why you can t find a taxi in the rain and other labor supply lessons from cab drivers i replicate and extend the seminal work of camerer et al labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time quarterly journal of economics 112 1997 407 441 who find that the wage elasticity of daily hours of work for new york city taxi drivers is negative and conclude that their labor supply behavior is consistent with reference dependence in contrast my analysis of the complete record of all trips taken in nyc taxi cabs from 2009 to 2013 shows that drivers tend to respond positively to unanticipated as well as anticipated increases in earnings opportunities additionally using a discrete choice stopping model the probability of a shift ending is strongly positively related to hours worked but at best weakly related to income earned i find substantial heterogeneity across drivers in their elasticities but the estimated elasticities are generally positive and rarely substantially negative i find that new drivers with smaller elasticities are more likely to exit the industry whereas drivers who remain quickly learn to be better optimizers have positive labor supply elasticities that grow with experience these results are consistent with the neoclassical optimizing model of labor supply and suggest that consideration of gain loss utility and income reference dependence is not an important factor in the daily labor supply decisions of taxi drivers jel codes d01 d03 j22

what drives the high moments of hedge fund returns abstractwe study the high moment distribution of hedge fund returns and identify factors that drive high moment risk using hedge fund monthly returns we find a strong correlation between the first four moments of returns i e mean standard deviation sd skewness and kurtosis and different characteristics of the funds such as leverage liquidity incentives and strategy related factors we find that after controlling for other factors incentives related factors and a hedge fund s specific strategy have the greatest impact on the distribution of fund returns our evidence also suggests investors allocate across hedge fund characteristics while placing greater emphasis on fund strategies and incentive factors

nonstationarity in job search theory generally structural job search models are taken to be stationary in this paper models are examined in which every exogenous variable can cause nonstationarity for instance because its value is dependent on unemployment duration a general differential equation that describes the evolution of the reservation wage over time is derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated that focuses on the consequences of a downward shift in the level of benefits it appears that the elasticity of duration with respect to the level of benefits after the shift is much larger than the elasticity with respect to the level before the shift this paper examines the movement of a job seeking individual s reservation wage over time in a general nonstationary job search model also results concerning comparative dynamics of the reservation wage and the distribution of the duration of unemployment are derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated the nonstationarity originates from the decrease in the level of benefits when unemployment duration equals two years from the results some detailed policy recommendations can be deduced as one is able to distinguish the effect of a change in the level of benefits in the first two years of unemployment from the effect of a change in the level after that period recently the use of job search models for the analysis of unemployment duration has become widespread the reduced form approach in empirical studies see e g lancaster 1979 in which only the hazard of the duration distribution is estimated is gradually being replaced by a more structural approach the latter way of modelling is characterized by the explicit use in empirical analysis of the reservation wage equation as stated by the theory e g yoon 1981 lancaster and chesher 1983 lynch 1983 narendranathan and nickell 1985 and van den berg 1988 use the complete theoretical framework of job search theory to make inferences about search behaviour however the structural models used in these studies are stationary this implies that variables like unemployment benefits or the rate of arrival of job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment which is often at variance with reality what is more various reduced form empirical studies indicate a significant durationdependence of the re employment probability which is generally interpreted as evidence in favour of the presence of nonstationarity see e g blau and robins 1986 kooreman and ridder 1983 lancaster 1979 and narendranathan nickell and stern 1985 consequently there is a need to model reservation wage movements over time based on a nonstationary theoretical framework

assessing the effects of reemployment bonuses on job search a regression discontinuity approach abstract this study examines the impacts of reemployment bonuses that is the incentive payments to unemployment insurance ui recipients who find a job within a specified period using korean data a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at age 55 identifies the effect of increased reemployment bonuses on unemployment duration and on subsequent job duration the results indicate that increases in the reemployment bonus boost the job finding hazards of ui claimants early in their unemployment spells during the bonus qualification period and significantly shorten the duration of ui spells by 0 16 to 0 42 months 0 68 to 1 82 weeks in addition employment stability is not significantly affected by an increased bonus which implies no negative influence of the bonus on subsequent job match quality the simulated estimates show that the increase in tax revenue and the decrease in ui benefit payment caused by the behavioral response of ui recipients are large enough to offset the increased cost of the reemployment bonus

too big to ignore hedge fund flows and bond yields abstract this paper investigates the information content of aggregate hedge fund flow and its predictive power with respect to bond yields using a sample of 9725 hedge funds from 1994 to 2012 we find that fund flow is negatively related to the changes in 10 year treasury and moody s baa bond yields one month ahead this relation is still pronounced after controlling for other determinants of yield changes including the amount of arbitrage capital available in the economy suggesting a non trivial effect of flow induced hedge fund trading on bond yields flow impact on corporate bonds is further amplified during periods of decreasing market liquidity consistent with a fire sale hypothesis hedge fund flow also predicts convergence between constant maturity swap rate and constant maturity treasury rate as well as between the tips and treasury bond yields suggesting that hedge funds exploit arbitrage opportunities in these fixed income markets

unemployment insurance and the rate of re employment of displaced workers the rate of transition from unemployment to re employment for a sample of displaced workers is estimated using a semiparametric specification which allows the effects of unemployment insurance benefits to vary over time three results which would be missed by more restrictive specifications demonstrate the value of this approach 1 the effects of ui benefits decline and eventually disappear as the date of expiration approaches 2 expiration of ui benefits are an inadequate explanation of the spikes commonly observed in nonparametric sample hazard rates for re employment 3 ui benefits do not significantly affect the rate at which a displaced worker becomes re employed in his or her previous industry but reduce the rate for transitions to other industries copyright 1991 by mit press

job search and hyperbolic discounting structural estimation and policy evaluation this paper estimates the structural parameters of a job search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search effort it estimates quantitatively the degree of hyperbolic discounting and assesses its implications for the impact of various policy interventions aimed at reducing unemployment the model is estimated using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy the likelihood function explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic programming solution to the model both observed and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for the results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting especially for low and medium wage workers the structural estimates are also used to evaluate alternative policy interventions for the unemployed estimates based on a model with exponential discounting may lead to biased inference on the economic impact of policies jel c6 c73 d90 j64 j68

optimal welfare to work programs a welfare to work wtw program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed e g unemployment insurance m job search monitoring m social assistance sa wage subsidies this paper provides a dynamic principal agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal wtw program such as the sequence and duration of the different policies the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell and the emergence of taxes subsidies upon re employment the optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort social assistance characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal wtw program the typical sequence of policies is quite simple the program starts with standard ui then switches into monitored search and finally into sa the optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both jm and sa whereas taxes subsidies can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during ui they must decrease increase during a phase of jm in a calibration exercise we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the u s economy with respect to the existing u s system the optimal wtw scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively

industry window dressing we explore a new mechanism by which investors take correlated shortcuts and present evidence that managers using sales management take advantage of these shortcuts specifically we exploit a regulatory provision wherein a firm s primary industry is determined by the highest sales segment exploiting this regulation we provide evidence that investors classify operationally nearly identical firms as starkly different depending on their placement around this sales cutoff moreover managers appear to exploit this by manipulating sales to be just over the cutoff in favorable industries further evidence suggests that managers engage in activities to realize large tangible benefits from this opportunistic action

job search and impatience workers who are more impatient search less intensively and set lower reservation wages the effect of impatience on exit rates from unemployment is therefore unclear if agents have exponential time preferences the reservation wage effect dominates for sufficiently patient individuals so increases in impatience lead to higher exit rates the opposite is true for agents with hyperbolic time preferences using two large longitudinal data sets we find that impatience measures are negatively correlated with search effort and the unemployment exit rate and are orthogonal to reservation wages impatience substantially affects outcomes in the direction predicted by the hyperbolic model

wage elasticities in working and volunteering the role of reference points in a laboratory study we experimentally test how effort responds to wages randomly assigned to accrue to individuals or to a charity in the presence of expectations based reference points or targets when individuals earn money for themselves higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior when individuals earn money for a charity higher wages instead lead to lower effort with substantial targeting behavior a reference dependent theoretical framework suggests an explanation for this differential impact when individuals place less value on earnings such as when accruing earnings for a charity instead of themselves more targeting behavior and a more sluggish response to incentives should result results from an additional experiment add support to this explanation when individuals select into earning money for a charity and thus likely place a higher value on those earnings targeting behavior is muted and no longer generates a negative effort response to higher wages data and the online appe

international sanctions as international punishment much of the contemporary literature on the utility of international sanctions approaches the apparent riddle of why sanctions are embraced so eagerly when they are supposedly such an ineffective tool of statecraft by focusing on the instrumental and rational purposes of sanctions as a result one purpose that does not always lend itself to a rational means end calculus the purpose of punishment tends to be overlooked or more commonly dismissed outright this article explores punishment as both a useful and an effective purpose of international sanctions it argues not only that sanctions should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft but also that they are a form of international punishment for wrongdoing despite the difficulties of applying the term punishment in the context of international relations the article then examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means end rationality is used suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions the argument is then applied to the case of u s sanctions imposed after the soviet union s invasion of afghanistan to demonstrate the different purposes of punishment at work in this case the article concludes that just as we cannot understand punishment as a purposive human activity solely by reference to a rational model of a means to a clearly delineated end so too we cannot entirely understand sanctions as a form of international punishment by an attachment to a rational model of policy behavior however some forms of punishment are exceedingly effective and this may explain why sanctions continue to be a popular instrument of statecraft

unemployment insurance recall expectations and unemployment outcomes this paper empirically examines the importance of explicitly accounting for the layoff rehire process in the analysis of unemployment outcomes in the united states we find that the spells of individuals who initially expect to be recalled account for much more of the unemployment of unemployment insurance ui recipients than do spells actually ending in recall our results indicate that the recall and new job escape rates from unemployment have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables we also find that the probability of leaving unemployment both through recalls and new job finding increases greatly around the time that ui benefits lapse over the past fifteen years many studies have empirically analyzed the determinants of individual unemployment spell durations in the united states much of this literature has used a job search framework in which the unemployed are viewed as permanently displaced workers who are unattached to jobs the possibility of recall to a former job a process not requiring search has been omitted from explicit consideration in the majority of these studies 2 an explicit treatment of the layoff rehire process is necessary for a proper understanding of the determinants of unemployment durations and of the impacts of unemployment policies in the united states for at least three reasons first temporary layoffs in which workers are often rehired by their original employers are a quantitatively quite important feature of the u s labor market 3 second expectations concerning the likelihood of recall are likely to affect the responses of employers and unemployed workers to labor market interventions such as reemployment bonuses and subsidies

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

does reducing unemployment insurance generosity reduce job match quality abstract this paper analyzes how a change in slovenia s unemployment insurance law affected the quality of jobs workers found after periods of unemployment taking advantage the natural experiment we show through difference in differences estimation results that reducing the potential duration of unemployment benefits had no detectable effect on wages on the probability of securing a permanent rather than a temporary job or on the duration of the post unemployment job

on the determinants of the success of economic sanctions an empirical analysis theory theories predicting the success of economic sanctions are tested on the universe of sanction episodes from 1914 to 1989 hypotheses the probability of success depends upon the cost to the target nation the extent of trade linkages between target and sender the stability of the target the amount of time sanctions are in force and whether financial sanctions are utilized method data are analyzed using logistic regression results the factors affecting success depend upon the goals of the sending nations when that goal is simply destabilization the principal determinant of success is the initial stability of the target for other goals the use of financial sanctions is most effective we also find evidence of a modest downward trend over time in the relative effectiveness of sanctions in the latter category

does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes in this paper we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment for that purpose we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service especially for low educated and low skilled workers they also show that the search effort is more costly for low educated women and low skilled adult unemployed workers this last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

the effects of extended unemployment insurance over the business cycle evidence from regression discontinuity estimates over 20 years one goal of extending the duration of unemployment insurance ui in recessions is to increase ui coverage in the face of longer unemployment spells although it is a common concern that such extensions may themselves raise nonemployment durations it is not known how recessions would affect the magnitude of this moral hazard to obtain causal estimates of the differential effects of ui in booms and recessions this article exploits the fact that in germany potential ui benefit duration is a function of exact age which is itself invariant over the business cycle we implement a regression discontinuity design separately for 20 years and correlate our estimates with measures of the business cycle we find that the nonemployment effects of a month of additional ui benefits are at best somewhat declining in recessions yet the ui exhaustion rate and therefore the additional coverage provided by ui extensions rises substantially during a downturn the ratio of these two effects represents the nonemployment response of workers weighted by the probability of being affected by ui extensions hence our results imply that the effective moral hazard effect of ui extensions is significantly lower in recessions than in booms using a model of job search with liquidity constraints we also find that in the absence of market wide effects the net social benefits from ui extensions can be expressed either directly in terms of the exhaustion rate and the nonemployment effect of ui durations or as a declining function of our measure of effective moral hazard copyright 2012 oxford university press

loss aversion in a consumption savings model abstract we propose a model of consumption and saving based on kahneman and tversky s prospect theory that implies a fundamental asymmetry in consumption behavior inconsistent with other models of consumption when there is sufficient income uncertainty a person resists lowering consumption in response to bad news about future income this resistance is greater than the resistance to increasing consumption in response to good news we present empirical evidence from five countries that confirms this behavior

the information content of losses abstract this study hypothesizes that because shareholders have a liquidation option losses are not expected to perpetuate they are thus less informative than profits about the firm s future prospects the results are consistent with the hypothesis they also show that the documented increase in the earnings response coefficent as the cumulation period increases appears to be due exclusively to the effect of losses the liquidation option effect extends to profitable cases where earnings are low enough to make the option attractive alternating explanations for the low informativeness of losses such as mean reversal of earnings are not supported by the tests

an econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns the returns to hedge funds and other alternative investments are often highly serially correlated in sharp contrast to the returns of more traditional investment vehicles such as long only equity portfolios and mutual funds in this paper we explore several sources of such serial correlation and show that the most likely explanation is illiquidity exposure i e investments in securities that are not actively traded and for which market prices are not always readily available for portfolios of illiquid securities reported returns will tend to be smoother than true economic returns which will understate volatility and increase risk adjusted performance measures such as the sharpe ratio we propose an econometric model of illiquidity exposure and develop estimators for the smoothing prole as well as a smoothing adjusted sharpe ratio for a sample of 908 hedge funds drawn from the tass database we show that our estimated smoothing coecien ts vary considerably across hedge fund style categories and may be a useful proxy for quantifying illiquidity exposure

consumer spending during unemployment positive and normative implications using de identified bank account data we show that spending drops sharply at the large and predictable decrease in income arising from the exhaustion of unemployment insurance ui benefits we use the high frequency response to a predictable income decline as a new test to distinguish between alternative consumption models the sensitivity of spending to income we document is inconsistent with rational models of liquidity constrained households but is consistent with behavioral models with present biased or myopic households depressed spending after exhaustion also implies that the consumption smoothing gains from extending ui benefits are four times larger than from raising ui benefit levels

does your hedge fund manager smooth returns intentionally or inadvertently abstract we propose an econometrically logical approach that distinguishes intentional from inadvertent smoothing of hedge fund return other than the hedge fund return y we introduce an explanatory variable a market portfolio of hedge fund returns x by connecting x and y some critical parameters are found to be effectively related to testing the two types of return smoothing using those parameters we develop distinct desmoothing algorithms against intentional and inadvertent smoothing our empirical results show that although intentional smoothing is partly responsible for hedge fund smoothing and is done more consistently than inadvertent smoothing return smoothing is mainly caused by the nature of underlying assets

job search search intensity and labor market transitions an empirical analysis this article proposes an empirical structural job search model with endogenously determined search intensity the model describes both the behaviour of unemployed job seekers and on the job search it draws on data on various indicators for the intensity of search to examine the effect of the intensity of search on labour market transitions the estimation results provide insight into the effectiveness of search the impact of the benefit level on the search intensity of unemployed job seekers is quantified the estimation results are used to gain insight into the discouraged worker effect

living standards and incentives in transition the implications of ui exhaustion in hungary the single most likely way to leave the unemployment insurance ui register in hungary is not by getting a job but by exhausting entitlement to benefit two questions follow first what are the implications of the cessation of ui for living standards second does ui exhaustion have much effect on the probability of getting a job through increasing incentives to work we investigate these issues with a survey of persons exhausting entitlement to ui in summer 1995 paying special attention to the household circumstances of the unemployed and to the probabilities of claiming and being awarded means tested assistance benefit

selection on observed and unobserved variables assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools in this paper we measure the effect of catholic high school attendance on educational attainment and test scores because we do not have a good instrumental variable for catholic school attendance we develop new estimation methods based on the idea that the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables in a model provides a guide to the amount of selection on the unobservables we also propose an informal way to assess selectivity bias based on measuring the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that would be required if one is to attribute the entire effect of catholic school attendance to selection bias we use our methods to estimate the effect of attending a catholic high school on a variety of outcomes our main conclusion is that catholic high schools substantially increase the probability of graduating from high school and more tentatively attending college we find little evidence of an effect on test scores

multi period performance persistence analysis of hedge funds since hedge funds specify significant lock up periods we investigate persistence in the performance of hedge funds using a multi period framework in which the likelihood of observing persistence by chance is lower than in the traditional two period framework under the null hypothesis of no manager skill no persistence the theoretical distribution of observing wins or losses follows a binormial distribution we test this hypothesis using the traditional two period framework and compare the findings with the results obtained using our multi period framework we examine whether persistence is sensitive to the length of return measurement intervals by using quarterly half yearly and yearly returns we find maximum persistence at the quarterly horizon indicating that presistence among hedge fund managers is short term in nature

the myth of the absolute return investor the notion of absolute return investing is spreading like wildfire many people believe that superior returns can be achieved by managers with strong views and little regard for benchmarks this article attempts to define absolute return investing and figure out whether it exists the conclusion is that all investment returns consist of a beta part representing the correlation of the active portfolio with one or more market benchmarks or normal portfolios and an active alpha part thus all investing is relative return investing in which active returns are earned relative to an appropriate benchmark or mix of benchmarks

moral hazard vs liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance this paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance ui benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from ui using this evidence i show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by ui benefits is due to a liquidity effect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search moral hazard by combining two empirical strategies first i find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity constrained households second lump sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households i derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities the formula implies that the optimal ui benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage the exact identification approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives

quantifying loss averse tax manipulation this article presents evidence that loss aversion affects taxpayers as they file their annual tax returns and presents a framework for estimating the policy impact of this psychological phenomenon in my theoretical framework taxpayers manipulate the money paid to the tax authority through avoidance and evasion activities when taxpayers face the prospect of owing the tax authority money on tax day loss aversion generates the perception of a greater marginal utility of tax reduction and therefore motivates greater pursuit of tax reduction activities applying a bunching based identification strategy to u s tax return data i estimate that taxpayers facing a payment on tax day reduce their tax liability by 34 more than taxpayers owed a refund

winning isn t everything corruption in sumo wrestling although the theoretical literature on corruption is well developed empirical work in this area has lagged because it has proven difficult to isolate corrupt behavior in the data in this paper we look for evidence of corruption in an unlikely place the highest echelons of japanese sumo wrestling this paper provides strong statistical evidence documenting match rigging in sumo wrestling a non linearity in the incentive structure of promotion leads to gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record and their opponents we show that wrestlers win a disproportionate share of the matches when they are on the margin increased effort can not explain the findings winning on the bubble is more frequent when the two competitors have met often in the past success on the bubble tends to rise over the course of a wrestler s career but declines in his last year consistent with the game theoretic predictions wrestlers who are victorious when on the bubble lose more frequently than would be expected the next time they meet that opponent suggesting that part of the payment for throwing a match is future payment in kind systematic differences across wrestling stables suggest that the stables play a role in facilitating the corruption in times of increased media scrutiny the match rigging disappears this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do hedge fund managers misreport returns evidence from the pooled distribution we find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns the number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses the dis continuity is present in live and defunct funds and funds of all ages suggesting that it is not caused by database biases the discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance the discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns indicating a reversal in fund performance following small gains this result suggests that the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily overstated returns

consumption commitments and habit formation we analyze the implications of household level adjustment costs for the dynamics of aggregate consumption we show that an economy in which agents have consumption commitments is approximately equivalent to a habit formation model in which the habit stock is a weighted average of past consumption if idiosyncratic risk is large relative to aggregate risk consumption commitments can thus explain the empirical regularity that consumption is excessively sensitive and excessively smooth findings that are typically attributed to habit formation unlike habit formation and other theories but consistent with empirical evidence the consumption commitments model also predicts that excess sensitivity and smoothness vanish for large shocks these results suggest that behavior previously attributed to habit formation may be better explained by adjustment costs we develop additional testable predictions to further distinguish the commitment and habit models and show that the two models have different welfare implications

when are sanctions effective a bargaining and enforcement framework although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms using a game theoretic model we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders we demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms competitiveness the model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender s firm retains a moderate share of the target s market relative to its foreign competitors however the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success the empirical implications of the model are tested using the threat and imposition of economic sanctions ties data set

job search and savings wealth effects and duration dependence this article studies a risk averse worker s optimal savings and job search behavior as she moves back and forth between employment and unemployment we show that job search effort is negatively related to wealth under the assumption of additively separable utility consequently job search exhibits positive unemployment duration dependence because wealth is drawn down to smooth consumption as the spell progresses finally given optimal search savings still provide imperfect insurance against income fluctuations precautionary savings are built up during employment spells and run down during unemployment spells but the consumption path will not be perfectly smooth over states

the hidden hand of economic coercion why do policymakers consistently employ economic sanctions even though scholars consider them an ineffective tool of statecraft game theoretic models of economic coercion suggest the success rate may be understated because of selection effects when the targeted country prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions the bulk of successful coercion episodes should therefore end with sanctions threatened but not imposed this contradicts the recent literature on sanctions which assumes that sanctions rarely if ever work at generating significant concessions from the targeted country and are imposed for domestic or symbolic political reasons if the game theoretic argument is correct the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented a statistical analysis of data on sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals strongly supports the gametheoretic argument these results suggest that the significance of economic coercion has been undervalued in the study of statecraft and international relations more generally

training and search during unemployment displaced workers often experience large losses in earnings even a long time after reemployment training programs during unemployment mitigate these losses but also affect the unemployed s willingness to search this paper analyzes how mandatory training programs affect the optimal design of unemployment insurance and how the training intensity should evolve during the unemployment spell the introduction of training reverses the optimal consumption dynamics during the unemployment spell and makes it optimal to incentivize the long term unemployed to find employment despite the depreciation of their human capital targeting training programs towards the long term unemployed however is optimal only if the fall in human capital upon displacement is small relative to the depreciation during unemployment

point shaving corruption in ncaa basketball a new field of forensic economics has begun to emerge applying price theoretic models to uncover evidence of corruption in domains previously outside the purview of economists by emphasizing the incentives that yield corruption these approaches also provide insight into how to reduce such behavior this paper contributes to this agenda highlighting how the structure of gambling on college basketball yields pay offs to gamblers and players that are both asymmetric and nonlinear thereby encouraging mutually beneficial effort manipulation through point shaving initial evidence suggests that point shaving may be quite widespread the incentives for gambling related corruption derive from the structure of basketball betting to highlight a simple example the university of pennsylvania played harvard on march 5 2005 and was widely expected to win rather than offering short odds on penn winning the game bookmakers offered an almost even bet bet 11 to win 10 on whether penn would win relative to a spread in this example the spread was 14 5 meaning that a bet on penn would win only if penn won the game by 15 or more points while a bet on harvard would be successful if harvard either won or lost by 14 or fewer points the incentive for corruption derives directly from the asymmetric incentives of players who care about winning the game and gamblers who care about whether a team beats or covers the spread indeed the example above is ripe for corruption the outcome that maximizes the joint surplus of the penn players and the gambler occurs when penn wins the game but fails to cover the spread and the gambler has bet on harvard the contract required to induce this outcome simply involves the gambler offering a contingent payment to the player with the contingency being that he pays only if penn fails to cover the spread given the player s approximate indifference over the size of the winning margin even small bribes may dominate his desire to increase the winning margin above 14 points and this in turn yields large profits for the gambler who has bet accordingly the betting market offers a simple technology for the gambler to commit to paying this outcomecontingent bribe he can simply give the player the ticket from a 1 000 bet on his opponent not covering the spread such attempts to shave the winning margin below the point spread are colloquially referred to as point shaving and form the focus of my inquiry i start by outlining the type of corruption that theory suggests will be most prevalent

labor market search effort with reference dependent preferences we incorporate forward looking reference dependent preferences into a simple job search framework and show that people with strong aversion to losses may choose not to search for a job despite economic incentives to do so we also discuss the policy implications

performance incentive fees an agency theoretic approach this paper employs recent developments in agency theory to study the impact that com pensation contracts have on portfolio management investment decisions in a restricted mean variance world two types of incentive contracts for mutual fund managers are ana lyzed and compared the results show that the symmetric contract while not necessar ily eliminating agency costs dominates the bonus contract in aligning the manager s interests with those ofthe investor investment companies and by extension their managers control a large and increasing percentage ofthe aggregate wealth of their clients more investors are putting their money under the control of these advisers than ever before con sequently potential conflicts of interest arise between investment company own ers and their financial management advisers the securities and exchange com mission sec has been concerned with this issue for a number of years the agency has commissioned several studies to investigate the issue and has set forth certain rulings concerning the behavior of investment company advisers of par ticular importance has been the compensation arrangement between mutual fund management and the fund owners in fact the sec has issued specific guidelines regarding allowable fee schedules for managers these guidelines have ied to a policy debate concerning whether the sec has been too stringent or not stringent enough in regulating compensation for investment managers the present study takes a new approach to this problem in an attempt to resolve this debate the fiduciary relationship between mutual fund management and the inves tors they represent may be viewed as a principal agent relationship conse quently the methodology from the agency literature can be applied to study the impact of various compensation arrangements on the potential conflict of interest between these two groups

earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses this paper provides evidence that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses specifically in cross sectional distributions of earnings changes and earnings we lind unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losscs and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income we find evidence that two components of earnings cash flow from operations and changes in working capital are used to achieve increases in earnings we present two theories based on stakeholder use of information processing heuristics and prospect theory about the motivation for avoidance of earnings decreases and losses

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

if wages fell during a recession abstract many economies exhibit downward wage rigidity surveys of managers indicate that employers hold wages rigid because they believe morale will suffer after a wage cut otherwise there is little evidence for how employers beliefs contribute to wage rigidity and whether those beliefs are accurate using an experiment we demonstrate that effort falls after workers experience a wage cut despite this partial confirmation of the bewley 1999 morale theory half of the employers in our experiment cut wages and lose money as a result under nominal inflation real wage cuts do not have a significant effect on effort

hard to get the scarcity of women and the competition for high income men in urban china reports of the difficulties of elite women in finding suitable mates have been increasing despite the growing availability and value of men in china we rationalize this leftover women phenomenon within the directed competitive search framework which uniquely allows for equilibrium crowding out within this framework we show that the leftover women phenomenon can be the result of women s aversion to men who have a lower income than themselves hereafter alm and the long predicted complementarity between women s non market traits in particular beauty and male earnings for high income h women even when high income h men are more plentiful and richer the direct effect of the greater number of desirable men can be overwhelmed by the indirect effect of competitive entry by low income l women particularly the beautiful we test for these competitive search effects using online dating field experimental census and household survey data consistent with the competitive entry of l women when sex ratio and h men s income increase the search intensity of beautiful l women for h men increases in response to this competitive entry plain h women who are constrained by their alm to search predominantly for h men also increase the search intensity however only their marriage probability decreases our evidence is consistent with intra female competitive search for spouses who can cover the labor market opportunity cost of marriage and childbirth which increases with a woman s income

recall expectations and duration dependence using novel administrative data from austria we investigate the nature of temporary layoffs and recalls we find that on average jobs ending in temporary layoffs lasted shorter but paid higher wages the majority of temporarily laid off workers return to their previous employer but also one fifth of those permanently laid off are recalled compared to job switchers recalls have shorter unemployment spells and do not experience wage losses negative duration dependence of unemployment only appears once recall exits are excluded for temporary and permanent layoffs however for temporary layoffs the aggregate pattern masks significant heterogeneity by pre unemployment tenure additional survey evidence suggests a lower average search level for temporary layoffs

should unemployment insurance vary with the unemployment rate theory and evidence we study how the marginal welfare gain from increasing the unemployment insurance ui bene t level varies over the business cycle we do this by estimating how the moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing bene t of ui vary with labor market conditions which we identify using variation in the interaction of ui bene t levels with the unemployment rate within u s states over time we nd that the moral hazard cost is procyclical greater when the unemployment rate is relatively low by contrast we do not nd evidence that the consumption smoothing bene t varies with the unemployment rate we use these empirical results to estimate the marginal welfare gain and we nd that it is modest on average but varies positively with the unemployment rate jel h5 j64 j65

do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target a form of foreign pressure sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries there is much pessimism on whether they ever work this article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect it destabilizes the leaders it targets i present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion i find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross country time series data the destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think i conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy s real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle

deal or no deal decision making under risk in a large payoff game show we examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular tv game show deal or no deal and related classroom experiments contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes our results point to reference dependent choice theories such as prospect theory and suggest that path dependence is relevant even when the choice problems are simple and well defined and when large real monetary amounts are at stake

when do imposed economic sanctions work previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions by contrast the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage in this article the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed first the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions miscalculate the sender s determination to impose them or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not second the target s misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed a game theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument

sanctions in networks abstract in this paper we contribute to the sender target models of sanctions by explicitly incorporating the linkages social political or economic that bind the sender and target to other agents given any network model and architecture we draw attention to two factors that play a key role in determining the efficacy of sanctions in reducing the frequency of violations these are respectively strategic complementaritiesbetween the sanctioning action deleting link with target and number of direct links of the sender and the externalities imposed on the sender by third parties we examine the role played by these factors both in the short run when links can only be deleted and the long run when links can also be added as well as when sanctions are unilateral the sender can only delete own links or multilateral the sender can impose on common allies to sever links to the target our analysis allows an active role to the target to build an opposing coalition to deflect sanctions and to third parties to engage in sanction busting it also extends to multiple senders and targets existence of interest groups within sender and target with dissimilar objectives and signed networks allowing both antagonistic and cordial bilateral relationships

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

reference dependent job search evidence from hungary we propose a model of job search with reference dependent preferences with loss aversion relative to recent income the reference point in this model newly unemployed individuals search hard since consumption is below their reference point over time though they get used to lower income and thus reduce their search effort in anticipation of a benefit cut their search effort rises again then declines once they get accustomed to the lower postcut benefit level the model fits the typical pattern of exit from unemployment even with no unobserved heterogeneity to distinguish between this and other models we use a unique reform in the unemployment insurance ui benefit path in 2005 hungary switched from a single step ui system to a two step system with overall generosity unchanged the system generated increased hazard rates in anticipation of and especially following benefit cuts in ways the standard model has a hard time explaining we estimate a model with optimal consumption endogenous search effort and unobserved heterogeneity the reference dependent model fits the hazard rates substantially better than plausible versions of the standard model including habit formation our estimates indicate a slow adjusting reference point and substantial impatience likely reflecting present bias jel codes d03 j64 j65

the termination of international sanctions explaining target compliance and sender capitulation abstract with the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the cold war the termination of these punitive measures has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in international politics yet research has hitherto almost exclusively focused on sanctions implementation and effectiveness whereas their termination has received little attention in this paper we draw on studies analyzing the varying duration of sanctions to examine under which conditions they end in contrast to prior research that has mostly treated the end of sanctions as a single category our analysis disaggregates sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation we run a competing risks model using novel dyadic sanctions data and show that the determinants of both outcomes significantly diverge while poor economic health and high political volatility in the target country make it significantly more likely to comply political alignment between the sender and target and leadership changes in the sender country lead to a higher probability of sender capitulation

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

prospect theory and energy efficiency abstract investments in energy efficiency entail uncertainty and when faced with uncertainty consumers have been shown to behave according to prospect theory preferences are reference dependent and exhibit loss aversion and probabilities are subjectively weighted using data from a choice experiment eliciting prospect theory parameters i provide evidence that loss averse people are less likely to invest in energy efficiency then i consider policy design under prospect theory when there are also externalities from energy use a higher degree of loss aversion implies a higher subsidy to energy efficiency numerical simulations suggest that the impact of prospect theory on policy may be substantial

mistake 37 the effect of previously encountered prices on current housing demand based on contrast effects studies from psychology we predicted that movers arriving from more expensive cities would rent pricier apartments than those arriving from cheaper cities we also predicted that as people stayed in their new city they would get used to the new prices and would readjust their housing expenditures countering the initial impact of previous prices we found support for both predictions in a sample of 928 movers from the psid alternative explanations based on unobserved wealth and taste and on imperfect information are ruled out

cash on hand and competing models of intertemporal behavior new evidence from the labor market this paper presents new tests of the permanent income hypothesis and other widely used models of household behavior using data from the labor market we estimate the excess sensitivity of job search behavior to cash on hand using sharp discontinuities in eligibility for severance pay and extended unemployment insurance ui benefits in austria analyzing data for over one half million job losers we obtain three empirical results 1 a lump sum severance payment equal to two months of earnings reduces the job finding rate by 8 12 on average 2 an extension of the potential duration of ui benefits from 20 weeks to 30 weeks similarly lowers job finding rates in the first 20 weeks of search by 5 9 and 3 increases in the duration of search induced by the two programs have little or no effect on subsequent job match quality using a search theoretic model we show that estimates of the relative effect of severance pay and extended benefits can be used to calibrate and test a wide set of intertemporal models our estimates of this ratio are inconsistent with the predictions of a simple permanent income model as well as naive rule of thumb behavior the representative job searcher in our data is 70 of the way between the permanent income benchmark and credit constrained behavior in terms of sensitivity to cash on hand

earnings management the shapes of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics are not evidence ipso facto we provide evidence that the shapes particularly around zero of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics examined in the extant earnings management literature are affected by 1 deflation using for example price or market capitalization 2 sample selection criteria that lead to differential inclusion exclusion of observations to the left of zero versus observations to the right of zero implicit in studies focusing on firms followed by i b e s and explicit in studies partitioning on a variable differing between loss observations and profit observations 3 differences between the characteristics of observations to the left of zero and observations to the right of zero such as market pricing and analyst optimism pessimism or 4 a combination of these factors since the shapes of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics at zero are likely due to one of the above effects we conclude that the shapes cannot be used as ipso facto evidence of earnings management

hedge fund risk dynamics implications for performance appraisal accurate appraisal of hedge fund performance must recognize the freedom with which managers shift asset classes strategies and leverage in response to changing market conditions and arbitrage opportunities the standard measure of performance is the abnormal return defined by a hedge fund s exposure to risk factors if exposures are assumed constant when in fact they vary through time estimated abnormal returns may be incorrect we employ an optimal changepoint regression that allows risk exposures to shift and illustrate the impact on performance appraisal using a sample of live and dead funds during the period january 1994 through december 2005