reform of the coal sector in an open economy the case of china cheap abundant and easy to transport and store coal has been produced and consumed to meet people s energy needs the last decade s growth in global coal use has been driven mainly by developing economies like china whose phenomenal economic growth has been powered by coal fired electricity and promoted by the export of manufactured goods a recent reform focus in china s coal sector is on coal taxation the paper develops a game theoretic model tailored to the context of china where coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy it finds that the adoption of special coal taxes is optimal for social welfare under most circumstances but may induce coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour in the process of privatisation the paper also cautions about potential resistance to the reform from consumers coal firms and government officials

quality and competition between public and private firms abstract we study a multistage quality then price game between a public firm and a private firm the market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations the public firm aims to maximize social surplus whereas the private firm maximizes profit in the first stage both firms simultaneously choose qualities in the second stage both firms simultaneously choose prices consumers quality valuations are drawn from a general distribution each firm s unit production cost is an increasing and convex function of quality there are multiple equilibria in some the public firm chooses a low quality and the private firm chooses a high quality in others the opposite is true we characterize subgame perfect equilibria equilibrium qualities are often inefficient but under some conditions on consumer valuation distribution equilibrium qualities are first best various policy implications are drawn

mixed markets and crime abstract this paper specifies and solves a two stage game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control in the first stage of the model private targets and the government choose levels of policing in the second stage criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit the paper s key results are as follows first private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less protected targets suffer second an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing this is an instance of a political incentive externality where private policing affects the objective function of the government specifically it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good third the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing in effect private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening this in turn may lead to an increase in the severity of crime fourth the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient and in some situations mixing may reduce the utility of all targets

capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms abstract this paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms we show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package if instead profits can be fully taxed then source based investment taxes vanish if domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners then source based investment taxes can be used to shift income away from these to domestic citizens and they may even be used to finance lump sum transfers to domestic residents

r d subsidies spillovers and privatization in mixed markets we examine the use of subsidies to research and development rd however it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs we also find that privatization of the public firm reduces r d activity and welfare in the duopoly market this result stands even when optimal r d subsidies are provided

evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms abstract in this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities confronting remarks by milton friedman and gary becker we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non profit motives we find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit maximizing rivals one insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare but that the level of social concern should not be too high based on a strategy s profitability we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity here we observe that the consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm if the firms propensity to switch between a social or a profit maximizing strategy is sufficiently large steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur

political manipulation of a public firm s objective function abstract in the context of a government owned public firm that competes with a private firm this paper demonstrates how the government can maximize its true objective by assigning the public firm a different objective function interestingly this assigned objective function need bear no resemblance to the actual objective being sought enabling the government to disguise a politically unpopular agenda and or outside influence

price equilibrium and willingness to pay in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly in the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with uncovered market and zero costs we study the existence of a price equilibrium when a welfare maximizing public firm producing low quality goods competes against a profit maximizing private firm producing high quality goods we show that a price equilibrium exists if the quality spectrum is wide enough vis a vis a measure of the convexity of the distribution of the consumers willingness to pay and that such equilibrium is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened logconcavity of the income distribution is inconsistent with the existence of equilibrium

the impact of information and communication technology adoption on multinational firm boundary decisions this article evaluates the effect of adopting internet enabled information and communication technology ict adoption on the decision to reorganize production across national borders foreign boundary decision by multinational enterprises mnes using a transaction cost framework we argue that ict adoption influences foreign boundary decisions by lowering coordination costs both internally and externally for the firm we propose that the heterogeneity in the technology s characteristics namely complexity and the production processes degree of codifiability moderate this influence using a difference in differences methodology and exploiting the richness of confidential us census bureau microdata we find that overall ict adoption is positively associated with greater likelihood of in house production as measured by increases in intra firm trade shares furthermore we find that more complex forms of ict are associated with larger increases in intra firm trade shares finally our results indicate that mnes in industries in which production specifications are more easily codified in an electronic format are less likely to engage in intra firm relative to arm s length trade following ict adoption

mixed oligopoly with differentiated products abstract the paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly with horizontal product differentiation firms choose their location and price in a model a la hotelling with quadratic transport costs and the solution concept is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium this enables one to determine how the presence of one or several public firms competing with private ones affects social welfare and how the results depend on the total number of firms n and their relative positions it is shown that is only for n 2 or n 6 that a mixed oligopoly with one public firm is socially preferable to the private oligopoly

workers versus firms bargaining over a firm s value we introduce a distinction between a firm and its network of workers in a competitive world if networks are easily lured away the workers must receive the entire value of their contribution to the firm how then can service firms have equity value a model is analysed in which workers are paid less as a group than their value even in a competitive world the workers are assumed to have a nonwage benefit for working at the current firm this benefit is privately known these privately known benefits make it impossible for the workers to agree on a division of their value should they leave the existing firm for a new enterprise the result is that the workers may receive a total compensation that is less than their contribution to the firm

endogenous role in mixed markets a two production period model in this paper i investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly where private and state owned public firms compete by allowing two production periods i find that many equilibria exist including the cournot type equilibrium and one stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower however another stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist if small inventory costs are introduced the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower

management innovation in supply chain appreciating chandler in the twenty first century alfred chandler attributed the rise of the vertically integrated corporation in the twentieth century to improvements in transportation and communication in contrast many have argued that further advances in transportation and communication have made vertical integration obsolete in recent years replacing it with modularity outsourcing and networking this article unpacks this apparent puzzle by regarding technological improvements in transportation and communication as theoretically neutral with respect to the degree of vertical integration we argue that the key concepts and issues in supply chain management that chandler highlighted remain highly relevant today we integrate chandler s detailed historical perspective on the evolution of the visible hand of managerial governance with more recent theories from organization economics and from engineering yielding the following insights first aligning incentives of buyers and suppliers is important in achieving throughput and assured supply but asset ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for this second vertical integration and disintegration decisions affect the internal operation of the firm and its future path third firms need to design their value chains in such a way as to achieve coordination without information overload the article demonstrates the continuing power of these insights in three phases over the last century in the first phase with the rise of mass production chandler himself noted a subtle array of make and buy decisions in the second phase with the rise of lean production several varieties of non integration e g exit vs voice persisted because of the specific ways in which firms combined incentive alignment and information flow in the third new economy phase management of information and material flows through the supply chain remains an important source of competitive advantage in particular disintermediation as a form of vertical integration and successful outsourcing require investment in technical expertise over a wide range of technological fields and coordination of knowledge to manage suppliers see for example brusoni and prencipe 2001 brusoni 2003 clark and fujimoto 1991 by noting that neither externalization through outsourcing nor flattening of managerial hierarchy is the same as decentralization the article provides theoretical and empirical bases for the continuing importance of chandler s principles in managing supply chains

csr in an asymmetric duopoly with environmental externality we investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation a la ramsey and a negative environmental externality pollution in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility csr in its statute and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function if the market is sufficiently large the csr firm sells more accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit seeking rival

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

mixed duopoly location choice and shadow cost of public funds we examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly where a welfare maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit maximizing private firm we introduce shadow costs of public funding i e the excess burden of taxation the profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs we find that in a mixed duopoly the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare this result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly where the level of product differentiation is too high finally we show that when the shadow cost is high privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare

exchange rate pass through abstract the resilience of trade balances of the major industrialized economies to changes in their exchange rates has evoked interest in the exchange rate pass through relationship so far there has not been a comprehensive survey of this literature the paper aims to fill this gap in two ways first it pieces together the theoretical literature on exchange rate pass through second it provides a critical survey of the empirical literature on exchange rate pass through emphasis is placed on the data and methodology employed in previous work this is done in order to guide future work in this growing area of research

capacity investment timing by start ups and established firms in new markets we analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start ups entering new markets which have a high degree of demand uncertainty firms may invest in capacity early when uncertainty is high or late when uncertainty has been resolved possibly at different costs established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits whereas start ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival when a start up competes against an established firm we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time the start up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity whereas the established firm follows by contrast when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game both firms invest late we conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start ups this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures abstract in this paper we consider a model of mixed oligopoly with conjectural variations equilibrium cve the agents conjectures concern the price variations depending upon their production output s increase or decrease we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium called an exterior equilibrium for any set of feasible conjectures to introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures referred to as influence coefficients and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium understood as a cve with consistent conjectures to prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non differentiable demand functions we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function s derivative with respect to the market price

policy objectives and performance in a mixed market with bargaining abstract we analyse a mixed duopoly in which wages and salaries are determined by nash bargaining and where the public firm s unit costs depend on its objectives because of constant returns to scale welfare maximisation without restriction would eliminate or significantly weaken the private firm therefore we focus on constrained welfare maximisation in which case unit costs are normally higher in the public firm on the other hand the private firm may even earn more than in a monopoly if the public firm maximises profits or if the constraint offers too much protection

privatization and foreign competition abstract this paper determines the equilibrium market structure in an international oligopoly where a state enterprise is sold at an auction the paper suggests that high greenfield costs and high trade costs do not necessarily induce foreign acquisitions in privatizations despite the fact that foreign firms would gain considerably from acquiring in such situations the reason is that domestic firms can then prevent foreign firms from becoming strong local competitors and thus their willingness to pay for the state assets is high

a public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination we visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded we demonstrate that the nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal in the presence of a publicly owned firm notwithstanding the degree of privatization

trade policy and mixed enterprises this paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments in the case of rivalry in the home market the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive for the case of cournot rivalry in a third market the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership while in the case of bertrand rivalry with differentiated products the optimal export tax increases

information technology and transnational integration theory and evidence on the evolution of the modern multinational enterprise reflecting amplified hazards in cross border exchange and imperfections in markets for intangibles internalization has been central in multinational enterprise mne theory this centrality notwithstanding the fact is that internalization coheres with lower powered incentives and carries an implicit drawback namely higher realized production costs with the emergence and deployment of information and communication technology ict modern mnes are reshaping their transnational governance to address this cost the modern mne uses ict to mitigate transaction costs and evolves more to arm s length exchange to incentivize lower production costs a testable prediction is that mnes in industries more susceptible to and employing more ict will exhibit a reduced propensity for transnational integration we examine this hypothesis using available data from 1982 to 1997 for us mnes across all manufacturing sectors regression results and robustness tests are strongly congruent with the prediction this study a first to explore empirically the role of ict in the evolution of transnational exchange suggests that mne theory until now founded primarily on transaction cost economics and a cross border control theory of value capture is more likely to keep pace with developments in mne practice by opening up to incentive theories of exchange governance and a cross border coordination theory of value creation

contracting structures for custom software development the impacts of informational rents and uncertainty on internal development and outsourcing custom software development projects have special informational attributes that have challenged managers for many years they are associated with information asymmetries regarding user valuation and developer costs relationship specific investments and a resulting likelihood of positive externalities for the user or the developer from the other party s investment furthermore in a custom project market prices for software are not helpful in solving either the valuation or the cost problems in this paper we analyze the unique nature of the software development agreements that can be reached between the user and the developer in such a setting we compare the value of using internal and external developers with the goal of better understanding the factors relevant to the outsourcing decision for internal development we derive a new mechanism that achieves the first best system whenever the project has positive expected net value while achieving ex ante budget balance in contrast the optimal mechanism for an external developer will not in general yield the first best system this implies that when internal and external developers have identical cost functions internal development definitely yields the larger net value more generally this implies that an external developer must have considerable cost advantages over an internal developer in order to have the larger net value numerical results indicate that this difference in net values can be very large as much as a 100 increase for internal development over external development this is consistent with the strong bias in favor of internal custom development found in recent empirical studies we also explain why the efficient levels of investment can be achieved only when there are no externalities and we show that the presence of positive externalities results in underinvestment since using an external developer will typically yield a system that is not first best inefficient investments result with or without externalities we present examples showing that uncertainty about system value is not a significant factor in choosing between internal and external development however uncertainty about the development costs is highly significant with greater uncertainty making outsourcing less attractive

redistribution state trading enterprises and politically optimal tariffs state trading enterprises stes are widely used and can be viewed as instruments of trade policy we analyse two aspects the first is their potential trade distorting effect the second is how they modify the case for the politically optimal tariff we show that the ste can reduce the need for a tariff designed for domestic redistribution this result introduces some ambiguity about how stes are interpreted from a multilateralist perspective they should be dealt with in the same way as other non tariff barriers from a nationalistic perspective they can reduce the need for politically optimal redistribution entreprises d etat impliquees dans le commerce international et tarifs politiquement optimaux les entreprises d etat impliquees dans le commerce international eeici sont communement utilisees comme instruments de politique commerciale on analyse deux aspects de cette intervention le premier est leur effet potentiel de distorsion sur les flux commerciaux le second est jusqu a quel point cette intervention modifie l argument du tarif politiquement optimal on montre que les eeici peuvent reduire le besoin d un tarif defini pour des fins de redistribution au niveau domestique le resultat injecte une certaine ambiguite dans le traitement des eeici d un point de vue international on devrait les traiter comme toute autre barriere non tarifaire d un point de vue nationaliste ils peuvent reduire le besoin de faire appel au politiquement optimal

mixed oligopoly subsidization and the order of firm s moves the relevance of privatization abstract a series of previous papers demonstrate that there are no consequences from privatization in a mixed oligopoly when the government uses a subsidy to ensure first best this conclusion depends upon the assumption that privatization results in a simultaneous move oligopoly if instead privatization results in a public leader becoming a private leader the optimal subsidy output and welfare are all reduced

information assets technology and organization although there is good reason to expect that the growth of information work and information technology will significantly affect the trade offs inherent in different structures for organizing work the theoretical basis for these changes remains poorly understood this paper seeks to address this gap by analyzing the incentive effects of different ownership arrangement in the spirit of the grossman hart moore ghm incomplete contracts theory of the firm a key departure from earlier approaches is the inclusion of a role for an information asset analogous to the ghm treatment of property this approach highlights the organizational significance of information ownership and information technology for instance using this framework one can determine when 1 informed workers are more likely to be owners than employees of firms 2 increased flexibility of assets will facilitate decentralization and 3 the need for centralized coordination will lead to centralized ownership the framework developed shed

mixed duopoly privatization and subsidization with excess burden of taxation we investigate optimal tax subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation we compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes mixed and private cournot duopolies and stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships we show that in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem privatization affects resulting welfare duopole mixte privatisation et subsidisation en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire on examine les politiques optimales de taxes et de subventions dans le cas d oligopoles mixtes et prives en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire on compare les subsides optimaux et les effets sur le niveau de bien etre dans quatre regimes les duopoles de cournot mixte et prive et la concurrence a la stackelberg avec leadership public et prive on montre que contrairement a ce que suggeraient les travaux anterieurs sur le theoreme de la neutralite de la privatisation la privatisation affecte les niveaux de bien etre

contracts entrepreneurs market creation and judgement the contemporary mainstream theory of the firm in perspective this survey gives an overview of the theory of the firm as it is formulated within the contemporary mainstream of economics two groupings of theories are briefly discussed principal agent and incomplete contract models next three of the most recent contributions regarding firms are considered the reference point approach is looked at first followed by a discussion of spulber s book the theory of the firm last we consider the entrepreneurial judgement perspective

public private mixed delivery and information effects this paper analyses public private mixed delivery of essential public services under price regulation a private firm may have lower production costs and can potentially provide a performance benchmark for a public firm a public firm may offer higher quality service and can reveal the production cost of the private firm to the regulator however this paper shows that public private mixed delivery does not always dominate public delivery or private delivery mixed delivery is optimal only when i the cost uncertainty of the private firm is large ii the managerial incentive problem of the public firm is large and iii the performances of the public and private firms are highly correlated

industries with private and public enterprises in this paper attention will be focussed on an industry consisting of public enterprises and institutions rather than on a public enterprise itself public enterprises can be used by the government as an instrument to implement an industrial policy since there exist a variety of instruments and objectives we firstly categorize industries as well as market structures section 2 next we mention some recent results section 3 in the last section a general equilibrium model is introduced that offers a framework to policy makers when designing an efficient organization of an industry with external effects

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

agency costs and innovation abstract stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of innovative research there are many possible explanations for this fact the paper seeks to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across individuals and organizations it is shown that incentive costs associated with a given task depend on the total portfolio of tasks that an individual or an organization undertakes mixing hard to measure activities innovation with easy to measure activities routine is particularly costly since it will either lead to misallocation of attention across tasks or to misallocation of risk larger firms are at a comparative disadvantage in conducting highly innovative research because of the costs associated with managing a heterogeneous set of tasks it is further argued that optimal organizational responses to coordination and control of routine tasks will lead to bureaucratization within the firm and to financial constraints imposed by capital markets both of which are hostile to innovation

the fee structure in franchising a property rights view abstract the paper offers a property rights explanation for the structure of royalties and initial fees in franchise relationships we argue that the structure of royalties and fees depends on the distribution of intangible assets between the franchisor and franchisee contrary to the agency theory our property rights approach predicts a positive relationship between royalties and fees this hypothesis was tested by using data from the austrian franchise sector

privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry we consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized in the short run privatization is harmful because prices rise the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost in the long run privatization leads to further entry the net effect is beneficial if consumer preference for variety is not too weak a sufficient statistic for the social surplus to be higher in the long run is that the public firm makes a loss this suggests that profitable firms should not necessarily be privatized

mixed oligopoly privatization and strategic trade policy this paper investigates the effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies within an international mixed oligopoly serving a single market if the government uses a domestic production subsidy then welfare is always increased with privatization while the optimal subsidy falls if the government uses an import tariff privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space the optimal tariff however may rise or fall in recent years many countries around the world are privatizing their state owned industries at the same time many of these countries are also showing remarkable changes in their economic policies toward international trade on many occasions tariffs are significantly altered and domestic production subsidies are substantially reduced for example russia has privatized its aircraft industry and doubled its tariff on imported aircraft colombia has privatized its stateowned automobile maker colombia automotriz and reduced the import tariffs on foreign made cars in argentina the government is pursuing a policy of selective privatization and subsequent reduction of subsidies in western europe countries such as germany and spain have privatized their major airlines lufthansa and iberia respectively and significantly reduced subsidies what is the connection between privatization and strategic trade policies does privatization require a welfare maximizing government to alter trade barriers the objective of this paper is to answer these questions by investigating the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies the effects of privatization are typically analyzed in the context of mixed oligopoly models where state owned welfare maximizing public firms interact with profit maximizing private firms 1 we investigate the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies by incorporating strategic trade instruments in an international mixed oligopoly model specifically we consider two strategic trade instruments an import tariff and a domestic production subsidy the government chooses the optimal level of tariff or subsidy to maximize domestic welfare for each trade instrument we primarily focus on two questions first does privatization increase

flexible vs dedicated technology adoption in the presence of a public firm author affiliation maria jose gil molto department of economics university of leicester university road leicester le1 7rh england united kingdom m j gil molto le ac uk corresponding authorjoanna poyago theotoky dagger department of economics loughborough university sir richard morris building loughborough le11 3tu england united kingdom j poyago theotoky lboro ac uk acknowledgment we thank john beath nikolaos georgantzis rafael moner colonques vicente octs and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments all remaining errors are our own we also thank for financial support the spanish ministry sej2005 08764 econ and the british academy joint activities scheme 1 introductionin the recent past many firms all over the world have substituted their traditional production processes with more flexible systems some of these flexible technologies allow for greater capacity process flexibility which can increase the ability of firms to adapt to fluctuations in demand boyer and moreaux 1997 boyer jacques and moreaux 2002 in other cases the advantage of a flexible manufacturing system fms over dedicated equipment de is that the former allows a firm to supply several products and consequently to participate in different markets in other words to become a multiproduct or multimarket firm1 without having to invest in separated manufacturing processes this is called product flexibility and is the main focus of our paper apart from benefits flexible technologies also report higher set up costs mainly in the form of development or adjustment costs jaikumar 1986 the study of the adoption of fms by private firms was first introduced by roller and tombak 1990 and kim roller and tombak 1992 in the context of oligopolistic competition their findings indicate that the adoption of flexible technologies requires a sufficiently low adoption cost sufficiently high product differentiation and large enough markets while consumers benefit from the use of fms due to the increase in competition 2 in addition roller and tombak 1993 validate these results with an empirical study dixon 1994 evaluates the welfare effects of using fms when the marginal cost of production is increasing in the number of goods produced and when the markets are unrelated as a result adopting fms might lead to welfare losses due to the inefficiency in production on the other hand eaton and schmitt 1994 point out that the adoption of fms may correspond to preemptive strategies leading to higher levels of concentration in the context of horizontal product differentiation to the best of our knowledge the issue of technology choice as exemplified by the adoption of fms versus de technologies has not been studied in the context of a mixed market where private profit maximizing firms coexist with public not for profit ones such mixed markets are quite prevalent in transition economies but not exclusively so telecommunications health services and the postal sector in many countries are organized as mixed markets although many public firms have been privatized in recent years it is worth pointing out that the behavior of these recently privatized firms remains subject to public regulation our analysis is motivated by a large number of industries in which multiproduct and single product firms coexist and the presence of public or newly privatized but still regulated firms is common this is the case for industries such as energy supply transport telecommunications or health care first consider the case of telecommunications traditionally the provision of internet access telephone and tv services required the use of different technologies and separate production processes for each one of them at present however cable technology can be used by firms to provide these three different services using the same production process thereby enabling firms to be present in all three markets and to exploit economies of scope

incentive schemes as strategic variables an application to a mixed duopoly abstract in the context of asymmetry of information between firms owners and their managers we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in a duopoly with a public and a private firm by giving the public manager an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue we show that welfare can be improved furthermore we show that the government should not privatize the public company

mixed oligopoly privatization and subsidization abstract this paper demonstrates three effects of domestic production subsidies in a mixed oligopoly industry regarding privatization and efficiency first if subsidies are used before and after privatization welfare is unchanged by privatization second if subsidies are used only before privatization then privatization always lowers welfare regardless of the number of private firms in the industry third the subsidy contributes to overall efficiency in a mixed oligopoly due to cost distribution effects

endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly abstract endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing for choosing their quantities the results are strikingly different from those obtained in a corresponding oligopoly with all profit maximizing firms

effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly abstract in a mixed oligopoly an increase in tax ad valorem or specific does not change total output but increases the output of the public firm and the tax revenue also privatization may increase both tax revenue and welfare

efficiency and privatisation in imperfectly competitive industries if a public firm is managed less efficiently than private producers facing similar conditions then privatisation will increase the overall efficiency of the industry and benefit society this paper challenges this apparently innocuous conclusion as long as the private firms efficiency improves as a result of competition then it will also be higher when they are subjected to unfair competition from a public oligopolist with no budget constraint we show that it may happen that the loss in efficiency due to the relatively inefficient public firm is more than compensated by gains in the efficiency of the private firms

mixed oligopoly sequential entry and spatial price discrimination this paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination it demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a stackelberg location leader the presence of a public firm always improves welfare moreover when three firms locate sequentially the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last thus despite examining a variety of location timings including simultaneous location privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare this conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare

do state trading exporters distort trade abstract in this paper we analyse the trade distorting effects of state trading enterprises stes which exist in some exporting countries because of these potential effects several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the doha round negotiations in the wto the belief is that stes in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy stes also exist in developing countries though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax we present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting stes in developed and developing economies the model is calibrated with data on two examples of stes one typical of an ste in a developed country the other typical of an ste in a developing economy in each case we allow for differences in the nature of the ste s pay off function the overall conclusion is that stes do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant

portuguese banking sector a mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we investigate whether we can find evidence of a regulatory intervention in the portuguese banking sector we develop and estimate using panel data a simple oligopoly model where one public bank competes in prices with several private banks we assume that private banks maximize profits and that the public bank is instructed to maximize an objective function that depends on the profits of the public bank and on the public bank s revenues from deposits and loans evaluated at their respective opportunity costs empirically we find evidence supporting the existence of a regulatory intervention in the loans market which aimed at reducing the equilibrium interest rates paid on loans however in the deposits markets our empirical results do not support the hypothesis of the existence of internal regulatory devices

the government as a shareholder a case from the united states we study a sample of u s corporations in which the federal government held 35 100 percent of the outstanding common stock for between 1 and 23 years during and following world war ii we find that although the firms experienced abnormally high turnover among corporate board members the tenure of senior management was relatively stable moreover the performance of the government owned companies was not significantly different than that of private sector firms in the same industry hence the interim government custodianship of the firms in our case does not have the effects normally attributed to government ownership

international evidence on the historical properties of business cycles we contrast properties of real quantities with those of price levels and stocks of money for ten countries over the last century although the magnitude of output fluctuations has varied across countries and periods relations among real quantities have been remarkably uniform properties of price levels however exhibit striking differences between periods inflation rates are more persistent after world war ii than before and price level fluctuations are typically procyclical before world war ii and countercyclical afterward fluctuations in money are less highly correlated with output in the postwar period but are no more persistent than in earlier periods jel e32 e31

foreign investment vertical integration and local equity requirements the paper presents a spatial model in which a foreign firm and local government behave strategically in setting a local equity requirement ler contrary to simple intuition larger equity requirements may increase economic efficiency but this conclusion is highly sensitive to the vertical structure of the foreign firm when the foreign firm has monopoly power in both foreign upstream and domestic downstream markets the optimal equity requirement is zero surprisingly the introduction of domestic competition upstream causes the government to adopt a ler which lowers economic efficiency

computerisation and wage dispersion an analytical reinterpretation the rich countries have recently seen a dramatic rise in income inequality all the more surprising because the long term trend had been toward equality this paper examines one of the leading explanations computerisation in the workplace i offer a theory of computers impact on white collar work which goes far toward explaining the timing form and locus of recent labour market changes the theory looks at the bureaucratic and organisational applications of computers that have been first largest and most influential they have two effects on firms demand for labour at different skill levels

privatisation and market structure in a transition economy abstract a model is developed in which an industry of n 1 firms is privatised the participation method of privatisation is used whereby firms are sold for cash but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership in each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment before output is produced this investment is unobservable by the state and therefore non contractible there is cournot competition in the product market the welfare maximising retained ownership share for the state is analysed taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance

comparing bertrand and cournot in mixed markets abstract we revisit the classic comparison between bertrand and cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms the results are often strikingly different and opposite to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in the standard setting with all profit maximizing firms

the comparative advantage of public ownership evidence from u s electric utilities studies of the performance effects of public vs private ownership have found mixed evidence this paper draws on theory suggesting that public enterprise may have an advantage in producing goods and services whose quality attributes are difficult to specify a priori using a comprehensive data set of u s electric utilities to estimate cost functions we find that while privately owned systems achieve lower costs in generation public systems generally have an advantage in the end user oriented distribution function with its more non contractible quality attributes other evidence on quality differences by ownership type and by enterprise size supports this distinction jel classification l33 l94 l avantage comparatif de la propriete publique resultats pour la production d electricite auxetats unis les etudes de la performance des entreprises publiques et privees ont produit des resultats qui ne sont pas determinants ce memoire se fonde sur la theorie qui suggere que l entreprise publique peut avoir un avantage dans la production de biens et services dont la qualite est difficile a definir a priori a partir de donnees extensives sur les producteurs d electricite aux etats unis on definit des fonctions de couts il appert que quand ils sont entre des mains privees les systemes de production reussissent a obtenir des couts de generation plus bas d autre part les systemes publics ont un avantage pour ce qui est de la fonction de distribution orientee vers les besoins de l usager a cause des attributs de qualite plus difficiles a contractualiser d autres resultats quant aux differences de qualite par types de propriete et par tailles d entreprises viennent confirmer l importance de cette distinction

oligopoly games and the cournot bertrand model a survey traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable output cournot or price bertrand alternatively a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price also known as the cournot bertrand model when the choice of strategic variable is endogenous the established dominant strategy is output competition a growing body of work demonstrates however that the cournot bertrand outcome can be a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries observations of real world markets consistent with cournot bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications we lay out the roots of the cournot bertrand model and explore a number of model developments we categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions in particular some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous altogether this research identifies when cournot bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions we also review the cournot bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics industrial organization labor and public economics we expect the literature to continue to expand in the future

the impact of public ownership in the lending sector we examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects for instance it can increase lender profit furthermore borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers projects in addition there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare resume l impact de la propriete publique sur le secteur des prets les auteurs examinent les effets de la propriete gouvernementale croissante des offreurs dans le secteur des prets un phenomene qui se traduit en un plus grand interet pour le bien etre global et un interet moindre pour le profit un tel accroissement de la propriete publique peut avoir des effets non anticipes par exemple cela peut accroitre les profits des preteurs de plus le bien etre des emprunteurs decline souvent a proportion que la croissance de la propriete gouvernementale d un preteur connote une competence relativement limitee pour discerner la veritable qualite des projets des emprunteurs enfin il existe des circonstances dans lesquelles l accroissement de la propriete gouvernementale d une institution preteuse n a aucun impact soit sur le profit du preteur soit sur le bien etre de l emprunteur

variations in output volatility evidence from international historical data abstract the paper investigates variations in output volatility in 38 oecd and non oecd countries over the last two centuries our tests reveal significant structural changes in output volatility in all countries a more than 70 of detected structural changes indicates a reduction in volatility suggesting that output volatility has been declining over the last two centuries in general the results however reveal different patterns of output volatility across countries

should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining a mixed duopoly approach abstract should civil servants employees in the public sector be allowed to bargain collectively to answer this question we construct a model of unionized mixed duopoly and examine the regulatory framework of public institutions especially focusing on a wage regulation imposed on the public firm the wage regulation turns out to yield critical welfare implications as it gives rise to two opposing strategic effects the wage regulation intensifies downstream market competition while it loosens upstream market competition the overall welfare effect is ambiguous depending crucially on the degree of product differentiation between the firms we also show that in contrast to the popular belief granting the right to bargain collectively to civil servants would not necessarily help them because they tend to demand excessively high wages when they are allowed to bargain collectively finally we briefly discuss a new perspective on the role of profit motives in public institutions when the wages are determined endogenously

distribution channel strategies in a mixed market abstract this paper studies equilibrium channel strategies in a mixed market with a public firm and a private firm the public firm is concerned with social welfare while the private firm aims to maximize its own profit each firm decides whether to adopt an integrated or a decentralized channel we examine two standard market competition modes bertrand and cournot within each competition mode we consider two typical vertical contracts wholesale price and two part tariff contracts our results suggest that equilibrium channel structures depend on the market competition mode the vertical contract form and the level of product substitutability specifically the channel strategy of the private firm depends mainly on the vertical contract form under a two part tariff contract the private firm always chooses decentralization under a wholesale price contract the private firm chooses integration for most scenarios except for highly substitutable products under bertrand competition i e under very intense competition the channel strategy of the public firm depends mainly on the competition mode under bertrand competition the public firm always chooses decentralization under cournot competition the public firm always chooses the opposite of the private firm s strategy

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social

regulating innovative activity abstract without spillovers and under the winner take all hypothesis there is overinvestment in r d in a non cooperative equilibrium due to duplication of effort we show that a public firm can represent an effective instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem in particular it is proved that in a mixed duopoly i each firm invests less than in a private duopoly and ii although the expected time of innovation is postponed social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly

a mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms in this paper a mixed oligopoly model is considered in which a state owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms previous articles on mixed oligopoly did not include foreign private firms the effect on the equilibrium involves a lower price and a different allocation of production relative to the case when all private firms are domestically owned in addition issues such as the effects of an open door policy allowing foreign firms to enter and the effects of foreign acquisition of domestic firms are discussed

employment generation potential of new technology based firms during a recessionary period the case of finland this article analyzes the employment generation potential of new technology based firms during a recessionary period the empirical data is from finland a country that was hit particularly hard by the economic recession between years 1990 and 1993 in spite of the recession the number of ntbfs new technology based firms rose by 17 from 1986 to 1993 in traditional manufacturing industry branches the overall employment fell by as much as 33 during the same period alternative hypotheses to explain the increase in the importance of ntbfs are presented and discussed in the light of research findings both flexible specialization and recession push hypotheses receive support in the empirical data

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

why so small explaining the size of firms in latin america hile a great deal of effort has been devoted to study the determinants ofaggregate economic growth in developing economies little attention hasbeen paid to the factors in uencing the creation growth and destruction of rmsin these economies deriving policy implications from empirical results basedon macroeconomic data is a risky proposition especially for policies that areexpected to have an effect through the response of rms a key issue at a microeconomic level is the extent to which rms are con strained on their pro t maximising technology and on their sales through ele ments such as excessive regulation trade barriers and corruption if world oroecd averages constitute a good proxy for optimal rm size then deviations notexplained by technology differences can be viewed as evidence of inef ciencydue to the presence of those factors the aim of this paper is to empiricallyinvestigate this issue with particular attention to those determinants of rm sizethat might be altered through the adoption of government policies this topic is particularly relevant for latin america a region with one of thelowest rates of growth during the second half of the twentieth century secondonly to the sub saharan countries inter american development bank 2000 ch 1 and where the largest rms in each country are severely undersized notonly by international standards but also in comparison with other developingcountries in fact latin american rms are small with respect to world patterns both in terms of the quantity of assets they control and with respect to the amountof employment they generate the idea that possibilities for business development are more limited inlatin america than in other regions is reinforced by business surveys that assesshow a variety of factors hinder the growth of rms worldwide according to the

optimal privatization of vertical public utilities we examine restructuring divestiture and deregulation of a vertically integrated public utility e g electricity from a public finance perspective how an optimal restructuring plan for the utility depends on the cost of public funds and on the x efficiency gains from privatization how the optimal degree of competition in the upstream and downstream segments are connected and implications of privatization for consumer prices are examined the higher the cost of public funds the more likely the post privatization price will exceed the regulated public utility price the greater the x efficiency gains from privatization the more likely the post privatization price will fall ce texte examine la restructuration le desaississement et la dereglementation d un service public integre verticalement comme par exemple l industrie de l electricite du point de vue des finances publiques on montre qu un plan optimal de restructuration depend du cout des fonds publics et des gains en efficacite de type x qui emergent de la privatisation ainsi que du degre optimal de concurrence dans les segments en amont et en aval on examine aussi les implications de la privatisation sur les prix aux consommateurs plus les couts des fonds publics sont eleves plus il y a de chance que les prix apres la privatisation vont exceder les prix du service public reglemente plus les gains en efficacite de type x sont importants comme resultat de la privatisation plus il y a de chance que le prix post privatisation tombe

privatization policy in an international oligopoly this paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly the argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than in greenfield fdi models since these profi ts hifts are partly paid for by the foreign firms in the bidding competition effects of local equity requirements trade and investment policies are also studied it is for instance shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial but large ones are counterproductive by preventing welfare enhancing foreign acquisitions

conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly we study a mixed duopoly model in which a state owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private foreign firm compete under general enough assumptions we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium cve applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly a particular case of a cve with constant influence conjecture coefficients is also examined

business cycles in international historical perspective business cycle models seek to answer the question of why economies go through cycles of recession and recovery or boom and bust any theory of the business cycle makes two sorts of claims what shocks are most important in disturbing the economy and what economic structure is necessary for propagating these shocks for example one common explanation of business cycles begins with monetary shocks and then seeks to explain why monetary shocks are not purely neutral as neoclassical theory would have it and instead have real effects at least in the short term early models in this vein were often implicitly or explicitly based on the proposition that markets do not clear continuously early equilibrium real business cycle theories instead emphasized the importance of real shocks especially to technology which may cause socially efficient fluctuations even when markets are always in equilibrium more recent models have attempted to marry the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics with the substantive keynesian ideas that money is not neutral and that economic fluctuations are costly new keynesian theories of the business cycle admit the possibility of a number of economic shocks including monetary and technology shocks but then focus on explaining how nominal price rigidities within the economy can turn these shocks into recessions or booms other models show that business cycles driven by keynesian animal spirits are consistent with rigorous microfoundations and rational expectations seeking empirical evidence for and against these various approaches we turn business cycle theories loose on perhaps the greatest macroeconomic laboratory

the organizational cost of protection abstract this paper offers another explanation for the proposition that protection induces slack it employs a model of a hierarchic firm in which the firm s owner cannot observe the cost type or the effort level of his manager a production subsidy by stimulating output may increase the marginal information rents that have to be paid to the manager for higher effort the resulting increase in the firm s marginal cost of effort leads to reduced managerial effort amplifying the intra firm effort distortion if effort is initially below the optimal level and yielding an organizational cost of protection additional to the standard deadweight cost

the trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises in importing countries abstract this paper focuses on the potential trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises an issue that is likely to receive greater attention than hitherto in the context of the current agricultural negotiations in the wto although state trading enterprises can arise in both exporting and importing countries the emphasis here is on the importing country case our results show that state trading enterprises do distort trade though the nature of the distortion i e whether it is equivalent to an import tariff or import subsidy depends on the nature of exclusive rights bestowed by government on the state enterprise we also consider state trading enterprises in both developed and developing economies the main difference being the nature of the government s pay off function the theoretical framework allows us to derive the tariff equivalent effects for various types of stes the results suggesting that the trade distorting effect is likely to vary considerably dependent on the type of ste that arises in particular circumstances

optimal public rationing and price response abstract we study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price responses consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity defined as treatment cost due to a limited budget some consumers must be rationed rationed consumers may purchase from a monopolistic private market we consider two information regimes in the first the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information means testing in equilibrium the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers rationing some poor consumers implements price reduction in the private market in the second information regime the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers wealth and cost information in equilibrium consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold cost effectiveness rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth

welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed bertrand duopoly abstract i investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces while a private enterprise has no such obligation i show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first best outcome walrasian equilibrium

the financial and operating performance of privatized firms during the 1990s this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 85 companies from 28 industrialized countries that were privatized through public share offerings for the period from 1990 through 1996 we document significant increases in profitability output operating efficiency and dividend payments and significant decreases in leverage ratios for our full sample of firms after privatization and for most subsamples examined capital expenditures increase significantly in absolute terms but not relative to sales employment declines but insignificantly combined with results from two previous directly comparable studies these findings strongly suggest that privatization yields significant performance improvements during the past two decades the privatization of state owned enterprises has moved from being a radical almost desperate policy initiative of the thatcher government in britain to being an accepted economic policy for governments of all ideological stripes according to gibbon 1998 860 billion has been raised by governments worldwide through privatizations with the bulk of this total coming since 1987 and at least one commentator roche 1996 predicts that no less than 6 trillion will be raised through privatizations over the next two decades in 1997 alone sales of public enterprises totaled a record 161 billion worldwide with more than 110 billion of the total coming during the second half of the year and 1998 s total of almost 140 billion indicates that the pace shows no sign of slackening as we approach a new millennium

welfare maximisation with endogenous average costs abstract in contrast to the earlier literature about industries mixing public and private ownership costs are not exogenous because firms choose capacity if capacity is increased the fixed costs increase but more can be produced at constant marginal costs it turns out that mixing private and public firms improves welfare if the deadweight loss of imperfect competition is significant all firms break even but welfare maximisation implies higher unit costs and lower profitability

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments

imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership this paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country the impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects the first is an output distortion effect which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption the second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input when the level of privatization increases a decrease in final good production lowers input demand causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase the third is a rent leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm the rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect with foreign ownership however complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent leaking effect we further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes e g selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm

information technology productivity and asset ownership evidence from taxicab fleets we develop a simple model that links the adoption of a productivity enhancing technology to increased vertical integration and a less skilled workforce we test the model s key prediction using novel microdata on vehicle ownership patterns from the economic census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were first adopted by taxicab firms controlling for time invariant firm specific effects firms increase the proportion of taxicabs under fleet ownership by 12 when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems an instrumental variables analysis suggests that the link between dispatching technology and vertical integration is causal these findings suggest that increasing a firm s productivity can lead to increased vertical integration even in the absence of asset specificity

r d competition between public and private sectors abstract we investigate a mixed market where a welfare maximizing public research institute competes against profit maximizing private firms we investigate r d competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and r d expenditure we find that the innovation size r d expenditure chosen by the public institute is too small too large from the viewpoint of social welfare respectively and so the government should control the public institute appropriately we also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes