banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

dollarization bailouts and the stability of the banking system central bank policy suffers from time inconsistency when facing a banking crisis a bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate however a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization undesirable the results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the imf as international lolr we would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned actions that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the detriment of the united states alan greenspan to a congressional panel in 1999 iht january 19 2000

market power in emission permit markets theory and evidence from the eu ets a well known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm i show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone i then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase i of the eu ets i find that some firms excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions my results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets

market power permit allocation and efficiency in emission permit markets market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal work of hahn q j econ 99 4 753 765 1984 but the effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both product and permit market has not been fully addressed i show that in this case the threshold of free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market and that overall efficiency cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone in addition to being of general economic interest this issue is relevant in the context of the eu ets i find that the largest german uk and nordpool power generators received free allowances in excess of the derived threshold conditional on having price setting power in both the electricity and permit markets these firms would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards despite being net permit buyers

competition and cooperation in the market for exclusionary rights salop and david scheffman 1983 show that firms profitably can gain market power by conduct that raises their competitors costs raising rivals costs is a more credible route to market power than is predatory pricing because it is not necessary to cause the rivals to exit no deep pocket is required and the additional profits are gained immediately that paper argues that vertical restraints and contracts with input suppliers can be fertile ground for raising competitors costs by contracting with one or more suppliers to exclude rivals either by dealing with them on discriminatory terms or refusing to deal with them altogether a firm sometimes can increase its rivals costs as a result it can sometimes gain the power to raise price in the market in which it sells output this type of contract often can be characterized as the purchase of an exclusionary right from the input suppliers that is in addition to the purchase of inputs the predator also purchases the right to exclude some of its rivals from access to the suppliers inputs exclusionary rights contracts can exist in a variety of forms at one extreme are agreements that involve only exclusionary rights no inputs are exchanged at all for example it was reported in alcoa that at one time alcoa purchased exclusionary covenants from power companies from which it did not purchase electricity the contracts involved only the utilities promises not to sell electricity to other aluminum companies such naked exclusionary rights contracts are unusual of course most exclusionary rights are bundled with the sale of inputs for example stroh beer has alleged that the two major brewers purchase not only advertising time on network sports programs but also the right to exclude remaining brewers from advertising on those same programs even though the networks have other advertising time available it might be argued that such exclusionary conduct would always fail for two reasons the excluded rivals would have available effective counterstrategies to prevent their own exclusion and input suppliers would have no incentives to reduce their sales by excluding some customers these criticisms imply that raising rivals costs by contracting with suppliers would not be credible it surely is not true that exclusionary strategies to restrict rivals input purchases will always succeed in raising their costs for example where rivals easily can substitute to other equally cost effective inputs or where entry into the production of inputs is so easy that the excluded rivals can efficiently produce the input themselves then cost raising strategies will fail moreover where competition in the output market would be sufficient to maintain low prices despite the exit or increased costs of the excluded competitors then no profit maximizing firm would spend any resources trying to exclude those rivals these conditions are discussed in detail in our earlier paper 1985 tdiscussants ronald h coase university of chicago gregory k down yale university david sappington bell communications research and university of pennsylvania

do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline deposit insurance and banking crises this paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline we focus on the experiences of argentina chile and mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises regardless of bank fundamentals and investors responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises

windfall profits in the power sector during phase iii of the eu ets interplay and effects of renewables and carbon prices abstract since power utilities were originally grandfathered into the eu ets by way of a free allocation of carbon emission allowances eua the issue of windfall profits accruing to producers with carbon intensive generation portfolios has been the subject of critical analysis one of the chief aims of the switch to a predominantly auction based allocation system at the onset of phase iii of the eu ets was to negate the incidence of windfall profits the following analysis examines the merits of this policy aim drawing on economic theory of power markets a linear optimisation model covering the electricity market of the eu member states is deployed to investigate this question scenarios reflecting developments over a medium term horizon 10 years are developed with which carbon prices are endogenously determined their effects on the contribution margins of producers in the member states are subsequently evaluated the overall findings indicate that the incidence of windfall profits in the power sector remains prevalent in the overwhelming majority of eu countries the analysis suggests that the carbon intensiveness of the respective generation fleet is not the deciding factor as to whether producers earn windfall profits but rather the fundamental generation structure of the power plant fleet the results raise questions about the capacity of the current eu ets regime to provide the desired decarbonising effect on power producers generation portfolios in european power markets

the effects of oil price shocks on the iranian economy abstract the iranian economy is highly vulnerable to oil price fluctuations this paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between oil price shocks and major macroeconomic variables in iran by applying a var approach the study points out the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks for instance positive as well as negative oil price shocks significantly increase inflation we find a strong positive relationship between positive oil price changes and industrial output growth unexpectedly we can only identify a marginal impact of oil price fluctuations on real government expenditures furthermore we observe the dutch disease syndrome through significant real effective exchange rate appreciation

should bank runs be prevented abstract this paper extends diamond and dybvig s model j political economy 91 1983 401 to a framework in which bank assets are risky there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high in this environment both information induced and pure panic runs will occur however banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately it is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior

on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances to meet its commitment under the kyoto protocol the eu plans to implement an emissions trading system whith grandfathering of allowances besides having distributional impacts the choice of the grandfathering scheme may affect efficiency if firms anticipate how future allocations depend on upcoming decisions in this paper we determine central design rules for optimal grandfathering within a simple two period model we find that for small open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous first best second period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm specific decisions in the first period second best schemes correspond to a ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both previous emissions and output however ofr closed emissions trading systems i e endogeneous allowance prices firstand second best rules coincide and must not depend on previous output levels they consist of an assignment proportional to the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm specific decisions in either of the two periods

windfall profits under pollution permits and output based allocation this paper analyzes the implementation of pollution permits it focuses on the distributional impacts linked with the stringency of output based allocation when two sectors are covered by the market for permits and the total cap is held constant a new type of profit increase in sectors that are not exposed to international competition when energy intensive trade exposed eite sectors are granted output based allocations is demonstrated theoretically the paper also illustrates a profit increase in the electricity sector in a possible fourth phase of the european union emission trading scheme in which output based allocation will be granted to eite sectors compared with the case in which all permits are auctioned

bank runs in emerging market economies evidence from turkey s special finance houses recent banking crises in emerging market countries have renewed debates about deposit insurance because insurance erodes banks incentives to manage risks prudently some argue that its elimination would improve bank stability yet eliminating insurance could be de stabilizing if it recreates risks of self fulfilling runs this paper examines dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of runs on turkey s special finance houses an uninsured sub sector of islamic banks detailed data on withdrawals are analyzed in a vector autoregressive framework that enables us to distinguish between informational and self fulfilling elements of runs we found that both types of dynamics were at work during the runs suggesting a role for deposit insurance judiciously used in ruling out expectational problems that fuel tendencies to run

an econometric study on china s economy energy and environment to the year 2030 abstract an integrated econometric model consisting of macroeconomic sub model energy sub model and environment sub model was developed and used to perform a long term simulation study for china in the coming 30 years the potential of gdp growth will be around 7 annually and the continuation of rapid economic growth could result in insurmountable difficulties for energy security air protection and co2 emission reductions for the sustainable development more comprehensive measures should be adopted including improvements in energy efficiency more rapid energy switching from coal to natural gas and renewable energy sources imposing carbon tax development of clean coal technology establishment of strategic petroleum stockpiling enforcement of air protection etc

an empirical analysis of energy demand in namibia abstract using a unique database of end user local energy data and the recently developed autoregressive distributed lag ardl bounds testing approach to cointegration we estimate the long run elasticities of the namibian energy demand function at both aggregated level and by type of energy electricity petrol and diesel for the period 1980 2002 our main results show that energy consumption responds positively to changes in gdp and negatively to changes in energy price and air temperature the differences in price elasticities across fuels uncovered by this study have significant implications for energy taxation by namibian policy makers we do not find any significant cross price elasticities between different fuel types

when to pollute when to abate intertemporal permit use in the los angeles nox market we study intertemporal trading of nitrogen oxides permits in southern california s reclaim program we model reclaim s distinct intertemporal features two overlapping permit cycles and two overlapping compliance cycles in the model competitive equilibrium is cost effective and firms have an incentive to delay abatement from 1994 to 2006 reclaim facilities traded intertemporally by using permits of the opposite cycle we test two theoretical propositions delayed abatement and trading across cycles with a difference in differences estimator and show weak though inconclusive support of the theory the theoretical and empirical results are relevant to cap and trade programs with potential for overlapping permit cycles jel q58

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

assessing the implementation of the market stability reserve abstract in october 2015 the european parliament has established a market stability reserve msr in the phase 4 of the eu ets as part of the 2030 framework for climate policies in this paper we model the eu ets in presence of the market stability reserve msr as it is defined by that decision and investigate the impact that such a measure has in terms of permits price output production and banking strategies to do so we build an inter temporal model in which polluting firms competing in an homogeneous good market are price takers in a permits market and face an uncertain demand our main finding is that the msr succeeds in increasing the permits price correcting an excess supply and conversely decreasing it in case of excess demand however when the output demand is stochastic the msr may alter the arbitrage conditions that determine permits prices in some cases which depend on the extend of the demand variation unintended effects on the price pattern appear this in turns may adversely affect welfare

atheoretical macroeconometrics a critique abstract the spurious nature of the restrictions used to identify many macroeconometric models has led some researchers to advocate a style of econometric inquiry that is less dependent on prior theoretical restrictions of the sort that were central to the approach of the cowles commission this development which we call atheoretical macroeconometrics is summarized and evaluated in the current paper it is contrasted with an updated version of the cowles commission approach we conclude that while some of the exercises of atheoretical macroeconometrics are valid those that have attracted the most attention and appear the most innovative exogeneity testing impulse response analysis and policy analysis using estimated vector autoregressions are based on incorrect analysis

irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties tradable emission permits and emissions charges abstract a major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge however under efficient permit trading the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies we develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits we compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges after controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly we find that firms investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties but more so under emissions charges than under permits therefore tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms investment incentive under uncertainty

does deposit insurance increase banking system stability an empirical investigation based on evidence of 61 countries in 1980 97 the authors find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector

islamic economics and the islamic subeconomy although islamic economics was developed to serve cultural and political ends efforts have been made to put its ideals into practice there now exist islamic banks which claim to offer an interest free alternative to conventional banking and government run islamic redistribution systems which were established to reduce inequalities these institutions have not revolutionized the economic lives of muslims yet along with a wide variety of enterprises that have emerged outside the purview of islamic economics they have formed vibrant islamic subeconomies in numerous metropolises these subeconomies are expanding because they foster interpersonal trust and offer opportunities for guilt relief

islamic economics the emergence of a new paradigm the authors illustrate the potential impact of the islamic doctrine on western economic relationships by focusing on the prohibition of interest riba in islamic economics they show that the alternate method of financier remuneration i e mudarabah profit and loss sharing will under certain conditions enhance capital investment on account of its ability to act as an efficient revelation device by applying ideas developed in the western contract literature the authors show that a mudarabah contract between the manager of a project and a syndicate of investors may permit a more efficient revelation of any informational asymmetries between the two copyright 1994 by royal economic society

multiple bubbles in the european union emission trading scheme abstract the european union emission trading scheme eu ets is the first large scale co 2 emission trading system in the world carbon allowances are financial assets potentially vulnerable to the behavior of traders and investors in fact the carbon price has been quite volatile since the inception of the market and it has recently hit very low values however to date no work exists to evaluate whether volatility and price spikes are due to episodes of speculation and price bubbles our paper fills this gap we use the recent approaches developed by phillips and yu 2010 phillips et al 2011 and phillips et al 2015a 2015b who propose a recursive right sided unit root approaches to detect and date stamp mildly explosive behaviors and carbon market exuberance we complement this methodology by using the wild bootstrap procedure by goncalves and kilian 2004 to control for the heteroschedasticity of carbon price data analyzing the eu ets front month contract price from 2005 to 2014 we find different episodes of price bubbles these episodes are not explained by similar behavior of the fundamentals but seem related to energy and environmental policy announcements our results can provide insightful policy implications in the context of the actual carbon market reform as well as the implementation of stricter financial regulations rules to co 2 trading

a note on market power in an emission permits market with banking in this paper we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods in particular we study the market equilibrium for a large potentially dominant firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations we characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm s stock holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation

using market information in prudential bank supervision a review of the u s empirical evidence in principle market and government supervision provide alternative devices for controlling governing any type of corporation most national governments have instituted nonmarket regulatory mechanisms for banking firms on the grounds that market based mechanisms do not adequately discipline banks but what evidence supports this assessment why must governments assure bank solvency but not the solvency of other firms government oversight naturally displaces private efforts to evaluate and control financial firms moreover if the banking business changes over time as it assuredly has in the past decade or two the best combination of government and private supervision may change concurrently this paper reviews and evaluates the growing empirical literature on private investors abilities to assess the financial condition of banking firms the evidence supports the proposition that market investors and analysts could reasonably provide a greater proportion of corporate governance services for large traded u s financial firms

allowance price drivers in the first phase of the eu ets abstract in the first phase of the eu emissions trading scheme eu ets the price per ton of co 2 initially rose to over 30 the price then collapsed to essentially zero by mid 2007 by deriving a structural model of the allowance price under the assumption of efficient markets i examine the extent to which this variation in price can be explained by marginal abatement costs i then gradually relax the model by allowing for delayed adjustment of price to fundamentals as well as by introducing lagged lhs variables the pattern of results suggests that while prices were not initially driven by marginal abatement costs this inefficiency was largely corrected after the accounting of 2005 emissions in april 2006

islamic banks and investment financing islamic law prohibits charging interest we study financial instruments used by islamic banks and find that most are not based on profit and loss sharing equity but instead are very debt like in nature we see some bias against providing financing for agriculture and industry long term financing is rarely offered to entrepreneurs our model shows that debt like instruments are a rational response by islamic banks to their contracting environments as agency problems become more severe debt becomes the dominant instrument of finance we give conditions under which banning debt increases social welfare as well as conditions under which banning debt decreases social welfare

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

china on the move oil price explosion abstract rapid expansion of highway and jet traffic in china has created a surge of demand for oil products putting pressure on world energy markets and petroleum product prices this paper examines trends in freight and passenger traffic to assess how growth in china s transport demand relates to growth in china s economy as well as the energy intensity of transport based on assumptions about demand elasticity and energy intensity a range of scenarios is developed for china s oil demand through 2020 incremental oil demand from china s transport sector is then compared with world oil demand projections to assess the likely impact on world oil prices the finding is that new demand from china s transport sector would likely raise world oil prices in 2020 by 1 3 in reference scenarios or by 3 10 if oil supply investment is constrained

oil revenue shocks and government spending behavior in iran abstract oil revenues play an important role in the political economy of iran on average 60 of the iranian government revenues and 90 of export revenues originate from oil and gas resources current international sanctions on iran have mainly targeted the oil production capacity of iran and its exports to the global markets in this study we analyze the dynamic effects of oil shocks on different categories of the iranian government expenditures from 1959 to 2007 using impulse response functions irf and variance decomposition analysis vdc techniques the main results show that iran s military and security expenditures significantly respond to a shock in oil revenues or oil prices while social spending components do not show significant reactions to such shocks

eu emission allowances and the stock market evidence from the electricity industry this paper constitutes to our best knowledge the first econometric analysis on stock market effects of the eu emission trading scheme eu ets our results suggest that eu emission allowance eua price developments matter to the stock performance of electricity firms eua price changes and stock returns of the most important european electricity corporations are shown to be positively related this effect does not work asymmetrically so that stock markets do not seem to react differently to eua appreciations in comparison to depreciations the carbon market effect is shown to be both time and country specific it is particularly strong for the period of eua market shock in early 2006 and differs with respect to the countries where the electricity corporations analysed are headquartered stock market reactions to eua volatility could not be shown

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

energy consumption in china past trends and future directions abstract in 2003 china s energy consumption amounted to 1678 million tonnes coal equivalent mtce making china the world s second largest consumer behind only the united states china is now also one of the largest oil importers in the world with an economy that is expected to maintain a rate of growth of 7 8 for decades china s role in the world energy market becomes increasingly influential this makes it important to predict china s future demand for energy the objective of this paper is to apply the bayesian vector autoregressive methodology to forecast china s energy consumption and to discuss potential implications the results of this paper suggest that total energy consumption should increase to 2173 mtce in 2010 an annual growth rate of 3 8 which is slightly slower than the average rate in the past decade the slower growth reflects expected slower economic growth and a decline in energy consumption due to structural changes in the chinese economy

do transaction costs influence firm trading behaviour in the european emissions trading system this study is one of the first to empirically investigate firm trading behaviour and the importance of permit trading transaction costs such as information costs and search costs in the first phase of the european union s emissions trading system eu ets the signs and significance of our constructed transaction costs proxy variables indicate for a presence of these costs in the initial years of the eu ets in particular this paper shows that ets firms with the smaller number of installations and with less trading experience were less likely to participate in the european emissions trading market and traded the lower quantities of permits furthermore these firms chose to trade permits indirectly via third parties this study also supports the concerns that transaction costs could be excessive for smaller participants and firms operating in the new eu member states

market discipline by thrift depositors this paper tests for the presence of depositor discipline by examining the effect of depository institutions risk on the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits the study analyzes a large panel of thrifts that includes detailed information on interest rate schedules this information allows the authors to develop a time consistent risk profile for thrifts their empirical findings support the presence of market discipline riskier banks are found to pay higher interest rates but attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits the authors also find that qualitative results are similar for fully insured deposits although statistical significance is substantially lower

shocks effects of macroeconomic variables on natural gas consumption in nigeria structural var with sign restrictions abstract this paper has examined the transmission of shocks from macroeconomic variables namely money supply inflation exchange rate and real gdp onto natural gas consumption using structural var svar model with sign restrictions the results revealed that both in the short run and long run natural gas consumption responds significantly to the shocks emanating from money supply and real gdp while its response to inflation shock is significant only in the short run but exchange rate shock is not significant however money supply has contributed greater proportion of the shocks followed by the real gdp inflation and exchange rate in the ordering of the variance decomposition the paper recommends that nigerian authorities adjust the monetary policy tools towards regulating the money supply and checking the inflation rate to ensure increased demand for natural gas and sustained economic growth on the response of natural gas consumption to the shock in the exchange rate since the shock is positive though insignificant it implies that depreciation of the exchange rate can discourage the demand for foreign exchange imports and boost the local production which would reciprocally lead to more natural gas consumption and improved growth in the country

the gains from agricultural groundwater trade and the potential for market power theory and application this article models and estimates the efficiency gains from using market based instruments relative to command and control to manage groundwater a theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive groundwater market is developed to show how the magnitude and distribution of the gains from trade change as market structure varies market structure is a key consideration because future groundwater markets will likely feature geographic limitations to trade large agricultural players and a legal environment that is conducive to forming cartel like coalitions application of the model to a groundwater dependent agricultural region in southern california shows the existence of large gains from trade despite the potential for market power with benefits up to 36 greater than that under command and control distributional impacts however can be sizable even for small degrees of market power simulations that vary market conditions show that results likely generalize to other groundwater basins

panic bank runs we provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems with fundamentals and coordination failures among depositors the two main culprits identified in the literature depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so even when theoretically they should not our findings suggest that panic also manifests itself in the beliefs of depositors who overestimate the probability that a bank run is underway loss aversion has a predictive power on panic behavior while risk or ambiguity aversion do not

market power in laboratory emission permit markets many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive when markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics however shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches this paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy indicating that policy makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances

bank failure contagion in historical perspective abstract bank failures are contagious due to the lack of bank specific information depositors who lack financial information on individual banks make withdrawal decisions based on the condition of the banking system as a whole a high ratio of bank failures then signals an adverse condition within the banking sector and triggers systemwide bank runs this paper looks at bank panics in u s history and shows the importance of solvency information specific to individual banks the major empirical finding is that the government or banks stopped bank panics mainly by providing financial information on banks

on the effects of deposit insurance and observability on bank runs an experimental study we study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment we consider three depositors in the line of a bank who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited we have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which reflect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run we find that different levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors actions affect the likelihood of bank runs when decisions are not observable higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs when decisions are observable this need not to be the case these results suggest that i observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance and ii the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability

the measurement of monopoly power in dynamic markets importance in the design and application of antitrust policy much of the recent literature has focused on the structural and behavioral determinants of monopoly and monopsony power including the characteristics of costs and demand and the ways in which firms in the market interact with each other there has been less concern however with the development of a measure of monopoly or monopsony power instead the lerner index first introduced in 1934 has for years been accepted as the standard measure of monopoly power and is often used as a summary statistic in antitrust applications 1 the lerner index is just the margin between price and marginal cost l p mc p in a static market d i1 where rfis the elasticity of demand facing the firm so that the firm s elasticity of demand completely determines its monopoly power 2 however this need not be the case in a

contagion and bank failures during the great depression the june 1932 chicago banking panic the authors examine the social costs of asymmetric information induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance their case study is the chicago bank panic of june 1932 the authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks copyright 1997 by american economic association

market discipline and deposit insurance cross country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking internationally deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage funding and management this reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured to inform this debate we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline

pricing emission permits in the absence of abatement abstract if emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to control them through abatement the cap in a permit market may be exceeded or not be reached i derive a binary options pricing formula that expresses the permit price as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the probability of an exceeded cap under the assumption of no abatement i apply my model to the eu ets where the rapid introduction of the market made it difficult for firms to adjust their production technology in time for the first phase the model fits the data well implying that the permit price may have been driven by firms hedging against stochastic emissions

dynamic behavior of co2 spot prices co2 emission allowances are traded nowadays over the counter otc and on exchanges across the european union eu it thus becomes increasingly important for traders of these emission certificates to have a valid co2 spot price model to value potential derivatives in addition co2 emitting companies require an adequate co2 spot price model in order to better assess their production costs and support emissions related investment decisions however sufficient price history is still lacking for the european union emission trading scheme eu ets we therefore present a tractable stochastic equilibrium model reflecting stylized features of the eu ets and analyze the resulting co2 spot price dynamics our main findings are that co2 prices do not have to follow any seasonal patterns discounted prices should possess the martingale property and an adequate co2 price process should exhibit a time and price dependent volatility structure a brief empirical examination regarding market efficiency complements our analysis