banking deregulation and industry structure evidence from the french banking reforms of 1985 we investigate how the deregulation of the french banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets following deregulation banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities at the industry level we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms and a decline in concentration overall these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a schumpeterian process of creative destruction many economies around the world are characterized by heavily regulated bank

releasing the regret lock consumer response to new alternatives after a sale this research examines how consumers behave after they miss a sale and subsequently face a smaller sale for the same or different product according to the proposed theory a two way interaction is predicted in which adding another similar alternative to the choice set leads to higher choice deferral without prior sale information but lower choice deferral with information about missing a larger sale on one of the alternatives in addition the new alternative in the choice set becomes more attractive and captures most of the market share the results from three lab experiments and one field experiment confirm the hypotheses and the proposed mechanism the article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of the findings

political connections and corporate investments evidence from the recent anti corruption campaign in china abstract taking advantage of corruption scandals in china we construct a natural experiment and identify the ousting of corrupt politicians and firms connected with them through bribery and personal relationships event firms we find that the investment expenditure of event firms declines significantly after the ousting of the politicians compared with that of non event firms especially for non soes we also find that after the ousting of the politicians investment efficiency improves for event soes but declines for event non soes compared with their non event counterparts we also document that the ousting of the politicians influences firm investment decisions more after the recent anti corruption campaign for bribing firms and for firms in more corrupt regions these results are robust to alternative measurements of key variables and specifications

strategic price complexity in retail financial markets abstract there is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous also despite the large number of firms in the market prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter in a non cooperative oligopoly pricing model i show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures complexity increases the market power of the firms because it prevents some consumers from becoming knowledgeable about prices in the market in the model as competition increases firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as a best response rather than make their disclosures more transparent because this may substantially decrease consumer surplus in these markets such practices have important welfare implications

endogenous growth and the emergence of equity finance abstract this paper characterises the development of equity markets as a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by the development of the real sector of the economy in overlapping generations economy borrowers seek funds to run risky investment projects by drawing up contracts which may take the form of either equity or debt issue in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders the optimal contract is determined by trading off information dilution costs against bankruptcy costs significantly the equilibrium choice of contract depends on the state of the economy which in turn depends on the contracting regime based on this analysis the paper provides a theory of the joint determination of real and financial development with the ability to explain the emergence of a stock market along the path of real development

consumer preference for a no choice option the traditional focus in the decision making literature has been on understanding how consumers choose among a given set of alternatives the notion that preference uncertainty may lead to choice deferral when no single alternative has a decisive advantage is tested in seven studies building on recent research the article shows that the decision to defer choice is influenced by the absolute difference in attractiveness among the alternatives provided and is not consistent with trade off difficulty or the theory of search these findings are then extended to show that choice deferral can also be modified for the same alternatives by manipulations that make them appear more similar in attractiveness or that decrease the need to differentiate among them the results are consistent with the notion that preference uncertainty results in a hesitation to commit to any single action since small differences in attractiveness among the alternatives are potentially reversible consistent with this premise the effect of attractiveness difference on choice deferral decreased significantly when subjects were first allowed to practice making monetary trade offs among the available alternatives

public capital asymmetric information and economic growth we investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information in a credit market with costly screening we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self selection of borrowers through identifying an additional adverse effect of taxation on growth we show that the optimal tax rate in our model is smaller than the output elasticity of public capital therefore our analysis justifies a more conservative tax policy in the presence of asymmetric information furthermore our model suggests a number of implications that appear to be well supported by preliminary evidence in cross country data jel classification d82 h21 041

the effectiveness of alternative preference elicitation procedures in predicting choice in a large scale national study the authors evaluated the effectiveness of several preference elicitation techniques for predicting choices the criteria for accuracy included both individual hit

risk mis perception when greater risk reduces risk valuation the authors show that the value of a risky option decreases upon addition of risky prospects of the same valence for instance a medical drug with a potential side effect of seizures is viewed as less threatening when it also has smaller potential side effects such as congestion and fatigue travel insurance covering serious injury is viewed as less attractive when it also covers minor ailments a lottery offering a chance to win an ipad is viewed as less attractive when it also offers a chance to win smaller prizes as a result consumers can perceive normatively more dangerous beneficial options to be less dangerous beneficial and normatively less dangerous beneficial options to be more dangerous beneficial this effect arises because people believe that larger prospects e g seizures are less likely than smaller prospects e g congestion therefore inclusion of smaller prospects by contrast makes a larger prospect appear less likely which in turn reduces the perceived value of the risky option thus this effect arises only when smaller prospects are added to a larger prospect and only when the prospects are probabilistic cognitive load and feelings of personal control also moderate the effect

a comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets abstract this paper compares bribery to competitive bidding in a government purchasing context while competitive bidding is one method of procurement bribery is a common alternative in many third world countries although bribery is often considered to be the ethical antithesis of competitive bidding the analysis shows there is a fundamental isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the transaction

asymmetric information auditing commitment and economic growth we analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences arising from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification specifically two endogenous growth models of which one allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies to identify borrowers investment returns and the other does not are compared we show that the inability to commit acts as an additional source of informational friction that leads to more stringent contractual terms which in turn result in lower capital accumulation growth and welfare in addition when a tax on capital is considered the tax induced investment distortions are amplified by the absence of auditing commitment from the policy perspective our analysis can be interpreted as suggesting a new micro economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare

overchoice and assortment type when and why variety backfires almost universally research and practice suggest that a brand that increases its product assortment or variety should benefit through increased market share in this paper we show this is not always the case we introduce the construct assortment type and demonstrate that the effect of assortment size on brand share is systematically moderated by assortment type we define an alignable assortment as a set of brand variants that differ along a single compensatory dimension such that choosing from that assortment only requires within attribute trade offs in contrast we define a nonalignable assortment as a set of brand variants that simultaneously vary along multiple noncompensatory dimensions demanding between attribute trade offs in turn we argue that an alignable assortment can efficiently meet the diverse tastes of consumers thereby increasing brand share but that a nonalignable assortment increases both the cognitive effort and the potential for regret faced by a consumer thereby decreasing brand share we term this effect overchoice across three studies we provide evidence of overchoice and tie the effect to the effort and regret brought about by nonalignability in the process we demonstrate that simplification of information presentation reversibility of choice and a reduction in underlying nonalignability serve to reduce or eliminate this effect

the effect of ordering decisions by choice set size on consumer search consumers frequently engage in sequential decisions this article explores whether the order of these decisions can influence the manner in which consumers search through the possible choice options results from five studies suggest that ordering decisions by increasing vs decreasing choice set size leads to greater search depth measured by both sampling count and decision time initial smaller choice sets in increasing sequences appear to initiate a maximizing mind set which then persists even as participants encounter later larger choice sets these participants report a greater desire to maximize and are less satisfied with their decisions consistent with research on chronic maximizers in addition they continue to exhibit maximizing behavior in subsequent unrelated tasks supporting a mind set account of the differences in search in sum decision makers are proposed to be sticky adapters initial decision strategies seem to constrain the extent to which they adapt to new contexts

when more is less and less is more the role of ideal point availability and assortment in consumer choice contrary to the common wisdom that more choice is always better selections made from large assortments can lead to weaker preferences building on the extant literature this research identifies ideal point availability as a key factor moderating the impact of assortment on choice it is proposed that in the case of large assortments ideal point availability can simplify choice leading to a stronger preference for the selected alternative in contrast for choices made from smaller assortments ideal point availability is proposed to have the opposite effect leading to weaker preferences data obtained from four experiments lend support for the theory and the empirical predictions advanced in this article

asymmetric information and loan contracts in a neoclassical growth model the authors consider a neoclassical growth model with risky investment projects in which a borrower s an investor s risk type is private information their innovation is to determine jointly the equilibrium loan contract and the economy s growth path and the steady state capital stock the authors show that as capital accumulates credit rationing may fall as an increasing number of lenders choose to acquire costly information to separate borrowers as to type this transition from credit rationing to screening in turn results in a higher capital accumulation path and a higher steady state capital stock they also investigate the effects of a decrease in the cost of information on the economy s capital accumulation path and steady state capital stock the authors show that the cost of information must fall below a threshold level before the economy moves from a credit rationing equilibrium to a screening one thus a threshold must be crossed before the steady state capital stock is increased with a decrease in the cost of information copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

the government as a shareholder a case from the united states we study a sample of u s corporations in which the federal government held 35 100 percent of the outstanding common stock for between 1 and 23 years during and following world war ii we find that although the firms experienced abnormally high turnover among corporate board members the tenure of senior management was relatively stable moreover the performance of the government owned companies was not significantly different than that of private sector firms in the same industry hence the interim government custodianship of the firms in our case does not have the effects normally attributed to government ownership

costly external finance corporate investment and the subprime mortgage credit crisis abstract we study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment the crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non financial firms corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis controlling for firm fixed effects and time varying measures of investment opportunities consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short term debt are financially constrained or operate in industries dependent on external finance to address endogeneity concerns we measure firms financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis and confirm that similar results do not follow placebo crises in the summers of 2003 2006 nor do similar results follow the negative demand shock caused by september 11 2001 the effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008 when the demand side effects of the crisis became apparent additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that is generally overlooked in the literature

open for innovation or bribery to secure bank finance in an emerging economy a model and some evidence abstract in an emerging economy like china characterized by scarce financial resources excessive red tape and rampant corruption firms are advised to bribe bank officials to grease the wheels of bank lending in order to secure the fund they need for innovation business venturing and growth drawing on the literature on corruption and open innovation we develop a model to illustrate that bribery fails to ease bank lending when red tape is endogenous whereas openness for innovation smooths bank lending no matter whether red tape is exogenous or endogenous openness for innovation is more effective than bribery in helping a firm reduce red tape to secure bank finance based on a dataset of chinese firms provided by the world bank our findings strongly support the argument we find that openness for innovation has a positive relationship with both the access to bank finance and the size of bank finance whereas bribery is related to neither supplementary tests further suggest that the positive relationship is mainly driven by private firms and manufacturing firms our findings help firms make decisions to select an effective and yet socially responsible approach to securing bank finance

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

constructive consumer choice processes consumer decision making has been a focal interest in consumer research and consideration of current marketplace trends e g technological change an information explosion indicates that this topic will continue to be critically important we argue that consumer choice is inherently constructive due to limited processing capacity consumers often do not have well defined existing preferences but construct them using a variety of strategies contingent on task demands after describing constructive choice consumer decision tasks and decision strategies we provide an integrative framework for understanding constructive choice review evidence for constructive consumer choice in light of that framework and identify knowledge gaps that suggest opportunities for additional research

reform without losers an interpretation of china s dual track approach to transition this paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient pareto improving economic reform that is reform achieving efficiency without creating losers the approach based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market can be understood as a method for making implicit lump sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform the model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency we examine how the dual track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in china

non performing loans moral hazard and regulation of the chinese commercial banking system abstract non performing loans npls represent a major obstacle to the development of banking sector one of the key objectives of the banking sector reforms in china has therefore been to reduce the high level of npls to do so chinese regulatory authorities have injected significant capital into the banking system and scrutinized npls since 2003 this paper examines the impact of npls on bank behavior in china using a threshold panel regression model and a dataset covering 60 city commercial banks 16 state owned banks and joint stock banks and 11 rural commercial banks during 2006 2012 we test whether lending decisions of chinese banks exhibit moral hazard the results support the moral hazard hypothesis suggesting that an increase in the npls ratio raises riskier lending potentially causing further deterioration of the loan quality and financial system instability policy implications of findings are evaluated

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

a note on competitive bribery games abstract within a competitive bribery game in which each player has incomplete information we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium which is symmetric similar results hold for another bribery game form that prevails in the literature implications for corrupt practices in relation to economic development are also discussed

state owned and privately owned firms an empirical analysis of profitability leverage and labor intensity for some it is an article of faith that governmentowned firms must be less efficient or at least less profitable than privately owned firms maxim boycko et al 1996 argue that politicians cause government owned firms to employ excess labor inputs anne o krueger 1990 suggests that such firms may be pressured to hire politically connected people rather than those best qualified to perform desired tasks more generally government owned firms are thought to forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political objectives such as wealth redistribution in addition the residual cash flow claims of these firms are not readily transferable like the shares of a private corporation this impairs residual claimant incentives to monitor managers and ultimately degrades firm performance as a consequence one expects government owned firms to be technically less efficient and therefore less profitable than private firms the implication is that in competitive markets without significant externalities private ownership is the superior organizational form the view that government firms are inherently less efficient than private ones however remains controversial among economists john vickers and george yarrow 1991 among others point out that agency problems arise in private firms as well as public ones in most large private corporations managers own little of the stock because monitoring managers is costly a divergence arises between their objectives and those of private shareholders private shareholders typically hold a small stake in any one firm and it may not pay any shareholder to bear the cost of monitoring management it follows from this discussion that whether government firms are more or less efficient than private firms is primarily an empirical issue to date the body of empirical evidence is mixed in this paper we report further empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of public and private enterprises we build on previous work by studying larger samples over longer time periods and by allowing for additional factors that influence firm performance in particular our analysis controls for time series variation in the general level of economic activity that may otherwise confound performance comparisons between government and private firms 2 we approach the issue in two different ways first using accounting numbers we conduct a large sample cross sectional comparison of government owned and privately owned corporations this comparison is similar in design to that of boardman and vining 1989 but our sample is three times the size of theirs and includes three

endogenous capital market imperfections human capital and intergenerational mobility in this paper capital market imperfections are endogenized considering an adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers we develop a growth model with linear olg wealth dynamics where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and ability which is private information we show that banks react to this informational asymmetry by granting higher loans to talented borrowers this in turn helps poor and talented agents to become educated and catch up with the rich agents furthermore the credit market friction leads to greater human capital accumulation

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

are results from non hypothetical choice based conjoint analyses and non hypothetical recoded ranking conjoint analyses similar conflicting findings have been found in previous research that compared choice based conjoint analysis and ranking conjoint analysis in a public good setting the present paper revisits this issue for a private good in a non hypothetical context using small and large choice sets our results suggest that in a small choice set setting participants preferences and willingness to pay are similar across the two conjoint analysis formats however in large choice sets a divergence between the two conjoint analysis formats emerges hence the two conjoint analysis formats can only be used interchangeably in small choice sets not in large choice sets

a retrospective and agenda for future research on chinese outward foreign direct investment our original 2007 journal of international business studies article the determinants of chinese outward foreign direct investment was the first theoretically based empirical analysis of the phenomenon it utilised internalisation theory to explain the internationalisation of chinese state owned enterprises this paper showed that we had failed to ask sufficiently challenging questions about the effects of home country institutions on outward foreign direct investment ofdi this retrospective builds on the extensive subsequent research to show the importance of context in constructing satisfactory theoretical explanations of ofdi building on these foundations we propose research challenges for the next decade on chinese ofdi that transcend the chinese context and have wider theoretical applicability examining alternative forms of social and economic organisation allows the creation of special theories of foreign direct investment nested within the general theory following such a strategy would enable international business research to make a contribution across the social sciences

who gets credit the behavior of bureaucrats and state banks in allocating credit to chinese state owned enterprises abstract using a sample of chinese state owned enterprises spanning 1980 to 1994 we investigate the factors that determine the sources of finance for firm level fixed investment including retained earnings bank finance and government transfers direct government transfers were not significantly associated with profitability throughout the period in contrast bank finance was positively linked to both profitability and some types of reform reforms that enabled managers to self select and thus expose themselves and their employees to greater risk were positively associated with acquiring bank finance the association between bank finance and profitability weakened in the 1990s as banks increasingly assumed bailout responsibility

ownership versus competition efficiency in public enterprise certainly the introduction of product market competition into potentially competitive or at least contestable markets can improve performance to take just one example morrison and whinston 1986 1986 estimate that even in the imperfectly contestable u s airline industry the annual u s welfare gains from deregulation have been around 6 billion

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

the economics of product variety a survey demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant the full degree of variety potentially demanded will not in general be supplied because scale economies even to a small degree mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants the economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum the survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms generalized monopolistic competition tracing modern developments in both the chamberlinian and hotelling traditions the latter has been particularly fruitful due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics the emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures including strategic market preemption although most work has been in a full information context there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information either by consumers to properties of the firms products or firms as to consumers demands

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

differentiation and parity in assortment pricing are consumers more likely to purchase an item from an assortment in which options are priced at parity or from an assortment in which options vary in price this research examines the influence of parity pricing and differentiation pricing strategies on consumer choice and identifies conditions in which parity pricing facilitates choice as well as conditions in which choice is facilitated by differential pricing in a series of three experiments the impact of assortment pricing on choice is shown to be a function of the uncertainty associated with consumers preferences and the consistency of these preferences with options prices

economic perspectives on privatization despite being one of the most fundamental issues in political economy the question of the appropriate boundary between public and private enterprise received relatively little attention in mainstream economic analysis until quite recently in the 1980s however programs of ownership reform were started in many developed and developing countries dramatic though some of these policies have been they are likely to be overshadowed in the 1990s by even greater privatization in the reforming socialist economies the opening sections of this paper are organized around three broad and interrelated questions how does ownership matter for the efficiency of enterprise performance what is the role for privatization in financing public debts and deficits what are the distributional and political implications of privatization finally we examine privatization in practice in three countries britain chile and poland

contextual inference in markets on the informational content of product lines context can influence decisions this malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings in a market equilibrium however context conveys payoff relevant information to consumers consequently these consumers rationally violate naive formulations of standard choice theoretic principles i identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors namely the compromise effect and choice overload arise as market equilibria firms respond to consumers contextual inference in case of the compromise effect a firm may introduce premium loss leaders expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods

relationship lending and the transmission of monetary policy abstract repeated interactions allow lenders to uncover private information about their clients decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing financiers this paper constructs a credit based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects monetary transmission i examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output the results demonstrate that relationship lending prevails in equilibrium smoothes the steady state output profile and induces less volatile responses to certain monetary shocks

optimal product line design when consumers exhibit choice set dependent preferences in a market of consumers with varying willingness to pay using product line as a discrimination tool may extract higher profits than serving all consumers with a single product local context effects however point to yet another consideration in designing product lines how the appeal of a product changes with the context provided by other products in the choice set i present a model of product line design that incorporates both discrimination and context management goals and offers recommendations for the variety and positioning of products to this end the model makes use of a framework that allows preferences to be choice set dependent given this framework i study how the firm manages externalities between products created by such dependencies the firm creates distortions above and beyond those resulting from discrimination motives alone for example in a vertically differentiated market for quality quality distortions exist even for the consumers with the highest valuations the range of quality provisions given the number of products is compressed as the relative importance of unfavorable comparisons among products increases surprisingly this compression may even lead the firm to forego discrimination among consumers regardless of the cost of offering distinct products

tax evasion and financial development under asymmetric information in credit markets abstract recent empirical studies have documented that after controlling for variables related to state capacity the incidence of firms tax evasion on their sales is negatively correlated with the level of a country s financial development motivated by this stylized fact our paper takes state capacity as given and provides an alternative theory that is built upon asymmetric information in credit markets particularly within developing economies we analytically show that with a more developed financial sector that exhibits smaller agency costs the government of a rich small open economy country will raise its optimal tax auditing probability which in turn leads to more tax compliance our baseline model also yields an empirically realistic positive correlation between financial development and the ratio of tax revenue over gdp in an extended setting which allows for size dependent probabilities of tax detection we find that consistent with the empirical evidence large firms comply with taxes whereas small firms evade taxes

partial privatization and firm performance most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact this perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner using data on indian state owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability productivity and investment widespread privatization in recent decades has generated a large empirical literature concerning the effect of ownership on firm performance most studies find that privatization has a positive impact on the profitability and efficiency of firms see megginson and netter 2001 for a recent survey 1 the firms in these studies have had a majority of their assets privatized and control rights have been transferred from the government to private owners surprisingly little is known about the effect of partial privatization where the government remains the controlling owner this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by investigating whether the performance of state owned enterprises in india is affected by the sale of non controlling equity stakes on the stock market

pushing subjects beyond rationality with more alternatives in experimental auctions the use of experimental economics in valuation of market and nonmarket goods has grown over the past few years the ability of experimental auctions eus to reveal consumer preferences and their malleability has been praised in previous literature because of the high cost of conducting eus researchers usually present multiple products to participants determining how many products to present has no clear guideline the results of this study show that subjects do not value products the same way across different number of options offered to them the main indicator is the increasing variance in responses for a benchmark product when more products are available with an econometric specification allowing for heteroscedasticity as a function of the number of product offerings the results indicate that the number of goods available for bidding is not to be taken as a trivial task in experimental design for value elicitation

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

economic perspectives on the development of complex products for increasingly demanding customers rival firms produce products with a variety of characteristics it is typically assumed that consumers purchase those products that most closely match their ideal set of characteristics orthodox production theory economics offers no analysis of how to divide limited product development budgets between different characteristics furthermore orthodox consumer economics assumes buyers make compensatory trade offs between different product characteristics this approach ignores problems caused by bounded rationality that in complex choice environments leads buyers to formulate simplifying heuristics such as hierarchical non compensatory preferences over characteristics an integrative analytical framework is developed drawing upon orthodox economics behavioural economics and evolutionary economics implications for the relationship between incremental product development and the firm s evolving capabilities are emphasized

the self selection of complexity in choice experiments we investigate whether individuals will voluntarily increase the complexity of the tasks they complete within a discrete choice experiment dce we do this via a self selection of complexity design in which respondents choose whether to face choice sets comprising 3 4 or 6 alternatives we link this approach with the emerging excessive choice effect ece literature we find that 30 of the sample opt for the largest sets we test whether this choice of complexity reveals information about respondents capability commitment we find that it does since those with lowest initial error variance levels are most likely to later select the highest level of task complexity we argue that this result offers insights regarding the design of more cognitively efficient dce designs we consider the matching of respondents to the appropriate level of task complexity as analogous to the principal agent problem with asymmetric information rather than trying to understand respondents cognitive capability or commitment ex ante we propose that participants self select designs that achieve the researcher s objective of minimizing error variance copyright 2012 oxford university press

flexibility in consumer purchasing for uncertain future tastes consumers often simultaneously purchase multiple units in the same product category whether they are best off purchasing an assortment of alternatives or an equal number of one alternative is addressed in this paper models of an expected utility maximizing consumer are developed and it is shown that an assortment may have greater expected utility than an equal number of any one alternative the rationale is that the assortment allows the consumer to choose from inventory the alternative most appropriate for a consumption occasion using preference information not available at the purchase occasion it is also shown that when consuming alternatives from inventory the consumer may forego the alternative offering the most utility in the expectation that it will yield even more utility in the future

greasing the wheels of bank lending evidence from private firms in china abstract bribery rather than firm performance largely determines the extent to which private firms access bank credit in china bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans these firms also pay more in terms of bribes although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans it does so only for loans originated by the big four banks for loans originated by smaller banks performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework

variety vice and virtue how assortment size influences option choice assortment size has been shown to influence whether consumers make a choice but could it also influence what they choose five studies demonstrate that because choosing from larger assortments is often more difficult it leads people to select options that are easier to justify virtues and utilitarian necessities are generally easier to justify than indulgences consequently choosing from larger assortments often shifts choice from vices to virtues and from hedonic to utilitarian options these effects reverse however when situational factors provide accessible reasons to indulge underscoring the role of justification implications for choice difficulty and justification processes are discussed

politics and productivity i introduction economic studies of long run performance are focusing increasingly on political legal financial and social factors development is no longer regarded as a gradual inevitable transformation from self sufficiency to specialization and participation in the division of labor instead progress follows the creation and evolution of institutions that support social and commercial relationships the new institutional economics explains that growth requires that the potential hazards of trade shirking opportunism risk and so on be controlled by institutions like secure property rights reliable procedures for resolving disputes and means of enforcing contracts in the absence of close social ties these institutions reduce information costs encourage capital formation and capital mobility allow risks to be priced and shared and otherwise facilitate cooperation north and thomas 1973 north 1990 drobak and nye 1997 levine 1997 in particular political authorities must make credible commitments not to expropriate private resources once investments have been made 1 despite widespread agreement that institutions matter there is no consensus on how they should be incorporated into the analysis even the best empirical studies of productivity and growth treat institutional characteristics in an eclectic way barro s 1991 influential article for example uses the numbers of assassinations and revolutions per capita as proxies for political instability finding these measures negatively correlated with growth and investment scully 1988 regresses growth rates on dummy variables derived from gastil s 1982 ordinal rankings of political and economic liberty king and levine 1993a 1993b 1993c derive various measures of the quality of financial intermediaries and show that these measures are good predictors of growth this article presents a different approach to analyzing the relationship between institutions and aggregate economic performance following the modem productivity literature see for example fried et al 1993 we model economic performance with a stochastic production frontier frontier analysis is a form of benchmarking it analyzes a group of branches firms nations or other units by identifying best practices and evaluating each member s performance relative to the best practice frontier the results produce not only qualitative rankings of the group members but also numerical efficiency scores that can be used to assess the effects of various policies and characteristics for this reason frontier analysis is well suited for studying the effects of legal and political institutions on the economic performance of nations to capture institutional factors we use two comprehensive indexes of legal regulatory and political conditions working with a broad sample of countries from 1975 to 1990 we incorporate a widely used measure of economic freedom along with a new measure of policy stability to represent a country s institutional environment the new institutional economics suggests that countries with high levels of economic freedom protection of private property rights respect for the rule of law an unhampered price system and so on and policy stability commitment not to change the rules of the game ex post will be closer to the best practice frontier in our model economic freedom and policy stability affect economic performance by enhancing technical efficiency in other words these institutions do not alter the state of technology but they allow producers to squeeze more out of current technology for instance countries with more stable policies attract more foreign investment than countries with less stable policies ceteris paribus this leads to increased competition among producers which in turn brings efficiency gains similarly countries with lower taxes milder regulatory burdens lower inflation fewer restrictions on foreign ownership and so on are likely to produce output more efficiently than countries with policies that restrict production inhibit capital formation and reduce competition

great expectations assortment size expectations and satisfaction abstract recent research challenges the idea that greater choice is always desirable showing that larger assortments can increase choice deferral and switching the current research demonstrates that even when consumers make a purchase the same item may generate lower satisfaction when chosen from a larger rather than a smaller assortment the authors explain this effect in terms of an expectation disconfirmation mechanism when assortments are small consumers have low expectations about their ability to match their preferences as assortment sizes increase so do consumers expectations of the degree of preference match they can achieve subsequently consumers may experience greater negative expectation disconfirmation or less positive expectation disconfirmation when a chosen item comes from a larger rather than a smaller set either less positive or more negative disconfirmation leads to lower choice satisfaction the results from three studies support this expectation based process and establish t

public offerings of state owned and privately owned enterprises an international comparison we compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies the evidence indicates that government officials in the united kingdom underprice ipos significantly more than their private company counterparts in canada and malaysia however the opposite is true there does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company ipos we provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries

the discriminating consumer product proliferation and willingness to pay for quality abstract the authors propose that a crowded product space motivates consumers to better discriminate between options of different quality specifically this article reports evidence from three controlled experiments and one natural experiment that people are prepared to pay more for high quality products and less for low quality products when they are considered in the context of a dense as opposed to a sparse set of alternatives to explain this effect the authors argue that consumers uncertain about the importance of quality learn from observing market outcomes product proliferation reveals that other consumers care to discriminate among similar alternatives and in turn this inference raises the importance of quality in decision making

bank supervision and corruption in lending abstract which commercial bank supervisory policies ease or intensify the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance based on new data from more than 2500 firms across 37 countries this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms financing obstacles we find that the traditional approach to bank supervision which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to monitor discipline and influence banks directly does not improve the integrity of bank lending rather we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance in extensions we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions

to what extent did the economic stimulus package influence bank lending and corporate investment decisions evidence from china abstract using a panel of chinese firms over the period 2003 2013 we show that from the supply side perspective as a result of the implementation of the economic stimulus package in china state owned enterprises soes received more bank loans and invested more than non soes we further find that after the implementation of the economic stimulus package bank lending became less responsive to firm profitability and firm investments became less responsive to investment opportunities for soes non soes from favoured industries and regions and non soes with political connections overall our findings support the view that the stimulus package and the associated increase in bank loan supply in china resulted in more resources being allocated to soes

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

politicians and banks political influences on government owned banks in emerging markets abstract government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the united states this paper provides cross country bank level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks it shows that government owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks this effect is robust to controlling for country specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank specific factors the increase in lending is about 11 of a government owned bank s total loan portfolio or about 0 5 of the median country s gdp per election per government owned bank

credit rationing and capital accumulation with investment and consumption loans revisited abstract a simple model is developed to evaluate the roles of credit rationing and government policies of financial repression in the process of capital accumulation in the model credit rationing on both investment and consumption loans decreases as capital accumulates but increases as the government imposes policies of financial repression to a greater extent while a reduction in credit rationing on consumption loans impedes capital accumulation such a reduction on investment loans facilitates it we find that developing countries may be trapped at a low capital stock steady state while developed countries converge to a high capital stock steady state instead of adopting policies of financial liberalization interestingly this paper finds that policies of financial repression may enable developing countries to escape the development trap

corruption in bank lending to firms cross country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing abstract building on the important study by beck demirguc kunt and levine 2006 bank supervision and corruption in lending journal of monetary economics 53 2131 2163 we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus registries on corruption in bank lending using the unique world bank data set wbes covering more than 4 000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus registries assembled by djankov mcliesh and shleifer 2007 private credit in 129 countries journal of financial economics 84 299 329 and bank regulation data collected by barth caprio and levine 2006 rethinking bank regulation till angels govern cambridge university press new york to measure bank competition and information sharing we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption we also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks legal environment and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption