restabilizing matching markets at senior level abstract we study in many to one matching markets the restabilization process of a group stable matching disrupted by a change in the population if firms are not allowed to fire workers the market always reaches stability again only if the disruption is due to the opening of positions by firms or the retirement of workers this is shown by designing an algorithm which always leads to a group stable matching the algorithm mimics markets where firms make offers and workers accept the offer of their favorite firm if firms are allowed to fire workers we construct another algorithm which produces a group stable matching when the disruption is due to the entrance of workers or the closure of positions in this algorithm unemployed workers make offers to firms in both cases of disruption we require firms to have q substitutable preferences

ipo pricing in hot market conditions who leaves money on the table this paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on ipo pricing using a model in which the aftermarket price of ipo shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment i show that ipos can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return a sample of recent french offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model individual investors demand is positively related to market conditions moreover large individual investors demand leads to high ipo prices large initial returns and poor long run performance the end of the nineties was one of the hottest ipo markets ever in this period both the number of initial public offerings and the level of initial returns have reached unprecedented peaks ritter documents that in 1999 and 2000 only 803 companies went public in the united states raising about 123 billion and leaving about 62 billion on the table in the form of initial returns periodically such periods of ipo euphoria occur these so called hot issue markets are characterized by high ipo volumes and high levels of initial return see ibbotson and jaffe 1975 and ritter 1984 as well as positive serial correlation of ipo initial returns and correlation between recent levels of initial return and current ipo volume surprisingly however pre ipo shareholders do not seem to be upset about leaving so much money on the table loughran and ritter 2002 explain this phenomenon by the fact that insiders of ipo companies consider not only the shares they sell in the ipo but also those they retain which benefit from the large initial price run up ljungqvist and wilhelm 2003 show that during the 1999 to 2000 period ipo companies were significantly different from usual

taxation in matching markets what is the impact of taxation in matching markets in matching markets because agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners welfare depends on which agents are matched to each other in equilibrium taxes in matching markets can generate inefficiency by changing who is matched to whom even if the number of workers at each firm is unaffected for markets in which workers refuse to match without a positive wage higher taxes decrease match efficiency however in more balanced matching markets where transfers may flow in either direction such as the student college market lowering taxes may decrease match efficiency because an agent can transfer enough to buy an inefficient partner only to be bought back when taxes are lowered further simulations show that in matching markets traditional deadweight loss estimates based on the change in taxable income can be substantially biased in either direction jel classification h20 j24 c78 d13

discounting and underpricing in seasoned equity offers abstract expected discounting in seasoned equity offers is a cost of uncertainty about firm value marketing new shares and acquiring information that raises the offer price stockholders incorporate predictable discounting in stock prices when equity offers are first announced the surprise component of discounting reflecting the lead bank s final adjustment to the offer price releases information that often causes economically large price swings on the offer day disparities between the issuer s closing price and the price suggested in the lead bank s final order book are a primary source of information the discount surprise appears to be used by lead banks to update capital suppliers with that eleventh hour information before they commit their funds

constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages a number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers while having to abide by the law of minimum wages firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what salary in such situations fair envy free allocations usually fail to exist to cope with this situation this paper proposes a new concept of fairness called constrained fairness among the set of constrainedly fair allocations the so called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular interest the reason for this is that the salaries are not only compatible with the minimum wages they are also optimal from the standpoint of cost minimizing firms and the assignment of jobs is efficient from the viewpoint of workers a convergent dynamic procedure that identifies constrainedly fair and minimal allocations is proposed furthermore strategic properties of the mechanism are derived and two notions of efficiency are evaluated

what a difference a month makes stock analyst valuations following initial public offerings we examine how analysts establish target prices for ipo firms and whether comparable firms used to support target prices are helpful in explaining ipo offer prices during the bubble period of 1999 to 2000 the average offer price was set at a discount relative to comparable firm valuations in contrast the average offer price was set at a small premium relative to comparables in the pre bubble period this shift appears to hold even after controlling for the differences in the types of firms going public during the bubble period moreover target prices of ipo firms were set at a higher premium relative to comparables during the bubble period while our results suggest that underwriters systematically dis counted offer prices during the bubble period an alternative explanation is that the shift arose because underwriters and analysts faced different incentives and legal exposures dur ing the bubble period

comparative statics in matching markets abstract this paper studies the comparative statics of adding agents to matching markets that generalize the marriage and college admissions markets of d gale and l shapley amer math monthly 69 1962 9 15 it is shown for the wide class of matching markets studied by a roth econometrica 52 1984 47 57 that adding an agent to one side of the market weakens the competitive positions of the other agents on that side and strengthens the competitive positions of the agents on the other side

a note on the room mates problem and a related revenue allocation problem we introduce in this note the consistent organizational structure cos problem which can be viewed as a generalization of the college admission and room mates problems both the room mates problem and the cos problem may have no stable solution when side payments are allowed the cos problem but not the room mates problem always has a nonempty core we further study some nucleoli of the cos problem with side payments

ipo first day returns offer price revisions volatility and form s 1 language abstract form s 1 is the first sec filing in the initial public offering ipo process the tone of the s 1 in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm s business strategy and operations should affect investors ability to value the ipo we find that ipos with high levels of uncertain text have higher first day returns absolute offer price revisions and subsequent volatility our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty bookbuilding and prospect theory

issuer surplus and the partial adjustment of ipo prices to public information abstract this study develops a model in which rational issuers maximize the expected surplus from going public by choosing an offer price that weighs the benefit of higher proceeds if the offer is completed against the cost of foregone surplus if the offer fails increases in the market valuation of comparable firms during the waiting period imply higher surplus associated with going public issuers respond with a partial revision in the offer price to elevate the probability of completion the model offers insights into many facts associated with initial public offering pricing including partial adjustment to market returns the inverse relation between withdrawal and market returns the asymmetric price adjustment to up versus down market returns hot issue markets and unconditional underpricing

the strategy structure of some coalition formation games in coalitional games with side payments the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared the predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully these difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form as the collection of pairs of buyer seller in an assignment game the incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection furthermore the relationships with vickrey clarke groves mechanisms are drawn

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

further results on the macroeconomic effects of aids the dualistic labor surplus economy this article generalizes and extends the earlier analyses of cuddington 1993 and cuddington and hancock forthcoming by incorporating the presence of underemployment and dual labor markets considerations that seem particularly important when assesssing the likely impact of aids in many african countries the dual economy simulations of the economic impact of aids using tanzanian data suggest that the macroeconomic consequences of the epidemic are of the same order of magnitude as those obtained using a single sector full employment model gross domestic product gdp is 15 to 25 percent smaller by 2010 than it would have been wtihout aids and per capita gdp is 0 to 10 percent smaller the output loss from aids in the dual economy framework is roughly the same as the output gain achievable through policies designed to increase labor market flexibility the exercise is crude but it suggests that meaningful efforts at economic reform in economies devastated by aids may at least ameliorate some of the negative economic effects of the epidemic although they would certainly not offset its personal and social costs

discussion of why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos in this article loughran and ritter 2001 hereafter lr provide an interesting new theory and empirical analysis in this discussion i would like to elaborate on their analysis in several ways first in section 1 1 review microsoft s ipo process as documented in a 1986 fortune article and related this to the lr model and evidence in section 2 i briefly discuss the lr model and its implications and the empirical findings presented in lr that support the model in section 3 i present some additional empirical evidence suggesting that the lr prospect theory model can t fully explain the ipo puzzles section 4 proposes an alternative explanation for these data namely that the data are consistent with a bargaining game in which the issuers underwriters and investors bargaining power changes with business and industry cycles section 5 concludes

organizational debut on the public stage marketing myopia and initial public offerings successful initial public offerings ipos provide firms with access to valuable resources but also put pressure on firms to impress potential investors with evidence of their current well being and prospects for future growth to impress investors ipo firms might curtail their marketing budgets which appears to inflate current earnings and provide evidence of current well being however curtailing marketing budgets unexpectedly during an ipo may be a myopic practice in that the immediate benefits of these budget cuts are offset by their longer term adverse consequences on financial well being the extent of these adverse consequences in turn may be moderated by external firm factors including strategic alliances and key customer relationships and internal firm factors such as the strategic emphasis on value creation versus value appropriation a sample of 1 095 ipos during 2000 2011 reveals evidence of myopic marketing practices in more than 37 of the sample investors seem misled during ipos bu

vacancies in supply chain networks we use the supply chain matching framework to study the effects of firm exit we show that the exit of an initial supplier or end consumer has monotonic effects on the welfare of initial suppliers and end consumers but may simultaneously have positive and negative effects on intermediaries furthermore we demonstrate that there are no clear comparative statics for the effects of intermediary exit on the welfare of other firms most surprisingly intermediary exit may diminish the welfare of other firms at the same level of the supply chain

adult mortality and consumption growth in the age of hiv aids the authors use a 13 year panel of individuals in tanzania to assess how adult mortality shocks affect both short and long run consumption growth of surviving household members using unique data which tracks individuals from 1991 to 2004 they examine consumption growth controlling for a set of initial community household and individual characteristics the effect is identified using the sample of households in 2004 which grew out of baseline households the authors find robust evidence that an affected household will see consumption drop 7 percent within the first five years after the adult death with high growth in the sample over this time period this creates a 19 percentage point growth gap with the average household there is some evidence of persistent effects of these shocks for up to 13 years but these effects are imprecisely estimated and not significantly different from zero the impact of female adult death is found to be particularly severe

how much of a threat to economic growth is a mature aids epidemic the article models the impact on economic growth of hiv aids when the epidemic is in a mature phase in contrast with previous studies focused on periods of expansion as it is typically the case in african countries simulations for honduras the epicentre of the epidemic in central america show that aids is not likely to threaten economic growth neither through labour nor capital accumulation channels impacts are estimated between 0 007 and 0 27 points of gross domestic product gdp growth annually for the period 2001 to 2010 increasing spending on prevention higher public treatment subsidies and increasing treatment access will not jeopardize economic growth prospects critical factors that slash economic growth in africa such as human capital reductions and shifts in relative skills are not strong in honduras

the package assignment model we study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several rather than single objects although buyers reservations values are non additive efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non linear in the objects constituting the packages the interconnections among the linear programming formulation walrasian equilibrium and the core are established in the single seller auction version a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 d44 d51

is the ipo pricing process efficient this paper investigates underwriters treatment of public information throughout the ipo pricing process two key findings emerge first public information is not fully incorporated into the initial price range while the economic magnitude of the bias is small it is puzzling because it is not clear who benefits from it further it indicates that the filing range midpoint is not an unbiased predictor of the offer price as prior literature has assumed second while public information is similarly not fully incorporated into the final offer price the small economic significance of this relation indicates that the ipo pricing process is almost efficient

on ascending vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects abstract we construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primal dual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficient allocation problem for this setting the auction assigns personalized prices to bundles and asks bidders to report their preferred bundles in each round a bidder s prices are increased when he belongs to a minimally undersupplied set of bidders this concept generalizes the notion of overdemanded sets of objects introduced by demange gale and sotomayor for the one to one assignment problem under a submodularity condition the auction implements the vickrey clarke groves outcome we show that this type of condition is somewhat necessary to do so when classifying the ascending auction literature in terms of their underlying algorithms our auction fills a gap in that literature we relate our results to various ascending auctions in the literature

stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues in the standard two sided matching models agents on one side of the market the institutions can each be matched to a set of agents the individuals on the other side of the market and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched we explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one s coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution

too good to fire non assortative matching to play a dynamic game abstract we model stable non assortative labor market matchings we endogenize how transferable utility is a matched firm and worker play an infinite horizon game with one sided moral hazard becker s 1973 result that complementarity yields positively assortative matching fails because increasing match quality harms dynamic incentives a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort thus firms may prefer lower type workers who will exert more effort we offer a new interpretation of efficiency wages committing to a high wage improves effort incentives indirectly by increasing the firm s willingness to walk away we also show that the set of stable outcomes has a lattice structure

a simple selling and buying procedure abstract for the assignment game we analyze the following mechanism sellers simultaneously fix their prices first then buyers sequentially decide which object to buy also each buyer may report his or her indifferences along with the previous buyers indifferences to the following buyer the first phase determines the potential prices while the second phase determines the actual matching reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers moreover when buyers state their true indifferences the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

bookbuilding how informative is the order book we examine the institutional bids submitted under the bookbuilding procedure for a sample of international equity issues we find that information in bids which include a limit price especially those of large and frequent bidders affects the issue price oversubscription has a smaller but significant effect for ipos public information affects the issue price to the extent that it is reflected in the bids oversubscription and demand elasticity are positively correlated with the first day aftermarket return and demand elasticity is negatively correlated with aftermarket volatility our results support the view that bookbuilding is designed to extract information from investors

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

empirical estimates of beta when investors face estimation risk we examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions the implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets we find such a decline over the first geveral periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings there is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement this paper examines several empirical implications of security return models involving differential information these models formalize the following intuition securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions the research relates to two streams of literature the first revolves around the new issues and new listings market it begins with ibbotson 1975 and includes for example ritter 1984 beatty and ritter 1986 mcconnell and sanger 1987 and muscarella and vetsuypens 1989 the second is the literature dealing with the effects of differential information on the risk assessment of low information firms this second literature is exemplified by the work of klein and bawa 1976 1977 and barry and brown 1984 1985 in our examination we focus on how increased risk associated with low information firms henceforth called estimation risk manifests itself in observed return data we explore how observed security returns to low information firms appear to researchers in relation to how they appear ex ante to investors who base their predictive distribution of security returns on incomplete information about the parameters of the return generating process we also examine data on new listings and new issues to exemplify some of the relationships the data support the most obvious and direct implication of the differential information model that the expected systematic risk of low information firms decreases as time passes and information increases our evidence as in ibbotson that risk declines with seasoning rejects a restrictive null hypothesis that information risk is diversifiable and the under

assessing the impact of aids on the growth path of the malawian economy abstract a modified solow growth model is used to simulate the impact of the aids epidemic on output capacity and other key macroeconomic aggregates in malawi comparing a counterfactual no aids scenario to medium and extreme aids projections suggests that average real gdp growth over the 1985 2010 period will be 0 2 0 3 1 2 1 5 percentage points lower in the medium extreme case relative to the no aids case as a result the size of the economy by the year 2010 will be reduced from a real gdp of 5 03 billion constant 1985 kwacha without aids to 4 81 4 77 3 80 3 46 billion kwacha in the medium extreme scenario

core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market abstract flexible firms compete by means of wages in the assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the marriage market workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the marriage market respectively assignment market are not robust to the entrance of flexible respectively rigid firms to this market a new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid respectively flexible firms from this market meaningful comparative static results are derived

some further properties of the cumulative offer process we investigate extension resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process cop extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched resource monotonicity on the other hand requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors the cop becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes us satisfying an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition irc this result implies that the cop is population monotonic under us and the irc we then turn to the respecting improvements property which states that no doctor should be harmed if some of his contracts become more popular with an additional law of aggregate demand condition we show that the cop respects improvements

public information ipo price formation and long run returns japanese evidence the price formation process of jasdaq ipos is more transparent than in the united states the transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the ipo literature why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information and why adjustments are related to initial returns the evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter s commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and or disclosing information offer prices reflect pre ipo market values of public companies and implicit agreements between underwriters and issuers that originate well before the offering underadjustment of offer prices is substantially reversed in the aftermarket copyright c 2009 the american finance association

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

aids and economic growth a human capital approach abstract using a model that combines growth and health capital equations this study analyses the impact of hiv aids on economic growth the econometric results indicate that the epidemic s effects have been substantial in africa the marginal impact on income per capita of a 1 increase in hiv prevalence rate is minus 0 59 even in countries with lower hiv prevalence rates the marginal impacts are non trivial hence while the human and social costs of the hiv aids epidemic are major causes for concern these results indicate that the macroeconomic affects of the hiv aids epidemic are important

a competitive partnership formation process a group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs all single agents as well as all partnerships generate values if two agents choose to cooperate they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another in equilibrium which may or may not exist no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships this paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps when an equilibrium exists partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process moreover several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived

common and conflicting interests in two sided matching markets abstract this paper reviews and synthesizes some of what is now known about what i will call two sided matching markets a number of such models which arise naturally in the study of certain labor markets have been shown to have surprising implications about the common and conflicting interests of the agents and about the incentives they face

political connections and the process of going public evidence from china abstract we examine how political connections impact the process of going public specifically we test how political connections impact the pricing of the newly offered shares the magnitude of underpricing and the fixed cost of going public based on the experience of the newly public firms from chinese security markets and using multiple measures of political connections we find robust evidence that the issuing firms with political connections reap significant preferential benefits in the process of going public to be specific we find that firms irrespective of their ownership status with greater political connections have relatively higher offering price lower underpricing and lower fixed costs during the going public process

the strategy structure of two sided matching markets we study two sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women the agents are to form partnerships which provide them with satisfaction and at the same time make monetary transfers e g salaries or dowries the core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability the idea of using walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively the scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions the competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly in general this procedure may run into two difficulties first nonuniqueness if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented and second manipulability if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data however as we will show here using the walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets these are the matching markets of our title and they include markets for single items like houses where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item they also include labor markets in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries it turns out that in these markets both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a

multi item auctions a collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders and each bidder is to receive at most one item assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal in a suitable sense for the bidders in this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy

top trading with fixed tie breaking in markets with indivisible goods abstract we study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects when preferences are strict gale s top trading cycles algorithm finds the unique core allocation when preferences are not necessarily strict we use an exogenous profile of tie breakers to resolve any ties in individuals preferences and apply gale s top trading cycles algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences we provide a foundation of these simple extensions of gale s top trading cycles algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences we show that gale s top trading cycles algorithm with fixed tie breaking is characterized by individual rationality strategy proofness weak efficiency non bossiness and consistency our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a good and simple rule for the resulting strict preferences

the underpricing of private targets abstract we examine acquisitions of private firms with valuation histories and find a positive relation between acquirer announcement returns and target valuation revisions similar to other studies acquirer announcement returns are positive on average however positive acquirer announcement returns are mainly driven by targets that are acquired for more than their prior valuation this relation is consistent with pricing effects associated with target valuation uncertainty and behavioral biases in negotiation outcomes

entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games abstract this paper presents several comparative statics results concerning the entry problem in assignment games the results compare sets of equilibria and hence do not require the usual assumption of a unique equilibrium by the device of a competing group generator the set of players is decomposed into three interest groups for which three forms of entry effects are identified for the group with the strongest entry effect it is found that generically 1 the benefit functions form a complete ordering and 2 the turnover effect dominates the unemployment effect the implications of these results to bargaining immigrations and matching problems are discussed

hiv testing subjective beliefs and economic behavior this paper examines the effects of learning hiv status on economic behavior among rural malawians according to economic life cycle models if learning hiv results is informative about additional years of life being diagnosed hiv positive or negative should predict changes in consumption investment and savings behavior with important micro and macro economic implications using an experiment that randomly assigned incentives to learn hiv results i find that while learning hiv results had short term effects on subjective belief of hiv infection these differences did not persist after two years consistent with this there were relatively few differences two years later in savings income expenditures and employment between those who learned and did not learn their status

bidding for army career specialties improving the rotc branching mechanism motivated by the low retention rates of us military academy and reserve officer training corps graduates the army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could bid 3 years of additional service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired branches the full potential of this incentives program is not utilized because of the rotc s deficient matching mechanism i propose a design that eliminates these shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the army has identified in contrast to the rotc mechanism my design utilizes market principles more extensively and it is a hybrid between a market mechanism and a priority based allocation mechanism