price response information and asymmetry of price dispersion abstractin this study we examine how differently gasoline prices in 25 regions of seoul korea respond to asymmetric information between retailers and consumers we estimate the region specific li

rockets and feathers understanding asymmetric pricing prices rise like rockets but fall like feathers this stylized fact of most markets is con rmed by many empirical studies in this paper i develop a model with competitive rms and rational partially informed consumers where such asymmetric response to costs by rms emerges naturally in contrast to public opinion and past work collusion is not necessary to explain such result using a rich dataset of retail gasoline prices i nd the observed price dispersion pattern to be consistent with the model s prediction

comparison shopping as a simultaneous move game this paper analyzes simultaneous move models of comparison shopping it shows that the equilibria in wilde schwartz 1979 can be rationalized as symmetric mixed strategies in an appropriately defined game in which information acquisition costs are endogenous it also shown that in the simultaneous move version of salop stiglitz 1977 nonexistence of equilibrium is not a problem in fact a variety of forms of equilibria emerge in that model pure strategy mixed strategy and blends of the two copyright 1992 by royal economic society

prices and qualities a search model recently there has been substantial interest in the study of price and or quality dispersion in markets with costly information many of these studies focus on the problem of price dispersion assuming that the quality is fixed i e homogeneous good the most distinct feature of these models is the way information is gathered information can either be obtained through the purchase of a newspaper at some cost information purchase models or through costly sequential or nonsequential search search models each of these models identifies the conditions under which a rational expectation price dispersion equilibrium will exist in particular using an information purchase model with two classes of consumers with differential information costs salop stiglitz 15 show that equilibrium may be characterized by a high and a low price for a homogeneous good on the other hand wildeschwartz 18 show that there can be price dispersion if consumers have different propensities to search they assume that one class of consumers will shop only once and the other class will shop an exogenously determined number of times before purchasing in their model only certain price distributions are sustainable in equilibrium the salop stiglitz and wilde schwartz results are due to the ex ante heterogeneity of consumer types in an interesting paper burdett judd 3 have established that price dispersion can exist even when consumers are identical due to ex post heterogeneity in information while the price dispersion models are illuminating in explaining the differential prices in the markets they are limited by their abstraction from the quality uncertainty goods of heterogeneous qualities can be and are offered in a recent paper 6 using an information purchase model with two classes of consumers we have analyzed the price and quality equilibria by examining three different environments involving costly information i quality information costly price information costless ii price information costly

oil price shocks and european industries abstract we investigate the impact of oil price shocks at the industry level in the euro area for the period 1983 2007 we use different oil price specifications and use dynamic var models and multivariate regression to investigate how 38 different industries respond to oil price shocks we pay specific attention to the asymmetry of the industries responses regarding oil price increases and decreases we find that the impact of oil price shocks substantially differs along the different industries we find that the significance of this result also differs along the various oil price specifications the results are quite robust to the way in which we model the problem

equilibrium pricing in a partial search market the shopbot paradox abstract price competition is explored when consumers costlessly learn product prices but not ancillary fees and have greater disutility to paying these fees there is a unique symmetric nash equilibrium price between the competitive bertrand and monopoly diamond prices

european emission trading scheme and competitiveness a case study on the iron and steel industry abstract we quantify the impact of the european emission trading scheme ets on the two dimensions of competitiveness production and profitability for the iron and steel industry among those covered by the scheme this sector is one of the most exposed since it is both highly co 2 intensive and relatively open to international trade we also examine the robustness of these results to various assumptions marginal abatement cost curve trade and demand elasticities as well as pass through rates and updating of allocation rules of which the latter two are scarcely debated we conclude that for this sector competitiveness losses are small we prove this conclusion to be robust hence arguments against tightening the environmental stringency of the ets in phase ii are not justified on grounds of competitiveness loss our systematic sensitivity analysis allows us to identify the important assumptions for each output variable it turns out that pass through rates and updating rules are significant despite being often implicit and least debated in existing analyses

price dispersion in the lab and on the internet theory and evidence price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook bertrand competition we show that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion a variety of statistical tests based on datasets from two independent laboratory experiments and structural estimates of the parameters of our models suggest that bounded rationality based theories of price dispersion organize the data remarkably well evidence is also presented to suggest that the models are consistent with data from a leading internet price comparison site

number of sellers average prices and price dispersion abstract a variety of models provide differing predictions regarding the effect of an increase in the number of competitors in a market seller density on prices and price dispersion we review different approaches to generating equilibrium price dispersion and then empirically estimate the relationship between seller density average product price and price dispersion in the retail gasoline industry using four unique gasoline price data sets controlling for station level characteristics we find that an increase in station density consistently decreases both price levels and price dispersion across four geographical areas

declining reservation wages and learning empirical studies of job search strongly suggest that the reservation wages of unemployed job seeking individuals decline with the length of their respective unemployment spells previous explanations of this behaviour based on age effects liquidity constraints and limited unemployment benefits are not adequate we provide a new answer to this question based on the reasonable assumption that workers do not have precise knowledge of the distribution of the prevailing wages an individual model of job search and learning is formulated it is shown that the declining trend of reservation wages naturally arises due to the selection process when search costs are not too small the example of a normal wage offer distribution is analysed and the implications are discussed

austrian style gasoline price regulation how it may backfire in january 2011 a price regulation was established in the austrian gasoline market which prohibits firms from raising their prices more than once per day similar restrictions have been discussed in new york state and germany despite their intuitive appeal this article argues that austrian type policies may actually harm consumers in a two period duopoly model with consumer search i show that under the regulation firms will distort their prices intertemporally in such a way that their aggregate expected profit remains unchanged this implies that as some consumers find it optimal to delay their purchase due to expected price savings but find it inconvenient to do so a friction is introduced that decreases net consumer surplus in the market

optimal monetary policy and imperfect financial markets a case for negative nominal interest rates this article studies optimal monetary policy in a model with credit frictions and money demand we show that augmenting a standard new keynesian model with money demand and financial frictions generates a mechanism that in equilibrium gives rise to optimal negative nominal interest rates in addition we find that the tighter credit markets are the lower the optimal nominal policy interest rate and the more likely it is to be negative quantitatively when credit constraints are binding a standard calibration of the model generates an optimal nominal policy interest rate that is roughly 4 annually jel e31 e41 e43 e44 e52 e58

strategic pricing consumer search and the number of firms discover prices there are three distinct price dispersed equilibria characterized by low moderate and high search intensity the effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour expected prices price dispersion and welfare are sensitive i to the equilibrium consumers search intensity and ii to the status quo number of firms for instance when consumers search with low intensity an increase in the number of firms reduces search does not affect expected price leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare in contrast when consumers search with high intensity increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms a question that has received much attention in economic theory is how the number of competitors and market outcomes are related despite the existence of work showing the contrary see e g satterthwaite 1979 rosenthal 1980 the prediction that emerges from a market where firms interact in a cournot fashion has come to dominate economic thought namely that an increase in the number of competitors leads to larger aggregate production lower market price and improved market performance measured in terms of some social welfare criterion ruffin 1971 this paper challenges the generality of this belief by presenting an oligopoly model with consumer search where the equilibrium expected price may be constant increasing or nonmonotonic in the number of firms we present an economy with two types of consumers consumers who search for prices at no cost fully informed and consumers who must pay a fixed search cost for each price quotation they observe less informed 1 all buyers have the same willingness to pay for the good and buy either a single unit or nothing at all on the supply side of the market there are n firms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost we analyse a one shot simultaneous move game firms set prices and consumers decide how many prices to search for at the same moment in time our model is essentially an oligopolistic version of burdett and judd 1983 where some consumers search costlessly in this model consumers search using a fixed sample size search strategy i e they choose the number of prices to observe before receiving any offer nonsequential search is appealing when consumers find it more advantageous to gather price information quickly morgan and manning 1985 this occurs when the search outcome is observed with delay and delay is costly for instance an mba graduate looking for a job 1 the presence in the model of consumers who search costlessly captures the fact that some people have a

sticky prices and costly credit we develop a theory of money and credit as competing payment instruments then put it to work in applications agents use cash and credit because the former latter is subject to the inflation tax transaction costs frictions that make the choice of payment method interesting also imply equilibrium price dispersion we derive closed form solutions for money demand and show how to simultaneously account for the price change facts cash credit shares in micro data and money interest correlations in macro data the effects of inflation on welfare price dispersion and markups are discussed as are nonstationary equilibria with dynamics in the price distribution

non sequential consumer search and the consequences of a deregulation of trading hours abstract this paper analyzes the consequences of a liberalization of shopping hours in a market where consumers collect price information through non sequential search it is first shown that with as well as without restrictions on search time an equilibrium price distribution and possibly a single price equilibrium with the monopoly price exist then it is demonstrated that a liberalization is either ineffective or leads to price reductions increases in consumer welfare and larger market shares of more efficient firms

a tale of two correlations evidence and theory regarding the phase shift between the price level and output abstract we examine the relationship between the price level and output at business cycle frequencies in the postwar period there is evidence of a phase shift between the price level and output such a phase shift is manifested in the price level being countercyclical and the inflation rate being procyclical or acyclical depending on the detrending method used our examination takes three approaches first we apply bootstrapping methods to characterize the two correlations though the methodology could easily be extended to any set of facts second we specify a model economy with forecast heterogeneity showing numerically that this model economy can match the observed pair of correlations third we apply robust control theory deriving conditions in which the price level is countercyclical and the inflation rate is procyclical

price dispersion and demand uncertainty evidence from u s scanner data i use the prescott 1975 hotels model to explain variations in price dispersion across items sold by supermarkets in chicago the effect of demand uncertainty on price dispersion is highly significant and quantitatively important my estimates suggest that more than 40 of the cross sectional standard deviation of log prices is due to demand uncertainty i also find that price dispersion measures are negatively correlated with the average price but are not negatively correlated with the revenues from selling the good across stores and weeks and with the number of stores that sell the good temporary sales are modeled as a reaction to unwanted inventories that are accumulated when the realization of demand is low the effect of demand uncertainty on the frequency of temporary sales is also highly significant and quantitatively important items with more demand uncertainty tend to accumulate unwanted inventories more often and tend to have temporary sales more often

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

an empirical model of wage dispersion with sorting we estimate an equilibrium on the job search model with endogenous search intensity workers differ by skill firms by productivity workers respond to mismatch by intensive search and sorting may result from complementarities in the match level production function the model is estimated on danish matched employer employee data firms are ranked through revealed preference by the fraction of hires that is poached from other firms the poaching rank identification is obtained by firm rank conditional mobility and wage patterns wage variation is decomposed into four sources sorting 40 worker heterogeneity 32 firm heterogeneity 18 and frictional competition 10 a social planner can improve output net of search cost by 1 5 relative to the decentralized solution

price search and periodic price discounts this paper empirically investigates the interplay between buyer search behavior and firm pricing strategy in a commodity market where many firms compete in price to sell homogeneous products we use the heterogeneity in buyer search cost to rationalize why a firm offers periodic price discounts and enjoys a high profit in such a market an estimation method is proposed to recover the nonparametric distribution of buyer search cost from the price and transaction volume data with both data we show that the search cost distribution can be estimated nonparametrically in a sequential search model and estimation results from a nonsequential search model are robust to the assumption on the maximum number of searches we also show that the commonly observed high low pricing strategy can be an optimal strategy for firms when buyers search for price information sequentially as an empirical application we use the proposed method to estimate the two search models using data on a commodity product sold by a firm

steady state price distributions in a noisy search equilibrium abstract in a model of noisy search where customers repeat purchase this paper characterises an equilibrium where each store changes its price as its stock of regular customers changes through time as stores in the market are of different size and age price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome along the equilibrium path smaller younger stores announce lower prices and grow faster than larger established stores furthermore the youngest stores set prices below marginal cost to build business up quickly each is willing to take an early operating loss to attract customers quickly in anticipation of extracting customer switching rents in the future journal of economic literature classification numbers d40 l10

wage and technology dispersion this paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs stigler 1961 in equilibrium some firms adopt high fixed cost high productivity technologies offer high wages and fill job openings quickly other firms adopt less capital intensive technologies and offer low wages hiring mostly uninformed workers in equilibrium the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice we show that worker search which would appear to be a rent seeking activity in partial equilibrium may be efficiency enhancing in general equilibrium

equilibrium using credit or money with indivisible goods this note studies the trade of indivisible goods using credit or money in a frictional market we show how indivisibility matters for monetary equilibrium under different assumptions about price determination bargaining generates a price and allocation that are independent of the nominal interest or inflation rate over some range this is not the case with price posting and directed search in either case we provide conditions the nominal rate cannot be too high under which stationary monetary equilibrium exists and we show it is unique or generically unique

price dispersion and learning in a dynamic differentiated goods duopoly we study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes sometimes as highly differentiated as the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price differential there is scope for active learning by firms when information has low value to the firms they charge the same price as would be set by myopic players and there is no price dispersion when firms value information more highly on the other hand they actively learn by creating price dispersion such price dispersion arises in a cyclical fashion and is most likely to be observed when the firms environment changes sufficiently often but not too frequently firms payoffs are higher when they use correlated pricing strategies contrary to what one might expect such coordination need not hurt consumers provided they are sufficiently impatient

inflation price dispersion and market integration through the lens of a monetary search model monetary search theory implies that the real effects of inflation via its impact on price dispersion depend on the level of search costs and thus on the level of market integration for less integrated markets the inflation price dispersion nexus is predicted to be asymmetrically v shaped which results in an optimal inflation rate above zero for highly integrated markets with low search costs however the impact of inflation on price dispersion should only be small using price data of the european union member states this paper is the first that tests and confirms these predictions of monetary search theory

the role of policy in the great recession and the weak recovery it s been nearly five years since the recession of 2007 2009 ended by all accounts this very severe recession was followed by an extremely disappointing recovery economic growth dur ing the recovery has been far too slow to raise the employment to population ratio from the low levels to which it fell during the recession or to close materially the gap between real gdp and potential gdp in marked contrast to the rapid recovery from the previous severe recession in the early 1980s or from earlier severe recessions in us history when you include both the periods of the recession and the slow recovery economic instability has more than tripled according to a common measure of performance used by macroeconomists the standard deviation of the percentage gap between real gdp and potential gdp rose from 1 percent during 1984 2006 to 5 percent during 2007 2012 taylor 2013 in this paper i consider the role of economic policy in this poor economic performance i the shift in policy in evaluating the role of policy it is important to consider actions taken before during and after the financial panic in the fall of 2008 a careful look at the full decade from five years before to five years after the panic reveals that there was a significant shift in policy away from what worked reasonably well in the decades before broadly speaking monetary policy regulatory policy and fiscal policy each became more discretionary more interventionist and less predictable in the years leading up to the

costly search with adverse selection solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing we analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes a low quality seller benefits more from trade and therefore searches more intensively than a high quality seller this makes a seller s contact carry negative information but a seller s availability become a stronger indicator of high quality in the stationary environment the two effects exactly offset each other and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller in the nonstationary environment the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller

labor force participation and monetary policy in the wake of the great recession in this paper we provide compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post 2007 decline in the u s labor force participation rate we then proceed to formulate a stylized new keynesian model in which labor force participation is essentially acyclical during normal times that is in response to small or transitory shocks but drops markedly in the wake of a large and persistent aggregate demand shock finally we show that these considerations can have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy especially under circumstances in which adjustments to the short term interest rate are constrained by the zero lower bound

markets with search friction and the dmp model dale t mortensen delivered his prize lecture on 8 december 2010 at aula magna stockholm university this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

directed search coordination failure and seller profits an experimental comparison of posted pricing with single and multiple prices we experimentally examine posted pricing and directed search in one treatment capacity constrained sellers post fixed prices which buyers observe before choosing whom to visit in the other firms post both single buyer applied when one buyer visits and multibuyer when multiple buyers visit prices we find based on a 2 2 two buyers and two sellers market and a follow up experiment with 3 and 2 3 markets that multibuyer prices can be lower than single buyer prices or prices in the one price treatment also allowing the multibuyer price does not affect seller profits and increases market frictions

learning and price discovery in a search market we introduce learning into an otherwise standard two sided search and bargaining market there is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand in the high state buyers are on the long side otherwise they are on the short side in equilibrium prices are on average higher in the high state individual agents learn about the distribution while searching agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining position buyers may initially insist on a low price and sellers on a high price after successive failures to trade agents become increasingly pessimistic about the market conditions and soften their bargaining stance when frictions are small equilibrium transaction prices are approximately market clearing despite aggregate demand being unknown thus the search and bargaining procedure enables price discovery in a decentralized market

student portfolios and the college admissions problem we develop a decentralized bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges heterogeneous students and two realistic match frictions students find it costly to apply to college and college evaluations of their applications are uncertain students thus face a portfolio choice problem in their application decision while colleges choose admissions standards that act like market clearing prices enrollment at each college is affected by the standards at the other college through student portfolio reallocation in equilibrium student college sorting may fail weaker students sometimes apply more aggressively and the weaker college might impose higher standards applying our framework we analyse affirmative action showing how it induces minority applicants to construct their application portfolios as if they were majority students of higher caliber

price dispersion inflation and welfare we examine the implications of inflation for both price dispersion and welfare in a monetary search economy in our economy if the degree of buyers incomplete information about prices is fixed both price dispersion and real prices are increasing in inflation as the inflation rate approaches the friedman rule both price dispersion and welfare losses vanish if households choose the number of prices to observe then the optimal inflation rate may exceed the friedman rule as inflation induces search and up to a point raises welfare by eroding market power

equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs this study seeks to establish the empirical importance of price dispersion due to costly consumer search by examining retail prices for prescription drugs posted prices in two geographically distinct markets are shown to vary considerably across pharmacies within the same market even after one controls for variation due to pharmacy differences pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third of the observed price dispersion the empirical analysis hinges on the observation that consumers incentives to price shop depend on characteristics of the drug therapy cross sectional patterns in price distributions across drugs are consistent with the predictions of a search model prices for repeatedly purchased prescriptions for which the expected benefits of search are highest exhibit significant reductions in both dispersion and price cost margins

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

subjective price search and price competition abstract in this paper we study price rivalry between two firms facing a population of imperfectly informed buyers the two sellers are geographically dispersed and consumers search for the lowest price the competitive process either suffers from cyclical instability or stabilises at that price at which no buyer searches

a new suggestion for simplifying the theory of money we propose a new search theoretic model of monetary exchange with indivisible assets based on price posting instead of bargaining and incorporating noisy search this yields some familiar results plus a lot more the model admits multiple steady states due to the self referential nature of liquidity it admits cyclic chaotic and stochastic equilibria and compared to bargaining versions the dynamics are more general and have better microfoundations it generates price dispersion with interesting efficiency implications plus sticky prices and rational inattention parametric examples yield closed form solutions based on these results we suggest this should become a benchmark model in monetary economics

self confirming price dispersion in monetary economies abstract in a monetary economy we show that price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome without the need for costly simultaneous search or any heterogeneity in preferences production costs or search technologies a distribution of money holdings among buyers makes sellers indifferent across a set of posted prices leading to a non degenerate price distribution this price distribution in turn makes buyers indifferent across a range of money balances rationalizing the non degenerate distribution of money holdings we completely characterize the distribution of posted prices and money holdings in any equilibrium equilibria with price dispersion admit higher maximum prices than observed in any single price equilibrium and feature an increasing density of prices in contrast to existing theories price dispersion reduces welfare by creating mismatch between posted prices and money balances inflation exacerbates this welfare loss by shifting the distribution towards higher prices

price distributions and competition considerable evidence demonstrates that significant dispersion exists in the prices charged for seemingly homogeneous goods this paper adopts a simple flexible equilibrium model of search to investigate the way the market structure influences price dispersion using the noisy search approach the paper demonstrates the effects of having a single large price leading firm with multiple outlets and a competitive fringe of small firms with one retail outlet each

gambling in contests this paper presents a strategic model of risk taking behavior in contests formally we analyze an n player winner take all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed brownian motion with drift a player whose process reaches zero has to stop the player with the highest stopping point wins unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition here higher stopping times are riskier because players can go bankrupt we derive a closed form solution of a nash equilibrium outcome in equilibrium highest expected losses occur at an intermediate negative value of the drift

income taxation in a frictional labor market a new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation the model retains the dynamics of wage posting models while exogenizing search effort therefore allowing more insight into policy issues the results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account the optimal income tax should depend on an incidence effect between workers and firms this incidence effect arises from firms trying to lower wages as much as possible an employment tax proves in certain cases to be the best method to encourage labor force participation

posting multiple prices to reduce the effectiveness of consumer price search in a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes this leads to added monopoly power for these firms and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher there is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour however consumers might search more or less with multiple prices the implications for the price setting equilibrium competition policy and recent judgements are considered

it s about time implications of the period length in an equilibrium search model empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month i analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous time model with bilateral meetings whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers in this environment i show that the period length has a profound effect on equilibrium outcomes including the unemployment rate unemployment duration and the cross sectional wage distribution

maximum likelihood estimation of search costs abstract in a recent paper hong and shum 2006 using price distributions to estimate search costs rand journal of economics 37 257 275 present a structural method to estimate search cost distributions we extend their approach to the case of oligopoly and present a new maximum likelihood method to estimate search costs we apply our method to a data set of online prices for different computer memory chips the estimates suggest that the consumer population can be roughly split into two groups which either have quite high or quite low search costs search frictions confer a significant amount of market power to the firms despite more than 20 firms operating in each of the markets we estimate price cost margins to be around 25 the paper also illustrates how the structural method can be employed to simulate the effects of the introduction of a sales tax

on the future of macroeconomics a new monetarist perspective this article argues that a pressing goal for macroeconomics is to incorporate financial considerations but we need models with solid microfoundations in particular the use of assets in facilitating exchange as well as different credit or other financial arrangements should be outcomes of not inputs to theories as a preview i suggest that mainstream macro does a good job explaining many phenomena and a financial crisis does not disprove such theory but understanding crises requires better incorporating factors related to money credit banking and liquidity the approach called new monetarist economics can help a lot in this regard

price discrimination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising a model of advertising and price distributions is investigated whereby each seller can contact different buyers whose preferences are identical with different probabilities the model features a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the ratio of the buyers contacted by one seller differing across market segments and by the other sellers in general the sellers practice price discrimination across segments more asymmetric equilibria correspond to higher volumes of transactions and higher expected transaction prices this results in a lower expected utility for the buyers and higher expected profits thus identifying areas of influence can help the sellers to support collusion

sticky prices a new monetarist approach why do some sellers set nominal prices that apparently do not respond to changes in the aggregate price level in many models prices are sticky by assumption here it is a result we use search theory with two consequences prices are set in dollars since money is the medium of exchange and equilibrium implies a nondegenerate price distribution when the money supply increases some sellers may keep prices constant earning less per unit but making it up on volume so profit stays constant the calibrated model matches price change data well but in contrast to typical sticky price models money is neutral jel e52 e31 e42

the provision of information in a bertrand oligopoly a two stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining costless information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting a perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by positive expected profits an alternati ve interpretation of the model is of firms deciding the proportion of contracts to tender for and then the prices at which the tenders wil l be made copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

production costs of the chemical industry in the eu and other countries ammonia methanol and light olefins abstract our study compares chemical production costs in the european union eu and other countries in order to understand whether these costs are higher in the case of europe than in other countries our analysis focuses on ammonia methanol and light olefins ethylene and propylene as all of them are considered chemical compounds produced in large scale the countries selected for comparison are usa russia ukraine and saudi arabia since they have high shares of extra eu28 trade and or the global installed capacity of the selected products a bottom up approach based on information at facility level has been followed including 116 29 122 and 224 facilities producing ammonia methanol ethylene and propylene respectively taking into consideration the complex differences in technologies and co products between operators costs are broken down to six components 1 feedstock 2 credits due to co products 3 electricity 4 thermal energy 5 other materials chemicals catalysts etc and 6 labour and other costs salaries overheads etc our findings suggest that it is not easy to reach a common conclusion about the whole chemical industry overall costs compare more favourably among countries than initially thought in the case of processes producing co products but maybe less favourably when processes are without co products the european industry has lower production costs than the industries in the other countries in the case of ethylene and propylene but higher in the case of ammonia and methanol feedstock costs play the most important role in the total production costs of all four products but the presence of credits due to by products could change the behaviour of the total costs

can we restart the recovery all over again abstract many have argued that a deviation from good economic policy has been a cause of the poor u s economic performance of the past decade and that policy reforms are needed to restore strong g

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

equilibrium in servicing industries an economic application of queuing theory the purpose of this article is to investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which service an d waiting time play an important role the author shows that if consu mers do not know which firms are charging which prices all firms cha rge the same price if firms reveal their prices by advertising the market separates with consumers with a high low cost of time buying from firms with high low prices and short long queues if firms are allowed to advertise they will but they benefit from a collusiv e agreement restricting advertisement provided the agreement is enfo rceable copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

semi nonparametric estimation of consumer search costs this paper studies the estimation of the distribution of non sequential search costs we show that the search cost distribution is identified by combining data from multiple markets with common search technology but varying consumer valuations firms costs and numbers of competitors to exploit such data optimally we provide a new method based on semi nonparametric estimation we apply our method to a dataset of online prices for memory chips and find that the search cost density is essentially bimodal such that a large fraction of consumers searches very little whereas a smaller fraction searches a relatively large number of stores copyright c 2012 john wiley sons ltd

demand shocks and open economy puzzles abstract we pose good markets frictions on top of an otherwise standard two country international real business cycle irbc model shopping for goods takes effort which prevents perfect matching between customers and producers an increase in search effort implies increased measured productivity demand shocks increase expenditures and search effort simultaneously increasing output consumption productivity and the trade deficit and appreciating the real exchange rate thus we solve the backus smith puzzle and we show that the cross country correlation of consumption is higher than that of output standard irbc models cannot account for these puzzles along with movements in tfp

consumer search costs and preferences on the internet we conduct an empirical analysis of consumer preferences and search costs on an internet platform using data from a major french platform priceminister we show descriptive evidence of substantial price dispersion among adverts for the same product of consumers often not choosing the cheapest advert and sometimes choosing an advert dominated in price and non price characteristics by another available advert we consider a sequential search model where consumers sample adverts in an endogenous order based on their preferences and search costs we show that the optimal search and purchase strategy can be characterized by a set of inequalities which can feasibly be tested on transaction and advert data this allows us to estimate for each transaction a set of preference and search cost parameter values thus allowing for flexible consumer heterogeneity in preferences and search costs the estimated model can then describe a wide range of consumer search and purchase behaviours we find that the model can explain almost all transactions in the data and requires non zero preferences and search costs for at least 50 and 22 respectively of observations we also find evidence of heterogeneous and sometimes substantial search costs

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

shopping externalities and self fulfilling unemployment fluctuations we propose a novel theory of self fulfilling fluctuations in the labor market a firm employing an additional worker generates positive externalities on other firms because employed workers have more income to spend and have less time to shop for low prices than unemployed workers we quantify these shopping externalities and show that they are sufficiently strong to create s complementarities in the employment decisions of different firms and to generate multiple rational expectations equilibria equilibria differ with respect to agents rational expectations about future unemployment we show that negative shocks to agents expectations lead to fluctuations in vacancies unemployment labor productivity and the stock market that closely resemble those observed in the us during the great recession

multiproduct pricing in oligopoly abstract this paper proposes a two good model of price competition where some consumers visit all shops and others visit only one we find that information frictions lead to price dispersion when the two goods are complements their prices will tend to be negatively correlated so if one is priced high the other will be discounted this finding is supported by some empirical evidence which suggests that simultaneous price discounts of complements are infrequent if the goods are substitutes their prices will be uncorrelated potentially rationalizing the lack of evidence on their co pricing when selling complements retailers earn higher profits than in the one good model through taxing captive consumers with a high overall price tag and attracting shoppers by pricing one of the goods aggressively bundling practices are thus shown to be detrimental to retailers profits

search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets abstract a leading explanation for price dispersion in posted price markets is search costs we incorporate this insight into a model of competing second price auctions similar to ebay by doing so we extend the narrow literature on competing auctions to capture price dispersion and grow the already large literature on price dispersion to include auctions we provide evidence on search costs and price dispersion using data collected from ebay identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to ebay s search tool

geographical dispersion of consumer search behaviour abstractthis article investigates whether consumer search behaviour differs across zip codes within the u s as an application daily gasoline price data covering virtually all gas stations within the u s are employed to estimate the distribution of search costs in each zip code the results show that there are significant differences across zip codes regarding the expected number of searches achieved before consumers purchase gasoline in order to have a systematic explanation such differences are further connected to geographic demographic and economic conditions of the zip codes in a secondary analysis the corresponding results imply several strategies for gas stations in order to maximize profits markups suggestions follow for policy makers and regulators to reduce redistributive effects of information barriers across locations

asymmetric marginal costs in search models abstract i show that marginal cost asymmetry has important implications for search models in several widely used search models with mixed strategy equilibria excluding some special cases firms with different marginal costs cannot randomize prices in the same interval so even a small asymmetry in marginal costs may result in a drastic asymmetry in equilibrium prices

equilibrium price dispersion with sequential search abstract the paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers buyers search sequentially for sellers but do not meet every seller with the same probability specifically a fraction of the buyers meetings lead to one particular large seller while the remaining meetings lead to one of a continuum of small sellers in this environment the small sellers would like to set a price that makes the buyers indifferent between purchasing the good and searching for another seller the large seller would like to price the small sellers out of the market by posting a price that is low enough to induce buyers not to purchase from the small sellers these incentives give rise to a game of cat and mouse whose only equilibrium involves mixed strategies for both the large and the small sellers the fact that the small sellers play mixed strategies implies that there is price dispersion the fact that the large seller plays mixed strategies implies that prices and allocations vary over time we show that the fraction of the gains from trade accruing to the buyers is positive and nonmonotonic in the degree of market power of the large seller as long as the large seller has some positive but incomplete market power the fraction of the gains from trade accruing to the buyers depends in a natural way on the extent of search frictions

job search with bidder memories this paper revisits the no recall assumption in job search models with take it or leave it offers workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments firms account for this difference when hiring a worker when a worker first meets a firm the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future the pair share the gains to trade in this case the diamond paradox no longer holds

competitive price and quality under asymmetric information we present an analysis of equilibrium in markets with asymmetrically informed consumers some consumers know both price and quality of all sellers whereas others know neither but may search among sellers the equilibrium correlation between price and quality generally increases with the level of information in the market and can be negative when this level is sufficiently small a meta analysis of the available empirical studies strongly supports the model s predictions

multiproduct equilibrium price dispersion abstract the model of burdett and judd econometrica51 1993 955 969 is generalized to the case of may goods consumers choose the best price observed for each good there are two classes of equilibria those that involve constant expected profits for each good independently of price and those with increasing profits for each good in price a continuum of the latter type always exists these equilibria are qualitatively different than the unique equilibrium of the single good case journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d43 l13

price dispersion in the small and in the large evidence from an internet price comparison site this paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1 000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http shopper com we find little support for the notion that prices on the internet are converging to the law of one price in addition observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices the difference between the two lowest prices the gap averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices and falls to 3 5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices these empirical results are an implication of a general clearinghouse model of equilibrium price dispersion

search theory the 2010 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences this paper surveys search theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the 2010 laureates for the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences peter diamond dale mortensen and christopher pissarides

costly search capacity constraints and bertrand equilibrium price dispersion this article analyzes the impact of transaction search costs and capacity constraints in an almost competitive market with homogeneous firms that compete on price we characterize conditions under which nash equilibria with price dispersion exist in equilibrium firms play pure strategies in prices and consumers adopt a symmetric mixed search strategy price dispersion is possible even though consumers all have the same search cost and valuation for the item and prices charged by all firms are common knowledge

rational buyers search when prices increase abstract we develop a dynamic pricing model motivated by observed patterns in business to business and some business to customer transactions seller costs are perfectly correlated and evolve according to a markov process in every period each buyer observes for free the price set by their current supplier but not the other sellers prices or the sellers common cost level by paying a cost s the buyer becomes active and benefits from bertrand competition among sellers we show that there exists a semi separating equilibrium whereby sellers increase price immediately when costs increase and otherwise decrease price gradually moreover buyers become active when prices increase but not otherwise in sum we deliver a theory whereby buyers become active search if and only if their supplier increases price

the euro changeover and its effects on price transparency and inflation despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no effect on prices european consumers perceived the opposite to shed some light on this puzzle we develop a model of imperfect information in which cheaper goods experience higher price growth after the changeover retailers aware of consumers difficulties in adopting the new currency use currency changeovers to increase profits by increasing prices the lower the price transparency after the changeover the higher the euro related inflation using data on inflation eurostat and price levels economist intelligence unit we show that although the euro changeover did not significantly increase inflation it nevertheless had a distortionary effect on prices after the changeover cheaper goods had higher inflation and this effect was stronger in countries in which people found dealing with the new currency problematic

money capital and exchange rate fluctuations we explore how the informational frictions underlying monetary exchange aect international exchange rate dynamics our perfectly exible price model is capable of producing endogenously rigid international relative prices in response to technology and monetary shocks the model is capable of accounting for the empirical regularities that the real and nominal exchange rates are more volatile than u s output and that the two are positively and perfectly correlated the model is also consistent with other standard real business cycle facts for the u s jel classication e31 e32 e43 e44

collusion with intertemporal price dispersion we develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion dispersion clouds consumer price awareness encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price for less patient firms monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales the most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble edgeworth cycles low consumer attentiveness enhances the effectiveness of price dispersion by reducing the payoff to deviations involving price reductions however for sufficiently low attentiveness price rises are also a concern

consumer protection and the incentive to become informed we discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumer incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market in a market with costly consumer search we find that imposing a cap on suppliers prices reduces the incentive to engage in search with the result that prices paid by consumers both informed and uninformed may rise in a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off

search costs and efficiency do unemployed workers search enough many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search the impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs in this paper we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the dutch labor market in our model the wage distribution job search intensities and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium given the distribution of search intensities which we directly observe we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non market time these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities from a social point of view some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold up problem while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent seeking behavior our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare improving

search costs and corporate income tax competition abstract if a small cost applies for learning the corporate tax rules in different countries this can completely eliminate tax competition this modified version of the diamond paradox and can also explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

pricing and signaling with frictions abstract we study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites observing sellers choices of prices and sites but not quality buyers choose which site to visit a seller s choices of prices can direct buyers search and signal quality a unique equilibrium exists and is separating when the quality differential is large the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information otherwise the quality of goods and or the number of sites created is inefficient due to a conflict between the search directing and signaling roles of prices