information on strikes and union settlements patterns of coverage in a newspaper of record the authors investigate whether the new york times coverage of strikes and non strike wage settlements in large bargaining units changed during the 1980s a time when a transformation of industrial relations is said to have taken place although the total number of new york times articles on such events declined during the 1980s the authors find that when appropriate control variables are included in the analysis the apparent drop in coverage disappears important variables determining the extent of news coverage were occurrence of a strike strike duration number of workers involved occurrence of federal intervention key industry status that is whether the affected industry was among those industries identified as exceptionally important for wage setting and proximity to new york city they speculate that the reduced number of articles may simply reflect a decreased incidence of strikes

collective bargaining in the public sector the effect of legal structure on dispute costs and wages this paper examines the impact of collective bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of canadian public sector contracts the authors results suggest that policymakers designing collective bargaining legislation face a trade off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective bargaining legislation exists hence a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs however the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures copyright 1991 by american economic association

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

bargaining over reform abstract this paper models the delay in a macroeconomic stabilization as the outcome of a bargaining game between two parties who must reach an agreement over how the stabilization cost is to be shared the paper modifies alesina and drazen s 1991 american economic review 81 1170 1189 war of attrition model by endogenizing the distribution of the stabilization costs through a bargaining game using this bargaining framework the paper analyzes the role of crises and foreign assistance in bringing about a settlement to the distributional conflict in the bargaining game a crisis that increases the welfare loss from not stabilizing the economy will lower the probability of delay in contrast foreign aid that is used to reduce the stabilization costs will further increase the delay in reaching an agreement between the two parties

cyclical fluctuations in strike activity using a set of data on contracts and strikes for the period 1970 81 the author distinguishes among the roles of aggregate business conditions labor market conditions and product market conditions in the determination of strike incidence and duration strike incidence is found to be highest in industries that are depressed relative to the rest of the economy but in regions with low unemployment this finding is consistent with the theory that the cost of a strike to a firm increases with the demand for its product and the cost of a strike to the union increases with unemployment another finding however is that strikes are longest in industries that are booming relative to the rest of the economy

strikes as the random enforcement of asymmetric information contracts a two state model of strikes in which both the entrepreneur and the worker randomize their behavior is developed the entrepreneur always asks for a wage reduction unaccompanied by a cut in labor services if the state is bad and he sometimes makes the same request in the good state the worker sometimes agrees to this request and sometimes threatens to strike the strike threat is only carried out in the bad state this equilibrium can pareto dominate that found in the standard asymmetric information contracting model

empirical test of a separating equilibrium in national football league contract negotiations i empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining contract of national football league nfl contract negotiations the separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations these predictions are tested using data on 1 873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 nfl drafts the empirical results support the implications of the separating equilibrium

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

contracts and strikes in canada 1952 1988 between 1952 and 1979 labour canada collected data on something in excess of 5300 contracts an earlier subset of these data covering 19531973 was used in work by inter alia riddell 1979 1980 but in recent years they have not been widely studied the reason is perhaps that in the early 1960s while labour canada was still assembling what is usually referred to as the wage chronologies file work also began on the collection of contract data for what is known as the wage file this data collection which continues to the present day has generated what many view as an unparalleled source of detail about wage agreements and most analyses of canadian contracts focus on the wage file alone this short paper briefly describes some aspects of the preparation of both data sets for analysis including the incorporation of information on strikes when they occurred a longer version of this paper that is available from the author dwells in considerably more detail on these issues the other main focus of this paper is on some preliminary evidence from a combination of the two samples covering contracts from 1952 to 1988 specifically the combined sample reveals several insights into changes over time in strike behaviour and contract length in future papers it is planned to use an extended version of the data beyond 1988 to explore these and other issues for a period of over 40 years the paper is organized as follows section ii describes the two sets of contract data paying particular attention to the use of labour canada s work stoppage file to supplement the information on those contracts that were settled only after a strike section iii outlines one way of combining the contract data sets and reports on the changes over time in strike behaviour and contract duration thus revealed

evaluating energy security in the asia pacific towards a more comprehensive approach the energy security conundrum how to equitably provide available affordable reliable efficient and environmentally benign energy services is a technology and policy challenge perhaps unlike any other the recent article on an energy security in the asia pacific by vlado vivoda is an excellent starting point for how to best capture the unique energy security challenges facing the region this article builds on vivoda s work but also points out some shortcomings with his analysis

is strike behavior cyclical we examine cyclicality of strike frequency and incidence using canadian data on strikes and contracts total strike frequency exhibits significant procyclicality to which within contract strikes contribute appreciably evidence is weaker for procyclical behavior of contract expiry strikes both in total and disaggregated by issue strike incidence is also procyclical particularly in manufacturing though the procyclicality here is confined to strikes over nonwage issues these results mirror those obtained by analyzing the frequency of strikes in the contract data industry specific cyclical variables positively affect strike incidence in manufacturing but region specific variables have no effect

defining energy security takes more than asking around abstract in undetermined the recent contribution by benjamin sovacool proposes 20 dimensions and 320 indicators of energy security in asia however the method for identifying these dimensions and indicators 64 semi structured interviews has three shortcomings first asian policy makers responsible for energy security are absent from the pool of respondents dominated by academics second no prioritization or contextualization of energy security concerns is attempted leading to an excessively long generic list third no disagreements between the interviewed experts are accounted for future attempts to define energy security based on perceptions should involve relevant social actors include mechanisms for discriminating between primary and secondary concerns and find ways to constructively report on disagreements less

an empirical study of the adverse selection model of strikes problems with existing empirical studies of the asymmetric information theory of strikes are 1 industry level data are used as proxies for firm level variables 2 studies using firm level data potentially suffer from simultaneity bias and 3 one of the key predictions of the theory is not tested the present paper addresses these issues while estimating a probit model of strike incidence using data comprising 2 459 contracts from canadian industry for 1964 85 that are merged with firm specific data under a number of alternative specifications results support the main predictions of the asymmetric information theory of strikes

the empirical relations between employers striker replacement strategies and strike duration this analysis of general accounting office survey data on strikes in 1985 and 1989 shows that employers permanent replacement of striking workers was associated with longer strikes than would otherwise have occurred furthermore the authors find that simply announcing the intent to replace strikers was also associated with longer strikes finally when employers permanently replaced strikers the probability of settlement fell approximately 30 these findings are consistent with models focusing on the joint costs of a strike and on private information in the bargaining process t o the firm that seeks to operate during a strike a major obstacle is securing a work force to do the work normally performed by members of the striking bargaining unit of the four possible strategies for securing such a work force reassigning struck work to non bargaining unit employees utilizing members of the bargaining unit who return to work during the strike hiring temporary replacement employees and hiring permanent replacement employees the strategy of hiring permanent replacements for strikers has become the most controversial before the passage of new deal labor legislation u s employers regularly exercised their common law right to replace striking workers the wagner act of 1935 protected employees right to strike but did not explicitly grant employers the right to replace strikers the supreme court however upheld the legality of permanently replacing strikers in its 1938 decision nlrb v mackay radio

controlling for endogeneity of strike variables in the estimation of wage settlement equations this article analyzes wage changes with an unbalanced panel from the spanish collective bargaining in large firms survey central to the analysis are the joint determination of strike and wage outcomes and in particular the estimation of the slope of the wage concession curve i control for the possible endogeneity of strike variables in the wage equation and suggest two sets of instruments lagged strike outcomes or reduced form predictions of the strike variables when controlling for endogeneity a negative relationship between strike duration and the size of the wage change arises however short strikes still produce higher wage changes

why u s wage and employment behavior differs from that in britain and japan if a poll were to be conducted among american academic economists to select the most mystifying economic phenomenon of our time surely the sticky nominal wage rate would emerge at or near the top of the list the slow and partial response of the nominal wage rate to changes in aggregate nominal spending has been a central postulate of macroeconomic theory for the past 45 years from keynes general theory down to the standard postwar textbook keynesian paradigm to the more modern fixed wage price models of robert barro and herschel grossman i976 and edmond malinvaud i977 unwilling passively to accept nominal wage rigidity as an unexplained assumption many labour market theorists have followed the lead of costas azariadis i975 and martin baily i974 in building models to explain rigid wages and layoff unemployment as the rational outcome of a profit maximising calculus as i pointed out in an early critique of the azariadis baily model i976a their assumptions cannot explain cycles in employment but rather why workers would want fixed incomes i e a fixed wage rate and fixed employment soon thereafter barro i977 went one step further and argued that contract theory is a facade which cannot explain why workers would choose a rigid wage and variable employment in preference to the classical equilibrium quantity of employment that equates the marginal product of labour with the marginal value of time now an examination of the evidence has led me to the realisation that rigid wages cannot provide the underpinnings for a universally valid theory of the business cycle simply because wages are not universally rigid i document below with postwar quarterly data that the share of fluctuations in the manufacturing wage bill taking the form of nominal wage changes as compared to changes in hours worked is five to ten times greater in britain and japan than in

evaluating energy security in the asia pacific region a novel methodological approach this paper establishes an energy security assessment instrument based on a new and expanded conceptualisation of energy security the instrument is a systematic interrogative tool for evaluating energy security of individual states or regions it consists of eleven broad energy security dimensions associated with the current global energy system these energy security dimensions take into account numerous quantitative and qualitative attributes of each country s energy security and policy and include both traditional energy security concerns and many new factors such as environmental socio cultural and technological another dimension largely absent from previous analyses is the existence of and the issues addressed in energy security policy in each country this instrument serves as an assessment system with which to evaluate energy security in the asia pacific region the existing studies on energy security in the asia pacific region suffer from serious limitations no study to date examines regional energy security policies by adopting a more comprehensive energy security definition as a starting point most studies also focus on a single country or issue even if they examine energy security in major regional economies they lack critical comparative analysis the instrument is valuable as it may be utilised to draw a comprehensive map of regional energy security situation which can also include comparative analysis of energy security characteristics across the asia pacific region ultimately it may be utilised to set up a framework for improved regional energy cooperation with the aim of providing regional leaders with a blueprint for improving regional energy security and policy

comment on robert m solow insiders and outsiders in wage determination solow s paper is concerned with explaining persistent unemployment in a fluctuating economy where labour is heterogeneous and employment decisions are linked through time this surely is an important problem it is also about time that we start thinking about the labour market as consisting not only of n identical clones but of individuals with different skills education and experience can the skilled or the experienced keep the unskilled from getting jobs and would it be in their interest to do so the latter question is easier to answer and the argument can be laid out in terms of a simple diagram fig 1

the development of the neoclassical tradition in labor economics this essay on labor economics examines neoclassical theory s rise to ascendancy following the second world war with a secondary focus on the relative decline but continued influence of institutionalist economic theory the authors describe the evolution of institutional and neoclassical theory from the late nineteenth to mid twentieth centuries examine some early intellectual debates between the two camps briefly describe the work of neoclassical labor economics pioneers and look at major developments over the past 30 years they argue that neoclassical economists increasing intellectual breadth and influence in public policy have led them to pay closer attention to issues that have long been of concern to institutionalists and neoinstitutionalists

logit estimates of strike incidence from canadian contract data logit estimates of strike incidence are made based on a unique and comprehensive data set of 2 437 collective agreements the appropriate level of aggregation since that is where bargaining occurs the results are interpreted through a theoretical framework emphasizing that strikes are more likely when the joint costs of using the strike mechanism are low relative to the cost of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same purposes such functions of strikes are to generate information elicit truth telling establish reputations provide catharsis and solve intraorganizational conflict

measuring energy security can the united states achieve oil independence stochastic simulation of the direct economic costs of oil dependence in an uncertain future is proposed as a useful metric of oil dependence the market failure from which these costs arise is imperfect competition in the world oil market chiefly as a consequence of the use of market power by the organization of the petroleum exporting countries opec cartel oil dependence costs can be substantial it is estimated that oil dependence costs to the us economy in 2008 will exceed 500 billion other costs such as military expenditures or foreign policy constraints are deemed to be largely derivative of the actual or potential economic costs of oil dependence the use of quantifiable economic costs as a security metric leads to a measurable definition of oil independence or oil security which can be used to test the ability of specific policies to achieve oil independence in an uncertain future

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

a theory of holdouts in wage bargaining holdouts the continuation of negotiations beyond the contract expiry date are the most common form of disputes in labor contract negotiations the authors model holdouts as a delaying tactic employed by unions to obtain information about other bargaining outcomes in their industry novel implications of their model include a positive association between holdout duration and the number of bargaining pairs negotiating contracts simultaneously bunching of holdout durations within these negotiating groups and fewer strikes among holdouts which end later in groups using a large panel of contract negotiations in canadian manufacturing the authors find considerable support for these predictions copyright 1998 by american economic association

the causes of bargaining failure evidence from major league baseball abstract final offer arbitration in major league baseball provides an ideal setting for examining the empirical regularities that are associated with bargaining failure since final offers salaries and player statistics which provide the fundamental facts for the case are all readily available using data for players eligible for arbitration for 1990 93 we conduct a wide variety of empirical tests regarding the relationship between aggressive offers and arbitration outcomes we find that aggressive offers by players trigger arbitration and that more aggressive offers are associated with inferior financial outcomes in arbitration overall clubs appear to outperform players in arbitration unexpectedly high or low offers are less common for players who have previously been through arbitration which suggests that learning occurs our results are inconsistent with simple one sided asymmetric information models of arbitration the results are more consistent with an optimism model or a model in which so

cyclical fluctuations in strike durations canadian data on strikes between 1946 and 1983 are used to estimate linear regression models for the logarithm of completed duration a thorough investigation of the influence of the business cycle reveals strong support for the hypothesis that strike durations are countercyclical the cyclical effect is shown to be robust to both the choice of cyclical variable and the econometric specification and the magnitude of the effect is quite substantial experimentation with different representations of the cycle reveals that it is difficult to improve on a simple formulation involving a single continuous variable

european climate energy security nexus a model based scenario analysis in this research we provide an overview of the climate security nexus in the european energy sector through a model based analysis of scenarios produced with the poles model the scenarios describe the consequences of different degrees of ghg emission constraint at world level but also for a case where europe adopts an ambitious climate policy while the rest of the world sticks to much more modest abatement policies the analysis shows that under such stringent climate policies europe may benefit of a significant double dividend first in its capacity to develop a new cleaner and climate friendlier energy model and second in a lower vulnerability to potential price or supply shocks on the international energy markets

an empirical model of wage indexation provisions in union contracts this paper describes the responses of index linked wage rates to concurrent price increases for a sample of canadian union contracts and then analyzes theseresponses in terms of a simple model of indexation to the aggregate price level the model highlights the importance of aggregate price movements in conveying information about industry specific prices the empirical analysis confirms that industry specific correlations between input and output prices and the consumer price index are important determinants of the flexibility of wages to prices across indexed contracts

concession stands how mining investments incite protest in africa foreign investment in africa s mineral resources has increased dramatically this paper addresses three questions raised by this trend do commercial mining investments increase the likelihood of social or armed conflict if so when are these disputes most prevalent and finally what mechanisms help explain these conflicts i show first that mining has contrasting effects on social and armed conflict while the probability of protests or riots increases roughly doubling after mining starts there is no increase in rebel activity second i show that the probability of social conflict rises with plausibly exogenous increases in world commodity prices finally i compile additional geo spatial and survey data to explore potential mechanisms including reporting bias environmental harm in migration inequality and governance finding little evidence consistent with these accounts i develop an explanation related to incomplete information a common cause of conflict in industrial and international relations this mechanism rationalizes why mining induces protest why these conflicts are exacerbated by rising prices and why transparency dampens the relationship between prices and protest

the methodological challenges of creating a comprehensive energy security index this short article defends the methods utilized in creating an energy security index it explains why an energy security index is needed and then justifies research interviews as a data collection tool next it responds to the three strands of professor cherp s critique before offering a few general conclusions for readers concerned about energy security

multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard an empirical study of national football league contract negotiations this paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts using contract and performance data on players drafted into the national football league from 1986 through 1991 we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations in addition our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player s effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract

global banking global crises the role of the bank balance sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises abstract we examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries risk of suffering financial turmoil we construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks balance sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets this allows us investigating the effect of foreign bank balance sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011 our proxies of shocks towards bank balance sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries confirming these results bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks assets are hit by negative shocks as measured by credit rating downgrades from third party countries short term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll over and funding risks thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders balance sheets domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities such as illiquid assets and a low deposit asset ratio are found to increase crisis contagion risk in contrast a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks assets to debtor countries

dynamic bargaining with action dependent valuations abstract an infinite horizon dynamic bargaining model is presented in which actions affect the expected future value of the buyer seller match because actions directly affect the future surplus to be bargained over the model is unlike other models that tie the dynamic process to nature alone focusing on a subset of weak markov equilibria several results come about that are not found in static bargaining models using similar bargaining protocols in particular optimal price demands can be lower higher than the buyer s lowest highest possible valuation and several empirical features concerning wage settlements and strike incidence from labor union contract negotiations can be explained

cost of living escalators in major union contracts this paper analyzes the price indexation provisions of a sample of major canadian collective bargaining agreements concluded between 1968 and 1975 under these contracts escalated wage increases comprised about one third of total wage increases and represented a major source of erosion in the relative wages of skilled workers the author argues that indexation provisions are usefully characterized by the marginal elasticity of the contractual wage rate to increases in prices measures of this responsiveness indicate that on average contractual wage rates are only slightly less than unit elastic with respect to price increases there is considerable variation across industries however in the extent to which wages respond to price changes

repeated bargaining with persistent private information the paper analyses repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent but not fully permanent private information the size of the surplus being divided is specified as a two state markov chain with transitions that are synchronized with contract negotiation dates equilibrium involves information cycles triggered by the success or failure of aggressive demands made by the seller because there is persistence in the markov chain generating the surplus a successful demand induces the seller to make another aggressive demand in the next negotiation since the buyer s acceptance reveals that the current surplus is large rejection of an aggressive demand on the other hand leads the seller to be pessimistic about the size of the surplus in the next contract so the seller makes a soft offer that is sure to be accepted then after several such offers have been accepted the seller is optimistic enough to again make an aggressive demand creating an information cycle an interesting feature of this cycle is that the soft price is not constant but declines as the cycle continues so as to offset the buyer s option value of re starting the cycle when the current state is bad an explicit mapping is given for the relationship between the basic parameters and the equilibrium prices and quantities in particular there is a closed form solution for the threshold belief that makes the seller indifferent between hard and soft offers

the relationship between unemployment spells and reservation wages as a test of search theory the theory of stationary job search predicts that controlling for other factors that affect the probability of leaving unemployment duration and reservation wages are likely to be positively associated the paper tests this prediction for british cross sectional data from 1982 using an estimating equation implied by search theory simultaneity is crucial in the evaluation of this prediction with single equation and instrumental variable estimates differing markedly perhaps surprisingly given the extreme paucity of both job interviews and offers in the sample the main finding is that reservation wages play a significant role in the determination of duration

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

an empirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining these models can be applied to contract negotiations yielding an economic theory of strikes to date however few empirical tests of these models have been carried out in this paper a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm s future profitability these predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major u s contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977

indicators for energy security the concept of energy security is widely used yet there is no consensus on its precise interpretation in this research we have provided an overview of available indicators for long term security of supply sos we distinguished four dimensions of energy security that relate to the availability accessibility affordability and acceptability of energy and classified indicators for energy security according to this taxonomy there is no one ideal indicator as the notion of energy security is highly context dependent rather applying multiple indicators leads to a broader understanding incorporating these indicators in model based scenario analysis showed accelerated depletion of currently known fossil resources due to increasing global demand coupled with increasing spatial discrepancy between consumption and production international trade in energy carriers is projected to have increased by 142 in 2050 compared to 2008 oil production is projected to become increasingly concentrated in a few countries up to 2030 after which production from other regions diversifies the market under stringent climate policies this diversification may not occur due to reduced demand for oil possible benefits of climate policy include increased fuel diversity and slower depletion of fossil resources

dynamic contractual enforcement a model of strikes this paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement a firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce if the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently then modulo discounting the first best is implementable but strikes are always off the equilibrium path if the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium the dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring the equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes

inventories and strikes this paper analyses a dynamic model of bargaining and strikes in which the reservation wage of union members in each period is private information the model endogenizes the firm s decision to accumulate inventories of finished goods in order to enhance its bargaining position with higher inventories the firm makes a lower wage offer thereby accepting an increased probability of a strike the model can help explain empirical results that have found a positive correlation between wages and inventory accumulation it also shows that unless inventories are controlled for strike incidence will exhibit a spurious negative state dependence

diversification of oil import sources and energy security a key strategy or an elusive objective this paper explores the relationship between the diversification of sources of imported oil and energy security of oil importing countries it examines the importance of diversification policy for oil importers explains why oil importers implement oil diversification policy and contextualizes the oil import diversification strategy in the overall energy security policy of oil importers the paper analyzes the factors and the contexts that affect the level of importance assigned to oil import diversification policy in oil importing countries and the limitations that may affect the successful implication of oil import diversification policy the examples are drawn from the world s top three oil importers the united states japan and china the policymakers in these and other oil importing countries place much importance on energy security the diversification of oil import sources is used as one of the strategies to enhance energy security in oil importing countries this paper is important for policymakers in oil importing countries as it provides them with a qualitative conceptual framework with which to evaluate the need to diversify their countries sources of imported oil and with which to identify the likely limitations to the successful implementation of oil import diversification policy

macroeconomic and political aspects of energy security exploratory data analysis abstract although the issue of energy security stands high on the scale of the european union s priorities there has been no single accepted definition of energy security thus far in light of the global economic crisis and political instability the issue of energy security is directly linked to geopolitical and macroeconomic stability this paper offers a new method of measuring energy security which unlike the existing indicators of energy stability in addition to economic and environmental indicators also includes the political and social aspects within the composite indicator of country risk the new energy security index esi is defined based on the application of principal component analysis pca analysis of the values of a new esi indicator shows that energy security is greatly influenced by gdp per capita country risk carbon intensity energy intensity final energy consumption per capita and electricity prices while the least importance rests with the share of renewable sources in energy consumption and energy dependence the values of the index by country are stable over the entire observed period but significant differences are noticeable between countries the highest index values are reported in luxembourg sweden finland and denmark and the lowest in bulgaria romania estonia and poland with the aim of robustness check the results of eu member states rankings were compared to country rankings based on the energy trilemma index compared to country rankings based on the energy trilemma index three countries recorded the same rank denmark check republic and bulgaria and the biggest deviation of 9 ranking position was reported by luxembourg the results of the research show that there is a statistically important difference in the value of energy security index between the observed groups of countries classified according to the level of macroeconomic stability

strikes and wages a test of an asymmetric information model this paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the profitability of the firm the model posits the existence of a negatively sloped resistance curve between wages and strike duration in addition it offer a series of predictions relating wage and strike outcomes to changes in the expected profitability of the firm and changes in the alternative opportunities of striking workers these implications are tested using data on wage outcomes strike probabilities and strike durations for a large sample of collective bargaining agreements

union wages temporary lay offs and seniority it is widely believed that the seniority system in conjunction with the collective bargaining process contributes significantly to the determination of the unemployment level in unionized sectors causa i empiricism suggests that real wage demands often remain buoyant in these sectors in the face of seemingly high rates of unemployment among union members james medoff 1979 p 380 convincingly documents the evidence that adjustment through lay offs is substantially greater in unionized firms than in comparable non unionized firms the usual but somewhat informal explanation is that the outcome of union voting is greatly influenced by senior workers who are fairly certain that they will not be laid off when normal shifts in the industry s demand for labour occur 2 these inframarginal workers are believed to vote for higher wage settlements than they would if their own jobs were not so secure

conceptualizing energy security abstract energy security 1 is one of the main targets of energy policy however the term has not been clearly defined which makes it hard to measure and difficult to balance against other policy objectives we review the multitude of definitions of energy security they can be characterized according to the sources of risk the scope of the impacts and the severity filters in the form of the speed size sustention spread singularity and sureness of impacts using a stylized case study for three european countries we illustrate how the selection of conceptual boundaries along these dimensions determines the outcome this can be avoided by more clearly separating between security of supply and other policy objectives this leads us to the definition of energy security as the continuity of energy supplies relative to demand

three theorems on inflation taxes and marginal employment subsidies most western nations are now experiencing high levels of unemployment traditional economic policies have apparently either helped to produce this or have not been able to eliminate the problem thus some economists have tried to suggest new ways in which governments might intervene in the labour market to raise the equilibrium level of employment two of the most widely known schemes are i taxes on inflation and ii marginal employment subsidies this paper examines the microeconomic effects of these policies one of the most fundamental points in the paper is that of the formal similarity between an inflation tax and a subsidy on marginal employment both work to raise the long run level of employment by changing the cost of adjusting from one short run equilibrium to another an inflation tax imposes a fine on firms or workers when wage rates rise too fast its aim is to reduce wages and so raise employment a marginal employment subsidy is designed to reward firms or workers when employment rises quickly its purpose too is to increase the level at which employment will be in equilibrium technically then these are both examples of the same sort of analytical problem each one requires that the relevant decision maker bear in mind that his life time utility depends on how quickly he alters his present behaviour each in other words is a problem in the calculus of variations not one in simple calculus there is now quite a large literature on the case for an inflation tax although it dates back at least twenty years the idea has become topical because of the work of richard jackman and richard layard most notably in layard

an investigation into the determinants of u s strike activity this paper outlines the steps involved in constructing a new panel dataset of u s contract negotiations and strike activity this data set has a much broader coverage of firms and unions than micro data sets analyzed to date key findings include the discovery that the variability and not the level of firm profitability affects the probability of a strike personal characteristics of the union workforce also emerge as key determinants of strike activity finally strikes are found to be more likely when the local labor market is tight but less likely when the industry labor market is tight copyright 1986 by american economic association

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

learning in sequential wage negotiations theory and evidence when union firm pairs bargain sequentially and when unobserved components of firms abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry we derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among followers than leaders in wage negotiations considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of canadian contract negotiations

the effects of public policy on strike duration hazard function estimates are utilized to analyze the effect of numerous public policy variables on strike duration based on 7 546 strikes in canada between 1967 and 1985 we find that only the mandatory strike vote substantially reduced conditional duration however the policy variables generally had a more favorable effect on reducing strike incidence so that on net they tended to reduce unconditional duration incidence times conditional duration specifically reduced unconditional duration was associated with the existence of conciliation and the requirement of a mandatory strike vote but the prohibition on replacement workers had a perverse effect

union wage determination in canadian and u s manufacturing 1964 1990 a comparative analysis the author analyzes nominal and real wage changes in unionized manufacturing firms in canada and the united states over the years 1964 90 he finds more differences between the countries patterns of wage determination in the years 1964 79 than have commonly been recognized in the 1980s the nominal wage determination structure changed more sharply in the united states than in canada real wage determination changed little in the united states before 1986 while after 1986 observed real wage growth was significantly smaller than what would have been predicted based on patterns of bargaining in earlier years in canada real wages in the 1980s were significantly higher than they would have been if the previous patterns of wage determination had persisted both the nominal and real wage change results suggest that unions in u s manufacturing fared poorly in wage bargaining in the 1980s by comparison with their canadian counterparts