micro incentives and municipal behavior political decentralization and fiscal federalism in argentina and mexico summary this article analyzes the mixed results of political and fiscal decentralization in latin america by comparing taxing and spending policies in six cities in argentina and mexico consistent with previous studies we find that decentralization has been frustrated by overconcentration of power at the provincial level and large vertical fiscal imbalances though we characterize these as functional elements in a system of redistributive policy making that benefits a wide array of provincial and municipal actors we seek to add a new dimension to the literature by arguing that micro level incentives conditions and circumstances particular to specific places are more important determinants of municipal behavior than macro level structures those policy and institutional changes intended to make officials more responsive to local conditions federalism local elections intergovernmental transfers and own source revenues we conclude that the theory of decentralization relies on a flawed conception of the causal mechanisms that are hypothesized to create responsiveness in local officials

are ghettos good or bad spatial separation of racial and ethnic groups may theoretically have positive or negative effects on the economic performance of those groups we examine the effects of segregation on outcomes for blacks in schooling employment and single parenthood we find that blacks in more segregated areas have significantly worse outcomes than blacks in less segregated areas we control for the endogeneity of location choice using instruments based on political factors topographical features and residence before adulthood a one standard deviation decrease in segregation would eliminate one third of the black white differences in most of our outcomes

inefficiencies from metropolitan political and fiscal decentralization failures of tiebout competition we examine the welfare effects of provision of local public goods in an empirically relevant setting using a multi community model with mobile and heterogeneous households and with flexible housing supplies we characterize the first best allocation and show efficiency can be implemented with decentralization using head taxes we calibrate the model and compare welfare in property tax equilibria both decentralized and centralized to the efficient allocation inefficiencies with decentralization and property taxation are large dissipating most if not all the potential welfare gains that efficient decentralization could achieve in property tax equilibrium centralization is frequently more efficient an externality in community choice underlies the failure to achieve efficiency with decentralization and property taxes poorer households crowd richer communities and free ride by consuming relatively little housing thereby avoiding taxes copyright oxford university press

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities abstract this paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agents is initially endowed with a finite number of personalized indivisible commodities we observe that the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibrium may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner we provide an alternative definition of the coalitional form game to resolve this problem so that the balancedness of the new defined game provides a useful necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium for the original economy journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d41 d51

fiscal federalism and economic growth this paper uses an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth the analysis shows that federalism which allows public good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers who live in different jurisdictions increases the incentive to save this stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in american public education naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation i derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area my results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling little of the effect of tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting this finding may be explained by another finding students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of tiebout choice among districts

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

local decentralization and local economic growth a cross sectional examination of us metropolitan areas this paper builds on the growing empirical literature that explores the relationship between government structure and economic growth it uses a new data set of 314 us metropolitan areas to examine the relationship between local decentralization and local economic growth the results indicate a negative relationship between the central city share of metro area population and economic growth and a positive relationship between both the number of municipalities per 100 000 residents and the number of counties per 100 000 residents and economic growth those findings provide support for the hypothesis that decentralization enhances economic growth

on the determinants of fiscal centralization theory and evidence abstract this paper presents a simple model that unifies most of the results of the literature on fiscal federalism the model describes an economy characterized by two levels of government one public good and a private good the predictions of the model are tested by using a new set of measures of fiscal centralization the main findings are that country size income per capita ethnic fractionalization and level of democracy are negatively correlated with the degree of fiscal centralization the model is tested using ols tobit and semi parametric estimators the paper also shows that the variables included in the regression are helpful in the prediction of changes in the level of centralization

cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteries abstract lotteries are introduced in the exchange model of shapley and scarf j math econ 1 1974 23 37 in competition traders buy and sell probabilities on houses when considering the core feasible allocations of the economy and blocking allocations of coalitions may involve lotteries among other results we show that the set of lottery equilibrium allocations is non empty and does not contain all competitive equilibrium allocations the core of the shapley scarf model is a strict subset of the lottery core and lottery equilibrium allocations are contained in the lottery core journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c71

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

economic integration and political disintegration in a world of trade restrictions large countries enjoy economic benefits because political boundaries determine the size of the market under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small homogeneous political jurisdictions this paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries and successfully tests two implications of the model firstly the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade secondly the history of nation state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime

federal competition and economic growth abstract this paper exploits exogenous variation in the natural topography of the united states to estimate the causal impact of inter jurisdictional competition on income growth we find that doubling the number of county governments in a metropolitan area leads to a 17 increase in the average annual growth rate of earnings per employee over 1969 2006 and a 10 increase in 2006 income per employee decomposing income effects using 2000 census worker level data we find that approximately half of the effect stems from making workers more productive while the other half comes from changing the composition of the workforce and inducing workers to work more hours we also present evidence that inter jurisdictional competition leads local governments to raise more in taxes spend more and issue more debt per capita but does not help them obtain more inter governmental transfers however the additional cost from this increase in expenditures to a median wage employee is much smaller than the increase in that employee s wages due to greater inter jurisdictional competition

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

capital market integration and fiscal sustainability abstract by constructing a two country endogenous growth model with a debt financing government this paper studies the relationship between the sustainability of public finance and increases in inter regional factor mobility to this end it identifies the minimum tax rate that ensures fiscal sustainability against the backdrop of capital tax competition and studies whether competition for mobile capital lowers or improves fiscal sustainability the main findings are as follows i when countries are symmetric increasing capital flows promotes economic growth through the expansion of romer type knowledge spillovers resulting in increased fiscal sustainability in all countries and ii when a marked difference exists between countries tax competition caused by capital movements might lower fiscal sustainability in a country with abundant capital and large outstanding debt

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers comment school choice policies promise to align the incentives of school administrators with the demands of parents and may therefore lead to more efficient educational production milton friedman 1962 geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1980 john chubb and terry m moe 1990 absent a large scale school voucher program in the united states however this prediction has been difficult to test several authors e g melvin v borland and roy m howsen 1992 clive r belfield and henry m levin 2002 have suggested studying the effects of tiebout choice the use of the residential location decision to select among local monopoly education providers the idea here is that fragmented governance induces competition among school districts analogous to that which would occur among schools with nonresidential choice in an influential paper caroline m hoxby 2000 points out that current governance structures are potentially endogenous to school productivity and proposes that variation in topography which may have influenced optimal jurisdiction size before modern transportation technologies provides a source of exogenous variation she estimates instrumental variables regressions of individual test scores and school spending on a metropolitan level tiebout choice index defined as one minus a herfindahl concentration index with districts enrollments as their market shares using as excluded instruments the number of larger and smaller streams in the area she reports substantial positive effects of district fragmentation on student test scores and negative effects on spending this comment presents a reanalysis of hoxby s test score results which form the core of her empirical analysis these results turn out to be quite sensitive to plausible alterations to hoxby s specification in particular the large significant effect of choice on achievement obtains

decentralization and economic growth revisited an empirical note abstract although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development there is a mixed picture of the decentralization effect on economic growth across earlier empirical studies using the instrument variables iv technique with the latest cross country data for the period from 1997 to 2001 this paper found that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on per capita gdp growth therefore when the focus is placed on the latest information on the economic situation in the latter 1990s decentralization particularly on the fiscal expenditure side is instrumental in economic growth

fiscal decentralisation and idc economic growth an empirical investigation the impact of fiscal decentralisation on ldc economic growth and development is widely debated in the development literature notwithstanding this there has been little attempt to test systematically this relationship accordingly in this note we present an empirical examination of the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralisation and economic growth rates across a sample of twenty three ldcsfrom 1974 to 1991 we fail to find however any strong systematic relationship between the two among our sample of ldcs

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

political jurisdictions in heterogeneous communities we investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population we consider heterogeneity in income race ethnicity and religion and we test the model using american school districts school attendance areas municipalities and special districts we find strong evidence of a trade off between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity we also find evidence of a trade off between economies of scale and income heterogeneity conversely we find little evidence that ethnic or religious heterogeneity shapes jurisdictions to clarify the direction of causality between heterogeneity and jurisdictions we exploit shocks to racial heterogeneity generated by the two world wars

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

does regulation improve small farmers access to brazilian rural credit abstract brazilian policymakers attempted to counter the inherent tendency for concentration in subsidized rural credit programs by requiring banks to lend a specified volume to small farmers inferences about the regulation s success are drawn from farm level panel data from sao paulo in the early 1980s membership in the target group should have a positive effect in an access rule relating farmers characteristics to their probability of receiving credit when allowing for time invariant individual effects possibly correlated with target group indicators tests indicate that the regulation had no effect subsidiary results cast doubt on the efficacy of a broader set of regulations

existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible indivisible commodities and linear production technologies abstract in this paper we consider a class of economies with a finite number of divisible commodities linear production technologies and indivisible goods and a finite number of agents this class contains several well known economies with indivisible goods and money as special cases it is shown that if the utility functions are continuous on the divisible commodities and are weakly monotonic both on one of the divisible commodities and on all the indivisible commodities if each agent initially owns a sufficient amount of one of the divisible commodities and if a no production without input like assumption on the production sector holds then there exists a competitive equilibrium for any economy in this class the usual convexity assumption is not needed here furthermore by imposing strong monotonicity on one of the divisible commodities we show that any competitive equilibrium is in the core of the economy and therefore the first theorem of welfare also holds we further obtain a second welfare theorem stating that under some conditions a pareto efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium allocation for some well chosen redistribution of the total initial endowments journal of economic literature classification numbers d4 d46 d5 d51 d6 d61

decentralization and pollution spillovers evidence from the re drawing of county borders in brazil decentralization can improve service delivery but it can also generate externalities across jurisdictional boundaries we examine the nature and size of water pollution externalities as rivers flow across jurisdictions panel data on water pollution in brazilian rivers coupled with county splits that change the locations of borders allow us to identify the spatial patterns of pollution as rivers approach and cross borders controlling for fixed effects and trends specific to each location the theory of externalities predicts that pollution should increase at an increasing rate as the river approaches the downstream exit border that there should be a structural break in the slope of the pollution function at the border and that a larger number of managing jurisdictions should exacerbate pollution externalities we find support for all four predictions in the data satellite data on growth in night time lights along rivers show that local authorities allow more settlements to develop close to rivers in the downstream portions of counties which is the likely underlying mechanism the border effects on pollution are not as pronounced when the cost of inter jurisdictional coordination is lower

the existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity abstract this paper considers an exchange economy called a generalized assignment market in which sellers and buyers trade one indivisible commodity possibly with product differentiation for a perfectly divisible commodity the existence of a competitive equilibrium in this economy is proved using kakutani s fixed point theorem this existence theorem is applied to a production economy in which sellers are formulated as producers with convex cost functions two examples of housing markets are provided and their competitive equilibria are numerically calculated

competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities abstract we analyze an exchange economy in which i all commodities except money are indivisible ii agents preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle of indivisible objects and iii all agents are price takers we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition under which market clearing prices exist implications for market mechanisms are discussed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 c78

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

fiscal centralization versus decentralization growth and welfare effects of spillovers leviathan taxation and capital mobility abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods leviathan taxation and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare we show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth however the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non monotonic and displays a hump shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition some tax competition is desirable but fierce tax competition may be harmful we also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare as in previous studies however if spillovers are below this critical level capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems

decentralization and the productive efficiency of government evidence from swiss cantons advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that among other benefits it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services this paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of government using a data set of swiss cantons we first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy further panel regressions of swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment we also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing for the swiss case the gender education gap

fiscal federalism decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism has identified several channels through which government decentralization could affect economic growth much of the literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services but decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms in contrast some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency and thus may diminish growth given this theoretical ambiguity several studies have attempted to identify the effect of decentralization on economic growth empirically over the last two decades we review and conduct a meta analysis of this empirical literature based on our analysis we point out open questions and discuss possible ways to answer them jel h77 043 c52 i introduction building on various theoretical contributions an empirical literature analyzing the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has emerged since the 1990s the relevant studies vary as to whether they use cross sectional time series or panel data as to whether they rely on cross country or single country samples and they vary in estimation methods decentralization measures and sample composition given the size and heterogeneity of the empirical literature it is useful to review the individual studies and summarize their main findings conducting a comprehensive search we identify 31 published and unpublished studies on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth each of these studies estimates several models resulting in over 400 individual estimates while we first review these studies in a traditional manner our main aim is to analyze these estimates quantitatively specifically the main contribution of this article is to offer a meta analysis of the empirical findings on fiscal decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis is a useful methodology in our context as it is difficult to obtain clear cut conclusions with only a traditional survey of empirical literature the individual studies vary substantially in their characteristics and correspondingly in the findings they report by conducting a meta analysis however we can identify how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular study relate to its findings the meta analysis approach thus addresses model uncertainty with regard to each individual estimate in addition it can also serve as a partial response to the methodological critique of empirical research on fiscal decentralization by rodden 2004 as it helps to clarify the quantitative effects of different decentralization measures and estimation techniques finally as meta analytical techniques are rarely used in economics we also aim at contributing to the further establishment of this methodology stanley 2001 2008 the next section briefly discusses the various theoretical arguments as to why fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth we then provide a short traditional survey of the empirical studies in section iii we review this literature more systematically and quantitatively in section iv in section v we report the results of meta regressions and discuss how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a given study are related to its specific findings finally section vi provides a discussion of the results and some conclusions ii how could fiscal federalism affect economic growth theoretical approaches within the framework of the solow swan model solow 1956 swan 1956 fiscal federalism may be associated with a different level of efficiency in governance than unitary systems leading to a different value of solow s a the level of technology a regime change toward federalism would then be associated with temporarily different growth rates and eventually different levels of income but not with persistent growth differences

fiscal decentralization and economic growth a cross country study abstract we use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970 1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth we find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries but none in developed countries several explanations are offered for our findings

on the number and size of nations this paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes and in different economic environments with more or less economic integration we focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations our model implies that i democratization leads to secessions ii in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries iii the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration

duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities we present certain duality results on comparative statics on competitive rent vectors in the rental housing market model in the model apartments as indivisible goods are classified into a finite number of categories and are traded for one composite commodity our concern is about certain general properties of the behavior of rents with parameter changes in particular the rent changes are intimately related to the boundary income changes of the categories of apartments both changes are endogenously determined in equilibrium we will show that these changes exhibit nice dual structures we will also apply our model and comparative statics to a rental housing market in the tokyo metropolitan area

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

a critique of traditional agricultural credit projects and policies abstract authors critique the results assumptions and policies commonly associated with agricultural credit projects in low income countries a summary of new views on these projects is present these views emphasize voluntary savings mobilization and positive real rates of interest several explanations are given for why few of these new views have been adopted by policymakers