learning and wage dynamics we develop a dynamic model of learning about worker ability in a competitive labor market the model produces three testable implications regarding wage dynamics 1 although the role of schooling in the labor market s inference process declines as performance observations accumulate the estimated effect of schooling on the level of wages is independent of labor market experience 2 timeinvariant variables correlated with ability but unobserved by employers such as certain test scores are increasingly correlated with wages as experience increases and 3 wage residuals are a martingale we present evidence from the nlsy that is broadly consistent with the model s predictions

the speed of employer learning the employer learning literature finds support for statistical discrimination on the basis of schooling how economically relevant statistical discrimination is depends on how fast employers learn about workers productive types this article is the first to estimate the speed of employer learning employers learn quickly initial expectation errors decline by 50 within 3 years this estimate places an upper bound on the contribution of signaling this bound varies with the speed of employer learning and with discount rate for a wide range of parameter values the contribution of signaling to the gains from schooling is less than 25

belief flipping in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination abstract the literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria this paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination if an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm the worker s welfare implications i e who benefits from an employer s discriminatory hiring practices are unclear even though agents face discrimination initially some may be better off because of it

cross listing and pricing efficiency the informational and anchoring role played by the reference price abstract when a firm cross lists its shares in segmented markets the price of the first issued share as a reference plays both an informational and anchoring role in pricing the second issued share we develop a model illustrating the dual role empirically we examine a group of chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then domestic a shares for which the anchoring effect adds to the a share underpricing consistent with the model predictions we find that the a share underpricing is positively related to the difference in costs of capital in the two segmented markets and that this positive association is weaker when participants are less likely to resort to the anchoring heuristic and when the a share valuation involves less uncertainty

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

are those paid more really more productive the case of experience this study uses computerized personnel microdata on the white male managerial and professional employees at a major u s corporation to address the following question can the additional earnings which are associated with more labor market experience at a point in time really be explained by higher productivity at the same point in time our answer to this question based on both cross sectional and longitudinal information is that performance plays a substantially smaller role in explaining cross sectional experience earnings differentials and earnings growth than is claimed by those who have adopted the human capital explanation of the experience earnings profile this response depends critically on our assumption that the performance ratings which supervisors give to their white male managerial and professional subordinates adequately reflect the subordinates relative productivity in the year of assessment we present a great deal of evidence which strongly supports this assumption

bonuses and promotion tournaments theory and evidence standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses we combine classic and market based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles we use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the finnish economy our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature

mentoring and diversity we study how diversity evolves at a firm with entry level and upper level employees who vary in ability and type gender or ethnicity the ability of entry level employees is increased by mentoring an employ receives more mentoring when more upper level employees have the same type optimal promotions are biased by type and this bias may favor either the minority or the majority we characterize possible steady states including a glass ceiling where the upper level remains less diverse than the entry level a firm may have multiple steady states whereby temporary affirmative action policies have a long run impact

how smooth is price discovery evidence from cross listed stock trading abstract the adjustment to parity can be nonlinear for a cross listed pair convergence may be quicker when the price deviation is sufficiently profitable we propose a threshold error correction model ecm to gauge the market respective information shares of canadian listings traded on the toronto stock exchange tsx and the new york stock exchange nyse since dynamics may alternatively be gradual we further generalize the threshold framework to a smooth transition ecm the empirical implications are as follows first the tsx and the nyse appear to have integrated over time second parity convergence accelerates upon discounts on the cross listings on the nyse third we find a larger feedback from the nyse if the price gap exceeds the threshold required arbitrage return fourth informed traders tend to cluster on the nyse upon discounts on the cross listings fifth information share and threshold are affected by the relative degree of private information market friction and liquidity measures firm level characteristics and aggregate risks

educational mismatch and promotions to managerial positions a test of the career mobility theory abstractcareer mobility theory suggests that given a certain occupation schooling improves upward mobility in terms of promotion and wage growth we are the first to test the implications of this theory for over and undereducation by means of direct information about promotions to managerial positions using german administrative data entailing an employer reported and hence objective measure of educational requirements we show that overeducated workers are indeed more likely to be promoted and that this career mobility advantage is more pronounced in the early stages of their working lives by contrast undereducated workers are less likely to be promoted to managerial positions moreover in terms of wage growth while overeducated workers benefit more undereducated workers benefit less from promotions than their well matched educational peers altogether these findings strongly support the career mobility theory furthermore by differentiating between internal and external promotions we prov

exchange rate fluctuations firm size and export behavior an empirical investigation in this paper we examine how changes in the exchange rate and its volatility affect the export behavior of manufacturing firms we also investigate whether both exchange rate changes and exchange rate volatility affect firms of different sizes differently applying the two step system generalized method of moment estimator on our data for a sample of 221 pakistani manufacturing firms we find that the real exchange rate depreciation has positive impacts whereas the exchange rate volatility has negative impacts on firms exports we also find that compared to large sized firms small and medium sized exporting firms are more likely to benefit from currency depreciations yet regarding the effect of exchange rate volatility we find that the adverse impact of exchange rate volatility is weaker for large sized firms as compared to small and medium sized firms our findings confirm the presence of nonlinearity in export deterring favoring effects of exchange rate volatility depreciation on exporting behavior depending on firm size pakistan should design and implement export favoring preferential policies by emphasizing on real exchange rate stabilization and providing incentives to large firms to come into being small and medium sized enterprises should develop such export strategies that help reduce their size disadvantages particularly in managing exchange rate risks

the effects of exchange rate volatility on exports some new estimates investigations of the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports have not allowed for the integrated non stationary of the variables employed in estimation the results reported in this note are suggestive that in the context of an error correction framework real exchange rate volatility has a significant impact on exports

early starters versus late beginners we consider a model of wage formation characterized by two features learning and downward rigidity we show that wages should exhibit a late beginning property when one controls for the wage at date t the wage at date t 1 should be negatively correlated with the wage at date 6 1 we test this property on a sample of about 1 000 executives of a french state owned firm whose careers we observe for 15 years this organization exhibits the features that charecterize internal labor markets in particular careers consist of sequences of discrete promotions a fact that generates specific econometric problems the results confirm the prediction

on the relationship between firm size and export intensity export marketing literature supports the view that firm size is positively related to export intensity although the empirical findings have been mixed a number of theoretical arguments are used to support this proposition i e international marketing economies of scale limited managerial and financial resources of small firms decisionmaker s risk perception based on a large survey of the italian manufacturing industry the article falsifies the proposition and challenges some widely held assumptions in export marketing literature

the gender gap in early career wage growth in the uk the gender pay gap on entry to the labour market is approximately zero but ten years after labour market entry there is a gender wage gap of almost 25 log points this article explores the reason for this gender gap in early career wage growth considering three main hypotheses human capital job shopping and psychological theories human capital factors can explain about 11 log points job shopping about 1 5 log points and the psychological theories up to 4 5 log points depending on the specification but a substantial unexplained gap remains women who have continuous full time employment have had no children and express no desire to have them earn about 8 log points less than equivalent men after 10 years in the labour market

promotion turnover and discretionary human capital acquisition this article explores human capital acquisition decisions when job placement helps determine competition for a worker with asymmetric information workers may invest in firm specific capital without long term contracts specific investment increases promotion chances and hence wage competition shifting competition back to a time when firms are symmetrically uninformed if general human capital is the efficient output maximizing investment then an equivalent firm specific investment maximizes expected career wages this is a general result for sellers in second price auctions sellers of labor invest to maximize the expected second highest bidder valuation wage not the winner s expected valuation

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

risk sharing market imperfections asset prices evidence from china s stock market liberalization abstract we examine the roles of risk sharing and other factors in stock price revaluation during a recent liberalization episode in china consistent with the theoretical prediction that liberalizations reduce systematic risk we find that risk sharing explains approximately one fourth of the price revaluation of investible stocks during the eight month window between reform announcement and implementation the firm specific information generated by the reform is more efficiently priced into stocks that have a higher degree of market liquidity information transparency and informed trading

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

promotions and wage growth this article presents evidence that internal mobility defined as a promotion or other position change is an important source of wage growth it accounts for approximately 15 of wage growth over the life cycle for white and black men but less for women the incidence of promotions and other position changes appears tied to the wage level better paid workers are more likely to be promoted the life cycle incidence of internal mobility looks similar to that for conventionally defined job mobility most moves are made early in the career mobility declines both with time in position and with experience

the determinants of cross border equity flows abstract we explore a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross border equity flows between 14 countries 1989 1996 we show that a gravity model explains international transactions in financial assets at least as well as goods trade transactions gross transaction flows depend on market size in source and destination country as well as trading costs in which both information and the transaction technology play a role distance proxies some information costs and other variables explicitly represent information transmission an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors and the efficiency of transactions the geography of information is the main determinant of the pattern of international transactions while there is weak support in our data for the diversification motive once we control for the informational friction we broaden the scope of our results by presenting some evidence linking the results on equity transactions to equity holdings

a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms we show that a framework that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms including the following first real wage decreases are not rare but demotions are second wage increases are serially correlated third promotions are associated with large wage increases fourth wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder fifth workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next

testing for asymmetric employer learning recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker s productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market the following question arises is learning symmetric that is do all employers have the same information about workers productivity or is learning asymmetric that is does the current employer have superior information about workers productivity this article develops a learning model with endogenous mobility that nests both learning hypotheses it then proposes new tests for asymmetric employer learning overall learning appears to be mostly symmetric except possibly when the employees involved are college graduates

glass ceilings or sticky floors statistical discrimination in a dynamic model of hiring and promotion i show that when two groups differ in i their average skill level ii the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market and or hi the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker s skill over time equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs in 1995 95 of senior level managers in the top fortune 1000 industrial and 500 service companies in the us were male 97 of whom were also white federal glass ceiling commission 1995 in the uk females make up just 8 3 of the senior judi ciary 9 7 of top business leaders and 9 1 of newspaper editors eoc 2005 at the end of the 2004 american football season only 5 of the 32 nfl head coaches were black and only 2 of the 117 division i college football teams had black head coaches rosenburg 2004 in 1999 there were only 68 female full professors at the 120 phd granting economics departments in the us cswep 1999 this severe underrepre sentation of females and minorities at the highest levels of occupational achievement throughout a wide range of occupations has often been referred to as the glass ceiling 1

firm size and export behaviour an indian case study in the context of indian industry this article argues that in the presence of capital market imperfections and sub optimal contractual arrangements small firms face higher transaction or selling costs in the domestic market one of the strategic responses by small firms towards overcoming the mobility barriers imposed by high transaction costs in the domestic market is to break into the competitive world market small firms that could realise a critical level of production efficiency and possible information externalities that arise through inter firm linkages might be the ones that could succeed in exports the empirical observations derived from the analysis of firm level survey data provide reasonable support to the main arguments

adopting knowledge from reverse innovations transnational patents and signaling from an emerging economy is there knowledge adoption of innovations from emerging economies we theorize that to help overcome information asymmetry across countries granting patents to technology in the emerging economy of china can serve as a signal of technology potential and market opportunity to enhance technological knowledge adoption in a developed economy such as the united states the effect may be greater in a complex technology sector with high information asymmetry than in a discrete technology sector and in regions with less developed market intermediaries where information asymmetry is high our difference in differences estimates using 4226 china u s patent dyads and comparable u s patents support our hypotheses

sectoral effects of exchange rate volatility on united states exports abstract we analyze the effects of real exchange rate volatility on the proportions of bilateral exports of nine categories of goods from the united states to seven major industrial countries using a fixed effect framework in six of the nine categories the volatility of the real exchange rate significantly affects the value of exports and in five of these categories the effect is positive these results are consistent with a model in which risk neutral firms increase supply of elastically demanded exports in response to an increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

on the changing structure among chinese equity markets hong kong shanghai and shenzhen this study investigates information discovery among five chinese equity markets measured daily over the period 1995 2014 we employ time series methods for finding structural breaks if any and uncovering both short run and long run fluctuations we apply a new algorithm of inductive causation for use with non gaussian data to study the information flows in contemporaneous time the empirical results show that there are four break dates and that the underlying causal models changed over our study period the shanghai a share market dominates the other markets in the most recent period

a sticky floors model of promotion pay and gender abstract according to raw data from the british household panel survey full time women are more likely than men to be promoted controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity we find that women are promoted at roughly the same rate as men but may receive smaller wage increases consequent upon promotion to help explain these phenomena we construct a new sticky floors model of pay and promotion in our model women are just as likely as men to be promoted but find themselves stuck at the bottom of the wage scale for the new grade

human capital investment under asymmetric information the pigovian conjecture revisited this article investigates how human capital investment labor turnover and wages are jointly determined when the current employer knows more about a worker s productivity than potential employers results derived are quite different from or unexplored by the standard human capital theory we show that the information asymmetry can cause an externality distortion in human capital investment because higher productivity due to the investment may not be recognized by the market the investment level increases in the degree of firm specificity of human capital the underinvestment problem is more severe when human capital is general than when it is firm specific

an opposing responses test of classic versus market based promotion tournaments we use a systems based econometric method to show that classic and market based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models implementing the method using a large finnish worker firm matched panel we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance the firm s wage structure is convex promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors performance is increasing in the wage spread and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

the insurance effect of groups many people belong to groups which partially identify their characteristics this paper argues that when agents are risk averse and where only group characteristics are visible rather than individual characteristics the pareto optimal construction of groups differs in systematic ways from standard notions of how groups should be formed two applications are considered the assignment of workers to jobs where it is shown the optimal contract does not involve maximizing output and accident insurance where the optimal contract does not involve complete insurance many people belong to groups which serve to partially identify otherwise hidden talents or characteristics for example it is possible to find out that certain authors have written an article but their individual contributions are much more difficult to ascertain similarly it may be easy to determine that a worker is a foreman but much more difficult to tell how much better he is than other foremen or that somebody is employed which tells us something about his talents but not whether he is more talented than the average employed person each of these examples illustrates cases where we can see the group to which an agent belongs author foreman employed rather than an individual s characteristics standard notions of efficiency tell us how these groups should be formed academics should write papers together only if their joint product is greater than if they operated separately a worker should be employer as a foreman only if his productivity is higher as a foreman than elsewhere in the organization and so on the principal result of this paper is that when agents are risk averse and where only groups of the type above are visible to some agents rather than individual characteristics these assignment rules may not be pareto optimal instead for example someone who is less competent as a foreman than as an operative may still be employed as a foreman and this yields higher welfare than employing that worker as an operative let me explain the intuition by a simple example assume that workers who join a firm are uncertain of their ability they are risk averse and seek insurance over that uncertainty untalented workers should be fired on standard efficiency grounds as they have higher productivity elsewhere assume that after a period of production information on ability becomes available to the employer and the employee but that other employers must infer this information from whether the

internal promotion and external recruitment a theoretical and empirical analysis we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment using a job assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two level job hierarchies with one managerial position the model predicts that controlling for the number of managers increasing the number of lower level workers is associated with 1 greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment 2 higher profit and 3 more general training empirical analysis of a large cross section of british employers is consistent with these predictions

job discrimination market forces and the invisibility hypothesis the invisibility hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem then at a competitive labor market equilibrium firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs consequently those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability as a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers

promotion signaling discrimination and positive discrimination policies this article studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability the model can account for statistical and taste based discrimination in the short run a positive discrimination policy is beneficial for workers in the middle of the ability distribution because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place instead workers of either high or low ability suffer from the policy in the long run the policy benefits all targeted workers the model can explain empirical findings about the effects of a gender quota on the boards of norwegian companies

subscribing to transparency abstract the paper empirically explores how more trade transparency affects market liquidity the analysis takes advantage of a unique setting in which the shanghai stock exchange offered more trade transparency to market participants subscribing to a new software package first the results show that the additional data disclosure increased trading activity but also increased transactions costs through wider bid ask spreads thus in contrast to popular policy belief the paper finds that more transparency need not improve market liquidity second the paper finds a particularly strong immediate liquidity impact accompanied by altered trading behavior which suggests a significant impact on institutional traders subscribing relatively early lastly since the effective level of market transparency is bound to depend on how many traders are subscribing to the data the study can empirically establish the functional form between market wide transparency and liquidity the relationship is non monotonic which can explain the lack of consensus in the existing literature where each empirical study is naturally confined to specific parts of the transparency domain

promotion turnover earnings and firm sponsored training i develop a model in which different technological conditions lead to distinct equilibria with different patterns in labor mobility promotion earning distribution and provision of firm sponsored training key is the asymmetric learning of workers characteristics because of the information that is conveyed to the market by promotion firms have incentives to adopt strategic promotion policies which result in different patterns in the use of internal labor market the theory explains well the differences between the japanese and the united states labor markets

promotion signaling gender and turnover new theory and evidence we extend promotion signaling theory to incorporate gender and across firm mobility within and across job levels evidence from worker firm linked finnish panel data supports our theory for some groups controlling for worker performance inferred from performance related pay within firm promotion probabilities are increasing and wage increases from promotion are decreasing in educational attainment for some educational groups with results stronger for first than for subsequent promotions women have lower promotion probabilities than men and a greater sensitivity of promotion probability to educational attainment across firm promotions are rare but bring wage increases exceeding those for internal promotions and across firm lateral moves

asymmetric employer information promotions and the wage policy of firms abstract this paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information building on the seminal work by waldman 1984a and milgrom and oster 1987 we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions using experimental labor markets we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion furthermore we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover

location matters an examination of trading profits the electronic trading system xetra of the german security exchange provides a unique data source on the equity trades of 756 professional traders located in 23 different cities and eight european countries we explore informational asymmetries across the trader population traders located outside germany in non german speaking cities show lower proprietary trading profit their underperformance is not only statistically significant it is also of economically significant magnitude and occurs for the 11 largest german blue chip stocks we also examine whether a trader location in frankfurt as the financial center or local proximity of the trader to the corporate headquarters of the traded stock or affiliation with a large financial institution results in superior trading performance the data provide no evidence for a financial center advantage or of increasing institutional scale economies in proprietary trading however we find evidence for an information advantage due to corporate headquarters proximity for high frequency intraday trading

exchange rate volatility and exports a firm level analysis the relationship between real exports and exchange rate volatility is investigated using panel data analysis at the firm level results indicate that there is no negative or positive relationship between volatility and real exports in addition firm size and level of international activity do not influence the size and significance of the volatility effect on exports however there is some evidence that firms use import revenue to lower their exchange rate exposure

firm size and export intensity solving an empirical puzzle this paper presents a transaction costs analysis of the firm size and export intensity relationship we submit that relation specific investments and the costs of safeguarding these investments play a significant role in export relationships firm size related differences with respect to these factors are used to explain the different relationships between firm size and export intensity that have been found in previous studies the theoretical framework is tested empirically and support is found for different industries

sex discrimination in the promotion process previous research has suggested that intra occupational earnings differences are the principal source of the long standing earnings gap between men and women following that line of research this study examines the extent of gender differences in the incidence of and returns to promotions drawing on the quality of employment panel the authors compare the earnings and promotion experience of men and women over the period 1973 1977 after controlling for unmeasured differences in job level and constant individual ability in a fixed effect model they conclude that the returns to promotion are comparable for men and women further analysis indicates however that women are held to higher promotion standards than men and therefore receive fewer promotions than men with equal measured abilities although the female male wage ratio in this sample increased by nearly 6 percent over four years the increase could have been as much as 9 2 percent if women and men had been held to the same promotion standards

male female wage differentials in job ladders much of the male female wage differential exists because men and women are assigned to different jobs within narrow job categories there is no male female differential only a tortured taste theory of discrimination can reconcile these facts we argue that differential movement along job ladders entails comparative advantage so the ability standard for promotion is higher for women this implies that more able women will be passed over in favor of less able men women assumed to have the same ability distribution as men earn less the differential reflects females lower promotion probability not within job discrimination

job tenure and job mobility in britain using work history data from the british household panel survey the authors examine job mobility and job tenure over the period 1915 90 british men and women held an average of five jobs over the course of their work lives and half of all lifetime job changes occurred in the first ten years separation hazards were higher for more recent cohorts implying an increase in job instability as jobs accumulated average tenure lengthened but the proportion of involuntary separations increased for both men and women the rise in job instability was particularly marked in the lowest occupational classification in general job insecurity was greater for men than women

uncertainty and export performance evidence from 18 countries we study a sample of nine developed and nine developing countries to evaluate the questions of how foreign income uncertainty and real exchange rate rer uncertainty impact international trade and how those impacts vary according to stage of development rer uncertainty has a negative and significant impact on export growth for six of the nine less developed countries in our sample while it has an insignificant effect for a majority of the developed countries in both groups foreign income uncertainty has a more pervasively significant and frequently larger influence on trade than does rer uncertainty

exchange rate expectations and the pricing of chinese cross listed stocks abstract i show that the price discounts of chinese cross listed stocks american depositary receipts adrs and h shares to their underlying a shares indicate the expected yuan us dollar exchange rate the forecasting models reveal that adr and h share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates particularly at long forecast horizons using panel estimations i find that adr and h share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the harrod balassa samuelson effect the risk of competitive devaluations relative purchasing power parity uncovered interest rate parity and the risk of currency crisis

enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in this article we extend that model in two ways first we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence second and more important we show that introducing task specific human capital allows us to produce cohort effects we further argue that task specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications we also discuss limitations of our extended approach

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

information asymmetry and asset prices evidence from the china foreign share discount we examine the effect of information asymmetry on equity prices in the local a and foreign b share market in china we construct measures of information asymmetry based on market microstructure models and find that they explain a significant portion of cross sectional variation in b share discounts even after controlling for other factors on a univariate basis the price impact measure and the adverse selection component of the bid ask spread in the a and b share markets explains 44 and 46 of the variation in b share discounts on a multivariate basis both measures are far more statistically significant than any of the control variables the extent of information asymmetry in the international equity market has become a very important topic the question of whether domestic investors have better information than foreign investors has also become increasingly controversial for instance a few papers argue that domestic investors have a linguistic and cultural advantage brennan and cao 1997 choe kho and stulz 2001 and hau 2001 others argue that foreign investors have an informational advantage because they possess a significant amount of investment experience and expertise seasholes 2000 grinblatt and keloharju 2000

the response of firms leverage to risk evidence from uk public versus nonpublic manufacturing firms this article empirically investigates the effects of macroeconomic and firm specific risk on firms leverage the analysis is carried out for a large panel of public and nonpublic uk manufacturing firms over the period 1999 2008 our investigation provides evidence that uk manufacturing firms use less short term debt during periods of high risk however the leverage of nonpublic manufacturing firms is more sensitive to firm specific risk in comparison to their public counterparts while macroeconomic risk affects both types of firms similarly our investigation also shows that firms with high liquid assets reduce their leverage more less during periods of heightened firm specific macroeconomic risk jel c23 g32