community development with endogenous land use controls abstract when competitive landowners developers control incorporation and zoning decisions efficient patterns of development emerge when by contrast early arrivals control policy they may impose zoning restrictions that force later entrants to pay via the property tax a disproportionate share of the cost of providing public services if new arrivals are sufficiently poor they may choose to reside outside the community while higher quality land within the community remains unoccupied this inefficient and exclusionary outcome can be an equilibrium if boundaries once drawn are irreversible the ex ante introduction of a seemingly natural compensation scheme may not remedy the problem

modeling local growth control decisions in a multi city case do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter our article analyzes the determinants of local growth control decisions which are modeled as the result of a political struggle between different groups of voters and organized lobbies we show that under specific hypotheses a higher homeownership rate can induce lower levels of controls considering residential choices as endogenous to growth control policies the local decisions to control growth become strategically interdependent assuming imperfect mobility we show that a spatial econometric specification can be directly derived from our theoretical model our empirical analysis concerning the determinants of the taxelocale d equipement a french local development tax is thus naturally based on spatial econometrics its results confirm the major predictions of our model

regions of europe a feasible status to be discussed regions of europe jacques dreze a new concept is proposed that of regions of europe which do not have full statehood and belong not to any state but to the community directly without endorsing this possibility and limiting itself to its economic aspects this article discusses the various dimensions of its economic desirability it appears that in general autonomous regions will not find it advantageous to insure each other investigating how assets and liabilities should be apportioned at the time of secession it argues in favour of distributive neutrality net incomes are unchanged by the secession itself in both the seceding region and the rest of the nation how distributive neutrality could be implemented is explored through a number of suggestive examples in general a region receives a share of the public debt related to its share of the public primary deficit with corrections to account for growth unsustainability of the public debt and so on

comparative statics analysis of a fully closed city abstract this paper extends the existing comparative statics analysis about open or semiclosed cities notably that of w wheaton j econom theor 9 2 223 237 1974 to a fully closed city where urban land rent is redistributed to the city population specifically we examine the effects on changes in exogenous variables such as population size agricultural rent and initial endowments on endogenous variables such as welfare level city size and rent schedule most but not all of the existing results are reestablished surprisingly it is shown that in contrast to the existing literature and perhaps to intuition the city area may shrink when the city population increases the paper also extends the existing literature by analyzing the effect of the exogenous variables on the endogenous income and the demand for transportation it is shown that under plausible assumptions the quantity of transportation demanded declines with its price

comparative statics analysis of density controls abstract the general similarity of the results of comparative statics in a semiclosed and in a fully closed city have been demonstrated by pines and sadka journal of urban economics 20 1 20 1986 the objective of this paper is to determine if the consequences of different forms of public regulation of the urban land market are also invariant with respect to the type of city the conclusion is that while there are well defined consequences of such controls on metropolitan area and land values in a semiclosed city the impacts in a fully closed city are generally ambiguous therefore proposals for the introduction of zoning and density regulation have to be city specific and take into consideration the pattern of land ownership and the extent of leakage of urban land rent income

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

a theory of growth controls a microeconomic model of individual decision making that illustrates how growth controls might arise is developed the emergence of growth controls is analyzed under a variety of assumptions about the local governmental environment including congestion effects different cost conditions and pricing schemes for public services and property tax limitations some welfare consequences of growth controls are also presented

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

housing price land supply and revenue from land sales in a recent study peng and wheaton empirically examine the effect of restrictive land supply on hong kong house prices however we argue that the impact of the supply of new land by the hong kong government is not as important as they maintain in accounting for the volatile house prices in hong kong we show that there is no causal relationship between land supply and housing prices our estimations based on the annual data of hong kong s public land sales find that the government acts to maximise land revenue maximisation of revenue from land sales is however consistent with the efficient allocation of resources we also show that the amount of land sales by the government and land in developers land banks tend to decrease when market interest rates increase land banking behaviour is governed by economic conditions long term land holding costs should cover interest costs

designing development planning charges settlement patterns cost recovery and public facilities there is a large body of literature that discusses the control of settlement patterns using traditional planning instruments whilst there is some theoretical literature discussing the use of development charges to influence settlement patterns by addressing market failure there is limited literature examining how such charging is implemented in practice this paper presents the theoretical basis for development charging based on the pigouvian tradition and discusses how these charges can be calibrated it identifies the potential for second best approaches including hypothecation of revenues this approach is distinguished from infrastructure charging which is a cost recovery instrument the irish system of infrastructure charging is assessed as a means of exploring how current instrument design could be improved to align with policy aspirations using the lessons that theory provides

strategic control of growth in a system of cities abstract this paper provides an analysis of the supply restriction model of growth controls growth controls in such a model harm consumers while enriching landowners and they will only be adopted if landowners have political power in the model this power is manifested in the city government s use of a social welfare that takes both landlord and consumer welfare into account since cities cannot be small if the supply restriction inherent in growth controls is to have an impact strategic interactions must be considered in the analysis of city choices a general model is presented and an extended example based on leontief preferences is then considered comparative static analysis of nash equilibria in the leontief case shows that perturbations of preferences or other characteristics of a single city can have important spillover effects that alter the choices of all cities in the region

on the theory of growth controls numerous empirical studies have examined the effect of growth controls on housing prices these studies have used many different techniques ranging from hedonic price model estimation to paired comparisons but have all come to the same conclusion growth controls raise the price of housing in theory there are both demand and supply side explanations which need not be mutually exclusive for these observed price differences on the supply side housing caps zoning restrictions limitations on the amount of developable land and other forms of growth control may reduce the supply of housing over time this in turn may produce scarcity effects which manifest as shifts or other changes in the housing supply curve and attendant price increases on the demand side to the extent that growth controls may reduce or internalize expected negative externalities and or congestion costs associated with growth controls may also produce amenity effects such amenity effects manifest as changes in the demand curve and likewise may be capitalized in land values and wages e g the price of a house rises as commute time falls

a comparative dynamic analysis of zoning in a growing city abstract this paper examines how zoning alters the pace and pattern of residential development in a dynamic open city it shows how zoning comparative dynamics systematically vary within and across urban areas relating predicted effects to time paths of exogenous economic variables determining bid rents binding zoning is seen to fundamentally alter development trajectories temporarily halting development at some locations while inducing leapfrog development at others zoning impacts under both perfect foresight and myopic developer behavior are derived and examined

a note on credible spatial entry deterrence abstract this note revisits the question of spatial entry deterrence to investigate the credibility of pre emption by crowding in a differentiated market judd rand j econ 16 1985 153 argues that pre emption by crowding is not a credible entry barrier because an incumbent monopolist has an ex post incentive to withdraw products in response to entry we demonstrate that pre emption by crowding may be a credible entry barrier if multiple potential entrants choose the timing of entry endogenously

lobbying political competition and local land supply recent evidence from spain abstract we analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition and interpret the findings as indications of the influence wielded by land developer lobbies we use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2 000 spanish municipalities for the period 2003 2007 in spain land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities needing periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans the main policy variable in these plans and the one analyzed here is the amount of land classified for potential development we measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government this variable is however potentially endogenous since not only do votes affect policy but also policy is expected to affect votes to deal with this problem we instrument this variable using the votes at the first national legislative elections following the re establishment of democracy and votes actually obtained regionally at the same type of election the results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development this effect is found to be most marked in suburbs in towns with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners and in municipalities governed by the left

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

a theory of development controls in a small city abstract this paper analyzes the implications of an institutional structure in which current residents of an urban area have the power to exercise control over the level and pattern of new residential development we develop a general equilibrium spatial model of a small urban area in which the current residents can control new residential development through a zoning policy determined by majority vote the current residents are modeled explicitly as home owners and are allowed to be arbitrarily different in tastes and endowments the urban government is assumed to provide a public good for its residents the level of which is also determined by majority vote the optimal development control policy from the point of view of a particular current resident is determined and the allocation resulting from a majority vote of the current residents is described for both head tax and property tax systems efficient development control policies are also analyzed

the welfare economics of land use planning abstract this paper presents an empirical methodology for the evaluation of the benefits and costs of land use planning the technique is applied in the context of the town and country planning system of the uk and examines the gross and net benefits of land use regulation and their distribution across income groups the results show that the welfare and distributional impacts can be large

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

urban growth controls transitional dynamics of development fees and growth boundaries abstract this paper investigates how development fees and urban growth boundaries affect urban development when the short run construction supply function is upward sloped i e convex development costs whereas the policies are equivalent in the traditional static model dynamic analysis reveals important differences out of the steady state in particular the development fee that is efficient in the steady state is also dynamically efficient in contrast the long run efficient urban growth boundary generates inefficiently fast development out of the steady state the results are robust with or without location rents and perfect or myopic foresight assumptions

urban growth controls and intercity commuting abstract this paper incorporates the possibility of intercity commuting ic in a growth control model as controls restrict the labor supply the wage rate increases in the city land rents capitalize the wage differential but when this differential reaches the ic cost ic starts to occur keeping wages constant thus if controls are adopted in the benefit of landowners ic weakens the incentive for tighter controls compared to case where ic is not possible however if firms profits which decrease with higher wages are also taken into consideration in the choice of controls then the possibility of ic may induce tighter controls

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

land taxation and the henry george theorem under uncertainty abstract this paper considers land taxation under uncertainty at an optimal population of a jurisdiction aggregate land rents of a jurisdiction equal expenditures on a public good dubbed the henry george theorem as a consequence the public good in a jurisdiction should be financed only by land taxes however in the presence of uncertainty the size of population serves as insurance it is thus efficient to increase the size of population beyond the optimal level with certainty and land rents exceed public good costs

effects of urban growth controls on intercity commuting this paper presents an empirical study of the effects of urban growth controls on the intercity commuting of workers growth controls land use regulations that attempt to restrict population growth and urban sprawl have increased housing prices and diverted population growth to uncontrolled cities it has been suggested that resulting changes in local labour supply might stimulate intercity commuting from uncontrolled to controlled cities to test this hypothesis a gravity model of commuting flows between places in california is estimated using alternative econometric methods ols heckman selection and count data the possibility of spatial dependence in commuting flows is also taken into consideration results suggest larger commuting flows to destination places that restrict residential growth

expansionary zoning and the strategic behaviour of local governments this paper analyses the extent to which local land supply is the result of strategic interaction among nearby local governments in a setting of limited tax instruments to raise revenues and interj

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

property value capitalization and municipal open space referenda this paper first develops a theory of demand for land conservation in the presence of price effects due to both amenity creation and housing supply restriction three hypotheses designed to distinguish demand for amenities from homeowner rent seeking are based upon 1 renters 2 the quality of another locally provided good schools and 3 spatial autocorrelation of funding across municipalities econometric results suggest an observable degree of demand for open space measures is nonenvironmental in motivation efficiency and policy implications are discussed along with a recommendation for benefit cost analysis capable of separating nonrival amenities from other interests to certify open space measures jel h41 q24

testing for strategic interaction among local governments the case of growth controls this paper helps to fill a gap in the public economics literature by providing empirical evidence on strategic interaction among local governments using the methodology of case et al journal of public economics 52 285 307 1993 the paper focuses on the adoption of growth control measures by cities in california and looks for evidence of policy interdependence in these choices the data are drawn from an elaborate survey of growth control practices in california cities conducted by glickfeld and levine regional growth local reaction lincoln institute of land policy cambridge ma 1992 the survey results are used to compute an index of the stringency of growth controls in each city which serves as the dependent variable for the study

growth controls real options and land development abstract many urban growth controls attempt to check sprawl by restricting allowable new housing densities however land may be undeveloped to preserve its real option value real options in land markets arise from uncertainty as to the optimum use of a site by limiting allowable development choices growth controls can narrow real options and potentially accelerate investment this paper examines the effect of price volatility a generator of option value on the timing of development after the imposition of an urban growth boundary ugb around seattle while the net effect of the ugb is to lower the likelihood of new housing outside the boundary by between 28 and 39 price volatility is no longer a deterrent to development

infrastructure financing and urban development abstract historically additions to public infrastructure necessitated by urban growth have been financed under a cost sharing approach in the last several decades however financing of growth has increasingly relied on land use exactions where new residents pay for the cost of incremental infrastructure despite the emergence of a formal growth control literature there has been virtually no formal analysis of the connection between infrastructure financing and urban development to provide such an analysis this paper investigates three different schemes for financing incremental infrastructure within an urban growth model the analysis compares an impact fee scheme to two types of cost sharing schemes deriving the effects on urban growth and land values of switching to the impact fee scheme the efficient financing scheme is also identified

the qualitative economics of development control abstract this paper examines space supply restrictions and containment policies in the context of a monocentric urban model with several classes results are obtained concerning the qualitative effects of such policies on space i e land values and locations of the various groups

equilibrium and migration in dynamic models of housing markets abstract this paper presents a model of a regional housing market where households choose among competing employment opportunities offered by cities within a given system the equilibrium requirement imposed in the model requires that households be indifferent among all locations both within their current city and other cities within the region rather than in terms of exogenously determined utility or populations this construction allows the characterization of equilibrium in terms of potentially observable variables related to household income given that equilibrium can be defined in this more general manner it is natural to identify ways in which the predictions will differ from those generated by existing models capozza and helsley s j urban econ 28 1990 180 203 model of land conversion is evaluated in this context in this setting the option value associated with the ability to delay development depends directly on the degree to which the income processes are correlated across cities also increased idiosyncratic income risk does not necessarily lead to larger option values

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association