bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

equilibrium and government commitment abstract how should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome in this paper i show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question and i propose an alternative i show that the complete description of an optimal indeed of any policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected the specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and which ones leave room for multiple equilibria that depend on the expectations of the private sector

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria abstract we study optimal fiscal policy in an economy where i search frictions create a coordination problem and generate multiple pareto ranked equilibria and ii the government finances the provision of a public good by taxing market activity the government must choose the tax rate before it knows which equilibrium will obtain and therefore an important part of the problem is determining how the policy will affect the equilibrium selection process we show that when the equilibrium selection rule is based on the concept of risk dominance higher tax rates make coordination on the pareto superior outcome less likely as a result taking equilibrium selection effects into account leads to a lower optimal tax rate

credible public policy abstract credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame perfect nash equilibrium behavior for the government it is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of abreu 1988 for repeated games the results are then extended to systems with state variables simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example

implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation abstract in a finite trader version of the diamond and dybvig j polit econ 91 1983 401 model the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism i e each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader when the model is modified by formalizing the sequential service constraint cf wallace fed reserve bank minneapolis quart rev 12 1988 3 the truth telling equilibrium implements the symmetric ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

bank runs and institutions the perils of intervention we study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create we show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals instead once a run is underway benevolent government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals placing further strain on the banking system when depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals their incentive to participate in the run increases in fact ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self fulfilling run to occur jel g21 g8

a model of financial crises in emerging markets recent events in mexico asia russia and brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive not too long ago the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates but this first generation view pioneered by krugman 1979 has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent and as obstfeld 1994 has argued currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them witness much of europe in the early 1990s obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large this new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self fulfilling expectations since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained but obstfeld s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession while appropriate for the erm 1992 crisis was at odds with the facts in mexico in 1994 and east asia in 1997 asian

evolution coordination and banking panics abstract i study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with multiple equilibria one of which involves a banking panic the analysis is built on a repeated version of the diamond dybvig 1983 model the optimal equilibrium is uniquely selected if it is also risk dominant when there are multiple banks the probability of observing a panic increases as the size of the banks decreases local interaction generates contagion effects that allow a bank run to spread first among banks in the same geographic location and then throughout the population

banking panics and policy responses we study how banking panics unfold in av ersion of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model with limited commitment as is well known the banking authority could eliminate the possibility of a run on the banking system by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start once a run is under way however the banking authority will choose to reschedule rather than suspend payments we construct equilibria in which depositors run on the banking system with positive probability and we show that an equilibrium bank run in this setting is necessarily partial with only some depositors participating we also show that a run naturally occurs in waves with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further policy response from the banking authority the number of waves that occur in equilibrium is stochastic and can be arbitrarily large

a model of a systemic bank run abstract this paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run focussing on six stylized key features in particular core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset backed securities rather than committed to long term projects in distress these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts i consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset backed securities uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection i shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective in the former the crisis deepens the larger the market share of distressed core banks while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version therefore the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

market uncertainty correlated and sunspot equilibria in imperfectly competitive economies first version received june 1988 final version accepted november 1990 eds an imperfectly competitive economy is very prone to market uncertainty including uncertainty about the liquidity or thickness of markets we show in particular that there exist stochastic equilibrium outcomes in nonstochastic market games if and only if the endowments are not pareto optimal we also provide a link between extrinsic uncertainty arising in games e g correlated equilibria and extrinsic uncertainty in market economies e g sunspot equilibria a correlated equilibria to the market game is either a sunspot equilibrium or a non sunspot equilibrium to the related securities games but the converse is not true in general

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

run equilibria in the green lin model of financial intermediation abstract we study the green lin model of financial intermediation e j green p lin implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation j econ theory 109 2003 1 23 under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents we derive the efficient allocation in closed form we show that in some cases the intermediary cannot uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism in these cases the mechanism also admits an equilibrium in which some but not all agents run on the intermediary and withdraw their funds regardless of their true liquidity needs in other words self fulfilling runs can arise in a generalized green lin model and these runs are necessarily partial with only some agents participating

economic growth liquidity and bank runs abstract we construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium in this setting a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output in addition the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks and thereby affects the long run growth rate these facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods a bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules in the first a run occurs with a fixed exogenous probability while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks portfolio choices we show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs

winners and losers in a major price war abstract although retail price wars have received much business press and some research attention it is unclear how they affect consumer purchase behavior this article studies an unprecedented price war in dutch grocery retailing that started in fall 2003 initiated by the market leader to halt its sliding market share the authors investigate the short and long term effects of the price war on store visits on spending and on the sensitivity of these decisions to weekly prices and price image they use a unique data set with consumer hand scan and perceptual data for a national panel of 1821 households covering two years before and two years after the price war started although the price war initially entailed more shopping around and increased spending spending per visit ultimately dropped because consumers redistributed their purchases across stores the price war made consumers more sensitive to weekly prices and price image which helped both the chain that showed an improvement in price image

meat meets meta a quantitative review of the price elasticity of meat the price elasticity of meat has been estimated in numerous studies that utilize a variety of disparate modeling procedures in light of differences in the literature a meta analysis is performed to assess the sensitivity of the meat price elasticity to a number of characteristics including the type of meat specification of demand nature of data estimation method characteristics of the publication outlet and location of demand the results from estimating linear and box cox meta regressions coupled with different panel data treatments reveal that these characteristics have differing influence on the reported price elasticity

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

run proof banking without suspension or deposit insurance abstract in a model of banking with asymmetric information among depositors and multiple sources of aggregate risk i show that a demand deposit arrangement with state contingent deposit payments and a priority of claims provision on final date resources is almost best under this arrangement intermediaries infer the realization of aggregate risk and of a privately observed signal on the outcome of the risky technology from depositors withdrawal choices and panics as well as information based runs are averted neither suspension provisions nor deposit insurance are necessary for an efficient run proof banking system furthermore intermediation provides information production services that a credit market does not necessarily provide