transparency in parliamentary voting how does transparency affect voting behavior to answer this question we exploit a switch from a show of hands to electronic voting in the upper house of the swiss parliament the change which took place halfway through the 2011 2015 legislative period also brought about the online publication of individual voting records using the lower house as a control group we compare individual voting decisions in a set of identical votes in both chambers this unique framework makes it possible to estimate the causal effect of increased transparency on legislators choices since the reform members of the upper house are less likely to deviate from the majority decision of their party legislators representing the same canton are also less likely to cast an aligned vote suggesting that voters lose influence over their representatives in parliament

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

issuing costs to existing shareholders in competitive and negotiated underwritten public utility equity offerings abstract this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation of whether there is any difference in the cost incurred by public utilities if they issue new equity through a negotiated or competitive underwriting we conclude that the expected cost of a competitive offer is less than the expected cost of a negotiated offer but that the variance of the cost is substantially greater with a competitive offer these results are interesting because most public utilities use negotiated underwriting unless forced by regulation to use competitive offers this paper is also an addition to the growing agency theory literature

fiscal discriminations in three wars in 1790 a u s paper dollar was widely held in disrepute something shoddy was not worth a continental by 1879 a u s paper dollar had become as good as gold these outcomes emerged from how the u s federal government financed three wars the american revolution the war of 1812 and the civil war in the beginning the u s government discriminated greatly in the returns it paid to different classes of creditors but that pattern of discrimination diminished over time in ways that eventually rehabilitated the reputation of federal paper money as a store of value

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

political parties and political shirking using ada roll call voting scores for the 1947 2006 period i find that senators shirk in their last term the degree of shirking is limited by political parties which constrain the politician in his last term and varies by post senate career choices the results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

the rule 415 experiment equity markets rule 415 allows a firm to register all the securities it reasonably expects to sell over the next two years and then at the management s option to sell those securities over these two years whenever it chooses this paper examines whether equity offerings made under rule 415 shelf offerings differ in issuing costs from equity offerings not sold under this rule we find that shelf offerings cost 13 less for syndicated issues and 51 less for nonsyndicated issues we also investigate the empirical relevance of the market overhang argument which suggests that shelf registrations depress the price of the registering firm s shares more than traditional registrations our data does not support the market overhang argument the securities and exchange commission s sec rule 415 which was permanently adopted for large firms in november 1983 allows a firm to register all the securities that it reasonably expects to sell over the next two years and then sell those securities whenever it chooses this procedure is known as shelf registration investment bankers securities regulators and corporate issuers vigorously debate the effect of rule 415 on firms issuing cost for new securities some mostly investment bankers argue that rule 415 increases new issue costs while others mostly issuers argue that rule 415 decreases new issue costs in addition many investment bankers argue that placing common stock on the shelf depresses the price of a firm s outstanding shares of stock most issuers

bargaining unit composition and the returns to education and tenure using data on collectively bargained outcomes in pennsylvania schools in 1983 89 the authors find a strong relationship between the returns to education and tenure and the distribution of those attributes in the bargaining unit for instance the higher the median level of teacher tenure in a district the greater was the pay gap between teachers with low and high tenure this relationship was very strong in districts with vigorous community support for union activities and weak or nonexistent in districts with low union support the authors argue that consistent with the median voter model the unions in this study pushed hardest to advance the interests of their typical members and that they were most effective in doing so where the community was generally supportive of unions

uncertainty and the neutrality of government financing policy abstract some ideas from the theory of finance are applied to consider whether debt financed tax cuts affect desired consumption it is shown that government financing policy is a matter of indifference to infinitely lived households if a perfect substitute for public debt exists the analysis allows for uncertainty about future taxes and for missing markets in some kinds of assets income redistribution risk and the public insurance aspects of an income tax scheme qualify this neutrality result but in general the net effect is ambiguous the real resource costs of financial transacting as well as government superiority in the intermediation process may be one rationale for activist debt management policy a better understanding of functioning capital markets is essential to evaluate these arguments

stationary pareto optimality of stochastic asset equilibria with overlapping generations abstract a way of establishing the stationary pareto optimality of asset equilibria in stochastic settings with age diversity among the agents is suggested difficulties in obtaining such results arise because agents behavior is affected by random future state variables while pareto optimality defined in terms of expected lifetime utility of representative agents conditioned on their first period state involves redistributions of consumption among agents with different histories of realized states frobenius theorem is used to establish the existence of weights for which the so weighted sum of representative agents conditional expected utilities is maximized at the asset equilibrium allocation

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

bank regulation as an antidote to price level instability abstract we use an overlapping generations model with a risky storage technology to describe a new type of sunspot equilibrium characterized by excessive price level volatility and overinvestment in stored goods the features of this equilibrium lead us to interpret it as involving speculation and as arising when banks create excessive quantities of money this interpretation provides welfare justification for imposing quantity limits on the bank money stock we argue that the monetary regime established in england under peel s act imposed such a quantity limit our findings support quantity theorists traditional view that the possibility of overissue provides a rationale for bank regulation

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

indexing and inflation abstract much of the opposition to indexation as a means of adapting to ongoing inflation arises from the view that indexation is itself inflationary this paper examines the basic for that view in a simple macroeconomic model in which budget deficits are in part financed through the printing of money it is shown that all aspects of indexing wage indexation bond indexation and tax indexation tend to increase the impact on the price level of any inflationary shock however this association between indexation and inflation is in large part a consequence of the monetary and fiscal policies being followed by the government evidence from a cross section of forty countries on the effects of indexation on the inflationary impact of the oil price shock of 1973 1974 suggests that indexation did not in general increase the inflationary impact of the oil shock the evidence is further consistent with the view that the absence of an excess inflationary effect of indexation is a result of the countries with substantial indexation not having accommodated the oil price shock as much as other countries

allocative effects of financial assets and the long run neutrality of money when markets are incomplete abstract we analyze the allocative role of money as a numeraire in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets and nominal financial instruments it is shown that regardless of their return specification nominal assets in net supply increase the consumption risk and trigger an endogenous monetary process which diminishes the influence of these assets on the equilibrium allocation through time the nonneutrality of money claimed in the recent literature is a temporary phenomenon only asymptotically the traditional neutrality theorems are valid

the intra unit wage structure and unions a median voter model this study adopts the median voter model to analyze the influence of unions on wage structures within collective bargaining units the model predicts that the intra unit wage structure will be changed to increase the share of the total wage bill received by the median members of the bargaining unit this prediction is examined through a case study of a collective bargaining unit the faculty of the state university system in minnesota the changes in the wage structure of the unit proposed by the union and those ultimately implemented are both consistent with the median voter model

assets general equilibrium and the neutrality of money when government liabilities including money are held in private portfolios only as stores of value and do not provide additional services such as liquidity real variables are not affected by changes in the money supply due to the government s trading in real assets open market operations this neutrality of monetary policy fails if the government either trades in nominal assets or it distributes subsidies and levies taxes the ability of monetary policy to affect real variables is an important issue and has been the subject of numerous theoretical and empirical studies the most useful theoretical framework within which to address the problem is a model of asset markets where the demand for money or other government liabilities is determined by rational portfolio choice tobin 1958 these assets may of course provide additional services such as transactions and liquidity we assume here however that these services do not exist the standard argument for the effectiveness of monetary policy goes as follows changes in the supply of money affect the price level and hence the distribution of returns to money as an asset as individuals realign their portfolios and prices adjust to maintain market clearing the equilibrium holdings of physical assets change in this case money is not neutral we shall argue however that as long as changes in the supply of money are effected through the government s trading in real assets this argument is in general not valid it is well known that the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the method of injection of new money into the economy two procedures are used by the government to effect changes in the supply of money it either trades in assets nominal or real open market operations or it distributes subsidies and levies taxes we show here that open market operations in real assets capital or indexed bonds have no effects on real variables in a general equilibrium model with market clearing the argument which can also be applied to the management of the public debt is presented in a most general framework in the next section it does not depend on the existence of a complete system of contingent securities or on an operative bequest motive furthermore it is compatible with incomplete and differential information the result is similar to the modigliani miller theorem in corporate finance that an argument along these lines can be employed to demonstrate the irrelevance of open

bargaining laws as a cause and consequence of the growth of teacher unionism this study analyzes state level data for 1959 78 to determine whether the rapid growth of teacher unionism during those years was primarily a result or a cause of the public sector bargaining laws adopted during the same period the author finds contrary to the view of some scholars that the enactment of laws requiring public sector employers to bargain with majority representatives of their employees was the single most important cause of the growth in the proportion of teachers covered by union contracts although the growth in teacher unionism in turn encouraged the adoption of some new or stronger bargaining laws this effect was relatively weak more important predictors of new bargaining laws included the extent of political patronage in a state and the bargaining laws adopted by neighboring states

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

why do we have nominal government debt abstract we study the choice between nominal and indexed debt in a stochastic macroeconomic model with discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with distortionary taxes nominal debt provides valuable insurance against the budgetary effects of economic fluctuations we show that a welfare maximizing government always issues some nominal debt even though nominal debt increases inflation along the time consistent path of the economy the result is fairly robust with respect to changes in assumptions about policy constraints and about the macroeconomic setting

the last period problem in politics do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior this study of roll call voting behavior in the u s house of representatives empirically documents the existence of an important simultaneity bias in the heretofore much investigated relationship between legislator ideological shirking and the security with which a legislator holds office the results indicate that while greater security allows a policymaker more leeway for ideological consumption increases in ideological on the job consumption also diminish a policymaker s security in office

the influence of ideology on congressional voting i introduction the question of what determines congressional voting on legislation has inspired a number of recent empirical analyses all are in agreement that congressional voting on specific bills is correlated with the economic self interest of the representative s constituents and a measure of the representative s ideology as indicated by his broader voting record however the interpretation of the empirical results regarding the influence of ideology has generated more debate than consensus in the current literature kau and rubin 1979 find evidence that a congressman s ideology influences his voting but also find evidence for an alternative but not mutually exclusive hypothesis that a congressman s rating by ideological groups reflects membership in a logrolling coalition kalt and zupan 1984 argue that although a representative s votes are likely to reflect the economic interests and the ideology of his constituents the weak incentive for the constituent principal to monitor the voting behavior of his representative agent gives the representative the opportunity to shirk or vote according to his personal ideology rather than his constituents both nelson and silberberg 1987 and mcarthur and marks 1988 find that the degree of shirking increases as the opportunity cost of shirking decreases in contrast to the above findings peltzman 1984 argues that ideological voting by congressmen need not necessarily reflect shirking but instead may be a way for the representative to cheaply provide his constituents with information about his general position on issues what appears to be shirking allowed by an imperfect principal agent relationship may instead be signaling designed to at least partially overcome the imperfect nature of the relationship lott 1987 extends peltzman s signaling argument by hypothesizing that if politicians are viewed by constituents as search goods rather than experience goods then they will have an incentive to establish a political brand name by establishing a consistent ideological voting record dougan and munger s 1989 approach is similar to lott s they argue that politicians with strongly held views that match those of their constituents make ideal representatives because they are less likely to vote against their constituents interests when pressured by special interest groups an incumbent therefore has an incentive to invest in reputational capital by maintaining the consistency over time of his broader voting record because this reputational capital generates quasi rents in electoral competition with candidates who possess less of it neither lott nor dougan and munger find evidence of shirking in their analyses of congressmen s broader voting records as measured by ideological groups ratings dougan and munger also develop a variable intensity of commitment version of the reputational capital hypothesis this version contends that voters with unambiguously liberal or conservative ideologies may prefer a candidate whose voting record indicates that his views are more extreme than their own such a zealous candidate voters believe is even less likely to be influenced by special interest groups a congressman serving an unambiguously liberal or conservative constituency therefore has an incentive to establish and maintain an extremely ideological overall voting record in contrast a congressman serving a constituency with centrist ideological preferences has an incentive to establish an overall voting record that matches his constituency s ideological leanings the systematic deviation of a congressman s voting record from his constituents preferences when near either extreme of the ideological spectrum is not inconsistent with a faithful principal agent relationship one cannot help but be struck by the observation that those researchers finding evidence consistent with shirking studied voting on specific legislation whereas those researchers finding no evidence of shirking studied representatives broader voting records as measured by ideological ratings

stochastic inflation and government provision of indexed bonds abstract this paper examines the consequences of using indexed bonds as one of the government financing instruments along with money and taxes it is shown that open market operations between money and indexed bonds do not matter in a real sense despite their different risk characteristics increasing the share of indexed bonds in the government portfolio increases the volatility and the conditional mean of real rates of return on money when provided by means other than open market operations indexed bonds can affect the allocation of resources but these reallocations cannot be pareto improving

direct equity financing a resolution of a paradox a reply richard l smith and manjeet dhatt sd 3 object to our comparative cost hypothesis based upon their claim that because of the way control enters direct offer flotation cost function our cost function statistically overstates forecasted direct offer issuing costs for low control firms while we find their complaint of our empirical forecasts to be unsubstantiated their comment does allow us to reinforce the comparative cost hypothesis using an updated sample and also to introduce a new and improved specification of our flotation cost function a specification that replaces the central control proxy variable with a direct measure of the blockholder guarantee effect to continue our direct offer research we have compiled information on recent nonunderwritten privileged subscription issues as well as new information on the registrations contained in our original sample close scrutiny of the offering characteristics of the direct offers included in our original sample revealed that five issues were not essentially concerned with raising new equity capital 1 we have discarded these registrations from our sample but we are now able to add seven direct offers which occurred since january 1980 2 we show below that our previous conclusions see 1 the most important of which is that firms using the direct financing method have a decisive comparative cost advantage are unaltered by the improved sample and we demonstrate that sd s functional forms are suitably misspecified so as to inadequately account for direct costs for low control firms finally we show that our improved flotation cost function fully supports the comparative cost hypothesis

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

an investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt abstract we examine the cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt for a sample of public utility issues the lowest cost method depends on a firm s transaction costs which comprise flotation costs agency costs and the costs of searching the market our findings suggest that firms minimize the cost of issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest transaction costs

beyond the median voter preferences district heterogeneity and political representation despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts however all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter we utilize a unique data set consisting of individual level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences we find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts

direct equity financing a resolution of a paradox when raising new equity capital managers have historically rejected the direct offer method favoring instead the seemingly more expensive underwritten public issue this paper provides a resolution for this equity financing paradox by demonstrating empirically that firms which engage in direct offers enjoy a comparative cost advantage that is more than sufficient to account for the absolute reported cost differences between the two methods of equity financing

on the denomination of government debt a critique of the portfolio balance approach abstract we show that some classes of sterilized interventions have no effect on equilibrium prices and quantities the proof does not require complete markets ricardian equivalence monetary neutrality or the law of one price moreover regressions of exchange rates or interest differentials on variables measuring debt s currency composition contain no information about the affectiveness of such interventions other interventions require changes in monetary and fiscal policy their effects depend generally on the influence of these changes on the economy and not on the intervention alone in short sterilized intervention is not as the portfolio balance approach indicates an extra policy instrument

irrelevance of open market operations in some economies with government currency being dominated in rate of return this paper describes an environment in which government issued currency is dominated in rate of return and in which there obtains a modigliani miller theorem for government open market operations earlier modigliani miller theorems for government finance have been stated for environments in which government issued currency is not dominated in rate of return in equilibrium since government issued currency is widely observed to be dominated in return it is useful to study how modigliani miller theorems hinge on absence of rate of return dominance

a tale of two unions divergent platforms and their constituencies the median voter theorem has regularly been used in economics to represent the behaviour of teachers unions little empirical work however tests whether this framework is a good fit for teachers

how do senators vote disentangling the role of voter preferences party affiliation and senate ideology this paper develops a methodology for consistently estimating the relative weights in senator utility functions despite the fact that senator ideologies are unobserved the empirical results suggest that voter preferences are assigned only one quarter of the weight in senator utility functions the national party line also has some influence but the senator s own ideology is the primary determinant of roll call voting patterns these results cast doubt on the empirical relevance of the median voter theorem estimation of the model requires only roll call voting data making it widely applicable copyright 1996 by american economic association

private saving and public debt a review essay private saving and public debt edited by m j boskin and s gorini basil blackwell oxford u k 1987 and based on the proceedings of a conference held in italy in 1985 is a well documented policy oriented guide to the analysis of recent fiscal developments several strands of research are represented in the volume some contributions provide a description of empirical and institutional facts while others analyze the theoretical foundations of different aspects of the public debt problem its impact on financial markets its connection with private saving behavior its international repercussions its effects on inflation and tax policy a unifying theme in the debate is an attempt to shift the focus of the analysis away from the keynesian emphasis on short run finetuning and towards a long run growth oriented perspective the most important issues addressed in the volume are the sustainability of public debt and the effects of government deficits on private saving

the dynamics of inflation with constant deficit under expected regime change a model that describes the dynamics of inflation with a fully anticipated stabilization program is developed it is shown that with a constant deficit an economy tends to stay at the neighborhood of the lower of the two state inflation rates that are compatible with the deficit further increasing inflation rates prior to the stabilization are compatible only with deficits that are lower than the maximal feasible staedy state deficits and with a stabilization program that reduces the demand for real balances if these conditions are not met inflation decreases towards the stabilization date it is argued that the data generated by actual inflationary episodes fit the conditions described above and corroborate the model this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

informational diversity over time and the optimality of monetary equilibria abstract the temporal realizations of a random state variable in an overlapping generations model create an informational diversity between members of different generations and require a reexamination of the optimality that competitive equilibria might display in such an environment using an optimality criterion that reflects this informational diversity we prove the optimality of competitive equilibrium in a model with a fixed stock of fiat money a single spot market and good endowments that follow a markov process the need for an optimality criterion that incorporates informational diversity is further motivated by studying the same model with the operation of complete contingent commodities markets

the effect of pre emptive right amendments on shareholder wealth abstract pre emptive rights allow existing shareholders to purchase a new offering of shares before the general public this paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth of removing pre emptive rights from corporate charters two hypotheses are constrasted 1 shareholder wealth maximization suggests that management uses this extra degree of freedom to pick the least cost method for raising new equity hence the amendment increases shareholder wealth 2 management welfare maximization holds that management will use the passage of the amendment to maximize their own welfare sometimes to the detriment of shareholders hence the amendment decreases shareholder wealth the evidence indicates that the amendment decreases shareholder wealth

long and short term interest rates in a risky world abstract the paper develops and tests a general equilibrium model in which variability or risk affects the choice of portfolios our measures of variability include only the variability of unanticipated growth in monetary and non monetary aggregates and our tests use data ending with the change in federal reserve procedures in october 1979 we find that increased variability of unanticipated money growth raises demands for debt and money and reduces the demand for real capital interest rates on both short and long term debt rise by a risk premium we estimate the size of the risk premium before and after the october 1979 change and we show that the change in federal reserve procedures moved the economy to a less efficient point

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

safe debt risky capital the author extends the diamond 1965 model of national debt in two directions she first introduces technological uncertainty and then she allows the stock of debt to vary the author studies the dynamical equilibria of the resulting stochastic system and she establishes conditions for the existence of stationary states that are expressed in terms of invariant distributions since conditions that ensure the existence of a stochastic stationary state with positive debt are very restrictive in this model financial instability is a pervasive phenomenon and allocations are in general dynamically inefficient copyright 1994 by the london school of economics and political science