tax structure and corruption cross country evidence one common feature of the current literature on corruption especially the empirical contributions to it is the emphasis on the exogenous determinants of corruption which are generally beyond the direct control of governments to date little is known about how the design of government policy potentially affects the level of corruption in a country even though there is growing recognition that the design and administration of tax and spending policies play important roles in promoting or discouraging corrupt practices using a large sample of countries over the 1995 2009 period this paper fills the gap by conducting the first analysis in the literature to examine the significance of the tax structure as measured by both tax mix and tax complexity in determining corruption our results suggest the following 1 countries relying more heavily on direct taxes tend to exhibit less corruption than countries that rely more heavily on indirect taxes and 2 countries with more complex tax systems tend to be more corrupt than countries with less complex tax systems these results are robust across alternative measures of corruption and tax structure and alternative estimations with and without correcting the potential endogeneity issue of the tax structure variables

corruption and government size a disaggregated analysis using annual state level data over 1983 1987 this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices our objectives are twofold first we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state local sector in each state second we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office our results are generally supportive of becker s crime and punishment model regarding the primary focus of the paper our results show that government size in particular spending by state governments does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption

do big countries win tariff wars yes it is widely believed that tariffs invite retaliation and that the postretaliation equilibrium l eaves all countries worse off than they would be at free trade the a uthors present a simple pure exchange model with two countries and t wo goods and show which endowment patterns are consistent with this belief they find that if one country is substantially bigger than th e other it can expect to gain from a tariff war despite retaliation the model can be extended to show that the advantage obtained by bei ng part of a large trading unit can help explain the formation of cus toms unions copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

tax complexity and fiscal illusion by using the hirschman herfindahl index hhc the traditional approach to the tax complexity hypothesis introduces a restriction into the fiscal illusion model which has no theoretical foundation we analyse the existing framework of the tax complexity hypothesis in detail and propose to capture this complexity through a hannah and kay index we extend the theoretical framework by considering the expected return on investment in information

when two wrongs make a right second best point nonpoint trading ratios most research on point nonpoint trading focuses on the choice of trading ratio the rate point source controls trade for nonpoint controls although the first best ratio is jointly determined with the optimal number of permits in practice program managers often do not have control over the number of permits only the trading ratio the trading ratio in this case can only be second best we derive the second best trading ratio and using a numerical example of trading in the susquehanna river basin we find the values are in line with current ratios but for different reasons than those that are normally provided

north south customs unions and international capital mobility the primary distinction in a north south trade accord is likely to be that the southern nation experiences more capital scarcity than its northern trade partner so the trade accord s impact on the southern trading partner s ability to attract capital may have welfare implications for both nations the authors extend the traditional analysis of customs unions to allow for international capital movements their results indicate that trade accords may affect the ability of southern nations to attract capital and may divert capital between southern nations moreover the welfare implications of north south trade accords may differ from those that predict the north american free trade agreement s nafta minor third country effects holding factor endowments constant the key implications of north south trade accords such as nafta are generally perceived to involve their impact on investment flows the authors try to understand the channels through which trade accords can affect north south investment flows a potential link between trade accords and investment flows may be how the accords affect the ability of the southern partner government to make commitments about the treatment of foreign investment they show that these accords can affect both the magnitude and pattern of inward foreign investment and production implying the possibility that both trade and financial diversion can stem from a bilateral regional trade accord novel effects that emerge under sovereign risk must be addressed when assessing the welfare implications of trade accords the greatest gains from integration are still achieved when integration takes place between the countries with the greatest potential gains from trade but the authors make a distinction these gains now include both current trade and inter temporal trade through foreign investment

point nonpoint effluent trading with spatial heterogeneity potential earnings from permits sales may provide an incentive for farmers to accept water quality regulation we derive optimal adjustments of point nonpoint effluent trading ratios for heterogeneity in marginal environmental damage and degradation retention of the pollutant across locations in a watershed a simulation based on data from the kymi river valley finland indicates that farmers are the greatest suppliers of permits as expected but that gains from trading vary substantially some farmers may become net buyers of permits and thus net losers from regulation the benefits of effluent trading are distributed unevenly among point sources as well copyright 2008 oxford university press

the effects of the value added tax on revenue and inequality this paper examines the impact of the introduction of the value added tax on inequality and government revenues using newly released macro data we present both conventional country fixed effect re

corruption inequality and fairness bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption we formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model a positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population this feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality multiple steady states exist in some cases

economics of additionality for environmental services from agriculture abstract we present a model of additionality for offsets sold from agriculture to industrial sector sources regulated by cap and trade we consider a potential policy where agricultural sources would not be covered by cap and trade requirements but would be eligible to receive offsets whenever their emissions fall below a policy specified baseline and would not be penalized for emissions above their baseline major results are 1 the optimal baseline should be set above the average counterfactual emissions of participating farms an unexpected result that has been missing from the literature 2 the optimal trading ratio should be greater than one a ton of offsets counts for less than a ton of covered emissions even under emissions certainty previous research has justified such trading ratios by emissions uncertainty 3 emissions uncertainty does not justify a change in the baseline if the accompanying emissions model is unbiased 4 an optimal combination of policies is to subsidize offsets and tighten the baseline relative to the no subsidy case

do south south preferential trade agreements undermine the prospects for multilateral free trade due to trade diversion there has been concerns expressed over the proliferation of preferential trade agreements ptas between south countries in this paper we compare welfare across the various forms of bilateral free trade agreements ftas and customs unions cus and examine their implications for the stability of multilateral free trade while north north ptas tend to yield higher welfare we fi nd certain cases where south south agreements are more likely to lead to global free trade than north north or north south agreements but other cases where multilateral cooperation over free trade is the least likely under south south agreements we also examine how the expansion of existing agreements or the combination of separate agreements affects the potential for free trade

does the internet reduce corruption evidence from u s states and across countries the authors test the hypothesis that the internet is a useful technology for controlling corruption in order to do so the authors develop a novel identification strategy for internet diffusion power disruptions damage digital equipment which increases the user cost of information technology it capital and thus lowers the speed of internet diffusion a natural phenomenon causing power disruptions is lightning activity which makes lightning a viable instrument for internet diffusion using ground based lightning detection censors as well as global satellite data the authors construct lightning density data for the contiguous united states u s states and a large cross section of countries empirically lightning density is a strong instrument for internet diffusion and the authors fourth estimates suggest that the emergence of the internet has served to reduce the extent of corruption across u s states and across the world

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

incremental and average control costs in a model of water quality trading with discrete abatement units this paper answers three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution abatement i does a source s incremental control cost as defined by the u s environmental protection agency necessarily exceed its average control cost ii is incremental control cost a better approximation of a source s willingness to pay for abatement credits than average control cost and iii exactly how does trading in discrete and continuous abatement markets differ we find that the answer to the first two questions are both no suggesting that the u s environmental protection agency needs to refine its reliance on incremental control cost as the sole measure upon which to assess the financial feasibility of water quality trading in answer to the third question we show that the outcome of bilateral trading in the presence of discrete abatement is determined by comparing the gains from trade associated with the full sequence of possible sunk cost trading scenarios for the most common case where trading partners average control cost curves cross the trading outcome with discrete abatement is inherently sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities

multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements abstract this paper examines the interaction between preferential trade agreements ptas and multilateral tariff reduction in a model of imperfect competition a growing literature finds that the formation of ptas alters the incentives for and the sustainability of multilateral tariff reduction we show that the causation is not one sided multilateral tariff reduction also affects the formation of ptas specifically tariff reduction enhances the incentives to form a pta and increases the likelihood that it is self enforcing thus each round of multilateral tariff reduction should lead to a new wave of ptas this may help to explain the current trend towards regionalism

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

endogenous trading bloc formation in a north south global economy the majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries rather than between developed and developing countries this paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon it develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries the countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners in the coalition proof nash equilibrium either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries la plupart des blocs commerciaux sont formes de pays similaires plutot que de pays developpes et en voie de developpement ce memoire explique pourquoi ce genre de resultat peut emerger en tant que phenomene d equilibre on developpe un modele d economie mondiale asymetrique dans lequel il y a au moins quatre pays les pays different par la taille et la nature de leurs marches et choisissent leurs partenaires commerciaux dans un equilibre libre de coalitions a la nash ou bien il existe un regime global de libre echange ou bien des zones de libre echange entre pays similaires emergent

does foreign aid corrupt abstract we estimate the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality aid decreases corruption our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different controls

corruption as an occupational choice endogenous corruption and tax policy corruption is endemic in many countries and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously we endogenize corruption as an occupational choice workers choose private or public employment public employees can be honest or corrupt corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self esteem those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt when a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate the economy has two self sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue an increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high corruption equilibrium paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low corruption equilibrium

the impact of corruption on firm tax compliance in transition economies whom do you trust tax compliance is an important issue for gov ernments and the public alike to meet public needs and fund public mandates firms around the world are expected to comply with tax laws factors that are related to orga nizational firm tax compliance have not been sufficiently examined in the literature owing to the increasing global influence of transition economies factors associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particu larly of interest based on a sample of over 5 000 firms from 22 former soviet bloc transition economies we find that higher levels of corruption and higher levels of par ticularized trust reliance on friends and family are asso ciated with lower levels of tax compliance interestingly we also find that the negative relationship between cor ruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust trust in strangers overall our study s results suggest that institutional factors play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

openness country size and government abstract this paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in gdp and are also more open to trade these empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size

tax structure and the size of government an empirical analysis of the fiscal illusion and fiscal stress arguments this study attempts to fulfill a number of objectives one is the possible reconciliation of two divergent strains of thought concerning the size of government fiscal illusion and fiscal stress in this respect the results show little evidence of fiscal illusion but provide support for some of the notions associated with the fiscal stress hypothesis namely the effects of revenue and income variability on the size of government

on the emergence of an mfn club equal treatment in an unequal world motivated by gatt we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the mfn principle of non discrimination the underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade while an mfn club does not alter average tariff levels across countries it increases aggregate world welfare makes non members worse off and can immiserize its high cost members these results imply that i core wto rules such as mfn are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and ii the distributional effects of mfn maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted special and differential treatment at the wto jel classification f13 f10 f15

endogenous risk and point nonpoint uncertainty trading ratios point nonpoint trading enables highly uncertain nonpoint pollution abatement to be substituted for relatively certain point source pollution abatement market designers use uncertainty trade ratios to address imperfect substitution between these commodities guidance from government agencies and other entities recommends large ratios that penalize trades for nonpoint abatement and extant programs universally implement this guidance previous research has shown that the standard guidance is based on an inappropriate framing of the risk effects of substituting nonpoint for point source pollution abatement and has demonstrated that the trade ratios should be set to encourage or discourage substitution depending on whether the substitution is risk reducing or risk increasing however the pigouvian pricing approach used to develop this result obscures the underlying economic calculus because it does not recognize or characterize the tradeoffs between abatement costs savings and environmental risk that must be considered in an economic evaluation of alternative ratios and that would be key to explaining why ratios recommended by economic analysis would be preferred to received wisdom we develop a new approach that explicitly identifies and characterizes the tradeoffs associated with the choice of ratio the approach is examined both in first best settings where trade ratios and initial permit allocations are jointly determined and in second best settings where permit allocations are taken as given we provide a numerical analysis of trading in the susquehanna river basin in pennsylvania to illustrate theory we find theoretical and numerical support suggesting that smaller ratios may be optimal

hold your nose and vote corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy this paper analyzes how corruption alters policy decisions in democracy and examines whether this distortion can result in a long term persistence of corruption even when the voters are well informed and rational by applying a citizen candidate model of representative democracy the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private consumption altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions the outcome is a reduction in real public expenditure and if the median voter s demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic a reduction in taxes in this case some citizens benefit indirectly from corruption the paper also presents some empirical evidence that in democratic countries corruption results in lower tax revenue and proceeds to show that when this occurs citizens anticipating a shift in preferences in favor of public expenditure may support institutions that favor corruption this result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in democracy to some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system it also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

regionalism in a multilateral world recent regional initiatives have been addressed from a vinerian perspective of trade creation and trade diversion this is true of both policy oriented economists who tend to be critical of the initiatives and theorists who have added dynamic and gametheoretic elements to the vinerian structure this paper describes the stylized facts of much recent regional integration and develops an alternative model the analysis suggests that regional integration far from threatening multilateral liberalism may in fact be a direct consequence of the success of past multilateralism and an added guarantee for its survival

tradeable permits for pollution control when emission location matters what have we learned our knowledge about tradeable permit approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed but we have now had over a decade of experience with them in the u s this article draws upon economic theory empirical studies and actual experience with implementation to summarize what we have learned about applying tradeable permits to air pollution control in the special circumstance where the spatial aspects of the problem are a prime consideration

the empirical analysis of fiscal illusion this paper examines the empirical analysis of the five main hypotheses subsumed under the generic term fiscal illusion after placing these hypotheses within a common theoretical framework the paper attempts to evaluate empirical research into the revenue complexity hypothesis the revenue elasticity hypothesis the flypaper effect renter illusion and debt illusion

a coalition formation approach to equilibrium federations the authors develop a model in which states may choose to form coalitions to capture efficiency gains from policy coordination joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalition s aggregate payoff at a nash equilibrium against nonmembers and to commit to a transfer scheme to share the gains with two states the unique equilibrium structure is complete federation with more than two states incomplete federation can be the unique equilibrium interpreting this result in terms of custom unions the trend to trading bloc formation may be equilibrium behavior even with cooperation and transfers within customs unions copyright 1997 by american economic association

reversing property rights practice based approaches for controlling agricultural nonpoint source water pollution when emissions aggregate nonlinearly nonpoint source water pollution remains a major issue despite decades of research and sizable conservation programs we suggest that by taking advantage of contemporary modeling and optimization approaches good approximations to physical relationships can be constructed so that even in the presence of unobservable field emissions and nonlinear fate and transport relationships standard economic tools of command and control requirements performance standards and trading can be implemented the boone river watershed in the u s state of iowa is used for empirical demonstration although the approach can be used to construct voluntary conservation policies the described policies involve imposing requirements on agricultural polluters rather than relying on voluntary actions alone

differences in social and public risk perceptions and conflicting impacts on point nonpoint trading ratios if stochastic nonpoint pollution loads create socially costly risk then an economically optimal point nonpoint trading ratio the rate point source controls trade for nonpoint controls is adjusted downward a risk reward for nonpoint controls encouraging more nonpoint controls however in actual trading programs ratios are adjusted upward in response to nonpoint uncertainties a risk premium for nonpoint controls this contradiction is explained using a public choice model in which regulators focus on encouraging abatement instead of reducing damages the result is a divergence of public and social risk perceptions and a trading market that encourages economically suboptimal nonpoint controls copyright 2001 oxford university press