contracts opportunism and trust self interest and social orientation this paper analyses the role of trust in facilitating efficient exchange relations when agents are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour two distinct mechanisms supporting trust are distinguished self interested trust sit which is forwardlooking and socially oriented trust sot which has its roots in the past the former is the only source of trust recognised in the mainstream economics literature while the latter draws heavily from sociology we develop the implications of isolated and of repeated exchange for the existence of sit or sit and for the role of formal contracts in exchange relations the paper concludes with a discussion of the feasibility of empirical testing to distinguish sit from sot

the hidden persuaders institutions and individuals in economic theory in his classic book the hidden persuaders vance packard claimed that large corporations manipulated consumers using advertising techniques john kenneth galbraith and others have repeated a similar view against this gary becker and george stigler have claimed that advertising is essentially informative rather than manipulative in contrast it is argued here that both of these opposed accounts of human agency neglect the more subtle and undesigned processes by which institutions bear upon and mould individuals this paper proposes a concept of reconstitutive downward causation in which institutions act upon individual habits and dispositions the mechanisms involved do not fall foul of past critiques of holism or methodological collectivism this argument involves a rehabilitation of the concept of habit in social science with far reaching implications

puzzles in the economic institutions of capitalism production coordination contracting and work organisation in the irish linen trade 1750 1850 pre famine ireland is a byword for market failure and path dependence production of flax yarn and linen cloth was highly regulated and coordinated by the market rather than by firms contemporary political economists suggested that these institutional features provided evidence of organisational inefficiency the historical evidence suggests that they were a rational response to transaction and production costs the irish case provides a test of the hypotheses that firms emerge to reduce the cost of market transactions it suggests that institutions other than the firm can modify transaction costs coordination of production can affect both transaction and production costs and that agents choose between market and firm coordination given technology and factor prices finally centralisation of production was driven by technology copyright 2005 oxford university press

forms of trust and conditions for their stability of the three principal approaches to trust we decided to investigate in greater detail the one in which trust is regarded as a belief that the individuals involved hold about a relationship trust was defined as a delegatory relationship based on anticipation of the delegatee s behaviour we reached four main conclusions first the solution to the problem posed by the indeterminacy of trust lies in the differentiation and hierarchisation of the various forms of trust contractual organisational and tacit on the basis of their degree of irreversibility and stability second contractual trust is unstable because it comes up against the problem of guarantees of individual intentions this leads to the third conclusion rational evaluation by individuals cannot by itself establish trust which is based on collective beliefs practices and rules fourth we identified two conditions for the stability of trust the creation of irreversibilities through adherence to a rule and the creation of a confidence interval within which different interpretations of contradictory individual strategies are tolerated thus the viability of the various forms of trust depends on the ability of institutions and organisations to create rules that are likely when applied to produce an interval in which tolerance of mutual intentions is the norm these analyses of trust hence highlight the role of time and period of time in the notion of trust

the lens of contract private ordering james buchanan 2001 p 29 avers that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics he further contends that this fundamental understanding is better realized by examining economics through the lens of contract rather than the lens of choice buchanan 1975 because the latter has been the reigning paradigm in economics during the 20th century lionel robbins 1932 melvin w reder 1999 the lens of contract is understandably less fully developed interest in contractual approaches has nevertheless been building up whence the gap between these two has been closing this paper sketches some of these developments with emphasis on private ordering

grid connected renewable energy in china policies and institutions under gradualism developmentalism and socialism abstract this communication displays some of our on going research on the incompleteness of china s advances toward best practice in policy making and institution building for renewables in particular this paper 1 summarizes how chinese policies and institutions for the deployment of renewable electricity are only partially compliant with what is internationally recognized as best practice and 2 contextualizes chinese policies and institutions for renewables in the broader picture of china s political economy much as a political economy perspective has aided the understanding of why chinese economic reforms were partial and unique the said contextualization might help explain why china s policies and institutions for renewables diverge from best practice further given that china proved successful in promoting its economic growth with partial and unique reforms the partiality and uniqueness of its renewables policies and institutions need not impede the rapid development of renewable electricity this on going research has so far combined a review of specialized literature and the business press with semi structured interviews held with relevant actors in policy business and research related to renewable energies

the organization of work a historical dimension abstract an evaluation of the organizational efficiencies of various modes of production by o e williamson has led him to conclude that given identical technologies the factory was more efficient than the putting out system the superior organizational efficiency of the former he maintains was one reason for the transition to factory production during the nineteenth century this paper challenges that view it is argued that the way in which williamson evaluates efficiency is open to methodological and other objections and that there is limited empirical support for his hypothesis given an identical technology the evidence suggests that the putting out system was usually able to compete with the factory

hedonic price indexes for spreadsheets and an empirical test for network externalities in this article i first estimate hedonic price equations for computer spreadsheet programs and then use the analysis to empirically test whether network externalities exist in this industry the study shows that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for spreadsheets that are compatible with the lotus platform and for spreadsheets that offer links to external databases and a similar premium for spreadsheets that offer local area network externalities finally the quality adjusted real price of computer spreadsheets declined by approximately 15 per year from 1986 to 1991

wind power policy in complex adaptive markets abstract this paper aims to advance research into the effectiveness of policies for encouraging technological transition in the energy sector in general and wind power in particular it contends that the ineffectiveness of wind power development policy in most nations stems from a linear approach to policy design that is unsuited to complex adaptive markets the paper argues that in complex adaptive markets policies are required that foster competition on a level playing field insights are extracted from complexity theory to advance four principles for effective wind power policy in such markets these principles include establishing policy initiatives to encourage technological diversity establish clear and progressive short to medium term targets enhance environmental monitoring systems and establish a malleable policy regime that directly resolves emergent challenges while simultaneously sustaining market momentum to ensure long term targets are met in order to demonstrate the applied relevance of these principles the paper applies these concepts to a historical analysis of denmark s wind power development policies

the effectiveness of china s wind power policy an empirical analysis abstract along with china s rapid industrialization and urbanization challenges in reducing pollution and co 2 emissions are increasing one of the major approaches to coordinate economic growth and environmental protection is to substitute coal fired power with renewable energy since 2003 in order to promote wind power development china has put in place many support policies which fall into either price policy category or non price policy category by using a variable intercept and mixed regression model with provincial panel data during 2001 2013 we analyzed the impacts of both categories on the increase of installed capacity in areas with different wind resources we found that price policy and two non price policies had positive impacts on the increase of wind power installation price policy played a greater role than non price policy did in promoting wind power development and price policy was more effective in areas with poor wind resources whilst non price policy was more effective in areas with rich wind resources built on these findings conclusions and policy recommendations are provided at the end of the paper

dynamic competition with network externalities why history matters we consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network exter nalities a platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes focal in the current period in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists yet when faced with higher quality competition can a low quality platform remain focal in the finite horizon case the unique equilibrium is efficient for patient platforms with an infinite time horizon however there are multiple equilibria where either the lowor high quality platform dominates if qualities are stochastic the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability even when its realized quality is lower and this probability increases as platforms become more patient hence social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking

danish and norwegian wind industry the relationship between policy instruments innovation and diffusion this article compares the role of policy instruments in stimulating long term technological change in danish and norwegian wind industry it concludes that although predictability has periodically been low denmark s broad portfolio of policies and measures has been well adapted to the different stages in the development of its wind industry this has contributed to a high degree of innovation successful establishment in niche markets high degree of diffusion and establishment of domestic and international mass markets and in recent years an increasingly successful replacement of senescent technology with new the motivation of norway s wind energy policies and measures at least up until the late 1990s has been to increase power supply rather than to stimulate industrial development and technological change policies and measures have been weaker than in denmark have been less stable over time and stimulated the demand side much less they have not sufficiently covered the wind industry s perceived needs on different stages in the development of new technology and have not sufficiently stimulated continuous improvement learning and new product development dynamic efficiency in industry this has been part of the reason why there has been only a limited extent of innovation and diffusion of wind technology in norway

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

one money one market the effect of common currencies on trade currency unions their dramatic effect on international trade a gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade the panel data bilateral observations for five years during 1970 90 covering 186 countries includes 300 observations in which both countries use the same currency i find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility even after controlling for a host of features including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime these effects statistically significant imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies currency unions like the european emu may thus lead to a large increase in international trade with all that that entails andrew rose

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

the perception and measurement of transaction costs the chapter discusses various explanations of how transaction cost minimising corporate configurations come about it contrasts darwinian with rational explanations finding both unsatisfactory what matters rather than computation of fully recognised transaction costs are managerial perceptions of transaction costs these perceptions are not expressed in numbers but in language this is related to arguments derived from bounded rationality and from transaction cost economics the chapter argues that issues of managerial perception must become central to analysis existing academic traditions which accord primacy to perception and to language are drawn upon and argued to be of great relevance to future work

platform selection in the lab abstract emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games these games converge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions we replicate the remarkable results of hossain and morgan 2009 in which such a game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform next we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent increases in out of equilibrium payoffs are introduced the inflated payoffs keep the best reply structure unchanged and do not influence players security levels our design allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance we find that equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is consistent with non rational learning furthermore and contrary to the literature we find that efficiency suffers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly

danish energy reform policy implications for renewables abstract for decades renewables have been promoted in denmark by the feed in model fixed price scheme with favourable tariffs for green electricity this has resulted in successful penetration of wind power covering more than 13 of danish electricity consumption 2001 changing the promotional scheme to a quota based system with tradable green certificates has been on the political agenda since 1999 this article discusses danish energy policy with focus on the implications for the penetration and deployment of renewables it has turned out to be more complicated than anticipated to create an efficient operational system for trade in green certificates and the starting date for trading has been postponed several times the national green certificates market was to be fully operational by the beginning of 2003 however political negotiations in the fall of 2001 seem to postpone the initiation of the certificate market until 2005 transitional rules for green electricity during the period from 2003 to 2005 are under negotiation after a national election in november 2001 this situation has created widespread uncertainty among potential investors in green electricity the article evaluates a number of problems related to the shift in danish energy policy

evolution and organisational choice in nineteenth century britain this paper offers an explanation for the dearth of labor managed firms in western economies it argues that the historical evolution of labor managed firms put them at a disadvantage relative to their classical capitalist counterparts in britain the government played an instrumental role in creating the initial disadvantage specifically it took too long for the british government to remove the legal burden of unlimited liability and other company laws that were especially costly of labor managed firms early financial instruments were also ill suited to the establishment and continuation of producers cooperatives of the day since organizational forms and their supporting institutions must coevolve a path dependent process has continued to impede the development of labor managed firms c 1993 academic press inc copyright 1993 by oxford university press

dollarization does promote trade abstract this study re evaluates the treatment effect of dollarization on trade while explicitly controlling for self selection of policy adoption employing a variety of propensity score matching methods we show that dollarization not only increases bilateral us trade with dollarized countries but promotes a dollarizer s bilateral trade with other dollar zone countries as well

a generalized design for bilateral trade flow models abstract this paper suggests a full interaction effects design to analyze bilateral trade flows this is illustrated with an unbalanced panel of bilateral trade between the triad eu15 usa and japan economies and their 57 most important trading partners over the period 1986 1997 our full interaction model finds empirical support for the new trade theory and linder s hypothesis we show that the omission of one or more interaction effects can result in biased estimates and misleading inference

the socio political economy of electricity generation in china abstract in addition to providing a review of electricity generation developments in china this paper features the development of a framework for understanding the socio political economy influencing electricity market development it documents and presents a critical evaluation of the social technological economic and political forces which influence electricity generation policy in china the analysis provides insight into why china s electricity generation shopping basket is being filled with both coal and co2 reduced electricity generation technologies it concludes that installed capacity of hydro power wind power nuclear power and solar pv power will outpace government projections due to inter alia a proclivity on the part of the chinese government to set conservative and achievable targets waning apathy toward pollution associated with coal fired power progressive improvements in grid connection and resilience increased economic viability of these alternative energy sources and government support for these industries as strategic commercial sectors

currency unions and trade how large is the treatment effect currency unions and trade what can the data say the impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex i argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent economic policy paper by andrew rose issue 30 2000 pp 7 45 using techniques designed to be robust in this situation i find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated torsten persson i have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large but i am not convinced by torsten persson s diagnosis and proposed solution i apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time series as well as cross sectional evidence the results are similar to my earlier ones the effect of a single currency on trade is large andrew rose

inefficient standard adoption inertia and momentum revisited i introduction since the establishment of the theory of network effects economists have been concerned with the question of whether a market with network effects will tend to settle on the socially optimal standard it has been postulated that markets may exhibit excess inertia once a technological standard is in place a new superior standard may not displace it because of installed base effects alternatively markets may exhibit excess momentum consumers may adopt a new standard too quickly ignoring the stranding effect they are having on previous users similar issues arise in the adoption of language and social norms the literature has investigated various conditions under which one of these inefficiencies arises such inefficiencies are of particular concern for open technologies such as the qwerty and dvorak keyboards 1 the situation is somewhat different when individual firms own standards in that case a simple argument seems to indicate that there is no possibility that an inefficient standard will persist if a new standard is superior in any objective sense there are gains to be made from switching to it once the standard has been adopted the firm can appropriate these gains therefore the firm has incentive to lower the initial price enough to induce adoption of the standard the preceding argument is made in liebowitz and margolis 1999 and repeated in spulber 2002 spulber expresses a general skepticism about the likelihood of inefficiencies when property rights are defined and markets exist critics might claim that previous models that imply inefficient standard adoption are unrealistic in some way and that if such models were modified slightly the inefficiency would disappear i reconsider the issue of inefficient standard adoption using a parsimonious yet compelling model assuming only that there are successive generations of finitely lived consumers that preferences are heterogeneous and that there are network effects among users adoption decisions can be inefficient this is true even if consumers can coordinate efficiently within a generation and a firm can act as a coordinating device across generations the model presented here generates some of the same results found in other papers collectively but in a more general setting and with more robust results if there is an established standard and a superior alternative emerges no single generation of consumers will be willing to switch to the new standard if the switching cost the loss of network benefit from breaking with past users is too high it may be that the benefits to future generations of consumers are large enough that from a social standpoint it would be efficient for one generation to adopt the new standard even if it is privately optimal for that generation to retain the old standard on the other hand the current generation considers only its own switching cost and not the cost it imposes on the previous generation leading to potential overadoption of new technology even for proprietary standards it is not clear that the incentive of the firm to induce adoption matches the social incentive in particular if consumer preferences are heterogeneous the firm will not be able to price in such a way to extract all of the additional surplus gained from the new standard on the other hand the firm will be able to appropriate some of the surplus generated by the network effect itself which is present for any standard and thus does not affect the social incentive to change standards it is not possible to address this issue with a two period model as in some of the previous literature see for example choi 1994 choi and thum 1998 katz and shapiro 1986 if a new technology is introduced in the second period but then the game ends the welfare of future generations of consumers is neglected 2 this article also differs from previous infinite horizon models of technology adoption

incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks lessons of experience from britain this paper reviews the recent experience of the uk electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation the uk has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990 we demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service we also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform we conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context the required legislative framework the need for appropriate unbundling the importance of quality of service incentives the regulatory information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation

the theory of the firm as governance structure from choice to contract the propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists one reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why the prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle as developed herein the lessons of organization theory for economics are both different and more consequential when examined through the lens of contract this paper examines economic organization from a science of contract perspective with special emphasis on the theory of the firm

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

wind electricity in denmark a survey of policies their effectiveness and factors motivating their introduction this paper surveys the development of the policies supporting the introduction of wind electricity in denmark in the last 15 years with special attention to the new policy introduced after a 2 year long debate the aim of this paper is to explore the roles of financial support policy certainty and planning constraints in the diffusion of wind electricity in denmark and the reasons prompting the change of the system in the current decade it is discovered that political uncertainty has badly affected the effectiveness of the feed in law in the years immediately after its introduction with regard to the new system it is concluded that the change has been prompted by generous conditions under the feed in law and by the desire to facilitate the modernisation of old turbines it is also concluded that incentive based systems can be more effective than tradable quotas in promoting the modernisation of renewable plants this finding is relevant to the development of energy policy in countries such as germany and spain where the average age of wind turbines is much younger than those existing in denmark

fiscal rules and government borrowing costs international evidence we find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985 2010 we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets the results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the risk premium on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility jel e43 g12 h60

fewer monies better monies in the aftermath of emerging market crises from russia to asia and latin america there is a quest for better monetary arrangements that are more crisis proof fixed rates are out flexible rates are in with a policy focus on inflation targeting but there is of course the alternative of abolishing exchange rates all together this paper revisits the issue of dollarization or currency boards to review what arguments in the debate stand up the case for flexible exchange rates emphasizes the need for a tool to accomplish relative price adjustment this paper argues that in an intertemporal perspective most shocks require financing in the capital market rather than adjustment moreover countries frequently do not use their flexible rate to play a cyclical role and as a result only a pay a premium for the option to depreciate but do not take advantage of the flexibility on the contrary they engineer systematic overvaluation in the context of inflation targeting