bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the european central bank evidence from a panel sample selection model abstract this paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations ltros of the european central bank we investigate how banks bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs interest rate expectations market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin size and experience a specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time therefore we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank s endogenous participation decision we find that bidding strategies depend on the banks attributes yet different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success there is evidence for the winner s curse effect in ltros indicating a common value component in banks demand for longer term refinancing

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

all pay auctions an experimental study this paper reports the results of a repeated all pay auction game the auction form used is the simplest possible complete information perfect recall and common value our main findings are that in such an auction over bidding is quite drastic and the seller s revenue depends strongly on the number of bidders in early stages however after a few rounds of play this dependence completely disappears and the seller s revenue becomes independent of the number of participants the results are confronted with two solution concepts of economic theory the nash equilibrium and the symmetric logit equilibrium 2005 published by elsevier b v

the estimation of welfare levels of a cardinal utility function in order to measure an individual s welfare function of income wfi van praag 1968 1971 the individual is confronted with various welfare levels and asked to associate income levels with them the welfare levels are given as verbal qualifications like good sufficient bad etc it is assumed that these verbal qualifications correspond to intervals of equal length of the range of the wfi here we want to test this assumption a first principal component model is applied the intervals of the range of the wfi associated with the verbal qualifications are estimated and a test of their equality is performed

interest rate and liquidity risk management and the european money supply process abstract the monetary setup of the european central bank ecb centers around short term securities repurchase agreements repos which ensure the flexibility of its money market management however a flexible repo based monetary policy exposes banks to both interest rate risk and liquidity risk this paper investigates the consequences for the money supply process and the conduct of monetary policy we develop a loan supply model with maturity transformation and show how banks respond when future monetary policy is expected to become tighter or more uncertain our results also shed light on the rationale behind the use of different pricing rules in the ecb s repo auctions

the repo auctions of the european central bank and the vanishing quota puzzle until june 2000 the european central bank ecb used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions a switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks in this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ecb s liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ecb s practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target

the statistical properties of daily foreign exchange rates 1974 1983 abstract this paper examines the statistical properties of daily rates of change of five foreign currencies from 1974 to 1983 the main purpose is to discriminate between two competing explanations for the observed heavy tails of the distribution that the data are independently drawn from a heavy tail distribution which remains fixed over time and that the data come from distributions which vary over time evidence point to the rejection of the first hypothesis further investigations show that the rejection can be attributed to changing means and variances in the data which can be described by a simple statistical model

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

a class of nonlinear arch models a class of nonlinear arch models is suggested the proposed class encompasses several functional forms for arch which have been put forth in the literature a lagrange multiplier test is developed to test engle s arch specification against the wider class of models this test provides an easily computed diagnostic check of the adequacy of an arch model after it has been estimated the theory is applied to a number of weekly exchange rate series and we find strong evidence of nonlinear arch

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training

term structure of interest rates in the singapore asian dollar market this paper investigates empirically the term structure of interest rates in the singapore asian dollar market we consider extended versions of the arch m model of engle lilien and robins 1987 the extended models permit autocorrelation skewness and leptokurtosis in the residuals the robustness of the empirical tests with respect to alternative specifications of the arch process is examined it turns out that there is significant time varying term premium and this conclusion is independent of the hypothesized arch model

multiple prize contests the optimal allocation of prizes abstract multiple prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics patent and r d races to tendering for governmental projects hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment this survey attempts to outline compare and evaluate the results from the literature while a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects depending on the objective function the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal

are risk aversion and impatience related to cognitive ability is the way that people make risky choices or tradeoffs over time related to cognitive ability this paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability risk aversion and impatience using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures we conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion and impatience over an annual time horizon for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1 000 german adults subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability which correspond to sub modules of one of the most widely used iq tests interviews are conducted in subjects own homes we find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion and more pronounced impatience these relationships are significant and robust to controlling for personal characteristics educational attainment income and measures of credit constraints we perform a series of additional robustness checks which help rule out other possible confounds

are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions field evidence from multistage tournaments abstract this paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices using data from professional and semi professional basketball tournaments we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present the results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low

monetary policy transmission with interbank market fragmentation this paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy fragmentation is the fact that banks depending on their country of location have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation excess liquidity arises endogenously this leads short term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates using data on monetary policy operations i show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008 the model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures

cross country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates volatility abstract volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models designed to replicate the features of individual countries markets cannot account for this paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks our model is consistent with central banks practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short term interest rates conflicts with another high frequency objective such as an exchange rate target

the credit crunch in east asia what can bank excess liquid assets tell us abstract the paper proposes a two step approach to assess the extent to which the fall in credit in crisis stricken east asian countries was a supply or demand induced phenomenon the first step is based on the estimation of demand function for excess liquid assets by commercial banks such a function is derived analytically in the first part of the paper the second step consists of establishing dynamic projections for the periods following the crisis and assessing whether or not residuals are large enough to be viewed as indicators of involuntary accumulation of excess reserves results for thailand indicate that the contraction in bank lending that accompanied the crisis was the result of supply factors

myopic risk taking in tournaments abstract there is a common notion that incentive schemes in the financial industry trigger myopia and risk taking in some sense this contrasts with the concept of myopic loss aversion mla which implies that myopia mitigates risk taking a number of experimental studies support the mla hypothesis by showing that people take less risk the more frequently their investments are evaluated in this paper we show experimentally that if subjects are exposed to tournament incentives the standard mla effect disappears rather there is a tendency towards more risk taking the more frequently investments are evaluated

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

arch models properties estimation and testing abstract the aim of this survey paper is to provide an account of some of the important developments in the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity arch model since its inception in a seminal paper by engle 1982 this model takes account of many observed properties of asset prices and therefore various interpretations can be attributed to it we start with the basic arch models and discuss their different interpretations arch models have been generalized in different directions to accommodate more and more features of the real world we provide a comprehensive treatment of many of the extensions of the original arch model next we discuss estimation and testing for arch models and note that these models lead to some interesting and unique problems there have been numerous applications and we mention some of these as we present different models the paper includes a glossary of the acronyms for the models we describe

a general analysis of rent seeking games in this paper we reconsider the basic model of efficient rent seeking we stress the importance of the shape of the players reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game we give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria moreover the possibility of preemption by a stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent seeking available to the agents

the estimation of the quantities in the ieq regression abstract the maintained hypothesis that the evaluation question in the measurement of individual welfare functions is answered according to equal intervals of the 0 1 scale is tested under the assumption that the welfare function can be approximated by a lognormal distribution function the quantiles corresponding to the intervals are estimated jointly with the individual parameters of the welfare function the estimation results for the quantiles reject the equal interval hypothesis

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

coping with complexity experimental evidence for narrow bracketing in multi stage contests abstract this paper investigates whether decision makers bracket their choices narrowly to facilitate complex decision problems evidence from a framing variation of rewards in experimental two stage pairwise elimination contests indicates that decision makers neglect the option value of participation in future stages of the contest if the reward frame facilitates the separate consideration of stages but not if the reward frame induces forward looking behavior decision makers account for the option value of participation in future stages of the contest independently of the reward frame however when complex strategic interactions in future stages of the contest are replaced by simple lotteries that facilitate the determination of the option value the results present novel evidence for the prevalence and the determinants of choice bracketing as a means to cope with complexity

poverty and the measurement of individual welfare a review article this review of hagenaars the perception of poverty gives a lengthy presentation and evaluation of the leyden approach of measuring the individual welfare function of income the key feature of the approach is the claim that welfare can be measured on a 0 1 scale the review discusses the book s wealth of material on poverty in europe within this theoretical framework

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

experimental games on networks underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection in this paper we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure specifically actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability this framework applies to a wide variety of settings we examine behavior and equilibrium selection the degree of equilibrium play is striking in particular with incomplete information behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique when there are multiple equilibria general features of networks such as connectivity clustering and the degree of the players help to predict informed behavior in the lab people appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs social efficiency but there are forces that moderate this attraction 1 people seem content with in the aggregate capturing only the lion s share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss and 2 uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding but efficient equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information

promotions and incentives the case of multistage elimination tournaments promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms we analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments in our two main treatments we compare a two stage tournament to a one stage tournament subjects in the two stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage both with respect to nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one stage tournament additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing

banks demand for reserves when future monetary policy is uncertain abstract the extensive use of revolving securities repurchase agreements has increased the flexibility of the money market management of many european central banks using an extended reserve management model this paper shows that a flexible central bank can influence money market conditions just by being more or less vague or determined about its future course of monetary policy employing arch in mean models for german money market rates confirms that more uncertainty reduces banks demand for borrowed reserves and thereby leads to decreasing interest rates in the interbank money market

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

estimates of the variance of u s inflation based upon the arch model it is generally agreed that the unpredictability of future inflation is a major component of the welfare loss associated with inflation perfectly predicted inflation might induce some costs through institutional rigidities governmental interference and transaction costs but in the long run these should be rather minimal as these institutions adopt various forms of indexing when inflation is unpredictable risk averse economic agents will incur a loss even if prices and quantities are perfectly flexible in all markets inflation is a measure of the relative price of goods today and goods tomorrow thus uncertainty in tomorrow s price impairs the efficiency of today s allocation decisions friedman in his nobel lecture 8 argues convincingly that higher variability of inflation would lead to decreased output ceteris paribus he then conjectures that higher rates of inflation are generally associated with higher variability of inflation and presumably greater uncertainty about future rates if this is true then higher rates of inflation would also be associated with low levels of output which implies a positively sloped phillips curve this paper uses a new statistical technique arch to estimate the conditional mean and variance of inflation from u s time series data the main finding is that the variance of inflation in the seventies was only slightly greater than in the sixties

measurement of income inequality experimental test by questionnaire abstract we reconsider some of the basic assumptions of the literature on inequality analysis students views on the meaning of inequality comparisons were elicited by means of a questionnaire involving both numerical and verbal questions the responses suggest that two important axioms the principle of transfers and decomposability are not universally accepted

how auctions reveal information a case study on german repo rates securities repurchase agreements repos have become the bundesbank s most important tool for its ongoing money market management and the control of the monetary base in the fall of 1988 the bundesbank changed the applied auction rule in order to prevent banks from submitting exaggerated bids focusing on the information content of a resulting repo rate this paper investigates how german money market rates react to auction results evidence will be found that the response of the money market to a new repo rate reflects the applied auction rule copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

a lagrange multiplier test for garch models abstract this paper extends the lagrange multiplier lm test to testing noise disturbances against garch disturbances in the linear regression model the resulting lm test for the garch alternative is identical to the lm test for an arch alternative

conditional variance and the risk premium in the foreign exchange market abstract we investigate the existence of a risk premium in the foreign exchange market based on the conditional variance of market forecast errors the forecast errors are assumed to follow the arch process introduced by engle 1982 estimation and diagnostic testing of the model are discussed and results are presented for the currencies of the united kingdom france germany japan and switzerland