competition and microfinance abstract competition between microfinance institutions mfis in developing countries has increased dramatically in the last decade we model the behavior of non profit lenders and show that their non standard client maximizing objectives cause them to cross subsidize within their pool of borrowers thus when competition eliminates rents on profitable borrowers it is likely to yield a new equilibrium in which poor borrowers are worse off as competition exacerbates asymmetric information problems over borrower indebtedness the most impatient borrowers begin to obtain multiple loans creating a negative externality that leads to less favorable equilibrium loan contracts for all borrowers

externality correcting taxes and regulation externality correcting taxes and regulation in much of the literature on externalities taxes and direct regulation have been considered as alternative policy instruments both instruments might be imperfect in practice reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations we analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour we consider the cases either where taxes are imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities or where some consumption escapes taxation in both cases we characterize the optimal instrument mix and we show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

on the option to invest in pollution control under a regime of tradable emissions allowances optimal decisions of a firm facing the option of retrofitting its plant to reduce pollution and thereby eliminate the need to purchase emissions allowances are analysed the decision is treated as a real option with the price of pollution permits following a known stochastic process the model is formulated as a set of one dimensional partial differential equations at discrete points in time the firm owner makes optimal decisions about the retrofit including whether to mothball temporarily the model is used to analyse a firm s decision to instal a scrubber as a result of the 1990 u s clean air act jel classification q25 d81 g31 sur la possibilite d investir dans le controle de la pollution dans un regime de permis d emission de pollution echangeables commercialement ce memoire examine les decisions optimales d une entreprise face a la possibilite d adapter ses installations pour reduire la pollution et ce faisant d eliminer le besoin de se procurer des permis d emission de pollution sur le marche le decision est traitee comme une option reelle ou le prix des permis resulte d un processus stochastique connu le modele est formule sous forme d un ensemble d equations differentielles partielles a une dimension a des points discontinus dans le temps le proprietaire de l entreprise prend des decisions optimales de mise a niveau des installations y compris la possibilite de les fermer temporairement le modele est utilise pour analyser une decision d installer un epurateur suite a la mise en place de la loi americaine de 1990 clean air act

pollution markets with imperfectly observed emissions i study the advantages of pollution permit markets over uniform emission or technology standards when the regulator has incomplete information on firms emissions and costs of production and abatement e g air pollution in large cities because the regulator observes only each firm s abatement technology but neither its emissions nor its output there are cases in which standards can lead to lower emissions and hence welfare dominate permits if permits are optimally combined with standards in many cases this hybrid policy converges to the permits alone policy but almost never to the standards alone policy

attitudes toward risk and compliance in emission permit markets we investigate the effects of uncertainty and concomitant risk aversion as they impact the incentive structure and subsequent operation of an emissions permit market modeled after the u s s02 market our theoretical results suggest that uncertainty dulls incentives to achieve cost savings through permit trading and inhibits efficient allocation of abatement efforts by firms we test hypotheses in an experimental laboratory setting and find that the irreversibility of investment in abatement technology may present countervailing incentives for potential sellers of permits resulting in a wait and see attitude toward adoption of efficient levels of abatement technology

the institutional causes of china s great famine 1959 1961 this paper studies the causes of china s great famine during which 16 5 to 45 million individuals perished in rural areas we document that average rural food retention during the famine was too high to generate a severe famine without rural inequality in food availability that there was significant variance in famine mortality rates across rural regions and that rural mortality rates were positively correlated with per capita food production a surprising pattern that is unique to the famine years we provide evidence that an inflexible and progressive government procurement policy where procurement could not adjust to contemporaneous production and larger shares of expected production were procured from more productive regions was necessary for generating this pattern and that this policy was a quantitatively important contributor to overall famine mortality

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

international emissions trading under the kyoto protocol credit trading abstract the kyoto protocol allows emissions trading between countries the protocol does however not specify how such trade is to take place so far two options have been discussed in the literature government trading and permit trading this paper discusses a third option credit trading credit trading is based on abatement projects but differs from joint implementation in that it does not require direct foreign investment furthermore credit trading can be implemented both domestically and internationally the main advantages of credit trading are that it excludes trading in hot air while it still makes trade between private entities possible however the environmental effectiveness is doubtful especially when it is based on relative targets the paper shows that several interest groups prefer credit trading based on relative targets to permit trading also governments may have reasons to prefer credit trading to permit trading hence the political acceptability of credit trading is larger than that of permit trading making it more likely that credit trading will be allowed than permit trading

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

funding microfinance under asymmetric information abstract we consider a model where poverty minimizing donors fund microfinance lenders that are heterogeneous in cost under asymmetric information the donors face a choice whether to issue grants or to charge the lenders for funds while charging for funds leads to higher interest rates a higher rate can induce separation by squeezing the higher cost lenders whether separation is good for aggregate poverty reduction or not depends on the quantity of supply of funds when the supply is small grants are best but when the supply is large enough it is better that lenders pay for external funding

microfinance and competition for external funding abstract in this paper we examine a one period model in which poverty minimizing microfinance lenders must raise external funding from a profit maximizing investor assuming that the lenders vary in their operating costs we find that competition between lenders for external funds can lead to higher aggregate poverty reduction

equilibrium price dynamics of emission permits this article presents a stochastic equilibrium model for environmental markets that allows us to study the characteristic properties of emission permit prices induced by the design of today s cap and trade systems we characterize emission permits as highly nonlinear contingent claims on economy wide emissions and reveal their hybrid nature between investment and consumption assets our model makes predictions about the dynamics and volatility structure of emission permit prices the forward price curve and the implications for option pricing in this market empirical evidence from existing emissions markets shows that the model explains the stylized facts of emission permit prices and related derivatives

emissions trading with profit neutral permit allocations this paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme ets on equilibrium emissions output price market concentration and profits in a generalized cournot model we develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ets we show that its profit impact is usually limited in a cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs total industry profits are preserved so long as freely allocated permits cover a fraction of initial emissions that does not exceed the industry s herfindahl index

cap and trade policy challenges a tale of three markets cap and trade policy instruments have been applied to a number of environmental problems with varying success this article examines cap and trade programs for so2 allowances fishery quotas and water rights design and implementation of cap and trade mechanisms involves challenging policy tradeoffs accommodating equity concerns balancing use levels with resource conditions facilitating transactions accounting for externalities assuring adequate monitoring and documenting welfare gains efficient trading mechanisms are more readily implemented when there is a strong political or legal mandate to cap resource use and trades are perceived as a means to ease adjustment to use limits

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

sellers hedging incentives at epa s emission trading auction cason 1993 argued thattheauction theepaused in order to start the market for sulfur allowances is not efficient the set up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance in this paper we show that the sellers incentives are even more perverse than cason suggested in particular we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid it is not possible to derive the nash equilibrium for this set up if such an equilibrium exists sellers either set only a positive ask price or an ask price equal to zero and a positive bid as well

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

the optimal initial allocation of pollution permits a relative performance approach the initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes we generalize the analysis of bohringer and lange 2005 eur econ rev 49 8 2041 2055 to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter firm relative performance comparisons including grandfathering and auctions as well as novel mechanisms we show that using firms historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting while using firms historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms instead it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions we then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism

dea and sfa research on the efficiency of microfinance institutions a meta analysis microfinance has played a key role in the fight against exclusion and the promotion of entrepreneurship in developing countries an important question today is how to increase the reach and profitability of microfinance in a context where subsidies are withdrawing to promote the viability and sustainability of microfinance institutions mfis efficiency analysis has found favor in this context and has attracted growing interest among professionals partners and researchers abundant empirical work has been conducted over the last ten years on this subject in very different contexts and with different methodologies the purpose of this article is to provide a meta regression analysis on parametric and nonparametric estimations of mean technical efficiency mte in microfinance using a data set of 262 observations from 38 studies the results show that in the microfinance industry mte scores have increased over time however with an mte rate of approximately 61 1 there is room for improving efficiency mfis use more resources than necessary for the results achieved in terms of outreach and revenue generated our results show heterogeneity of mte according to the methodological approach of the studies studies with a larger number of variables inputs and outputs produced higher mte scores than did those with a smaller number of variables studies using the variable returns to scale assumption resulted in higher mte scores than those using constant returns to scale in addition those with a production approach had higher mtes than did those using the intermediation approach while studies of a large number of mfis had lower scores than did those involving a small sample size moreover research estimating social efficiency generated lower mtes compared to those estimating financial efficiency studies using data from african mfis obtained lower mtes than did those on mfis in latin america and mena which confirms the poor performance of african microfinance

optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information abstract a market model of environmental regulation with interdependent production and pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous firms is developed firms have private information about costs which have a quadratic form firms pursue bayes nash strategies in communication with the regulator the full information optimum cannot be attained unless gains from trade in the product market net of external damages exceed the information rents earned by firms aggregate output and externality levels are lower at the regulated equilibrium than at the full information social optimum

multiple pollutants co benefits and suboptimal environmental policies abstract in our analytical general equilibrium model polluting inputs can be substitutes or complements we study a tax increase on one pollutant where the other faces a tax or permit policy our solutions highlight key parameters and welfare effects with gains from abatement plus positive or negative co benefits from other pollutants in the covered and uncovered sectors we demonstrate several ways taxes and permits differ first the change in taxed pollutant depends on whether the other pollutant faces a tax or permit policy also only with a tax on the other pollutant can a co benefit arise the sign of co benefits depends on the sign of cross price elasticities and on whether the other pollutant s price is above or below marginal damages finally the other pollutant s tax or permit policy also affects emissions in the uncovered sector leakage in a numerical illustration of carbon tax in u s electricity we calculate emissions of co2 and so2 in both sectors for plausible parameters co benefits are larger than direct

a simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators e g cost of pollution abatement this paper proposes a simple mechanism that implements the first best for any number of firms a uniform price sealed bid auction of an endogenous number of transferable licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms paybacks which rapidly decrease with the number of firms are such that truth telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non cooperatively or collusively the mechanism also provides firms with incentives to invest in socially optimal r d jel d44 d62 d82 q28 regulatory authorities generally find that part of the information they need for implementing an efficient regulation is in the hands of those who are to be regulated regulating externalities such as access to common resources e g clean air water streams fisheries etc is a good example environmental regulators for example know little about firms pollution abatement costs so without communicating with firms they would be unable to establish the efficient level of pollution a number of mechanisms have been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private information but for different reasons

new directions in emissions trading the potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract once an arcane topic even among environmental economists emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the usa moreover the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics this paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems focusing on credit market development participation and results including transaction costs five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered as well as the possibility of inter pollutant trading while inter pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons cfcs the applicability of this experience is probably very limited additionally it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems some of which have yet to be even partially implemented in order to improve these latter and future programs the paper considers the potential contribution of the new institutional economics nie to emissions trading the nie is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems

efficient pollution regulation getting the prices right this paper argues for efficient environmental regulations that equate the mar ginal damage of pollution to marginal abatement costs across space the paper estimates the source specific marginal damages of air pollution and calculates the welfare gain from making the current sulfur dioxide allowance trading pro gram for power plants more efficient the savings from using trading ratios based on marginal damages are between 310 and 940 million per year the potential savings from setting aggregate emissions efficiently and from includ ing more sources of air pollution are many times higher jel h23 q53 q58

competition between microfinance ngos evidence from kiva summary this paper investigates empirically the effect of competition between microfinance ngos seeking subsidized capital from individual social investors although ngo behavior in competitive environments is often subject to controversy there is little formal empirical evidence to illustrate theoretical findings and inform policy using data from kiva an online peer to peer p2p microfinance platform we find that competition has a sizable negative impact on projects funding speed and that the effect is stronger between close substitutes this is important because competition for subsidized capital implies organizational pressures similar to those faced when ngos compete for donations

strategic state level environmental policy with asymmetric pollution spillovers this paper examines the strategic behavior of state level utility regulators in the context of the federal tradable emissions permits market when state to state pollution spillovers are asymmetric strategic behavior is possible because a state s environmental policy indirectly affects the price of permits and therefore abatement in other states we show that the optimal pollution penalty is comprised of two parts i a pigouvian tax adjusted for state to state spillovers and ii an optimal tariff designed to improve the terms of trade in permits generally abatement costs are not minimized and the outcome is pareto inefficient regardless of the size of the market 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

permit trading and credit trading a comparison of cap based and rate based emissions trading under perfect and imperfect competition this paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions permit trading and on relative standards per unit of output credit trading two types of market structure are considered perfect competition and cournot oligopoly we find that output abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading allowing trade between permit trading and credit trading sectors may increase welfare with perfect competition permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading with imperfect competition credit trading may outperform permit trading environmental policy can lead to exit but also to entry of firms entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes especially under imperfect competition we find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions

sulfur allowance trading and the regional clean air incentives market a comparative design analysis of two major cap and trade permit programs this paper investigates in detail the design parameters of the two mostprominent us cap and trade permit program the us epa sulfur allowancetrading program and the south californian regional clean air incentivesmarket reclaim in contrast to expectations the two programs turn out to be rather different in several important design parameter choices common elements emerge primarily in the existence of an ambitious quantifiedenvironmental target mandatory use of stringent emission monitoring methodsand stiff penalties for non compliance coexisting command and controlregulations the creation of a competitive permit market structure andsome distributional concessions in the initial permit allocation generalizing from these common features we find that provisions to assurepolitical acceptance functional interdependencies and overlapping regulation are the most important influences on the design of applied cap and trade permit programs

international corporate taxation and u s multinationals behaviour an integrated approach this paper explores the effects of corporate taxation on u s capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices the econometric analysis first indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates with a magnified impact particularly for low tax rates implying that the attractiveness of low tax countries is not weakened by anti deferral rules and cross crediting limitations further explorations suggest that firms report higher profit higher subpart f income and are less likely to repatriate dividends when they are located in low tax jurisdictions finally when the role of effective transfer pricing regulations is estimated it appears that low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income shifting ce memoire s interesse aux effets des impots sur le revenu des societes sur l investissement et les pratiques de planifications fiscales des firmes multinationales americaines l analyse econometrique indique que l investissement americain est fortement influence par le taux d imposition moyen et que cet impact est sensiblement plus important pour de faibles taux d imposition ceci suggere que l attractivite des pays a faible imposition n est pas affaiblie par les limites imposees par le systeme fiscal americain sur la possibilite de differer l impot et sur les moyennes de credit des tests additionnels montrent que les firmes reportent un profit ainsi qu un revenu subpart f plus important et rapatrient moins leurs dividendes lorsqu elles sont localisees dans des pays a faible imposition finalement en estimant le role joue par l efficacite des reglementations en termes de prix de transferts il apparait qu un faible etat de droit est associea de plus fortes manipulations fiscales

the choice between emission taxes and output taxes under imperfect monitoring we consider a regulator s choice between environmentally motivated emissions taxes and output taxes we investigate how the optimal instrument depends on the monitoring cost function the firm s technology and on social preferences regarding output and environmental quality pure emissions taxes are usually not optimal with monitoring costs pure output taxes are optimal under sufficiently high monitoring costs sufficiently limited options for emission reduction by means other than output reduction and sufficiently high substitutability of the output finally conditions for the optimality of mixed taxes are given

seller incentive properties of epa s emission trading auction abstract the new clean air act amendments instruct the environmental protection agency epa to conduct annual sealed bid offer auctions of emission allowances the auction pricing rules are discriminative and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper assesses the seller incentives of this auction and demonstrates that the auction rules cause sellers to choose asking prices that under reveal their cost of emission control furthermore increasing the number of sellers intensifies this misrepresentation if the number of buyers remains fixed the epa s rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market

the political economy of market based environmental policy the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program enacted in 1990 gave valuable tradable sulfur dioxide emissions permits called allowances to electric utilities we examine the political economy of this allocation though no senate or house votes were ever taken hypothetical votes suggest that the actual allocation would have beaten plausible alternatives while rent seeking behavior is apparent statistical analysis of differences between actual and benchmark allocations indicates that the legislative process was more complex than simple models suggest the coalition of states that produced and burned high sulfur coal both failed to block acid rain legislation in 1990 and received fewer allowances than in plausible benchmark allocations some of these states may have received additional allowances to cover 1995 99 emissions by giving up allowances in later years and some major coal producing states seem to have focused on benefits for miners and on sustaining demand for high sulfur coal

externalities and optimal taxation this paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem income and commodities in the presence of externalities the nature of the second best and the choice of the tax instruments are motivated by the informational structure in the economy the main results are i environmental levies linear or nonlinear differ in formula from pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods ii externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas linear and nonlinear for private goods iii externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear and iv a general income tax plus strictly pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution at any given consumption bundle

the net benefits of incentive based regulation a case study of environmental standard setting economists interested in environmental safety and health regulation have long argued that decentralized incentive based or ib policies are more efficient than centralized command and control or cac approaches see charles schultze 1977 for instance these arguments generally have been based on the assumption that ib policies will accomplish the same goals as their cac counterparts but at less cost to society however some of those touting ib policies have overlooked an important point environmental workplace or even productsafety standards typically take the form of maximum permissible concentrations of harmful substances so that compliance only requires that all monitoring points or samples register readings below these critical levels for this reason ib policies typically assign a shadow price of zero to improvements that exceed the standard s while more crude cac policies generally result in overcontrol beyond the standards if there is no value to this overcontrol cac policies will not improve at all on ib approaches and will indeed be more expensive if however reduced concentrations below the level of the standards bring with them further improvements in health or the environment cac approaches will produce greater benefits than ib approaches thus a fair comparison between the two necessitates that any additional benefits associated with cac policies be offset against the cost advantages enjoyed by their ib counterparts although this possibility has been recognized by others scott atkinson and t h tietenberg 1982 for instance it is little appreciated and its empirical significance has never been ascertained that is our purpose here we do so by developing data on the costs and benefits of controlling a common air pollutant total suspended particulates or tsp in baltimore by comparing the tsp levels likely under both ib and cac approaches we are able to estimate the marginal costs and benefits associated with a variety of alternative air quality standards which take the form of maximum permissible concentrations this in turn allows us to determine the net benefits arising from the two kinds of regimes in the next section we present a simple conceptual framework for our analysis section ii describes the estimation of the costs and benefits of our hypothesized air pollution controls in baltimore section iii presents our somewhat surprising findings and section iv discusses those findings and their potential significance for regulation in the real world

financial performance and outreach a global analysis of leading microbanks microfinance contracts have proven able to secure high rates of loan repayment in the face of limited liability and information asymmetries but high repayment rates have not translated easily into profits for most microbanks profitability though is at the heart of the promise that microfinance can deliver poverty reduction while not relying on ongoing subsidy the authors examine why this promise remains unmet for most institutions using a data set with unusually high quality financial information on 124 institutions in 49 countries they explore the patterns of profitability loan repayment and cost reduction the authors find that institutional design and orientation matter substantially lenders that do not use group based methods to overcome incentive problems experience weaker portfolio quality and lower profit rates when interest rates are raised substantially for these individual based lenders one key to achieving profitability is investing more heavily in staff costs a finding consistent with the economics of information but contrary to the conventional wisdom that profitability is largely a function of minimizing cost

an international policy architecture for the post kyoto era in february 2005 the kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change came into force but without participation by the united states its impacts on emissions of greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide co2 the primary anthropogenic driver of climate change will be trivial but scientific robert t watson 2001 and economic charles d kolstad and michael a toman 2001 analyses point to the need for a credible international approach because the kyoto protocol s ambitious targets apply only to the short term 2008 2012 and only to industrialized nations the agreement will impose relatively high costs and generate only modest short term benefits while failing to provide a real solution joseph e aldy et al 2003 for these reasons most economists see the agreement as deeply flawed richard n cooper 1998 david g victor 2001 warwick j mckibbin and peter j wilcoxen 2002 although some see it as an acceptable first step axel michaelowa 2003 virtually all agree however that the protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge we describe the basic features of a postkyoto international global climate agreement which addresses three crucial questions who when and how the respective elements are first a means to ensure that key nations industrialized and developing are involved second an emphasis on an extended time path of action employing a cost effective pattern over time and third inclusion of market based policy instruments i who expand participation to include all key countries

foreign direct investment co2 emissions nexus in middle east and north african countries importance of biomass energy consumption abstract this study examines the association between foreign direct investment fdi and carbon emissions for the middle east and north african mena region in 1990 2015 including biomass energy consumption as an additional determinant of carbon emissions we apply the generalized method of moments gmm to validate the existence of the pollution haven hypothesis phh the n shaped association is also validated between fdi and carbon emissions the link between economic growth and carbon emissions is inverted u and n shaped that is it satisfies the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypotheses biomass energy use lowers carbon emissions and the causality analysis reveals that fdi causes co2 emissions clearly the results confirm the existence of a feedback effect between economic growth and carbon emissions the connection between biomass energy use and co2 emissions is also bidirectional the empirical findings suggest policy makers to design comprehensive trade and energy policies by targeting the cleaner production practices for not only to ensure environmental sustainability but also to fulfil the objectives of sustainable development goals

allowance price drivers in the first phase of the eu ets abstract in the first phase of the eu emissions trading scheme eu ets the price per ton of co 2 initially rose to over 30 the price then collapsed to essentially zero by mid 2007 by deriving a structural model of the allowance price under the assumption of efficient markets i examine the extent to which this variation in price can be explained by marginal abatement costs i then gradually relax the model by allowing for delayed adjustment of price to fundamentals as well as by introducing lagged lhs variables the pattern of results suggests that while prices were not initially driven by marginal abatement costs this inefficiency was largely corrected after the accounting of 2005 emissions in april 2006

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

voluntary compliance with market based environmental policy evidence from the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities sulfur dioxide so2 emissions and included voluntary compliance possibilities for nonaffected sources i observe significant voluntary participation albeit with small impact on the so2 market mostly from sources with counterfactual emissions below their allowance allocations an ex post analysis suggests that costs from the resulting higher emissions outweigh savings from shifts in emissions reductions from high cost affected sources to low cost nonaffected sources further utilities voluntary participation is well explained by economic variables which provides new evidence of cost effective compliance strategies and low transaction costs

pricing monitoring uncertainty in climate policy this article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy namely prescribing uncertainty setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount our model of the behavior of profit maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty however in the presence of information asymmetry monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection in a mandatory policy prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level for voluntary mechanisms such as carbon offsets allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry these conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action other than carbon our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry which results in heterogeneity in the agents benefits from abatement generalizes the classical trade off between production efficiency and information rents

abatement and permits when pollution is uncertain and violations are fined this paper considers a firm s choice of abatement and of the number of permits if actual pollution is stochastic such that full compliance cannot be ensured this straightforward extension induces non trivial and unexpected comparative static properties such as permits and abatement can be either substitutes or complements higher fines can lower the number of acquired permits or abatement and higher permit prices can reduce abatement yet integrating these reactions into a competitive permit market eliminates puzzling features this is an additional justification of tradable permits over standards where regulators must cope with potentially counterproductive firm reactions

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

bringing biophysical models into the economic laboratory an experimental analysis of sediment trading in australia abstract experimental economics has emerged and matured as a formal method for questioning and testing economic theory and assumptions concerning individual behavior more recently experimental methods have been used successfully in an economic laboratory to test alternative environmental policy options the data underpinning these experiments is often stylized or hypothetical in nature ecologists and experimental economists have much to gain by exploring ways to underpin economic experiments with data generated from biophysical models the study makes a contribution by demonstrating how underpinning experiments with regionally modeled biophysical data may give insights which would not necessarily arise from stylized data in this study sediment data generated from an environmental management support system emss a software model of sediment runoff in catchments was used to populate the players decision space the study investigated the relative performance of four different instruments closed first and second price call tenders cap and trade and command and control regulation these market instruments will be compared with the aim of promoting riparian management and reducing total suspended solids exiting a catchment the study finds that the cost of meeting regulatory requirement of sediment reduction through command and control is less than either first or second price auction however cap and trade produced high levels of convergence and production which moved towards minimizing the cost of achieving the cap reduction level

environmental regulation a value theoretic and class based analysis following a value theoretic and class based approach it is argued in this paper that ecological problems are inseparably linked to the process of extracting surplus value in capitalism and owing to their adverse impacts instigate struggles over the appropriation of nature these struggles fought within and outside the state by competing agents shape environmental regulation in particular taxes permits command and control measures and subsidies affect prices profits and rents and have class and other social implications evidence of current environmental regulation shows that it takes places under the great influence of capitalist concerns

fishing quota markets abstract in 1986 new zealand responded to the open access problem by establishing the world s largest individual transferable quota itq system using a 15 year panel dataset from new zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas we assess trends in market activity price dispersion and the fundamentals determining quota prices we find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices ecological variability and market interest rates controlling for these factors our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization overall this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well implying that itqs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management

regulation and contract design the impact of relationship specific investment a primary explanation for variation in contract structure is the extent to which contracting parties make investments specific to their transaction investment decisions are typically endogenous in contract choice however frustrating attempts at causal verification i analyze the impact of a major environmental regulation the clean air act amendment of 1990 on coal procurement strategies of u s utilities i exploit a key feature of the amendment s design to define a difference in difference model that is arguably less susceptible to endogeneity concerns i find wide support for the theoretical prediction reduced specificity leads to shorter length fixed price contracts

multiple pollutants uncovered sectors and suboptimal environmental policies in our analytical general equilibrium model where two polluting inputs can be substitutes or complements in production we study the effects of a tax on one pollutant in two cases one where both pollutants face taxes and the second where the other pollutant is subject to a permit policy in each case we solve for closed form solutions that highlight important parameters we demonstrate two important ways that environmental taxes and permits are not equivalent first the change in the pollutant facing a tax increase depends on whether the other pollutant is subject to a tax or permit policy second if that other pollutant is subject to a tax then general equilibrium effects can increase or decrease its quantity affecting overall welfare however when the second pollutant is subject to a permit policy that binds then welfare is not affected by this spillover effect finally a numerical exercise helps demonstrate these two ways that taxes and permits differ using the example of coal fired power plants our numerical exercise examines the impacts of increasing a hypothetical carbon tax on the quantity of sulfur dioxide emissions don fullerton department of finance university of illinois bif box 30 mc520 515 east gregory drive champaign il 61820 and nber dfullert illinois edu daniel h karney department of economics university of illinois david kinley hall champaign il 61820 dkarney2 illinois edu in a simple model with multiple pollutants the first best can be achieved either by a tax on each pollutant or equivalent permit price that reflects each marginal environmental damage that is the first best requires each pollutant to be optimally regulated not all pollutants are regulated however and even regulated ones likely face suboptimal policy the multiple pollutant setting creates complications for regulators tightening rules on one pollutant changes how firms value other pollutants thus a regulator concerned with social welfare who can change only one policy needs to account for changes across multiple pollutants for example policymakers who adopt a new carbon policy may not be able to adjust each regulation on other types of pollution especially where different laws and jurisdictions govern the different pollutants our model is general enough to represent any industry with multiple pollutants that are substitutes or complements so a price increase on one can induce firms to increase or decrease other pollutants for example sigman 1996 studies chlorinated solvents used for metal cleaning and degreasing and she finds that raised disposal costs for liquid chemical wastes may lead to more air emissions i e substitutes ren et al 2011 find that reducing co2 by use of biofuel can increase nitrogen runoff from farms our numerical example below involves coal fired electric power plants that emit both carbon dioxide co2 and sulfur dioxide so2 agee et al 2014 describe four ways these two pollutants could be substitutes or complements they find that reducing nox has substantially reduced so2 and co2 while reducing so2 has substantially increased co2 p 66 our illustration uses the u s epa assumption that a carbon tax reduces use of coal and therefore both pollutants i e complements a permit policy limits so2 from power plants under the u s acid rain program arp which has received much academic attention if co2 were to be regulated by a 1 in fact studies of a particular environmental regulation often include ancillary benefits from the reduction of other pollutants see burtraw et al 2003 groosman et al 2011 and kolstad et al 2014 2 yet greenstone 2003 finds little evidence that the clean air act increased water or ground pollution gamper rabindran 2006 finds that off site recycling is a substitute for chemical waste disposal while fare et al 2012 find that nox and so2 are substitutes in production at power plants 3 in response to so2 controls the switch to low sulfur coal with lower heat rate could increase co2 per kilowatt hour also desulfurization equipment uses electric power that requires burning more coal and may generate added co2 emissions from the chemical reactions that capture so2 if the response is to shut down dirty plants then effects on co2 depend on whether new plants use coal or natural gas 4 see schmalensee et al 1998 burtraw et al 1998 and carlson et al 2000 the arp s cap on so2 is not currently binding so the permit price is zero starting in 2011 to explore the general problem of interactions between pollution policies our numerical exercises use positive so2 prices from 2007 data

aggressive tax avoidance a conundrum for stakeholders governments and morality this is the conundrum that gives rise to the issue of tax avoidance although governments always seem to lack sufficient funds to support the needs of society tax codes are often written that offer a way out of paying taxes for some but not all constituents the ways out are referred to as loopholes that allow taxpayers to avoid taxes this paper first defines the basic terms of tax avoidance and tax evasion and then offers an ethical review of the morality of aggressive tax avoidance aggressive tax avoidance is then addressed in relationship a corporate entity s tone at the top the conclusion is drawn that use of the letter of the law to avoid payment of taxes sorely needed by governments for the good faith provision of public goods and services is ethically unacceptable several suggestions for change are provided including a new financial statement disclosure and the possibility of a published corporate ethics report

market power in tradable emission markets a laboratory testbed for emission trading in port phillip bay victoria abstract in theory competitive emission permit markets minimize total abatement costs permit markets are often imperfectly competitive however and may be thin and dominated by large firms the dominant firm s could exercise market power and increase other firms costs of pollution control while reducing their own emission control costs this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organized using the double auction trading institution our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the port phillip watershed in victoria australia we vary across treatments the initial allocation of permits to sources so that in one treatment the seller of permits is a monopolist and in another treatment the market is duopolistic we also vary the information that subjects have about the number and abatement costs of their competitors we find that prices and seller profits are higher and efficiency is lower on average in the monopoly sessions compared with the duopoly sessions but the differences are not substantial and are not statistically significant due to pronounced variation across sessions moreover prices profits and transaction volumes are usually much closer to the competitive equilibrium ce than the monopoly equilibrium

an experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the epas emission trading auction the clean air act requires the epa to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances under the discriminative auction rules sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the epa auction consistent with theoretical predictions buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient and increasing the number of buyers increases bids buyers facing human opponents compete more aggressively than the risk neutral prediction but bids do not differ systematically from this prediction when buyers face computerized nash robots copyright 1995 by american economic association

optimal design of a phase in emissions trading program abstract this paper studies a phase in emissions trading program with voluntary opt in possibilities for non affected firms and derives optimal permits allocations to affected and opt in firms when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs the regulator faces a trade off between production efficiency minimization of control costs and information rent extraction reduction of excess permits allocated to opt in firms the first best equilibrium can be attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt in firms otherwise a second best equilibrium is implemented the latter is sensitive to uncertainty in control costs and benefits

imperfect observability of emissions and second best emission and output taxes abstract this paper studies the second best tax design problem when emissions are publicly unobservable but can be discovered through costly monitoring a representative firm in industry chooses its emissions and declarations to maximize its expected profits the paper shows the pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions is modified to take account of the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement emissions from different sectors must be taxed at different rates every polluting good must face an effective emission tax that is less than the full marginal social damage of emissions emission taxes do not reflect standard optimal tax objectives output taxes have a pigouvian role so that the targeting principle fails

market power in laboratory emission permit markets many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive when markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics however shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches this paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy indicating that policy makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances

heterogeneity irreversible production choices and efficiency in emission permit markets abstract this paper investigates a class of market mechanisms for environmental regulation based on the clean air act tradable discharge permit program laboratory market experiments capture some of the more salient institutional features and focus on issues of firm technological heterogeneity and irreversible investment regarding the operation of the permit market experimental results suggest that higher degrees of abatement cost heterogeneity may lead to reduced trade volume while the implications of increased cost heterogeneity regarding price volatility are mixed finally increased cost heterogeneity appears to result in decreased laboratory efficiency

the potential for cost savings in the sulfur dioxide allowance market empirical evidence from florida since the passage of the 1990 clean air act amendments researchers have hastened to appraise the new market for sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances as the epa s program moves into its second phase some analysts question whether large enough savings are available to induce widespread market participation this study calculates the shadow prices of emission reductions for power plants that serve florida and compares the actions of utility owners to the actions predicted by the shadow prices the evidence suggests that plant owners have not taken full advantage of the opportunities the allowance market has provided to date

tell the truth or not the montero mechanism for emissions control at work abstract we experimentally test the truth telling mechanism proposed by montero 2008 for eliciting firms abatement costs we compare this mechanism with two well known alternative allocation mechanisms free and costly allocation of permits at the pigouvian price controlling for the number of firms and the firms maximal emissions we find that in line with the theoretical predictions firms over report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under report these under costly allocation of permits under montero s mechanism by contrast firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully however in terms of efficiency the difference between montero s mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm

using output based allocations to manage volatility and leakage in pollution markets abstract output based allocations obas are typically used in emission trading systems ets with a fixed cap to mitigate leakage in sectors at risk recent work has shown they may also be welfare enhancing in markets subject to supply and demand shocks by introducing some flexibility in the total cap resulting in a carbon price closer to marginal damage we extend previous work to simultaneously include both leakage and volatility we study how oba permits can be implemented under an overall cap that may change with the level of production in contrast with a design that deducts oba permits from the overall permit allocation as is the current practice in the eu ets and california we show that introducing oba permits while keeping the overall cap fixed would only increase price fluctuations and induce severe welfare losses to non oba sectors

the impact of economics on environmental policy abstract environmental economists have seen their ideas translated into the rough and tumble policy world for over two decades they have witnessed the application of economic instruments to several environmental issues including preserving wetlands lowering lead levels and curbing acid rain this essay examines the impact of the rise of economics in the policy world on the making of environmental policy i focus on two related but distinct phenomena the increasing interest in the use of incentive based mechanisms such as tradable permits to achieve environmental goals and the increasing interest in the use of analytical tools such as benefit cost analysis in regulatory decision making i argue that economists and economic instruments have had a modest impact on shaping environmental health and safety regulation but that economists will play an increasingly important role in the future although the role of economics is becoming more prominent it does not follow that environmental policy will become more efficient this apparent inconsistency can be explained by the political economy of environmental policy

moral ethics v tax ethics the case of transfer pricing among multinational corporations in recent years there has been an increased awareness with regards to ethics in business more specifically the abundance of well publicized examples of cheating greed and hypocrisy has created some alarm about the general state of personal ethics josephson 1988 recent examples include the oliver north ivan boesky and jimmy swaggart cases the tax practitioner probably has little direct concern for matters of misconduct and ethical improprieties as mentioned above adherence to a code of conduct appears to circumvent the ethical conflict typically found in the business environment the tax practitioner s ultimate goal is tax minimization for clients this goal has the blessings of the courts and the writers of tax law

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

aggressive tax avoidance by managers of multinational companies as a violation of their moral duty to obey the law a kantian rationale managers of multinational companies often favour an aggressive tax avoidance strategy that pushes the legal limits onto the advantage of shareholders and the disadvantage of the spirit of democratically legitimized tax laws the public and media debate whether such aggressive behaviour is immoral aggressive tax avoidance is a subset of the aggressive legal interpretations potentially observable in all fields which places little weight on the will of a democratically legitimized legislation a thorough ethical analysis based on the deontological approach of kant demonstrates that aggressive tax avoidance as a special case of operating on the edge of legal boundaries is potentially immoral applying the kantian contradiction of conception or will test shows that this maxim might not be conceived or willed as a general law of nature if all natural or legal persons aggressively interpret laws on all subjects and in every imaginable situation then central principles of the system of law we all rely upon would be severely compromised therefore aggressive tax avoidance by managers of multinational companies may violate the managers moral duty to obey not only the letter but also the intention or spirit of the law the validity of the argumentation depends critically on the formulation and interpretation of the respective maxims and on assumptions about the legal system preserving central elements of kantian philosophy the article demonstrates the complexity of a philosophical argumentation which tries to justify the moral intuitions that underpin the common negative evaluation of aggressive legal strategies in business

goodwill bazaar ngo competition and giving to development this paper builds a model of competition through fundraising between horizontally differentiated ngos ngos allocate their time resource between working on the project and fundraising which attracts private donations if the market size is fixed the fundraising levels increase with the number of ngos and the free entry equilibrium number of ngos can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal number depending on the efficiency of the fundraising technology if the market size is endogenous and ngos cooperate in attracting new donors fundraising levels decrease with the number of ngos and the free entry equilibrium number of ngos is smaller than the one that maximizes the welfare of donors and beneficiaries if ngos can divert funds for private use multiple equilibria with high diversion and no diversion of funds appear

ethics in tax practice a study of the effect of practitioner firm size while much of the empirical accounting literature suggests that if differences do exist big four employees are more ethical than non big four employees this trend has not been evident in the recent media coverage of big four tax practitioners acting for multinationals accused of aggressive tax avoidance behaviour however there has been little exploration in the literature to date specifically of the relationship between firm size and ethics in tax practice we aim here to address this gap initially exploring tax practitioners perceptions of the impact of firm size on ethics in tax practice using interview data in order to identify the salient issues involved we then proceed to assess quantitatively whether employer firm size has an impact on the ethical reasoning of tax practitioners using a tax context specific adaptation of a well known and validated psychometric instrument the defining issues test

tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact in the european monetary union tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact borrowing from the experience of environmental markets this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the european monetary union having chosen an aggregate target for the union and an initial distribution of permits emu countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation the scheme exploits countries incentives to minimize their costs is transparent and flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of europe wide recessions in addition it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to gdp ratios finally the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance lending credibility to the stability pact s goal of a balanced budget in the medium run alessandra casella

tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation abstract this paper incorporates tax evasion into ramsey s optimal taxation problem it provides i a precise and intuitive characterization of the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities and ii a modified version of the ramsey equation it also proves that in the presence of tax evasion a the well known requirement of proportional reduction in compensated demands b the traditional result on the optimality of uniform taxation when income is exogenous and c the equivalence of wage and uniform commodity taxes are no longer valid

revenue raising vs other approaches to environmental protection the critical significance of pre existing tax distortions using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a tax interaction effect that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates this effect is partially offset by a revenue recycling effect grandfathered pollution quotas such as those used under the 1990 clean air act amendments to regulate electric utilities so2 emissions do not benefit from this offset preexisting taxes raise this regulation s cost by over 70 more than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue recycling effect

flexibility premium of emissions permits abstract investments in abatement technology are often characterised by irreversibility and significant implementation lags whereas emissions permits can be traded at any time as such abatement and emissions permit trading systems are hardly perfect substitutes we formally study the flexibility of emissions permits and propose a unified framework to rationalise the impact of both investment divestment lags and irreversibility in relation to the price of emissions permits using option pricing concepts we reformulate the technology adoption problem in terms of the technology s characteristics irreversibility and implementation lags and offer a conceptual quantification of the flexibility premium of emissions permits

trade policy with endogenous entry revisited abstract this paper revisits the effects of tariffs and quotas in a competitive setting where three results are thought to hold these are that quotas are equivalent to specific tariffs the form of tariffs specific or ad valorem does not matter and that the way in which a quota is allocated has no real effects as it only affects the allocation of rents not their size we show that all three of these results are false when entry exit is endogenous equivalence holds only if the initial level of entry is set at the long run level under the quota

absolute abundance and relative scarcity environmental policy with implementation lags we study the effectiveness of environmental policy in a model with nonrenewable resources and an unavoidable implementation lag we find that a time lag between the announcement and the implementation of an emissions quota induces an increase in emissions in the period between the policy s announcement and implementation since a binding constraint on emissions restricts energy use during the implementation phase more of the resources must be extracted outside of it we call this the abundance effect in the case of multiple resources that differ in their pollution intensity a second channel emerges since cleaner sources are relatively more valuable when the policy is implemented it is optimal to conserve them before the cap is enforced this ordering effect tends to induce a switch to dirtier resources before the policy is implemented compounding the increase in emissions via the abundance channel using the announcement lag in title iv of the 1990 caaa as a case study we are able to empirically show that the abundance effect and ordering effect are both statistically and economically significant we discuss a number of alternative policy options to deal with these undesirable side effects of policy announcements