optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market this article studies optimal linear and non linear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labour market unlike in standard taxation models firms do not know workers abilities and competitively screen them through non linear compensation contracts unobservable to the government in a miyazaki wilson spence equilibrium adverse selection leads to different optimal tax formulas than in the standard mirrlees 1971 model because of the use of work hours as a screening tool by firms which for higher talent workers results in a rat race and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross subsidies the most surprising result is that if the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not policies that endogenously affect adverse selection are discussed the model has practical implications for the interpretation estimation and use of taxable income elasticities which are central to optimal tax design

setting the agenda electoral competition commitment of policy and issue salience by committing policy an incumbent in effect disowns an issue when she maintains policy flexibility the issue remains electorally salient electoral competition shapes political commitment decisions and collapses the multi dimensional issue space into a low dimensional space of electorally salient issues

real sources of european currency policy sectoral interests and european monetary integration in the thirty years before economic and monetary union was achieved european currency policies varied widely among countries and over time in this article i argue that the sectoral impact of regional exchange rate arrangements in particular their expected real effects on european trade and investment exerted a powerful influence on the course of european monetary integration the principal benefit of fixing european exchange rates was facilitation of cross border trade and investment within the european union eu the principal cost of fixed rates was the loss of national governments ability to use currency policy to improve their producers competitive position empirical results indeed indicate that a stronger and more stable currency was associated with greater importance of manufactured exports to the eu s hard currency core while depreciations were associated with an increase in the net import competition faced by the country s producers this suggests a powerful impact of real factors related to trade and investment and of private interests concerned about these factors in determining national currency policies

a political economy theory of the soft budget constraint why do soft budget constraints exist and persist in this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness we develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal we show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do this encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival in consequence even when information is complete politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future we show that maybe somewhat surprisingly dictators who are less likely to lose power are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

the surprising power of age dependent taxes this paper provides a new empirically driven application of the dynamic mirrleesian framework by studying a feasible and potentially powerful tax reform age dependent labour income taxation i show analytically how age dependence improves policy on both the intratemporal and intertemporal margins i use detailed numerical simulations calibrated with data from the u s panel study of income dynamics to generate robust policy implications age dependence 1 lowers marginal taxes on average and especially on high income young workers and 2 lowers average taxes on all young workers relative to older workers when private saving and borrowing are restricted finally i calculate and characterize the welfare gains from age dependence despite its simplicity age dependence generates a welfare gain equal to between 0 6 and 1 5 of aggregate annual consumption and it captures more than 60 of the gain from reform to the dynamic optimal policy the gains are due to substantial increases in both efficiency and equity when age dependence is restricted to be pareto improving the welfare gain is nearly as large

the scope of imf conditionality international organizations are governed by two parallel sets of rules formal rules which embody consensual procedures and informal rules which allow exceptional access for powerful countries a new data set drawn from the imf s records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution s autonomy i find evidence of u s influence which operates to constrain condition ality but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the united states in ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances broad authority is delegated to the imf which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition the imf has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality international organizations have become increasingly important actors in inter national politics they have proliferated have expanded in membership have acquired new legal enforcement powers and have extended their reach into the details of domestic political economy in their member states af ew including the international monetary fund imf or simply the fund command significant resources and wield considerable authority some critics have argued that these international organizations are sufficiently autonomous to create a democratic def icit at the international level as they pursue a vision of undemocratic liberal ism 1 other critics have argued that international organizations are nothing more than instruments in the hands of powerful states 2 these critiques of course cannot simultaneously be true and both run into difficulties the puzzle that the rogue agency view cannot explain is why the principals have chosen to delegate so much authority in principal agent terms this view posits that both screening and monitoring have failed the principals are unable to select agents with preferences similar to their own and are unable

imperfect information and the equitability of competitive prices in many markets sellers have imperfect information about the costs of sales to different buyers and the pattern of competitive pricing depends on the information available in order to analyze the equity implications of public policies requiring information suppression non utilitarian measures of the horizontal and vertical dimensions of pricing inequity caused by cross subsidization are proposed and examined better information generally reduces vertical inequity but if information about buyers is initially poor additional imperfect information may increase horizontal inequity if information is initially good more information generally lowers both dimensions of inequity

the political economy of fiscal policy an experimental study on the strategic use of deficits field data on the strategic use of deficits to limit thebudgetary scope of future governments are inconclusive aboutthe effects of political polarization or a government sre election probability on fiscal policy therefore wedesigned a controlled experiment to examine the strategic useof deficits using a within subjects design we find thatdeficits rise with a higher degree of polarization and a lowerreelection probability however in a between subjects designneither polarization nor reelection probabilities have asystematic effect we discuss the implications of ourexperimental results for empirical tests of the strategic useof deficits with field data

energy subsidies and policy commitment in political equilibrium abstract because non renewable energy subsidies affect incentives for investing in energy saving technologies they entail a classic investment hold up problem once investment has taken place policymakers will tend to overuse them for distributional reasons which will in turn depress investment by forward looking agents reforming energy subsidies thus requires overcoming a policy commitment problem in this paper we show that even when commitment is feasible it may fail to materialize in a political equilibrium due to politicians re election incentives in particular it will be those politicians who are comparatively less favorable to energy subsidies who may fail to commit to phase them out

the political economy of monetary institutions in recent decades countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions including alternative exchange rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions emphasizing their role in resolving both the time inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy this first generation work however suffers from a central limitation it studies exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other by contrast the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and central bank independence together and in so doing present a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions the articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions investigating how political institutions democratic processes political party competition and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives

the value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities abstract this paper investigates the welfare implications of symmetrical improvements in information and accompanying screening mechanisms which allow for improved matching of individuals to their respective risk classes unlike previous models used to investigate this phenomenon this paper allows for the possibility that individuals differ not simply according to exogenously specified unequal loss probabilities but rather that individuals possess different self protection technologies moreover various insurance contracting possibilities are also considered it is demonstrated that the structural form of the heterogeneity of technologies and the type of insurance contracts available in the market determine in an interactive way the value of information which improves the matching of individuals to risk class

in search of the holy grail policy convergence experimentation and economic performance we consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country s own circumstances but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little policy experimentation corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation corruption and economic performance as a function of a country s location vis aa vis successful leaders in particular it predicts a u shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics close neighbors should do very well distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance and intermediate countries worst of all an empirical test with the experience of post socialist countries provides supportive results

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

the disadvantage of tying their hands on the political economy of policy commitments incumbents are more likely to be re elected if they have a comparative advantage in the eyes of voters on some central issue this paper argues that incumbents have an incentive to avoid reforms that reduce the government s role in deciding these issues in order to increase their chances of re election this point is illustrated in the context of the choice of an exchange rate regime in an economy characterized by an inflation bias a flexible exchange rate allows the government to use monetary policy as a stabilization tool while fixed exchange rates remove the inflation bias of the economy on the one hand it is shown that a more inflation averse government may refrain from choosing fixed exchange rates in order to capitalize on the inflationary reputation of its opponent this incentive is contrasted with the opposite incentive to tie the hands of the future government should be incumbent be defeated on the other hand it is shown that electoral considerations may reinforce the incentive of the more inflationary government to tie its own hands with fixed exchange rates

monetary politics and unemployment persistence abstract this paper develops a positive model of monetary policy that allows for persistent unemployment and electoral uncertainty the common credibility problem associated with low inflation monetary policy results in both a more severe inflation bias and a stabilization bias however a simple state contingent performance contract eliminates both biases monetary policy is also subject to two different strategic political considerations it is used to influence future policy decisions as well as to increase the incumbent party s probability of re election this results in a political business cycle which however is fundamentally different for left wing and right wing governments

is there a politically optimal level of judicial independence independent courts render current policy more durable by raising the cost of future policy changes but may also engage in policy making of their own this paper asks is there an optimal level of judicial independence from the perspective of incumbent officials in the other branches to answer that question the paper develops a model of strategic institutional choice and tests it on the judicial institutions of the american states consistent with the model s predictions the most independenceenhancing institutions are found where political competition between rival parties is tightest and differences between party platforms are largest

exchange rate regimes and independent central banks a correlated choice of imperfectly credible institutions theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments however the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments thus the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adopt both institutions and the interaction between them this paper presents a model that allows policymakers the simultaneous choice of monetary institutions and shows that imperfectly credible institutions will overlap when exchange rates are fixed but adjustable and central bank independence is not fully ascertainable governments choose both institutions more generally the paper generates hypotheses about the conditions that make fixed exchange rates and independent central banks complements or substitutes thus contributing to an explanation of the diversity of global monetary institutions in the post bretton woods period

checks and balances and the supply of central bank independence abstract the paper analyzes the institutional conditions under which policymakers can credibly commit to an independent central bank and thereby mitigate the well known time consistency problem in monetary policy it is shown theoretically that granting independence via a statute is only credible for legislative systems with at least two heterogeneous decision making bodies which both have veto rights for example bicameral systems this thesis is supported by empirical evidence the legal independence of central banks is significantly higher in those oecd countries whose legislative processes are characterized by extensive checks and balances furthermore the negative relation between legal independence and inflation is larger in countries with checks and balances than in countries without checks and balances

optimal maturity of nominal government debt an infinite horizon model the role of debt maturity is analyzed in a framework that blends tax smoothing with time inconsistency of optimal policy when policymakers have an incentive to use unanticipated inflation to reduce the real value of nominal government liabilities three conclusions emerge 1 nominal debt leads policymakers to resort to inflation even though in equilibrium inflation collects no revenue 2 when under full precommitment the optimal policy calls for complete tax smoothing and a constant debt level the equilibrium policy without precommitment calls for anticipating tax collection and early debt repayment and 3 management of debt maturity is an essential component of the equilibrium policy copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a theory of political entrenchment can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency this paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon which we label political entrenchment we use a two party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting political entrenchment by the left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high low skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies we discuss the possibility of entrenchment by the right the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies and the effect of state capacity income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment we illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples

elections exchange rates and reform in latin america abstract in this paper we study the link between real exchange rate rer depreciation and elections in latin america our contribution is threefold first we employ a statistical model that takes into account the pervasive conditional heteroskedasticity found in financial data and includes a wide range of macroeconomic variables as regressors second we test whether the wave of central bank reform that swept the region has had any effect on the existence or strength of the electoral cycle in exchange rates third we test an additional hypothesis namely that financial liberalization may also be an important variable explaining changes in electoral effects on the real exchange rate in a panel of 9 latin american countries with available macroeconomic data and a history of exogenous election dates we confirm the previous findings that real depreciation intensifies after elections even when modeling the significant conditional heteroskedasticity in these data we also show for the first time in the literature that post election exchange rates are significantly less predictable we go on to test whether central bank reform has influenced the way in which elections affect the rer in latin america if reform has been effective at reducing political manipulation of the exchange rate then any relationship we see between elections and the rer before central bank reform should be mitigated in the post reform era we find that the relationship disappears after reform and that post reform real exchange rates are also significantly less volatile finally we show that financial liberalization seems to have a stronger effect on the conditional variance of the rer than does central bank reform but reform has a stronger impact on the conditional mean

the impact of imperfectly categorizing risks on income inequality and social welfare the use of imperfect information to categorize risks is a pervasive and controversial phenomenon in the insurance industry although this activity reduces the average extent of vertical price discrimination it is shown in this paper that both highand low risk types may prefer ex ante to knowing the category to which they will be assigned that such information be suppressed furthermore for the lorenz criterion it is shown that under certain restrictive demand conditions the imperfect categorization of risks leads to an increase in inequality the paper employs the wilson e2 equilibrium concept l impact d une categorisation imparfaite des risques sur l inegalite du revenu et le bien etre social l utilisation de renseignements imparfaits pour categoriser les risques est un probleme important qui porte a controverses dans l industrie de i assurance meme si ce phenomene reduit le degre de discrimination verticale par les prix en moyenne i auteur montre que a la fois les personnes dont le coefficient de risques est faible et elev6 et ce avant de savoir a quelle categorie on va les assigner peuvent fort bien preferer que cette information soit supprimee de plus 1 auteur montre que sous certaines conditions de demande restrictives la categorisation imparfaite des risques conduit a un accroissement du degre d inegalite mesure par le critere de lorenz ce memoire utilise le concept d equilibre dit de wilson e2 if insurance firms are unable to distinguish between the risk types of their clients but consumers know their own probability of loss i e if asymmetric information persists then the complication of adverse selection may arise adverse selection occurs when the class of risks or set of classes that purchases insurance differs adversely from that anticipated by the firm for example if a firm offers a contract to low risk types at their actuarially fair rate then high risk types will also purchase it with the result that the firm will earn expected losses hence the problem of adverse selection restricts the ability of firms to offer efficient insurance contracts to low risk types it has been demonstrated by rothschild and stiglitz 1976 that provided the proportion of high risk types in the population is above some critical level a this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 of the author s phd thesis entitled the economics of risk classification in insurance london school of economics and political science 1982 i am indebted to my supervisor lucien foldes and an anonymous referee for useful comments the author alone is responsible for any errors herein canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xvil no 3 august aotlt 1984 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 84 557 568 1 50 c canadian economics association this content downloaded from 157 55 39 215 on wed 31 aug 2016 04 39 57 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

the effect of government ideology on an exchange rate regime some international evidence this paper comprehensively investigates the effect of government ideology on the type of exchange rate regime that a country implements via multinomial logit and multinomial probit models for 147 countries in the period 1974 2009 our results clearly indicate that a left wing government increases the likelihood that a country implements a flexible regime in the classifications of exchange rate regimes nevertheless evidence is weaker when using the de jure imf course classification which is set up by ilzetzki et al 2008 in a deeper investigation we find that left wing governments are more likely to choose a flexible regime relative to a fixed one in our sample of oecd non oecd and non eurozone countries as the impacts from government ideology on the determinant of the choice of exchange rate regime in eurozone countries disappear more importantly we present many explanations for exchange rate regime choices when macroeconomic conditions political constraints and institutions impact the choice of exchange rate regime