contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

risk in dynamic arbitrage the price effects of convergence trading i develop an equilibrium model of convergence trading and its impact on asset prices arbitrageurs optimally decide how to allocate their limited capital over time their activity reduces price discrepancies but their activity also generates losses with positive probability even if the trading opportunity is fundamentally riskless moreover prices of identical assets can diverge even if the constraints faced by arbitrageurs are not binding occasionally total losses are large making arbitrageurs returns negatively skewed consistent with the empirical evidence the model also predicts comovement of arbitrageurs expected returns and market liquidity many hedge funds and other financial institutions attempt to exploit the relative mispricing of assets however from time to time the prices of the assets diverge forcing these institutions whom i will refer to as convergence traders or arbitrageurs to unwind some of their positions at spectacular losses the near collapse of the long term capital management ltcm hedge fund in 1998 is frequently cited as an example of this phenomenon 1 to what extent can these losses be attributed to the actions of arbitrageurs as opposed to unforeseen shocks why do other institutions with liquid capital not eliminate the abnormal returns around these events in this paper i develop a theoretical model to address these questions i show that such losses can occur in the absence of any shock i also show that even if the constraints faced by

a model of tourism destination choice a theoretical and empirical analysis abstract in recent years tourism has become one of the fastest growing sectors of the world economy and is widely recognised for its contribution to regional and national economic development the main aim of the paper is to propose a methodological framework within which the impact of characteristics of a tourism product on foreign travel can be captured and analysed this is achieved by combining the lancasterian product characteristics approach with the koppelman s consumer transportation model within the proposed model the characteristics of the tourism product destination including quality of service advertising and political instability are combined to generate a perception feeling regarding the tourism destination in the mind of the tourists in order to measure these perceptions feelings and hence develop a preference ordering the model is estimated by utilising a conditional logit analysis the analysis is based on primary data collected from tourists visiting cyprus the conditional logit model generates the probability of revisit given the characteristics of tourists and the cyprus tourism product the paper extends further the lancaster product characteristics framework as applied to tourism by rugg rev econom stat 55 1 1973 64 morley ann tourism res 19 1992 250 and papatheodorou ann tourism res 28 2001 164 by including the neglected but from any viewpoint important political instability characteristic that is attached to the tourist product of cyprus the inclusion of product characteristics attributes in tourism analysis appear to strongly contribute towards the better understanding of travel choice behaviour

did rabuka s military coups have a permanent effect or a transitory effect on tourist expenditure in fiji evidence from vogelsang s structural break test abstract the central aim of this paper is to investigate whether the military coups instigated by major general sitiveni rabuka in 1987 had a permanent effect or a transitory effect on tourist expenditures in fiji to accomplish this aim we use the vogelsang econ theory 13 1997 818 test for one break in linear trending data the vogelsang test reveals 1988 as the year of the break and based on a suite of test statistics recommended by vogelsang we reject the unit root null leading to the conclusion that rabuka s coups had a transitory effect on tourist expenditure in fiji

self fulfilling fire sales fragility of collateralised short term debt markets this paper shows that collateralised short term debt although privately optimal for reducing borrowers moral hazard can cause fragility multiple equilibria when the collateral market is illiquid a new form of coordination failure between borrowers ex ante margin and risk taking decisions engenders a systemic run in the collateralised debt market large changes in credit rationing margins repo spreads etc the model also captures the large small crosssectional differences between safe and risky collateral in bad good times finally i show that asset price guarantees could improve welfare and promote stability but repealing repo contracts automatic stay exemption might do the opposite

oiling the palms restructuring of settlement schemes in malaysia and the new international trade regulations abstract the felda resettlement program in malaysia is internationally recognized as a success story in terms of cultivated area number of settlers and scope of vertical integration in the malaysian palm oil industry since the mid 1980s however a series of reorganizations of work and property rights in the settlement schemes have taken place it is argued here that the recent adjustments of felda are in accordance with the new rules for international regulation of agricultural production and trade in the wto international trade regulations increasingly influence the direction of socioeconomic and institutional struggles over rural reform programs in developing countries

money liquidity and monetary policy in a market based financial system banking and capital market developments are inseparable and funding conditions are closely tied to fluctuations in the leverage of market based financial intermediaries offering a window on liquidity the balance sheet growth of broker dealers provides a sense of the availability of credit contractions of broker dealer balance sheets have tended to precede declines in real economic growth even before the current turmoil for this reason balance sheet quantities of market based financial intermediaries are important macroeconomic state variables for the conduct of monetary policy

asset redeployability liquidation value and endogenous capital structure heterogeneity firms with lower leverage are not only less likely to experience financial distress but are also better positioned to acquire assets from other distressed firms with endogenous asset sales and values each firm s debt choice then depends on the choices of its industry peers with indivisible assets otherwise identical firms may adopt different debt policies with some choosing highly levered operations to take advantage of ongoing debt benefits and others choosing more conservative policies to wait for acquisition opportunities our key empirical implication is that the acquisition channel can induce firms to reduce debt when assets become more redeployable

events in indonesia exploring the limits to formal tourism trends forecasting methods in complex crisis situations the desire to know the future is as old as humanity for the tourism industry the demand for accurate foretelling of the future course of events is a task that consumes considerable energy and is of great significance to investors this paper examines the issue of forecasting by comparing forecasts of inbound tourism made prior to the political and economic crises that engulfed indonesia from 1997 onwards with actual arrival figures the paper finds that current methods of forecasting are not able to cope with unexpected crises and other disasters and that alternative methods need to be examined including scenarios political risk and application of chaos theory the paper outlines a framework for classifying shocks according to a scale of severity probability type of event level of certainty and suggested forecasting tools for each scale of shock

government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection we study government interventions in a dynamic market with asymmetric information we show that if the government can only carry out budget neutral policies introducing a short tax exempt trading window followed by short lived positive taxes creates a pareto improvement in the market under a su cient condition on the shape of the gains from trade and the distribution of asset values we show that even when not requiring budget neutrality it is optimal to subsidize trades only at time zero while imposing prohibitively high taxes afterwards subsidies can greatly enhance welfare but they can also be detrimental if they are provided with delay

convergence trading with wealth effects an amplification mechanism in financial markets abstract i study convergence traders with logarithmic utility in a continuous time equilibrium model in general convergence traders reduce asset price volatility and provide liquidity by taking risky positions against noise trading however when an unfavorable shock causes them to suffer capital losses thus eroding their risk bearing capacity they liquidate their positions thereby amplifying the original shock in extreme circumstances this wealth effect causes convergence traders to be destabilizing in that they trade in exactly the same direction as noise traders this situation is consistent with the near collapse of long term capital management in 1998

tourism trade and growth the case of cyprus although the relationship between international trade and economic growth has found a wide application area in the literature over the years this can not be said about tourism and growth or trade and tourism this study employs the bounds test for cointegration and granger causality tests to investigate a long run equilibrium relationship between tourism trade and real income growth and the direction of causality among themselves for cyprus results reveal that tourism trade and real income growth are cointegrated thus a long run equilibrium relationship can be inferred between these three variables on the other hand granger causality test results suggest that real income growth stimulates growth in international trade both exports and imports and international tourist arrivals to the island furthermore growth in international trade both exports and imports also stimulates an increase in international tourist arrivals to cyprus and finally real import growth stimulate growth in real export

managing markets for toxic assets abstract a model in which banks trade toxic assets to raise funds for investment is analyzed toxic assets generate an adverse selection problem and consequently the interbank asset market provides insufficient liquidity investment is inefficiently low because acquiring funding requires banks to sell high quality assets for less than their fair value equity injections reduce liquidity and may be counterproductive as a policy for increasing investment paradoxically if it is directed to firms with the greatest liquidity needs an equity injection will reduce investment further asset purchase programs like the public private investment program often have favorable impacts on liquidity investment and welfare

private money creation liquidity crises and government interventions abstract the joint supply of public and private liquidity is examined when financial intermediaries issue both riskless and risky debt and the economy is vulnerable to liquidity crises government interventions in the form of asset purchases and deposit insurance are equivalent in the sense that they sustain the same equilibrium allocations increase welfare and if fiscal capacity is sufficiently large eliminate liquidity crises in contrast restricting intermediaries to investing in low risk projects always eliminates liquidity crises but reduces welfare under some conditions deposit insurance gives rise to an equilibrium in which intermediaries that issue insured debt i e traditional banks coexist with others that issue uninsured debt i e shadow banks despite the two being ex ante identical

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

liquidity efficiency and bank bailouts governments can efficiently provide liquidity as when the banking system is bailed out we study a model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date agents sometimes want to sell projects the market price of the projects sold depends on the supply of liquidity which is determined in general equilibrium while private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante there is a role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities

contagious bank failures in a free banking system this paper develops a model of an unregulated banking system based around a private clearing house arrangement whilst such a system may dominate one with a public safety net in reducing moral hazard in lending and therefore the scope for individual bank insolvency it also increases the likelihood of contagious bank failures following a systemic shock or an aggregate liquidity shortage

the impact of political instability on a fragile tourism product abstract the eastern mediterranean and aegean sea are not the first areas to find themselves engulfed in a political situation which threatens economies so reliant upon tourism and foreign currency receipts recent examples along the coast of north africa and former yugoslavia for instance show how foreign tourism can be all but obliterated by political instability and civil upheaval the on going dispute between the two partitioned communities on the island of cyprus threatens not only a tourism destination already suffering from increased competition and quality problems but also the neighbouring countries greece and turkey who rely upon tourism to contribute to their economies downturns in these economies can only exacerbate the problems in a vicious circle the reader is introduced to the more recent causes and the threats occurring in the area

market and public liquidity as the record of federal reserve interventions over the past year from december 2007 to december 2008 makes abundantly clear a foremost concern of monetary authorities in responding to the financial crisis has been to avoid a repeat of the great depression and especially a repeat of the monetary contraction that milton friedman and anna schwartz 1963 have claimed as the major cause of the 1930s depression the fed has shown tremendous resourcefulness and inventiveness in its liquidity injections considerably widening the collateral eligible under the discount window and the term auction facility and setting up new programs targeted at primary dealers the commercial paper market and money market funds at the same time it has stepped in to offer guarantees on assets held by some financial institutions e g citigroup to avoid their bankruptcy see david enrich et al 2008 this unprecedented intervention has had the intended effect of averting a major systemic financial meltdown and it has kept some critical financial institutions afloat yet until now banks have mostly responded by cutting new lending and hoarding liquidity so that the ultimate goal of forestalling a credit crunch has not been achieved for the most part banks also are still holding most of the toxic assets that monetary policy liquidity and financial crises

uncertainty in an interconnected financial system contagion and market freezes this paper studies contagion and market freezes caused by uncertainty in financial network structures our model demonstrates that in a financial system where financial institutions are interconnected a negative shock to an individual financial institution could spread to other institutions causing market freezes because of creditors uncertainty about the financial network structure our model also reveals that when both a large creditor and a continuum of small creditors are present the size of the large creditor will affect the severity of market freezes substantially moreover our model is used to examine central bank policies to alleviate market freezes

does cultural background of tourists influence the destination choice an empirical study with special reference to political instability abstract political instability is a complex and multidimensional term with various conceptualisations and interpretations this paper investigates the cross cultural differences of the perceptions of travel agents concerning the impact of political instability on tourism to capture the impact a composite index of political instability indicators was developed and was subsequently distributed to 2000 travel agents in six major tourism generating countries an integrated empirical framework has been developed which allows the analysis of the survey data using repeated measures anova the results of the study demonstrates the existence of significant differences on the way that travel agents perceive the impact of the various types of political instability on the tourism industry the results might be of some interest to tourism policy makers and marketing agents

asset commonality debt maturity and systemic risk we develop a model in which asset commonality and short term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk two asset structures arise in a clustered structure groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together in an unclustered structure defaults are more dispersed portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency when bank debt is short term creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are ine ciently liquidated this information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures in contrast when bank debt is long term welfare is the same under both asset structures

outside and inside liquidity we propose an origination and contingent distribution model of banking in which liquidity demand by short term investors can be met with cash reserves inside liquidity or sales of assets outside liquidity to long term investors outside liquidity is a more e cient source but asymmetric information about asset quality can introduce a friction in the form of excessively early asset trading in anticipation of a liquidity shock excessively high cash reserves and too little origination of assets by banks the model captures elements of the current flnancial crisis and yields policy prescriptions on public liquidity provision to overcome liquidity crises

frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection abstract this paper studies asset reallocation in over the counter markets subject to search bargaining and information frictions and discusses their implications for optimal monetary policy the results show that inefficiencies arise from trade under private information resulting in reduced trading volume and consumption conditional on search frictions in the over the counter market information frictions can be both welfare decreasing and welfare increasing addressing the pecuniary externality arising from the portfolio choice of liquid and illiquid assets optimality is guaranteed under the friedman rule away from the friedman rule efficiency can be restored through open market operations exchanging information sensitive assets for risk free bonds as conducted by the federal reserve in response to the global financial crisis

overcoming adverse selection how public intervention can restore market functioning as illustrated by liquidity support equity injections and asset repurchases in financial crises and by imf credit lines to countries authorities often intervene in orderto revive markets that have dried up or to create newones in suchsituations agents participate only if they receive from the governmental scheme more than in the marketplace while the market outcome depends on who joins the scheme the paper provides a first analysis of market jumpstarting and its two way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints in the model sellers in need of cash have private information about the value of their legacy asset the absence of buyer confidence forces authorities to intervene to jump start the market we characterize the optimal intervention and draw two main implications first the government should clean up the market through buybacks of the weakest assets and then through some equity injections and leave the agents with the strongest legacy assets to the market in particular authorities should not substitute fully for the market even when they have no comparative disadvantage in acquiring assets or shares thereof second the government creates its own competition by cleaning up the market from its most toxic pieces at the optimal intervention the government always strictly overpays for the legacy asset yet and unlike what would be suggested by coasian profit evasion the existence of a later market imposes no welfare cost while it is cast in a public intervention context the analysis of mechanismdependent reservation utilities also admits important private sector applications

loan sales and relationship banking firms raise money from banks and the bond market banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms optimal financial structure the endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal there is excessive trade in highly rated names and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds we provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets and bond markets further we posit that risk based capital requirements may be socially desirable the term collateralized loan obligations clos was coined in 1989 when corporate loans were first used as collateral in collateralized debt obligations cdos 1 since then the growth in loan sales has been enormous according to lucas et al 2006 1 1 trillion of cdos were outstanding as of 2005 and 50 of their collateral was comprised of loans in addition to pooled securities banks also trade first loss positions on single names through direct sales of individual loans in the united states loan sales have grown from 8 billion in 1991 to 154 8 billion by 2004 2 if a bank securitizes or sells a loan that it originated it is buying insurance on credit events over which it has either more control or more information than the buyer in the face of this informational friction why did the secondary market for corporate loans develop in the 1990s what effect has this had on relationship banking in this paper we characterize when a liquid secondary market for loans arises when a liquid secondary loan market is socially desirable and we provide testable predictions on the effect of the emergence of this market on prices and quantities in bond and primary loan markets our predictions are based on both changes in the parameters that lead to higher loan liquidity and changes in the contracts that are written between banks and firms given this higher liquidity

the eec s policies and its food abstract this article examines four interrelated aspects of the european community s policy as they affect food supply the customs union the adoption of a common agricultural policy the move towards a single market and the recent extension of the ec s competence to embrace environmental matters ec intervention has certainly affected the range quality composition and price of food in europe s stores and that involvement is likely to grow but the cap does not have the dominant role in determining the food europeans eat europe s international buying power and the ready availability of foods on world markets are more potent considerations

food law and the internal market taking stock abstract the history of community food law is briefly traced the changes in policy which followed the difficulties encountered in vertical harmonization and the cassis de dijon case are described 1989 is identified as a turning point since the legal framework for community food law has now been agreed the future legislative programme is described as is the need for cooperation between member states and the commission through all processes from scientific assessment to control

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

combining volatility and smoothing forecasts of uk demand for international tourism abstract univariate volatility models are applied to uk tourism demand to the country s most popular international destinations volatility is a concept borrowed from finance the fact that significant volatility models are found for ten of the twelve destinations examined shows that the volatility concept has relevance to tourism demand volatility models are able to quantify the impacts of positive and negative shocks on tourism demand the impacts of negative shocks vary in magnitude and duration according to the destination involved and the nature of the shock the forecasting capability of these models has never been assessed in the tourism field they are shown to generate highly accurate forecasts but become optimal when combined with forecasts obtained from exponential smoothing models two methods of combining individual forecasts are considered bias in individual volatility and smoothing models and in combinations of them is examined

the fragility of short term secured funding markets abstract this paper develops an infinite horizon model of financial institutions that borrow short term and invest in long term assets that can be traded in frictionless markets because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation they are subject to potential runs we derive distinct liquidity collateral and asset liquidation constraints which determine whether a run can occur as a result of changing market expectations we show that the extent to which borrowers can ward off an individual run depends on whether it has sufficient liquidity collateral and asset liquidation capacity these determinants depend on the borrower s endogenous balance sheet and on exogenous fundamentals systemic runs are possible if shocks to the valuation of collateral held by outside investors are sufficiently strong and uniform and if the system as a whole is exposed to high short term funding risk the theory has policy implications for prudential regulation and lender of last resort interventions

an empirical analysis of excess interbank liquidity a case study of pakistan we investigate the drivers of excess interbank liquidity in pakistan using the autoregressive distributed lag approach on weekly data for december 2005 to july 2011 we find that the financing of the government budget deficit by the central bank and nonbanks leads to persistence in excess liquidity moreover we identify a structural shift in the interbank market in june 2008 before june 2008 low credit demand was driving the excess liquidity holdings by banks after june 2008 banks precautionary investments in risk free securities drive excess liquidity holdings monetary policy is less effective if banks hold excess liquidity for precautionary reasons