what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

why do u s states adopt public private partnership enabling legislation abstract public private partnerships or ppps have the potential to address a range of urban economic issues as of late 2012 thirty two u s states and puerto rico had enacted legislation enabling the use of ppps ppp enabling laws address such issues as the treatment of unsolicited ppp proposals prior legislative approval of ppp contracts and the mixing of public and private funds we utilize 13 key elements of ppp enabling laws to develop an index reflecting the degree to which a state s law is encouraging or discouraging of private infrastructure investment we examine why states pass such laws and why some states pass legislation that is relatively more favorable to private investment we consider demand side supply side and political institutional drivers of passage vehicle registration growth and greater traffic congestion both increase the likelihood of passage as does political agreement between a state s executive and legislative branches traffic congestion growth in per capita income and the percent of republicans in the state s house of representatives all increase a law s favorability to private investment there is little indication that traditional public finance variables such as federal highway aid affect the likelihood of passage or the favorability of a state s ppp enabling law

does there exist a relation between inflation and relative price change variability the effect of the aggregation level abstract the actual magnitude of relative price change variability is dependent on the level of aggregation this note demonstrates the effect of this dependence when we try to estimate a relation between inflation and relative price change variability and when we perform a decomposition analysis of this variability

factors explaining local privatization a meta regression analysis this paper aims at explaining the differences in the results of empirical studies of motivations for local privatization by undertaking a meta regression our results suggest that fiscal constraints and interest groups were especially relevant in the early studies of the us which considered several services further studies that focus on one service capture the influence of scale economies more accurately finally our results show that small towns are more affected by fiscal and political factors while ideology plays a major role for european and large cities thus no clear conclusions emerge from this literature because the findings of each study are sensitive to its characteristics

how product standardization affects choice evidence from the massachusetts health insurance exchange this paper examines the effect of choice architecture on massachusetts health insurance exchange a policy change standardized cost sharing parameters of plans across insurers and altered information presentation post change consumers chose more generous plans and different brands but were not more price sensitive we use a discrete choice model that allows the policy to affect how attributes are valued to decompose the policy s effects into a valuation effect and a product availability effect the brand shifts are largely explained by the availability effect and the generosity shift by the valuation effect a hypothetical choice experiment replicates our results and explores alternative counterfactuals

choose to lose health plan choices from a menu with dominated option we examine the health plan choices that 23 894 employees at a u s firm made from a large menu of options that differed only in financial cost sharing and premium these decisions provide a clear test of the predictions of the standard economic model of insurance choice in the absence of choice frictions because plans were priced so that nearly every plan with a lower deductible was financially dominated by an otherwise identical plan with a high deductible we document that the majority of employees chose dominated plans which resulted in excess spending equivalent to 24 of chosen plan premiums low income employees were significantly more likely to choose dominated plans and most employees did not switch into more financially efficient plans in the subsequent year we show that the choice of dominated plans cannot be rationalized by standard risk preference or any expectations about health risk testing alternative explanations with a series of hypothetical choice experiments we find that the popularity of dominated plans was not primarily driven by the size and complexity of the plan menu nor informed preferences for avoiding high deductibles but by employees lack of understanding of health insurance our findings challenge the standard practice of inferring risk preferences from insurance choices and raise doubts about the welfare benefits of health reforms that expand consumer choice

infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries and the government s budget constraint the paper analyses governments trade off between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries under privatization the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline this benefit for tax payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers in developing countries tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments for highly profitable public utilities the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favour public ownership finally once a market segment gives room for more than one firm governments prefer to regulate the industry in the absence of a credible regulatory agency regulation is achieved through public ownership

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

information rigidities inflation perceptions and the media lessons from the euro cash changeover the objective of theoretical models of information rigidities is to capture the fact that people are constrained in their ability to acquire and process all available information given that most people obtain their information about the economy from the media press coverage of the economy may exert an influence on peoples attitudes this paper tests for this influence by examining consumers inflation perceptions in the aftermath of the euro cash changeover which serves as a natural experiment using a new data set that quantifies the intensity and tone of media reports we document that media reporting has had a statistically significant and economically meaningful impact on inflation perceptions and contributed to their sharp rise in the aftermath of the euro cash changeover and to the divergence between inflation perceptions and actual inflation rates jel e53 d83

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

asymmetric information and rational expectations when is it right to be wrong abstract in this paper we examine the effects of private agents being less than fully rational in their expectations we examine this in the context of monetary policy where the central bank may have uncertain preferences either by choice or by necessity the new feature is that we allow the public to react in two different ways they either form rational expectations and internalize the uncertainty about the central bank s preferences in full or alternatively and if this process of internalization is costly it forms a best guess regarding those preferences this implies a certainty equivalence strategy applied to the preference parameters as those parameters enter the decisions non linearly a systematic error emerges we examine the magnitude of the resulting error in inflation and output following the assumption of certainty equivalence under all reasonable levels of uncertainty this error turns out to be small but involves trading a deflation bias against the cost of gathering the information needed for the full information rational expectations solution

renegotiation of concession contracts in latin america evidence from the water and transport sectors abstract high rates of contract renegotiation have raised serious questions about the viability of the concession model to attract private participation in infrastructure in developing countries after extending in reduced form a standard regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts we use a unique data set of 307 concessions awarded in latin america from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of transport and water to analyze the determinants of this high incidence of renegotiations of infrastructure contracts we look in details at the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession of regulatory institutions institutional features economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves we then derive some policy implications of our work

monetary shocks in models with inattentive producers we study models where prices respond slowly to shocks because firms are rationally inattentive producers must pay a cost to observe the determinants of the current profit maximizing price and hence observe them infrequently to generate large real effects of monetary shocks in such a model the time between observations must be long and or highly volatile previous work on rational inattentiveness has allowed for observation intervals that are either constant but long e g caballero 1989 or reis 2006 or volatile but short e g reis s 2006 example where observation costs are negligible but not both in these models the real effects of monetary policy are small for realistic values of the duration between observations we show that non negligible observation costs produce both of these effects intervals between observations are infrequent and volatile this generates large real effects of monetary policy for realistic values of the average time between observations

sticky information phillips curves european evidence we estimate the sticky information phillips curve model of mankiw and reis 2002 using survey expectations of professional forecasters from four major european economies our estimates imply that in ation expectations in france germany and the united kingdom are updated about once a year in italy about once each six months

building and managing facilities for public services abstract we model alternative institutional arrangements for building and managing facilities for provision of public services including the use of the private finance initiative pfi by exploring the effects on innovative investment activity by providers the desirability of bundling the building and management operations is analyzed and it is considered whether it is optimal to allocate ownership to the public or the private sector we also examine how the case for pfi is affected by the voluntary or automatic transfer of ownership from the private to the public sector when the contract expires asset specificity and service demand risk play critical roles

shrouded attributes and information suppression evidence from the field we use eld and natural experiments in online auctions to study the revenue eect of varying the level and disclosure of shipping charges our main ndings are 1 disclosure aects revenues for low shipping charges a seller is better odisclosing 2 increasing shipping charges boosts revenues particularly when these charges are hidden and 3 the level and disclosure of the shipping charge have little eect on the number of bidders attracted to an auction

rational inattention competitive supply and psychometrics we introduce a simple method of recovering attention costs from choice data our method rests on a precise analogy with production theory costs of attention determine consumer demand and consumer welfare just as a competitive firm s technology determines its supply curve and profits we implement our recovery method experimentally outline applications and link our work to the broader literature on inattention and mistaken decisions

the relationship between relative prices and the general price level it is very nearly a truismi amaong neoclassical economists that the public is wont to confuse changes in the general price level with relative price changes correspondingl y one might speak of the independence between the two as one of the central postulates of the neoclassical tradition william stanley jevons was aml ong the first to identify this basic dichotomin economic life as well as to attempt to explain the ordinary citizen s seenming incapacity to understand it

a quantitative comparison of sticky price and sticky information models of price setting i estimate sticky price and sticky information models of price setting for the united states via maximum likelihood techniques reaching several conclusions first the sticky price model fits best and captures inflation dynamics as well as reduced form equations once hybrid behavior is allowed second the importance of hybrid behavior in sticky price models is potentially consistent with a role for some information imperfections such as sticky information as a complement to nominal price rigidities finally the favorable results herein for the hybrid sticky price model when evaluated by statistics that summarize the relative fit of different models is consistent with the existing literature that is both supportive and dismissive of such models as this literature has largely ignored fit in evaluating such models many previous studies have focused on ancillary issues such as the standard errors associated with certain parameters or granger causality tests that may not provide much information about sticky price models

the determinants of the choice between public and private production of a publicly funded service the public choice literature contains little formal analysis of the bureaucratic choice of production modes public or private of publicly funded services an important question to be addressed is why some governmental bodies choose to provide a publicly funded service with publicly owned and operated production units whereas other governmental bodies contract with private firms to provide the same publicly funded service this paper is the first formal attempt to remedy this gap in the literature we develop a theoretical explanation of the government decision maker s choice between public and private production modes based on utility maximizing behavior we then examine empirically this choice employing logit analysis the empirical results which include several tests for robustness confirm our theoretical explanation the results are significant and suggest that non monetary constraints are an important factor affecting this choice of production modes and that monetary constraints are less influential

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

optimal adaptive price search consider the problem of a consumer desiring to buy a good which is sold at a variety of prices such a buyer will be able to obtain a sequence of price quotations from various sellers when should the buyer stop searching for a lower price if he continues he may obtain a lower price but he incurs additional time effort and expense in searching the optimal price search decision is one of balancing the expectation of a possibly lower price obtained by continued search against cumulative costs from search when the prices arise from a known probability distribution the optimal search strategy has certain well defined and desirable properties in the more realistic case that the buyer has only partial information about the price distribution and must update his beliefs after observing prices in the marketplace the problem becomes more complex and search strategies become less well behaved the major purpose of this article is to determine new conditions under which optimal policies have these desirable characteristics in the case where the consumer possesses only incomplete information about the distribution of prices price quotations he receives in addition to providing him with price possibilities provide him with information about that distribution rothschild 151 in citing an unpublished paper of gastwirth has noted that small specification errors for an assumed distribution can lead to substantial changes in expected number of searches and expected cost consequently the assumption of a known distribution of prices can have a profound effect on total cost 1 0022 053 l 8 l 040001 20 02 00 o

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

international evidence on the efficacy of new keynesian models of inflation persistence in this paper we take an agnostic view of the phillips curve debate and carry out an empirical investigation of the relative and absolute efficacy of calvo sticky price sp sticky information si and sticky price with indexation models spi with emphasis on their ability to mimic inflationary dynamics in particular we look at evidence for a group of 13 oecd countries and we consider three alternative measures of inflationary pressure including the output gap labor share and unemployment we find that the calvo sp and the si models essentially perform no better than a strawman constant inflation model when used to explain inflation persistence indeed virtually all inflationary dynamics end up being captured by the residuals of the estimated versions of these models we find that spi model is preferable because it captures the type of strong inflationary persistence that has in the past characterized the economies of the countries in our sample however two caveats to this conclusion are that improvement in performance is driven mostly by the time series part of the model i e lagged inflation and that the spi model overemphasizes inflationary persistence thus there appears to be room for improvement via either modified versions of the above models or via development of new models that better track inflation persistence

a sparsity based model of bounded rationality this article defines and analyzes a sparse max operator which is a less than fully attentive and rational version of the traditional max operator the agent builds as economists do a simplified model of the world which is sparse considering only the variables of first order importance his stylized model and his resulting choices both derive from constrained optimization still the sparse max remains tractable to compute moreover the induced outcomes reflect basic psychological forces governing limited attention the sparse max yields a behavioral version of basic chapters of the microeconomics textbook consumer demand and competitive equilibrium i obtain a behavioral version of marshallian and hicksian demand arrow debreu competitive equilibrium the slutsky matrix the edgeworth box roy s identity and so on the slutsky matrix is no longer symmetric nonsalient prices are associated with anomalously small demand elasticities because the consumer exhibits nominal illusion in the edgeworth box the offer curve is a two dimensional surface rather than a one dimensional curve as a result different aggregate price levels correspond to materially distinct competitive equilibria in a similar spirit to a phillips curve the arrow debreu welfare theorems typically do not hold this framework provides a way to assess which parts of basic microeconomics are robust and which are not to the assumption of perfect maximization jel codes d01 d03 d11 d51

to build or not to build normative and positive theories of public private partnerships abstract this paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not when performance contracts can be written both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs otherwise tasks should be kept apart and undertaken by different units in incomplete contracting environments we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public private partnership emerges optimally the latter dominates when there is a positive externality and the private benefits from owning assets are small enough finally we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision makers much of the gains from bundling may be lost in this case

frictions or mental gaps what s behind the information we don t use and when do we care consumers suffer significant losses from not acting on available information these losses stem from frictions such as search costs switching costs and rational inattention as well as what we call mental gaps resulting from wrong priors worldviews or relevant features of a problem not being top of mind most research studying such losses does not empirically distinguish between these mechanisms instead we show that most highly cited papers in this area presume one mechanism underlies consumer choices and assume away other potential explanations or collapse many mechanisms together we discuss the empirical difficulties that arise in distinguishing between different mechanisms and some promising approaches for making progress in doing so we also assess when it is more or less important for researchers to distinguish between these mechanisms approaches that seek to identify true value from demand without specifying mechanisms behind this wedge are most useful when researchers are interested in evaluating allocation policies that strongly steer consumers towards better options with regulation traditional policy instruments and defaults on the other hand understanding the precise mechanisms underlying consumer losses is essential to predicting the impact of mechanism policies aimed primarily at reducing specific frictions or mental gaps without otherwise steering consumers we make the case that papers engaging with these questions empirically should be clear about whether their analyses distinguish between mechanisms behind poorly informed choices and what that implies for the questions they can answer we present examples from several empirical contexts to highlight these distinctions

choosing between time and state dependence micro evidence on firms price reviewing strategies because of recent findings based on survey data it is now well known that firms differ from each other with respect to their price reviewing strategies while some firms review their prices at fixed intervals of time others prefer to perform price revisions in response to changes in economic conditions some theories have been suggested to explain this however empirical evidence on the relative importance of the factors that determine the different strategies of firms is virtually non existent in this paper we help to fill this gap by investigating the factors that explain why firms follow time dependent state dependent or both time and state dependent price reviewing rules we find that the strategies of firms vary with firm characteristics that have a bearing on the importance of information costs with the variability of the optimal price and with the sensitivity of profits to non optimal prices

a theory of bot concession contracts in this paper we discuss the choice for build operate and transfer bot concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility we show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose bot concessions this result stems from a trade off between the government s shadow costs of financing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period the incentives to choose bot concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential bot concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession

the determinants of tendering periods for ppp procurement in the uk an empirical analysis abstractthe procurement of infrastructure projects via public private partnerships ppps is rising globally ppps are however often characterized by lengthy tendering periods defined as the difference between contract notice and financial close tendering periods are important because they account for a significant proportion of overall project delivery time slow tendering deters bidders and thus reduces competition for contracts we source data on 670 ppp projects in the united kingdom and use a duration analysis model to empirically examine factors that impact tendering period duration our results reveal significant sectoral variation with projects in the health and housing sectors taking significantly longer to reach financial close we also show that after controlling for other factors projects with higher capital values and projects that overlap with the timing of general elections are associated with significantly longer tendering periods we further examine the impact of the competitive dia

the expected price of keeping up with the joneses abstract inflation expectations elicited in surveys have been found to exhibit large dispersion across individuals although several explanations have been proposed none fully explain this puzzle we explore in this paper a new behavioral factor social comparison using original survey data we find that respondents who feel they are falling behind compared to their peers report significantly and substantially higher inflation expectations we argue that this result is consistent with an experience based belief formation model in which those unable to keep up with the joneses overweight the high prices of aspiration goods they are unable to purchase

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

bot projects incentives and efficiency abstract in recent years governments have been increasingly adopting build operate transfer bot contracts for large infrastructure projects however bot contracts have received little attention from economists the apparent agency problem in bot projects has never been analyzed in this paper we develop a model to examine the incentives efficiency and regulation in bot contracts we show that a bot contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency both license extension and price control are observed in many real world bot projects we also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors including time consistency price ceiling foreign ownership and the lack of price regulation

public private partnerships and government spending limits abstract we consider public private partnerships in which a public official selects a project that is then developed and operated by a private contractor we derive optimal public accounting rules when the official s choice among projects is biased by ideology or social ties or because of pandering to special interests we give particular emphasis to how the rules should constrain the official s incentive to understate the costs of her pet projects in the basic model we show that the optimal accounting rule takes the form of a budget cap with a project s expected cost modified to reflect the official s distortionary incentives if the project can be partially financed privately then fixed price contracts can serve to curb political misbehavior by securitizing public sector liabilities we also consider the possibility that development and operations are each handled by different contractors such unbundling deprives public accountants of forward information about future costs but can prevent the official from funneling hidden future rents to contractors

foundations for optimal inattention abstract this paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information an optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation net of a cognitive cost of attention the main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention observing these choices permits unique identification of the agent s utility index the information to which she pays attention her attention cost and her prior whenever information is costly

inattentive professional forecasters abstract using the ecb survey of professional forecasters to characterize expectations at the micro level we emphasize two new facts forecasters i fail to systematically update their forecasts and ii disagree even when updating it is moreover found that forecasters have predictable forecast errors these facts are qualitatively supportive of recent models of inattention and suggest a setup where agents imperfectly process information due to both sticky information a la mankiw reis and noisy information a la sims however building and estimating such an expectation model we find that it cannot quantitatively replicate the error and disagreement observed in the data

what can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities a lot we derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers firms central bankers and professional forecasters we document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information the dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities

inflation and relative prices a decomposition analysis abstract the variability of relative prices is decomposed into a component due to real effects technical change real income growth and so on and a component due to inflation using quarterly australian data inflation is shown to account for 24 percent of the total relative price variability

financing infrastructure in developing countries this article develops a theoretical framework to analyse options for financing infrastructure in developing countries we build a basic model that gives motivations for using a combination of public finance private debt and private equity the model is then extended in a number of ways to examine factors that are important for developing countries we focus in particular on key institutional weaknesses that are often important for infrastructure investment overall we show that such weaknesses can be key in determining financing choices but that they do not all push in the same direction financing schemes must therefore be adapted to consider the institutional limitations that are most pertinent in any given context

actively learning by pricing a model of an experimenting seller this article presents a model of a rational seller who is actively learning the slope of his demand curve via his pricing strategy consequently this seller optimally experiments with his price resulting price patterns show a tendency for discreteness as observed in the data which has proved to be a major challenge to most price setting models the experimentation motive can also replicate the observation that prices are more volatile than costs as well as the presence of many idiosyncratic price changes in the data it can do so without a need to assume the existence of large idiosyncratic shocks

a theory of privatization or why bureaucrats are still in business abstract privatization is a dynamic phenomenon and changes in ownership arrangements require explanations based upon changes in background variables without movements in these variables bureaucrats are likely to stay in business even if reform would increase efficiency it is argued that changes in one such variable the cost of government finance have played a particularly significant role in trigerring privatizations and related reforms the increasing cost of government finance resulting from higher levels of general public expenditure and taxation also explains the policy sequence observed in many countries in which comprehensive ownership reform is preceded by a period of increased financial stringency for state owned enterprises soes

government outsourcing public contracting with private monopoly the article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts the government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds a la laffont and tirole 1993 government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels however government can contract ex post with the private firms this ex post contracting set up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash flows this is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties

robustly strategic consumption portfolio rules with informational frictions this paper provides a tractable continuous time constant absolute risk aversion gaussian framework to explore how the interactions of fundamental uncertainty model uncertainty due to a preference for robustness and state uncertainty due to information processing constraints rational inattention affect strategic consumption portfolio rules and precautionary savings in the presence of uninsurable labor income specifically after solving the model explicitly i compute and compare the elasticities of strategic asset allocation and precautionary savings to risk aversion robustness and inattention furthermore for plausibly estimated and calibrated model parameters i quantitatively analyze how the interactions of model uncertainty and state uncertainty affect the optimal share invested in the risky asset and show that they can provide a potential explanation for the observed stockholding behavior of households with different education and income levels this paper was accepted by neng wang finance

the effects of professional forecast dissemination on macroeconomic volatility abstract this paper explores the role that professional forecast announcements can have on macroeconomic volatility bounded rational agents are used inside a medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with financial frictions modeled agents must form expectations about endogenous variables by selecting between three simple linear forecasting specifications some of which contain the inclusion of a professionally announced forecast of the economic variable historically calibrated simulations of the model show that the usage of the announced professional forecast by the agents in their adaptive learning forecast specifications can reduce the volatility in consumption inflation and wages by as much as 26 23 and 22 respectively however if the professional forecast is not disseminated well to the agents or biased in its dissemination agents will learn to ignore the announcement and macroeconomic volatility will increase further the inclusion of very noisy professional forecast signals can result in coordinated volatility cascades where agents could reduce macroeconomic volatility by ignoring the professional forecast but choose not to because of its previous forecast performance

a dynamic principal agent framework for modeling the performance of infrastructure abstract this paper presents a novel approach to the problem of infrastructure development by integrating technical economic and operational aspects as well as the interactions between the entities who jointly carry out the project the problem is defined within the context of a public private partnership ppp where a public entity delegates the design construction and maintenance of an infrastructure system to a private entity despite the benefits of this procurement method the relationship between the two entities is inherently conflictive three main factors give rise to such conflict the goals of the public and private party do not coincide there is information asymmetry between them and their interaction unfolds in environments under uncertainty the theory of contracts refers to this problem as a principal agent problem however due to the complexity of the problem it is necessary to recreate a dynamic interaction between the principal i e the public entity and the agent i e the private entity while including the monitoring of the infrastructure performance as an essential part of the interaction the complex relationship between the sequential actions of players and the time dependent behavior of a physical system is explored using a hybrid agent based simulation model the model is illustrated with several examples that show the versatility of the approach and its ability to accommodate the different decision strategies of the players i e principal agent and the model of a physical infrastructure system

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

investment dynamics with information costs investment in physical capital at the micro level is infrequent and large or lumpy the most common explanation for this is that firms face non convex physical adjustment costs the model developed in this paper shows that information costs make investment lumpy at the micro level even in the absence of non convex adjustment costs when collecting and processing information is costly the firm optimally chooses to do it sporadically and to be inactive most of the time this behavior results in infrequent and possibly large capital adjustments the model fits plant level investment rate moments well and it also matches some higher order moments of aggregate investment rates keywords investment dynamics information costs inattentiveness lumpy investment jel classification d21 d83 d92 e22

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

minding small change among small firms in kenya abstract many micro enterprises in kenya have low productivity we focus on one particular business decision which may indicate low productivity keeping enough change on hand to break larger bills this is a surprisingly large problem our estimates suggest that the average firm loses approximately 5 8 of total profits because they do not have enough change we conducted two experiments to shed light on why this happens surveying firms weekly about lost sales thereby increasing the salience of change and explicitly informing firms about lost sales we find that both interventions significantly altered change management and reduced lost sales this largely rules out many potential explanations such as the risk of theft or the costs of holding change being too high one explanation consistent with firms response to the survey and information on their lost sales is that firms were not perfectly attentive to change management prior to the interventions

relative price variability in the united states abstract following the clements nguyen methodology relative price variability in the united states is decomposed into the components due to real factors inflation and their interaction overall inflation accounts for about half of relative price variability but its share is the largest during 1973 1980 and the smallest during 1981 1986 cross commodity distribution of relative price variability shows rather dramatic changes

focusing effect and the poverty trap abstract i build a dynamic consumption savings model in which agents choices are distorted by the focusing effect agents overweight the utility of goods in which their options differ more i show that the consumption savings choice depends both on the marginal return on savings and on the total return on savings implying that the incentive to save may increase with the initial level of wealth as a consequence a salience based poverty trap may exist when the marginal return on savings is sufficiently high and sufficiently flat i also consider the case of a perfect credit market and show that a poverty trap may emerge when the salience of consumption is bounded above i discuss policy implications in particular imposing upon an agent a punishment for decreasing savings below a threshold leads to a higher level of savings even when the threshold triggering the punishment is not binding

inflation and relative prices a system wide approach abstract the paper introduces a system wide model for the analysis of the effects of inflation on relative prices this enables the identification of those commodities whose relative prices are distorted by inflation the model provides measures of the natural rate of relative price variability which is associated with zero inflation and the inflation rate which minimizes relative price variability an illustrative application with australian data is provided

bounded rationality lifecycle consumption and social security abstract this paper explores an overlapping generations model of bounded rationality in which consumers only foresee the future over a subset of their life span we focus in particular on whether the model can in general equilibrium produce a hump shaped lifecycle consumption profile with a peak that matches data for the average u s consumer for a simple four period model we show that an increasing income profile along with exogenously imposed retirement are sufficient to induce a hump with no other mechanism that can account for a hump besides bounded rationality the model best fits the salient features of consumption data with a planning horizon of 20 years which is well supported by the behavioral evidence found in surveys on retirement planning finally we show that the age of the consumption peak is robust to the introduction of social security mortality risk and another species of bounded rationality quasihyperbolic discounting moreover social security can be welfare improving with a short planning horizon we can calibrate the model to jointly explain the timing of the consumption hump and the optimality of the current social security system with quasihyperbolic discounting instead we can calibrate the model so the current social security system is optimal but we cannot also account for the timing of the consumption hump if we add quasihyperbolic discounting in addition to a short planning horizon the present bias has a negligible effect in equilibrium

setting the right prices for the wrong reasons we consider a model of nominal price adjustment with firm specific and aggregate shocks to economic fundamentals and incomplete dispersed information firms update their expectations about fundamentals based on their own cash flows revenues and wages we show that in a model with realistic levels of product level price dispersion the firms inference about aggregate shocks is very gradual yet in the aggregate prices adjust rapidly in response to aggregate nominal shocks when an aggregate shock occurs firms mistakenly attribute it to firm specific shocks but adjust prices nevertheless since the exact nature of the shock matters little for its optimal pricing decision

statistical testing of bounded rationality with applications to the newsvendor model abstract in this paper we define bounded rationality in terms of probabilistic cost efficiency this establishes a framework where bounded rationality can be examined rigorously by statistical methods we apply this theory to data from laboratory experiments on the newsvendor model we enter into a theoretical discussion of the classical pull to center effect and explain why underorders are typically larger than overorders

learning through noticing theory and evidence from a field experiment we consider a model of technological learning under which people learn through noticing they choose which input dimensions to attend to and subsequently learn about from available data using this model we show how people with a great deal of experience may persistently be off the production frontier because they fail to notice important features of the data they possess we also develop predictions on when these learning failures are likely to occur as well as on the types of interventions that can help people learn we test the model s predictions in a field experiment with seaweed farmers the survey data reveal that these farmers do not attend to pod size a particular input dimension experimental trials suggest that farmers are particularly far from optimizing this dimension furthermore consistent with the model we find that simply having access to the experimental data does not induce learning instead behavioral changes occur only after the farmers are presented with summaries that highlight previously unattended to relationships in the data jel codes d03 d83 o13 o14 o30 q16

inflation and relative price variability the effect of commodity aggregation using quarterly us data for 1948 89 we study the effect of the level of commodity aggregation on the relation between inflation and relative price variability the effect is assessed for the full period and the subperiods 1948 73 and 1974 89 the relationship is investigated for actual inflation as well as its expected and unexpected components although the parameter estimates show sizeable differences across the two aggregation levels the qualitative picture is the same for both levels in all cases one of the by products of the exercise is the observation that unexpected inflation shows a much stronger positive covariation with relative price variability than the expected component

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

the labor market impact of state level anti discrimination laws 1940 1960 by the time congress passed the 1964 civil rights act 98 of non southern blacks 40 of all blacks already resided in states with fair employment laws prohibiting labor market discrimination using census data from the integrated public use microdata series the author assesses the impact of fair employment legislation on black workers relative income unemployment labor force participation migration and occupational and industrial distributions in general the fair employment laws adopted in the 1940s appear to have had larger effects than those adopted in the 1950s and the laws had considerably smaller effects on the labor market outcomes of black men than on those of black women

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had