analysts forecasts as proxies for investor beliefs in empirical research abstract we analyze how analysts forecasts relate to investor beliefs and describe the implications of these relations for price and volume reactions to earnings surprises we show that dispersion among forecasts does not fully capture investor uncertainty we also show how the relations between market reactions and forecast properties differ under the alternative assumptions of exogenous and endogenous private information acquisition finally the analysis suggests refined tests for volume reactions at the time of an announcement our results indicate that the model is useful for understanding and interpreting empirical work and developing empirical tests of market reactions to announcements

anonymous lindahl pricing in a tiebout economy with crowding types the crowding types model of a local public goods economy makes a distinction between crowding effects and tastes of agents decentralization of the core is possible both with anonymous admission prices that depend only on publicly observable information and when technology is linear with lindahl per unit prices lindahl price systems are superior to admission prices since they can be specified with only a finite number of prices here we show that the core is equivalent to the set of non anonymous lindahl equilibria even with non linear technology the core is generally larger however than the set of anonymous lindahl equilibria

on price taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding abstract competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry for two reasons first there may be an integer problem as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding second optimal groups may have different compositions from the population and then even if there is no integer problem it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups i define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium always exists in a sufficiently large economy i focus on the optimal size of the economy rather than of clubs

information and diversity of analyst opinion this paper examines problems in the use of divergence of analyst opinion as a proxy for estimation risk in empirical studies of security returns and asset pricing models we demonstrate that diversity of opinion can increase even though the amount of private information increases and we show that diversity of opinion may overstate estimation risk if the capital market aggregates the information held by investors we produce empirical results consistent with our conclusions specifically we find that divergence of opinion can produce measures of estimation risk that are inconsistent with a received proxy for estimation risk and with observed common stock returns

estimation of poverty transition matrices with noisy data summary this paper investigates measurement error biases in estimated poverty transition matrices we compare transition matrices based on survey expenditure data to transition matrices based on measurement error free simulated expenditure the simulation model uses estimates that correct for measurement error in expenditure we find that time varying measurement error in expenditure data magnifies economic mobility roughly 45 of households initially in poverty at time t 1 are found to be out of poverty at time t using data from the korean labor and income panel study when measurement error is removed this drops to between 26 and 31 of households initially in poverty copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

bureaucrats and tax limitation abstract this paper examines the welfare effect of tax limitation and the nature of voting equilibrium on tax limitation proposals in an economy where voters initially accept or reject the tax bill proposed by a monopoly bureau since tax limitation enables voters to limit the tax bill to the desired level it improves the voters welfare however voters may not impose tax limitation because the bureau may prevent tax limitation ahead of time by softening its monopoly position and because heterogeneous voters may fail to agree on how much the tax should be limited the analysis attempts to identify the conditions under which voters impose tax limitation

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

trading volume reactions to annual accounting earnings announcements the incremental role of predisclosure information asymmetry abstract this study provides empirical evidence regarding the effect of annual accounting earnings announcements on investors trading behavior we find that the magnitude of trading volume reaction is an increasing function of both the magnitude of the associated price reaction and the level of predisclosure information asymmetry these results are consistent with kim and verrecchia s 1991a theoretical trading volume proposition

categorizing risks in the insurance industry this paper analyzes the welfare implications of imperfectly categorizing risks in the insurance industry under conditions of asymmetric information firms initially unable to distinguish the risk type of individuals are provided with imperfect information concerning risk membership the paper then compares various wilson type equilibria to determine the welfare implications of firms imperfectly categorizing risks it is shown that only in the case where the initial equilibrium is of the nash no subsidy type is there a pareto type improvement in welfare

local property and state income taxes the role of interjurisdictional competition and collusion this paper addresses two long standing positive questions in public finance i why is the property tax despite widespread popular complaints against its fairness the almost exclusive tax instrument used by local governments and ii why do we consistently observe higher levels of governments states undermining local property tax systems through income tax funded grants and state imposed caps on local property tax rates a new intuitive argument to explain question is presented and tested in simulations using a computable general equilibrium model with parameters set to be consistent with new jersey data both the intuitive argument and the simulation results indicate that setting local income tax rates to zero is a dominant strategy for community planners when faced with popular sentiment against the property tax community planners can collude and introduce local income taxes simultaneously to prevent adverse general equilibrium migration and price changes since zero income tax rates are dominan

federal mandates by popular demand this paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality public health highway safety and the provision of local public goods voters have single peaked preferences along a single policy dimension there are two levels of government federal and local the federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum or maximum policy localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed by the federal mandate we show that voters choose federal mandates that are too strict which leads to excessively severe mandates we show that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the public provided good is more efficient than local provision

equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects public service output depends on input expenditures on own personal characteristics and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community the peer group effect in a community model with public expenditures set by voting with migration between communities and with land price differentials capitalization it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and second best inefficient this equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither too strong nor too weak the inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration the land price differential does not play the part of the price of the better peer group but of a transfer payment

market response to financial reports abstract a two date rational expectations model is analyzed at the first date traders can privately acquire a costly signal that provides imperfect information about a public report that will be issued at the second date equilibrium characterizations are provided for the fraction of traders that become informed and the informativeness of the first date price as well as the price change variance and the expected trading volume at the second date comparative statics identify how the above variables are influenced by changes in the information content of the public report and in particular how market phenomena at the public release date are influenced by endogenous prior information acquisition and trading in response to the forthcoming public release

subsidies as sorting devices abstract the divergence between tax payments and the cost of providing public services that arise from financing local public services provides an incentive for higher income communities to deter the entry of lower income households into their community here we demonstrate that higher income households to insure that low income households do not enter their community or reduce the number that do enter subsidize goods consumed by higher income households more than by lower income households this strategy will make the rich community less attractive to the poor deterring their entry to the community

efficiency equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich using a simple adverse selection model we characterize equilibrium when the rich chase the poor if communities are established by competitive entrepreneurs the equilibrium exists is unique and is efficient it involves either complete separation or complete pooling different income groups may rank these qualitative outcomes differently we show how restrictions imposed by a central government may alter the nature of equilibrium such restrictions may be explained as the choice of a low income majority altering the equilibrium to the pooling outcome which they prefer

financial analysts forecasts of earnings a better surrogate for market expectations abstract the specification of the market expectation of accounting numbers is a common feature of many empirical studies in accounting and finance givoly and lakonishok 1979 found that financial analysts forecasts have information content this study evaluates the quality of analysts forecasts as surrogates for the market expectation of earnings and compares it with that of prediction models commonly used in research results indicate that prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements suggesting that analysts forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time series models the study also identifies factors that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts forecasts the broadness of the information set employed by analysts and to a lesser extent their reliance on information released after the end of the fiscal year appear to be important contributors to their performance

all school finance equalizations are not created equal school finance equalization has probably affected american schools more than any other reform of the last 30 years understanding it is a prerequisite for making optimal social investments in human capital yet it is poorly understood in this paper i explain why it differs from conventional redistribution because it is based on property values which are endogenous to schools productivity taste for education and the school finance system itself i characterize equalization schemes and show why some level down and others level up schemes that strongly level down have unintended consequences even poor districts can end up worse off i also show how school finance equalization affects property prices private school attendance and student achievement