an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

is tiger woods loss averse persistent bias in the face of experience competition and high stakes although experimental studies have documented systematic decision errors many leading scholars believe that experience competition and large stakes will reliably extinguish biases we test for the presence of a fundamental bias loss aversion in a high stakes context professional golfers performance on the pga tour golf provides a natural setting to test for loss aversion because golfers are rewarded for the total number of strokes they take during a tournament yet each individual hole has a salient reference point par we analyze over 2 5 million putts using precise laser measurements and find evidence that even the best golfers including tiger woods show evidence of loss aversion jel d03 d81 l83

the transition to the knowledge economy labor market institutions and income inequality in advanced democracies the transition from fordism to the knowledge economy in the world s advanced democracies was underpinned by the revolution in information and communications technology ict the introduction and rapid diffusion of ict pushed up wages for college educated workers with complementary skills and allowed top managers and ceos to reap greater rewards for their own talents despite these common pressures income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere income in the anglo saxon countries remains particularly unequally distributed to shed new light on this puzzle the authors carry out a panel data analysis of eighteen oecd countries between 1970 and 2007 their analysis stands apart from the existing empirical literature by taking a comparative perspective the article examines the extent to which the relationship between the knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labor market institutions the authors find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively associated with both the 90 10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1 percent but that these effects are mitigated by the presence of strong labor market institutions such as coordinated wage bargaining strict employment protection legislation high union density and high collective bargaining coverage the authors provide robust evidence against the argument that industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity in the knowledge economy

correlates of narrow bracketing we examine whether different phenomena of narrow bracketing can be traced back to some common characteristic and whether and how different phenomena are related we find that making dominated lottery choices or ignoring the endowment when making risky choices are related phenomena and are both associated with low levels of cognitive reflection in contrast the phenomena of setting narrow goals or narrow mental budgets seem not to reflect choice errors due to low cognitive reflection but are tools to overcome self control problems buying small scale insurance is associated with having narrow mental budgets suggesting that people buy such insurance to insure themselves against the consequences of their own self control strategy

the impact of monetary policy on inequality in the uk an empirical analysis the uk has experienced a dramatic increase in earnings and income inequality over the past four decades we use detailed micro level information to construct quarterly historical measures of inequality from 1969 to 2012 we investigate whether monetary policy shocks played a role in explaining this increase in inequality we find that contractionary monetary policy shocks lead to an increase in earnings income and consumption inequality and contribute to their fluctuation the response of income and consumption at different quantiles suggests that contractionary policy has a larger negative effect on low income households and those that consume the least when compared to those at the top of the distribution our evidence also suggests that the policy of quantitative easing may have contributed to the increase in inequality over the great recession

the effect of unions on the structure of wages a longitudinal analysis this paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the u s current population survey the results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills in addition the patterns of selection bias differ by skill group among workers with lower levels of observed skill unionized workers are positively selected whereas union workers are negatively selected from among those with higher levels of observed skill despite a large and sophisticated literature there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers 2 one method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status unfortunately longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low this sensitivity led lewis 1986 to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects in this paper i present some new evidence on the union wage effect based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status the estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates along with the reduced form coefficients from a multi variate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for

tourists spending and adherence to shopping plans the case of the christmas market in merano italy abstract the present paper investigates the determinants of tourists expenditure by categorizing tourists based on their mental budgets individuals can be divided into three categories based on the difference between their mental budget and actual expenditure underspenders on budget spenders and overspenders estimation of the empirical model is performed based on data collected through a survey of visitors to the christmas market in merano italy during advent in 2011 the estimation is performed with the heckman estimator ordered probit selection rule and linear regression we find that the spending patterns of visitors belonging to the three identified categories differ significantly analyzing visitors expenditure based on the proposed categorization allows us to identify category specific factors and develop management strategies for each category the managerial and theoretical implications of the results are discussed

the stability of measured time preferences abstract we use a panel dataset to test the stability of measured discount rates over time in response to changes in both macroeconomic events and household level labor market outcomes while discount rate measures are constructed to capture a rate of time preference our evidence is inconsistent with such an interpretation our results more closely align with the interpretation that standard methods to elicit discount rates reveal the market interest rate faced by an individual rather than their pure rate of time preference it follows directly from such an interpretation that factors which influence the interest rate at which a household can borrow and lend such as the inflation rate and household income ought to be correlated with the elicited discount rate a prediction supported by our data

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

multiperson tournaments an experimental examination modern hierarchical organizations like corporations must motivate agents to work hard given their pyramid structure it is not surprising that one commonly used motivator is the promotion tournament in such tournaments agents compete to advance to positions at higher organizational levels though these tournaments are common little research has empirically looked at the interface of organizational structure and tournament design this paper aims to take a step in filling this void by comparing the performance of various tournament designs using controlled laboratory techniques

pay performance sensitivity and production uncertainty abstract the pay performance sensitivity of linear incentive contracts can increase with increasing production uncertainty depending upon the timing and nature of this uncertainty this provides a possible explanation for the failure of empirical tests to yield convincing support for a negative relationship

performance measurement expectancy and agency theory an experimental study theoretical analyses of optimal performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model this model implies that for a given compensation scheme the agent s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure in contrast expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels for noisier performance measures we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term i e to expectancy this suggests that enriching the economic linear agency model commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter is not needed

what happened to long term employment the role of worker power and environmental turbulence in explaining declines in worker tenure recent declines in the average length of time that u s workers spend with a given employer represent an important change in the nature of the employment relationship yet it is one whose causes are poorly understood i explore those causes using current population survey data on the tenure of men aged 30 65 from the years 1979 2008 i argue that long term employment relationships primarily occur when workers pressure employers to close off employment from market competition reducing the attractiveness of external mobility relative to internal opportunities and increasing employment security i then explore how two changes in organizations environments a decline in union strength and increased turbulence from changes in technology and globalization might have affected workers ability to secure such closed employment relationships over the last 30 years my results support the argument that declines in tenure reflect the reduced power of workers to secure closed employment relationships recent declines in tenure have been concentrated in large organizations and many of those declines are explained by controlling for the changing levels of industry unionization i find little evidence that foreign competition or technological change affected mobility the results are robust to measures of changing industry growth rates and within industry reorganization supplementary analyses suggest that layoffs are associated with different industry pressures than tenure and that voluntary mobility may have played an important role in declines in tenure

nonunion wage rates and the threat of unionization i investigate how the threat of union organization affects the wage paid to nonunion workers i start by outlining the standard model of wage determination by a nonunion employer when faced with the threat of union organization the model suggests that the nonunion wage will be directly related and the union wage gap will be inversely related to the threat i use repeated cross section data from the cps from 1977 2002 to develop a measure of the threat as the predicted probability of union membership i use this measure to estimate earnings functions that use several sources of variation in the likelihood of union membership to identify the threat effect in a manner that reduces the likelihood of omitted variable bias finally i investigate two cases where there has arguably been a change in the likelihood of union organization that is not correlated with changes in the demand for labor these include the wage changes surrounding the introduction of rightto work rtw laws in two states during the period studied and wage changes surrounding deregulation of key industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s the results are mixed the preferred estimates from the analysis using predicted probability of unionization as the threat measure imply very little relationship between either nonunion wages or the union wage gap and the threat the estimates that rely on the introduction of rtw laws show a significant relationship between nonunion wages and the introduction of rtw laws in one of the two states stronger evidence of threat effects is found in the experience of deregulated industries where regulation was a central factor in union strength

job queues and the union status of workers this paper develops a model of the determination of the union status of workers that allows for the possibility of queuing for union jobs the empirical results derived using a sample from the university of michigan panel study of income dynamics are supportive of the queuing hypothesis the no queue model can be rejected using a likelihood ratio test this suggests that a simple probit or logit model for union status is misspecified because it is not based on any consistent behavioral theory an important implication of the model is that because most new entrants to the labor market prefer union jobs but cannot get them and because accrual of nonunion seniority makes workers progressively less likely to desire union jobs the union status of workers is largely determined by their success in being selected from the queue early in their working life

union strength neoliberalism and inequality contingent political analyses of u s income differences since 1950 do historically contingent political accounts help explain the growth in family income inequality in the united states we use time series regressions based on 60 years to detect such relationships

motivating employees to act ethically an expectancy theory approach employees face an array of moral issues in their everyday decision making environmental concerns employee and community welfare and the interests of other companies competitors customers and suppliers are only a few examples yet businesses do not always address the issue of how employees should assess the moral import of their actions and incorporate these considerations into their decisions as a result moral considerations are often ignored leading to unethical practices which may hurt the long term interests of the company in this paper we present a model to help eliminate this problem our model uses expectancy theory a process theory of motivation to show that teaching employees to engage in moral reasoning and creating a corporate culture in which ethical behavior is both encouraged and rewarded can increase the likelihood that a company s employees will act ethically

unions and wage inequality in mexico this paper offers empirical evidence on the impact of trade unions on wage inequality in mexico the results indicate that unions were a strongly equalizing force affecting the dispersion of wages in 1984 but were only half as effective at reducing wage inequality in 1996 not only did the unionized percentage of the labor force fall considerably over the period unions also lost some of their ability to reduce wage dispersion among the workers they continued to represent had unions maintained in 1996 the same structural power they possessed in 1984 the rise in wage inequality in the formal sector of the labor market between those years would have been reduced by roughly 11

the effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking an experimental test myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently two implications of myopic loss aversion are tested experimentally 1 investors who display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often 2 if all payoffs are increased enough to eliminate losses investors will accept more risk in a task in which investors learn from experience both predictions are supported the investors who got the most frequent feedback and thus the most information took the least risk and earned the least money language en

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

choice simplification a theory of mental budgeting and naive diversification we develop a theory of how an agent makes basic multiproduct consumption decisions in the presence of taste consumption opportunity and price shocks that are costly to attend to we establish that the agent often simplifies her choices by restricting attention to a few important considerations which depend on the decision at hand and affect her consumption patterns in specific ways if the agent s problem is to choose the consumption levels of many goods with different degrees of substitutability then she may create mental budgets for more substitutable products e g entertainment in some situations it is optimal to specify budgets in terms of consumption quantities but when most products have an abundance of substitutes specifying budgets in terms of nominal spending tends to be optimal if the goods are complements in contrast then the agent may consistent with naive diversification choose a fixed unconsidered mix of products and if the agent s problem is to choose one of multiple products to fulfill a given consumption need e g for gasoline or a bed then it is often optimal for her to allocate a fixed sum for the need

the effect of teachers unions on education production evidence from union election certifications in three midwestern states using a unique data set on teachers union election certifications from iowa indiana and minnesota i estimate the effect of teachers unions on school district resources and on student educational attainment my empirical strategy allows for nonparametric leads and lags of union age i find no impact on teacher pay or per student district expenditures but that unions increase teacher employment by 5 i find no class size effect because of enrollment increases in unionized districts and i estimate that unions have no net effect on high school dropout rates these findings highlight the importance of correctly measuring unionization status

the union threat this paper studies the impact of unions on wage inequality output and unemployment to do so it proposes a search and matching model of union formation in which unions arise endogenously through a voting process within firms in a union firm workers bargain their wages collectively in a nonunion firm each worker bargains individually with the firm because of this wage setting asymmetry a union lowers the profit of a firm and compresses the wage distribution of the workers furthermore to prevent unionization nonunion firms distort their hiring decisions in a way that also lowers the dispersion of wages after being calibrated on the united states the model shows that even though a partial equilibrium estimate would predict a small impact of unions on inequality removing the threat of unionization increases the variance of wages substantially completely outlawing unions increases wage inequality further moreover outlawing unions increases welfare and output and lowers unemployment these results suggest that even with a small membership unions might have a significant impact on the economy through general equilibrium mechanisms and the way they distort firms decisions i am greatly indebted to nobuhiro kiyotaki esteban rossi hansberg and oleg itskhoki for their invaluable advice and support throughout this project special thanks go to esteban for suggesting the title i also wish to thank manuel amador orley ashenfelter francisco buera jeff campbell pablo fajgelbaum henry farber baris kaymak david lee thomas lemieux benjamin moll justinas pelenis edouard schaal andrew shephard christopher sims liz tennant as well as seminar participants at princeton university and the chicago fed rookie seminar for helpful comments and suggestions i gratefully acknowledge financial support from the fonds quebecois de recherche sur la societe et la culture email mtascher princeton edu address 001 fisher hall department of economics princeton university princeton nj 08544 for the most recent version go to http sites google com site mathtd

mental budgeting and consumer decisions consumers often set budgets for categories of expenses e g entertainment and track expenses against their budget because budgets cannot perfectly anticipate consumption opportunities people may earmark too much or too little money for a particular category this leads them to overconsume or underconsume goods in that category the results of three studies suggest that consumers do indeed set budgets and that budgeting may lead to underconsumption to show that consumers track expenses the studies demonstrate that budgeting effects are larger for purchases that are highly typical of their category such purchases reduce the amount people spend in a category and block the purchase of other typical items the studies control for satiation and income effects thus budgeting adds predictive power to standard economic consumer theory

a dual self model of impulse control we propose that a simple dual self model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi hyperbolic discounting and rabin s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small the model also implies that self control costs imply excess delay as in the o donoghue and rabin models of quasi hyperbolic utility and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist the base version of our model is consistent with the gul pesendorfer axioms but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load

unions norms and the rise in u s wage inequality from 1973 to 2007 private sector union membership in the united states declined from 34 to 8 percent for men and from 16 to 6 percent for women during this period inequality in hourly wages increased by over 40 percent we report a decomposition relating rising inequality to the union wage distribution s shrinking weight we argue that unions helped institutionalize norms of equity reducing the dispersion of nonunion wages in highly unionized regions and industries accounting for unions effect on union and nonunion wages suggests that the decline of organized labor explains a fifth to a third of the growth in inequality an effect comparable to the growing stratification of wages by education

transaction decoupling how price bundling affects the decision to consume abstract in today s marketplace price bundling is widespread manufacturers and retailers routinely offer multiple products for a single bundled price although the effects of price bundling on purchase behavior have been well researched the effects of price bundling on postpurchase consumption behavior have received almost no attention in this article the authors build on the sunk cost literature e g thaler 1980 1985 and predict that price bundling leads to a disassociation or decoupling of transaction costs and benefits thereby reducing attention to sunk costs and decreasing a consumer s likelihood of consuming a paid for service e g a theater performance four studies show this to be the case in two lab studies the authors show that having a bundled four day ski pass as opposed to four one day ski tickets decreases a person s likelihood of skiing on the final day of a four day ski vacation they replicate this result in a field study showing that multiperformance ticket holders are

right to work laws and the extent of unionization it is a well known fact that the extent of unionization is less in states with right to work rtw laws a framework is developed for determining whether rtw laws actually cause a decrease in the extent of unionization or whether they simply mirror preexisting tastes of workers against unions a set of empirical tests is proposed that can distinguish between these explanations based on differences between rtw and non rtw states in the demand for union representation the supply of union jobs relative to that demand and the observed union nonunion wage differential these tests are implemented using disaggregated data from the quality of employment survey and the current population survey and a pattern is found that is consistent with the hypothesis that rtw laws simply mirror preexisting preferences against union representation

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

estimating the effects of unions on wage inequality in a panel data model with comparative advantage and nonrandom selection this article considers the estimation of the structure of wages in union and nonunion sectors it proposes an estimator that extends standard panel data techniques to the case in which the return to the permanent component of the error term is differently rewarded in the two sectors the econometric model is used to estimate the effect of unions on both the level and the variance of wages in canada the findings indicate that unions increase the average wage of workers and compress the returns to observable measures of skill and to a time invariant unobservable measure of skill

the effect of unions on wage inequality in the u s labor market this study uses current population survey micro data for 1973 74 and 1993 to evaluate the effect of changing union membership on trends in male and female wage inequality unionization rates of men fell between the two sample periods with bigger declines among lower skill groups these trends account for 15 20 of the rise in male wage inequality union membership rates of low wage women also declined while unionization increased among higher wage women on balance shifting unionization accounts for very little of the rise in female wage inequality economy wide trends in unionization mask a sharp divergence between the private sector where unionism was declining and the public sector where it was rising comparisons across sectors suggest that unionization substantially slowed the growth in wage inequality in the public sector

the sales agent problem effort leisure allocation under performance pay as behavior towards risk the choice between safe and risky assets represents behavior towards risk more risk averse investors buy more safe assets we develop and test a general model that applies this intuition to the time allocation between risky effort and risk free leisure under linear incentives when risk increases with effort risk averse agents choose less effort but when risk is independent of effort effort choice is unaffected by risk preferences in many incentive contracts income risk is multiplicative with rather than additive to effort sales commissions being one example in such cases lower effort by the risk averse is a hitherto undocumented behavior towards risk jel c91 m52 j33

the effect of partitions on controlling consumption abstract the authors demonstrate that partitioning an aggregate quantity of a resource e g food money into smaller units reduces the consumed quantity or the rate of consumption of that resource partitions draw attention to the consumption decision by introducing a small transaction cost that is they provide more decision making opportunities so that prudent consumers can control consumption thus people are better able to constrain consumption when resources associated with a desirable activity which they are trying to control are partitioned rather than when they are aggregated this effect of partitioning is demonstrated for the consumption of chocolates study 1 and gambles study 2 in study 3 process measures reveal that partitioning increases recall accuracy and decision times importantly the effect of partitioning diminishes when consumers are not trying to regulate consumption studies 1 and 3 finally study 4 explores how habituation may decrease the amount of attention that pa

new york city cab drivers labor supply revisited reference dependent preferences with rational expectations targets for hours and income this paper reconsiders whether cabdrivers labor supply decisions reflect reference dependent preferences following botond koszegi and matthew rabin 2006 we construct a model with targets for hours as well as income both determined by rational expectations estimating using henry s farber s 2005 2008 data we show that the reference dependent model can reconcile his 2005 finding that drivers stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with the negative wage elasticity of hours found by colin camerer et al 1997 and farber 2005 2008 the model yields sensible estimates that avoid farber s 2008 criticism that drivers income targets are too unstable to allow a useful reference dependent model of labor supply

public sector earnings and the extent of unionization many studies have examined the influence of union density union members as a percentage of all workers on earnings in the private sector but few such studies have looked at the public sector using data from the 1991 current population survey this study estimates the determinants of earnings for state and local government employees in both the union and nonunion sectors the extent of public sector unionization appears to be positively correlated with earnings for both state and local government workers and for those covered and not covered by collective agreements although the effect for non covered employees is smaller than that for covered employees both effects are larger than those typically found in similar estimates for the private sector the authors also find that bargaining structure has some influence on earnings with the most consistent effect being a positive influence of arbitration on the earnings of local government workers

temporal stability of time preferences abstract the preferences assumed to govern intertemporal trade offs are generally considered to be stable economic primitives though evidence on this stability is notably lacking we present evidence from a large field study conducted over two years with around 1 400 individuals using incentivized intertemporal choice experiments aggregate choice profiles and corresponding estimates of discount parameters are unchanged over the two years and individual correlations through time are high by existing standards however some individuals show signs of instability by linking experimental measures to administrative tax records we showthat identified instability is uncorrelated with both levels and changes in sociodemographic variables

insurance self control and contract flexibility we study a competitive insurance market in which some consumers have too optimistic expectations regarding their future use of preventive measures when contracts are long term and inflexible such naive consumers would increase the costs of insurance for low risk consumers the competitive insurance market therefore offers flexible contracts that allow for switching between different tariffs sophisticated consumers choose a partial insurance tariff and remain low risks naive consumers choose the same tariff but later switch to full insurance and become high risks if there are sufficiently many naive consumers they pay a transfer to sophisticated consumers so that high risks subsidize low risks in contrast there are no such transfers when contracts are short term the model generates novel implications for the time frame of insurance contracts and insurance requirements

risk aversion wealth and background risk we use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a risky security we relate this measure to consumer s endowments and attributes and to measures of background risk and liquidity constraints we find that risk aversion is a decreasing function of the endowment thus rejecting cara preferences we estimate the elasticity of risk aversion to consumption at about 0 7 below the unitary value predicted by crra utility we also find that households attributes are of little help in predicting their degree of risk aversion which is characterized by massive unexplained heterogeneity we show that the consumer s environment affects risk aversion individuals who are more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion consistent with recent theories of attitudes toward risk in the presence of uninsurable risks jel d1 d8

the red and the black mental accounting of savings and debt in the standard economic account of consumer behavior the cost of a purchase takes the form of a reduction in future utility when expenditures that otherwise could have been made are forgone the reality of consumer hedonics is different when people make purchases they often experience an immediate pain of paying which can undermine the pleasure derived from consumption the ticking of the taxi meter for example reduces one s pleasure from the ride we propose a double entry mental accounting theory that describes the nature of these reciprocal interactions between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of paying and draws out their implications for consumer behavior and hedonics a central assumption of the model which we call prospective accounting is that consumption that has already been paid for can be enjoyed as if it were free and that the pain associated with payments made prior to consumption but not after is buffered by thoughts of the benefits that the payments will finance another important concept is coupling which refers to the degree to which consumption calls to mind thoughts of payment and vice versa some financing methods such as credit cards tend to weaken coupling whereas others such as cash payment produce tight coupling our model makes a variety of predictions that are at variance with economic formulations contrary to the standard prediction that people will finance purchases to minimize the present value of payments our model predicts strong debt aversion that they should prefer to prepay for consumption or to get paid for work after it is performed such pay before sequences confer hedonic benefits because consumption can be enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it in the future likewise when paying beforehand the pain of paying is mitigated by thoughts of future consumption benefits contrary to the economic prediction that consumers should prefer to pay at the margin for what they consume our model predicts that consumers will find it less painful to pay for and hence will prefer flat rate pricing schemes such as unlimited internet access at a fixed monthly price even if it involves paying more for the same usage other predictions concern spending patterns with cash charge or credit cards and preferences for the earmarking of purchases we test these predictions in a series of surveys and in a conjoint like analysis that pitted our double entry mental accounting model against a standard discounting formulation and another benchmark that did not incorporate hedonic interactions between consumption and payments our model provides a better fit of the data for 60 of the subjects the discounting formulation provides a better fit for only 29 of the subjects even when allowing for positive and negative discount rates the pain of paying we argue plays an important role in consumer self regulation but is hedonically costly from a hedonic perspective the ideal situation is one in which payments are tightly coupled to consumption so that paying evokes thoughts about the benefits being financed but consumption is decoupled from payments so that consumption does not evoke thoughts about payment from an efficiency perspective however it is important for consumers to be aware of what they are paying for consumption this creates a tension between hedonic efficiency and what we call decision efficiency various institutional arrangements such as financing of public parks through taxes or usage fees play into this tradeoff a producer developing a pricing structure for their product or service should be aware of these two conflicting objectives and should try to devise a structure that reconciles them

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

narrow bracketing and dominated choices an experiment by tversky and kahneman 1981 illustrates that people s tendency to evaluate risky decisions separately can lead them to choose combinations of choices that are first order stochastically dominated by other available combinations we investigate the generality of this effect both theoretically and experimentally we show that for any decisionmaker who does not have constant absolute risk averse preferences and who evaluates her decisions one by one there exists a simple pair of independent binary decisions where the decisionmaker will make a dominated combination of choices we also characterize as a function of a person s preferences the amount of money that she can lose due to a single mistake of this kind the theory is accompanied by both a real stakes laboratory experiment and a large sample survey from the general u s population replicating tversky and kahneman s original experiment where decisionmakers with prototypical prospect theory preferences will choose a dominated combination we find that 28 of the participants do so in the survey we ask the respondents about several hypothetical large stakes choices and find higher proportions of dominated choice combinations a statistical model that estimates preferences from the survey results is best fit by assuming people have utility functions that are close to prospect theory value functions and that about 83 of people bracket narrowly none of these results varies strongly with the personal characteristics of participants we also demonstrate directly that dominated choices are driven by narrow bracketing when we eliminate the possibility of narrow bracketing by using a combined presentation of the decisions the dominated choices are eliminated in the laboratory experiment and are greatly reduced in the survey

goals and bracketing under mental accounting abstract behavioral economics struggles to explain why people sometimes evaluate outcomes separately narrow bracketing of mental accounts and sometimes jointly broad bracketing we develop a theory of endogenous bracketing where people set goals to tackle self control problems goals induce reference points that make substandard performance painful evaluating goals in a broadly bracketed mental account insulates an individual from exogenous risk of failure but because decisions or risks in different tasks become substitutes there are incentives to deviate from goals that are absent under narrow bracketing extensions include goal revision naivete about self control income targeting and firms bundling strategies

earmarking and partitioning increasing saving by low income households abstract this research examines the effects of earmarking money on savings by low income consumers in particular the authors test two interventions that are designed to enhance the effects of earmarking 1 using a visual reminder of the savings goal and 2 dividing the earmarked money into two parts consistent with prior research suggesting that partitioning increases self control people save more when earmarked money is partitioned into two accounts than when it is pooled into one account in addition the presence of the visual reminder increases the savings rate the authors conclude with implications for consumer welfare and directions for further research

is tomorrow another day the labor supply of new york city cabdrivers the labor supply of taxi drivers is consistent with the existence of intertemporal substitution my analysis of the stopping behavior of new york city cabdrivers shows that daily income effects are small and that the decision to stop work at a particular point on a given day is primarily related to cumulative daily hours to that point this is in contrast to the analysis of camerer et al who find that the daily wage elasticity of labor supply of new york city cabdrivers is substantially negative implying large daily income effects this difference in findings is due to important differences in empirical methods and to problems with the conception and measurement of the daily wage rate used by camerer et al

self regulation through goal setting goals are an important motivator but little is known about why and how people set them we address this issue in a model based on two stylized facts first goals serve as reference points for performance second present biased preferences create self control problems we show the power and limits of self regulation through goals goals increase an individual s motivation but only up to a certain point furthermore they are painful self disciplining devices thus greater self control problems may result in tougher goals but for a severe present bias goals either lack a motivating force or are too painful to be accepted

contraction and expansion the divergence of private sector and public sector unionism in the united states the institutional structure of the american labor market changed remarkably from the 1950s and 1960s to the 1980s in the 50s and 60s trade unions seemed permanently established in the private sector of the economy a third of nonagricultur al wage and salary workers and over half of blue collar workers were union members hundreds of thousands of workers voted annually in national labor relations board nlrb representation elections to join unions most large firms sought stable collective bargaining relations with their unions by contrast in the public sector only 10 12 percent of workers were union members fewer were covered by collective bargaining contracts and most experts regarded public employees as intrinsically nonorganizable according to afl cio president george meany it was impossible to bargain collectively with the government kramer 1962 p 14 the massive contraction of unionism in the private sector and expansion in the public sector in the 1970s and 1980s see exhibit 1 has produced an utterly different situation today in the private sector the proportion of wage and salary workers in unions plummeted to 14 percent in 1986 a level comparable to that in the great depression only a minuscule number of workers joined unions through nlrb elections and national companies openly proclaimed their intent to establish a union free environment by contrast in the public sector over a third of the work force was unionized some 40 percent were covered by collective contracts 1 and 1 estimates of organization in the public sector differ somewhat among sources though all data show greater organization than in the private sector see freeman ichniowski and zax forthcoming for a detailed analysis of the various statistics

labor market institutions and wage inequality the authors investigate how labor market institutions such as unemployment insurance unions firing regulations and minimum wages have affected the evolution of wage inequality among male workers results of estimations using data on institutions in eleven oecd countries indicate that changes in labor market institutions can account for much of the change in wage inequality between 1973 and 1998 factors found to have been negatively associated with male wage inequality are union density the strictness of employment protection law unemployment benefit duration unemployment benefit generosity and the size of the minimum wage over the 26 year period institutional changes were associated with a 23 reduction in male wage inequality in france where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter but with an increase of up to 11 in the united states and united kingdom where unions became less powerful and in the united states minimum wages fell

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

signaling in secret pay for performance and the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy although the vast majority of u s firms follow a policy of pay secrecy research provides a limited understanding of its overall utility to organizations building on signaling theory we develop

revising commitments field evidence on the adjustment of prior choices the very poor in developing countries often make intertemporal choices that seem at odds with their individual self interest there are many possible reasons why this paper investigates several of these reasons with a lab in the field experiment in rural malawi involving large stakes it makes two contributions first it constructs a new dependent variable revisions of prior choices regarding the allocation of future income this allows us to directly examine intertemporal choice revision and its determinants in particular this dependent variable permits a novel test for the existence of self control problems it turns out revisions of money allocations toward the present are positively associated with measures of present bias from an earlier baseline survey as well as the randomly assigned closeness in time to the first possible date of money disbursement second the paper investigates other potential determinants of revision aside from self control problems it finds little evidence that revisions of money allocations toward the present are associated with spousal preferences for such revision household shocks or the financial sophistication of respondents

revisiting the role of labor worker solidarity employer opposition and the development of old age pensions in the netherlands and the united kingdom the purpose of this article is to emphasize the importance of the organizational blueprint of labor unions for welfare state outcomes as a result of the tendency of scholars to view labor as a homogenous and disadvantaged class the existing literature has paid little attention to this many scholars have simply taken labor union support for welfare state development for granted and consequently have focused only on labor union strength this article argues rather that labor union support for welfare state development cannot be taken for granted it shows that labor unions support or oppose welfare state development depending on their organizational blueprint this new approach highlights the importance of the labor union movement s organizational structure as opposed to its organizational strength for welfare state outcomes the article also explores how the organizational structure of the labor union movement shapes the stance of employer interest groups toward welfare state development the empirical findings are based on a comparison of british and dutch postwar old age pension development

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

incentive systems in a real effort experiment in the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects payments based on individual team and relative performance are compared subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort the results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels in team production free riding occurred but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay effort was higher but more variable in tournaments while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others finally attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

goal setting and self control abstract this paper addresses the role of non binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency present biased agents have linear reference dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point they face an infinite horizon optimal stopping problem in continuous time when there is sufficient commitment to expectation based goals goal setting attenuates the present biased agent s tendency to stop too early and may even lead an agent to wait longer than the first best in particular reference dependence is strictly worse for a time consistent agent notably none of the effects of goal setting require loss aversion

good times bad times postwar labor s share of national income in capitalist democracies this article returns to a classic question of political economy the zero sum conflict between capital and labor over the division of the national income pie a detailed description of labor s shar

compensation unionization and deregulation in the motor carrier industry abstract previous research on the deregulation of the motor carrier industry has concluded that firms have become more efficient under deregulation and that costs have fallen largely at the expense of labor most studies that examine the effects on labor use current population survey data and find that wage premiums to union labor have fallen as a result of deregulation this study uses firm data and finds that deregulation had a very small effect on the average compensation paid by surviving union firms for nonunion firms the impact of deregulation is much larger these results suggest that the compensation premium for the labor of surviving union firms has increased but this increase applies only to surviving union labor in the paper we also point to and note a major exodus of union firms with the result that union labor levels have fallen and fallen dramatically