efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

patent trolls on markets for technology an empirical analysis of npes patent acquisitions abstract patent trolls or npes appropriate profits from innovation solely by enforcing patents against infringers they are often characterized as relying on low quality patents an assessment that if correct would imply that eradicating such patents would effectively terminate the npe business in this paper we shed light on this issue by empirically analyzing npes patent acquisitions we draw on a unique dataset of 392 u s patents acquired by known npes between 1997 and 2006 which we compare to three control groups of 784 u s patents each acquired by practicing firms we find that the probability that a traded patent is acquired by an npe rather than a practicing entity increases in the scope of the patent in the patent density of its technology field and contrary to common belief in the patent s technological quality our findings thus support recent theoretical propositions about the npe business model showing that npes procure patents that are more likely to be infringed harder to substitute for and robust to legal challenges the fact that npe acquired patents are of significantly higher quality than those in the control group implies that elevating minimum patent quality will not put an end to the npe business and suggests that this business is sustainable in the long run we furthermore discuss the fact that npes are peculiar players on markets for technology insofar as they are solely interested in the exclusion right not in the underlying knowledge we posit that transactions involving npes may only be the tip of the iceberg of patent only transactions a conjecture with strong implications for the efficiency and the study of markets for technologies managerial and policy implications are discussed

seigniorage banking and the optimal quantity of money abstract this paper discusses seigniorage in an economy with imperfect competition in the banking sector the amount of total seigniorage and its division between the central bank and the banking sector are derived by using the opportunity cost concept of seigniorage the paper analyzes the impact of changes in inflation reserve requirements competition and technology on the division of seigniorage and on the welfare loss and relates the analysis to the concept of the optimal quantity of money

litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases a patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified the patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement his reaction may be to go to court to settle or to accept entry we investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision in a simultaneous game even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial the likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty in sequential games regardless who plays first entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game

tilting the table the use of preliminary injunctions abstract this paper examines the economic role of preliminary injunctions in legal disputes we present a model in which differences in financing costs drive the use of preliminary injunction and explore the implications of this legal remedy for ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives controlling for the nature of the dispute we examine the relationships between the financial status of litigating parties and whether a preliminary injunction is requested the empirical analysis uses detailed data compiled for a sample of 252 patent suits and reveals patterns generally consistent with those suggested by the model

how valuable is patent protection estimates by technology field i present evidence on the private value of patent rights in france for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal i find that the distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed that patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to r d and that these characteristics vary across technology fields i compute the r d cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights measure the variations in value of time technology fields and nationalities and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates

protecting intellectual property rights are small firms handicapped this paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978 99 by linking information from the u s patent office the federal courts and industry sources we find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade or other characteristics that facilitate cooperative resolution of disputes are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits however postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics these findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs

damages and injunctions in protecting intellectual property we investigate how liability rules and property rules protect intellectual property infringement might not be deterred under any of the enforcement regimes available however counterintuitively a credible threat of infringement can actually benefit the patentholder we compare the two doctrines of damages lost profit lost royalty and unjust enrichment and argue that unjust enrichment protects the patentholder better than lost royalty in the case of proprietary research tools both can be superior to a property rule depending on how much delay is permitted before infringement is enjoined for other proprietary products end user products cost reducing innovations these conclusions can be reversed

efficient patent pools the paper builds a tractable model of patent pools agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing the paper allows patents to differ in importance asymmetric blocking patterns and licensors to also be licensees we undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation the analysis has broader applicability than pools being relevant to a number of co marketing arrangements

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

the demand for money total transactions as the scale variable abstract we examine the impact of a direct measure of total transactions in the uk economy on the demand for money by estimating three models two with proxies for transactions using the dynamic ols cointegration technique the total transactions measure outperforms both proxies

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

the settlement of patent litigation in this article i develop a model to analyze patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid litigation of the issue of patent validity the patentee possesses private information about patent validity and makes a take it or leave it settlement offer to a single potential rival an essentially unique sequential equilibrium exists if out of equilibrium beliefs are restricted appropriately the model analyzes the effect of the probability of settlement and litigation

characteristics of patent litigation a window on competition we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid 1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

do banks have a future abstract are banks special intermediaries do they play any unique role in the economy and if so will they retain their specialness in the ever faster changing world of finance the rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking e age revolution have persuaded many that eventually banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can at least as efficiently be carried out by nonbanks this study re explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject and presents an approach which identifies the banks specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money the study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks lending to production has become relatively less important and the use of e money may soon be dominating financial transactions

cross licensing and competition we study bilateral cross licensing agreements between n 2 firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase it is shown that the most collusive cross licensing royalty i e the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements in a symmetric setting if the terms of the cross licensing agreements are not observable to third parties the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty however when the terms of the agreements are public the most competitive royalty i e zero can also be bilaterally efficient policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross licensing agreements are derived from these results

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

the dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents this article explores new data on the transfer and renewal of u s patents and interprets this new evidence using a model of patent transfers and renewal we find that the proportion of transferred patents is large and differs across technology fields and especially type of patentees we also find that the probability of a patent being traded depends on a number of factors the age of the patent the number of citations received by a given age the patent generality and whether the patent has been previously traded or not these findings are consistent with the predictions of a model of patent transfers and renewals

note and comment the supply of credit money and the demand for deposits a reply in his paper in this journal marc lavoie 1999 sets out to establish that our mechanism for reconciling the demand for deposits with the credit led supply is not in conflict with the reflux principle and also to establish the reflux mechanism as the primary mechanism we accept the former without hesitation but the latter argument seems to us to hinge critically on the meaning of terms like primary and automatic and fallacy as well as drawing strength from an institutional framework which diverges in some respects from that of the uk in recent years we explain both of these responses in the two sections that follow before drawing a brief conclusion

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

patents and cumulative innovation causal evidence from the courts cumulative innovation is central to economic growth do patent rights facilitate or impede such follow on innovation this paper studies the effect of removing patent protection through court invalidation on the subsequent research related to the focal patent as measured by later citations we exploit random allocation of judges at the u s court of appeal for the federal circuit to control for the endogeneity of patent invalidation we find that patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent on average but the impact is highly heterogeneous patent rights appear to block follow on innovation only in the technology fields of computers electronics and medical instruments moreover the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers entry of small innovators suggesting that patents may impede the democratization of innovation

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

bank capitalization and cost evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling we amend the standard cost model to account for the role of financial capital in banking the cost function is conditioned on the level of capital but we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of capitalization that minimizes cost we find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk

payment system settlement and bank incentives in this article we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non interest bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems the put option value of default under net settlement can also distort banks investment incentives absent these distortions net settlement dominates gross although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

on the measurement of unemployment abstract this paper suggests a new measure of unemployment which takes into account both the intensity and distribution aspects of unemployment the proposed index is also generalised to a parametric family of measures where the parameter is interpreted as an indicator of aversion to unemployment it also possesses the property of additive decompasibility which enables us to quantify the contribution for a specific group towards total unemployment the measure is most suitable for the less developed economies where major work activities especially in the rural area are often irregular and sporadic leading to frequent entry and involuntary withdrawls from the labour force on the part of workers an empirical exercise based on indian national sample survey data illustrates the usefulness of the proposed index

patent litigation with endogenous disputes the recent explosion of patenting and patent disputes has sparked a growing literature on the economics of patent litigation generally models in this literature take the existence of a dispute as given this assumption is troubling because it hampers the interpretation of empirical studies of patent litigation and the assessment of many patent policy reforms disputes would not arise if all technology adopters obtained ex ante licenses from patent owners this suggests that two stories could explain the origin of patent disputes in one the technology adopter observes a patented technology but chooses to imitate inventing around and or hiding the infringement in the other the adopter develops his own technology and is unaware of another firm s putative patent rights this kind of innocent infringement occurs because patent rights often have uncertain boundaries or questionable validity in addition the sheer number of patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment quite burdensome furthermore patent claims are often hidden sometimes strategically until after firms have made technology investments these two accounts suggest that a model of disputes should consider the decisions of patent owners to invent to patent and to monitor use of the patented technology by others and the decisions of potential infringers to monitor extant patents and develop and adopt new technology claude crampes and corinne langinier 2002 endogenize disputes by focusing on a patent owner s monitoring activity and imitative behavior by potential infringers our model includes this behavior but it also includes defendants who invent around a patent and defendants who are unaware of the patented technology we find that this richer model generates testable implications that better match empirical evidence on patent litigation

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

circuit theory of banking and finance abstract drawing on monetary circuit theory this study develops an approach to analyze the integrated functions of banking and finance in a monetary production economy the study proposes a micro founded circuit sequenced model of a decentralized decisions economy where production exchange and investment from households and firms are integrated through money creation and funds allocation operated respectively by banks and non bank financial intermediaries the model is used to draw implications on the special nature of banks and the role of non bank financial intermediaries the relationship between saving and investment and the channels through which finance may cause the circuit process to break down the study also discusses how the circuit approach can be used for an integrated analysis of economic and financial structural change

private money creation and the suffolk banking system while much has been written on the history of the suffolk banking system somewhat surprisingly to our knowledge no attempt has been made to formally model its monetary consequences in this paper we attempt to fill this gap

the role of patents in information and communication technologies a survey of the literature during the last few decades the number of patents in information and communication technologies has increased considerably an increasing number of patents and the associated fragmentation of ip rights have generated a series of potentially problematic consequences patent thickets royalty stacking the emergence of patent assertion entities increased patent litigation particularly around standard essential patents and the difficulties with defining fair reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing terms are some of the most debated issues in the literature that we review in this paper we devote a specific section of our survey to patent quality currently one of the most debated issues surrounding the patent system in our analysis we mix theoretical and empirical arguments with a more policy oriented reasoning this allows us to better position the different issues in the relevant political and economic context

do patents work thickets trolls and antibiotic resistance this paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property ip to address the question did the strengthening and broadening of ip rights from important patent policy changes in the us promote greater innovation the analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation which shows that if ip rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow on research and impediments to contracting exist then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory patents can significantly deter follow on research in complex technology areas where contracting is difficult computers electronics telecommunications but not in drugs chemicals and human genes i outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling patent thickets and the anti commons of fragmented ownership i then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market drawing on recent research to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance the literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening ip rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the us and canada

poverty and unemployment in india an analysis of recent evidence a careful analysis of the data for two states of india shows that the incidence of unemployment was markedly higher among those whose usual activity was casual labour the self employed and family helpers reported a much less than average level of unemployment or underemployment the casual labourers were over represented among the bottom deciles in terms of their per capita expenditure they reported a lower than average level of literacy and education and were generally younger than other workers those in rural areas were predominantly agricultural labourers with no land or very small land holdings two distinct groups among urban casual labourers were agricultural labourers and miscellaneous workers in the not elsewhere classified category the incidence of unemployment in 17 major states of india shows a statistically significant positive association with the percentage of casual labourers in the rural labour force and in the urban male labour force the importance of casual labourers if the labour force seems to explain a good part of the interstate variance in unemployment rates

patent thickets courts and the market for innovation we study how fragmentation of patent rights and the formation of the court of appeals for the federal circuit cafc affected the duration of patent disputes and thus the speed of technology diffusion through licensing we develop a model of patent litigation which predicts faster settlement when patent rights are fragmented and when there is less uncertainty about court outcomes as was associated with the pro patent shift of the cafc we confirm these predictions empirically using a data set that covers patent suits in u s district courts during the period 1975 2000 finally we analyze how fragmentation affects total settlement delay considering both the reduction in dispute duration and the increase in the number of patent negotiations