defending the articles of confederation a reply to dougherty this reply addresses the issues raised bydougherty in response to my 1999 article in this journal ialso develop a new graphical model of the optimal collectionrate under the articles where states made contributions andcontrast it to the revenue potential from direct taxation ibelieve that despite dougherty s criticisms my argumentremains valid while the articles were not perfect in anabsolute sense that when more properly viewed in acomparative manner that the system of state contributions forraising revenue under the articles was and still is superiorto a system of direct federal taxation

micro incentives and municipal behavior political decentralization and fiscal federalism in argentina and mexico summary this article analyzes the mixed results of political and fiscal decentralization in latin america by comparing taxing and spending policies in six cities in argentina and mexico consistent with previous studies we find that decentralization has been frustrated by overconcentration of power at the provincial level and large vertical fiscal imbalances though we characterize these as functional elements in a system of redistributive policy making that benefits a wide array of provincial and municipal actors we seek to add a new dimension to the literature by arguing that micro level incentives conditions and circumstances particular to specific places are more important determinants of municipal behavior than macro level structures those policy and institutional changes intended to make officials more responsive to local conditions federalism local elections intergovernmental transfers and own source revenues we conclude that the theory of decentralization relies on a flawed conception of the causal mechanisms that are hypothesized to create responsiveness in local officials

institutional competition versus centralization quo vadis europe lots of steep and sometimes blind bends with harsh speed limits and frequent detours but still it has been one that has attracted more and more traffic after a successful period of shaping a customs union and a free trade area following the treaty of rome 1957 europe became infected with euro sclerosis in the seventies owing to an increased intensity of national regulation especially in the labour market the constructionist approach to harmonization from above slowed down the speed of integration almost to a halt only the change of two fundamental rules revitalized the european integration process namely the introduction of majority voting in the ec council and the mutual recognition of national regulations brought about by the 1979 ruling of the european court with the single european act and the launch of the internal market programme europhoria blossomed finally leading to the maastricht treaty which aimed to be the masterpiece of european integration only very recently the danish no and the unconvincing approval by the french voters cooled off hopes for a united states of europe signalling that european integration is at the crossroads once again

party system institutionalization and government formation in new democracies party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment stability in party systems ensures the presence of regularities that can be observed in government formation but most empirical research focuses on established democracies in new democracies party systems are less institutionalized which means that interactions between parties can be unpredictable and has significant implications for coalition formation this article presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design comparable to that of the leading research on western europe the author uses a new data set of potential coalitions in central and eastern europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized the results show first that incumbency is a disadvantage for governments in new democracies when formation occurs postelection this disadvantage is due to high levels of electoral volatility caused by policy failure and clientelistic practices incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place midterm as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative second the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition instead programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities and third established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation a possible indicator that a party system is becoming more institutionalized the article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

do high taxes lock in capital gains evidence from a dual income tax system the purpose of this paper is to study whether investors willingness to realize capital gains falls when the marginal tax rate on capital gains is raised we use a rich register based panel data set covering almost 8 of the swedish population the results indicate that a 10 increase in capital gains tax rate reduces the number of realizations of capital gains with 8 7 and the realized amount given the decision to realize with 1 9 in addition we find that wealthy individuals seem to respond more to changes in capital gains tax rates than less wealthy

foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization countries differ in their government architecture some countries are characterized by a high degree of concentration of fiscal administrative judicial executive and lawmaking powers whereas others have decentralized many functions and responsibilities of government to different jurisdictions and various levels of government the cross country differences in the organization of government are also not static but have been subject to substantial change in many countries the co existence of different organizational patterns of government has created an important debate regarding the determinants of particular government structures as well as questions regarding the optimality of different forms of organization

e ztax tax salience and tax rates this paper examines whether the salience of a tax system affects equilibrium tax rates i analyze how tolls change after toll facilities adopt electronic toll collection etc drivers are substantially less aware of tolls paid electronically i estimate that in steady state tolls are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been without etc consistent with a salience based explanation for this toll increase i find that under etc driving becomes less elastic with respect to the toll and toll setting becomes less sensitive to the electoral calendar alternative explanations appear unlikely to be able to explain the findings

competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment abstract tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards the tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels one would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements despite this the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down performance requirements are as popular as ever we explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms in equilibrium municipalities choose performance requirements which maximize joint surplus from investment competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies

expenditures and receipts testing for causality in state and local government finances the results of our tests indicate similarities between the expenditure tax receipt relations of state governments to those previously reported for the federal government in manage and marlow 1986 the results reported here indicate support for the hypothesis that tax receipts cause expenditures at the state level of government for tests utilizing symmetric lag structures ranging from three to five years state expenditures appear to follow state tax receipts for the shortest lag length 2 2 the determination of bidirectional causality does not make us reject the hypothesis that higher spending levels result from higher revenue levels rather the causality appears to be in both directions for the shortest lag length

do external grants to district governments discourage own revenue generation a look at local public finance dynamics in ghana summary using rich panel data on all of ghana s districts local public finances over 11 years this paper investigates the way that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments affect local governments incentives to collect internally generated revenues and funds igf we find that despite an incentive scheme built into one of the major intergovernmental grants the flow of all grants taken together discourages rather than encourages igf this is reflected both in the depressing effect of transfers on igf levels as well as on igf growth

taxation and political business cycles in eu economies this paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the european union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles opportunistic or partisan the empirical evidence based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period does not support this hypothesis rather it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies

political stability and fiscal policy time series evidence for the swiss federal level since 1849 this paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy in a time series analysis over 158 years at the swiss federal level we argue that the fiscal commons problem of public finances is affected by the number of years a finance minister remains in office because the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office enjoys a politically powerful position towards the administration parliament and interest groups in contrast frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

government growth in the twenty first century public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories budget maximization theories rational choice models and path dependent models like the ratchet hypothesis the strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty first century government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government s ability to continue to expand the tax base

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

heterogeneous vertical tax externalities and macroeconomic effects of federal tax changes the role of fiscal advantage abstract how do state tax rates respond to federal tax shocks this paper presents a novel mechanism of heterogeneous vertical tax externalities across state levels of fiscal advantage showing that tax increases can be expansionary even without their reinvestment states rich in natural resources have a fiscal advantage in the inter state competition over production factors which allows them to respond better to increases in federal taxes and consequently attract capital from other parts of the nation we add heterogeneity in fiscal advantage levels to an otherwise standard model of vertical tax externalities and horizontal tax competition the model shows that irrespective of federal redistribution the contractionary effect of a federal tax increase can be overturned in fiscally advantaged states through an increase in their tax base using the case of the u s and narrative based measures of federal tax shocks a la romer and romer 2010 we provide empirical evidence for the various aspects of this mechanism specifically our baseline estimates indicate that controlling for federal transfers a 1 increase in the gdp share of capital related federal taxes at the beginning of a year increases the growth rate of the per capita tax base by approximately 0 7 in high fiscal advantage states at the end of it

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

do budget maximizing public officials increase the probability of property reassessment county governments in pennsylvania face non binding limits on their property tax rates these are considered non binding because they do not place a limit on tax levies or expenditures assuming local public officials have monopoly power tax rate limits can be circumvented by reassessing the property tax base a two stage process was hypothesized in which the probability of reaching tax rate limits first was determined and the probability of reassessment then was determined the effect of budget maximizing government officials at each stage was tested for 66 pennsylvania counties over the 1970 1995 period the empirical results showed that variables associated with budget maximizing behaviour influenced the choice in each stage public expenditure growth increased the probability of reaching the tax rate limit in the first stage while reaching the tax rate limit increased the probability of reassessment in the second stage the estimates also showed that economic fiscal and taste variables were signific

fiscal decentralization and government size numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors this paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth fiscal decentralization the results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy

a predictive index for the flypaper effect abstract it is well established that lump sum public grants boost local government spending more than an equivalent increase in private income the flypaper effect one shortcoming of the related literature is that it presumes all communities have an identical propensity to consume from an intergovernmental grant this paper is one attempt to allow for a heterogeneous response the working conjecture is that government expenditure on administrative overhead is a gauge of voter control over fiscal decisions high overhead spending implies a lower provision of public services and a stronger role for revenue maximizing forces in the budget setting process as such the flypaper effect should be more marked in high overhead communities an overhead index is applied to a sample of pennsylvania communities in the philadelphia metropolitan area it is difficult to understand these governments spending propensities from various windfall revenues without the help of the overhead index supportive evidence for this approach because overhead data is widely available the technique here can be used to address important policy questions such as predicting variations in state government responses to the recently created lump sum welfare grants

establishing property rights establishing secure property rights in transition economies amounts to solving two problems inefficiency structures of control rights over assets and poor contract enforcement politicians and bureaucrats still wield excessive control over assets which results in inefficient underinvestment by entrepreneurs corruption is one way of getting around political control but the drawbacks are considerable particularly the limited enforceability of corruption contracts more workable strategies for establishing property rights in transition economies are giving equity to the bureaucrats and other parties that have control reforming the civil service and removing bureaucratic control rights through privatization russia s experience shows how privatization combined with equity incentives for enterprise insiders transfers control rights from the bureaucrats and stimulates political and economic pressures to protect private property rights

economists and the welfare state abstract this paper constrasts the views of the welfare state of economists in the 1940s and 1950s with those of the current generation it is argued that economists as a profession in particular in the scandinavian countries have changed from being strong spokesmen for the welfare state to becoming much more critical the reasons for this are sought both in the expansion of the public sector in recent decades and in the development of economic theory in the areas of public finance insurance and incentives and public choice an attempt is made to evaluate the importance of the empirical and theoretical developments for the changing views of the welfare state

intervention policy under floating exchange rates an analysis of the swiss case empirical analyses of central bank foreign exchange market intervention are typically cast in terms of a dichotomy between leaning against the wind and exchange rate targeting apparently the profession has arrived at an almost unanimous verdict in favor of the former th is paper challenges the ruling consensus econometric estimates are c omputed on the basis of a more flexible intervention response functio n and a new proposal for removing simultaneous equations bias in the context of intervention analyses the obtained results suggest that in situations of conflict the swiss national bank has given priority to exchange rate targeting over exchange rate smoothing copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

government turnover in parliamentary democracies in this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena 1 cabinet terminations due to replacement or early election 2 cabinet reshuf es 3 minority and surplus governments 4 the relative instability of minority governments

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

the influence of decentralized taxes and intergovernmental grants on local spending volatility abstractthe influence of decentralized taxes and intergovernmental grants on local spending volatility regional studies this paper studies what affects the volatility of sub central public spending in 20 organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries the evidence based on data from 1972 to 2007 shows that the volatility of intergovernmental grants from upper levels is positively associated with the volatility of local expenditure on the other hand the volatility of local tax revenues mainly that of property taxes exerts the opposite effect these findings suggest that making local governments rely more on grants than own tax revenues adversely affects their spending stability allowing them to levy autonomously taxes relying on responsive tax bases provides incentives to smooth their expenditure

the economic effects of constitutions replicating and extending persson and tabellini persson and tabellini the economic effects of constitutions the mit press cambridge 2003 show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects here the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used in replicating and extending their analyses we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely with regard to electoral systems the original results are largely confirmed majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker the institutional details such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size are particularly important

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

the size of the state economic growth and the efficient utilization of national resources the motives of the state in projecting a more than minimal presence in the economy may be conceived of as benevolent or malevolent whatever the characterization of the motivation increases in the size of the government share of the economy adversely affect economic growth and the allocation of resources nations with relatively large government shares in 1960 on the whole grew more slowly than nations with relatively small state sectors interperiod increases in the size of government were associated with lower growth rates over the period the size of the government share coefficients in the regressions were of sufficiently large magnitude to conclude that the rise in the size of the government has had a substantial depressing effect on economic growth these results are consistent with those reported by landau 1983 and marlow 1986 landau did not adjust economic growth for the growth in factor endowment consequently his results overstate the adverse effect of government size

nation states vs united empire effects of political competition on economic growth is political fragmentation i e nation states more favorable to economic growth than political unification i e a united empire this study develops an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification under unification the economy is vulnerable to excessive leviathan taxation and possibly subject to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations under fragmentation the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense if capital mobility is above below a threshold then fragmentation unification would favor growth and this threshold is increasing in the degree of defense competition and decreasing in the costs of heterogeneity

is there a bias toward excess in u s government budgets or deficits do the political institutions of a majoritarian representative democracy and in particular those of the united states systematically produce either levels of public spending or budget deficits that are excessive should u s political institutions be altered by constitutional amendment to deal with these problems i will start by examining the issue of public spending and then turn to the question of budget deficits

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

the political economy of central bank intervention this paper analyzes an exchange rate policy game between a central bank and rational speculators under symmetric information the central bank tries to counteract shocks to the exchange rate by means of sterilized intervention working through the expectations channel private speculators resist being fooled they anticipate the interventions an intervention bias results with an inefficiently high equilibrium volume of intervention which does not reduce the impact of shocks to the exchange rate the model implies that the more independent the central bank the smaller and the more consistent the intervention efforts an empirical illustration lends some support to the model

do law enforcement expenditures crowd out public education expenditures as state and local governments have devoted a rising share of their resources to crime related programmes concerns have arisen that spending on other programmes such as education will fall coupled with growing public concerns over performance of the public education system and expectations that prison populations will rise as states pass and enforce more stringent sentencing laws it is not surprising that some view the expansion of crime related programmes as troublesome one hypothesis is that education and crime related programmes directly compete for government expenditures so that what one programme gains the other must lose as in a fixed pie situation a competing hypothesis is that spending on these two public programmes are unrelated and therefore higher crime related spending may also lead to higher taxes or public debt issuance or to reduction in spending on programmes other than education we estimate a three equation model of spending on crime related programmes spending on education and

rights equity and economic efficiency the adelman morris premise that economic development and equity are incompatible is not supported by the evidence of a strong relationship between equality of rights and the income distribution the premise that equity requires the denial of individual rights and the affirmation of state control is an oxymoron what has been overlooked in the literature on growth and equity is the effect of the rights structure on both economic efficiency and on the income distribution the evidence is that free societies have much larger shares of income going to the middle 60 percent of the distribution than is observed in societies where men are not free to choose in politically open societies compared to politically closed regimes the share of income to the middle three quintiles is q2 10 7 vs 8 0 q3 16 0 vs 11 5 and q4 22 9 vs 17 9 in the aggregate the shares to the middle quintiles are 49 6 vs 37 4 in nations that obey the rule of law compared to regimes in which the rights of the state relative to the individual are paramount the comparisons are q2 11 2 vs 7 4 q3 16 3 vs 10 6 q4 23 0 vs 17 3 summing the three quintiles yields a comparison of 50 5 vs 35 3 in countries that have private property market allocation of resources and minimum intervention by the state compared to command economies the shares of income to the middle quintiles are q2 10 8 vs 8 0 q3 16 0 vs 11 1 and q4 22 8 vs 17 7 aggregated the shares of the middle class in regimes with high levels of economic liberty are 49 6 vs 36 8 for regimes with restricted private economic rights

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

an empirical assessment of the factor supplier pressure group hypothesis the main purpose of this paper has been to empirically assess tullock s factor supplier pressure group hypothesis theory predicted that public employees would be most able to use their political power to expand public spending levels at the local level of government therefore in contrast to the two previous attempts to test this hypothesis the empirical tests focused on the growth oflocal public spending the test results lead to the conclusion that the political power of public employee groups is an important determinant of the growth of local public spending although the extent of their influence is as yet unknown general control personnel and sanitation workers were found to be exceptionally successful at influencing budgetary growth in terms of the former group these results lead me to suspect that the results of bennett and johnson s 1980 research on federal government growth apply to the local public sector as well that is while there may be debate over how much local public spending has increased as a percentage of net national product its composition has changed in that proportionally more resources are being used for the purposes of administrative rule making as is the case with federal governmental regulation increased regulation of the local public economy is sure to have substantial allocative and distributive effects which form an agenda for future research

do institutions really matter taxation in industrialized democracies new institutionalism has emerged as one of the most prominent research agendas in the field of comparative politics political economy and public policy this article examines the role of institutional variation in political economic regimes in shaping tax burdens in industrialized democracies an institutionalist model for tax policy variation is tested across the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd democracies countries are conceptualized and statistically modeled in terms of majoritarian shifting coalition and dominant coalition governments regression analysis and cluster analysis are used to statistically model crossnational tax burdens relative to the strength of labor organization and party dominance in parliament this study finds that political and economic institutions are important in explaining tax policy variation specifying the structure of political and economic institutions helps to explain the size of the state in modern capitalist democracies this article specifies and demonstrates which institutions matter and how much they matter

fiscal decentralization and the size of government a european country empirical analysis this article is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size using a panel data set of the eu 15 countries we analyse the effect of decentralization on aggregate national and subnational government sizes by separating the long run effects of decentralization from its short run dynamics in the long run tax autonomy reduces central expenditure but increases and to a greater extent subnational public expenditure leading to higher aggregate public expenditure we find also that vertical imbalances tend to increase the sizes of subnational national and aggregate governments

land leasing and local public finance in china s regional development evidence from prefecture level cities by analysing the evolution of local governments roles in different periods of china s growth in transition this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s local land development behaviour is related to china s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements on the basis of panel data covering prefectural level cities from 1999 to 2003 the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing by negotiation versus by auction tender policy implications are drawn from this analysis for the further reform of china s urban land system and fiscal institutions

the limits of tax and expenditure limits tel implementation as a principal agent problem previous scholarship has shown that tax and expenditure limits tels often fail to constrain government growth this paper views the implementation of tels as a principal agent problem agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents using panel data for the us states from 1970 through 2008 i conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal agent model for tels i find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government additionally state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action these findings contradict an alternative theory of tel implementation that looks towards the policy s origin my research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions tels effectively reduce government growth

party systems and government stability in central and eastern europe after two decades of parliamentary democracy the countries of central and eastern europe cee have quite different records of government stability at the same time there continues to be turbulent fluctuation within the individual countries to explain this variation the authors draw on characteristics of parties and party systems for 138 governments in 12 cee countries the analysis is structured by two distinct logics that underlie the effect of party related attributes on government survival the logic of internal friction within the government and the logic of external pressure from the opposition the authors argue that in the difficult contexts of postcommunist party systems these two logics do not operate independently of each other instead they suggest that standard theory needs to be revised to account for the interactions of government and opposition characteristics their model of these interactions not only includes standard numeric and ideological variables but also integrates specificities of the postcommunist context the regime divide and the low degree of party system consolidation quantitative and qualitative findings demonstrate that government stability in cee is interactively determined by whole constellations of party attributes

can tax evasion tame leviathan governments this paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion may keep leviathan governments at bay the specific feature we look at is banking secrecy abroad the analysis draws on a 16 generation olg model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent seeking leviathan government key insights are 1 effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born 2 there is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young to old combined these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex

searching for leviathan comment and extension in a recent article wallace oates 1985 investigated whether fiscal decentralization tended to act as a constraining influence on the overall size of the public sector this hypothesis has been advanced by several alternative theories of government behavior including richard musgrave s 1959 model of how the distribution function of government would be carried out by subnational governments geoffrey brennan and james buchanan s 1980 leviathan model and the more traditional public choice model for example walter hettich and stanley winer 1984 all contend that the decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources and thereby constrains taxing power oates analyzed two data sets one pertaining to the state and local sector in the united states and the other consisting of a sample of 43 countries and found little empirical support for the decentralization hypothesis the purpose of this paper is to reconsider his analysis in the case of state and local governments specifically it will be argued that oates s measures of decentralization may be inappropriate to test the hypothesis furthermore by taking into account the structure or composition of local governmental jurisdictions within a state empirical support of the decentralization hypothesis can be marshaled for general purpose local governments such as counties and municipalities i measuring fiscal decentralization among the states

implicit bands in the yen dollar exchange rate this article attempts to identify implicit exchange rate regimes for the yen dollar exchange rate to that end we apply a sequential procedure that considers both the dynamics of exchange rates and central bank interventions to data covering the period from 1971 to 2003 our results suggest that implicit bands existed in two subperiods april december 1980 and march october 1987 the latter coinciding with the louvre accord furthermore the study of the credibility of such implicit bands indicates the high degree of confidence attributed by economic agents to the evolution of the yen dollar exchange rate within the detected implicit band rate thus lending further support to the relevance of such implicit bands

leviathan in a dual economy this paper studies the policies of a leviathan state with an ambition to make money and to stay in power the economic framework is a developing country characterized by dual markets government revenue is raised by taxing the agricultural sector part of this revenue is offered to the politically influential urban population in the form of low productive but well paid public sector employment i calculate the optimal level of rural taxation from the point of view of the leviathan and investigate its effects on migration industrialization public sector employment and urban unemployment in different political scenarios

interdependencies between transport fuel demand efficiency and quality an application to austria abstract this paper focuses on the interdependencies between technical efficiencies and energy demand which are often either treated in isolation or do not get the sufficient attention in the literature more precisely this paper uses technical efficiencies as one crucial determinant of energy demand in order to integrate at least two issues that are usually investigated separately from each other the rebound effect resulting from improved technical efficiencies and the asymmetry of energy demand in this regard our paper sets out a theoretical framework which has the following implications higher efficiency increases service demand first order rebound low fuel prices and higher efficiency increases the demand for quality second order which in turn increases service demand further third order ceteris paribus energy price shocks should increase scrapping rates fuel prices direct the rd those on engine efficiency are irreversible which has the consequence that energy price elasticities depend on the history of energy prices rather than being asymmetrical derived implications are subsequently tested on austrian data in particular the purchasing decision diesel versus gasoline powered cars allows to refute the myth that consumers apply high implicit rates for discounting the future benefit from efficient cars

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

cabinet survival and competing risks we attempt to resolve a recent controversy in the study of cabinet terminations pertaining to the shape of hazard rates on the one hand warwick 1992b provides evidence that cabinets are more likely to terminate the longer they are in office alt and king s 1994 analysis on the other hand suggests that hazard rates are constant over the life time of a cabinet this issue is of particular theoretical importance since a constant hazard rate would add support to the nonstrategic model of cabinet termination due to browne et al 1986 while an increasing hazard rate would seem to favor lupia and strom s 1995 strategic approach by applying a semi parametric competing risk approach to data on cabinet durations we are able to show that through its use of theory based censoring the previous literature in effect analyzed only one mode in which cabinets terminate the case where one cabinet is replaced by another without a new election once cabinet terminations that lead to chamber dissolutions with subsequent elections are analyzed directly we can show that they are governed by a very different stochastic process hazard rates are not flat as in the case of replacements but increase over the life of the government further the covariates governing replacement terminations fail to explain dissolution terminations these findings add support to the strategic approach suggested by lupia and strom

the evolution of tax structures certain themes recur throughout this paper the traditional account of the evolution of tax structures through the interaction of increasing efficiency and the claims of special interests plays a role but is not the whole story different taxes create tradeoffs between the costs of administration and compliance specification of these costs creates a framework in which long term trends like the growth and centralization of revenues and the increasing dependence on direct taxation can be understood this framework applies to observable collective decisions to alter tax structures uncertainty about ultimate incidence plays a major role in such decisions it also applies to the decentralized context of adjustment and resistance this framework can be used to investigate the extent of redistribution within tax systems and of the requirement of frequent reforms to sustain redistribution against resistance the simultaneous consideration of economic and political aspects of taxation can only improve future research

optimism and pessimism in political and market institutions buchanan and faith1 have demonstrated that the introduction of subjective elements into the individual choice calculus behind the rawlsian veil of ignorance can lead to differences in predictions among arrays of institutional alternatives their analysis implies that when individuals make subjective predictions concerning the working properties of alternative institutions there will exist a bias toward pessimistic control in the selection of the basic rules of the game we seek to extend the analysis of subjective evaluations to democratic institutions where outcomes are determined by simple majority voting rules and individual wealth positions are known prior to voting it is our purpose to contrast the impact of subjectiveevaluations on market and political institutions we will argue that diversity of beliefs systematically affects political institiutions in a different manner than they affect market institutions in particular we contend that uncertainty with respect to either costs or benefits of new governmental programs will determine whether the optimists or the pessimists control the outcome our theory offers an alternative explanation for the growth of government in our economy and counters the downsian conclusion that government will be too small in a democracy 2 we analyze aspects of political behavior that cannot be explained solely with reference to special interest theory in the political marketplace we demonstrate that there is a tendency for extreme opinion to dominate and in particular for optimists to have a disproportionate impact on the outcome of public decisions

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers comment school choice policies promise to align the incentives of school administrators with the demands of parents and may therefore lead to more efficient educational production milton friedman 1962 geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1980 john chubb and terry m moe 1990 absent a large scale school voucher program in the united states however this prediction has been difficult to test several authors e g melvin v borland and roy m howsen 1992 clive r belfield and henry m levin 2002 have suggested studying the effects of tiebout choice the use of the residential location decision to select among local monopoly education providers the idea here is that fragmented governance induces competition among school districts analogous to that which would occur among schools with nonresidential choice in an influential paper caroline m hoxby 2000 points out that current governance structures are potentially endogenous to school productivity and proposes that variation in topography which may have influenced optimal jurisdiction size before modern transportation technologies provides a source of exogenous variation she estimates instrumental variables regressions of individual test scores and school spending on a metropolitan level tiebout choice index defined as one minus a herfindahl concentration index with districts enrollments as their market shares using as excluded instruments the number of larger and smaller streams in the area she reports substantial positive effects of district fragmentation on student test scores and negative effects on spending this comment presents a reanalysis of hoxby s test score results which form the core of her empirical analysis these results turn out to be quite sensitive to plausible alterations to hoxby s specification in particular the large significant effect of choice on achievement obtains

the assessment institutions of policy this article reviews changes in thinking about the scope and design of government institutions it looks at the rationales for privatization of state owned utilities and the recent reforms in the u k new zealand and elsewhere to social service agencies and the institutions of economic policy making after examining the role of public choice and principal agent theories in shaping current attitudes it notes the impossibility of complete contracting for the provision of many public services and emphasizes the importance of relational contracts in institutions where objectives are inevitably complex and many dimensions of performance difficult to verify it concludes that commercial models are often inappropriate replacements for centralized political control many public service functions are best carried out by intermediate institutions management of these institutions should operate on franchises giving a renewable lease on assets held in trust accountability to stakeholders and the political authority should be periodic rather than continuous copyright 1994 by oxford university press

government capacities and policy making by decree in latin america the cases of brazil and argentina what is the effect of constitutional decree authority cda on the policy making process of a presidential regime despite recent efforts to answer this question there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process this article argues that in a separation of powers system the existence of cda effectively enhances executives ability to act as agenda setters this capacity however is not uniform across all cases developing a simple spatial model of decree games the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors decree approval rules the extent of the executive s partisan support in the legislature and the strength of the presidential veto these propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in brazil and argentina two cases prese

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

short term and long term government debt and nonresident interest withholding taxes abstract this paper examines the incidence of nonresident interest withholding taxes in the international 3 month treasury bill market and the international 5 year government bond market the approach is one of pooled cross section time series regressions the evidence suggests that the yields on national treasury bills and on 5 year government bonds fully reflect the nonresident interest withholding taxes imposed on american or japanese investors nonresident interest withholding taxes on short term and long term government debt thus do not appear to be borne by the international investor

municipal annexation and local monopoly power we have found that the fiscal power of a city can be increased by extension of its borders within a land area that is homogeneous with respect to earning opportunities even when numerous rival jurisdictions exist in the area we hypothesized that extending municipal boundaries will have a positive effect on discretionary outlays and on expenditures per capita the evidence presented supports these hypotheses furthermore municipal wages appear to be significantly increased in cities experiencing annexation growth therefore we would expect to find that municipal employees are more inclined to favor annexation than the rest of the electorate from a policy standpoint this study suggests that significant perverse effects on fiscal efficiency may follow adoption of legal reforms that facilitate the ability of municipalities to extend their borders or that restrict the formation of new municipalities

unified government bill approval and the legislative weight of the president this article proposes a new approach to measuring the legislative weight of the president and congress based on the approval of each actor s legislative agenda the authors focus on presidential systems where presidents possess both formal authority to introduce their own bills and a variety of prerogatives to influence the passage of legislation the authors argue that the legislative weight of the president varies over time in response to contextual political variables after devising a general model to measure changes in the legislative weight of the president vis a vis congress the authors empirically test their propositions using data from argentina the results indicate that the policy and productivity weights of the president actually increase in the absence of unified government

the impact of fiscal decentralization on economics performance in high income oecd nations an institutional approach this paper examines the impact of public sector decentralization on per capita income controlling for differences in institutional arrangements among countries panel data regressions on a sample of observations from 20 high income oecd nations spanning the years 1972 to 2005 indicate that decentralization is positively related to income the empirical analysis shows that institutions consistent with economic freedom enhance the positive income effects of decentralization thus the impact of public sector decentralization is dependent upon a nation s institutional environment

tax structure and public sector growth abstract it has been hypothesized that a jurisdiction s tax structure exerts an indipendent effect upon the growth of its public sector we test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between the growth of state general expenditure and the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to income the work takes advantage of a very careful set of income elasticities for the personal income and sales tax systems for each state for every year from 1978 to 1983 the main conclusion is that the data do not support the notion that the form of the tax structure exerts an independent effect on public sector growth

voting as a lottery supermajorities have their advantage as well as their disadvantage they provide an hedge against being in the minority but they make being in the majority less likely we characterize this trade oand compute the most preferred majority threshold the relevant parameters are voting power risk aversion and pessimism people who feel powerful prefer low thresholds high thresholds are preferred by risk averters or by those who are pessimistic about being in the majority further we study constitutional agreements on the voting rule members of the constituent assembly are heterogeneous in the parameters above we show that weak and minority members succeed in pushing forward on high and protective rules

a unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies the literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions the attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes in this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches we also generalize this unified model and all previous models by including 1 a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period 2 a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions and 3 a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries

the economics of fiscal decentralization there is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years this paper provides a general brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization in doing so literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches first generation approach and an emerging second generation approach the discussion generally covers the two notions of fiscal decentralization fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments as the background of the most recently developed index of fiscal decentralization in vo the relevance of this discussion to any further development of a fiscal decentralization index is briefly noted

public choice social choice and political economy since world war ii a large literature has arisen that uses the methodology of economics to examine the behavior of governments and the actors in them some scholars refer to their research as public choice some as social choice and still others as political economy this article discusses the distinctions among these three terms it concludes that all of the research falling under these three headings has much in common and that people who refer to their work as public choice or political economy are essentially employing identical methodologies contributions to public choice narrowly defined are more often positive and empirical analyses of government behavior than those in social choice narrowly defined

tax competition rent seeking and fiscal decentralization abstract the present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self defeating we find that rent seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

the timing of elections in federations a disciplining device against soft budget constraints we introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints specifically we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse with synchronized elections i e simultaneous central and regional office terms or with staggered elections i e terms of office that do not coincide we find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare

out of the cabinet what drives defections from the government in presidential systems this article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short lived and ad hoc the author shows instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes she develops a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which scholars might expect to see the existing governing coalition break down the author draws on data from 121 cabinets in 12 latin american countries between the late 1980s and the mid 2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government in particular the author shows that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties in contrast effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contri

bailout for sale the vote to save wall street this paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the united states the paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics district heterogeneity implies district specific electoral constraints on legislators ability to collect rents from and cast dissonant votes in support of special interests an empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables the empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias using valid instruments and considers several intuitive sub sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue the paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout