structural gaiatsu international finance and political change in japan argues that the principal contributor to changes in japan s political economy is the decline of japanese governmental control over capital flows and foreign exchange rates brought about by structural gaiatsu or direct foreign pressure differs from previous analysis of gaiatsu by arguing that international capital and market forces generate gaiatsu not foreign governments and that its influence has been worldwide as well as deeper and more ongoing than bilateral negotiating sessions and joint communiques related to trade discusses how the change has catalyzed a major increase in foreign direct investment by japanese owned corporations a reduction in government s ability to control corporate behavior a diminution of intra corporate linkages conflict within national economic policies and the increased penetration of the japanese economy by foreign financial institutions describes how the change has resulted in an emerging socio economic gap in japan between individuals groups and organizations demonstrates how the japanese experience suggests the transformative power of global capital markets on national political economies particularly those that have been interventionist in nature

the mass political economy of capital controls this article examines mass public opinion toward international financial market regulations known as capital controls conventional wisdom maintains that most voters do not pay attention to or c

multi level programming and conflict resolution abstract we examine conflict resolution problems by postulating the existence of an arbitrator who acts as the leader in a stackelberg game we present models for different configurations of the resulting multi level linear programs and provide new algorithms for solving them we also examine the problems of coordinating such systems under informational decentralization the models are illustrated with an application to a water conflict problem between india and bangladesh which shows that both parties can gain by the arbitration of an international agency such as the united nations

great expectations financialization and bank bailouts in democracies accelerating financialization and rising societal wealth have meant that democratic governments increasingly provide bailouts following banking crises using a new long run data set we show that despite frequent and virulent crises before world war ii bank bailouts to protect wealth were then exceptionally rare in recent decades by contrast governments have increasingly opted for extensive bailouts well before the major interventions of 2007 2009 we argue that this policy shift is the consequence of the great expectations of middle class voters overlooked in existing accounts associated with the growing financialization of wealth rising leverage and accumulating ex ante financial stabilization commitments by governments these expectations are suggestive of substantially altered policy preferences and political cleavages since the 1970s when severe banking crises returned as an important threat to middle class wealth this pressure from below has led elected governments to provide increasingly costly bailouts with no historical precedent

third world indebted industrialization international finance and state capitalism in mexico brazil algeria and south korea the past fifteen years have seen two important developments in the international economic system the rapid industrialization of many less developed countries ldcs and their increasing indebtedness to private financial institutions massive bank loans have been used to fund industrial growth in many ldcs international financial markets have replaced multinational corporations as the third world s most important source of private foreign capital in four major borrowing countries mexico brazil algeria and south korea the process of indebted industrialization has its roots in the internationalization of finance the increasing role of the state and the use of funds raised on the international capital markets to finance industrial development the results include rapid expansions of ldc industrial production and ldc exports of manufactured products as well as the formation of an implicit partnership between private financial institutions and state capitalist elites in the third world

power and the control of capital this essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial asia and latin america and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources the stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who or what supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow

partisan governments the international economy and macroeconomic policies in advanced nations 1960 93 this article examines the impact of parties domestic institutions and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time series cross section data from nineteen oecd countries for the years between 1960 and the mid 1990s the results are as follows partisan governments have affected alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets the pattern of macroeconomic management still their impact has varied over time partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange rate system in place after following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s oecd governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline by contrast taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings as financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s partisan and institution led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries

interests and the wall of ideas germany s eastern trade policy after unification since 1989 germany s domestic and international environments have experienced significant changes thus it is reasonable to expect that the country s long standing foreign and domestic policies will adapt to novel challenges and pressures this article examines eastern trade policy an area in which one might expect to observe a greater degree of government intervention postunification in fact no such adaptation has taken place this empirical puzzle lends itself to analysis based on the interaction of interests institutions and ideas unification altered the prevailing constellation of material economic interests in germany as well as parliamentary electoral institutions however the events of 1989 to 1990 left untouched dominant ideas that shaped the west german political economy as well as crucial sets of domestic and international institutions linked to those ideas the authors conclude that the absence of an interventionist trade response stems from continuity at the nexus of ideas and insti

transmission capacity expansion in imperfectly competitive power markets this paper proposes a mathematical model for transmission planning in an environment where there is imperfect competition in electricity supply industry the model is developed based on the concept of the leader followers game in applied mathematics the leader of the game is the transmission planner and the followers are the strategic electricity producing firms the reaction of the strategic electricity producing firms to the transmission planning decision is modeled using the introduced concept of the worst cournot nash equilibrium the worst cournot nash equilibrium can handle the multiple nash equilibria problem the whole mathematical formulation is a bilevel mixed integer linear programming problem this formulation is achieved using the karush kuhn tucker optimality conditions and a binary mapping approach the application of the proposed approach to the three node example system and the modified six node garver s example system are studied the transmission planning with perfect competition is formulated and used as the benchmark the numerical results show that the proposed approach in this paper can efficiently allocate the additional transmission capacity to the transmission grid such that it reduces the market power cost in the electricity supply industry however further studies should be carried out to scale up the proposed approach to the larger case studies

how do crises lead to change liberalizing capital controls in the early years of new order indonesia how do crises lead to change rationalist approaches to the question that emphasize inexorable structural responses and the pursuit of distributive preferences by newly dominant coalitions are inadequate because they obscure the social mediation of material events and the pervasive uncertainty that follows destabilization of the precrisis status quo the latter constrains actors from fully grasping their distributive preferences until uncertainty is reduced persuasion emerges as a key mechanism of change although constructivist approaches emphasize persuasive practices they have yet to adequately specify the scope conditions underpinning the selection of new ideas this article goes beyond much of the constructivist focus on domestic legitimacy and static notions of resonance by emphasizing external credibility and dynamic processes of resonance building by norm entrepreneurs the author specifies four features what he calls the four cs of crisis resolution that shape the process of idea selection carriers composition crossover appeal and credibility developing these arguments in the case of the early years of new order indonesia the article suggests that whenever a prominent and cohesive group of advocates promotes an idea that has sufficient ideational and distributive appeal and the endorsement of external actors whose seal of approval is perceived as important intersubjective belief change and thus institutional and policy change is more likely

economic transmission augmentation with explicit modeling of the competition benefit this paper derives and evaluates a mathematical structure for identifying economically efficient transmission augmentations the mathematical structure is based on the concepts of sequential move and simultaneous move games in applied mathematics the nash equilibrium solution concept has been reformulated as an optimization problem in the proposed structure the problem of multiple nash equilibria is managed by introducing the concept of the worst case nash equilibrium both the economic concepts of the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity are explicitly modeled in the proposed structure a simple three bus example system and garver s example system are employed and modified to suit the purpose of analysis a thorough economic study of these example systems is presented to highlight the concept and operation of the proposed mathematical structure from different perspectives the results demonstrate the utility of the proposed structure for measuring the total economic efficiency benefit of additional transmission capacity

the effect of incomplete information about demand on preemption abstract in certain circumstances a first mover need not preemptively invest in capacity to discourage entry into a new market asymmetric learning about buyer acceptance may make preemption unnecessary this paper explores the tension between competitive pressure to invest and the real option value in an entry opportunity under uncertainty about demand if an outsider s expectation about buyer valuation makes entry appear less attractive and if an incumbent can keep proprietary its updated information about demand then it may be able to secure its advantage and partially deter imitators without a substantial initial capacity investment

indonesia from showcase to basket case in the year after the onset of the east asian financial crisis a diverse set of national crises began to take shape among these indonesia s is by far the most severe national income was expected to contract in 1998 by between 10 and 15 and the decline to extend into 1999 1 according to government estimates the proportion of the population below the poverty line has risen to 40 and 15 million workers have lost their jobs thoenes 1998b 2 a severe drought has complicated matters driving up food prices and causing shortages in some locations 3 the banking system is essentially defunct suppressing exports and reducing whole industries to resort to barter as the last remaining source of working capital 4 the nation s currency the rupiah was still trading in july 1998 at around 15 000 to the us dollar levels at which it ceases tofunction as a meaningful store of economic value

ideas versus resources explaining the flat tax and pension privatization revolutions in eastern europe and the former soviet union this article examines the rapid spread of pension privatization and the flat tax in former communist countries to understand why new policy ideas take hold and to elucidate the role played by mater

the impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence an example abstract a simple non pathological example demostrates that when an incumbent firm has private information about the state of demand an entrant s profits and the likelihood of entry may be decreasing in the state of demand

increasing returns to scale in financial intermediation and the non neutrality of government policy a general equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries is constructed and used to study the effects of some standard policy experiments one time increases in the growth rate and in the level of the stock of money have non neutral and sometimes surprising effects on interest rates the quantity of intermediated borrowing and lending the number of intermediary firms inflation and the price level optimal government macroeconomic policy is shown to reflect a tradeoff between public sector frictions and the capital market distortion created by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in private intermediation

the political economy of the euro crisis this article introduces the special issue on the political economy of the euro crisis which aims to improve our understanding of the causes consequences and implications of the highly unusual nature of this crisis a financial crisis among developed countries within a supranational monetary union the article provides a brief chronology of the crisis discusses its underlying causes and reviews the ways in which comparative and international political economy can help us understand the crisis the article then discusses the individual and collective contributions of the articles in the special issue and discusses possible future research paths on the political economy of the euro crisis we conclude with a brief discussion of how a political economy perspective informs our understanding of the long term prospects for the eurozone and european integration

revisiting the single european act and the common wisdom on globalization the european program of liberalization launched by the single european act sea of 1987 is commonly seen as a powerful instance of globalization trends of economic integration liberalization and international institution building this article revisits the origins of the sea to argue that the extent and success of its liberalizing program depended on a causally distinct push for european institutional reform a retracing of concrete political patterns behind the sea greatly strengthens broader statistical and theoretical challenges to the notion of strong universal trends of globalization

congestion driven transmission expansion in competitive power markets a framework for transmission planning in a deregulated power market environment is discussed the level of congestion in the network is utilized as the driving signal for the need of network expansion a compromise between the congestion cost and the investment cost is used to determine the optimal expansion scheme the long term network expansion problem is formed as the decoupled combination of 1 the master problem minimization of investment costs subject to investment constraints and the benders cuts generated by the operational problem power pool and 2 the operational problem whose solution provides congestion details and associated multipliers a proper power pool model is developed and solved for congestion cost congestion revenue and transmission shadow prices linear programming is utilized to solve the investment subproblem while the quadratic programming technique has been used to solve the operational problem the algorithm has been developed for the complete planning process which provides the expansion schemes for the planning horizon the technique has been applied to illustrate the network planning study for a modified ieee 24 bus test system

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

societal preferences partisan agents and monetary policy outcomes if different producer groups have divergent interests concerning macroeconomic policies how do societal preferences translate into state policy outcomes i develop and test a party as agent framework for understanding the importance of societal preferences with regard to monetary policy under capital mobility following the principal agent model political parties function as agents for different societal principals rightist parties tend to represent internationally oriented business groups with preferences for monetary convergence while leftist parties do the same for domestically oriented groups preferring monetary autonomy under capital mobility i present statistical evidence showing that oecd leftist governments have been associated with more monetary autonomy and currency variability than their rightist counterparts even after controlling for basic economic indicators such as inflation the statistical evidence also shows that societal group size tends not to explain either autonomous monetary policy choices or exchangerate stability thus even large and wealthy societal groups may be unable to obtain their preferred policy outcome when their respective partisan agents do not hold government power

the moderating role of submarket dynamics on the product customization firm survival relationship in this paper we examine how the provision of product customization services affects firm survival integrating literatures on industry evolution product related adapting services and entry deterrence we hypothesize that the relationship between product customization the costly modification of a product to cater to customer needs and firm survival differs across industries based on the extent of submarkets we argue that in industries that feature submarkets more prominently the positive association between product customization and firm survival is stronger for two conceptually distinct and empirically distinguishable mechanisms customizing firms enter new submarkets and also deter potential entry we conclude that offering product customization services has strategic benefits that sometimes outweigh the cost of coordinating with customers

small states in big trouble state reorganization in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s coalitions of politicians fiscal bureaucrats and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform the largest single nontradables sector in their society the state particularly the welfare state they exposed state personnel and agencies to market pressures and competition to reduce the cost of welfare and other state services the impetus for change came from rising foreign public and private debt rising public debt levels and expensive welfare states interacted to create a tax wedge between employers wage costs and workers received wages this undercut international competitiveness worsening current account deficits and leading to more foreign debt accumulation two factors explain variation in the degree of reorganization in each country differences in their electoral and constitutional regimes and the willingness of left parties to risk splitting their core constituencies introduction of market pressures is an effort to go beyond the liberalization of the economy common in industrial countries during the 1980s and both to institutionalize limits to welfare spending and to change the nature of statesociety relations away from corporatist forms of interest intermediation in short not just less state but a different state

voting for change calculation community and euro referendums referendum votes on adoption of the euro in denmark 2000 and sweden 2003 provide unprecedented natural experiments through which to study the political economy of money using exit polling data and multinomial logit statistical models that allow us to separate preferences for the euro from preferences for the european union eu we test economic calculation and political community as determinants of individual level preferences over adoption of the euro we find that calculation operates most clearly where as in sweden the choice of a fixed versus a floating exchange rate regime is at stake while community exerts strong effects across the two cases we would like to thank krister andersson jerry cohen robert fishman jennifer fitzgerald jeff frieden eric helleiner jacques hymans lars jonung kate mcnamara jennifer wolak and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and helga sverrisdottir for outstanding research assistance we are grateful to jens wagner of the danish data archive and torbja rn berglund of the swedish social science dataservice for providing the data used in this note neither these individuals nor their respective agencies are responsible for the interpretations contained herein

de globalization theories predictions and opportunities for international business research de globalization now a distinct possibility would induce a significant qualitative shift in strategies structures and behaviors observable in international business ib coming to terms with this qualitative shift would require ib research to develop a much deeper integration of politics the key driver of de globalization to support such integration this paper introduces two relevant theories of de globalization from political science liberalism and realism both predict de globalization under current conditions but lead to different expectations about the future world economy liberalism suggests a patchwork of economic linkages while realism predicts the emergence of economic blocs around major countries this paper discusses the resulting opportunities in three areas of ib research political strategies and roles of multinational enterprises mnes global value chains and the role of the national context for political strategies and roles there is a need to explore how regular business activities and deliberate political agency of mnes affect the political sustainability of globalization for value chains questions include their future reach and specialization changes in organizational forms and the impact of political considerations on location decisions research opportunities on national contexts relate to their ability to sustain globalization and their connection with economic and military power

doctors with borders occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking conclusions that skilled americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants in this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition in practice high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high skill migrants who share their occupation specific skills licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants from a collective action perspective skilled natives can more easily secure sub national occupation specific policies than influence national immigration policy we exploit the unique structure of the american medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations we show that over the 1973 2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and as a consequence received fewer new migrant physicians by our estimates over a third of all us states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements this article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration regulatory rent seeking as a barrier to the cross national mobility of human capital and the public policy implications of such barriers

the political economy of financial internationalization in the developing world in the last decade a growing number of developing countries have opened their financial systems by liberalizing capital flows and the rules governing the international operations of financial intermediaries one explanation of this rush toward greater financial internationalization is that increasing interdependence generates domestic and foreign political pressures for capital account liberalization while we find evidence for that hypothesis we find that the proximate cause in developing countries more frequently is found in balance of payments crises politicians perceive that financial openness in the face of crisis can increase capital inflows by indicating to foreign investors that they will be able to liquidate their investments and by signaling government intentions to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline the argument is explored through case studies of chile indonesia mexico and south korea

death of the partisan globalization and taxation in south america 1990 2006 correcting the relative lack of attention to the revenue side of public finance this article examines to what extent globalization constrains partisan tax policy the author hypothesizes that political ideology is still a good predictor of taxation in the neoliberal era advancing this argument against the prominent globalization thesis that global economic pressures have supplanted political ideology as the driving force of revenue policy although research in developed democracies identifies a resilient link between partisanship and policy outcomes the impact of the drastic neoliberal transition on partisan policy making in the developing world remains poorly understood using time series cross section data to evaluate partisan taxation in south america the author finds that partisanship is a reliable indicator of tax revenue in the neoliberal era counterintuitively however the promarket right generates more tax revenue than the interventionist left the author argues that this previously unexpec

phoenix risen the resurrection of global finance of all the many changes of the world economy since world war ii few have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance a review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial globalization leaving much room for further research competing historical interpretations stressing the contrasting roles of market forces and government policies need to be reexamined for dynamic linkages among the variables they identify likewise impacts on state policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions and what policymakers can do about them finally questions are also raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally used for the study of international political economy and international relations more generally

exchange rate theory and practice this volume grew out of a national bureau of economic research conference on exchange rates held in bellagio italy in 1982 in it the world s most respected international monetary economists discuss three significant new views on the economics of exchange rates rudiger dornbusch s overshooting model jacob frenkel s and michael mussa s asset market variants and pentti kouri s current account portfolio approach their papers test these views with evidence from empirical studies and analyze a number of exchange rate policies in use today including those of the european monetary system

the politics of common knowledge ideas and institutional change in wage bargaining domestic economic institutions change through processes of conflict and bargaining why do the strongest groups in such conflicts ever change their minds about the acceptability of institutional arrangements they once opposed drawing on the cases of ireland in 1986 87 and italy in 1989 93 this article demonstrates how the process of common knowledge creation between employers and unions changed the course of negotiations over national wage bargaining institutions common knowledge creation happens when existing institutions are in crisis the institutional experimentation that follows such crises characterized by deep uncertainty places a premium on persuasive argument the ideas most likely to serve as the basis for newly common knowledge will have analytical and distributive appeal to both unions and employers and they must be ratified in public agreements which i call common knowledge events common knowledge events establish new social facts which can change the payoffs associated with different institutional outcomes this can lead even powerful actors to accept institutions they had previously opposed the author thanks marius busemeyer mary louise culpepper keith darden orfeo fioretos archon fung peter hall andrew martin cathie jo martin victoria murillo kathleen thelen and gunnar trumbull along with three anonymous reviewers and the editors of io for comments and conversations that improved this article ben ansell and vikram siddarth provided valuable research assistance financial support from the john f kennedy school of government and the weatherhead center for international affairs at harvard university is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are my own

the globalization of liberalization policy diffusion in the international political economy one of the most important developments over the past three decades has been the spread of liberal economic ideas and policies throughout the world these policies have affected the lives of millions of people yet our most sophisticated political economy models do not adequately capture influences on these policy choices evidence suggests that the adoption of liberal economic practices is highly clustered both temporally and spatially we hypothesize that this clustering might be due to processes of policy diffusion we think of diffusion as resulting from one of two broad sets of forces one in which mounting adoptions of a policy alter the benefits of adopting for others and another in which adoptions provide policy relevant information about the benefits of adopting we develop arguments within these broad classes of mechanisms construct appropriate measures of the relevant concepts and test their effects on liberalization and restriction of the current account the capital account and the exchange rate regime our findings suggest that domestic models of foreign economic policy making are insufficient the evidence shows that policy transitions are influenced by international economic competition as well as the policies of a country s sociocultural peers we interpret the latter influence as a form of channeled learning reflecting governments search for appropriate models for economic policy

investing in the peace economic interdependence and international conflict research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace still existing understanding of linkages between cone ict and international economics is limited in at least two ways first cross border economic relationships are far broader than just trade global capital markets dwarf the exchange of goods and services and states engage in varying degrees of monetary policy coordination second the manner in which economics is said to inhibit cone ict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war we discuss and then demonstrate formally how interdependence can ine uence states recourse to military violence the risk of disrupting economic linkages particularly access to capital may occasionally deter minor contests between interdependent states but such opportunity costs will typically fail to preclude militarized disputes instead interdependence offers nonmilitarized avenues for communicating resolve through costly signaling our quantitative results show that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade democracy interest and other variables students of world politics have long argued that peace is a positive externality of global commerce theorists like montesquieu and kant and practitioners like woodrow wilson asserted that economic relations between states pacify political interaction mounting evidence in recent years appears to substantiate these claims multiple studies many identie ed with the democratic peace link interstate trade with reductions in militarized disputes or wars 1 while we concur with the evolving

partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital central bank independence and pegged exchange rates have each been viewed as solutions to the inflationary bias resulting from the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy while it is obvious that a benevolent social planner would opt for such an institutional solution it is less obvious that a real world incumbent facing short term partisan or electoral pressures would do so in this article i model the choice of monetary institutions from the standpoint of a survival maximizing incumbent it turns out that a wide range of survival maximizing incumbents do best by forfeiting control over monetary policy while political pressures do not in general discourage monetary commitments they can influence the choice between fixed exchange rates and central bank independence i highlight the importance of viewing fiscal policy and monetary policy as substitutes and identify the conditions under which survival maximizing incumbents will view fixed exchange rates and central bank independence as substitutes in so doing i provide a framework for integrating other contributions to this volume

public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries if so what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions macroeconomic policy and international monetary cooperation this article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities the analysis establishes three key findings first the results suggest that economic context defined by inflation and unemployment performance has a substantial impact on the public s economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature second the results suggest that there is significant cross country variation in inflation aversion controlling for economic context third some of this variation is accounted for by national level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment these results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking the explanation of variation in economic outcomes and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking i thank the bank of england the center for basic research in the social sciences and the institution for social and policy studies for research support and jim alt andrew bailey bill bernhard lawrence broz john freeman jeff frieden jim granato shigeo hirano david lake jeff lax simon price rose razaghian ron rogowski david stasavage gabriel sterne mike tomz jim vreeland the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments all views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the bank of england

the origins of persistent current account imbalances in the post bretton woods era why do some countries run persistent current account surpluses why do others run deficits often over decades leading to enduring global imbalances such persistent imbalances are the root cause of many financial crises and a major source of international economic conflict we propose that differences in wage bargaining institutions explain a large share of imbalances through their effect on the trade balance in countries with coordinated wage bargaining wage growth in export industries can be restrained to ensure competitiveness leading to persistent trade surpluses we estimate the contribution of these institutions to trade balances in organisation for economic co operation and development oecd member countries since 1977 and find ample support for our hypothesis contrary to much of the literature the choice of fixed or floating exchange rate regimes has only a small effect on trade or current account balances in other words internal adjustment in surplus countries via wage bargaining institutions trumps external adjustment by deficit countries

capital mobility and the origins of stock markets i illustrate the accepted though hardly researched idea that political institutions play a role in locking in factor specificity across sectors space and borders i use the emergence of modern capital markets in the nineteenth century a process that threatened to redeploy financial resources away from land and traditional sectors to heavy industry as a test case to ascertain the degree of domestic financial capital mobility in nine advanced industrialized countries the main finding is that cross national variations in financial capital mobility holding constant the level of economic development reflect the degree of state centralization

economic actors lobbying influence on the prospects for war and peace political scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process in the past few years a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace all of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not i advance two contrary arguments at least among the advanced states i posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference all of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization in particular i show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras my second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace i posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders

international institutions and domestic compensation the imf and the politics of capital account liberalization certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross border movement of capital how can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s we argue that imf stabilizationprogramsprovideawindowofopportunityforgovernmentstoinitiatefinancialreforms butthatpolicymakers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high large loans from the imf shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government s ex ante promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms we test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002 we employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in imf programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion the results provide strong support for the interactive effect of imf programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization

asset specificity and the political behavior of firms lobbying for subsidies in norway previous research into endogenous trade policy has described extensively the political incentives of firms with specific assets but no studies have shown directly that firms behave as predicted we adopt insights from transaction costs economics to develop measures of asset specificity and to investigate how variation in these measures affects the political behavior of firms in particular we examine the lobbying choices of norwegian firms in the 1980s given available subsidy funds from norway s oil boom and some government decisions in the 1970s firms with more specific assets faced potentially greater losses from adjusting to new activities in the face of competitive pressures and thus had greater incentives to lobby for subsidies to protect themselves joint contacting of parliament and government on behalf of firm interests by representatives of both management and labor should be particularly likely where firms had specific assets data analysis shows that asset specificity as indicated by r d intensity and job immobility predicts joint contacting independently of plausible alternative explanatory variables like firm size and export orientation

openness and the politics of potable water improving access to potable water has become an increasingly urgent concern for developing nations in the current era of globalization according to standard wisdom if developing countries undertake certain domestic reforms such as investing in infrastructure and engineering then safe and clean drinking water will improve this analysis uncovers however that in addition to such domestic efforts one of the greatest factors affecting water uncertainty is in fact internationally induced trade surprisingly both scholars and practitioners have neglected the potential impacts of expanding trade on access to potable water this analysis is the first large n cross national study of water that focuses on the interplay of trade and politics both international and domestic as the primary driving forces behind improvements in or constraints to water access the author hypothesizes that growing export pressures are constraining drinkable water in poor countries but a particular domestic condition can mit

international macroeconomic policy coordination when policymakers do not agree on the true model the authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model t wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the nash noncooperative solution however the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction these points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models out of 1 000 possible combina tions of models that could represent u s beliefs non u s beliefs and the true model monetary coordination improves u s welfare in on ly 546 cases copyright 1988 by american economic association

globalization taxation and burden shifting in latin america most researchers interested in the relationship between global markets and public policy focus on advanced industrial democracies in contrast we examine competing hypotheses as to globalization s effect on governments by expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing nations more specifically we investigate the relationship between international market integration and the evolving burden of taxation on capital as well as the subsequent response of markets to shifts in tax policy in latin america since the late 1970s consistent with our theoretical expectations we find that global market forces are more constraining vis a vis tax policy in latin america than in the world s wealthiest nations despite these market based pressures however national politics continue to influence tax policy in latin america in a manner consistent with findings on advanced industrial democracies as such developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate policy though within the context of a more strictly neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies

national tax systems versus the european capital market capital taxation alberto giovannini the current structure of taxes on capital income across ec countries can be exploited by corporations to reduce tax burdens skilled individuals can indulge in tax avoidance too the liberalization of capital movements stands to turn tax avoidance into a cottage industry this article provides a primer on capital income taxes and describes strategies which reduce the tax burden from a policy perspective the question is how to avoid massive tax evasion after 1992 there is no need to harmonize if the right taxation principle is adopted two principles are contrasted the territorial principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic investment irrespective of the country of residence of the beneficiary and the worldwide principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic savings irrespective of where they are invested it is shown that the worldwide principle involves much fewer distortions than the territorial principle a strict application of this principle would effectively solve the problem of tat evasion in europe without requiring full harmonization of the tax systems its full implementation would require the abolition of withholding taxes the elimination of tax deferrals which are quite pervasive throughout europe and an in depth review of blocking and secrecy laws

the snowball effect abstract many economists think that dominant positions unprotected by strategic or operating advantages will tend to decay i demonstrate that that intuition is flawed by devising a model of noncooperative duopoly in which the initially larger competitor monopolizes all investment opportunities even though it is no more efficient than its smaller rival as part of an effort to push up output prices i also present an apparent example of this mechanism at work and discuss the implications for public policy

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

growth volatility and financial liberalization we examine the effects of both equity market liberalization and capital account openness on real consumption growth variability we show that financial liberalization is mostly associated with lower consumption growth volatility our results are robust surviving controls for business cycle effects economic and financial development the quality of institutions and other variables countries that have more open capital accounts experience a greater reduction in consumption growth volatility after equity market openings we also find that financial liberalizations are associated with declines in the ratio of consumption growth volatility to gdp growth volatility suggesting improved risk sharing our results are weaker for liberalizing emerging markets but we never observe a significant increase in real volatility moreover we demonstrate significant differences in the volatility response depending on the size of the banking and government sectors and certain institutional factors

monetary union and wage bargaining institutions in the eu extrapolating from some member state experiences this article considers the question of how monetary union in the eu is likely to impact the preferences of governments employers and unions regarding the organization of wage bargaining european monetary union involves a decentralization of wage bargaining centered at the national level in relation to monetary policy centralized at the european level drawing on recent literature and on the experience of two member states italy and spain which prior to emu underwent periods of intense bargaining fragmentation the author argues that the imposition of restrictive monetary policy in a fragmented wage bargaining context in which workers nonetheless have substantial bargaining rights tends to have perverse effects these effects ultimately led governments and bargaining actors in italy and spain to seek a reorganization of bargaining that gave national actors greater control over wage setting the article considers to what extent a similar dynamic might play out in the euro zone

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design