bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the european central bank evidence from a panel sample selection model abstract this paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations ltros of the european central bank we investigate how banks bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs interest rate expectations market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin size and experience a specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time therefore we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank s endogenous participation decision we find that bidding strategies depend on the banks attributes yet different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success there is evidence for the winner s curse effect in ltros indicating a common value component in banks demand for longer term refinancing

labor market regulation and the winner s curse i introduction in march 1992 the government of british columbia b c canada introduced the skill development and fair wage policy sdfwp which mandated the payment of fair wages on provincial public construction projects and promulgated the wage scales for construction crafts in 1994 sdfwp was enacted as legislation similar laws have been enacted in england and the united states in the past and as allen s 1983 survey shows their impact is a subject of controversy opponents argue that regulated wages distort the labor market reduce competition and increase construction costs proponents of the law on the other hand not only emphasize its long term positive effects on the living and working conditions of workers training and the consequent productivity increases but also claim that the alleged inflationary effect is counterbalanced by the improved labor and product quality in this paper i focus on another consequence of wage regulation namely its impact on bidding for public construction contracts i propose that the wage regulation will affect the construction market not only by changing the costs and quality of inputs but also through the transformation of the nature of the uncertainty that the contractors face during the bidding process the auction theory predicts that the optimal bid is responsive to the type of uncertainty under the so called common values cv model bidders face some common source of uncertainty regarding the construction cost and the winner is prone to underestimate the true cost rational and experienced bidders avoid this winner s curse by adding a surcharge to their estimated cost as uncertainty assumes a less collective and more private nature however the winner s curse becomes less of a problem and the rational bidder does not need to resort to the additional surcharge as a protection from underbidding the sdfwp may result in such a transformation in the bidding environment by reducing the uncertainty over labor costs that are common to all nonunion contractors elimination of the surcharge in turn may even offset the possibly higher labor cost in this paper i will test indirectly the hypothesis that the sdfwp influenced the bidding environment in b c in this fashion under the working assumption that contractors follow optimal rules in determining bids for this purpose i will use data from 54 public school construction projects tendered between 1989 and 1995 and compare the pre and post sdfwp unit bid prices the paper is organized as follows in section ii i discuss the relevant auction literature and the hypotheses i state the main hypotheses of the paper concerning the sdfwp and bidding behavior in section iii section iv describes the data an empirical model of bid price determination is presented and estimated in sections v vi and vii the final section concludes ii bidding and the winner s curse bidders for public school construction projects in b c submit sealed bids at a specified date and the lowest bidder wins the contract 1 many of the early sealed bid first price optimal bidding models presented in economics civil engineering and operations research literatures follow friedman 1956 according to these models bidders are risk neutral non colluding expected profit maximizers competing over a single project friedman suggests that the probability of being the lowest competitor is equal to the product of the probabilities of underbidding each competitor probability distributions of the competitors bids are to be obtained from the data on previous tenders this approach lays bare critical elements in competitive bidding first the contractor faces a trade off between profitability and the probability of winning the contract the bid must be high enough to yield a positive profit and low enough to win over other bids second superior cost efficiency enables the contractor to change the parameters of this trade off in his or her favor

how to set minimum acceptable bids with an application to real estate auctions in a general auction model with affiliated signals common components to valuations and endogenous entry we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price this lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods we illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions

using auctions to price employee stock options the case of zions bancorporation esoars the first empirical analysis of zions bancorporation s 2006 and 2007 auctions of employee stock option appreciation rights securities esoars this study examined 1 the impact of auction rules on bidding strategies and allocations 2 the efficiency of the auction clearing prices and 3 the value gap between esoars auction clearing prices and various model based estimates it found that the design features of the auctions e g ending rules significantly affected bidding strategies but not final allocations which remained highly concentrated it also found that the clearing prices 1 displayed high price elasticities of demand suggesting efficient price discovery and 2 were low relative to some but not all model based estimates these findings suggest design improvements that might benefit auctions of other illiquid derivatives e g banks troubled assets currently being considered by the u s government

salomon brothers and the may 1991 treasury auction analysis of a market corner abstract in may 1991 the treasury sold 12 29 billion in two year notes through improper bidding salomon brothers gained control of at least 86 percent of the issue this study investigates the impact of salomon s attempted corner by examining the postauction price behaviour of the two year note based on a no arbitrage relation the results show that the two year note was substantially overpriced for approximately six weeks following the auction the typical mispricing during this period is estimated at 0 16 to 0 25 percent of par in dollar terms the aggregate misvaluation averaged 20 30 million and by controlling the supply of the issue salomon stood to gain substantially from the squeeze

an empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in road construction auctions this paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions we find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents the differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant s costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent s and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs we also find that more efficient firms bid on average more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

executive incentives and the horizon problem an empirical investigation abstract this paper investigates the hypothesis that ceos in their final years of office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short term earnings performance we examine the behavior of r d expenditures for a sample of firms in industries that have significant ongoing r d activities the results suggest that ceos spend less on r d during their final years in office however we find the reductions in r d expenditures are mitigated through ceo stock ownership there is no evidence that the reduced r d expenditures are associated with either poor firm performance or reductions in investment expenditures that are capitalized for accounting purposes

performance shocks and misreporting we propose a parsimonious stochastic model of reported earnings that links misreporting to performance shocks our main analytical prediction is that misreporting leads to a negative second order autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression of current earnings on lagged earnings we also propose a stylized dynamic model of earnings manipulation and demonstrate that both earnings smoothing and target beating considerations result in the same predictions of negative second order autocorrelations empirically we find that the distribution of this measure is asymmetric around zero with 27 of the firms having significantly negative estimates using this measure we specify a methodology to estimate the intensity of misreporting and to create estimates of unmanipulated earnings our estimates of unmanipulated earnings are more correlated with contemporaneous returns and have higher volatility than reported earnings with respect to economic magnitude we find that in absolute terms median misreporting is 0 7 of total assets moreover firms in our sample subject to sec aaers have significantly higher estimates of manipulation intensity

strategic delay in market entry two firms are contemplating entry into a market that is viable for only one firm in a good state we show that even if each firm receives a signal that perfectly reveals a good state both might strategically delay entry owing to the fear that the other firm might enter in the same period as well we also find the conditions where the informed firm will let the rival firm know about the market s profitability and the two will merge to enter the market we discuss the applications of this model to the oil industry and the generic drug industry jel classification l71 d8

status quo maintenance reconsidered changing or incomplete preferences after reviewing the evidence for status quo maintenance sqm i consider how to reconcile sqm with traditional consumer theory behavioural economists usually let agents preferences change as a function of their endowments treating the same person with different endowments as a set of distinct agents many properties of preferences then become immune to empirical test and it becomes impossible to judge whether an agent s decisions make the agent better or worse off this impedes prediction of when decision rules are likely to change sqm can alternatively be explained with unchanging preferences if preferences are incomplete sqm is then consistent with self interest and there is no reason why it should not persist

foreign earnings management of us multinational companies the role of decision rights us multinational corporations mncs need to allocate decision rights between parent companies and subsidiaries to manage global operations this article examines how the allocation of decision rights affects foreign earnings management of mncs i find that the extent of foreign earnings management increases when parents retain centralized decision rights but internal cross border frictions between parents and their foreign subsidiaries and the external local legal environment in which foreign subsidiaries operate can mitigate foreign earnings management despite parents having centralized decision rights this study provides evidence on how the decision structures of mncs affect where earnings are managed

do better informed investors always do better a buyback puzzle we explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source auctions of yearling racehorses horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction however those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average earning 30 less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders moreover this underperformance is concentrated in male horses despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes these puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities or by nonfinancial objectives or by behavioral or selection biases jel g02 g11 g14 l83 d44

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the effect of shill bidding upon prices experimental evidence this paper explores through a series of experiments the effect of shill bidding upon revenues and prices in auctions we study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework our findings are consistent with the prediction that if bidders are aware of the possibility of seller participation in an auction profits will be reduced on average we also study factors that affect bidder and seller participation decisions shill bidding can alleviate the problem of the winner s curse by lowering the price and it can thus provide benefits to bidders

resource allocation models with risk aversion and probabilistic dependence offshore oil and gas bidding bidding for offshore u s oil and gas leases is a major corporate resource allocation problem involving enormous uncertainties and very high stakes this paper presents two new operationally useful decision analysis models to aid in bidding for oil and gas leases they are unique in that they consider risk aversion and probabilistic dependence among the values of the leases with both bid levels and partnership shares as continuous decision variables they are suitable for use in evaluating proposed bidding policies or as objective functions in optimization formulations practicality of their data requirements is evidenced by use of one of the models for several years in a major oil company comparison of optimal solutions to these models on a small example using actual oil company data demonstrates the importance of taking risk aversion and probabilistic dependence into account and provides insight into the adequacy of independence and conditional dependence as approximations for dependence these results are pertinent to other real world allocation problems that share many of the characteristics of bidding problems such as r d funds allocation

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

comparing the spanish and the discriminatory auction formats a discrete model with private information abstract the spanish treasury is the only treasury in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell government debt winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than the weighted average price of winning bids wap and pay the wap otherwise following gordy gordy m 1996 multiple bids in a multiple unit common value auction board of governors of the federal reserve system we model the spanish auction as a common value auction of multiple units with private information allowing for multiple bids numerical analysis shows that bidders spread their bids more in the spanish than in the discriminatory auction and bid higher for the first unit and that the expected seller s revenue is higher in the spanish than in the discriminatory auction within a reasonable set of parameter values

empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers discretionary accrual choices abstract in this paper we investigate whether budgets ratchet using business unit data from a large multinational corporation we find evidence consistent with ratcheting where favorable budget variances result in performance budget increases that are larger than decreases associated with unfavorable variances of the same magnitude we argue that under ratcheting the cost of reporting positive transitory earnings surprises outweigh the short term benefits of the current period bonus consequently we hypothesize that managers make income decreasing discretionary accruals to offset transitory earnings surprises beyond the level expected under fixed budgets using a proxy for transitory earnings surprise we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis

finding our balance revisiting the randomization revolution in development economics ten years further on abstract ten years ago we offered reflections on the power and pitfalls of randomized controlled trials in development economics arguing that the research community had lost its balance between theory observational data and randomized experiments we remain convinced of both the importance and the limits of rcts for development economics research but with another decade of rcts under our collective belts three issues now strike us as having become increasingly important first ethical risks still loom large second increasing evidence that many interventions have highly heterogeneous impacts places a premium on reintegrating ex ante theorizing with rct methods to understand the heterogeneity in some cases heterogeneity may imply rcts are less desirable than other research methods third the increasing use of rcts to study informational behavioral and other perceptions mediated interventions creates an opportunity for non classical measurement error problems that undercut the statistical power of seemingly well designed studies in ways that remain underappreciated

market performance and bidders bidding behavior in the new york transmission congestion contract market abstract using publicly available bidder level bids data for transmission congestion contracts tccs and the realized awards of tccs in the nyiso monthly reconfiguration auctions from june 2000 to december 2004 we examine both market performance and bidders bidding behavior in the auctions the data show significant under pricing in the realized awards of tccs theories suggest that under pricing may arise from risk aversion monopsonistic market power or winner s curse our empirical analysis illustrates that all of the three effects play a role in the nyiso tccs market both market performance and bidders bidding strategies can be best explained by the theoretical model with asymmetric information and risk averse bidders

on strategic quantity bidding in multiple unit auctions standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders quantity decisions using a simple equilibrium model of bidding the author analyzes bidders incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions the main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower valuing bidders enter the set of winners this prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions copyright 1997 by blackwell publishing ltd

contract selection and performance in competitive bidding for electricity generation third parties bidding to supply utilities with electric generation facilities is a new and increasingly important practice six states have either establishes bidding programmes or are considering doing so the paper uses data from maine the first state to use electric generation bidding to examine which bids are awarded contracts and which contracts fail to fulfill their provisions results show that bid price plays a very small role if any in the selection process

exploration and development of u s oil and gas fields 1955 2002 we study the exploration and development of oil and gas fields in the u s over the period 1955 2002 we make four contributions to explain the economic evolution of the oil and gas industry during this period first we derive a testable model of the dynamics of competitive oil and gas field exploration and development second we show how to empirically distinguish hotelling scarcity effects from effects due to technological change third we test these hypotheses using statewide panel data of exploration and development drilling we find that the time paths of exploration development and total wells drilled are dominated by hotelling scarcity effects finally we offer an explanation for why fixed costs from exploration can make the contracting equilibrium in the mineral rights market efficient

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

hedging winner s curse with multiple bids evidence from the portuguese treasury bill auction auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price quantity bids despite the widespread adoption of this institutional feature and its use by bidders the motivations behind its use and its effects on auction outcomes are not well understood theoretically and have been little explored empirically this paper proposes that bidders use multiple bids to adjust for winner s curse by spreading her bids a bidder aligns her outcome more closely to the aggregate outcome of the auction this hypothesis is tested using bidding data from treasury bill auctions in portugal i find that ceteris paribus a bidder submits a greater number of bids and disperses prices on these bids more widely when there is a greater potential for winner s curse in particular both these measures of bid spreading increase with the volatility of market interest rates and the expected number of participating well informed bidders

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

the interplay between forward looking measures and target setting we examine whether financial targets are based on both forward looking and financial information rather than on financial information only we collect sales and performance appraisal data of store managers in a retail chain the firm issues directives focused on the provision of excellent customer service and assesses store managers compliance with these directives subjectively we demonstrate that controlling for current sales compliance with directives scores predicts future sales performance we find that next to objective sales information this forward looking information is impounded in the next year s sales target finally we find some evidence that suggests that incorporating forward looking information improves the accuracy of sales targets this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

labor markets and poverty in village economies we study how women s choices over labor activities in village economies correlate with poverty and whether enabling the poorest women to take on the activities of their richer counterparts can set them on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty to do this we conduct a large scale randomized control trial covering over 21 000 households in 1 309 villages surveyed four times over a seven year period to evaluate a nationwide program in bangladesh that transfers livestock assets and skills to the poorest women at baseline the poorest women mostly engage in low return and seasonal casual wage labor while wealthier women solely engage in livestock rearing the program enables poor women to start engaging in livestock rearing increasing their aggregate labor supply and earnings this leads to asset accumulation livestock land and business assets and poverty reduction both accelerating after four and seven years these gains do not come at the expense of others non eligibles livestock rearing businesses are not crowded out and wages received for casual jobs increase as the poor reduce their labor supply in such labor activities our results show that i the poor are able to take on the work activities of the non poor but face barriers to doing so and ii one o interventions that remove these barriers lead to sustainable poverty reduction

quantitative easing auctions of treasury bonds abstract the federal reserve uses reverse auctions to implement its purchases of treasury bonds in quantitative easing qe to evaluate dealers offers across multiple bonds the fed relies on its internal yield curve model fitted to secondary market bond prices from november 2010 to september 2011 a one standard deviation increase in the cheapness of a treasury bond how much the market price of the bond is below a model implied value increases the fed s purchase quantity of that bond by 276 million and increases the auction costs on that bond by 2 6 cents per 100 par value controlling for standard covariates our results suggest that the fed harvests gains from trades by purchasing undervalued bonds but strategic dealers extract some profits because the fed s relative values can be partly inferred from price data

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

are governmental expenditures also sticky evidence from the operating expenditures of public schools abstractexisting research on cost stickiness focuses primarily on for profit companies this study investigates cost behaviour in the public sector a new setting that deserves more research attent

did installed base give an incumbent any measurable advantages in federal computer procurement this research examines the relative strength and significance of the status of incumbent contractor in federal computer procurement one finding as expected is that an agency is likely to acquire a system from an incumbent vendor another finding perhaps more interesting is that the in compatibility between a buyer s installed base and a potential system also influences the vendor choice a result that may be the first econometric measurement of the competitive effects of incompatibility an illustration of this thesis comes from ibm s experience new evidence shows however that ibm s apparent disadvantage with government agencies is largely due to incompatibilities in ibm s product line

hindsight foresight and insight an experimental study of a small market investment game with common and private values we experimentally test an endogenous timing investment model in which sub jects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return subjects overinvest relative to nash we separately consider whether subjects draw inferences in hindsight and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity in contrast to nash cursed equilibrium and level k predictions behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief based theories we offer an explanation in terms ofboundedly ratio nal rules of thumb based on insights about the game which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium jel c72 d82 d83 gil

bidder behavior in multiunit auctions evidence from swedish treasury auctions we analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 swedish treasury auctions first we document that bidders vary their prices bid dispersion and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding second we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner s curse driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies third we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information the winner s curse and the champion s plague while the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

auctions for initial sale of annual catch entitlement we use a laboratory experiment calibrated to a representative new zealand fishery to assess three sealed bid multi unit demand auction mechanisms under consideration for allocating quota for species being introduced into the quota management system these auctions allocate the k units to the k highest bids but prices are determined according to discriminative kth price and k 1st price rules in our experiment the auctions are equally efficient but revenue is highest in the discriminative auction and lowest in the k 1st price auction results are robust to industry subjects and subjects are responsive to the across unit bidding incentives present in multi unit demand auctions

the impact of market competition on ceo salary in the us energy sector1 abstract in this work we examine the impact of market competition on ceos salaries by analyzing a sample of alls p american firms in the energy sector in the 1992 2015 time span and measuring market competition by means of the so called herfindhal hirschman index we divide industries into three sub groups based on small medium and high market concentration and try to expand our research by exploring the impact of the recent financial crisis the paper investigates how ceos salaries are affected by firm level determinants e g firm size returns on assets returns on equity capital expenditure market concentration tobin s q etc as well as by the individual characteristics of each ceo e g ceos age gender based on our findings the market concentration index in the us energy sector has a negative and statistically significant impact on ceo salary for all firms that operate in either a highly monopolistic or a purely competitive environment the results of this empirical work are robust after examining for different alternative high order fixed effects specifications

how do nonprofit hospitals manage earnings abstract we hypothesize that unlike for profit firms nonprofit hospitals have incentives to manage earnings to a range just above zero we consider two ways managers can achieve this they can adjust discretionary spending hoerger t j 1991 profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals journal of health economics 10 259 289 and or they can adjust accounting accruals using the flexibility inherent in generally accepted accounting principles gaap to test our hypothesis we use regressions as well as tests of the distribution of earnings by burgstahler and dichev burgstahler d dichev i 1997 earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses journal of accounting and economics 24 99 126 on a sample of 1 204 hospitals and 8 179 hospital year observations our tests support the use of discretionary spending and accounting accrual management like hoerger 1991 we find evidence that nonprofit hospitals adjust discretionary spending to manage earnings however we also find significant use of discretionary accruals e g adjustments to the third party allowance and allowance for doubtful accounts to meet earnings objectives these findings have two important implications first the previous evidence by hoerger that nonprofit hospitals show less variation in income may at least partly be explained by an accounting phenomenon second our findings provide guidance to users of these financial statements in predicting the direction of likely bias in reported earnings

smallholder participation in contract farming comparative evidence from five countries summary supermarkets specialized wholesalers processors and agro exporters are transforming the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low income economies we develop a conceptual framework with which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity processing firm we then synthesize results from empirical studies of contract farming arrangements in five countries ghana india madagascar mozambique and nicaragua the resulting meta narrative documents patterns of participation the welfare gains associated with participation reasons for nonparticipation the significant extent of contract noncompliance and the considerable dynamism of these value chains as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently

bidding in common value auctions how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner s curse experienced construction industry executives suffer from a winner s curse in laboratory common value auction markets dyer et al dyer d j h kagel d levin 1989 a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions laboratory analysis econom j 99 108 115 this paper identifies essential differences between field environments and the economic theory underlying the laboratory markets that account for the executives success in the field and a winner s curse in the lab these are 1 industry specific mechanisms which enable contractors to escape the winner s curse even when they bid too low 2 learned industry specific evaluative processes which enable experienced contractors to avoid the winner s curse in the first place and 3 important private value elements that underlie bidding also identified are a number of industry specific bidding characteristics whose evolution can be explained using modern auction theory lessons are drawn regarding the use of experime

heterogeneous impact dynamics of a rural business development program in nicaragua abstract we study the impacts of a rural development program designed to boost the income of the small farm sector in nicaragua exploiting the random assignment of treatment we find statistically and economically significant impacts on gross farm income and investment in productive farm capital using continuous treatment estimation techniques we examine the evolution of program impacts over time and find that the estimated income increase persists and that the impacts on productive capital stock continue to rise even after the program concluded additionally panel quantile methods reveal striking heterogeneity of program impacts on both income and investment we show that this heterogeneity is not random and that there appear to exist low performing household types who benefit little from the program whereas high performing upper quantile households benefit more substantially analysis using generalized random forests a machine learning algorithm points toward greater program impacts for households who were disadvantaged at baseline even after controlling for this source of heterogeneity we find large and persistent differences in how much different types of households benefited from the program while the benefit cost ratio of the program is on average positive the impact heterogeneity suggests that business development programs aiming to engage farm households as agricultural entrepreneurs have limitations as instruments to eliminate rural poverty

asymmetric information information externalities and efficiency the case of oil exploration in this article we examine the efect of private information and information externalities on the ex post eficiency of investment in oil exploration we show that too much drilling tends to occur ifjirms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil and too little drilling occurs if the opposite is true bargaining with well defined property rights to the information externality can eliminate underinvestment but overinvestment remains a problem because firms have an incentive not to disclose their private information

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

the performance of corporate alliances evidence from oil and gas drilling in the gulf of mexico abstract i use data on oil and gas drilling in the gulf of mexico to measure how a corporate alliance a group of firms that jointly develops an offshore tract performs relative to a solo firm i employ a regression discontinuity strategy based on bids in first price sealed bid auctions for the rights to develop leases by focusing on leases where one organizational form narrowly outbids the other i measure drilling outcomes while controlling for the endogenous matching of projects and organizational forms solo firm leases are less profitable than alliance leases because alliance members combine their information and expertise

bidding behaviour in ocs drainage auctions theory and evidence empirical economists frequently criticize game theoretic models of markets on the grounds that they fail to generate empirically testable hypotheses the complaint is that prices and quantities or entry decisions are explained using factors that are not observable to the econometrician such as private valuations and beliefs of agents the corollary to this argument is that the only way to proceed empirically is through experiments however this approach suffers from the problem that the experience of the subjects may be too limited and the compensation too small for them to perform the requisite optimizing calculations the objective of this paper is to discuss the above criticism of gametheoretic models in the context of our work on markets of offshore oil and gas leases in this case study one group of buyers is better informed about the unknown value of the leaae being sold that another group and the two groups can be identified game theoretic models of markets with informational asymmetries generate restrictions on the relative behaviour and performance of the two groups of buyers and some of these restrictions are empirically testable we examine them using bid and profit data more generally the work serves to illustrate a basic point about testing models of

additional evidence on bonus plans and income management abstract we extend healy 1985 by examining the relation between discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms for the 1980 1990 period contrary to healy we find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound managers select income increasing discretionary accruals and vice versa we believe that our results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis than with healy s bonus hypothesis however mechanical selection bias in portfolio formation cannot be entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for our results

bid dispersion competition and wage regulation some field evidence from public contract bidding in british columbia the paper uses data from british columbia to show that bid dispersion the difference between the winning and next lowest bids in public school construction contract bidding is very compact and that it varies inversely with the degree of competition it also examines the impact of the skill development and fair wage law sdfwp which promulgated wage scales and required contractors to pay them in public construction projects on the bid dispersion multivariate analysis shows that bid dispersion declined after sdfwp one possible interpretation of this result is that the contractors became less prone to the winner s curse following the sdfwp

anomalies the winner s curse abstract next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch try the following experiment in your class take a jar and fill it with coins noting the total value of the coins now a

smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings abstract recent theory argues that concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to smooth earnings in consideration of both current and future relative performance we find support for this theory our evidence suggests that when current earnings are poor and expected future earnings are good managers borrow earnings from the future for use in the current period conversely when current earnings are good and expected future earnings are poor managers save current earnings for possible use in the future however sensitivity analysis indicates that we cannot rule out selection bias as a potential alternative explanation for our findings

market structure and incomplete information price formation in a real world repeated english auction abstract this paper examines the effect of buyer size on price formation in an english auction of used state police cars while open auctions generally favor competitive pricing bikhchandani 1988 develops a model of a second price common value auction in which bidders can use strategic behavior based on repeated sales to develop an aggressive reputation and as a result pay lower prices in equilibrium the paper tests this hypothesis by examining sales of 340 used automobiles sold at 13 public auctions conditional on the volume of purchases made by the three largest buyers at the auctions the empirical results show that the number of buyers plays a stronger role in price formation than does buyer size

structural econometric analysis of descending auctions since vickrey s 1961 paper the theory of auctions has considerably expanded particularly over the last decade see e g milgrom 1985 1986 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 for recent surveys in contrast except for some experimental work only a few empirical studies have attempted to validate the new theoretical auction models using field auction data two approaches have emerged the first has concentrated upon testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced form econometric models with observed bids as the explained variables explanatory variables might then be the reservation price the number of potential bidders when observed and some characteristics of the auctioned object examples are hansen 1985 1986 hendricks et al 1987 and hendricks and porter 1988 the second approach which is structural has a long tradition in econometrics starting from the work of the cowles commission this approach is followed in this paper the basic idea is simple and relies upon

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

does managerial sentiment affect accrual estimates evidence from the banking industry abstract we examine whether managerial sentiment is associated with errors in accrual estimates using public banks we find 1 managerial sentiment is negatively associated with loan loss provision estimates 2 future charge offs per dollar of provision are positively associated with sentiment when the provision is estimated and 3 the effects of sentiment are greater for firms with more uncertain charge offs results are similar for private banks suggesting accrual manipulation related to capital market incentives is unlikely to explain the results although economic fundamentals explain most of the variation in the provision we find sentiment has an incremental and economically meaningful effect