dualism and reform in china according to the dual economy tradition of economic development models less developed economies at an early stage of development are marked by a dichotomy between a modern sector in which workers are hired at an institutional wage in numbers that rise with the growth of the industrial capital stock and a traditional sector in which workers subsist at an income level that is somewhat below the indus

urban bias rural bias or state bias urban rural relations in post revolutionary china the authors aim to evaluate the relevance of urban bias and rural bias to the chinese case they present empirical evidence on the nature and extent of differentiation in rural urban living standards examine the political basis of relevant economic policies and investigate the relationship between these policies both the changes in labour productivity in each sector and the inter sectoral savings transfers both urban and rural bias hypotheses illuminate certain dimensions of chinese development strategy but the realities of rural urban relations have been complex and analysis must be supplemented by a focus on the divide between state and society and the question of state bias

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure in a north south vertically differentiated duopoly the analysis in this paper derives equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports by incorporating strategic interaction at the policy setting stage and the product market the model sheds new light on i the effects of parallel import policies on pricing behavior of firms and ii the interdependence of national parallel import policies if demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large the north forbids parallel imports to ensure its firm sells in the south thereby generating international price discrimination the south s most preferred market outcome as the equilibrium when demand structures are relatively similar across countries the north permits parallel imports and uniform pricing its most preferred market outcome obtains

gaidar s reforms truth and fiction the article by v mau is devoted to long term challenges in the development of russia in terms of e gaidar s scientific heritage it presents a methodological approach to the analysis of the country s development consider the economic policy and economic reforms of the 1990 s in the article by a nechaev the myths and realities of the reforms shock therapy are examined the role of gaidar who saved the country from the bloody drama is traced a aganbegyan pays special attention to the scientific heritage of e gaidar considering him worthy of the title of academician s dubinin distinguishes leadership abilities of gaidar allowed him to become the head of complex transformations which have no analogues in the world

parallel imports and the pricing of pharmaceutical products evidence from the european union we consider policy issues regarding parallel imports pis of brand name pharmaceuticals in the european union where such trade is permitted we develop a simple model in which an original manufacturer competes in its home market with pi firms the model suggests that for small trade costs the original manufacturer will accommodate the import decisions of parallel traders and that the price in the home market falls as the volume of parallel imports rises using data from sweden we find that the prices of drugs subject to competition from parallel imports fell relative to other drugs over the period 1994 1999 econometric analysis finds that parallel imports significantly reduced manufacturing prices by 12 19 there is evidence that this effect increases with multiple pi entrants

an elementary proposition concerning parallel imports abstract this paper demonstrates that when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports a global nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i e global uniform pricing this result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government s objective function i e political economy considerations we also show that when countries can prevent parallel exports then any nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination

wages profits and capital intensity evidence from matched worker firm data swedish data on workers matched with firms balance sheet reports are used to examine the relation between wages and firms ability to pay results indicate that experienced and highly educated workers are sorted into profitable firms wages are positively correlated with profits and the capital labor ratio after controlling for worker quality degree of effort supervision job characteristics local unemployment firms employment history and employer size lester s range of pay due to rent sharing is around 12 24 of the mean wage in sweden which is close to the estimates for the united states and united kingdom

rural urban disparity and sectoral labour allocation in china this study examines china s rural urban segmentation and its causes in the context of economic reforms household survey and aggregate data indicate a v shaped process in which rural urban consumption and income differentials decreased between 1978 and 1985 but then have continually increased to historically high levels this sectoral division is consistent with production function estimates based on provincial data that reveal higher labour productivity in urban state owned industries than in rural industries and agriculture to explain the v shaped change we argue that the precedent of successful rural reforms raised farmers relative earnings but the remaining obstacles to an efficient sectoral allocation of labour have prevented china from eliminating dualism recent financial policies consisting of urban price subsidies and increased investment credits have also had influential distribution effects that are biased against the rural sector

the creation and capture of rents wages and innovation in a panel of u k companies this paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of british firms a head count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information innovating firms are found to have higher average wages but rival innovation tends to depress own wages this appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation in other words innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability quasi rents or tobin s average q instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0 29

union egalitarianism as income insurance it is a common observation that unions often try to compress the wage distribution among their members as compared with the productivity distribution a troublesome aspect of standard theories of redistributive unions is the question why high productivity workers choose to enter the union in the first place this paper develops and explores the implications of an alternative insurance rationale for egalitarian wage objectives apart from providing a simple explanation of why heterogeneous union members may agree on egalitarian wage policies it also suggests a more guarded attitude toward the welfare costs of pay compression copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

third degree price discrimination under economies of scale there has long been a controversy in economics about whether or not a firm with monopoly power should be allowed to exploit its monopoly power by engaging in third degree price discrimination the effect of third degree price discrimination on welfare is two fold 1 output under price discrimination is misallocated because different groups are charged different prices but 2 if total output is different under price discrimination than under uniform pricing this will also affect welfare 2 schmalensee 8 varian 11 12 and schwartz 9 have shown that price discrimination must decrease welfare if output under price discrimination is the same or less than output under uniform pricing this fundamental result is quite robust and holds regardless of the number of sub markets or the behavior of marginal cost rising constant or falling it also holds even if the sub market demands are interdependent a necessary but not sufficient condition for price discrimination to be beneficial is that it increase total output perhaps the most common situation in which price discrimination will be beneficial is the case where only one sub market is served under uniform pricing but two or more sub markets are served under price discrimination in this case hausman and mackie mason 3 have pointed out that price discrimination will result in a pareto welfare improvement if marginal cost is constant or falling even when price discrimination does not open up new markets hausman and mackie mason 3 and nahata ostaszewski and sahoo 5 have shown that price discrimination can result in a pareto improvement by lowering prices in all sub markets hausman and mackie mason 3 257 argue that price discrimination is most likely to be beneficial when economies of scale are present 3

planned obsolescence as an incentive device for unobservable quality stressing the multi dimensional character of quality i propose a new theory of planned obsolescence as an incentive device that benefits consumers i argue that planned obsolescence increases the frequency of repurchases and therefore enables consumers to punish producers faster for a lack of overall quality this strengthens the producers incentives to provide adequate levels of quality the theory implies a trade off between a good s durability and its other unobservable quality attributes this leads to an artificially high degree of obsolescence as compared to the first best where quality is observable

chinese urbanization and development before and after economic reform a comparative reappraisal abstract this paper analyzes the recent process and consequences of china s urbanization by weighing the short term policies and long term strategies concerning national development and urban growth against the objective material conditions and competing group interests in chinese society comparative insights are drawn from the experiences of other late developing countries where the effects of political decisions concerning urban growth have been fundamentally modified by social and economic forces thus china s urbanization is examined here in terms of the four major aspects of third world urbanization overurbanization urban bias and the parasitic versus generative nature of cities rural development and the role of small urban places and interregional balance in urbanization and development the rapid and complex process of urbanization certainly helps boost the dynamic of the post mao chinese economy but not without the problematic symptoms of congestion and inequality

pareto price discrimination abstract as the collection of consumer data becomes more common online merchants are better equipped to price discriminate now more than ever before while standard first degree price discrimination benefits merchants and harms consumers relative to uniform pricing i derive an alternative first degree pricing strategy that achieves efficiency and pareto improves upon the uniform pricing equilibrium furthermore i show that price ceilings can enforce these pareto price discrimination strategies making pareto price discrimination a viable option for merchants and policy makers

rent sharing holdup and wages evidence from matched panel data rent sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages we propose a simple measure of this holdup effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm specific capital accumulation using social security earnings records for workers in the veneto region of italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers we find strong evidence of rent sharing with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around 4 arising mainly at larger firms with higher price cost margins on the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment instead firm level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital

the peasant family in the transition from maoist to lewisian rural industrialisation rural industrialisation in china in the post maoist era involves the social transformation of the peasant population into a new class which is partially detached from agriculture and employed in diverse non state enterprises ranging from family run businesses to village and township run enterprises the peasant family internalises this transformation as it reallocates labour and capital into new industrial and tertiary sectors while maintaining agricultural production as a first and last means for labour absorption and subsistence since it is peasant families not the chinese state or the collective that now wholly undertake the burden of supporting the sizeable labour surplus their managerial autonomy tends to result in an energetic effort at economic rationalisation mainly through sectoral diversification of family income sources statistical analysis shows that the adoption of household production responsibility systems in agriculture while ambiguous in its effects on agricultural productivity w

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

bounding the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under pigouvian third degree price discrimination a profit maximizing monopolist typically charges different groups of customers different prices resale between groups is assumed to be impossible these differences in price entail a loss of efficiency because marginal valuations of the output are not equal across buyers the net welfare effect of allowing price discrimination is ambiguous though because the total output under discrimination may exceed that under uniform pricing nevertheless under quite general conditions third degree price discrimination by a monopolist can increase static welfare only if total output is greater under discriminatory pricing than under uniform pricing richard schmalensee 1981 hal r varian 1985 marius schwartz 1990 although there has been much analysis of whether price discrimination raises or lowers total output or welfare the size of these effects has remained largely unexplored varian 1985 compares discriminatory pricing to uniform pricing for a monopolist and provides some bounds for the change in welfare in terms of market prices and outputs but these relationships give little sense of the relative size of welfare changes resulting from third degree price discrimination i address this issue by asking what can be said about the ratio wd wu where wd and wu denote welfare under discriminatory and uniform pricing respectively welfare is measured as the sum of producer surplus and marshallian consumer surplus section i provides two examples showing that this ratio can range from zero to infinity in these examples all markets are served under uniform pricing and demand in one of the markets is strictly convex considering a two market model in which a monopolist with constant marginal cost serves two independent markets under uniform pricing i show in section iii that if demands in both markets are concave then wd w is bounded below by 2 the assumptions of constant marginal cost and independent demands allow producer surplus and consumer surplus to be identified separately for each market separability across markets is central to the approach taken in this paper following joan robinson 1933 i call a market strong weak if the discriminatory price in that market is at least as great as no greater than the profit maximizing uniform price surprisingly the key to bounding wd wu is that the demand function in the weak market be concave if one market is strong the other is weak and demand in the weak market is concave then wd w can be bounded above by 2 5 or even 1 75 or 1 6 with additional assumptions on the demand functions these bounds arise for several reasons first the monopolist s profit under uniform pricing must be at least as large as the profit in the weak market under discrimination moreover if at all prices demand in the strong market is as great as in the weak market then profit under uniform pricing must be at least twice as great as profit in the weak market under discrimination otherwise the monopolist could do better by charging the monopoly price for the weak market second this relationship between profits in the two markets is useful in bounding welfare because welfare in each market can be related to profit in that market section ii shows that if demand is con department of economics and a b freeman school of business tulane university new orleans la 70118 i thank marius schwartz and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper

rent sharing and collective wage contracts evidence from german establishment level data using german establishment level data this article analyses whether wages respond to firm specific profitability conditions particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage in this context two conflicting hypotheses are tested the first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms the second one states that unions favour a compressed intra industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm specific profitability conditions the empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis while pooled ordinary least squares pols estimates yield positive estimates of the rent sharing coefficient in covered establishments dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent sharing coefficient of zero

strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy this paper shows that parallel import policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy we demonstrate this result in two country international duopoly where a domestic monopolist competes with a rival rm in the foreign market if it chooses to incur the xed investment cost of exporting the two rms sell horizontally dierentiated goods and compete in prices when the foreign market is signi cantly larger than the domestic one the home rm gains if it is unable to price discriminate its desire to not deviate too far from its optimal monopoly price in the domestic market makes it credibly less aggressive in price competition abroad which softens price competition and raises pro ts on the other hand when the foreign market is not signi cantly larger it is optimal for the home country to forbid parallel imports since international price discrimination yields higher pro ts to the home rm we draw out the implications of the two types of parallel import policies for global welfare

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

monopoly with endogenous durability abstract a multi period formulation for a durable good monopoly is developed where production and durability are decision variables when commitment to production is possible neither the level nor the depreciation rate of initial stock has an effect on the selected efficient degree of durability with time consistent production policy the optimal degree of durability is less than the efficient rate and typically increasing in the initial stock and initial degree of durability when a monopolist can switch at any time from an inefficient non durable to an efficient durable there exists a cutoff durability above which only the non durable will be produced otherwise the efficient durable will be produced

wages profits and rent sharing the paper suggests a new test for rent sharing in the u s labor market using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector it shows that a rise in a sector s profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long run level of wages in that sector the paper controls for workers characteristics for industry fixed effects and for unionism lester s range of wages is estimated for rent sharing reasons alone at approximately 24 per cent of the mean wage

rent sharing and wages evidence from company and establishment panels a central question in labor economics and macroeconomics is whether the textbook competitive model provides an adequate representation of the labor market using longitudinal data on companies and establishments this article suggests that it may not as predicted by rent sharing models of the labor market changes in profitability are shown to feed through into long run changes in wages these are not temporary wage effects and are not driven by the unionized workplaces in the data the article s estimates imply that for rent sharing reasons alone lester s range of wages is approximately 16

real wage determination and rent sharing in collective bargaining agreements the microeconomic forces that influence real wages are not fully understood this paper studies pay determination using data on approximately 600 labour contracts it finds that the real wage is an increasing function of past profitability in the employer s industry and a decreasing function of the level of unemployment in the employer s region these results are consistent with rent sharing theories

german works councils and the anatomy of wages using matched employer employee data from the german liab for 2001 the authors found that german works councils are in general associated with higher earnings even after accounting for establishm

planned obsolescence and the r d decision by investing in rd i e the r d choice that maximizes current profitability does not maximize overall profitability the result is that if output is sold rather than rented then in its r d decision the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned obsolescence that lowers its own profitability

parallel imports challenges from unauthorized distribution channels we examine the problem of parallel imports unauthorized flows of products across countries which compete with authorized distribution channels the traditional economics model of a discriminating monopolist that has different prices for the same good in different markets requires the markets to be separated in some way usually geographically the profits from price discrimination can be threatened by parallel imports that allow consumers in the high priced region some access to the low priced marketplace however as this article shows there is a very real possibility that parallel imports may actually increase profits the basic intuition is that parallel importation becomes another channel for the authentic goods and creates a new product version that allows the manufacturer to price discriminate we propose a two country three stage model to quantitatively study the effects and strategies in the third stage and in the higher priced country where parallel imports have entered we characterize the resulting market segmentation one segment of consumers stays with the authorized version as they place more value on the warranty and services that come with the authorized version another segment switches to parallel imports because a lower price is offered due to lack of country specific features or warranties parallel imports also generate a third and new segment that would not have bought this product before unlike counterfeits that are fabricated by imitators all parallel imports are genuine and sourced from the manufacturer in the lower priced country through authorized dealers therefore the manufacturer s global sales quantity should increase but profit may rise or fall depending on the relative sizes and profitability of the segments a profit maximizing parallel importer should set price and quantity in the second stage after observing the manufacturer s prices in both countries there will be a threshold of across country price gap above which parallel imports would occur in the first stage the manufacturer can anticipate the possible occurrence of a parallel import its price and quantity and its effect on authorized sales in each country to make a coordinated pricing decision to maximize the global supply chain profit under some circumstances the manufacturer should allow parallel imports and under others should prevent them through a stackelberg game we solve for the optimal pricing strategy in each scenario we then find in one extension that when the number of parallel importers increases the optimal authorized price gap should narrow but the prices and quantities of parallel imports may rise or fall in another extension we nd that when the manufacturer has other means such as monitoring dealers differentiating designs and unbundling warranties to contain parallel imports the authorized price gap can widen as a function of the effectiveness of nonpricing controls in summary parallel imports may help the manufacturer to extend the global reach of its product and even boost its global profit if the manufacturer offers a discount version through its authorized dealers it is running a high risk of confusing customers and tarnishing brand images parallel imports may cause similar concerns for the manufacturer but unauthorized dealers are perceived as further removed from the manufacturer therefore there is less risk of confusing consumers when parallel imports are channeled through unauthorized dealers furthermore they are more nimble in diverting the product whenever their transshipment and marketing costs are small enough not to offset the authorized price gap and the valuation discount this may explain why some manufacturers fiercely fight parallel imports while others knowingly use this alternative channel

insurance within the firm we evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer employee panel data unlike previous contributions this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm which are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of diversifiable risk we allow for both temporary and permanent shocks to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only partially risk sharing considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings variability the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an important vehicle of insurance provision

rent sharing before and after the wage bill many biases plague the analysis of whether employers share rents with their employees unlike what is predicted by the competitive labour market model using a portuguese matched employer employee panel this article is one of the first to address these biases in three complementary ways 1 controlling directly for the fact that firms that share more rents will ceteris paribus have lower net of wages profits 2 instrumenting profits via interactions between the exchange rate and the share of exports in firm s total sales 3 considering firm or firm worker spell fixed effects and highlighting the role of downward wage rigidity these approaches clarify conflicting findings in the literature and result in our preferred specifications in significant evidence of rent sharing a lester range of pay dispersion of 56 also shown to be robust to a number of competitive interpretations

parallel imports demand dispersion and international price discrimination parallel imports goods imported by unauthorized resellers are advocated worldwide for undermining international price discrimination for a continuum of markets we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is large though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation too many markets go unserved mixed systems permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing or unrestricted multimarket discrimination and can pareto dominate uniform pricing thus while parallel imports might benefit some countries our results weaken the multilateral case for allowing them

differential pricing parallel trade and the incentive to invest abstract i consider the case for imposing uniform pricing on a monopolist in a setting where markets can be segmented according to differences in marginal costs and or consumer demand i also analyze the ex ante impact on incentives to invest in r d i show how two opposite trade offs arise when differential pricing is demand based uniform pricing has good ex post welfare properties but leads to lower investment ex ante conversely when differential pricing is cost based uniform pricing has bad ex post welfare properties but leads to higher investment ex ante

durable goods monopoly with limited choice of commitment strategy when should the monopolist precommit consider a firm a monopolist offering a unique product to a fixed number of potential customers suppose that no consumer desires more than one unit of the good within a given period or across periods that is there is no value to repeat purchases in addition suppose that customers vary with respect to their initial reservation prices which decline over time a natural interpretation is that the monopolist is selling a good that is durable alternatively the firm is providing an entertainment or fashion good consumers may place a premium on obtaining the product quickly before it becomes less useful less stylish or less novel coase 7 conjectured that this firm s ability to extract surplus is limited because the firm has to compete with itself across time periods high valuation customers would be unwilling to pay a high initial price because they would anticipate that over time the firm will be reducing the price in order to sell to lower valuation customers subsequent literature formalizes this as a time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist unable to make intertemporal commitments a separate strand of the literature proceeds from the polar assumption that the monopolist can precommit to any multiperiod pricing strategy comparison to coase s monopolist is simple higher profits are obtainable under precommitment because more surplus is extracted from high valuation customers an important proposition due to stokey 22 is that it will be optimal for the monopolist to precommit to a declining intertemporal price schedule if consumers with higher initial valuations have a higher rate of time preference 2 otherwise the optimal strategy is to hold price constant at the static monopoly level and to sell no more than the static monopoly quantity 3

bundling and international market segmentation the paper shows how firms by bundling their products with nontradables may contribute to the segmentation of international oligopoly markets we develop a simple example with two products one that is homogeneous across markets and one that is bundled with a nontradable e g local services integration of the markets for the homogeneous product yields the expected price equalization across markets however integration of the markets for bundled products leaves the economy entirely unaffected hence the standard methodology of comparing a segmented and an integrated equilibrium would exaggerate the effects of integration in this economy

why parallel trade may raise producers profits abstract this paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade in addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period for these types of products letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit the model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles clothes toys consumer electronics musical recordings cosmetics and perfumes

parallel imports and repair services abstract this study explores the welfare effects of parallel imports when the producer may refuse to provide repair services for parallel imported units which reduces the degree of price convergence between countries if the probability of the product s breakdown is endogenously determined by the producer permitting parallel imports could increase the probability because a higher probability leads to a larger price gap as a result it is possible that prices increase and welfare deteriorates in both countries this negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as the liberalization of trade in goods proceeds the prohibition of service discrimination recovers the positive welfare effect

the impact of parallel imports on investments in cost reducing research and development abstract we develop a two country model of endogenous investment in process innovation by a manufacturer facing competition from parallel imports pi we find that the distortions associated with pi inhibit innovation however the difference between the manufacturer s expected profits under successful and failed innovation is u shaped in the cost of engaging in pi thus the reduction in r d investment depends on both legality of pi and transport costs the reduction in innovation could harm global welfare depending on whether the manufacturer was deterring pi with a high wholesale price if so banning such trade would raise expected welfare

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

vertical distribution parallel trade and price divergence in integrated markets we develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets that are integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports pi the manufacturing rm needs to set these two prices to balance three competing interests restricting competition in the pi recipient market avoiding resource wastes due to actual trade and reducing the double markup problem in the pi source nation

work characteristics firm size and wages a positive wage firm size relationship is well documented in the empirical literature in industrial organization and labor economics firm size seems to proxy various unobserved determinants such as job satisfaction monitoring costs more complex technologies and worker participation in monopoly profits it is generally argued that the greater the possibility of controlling for these latent factors the less likely that a significant size effect will appear this paper attempts to distinguish firm size from other wage determinants for a rich data source for west germany and demonstrates the persistence of the size premium

insider effects in wage determination abstract the paper attempts to shed new light on the determinants of industry wages by a cross country comparison of wage setting relationships making use of comprehensive and consistent panel data on industries from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s the empirical analysis involves estimations of identically specified industry wage equations for each of five countries sweden norway finland germany and the united states a key finding is that industry wages in the u s are the most responsive to sectoral price and productivity changes by contrast industry wages in the nordic countries are largely unaffected by sectoral conditions the results cast doubt on the competitive model as an accurate characterization of wage setting under decentralization

economic reform in china since 1978 china has undergone a series of radical economic reforms which officially constitute a logical step in the initial stage of socialism and imply a transition from central planning to a mixed economy the author argues that in fact the transition taking place is from a soviet type of state capitalism towards private capitalism the rural reforms involve the restoration of pre revolutionary production relations while the urban reforms introduce new capitalists drawn from the ranks of the state administration to the detriment of the poor and unskilled there has been a retreat from marxism as the official ideology and the legitimacy of the regime is now based on modernisation as a national goal

parallel trade product quality and welfare we study the welfare effects of parallel trade pt considering investment in quality we thus revisit the case for pt in research intensive industries we find that pt may raise quality depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries conditional on quality consumer surplus may rise fall in the pt source pt recipient country while pt reduces ex post welfare improving quality is a necessary condition for pt to increase welfare ex ante

welfare and output in third degree price discrimination a note abstract one main result on the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement this note provides two examples showing that this proposition does not generalize to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms in these examples price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm this induces a cost saving that overcomes the welfare loss associated with price discrimination

third degree price discrimination in linear demand markets effects on number of markets served and social welfare author affiliation victor kaftal department of mathematical sciences 839 c old chemistry building university of cincinnati cincinnati oh 45221 usa victor kaftal uc edudebashis pal department of economics 1204 crosley tower university of cincinnati cincinnati oh 45221 debashis pal uc edu corresponding author acknowledgment we are grateful to rick harbaugh laura razzolini david sappington and two anonymous reviewers debashis pal is also grateful to taft research center for financial support 1 introductiondoes monopolistic third degree price discrimination reduce social welfare the question has continued to intrigue economists and policy makers for more than half a century the seminal work of robinson 1933 shows that if a monopolist with a constant marginal cost sells in two distinct and independent markets having linear demands then welfare falls with third degree price discrimination almost half a century later schmalensee 1981 reexamines robinson s result and demonstrates that for any number of markets with linear demands third degree price discrimination lowers welfare schmalensee 1981 also establishes more generally that price discrimination increases welfare only if it increases aggregate output subsequently using ingenious duality approaches varian 1985 and schwartz 1990 generalize the results for correlated demands and nonlinear marginal costs 1it is therefore well known that for linear market demands and constant marginal costs monopolistic third degree price discrimination indeed lowers welfare it is important to note however that the welfare reducing effect of third degree price discrimination is derived under a crucial assumption it is assumed that if the monopolist is forced to charge the same price in all markets uniform pricing the monopolist would sell a positive quantity in each market in a recent article cowan 2007 considers various forms of nonlinear demands and presents the necessary and sufficient and or sufficient conditions for price discrimination to reduce welfare cowan 2007 however also assumes that all markets are served under uniform pricing yet when this assumption does not hold the welfare effects of monopolistic third degree price discrimination turn out to be significantly more intricate observe that when all markets are not served under uniform pricing price discrimination may increase welfare because price discrimination may serve markets that would not be served under uniform pricing thus relative to uniform pricing price discrimination has two countervailing effects on welfare aggregate welfare goes down in those markets that are originally served under uniform pricing whereas welfare goes up in those markets that are not served under uniform pricing therefore the additional welfare from the new markets under price discrimination may offset any loss of welfare in the markets that are originally served under uniform pricing the point is strongly emphasized in schmalensee s 1981 seminal work in the context of prescription drugs an identical sentiment is recently echoed in varian 2000 in the context of two markets the possibility of price discrimination opening up new markets is first analyzed graphically by battalio and ekelund 1972 layson 1994 also considers two markets but includes nonlinear demands and presents conditions for opening of new markets based on endogenous features such as elasticities in the context of patent policy opening of new markets by price discrimination is explicitly incorporated by hausman and mackie mason 1988 using two markets they show that price discrimination by a patent holder is socially desirable in many cases because it allows the patent holder to open new markets there is a related literature in spatial economics beginning with greenhut and ohta 1972 and holahan 1975 that deals with spatial price discrimination and market opening with linear demand

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in a differentiated oligopoly this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is verified however that consumer surplus is never improved social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms profits in the case of linear demands jel d43 l11 l13 i introduction this article examines the welfare effects of oligopolistic third degree price discrimination explicitly considering product differentiation as a source of market power and strategic interaction product differentiation is one of the main reasons why firms can enjoy market power it enables them to sell products that are no longer perfect substitutes for example coca cola and pepsico sell similar types of soda although it is arguable that they differ in taste each firm thereby attracts some consumers over another as a form of price discrimination coca cola was once reported to be testing a vending machine that would automatically raise prices in hot weather 1 although the plan triggered nationwide controversy and coca cola had to abandon the project as a result it could have changed the regime of uniform pricing to one of price discrimination in the soda market how would the resulting change affect consumer welfare and firms profits in other words is third degree price discrimination good or bad answering this question is important because it helps us to evaluate price discrimination under oligopoly in this article we focus on horizontal product differentiation to consider substitutability as well as complementarity 2 by assuming a linear quadratic utility function of a representative consumer and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of a pricing game we characterize the conditions relating to such demand properties as substitutability and complementarity required for price discrimination to improve social welfare more specifically we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is also shown that aggregate output must increase for price discrimination to improve social welfare we verify however that consumer surplus is never improved by price discrimination welfare improvement from price discrimination is solely owing to an increase in firms profits in the example above the degree of substitution would be higher in the strong market i e when the temperature is high because consumers care less about which brand when it is hot weather our analysis below implies that social welfare might improve in this case the degree of substitution can vary across markets even if consumers in each market face exactly the same products because consumers taste depends on various market specific factors such as geographical and natural conditions if the strong market is where consumers demand a product more eagerly caring less about which brand in the above example individuals demand soda more eagerly in hot weather then our results suggest that price discrimination has large potential to improve social welfare 3 why does allowing price discrimination improve social welfare notice that there are two forces that determine equilibrium prices in price setting oligopoly a larger market size raises the price whereas a larger substitutability parameter lowers the price for price discrimination to raise social welfare it is necessary that a high degree of substitutability mitigates an increase in the discriminatory price in the larger market

monopolistic third degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation this paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous the results provide rich implications for antitrust policy

what explains china s rising urbanisation in the reform era china has been transforming from a rural to an urban economy over the past century especially since 1978 when economic reforms were initiated and rapid economic growth began this paper attempts t

input price discrimination in the presence of downstream vertical differentiation abstract this paper investigates the competitive effects of input price discrimination ipd in a setting in which an upstream monopolist produces an essential input supplied to the downstream market where there is competition between two vertically differentiated retailers two different input pricing regimes are investigated i the uniform pricing regime in which third degree input price discrimination is prohibited and i i a discriminatory pricing regime under which the upstream monopolist may charge different prices to the two downstream firms we find that despite favoring the low quality firm ipd is welfare enhancing if and only if the quality gap is sufficiently high

orders to supply as substitutes for commitments to aftermarkets a number of recent antitrust cases in canada and other countries have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service or ganizations earlier work suggested that the inability of manufacturers to commit to low aftermarket prices creates an inefficiency that might be removed by a judicial order to supply this paper examines this view critically with a specific model of repairs and demonstrates that under plausible conditions there is no welfare loss due to the inability to commit it goes on to show that an order to supply can create its own distortion and welfare loss if it encourages