the optimal auction a mechanism for optimal third degree price discrimination abstract recently bulow and roberts have indicated that there is a close correspondence between the optimal auction mechanism introduced by myerson and the problem of a monopolist practising third degree price discrimination in several markets they find differences however in the choice variables and in the constraints of the two problems a reinterpretation of the price discrimination problem leads to the demonstration that an optimal auction is an optimal way to practise price discimination

on the optimality of treasury bill auctions in this paper we examine a stylized version of treasury bill auctions we show that if bidders are uncertain about the total amount being sold as in actual tbill auctions there is a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium in this equilibrium the seller s revenue is maximized

effect of information feedback on bidder behavior in continuous combinatorial auctions combinatorial auctions in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods can increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities recent theoretical developments have lessened the computational complexity of these auctions but the issue of cognitive complexity remains an unexplored barrier for the online marketplace this study uses a data driven approach to explore how bidders react to the complexity in such auctions using three experimental feedback treatments using cluster analyses of the bids and the clicks generated by bidders we find three stable bidder strategies across the three treatments further these strategies are robust for separate experiments using a different setup we also benchmark the continuous auctions against an iterative form of combinatorial auction the combinatorial clock auction the enumeration of the bidding strategies across different types of feedback along with the analysis of their economic implications is offered to help practitioners design better combinatorial auction environments this paper was accepted by lorin hitt information systems

multiple round timber auction design and simulation this paper presents a multiple round timber auction simulation developed in order to study various configurations of auction design in this study simultaneous sequential timber auctions are modelled and analysed using agent based simulation technology as there are many individual items in the auction to be sold the auction designer defines several rounds that are sequential at pre defined intervals at each round the auction designer announces several simultaneous auctions since bidders are offered different items at each round a mathematical linear programing model for selecting the best set of items to bid for is presented different bidding patterns are simulated and compared in various setup configurations the most advanced of these strategies are adaptive and use agent learning capability the comparisons include the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3 this study suggests an efficient bidding pattern for bidders to bid in order to achieve to their goal and increase their profit similarly in order to increase profit the auctioneer i e the government needs to control several auction parameters including the number of auctions per year the lot size the auction periodicity and the number of bidders this study also suggests parameters configurations that to maximise revenue for the auctioneer

the probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties this paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently the empirical analysis considers both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the guide price reserve and opening bid the findings highlight that the final achieved sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself factors such as auction participation the number of individual bidders and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications

workers remittances and the equilibrium real exchange rate theory and evidence economic integration in the early twenty first century is coninternational ventionally thought of in terms of increased openness to trade in goods and services as well as a dramatic increase in the volume of capital flows the twenty first century experience is sometimes contrasted with that of the last wave of globalization at the end of the nineteenth century when increased integration in both of those dimensions was also accompanied by large waves of international migration however this contrast is probably overdrawn as increases in international flows of labor services have also been characteristic of the current wave of globalization and the impact of these factor movements is increasingly being felt in the international economy a particularly dramatic manifestation of this fact is the sharp recorded increase in flows of worker remittances to the large number of developing countries that have been the source of these flows of labor services in recent years many such countries have witnessed significant increases in remittance flows to the point that their scale has come to dwarf that of other types of resource inflows whether development assistance foreign direct investment or other types of capital flows in 2007 remittance flows to sub saharan africa were equal in magnitude to flows of official development assistance for example remittance flows now account for some 17 percent of gdp and 77 percent of exports in el salvador and over 20 percent of gdp and nearly 50 percent of exports in honduras in these countries remittance flows are more than five times larger than foreign direct investment flows unlike capital flows remittances do not entail the creation of external debt with future repayment obligations unlike foreign development assistance they do not come encumbered with a variety of political and economic conditions with which the recipient country must comply despite these virtues however large inflows of worker remittances have been perceived as posing 45

uniform vs discriminatory auctions with variable supply experimental evidence in the variable supply auction considered here the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids bidders are uncertain about the seller s cost we experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting exactly as predicted by theory it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller furthermore again as predicted by theory the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions which makes it also the more efficient auction format

incentives and the efficiency of public sector outsourcing contracts abstract outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations despite its prevalence there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude and determinants of expected cost savings to the government nor the sources of those savings this article considers the arguments for and against outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time in addition we examine the existing evidence for the redistribution hypothesis and the quality shading hypothesis which critics have used to argue that outsourcing lowers government expenditure by lowering wages and conditions and or lower quality services finally we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes while the power of incentives is a strong theme in economics recent work has suggested that high powered incentives may be suboptimal for many public sector services because they may crowd out intrinsic motivation particularly in instances where agents are highly motivated we discuss the implications of this insight for the efficiency of public sector outsourcing

remittances and the dutch disease phenomenon evidence from the bounds error correction modelling and a panel space remittances have grown in size and importance they are also among the most stable inflows of scarce foreign exchange for the developing world while such inflows can boost economic growth they ca

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

a test that discriminates between two models of the dutch first auction non isomorphism abstract previous experiments reject the hypothesis that the dutch and first auctions are isomorphic two alternatives to the standard normal form analysis of the dutch auction are formalized 1 bidders violate bayes rule 2 bidders experience a utility of suspense that is additive with the utility of monetary reward paired comparisons of bidding behavior between groups in which the treatment is to triple the payoff of the baseline group yields no significant effect of this treatment we therefore reject the utility of suspense model

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management we analyze a dynamic auction in which a seller withc units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated intot time periods each group of buyers has independent private values for a single unit buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with buyers in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller the number of buyers in each period as well as the individual buyers valuations are random the model is a variation of the traditional single leg multiperiod revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time for this setting we prove that dynamic variants of the first price and second price auction mechanisms maximize the seller s expected revenue we also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal auctions the optimal auctions are then compared to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which list prices are used in each period together with capacity controls and to a simple auction heuristic that consists of allocating units to each period and running a sequence of standard multiunit auctions with fixed reserve prices in each period the traditional revenue management mechanism is proven to be optimal in the limiting cases when there is at most one buyer per period when capacity is not constraining and asymptotically when the number of buyers and the capacity increases the optimal auction significantly outperforms both suboptimal mechanisms when there are a moderate number of periods capacity is constrained and the total volume of sales is not too large the benefit also increases when variability in the dispersion in buyers valuations or in the number of buyers per period increases

a dual dutch auction in taipei the choice of numeraire and auction form in multi object auctions with bundling abstract in taipei we observed a dual dutch fish auction like a conventional dutch auction with bundling but with reversed roles of price and quantity we study dual and conventional auctions with symmetric independent private values when agents utilities are linear in money but strictly concave in fish with known buyers values conventional and dual auctions english or dutch are equivalent with values known to buyers but not the seller the seller prefers conventional auctions with private values the seller can prefer a dual dutch or a conventional english or dutch auction but prefers all three to a dual english auction

the effects of information transparency on suppliers manufacturers and consumers in online markets this paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading environment we study these effects in business to business electronic markets with firms competing in both upstream and downstream industries the prior literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm buyer or the upstream firm seller is a monopoly it is not clear whether information transparency would still create value if both buyers and sellers face oligopolistic competition where the benefits of information transparency could be competed away to answer this question we first develop a simple two echelon e market model and then extend the model to more general settings we find that information transparency can create value for the overall e market yet it affects buyers and sellers very differently one side will be hurt depending on the competition mode cournot or bertrand in the downstream this suggests that a manufacturer owned a supplier owned and a neutral e market will have different preferences for information transparency finally we find that information transparency can hurt consumers when the downstream industry engages in bertrand competition this is a surprising result given the expectation that online markets create substantial value for consumers

costly bidding in online markets for it services internet enabled markets are becoming viable venues for procurement of professional services we investigate bidding behavior within the most active area of these early knowledge markets the market for software development these markets are important both because they provide an early view of the effectiveness of online service markets and because they have a potentially large impact on how software development services are procured and provided using auction theory we develop a theoretical model that relates market characteristics to bidding and transaction behavior taking into account costly bidding we then test our model using data from an active online market for software development services which yields contracts for 30 40 of posted projects in its current format however the studied market may induce excessive bidding by vendors consistent with our theoretical predictions and those of carr 2003 higher value projects attract significantly more bids with lower average quality greater numbers of bids raise the cost to all participants due to costly bidding and bid evaluation perhaps as a consequence higher value projects are also much less likely to be awarded

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

assessing the performance of conservation auctions an experimental study this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results we find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed price programs only in the one shot setting with repetition the auctions quickly lose their edge the budget constrained auction performs similarly to the target constrained in the one shot setting but appears more robust to repetition our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic and we propose a method for improving such estimates

comprehensive bidding strategies with genetic programming finite state automata this research is an extension of the authors previous work in double auctions aimed at developing bidding strategies for electric utilities which trade electricity competitively the improvements detailed in this paper come from using data structures which combine genetic programming and finite state automata termed gp automata the strategies developed by the method described here are adaptive reacting to inputs whereas the previously developed strategies were only suitable in the particular scenario for which they had been designed the strategies encoded in the gp automata are tested in an auction simulator the simulator pits them against other distribution companies distcos and generation companies gencos buying and selling power via double auctions implemented in regional commodity exchanges the gp automata are evolved with a genetic algorithm so that they possess certain characteristics in addition to designing successful bidding strategies whose usage would result in higher profits the resulting strategies can also be designed to imitate certain types of trading behaviors the resulting strategies can be implemented directly in online trading or can be used as realistic competitors in an off line trading simulator

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

genetic algorithm evolution of utility bidding strategies for the competitive marketplace this paper describes an environment in which distribution companies discos and generation companies gencos buy and sell power via double auctions implemented in a regional commodity exchange the electric utilities profits depend on the implementation of a successful bidding strategy in this research a genetic algorithm evolves bidding strategies as gencos and discos trade power a framework in which bidding strategies may be tested and modified is presented this simulated electric commodity exchange can be used offline to predict whether bid strategies will be profitable and successful it can also be used to experimentally verify how bidding behavior affects the competitive electric marketplace

shared agents and competition in laboratory english auctions at livestock auctions the same purchasing agent can represent more than one processor repeated multiple unit english auctions are created in a laboratory to measure the impact of shared agents on trade prices under alternative treatments with six and as few as two agents representing six principals treatments are constructed in which the agents either know or do not know quantity for sale and in which there are progressively fewer agents bidding knowledge of quantity for sale can be anticompetitive evolution toward increased market concentration leads to consistent anticompetitive pricing resulting in prices significantly lower than the predicted competitive equilibrium prices

collusion in uniform price auctions experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions in uniform price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction we provide experimental evidence that in uniform price auctions non binding pre play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes on the other hand regardless of the opportunities for communication in discriminatory auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule this evidence suggests that uniform price auctions of treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure

the j curve a literature review due to lag structure currency devaluation is said to worsen the trade balance first and improve it later resulting in a pattern that resemble the letter j hence the j curve phenomenon since its introduction by magee in 1973 brooking papers on economic activity 1 pp 303 25 a large number of studies have attempted to test the phenomenon using different techniques and different model specifications the results are at best ambiguous and deserve to be collected together for the future generation of researchers and graduate students this paper fills such a vacuum in the literature by reviewing the j curve related empirical papers

workers remittances and the real exchange rate a paradox of gifts abstract we test the impact of workers remittances on the real exchange rate using a panel of 13 latin american and caribbean countries the analysis reveals that workers remittances have the potential to inflict economic costs on the export sector of receiving countries by reducing its international competitiveness our findings raise concerns parallel to those raised by dutch disease or resource boom models where resource discoveries result in real exchange rate appreciation and shifting of resources from the traded to the nontraded sectors of the economy

common value auctions with discrete private information abstract a first price sealed bid common value auction with finite valued conditionally independent private information is studied we show that the equilibrium in this auction game is characterized by all bidders using a symmetric mixed strategy in which bids are randomized over intervals that are successive and non overlapping for consecutively indexed signals we also show that as the number of bidders grows the winning bid conditional on the true value of the object converges to a non degenerate random variable that is affiliated with the true value therefore only partial information revelation is achieved in the limit

auctions with a buy price the case of reference dependent preferences abstract in an auction with a buy price the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price this paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction s reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price the model both explains why a revenue maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders reference price through the auction s reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders reference price through the auction s reserve price only the comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction s buy price have no effect on bidding behavior

regionalism and the bias against agriculture in less developed countries panel survey data play a crucial role in producing estimates on welfare dynamics as well as insights into transformation processes in developing economies panel survey data are indispensable for effective policy advice for poverty reduction and growth fielding and maintaining a good quality panel survey requires investment in financial and technical resources as well as careful planning especially in developing countries statistical techniques can also be employed to produce estimates on poverty dynamics as an alternative methodology but a new hybrid approach can combine the advantages of both methods

the role of dutch auctions and lotteries in shaping the art market s of 17th century holland abstract this article examines institution formation in the nascent art markets of 17th century amsterdam and haarlem in response to external and internal pressures on artists guilds in amsterdam poor quality imports often copies were touted as originals and sold in clandestine dutch auctions the deliberate confusion about quality imparted to the market features similar to those of akerlof s lemons model and a need for quality guarantees gave occasion to dealers in haarlem and other towns demand was viewed as fixed and guilds toughened restrictions on the supply side dissenters successfully used lotteries to show that demand can be engendered promotion was to become a key feature of later art markets

auctions with endogenous quantity this article studies auctions in which several sellers compete for the right to sell to a market characterized by a negatively sloped demand curve in this environment the quantity traded becomes endogenous this effect leads to three results concerning the outcomes of open versus first price sealed bid auctions first an open auction yields a higher expected price than does sealed bidding second and more important the open auction captures less of the potential gains from trade than does the sealed bid auction third for broad classes of demand curves the efficiency gains from switching to sealed bids from an open auction accrue to both sellers and the buyer so that all concerned parties would agree to the change a direct application of the theory is to procurement the heavy use of sealed bidding in procurement is seen as rational in light of these results auction models with endogenous quantity could be an alternative to price setting oligopoly models for the study of price formation in general for the latter impose strong information requirements on agents and yield only equilibrium price vectors not equilibrium processes for determining prices

do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries summary few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in the developing world this paper fills this lacuna by constructing and analyzing a new data set on international migration remittances inequality and poverty from 71 developing countries the results show that both international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level depth and severity of poverty in the developing world after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration and controlling for various factors results suggest that on average a 10 increase in the share of international migrants in a country s population will lead to a 2 1 decline in the share of people living on less than 1 00 per person per day after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances a similar 10 increase in per capita official international remittances will lead to a 3 5 decline in the share of people living in poverty

the effectiveness of english auctions abstract we study the performance of the english auction under different assumptions about the seller s degree of bayesian sophistication we define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation total surplus we identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the english auction for general private values environments and for private values environments where bidders valuations are non negatively correlated for example when the seller faces 12 bidders who the seller believes have non negatively correlated valuations whose expectations are at least as high as 60 of the maximal possible valuation an english auction with no reserve price generates an expected price that is more than 80 of the value of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation

modeling and analysis of an auction based logistics market we consider a logistics spot market where the transportation orders from a number of firms are matched with two types of carriers through a reverse auction in the spot market local carriers compete with in transit carriers that have lower costs in order to analyze the effects of implementing a logistics spot market on these three parties firms local carriers and in transit carriers and also the effects of various system parameters we develop a two stage stochastic model we first model the auction in a static setting and determine the expected auction price based on the number of carriers engaging in the auction and their cost distributions we then develop a continuous time markov chain model to evaluate the performance of the system in a dynamic setting with random arrivals and possible abandonment of orders and carriers by combining these two models we evaluate the performance measures such as the expected auction price price paid to the carriers distribution of orders between local and in transit carriers and expected number of carriers and orders waiting at the logistics center in the long run we present analytical and computational results related to the performance of the system and discuss operation of such a logistics spot market in turkey

regulatory reform in european banking abstract a stylized model of the role of banks in a context of imperfect financial markets where the potential for market failure exists is proposed the specificity of banking is analyzed and the need of regulation explained the study of regulatory responses highlights the importance of their associated side effects particular attention is devoted to the interaction of regulation and competition in a strategic context the effects of deregulation and european integration of financial markets on banking competition are dealt with in the proposed framework

remittances and competitiveness the case of the philippines summary the paper looks at the impact of migration and workers remittances on the competitiveness of the home economy it extends existing research that concentrated on the exchange rate effects of remittances the so called dutch disease effect by adding labor market effects the results show that the labor market effects of emigration and remittances have a significant impact on competitiveness that goes beyond the traditional exchange rate effect

a laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non point source pollution auctions allow regulators to identify land management changes with substantial environmental benefit and low opportunity cost this paper reports an experiment in which seller subjects compete in sealed offer auctions to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the experimenter regulator to subsidize pollution abatement one treatment employs uniform price auction rules whereas another treatment employs discriminative price auction rules we find that most offers in the uniform price auction are within 2 of cost whereas most offers in the discriminative price auction are at least 8 greater than cost nevertheless the discriminativeprice auction has superior overall market performance

hedging winner s curse with multiple bids evidence from the portuguese treasury bill auction auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price quantity bids despite the widespread adoption of this institutional feature and its use by bidders the motivations behind its use and its effects on auction outcomes are not well understood theoretically and have been little explored empirically this paper proposes that bidders use multiple bids to adjust for winner s curse by spreading her bids a bidder aligns her outcome more closely to the aggregate outcome of the auction this hypothesis is tested using bidding data from treasury bill auctions in portugal i find that ceteris paribus a bidder submits a greater number of bids and disperses prices on these bids more widely when there is a greater potential for winner s curse in particular both these measures of bid spreading increase with the volatility of market interest rates and the expected number of participating well informed bidders

analysis and design of business to consumer online auctions business to consumer online auctions form an important element in the portfolio of mercantile processes that facilitate electronic commerce activity much of traditional auction theory has focused on analyzing single item auctions in isolation from the market context in which they take place we demonstrate the weakness of such approaches in online settings where a majority of auctions are multiunit in nature rather than pursuing a classical approach and assuming knowledge of the distribution of consumers valuations we emphasize the largely ignored discrete and sequential nature of such auctions we derive a general expression that characterizes the multiple equilibria that can arise in such auctions and segregate these into desirable and undesirable categories our analytical and empirical results obtained by tracking real world online auctions indicate that bid increment is an important factor amongst the control factors that online auctioneers can manipulate and control we show that consumer bidding strategies in such auctions are not uniform and that the level of bid increment chosen influences them with a motive of providing concrete strategic directions to online auctioneers we derive an absolute upper bound for the bid increment based on the theoretical upper bound we propose a heuristic decision rule for setting the bid increment empirical evidence lends support to the hypothesis that setting a bid increment higher than that suggested by the heuristic decision rule has a negative impact on the auctioneer s revenue

sequential auctions with delay costs a two period model we examine the outcome of a two round second price auction of stochastically equivalent objects where players face delay costs if they decide to stay for the subsequent round in our model agents decide whether to stay for the next round after seeing their valuations for the good we describe an equilibrium involving a screening level such that only those bidders with values bigger than that amount decide to stay for the last period we also provide an example where expected prices are decreasing

auction design for the allocation of emission permits in the presence of market power to the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms this has been done using a sealed bid auction design typically with discriminatory prices however several authors have recommended the ascending auction format basically two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested the standard ascending auction with clock or demand schedules or an alternative ascending clock implementation of vickrey pricing the latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed bid and the standard ascending auction format the purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms the auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated in this setting it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design the alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits thus increasing the competitor s costs leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy

does urgency affect price at market an analysis of u s treasury short term finance like all economic agents government must actively manage its cash position in order to meet obligations in the u s when the short term cash position is not adequate treasury offers bills that are not previously scheduled cash management bills using data from treasury s proprietary domestic finance database this paper finds unscheduled bills have consistently higher yields than normally scheduled bills suggesting the more inelastic demand represented by this type of finance has an impact on costs several factors are identified which contribute to the costs of cash management for treasury

auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication abstract this paper examines the feasibility of collusive mechanisms in single unit auctions a model is constructed with private and common value information asymmetry and continuous type space we show that an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism bcm does not exist if common value uncertainty is present this result contradicts actual antitrust cases where common effects or resale opportunities created uncertainty about valuations but a price fixing cartel was formed we solve the puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all bidder types truthfully reveal their private information the introduced bayesian bid coordination mechanism bbcm exists if the main source of information asymmetry is private value in that case a designated ring member can signal high valuation and suppress competition our results demonstrate the rationale behind cartel mechanisms with pre auction knockouts

dea based auctions we discuss the design of a multi dimensional procurement mechanism that combines data envelopment analysis dea and auction theory the mechanism selects an agent to provide a project characterized by multiple attributes the optimal configuration of the multiple attributes is settled endogenously by trading off the costs to the provider with the benefits to the acquirer this is done within a context of asymmetric information and strategic behavior as well as possibly correlated costs the mechanism makes it individually rational and incentive compatible to participate and reveal costs and the outcome is socially optimal allocatively efficient

multi criteria auctions without full comparability of bids the emergence of auction mechanisms that support bids characterized by several attributes is one of the most recent evolutions within auction theory these mechanisms referred to as multi attribute multiple issue or multi dimensional auctions are at the intersection between multi criteria decision and auction theories the purpose of this paper is to introduce multi criteria auctions the originality of which is not to require full comparability between bids we claim that this distinctive feature is of great interest especially in procurement situations furthermore the existence of potential incomparability between multi dimensional offers will permit us to manage different bidding niches coexisting within the same bidding space a theoretical framework based on a general preference structure will be introduced and then referenced to existing approaches such as multi attribute auctions or new ones such as dominance based multi criteria auctions or butterfly auctions

booming sector and de industrialisation in a small open economy this paper presents a theoretical analysis of the dutch disease the phenomenon whereby a boom in one traded goods sector squeezes porfitability in other traded goods sectors both by directly bi

divisible good auctions with asymmetric information an experimental examination an experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good in a symmetric information environment the different auction formats provide the same average revenue however when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform price auction the volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform price auctions in all treatments the results therefore provide support for the use of the discriminatory format subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior

the outsourcing of r d through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry abstract we examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns these returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position a unique desperation index is employed to determine the current status of a firm s internal productivity we find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines

the design of auctions and tenders with quality thresholds the symmetric case three designs of auctions with quality thresholds are considered the quality threshold is not known with certainty by the bidders in one scheme quality plans submitted by potential bidders are evaluated first and price bids for only those plans which have been approved are invited the second scheme has price bids first to yield a priority for scrutinising quality a third has simultaneous decisions on price and quality the model yields an equivalence result the use of reserve prices to produce social optimality is then investigated the theory is used to discuss the recent auction for uk television franchises

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

a profit based unit commitment ga for the competitive environment as the electrical industry restructures many of the traditional algorithms for controlling generating units need modification or replacement previously utilized to schedule generation units in a manner that minimizes costs while meeting all demand the unit commitment uc algorithm must be updated a uc algorithm that maximizes profit will play an essential role in developing successful bidding strategies for the competitive generator simply bidding to win contracts is insufficient bidding strategies must result in contracts that on average cover the total generation costs no longer guaranteed to be the only electricity supplier a generation company s share of the demand will be more difficult to predict than in the past removing the obligation to serve softens the demand constraint in this paper the authors provide a price profit based uc formulation which considers the softer demand constraint and allocates fixed and transitional costs to the scheduled hours the authors describe a genetic algorithm solution to this new uc problem and present results for an illustrative example

agricultural incentives in developing countries measuring the effect of sectoral and economywide policies the impact of sector specific direct and economywide indirect policies on agricultural incentives for 18 developing countries for the period 1975 84 are estimated the direct effect is measured by the proportional difference between the producer price and the border price adjusting for distribution storage transport and other marketing costs the indirect effect has two components 1 the impact of the unsustainable portion of the current account deficit and of industrial protection policies on the real exchange rate and thus on the price of agricultural commodities relative to nonagricultural nontradables and 2 the impact of industrial protection policies on the relative price of agricultural commodities to that of nonagricultural tradable goods the authors found that a in almost all cases the direct effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for importables b the indirect effect also taxes agriculture and dominates the direct effect and c the direct policies for both importables and exportables stabilize domestic producer prices

quality incentives in auctions for construction contracts construction projects are frequently awarded on the basis of auctions the winning project is selected not only on the basis of price but also a variety of quality characteristics coming up with a high quality project may require substantial up front investments this paper studies the relative weight the auctioneer should attach to quality when selecting the winning project it is shown that the optimal weight may be substantially higher than his own marginal utility of quality as a result it may be quite difficult to detect favouritism in the process of selecting the winner

rural nonagricultural activities in development theory and application abstract this paper focusses on the potentially important role of rural nonagricultural activity in the development process using the hymer resnick z goods model as a point of departure we first show that its pessimistic conclusions are based on rather restrictive assumptions as applied to the colonial period we relax these assumptions indicating the theoretical possibility of a substantially more positive scenario for that period subsequently we analyze the role of z goods traditional and nontraditional in the post independence era again distinguishing between archetypal pessimistic and optimistic cases finally the comparative historical experience of the philippines and taiwan is brought to bear to illustrate the argument empirically

a theory of value with non linear prices equilibrium analysis beyond vector lattices this paper presents a new theory of value with a personalized pricing system that naturally induces a family of non linear prices this affords a coordinate free theory of value in which the analysis is without any lattice theoretic considerations when commodity bundles are perfectly decomposable the generalized prices become linear and the analysis specializes to the walrasian model this happens for instance whenever the commodity space is a vector lattice and consumption sets coincide with the positive cone our approach affords theorems on the existence of equilibrium and provides a value based characterization of pareto optimality and edgeworth equilibrium where the walrasian linear price based characterization fails the analysis has applications in the finite as well as the infinite dimensional setting journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c71 d46 d51 d61

discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions evidence from when issued transactions abstract we use when issued transactions data to assess the treasury s current experiment with uniform auctions when issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions suggesting a higher information release which should reduce pre auction uncertainty and the winner s curse under uniform auctions when issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement the pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions this is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre auction information and lower the short squeeze a direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results

tariff rates tariff revenue and tariff reform some new facts this article compares the statutory and valorem tariff rates official rates with the ratio of tariff revenues to import values collected rates for jamaica kenya and pakistan it identifies four general features of the tariff codes considers whether these features apply to all developing countries and discusses four implications of these features for tariff reform first the collected rate for any given item in the tariff code is only weakly related to the official rate for the item second the variation of collected rates on average increase much less than the official rates fourth the relation between official rates and collected rates is nonlinear because the slope is lower at higher levels of the official rate

auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity the case of nabucco and its open season as a response to the russian dominance of the eu s natural gas supplies and the eu s increasing gas demands major gas pipeline projects are currently under way to enhance the eu s energy supply security oftentimes to raise financing and to allocate gas transportation capacities auctions are carried out to allow gas shippers to book transportation rights in recent years auctions have emerged as one of the most successful allocation mechanisms in the microeconomic theory however different auction designs can lead to different outcomes making the choice of auction design a decisive one especially for divisible good auctions this paper seeks to give a formulation of an optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity specifically three different mechanisms are tested i npv allocation ii pro rata allocation and iii optimization in addition nabucco is taken as a case study to empirically show results of such auction designs results show that a trade off between revenue optimization and fair allocation can be observed allocation per optimization is the favorable auction design when revenue maximization is more important than fair allocation on the other hand pro rata allocation is the auction design to be chosen when fairness of allocation is considered most central

underpricing in discriminatory and uniform price treasury auctions this paper compares the newer uniform price u s treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing empirically i find that even for the newer uniform price auctions the average price received by the treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism from the summary statistics released by the treasury i calibrate common value auction models for the two mechanisms and predict the level of underpricing in each auction i find that the observed magnitude of underpricing in the auctions is consistent with the model s predictions

are bilateral remittances countercyclical by putting together a relatively large data set on bilateral remittances of emigrants this paper is able to shed light on the important hypothesis of smoothing the smoothing hypothesis is that remittances are countercyclical with respect to income in the worker s country of origin the recipient of the remittance while procyclical with respect to income in the migrant s host country the sender of the remittance the econometric results confirm the hypothesis this affirmation of smoothing is important for two reasons first it suggests that remittances should be placed on the list of criteria for an optimum currency area second it brings into doubt plans by governments in some developing countries to harness remittances for their own use in that government spending in these countries generally fails the test of countercyclicality which remittances pass

bid dispersion competition and wage regulation some field evidence from public contract bidding in british columbia the paper uses data from british columbia to show that bid dispersion the difference between the winning and next lowest bids in public school construction contract bidding is very compact and that it varies inversely with the degree of competition it also examines the impact of the skill development and fair wage law sdfwp which promulgated wage scales and required contractors to pay them in public construction projects on the bid dispersion multivariate analysis shows that bid dispersion declined after sdfwp one possible interpretation of this result is that the contractors became less prone to the winner s curse following the sdfwp

markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions this paper studies the relation between the premiums in takeover bids involving exchange listed target firms from 1975 91 and the pre announcement stock price runups the evidence shows that the pre bid runup and the postannouncement increase in the target s stock price the markup are generally uncorrelated with little substitution between the runup and the markup the runup is an added cost to the bidder this finding has important implications for assessing the costs of insider trading it also raises interesting questions about the role of information from public capital markets in private takeover negotiations

the loser s curse if the value of a commodity is unknown a prospective buyer must realize that a bid based on an overestimate of its value is likely to be accepted in this situation merely finding out that one s bid is accepted may cause one to reduce the estimate of a commodity s value so winning an auction can bring a feeling of regret 1 acceptance of a bid is an informative event and failure to incorporate this contingent information into the bidding strategy can lead to excessive bids and subsequent losses a result widely known as the winner s curse 2 there is considerable anecdotal evidence that bidders for a prize of uncertain value fall prey to the winner s curse and persistent overbidding has also been observed in laboratory experiments 3 there is a second factor that can also induce overbidding the thrill of winning this raises the possibility that overbidding is due to a utility of winning instead of being the result of an irrational failure to anticipate the informational content of a bid s acceptance one way to distinguish these explanations is to examine a situation in which the winner s curse effect is neutralized to see if bids are still too high in order to neutralize the winner s curse we identify an opposing bias a situation in which a failure to anticipate the informational content of a bid s acceptance will cause one to bid below the optimal bid resulting in a loser s curse since the loser s curse produces underbidding its effect is the opposite of that arising from the winner s curse

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

the saving and investment nexus for china evidence from cointegration tests the saving and investment nexus as postulated by feldstein and horioka fh 1980 is revisited the saving investment correlation for china is estimated over the periods 1952 1998 and 1952 1994 the latter culminating in a period of fixed exchange rate regime amongst the key results it is found that saving and investment are correlated for china for both the period of the fixed exchange rate and the entire sample period with high saving investment correlation the results suggest that the chinese economy is in conformity with the fh hypothesis this is a valid outcome for in china capital mobility was fairly restricted over the 1952 1994 period as indicated by the relatively low foreign direct investment

child auctions in nineteenth century sweden an analysis of price differences during the nineteenth century destitute and or orphan swedish children were boarded out as a part of that time s public assistance the families to which they were allocated were determined by means of english auctions this paper studies the price differences among such children using empirical data from 601 auctions price is regressed on variables related both to the buyer and to the child the results suggest that variables related to the children s characteristics were important and that the willingness to take a poor or orphan child was dependent on the foster parents uses for a child in the household children who were old enough to be used as shepherd boys or girls were easily placed it was worse with those who were feeble incapacitated blind sick mentally deranged or confined to their beds they were useless to farmers and others as a rule the most miserable were boarded out to the poorest of the non property owners julius ejdestam 1969 the poor s sweden my translation