comparative statics and asset substitutability complementarity in a portfolio model a dual approach this article uses a dual approach to investigate the properties of an n asset portfolio model the indirect expected utility and expenditure functions are used to provide an extremely simple derivation of slutsky equations by obtaining results similar to roy s identity and shephard s lemma the substitutability complementarity relations among assets are investigated and a number of empirically testable implications are deduced from the properties of the expenditure function

is there a causal effect of working part time on current and future wages in this paper i study the causal effects of part time work on current and future wages to estimate these effects i use a random effects model with a wage equation capturing the employment history and a dynamic multinomial probit component for the choice of employment status exclusion restrictions from the institutional context are exploited to support identification the results suggest that working part time with few hours has a large causal effect on current wages but more extensive part time work does not reduce current wages however both types of part time work lead to negative long term wage effects

a multivariate sample selection model estimating cigarette and alcohol demands with zero observations heckman s sample selection model is generalized to the multivariate case and used to estimate demands for cigarettes beer and wine by individuals in the united states the specification allows correlations between the error terms of multiple selection and level equations and nests the popular bivariate sample selection model and two part model empirical results suggest that the proposed model performs better than the restricted specifications differentiated effects of variables on probabilities and levels of consumption also suggest rejection of the tobit system gender differences are present and demographic variables are more important than income in determining consumption of cigarettes beer and wine

bayesian inference for the mover stayer model in continuous time with an application to labour market transition data this paper presents bayesian inference procedures for the continuous time mover stayer model applied to labour market transition data collected in discrete time these methods allow us to derive the probability of embeddability of the discrete time modelling with the continuous time one a special emphasis is put on two alternative procedures namely the importance sampling algorithm and a new gibbs sampling algorithm transition intensities proportions of stayers and functions of these parameters are then estimated with the gibbs sampling algorithm for individual transition data coming from the french labour force surveys collected over the period 1986 2000 copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

wages experience and seniority in this paper we study the sources of wage growth we identify the contribution to such growth of general sector specific and firm specific human capital our results are interpretable within the context of a model where the returns to human capital may be heterogeneous and where firms may offer different combinations of entry level wages and firm specific human capital development we allow for the possibility that wages are match specific and that workers move jobs as a result of identifying a better match to estimate the average returns to experience sector tenure and firm specific tenure within this context we develop an identification strategy which relies on the use of firm closures our data source is a new and unique administrative data set for germany that includes complete work histories as well as individual characteristics we find positive returns to experience and firm tenure for skilled workers the returns to experience for unskilled workers are small and insignificant after 2 years of experience their returns to sector tenure are also zero however their returns to firm tenure are substantial in this paper we study the growth of wages of young workers in germany knowing the extent and reasons for individual wage growth over the life cycle is important for a number of areas in economics just to mention two examples first it is a key element to understanding and designing active labour market programmes many such programmes offer temporary and often subsidized work opportunities examples are the new deal in the u k and the swedish programmes as well as a number of programmes in germany these programmes are based on the assumption that general skills are sufficiently enhanced while working so as to render the workers employable without a wage subsidy thus the success of these programmes depends on how skills improve on the job for the target population and whether this skill enhancement is transferable across jobs second it is a key to understanding the benefits and costs of job mobility this in turn matters for a number of policy issues including the design of pension policies relating for example to final salary schemes as a result of this widespread interest a large body of empirical research has focused on obtaining estimates for the returns of experience and seniority 1 our study uses a new and unique administrative data set with a number of features that are important for our analysis and allow us to avoid many problems encountered in earlier work in this field in our model wages grow due to learning by doing which may be heterogeneous across individuals moreover since firms offer different career profiles and because we allow for match specific effects on wages investments take the form of searching for the firm with the most desirable learning by doing characteristics career structure 2

job displacement risk and severance pay abstract this paper is a quantitative equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay when workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete a key feature of our model is that in line with an established empirical literature job displacement entails a persistent fall in earnings upon re employment due to the loss of tenure the model is solved numerically and calibrated to the us economy in contrast to previous studies that have analyzed severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses we find that the welfare gains from the insurance against job displacement afforded by severance pay are sizable

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

job matching within and across firms this article proposes a matching model of the labor market in the presence of uncertainty and learning about ability that provides a simple unified framework for analyzing the dynamics of jobs and wages within firms and in the labor market the model allows for different degrees of generality of ability as well as speeds of learning across jobs and firms equilibrium assignments and wages are consistent with a broad range of empirical findings on careers suggest a novel interpretation for well documented patterns and help explain features of careers usually thought difficult to reconcile with the presence of uncertainty and learning

consumer demand and the life cycle allocation of household expenditures the purpose of this paper is to estimate the parameters of household preferences that determine the allocation of goods within the period and over the life cycle using micro data in doing so the authors are able to identify important effects of demographics labor market status and other household characteristics on the intertemporal allocation of expenditure they test the validity of the life cycle model using excess sensitivity tests and find that controlling for demographics and labor market status variables can largely explain the excess sensitivity of consumption to anticipated changes in income

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

wages mobility and firm performance advantages and insights from using matched worker firm data to illustrate the wide applicability of longitudinal matched employer employee data we study the simultaneous determination of worker mobility and wage rates using an econometric model that allows for both individual and firm level heterogeneity the model is estimated using longitudinally linked employer employee data from france structural results for mobility show remarkable heterogeneity with both positive and negative duration dependence present in a significant proportion of firms the average structural returns to seniority are essentially zero but this result masks enormous heterogeneity with positive seniority returns found in low starting wage firms

a political economy theory of the soft budget constraint why do soft budget constraints exist and persist in this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness we develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal we show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do this encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival in consequence even when information is complete politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future we show that maybe somewhat surprisingly dictators who are less likely to lose power are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support

estimation of censored demand equations from large cross section data the article develops an alternative econometric methodology to estimate a system of censored demand equations using a large cross section data from colombian urban households the approach preserves the behavioralinformation expressed by zero expenditures and conforms with the requirements imposed by consumer theory in a way consistent with the random utility hypothesis we motivate the choice of the tobit modelas a statistical representation of consumer behavior and introduce the methodology by specifying the aids model modified according to both a translating and scaling demographic transformation we propose to estimate each demand equation in unrestricted form using the jackknife technique we then recover the demand parameters imposing the cross equations restrictions by using minimum distance estimation the empirical results of the censored demand system for specific households of policy relevance are reported copyright 2000 oxford university press

neoclassical consumer demand theory and the demand for money m friedman 1956 suggests that the demand for money should be analyzed in terms of consumer demand theory although often the interpretation of empirical results from studies using aggregate data appears to be in terms of the motives approach i e transactions precautionary and speculative motives the authors develop friedman s ideas within an explicit model of consumer theory and find that they provide a consistent framework for analyzing portfolio choice and offer greater insights into results from aggregate studies of the demand for money than the motives approach in particular the authors provide a new interpretation of the role of nominal interest rates inflation and a hicksian measure of wealth in the demand for money function copyright 1991 by royal economic society

household saving micro theories and micro facts in this survey we review the recent theoretical and empirical literature on household saving and consumption the discussion is structured around a list of motives for saving and how well the standard theory captures these motives we show that almost all of the motives for saving that have been suggested in the informal saving literature can be captured in the standard optimizing model particular attention is given to recent work on the precautionary motive and its implications for saving and consumption behavior we also discuss the behavioral or psychological approach that eschews the use of standard optimization techniques and focuses instead on direct consideration on saving we provide a section on facts who save and how much we then discuss informally the recent decline in the u s saving rate and whether the theory is of much use in understanding this and other changes in aggregate saving rates over time we do not find any convincing explanation for the change in saving rates we also discuss some analyses of saving behavior over the life cycle addressing such questions as whether households save enough for retirement and whether the consumption patterns of older households can be rationalized within a simple life cycle model we also review a great number of studies of the consumption euler equations based on our analysis of the studies cited we conclude that there is still mixed evidence that consumption is excessively sensitive to income we also examine in depth the recent empirical literature on the precautionary motive we conclude that although some households do seem to have a significant precautionary motive at some points in their life cycle this motive is not so strong empirically as some investigators suggest

job displacement relative wage changes and duration of unemployment using special cps data on displaced workers this article investigates the wage consequences of job displacement in a framework that emphasizes the effects of past job duration s and unemployment duration s on postdisplacement wages our model also attempts to take account of the simultaneity between unemployment duration and the postdisplacement wage it is found that duration strongly reduces subsequent earnings and that considerable overstatement of the loss in firm specific training investments is implied by conventional routes to measuring wage losses

an empirical equilibrium job search model with search on the job and heterogeneous workers and firms in this article we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models allowing for continuous distributions of workers opportunity costs of employment as well as firms productivities the model allows for on the job search and we assume that job offer arrival rates for workers are independent of their labor market state we derive the theoretical implications of these assumptions we provide simulations and we develop a semiparametric estimation procedure that we apply to a dataset of individual labor market histories

do wages rise with job seniority a reassessment the authors provide new estimates of the return to job seniority using a dataset similar to that employed in joseph altonji and robert shakotko do wages rise with job seniority review of economic studies 1987 and robert topel specific capital mobility and wages journal of political economy 1991 they consider the strengths and weaknesses of these studies treatment of economy wide trends their dating conventions for tenure and wages their handling of wage observations that might span multiple jobs and their estimation approaches re estimation points to an effect often years of tenure on the log wage equal to 11 which is above the preferred estimate of altonji and shakotko but far below that of topel changes in earnings distributions and in the employment relationship motivate the examination of more recent data perhaps surprisingly the return to tenure has probably increased over time

differential income taxation and household asset allocation this article empirically investigates the effects of differential income taxation on households portfolio choice and asset allocation applying a two stage budgeting model of asset demand to german survey data the model is structured into the discrete and the continuous asset choice cross sectional variation in marginal tax rates appropriately instrumented as well as over time variation from a major tax reform are used to identify the tax effects households with higher tax rates are found to have relatively greater demand for tax privileged assets such as nonowner occupied housing mortgage repayments building society deposits stocks insurances and consumer credits than households with lower tax rates demand at higher tax rates is lower for owner occupied housing bank deposits and bonds

industry specific capital and the wage profile evidence from the national longitudinal survey of youth and the panel study of income dynamics using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1979 96 and the panel study of income dynamics 1981 91 i seek to determine whether there is any net positive return to tenure with the current employer once we control for industry specific capital including total experience in the industry as an additional explanatory variable i show that the return to seniority is markedly reduced using gls while it virtually disappears using iv gls at both the one digit and three digit levels therefore it seems that what matters most for the wage profile in terms of human capital is industry specificity not firm specificity

early career work experience and gender wage differentials we estimate a wage model that includes an array of variables measuring the fraction of time worked during each year of the career this array fully characterizes past employment experience regardless of how sporadic it has been our model yields substantially higher estimated returns to experience and lower returns to tenure than do models that measure experience cumulatively and use the standard quadratic functional form we find that the data reject the standard model but fail to reject our model furthermore we find that 12 of the male female wage gap is due to differences in the timing of work experience

intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes a revealed preference approach using data the german socio economic panel gsoep we investigate whether the willingness to take risks which is revealed via observed choices of occupation is transmitted from parents to children our approach resembles the one by dohmen et al 2008 who investigate the same question using stated preferences as risk variable we use earnings risk measured by the cross sectional coecient of residual variation obtained from mincerian wage regressions we nd that fathers riskiness of the job chosen is a signicant determinant of sons occupational risk our results are robust to dierent specications underpinning the hypothesis of intergenerational transmission of risk preferences

does centralization increase the size of government abstract are fiscal programs larger or smaller if they are run centrally rather than locally in a prospective federation we abstract completely from well understood economic issues and focus instead on the political effects of centralization for fiscal programs with benefits broadly spread in the population such as redistributive transfer schemes social insurance and general government consumption centralization changes the coalition of voters who favor a large program in a direction that depends on the nature of the redistributive instrument for fiscal programs with localized benefits such as provision of local public goods centralization creates opportunities for rent seeking which increases the size of government

an empirical equilibrium job search model with continuously distributed heterogeneity of workers opportunity costs of employment and firms productivities and search on the job in this paper we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models allowing for continuous distributions of workers opportunity costs of employment as wellas firms productivities the model allows for on the job search and we assume that job offer arrival rates for workers are independent of their labormarket state we derive the theoretical implications of these assumptions we provide simulations and we develop a semi parametric estimation procedure that we apply to a dataset ofindividual labor market histories

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

linear household technologies this paper discusses estimates and formally compares the best known procedures for incorporating demographic variables into complete demand systems in particular a class of general procedures belonging to gorman s family of general linear household technologies is introduced estimation and comparison of different procedures make use of italian household budget data for the years 1973 1992 incorporating a single demographic variable family size into a generalized quadratic almost ideal demand system in our empirical example however even the most general household technologies are unable to fully capture the behavioural heterogeneity shown by the data copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

bias in returns to tenure when firm wages and employment comove a quantitative assessment and solution it is well known that unless worker firm match quality is controlled for reduced form estimates of returns to firm tenure will be biased in this paper we show that there is a further pervasive source of bias namely the comovement of firm employment and firm wages we argue that firm year fixed effects must be used to eliminate this bias estimates from two large panel data sets from germany and portugal show that the bias is empirically important finally we show that the results extend to tenure correlates used in macroeconomics such as the minimum unemployment rate since joining the firm

allocation under dictatorship research in stalin s archives we survey recent research on the soviet economy in the state party and military archives of the stalin era the archives have provided rich new evidence on the economic arrangements of a command system under a powerful dictator including stalin s role in the making of the economic system and economic policy stalin s accumulation objectives and the constraints that limited his power to achieve them the limits to administrative allocation the information flows and incentives that governed the behavior of economic managers the scope and significance of corruption and market oriented behavior and the prospects for economic reform

consumer behaviour theory and empirical evidence a survey this survey is designed to emphasize the relationship between empirical a nd theoretical considerations in the analysis of consumer behavior a lthough it focuses primarily on analysis at the individual or micro l evel it tries where possible to draw implications for the estimati on of aggregate relationships the importance of micro level analysis stems from the rapid expansion in available panel and survey data se ts this development has generated its own theoretical and empirical issues many of which are raised in this survey copyright 1988 by royal economic society

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

household demand for fats and oils two step estimation of a censored demand system a censored system of household fat and oil demand equations is estimated with a two step procedure using cross sectional data from the 1987 1988 us nationwide food consumption survey own price and total expenditure elasticities are close to unity and there is no evidence of gross substitutability compensated elasticities suggest net substitution among the products considered

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

state dependence serial correlation and heterogeneity in intertemporal labor force participation of married women a dynamic search framework is developed to analyze the intertemporal labor force participation behavior of married women using longitudinal data to allow for a rich dynamic structure the sensitivity to alternative distributional assumptions is evaluated using linear probability and probit models the dynamic probit models are estimated using maximum simulated likelihood msl estimation to overcome the computational difficulties inherent in maximum likelihood estimation of models with nontrivial error structures the results find that participation decisions are characterized by significant state dependence unobserved heterogeneity and negative serial correlation in the error component the hypothesis that fertility decisions are exogenous to women s participation decisions is rejected when dynamics are ignored however there is no evidence against this hypothesis in dynamic model specifications women s participation response is stronger to permanent than current nonlabor income reflecting unobserved taste factors

optimal diversification and risk taking a theoretical and empirical analysis among the justifications for capital property income received by private households is that it is a return to risk taking however portfolio diversification provides an obvious means toward the reduction of risk moreover it is widely believed that the wealthier the household the more diversification it practices the larger tends to be the proportion of its total portfolio allocated to publicly traded stock and the larger tends to be the number of individual stock issues included in its portfolio using a simple homogeneous securities model explicit functional forms are obtained for both the optimal proportion of the portfolio allocated to stocks and the optimal number of individual stock issues in the portfolio empirical evaluation of these theoretical results using a dataset derived from the 2004 survey of consumer finances scf lends substantial support to the model applying these empirical results it is found that as household capital wealth increases expected capital income increase

social interaction and stock market participation we propose that stock market participation is influenced by social interaction in our model any given social investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate we test this theory using data from the health and retirement study and find that social households those who interact with their neighbors or attend church are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non social households controlling for wealth race education and risk tolerance moreover consistent with a peer effects story the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock market participation rates are higher

tenure experience human capital and wages a tractable equilibrium search model of wage dynamics we develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers allowing for human capital accumulation employer heterogeneity and individual level shocks wage growth is decomposed into contributions of human capital and job search within and between jobs human capital accumulation is largest for highly educated workers the contribution from job search to wage growth both within and between job declines over the fi rst ten years of a career the job shopping phase of a working life after which workers settle into high quality jobs using outside o ffers to generate gradual wage increases thus reaping the bene fits from competition between employers

borrowing constraints and portfolio choice this paper examines how borrowing ceilings in the personal loan market affect the portfolio choice of consumers most papers on borrowing constraints do not address the question of portfolio choice it is typically assumed that all assets can be liquidated to finance consumption in the case of an income shortfall in this case borrowing ceilings will never bind until consumers have run their assets down to zero and borrowed up to their limits however it may be more realistic to assume that consumers have a choice of allocating wealth between short term liquid assets e g cash that can be used for current consumption purposes and longer term illiquid assets e g housing equity cds that cannot be used for current consumption purposes but may be used as collateral for loans the central question of this paper is whether the presence of borrowing ceilings in the personal loan market will induce individuals to hold a larger share of their assets in liquid form this question is addressed within the context of two types of borrowing ceilings first it is assumed that borrowing ceilings are exogenous in that they are unaffected by the individual s portfolio choice this assumption is similar to that made in many papers on borrowing constraints 2 the presence of exogenous borrowing ceilings will unambiguously lead to more liquid portfolios individuals who know that there is a limit to the amount that can be borrowed will hold a larger share of their wealth in liquid form since by doing so the probability of becoming credit constrained in the future is reduced the case of exogenous borrowing ceilings is contrasted with the case in which borrowing ceilings are due to interest rate ceilings in

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

constitutions and economic policy at the rare moments in history when a nation debates constitutional reform the key issues often concern how the reforms might affect economic policy and economic performance for example italy abandoned a system of pure proportional representation where legislators were elected according to the proportions of the popular national vote received by their parties and moved toward including ingredients of plurality rule where legislators are elected in each district according to who receives the highest number of votes key italian political leaders are now considering proposals to introduce elements of presidentialism where the head of government is elected by direct popular vote rather than the current parliamentary regime a common argument in italy was that the electoral reform would help stifle political corruption and reduce the propensity of italian governments to run budget deficits in the 1990s constitutional reforms have been debated and implemented in a number of other countries too for instance new zealand moved away from a pure system of plurality rule in single member districts to a system mixing elements of proportional representation japan also renounced its special form of plurality rule the so called single nontransferable vote in favor of a system that mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation similar proposals have been debated in the united kingdom in latin america questions have been raised as to whether the poor and volatile economic performance of many countries can be traced to their presidential form of government

understanding the soft budget constraint we propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist transitional and market economies our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences in light of this interpretation we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics

unions in a frictional labor market abstract a labor market with search and matching frictions where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup with full commitment to future wages the union achieves efficient hiring in the long run but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate rents from firms without commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium hiring is too low both in the short and the long run the quantitative impact is demonstrated in an extended model with partial union coverage and multiperiod union contracting

the sensitivity of an empirical model of married women s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions this study undertakes a systematic analysis of several theoretic and statistical assumption s used in many empirical models of female labor supply using a singl e data set psid 1975 labor supply data the author is able to replic ate most of the range of estimated income and substitution effects fo und in previous studies in this field he undertakes extensive specif ication tests and finds that most of this range should be rejected du e to statistical and model misspecifications the two most important assumptions appear to be the tobit assumption used to control for sel f selection into the labor force and exogeneity assumptions on the wi fe s wage rate and her labor market experience copyright 1987 by the econometric society

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

natural resources education and economic development economic growth since 1965 has varied inversely with the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries four main channels of transmission from abundant natural resources to stunted economic development are discussed a the dutch disease b rent seeking c overconfidence and d neglect of education public expenditure on education relative to national income expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrolment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries natural capital appears to crowd out human capital thereby slowing down the pace of economic development

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

the disadvantage of tying their hands on the political economy of policy commitments incumbents are more likely to be re elected if they have a comparative advantage in the eyes of voters on some central issue this paper argues that incumbents have an incentive to avoid reforms that reduce the government s role in deciding these issues in order to increase their chances of re election this point is illustrated in the context of the choice of an exchange rate regime in an economy characterized by an inflation bias a flexible exchange rate allows the government to use monetary policy as a stabilization tool while fixed exchange rates remove the inflation bias of the economy on the one hand it is shown that a more inflation averse government may refrain from choosing fixed exchange rates in order to capitalize on the inflationary reputation of its opponent this incentive is contrasted with the opposite incentive to tie the hands of the future government should be incumbent be defeated on the other hand it is shown that electoral considerations may reinforce the incentive of the more inflationary government to tie its own hands with fixed exchange rates

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

statistical models for zero expenditures in household budgets household budget surveys are an important source of data on consumer s expenditure not just for individual consumers but also for estimating national aggregates however it is a widespread finding that for certain commodities most notably tobacco and alcohol the estimate from the household survey falls short of the known consumption total calculated with some confidence from data on production imports exports and excise duties for example in the british family expenditure survey with which we shall largely be concerned total tobacco expenditure was underestimated in 1976 by 21 percent see kemsley redpath and holmes 1980 p 51 much of this understatement together with that on alcohol is thought to occur because of the design of the survey which excludes many persons amongst whom consumption of such items is thought to be atypically high e g prisoners hoteliers and their residents merchant seamen even so the possibility remains that some of the understatement is due to various types of misreporting by households included in the survey in this paper we consider a model in which the standard tobit specification tobin 1958 is supplemented by the operation of a simple binary censor the tobit model is essentially a linear regression model in which non positive observations of the dependent variable are replaced by zero we take this specification as our starting point but add a second censoring process that randomly replaces a fraction of the observations generated by the tobit model bv zeroes the combined model can serve as a representation of several types of

labor supply estimation biases from disregarding nonwage benefits labor supply models and research underpinned by labor supply decisions typically assume the agents choices are functions of wage and wage offers however there is evidence that these selections are not only wage driven but at least in part depend on non wage benefits encompassed in jobs and occupations in this paper i develop and estimate a stochastic dynamic model of occupational and job choice where non wage benefits are directly incorporated into the decision alongside wages a nested model within this is a wage model representing common practice in the literature where non wage benefits are disregarded i separately estimate the full model and the nested wage model in order to compare the implications of omitting non wage benefits three analyses are compared elasticities economy wide structural changes in occupations and inequality reduction intervention policies i find that while disregarding non wage benefits generally causes biases there are cases when the two models predict very similar outcomes and have close estimates such as in occupational specific elasticities and job transition elasticities however i demonstrate that these special cases are products of canceling biases and that the same estimates on subpopulations are biased these results suggest that in most cases ignoring non wage benefits will bias estimates by overestimating the importance of wage in the selection process and so any intervention or change in wages will be over emphasized and by disregarding changes in relative prices between wage and non wage benefits such as happens through changes in wage taxes or in non wage benefits these biases can be severe the results suggest that ignoring non wage benefits in labor supply decisions is appropriate only in the special case in which subpopulation biases negate each other which is atypical i would like to thank moshe buchinsky and maria casanova for their invaluable and continual help in this project as well as rosa matzkin arturo harker seth kerstein dan ben moshe peter bergman anonymous referees at review of economics and statistics and seminar participants at ucla rand syracuse university the bureau of labor statistics and the census bureau for numerous helpful comments and suggestions

taxation portfolio choice and debt equity ratios a general equilibrium model this paper explores the portfolio behavior of investors differing with respect to both tax rates and risk aversion emphasizing the role of constraints on individual and firm behavior in ensuring the existence of and characterizing portfolio equilibrium under certain conditions on the securities available in the market which also are necessary for shareholders to be unanimous in supporting firm value maximization investors will be segmented by tax rate into two groups one specialized in equity and the other in debt though the relative wealths of the two groups determine the aggregate debt equity ratio each firm will be indifferent to its financial policy

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

investment choice and asset allocation of italian households the discrete continuous approach financial and monetary policies are considered to be effective depending on the reaction of financial markets which are increasingly populated by households in this article from intertemporal settings i derive a financial almost ideal fai demand system and i estimate it by highlighting the determinants of both limited participation to financial markets and asset substitutability complementarity in the allocating stage finally the wealth elasticities provide some further insights on the low diffusion of the newer and more complex financial instruments across italian households

interfirm mobility wages and the returns to seniority and experience in the united states in this paper we expand on the seminal work of altonji and shakotko 1987 and topel 1991 and reinvestigate the returns to seniority in the united states we begin with the same wage equation as in previous studies we extend the model of hyslop 1999 and explicitly model the participation employment and inter firm mobility decisions which in turn define the individual s experience and seniority we introduce into the wage equation a summary of the workers entire career path the three equation system is estimated simultaneously using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid we find that for each of the three education groups studied the returns to seniority are larger than those previously found in the literature

asset holding and consumption volatility we investigate the possibility that limited participation in asset markets and the stock market in particular might explain the lack of correspondence between the sample moments of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and asset returns in u k data we estimate ownership probabilities to separate likely shareholders from nonshareholders enabling us to control for changing composition effects as well as selection into the group we then construct estimates of the imrs for each of these different groups and consider their time series properties we find that the consumption growth of shareholders is more volatile than that of nonshareholders and more highly correlated with excess returns to shares in particular one cannot reject the predictions of the consumption capital asset pricing model for the group of households predicted to own both assets this is in contrast to the failure of the model when estimated on data for all households

u s cigarette consumption the case of low income women we use double hurdle or cragg models to test whether decisions about smoking participation and consumption levels are separate endogenous choices we also estimate several dominance models which assume that standard corner solutions are not applicable a complete dominance model with independence between the participation and consumption decisions is the preferred specification for our data the most important variables influencing participation are region number of children education and ethnicity region age race ethnicity and health status most affected consumption levels

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

fiscal games and public employment a theory with evidence from russia why do some governments both in different countries and in regions within those countries employ more workers than others existing theories focus on the level of economic development political redistribution and social insurance but they raise additional puzzles and do not account for all evidence or for a global trend toward decentralization of public employment the authors propose a new theory inspired by russia s recent experience that locates one motive for subnational public employment growth in a political and fiscal game between central and subnational governments in countries with weak legal systems local and regional officials may deliberately set their employment levels beyond their fiscal capacity prompting bailouts from the central government which fears the political cost to it if wage arrears accumulate and provoke strikes the authors model the logic of such brinkmanship derive several propositions and show that they and the model s assumptions fit empirical evidence from russia in the 1990s deficiencies of that country s overstaffed underequipped irregularly paid ineffective and strike prone public sector appear to result in part from a system of dysfunctional incentives created by the interaction of electoral pressures with the system of fiscal federalism the authors suggest parallels with latin american countries such as argentina and brazil