the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

energy distribution and economic growth an empirical test for china abstract in this paper we consider whether economic growth in china could be constrained by the physical development of the energy distribution network specifically we structurally test the network theory of electricity distribution of dalgaard and strulik 2011 using city level data for china in their paper they argue that the relationship between the size of the economy measured by capital per capita and electricity consumption per capita is governed by a simple power law with capital having an exponent bounded between and depending on the efficiency of the network we use data for 224 cities in china between 2002 and 2007 to observe whether structural estimates match those of dalgaard and strulik 2011 for 50 us states where they find the exponent in the power law connecting capital with electricity to be 2 3 our results provide an estimate of the power law component to a little higher than the 2 3 found for the us which provides broad support for the model when we look at different time periods we observe what appears to be a fall in the efficiency of the energy distribution network towards the end of our period

status in markets this project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market we consider a special box design market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices we manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures in the first a subject s score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status in another subjects are assigned randomly to a higher status or lower status group in both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher status sellers face lowerstatus buyers and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers across all sessions the higher status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus earning significantly more than their lower status counterparts

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

endogenous incomplete contracts a bargaining approach in this paper we argue that by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts this point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once for all bargain over the entire stream a long term contract or through a series of bargaining rounds a short term contract within this structure short term contracts arise as equilibrium outcomes under very general conditions because a short term contract implies reduced bargaining costs for one of the agents in essence reduced transaction costs produce a short term contract jel classification l14 c78

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

risk sharing in procurement abstract we introduce bilateral risk aversion into the mixed adverse selection moral hazard model of laffont and tirole 1986 the presence of exogenous risk interacts with the adverse selection problem in interesting ways in particular we show that it is never optimal to present the firm with a fixed price contract that the efficient firm typically bears more risk than the inefficient firm and that an increase in exogenous risk may bring about a decrease in expected cost of the project as a by product we also establish that the famous no distortion on the top result in adverse selection models relies on risk neutrality of the agent

managerial turnover in a changing world we develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world in which the quality of the match between a firm and its managers changes stochastically over time shocks to managerial productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers our key positive result shows that the firm s optimal retention decisions become more permissive with time our key normative result shows that compared to what is efficient the firm s contract induces either excessive retention at all tenure levels or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure

status seeking and material affluence evaluating the hirsch hypothesis abstract when individuals hold a preference for high relative consumption competition to achieve social status can lead to inefficiently high levels of production and consumption contributing to natural resource depletion and environmental degradation in the 1970s fred hirsch argued that an increasing portion of expenditure is allocated to status seeking as average income rises this paper critiques this hypothesis from two points of view first we note examples from the historical and anthropological literatures suggesting that status seeking is often important in societies with relatively low incomes second we consider a set of analytical models that focus on the economic consequences of status seeking when social status is defined in terms of the algebraic difference between an individual s consumption of a status good and the average consumption level in society hirsch s hypothesis holds true and growth in the level of productivity and output can lead to declines in human welfare if on the other hand status is linked to the ratio of individual and average consumption hirsch s hypothesis is valid only if social status and non status goods are poor substitutes the paper also considers two cases in which social status is defined in terms of the amount of time people devote to status oriented activities under this assumption productivity growth leaves time use unchanged though the value of time devoted to status signaling increases in proportion to total expenditure

multi period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection abstract multi period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied with risk neutrality and independent private information all inefficiency arises in the first period only with positive serial correlation inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time

modeling international trends in energy efficiency article i nfo article history i use a stochastic production frontier to model energy ef ciency trends in 85 countries over a 37 year period differences in energy ef ciency across countries are modeled as a stochastic function of explanatory variables and i estimate the model using the cross section of time averaged data so that no structure is imposed on technological change over time energy ef ciency is measured using a new energy distance function ap proach the country using the least energy per unit output given its mix of outputs and inputs de nes the global production frontier a country s relative energy ef ciency is given by its distance from the frontier the ratio of its actual energy use to the minimum required energy use ceteris paribus energy ef ciency is higher in countries with inter alia higher total factor productivity undervalued currencies and smaller fossil fuel reserves and it converges over time across countries globally technological change was the most impor tant factor counteracting the energy use and carbon emissions increasing effects of economic growth

technical allocative and economic efficiencies in swine production in hawaii a comparison of parametric and nonparametric approaches abstract technical allocative and economic efficiency measures are derived for a sample of swine producers in hawaii using the parametric stochastic efficiency decomposition technique and nonparametric data envelopment analysis dea efficiency measures obtained from the two frontier approaches are compared firm specific factors affecting productive efficiencies are also analyzed finally swine producers potential for reducing cost through improved efficiency is also examined under the specification of variable returns to scale vrs the mean technical allocative and economic efficiency indices are 75 9 75 8 and 57 1 respectively for the parametric approach and 75 9 80 3 and 60 3 for dea while for the constant returns to scale crs they are 74 5 73 9 and 54 7 respectively for the parametric approach and 64 3 71 4 and 45 7 for dea thus the results from both approaches reveal considerable inefficiencies in swine production in hawaii the removal of potential outliers increases the technical efficiencies in the parametric approach and allocative efficiencies in dea but overall contrary to popular belief the results obtained from dea are found to be more robust than those from the parametric approach the estimated mean technical and economic efficiencies obtained from the parametric technique are higher than those from dea for crs models but quite similar for vrs models while allocative efficiencies are generally higher in dea however the efficiency rankings of the sample producers based on the two approaches are highly correlated with the highest correlation being achieved for the technical efficiency rankings under crs based on mean comparison and rank correlation analyses the return to scale assumption is found to be crucial in assessing the similarities or differences in efficiency measures obtained from the two approaches analysis of the role of various firm specific factors on productive efficiency shows that farm size has strong positive effects on efficiency levels similarly farms producing market hogs are more efficient than those producing feeder pigs based on these results by operating at the efficient frontier the sample swine producers would be able to reduce their production costs by 38 46 depending upon the method and returns to scale considered

regulation of a risk averse firm abstract we extend the laffont tirole regulation model to the case of risk averse firms our main results are the impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost plus contract as compared with the risk neutral case distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller for high levels of risk aversion the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together journal of economic literature classification numbers d8 l5

rewarding improvements optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation we study a t period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private we find that the principal should punish the agent for performing poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past at the same time the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor evaluations in the past with better performance in the future optimal incentives are thus asymmetric conditional on the same number of good evaluations an agent whose performance improves over time should be better rewarded than one whose performance deteriorates

a test of conspicuous consumption visibility and income elasticities abstract this paper shows that consistent with a signaling by consuming model a la veblen income elasticities can be predicted from the visibility of consumer expenditures we outline a stylized conspicuous consumption model where income elasticity is endogenously predicted to be higher if a good is visible and lower if it is not we then develop a survey based measure of expenditure visibility ranking different expenditures by how noticeable they are to others finally we show that our visibility measure predicts up to one third of the observed variation in elasticities across consumption categories in u s data

spatial allocation and the shadow pricing of product characteristics abstract the paper considers an industry transforming primary commodities farm products into processed commodities food products it focuses on the allocation of embedded characteristics carbohydrate protein etc both across space and among commodities the approach generates a spatial competitive market equilibrium of production consumption transformation and trade for both primary and processed commodities along with the spatial distribution of shadow prices for the product characteristics the model provides a basis for analyzing the allocation and pricing of agricultural products food products and characteristics in spatial markets the empirical usefulness of the model is illustrated in the context of regional resource allocation in the u s dairy sector

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection we characterize the set of second best optimal menus of student loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour market outcomes adverse selection moral hazard and risk aversion the model combines student loans with an elementary optimal income tax problem the second best optima provide incomplete insurance because of moral hazard they typically involve cross subsidies between students generically optimal loan repayments cannot be decomposed as the sum of an income tax depending only on earnings and a loan repayment depending only on education therefore optimal loan repayments must be income contingent or the income tax must comprise a graduate tax the interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard i e self selection

contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models abstract settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory i e where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes if contracts have no memory a repeated agency game can be played myopically there are no gains to long term relationships conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented in an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract in a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome domain additivity implies no memory

the economic role of a work ethic abstract this paper explores the extent to which a cultural work ethic can improve the performance of an economy it argues that a variety of technological and institutional features of labor markets tend to cause pareto sub optimal amounts of labor to be supplied to the economic nexus as a consequence a proper work ethic can improve economic efficiency as well as material well being a man does not by nature wish to earn more and more money but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose wherever modern capitalism has begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labor by increasing its intensity it has encountered this leading trait of pre capitalistic labor max weber the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism 1904 1984 p 60 sacred to the city however is the work ethic office workers think nothing of leaving for work at 6a m and staying on to 9 or 10 at night that rather than economic management is the explanation for the brazilian miracle of the past 40 years the economist april 25 1987 p 22 1

the welfare performance of sequential pricing mechanisms consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits furthermore evidence suggests that a menu of optional two part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective

sources of production inefficiency and productivity growth in china a global data envelopment analysis abstract the current mode of production in china is extensive and inefficient and has caused great stress on both resources and the environment this paper focuses on analyzing the sources of production inefficiency and productivity growth in china here a developed slacks based measure is utilized to decompose production inefficiency into three components input inefficiency economic output inefficiency and environmental inefficiency furthermore by applying a method based on global data envelopment analysis we take a further step to analyze the key factors responsible for the change of environmental productivity during 2003 2011 from the point of view of technical progress productive scale and management level the results show that redundancy in energy and labor inputs and excessive emission of sulfur dioxide chemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen are the main sources of production inefficiency in china during the sample period the efficiency in all inputs and environmental emissions has improved except for capital input efficiency which had a decreasing trend further analysis shows that the overall environmental productivity in china has begun to follow an ascending path technical progress is the most powerful contributor to china s productivity growth while the decreases in scale and management efficiency are the two main obstacles preventing productivity improvement

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

motivating with simple contracts abstract in practice incentive schemes are rarely tailored to the specific characteristics of contracting parties however according to economic theory optimal contracts should be highly dependent on individual conditions we reconcile these observations in the context of a principal agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection motivating an agent could be increasingly costly to the principal because a more productive agent could also be more able to manipulate the terms of the contract as a result the principal may optimally pool some types by offering a contract with constant transfer and bonus we also explore parameterizations where the optimal contract is fully separating but simple contracts attain a significant portion of the optimal welfare

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

noisy observation in adverse selection models we consider a principal agent contracting problem under incomplete information where some of the agent s actions are imperfectly observable contracts take the form of reward schedules based on the noisy observation of the agent s action we first review situations where the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence of noise then we focus on the use of linear reward schedules which allow universal implementation i e implementation of a given mechanism for any unbiased noise of observation and on quadratic reward schedules which only require the knowledge of the variance of the noise we exhibit sufficient conditions under which linear reward schedules implement a given mechanism finally we characterize necessary conditions for a mechanism to be implementable under noisy observation by a linear schedule and by quadratic schedules we give the geometric intuition behind all results

on the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion abstract the pursuit of relative advantage in a setting where one person has power over another may yield perfectly rational decisions by the person in power which reduce the wealth of all affected parties including the person in power this contrasts with decisions by independent egoistic decision makers who in a similar circumstances will not pursue transfers when they are known to cost more to obtain than would be realized utility functions that include relative wealth or position as arguments have the property that utility increases as relative wealth increases consequently mutually immiserating policies may be rationally undertaken if they yield sufficient relative advantage to offset absolute wealth reductions

wealth seeking reconsidered abstract if individuals are interested in their relative wealth position they engage in contests for wealth this leads to a steady state with overaccumulation in a simple growth model it is shown that if some individuals are engaged in wealth seeking activity but others are not the latter might benefit however wealth seeking is not welfare enhancing under usual assumptions concerning production technology the steady state equilibrium is characterized by a marginal productivity of capital that is below the steady state rate of time preference and by emergence of a class structure

guilty until proven innocent regulation with costly and limited enforcement abstract we consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring fines or subsidies for enforcing compliance are also limited the optimal regulations resemble a deposit refund system the firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report if the firm is monitored it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide the enforcement constraints and the firm s rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance the monitoring probability or the initial tax

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

preference representation and randomization in principal agent contracts abstract conditions on an agent s preferences that induce a demand for ex ante randomization are derived when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion in wealth but additive separable preferences in wealth and effort optimal contracts often require randomization under additive separability the principal can use randomization to exploit the interaction between incentive considerations and the agent s outside opportunities however when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion in wealth but multiplicative separable preferences participation and incentive considerations separate hence optimal contracts do not exhibit ex ante randomization

repeated moral hazard with a time inconsistent agent abstract i consider a repeated principal agent model with moral hazard in which the agent has preferences which are widely used to capture time inconsistency i analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting i characterize the optimal wage scheme for such an agent and compare it to time consistent benchmarks the marginal cost of rewarding the agent for high output today exceeds the marginal benefit of delaying these rewards until tomorrow in this sense the principal does not smooth the agent s rewards over time when facing a sophisticated agent it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the early period relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time consistent agent

risk averse rent seeking with shared rents this paper presents a nash equilibrium model of rent seeking behavior in which risk averse players expend resources to obtain a share of a rent as for example in contests for import quota licences results are obtained relating the equilibrium level of lobbying effort by each player to the value of the rent in particular reduced individual lobbying effort is associated with higher rents contested if players are sufficiently risk averse the question of whether the value of rents is a good measure of the resource cost of rent seeking is also considered a simple approximation involving risk and risk aversion parameters is derived for the proportion of rents dissipated in long run equilibrium risk and risk aversion are seen to reduce the rent dissipation ratio below unity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the new economics of regulation ten years after the new economics of regulation is an application of the principal agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms after a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed a survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules the auctioning of incentive contracts the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment and the hierarchical problems in regulation empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion

adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard this paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions i contracts are subject to renegotiations ii the agent s action has long term effects the action is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or type renegotiation proof contracts that implement various actions including random ones are characterized under appropriate conditions the equilibrium involves the principal implementing a random action therefore the equilibrium has standard properties of adverse selection models

measuring eco efficiency based on green indicators and potentials in energy saving and undesirable output abatement abstract nowadays majority of organizations are seeking to achieve sustainable development with respect to green concept one of the main criteria for assessing green performance is eco efficiency to identify all aspects of the eco efficiency inputs should be divided into energy and non energy and outputs should be divided into good and bad outputs to deal with this issue a data envelopment analysis dea model is developed to divide inputs into both energy and non energy and outputs into both desirable good and undesirable bad outputs likewise variables are separated into both discretionary and non discretionary factors accordingly a bounded adjusted measure bam based on green indicators is developed to calculate the eco efficiency of decision making units dmus besides energy saving potentials and undesirable output abatement potentials are calculated to show correlation coefficient between energy consumption and undesirable output finally proposed model is validated by assessing the eco efficiency of some selected members of organization for economic cooperation and development oecd australia finland ireland new zealand and switzerland are recognized as eco efficient countries and the rest of countries are inefficient in terms of the eco efficiency high and positive spearman correlation coefficient between energy consumption and undesirable outputs addresses that the more use of energy inputs the more undesirable outputs

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

efficient status seeking externalities and the evolution of status games abstract status seeking games are games in which an individual s utility is determined by his relative expenditure on status seeking activities rather than his absolute consumption there are a number of parallels between status seeking and rent seeking activities for example a tendency for pareto excessive private investment however many status seeking activities differ from rent seeking activities insofar as they generate significant benefits to individuals not actively involved in the game given an array of more or less productive status seeking games it is likely that relatively efficient status conferring mechanisms will tend to displace less efficient ones

a network game analysis of strategic interactions in the international trade of russian natural gas through ukraine and belarus abstract natural gas is an important source of relatively low emission low cost non nuclear and abundant energy however the difficulty of storage and transportation adds geopolitical and geostrategic complexity to its international trade much of the global natural gas trade occurs through natural gas pipelines which as an infrastructure is strictly specific to the transportation of natural gas therefore the very structure of natural gas pipeline networks can dictate the strategic relationship among countries involved in its trade this paper applies a network game model where these pipeline networks are modeled as graphs and respective value functions and employs the link based flexible network allocation rule developed by jackson 2005 as a solution concept to measure the relative power structure among these natural gas trading countries the paper analyzes the case of trade between russia ukraine belarus and western europe and compares the results to existing analyses that employ a cooperative game model in characteristic function form and the shapley value as the solution concept whereas the results of the analysis conducted in the previous literature indicate that russia s relative power was significantly stronger than other players both before and after the construction of the nord stream pipeline the results provided in this paper draw a different conclusion ukraine s relative power was already equal to that of russia before the nord stream this may be understood as one of the underlying causes for the prolonged conflicts that occurred repeatedly in this region concerning natural gas trade

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

long term relationships governed by short term contracts this paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information and contracts are complete ex cept that short term contracts specify only current period actions t hen short term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption smoothing role there is a general but no t universal tendency to underinvest copyright 1988 by american economic association

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

energy savings potential in china s industrial sector from the perspectives of factor price distortion and allocative inefficiency abstract china s industrial energy consumption accounted for 70 82 of national and 14 12 of world energy usage in 2011 in the context of energy scarcity and environmental pollution the industrial sector in china faces unsustainable growth problems by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis sfa framework this paper analyzes the factor allocative efficiency of china s industrial sector and estimates the energy savings potential from the perspective of allocative inefficiency this paper focuses on three issues the first is examining the factor allocative inefficiency of china s industrial sector the second is measuring factor price distortion by the shadow price model the third is estimating the energy savings potential in china s industrial sector during 2001 2009 major conclusions are thus drawn first factor prices of capital labor and energy are distorted in china due to government regulations moreover energy price is relatively low compared to capital price while is relatively high compared to labor price second the industry wide energy savings potential resulted from energy allocative inefficiency was about 9 71 during 2001 2009 the downward trend of energy savings potential implies the increasing energy allocative efficiency in china s industrial sector third a transparent and reasonable pricing mechanism is conducive to improving energy allocative efficiency

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

optimization models for salesforce compensation abstract this paper reviews models which address the design of optimal salesforce compensation schemes the discussion starts with agency theoretic models that are able to derive the optimal form for a compensation scheme under assumptions regarding the degree of information asymmetry and heterogeneity within the salesforce for the four resulting extreme cases models are presented that allow for the determination of optimal parameter values for specific compensation schemes such as fixed salary plus commission bonus for quota achievement and menus of plans finally there follows an examination of approaches through which commission rates or bonuses can be optimally differentiated such that the salespersons allocate their selling time in their own and at the same time in the firm s best interest all of these models are reviewed in particular with respect to their applicability in practice

attitudes and allocations status cognitive dissonance and the manipulation of attitudes abstract economic studies of social status have typically focused on individuals engaging in relative comparisons based on certain characteristics e g consumption wealth without considering why these characteristics are deemed status worthy in this paper individuals choose a status earning characteristic in order to reduce mental discomfort dissonance as a result those individuals with the highest marginal utility from income are often the first to misconstrue or abandon these incentives in favor of alternate forms of seeking status the model provides an explanation for endogenous class formation and highlights the role of redistributive taxation in manipulating individuals attitudes towards status

dynamic contracting with persistent shocks abstract in this paper we develop continuous time methods for solving dynamic principal agent problems in which the agent s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time we characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that under this contract the agent s utility converges to its lower bound immiserization occurs unlike under risk neutrality the wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and a low productivity agent s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure will not vanish permanently at her first high productivity report also the wedge increases with the duration of a low productivity report we apply the methods to numerically solve the mirrleesian dynamic taxation model and find that the wedge is significantly larger than that in the independently and identically distributed i i d shock case

a dynamic multi stage data envelopment analysis model with application to energy consumption in the cotton industry abstract data envelopment analysis dea is a non parametric method for evaluating the relative efficiency of homogenous decision making units dmus with multiple inputs and outputs in this paper we present a dynamic multi stage dea dms dea approach to evaluate the efficiency of cotton production energy consumption in the proposed model the farms which consume resources i e fertilizers seeds and pesticides to produce cotton are assumed to be the dmus inputs not consumed during a planning period are carried over to the next period in the planning horizon initially a dms dea model is used to determine the overall efficiency of the dmus with dynamic inputs next the efficiency score of each dmu is calculated for each time period in the planning horizon we demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method and exhibit the efficacy of the procedures and algorithms with a real life case study of energy consumption in the cotton industry

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

contracting with private knowledge of signal quality we characterize the optimal procurement contract in a setting where a supplier has privileged knowledge of the quality of a public signal about his production costs the optimal contract exhibits important differences with standard contracts in adverse selection settings for instance the contract induces output both above and below first best levels furthermore the induced output may not vary with the realized public signal unless the signal quality is sufficiently pronounced in addition output may increase as expected costs increase

holdups simple contracts and information acquisition abstract in a typical procurement setup several recent papers have shown that when complete contracting is not possible simple noncontingent contracts may suffice to solve the under investment problem this paper points out that a noncontingent contract offer such as a fixed price contract may induce the seller to acquire information on the future course of costs and only to accept the offer if the cost is low it is shown that sometimes the buyer prefers to wait and buy on the spot market than to offer a long term contract when the seller rejects a contract offer or the buyer chooses not to make one the seller will not make efficient investments because he expects to be held up on the spot market

penalizing success in dynamic incentive contracts no good deed goes unpunished we examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present we find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower powered incentive contract penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent s initial incentive to understate his ability

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

help harm or avoid on the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral pd games with exit abstract simulated round robin tournaments are used 1 to assess the relative performance of non defecting conditionally cooperative programs in a three person pd setting where exit is possible pdes and 2 to assess the importance of sanctions for the success of joint enterprises we find that the possibility of exit allows individuals to escape from dysfunctional teams which increases the potential benefits of cooperation while reducing those associated with free riding we also find that punishment especially targeted punishment is critical to the success of shorter term enterprises similar results held in evolutionary settings where successful behavioral programs can be imitated or propagated by non rational biological or social processes our results suggest that non defecting programs of conditional cooperation can be rational average payoff maximizing strategies for participating in small multilateral settings where individuals can choose to participate in a pd game or not

metafroniter energy efficiency with co2 emissions and its convergence analysis for china this paper measures the energy efficiency performance with carbon dioxide co2 emissions in 30 provinces in china during the period of 1997 2011 using a meta frontier framework with the improved directional distance function ddf we construct a new environmental production possibility set by combining the super efficiency and sequential data envelopment analysis dea models to avoid discriminating power problem and technical regress when evaluating efficiency by ddf then it is used in a meta frontier framework to reflect the technology heterogeneities across east central and west china the results indicate that eastern china achieved the highest progress inefficiency relative to the metafrontier followed by western and the central china by focusing on technology gaps we offer some suggestions for the different groups based on group frontier and meta frontier analyses the inefficiency can be attributed to managerial failure for eastern and western china and technological differences for central china the convergence analysis shows that energy and co2 emission governance will produce negative effects on economic growth and it is suitable and acceptable to introduce rigorous environmental measures in eastern china

project evaluation and control in decentralized firms is capital rationing always optimal when capital investments are made in an agency setting we show that even without risk considerations capital rationing need not be the only rational outcome we analyze a principal agent model with risk neutrality and with two productive inputs the agent s efforts and capital investment the two inputs can be either economic complements or substitutes the agent has pre contract private information about his own type the output is measured with an additive noise we show that when the two inputs are substitutes the optimal solution entails a marginal capital rationing but when the two inputs are complements then either a marginal capital rationing or a marginal leniency could be the optimal response our results therefore provide an explanation for why firms may employ a capital rationing for a project that may increase manufacturing complexity and hence may reduce managerial labor productivity yet employ a less strict criterion for evaluating a productivity enhancing project this result contrasts with earlier results where only a capital rationing is shown to be optimal

keeping up with the joneses abstract the paper is concerned with the dynamics of a two players status game there is a nash equilibrium in status seeking activities and one can show that chaotic adjustment pathe are possible for particular parameter constellations

dynamic regulation of quality we develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact when the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect when the regulator contracts with a single agent the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator s ability to transfer rents across periods hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is socially preferable to hiring a sequence of agents even when no commitment is feasible by contrast shorter franchises are socially preferable if the agent has limited liability

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

preference falsification policy continuity and collective conservatism through a model that distinguishes between privately held and publicly declared preferences and between private and public beliefs this paper explains why a society might c ling to its past choices all four variables are endogenous to the mo del following the introduction of a measure of collective conservati sm the paper turns to the determinants and consequences of feedback from society s choices to its members private beliefs and preference s the theory is applied to the persistence of india s caste system t o explain why the lowest castes have been among the system s most com mitted supporters copyright 1987 by royal economic society

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

network dea efficiency in input output models with an application to oecd countries we undertake network efficiency analysis within an input output model that allows us to assess potential technical efficiency gains by comparing technologies corresponding to different economies input output tables represent a network where different sectoral nodes use primary inputs endowments to produce intermediate input and outputs according to sectoral technologies and satisfy final demand preferences within the input output framework it is possible to optimize primary inputs allocation intermediate production and final demand production by way of non parametric data envelopment analysis dea techniques dea allows us to model the different subtechnologies corresponding to alternative production processes to assess efficient resource allocation among them and to determine potential output gains if inefficiencies were dealt with the proposed model optimizes the underlying multi stage technologies that the input output system comprises identifying the best practice economies the model is applied to a set of oecd countries

rank as an inherent incentive evidence from a field experiment abstract money is the prime incentive considered in economic models however recent evidence indicates that people are also greatly concerned about their social rankings is this solely because rank brings tangible benefits or because in addition people have an inherent preference for high rank this paper deployed a field experiment that provides evidence for an inherent preference in the experiment vietnamese students enrolled in an english course performed significantly better on the official standardized international final test when they were told their rankings on practice tests than when they were not this result held even when this ranking information could not be reliably communicated thus severely attenuating the potential to bring tangible or status benefits

cognitive dissonance status and growth of the underclass we present a model of cognitive adaptation to examine the growth and behaviours of the underclass in the model individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance between status seeking and social recognition adapt their attitudes regarding what is deemed status worthy this yields the endogenous formation of an underclass in which non pecuniary social returns counteract the effect of traditional incentives i e wages in motivating behaviour by gaining insight into the process of psychological adaptation of those living in poverty the paper sheds light on economic policies that mitigate the disenfranchisement and hence the growth of the underclass

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

relative performance evaluation and project selection relative performance evaluation rpe occurs when one person s compensation depends on the relation of his output to that of others agency theory e g lazear and rosen 1981 and holmstrom 1979 1982 predicts that managerial compensation will use relative performance when other firms outputs reveal information about the manager s actions which is not knowable from the manager s output alone tests of the theory measure other firms outputs using the performance of other firms in the same industry or some macroeconomic measures of performance these two approaches are designed to separate industry and economy effects from the effects of the manager s actions empirical tests by antle and smith 1986 and janakiraman lambert and larcker 1992 found limited evidence that managerial compensation is adjusted for industry effects gibbons and murphy 1990 found some adjustment in ceo compensation for industry performance and much more adjustment for changes in market wide rates of return this paper provides an explanation for these empirical results by illustrating how the benefits of rpe based schemes depend on the absence of project choice decisions in the canonical agency model 1

multi task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types abstract this paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low powered incentive contract over the high powered incentive contract using a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection we first show that unobservable risk aversion or cost leads to low powered incentives we then consider the case where both risk aversion and cost of the agent are unobservable to the principal this multidimensional mechanism design problem is solved under two assumptions with regard to the structures of performance measurement system and wage contract it is shown that if the deterministic and stochastic components of performance measures vary proportionally the principal is inclined to provide a low powered incentive contract moreover it is shown that if the base wage depends on a quadratic function rather than the direction of the performance wage vector no incentive is provided for most of the performance measures in an orthogonal performance measurement system