time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

inequality inflation and central bank independence what can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries and of the same country over time we present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective we document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution we conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality jel classification e5 h0 inegalite inflation et l independance de la banque centrale quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les experiences inflationnistes tellement differentes des divers pays dans le passe recent et l experience tellement differente d un pays donne dans le temps les auteurs analysent ce probleme de la determination du taux d inflation dans une perspective d economie politique ils determinent qu il y a une correlation positive entre l inegalite et l inflation et presentent une theorie de la determination de l inflation dans les societes democratiques qui montre comment une inegalite plus grande entraine une inflation plus grande a cause du desir des electeurs de demander une redistribution de la richesse le memoire montre en terminant que les democraties e quipees de banques centrales plus independantes tendent a avoir de meilleurs resultats en terme d inflation pour un degre d inegalite donne

when in rome how non domestic companies listed in the uk may not comply with accepted norms and principles of good corporate governance does home market culture explain these corporate behaviours and attitudes to compliance non domestic companies are increasingly present on the london stock exchange such companies have specific governance requirements they may seek to access capital in a more liquid market and to diversify ownership the reputational bonding coffee northwest univ law rev 93 641 708 1999 columbia law rev 102 1757 1831 2002 to a prestigious exchange should be a statement to the market of a propensity to disclosure and a willingness to protect minority shareholders yet many non domestic companies retain tightly controlled shareholding structures and are based in emerging regions where national culture norms differ to the uk we hypothesise that non domestic companies are likely to be less compliant with the principles of the uk corporate governance code and suggest a correlation between lower levels of compliance and non domestic companies from countries that demonstrate high power distance in the hofstede culture s consequences international differences in work related values 1980a cultural value framework we find some encouraging signs of compliance with the reigning governance code principles in board structures however we find only partial compliance in leadership and board effectiveness measures in those companies from cultures high on the power distance scale further we include analysis into ownership characteristics and find companies from emerging markets are dominated by a single or controlling group of shareholders which is likely to impact on attitudes to compliance and is particularly evidenced in terms of board structures with no executive directors or led by an executive chairman much of the prior research effort into the levels of compliance with the uk s comply or explain approach to governance has produced mixed results and focused on all companies in our exploratory approach to analysing only the non domestic subsample we report some evidence linking cultural distance to lower levels of compliance with the uk standards we develop a framework to guide future research into the context and cultural underpinnings of this sub sample of companies hypothesising that frequent market capitalisation induced index changes may divert attention away from any potential compliance issues on the one hand our evidence is encouraging for governance regimes based on voluntary compliance disclosures such as the uk and similar european and international markets as we report partial compliance with the principles of the current governance code our research may however be helpful in guiding future versions of the uk governance framework and other international governance regimes adopting the comply or explain approach and in setting policy to improve disclosure it contributes to the understanding of the specific context of non domestic companies and any cultural tendencies to non compliance by demonstrating evidence of lower levels of compliance with key principles of the code by non domestic companies we present a framework enabling lawmakers to further improve corporate governance codes

credibility versus control agency independence and partisan influence in the regulatory state there is a natural tension between theories of party government and theories of regulatory politics whereas effective party government requires that politicians have firm control over public polic

the political economy of inflation bargaining structure or central bank independence the causes of inflation are commonly analyzed as the function of either the organization of wage bargaining or the independence of the central bank although these explanations are widely treated as competing recent evidence suggests that there may be merit to both arguments this paper presents a game theoretic model of wage bargaining and monetary policy making that shows why the two institutional causes are not only complementary but elements of a more encompassing logic the empirical superiority of this synthesizing model is demonstrated by reanalyzing data used in al marhubi and willett 1995 and by presenting new evidence

fostering change to sustainable consumption and production an evidence based view this note from the field is an edited version of a policy brief summarizing the key findings from the first half of the sustainable consumption research exchange network score for the policy programs in the field of sustainable consumption and production scp we recommend a framework for action to change to scp that mentions the key domains to include food mobility and energy use housing the last two clearly related to urban development it should use a systemic perspective on the scp challenge and differentiate between developed fast developing and base of the pyramid economies score focuses mainly on developed economies and here we propose to differentiate between 1 measures that fit with mainstream beliefs and paradigms here governments could make operational agreements on implementation of instruments like green public procurement stimulating ecodesign etc 2 problems where a rough agreement on goals exists but where change is radical or means are uncertain and hence planning difficult here governments could foster visioning experimentation and support e g international collaboration in leapfrogging programs 3 problems that outright clash with the mainstream beliefs and paradigms here governments could foster informed deliberation on the more fundamental issues related to markets governance and growth 2007 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

equilibrium policy in an overlapping generations economy abstract this paper offers a mechanism for reducing the number of stationary equilibria that arise in a simple two period lived overlapping generations economy since each equilibrium is associated with a different combination of monetary and fiscal policies i assume that at each date the agent in his second period of life determines how that period s monetary and fiscal instruments will be set i show that the set of stationary equilibria where this occurs is a proper and nonempty subset of the set of stationary competitive equilibria and that at least one such equilibrium is a pareto optimum

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

the anti inflationary influence of corporatist structures and central bank independence the importance of the hump shaped hypothesis many studies have found strong negative correlations between central bank independence and inflation but the casual significance of this relationship is often challenged we find that the negative relationship remains even when a number of other explanatory variables are considered special attention is given to the role of corporatism following calmfors and driffell it is argued that both high and low levels of centralization should be associated with lower inflation we present empirical support for his hump shaped hypothesis and find that the inclusion of corporatism does not diminish the significance of central bank independence

the last word on the wage curve abstract since 1990 there has been extensive international research on the responsiveness of wages of individuals to changing local labour market conditions for many countries an inverse relationship between wages and local unemployment rates has been found in their book the wage curve blanchflower and oswald argued that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around 0 1 in most countries in a 1995 literature survey card referred to this striking empirical regularity as being close to an empirical law of economics nonetheless reported elasticities do vary even excluding outliers between about 0 5 and 0 1 there is also considerable heterogeneity among wage curve studies in terms of data and model specification this paper carries out meta analytic techniques on a sample of 208 elasticities derived from the literature to uncover the reasons for the differences in empirical results across studies several causes of variation are identified there is also clear evidence of downward publication bias in addition many reported t statistics are biased upwards due to the use of aggregate unemployment rates a maximum likelihood method and a trimming procedure are used to correct for these biases both methods give similar results for our sample an unbiased estimate of the wage curve elasticity at the means of study characteristics is about 0 07

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

public procurement and innovation resurrecting the demand side abstract demand is a major potential source of innovation yet the critical role of demand as a key driver of innovation has still to be recognised in government policy this article discusses public procurement as one of the key elements of a demand oriented innovation policy the paper starts by signaling the new significance of public procurement for innovation policy strategies at the eu level and in a range of european countries it then defines the concept of public procurement and embeds this concept within a taxonomy of innovation policies the rationales and justifications of public procurement policies to spur innovation are discussed followed by a consideration of the challenges and potential pitfalls as well as appropriate institutional arrangements and strategies including some recent empirical examples of good practice it concludes by confronting the public procurement approach with two of the most common objections to it and by considering future prospects

socioeconomic development and electricity consumption a cross country analysis using the random coefficient method this paper analyses the relationship between electricity consumption and socioeconomic variables by estimating the electricity consumption function on the basis of single year cross country data and using ols and random coefficient rc methods the latter method yields both mean response as well as country specific coefficients while electricity consumption is found to rise with socioeconomic development it is found to be inelastic with respect to changes in all the variables the estimated country specific coefficients with respect to per capita gnp and share of industry in gdp are found not to vary across countries indicating that the impact of these variables on electricity consumption is similar across countries on the other hand the impact of other variables years of schooling gdp growth urbanization and population density is found to vary substantially across countries

seigniorage in a cross section of countries empirical investigation of the average level of seigniorage in a cross section of up to ninety countries for the period 1971 90 suggests that optimum tax theory explains up to 40 percent of the cross country variation in seigniorage since seigniorage is higher where its deadweight losses are probably lower and where deadweight losses from conventional taxation are probably higher but that average government spending is not a determinant of seigniorage practical concerns about financing transitory government spending explain some of the remaining variation in seigniorage and central bank independence and political instability are useful as well in contrast 90 percent of the cross country variation in conventional taxation appears to be determined by the level of government spending and deadweight losses and additional variables do not add to the results

the politics of finance how capital sways african central banks abstractwhile there is a large literature on the politics of central banking its insights are difficult to translate to sub saharan africa this article addresses gaps in this literature by considering how the interests of those who control financial resources sway african central banks case studies of kenya nigeria and uganda demonstrate that variation in the sources of capital on which countries rely to finance investment helps to account for the pattern of variation in central bank policy stances the analysis further develops and probes arguments about power derived from the control of capital in the context of developing countries

fiscal decentralization central bank independence and inflation abstract we develop earlier cross sectional studies of inflation rates by adding the degree of tax centralization as another explanatory variable this makes central bank independence perform appreciably better as an explanatory variable also we find that centralized countries have higher inflation

political influence on the central bank international evidence political influence on the central bank is measured bere by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government the governor changes about half the time witbin six months of a nonconstitutional or other radical change of government a military coup or a restoration of democracy the governor is much less likely to change within six months following a routine change in the head of government about one fourth of the time in developing countries and one tenth in industrial countries these indicators vary across countries and correlate statistically with inflation and its variability and with real growth and real interest rates differences in the vulnerability of the central bank to political instability in political instability itself and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periods seem to be a major part of the explanation for why developing countries have on average higher and more variable inflation than industrial countries do

classifying exchange rate regimes deeds vs words abstract most of the empirical literature on exchange rate regimes uses the imf de jure classification based on the regime announced by the governments despite the recognized inconsistencies between reported and actual policies in many cases to address this problem we construct a de facto classification based on data on exchange rates and international reserves from all imf reporting countries over the period 1974 2000 which we believe provides a meaningful alternative for future empirical work on the topic the classification sheds new light on several stylized facts previously reported in the literature in particular we find that the de facto pegs have remained stable throughout the last decade although an increasing number of them shy away from an explicit commitment to a fixed regime hidden pegs we confirm the hollowing out hypothesis but show that it does not apply to countries with limited access to capital markets we also find that pure floats are associated with only relatively minor nominal exchange rate volatility and that the recent increase in the number of de jure floats goes hand in hand with an increase in the number of de facto dirty floats fear of floating

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

whither monetary economics i argue that monetary economics should be pursued by applying implementation theory to models which contain explicit frictions that make money essential the argument has two parts first i argue that models in which real balances are assumed to be productive models with money in utility or production functions or with cash in advance constraints contain hidden inconsistencies second i argue that the approach advocated is capable of providing new insights about some of the main issues in monetary economics the effects of monetary shocks the welfare cost of inflation and the roles of inside and outside money

model of efficient and sustainable improvements in a lean production system through processes of environmental innovation abstract globalization has changed the world as well as how a customer judges the value of a product which has created a new business focus different approaches have been oriented on this direction such as the lean manufacturing system and the concept of sustainability however these two notions are not easy to implement simultaneously besides several authors have declared doubts with respect to reaching this target difficulty persists in identifying the tools required and quantifying the improvements achieved this research develops a general approach based on environmental innovation to help firms harmonize efficiency and sustainability the goal is to add extra value to the product which provides the potential to enhance competitiveness in the 21st century globalized market a case study demonstrates that the costs the incomes the social responsibility and the sustainability can be improved when environmental innovation is applied transforming the traditional production system into a lean system

on inflation as a regressive consumption tax abstract evidence on the portfolio holdings and transaction patterns of households suggests that the burden of inflation is not evenly distributed we build a monetary growth model consistent with key features of cross sectional household data and use this framework to study the distributional impact of inflation at the aggregate level our model economy behaves similar to standard monetary growth models within the representative agent abstraction inflation has however important distributional effects since it is effectively a regressive consumption tax thus neglecting the distributional consequences of inflation may prove misleading in assessing the effects of inflation in our economy

variation in central bank independence across countries some provisional empirical evidence in this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested the predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias the higher political instability or the larger the government debt central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability we do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks

regional convergence evidence from a new state by state capital stock series this paper seeks to reconcile the growth empirics technique of mankiw romer and weil 1992 with the empirical results of barro and sala i martin 1991 through the development of a new database covering the 1977 96 period we create state by state capital stock and gross investment estimates by apportioning the national capital stock among the states using these estimates along with gross state product and employment data we find evidence that the solow growth model explains state wide growth during this period we consistently find a rate of convergence of around 2 our results as a consequence suggest that the empirical results of barro and sala i martin are driven by the neoclassical growth process of solow

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

viewpoint a microfoundation of monetary economics in this lecture i explain what the microfoundations of money are about and why they are necessary for monetary economics then i review recent developments of a particular microfoundation of money commonly known as the search theory of money finally i outline some unresolved issues dans cette presentation l auteur explique ce que sont les microfondations de la monnaie et pourquoi elles sont necessaires a l economie monetaire ensuite il passe en revue certains developpements recents d une microfondation particuliere de la monnaie connue sous le nom de theorie de la recherche de la monnaie enfin l auteur fait le tour d un ensemble de problemes qui restent sans solution pour le moment

meta regression analysis a quantitative method of literature surveys abstract pedagogically literature reviews are instrumental they summarize the large literature written on a particular topic give coherence to the complex often disparate views expressed about an issue and serve as a springboard for new ideas however literature surveys rarely establish anything approximating unanimous consensus ironically this is just as true for the empirical economic literature to harmonize this dissonance we offer a quantitative methodology for reviewing the empirical economic literature meta regression analysis mra is the regression analysis of regression analyses mra tends to objectify the review process it studies the processes that produce empirical economic results as though they were any other social scientific phenomenon mra provides a framework for replication and offers a sensitivity analysis for model specification in this brief essay we propose a new method of reviewing economic literature mra and discuss its potential

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

macro prudential governance and central banks facts and drivers abstract the great crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability central banks are always part of macro prudential settings but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision the issue is then genuinely empirical are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank s role in macro prudential governance we identify three potential drivers micro supervision involvement monetary policy discretion overall institutional independence and test for their relevance by analysing current institutional settings in 31 advanced and emerging market economies we find that central bankers already in charge of micro supervision and less politically independent are more likely to get extended macro prudential powers the same is true if they have low monetary policy discretion being constrained by a monetary stability objective we interpret these results by using a political economy perspective

extensive margins and the demand for money at low interest rates we argue that the relevant monetary decision for the majority of u s households is not the fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form but whether to hold any such assets at all we call this the decision to adopt the financial technology we show that the key variable governing the adoption decision is the product of the interest rate times the total amount of assets this implies that the interest elasticity of household money demand at low interest rates can be estimated from the variation in asset holdings in a cross section of households rather than historical interest rate variations we do so with the 1989 survey of consumer finances we find that a the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small b the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assets is positively related to the level of financial assets and c the cost of adopting financial technologies is negatively related to participation in a pension program at intere

the non monotonic relationship between seigniorage and inequality we present an analysis of how political factors may come into play in the equilibrium determination of inflation we employ a standard overlapping generations model with heterogenous young age endowments and a government that funds an exogenous spending via a combination of non distortionary income taxes and the inflation tax agents have access to two stores of value fiat money and an inflation shielded yet costly asset the model predicts that the relationship between elected reliance on the inflation tax for revenue and income inequality may be non monotonic we find robust empirical backing for this hypothesis from a cross section of countries jel classification e5 p16

reconsidering the principal components of central bank independence the more the merrier we use principal component analysis to reassess the link between different attributes of central bank independence and inflation performance we suggest that coding problems may account for the fact that almost none of the attributes included in the cukierman index has a systematic plausible relationship with inflation the multi faceted cukierman index also seems to be out performed by a much narrower index focusing solely on policy independence these findings point to the importance of using public choice analysis to isolate the real problem here namely finding specific central bank structures that effectively insulate central bankers from political pressures

a price discrimination analysis of monetary policy monetary policy is analysed within a model that appeals to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain the coexistence of currency and interest bearing default free bonds the interaction between such legal restrictions and monetary policy is illustrated in a version of the overlapping generations model the model shows that legal restrictions and the use of both currency and bonds permit the government to levy a nonlinear inflation tax and that such a tax may be better in terms of the pareto criterion than a linear inflation tax

central bank independence an update of theory and evidence this paper reviews recent research on central bank independence cbi after we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed finally the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on cbi are discussed we conclude that the negative relationship between cbi and inflation is quite robust

green supply chain performance with cost learning and operational inefficiency effects environmental issues are receiving significant attention from the public accelerating the development of green supply chain in operations management this study focuses on the green supply chain performance in a single manufacturer retailer setup in which the manufacturer determines energy efficiency level and wholesale price while the retailer decides on sales price the unit production cost is jointly affected by cost learning and operational inefficiency effects open loop feedback and myopic equilibria are subsequently derived and the corresponding supply chain performance and profit distribution are analyzed the main results show that forward looking behavior is preferred to myopic one for channel members feedback equilibrium is beneficial to the manufacturer but is harmful to the retailer the supply chain efficiencies in forward looking and myopic situations are lower than the static supply chain efficiency which results from cost learning and operational inefficiency effects as well as non price variable the manufacturer and the retailer extract more profits under certain conditions i e high cost learning effect large energy efficiency effectiveness low operational inefficiency effect or discount rate however the corresponding supply chain efficiencies decrease and the manufacturer s profit proportions are less than 2 3 investigation of supply chain performance with competition from multiple retailers implies that the effects of system parameters on supply chain performance keep the same directions of single manufacturer retailer setup while competition improves supply chain efficiency and manufacturer s profit proportion this work contributes in involving cost learning and operational inefficiency effects simultaneously in a dynamic environment to explore supply chain performance

central bank independence and inflation corporatism partisanship and alternative indices of central bank independence a well developed theoretical literature suggests that central bank independence causes low inflation empirical work supporting this hypothesis is unsatisfactory however for two reasons statistical analysis has only recently begun to include control variables and important political variables that are related to inflation have not yet been included analysis has not yet undertaken a systematic comparison of alternative indices of central bank independence this paper addresses both weaknesses by testing the explanatory power of eight indices of central bank independence in a political economic model of inflation the results suggest that while support for the central bank independence hypothesis survives a relatively inclusive set of control variables support for the hypothesis is not independent of the particular index upon which analysis relies

central bank independence and inflation good news and bad news abstract the bad news is that the findings of recent studies of central bank independence and inflation are very sensitive to outliers the good news is that evidence presented here reinforces the existing case for bank independence in high income economies

inflation and central bank independence a meta regression analysis using 59 studies we perform a meta regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence cbi the studies considered are very different with respect to the cbi indicator used the sample of countries and time periods covered model specification estimators used and publication outlet we conclude that there is a significant publication bias however we also find a significant genuine effect of cbi on inflation differences between studies are not caused by differences in cbi indicators used

markov perfect capital and labor taxes abstract this paper analyzes the markov perfect equilibrium of an economy were a benevolent government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices uses taxes on capital and labor income to finance the provision of a public good the main finding is that the government taxes capital and subsidizes labor so that only the dynamic inefficiency of future capital taxes remains if agents preference for the public good is sufficiently high then capital is confiscated setting bounds on taxes alleviates the dynamic inefficiency inherent in capital taxation but some implementations carry a high welfare cost allowing for endogenous capital utilization makes the current capital tax distortionary and implies capital and labor tax rates that are relatively close to those measured for the u s economy

environmental value chain in green sme networks the threat of the abilene paradox abstract demand side policies are an important complement to subsidies in fostering green product service markets green public procurement gpp in particular presents valuable characteristics in terms of directionality volumes and measurability despite being widely analysed from a public perspective gpp development is still under explored from a corporate point of view to shed some light on the strategic attitude of firms towards gpp this paper discusses an exploratory research in the field of road construction an inductive analysis of direct observations and theoretical contributions suggests the potential for the so called abilene paradox to hamper gpp opportunities for small and medium enterprises in fact in times of crisis increased pressures to improve performance and reduce risk resistance to change and strategic myopia can easily impair inter organizational interactions and thus prevent potentially innovative networks from pressuring public investments in green supply chains the related policy suggestions represent a first attempt to enter the realm of systemic approaches to gpp

environmental criteria in the public purchases above the eu threshold values by three nordic countries 2003 and 2005 abstract green public procurement gpp has been considered as an important policy instrument in the context of sustainable consumption and production the state and progress of gpp has earlier been measured by questionnaires and interviews both methods being based on the assessment by the purchaser and questionnaires having low response rates recently a new method was developed analyzing the existence of environmental criteria in the calls for tenders however the studies have dealt neither with the progress in gpp nor the statistical evidence of differences between countries our aim was to analyze more thoroughly whether the differences in the proportions of green calls for tenders between the three nordic countries denmark finland and sweden in 2003 and 2005 were real and whether there had occurred any progress between the years concerned the paper also presents the gpp record method which enables more valid measurement of the environmental soundness of public purchasing the statistical analyses were done using logit models with country year and product group as the explanatory factors it proved to be relevant to take into account the variation that occurred from the random existence of product groups in the samples of calls for tender there were less environmental criteria in the calls for tenders in finland than in denmark and sweden in 2003 but in 2005 no significant difference between finland and denmark was observed both finland and sweden saw progress in this area between 2003 and 2005

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

inflation government transfers and optimal central bank independence abstract the problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two stage non cooperative game between the government and the central bank the solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence the results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism the results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker

partially independent central banks politically responsive governments and inflation theories of central bank independence have more exact implications regarding inflation in different political economic environments than generally understood or empirically examined they imply that inflation in any given country time will be a weighted average of what it would be if the central bank completely controlled monetary policy and what it would be if the government completely controlled it with the degree of central bank independence weighting the former an equation embodying this theoretical expectation is estimated by constrained least squares from a time series cross section of inflation rates in developed democracies since the bretton woods era the results confirm that the antiinflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader politicaleconomic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently conversely the inflationary impacts of all such political economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

central bank independence and inflation revisited we re examine the relationship between central bank independence cbi proxied by the central bank governor s turnover rate and an indicator based on central bank laws in place and inflation using a random coefficient model with the hildreth houck estimator for more than 100 countries in the period 1980 to 2005 we conclude that there exists no general significant negative relation between our indicators of central bank independence and inflation central bank independence has a significant effect only in a minority of the countries in our sample

publication bias in the economic freedom and economic growth literature abstract the impact of institutions on economic performance has attracted significant attention from researchers as well as from policy reformers a rapidly growing area in this literature is the impact of economic freedom on economic growth the aim of this paper was to explore publication bias in this literature by means of traditional funnel plots meta significance testing as well as by bootstrapping these meta significance tests when all the available estimates are combined and averaged there seems to be evidence of a genuine and positive economic freedom economic growth effect however it is also shown that the economic freedom economic growth literature is tainted strongly with publication bias the existence of publication bias makes it difficult to identify the magnitude of the genuine effect of economic freedom on economic growth the paper explores the differences between aggregate and disaggregate measures of economic freedom and shows that selection effects are stronger when aggregate measures are used

government policy in monetary economies i study how the specic details of a micro founded monetary economy aect the determination of government policy i consider three variants of the lagos wright monetary framework a benchmark were all markets are competitive a case which allows for nancial intermediaries and a case with trading frictions although intitutions frictions are shown to have a signicant structural impact in the determination of policy the calibrated articial economies are observationally equivalent in steady state the policy response to aggregate shocks is qualitatively similar in the variants considered however there are signicant quantitative dierences in the response of government policy to productivity shocks mainly due to the idiosyncratic behavior of money demand the variants with no trading frictions display the best t to u s post war data

getting the incentives right energy performance contracts as a tool for property management by local government energy conservation is a challenging and difficult task because disincentives in the building sector inhibit innovation the municipality of rotterdam experimented with an energy performance contract that aimed to avoid disincentives and replace them with a stimulus for innovation this article investigates whether the design requirements for performance management found in the management literature were fulfilled during the development of the contract and its implementation the outcomes of the experiment show substantial energy conservation around 30 percent the existing incentive structure was changed through the use of a performance management contract and perverse effects that are mentioned in the literature were limited the incentives established between the commissioning party and the contractor triggered better performance and innovation although balancing the responsibilities between the principal and the agent was demanding and time consuming energy performance contracts are a useful piece of the sustainability puzzle but tailor made refinements are necessary

decentralization and inflation commitment collective action or continuity do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation political decentralization however does appear to reduce change in countries relative inflation rates over time by creating additional veto players federal structure may lock in existing patterns of monetary policy whether inflationary or strict among the mostly developed countries that started with low inflation inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states among the mostly developing countries that started with high inflation inflation tended to increase faster in the federations there is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country s degree of practical central bank independence whether high or low and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments

does central bank independence really matter new evidence for developing countries using a new indicator abstract this paper provides a new indicator for central bank independence cbi based on the turnover rate of central bank governors for 82 developing countries over the period 1980 1989 using this new indicator it is concluded that this proxy for cbi is related to inflation only if the high inflation countries are included in the sample the view that both cbi and inflation are caused by effective opposition towards inflation is not supported using both the extreme bound analysis and sala i martin s method we do not find evidence that cbi is robustly related to economic growth

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

inflation and central bank independence conventional wisdom redux until recently there existed a broad consensus that an important institution for combating inflation is a central bank insulated from political influence this conventional wisdom has been challenged by among others campillo and miron 1997 who present evidence purporting to show that if an inflation regression equation is expanded to include not only their proxy for central bank independence cbi but other regressors as well then the negative correlation between inflation and cbi vanishes the present paper argues that allegations of the demise of this nexus should not be accepted uncritically this paper which reports the results of an analysis of covariance structures finds a strong negative relationship between inflation and cbi

replacing a disobedient central bank governor with a docile one a novel measure of central bank independence and its effect on inflation this paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor i the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and ii whether his her replacement is an ally of the government we identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government we find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

why poor countries rely mostly on redistribution in kind abstract we present a model in which the crucial distinction between rich and poor countries is that governments in rich countries have access to a more productive tax collection technology than governments in poor countries since the tax collection technology in poor countries is poor the quality of the public service is low therefore many households at the top of the income distribution opt out of the public service the median voter takes this into consideration and allocates a larger share of the public budget to redistribution in kind public service than to redistribution in cash

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

reconstructing and reforming the financial system in conflict and post conflict economies reconstructing the financial system in countries affected by violent conflict is crucial to successful and broad based recovery particularly important tasks include currency reform rebuilding or creating central banks revitalising the banking sector and strengthening prudential supervision and regulation encouragement of private capital into the banking sector must be balanced by protection of the public interest a task made more difficult by the nature of war to peace transition bank crises can destabilise economies in recovery from war and their fiscal burden takes resources away from development and poverty spending thereby threatening post conflict reconstruction itself

the environmental kuznets curve does one size fit all abstract this paper uses a new panel data set on state level sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from 1929 1994 to test the appropriateness of the one size fits all reduced form regression approach commonly used in the environmental kuznets curve literature empirical results provide initial evidence that an inverted u shape characterizes the relationship between per capita emissions and per capita incomes at the state level parameter estimates suggest however that previous studies which restrict cross sections to undergo identical experiences over time may be presenting statistically biased results

financial regulation in developing countries many ldcs have implemented reforms to strengthen the prudential regulation and supervision of their financial systems this article examines the progress made by ldcs in implementing reforms analyses the weaknesses in their prudential systems and discusses policy options for further reform while considerable improvements have been achieved the occurrence of banking crises during the 1990s indicates that many countries have yet to build robust prudential systems which can protect their banking systems from systemic crises the weaknesses include loopholes in the prudential regulations shortages of skilled supervisors and regulatory forbearance furthermore there are difficulties in applying the developed country model of regulation which relies heavily on accurate financial information highly skilled technicians and an impartial bureaucracy in an environment characterised by weak accounting and legal frameworks acute shortages of skilled personnel and pervasive political interference in public ad

why inflation rose and fell policy makers beliefs and u s postwar stabilization policy this paper provides an explanation for the run up of u s inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation in the early 1980s which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in addressing i present a model in which rational policymakers learn about the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally conditional on their current beliefs the steady state associated with the self confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inflation however prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur when policymakers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the phillips curve i estimate the model using likelihood methods the estimation results show that the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policymakers beliefs stabilization policy and the postwar behavior of inflation and unemployment in the united states

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable abstract we characterize the optimal financing of productive public capital and compute the welfare loss from being unable to commit to the ramsey policy because this calculation ultimately relies on numerical approximations we contrast alternative approaches while perturbation and linear quadratic methods deliver accurate steady states the latter can yield misleading policy implications during transitions we find that moving from a regime with commitment to one with discretion implies only a small welfare loss although markov perfect consumption falls noticeably short of its ramsey counterpart in steady state consumption under discretion is higher in the short run which largely offsets this long run loss

central bank independence centralization of wage bargaining inflation and unemployment theory and some evidence abstract this paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables on real wages unemployment and inflation in a framework in which unions are averse to inflation this aversion moderates union s wage demands as they attempt to induce the central bank to inflate at a lower rate an increase in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining a decrease in the number of unions triggers two opposite effects on real wages unemployment and inflation it reduces the substitutability between the labor of different unions and therefore the degree of effective competition between them this reduced competition effect raises real wages unemployment and inflation but the decrease in the number of unions also strengthens the moderating effect of inflationary fears on the real wage demands of each union this strategic effect lowers real wages unemployment and inflation for sufficiently inflation averse unions the interaction between those two effects produces a calmfors driffill type relation between real wages and centralization the paper analyzes the effects of central bank independence on the position and the shape of this relation as well as on inflation and unemployment the paper features two mechanisms one of which is novel through which monetary institutions have real effects the model implies that if there is a single union social welfare is maximized when the central bank attaches a zero weight to inflation but when the number of unions is larger than one this result is no longer true in general empirical evaluation of some of the theoretical implications using data from 19 developed economies is for the most part supportive of those implications

central bank independence economic freedom and inflation rates william a luksetich measures of central bank independence combine many attributes that may or may not affect inflation central bank attributes are chosen as a result of political calculations over the distribution of resources between competing interest groups simultaneity bias results from regressions of central bank independence or of economic and political freedom on inflation or growth our estimates demonstrate the connections between economic and political freedom and central bank attributes that lead to inflation countries showing high degrees of economic freedom adopt structures that lead to lower inflation those that show high degrees of political freedom do not adopt inflation reducing institutional structures jel e0 e5 i introduction the relationship between inflation rates and central bank independence from political control has been the subject of a number of recent studies generally these studies provide evidence that greater central bank cb independence is associated with lower inflation rates banaian et al 1983 1995 1997 burdekin and willett 1991 masciandaro and spinelli 1993 alesina and summers 1993 this relationship appears to be weaker when developing countries are included in the analysis cukierman 1992 all of these draw rather strong conclusions about the importance of cb independence as a force constraining the political system from using the monetary system to achieve political goals that are likely to be hostile to price stability supporting evidence is not strong however and the indices used to measure cb independence are far from perfect moreover even if the cb independence measures were accurate they may simply be proxies for political and economic freedoms that are the more important checks on political manipulations of the economic system others question the evidence and draw different conclusions lohmann 1994 1997 and posen 1993 1995 1997 argue that the correlation between inflation and central bank independence is spurious lohmann argues that the federalist nature of the german government and its frequent use of coalitions in forming governments limit the number of threats to bundesbank independence posen 1995 finds that political support for independence comes from the financial sector if they effectively lobby for price stability an independent central bank tends to accompany that lobbying miller 1998 provides a framework for understanding the behavior of various interest groups in controlling the rate at which governments inflate their currencies cukierman s 1992 gb independence indices have been widely used in empirical studies to assess the effects of cb independence on inflation rates 1 the term of office of the head of a cb which we will call the central banker is one measure of bank independence he assigns a ranking of 1 if the term of office too is greater than eight years 0 75 if the too is great than or equal to six years and less than or equal to eight years 0 50 if the too is equal to five years 0 25 if it equals four years and 0 if it is less than four years he does this for numerous measure of bank independence since the publication of cukierman s index nearly all the aforementioned researchers have either used these individual rankings or a weighted average of these rankings in their efforts to determine the importance of cb independence on inflation rates in this article we extend the research in this area in three ways first the use of a multipoint ranking of central bank attributes imposes restrictions on the marginal impact of changing structures or attributes of the cb law that have no a priori basis moreover the weights within the aggregate cukierman index are quite arbitrary and do not hold up under any reasonable degree of scrutiny see banaian et al 1998 hereafter referred to as bbw constructing dummy variables for each of the classifications would be more appropriate than using the classification scheme cukierman devised as a continuous variable