renegotiation and the efficiency of investments in a long term relationship between two parties one party s threat of a unilateral violation of an initial contract may induce a renegotiation of the contract as a renegotiation may result in one party capturing some of the return from the other s investments this possibility may lead to underinvestment i show that if there is uncertainty associated with the outcome of a renegotiation and if players are risk averse there will be an interval for the initial contract so that it is not renegotiated by an appropriate choice of the initial contract underinvestment can thus be avoided

the role of application assistance and information in college decisions results from the h r block fafsa experiment growing concerns about low awareness and take up rates for government support programs like college financial aid have spurred calls to simplify the application process and enhance visibility we present results from a randomized field experiment in which low income individuals receiving tax preparation help were also offered immediate assistance and a streamlined process to complete the free application for federal student aid fafsa for themselves or their children treated participants were also provided with aid estimates that were compared against tuition cost amounts for nearby colleges the combined assistance and information treatment substantially increased fafsa submissions and ultimately the likelihood of college attendance persistence and aid receipt in particular high school seniors whose parents received the treatment were 8 percentage points more likely to have completed two years of college going from 28 to 36 during the first three years following the experiment families who received aid information but no assistance with the fafsa did not experience improved outcomes the findings suggest many other opportunities for using personal assistance to increase participation in programs that require filling out forms to become eligible jel codes i2 h4 j24 copyright 2012 oxford university press

delegated portfolio management abstract a problem of screening agents with privately known forecasting abilities and reservation utilities and then eliciting truthful information from these agents once they are employed is considered for the case of risk averse agents and large principals an approximately optimal solution is constructively characterized under the assumption that payoffs are normally distributed a significant extension of the definnetti savage probability elicitation result is developed under this extension knowledge of agent preferences is not required when the underlying conditional distributions are symmetric and this fact is exploited to solve the screening problem in a mean variance formulation

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

the effects of incentive compensation contracts on the risk and return performance of commodity trading advisors this paper shows that commodity trading advisors ctas investment performance may be partially explained by their incentive compensation contracts contracts include base incentive and asset parameters the relationships between contract parameters and performance are theoretically indeterminate but are examined here empirically results indicate that incentive parameters are positively related to return means and standard deviations the dollar amounts of assets ctas manage are negatively related to return means and standard deviations supporting elton et al s 1987 1989 finding that cta performance falls after public offerings of commodity funds intuitively since dollar fees are a function of assets at the higher asset and fee levels achieved through commodity fund offerings ctas may safeguard assets and fees by pursuing less risky investment strategies

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

renegotiation design and contract solutions to the hold up problem abstract this paper surveys the literature on contractual solutions to the hold up problem which has addressed the issue of how to design the optimal contractual arrangement to achieve efficient investments in the presence of contract incompleteness although scholars have argued that renegotiation design is a necessary condition to avoid the hold up problem some recent papers have seriously questioned this condition we mainly show that renegotiation design remains a necessary condition to implement efficient investments

noncooperative bargaining hostages and optimal asset ownership this paper re examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels it obtains some results which contradict findings by sanford j grossman oliver d hart and john moore in particular it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser s investment incentive the difference between this paper and those authors papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining this paper also clarifies the role of relationship specific investments as a cause of integration copyright 1998 by american economic association

reservation wage and optimal contract for experts abstract we examine the optimal contract for experts with type dependent reservation wage we show that bhattacharya and pfleiderer 1985 s result the possibility of achieving the truthful revelation of information with full surplus extraction can be achieved with relaxing the restriction on the shape of reservation wage schedules this outcome can be achieved through payoff functions that are affine in a convex transformation of the ex post error our result is applied to the case of multiple experts

on the political economy of uk pension scheme regulation we take the opportunity of the recent consultation exercise on uk defined benefit pension schemes conducted by the pensions regulator to examine the approach to pension scheme portfolio management that it and the related pension protection fund have adopted after summarising the regulatory basis we identify three essential building blocks for further examination the notion of matching liabilities to long term government bonds the use of standard deviation of return as a measure of risk and the idea that strategic asset allocation is the most important decision in portfolio management this last one the brinson axiom we examine these foundations individually and then collectively with the aid of two unobtrusive postulates the first being the efficient markets hypothesis and the second that pension scheme assets should be used to purchase only those securities with minimal default risk from the perspective of what we have elsewhere called the keynes graham schema we conclude that the foundations are unsound and that the conventional approach adopted not only by both the regulator and the protection fund but also by the major actuarial consultancies induces if not actually requires pension schemes to engage in speculation rather than investment

new public offerings information and investor rationality the case of publicly offered commodity funds publicly traded commodity funds have been poor investment vehicles yet new funds are a fast growing part of the investment scene in this article the authors show that the information provided to investors is significantly biased upward and that true performance cannot be determined by the information most investors see thus investment in commodity funds given the information set is rational while the authors limit the study to commodity funds the same should hold for other limited partnerships such as real estate oil and gas copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

relative performance of incentive mechanisms computational modeling and simulation of delegated investment decisions this paper evaluates the relative performances of several well known and widely used incentive mechanisms under controlled experimental conditions the scenario utilized is a delegated investment setting where effort and risk aversions contribute to moral hazard among fund managers analytical intractability of the problem requires a computational modeling approach to simulate comparative solutions for specific contracts under different parametric settings through a simulation exercise we consider multiple agents who decide their investment strategy over several consecutive periods agents learn about estimation and market uncertainty through repeated realizations of investment returns in each sequence of periods a number of different incentive mechanisms based on the agent s communication and or outcome are considered results of the computational experiments are presented our results overwhelmingly show the efficacy of the incentive contracts in improving the welfare of the investors in the presence of an estimation risk when agents learn from their past performances the market volatility interacts with the estimation risk that makes risk sharing arrangements such as limited liability overly important paying the agent to assume the risk may no longer lead to the best performance incentives

does aid matter measuring the effect of student aid on college attendance and completion does student aid increase college attendance or simply subsidize costs for infra marginal students settling the question empirically is a challenge because aid is correlated with many characteristics that influence educational investment decisions a shift in financial aid policy that affects some youth but not others can provide an identifying source of variation in aid in 1982 congress eliminated the social security student benefit program which at its peak provided grants totaling 3 7 billion a year to one out of ten college students using the death of a parent as a proxy for social security beneficiary status i find that offering 1 000 1998 of grant aid increases educational attainment by about 0 16 years and the probability of attending college by four percentage points the elasticities of attendance and completed years of college with respect to schooling costs are 0 7 to 0 8 the evidence suggests that aid has a threshold effect a student who has crossed the hurdle of college entry with the assistance of aid is more likely to continue schooling later in life than one who has never attempted college this is consistent with a model in which there are fixed costs of college entry finally a cost benefit analysis indicates that the aid program examined by this paper was a cost effective use of government resources this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

ambivalent investment and the hold up problem in this paper we add to the foundations of incomplete contracting literature we study the hold up problem with ambivalent investment where investment benefits the investing party if ex post the right decision is undertaken but harms the investing party if the wrong decision is made in this context we show that the power of contracts to provide investment incentives depends on three factors the commitment value of contracts the amount of quasirents that the investing party can expect in the case of out of contract renegotiation and the degree of ambivalence of investment first contracts provide first best investment incentives when parties can commit to a contract regardless of the type of investment second with sufficiently ambivalent investment if parties cannot commit not to renegotiate a contract and if the investing party s bargaining power is intermediate contracts cannot improve investment incentives above those provided by no contract in contrast a simple buyer or seller option contract is optimal when the investing party s bargaining power is extreme jel d23 k12 l22

professionally managed publicly traded commodity funds investment in professionally managed publicly traded commodity funds has grown rapidly in recent years this is the first comprehensive study of the performance of these funds it is found that randomly selected funds offer neither an attractive alternative to bonds nor a profitable addition to a portfolio of stocks and bonds furthermore past performance of these funds offers very little information about future performance the findings may be explained by the large transactions costs incurred by these funds and their primary reliance on technical analysis copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

the nature of credit constraints and human capital we develop a human capital model with borrowing constraints explicitly derived from government student loan gsl programs and private lending under limited commitment the model helps explain the persistent strong positive correlation between ability and schooling in the u s as well as the rising importance of family income for college attendance it also explains the increasing share of undergraduates borrowing the gsl maximum and the rise in student borrowing from private lenders our framework ofiers new insights regarding the interaction of government and private lending as well as the responsiveness of private credit to economic and policy changes

a theory of noise trading in securities markets in a recent article black 1 introduces a type of trading that he terms noise trading he asserts that noise trading which he defines as trading on noise as if it were information must be a significant factor in securities markets however he does not provide an explanation of why any investors would rationally want to engage in noise trading the goal of this paper is to provide such an explanation for one type of investor managers of investment funds as shown here the incentive for a manager to engage in noise trading arises because of the positive signal that the level of the manager s trading provides about his or her ability to collect private information concerning current and potential investments if the manager s compensation is directly related to investors perceptions of his or her ability the manager will then trade more frequently than is justified on the basis of his or her private information in addition to providing this explanation for noise trading the results of this analysis may also be useful for further empirical exploration of the relation between investment fund portfolio turnover and subsequent performance

performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk abstract we examine the effect that an exogenously specifically governmentally required change in compensation contract had on a managerial decision we find that a group of mutual funds changed their portfolio risk levels after they were forced to change their performance fee schedules their portfolio risk choices differed predictably from a randomly selected group of nonperformance fee funds and a group of performance fee funds that were not required to change their compensation contracts in addition the affected mutual funds lost both shareholders and assets around the time of the imposition of the restriction while the other funds exhibited little change or gained assets and shareholders

multifaceted aid for low income students and college outcomes evidence from north carolina we study the evolution of a campus based aid program for low income students that began with grant heavy financial aid and later added a suite of nonfinancial supports we find little to no evidence that program eligibility during the early years 2004 2006 in which students received additional institutional grant aid and few nonfinancial supports improved postsecondary progress performance or completion in contrast program eligible students in more recent cohorts 2007 2010 when the program supplemented grant heavy aid with an array of nonfinancial supports were more likely to meet credit accumulation benchmarks toward timely graduation and earned higher grade point averages than their barely ineligible counterparts jel i21 i23 i24 j08

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

when financial aid is scarce the challenge of allocating college aid where it is needed most abstract inequality in college completion by income is a persistent problem often addressed through financial aid to lower income students prior research has found mixed effects of financial aid but research designs have not identified effects for the poorest students who may benefit the most this study exploits an eligibility cutoff induced by first come first served allocation of funds in the state of wisconsin the analysis focuses on two year technical colleges where there was a large funding shortage affecting students at all income levels i find positive effects of grant aid in reducing dropout and supporting degree completion with larger positive effects for the poorest students

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

measuring investment performance in a rational expectations equilibrium model much research has been concerned with evaluating the performance of managed portfolios e g mutual funds and examining whether portfolio managers display in some sense superior performance superior performance would seemingly turn on the possession of superior information that is utilized in managing portfolios in general a fund s asset holdings or portfolio weights might not be observable to an outsider whether they are or not however they are likely to change over time this happens especially when better performance is a result of superior information since managers will change their portfolio composition on obtaining private information since such changes must be taken into account the problem of measuring performance of managed portfolios is inherently different from that of evaluating the performance of individual assets groups of assets or generally portfolios with constant and known composition

on partial contracting this paper investigates contracting situations where giving away some control rights enhances both the donor s and the receiver s incentives to cooperate in the future we define a partial contracting framework with nonverifiable actions for which either control is contractible contractible control actions or the right to transfer control ex post to another party is contractible transferable control actions under incomplete information when control over particular actions is transferable but not contractible it can be optimal to give one party the right to transfer control over a particular action to the other party in order for that party to build a reputation regarding her willingness to cooperate in the future c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

when cheaper is better fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds abstract in this paper we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market first there is competition among funds second fund managers ability is not observed by investors before making their investment decisions third some investors do not make optimal use of all available information the main results of the paper are that 1 price competition is compatible with positive mark ups in equilibrium and 2 worse performing funds set fees that are greater or equal to those set by better performing funds these predictions are supported by available empirical evidence

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

on the observational equivalence of managerial contracts under conditions of moral hazard and self selection managerial contracts often tie compensation to the performance of the firm two models of contracting under asymmetric information moral hazard and self selection are used to explain this phenomenon an important direction for research in this area will be to use data on managerial contracts to sharpen our understanding of the settings in which a given informational problem is most important the purpose of this paper is to ask whether this is possible using static models of contracting under asymmetric information to address this question we compare the standard principal agent model presented by grossman and hart 1983 with a plausible self selection model where the firm only wants to hire a manager with a particular level of productivity we call this self selection model a talent search

after you sir hold up direct externalities and sequential investment we propose a solution to the hold up problem the parties in a contract can avoid the inefficiencies caused by the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and implement the first best level of investment if they make their investment decision sequentially one party observing the choice made by the other party before making his own choice unlike the existing literature the proposed solution leads to the efficient choice of investment even when there are two sided direct externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d23 d82

performance incentive fees an agency theoretic approach this paper employs recent developments in agency theory to study the impact that com pensation contracts have on portfolio management investment decisions in a restricted mean variance world two types of incentive contracts for mutual fund managers are ana lyzed and compared the results show that the symmetric contract while not necessar ily eliminating agency costs dominates the bonus contract in aligning the manager s interests with those ofthe investor investment companies and by extension their managers control a large and increasing percentage ofthe aggregate wealth of their clients more investors are putting their money under the control of these advisers than ever before con sequently potential conflicts of interest arise between investment company own ers and their financial management advisers the securities and exchange com mission sec has been concerned with this issue for a number of years the agency has commissioned several studies to investigate the issue and has set forth certain rulings concerning the behavior of investment company advisers of par ticular importance has been the compensation arrangement between mutual fund management and the fund owners in fact the sec has issued specific guidelines regarding allowable fee schedules for managers these guidelines have ied to a policy debate concerning whether the sec has been too stringent or not stringent enough in regulating compensation for investment managers the present study takes a new approach to this problem in an attempt to resolve this debate the fiduciary relationship between mutual fund management and the inves tors they represent may be viewed as a principal agent relationship conse quently the methodology from the agency literature can be applied to study the impact of various compensation arrangements on the potential conflict of interest between these two groups

a new test of borrowing constraints for education we discuss a simple model in which parents and children make investments in the children s education investments for other purposes and parents can transfer cash to their children we show that for an identifiable set of parent child pairs parents will rationally under invest in their child s education for these parent child pairs additional financial aid will increase educational attainment the model highlights an important feature of higher education finance the expected family contribution efc that is based on income assets and other factors the efc is neither legally guaranteed nor universally offered our model identifies the set of families that are disproportionately likely to not provide their full efc using a common proxy for financial aid we show in data from the health and retirement study that financial aid increases the educational attainment of children whose families are disproportionately likely to under invest in education financial aid has no effect on the educational attainment of children in other families the theory and empirical evidence identifies a set of children who face quantitatively important borrowing constraints for higher education

does asset ownership always motivate managers outside options and the property rights theory of the firm this paper studies the grossman hart moore ghm property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating offers bargaining when managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation the ghm results obtain if taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining outcomes are very different sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with sometimes independent assets should be owned together sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately

optimal portfolio choice under incomplete information models of asset pricing generally assume that the variables which characterize the state of the economy are observable however the distributional properties of asset prices that are relevant for portfolio decisions are in general not observable and therefore must be estimated the estimation of expected returns is a particularly difficult problem and estimation errors are likely to be substantial in this light it is reasonable to examine whether the assumption of observability of expected returns and other relevant state variables causes significant mis specification in equilibrium models of asset prices this paper has three main objectives first to derive optimal estimators for the unobservable expected instantaneous returns using observations of past realized returns second to establish that estimation and portfolio choice can be solved in two separate steps third to analyze the impact of estimation error on investment choices the estimators of expected returns are in general not consistent i e the estimation error does not tend to disappear asymptotically the effects of the estimation error therefore cannot be ignored even if realized returns are observed continuously over an infinite time period

estimation risk and incentive contracts for portfolio managers the fiduciary relationship between portfolio managers and the investors they represent may be viewed as a principal agent relationship and therefore we have used the methodology from the agency literature in economics and finance to study the impact of existing compensation arrangements on the conflicts of interest between these two groups in this paper we employ the assumptions of the capital asset pricing model and of estimation risk concerning beta to develop a model in which portfolio managers can through effort choose the parameters of the beta distribution our model entails moral hazard because the investor cannot observe the manager s action given certain utility functions we show that the presence of estimation risk leads the manager to choose a lower beta portfolio than otherwise and that no first best optimal contract exists we also show that managerial divergent behavior is related to the divergence in risk preferences between the manager and the investor by making slightly more stringent assumptions about preferences we show that there exist some conditions under which the manager will provide more effort but also a riskier portfolio than the investor prefers finally we show that the investor will prefer a manager who is less risk averse than the investor

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

herding in delegated portfolio management when is comparative performance information desirable abstract we address the issue of investors asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative doing so allows investors to write an efficiency improving relative performance contract on the other hand herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium we show that herding occurs when the cost of information is high information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse moreover when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager s performance they will not do so

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

optimal contracts in a continuous time delegated portfolio management problem this article studies the contracting problem between an individual investor and a professional portfolio manager in a continuous time principal agent framework optimal contracts are obtained in closed form these contracts are of a symmetric form and suggest that a portfolio manager should receive a fixed fee a fraction of the total assets under management plus a bonus or a penalty depending upon the portfolio s excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio the appropriate benchmark portfolio is an active index that contains risky assets where the number of shares invested in each asset can vary over time rather than a passive index in which the number of shares invested in each asset remains constant over time fund managers compensation schemes in a delegated portfolio management setting have been of special interest to both academics and practitioners academic interest stems in part from the rapid growth of managed funds over the last two decades gompers and metrick 1998 report that by december 1996 mutual funds pension funds and other financial intermediaries held discretional control over more than half of the u s equity market it is thus of importance to study the impact of institutional trading on asset prices and to integrate into one model both asset pricing and delegated portfolio management compensation as advocated by brennan 1993 allen and santomero 1997 and allen 2001 it is also important to understand the relationship between a manager s trading strategies and his implicit incentives or career concerns see e g brown harlow and starks 1996 brown goetzmann and park 1997 chevalier and ellison 1999 and chen and pennacchi 2000 these concerns include internal promotion from a small to a large fund higher outside offers and the flow of money through the fund under management 1 the importance of fund manager compensation is also underscored by congressional passage in 1970 of the amendment to

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

competition in portfolio management theory and experiment we explore theoretically and experimentally the general equilibrium price and allocation implications of delegated portfolio management when the investor manager relationship is nonexclusive our theory predicts that competition forces managers to promise portfolios that mimic arrow debreu ad securities which investors then combine to fit their preferences a weak version of the capital asset pricing model capm obtains where state prices relative to state probabilities implicit in prices of traded securities will be inversely ranked to aggregate wealth across states our experiment broadly corroborates the price and choice predictions of the theory however price quality deteriorates when only a few managers attract most of the available wealth wealth concentration increases because funds flow toward managers who offer portfolios closer to replicating ad securities as in the theory but also because funds flow to managers who had better performance in the immediate past an observation unrelated to the theory this paper was accepted by jerome detemple finance

not whether but where pell grants and college choices abstract pell grants are the largest financial aid vehicle in the united states and yet their role in shaping students college choices is not clear drawing on the enrollment decisions of four cohorts of tennessee high school graduates and quasi experimental pell eligibility derived from federal formulas we find little evidence that marginal pell eligibility affects whether or where students enroll in college inframarginal estimates suggest that students sort into colleges with 11 6 cents higher tuition per dollar of pell aid although other measures of college quality do not significantly improve over the counterfactual an investigation into mechanisms that might be muting student responses to pell favors the application process itself over grant size or institutional aid flexibility

born under a lucky star financial aid college completion labor supply and credit constraints financial aid can affect both college enrollment and graduation the effects on graduation can be driven by students being induced to enroll by financial aid students who would have enrolled anyway graduating as a result of the financial aid or both this study isolates the effect of financial aid on the second group by examining a change in aid that did not change enrollment i study a discontinuous change in the amount of aid available to students who meet the age cutoff for financial independence i find that additional aid causes some university seniors to graduate one year earlier abstract from author

reducing income inequality in educational attainment experimental evidence on the impact of financial aid on college completion income inequality in educational attainment is a long standing concern and disparities in college completion have grown over time need based financial aid is commonly used to promote equality in college outcomes but its effectiveness has not been established and some are calling it into question a randomized experiment is used to estimate the impact of a private need based grant program on college persistence and degree completion among students from low income families attending 13 public universities across wisconsin results indicate that offering students additional grant aid increases the odds of bachelor s degree attainment over four years helping to diminish income inequality in higher education

can a contract solve hold up when investments have externalities a comment on de fraja 1999 abstract this comment finds an error in de fraja 1999 the correction of which overturns its main result in contrast to his claim under a mild condition the suggested contract is not only unable to solve the hold up problem but it can provide almost no incentive for specific investments when they exhibit sufficiently large direct externalities his result holds primarily when the investments have no externalities we remark on a related result in the literature and propose an alternative contract that achieves efficiency journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 j41 k12 l22