shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money burning options in a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumer s payoff expectations i an opportunity for the expert to make a non binding promise and ii an opportunity for the consumer to burn money in belief based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expert s behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer by contrast the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of i but fail to confirm ii

the development of nominal wage rigidity in the late 19th century wage price and output indexes suitable for comparing cyclical movements across decades show a decrease in nominal wage flexibility the change in wage inflation associated with output fluctuations after the 1880s following an increase in strike frequency linked to the spread of large scale manufacturing cross sectional data show that firms in industries experiencing more strikes in the 1880s were less likely to cut nominal wages in the depression of 1893 this and other evidence suggests that the nineteenth century decrease in wage flexibility was caused by an increase in workers bargaining power in the absence of binding wage contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

causes consequences and cures of myopic loss aversion an experimental investigation we examine in an experiment the causes consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion mla for investment behaviour under risk we find that both investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of mla longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments however when given the choice subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention that increases investment levels

do banks lend less in uncertain times we study the development of bank lending in the usa after four large jumps in uncertainty using an event study approach we find that more liquid banks slow down and lend less after a surge in uncertainty lending by smaller banks is also less responsive to increases in uncertainty which points to an increased importance of bank customer relationships for capitalization we find mixed evidence these heterogeneities across banks suggest that declines in bank lending following increases in uncertainty result at least partly from a reduced supply of bank loans

real and nominal wage rigidities and the rate of inflation evidence from west german micro data the paper examines real and nominal wage rigidities we estimate a switching regime model in which the observed distribution of individual wage changes computed from west german register data for 1976 1997 is generated by simultaneous processes of real nominal or no wage rigidity and measurement error the fraction of workers facing wage increases that are due to nominal but mostly real wage rigidity is substantial the extent of real rigidity rises with inflation whereas the opposite holds for nominal rigidity overall the incidence of wage rigidity which accelerates unemployment growth is most likely minimized in an environment with moderate inflation

wage rigidity in canadian collective bargaining agreements the authors search information on the provisions of 10 947 wage contracts signed in the canadian unionized sector between 1976 and 1999 for evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity the disinclination of wages to fall in nominal dollars below their established level over the sample period real wage reductions were common but nominal wage reductions were rare the probability of downward nominal wage rigidity increased substantially during low inflation periods during such periods apparently there was no reduction in the incidence of real wage cuts but the magnitude of those cuts was modest suggesting a lesser ability of wages to adjust to labor market conditions than at other times

do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis two behavioral concepts loss aversion and mental accounting have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle recent experimental evidence supports the theory as students behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion mla yet much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision making these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals using traders recruited from the cbot we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with mla to a greater extent than students

new evidence on canadian wage rates 1900 1930 this paper shows there are serious errors in published canadian nominal wage data and presents hourly wage series developed from firm records for machinists helpers and laborers employed by the canadian pacific railway between 1900 and 1930 this new evidence suggests that real wage growth in canada was faster than previously believed and that there were substantial changes in wage inequality

personnel policies at the union bank of australia evidence from the 1888 1900 entry cohorts this article uses personnel payroll and other records from the union bank of australia to examine internal labor markets it is shown that employment was characterized by limited ports of entry impersonal rules for pay and promotion well defined career ladders shielding from the external labor market and a long term employment relationship in addition tenure within the bank was rewarded considerably more than experience elsewhere and compensation increased considerably after 25 30 years tenure these facts are partially consistent with the human capital matching and contract theory models but cannot be fully explained by any one model

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

when curiosity kills the profits an experimental examination economic theory predicts that in a first price auction with equal and observable valuations bidders earn zero profits theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation bidders will bid less and earn positive profits hence rational players in an auction game should prefer less public information we are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent bertrand setting in our experimental auction we find that individuals without information on each other s valuations earn more profits than those with common knowledge then given a choice between the two sets of rules half the individuals still preferred to have the public information we discuss possible explanations including ambiguity aversion

selection into auctions for risky and ambiguous prospects we study experimentally the selection into first price sealed bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders a control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes jel c91 d44 d81

selecting public goods institutions who likes to punish and reward we study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand and preferences over as well as behavior within various public goods institutions on the other hand we incentive compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions we find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment somewhat surprisingly preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics conversely individual characteristics including institutional preferences are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game for instance risk averse individuals preemptively punish more often this suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty although they may not affect the original selection into institutions

downward nominal wage rigidity evidence from canada 1901 1950 this paper tests for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity in canadian wage data for 26 occupations in 38 cities from the first half of the 20th century the sample is of particular interest as it contains periods with average inflation rates that are close to zero as well as two sharp deflations results from a variety of different tests indicate that wage change distributions are consistent with the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity however for two subsamples containing sharp declines in output and prices estimates of the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity are much lower this suggests that downwards adjustments did occur during times of severe depression and deflation

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

donations risk attitudes and time preferences a study on altruism in primary school children abstract we study in a sample of 1070 primary school children aged seven to eleven years how altruism in a donation experiment is related to children s risk attitudes and intertemporal choices examining such a relationship is motivated by theories of reciprocal altruism that provide a cornerstone for understanding human social behavior we find that higher risk tolerance and patience in intertemporal choice increase in general the level of donations albeit the effects are non linear we confirm earlier results that altruism increases with age during childhood and that girls are more altruistic than boys having older brothers makes subjects less altruistic

the spectre of deflation a review of empirical evidence what explains the widespread fear of deflation this article reviews the history of thought economic history and empirical evidence on deflation with a view to answering this question it also outlines informally the main effects of deflation in applied monetary models the main finding is that for both historical and contemporary deflations there are many open empirical questions that could be answered using the tools economists use to study inflation and monetary policy more generally qu est ce qui explique la peur tres repandue de la deflation ce memoire fait un tour d horizon de l histoire de la pensee economique de l histoire economique et des resultats empiriques quant aux effets de la deflation en vue de repondre a cette question on fait aussi echo informellement aux effets principaux de la deflation dans les modeles monetaires appliques ce qui ressort principalement de ce travail est que tant pour les deflations dans l histoire que dans le monde contemporain il y a bien des questions empiriques encore irresolues auxquelles on pourrait donner une reponse en utilisant l outillage mental que les economistes utilisent pour etudier l inflation et la politique monetaire plus generalement sp c tre n thing that is thought to be seen but has no material existence haunting presentiment of ruin war madness etc

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

what drives taxi drivers a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods credence goods are characterized by informational a symmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by seller s this paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in athens g reece set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers p resumed information and income on the extent of fraud results reveal that taxi drivers c heat passengers in systematic ways passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system l eads to manipulated bills higher income seems to lead to more fraud

wage adjustment under low inflation evidence from u s history data from recent years indicate that employers are especially unlikely to cut the nominal wage rate paid for a job adjustments to real or relative wages that require absolute cuts in money wages are very rare relative to the frequency one might expect to observe based on distributions of wage changes that do not require money wage cuts erica l groshen and mark e schweitzer 1995 1997 david e lebow et al 1999 a worker who remains with the same employer from one year to the next is accordingly unlikely to report an absolute reduction in the nominal wage he receives david card and dean hyslop 1997 shulamit kahn 1997 joseph g altonji and paul j devereux 1999 the existence and causes of downward nominal wage rigidity have implications for macroeconomic outcomes and for practical issues in monetary policy presumably efficient operation of labor markets requires many downward adjustments of relative wages and occasional decreases in the overall wage level relative to product prices if the average rate of wage inflation were close to zero some of these relative or real wage adjustments would be blocked by a floor under current levels of nominal wage rates george a akerlof et al 1996 assert that downward nominal wage rigidity reflects fundamental preferences of workers and argue that it implies a central bank should target a rate of price inflation greater than zero because a target of zero inflation will impose permanent real costs on the economy p 2 the notion that downward nominal wage rigidity is a fundamental constraint so that inflation serves to grease the wheels of the labor market is controversial even among those who accept the possibility of nominal rigidities in general it has been argued that downward nominal wage rigidity as distinct from such phenomena as menu costs which would discourage adjustment of a wage in either direction david romer 1993 may be an artifact of an inflationary monetary regime and would disappear in the absence of persistent inflation nominal wage reductions would no longer be seen as unusual if the average nominal wage was not growing workers would not see them as unfair and firms would not shy away from imposing them robert j gordon 1996 p 62 see also n gregory mankiw 1996 william poole 1998 william b english 2000 to see whether downward nominal wage rigidity would exist in a noninflationary regime it may be useful to examine data from times and places where there was no persistent wage inflation for the united states at least that excludes data from years since the second world war throughout the postwar period price inflation or real wage growth has been sufficient to keep average wage inflation above zero before the second world war on the other hand long run trend rates of price inflation were often close to zero or negative robert b barsky 1987 if wage inflation was correspondingly low u s historical data may offer tests of the proposition that downward nominal wage rigidity exists even in noninflationary

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

a comparison of posted offer and double auction pricing institutions this paper presents an experimental study of a computerized posted offer pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the u s posted offer market performance is evaluated relative to double auction market performance using two supply and demand designs subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable the market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted offer pricing relative to double auction however the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions when feasible the predictive power of competitive nash and limit price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

downward wage rigidity in italy micro based measures and implications using the 1985 99 whip data we find a sizable amount of downward wage rigidity in italy with a prevalence of real over nominal rigidity the results hold when real rigidity is identified either with reference to collective bargaining dispositions or to price inflation consistently with the labour market reforms of the early 1990s downward rigidities have become less important over time with the reduction in real rigidities more than offsetting the rise in nominal rigidities we also find that downward wage rigidities are positively related to labour reallocation and local unemployment rates hinting at the macroeconomic relevance of our estimates

experts vs discounters consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods this paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis the unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures this makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters we explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free riding on experts advice and we discuss policy options to solve the free riding consumers cheating experts problem

gaming against managers in incentive systems experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers we examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in china comparing behavior between i students and managers with field experience with this situation ii standard versus increased monetary incentives and iii sessions conducted in context making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers and those without any such references the dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually and incompletely converging on a pooling equilibrium a fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers with minimal impact on students

sealed bid auctions with ambiguity theory and experiments this study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown in our experimental setting in first price auctions bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity this result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes we also find that the first price auction generates significantly higher revenue than the second price auction with and without ambiguity

experimental games on networks underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection in this paper we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure specifically actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability this framework applies to a wide variety of settings we examine behavior and equilibrium selection the degree of equilibrium play is striking in particular with incomplete information behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique when there are multiple equilibria general features of networks such as connectivity clustering and the degree of the players help to predict informed behavior in the lab people appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs social efficiency but there are forces that moderate this attraction 1 people seem content with in the aggregate capturing only the lion s share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss and 2 uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding but efficient equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training