efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities many institutions allocate resources by non market mechanisms based on priorities in this paper we introduce a model of resource allocation on the basis of priorities and address the following questions is it possible to allocate resources on the basis of any priority structure if yes when can we do this pareto efficiently without creating incentives for manipulation and consistently across different groups of agents and resource levels we adopt a basic indivisible objects model with a finite number of object types and a finite quota of goods of each type some interesting examples are the determination of access to education allocation of graduate houses offices or tasks agents are assumed to have strict preferences over object types and remaining unassigned an assignment is an allocation of the objects to the agents such that every agent receives at most one object a rule associates an assignment to each preference profile we formalize a priority structure to be a collection of strict priority rankings of individuals indexed by the object types where i a j would be read as i has higher priority for object a than j we assume that the priority structure is exogenously fixed and allow the preferences of the agents to vary a rule is said to violate a priority of i for a if there is a preference profile under which i envies j who is assigned a and publication information econometrica 70 6 november 2002 2489 2497 the copyright to this article is held by the econometric society http www econometricsociety org it may be downloaded printed and reproduced only for personal or classroom use absolutely no downloading or copying may be done for or on behalf of any for profit commercial firm or other commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the econometric society for this purpose contact julie p gordon executive director of the society at jpg northwestern edu i would like to thank faruk gul wolfgang pesendorfer the co editor the four anonymous referees and the participants of the micro theory lunch seminar in princeton university for their comments and suggestions

determinants of donations in private nonprofit markets abstract we estimate the responsiveness of donations to a number of economic variables including price advertising and the availability of revenue from such other sources as government grants and program service sales utilizing a set of irs data on individual nonprofit organizations in each of seven industries including hospitals and higher education for the years 1982 1994 we find distinct overall patterns as well as notable variation across industries a nonprofit organization s fundraising expenditures are estimated to exert two countervailing effects on donations the direct advertising and information effect augments donations while the indirect effect on the price of donating has a negative effect we do not find evidence that fundraising is carried to the profit maximizing levels in some industries fundraising is substantially short of that level while in other industries it is excessive implying that the marginal return to fundraising is exceeded by the cost focusing on whether revenue from other sources affects donations to a nonprofit organization we find evidence that revenue from either government grants or from the organization s own program sales activity generally does not crowd out private donations to the contrary in most industries there are significant positive effects

are church and state substitutes evidence from the 1996 welfare reform abstract churches provide community services similar to those provided by the government but there has been no convincing analysis of the extent to which church activity can substitute for government activity to address this important issue this paper uses a new panel data set of presbyterian church usa congregations to regress both church member donations and a church s community spending on a number of variables including government welfare expenditures a provision of the 1996 welfare law that decreased the availability and use of welfare services by non citizens serves as an instrument to identify the causal effect of government spending on church activity the results show that church activities substitute for government activities extrapolating the findings to all denominations the estimated crowd out effect lies between 20 and 38 cents on the dollar the results are subjected to a number of robustness tests

food insecurity and public assistance this paper examines if welfare programs reduce the probability that vulnerable households experience food deprivation because of financial constraints although the 1996 welfare reform legislation specifically limited the eligibility of immigrant households to receive assistance many states chose to protect their immigrant populations by offering state funded aid to these groups i exploit these changes in eligibility rules to examine the link between food insecurity and public assistance the evidence indicates that a 10 percentage point cut in the fraction of the population that receives public assistance increases the fraction of food insecure households by about 5 percentage points

content based agendas and qualified majorities in sequential voting we analyze sequential binary voting schemes in settings where several privately informed agents have single peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives and we focus on robust equilibria that do not depend on assumptions about the players beliefs about each other our main results identify two intuitive conditions on binary voting trees ensuring that sincere voting at each stage forms an ex post perfect equilibrium in particular we uncover a strong rationale for content based agendas if the outcome should not be sensitive to beliefs about others nor to the deployment of strategic skills the agenda needs to be built from the extremes to the middle so that more extreme alternatives are both more difficult to adopt and are put to vote before other more moderate options an important corollary is that under simple majority the equilibrium outcome of the incomplete information game is always the condorcet winner finally we aim to guide the practical design of schemes that are widely used by legislatures and committees and we illustrate our findings with several case studies

on two competing mechanisms for priority based allocation problems we consider the priority based allocation problem there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies e g schools with seats and a set of agents e g students with priorities over objects e g proximity of residence area we study two well known and competing mechanisms the agentoptimal stable mechanism aosm allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm the top trading cycles mechanism ttcm allots objects via gale s top trading cycles algorithm we show that the two mechanisms are equivalent or ttcm is fair i e respects agents priorities or resource monotonic o rpopulation monotonic if and only if the priority structure is acyclic furthermore if aosm fails to be efficient consistent for a problem ttcm also fails to be fair consistent for it however the converse is not necessarily true

strategy proof stochastic assignment abstract i study strategy proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects a stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments and mechanisms are compared according to first order stochastic dominance i show that non wasteful strategy proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy proof mechanisms however non wastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization in fact the random priority mechanism i e the random serial dictatorship and a recently adopted school choice mechanism deferred acceptance with random tie breaking are wasteful i find that both these mechanisms are dominated by strategy proof mechanisms in general strategy proof improvement cannot be due to merely reshuffling objects and therefore must involve assigning more objects

on stable and strategy proof rules in matching markets with contracts abstract this paper studies stable and one sided strategy proof rules in many to one matching markets with contracts not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand we obtain the following results first the number of stable and strategy proof rules is at most one second the doctor optimal stable rule whenever it exists is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy proof rule third a stable and strategy proof rule whenever it exists is second best optimal for doctor welfare in that no individually rational and strategy proof rule can dominate it this last result is further generalized to non wasteful and strategy proof rules due to the weak assumptions our analysis covers a broad range of markets including cases where a unique stable and strategy proof rule is not equal to the one induced by the cumulative offer process or the deferred acceptance algorithm

mr smith and the preachers the economics of religion in the wealth of nations the extension of economic analysis to problems beyond the domain of formal markets and explicit prices represents a major recent intellectual development but economic imperialism is not new and was not invented in chicago adam smith in his wealth of nations extended economic reasoning to a variety of nonmarket exchange problems one example is his analysis of religious behavior smith viewed participation in religion as a rational device by which individual enhanced the value of their human capital he also explained the behavior of the clergy and other suppliers of religious services from an economic perspective

demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets can fundraising expenditures help overcome free rider behavior abstract economic theory ascribes the primary role in the provision of public goods to government this emphasis on government overlooks the role of the not for profit sector in providing collective type goods in this paper we seek to determine the factors influencing charitable contributions to private nonprofit organizations by estimating a demand function for the output of these collective good providers specifically we test the hypothesis that voluntary giving is responsive to conventional market variables such as advertising expenditures price and quality overall the results are strongly supportive

faith based charity and crowd out during the great depression abstract interest in religious organizations as providers of social services has increased dramatically in recent years churches in the u s were a crucial provider of social services through the early part of the twentieth century but their role shrank dramatically with the expansion in government spending under the new deal in this paper we investigate the extent to which the new deal crowded out church charitable spending in the 1930s we do so using a new nationwide data set of charitable spending for six large christian denominations matched to data on local new deal spending we instrument for new deal spending using measures of the political strength of a state s congressional delegation and confirm our findings using a different instrument based on institutional constraints on state relief spending with both instruments we find that higher government spending leads to lower church charitable activity crowd out was small as a share of total new deal spending 3 but large as a share of church spending our estimates suggest that benevolent church spending fell by 30 in response to the new deal and that government relief spending can explain virtually all of the decline in charitable church activity observed between 1933 and 1939

electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties abstract the non existence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics in this paper we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers we show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty averse what is more these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result

does the government crowd out private donations new evidence from a sample of non profit firms abstract during the 1980s government grants to non profit organizations declined dramatically and the price of private donations increased given there are different costs associated with government grants and private donations to non profits it is important to study the relationship between these two sources and determine whether government grants crowd out private donations i take a fresh look at the issue of crowd out and improve upon the literature by exploiting a panel data set that links private donations to non profit firms with the government grants they received i study 430 non profit shelter human services and other similar types of organizations that were in operation between 1982 and 1992 i find private donations to these non profits effectively do not change with changes in government grants after controlling for firm heterogeneity and political and economic factors under an ols specification in a 2sls specification after controlling for possible endogeneity of the government grants the estimated crowd out is significantly different from zero and one dollar on average the estimated crowd out is 50 cents

a dynamic school choice model this paper inspires from a real life assignment problem faced by the mexican ministry of public education we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers from one period to another teachers can either retain their current positions or choose a preferred one in this framework a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced it is then proved that a solution always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of gale and shapley we also show that the mechanism is dynamically strategy proof and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure

crowd out and diversity abstract research has shown that altruism is lower in diverse communities can this phenomenon be counteracted by government intervention to answer this question this paper introduces diversity to the canonical model of warm glow giving diversity may have two effects on incentives it may attenuate individuals altruistic preferences for public goods and it may cool off the warm glow that individuals get from voluntarism either of these effects leads to diverse communities having lower levels of public goods consistent with prior research however these effects have opposite implications for the efficacy of government intervention i then empirically investigate whether government intervention is more effective in diverse communities for identification i exploit the supreme court mandated 1991 expansion of the ssi program using a new dataset of united methodist churches from 1984 to 2000 the results show that the expansion of ssi crowded out charitable spending by churches the crowd out estimate for the average church is reasonably large but this masks significant differences in crowd out between communities crowd out occurred almost entirely in relatively homogeneous communities there is only modest evidence of crowd out in racially diverse communities thus diverse communities while having the lowest levels of altruism are in this instance the most amenable to government intervention

kids or cash exploring charter school responses to declining government revenues while the literature is extensive on school districts revenue sources less research has been done on the impact of donations on school district funds in this paper we extend the theoretical literature on crowding out of private donations by government grants for one type of nonprofit firm namely charter schools the theoretical model leads us to focus on the key relationships among fundraising effort enrollment which is tied to federal and state funding and donations using a dataset on texas charter schools we adopt a two stage approach to examine the empirical relationship between changes in nondonor revenues and the donations received by charter schools like the extensive empirical estimates of the effects of government grants on donations for other types of nonprofit firms we find evidence of crowding out with respect to our sample of charter schools we also find a significant positive effect of fundraising on donations with a 1 increase in fundraising associated to a 0 58 increase in donations a pattern consistent with overinvestment in fundraising enrollments exhibit a robust inverse relationship to changes in nondonor revenues jel h00 h32 h50

generalized median voter schemes and committees abstract we define a multidimensional analogue of a single peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme every onto strategy proof social choice function on a single peaked domain is a generalized median voter scheme since a single peaked preference can be identified unequivocally with its bliss point one can view a social choice function as an arrowian social welfare function we show that a social choice function is strategy proof iff viewed as a social welfare function it satisfies a monotonicity property finally we investigate strategic decision making in hierarchical committees journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d71

race and charitable church activity i introduction faith based organizations provide social services for more than 70 million americans annually johnson tompkins and webb 2002 of the more than 350 000 congregations in the country more than 85 support some type of social service activity solomon 2003 biddle 1992 estimates that each year congregations spend 24 billion dollars on philanthropic activities these actions have gained new relevance for policymakers as the availability of public funding for charitable church activity has dramatically increased in the past decade starting with the charitable choice provision of the 1996 welfare reform law and continuing with the creation of centers for faith based and community initiatives located in 11 different federal agencies policymakers have instituted a devolution of federal funds intended to provide community services in 2005 more than 2 1 billion dollars in government grants were awarded to religious organizations by federal agencies office of the press secretary 2006 1 some observers fear that this policy trend will encourage racial discrimination by congregations leonard 2002 as bartkowski and regis 2003 write congregational definitions of legitimate social problems that members care about are in actuality influenced by various considerations among them racialized perceptions of welfare recipients past studies by economists have postulated but not substantiated that churchgoers warrant special consideration as individuals whose actions are sensitive to community demographics e g alesina and la ferrara 2000 gruber 2005 alternately some policymakers have championed faith based organizations because they are not likely to display sensitivity to community demographics when providing services as president bush stated in a speech in 2002 faith based charities work daily miracles because above all they recognize the dignity of every citizen and the possibilities of every life office of the press secretary 2002 john diiulio the former director of the white house office of faith based and community initiatives argued for charitable choice by saying government at all levels blatantly denies the equal protection of the laws to low income urban african american and latino children and families who depend disproportionately on faith based organizations for both basic life necessities and the delivery of specific social welfare benefits diiulio 2002 there is also noneconomic research consistent with this view e g billiet 1995 johnson 1977 the goal of this article was to examine whether congregations are affected by the racial composition of the local community when deciding whether and how much charitable activity to provide exploring this relationship is valuable not only because it addresses a key policy debate but also because it contributes to existing economic work on diversity and redistribution much prior work on socioeconomic conditions and tastes for redistribution relies on hypothetical questions asked to respondents in the general social survey or in gallop polls examples include alesina and la ferrara 2005b luttmer 2001 fong 2001 this article examines how a community s racial composition affects actual charitable expenditures studying actual charitable activities will be valuable if individuals stated preferences are different from their actual preferences or if stated preferences are sensitive to the wording of a question as is the case in alesina and la ferrara 2005b to investigate the effect of race on charitable church activity we compare how racially homogeneous congregations respond to the community s racial composition relative to other congregations several factors support this approach first members of homogeneous congregations have ostensibly taken race into account when selecting a congregation to attend consequently these congregations may be especially likely to display sensitivity to a community s racial composition when providing charitable services

a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed the author describes a class of simple two stage mechanisms that implement efficient allocations as subgame perfect equilibria for economic environments involving externalities these mechanisms known as compensation mechanisms solve a wide variety of externalities problems including implementation of lindahl allocations regulation of monopoly and efficient solutions to the prisoner s dilemma copyright 1994 by american economic association

the externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution abstract this paper deals with implementing the efficient allocation of transboundary and persistent pollution in particular we adapt varian s compensation mechanism varian a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed amer econ rev 85 1994 1278 1293 to cover situations in which pollutants extend to neighboring regions and their effects persist over time the main contribution of this paper is the design of a mechanism that implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the efficient pollution levels in this context

club goods and group identity evidence from islamic resurgence during the indonesian financial crisis this paper tests a model in which group identity in the form of religious intensity functions as ex post insurance i exploit relative price shocks induced by the indonesian financial crisis to demonstrate a causal relationship between economic distress and religious intensity koran study and islamic school attendance that is weaker for other forms of group identity consistent with ex post insurance credit availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity religious intensity alleviates credit constraints and religious institutions smooth consumption shocks across households and within households particularly for those who were less religious before the crisis

dynamic stability and reform of political institutions abstract this paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games the political aggregation rules used at date t 1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t effectively rules are players who can strategically delegate future policy making authority to different rules a political rule is stable if it selects itself a reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected the stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent for instance simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth weighted voting rules are not the result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra legal protests threats or private investment the approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature a parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration

pay or pray the impact of charitable subsidies on religious attendance abstract the economic argument for subsidizing charitable giving relies on the positive externalities of charitable activities particularly from the religious institutions that are the largest recipients of giving but the net external effects of subsidies to religious giving will also depend on a potentially important indirect effect as well impacts on religious participation religious participation can be either a complement to or a substitute with the level of charitable giving understanding these spillover effects of charitable giving may be quite important given the existing observational literature that suggests that religiosity is a major determinant of well being among americans in this paper i investigate the impact of charitable subsidies on a measure of religious participation attendance at religious services i do so by using data over three decades from the general social survey as well as confirming the impact of such subsidies on religious giving using the consumer expenditure survey i find strong evidence that religious giving and religious attendance are substitutes larger subsidies to charitable giving lead to more religious giving but less religious attendance with an implied elasticity of attendance with respect to religious giving of as much as 1 1 these results have important implications for the debate over charitable subsidies they also serve to validate economic models of religious participation

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

individual versus group strategy proofness when do they coincide a social choice function is group strategy proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy proofness can be defined and for some of them all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy proofness we provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them individual and group strategy proofness become equivalent we also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions

implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects abstract the regulation of a persistent pollutant through a sequence of compensation mechanisms varian h 1994 a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed american economic review 85 1278 1293 involves the unexpected conclusion that it may be optimal to establish lower taxes in response to an increase in the magnitude of a possible catastrophe

the church versus the mall what happens when religion faces increased secular competition recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation an unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity cost of religious participation in this paper we identify a policy driven change in the opportunity cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on sunday known as blue laws many states have repealed these laws in recent years raising the opportunity cost of religious participation we use a variety of data sets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws religious attendance falls and that church donations and spending fall as well these results do not seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change nor do we see comparable declines in membership in or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws we then assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the nlsy we find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use and that this increase is found only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws the effect is economically significant for example the gap in heavy drinking between religious and nonreligious individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed

emergent extremism in a multi agent model of religious clubs i introduction religious extremism is as old as religion itself but the tendency to promote militancy and terrorism from within extremist religions appears to be much more common now than in times past juergensmeyer 2001 stern 2003 wiktorowicz 2005 1 today s terrorists routinely frame their objectives in religious terms and organize their activities within religious movements this shift is not due to increased militancy within religion as a whole not even within the stricter subset of religious groups commonly labeled sectarian or fundamentalist bromley and melton 2002 marty and appleby 1995 rather groups with militant objectives are increasingly leveraging the latent potential for violence within extremist religion krueger and maleckova 2003 and krueger 2007 have shown that contrary to popular hypotheses regarding the salience of poverty and education it is instead institutional conditions such as civil liberties that contribute to the origination of terrorists within a country religious extremism has been shown to be a potentially powerful input into the production of terrorism berman 2004 2 and the origination of terrorists has been empirically connected to civil liberties we seek to complete the triangle and connect religious extremism to social conditions in an extension of existing theory and test the predictions of the model in an empirical context with an eye toward civil liberties this paper extends previous models of religious clubs to better account for observed patterns of extremism across different settings and test policies most likely to reduce the appeal of extremism economists at first blush should have trouble explaining the survival of groups that demand large sacrifices from their members successful religious groups however routinely impose all sorts of apparently unproductive costs on their members iannaccone 1992 introduced a formal model of religious clubs within which apparently irrational sacrifice and stigma enhances the individual and collective utility his model demonstrated the feasibility of extremist groups but does less to explain the relative prevalence of extremism across time and place further the original model allows for only corner solutions and as such the viability of extreme groups is indistinguishable from the viability of the more moderate groups they must compete with for members in the religious marketplace in section ii we revisit analyze and extend the club model of religion we push the analysis of the original model exploring sacrifice substitutability of club and private goods and their relationships to member commitment and the viability of extremist groups in this preliminary analysis we illustrate not only the potential insights of the club theory of religion into the strength and viability of extremist groups but also the limitations inherent to the representative agent model we proceed by extending the model in a multi agent ma computational framework this framework permits us to analyze the distributions of agents and clubs that make up a religious economy the computational nature of the model is critical because it allows for sufficient heterogeneity of agents and clubs and given this heterogeneity agent decision making absent closed form solutions via nash equilibria extremists groups emerge as just one segment the high cost tail of a distribution of religious clubs that range across the full spectrum of potential group imposed sacrifice and stigma extremism is identifiable and comparable in the model because it exists within a full spectrum of clubs by varying the parameters of the model that control the distribution of secular wages across agents and the degree of substitutability between religious and secular commodities we can better explain where and when religious extremism is most popular its strength relative to more moderate groups and which economic policies reduce its prevalence

an accurate measurement of the crowd out effect income effect and price effect for charitable contributions in the past empirical research on charitable contributions has focused on two issues estimating the income and price elasticities of contributions and estimating the extent to which government funding crowded out private contributions the two fundamental problems in all these studies are the differences in the underlying conceptual models and the use of imperfect data for empirical analysis this paper addresses both of these problems

strategy proofness and essentially single valued cores in this paper we search for solutions to various classes of allocation problems we hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging roth 1982b shows that in the context of housing markets the core correspondence which is shown to be single valued by roth and postlewaite 1977 is strategy proof moreover ma 1994 shows that it is the only solution that is pareto efficient individually rational and strategy proof

church state separation and redistribution we analyze how religion affects voting and redistribution our model directs attention away from the particular faith belief or risk attitudes of religious individuals and emphasizes instead how organized religion opens the door to standard group based distributive politics we argue that organized religion makes it possible for the rich and the religious poor to form electoral coalitions in favor of low taxes and limited redistribution such electoral coalitions form out of simple material self interest and they occur at the expense of the secular poor however the material reward to the religious poor from supporting such electoral coalitions depends on the institutional context as state support for religion increases poor religious voters have greater incentives to vote with poor secular voters in favor of parties that support high taxes the analysis therefore highlights the possibilities of understanding how religion affects politics without asserting that religious individuals differ systematically from secular ones in their values or preferences

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

dynamic income progressive taxes and the timing of charitable contributions using an econometric model of charitable giving and a 10 year panel of tax return data i find that previous studies have underestimated the effects of permanent income and overestimated the effects of permanent changes in tax prices the significant statutory tax changes that occurred during the 1980s especially in 1986 serve to identify the key model parameters my results imply that people smooth their giving when transitory income changes but also time their giving to exploit transitory changes in tax prices the results also raise questions about how effectively the tax incentives permanently influence the level rather than just the timing of charitable giving by individuals

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federal system proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks the author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations the author characterizes the response of political economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions partial replacement is the most likely outcome though others are possible copyright 1987 by american economic association

government growth and private contributions to charity we exploit the time series properties of charitable giving to provide additional insights into the relationship between charitable contributions and government spending cointegration tests reveal a significant long run relationship between several categories of charitable giving and government spending granger causality tests provide evidence on the short run giving and spending relationship evidence suggests that charitable contributions to education respond quite differently to state and local government education expenditures versus federal government expenditures we argue that the government spending and charitable giving relationship depends on the source of government revenue how this revenue is used and the rational ignorance of private donors

identifying the causal effect of income on religiosity using the earned income tax credit abstract how do economic conditions income and the generosity of social insurance affect religious behavior this paper provides novel evidence for the united states using variation in earned income tax credit benefits across states over time and by number of children in the raw data income and religiosity have a trivial relationship in contrast the instrumental variables strategy shows that increases in income from the eitc are found to sizably reduce religious attendance among low income individuals among individuals who attend the results indicate that an additional 1000 in annual income is associated with a decrease of roughly 1 service per year as compared to an average of 16 services per year the effect arises mainly along the intensive margin decreasing devout behavior and increasing more marginal attendance but having little impact on whether an individual participates at all or on beliefs there are also minimal effects on the occurrence and amount of contributions to religious organizations the results extend our understanding of the determinants of religiosity the relationship between governmental income support and religious behavior and the social effects of the earned income tax credit

religiosity and state welfare abstract the catholic sex abuse scandals reduced both membership and religiosity in the catholic church because government spending on welfare may substitute for the religious provision of social services we consider whether this plausibly exogenous decline in religiosity affected several measures of the public taste toward government and spending on welfare between 1990 and 2008 in places where there were more scandals individuals state a preference for less government provision of social services in contrast a higher level of abuse is also associated with an increase in voting for democratic candidates for president state legislatures and the us house of representatives and an increase in per capita government welfare spending although this increase is insufficient to replace the decrease in catholic provided charity

efficiency and income redistribution in the single peaked preferences model with several commodities abstract we consider the problem of allocating m infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single peaked preferences we propose a variation on the mas colell s walrasian solution with slacks to characterize the efficient allocations our solution allows us to associate with each efficient allocation an income redistribution we prove that the original solution proposed by mas colell is the efficient selection which requires an income redistribution where the maximum payoff and the maximum subsidy are smallest this generalizes a derivation of the uniform rule by schummer and thomson

economic growth and the separation of church and state the french case i introduction historically the decision to establish or forsake a state religion was seldom democratic it resulted from the political leaders willingness to consolidate their hold on power and did not reflect the people s attitudes toward a state religion even in a democracy like the united states the separation of church and state did not result from a popular vote but was derived from the first amendment of the u s constitution and subsequently reaffirmed by the supreme court france is actually one of the few countries where citizens had a say in the separation between church and state in 1905 the democratically elected french representatives adopted a bill that separated religion from the state the bill abolished the concordat which had been instituted by napoleon bonaparte in 1801 so as to govern the relationship between the french state and the roman catholic church under this arrangement the members of the catholic clergy were paid by the french state which in return had a say in their appointment the 1905 bill ended state subsidies for the church but also governmental interventions in the appointment of the church s personnel the passing of the 1905 bill illustrates the progressive rejection of the church in french politics it occurred at a time when france remained an agricultural country even though a growing share of the population worked in industrial activities in addition because primary education had been made compulsory in 1881 for both boys and girls illiteracy was decreasing nevertheless there remained many disparities between the different french departements 1 for instance the share of the french army s conscripts who were illiterate substantially varied between the different departements from 0 32 in haute savoie to 16 89 in morbihan in the academic literature economists have shown that religious laws have consequences on economic growth and human capital for example kuran 2003 botticini and eckstein 2005 hillman 2007 but they still debate the causal relationship between a nation s actual degree of religious observance and economic development there are indeed two major theories of religiosity the religion market model and the secularization hypothesis the religion market model developed by iannaccone 1991 iannaccone and stark 1994 iannaccone finke and stark 1994 and gill 1999 among others argues that religious participation is mainly supply driven in other words the government s intervention such as the establishment of state religion is a major determinant of religiosity however following weber 1905 proponents of the secularization hypothesis such as chaves 1994 and bruce 2001 argue that religious participation is demand driven they consider that economic development which includes industrialization an increase in literacy and wealth and a decrease in fertility rates entails a decline in religiosity this secularization process supposedly leads individuals to define themselves as less religious and decreases the influence of religion on social and political institutions as a matter of fact mccleary and barro 2006 find in a study of religiosity in 68 countries that economic development has an overall negative effect on religiosity urbanization also makes individuals less observant but education and the presence of children are positively correlated with religiosity still studies by finke and stark 1992 iannaccone and stark 1994 and stark 1999 among others argue that there is no empirical evidence to support secularization theories in particular the secularization hypothesis predicts that the separation between religion and state should become widespread as countries become richer but barro and mccleary 2005 cannot find any link between wealth measured by a country s gross domestic product gdp and the current existence of a state religion

voting by committees under constraints we consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects specifically we characterize the families of strategy proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible and voters preferences are separable or additively representable

strategyproof collective choice in economic and political environments this paper surveys some recent results characterizing strategyproof collective choice rules when preferences satisfy conditions that are meaningful in economic or political environments

confining the coase theorem contracting ownership and free riding if individuals own the right to take any action that they please and are free to contract about behaviour will outcomes be efficient in all situations that is does the coase theorem hold we study this classic question through the lens of a non cooperative model of contract negotiations considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations in either case we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players but if participation is voluntary and there are more than two players there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient specifically the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting free riding on others agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions when actions involve the use of assets efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership

economics religion and culture a brief introduction in this introduction we will avoid laboring over a definition of the economics of religion culture but this will not stop us from arguing that it is a burgeoning area of research work focusing on religious practice and related cultural issues dates back at least to adam smith but until the 1990s there had been little published by mainstream economists in this area recently however a variety of subfields in economics have taken up work here the jel classification code system includes a designation for papers on religion z12 and the american economic association via econlit keeps track of the number of journal articles published under this section of the code in fig 1 we show the number of papers published in this area in recent years as the picture shows there has been a sixfold increase in the total number of papers published in this area over the past decade including a number of truly excellent works some of the topics considered here include studies of how public policy affects attitudes and beliefs studies on the lasting economic implications of historic cultural institutions work on religious schooling versus secular schooling investigations of faith based social service provision work on violence and religious extremism analyses of religious donations and research on the connection between beliefs such as religious beliefs and behaviors

optimal voting rules we study dominant strategy incentive compatible dic and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives the agents are privately informed about their preferences and have single crossing utility functions monetary transfers are not feasible we use an equivalence between deterministic dic mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as say a rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained

on the operation of multiple matching markets abstract we provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets our finding is that the market wise adaptation of strategy proof and non wasteful rules yields a strategy proof rule with the following efficiency property no strategy proof rule pareto dominates the rule such rules are abundant as they include the market wise use of the well known priority based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance this result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real life markets as well as our practice in market design that separately treats each market for its design

introduction to the economics of religion after a very long hiatus economists have begun again to study the relationship between economics and religion this article seeks to summarize and evaluate the principal themes and empirical findings that have appeared in some 200 recent papers on the economics of religion although some of the research concerns the economic consequences of religiosity most applies standard economic theory to the study of individual religious activity the characteristics of religious groups and the impact of regulation and competition on religious markets

matching with branch of choice contracts at the united states military academy branch selection is a key decision in a cadet s military career cadets at usma can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement this real life matching problem lls an important gap in market design literature although priorities fail a key substitutes condition the agent optimal stable mechanism is well dened and in contrast to the current usma mechanism it is fair stable and strategy proof adoption of this mechanism benets cadets and the army this new

partners in giving the crowding in effects of uk government grants abstract this study examines the determinants of voluntary donations to uk charities using empirical specifications that combine error component and simultaneous equations methods in a series of tests we identify the one way fixed effects endogenous representation for government grants as the best empirical model when this endogeneity is taken into account government grants cause significant crowding in for the full sample and the two largest cohorts price coefficients are negative and fund raising coefficients are positive religion charities are net revenue maximizers whereas other charity cohorts fund raise short of net revenue maximization

simultaneous determination of church contributions and church attendance in a standard model of household allocation of time and income church attendance and church contributions are determined simultaneously there are life cycle aspects to both attendance and contributions as azzi and ehrenberg 1975 and ehrenberg 1977 have argued and contributions behavior is affected by tax treatment and by a potential free rider problem as well this paper motivates an econometric specification which recognizes these features and estimates the parameters with a data set of over 2000 protestant church members

preaching matters replication and extension statistical evidence in a recent excellent paper by lipford mccormick and tollison shows a negative relationship between church membership and social misbehavior this paper replicates that relationship using more comprehensive data by u s county we provide theoretical support for the statistical evidence by showing that churches encourage appropriate behavior thus providing property rights enforcement because doing so benefits churches and their members aa church membership increases property rights enforcement increases although at a diminishing rate

do immigrants and their children free ride more than natives the main goal of this paper is to analyze the differences between immigrant and native households in their volunteer contributions and private transfer behavior as well as their receipt of assistance from nongovernment sources in addition we examine how the immigrant native differences evolve over time as immigrant households accumulate us experience finally we examine the voluntary contribution behavior of second generation immigrants and children in immigrant households to gain insight into the long term impact of immigration we do not find evidence that immigrant households free ride more than native born households first immigrant households when compared to similar native born households are less likely to receive assistance from nongovernment sources second immigrant status has no statistically significant impact on monetary contributions toward public good provision we also find that the immigrant native differences in monetary and time contributions tend to diminish over time as immigrants acquire us experience finally we find no significant differences between the second generation of immigrants and third or higher generations of americans in their voluntary contributions of money and time we obtain similar results for children in immigrant households they are not significantly different from children in native households in their time contribution and in their enrollment in federal meal programs the results are robust to various income and wealth controls do immigrants and their children free ride more than natives

impure altruism in dictators giving abstract we design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences by giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels we create an environment in which crowding out may occur we find that the behavior of 66 of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function

impossibility of strategy proof mechanisms in economies with pure public goods this paper investigates the structures of strategy proof mechanisms in general models of economies with pure public goods under the assumptions that the set of allocations is a subset of some finite dimensional euclidean space and that the admissible preferencees are continuous and convex i establish that any strategy proof mechanism is dictatorial whenever the decision problem is of more than one dimension furthermore i establish a similar result when preference relations also satisfy the additional assumption of monotonicity these results properly extend the gibbard satterthwaite theorem to economies with pure public goods

nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems abstract for a very general class of pollution control models involving strictly quasi concave utility functions over consumption and environmental quality and strictly convex emission abatement cost functions a proportional cost sharing mechanism is presented inspired by the ratio equilibrium introduced by 7 it is shown that the proportional solution yields a cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts and that the resulting utility imputation always lies in the stand alone core of the cost sharing game in order to decentralize the proportional cost sharing equilibrium a financial compensation mechanism implementing the proportional solution in complete information nash equilibrium is presented

on strategy proofness and symmetric single peakedness we characterize the class of strategy proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single peaked preferences this class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes the class of strategy proof and tops only social choice functions on the domain of single peaked preferences characterized by moulin 1980 since under the domain of symmetric single peaked preferences generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy proof on the smaller domain our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints

dynamically consistent voting rules abstract this paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage we call the family of stage voting rules dynamic voting rules and provide an axiomatic characterization on the domain of single peaked preferences of dynamic voting rules that are strategy proof and satisfy a second property inspired from choice theory which we call dynamic consistency

implementing the efficient allocation of pollution we provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another using firms reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers the complete information mechanism determines a firm s transfer according to a linear pollution price set by other firms both mechanisms can be modified to be budget balanced in and out of equilibrium the complete information mechanism implements the efficient allocation even when firms are allowed to use mixed strategies under a single crossing condition the same holds for the incomplete information mechanism this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution abstract this paper presents a simple twofold mechanism that attains a complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution the first component is adopted from duggan and roberts duggan j roberts j 2002 implementing the efficient allocation of pollution american economic review 92 1070 1078 the second new component takes care of the moral hazard problem

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system comment and extension in a recent paper richard steinberg 1987 examines the effects upon private donations of federal and local government spending for a public good unfortunately when discussing the consequences of changes in local spending he mis specifies the demand function for donations this error enables one to conclude from his model that it is a priori impossible for government to crowd out private donations one for one such a conclusion violates intuition because one for one crowding out should be at least theoretically possible and steinberg s model when corrected does allow donations to fall as much as the government increases its spending as this comment will show one can further conclude from the model presented in the body of steinberg s paper that the structure of the government s tax policy has no effect on the level of crowding out however the corrected model implies that the government can influence changes in private donations that are caused by increased government spending the degree of control depends upon the size of the donors income effects and upon the ability of the government to allocate the extra tax burden