lorenz domination and global tax progressivity a reply the concept of tax progressivity at a point local progressivity is well defined and accepted but the concept of overall progressivity of a tax schedule global progressivity is not as precise and clearly defined even though it is an important concept and is widely used in evaluating the redistributive impact of tax policies public finance economists have been comparing tax schedules and making statements on one as more progressive than another without being very precise about the basis of comparison in my earlier paper in the may 1985 issue of this journal liu 1985 i attempted to unify the two concepts of local and global progressivity two requirements are imposed when a tax schedule is characterized as globally progressive one of which is structural and the other redistributive and hence normative in nature drawing on the earlier work of jakobsson 1976 musgrave thin s measure was shown to satisfy both requirements two recently proposed measures by suits 1977 and kakwani 1976 were shown to be unappealing from both a positive and a normative viewpoint in their comment on my paper formby smith and sykes pointed out an error in a proposition by jakobsson thereby showing that the link between the pointwise concept of residual progression and the global concept of lorenz domination is weaker than indicated by jakobsson and me this reduces the appeal of musgrave thin s global measure as structurally consistent with pointwise progressivity everywhere in the tax schedule the implication is that if we insist on this structural consistency the basis for comparison of tax schedules will be too restrictive since comparison will require one post tax income distribution to lorenz dominate another for all instead of for any pre tax income distributions hence despite my earlier effort the device of a global measure of tax progressivity that is consistent with pointwise

inequality reduction through the income tax income taxation typically has an inequality reducing impact this would be explained by theory were it the case that all income units were taxed according to a common progressive schedule but this is not so we lack a theoretical explanation for the observed finding this paper explains how income taxes that take nonincome attributes such as marital status into account can act to reduce overall income inequality copyright 1993 by the london school of economics and political science

competing through information provision this paper studies the symmetric equilibria of a two buyer two seller model of directed search in which sellers commit to information provision more informed buyers have better differentiated private valuations and extract higher rents from trade when sellers cannot commit to sale mechanisms information provision is higher under competition than under monopoly in contrast when sellers commit to both information provision and sale mechanisms i identify simple conditions under which sellers post auctions and provide full information in every equilibrium ensuring that all equilibrium outcomes are constrained efficient sellers capture the efficiency gains from increased information and compete only over non distortionary rents offered to buyers

the compliance cost of itemizing deductions evidence from individual tax returns the resource cost of operating the income tax system is large totaling as much as seven to eight percent of revenue raised one source of this cost is the system of itemized deductions which can require extensive record keeping and calculation this paper estimates the resource cost of itemizing deductions in contrast to previous studies of compliance cost which rely an survey evidence we infer this evidence from data reported on tax returns which suggest that there exists taxpayers who would save money by itemizing but who choose not to we find that in 1982 the private cost of itemizing totaled 1 44 billon or 43 per itemizing taxpayer the compliance cost dissuaded from itemizing aver 650 000 taxpayers who would have thereby saved taxes causing an extra tax liability of nearly 200 million increasing the standard deduction by 1 000 would save 100 million in resources that would otherwise have been devoted to itemizing this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal tax transfer systems and redistributive policy in this paper we develop optimal yardsticks to gauge the effectiveness of given tax and benefit policies in reducing inequality we show that the conjunction of the optimal tax and optimal benefits policies constitutes the optimal tax and benefit policy given the tax and benefit budget sizes a decomposition formula enables trends in the inequality impact of taxes and benefits to be explained in terms of changing policy effectivess targeting and budget size effects the analysis incorporates a distributional judgement parameter for sensitivity analysis and concludes with an examination of the finnish case for the period 1971 1990

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

on the principle of equal sacrifice in income taxation abstract in an influential article by young journal of economic theory 1988 44 321 335 it is shown that the traditional equal sacrifice principles in taxation can be justified from a non utilitarian perspective by proving that equal sacrifice is in fact a consequence of more primitive concepts of distributive justice this result is obtained in a distribution theoretic setting where total revenue to be raised is fixed the present paper studies the same question in a setting where the basic problem is to determine a tax function without any reference to the total tax revenue a setting which is familiar from the theory of progressive taxation and shows that i there exists a utility function which is continuous and strictly increasing relative to which all agents sacrifice equally if and only if the tax function is incentive preserving and ii any convex hence progressive and incentive preserving tax function equalizes sacrifice relative to a utility function which is continuous strictly increasing and concave

wage and technology dispersion this paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs stigler 1961 in equilibrium some firms adopt high fixed cost high productivity technologies offer high wages and fill job openings quickly other firms adopt less capital intensive technologies and offer low wages hiring mostly uninformed workers in equilibrium the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice we show that worker search which would appear to be a rent seeking activity in partial equilibrium may be efficiency enhancing in general equilibrium

racial discrimination in the labor market theory and empirics we review theories of race discrimination in the labor market taste based models can generate wage and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even when strong prejudice is not widespread but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment at their current state of development models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes have little empirical content it is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with statistical discrimination could fit the data we suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment briefly on the implication of existing theory for public policy jel j15 j31 j64 j71

on the equitability of progressive taxation abstract we propose the principle of equal sacrifice to determine the class of vertically inequitable progressive taxes a necessary condition for an income tax function to be equal sacrifice is formulated and hence a subclass of progressive taxes which cannot inflict the same sacrifice upon all individuals relative toanystrictly increasing and concave utility function is determined conversely it is shown in a general framework that any convex thus progressive tax function satisfies the principle of equal sacrifice our findings point to the fact that equal sacrifice under progressive income taxation depends heavily upon the degree of marginal rate as opposed to average rate progressivity journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d63 h20

country asymmetries endogenous product choice and the timing of trade liberalization abstract we analyze the effects of trade liberalization on firms decisions and profits in a vertical product differentiation model with countries which have different characteristics firms decide product specifications at the beginning of the game in which autarky is followed by trade liberalization whose date is anticipated our analysis suggests that a firm located in a large or rich country is the likely market leader at the trade equilibrium this outcome might be reversed if small country firms have a strong cost advantage transport costs are negligible or if the large country opens its market before the small one

the impossibility of a progressive tax structure abstract when households are identical in all respects other than income a non decreasing average tax rate is both necessary and sufficient for post tax incomes to be always at least as equal as pre tax incomes this paper investigates whether this well known result can be extended to households with different needs a tax structure which never increases inequality in the lorenz sense is shown to be unable to discriminate between household types if in addition the tax structure never reduces the relative income of the poorest member of the neediest group of households then the same proportional tax must be applied to all households and redistribution is impossible either within or between groups of households with differing needs a similar conclusion is reached using conventional equivalence scale arguments and also applies when the parameters of the tax schedules are determined endogenously we discuss the significance of this impossibility result and its implications for tax design

efficiency and surplus bounds in cournot competition we derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under cournot competition to do so we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of concavity and convexity the more concave is demand the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at rst increasing with demand concavity then eventually

a formalization of the biological model of trade in similar products abstract the present paper uses a variant of the characteristics framework to develop a world demand structure based on broadly defined international taste differences moreover firms face short run adjustments costs when changing product specifications this constellation of assumptions traces very closely the biological model of trade in similar products the usual problem of the pattern of trade indeterminacy that emerges in models of intra industry trade is resolved even in the case with zero transport costs finally the paper analyzes the efects of taste induced intra industry trade on prices and product specifications

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

single crossing conditions in comparisons of tax progressivity statements to the effect that one tax is more progressive than another are frequently made but seldom explained starting from a criterion of lorenz domination this paper shows how an intuitively appealing single crossing condition on appropriately normalized tax schedules may be used in progressivity comparisons this condition is closely related to and illuminates the necessary and sufficient condition derived by jakobsson 1976 for the distributional implications of alternative taxes to be inferred from their schedules alone

voting inequality and redistribution this paper surveys models of voting on redistribution under reason able assumptions the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner if the median is poorer than average redistribution is from rich to poor and increasing inequality increases redistribution however under different assumptions about the economic environment redistribution may not be simply rich to poor and inequality need not increase redistribution several lines of argument are presented in particular political participation public provision of private goods public pensions and tax avoidance or evasion

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

equivalence scale relativities and the extent of inequality and poverty most inequality and poverty theory analyzes equivalent income distributions for homogeneous populations incomes are assumed to be deflated by an equivalence scale that accounts for differences in needs between households yet in practice there is no consensus about what the appropriate equivalence scale is the authors analyze how the choice of equivalence scale affects inequality and poverty measures and show that there is a systematic relationship between equivalence scale generosity and the extent of inequality and poverty they consider most of the measures in common use and provide some empirical illustrations copyright 1992 by royal economic society

individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion abstract empirical evidence suggests some taxpayers never evade evasion increases with the tax rate and evasion decisions are interdependent these findings are not easily explained by the existing theory which models evasion as an independently made amoral gamble this paper uses nonpecuniary costs of evasion to reconcile theory with evidence once individuals are assumed to differ by an honesty characteristic taxpayers dichotomise into groups the more honest of which responds to a tax change as the evidence suggests a further extension is to introduce an endogenous reputation cost this suggests a positive relationship between the number of evaders and the tax rate

innovation and industry evolution the theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents by contrast we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent while the remaining firms are challengers moreover we consider a sequence of innovations so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after but only until the next better innovation is developed we begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the schumpeterian process of creative destruction that is a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger the essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods the new methods of production or transportation the new markets the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates schumpeter 1942 pp 82 83

income redistribution and local tax progressivity a reconsideration this paper investigates and clarifies the relation between global tax progressivity as measured by musgrave and thin s effective progression and pointwise local progression as measured by the elasticity of after tax income with respect to pre tax income residual progression liu s 1985 vigorous defence of the global measure of effective progression is shown to rest upon an erroneous proposition of jakobsson 1976 a counter example is presented demonstrating that the link between residual progression and lorenz domination is much weaker than the work of liu and jakobsson suggests redistribution des revenus et mesure ponctuelle de la progressivite de l imp6t un re examen ce memoire examine et clarifie les rapports entre la progressivite globale de l impot telle que mesuree par l indice de progression effective de musgrave et thin et la progressivite ponctuelle de l imp6t telle que mesuree par l elasticite du revenu apres impot par rapport au revenu avant impot la progression residuelle on montre que la vigoureuse defense de liu 1985 de la mesure globale de progression effective est batie sur une proposition erronnee de jakobsson 1976 un exemple montre bien que le lien entre la progression residuelle et la domination au sens de lorenz est bien plus faible que ne le suggerent les travaux de liu et jakobsson

lorenz dominating income tax functions this paper examines the rest rictions imposed upon income tax functions by the criterion of lorenz domination under alternative tax revenue raising regimes both neces sary and sufficient conditions are derived the necessary conditions are weaker than those already existing in the literature while the a nalysis uncovers the multitude of sufficient conditions that are poss ible copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

international capacity choice and national market games abstract international trade is modelled as a two stage game between firms in different countries at the first stage firms choose their capacity and at the second stage play a separate price game in each national market given their worldwide capacity it is established that firms use capacity strategically in order to manipulate the distribution of rivals output between markets the volume of intra industry trade is intermediate between the cases of integrated and segmented market cournot equilibria countries gain from small import tariffs and export subsidies but these gains are less than in the segmented market cournot equilibrium case

the stability of economic integration and endogenous growth this paper examines the transitional dynamics of economic integration in the two country endogenous growth model of rivera batiz and romer 1991 and in an extension by rivera batiz and xie 1992 it is shown that in the absence of knowledge flows across countries economic integration will generically lead to a corner solution where only one country does all the r d and the other specializes in manufactures when countries are symmetric the world growth rate in this equilibrium will always be higher than in autarky when countries differ in their human capital endowment the world growth rate with trade is always greater than the autarky growth rate of the low growth country but may or may not be greater than the autarky growth rate of the high growth country this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the design of direct taxation and family benefits abstract the subject of this paper is the design of the personal income tax and social security benefits that vary with the size of the family it is concerned with the analytical problems of policy design that arise from constraints on the instruments which may be used from differences in social judgements about the desirability of redistribution and from differences of view about the disincentive effects of taxation the paper considers these issues in the context of the french tax benefit system and the implications of the french system being harmonised towards certain features of the british system

optimal top marginal tax rates under income splitting for couples abstract this paper provides formulas for optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are taxed according to income splitting between spouses consumption is taxed and the skill distribution is unbounded optimal top marginal income tax rates are computed for germany using a dataset that includes the tax returns of all german top taxpayers we find that the optimal top marginal tax rate converges to about 2 3 and convergence obtains at income levels that are substantially higher than those currently subject to the actual top tax rate

income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma based model of tax evasion abstract this paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma based model of tax compliance the paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge precisely multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous because the social coordination effect dominates the individual characteristics effect numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two step audit policies on the part of the tax agency under the presumption that the best or good equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria as a byproduct the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two step audit policy the equilibrium compliance and fiscal revenue is analyzed

sunk costs and trade liberalization a model of vertical product differentiation is applied to the study of trade between two countries of differing sizes firms in the small country choose lower quality products in autarky unlike a shaked and j sutton 1984 welfare effects of trade are fully analyzed and shown to depend on the degree of sunkness of costs if firms have not sunk costs losses from trade may arise for the small country in the short run when quality is fixed and for the large country in the long run when quality is variable if costs are sunk both countries always gain from trade copyright 1992 by royal economic society

reinterpreting the frisch parameter in the field of personal taxation a link between taxable capacity and social marginal utility in optimal taxation we give an objective meaning to the concept of taxable capacity and establish a theoretical link between optimal taxation theory ott and the proposals of the carter and meade reports solving at the same time kay s 2008 criticism to both approaches

inequality reducing properties of composite taxation abstract on the one hand we know that the more progressive a tax schedule the more equally distributed the after tax incomes u jakobsson j public econ 5 1976 161 168 on the other hand most tax systems involve a complex procedure where individual incomes are successively subjected to different rounds of taxation we study in the paper the inequality reducing properties of the composition of different taxation schemes and we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for after tax inequality to decrease when the degree of progressivity of one element or more of the tax system is increased for the sake of generality we assimilate the set of income distributions with the space of probability measures over an interval of the real line and any function that associates after tax incomes to before tax incomes is viewed as a taxation scheme this general approach proves to be particularly powerful when investigating the restrictions the egalitarian principle imposes on the set of admissible taxation schemes journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 h24

a necessary and sufficient condition for greater conditional progressivity conditional progressivity is defined in terms of a weakly lorenz dominating posttax income distribution conditional upon a given pretax income distribution this paper derives a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for one income tax to be conditionally more progressive than another it involves the odd number crossing of normalized posttax income functions together with certain integral or summation conditions single crossing as a special case is sufficient if the posttax income functions are at least piecewise differentiable an average rate progressivity condition is sufficient for the residual progressivity condition which in turn is sufficient for single crossing

flat rate taxes and inequality measurement abstract tax flattening exercises which include an increase in personal allowances have been pervasive over the past two decades such changes which typically benefit both the poor and the rich at the expense of the middle class have complex redistributive effects which are not obviously equalizing or disequalizing we develop a systematic approach to comparing the relative inequality of flat rate tax schemes to conventional graduated rate taxes we provide an illustrative example using 1993 u s taxfiler data

on income tax avoidance the case of germany abstract we present a micro estimate determining taxed income as a function of gross income and all major deduction options depending on household and asset categories it shows that tax savings strongly increase with increasing income resulting in an effective marginal tax rate 16 percentage points below the legislated one for the highest income groups this calls into question the intended distributional impact of progressive income taxation our estimate suggests aggregate income tax losses to the german fiscal authorities in the order of magnitude of 34 of wage and income taxes paid in 1983 relative to 1994 tax proceeds this percentage would amount to dm 105 b

transitional dynamics of economic integration and endogenous growth abstract rivera batiz and romer have demonstrated some comparative dynamic analysis namely comparing pre and post economic integration balanced growth paths and have derived interesting economic results even though these results are interesting their analysis has a serious shortcoming namely the balanced growth path studied by them exhibits a knife edge property and is unstable this clearly implies that their results are not robust in this paper we propose a modified knowledge driven model based on their model then we give a comparative dynamic analysis and show different results of economic integration from theirs

corruption in tax administration abstract we extend the game theoretic model of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 to allow for corruption in tax administration in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence in fact in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited moreover when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue

a general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement this paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax and enforcement schemes our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates audit probabilities and penalties for misreporting in particular it is shown that for a variety of objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave at least weakly and monotonic the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs our results imply that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy it is well accepted by now that informational asymmetries generate important constraints on the formulation of economic policy an early and classic example is given by mirrlees 1971 who considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals differ in their ability to transform effort into income it is assumed that ability and effort of an individual cannot be observed at any cost whereas income which is the product of these two unobservables is perfectly and costlessly observable taxes can thus depend only on final income under these informational conditions the equity efficiency tradeoffs that constrain the choice of tax policy arise only because of the presence of moral hazard associated with taxation of income if there were no moral hazard i e individual efforts and therefore incomes were exogenous the problem of optimal income taxation would be a trivial one since by assumption individual incomes are perfectly and costlessly observable in much of the recent literature on optimal income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement reinganum and wilde 1985 border and sobel 1987 and others on the other hand individual incomes are treated as exogenous i e there is no moral hazard however informational constraints arise from another important consideration namely an individual s income cannot be directly observed it can only be verified through a costly

the demand for tax haven operations what types of firms establish tax haven operations and what purposes do these operations serve analysis of affiliate level data for american firms indicates that larger more international firms and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high r and d intensities are the most likely to use tax havens tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income the evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of u s taxation of foreign income firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens one percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non haven countries is associated with a 1 5 to 2 greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation

on the effects of ranking by unemployment duration abstract we propose a theory based on the firm s hiring behavior that rationalizes the observed significant decline of callback rates for an interview and exit rates from unemployment and the mild decline of reemployment wages over unemployment duration we build a directed search model with symmetric incomplete information on worker types and non sequential search by firms sorting due to firms testing of applicants in the past makes expected productivity fall with duration which induces firms to rank applicants by duration in equilibrium callback and exit rates both fall with unemployment duration in our numerical exercise using u s data we show that our model can replicate quite well the observed falling patterns with the firm s ranking decision accounting for a sizable part

rational conjectures in the theory of oligopoly abstract the paper employs the notion of rational conjectural equilibrium to remove the arbitrary nature of conjectures about rivals reactions which characterises the traditional non cooperative theory of oligopoly a general definition of these equilibria is given and the concept is then applied to a simple duopoly model the standard models of perfect competition monopoly limit price dominant firms are shown to emerge as special cases of rational conjectural equilibria

distributive justice in taxation abstract a classical criterion for apportioning taxes is that all should sacrifice equally in loss of utility suppose that a method of apportioning taxes is continuous and has the following four properties i the way that taxpayers split a given tax total depends only on their own taxable incomes ii an increase in the tax total implies that everyone pays more iii every incremental increase in tax is apportioned according to taxpayers current after tax incomes iv the ordering of taxpayers by pre tax income and after tax income is the same then there exists a utility function relative to which all sacrifice equally

tax progressivity income distribution and tax non compliance this article examines the determinants of tax non compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive tax advice industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability we apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry this tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence the level of noncompliance is the convexity of the demand schedule we show that in this context this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre tax income the progressivity of the tax schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income it is shown that lower pre tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities therefore the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline one way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions

persistence of leadership in product innovation in a firm model of vertical product differentiation three distinct patterns of market shares emerge as an equilibrium outcome reflecting three distinct strategies in respect of timing of the introduction of new products the main novelty relative to the existing literature on vertical product differentiation lies in the incorporation of learning by doing this assumption generates stability of market share patterns over a sequence of product innovations copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

a mechanism design approach to the tiebout hypothesis we revisit the tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens it is shown in quasi linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed

tax reform and progressivity the established theory of tax progressivity cannot handle basic tax reform questions such as whether an increase in personal allowances makes the tau system more progressive because the core results assume that tax liability is never zero this paper generalises the core theory to allow for zero tax payments and applies the new framework to the analysis of allowances income related deductions and tau credits log concavity of the tax schedule a property quite distinct from any existing notion of progressivity emerges as the critical determinant of whether the distribution of die tau burden becomes more progressive as allowances are increased

taxation with representation abstract in this paper a framework is developed for the joint analysis of tax preparation mode and tax non compliance estimation is performed using micro level audit data from the internal revenue service although tha availability of tax practitioners undoubtedly reduces many of the informational and computational barriers to tax compliance the results indicate that their use particularly the use of cpas and attorneys is associated with increased tax non compliance which may have negative implications for both tax equity and tax efficiency

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of duopolistic equilibria the purpose of this article is to investigate the basic premise that the various oligopoly models result in an unacceptable divergence in market equilibria in the first half of the paper a theoretical model of a static conjectural variation duopoly with symmetric costs is presented using this model we define the coefficient of dispersion of equilibria and show that it is solely a function of the basic conditions of the market costs and demand this result is of empirical significance because it is possible to determine ex ante from easily observable information the extent to which conjectural variation market conduct will influence market equilibrium variation conjecturale et indetermination des equilibres duopolistiques l objectif de cet article est d analyser la proposition fondamentale que les divers modeles d oligopole se resolvent en une divergence inacceptable d equilibres de marche dans la premiere partie du m6moire on presente un modele theorique de duopole avec variation conjecturale statique et couits symmetriques avec l aide de ce modele on definit le coefficient de dispersion des equilibres et on montre qu il est seulement fonction des conditions du marche cofits et demande ce resultat a une importance empirique significative parce qu il devient possible de determiner ex ante a partir de renseignements facilement observables jusqu a quel point la variation conjecturale la conduite sur le marche va influencer l equilibre du marche

tax arbitrage and labor supply we examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well functioning asset markets affects the basic labor supply model we show that tax arbitrage has dramatic implications for positive normative and econometric analysis of how taxes affect work incentives

on the persistence of leadership or leapfrogging in international trade when two countries starting from different quality levels reflecting different conditions on domestic market demands open to trade two possible equilibria arise in the first the quality leader maintains its position in the second leapfrogging occurs however the latter is possible only if the initial quality gap is not too wide further when the risk dominance criterion is used only the former equilibrium is selected these results suggest that initial conditions such as domestic market size or home demand preferences are important factors in determining relative competitiveness of firms in international markets

analyzing redistribution policies a study using austrialian data preface 1 introduction part i conceptual issues in the measurement of income distribution 2 income recipient units and their differing needs 3 income concept in the analysis of income distribution part ii measures of income inequality redistribution and equity 4 on the measurement of income inequality 5 measures of redistribution and equity part iii distribution and redistribution of income 6 distribution of income in australia 7 tax rates and government benefit rates by income ranges 8 effects of taxes and cash benefits on equity 9 redistribution of income within and between socioeconomic and demographic groups 10 progressivity of sales tax on individual expenditure items part iv welfare and poverty 11 distribution of welfare in australia 12 optimal negative income taxation when individuals feel envious 13 the impact of taxes and cash benefits on poverty appendix notes references author index subject index

national treatment at the wto the roles of product and country heterogeneity this paper analyzes the world trade organization s wto s national treatment nt clause in a two country model where quality of goods and or market size are heterogenous across countries when market size is symmetric across countries a reciprocal nt agreement i benefits the high quality country ii hurts the low quality country and iii delivers higher aggregate world welfare however such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high quality country s market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small i e goods are sufficiently alike the qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined

directed search on the job and the wage ladder we model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers search using wage offers and employment probabilities applicants observe all offers and face a trade off between wage and employment probability there is wage dispersion among workers even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous equilibrium wages form a ladder as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time this is because low wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage with a lower chance of success

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

uniform progressivity residual progression and single crossing abstract the relationship between lower residual progression and single crossing conditions as necessary and sufficient conditions for one tax system to be conditionally more progressive or uniformly more progressive than another are clarified

two remarks on cournot equilibria abstract we describe two simple results in the theory of cournot equilibria the first has to do with the effect of taxation in a cournot industry and the second describes under what conditions a cournot equilibrium will implicity maximize an objective function these results are probably known but are not well known and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out

learning by doing and the choice of technology the role of patience if agents learn by doing and are myopic less advanced firms might adopt new technologies while more advanced firms would stick with the old technology this kind of overtaking can also occur if agents are forward looking and have high discount rates however overtaking never occurs if agents are sufficiently patient a finite discount rate increases the set of states at which agents adopt new technologies so more patient agents tend to upgrade their technology more frequently journal of economic literature classification numbers d92 o14 o33

household equivalence scales and the measurement of inequality transfers from the poor to the rich could decrease inequality abstract the use of equivalence scales when measuring income inequality can lead to the paradoxical result that transferring money from poor to wealthy households may reduce measured inequality this paper explains this result and restates the pigou dalton transfer axiom in a way that gets around this counterintuitive outcome

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation we examine the circumstances under which minimal equal sacrifice taxation reduces income inequality focusing on absolute sacrifice and relative inequality we show that after tax incomes are more equally distributed than before tax incomes and that after tax inequality decreases with the revenue to be raised if and only if the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is decreasing however other things equal after tax inequality is shown to decline as the utility function becomes more concave we investigate next how these conclusions extend when one takes the absolute inequality view and considers that it is the relative loss in utility that has to be equalized across individuals

corruption extortion and evasion corruption evasion and the abuse of power and the possibility thereof are pervasive features of economic activity a prominent instance is tax collection this paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of potentially non linear tax collection schemes amongst the findings are that the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in practice and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be paid commission on high income reports but not on low with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be a previously unnoticed trade off between equity and efficiency

tax morale in latin america in the tax compliance literature there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of tax morale in developing countries as a novelty this paper focuses thus on latin america analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically affect tax morale working with the two data sets latinobarometro and world values survey our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy furthermore people who said they knew have heard about practised tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others looking at individuals perception of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden lacking honesty and corruption are seen as the main factors we observed a significantly lower tax morale in south america mexico than in the central american caribbean area furthermore trust in the president and the officials the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax morale

optimal non linear income taxation for reduction of envy abstract this paper examines the optimal non linear income taxation problem based on equitability an allocation is equitable if no agent envies a proportion of the bundle of any other agent we examine the properties of pareto undominated allocations for various equitability requirements when there is one output the marginal income tax rate can increase only if leisure is a luxury in a multi commodity model with commodity taxes the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and or those with high hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily when preferences exhibit quasi linearity we can show that the introduction of the equitability constraint increases the marginal income tax rates of the entire population

tax evasion under differential taxation the economics of income source misreporting abstract if different income sources are subject to different rates of taxation a taxpayer may find it worthwhile to evade taxes by declaring part of his higher taxed income as stemming from a lower taxed source this paper inquires into the determinants of income source misreporting focusing on the relationships between misreporting and taxation under alternative penalty schemes allowing the taxpayer the choice between source misreporting and pure underreporting the paper examines also the relative amount of tax escaping the tax collector through the alternative forms of evasion and determines the conditions under which one will be preferred to the other

the political economics of not paying taxes this paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance when tax avoidance is possible the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay this affects both redistributive outcomes as well as political attitudes towards taxation depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge when the avoidance possibilities are limited the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained if the tax avoidance technology is more effective however the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation where a coalition of poor and the very richest favor a higher tax rate comparing the model predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity it comes surprisingly close to actual observations

nontaxable income and necessary consumption the rousseau s paradox of fiscal egalitarianism this article compares a tax method featuring flat rates and fixed allowances equal for all taxpayers surplus income tax method sitm procedure with a tax method featuring also flat rates and increasing personal allowances ipas to meet the amounts of necessary consumption required by the different living standards discretionary income tax method ditm procedure our results show that the ditm procedure generates an after tax income distribution less unequal and superior in terms of social welfare moreover the assumption for comparison purposes of identical total tax revenues leads to the corollary that the flat tax rate under the ditm is necessarily larger than the one under the sitm being thus the former taxmethod is more progressive than the latter these results imply an obvious paradox considering the commonly accepted principle that basic necessities are the same for everyone rousseau 1755 based on the results obtained in this article we have labelled this paradox as the rousseau s

consistent income tax structures when households are heterogeneous the paper examines the redistributive impact of income taxation for heterogeneous populations an equivalent income function is introduced in order to adjust the incomes of different types of households and the redistributive performance of the tax system is evaluated by comparing the lorenz curves of the distributions of before and after tax equivalent incomes inequality reduction after tax imposes mild consistency conditions which are met by most current tax systems if the inequality reducing effect of taxation is required to be independent of the reference household type then the structure of the equivalent income function is fully determined by the inequality concept journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 h24

measuring income tax discrimination we propose a procedure for measuring the effect of systematic discrimination in the income tax different socioeconomic groups are assumed to face different tax schedules we show that a welfare loss is caused by the group specificity of schedules the dollar value of which is our measure of discrimination defining vertical equity as the dollar value of the tax system s welfare superiority over an equal yield flat tax discrimination equates to a loss in vertical equity the australian income tax is found to discriminate against wage and salary earners causing a roughly 1 loss of social welfare in 1984

import competition product quality reversal and welfare abstract we investigate product quality in an import competing country using the framework of vertical product differentiation comparison of three polices suggests that the quality based r d subsidy brings quality reversal leading to a win win win equilibrium in consumer surplus domestic profit and social welfare

noncontractible heterogeneity in directed search this paper provides a directed search model designed to explain the residual part of wage variation left over after the impact of education and other observable worker characteristics have been removed workers have private information about their characteristics at the time they apply for jobs firms value these characteristics differently and can observe them once workers apply they hire the worker they most prefer however the characteristics are not contractible so firms cannot condition their wages on them this paper shows how to extend arguments from directed search to handle this allowing for arbitrary distributions of worker and firm types the model is used to provide a functional relationship that ties together the wage distribution and the wage duration function this relationship provides a testable implication of the model this relationship suggests a common property of wage distributions that guarantees that workers who leave unemployment at the highest wages also have the shortest unemployment duration this is in strict contrast to the usual and somewhat implausible directed search story in which high wages are always accompanied by higher probability of unemployment

bargaining versus posted price selling abstract two popular selling methods bargaining and posted price selling are compared here in a dynamic model when bargaining costs no more than posted price selling we find that bargaining is always optimal when bargaining costs more however bargaining is still preferred if and only if the common cost for both selling methods is large enough we also find that an increase in the discount rate or the seller s bargaining power favors bargaining finally we find that if the distribution becomes more dispersed and the increase in a buyer s valuation is sufficiently large bargaining is more likely to be adopted