changing one s mind when the facts change incentives of experts and the design of reporting protocols experts often collect and report information over time what reporting protocol elicits the most information here a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability who observes two signals about the state of the world the signals differ in initial quality and unlike previous work differ in quality improvement the paper finds that mind changes inconsistent reports can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster also sequential reports dominate when the principal s decision is very sensitive to information a single report dominates if the mediocre agent s signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre

estimating the marginal abatement cost curve of co2 emissions in china provincial panel data analysis abstract this paper estimates the marginal abatement cost curve macc of co2 emissions in china based on a provincial panel for the period of 2001 2010 the provincial marginal abatement cost mac of co2 emissions is estimated using a parameterized directional output distance function four types of model specifications are applied to fit the mac carbon intensity pairs the optimal specification controlling for various covariates is identified econometrically a scenario simulation of china s 40 45 carbon intensity reduction based on our macc is illustrated our simulation results show that china would incur a 559 623 yuan t roughly 51 57 increase in marginal abatement cost to achieve a corresponding 40 45 reduction in carbon intensity compared to its 2005 level

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

the hotspots reference routes and research trends of marginal abatement costs a systematic review abstract as one of the most effective means of evaluating environmental policies marginal abatement costs macs have been adopted in a growing body of research this study characterizes the mac related literature from 1993 to 2018 on web of science based on a systematic review bibliometric analysis and mind mapping the results classify the research hotspots into influential factors methods and empirical applications the three most frequently mentioned influential factors are technical change discount rates and energy prices compared with top down models bottom up models including engineering model and expert based method are the most widely used improvements in the former focus on strengthening market behavior effect while those in the latter aim to overcome the weaknesses of negative costs and lack of interaction across measures mac applications focus on environmental policies with two new research areas recently emerging co benefits and sectoral abatement costs furthermore a reference route is proposed by summarizing the applicability of methods and matching relationships among influential factors methods and empirical problems finally potential research directions are summarized based on the identified research hotspots and a similar co word analysis in marginal cost field such as considering the effects of both multiple influential factors and the interaction among factors on maccs

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

strategic information manipulation in duopolies abstract this paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning uncertain market demand from observations of their outputs and market price firms may adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the market price because firms quantities are observed firms can manipulate the extent to which belief revision occurs rather than the direction in which beliefs are revised as in signal jamming models we develop conditions and present examples under which the value of information is positive and negative and under which firms will increase or decrease quantity to manipulate information journal of economic literature classification numbers d80 l13

well informed intermediaries in strategic communication this paper studies how a sender with private information can influence the decisionmaker through well informed intermediaries both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased with the objective type assumed to pass on the most accurate information while the biased type wanting to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective although using one s own information is a sign of objectivity the biased intermediary selectively incorporates the sender s information to push his agenda and his truth telling incentives always decrease in those of the biased sender s hence measures raising the sender s reputation cost worsen the intermediary s distortion and may make the decisionmaker strictly worse off in contrast the biased sender s and the intermediary s truth telling incentives are strategic complements if they report simultaneously

bidding behavior and decision costs in field experiments i introduction positive opportunity costs of mental effort may invalidate the predictions of traditional models of rational or hyperrational agents conlisk 1996 uses deliberation costs as a recurring theme when discussing four important reasons for incorporating bounded rationality in economic models smith and walker 1993 and smith and szidarovszky 1999 present effort models that predict individual behavior will more closely match the predictions of rational behavior theories as 1 the stakes of the decision increase and 2 the decision costs decrease smith and walker 1993 find evidence of these two effects in a comprehensive review of 31 published laboratory experiments camerer and hogarth 1999 extend smith and walker s survey by examining 74 experimental papers and find evidence in favor of the cognitive effort theory noting that higher levels of incentives have the largest effects in judgment and decision tasks p 34 although the laboratory evidence is compelling there has been little verificati on of these predictions outside the laboratory 1 the present article fills this gap by examining field data from 214 multiunit sports card auctions carried out in an active marketplace on the floor of a sports card show we auctioned four types of trading cards with book values ranging from 3 to 70 providing significant variation in the stakes of the auction our auctions also included two distinct types of subjects some auctions had sports card dealers bidding against each other whereas others had individual card collectors as the participants this variation allows us to explore the second dimension of decision cost theory do dealers who commonly participate in sports card auctions and therefore likely require less effort to bid optimally bid more rationally than nondealers our measure of rational bidding comes from multiunit auction theory which predicts strategic demand reduction in uniform price auctions 2 for each type of bidder and each type of card we measure this demand reduction behavior in the uniform price auction relative to a control the multiunit vickrey 1961 auction where bidders are predicted to fully reveal their demands our sports card data generated from sales of 428 cards with a combined book value of nearly 10 000 provide two major insights first we find that the predicted strategic behavior is considerably greater when the auctioned cards have higher values second dealers exhibit more of the predicted strategic behavior than do nondealers for both lower and higher priced cards one conjecture to explain this finding is that nondealers may find that the cognitive effort required to bid strategically exceeds the benefits especially for low valued cards by contrast dealers have more experience with auctions and make their living by buying selling trading cards so their cognitive costs are likely much lower than those of nondealers these two findings are consistent with recent theoretical models of monetary rewards and decision costs and extend previous experimental evidence from the laboratory into the field ii experimental design as mentioned recent theoretical literature has suggested that demand reduction inherent in uniform price auctions with multiunit demand can induce inefficient allocations and possible reductions in auction revenue to avoid the inefficiencies associated with the uniform price auction theorists have identified an alternative mechanism the generalized vickrey auction which gives bidders a dominant strategy of revealing their true valuations for all units of the good in this multiunit vickrey auction as in the uniform price auction each bidder can submit up to n different sealed bids on individual units and the highest n bids are declared winners if a bidder submits one or more of the winning bids his or her price for the first unit equals the highest rejected bid submitted by someone else and his or her price for the kth unit equals the kth highest of the rejected bids submitted by others

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

an analysis of the costs of energy saving and co2 mitigation in rural households in china abstract households may imperfectly implement energy saving measures this study identifies two factors resulting in imperfect use of energy saving technology by households households often continue to use old technologies alongside new ones and the energy saving technologies have shorter actual lifetimes than their designed lifetimes these two factors are considered when computing marginal energy conservation cost and marginal co2 abatement cost using data collected from a survey of rural households in three provinces in china the results show that there are cost reduction for most space heating technologies and their marginal abatement cost under full implementation ranges from 60 to 15 usd t co2 while the marginal abatement cost of cooking technologies ranges from 12 to 85 usd t co2 the marginal abatement costs of the majority of technologies increased after accounting for the two implementation factors the marginal abatement cost in the imperfect implementation scenario is higher with a range of 1 to 15 usd t co2 for space heating and 18 to 165 usd t co2 for cooking assuming implementation factors are constant until 2035 annually achievable co2 abatement by 2035 is estimated to be 57 11 and 10 mt co2 y in hebei guizhou and guangxi provinces

field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions more magic on the internet i present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first price sealed bid auctions the auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the internet for collectible trading cards from the game magic the gathering i examine a number of outcomes including the number of participating bidders the probability of sale the levels of individual bids and the auctioneer s revenues the benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric risk neutral bidders with independent private values the results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding many bidders behave strategically anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others bids

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

manipulated news model electoral competition and mass media abstract this paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media and self mediatization the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates in elections in the model a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two office motivated candidates the voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place while the media outlet suppresses some of this information because the voter s decision making could be incorrect direct distortion the candidates have an incentive to win the election by influencing the media coverage through policy settings indirect distortion as a result policy convergence to the voter s ideal policy occurs if and only if the media bias is sufficiently small we then characterize the set of equilibria in terms of the degree of distortion the results suggest that if either strategic media manipulation or competition among the candidates is omitted then the distortion is nonnegligibly misspecified

pennies from ebay the determinants of price in online auctions this paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible united states one cent coins at the ebay web site starting with an initial data set of 20 000 auctions we perform regression analysis on a restricted sample of 461 coins for which we obtained estimates of book value we have three major findings first a seller s feedback ratings reported by other ebay users have a measurable effect on her auction prices negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do second minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on the final auction price in particular minimum bids appear only to have a significant effect when they are binding on a single bidder as predicted by theory third when a seller chooses to have her auction last for a longer period of days this significantly increases the auction price on average

duopoly information exchange the case of unknown slope abstract we model information exchange between duopolists facing a common random demand the slope of the common demand curve facing the firms is assumed unknown and firms observe private signals about this slope we show that for sufficiently large variation in the demand slope firms earn strictly higher profit when they share their information rather than keeping it private even with constant marginal costs and homogeneous goods in this case it is a nash equilibrium for the duopolists to share their information in a quid pro quo information exchange consistent with earlier models information exchange raises welfare

on the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions abstract bids in oral auctions are restricted to discrete levels this paper both examines the choice of levels at which bids will be allowed and also presents a simple model of the role of the discrete levels in bidding strategy we consider two different distributions of bidders values identifying cases in which revenue is maximized by increasing intervals by constant intervals and by decreasing intervals moreover conditions under which the choice of bid levels that maximizes bid taker revenue also maximizes economic efficiency are developed we present a model of the economic trade off between auction duration and step size we consider the previously undiscussed issue of when economically motivated bidders should skip bid levels and when they should merely make minimum advances and develop a model in which it is equilibrium behavior always to make the minimum allowed advance

effects of minimum bid increments in internet auctions evidence from a field experiment i study the role of minimum bid increments mbi in internet auctions using natural field experiment data from a finnish online auction site huuto net internet auctions are typically viewed as secondprice implying truthful bidding however due to the presence of the mbi equilibrium bidding behavior involves bid shading i sell otherwise identical gift cards while varying the mbi and test between truthful bidding and bid shading truthful bidding is rejected consistently with equilibrium behavior bid shading increases as the mbi increases this implies that real world bidders are capable of reacting rationally even to seemingly small variations in their strategic environment this version september 17 2015 replaces the february 15 2013 version this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

rationality and analysts forecast bias this paper proposes and tests a quadratic loos utility function for modeling corporate earnings forecasting where financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy optimal forecasts with minimum expected error are optimistically biased and exhibit predictable cross sectional variation related to analyst and company characteristics empirical evidence from individual analyst forecasts is consistent with the model s predictions these results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal earnings forecasts prior studies using classical notions of unbiasedness may have prematurely dismissed analysts forecasts as being irrational or inaccurate

the paper work of medicine understanding international medical costs this paper draws on international evidence on medical spending to examine what the united states can learn about making its healthcare system more efficient we focus primarily on understanding contemporaneous differences in the level of spending generally from the 2000s medical spending differs across countries either because the price of services differs for example a coronary bypass surgery operation may cost more in the united states than in other countries or because people receive more services in some countries than in others for example more bypass surgery operations within the price category there are two further issues whether factors earn different returns across countries and whether more clinical or administrative personnel are required to deliver the same care in different countries we first present the results of a decomposition of healthcare spending along these lines in the united states and in canada we then delve into each component in more detail administrative costs factor prices and the provision of care received bringing in a broader range of international evidence when possible finally we touch upon the organization of primary and chronic disease care and discuss possible gains in that area

the applicability of marginal abatement cost approach a comprehensive review abstract the marginal abatement cost mac methodology is widely used in climate change policies policy makers rely on mac to assess feasible strategies and related costs to achieve emission reduction goals this paper introduces a variety of mac methodologies aiming at solving diverse problems which utilizes various calculable logic thus producing different results and implications this study applies a mind mapping method to capture differentiation of mac methods and systematically classify mac methodologies the applicability path analysis was proposed based on principles such as stakeholder type decision making objectives cost concept strategy mode and information scope our goal is to assess the applicability of different methodologies to reduce misuse by policy makers and to serve as a guide for subsequent research which might prompt and lead to the derivation of more consequential results in future studies the results of this study suggest that the complex method is not always better than the simplified method because policy makers are required to select the appropriate method according to the type of information needed it may even be suggested that mac could be reliable by ranking relative value of options compared with baseline rather than focusing on the absolute value of individual measures

naturally occurring markets and exogenous laboratory experiments a case study of the winner s curse we examine the relevance of experimental findings from laboratory settings that abstract from the field context of the task that theory purports to explain using common value auction theory as our guide we identify naturally occurring settings in which one can test the theory experienced agents bidding in familiar roles do not fall prey to the winner s curse yet experienced agents fall prey to the winner s curse when bidding in an unfamiliar role we conclude that the theory predicts field behaviour well when one is able to identify naturally occurring field counterparts to the key theoretical conditions

the energy efficiency gap what does it mean abstract as renewed attention has been given by policy makers to energy conservation issues it has frequently been asserted that an energy efficiency gap exists between actual and optimal energy use the critical questions is how to define the optimal level of energy efficiency this paper seeks to disentangle some confusing strands of argument that are frequently brought to bear on this question by identifying the major conceptual issues that determine the set of feasible answers we identify five separate and distinct notions of optimality the economists economic potential the technologists economic potential hypothetical potential the narrow social optimum and the true social optimum each of these has associated with it a corresponding definition of the energy efficiency gap our analysis demonstrates that necessary preconditions for identifying the right measure of the energy efficiency gap include understanding and disentangling market failure and non market failure explanations for the gradual diffusion of energy efficient technologies

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

optimal limited authority for principal abstract this article studies a principal agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent we show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal biased toward the agent s preference generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain compared to no commitment limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent as a result it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation