efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

price discovery and learning during the preopening period in the paris bourse before the opening of the paris bourse traders place orders and indicative prices are set this offers a laboratory to study empirically the t tonnement process through which markets discover equilibrium prices since preopening orders can be revised or canceled before the opening indicative prices could be noise we test this against the hypothesis that preopening prices reflect learning early in the preopening the noise hypothesis is not rejected as the opening gets closer the informational content and efficiency of prices increase and the learning hypothesis is not rejected we also propose a gmm based estimate of the speed of learning

the effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k double auctions abstract this paper describes how introducing statistical dependency among trader values changes the equilibrium bidding strategies in bilateral k double auctions and uses the special case of affiliation to illustrate the range of equilibrium responses to a change in the value distribution consistent with standard intuition a change from independent to strictly affiliated valuations can result in high value buyers and low value sellers bidding closer to their actual values while low value buyers and high value sellers distort their bids farther from their true values however there also exist equilibria for which either type of trader responds to a change in the distribution of values in the opposite direction whether a given trader bids more aggressively or less aggressively can also be non monotonic with respect to the trader s value

optimal liquidity management and bail out policy in the banking industry abstract we characterize the profit maximizing reserves of a commercial bank and the generated probability of a liquidity crisis as a function of the penalty imposed by the central bank the probability of depositors liquidity needs and the return on outside investment opportunities we demonstrate that banks do not fully internalize the social cost associated with the bail out policy if the liquidity needs of individuals are correlated and that competitive interbank markets will induce banks to raise their reserves under reasonable conditions the marginal benefits from an interbank market decrease as the correlation between the liquidity shocks of banks increases

emotional bidders an analytical and experimental examination of consumers behavior in a priceline like reverse auction e commerce has proved to be fertile ground for new business models which may be patented for up to 20 years and have potentially far reaching impact on the e commerce landscape one such electronic market is the reverse auction model popularized by priceline com there is still uncertainty surrounding the survival of such new electronic markets currently available on the internet understanding user behavior is necessary for better assessment of these sites survival this paper adds to economic analysis a formal representation of the emotions evoked by the auction process specifically the excitement of winning if a bid is accepted and the frustration of losing if it is not we generate and empirically test a number of insights related to 1 the impact of expected excitement at winning and frustration at losing on bids across consumers and biddings scenarios and 2 the dynamic nature of the bidding behavior that is how winning and losing in previous bids influence their future bidding behavior

how trading institutions affect financial market performance some laboratory evidence i introduction trading institutions vary considerably across contemporary financial markets 1 but most can be classified into one of two basic types the continuous double auction da allows traders to submit public offers to buy or to sell and to accept other traders offers at any moment in time the double auction institution offers immediacy but non uniform transaction prices the other basic trading institution the clearinghouse ch gathers offers and clears them at a unified price at a pre specified time it sacrifices immediacy for uniform transaction prices 2 the two types of institutions have co existed and evolved for centuries but now are emerging in new electronic versions market participants and policy makers would like to know which institution or variant or combination is most efficient but theoretical and empirical work to date provides little guidance this paper reports on a series of laboratory asset markets experiments designed to compare variants of the double auction and clearinghouse trading institutions the markets are small usually with eight or nine traders but the traders are profit motivated and experienced with the trading institutions the traded asset has uncertain market value and traders receive useful but inconclusive private information they can only learn the asset s true value during the course of trade laboratory markets offer several advantages for empirical study of financial market institutions first private information is observable even controllable in the laboratory and therefore the investigator can directly measure market efficiency 3 second the complexity of the environment can be varied systematically in the laboratory and its effects on market performance can be separated from the effects of the market institution and other forces finally the market institution itself is controllable in the laboratory so it is possible to make valid causal inferences on how the market institution shapes market performance i begin with a survey of relevant literature and other preliminaries in the rest of this section section ii outlines the laboratory procedures the creation of trading environments of varying complexity the electronic implementation of the clearinghouse and double auction trading institutions the computation of theoretical benchmark prices and allocations and the measurement of market performance section iii collects the results following an illustrative account of a double auction trading period and a clearinghouse trading period i use descriptive statistics to summarize market performance in each of the thirty nine experiments the main conclusions are based on statistical comparisons of market performance across alternative market institutions the clearinghouse institution does surprisingly well it delivers greater market depth than the double auction discovers prices at least as efficiently and produces final allocations almost as efficient as the double auction the main institutional variants examined in this paper concern the amount of information made public regarding order placement orderflow the data suggest that public display of the orderflow enhances double auction efficiency but may impair clearinghouse efficiency a study of trading volume shows higher volume in the double auction in both institutions volume increases when important private news arrives and when the trading period is about to end the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the results a companion paper friedman 1991 considers the effects of awarding various privileges to some but not all traders copeland and friedman 1987 1991 provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets instructions for the current experiments are available on request the need for empirical work a skeptic might argue that empirical work is unnecessary the mere fact that the double auction and clearinghouse institutions both persist in major financial markets implies that both are highly efficient because a more efficient institution would displace less efficient institutions

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

qualitative uncertainty in a market with bilateral trading bargaining between a single seller and a succession of potential buyers of an indivisible object is studied in this paper the seller bargains with one buyer at a time and switching buyers is costly the seller does not know the buyers reservation prices and buyers cannot observe the quality of the object if the costs of switching buyers are high there exists a signalling equilibrium in which the seller s price offer reveals the quality of the object if the costs of switching are low adverse selection occurs and the high quality seller drops out of the market

partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations in a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed bid double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently this well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations however if common values components are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction therefore a simple extention of the rules of double auctions is suggested that ensures participation even though these modified double auctions are not incentive efficient they still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the specifications of the model

selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry an asymptotic analysis we study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction like setting for venture capital vc funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the vc can only finance the best entrepreneurs with asymmetric information vcs can only assess entrepreneurs by the progress of development which in equilibrium reveals the quality of the new technology using an asymptotic analysis we prove that in attractive industries having a large number of entrepreneurs competing for vc funding could lead to underinvestment in technology by entrepreneurs as the effort exerted by losing entrepreneurs is wasted the study then proceeds to characterize the conditions under which a greater number of competing entrepreneurs is better the model also demonstrates that vcs could possibly increase their payoff by concentrating on a single industry in addition the study also provides some insights on the effects of multiple investments by vcs and the effects of competition among vcs on the same investments

side choice and bargaining under asymmetric information choose their optimal trading sides before they begin bargaining in a full participation nash equilibrium the probability of any trader reaching an agreement at the bargaining stage will be higher than that obtained in bargaining models with exogenously fixed sides however owing to the additional uncertainty of finding a trading partner the probability of successful trading will be reduced the model also shows that some high low valuation agents will always be buyers sellers even if the pricing rule is fully biased against them furthermore in a partial participation equilibrium when the participation cost for a particular side increases the number of participants decreases not only in that particular side but also in the entire market

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

final offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties abstract final offer arbitration foa is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers proposed by two disputing parties we build an equilibrium model of foa with players averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues the role of foa in incentivizing negotiated settlements the convergence of final offers and the normative effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion we show that increase in arbitral uncertainty increases the likelihood of negotiated agreements and make the final offers converge to each other risk aversion is not necessary for convergence of offers precision and mean of arbitral uncertainty matter differently and can be controlled separately moreover as also argued by the industry practitioners carefully selected level of diversity of opinion in the arbitrator roster increases the welfare of negotiating parties

trading complex assets we perform an experimental study of complexity to assess its eect on trading behavior price volatility liquidity and trade eciency subjects were asked to deduce the value of a particular asset from information they were given about the composition and price of several portfolios following that subjects traded with each other anonymously in a well dened simple bargaining process portfolio composition ranged from requiring simple analysis to more complicated computation in order to deduce the value of the asset complexity altered subjects bidding strategies decreased liquidity increased price volatility and decreased trade eciency however in follow up experiments we show that uncertainty over private values does not lead to the same changes in trading behavior therefore while complexity induces estimation errors and higher uncertainty this is not what drives our results

policy analysis for an amicable efficient and sustainable inter country fresh water resource allocation abstract in the area of fresh surface water resources which are gradually becoming more scarce sustainable utilization implies the need for policies aiming to provide adequate water supplies for everyone in both national and international contexts many international river basins are shared without any formal intergovernmental agreement while bilateral agreements guaranteeing amicable cooperation amount to a handful this paper presents a simple economic ecologic model within which it examines input output controls social input prices bilateral water trade a water market for all water users and a fixed water allocation agreement as possible water policies for cross border river water sharing all of these policies can satisfy the conditions for maximum joint economic benefits while simultaneously working towards maintaining the functional integrity of river ecosystems in theory therefore these policies are of equal use there are however several costs associated with policy administration which are hidden and must explicitly be taken into account the analysis indicates that bilateral water trade can prove a workable efficient and sustainable policy for cross border water sharing

bad and good news about the sealed bid mechanism some experimental results this paper surveys a set of experiments conducted by roy radner and myself 1989 and peter linhart radner and myself 1989a b all of which were conducted to investigate the properties of the sealed bid mechanism a mechanism used to structure bargaining under situations of incomplete information what we find is both bad news and good news for the mechanism the bad news is that the behavior of subjects seems quite sensitive to the parameters of the prior distribution of types used and the number of rounds over which the experiment is run as such prior distributions become more skewed in a sense to be defined below and the number of rounds in the experiment are increased to 75 bidder behavior becomes less linear such movements have a regular pattern however and this phenomenon is remarkably consistent the good news is that such behavioral shifts do not seem to interfere with the efficiency of the mechanism this is of course important for the acceptance of the mechanism in the real world since if efficiency were to change dramatically as we change the parameters of the environment adoption would have to proceed on a case by case basis the fact that our results imply robustness of efficiencies indicates that at least on a practical level the sealed bid mechanism may be a viable way to structure bargaining in many large scale economic organizations i the sealed bid mechanism

bargaining over perfect complements owned separately with experimental test this paper considers the situation in which two perfect complements belong to different owners we calculate the bayesian nash equilibrium in the mechanism of k 1 price bargaining with private value and did experiment to test the theory

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

vote trading with and without party leaders two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority individuals have different privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money we study theoretically and experimentally the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market the theory has strong predictions in both cases trading falls short of full efficiency but for opposite reasons with group leaders the minority wins too rarely with market trades the minority wins too often as a result with group leaders vote trading improves over no trade with market trades vote trading can be welfare reducing the theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data

investment incentives in bilateral trading abstract we characterize the surplus maximizing trading mechanism under two sided incomplete information and interim individual rationality when one party can make a value enhancing specific investment this mechanism exhibits a trade off between providing investment incentives and inducing voluntary participation we analyze how the trading area of the optimal mechanism is further distorted in order to provide investment incentives applications of our main results and the underlying geometric analysis to institutional design issues are also provided

from bottom of the barrel to cream of the crop sequential screening with positive selection in a number of interesting environments dynamic screening involves positive selection in contrast with coasian dynamics only the most motivated remain over time the paper provides conditions under which the principal s commitment optimum is time consistent and uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks it also identifies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

the information advantage in two person bargaining with incomplete information abstract the sealed bid k double auction is a mechanism used to structure bilateral bargaining under two sided incomplete information in the process of testing whether or not the observed bid and ask functions are in agreement with the bayesian linear equilibrium solution under asymmetric information conditions we find a strong information disparity effect the trader favored by the information disparity whether buyer or seller receives a significantly larger share of the realized gains from trade than that predicted by the theory a reinforcement based learning model is formulated and tested it accounts successfully for most of the variability in the round to round individual decisions

equilibrium in strategic interaction the contributions of john c harsanyi john f nash and reinhard selten during the past 15 years or so a game theoretic revolution of economics has taken place microeconomic theory has been rewritten in the language of a game theory see kreps 1 990b i publications in industrial organization differ substantially from work published in this area two decades ago in macroeconomics issues of time consistency credibility and reputation have been analyzed by means of game theoretic tools trade theory has been cast in game theoretic terms in financial economics problems of market micro structure are analyzed by means of non cooperative games fundamental concepts and techniques developed by this year s nobel laureates have enabled this revolution to take place as kreps writes

the reeded edge and the phillips curve money neutrality common knowledge and subjective beliefs abstract i present a simple two person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money however the value of a unit of money is uncertain i show 1 a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge 2 if seller and buyer have identical beliefs making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade 3 if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs then monetary revaluations have no net effect 4 when the seller knows the value of money but the buyer does not the expected utilities of both seller and buyer are proportional to 1 1 2 where is the standard deviation of the value of money expressed as a fraction of the mean and 5 when beliefs are subjective monetary policy can improve total gains from trade as in friedman s explanation of the phillips curve and an optimal level of inflation can be determined journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e52

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

perfect equilibria in budget constrained sequential auctions an experimental study this article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the nash equilibrium concept we find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices

payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk abstract this paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of yaari s econometrica 55 1987 95 dual theory of choice under risk it is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions

optimal robust bilateral trade risk neutrality a risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item we prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non wasteful randomized posted prices

reprint of information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

durable goods monopoly with incomplete information this article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist s marginal cost is private information we show that the coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem in any equilibrium in which the lowest cost seller s initial offer approaches her marginal cost the aggregate probability of trade must vanish however we also construct non coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model these stationary equilibria are comparatively efficient the results are equally applicable to the mathematically equivalent problem of sequential bargaining with two sided incomplete information where one party makes all the offers what are the consequences of monopoly in a market for a durable good present day understanding of this question divides into two strands of thought first the monopolist may effectively lack any ability to credibly precommit on her future output under this scenario the price will drop almost instantaneously to marginal cost apparently yielding the efficient outcome normally associated with perfect competition 1 second the monopolist may possess an explicit e g leasing the good rather than selling2 or implicit e g the maintenance of reputation3 device enabling her to adhere to an output restriction under such circumstances price will be maintained at a non competitively high level suggesting an outcome fraught with all the inefficiency of classical monopoly the conclusions of the first paragraph rest on analysis of a standard model in which the monopolist s payoff function is taken to be common knowledge a single firm with known constant marginal cost sells an infinitely durable good to consumers with a known distribution of valuations for the good 4 the firm has the ability to revise its posted price

perfect competition and the creativity of the market from the perspective of the walrasian general equilibrium model entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior many would say no but we argue the contrary indeed we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to rather than a detour from such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives the trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist seeking out profit potentials wherever he can

ex ante efficient ex post individually rational trade abstract consider a bilateral trade model with two sided incomplete information for a general set of independent beliefs an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient interim individually rational mechanism is constructed thus imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency

selling procedures with private information and common values the seller posted price procedure is probably the most common method for making transactions in modern economies we analyze the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common value elements in a model of two sided private information we characterize the fully revealing perfect equilibrium offer strategy of the seller we also characterize equilibrium behavior under two other pricing procedures a sealed bid procedure and a direct revelation mechanism finally we examine the efficiency of these procedures and show that as the degree of common values increases fewer mutually beneficial agreements are attained

predation mergers and incomplete information this article examines the strategic pricing of duopolists in anticipation of a takeover of one by the other in equilibrium the acquiring firm may expand its output to signal that it is a low cost rival and thereby improve the takeover terms if the merged firm willface potential entry a premerger expansion of output may be necessary to deter entry and to make the merger profitable in that case the acquiringjirm s output expansion increases industry concentration by facilitating the takeover and by deterring entry this establishes the rationality of predatory output expansions even when a merger or a takeover is possible and indeed anticipated a voluminous literature is devoted to exploring the role of pricing in altering industry structure to achieve monopoly power that literature discusses both price cutting to drive existing rivals from the industry predatory pricing and setting low prices to deter potential entrants limit pricing the former has received the lion s share of the attention of antitrust commentators and enforcers but the rationality of predatory pricing has been seriously questioned the major criticism has two parts i takeovers are a superior means of achieving monopoly power and where legal should therefore be used instead of price cutting and ii if a takeover is anticipated premerger price cutting merely dissipates some of the value of the merging parties and would thus be irrational the first argument was originally advanced by mcgee 1958 and later by telser 1965 and bork 1978 the essential idea is that since predation is costly firms should realize that a more profitable arrangement in the form of a merger exists and ought to be negotiated the second argument is a natural extension of the first in response to this criticism yamey 1972 provides two arguments first the aggressor knows that he may face other rivals in the future entrants into this or other markets those potential rivals may draw inferences from his current behavior about the response they will face if they enter in that case the aggressor may wish to develop a reputation for aggressive behavior second even if a takeover is anticipated the terms of the takeover may be affected by the pretakeover pricing

existence and convergence of equilibria in the buyer s bid double auction this paper concerns a bayesian game model of the buyer s bid double auction which is a procedure for organizing trade that selects a market clearing price from a list of offers bids strategic misrepresentation by traders may make the outcome of trade inefficient satterthwaite and williams 1989 showed that misrepresentation and inefficiency quickly converge to zero as the number of traders on each side of the market increases this is extended here to cases in which the number of buyers may differ from the number of sellers the existence of equilibria in a generic instance of the model is also proven this paper concerns a market in which each trader privately knows his own preferences such a trader may have an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in order to influence the market price in his favour a buyer for instance may bid less than his true evaluation of the good for sale in an attempt to drive the price down similarly a seller may ask for more than he is willing to accept with behaviour of this kind a seller s offer could exceed a buyer s bid even though a mutually profitable trade between them exists in the market as a whole a price may be determined at which all potential gains from trade are not achieved strategic misrepresentation may therefore cause inefficiency our confidence in markets rests upon the belief that this inefficiency is insignificant when there are a large number of small traders a small trader in a large market is unlikely to have much influence on the market price as a consequence he has little incentive to misrepresent and the market is therefore almost fully efficient this argument however is vague about a very important point when is a trader relatively small and how many traders constitute a large market the meaning of small and large in this context is critical to understanding when this intuitive argument applies this argument is investigated here by thoroughly analyzing a particular model of trade a market is considered in which money may be exchanged for indivisible units of a good for n m 1 there are n sellers each of whom has a unit to sell and m buyers each of whom wishes to buy a unit each trader is therefore small in that he trades at most one unit we shall consider arbitrary values of n and m however trade is organized with the following rules each seller submits an offer while each buyer submits a bid the n m offers bids are ordered in a list sl s2 sn m any

communication in bargaining over decision rights abstract this paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self interested agent we introduce two different bargaining mechanisms tacit and explicit bargaining in tacit bargaining an uninformed principal makes a take it or leave it price offer to the agent who then decides whether to accept or reject the offer in the equilibrium of the game the principal inefficiently screens out some agent types so that the agent s private information cannot be fully utilized when the decision is made in explicit bargaining in which parties can communicate explicitly via cheap talk before tacit bargaining however an equilibrium with no such inefficient screening exists even when the conflict of interest is arbitrarily large we also follow a mechanism design approach showing that under certain conditions explicit bargaining is an optimal bargaining mechanism that maximizes the joint surplus of the parties

does commodity money eliminate the indeterminacy of equilibrium abstract previous studies have shown that a random matching model with divisible fiat money and without constraint on agents money inventories possesses a continuum of stationary single price equilibria wallace j econom theory 81 1998 223 conjectures that the indeterminacy can be eliminated by the use of commodity money instead i find that in a similar random matching model with dividend yielding commodity money a continuum of stationary single price equilibria exists when the utility of dividend is not too high this result casts doubt on the conventional belief that the indeterminacy of monetary equilibrium is be caused only by the nominal nature of money

technical note revenue management with bargaining static game theoretic models of bilateral bargaining assume that the seller knows his valuation for the item that is up for sale that is how the seller may determine this quantity is exogenous to these models in this paper we develop and analyze a stylized markov decision process that endogenizes the seller s computation of his marginal inventory valuation in an infinite horizon revenue management setting when each sale occurs according to a given bilateral bargaining mechanism we use this model to compare both analytically and numerically the seller s performance under four basic bilateral bargaining mechanisms with a tractable information structure these comparisons provide insights into the seller s performance under the following trading arrangements buyer and seller posted pricing negotiated pricing and rule based pricing

a note on the seller s optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two sided incomplete information it is shown with an example that in bilateral trade problems with two sided incomplete information some seller types may obtain higher expected payos in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take it or leave it oer contrary to popular belief if one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the informed seller then the op timality of a take it or leave it oer for the seller is restored journal of economic literature classi cation numbers c72 c78 d82

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

make trade not war this paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade we show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial military conflicts reduce trade and leaders are rational when war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains however countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict we test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950 2000 period using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues including instrumental variables we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness for proximate countries we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict

introduction symposium on noncooperative bargaining this symposium includes 12 models of bargaining each of the following characteristics is shared by most of them 1 bargaining is noncooperative within a set of rules governing the process of negotiation the nash program 2 bargaining is bilateral 3 some or all of the traders are incompletely informed the authors explore the existence multiplicity and efficiency of equilibria and the plausibility of equilibria as descriptions of observed behavior in addition some authors discuss the effects of nonbinding preplay communication cheap talk the effects of increasing the number of players and alternatives to the nash equilibrium framework

cheap talk can matter in bargaining this paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation the intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model instead if good faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the probability of continued negotiation our cheap talk equilibrium features bargaining behavior that could not be equilibrium behavior in the absence of talk

efficiency and disagreement in repeated infinite horizon bargaining games m satterthwaite and s williams 1987 characterize regular equilibria of the sealed bid k double auction that in some cases are efficient the sealed bid k double auction specifies one period of simultaneous offers and requires agents to sometimes disagree at the end of the first period when gains from continued bargaining exist this paper constructs a theory of disagreement based on reputation in repeated bargaining games agents make the offers of a satterthwaite williams regular equilibrium in the first round of a negotiation then if no trade results the agents terminate the negotiation in spite of possible gains from the option of continued bargaining copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

the role of exclusive contracts in facilitating market transactions vertical contracts between a buyer and a seller often contain exclusivity provisions that restrict their ability to transact with third parties in the future in this paper we develop a matching model in which matched agents first decide whether or not to adopt exclusivity provisions and then bargain over the price of a good in the presence of private information we show that by making disagreement more costly exclusivity provisions reduce the risk of inefficient bargaining breakdowns and that agents find it optimal to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets for intermediate levels of market thickness all agents matched and unmatched would be better off if courts did not enforce the exclusivity provisions

foundation of competitive equilibrium with non transferable utility abstract this paper investigates the dynamic foundation of a competitive equilibrium studying a sequence of random matching models between ex ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers under two sided incomplete information with no entry where each agent is endowed with non transferable utility the economy is populated with two sets of infinitesimal agents buyers and sellers who have private information about their own valuations of the object in each period buyers and sellers in the pool are matched to draw randomly a pair of expected payoffs which will realize if the long term relationship is formed each player decides whether or not to agree to form a long term relationship conditioned on his private information if both parties agree then they leave the pool receiving the expected payoff in each period while the long term relationship continues the existing long term relationship is terminated either by will or by a random shock upon which both parties return to the respective pools of agents we quantify the amount of friction by the time span of each period we demonstrate that as the friction vanishes any sequence of stationary equilibrium outcomes in which trade occurs with a positive probability converges to the competitive equilibrium under a general two sided incomplete information about the private valuation of each agent

how corruptible are you bribery under uncertainty abstract we model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials we investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one s potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in bribery and consequently the equilibrium level of corruption in the society we assume that the cost of engaging in corruption is subject to strategic complementarities which may lead to multiple corruption equilibria we find that corruption is lowest when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other s corruptibility and have asymmetric bargaining powers our uncertainty result provides theoretical support in favor of anti corruption strategies such as staff rotation in public offices aimed at decreasing the social closeness of bribers and bribees our bargaining power result suggests that under uncertainty monopolistic public good provision has the same corruption reducing effect as competitive public good provision

a general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments we consider the class of bayesian environments with independent types and utility functions which are both quasi linear in a private good and linear in a one dimensional private value type parameter we call these independent linear environments for these environments we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints we also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization together with the appropriate incentive taxes we illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision

limited observability as a constraint in contract design limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information given this constraint contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail we consider the extent to which finite contracts can approximate the idealized complete contracts the objectives of the paper are i to identify properties of agents preferences that determine whether or not finiteness of contracts causes significant inefficiency ii to evaluate the performance of finite contracts against the ideal optimal contracts in principal agent and bilateral bargaining models

bargaining with endogenous information two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values this paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable three types of inefficiencies can arise if the information cost is in an intermediate range no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information if the information cost is low any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition if the agents face asymmetric information cost the akerlof s lemons problem arises as a self fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha