empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions this paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the outer continental shelf from 1954 to 1970 these are leases where bidders privately acquire at some cost noisy but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present we develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values we also use data on tract location and exposr values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition we find that bidders are aware of the winner s curse and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium

recent progress in the empirical analysis of multi unit auctions abstract i discuss some recent progress in the empirical analysis of multi unit auctions through which a number of important commodities treasury bills and bonds electricity emission permits monetary infusions by some central banks are allocated

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model we consider the structural estimation of the affiliated private value apv model in first price sealed bid auctions the model allows for bidders individual efficiencies and opportunity costs while permitting dependence among bidders private values through affiliation we establish the nonparametric identification of the apv model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a computationally convenient and consistent two step nonparametric estimation procedure for estimating the joint private value distribution from observed bids using simulated bid data we provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure and show the good behavior of our estimator in small samples

discussion of a simulation model for a competitive generation market two sets of authors discuss the paper a simulation model for a competitive generation market see ibid vol 15 no 1 p 250 6 2000 requesting comments and clarification on the proposed simulation tool for mainland spain s competitive electricity market the original authors responses to these discussions are also included

public utility pricing under risk the case of self rationing comment and extension this paper reviews a previously offered model of electricity load management containing uncertainties this analysis allows individual customer demand to fluctuate within a billing period also it allows diversity or imperfect correlation among customer demands the behavioral effects are examined for a fuse that allows utilities and customers to incur costs or ration the loads under excess demand charges the behavioral implication is that the demand price is effective at each instant of the billing period the fuse analogy suggests that demand and energy prices be kept separate and that behavior is best understood as a two stage procedure

intelligent agents for negotiations in market games 2 application for part i see ibid vol 13 no 5 p 1103 8 1998 in competitive markets human decision makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of note that such coalitions are legal provided market power is not monopolized we present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt our negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory however it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential coalition partners in the part i we presented the negotiation model in this paper we apply it to power markets

game theoretical multi agent modelling of coalition formation for multilateral trades in recent years electric utility industries worldwide have been undergoing deregulation to introduce competitiveness in the generation transmission and distribution of electric power the once centralised system planning and operation management must be remodelled to adapt to the new market structure in particular the trading mechanism needs to be totally revised as any party may now get involved in this free market subject to the unavoidable constraints such as generation volumes physical transmission means and days ahead scheduling this paper presents a multi agent model in conjunction with game theory to resolve the coalition formation for multilateral trades the authors have implemented the model using the java language and the jatlite jat0 3 agent development tools developed by stanford university

evaluation of alternatives for power system coordination and pooling in a competitive environment the paper defines and classifies essential issues that relate the need for electric power system coordination with the increasing development of competition principles are formulated and a coordination model and a market structure are proposed emphasizing the need for economic dispatch in the wholesale market a detailed comparison is made of the market and pooling implementations developed in argentina and chile countries that have pioneered the creation of competitive markets in the electric energy sector an evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of those two implementations is included

the bias in price elasticity estimates under homothetic separability implications for analysis of peak load electricity pricing this article demonstrates that the assumption of a homothetically separable utility function places a priori restrictions on the parameters of the demand system if these restrictions are unwarranted an open question if they are not explicitly tested they will lead to biased price elasticity estimates in particular we show that the uncompensated own price elasticities must be smaller than the negative of the expenditure shares that is the price elasticity of peak electricity demand must be less than the negative of the share of expenditure devoted to peak electricity this finding is probably not new to economists familiar with consumer demand analysis nevertheless many recent studies of consumer demand for electricity under time of day rates explicitly impose this restriction the resulting price elasticity estimates are usually quite large in absolute value 5 to 8 but they are the product of restrictive a priori assumptions as well as information embodied in the sample data the results of

market equilibrium under incomplete and imperfect information in bilateral electricity markets in contrast to the centralized pool model bilateral markets present a decision making situation in which information plays a major role along with the physical and operative constraints of the network we propose a model that includes network constraints for competitive bilateral electricity markets based on an evolutionary bipartite complex network in which the nodes and weighted links represent the players and transactions respectively the strong stable equilibrium of the network is applied to detect possible market equilibria obtained through a dynamic game with incomplete and imperfect information in which the players form an evolutionary network while trying to maximize their own utilities the model is conceptually illustrated with a four bus test system and then applied to the ieee30 test system to analyze the impact of the transmission network and information on the equilibria and market performance

multi unit pay your bid auctions with variable awards abstract multi unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit in an independent private values pay your bid auction where bidders may win up to two units we show that first order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability this behavior is not found in multi unit uniform price auctions it also contrasts with asymmetric first price auctions of a single good whose first order conditions are superficially similar a uniform distribution example is analyzed numerically journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 c72

advanced pricing in electrical systems i theory this paper sets forth a comprehensive theory for the real time pricing of electricity that includes selected ancillary services and extends the theory to incorporate constraints on power quality and environment impact that often influence the operation of a power system this paper is part i of a two paper set it sets forth the mathematical development of the extended model for real time pricing the formulation is novel in that it combines the dynamic equations for load frequency control with the static equations of a constrained optimal power flow part ii derives optimal nodal specific real time prices for both real and reactive power the prices derived include additive premia or opportunity costs reflecting the effects of voltage regulation maintenance of generation and transmission reserves regulation of frequency and tie line flows removal and or control of power harmonics and others

revenue adequate bidding strategies in competitive electricity markets energy trading in a competitive electricity market can be modeled as a two level optimization at the top level a centralized economic dispatch ced uses a priority list method to solve the fundamental problem of reliable market clearing with price discovery the lower level consists of a set of decentralized bidding db subproblems the db model uses a self unit scheduling simulator based on parametric dynamic programming to produce hourly bid curves for the central dispatch coordinator unit operating constraints and costs such as the unit minimum up and minimum down times ramp rates and the unit start up no load and sunk capital costs are internalized in the bid curves through the simulator a special algorithm is presented to solve the revenue adequacy problem for marginal units both ced and db models are based on the revenue maximization in contrast with the cost minimization criteria used in the conventional unit commitment uc the proposed method has been tested in a study case and some interesting results have been demonstrated

the relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment we examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting we show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue when the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders then the particulars of the auction format matter all equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient the relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction depending on the specifics of the environment these conclusions regarding the efficiency and revenue ranking are in contrast to the previous literature which focused on the case of independent information across agents

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices

impacts of network constraints on electricity market equilibrium nash equilibrium is usually used as the solution of generator s strategic bidding in electricity markets the available literature has shown by simulation that multiple market equilibria or no pure equilibrium may be induced after the inclusion of network constraints transmission constraints this paper presents a systematical analysis for the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium in oligopolistic electricity markets in our modeling the independent system operator iso dispatches generation and determines nodal prices via solving an optimal power flow opf and the individual generator optimizes its submitted supply function with nash supply function equilibrium sfe strategy after taking into account iso s decision making process on dispatched generations and nodal prices the conditions for the existence of equilibrium are given and it is shown that there may be multiple equilibria or no pure nash equilibrium the equilibrium if it exists will be at a point where generators pay no congestion charge

bounding revenue comparisons across multi unit auction formats under e best response expected revenue and allocative efficiency are two of the most important considerations in auction design the revenue equivalence theorem provides conditions under which many singleobject auctions generate the same expected revenue but theory provides little guidance when more than one object is sold in such settings the question of which auction format or pricing rule generates the most expected revenue or the most efficient allocation remains largely an empirical one in canada the central bank the bank of canada currently uses a multi unit sealed bid auction format in conjunction with a discriminatory pricing rule to invest excess government cash in term deposits at a select group of financial institutions winners at these auctions pay their tendered bids so participants shave their bids in equilibrium and winning allocations can be inefficient we consider what would happen to expected revenues and allocational efficiency should the bank of canada switch from the

tariff structure of japanese electric power companies an empirical analysis using dea this research explores a marginal cost mc based pricing system using data envelopment analysis dea this dea technique is widely applied for performance analysis and efficiency measurement in public and private sectors this article does not follow such a previous research direction rather directing itself towards the new measurement of mc and ramsey prices of multiple electric power services as an important case study this research applies the proposed dea approach to examine how much the current tariffs of japanese electric power services deviate from these mc and ramsey prices this type of research has never been explored in japan even though such a research effort is needed by many policy makers and consumers it is hoped that our empirical findings can serve as a policy making basis for guiding the japanese electric power industry this study believes that this japanese experience is useful for other nations such as asia pacific countries where many public industries are regulated by their governments

time of day electricity consumption response to temperature and the ownership of air conditioning appliances this article is concerned with the endogeneity of air conditioning appliance ownership in the consumption of electricity by time of day tod both tod consumption and air conditioning appliance ownership depend on temperature level and on household responsiveness to temperature variation as well as on other measured household characteristics the article presents an appropriate econometric methodology and applies it to obtain estimates and perform tests based on data from southern california edison s residential tod pricing experiment the authors emphasize the implications for estimated consumption price elasticities

commercial industrial customer response to time of use electricity prices some experimental results this article analyzes a time of use pricing experiment involving over 700 small and medium size commercial industrial firms two basic rate structures were implemented one with time varying demand kw charges and a flat energy kwh charge and the other with time varying energy charges and a flat kw charge a small but statistically significant elasticity of substitution between peak and offpeak kwh consumption is estimated for the summer season in the overall sample for firms facing the time of use demand rate a substantially larger response is estimated in the summer season for the subgroup of large firms in the experiment that faced a time of use demand rate and this response translates into a welfare gain that in just the first year more than offsets the additional metering costs involved under mandatory implementation

comprehensive bidding strategies with genetic programming finite state automata this research is an extension of the authors previous work in double auctions aimed at developing bidding strategies for electric utilities which trade electricity competitively the improvements detailed in this paper come from using data structures which combine genetic programming and finite state automata termed gp automata the strategies developed by the method described here are adaptive reacting to inputs whereas the previously developed strategies were only suitable in the particular scenario for which they had been designed the strategies encoded in the gp automata are tested in an auction simulator the simulator pits them against other distribution companies distcos and generation companies gencos buying and selling power via double auctions implemented in regional commodity exchanges the gp automata are evolved with a genetic algorithm so that they possess certain characteristics in addition to designing successful bidding strategies whose usage would result in higher profits the resulting strategies can also be designed to imitate certain types of trading behaviors the resulting strategies can be implemented directly in online trading or can be used as realistic competitors in an off line trading simulator

wheeling rates of reactive power flow under marginal cost pricing wheeling is the transmission of electrical power and reactive power from a seller to a buyer through a transmission network owned by a third party the wheeling rate is an area of intense research in view of increased deregulation this paper uses a wheeling rate based on marginal cost pricing and implemented using a modification of the optimal power flow opf a case study based on the ieee 30 bus system illustrates the magnitudes and ranges that wheeling rates might have in different circumstances special attention is paid to reactive wheeling which cannot be analyzed with a dc model used by previous authors the ratio of wheeling rates between real and reactive flow shows the importance of the latter the paper also discusses the significance of this for the trade off between paying for reactive wheel or investing in compensating plant

the treasury s experiment with single price auctions in the mid 1970s winner s or taxpayer s curse this study examines the treasury s experiment with single price bond auctions in the mid 1970s and finds that controlling for factors unrelated to auction technique markups of auction average rates over when issued rates shortly after auctions were a statistically significant seven to eight basis points higher at single price auctions than at discriminating price auctions these results suggest that single price auctions raised treasury borrowing costs by roughly 3 4 percent of the issuing price of auctioned securities copyright 1994 by mit press

identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand this note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand

nash equilibrium in strategic bidding a binary expansion approach this paper presents a mixed integer linear programming solution approach for the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec problem of finding the nash equilibrium ne in strategic bidding in short term electricity markets a binary expansion be scheme is used to transform the nonlinear nonconvex ne problem into a mixed integer linear problem milp which can be solved by commercially available computational systems the be scheme can be applicable to cournot bertrand or joint price quantity bidding models the approach is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 95 gw brazilian system including unit commitment decisions to the price maker agents

optimal electricity supply bidding by markov decision process the bidding decision making problem is studied from a supplier s viewpoint in a spot market environment the decision making problem is formulated as a markov decision process a discrete stochastic optimization method all other suppliers are modeled by their bidding parameters with corresponding probabilities a systematic method is developed to calculate transition probabilities and rewards a simplified market clearing system is also included in the implementation a risk neutral decision maker is assumed the optimal strategy is calculated to maximize the expected reward over a planning horizon simulation cases are used to illustrate the proposed method

efficiency of large private value auctions we consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply in this setting equlibria generally will be inefficient despite this we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are large and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior

competitive bidding as a control problem the dynamics and mechanisms of bidding by electricity generators to supply electricity to a national grid are investigated a mathematical model for the bidding process is developed and the generators are assumed to act rationally according to the maximize expected utility principle the model and system objectives are interpreted as a classical control problem and results simulated and analytical are presented the results show that by introducing multiple bidding rounds convergence to a pareto optimum is possible if a proportional integral control policy is introduced

lancaster s principle of efficient choice an empirical note abstract lancaster s principle of efficient choice is submitted to an empirical examination using data from consumer reports the results give only moderate support for that principle

an empirical study of auction revenue rankings the case of municipal bonds using a novel dataset of 386 rst price municipal bond auctions held in california i perform counterfactual revenue comparisons based on the theoretical result of milgrom and weber 1982 i show that the revenue in the second price auction is non parametrically identi ed and the counterfactual revenue in the english auction can be bounded in an informative way these results form a

optimal response of a thermal unit to an electricity spot market this paper addresses the optimal response of a thermal unit to an electricity spot market the objective is to maximize the unit profit from selling both energy and spinning reserve in the spot market the paper proposes a 0 1 mixed integer linear programming approach that allows a rigorous modeling of i nonconvex and nondifferentiable operating costs ii exponential start up costs iii available spinning reserve taking into account ramp rate restrictions and iv minimum up and down time constraints this approach overcomes the modeling limitations of dynamic programming approaches and is computationally efficient results from realistic case studies are reported

the impact of auction choice on revenue in treasury bill auctions an empirical evaluation abstract i evaluate whether uniform price or discriminatory auctions are revenue superior for selling treasury bills to this end i apply two structural econometric models hortacsu and mcadams 2010 and fevrier et al 2002 to a dataset on polish zero coupon bonds my secondary aim is to analyze mutual inconsistencies in prediction from these models i find that both agree on the revenue superiority of discriminatory auctions by between 0 01 and 1 5 the models predictions are contradictory in only 7 of auctions the large scale agreement of two vastly different models gives confidence that the conclusions on polish data are robust to varying many of the underlying economic and econometric assumptions and not likely just a modeling artifact

artificial power markets and unintended consequences administrative pricing rules that try to mimic economic equilibria often fail to capture the complexity of real markets and in that failure can distort incentives as much as or more than cost based pricing in this paper the authors provide three examples of the failure of administrative mechanisms meant to mimic a market two of those examples are very relevant to current debates over industry restructuring in each case the pricing rule fails to maximize social welfare even though in the last two examples production cost is minimized

hydrothermal market simulator using game theory assessment of market power the aim of this work is to build a model able to simulate a hydrothermal electric power market based on simple bids to a power exchange the model studies the behavior of different market agents in a short term horizon and delivers information about spot prices use of water and other relevant variables initially a thermoelectric market is simulated through a static model based on cournot concepts the addition of hydroelectric power stations and time dependencies is made later using a dynamic programming algorithm to build a dynamic model in each stage and state of the dynamic programming a nash cournot equilibrium is determined to assess the behavior of the thermoelectric power stations static model different strategies that firms can follow and the consequences of each one of them are analyzed market power mitigation effects of physical and financial bilateral contracts are also investigated a case study with data on the chilean power system is presented and analyzed

market mechanisms in online peer to peer lending online peer to peer lending p2p lending has emerged as an appealing new channel of financing in recent years a fundamental but largely unanswered question in this nascent industry is the choice of market mechanisms i e how the supply and demand of funds are matched and the terms price at which transactions will occur two of the most popular mechanisms are auctions where the crowd determines the price of the transaction through an auction process and posted prices where the platform determines the price while p2p lending platforms typically use one or the other there is little systematic research on the implications of such choices for market participants transaction outcomes and social welfare we address this question both theoretically and empirically we first develop a game theoretic model that yields empirically testable hypotheses taking into account the incentive of the platform we then test these hypotheses by exploiting a regime change from auctions to posted prices on one of the largest p2p lending platforms consistent with our hypotheses we find that under platform mandated posted prices loans are funded with higher probability but the preset interest rates are higher than borrowers starting interest rates and contract interest rates in auctions more important all else equal loans funded under posted prices are more likely to default thereby undermining lenders returns on investment and their surplus although platform mandated posted prices may be faster in originating loans auctions that rely on the crowd to discover prices are not necessarily inferior in terms of overall social welfare this paper was accepted by chris forman information systems

mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions an empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market we propose an estimation method to bound bidders marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid level data and apply the method to data from the turkish treasury auction market using estimated bounds on marginal values we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or vickrey auction we conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue moreover such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0 02 percent

transaction analysis in deregulated power systems using game theory the electric power industry is in transition to a deregulated marketplace for power transactions in this environment all power transactions are made based on price rather than cost a regional power pool is noted as the most straightforward path to a deregulated electricity marketplace however many questions remain unanswered regarding the economics of power pool participation in a deregulated energy marketplace participants are interested in maximizing their own profits regardless of the system wide profits it is perceived that competition will reduce the price of electricity for retail customers however the key issue for participants is related with the price definition to remain competitive in this paper the authors use game theory to simulate the decision making process for defining offered prices in a deregulated environment the outcome of this study may be used by power pool coordinators to discourage unfair coalitions a modified ieee 30 bus power system is used as a deregulated power pool to illustrate the main features of the proposed method

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

quantitative easing auctions of treasury bonds abstract the federal reserve uses reverse auctions to implement its purchases of treasury bonds in quantitative easing qe to evaluate dealers offers across multiple bonds the fed relies on its internal yield curve model fitted to secondary market bond prices from november 2010 to september 2011 a one standard deviation increase in the cheapness of a treasury bond how much the market price of the bond is below a model implied value increases the fed s purchase quantity of that bond by 276 million and increases the auction costs on that bond by 2 6 cents per 100 par value controlling for standard covariates our results suggest that the fed harvests gains from trades by purchasing undervalued bonds but strategic dealers extract some profits because the fed s relative values can be partly inferred from price data

divisible good auctions with asymmetric information an experimental examination an experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good in a symmetric information environment the different auction formats provide the same average revenue however when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform price auction the volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform price auctions in all treatments the results therefore provide support for the use of the discriminatory format subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior

the conservation and welfare effects of information in a time of day pricing experiment a recurring concern in tod pricing studies has been that short term experimental tod rates may not stimulate as much conservation as would occur if tod rates were implemented on a permanent basis that is how accurately do experimental tod pricing results extend to nonexperimental settings the present paper provides information relevant to this adjustment question we examine a little analyzed component of the tod pricing experiment conducted by the southern california edison sce company wherein a subset of the tod treatment households had a continuous display electricity use monitoring device installed mid way through the experiment the sce experiment was one of 14 tod pricing studies initiated by the u s department of energy doe most analyses of tod pricing have been based on doe initiated studies but this experiment was the only such study to include the monitoring component this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimization based bidding strategies in the deregulated market with the deregulation of electric power systems market participants are facing an important task of bidding energy to an independent system operator iso this paper presents a model and a method for optimization based bidding and self scheduling where a utility bids part of its energy and self schedules the rest as in new england the model considers iso bid selections and uncertain bidding information of other market participants with appropriately simplified bidding and iso models closed form iso solutions are first obtained these solutions are then plugged into the utility s bidding and self scheduling model which is solved by using lagrangian relaxation testing results show that the method effectively solves the problem with reasonable amount of cpu time

sovereign debt auctions uniform or discriminatory abstract many financial assets especially government bonds are issued by an auction an important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism uniform versus discriminatory theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the dominance of one type of auction over the other we investigate the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions we find that the majority of the issuers countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism for issuing government debt we use a multinomial logit procedure and discriminatory analysis to investigate the mechanism choice it was interesting to find that market oriented economies and those that practice common law tend to use a uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice civil law tend to use discriminatory price auctions

do farmers value the environment evidence from a conservation reserve program auction the paper uses data from one conservation reserve program crp auction to elicit farmers attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids the crp pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use an interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land

bidder behavior in multiunit auctions evidence from swedish treasury auctions we analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 swedish treasury auctions first we document that bidders vary their prices bid dispersion and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding second we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner s curse driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies third we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information the winner s curse and the champion s plague while the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions

asymptotic efficiency for discriminatory private value auctions we consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly for multiple units none of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players distributions over values or symmetry of equilibrium play are made because of this equilibria will typically involve inefficient allocations equilibria also become very difficult to solve for using an approach which does not depend on explicit equilibrium calculations we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of players and possibly the number of objects grows large and provide a simple characterization of limit equilibria

decomposition model and interior point methods for optimal spot pricing of electricity in deregulation environments in this paper an integrated optimal spot pricing model is presented first the proposed model includes the detailed derivation of optimal nodal specific real time prices for active and reactive powers and the method to decompose them into different components corresponding to generation loss and many selected ancillary services such as spinning reserve voltage control and security control the features of the proposed model are discussed in relationship to existing pricing models and classical economic dispatch the model is then implemented by modifying existing newton opf methods through interior point algorithms which can effectively avoid go no go gauge i e highly volatile in the calculation of spot prices case studies on 5 bus and ieee 30 bus systems are reported to illustrate the proposed method

consumer payment minimization in power pool auctions this paper presents a new methodology within the framework of centralized optimization for calculating optimal generation schedules that minimize energy payments by power pool consumers this paper addresses issues related to market structure and the operation of power pools such as bid evaluation generator no load and start up cost recovery generator unit operating constraints and market clearing price determination unlike conventional unit commitment algorithms that minimize total energy production costs the method presented here minimizes payments by power pool consumers a payment minimization objective leads to a different unit commitment and dispatch solution and lower market clearing prices additionally optimal allocation of generator no load and start up costs over the scheduling period is integrated in the bid evaluation process leading to a further reduction in consumer payments

imperfect knowledge and the new theory of demand in the conventional simple analysis of demand theory a consumer is confronted with the task of maximizing his utility in consuming two or more goods subject to a budget restraint it is usually assumed that the consumer has perfect knowledge concerning the qualities of characteristics of the goods he chooses to purchase when knowledge about one or more goods is lacking the conclusions about consumer welfare must be qualified suppose for example that a consumer maximizes his utility in consuming goods given limited information about the goods if additional information is made available the pattern of his consumption is likely to change and this change in preference can be illustrated by a new indifference map it is not possible however to compare the two sets of indifference maps for the purpose of making a decision about the change in welfare recent developments in the new theory of demand suggest a possible solution to this problem lancaster 1966a 1966b in the new framework emphasis is placed upon the characteristics of the goods which the consumer receives when he purchases goods or services the consumer s utility function is thus based upon these characteristics not the physical goods or services themselves for the purpose of analyzing the effect of changing information on consumer behavior we shall assume that the consumer spends his budget on two goods if and f2 each good possesses two characteristics designated by el and e2 the first characteristic yields positive utility while the second imposes a negative utility 2 the basic model is illustrated in figure 1 the

auctioning the digital dividend a model for spectrum auctions abstract we model a spectrum auction where firms purchase units to participate in a constrained multi product downstream market we use dynamic programming techniques to numerically solve for the optimal bidding strategy in a clock auction firms value constraining competitor market power so incumbents often bid aggressively to shut out entrants we find that high cost firms may hold up the market so the auction may be inefficient and generate zero revenue an auction may be optimal for a regulator maximising total surplus a regulator maximising auction revenue sets reserve prices high enough to restrict spectra sold effectively behaving as a monopolist

auction design in day ahead electricity markets competition in day ahead electricity markets has been established through auctions where generators and loads bid prices and quantities different approaches have been discussed regarding the market auction design multi round auctions despite its implementation complexity allow market participants to adapt their successive bids to market prices considering their operational and economic constraints however most of the day ahead electricity market implementations use noniterative single round auctions this paper presents a market simulator to compare both auction models different auction alternatives such as the spanish single round auction that takes into account special conditions included in the generator bids and multi round auctions with different stopping rules are analyzed the results and acquired experience in the simulation of the spanish market started in january 1998 are presented hourly market prices average daily price price demand correlation and several economic efficiency indicators such as generator surplus consumer surplus and social welfare are compared to derive conclusions regarding the performance of the auction alternatives

the study of the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategies of gencos the paper studies the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategies of gencos in a pool based power market the generator under consideration can form any potential coalition with other generators subgroups are then formed and each of these subgroups consists of some members which coordinate their bidding strategies to achieve a common goal noncooperative gaming applies among all the subgroups while cooperative gaming applies among the members in each subgroup by implementation of bids sensitivities the paper presents an algorithm for the members in each coalition subgroup to obtain optimal bids which essentially is based on interior point optimal power flow ipopf model a priority list produced after optimal bids are found for all the potential combinations of coalition is used by the generator under consideration to bargain with members on the list the algorithm and model are tested by the ieee 30 bus system and numerical results are presented

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

time of use electricity pricing evidence from a british experiment seemingly unrelated regression sure analysis is applied to data from a british time of use tou pricing experiment it is shown that consumption changes are statistically significant and important but vary by consumption strata the results have implications for demand system analysis of tou data

price taker bidding strategy under price uncertainty this paper provides a framework to obtain the optimal bidding strategy of a price taker producer an appropriate forecasting tool is used to estimate the probability density functions of next day hourly market clearing prices this probabilistic information is used to formulate a self scheduling profit maximization problem that is solved taking advantage of its particular structure the solution of this problem allows deriving a simple yet informed bidding rule results from a realistic case study are discussed in detail

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions evidence from when issued transactions abstract we use when issued transactions data to assess the treasury s current experiment with uniform auctions when issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions suggesting a higher information release which should reduce pre auction uncertainty and the winner s curse under uniform auctions when issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement the pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions this is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre auction information and lower the short squeeze a direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

valuing dealers informational advantage a study of canadian treasury auctions in many financial markets dealers have the advantage of observing the orders of their customers to quantify the economic benefit that dealers derive from this advantage we study detailed data from canadian treasury auctions where dealers observe customer bids while preparing their own bids in this setting dealers can use information on customer bids to learn about i competition that is the distribution of competing bids in the auction and ii fundamentals that is the ex post value of the security being auctioned we devise formal hypothesis tests for both sources of informational advantage in our data we do not find evidence that dealers are learning about fundamentals we find that the information about competition contained in customer bids accounts for 13 27 of dealers expected profits

do demand curves for stocks slope down since september 1976 stocks newly included into the standard and poor s 500 index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the inclusion this return does not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion the returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds consistent with the hypothesis that demand curves for stocks slope down the returns are not related to s p s bond ratings which is inconsistent with a plausible version of the hypothesis that inclusion is a certification of the quality of the stock

beliefs and errors in voting choices a restatement of the theory of fiscal illusion this paper reformulates the theory of fiscal illusion to make it more compatible with the median voter model of collective choice it emphasizes the requirement that misperceptions about marginal tax costs and benefits must be permanent to have any significant effect on the level of public expenditures the lancaster becker model of consumer demand is then used to demonstrate the peculiar effects of permanent misperceptions on consumer demand it can be shown for example that other things being the same a republican who underestimates continuously the marginal benefits of public activities may demand more public goods than a democrat who overestimates those same benefits in a permanent fashion

forward looking behavior in ecb liquidity auctions evidence from the pre crisis period abstract using data from the pre crisis period we investigate banks joint bidding behavior in the ecb s main refinancing operations mro and longer term refinancing operations ltro we test whether banks bid at lower rates in mros before the ltro and at higher rates after the ltro compared to other operations we motivate this by findings from the auction literature suggesting that agents bidding behavior is forward looking and takes sequences of future auctions into account we offer two findings first we find that in general banks bid in the mro before the ltro at lower rates as compared to other mros moreover mro participants that also bid in the following ltro bid at even lower rates compared to peers not bidding in the ltro these findings support the hypothesis that banks view obtaining liquidity from the two operations as a substitute second we find that banks generally bid more aggressively in the mro after the ltro banks that participated also in the ltro preceding the mro bid at substantially higher rates these findings reflect that short banks with potentially large net liquidity needs in the mro after the ltro bid more aggressively although size plays a considerable role for bidding behavior the conclusions are valid for banks of different sizes

underpricing in discriminatory and uniform price treasury auctions this paper compares the newer uniform price u s treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing empirically i find that even for the newer uniform price auctions the average price received by the treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism from the summary statistics released by the treasury i calibrate common value auction models for the two mechanisms and predict the level of underpricing in each auction i find that the observed magnitude of underpricing in the auctions is consistent with the model s predictions

consumer responses to time varying prices for electricity abstract we report new experimental evidence of the household response to weekday differentials in peak and off peak electricity prices the data come from auckland new zealand where peak residential electricity consumption occurs in winter for heating peak off peak price differentials ranged over four randomly selected groups from 1 0 to 3 5 on average there was no response except in winter in winter participant households reduced electricity consumption by at least 10 took advantage of lower off peak prices but did not respond to the peak price differentials response varied with house and household size time spent away from home and whether water was heated with electricity

multicommodity spatial cournot model for generator bidding analysis conventional behavioral models such as cournot to analyze generator behavior do not reflect many of the complexities of advanced electricity markets dispatch and pricing in a number of advanced pool based electricity markets worldwide explicitly recognize the co optimization of ancillary services as well as transmission constraints this paper discusses the development of and experiments with a multimarket cournot model that deals with co optimization of multiple commodities namely energy and various classes of ancillary services and deals with transmission constraints that separate these commodity markets spatially we also discuss the multimarket extension of the cournot model to deal with bilateral contracts for energy a nonlinear programming formulation of the proposed model and the analysis of nodal prices are presented followed by a detailed set of experiments using a simple three node system the model is expected to add to understanding of complex interactions between energy and ancillary services markets and further the impact transmission capacity limits may have on exercise of market power of each of these markets

treasury bill auction procedures empirical perspectives from french market bid functions we use empirical properties of market bid functions in treasury bill auctions to analyze the treasury auction mechanism we propose an econometric method that exploits data from auction tables and we determine variables influencing the shape of market bid functions and their fluctuations across auctions we apply the estimation procedure to discriminatory french treasury bill auctions we propose several applications of our empirical model first we provide a tool to forecast incoming auctions second we measure by simulations the impact of different environments on auction rates third we provide new empirical perspectives on the debate about the best procedure between the discriminatory and the uniform price auctions

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

intelligent agents for negotiations in market games i model in competitive markets human decision makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of note that such coalitions are legal provided market power is not monopolized we present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt our negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory however it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential coalition partners in this paper we present the negotiation model

opf for reactive pricing studies on the ngc system retail transmission services like those being provided by the national grid company ngc in england and wales pose new challenges for the pricing of reactive power supply a reactive power market approach has been proposed by ngc and continues to be evaluated such an approach includes a novel requirement for transmission constrained economic dispatch of var a problem in the security constrained optimal power flow opf class the problem formulations handled by the opf package in use could not accommodate ngc s requirements this paper describes the reactive pricing problem being addressed the modeling requirements and the resulting extensions made to the opf formulation and package it discusses the test results obtained to date on the ngc system

a simulation model for a competitive generation market the simulation of a wholesale electricity market should go beyond a simple optimization based on the operating costs of the generating units a model of a competitive electricity market must consider the market structure the strategy of the market participants and any other factor that lead to prices different from costs this paper presents cosmee a model of a wholesale electricity market based on simple bids that estimates expected bid prices and quantities system hourly prices and generation schedules taking into account the bidding strategies of generators and the structure of the market the model reflects the profit maximizing behavior of the market agents subject to different types of constraints cosmee has been used to simulate a real wholesale market

optimal bidding strategies for hydro electric producers a literature survey in a competitive environment with bid based markets power generation companies desire to develop bidding strategies that maximize their revenue in this paper we ask what approaches and methodologies have been used to model the bidding problem for hydro electric producers we present the problem s developments over time and through reviewing different variants of the problem progressively build to the case in which the agent is a price maker hydro electric producer in each variant of the bidding problem we examine how the approaches used to solve it may or may not be applicable to other variants last for the price maker hydro electric producer s bidding problem we recognize the most recent developments and illuminate a path for future efforts