joseph schumpeter lecture ideology i develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained yet individually rational distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets in processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education health insurance pensions etc individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects or their children s versus the costs of misinformed decisions because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial endogenous social cognitions emerge thus an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government conversely an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand with public sector capital this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history dependent dynamics the model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views even when ex post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news jel h11 d72 d83 p16 z1

observable reputation trading is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable we consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period new owners bid for the firms that are for sale customers learn the owner s type which reflects the quality of the good or service provided through experience after observing an ownership change they may want to switch firm however in equilibrium good new owners buy from good old owners and retain high value customers hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset although ownership change is observable

e government internet adoption and corruption an empirical investigation abstract this study empirically investigates the impact of e government and internet adoption on curbing corruption by utilizing a large panel dataset the results reveal that e government is a powerful tool in reducing corruption via telecommunication infrastructure and the scope and quality of online services which is strengthened by greater internet adoption the interaction effects between e government and internet adoption suggest both as complements in anti corruption programs a dynamic panel data model that addresses the endogeneity problem and considers corruption persistency is employed results of panel granger causality tests indicate a unidirectional causality from e government to corruption while a bilateral causality between internet adoption and corruption

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

racial discrimination in the labor market theory and empirics we review theories of race discrimination in the labor market taste based models can generate wage and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even when strong prejudice is not widespread but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment at their current state of development models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes have little empirical content it is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with statistical discrimination could fit the data we suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment briefly on the implication of existing theory for public policy jel j15 j31 j64 j71

aid policy and growth in post conflict societies countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice this paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post conflict growth process it is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars and covers 27 countries that were in their first decade of post conflict economic recovery during the 1990s the authors first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post conflict countries they find that during the first three post conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level so ideally aid should phase in during the decade historically aid has not on average been higher in post conflict societies and it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade the authors then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post conflict countries and in particular whether particular components of policy are differentially important for this they use the world bank policy rating database the authors find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post conflict societies comparing the efficacy of different policies they find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies however historically this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post conflict societies

central bankers in government appointed committees abstract i study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee who are appointed by the government central bankers balance their desire to protect the central bank s reputation against their interest to be reappointed committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures these gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small the former is associated with a low risk of being replaced for not supporting the government s preferred policy the latter meanwhile implies high probability that a single vote affects policy making any individual member more weary of potentially affecting the central bank s reputation through his vote

experts and quacks what happens when type is endogenous in a reputational setting here customers cannot tell experts from imitative quacks but gain information through repeated interaction firm incentives to invest in expertise vary nonmonotonically in how tolerant customers are of bad outcomes more tolerant customers are both more forgiving making expertise less necessary and longer tenured increasing the value of retaining them in equilibrium the proportion of expert firms is bounded away from one some quacks are necessary to keep incentives of experts in line the fraction of experts is decreasing in customers switching costs and the relative cost of expertise over quackery

this time is the same using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises if yes why in this paper we show that a bank s stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis this effect is economically large our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank s risk culture and or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises banks that relied more on short term funding had more leverage and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

a latent structure approach to measuring reputation the present study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation specifically this study seeks to i quantify the reputation of washington apples over time ii study the dynamic nature of reputation and iii analyze the effect of the label washington apple the model adopted in this study is the dynamic multiple indicator multiple cause dymimic modeling approach which is a special case of the general latent variable modeling scheme called state space models both dymimic and hedonic approaches are applied to the data on washington apples and results from the two approaches are compared reputation plays an important role in assuring product quality in markets where consumers can only imperfectly judge the product quality until after consumption if reputation effects are absent in these types of markets there is an incentive for producers to reduce quality and take short run gains before buyers catch on in order to avoid such quality cutting products with good reputations will sell for premium prices shapiro 1983 showed theoretically that price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in quality and reputation there is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation but empirical studies are limited empirical studies on the impact of firm reputation on shareholder wealth or product demand include jarrell and peltzman 1985 borenstein and zimmerman 1988 and karpoff and lott 1993 caves and green 1996 showed that factors that may affect a firm s reputation influence the relationship between price and quality gorton 1996 analyzed how a bank s reputation for default affects the discount rate on its debt the measurement of the value of reputation to producers in terms of price premiums and how a reputation can be built up and destroyed are important issues that have not been empirically analyzed the current study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation steenkamp 1990 points out that consumers observe at the moment of purchase the intrinsic and extrinsic product quality cues but not the quality attributes intrinsic cues are characteristics of the product such as color freshness texture and flavor while extrinsic

how valuable is a good reputation a sample selection model of internet auctions on the online auction site ebay by convention sellers do not ship goods to winning bidders until after they have received payment so there is an opportunity for sellers to take advantage of bidders trust realizing this the designers of ebay created a system that relies on self enforcement using reputation several recent studies have found that bidders give little or no reward to sellers who have better reputations i show that in fact sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports that they have behaved honestly but marginal returns to additional reports are severely decreasing

estimating the cost of leisure time for recreation demand models abstract in this paper we propose a method of determining the opportunity cost of leisure time with an empirical recreation demand application typically the opportunity cost of leisure time is assumed to be some fraction of the wage rate this practice has limitations first it assumes that individuals can trade time for money at their wage second it offers no guidance about how to value the time of an individual who is not in the labor force this paper proposes a method of determining this cost that does not suffer from these drawbacks an empirical example is provided which demonstrates the proposed approach and contrasts it with commonly applied approaches

money is an experience good competition and trust in the private provision of money the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money is studied with commitment trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency without commitment competition plays no role trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency stationary inflation must be non negative and therefore the friedman rule cannot be achieved the quality of money can be observed only after its purchasing capacity is realized in this sense money is an experience good

testing benefits transfer of forest recreation values over a twenty year time horizon we conduct a functional benefit transfer over 20 years of total willingness to pay based on carborne forest recreation in 52 forests using a mixed logit specification of a random utility model and geographic information systems to allow heterogeneous preferences across the population and for heterogeneity over space results show that preferences for some forest attributes such as species diversity and age as well as transport mode have changed significantly over the period updating the transfer model with present total demand for recreation improves the error margins by an average of 282 average errors of the best transfer model remain 25

group dynamics in experimental studies the bertrand paradox revisited abstract different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects behavior considering the repeated bertrand duopoly game of dufwenberg and gneezy dufwenberg m gneezy s u 2000 price competition and market concentration an experimental study international journal of industrial organization 18 7 22 we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to nash equilibrium limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject s own opponent in contrast leads to competitive behavior when we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment full we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices we can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

modelling prices and the reputation of individual named wines this article develops empirical models to assess the relation between the reputation of an individual named wine and its price unrestricted and polynomial distributed lag models are used to assess

an equilibrium search matching model of discrimination abstract a model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical groups which are discriminated against e g blacks women earn lower wages and endure longer unemployment spells

managing local commons theoretical issues in incentive design local commons encompass a wide range of resources whose shared feature is the need for some form of collective management in what follows we shall be concerned mainly with the problems of implementing a collective management plan whatever the mechanisms invoked many recent contributions to the literature have stressed that relatively informal collective management of common property resources can in the right circumstances avoid the severe resource degradation predicted by the tragedy of the commons nevertheless both empirical and theoretical arguments suggest that cooperative behavior may be only partial and the incentives of short term self interest only partially held in check under what circumstances then can more formal implementation mechanisms make good the deficiency and given that formal incentives are typically stronger than informal ones are there any reasons why informal incentives might nevertheless sometimes be preferred

welfare losses due to livestock grazing on public lands a count data systemwide treatment backcountry hikers willingness to pay for removing grazing from trails in the hoover wilderness is analyzed using a multinomial dirichlet negative binomial distribution this multivariate discrete distribution allows the direct calculation of seasonal welfare measures that are derived from an incomplete demand specification the welfare maximizing choice of activities is examined on a trail by trail basis using the results of the analysis our findings suggest that a mix of hiking and grazing activities provide the greatest social welfare

a game theoretic approach to behavioral food risks the case of grain producers abstract food risks may be caused by malpractice of suppliers who exploit the fact that their production processes and resulting product properties cannot be directly observed by buyers the probability of malpractice increases with the profits that can be earned through opportunistic behavior in this paper we develop a moral hazard model for the empirical analyses of behavioral risks it accounts for the essential fact that incomplete inspection and tracing increase the profitability of rule breaking behavior and that monitoring tracing and sanctioning are costly using the model we first demonstrate how to design efficient contracts in various situations in a case study we then analyze farmers incentives with regard to the minimum waiting period after fungicide use data are gathered in interviews with three large scale german farmers and a grain dealer we find that while their perception of parameters varies widely high temptations for rule breaking arise in some cases we conclude that empirical moral hazard analyses have significant potential to shed light on behavioral risks

social contracts as assets a possible solution to the time consistency problem this paper presents a new solution to the time consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work the solution involves formulating a social contract institution or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy the social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract for the old generation breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it for the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

estimation and welfare analysis with large demand systems we develop an approach for estimating individual or household level preferences for a large set of quality differentiated goods and for constructing hicksian welfare measures within the demand system framework our approach uses a maximum simulated likelihood procedure to recover estimates of the structural parameters and a multistage monte carlo markov chain algorithm for constructing hicksian consumer surplus estimates we illustrate our approach with a recreation dataset consisting of day trips to 62 mid atlantic beaches

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

collective reputation and quality firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem we show that for an experience good without firm traceability individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub optimal for the group these results support minimum quality standards trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem finally the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of washington apples specialty regional authentic and local food products have become a more important part of consumer purchases in recent years firms have responded by marketing food products that come from specific geographic areas this trend in consumers preferences has led the european union to introduce protected designations of origin labels and protected geographical identification labels which provide protection of food names on a geographical or traditional basis ranging from parmesan cheese to such lesser known items such as galician veal in the united states there are popular state products that carry labels such as washington apples idaho potatoes

benefit incidence of public recreation areas have the winners taken almost all this study presents a framework for investigating the benefit incidence of provision of public recreation opportunities the proportion of individuals who use outdoor recreation services increases with income and frequency of use differs by the users gender and life situation e g depending on whether they are students or older citizens the decomposition of distributive incidence shows that a bias in favor of high income groups may be accentuated when the perceived value of these services is taken into account in monetary terms we compare alternative strategies in terms of equity for improving recreation opportunities e g reduced distance to or increased acreage of recreation sites our results indicate that although these strategies improve the welfare distribution among the income groups a considerable proportion of benefits nevertheless accrue to high income groups

corruption top down or bottom up this article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government in particular we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption we show that when the after tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption by contrast for high enough public wages and or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level in the process total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands

ethical spillovers in firms evidence from vehicle emissions testing in this paper we explore how organizations influence the unethical behavior of their employees using a unique data set of over three million vehicle emissions tests we find strong evidence of ethical spillovers from firms to individuals when inspectors work across different organizations they adjust the rate at which they pass vehicles to the norms of those with whom they work these spillovers are strongest at large facilities and corporate chains and weakest for the large volume inspectors these results are consistent with the economics literature on productivity spillovers from organizations and peers and suggest that managers can influence the ethics of employee behavior through both formal norms and incentives the results also suggest that employees have persistent ethics that limit the magnitude of this influence these results imply that if ethical conformity is important to the financial and legal health of the organization managers must be vigilant in their hiring training and monitoring to ensure that employee behavior is consistent with firm objectives

okun s micro macro system a review article prices and quantities is the brilliant and disturbing last work of arthur m okun 1928 1980 for more than a decade okun was the foremost practitioner of macroeconomics in the united states his critical intelligence at both the theoretical and empirical ends of economics was unsurpassed these facts were virtually a manufacturer s warranty that the book whatever its argumentation and evidence would be significant we want to know what okun thought but this background was no guarantee of an important treatise and it must have taken some courage to venture a big theoretical work in an accessible style on urgent questions in fact okun has delivered a creative and virtuosic study in economic theory the book s contribution is to provide a complete description of an economy in which rational economic agents consider the distributional consequences of wage and price decisions the perspective adopted one which is winning growing favor of late is contract theoretic because they wish to economize on their costly transactions with one another people trade repeatedly with the same agent so trust and fidelity to understandings are important the ensuing analysis lodges some basic dissents from the informational expectational paradigm developed over the last score of years it is particularly stimulating and troubling on the main policy controversy of the decade the question of disinflation

corruption as a self fulfilling prophecy evidence from a survey experiment in costa rica an influential body of scholarship argues that corruption behaves as a selffulfilling prophecy the idea of this work is that levels of corruption emerge endogenously as a result of a society wide coordination game in which ther individual returns to corrupt behavior are a function of how disposed towards corruption the other members of society are perceived as being an empirical implication of this logic is that if one were to exogenously perturb beliefs about societal levels of corruption upward willingness to engage in corruption should increase as a consequence the current paper evaluates this claim by utilizing an information experiment embedded in a large scale household survey conducted in the gran area metropolitana gam of costa rica from october 2013 to april 2014 n 4200 changes in beliefs about corruption were induced via the random assignment of an informational display depicting the increasing percentage of costa ricans who have experienced or directly observed an act of corruption from 2006 to 2011 the paper finds that on average assignment to this display relative to the control condition increased the probability that a respondent would be willing to pay a bribe to a police officer by approximately 0 04 to 0 08 thereby providing supporting evidence for the self fulfilling prophecy hypothesis

income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma based model of tax evasion abstract this paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma based model of tax compliance the paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge precisely multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous because the social coordination effect dominates the individual characteristics effect numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two step audit policies on the part of the tax agency under the presumption that the best or good equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria as a byproduct the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two step audit policy the equilibrium compliance and fiscal revenue is analyzed

a comparison of welfare estimates from four models for linking seasonal recreational trips to multinomial logit models of site choice we compare four methods of linking a site choice random utility model to a seasonal trip model the four approaches are those proposed by morey et al 1993 am j agric econom 75 578 592 hausman et al 1995 j public econom 56 1 30 parsons and kealy 1995 j environ econom management29 357 367 and feather et al 1995 j environ econom management29 214 227 we estimate the alternative models using a common data set and calculate a change in welfare for two policy scenarios across the models we find that there is little practical difference between the approaches of morey et al and hausman et al they are nearly the same mathematically and the welfare estimates in our empirical example are quite close the approaches of parsons and kealy and feather et al generated welfare estimates that were substantially different from the previous two approaches as well as from each other they also generated results that reveal the inconsistencies between their site choice and season trip models

explicating factors for companies inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management an exploratory study in germany abstract the literature on corruption is rich in works focusing on individual and organizational aspects however existing research is void in studies that specifically deal with factors for a company s inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management the present paper fills this gap by explicating why some firms are more prone to corruption than others within this context it is our objective to explore the structural and organizational bases for companies especially their purchasing units to engage in corrupt business practices grounding our work in principal agent theory and the fraud triangle we suggest that the factors of organizational complexity corporate culture internationality and functional complexity all influence a firm s inclination towards corruption which in turn should manifest itself in the presence or absence of corruption control and prevention mechanisms this framework is tested with data collected from 104 purchasing managers in germany and implications for both theory and practice are highlighted

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

calibrating benefit function transfer to assess the conservation reserve program benefit transfer offers an inexpensive alternative to conducting an original study to determine economic value unfortunately benefit transfers can also result in biased welfare estimates in this paper we suggest a method of calibrating the benefit transfer to reduce this bias an empirical example to determine the benefits of the conservation reserve program on water based recreation illustrates the potentially large biases that can result if the transfer is not calibrated

the emergence of political accountability when and how do democratic institutions deliver accountable government in addressing this broad question we focus on the role played by political norms specifically the extent to which leaders abuse office for personal gain and the extent to which citizens punish such transgressions we show how qualitatively distinct political norms can coexist because of a dynamic complementarity in which citizens willingness to punish transgressions is raised when they expect such punishments to be used in the future we seek to understand the emergence of accountability by analysing transitions between norms to do so we extend the analysis to include the possibility that at certain times a segment of voters are behaviorally intolerant of transgressions our mechanism highlights the role of leaders offering an account of how their actions can instigate enduring change within a fixed set of formal institutions by disrupting prevailing political norms we show how such changes do not depend on sun spots to trigger coordination and are asymmetric in effect a series of good leaders can and eventually will improve norms whereas bad leaders cannot damage them jel codes d72 p16 c73 copyright 2013 oxford university press

limiting environmental program contradictions a demand systems application to fishery management economically efficient natural resource policy requires the comprehensive management of environmental improvements over a system of sites use of multisite demand and benefit models can reduce the number and cost of environmental program contradictions in this paper we present a multisite demand model that incorporates several quality dimensions for a system of new mexico fishing sites use of the model permits managers to improve total welfare at lower cost by simultaneously distributing opportunity across all elements in resource users choice sets model results show that errors that result from independently adding values of interdependent program elements approach 50

collective reputation and the dynamics of statistical discrimination previous literature on statistical discrimination explained stereotypes based on the existence of multiple equilibria in which principals have difierent self conflrming beliefs about difierent social groups arrow 1973 coate and loury 1993 however the literature has not provided an account of where the principals prior beliefs come from moreover the static models dominating the literature do not ofier relevant information about the dynamic paths that lead to each equilibrium this paper develops a dynamic version of statistical discrimination in which economic players forwardlooking behaviors determine the dynamic paths to each equilibrium deflning group reputation as the objective information shared by principals regarding the average characteristics of agents belonging to each group this study identifles groups as advantaged or disadvantaged based on their initial reputation states and provides conditions by which a group can switch from one reputation state to another by understanding this dynamic structure of reputation evolution we examine the strategy that well coordinated principals may voluntarily utilize to maximize their proflts helping the group in the reputation trap to improve its skill investment rate

estimating a dynamic adverse selection model labour force experience and the changing gender earnings gap 1968 1997 this paper addresses two questions what accounts for the gender gap in labour market outcomes what are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender labour market outcomes over the period 1968 1997 it formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labour supply occupational sorting and human capital accumulation in which gender discrimination and an earnings gap arise endogenously it uses this model to quantify the driving forces behind the decline in the gender earnings gap and the increase in female labour force participation the proportion of women working in professional occupations and hours worked it finds that labour market experience is the most important factor explaining the gender earnings gap in addition statistical discrimination accounts for a large fraction of the observed gender earnings gap and its decline it also finds that a large increase in aggregate productivity in professional occupations plays a major role in the increase in female labourforce participation number of hours worked and the proportion of females working in professional occupations although of less importance demographic changes account for a substantial part of the increase in female labour force participation and hours worked whereas home production technology shocks do not

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

breaking free of a stereotype should a domestic brand pretend to be a foreign one consumers in many emerging markets exhibit a pronounced preference for western and global brands while domestic brands are often associated with a cheap but low quality image frustrated with the negative country of origin coo stereotype imposed on them many domestic brands from emerging markets follow a variety of approaches to disguise their coo and pretend to be foreign this paper studies the strategic aspects of this phenomenon we consider an experience good market where consumers learn about each brand s quality using its coo as a prior each firm can invest in product quality or coo dissociation the former generates better quality signals while the latter simply masks the firm s coo identity the analysis reveals a few main insights sharing a reputation leads to a common good problem where firms free ride on each other s quality investments as a high quality firm dissociates itself from the stereotype it ceases to contribute to the coo image but also prevents its low quality peers from free riding on it this incurs a negative direct effect but a positive strategic effect on the group image consequently a country s coo image may actually improve when more high quality brands shun their identities and pretend to be foreign in equilibrium coo image improves monotonically as firms become more efficient in providing quality however the prevalence of coo dissociation may first increase then decrease we discuss the implications of these results for emerging market brands as well as policy makers

estimation and welfare calculations in a generalized corner solution model with an application to recreation demand the kuhn tucker model of wales and woodland 1983 provides a utility theoretic framework for estimating preferences over commodities for which individuals choose not to consume one or more of the goods due to the complexity of the model however there have been few applications in the literature and little attention has been paid to the problems of welfare analysis within the kuhn tucker framework this paper provides an application of the model to the problem of recreation demand in addition we develop and apply a methodology for estimating compensating variation relying on monte carlo integration to derive expected welfare changes

the economics of nested names name specificity reputations and price premia a good can be identified by its region or country of origin the firm that produces it and its product name in other words names can nest within each other to categorize goods with increasing specificity this article develops a conceptual framework for jointly analyzing the effect of product firm and collective reputations on market price the model is estimated via quantile regression with california wine market data the results portray how the structure and relative importance of reputations change as product prices vary specifically reputation premia migrate from collective to specific names as prices increase

job discrimination market forces and the invisibility hypothesis the invisibility hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem then at a competitive labor market equilibrium firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs consequently those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability as a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

valuing food store access policy implications for the food stamp program food stamp recipients may lack access to larger stores reducing the availability of nutritious food reliance on smaller stores may have undesirable impacts policy alternatives include limiting food stamp redemption to larger stores and subsidizing store development i estimate that limiting redemption to supermarkets and grocery stores or supermarkets alone results in losses ranging from 499 2 million to 1 05 billion or 1 17 billion to 2 44 billion respectively annual loss in food stamp recipient welfare nationwide the impact of improving access is also significant ranging from 333 6 million to 931 2 million

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

optimal protection of property rights in a general equilibrium model of growth we incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second best optimal policy in this setup the state plays two of its key roles it protects property rights and provides public services the government chooses policy the income tax rate as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services to maximize the growth rate of the economy the focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria the different properties of these equilibria and the implications of second best optimal policies

traders vs relationship managers reputational conflicts in full service investment banks we present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients interest on the other hand banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so a behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities the model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral and type reputation concerns

evaluating the net benefits of collective reputation the case of bordeaux wine in this paper we develop an original approach to assess the net benefits associated with a generic promotion program using an application to bordeaux wines the benefit is computed from the marginal impact of the program s collective reputation on the individual reputation for sub regions within bordeaux these different marginal impacts are estimated using detailed survey data about the image of bordeaux wines in seven european countries we find positive and significant spillover effects from the collective reputation bordeaux that moreover increase with the reputation of the sub region these spillover effects when significantly positive vary from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 15 of additional favorable quality opinions we then calculate a measure of the average net benefits earned by producers from the regional promotion program in selected sub regions within bordeaux our results indicate that producers in some sub regions are more likely to benefit from the promotion program and suggest that the current fee structure may not be properly aligned with market conditions

persistent court corruption levels of court corruption differ widely across the world to give just one example in a recent survey of firms in transition economies the proportion of respondents who answered that firms in their line of business never have to make additional payments to deal with the courts ranged from 86 8 in hungary to just 37 2 in albania a second notable feature of court corruption is its persistence over time in spite of almost universal condemnation of the phenomenon and frequent government anti corruption campaigns this article presents a simple model that explains both the variation and persistence of corruption the main argument is as follows a major role of the legal system is to provide incentives to individuals to take or abstain from certain actions this is true of regulation criminal law contract law and tort law alike however when courts are corrupt the incentive effect provided by court enforced fines and other penalties is reduced to maintain incentives higher penalties are required but these higher penalties in turn raise the bribes that court officials can extract since the stakes to winning a court case are now higher finally higher bribes make court employment more attractive to dishonest individuals which raises the corruptibility of the court loosely speaking then corruption and penalties are complements corruption necessitates higher penalties while higher penalties engender corruption the feedback effect just described gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria that is apparently similar countries can have very different levels of court corruption one country may have a relatively honest pool of court officials and a low level of penalties while a second country may have the opposite moreover if a country in a high corruption equilibrium attempts to shift to using smaller penalties the immediate effect is a fall in the incentives provided by the legal system as such a country can find itself stuck in a high corruption equilibrium

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

reputational comparative advantage and multinational enterprise 1 introduction when cultivating a new export market or attempting to expand its share of an existing market an exporter is likely to find that it has been preceded by its reputation minus a readily identifiable brand name quality reputation may solely reflect the country of origin for example when consumers are presented with a large amount of complex product information they may use the country of origin as a heuristic in forming product impressions without considering other product attributes 1 in this article i show that this heuristic decision making process can affect a firm s quality decision and can therefore become self fulfilling hence any bias that consumers have may be well founded however it is only correct because firms respond rationally to it colombia s garment industry provides an interesting example of a self fulfilling unfavorable quality reputation in international trade as described by morawetz 1981 a single colombian garment firm took a contract for 50 000 men s suits that was beyond its capability the poor quality result so tarnished the american importer s name that other high quality importers become wary of colombian sewn garments with the payoff to high quality production reduced colombian garment firms then concentrated on low quality markets and the newly found unfavorable reputation was justified in the model constructed here consumers see only a noisy signal of the product s quality at the time of purchase therefore their posterior beliefs are based on this noisy signal and the country of origin reputations as will be made clear higher quality firms benefit more from an increase in their country s reputation so that a better reputation generates an increase in the percentage of high quality firms in this way the reputation becomes self fulfilling and ex ante identical countries can be correctly perceived as differing in their percentage of high quality producers i next introduce an economy with two sectors one sector produces more complex goods where high quality is not easily verified and is more essential to the product s performance these may be technology intensive products or they may consist of the design and marketing of the goods produced in the other sector in particular high quality production costs and the consumer s value for high quality goods is greater in this sector i show that this sector becomes more profitable as the country of origin reputation increases hence if one country s equilibrium reputation is low and the other country s equilibrium reputation is high then the pattern of specialization and international trade can be determined solely by reputational comparative advantage 2 finally i show that reputational comparative advantage can overshadow a small technological comparative disadvantage in determining the pattern of international trade given this pattern of trade and specialization based on reputational comparative advantage a high reputation firm may expend resources to establish a multinational enterprise mne in the low reputation country for example many mne products require the differing specializations of both the high and low reputation countries although differing in motivation this result accords well with more traditional models of vertical mne 3 however this impetus for mne as well as its more traditional counterparts does not explain why the mne would choose foreign direct investment fdi over a less costly licensing arrangement 4 the quality uncertainty in this model along with the difference in equilibrium reputations allows us to address this question in particular appropriable reputational rents are generated by fdi when the high reputation parent firm procures and internalizes production with a low reputation host firm this fdi breaks the low reputation equilibrium of the host firm and generates reputational rents

a discrete count model of recreational demand abstract discrete choice models generate welfare measures resulting from environmental quality changes on a per trip basis instead of over a longer more policy relevant time period seasonal or annual welfare measures resulting from a quality change are often computed by multiplying each individual s per trip welfare measure by the number of trips the individual is forecasted to take at the new quality level these models are typically formulated so that increases in the quality of any site causes every individual to increase his or her participation this paper presents an alternative method of linking the discrete choice model to a demand model enabling welfare changes to be estimated in a conventional manner

on the aggregate value of recreational activities a nested price index approach using poisson demand systems an important consideration in the development ofregulations and policies that administer naturalresources in an area is the value of the non marketactivities supported by those lands little attentionhas been paid to the aggregate value of largegeographic areas this analysis builds autility theoretic price index and utilizes this indexto estimate an aggregate poisson demand to valuebackcountry recreational hiking opportunities innorthern california

propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior experimental evidence from australia india indonesia and singapore abstract this paper examines cultural differences in individual decision making in a corruption game we define culture as an individual s accumulated experience shaped by the social institutional and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives based on experiments run in australia melbourne india delhi indonesia jakarta and singapore we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures consistent with the existing corruption indices the subjects in india exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in australia however the subjects in singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected we conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries we also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture specific

governance reform in legal service markets this paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets the model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms we identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform focussing particularly on the rent recapture and relationship substitution effects we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service

persistence of corruption some theoretical perspectives summary the paper examines how pervasive corruption can be persistent despite the presence of anti corruption measures and incentives corruption has a strong tendency to persist in the first part we discuss how a high level of corruption or a low level of compliance can be an equilibrium outcome in such a case corruption becomes the social norm in the second part of the paper we use ides from evolutionary game theory to discuss how corrupt behavior can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different individual behavioral norms

corruption and air pollution in europe this paper examines how the effectiveness of regulatory framework influences levels of sulphur emissions in a scenario where to reduce its emission tax payments a polluting firm may under report emissions level at the risk of being audited and fined first a model to explain how changes in regulatory framework e g audit effectiveness and transboundary spillovers affect both actual and reported emissions is developed then the theoretical predictions using data for 39 european countries from 1999 to 2003 are tested and inferences about true emission levels are made the empirical analysis supports the theoretical predictions with significant implications for the interpretation of pollution data reported to international monitoring agencies countries with effective regulation are likely to have relatively high reported emissions of sulphur but this should not automatically be interpreted as weak environmental performance because their actual pollution levels are likely to be lower than in nations with less effective regulation

public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game abstract this paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat a lobby and the public there is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat who is averse to letting the public down we study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time with time varying beliefs corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are updated fast

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

brand choice and purchase frequency revisited an application to recreation behavior the role that total purchases play in determining the choice among brands has been considered in microeconomic theory for quite some time but for traditional goods only consumption of outdoor recreation is an unusual good most often measured using an individual s recreational trip adding the trips made on a number of choice occasions seems the obvious way to aggregate this good but doing so leads to several problems in defining a meaningful price index the hicks leontief conditions for aggregation suggest that trips to destinations may be thought of as brand choices on consumption occasions andthe continuous analogue to total purchases may in fact be the individual s total travel an empirical example of the model is used to estimate welfare impacts for a group of anglers

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

reputation effects and the limits of contracting a study of the indian software industry this paper examines evidence of the role that reputation plays in determining contractual outcomes we conduct an empirical analysis of the indian customized software industry using a data set we collected containing detailed information on 230 projects carried out by 125 software firms we propose a model ofthe industry where reputation determines contractual outcomes the evidence supports the view that reputation matters ex ante contracts as well as the outcome after ex post renegotiation vary with firms characteristics plausibly associated with reputation this holds after controlling for project client and firm characteristics

on the strength of corporate cultures abstract we model corporate culture s as production technologies for which employees have to undertake culture specific investments that improve their effectiveness at a later date the organization can adopt cultural changes that make this investment partially redundant this leads to under investment however as agents invest more the organization s opportunity cost of a change increases which in turn increases each agents incentives to invest this externality among agents leads to multiple equilibria otherwise similar organizations can thus exhibit either high investment levels and low probability of changes strong culture or low investment levels and high probability of changes weak culture we also explore some implications for the nature and management of corporate culture

corruption across countries and regions some consequences of local osmosis abstract large and persistent differences in corruption across comparable countries is a challenging research issue even more intriguing are such differences across regions within the same country because the typically considered socioeconomic and governance characteristics are generally more similar across such regions than across different countries this paper s principal theme is that individuals perceptions of their environments are influenced by the realities that they have faced in the past these perceptions affect their current and future actions which in turn influence the current and future realities an articulation and analysis of these dynamics yields significant observations concerning individuals behavior and societal outcomes

search with learning from prices does increased inflationary uncertainty lead to higher markups aggregate cost uncertainty arising from real shocks or unanticipated inflation reduces the informativeness of prices by scrambling relative and aggregate variations but when agents can acquire additional information such increased noise may in fact lead them to become better informed and price competition will intensify we examine these issues in a model of search with learning where consumers search optimally from an unknown price distribution while firms price optimally given consumers search rules we show that the decisive factor in whether inflation variability increases or reduces the incentive to search and thereby market efficiency is the size of informational costs