partnerships lemons and efficient trade we analyze the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership a crucial role is played by the sign of the derivatives that measure how valuation functions depend on others signals if valuations are increasing functions of other agents signals it is more difficult to achieve efficient trade with interdependent values than with private values where the respective derivatives are zero in contrast if valuations are decreasing functions of other agents signals it is easier to achieve efficient trade with interdependent values our results unify and generalize the insights of cramton et al 1987 myerson and satterthwaite 1983 and akerlof 1970

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

street crime and street culture a model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime a street culture where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak there are social benefits to street reputations but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it the model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns disproportionate victimization of the young and poor and high variance in rates across small distances the model generates novel implications for policy and social science including a negative effect of social capital

the energy efficiency paradox revisited through a partial observability approach the present paper examines the energy efficiency paradox demonstrated in greek manufacturing firms through a partial observability approach the data set used has resulted from a survey carried out among 161 energy saving technology firm adopters maximum likelihood estimates that arise from an incidental truncation model reveal that the adoption of the energy saving technologies is indeed strongly correlated to the returns of assets that are required in order to undertake the corresponding investments the source of the energy efficiency paradox lies within a wide range of factors policy schemes that aim to increase the adoption rate of energy saving technologies within the field of manufacturing are significantly affected by differences in the size of firms finally mixed policies seem to be more effective than policies that are only capital subsidy or regulation oriented

collective choice under dichotomous preferences abstract agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad a mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes time shares the probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility the utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest approval it is efficient strategyproof anonymous and neutral we reach an impossibility if in addition each agent s utility is at least 1 n where n is the number of agents or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes we conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents and prove a weaker statement

auctioning incentive contracts this paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory it considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms the firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion the authors show that 1 the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid 2 the winner faces a linear incenti ve contract 3 the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost and 4 the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner s announced expected cost copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

local incentive compatibility with transfers we consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility we identify a rich class of type spaces which includes the single peaked type space where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility our main result shows that in such type spaces a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment only incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible payment only incentive compatibility requires that a mechanism that generates the same allocation at two types must have the same payment at those two types our result works on a class of ordinal type spaces which are generated by considering a set of ordinal preferences over alternatives and then considering all non negative type vectors representing such preferences

pre sale information in markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre sale consultation services we study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre sale information next to the price of information and the product price and obtain clear cut predictions on when information is over and when it is underprovided even though we find that information quality does not satisfy a standard single crossing property buyers who are a priori more optimistic about their valuation end up paying a higher margin for information but a lower margin for the product when they subsequently exercise their option to purchase at a pre specified price

adverse selection without single crossing monotone solutions abstract the single crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility if single crossing is violated global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account this paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one time violation of single crossing the results show that local and non local incentive constraints distort the solution in opposite directions therefore the optimal decision might involve distortions above as well as below the first best decision furthermore the well known no distortion at the top property does not necessarily hold the results show that the decision can even be distorted above first best for all types sufficient conditions for existence strict monotonicity and continuity of the solution are presented a new necessary condition satisfied by such solutions is found an algorithm based on this condition can calculate continuous and strictly monotone solutions

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

appreciating the renminbi international pressure to revalue china s currency stems in part from the expectation that rapid economic growth should be associated with an underlying real exchange rate appreciation this hinges on the balassa samuelson hypothesis which sees growth as stemming from improvements in traded sector productivity and associated rises in wages and non traded prices yet despite extraordinary growth after the mid 1990s china s real exchange rate showed no tendency to appreciate until after 2004 we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to simulate the economy and show that during this period trade reforms and a rising national saving rate were offsetting forces in the presence of elastic labour supply we then examine the possible determinants of the striking transition to real appreciation thereafter noting mounting evidence that an improved rural term of trade has tightened china s labour market we show that should the chinese government bow to international pressure by appreciating the renminbi either via an extraordinary monetary contraction or via export disincentives the consequences would be harmful for both chinese and global interests

implications of population ageing for economic growth the share of the population aged 60 and over is projected to increase in nearly every country in the world during the period 2005 50 population ageing will tend to lower both labour force participation and savings rates thereby raising concerns about a future slowing of economic growth our calculations suggest that oecd countries are likely to see modest but not catastrophic declines in the rate of economic growth however behavioural responses including greater female labour force participation and policy reforms including an increase in the legal age of retirement can mitigate the economic consequences of an older population in most non oecd countries declining fertility rates will cause labour force to population ratios to rise as the shrinking share of young people will more than offset the skewing of adults towards the older ages these factors suggest that

incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms we study three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms i strategy proofness which requires that no agent gain by misrepresenting his preferences ii adjacent strategy proofness which requires that no agent gain by switching the rankings of two adjacent alternatives and iii mistake monotonicity which requires that the welfare of each agent weakly decrease as he reports increasingly bigger mistakes each of these properties has three versions depending on whether preferences over sure alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries by the stochastic dominance downward lexicographic or upward lexicographic extension we identify conditions on the preference domain that guarantee the equivalence of these properties the universal domain and the domains of single dipped and single peaked preferences satisfy our conditions

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

robust implementation in direct mechanisms a social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile in an interdependent value environment with single crossing preferences we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism including indirect ones the contraction property requires that the interdependence is not too high in a linear signal model the contraction property is equivalent to an interdependence matrix having all eigenvalues smaller than one

market participation in delegated and intrinsic common agency games we study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals sellers affects market participation by a privately informed agent consumer when participation is restricted to all or nothing intrinsic agency the agent must choose between both principals contracts and selecting her outside option when the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract delegated agency competition is more intense the two games have distinct predictions for participation intrinsic agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer under delegated agency relative to monopoly market participation increases respectively decreases when contracting variables are substitutes respectively complements on the intensive margin equilibrium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product offerings is identical to both the first best and the monopoly outcome

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

competitive insurance markets with two unobservables i study a screening game in a competitive insurance market in which insurance customers differ with respect to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion it is shown that indifference curves of customers may cross twice thus the single crossing property does not hold when differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large firms cannot use policy deductibles to screen high risk customers types may be pooled in equilibrium or are separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair levels this leads to excessive entry of firms in equilibrium

strategic voting in agenda controlled committee experiments this paper reports results of committee voting experiments with a fixed agenda that specified a sequence of binary decisions in this particular context the agenda setter can control the ultimate committee decision if it is known whether voting behavior is myopic or strategic subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic voting rules strategic behavior was more prevalent with experience the use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type copyright 1989 by american economic association

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

product design in selection markets insurers choose plan characteristics to sort for profitable consumers in a model with multidimensional types this sorting incentive is proportional to the covariance among marginal consumers between marginal willingness to pay and cost to the insurer standard forms of cost sharing successfully repel costly consumers but reducing plan comprehensiveness instead alienates the risk averse in a perfectly competitive equilibrium the sorting incentive must vanish market power increases insurance quality and welfare nonetheless a competitive equilibrium with positive insurance is possible when insurance value is suciently negatively correlated with cost however in a calibration to handel hendel and whinston 2013 s data equilibrium still fails to exist

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

finite mixture estimation of multiproduct cost functions this paper presents a technique of cost function estimation based on the theory of finite mixture distributions which allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple technologies of production when the researcher does not know which observations correspond to which technologies the finite mixture technique provides estimates of the proportions of firms using the various technologies facilitates comparisons between technologies and preserves the traditional interpretations of cost estimation after describing the mixture procedure the technique is illustrated on a large sample of savings and loan associations and it is concluded that this industry exhibits multiple technologies of production copyright 1991 by mit press

solidarity in preference aggregation improving on a status quo abstract working in the arrowian framework we search for preference aggregation rules with desirable solidarity properties in a fixed population setting we formulate two versions of the solidarity axiom welfare dominance under preference replacement although the stronger proves incompatible with efficiency the combination of efficiency and our second version leads to an important class of rules which improve upon a status quo order these rules are also strategy proof which reveals a further connection between solidarity and incentive properties allowing the population to vary we again characterize the status quo rules by efficiency and a different solidarity axiom population monotonicity this extends a similar characterization of a subclass of these rules by bossert and sprumont 2014

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

random matching under dichotomous preferences we consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare wise identical using randomization many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties the profile of probabilities is lorenz dominant and the revelation mechanism is group strategyproof for each side of the market our results apply to the random assignment problem as well

robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities the standard revenue maximizing auction discriminates against a priori stronger bidders so as to reduce their information rents we show that such discrimination is no longer optimal when the auction s winner may resell to another bidder and the auctioneer has non bayesian uncertainty about such resale opportunities we identify a worst case resale scenario in which bidders values become publicly known after the auction and losing bidders compete bertrand style to buy the object from the winner with this form of resale misallocation no longer reduces the information rents of the high value bidder as he could still secure the same rents by buying the object in resale under regularity assumptions we show that revenue is maximized by a version of the vickrey auction with bidder specific reserve prices first proposed by ausubel and cramton 2004 the proof of optimality involves constructing lagrange multipliers on a double continuum of binding non local incentive constraints

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

population pessimism and economic optimism in the asian giants the timing of china s and india s demographic transitions and the implications of alternative fertility scenarios are explored here using a global economic model incorporating full demographic behaviour and measures of dependency that accurately reflect the changing proportion of workers rather than working aged in the total population the baseline scenario confirms that demographic change in india may yield significant gains to future real per capita income resulting from a continuing sharp decline in its total dependency ratio for china these gains are largely in the past although the positive contribution of declining youth and working aged dependency to future per capita income will continue to offset the negative impact of rising aged dependency through to 2030 whilst a policy change to foster higher fertility rates and hence more rapid population growth in china might ultimately ease its dependency burden in the short run it will increase it in any case such a course is contradictory to the goal of delivering improvements in real per capita income for india we confirm that the benefits of further fertility reductions in the form of increased real per capita income are substantial

mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints abstract we study an adverse selection problem where an agent is able to understate his productivity but not allowed to overstate it the solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent we identify a sufficient condition that does not depend on the distribution of types under which these two solutions coincide

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research