union coverage and profitability among u s firms this paper utilizes unique survey data on labor union coverage at the firm level to examine union effects on the profitability of 705 u s companies during the 1970s market value and earnings are estimated to be about 10 15 percent lower in an average unionized company than in a nonunion company following extensive control for firm and industry characteristics deleterious union effects on firm profitability are sizable throughout the 1972 80 period but vary considerably across industries the relatively poor profit performance of unionized companies may help explain the recent decline in u s union membership the author thanks the w e upjohn institute for employment research for financial support elizabeth gregory for assistance with the union coverage survey zvi griliches for providing access to the rd donald deere terry seaks and anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and seminar participants at connecticut florida state harvard texas a m and william and mary for comments on earlier versions of this research

the union impact on profits in the supermarket industry a number of studies have found that unions lower profits but controversy continues over whether the union impact is or is not greater in more concentrated markets this empincal controversy is linked to two underlying issues whether unions distort capital investment decisions and the total volume of monopoly profits in the u s economy research on the supermarket industry reveals that unions lower profits substantially in this sector and that indeed their impact is greater when local markets are more concentrated recently there has been an explosion of research concerning the union impact on profits and the associated question of whether or not unions reduce profits more in noncompetitive than competitive sectors for a review of studies see voos and mishel 1986 this has become an important empirical issue for a variety of reasons one concern has been whether unions distort capital investment decisions insofar as unions merely capture monopoly rents as opposed to reducing the rate of return in competitive industries the presumption is that unions create less distortion a separate issue has been whether or not previous research has underestimated the extent of total monopoly rents in the u s economy this would occur if observed profits are less than total profits in noncompetitive sectors because in those sectors a portion of monopoly rents is being redistributed to unionized employees while most studies find that unions lower profits there is some controversy regarding whether or not unions reduce profits more in industries with less competitive market structures freeman 1983 and karier 1985 both find that unions have a much larger effect in concentrated industries however hirsch and connolly 1985 question that conclusion and clark 1984 reports contrary evidence with regard to market share all previous investigations of this issue utilize manufacturing inter industry data cross sections of predominantly manufacturing firms or 2 digit sic manufacturing industry observations disaggregated by state this paper reports the results of research designed to ascertain whether unions reduce profits in one relatively homogeneous nonmanufacturing industry supermarkets and if their impact is larger when local markets are more concentrated lamm 1982 and marion et al 1979a and 1979b have explored the impact of unions and of concentration respectively on food prices moreover excellent data on supermarket profits exist the data give our study several unique qualities because observations are on firms in specific geographic markets in a single disaggregate industry any estimated union profit effect cannot be said to result from a correlation between unionism and unobserved industry specific factors the study is also the first to be based on evidence from the nonmanufacturing sector the data utilized and the model estimated the data on which this research was based were gathered under subpoena by the joint economic comreceived for publication july 8 1985 revision accepted for publication october 17 1985 university of wisconsin and industrial union department afl cio respectively special thanks to frederick geithman for many helpful suggestions and for research assistance and to bruce marion for making the data available to us and for commenting on our results all opinions as well as errors are the authors own funds for a portion of this research came from the university of wisconsin graduate school during a portion of this research mishel was affiliated with cornell university

union rents as a source of takeover gains among target shareholders this paper tests the hypothesis that the substantial gains enjoyed by shareholders in target firms during the corporate acquisition boom of the 1980s reflected in part shareholders recouping of the value of rents in the form of wage premiums higher fringe benefits and constraints on managerial authority held by unionized labor analyzing data on the merger and acquisition experience of nearly 300 large publicly traded target firms during the period 1982 86 the author finds consistent with that hypothesis that shareholders average returns from takeover activity were higher in unionized target firms 41 than in nonunion target firms 35 for unionized workers these effects are equivalent to an annualized employee loss approaching 8 of annual earnings or 50 of the wage premium conventionally associated with union coverage

unions and monopoly profits using cross sectional data for u s manufacturing the author identifies a negative effect of unions on the profits of highly concentrated industries and virtually no effect on the profits of unconcentrated industries the results for concentrated industries are explained in terms of the monopoly model which predicts a negative effect of unions on profits equivalent to the change in employer s surplus the monopoly model also suggests that previous profit studies which omitted the union variable were likely to significantly underestimate the relationship between concentration and profits this prediction is also supported by empirical evidence m sany studies have demonstrated the ability of unions to raise wages above the level of nonunion workers higher union wages in turn may affect the level of prices employment capital intensity productivity and profits recent studies by clark 1982 and freeman 1983 have found significant negative effects of unions on profit rates in the united states using line of business data from 1970 to 1980 for 900 firms clark found a negative effect of unions on the rate of return to capital more specifically the union effects were found to be significantly negative when market shares were low and insignificant when market shares were high according to clark the absence of a union effect in the latter case can be explained by the ability of firms with market power to pass on higher union wages into higher prices 1982 p 47 on the other hand freeman 1983 using data from the survey of manufactures from 1958 to 1976 and the internal revenue service from 1965 to 1976 also found a negative effect of unions on profits contrary to clark s results however the union profit effect was negative only in concentrated industries the point of contention appears to be the role of concentration in determining the union profit effect rather than the overall negative impact of unions the results of clark and freeman are important because previous industrial organization research on profit rates generally ignored unions for instance of the forty six profit studies surveyed by weiss 1974 none included a union variable more recently a profit study in this review by ravenscraft 1983 using high quality line of business data from the federal trade commission also ignored unionization as will be demonstrated the omission of the union variable leads to an understatement of the effect of industrial concentration on profits this means that concentrated industries generate much greater profits than indicated by previous research in order to measure the size of the understatement a new concept employer s surplus is developed which illustrates the theoretical impact of a union wage increase on monopoly profits the empirical estimates of employer s surplus in this paper indicate how monopoly profits are divided between firms and unions most of the data used in this study were obtained from james medoff and charles brown 2 unlike the previous two studies each observation corresponds to a state by two digit sic industry for manufacturing in 1972 because of the large variations in unionization across states this data set offers a useful test of the union profit effect i employer s surplus according to accepted theory the profit maximizing monopolist will employ labor up to the point where the market wage equals the marginal revenue product mrp 3 if for simplicity we assume that all other factors are variable then the mrp curve represents the monopolist s long run demand for labor in the absence of unions employment is determined by the intersection of the mrp curve and nonunion wage wn as pictured in figure 1 if unions raise wages to wa employment will decrease from ln to l with the reducreceived for publication november 28 1983 revision accepted for publication july 6 1984 eastern washington university i am very grateful to dave bunting lisa brown bill dickens claire brown and george strauss for their valuable suggestions on this research this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 from the author s ph d thesis the union impact on profits productivity and prices university of california berkeley 1 see parseley 1980 for a recent review of this literature 2 i would like to thank brown and medoff for making these data available to me 3 marginal revenue product is equal to marginal revenue multiplied by marginal physical product see rees 1979

the intertemporal stability of the concentration margins relationship using a longitudinal data base we find that there has been a substantial narrowing of the spread between the price cost margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries including measures of macroeconomic fluctuations into standard price cost margin regressions we find significant differences in cyclical behavior across market structure we also explore a possible explanation unionization for differences in cyclical behavior finally we investigate the degree to which our results are affected by the potential simultaneity of concentration advertising and the price cost margin

learning and capacity expansion under demand uncertainty a competitive dynamic model of entry into a new industry is set up and both its positive and normative aspects are studied the main assumptions are that entry is sequential that it occurs under imperfect information on the size of the market and that better information becomes available as time goes on the gradual improvement in information is due to the fact that later waves of entrants are able to observe the profitability of earlier entrants the major results reported here under suitable restrictions are that the equilibrium rate of entry is monotonically decreasing over time and that at any given point in time it is smaller than the socially optimal one when a new market opens as a result of a product being newly invented for instance or when an existing market starts to expand uncertainty with respect to its size is likely to prevail as a result of this uncertainty entry of firms into such markets typically will occur in waves some firms will enter initially while others will wait to see the consequences of that initial entry if the experience of early entrants is favourable entry will continue otherwise entry will cease hence with the introduction of a new product two phases are associated the growth phase typified by positive operating profits for existing firms and expansion of productive capacity due to entry of new firms and the mature phase typified by erosion of profits and fixed total productive capacity empiricists estimating the time pattern of investments during the growth phase have found an s shaped diffusion curve see mansfield 1986 and gort and klepper 1982 the purpose of the present paper is to theoretically characterize these time patterns and to investigate their welfare properties any attempt to model the type of entry described above must account for differences in both entry dates and resultant earnings in other words the theory must explain why the realized earnings of different cohorts of firms are not equal often such ex post differences are reconciled by assuming heterogeneity with respect to some latent underlying characteristic managerial ability for instance and attributing differences in earnings to differences in that characteristic in this paper instead earning differentials are attributable to luck only ex ante all firms are technologically identical and equally capable of forecasting market prospects and rationally acting upon those forecasts ex post some firms turn out to have entered at the right time and are for that reason more profitable the model developed in this paper analyzes a parametric example of a sequential entry problem in which the uncertainty over market size is gradually resolved over time in a bayesian setting in an environment of perfect competition and constant returns toscale a free entry equilibrium concept is introduced and the aggregate implications of the time path of investments are derived i then compare this actual time path to the optimum this comparison is interesting because the equilibrium is analysed under the

unionism and gross employment flows considerable research interest exists in the measurement and analysis of the gross employment flows that underlie industry and regional net employment growth studies by armington and odle 4 leonard 25 davis and haltiwanger 12 and dunne roberts and samuelson 15 examine the relative importance of plant openings plant expansions plant contractions and plant closings as sources of labor demand fluctuations all of these studies find that the individual components of gross employment flows are substantially larger than the net employment change this paper extends this literature in three ways first it examines the correlations between sectoral unionism and sectoral measures of job loss due to plant closings and contractions and employment gains due to plant expansions previous research indicates that unionism lowers firm and industry profits if this is the case then unionism would be expected to affect the growth and failure of plants and firms as well the results will also shed some light on whether previous estimates of the negative effect of unionism on profits are understated since only surviving firms are examined in these studies

the structural determinants of union bargaining power this paper investigates the structural determinants of variation in union power across manufacturing industries using a pooled sample of unionized establishments from the expenditure on employee compensation surveys of 1968 72 the author estimates wage equations augmented with measures of product market structure bargaining structure and the size distribution of unions the results suggest that union wage gains are greatest where discretionary pricing power enhances employers ability to pay and where unions achieve high coverage practice centralized bargaining and avoid union fragmentation on the other hand centralized bargaining provides no advantage in competitive industries

the effects of the nlra on stockholder wealth in the 1930s whereas most recent research examining the effects of the nlra on labor management relations has focused on the impact of specific provisions of the law this study provides an estimate of the impact of the passage of the nlra on 75 firms that were at great risk of being unionized in the 1930s taking changes in shareholder wealth as a measure of the shift in the balance of power caused by the nlra the authors find that the passage of the nlra caused a statistically and economically significant decline in shareholder wealth for the sampled firms specifically by april 1937 stockholder wealth in the firms was 15 9 lower than would have been expected had the nlra not been enacted t he impact of public policy on the balance of power between labor and management has always been a fundamental topic in industrial relations recent changes in many labor management relationships have renewed interest in the influence of public policy on labor relations and raised questions of how modifications in these policies might alter the behavior of the parties according to delaney lewin and sockell 1985 the empirical research on this topic has largely concentrated on specific provisions of the wagner act such as election procedures and regulation of employer unfair labor practices for example getman gold

the union impact on profits evidence from industry price cost margin data this paper uses industry price cost margin data to estimate the extent to which unions reduce profits estimates allowing for the endogeneity of union status are contrasted with estimates that assume union status is exogenous and not determined in part by either profitability or industry structure endogeneity is found to be an important consideration in estimating the union impact on profits two stage estimates are considerably larger than ols estimates the final section explores the total estimated redistribution from capital to labor in the manufacturing sector an important conclusion is that unions raise prices less than was previously believed

growth under uncertainty with experimentation abstract we introduce bayesian learning into a stochastic growth model and study the effect of experimentation on the optimal level of the investment decision and on the amount of information gathering when more investment produces more information experimentation can push towards a lower level of investment thus reducing information acquisition symmetrically when more investment reduces information experimentation can increase investment and again decrease information gathering these results run contrary to intuitions generated by the standard literature on experimentation

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

adjustment costs uncertainty and the behavior of the firm this paper examines the effects of demand and cost uncertainty on a firm s investment output and pricing decisions but unlike most earlier studies in which demand and cost are simply not known at the time an output or pricing decision is made here i consider uncertainties over future demand and costs it will be seen that the effects of such uncertainties depend critically on the characteristics of the firm s adjustment costs i treat demand uncertainty in a dynamic context by letting the market demand function shift randomly but continuously through time according to a stochastic process this means that today s demand is known exactly but future demand may be larger or smaller and has a variance that increases with the time horizon likewise uncertainty over factor costs is characterized by treating those variables as stochastic processes i combine this characterization of uncertainty with a dynamic model of the firm in which some factor inputs can be adjusted freely in response to stochastic demand changes but other factors are quasi fixed in that adjustment costs are incurred when they are changed in this model the firm s price and output are random processes but we can examine the firm s behavior in expected value terms of interest is whether the presence of uncertainty should cause competitive or monopolistic firms to invest and produce more or less than they would otherwise how the effects of uncertainty are influenced by the presence of risk aversion and how the use of inventories can alter the impact of uncertainty on capacity and sales of course these questions have been addressed by others in the past among the earliest studies of demand uncertainty are those of edwin mills 1959 1962 and samuel karlin and charles carr 1962 mills examined a single period monopolistic firm that sets both output and price and showed that additive demand uncertainty i e the demand function is of the form q q p u where u is a random variable leads to a lower price if marginal cost is constant so that the firm reduces the expected loss from discarding unsold production karlin and carr confirmed for both the static case and the multiperiod case with inventory carryover that additive uncertainty tends to reduce the price and increase the output of a risk neutral firm while multiplicative uncertainty does the opposite other papers have been concerned with the way in which the error term enters the demand function additively multiplicatively or nonlinearly the implications of choosing price ex ante instead of output the implications of risk aversion and the use of inventories for example agnar sandmo 1971 and david baron 1970 showed that a risk averse competitive firm will produce less when the price is a random variable or subject to an additive error term but a riskneutral firm will not alter its production hayne leland 1972 extended these results to a monopolistic firm whose demand can depend in a general way on a random error term for example q q p u and showed that uncertainty reduces the production of a

the relationship between union wage and profitability effects abstract this paper presents empirical evidence on the relationship between union effects on wages and on profitability as expected unions are found to increase wages albeit significantly in smaller firms only and to reduce profitability in a sample of british engineering firms over the period 1979 1982 the key question asked is whether the observed union effect on profitability is no more than a further manifestation of the observed wage effect estimates of profit equations normalised to take account of the union wage effect do not reject the hypothesis that it is

the determination of profit margins in uk manufacturing this paper examines the determinants of profit margins in 91 u k manufacturing industries over the period 1983 86 it considers how the inclusion of labor market characteristics in empirical industrial organization specifications affects the estimated concentration margins relationship the empirical work pays detailed attention to the endogenous nature of variables derived from structural industrial organization models the authors report instrumental variables estimates of margins equations in which there emerges a significant role for labor market characteristics indeed both unionization and industrywide unemployment are found to depress profit margins the impact of concentration is seen to be biased downward when these variables are omitted

estimation of price cost margins and union bargaining power for belgian manufacturing abstract this paper extends hall s 1988 hall r e 1988 the relationship between price and marginal cost in us industry journal of political economy 96 921 947 methodology to analyze imperfections in both the product and the labor market for firms in the belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988 1995 we investigate the heterogeneity in price cost mark up and workers bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing industry as well as the relationship between both parameters using a sample of more than 7000 firms our gmm results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labor market leads to an underestimation of the price cost margin evaluated at perfect competition in the labor market these findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis sectors with higher workers bargaining power typically show higher price cost margins

union rent seeking intangible capital and market value of the firm abstract this study considers the effect of unions on intangi ble capital investment and profitability within the context of a market value rather than a more traditional accounting based approach theory is provided suggesting unions are able to affect profitability by sharing in the economic returns to firm specific intangible capital in support of this hypothesis we find unionization reduces the returns to r d and produces a corresponding limiting influence on r d investment at the firm level i introduction a n extensive literature in economics has ex amined the determinants of profitability with much of the focus centering on the role of market structure only recently however have the effects of labor unions on profitability been analyzed ths is surprising since labor economists long have emphasized union influences on wages and productivity that in turn may affect profitabil ity in recent studies freeman 1983 and karier 1985 report a significant limiting influence of unions on price cost margins in high concentra tion manufacturing industries using firm level data and the market based tobin s

economic theory and the world of practice a celebration of the s s model it was the question of how best to balance the costs of ordering and of running out of stock against the costs of holding excess inventory that inspired kenneth arrow theodore harris and jacob marschak to introduce the s s model in 1951 in this celebratory article we show how this model not only answered important practical questions but also opened the door to a quite startling range of important and challenging follow up questions many of great practical importance and analytic depth the s s model has become one of the touchstone models of economics opening new vistas of applied economic theory to all who internalize its structure today it is universally applied to solve questions faced in inventory control the core model elements uncertainty and fixed costs of adjustment are ubiquitous which has resulted in its becoming the general purpose economic model of discrete adjustment the s s model has also become a profound source of inspiration for macroeconomists seeking to understand the role that discrete microeconomic adjustments play in macroeconomic fluctuations looking forward we foresee rapid growth in the use of s s modeling to aid households making complex and costly financial decisions such as when and how to terminate a mortgage in the projected era of household operations research new modeling challenges will arise due to enriched feedback from the world of practice

unionization and shareholder interests drawing on agency theory this study examines union nonunion differences in the allocation of both firm profits and business risk to employees and shareholders using a sample of more than 1 000 large private sector firms the authors find that over the period 1970 81 shareholders in unionized firms assumed less of the firm s business risk than shareholders in nonunion firms this finding is interpreted as evidence that managers of unionized firms attempted to minimize agency costs by capitalizing on the incentive effects of risksharing in addition risk adjusted returns to shareholders were lower in unionized firms than in nonunion firms the authors view the relatively poor performance of union firms as a primary motivating factor behind the restructuring of the american industrial relations system during the period studied

monetary policy as a process of search monetary policymakers are uncertain about the state of the economy and learn from the economy s reaction to policy private agents however anticipate any systematic attempt to incorporate this information into future policy the authors analyze this feedback in the context of a monetary authority s attempt to stimulate an economy in recession they show that modest stimuli may prove ineffectual if small reductions in interest rates are unlikely to promote a response then they may be followed by further cuts a vicious circle develops in which the expectation that the policy could fail leads investors to delay investment thereby promoting failure copyright 1996 by american economic association

unionization and profitability evidence from the capital market this paper examines the effect of unionization on the profitability of firms abnormal monthly common stock returns for a sample of 253 nyse listed firms are estimated for the month in which the union petitions for an election and for the month in which the national labor relations board certifies the election outcome the results suggest that unionization on average is associated with a reduction in equity value when unions win an election the average loss associated with the unionization drive is 3 8 percent of equity value when unions lose an election there is an average net reduction of 1 3 percent in the equity value of the firm

economic development as self discovery in the presence of uncertainty about what a country can be good at producing there can be great social value to discovering costs of domestic activities because such discoveries can be easily imitated we develop a general equilibrium framework for a small open economy to clarify the analytical and normative issues we highlight two failures of the laissez faire outcome there is too little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante and too much production diversification ex post optimal policy consists of counteracting these distortions to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante but to rationalize production ex post we provide some informal evidence on the building blocks of our model

capital labor and the firm a study of german codetermination under the german corporate governance system of codetermination employees are legally allocated control rights over corporate assets through seats on the supervisory board that is the board of nonexecutive directors the supervisory board oversees the management board the board of executive directors approves or rejects its decisions and appoints its members and sets their salaries we empirically investigate the implications of this sort of labor participation in corporate decision making we find that companies with equal representation of employees and shareholders on the supervisory board trade at a 31 stock market discount as compared with companies where employee representatives fill only one third of the supervisory board seats we show that under equal representation management board compensation provides incentives that are not conducive to furthering shareholders interests possibly because labor maximizes a different objective function than shareholders we document that under equal representation companies have longer payrolls than their one third representation peers have finally we provide evidence that shareholders respond to the allocation of control rights to labor by linking supervisory board compensation to firm performance and by leveraging up the firm jel g32 g34

unions and the capture of economic rents an investigation using british firm level data this paper considers the relationship between unions and profitability in a sample of large british firms in 1984 and 1985 the initial finding is that unionised firms have significantly lower profit margins than otherwise comparable non union firms tests of whether the ability of unions to influence profit margins varies with the product and labour market characteristics of the firms in which they are located are then conducted the ability of unions to capture economic rents is seen to be significantly greater in firms which have a high market share and or operate in highly unionised industries

investment as a process of search this paper analyzes optimal capital accumulation in the face of structural uncertainty in which the firm does not fully know its own profit function and can discover it only through further investment it is shown that under structural uncertainty capital accumulation is gradual even when adjustment costs are linear and not convex it is further shown that structural uncertainty creates an incentive to market research the paper also presents an example of structural uncertainty in which an additional price uncertainty has a negative effect on investment contrary to the standard models

investment and union certification using data on union certification elections we estimate the impact of unionization on firms investment behavior employing both a standard q model and an investment surprises technique we find that union certification significantly reduces investment in the year following the election we find that a winning certification election has on average about the same effect on investment in the year following the event as would given the elasticity measures taken from the public finance literature a 33 percentage point increase in the corporate tax the magnitude of the response in years further away from the election is less certain

the validity of profits structure studies with particular reference to the ftc s line of business data the simple proposition that consumerdamaging collusion is more likely to occur when there are fewer competitors has given rise not only to legal restrictions of economic activity thought to restrict output but also to an enormous amount of empirical work attempting to relate market concentration to the exercise of monopoly power most such studies measured market structure by an index of concentration for example four firm concentration or herfindahl and performance by accounting profit for example net profit divided by assets or price cost margins sales less direct costs divided by sales from the positive statistically significant correlations often found between greater concentration and profit with other factors presumably accounted for some researchers conclude that increases in concentration are anticompetitive and that concentration therefore is bad the concentration profits studies have been criticized essentially on two grounds one is that the positive relationship is not indicative of collusive behavior in particular oliver williamson 1968 john mcgee 1971 harold demsetz 1973 1974 and sam peltzman 1977 point out that higher profits could result from efficiencies experienced by large firms which resulted both in greater market shares and high levels of concentration analytical arguments show that higher profits logically follow as much from lower costs that are associated with higher levels of concentration as from collusion determined higher prices some empirical evidence that supports this belief is presented by demsetz peltzman and bradley gale and ben branch 1982 however their findings have been contested on the grounds that the data used are biased or inadequate or that the researchers have not demonstrated that the observed higher profits greater concentration relationship was caused by lower costs 2 the second criticism is that available data provide an inadequate basis for such conclusions the concentration numbers are based usually on industries defined by the commerce department s standard industrial classifications sic the sic definitions tend to be supply production rather than demand determined include nonhomogeneous products and exclude sales of similar products that are included in different sic groups or are imported the profit data are taken from accounting reports that provide poor measures of economic values weiss 1974 describes many of these problems however he does not believe that these shortcomings invalidate the studies as weiss 1979 concludes

the international credit channel of u s monetary policy transmission to developing countries evidence from trade data abstract in a large sector level bilateral trade dataset we find robust evidence supporting a broad international credit channel of u s monetary policy transmission to developing countries we show that u s monetary policy has a significant effect on the sectoral composition of developing countries exports financially more vulnerable sectors have a significantly more negative exposure of their trade to a tight u s monetary policy especially in financially less developed exporting countries or during significant u s tightening periods moreover we identify both a monetary policy dependence mechanism and a financial dollarization mechanism through which u s monetary policy can influence the sectoral composition of developing countries exports

substitution between production labor and other inputs in unionized and non unionized manufacturing the ease of substitution between labor and other factors of production is an important determinant of the elasticity of demand for labor and thus of the economic effects of unionism all else the same the greater the elasticity of substitution the greater is the elasticity of derived demand and the greater the displacement of labor for a given union induced wage increase in sectors where this elasticity is large unions are likely to be relatively weak and able to win only slight wage gains freeman and medoff 1981 and forthcoming or if they win large gains will have to pay a high price in terms of lost jobs in the sectors where the elasticity is small unions may be able to extract a substantial wage premium at little cost in terms of employment moreover as a simple general equilibrium model indicates the elasticity of substitution between labor and other factors in the unionized sector is a key parameter in determining the impact of the iiunion wage effect on the earnings of nonunion workers and on the efficiency of the economy johnson and mieskowski 1970 despite the importance of the elasticity of labor demand for an analysis of unionism little attention has been given to the absolute and relative magnitude of this elasticity under collective bargaining while there is some discussion of technological change and the substitution of capital and nonproduction workers for organized production workers in the institutional literature e g slichter 1941 slichter healy and livernash 1960 bok and dunlop 1970 modern econometric work provides no estimates of the relevant parameters as a result johnson and mieskowski 1970 rees 1963 lewis 1964 and others have been forced to evaluate union effects with guesstimates of the elasticities of concern in union settings this paper attempts to fill some of the gap in our knowledge by providing estimates for u s manufacturing of the constant output elasticity of demand for unionized and nonunionized production workers and of the elasticity of substitution between these workers and other inputs the analysis concentrates on what we call the relative inelasticity hypothesis which states that the demand for production workers will be more inelastic in the presence of a union for two reasons the likelihood that unions have organized and survived in sectors with low elasticities and the effects of various contract provisions on the ability of management to substitute other factors for production labor the study is divided into four sections section i develops the rationale for the relative inelasticity hypothesis and describes the nature of the empirical analysis conducted to test its validity the second section uses a 1972 state by 2 digit standard industrial classification sic industry data file for manufacturing to estimate the elasticity of substitution between production labor and both nonproduction labor and capital in the union and nonunion sectors of u s manufacturing industries section iii provides estimates based on a 1968 72 sample of manufacturing establishments of the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor the only two inputs for which information is available the final section briefly summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for understanding the impact of trade unionism on the u s economy to preview the ensuing discussion our main conclusion is substitution between production labor and other inputs is generally lower in union received for publication march 6 1978 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 both authors are with harvard university and the national bureau of economic research supported by u s department of labor grant no j 9 m 6 0094 national science foundation grant no apt77 16279 and the national bureau of economic research under its program of research on labor economics we are especially grateful to jane mather for her invaluable assistance on this project and to greg bialecki charles brown gary chamberlain kathy coons jon fay martin van denburgh and lori wilson for their significant contributions the study has not been reviewed by the board of directors of the national bureau

business as usual market crashes and wisdom after the fact the authors present a three stage model of market dynamics in the first stage routine behavior tends to keep information of common interest trapped in private hands in the second stage private information reaches a threshold that triggers some agents to alter their behavior these actions release information to the market the final stage involves the market s response to this news as other participants react to the initial departure from routine behavior the authors present an application to industry investment they also outline applications to the international debt crisis to bank runs and to political upheavals copyright 1994 by american economic association

margins concentration unions and the business cycle theory and evidence for britain abstract a number of recent studies have examined the cyclical relationship between price cost margins concentration and unions u s data has concluded that unions reduce margins margins vary over the cycle and concentration unionisation and the cycle interact in their effect on margins however there is almost no theory to account for these results we propose a simple theory that assumes only that there is overhead labour present at the firm this produces theoretical predictions that can explain these results and discriminate between existing theories we present results of our own using u k panel data and show similar findings to the u s

investments of uncertain cost abstract this paper examines irreversible investment decisions when projects take time to complete and are subject to two types of cost uncertainty the first is technical uncertainty i e uncertainty over the physical difficulty of completing a project which is only resolved as the investment proceeds the second is input cost uncertainty i e uncertainty over the prices of construction inputs or over government regulations affecting construction costs which is external to the firm these two types of uncertainty have very different effects on the investment decision a simple investment rule is derived that maximizes firm value and is used to analyze the decision to start or continue building a nuclear power plant during the 1980s

trade unions and labor s share in u s manufacturing industries abstract this study assesses the impact of trade unions on labor s share of income it improves on previous tests by accounting for possible alternative explanations of an observed positive relationship between union coverage and labor s share using three digit cross sectional data on united states manufacturing industries from 1973 1975 and 1983 1985 the analysis accounts for both establishment size and worker characteristics and conducts tests across different time periods union density and establishment size are found to have a positive effect on labor s share

do unions capture monopoly profits this paper challenges the conclusion reached in recent studies that unions reduce profits exclusively in highly concentrated industries from their review of previous studies and their analysis of 1977 data on 367 fortune 500 firms the authors conclude that there is no convincing evidence that concentration produces monopoly profits for unions to capture moreover they find that the union wage effect is not greater in concentrated industries as suggested by the hypothesis that unions capture concentration related profits evidence is found suggesting that a firm s market share its expenditures on research and development and its protection from foreign competition provide more likely sources for union rents than does industry concentration several recent studies have found that unions reduce profits significantly and some have concluded that this profit reduction is restricted to highly concentrated industries both conclusions are important the finding that unions reduce profitability indicates that in general the cost increasing effects of unions outweigh any positive productivity effects they may bring to the workplace such a

unionism in a competitive industry this article explores a model in which a union confronts many competitive workers firms and consumers under monopoly unionism union coverage may be incomplete then union wages and employment are insensitive to product demand variation under efficient unionism coverage can never be incomplete some union variables necessarily vary with product demand preliminary evidence on the demand independence under incomplete coverage hypothesis is presented also more structure is imposed and further hypotheses are derived and the manner in which the model can be enriched to allow for a variety of union related issues within a consistent framework is set out

union effects on productivity profits and growth has the long run arrived this article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity positive effects where they exist appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process lower profitability among unionized firms is well established more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long lived tangible and intangible capital the connection between unions investment behavior and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism s long run impact

unions and the financial performance of british private sector establishments summary this paper considers the relationship between unions and financial performance using data from the 1980 and 1984 workplace industrial relations surveys a qualitative indicator of financial performance is utilized and ordered probit estimates presented these indicate that unionized establishments are characterized by lower performance levels than are non union concerns the interface between union effects and relative market power is also explored and the ability of unions to extract a share of the available rents is found to be greater if the plants in which they are located possess a higher market share

union membership determination and industry characteristics recent literature on the economics of unionism has expanded beyond its customary focus on the wage and nonwage effects of collective bargaining and given increased attention to the determinants of union membership previous union membership studies have been couched primarily within an individual choice framework whereby utility maximizing individuals choose either to join or not to join a union empirical work typically treats membership as a function of some vector of personal characteristics 1 2 10 11 21 it is our contention that such studies can best be interpreted as explaining the determination of the union status of jobs and that several industry and firm characteristics in addition to personal characteristics can be expected to affect significantly union membership in this paper theory and evidence relating to the effects of firm and industry characteristics on union membership are presented industry level data are bridged with a large microdata set containing individual characteristics in order to examine the determinants of unionism among workers in manufacturing utilizing a simultaneous model and controlling for sample selection bias we find that product market concentration capital intensity establishment size and job risk significantly affect the likelihood of union membership

do unions contract for added employment the efficient contract model predicts unions will contract for added employment that is a level of employment higher than would be predicted by the demand curve for labor using three data sets on canadian industries in 1971 81 u s industries in 1972 and u s construction projects in 1973 74 and several estimation techniques the author estimates and compares labor demand equations for both union and nonunion firms some regressions that control for few variables support the added employment hypothesis but those with more complete specifications reject it