a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

taxes and the theory of trade debt in this paper we show that taxes motivate the flow of trade credit without involving the assumption of credit market imperfections the direction of trade credit flow depends on the distribution of marginal tax rates among buyers and sellers in equilibrium the trade credit decision follows a tax induced clientele on both the supply and demand side a glance at the balance sheet of a typical corporation reveals the sizeable investment firms make in accounts receivable 1 in spite of its quantitative importance the analysis of trade credit policy figures far less prominently than other corporate policies in the finance literature although there exists a body of literature on the subject its focus is on the monetary policy implications of trade credit flow and therefore holds only indirect relevance to micro aspects such as the trade credit decision as part of corporate policy in this paper we examine the trade credit decision as a short term financing decision the decision to either grant or issue trade debt is analyzed in the familiar framework of miller 12 this approach establishes the link between existing paradigms on the financing of firms and the formulation of trade credit policies the existing literature provides three possible motives for trade credit they are respectively the transaction motive the price motive and the financial motive the first two motives have been discussed extensively elsewhere see for example smith 18 for a summary it is at the third motive the financial motive that the present paper is directed 2 past studies on the financial motive such as brechling and lipsey 3 jaffee and modigliani 7 laffer 10 schwartz 15 and schwartz and whitcomb 16

diffusion and the international context of democratization democracy does not evolve sui generis the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions suggests that international factors play a prominent role in forg ing democracies as well as influencing their durability we argue that democracy often comes about as a result of changes in the relative power of important actors and groups as well as their evaluations of particular institutions both of which are often influenced by forces outside the country in question the scope and extent of con nections with other democratic countries in a region can strengthen support for dem ocratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies results from a transition model demonstrate that international factors can exert a strong influence on the prospects for transitions to democracy and the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions cannot adequately be explained by the hypothesized domestic social requisites of individual countries

tax policy in an era of internationalization explaining the spread of neoliberalism i offer an explanation for the widespread diffusion of neoliberal tax policies in the developed democracies after accounting for the policy influences of commonly experienced domestic and international forces i consider several plausible paths of diffusion of neoliberal tax structure my central argument is that the highly visible 1980s market conforming tax reform in the united states should be especially important in shaping subsequent tax policies in other polities there are substantial reasons to believe however that domestic political and institutional forces will shape policymaker assessment of the benefits and costs of neoliberal reforms the strength of right parties and the degree to which the median voter has moved right should condition adoption of neoliberal tax policy the institutions of national and sector coordinated capitalism should also slow the enactment of neoliberal tax reforms i assess these arguments with empirical models of 1981 98 tax rates on capital in sixteen nations i find that changes in u s tax policy influence subsequent reforms in other polities in the long term all nations move toward the u s neoliberal tax structure analysis also shows however that the short term responsiveness to u s tax reforms is notably greater where uncoordinated market institutions are dominant theory and extensive qualitative and quantitative evidence indicate that pressures to compete for mobile assets as balanced against the economic and political costs of adoption anchor the process of diffusion of neoliberal tax policy there is little evidence for the view that systematic policy learning or social emulation drove tax policy diffusion earlier versions of this article were presented at the center for european studies and weatherhead center for international affairs harvard university center for international studies ucla and yale university as well as the 2002 annual meetings of the american political science association an earlier version was published as minda de gunzburg center for european studies harvard university working paper 120 i thank alex hicks rob franzese torben iversen andy martin cathie jo martin participants in the yale ucla and harvard conferences especially geoffrey garrett helen milner dennis quinn and beth simmons and two anonymous referees and the editors of international organization for helpful comments i also gratefully acknowledge the contribution of sven steinmo that comes by way of our past collaborative work on tax policy

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

large block transactions the speed of response and temporary and permanent stock price effects abstract the paper investigates how quickly prices attain new equilibrium levels after large block transactions and measures the associated temporary and permanent price effects we find that prices adjust within at most three trades with most of the adjustment occurring in the first trade the temporary price effect for seller initiated transactions is related to block size but the temporary price effect observed for buyer initiated transactions is no larger than that observed in 100 share trades most of the price effect associated with block trades is permanent and is related to block size regardless of the initiating party

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

formulation of the russell yasuda kasai financial planning model this paper describes the formulation of the russell yasuda kasai financial planning model including the motivation for the model the presentation complements the discussion of the technical details of the financial modeling process and the managerial impact of its use to help allocate the firm s assets over time discussed in carin o et al 1994 1998 respectively the multistage stochastic linear program incorporates yasuda kasai s asset and liability mix over a five year horizon followed by an infinite horizon steady state end effects period the objective is to maximize expected long run profits less expected penalty costs from constraint violations over the infinite horizon scenarios are used to represent the uncertain parameter distributions the constraints represent the institutional cash flow legal tax and other limitations on the asset and liability mix over time

optimal deleveraging with nonlinear temporary price impact abstract in this paper we first propose a portfolio management model where the objective is to balance equity and liability the asset price dynamics includes both permanent and temporary price impact where the permanent impact is a linear function of the cumulative trading amount and the temporary impact is a k th between 0 and 1 order power function of the instantaneous trading rate we construct efficient frontiers to visualize the tradeoff between equity and liability and obtain analytical properties regarding the optimal trading strategies in the second part we further consider an optimal deleveraging problem with leverage constraints it reduces to a non convex polynomial optimization program with polynomial and box constraints a lagrangian method for solving the problem is presented and the quality of the solution is studied

a bank asset and liability management model in managing its assets and liabilities in light of uncertainties in cash flows cost of funds and return on investments a bank must determine its optimal trade off between risk return and liquidity in this paper we develop a multiperiod stochastic linear programming model alm that includes the essential institutional legal financial and bank related policy considerations and their uncertainties yet is computationally tractable for realistically sized problems a version of the model was developed for the vancouver city savings credit union for a 5 year planning period the results indicate that alm is theoretically and operationally superior to a corresponding deterministic linear programming model and that the effort required for the implementation of alm and its computational requirements are comparable to those of the deterministic model moreover the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the solutions are sensitive to the model s stochastic elements such as the asymmetry of cash flow distributions we also compare alm with the stochastic decision tree sdt model developed by s p bradley and d b crane alm is computationally more tractable on realistically sized problems than sdt and simulation results indicate that alm generates superior policies

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

institutional investors and stock market volatility statement of responsibility on t p reads xavier gabaix parameswaran gopikrishnan vasiliki plerou h eugene stanley

the role of geography in financial and economic integration a comparative analysis of foreign direct investment trade and portfolio investment flows the objective of this paper is to examine the role of geography in explaining the patterns of financial and economic integration among both developed and developing countries using a gravity model we compare north north north south and south north fdi trade and portfolio investment flows to examine how geographical factors influence these bilateral flows the results indicate that the impact of geography variables on fdi and portfolio are similar to their effect on trade geography variables have a statistically significant effect both on fdi and portfolio investment but fdi is more sensitive to distance we interpret the negative effect of distance as the existence of information costs in financial flows also bilateral fdi trade and portfolio investment flows react to macroeconomic fundamentals in the same way however with different degrees of sensitivity there are significant differences between north north and north south flows our results find support for the argument that most fdi among industrial countries are horizontal whereas most fdi investment in developing countries is vertical the fact that the significance of geographical variables on financial flows still remained even after controlling for the macroeconomic fundamentals is in contrast with the standard capital market model the results can however be reconciled if geographical factors can proxy for information costs which may in turn explain why country portfolios are still home biased the significant effect of distance on financial flows may also explain how idiosyn cratic shocks are spread i e contagion to other countries in the same region ultimately the geographical location of a country may determine its economic and financial integration into the world economy

optimal portfolio liquidation with distress risk we analyze the problem of an investor who needs to unwind a portfolio in the face of recurring and uncertain liquidity needs with a model that accounts for both permanent and temporary price impact of trading we first show that a risk neutral investor who myopically deleverages his position to meet an immediate need for cash always prefers to sell more liquid assets if the investor faces the possibility of a downstream shock however the solution differs in several important ways if the ensuing shock is sufficiently large the nonmyopic investor unwinds positions more than immediately necessary and all else being equal prefers to retain more of the assets with low temporary price impact in order to hedge against possible distress more generally optimal liquidation involves selling strictly more of the assets with a lower ratio of permanent to temporary impact even if these assets are relatively illiquid the results suggest that properly accounting for the possibility of future shocks should play a role in managing large portfolios

the globalization of liberalization policy diffusion in the international political economy one of the most important developments over the past three decades has been the spread of liberal economic ideas and policies throughout the world these policies have affected the lives of millions of people yet our most sophisticated political economy models do not adequately capture influences on these policy choices evidence suggests that the adoption of liberal economic practices is highly clustered both temporally and spatially we hypothesize that this clustering might be due to processes of policy diffusion we think of diffusion as resulting from one of two broad sets of forces one in which mounting adoptions of a policy alter the benefits of adopting for others and another in which adoptions provide policy relevant information about the benefits of adopting we develop arguments within these broad classes of mechanisms construct appropriate measures of the relevant concepts and test their effects on liberalization and restriction of the current account the capital account and the exchange rate regime our findings suggest that domestic models of foreign economic policy making are insufficient the evidence shows that policy transitions are influenced by international economic competition as well as the policies of a country s sociocultural peers we interpret the latter influence as a form of channeled learning reflecting governments search for appropriate models for economic policy

globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democracies this article contributes to the growing literature on the role that domestic political institutions play in mediating globalization pressures by arguing that the capital tax constraints arising from international economic integration are the most severe for countries with majoritarian political institutions in doing so the author solves a tax puzzle that challenges conventional thinking about how institutions condition the relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics he presents a formal game theoretic model to sharpen the basic logic of his argument and then tests some of the model s predictions empirically using both quantitative and qualitative evidence

civil wars and economic growth spatial dispersion this article quantifies the impact of civil wars on economic growth at home and in nearby countries three alternative measures of nearness contiguity length of contiguous borders and distance of closest approach are used to capture the spatial dispersion of civil war consequences we present short run panel estimates at five year intervals and long run 1961 95 panel estimates for the world generally the distance measures novel to this study and not contiguity provides the most accurate measure of the diffusion of the negative economic consequences of civil wars on other countries unlike earlier studies we also investigate the temporal influence of civil wars on growth at home and in nearby countries both the duration and the timing of civil wars have an economic impact

policy learning in embedded negotiations explaining eu electricity liberalization taking the example of the liberalization of the electricity supply industy i analyze member state negotiations in the european union eu confronting central tenets of the intergovernmental approach i suggest that member state executives act within the limits of bounded rationality and do not always hold clear and fixed preferences i focus on the large member states germany france and the united kingdom and identify four institutional mechanisms that support outcomes above the least common denominator 1 the role of norms that constrain strategic action and frame the negotiations 2 the empowerment of supranational actors 3 the decision routines of the council of the european union that provide standardized mechanisms for resolving conflicts and induce policy learning and preference changes and 4 the vertical differentiation within the council system that can unblock issue specific controversies even if as a result of these techniques eu legal acts contain several flexibilization elements they can trigger behavioral changes that clearly surpass their regulatory content

interdependence in comparative politics substance theory empirics substance interdependence is ubiquitous and often central across comparative politics indeed as the authors show first theoretically any situation involving externalities from one unit s actions on others implies interdependence positive or negative externalities induce negative or positive interdependence which spurs competitive races or free riding with corresponding early or late mover advantages and thus strategic rush to act or delay and inaction the authors show next how to model interdependent processes empirically how not doing so risks omitted variable biases favoring domestic and exogenous external accounts over interdependence but how doing so naively risks simultaneity biases with the opposite substantive implications they then discuss how to estimate properly specified interdependence models and finally how to interpret and present estimated spatio temporally dynamic effects response paths and long run steady states with associated standard errors they illustrate by replicating a not