how to best ensure remuneration for creators in the market for music copyright and its alternatives the focus of this essay is to examine the market for copyrighted works with a particular emphasis on the sound recording market this market is currently in a state of flux some would say disarray due to the ability of the internet to lower transmission costs for both authorized and unauthorized copies with the latter being at this time far more prevalent in this essay we discuss the intent of copyright the role of copying and file sharing and some alternative production consumption schemes meant to strengthen or to replace copyright

section 337 and the protection of intellectual property in the united states the complainants and the impact under section 337 of the tariff act of 1930 a firm can challenge imports that infringe its u s intellectual property rights such as patents copyrights and trademarks based on publicly available information this paper examines the characteristics of firms that file complaints under section 337 and also evaluates how firms are affected by the outcomes we find a complaining firm compared with peer firms in the same industry is typically larger produces a more diverse range of products has invested more in intangibles and is no less profitable a finding of no violation significantly depresses the filing firm s profits compared to peers section 337 appears to protect innovators but its effectiveness in promoting more innovation cannot be demonstrated so clearly copyright 1996 by mit press

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

sales and collusion in a market with storage sales are a widespread and well known phenomenon documented in several product markets this paper presents a novel rationale for sales that does not rely on consumer heterogeneity or on any form of randomness to explain such periodic price fluctuations the analysis is carried out in the context of a simple repeated price competition model and establishes that firms must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the market is large the largest equilibrium profits are characterized at any market size a trade off between the size of the industry and its profits arises sales foster collusion by magnifying the inter temporal links in consumers decisions

a general equilibrium analysis of software development implications of copyright protection and contract enforcement abstract we develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production we show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode i e in house versus outsourcing of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development we obtain some testable results when copyright protection is weak only customized software will be developed when copyright protection is strong both customized software and packaged software will be developed environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

coase versus pacman who eats whom in the durable goods monopoly in standard durable goods monopoly models both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua if the set of buyers is finite the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers a folk theorem is obtained if both sets are finite these results reflect a strategic disadvantage of having to make moves with a large impact on other players payoffs the analysis is extended to durable goods oligopoly

patenting in the shadow of competitors this article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs i show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards particularly those of firms with low litigation costs this pattern is consistent with the literature on costly litigation which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation these results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations

limits to database protection fair use and scientific research exemptions a trend running diametrically opposed to the expansion of intellectual property rights ipr is the increasing awareness that dominant positions sustained by ipr may be mitigated through exemptions and statutory or compulsory licences it is argued that there are compelling economic reasons to protect valuable assets that are prone to copying but that there are equally compelling reasons to limit monopolistic claims and stimulate cross licensing practices compulsory licensing may serve as a stimulus to the bargaining process with private parties and research institutions alike another important category of information is public sector information access to information has become a concern and the european commission has followed up on its green paper on public sector information in the information society with a directive implementing its vision on affordable access for all and exploitation potential the right of access to information may be enforced through the european convention on human rights it not only guarantees the freedom of speech it also recognises the freedom to receive information

intellectual property litigation activity in the usa abstract brand names or trademarks carry incredible economic power and prestige there is increasing recognition by world bodies that intellectual property ip whether manifested in patents trademarks copyrights or trade secrets is highly valuable and must be protected through robust ip enforcement the usa is an interesting natural laboratory as patent trademark and copyright litigation battles have been raging domestically for some time the paper discusses the four main forms of ip assets the legal remedies that are available to enforce the property rights inherent in each type of ip asset the basic damages theory relating to each form of ip and how damages may be calculated when each type of asset is presumed to be infringed the increased recognition of the value of ip has led to stronger enforcement of ip protection an increase in ip litigation and growing policy actions that are focused on how that protection should be manifested an empirical analysis of how the ip litigation activity in the usa has changed over time is also presented

strategizing by firms in the presence of markets for resources strategizing by firms from the resource based view is concerned with the process through which firms acquire a distinctive bundle of resources that is costly and time consuming for competitors to duplicate or imitate a central question facing any firm therefore is its strategy for accumulating the resources that underpin its production activities in this article the process of resource accumulation is discussed as one involving potentially both internal resource development and external resource acquisition from the perspective of the strategic issues involved in making a choice between these options emerging markets for technologies and know how through licensing and other forms of resource exchange have opened up new avenues through which firms may jostle for advantage the article is concerned with three major aspects of this process illustrating the discussion with cases from biotechnology and pharmaceuticals first the strategizing by firms around the internal development vs external sourcing issue is discussed as informed by the practices of leading firms and how these lend greater variety of strategic options for firms second the potential competitive advantages as well as disadvantages to be secured by firms through the process of external sourcing as compared with the well known potential advantages accruing to incumbents through internal development such as time compression diseconomies and causal ambiguity and third the criteria to be used by firms to strategically evaluate resources individually as contrasted with the strategic evaluation of the resource bundle or totality these criteria it is argued turn on the issues of marginal value contribution resource complementarities and synergies resource variety and transferability involving intellectual property issues successful firms it is argued expand their options through blending internal resource accumulation with external resource leverage thereby deepening their distinctive dynamic capabilities this approach extends the framework of the rbv enabling it to encompass resource driven schumpeterian competition and such aspects of industrial dynamics as specialization modularization and imitative challenge copyright 2003 oxford university press

an introduction to the law and economics of intellectual property although economists have written on topics of intellectual property for a long time the impact of economics on public policy in this area has been slight especially as compared to the influence of professional writings in areas such as antitrust and taxation we believe that too few of the profession s resources have been devoted to these issues and that of those resources that have been employed too few have been devoted to empirical analyses we hope that this introductory essay and the three papers that follow will stimulate interest in this subject this introductory essay first describes some of the basic economic tradeoffs involved in intellectual property law and then describes the framework of the law in the six areas described above patent copyright semiconductor protection trademark trade secret and misappropriation it is intended both to provide thumbnail descriptions of the various intellectual property regimes to economists working in this area and to indicate where additional economic research might be useful

outside options and the failure of the coase conjecture a buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option abandoning their search or moving on to another seller we show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price contravening the coase conjecture we then embed the singleseller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual no haggling assumption jel c78 d42 d43 l12 l13 the coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment the idea is that for any given price high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers leading to negative selection in the demand pool accordingly the seller cuts its price over time causing high value buyers to delay their purchases the seller s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves reducing its overall profit gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 this idea of negative selection is robust versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear kahn 1986 when goods depreciate over time bond and samuelson 1984 when there is entry of new buyers sobel 1991 and when the buyers face future competition fuchs and skrzypacz 2010 in this article we show that the coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise we consider a seller who faces a buyer or a continuum of buyers with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option each period the seller chooses price p t the buyer then chooses to buy wait or exercise his option and terminate the game the outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product for example when waiting for the price of the iphone to fall a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor similarly when bargaining over the price of a car a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer the outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated for example after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar a tourist could start seeing local attractions

trends countertrends and gaps in women s employment abstract the factors driving global integration namely trade expansion technological change and the internationalization of production have altered production patterns and changed the composition of output in both developed and developing countries as global patterns and modes of production have changed there has been a general shift away from agriculture toward industry and services along with these output changes have come significant changes in regional and national employment in developing and developed countries these changes span divergent trends on the one hand there is the increased availability of more and better quality employment as workers shift out of agriculture and subsistence production and into waged employment in the expanding manufacturing and service sectors on the other hand there have been sectors where the trend has been away from formalization toward the informalization and semi formalization of production activities and employment practices women have generally benefited from improvements in the world economy this article demonstrates however that patterns of employment and income generation among women often diverge however from global trends in important ways that suggest that the forces shaping global integration effect women differently the article frames a policy discussion that the international center for research on women led to debate the implications of recent trends in women s employment in the developing and developed world the six articles in this section represent this discussion they span a range of empirical and theoretical inquiry exploring global employment trends and highlighting changes in women s participation in formal and informal economic activities

durable goods oligopoly abstract this paper models a durable goods oligopoly as a differential game two cases are treated sales where firms cannot lease but must sell the good in question and leasing where firms do not sell but only rent in the sales case firms face increasing marginal cost of production and the good in question depreciates for this case a rational expectations feedback nash equilibrium is constructed for which monopoly or oligopoly output is less than the efficient level this gap between oligopoly and competitive output diminishes as the number of firms increases when firms can only lease the good the good is assumed not to depreciate and the monopoly level of steady state output is compared with the level of steady state output for a feedback equilibrium duopoly for this case the duopoly equilibrium has steady state output that is less than the corresponding efficient level but greater than the monopoly level the leasing model is shown to be isomorphic to the adjustment cost duopoly model of driskill and mccafferty journal of economic theory 49 1989 324 338

the effect of trade secret legal protection on venture capital investments evidence from the inevitable disclosure doctrine abstract this study investigates how the inevitable disclosure doctrine a form of trade secret legal protection affects venture capital vc investment using a data set of vc deals realized in the united states from 1980 to 2012 we find that a rule in favor of inevitable disclosure increases the amount of vc investment we address mechanisms that can explain these findings by assessing how the inevitable disclosure doctrine a displays a different impact on vc investments according to the characteristics of the state and the industry where the start ups operate and b affects the performance of vc backed firms we also discuss managerial and policy implications of our findings

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

long run price competition we generalize the standard repeated games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long lived and forward looking each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers expectations about future prices we analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers the model nests the repeated game model and the coasian durable goods model as its two extreme cases the analysis is mostly focused on constant price collusion but conditions for collusive recurrent sales are also identified

protecting intellectual property rights are small firms handicapped this paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978 99 by linking information from the u s patent office the federal courts and industry sources we find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade or other characteristics that facilitate cooperative resolution of disputes are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits however postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics these findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs

resale and collusion in a dynamic market for semidurable goods the paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second hand markets it will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity the main contribution of the paper shows that an active second hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude as do policies that affect the functioning of the second hand market e g leasing policy and buy back it will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits

anticompetitive financial contracting the design of financial claims this paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product market channels in standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets a firm s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms we find that in order to deter entry the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky i e equity in contrast to the standard branderlewis 1986 result that debt deters entry the model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms it also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start up firms

the effects of increased copyright protection an analytic approach previous authors who have considered partially nonexcludable goods have claimed that an increase in copyright protection will have the following two effects on social welfare first it will decrease the social welfare loss due to underproduction second it will increase the social welfare loss due to underutilization in this paper we investigate these claims in a formal setting by analyzing a model in which consumers vary only in terms of their costs of obtaining a reproduction our analysis provides partial support to the first claim of these previous authors while giving little or no support to the second claim

self employment the role of intellectual property right laws little is known about the impact of intellectual property rights iprs on typically imitative self employment ipr laws have contrasting dual innovation creation and access effects on self employment activity the first effect is positive where strong ipr laws promote innovation and so create new opportunities for self employment the second effect is negative where strong ipr laws restrict access to innovation and technology used as inputs to self employed businesses using a 33 country dataset over the period 1995 2000 we estimate the impact of ipr laws on self employment helping to fill the vacuum of empirical evidence that has plagued policy decision making in this area we find that patent activity has a negative effect on self employment however overall we find that more extensive and strong ipr laws have a net positive effect on self employment activity

intellectual property rights and the welfare effects of agricultural r d the profound changes that have affected agriculture in modern times are perhaps best illustrated by the evolution of production techniques due to mechanization new chemical inputs such as herbicides pesticides and fertilizers genetic selection of crops and animals new crop varieties and countless other technical and organizational improvements these innovations have allowed a generalized increase in physical output while at the same time agriculture has suffered a massive exodus of labor forces towards the non farm sectors indeed a stylized fact of developed countries post war growth is that productivity in agriculture has grown faster than in other sectors jorgenson and gollop 1992 this remarkable record naturally begs the question of what is at its root and a view that commands considerable consensus is that agricultural productivity growth is due to past investments in scientific research and development r d

optimal best price policy abstract a best price policy bp is a promise by a seller to give her customer a refund if she reduces her price after the customer has already purchased the product we characterize the optimal bp policy as when the seller can control both the policy length when the promise expires and the refund scale what portion of the price difference is refunded we explain why the policy length is finite and varies across industries in a setting where consumers valuations decline over time we show that a finite length bp allows the seller to commit to not lowering her price too soon while at the same time letting her capture some of the benefits of intertemporal price discrimination however because the decline in consumers valuations is uncertain a bp does not allow the monopolist to achieve the profit she could earn with a full commitment

r d and internal finance a panel study of small firms in high tech industries since joseph schumpeter economists have argued that internal finance should be an important determinant of r d expenditures yet almost without exception previous empirical studies have not found evidence of such a relation using newly available data the authors investigate this puzzle with a panel of 179 small firms in high tech industries under each estimation strategy they employ the authors find an economically large and statistically significant relationship between r d investment and internal finance their results are consistent with the view that because of capital market imperfections the flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small high tech firms acquire technology through r d copyright 1994 by mit press

fighting software piracy which governance tools matter in africa this article integrates previously missing components of government quality into the governance piracy nexus in exploring governance mechanisms by which global obligations for the treatment of iprs are effectively transmitted from international to the national level in the battle against piracy it assesses the best governance tools in the fight against piracy and upholding of intellectual property rights iprs the instrumentality of ipr laws treaties in tackling piracy through good governance mechanisms is also examined findings demonstrate that 1 while all governance tools under consideration significantly decrease the incidence of piracy corruption control is the most effective weapon 2 but for voice and accountability political stability and democracy ipr laws treaties are instrumental in tackling piracy through government quality dynamics of rule of law regulation quality government effectiveness corruption control and press freedom hence the need for a policy approach most conducive to expanding development is to implement an integrated system of both iprs and corollary good governance policies moreover our findings support the relevance of good governance measures in developing countries wishing to complement their emerging ipr regimes

entry versus success in the labor force young women s employment in sri lanka abstract in this paper we contribute to the understanding of women s labor force behavior in developing societies through a household level analysis of young single women in sri lanka we argue that in the context of saturated and imperfect labor markets of asian societies such as sri lanka it is important to 1 a differentiate between labor force participation and employment 2 b consider familial and cultural factors in addition to the standard determinants of labor supply and demand and 3 c examine the labor force activity of the current generation of single women in sri lanka where unemployment among young women is widespread our results strongly support the strategy of differentiating between labor force participation and employment that the determinants of these components of the employment process function in different ways is best illustrated by our findings regarding the effects of education higher education levels lead to greater labor force participation but highly educated women are also more likely to be unemployed than to be employed in addition our findings show that the labor market behavior of young women is shaped by familial expectations and resources in terms of the protected role of young daughters in the household cultural differences in the acceptability of young women working across ethnic groups the necessity for women to work across social classes and classbased advantages in access to information and channels that facilitate job acquisition

employment and unemployment in jordan the importance of the gender system abstract using data from focus group interviews this study investigates how the gender system influences employment and unemployment patterns in jordan cultural and family level factors affect not only whether women are in the labor market but also their success in finding a job cultural proscriptions on female mobility are a significant constraint in women s job searches state and employer level factors are also important in explaining high unemployment rates among women the shrinking of the public sector disproportionately affects women the location of jobs matters more for women than for men and discrimination in the private sector remains

capitalists and workers knowledge and the strategic role of investment within the firm does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm the formation of a firm frequently represents an attempt by an individual to secure a return on knowledge and we demonstrate that in this context there can be an incentive to precommit capital before contracting with other members of the firm that is to be the capitalist results are also obtained on the investment level and wage rate the key ingredient of the model is emergence of a product market entry threat from within the firm this contrasts with the anonymous external potential entrant prevalent in the literature

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

patents and other intellectual property rights in this article the author reviews intellectual property rights iprs with some emphasis on the protection of agricultural and life sciences innovations the main institutional features of iprs are first discussed along with a brief historical background and an articulation of the main rationale for the existence of such rights this is followed by an overview of the principal economic issues related to iprs the author explains the main benefit cost trade offs of allowing patents and other iprs and then analyzes specific issues in some depth including the scope of patent protection the effects of patent races and the problems arising when iprs concern cumulative and or complementary innovations the author further illustrates the economics of iprs by considering instruments alternative to patents such as prizes and government procurement contracts finally the author briefly discusses some open policy issues in this area

durable good monopoly with one hoss shay depreciation abstract this paper analyzes the effects of one hoss shay depreciation on the equilibrium stock path in a monopoly market for a durable good it is shown that the stock path oscillates converging to a stationary level lower than the competitive level

incentive to reduce crop trait durability to reduce the competition from farmers who self produce seed an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed in a two period model we investigate the impact of crop durability on self production pricing and switching decisions and we examine the impact of license fees paid by self producing farmers first in an inbred line seed monopoly model we find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers further the introduction of license fees improves efficiency second we study how the monopolist s behavior is affected by the entry of a nondurable hybrid seed producer we show that the inbred line seed producer might benefit from competing with a technologically dominated hybrid seed producer as this allows for consumers discrimination

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

constrained geographical mobility and gendered labor market outcomes under structural adjustment evidence from egypt summary we examine in this paper the evolution of gender gaps in labor market outcomes during structural adjustment and explore the extent to which widening gaps can be attributed to women s more limited geographical mobility using comparable household surveys carried out in 1988 and 1998 we show that gender gaps in access to wage and salary employment and in earnings have widened during this period especially in the nongovernmental sector we attribute these changes at least in part to women s more limited geographical mobility we show that women s commuting rates are not only much lower than those of men but also have remained stagnant in a period where males were having to travel significantly more to obtain jobs outside the government

optimal pricing strategy for durable goods monopoly abstract in this paper we reconsider the profitability of a durable good monopoly when the seller s discount rate may be different from the buyers in an infinite horizon continuous time full commitment model the monopoly can achieve more than the static monopoly profit if and only if the seller is more patient than the buyers under this condition the price function is strictly decreasing over time these results remain valid in models with buyers arriving sequentially where the seller may have only one unit to sell or can produce more at constant marginal cost

the measurement of intellectual property rights protection this research improves upon empirical studies that examine the measurement of intellectual property rights ipr protection prior measures examine only one type of law or lack a component that addresses the actual enforcement of these laws the measure presented here uses three types of ipr laws and enforcement components for them

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

the influence of regulations on innovation a quantitative assessment for oecd countries abstract regulatory framework conditions have been identified as important factors influencing the innovation activities of companies industries and whole economies however in the empirical literature the impacts of regulation have been assessed as rather ambivalent for innovation different types of regulations generate various impacts and even a single type of regulation can influence innovation in various ways depending on how the regulation is implemented the endogenous growth approach developed by carlin and soskice 2006 and empirically applied by crafts 2006 which determines endogenously the rate of technological progress and therefore innovation allows a conceptual analysis of the influence of different types of regulation on innovation in general the negative effect of compliance costs should be compared with the more dynamic effect of regulations generating additional incentives for innovative activities based on this approach we derive hypotheses on the impact of different specific regulations on innovation we differentiate between economic social and institutional regulations following the oecd taxonomy on regulations existing economic analyses are surveyed which are characterised by rather heterogeneous approaches data bases and results the paper aims to apply a comprehensive and comparative approach to investigate quantitatively the innovation impacts in 21 oecd countries using panel data for the period between 1998 and 2004 in summary the empirical results confirm the hypotheses derived from the conceptual theoretical framework determining technical progress and innovation endogenously and allowing a distinction between short term and long term effects consequently the theoretical approach is an appropriate starting point for the empirical analysis of the influence of different regulations on innovation

technology adoption learning spillovers and the optimal duration of patent based monopolies abstract the paper analyses an often overlooked aspect of the patent system namely that a monopoly franchise for production of a new good could lead to a second best welfare optimum event when there was no future prospect of inventions being induced by the patent it is shown that a paten may improve economic welfare relative to a regime of competitive supply when there are learning externalities or spillovers from experience in the process of production comparative statics show that stronger learning effects at low levels of experience tend to strengthen the case for ex post grant of a monopoly franchise

durable goods monopoly with limited choice of commitment strategy when should the monopolist precommit consider a firm a monopolist offering a unique product to a fixed number of potential customers suppose that no consumer desires more than one unit of the good within a given period or across periods that is there is no value to repeat purchases in addition suppose that customers vary with respect to their initial reservation prices which decline over time a natural interpretation is that the monopolist is selling a good that is durable alternatively the firm is providing an entertainment or fashion good consumers may place a premium on obtaining the product quickly before it becomes less useful less stylish or less novel coase 7 conjectured that this firm s ability to extract surplus is limited because the firm has to compete with itself across time periods high valuation customers would be unwilling to pay a high initial price because they would anticipate that over time the firm will be reducing the price in order to sell to lower valuation customers subsequent literature formalizes this as a time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist unable to make intertemporal commitments a separate strand of the literature proceeds from the polar assumption that the monopolist can precommit to any multiperiod pricing strategy comparison to coase s monopolist is simple higher profits are obtainable under precommitment because more surplus is extracted from high valuation customers an important proposition due to stokey 22 is that it will be optimal for the monopolist to precommit to a declining intertemporal price schedule if consumers with higher initial valuations have a higher rate of time preference 2 otherwise the optimal strategy is to hold price constant at the static monopoly level and to sell no more than the static monopoly quantity 3

the design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections abstract market power within a dynamic system of tradeable quotas with banking and borrowing of quotas leads to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across agents in this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the efficiency loss from market power and thereby result in a distribution of abatement across agents that is closer to a cost effective outcome however this system will in general lead to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across periods hence we may face a trade off between a cost effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse effects of market power

software copyright infringement among college students in recent years the issue of infringement in the software industry has gained international attention as the demand for software continues to grow the growing presence of unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted products inhibits full potential growth and discourages creative activity this study analyses the extent of software copyright infringement among college students and attitudes of these students with regard to risk of apprehension and conviction this study finds a significantly higher likelihood of infringement for computer majors and male students and a decrease in the likelihood of infringement for older students this study also uncovers differences in attitudes toward risk of apprehension and conviction between majors in scientific fields and those in business and economics whereas the first group of majors appears to exhibit risky behaviour the latter tends to be more risk averse

development growth and policy reform in the middle east and north africa since 1950 prior to 1950 the countries of the middle east exhibited some of the lowest levels of socioeconomic development in the world for many of these countries not even approximate economic statistics are available for the first half of the twentieth century but the state of underdevelopment can be illustrated by looking at egypt the most modernized and populous country in the arab world at the time egyptian per capita income stagnated in the first half of the twentieth century the country lacked modern industries and relied largely on the cotton sector for export and government revenues but agricultural productivity had been on a steady decline since the end of the nineteenth century owen and pamuk 1998 prior to land reforms in 1952 three quarters of peasants in this agrarian country owned less than an acre or no land at all the neglect of human services allowed periodic epidemics and malnutrition to keep mortality rates high until the late 1940s education levels were well below other developing regions with adult illiteracy estimated at 85 percent in 1939 and only 23 percent of children ages 5 19 enrolled in school but in the 1960s and 1970s egypt and other countries of the middle east experienced robust economic growth based largely on high levels of investment in physical capital that facilitated substantial increases in per capita income it might seem obvious that the higher oil prices of the 1970s should have sustained the growth cycle in this oil exporting region but gdp growth per worker in the middle east decelerated in that decade and factor productivity growth actually turned negative in the 1980s and 1990s gdp growth per worker in the region was less than 1 percent per year and modest gains in human capital were largely offset by

the welfare implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities this paper finds that unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities can not only induce greater firm profits relative to the case where there is no copying it can lead to a pareto improvement in social welfare ceteris paribus when network externalities are present firms have a greater incentive to expand output because marginal revenue is higher and or they may wish to create preemptive installed bases this paper suggests that unauthorized copying can be a relatively efficient means of achieving this by allowing the firm in effect to price discriminate among different classes of consumers copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

which countries protect intellectual property the case of software piracy david g steel using data on software piracy we examine how protection of intellectual property varies across countries consistent with other studies we find that intellectual property receives greater protection in developed economies high income countries have lower piracy rates we also find that protection depends on cultural factors countries with an individualist culture have lower piracy rates than do countries with a collectivist culture piracy rates are also lower in countries that have strong institutions that enforce contracts and protect property from expropriation these results suggest that national policies toward intellectual property reflect not only economic concerns but also national culture and institutions jel 034 l86 i introduction intellectual property rights are a recurring focus of international negotiation developed nations argue that such rights are essential for promoting innovation and economic growth many developing nations on the other hand argue that intellectual property rights inhibit economic development by restricting use of existing knowledge a generation of theoretical research has demonstrated that there is truth in both arguments depending on circumstances individual countries may reasonably favor different levels of protection for intellectual property 1 surprisingly little is known however about how such protection is actually determined only a handful of previous studies have analyzed cross national variation in intellectual property rights 2 these studies relate patent rights as formalized in the laws of individual countries to a range of social and economic variables the main empirical finding is that developed countries provide stronger patent protection in this article we extend this line of research by examining cross national variation in piracy of computer software the business software alliance and the software publishers association 1998 have estimated piracy rates the ratio of illegally copied units to total units for business software in more than 70 countries for 1994 97 these rates vary substantially in some countries essentially all new software was pirated in other countries less than 40 of software was pirated what explains these differences consistent with previous studies we find that developed countries provide greater protection for intellectual property than do developing countries high income countries tend to have lower piracy rates this is true both in a simple comparison of piracy rates with per capita income and to a lesser extent in regressions that control for other factors as we discuss below the causal interpretation of this correlation is not obvious the correlation is consistent with the hypothesis that intellectual property rights promote economic development however it may also reflect reverse causality e g if developing nations offer less protection so that they can use the intellectual property of developed nations or common causation by other factors many commentators have suggested that culture may also explain differences in piracy rates western countries they argue have individualist cultures that naturally embrace individual ownership of intellectual property whereas many non western countries have collective cultures that emphasize sharing over individual ownership as a result these societies have been reluctant to adopt western conceptions of intellectual property rights to test whether differences in culture lead to differences in intellectual property rights we relate piracy rates to an index of individualism and collectivism developed by hofstede 1980 1983 we find strong evidence that culture matters 3 countries with a tradition of individualism pirate much less than do countries with a tradition of collectivism this is true both in simple comparisons of piracy rates with individualism and in regressions that control for other factors

fulfilled expectations of entry i develop a two period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer s expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium i find that both expectations duopoly and monopoly are fulfilled in the incumbent s price setting game while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity setting game i also find that quantity is more entry deterring than price in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity setting game

modelling competitive behavior a single seller of an indivisible object wishes to sell the good to one of many buyers the seller has zero value for the good the buyers have a commonly known identical value of one this article attempts to determine strategic environments that ensure the seller s ability to exploit the competitive behavior of the buyers to extract all the surplus in the game i show that in many simple dynamic games there are subgame perfect equilibria that involve the seller s giving up the good for free even if the seller has an informational advantage that allows him to keep bidders from learning the bidding behavior of their opponents there still exist perfect bayesian equilibria that involve a sale at the price of zero however in this case a simple refinement in the spirit of sequential equilibria can be used to rule out such collusive behavior and to show that the unique equilibrium outcome satisfying this refinement yields the seller a price of one

copying and indirect appropriability photocopying of journals creators and owners of intellectual properties are alarmed by the growth of technologies that ease the tasks of copying these properties this paper however shows that the unauthorized copying of intellectual properties need not be harmful and actually may be beneficial the empirical impact of photocopying on publishers of journals is examined in an attempt to discover if publishers can indirectly appropriate revenues from users who are not original purchasers the evidence indicates that publishers can indirectly appropriate revenues from users who do not directly purchase journals and that photocopying has not harmed journal publishers 18 references 1 table

court decisions and equity markets estimating the value of copyright protection abstract we construct a database of u s federal court decisions pertaining to copyright and changes in federal statutory copyright law and use this database to assemble indices measuring changes in the breadth of copyright protection we combine our indices with information on excess returns to equity from a quarterly panel of firms and estimate how the breadth of copyright affects the market valuation of firm equity a typical statute that increases copyright breadth generates an increase in a firm s excess return to equity of 40 209 basis points depending on the exact time frame the size of the firm and the importance of the change in statutory law a typical high court decision expanding copyright generates a 13 105 basis point increase in excess returns our results are robust across 4 5 year subsamples and the size distribution of firms our statutory findings are strongest in the most recent portion of the sample

the economics of product patents this paper develops a model of product patents in which the patent changes the nature of market entry behavior rather than preventing entry entirely the model incorporates three levels of action namely the innovator s patenting decision the potential entrant s location decision and possible court action the analysis demonstrates how the characteristics of the patents system and the enforcement framework can influence rivals variety choices and thus the market equilibrium it also considers how the system can in principle be adjusted to improve social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

social norms and emission tax multiple equilibria in adopting pollution abatement device the effect of social norm is addressed in an adoption game where an emission tax is used to motivate oligopolistic firms to adopt a pollution abatement device we ask if the intrinsic motivation from social norm alone can motivate firms to participate in adoption the multiple equilibria in the adoption game indicates two possibilities this intrinsic motivation may or may not enhance adoption the existing literature on equilibrium selection further suggests that the most likely outcome is that it cannot enhance adoption next by keeping the assumption of symmetry we show that if cooperation is an option for firms then the presence of two coordination effects social norm on adoption and cooperation benefits on output will result in the existence of asymmetric adoptions

when do secondary markets harm firms to investigate whether secondary markets aid or harm durable goods manufacturers we build a dynamic model of durable goods oligopoly with transaction costs in the secondary market calibrating model parameters using data from the us automobile industry we find the net effect of opening the secondary market is to decrease new car manufacturers profits by 35 percent counterfactual scenarios in which the size of the used good stock decreases such as when products become less durable when the number of firms decreases or when firms can commit to future production levels increase the profitability of opening the secondary market

economic benefits and costs of biotechnology innovations in agriculture the conceptual model necessary for an assessment of biotechnology s economic benefits and costs is outlined emphasizing the need to account for the proprietary nature of biotechnology innovations the model is illustrated with an application to roundup ready soybeans the estimated value of this innovation is sizeable with consumers and innovators claiming the larger share of net benefits also disparities in intellectual property rights protection across countries affect the distribution of benefits consumer resistance toward genetically modified organisms gmos and the issues of labeling and market segregation complicate the economic evaluation of biotechnology innovations and a number of related regulation and public policy issues are discussed emerging output trait gmos are potentially less controversial and ma y bring more benefits to all participants in the agri food sector but this outcome depends crucially on the development of an effective credible and internationally harmonized regulatory system

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

entry deterrence and innovation in durable goods monopoly this paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well we show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good the equilibrium is therefore determined not only by competitive pressure due to time inconsistency but also by the incumbent s concern for maintaining the technological leadership we demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation

entrepreneurs and new ideas we study how early stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension such as technical feasibility correspondence to market demand legality or patentability to screen good ideas the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise sharing the idea however creates the risk that the expert would steal it yet the idea thief cannot contact any other expert lest he should in turn steal the idea thus stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary in such cases the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other s information yet very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them

the moral legitimacy of intellectual property claims american business and developing country perspectives private property forms the bedrock of the business society relationship in a market economy in one way or another most societies limitwhat people can claim as property as well as theextent of claims they can make regarding it in the international arena today intellectual property rights are a focal point of debate many developing countries do not recognize the monopoly claims of patents and copyrights asserted by business as legitimate this paper reviews contemporary areas of dispute and then presents the tasks facing the construction of a fair intellectual property rights regime

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

intellectual property rights in china the changing political economy of chinese american interests we review the evolution of modern chinese intellectual property right ipr laws and enforcement and explore economic and political forces involved in international conflicts over chinese ipr protection our analysis considers why the us and china moved from conflict to cooperation over intellectual property rights structural and institutional aspects of the political economy of iprs within each country are considered and data on chinese us trade in intellectual property intensive goods are examined we conclude that although enforcement of iprs within china continues to be relatively weak chinese ipr institutions are converging on those in the oecd nations

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

a dynamic equilibrium model of durable goods monopoly abstract in this paper we construct a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of durable goods monopoly in a discrete time framework and show that a revised coase conjecture monopolists are efficient under a proper tax subsidy policy holds even in the case of increasing marginal cost if the length of each period in the discrete model is sufficiently short

south north trade intellectual property jurisdictions and freedom to operate in agricultural research on staple crops international food policy research institute washington d c center for the application of molecular biology to international agriculture canberra university of california berkeley the authors are listed alphabetically philip pardey is a senior research fellow and patricia zambrano a senior research assistant at the international food policy research institute carol nottenburg is director of intellectual property at the center for the application of molecular biology to international agriculture and brian wright is a professor and eran binenbaum a ph d student in the department of agricultural and resource economics university of california berkeley stephen stohs bonwoo koo and yuan liang provided excellent research assistance and agapi somwaru usda ers collaborated with us in compiling the trade data richard jefferson provided invaluable comments on earlier drafts research for this paper was made possible in part by a grant from the swedish international development agency sida

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

location taxation and governments an exchange theory of intellectual property abstract the standard economic model of intellectual property is an efficient property rights solution to a market failure problem of investment in a non rival and non excludable good we propose an exchange theory of intellectual property based on a contracting approach in the context of market making and enforcement of economic rights in exchange for monopoly taxation rights we use a hotelling 1929 type spatial model to show the relationship between location and pricing decisions of innovating firms under differing intellectual property institutional quality and taxation regimes

how valuable are the patents behind section 337 cases a us patent protects the owner of the intellectual property from imitators producing in the us and foreign imitators selling in the us market there are two venues for filing infringement cases against international infringement of us patents with the international trade commission itc using section 337 of the tariff act of 1930 or with federal district courts three indicators of patent value suggest that patents litigated under section 337 are on average more valuable however their values tend to be more variable the latter suggests that some firms may be using section 337 not for protection against international infringement of us patents but for protection against imports