the emergence of iran in the world car industry an estimation of its export potential in the past 10 years iran has been emerging as a major car producer in the world however due to delays in economic reforms iranian car exports have not increased as much as production this paper presents a first estimation of the iranian export potential in the car industry based on new theoretical developments of the gravity equation an empirical bilateral trade model is proposed it includes sectoral variables car production import tariffs as well as other original variables such as expectations and hysteresis we then develop a dataset which includes the 40 major car exporting countries in the world 34 importing countries a 10 year time period as well as four car production groups the model is then estimated by using alternative panel data estimators such as those of hausman and taylor and dynamic estimators as well as transformed variables estimators export potential is finally calculated from the residuals of the model results show that iranian current car exports are about 100 times less than their fitted values this indicates that there is a significant export potential for iran especially toward india china russia as well as smaller neighbours turkey pakistan central asian countries as a result iran could become the major auto supplier in the middle east however this requires the completion and success of ongoing economic reforms

scale economies and the volume of trade in this paper we split the number of actual years of schooling into five components effective years repeated years skipped years inefficient routing years and dropout years estimation of earnings equations using these explanatory variables produces some interesting empirical and theoretical results the main empirical finding is that the concepts of actual and effective years of schooling that are usually used in the estimation of earnings equations are statistically inferior to our classification both concepts pro

an econometric view on the estimation of gravity models and the calculation of trade potentials this paper presents an ar 1 model in the spirit of hausman and taylor zero differences between actual and in sample predicted trade flows large systematic differences between observed and in sample predicted trade flows only indicate model misspecification and econometric problems out of sample predictions make sense if countries of interest are in an early stage of the transformation process the gravity model remains an interesting tool for the calculation of counterfactuals e g the impact of catching up in gdp per capita in the ceec or of the reduction of trade costs via infrastructure investments or tariffs on bilateral trade etc for this line of research the difference between short term and long term influences could provide interesting insights

viewpoint decision making in committees this article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision making a committee consists of self interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre specified decision rule we focus on costly information acquisition strategic information aggregation and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision making process such as over cautiousness voting and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems cet article passe en revue certains developpements recents dans la theorie de la prise de decision en comite un comite est defini comme un groupe de membres qui ont des interets particuliers et qui prennent une decision publique en agregeant une information imparfaite et dispersee a travers le groupe selon une regle de decision pre etablie les auteurs portent leur attention sur l acquisition couteuse d information l agregation de l information strategique et les regles et procedures qui accroissent la qualite de la decision en comite ce qui apparait comme des inefficacites du processus de prise de decision en comite sur precaution votes delais s avere etre des remedes partiels aux problemes d incitation

persistent trade effects of large exchange rate shocks this paper presents a theoretical basis for the argument that large exchange rate shocks such as the 1980s dollar cycle may have persistent effects on trade flows and the equilibrium exchange rate itself we begin with a partial equilibrium model in which large exchange rate fluctuations lead to entry or exit decisions that are not reversed when the currency returns to its previous level then we develop a simple model of the feedback from hysteresis in trade to the exchange rate itself here we see that a large capital inflow which leads to an initial appreciation can result in a persistent reduction in the exchange rate consistent with trade balance

strategic disclosure of research results the cost of proving your honesty in situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver i study how strategic reporting affects the incentives to search for information research provides series of signals that can be used selectively in reporting i show that the sender is strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equilibrium discloses all the information he obtained however this extra research can be socially beneficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing finally i identify cases where the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive in 2002 editors of eleven of the most prestigious medical journals announced that they would only publish the results of studies that were entered at their start in a publicly available database 1 pharmaceutical firms conduct clinical trials to test the efficacy and potential side effects of their drugs and to compare them to competitors products publishing results of studies is an efficient way to influence doctors prescriptions and patients tastes however firms can conduct multiple trials and select the most favourable results the system of mandatory disclosure adopted by medical journals is a response to the fear of such selective publishing 2 it makes the research effort of pharmaceutical firms more observable and will influence both the information they disclose and the amount of research they perform in the present article i study the interaction between the research and disclosure decisions which is an essential element in many settings the adoption of mandatory disclosure rules has subtle effects and i discover that leaving the research effort unobservable can sometimes be socially beneficial 3 i study the interaction between research and disclosure in a model where a biased sender searches for information and communicates it strategically to a receiver who will

maintaining and testing separability in demand systems we derive a general elasticity representation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for direct weak separability of the utility function parametric restrictions required to implement the separability conditions are presented for three common demand systems the almost ideal translog and rotterdam our empirical application uses the rotterdam model to test a few separable structures within a complete u s demand system emphasizing food commodities results based on size corrected likelihood ratio tests provide support for commonly used separability assumptions about food and meat demand

a model of expertise we study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees when the decision maker consults only a single expert the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker we ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts we first show that there is no perfect bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs when both experts are biased in the same direction it is never beneficial to consult both in contrast when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both indeed in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal

opinions as incentives we study costs and benefits of differences of opinion between an adviser and a decision maker even when they share the same underlying preferences over decisions a difference of opinion about payoff relevant information leads to strategic information acquisition and transmission a decision maker faces a fundamental trade off a greater difference of opinion increases an adviser s incentives to acquire information but exacerbates the strategic disclosure of any information that is acquired nevertheless when choosing from a rich pool of opinion types it is optimal for a decision maker to select an adviser with some difference of opinion centralization of authority is essential to harness these incentive gains since delegation to the adviser can discourage effort

persuasion games with higher order uncertainty abstract shin j econom theory 64 1994 253 264 showed that a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to exist in persuasion games when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party s payoff relevant information by explicitly integrating higher order uncertainty into the information structure this note shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff relevant state space

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

disclosure and choice an agent chooses among projects with random outcomes his payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer s expectation of the outcome with some probability the agent will be able to disclose some information about the true outcome to the observer we show that choice is inefficient in general we illustrate this point with a characterization of the inefficiencies that result when the agent can perfectly disclose the outcome with some probability and can disclose nothing otherwise as in dye 1985a in this case the agent favours riskier projects even with lower expected returns on the other hand if information can also be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information excessively risk averse when the challenger has better access and efficient otherwise we also characterize the agent s worst case equilibrium payoff we give examples of alternative disclosure technologies illustrating other forms the inefficiencies can take for example in a two dimensional setting we demonstrate a hitting for the fences effect where the agent systematically focuses on the harder dimension at the expense of success on the easier

household equivalence scales and welfare comparisons abstract the ratio of cost functions of different households facing the same prices and attaining the same utility level is a true cost of demographic characteristics index this index is independent of a base level of income or utility ib if and only if it equals a ratio of household equivalence scales that are themselves ib applied cost index and equivalence scales specifications are usually ib this paper describes the general restrictions on cost functions and social welfare functions required for ib scales and for their use in welfare analysis

aids translog and the gorman polar form abstract all budget share models that are linear in the log of income can be derived from gorman polar form subutility functions implications of this result for two stage budgeting lifetime utility maximization and social welfare calculations are discussed

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

when does a firm disclose product information a firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types it allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity with independently distributed product and consumer types full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full disclosure profit

the semiflexible almost ideal demand system abstract the concept of a semiflexible functional form is applied to the almost ideal ai demand system this yields a demand model that is more parsimonious than standard ones while preserving a degree of flexibility that satisfies the curvature property of concavity of the underlying expenditure function at least locally and that preserves the desirable properties of the ai model aggregation across consumers and nonlinearity of the engel curves the model is illustrated with an application to a relatively large demand system emphasizing food consumption

pay to play politics informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access abstract we develop a game theoretic model of informational lobbying between two interest groups and a politician in which the politician can require political contributions in exchange for access the analysis considers three claims 1 the rich have better access to politicians than less wealthy groups 2 this access advantage makes the rich better off and skews policy in their favor and 3 contribution limits can reduce the rich group advantage and result in less skewed policy we show that the rich do have better access with the politician always offering access to the rich groups and only sometimes offering access to the less wealthy group this does not however mean that the rich group is better off or that policy is biased in its favor the politician sets access fees to extract the greatest amount of rent from the political process when only the rich group has access its expected benefit from gaining access is fully offset by its payment to the politician in this case the less wealthy interest group who is not targeted by the politician is better off contribution limits decrease the politician s ability to extract rent which improves the payoffs of rich interests and decreases politician payoffs finally the paper presents a novel benefit of contribution limits they can encourage the formation of lobby groups or the search for evidence which results in more evidence disclosure and better policy

explaining the volume of north south trade much of the recent literature on scale economies has been motivated by the large volume of trade among the industrialized countries relative to north south trade this paper presents theoretical and empirical analyses of two alternative hypotheses one based on differences in north versus south gnp and one based on higher protection levels in the south counter factual experiments using a numerical general equilibrium model support the hypotheses that north south trade is relatively small because the south is poor and highly protected copyright 1990 by royal economic society

the burden of proof in a game of persuasion abstract an arbitrator faces the task of deciding the level of compensation to be received by a plaintiff from a defendant the arbitrator must rely on the verifiable submissions of the two interested parties because the information of the interested parties is not verifiable the unravelling argument has no force nevertheless a class of equilibria of this game gives rise to a particularly simple decision rule for the arbitrator which appeals to a probability distribution over the payoff relevant state space alone the uncertainty concerning the precision of the disputants information enter as parameters in this distribution this parametrization yields an answer to how the arbitrator s decision rule should be modified as the information of the disputants changes journal of economic literature classification numbers d78 d82 l51

near sighted justice chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court we identify conditions where the court should sometimes err in determining which firms should be liquidated such errors affect actions by both good and bad entrepreneurs we first characterize the optimal error rate without renegotiation when creditors and debtors can renegotiate to circumvent an error riven court for one class of actions a blind court that ignores all information is optimal for another class the court should place the burden of proof on the entrepreneur the robust feature is that the court should sometimes err chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court it is often unclear whether it is socially optimal for a bankrupt firm to be reorganized as a continuing entity or whether it should be liquidated and the proceeds from liquidation distributed if creditors and debtors cannot reach a settlement then the bankruptcy court may impose one this paper asks the following questions is it always optimal for the court to make the right decision if liquidation is efficient should the court always mandate liquidation if the bankrupt firm could be a profitable entity should the court always allow it to restructure under the existing management and continue or is it optimal for the court to sometimes make mistakes how does the possibility of negotiated settlements affect the optimal design of the court at one level the answers to these questions are straightforward in a world where more accurate appraisals of a firm s quality are more costly the optimal allocation by a court of resources to evaluate the bankrupt firms will always reflect trade offs between the marginal costs of better appraisals and the marginal benefit of decision making based on more accurate appraisals in this paper we show that a court should also consider how the probability that it misidentifies the quality of a bankrupt firm affects the ex ante behavior of management and hence the probability that the firm becomes bankrupt

implementation with partial provability we extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence we show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences including state dependent with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f if transfers can be large f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption for both results transfers only occur out of equilibrium the use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others preferences our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost

comparative advertising disclosing horizontal match information improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices so consumer surplus can go up or down while profits rise with enough quality asymmetry though the higher quality and hence larger firm s price falls with more information so both effects benefit consumers this occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one comparative advertising as it imparts more information therefore helps consumers although it also improves the profitability of the small firm overall welfare goes down because of the large loss to the attacked firm

cost of characteristics indices and household equivalence scales abstract the ratio of cost functions of demographically different households is a true cost of demographic characteristics index this index is independent of a base level of income or utility ib if and only if it equals a ratio of household equivalence scales that are themselves ib this paper analyzes the restrictions on cost functions and commodity specific equivalence scales required for the existence of ib scales and indices since scales can be price dependent the restrictions on behavior are far less severe than for ordinary engel style household scales connections between ib scales and other techniques for incorporating demographic effects into demand systems are described