capital income taxation and welfare in a small open economy abstract the paper studies the effects of various capital income tax policies in a small open economy households are infinitely lived and possess endogenous time preferences investment by firms is subject to adjustment costs it is shown that welfare paradoxes may exist in that increases in tax instruments may improve welfare

a theory of retail pricing until recently the retail enterprise the shop has been comparatively neglected by economic theorists partly because they assigned little role to retailing the growth of interest in the problem in recent years reflects the development of models of imperfect information and the revival of interest in location theory pricing theory for the retail enterprise however remains a neglected area after surveying existing models of retailing the paper concentrates on the idea that the shop saves its customers costs by assembling goods in one place this introduces an essential non convexity and importantly affects the conditions under which shops compete with each other and the constraints on their price setting under the admittedly unrealistic assumption of full buyer information a theory of retail pricing is developed retail prices are frequently regarded as exceptions both to the law of costs and generally to every rational process of price formation which is all the more remarkable since these prices are the only ones which are of direct interest to the consumer and which are directly influenced by consumption knut wickselt

are corporate tax rates or countries converging abstract the statutory rate and effective tax rate imposed on corporation income as well as the dispersion of these rates began to decline in the 1980s is this due to changes in the domestic determinants of corporate taxation or increases in international pressures for tax competition this paper finds clear evidence that the corporate tax rate is insulated from a country s revenue needs across countries there is no association of the expenditure gdp ratio with the corporate statutory rate and only weak evidence of a positive association with the average rate there is suggestive but not definitive evidence that the domestic role of the corporate tax as a backstop to the individual income tax is important across countries there is indeed a strong association between the top individual rate and the top statutory corporate rate there is intriguing evidence about the role of international competitive pressures on corporate taxation measures of openness are negatively associated with statutory corporate rates although not with revenues collected as a fraction of gdp strikingly larger more trade intensive countries do collect more corporate tax but this may be because these countries are more attractive venues for investment

optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income foreign source capital income taxes are examined from the point of view of optimal taxation in the framework of a simple economy with international real capital flows a taxonomy of alternative systems of such taxation is first presented showing how crediting and other tax parameters induce what are called source based residence based and related systems next tax rates are determined that are optimal from a single country s point of view given those of the others the achievability of these rates under the various systems is analyzed finally tax rates that are optimal from an international point of view are considered again achievability of an international optimum under the various systems is considered leading to the main conclusions that i a pure residence based system in all countries can achieve an international fiscal optimum ii it cannot however be sustained as an equilibrium

price dispersion and loss leader pricing evidence from the online book industry in this paper we develop a theoretical model to analyze the pricing strategies of competing retailers with asymmetric cross selling capabilities when product demand changes our results suggest that retailers with better opportunities for cross selling have higher incentives to adopt loss leader pricing on high demand products than retailers with low cross selling capabilities as a result price dispersion of a product across retailers rises when its demand increases the predictions of our model are consistent with the empirical evidence from the online book retailing industry using product breadth as a proxy for cross selling capability we find that retailers with high cross selling capabilities reduce prices on best sellers more aggressively than retailers with low cross selling capabilities as a result price dispersion increases when a book makes it to the best seller list and the increase is mainly driven by the difference in pricing behavior between retailers with different cross selling capabilities our empirical results are robust against a number of alternative explanations

fiscal policy in a simple two country dynamic model abstract this paper analyzes the national and international effects of labor and capital income taxes in a two country infinite horizon perfect foresight neoclassical model with endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation two polar regimes of capital income taxation are considered the source based and the residence based the qualitative effects of labor income taxes are shown to be independent of the taxation regime whereas the effects of capital income taxes are not

strategic behaviour and the rules for international taxation of capital this paper examines the welfare of a capital exporting or source country and a capital importing or host country under tax credit and tax deduction systems for the international taxation of capital because the two tax systems may create quite different strategic incentives for the countries the authors compare the equilibria in the tax setting game played by the two countries under each system they find that the tax credits system introduces an antitrade bias into the equilibrium contrary to initial impressions and that both capital exporting and capital importing countries will prefer the tax deductions scheme to tax credits copyright 1989 by royal economic society

how to maximize domestic benefits from foreign investments the effect of irreversibility and uncertainty when a foreign monopolist facing uncertain future demand can either export to a host country or serve the market by undertaking an irreversible foreign direct investment the host government maximizes net domestic benefits by nearly fully subsidizing the investment cost in combination with taxing away benefits that exceed the gains from exporting without the subsidy maximization of domestic benefits leads to underinvestment from a world welfare point of view

tax policy in an era of internationalization explaining the spread of neoliberalism i offer an explanation for the widespread diffusion of neoliberal tax policies in the developed democracies after accounting for the policy influences of commonly experienced domestic and international forces i consider several plausible paths of diffusion of neoliberal tax structure my central argument is that the highly visible 1980s market conforming tax reform in the united states should be especially important in shaping subsequent tax policies in other polities there are substantial reasons to believe however that domestic political and institutional forces will shape policymaker assessment of the benefits and costs of neoliberal reforms the strength of right parties and the degree to which the median voter has moved right should condition adoption of neoliberal tax policy the institutions of national and sector coordinated capitalism should also slow the enactment of neoliberal tax reforms i assess these arguments with empirical models of 1981 98 tax rates on capital in sixteen nations i find that changes in u s tax policy influence subsequent reforms in other polities in the long term all nations move toward the u s neoliberal tax structure analysis also shows however that the short term responsiveness to u s tax reforms is notably greater where uncoordinated market institutions are dominant theory and extensive qualitative and quantitative evidence indicate that pressures to compete for mobile assets as balanced against the economic and political costs of adoption anchor the process of diffusion of neoliberal tax policy there is little evidence for the view that systematic policy learning or social emulation drove tax policy diffusion earlier versions of this article were presented at the center for european studies and weatherhead center for international affairs harvard university center for international studies ucla and yale university as well as the 2002 annual meetings of the american political science association an earlier version was published as minda de gunzburg center for european studies harvard university working paper 120 i thank alex hicks rob franzese torben iversen andy martin cathie jo martin participants in the yale ucla and harvard conferences especially geoffrey garrett helen milner dennis quinn and beth simmons and two anonymous referees and the editors of international organization for helpful comments i also gratefully acknowledge the contribution of sven steinmo that comes by way of our past collaborative work on tax policy

why do countries combine the exemption system for the taxation of foreign profits with domestic double taxation relief many european countries exempt foreign profits from domestic corporate taxation at the shareholder level however all corporate profits are taxed and double taxation relief is granted only for domestic corporate taxes this paper attempts to rationalize this tax policy in the presence of double taxation agreements which exempt foreign profits from domestic corporate taxation countries may use shareholder taxes to tax these profits the disadvantage of shareholder taxes is that they create incentives to sell domestic firms to foreigners but double taxation relief for domestic profits may preserve domestic ownership our results imply that national dividend tax policies may be a factor contributing to the empirically observed home bias in investment

dual income taxation a promising path to tax reform for developing countries summary the dual income tax combines a progressive tax on labor income and a lower flat tax on income from capital unlike flat tax systems a dual income tax provides developing countries greater flexibility in addressing tax competition while retaining progressivity countries could use the move to a dual income tax system not just as an opportunity to rationalize the taxation of income from business operations and investment but also as a vehicle for broader reform of their tax systems

captial mobility distributive conflict and international tax coordination basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility but just as with free trade in goods there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off consequently capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency this paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances c 2001 published by elsevier science b v

international competition in corporate taxation evidence from the oecd time series despite numerous studies controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries in this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across oecd countries since the 1950s issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive race to the bottom in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross sectional analysis in contrast we adopt an explicitly time series method to what are essentially time series questions cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the oecd and europe as a whole it does however indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries mainly in northern europe important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations kenneth stewart and michael webb

the taxing task of taxing transnationals financial and real investment flexibility tax competition and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation while these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies such as deferral double taxation apportionment and trade rules very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models in this paper i show how the integration of investment flexibility tax competition and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies

shifting mne taxation from national to global profits a radical reform long overdue the current separate accounting taxation of corporations gives governments the right to tax the national incomes of firms operating within their borders however multinational and increasingly digital business models beg the question what is national taxable income we argue that a radical rethink of the corporate taxation moving away from a separate taxation of national corporate income to a taxation of global corporate income allocated via formula apportionment is long overdue global corporate income as a basis for taxation is supported both by recent theoretical developments and corroborating empirical evidence with the eu and emerging economies including china already considering its adoption nor is it new as we relate formula apportionment of global corporate income was used a century ago before commercial and political interests promoted separate accounting thereby providing both precedent and experience to inform its re adoption

taxes and international risk sharing abstract we extend a standard model of international risk sharing to include an empirically plausible distortion taxes the tax inclusive theory implies even under full risk sharing a predictable relationship between consumption growth and the consumption and capital income tax rates both within and across countries we find strong empirical evidence in favor of this relationship while idiosyncratic output fluctuations account for substantially more of cross country consumption growth variability than do taxes trends in tax differentials are found to be informative about the dynamic evolution of international risk sharing in particular adjusting for capital taxes reveals a marked improvement in risk sharing over the last three decades that is absent in baseline measures this improvement has been driven by the convergence of average tax rates on capital income across oecd countries toward the united states average capital tax rate

endogenizing leadership in tax competition abstract in this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games we consider a pre play stage where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late i e to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage we highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second mover advantage we show that the subgame perfect equilibria spes correspond to the two stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem in order to solve this issue we consider a quadratic specification of the production function and we use two criteria of selection pareto dominance and risk dominance we emphasize that at the risk dominant equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second mover advantage if asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient pareto dominance reinforces risk dominance in selecting the same spe three results may be deduced from our analysis i the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted ii the smaller jurisdiction leads iii the big country higher tax rate rule does not always hold

taxation of asset income in the presence of a world securities market abstract this paper examines a capm model of world security prices in which governments recognize their ability to influence international security prices via their tax treatment of foreign and domestic investors in this model governments have the incentive to set tax rates such that investors tend to specialize in domestic securities and to restrict net capital flows between countries each country does this to increase the utility of domestic residents taking as given the tax policies of other governments but the net outcome is a reduction in world efficiency and likely a reduction in the utility of all investors

retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism previous theoretical explanations for retail price fixity show that fixed retail prices can be consistent with either competitive or imperfectly competitive behavior we develop a conceptual model of retail pricing wherein fixed price points are facilitating mechanisms for tacit collusion a non cooperative equilibrium in fixed retail prices is supported through credible threats to revert to nash pricing if cheating is suspected we test the implications of this model using a two stage ordered probit approach in weekly supermarket pricing data the results show that price fixity does support collusive equilibria among retailers but other factors may also explain retail price behavior

origins and consequences of changes in u s corporate taxation 1981 1998 foreign direct investment hat u s corporate tax policy is partly determined by partisan and organizational forces as well as by domestic economic forces is a standard theoretical view scholars find that democratic presidential administrations have differed from republican administrations in that the former tended to increase the tax burdens of corporate taxpayers other studies report that increasing business political activity has had an ameliorating effect on business tax burdens on the economic side corporate tax policy is counter cyclical investment inducing and linked with growth and investment in long run structural relationships in at least two important ways however the structure of the american economy differed in the 1980s and 1990s from earlier periods first the u s economy internationalized with the oil shocks of the 1970 s serving as globalization s annunciation second economic agents became increasingly sophisticated in anticipating how governments would respond to economic events and how these government policies would in turn affect economic events the rational expectations revolution led president reagan among others to conclude that traditional u s macroeconomic policies were ineffective some scholars argue that these structural shifts changed the dynamics of u s corporate tax policy they theorize that in open economies like the

the seesaw principle in international tax policy abstract the standard analysis of the optimal international tax policy of a small country typically assumes that the country either imports or exports capital but does not do both this paper considers the situation in which a small country both exports and imports capital and can alter its tax on one or the other but not both in each case a seesaw relationship is identified in which the optimal tax on the income from capital exports imports is inversely related to the given tax rate on income from capital imports exports the standard results for optimal taxation of capital exports and imports are shown to be special cases of the more general seesaw principle

can capital income taxes survive in open economies optimal tax theory forecasts that small open economies should not tax capital income yet countries do tax capital income why the inconsistency this paper shows that use of the double taxation convention whereby governments credit taxes paid abroad against domestic taxes helps explain this inconsistency in particular capital income will be taxed if a dominant capital exporter acts as a stackelberg leader when setting its tax policy due to the convention other countries will then tax capital imports making it attractive for the dominant capital exporter to tax capital income without a dominant capital exporter however the model still forecasts no capital income taxes can taxation of capital income survive the increasing integration of world capital markets a number of recent papers suggest not diamond and mirrlees 1971 for example showed that a small open economy would not choose to tax the income generated by the physical capital located within the country this is because production would occur efficiently under an optimal tax system which requires that domestic investments earn the rate of return available on the world capital market in principle a country might still attempt to tax income earned on the savings of its residents however in practice income from savings invested outside the country is virtually impossible for a government to monitor individuals therefore can evade tax on such savings with very little risk as razin and sadka 1989 show such capital flight in theory eliminates any possibility of a tax on savings investors will simply transfer their funds abroad to avoid taxation yet virtually all countries do in fact tax the capital income earned by corporations and individuals located within their borders how can the theoretical forecast of no capital income taxation be reconciled with this simple observation it is difficult to use existing models with any confidence to analyze the implications of changes in capital income tax rates if these same models forecast that countries should never tax capital income

towards sustainable consumption economic modelling of mobility and heating for austria abstract the paper focuses on economic modelling and empirical analysis of sustainable structures in private consumption and strives to extend conventional economic consumption models the model analysis of sustainable consumption in the areas heating and transport for austria attempts to depart from traditional measurement of consumption in national accounts and economic consumption models the focus of the analysis is laid on consumer services derived from a combination of stocks e g building stock transport systems and flows mainly energy this approach intends to illustrate that a concentration on flows in consumption models lacks important aspects of sustainable consumption the economic analysis of sustainable consumption patterns aims to highlight the effects related to the substitution of flows by stocks in the consumption areas transport and heating e g improvements in thermal quality of buildings more energy efficient transport systems relevant too in this respect is the role that can be played by technological innovation improvements in energy efficiency of stocks the potential for specific incentives to promote new technologies two essential factors are crucial in the context of sustainable consumption the demand shifts concerning the consumer services desired and the composition of the stock flow mix necessary for the service provision

foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes abstract governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment fdi focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes this paper examines the impact of indirect non income taxes on fdi by american multinational firms using affiliate level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of american companies estimates imply that 10 higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7 1 lower affiliate assets which is similar to the effect of 10 higher income tax rates affiliate output falls by 2 9 as indirect taxes rise by 10 while higher income taxes have more modest output effects high corporate income tax rates depress capital labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates whereas high indirect tax rates do not these patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect fdi

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

the oecd model tax treaty tax competition and two way capital flows model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings this contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient i incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral with symmetric countries credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium this equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium with asymmetric countries the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization with harmonization it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries welfares only if neither uses deductions

price discrimination in grocery trade evidence from italy this paper investigates the determinants of price dispersion between staple and non staple goods in grocery retailing as the result of pricing decisions by multiproduct firms theoretical predictions about the nature of supermarkets pricing behaviour are compared and tested empirically using disaggregated data from the italian grocery trade over the period 1990 1992 the empirical results provide evidence for the existence in all types of retail organization of the form of price discrimination suggested by bliss particularly for specialist shops the results are consistent with discrimination due to the exploitation of consumers switching costs

tax and the city a theory of local tax competition abstract in this paper we propose a novel theoretical model of tax competition at the local level large jurisdictions cities compete both locally with smaller neighbouring communities and interregionally with more distant cities while small jurisdictions hinterlands compete only with other jurisdictions in their neighbourhood the model structure is motivated by recent empirical findings as well as survey results among german mayors the perceived intensity of competition for firms varies considerably between jurisdictions and can mainly be explained by the size and location of the jurisdiction our model predicts contrary to earlier findings for competition between countries or regions that capital taxes of large jurisdictions fall more strongly with increasing interregional competition and may eventually lead to smaller taxes than in small jurisdictions hinterlands are therefore less affected from globalisation than cities we contrast our results with a standard tax competition model in which all jurisdictions compete with all other jurisdictions

international capital tax evasion and the foreign tax credit puzzle in this paper we examine how the presence of international tax evasion affects the choice of a foreign tax credit by a capital exporting region since the credit raises the opportunity cost of concealing foreign source income it can be employed to discourage evasion activity international tax evasion can thus help to rationalize the adoption of a tax credit in excess of a deduction equivalent rate jel classification h21 h26 evasion fiscale pour le capital international et le probleme du credit d impot pour le fardeau fiscal a l etranger ce memoire examine comment la presence d evasion fiscale pour le capital international affecte le choix du credit d impot pour le fardeau fiscal a l etranger par une region qui exporte du capital puisque le credit d impot accroit le cout d opportunite du camouflage de la source etrangere de revenus c est une technique qui peut etre employee pour decourager l evasion fiscale voila qui peut expliquer qu on adopte un credit d impot qui est plus genereux que ce qui constituerait la deduction dans un systeme ou le fardeau fiscal a l etranger est simplement deduit du revenu imposable

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model abstract the paper uses the self selection approach of stiglitz 1982 to study tax competition and tax coordination in a many country optimum income tax model in the model the government can impose a non linear tax schedule on wage income and a source based tax on mobile capital in an uncoordinated equilibrium it turns out that countries can use the capital tax instrument to weaken the self selection constraint the paper presents examples where positive and negative capital taxes are optimal from a single country perspective if the production function is weakly separable between labor and capital it can be shown that the optimal capital tax is zero the paper also shows that contrary to the standard tax competition model the uncoordinated equilibrium can be efficient if the wealth distribution the endowments with capital among individuals is egalitarian a coordination of capital taxes does not affect welfare for non egalitarian wealth distributions a coordinated increase in capital taxes can raise or lower welfare depending on the redistributive impact of a higher capital tax

on capital income tax policies under uncertainty this paper investigates corporate income and dividend taxation in a multi country world where production is subject to country specific productivity shocks singlecountry non cooperative tax policy is shown to imply a tax on foreign source dividends and a subsidy to domestic source dividends the optimal corporate tax may be negative if international portfolios are little diversified at the outset finally each country in a coordinating region should subsidize rather than tax domestic citizen s investment in equity in partner countries 1998 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

foreign direct investment under oligopoly profit shifting or profit capturing abstract in this paper a model of taxation of foreign source corporate income is developed when the output market is not perfectly competitive profit shifting policies similar to those in the new trade literature are also present in the case of foreign direct investment fdi there are however important differences to the new trade theory since in case of fdi i corporate taxation and double taxation relief are the policy instruments rather than output or revenue taxes ii countries are not symmetric in the sense that the host country has the first right to tax the multinational s profit and the home country reacts by providing double taxation relief and iii output but not corporate taxation is specific to imperfectly competitive industries it is argued that a variants of a tax credit are analogous to export subsidies b when the home country operates a tax credit system the host country s incentive to capture the multinational s profit is bounded under imperfect competition c when the host country offers a tax holiday the home country should imitate this policy and d in the presence of perfect competitive industries double taxation relief is a good instrument to target imperfectly competitive industries

tax competition under the threat of capital flight abstract a tax competition model has been constructed in this paper we have found that tax distortions can result from the mere threat of capital flight and the ensuing tax competition even though inefficient allocation of the world capital resources may no longer be a problem

the scope for taxation and public expenditure in an open economy in this survey of some central issues of tax and expenditure policy in an open economy we consider the implications for policy of free although not necessarily perfect international mobility of commodities capital and labour we examine the issues both from a positive and a normative point of view trying to identify both the incidence and welfare effects of international mobility one general conclusion is that tax distortions may increase in magnitude in comparison with a closed economy but they may also increase in kind as when otherwise neutral taxes become distortionary because of factor mobility

tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets abstract the literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in imperfectly competitive markets governments have an incentive to subsidize exports of their own firms yet the consequence of the departure from laissez faire is a wasteful subsidy race in contrast this paper shows that even in imperfectly competitive markets there is a strong tendency for laissez faire to prevail the driving force is the firms willingness to exploit tax or subsidy differentials by relocating production a small tax differential induces firms to change their place of production the change in market structure has a negligible effect on the oligopoly equilibrium but a non negligible impact on government revenues when tax policy is non discriminatory governments gain lose by attracting all firms when production is taxed subsidized hence laissez faire is the only equilibrium since from the point of view of the two producing countries laissez faire nondiscrimination pareto dominates the intervention equilibrium discrimination nondiscrimination is a simple device to result in a mutual beneficial outcome

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

the impact of corporate and personal income taxes on the location of firms and on employment some panel evidence for the swiss cantons abstract the impact of corporate income taxes on location decisions of firms is widely debated in the tax competition literature tax rate differences across jurisdictions may lead to distortions of firms investment decisions empirical evidence on tax induced relocation and subsequent economic development in the us and europe is still inconclusive much the same applies to switzerland while there is some evidence on personal income tax competition between swiss cantons evidence on the impact of intercantonal corporate income tax differences on the location of business within switzerland is missing in this paper we present econometric evidence on the influence of corporate and personal income taxes on the regional distribution of firms in 1981 and 1991 and on cantonal employment using a panel data set of the 26 swiss cantons from 1985 to 1997 the results show that corporate and personal income taxes deter firms to locate in a canton and subsequently reduce cantonal employment

tariff jumping foreign investment and capital taxation abstract this paper reconsiders the welfare effects of tariff jumping direct investment if mobile capital is subjected to taxation in contrast to the conventional wisdom the receiving country may in this case gain from the incremental inflow of capital as this diverts tax revenues from the rest of the world in the case of perfect capital mobility this possibility becomes a certainty our argument provides one rationale for a small country to levy a distorting tariff in a second best world in which capital taxes already exist

yardstick competition and partial coordination exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates abstract this paper explores a striking form of tax policy interdependence that can be observed in the german federation though municipalities enjoy discretion in setting the local business tax rate large fractions of municipalities in some states even the majority set identical tax rates our analysis shows that this tax rate bunching is not the result of federal or state level institutions possible explanations rest on partial coordination and yardstick competition the role of the former is exemplified by the finding that small jurisdictions and jurisdictions sharing the same county are more likely to engage in bunching yardstick competition seems also relevant since jurisdictions for which strategic tax setting should be associated with larger gains and lower cost are in fact more likely to set identical tax rates

exclusive contracts and market dominance we propose a new theory of exclusive dealing the theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals and that the buyers willingness to pay for the product is private information in this setting the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive we discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases jel d21 d43 d82 d86 k21 l13 l40