are firms successful at selective hedging we analyze the corporate risk management policies of 44 companies in the gold mining industry firms tend to decrease hedging as prices move against them behavior contrary to that predicted by risk management theory these results along with new survey evidence suggest that firms attempt to time market prices so called selective hedging although estimates show a statistically significant ability of producers to favorably adjust hedge ratios this can be attributed to sample specific negative autocorrelation in gold prices economic gains to selective hedging are small and no evidence suggests that selective hedging leads to superior operating or financial performance

hedging and coordinated risk management evidence from thrift conversions we provide an explanation for hedging as a means of allocating rather than reducing risk we argue that when increases in total risk are costly firms optimally allocate risk by reducing increasing exposure to risks that provide zero positive economic rents our evidence shows that mutual thrifts that convert to stock institutions increase total risk following conversion consistent with their increased abilities and incentives for risk taking they achieve this increase by hedging interest rate risk and increasing credit risk we provide some evidence that risk management activities are related to growth capacity and management compensation structure attained at conversion

habit formation in consumer preferences evidence from panel data this paper tests for the presence of habit formation using household data a simple model of habit formation implies a condition relating the strength of habits to the evolution of consumption over time when the condition is estimated with food consumption data from the panel study on income dynamics the results yield no evidence of habit formation at the annual frequency this finding is robust to a number of changes in the specification it also holds for several proxies for nondurables and services consumption created by combining psid variables with weights estimated from consumer expenditure survey data

asymmetric reduced form auctions this paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions using this auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only this allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

the structure and incentive effects of corporate tax liabilities this paper describes situations in which tax liabilities assume the form of a negative position in a call option this structure motivates an examination of the investment decisions of taxed corporations in the presence of risk it is shown that the structure of the tax liability creates an incentive to underinvest in more risky projects and an incentive for conglomerate merger these effects are then evaluated in the presence of conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders and under alternative assumptions about the tax code and about the timing of investment and financing decisions this paper makes an observation regarding the functional form assumed by the tax liabilities of corporations with potentially redundant deductions and evaluates its consequences for investment incentives interest and other deductions against taxable income can be taken for the most part only to the extent of that income in a single period model this gives the net tax liability a familiar structure it can be viewed as a call option where the exercise price on the call is the allowable deductions the tax paying entity holds a positive position in the assets which generate the taxable income and a negative position in a call option on those assets the analogy between options and the structure of tax liabilities calls attention to some interesting incentive effects concerning risk using their model of option valuation black and scholes 5 showed that the value of an option is increasing in the variance of the asset it is written on other authors have generalized this result and studied its implications for corporate financing see jagannathan 16 jensen and meckling 17 and green 15 the importance of the risk attributes of the underlying asset in option valuation suggests that taxation may have important incentive consequences for investment decisions involving risk it has been recognized in the public economics literature for some time that asymmetries in the tax schedule can affect risk taking behavior early papers by mossin 20 and stiglitz 25 studied individual portfolio decisions over a riskless and a risky asset our analysis differs from these in a number of respects the most important of these is our use of market valuation rather than expected utility in the decision maker s objective function this is surely a more appropri

risk preferences in multi period consumption models the equity premium puzzle and habit formation utility abstract the relationship between the relative risk aversion measure for the utility function for consumption and that for the value function for wealth is a derived relationship whose properties depend on how consumption and wealth are defined and measured this fact together with information concerning estimates for these two relative risk aversion measures is used to give another perspective on the equity premium puzzle and to explain why it is that the habit formation utility function is effective in eliminating that puzzle a time separable utility function that can serve as an alternative to the assumption of habit formation is also presented

optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers abstract we study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers they cannot pay more than their budget regardless of their valuation both valuation and budget are private information we derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting we show an implementation via a modified all pay auction the highest bidder need not win the good outright or stated differently the auction has pooling despite the usual regularity conditions subsidizing low budget buyers cannot increase revenue from a technical standpoint we contribute to auction design with multidimensional private information by working directly with reduced form allocation rules

on the asset substitution problem in their seminal paper modigliani and miller 11 12 demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions furthermore if capital markets are perfect stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm see 6 motivated by this assumption the firm has been viewed as a black box namely as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value however in a growing body of recent literature see 1 2 7 9 13 and 14 researchers recognize that the firm in an imperfect capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can and do conflict jensen and meckling 9 study the roles of three important groups the owner manager the stockholders and the bondholders focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them they provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts

corporate risk management and the incentive effects of debt this paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets commonly referred to as the asset substitution problem is related to the level of observable risk in the firm when observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated increases decreases in observable risk generate the incentive for manager equityholders to increase decrease unobservable risk thus credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm s manager equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt this provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level in the last few years a sizeable literature has emerged which is devoted to explaining how shareholders can benefit from hedging undertaken by the firm such hedging may include the purchase of insurance the use of financial futures and options and even diversification at the level of the firm four lines of reasoning have been pursued in the literature smith and stulz 1985 and campbell and kracaw 1987 rely on the fact that under optimal contracting between managers and shareholders managers are less diversified than are shareholders hedging by the firm which reduces the manager s exposure to risk can improve on the optimal compensation contract between the manager and equityholders this argument may be applied to a firm with any capital structure or any degree of leverage the other arguments apply to firms which are financed with risky debt smith and stulz show that hedging may be useful in reducing expected bankruptcy costs they also show as does macminn 1985 that hedging by the firm may reduce the probability that depreciation tax shields may be lost due to financial distress finally diamond 1984 has shown that monitoring costs may be reduced through diversification macminn s result is of particular interest part of his analysis is based on an earlier paper by green and talmor 1985 which demonstrates that the equityholders of a levered firm will have an incentive to underinvest in risky assets if the firm cannot capture its interest and depreciation tax shields with certainty in green and talmor s analysis the firm has no mechanism to reduce or hedge the uncertainty surrounding its tax shields other than to alter its investment decisions however as macminn argues if the firm is allowed to hedge its risks

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

expo power utility a flexible form for absolute and relative risk aversion a new utility function which i call expo power is proposed that exhibits decreasing constant or increasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing or increasing relative risk aversion depending on parameter values numerical analysis suggests that the expo power function performs well in incorporating these risk preference structures and that arbitrary risk preference specifications may lead to biased risk response estimates

weak cartels and collusion proof auctions abstract we study private value auctions in which bidders may collude without using side payments in our model bidders coordinate their actions to achieve an outcome that interim pareto dominates the noncooperative outcome we characterize auctions that are collusion proof in the sense that no such coordination opportunities exist and show that the efficient and revenue maximizing auctions are not collusion proof unless all bidders exhibit a concave distribution of valuations we then solve for revenue maximizing collusion proof auctions if distributions of valuations are symmetric and single peaked the optimal selling mechanism is a standard auction with a minimum bid followed by sequential negotiation in case no bidder bids above the minimum bid

asset substitution and the agencycosts of debt financing agency costs of debt have been advanced in the literature as an important consideration foroptimal corporate debt policies recently there have been some doubts concerning the theoretical foundations of the notion that these costs increase as the firm employs more debt in this paper we examine explicitly the incentive for asset substitution by solving endogenously for the optimal risk policy the results support the notion that more debt aggravates shareholders incentives to take risk we also investigate the marginal agency cost function and discuss conditions for interior optimal capital structure

solving consumption models with multiplicative habits this paper provides derivations necessary for solving an optimal consumption problem with multiplicative habits and a crra outer utility function either for a microeconomic problem with both labor income risk and rate of return risk or for a macroeconomic representative agent model

optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize the prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim if the number of agents is large the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist when the number of agents is small the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim but restricts the range of claims above and below

decreasing relative risk aversion risk sharing and the permanent income hypothesis this article develops a method for testing the risk sharing hypothesis rsh against various versions of the permanent income hypothesis pih while allowing for heterogeneity in risk preferences across households using 1 year and longer differences in household total nondurable consumption data from indian villages we find evidence that favors the rsh over the pih at the village level

forward markets stock markets and the theory of the firm this paper models a competitive financial market economy in which there are forward markets as well as stock and bond markets although there are separation theorems in the stock and forward markets literatures this analysis shows that neither separation theorem survives in this integrated financial market economy next the analysis shows that the separation results hold and are equivalent if the manager has an appropriate compensation package then the model is modified to allow for depreciation charges and tax credits a positive theory of hedging is developed that shows that the corporation can preserve deductions and credits by hedging and so increase corporate value the theory of the firm under uncertainty has been developed along seemingly independent lines in the literature on stock market economies and the literature on forward market economies there are some interesting parallels but apparently no financial market model also incorporates forward markets some of the models in the two literatures may be viewed as extensions of the theory of the competitive firm under uncertainty developed by both baron 1 and sandmo 13 in each literature the firm manager s optimal production decision may be characterized as the production level at which expected price equals marginal cost plus a marginal risk premium each literature contains a separation theorem in the stock market literature we have the unanimity theorem which shows that stockholders will agree on the optimal production level despite different probability beliefs and attitudes toward risk in a competitive stock market economy this result is equivalent to all stockholders agreeing that the firm should maximize corporate value since any competitive firm s manager finds it in his or her own best interests to maximize corporate value despite his or her probability beliefs and attitude toward risk the unanimity theorem is a separation theorem in the forward market literature we have a separation theorem that shows that any firm manager will select the production level at which the forward price equals marginal cost again despite his or her probability beliefs and attitude toward risk 2 the purpose of this paper is to investigate the theory of the competitive firm in a financial market economy characterized by stock bond and forward markets although one might expect the separation results of the two literatures to survive this generalization we show that they do not we go on to show that

asset pricing with multiplicative habit and power expo preferences abstract multiplicative habit introduces an additional consumption risk as a determinant of the equity premium and allows time preference and habit strength in addition to risk aversion to affect the price of risk a model combining multiplicative habit and power expo preferences cannot be rejected

consumption and portfolio choice under internal multiplicative habit formation this paper explores the optimal consumption and investment behavior of an individual who derives utility from the ratio between his consumption and an endogenous habit we obtain closed form policies under general utility functionals and stochastic investment opportunities by developing a nontrivial linearization to the budget constraint this enables us to explicitly characterize how habit formation affects the marginal propensity to consume and optimal stock bond investments we also show that in a setting that combines habit formation with epstein zin utility consumption no longer grows at unrealistically high rates at high ages and investments in risky assets decrease

decreasing relative risk aversion and tests of risk sharing the relative risk aversion rra coefficient of a household whose consumption is close to the subsistence level may be very high for example if consumption is exactly at the subsistence level the household may not be willing to bear any risk if this is the case then the rra coefficient must be a decreasing function of wealth for poor households therefore we should allow the possibility of decreasing rra drra in testing the full risk sharing hypothesis however existing tests in the empirical literature are derived using preferences that exhibit either increasing or constant rra even when they are applied to data containing low income households we therefore use a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility which implies increasing constant and decreasing rra as special cases to test full risk sharing hypothesis using the international food policy research institute ifpri and the international crops research institute of the semi arid tropics icrisat household level data sets we find evidence in support of the drra hypothesis along with evidence favoring full risk sharing hypothesis at the village level and evidence against the hypothesis at the inter village level when rra is restricted to be constant we replicate the previous results in the literature reject the full risk sharing hypothesis at both levels our tests however reject this restriction and favor drra in almost all cases these results suggest that it is important to allow for drra in testing the full risk sharing hypothesis when data containing low income households are investigated this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

efficient sourcing and debt financing in imperfect product markets supplier relations play an important role in determining a firm s product market strategy and position by affecting the cost and quality of the product produced by the firm these relations are especially significant because the cost of purchased materials for an average firm is more than half its total sales in this paper we model the adverse incentives of a firm that sources from a competitive supplier industry we show that a firm s propensity to behave opportunistically towards its suppliers raises the firm s input costs by decreasing the number of suppliers servicing it this results in a suboptimal production decision compared to the firm s first best choice we argue that an appropriate level of debt financing alters the shareholder incentives and mitigates the hold up problem further we also show that at the optimal debt level the firm produces its first best level of output

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

debt maturity and the cost of bank loans abstract this study explores the extent to which a firm s debt maturity structure affects the cost of bank loans by examining the u s syndicated loans from 1990 and 2014 we find that debt maturity structure is a major determinant of loan spreads after accounting for firm and loan specific variables and firm and year fixed effects a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of short term debt to total assets is associated with an increase of 11 44 basis points in loan spread representing an additional 0 644 million in interest expenses the results support the rollover risk hypothesis which predicts that short term debts intensify the shareholder and bondholder conflicts and lead to greater credit risk in addition high growth firms experience significantly smaller increases in their loan spreads than low growth firms when the short term debt ratio increases this finding is consistent with the asset substitution theory that short term debt mitigates the managerial shareholders risk taking incentives leading to a decrease in firm risk our results remain strong when we use alternative short term debt proxies address endogeneity concerns and perform various robustness tests

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space