immiserizing growth with semi public goods under consistent conjectures abstract population growth allows society to afford more public goods and in this respect improves per capita welfare possibilities however this note shows that with private provision of public goods under consistent conjectures population growth also exacerbates free riding behavior this ultimately reduces public good provision when it should be increased and population growth proves to be immiserizing this striking result constrasts with the nash model where the improved welfare possibilities are at least partially exploited

international cooperation behind the veil of uncertainty the case of transboundary acidification the complexities of international environmental problems are only poorly understood hence decision makers have to negotiate about abatement measures even though they do not know the true model of the ecological system and have only a rough idea about the costs and benefits of their action it will be analysed to what extent this kind of model uncertainty where players do not only have incomplete information about the payoff functions of the other players but also about their own payoff function affects the prospects of international cooperation using a simple game theoretic model it is shown how countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests the arguments are based on a deviation from the common prior assumption which seems particularly questionable in a setting comprising various countries with different cultural and scientific backgrounds finally the model will prove useful to quantitatively and qualitatively illustrate the central role of model uncertainty in the negotiations of the first sulphur protocol signed to combat transboundary acidification

global warming irreversibility and learning a number of economists have argued that the literature on the irreversibility effect implies that current abatement of greenhouse gas emissions should be greater when there is the possibility of obtaining better information in the future about the potential damages from global warming than when there is no possibility of obtaining better information in this paper we show that even the simplest model of global warming does not satisfy either of epstein s 1980 sufficient conditions so it is not possible to use epstein s analysis to tell whether the irreversibility effect applies to models of global warming we derive an alternative sufficient condition for the irreversibility effect to hold

externalities expectations and pigouvian taxes this article derives pigouvian type corrective measures for reciprocal externalities when non nash behavior characterizes the participants these reciprocal externalities may involve various kinds of environmental pollutants such as acid rain a comparison between corrective measures for nash and non nash behavior demonstrates that positive conjectures regarding the other agent s externality generating activity have an expectation internalizing influence that usually reduces the required corrective measures negative conjectures e g free riding expectations however have an expectation externalizing effect that increases the required corrective measures the article analyzes both two person and n person externalities 13 references 3 figures 1 table

heterogeneity returns to scale and collective action i analyze the effects of resource inequality and valuation heterogeneity on the provision of public goods with increasing or decreasing returns to scale in production the existing literature typically takes the agents characteristics as given and known to the researcher in contrast this paper compares collective action provision across groups of agents with resources and valuations for the public good drawn from different known joint distributions specifically i characterize the expected equilibrium public good level as function of various distributional properties and moments a resource valuation distribution that first order stochastically dominates another distribution always results in higher expected public good provision level independent of the production technology with decreasing returns to scale in the public good production higher resource inequality results in higher expected provision with increasing returns the same result holds when the mean resource level is relatively low but expected provision decreases in inequality when the mean resource level is high a parallel result holds for agents valuations l auteur analyse les effets de l inegalite des ressources et de l heterogeneite dans l evaluation de biens publics dont la production se fait avec des rendements croissants et decroissants a l echelle la litterature specialisee suggere habituellement que les caracteristiques des agents sont donnees et connues du chercheur a contrario ce memoire compare l action collective de groupes d agents dont les ressources et les evaluations du bien public sont tirees de distributions conjointes connues specifiquement le niveau d equilibre anticipe du bien public est fonction de divers moments et proprietes de ces distributions une distribution conjointe ressources evaluations qui en domine une autre au sens stochastique de premier ordre resulte toujours en un niveau de bien public anticipe plus eleve quelle que soit la technologie de production quand les rendements a l echelle sont decroissants une inegalite de ressources plus grande resulte en un niveau de bien public anticipe plus eleve quand les rendements sont croissants le meme resultat s ensuit si le niveau moyen de la ressource est relativement bas mais le niveau de bien public anticipe decroit quand le niveau moyen de la ressource est eleve des resultats paralleles sont notes pour ce qui est des evaluations du bien public par les agents

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

convergence across the swedish counties 1911 1993 abstract this paper finds strong and robust evidence of convergence in per capita income across the twenty four swedish counties 1911 1993 in contrast to most previous studies on regional convergence this study adjusts incomes to account for regional differences in the cost of living the main conclusion is that using adjusted incomes as opposed to non adjusted incomes does not qualitatively change the results on convergence for the swedish counties however a quantitative difference is that estimated speeds of convergence are higher and the standard deviation of the log of per capita income is lower when adjusted incomes are used which is consistent with cross country evidence

the theory of public goods non nash behaviour abstract most treatments of equilibrium public goods provision assume zero conjectural variations in the sense that each individual regards the behaviour of the rest of the community as independent of his own this paper introduces nonzero conjectural variations into the model a diagram is introduced which can depict both the individual s and the community s equilibrium in the presence of nonzero conjectural variations equilibrium and optimal outcomes are compared and a specific functional form is used to investigate the effect of community size on the nature of equilibrium finally we discuss the requirement that conjectures should be consistent

the harambee movement and efficient public good provision in kenya abstract those familiar with kenya since independence will know of the importance of the harambee system the term harambee has come to mean the provision of goods usually social infrastructure through the voluntary cooperation of members of the community provision of public goods in this way is an important alternative to the more normal method provision through tax finance here we compare these two methods of provision with a view towards determining first the circumstances under which harambee might be more effective and second what policies might be pursued to best utilize this system

the value of public information in a cournot duopoly we derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale

strategic work interactions and the kibbutz kolkhoz paradox the authors develop a model of strategic work interactions in collective enterprises explaining the following observation the israeli kibbutz in which net collective output is distributed equally has been an economic success while the soviet kolkhoz in which net output traditionally was divided according to relative work input has been a failure in contrast the conventional cournot nash theory of collective enterprises predicts superoptimal output in the kolkhoz while in the kibbutz the free fider problem is predicted to lead to suboptimal effort their theory predicts pareto optimal work effort in the kibbutz and suboptimal effort in the kolkhoz copyright 1989 by royal economic society

economic growth in a cross section of cities abstract we examine the relationship between urban characteristics in 1960 and urban growth between 1960 and 1990 income and population growth move together and both types of growth are 1 positively related to initial schooling 2 negatively related to initial unemployment and 3 negatively related to the initial share of employment in manufacturing racial composition and segregation are uncorrelated with urban growth across all cities but in cities with large nonwhite communities segregation is positively correlated with population growth government expenditures except for sanitation are uncorrelated with growth government debt is positively correlated with later growth

intelligence social mobility and growth this study develops a model where the allocation of human resources intergenerational social mobility and technological growth are jointly determined high growth endogenously increases the equilibrium return to innate cognitive ability and makes the allocation of individuals depend more on innate ability and less on social background a social allocation based on innate ability and high growth will thus reinforce each other implying the possibility of multiple endogenous growth equilibria

school finance reform and voluntary fiscal federalism california has transferred the financing of its public schools from localities to the state in response many families have supplemented the tax revenue of their local public schools with voluntary contributions this paper analyzes that phenomenon we propose a model of partial cooperation among parents in making voluntary contributions to their public schools under reasonable conditions the model predicts that contributions per pupil should decline with school size we estimate this relationship using data on contributions to california schools our estimates reveal that contributions per pupil do decline with size however the rate of decline is surprisingly slow 2002 elsevier b v all rights reserved

who wants to redistribute the tunnel effect in 1990s russia abstract support for governmental redistribution tended to be greater for the poor than the rich in a representative sample of russian adults in 1996 however support for redistribution is higher amongst those who expect their welfare to fall and this effect is strongest amongst the currently well off a rising trajectory inhibits demand for redistribution support is also stronger in rural areas amongst those with less schooling those who fear losing their job the elderly and amongst women our results are consistent with albert hirschman s idea of a tunnel effect whereby prospects of mobility in both directions influence demand for governmental redistribution

uncertainty learning and international environmental policy coordination in this paper we construct a simple model of global warming which captures a number of key features of the global warming problem i environmental damages are related to the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere ii the global commons nature of the problem means that these are strategic interactions between the emissions policies of the governments of individual nation states iii there is uncertainty about the extent of the future damages that will be incurred by each country from any given level of concentration of greenhouse gases but there is the possibility that at a future date better information about the true extent of environmental damages may become available an important aspect of the problem is the extent to which damages in different countries may be correlated in the first part of the paper we consider a simple model with two symmetric countries and show that the value of perfect information is an increasing function of the correlation between damages in the two countries in both the cooperative and non cooperative equilibria however while the value of perfect information is always non negative in the cooperative equilibrium in the non cooperative equilibrium there is a critical value of the correlation coefficient below which the value of perfect information will be negative in the second part of the paper we construct an empirical model of global warming distinguishing between oecd and non oecd countries and show that in the non cooperative equilibrium the value of perfect information for oecd countries is negative when the correlation coefficient between environmental damages for oecd and non oecd countries is negative the implications of these results for international agreements are discussed

fundamental irreversibilities in stock externalities abstract this paper concerns the irreversibility effect in stock externalities in an environment of uncertainty with learning taking place one may wish to under emit today to avoid potential environmental irreversibilities alternatively one may wish to under invest in pollution control capital avoiding investments in sunk capital that turn out to be wasted the paper develops theoretical results on the tension between these two effects and separates risk aversion from the irreversibility effect the paper also presents a simple example in climate change policy

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

on consistency of conjectures in the private provision of public goods abstract this paper shows that the condition recently given by cornes and sandler for consistency of conjectures in a non nash model of voluntary public good provision is neither necessary nor sufficient it gives an alternative condition which is both necessary and sufficient for consistency of conjectures and may be used to compute appropriate conjectural variations in communities of arbitrary size if a symmetric equilibrium exists

economic models of nato abstract the seminal work of olson and zeckhauser 1966 on the economic theory of alliances in particular nato provides the theoretical background for this paper after restating their results on alliance allocation behavior in a formal framework we show that these results may fail in a context with decentralized production of the public defense commodity finally we introduce a simple mechanism which allows the implementation of an efficient allocation characterized by proportional burden sharing and cost monotonicity these results can also be applied to other public goods problems

consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods why the conventional theory does not work abstract the conventional theory of voluntary contributions to public goods assumes that each person maximises his utility taking other people s behaviour as given nash conjectures it is now coming to be recognised that this theory is inconsistent with observed behaviour this paper argues that the problems of the theory are compounded and not as some economists have argued resolved by relaxing the assumption of nash conjectures if individuals conjectures are consistent each person will hold the correct belief that other people s contributions are inversely related to his own under most reasonable assumptions equilibrium is a state in which no one contributes anything

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

providing global public goods under uncertainty abstract we study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods we consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs when countries directly contribute to a public good uncertainty tends to lower signatories efforts but may increase participation despite risk aversion uncertainty may improve welfare in contrast when countries try to reduce a global public bad uncertainty tends to increase signatories efforts and decrease participation in that case an ex ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare

a brave new world kantian nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation abstract we model game theoretic situations in which agents motivated by kantian ethics interact with conventional nashian agents we define the concept of generalized kant nash equilibrium which encompasses the nash equilibrium the kantian equilibrium and the kant nash equilibrium as special cases we show the existence and uniqueness of a kant nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation and derive its properties in a dynamic setting we analyze a differential game of climate change mitigation in the presence of both types of agents and compare their markov emission strategies for both the static model and the dynamic model as the population share of kantians increases the quality of the environment improves and both types of agents are better off

learning and stock effects in environmental regulation the case of greenhouse gas emissions abstract this paper concerns the optimal regulation of greenhouse gases that lead to global climate change in particular we focus on uncertainty and learning which over time resolves uncertainty we present an empirical stochastic model of climate economy interactions and present results on the tension between postponing control until more is known vs acting now before irreversible climate change takes place uncertainty in our model is in the damage caused by global warming the results suggest that a temporary carbon tax may dominate a permanent one because a temporary tax may induce increased flexibility

social mobility what is it and why does it matter the definition of social mobility is a matter of debate in the following discussion conceptual issues in the literature on mobility are commented this paper defines social mobility as a situation in which the relative economic status of an agent is not dependent on starting conditions such as parental income or family background analyzing the determinants of mobility involves exploring the channels through which offspring s income is correlated to its parents such as inherited bequest education skills among many others this survey explores in an analytical framework the relation between social mobility and inequality among other important dimensions of income distribution that are jointly determined the focus is on the relevance of social mobility as it affects variables determining welfare and economic efficiency and therefore on policies to promote it

intergenerational earnings mobility inequality and growth abstract we examine a model in which per capita income inequality intergenerational mobility and returns to education are all determined endogenously individuals earn wages depending on their ability which is a random variable they purchase an education with transfers received from their parents and are subject to liquidity constraints in the model multiple steady state equilibria are possible countries with identical tastes and technologies can reach differing rates of mobility inequality and per capita income equilibria with higher levels of output also have lower inequality higher mobility and more efficient distribution of education

equity development and climate change control the paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions a game theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control then the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed jel c7 h0 h3 q38

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper analyzes a simple oligopoly model with information spillovers firms spend on r d to affect their costs of production the main finding is that depending on the magnitude of the spillover the market may not provide enough incentives for the optimum degree of cooperation to take place it is shown that the equilibrium size of a research joint venture is usually less than the optimum size which requires all firms to participate in the research joint venture the policy implications of this result are that there should be encouragement for firms competing in high technology industries to form industry wide cooperative agreements copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

opportunity and social mobility the fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of poor parents unequal opportunity is generally thought to be one of the weak points of modem capitalist societies the ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor social mobility is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies here i argue that both of these characteristics are in fact necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided i argue this point using a generational version of the model of phelan and townsend 1991 an infinitely repeated general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints in my model each household s stochastic output is a function of its level of effort since effort is assumed to be costly and privately observed households can shirk higher than minimal effort levels must be induced by making a household s present or future consumption dependent on the household s observed output history a large literature considers models similar to this including green 1987 atkeson and lucas 1992 phelan 1994 1995 wang 1995 hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 khan and ravikumar 2002 the main difference between the economies in that literature and here is that here instead of a household consisting of a single infinitely lived individual a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals a familial dynasty each of whom lives for one period this difference affects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations when households consist of a single infinitely lived individual allocations can be ranked according to their implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities if one allocation delivers a distribution of ex ante utilities dominated by another allocation then the first allocation is inefficient however if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals then the appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious how those in the first generation rank allocations will in general differ from how their descendants rank allocations this paper addresses this conflict between generations by ranking allocations according to a rawlsian veil of ignorance criterion rawls 1971 that is here society seeks to maximize the expected dynastic utility utility including altruism toward descendants of an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and the identity or output levels of his ancestors 1 i argue that this corresponds to a societal ranking which does

regional income growth and net migration in sweden 1970 1995 this paper concerns the regional growth pattern in sweden and the purpose is to analyse what factors determine the growth rate of average income and the net migration at the regional level we fin

collective action in an asymmetric world abstract a central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good absent a central authority voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones and significant under provision must be expected international public goods are particularly challenging due to the substantial asymmetries among nations small interest nations have strong incentives to ride cheaply our empirical results reveal cheap riding intentions in providing for climate change mitigation a critical international public good the evidence is provided by individual nations intended nationally determined contributions voluntarily pledged for the paris climate change conference we find that larger nations made much larger pledges in proportion to both their gross national incomes and their historical emissions implications for the nordhaus climate club and carbon tax proposals are discussed to achieve pareto optimality despite disparate cheap riding incentives we propose the cheap riding efficient equilibrium that solution takes the nash equilibrium as a base point and then applies the principles of either the nash bargaining solution or the lindahl equilibrium to proceed to the pareto frontier

a dynamic conjectural variations model in the private provision of public goods a differential game approach abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide a reasonable microfoundation to justify the concept of a conjectural variations equilibrium which is often used in the literature on private provision of public goods with the help of the differential game by interpreting the steady state conjectures in a dynamic contribution game as the conjectural variations in the corresponding static game we derive explicit forms of nash or non zero conjectural variations depending on the choice of the strategy spaces furthermore we find that there may be uncountable many conjectural variations and the possibility of matching behavior i e positive conjectural variations when non linear markov perfect strategies are used and when the domain of a state variable is appropriately restricted

successful leadership in global public good provision incorporating behavioural approaches in the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models climate friendly leadership of a country is not successful a unilateral increase of this country s greenhouse gas abatement measures i e contributions to the global public good of climate protection will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding out effect in this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision in particular strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non egoistic or other regarding preferences or if the leader s contribution positively affects the follower s beliefs i e his conjectural variations about the leader s behaviour

uncertainty learning and heterogeneity in international environmental agreements this paper concerns the formation of international environmental agreements under uncertainty about environmental damage with different models of learning complete learning partial learning or no learning the results of the existing literature are generally pessimistic the possibility of either complete or partial learning generally reduces the level of global welfare that can be achieved from forming an iea relative to no learning that literature regards uncertainty as a parameter common to all countries so that countries are identical ex ante as well as ex post in this paper we extend the literature to the case where there is no correlation between damage costs across countries each country is uncertain about a particular parameter in our case the benefit cost ratio drawn from a common distribution but ex post each country s realized parameter value is independently drawn consequently while countries remain identical ex ante they may be heterogeneous ex post we show that this change reinforces the negative conclusions about the effects of partial learning on international environmental agreements but under certain conditions moderates the negative conclusions about the effects of complete learning

using spatial econometrics to analyze local growth in sweden lundberg j 2006 using spatial econometrics to analyse local growth in sweden regional studies 40 303 316 the paper investigates factors that determine the average income growth and net migration rates in swedish municipalities during 1981 99 the main issue is to test the hypothesis that conditional on a set of other possible determinants of regional growth the growth rate in one municipality is affected by the growth rates in its neighbouring municipalities the hypothesis of conditional convergence is also tested a positive correlation is found between net migration rates in neighbouring municipalities which suggests that net migration tends to spillover to neighbouring municipalities when it comes to average income growth the results indicate spatial dependence in the error terms during the 1980s however there is no clear evidence in favour of the hypothesis of conditional convergence instead the results predict conditional divergence between municipalities located in the stockholm reg

endogenous conjectural variations in oligopoly abstract conventional oligopoly theories provide no mechanism for oligopolists to learn from their experience of other firms behavior in forming conjectural variations this paper explores two approaches to the solution of this problem in the first the consistent conjectures approach oligopolists passively react to changes in other firms outputs so as to keep their own profits at a maximum other firms correctly anticipate these reactions in the second approach the matching behavior approach firms actively choose reactions which will induce other firms to reduce their outputs again these reactions are correctly anticipated by the other firms the implications of these alternative models are derived and contrasted with the implications of the cournot and joint profit maximization models

free riding and uncertainty this paper examines the effects of uncertainty on pure public good provision and free riding behavior two models are presented in the first nash behavior is assumed and uncertainty is with respect to the contributions of the rest of the community for the second model non nash behavior is assumed and uncertainty concerns the nonzero response that a representative individual s optimizing choice will cause in the community propositions provide sufficient conditions for increased risk to worsen free riding behavior in the two models for nash behavior we also give the sufficient condition for increased risk to ameliorate free riding behavior the effects of group size on free riding are also explored for uncertain responses by the community

eating the rich vs feeding the poor borrowing constraints and the reluctance to redistribute this paper offers an explanation why most democracies arecharacterized by moderate taxation of wealth although thewealth distribution is persistently skewed to the right wemodel an economy in which agents have to acquire highereducation to qualify for skilled work and in which capitalmarket imperfections prevent poor individuals from making sucha profitable human capital investment if these borrowingconstraints do not bind for members of the middle class theymay rationally reject redistribution although both the currentand the future median of the wealth distribution are below themean

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

can international environmental cooperation be bought in this paper a two stage game of international environmental agreement formation with asymmetric countries is analytically solved the equilibrium of the game makes it possible to determine the size and composition of a stable agreement two cases are studied in the first case countries differ only in abatement costs while in the second case they differ in environmental damages in both cases two different institutional settings one without transfers and another with transfers are considered the results establish that the asymmetry assumption has no important effects on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the symmetric case if transfers are not used or abatement costs represent the only difference among countries however when the only difference is in environmental damages the level of cooperation that can be bought through a self financed transfer scheme increases with the degree of asymmetry

the theory of collective action and burden sharing in nato mancur olson s theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the north atlantic treaty organization nato in the early years of the cold war but the association between economic size gross domestic product or gdp and defense burden the ratio of military expenditures to gdp has declined to insignificant levels two influences are shown to be important in producing this change the increased pursuit of private goods by greece turkey and portugal and the growing cooperation among the other european allies since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the europeans with credible means of self defense it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in europe during the postwar period nato is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good accordingly the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance

managing increasing environmental risks through agrobiodiversity and agrienvironmental policies abstract agro biodiversity can provide natural insurance to risk averse farmers by reducing the variance of crop yield and to society at large by reducing the uncertainty in the provision of public good ecosystem services such as e g co2 storage we analyze the choice of agro biodiversity by risk averse farmers who have access to financial insurance and study the implications for agri environmental policy design when on farm agro biodiversity generates a positive risk externality while increasing environmental risk leads private farmers to increase their level of on farm agro biodiversity the level of agro biodiversity in the laissez faire equilibrium remains inefficiently low we show how either one of two agri environmental policy instruments can cure this risk related market failure an ex ante pigouvian subsidy on on farm agro biodiversity and an ex post compensation payment for the actual provision of public environmental benefits in the absence of regulation welfare may increase rather than decrease with increasing environmental risk if the agroecosystems is characterized by a high natural insurance function low costs and large external benefits of agro biodiversity

equilibrium binding agreements a comment abstract to construct their equilibrium binding agreements ray and vohra j econ theory 73 1997 30 78 define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure we show that this result crucially depends on the quasi concavity of the utility functions which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions when coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi concave and an equilibrium may not exist however if coalitions use correlated strategies an equilibrium always exist

moral behaviour altruism and environmental policy free riding is often associated with self interested behaviour however if there is a global pollutant free riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make in this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism for behaviour to change individuals need to make their decisions in a different way we propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self interest and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a kantian form of behaviour that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did we show that a if individuals behave this way then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a dirty good b nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self interested fashion

international cooperation for sale abstract this paper shows that strong asymmetry among countries warrants a change in the rules of the game of global public goods provision with the consequence that cooperation by some countries is bought by others and aggregate welfare is increased perhaps substantially side payments on their own have virtually no effect on the outcomes that can be sustained by self enforcing cooperative agreements but when the rules of the game are changed by strong asymmetry when some countries are effectively committed to being non signatories to an agreement eschewing money transfers side payments become the vehicle for increasing participation in a cooperative agreement

the oslo protocol on sulfur reduction the great leap forward the increasing number of international environmental agreements ieas and the fact that under some agreements emissions have been reduced beyond agreed targets are frequently viewed as success stories of international cooperation we argue that success can only be measured if abatement targets under an iea are compared with estimated abatement levels in the absence of a treaty and are evaluated in terms of costs and benefits we analyze the oslo protocol on sulfur reduction showing that this iea is not the great leap forward when compared with the calculated nash equilibrium and the social optimum however we also demonstrate that under the oslo protocol more ambitious targets could not have been realized due to strong free rider incentives

climate treaties and breakthrough technologies an effective climate change treaty must promote the joint supply of two global public goods climate change mitigation and knowledge of new technologies that can lower mitigation costs r d is especially needed to bring about substantial long term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases for this will require the development and diffusion of revolutionary breakthrough technologies martin i hoffert et al 2002 in principle such an outcome could be realized by the kyoto protocol approach if that agreement were strengthened over time however that response may be inadequate kyoto makes no provision for r d and as i shall demonstrate unlikely to succeed can a treaty system relying directly on targeted r d and the adoption of breakthrough technologies perform better in this same setting of anarchic international relations i will show that as a general rule the answer is no essentially the same forces that undermine kyoto also challenge the r d and technology approach there is one exception to this rule r d leading to breakthrough technologies exhibiting increasing returns can improve dramatically on the kyoto approach even when these technologies are otherwise inferior to the alternatives available this suggests that our approach to treaty design should be strategic

can uncertainty alleviate the commons problem global commons problems such as climate change are often affected by severe uncertainty the paper examines the effect of uncertainty on pollution emissions and welfare in a strategic context we find that emissions are always lower under uncertainty than under certainty reflecting risk reducing considerations we show that uncertainty can have a net positive impact on the welfare of risk averse polluters we extend the analysis to increases in risk increases in risk aversion and to risk heterogeneity jel d81 c72 q54 h23

household migration and the local public sector evidence from sweden 1981 1984 westerlund o and wyzan m l 1995 household migration and the local public sector evidence from sweden 1981 1984 reg studies 29 145 157 in this paper the relationship between public sector attributes and household characteristics and swedish household migration 1981 4 is studied we report results separately for metropolitan and non metropolitan areas because the per capita levels of the tax base and intergovernmental grants are theoretically important migration determinants where population is sparse whilst the tax rate may be more important where population is dense because fiscal influences are likely to be stronger for short distance migration we apply multinomial logit to a three way choice set staying and migrating short and long distances empirical results support our fiscal hypotheses and are consistent with previous findings on household characteristics westerlund o et wyzan m l 1995 la migration des menages et le secteur public local des preuves provenant de la suede de

optimal choices under uncertainty the case of two argument utility functions this paper presents a unified treatment for the analysis of two argument utility functions with a random budget constraint the way in which changes in both additive and multiplicative risk affect optimal choices has been analyzed prov iding intuitive economic explanations to third order magnitudes which usually appear in this kind of analysis two examples are given in t erms of optimal savings and labor supply under uncertainty finally an application to taxation under uncertainty is given where both the effects of increased tax progressivity and the rules for efficient t axation are analyzed copyright 1988 by royal economic society

the effect of uncertainty on interactive behaviour economists have studied extensively the effects of uncertainty on the optimising choices of a single agent two areas among many where this has been done are optimal savings by consumers and optimal production by firms 2 work of a more theoretical nature on uncertainty includes the seminal essay of rothschild and stiglitz i970 cheng et al i987 feder i977 kraus i979 meyer and ormiston i985 among others more recently dardanoni i988 has presented an elegant unifying treatment of the effect of uncertainty on an agent who has a two argument utility function and faces a linear constraint which relates the two arguments many situations of interest in economics go beyond the analysis of a single optimising agent since they involve several agents interacting with each other the outcomes in such cases have often been analysed as the nash equilibrium of a non cooperative game examples include a variety of oligopoly models 3 the voluntary provision of public goods 4 the tragedy of the commons 5 the behaviour of workers in self managed cooperatives6 and different kinds of strategic contests 7 surprisingly the effect of common uncertainty on the nash equilibrium of such games either specifically or in general has hardly been studied 8 in this paper we seek to provide a general analysis of the effect of uncertainty on equilibrium outcomes for the class of games in which each agent has one choice variable since this class includes the single agent case which is usually considered in the uncertainty literature and which was recently comprehensively studied in dardanoni 1 988 our paper in effect extends this literature to game situations in particular we examine when the results for games and for single agent optimisation coincide and when and how they differ our analysis focuses on the class of symmetric games but we also present some results in asymmetric cases

strategic information acquisition and the mitigation of global warming abstract we consider the strategic role of uncertainty and information acquisition for the mitigation of global warming before the countries decide on their contribution to a mitigation of global warming they may invest in information about the country specific benefit of reductions of the emissions of greenhouse gases we show that information acquisition has a substantial strategic value countries may prefer not to learn their benefit of climate protection even if information acquisition does not involve a direct cost this strategic information choice may further decrease the efficiency of the public good provision

donations to a public good in a large economy abstract the characteristics of private provision of public goods in a large economy are investigated when agents undertake an activity which has an adverse effect on the quantity of the public good itself in contrast to a model in which provision is by donations alone a substantial proportion of the population can be donors in a large economy nevertheless the model faces certain empirical difficulties

negative conjectures and increased public good provision abstract a stochastic non nash model with negative conjectures is developed which yields a condition in which an individual increases voluntary public good provision relative to the nash solution

voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality abstract we examine both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntary provision of a public good some implications of the assumption that individuals may obey ethical codes of conduct the notion of morality considered captures the intuition often attributed to kant that a moral action leads to the best outcome when it is properly universalized we propose a formalization of this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this direction in the literature by allowing the players to differ both in their strategy sets and their preferences we show that it is easy to find examples of games in which no moral behavior of this type exists or where the only existing kantian code of conduct leads to a pareto inefficient outcome we then more specifically examine the issues of existence and pareto efficiency of kantian norms of behavior in games of voluntary provision of a public good we find in this context that there is no conflict between morality and pareto efficiency since any kantian norm of behavior is pareto efficient we also prove the existence of a kantian norm of individual contribution

the effect of state and local taxes on economic growth a time series cross section approach results based on pooled time series and cross section data are presented which indicate that state and local tax increases significantly retard economic growth when the revenue is used to fund transfer payments however when the revenue is used instead to finance improved public services such as education highways and public health and safety the favorable impact on location and production decisions provided by the enhanced services may more than counterbalance the disincentive effects of the associated taxes these findings underscore the importance of considering the incentives provided by a state s expenditures as well as by its taxes i n the past several years a number of states have implemented limitations on taxes or expenditures while others have raised tax rates in response to the revenue shortfalls of the early 1980s although much of the ongoing debate over state fiscal structures revolves around expressed preferences over tax expenditure combinations per se the question of how state and local taxes may affect economic growth is often central to the discussion nonetheless the empirical evidence remains sparse previous studies can be divided into two broad categories assessments of the magnitudes of tax costs and statistical analyses of the relationship between tax rates and growth cost studies have tended to minimize the role of taxes in business location decisions either because state and local taxes are a relatively small component of total costs for most businesses or because interstate tax differences are small relative to other cost differences between states although these results suggest that the role played by taxes is a minor one describing how large the tax disparities may be is not the same as ascertaining their economic effect of the statistical studies many including bloom 1955 thompson and mattila 1959 and carlton 1979 1983 find no relationship between taxes and growth however kleine 1977 grieson 1980 and generally grieson et al 1977 report negative correlations romans and subrahmanyam 1979 find growth to be negatively related to the fraction of revenues devoted to transfer payments and a variable which they claim measures personal tax progressivity but positively related to business taxes with the exception of carlton who estimates models of the birth and size of firms within metropolitan areas and the grieson et al 1977 and grieson 1980 studies which consider taxes in new york city and philadelphia these authors use data from a single cross section of states more recently newman 1983 and plaut and pluta 1983 both use cross sectional data from two time periods the former finding negative effects of corporate tax rates and the latter yielding mixed results in this study we utilize a time series from 1965 through 1979 of cross sections of 48 states exploiting the richness of this data set we are able to allow for otherwise unexplained differences between states which could be expected to bias results based on a single cross section moreover this much larger sample provides the statistical power necessary to disentangle the separate effects of different categories of taxes public expenditures and transfer payments a distinguishing feature of this paper is that we explicitly recognize the government budget constraint linking these fiscal variables and the deficit or surplus in addition we have taken account of the effects of labor force characteristics by including variables for wage rates unionization and population density our results indicate that tax increases significantly retard economic growth when the revenue is used to fund transfer payments as a result programs of income redistribution are more effectively undertaken at the federal than at the state and local level on the other hand when the revenue is received for publication april 30 1984 revision accepted for publication january 22 1985 university of california davis i am indebted to the institute of governmental affairs at the university of california davis for financial support to adrienne kandel for invaluable research assistance and to two referees for their helpful comments 1 see williams 1967 morgan and brownlee 1974 vasquez and deseve 1977 and the advisory commission on intergovernmental relations 1981 see also due 1961 for a survey of the early literature including a discussion of the findings and limitations of survey results on this topic 574 1 copyright 1985 this content downloaded from 157 55 39 35 on mon 29 aug 2016 04 45 38 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms state and local taxes and economic growth 575 used instead to finance enhanced public services such as highways education and public health and safety the favorable impact on location and production decisions provided by the improved services may more than counterbalance the disincentive effects of the concomitant taxes these findings underscore the importance of considering the incentives provided by a state s expenditures as well as by its taxes we begin by sketching a model which provides the basis for the analysis and discussing appropriate estimation techniques then in section ii we describe the data used and our hypotheses the econometric results are presented in section iii followed by brief concluding remarks in the final

self selection and internal migration in the united states abstract within the conceptual framework of the roy model this paper provides an empirical analysis of internal migration flows using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth the theoretical approach highlights regional differences in the returns to skills regions that pay higher returns to skills attract more skilled workers than regions that pay lower returns our empirical results suggest that interstate differences in the returns to skills are a major determinant of both the size and skill composition of internal migration flows persons whose skills are most mismatched with the reward structure offered by their current state of residence are the persons most likely to leave that state and these persons tend to relocate in states which offer higher rewards for their particular skills

the inheritance of inequality how level is the intergenerational playing field what are the causal mechanisms that underlie the intergenerational transmission of economic status are these mechanisms amenable to public policies in a way that would make the attainment of economic success more fair these are the questions we will try to answer

financing of public goods and noncooperative theory of bargaining abstract this paper deals with an application of the noncooperative theory of bargaining to the financing of public goods we characterize the equilibrium of the bargaining game and perform comparative statics with respect to the model parameters in particular our results indicate that i if agreement from both parties is necessary to provide a public good the poorer party may make a negative contribution to the provision of a public good and ii if each party is free to provide the public good without the assent of the other party outside option principle then only non negative contributions are possible

us regional income convergence a spatial econometric perspective rey s j and montouri b d 1999 us regional income convergence a spatial econometric perspective reg studies 33 143 156 this study reconsiders the question of us regional economic income convergence from a spatial econometric perspective recently developed methods of exploratory spatial data analysis provide new insights on the geographical dynamics of us regional income growth patterns over the 1929 94 period strong patterns of both global and local spatial autocorrelation are found throughout the study period and the magnitude of global spatial autocorrelation is also found to exhibit strong temporal co movement with regional income dispersion a spatial econometric analysis of the familiar baumol specification reveals strong evidence of misspecification due to ignored spatial error dependence because of this dependence shocks originating in one state can spillover into surrounding states potentially complicating the transitional dynamics of the convergence process rey s j et montouri

piercing the veil of uncertainty in transboundary pollution agreements this paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states a measure of difficulty is constructed related to side payments necessary to make an agreement a pareto improving move using a simple model it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier

the dynamics of u s internal migration in this paper we have theoretically derived a net migration equation and estimated it using time series data for 51 u s regions over the period 1971 1988 the results indicate that the dynamic response of net migration is stable and is significantly related to stock equilibrium changes induced by amenity differentials relative employment opportunities relative real wages and industry composition excerpt

giving overseas and public policy remarkable numbers of people give to overseas development charities the aim of this paper is to consider how such overseas giving is best modelled and the implications for public policy widely used theories of charitable giving based on warm glow or the provision of public goods provide insight but are not fully satisfactory as explanations of giving for the specific purpose of development instead an identification approach to individual giving is proposed here that combines the results focus of the public goods formulation with the scale of the warm glow model the theoretical model is used to examine the implications for public policy including the extent to which official aid crowds out private giving and how public policy should take account of private willingness to make charitable transfers overseas