learning about a new technology pineapple in ghana this paper investigates the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new agri cultural technology in ghana we use unique data on farmers communication patterns to define each individual s information neighborhood conditional on many potentially confounding variables we find evidence that farmers adjust their inputs to align with those of their information neighbors who were surpris ingly successful in previous periods the relationship of these input adjustments to experience further indicates the presence of social learning in addition applying the same method to input choices for another crop of known technol ogy correctly indicates an absence of social learning effects jel d83 013 033 q16

international environmental agreements for local and global pollution abstract increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of international environmental agreements ieas as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects in this paper we study the stability of ieas in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which are simple and invariant to renegotiation our main contribution is that we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of an iea when pollution has both a global and local effect local pollution spillovers are represented by a network structure we find that stable ieas exist if the network structure is balanced too large asymmetries in the degree of local spillovers may however lead to non existence of stable structures we also discuss the implications of our results for welfare the generality of our approach allows for several applications in particular the provision of public goods

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

tax evasion on a social network abstract we relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on social comparison in judgements taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their social network the unique nash equilibrium of the model relates optimal evasion to a bonacich measure of network centrality more central taxpayers evade more given that tax authorities are now investing heavily in big data tools that aim to construct social networks we investigate the value of acquiring network information we do this using networks that allow for celebrity taxpayers whose consumption is seen widely and who are systematically of higher wealth we show that there are pronounced returns to the initial acquisition of network information especially in the presence of celebrity taxpayers

adaptive learning in weighted network games abstract this paper studies adaptive learning in the class of weighted network games this class of games includes applications like research and development within interlinked firms crime within social networks the economics of pollution and defense expenditures within allied nations we show that for every weighted network game the set of pure nash equilibria is non empty and generically finite pairs of players are shown to have jointly profitable deviations from interior nash equilibria if all interaction weights are either non negative or non positive then nash equilibria are pareto inefficient we show that quite general learning processes converge to a nash equilibrium of a weighted network game if every player updates with some regularity

public goods in networks this paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non excludable along social or geographic links we find first that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision in every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride in many networks this extreme is the only outcome second specialization can benefit society as a whole this outcome arises when contributors are linked collectively to many agents finally a new link increases access to public goods but reduces individual incentives to contribute hence overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network

a latent structure approach to measuring reputation the present study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation specifically this study seeks to i quantify the reputation of washington apples over time ii study the dynamic nature of reputation and iii analyze the effect of the label washington apple the model adopted in this study is the dynamic multiple indicator multiple cause dymimic modeling approach which is a special case of the general latent variable modeling scheme called state space models both dymimic and hedonic approaches are applied to the data on washington apples and results from the two approaches are compared reputation plays an important role in assuring product quality in markets where consumers can only imperfectly judge the product quality until after consumption if reputation effects are absent in these types of markets there is an incentive for producers to reduce quality and take short run gains before buyers catch on in order to avoid such quality cutting products with good reputations will sell for premium prices shapiro 1983 showed theoretically that price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in quality and reputation there is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation but empirical studies are limited empirical studies on the impact of firm reputation on shareholder wealth or product demand include jarrell and peltzman 1985 borenstein and zimmerman 1988 and karpoff and lott 1993 caves and green 1996 showed that factors that may affect a firm s reputation influence the relationship between price and quality gorton 1996 analyzed how a bank s reputation for default affects the discount rate on its debt the measurement of the value of reputation to producers in terms of price premiums and how a reputation can be built up and destroyed are important issues that have not been empirically analyzed the current study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation steenkamp 1990 points out that consumers observe at the moment of purchase the intrinsic and extrinsic product quality cues but not the quality attributes intrinsic cues are characteristics of the product such as color freshness texture and flavor while extrinsic

natural endowments production technologies and the quality of wines in bordeaux does terroir matter we study whether quality assessments made by wine experts and by consumers based on prices obtained at auction between 1980 and 1992 can be explained by variables describing endowments land characteristics exposures of vineyards and technologies from grape varieties and picking to bottled wines however since technological choices are likely to depend on endowments the effects can only be identified using an instrumental variables approach we show that technological choices affect quality much more than natural endowments the effect of which is negligible

optimal pricing in networks with externalities we study the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a divisible good service to consumers who are embedded in a social network a key feature of our model is that consumers experience a positive local network effect in particular each consumer s usage level depends directly on the usage of her neighbors in the social network structure thus the monopolist s optimal pricing strategy may involve offering discounts to certain agents who have a central position in the underlying network our results can be summarized as follows first we consider a setting where the monopolist can offer individualized prices and derive a characterization of the optimal price for each consumer as a function of her network position in particular we show that it is optimal for the monopolist to charge each agent a price that consists of three components i a nominal term that is independent of the network structure ii a discount term proportional to the influence that this agent exerts over the rest of the social network quantified by the agent s bonacich centrality and iii a markup term proportional to the influence that the network exerts on the agent in the second part of the paper we discuss the optimal strategy of a monopolist who can only choose a single uniform price for the good and derive an algorithm polynomial in the number of agents to compute such a price third we assume that the monopolist can offer the good in two prices full and discounted and we study the problem of determining which set of consumers should be given the discount we show that the problem is np hard however we provide an explicit characterization of the set of agents who should be offered the discounted price next we describe an approximation algorithm for finding the optimal set of agents we show that if the profit is nonnegative under any feasible price allocation the algorithm guarantees at least 88 of the optimal profit finally we highlight the value of network information by comparing the profits of a monopolist who does not take into account the network effects when choosing her pricing policy to those of a monopolist who uses this information optimally

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

a potential disintegration of the west antarctic ice sheet implications for economic analyses of climate policy the earth system may react in a nonlinear threshold response to climate forcings incorporating threshold responses into integrated assessment models iams used for climate policy analysis poses nontrivial challenges for example due to methodological limitations and pervasive deep uncertainties here we explore a specific threshold response a potential disintegration of the west antarctic ice sheet wais we review the current scientific understanding of wais identify methodological and conceptual issues and demonstrate avenues to address some of them through a stochastic hazard iam framework combining emulation expert knowledge and learning we conclude with a discussion of challenges and research needs

collective reputation and quality firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem we show that for an experience good without firm traceability individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub optimal for the group these results support minimum quality standards trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem finally the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of washington apples specialty regional authentic and local food products have become a more important part of consumer purchases in recent years firms have responded by marketing food products that come from specific geographic areas this trend in consumers preferences has led the european union to introduce protected designations of origin labels and protected geographical identification labels which provide protection of food names on a geographical or traditional basis ranging from parmesan cheese to such lesser known items such as galician veal in the united states there are popular state products that carry labels such as washington apples idaho potatoes

peer effects in endogenous networks abstract this paper presents a model of strategic network formation with local complementarities in effort levels and positive local externalities results are obtained for a general class of payoff functions which subsumes the linear quadratic specification frequently used in theoretical and applied work we assume homogeneous agents and characterize equilibria for two sided and one sided link formation pairwise nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs which are a strict subset of core periphery networks we highlight the relevance of the convexity of the value function for obtaining these structures more central agents are shown to exert more effort and obtain higher gross payoffs in equilibrium however net of linking cost central agents may obtain strictly lower net payoffs the curvature of the value function is also important for efficiency considerations these findings are relevant for many social and economic phenomena such as educational attainment criminal activity labor market participation and r d expenditures of firms

learning by doing and learning from others human capital and technical change in agriculture household level panel data from a nationally representative sample of rural indian households describing the adoption and profitability of high yielding seed varieties hyvs associated with the green revolution are used to test the implications of a model incorporating learning by doing and learning spillovers the estimates indicate that i imperfect knowledge about the management of the new seeds was a significant barrier to adoption ii this barrier diminished as farmer experience with the new technologies increased iii own experience and neighbors experience with hyvs significantly increased hyv profitability and iv farmers do not fully incorporate the village returns to learning in making adoption decisions

the law of the few the law of the few refers to the following empirical phenomenon in social groups a very small subset of individuals invests in collecting information while the rest of the group invests in forming connections with this select few in many instances there are no observable dierences in characteristics between those who invest in information and those who invest in forming connections this paper shows that the law of few naturally emerges in environments with identical rational agents we develop a strategic game in which players have the opportunity to invest in collecting information as well as in investing in bilateral connections with others we find that every strict equilibrium of this game exhibits the law of the few we also show that this pattern of social dierentiations is ecient in some cases

the economics of collective reputation evidence from the wine industry we use original data regarding the array of italian winery coalitions wine denominations to analyze the economics and determinants of collective reputation we first run a cross sectional analysis with 2008 data and the full set of control variables then move to the dynamics of collective reputation with panel data analysis on a 30 year time span 1978 2008 group reputation is history dependent in particular past bad collective behavior increases the probability of being stuck in a bad reputation trap minimum quality standards and effective enforcement are fundamental drivers of group reputation the relationship between group size and collective reputation is non linear free entry may not be optimal due to free riding problems finally institutional signals such as the wine classification system are useful because they can be used by consumers as easily available proxies for information that is much more difficult to acquire

heterogeneity and fine wine prices application of the quantile regression approach this study addresses the price heterogeneity of the five first growths of bordeaux we apply the quantile regression qr approach with market segmentation based on wine bottle price quantiles we

network security and contagion abstract we develop a theoretical model of security investments in a network of interconnected agents network connections introduce the possibility of cascading failures due to an exogenous or endogenous attack depending on the profile of security investments by the agents we provide a tractable decomposition of individual payoffs into an own effect and an externality which also enables us to characterize individual investment incentives recursively by considering the network with one agent removed at a time using this decomposition we provide characterization of equilibrium and socially optimal investment levels as a function of the structure of the network highlighting the role of a new set of network centrality measures in shaping the levels of equilibrium and optimal investments when the attack location is endogenized by assuming that the attacker chooses a probability distribution over the location of the attack in order to maximize damage similar forces still operate but now because greater investment by an agent shifts the attack to other parts of the network the equilibrium may involve too much investment relative to the social optimum

why the far distant future should be discounted at its lowest possible rate abstract a critical feature of the distant future is currently unresolvable uncertainty about what will then be the appropriate rate of return on capital to use for discounting this paper shows that there is a well defined sense in which the lowest possible interest rate should be used for discounting the far distant future part of any investment project some implications are discussed for evaluating long term environmental projects or activities like measures to mitigate the possible effects of global climate change

product reliability and firm value the experience of american and japanese automakers 1973 1992 in a typical month several recall campaigns of motor vehicles are announced by automobile manufacturers they are carried out to correct defective vehicles whether safetyor pollution related recalls imply that the products made available to consumers are not what they were supposed to be a question arises then as to whether and how much the offending automakers are affected by these recall campaigns the answer to this question has been ambiguous in the literature we have two purposes in this paper first on the basis of a longer and broader database we offer additional and more conclusive evidence that documents significant and negative market reactions to automobile recall announcements our finding therefore helps to resolve the ambiguity in the literature on this question second we offer new evidence on japanese automobile companies they too suffer from significant and negative stock market reactions but the incidence of recalls is less frequent perhaps as a result the magnitude of the stock market reaction to each recall is somewhat larger nevertheless because recalls are much less frequent the total losses

the structure of economic modeling of the potential impacts of climate change grafting gross underestimation of risk onto already narrow science models scientists describe the scale of the risks from unmanaged climate change as potentially immense however the scientific models because they omit key factors that are hard to capture precisely appear to substantially underestimate these risks many economic models add further gross underassessment of risk because the assumptions built into the economic modeling on growth damages and risks come close to assuming directly that the impacts and costs will be modest and close to excluding the possibility of catastrophic outcomes a new generation of models is needed in all three of climate science impact and economics with a still stronger focus on lives and livelihoods including the risks of large scale migration and conflicts

sparkling wine choice from supermarket shelves the impact of certification of origin and production practices we report the results of a study based on revealed and stated preference data on choice of prosecco wines in retail stores close to the origin of production in northern italy emphasis is placed on ability to reconcile the utility structure of stated preference data with that underlying revealed preference data we extend the analysis to cover nonattendance of key attributes such as price and certification of origin while controlling for the large range of brand effects

estimating the value of an in kind transfer the case of food stamps the value of one in kind transfer food stamps is estimated by evaluating the experience of an actual conversion from stamps to cash in puerto rico in 1982 the evidence indicates that the cashout of the stamps had no detectable influence on food expenditures the explanation partly lies in the distribution of expenditures for the stamps were inframarginal for most recipients however some evidence indicates that trafficking in stamps was widespread as well including indirect evidence from estimation of the piecewise linear constraint model copyright 1989 by the econometric society

hedonic price functions and the measurement of preferences the case of swedish wine consumers abstract a hedonic price function for wine is estimated using swedish data 1989 1991 implicit prices for quality attributes are determined not from a regression of variety price on a vector of quality attributes but rather from a regression of quantity sold adjusted for weeks of availability on price and quality attributes such a reduced form is justified by the assumption that prices and attribute contents can be taken as exogenous to the swedish consumer price elasticity is estimated to be about 1 65 holding quality constant showing that swedish consumers are highly sensitive to price estimates of the implicit valuations of quality attributes are shown to differ greatly from those obtained from the more usual hedonic regression with price as the dependent variable

consumer sorting and hedonic valuation of wine attributes exploiting data from a field experiment this article uses a novel experimental approach to measure consumer willingness to pay wtp for wine attributes we invited customers of a local supermarket who had selected a bottle of wine to purchase to participate in a valuation experiment integrating their original wine choice into the experiment each participant evaluated six alternative wines generating a rich set of data on willingness to pay and consumer characteristics the data from the experiment allow us to compare standard shelf price based wine attribute valuation estimates with estimates using wtp data and an increasing amount of information about individual consumers the full model employs individual fixed effects to estimate wtp parameters without bias from consumer sorting or supply side influences our wtp estimates for wine attributes differ markedly from previous attribute value estimates consumers in our sample display clear and stable preferences for wine varieties but less clear preferences for appellations our results suggest caution is needed in using market prices to estimate parameters of the consumer valuation function for product attributes

the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods abstract this note provides an alternative elementary proof of bergstrom blume and varian s well known result on the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of a public good when all goods are normal

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change the stern review calls for immediate decisive action to stabilize greenhouse gases because the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweighs the costs the economic analysis supporting this conclusion consists mostly of two basic strands the first strand is a formal aggregative model that relies for its conclusions primari ly upon imposing a very low discount rate concerning this discount rate aspect i am skeptical of the review s formal analysis but this essay points out that we are actual ly a lot less sure about what interest rate should be used for discounting climate change than is commonly acknowledged the review s second basic strand is a more intuitive argument that it might be very important to avoid possibly large uncertain ties that are difficult to quantify concerning this uncertainty aspect i argue that it might be recast into sound analytical reasoning that might justify some of the review s conclusions the basic issue here is that spending money to slow global warming should perhaps not be conceptualized primarily as being about consump tion smoothing as much as being about how much insurance to buy to offset the small change of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to compensate by ordinary savings

what s in a name reputation as a tradeable asset the author develops a model in which a firm s only asset is its name which summarizes its reputation and studies the forces that cause names to be valuable tradable assets an adverse selection model in which shifts of ownership are not observable guarantees an active market for names with either finite or infinite horizons no equilibrium exists in which only good types buy good names the reputational dynamics that emerge from the model are more realistic than those in standard game theoretic reputation models and suggest that adverse selection plays a crucial role in understanding firm reputation

strength of protection for geographical indications promotion incentives and welfare effects we address the question of how the strength of protection for geographical indications gis affects the gi industry s promotion incentives equilibrium market outcomes and the distribution of welfare geographical indication producers engage in informative advertising by associating their true quality premium relative to a substitute product with a specific label emphasizing the gi s geographic origin the extent to which the names words of the gi label can be used and or imitated by competing products which depends on the strength of gi protection determines how informative the gi promotion messages can be consumers heterogeneous preferences vis a vis the gi quality premium are modeled in a vertically differentiated framework both the gi industry and the substitute product industry are assumed to be competitive with free entry the model is calibrated and solved for alternative parameter values results show that producers of the gi and of the lower quality substitute good have divergent interests gi producers are better off with full protection whereas the substitute good s producers prefer intermediate levels of protection but they never prefer zero protection because they benefit indirectly if the gi producers incentives to promote are preserved for consumers and aggregate welfare the preferred level of protection depends on the model s parameters with an intermediate level of protection being optimal in many circumstances

the economics of nested names name specificity reputations and price premia a good can be identified by its region or country of origin the firm that produces it and its product name in other words names can nest within each other to categorize goods with increasing specificity this article develops a conceptual framework for jointly analyzing the effect of product firm and collective reputations on market price the model is estimated via quantile regression with california wine market data the results portray how the structure and relative importance of reputations change as product prices vary specifically reputation premia migrate from collective to specific names as prices increase

prioritarianism and climate change prioritarianism is the ethical view that gives greater weight to well being changes affecting individuals at lower well being levels this view is influential both in moral philosophy and in theoretical work on social choice where it is captured by a social welfare function swf summing a concave transformation of individual well being numbers however prioritarianism has largely been ignored by scholarship on climate change this article compares utilitarianism and prioritarianism as frameworks for evaluating climate policy it reviews the distinctive normative choices that are required for the prioritarian approach specifying a ratio scale for well being if the prioritarian swf takes the standard atkinson form determining the degree of concavity of the transformation function i e the degree of social inequality aversion and choosing between ex ante and ex post prioritarianism under conditions of risk the article also sketches some of salient implications of a prioritarian swf for climate policy with respect to the social cost of carbon the social discount rate optimal mitigation and the dismal theorem finally it discusses the issue of variable population

uniqueness of nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods an improved proof our 1986 paper private provision of public goods presents a theorem on the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods richard hirth of the university of pennsylvania and clive fraser of warwick have independently suggested that although our theorem is correct our proof is incorrect each writer proposes an alternative method of proof for the theorem with characteristic charity to our own deficiencies we prefer to view our earlier proof as unduly opaque rather than wrong whichever view one takes a more transparent proof is called for the proof presented here follows the same outline as our 1986 proof but explains a step of the argument that was far from obvious in the original proof this proof uses the notation of the 1986 paper and refers to facts that are proved there

social norms in networks abstract although the linear in means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects its theoretical properties are understudied in this study we develop a social norm model that provides a microfoundation of the linear in means model and investigate its properties we show that individual outcomes may increase decrease or vary non monotonically with the taste for conformity equilibria are usually inefficient and to restore the first best the planner needs to subsidize tax agents whose neighbors make efforts above below the social norms thus giving more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily efficient we also discuss the policy implications of our model in terms of education and crime

market incentives for safe foods an examination of shareholder losses from meat and poultry recalls meat and poultry recalls while voluntary are carried out under governmental oversight if firms have financial incentives to avoid being implicated in a recall situation governmental involvement in recalls may cause firms to internalize social costs when making investment decisions concerning food safety controls to examine these incentives we analyze federally supervised meat and poultry recalls from 1982 to 1998 within an event study results show significant shareholder losses when publicly traded food companies are implicated in a recall involving serious food safety hazards we find no evidence that the stock market reacts negatively when recalls involve less severe hazards each year unsafe foods sicken millions and lead to losses in terms of life and productivity mead et al estimate that foodborne pathogens account for 76 million illnesses and 5 000 deaths in the united states given human error and the limitations of food safety technology food items that pose undue risks to the public will be distributed from time to time when this occurs the firms involved stand to incur expenses related to recovering disposing of or reconditioning potentially contaminated products already placed on the market in addition negative publicity can lead to reductions in product demand and may erode prior investments in reputation and brand capital these firms may also face costs from liability claims associated with an outbreak of food related illnesses or injury our main objective in this paper is to examine reductions in food company valuations that result from food contamination incidents we focus specifically on meat and poultry firms that have shipped products that were later recalled for food safety reasons because preventative actions taken by firms can affect the probability of being implicated in a product recall situation the wealth that is lost when companies are required to recall

altruism in networks we provide the first analysis of altruism in networks agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about the well being of their network neighbors depending on incomes they may provide financial support to their poorer friends we study the nash equilibria of the resulting game of transfers we show that equilibria maximize a concave potential function we establish existence uniqueness of equilibrium consumption and generic uniqueness of equilibrium transfers we characterize the geometry of the network of transfers and highlight the key role played by transfer intermediaries we then study comparative statics a positive income shock to an individual benefits all for small changes in incomes agents in a component of the network of transfers act as if they were organized in an income pooling community a decrease in income inequality or expansion of the altruism network may increase consumption inequality

price and quality cycles for experience goods we explore a dynamic competitive model for experience goods and study an equilibrium for it in which firms plan initially to produce high quality at low price then high quality at high price then low quality at high price each consumer is aware that all firms eventually intend to run down their reputations at customers expense yet he rationally chooses to wait for direct evidence that the firm to which he is attached has already entered into the exploitative phase

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

forecasting bordeaux wine prices using state space methods generic bordeaux red wine basic claret can be regarded as being similar to an agricultural commodity production volumes are substantial they are traded at high frequency and the quality of the

evaluating the net benefits of collective reputation the case of bordeaux wine in this paper we develop an original approach to assess the net benefits associated with a generic promotion program using an application to bordeaux wines the benefit is computed from the marginal impact of the program s collective reputation on the individual reputation for sub regions within bordeaux these different marginal impacts are estimated using detailed survey data about the image of bordeaux wines in seven european countries we find positive and significant spillover effects from the collective reputation bordeaux that moreover increase with the reputation of the sub region these spillover effects when significantly positive vary from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 15 of additional favorable quality opinions we then calculate a measure of the average net benefits earned by producers from the regional promotion program in selected sub regions within bordeaux our results indicate that producers in some sub regions are more likely to benefit from the promotion program and suggest that the current fee structure may not be properly aligned with market conditions

the stability of the cournot oligopoly model a reassessment abstract the stability properties of the cournot oligopoly model are examined for the continuous adjustment process sufficient conditions for instability are established which are shown to be of significance when the number of firms n is small local and global stability are shown under appropriate conditions which for global stability include the restriction n 5 the proof of global stability corrects a well known proof by f hahn rev econ stud 29 1962 329 331 results for the discrete time adjustment process are reported and the restrictiveness of the model s assumptions are discussed

does food safety information impact u s meat demand a theoretical model of consumer response to publicized food safety information on meat demand is developed with an empirical application to u s meat consumption evidence is found for the existence of pre committed levels of consumption seasonal factors time trends and contemporaneous own and cross commodity food safety concerns the average demand response to food safety concerns is small especially in comparison to price effects and to previous estimates of health related issues this small average effect masks periods of significantly larger responses corresponding with prominent food safety events but these larger impacts are short lived with no apparent food safety lagged effects on food safety concerns in the united states have dramatically increased in the past decade with regard to incidences of contaminated meat products concerns have arisen because contaminated meat products can result in serious risk to the well being and health of consumers contamination comes from a myriad of sources including but not limited to outbreaks of listeria monocytogenes escherichia coli e coli and salmonella centers for disease control and prevention food safety problems are not isolated to the united states as other unsafe contaminates in meats have emerged across the world including highly publicized outbreaks of bovine spongiform encephalopathy bse in europe the potential impacts of publicized food safety events on consumer s demand for meat products in the united states include own effects on the demand for the contaminated meat involved as well as cross effects impacting the demand for other meats the objective of this article is to investigate whether publicized food safety concerns surrounding beef pork and poultry chicken and turkey have impacted meat consumption food safety indices are constructed separately for beef pork and poultry

key market values for bottled wine in an emerging market product attributes or business strategy this article focuses on the emerging bottled chilean red wine market and studies the main determinants of the consumer price of wine sold on the domestic market a hedonic price function was estima

altruists egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model the authors study a population of agents each of whom can be an altruist or an egoist altruism is a strictly dominated strategy agents choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs interactions between agents are local so that each agent affects and is affected by only his neighbors altruists can survive in such a world if they are grouped together so that the benefits of altruism are enjoyed primarily by other altruists who then earn relatively high payoffs and are imitated altruists continue to survive in the presence of mutations that continually introduce egoists into the population copyright 1998 by american economic association

specifications of social welfare in economic studies of climate policy overview of criteria and related policy insights an important assumption in economic studies of climate policy is the social welfare function this paper shows that applying distinct decision or social welfare criteria can result in different optimal policies of climate control notably if climate change impacts are uncertain first decision criteria in current climate economic studies are reviewed next the most important alternatives are discussed including their mathematical formalization and incorporation in economy climate models most of these alternative criteria suggest more stringent climate policies to be optimal than the standard discounted utilitarianism approach however several important welfare criteria have not or hardly seen any application in the economic analysis of climate policy we conclude that there is clear need for systematic research on this theme for which the current review provides a solid basis

the cost of segregation in social networks abstract this paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks we first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by bonacich centrality then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions which roughly speaking measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors the proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that display special segregated interactions which suggests an asymptotic neutrality of redistributive policies

on the private provision of public goods on networks abstract this paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors provisions we present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a nash equilibrium for general networks and best reply functions in addition we investigate the neutrality result of warr 38 and bergstrom blume and varian 6 whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision financed by lump sum taxes to this effect we show that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond a special network architecture in the neighborhood of the set of contributors

towards a differentiated modelling of origin effects in hedonic analysis an application to auction prices of specialty coffee abstract origin matters this has been shown by numerous studies using either discrete choice or hedonic approaches to derive implicit prices for origin as a product attribute in most of the hedonic studies intercept dummies were introduced for specific regional origins and statistically significant coefficients of those variables were seen as an indication of either a superior or inferior reputation compared to products from other origins we argue that hedonic pricing models of this type may be too simple to detect the true origin effects if assessments of a product s sensory quality are available and interact with prior beliefs about reputation based on a supply and demand framework to explain auction prices a reduced form hedonic pricing model is suggested that includes intercept as well as slope dummy effects of the regional origin because reputation and the objective product quality are particularly important for markets of differentiated high quality foods and beverages we analyze electronic auction markets for specialty coffees the findings for the cup of excellence data reveal that it is important to distinguish reputation sensory quality and their interaction as determinants of coffee auction prices as well as varying origin impacts across market segments

the samuelson condition and the lindahl scheme in networks abstract we study optimal provision of public goods in the network showing that the samuelson condition and the lindahl scheme can both be substantially extended to characterize the expenditure on such public goods couched in terms of the structure of the network the extended samuelson condition and lindahl scheme formulate precisely how the local publicness of a local public good fundamentally determines its optimal provision and the personalized price that the lindahl tax payer faces independence of the optimal allocation from the distribution of resources at interior samuelsonian solutions in the network generally fails to hold even for the bergstrom cornes preferences

estimation of a hedonic price equation for bordeaux wine does quality matter in this paper the hedonic price technique is applied to bordeaux wine in the hedonic price function we include not only the objective characteristics appearing on the label of the bottle but also the sensory characteristics of the wine our data come from an experimental study in which juries have evaluated and graded a sample of bordeaux wines the estimation of the hedonic price equation shows that the market price is essentially determined by the objective characteristics the estimation of a jury grade equation shows that quality unlike the market price is essentially determined by the sensory characteristics

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change how much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming the stern review argues that the damages from climate change are large and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions an examination of the review s radical revision of the economics of climate change finds however that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function the review s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis