contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

correlation neglect voting behavior and information aggregation in this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation between their information sources correlation neglect we find that this cognitive bias can improve political outcomes we show that the extreme beliefs which result from correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on political preferences we characterise conditions on the distribution of preferences under which this induces higher vote shares for the optimal policies and better information aggregation

financial globalization financial crises and contagion abstract two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial crisis first more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the u s non financial sectors since the mid 1980s has been financed by foreign lending second the collapse of the u s housing and mortgage backed securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset markets using an open economy model where financial intermediaries play a central role we show that financial integration leads to a sharp rise in net credit in the most financially developed country and to large asset price spillovers of country specific shocks to bank capital the impacts of these shocks on asset prices are amplified by bank capital requirements based on mark to market

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

is voter competence good for voters information rationality and democratic performance a long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence this literature got its start arguing that voters lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability a more recent literature deepens the debate with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so we argue that regardless of its conclusions about voter competence this literature s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided we use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians when this strategic interaction is taken into account increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse one simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the

correlation neglect in belief formation many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals the news media being a prime example this article provides experimental evidence that many people neglect the resulting double counting problem in the updating process in consequence beliefs are too sensitive to the ubiquitous telling and re telling of stories and exhibit excessive swings we identify substantial and systematic heterogeneity in the presence of the bias and investigate the underlying mechanisms the evidence points to the paramount importance of complexity in combination with people s problems in identifying and thinking through the correlation even though most participants in principle have the computational skills that are necessary to develop rational beliefs many approach the problem in a wrong way when the environment is moderately complex thus experimentally nudging people s focus towards the correlation and the underlying independent signals has large effects on beliefs

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

accountability with large electorates we show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability in our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance a sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter s signal and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect

correlation misperception in choice we present a decision theoretic analysis of an agent s understanding of the interdependencies in her choices we provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks we introduce a framework in which the decision maker chooses a portfolio of assets among which she may misperceive the joint returns and present simple axioms equivalent to a representation in which she attaches a probability to each possible joint distribution over returns and then maximizes subjective expected utility using her possibly misspecified beliefs

uninformed votes information effects in presidential elections theory recent scholarship has emphasized the potential importance of cues information shortcuts and statistical aggregation processes in allowing relatively uninformed citizens to act individually or collectively as if they were fully informed hypotheses uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed failing that individual deviations from fully informed voting cancel out in a mass electorate producing the same aggregate election outcome as if voters were fully informed methods hypothetical fully informed vote choices are imputed to individual voters using the observed relationship between political information and vote choices for voters with similar social and demographic characteristics estimated by probit analysis of data from national election study surveys conducted after the six most recent united states presidential elections results both hypotheses are clearly disconfirmed at the individual level the average deviation of actual vote probabilities from hypothetical fully informed vote probabilities was about ten percentage points in the electorate as a whole these deviations were significantly diluted by aggregation but by no means eliminated incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points better and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better than they would have if voters had in fact been fully informed

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

the role of portfolio constraints in the international propagation of shocks we study the comovement among stock prices and exchange rates in a three good three country centre periphery dynamic equilibrium model in which the centre s agents face portfolio constraints we characterize equilibrium in closed form for a broad class of portfolio constraints solving for stock prices terms of trade and portfolio holdings we show that portfolio constraints generate wealth transfers between the periphery countries and the centre which increase the comovement of the stock prices across the periphery we associate this excess comovement caused by portfolio constraints with the phenomenon known as contagion the model generates predictions consistent with other important empirical results such as amplification and flight to quality effects copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

volatility dependence and contagion in emerging equity markets abstract in this paper we use weekly stock market data for a group of latin american countries to analyze the behavior of volatility through time we are particularly interested in understanding whether periods of high volatility are correlated across countries the analysis uses both on univariate and bivariate switching volatility models our results do not rely on the correlation coefficients but on the co dependence of volatility regimes the results indicate that high volatility episodes are in general short lived lasting from 2 to 12 weeks we find strong evidence of volatility co movements across countries especially among the mercosur countries

quantitative implications of a debt deflation theory of sudden stops and asset prices abstract this paper shows that the quantitative predictions of an equilibrium asset pricing model with financial frictions are consistent with key features of the sudden stop phenomenon foreign traders incur costs in trading assets with domestic agents and a collateral constraint limits external debt to a fraction of the market value of domestic equity holdings when this constraint does not bind standard productivity shocks cause typical real business cycle effects when it binds the same shocks cause strikingly different effects depending on the leverage ratio and asset market liquidity with high leverage and a liquid market the shocks force fire sales of assets and fisher s debt deflation mechanism amplifies the responses of asset prices consumption and the current account precautionary saving makes these sudden stops infrequent in the long run

sudden spikes in global risk abstract recent episodes october 2008 may 2010 august 2011 have witnessed huge spikes in equity price risk implied volatility apart from their large size several features characterize these risk panics they are global phenomena shared among a broad set of countries there is substantial variation though in the extent to which individual countries are impacted while the impact bears little relation to financial linkages with the epicenter of the crisis in addition there is usually not a large shock to fundamentals that sets off these panics we provide an explanation for these risk panic features in the context of a two country model that allows for self fulfilling shifts in risk

coalitional strategy proofness in economies with single dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object we study two allocation models in the first model we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single dipped preferences in the second model a degenerate case of the first one we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents our main result is the characterization of the class of pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy proof allocation rules alternatively this class of rules which largely consists of serially dictatorial components can be characterized by pareto optimality strategy proofness and weak non bossiness in terms of welfare furthermore we study properties of fairness such as anonymity and no envy journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d71

retrospective voting and party polarization we provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization we contrast sophisticated nash versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy instead they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance as determined in equilibrium we show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective compared to nash voting moreover this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals

almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition proof abstract we prove that almost all equilibria in dominant strategies of finite strategic games are coalition proof also we investigate existence of coalition proof equilibria of separable games and strategyproof mechanisms in particular we give an example of a strategyproof mechanism which is defined for strict orderings and which is coalition proof but not coalitionally strategyproof

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

individual versus group strategy proofness when do they coincide a social choice function is group strategy proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy proofness can be defined and for some of them all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy proofness we provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them individual and group strategy proofness become equivalent we also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions

corruption via media capture the effect of competition in this article we compare a government s optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures monopoly versus duopoly while there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co opts with the government we find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption

learning about voter rationality we model the accountability relationship between voters and politicians to clarify what can and can t be learned about voter rationality from existing evidence from the behavior literature we make two key points first we show that evidence on the electoral consequences of natural disasters and economic shocks typically interpreted as evidence for voter irrationality is consistent with a canonical model with rational voters second we show that the evidence on the electoral consequences of disaster response typically interpreted as evidence for voter rationality is consistent with the same model with irrational voters hence neither body of evidence can adjudicate between rational and irrational voting behavior we also derive new hypotheses that can better guide future empirical work attempting to assess voter rationality

negative voters electoral competition with loss aversion this paper studies how voter loss aversion affects electoral competition in a downsian setting assuming that the voters reference point is the status quo we show that loss aversion has a number of effects first for some values of the status quo there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo regardless of other parameters second there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters ideal point than in the absence of loss aversion in a dynamic extension of the model we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage and we find that this increases policy rigidity finally we show that with loss aversion incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences the underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent this prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new and we test it using elections to us state legislatures the results are as predicted incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter

evaluating international financial integration under leverage constraints abstract the global financial crisis has undermined many economists views about the benefits of open financial markets anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that financial linkages may propagate shocks during crises this paper develops a simple two country model in which financial liberalisation across countries takes place in the presence of credit market distortions within countries countries may be subject to macro risk coming from productivity shocks and direct shocks to the credit system financial shocks three different degrees of financial linkages between countries are examined it is shown that the type of financial integration is critical for both macroeconomic outcomes and welfare in particular financial integration in bond markets alone may increase aggregate consumption volatility and reduce welfare financial integration in both bond and equity markets generates high positive co movement across countries but is welfare improving

self fulfilling risk panics abstract recent crises have seen large spikes in asset price risk we propose an explanation for such panics based on self fulfilling shifts in beliefs about risk a negative link between the curre

measuring financial asset return and volatility spillovers with application to global equity markets we provide a simple and intuitive measure of interdependence of asset returns and or volatilities in particular we formulate and examine precise and separate measures of return spillovers and volatility spillovers our framework facilitates study of both non crisis and crisis episodes including trends and bursts in spillovers and both turn out to be empirically important in particular in an analysis of sixteen global equity markets from the early 1990s to the present we find striking evidence of divergent behavior in the dynamics of return spillovers vs volatility spillovers return spillovers display a gently increasing trend but no bursts whereas volatility spillovers display no trend but clear bursts

group strategy proofness in private good economies many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof but also group strategy proof in appropriate domains of definition hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency that is so for solutions to matching division cost sharing house allocation and auctions in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases in a general framework encompassing all of them we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds jel c78 d44 d63 d71 d82

more than a feeling confidence uncertainty and macroeconomic fluctuations economists observers and policy makers often emphasize the role of sentiment as a potential driver of the business cycle in this paper we provide three contributions to this debate first we give an overview of the recent literature on the nexus between sentiment considering both confidence and uncertainty and economic activity second we review existing empirical measures of sentiment in particular consumer confidence stock market volatility smv and economic policy uncertainty epu on monthly data for 27 countries 1985 2016 third we identify some new stylized facts based on international evidence while different measures are surprisingly lowly correlated on average in each country they are typically highly positively correlated across countries suggesting the existence of a global factor or sizeable international spillovers of sentiment consumer confidence has the closest co movement with economic and financial variables and most of the correlations are contemporaneous or forward looking consistent with the view that economic sentiment is indeed a driver of activity

expert information and majority decisions this paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double edged sword for collective decision making we present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members in theory there are bayesian nash equilibria where the committee members voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision however there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision does not aggregate private information in the laboratory the majority decisions and the subjects voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of inefficient equilibria we found a large efficiency loss due to t he presence of expert information especially when the committee size was large we suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

confirmation bias and signaling in downsian elections how do voters behavioural biases affect political outcomes we study this question in a model of downsian electoral competition in which office motivated candidates have private information about the benefits of policies and voters may infer candidates information from their electoral platforms if voters are bayesian candidates have strategic incentives to anti pander they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs however anti pandering incentives are ameliorated if voters inferences are subject to confirmation bias voter confirmation bias can thus counteract distortions due to the strategic interaction between candidates potentially leading to welfare improvements indeed we show that all observers whether biased or bayesian would like the representative voter in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves

on strategy proofness and symmetric single peakedness we characterize the class of strategy proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single peaked preferences this class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes the class of strategy proof and tops only social choice functions on the domain of single peaked preferences characterized by moulin 1980 since under the domain of symmetric single peaked preferences generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy proof on the smaller domain our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints

country portfolios in open economy macro models this paper develops a simple approximation method for computing equilibrium portfolios in dynamic general equilibrium open economy macro models the method is widely applicable simple to implement and gives analytical solutions for equilibrium portfolio positions in any combination or types of asset it can be used in models with any number of assets whether markets are complete or incomplete and can be applied to stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models of any dimension so long as the model is amenable to a solution using standard approximation methods we first illustrate the approach using a simple two asset endowment economy model and then show how the results extend to the case of any number of assets and general economic structure

social connectivity media bias and correlation neglect we propose a model of political persuasion in which a biased newspaper aims to convince voters to vote for the government each voter receives the newspaper s report as well as an independent private signal voters then exchange this information on social media and form posterior beliefs neglecting correlation among signals an increase in connectivity increases the newspaper s bias if voters are ex ante predisposed to vote against the government and reduces the bias if they are predisposed in favour of the government while more precise independent signals reduce the newspaper s optimal bias the bias remains positive even when connectivity becomes large thus even with a large number of social connections the election produces an inefficient outcome with positive probability implying a failure of the condorcet jury theorem

sources of bias in retrospective decision making experimental evidence on voters limitations in controlling incumbents are citizens competent to assess the performance of incumbent politicians observational studies cast doubt on voter competence by documenting several biases in retrospective assessments of performance however these studies are open to alternative interpretations because of the complexity of the real world in this article we show that these biases in retrospective evaluations occur even in the simplified setting of experimental games in three experiments our participants 1 overweighted recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer rather than more distant from that event 2 allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare to influence their choices and 3 were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance these biases were apparent even though we informed and incentivized respondents to weight all performance equally our findings point to key limitations in voters ability to use a retrospective decision rule

the neglect of correlation in allocation decisions we study the effect of variation in correlation on investment decision in an experimental two asset application comparison of allocations across problems suggests that subjects neglect probabilistic information on the joint distribution of returns and base their allocations on the observed return levels for the two assets when asked to predict future returns subjects try to replicate the historical distribution thereby falling into the probability matching bias predictions drastically vary when correlations become negative while allocations are not significantly affected by changes in sign of correlation the observed allocation patterns contradict the predictions of standard models of choice the inconsistency is attributed to common behavioral bias in financial decision field implications of the results are discussed

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite

leadership coordination and corporate culture what is the role of leaders in large organizations we propose a model in which a leader helps to overcome a misalignment of followers incentives that inhibits coordination while adapting the organization to a changing environment good leadership requires vision and special personality traits such as conviction or resoluteness to enhance the credibility of mission statements and to eectively rally agents around them resoluteness allows leaders to overcome