decomposing productivity growth in the u s computer industry in this paper we examine the sources of the productivity growth in the u s computer industry from 1978 to 1999 we estimate a joint production model of output quantity and quality that distinguishes two types of technological changes process and product innovations based on the estimation results we decompose total factor productivity tfp growth rate into the contributions of process and product innova tions and scale economies we find that product innovation associated with better quality accounts for about 30 of the tfp growth in the computer industry furthermore the tfp acceleration in the computer industry in the late 1990s is mainly derived from a rapid increase in product innovation

equivalence and implementation of alternative methods for determining returns to scale in data envelopment analysis abstract this paper discusses alternative methods for determining returns to scale in dea the methods for estimating returns to scale in dea as developed by banker 1984 banker charnes and cooper 1984 and banker and thrall 1992 are proved to be conceptually equivalent to the two stage methods of fare grosskopf and lovell 1985 when their assumptions apply here the emphasis is on the ccr model of dea and very simple methods are introduced for determining returns to scale locally with this model by reference to banker s concept of most productive scale size

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

size r d productivity and decision styles we extend the size innovation debate by incorporating decision making style as a relevant factor in the innovation process we propose that the size of firms affects the scale and quality of product innovation through the adoption of different decision making styles using the literature on cognition we conceptualize decision making style as the degree to which firms rely on analytical information for decision making during the r d process using longitudinal data of spanish firms we show that as firms increase in size they rely more extensively on analytical decision tools for the innovation activity additionally we show that the size of firms is negatively related to product innovation productivity in terms of scale and positively related to the quality and that these relationships are mediated by firms reliance on analytical decision making style we discuss theoretical and managerial implications for innovation research and practice

one sided elasticities and technical efficiency in multi output production a theoretical framework one of the concepts that have sparked considerable interest in the theory of production and efficiency is that of returns to scale rts economics researchers typically define rts using the notion of elasticity considerable research activity on rts has also been observed by management science researchers who utilize the methodology of data envelopment analysis dea to gain insights on rts in this paper we present a theoretical framework that integrates existing economics and management science literature on rts and provides a solid foundation for research work in this area our framework defines discusses and proposes an approach to measure input and output oriented elasticities and one sided rts we demonstrate how the work done in dea is a special case of our framework and discuss the conditions under which the resulting two left hand and the two right hand elasticities can be equal future research directions are also discussed

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

edwin mansfield s contributions to the economics of technology abstract edwin mansfield s contributions to the economics of technology are summarized from the early 1960s through his death in 1997 mansfield s methodology is discussed as are his contributions on the diffusion of technical innovation the effect of firm size on innovation the role of academic and basic research in increasing innovation and productivity international technology transfer and the inaccuracy of technological forecasts the economics profession s evaluation of the relative importance of mansfield s work is presented using as evidence citation counts of his works collected from the social science citation index ssci identified as among mansfield s most important contributions are his work on the importance of academic research for industrial innovations his empirical estimation of the rates of diffusion of different innovations and his estimation of the private and social returns from investments in industrial innovations finally we present mansfield s advice on the future of the economics of technology

marginal values and returns to scale for nonparametric production frontiers we present a unifying linear programming approach to the calculation of various directional derivatives for a very large class of production frontiers of data envelopment analysis dea special cases of this include different marginal rates the scale elasticity and a spectrum of partial and mixed elasticity measures our development applies to any polyhedral production technology including to name a few the conventional variable and constant returns to scale dea technologies their extensions with weight restrictions technologies with weakly disposable undesirable outputs and network dea models furthermore our development provides a general method for characterization of returns to scale rts in any polyhedral technology the new approach effectively removes the need to develop bespoke models for the rts characterization and calculation of marginal rates and elasticity measures for each particular technology

returns to scale and scale elasticity in data envelopment analysis abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide mathematical characterizations of the data envelopment analysis dea based scale elasticity that is computable for both frontier and nonfrontier units in order to accomplish this we first review existing frontier results extend them formally to the nonfrontier case and then analyze how the scale elasticity behaves we also study how shadow pricing can be done as an application of the scale elasticity and show how upper and lower scale elasticity bounds can be obtained finally we provide an illustrative example for the clarification and verification of our results

reply to comments by soleimani damaneh and mostafaee 2006 and zhang 2006 abstract in fukuyama fukuyama h 2000 returns to scale and scale elasticity in data envelopment analysis european journal of operational research 125 93 112 i investigated some mathematical structure on scale elasticity and returns to scale soleimani damaneh and mostafaee soleimani damaneh m mostafaee a in press a comment on returns to scale and scale elasticity in data envelopment analysis european journal of operational research doi 10 1016 j ejor 2006 11 042 and zhang zhang b in press a note on fukuyama 2000 european journal of operational research doi 10 1016 j ejor 2006 11 040 claim that some results which are related to homogeneity are incorrect this note replies to their comments by demonstrating that fukuyama 2000 results are still valid

scale characterizations in a dea directional technology distance function framework abstract the present study extends prior research on data envelopment analysis dea based returns to scale in view of the fact that the standard methods are very restrictive the extension is made in the context of the directional technology distance function that generalizes the shephard input and output distance functions the two main results in this extended setting are as follows first we show how banker s most productive scale size mpss concept is characterized second we obtain scale elasticity measures and examine the properties and the relationships with standard scale elasticity measures

a comment on returns to scale and scale elasticity in data envelopment analysis abstract fukuyama fukuyama h 2000 returns to scale and scale elasticity in data envelopment analysis european journal of operational research 125 93 112 provided some characterizations of scale elasticity and returns to scale in dea in this paper we present some counterexamples and comments to the main lemma of the afore mentioned paper based on which fukuyama s idea has been built

estimating most productive scale size using data envelopment analysis abstract the relation between the most productive scale size mpss for paparticular input and output mixes and returns to scale for multiple inputs multiple outputs situations is explicitly developed this relation is then employed to extend the applications of data envelopment analysis dea introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes ccr to the estimation of most productive scale sizes for convex production possibility sets it is then shown that in addition to productive inefficiencies at the actual scale size the ccr efficiency measure also reflects any inefficiencies due to divergence from the most productive scale size two illustrations of the practical applications of these results to the estimation of most productive scale sizes and returns to scale for hospitals and stem electric generation plants are also provided emphasize the advantage of this method in examining specific segments of the efficient production surface

stock options and the strategic use of managerial incentives in cournot based oligopoly models there is an incentive for firms to pursue overly aggressive behavior resulting in prices and profits below those of the cournot equilibrium compensating managers in proportion to a combination of profits and sales provides one mechanism through which aggressive behavior emerges however when the profit component of managerial compensation comes in the form of stock options the aggressive behavior is restrained or even eliminated in equilibrium this result relies only on the nonlinearity of the stock option generalizations to other forms of compensation are discussed copyright 1993 by american economic association

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

stock related compensation and product market competition this dissertation consists of four self contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers as revealed by the available empirical evidence in supergame theoretic analyses of long term competition between oligopolistic firms the first essay ownership control and collusion considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on income smoothing and when managerial compensation has the low pay performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies in a similar fashion the second essay stock related compensation and product market competition deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price e g stock options which have become increasingly common in the u s on long term oligopolistic competition in the third paper debt as a credible collusive device shareholders commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with conservative incentives are considered these forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the agency cost of debt finance this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms capital structure and product market competition the fourth paper multimarket contact concavity and collusion addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies it explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers and extends the results to non oligopolistic supergames

returns to scale in different dea models abstract this paper discusses returns to scale rts in data envelopment analysis dea for each of the presently available types of models the bcc and ccr models are treated in input oriented forms while the multiplicative model is treated in output oriented form this distinction is not pertinent for the additive model which simultaneously maximizes outputs and minimizes inputs in the sense of a vector optimization quantitative estimates in the form of scale elasticities are treated in the context of multiplicative models but the bulk of the discussion is confined to qualitative characterizations such as whether rts is identified as increasing decreasing or constant this is discussed for each type of model and relations between the results for the different models are established the opening section describes and delimits approaches to be examined the concluding section outlines further opportunities for research

estimating returns to scale in dea this paper addresses issues of returns to scale in data envelopment analysis starting with the model developed by banker but avoiding banker s conclusions on returns to scale the paper shows how two close variants inputs and outputs oriented of the banker charnes cooper model can be used to provide precise estimates of returns to scale the estimation of returns to scale for each unit is done by testing the existence of solutions in four regions defined in the neighborhood of the analyzed unit numerical examples and graphs are used to illustrate the proposed procedures

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

a scale elasticity measure for directional distance function and its dual theory and dea estimation abstract in this paper we focus on scale elasticity measure based on directional distance function for multi output multi input technologies explore its fundamental properties and show its equivalence with the input oriented and output oriented scale elasticity measures we also establish duality relationship between the scale elasticity measure based on the directional distance function with scale elasticity measure based on the profit function finally we discuss the estimation issues of the scale elasticity based on the directional distance function via the dea estimator

vertical coordination antitrust law and international trade this paper demonstrates that vertically aligned private or public organizations are capable of generating strategic trade advantage similar to that acquired through direct government export subsidization the model considers two forms of vertical coordination that lead to advantageous trade positions in international markets upstream vertical restraint and downstream equity sharing such practices are commonly employed both by state trading agencies and by private firms in nations with lenient antitrust laws the finding has important implications under new world trade organization wto rules intended to reduce government intervention in international transactions recent reforms in the wto favor nations that sanction highly refined vertical linkages between firms while nations with stringent antitrust legislation have an incentive to negotiate for greater harmonization of international laws

total board remuneration and company performance using a hitherto neglected source of data this paper combines executive emoluments with executive options to construct a broader measure of executive pay than has been possible in earlier british studies the result of including the long term share option component of pay along with the more commonly utilized short term component of emoluments is to reveal executive pay as being significantly more sensitive to company performance than has previously been thought to be the case the paper questions the current policy stance of british institutional investors and of the greenbury committee with respect to executive share options copyright 1996 by royal economic society

returns to scale and most productive scale size in dea with negative data abstract non parametric evaluation of returns to scale of production units in standard dea models becomes problematic when their underlying technologies involve negative data the methodology recently offered by allahyar and rostamy malkhalifeh 2015 hence after called arm model is of some help to deal with this issue however there are two shortcomings underlying the arm model first it may not be capable of locating all the production units exhibiting constant returns to scale and second it is also not able to determine most productive scale size in order to deal with these two shortcomings the current paper contributes to the dea literature in two ways first it makes a unifying attempt to propose a general non radial dea model to determine both the most productive scale size and the returns to scale characterizations of production units in the presence of negative data second the proposed model can be adapted in a dynamic dea technology setting to determine growth efficiency and returns to growth behavior of production units facing hyper competition in a new economy

returns to scale in convex production technologies the notion of returns to scale rts is well established in data envelopment analysis dea in the variable returns to scale production technology the rts characterization is closely related to other scale characteristics such as the scale elasticity most productive scale size mpss and global rts types indicative of the direction to mpss in recent years a number of alternative production technologies have been developed in the dea literature most of these technologies are polyhedral and hence are closed and convex sets examples include technologies with weakly disposable undesirable outputs models with weight restrictions and production trade offs technologies that include several component production processes and network dea models for most of these technologies the relationship between rts and other scale characteristics has remained unexplored the theoretical results obtained in this paper establish such relationships for a very large class of closed convex technologies of which polyhedral technologies are an important example

r d productivity and the spillover effects of high tech industry on the traditional manufacturing sector the case of taiwan this study sets out to estimate the impact of r d on productivity within the private sector with further analysis of the different impacts of r d within high tech and traditional manufacturing firms we also attempt to examine the spillover effects from r d investment in the high tech sector on productivity growth within the traditional industries using a sample of 136 large manufacturing firms during the period 1994 2000 we develop an extended version of the cobb douglas production function model and our findings suggest that taiwan s r d investment had a significant impact on firm productivity growth with output elasticity standing at around 0 18 when the sample is divided into high tech and traditional firms the r d output elasticity in high tech firms is significantly greater than that found in traditional firms in addition the average rate of return in high tech firms is much greater than that estimated for other industries besides our empirical results show that although significant the impact of r d investment from the high tech sector on the productivity growth of traditional firms is rather limited

profit sharing with workers facilitates collusion among firms we show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand we first show that firm profits can always be increased by tying wages to market conditions the optimal agreement takes the form of an option and features partial sharing because increased sharing raises the expected price wage differential but reduces price wage variability we then show that given any cartel there exist market conditions such that simply giving some expected profit to workers raises expected firm profits via the transfer s impact on the incentive to cheat on the cartel

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

r d innovations and total factor productivity growth in british manufacturing 1989 r d innovations and total factor productivity growth in british manufacturing applied economics vol 21 no 11 pp 1549 1562

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

innovation by heterogeneous leaders we develop a schumpeterian growth model in which leaders and followers conduct research and development rd this result is consistent with the actual behaviors of some previous leader firms such as sony and eastman kodak moreover we show that subsidizing the r d of followers can promote the aggregate r d of leaders because promotion of followers r d decreases increases the number of leaders with larger smaller quality leads and smaller larger r d investments