residual wage disparity and coordination unemployment how much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms to answer we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high or low productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers calibrated to the u s economy workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms and can conduct on the job search the stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump shaped skewed significantly to the right and with baseline parameters generates residual dispersion statistics 75 90 of those found empirically however the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment

combining the endogenous choice of price quantity and timing abstract this paper builds a theory of endogenous role distribution leader follower and nash player and of endogenous choice for the type of competition strategy price and quantity in a product differentiated duopoly model we examine an extended game by adding a pre play stage in which duopoly firms simultaneously decide whether to select a price contract or a quantity contract and also whether to move in the first period or in the second period before market competition we demonstrate that the unique equilibrium outcome is simultaneous quantity competition if the goods are substitutes and simultaneous price competition if the goods are complements

the probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties this paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently the empirical analysis considers both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the guide price reserve and opening bid the findings highlight that the final achieved sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself factors such as auction participation the number of individual bidders and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications

equality employment and budgetary restraint the trilemma of the service economy this article presents an analysis of the postindustrial economy from a political economy perspective it identifies a set of specific distributional trade offs associated with the new role played by the services sector as the chief source of employment growth in advanced democracies over the last three decades it is argued that three core policy objectives budgetary restraint wage equality and expansion of employment constitute a political trilemma that allows only two of the goals to be successfully pursued at the same time using a combination of statistical and case oriented analysis the authors demonstrate the political and economic salience of the trilemma the distributional tensions inherent in each strategy to cope with it and the political institutional constraints under which these strategies are chosen

temporary boycotts as self fulfilling disruptions of markets abstract this paper demonstrates how equilibrium involving anticipated boycotts and actual boycotts can occur even though consumers are negligible and only care about the price they pay and the timing of purchase the model is a two period durable goods monopoly game with demand uncertainty first a non boycott equilibrium is characterized under regularity assumptions ruling out multiplicative uncertainty there are additional equilibria in which the firm sets a low price in period 0 based on the anticipation that consumers will boycott whenever the price exceeds a threshold also the augmented game with a publicly observed sunspot has equilibria in which boycotts occur on the equilibrium path with positive probability

on the choice of pricing policies ex ante commitment and prisoners dilemma abstract i study the endogenous formation of pricing policies posted uniform versus negotiated pricing by using a version of a two stage pricing game in a duopoly context the model explains the prevalence of uniform pricing in some markets countries and identifies a typical prisoners dilemma in these cases the sellers commitment to a pre announced price under uniform pricing mitigates the fear of buyers that they might be exploited once they start price negotiations while such buyers anticipation induces sellers to adopt uniform pricing in an attempt to capture more buyers it results in intensified competition with lower seller payoffs

equivalence of auctions and posted prices abstract we determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms auctions and posted prices agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices we show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 d44

private fiat money with many suppliers a dynamic rational expectations model of money is used to investigate whether a nash equilibrium of many firms each supplying its own brand name currency will optimally deflate their currencies in friedman s 1969 sense the optimal deflation does arise under an open loop dynamic structure but the equilibrium breaks down under a more realistic feedback control structure

does political reform increase wealth or why the difference between the chicago and virginia schools is really an elasticity question this paper shows that contrary to becker work there is no innate tendency for political competition to reduce the total cost of government wealth transfers simple examples demonstrate how the effects of government policies on total wealth boil down to the elasticities of the marginal support and opposition curves disagreements between the chicago and virginia schools of political economy can be understood as a disagreement about these elasticities the broader implications for this argument in terms of the efficiency of the common law are also discussed

basing point pricing and production concentration basing point pricing is a delivered price system in which the price quoted for delivery of a commodity is the sum of the price quoted at a predetermined basing point plus the cost of transportation from the basing point to the point of delivery whether or not the commodity is actually shipped from the basing point thus a seller who is not located at the base site absorbs freight for shipments toward the base point and charges phantom freight on shipments away from the base point basing point pricing has been widely practiced throughout the world for example testimony of the federal trade commission before the tnec i 94 i p 33 alleged that industries in the united states which then or previously followed basing point pricing included lumber iron and steel pig iron cement lime brick asphalt shingles and roofing window glass white lead metal lath building tile floor tile gypsum plaster bolts nuts and rivets cast iron soil pipe range boilers valves and fittings sewer pipes paper and paper products salt sugar corn derivatives industrial alcohol linseed oil fertilisers chemicals transportation equipment and power cable almost from its inception economists have generally considered basingpoint pricing to reflect a cartel or price leadership arrangement hoover i937 stigler i949 machlup i949 and such practices have been attacked under antitrust statutes for example aetna portland cement co vs ftc i 57 f 2nd 533 i946 triangle conduit cable co vs ftc i68 f 2nd i 75 7th cir i 948 cement institute vs ftc i57 f 2nd 533 i948 nonetheless basing point pricing remains prevalent particularly outside the united states opec has used a gulf based price plus transport costs to determine the delivered prices of crude oil to most places in the world haddock i982 p 290 the pricing of cement in great britain and steel in europe can be characterised as multibase point systems greenhut i987 recent attempts by for example haddock i982 to return to the theme that the basing point system could be competitive and desirable have been challenged by thisse and vives i988 and benson et al i990 on the basis of recent advances in the analysis of pricing policy given then that we assume basing point pricing to be a collusive device adopted by incumbent firms to impose some kind of price discipline on potential entrants the price leadership point referred to above important strategic and locational issues arise in particular a major concern of the early analysis of basing point pricing was the effect such a pricing policy would have on location choice of entrant firms

research note quantity discounts in differentiated consumer product markets in this paper we extend the standard hotelling model of product differentiation to incorporate a second dimension of consumer heterogeneity that relates to the quantity of the product consumers wish to buy this extension allows us to derive optimal nonlinear pricing rules chosen by competing sellers when offering differentiated products in the marketplace it also permits us to assess whether sellers find it optimal to offer quantity discounts in such a setting and the implications of such discounts on their profitability we find that offering quantity discounts corresponds indeed to equilibrium behavior the extent of discounting declines the less differentiated the products surprisingly when sellers offer to consumers a choice between two different sized packages their profits are at most as high as when such a choice is unavailable moreover when utilizing nonlinear pricing rules is not feasible the profits of the sellers actually decline when they offer consumers a choice between different sized packages a limited empirical investigation supports the comparative statics we derive in our theoretical model

revenue management with forward looking buyers a seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline for example the end of a season potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases each period the profit maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs we show that these cutoffs are deterministic depending only on the inventory and time remaining in the continuous time limit the optimal mechanism can be implemented by posting anonymous prices when incoming demand decreases over time the optimal cutoffs satisfy a one period look ahead property and prices are defined by an intuitive differential equation

price commitment in search markets abstract this paper studies the formation of pricing rules in search markets at a cost each seller can commit himself to a fixed price if he takes no actions to preclude haggling his sales price is determined through bilateral negotiations with the buyer the selection of pricing rules exhibits strategic complementarities that may give rise to multiple equilibria differences in trading practices across countries and cultures may thus be consistent with equilibrium behavior in bazaar markets where the buyer s cost of switching sellers is relatively low most of the trade is conducted via bargaining and prices are close to the perfectly competitive outcome

comparing revenue from auctions and posted prices i analyze the market for compact discs using an original data set of items listed for sale online over 5000 listings of both new and used compact discs were collected from ebay which provides sellers a choice between two mechanisms auction or posted price and its subsidiary half com which features only posted prices despite the often cited revenue dominance property of auctions many sellers choose to post a fixed price to explain this anomaly i examine empirically the determinants of the revenue earned by sellers in this market i find that posted price goods sell for higher prices while auctioned goods sell with a higher probability further results suggest that the size of a seller s inventory is the key factor in the choice between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price in particular sellers with large inventories are more likely to use the posted price mechanism

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices abstract i consider a model in which several identical objects are sold simultaneously via an auction and a posted price mechanism the model explains several empirical regularities regarding bidding behavior in ebay auctions such as the finding that some bidders bid multiple times over the course of the auction and that bidders tend to bid with greater frequency near the end of the auction than the beginning i also show that sellers prefer to simultaneously use auctions and posted prices than to use either mechanism individually

dynamic pricing behavior in perishable goods markets evidence from secondary markets for major league baseball tickets sellers of perishable goods increasingly use dynamic pricing strategies as technology makes it easier to change prices and track inventory this paper tests how accurately theoretical models of dynamic pricing describe sellers behavior in secondary markets for event tickets a classic example of a perishable good it shows that the simplest dynamic pricing models describe very accurately both the pricing problem faced by sellers and how they behave explaining why sellers cut prices dramatically by 40 percent or more as an event approaches the estimates also imply that dynamic pricing is valuable raising the average seller s expected payoff by around 16 percent

how do selling mechanisms affect profits surplus capacity and prices with unknown demand i analyze a model in which a seller wishes to sell multiple homogeneous goods to a large group of buyers with unknown demand the seller may either sell objects via a posted price mechanism a discriminatory price auction a uniform price auction their open bid analogs or a revelation mechanism in which the seller first asks all potential buyers to report their valuations and then sets a reserve price i show that the revelation mechanism leads to the greatest profits the auction mechanisms result in identical expected profits and the posted price mechanism results in the smallest profits however the more profitable mechanisms impose stronger informational requirements that may make these mechanisms infeasible in practice and the posted price mechanism also results in the greatest total surplus i also find the seller chooses a lower capacity and reserve price in an auction than in the posted price mechanism

the evolution of a free banking system the institutional features of models of unregulated monetary systems have often been arbitrarily and implausibly assumed this paper instead provides realistic grounding for important features by constructing a logical evolutionary account of free banking sophisticated and orderly arrangements are shown to emerge from competition and the pursuit of less costly methods of payment the emergence of standardized commodity money is followed by the development in turn of basic money transfer banking easily transferable bank liubilities and clearinghouses the features of an evolved free banking system differ from those assumed in recent models of competitive payments systems

when and why hyperinflating monetary authorities abandon a currency hyperinflating monetary authorities occasionally abandon the currency with delay to extract remaining seignorage modeling the monetary authority as an exhaustible resource extracting monopolist shows the delay increases with higher remaining seignorage or real interest rates or lower seignorage maximizing rates

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse we endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand auctions bargaining discount pricing etc expose buyers to the price risk the uncertainty of not knowing how much to pay in advance fixed price trading eliminates the price risk which is why risk averse customers accept paying more to shop at such stores

wage inequality and varieties of capitalism this article draws on a new data set that enables the authors to compare the distribution of income from employment across oecd countries specifically the article conducts a pooled cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of wage inequality in sixteen countries from 1973 to 1995 the analysis shows that varieties of capitalism matter the authors find that the qualities that distinguish social market economies from liberal market economies shape the way political and institutional variables influence wage inequality of particular interest to political scientists is the finding that the wage distributive effects of government partisanship are contingent on institutional context union density emerges in the analysis as the single most important factor influencing wage inequality in both institutional contexts

dynamic competition with random demand and costless search a theory of price posting this paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under demand uncertainty firms must produce output in advance after observing aggregate sales in prior periods firms post prices for their unsold output in each period the demand of a new batch of consumers is randomly activated existing customers who have not yet bought and then new customers arrive at the market in random order observe the posted prices and either purchase at the lowest available price or delay their purchase decision we construct a sequential equilibrium in which the output produced and its allocation across consumers is efficient thus consumers endogenously sort themselves efficiently with the highest valuations purchasing first transaction prices in each period rise continuously as firms become more optimistic about demand followed by a market correction by the last period prices are market clearing

auctions versus posted price selling two popular selling methods posted price selling and auctions are compared here in an independent private values model without auctioning costs auctioning is always optimal when auctioning is costly auctions are still preferable if the marginal revenue curve is sufficiently steep the global steepness of the marginal revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions finally the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared copyright 1993 by american economic association

the bidder s curse traditional explanations for the popularity of auctions are efficiency and revenue maximization we argue that another reason is the potential for overbidding i e buyers bidding above their willingness to pay outside the auction the auction mechanism ensures that even if only few buyers overbid they affect prices and allocations we employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field comparing auction prices to simultaneous fixed prices for identical items on the same ebay webpage we argue that fixed prices provide an upper bound for auction bids in a detailed data set of board game auctions we find that the final price exceeds the simultaneous fixed price in 42 percent of the auctions the result is not explained by differences in item quality shipping costs or seller reputation prior auction experience does not eliminate overbidding the finding replicates in a second broad data set of a cross section of auctions 48 percent overbidding the substantial fraction of overbid auctions is induced by a small number of bidders only 17 percent ever bid above the fixed price using a simple model of second price auctions with alternative fixed prices we show that transaction costs of switching between auctions and fixed prices cannot explain the results given that even the expected auction price is higher than the fixed price consistent with limited attention the closer the fixed price is listed relative to an auction the less likely are overbids this effect is strongest for bidders first bids when they are likely to examine the auction and fixed price listings more closely

on the efficiency of location decisions under discriminatory pricing abstract the paper analyzes the question of whether delivered pricing policies give rise to an inefficient location of firms and in particular to a geographical distribution of capacity which is overly concentrated the analysis adds to the literature on spatial pricing and location decisions the element of uncertainty over the timely delivery of products and therefore the possibility that risk averse consumers may be willing to pay a higher delivered price for products if they can hedge and divide their orders among two suppliers the results are in strong contradiction to the common belief that identical delivered pricing systems produce a highly inefficient distribution and that fob would yield the optimal location however it is shown that in markets with coordination problems the concern about excessive concentration of productive capacity may be legitimate

a structural model of competing sellers auctions and posted prices in an original data set of goods listed for sale online i observe that both auctions and posted prices are popular with buyers and sellers in the compact disc market to explain why these two mechanisms coexist i estimate a structural model of competing sellers who differ in the value of their outside options buyers are allowed to value auctioned and posted price goods differently but the estimated value distributions suggest that differences across buyers do not explain the mechanism coexistence that i observe in contrast differences across sellers outside options are important the value of the outside option segments the market with high outside option sellers choosing to post a fixed price there are two key forces at work that drive this empirical result first competition between sellers favors coexistence over an auction only or a posted price only marketplace because sellers prefer to be in a market with fewer rivals second sellers with more valuable outside options prefer the posted price mechanism because posted price goods sell less often than auctioned goods but at a higher price as a result a larger outside option reduces the loss from not selling and favors the posted price mechanism

why do sellers usually prefer auctions we compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly a simple simultaneous auction and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding the sequential process is always more efficient but preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers because the auction is more conducive to entry precisely because of its inefficiency it usually generates higher expected revenue we also discuss the effects of lock ups matching rights break up fees as in takeover battles entry subsidies etc

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

selling formats for search goods the paper offers a comparative analysis of different ways to sell products selling formats when buyers incur evaluation costs since these costs are sunk at the moment of trade buyers may refrain from incurring them for fear of later opportunism on the part of sellers it is found that the use of many common selling formats can be explained in terms of their ability to alleviate this problem specifically i explain price advertising seller colocation and bargaining the theory explains much of the divergence in retail trading institutions and leads to several testable predictions

time matters postindustrialization new social risks and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies western welfare states were built during the postwar years with one key objective to protect family male breadwinners against the consequences of losing their ability to extract an income from

auctions with a buy price the case of reference dependent preferences abstract in an auction with a buy price the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price this paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction s reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price the model both explains why a revenue maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders reference price through the auction s reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders reference price through the auction s reserve price only the comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction s buy price have no effect on bidding behavior

money and monetary stability in europe 1300 1914 abstract this paper investigates the determinants of monetary stability in europe from the late medieval era until world war i through this period the anchor for monetary policy was the silver or gold value of the monetary unit states however frequently abandoned this anchor some depreciating their monetary units against silver and gold less than 10 fold and others more than 10 000 fold between 1500 and 1914 to understand the determinants of these differences we compile a new and comprehensive monetary history dataset for all major states in europe and test alternative theories we find strong evidence that political factors and in particular fiscal capacity political regime and warfare explain patterns of monetary stability this finding is robust to addressing endogeneity controlling for the instability induced by the mechanics of the monetary system and accounting for the impacts of new monetary technologies and the advent of fiat standard

personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony abstract we analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs when the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular the buyer chooses to make the same offer to all suppliers leading to a posted price when demand is sufficiently concave convex this price is lower higher than the classical monopsony price in the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero we obtain the classical monopsony price therefore our model provides a decentralized micro foundation for monopsony

social democracy christian democracy constitutional structure and the welfare state the literature on the determinants of welfare state effort displays many inconsistencies and contradictins this article takes imoprtant stepts toward resolving these issues with the use of pooled

incomplete information bargaining with outside opportunities we consider two kinds of outside opportunity that a seller of an indivisible good might have selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself in both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer s valuation and becomes more pessimistic over time when the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic she prefers the outside opportunity so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer despite the resulting finite horizon nature of negotiations the link between the buyer s willingness to accept an offer and the seller s eagerness to go outside generates multiple equilibria

is the friedman rule optimal when money is an intermediate good in contrast to the recent literature on the optimal inflation tax we show that in models where money reduces transactions costs it is optimal to set the inflation tax to zero when seigniorage is replaced by revenue from distortionary taxes the main reasons for this result are that the variable costs of supplying real balances are negligible and the inflation tax is a unit tax we also show that the intermediate good optimal taxation rules in the public finance literature cannot be directly applied both when money is costless and when it requires resources to be produced

selecting optimal selling format of a product in b2c online auctions with boundedly rational customers abstract the advancement of internet technology has enabled new formats for selling products in the b2c online auctions at present on the major online auction sites there exist three popular selling formats namely the posted price pure auction and buy price auction formats it is an important decision problem for a firm to select the most profitable format to sell its products through the internet the customer behavior is of course a crucial element of the decision process to the best of our knowledge most models available today assume that customers are perfectly rational to better understand the decision process in this paper we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration we first present a behavior choice function to characterize the behavior of the customers with bounded rationality then corresponding to each selling format we construct a revenue model based on the bounded rationality for analysis finally we conduct some elaborate computational experiments to investigate the performance of each revenue model for developing new managerial insights our computational results clearly demonstrate how the bounded rationality of customer behavior affects the choice of a preferable selling format for a b2c firm in an online auction

fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination we investigate the effect of a ban on third degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion we build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups two cases are analyzed i best response symmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are higher if price discrimination is allowed ii best response asymmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are lower if price discrimination is allowed in both price discrimination scenarios firms discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim trigger strategies than under uniform pricing

upping the ante how to design efficient auctions with entry of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage we first formalize hold up regarding entry costs that preys on second price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill bidding activity we derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions second we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post which offers some valuable flexibility the english auction with jump bids implements then the first best in general environments

inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders abstract participation in internet auctions goes well beyond those who place a bid participants arrive in random order and if the auction s standing price has already exceeded a participant s valuation she will not bid even so her unreported valuation is a relevant part of demand for the item and in an alternate random order her bid would have been registered i provide a method to estimate the average number of participants from the average number of bidders per auction this enables estimation of the distribution of participant valuations from either the distribution of closing prices or the distribution of all observed bids

the effectiveness of english auctions abstract we study the performance of the english auction under different assumptions about the seller s degree of bayesian sophistication we define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation total surplus we identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the english auction for general private values environments and for private values environments where bidders valuations are non negatively correlated for example when the seller faces 12 bidders who the seller believes have non negatively correlated valuations whose expectations are at least as high as 60 of the maximal possible valuation an english auction with no reserve price generates an expected price that is more than 80 of the value of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation

dual mechanism for an online retailer abstract while posted price and auction have typically been seen as alternatives to each other we observe web stores selling a product at a posted price and simultaneously running auctions for the identical product a phenomenon that has not been studied fully in this article we study a dual mechanism where an online retailer combines the two conventional mechanisms posted price and auction for multiple units of a product we demonstrate that the dual mechanism can be used to achieve market segmentation when customers discount the expected utility of auctions we characterize the customer s decision rule and formulate a retailer s profit function under the dual mechanism finally we compare the performance of three selling mechanisms posted price auction and dual through computational experiments

pricing in the online invoice trading market first empirical evidence abstract in recent years online invoice trading has gained importance in providing smes with short term financing in this paper we present first empirical evidence concerning the question whether the risk of payment difficulties is appropriately reflected in the pricing variables to this end we investigate predictors of default of online invoice trading platforms we analyze both the probability of default and the loss rate and find that the interest rate the duration and the percentage funded have good predictive power furthermore we show that the pricing mechanism auction vs fixed prices helps to explain defaults on online invoice trading platforms

price setting and competition in a simple duopoly model the paper studies a market in which there are two sellers and one buyer each agent wants to trade at most one unit of an indivisible commodity the sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving offers from one or both of them at any given time this model induces competitive and monopolistic outcomes for particular parameter values but other things being equal as the buyer becomes very patient the equilibrium price converges to the competitive one

market mechanisms in online peer to peer lending online peer to peer lending p2p lending has emerged as an appealing new channel of financing in recent years a fundamental but largely unanswered question in this nascent industry is the choice of market mechanisms i e how the supply and demand of funds are matched and the terms price at which transactions will occur two of the most popular mechanisms are auctions where the crowd determines the price of the transaction through an auction process and posted prices where the platform determines the price while p2p lending platforms typically use one or the other there is little systematic research on the implications of such choices for market participants transaction outcomes and social welfare we address this question both theoretically and empirically we first develop a game theoretic model that yields empirically testable hypotheses taking into account the incentive of the platform we then test these hypotheses by exploiting a regime change from auctions to posted prices on one of the largest p2p lending platforms consistent with our hypotheses we find that under platform mandated posted prices loans are funded with higher probability but the preset interest rates are higher than borrowers starting interest rates and contract interest rates in auctions more important all else equal loans funded under posted prices are more likely to default thereby undermining lenders returns on investment and their surplus although platform mandated posted prices may be faster in originating loans auctions that rely on the crowd to discover prices are not necessarily inferior in terms of overall social welfare this paper was accepted by chris forman information systems

sorting versus screening search frictions and competing mechanisms in a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism price posting prevails when meetings are rival i e when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer s meeting probability under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non rival price posting is not an equilibrium multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

adaptive learning and the transition to fiat money this article explores some implications of adaptive learning for monetary evolution using a search theoretic framework that allows for media of exchange network effects adaptive learning precludes any voluntary transition to a fiat standard from a non monetary state of nature and can account for the historically observed tendency for fiat monetary standards to emerge only following the prior appearance of commodity money and the widespread employment of redeemable banknotes adaptive learning can also account for governments frequent resort to coercive measures to force a switch to fiat money and for their ability to affect such a switch even when doing so is not pareto optimal exchange media fall into the general category of products for which the utility that a user of the good derives from use of the good increases with the number of other agents using the good katz and shapiro 1985 p 424 there are two reasons for these positive network effects 1 indirect the more agents who employ a particular medium of exchange the more likely it is that prices will be quoted in terms of that medium of exchange i e that the medium of exchange will also serve as the economy s principle medium of account the costs of exchange are less for a medium of exchange that trades at par this indirect external effect is analogous to one encountered in computer hardware the more purchasers of a particular kind of hardware the more likely manufacturers of software are to supply compatible products 2 direct the more persons who use a particular exchange medium the better its quality or performance this direct network effect is analogous to one encountered in communications technologies such as telephones the analogy is especially close for fiat money which is useless to an isolated individual this article examines some ways in which media of exchange network effects influence the evolution of monetary standards and especially their role in determining both when and how a transition may occur from barter or commodity money to fiat money the approach taken here emphasises the role of adaptive learning where agents select exchange strategies that reflect static expectations concerning other agents preferred strategies although the exchange game agents play generally has multiple nash equilibria including one in which all agents accept fiat money adaptive learning precludes a spontaneous transition from barter to a fiat monetary standard even where a fiat standard would be welfare enhancing yet such learning does not rule out the spontaneous evolution of a commodity money standard or the eventual substitution of redeemable banknotes for commodity money readers familiar with the literature on network effects will recognise this

bundling and competition for slots we consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots under independent pricing a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient when bundling is allowed each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient technology renting equilibrium always exists furthermore in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned all equilibria are efficient comparing the mixed strategy equilibrium with the technology renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer s surplus finally we derive clear cut policy

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

a fiscal theory of government s role in money i introduction economic policy has up to the turn of the century been motivated primarily by fiscal considerations f iscal measures have created and destroyed industries even where this was not their intent and have in this manner contributed directly to the construction and distortion of the edifice of the modern economy schumpeter 1954 7 why do governments play the roles they do in the monetary system in particular why have national governments almost universally taken over the business of issuing coins and paper currency and replaced precious metals with fiat money as the base supporting bankissued money why have they not in developed countries at least also nationalized the production of checking accounts choosing instead to tax and regulate private banks standard answers to these questions refer to market failures natural monopolies externalities or information asymmetries that might render unregulated private production of money inefficient or unstable or infeasible market failure explanations assume that governments shape monetary institutions to serve money holders by providing a more efficient and stable payments system than would exist under laissez faire thus private competition is not allowed in currency issue because markets inherently would fail or historically did fail there and the legal restrictions we see on deposit banking are ones needed to prevent market failures in that industry recent research supplies three reasons for doubting the adequacy of the market failure approach for explaining monetary arrangements first economic historians have found that the actual forms taken by money and banking regulations and the timing of their adoption often have little apparent connection to alleged market failures observed regulations e g reserve requirements that freeze rather than enhance liquidity are ill designed to remedy the suboptimalities that are supposed to have motivated them second monetary historians have found that systems close to laissez faire have by and large been at least as successful as more restricted systems finally monetary theorists have pointed out weaknesses in theoretical arguments for market failure in money 1 if the market failure explanation is doubtful how else can one explain government s role in money charles kindleberger 1994 xi poses the challenge squarely the economist who doubts the market failure approach has to explain why there seems to be a strong revealed preference in history for a sole issuer we propose a fiscal hypothesis governments have come to supply currency and to restrict the private supply of currency and deposits not to remedy market failures but to provide themselves with seigniorage and loans on favorable terms government currency monopolies and bank regulations can thus be understood as part of the tax system the strong revealed preference in history for a sole issuer is fundamentally the preference of fiscal authorities not of consumers 2 economic historians have of course often recognized fiscal motives behind specific monetary arrangements especially those of ancient and medieval autocracies analysts of developing countries today have recognized that policies of financial repression aim at fostering financial institutions and financial instruments from which government can expropriate significant seigniorage fry 1988 14 giovanni and de melo 1993 we go further in arguing that fiscal forces have typically shaped the industrial organization of money production throughout history and across countries and account for its major institutional features even in advanced democracies today such observed legal restrictions as statutory reserve requirements interest rate ceilings foreign exchange controls and monopoly issue of currency impede efficiency but raise revenue a rational dictator model to develop our hypothesis we adopt a method found in the writings of the italian fiscal theorists especially amilcare puviani

all pay auctions with a buy price option all pay auctions this paper studies all pay auctions in which there is a buy price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified price we analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first and second price all pay auctions with the buy price option while the optimal buy price in the second price is higher than are those in the first price all pay auction both formats maintain the same expected profit with an endogenous entry process all pay auctions with the buy price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted price selling mechanism jel d44 l11 l81

bundling and international market segmentation the paper shows how firms by bundling their products with nontradables may contribute to the segmentation of international oligopoly markets we develop a simple example with two products one that is homogeneous across markets and one that is bundled with a nontradable e g local services integration of the markets for the homogeneous product yields the expected price equalization across markets however integration of the markets for bundled products leaves the economy entirely unaffected hence the standard methodology of comparing a segmented and an integrated equilibrium would exaggerate the effects of integration in this economy

social policy through labor markets understanding national differences in the provision of economic security to wage earners recent work in comparative political economy has emphasized the existence of functional equivalents to the welfare state in the area of labor market policy in many european countries in australia and in new zealand labor laws minimum wages and collective agreements have traditionally played an important role in guaranteeing a certain level of economic security for workers and their families this article tries to explain why different countries have developed different instruments for providing economic security to wage earners it compares labor legislation and practices across several european countries and focuses on the detailed trajectory of france germany and the united kingdom it finds that state society relationships and ideological influences at key historical moments can help understand the original divergence which is perpetuated through a typical path dependent development

the dual transformation of social protection and human capital comparing britain and germany britain and germany have been experiencing significant changes in the nature of work and welfare since the 1990s although important differences have remained there have been compelling indication

bargaining versus posted price selling abstract two popular selling methods bargaining and posted price selling are compared here in a dynamic model when bargaining costs no more than posted price selling we find that bargaining is always optimal when bargaining costs more however bargaining is still preferred if and only if the common cost for both selling methods is large enough we also find that an increase in the discount rate or the seller s bargaining power favors bargaining finally we find that if the distribution becomes more dispersed and the increase in a buyer s valuation is sufficiently large bargaining is more likely to be adopted

multiproduct pricing in oligopoly abstract this paper proposes a two good model of price competition where some consumers visit all shops and others visit only one we find that information frictions lead to price dispersion when the two goods are complements their prices will tend to be negatively correlated so if one is priced high the other will be discounted this finding is supported by some empirical evidence which suggests that simultaneous price discounts of complements are infrequent if the goods are substitutes their prices will be uncorrelated potentially rationalizing the lack of evidence on their co pricing when selling complements retailers earn higher profits than in the one good model through taxing captive consumers with a high overall price tag and attracting shoppers by pricing one of the goods aggressively bundling practices are thus shown to be detrimental to retailers profits

basing point pricing competition versus collusion we consider the implications of game theoretic models for the competitive or collusive nature of basing point pricing bpp in one shot games equilibrium price schedules do not generally conform to bpp with unrestricted price competition nevertheless bpp can emerge in dynamic contexts define modified fob price policy as using fob in one s natural market and matching the rival s delivered price whenever profitable a configuration where both firms do this is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a two stage game where firms choose first price policies and then compete in the marketplace further with repeated competition bpp can be used as punishment device

buybacks with costly participation abstract posted price offers and first price auctions along with the multi unit discriminatory auction extension are two widely used mechanisms for allocating conservation contracts the choice between the two typically hinges on the trade off between the posted price s simplicity and the potential revenue gains of the auction in this paper we introduce a novel mechanism that attempts to bridge the gap between the performance of posted price offers and auctions a two price and lottery schedule combines the simplicity of the former with some of the flexibility of the latter using a model that incorporates agents cognitive and information costs of bidding we analyze how the ranking of allocative efficiency and cost effectiveness between the mechanisms varies as the wedge of participation costs increases when the number of bidders is endogenously determined by participation costs bid shading associated with a lack of competition in the auction compromises its cost effectiveness vis a vis the posted price and the lottery schedule we use data from three recent buybacks for fishing licenses conducted in maryland to calibrate our model and identify conditions under which the two price schedule outperforms the other mechanisms

the optimal listing strategies in online auctions this article proposes a unified framework to completely characterize the seller s optimal listing strategy in the online auction as a function of her rate of time impatience specifically the fixed price listing the regular auction and the buy it now bin auction are each a solution of the seller s single optimization problem under different values of the rate of intertemporal discount the perfectly patient seller adopts the regular auction the sellers with a medium range of time impatience adopt the bin auction and the most impatient of sellers adopt the fixed price listing moreover under mild conditions the reverse price is inversely related to the value of the seller s discount factor either within or across formats this in turn implies that the posted price in the fixed price sale is greater than the reserve price of the bin auction followed by that of the regular auction these predictions offer clear empirical implications

government revenue from money creation with government and private money abstract for a stationary state we show that if the government is as efficient as a competitive banking industry in producing money then the substitution of private for government money does not alter the revenue from money creation or the present value maximizing holding cost of money if households and non banking firms hold both government and private money then maximum present value requires that the reserve ratio maximize the monetary base and that the base nominal interest elasticity equal minus one with perfect foresight zero money balances and zero revenue from money creation is the only time consistent revenue maximizing solution

selecting a selling institution auctions versus sequential search we consider the seller s choice between sequential search and an auction when selling n homogeneous units of a good in the presence of informational asymmetries discounting and transaction costs our analysis shows that the expected return per unit from sequential selling decreases in n the number of units being sold for the auction with suitable restrictions the expected return per unit increases in n thus sequential search is the preferred institution if n is small whereas the auction is preferred if n is large historical details of the evolution of livestock markets closely fit our theoretical results

competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice abstract we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions of competing sellers with private valuations assuming that buyers face higher hassle costs in auctions we show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers offer posted prices rather than auctions if and only if they have a sufficiently high reservation value posted prices sell with lower probability but yield a larger revenue in case of trade using an empirical strategy to compare revenues of posted prices and auctions that takes selling probabilities explicitly into account we find our theoretical predictions supported by data from ebay auctions on ticket sales for the euro 2008 european football championship

product line competition customization vs proliferation we study a market with customers who have heterogeneous preferences for product attributes we consider two types of firms that compete on price and product variety a traditional firm which chooses a limited set of product configurations and a customizing firm which can produce any configuration to order the traditional firm carries product inventories and experiences a lead time delay the customizing firm does not carry inventory and its customers incur waiting costs until they receive their orders we assume that the customizing firm has limited capacity in the short run e g when it does not outsource production to high volume manufacturers we derive the equilibrium for a duopoly competition between the customizing firm and the traditional firm study its characteristics and compare it to a monopoly we characterize conditions that favor customization under competition we find that the customizing firm s profit is not monotone in the market size and its ease of customization similarly a

revenue management without commitment dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales a seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline at each time he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale over time buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases if a buyer does not purchase when she arrives she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price in the unique markov perfect equilibrium the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods a flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game when it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale the seller holds a big initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good

on the basing point system reply david d haddock s 1990 contention is really that the jacques f thisse and xavier vives 1988 and the bruce l benson melvin l greenhut and george norman 1990 papers do not provide a collusive model that yields base point pricing bpp he apparently believes his paper 1982 established competitive bpp and suggests in 1990 that the collusive model and hard empirical work alone remain however no collusive model is required since it has already been well demonstrated in the literature on plant location and spatial price theory that firms at feasible distance locations from a production center would accept bpp only because they fear that to do otherwise would subject them to retaliatory actions by the larger more powerful firms at the production center moreover the paper by thisse vives 1988 henceforth tv and benson greenhut norman 1990 henceforth bgn indicated sufficiently that other systems would arise than haddock s competitive bpp especially since the restrictive conditions necessary for the latter militate against its use haddock in fact appears to accept these conditions in his references to arthur r burns proposals 1936 of nearbase point pricing nbpp hard empirical analysis would indeed be in order in determining the extent of nbpp not competitive bpp this paper responds to the above noted issues in three main sections section i briefly provides some historical data on the collusive uses of bpp for any future researcher who seeks empirically to uncover a

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

a model of competing selling mechanisms abstract a model where sellers choose sequentially between any two selling mechanisms is studied with monotonicity and minimum mechanism difference there exists a unique equilibrium where all sellers choose the mechanism of higher per seller surplus at a critical number of sellers

posted pricing vs bargaining in sequential selling process we study the role of bargaining in a firm s sequential selling process the seller firm under consideration sequentially sells a fixed amount of stock to a random arrival stream of potential buyers who are heterogeneous in product valuation based on the stock level and the time to the end of the selling season the seller may dynamically choose either to post a take it or leave it price or to engage in bargaining with an arriving buyer we introduce a stochastic order called the scaled pricing order for the buyer s valuation distribution the scaled pricing order measures the average portion of trade surplus that the seller can obtain by posting a price for distributions with increasing length biased hazard rate checking the property of increasing decreasing scaled pricing order boils down to verifying the concavity convexity of the mills ratio we fully characterize the family of distributions that are invariant in the scaled pricing order which includes uniform and exponential distributions

mechanism choice and the buy it now auction a structural model of competing buyers and sellers a striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms items on ebay for instance are frequently offered through auctions posted prices and buy it now auctions in this article i study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers i specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets in which i consider both sides of the market on the demand side buyers choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game on the supply side sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices i estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on ebay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed price listings respectively i find that the addition of auctions to fixed price markets hurts sellers and risk averse buyers but benefits risk neutral buyers additionally the consumer surplus increases when buy it now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further i discuss the intuition for the cause of this result

pricing and allocation for quality differentiated online services we explore the problem of pricing and allocation of unique one time digital products in the form of data streams we look at the short term problem where the firm has a capacitated shared resource and multiple products or service levels we formulate the allocatively efficient generalized vickrey auction gva for our setting and point out the computational challenges in determining the individual discriminatory transfer payments we propose an alternative uniform price computationally efficient revenue maximizing knapsack formulation called the multiple vickrey auction mva while not incentive compatible the mva mechanism achieves bounded posterior regret and can be solved in real time it has the added benefit of realizing imputed commodity prices for the various services a feature lacking in the discriminatory gva approach for service providers that are concerned about the incentive compatibility but want imputed service prices we suggest a maximal mva mmva uniform pricing scheme that trades off revenue maximization for allocative efficiency for sake of completeness we discuss the properties of a first price pay your bid scheme while np hard and not incentive compatible this formulation has the perceived benefit of cognitive simplicity on the parts of sellers and bidders

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

arriving in time estimation of english auctions with a stochastic number of bidders we develop a new econometric approach for the estimation of second price ascending bid auctions with a stochastic number of bidders our empirical framework considers the arrival process of new bidders as well as the distribution of bidders valuations of objects being auctioned by observing the timing of bidder arrival the model is identified even when the number of potential bidders is stochastic and unknown the relevance of our approach is illustrated with an empirical application using a unique dataset of art auctions on ebay our results suggest a higher impact of sellers reputation on bidders valuations than previously reported in cross sectional studies but the impact of reputation on bidder arrival is largely insignificant interestingly a seller s reputation impacts not only the actions of the bidders but the actions of the seller as well in particular experience and a good reputation increase the probability of a seller posting items for sale on longer lasting auctions which we find inc