corruption and government size a disaggregated analysis using annual state level data over 1983 1987 this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices our objectives are twofold first we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state local sector in each state second we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office our results are generally supportive of becker s crime and punishment model regarding the primary focus of the paper our results show that government size in particular spending by state governments does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption

reforming residential electricity tariff in china block tariffs pricing approach the chinese households that make up approximately a quarter of world households are facing a residential power tariff reform in which a rising block tariff structure will be implemented and this tariff mechanism is widely used around the world the basic principle of the structure is to assign a higher price for higher income consumers with low price elasticity of power demand to capture the non linear effects of price and income on elasticities we set up a translog demand model the empirical findings indicate that the higher income consumers are less sensitive than those with lower income to price changes we further put forward three proposals of chinese residential electricity tariffs compared to a flat tariff the reasonable block tariff structure generates more efficient allocation of cross subsidies better incentives for raising the efficiency of electricity usage and reducing emissions from power generation which also supports the living standards of low income households

the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

residential peak electricity demand response highlights of some behavioural issues electricity demand response refers to consumer actions that change the utility load profile in a way that reduces costs or improves grid security the focus of demand response has mainly been on the commercial and big industrial sectors because of the large demand reduction that they can offer to the utility grid operators utilities are showing increasing interest in residential demand response rdr rdr can be treated as an energy resource which can be assessed and commercially developed however there are still some issues that remain to be addressed for rdr to be successful these include price unresponsiveness of some residential consumers equity issues and high cost of the metering infrastructure the aim of this paper is to investigate and present some of the challenges in achieving effective voluntary demand reduction based on a review of residential demand response literature as well as the general residential energy use behaviour literature the authors propose the use of a hybrid engineering approach using social psychology and economic behaviour models to overcome these challenges and realize the benefits of supply security and cost management

evaluating the public perceptions of nuclear power in china evidence from a contingent valuation survey national natural science foundation of china 71303199 71373218 ministry of education foundation of china 13yjc790123 11jbgp006 13jzd010 fundamental research funds for the central universities 201122g008 2014221001 national social science foundation of china 13zd167

urban biased policies and rising income inequality in china since the start of economic reforms in 1978 china has experienced the largest increase in income inequality of all countries for which comparable data are available according to the world bank 1997 china s gini coefficient increased from 28 2 in 1981 to 38 8 in 1995 based on official survey data another study that used internationally standard definitions for incomes estimated china s gini ratio at 38 2 in 1988 and 45 2 in 1995 a level that already surpassed many developing economies in asia azizur khan and carl riskin 1998 are these income inequality changes the consequence of institutional reforms that replaced egalitarian rewards with work incentives employment contracts and labor mobility this paper uses household survey data collected by china s state statistical bureau ssb to investigate the sources and causes of this rising inequality by analyzing gini ratios and generalized entropy measures i decompose the overall inequality into three sectoral components i inequality within rural areas ii inequality within urban areas and iii sectoral disparity the data indicate that increases in rural urban income differentials have been the driving factor behind the rising overall inequality in china i argue that urbanbiased policies and institutions including labor mobility restrictions welfare systems and financial policies of inflation subsidies and investment credits to the urban sector are responsible for the long term rural urban divide and the recent increases in disparity

the impact of the corporate income tax evidence from state organizational form data abstract by taxing the income of corporate firms at a different rate than non corporate firms taxes can play an important role in a firm s choice of organizational form the sensitivity of the organizational form decision to tax rates provides a key indicator of the distortion created by the corporate income tax this paper uses new cross sectional data on organizational form choices across states compiled in the census of retail trade to estimate this sensitivity the results document a significant impact of the relative taxation of corporate to personal income on the share of real economic activity that is done by corporations and that the impact is many times larger than has been found in the previous empirical literature based on time series data the results show little impact however on the actual operations of firms such as their labor intensity wages and the like they do indicate that firms are able to exploit the progressivity of the corporate income tax system by dividing into numerous firms

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

high corruption income in ming and qing china abstract we develop an economic model that explains historical data on government corruption in ming and qing china in our model officials extensive powers result in corrupt income matching land s share in output we estimate corrupt income to be between 14 and 22 times official income resulting in about 22 of agricultural output accruing to 0 4 of the population the results suggest that eliminating corruption through salary reform was possible in early ming but impossible by mid qing rule land reform may also be ineffective because officials could extract the same rents regardless of ownership high officials incomes and the resulting inequality may have also created distortions and barriers to change that could have contributed to china s stagnation over the five centuries 1400 1900s

equilibrium shirking access to credit and endogenous tfp fluctuations this paper develops a model in which idea rich cash poor entrepreneurs undertake risky investment projects that are subject to future liquidity needs and shirking due to moral hazard the model suggests that the strength of the entrepreneur s incentive to shirk is countercyclical and that endogenous shirking adds volatility to the economy by increasing the persistence and volatility of tfp this increase in persistence and volatility is driven by the variation in the number of successfully completed projects compounded by the effect of the incentive to shirk on access to credit changes in factor employment play only a minor role

correlated payoffs in the inspection game some theory and an application to corruption the inspection game as formulated by tsebelis am polit sci rev 83 77 91 1989 has the counterintuitive implication that crime is unaffected by the magnitude of the penalty this paper demonstrates that to attain this outcome it is necessary to assume independence of enforcer and offender payoffs given correlated payoffs the comparative statics of the equilibrium yield an inverse relationship between crime and the severity of the sanction in an application we enrich the framework of tsebelis by adding corruption stages and show that this can imply such a correlation of payoffs another interesting finding is that harsher anticorruption measures can increase crime incentives

competition in bureaucracy and corruption abstract this paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences some bureaucrats are corrupt that is they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe the competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation that is distributing the licences given the firms investment decisions additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats rotation are provided

corruption in russia abstractwe analyze the determinants of corruption in russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 russian regions for the period 2004 13 we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels corruption declines as relative salaries rise yet at strongly diminishing rates furthermore we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement education levels and unemployment rates

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

can market oriented economic reforms contribute to energy efficiency improvement evidence from china since china accelerated its market oriented economic reforms at the end of 1992 its energy intensity has declined 3 6 annually over 1993 2005 however its energy intensity declined 4 2 annually during its first reform period 1979 1992 therefore can we conclude that the accelerated marketization since the end of 1992 has made no contribution to its energy efficiency improvement in order to answer this challenging question we examine the changes of energy own price elasticity as well as the elasticities of substitution between energy and non energy capital and labor in china during the periods of 1979 1992 and 1993 2003 generally in transition or developing economies holding the technology and output level fixed if the energy own price elasticity algebraic value declines or the substitution elasticity between factors rises they will contribute to energy efficiency improvement our empirical study finds that 1 during 1979 1992 the energy own price elasticity is positive 0 285 and capital energy labor energy are both morishima complementary which indicates a distorted energy price and inefficient allocation and 2 during 1993 2003 the own price elasticity for energy is negative 1 236 and capital energy and labor energy are both morishima substitute all factor demands become more elastic and all elasticities of substitution increase the implication is that the accelerated marketization contributes substantially to energy efficiency improvement since 1993 c 2006 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

2002 lawrence r klein lecture liquidity and asset prices we broadly define liquid assets or monetary assets as any asset that can be readily sold in the market and can be held by a number of people in succession before maturity we ask in what environment is the circulation of liquid assets essential for the smooth running of the economy by developing a canonical model of a monetary economy i e where the circulation of liquid assets is essential we are able to examine the interaction between liquidity asset prices and aggregate economic activity

corruption in a model of growth political reputation competition and shocks the article tries to incorporate political corruption toplevel corruption into economic growth analysis we propose amicroeconomic framework an agent of the public sector who wantsto optimize his cash flow resulting from budget misappropriations will be highly sensitive to the instability related to his office the natural equilibrium for the politician will be to fall into a high political instability low growth trap in whichcorruption appears endemic however the control of corruption bysociety will be possible we consider a model in which alternativepoliticians compete with the incumbent politician but benefit from a common political reputation it is shown that this situation leads to dynamic collective reputation which should restrain misappropriationpractices this theoretical framework will be useful in defining a sustainable degree of political competition and inunderstanding the asymmetric effects of extrinsic shocks on thegrowth process

notes on bribery and the control of corruption abstract existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem when an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested he has to take into account the fact that he may in turn be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain but from the other side the purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion having done so it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption these turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests

corruption as a self fulfilling prophecy evidence from a survey experiment in costa rica an influential body of scholarship argues that corruption behaves as a selffulfilling prophecy the idea of this work is that levels of corruption emerge endogenously as a result of a society wide coordination game in which ther individual returns to corrupt behavior are a function of how disposed towards corruption the other members of society are perceived as being an empirical implication of this logic is that if one were to exogenously perturb beliefs about societal levels of corruption upward willingness to engage in corruption should increase as a consequence the current paper evaluates this claim by utilizing an information experiment embedded in a large scale household survey conducted in the gran area metropolitana gam of costa rica from october 2013 to april 2014 n 4200 changes in beliefs about corruption were induced via the random assignment of an informational display depicting the increasing percentage of costa ricans who have experienced or directly observed an act of corruption from 2006 to 2011 the paper finds that on average assignment to this display relative to the control condition increased the probability that a respondent would be willing to pay a bribe to a police officer by approximately 0 04 to 0 08 thereby providing supporting evidence for the self fulfilling prophecy hypothesis

financial intermediation business failures and real business cycles in this paper a general equilibrium business cycle model is construct ed that when subjected to real disturbances mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output money business failures risk pr emia intermediary loans and prices in contrast monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence thus providing support for real business cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business cycle behavior a credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

institutional corruption and election fraud evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan w e investigate the relationship between political networks weak institutions and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in afghanistan combining i data on political connections between candidates and election officials ii a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology and iii direct measurements of aggregation fraud we find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent the results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers jel c93 d02 d72 k42 o17

on the economic incentives for taking bribes this paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors affecting bribe taking by public officials factors influencing the acceptance of bribes include the probability of being convicted severity of punishment government salary relative to private sector income the demonstration effect and the unemployment rate our results indicate that higher probability of being convicted discourages the acceptance of bribes as does more severe punishment low relative earnings high unemployment and the demonstration effect of aggregate advertising all lead to increased bribe taking

corruption and allocation efficiency abstract in this paper we investigate the possibility of allocation inefficiencies associated with corrupt practices specifically we consider the case in which two firms compete via bribery of a corrupt government official for a to be awarded project the economy may suffer allocation inefficiencies whenever there is some degree of discrimination given additional assumptions it is shown that the possibility of inefficient allocations increases as the degree of discrimination increases although empirical verification of discrimination is difficult due to the observational equivalence of an alternative imperfect knowledge model two possible explanations for the determination of discrimination coefficients indicate that it is a general phenomenon in competitive bribery games

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

corruption in tax administration abstract we extend the game theoretic model of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 to allow for corruption in tax administration in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence in fact in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited moreover when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue

understanding liquidity shortages during severe economic downturns abstract one feature of economic recessions is the appearance of aggregate liquidity shortages that can exacerbate the economic downturn we develop a model in which the demand for liquidity arises suddenly in response to continued funding needs of partially completed investment projects whose outcomes are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and moral hazard when the economy experiences an adverse aggregate productivity shock incentive constraints that underlie equity contracts may bind provided the shock is severe enough in this case credit rationing appears and the heightened demand for liquidity coincides with a greater reluctance to take on equity positions or deepen investments in on going investment projects the consequence is a reduction in new investment and termination of on going projects due to a lack of liquidity thereby worsening the economic slowdown

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

on controlling crime with corrupt officials abstract this paper attempts to synthesize the recently developed strategic approach towards modeling corruption and the classical views the following propositions are sought to be proved a if reward schemes are introduced the classical and the strategic approaches yield similar results so far as controlling crime is concerned b with probability of detection being dependent on the effort of a corrupt official crime cannot be controlled and c in the context of an infinitely repeated game of crime the corrupt law enforcing agent might choose less bribes and lower effort level than the myopic optimal and hence would strategically pamper crime

corruption clubs empirical evidence from kernel density estimates a common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption countries characterized by the same economic social and cultural background do not necessarily experience the same levels of corruption in this article we use kernel density estimation techniques to analyse the cross country distribution of corruption particular emphasis will be given to the question whether the distribution of corruption shows more than one peak we find that most of the estimated densities exhibit twin peaks we also provide some evidence on the intra distribution dynamics and the persistence of corruption we find the group of countries classified within the two clubs to be very stable corruption is a highly persistent phenomenon substantial changes in the economic political and cultural environment of countries within the corruption club are required before a significant decline of corruption is to be expected

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

residential energy consumption in urban china a decomposition analysis abstract residential energy consumption rec is the second largest energy use category 10 in china and urban residents account for 63 of the rec understanding the underlying drivers of variations of urban rec thus helps to identify challenges and opportunities and provide advices for future policy measures this paper applies the lmdi method to a decomposition of china s urban rec during the period of 1998 2007 at disaggregated product activity level using data collected from a wide range of sources our results have shown an extensive structure change towards a more energy intensive household consumption structure as well as an intensive structure change towards high quality and cleaner energy such as electricity oil and natural gas which reflects a changing lifestyle and consumption mode in pursuit of a higher level of comfort convenience and environmental protection we have also found that china s price reforms in the energy sector have contributed to a reduction of rec while scale factors including increased urban population and income levels have played a key role in the rapid growth of rec we suggest that further deregulation in energy prices and regulatory as well as voluntary energy efficiency and conservation policies in the residential sector should be promoted

an axiomatic approach to the measurement of corruption theory and applications in this paper we demonstrate that the axiomatic measurement approach developed in the poverty and inequality literature can be usefully applied to the measurement of corruption we develop a conceptual framework for organizing corruption data and discuss several objective aggregate corruption measures consistent with axiomatic requirements we then provide an empirical application of the methodology and estimate the respective corruption measures for a sample of over 25 countries during the year of 2000 our empirical analysis reveals significant discrepancies between the country rankings generated by these measures and those provided by the corruption perception index cpi from transparency international to our knowledge this paper represents a first analysis of corruption measurement using an axiomatic framework

corruption cooperation and endogenous time discount rates virtually all uses of repeated games tostudy of cooperation assume that people stime discount rates are exogenous andfixed here we offer an evolutionary gameembedded in a multi period model ofinvestment and consumption in whichindividual time discounts are determined bytheir convergence to values determined byevolutionary stable strategies oursubstantive motivation though iscorruption and its relationship to economicgrowth to understand the observedrelationship between levels of corruptionand economic indicators of social welfare we argue that corruption is a form ofcooperation that requires closeinterpersonal monitoring if we assume moreover that when people discount thefuture greatly the only sustainable formsof cooperation are those that allow forclose monitoring then our analysis can beinterpreted as a dynamic model of therelationship between corruption andinvestment

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

business culture and tax evasion why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist abstract this paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria in bad equilibria high cheating and corruption increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures as tax evasion and corruption become more common they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered a third externality that between firms and inspectors is the source of the perverse effect more cheating by firms is good for bribe taking inspectors and more bribe taking inspectors are good for cheating firms

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

a model of bureaucracy and corruption we analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and lemons exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral random matches agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats as a result private agents might bribe bureaucrats whereas they do not bribe each other an equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist we discuss some welfare implications of the model

corruption and local democratization in indonesia the role of islamic parties indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms this paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies democratization occurred in 1999 and decentralization in 2001 we have firm level data for 2001 and 2004 the 2001 data benchmark corruption at the time of decentralization we find that corruption declines between 2001 and 2004 overall but much less so in districts with more secular party as opposed to islamic party representatives in district assemblies for a larger sample of districts correspondingly we find that corruption in 2004 is more in districts which voted more in favor of secular party representatives in the first elections in 1999 we argue that the effects seem to be causal over above any effects of changing religiosity and economic circumstances across districts

deals and delays firm level evidence on corruption and policy implementation times whether demands for bribes for particular government services are associated with expedited or delayed policy implementation underlies debates around the role of corruption in private sector development the grease the wheels hypothesis which contends that bribes act as speed money implies three testable predictions first on average bribe requests should be negatively correlated with wait times second this relationship should vary across firms with those with the highest opportunity cost of waiting being more likely to pay and facing shorter delays third the role of grease should vary across countries with benefits larger where regulatory burdens are greatest the data are inconsistent with all three predictions according to the preferred specifications ceteris paribus firms confronted with demands for bribes take approximately 1 5 times longer to get a construction permit operating license or electrical connection than firms that did not have to pay bribes and respectively 1 2 and 1 4

how corruptible are you bribery under uncertainty abstract we model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials we investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one s potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in bribery and consequently the equilibrium level of corruption in the society we assume that the cost of engaging in corruption is subject to strategic complementarities which may lead to multiple corruption equilibria we find that corruption is lowest when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other s corruptibility and have asymmetric bargaining powers our uncertainty result provides theoretical support in favor of anti corruption strategies such as staff rotation in public offices aimed at decreasing the social closeness of bribers and bribees our bargaining power result suggests that under uncertainty monopolistic public good provision has the same corruption reducing effect as competitive public good provision

evaluating the atkinson index of household energy consumption in china abstract improving equality and efficiency of household energy distribution is the primary concern of china s policy makers in their effort to reform the energy pricing system in this paper we use atkinson index as an analytical tool to quantitatively and systematically evaluate the equality and efficiency of household energy distribution the result shows that the atkinson index of electricity expenditure is much smaller than that of transportation expenditure which indicates that transportation expenditure responds better to income differences furthermore a geographical distribution analysis indicates that households in middle china suffer greater inequality in energy distribution than those in eastern and western china in view of the oncoming energy pricing reform in china we reevaluate the atkinson index under the new pricing scenarios for electricity and petroleum products compared to the current household energy pricing mechanism the simulated new policies generate more allocative efficiency of household energy and ensure more equality of energy consumption for low income households on this account we suggest that geographical differences and equality in energy distribution be duly addressed in reforming energy policies in china

integrity for hire an analysis of a widespread customs reform abstract can governments improve bureaucratic performance by hiring integrity from the private sector in the past 2 decades a number of developing countries have hired private firms to conduct preshipment inspections of imports generating independent data on the value and tariff classification of incoming shipments i find that countries implementing such inspection programs subsequently experience large increases in import duty collections by contrast the growth rate of other tax revenues does not change appreciably additional evidence suggests that declines in falsification of import documentation are behind the import duty improvements the programs also lead to declines in undervaluation and misreporting of goods classifications historically this hired integrity appears to have been cost effective with improvements in import duty collections in the first 5 years of a typical inspection program amounting to 2 6 times the program s costs

corruption across countries and regions some consequences of local osmosis abstract large and persistent differences in corruption across comparable countries is a challenging research issue even more intriguing are such differences across regions within the same country because the typically considered socioeconomic and governance characteristics are generally more similar across such regions than across different countries this paper s principal theme is that individuals perceptions of their environments are influenced by the realities that they have faced in the past these perceptions affect their current and future actions which in turn influence the current and future realities an articulation and analysis of these dynamics yields significant observations concerning individuals behavior and societal outcomes

does oil corrupt evidence from a natural experiment in west africa abstract this paper explores the oil discovery announcements in sao tome and principe 1997 1999 to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption for this purpose we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts sao tome and principe to cape verde a control west african country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries the unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents we analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations we find clearest increases on vote buying education namely in the allocation of scholarships and customs ranging from 31 to 40 of the subjective scale we interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources