dynamic adverse selection a theory of illiquidity fire sales and flight to quality we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection there exists a unique equilibrium in which better quality assets trade at higher prices but with a lower price dividend ratio in less liquid markets sellers of high quality assets signal quality by accepting a lower trading probability we show how the distribution of sellers private information affects an asset s price and liquidity how a change in that distribution can cause a re sale and a ight to quality and how asset purchase and subsidy programs may raise prices and liquidity and reverse the ight to quality jel d82 g12 this paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection the owners of heterogeneous assets are privately informed about the quality of their assets sellers set prices for their assets recognizing that sales may be rationed at high prices buyers set prices recognizing that the quality of available assets may depend on the price selected in equilibrium sellers of high quality assets are willing to set a high price despite the low sale probability because the continuation value from failing to sell a high quality asset is high conversely sellers of low quality assets opt for a low price buyers are indifferent between paying a low price for a low quality asset and a high price for a high quality asset we prove these results in a deliberately stylized dynamic general equilibrium framework assets are perfectly durable and pay a constant dividend each period some amount of a perfectly perishable consumption good better quality assets pay a higher dividend but only the asset s current owner observes the dividend this is the source of private information and the root of the adverse selection problem as in akerlof 1970 the only permissible trades are between the consumption good and the asset individuals are risk neutral and have a discount factor that changes over time independently across individuals creating gains from trade finally discount factors are observable which ensures that patient individuals never sell assets since there are no gains from trade we believe this framework is useful for capturing

debt futures and options optimal price linked financial contracts under moral hazard and limited liability this paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability there is moral hazard and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in output in this setting the optimal contract is a price contingent commodity bond that can be replicated by combining pure debt commodity futures and commodity call option contracts although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal a pure debt contract is almost never optimal various properties of the entrepreneur s optimal price contingent promised payment are described copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

income insurance with uncertain output this paper examines the properties of a market solution to the output uncertainty problem faced by unincorporated primary producers an insurance contract is formulated and shown to provide income insurance to producers without exposing insurers to moral hazard the equilibrium relative to this contract is shown to be equivalent to that effected by a stock market available to all producers copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

welfare improving adverse selection in credit markets a model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral hazard only case adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model high quality borrowers cross subsidize low quality borrowers the cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices the analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria

comparing the post earnings announcement drift for surprises calculated from analyst and time series forecasts post earnings announcement drift is the tendency for a stock s cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an earnings announcement we show that the drift is significantly larger when defining the earnings surprise using analysts forecasts and actual earnings from i b e s than when using a time series model based on compustat earnings data neither compustat s policy of restating earnings nor the inclusion of special items in reported earnings contribute significantly to the disparity in drift magnitudes rather our results suggest that this disparity is attributable to differences between analyst forecasts and those of time series models or at least to factors correlated with these differences further we document that analyst forecasts lead to return patterns around future earnings announcements that differ from those observed when using time series models suggesting that the two types of surprises may capture somewhat different forms of mispricing

perquisites risk and capital structure in a corporate agency problem perquisites and risk interact to produce novel complex comparative statics for example even if additional debt induces risk neutral insiders to increase risk they never seek to increase the market value of their stock instead insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent conditionally optimal perquisites also the firm s optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults however the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds stocks options and their hybrids

typology for flight to quality episodes and downside risk measurement abstractwe propose a total return based framework to measure downside risk associated with phenomenon of capital outflows from riskier to safer financial markets the proposed method consists of three elements i the general definition of the flight to quality ftq phenomenon ii the typological classification of the flight to quality occurrences for associating them with the phases of the business cycle and iii the automated technique to diagnose the time frames and to measure the impact of flight to quality on financial instruments the proposed framework is applied to analyse the global scale capital inflows outflows from emerging markets public debt to the us treasuries and vice versa the results show that different phases of business cycles and gdp growth rates including turning points could be associated with flights to quality of different types and causality origins addressing downside risk crystallizations in flight to quality occurrences new perspectives of integrated interest rate r

earnings skewness and analyst forecast bias abstract we argue that if analysts objective is to provide the most accurate forecast by minimizing the mean absolute forecast error then the optimal forecast is the median instead of the mean earnings forecast bias is observed when the median is different from the mean in a skewed earnings distribution thus part of the observed analyst forecast bias could be a result of analysts efforts to improve forecast accuracy when the earnings distribution is skewed we find that earnings skewness is significantly related to analyst forecast bias we also provide evidence that the market adjusts for part of the skewness induced bias

financial signalling and the deep pocket argument this article provides a formal representation of telser s 1966 deep pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant s and the incumbent s financial structures are endogenous the entrant s financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets financiers are uncertain of the entrant s true value but they know the incumbent s true worth both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production in equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity while the high value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent this provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy

financial crises and the multilateral response what the historical record shows abstract we provide a synoptic description of financial crises and the multilateral response over the course of the last four decades we present both indicators of economic performance around crisis dates and a comprehensive description of multilateral rescue efforts while emergency lending has grown reliance on debt restructuring broadly speaking has declined this leads us to ask what can be done to rebalance the management of debt problems toward a better mix of emergency lending and private sector burden sharing in particular we explore the idea of sovereign cocos contingent debt securities that automatically reduce payment obligations in the event of debt sustainability problems

information uncertainty and the post earnings announcement drift in europe investigating the effect of earnings announcement abnormal return and of abnormal trading volume on future returns for a large sample of european companies with both annual and interim announcements over 1997 2010 the author found that the two measures of market surprise are positively related to future abnormal returns especially when information uncertainty is high these two effects also appear to be complementary in that each retains some incremental predictive power for future returns

incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints abstract we explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk neutral agents operate in correlated environments our focus is on the subgame equilibrium in which each agent is induced via a direct mechanism to truthfully reveal his private information as a nash response to truth telling by his counterpart we identify a class of examples in which in contrast to the case where the agents are risk averse the nash constraints induce a subgame dominant strategy equilibrium thus implementation via direct mechanisms is feasible for this class more generally however the truth telling nash equilibrium may be subgame dominated so the question of implementation via direct mechanisms remains a delicate one

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

conservatism and cross sectional variation in the post earnings announcement drift accounting conservatism allows me to identify a previously undocumented source of predictable cross sectional variation in standardized unexpected earnings autocorrelations viz the sign of the most recent earnings realization and present evidence that the market ignores this variation loss effect it is possible to earn returns higher than from the bernard and thomas 1990 strategy by incorporating this feature additionally the paper shows that the loss effect is different from the cross quarter effect shown by rangan and sloan 1998 and it is possible to combine the two effects to earn returns higher than either strategy alone thus the paper corroborates the bernard and thomas finding that stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which quarterly earnings series differ from a seasonal random walk and extends it by showing that the market systematically underestimates time series properties resulting from accounting conservatism

why are capitalists the bosses this paper addresses the question why does capital typically hire labor rather than the other way around it models a situation in which a capitalist owner of money capital can choose between lending out his capital for production and using it to set up production under his own supervision it is demonstrated that the moral hazard of potential borrowers on account of limited liability provides the capitalist with the incentive to become a firm owner supervising hired labor the capitalist s choice is endogenized in terms of his opportunity cost of time it is argued that moral hazard with respect to the use of borrowed capital is an important determinant of the social hierarchy in the workplace copyright 1989 by royal economic society

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal a highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock the reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability bankruptcy constraint limits the payments the principal can make provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small this finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms even though limited liability becomes an issue for different ranges of liquidation values under the two schemes tournaments are still superior when the liquidation value of the firm is intermediate or large even though the limited liability constraint is still binding for intermediate values surprisingly uncertainty in the price of output strengthens the need for tournaments by expanding the range of liquidation values over which tournaments are dominant because price uncertainty introduces additional bankruptcy risk these findings provide insight into policy implications in the contracting out of services by state and local governments in procurement in rent seeking contests and in tournaments used by hmos

an economic capital model integrating credit and interest rate risk in the banking book banks often measure credit and interest rate risk in the banking book separately and then add the risk measures to determine economic capital this approach misses complex interactions between the two risk types we develop a framework where these risks are analysed jointly since banking book positions are generally not marked to market our model is based on book value accounting our simulations show that interactions matter and that ignoring them leads to risk overstatement the magnitude of the errors depends on the structure of the balance sheet and on the repricing characteristics of assets and liabilities

autocorrelation structure of forecast errors from time series models alternative assessments of the causes of post earnings announcement drift abstract this paper demonstrates that the evidence supporting the hypothesis that post earnings announcement drift pead is caused by investors failure to incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings is also consistent with researchers over differencing an already stationary time series specifically we show the evidence is driven by a subset of firms where over differencing of quarterly earnings in estimating earnings surprises is most likely to have occurred given the persistence of the pead over time our alternative explanation suggests that the prior research investigating the causes for the pead overestimates investors naivete

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

seasonal patterns of futures hedging and the resolution of output uncertainty abstract optimal futures hedging is examined in a two good model with stochastic output and sequential information arrival a producer s optimal hedge depends on demand elasticity sensitivity of his output to weather his correlation with aggregate output and how rapidly his output uncertainty is resolved relative to other producers during different seasonal periods because regional output uncertainties are resolved at different times the optimal futures position of a grower will commonly reverse in direction during the crop year a producer with non stochastic output who faces price risk arising from demand shocks may remain unhedged or even maintain a long position

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

design and marketing of financial products marketing costs are introduced into the security design environment outlined in allen and gale 1988 it is shown that splitting the firm s cash flow between products enhances their investor appeal and reduces marketing costs we also explain how the extremal product design in allen and gale is thereby avoided and how in simple cases debt equity or warrants can be optimal furthermore we illustrate in general terms how the optimal solution employs portfolios of option type products and we give an example of two optimal products that share profits in seven of eight states article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

the intersection of market and credit risk abstract economic theory tells us that market and credit risks are intrinsically related to each other and not separable we describe the two main approaches to pricing credit risky instruments the structural approach and the reduced form approach it is argued that the standard approaches to credit risk management creditmetrics creditrisk and kmv are of limited value when applied to portfolios of interest rate sensitive instruments and in measuring market and credit risk empirically returns on high yield bonds have a higher correlation with equity index returns and a lower correlation with treasury bond index returns than do low yield bonds also macro economic variables appear to influence the aggregate rate of business failures the creditmetrics creditrisk and kmv methodologies cannot reproduce these empirical observations given their constant interest rate assumption however we can incorporate these empirical observations into the reduced form of jarrow and turnbull 1995b drawing the analogy risk 5 63 70 model here default probabilities are correlated due to their dependence on common economic factors default risk and recovery rate uncertainty may not be the sole determinants of the credit spread we show how to incorporate a convenience yield as one of the determinants of the credit spread for credit risk management the time horizon is typically one year or longer this has two important implications since the standard approximations do not apply over a one year horizon first we must use pricing models for risk management some practitioners have taken a different approach than academics in the pricing of credit risky bonds in the event of default a bond holder is legally entitled to accrued interest plus principal we discuss the implications of this fact for pricing second it is necessary to keep track of two probability measures the martingale probability for pricing and the natural probability for value at risk we discuss the benefits of keeping track of these two measures

moral hazard and adverse selection the question of financial structure this paper looks at the moral hazard and adverse selection problems confronting an entrepreneur offering securities to an uninformed but competitive financial market the adverse selection aspect of the problem is generated by the unobservable entrepreneur s ability to transform effort into value moral hazard arises because the investment decision is made subsequent to financing we consider the joint use of both debt and equity and characterize the equilibrium relation between capital structure and unobservable attributes it is shown that 1 investment and financing are not separable 2 there is an underinvestment problem for better firms and 3 simultaneous use of both debt and equity can resolve this difficulty we also establish a connection between expected terminal firm value and debt promised payment level and between share retention and standard deviation agency problems in corporate finance originated with the influential papers of jensen and meckling 11 myers 17 ross 21 and leland pyle 14 they show that the market imperfections induced by unobservable actions lack of contracting ability and information asymmetry generally lead to second best outcomes in which the distribution of corporate ownership is achieved only at significant cost these costs take the form of excessive perquisite consumption overinvestment underinvestment and incomplete diversification of personal investment portfolios moral hazard and adverse selection comprise two forms in which agency problems may take shape arrow 1 equates these two terms with hidden action and hidden information respectively moral hazard arises when the action undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a differential value to the agent as compared to the principal adverse selection problems arise when the agent has more information than the principal the resolution of such difficulties has been explored in a number of contexts with both signals and contingent contracting mechanisms these definitions exclude certain agency problems in the delegation literature for which the preference incongruity results from a lack of precommitment rather than some exogenous feature of the model in corporate finance one would thus identify the jensen meckling paper with moral hazard because perquisites enter the insider s objective differently from outsiders while darrough is from columbia university and stoughton is from the university of california irvine the second author s research was partially supported by grant number 410 83 0786 r 1 from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada this paper was presented at the 1984 meetings of the western finance association in vancouver and at the 1985 european finance association meetings in bern we thank kose john and frans tempelaar for their comments at the meetings

moral hazard and limited liability implications for the theory of the firm this paper presents a theory of the firm based on moral hazard in the provision of effort by an owner manager who borrows money in financial markets under conditions of limited liability the authors examine the relationship between the financial structure of the firm and the effort and output decisions of the owner manager results are reported concerning the determination of the firm s optimal financial structure and concerning the positive and normative implications of financial structure for pure competition and monopoly they also identify a strategic advantage from equity finance under cournot oligopoly copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the multiperiod information content of accounting earnings confirmations and contradictions of previous earnings reports in this study we propose and test the hypothesis that investors reevaluate earnings announcements in the light of postannouncement information 1 our argument for multiperiod price reactions to earnings news is motivated by the literature linking price responses to earnings persistence 2 when earnings are announced we assume that investors are unable to determine with certainty the persistence of an earnings

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

futures markets and production decisions this paper investigates the use of futures prices in making production decisions we derive a preference independent production rule for firms that face both demand and production uncertainty this rule is compared to a simple marginal cost equals future price rule which previously has been suggested for firms with deterministic output data for agricultural producers are used to examine the importance of output uncertainty in the determination of the proper production rule our analysis suggests that for many crops the simple rule is sufficiently accurate to be a useful guide to production

the relation between earnings and cash flows abstract a model of earnings cash flows and accruals is developed assuming a random walk sales process variable and fixed costs and that the only accruals are accounts receivable and payable and inventory the model implies earnings better predict future operating cash flows than current operating cash flows and the difference varies with the operating cash cycle also the model is used to predict serial and cross correlations of each firm s series the implications and predictions are tested on a 1337 firm sample over 1963 1992 both earnings and cash flow forecast implications and correlation predictions are generally consistent with the data

dynamic hedging with uncertain production this paper provides a closed form rule for dynamic hedging with production uncertainty the rule is obtained by considering a discret e time control problem in the limit as the interval between hedging opportunities goes to zero price may be expected to increase or decrease so that a speculative motive is present in the absence of this motive and of discounting the optimal hedge is myopic for a given expected rate of change in price the hedge may be expected to rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit markets welfare increasing reputation effects arise in credit markets when adverse selection gives rise to borrower reputation formation incentives that mitigate moral hazard problems this paper shows that welfare stemming from reputation effects will diminish over time as the private information of borrowers is revealed to lenders in the form of lengthening credit histories aggregate borrower welfare may therefore decrease over time unless reputation effects can be sustained restricting a lender s access to a borrower s credit history via credit bureau policy is shown to be one method of sustaining reputation effects and preventing a decline in welfare copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

stock and bond market liquidity a long run empirical analysis this paper establishes liquidity linkage between stock and treasury bond markets there is a lead lag relationship between illiquidity of the two markets and bidirectional granger causality the effect of stock illiquidity on bond illiquidity is consistent with flight toquality or flight to liquidity episodes monetary policy impacts illiquidity the evidence indicates that bond illiquidity acts as a channel through which monetary policy shocks are transferred into the stock market these effects are observed across illiquidity of bonds of different maturities and are especially pronounced for illiquidity of short term maturities the paper provides evidence of illiquidity integration between stock and bond markets