test of the adjustment process and linear homogeneity in a stock adjustment model of money demand stock adjustment models of money demand have employed either the nominal or real adjustment process but they have not been tested statistically due to their nonnestedness this paper formulates a general stock adjustment model which includes both nominal and real adjustment processes as its nested subsets each process is then tested against the general specification the paper also examines the homogeneity of money demand with respect to price level and income in the general model

vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

the quantitative analytics of the basic neomonetarist model this paper constructs a dynamic macroeconomic model with less than perfect price flexibility which has a classical side consistent with real business cycle theory augmented by investment adjustment costs increasing returns to scale and a new flexible formalization of imperfect competition something akin to the classical dichotomy is justified by a mode of approximation appropriate for a model in which one state variable adjusts quickly while another state variable adjusts slowly even with investment adjustment costs monetary expansions are found to raise the real interest rate the determinants of real rigidity and the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment are investigated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

real rigidities and the non neutrality of money rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks and by themselves small frictions in nominal adjustment such as costs of changing prices create only small non neutralities but this paper shows that substantial nominal rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions the paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for two specific sources of real rigidity one arising from goods market imperfections and the other from labour market imperfections

parallel imports price controls and innovation the impact of parallel trade on innovation in r d intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals is a hotly debated question in antitrust and ip policy the well known argument that parallel trade dampens innovation by undermining firms ability to price discriminate has been challenged by recent literature the argument is that with endogenous price controls parallel trade increases innovation by reducing governments incentives to set particularly low price caps in this paper we show that this result crucially depends on the degree of homogeneity of the trading countries the result only holds if consumers in poorer countries have a relatively similar demand for medication as consumers in richer countries instead when countries are relatively heterogeneous parallel trade dampens innovation and lowers welfare by exporting price cap regulation from poorer to richer countries these findings are in line with recent case evidence we also show that when patent length is endogenous richer countries will tend to choose longer patent protection with parallel trade whereas equilibrium price caps tend to be tighter in that case

price changes in the euro area and the united states some facts from individual consumer price data prices of goods and services do not adjust immediately in response to changing demand and supply conditions this paper characterizes the average frequency and size of price changes in the euro area and its member countries investigates the determinants of the probability of price changes and compares the evidence for the euro area with available u s results the facts documented in this paper are based on evidence from individual price data recorded at the store level in all euro area countries except ireland and greece that is in datasets covering austria belgium finland france germany italy luxembourg the netherlands portugal and spain which together account for around 97 percent of euro area gdp the data used are the monthly price records underlying the computation of national consumer price indices and harmonized consumer price indices these data cover a large number of products selected on the basis of extensive household budget surveys

equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure in a north south vertically differentiated duopoly the analysis in this paper derives equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports by incorporating strategic interaction at the policy setting stage and the product market the model sheds new light on i the effects of parallel import policies on pricing behavior of firms and ii the interdependence of national parallel import policies if demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large the north forbids parallel imports to ensure its firm sells in the south thereby generating international price discrimination the south s most preferred market outcome as the equilibrium when demand structures are relatively similar across countries the north permits parallel imports and uniform pricing its most preferred market outcome obtains

retailers as agents and the limits of parallel trade abstract the volume of retail level parallel trade is surprisingly small despite persistent international price differences we offer an agency based explanation by considering competition between an original home manufacturer and a foreign retailer the model endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent with private information on the perceived quality of the good in its own market the manufacturer cannot control the retailer once the latter has ordered its sales quantity but it can limit the initial offer if parallel trade is permitted this offer will fall if there is incomplete information resulting in a small or zero volume of parallel trade this outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off while offering little benefit to home consumers compared to the case where such trade is banned

limited rationality and strategic interaction the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational forward looking decisions this raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results we examine this question in the context of a long standing and important economic problem the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock our experiments suggest that two types of bounded rationality money illusion and anchoring are important behavioral forces behind nominal inertia however depending on the strategic environment bounded rationality has vastly different effects on aggregate price adjustment if agents actions are strategic substitutes adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick whereas under strategic complementarity adjustment is both very slow and associated with relatively large real effects this adjustment difference is driven by price expectations which are very flexible and forward looking under substitutability but adaptive and sticky under complementarity moreover subjects expectations are also considerably more rational under substitutability

capacity investment under postponement strategies market competition and demand uncertainty we consider duopoly models where firms make decisions on capacity production and price under demand uncertainty capacity and price decisions are made respectively ex ante and ex post demand realizations the interplay between the timings of demand realization and production decision endows firms with different capabilities flexible firms can postpone production decisions until the actual demand curve is observed but inflexible firms cannot under general demand structures and cost functions we characterize the equilibrium for a symmetric duopoly and establish the strategic equivalence of price and quantity competitions when firms are flexible we investigate the stochastic order properties of capacity and profit and show that they both increase for a flexible firm when the market is more volatile we find that flexibility allows a firm to increase investment in capacity and earn a higher profit while benefiting customers by keeping the price in a narrower range strategic equivalence implies that

the short run demand for money a reconsideration the partial adjustment approach to the specification of the short run demand for money has dominated the literature for more than a decade there are three basic problems with this approach first the same lag structure is imposed on all variables and each independent variable enters only as a current value in contrast a rational individual would respond to different variables income interest rates prices with quite different lags second when the general price levelis subject to gradual adjustment hut can move quickly in response to supply shocks the influence of these supply shocks should enter with a negative sign third the estimated equation for real balances may not be a money demand equation at all but rather its coefficients may represent a shifting mixture of demand and supply responses the empirical work examines several alternative dynamic specifications including a generalized partial adjustment framework and the error correction model both of the latter specifications exhibit greater structural stability after 1973 than the standard partial adjustment specification and the generalized partial adjustment model also yields relatively small errors in post sample dynamic simulations shifts in coefficients as the sample period is extended after 1973 are consistent with the interpretation that the real balance equation no longer traces out structural demand parameters hut rather a mixture of demand and supply responses this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

returns system with rebates we consider a variant of the newsvendor problem atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand after the orders are filled the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not we show that in this setting a returns system with rebates with previously set buy back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold implements the optimal production and sales strategy attaining maximum expected profit in the channel

raising retailers profits on vertical practices and the exclusion of rivals resale price maintenance rpm slotting fees loyalty rebates and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers if these retailers were to accommodate entry upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers thus in equilibrium retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent s profits consequently if entry requires downstream accommodation entry can be deterred we discuss policy implications of this aspect of vertical contracting practices jel l14 l22 l25 l42 l81 this paper considers the upstream exclusionary effect of vertical practices that create rents for downstream retailers without carrying a contractual obligation for exclusivity 1 examples of interest include allowing the manufacturer to set the price at which a retailer sells to consumers resale price maintenance or rpm periodic lump sum payments to retailers through slotting fees or loyalty rebates and mar ket division schemes such as the allocation of clients to specific retailers or the use of exclusive territories we explore equilibria that can arise when an upstream incumbent uses a vertical practice of the sort outlined above to share industry profits with retailers we show that if entry by another upstream manufacturer leads to competition that reduces industry profits sufficiently and entry requires accommodation by retailers then equilibria exist in which retailers do not accommodate the entrant this results in exclusion in essence the vertical practice creates a quasi rent that retailers in equilibrium have an incentive to protect

an elementary proposition concerning parallel imports abstract this paper demonstrates that when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports a global nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i e global uniform pricing this result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government s objective function i e political economy considerations we also show that when countries can prevent parallel exports then any nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination

manufacturers and retailers in the global economy we develop a general equilibrium model to capture key features of the retailing and of the manufacturing industry in order to understand how these two industries interact and how labor is allocated between them we show that the observed shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing the rise in retailer product assortment and the emergence of slotting allowances in many retail markets are consistent with the global integration of product markets while higher retail market concentration is best explained by technological change in retailing we also identify a novel benefit from market integration consisting of efficiency gains in the vertical distribution chain

the timing of monetary policy shocks a vast empirical literature has documented delayed and persistent effects of monetary policy shocks on output we show that this finding results from the aggregation of output impulse responses that differ sharply depending on the timing of the shock when the monetary policy shock takes place in the first two quarters of the year the response of output is quick sizable and dies out at a relatively fast pace in contrast output responds very little when the shock takes place in the third or fourth quarter we propose a potential explanation for the differential responses based on uneven staggering of wage contracts across quarters using a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model we show that a very modest amount of uneven staggering can generate differences in output responses similar to those found in the data

distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty abstract when suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer this paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts each of which consists of a mixture of constant per unit wholesale prices buy back arrangements and post sale payments contingent on sales made such as revenue sharing or buybacks we show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly thereby generating the supplier s preferred inventory configuration and price distribution we extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution given the choices of its rival distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers standpoint even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty and given the perfect competition among distributors all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers thus suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand and without the need to control dealer actions in detail in particular suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion

multi period modeling of two way price commitment under price dependent demand abstract this paper examines the use of price commitment policies in dynamic contracting in multiple period finite time horizons two specific forms of price commitment are considered one on the part of the retailer through a retail fixed markup contract and one on the part of the manufacturer through a price protection contract optimal policies for each form of price commitment are analytically derived as are optimal policies for the traditional price only and centralized supply chain scenarios that we use as comparisons we prove that optimal retail price and order size solutions exist in each period under the assumption of non increasing price dependent demand we show that the existence of retailer inventory between periods causes the optimal policies to differ from a static single period model further we show that a supplier offers a price protection policy as a signal to the retailer to resolve the gaming that naturally occurs under price only this effectively decouples the multi period dynamic contracting setting into repeated single period scenarios however the resulting behavior can actually inhibit supply chain performance on the retail commitment side we find that retail fixed markup policies are quite effective in improving supply chain efficiency we show that such policies can lead to pareto improvement over price only contracts and can even coordinate the supply chain in some situations

wage setting patterns and monetary policy international evidence abstract systematic differences in the timing of wage setting decisions among industrialized countries provide an ideal framework to study the importance of wage rigidity for the transmission of monetary policy synchronization in wage setting decisions is prevalent in japan and the united states yielding varying degrees of wage rigidity within the year instead in france germany and the united kingdom decisions are more uniformly spread over time exploiting within year variation in the timing of wage setting decisions in these economies we find support for the long held but scarcely tested view that wage rigidity plays a critical role in the transmission of monetary policy

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

the demand for money a rational expectations approach the authors derive a model of money demand for an optimizing consumer with rational expectations in a discrete time infinte hortizon framework under uncertainty mone y demand responds to unanticipated changes in income one period expe ctations of future bond and money interest rates unanticipated curre nt interest rates and past anticipations of current rates the deriv ed consumption function mirrors money demand behavior joint estimati on of the consumption and money demand equations by weighted nonlinea r least squares corroborates the predicted effects particularly inco me neutrality this money demand model substantially outperforms a co nventional specification in post sample simulation over 1975 85 copyright 1988 by mit press

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of rpm we analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers we show that rpm indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry wide monopoly pricing the impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties influence in determining the terms of the contracts our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies

the search for a stable money demand function a survey of the post 1973 literature phe question of whether the demnand function for money is stable is one of the most important recurring issues in the theory and application of macroeconomic policy what is being sought in a stable demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank s control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy as such the notion of a stable demand function appears to involve three key elements e g john t boorman 1976 p 317 and david e w laidler 1977 pp 34 35 first the demand for money relation should be highly predictable in a statistical sense as measured by the usual goodness of fit statistics precision of estimated coefficients and presumably its ability to forecast accurately out of sample second a stable demand function for money has relatively few arguments a relationship that requires knowledge about a large number of variables in order to pin it down is in effect not predictable finally the variables that appear as arguments in the function should represent significant links to spending and economic activity in the real sector in sum a stable demand function for money means that the quantity of money is predictably related to a small set of key variables linking money to the real sector of the economy the importance of a stable money demand function for monetary policy can be illustrated with the standard is lm model in which interest rates and gnp are the endogenous variables in this context a stable demand function for money translates into a well defined relationship between money interest rates and gnp

strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy this paper shows that parallel import policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy we demonstrate this result in two country international duopoly where a domestic monopolist competes with a rival rm in the foreign market if it chooses to incur the xed investment cost of exporting the two rms sell horizontally dierentiated goods and compete in prices when the foreign market is signi cantly larger than the domestic one the home rm gains if it is unable to price discriminate its desire to not deviate too far from its optimal monopoly price in the domestic market makes it credibly less aggressive in price competition abroad which softens price competition and raises pro ts on the other hand when the foreign market is not signi cantly larger it is optimal for the home country to forbid parallel imports since international price discrimination yields higher pro ts to the home rm we draw out the implications of the two types of parallel import policies for global welfare

demand uncertainty inventories and resale price maintenance we show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers in our model discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand full price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell we show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer s wholesale demand and profits and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase

the effects of advertising on resale price maintenance this research combines the market power and market competition perspectives on advertising under the framework of a generalized theoretical model in minimum resale price maintenance rpm in order to investigate the effects of advertising on rpm using the real options approach the effects of advertising on retail price will impact the value of rpm further influence the incentive of manufacturers to impose rpm through brand penetration and promotional pricing effects advertising is likely to influence rpm under the condition of retail price competition when the brand penetration effect is dominant advertising will discourage manufacturers from imposing rpm advertising will encourage manufacturers to impose rpm when the promotional pricing effect is dominant rpm not only substitutes advertising but also complements advertising

resale price maintenance and spatial price discrimination abstract in this article we examine resale price maintenance rpm in a classic model of downstream retailers engaging in spatial price discrimination we show that a resale price floor increases the total profit of the upstream monopoly when transport cost product differentiation is relatively low importantly this profitable rpm floor can also enhance social welfare and even consumer surplus a resale price ceiling can also be profitable and always improves consumer surplus and social welfare we argue that such findings support a rule of reason approach to rpm

estimating the frequency of price re optimization in calvo style models abstract this paper assesses the empirical performance calvo style models of price re optimization we first show that versions of these models in which firms update non re optimized prices to lagged inflation account well for the statistical behavior of post war u s inflation rates we then investigate whether these models imply plausible degrees of inertia in price setting behavior by firms they do but only if we depart from two standard auxiliary assumptions monopolistically competitive firms face a constant elasticity of demand and capital is homogeneous and can be instantaneously reallocated after a shock we develop a version of the model in which these assumptions are relaxed and show that it is consistent with the view that firms re optimize prices on average once every two quarters

organizational structure of a global supply chain in the presence of a gray market information asymmetry and valuation difference we consider a global supply chain of a multinational firm mnf with domestic and foreign markets in the presence of a gray marketer in particular we investigate the organizational structure of the mnf for pricing centralization vs decentralization when the foreign division of the mnf competes with the gray marketer the foreign division has a private information on the market potential and customers have a valuation difference between the products sold by the foreign division and the gray marketer in this situation while centralized pricing may control the gray marketer s activities decentralized pricing may take advantage of a local manager s private information especially when a significant valuation difference of customers exists due to product or service differentiation we analyze the trade offs in the choice of organizational structure for pricing and the impact of information asymmetry and valuation difference on this choice also we show that decentralization can be further improved by an incentive adjustment of profits between divisions which has a potential to increase all divisions and mnf s total profits over centralization

money demand the effects of inflation and alternative adjustment mechanisms the paper first reconciles a variety of specification tests for partial adjustment money demand models and points out a fundamental identification problem which makes it impossible to distinguish between the real and nominal partial adjustment models if inflation has an independent effect on the long run demand for money the paper also finds that empirical estimates of simple partial adjustment models have some undesirable properties and then considers the shortand long run effects of inflation in a more general distributed lag model

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

parallel imports challenges from unauthorized distribution channels we examine the problem of parallel imports unauthorized flows of products across countries which compete with authorized distribution channels the traditional economics model of a discriminating monopolist that has different prices for the same good in different markets requires the markets to be separated in some way usually geographically the profits from price discrimination can be threatened by parallel imports that allow consumers in the high priced region some access to the low priced marketplace however as this article shows there is a very real possibility that parallel imports may actually increase profits the basic intuition is that parallel importation becomes another channel for the authentic goods and creates a new product version that allows the manufacturer to price discriminate we propose a two country three stage model to quantitatively study the effects and strategies in the third stage and in the higher priced country where parallel imports have entered we characterize the resulting market segmentation one segment of consumers stays with the authorized version as they place more value on the warranty and services that come with the authorized version another segment switches to parallel imports because a lower price is offered due to lack of country specific features or warranties parallel imports also generate a third and new segment that would not have bought this product before unlike counterfeits that are fabricated by imitators all parallel imports are genuine and sourced from the manufacturer in the lower priced country through authorized dealers therefore the manufacturer s global sales quantity should increase but profit may rise or fall depending on the relative sizes and profitability of the segments a profit maximizing parallel importer should set price and quantity in the second stage after observing the manufacturer s prices in both countries there will be a threshold of across country price gap above which parallel imports would occur in the first stage the manufacturer can anticipate the possible occurrence of a parallel import its price and quantity and its effect on authorized sales in each country to make a coordinated pricing decision to maximize the global supply chain profit under some circumstances the manufacturer should allow parallel imports and under others should prevent them through a stackelberg game we solve for the optimal pricing strategy in each scenario we then find in one extension that when the number of parallel importers increases the optimal authorized price gap should narrow but the prices and quantities of parallel imports may rise or fall in another extension we nd that when the manufacturer has other means such as monitoring dealers differentiating designs and unbundling warranties to contain parallel imports the authorized price gap can widen as a function of the effectiveness of nonpricing controls in summary parallel imports may help the manufacturer to extend the global reach of its product and even boost its global profit if the manufacturer offers a discount version through its authorized dealers it is running a high risk of confusing customers and tarnishing brand images parallel imports may cause similar concerns for the manufacturer but unauthorized dealers are perceived as further removed from the manufacturer therefore there is less risk of confusing consumers when parallel imports are channeled through unauthorized dealers furthermore they are more nimble in diverting the product whenever their transshipment and marketing costs are small enough not to offset the authorized price gap and the valuation discount this may explain why some manufacturers fiercely fight parallel imports while others knowingly use this alternative channel

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

parallel imports demand dispersion and international price discrimination parallel imports goods imported by unauthorized resellers are advocated worldwide for undermining international price discrimination for a continuum of markets we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is large though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation too many markets go unserved mixed systems permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing or unrestricted multimarket discrimination and can pareto dominate uniform pricing thus while parallel imports might benefit some countries our results weaken the multilateral case for allowing them

price expectations and the demand for money resolution of a paradox in his restatement of the quantity theory of money milton friedman 1956 argued that physical goods should be regarded as a substitute for money and that higher expected rates of inflation should induce a portfolio shift from money to physical assets as friedman has derived his equation the demand for real balances is a function of the expected rate of inflation in addition to nominal rates of interest wealth and real income p 58 equation 11 this also has been the approach of many applied studies for example valentine 1977 p 747 concludes the fact that the anticipated rate of inflation has an effect on the demand for money which is additional to its effect through its influence on the nominal interest rate provides support for friedman s view of the demand for money emphasis mine there is of course likely to be some degree of substitution between physical goods and wider definitions of money which is the definition friedman envisages it is difficult to believe however that the demand for narrowly defined money mi which is used primarily for transactions balances should be terribly sensitive to moderate expected rates of inflation certainly from theoretical considerations in transactions demand models of the tobin baumol variety there is no role for the expected rate of inflation other than via interest rates herein lies the paradox whilst theory and common sense seem to dictate that expected or actual inflation play little role in the demand for narrow money a number of studies for different countries have reported the opposite these include shapiro 1973 and goldfeld 1973 for the united states smith and winder 1971 for canada and adams and porter 1976 juttner and tuckwell 1974 and valentine 1977 for australia this paper reconciles theory and evidence by showing that with more appropriate specification of previous studies the expected or actual rate of inflation is redundant and not significant those models use either a partial adjustment mechanism or an expectations formation mechanism in real terms it is shown below that this equation is rejected relative to one in which the expectations and adjustments are in terms of nominal variables this nominal specification was pointed out by goldfeld 1973 and hafer and hein 1980 who selected the nominal version on the basis of within sample errors following a description of the real adjustment models in the next section section iii shows this selection of the nominal version more rigorously on the basis of a likelihood ratio test more importantly it is shown that this test of superiority of specification is identical to the test that the rate of inflation exerts no independent influence on the demand for money these tests are carried out in section iv since empirical studies of this question use both the actual and expected rates of inflation the results of those authors using the expected rate of inflation are examined in section v in all cases the strategy has been to replicate those models as closely as possible to see if their conclusions are upheld under more appropriate specifications and in all cases these conclusions are not upheld the aim of the paper is not to suggest new or appropriate expectations formations or to exhaust all possible ones but to test those on which previous conclusions are based the aim is twofold to point out the duality of the appropriate real vs nominal test procedure with the test of significance of the rate of inflation and to show that the conclusions of previous studies regarding the independent effect of the rate of inflation on transactions balances are due to an incorrect specification and interpretation

resale price maintenance and forward integration into a monopolistically competitive industry in this paper we adopt the ces model of product differentiation for the downstream stage of the industry with an upstream monopolist we first show that resale price maintenance is equivalent to forward integration and that both increase profits then we demonstrate that forward integration by an upstream monopolist will reduce welfare for the industry prices fall with forward integration but the integrating firm contracts the number of downstream subsidiaries so drastically that the reduced diversity more than offsets the gains from lower prices

why parallel trade may raise producers profits abstract this paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade in addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period for these types of products letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit the model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles clothes toys consumer electronics musical recordings cosmetics and perfumes

parallel imports and repair services abstract this study explores the welfare effects of parallel imports when the producer may refuse to provide repair services for parallel imported units which reduces the degree of price convergence between countries if the probability of the product s breakdown is endogenously determined by the producer permitting parallel imports could increase the probability because a higher probability leads to a larger price gap as a result it is possible that prices increase and welfare deteriorates in both countries this negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as the liberalization of trade in goods proceeds the prohibition of service discrimination recovers the positive welfare effect

nonuniform staggered prices and output persistence staggered prices are a fundamental building block of new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models in the standard model prices are uniformly staggered but recent empirical evidence suggests that deviations from uniform staggering are common this paper analyzes how synchronization of price changes affects the response to monetary policy shocks i find that even large deviations from uniform staggering have small effects on the response of output aggregate dynamics in a model of uniform staggering may serve well as an approximation to a more complicated model with some degree of synchronization in price setting

synchronization of price changes by multiproduct firms evidence from canadian newspaper prices abstract using data for canadian daily newspapers we find that price changes of papers owned by the same firm are synchronized on the other hand independently owned newspapers do not appear to change their prices together

limited rationality and strategic complements the implications for macroeconomics this paper considers the implications of heterogeneity in information processing abilities for macroeconomic models that exhibit strategic complements the latter is the same concept that has received much attention in the recent macro literature under the headings keynesian coordination problems and positive trading externalities we consider environments in which agents vary in terms of their ability to form expectations and ask whether it is the sophisticated agents or the naive agents who have a disproportionately large effect on macroeconomic equilibrium we find that if macroeconomic interaction exhibits strategic complementarity then it is the naive agents who have a disproportionate impact

some evidence on the adjustment of producer prices we document producer price adjustment using a low inflation micro price dataset on average 24 of prices adjust each month with an average increase decrease of 6 producer prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices but their size of adjustment is typically smaller sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment is strongly related to heterogeneity in the cost structure fluctuations in aggregate producer price inflation occur to a large extent through variation in the relative share of upward and downward price adjustment

dedicated vs product flexible production technology strategic capacity investment choice this paper studies the optimal investment strategies of an incumbent and a potential entrant that can both choose between a product flexible and dedicated technology in a two product market characterized by uncertain demand the product flexible production technology has certain advantages especially when the economic environment is uncertain on the other hand the dedicated production technology allows a firm to commit to production quantities this gives strategic advantages which can outweigh the value of flexibility it turns out that both firms prefer for some scenarios the dedicated production technology however we find that in a game with sequential technology choices both firms investing dedicated will not be an equilibrium especially when the economic environment is more uncertain the incumbent overinvests in product flexible capacity to force the entrant to choose the dedicated technology then the incumbent is the only firm with the product flexible production technology which results in a high payoff

strategic technology choice and capacity investment under demand uncertainty this paper studies the impact of competition on a firm s choice of technology product flexible or product dedicated and capacity investment decisions specifically we model two firms competing with each other in two markets characterized by price dependent and uncertain demand the firms make three decisions in the following sequence choice of technology technology game capacity investment capacity game and production quantities production game the technology and capacity games occur while the demand curve is still uncertain and the production game is postponed until after the demand curve is revealed we develop best response functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and a duopolist respond to a given flexibility premium we show that the firms may respond to competition by adopting a technology which is the same as or different from what the competitor adopts we conclude that contrary to popular belief flexibility is not always the best response to competition flexible and dedicated technologies may coexist in equilibrium we demonstrate that as the difference between the two market sizes increases a duopolist is willing to pay less for flexible technology whereas the decision of a monopolist is not affected further we find that a firm that invests in flexibility benefits from a low correlation between demands for two products but the extent of this benefit differs depending on the competitor s technology choice our results indicate that higher demand substitution may or may not promote the adoption of flexibility under competition whereas it always facilitates the adoption of flexibility without competition finally we show that contrary to intuition as the competitor s cost of capacity increases the premium a flexible firm is willing to pay for flexibility decreases

reply to do returns policies intensify retail competition returns policies are common in many sectors of retail distribution padmanabhan and png 1997 showed that with demand uncertainty a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions wang 2004 showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive we show that returns policies do increase manufacturer profitability by attenuating retailer price competition when demand is low and intensifying competition when demand is high importantly this effect holds only in the presence of demand uncertainty further the conditions under which a returns policy raises the manufacturer s profit are weaker when retailing is a duopoly than when retailing is a monopoly this suggests that returns policies serve both to manage competition and mitigate demand uncertainty

commodity taxation and parallel imports we examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a two country model with imperfect competition while governments determine non cooperatively their commodity tax rate the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector we compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle we show that as the volume of parallel imports increases non cooperative origin taxes converge while destination taxes diverge moreover origin taxes are more similar and lead to higher aggregate welfare levels than destination taxes

how to escape a declining market capacity investment or exit this paper considers a firm that faces a declining profit stream for its established product the firm has the option to invest in a new technology with which it can produce an innovative product while having the option to exit at any point in time in the presence of an exit option earlier work determined the optimal timing to invest where it was shown that higher uncertainty might accelerate investment timing in the present paper the firm also decides on capacity this extension leads to monotonicity i e higher uncertainty delays investment timing we also find that higher potential profitability of the innovative product market increases the incentive to invest earlier where however we get the counterintuitive result that the firm invests in smaller capacity finally if quantity has a smaller negative effect on price the firm wants to acquire a larger capacity at a lower investment threshold

demand for money and expected inflation the role of the expected rate of inflation in the demand for money has been highly controversial both at the theoretical and the empirical level this note critically discusses these issues and puts forward a hypothesis accounting for the significance of expected inflation in money demand equations which is corroborated by an empirical investigation of the italian experience particularly suited for this specific experiment

entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework this paper examines a dynamic incumbent entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the inverse demand in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly considered we find that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry deterrence is achieved through timing rather than through overinvestment this is because the incumbent invests earlier and in a smaller amount compared to a scenario without potential entry if on the other hand the size of the investment is exogenously given the investment order changes and the entrant invests before the incumbent does

effects of sourcing structure on performance in a multiple product assemble to order supply chain abstract this paper addresses the strategic pricing decisions of a decentralized assemble to order system and the effects of sourcing structure on system performance we consider an assemble to order system consisting of two substitute products and three components manufactured by different suppliers demand for the products is price sensitive the selling prices for the products are jointly determined by firms in the system we study the system under both centralized and decentralized decision making situations for the centralized system we demonstrate that there exists a unique optimal pricing solution for the decentralized system we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium in the players pricing game we further analyze the effects of different sourcing structures on the system performance and the assembler s performance we find that reduction of suppliers in the system does not guarantee improvement of system performance different sourcing structures have different impacts on performance when the two dedicated components are sourced from a single supplier and the common component is sourced from another independent supplier the system and the assembler s performance become worse we show that the decentralized system can be effectively coordinated and the system performance can be improved with a simple profit sharing contract finally we provide comprehensive numerical examples to demonstrate some important managerial insights

capacity optimization under uncertainty the impact of operational time lags time lags in switching operational modes are typical in the manufacturing and power sectors but are not treated in most real options models in this paper we consider a firm that has the opportunity to suspend and to resume production infinitely many times subject to a time lag after each startup decision we contribute to the literature by allowing the firm to determine its level of installed capacity in conjunction with its optimal investment timing we find that an increase in the length of the time lag results in an increase in the optimal capacity level capacity optimization also interacts with the length of the time lag to affect investment timing and the triggers to suspend and resume production thereby weakening the result about hysteresis from a standard real options model under the assumption of a fixed level of capacity a longer lag speeds up the decision to resume operations due to a positive upside to the revenue but delays the suspension of operations by contrast with capacity optimization a longer time lag results in a larger capacity choice which can indirectly delay the investment decision and the timing to resume operations this indirect effect dominates when the level of market uncertainty is low and the time lag is initially small

the value of flexibility in make to order systems the effect of demand correlation we consider a manufacturer of mass customized modular products who orders components under demand uncertainty and sets prices produces to order and trades excess components in a secondary market after this uncertainty is resolved the sequence of events reflects in a parsimonious fashion the considerable reduction in demand uncertainty between the procurement stage and the selling season typical of industries with long supply lead times and short product life cycles we prove that in contrast to conventional wisdom the value of production flexibility and expected profit increase with demand correlation if and only if commonality between the corresponding products does not exceed a threshold we also prove that the value of flexibility and expected profit may each increase or decrease with demand variability depending on demand correlations and component commonalities across the entire product line finally we prove that when demand shocks are independent the optimal product prices are positively correlated if and only if the degree of commonality between the corresponding products exceeds a threshold

demand uncertainty and returns policies manufacturers facing uncertain demand may induce distributors to carry ample stocks of their products by agreeing to accept returns of unsold goods for credit the authors model the manufacturer s decision to accept returns showing that this decision depends crucially on the nature of the demand uncertainty uncertainty over customer arrivals favors returns while uncertainty over consumers valuation of the manufacturer s product leads distributors to set retail prices too high from the manufacturer s standpoint when returns are allowed the authors show that returns can be expected to raise retail prices while maintaining shrinking distributor margins copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

identification and estimation of money demand in most natural sciences physics chemistry biology theories are validated by controlled experiment however in other natural sciences astronomy meteorology and in most social sciences including economics the data are characteristically generated not by experiment but by measurement of uncontrolled systems in economics theories take the form of restrictions on the models assumed to generate the data and statistical methods replace experimental controls in testing these restrictions and here is the difficulty in economics particularly macroeconomics the theory used to derive tests ordinarily does not generate a complete specification of which variables are to be held constant when statistical tests are performed on the relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables of primary interest accordingly in such cases there will be a set of often very different candidate regression based tests each of which has equal status with the others since each is based on a different projection of the same underlying multivariate model except in the unlikely event that the explanatory variables are mutually orthogonal the conditional regression coefficients which generally form the basis for the test statistic will depend on the conditioning set we conclude from this that if a theory which does not generate a complete specification of the regression test is nonetheless to have testable implications these implications must be robust over the permissible alternative specifications if the restrictions indicated by the theory are satisfied in some projections but not in others that have an equal claim to represent implications of the theory one cannot conclude that the theory has been confirmed the fact that the observable implications of valid theories must obtain over a broad but usually incompletely specified set of regressions rather than for a single regression introduces a large and unavoidable element of imprecision into hypothesis testing in macroeconomics generally it appears to be appropriate to weaken the statistical criterion for rejecting theories consider for example the theory of money demand which will engage our attention in this paper the tobin baumol square root formula implies that the elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate is exactly one half but which interest rate should wealth be held constant inflation in view of such uncertainties it would be inappropriate to insist in a literal minded fashion on rejecting the tobin baumol model if in some regression the measured interest elasticity differed from one half by more than two standard deviations and only then obviously a more flexible approach is called for the practice has been to conclude that the statistical evidence is consistent with the tobin baumol model as long as the interest rate coefficient is negative if it is negative and significant or negative and insignificantly different from minus one half that would provide somewhat stronger confirmation but a positive coefficient particularly a significantly positive coefficient would be viewed as raising questions about the validity of the theory in macroeconomics generally as in the money demand application the typical response to specification uncertainty has been to regard a theory as supported if the signs of the estimated coefficients agree with those expected from theory and as disconfirmed otherwise there is no theoretical justification for this procedure but it seems to be a reasonable course to follow the point that economic theory ordinarily generates incompletely specified statistical university of california santa barbara we have received helpful comments from andrew abel robert clower michael darby robert engle stephen goldfeld david laidler edward leamer robert lucas frederic mishkin and edward prescott thomas hall provided able research assistance

on endogenously staggered prices taylor s model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks however in standard imperfect competition models if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions they will typically choose to synchronize this paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition which produces stable staggering our argument relies on strategic interaction at two levels between firms within an industries and across industries and produces a continuum of staggered price equilibria these equilibria are strict and hence stable under a simple adaptive learning process an enduring problem for business cycle theory is an explanation for the persistent effects of nominal shocks explaining persistence is particularly problematic for theories based on nominal shocks as opposed to real shocks this is because rational expectations implies that nominal shocks themselves cannot be serially correlated since nominal shocks are the deviation of realized nominal magnitudes from expected values in two important papers taylor 1979 1980 provided an argument as to why a nominal shock can have persistent effects taylor s argument required two important assumptions first he assumed that firms could adjust prices only in alternate periods an assumption which may be justified by menu or information costs taylor s second assumption was that price setting was staggered half the firms were constrained to adjust prices in odd periods while the other half were allowed to adjust prices in even periods these two assumptions combined to provide dramatic results on nominal inertia the adjustment of prices to a nominal shock is slow and hence output effects are long lasting taylor s results on persistence arise due to strategic complementarity between price setting decisions this implies that each firm s optimal price is an increasing function of the aggregate price level if a shock arrives in an even period firms in the even cohort will not adjust fully to the nominal shock since firms in the odd cohort have fixed prices in the current period furthermore with rational expectations the even cohort also takes into account the fact that its own failure to adjust fully will also make for partial adjustment in future periods this elegant story has made taylor s model possibly the most influential of new keynesian models by providing a dynamic setting within which small nominal rigidities may result in persistent nominal inertia