information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

market wide attention trading and stock returns abstract market wide attention grabbing events record levels for the dow and front page articles about the stock market predict the trading behavior of investors and in turn market returns both aggregate and household level data reveal that high market wide attention events lead investors to sell their stock holdings dramatically when the level of the stock market is high such aggressive selling has a negative impact on market prices reducing market returns by 19 basis points on days following attention grabbing events

optimal shared savings contracts in supply chains linear contracts and double moral hazard in many supply chains consumption of indirect materials sold by a supplier to a customer for use in her production process can be reduced by efforts exerted by either party since traditional supply contracts provide no incentive for the supplier to exert such effort shared savings contracts have been proposed as a way to improve incentives in the channel leading to more efficient effort choices by the two parties such shared savings contracts typically combine a fixed service fee with a variable component based on consumption volume we formalize this situation using the double moral hazard framework in which both parties decide how much effort to exert by trading off the cost of their effort against the benefits that they will obtain from reduced consumption we also extend the double moral hazard framework to analyze a broader class of cost of effort functions than considered so far including the linear cost of effort functions commonly found in practice we show that the supplier can still always induce the optimal second best equilibrium with a linear shared savings contract under this broader class of functions however the behavior of the optimal contract as a function of the problem parameters becomes more complex we illustrate how small changes in the problem parameters can turn profits from being a well behaved to a poorly behaved function of the contract and provide some theoretical characterization of this phenomenon the practical significance of this is that simple linear contracts are sufficient in many double moral hazard contexts even for the broader class of functions we consider but care must be taken in selecting the optimal contract parameters

a model of the used car market with lemons and leasing this article extends kim s 1985 model of the used car market with asymmetric information to examine the possible impacts of leasing and certified pre owned cpo programs on the average quality of traded used cars in the market the author assumed that a consumer can buy or lease a new car or he she can buy a used or a cpo car while like kim 1985 the author assumed that the quality of a car depends on the maintenance level the maintenance level in this model is chosen when a car is still a new car i e after the warranty ends the model implied that the average quality of traded used cars can be either higher or lower than the average quality of nontraded used cars the study also found that leasing and cpo have substantially improved the information mechanism between buyers and sellers of used cars which in turn has helped reduce adverse selection and improved the average quality of traded used cars in the market

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

herding with and without payoff externalities an internet experiment most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities yet the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities in this paper we experimentally investigate the effects of several different forms of payoff externalities e g network effects first mover advantage etc in a standard information based herding model our results are based on an internet experiment with more than 6000 subjects of which more than 2400 participated in the treatments reported here including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm we also replicate and review earlier cascade experiments finally we study reputation effects i e the influence of success models in the context of herding

pricing risk in economies with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets habit formation has been proposed as a possible solution to the equity premium puzzle this paper extends the class of models that support the habits explanation in order to account for heterogeneity in earnings wealth habits and consumption i find that habit formation does indeed increase the equity premium however contrary to earlier results the habit hypothesis does not imply a price for risk as largeas the one measured in the data there are three reasons for this first households in a habits economy modify their consumption savings decision second they modify their portfolio choice these two changes in behavior diminish the consumption fluctuations faced by households third the composition of the set of agents pricing risk in the economy changes so that relatively better self insured households end up pricing risk jel d52 g12 e21 c68

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

satisfaction guaranteed or money partially refunded efficient refunds under asymmetric information refunds are modelled as a competitive market response to asymmetric information firms have private information on their choice of product quality and compete by offering price and refund contracts consumers who care about quality draw inferences about the quality offered by the various firms from observed contracts conditions under which a revealing market equilibrium emerges are specified and the equilibrium quality and contract s characterized the model predicts that when product risk is not insurable consumers with higher incomes will pay higher prices for higher quality goods with higher refunds if the product fails

information aggregation around macroeconomic announcements revisions matter abstract i show that an empirical relation exists between stock returns on macroeconomic news announcement days and the future revisions of the released data but that this link differs across the business cycle using three major macroeconomic series that undergo significant revisions nonfarm payroll gross domestic product and industrial production i present evidence that daily returns on the standard poor s 500 index and revisions are positively related in expansions and negatively related in recessions the results suggest that revisions do matter i e that investors care about the final revised value of a macroeconomic series that they infer accurate information from the release of the preliminary inaccurate report and that the more precise information is aggregated into prices on the day of the initial announcement the results are consistent with the predictions of rational expectations trading models around public announcements combined with well established empirical results on the asymmetric interpretation of information across the business cycle

price formation and liquidity in the u s treasury market the response to public information the arrival of public information in the u s treasury market sets off a two stage adjustment process for prices trading volume and bid ask spreads in a brief first stage the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price change with a reduction in trading volume demonstrating that price reactions to public information do not require trading the spread widens dramatically at announcement evidently driven by inventory control concerns in a prolonged second stage trading volume surges price volatility persists and spreads remain moderately wide as investors trade to reconcile residual differences in their private views how do financial markets form prices and provide liquidity when information arrives efforts to address this issue have led to an extensive microstructure literature on equity markets and to a lesser extent on the foreign exchange fx market relatively little work has focused on the u s treasury market however in spite of its importance in its own right and the advantages it offers as an alternative testing ground for microstructure hypotheses

optimal inattention to the stock market with information costs and transactions costs recurrent intervals of inattention to the stock market are optimal if consumers incur a utility cost to observe asset values when consumers observe the value of their wealth they decide whether to transfer funds between a transactions account from which consumption must be financed and an investment portfolio of equity and riskless bonds transfers of funds are subject to a transactions cost that reduces wealth and consists of two components one is proportional to the amount of assets transferred and the other is a fixed resource cost because it is costly to transfer funds the consumer may choose not to transfer any funds on a particular observation date in general the optimal adjustment rule including the size and direction of transfers and the time of the next observation is state dependent surprisingly unless the fixed resource cost of transferring funds is large the consumer s optimal behavior eventually evolves to a situation with a purely time dependent rule with a constant interval of time between observations this interval of time can be substantial even for tiny observation costs when this situation is attained the standard consumption euler equation holds between observation dates if the consumer is sufficiently risk averse

price discovery in the u s treasury market the impact of orderflow and liquidity on the yield curve we examine the role of price discovery in the u s treasury market through the empirical relationship between orderflow liquidity and the yield curve we find that orderflow imbalances excess buying or selling pressure can account for as much as 26 percent of the day to day variation in yields on days without major macroeconomic announcements the effect of orderflow on yields is permanent and strongest when liquidity is low all of the evidence points toward an important role of price discovery in understanding the behavior of the yield curve

signal facilitation a policy response to asymmetric information in cases of asymmetric information policymakers sometimes want to make informed agents share their private information one policy response to this situation is signal facilitation altering the environment to encourage signaling this article illustrates signal facilitation in the context of a competitive used car market sellers may determine quality and reveal it through warranties signal facilitation compares favorably to a policy of mandatory disclosure because car dealers can refuse to test and signal if the cost is excessive also this policy permits dealers to select less costly less revealing alternatives that may enhance social welfare copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

optimum tariffs for vertically differentiated products with an application to indian tea exports optimum export tariffs are typically related to the elasticity of demand for exports in homogeneous goods markets in this paper we set up a simple model for large exporters of quality differentiated products and estimate optimum tariffs based on the quality of the good restrictions on demand parameters implied by the theoretical model are used in estimating demands for different qualities of indian tea exports we use the estimated model to find optimum tariffs for two qualities of indian tea exports and find that optimum export tariffs for high quality teas should on average be 14 higher than the tariff on low quality tea exports

herd behavior the penguin effect and the suppression of informational diffusion an analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency this article analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities the interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk averse and clustering behavior in the technology adoption process the analysis differs from the herd behavior literature in focusing on how the herd behavior of subsequent users influences the initial adoption decision moreover herd behavior in this article stems from each agent s desire to inhibit the revelation of new information that can be used in a way detrimental to her rather than from each agent s effort to free ride on information contained in the decisions made by predecessors

price discrimination via second hand markets consumers have heterogeneous tastes for new and used goods and second hand markets involve transactions costs a monopoly seller may gain or lose from the existence of a second hand market locally it may prefer lower transactions costs but globally it may prefer high transactions costs so it can strangle the used market the monopolist uses the second hand market as an indirect device to achieve a form of second degree price discrimination if the monopolist can control the quality of its product when used it may wish to deteriorate this quality to worthless or else to have it as good as new

quality undersupply and oversupply abstract i analyze a market in which a price taking buyer buys a variable quality good from a population of sellers contrasting the case where quality is a seller s private information to that where it is public information average quality traded under private information can be either higher quality oversupply or lower quality undersupply than under public information depending on sellers preferences we are likely to see quality undersupply if i sellers preferences exhibit substitutability between the variable quality good and the numeraire good and or ii sellers view the numeraire good as a luxury good relative to the variable quality good reverse arguments hold for quality oversupply

a direct test of the lemons model the market for used pickup trucks of the implications of models of markets with asymmetric information in the seminal paper on markets with asymmetric information george akerlof 1970 pointed out two possible outcomes that may occur where sellers have better information about the quality of products than do buyers one possibility is that bad products will drive out good products if buyers cannot distinguish quality until after the purchase has been made there will be no incentive for sellers to provide good quality products and the average quality in the market will decline in the case of cars an often cited example of this phenomenon owners who discover that they have a lemon will attempt to sell it in the used car market to an unsuspecting buyer the owner of a creampuff will not sell his car since it is indistinguishable from a lemon to buyers and must therefore sell for the price of a car of average quality the effect of quality uncertainty is to reduce the volume of transactions in the used car market below the socially optimal level a second possibility suggested by akerlof is that institutions may develop to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty warranties and brand names can be used to give the buyer some assurance of quality these institutions may prevent good products from being driven from the market but they will

east west joint ventures and buyback contracts abstract contractual joint ventures cjvs and the buyback form of countertrade are popular methods that socialist countries use to attract foreign investment in this paper we explore some reasons why this is so and also explain two predominant characteristics of these contracts the existence of sharing rules and minimum standard requirements on inputs the model stresses the incentive problems involved when a socialist host country which does not allow foreign direct investment uses a cjv to obtain the fruits of some knowledge based production process from a multinational enterprise

investor attention overconfidence and category learning abstract motivated by psychological evidence that attention is a scarce cognitive resource we model investors attention allocation in learning and study the effects of this on asset price dynamics we show that limited investor attention leads to category learning behavior i e investors tend to process more market and sector wide information than firm specific information this endogenous structure of information when combined with investor overconfidence generates important features observed in return comovement that are otherwise difficult to explain with standard rational expectations models our model also demonstrates new cross sectional implications for return predictability

the flat rental puzzle 4cars and replace them after 2 years or when their odometer exceeds 34 000 km this is a very costly 5 strategy caused by rapid depreciation in used car prices we show how economic theory predicts that 6 in a competitive market cars are rented out covering their full economic lifespan and rental prices are 7 a declining function of their odometer value our solution to these puzzles is that actual rental markets 8 are not fully competitive and firms may be behaving suboptimally we provide a case study of a large 9 car rental company that provided us access to its operating data we develop a model of the company s 10 operations that predicts that the company can significantly increase its profits by keeping its rental cars 11 twice as long as it currently does and also by discounting the rental cost of older vehicles to induce 12 its customers to rent them the company undertook an experiment to test our model s predictions 13 we report initial findings from this experiment which involved over 4500 rentals of over 500 cars in 14 4 locations over a 5 month period the results are consistent with the predictions of our model and 15 suggest that a properly chosen declining rental price function can increase overall revenues profits 16 also increase significantly since doubling the holding period of rental cars cuts discounted replacement 17 costs by nearly 40 18

the relationships among expected inflation disagreement and uncertainty evidence from matched point and density forecasts abstract this paper examines matched point and density forecasts of inflation from the survey of professional forecasters to analyze the relationships among expected inflation disagreement and uncertainty we undertake the empirical analysis within a seemingly unrelated regression framework and derive measures of uncertainty using a decomposition proposed by wallis 2004 2005 and by drawing on the concept of entropy the results offer little evidence that disagreement is a useful proxy for uncertainty and mixed evidence that increases in expected inflation are accompanied by heightened uncertainty conversely we document a quantitatively and statistically significant positive association between disagreement and expected inflation

deutsche mark dollar volatility intraday activity patterns macroeconomic announcements and longer run dependencies this paper provides a detailed characterization of the volatility in the deutsche mark dollar foreign exchange market using an annual sample of five minute returns the approach captures the intraday activity patterns the macroeconomic announcements and the volatility persistence arch known from daily returns the different features are separately quantified and shown to account for a substantial fraction of return variability both at the intraday and daily level the implications of the results for the interpretation of the fundamental driving forces behind the volatility process is also discussed the efficient market hypothesis contends that financial asset prices provide rational assessments of fundamental values and future payoffs by implication price changes should reflect the arrival and processing of all relevant new information however the proportion of return variability that can be ascribed to public news announcements is low for example cutler poterba and summers 1989 find that even the largest daily price changes in the stock market generally cannot be associated with any significant economic news 1 moreover proxies for the flow of public information e g the number of news items released by reuter s news service berry and hiowe 1994 or dow jones company mitchell and mulherin 1994 explain little of the overall variation thus if private information is ruled out proponents of rational price formation have to assert the existence of important news items

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

the value of technology improvements in games with externalities a fresh look at offsetting behavior abstract we model the effect of safety technology improvements in a symmetric game in which each player s payoff depends on his own precaution and the other players average precaution we derive conditions under which an improved technology increases or decreases players equilibrium utilities for mandatory safety technologies the direction of the welfare effect depends on whether the externality between players is positive or negative and on whether the technology improvement is a complement or substitute for individual precaution for safety technologies that individuals can choose whether or not to purchase individuals expend too much on reducing the loss size but may spend either too much or too little on features that reduce an individual s loss probability

investor attention and market microstructure this paper develops the first economic model to study the impact of investor attention on the market microstructure in the kyle s 1985 setup our model strongly supports the empirical observation that higher investor attention leads to higher stock market volatility the first special case with one fully and one limited attentive traders explains that higher attention leads to higher trading intensity of retail investors market liquidity and stock market volatility the second special case with one fully inattentive and one limited attentive traders explains how investor attention affects buying and selling

optimal inattention to the stock market inattentive agents update their information sporadically and thus respond belatedly to news we generate optimally inattentive behavior by assuming that to observe the value of his investment portfolio the consumer must pay a cost that is proportional to the portfolio s contempo raneous value it is optimal for the consumer to check his investment portfolio at equally spaced points in time consuming from a riskless trans actions account in the interim the riskless transactions account that finances consump tion guarantees that funds are never unwittingly exhausted we show that the optimal interval of time between consecutive observations of the value of the portfolio is the unique positive solution to a nonlinear equation quantitatively even a small observation cost one basis point of wealth implies a substantial eight month decision interval under conventional parameter values

uncertainty shocks as second moment news shocks we provide evidence on the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and the macroeconomy identifying uncertainty shocks using methods from the news shocks literature the analysis finds that innovations in realized stock market volatility are robustly followed by contractions while shocks to forward looking uncertainty have no significant effect on the economy moreover investors have historically paid large premia to hedge shocks to realized but not implied volatility a model in which fundamental shocks are skewed left can match those facts aggregate volatility matters but it is the realization of volatility rather than uncertainty about the future that has been associated with declines

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

transactions costs and portfolio choice in a discrete continuous time setting abstract this paper makes the following observation concerning a new formulation of the consumption and portfolio choice model of merton 1971 with transaction costs suppose an investor observes his or her current wealth only when making a transaction that transactions are costly and that decisions to transact can be made at any time based on all current information if at each transaction the agent is charged a fixed fraction of current portfolio value an optimal policy exists and the optimal interval of time between transactions is fixed independent of time and current wealth

leasing lemons and moral hazard abstract a number of recent papers have analyzed leasing in the new car market as a response to the adverse selection problem in the used car market originally explored in the seminal 1970 paper by george akerlof in this paper we consider a model characterized by both adverse selection as in these earlier papers and moral hazard concerning the maintenance choices of new car drivers we show that this approach provides explanations for a number of empirical findings concerning real world new and used car markets including that leasing has become more popular over time very high income new car drivers lease more and used cars that were leased when new sell for more than used cars that were purchased when new we also compare and contrast our approach to new car leasing with alternative approaches

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

incomplete information higher order beliefs and price inertia the question that motivates this paper is how incomplete information impacts the response of prices to nominal shocks our baseline model is a variant of the calvo model in which firms observe the underlying nominal shocks with noise in this model the response of prices is pinned down by three parameters the precision of available information about the nominal shock the frequency of price adjustment and the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions this result synthesizes the broader lessons of the pertinent literature however this synthesis provides only a partial view of the role of incomplete information once one allows for more general information structures than those used in previous work one cannot quantify the degree of price inertia without data on the dynamics of higher order beliefs or of the agents forecasts of inflation we highlight this with three extensions of our baseline model all of which break the tight connection between the precision of information and higher order beliefs featured in previous work

disagreement as a measure of uncertainty this paper presents evidence from the livingston survey of inflation forecasts that forecaster disagreement provides a useful measure of forecast uncertainty the evidence is analogous to the evidence for arch effects disagreement at the time of the forecast has as large positive effect on the conditional variance of the subsequent forecast error as a conditioning variable forecaster disagreement dominates arch for both survey errors and the error terms in robert engle s quarterly model of inflation as measured by the resulting conditional variances disagreement indicates larger and more variable levels of uncertainty for the 1946 94 period copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

overconfidence on public information abstract this work sets the market maker as overconfident and shows that this will lead to a higher informed trading intensity a more efficient market a larger informed profit and a lower adverse selection

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

information cascades in the laboratory when a series of individuals with private information announce public predictions initial conformity can create an information cascade in which later predictions match the early announcements this paper reports an experiment in which private signals are draws from an unobserved urn subjects make predictions in sequence and are paid if they correctly guess which of two urns was used for the draws if initial decisions coincide then it is rational for subsequent decisionmakers to follow the established pattern regardless of their private information rational cascades formed in most periods in which such an imbalance occurred copyright 1997 by american economic association

inattention wealth inequality and equilibrium asset prices abstract heterogeneity in planning propensity affects wealth inequality and asset prices this paper presents an economy where attentive agents plan their consumption period by period while inattentive agents plan every other period inattentive consumers face more uncertainty and trade at unfavorable prices if the only source of uncertainty is future income inattentive consumers accumulate more wealth in contrast with uncertain asset returns inattentive investors accumulate less wealth asset prices must induce attentive consumers to voluntarily bear the burden of adjusting to aggregate shocks and as a result are much more volatile than in a representative agent model with full attention

adverse selection in the used car market evidence from purchase and repair patterns in the consumer expenditure survey we analyze adverse selection in the used car market using a new approach that considers a car as an assemblage of parts some with symmetric information and others with asymmetric information using data from the consumer expenditure survey and consumer reports we examine turnover and repair patterns we find evidence of adverse selection due to the conditions of the transmission engine and during colder months air conditioning and sorting due to the conditions of the vehicle body and during warmer months air conditioning our quantification exercises indicate that adverse selection may have a meaningful effect on trade volume and quality in the secondhand market

durable consumption and asset management with transaction and observation costs this paper provides a contribution to the recent growing literature on rational inattention we start by testing the implications of recent rational inattention models of asset management liquidity holdings and savings using two novel datasets some predictions of these models are at odds with the data which motivates us to introduce a new model that shifts the focus from non durable to durable consumption and features both information and adjustment costs the focus on non durable consumption which departs from the previous literature is key to improve the fit of the model the investor s behavior in our setup combines elements of what the literature refers to as state dependent and time dependent adjustments the model allows us to quantify the information and transactions costs that are consistent with observed patterns of information review and asset trades a calibration of the model shows that very small information costs are sufficient to reproduce the relatively high frequency of observation that is found in the data we test a novel prediction of the model on the relationship between assets trades and durable goods trades and find it aligned with the data

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

new car sales and used car stocks a model of the automobile market this article develops a short run general equilibrium model of the automobile market by combining a discrete choice model of consumer automobile demand with simple models of new automobile production and used vehicle scrappage the theoretical model allows an unlimited degree of heterogeneity of both consumers and automobiles with equilibrium defined as aggregate demand equal to supply for every vehicle type econometric estimates of the scrappage and demand functions are then used to create a simulation model of the automobile market which is used to provide forecasts of automobile sales stocks and scrappage for the 1978 1990 period

monetary policy surprises and interest rates evidence from the fed funds futures market abstract this paper estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on bill note and bond yields using data from the futures market for federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components interest rates response to anticipated target rate changes is small while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant these responses are generally consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure surprise target rate changes have little effect on expectations of future actions however which helps to explain the lack of empirical support for the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve

learning and asset price jumps w e develop a general equilibrium model in which income and dividends are smooth but asset prices contain large moves jumps these large price jumps are triggered by optimal decisions of investors to learn the unobserved state we show that learning choice is determined by preference parameters and the conditional volatility of income process an important model prediction is that income volatility predicts future jump periods while income growth does not consistent with the model large moves in returns in the data are predicted by consumption volatility but not by consumption growth the model quantitatively captures these novel features of the data jel g00 g12 g14 d83 a prominent feature of financial markets is infrequent but large price movements jumps 1 in this article we develop a model in which income and dividends have smooth gaussian dynamics however asset prices are subject to large infrequent jumps in our model large moves in asset prices obtain from the actions of the representative agent to acquire more information about the unobserved state of the economy for a cost we show that the optimal decision to incur a cost and learn the true economic state is directly related to the level of uncertainty in the economy this implies that aggregate economic volatility as well as market volatility should predict jumps in returns we show that indeed in the data consistent with the model return jumps are predicted by consumption volatility market volatility further the implied asset price implications from our model are consistent with the key findings from parametric models about frequency and predictability of jumps as well as nonparametric jump detection analysis of barndorff nielsen and shephard 2006 based on

wealth accumulation and the propensity to plan why do similar households end up with very different levels of wealth we show that differences in the attitudes and skills with which they approach e nancial planning are a signie cant factor we use new and unique survey data to assess these differences and to measure each household s propensity to plan we show that those with a higher such propensity spend more time developing e nancial plans and that this shift in planning is associated with increased wealth these e ndings are consistent with broad psychological evidence concerning the benee cial impacts of planning on goal pursuit those with a high propensity to plan may be better able to control their spending and thereby achieve their goal of wealth accumulation we e nd direct evidence supporting this effortful self control channel in the very strong relationship we uncover between the propensity to plan and budgeting behavior

fluctuations in uncertainty this review article tries to answer four questions i what are the stylized facts about uncertainty over time ii why does uncertainty vary iii do fluctuations in uncertainty matter and iv did higher uncertainty worsen the great recession of 2007 2009 on the first question both macro and micro uncertainty appears to rise sharply in recessions on the second question the types of exogenous shocks like wars financial panics and oil price jumps that cause recessions appear to directly increase uncertainty and uncertainty also appears to endogenously rise further during recessions on the third question the evidence suggests uncertainty is damaging for short run investment and hiring but there is some evidence it may stimulate longer run innovation finally in terms of the great recession the large jump in uncertainty in 2008 potentially accounted for about one third of the drop in gdp

asset pricing with limited risk sharing and heterogeneous agents we develop a model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents that generates a large equity premium while simultaneously matching stock market participation and individual asset holdings the high risk premium is driven by incomplete risk sharing among stockholders which results from the combination of aggregate uncertainty borrowing constraints and a realistically calibrated life cycle earnings profile subject to idiosyncratic shocks we show that it is challenging to simultaneously match asset pricing moments and individual portfolio decisions while limited participation has a negligible impact on the risk premium contrary to the results of models where it is imposed exogenously

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

editor s choice financial attention this paper investigates financial attention using novel panel data on daily investor online account logins we find support for selective attention to portfolio information account logins fall by 9 5 after market declines investors also pay less attention when the vix volatility index is high the level of attention and the attention return correlation are strongly related to investor demographics gender age and financial position wealth holdings using a new statistical decomposition we show how aggregate and individual household trading are related to investor attention

adverse selection in durable goods markets we present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets we find that the used market never shuts down the volume of trade can be large and distortions are lower than previously thought new cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence an extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade we contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates

voluntary product safety certification this paper describes the incentives for firms to seek voluntary product safety certifications we consider a firm that makes the decision of whether or not to seek certification prior to selling the product we show that even when the firm and the consumers have the same beliefs about the product s safety there are incentives for the firm to seek safety certification the main analysis investigates the role of consumer moral hazard and shows that it can lead to greater incentives for voluntary certification when inherent product safety and effort are substitutes but smaller incentives when they are complements the analysis of consumer moral hazard provides a nuanced perspective on the so called risk compensation or the peltzman effect phenomenon which postulates higher levels of accidents for safer products in our paper products that are successfully certified can end up with a higher incidence of accidents we also uncover an interesting nonmonotonic relationship between effectiveness of consumer

the determinants of international investment and attention allocation using internet search query data abstract this paper explores the joint determination of home bias and attention allocation we overcome the typical challenge associated with evaluating attention allocation theories by using a new internet search query dataset to measure how much information investors decide to process employing an instrumental variables approach we find empirical evidence of a two way causality between home bias and attention our estimates suggest that if all countries were to receive the same level of attention as the u s then the average home bias by u s investors would fall from 85 2 to 57 3

presidential address asset price dynamics with slow moving capital i describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries i discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions which subsided afterward after presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings i offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors i address the implications for asset price dynamics of the apparent slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the arrival of new capital to an investment opportunity can be delayed by fractions of a second in some markets for example an electronic limit order book market for equities or by months in other markets such as that for catastrophe risk insurance accordingly prices respond to supply or demand shocks with a sharp reaction because of the relatively small subset of capital and thus risk bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice such a price impact is substantially reversed over time as additional capital becomes available the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect many sorts of attention costs to trade as well as institutional impediments to capital movement such as search costs for trading

bond yields and the federal reserve bond yields respond to policy decisions by the federal reserve and vice versa to learn about these responses i model a high frequency policy rule based on yield curve information and an arbitrage free bond market in continuous time the fed s target is a pure jump process jump intensities depend on the state of the economy and the meeting calendar of the federal open market committee the model has closed form solutions for yields as functions of a few state variables introducing monetary policy helps to match the whole yield curve because the target is an observable state variable that pins down its short end and introduces important seasonalities around fomc meetings the volatility of yields is snake shaped which the model explains with policy inertia the policy rule crucially depends on the two year yield and describes fed policy better than taylor rules

portfolio rebalancing and asset pricing with heterogeneous inattention can households inattention to the stock market quantitatively account for the inertia in portfolio rebalancing i address this question by introducing an observation cost into a production economy with heterogeneous agents in this environment inattention changes endogenously over time and across agents i find that inattention explains the inertia in portfolio rebalancing and its heterogeneity across households inattention also rationalizes the limited stock market participation observed in the data and improves the asset pricing performance of the model finally i present a novel testable implication linking the effects of inattention on portfolio choices and asset prices to households funding liquidity

consensus and uncertainty in economic prediction we define consensus as the degree of agreement among point predictions aimed at the same target by different individuals and uncertainty as the diffuseness of the corresponding probability distributions this distinction is made operational with the aid of the nber asa survey data on matched point and probabilistic forecasts of inflation and the rate of change in gross national product the means of the two sets of forecasts agree closely standard deviations of point forecasts tend to understate uncertainty as measured by standard deviations of the predictive probability distributions however these measures of consensus and uncertainty are on the whole positively correlated there is evidence that expectations of higher inflation generate greater uncertainty about inflation tests also favor the hypothesis that a rise in inflation uncertainty has adverse effects on real growth

a closer look at the behavior of uncertainty and disagreement micro evidence from the euro area this paper examines point and density forecasts of real gdp growth inflation and unemployment from the european central bank s survey of professional forecasters we present individual uncertainty measures and introduce individual point and density based measures of disagreement the data indicate substantial heterogeneity and persistence in respondents uncertainty and disagreement with uncertainty associated with prominent respondent effects and disagreement associated with prominent time effects we also examine the co movement between uncertainty and disagreement and find an economically insignificant relationship that is robust to changes in the volatility of the forecasting environment this provides further evidence that disagreement is not a reliable proxy for uncertainty

wealth information acquisition and portfolio choice i solve with an approximation a grossman stiglitz economy under general preferences thus allowing for wealth effects because information generates increasing returns decreasing absolute risk aversion in conjunction with the availability of costly information is sufficient to explain why wealthier households invest a larger fraction of their wealth in risky assets one no longer needs to resort to decreasing relative risk aversion an empirically questionable assumption furthermore i show how to distinguish empirically between these two explanations finally i find that the availability of costly information exacerbates wealth inequalities copyright 2004 oxford university press

an experiment on behavior in social learning games with collective preferences abstract many environments with social learning involve payoff interdependencies until recently few studies have examined sequentially observational social learning environments with externalities this paper presents the results of an experiment that examines the theoretical predictions of a simple model of observational learning where individuals care about their own actions and the actions of others ali and kartik 2012 consistent with theory i find that behavior does not change with this class of payoff interdependencies however behavior deviates from equilibrium predictions in the same manner both with and without these interdependencies

the measurement and behavior of uncertainty evidence from the ecb survey of professional forecasters summary we examine matched point and density forecasts of output growth inflation and unemployment from the ecb survey of professional forecasters we construct measures of uncertainty from individual histograms and find that the measures display countercyclical behavior and have increased across all forecast horizons since 2007 we also derive measures of forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy and find that they are not reliable proxies for uncertainty there is however evidence of a meaningful co movement between uncertainty and aggregate point predictions for output growth and unemployment these results are robust to changes in the composition of the survey respondents over time copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

expectations surprises and treasury bill rates 1960 82 changes in six month bill rates over semiannual periods in the 1960s and 1970s are successfully related to expected changes and to surprises the latter include unanticipated changes in expected inflation in the growth of industrial production and base money and in inflation uncertainty estimation of the basic equation through the middle of 1983 does not suggest any change in structure moreover the equation explains 60 percent of the extraordinarily high level of real rates since late 1980 largely owing to an excess of unexpected net increases in anticipated inflation over actual increases our estimates provide some support for the expectations theory there appears to be information content in six month forward rates while this content is swamped by the impact of surprises in equations explaining rate changes in terms of forward rates alone the content is clear when proxies for the surprises are included in the equations the height and volatility of interest rates in the early 1980s spectacularly exceeded that of the past half century various researchers have attributed this to the sharp increase and decline in inflation the special characteristics of recent monetary the monetarist experiment and fiscal the structural deficit policies and mysterious or unidentified forces see clarida and friedman 1982 and makin and tanzi 1983 the present paper estimates the relationship between the six month treasury bill rate and its determinants in the 1960s and 1970s the purpose is to test various hypotheses regarding interest rate determination and to determine whether this relationship was altered markedly in the early 1980s the short term bill rate is chosen for investigation for two reasons first the yield on a short term instrument is independent of longer term expectations regarding inflation output growth and fiscal and monetary policies longerterm yields should depend heavily on such variables while reasonably accurate measures of expectations over say a six month horizon can probably be deduced are in fact available from survey data longer term expectations are both more uncertain and vary more widely across market participants second analysis of a short term bill rate allows an easy test of the expectations theory of interest rates recent studies by shiller campbell and schoenholtz 1983 and by mankiw and summers 1983 suggest that observed interest rate movements are unrelated to expected changes in rates extracted from the term structure of short term rates calling into question the validity of the expectations theory but see fama 1983 for an alternative view the six month bill rate is analyzed because it meshes best with the livingston survey data

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking