the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines the authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies the productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices which include incentive pay teams flexible job assignments employment security and training achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach which includes narrow job definitions strict work rules and hourly pay with close supervision their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices

the demand for and impact of learning hiv status this paper evaluates an experiment in which individuals in rural malawi were randomly assigned monetary incentives to learn their hiv results after being tested distance to the hiv results centers was also randomly assigned without any incentive 34 percent of the participants learned their hiv results however even the smallest incentive doubled that share using the randomly assigned incentives and distance from results centers as instruments for the knowledge of hiv status sexually active hiv positive individuals who learned their results are three times more likely to purchase condoms two months later than sexually active hiv positive individuals who did not learn their results however hiv positive individuals who learned their results purchase only two additional condoms than those who did not there is no significant effect of learning hiv negative status on the purchase of condoms

micro data heterogeneity and the evaluation of public policy nobel lecture this paper summarizes the contributions of microeconometrics to economic knowledge four main themes are developed 1 microeconometricians developed new tools to respond to econometric problems raised by the analysis of the new sources of micro data produced after the second world war 2 microeconometrics improved on aggregate time series methods by building models that linked economic models for individuals to data on individual behavior 3 an important empirical regularity detected by the field is the diversity and heterogeneity of behavior this heterogeneity has profound consequences for economic theory and for econometric practice 4 microeconometrics has contributed substantially to the scientific evaluation of public policy

the market for quacks a group of n quacks plays a price competition game facing a continuum of patients who recover with probability whether or not they acquire a quack s treatment if patients chose rationally the market would be inactive i assume however that patients choose according to a boundedly rational procedure which re ects anecdotal reasoning this element of bounded rationality has signi cant

firm and product life cycles and firm survival on average roughly 5 10 percent of the firms in a given market leave that market over the span of a single year at least so data for a broad range of industries in several economies tell us what is it other than random shocks that determines the probability of survival for a firm in a given market we start by decomposing the forces that affect survival into industry and firm attributes industry attributes we hypothesize encompass variables that exert their influence both over time and across markets the variables that operate over time are defined by the life cycle of the industry life cycles of the industry affect mainly the characteristics of demand and the rate and form of technical change variations across firms we hypothesize arise mainly from learning by doing darwinian survival of the fittest and the obsolescence of initial endowments these variables are linked to the life cycle of the firm how these industry and firm life cycles define patterns of survival is the story

explaining the attacker s advantage technological paradigms organizational dynamics and the value network abstract understanding when entrants might have an advantage over an industry s incumbent firms in developing and adopting new technologies is a question which several scholars have explained in terms of technological capabilities or organizational dynamics this paper proposes that the value network the context within which a firm competes and solves customers problems is an important factor affecting whether incumbent or entrant firms will most successfully innovate in a study of technology development in the disk drive industry the authors found that incumbents led the industry in developing and adopting new technologies of every sort identified by earlier scholars at component and architectural levels competency enhancing and competency destroying incremental and radical as long as the technology addressed customers needs within the value network in which the incumbents competed entrants led in developing and adopting technologies which addressed user needs in different emerging value networks it is in these innovations which disrupted established trajectories of technological progress in established markets that attackers proved to have an advantage the rate of improvement in product performance which technologists provide may exceed the rate of improvement demanded in established markets this mismatch between trajectories enables firms entering emerging value networks subsequently to attack the industry s established markets as well

balancing search and stability interdependencies among elements of organizational design we examine how and why elements of organizational design depend on one another an agent based simulation allows us to model three design elements and two contextual variables that have rarely been analyzed jointly a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates an incentive system that rewards subordinates for departmental or firm wide performance the decomposition of an organization s many decisions into departments the underlying pattern of interactions among decisions and limits on the ability of managers to process information interdependencies arise among these features because of a basic general tension to be successful an organization must broadly search for good sets of decisions but it must also stabilize around good decisions once discovered an effective organization balances search and stability we identify sets of design elements that encourage broad search and others that promote stability the adoption of elements that encourage broad search typically raises the marginal benefit of other elements that provide offsetting stability hence the need to balance search and stability generates interdependencies among the design elements we pay special attention to interdependencies that involve the vertical hierarchy our findings confirm many aspects of conventional wisdom about vertical hierarchies but challenge or put boundary conditions on others we place limits for instance on the received wisdom that firm wide incentives and capable subordinates make top level oversight less valuable we also identify circumstances in which vertical hierarchies can lead to inferior long term performance

asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage given incomplete factor markets appropriate time paths of flow variables must be chosen to build required stocks of assets that is critical resources are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor markets barney barney j 1986 strategic factor markets expectations luck and business strategy management sci october 1231 1241 sustainability of a firm s asset position hinges on how easily assets can be substituted or imitated imitability is linked to the characteristics of the asset accumulation process time compression diseconomies asset mass efficiencies inter connectedness asset erosion and causal ambiguity

zero as a special price the true value of free products when faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products or possibly buying nothing according to standard theoretical perspectives people will choose the option with the highest cost benefit difference however we propose that decisions about free zero price products differ in that people do not simply subtract costs from benefits but instead they perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher we test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that maintain the price difference between the goods but vary the prices such that the cheaper good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price in contrast with a standard cost benefit perspective in the zero price condition dramatically more participants choose the cheaper option whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more expensive option thus people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits after documenting this basic effect we propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect including social norms mapping difficulty and affect affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect

information and subsidies complements or substitutes abstract does providing information about a product influence the impact of price subsidies on purchases this question is particularly relevant for health products in developing countries where both informational campaigns and price subsidies are common policy instruments we conduct a field experiment in zambia and find that providing information about a new version of a product significantly increases the impact of price subsidies on take up taken alone the information manipulation has no significant impact on demand while the price subsidy substantially increases demand however the evaluation of either intervention in isolation fails to capture the significant complementarity between the two

motivated health risk denial and preventative health care investments abstract people deny health risks invest too little in disease prevention and are highly sensitive to the price of preventative health care especially in developing countries moreover private sector r d spending on developing country diseases is almost non existent to explain these empirical observations i propose a model of motivated belief formation in which an agent s decision to engage in health risk denial balances the psychological benefits of reduced anxiety with the physical cost of underprevention i use the model to study firms price setting behavior and incentive to innovate i also show that tax funded prevention subsidies are welfare enhancing

selective trials a principal agent approach to randomized controlled experiments we study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are significantly affected by experimental subjects unobserved effort expenditure while standard randomized controlled trials rcts are internally consistent the unobservability of effort compromises external validity we approach trial design as a principal agent problem and show that natural extensions of rcts which we call selective trials can help improve external validity in particular selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment effort and the interaction of treatment and effort moreover they can help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort expenditure

entry and exit decisions in flexible teams the present study identifies a major limitation of current research on multinational enterprises mnes joint decision making in a distributed setting is of critical importance in practice but has received little attention in our theories to address this gap in knowledge we examine the effects of flexible decision teams when mnes assess turbulent markets remarkably flexible teams composed of fallible evaluators can outperform what is usually thought of as an optimal decision our main result supports the claims advanced in recent empirical studies structural flexibility can help mnes achieve high levels of performance even in conditions of turbulence

international financial crises causes prevention and cures dale jorgenson has bestowed a great honor and no small challenge by inviting me to give this lecture a great honor because of the distinguished list of economists who have preceded me a challenge because of the standard they have set and because there is no greater challenge for any economist than providing a coherent account of significant events to his scientific peers i am sometimes asked by friends about the differences between academic life and life as a public official there are many two stand out first as an academic the gravest sin one can commit is to sign one s name to something one did not write as a public official it is a mark of effectiveness to do so as often as possible second as an academic if a problem is too hard and does not admit of a satisfactory solution there is an obvious response work on a different problem that is not a luxury that one has in government i have been reminded of this often in recent years as we have grappled with financial crises in a number of what had previously been considered emerging markets with unrestrained futures anyone who doubts the social importance of what economists do should consider the debates surrounding these crises hundreds of millions of people who expected rapidly rising standards of living have seen their living standards fall hundreds of thousands if not millions of children have been forced to drop out of school and go to work hundreds of billions of dollars of apparent wealth has been lost the stability of large nations as nations has been called into question and the united states has made its largest nonmilitary foreign policyrelated financial commitments since the marshall plan almost all the issues involved in understanding preventing and mitigating these crises are the stuff of economics courses and research fixed versus flexible exchange rates moral hazard and multiple equilibria speculation and liquidity fiscal and monetary policies regulation and competition what economists think say and do has profound implications for the lives of literally billions of their fellow citizens whether it is discussing the role of derivatives in signaling exchange rate commitments with chinese premier zhu rongji or discussing an nber working paper on inflation targeting with the brazilian central bank governor arminio fraga or discussing alternative approaches to bankruptcy law with indonesia s economic team or optimal debt durations with the mexican authorities i am consistently struck by the impact of the kind of research discussed at the aea meetings the future well being of the world s people in large part will depend on how the ongoing process of global integration works out this is a strong statement but one that is supported by the global economy s post world war i failure and its post world war ii success central to global integration is financial integration the flow of funds and of capital across international borders and as the events of the late 1920 s and early 1930 s remind us central to global disintegration can be international financial breakdowns today i want to reflect on the issue of global financial integration in light of the dramatic and largely unpredicted events of recent years it is perhaps a good time for reflection there has been enough repair that priority can shift from u s department of the treasury 1500 pennsylvania avenue washington dc 20005 this lecture reflects many things i have learned from experiences i have shared with colleagues in the united states government and governments around the world i thank brad delong marty feldstein stephanie flanders ken rogoff andrei shleifer and ted truman for useful comments and suggestions i am especially grateful to nouriel roubini and stephanie flanders for valuable discussions and assistance in the preparation of this lecture the usual disclaimer applies

what matters and what does not in households decision to invest in malaria prevention this paper examines the take up of a new malaria control device by rural households in kenya and tests whether the demand curve for the device varies with the framing of marketing messages and with the gender of the person targeted by the marketing previous research suggests that the demand for malaria prevention is highly price sensitive jessica cohen and dupas 2008 even though the private returns to preventing malaria are very large christian lengeler 2004 in the standard model of investment in human capital individuals invest in a health product if the expected benefits from the product outweigh its costs michael grossman 1972 in this framework the low take up observed at relatively moderate prices by cohen and dupas 2008 could be due to people underestimating the expected benefits of investing in prevention or due to people being credit constrained and unable to pay the cost up front it is also possible that the standard model does not apply because people have time inconsistent preferences or because they are uncertain about their own preferences and rely on external cues to resolve their own uncertainty when they need to make a decision an extensive literature in psychology and marketing suggests that decision making can be affected by frames or cues that do not add information about a product but can be effective at persuading individuals to invest in it for example in a recent field experiment in south africa marianne bertrand et al 2008 found what matters and what does not in households decision to invest in malaria prevention

interdependency competition and the distribution of firm and industry profits coordination of interdependencies among firms productive activities has been advanced as a promising explanation for sustained heterogeneity in capabilities among firms in this paper we extend this line of research to determine the industry structures and patterns of expected firm profits for the case when difficulty optimizing interdependent activities does in fact generate and sustain capability heterogeneity among firms we combine a widely used agent based model where firms search to discover sets of activities that complement one another reducing overall costs or raising product quality with traditional economic models of competition among profit maximizing firms the agent based model produces a distribution of performance interpreted as variable cost or product quality among firms and the competition models determine resulting industry outcomes including patterns of entry exit and profits the integration of economic models of competition among firms with an agent based model of search for improvement by firms reveals a rich relationship between interdependencies in production functions and industry structure firm profits and industry average profitability

keeping the doctor away experimental evidence on investment in preventative health products household investment in preventative health products in developing countries is typically low even though the returns to such products are high in this paper we experimentally estimate demand curves for health products and test whether 1 information about health risk 2 cash liquidity 3 peer effects and 4 intra household differences in preferences affect demand in our main experiment in kenya involving children s shoes critical for preventing hookworm infection price is by far the most important predictor of purchase providing liquidity and targeting women also increased demand information had no effect even though we find that genuine learning occurred we find no peer effects even though people discussed the product purchase decision extensively we find similar results for price and information in three smaller studies in guatemala india and uganda in experiments involving soap and multivitamins

what is the price of prevention new evidence from a field experiment how does increasing access to treatment affect the demand for preventive testing in this paper we present results from a field experiment in nigeria in which we offered cervical cancer screening to women at randomly chosen prices to test our hypothesis we also offered women a lottery where the payoff was a subsidy towards the cost of cervical cancer treatment conditional upon a diagnosis of cervical cancer we find that women randomly selected to receive the conditional cancer treatment subsidy were about 4 percentage points more likely to take up screening than those in the control group we also show that reducing the price of screening by 10 cents increased take up by about 1 percentage point these results offer compelling evidence that the optimal set of subsidies to increase take up of preventive testing in developing countries must include subsidies towards treatment costs in addition to price subsidies

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

can higher prices stimulate product use evidence from a field experiment in zambia the controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests in part on whether higher prices can increase use either by targeting distribution to high use households a screening effect or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk cost effect we develop a methodology for separating these two effects we implement the methodology in a field experiment in zambia using door to door marketing of a home water purification solution we find evidence of economically important screening effects by contrast we find no consistent evidence of sunk cost effects jel c93 d12 i11 m31 o12

paying is believing the effect of costly information on bayesian updating the supposed irrelevance of historical costs for rational decision making has been the subject of much interest in the economic literature in this paper we explore whether individual decision making under risk is affected by the cost of information to do so one must distinguish the effect of cost from self selection by individuals who value information the most outside of the laboratory it is difficult to disentangle these two effects we thus create an experimental environment where subjects are o ered additional useful and identical information on the state of the world across treatments we find a systematic effect of sunk costs on the manner in which subjects update their beliefs subjects over weigh costly information relatively to free information which results in a push of beliefs towards the extremes this shift does not necessarily lead to behavior more attuned with bayesian updating we find that an intensification of representativeness bias due to cost is the most likely explanation of our results

do non monetary prices target the poor evidence from a field experiment in india monetary price subsidies are often used to increase take up of health products but monetary prices may screen out those with the highest returns the poor using willingness to pay wtp data from a field experiment in india this paper determines whether nonmonetary prices better target health products to the poor than monetary prices it is found that monetary wtp is increasing in income and nonmonetary wtp is weakly decreasing in income comparing across price types nonmonetary wtp falls relative to monetary wtp as income rises nonmonetary prices better target the poor than monetary prices a larger fraction of total demand is poor

productivity in piece rate labor markets evidence from rural malawi abstract piece rate compensation is a common feature of developing country labor markets but little is known about how piece rate workers respond to incentives or the tradeoffs that an employer faces when setting the terms of the contract in a field experiment in rural malawi we hired casual day laborers at piece rates and collected detailed data on the quantity and quality of their output specifically we use a simplified becker degroot marschak mechanism which provides random variation in piece rates conditional on revealed reservation rates to separately identify the effects of worker selection and incentives on output we find a positive relationship between output quantity and the piece rate and show that this is solely the result of the incentive effect not selection in addition we randomized whether workers were subject to stringent quality monitoring monitoring led to higher quality output at some cost to the quantity produced however workers do not demand higher compensation when monitored and monitoring has no measurable effect on the quality of workers willing to work under a given piece rate together the set of worker responses that we document lead the employer to prefer a contract that offers little surplus to the worker consistent with an equilibrium in which workers have little bargaining power

eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay evidence from field trials in northern ghana we utilize the becker degroot marschak 1964 mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern ghana the bdm mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research allowing us to directly estimate demand compute heterogeneous treatment effects and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting we demonstrate the implementation of bdm along these three dimensions compare it to the standard take it or leave it method for eliciting willingness to pay and discuss practical issues for implementing the mechanism in true field settings jel classifications c93 d12 d82 l11 l31

the illusion of sustainability this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled the illusion of sustainability conducted during the time period 1998 to 2001 in kenya the study observed that deworming is a public good since much of its social benefit comes through reduced disease transmission people were less likely to take deworming if their direct first order or indirect second order social contacts were exposed to deworming the introduction of a small fee for deworming drugs led to an 80 percent reduction in treatment rates take up was not sensitive to the exact price level suggesting that it is particularly counter productive to charge small positive prices for the treatment of infectious diseases an intensive school health education had no impact on worm prevention funding for the study derived from world bank nih fogarty international center berkeley center for health research

observing unobservables identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice we estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology we randomized 58 000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major south african lender along three dimensions i an initial offer interest rate featured on a direct mail solicitation ii a contract interest rate that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate and ii a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing these three randomizations combined with complete knowledge of the lender s information set permit identification of specific types of private information problems our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate via unobservable risk and anticipated effort from hidden action effects via moral hazard in effort induced by actual contract terms we find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems a rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13 to 21 of default is due to moral hazard asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high risk borrowers

the sunk cost fallacy in penny auctions this article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions a relatively new auction mechanism as in the us dollars or war of attrition players in penny auctions commit higher non refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding i first show that in any equilibria that does not end immediately players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero then using two large data sets covering 166 000 auctions i calculate that average profit margins actually exceed 50 to explain this deviation i incorporate a sunk cost fallacy into the theoretical model to generate a set of predictions about hazard rates and player behaviour which i confirm empirically while players do slowly learn to correct this bias and there are few obvious barriers to competition activity in the market is rising and concentration remains relatively high

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

interdependency competition and industry dynamics asystematic understanding of industry dynamics is critical to strategy research because individual firm performance dynamics both reflect and affect change at the industry level descriptive research on industry dynamics has identified a dominant pattern where prices fall output rises and the number of firms rises and then falls over time several models have been advanced to explain these patterns with a particular focus on explaining why a shakeout in the number of firms occurs in the most prominent models shakeout is generated by rising realized heterogeneity among firms that either is assumed to be unrecognized but determined ex ante or is generated by stochastic innovation outcomes coupled with convex adjustment costs and scale advantages in innovation and learning in this paper we develop an alternative model where heterogeneity develops among firms over time leading to a shakeout because firms must make choices about highly interdependent productive activities where the ideal combinations cannot be easily deduced or imitated by combining two established models a cournot model of competition with an nk model of interdependency in production activities we are able to advance an alternative explanation for the observed patterns of industry behavior including shakeout we show that variation in the potential for interdependency in activities among industries is able to explain varying levels of shakeout as well as differing patterns of entry and exit among industries notably the model generates several empirical predictions not apparent in past research and several that directly conflict with the results of prominent alternative models of industry dynamics specifically we show that when the potential for interdependency within an industry is low entry slows down and incumbent survival is all but assured whereas in industries where the potential for interdependencies is high shakeouts are severe and the rates of entry and exit remain high over longer time periods with decreasing survival rates for incumbents

micro loans insecticide treated bednets and malaria evidence from a randomized controlled trial in orissa india we describe findings from the first large scale cluster randomized controlled trial in a developing country that evaluates the uptake of a health protecting technology insecticide treated bednets itns through micro consumer loans as compared to free distribution and control conditions despite a relatively high price 52 percent of sample households purchased itns highlighting the role of liquidity constraints in explaining earlier low adoption rates we find mixed evidence of improvements in malaria indices we interpret the results and their implications within the debate about cost sharing sustainability and liquidity constraints in public health initiatives in developing countries

tuition fees and sunk cost effects this article reports on a field experiment testing for sunk cost effects in an education setting students signing up for extra curricular tutorial sessions randomly received a discount on the tuition fee the sunk cost effect predicts that students who pay more will attend more tutorial sessions with possibly beneficial effects on their performance for our full sample we find no support for this hypothesis neither on attendance nor on performance results are consistent with a sunk cost effect for the subsample of students who based on hypothetical survey questions are identified as sunk cost prone we do not find differential effects by students income or parental contributions

self screening in targeted public transfer programs the self screening properties of initial eligibility determination a mechanism often under the control of the administrators of targeted transfer programs are derived and the use of this mechanism in the social security disability insurance system is explored empirically an increase in the rigor of initial eligibility screening may discourage potential applicants because they are unaware of appeal prospects and because the eligibility decision delay is lengthened as denied applicants are forced to appeal their claims in the disability program a 10 percent increase in the initial denial rate induces a 4 percent decrease in applications self selection is nonperverse

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

price subsidies diagnostic tests and targeting of malaria treatment evidence from a randomized controlled trial author s dupas pascaline cohen jessica schaner simone abstract both under and over treatment of communicable diseases are public bads but efforts to decrease one run the risk of increasing the other using rich experimental data on household treatment seeking behavior in kenya we study the implications of this tradeoff for subsidizing life saving antimalarials sold over the counter at retail drug outlets we show that a very high subsidy such as the one under consideration by the international community dramatically increases access but nearly half of subsidized pills go to patients without malaria we study two ways to better target subsidized drugs reducing the subsidy level and introducing rapid malaria tests over the counter

in search of complementarity in innovation strategy internal r d and external knowledge acquisition empirical research on complementarity between organizational design decisions has traditionally focused on the question of existence of complementarity in this paper we take a broader approach to the issue combining a productivity and an adoption approach while including a search for contextual variables in the firms strategy that affects complementarity analysis of contextual variables is not only interesting per se but also improves the productivity test for the existence of complementarity we use our empirical methodology to analyze complementarity between innovation activities internal research and development r d and external knowledge acquisition our results suggest that internal r d and external knowledge acquisition are complementary innovation activities but that the degree of complementarity is sensitive to other elements of the firms strategic environment we identify reliance on basic r dthe importance of universities and research centers as an information source for the innovation processas an important contextual variable affecting complementarity between internal and external innovation activities

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

free distribution or cost sharing evidence from a randomized malaria prevention experiment author s cohen jessica dupas pascaline abstract it is often argued that cost sharing charging a subsidized positive price for a health product is necessary to avoid wasting resources on those who will not use or do not need the product we explore this argument through a field experiment in kenya in which we randomized the price at which prenatal clinics could sell long lasting anti malarial insecticide treated nets itns to pregnant women we find no evidence that costsharing reduces wastage on those that will not use the product women who received free itns are not less likely to use them than those who paid subsidized positive prices we also find no evidence that costsharing induces selection of women who need the net more those who pay higher prices appear no sicker than the average prenatal client in the area in terms of measured anemia an important indicator of malaria cost sharing does however considerably dampen demand we find that uptake drops by 75 percent when the price of itns increases from zero to 0 75 i e from 100 to 87 5 percent subsidy the price at which itns are currently sold to pregnant women in kenya we combine our estimates in a cost effectiveness analysis of itn prices on child mortality that incorporates both private and social returns to itn usage overall our results suggest that free distribution of itns could save many more lives than cost sharing programs have achieved so far and given the large positive externality associated with widespread usage of itns it would likely do so at a lesser cost per life saved

the simple analytics of contraceptive social marketing abstract contraceptive social marketing csm programs have been advocated for the dissemination of contraceptives in developing countries this paper considers csm programs from a simple economic perspective it begins with a review of the major economic models of private fertility determinants and the associated private demand for contraceptives and then adds private contraceptive supply to obtain market equilibrium next inefficiencies due to negative externalities of added children and due to imperfect information and distributional concerns are considered finally this framework is utilized to point to lacunae in our knowledge of csm programs and their impact and to suggest some promising areas for research

the effect of recipient contribution requirements on support for social programs abstract a large literature examines the use of recipient contribution requirements in social programs to target people who most need and value aid yet little is known about public support for such requirements in a field experiment with a nationally representative sample we examine the effect of recipient contributions on charitable donations to a food aid program the response to recipient monetary contributions is non monotonic donations increase when recipients make small monetary contributions and return to baseline under large recipient contributions recipient time contribution requirements also increase program support results from additional treatments suggest that individuals use contribution requirements to increase both allocative efficiency screening recipients who most value the good and targeting efficiency screening recipients most in need our work informs the design of social programs which must respond to the preferences of voters and donors who provide political and financial support

short run subsidies and long run adoption of new health products evidence from a field experiment short run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries how do they affect long run adoption a common fear among development practitioners is that one off subsidies may negatively affect long run adoption through reference dependence people might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later but for experience goods one off subsidies could also boost long run adoption through learning this paper uses data from a two stage randomized pricing experiment in kenya to estimate the relative importance of these effects for a new improved antimalarial bed net reduced form estimates show that a one time subsidy has a positive impact on willingness to pay a year later inherit to separately identify the learning and anchoring effects we estimate a parsimonious experience good model estimation results show a large positive learning effect but no anchoring we black then discuss the types of products and the contexts inherit for which these results may apply

choice interactions and business strategy choice settings are strategic to the extent that they entail cross sectional or intertemporal linkages these same factors may impose daunting demands on decision makers we develop a graph theoretic generalization of the nk model of fitness landscapes to model the way in which policy choices may be more or less strategic we use this structure to examine through simulation how fully articulated a strategy or set of policy choices must be to achieve a high level of performance and how feasible it is to offset past strategic mistakes through tactical adjustments instead of alignment our analysis highlights the role of asymmetry in the interaction of strategic choices and in particular the degree to which choices vary in terms of being influential dependent or autonomous from other choices

the effect of medicaid premiums on enrollment a regression discontinuity approach abstract this paper estimates the effect that premiums in medicaid have on the length of enrollment of program beneficiaries whether and how low income families will participate in the exchanges and in states medicaid programs depends crucially on the structure and amounts of the premiums they will face i take advantage of discontinuities in the structure of wisconsin s medicaid program to identify the effects of premiums on enrollment for low income families i use a 3 year administrative panel of enrollment data to estimate these effects i find an increase in the premium from 0 to 10 dollars per month results in 1 4 fewer months enrolled and reduces the probability of remaining enrolled for a full year by 12 percentage points but other discrete changes in premium amounts do not affect enrollment or have a much smaller effect i find no evidence of program enrollees intentionally decreasing labor supply in order to avoid the premiums

losing prosociality in the quest for talent sorting selection and productivity in the delivery of public services we embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for nurses in zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation we randomize the offer of career benefits at the recruitment stage in line with common wisdom treatment attracts less prosocial applicants however the trade off only exists at low levels of talent the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally pro social these are hired and they perform better at every step of the chain they deliver more services promote institutional childbirth and reduce child malnutrition by 25 in the communities they serve

learning misallocation and technology adoption evidence from new malaria therapy in tanzania i study how the misallocation of new technology to individuals who have low ex post returns to its use affects learning and adoption behavior i focus on antimalarial treatment which is frequently over prescribed in many low income country contexts where diagnostic tests are inaccessible i show that misdiagnosis reduces average therapeutic effectiveness because only a fraction of adopters actually have malaria and slows the rate of social learning due to increased noise i use data on adoption choices the timing and duration of fever episodes and individual blood slide confirmations of malarial status from a pilot study for a new malaria therapy in tanzania to show that individuals whose reference groups experienced fewer misdiagnoses exhibited stronger learning effects and were more likely to adopt

impact of growth opportunities and competition on firm level capability development trade offs how should managers prioritize among production product development branding internationalization and other capabilities and resources this question is central to the resource based view and the answer depends not only on the direct returns on investment in each capability but also on the trade offs in using those returns for future growth or survival in a competitive market through simulation experiments this study examines firm level capability development trade offs in the context of a firm s market level competition and growth it is found that investing in operational capabilities which enhance short term performance gains priority over investing in long term dynamic capabilities when the operational capability investment strengthens the reinforcing loop between performance investment flow and capability development such operational capability investment provides growth opportunities and competitive advantage moreover in strategic competition firms anticipating rivals focus on short term growth need to further ignore dynamic long term capability building in order to survive testable propositions are offered as to how trade offs between short term and long term investments depend on different firm and industry characteristics the results may explain why short term focused firm behavior persists in firms even in the absence of discounting short term managerial incentives decision biases or learning failures

does purchase price matter for the waiting time to start using energy efficient technologies experimental evidence from rural ethiopia abstract in this study we conducted a randomized experiment in rural ethiopia to test on how quickly energy efficient technology an improved stove is put in use after the technologies is disseminated we evaluate two concepts that may affect usage of a product screening related to valuation of a product and sunk cost effects based on the price the potential user paid for the product a standard tobit and iv tobit methods of estimations are used for testing sunk cost and screening effects respectively results based on the baseline survey and follow up data shows that there is no difference in the length of waiting time to start using the energy efficient technology between those who got the stove for free and those that paid money for it in other words the sunk cost effect is absent however we find a difference in the waiting time between those with high valuation for the stove and those with lower valuation for it in other words we find an evidence of the screening effect the result has pricing policy implications for government and non government organizations involved in dissemination of such technologies that have both public environmental and private benefits

one off subsidies and long run adoption experimental evidence on improved cooking stoves in senegal free technology distribution can be an effective development policy instrument if market driven adoption is socially inefficient and hampered by affordability constraints yet policy makers often oppose free distribution arguing that reference dependence lowers the willingness to pay wtp and thus market potentials in the long run for improved cookstoves this paper studies the wtp six years after a randomized one time free distribution in 2009 we demonstrate that the cookstoves were intensely used by the treatment group households in the years after randomization until they reached their designated lifetime using a real purchase offer we find that both treatment and control households reveal a remarkably high wtp in 2015 the estimated confidence interval suggests that we can exclude a substantial negative effect on the treatment group the policy implication is that one time free distribution does not necessarily undermine future market establishment and thus can be an effective policy instrument if rapid dissemination is the objective

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

cost minimizing welfare programs abstract we study opportunities for lowering the cost of welfare programs by exploiting heterogeneity in the unobservable tastes of welfare recipients relying on the inability of cash based programs to achieve self selection we provide circumstances in which it is optimal to provide payments in kind our model differs from other self selection models because we allow the recipients the opportunity to trade the subsequent to the receipt of their welfare packages the presence of unreported cash among the recipient population is considered

pricing decisions of the newspaper monopolist in nearly every city in the united states there is only one daily newspaper of general interest given the prevalence of monopoly it seems anomalous that newspapers are typically sold well below cost compaine 5 19 for example reports that sales revenue is only 28 7 percent of total cost moreover it appears that price is below marginal cost since the sales revenue does not cover the cost of the ink and paper used in producing the newspaper 2 if the newspaper publisher were selling only newspapers he or she would be in dire straits but in reality the publisher has two products to sell the newspaper itself and advertising space within the newspaper although very few newspaper customers are also purchasers of advertising space there is an important interaction between the circulation of the newspaper and the sale of advertising space the higher the circulation of the newspaper the greater the demand for advertising and the more advertising there is in the newspaper the greater the circulation of the newspaper 3 as a consequence the publisher has a more complicated pricing problem since the prices of advertising space and of the newspaper have feedback effects upon one another in the next section of this paper we shall derive the publisher s optimal prices for advertising space and for the newspaper under fairly general conditions one purpose of this analysis is to show that there are two meaningful measures of demand elasticity in section iv we discuss some of the associated empirical problems that this poses and relate this to two existing newspaper demand studies

improved source improved quality demand for drinking water quality in rural india abstract this paper tests the hypothesis that the expansion of improved drinking water supplies in rural india reduced household expenditure on water quality offsetting some of the quality benefits from source protection i estimate demand for in home treatment using geological characteristics to predict a household s drinking water source the probability of treatment and in particular boiling reduces by 18 27 percentage points in response to source protection offsetting 4 of the water quality gains and saving households 0 5 1 in monthly expenditure behavioral choices partly counteract the water quality gains from source protection

training wages and sample selection estimating sharp bounds on treatment effects this paper empirically assesses the wage effects of the job corps program one of the largest federally funded job training programs in the u s even with the aid of a randomized experiment the impact of a training program on wages is difficult to study because of sample selection a pervasive problem in applied microeconometric research wage rates are only observed for those who are employed and employment status itself may be affected by the training program this paper develops an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding average treatment effects in the presence of sample selection in contrast to existing methods the procedure requires neither exclusion restrictions nor a bounded support for the outcome of interest identification results estimators and their asymptotic distribution are presented the bounds suggest that the program raised wages consistent with the notion that the job corps raises earnings by increasing human capital rather than solely through encouraging work the estimator is generally applicable to typical treatment evaluation problems in which there is nonrandom sample selection attrition copyright wiley blackwell