low inflation the behavior of financial markets and institutions this paper provides a broad overview of the potential impact of low inflation deflation on u s financial markets and institutions it is argued that the contemporary experience of japan and the historical experience of the united states in the 1920s and 1930s offer only limited insights into the potential impact of low inflation deflation on today s u s financial system a number of potential implications are discussed including a decline in secondary market trading and a trend towards reintermediation in addition low inflation deflation is likely to have a material effect on bank duration and convexity exposures

was debt deflation operative during the great depression i introduction important questions remain regarding the transmission mechanism that linked falling prices and falling output during the great depression despite recent analysis suggesting that the worldwide deflation was initiated and propagated internationally by negative impulses associated with the interwar gold standard 1 a key issue is whether the deflation during the early 1930s was unanticipated prior to the onset of the depression if it was at least largely unanticipated then when combined with rapidly rising nominal debt issuance bernanke s 1983 credit view explanation and extension of fisher s 1933 original debt deflation hypothesis helps explain the persistent monetary nonneutralities present during the depression these nonmonetary financial theories hold that events in the financial markets other than shocks to the money supply can account for the paths of output and prices without invoking irrational behavior on the part of agents in his debt deflation hypothesis fisher asserted that nominal overindebtedness and deflation are the dominant forces that account for great depressions specifically he argued that given nominally denominated debt contracts a protracted fall in prices and nominal incomes substantially increased real debt burdens led to debtor insolvency and lowered aggregate demand in a continuing spiral this fall in demand contributed to a further decline in the price level and thus further increases in the real burden of debt bernanke 1983 provided additional details to help explain fisher s debt deflation hypothesis he argued that in normal circumstances an initial decline in prices merely reallocates wealth from debtors to creditors such as banks usually such wealth redistribution has no first order impact on the economy however in the face of large shocks deflation in the prices of assets forfeited to banks by debtor bankruptcies leads to a decline in the nominal value of assets on bank balance sheets for a given value of bank liabilities also denominated in nominal terms this deterioration in bank assets threatens insolvency as banks reallocate assets away from loans to safer government securities some borrowers particularly small ones are unable to obtain funds often at any price furthermore if bank portfolio reallocation is long lived the shortage of credit for these borrowers helps explain the persistence of the downturn as the disappearance of bank financing forces lower expenditure plans aggregate demand declines which again contributes to the downward deflationary spiral 2 analyses such as cecchetti 1992 which carefully demonstrate that the deflation was anticipated at short horizons once it started do not bear directly on our discussion 3 instead to show that debt deflation was an important part of the contraction of the early 1930s it is important to document the accumulation of substantial medium and long term debt prior to 1929 in addition the finding that deflation could have been anticipated at horizons of 3 6 months does suggest that simple debt deflation theories for the propagation of the great depression must rely on the failure of agents to anticipate deflation several years in advance not several quarters in advance cecchetti 1992 note 26 we will argue that debt deflation was operative both because of a rise in nominally denominated debt and because the deflation in the early 1930s was unanticipated when this debt was being incurred we demonstrate three facts consistent with this statement of the debt deflation credit view explanation of the depression first we document that private medium and long term nominal debt during the 1920s exhibited a combination of a high initial value relative to income and a rapid growth rate that is unparalleled in a consistent data set covering more than half a century 4 second following the seminal work of evans and wachtel 1993 estimation results from a markov switching model of the price process during the entire interwar period suggest that the debt issued during the decade preceding the downturn occurred in a stable price regime and that the probability of remaining in this stable price regime was 0

the fisher hypothesis and the forecastability and persistence of inflation abstract for the period 1860 to 1939 the simple correlation of the u s commercial paper rate with the contemporaneous inflation rate is 0 17 the corresponding correlation for the period 1950 to 1979 is 0 71 this paper attributes this apparent change in the fisher relation to differences in the stochastic process of inflation rather than a change in any structural relationship between interest rates and expected inflation contrary to recent claims in the literature there is little evidence of inflation non neutrality in data from the pre world war i period

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

harvests and business cycles in nineteenth century america most major american industrial business cycles from around 1880 to the first world war were caused by fluctuations in the size of the cotton harvest due to economically exogenous factors such as weather wheat and corn harvests did not affect industrial production nor did the cotton harvest before the late 1870s the unique effect of the cotton harvest in this period can be explained as an essentially monetary phenomenon the result of interactions between harvests international gold flows and high powered money demand under america s goldstandard regime of 1879 1914

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

rules for a lender of last resort an historical perspective abstract the federal reserve was established in 1913 to be a lender of last resort paul warburg its principal architect had in mind that a u s central bank would follow bagehot s strictures to lend freely at a penalty rate in the face of a scramble for high powered money yet the federal reserve act never spelled out how the fed was supposed to act as an llr this omission came to the fore in the great contraction 1929 to 1933 when the fed failed to prevent four banking panics which turned a serious recession into the great contraction reforms in the 1930s corrected some of the fed s failures but clamped down on financial activity for 40 years the financial crisis problem returned in the 1970s with financial liberalization the fed abandoned bagehot s strictures and adopted the too big to fail doctrine and creative ambiguity this policy shift contributed to moral hazard and created new threats to financial stability with the rise of the shadow banking system the subprime mortgage crisis prompted the fed to take unprecedented llr activities which have opened up a pandora s box of perils the fed has moved away from rules based policy in its llr function

identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets lessons from the founding of the fed abstract we use the founding of the federal reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort we examine stock return and interest rate volatility during september and october when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest stock volatility fell by 40 and interest rate volatility by more than 70 following the monetary regime change the drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis however because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises our results suggest that the existence of the federal reserve reduced liquidity risk

was there a peso problem in the u s term structure of interest rates 1979 1982 during the period following october 1979 through 1982 the u s federal reserve allowed interest rates to fluctuate widely in contrast to its previous policy of targeting these rates in the 1970s the policy was abandoned in 1982 in favor of an operating procedure that reduced the variation in interest rates this paper implements an estimation method to identify from the term structure of eurodollar returns the market s beliefs that the federal reserve may revert to interest rate targeting the model is not rejected and gives plausible estimates of the probability of a switch in monetary regimes copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

was the deflation during the great depression anticipated evidence from the commodity futures market futures prices were well above spot prices for most commodities during most of the great depression evidently the spectacular declines in agricultural prices caught many people by surprise based on the historical correlations between commodity prices and consumer prices commodity markets anticipated stable consumer prices during the first year of the great depression the dramatic drop in nominal treasury bill yields thus should be read as a drop in ex ante real rates later in the great depression markets anticipated deflation but not as severe as actually occurred copyright 1992 by american economic association

were price changes during the great depression anticipated abstract this paper reassesses whether the large swings in prices during the 1930 s were anticipated we argue that uncertainty about monetary fiscal and exchange rate policies induced systematic differences between the rate of price change expected by economic agents at the time and the time series forecasts of inflation our analysis of nominal interest rates and ex post inflation strongly supports this view in fact our results suggest that the deflation of the early depression years and the inflation that followed were both largely unanticipated

asymmetric exchange rate intervention and international reserve accumulation in india abstract the empirical evidence derived from the ardl approach of pesaran et al pesaran m h shin y smith r j 1996 testing for the existence of a long run relationship dae working paper no 9622 department of applied economics university of cambridge suggests that volatility of external transactions has had a moderate impact on reserve demand in recent years instead asymmetric exchange rate intervention triggered perhaps by concerns about india s export competitiveness seems to have contributed to large stockpile of reserves

from drafts to checks the evolution of correspondent banking networks and the formation of the modern u s payments system 1850 1914 checks remained local payments instruments throughout virtually the entire nineteenth century their significant use in interregional transactions dates only to the 1890s we explain their lagged spatial diffusion by the evolution of centralized payments institutions to coordinate transactions among myriad banks not real technological changes to annihilate distance the pivotal institutions were large correspondent banks especially in new york after the civil war new york funds constituted a national settlement medium and the concentration of bankers balances in new york yielded liquidity and other externalities smoothing the flow of check payments

how amsterdam got fiat money abstract a fiat money system was introduced in the seventeenth century by a prominent public bank of the time the bank of amsterdam employing data from the bank s archives we show that bank money became a more attractive transactions medium following a 1683 policy change which unbundled the bank s account balances from a right to redeem these balances in coin balances not matched by a redemption right became fiat this change also stabilized the value of bank money as a unit of account freed the bank from defensive open market operations and promoted seigniorage collection

financial factors in the great depression eginning with irving fisher 1933 and john maynard keynes 1931 b 1963 macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the great depression turning points during the depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets stock market collapse waves of bankruptcy and bank failure and contractions in the money stock but the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the depression has been a source of controversy as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the depression this essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the depression and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the depression and for macroeconomics i argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial real links in the depression followed a paradigm shift in economics a central neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity also the increasing emphasis on learning and path dependence in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy makers failed to prevent the depression

the transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma we formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource the diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource agents remain conditionally cooperative unless other individuals are misbehaving already we can observe a bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up followed by a sudden burst which means that a transition from a cooperative social norm to non cooperation occurs interestingly in some parameter regions alternative stable states and limit cycles arise the latter implies that the same community goes through such a transition repeatedly over long time spans history thus repeats itself in the form of the creation and erosion of social capital

banking crises and liquidity in a monetary economy abstract this study investigates banks liquidity provision using the lagos and wright model of monetary exchange with aggregate uncertainty we show that banks sometimes exhaust their cash reserves and fail to satisfy their depositors needs for consumption smoothing we also show that banking crises can be eliminated by a rate of return equalizing policy under perfect risk sharing but the first best outcome can be only achieved with the friedman rule these results cannot be obtained with other monetary models e g overlapping generations models we also derive a rich array of non trivial effects of inflation on equilibrium deposits the probability of banking crises and banks portfolios

monetary policy theory and practice in respect of the theory of monetary policy i am reminded of the comment that jacob viner made many years ago at a meeting of the american economic association about alfred marshall s economics what is new is highly unlikely at this late date also to be true and significant 1 consequently i shall restrict my remarks on theory to trying to summarize what i regard as the present intellectual position

could stable money have averted the great contraction i introduction although over fifty years have elapsed since the onset of the great contraction controversy still swirls about the factors responsible for its depth and long duration a basic issue is the hypothesis due to friedman and schwartz 1963 that the great contraction would have been attenuated had the federal reserve not allowed the money stock to decline although the validity of the hypothesis has been a subject of much debate there is little empirical evidence directly addressing it a direct test of the friedman and schwartz hypothesis requires simulating the behavior of output under a counterfactual policy of stable money that approach was adopted by warburton 1966 friedman 1960 and modigliani 1969 none of whom constructed a model of the economy on the basis of which to conduct his test recently mccallum 1990 has used simulations from a macro model to show that his base rule with feedback would have avoided the severe decline in nominal income that occurred between 1929 and 1933 1 the extent to which his rule would have improved the behavior of nominal income depends on the value of the feedback coefficient mccallum s simulations however do not address the issue considered here of how a stable money rule would have performed in this paper we present simulations that focus on the stable money counterfactual our model is based on mccallum s but we use a more general framework than his that a estimates separate relations for output and the price level and b places no prior restrictions on the feedback from output and the price level to money our stable money counterfactual does not change the long term rate of money growth from that actually experienced and thus involves only short run changes in the behavior of the money supply we assume that dynamics embedded in the output and price relation are not especially sensitive to this type of policy change we simulate two variants of milton friedman s 1960 constant money growth rule the first a strong form of the rule assumes that the fed could quickly offset changes in the money multiplier by changes in high powered money and thus keep the money stock on the constant growth rate path in each quarter the second a weaker form of the rule assumes that the money multiplier is observed with a one quarter lag and the fed can only set the expected rate of growth of money conditional on last period information equal to the constant rate our basic simulation is derived from a model estimated for the 1921 1 1941 4 interwar period the results of this simulation buttress the views of friedman and schwartz had a constant money growth rule with an annual rate equal to the average 1921 41 rate of 2 95 percent been followed throughout the interwar period the great contraction would have been avoided real output would have declined from 1929 3 to 1933 1 but the order of magnitude of the cumulative change 11 1 to 21 6 percent and the annual rate of change 3 3 to 6 6 percent when the actual cumulative change was 36 2 percent and the annual rate of change was 12 1 percent would have been comparable to other recessions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the basic simulation we assume that the output and price relations remained stable over the entire interwar period the extraordinary economic conditions of the great contraction could have arguably shifted the output and price relations thus we also present an alternative simulation that uses estimates of these relations based on the 1920s data this simulation shows that a constant money growth rule with an annual rate equal to the 1921 29 average of 3 29 percent would have prevented even a mild recession during the great contraction period section ii contains a brief survey of the continuing debate over the cause and propagation mechanism of the great contraction and its implications for the stable money hypothesis

sources of panics evidence from the weekly data abstract we use weekly data 1867 1933 to investigate the sources of banking and financial panics we find that while a panic s exact starting date is unpredictable one can identify environments conducive to panics a lack of liquidity in financial markets seems to be a key source results also reveal the effectiveness of the aldrich vreeland act inelastizing the money supply and shortening the panic of 1914 and suggest that the panic of 1933 may have been caused by a speculative attack on the gold backed us dollar via the banks as opposed to a run on the banks directly

interest rate targeting abstract the paper develops a model in which the monetary authority successfully targets the nominal interest rate while also holding down the forecast variance of the price level the latter objective pins down the extent of monetary accommodation to shifts in the demand for money and other shocks and thereby makes determinate the levels of money and prices at each date empirical evidence for the united states suggests that the model s predictions accord reasonably well with observed behavior for nominal interest rates growth rates of the monetary base and rates of inflation

the spectre of deflation a review of empirical evidence what explains the widespread fear of deflation this article reviews the history of thought economic history and empirical evidence on deflation with a view to answering this question it also outlines informally the main effects of deflation in applied monetary models the main finding is that for both historical and contemporary deflations there are many open empirical questions that could be answered using the tools economists use to study inflation and monetary policy more generally qu est ce qui explique la peur tres repandue de la deflation ce memoire fait un tour d horizon de l histoire de la pensee economique de l histoire economique et des resultats empiriques quant aux effets de la deflation en vue de repondre a cette question on fait aussi echo informellement aux effets principaux de la deflation dans les modeles monetaires appliques ce qui ressort principalement de ce travail est que tant pour les deflations dans l histoire que dans le monde contemporain il y a bien des questions empiriques encore irresolues auxquelles on pourrait donner une reponse en utilisant l outillage mental que les economistes utilisent pour etudier l inflation et la politique monetaire plus generalement sp c tre n thing that is thought to be seen but has no material existence haunting presentiment of ruin war madness etc

hyperinflation the exchange rate and endogenous money post world war i germany revisited abstract we re examine the interaction of domestic and external factors in the german hyperinflation by extending frenkel s monetary model of the exchange rate to incorporate 1 endogeneity of the money supply with respect to government debt expected inflation and money wages 2 the direct impact of exchange rate depreciation on the domestic price level and 3 endogenous wage determination four equation estimates support each extension of the monetary model it appears that government deficit finance the collapse of the exchange rate and the monetary transmission of the wage price spiral were all crucial contributors to the price explosion

money creation and the shadow banking system many explanations for the rapid growth of the shadow banking system in the mid2000s focus on money demand this paper asks whether the short term liabilities of the shadow banking system behave like money we rst present a simple model where households demand money services which are supplied by three types of claims deposits treasury bills and asset backed commercial paper abcp the model provides predictions for the price and quantity dynamics of these claims as well as the behavior of the banking system in terms of issuance and the monetary authority in terms of open market operations consistent with the model the empirical evidence suggests that the shadow banking system does respond to money demand

shadowy banks and financial contagion during the great depression a retrospective on friedman and schwartz this essay assesses whether network linkages within the banking system amplified the real effects of bank failures during the great contraction in 1929 nearly all interbank deposits held by federal reserve member banks belonged to shadowy nonmember banks which were outside the regulatory reach of federal regulators regional banking panics in the early 1930s drained these interbank deposits from central reserve city banks money center banks in chicago and new york responded to volatile and declining interbank deposits by changing their asset composition they reduced their lending to businesses and individuals and increased their holdings of cash and government bonds

loan commitments and optimal monetary policy abstract with loan commitments negotiated in advance the use of tight money to restrain nominal spending has asymmetric effects upon different categories of borrowers this can reduce efficiency even though aggregate demand is stabilized an equilibrium model of financial intermediation with loan commitments is developed and used to analyze the welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies if demand uncertainty relates primarily to the number of borrowers rather than to each one s demand for credit an interest rate smoothing policy is optimal

do stationary risk premia explain it all evidence from the term structure abstract predictable variations in excess returns have often been attributed to the presence of time varying risk premia in this paper we use an insight based upon new techniques from time series analysis to test whether stationary risk premia can alone explain the behavior of excess returns to long bonds relative to rolling over short rates surprisingly we reject this hypothesis using u s t bill returns we then show that either permanent shocks to the risk premia and or rationally anticipated shifts in the interest rate process could produce anomalous results

the adjustment of expectations to a change in regime a study of the founding of the federal reserve the founding of the federal reserve system in 1914 led to a substantial change in the behavior of nominal interest rates the authors examine the timing of this change and the speed with which it was effected they then use data on the term structure of interest rates to determine how expectations responded their results indicate that the change in policy regime was rapid and that individuals quickly understood the new environment they were facing copyright 1987 by american economic association

seasonal fluctuations and the demand for money the reaction of money holders to the systematic seasonal changes in the level of transactions represents an interesting experiment for learning about the money demand function an analysis of the seasonal fluctuations of the real quantity of money and several measures of transactions in the united states germany the united kingdom and canada reveals the following first consumption expenditures in semidurables nondurables and services appears to be a good proxy for transactions in a money demand function and superior to gross domestic product or consumption expenditures second the transactions elasticity of the demand for money is substantially lower than one

liquidity risk bank networks and the value of joining the federal reserve system reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal swings in loan demand was one reason for the founding of the federal reserve system existing evidence on the post federal reserve increase in the seasonal volatility of aggregate lending and the decrease in seasonal interest rate swings suggests that it succeeded in that mission nevertheless less than 8 percent of state chartered banks joined the federal reserve in its first decade some have speculated that nonmembers could avoid higher costs of the federal reserve s reserve requirements while still obtaining access indirectly to the federal reserve discount window through contacts with federal reserve members we find that individual bank attributes related to the extent of banks ability to mitigate seasonal loan demand variation predict banks decisions to join the federal reserve consistent with the notion that banks could obtain indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers we find that a bank s position within the interbank network as a user or provider of liquidity predicts the timing of its entry into the federal reserve system and the effect of federal reserve membership on its lending behavior we also find that indirect access to the federal reserve was not as good as direct access federal reserve member banks saw a greater increase in lending than nonmember banks

uncertainty irreversibility durable consumption and the great depression what was the role of uncertainty in the great depression this paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model to show that in response to an increase in uncertainty agents increase expenditure on irreversible durable goods and reduce investment in irreversible physical capital these relative movements occur because durable goods provide a store of utility and are less irreversible than physical capital these substitutions are unclear at the start of the great depression but are clearly visible at the deep end of it in 1932 when the volatility of stock returns is consistently high coefficients on the variance which is consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis both the theoretical hypothesis and its empirical tests are of a partial equilibrium nature yet the great depression was a general equilibrium event this paper puts the uncertainty argument explicitly in a general equilibrium model with consumer durables and capital goods both subject to irreversibility constraints i associate income uncertainty with the stochastic process driving output fluctuations and an increase in uncertainty is modelled as a mean preserving spread on the distribution of this shock the general equilibrium setup also incorporates a specific notion of irreversibility namely that goods are irreversible if there are no buyers when one wants to sell the test of the uncertainty hypothesis in general equilibrium is a simulation of a calibrated version of the model what makes the reaction to a mean preserving spread nontrivial is the clash of the theoretical predictions of precautionary savings and irreversible investment in a general equilibrium context savings should increase and investment should fall to complicate matters durable goods have components of both consumption and investment so what was the role of uncertainty in the great depression in this setup a calibrated model provides a simple answer higher uncertainty makes agents cut capital investment and increase expenditure on durables there are two reasons for this the first is that durables are the least irreversible of the two assets in the model and the second is that durable goods act as a store of utility and thus as insurance the view of the uncertainty hypothesis that a cut in expenditure on durable goods is a key response to high uncertainty is not supported by a standard general equilibrium model there may however be some truth in itfbut for the wrong reasons and at the wrong time it is not a fall in durable expenditure per se but rather an increase relative to

conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods we compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations subjects in the partners conditi on contribute from t he first period on significantly more to the publi c good than subjects in the strangers conditi on in the strangers conditi on contributions show a continual decay whil e in the partners conditi on contributions fluctuate on a high level until t hey decrease in the final periods we interpret subjects behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future oriented and reactive behavior

changing beliefs and systematic rational forecast errors with evidence from foreign exchange this paper addresses a new interpretation to the appearance in the early 1980s of systematic errors in forecasting the dollar exchange rate following a change in the process of a fundamental variable market participants revise their beliefs about the process using bayes rule since the market does not immediately recognize the change forecast errors are on average wrong during a period when the market is rationally learning for conservative parameter values the learning behavior of the dollar exchange rate in the early 1980s appears consistent with about half of the dollar s underprediction implied by the forward market copyright 1989 by american economic association

the federal reserve amendments of 1917 the beginning of a seasonal note issue policy the federal reserve adopted a policy of smoothing the seasonal behavior of interest rates after the amendments of 1917 these amendments reduced the collateral requirements for notes issued and thereby increased note issue capability notes in circulation more than doubled from june to december 1917 these amendments were passed to assist with war related financing as their timing coincided with the entry of the united states into world war i the smoothing of interest rates seasonals between 1914 and 1917 was not due to the founding of the federal reserve system but rather to trade related gold flows copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

interest rate seasonals and the federal reserve it is widely believed that one of the federal reserve s first important monetary policy achievements was the deseasonalization of interest rates the federal reserve supposedly accomplished this by introducing appropriate seasonal movements into the supplies of currency and high powered money this view implicitly assumes that there was no interaction between american and foreign financial markets two findings are reported that challenge this conventional view first interest rate seasonals disappeared in the united states and other countries at approximately the same time second interest rate seasonal ended approximately 3 years before the seasonal movements of currency and high powered money changed

price smoothing policies a welfare analysis in post wwii experience u s monetary authorities have attempted to eliminate seasonal fluctuations in prices and nominal interest rates developments in financial markets and recently discovered empirical regularities regarding the seasonal cycle seem to make these activities questionable using a money in the utility function model this paper analyzes the welfare properties of price and interest rate smoothing policies and the sense in which the distinction between seasonal and cyclical fluctuations is relevant it is shown that smoothing policies are welfare improving but not optimal and that the origin of the shocks not the persistence of the fluctuations is relevant in formulating policies

public ends private means abstract this paper is an empirical investigation into the practices of the second bank of the united states during the decade preceding andrew jackson s veto of the bank a new monthly data set derived from financial publications and second bank records of the time is employed to investigate whether the bank operated in the public interest as argued by its supporters or to further its own monopolistic interests as argued by its detractors the paper analyzes the role played by this early central bank and provides an intriguing example of one experiment in the private provision of public goods

bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking abstract central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis the lender of last resort function this activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic the likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system banking systems with well diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry in addition big banks can self monitor through publicly observable branch closure systems of many small banks form incentive compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance a precursor of central banking

who anticipated the great depression gustav cassel versus keynes and hayek on the interwar gold standard the intellectual response to the great depression is often portrayed as a battle between the ideas of friedrich hayek and john maynard keynes yet both the austrian and the keynesian interpretations of the depression were incomplete austrians could explain how a country might get into a depression bust following a credit fueled investment boom but not how to get out of one liquidation keynesians could explain how a country might get out of a depression government spending on public works but not how it got into one animal spirits by contrast the monetary approach of gustav cassel has been ignored as early as 1920 cassel warned that mismanagement of the gold standard could lead to a severe depression cassel not only explained how this could occur but his explanation anticipates the way that scholars today describe how the great depression actually occurred unlike keynes or hayek cassel analyzed both how a country could get into a depression deflation due to tight monetary policies and how it could get out of one monetary expansion

origins of the federal reserve system international incentives and the domestic free rider problem from the civil war to 1914 the united states had one of the worst e nancial systems in the world the dominant institutional feature of the system was the absence of a central bank and its most salient performance characteristics were the recurrence of banking panics and severe seasonal interest rate e uctuations these e nancial problems were economically costly panics were accompanied by sharp declines in the money supply reduced economic activity and increased unemployment and business failures in 1913 congress created the federal reserve system to safeguard the nation from panics and smooth out interest rate seasonals in more general terms the federal reserve was established to provide the national public good of e nancial system stability in this study i explain how american society overcame the collective action problems that normally constrain the production of public goods to inadequate levels in other words the article is about the political effort that produced an infrastructural cornerstone of the modern u s economy in the face of incentives that should have left few people with sufficient motivation to pay for the improvement i bring to bear a joint products selective incentives argument to explain the voluntary collective action behind the federal reserveact 1 the lobbying effort was aboutsolving thepanic problem tobe sure but becausethisexpected benee t approximated a societywide public good it did not on its own motivate collective action instead the united states faced a second problem of e nancial organization before 1914 and it was this problem that created a private inducement to lobby for the federal reserve the structure of the domestic e nancial machinery contributed not only to instability at home but also to the near complete absence of the u s dollar in global e nancial affairs indeed the united states was the only major trading country whose currency did not function as an international currency before 1914 the new this article is a revision of a paper delivered at the 1996annual convention of the southern economic association washington d c 23 25 november i thank michael bordo marc busch william r clark benjamin j cohen barry eichengreen jeffry frieden william keech stephen krasner charles lipson jameslivingston louispauly georgeselgin bethsimmons richardtimberlake danielverdier eugene n white and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 1 see olson 1965 and sandler 1992

interpreting the movements in short term interest rates this article uses modern asset pricing theory to examine the behavior of short term nominal interest rates over the past twenty five years the analysis investigates whether variation in the stochastic behavior of consumption growth and inflation can explain movements in the rate of interest the model estimated allows for taste shocks to utility the authors results reveal that much of the month to month movement in nominal interest rates reflects changes in the real rate and the risk premia in addition to inflationary expectations copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

forecasting the depression harvard versus yale was the depression forecastable after the crash how long should it have taken contempo rary forecasters to realize how severe the downturn was going to be these questions are addressed by studying the predictions of the harv ard economic service and yale s irving fisher during 1929 and the ear ly 1930s the data assembled by the harvard and yale forecasters tog ether with modern historical data are subjected to statistical analy sis to learn whether their verbal pronouncements were consistent with the data both the harvard and yale forecasters were systematically too optimistic yet nothing in the data suggests that the optimism w as unwarranted copyright 1988 by american economic association

the worldwide change in the behavior of interest rates and prices in 1914 abstract this paper evaluates the role of the destruction of the gold standard and the founding of the federal reserve both of which occured in 1914 in contributing to observed changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices after 1914 the paper presents a model of policy coordination in which the introduction of the fed stabilizes interest rates even it the gold standard remains intact and it offers empirical evidence that the dismantling of the gold standard did not play a crucial role in precipitating the changes in interest rate behavior

bank regulation and monetary policy the depository institutions deregulation and monetary control act 1980 and the garn st germain depository institutions act 1982 are the two most significant pieces of bank legislation since the 193os their significance stems from the fact that they have sought to roll back a number of the regulations and restrictions imposed on bank activity and competition in the 1933 80 period among the important provisions of these acts are a gradual elimination of regulation q ceilings on time and savings deposits by march 1986 the amelioration of state imposed usury ceilings on loans the nationwide provision of interest bearing transaction type accounts negotiable order of withdrawal now and super now accounts permission for thritts to expand into bank like products such as commercial and industrial loans consumer loans and credit cards and the development of new types of savings accounts such as mmdas l in addition to legislative deregulation we have also witnessed homemade deregulation as banks have sought to exploit often with great success loopholes in the bank holding

seasonal cycles business cycles and monetary policy abstract this paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that is consistent with both seasonal and business cycle facts in the u s economy the model features consumption durability and a transaction technology both crucial in accounting for seasonal patterns of nominal variables a calibrated version of the model is used to quantitatively evaluate welfare consequences of three alternative monetary policy rules 1 the fed s historical policy that smooths nominal interest rates at the seasonal frequency but not at the business cycle frequency 2 a constant money growth rule and 3 a constant interest rate rule we find that the historical policy is associated with higher welfare than both alternatives

the federal reserve and panic prevention the roles of financial regulation and lender of last resort this paper surveys the role of the federal reserve within the financial regulatory system with particular attention to the interaction of the fed s role as both a supervisor and a lender of last resort the institutional design of the federal reserve system was aimed at preventing banking panics primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window this new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s after which the fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create stigma for window borrowing policies that contributed to the panics of the great depression the legislation of the new deal era centralized fed power in the board of governors and over the next 75 years the fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks nevertheless prior to the recent crisis the fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort with the latter role weakened further by stigma the fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly as the fed begins its second century there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention

economic growth liquidity and bank runs abstract we construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium in this setting a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output in addition the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks and thereby affects the long run growth rate these facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods a bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules in the first a run occurs with a fixed exogenous probability while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks portfolio choices we show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs

the optimal level of international reserves evidence for india abstract in india the reserve demand is predominantly determined by the opportunity cost than the reserve volatility which is in stark contrast to the overall evidence of the emerging market economies this can perhaps be attributed to relatively free inflow than outflow of capital

the sources of financial crises pre and post fed evidence this paper investigates the generation and the propagation mechanism of currency demand and supply shocks before and after world war i the structural determinants of the variability of stock prices and interest rates and the changes introduced by the creation of the fed on the dynamics of the system it is shown that in the pre 1914 era external monetary shocks interacted with a seasonal demand for money to produce financial crises the fed helped to prevent crises by insulating the u s economy from external shocks a structural vector autoregressive model provides evidence for these claims copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a multivariate analysis of interest rate seasonality at the time of the founding of the federal reserve miron 9 10 clark 2 mankiw miron and weil 7 and barsky et al 1 have used univariate methods to demonstrate that the seasonality in interest rates changed in the period following the creation of the federal reserve system they have also debated whether these changes were attributable to the founding of the fed or to some other event such as the collapse of the gold standard following the beginning of world war i this paper in contrast will use a vector autoregression var to determine the source of the change in interest rate seasonality we will show that the change in interest rate seasonality is at least in part due to the transmission to the interest rate of changes in seasonality of other variables in particular when seasonal variation in other variables is eliminated so that a counterfactual path for interest rates is determined we find no tendency for the seasonality of these counterfactual interest rates to decline after the founding of the fed these results suggest that the decline in interest rate seasonality noted in simple autocorrelation functions computed before and after the end of 1914 is likely more complex than previous discussions have implied the var used here includes five variables the wholesale price index the call interest rate an index of stock prices high powered money and industrial production we employ monthly data covering the period 1890 to 1929 this var is subjected to a stability test with a hypothesized break in november 1914 which corresponds to the opening of the federal reserve the literature has established from both economic and statistical perspectives that for single equation models of the interest rate this is a reasonable break date 2 using a bootstrap technique we ex

contagious cooperation temptation and ecosystem collapse real world observations suggest that social norms o f cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a c ommon pool resource but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse we show that these patterns of erosion and 15 collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the tempta tion to overexploit the resource while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations we analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters including the size of the community and the rate of technological progress trigger catastrophic transitions from 20 relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation causing the social ecological system to collapse

is the accumulation of international reserves good for development international reserves accumulation has been the preferred policy recently adopted by developing economies to achieve financial stability the aim of this policy is to increase liquidity and thus reduce the risk of suffering a speculative attack the main concern expressed in the literature has been related to its cost most of the studies conclude that the opportunity cost of international reserves accumulation is around 1 of gdp however these studies have not analysed whether this strategy is or could be more broadly supportive of development an issue that must be of central interest for developing economies the aim of this paper is to show that the stockpiling of international reserves is not optimal for developmental purposes and that there exist alternative policies that can be applied to achieve financial stability policy autonomy and a better performance in terms of development

more on the behavior of interest rates and the founding of the fed abstract the paper addresses the issue of the impact of the foundation of the federal reserve system in 1914 on the behavior of short term interest rates empirical evidence is presented showing that no change of regime can be detected in the process governing short term rates in the years straddling the foundation of the fed since the behavior of this process did change in the decade 1910 1920 the paper discusses some historical events and institutional changes in the new york money market that had an impact on the behavior of short term interest rates between 1908 and 1920

profit fluctuations signal eroding resilience of natural resources abstract a common pattern of environmental crises is a vicious cycle between environmental degradation and socio economic disturbances here we show that while such feedbacks may give rise to critical transitions in social ecological systems at the same time they can offer novel opportunities for anticipating them we model a community that has joint access to the harvest grounds of a resource that is prone to collapse individuals are tempted to overexploit the resource while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations both social and ecological collapses can be induced by environmental or socio economic driving forces regardless of the type and cause of collapse we find that upcoming transitions may be detected using simple socio economic response variables such as individual profits our findings suggest that such alternative sources of information can be used to detect upcoming critical transitions in social ecological systems however we also find that robust detection of critical transitions may be confounded by recovery attempts undertaken by resource users in the vicinity of an upcoming collapse which may be falsely interpreted as a stabilization of the social ecological system

interwar inflation unexpected inflation and output growth interwar macroeconomic history is a natural place to look for evidence on the correlation between output growth and inflation or unexpected inflation we apply time series methods to measure unexpected inflation for more than 20 countries using both retail and wholesale prices there is a significant positive correlation between output growth and inflation for the entire period there is little evidence that this correlation is caused by an underlying role for unexpected inflation for wholesale price inflation in particular the output declines associated with deflations were larger than the output increases associated with inflations of the same scale

nominal exchange rate regimes and the real exchange rate abstract two assumptions about the real exchange rate are common in the literature on international finance 1 the real exchange rate is a random walk 2 the time series properties of the real exchange rate depend on the nominal exchange rate regime this paper presents evidence that indicates that the random walk behavior of the real exchange rate is only a characteristic of the post world war ii period moreover our findings also suggest that what is crucial to the real exchange rate behavior is the particular historical period rather than the nominal exchange rate arrangement

nonlinear behavior of the socio economic dynamics for lake eutrophication control abstract to succeed in combating lake eutrophication cooperation of local inhabitants small factories and farmers in reducing phosphorus discharge is very important but the willingness of each player to cooperate would depend on the cooperation of other players and on the level of environmental concern of the society in general here we study the integrated dynamics of people s choice of behavior and the magnitude of eutrophication assumptions are there are a number of players who choose between alternative options a cooperative and environment oriented option is more costly than the other the decision of each player is affected by social pressure as well as by economical cost of the options the lake pollution increases with the total phosphorus released and a high pollution level in the lake would enhance the social pressure the model includes a positive and a negative feedback loops which create diverse dynamical behavior the model often shows bistability having an equilibrium with a high level of cooperation among people and clean water and the other equilibrium with low cooperation and polluted water which are simultaneously stable the model also shows fluctuation between a high and a low levels of cooperation in alternating years cycle with a longer periodicity or chaotic fluctuation conservatism of people stabilizes the system and sometimes helps maintaining cooperation the system may show unexpected parameter dependence the improved phosphorus removing efficiency might make water more polluted if it causes the decline in the environmental concern and cooperation among people

great crashes in history have they lessons for today crashes in asset markets have been common throughout history while financial crises defined as crises in the banking system have in some countries and periods been as common and in others much more rare this article examines historical attitudes to those events and looks at some of the events themselves it is concluded first that crashes need not inevitably be followed by crises second that crashes without crises do not have serious effects on the economy and third that there is a policy instrument the lender of last resort to prevent financial crises from occurring even should there be a substantial preceding fall in asset markets these lessons from history so it is argued hold for recent events in south east asia and indeed apply generally to any economy the present can still learn from the past copyright 1999 by oxford university press

the seasonality of banking failures during the late national banking era in this paper we expand previous models with banks and money and explore the consequences of seasonals in the banking system we find that when bank failures occur not all of them have associated large output losses and currency premiums exist we show that the most important sources of seasonal fluctuations for the banking system are those related to the return on farming activities and the scrapping value of the initial investment finally this model is consistent with the notion that the treasury is more likely to accommodate the money market in periods where the liquidity needs

investigating the effects of monetary regime shifts the case of the federal reserve and the shrinking risk premium abstract in this paper we use mishkin s efficient markets framework journal of finance 37 1982 63 72 to show that the founding of the federal reserve led to a greater than 50 reduction in the size of the risk term premium a 6 month instrument pays over a 3 month one and that this reduction coincides with the significant reduction in the uncertainty of interest rates that took place during the same period this result demonstrates a major impact this unparalleled us monetary regime shift had on financial markets and provides further confirmation of the importance of accounting for major institutional and policy changes when investigating the sources of changing intertemporal macroeconomic relationships

conflict between groups of players in coupled socio economic and ecological dynamics conflict among multiple groups is a major source of difficulty in environmental conservation people are often divided into various groups that have different social factors sometimes leading to differences in the degree to which they cooperate in environmental conservation this obstructs the social consensus needed to solve the environmental problems here we study the coupled dynamics of human socio economic choice and lake water pollution and examine the magnitude of the difference in cooperation levels between two groups in the model many players choose between a costly but cooperative option and a selfish option the former results in a reduced phosphorus discharge into the lake each player s choice is affected by an economic cost and social pressure social pressure is a psychological factor that promotes cooperation it becomes stronger when more players in the society are cooperative conformist tendency and when the problem at hand is a greater concern to society in the model two groups sometimes show large differences in their cooperation levels even when both have exactly the same social factors however cooperation levels are more likely to differ between groups that have different social factors enhancement of the cross group conformist tendency is the most effective way to minimize differences in cooperation levels and to mitigate conflict between groups

prices during the great depression was the deflation of 1930 1932 really unanticipated this paper examines inflationary expectations in order to investigate whether the deflation of 1930 32 could have been anticipated the major conclusion is that beginning in late 1930 and possibly as early as late 1929 deflation could have been anticipated at horizons of three six months this implies in turn that short run ex ante real interest rates were very high during the initial phases of the great depression these results provide further support for the proposition that monetary contraction was the driving force behind the economic decline copyright 1992 by american economic association

the political lessons of depression era banking reform ironically the primary motivations for the main bank regulatory reforms in the 1930s regulation q the separation of investment banking from commercial banking and the creation of federal deposit insurance were to preserve and enhance two of the most disastrous policies that contributed to the severity and depth of the great depression unit banking and the real bills doctrine other regulatory changes affecting the allocation of power between the fed and the treasury were intended to reduce the independence of the fed while giving the opposite impression the ill conceived banking legislation of the 1930s took very little time to pass but a great deal of time to disappear the overarching lesson is that the aftermath of crises are moments of high risk in public policy the great depression provoked banking reform legislation that was quick comprehensive and unusually responsive to popular opinion each of these three aspects increases the risk that regulation will have adverse consequences

financial panics the seasonality of the nominal interest rate and the founding of the fed after the founding of the fed in 1914 the frequency of financial panics and the size of the seasonal movements in nominal interest ratesboth declined substantially this paper establishes that the fed by carrying out the seasonal open market policy that eliminated the seasonal in nominal interest rates caused the decrease in the frequency of panics since seasonal movements are anticipated and financial panics are probably real events the results show that an anticipated monetary policy had real effects on the economy copyright 1986 by american economic association

were financial crises predictable this paper empirically investigates the nature of financial crises in the united states before 1914 it attempts to determine whether crises were statistically similar predictable and had a common generating mechanism using probit and hazard models and out of sample criteria it is shown there are variables that explain movements in the probability of crises and that the probability of crises is seasonal two crises were predictable but in the other six episodes every forecasting model examined failed these results suggest that financial crises were not all statistically alike and that their generation mechanisms differed copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

monetary factors in the great depression this paper examines the role of monetary policy in the early stages of the great depression and considers the mechanism whereby this policy may have affected real activity i conclude that the depression was preceded by a dramatic shift towards a highly contractionary monetary policy the economic impact of this policy seems unlikely to have come through the conventional keynesian channels of a shortage of liquidity and high ex ante real interest rates but instead may have operated through unanticipated deflation and after 1930 through the disruption of financial intermediation as a consequence of the banking panics

an examination of the asymmetric effects of money supply shocks in the pre world war i and interwar periods we test whether monetary shocks had asymmetric output effects before world war ii ball and mankiw 1994 show that expectations of persistent inflation under fiat money can explain why negative monetary shocks had larger effects than positive shocks after world war ii consistent with this explanation we find such asymmetry in the interwar period following the abandonment of the gold standard and before it when agents arguably anticipated this development we find no monetary asymmetry before world war i which is consistent with ball and mankiw 1994 because under a credible gold standard agents do not expect persistent inflation jel e31 es2

the role of the federal reserve as lender of last resort and the seasonal fluctuation of interest rates the federal reserve s role as a lender of last resort may explain why the seasonal fluctuation of interest rates appeared to decline around 1914 the creation of the fed reduced the seasonal fluctuation of both the probability of a bank receiving an emergency loan and the probability of a financial panic the seasonality of real interest rates could therefore have declined regardless of whether the fed conducted seasonal open market operations the evidence is consistent with the lender of last resort model copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

price inertia and policy ineffectiveness in the united states 1890 1980 this paper introduces a new approach to the empirical testing of the lucas sargent wallace lsw policy ineffectiveness proposition which compares the lsw hypothesis with an alternative that states that prices respond fully in the long run but only gradually in the short run to nominal aggregate demand disturbances the empirical equations estimated for a new set of quarterly data extending back to 1890 exhibit uniformly high responses of real output and low responses of price changes to anticipated changes in nominal gnp the paper compares and tests three alternative methods of introducing persistence effects into the lsw framework

the case of the negative nominal interest rates new estimates of the term structure of interest rates during the great depression throughout the 1930s and early 1940s u s treasury bonds and notes appeared to have negative nominal yields as they approached maturity but negative nominal interest rates are impossible in a world in which one can always hold cash the resolution to this puzzle is that treasury securities in addition to making coupon payments gave the owner the right to buy a new security on a future date this paper describes the institutional environment that led to the apparent negative nominal interest rates develops a method for valuing the exchange privilege and computes accurate measures of the yield to the coupon bearing component of these composite bond options these corrected bond and not yields are then used to calculate new estimates of the term structure of interest rates from 1929 to 1949

a positive model of reserve requirements and interest on reserves a clearinghouse interpretation of the federal reserve system this paper develops a positive model of reserve requirements and interest on reserves based on the observation that congress exempted the fed from a legal restriction that had prevented private clearinghouses from issuing their own currency eliminating the restriction provided the fed with a source of revenue that could be used to finance general government outlays and to pay implicit interest on reserves the model implies that the government s financing requirements help explain reserve requirement movements and that interest rates on reserves vary with market loan rates cointegration error correction and granger causality tests provide supporting evidence