the silent success of customs unions an earlier version of this paper is part of arevik gnutzmann mkrtchyan s thesis essays on the economics of trade agreements 2014 http hdl handle net 1814 34561

viewpoint climate impacts on agriculture searching for keys under the streetlight abstract this paper provides a critical assessment of the literature estimating the consequences of climate impacts in agriculture and the food system this literature focuses overwhelmingly on the impact of elevated co2 concentrations in the atmosphere higher temperatures and changing precipitation on staple crop yields while critically important for food security we argue that researchers have gravitated to measuring impacts under the streetlight where data and models are plentiful we argue that prior work has largely neglected the vast majority of potential economic impacts of climate change on agriculture a broader view must extend the impacts analysis to inputs beyond land including the consequences of climate change for labor productivity as well as for purchased intermediate inputs largely overlooked is the impact of climate change on the rate of total factor productivity growth and the potential for more rapid depreciation of the underlying knowledge capital underpinning this key driver of agricultural output growth this broader view must also focus more attention on non staple crops which while less important from a caloric point of view are critically important in redressing current micronutrient deficiencies in many diets around the world the paper closes with numerical simulations that demonstrate the extent to which limited input and output coverage of climate impacts can lead to considerable underestimation of the consequences for food security and economic welfare of particular significance is the finding that humans in the humid tropics are likely more vulnerable to heat stress than are many of the well adapted crops such as rice by omitting the impact of heat stress on humans most studies of climate impacts greatly understate the welfare losses in the world s poorest economies

support for a characteristics approach evidence from the market for insecticides a procedure is developed to test the principal prediction of characteristics theory all products are priced to appear on a convex market opportunity frontier the feasibility of this testing procedure is shown by its application to the u s insecticide market during each year between 1944 and 1987 results provide the first empirical support for characteristics theory

conflict cooperation and commerce the effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows the public choice approach to political economy is employed to gain insight into the connection between international politics and trade flows a model is constructed in which importers are assumed to be rational utility maximizers who seek to satisfy international security as well as economic welfare objectives this model of bilateral trade flows reflects contemporary theory in the field of international economics and it explicitly incorporates the general foreign policy orientation of importers among its determinants the model is tested in 16 annual crosssectional estimations 1960 75 for a complete network of 25 countries the findings show considerable support for the hypothesis that trade flows are significantly influenced by broad political relations of amity and enmity between nations the author concludes that nations adjust trade ties to satisfy security as well as economic welfare goals and that a formal political economy of trade should reflect this fact

returns to regionalism an analysis of nontraditional gains from regional trade agreements the past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements with many policymakers and academics seeming to believe that these provide more than the traditional gains from trade this article examines several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may confer on their partners including credibility signaling bargaining power insurance and coordination it assesses the necessary conditions for each possible channel to work gives stylized examples of specific types of policy where the benefit might be applicable examines cases where the explanation might be relevant and discusses their overall plausibility it concludes by examining the north american free trade agreement and the europe agreements

free to trade democracies autocracies and international trade trade relations we address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy in a formal model of commercial policy we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy we test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990 the results of this analysis accord with our argument democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs t he effects of domestic political institutions on trade policy have long been a source of controversy among social scientists despite the widespread interest that this debate has prompted however remarkably few studies have addressed the links between political regime type and commercial policy 1 most work on the political economy of trade policy that examines institutional factors focuses only on variations in policy among democracies and avoids comparing democracies with other types of regimes moreover many analyses of trade barriers especially those by economists ignore the effects of domestic political

reform of the coal sector in an open economy the case of china cheap abundant and easy to transport and store coal has been produced and consumed to meet people s energy needs the last decade s growth in global coal use has been driven mainly by developing economies like china whose phenomenal economic growth has been powered by coal fired electricity and promoted by the export of manufactured goods a recent reform focus in china s coal sector is on coal taxation the paper develops a game theoretic model tailored to the context of china where coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy it finds that the adoption of special coal taxes is optimal for social welfare under most circumstances but may induce coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour in the process of privatisation the paper also cautions about potential resistance to the reform from consumers coal firms and government officials

power politics and international trade r recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade we argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly doing so leads us to two conclusions 1 free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances and 2 alliances are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 we test these hypotheses the results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems in the early 1970s students of international relations began what would become a long and heated debate about the political correlates of open international markets recently however an important element of consensus has begun to emerge most contributors to this debate now seem to agree that the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade explains the relative dearth of open international markets here we argue that what has become the standard prisoner s dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in the anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly in order to do so we construct and analyze a simple game theoretic model the results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries these differences imply that free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances however our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system we test this argument using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 the empirical analysis supports our argument it demonstrates that alliances have a direct statistically significant and large effect upon bilateral trade moreover it shows that on average alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world 2

the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on international conflict across levels of analysis this study develops a social network analytic approach to conceptualize and measure interdependence across levels of analysis this framework contains several innovations first it integrates sensitivity interdependence the effects of changes in one state on other states with vulnerability interdependence the opportunity costs of breaking a relationship second it measures interdependence at different levels of analysis and across multiple relationships third it integrates multiple dimensions of interdependence into a single measure i derive hypotheses from the realist and liberal paradigms regarding the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on monadic dyadic and systemic conflict these hypotheses are tested via data on alliances military capability and trade the findings provide robust support to the expectations of the liberal paradigm regarding the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on conflict on the other hand the expectations of the realist paradigm are not supported i discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of this approach

sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy 1914 1940 the period from 1914 to 1940 is one of the most crucial and enigmatic in modern world history and in the history of modern u s foreign policy world war i catapulted the united states into international economic and political leadership yet in the aftermath of the war despite grandiose wilsonian plans the united states quickly lapsed into relative disregard for events abroad it did not join the league of nations disavowed responsibility for european reconstruction would not participate openly in many international economic conferences and restored high levels of tariff protection for the domestic market only in the late 1930s and 1940s after twenty years of bitter battles over foreign policy did the united states move to center stage of world politics and economics it built the united nations and a string of regional alliances underwrote the rebuilding of western europe almost single handedly constructed a global monetary and financial system and led the world in commercial liberalization

optimal management of strategic reserves of nonrenewable natural resources abstract this paper studies the stockpiling issue for an oil importing country that is likely to suffer embargoes the occurrence and duration of which are uncertain i show the existence of a decreasing reserves path that the country wants to attain in order to hedge against these disruptions allowing the importing country to invest in r d in order to free itself from the embargo threat i determine the optimal effort that should be engaged in research the incentive to develop a backstop is shown to increase with the depletion of the reserves

economic diplomacy and international trade asean s quest to value claim utilising economic diplomacy theory this study specifies a statistical model to reveal asean members capacity to negotiate better international trade outcomes examining imports into asean members from 134 nations between 1980 and 2001 we find that asean s diplomats were able to pursue more value claiming in economic diplomacy than expected while our results support the commonly accepted view in economic diplomacy that smaller nations are pressured to accept trade outcomes desired by larger nations we also find support for a new perspective smaller nations obtain more favourable trade outcomes as members of a regional trade bloc which cannot be achieved as individual nations we find that asean s conversion to a fully fledged regional trade agreement in 1992 significantly enhanced this capacity this study adds a different perspective to the substantial literature examining cases in trade and economic diplomacy

revisiting the effects of regional trade agreements on trade flows with proper specification of the gravity model this paper uses a gravity model to assess ex post regional trade agreements the model includes 130 countries and is estimated with panel data over the period 1962 1996 the introduction of the correct number of dummy variables allows for identification of vinerian trade creation and trade diversion effects while the estimation method takes into account the unobservable characteristics of each pairs of trade partner countries the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables as well as a potential selection bias in contrast to previous estimates results show that regional agreements have generated a significant increase in trade between members often at the expense of the rest of the world

supply management with intermittent trade disruptions when the probabilities are not fully known abstract previous studies of trade disruptions have assumed that the probabilistic transition rates between normal and disrupted markets are known this may be unreasonable if disruptions occur infrequently in this paper a bayesian procedure for estimating the transition rates is derived under the assumption that the transition processes are exogenous and poisson the procedure is applied to the problem of managing emergency reserves in an import dependent economy time consistent plans for consuming and replenishing reserves are derived optimal reserves are found to be generally larger than if the transition rates were known and equal to current expected values

the politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries increasing fdi through international trade agreements the flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time the political factors that affect these flows are not well understood focusing on the relationship between trade and investment we argue that international trade agreements gatt wto and preferential trade agreements ptas provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets thus reassuring investors and increasing investment these international commitments are more credible than domestic policy choices because reneging on them is more costly statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 support this argument developing countries that belong to the wto and participate in more ptas experience greater fdi inflows than otherwise controlling for many factors including domestic policy preferences and taking into account possible endogeneity joining international trade agreements allows developing countries to attract more fdi and thus increase economic growth

economic obstacles to expanding intra african trade abstract the paper extends the gravity model to examine the impact of infrastructure availability economic policy and internal political tensions on intra african trade to highlight specific obstacles hampering such a trade bilateral trade between africa and developed countries is also analyzed the results show that besides traditional gravity variables poor infrastructure economic policy mismanagement and internal political tensions have a negative impact on trade among african countries except for political tensions the identified obstacles are specific to intra african trade since they have no impact on african trade with developed countries

trade conflict and political integration explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements many historians argue that the main goal of european trade integration was the preservation of peace this paper investigates whether this reasoning is relevant for the eu and other regional trade agreements rtas i provide empirical evidence that customs unions and common markets deep rtas do reduce the probability of war between members partial scope and free trade agreements shallow rtas however have no effect on war probabilities accordingly international insecurity has a differential impact on incentives to create rtas deep rtas are signed between countries that are involved in many interstate disputes and that have low trade costs with the rest of the world whereas the opposite is true for shallow rtas

monopolistic recycling of oil revenue and intertemporal bias in oil depletion and trade this paper investigates oil depletion and trade when monopolistic oil producers also exercise monopoly power in the capital market a two period model views collusively organized oil producers with an initial trade surplus and a subsequent deficit when monopoly power in the capital market is applied to the disadvantage of borrowers less oil is initially made available to oil importers than if the interest rate had been competitively determined this depletion bias however is reversed if because of incentives for capital accumulation it is to the advantage of the oil producers to subsidize lending to the oil importers in either case the bias in oil depletion due to monopolistic recycling of oil revenue is greater the more vulnerable are oil importer s incomes to a curtailment of oil supplies 25 references

the political determinants of international trade the major powers 1907 1990 we test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows the first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads and the third that trade flows are greater between allies we examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990 this period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically we estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad but alliances generally do not even when controlling for polarity of the system

optimum responses of the current account when income is uncertain abstract how the current and capital accounts in the balance of payments should adjust when there are exogenous shocks has recently been examined in the context of optimal intertemporal choice of consumption and borrowing thus a fall in income will call forth a variety of responses depending on whether it is thought to be permanent or temporary long term or short term and on the form of the discount function in this paper uncertainty is introduced into the timing of the reversal of an income fall this being modelled by a poisson process phase diagrams are derived for the paths of consumption and debt

feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism recent research has underlined the efficiency of the gatt wto rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium such an equilibrium is however economically inefficient global free trade in particular is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world provided that governments have distributive motivations in such a context we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare superior equilibrium the reason is that as members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another they are induced to reduce their multilateral tariff sa s well once we account for these endogenous changes and only then we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative but political world we also find however that members are likely to gain too much from regional integration thereby harming outsiders

determinants of bilateral trade flows what factors influence the level of trade flows that occur between nations past studies have answered this question primarily in terms of distance and economic size the present study considers additional variables as potential determinants of trade relations between nations also trade flows are analyzed by the type of products being exported and imported the findings show that several additional variables are significant determinants of the level of bilateral trade relations between nations in addition it is found that models of trade flows are more appropriate for manufactured goods than they are for basic commodities

policy diffusion of emission standards is there a race to the top in a dramatic example of policy diffusion the past three decades have witnessed the spread of automobile emission standards throughout the world contrary to fears that global competition would produce a race to the bottom there appears to be a race to the top not only among rich countries but also among poor ones using econometric analysis of the adoption of automobile emission standards over the past twenty years for 129 countries the author argues that this global diffusion results from countries efforts to stay competitive in the international market due to the pressure from importing countries that have adopted stringent emission standards even developing countries have rapidly moved to adopt rich country standards the evidence shows that adoption of automobile emission standards correlates with an increase in the total value of automobile exports under some conditions economic incentives in a global market can be a complement to environmental protection

how did wars dampen trade in the mena region abstractthe article investigates the impact of wars on trade in the middle east and north african region using an augmented gravity model that controls for the endogeneity problem in our estimation we introduce a war variable and distinguish between different types of conflicts the results show that wars have a significantly negative impact on exports imports and trade civil conflicts hinder exports imports and trade significantly the disaggregated version of the gravity model shows that non state conflicts have a detrimental effect on bilateral trade flows in manufacturing and that none of the conflicts do affect trade in services we also find that on average a conflict is equivalent to a tariff of 5 of the value of trade

product portfolios and the introduction of new products an example from the insecticide industry this article explores how the introduction of new products by multiproduct firms might be affected by existing goods in each firm s portfolio a logit analysis is conducted to estimate the effects of local monopoly power cost advantages and learning characteristics theory is used to determine whether the addition of a new product by a firm s existing portfolio creates the potential for local monopoly power while the chemical similarity of products has the largest effect results nonetheless indicate the empirical significance of potential monopoly power in influencing product introductions by multiproduct firms

are preferential trade agreements with non trade objectives a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization in many preferential trade agreements ptas countries exchange not only reductions in trade barriers but also cooperation in non trade issues such as labor and environmental standards intellectual property etc we provide a model of ptas motivated by cooperation in non trade issues and analyze its implications for global free trade and welfare we find that such ptas increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions and thus cause a stumbling block to global free trade this occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that can be used in ptas and thus the surplus that can be extracted from them by explicitly modeling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations we derive a testable prediction and provide novel econometric evidence that supports the model s key prediction the welfare analysis shows that the current wto rules allowing this type of ptas may be optimal for economically large countries thus the model can predict the rules we observe we also analyze alternative rules that constitute a pareto improvement

formulas and flexibility in trade negotiations sensitive agricultural products in the world trade organization s doha agenda many trade negotiations involve large cuts in high tariffs while allowing smaller cuts for an agreed share of politically sensitive products the effects of these flexibilities on market access opportunities are difficult to predict creating particular problems for developing countries in assessing whether to support a proposed trade agreement some widely used ad hoc approaches for identifying likely sensitive products such as the highest bound tariff rule suggest that the impact of a limited number of such exceptions on average tariffs and market access is likely to be minor applying a rigorous specification based on the apparent objectives of policymakers in setting the prenegotiation tariff enables more accurate assessment of the implications of sensitive product provisions for average agricultural tariffs economic welfare and market access under the doha negotiations the analysis concludes that highest tariff rules are likely to seriously underestimate the impacts on average tariffs and that treating even two percent of tariff lines as sensitive is likely to have a sharply adverse impact on economic welfare the impacts on market access are also adverse but much smaller perhaps reflecting the mercantilist focus of the negotiating process

the third leg of the kantian tripod for peace international organizations and militarized disputes 1950 85 immanuel kant believed that democracy economic interdependence and international law and organizations could establish the foundations for perpetual peace our analyses of politically relevant dyads show that each of the three elements of the kantian peace makes a statistically significant independent contribution to peaceful interstate relations these benefits are evident even when the influence of other theoretically interesting factors such as relative power alliances geographic contiguity and economic growth is held constant increasing the number of shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations igos by one standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized disputes by about 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical pair of bordering states if both members of a dyad are democratic conflict is 35 percent less likely than the baseline increasing both the dyadic trade gdp ratio and the trend in trade by a standard deviation reduces the chance of conflict by 38 percent together all the kantian variables lower the probability of a dispute by 72 percent we check for reverse causation and find reason to believe that a feedback system is at work with igos reducing conflict and low conflict dyads joining igos democracies and interdependent states are more likely to join igos with one another bringing together the three elements of a system for kantian peace

alliances preferential trading arrangements and international trade c oncerns about the stability of the international trading system have become widespread in recent years many observers feel that the relatively liberal system forged after world war ii is being undermined by the proliferation of preferential trading arrangements these concerns have spawned a great deal of empirical research much of which has found that such arrangements exert a substantial effect on trade flows yet these studies have neglected the role political military alliances play in shaping patterns of commerce this omission is important because there is ample reason to expect that alliances guide trade flows and preferential trading arrangements often are comprised of allies as a result extant analyses risk confusing the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on commerce and systematically overstating the effects of the latter in this study we analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows both factors are likely to promote trade among members but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce the combination of an alliance which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade and a commercial institution which liberalizes trade among members is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both 1

should the wto require free trade agreements to eliminate internal tariffs abstract in a three country model of endogenous free trade agreements ftas we study the effects of requiring fta members to eliminate tariffs on one another as is essentially stipulated under current wto rules we explain why in the absence of such a requirement ftas members impose positive tariffs on each other even when maximizing their joint welfare we show that requiring fta members to eliminate internal tariffs induces them to lower their external tariffs such external trade liberalization by fta members undermines the prospects of global free trade since it reduces the non member s incentive to enter into trade agreements with them

investing in the peace economic interdependence and international conflict research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace still existing understanding of linkages between cone ict and international economics is limited in at least two ways first cross border economic relationships are far broader than just trade global capital markets dwarf the exchange of goods and services and states engage in varying degrees of monetary policy coordination second the manner in which economics is said to inhibit cone ict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war we discuss and then demonstrate formally how interdependence can ine uence states recourse to military violence the risk of disrupting economic linkages particularly access to capital may occasionally deter minor contests between interdependent states but such opportunity costs will typically fail to preclude militarized disputes instead interdependence offers nonmilitarized avenues for communicating resolve through costly signaling our quantitative results show that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade democracy interest and other variables students of world politics have long argued that peace is a positive externality of global commerce theorists like montesquieu and kant and practitioners like woodrow wilson asserted that economic relations between states pacify political interaction mounting evidence in recent years appears to substantiate these claims multiple studies many identie ed with the democratic peace link interstate trade with reductions in militarized disputes or wars 1 while we concur with the evolving

market presence contestability and the terms of trade effects of regional integration abstract this paper examines the impact of market presence and contestability on the price behavior of us exporters in brazil s market when mercosur and mfn trade liberalization take place using detailed panel data on trade and tariff rates we find that both the preferred supplier s market presence and threat of entry lower raise the us price reaction to mfn preferential trade liberalization with similar quantitative effects thus presence in or threat of entry into partners markets implies lower optimal mfn tariffs and regional agreements can have pro competitive effects in contestable markets we also examine the symmetry hypothesis between the effect of tariffs and exchange rates

does trade still follow the flag t he economic ties between any two nations are frequently affected by a warming or cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations but there is little to be found in modern economics or political science that helps us understand the connections between international politics and commerce the notion that international economics could be studied in isolation from its political underpinnings or consequences would have been quite alien to mercantilist thinkers in the eighteenth century or to the critics or advocates of imperialism in the nineteenth that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined was taken as a matter of course indeed trade follows the flag was central to these people s understanding of world politics and international economics intellectual trends over the past century radically changed this worldview the ascendancy of liberalism in economic thought brought with it a compartmentalization of disciplines that may now be eroding but we are left with theories of international politics and economics that are very weakly bridged the objective of this study is to map one of the many connections between international politics and commercial ties specifically i seek to identify and measure the effect of changes in state to state diplomatic relations on trade flows between those nations theoretical underpinnings of my effort are in the tradition of public choice political economy frey 1984 because i treat importers as rational utility maximizers and their behavior as determined by preferences pursued within a context of specified constraints the model i put forward is wholly consistent with contemporary neoclassical trade theory but i extend the economists notion of welfare and contend that importers take account not only of the price and quantity of goods and services but of the place of origin of these products and the political relationship between the importing and the exporting nation they do so essentially for traditional security reasons that is importers are motivated to manage their trade relations in ways that minimize risks of disruption in supply or the possibility of hurting friends or

collateral damage trade disruption and the economic impact of war abstract conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of economic activity especially international trade we study the effects of war on bilateral trade with available data extending back to 1870 using the gravity model we estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on the trade of belligerent nations and neutrals controlling for other determinants of trade as well as the possible effects of reverse causality we find large and persistent impacts of wars on trade national income and global economic welfare we also conduct a general equilibrium comparative statics exercise that indicates costs associated with lost trade might be at least as large as the conventionally measured direct costs of war such as lost human capital as illustrated by case studies of world wars i and ii

post green revolution food systems and the triple burden of malnutrition developing country food systems have changed dramatically since the green revolution period at the same time malnutrition still represents a challenge and is now understood to encompass the three simultaneous dimensions of undernourishment micronutrient deficiencies and over nutrition manifest in overweight and obesity these changes in food systems and in the understanding of the global malnutrition challenge necessitate fresh thinking about food systems based strategies to reduce malnutrition this paper introduces a special section that offers such new perspectives we discuss trends with respect to indicators of the triple burden of malnutrition to understand the extent of global malnutrition challenges and then relate those to food systems transformation in developing countries

the efficient use of multiple sources of a nonrenewable resource under supply cost uncertainty whereas in a deterministic world leaving a high cost source of a nonrenewable resource untouched as long as a less costly source is available is always efficient this may not be the case in a stochastic world conditions are derived under which it can be efficient to use a risky supply source in order to conserve a cheaper nonrisky source or to use a costly nonrisky source while a less costly risky source is still available a supply embargo can be interpreted as a limiting case the nonrisky source can be reinterpreted as an artificial stockpile

trade and thy neighbor s war abstract this paper is the first to examine the spillover effects of regional conflicts defined as internal or external armed conflicts in contiguous states on international trade our empirical findings based on different measures of regional conflict constructed using alternate definitions of contiguity and types of conflict for 145 countries over 1948 2006 reveal a significant negative effect of both intrastate and international conflicts on the bilateral trade of neighboring countries that may not be directly involved in any conflict the impact increases with conflict duration and is persistent on average it takes bilateral trade 3 5 years to recover after the end of a regional conflict

comparing supply side specifications in models of global agriculture and the food system this article compares the theoretical and functional specification of production in partial equilibrium pe and computable general equilibrium cge models of the global agricultural and food system included in the agmip model comparison study the two model families differ in their scope partial versus economy wide and in how they represent technology and the behavior of supply and demand in markets the cge models are deep structural models in that they explicitly solve the maximization problem of consumers and producers assuming utility maximization and profit maximization with production cost functions that include all factor inputs the pe models divide into two groups on the supply side 1 shallow structural models which essentially specify area yield supply functions with no explicit maximization behavior and 2 deep structural models that provide a detailed activity analysis specification of technology and explicit optimizing behavior by producers while the models vary in their specifications of technology both within and between the pe and cge families we consider two stylized theoretical models to compare the behavior of crop yields and supply functions in cge models with their behavior in shallow structural pe models we find that the theoretical responsiveness of supply to changes in prices can be similar depending on parameter choices that define the behavior of implicit supply functions over the domain of applicability defined by the common scenarios used in the agmip comparisons in practice however the applied models are more complex and differ in their empirical sensitivity to variations in specification comparability of results given parameter choices is an empirical question to illustrate the issues sensitivity analysis is done with one global cge model magnet to indicate how the results vary with different specification of technical change and how they compare with the results from pe models

dyadic military conflict security alliances and bilateral fdi flows although multinationals operate under cross border jurisdictions the relevance of interstate security relations to international business has received little attention despite the impressive accumulation of knowledge in international business and international relations the two intellectual communities have largely ignored the insights from each other in this article we seek to bridge this gap we argue that interstate military conflict and security alliances as two central features of interstate security relations often change both government policies toward international business and investor expectations of political risk from the perspectives of both states and investors military conflict should reduce bilateral investment whereas security alliances increase it our empirical analysis applies the system gmm estimator to a gravity model of bilateral investment flows for 1117 directed dyads among 58 countries from 1980 to 2000 among 18 countries whose per capita real incomes remain consistently above 12 000 constant dollars the security factors do not affect bilateral investment in the high income low income dyads interstate military conflict and security alliances significantly influence bilateral investment as expected the findings depict two separate realms in which international politics does and does not interfere with international business helping us improve political risk assessments and understand the interactions between states and firms

dynamic policy coordination stockpiling for energy security abstract this paper looks at the problem of coordinating the use of oil stockpiles during a disruption in the world oil market when an individual country s actions affect the market price we model the problem as a dynamic game between two oil importing nations when the disruption is expected to persist at the same intensity we show that there are no benefits to coordination more generally however the noncooperative equilibrium will differ from the cooperative one we characterize the benefits from cooperation and determine the key parameters on which they depend

the kantian peace the pacific benefits of democracy interdependence and international organizations 1885 1992 the authors test kantian and realist theories of interstate conflict using data extending over more than a century treating those theories as complementary rather than competing as the classical liberals believed democracy economic interdependence and international organizations have strong and statistically significant effects on reducing the probability that states will be involved in militarized disputes moreover the benefits are not limited to the cold war era some realist influences notably distance and power predominance also reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict the character of the international system too affects the probability of dyadic disputes the consequences of having a strong hegemonic power vary but high levels of democracy and interdependence in the international system reduce the probability of conflict for all dyads not just for those that are democratic or dependent on trade

ex tridenti mercatus sea power and maritime trade in the age of globalization this paper tests an implication of the hypothesis that hegemons provide increased global stability and thus promote international commerce specifically we measure the influence of naval power projections on global trade during the latter 19th and early 20th centuries a time of relative peace and robust commercial activity we use archival data on the navies of britain france the united states and germany capturing longitudinal measures of ship deployment tonnage and ship personnel first we develop an empirical naval arms race model and demonstrate that the navies of britain and france in particular responded rigorously to each other we then use our estimates of naval power projected around the world by britain and france to measure their effects on bilateral trade in a panel data gravity model results indicate that while navies had some positive impact on their own nation s trade other nations trade suffered our results show that rather than bolster globalization the first global arms race damaged commercial interests and lowered trade potential around the world

the political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry a similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the new economics of institutions the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity in this survey the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined in addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or where there are answers no strong evidence in support of them this essay then in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics

embargo threats and the management of emergency reserves this paper develops a model of a country that can import oil in normal times but is subject to random trade disruptions to mitigate the effects of these disruptions some of the imported oil is stockpiled there are two kinds of uncertainty involved the date at which an embargo will be imposed is not known in advance and given that an embargo has been imposed the date at which it will end is uncertain optimal behavior is analyzed by means of dynamic programming 13 references

sequencing regional trade integration and cooperation agreements trade integration agreements and other international cooperation agreements have proliferated in recent years around the world rather than being spurred by exogenous forces alone the two phenomena are likely to be both path dependent and endogenous to one another however the theoretical and empirical understanding of the relationships between agreements forged in different domains of cooperation remains nascent the purpose of this paper is to describe a new extensive dataset on international agreements that can be employed to start mending the gaps in the literature and to develop best practices of sequencing international agreements to obtain higher pay offs from cooperation of particular interest here is the relationship between trade integration and other cooperation agreements the data provide preliminary grounds for hypothesising that trade integration agreements can be a particularly likely catalyst for further cooperation between states

pricing and depletion of an exhaustible resource when there is anticipation of trade disruption this paper considers pricing and depletion of an exhaustible nonrenewable resource in an economy wherein domestic consumption is provided for by supplementing extraction from the economy s own resource stock with imports the future supply of which is not assured the socially optimal response to threat of trade disruption is a more conservationist depletion program for the domestic resource stock than would be called for if import supplies were assured to persist competitive domestic firms adopt the socially optimal conversationist program however firms anticipating domestic market power after the disruption of import supplies are revealed to overextract the domestic resource stock 33 references 2 figures

regionalism and conflict peace creation and peace diversion abstract we investigate the implications of preferential trade agreements ptas for interstate conflict we set up a two stage game with three competing importers where first two of the countries decide on whether to initiate war against each other and subsequently all three countries select their import tariffs we show that ptas produce both a peace creation effect and a peace diversion effect whereby they reduce the likelihood of conflict between member countries peace creation but render the eruption of war between member and non member countries more likely peace diversion this paper is the first to identify and explicitly model the peace diversion effect of ptas and is also the only one in this literature to endogenize countries terms of trade we use data from the correlates of war project to empirically test these predictions and after controlling for endogeneity we find robust evidence of both peace creation and peace diversion in relation to pta establishment

sensitivity of modeling results to technological and regional details the case of italy s carbon mitigation policy model differences in technological and geographical scales are common but their contributions to uncertainties have not been systematically quantified in the climate policy literature this paper carries out a systematic assessment on the sensitivity of computable general equilibrium models to technological and geographical scales in evaluating the economic impacts of carbon mitigation policies in particular we examine the impacts of sub national details and technological details of power generation on the estimate of carbon price and economic cost taking italy as an example we find that the estimation for carbon price and the economic cost of a de carbonization pathway by means of a model with technological and regional details can be lower than a model without such details by up to 40 additionally the effect of representing regional details appears to be far more important than the effect of representing the details of electricity technology in both the estimated carbon prices and the estimated economic impacts our results for italy highlight the importance of modeling uncertainties of these two key assumptions which should be appropriately acknowledged when applying cge models for policy impact assessment our conclusions can be generalized to different countries and policy scenarios not in terms of absolute numbers but in terms of economic explanations in particular intra national trade and the sub national sectoral technological specialization are important variables for understanding the economic dynamics behind these outcomes

regional integration as diplomacy regional integration agreements rias are examples of second best and have an ambiguous impact on welfare contend the authors they build a model in which rias unambiguously raise welfare by correcting for externalities it assumes that trade between neighboring countries increases trust between them and reduces the likelihood of conflict the optimum intervention in that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor the authors show that an equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries to tax imports from the rest of the world that is to form an ria together with imposing some domestic taxes in fact security threats have moved neighboring countries to form rias examples include the creation of the european coal and steel community 1951 and the european economic community 1957 to reduce the threat of war in europe as well as various rias among developing countries the authors show among other things that 1 the optimum tariffs on imports from the rest of the world are likely to decline over time 2 deep integration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it is exogenous 3 but if deep integration is endogenous it implies higher optimum external tariffs before it occurs and lower ones thereafter and 4 enlargement of a bloc in terms of symmetric countries has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but improves welfare and some form of domino effect exists in the sense that enlargement increases the incentive for nonmembers to seek accession although externalities associated with security matters imply that an ria may maximize welfare this model suggests that the ria is a transitory arrangement in the sense that optimum trade preferences are highest at the time the ria is formed when security is low and tend to decline over time in other words the ria s external trade policy becomes increasingly open over time as well as following deep integration

transboundary pollution game with potential shift in damages abstract complex systems exposed to pollution may suddenly and permanently shift to a dangerous regime this paper studies a dynamic game among countries that face the prospect of such a shift each country derives some flow utility from its own emissions which are chosen unilaterally but flow emissions by all countries increase the pollution stock in the world in addition to generating global damages such as global warming the pollution stock may trigger an irreversible and abrupt jump in global damages or catastrophe at an unknown date in the future we ask whether endogenous and exogenous threats of such a jump in damages or catastrophe mitigate the tragedy of the commons and examine their implications on welfare our analysis yields different emission responses to these threats as compared to the related literature that focuses only on the single polluter case for example when the hazard rate is exogenous and countries commit to nonlinear strategies we find that the threat of a possible jump in damages or catastrophe may induce a lower or larger emission level and initial welfare due to multiple equilibria these results are maintained when the hazard rate endogenously depends on emission decisions

hedonic prices goods specific effects and functional form inferences from cross section time series data tests for two key elements of the hedonic model of price determination for differentiated goods are proposed when cross sectional time series data are available first the hedonic hypothesis that price is determined by sellers and buyers valuations of characteristics bundled in a good is tested against the alternative that consumers demand specific goods the sensitivity of the outcome of the test to unmeasured characteristics serial correlation or heteroscedasticity and misspecification of functional form is assessed second a novel approach to testing functional form illustrates limitations of testing hedonic specifications only against alternatives nested in the box cox functional form

the intergovernmental network of world trade igo connectedness governance and embeddedness membership in certain intergovernmental organizations igos such as the world trade organization has long been argued to stimulate trade yet evidence linking igos to trade is mixed the authors argue that identifying the influence of igos requires attention not only to the institutions igos enact but also to the network through which they enact them this approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58 with every doubling of the strength of igo connection between the countries they also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic igos but also through igos that were formed for social and cultural purposes and that connections through igos that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist igos

trade blocs trade flows and international conflict the relationship between foreign trade and political conflict has been a persistent source of controversy among scholars of international relations existing empirical studies of this topic have focused on the effects of trade flows on conflict but they have largely ignored the institutional context in which trade is conducted in this article we present some initial quantitative results pertaining to the influence on military disputes of preferential trading arrangements ptas a broad class of commercial institutions that includes free trade areas common markets and customs unions we argue that parties to the same pta are less prone to disputes than other states and that hostilities between pta members are less likely to occur as trade flows rise between them moreover we maintain that heightened commerce is more likely to inhibit conflict between states that belong to the same preferential grouping than between states that do not our results accord with this argument based on an analysis of the period since world war ii we find that trade flows have relatively little effect on the likelihood of disputes between states that do not participate in the same pta within ptas however there is a strong inverse relationship between commerce and conflict parties to such an arrangement are less likely to engage in hostilities than other states and the likelihood of a military dispute dips markedly as trade increases between them

tariffs and the most favored nation clause abstract in an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade n 3 this paper explores the economics of the most favored nation mfn principle under the non cooperative tariff equilibrium each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion mfn adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion under linear demand mfn adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable high cost countries refuse reciprocal mfn adoption with other countries and also lose even if others engage in reciprocal mfn adoption amongst themselves

trade diversion and declining tariffs evidence from mercosur abstract this paper empirically examines the alternative posed by richardson j intern econ 34 1993 39 to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies richardson s hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion and trade creation may actually cause tariffs to decline the hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments objective functions a cross sectionally rich data set on trade and tariffs from the mercosur pact countries primarily argentina is used the evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of endogenous tariff determination in models of trade integration

economic structure and international security the limits of the liberal case the theory that a liberal international economic structure is associated positively and a mercantilist structure negatively with international security is widespread but the case in favor of liberalism and the case against mercantilism are both one sided and the whole attempt to link economic structure to international security anyway overestimates the influence that economic structure has on the use of force political and military factors provide explanations more convincing than economic ones for the propensity of states to resort to or refrain from the use of force liberal and mercantilist structures each have both positive and negative impacts on the use of force but these impacts become important only when they are complemented by noneconomic factors governing the use of force hence security grounds cannot be used convincingly either as a reason for maintaining the current liberal system or as a reason for opposing a shift toward a more mercantilist structure of international economic relations

a political economic model of u s bilateral trade a bstract interrelationships between economics and politics have long been recognized by scholars in the field of international relations this paper attempts to identify and quantify the factors aflecting bilateral trade flows between the united states and other countries by developing a gravity type model the model includes economic and political variables and is tested using data for sixty six u s trading partners results indicate that pure economic variables which reflect market forces are not the only factors affecting u s bilateral trade semi cconomic and international political factors are also important

alliances in international governmental organizations regional trade agreement formation and multinational enterprise regionalization strategy abstract drawing from political science alliance theories we explain why countries are likely to enter regional trade agreements we argue that the probability that this will happen is higher if the countries are allies in the same international governmental organizations igos as such alliances can help build trust and reduce political risk our results show that igo scope and also partner reliability and influence in the igo network play important roles our findings provide guidance to multinational enterprises in formulating regionalization strategies

mutual raiding of production and the emergence of exchange joint exchange and raiding can emerge in a world of mutual raiding when the appropriated production is less valuable to the appropriator than to the defender and the defense is not too inferior to attack the amounts of resources allocated to production and raiding and the amounts of goods exchanged reciprocally are determined endogenously the model reduces to pure exchange and pure raiding as special cases pure exchange emerges when the usability of appropriation is sufficiently low pure raiding emerges if the defense is sufficiently inferior to attack the results of the model are intermediate between the results of the two extreme cases jel c6 c72 d51 d72 d74 f10 i introduction in the american civil war each side to some extent looted the other still some true reciprocal exchange between the two sides was conducted by blockade runners whereby the south exported cotton and imported manufactured goods varying across time space pure market exchange may be supplemented by or grow out of such activities as war piracy 1 corruption 2 extortion 3 crime 4 plundering or theft referred to as raiding or mutual raiding generally agents individuals groups companies nations can meet their consumption needs by exchange of goods in accordance with comparative advantage or else by attempts at confiscating the other s production resources goods or trade flows each route has been the subject of separate study this article develops a model in which the equilibrium balance between the two ways of acquiring desired goods is determined by the values of various parameters governing the productive and conflictual processes involved how can exchange conducted voluntarily and with mutual advantage emerge in a world where appropriation and defense through mutual raiding appear to be more natural means of survival 5 classical economics describes how agents exchange goods reciprocally voluntarily and nonviolently 6 political economy describes how agents appropriate and defend one productive resource without reciprocal exchange 7 a few authors attempt to integrate production exchange and appropriation 8 this article lets two agents exchange goods reciprocally and raid each other s production mutually hausken 2003 33 36 classifies the 78 possible models in the exhaustive spirit of rapoport and guyer 1966 for how one or several of the five objects production resources consumption goods exports and imports can be set under attack as is also the case for rider 1999 anderton et al 1999 and anderton 1999 this article utilizes ratio forms of the contest success function 9 reduction to a pure exchange model presented in section ii or a pure raiding model occurs by adjusting parameters also assuming raiding of production rider 1999 claims that pure exchange is impossible 10 which is correct when the production is equally valuable to the appropriator and defender rider shows that in the absence of pure exchange it could turn out and in fact it inevitably turns out that the advantages of diversified consumption achieved by mutual raiding exceeds the wastage of fighting effort if his result were universal one would not observe pure exchange in the real world which in fact we do accordingly this article shows that rider s 1999 result is not inevitable even when accepting his assumption that each agent produces only one of the two desired goods we believe that the two characteristics value of appropriation and superiority of defense over attack 11 are realistic and help explain the empirics as well as reciprocal exchange in the real world 12 regarding the first characteristic grossman and kim 1995 1279 present the following argument which is contrary to most contest models which let appropriated objects be equally valuable to the appropriator and the defender we also allow for the possibility that predation is destructive by which we mean that in any appropriative interaction the predator gains less than the prey loses

endogenous tariff formation the case of mercosur mercosur appears as an interesting case study for analyzing the determinants of exceptions in regional trade agreements its member countries argentina brazil paraguay and uruguay intended to make mercosur a full customs union by january 1995 this goal turned out to be too ambitious and the protocol of ouro preto and other agreements signed in december 1994 led to a hybrid solution overall out of a total of 9 119 tariff lines around 30 percent are subject in at least one member country to either external deviations from the common external tariff or internal deviations from free trade thus an important set of holes remains under the existing agreement leading some authors to consider mercosur an incomplete customs union this article compares the results of the theoretical literature on endogenous tariff formation with evidence from mercosur the results show that mercosur common external tariff and member countries deviations from it and from internal free trade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predicted by the endogenous tariff literature if a viable political economy is a key to success then mercosur is here to stay

the transhipment problem smuggling and welfare in paraguay abstract this paper studies the effects of contraband on resource allocation and welfare using parguayan data a major portion of exports from this economy involves the transhipment of goods from third countries through paraguay to brazil and argentina to avoid trade taxes both explicit and implicit via quantitative restrictions and multiple exchange rates using international and paraguayan databases for 1990 we calculate that contraband accounted for 58 of exports and 31 of imports finally we estimate that such trade increased welfare by 2 1 of gdp

expanding international trade beyond the rta border the case of asean s economic diplomacy abstract we examine the roles of regional trade agreements rtas not only in regionalization processes but also in globalization of trade results from various specifications of the gravity equation model confirm that a country can noticeably increase directional trade through diplomatic relations as well as through membership

the protectionist bias of duty drawbacks evidence from mercosur in a political economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying it is shown that full duty drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production this in turn decreases their incentives to counter lobby against high tariffs on their inputs in equilibrium higher tariffs will be observed on these goods the creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium duty drawbacks will be eliminated on intra regional exports which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra regional exporters evidence from mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty drawbacks for intra regional exports led to increased counter lobbying by users of intermediate products in its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3 5 percentage points 25 percent higher