price formation in electricity forward markets and the relevance of systematic forecast errors since the liberalisation of the european electricity sector forward and futures contracts have gained significant interest of market participants due to risk management reasons for pricing of these contracts an important fact concerns the non storability of electricity in this case according to economic theory forward prices are related to the expected spot prices which are built on fundamental market expectations in the following article the crucial impact parameters of forward electricity prices and the relationship between forward and future spot prices will be assessed by an empirical analysis of electricity prices at the european energy exchange and the nord pool power exchange in fact price formation in the considered markets is influenced by historic spot market prices yielding a biased forecasting power of long term contracts although market and risk assessment measures of market participants and supply and demand shocks can partly explain the futures spot bias inefficiencies in the analysed forward markets cannot be ruled out

price asymmetry in the dutch retail gasoline market abstract this article analyses the retail price adjustments in the dutch gasoline market we estimate an asymmetric error correction model on weekly price changes for the years 1996 2001 we construct five datasets one for each working day the conclusions on asymmetric pricing are shown to differ over these datasets suggesting that the choice of the day for which the prices are observed matters more than commonly believed in our view the insufficient robustness of the outcomes might explain the mixed conclusions found in the literature using these two approaches we also show that the effect of asymmetry on the dutch consumer costs is negligible

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

fiscal federalism and redistributive politics abstract we consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics in both federal and unitary systems we examine how the political characteristics of different states and groups give them better or worse outcomes in a federal system as opposed to a unitary system we examine possibilities of multiple equilibria with divided government between the two layers we analyze the choice between block grants and matching grants we also examine the impact of federalism on the incentives for geographic mobility

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

rockets and feathers the asymmetric speed of adjustment of uk retail gasoline prices to cost changes abstract the paper develops a quadratic quantity adjustment model to test the hypothesis put forward in the recent monopolies and mergers commission report that the speed of adjustment of uk retail gasoline prices to cost changes is more rapid when costs rise than when they fall and that the adjustment path is more concentrated around the mean value on the upswing using data from 1982 to 1989 evidence of faster and more concentrated responses to cost increases were found

the overnight risk premium in electricity forward contracts abstract we analyze the risk premium on electricity forward contracts traded for the nordic and german austrian electricity markets we argue that finding risk premiums by analyzing overnight returns is more relevant than the frequently used ex post approach the derivatives in these markets can be characterized as trading products and hedging products each contract shows a clear increase in trading volume and liquidity when approaching maturity we link this to a testable hypothesis where financial traders are compensated for holding price risk and where the sign and magnitude of the risk premium changes depending on the hedging pattern of producers and retailers incorporating this in regressions we find that there are higher risk premiums in the period before the forwards become front products compared to the risk premiums in the front period quarterly and monthly contracts show the most significant results

pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle explaining the sign of the market risk premium in this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers in commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short term and long term horizons we show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium we apply our model to the german electricity market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors firstly the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers and secondly how the market power of producers relative to that of buyers affects forward prices with different delivery periods

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

cointegration and threshold adjustment this article proposes an extension to the engle granger testing strategy by permitting asymmetry in the adjustment toward equilibrium in two different ways we demonstrate that our test has good power and size properties over the engle granger test when there are asymmetric departures from equilibrium we consider an application namely whether there exists cointegration among interest rates for instruments with different maturities this issue has been widely tested with mixed results we argue that either cautious policy or possibly opportunistic behavior on the part of the federal reserve implies that an equilibrium relationship between short and long term interest rates exists but that adjustments from disequilibrium are asymmetric in nature empirical tests using u s yields confirm the asymmetric nature of error correction among interest rates of different maturities

why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency a rational choice explanation in recent elections voters supported initiatives to limit the number of terms that their representatives may serve yet at the same time overwhelmingly re elected their incumbents we provide a theoretical explanation for this and other puzzles associated with voting on term limitations the pattern of voting on term limits can be explained by the desire to redistribute power from one party to another from one branch of government to another and from districts with long term incumbents to districts whose representatives have served only for a short time span we test these hypotheses by looking at voting patters on california proposition 140 and the vote on the 22nd amendment with generally positive results

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

the politics of infrastructure a number of recent studies attempt to measure the productivity of public capital some estimates indicate that government investments are a potential well spring for economic progress while others indicate that public infrastructure has a negligible effect on private sector output this article investigates political institutions and processes underlying the decisions for public infrastructure spending we apply the framework of strategic models of fiscal policy and develop an empirical model to analyze the substantial differences in public capital across american states institutions such as term limits citizen initiative and budgeting procedures were significant determinants of state public capital stocks and the flow of new public investments during the 1980s the results further suggest that political conditions such as legislative stability and voter volatility are systematically related to infrastructure differences across states

budget referendums and government spending evidence from swiss cantons vortrag im forschungsseminar der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen fakultat der universitat basel schweiz am 20 november 2000

prices rise faster than they fall output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases this tendency is found in more than two of every three markets examined it is found as frequently in producer goods markets as in consumer goods markets in both kinds of markets the asymmetric response to cost shocks is substantial and durable on average the immediate response to a positive cost shock is at least twice the response to a negative shock and that difference is sustained for at least five to eight months unlike past studies which documented similar asymmetries in selected markets gasoline agricultural products etc this one uses large samples of diverse products 77 consumer and 165 producer goods accordingly the results suggest a gap in an essential part of economic theory as a start on filling this gap the study finds no asymmetry in the resonse of an individual decision maker a supermarket chain to its costs but it finds above average asymmetry where a cost shock is filtered through a fragmented w

sticky prices inventories and market power in wholesale gasoline markets a model with costly adjustment of production and costly inventories implies that wholesale gasoline prices will respond with a lag to crude oil cost shocks unlike explanations that rely upon menu costs imperfect information or long term buyer seller relationships this model predicts that futures prices for gasoline will adjust incompletely to crude oil price shocks that occur close to the expiration date of the futures contract we test and confirm this implication examining wholesale price responses in 188 gasoline markets we also find that firms with market power adjust prices more slowly than do competitive firms consistent with the model

forward premia in electricity markets a replication study abstract motivated by mixed empirical evidence for the risk premium theory of bessembinder and lemmon 2002 i perform a replication study by rerunning simulations the risk premium theory links forward premia to the statistical properties of the anticipated distribution of spot power prices in an equilibrium approach my simulations closely following those run in the original paper support the first three hypotheses but not hypothesis 4 an increase in mean demand can thus result in a lower forward premium for some ranges of parameter values the replication results do not explain the mixed empirical support for the theory

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

self imposed term limits in reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits dick and lott argue that since more senior representatives are better at rent seeking there is an inefficient tendency to re elect incumbents in their model term limits are preferred collectively by constituencies even though no constituency would independently oust its incumbent representative however many term limits are unilaterally self imposed in particular the 22nd amendment limiting presidents terms to two and their model cannot explain these limits in this comment i suggest that term limits may be self imposed by risk averse voters who prefer cycling between left and right wing candidates to a once and for all election that imposes a candidate of a single ideology on the entre electorate the market failure that makes term limits helpful is that out of power minorities cannot bribe the median voter

an empirical study of the information premium on electricity markets abstract due to the non storability of electricity and the resulting lack of arbitrage based arguments to price electricity forward contracts a significant time varying risk premium is exhibited using eex data during the introduction of emission certificates and the german atom moratorium we show that a significant part of the risk premium in electricity forwards is due to different information sets in spot and forward markets in order to show the existence of the resulting information premium and to analyse its size we design an empirical method based on techniques relating to enlargement of filtrations and the structure of hilbert spaces

congressional voting on term limits between 1990 and 1995 twenty three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations tocongress in 1995 the house ofrepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of congress only weeks later thesupreme court struck down the individualstate laws in 1997 the house againbrought the issue to a vote which alsofailed this paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents the game foremost predictsthat members from term limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote the empirical section employsprobit multinomial logit and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses among otherresults in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a yea on thefirst vote and a subsequent nay on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self imposedterm limits the results are robust tomodel specification estimator andalternative sampling implications areproposed in the concluding comments

term limits causes and consequences this paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation particularly on congress i first consider theories that aroseto explain among related issues why individual states mightunilaterally self impose term limits on their own delegationsto congress next i consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure first supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government highspending second higher tenure creates inefficient anti competitive conditions in the legislative election market term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure these claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature based on theliterature reviewed this paper finds that while term limitswill reduce average tenure there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies further research on a more general reform which would strike deeper at these underlying causes isimplied

districts diversity and fiscal biases evidence from the american states abstract this paper argues that the configuration of legislative districts and not merely the number of districts matters for fiscal performance district configuration mediates the extent of constituent diversity both across and within districts both dimensions of diversity affect the political calculus associated with pork barrel politics empirical findings for the american states reveal statistically and quantitatively significant effects of constituent diversity on state government spending together the analysis and evidence emphasize the conditional nature of the law of l n in the united states this point acquires practical relevance from the constitutional mandate for decennial redistricting in all jurisdictions based on geographic representation

strategic institutional choice voters states and congressional term limits states choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed measures of relative political influence in congress explain much of this variation using 1992 data on the american states the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states at 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members terms but cannot under a supreme court ruling we discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states

revisiting the relationship between spot and futures prices in the nord pool electricity market abstract this work discusses potential pitfalls of applying linear regression models for explaining the relationship between spot and futures prices in electricity markets in particular the bias coming from the simultaneity problem the effect of correlated measurement errors and the impact of seasonality on the regression results studying a 13 year long 1998 2010 price series of spot and futures prices at nord pool and employing regression models with garch residuals we show that the impact of the water reservoir level on the risk premium is positive which is to be expected but contradicts the results of botterud et al 2010 we also show that after taking into account the seasonality of the water level the storage cost theory proposed by botterud et al 2010 to explain the behavior of convenience yield has only limited support in the data

locational price spreads and the pricing of contracts for difference evidence from the nordic market in electricity markets not only does the risk of substantial price variations over time exist but so does the risk of price variations over space as prices between locations can differ due to transmission congestion to manage this risk contracts for difference cfds i e forwards on the spread between a particular area price and the unconstrained system price were introduced at the scandinavian electricity exchange nord pool at the end of 2000 we empirically investigate the pricing of these cfds over the period 2001 through 2006 and find that cfd prices contain significant risk premia their sign and magnitude however differ substantially between areas and delivery periods because areas are subject to transmission congestion to a varying extent while the relation between risk premia and time to maturity is not uniform for cfds there is a negative relation for implied area and system forwards which can be explained by the relative hedging demand of market participants in addition we find that risk premia of cfds and implied area forwards vary systematically with the variance and skewness of the underlying spot prices this confirms both implications of the bessembinder and lemmon bessembinder h lemmon m l 2002 equilibrium pricing and optimal hedging in electricity forward markets journal of finance 57 1347 1382 model

the political economy of policy centralization direct versus representative democracy abstract this paper analyzes policy centralization outcomes in a two jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and interjurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures direct referendum and representative democracy we show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers rather than by referendum in these situations centralized policies converge to the preferred level of the jurisdiction that least favours centralization rather than to a compromise between the two jurisdictions preferred levels

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

effects of term limits on fiscal performance evidence from democratic nations political reputation models feature forward looking rational voters who re elect incumbents based on their estimate of an incumbent s ability level fiscal policy is one of the ways an incumbent establishes a reputation and thereby signals this ability level to voters the reputation building framework implies that term limits should affect fiscal performance a term limited incumbent places less value on reputation building than an incumbent eligible for re election does we examine differences in fiscal performance in democratic countries under alternative executive term limit regimes our results generally agree with the prior findings of besley and case 1995a who analyzed gubernatorial term limits in the american states we provide new evidence that the fiscal effects of term limits differ under a two term rule versus a single term rule

a threshold cointegration analysis of asymmetric price transmission from crude oil to gasoline prices abstract this study provides new supportive evidence for asymmetric adjustment in u s retail gasoline prices the asymmetric transmission is found to occur not just through the spot markets of crude oil and refinery gasoline but also through their future markets further evidence also shows that the observed asymmetry in price transmission primarily occurs downstream not upstream of the transmission process

the relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits whether term limits would increase or decrease federal spending depends on the reason for the causal relationship between tenure and spending we investigate this subject by empirically studying congressional spending and tenure for all united states house and senate members who entered congress between the 94th and 102nd congresses 1975 1992 as our measure of congressional spending we use the national taxpayers union s congressional spending scores our study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between congressional spending and tenure for some groups of congressmen we then test three hypotheses relating tenure and spending no single hypothesis is consistent with all of our empirical results nevertheless the small sizes of the empirical effects estimated in this study suggest that term limits would have an inconsequential impact on the level of federal spending at least via the moral hazard mechanisms described in this paper

the political economy of direct legislation direct democracy and local decision making local fiscal referenda the dampening effect on taxes and spending local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and given the decentralization trend in oecd nations this is likely to increase how should this spending be governed this article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision making at the state and local level to support this we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes the basic argument concerns voter control under representative democracy citizens only have direct control at election time with referenda and initiatives citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens preferences as a result fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences we empirically test this on swiss data since switzerland provides a natural laboratory for local governance the governance structures of swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels specifically we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 swiss cantons and 1990 data on 134 local communities it is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue and at the local level also on public debt combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens lars p feld and gebhard kirchgassner

optimal tenure of elected public officials constitutional limits on the tenure of elected chief executives are a prominent feature of many governments yet they have received little attention from economists working in the field of political behavior this paper develops an analysis of tenure limits and their incidence the analysis assumes that the limits substitute for more familiar electoral controls such as elections recalls and impeachment proceedings we assume that restrictions are imposed if they cause the constitutionally decisive voter to be better off on average this assumption although not a standard one applied to policy in general is fairly common in the literature on constitutional choice where the memberships of interest groups later to be formed are plausibly unknown at the time of the constitutional convention 1 the decision to restrict is undertaken in an environment of uncertainty and naturally it is not without its costs it is clear for instance that restriction substitutes inexperienced politicians for experienced ones moreover a tenure limit generates an incentive problem during the final term in office since no further electoral test remains 2 this lame duck

market efficiency and risk premia in short term forward prices abstract using recursive estimation and rolling windows over extended sample periods we examine the time varying relationship between spot and short term forward prices in the pennsylvania new jersey maryland pjm wholesale electricity market we examine theoretical models of forward risk premia in electricity markets and show that recent data do not provide support for existing models the results indicate that short term forward prices have converged towards unbiased predictors of the subsequent spot prices

budget institutions and political insulation why states adopt the item veto abstract forty three of the fifty states of the united states have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions in this paper i test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power using data from 1865 to 1994 i show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future liberal legislatures the results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas first by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions second it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily insulate policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power e g moe 1989 de figueiredo 2002

market price of risk implied by asian style electricity options and futures in this paper we propose a jump diffusion type model which recovers the main characteristics of electricity spot price dynamics in the nordic market including seasonality mean reversion and spiky behavior we show how the calibration of the market price of risk to actively traded futures contracts allows for efficient valuation of nord pool s asian style options written on the spot electricity price furthermore we study the evolution of the market price of risk and the risk premium over a three year time period and compare the obtained results with those reported in the literature

fiscal effects of the voter initiative in the first half of the twentieth century abstract this paper compares the fiscal policy of initiative and noninitiative states in the first half of the twentieth century states with initiatives had higher combined state and local expenditure after controlling for income and other demographics but a lower ratio of state to local expenditure this together with existing evidence from later in the century suggests that the voter initiative does not have a consistent effect on the overall size of state and local government however it does systematically lead to more decentralized expenditure

econometric models of asymmetric price transmission abstract in this paper we review the existing empirical literature on price asymmetries in commodities providing a way to classify and compare different studies that are highly heterogeneous in terms of econometric models type of asymmetries and empirical findings relative to the previous literature this paper is novel in several respects first it presents a detailed and updated survey of the existing empirical contributions on price asymmetries in the transmission mechanism linking input prices to output prices second this paper presents an extension of the traditional distinction between long run and short run asymmetries to new categories of asymmetries such as contemporaneous impact distributed lag effect cumulated impact reaction time equilibrium and momentum equilibrium adjustment path regime effect regime equilibrium adjustment path each empirical study is then critically discussed in the light of this new classification of asymmetries third this paper evaluates the relative merits of the most popular econometric models for price asymmetries namely autoregressive distributed lags partial adjustments error correction models regime switching and vector autoregressive models finally we use the meta regression analysis to investigate whether the results of asymmetry tests are not model invariant and find which additional factors systematically influence the rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetric price adjustment the main results of our survey can be summarized as follows i each econometric model is specialized to capture a subset of asymmetries ii each asymmetry is better investigated by a subset of econometric models iii the general significance of the f test for asymmetric price transmission depends mainly on characteristics of the data dynamic specification of the econometric model and market characteristics overall our empirical findings confirm that asymmetry in all its forms is very likely to occur in a wide range of markets and econometric models

the relationship between spot and futures prices in the nord pool electricity market abstract we analyze 11 years of historical spot and futures prices from the hydro dominated nord pool electricity market we find that futures prices tend to be higher than spot prices the average convenience yield is therefore negative but varies by season and depends on the storage levels in hydro reservoirs the average realized return on holding a long position in the futures market is also negative the negative convenience yield and risk premium contrast empirical findings in most other commodity markets we argue that differences between the supply and demand sides in terms of risk preferences and the ability to take advantage of short term price variations can contribute to explain the observed relationship between spot and futures prices in addition our analysis shows that the relationship between spot and futures prices is clearly linked to the physical state of the system such as hydro inflow reservoir levels and demand

selective hedging in hydro based electricity companies abstract we analyze risk management trends in electricity commodity markets using the production and transaction data and written hedging policies of 12 norwegian hydropower companies the scope of our analysis is the hedging of physical electricity production using the power derivatives available at nasdaq omx commodities in their hedging policy these companies either use a cashflow at risk c far approach or a hedge ratio approach or follow no explicitly stated approach we find that the derivative cashflows constitute substantial profits for these companies furthermore hedging contributes to reducing the c far for 10 of the companies these findings are surprising considering that we expect hedging to yield zero expected profit and to smooth the earnings overall our findings reveal that a practice of incorporating market views in hedging decisions is widespread in the sample companies as both sanctioned in their written hedging policy and as indicated by the substantial hedging profits

when is two better than one how federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition the current paper models power maximizing politicians behavior subject to imperfect political competition and perfect citizen mobility it then analyzes the welfare implications of federal and non federal structures the model abstracts from both heterogeneous preferences the most common argument in favor of federalism and externalities the most common argument against showing that even in this simplified setting federalism has important welfare implications there is one class of equilibria in which more federalism has the purely beneficial effect of offsetting imperfections in the political process however there is also a second class of equilibria in which citizen mobility makes political imperfections more severe by creating safe districts for both political parties 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

beggar thy neighbor testing for free riding in state level endangered species expenditures an important public policy question that remains unresolved iswhether devolution will enhance sensible policy making byexploiting informational asymmetries or instead trigger a beggar thy neighbor response and stimulate free ridingamongst localities we analyze this question within theframework of u s environmental policymaking by scrutinizing aunique panel data set on state level endangered speciesexpenditure patterns our empirical estimates are consistentwith the notion that states free ride which may lead to anexpenditure equilibrium that is not pareto efficient

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

market power and heterogeneous pass through in german electricity retail abstract we analyze the pass through of cost changes to retail tariffs in the german electricity market over the 2007 2014 period we find an average pass through rate of around 60 this significantly varies with demand factors while the pass through rate to baseline tariffs where firms have greater market power because customers are less willing to switch is only 50 it increases to 70 in the competitive segment of the market although the pass through rate of independent firms is significantly higher than that of other firms in the competitive market segment the extent of supply side heterogeneity is limited thus the firms ability to exercise market power and reduce pass through appears to be constrained by competition and largely determined by demand side factors finally we find that the pass through rate in the competitive market segment has been approaching unity over the past years indicating a rise in competitive pressure

why are prices sticky the dynamics of wholesale gasoline prices the menu cost interpretation of sticky prices implies that the probability of a price change should depend on the past history of prices and fundamentals only through the gap between the current price and the frictionless price we find that this prediction is broadly consistent with the behavior of nine philadelphia gasoline wholesalers nevertheless we reject the menu cost model as a literal description of these firms behavior arguing instead that price stickiness arises from strategic considerations of how customers and competitors will react to price changes

pass through of wholesale price to the end user retail price in the norwegian electricity market abstract in this paper we estimate the pass through of wholesale electricity price to the end consumer price with variable price contracts in the norwegian electricity market using weekly data we find substantial asymmetry when retailers pass on the impact of price changes in the wholesale market to the retail prices as price increases are transmitted more quickly than price decreases by examining the cumulative adjustment function of price change we identify that some dominant retailers might be exercising market power in the retail electricity market for an average norwegian household with variable price contract the cost of asymmetric price pass through due to 2 5 ore kwh change in the wholesale price over the complete life of pass through in a year reaches to a high of 2 28 nok this cost sums up to 3 8 million nok for all the norwegian households on variable price contracts for one time price change to deal with this asymmetric price setting behavior end consumers should switch to spot price contracts and make use of smart grid technologies

on the strength of corporate cultures abstract we model corporate culture s as production technologies for which employees have to undertake culture specific investments that improve their effectiveness at a later date the organization can adopt cultural changes that make this investment partially redundant this leads to under investment however as agents invest more the organization s opportunity cost of a change increases which in turn increases each agents incentives to invest this externality among agents leads to multiple equilibria otherwise similar organizations can thus exhibit either high investment levels and low probability of changes strong culture or low investment levels and high probability of changes weak culture we also explore some implications for the nature and management of corporate culture

a history of european electricity day ahead prices in this article we examine the development of day ahead prices in five european markets which became more connected over recent years where previous studies examined the convergence of price levels over time we focus on patterns in estimates for the parameters in a switching regimes model this makes it possible to distinguish between prices under normal market conditions and under non normal market conditions those market conditions that can cause extreme price spikes we expect that increased connectivity yields additional supply in the short term and therefore will reduce the impact of price spikes our results indicate that the impact of price spikes and volatility decreased over time that prices behave more random and that the parameter estimates between various connected markets seem to have converged between the belgian dutch french german and nordic day ahead markets over the years 2003 through 2010 these results can be explained by increased connectivity and improved liquidity

corporate culture and identity investment in an industry equilibrium we explore the two way relationship between corporate culture and market structure we emphasize two market dimensions through which firms interact the product market where goods are sold and the labor market where managers are hired we model the firm s principal agent relationship by assuming that managers may be socialized to a corporate identity that leads them to behave more in concert with the profit maximizing goals of the firm i e a corporate culture we first analyse the optimal incentive scheme and corporate culture investment at the firm level then we consider the industry equilibrium with free entry and market clearing for managerial labor we discuss how industry characteristics market size effects global market integration or technological shocks affect the pattern of equilibrium corporate cultural choices across firms

do gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to crude oil price changes the authors test and confirm that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices among the possible sources of this asymmetry are production inventory adjustment lags and market power of some sellers by analyzing price transmission at different points in the distribution chain the authors attempt to shed light on these theories spot prices for generic gasoline show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes which may reflect inventory adjustment effects asymmetry also appears in the response of retail prices to wholesale price changes possibly indicating short run market power among retailers