what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

nonmonetary effects of financial crises abstract this paper empirically examines the nonmonetary effects of financial crises it exploits the special nature of the great depression in canada to test propositions linking financial structure and aggregate economic activity canada s large domestic debt and shrinking banking system had little impact on the course of the depression in comparison with results for the united states this implicates bank failures as a prime factor in the real effects of financial crises

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

monetary transmission through bank loans or bank liabilities interest in the transmission of monetary fluctuations to real output has dominated macroeconomics since at least the eighteenth century since then many observers have noted the tendency of a monetary expansion to be followed initially by an expansion of real output and later by an increase in prices while the reason for the long run price change is well understood understanding the short run impact of money on nominal output remains an active unresolved research topic most theoretical models explain the transmission of monetary fluctuations to real output as a consequence of sticky prices or expectations the stickiness is either due to informational imperfections or to contractual rigidities while the policy implications of the two types of stickiness differ both types of model predict a transitory response of real output to a shock in nominal money balances neither the informational imperfection nor the contractual rigidity story is completely compelling and both rely on the central role played by movements in real balances and perceived real interest rates yet for thirty five years following world war ii neither significant movements in the anticipated real rate nor large interest elasticities of spending were apparent despite this the empirical correlation of money and output fluctuations has been found in most time periods and countries consequently the need for alternative explanations of monetary transmission or a credible reverse causation story remains strong

the federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission the authors show that the interest rate on federal funds is extremely informative about future movements of real macroeconomic variables then they argue that the reason for this forecasting success is that the funds rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves that is the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy actions finally using innovations to the funds rate as a measure of changes in policy the authors present evidence consistent with the view that monetary policy works at least in part through credit i e bank loans as well as through money i e bank deposits copyright 1992 by american economic association

securitization and the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission abstract this paper shows that the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission is stronger for us banks that securitize their assets this finding is different in spirit from the widely found negative relationship between financial development and the strength of the lending channel of monetary transmission focusing on the balance sheet channel and using bank level observations we find that securitizing banks are more sensitive to borrowers balance sheets and that monetary policy has a greater impact on this sensitivity for securitizing banks the optimality conditions from a simple partial equilibrium framework suggest that the positive effects of securitization on policy effectiveness could be due to the high sensitivity of security prices to policy rates

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

liquidity flows and fragility of business enterprises abstract this paper develops a macroeconomic model in which funds are channeled to entrepreneurs through long term relationships between entrepreneurs and lenders the flow of funds to a relationship may be low causing it to break up due to insufficient liquidity multiple pareto ranked steady states emerge from complementarity between financial intermediation reflected by the number of relationships and households incentives to provide funds this complementarity also serves as a mechanism for propagating aggregate shocks financial collapse may become inescapable if a shock destroys sufficiently many relationships

corporate campaign contributions repeat giving and the rewards to legislator reputation abstract are politicians who follow a strategy of reputational development rewarded with high levels of corporate campaign contributions reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to greater campaign contributions from favored interests alternatively such clarity could alienate those who disagree and prevent the politician from obtaining contributions from groups on both sides of an issue we outline an approach that considers conditions under which a politician would or would not prefer reputational development and policy stance clarity and consistency in the context of repeat dealing with special interests our proxy for reputational development is the percentage of repeat givers to a legislator using data on corporate political action committee pac contributions to members of the u s house during the seven electoral cycles from 1983 84 to 1995 96 we explore a variety of alternative hypotheses and find that greater reputational development is rewarded with g

some talk money in politics a partial review of the literature the financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study i review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empir ical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions the effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot measure elections are summarized as are the impacts of contributions on contributors welfare many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years and i describe work that exploits variations in these laws a discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors motives

interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts the effects of monetary policy existing theory and evidence on the effects of monetary policy are reviewed substantial room for disagreement among economists remains new evidence based on multivariate time series studies of several countries is presented while certain patterns in the data consistent with effective monetary policy are strikingly similar across countries others particularly the tendency of interest rate increases to predict high inflation are harder to reconcile with effective monetary policy

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

zombie lending and depressed restructuring in japan this paper explores the role that misdirected bank lending played in prolonging the japanese macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early 1990s the investigation focuses on the wide spread practice of japanese banks of continuing to lend to otherwise insolvent firms we docu ment the prevalence of this forbearance lending and show its distorting effects on healthy firms that were competing with the impaired firms the paper by hoshi 2000 was the first to call attention to this phenomenon and its ramifi

localized market power in the u s airline industry this paper tests whether the observed dominance of most city pair markets and airports in the u s domestic airline industry by single carriers confers any pricing power on the dominan t firms the results of fixed effects estimation indicate that airport dominance by a carrier does confer upon it substantial pricing power whereas dominance at the route level seems to confer no such pricing power additionally the authors find a positive yet small correlation between both route concentration and price and airport concentration and price the quantitative importance of airport dominance reveals that the most promising direction for public polic y aimed at improving the industry s performance is to ensure equal acc ess to sunk airport facilities copyright 1993 by mit press

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

choosing a common project experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism abstract perez castrillo d wettstein d 2002 choosing wisely a multibidding approach american economic review 5 1577 1587 and veszteg r f 2004 multibidding game under uncertainty working paper 14 04 universidad de navarra propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project examples are decisions involving public goods or public bads we report experimental results that test the practical tractability and effectiveness of multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects the mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory providing the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments moreover the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to theoretical bidding behavior

gross loan flows we present a series of stylized facts about gross loan flows and how they vary over time bank size and region we define loan creation as the sum of the change in bank loans at all banks that increased loans since last quarter loan destruction is similarly defined as the absolute value of the change in loans at all banks that decreased loans the gross flow akin to what the labor literature calls reallocation is the sum of creation and destruction

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

political quid pro quo agreements an experimental study we experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence in the game one special interest i e a corporate firm has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates the success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections in the experiment successful political influence never materializes when the firm and candidates interact just once by contrast it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40 of societies with finitely repeated encounters however investments are not always profitable and profit sharing between the firm and candidates depends on prominent equity norms our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few firms do actually attempt to influence policymaking

money for nothing politicians rent extraction and political extortion introduction the model 1 background the economic theory of regulation 2 rent extraction the theory of political extortion demonstrations 3 observing extortion the practice of rent extraction 4 validating the model empirical tests of rent extraction 5 contracting for rent preservation the durability problem extensions 6 extraction and optimal taxation excises earmarked taxes and government user charges 7 costs and benefits of interest group organization 8 improving the model worthy yet unanswered questions notes references index

loan commitments and optimal monetary policy abstract with loan commitments negotiated in advance the use of tight money to restrain nominal spending has asymmetric effects upon different categories of borrowers this can reduce efficiency even though aggregate demand is stabilized an equilibrium model of financial intermediation with loan commitments is developed and used to analyze the welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies if demand uncertainty relates primarily to the number of borrowers rather than to each one s demand for credit an interest rate smoothing policy is optimal

cooperation in community interaction without information flows we study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other s past actions they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship there is incomplete information regarding player types a subset of the population is myopic while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation in principle we define social equilibrium in such communities such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase followed by cooperation if the test is successful it is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation by raising barriers to entry into new relationships we examine the implications of increased patience which takes two forms an increase in the number of non myopic types and an increase in the discount factor of non myopic types these two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained

multiperson bargaining over two alternatives abstract we present a continuous time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information where only two agreements are possible we show that under mild informational assumptions players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative individually playing a war of attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side we also provide a characterization of the perfect bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game which yields a unique outcome in most cases journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c78 d72 d74

u s commercial bank lending through 2008 q4 new evidence from gross credit flows i introduction debate about the behavior of the banking sector has intensified in the popular press as well as within academia as the financial crisis continues to gather steam many of the questions raised about the behavior of banks during the current crisis rely on net aggregate data on bank lending activity however the banking sector is very heterogeneous and aggregate data can be hard to interpret if not combined with observations at the individual bank level as argued by chari christiano and kehoe 2008 and cohen cole et al 2008 in this paper we use publicly available balance sheet data for the entire population of commercial banks to construct quarterly gross credit flows for the u s banking system during the period 1999 q1 2008 q4 and to provide new evidence about the behavior of regulated commercial banks during the financial crisis that began in 2007 loosely speaking the weighted sum of positive changes in credit for banks that increased loans is a measure of credit expansion while the weighted sum of negative changes in credit is a measure of credit contraction while net flows are a measure of aggregate credit change in the overall economy gross flows are a measure of how much credit is expanding and contracting or the reallocation of lending across borrowers although we use comprehensive balance sheet data to calculate our measures of credit contraction and expansion we caution that without actual loan origination data or a careful accounting for unused loan commitments we cannot capture the complete dynamics of credit flows for commercial banks and therefore our results should be interpreted cautiously several recent papers have highlighted the importance of considering gross credit flows rather than net lending in both a domestic context where credit is provided by banks dell ariccia and garibaldi 2005 craig and haubrich 2006 and firms herrera kolar and minetti 2007 and an international context where credit is provided by countries contessi de pace and francis 2008 in the banking sector aggregate changes obscure changes in gross lending and the heterogeneous patterns of contraction and expansion within regions sectors and groups of banks moreover the elements determining bank level credit expansion are fundamentally different from those of credit contraction when banks increase lending they face informational asymmetries and the costs of information acquisition searching for new clients or evaluating new projects conversely when loans are retired because of expiry or nonperformance different costs occur which depend on the liquidity of borrowers and on the steps that must be taken to ensure repayment the different activities underlying expansion and contraction lead to different cyclical properties and volatility measures that we discuss in this paper 1 we follow two steps in our analysis of gross loan flows first we present several findings about gross credit flows in the u s banking system between 1999 q1 and 2008 q4 and use previous estimates by dell ariccia and garibaldi 2005 as our main term of comparison a similar paper by craig and haubrich 2006 focuses more on entry and exit which are relatively less important for the period we study 2 we then focus on the recent financial crisis and compare behavior during the current recession to the previous four recessions to put current behavior in context our results reveal that gross flows are much larger than net flows so at any phase of the business cycle significant credit contraction and credit expansion co exist we also find significant credit contraction and expansion within banks of similar size categories of loan real estate individual commercial and industrial c i and across states even with the significant restructuring of the u s banking system and attendant reduction in the number of banks between the dell ariccia and garibaldi 2005 sample 1979 1999 and ours 1999 2008 and an increase in the size of the average bank we find that a substantial amount of heterogeneity remains

less fighting than expected experiments with wars of attrition and all pay auctions while all pay auctions are well researched experimentally we do not have much laboratory evidence on wars of attrition this paper tries to fill this gap technically there are only a few differences between wars of attrition and all pay auctions behaviorally however we find striking differences as many studies our experiment finds overbidding in all pay auctions in contrast in wars of attrition we observe systematic underbidding

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

gross credit flows the paper estimates gross credit flows for the u s banking system between 1979 and 1999 and shows that sizable gross flows coexist at any phase of the cycle even within narrowly defined loan categories bank size categories and regional units to investigate the macroeconomic dimensions of gross credit flows the paper studies the cyclical behavior of aggregate credit flows and documents three key cyclical facts first excess credit reallocation is countercyclical for any given rate of change of net credit gross flows are larger in a recession than in a boom second gross credit flows are highly volatile with a cyclical volatility which appears more than an order of magnitude larger than gdp volatility third credit contraction is more volatile than credit expansion furthermore the behavior of gross flows over the 1991 recession suggests that persistent and historically high credit contraction is a key feature of the relatively mild cyclical downturn the results lends some support to aggregate models that emphasize the asymmetric behavior of credit expansion and credit contractions

the politics of ambiguity politicians face a trade off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent this paper analyzes this trade off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent first we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party s ideal policy and his own ideal policy second we show that often the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision thus politicians may prefer to be ambiguous

relationships and rationing in consumer loans we empirically examine how relationships between individual households and their creditors affect the probability of being credit rationed using a data set where the credit rationing of individual households is observed directly we show that relationship duration and the number of activities between a family and a potential lender significantly lower the probability of being credit rationed additionally we examine the relative role of relationships in determining the interest rates of two consumer loans a mortgage loan and a special purposes loan and show that mortgage loan rates are driven less by relationship factors than the special purposes loan rates copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

identifying the balance sheet and the lending channels of monetary transmission a loan level analysis abstract we make a novel attempt at comparing the strength of the lending and balance sheet channels of monetary transmission to make this comparison we use loan level data to determine how borrower balance sheets and bank liquidity are related to bank lending decisions and how monetary policy can affect these relationships the key innovation in this paper is the use of loan level data this enables us to measure the independent effects of the two channels and directly account for borrower balance sheets and lender liquidity instead of using proxies our results show that the balance sheet channel is the main mechanism through which monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the economy and that the lending channel does not play a significant role

the macroeconomics of labor and credit market imperfections labour market frictions are not the only possible source of high unemployment credit market imperfections driven by microeconomic frictions and influenced by macroeconomic factors could also be to blame to develop this idea in a simple and tractable macroeconomic model we treat credit and labour market imperfections in a symmetrical way accordingly we introduce specificity in credit relationships and assume that credit to potential entrepreneurs is rationed due to endogenous search frictions in the spirit of diamond 1990 these imperfections mirror job search frictions in the labour market we study the determination of equilibrium unemployment in the presence of credit market frictions both with exogenous and endogenous wages we explore a number of possible extensions endogenous destruction monetary policy and the short run effects of financial liberalization

efficient voting with penalties abstract simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters preferences this paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism with two alternatives when the designer may use non transferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information the designer faces a dilemma a punishment may induce a more correct choice but its cost is socially wasteful the efficient mechanism is a weighted majority weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments are applied if preferences are relatively homogeneous eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous

the rise and decline of nations economic growth stagflation and social rigidities the years since world war ii have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions leading political economist mancur olson offers a new and compelling theory to explain these shifts in fortune and then tests his theory against evidence from many periods of history and many parts of the world

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

the credit effects of monetary policy evidence using loan commitments in addition to the usual channels monetary policy may affect spending by changing the supply of bank loans and the creditworthiness of borrowers this paper tests for these credit effects using a contractual difference across commercial bank loans the author finds that bank loans not made under a commitment slow after tight policy while loans under commitment accelerate or are unchanged this divergence coincides with reports of tighter credit by lenders and by small firms suggesting the divergence reflects a reduction in the supply of credit to the firms without commitments rather than a reduction in their demand for loans

the implications of unverifiable fair value accounting evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting abstract i study the evolution of sfas 142 which uses unverifiable fair value estimates to account for acquired goodwill i find evidence consistent with the fasb issuing sfas 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting the result is interesting given this proposal was due in part to sec concerns over pooling misuse i also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for sfas 142 increasing in firms discretion under the standard agency theory predicts such unverifiable discretion can be used opportunistically

competition in corruptible markets firms seeking business opportunities often face corruptible agents in many markets this paper investigates the marketing strategy implications for firms competing for business and for the buyer in a corruptible market we consider a setting in which a buyer a firm or government seeks to purchase a good through a corruptible agent supplier firms that may or may not be a good fit compete to be selected by the agent only the agent observes whether a firm is a good fit corruption arises due to the agent s incentive to select a nondeserving firm in exchange for bribes intuitively and as expected a sufficiently large monitoring of the agent eradicates corruption interestingly however increasing the monitoring from an initial low level can backfire making the agent more likely to select a nondeserving firm this nonmonotonic agent behavior makes it difficult for the buyer to reduce corruption the implication is that the buyer should choose either to be ignorant or to take drastic measures to limit

business loans and the transmission of monetary policy we study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through business loans and illustrate subtle aspects of its functioning that relate to the contractual characteristics and the borrower lender types of loans we show that the puzzling increase in business loans in response to monetary tightening documented before the great recession is largely driven by drawdowns from existing commitments at large banks spot loans also rise and take a considerable amount of time to adjust banks nonetheless do curtail credit supply by shortening maturities of new loans following the great recession the mechanism has worked differently with loan responses to monetary tightening displaying a significant downward shift

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

an experimental study of voting with costly delay a conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached we study experimentally welfare properties of simple three voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs the resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition our key finding is that consistent with theoretical predictions when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting we also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave when social cost of waiting is taken into account the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version

politician preferences law abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions the effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a policy preference in contrast to the previous literature without politician policy preferences more restrictive binding caps always reduce expected aggregate contributions however the initial imposition of a cap increases contributions if the politician mildly favors the low valuation lobbyist s policy the introduction of policy preferences permits analysis of monied interests policy influence a more restrictive cap makes it more likely that the politician enacts the policy he would have enacted in the absence of lobbying even in cases where expected aggregate contributions increase

black swans before the black swan evidence from international libor ois spreads abstract the libor ois spread is a closely monitored indicator of the financial health of economy previous research has used this spread to identify and anticipate abrupt changes in financial markets taylor and williams 2009 refer to the drastic increase in the us libor ois spread on august 7th 2007 as a black swan in the money market in this paper rather than rely on visual observations of black swans we estimate them using bai and perron s 1998 procedure we estimate structural breaks granger causality tests and innovation accounting in international libor ois spreads and a cds index to better understand their dynamics during the recent crisis our results reveal that black swans appeared in smaller economies prior to that in large ones during the financial crisis in addition we find that only shocks to the us libor ois spread has any statistically significant effects after 30 days

the generalized war of attrition abstract we model a war of attrition with n k firms competing for n prizes in a natural oligopoly context the k 1 lowest value firms drop out instantaneously even though each firm s value is private information to itself in a standard setting context in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen even after giving up on its own preferred alternative each firm s exit time is independent both of k and of other players actions our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics solving the model is facilitated by the revenue equivalence theorem jel d43 d44 l13 o30

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

term limits and electoral competitiveness evidence from california s state legislative races california s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures real expenditures during the three general elections after the term limits initiative passed in 1990 were lower than in even 1976 this drop has occurred at the same time that races have become closer contests and more candidates are running for office by any measure term limits have coincided with large changes in the level of political competition even before term limits have forcibly removed a single politician from office the changes are so large that more incumbents are being defeated races are closer more candidates are running and fewer single candidate races than occur at any other time during our sample period from 1976 to 1994

does monetary policy lose effectiveness during a credit crunch this article investigates the effectiveness of monetary policy during a credit crunch by estimating a vector autoregression on the us economy we present evidence that interest rate cuts have a diminished impact on growth due to impairment in the relationship between monetary policy and the supply of intermediated credit

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

financial intermediary development and growth volatility do intermediaries dampen or magnify shocks the authors extend the recent literature on the link between financial development and economic volatility by focusing on the channels through which the development of financial intermediaries affects economic volatility their theoretical model predicts that well developed financial intermediaries dampen the effect of real sector shocks on the volatility of growth while magnifying the effect of monetary shocks suggesting that overall financial intermediaries have no unambiguous effect on growth volatility the authors test these predictions in a panel data set covering 63 countries over the period 1960 97 using the volatility of terms of trade to proxy for real volatility and the volatility of inflation to proxy for monetary volatility they find no robust relationship between the development of financial intermediaries and growth volatility weak evidence that financial intermediaries dampen the effect of terms of trade volatility and evidence that financial intermediaries magnify the impact of inflation volatility in low and middle income countries

mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences we experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences with random matching subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences which leads to ineciency we analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 as well as repeated interaction in dierent settings which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve we find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable eciency gains whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and eciency only in

campaign contributions and congressional voting does the timing of contributions matter theoretical and empirical studies do not address whether campaign contributions from more than one election cycle are important for congressional voting behavior further they do not address whether campaign contributions from different periods have different effects on legislative voting behavior this paper analyzes the cumulative effect of campaign contributions over two time periods moreover this paper studies the importance of the timing of contributions for legislative voting behavior ten roll call votes on price supports and quotas for various farm commodities in 1981 and 1985 are analyzed most of the estimated contribution coefficients are statistically significant the results show that without campaign contributions farm interest would have lost in five of the seven votes that were won moreover contributions that were given at approximately the same time as the vote have a larger impact on voting behavior than contributions that the legislator received one or two years prior to the vote copyright 1995 by mit press

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

economic policy uncertainty and the supply of business loans abstract using a vector autoregressive framework of analysis we show that banks contract their supply of business credit in response to an exogenous increase in economic policy uncertainty this contraction takes two main distinct forms on the one hand banks restrict their supply of spot funds which we document using flows of loans and term loan originations on the other hand banks also curtail their provision of liquidity insurance reducing the amount of new credit lines and embedding in them a pricing structure that reduces the probability of borrowers drawing down on the lines at the peak of the responses we find that a one standard deviation increase in epu causes a contraction in the supply of business loans between 3 and 5 on the extensive margin

pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules we consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives independent private values and no monetary transfers the utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule where agents weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen it is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex ante incentive efficient we also discuss efficiency in the class of anonymous mechanisms and the stability of weighted majority rules