide holmstrom bell journal of economics 13 1982 324 40 showed that freeriding is inevitable in partnerships where inputs are substitutes legros and matthews review of economic studies 68 1993 599 611 and vislie journal of economics behavior and organization 23 1994 83 91 showed that when inputs are strict complements leontief technology free riding can be avoided with a linear sharing rule this paper considers the robustness and some extensions of the positive result of these articles first i show that legros and matthews s and vislie s results are not robust to the introduction of participation constraints and limited liability however i construct a novel rule that mitigates that problem second i perturb the deterministic model of the other authors it turns out that free riding is avoidable with noise added to joint output and is inevitable when noise is added to individual productivity jel c72 d20 d29 d82 i introduction a long tradition in economics compares the performance of different ownership arrangements of firms capitalist firms are defined through separating ownership and production by having an outside owner and partnership firms split the value of production in full between the partners building on alchian and demsetz 1972 the seminal paper by holmstrom 1982 argues that partnership firms may suffer from free riding problems holmstrom 1982 shows that efficient provision of effort is not consistent with nash behavior in static partnership games where inputs are substitutes and actions are noncontractible capitalist firms on the other hand can mitigate the free rider problems by a principal breaking the budget i e keep some of the surplus for oneself whenever one observes a low joint output motivated by the many examples of partnerships in the real world considerable literature has questioned the generality of holmstrom s result 1 the present article considers a particular branch of that literature works that explore effort taking in leontief partnerships partnerships where joint output is determined by the partner with the least effort 2 legros and matthews 1993 section 3 1 and vislie 1994 hereafter abbreviated lmv find that if production is determined in such a manner there exists a linear sharing rule denoted beta sup that implements the efficient provision of effort and hence eliminates free riding the intuition for this result is that given that the other agents stick to the efficient action no agent can gain by providing more effort because output does not change and can be made to support the full decrease in output since his deviation is proportional to the change in output the present article discusses the robustness of the implementation result of lmv in two different directions by introducing participation constraints and limited liability on one hand and by introducing noise in the production on the other hand let me articulate why it is important to test for robustness along these two directions first the partnership literature has largely ignored whether a partnership can be expected to agree ex ante on efficient sharing rules when such rules exist the interesting problem is that a partner with a strong bargaining power may wish to settle on a non efficient rule if that gives him or herself a greater return hence it is of importance to have sharing rules that make provision of effort incentive compatible under any distribution of participation constraints to distribute a large share of surplus to agents with strong bargaining power proposition 1 see below constructs a simple sharing rule that solves the participation problem this sharing rule which is inspired by the groves s mechanism has the attractive property of implementing the efficient provision of effort under any conceivable distribution of participation constraints

too much monitoring not enough performance pay this paper endogenises the internal organisation of competitive firms in a simple general equilibrium framework the options are monitored teams unmonitored teams motivated by collective performance pay and self employment the choice of incentive scheme depends on market price and also affects price through its influence on output as more people opt for self employment pecuniary externalities increase the pressure on the rest to follow suit and pareto rankable multiple equilibria arise the conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient are restrictive and everyone may gain from policies limiting monitoring and self employment and from the imposition of entry taxes

moral hazard in risk averse teams holmstrom 1982 has shown that a non budget balancing contract induces a team of risk neutral agents to choose the first best effort levels this is not generally true when agents are risk averse furthermore a massacre contract which punishes all but one agent when the outcome is low can attain the first best over a wider range of parameters than any other budget balancing contract

wealth effects distribution and the theory of organization abstract we construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem because incentives vary with an agent s wealth different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances when borrowing is not costly firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently but when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth with enough inequality it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d2 d31 j41 l2

repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting in a partnership game each player s utility depends on the other players actions through a commonly observed consequence e g output profit price which is itself a function of the players actions and an exogenous stochastic environment if a partnership game is repeated infinitely and each player s payoff in the infinite game supergame is the long run average of his expected one period utilities then efficient combinations of one period actions can be sustained as nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players actions or information but can only observe the resulting consequences

internal competition for corporate resources and incentives in teams invoking thefree rider problem in teams many observersfind profit sharing in large organizations puzzling because it should have negligible incentive effects we show that a firm can be decomposed into two separate teams whose outputs can be observed thenprofit sharing combined with competition between these two teamsfor internal resourcesfrequently solves thefree rider problem using this result we endogenize thefirm s organizational structure and show that in the presence of economies of scale small firms tend to organize as unita y firms while largefirms choose the multidivisional organizationalform

private information and intertemporal job assignments this paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information the combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long term assignments more generally however rotating agents can be valuable because it conceals information from agents which mitigates incentive constraints with complete contracts that communicate interim states rotation allows for even more concealment possibilities and better targeted incentives furthermore it allows for the reporting of interim shocks at no cost to the principal properties of the production technology are also shown to matter substitutability of intertemporal effort is a force for long term assignments while coordination with nash equilibrium strategies is a force for job rotation copyright 2006 wiley blackwell

a policy approach to the environmental impacts of technological lock in abstract the broadening spectrum of environmental problems the uncertainty regarding their scale and duration and their possible irreversibility in the context of the growing social preference for environmental quality make it necessary to undertake an ex ante approach to the link between productive activity and environmental quality this link lies in technology and the right approach is to understand how the process of technological change can lead towards sustainability the added value of evolutionary economics in the context of environmental policy resides mainly in the fact that it warns that certain inferior environmental technologies may be locked in to the economic system the results of our model show that it would be advisable to undertake policies expressly aimed at the process of sustainable technological change applying an ex ante precautionary approach in a way that is complementary to the conventional equilibrium oriented environmental policies the nature of these policies and how they might be implemented are questions we will address from this novel approach to the concept of sustainable development in short the main objectives of this paper are to understand more fully the dynamics of the process of technological change its role in sustainable development and to assess the implications of this dynamic approach to techno environmental policy to achieve these goals we have developed an agent based model abm using distributed artificial intelligence dai concepts drawn from the general methodology of social simulation

widening and deepening reforming the european union the european union is the product of a unique institutional process individual states often with a history of belligerent relationships have gradually given up ever more sovereignty to produce an increasing number of common goods including the single market a joint cur rency and common policies in the process the union has integrated increasingly diverse coun tries and achieved institutional progress beyond its borders these achievements are particularly remarkable given that member states have had and still have widely different views of the desirable speed and ultimate depth of integra tion possibly the single most powerful force sustaining the process of integration has been the implicit and often explicit threat by more committed member states to form an inner core a club in the club conversely less enthusias tic members have supported extending member ship to more countries as a strategy to frustrate deeper integration

efficient and nearly efficient partnerships this paper shows in two ways that the degree to which free riding diminishes the performance of deterministic partnerships may be less than has been generally thought first a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for a partnership to sustain full efficiency it implies that many non trivial partnerships sustain efficiency such as generic ones with finite action spaces and neoclassical ones with leontief technologies second approximate efficiency is shown to be achievable in a large class of partnerships including ones with smooth and monotonic production and disutility functions approximate efficiency is achieved by mixed strategy equilibria one partner takes with small probability an inefficient action the degree to which efficiency is approximated is restricted only by the amount of liability the partners can bear nonetheless their equilibrium payments are not arbitrarily large

incentives wages employment and the division of labor in teams we develop a theory of incentives wages and employment in the context of team production a central insight is that specialization and division of labor not only improve productivity but also increase effort and the sensitivity of effort to incentives under moral hazard we show that employment and incentives are complements for the principal when the positive effects of specialization and division of labor outweigh the increase in risk associated with additional employment and are substitutes otherwise we provide new characterizations of the partnership the firm and the role of the budget breaker that are quite different from the classical literature

coordinating development can income based incentive schemes eliminate pareto inferior equilibria individuals inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development in this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome a general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual s incomes from investment and noninvestment are equal we show that arbitrarily small errors in the government s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome we conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government s ability to use income based incentive schemes as a coordination device

information asymmetry and equilibrium monitoring in education abstract we develop a theoretical and computational model of school choice and achievement that embeds information asymmetries in the provision of education because school effort is unobservable to households and policymakers schools have an incentive to under provide effort this moral hazard affects both public and private schools although public schools are subject to an additional distortion because of limited competition and fixed funding household monitoring of schools can mitigate moral hazard but some households may free ride on the monitoring of others using our calibrated model we simulate two policies aimed at raising achievement public monitoring of public schools and private school vouchers our results indicate that in large scale settings no single tool may suffice the reason is twofold a no tool raises achievement or welfare for all households and b since the extent of moral hazard is endogenous the application of each tool has unintended consequences that limit its own effectiveness results also indicate that setting the policy parameters for public schools at the levels preferred by the majority of households may mitigate the distortions nonetheless the current actual values of these parameters seem to match more closely the preferences of public schools than the preferences of parents

inequality and inefficiency in joint projects a group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable the output is divided according to some given vector of shares a share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs when the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable and all other vectors can be improved via lorenz domination for higher elasticities of substitution perfect equality is no longer unimprovable our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action

dynamic risk sharing with two sided moral hazard abstract a group of risk averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consumption good individual outputs are observable but efforts are not the contracting problem admits a recursive formulation and the optimal value function is the fixed point of a contraction mapping when the agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period every continuation contract of an optimal contract is itself optimal the marginal utility ratio between one agent and another is a submartingale the results imply that it is in general important to restrict an agent whose moral hazard constraint is binding from saving through another agent within the risk sharing group limited commitment and long run implications of optimal contracting are also examined

efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring abstract this paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation no other partner has any additional information in such a model whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d7 d8 l2

linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty an overview we review different generic conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships their logical relationship is explored two kinds of conditions are considered however the property for an action profile to be compatible plays a crucial role in both kinds also two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition

why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects this paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward luck i consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees outside opportunities are correlated with their firms performance the model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad based stock option plans as well as other financial instruments even when these pay plans have no effect on employees on the job behavior the model suggests that agency theory s often overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks many compensation plans reward or punish employees for factors they cannot control an often discussed example of this phenomenon is executive compensation where stock options are not generally indexed to the overall market however many firms also offer firm wide stock options and profit sharing plans that provide even weaker incentives than executive plans after all most workers can expect to reap trivial personal gain from their contribution to firm value or profits i consider an explanation for this phenomenon in which firms contract with employees as a means of indexing wages to market rates rather than to provide incentives while much of the agency literature has concentrated on inducing optimal effort i consider the importance of the generally overlooked participation constraint i study a model in which employees outside opportunities are correlated with firm profits or stock price and in which both turnover and adjusting the pay scheme parameters are costly given these assumptions the firm may find it most profitable to pay the employee in a way that is correlated with the outside options presented by the outside labor market despite the requisite risk premium rather than pay a fixed wage that insures participation in all states the model derived below starts from the assumption that wage adjustments are costly but that workers are willing to make part of their pay contingent

strategic incentives in teams implications of returns to scale this article demonstrates the critical relationship between the characteristics of the production function and the strategic incentives in a team equilibrium effort increases in team size when substitutability is low relative to returns to scale effort levels are actually strategic complements when returns to scale exceed the substitutability of members effort moreover even with equal shares the well known problem is determined by returns to scale and becomes worse as returns increase while a target scheme can support the optimal output level as an equilibrium it does not completely deter free riding a team member will accommodate shirking by increasing their own effort within a remarkably large accommodation zone where the additional effort cost is less than the bonus this accommodation of shirking by others exists for different returns to scale and even for very low levels of substitutability

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

efficiency in sequential partnerships abstract we consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents for such partnerships a budget balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production the sharing rule has many desirable features 1 it uniquely implements efficient production 2 it does not rely on message games 3 it does not rely on unlimited liability and 4 it is robust to renegotiation the rule is furthermore simple intuitive and robust to sabotage coalition formation and noise it also induces efficient production when agents obtain incomplete information about previous actions journal of economic literature classificationnumbers d82 l23

procrastination in teams and contract design abstract we study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard we show that players might procrastinate to exploit the future externalities of team production contract design is shown to be a powerful tool to mitigate the problem of procrastination and enhance efficiency the team s ability to write discriminatory contracts is therefore central we also show that deadlines are not beneficial for a team provided that players can choose efforts frequently and design contracts optimally

efficiency in partnership structures abstract consider an economy where agents differ in production skills and abilities and are free to form production coalitions or partnerships with each other farrell and scotchmer 1988 showed that if partners are restricted to equal output sharing in equilibrium the partnerships are inefficiently small we elaborate on another possible source of inefficiency which is due to composition rather than size under the equal sharing constraint high ability agents form partnerships with agents of similar ability levels yet mixing of ability levels may be socially efficient we further investigate whether relaxing the equal sharing constraint corrects the inefficiency of equilibrium

recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change this famous passage from marshall s principles of economics it first appeared in the fifth edition which came out in 1907 nicely brings out two issues which are as germane to economics today as they were when marshall wrote the first is the heavy reliance by economists in their formal theorizing on the notion of equilibrium the other is the appeal that biological conceptions3x201d have for many economists particularly when their focus is on economic change

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

an example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria in this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate provided the latter is strictly positive on the other hand if the players do not discount the future then every efficient one period payoff vector that dominates the one period equilibrium payoff vector can be attained by an equilibrium of the repeated game thus the correspondence that maps the players discount rate into the corresponding set of repeated game equilibrium payoff vectors is discontinuous at the point at which the discount rate is zero

all units discounts and double moral hazard abstract an all units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer s total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price cliff at the threshold that triggers the discount this paper shows that all units discounts arise in optimal agency contracts between upstream and downstream firms that face double moral hazard i present conditions under which all units discounts dominate two part tariffs and other continuous tariffs i also examine these tariffs when the upstream market faces a threat of entry in the case considered all units discounts deter entry by less efficient rivals without distorting price and investment whereas continuous tariffs either accommodate such entry or deter it by distorting price and investment

relational incentives and moral hazard in teams this paper studies moral hazard in teams using a model where efforts are promoted via the combination of profit shares and relational contracts the focus is on how these two forms of incentives interact according to the degree of effort observability and the importance of future interaction the optimal allocation of profit shares can range from a wide dispersion across players to a full concentration of shares in the hands of a single player when shares are sufficiently concentrated the corresponding residual claimant can also adopt the role of administering all relational contracts therefore serving as an endogenously chosen principal copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

sharing rules in teams abstract we examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation although we do not consider any particular procedure we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place for example this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem this must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule we show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules we also show that when there is limited liability the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules as a consequence of the linear sharing rule result we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d2 c72 j54

social norms and economic incentives in firms abstract this paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms we introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents desire for or peer pressure towards social efficiency in a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms we show that one and the same norm can be output increasing neutral or output decreasing depending on the contract multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise

efficiency in partnerships we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a partnership to be able to sustain efficiency when the output is stochastic when limited liability is imposed we show that only the level of the average liability of the partnership is important the individual levels of liability are irrelevant however the allocation of the total liability among the partners is crucial when additional conditions such as neutrality or individual rationality are imposed

project characteristics incentives and team production we develop a model to show how agency conflicts free rider effects and monitoring costs interact to affect optimal team size and workers incentive contracts team size increases with project risk decreases with profitability and decreases with monitoring costs as a proportion of output our predictions are consistent with empirical evidence that firm specific risk has increased over time average corporate earnings have declined and firms organizational structures have also flattened the predicted effects of monitoring costs on team size are supported by evidence that improvements in information technology likely to lower monitoring costs lead to larger teams further firms with relatively more intangible assets where monitoring costs are likely to be higher are smaller optimal incentive intensities decrease with risk and increase with profitability the endogenous determination of team size accentuates the positive effects of a decline in risk and an increase in profitability on incentives

efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams a comment abstract we argue that visile s 1994 claim that the moral hazard in the teams problem depends on the assumption that the inputs are perfect substitutes is incorrect discontinuities in the marginal product curves not complementarity of the inputs allows the moral hazard problem to be avoided in vislie s perfect complements example

collective versus individual sale of television rights in league sports in many countries the collective sale of tv rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities in several cases however leagues won in court on the ground that sport cannot be considered a standard good in this paper we investigate the conditions under which the sale of tv rights collectively by sports leagues rather than individually by teams is preferred from a social welfare viewpoint we find that collective sale is socially preferable when leagues are small relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and where teams get little performance related revenues

profit sharing and market structure we study how agents decide between working for firms with profit sharing and firms in which pay is based on individual productivity profit sharing has the disadvantages of free riding and adverse selection the benefit of profit sharing is that it makes easier for agents to signal their productivity we show that in equilibrium skilled agents are more likely to belong to profit sharing organizations the analysis provides a framework for understanding the market structure of industries like law accounting and consulting services in which both profit sharing partnerships and eat what you kill firms co exist and compete with each other