regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

technological innovation and real investment booms and busts abstract we investigate why new high risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment we develop an equilibrium model in which rational risk averse agents overinvest in a risky technology possibly to the point that its expected return is negative overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with keeping up with the joneses properties that can induce herding because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology our model can explain why new risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

the european umts auctions abstract in this paper we review and draw some lessons from the umts auctions that have taken place in europe during 2000 and 2001 we address several design issues and in particular focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion an outlook is provided to several other auctions in which the stakes may not be so high but the design issues perhaps somewhat more complex

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

policy watch medicare public policies are often made without much recourse to economic reasoning economists are sometimes unaware of what is happening in the world of public affairs as a result both the quality of public decision making and the role that economists play in it are less than optimal this feature contains short articles on topics that are currently on the agendas of policymakers thus illustrating the role of economic analysis in illuminating current debates suggestions for future columns and comments on past ones should be sent to daniel weinberg c o journal of economic perspectives hhes division bureau of the census department of commerce washington d c 20233

impacts of meat product recalls on consumer demand in the usa the impact of meat product recall events on consumer demand beef pork poultry and other consumption goods in the usa is tested empirically beef pork and poultry recall indices are constructed from both the food safety inspection service s meat recall events and from newspaper reports over the period 1982 1998 following previous product recall studies recall indices are incorporated as shift variables in consumers demand functions estimating an absolute price version of the rotterdam demand model findings indicate that food safety inspection service s meat recall events significantly impact demand and newspaper reports do not moreover although elasticities related to recall events are significant they are small in magnitude relative to price and income effects any favourable effects on the demands of meat substitutes for a recall are offset by a more general negative effect on meat demand the general negative effect indicates a shift out of meat to non meat consumption goods

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

demand systems estimation with microdata a censored regression approach demand systems estimation increasingly makes use of household level microdata mainly to measure the effects of demographic variables data based on these household expenditure surveys present a major estimation problem for any given household many of the goods have zero consumption implying a censored dependent variable techniques which do not take this censored dependent variable into account will yield biased results we utilize a censored regression approach that is computationally simple consistent and asymptotically efficient the results are then presented and compared with those obtained using an uncensored technique

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights we demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms when future market profit is uncertain winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket if firms differ in risk attitudes auctions select the least risk averse firm which in turn set a higher price or a higher quantity in case quantity is the decision variable in the marketplace than an average firm

disaggregated household meat demand with censored data previous research on meat demand has generally used highly aggregated data across time products and consumers however meat products across species are likely stronger substitutes than some products from the same species further demand for specific meat products would be expected to respond differently to market information about food safety or other events this study uses monthly consumer panel data collected between 1992 and 2000 to estimate a disaggregated meat product demand system the use of the expectations maximization algorithm is introduced to estimate a demand system that adjusts for the econometric problem of censored data resulting from purchased shares of some products by individuals often being equal to zero results indicate that certain individual meat products have noticeably different own price elasticities than existing aggregate meat product estimates of their respective species some individual meat products have stronger substitutes across species than within species e g be

on price indices in the almost ideal demand system a number of papers have discussed the relationship between the almost ideal demand system aids and its linear approximation la aids in this paper it is shown that if the prices in the system are normalized to one the aids and la aids representations are identical at the point of normalization also at the point of normalization the expressions for price and expenditure elasticities from both systems are identical

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

a demand systems analysis of food commodities by u s households segmented by income using the 1987 88 nationwide food consumption survey twelve food commodity groups were analyzed according to household poverty status parameter estimates were used to obtain subsistence expenditures own price elasticities expenditure elasticities and income elasticities own price elasticities were similar between the income groups for most commodities however income elasticities were consistently higher for the lower income group the use of average estimates of price and income elasticities for the population as a whole for the projection of individual commodity demands is not likely to be successful if notable changes are evident in income distribution

demand for beef and chicken products separability and structural change several studies have indicated that the recent shift from beef to poultry in consumption is not entirely caused by changes in rela tive prices or income braschler chavas dahlgran hudson and vertin moschini and meilke frank thurman most studies of structural change have focused on red meat consumption only thurman has looked closely at the poultry market and no one has considered poultry products yet the mix of chicken products marketed changed dramat ically during the last twenty years and should have influenced aggregate meat demand the share of broiler slaughter marketed as whole birds declined from 74 in 1965 to 28 in 1985 while cut up parts and processed chick en products increased from 26 to 72 whole birds are inferior goods and cut up parts and processed chicken are normal goods haidacher et al the shift in chicken prod uct mix away from whole birds should have increased the preference for total chicken in this article two related questions are ad dressed first do consumers allocate expendi tures among meats by animal origin or by product type second does disaggregation of meat into products in a meat demand model give insight into the causes of structural

know how and asset complementarity and dynamic capability accumulation the case of r d dynamic capabilities enable firms to create new products and processes and respond to changing market conditions this empirical investigation of dynamic r d capabilities deals with the role of complementary know how and other assets in the context of changing conditions in the u s petroleum industry during the 1970s and early 1980s the analysis suggests that in response to rising oil prices firms with larger amounts of complementary technological knowledge and physical assets also undertook larger amounts of r d on coal conversion a synthetic fuels process 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

welfare losses under cournot competition abstract in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical compete in quantities and produce with constant returns the percentage of welfare losses pwl is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases we study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms we provide exact formulae of pwl and robust constructions of markets were pwl is close to one in these two cases we show that the market structure that maximizes pwl is either monopoly or dominant firm depending on demand finally we prove that pwl is minimized when all firms are identical a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of pwl downwards

an economic perspective on auctions the recent spectrum auctions in europe have shown that serious problems can wise in auctions where multiple complementary objects are being sold such as blocks of radio spectrum that will subsequently be used by the wining bidders to compete against each other in downstream markets other important instances of such situations include take off and landing slots at airports and rights for electricity and gas transmission t i first review some of the theory describing multi object auctions i i next outline the importance of strategic effects arising in auctions that are followed by competition between the bidders and the tension arising between various goals such as efficiency and revenue maximization although more flexible auction formats can have virtues particularly in taking into account complementarities they can also be manipulated by bidders to build market power to the detriment of consumers we next apply these insights to the recent european umts licence auctions finally we draw the main conclusions and policy implications

wages and productivity growth in a competitive industry abstract we describe the evolution of productivity growth in a competitive industry with free entry and exit the exogenous wage rate determines the firms engagement in labor productivity enhancing process innovation there is a unique steady state of the industry dynamics which is globally asymptotically stable in the steady state the number of active firms their unit labor cost and supply depend on the growth rate but not on the level of the wage rate in addition to providing comparative statics of the steady state the paper characterizes the industry s adjustment path

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

speculative profits innovation and growth when technological change affects the prices of tradeable assets innovators can obtain speculative profits by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations we propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument originally due to hirshleifer 1971 we then use the model to assess two claims advanced by hirshleifer namely that speculative profits can generate excessive investment in r d when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection or else even in a perfectly competitive economy the analysis confirms the first claim but casts doubts on the second one jel o30 o40

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

bidding for the future signaling in auctions with an aftermarket abstract this paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions when bidders wish to exaggerate their private information equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid signaling is most prominent in second price auctions where equilibrium bids are above value in english and first price auctions signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice the opportunity to signal lowers bidders payoffs and raises revenue when bidders understate their private information separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient

producer opportunism in retailing contracts this paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints it considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation it shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee this conclusion holds for various opportunistic strategies direct eviction of initial retailers excessive entry of new retailers on the market or resale price maintenance used to encourage voluntary exit of initial retailers

public monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions we estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government controlled retailing on entry patterns in the absence of the pennsylvania liquor control board the state would have roughly 2 5 times the current number of stores higher consumer surplus and lower payments to liquor store employees with just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing government operation mitigates but does not eliminate free entry s bias against rural consumers we find only limited evidence of political influence on entry jel d42 d72 l11 l12 l43 l81

does food safety information impact u s meat demand a theoretical model of consumer response to publicized food safety information on meat demand is developed with an empirical application to u s meat consumption evidence is found for the existence of pre committed levels of consumption seasonal factors time trends and contemporaneous own and cross commodity food safety concerns the average demand response to food safety concerns is small especially in comparison to price effects and to previous estimates of health related issues this small average effect masks periods of significantly larger responses corresponding with prominent food safety events but these larger impacts are short lived with no apparent food safety lagged effects on food safety concerns in the united states have dramatically increased in the past decade with regard to incidences of contaminated meat products concerns have arisen because contaminated meat products can result in serious risk to the well being and health of consumers contamination comes from a myriad of sources including but not limited to outbreaks of listeria monocytogenes escherichia coli e coli and salmonella centers for disease control and prevention food safety problems are not isolated to the united states as other unsafe contaminates in meats have emerged across the world including highly publicized outbreaks of bovine spongiform encephalopathy bse in europe the potential impacts of publicized food safety events on consumer s demand for meat products in the united states include own effects on the demand for the contaminated meat involved as well as cross effects impacting the demand for other meats the objective of this article is to investigate whether publicized food safety concerns surrounding beef pork and poultry chicken and turkey have impacted meat consumption food safety indices are constructed separately for beef pork and poultry

awarding telecom licences the recent european experience this paper analyses the procedures used by different european countries for awarding spectrum licences to potential operators of third generation 3g mobile telephone networks we contrast market based methods such as auctions with bureaucratic methods such as beauty contests they have been used for decisions about two major questions 1 how many licences should be awarded and how much spectrum should each licence give access to 2 which companies should receive which licences and how much should they pay for their licences most countries used a bureaucratic process to answer the first question however germany austria and greece were different and constructed auctions in which the number and size of licences were determined by the auction itself as for the second question there was much variation between countries and both auctions and beauty contests were popular methods we have four main findings first the bureaucratic procedure used by most countries to answer the first question led to companies concealing relevant information from the authorities second while firms may have tried to manipulate the procedures used in germany austria and greece to deter entry to their markets they were surprisingly unsuccessful in this third the traditional economic criticisms of beauty contests seem to apply to some but not to all those that were conducted finally the bidding strategies adopted by the telecom companies were often more complex than those predicted by economic theory

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

prices poaching and protein alternatives an analysis of bushmeat consumption around serengeti national park tanzania abstract the consumption of meat from wild animals or bushmeat occurs throughout africa and highlights the conflict between two distinct development goals food security and biodiversity conservation growing human populations throughout the greater serengeti ecosystem rely heavily on bushmeat as a source of protein which places pressure on migratory wildlife populations this paper uses unique data from protein consumption surveys from 131 households over 34 months in a generalizable empirical framework to estimate price cross price and expenditure elasticities of protein sources and analyze the potential economic effects of policies to mitigate bushmeat hunting and consumption results suggest that 1 directly increasing the price of bushmeat through enforcement or other policies to reduce supply will have the most direct and largest effect of bushmeat consumption 2 increasing income increases bushmeat consumption as well as consumption of other meat sources 3 if surrounding fisheries experience a negative shock or collapse this will lead to a dramatic increase in bushmeat consumption overall these results strongly indicate that policies to reduce bushmeat hunting while maintaining food security must be considered in a broad and comprehensive framework

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

the effect of leverage on bidding behavior theory and evidence from the fcc auctions this is an exploration of how bidding behavior of firms in various auctions is affected by their capital structure the theoretical model considers a first price sealed bid and an english auction we find that as debt levels increase firms tend to reduce their bids the lower bids give the competition incentives to reduce their bids as well these results are investigated empirically using data from the 1994 1995 fcc spectrum auctions consistent with the theoretical model higher debt levels of the bidding firm and of the competition tend to lead to lower bids additional determinants of bidding behavior in these auctions are also analyzed copyright 2002 oxford university press

the cost effectiveness of conservation payments international donors invest billions of dollars to conserve ecosystems in low income nations the most common investments aim to encourage commercial activities such as ecotourism that indirectly generate ecosystem protection as a joint product we demonstrate that paying for ecosystem protection directly can be far more cost effective although direct payment initiatives have imposing institutional requirements we argue that all conservation initiatives face similar challenges thus conservation practitioners would be well advised to implement the first best direct payment approach rather than a secondbest policy option an empirical example illustrates the spectacular cost savings that can be realized by direct payment initiatives

elasticities in aids models in the literature a variety of approaches have been used to calculate demand elasticities in almost ideal demand system aids models of demand it is common to estimate the linear approximate almost ideal demand system la aids instead of the aids when the la aids is estimated all of the previously reported approaches to compute elasticities are theoretically incorrect this paper presents correct formulas for la aids elasticities and illustrates the potential errors from using incorrect computing the almost ideal demand system aids of deaton and muellbauer 1980a b has become popular in recent years anderson and blundell blanciforti and green 1983a b blanciforti green and king chalfant eales and unnevehr fujii khaled and mak fulponi heien and willett murray parsons ray a variety of approaches to computing elasticities has been used and some of the approaches may lead to significant errors this paper clarifies the differences between alternative approaches to estimating demand elasticities in aids models

the costs of free entry an empirical study of real estate agents in greater boston this paper studies the consequences of xed commissions and low entry barriers in greater boston s real estate brokerage industry from 1998 2007 a period with substantial agent turnover we nd that entry is not associated with increased sales probabilities or reduced sales time instead it decreases the market share of experienced agents and reduces average service quality we develop a dynamic empirical model motivated by these patterns to study the extent of ineciency in the current system compared to alternatives to accommodate a large state space we approximate the value function using sieves and impose the bellman equation as an equilibrium constraint if commissions are cut in half there would be 40 fewer agents implying social savings of 23 of industry revenue and the average agent would facilitate 73 more transactions house price appreciation of 50 during our sample period accounts for a 24 increase in the number of agents and a 31 decline in average agent productivity finally improving information about past agent performance can increase productivity and generate signicant social savings

social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry we provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of entry by showing that if the input supplier has market power social desirability of entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology but it can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive hence the anti competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies

equilibrium product bundling this article offers an equilibrium theory of product bundling by rival firms in several models where a primary good is produced in a duopoly market and one or more other goods is produced under perfectly competitive conditions bundling is shown to emerge as an equilibrium strategy of one or both of the duopolists for its role as a product differentiation device when the rival firms can commit to bundling sales their profits are higher but social welfare is reduced copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

market r d allocations when research paths are product specific a compared to the social optimum individual firms undertook too little rd b too many firms entered the competition to undertake rd2 c if the elasticity of demand were sufficiently low aggregate rd

standard auctions with identity dependent externalities i analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in the open ascending bid auction with identity dependent externalities with reciprocal externalities the allocation is determined by bidders consumption values alone with large nonreciprocal externalities the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed bid auctions the progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payoff reducing externalities the associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price and relative to sealed bid auctions bidders experience less ex post regret

how not to run auctions the european 3g telecom auctions abstract there were enormous differences in the revenues from the european third generation 3g or umts mobile phone license auctions from 20 euros per capita in switzerland to 650 euros per capita in the uk though the values of the licenses sold were similar poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants the sequencing of the auctions was also crucial we discuss the auctions in the uk netherlands germany italy austria switzerland belgium greece and denmark

auctions as coordination devices this paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices at the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction i show that when there are two licenses for sale the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount almost equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices with three or more licenses the auction format co determines whether or not the forward induction argument works

price fixing policy abstract the prohibition against price fixing is competition law s most important and least controversial provision yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing and prevalent understandings cannot be reconciled with principles of oligopoly theory this article 1 presents a fundamental reconceptualization of our understanding of horizontal agreements 2 develops a systematic analysis of price fixing policy that focuses on its deterrence benefits and chilling costs and 3 compares this direct approach to commentators favored formulations that typically involve some sort of formalistic communications based prohibition by targeting a subset of means rather than the illicit ends conventional formulations tend to impose liability in cases with lower deterrence benefits and greater chilling costs than those reached under a direct approach and to incur greater administrative costs as well

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

what causes over investment in r d in endogenous growth models endogenous growth models may exhibit either under or over investment in r d the possibility of over investment is generally attributed to a business stealing effect that arises as the latest innovator destroys and or appropriates previous incumbent s rents we argue that this conventional wisdom is misleading in standard models business stealing by itself cannot result in excessive r d we explain the other effects that must be at work here thus contributing towards a better understanding of when and why the market may be biased towards excessive r d

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

license auctions when winning bids are financed through debt we study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold and winning bidders finance their bids on the debt market higher bids imply higher debts which affects product market competition when debt induces firms to compete more aggressively retail prices are lower than in a model without debt as are auction revenues when debt induces firms to compete less aggressively retail prices are higher than in a model without debt and the effect on auction revenues is ambiguous net firm profits are always higher than in a model without debt due to endogenous credit rationing

does auctioning of entry licences induce collusion an experimental study we use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost this argument is not uncontested though and this paper puts it to an experimental test our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly these results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits in oligopoly entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path in monopoly taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit maximizing price

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed