the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

dynamic market models in industrial organization abstract this paper surveys empirical work done on dynamic models of market performance these fall into one of two categories structural models which model how market structure and performance change in response to entry and reduced form models which describe change regardless of how it is brought about a typical example of each type of model is chosen from the literature and simulations are used to draw out the implications of the estimated coefficients both models depict the competitive process in the us economy as being extremely slow

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

specifying the dynamics of industry concentration previous studies generally explain changes in concentration by its initial determinants or by changes in its determinants little attention is paid to the dynamic structure of the model this study provides a framework to sort out adjustment effects in a systematic manner the empirical model distinguishes long term from short term effects and estimates the rate of adjustment when concentration deviates from its long term equilibrium level considerable attention has focused on industry concentration as a key element of market structure while earlier empirical studies examined determinants of the level of industry concentration a more recent literature focuses on changes in concentration these more recent papers typically explain intertemporal changes in concentration by the past levels of industry growth concentration advertising intensity and minimum efficient plant size however the dynamic relationship between changes in concentration and the levels of the independent variables has not been explicitly specified caves and porter 1980 have argued that explaining changes in concentration by past levels of market structure variables is tantamount to assuming that the sampled industries are in the process of adjusting to a disequilibrium situation as an alternative they adopt a long term equilibrium approach whereby changes in concentration are explained by lagged changes in the relevant market conditions they find that this approach as a whole was unsuccessful exhibiting low levels of significance and a lack of robustness when the cross section regressions were shifted to different time periods

polynomially bounded rationality abstract this paper explores the conditions under which agents can learn enough about an economy to form rational expectations the agents rationality is bounded by limiting their computational resources to algorithms with running time bounded by a polynomial in the relevant problem parameters we characterize the classes of price functions and economies that agents can learn under these assumptions and present a result that suggests that it is unlikely that agents can learn even those price functions and economies computable by finite state automata this result casts doubt on the ability of agents to form rational expectations in complex economies journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 c68 c63

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication abstract this paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment by allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature s common but overly restrictive focus on one shot direct communication in addition general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment first they allow us to identify the local downward incentive constraints as the relevant ones if the agent s preferences satisfy a single crossing property second we show how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communication device an example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one shot direct communication

comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract abstract each period a firm must carry out an indivisible project the cost of which depends on the firm s constant efficiency and its variable level of effort only the cost is observed by the regulator who has to choose the incentive scheme the optimal dynamic mechanism is derived under possible commitment of the regulator over time then under non commitment it is shown that there are four types of continuation equilibria also the profile of effort levels is compared to the commitment case finally some numerical comparative statics is performed and it is shown that all types of equilibria can be optimal

market dynamics and dichotomy evidence from taiwanese manufacturing in taiwan a dichotomous market structure is closely related to the progress of economic development the purpose of the present article is to examine the market dynamics and dichotomous nature of taiwanese manufacturing a model of dynamic adjustment of industry structure is considered when both the speed of adjustment and the long run market concentration are allowed to vary across industries we use 118 four digit manufacturing industries for empirical analysis of our models spanning between 1981 and 1991 empirical findings show that both the speed of adjustment and long run industry concentration are predominantly determined by minimum efficient scale the speed of adjustment is much faster in a small open economy like taiwan compared to mature economies like the us and australia in addition the dichotomous nature of the market is supported in our findings for both periods viz 1981 1986 and 1986 1991 albeit weaker for the later period

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

contractual contingencies and renegotiation in a dynamic model of asymmetric information between the owner of a firm and a manager we investigate the optimal set of contingencies on which an incentive contract should depend when renegotiation is possible in particular we characterize the circumstances in which the contracting parties find it desirable to deliberately restrict what the owner can monitor thereby limiting the contractible contingencies our findings thus provide an endogenous explanation for contract simplicity in contrast to those based on transactions costs or bounded rationality

industrial concentration and competition in malaysian manufacturing industrial concentration is the most widely studied area among various elements of market structure in the industrial organization literature this paper is a first attempt to analyse the determinants of changes in industry concentration over time in the case of malaysia using a partial adjustment model a cross sectional analysis is carried out against a sample of manufacturing industries between 1986 and 1996 domestic factors in influencing competition e g capital intensity advertising intensity and market size are found to be significant in most cases to explain the level of concentration considering variable rate of adjustment of concentration an increase in labour productivity of large firms and high entry rates are found to be significant for faster adjustment towards equilibrium level compared with other developed countries the annual rate of structural adjustment is found to be slow in the case of malaysian manufacturing

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

profit entry and changes in concentration abstract the simultaneity between profit entry and changes in concentration is examined the sample includes 481 observations on 4 digit industries over the years 1972 1977 and 1977 1982 results show that profits respond positively to entry barriers and initial concentration net entry responds positively to initial profits and responds negatively to entry barriers concentration moves toward its steady state level but the rate of adjustment is very slow the competitive process left on its own does not seem to move quickly toward equilibrium

equilibria with communication in a job market example we study costless information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and if so which position to give him we construct equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps or even that no deadline be imposed on the plain conversation the set of communication equilibrium payoffs achieved with the help of a communication device is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

commitment through renegotiation proof contracts with third parties the paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment that is commitment against outside parties to the agreement it considers the example of an incumbent firm which enters a contractual relationship with its workers in order to deter entry it assumes away the possibility for the parties to precommit not to make pareto improving renegotiations of the agreement once entry has taken place under symmetric information the contract is thus found to be useless for entry deterrence if the incumbent firm or workers possess some private information excessive post entry production levels can however be sustained ex post since output reductions may not be incentive compatible while information asymmetries are usually welfare decreasing when the goal is optimal risk sharing they can thus be welfare improving for the contracting parties when commitment against outsiders is the goal of the contract the role of the renegotiation process as a constraint on sustainable agreements is stressed in the paper and the general relevance of strategic contractual commitment is discussed

innovation and the evolution of market structure this paper examines the association between innovation and the evolution of market structure a dynamic model of market concentration is applied to seventy three u k industries 1970 79 and the results are found to be consistent with the hypothesis that innovation is deconcentrating the results reported here and those contained in earlier work combine to suggest that innovation and changes in market concentration interact in a relatively rapid mutually reinforcing but rather weak spiral of increased innovation and decreasing concentration copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

the dynamics of market structure abstract in this paper changes in market concentration are modelled in terms of long run steady state levels and the adjustment towards them both the speed of adjustment and the long run levels of concentration are allowed to vary across industries non linear three stage least squares estimates for allowing for the endogeneity of profits and advertising for 184 u s industries 1963 1967 suggest that both the speed of adjustment and the levels of concentration in the long run are largely determined by minimum efficient scale

potential competition in the deregulated airlines using a new and unique data set this paper applies a systems approach to the study of potential competition prices and entry relations in airline city pair markets consistent with limit pricing models future entry is directly influenced by current prices current prices thus appear to provide an important signal to potential entrants about the probability of profitable entry while results indicate the existence of barriers to entry these barriers appear to have no independent effects on price beyond there effect on actual competition through increases in concentration copyright 1990 by mit press

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

contract design and non cooperative renegotiation abstract we study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements in particular we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if having observed the agent s contract choice the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place an outcome function can be implemented in this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent types which is more pessimistic in the sense of the likelihood ratio order than the prior furthermore the outcome function cannot be too sensitive to variations in the agent s type we show that the direct revelation mechanism which implements such a function when renegotiation can be prevented will also implement it in any equilibrium when it cannot so the standard contract is robust to renegotiation

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

direct foreign investment in the united states abstract cross section analysis of direct foreign investment in the united states provides some support for market structure and transaction cost explanations of dfi a time series country by country analysis suggests the importance of profitability differences the desire to avoid trade barriers and a shift in investment patterns related to world oil shocks

simultaneous equations models of the structure performance paradigm abstract this paper is concerned with determining the dimension of the simultaneous equations model surrounding the basic profits concentration relationship a very general model is considered and then simplified using a simple test for exogeneity and it is concluded that the model is nonlinear in concentration and that simultaneous interaction occurs between profits and foreign competition variables

social costs of oligopoly and the value of competition in this study we present a new methodology for estimating welfare losses caused by market power we depart from past studies by explicitly taking into account different levels of market power we provide estimates of a actual social costs arising from existing market structures and b expected monopoly social costs that would occur if there were no competition actual or potential the difference between actual and monopoly welfare losses represents the value of competition in existing markets we further estimate the separate contributions of actual and potential competition to this value our methodology is based upon an empirical model of oligopoly behaviour and limit pricing from this model we estimate the markup which would occur were there no competition we use this markup in turn to estimate industry demand elasticity at the monopoly price with this elasticity and the assumption of linear demand we can characterise demand cost and welfare conditions at each equilibrium monopoly actual and competitive with this new methodology and some other modifications of earlier techniques we provide not only new estimates of welfare losses but also estimates of the value of competition under existing conditions we find that the actual deadweight loss triangle averages 2 9 of value of shipments for a sample of 37 industries we also estimate that were these industries to maximise joint profits with no threat of entry the welfare loss would be i i 6 the difference 8 7 we attribute to the beneficial effects of potential competition 4 9 and actual competition 3 8 our monopoly benchmark thus yields additional understanding of the value of competition we cannot represent our study as having solved all of the problems associated with social cost estimation of monopoly power indeed given general equilibrium problems associated with horizontal vertical and cross industry aggregation interacting with the second best problem we doubt that all the problems can be solved although we can point out some of the potentials for bias after presenting our estimates we discuss the implications of sampling methodology and aggregation problems demonstrating that potentially strong but possibly offsetting biases exist in all studies including ours

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle the single agent case this paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism we show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent in contrast with the conventional revelation principle however the agent may not use this strategy with probability one our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent by reducing such problems to well defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment

dynamics of market concentration in u s banking 1966 1986 abstract this paper estimates the speed at which local banking market concentration adjusts to its long run equilibrium level long run market concentration is estimated as a function of the attractiveness of entry and regulatory barriers to entry into the market the speed of adjustment is allowed to vary across markets and depends on the deviation of market from normal profits the empirical results from panels of data over 5 10 15 and 20 years show that concentration levels in local banking markets adjust slowly over time markets with unusually high or low profits show significantly more rapid adjustment than other markets over shorter time periods but the differences are small in magnitude legal barriers to entry significantly impede market adjustment over longer time periods

time to build and fluctuations in bulk shipping abstract this paper explores the nature of fluctuations in world bulk shipping by quantifying the impact of time to build and demand uncertainty on investment and prices we examine the impact of both construction lags and their lengthening in periods of high investment activity by constructing a dynamic model of ship entry and exit a rich dataset of secondhand ship sales allows for a new estimation strategy resale prices provide direct information on value functions and allow their nonparametric estimation we find that moving from time varying to constant to no time to build reduces prices while significantly increasing both the level and volatility of investment jel g31 l11 l62 l92

mediated contracts and mechanism design abstract the framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of myerson 1982 5 is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of rahman and obara 2010 11 and rahman 2009 10 the equivalence follows because the framework of myerson 1982 5 allows for a correlation between recommendations and transfers the literature has hitherto not recognized the importance of this correlation for the structure of optimal contracts and for extending the revelation principle to address agency moral hazard problems

on the value of commitment with asymmetric information several recent papers have emphasized that long term relationships can be efficiently governed by short term contracts provided that there is no asymmetric information at the contracting dates this excludes not only adverse selection problems but also moral hazards problems in which hidden actions generate private information over the future in this paper we show in the context of a multiperiod principal agent relationship with adverse selection that renegotiable short term contracts can be as efficient as long term renegotiation proof contracts on the other hand spot contracting may fail to achieve long run efficiency not only because of intertemporal smoothing as with symmetric information but also because of ratchet effects and time inconsistency in the optimal structure of informational rents thus some limited commitment seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve long run efficiency

mediation and peace this article applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolution standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually not feasible because disputants are sovereign entities nevertheless we find that this limitation is inconsequential despite only being capable of making unenforceable recommendations mediators can be equally effective as arbitrators by using recommendation strategies that do not reveal that one player is weak to a strong opponent a mediator can effectively circumvent the unenforceability constraint this is because these strategies make the strong player agree to recommendations that yield the same payoff as arbitration in expectation this result relies on the capability of mediators to collect confidential information from the disputants before making their recommendations simple protocols of unmediated communication cannot achieve the same level of ex ante welfare as they preclude confidentiality

cheap talk in games with incomplete information abstract the paper studies bayesian games which are extended by adding pre play communication let be a bayesian game with full support and with three or more players the main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome q that is rational i e involves probabilities that are rational numbers can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of provided that the following condition is satisfied there exists a bayesian nash equilibrium s in such that for each type t i of each player i the expected payoff of t i in q is larger than the expected payoff of t i in s

the dynamics of industrial concentration in australian manufacturing abstract a dynamic model of concentration is developed with incomplete and industry specific adjustment to deviations of concentration from its steady state cross sectional analysis is carried out against a sample of 102 australian manufacturing industries at the australian standard industrial classification asic four digit level over the period 1977 78 1984 85 the estimated adjustment is faster than found in studies of the more mature industrial economies and this adjustment is found to significantly increase with reductions in tariff protection there is also empirical support for john sutton s argument that the relationship between concentration and market size depends on whether set up costs are exogenous

a new methodology linking concentration dynamics to current and steady state profits examining korean industrial policy during take off abstract we model the dynamics of industrial structure and market power using korean manufacturing data during the take off period 1978 82 structure conduct performance scp methodologies have been criticized for using accounting data and because a few superior firms may have greater shares and greater profits both are argued to present possible spurious correlations between concentration and profits this paper follows earlier work which shows that market structure responds to observed accounting profits as if these were accurate indices of real profits and not as if leading firms are perceived to have unmatchable advantages the methodological contribution of this model is a new latent variable for steady state profits derived from the speed of structural adjustment long run profits are identified by the hypothesis that structural adjustment will be more rapid when industries are farther from steady state levels we analyze the long run profits latent variable finding strong support for this hypothesis the speed of adjustment is greater for positive and negative deviations from steady state structure we show that the profits and structural adjustment relationship is non monotone the scp criticisms above are based on spurious correlations which are monotone in profits and structure positing spurious correlations which are at the same time monotone in structure and non monotone in structural adjustment seems less plausible than accepting the scp results which are consistent with both our analysis also is new in that it is the first direct econometric analysis of korean industrial policy during its take off years we note that in korea unlike elsewhere industrial policy was hypothesized to lead to concentration and market power in the popular press and by professional economists ours is the first direct econometric analysis of this hypothesis and we find it supported

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

sequentially optimal mechanisms this paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment a risk neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line the seller has all the bargaining power she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t 1 we show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism a methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent s type 2006 the review of economic studies limited

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

message contingent delegation abstract the paper studies the role of delegation and authority in a principal agent relation in which a non contractible action has to be taken the agent has private information relevant for the principal but has policy preferences different from the principal consequently an information revelation problem arises i consider a partially incomplete contracting environment with contractibility of messages and decision rights and with transferable utility i contribute to the literature by allowing for message contingent delegation and by deriving the optimal partially incomplete contract it is shown that message contingent delegation creates incentives for information revelation and may outperform unconditional authority and unconditional delegation