risk sharing and contagion in networks we investigate the socially optimal design of financial networks that allows to tackle the trade off between risk sharing and contagion we identify conditions on the shock distribution under which full integration or maximal segmentation is optimal we also show that under different conditions the optimal network displays different levels of strength of linkages to other firms or intermediate degrees of segmentation in the latter case the individual and social incentives to establish linkages are not necessarily aligned when firms face heterogeneous distributions of risks they should optimally form linkages only with firms facing risks of the same kind

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

intermediation and resale in networks i study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure a partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power competition governs trade withi

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

reconsidering the relationship between inflation and relative price variability it has long been popularly believed that the relationship between inflation and relative price variability rpv is positive and stable using disaggregated cpi data for the united states and japan however this study finds that the relationship is neither linear nor stable over time the overall relationship is approximately u shaped around a nonzero threshold inflation rate rpv therefore changes not with the inflation rate per se but with the deviation of inflation from the threshold inflation rate more importantly the relationship is by no means stable over time but instead varies significantly in a way that coincides with regime changes of inflation or monetary policy the relationship was positive during the period of high inflation of the 1970s and the early 1980s as has been documented by a number of previous studies whereas it takes a u shape profile during the great moderation the results are robust to the use of core inflation which excludes the traditionally volatile prices of food and energy this paper then presents a modified version of the calvo type sticky price model to describe the observed empirical regularities simulation experiments show that the modified calvo model fits the data well and that the underlying relationship hinges upon the degree of price rigidity which is systematically related to inflation regime for countries and periods with low inflation rates the relationship takes a u shape as price adjustment is more sticky in a high inflation environment when price setting becomes more flexible the u shaped profile vanishes

inflation relative prices and their skewness the results are presented of an empirical study on the extent of the skewness of price changes across products for nine european countries skewness may arise from product specific shocks or high costs in undertaking price changes leading to irregular though unusually large price changes hypotheses are established as to the nature of such skewness and results provided it is argued that our concern might also be with how skewness changes in response to inflation this is modelled and results are provided which incorporate tests as to the response when inflation is increasing and falling the empirical results are of interest not only in highlighting features of inflation but also for their implications for consumer price indices

is the glass steagall act justified a study of the u s experience with universal banking before the glass steagall act of 1933 removed commercial banks from the securities underwriting business we evaluate the argument for the separation of commercial and investment banking that conflicts of interest induce commercial banks to fool the public into investing in securities which turn out to be of low quality a comparison of the performance of securities underwritten by commercial and investment banks prior to the act shows no evidence of this instead the public appears to have rationally accounted for the possibility of conflicts of interest and this appears to have constrained the banks to underwrite high quality securities jel g21 g24 n22

relative price variability and inflation evidence from us cities we test whether the time series positive correlation of inflation and intermarket relative price variability is also present in a cross section of u s cities we find this correlation to be a robu

endogenous search price dispersion and welfare abstract this paper studies the welfare cost of inflation in a frictional monetary economy with endogenous consumer search equilibrium entails price dispersion where sellers compete for buyers by posting prices we identify three channels through which inflation affects welfare the real balance channel is the source of welfare loss its interaction with the price posting channel generates a welfare cost larger than lucas 2000 the search channel reduces the welfare cost by more than one half through general equilibrium effect the aggregate effect of these three channels on welfare is non monotonic additionally the welfare cost of inflation fluctuations is negligible

intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the japanese firm abstract the purpose of this paper is to specify a formal model that rationalizes the intercorporate shareholdings observed in the japanese equity market as a mechanism for mutual commitment and risk sharing that creates greater possibilities to resolve managerial myopic problems caused by the threat of external takeovers we show that under certain conditions all agents including the existing shareholders of the firm are strictly better off when participating in an implicit contract associated with intercorporate shareholdings the results also suggest that intercorporate ownership raises the stock prices of the member firms

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

a search based theory of the on the run phenomenon we propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market we show that short sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed that asset enjoys greater liquidity a higher lending fee specialness and trades at a premium consistent with no arbitrage we derive closed form solutions for small frictions and provide a calibration generating realistic on the run premia

modelling prices and the reputation of individual named wines this article develops empirical models to assess the relation between the reputation of an individual named wine and its price unrestricted and polynomial distributed lag models are used to assess

inflation and relative price variability new evidence for the united states this article provides new evidence on the empirical relationship between inflation and relative prices in the united states in line with the predictions of recent monetary search models we find that the impact of expected inflation on relative price variability rpv has disappeared during the recent period when inflation expectations have been stabilized on a low level endogenous break point tests are applied to identify the timing and to confirm the significance of the changing role of inflation for rpv the empirical findings are robust with respect to different price indices disaggregation levels and measurement concepts

bank risk dynamics and distance to default we adapt structural models of default risk to take into account the special nature of bank assets the usual assumption of log normally distributed asset values is not appropriate for banks typical bank assets are risky debt claims which implies that they embed a short put option on the borrowers assets leading to a concave payoff this has important consequences for banks risk dynamics and distance to default estimation due to the payoff non linearity bank asset volatility rises following negative shocks to borrower asset values as a result standard structural models in which the asset volatility is assumed to be constant can severely understate banks default risk in good times when asset values are high bank equity payoffs resemble a mezzanine claim rather than a call option bank equity return volatility is therefore much more sensitive to big negative shocks to asset values than in standard structural models

an equilibrium analysis of relative price changes and aggregate inflation abstract inflation is positively correlated with the variability of relative prices as measured by the standard deviation of the cross section distribution of prices and also with the third moment skewness of the cross section distribution of prices the conventional interpretation of these relationships is that they reflect sluggishness in the adjustment of individual prices in response to shocks in this paper we question this interpretation first we show that similar correlations among the moments exist in alternative measures of underlying technology shocks second when these shocks are fed into a general equilibrium model with multiple sectors and flexible prices the resulting prices also display a positive correlation between aggregate inflation and skewness of the cross section distribution

estimating bilateral exposures in the german interbank market is there a danger of contagion abstract credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock recent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages we use balance sheet information to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the german banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion we find that in the absence of a safety net there is considerable scope for contagion that could affect a large proportion of the banking system the financial safety net in this case institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks considerably reduces but does not eliminate the danger of contagion even so the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15 of the banking system in terms of assets

relative price variability and inflation regression studies have established that there tend to be convex nonsymmetric relationships between relative price variability and the inflation rate unanticipated inflation and the change in the inflation rate this paper shows that such regression results follow as definitional artifacts for a simple but quite general stochastic model of price changes the analysis is based on the fact that the definitions of relative price variability the inflation rate unanticipated inflation and the change in the inflation rate imply a particular structure for the covariances among these variables the structure of these covariances has implications for the regression coefficients copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

inflation targeting and relative price variability what difference does inflation targeting make author affiliation chi young choi cychoi uta eduyoung se kim acknowledgment the authors are grateful to coeditor kent kimbrough and two anonymous referees for constructive comments that helped to improve this article the authors also wish to thank steve cecchetti kang liu shin ichi nishiyama margie tieslau taka tsuruga and the seminar participants at the academia sinica national chung cheng university national sun yat sen university national taiwan university texas tech university and the university of texas at arlington for helpful comments and vikas kakkar for providing cpi data for hong kong any remaining errors are the authors 1 introductionvariability in relative prices is known to be a major channel through which inflation can induce welfare costs by impeding an efficient allocation of resources in the economy consequently substantial effort has been devoted in the literature to examining the link between relative price variability rpv and aggregate inflation although much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature points to a positive monotonic relationship newer contributions suggest that the relationship between inflation and rpv is more complicated particularly in terms of its sensitivity to the inflation regime 1the primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether the connection between inflation and rpv is influenced in an important way by the monetary policy framework chosen by a central bank specifically this article focuses on exploring whether the adoption of an inflation targeting it framework exerts any significant impact on rpv as measured by the standard deviations of sectoral inflation rates relative to the aggregate rate since it was first implemented in new zealand more than two decades ago the popularity of it has spread with some twenty five countries worldwide implementing the framework to date freedman and laxton 2009 the literature is now replete with studies pointing to reductions in both the level and the volatility of inflation in countries that have adopted it e g mishkin and schmidt hebbel 2007 2 while studies of the impact of it on aggregate inflation performance are plentiful little attention has been paid to the impact of it on rpv the question of whether and indeed how it affects rpv is an important one for several reasons first exploring the potential connection between it and rpv is a worthwhile exercise given the popularity of it as a monetary framework and the centrality of rpv to the current generation of macromodels the importance of rpv is recognized in standard new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models where the variance of relative prices is viewed as a useful summary statistic as noted by amano ambler and rebei 2007 for example in dsge models the optimal rate of target inflation and the optimal variability of inflation relative to output depend on the quantitative effects of price dispersion on macroeconomic equilibrium second answering the question helps us identify the driving force behind the change in rpv distinguishing between it adoption itself and its subsequent impact on inflation if the relationship is monotonically positive as is often believed in the literature one should expect that it adoption would bring about a decline in rpv in the same way as it has led to a decline in inflation if the relationship is more complex however the effect of it adoption on reducing rpv may hinge on the change in inflation regimes after it adoption third our answer to the question also sheds additional light on the empirical evidence for the relative effectiveness of it across different stages of development while there is strong evidence that developing countries benefit more from it than industrial countries in combating inflation and its volatility e g petursson 2004 lin and ye 2009 we are aware of no empirical research that has assessed this issue with respect to rpv

the economics of collective reputation evidence from the wine industry we use original data regarding the array of italian winery coalitions wine denominations to analyze the economics and determinants of collective reputation we first run a cross sectional analysis with 2008 data and the full set of control variables then move to the dynamics of collective reputation with panel data analysis on a 30 year time span 1978 2008 group reputation is history dependent in particular past bad collective behavior increases the probability of being stuck in a bad reputation trap minimum quality standards and effective enforcement are fundamental drivers of group reputation the relationship between group size and collective reputation is non linear free entry may not be optimal due to free riding problems finally institutional signals such as the wine classification system are useful because they can be used by consumers as easily available proxies for information that is much more difficult to acquire

the impact of inflation on budgetary discipline abstract this paper views the budgetary process as a limited contingencies contract between the treasury and the ministers allowing a minister to ask for budget revisions upon costly verification by the treasury the minister may obtain extra funds for significant state verification costs and for low volatility the contract is non contingent for volatility significant enough the contract becomes state contingent it reduces the initial allocation and reduces the threshold associated with budgetary revisions in volatile economics the projected revenue understates the realized budget and the average budget error is positive the model s predictions are confirmed using data from latin america

asymmetric information and intermediation chains we propose a parsimonious model of bilateral trade under asymmetric information to shed light on the prevalence of intermediation chains that stand between buyers and sellers in many decentralized markets our model features a classic problem in economics where an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty paradoxically involving moderately informed intermediaries also endowed with market power can improve trade efficiency long intermediation chains in which each trader s information set is similar to those of his direct counterparties limit traders incentives to post prices that reduce trade volume and jeopardize gains to trade

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

a flow network analysis of direct balance sheet contagion in financial networks this paper puts forward a novel approach to the analysis of direct contagion in financial networks financial systems are here represented as flow networks i e directed and weighted graphs endowed with source nodes and sink nodes and the propagation of losses and defaults originated by an exogenous shock is here represented as a flow that crosses such a network in establishing existence and uniqueness of such a flow function we address a know problem of indeterminacy that arise in financial networks from the intercyclicity of payments sufficient and necessary conditions for uniqueness are pinned down we embed this result in an algorithm that while computing the propagation caused by a shock controls for the emergence of possible indeterminacies we then apply some properties of network flows to investigate the relation between the structures of a financial network i e the size and the pattern of obligations and its exposure to default contagion

robustness of the relationship between price variability and inflation for us manufacturing we study the relationship between relative price variability and inflation in two different ways we first look at product class census unit values for five time periods between 1958 and 1982 and find evidence of a positive relationship between variability and inflation then we directly update the vining and elwertowski 1976 study for the period 1974 91 using individual commodity series from the bureau of labor statistics we conclude by discussing differences across industries in price stickiness

measuring substitution bias in international comparisons based on additive purchasing power parity methods abstract this paper shows that additive purchasing power parity ppp methods such as geary khamis are subject to substitution bias as a result geary khamis comparisons tend to underestimate per capita income differentials across countries the magnitude of the bias is measured for a cross section of 64 countries using international comparison programme icp data geary khamis overestimates some poorer countries per capita incomes relative to richer countries by as much as 70 these results have important implications for much empirical work in development and international economics since geary khamis is the ppp method used by the world bank imf oecd icp and the penn world table

entry and exit in otc derivatives markets we develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium and socially optimal decisions of banks to enter trade in and possibly exit an otc market although we endow all banks with the same trading technology banks optimal entry and trading decisions endogenously lead to a realistic market structure composed of dealers and customers with distinct trading patterns we decompose banks entry incentives into incentives to hedge risk and incentives to make intermediation profits we show that dealer banks enter more than is socially optimal in the face of large negative shocks they may also exit more than is socially optimal when markets are not perfectly resilient

the large small bank dichotomy in the federal funds market abstract despite the central importance of the federal fund market little research has been undertaken on the micro decision making of individual market participants and their interactions this paper demonstrates that there are asymmetries of information between federal funds lenders and borrowers that can only be resolved through frequent and continuous trading smaller banks are constrained in their ability to borrow federal funds due to their size and location it is shown that information asymmetries and resulting adverse selection problems may be resolved through the use of implicit multi period contracts

the economic consequences of social network structure we survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks we develop a taxonomy of macro and micro characteristics of social interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in determining learning diffusion decisions and resulting behaviors we also discuss the challenges of accounting for the endogeneity of networks in assessing the relationship between the patterns of interactions and behaviors

the pricing of experience goods the example of en primeur wine the market for primeur wine in the bordeaux region allows producers to sell wine that is still in barrels as with all experience goods producers send quality signals to uninformed buyers using original data on bordeaux wines we show that the pricing behavior of producers depends to a large extent on their reputation and much less on short term changes in quality as measured by experts grades we also find that the primeur price has an informative role since a 10 increase in primeur price leads to a 3 increase in prices on the market for bottled wine

a dynamic network model of the unsecured interbank lending market abstract we introduce a dynamic network model of interbank lending and estimate the parameters by indirect inference using network statistics of the dutch interbank market from february 2008 to april 2011 we find that credit risk uncertainty and peer monitoring are significant factors in explaining the sparse core periphery structure of the market and the presence of relationship lending shocks to credit risk uncertainty lead to extended periods of low market activity intensified by reduced peer monitoring moreover changes in the central bank s interest rate corridor have both a direct effect on the market as well as an indirect effect by changing banks monitoring efforts

frictional goods markets theory and applications we analyse dynamic general equilibrium models with more or less directed search by informed buyers and random search by uninformed buyers this nests existing specifications and generates new insights a quantitative application concerns the welfare cost of inflation which is known to be quite high with pure random search and low with pure directed search our calibration implies the impact of inflation is fairly low in part because in addition to the usual costs it provides benefits by more heavily taxing high price sellers that inefficiently profit from exploiting the uninformed other applications analyse analytically and numerically changes in credit conditions and information

a model of financial fragility abstract this article presents a dynamic stochastic game theoretic model with two essential features first agents hold diversified portfolios that link their financial positions to those of other agents second shocks to fundamentals at the initial date cause some portfolio losses agents who incur losses reallocate their portfolios thereby breaking some linkages in the pareto efficient symmetric equilibrium studied two related types of financial crisis can occur in response one occurs gradually as losses spread breaking more links the other type occurs instantaneously when forward looking agents preemptively shift to safer portfolios to avoid future losses from contagion an economy is more fragile the earlier its last remaining link breaks from such a crisis journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 e00 e3 e44 g1

liquidity premia in dynamic bargaining markets abstract this paper develops a search theoretic model of the cross sectional distribution of asset returns abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity in contrast with much of the transaction cost literature it is not assumed that different assets carry different exogenously specified trading costs instead different expected returns due to liquidity are explained by the cross sectional variation in tradeable shares the qualitative predictions of the model are consistent with much of the empirical evidence

systemic illiquidity in the federal funds market this paper shows how the intra day allocation and pricing of overnight loans of federal funds reflect the decentralized inter bank market in which these loans are traded a wouldbe borrower or lender typically finds a counterparty institution by direct bilateral contact once in contact say by telephone the two counterparties to a potential trade negotiate terms that reflect their incentives for borrowing or lending as well as the attractiveness of their respective options to forego a trade and to continue shopping around this overthe counter otc pricing and allocation mechanism is quite distinct from that of most centralized markets such as an electronic limit order book market in which every order is anonymously exposed to every other order with a centralized order crossing algorithm while there is a significant body of research on the micro structure of specialist and limit order book markets most otc markets do not have comprehensive transactionslevel data available for analysis the federal funds market is a rare exception we go beyond a previous study by craig furfine 1999 of the microstructure of the federal funds market by modeling how the likelihood of matching a particular borrower with banking studies federal reserve bank of new york 33 liberty street new york ny 10045 we are grateful for support and data from the federal reserve bank of new york and for comments from guillaume plantin jamie mcandrews craig furfine michael fleming and anonymous federal funds traders we have also benefited from comments by andrew metrick jeremy stein ken french larry harris owen lamont john taylor and randy westerfield the views expressed here are not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of new york or the federal reserve system

inflation and price setting in a natural experiment abstract we analyze the behavior of price setters in poland during the transition from a planned to a market economy using a large disaggregated data set the size and frequency of price changes as well as relative price variability all increase as inflation rises the effect of expected inflation on relative price variability is much stronger than the effect of unexpected inflation despite the unusual economic environment the results are qualitatively identical and quantitatively stronger than those in lach and tsiddon 1992 journal of political economy 100 349 389

bilateral trading in networks in many markets goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric we study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features we show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non monotonic but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time with the possible exception of the last period the price dynamic is therefore reminiscent of fire sales and hot potato trading traders who intermediate the object arise endogenously and make a positive profit the profit earning intermediaries are not necessarily traders with many connections for the case of multilayer networks they belong to the path that reaches the maximum number of potential buyers using the minimal number of intermediaries this is not necessarily the path of the network that maximizes the probability of consumption by traders who value the most the object i e welfare

relative price changes as aggregate supply shocks this paper proposes a theory of supply shocks or shifts in the short run phillips curve based on relative price changes and frictions in nominal price adjustment when price adjustment is costly firms adjust to large shocks but not to small shocks and so large shocks have disproportionate effects on the price level therefore aggregate inflation depends on the distribution of relative price changes inflation rises when the distribution is skewed to the right and falls when the distribution is skewed to the left we show that this theoretical result explains a large fraction of movements in postwar u s inflation moreover our model suggests measures of supply shocks that perform better than traditional measures such as the relative prices of food and energy

efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too interconnected to fail institutions abstract the regulation of large interconnected financial institutions has become a key policy issue to improve financial stability regulators have proposed limiting banks size and interconnectedness i estimate a network based model of the over the counter interbank lending market in the us and quantify the efficiency stability implications of this policy trading efficiency decreases with limits on interconnectedness because the intermediation chains become longer while restricting the interconnectedness of banks improves stability the effect is non monotonic stability also improves with higher liquidity requirements when banks have access to liquidity during the crisis and when failed banks depositors maintain confidence in the banking system

taste or reputation what drives market prices in the wine industry estimation of a hedonic model for italian premium wines the aim of this article is to provide new evidence on the factors affecting wine prices on both methodological and factual grounds on the methodological ground this study is the first to apply a general box cox transformation within the context of hedonic models which exploit all the variables objective and sensorial characteristics reputation pointed out by previous literature as relevant in driving market prices on the factual ground the article fills the lack of empirical evidence on the issue for italy one of the leading wine producers by using a large data set on two premium quality wines barolo and barbaresco covering the 1995 1998 vintages our results support the evidence obtained using data from other countries showing that sensorial traits the reputation of wines and producers as well as objective variables are all important factors influencing the consumers willingness to pay more importantly by resorting to a nonnested statistical test vuong 1989 we compare two alternative

trade dynamics in the market for federal funds we develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features banks have to search for a suitable counterparty and once they have met both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment the theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions what are the determinants of the fed funds rate how does the market reallocate funds is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds we also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks

structural holes in social networks we consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction e g exchange goods or information creates a unit surplus a transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection if the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus thus individuals form links with others to create surplus to gain intermediation rents and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation first we show that in the absence of capacity constraints on links it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs second we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links in this case distances between players must be long which induces players who are far off to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents a cycle network then emerges payoffs being equal across all players

liquidity coinsurance moral hazard and financial contagion we study the propagation of financial crises between regions characterized by moral hazard problems the source of the problem is that banks are protected by limited liability and may engage in excessive risk taking the regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks so that liquidity coinsurance is pareto improving the moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized under autarky a limited investment is needed to achieve optimality so that a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk taking with interbank deposits the optimal investment increases and capital becomes insufficient to prevent excessive risk taking thus bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crises spread to other regions via the financial linkages opening the financial markets is nevertheless pareto improving consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance although they pay the cost of excessive risk taking finally we show that in this framework a completely connected deposit structure is more conducive to financial crises than an incompletely connected structure

interbank contagion an agent based model approach to endogenously formed networks abstract the potential impact of interconnected financial institutions on interbank financial systems is a financial stability concern for central banks and regulators in examining how financial shocks propagate through contagion effects we argue that endogenous individual bank choices are necessary to properly consider how losses develop as the interbank lending network evolves we present an agent based model to endogenously reconstruct interbank networks based on 6600 banks decision rules and behaviors reflected in quarterly balance sheets we compare the results of our model to the results of a traditional stationary network framework for contagion the model formulation reproduces dynamics similar to those of the 2007 09 financial crisis and shows how bank losses and failures arise from network contagion and lending market illiquidity when calibrated to post crisis data from 2011 to 2014 the model shows the u s banking system has reduced its likelihood of bank failures through network contagion and illiquidity given a similar stress scenario

wine prices and quality ratings a meta regression analysis this article examines the empirical support for the hypothesized hedonic theoretical relation between the price of wine and its quality the examination considers over 180 hedonic wine price models developed over 20 years covering many countries the research identifies that the relation between the price of wine and its sensory quality rating is a moderate partial correlation of 0 30 this correlation exists despite the lack of information held by consumers about a wine s quality and the inconsistency of expert tasters when evaluating wines the results identify a moderate price quality correlation which suggests the existence of strategic buying opportunities for better informed consumers strategic price setting possibilities may also exist for wine producers given the incomplete quality information held by consumers the results from the meta regression analysis point to the absence of any publication bias and attribute the observed asymmetry in estimates to study heterogeneity the analysis suggests the observed heterogeneity is explained by the importance of a wine s reputation the use of the 100 point quality rating scale the analysis of a single wine variety style and the employed functional form the most important implication from the analysis is the relative importance of a wine s reputation over its sensory quality inferring that producers need to sustain the sensory quality of a wine over time to extract appropriate returns the reputation of the wine producer is found not to influence the strength of the price quality relationship this finding does not contradict the importance of wine producer reputation in directly influencing prices

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

financial networks and contagion we study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations how discontinuous changes in asset values e g defaults and shutdowns trigger further failures and how this depends on network structure integration greater dependence on counterparties and diversification more counterparties per organization have different nonmonotonic effects on the extent of cascades diversification connects the network initially permitting cascades to travel but as it increases further organizations are better insured against one another s failures integration also faces trade offs increased dependence on other organizations versus less sensitivity to own investments finally we illustrate the model with data on european debt cross holdings jel d85 f15 f34 f36 f65 g15 g32 g33 g38 globalization brings with it increased financial interdependencies among many kinds of organizations governments central banks investment banks firms etc that hold each other s shares debts and other obligations such interdependencies can lead to cascading defaults and failures which are often avoided through massive bailouts of institutions deemed too big to fail recent examples include the us government s interventions in aig fannie mae freddie mac and general motors and the european commission s interventions in greece and spain although such bailouts circumvent the widespread failures that were more prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they emphasize the need to study the risks created by a network of interdependencies understanding these risks is crucial to designing incentives and regulatory responses which defuse cascades before they are imminent in this paper we develop a general model that produces new insights regarding financial contagions and cascades of failures among organizations linked through a network of financial interdependencies organizations values depend on each other e g through cross holdings of shares debt or other liabilities if an

intercountry differences in the relationship between relative price variability and average prices this paper provides new evidence on the relationship between relative price variability and inflation the model uses a consistently defined data set for nine european countries it benefits from the inclusion and testing of the effects of macroeconomic variables and the incorporation into the measures of inflation and dispersion adjustments for timeliness appropriate formulas and proximity the general findings of an effect on relative price variability by the macroeconomic environment and negative coefficients on unexpected inflation are supported by their occurrence in models estimated by seemingly unrelated regression and a robust systems estimator

generalized reduced form auctions a network flow approach we develop a network flow approach for characterizing interim allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints both ceilings and floors applications include a variety of settings of practical interest ranging from individual and group specific capacity constraints set aside sale partnership dissolution and government license reallocation

financial networks contagion commitment and private sector bailouts i develop a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion but also induce private sector bailouts where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion introducing this bailout possibility i show that linkages may be optimal ex ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible however in some cases e g when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks the whole network may collapse i also characterize the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems linkages among agents in financial markets are a concern because of the risk of financial contagion that is the risk that a small shock to one agent will spread to other agents in a domino effect whether we should worry about these linkages is an open question the main goal of this paper is to show that a network in which agents are closely interlinked may be optimal both because of and despite the potential for contagion another goal is to characterize optimal networks that is whether and how agents should be linked to one another the basic intuition is as follows linkages present the threat of contagion to prevent collapse of the whole network agents who are lucky ex post may be willing to bail out those who are not in this way agents obtain the benefits of mutual insurance even though they cannot precommit to making payments

systemic risk in financial systems we consider default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism the obligations of all firms within the system are determined simultaneously in a fashion consistent with the priority of debt claims and the limited liability of equity we first show via a fixed point argument that there always exists a clearing payment vector that clears the obligations of the members of the clearing system under mild regularity conditions this clearing vector is unique next we develop an algorithm that both clears the financial system in a computationally efficient fashion and provides information on the systemic risk faced by the individual system firms finally we produce qualitative comparative statics for financial systems these comparative statics imply that in contrast to single firm results even unsystematic nondissipative shocks to the system will lower the total value of the system and may lower the value of the equity of some of the individual system firms

inflation and relative price variability abstract theoretical explanations of the inflation relative price variability relationship are often observationally equivalent this paper compares two theoretical models menu costs and imperfect information the microfoundations of the models are used to generate new testable differences between the theories

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

balance sheet contagion japan has been in a slump for the past decade after gdp had been growing by on average 4 percent during the 1980 s the growth rate dropped to 1 percent in the 1990 s asset prices also fluctuated significantly capital gains on stocks and real estate in the 1980 s followed by capital losses in the 1990 s were both on the order of a few years worth of gdp even after taking inflation into account together with production and asset prices the fraction of nonperforming loans fluctuated substantially these are by no means all bank loans for the nonfinancial corporate sector in japan the ratio of financial assets to total assets is about 40 percent much higher than in the united states such financial assets include loans to and securities of other private agents that is nonfinancial institutions simultaneously borrow from and lend to each other on a significant scale many nonperforming loans are interlocked paralyzing the financial system it is important to recognize that these swings have been experienced by almost all sectors of the japanese economy yet in other countries comparable movements in asset prices have had less widespread consequences for example the recent fluctuations in the nasdaq index in the united states have been no smaller than those of asset prices in japan but the damage appears to be contained to closely related sectors although u s equity holders particularly pension funds have lost value the level of nonperforming loans is relatively limited up to now the question is why does there appear to be more contagion in some countries than in others has contagion anything to do with the nature of financing or the extent to which there are inter locking loans in this theoretical paper we examine two different mechanisms by which contagion may occur in both cases propagation is through balancesheet effects first through the indirect effects that fluctuations in asset prices have on collateral values second through the direct effects that default on or postponement of debt repayments have when there are chains of credit

systemic risk in the angolan interbank payment system a network approach in this work we analyse the topology of the network of interbank payment flows settled via the real time gross settlement system rtgs of the angolan payment system aps during the fourth quarte

the interbank market during a crisis abstract the autumn of 1998 provides a setting in which to test the performance of the interbank market during a potential financial crisis this period witnessed russia s effective default on its sovereign bonds and the near collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management despite these negative shocks to bank capital and increased uncertainty in financial markets the federal funds market still effectively channeled liquidity to those institutions in need at rates consistent with federal reserve intentions further risk premiums on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased suggesting that the federal funds market performed well during this period

nonlinear impact of inflation on relative price variability using a half a century long disaggregated price data for 22 food products collected from 19 cities we show that the association between inflation and price variability is nonlinear with respect to changes in inflation rate we obtain similar results for expected and unexpected inflation