collusion collective action and protection theory and evidence this paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying we show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high the empirical evidence from the u s supports the theory greater collusionreduces the level of pac contributions

political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas abstract tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances this paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance domestic market power for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives in the presence of revenue seeking ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels also some welfare implications emerge

on the efficiency of law a public choice perspective economists have not yet developed a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating transaction cost economics within a public choice perspective for predicting when there will be an efficiency problem with the law transaction cost reasoning and the rent seeking insight have not been applied systematically in a dynamic institutional context to evaluate when the law will be used to increase or not minimize problems of bounded rationality and opportunism this paper takes a first step at identifying and remedying this deficiency the paper first provides a critical review of relevant theoretical contributions made by becker 1983 1985 posner 1977 priest 1977 rubin 1977 1982 williamson 1975 1985 and others we then show how analysis of the efficiency of law can be synthesized into a broader whole by incorporating transaction cost economics more fully into existing understanding of rentseeking in the political realm thus within the public choice paradigm this paper develops a deeper transaction cost analysis of the efficiency of law building on prior research by the authors crew and rowley 1988a 1988b twight 1983 1988 the paper identifies variables that position legal rules on a spectrum that ranges from those that are predominantly transaction cost

voter preferences and state regulation of smoking i introduction tobacco taxation and smoking restrictions are two areas of regulation for which states have maintained a high level of control relative to the federal government 1 given this flexibility states have established a wide range of restrictions on smoking in areas such as government workplaces restaurants bars shopping malls indoor arenas and hospitals 2 although most states restrict smoking in hospitals there is considerable variation among states in restrictions in other areas in the 1998 99 period of this study about two thirds of states restricted smoking in restaurants whereas only four states restricted smoking in bars what has led to variation in smoking restrictions across states in a democratic society one would expect voter preferences to play an instrumental role in determining which policies are enacted and which are not this article provides the first empirical exploration of whether state level smoking restrictions are consistent with preferences of the citizenry taking into account both voting behavior and the role of smoking status in influencing whether an individual votes specifically we examine whether voters preferences for smoking restrictions in restaurants bars malls indoor sporting events and hospitals are consistent with state level restrictions on smoking in each of these public areas 3 our research draws on public choice models of policy making by state and local governments voters preferences typically play a central role because voting affects legislators incentives to support regulations 4 public choice research also finds that nonvoter factors may influence state and local policy making 5 in the case of smoking regulations public health advocates or tobacco industry lobbyists might influence regulatory policies the specific building block of our analysis of state restrictions on smoking is information on individuals voting behavior which we link to their smoking status and preferences over smoking restrictions our analysis uses measures of political pressure that account for individual preferences as well as their voting behavior to examine the possible role of interest group pressures we also control for nonvoter influences on smoking regulation including the proportion of the state population who smoke measures of state ideology and size of the tobacco industry with the exception of smoking in bars there is majority support for smoking restrictions unsurprisingly smokers are less supportive of restrictions than are nonsmokers nonetheless even smokers demonstrate a high level of support for many restrictions smokers are also less likely to vote than are nonsmokers even after controlling for other demographic factors the lower voting rate diminishes voter opposition to antismoking regulation but is usually not critical in view of the substantial support that most smoking restrictions have among smokers the political pressure indices for restrictions on smoking in each public area are generally significantly related to the probability that a state restricts smoking in that public area the nonvoter factors such as the smoking rate in the state and tobacco s role in the state economy are rarely influential policy debates over the desirability of smoking restrictions emphasize possible health risks due to exposure to environmental tobacco smoke ets and effects on business profitability the primary argument for expanding smoking restrictions is to protect workers and customers from exposure to ets 6 as our results show voters are generally supportive of smoking restrictions in public areas which would thereby protect workers as well as themselves and other customers however there is a substantial controversy over the extent of health risks associated with exposure to ets the basis for the push by the u s occupational and safety health administration osha for increased smoking restrictions to protect workers is the highly controversial u

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

positive feedback the impact of trade liberalization on industry demands for protection contrary to widely accepted theories of interest group demand for protection industries that experience high and rising import competition after a reduction in trade barriers often become less rather than more protectionist in the long term to unravel this paradox i propose and test a theory that explains variation in domestic producer groups demand for protection over time this model of industry behavior suggests that trade liberalization has a positive feedback effect on the policy preferences and political strategies of domestic industries compelling them to adjust to more competitive market conditions and thereby reducing their future demand for protection

the price elasticity of u s shale oil reserves we formulate a model of shale oil development that identifies how much of the u s resource base is likely to be economically viable at various price levels and what share of potential drilling sites are likely to be exploited the analysis is driven by the lognormal variability in productivity of individual wells we find the volume of reserves to be highly inelastic with respect to price the number of viable drilling sites is less inelastic which may explain why reserve additions and production fell much less than drilling activity during the recent industry slump

why hasn t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom some quantitative lessons from the eu abstract the integration of european financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes the years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results instead of the dreaded race to the bottom in capital taxes the uk lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of france germany and italy while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries the uk increased its labor tax marginally but the other countries increased theirs sharply this paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices wealth distribution and fiscal solvency tax competition is modeled as a one shot game over time invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to european data the calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes the solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency there is no race to the bottom and the nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes in contrast if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency competition over capital taxes triggers a race to the bottom but this outcome entails large welfare gains surprisingly the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

government policy and the firm s capital structure abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of commonly observed forms of government intervention on the firm s capital structure we show that since market claims against the firm are always properly priced the firm is forced to take market claimants interests into account on the other hand since government claims are usually not adjusted for risk the firm can take advantage of the government it does so by choosing strategies that extract maximum value minimum cost from these policies in particular the firm uses its capital capital structure to maximize the value of the policy thus leading to a determinate capital strucure

competitive equilibrium and public investment plans abstract we examine a one sector growth model in which public capital is an external input to private production functions revenues from taxing capital and labor income are used to fund public investments the competitive equilibrium can be obtained by solving an artificial planning problem we prove that there exists a unique competitive equilibrium which can be characterized by euler equations and a transversality condition we then establish the existence of an optimal public investment plan

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

the political economy of declining industries senescent industry collapse revisited many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection once it is instituted to persist over time this paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment with endogenous protection the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs the more an industry lobbies the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future when the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust however the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection such as that predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 american economic review 76 516 523 in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection finally the paper examines the well documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process

bankruptcy warranties and the firm s capital structure this paper examines the role of capital structure as an instrument for shifting risk between real and financial markets the author considers a firm whose contractual agreements involve both consumers and debtholders and shows that if consumers are risk averse whereas equity and debtholders are risk neutral the firm uses its capital structure to shift risk away from consumers the optimal allocation of risk across real and financial markets leads the firm to be fully equity financed copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the political economy of guest worker programs in agriculture guest workers have provided a source of agricultural labor supply in many countries recent legislative proposals on immigration reform in the united states have renewed discussions about the role of guest worker programs and highlighted the arguments for and against such programs even within the agricultural sector there has not been strong broad based support for an expansion in the number of guest workers a model is developed that considers competing interests between commodity groups horticulture crops and grain crops to explain this lack of support and then a series of simulations are conducted to highlight the possible economic effects of an expanded guest worker program results suggest that an increase in the labor supply would have much larger economic impacts for horticultural producers and firms in the supporting input markets furthermore under some conditions simulation outcomes show how an increase in the labor supply may lead to small revenue losses for both producers and input suppliers in grain markets

growth effect of taxes in an endogenous growth model to what extent do taxes affect economic growth abstract this paper presents an endogenous growth model comprising of financial human and physical capital and incorporating major features of a general tax system technology and preference parameter values in the model are chosen to fit the actual growth experiences of the united states and a rapidly growing east asian nic using the calibrated model i assess the role of differences in taxes and other variables in explaining the difference in growth rates the main findings are i the difference in tax systems across countries explains a significant proportion around 30 of the difference in growth rates ii the difference in preferences explains at most 4 and iii differences in labor income tax debt equity ratio and inflation can be important in explaining the growth difference further i evaluate the contribution of the monetary factor to the growth rate gap and the growth effect of us tax reforms e g revenue neutral changes in relative tax structure

the welfare costs of worker displacement abstract recent work has documented the large persistent earnings losses associated with the displacement of high tenure workers in this paper we assess the welfare costs of this risk assuming that workers do not have access to insurance markets we find that the cost is substantial on the same order of magnitude as the cost associated with unemployment risk we also argue that long duration unemployment insurance is likely to exacerbate this cost and that government financed severance payments are a far more effective way of dealing with the displacement risk

the decline of organizations and the rise of administrators parkinson s law in theory and practice abstract parkinson reported observing substantial growth of administrators as organizations were declining such behavior has usually been considered proof of an inherent tendency for bureacracies to grow in this paper we offer a different interpretation expansion of administration during periods of decline is the result of promotions of line workers to administrative positions promotions are a means of protecting from layoff or dismissal those employees who have accumulated network capital with their superiors all large organizations private firms as well as public bureaus can be expected to behave in this way and parkinson s observations are simply evidence of the existence of implicit contracts within organizations we report empirical tests which provide convincing evidence for parkinson s law in two very different organizations a public sector bureau education and a private sector industry steel

budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority the divestiture of the house appropriations committee in the1880 s has received considerable attention of an empiricalnature this paper presents a formal model of legislativedecisionmaking using a common agency formulation to representinterest group lobbying of legislators this framework is usedto analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriationsauthority the conditions under which decentralization leadsto higher spending are characterized it is argued that theconventional view that divestiture caused higher levels ofspending only holds if decentralization created barriers tolobbying and political bargaining across different committees in addition the role of specialized committee knowledge isexamined

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

equity and efficiency effects of redistributive policies abstract how do various forms of redistribution affect the distributions of earnings and consumption and their intergenerational mobility do redistributive policies enhance efficiency by mitigating market imperfections or do they create a trade off between equity and efficiency to address these issues a dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed and solved numerically the effects of the degrees of targeting of money transfers and educational transfers and the relative performance of the two types of transfers are examined

unprotective tariffs ineffective liberalization and other mysteries an investigation of the endogenous dimensions of trade policy formation in australia 1 introductionsince its formation as a federation in 1901 australia embraced a fairly comprehensive tariff schedule in relation to imported manufactures 1 tariff rates fluctuated considerably over the years however over the course of the century they remained sufficiently high to earn australian manufacturing the reputation of one of the most heavily protected manufacturing sectors in the industrialized world 2 in recent years a number of liberalization waves have surfaced the most notable of these took place in 1973 1977 1988 1991 and most recently in 1994 with the signing of the uruguay round of the gatt agreement still tariffs remain a principal actor in australia s menu of industrial policies in a recent edition of the annual report of the productivity commission 3 published in november 1999 it is noted that although tariffs have dropped considerably since 1994 they remain an important form of assistance tariff assistance still accounts for around 90 of measured effective assistance to the manufacturing sector 4 p 52 given the pervasiveness of australian tariff policy the significant welfare implications of changes in that policy and the particular importance of international trade for this country ensuing from its idiomorphic cultural resource endowment and geographic characteristics 5 considerable research effort has been invested in the examination of various dimensions of this issue at the forefront of pertinent empirical research two items have attracted considerable interest 1 the host of determinants of the highly dispersed tariff concessions and 2 the impact of liberalization on imports research that falls in the category that examines the former including anderson 1980 conybeare 1984 aislabie 1988 and feaver and wilson 1998 is consistent at varying degrees with the theory of endogenous trade policy formation 6 according to the foundations of this theory tariff concessions may be viewed as public outcomes that facilitate a political equilibrium the mechanics are rather elementary when the profit loss that arises from import competition exceeds the transaction cost of a successful lobbying campaign for protection private interests will undertake such lobbying activities the higher the loss from foreign competition the more fervent the lobbying effort hence an increase in import penetration is likely to trigger greater protection7 trefler 1993 p 139 unlike this line of inquiry the critical causal relationship of interest to studies that fall in the category that investigates item 2 including simmons and smith 1994 relates to the effects of tariff changes on imports rather than the reverse the causal directions of the nature examined by studies that investigate issues 1 and 2 are of course not mutually exclusive higher import penetration increases tariffs and higher tariffs in turn decrease import penetration however despite the simultaneity of these variables studies of australia s trade policies associated with research lines 1 and 2 followed separate paths by only considering unidirectional causal relationships and yet these paths do converge the meeting point perplexing results on the one hand studies of endogenous protection such as anderson 1980 and aislabie 1988 have consistently failed to establish the expected result that an increase in import penetration will lead to higher tariffs on the other studies of trade liberalization often find that tariff reduction shave asurprisingly small effect on imports with a study by simmons and smith 1994 concluding that at least in relation to the examined industry removal of the tariff would have no effect on the level of imports p 57 it is important to note that analogous and equally puzzling findings pertaining to improbably smalle ffect so fliberalization on imports have been identified in the caseofothercountries suchastheunitedstates byanumberofauthors

on the analytics of the dynamic laffer curve in this paper we analyze government budget balance within a simple model of endogenous growth for the ak model simple analytical conditions for a tax cut to be self financing can be derived the critical variable is not the tax rate per se but the transfer adjusted tax rate we discuss some conceptual issues in dynamic revenue analysis and we explain why previous studies have arrived at seemingly contradictory results finally we perform an empirical study of the transfer adjusted tax rates of the oecd countries to see which country has the highest potential for fiscal improvements it turns out that only a few countries have any potential for such dynamic scoring

taxation and long run growth abstract a number of recent papers have investigated the growth effects of tax reforms in the context of neoclassical growth models with human capital growth effects were found to be large but highly sensitive to parameter choices this paper shows that growth effects are smaller and much less sensitive in models that generate realistic life cycle behavior which requires that households are finitely lived but generations may be altruistically linked and face diminishing point in time returns in human capital accumulation reasonable upper bounds for growth effects in such models are less than one third of some values reported in the literature

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

voting and paying for public goods an application of the theory of the core abstract let any coalition with a majority of all voters have the power to choose the quantities of public goods under rule i a majority coalition bears a cost of its decision that is proportional to its size under rule ii it must bear the whole cost of its decision thus rule i imposes costs on minorities although they have no power to choose the quantities of public goods while rule ii allows goods to have some attributes of semiprivate goods it is shown that a nonempty core under rule i implies a nonempty core under rule ii but not conversely necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the properties of the von neumann morgenstern characteristic function are given

the theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation in this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states we find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors 1 the extent of public sector union membership which represents the interest group hypothesis has a positive influence on pro union legislation 2 the extent of employer opposition to unions as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections has a negative effect on bargaining laws 3 two taste variables the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state have a positive influence on these laws a result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

trade liberalization through asset markets abstract political economy expositions of trade policy have traditionally described asset or factor ownership as not subject to change asset markets however allow individuals to change the composition of income sources we consider an economy with stochastic productivity to show how the equilibrium composition of asset portfolios influences individual attitudes toward free trade the model links financial market completeness and trade liberalization in the second half of the 20th century and provides a contributing answer to why governments in poorer countries without well developed financial markets have failed to liberalize trade

welfare costs of inflation in a dynamic economy with search unemployment abstract we present a monetary general equilibrium model with labor market frictions in the form of search unemployment which is calibrated for the us economy interestingly both employment and output may even increase with the rate of inflation depending on the elasticity of labor supply considering the transition dynamics following a change in the monetary policy the optimal quarterly inflation rate is found to amount to approximately 0 6 in the benchmark case a reduction of the inflation rate from its current level to its optimal value only results in small welfare gains equal to 0 08 of total consumption

public schooling college subsidies and growth abstract how does the mix of public education expenditures across primary and secondary k 12 education and post secondary college education influence economic growth to address this i build an overlapping generations endogenous growth model human capital is accumulated through compulsory k 12 education and through optional college education government uses tax revenue to provide quality in k 12 schooling and to subsidize college tuition when total expenditures are small all funds should provide k 12 quality when expenditures are above a critical value a positive share should subsidize tuition the share should increase with total expenditures and with the degree of complementarity of human capital accumulated through the two types of education also increased education spending is more likely to increase growth when a larger share subsidizes tuition

the bias in favor of pro tariff lobbies abstract we show that the probability of success of the pro tariff lobby defined as a decreasing function of the ratio of consumer loss to producer gain rent generated by the tariff rises with the tariff under very general conditions this appears as an exception to becker s view that less distortionary measures tend to be adopted over their more distortionary counterparts we then provide a micro foundation for our probability definition using the imperfectly discriminating lobbying framework

lobbying incentives and the pattern of protection in rich and poor countries in seeking to explain why poor countries tend to choose policies that tax agriculture relative to manufacturing while rich countries do the opposite archetypical parameters for a poor agrarian economy and a rich industrial one are inserted in a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the medium term effects on income distribution of policies that distort the relative prices of tradables the model includes a non tradables sector and intermediate inputs realistic features that ensure even greater skewness in the distributional effects of protection than simpler models suggest the magnitude of the results helps explain the tendency for countries to change gradually from taxing to subsidizing agriculture relative to manufacturing as their economies develop the paper draws out the implications of the analysis for agricultural and trade policy reform in the 1990s this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

anticipation learning and welfare the case of distortionary taxation we study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in the ramsey economy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning we extend the existing framework by distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply which makes agents decisions non predetermined but more realistic we detect that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning have oscillatory behaviour moreover we demonstrate that this behaviour can have important implications for the welfare consequences of fiscal reforms

debt and tariffs an empirical investigation of the evolution of revenue systems abstract this paper presents a theoretical framework where government chooses fiscal structure so as to maximize political support and where the evolution of fiscal systems is determined by changing economic political and administrative factors estimating equations are derived and the model is used to explain the development of revenue structure in canada from 1871 to 1913 a period when major revenue sources consisted of the tariff debt and excises the empirical analysis distinguishes between government plans and ex post observations of public revenues and places particular emphasis on the derivation of hypotheses linking economic political and administrative variables to revenue structure

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

tight oil real wti prices and u s stock returns abstract following the adoption of new techniques of shale and fracking by u s oil companies a structural vector autoregression model svar complements studies on why brent and wti started to diverge around early 2011 using monthly data from 2000 to 2018 we decompose oil supply into world oil excluding u s u s conventional non tight oil and u s tight oil we examine the variance decomposition of stock returns for the aggregate market s p 500 the s p energy sector and chevron and exxon mobil oil companies and we further identify differences between two subsamples from 2000 to 2010 and 2011 to 2018 respectively we find that supply considerations especially due to tight oil become more important in the subsample after 2011 not only for individual oil companies but also for the aggregate market and energy sector supply shocks due to tight oil explain in our benchmark model between 29 s p 500 and 31 s p energy of the variance in stock returns after 24 months and between 28 and 29 for oil companies none of these are statistically significant in the pre 2011 subsample among impulse responses tight oil production responds positively to disruptions in world oil and u s stock returns respond positively to oil price shocks and respond negatively to tight oil shocks which is a further finding while being consistent with the literature copula modeling uncovers stronger tail dependences in the second subsample for the interactions during downturns and upturns among global demand crude oil prices and stock markets

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

self regulation taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements an increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the public voluntary agreement va in which government offers technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that reach certain environmental goals prior papers treat such agreements as a superior low cost instrument that can be used to preempt a threat of traditional inefficient regulation we present a more general model in which public vas may instead be weak tools used when political opposition makes environmental taxes infeasible we explore the conditions under which taxes public vas and unilateral industry actions are to be expected and the welfare implications of the various instruments notably we also show that welfare may be reduced by the introduction of public vas 2002 elsevier b v all rights reserved

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

inducing political action by workers a firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders such as workers this article studies the behavior of such a firm showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage the firm may therefore profit from paying above market wages and from hiring what might appear to be an inefficiently large number of workers and because unions may overcome free rider problems of uncoordinated political effort a firm may favor unionization or be less opposed to unionization than it would otherwise be the results of this article can also explain why firms may little reduce wages in a recession and why the higher wages paid by unionized firms do not reduce survival rates of these firms

a dynamic model of endogenous trade policy empirical evidence suggests that past levels of protection are significant determi nants of current levels of protection we investigate dynamic interactions among interest groups and resulting endogenous links between current and future trade policies we explore these intertemporal links in a small open economy in which lobbying and tariff policies are the outcome of a dynamic game among factor owners the model can generate cycles with prolonged periods of free trade and or prolonged periods of restricted trade i e persistent trade policies an interesting aspect of the environment is the role of lobbying as a partial

explaining price policy bias in agriculture the calculus of support maximizing politicians a model is developed to explain observed patterns of policy intervention in agriculture we analyze the interaction between political support seeking politicians and supportsupplying citizens society consists of a rural and urban group we determine the effects on transfers of relative group size disparities in income endowments between groups and the deadweight loss of redistribution the framework advanced is an alternative to that of the interest group model and is used to explain for example why the export sectors in developing countries are taxed more and why the united kingdom is less adamant for higher price supports than germany

allocation of goods by lottery i introduction many goods such as hunting permits oil drilling leases cellular telephone licenses and rights to fishing berths as well as some buds such as the military draft jury duty and who is to be thrown overboard on a sinking life raft are or have been allocated by lotteries in neo classical welfare economics the random distribution of property rights does not affect allocative efficiency as long as transferability is allowed and the transactions costs are non prohibitive lottery allocations however are generally not transferable thus lottery allocations are inefficient since the goods are not ultimately allocated to the users who value them the most a number of authors such as aubert 1959 fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 36 122 have argued that lotteries are chosen as the allocative instrument because it represents a fair or just means of allocating the goods rawls 1971 374 and eckhoff 1989 have noted that where it is impractical to divide the goods equally among those who desire them a lottery serves to satisfy both the requirement that the process be fair and that the allocation problem be resolved relatively costlessly elster 1989 113 however notes that lotteries are not the only fair allocation mechanism for example he points out that in jewish ethics the problem of allocating an indivisible good such as life saving resources is resolved by denying it to everyone even economists would probably prefer a lottery to this resolution the fairness hypothesis has a rich history in the old testament lotteries are deemed a fair way of allocating goods such as the inheritance of land numbers 33 54 lotteries are also used to allocate bads in perhaps the most famous biblical example of use of lots jonah was chosen by lot to be sacrificed to appease god who had brought a storm that threatened to wreck the ship the story goes that the lot selected jonah because he was shirking his duties elsewhere and should not have even been on the vessel jonah 1 6 1 notice that fair here is taken to mean just given this theological foundation it is not surprising that the lottery has seen frequent use in legal history as well one of the most interesting cases occurred in swedish and finnish trials in the 17th and 18th centuries in cases where a man was murdered by a mob lotteries were used to allocate punishment since the law required an eye for an eye no more and no less eckhoff says that if it was impossible to ascertain which of them had dealt the mortal blow the courts determined that one of the responsible parties be sentenced to death and that the person be selected by lottery 1989 19 a similar use of lotteries occurs in military history to deal with cases of mass desertion in roman armies every tenth man was executed decimated and the remainder pardoned in more modern times the lottery has been used in u s law 2 first of course is the use of a lottery to decide who shall sit on a jury a connection between fairness and lotteries however has also appeared in the common law in an 1842 case u s v holmes which has been discussed by fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 a ship sank in a heavy storm and the lone surviving life raft was in grave danger of sinking the crew threw overboard fourteen male passengers in an effort to save the rest when back in port after being rescued a crewman named holmes the only crew member who had not disappeared upon arrival to port was brought to trial for the deaths of the passengers the court ruled that the non essential members of the crew should have been thrown overboard before any passengers and if that was not sufficient then passengers should have been selected by lot which is the fairest mode elster 1989 65 the fact that a human life presumably a large cost was at stake ex post did not affect the decision 3 the environmental economics literature contains a number of references to the social preferences for and benefits of lottery allocations

exogenous tariff changes with an endogenous lobbying response as pointed out by krueger 1993a 1993b changes in policy which are exogenous to the lobbying process may lead to a vicious circle of protectionism a sector which receives protection will tend to grow thereby increasing the constituency for greater protection and reducing the constituency which opposes protection the possibility of such a vicious circle is examined in the context of a trade model where capital which is immobile in the short run may lobby for a sector specific import tariff if costs associated with overcoming the free rider problem do not rise too quickly exogenous policy changes will be reinforced by the endogenous lobbying response as capital flows into the protected sector in the long run the implications of lobbying by third parties versus lobbying by the specific factors themselves are also examined

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

equipment prices human capital and economic growth abstract this paper presents a multisectoral model of economic growth in which endogenous technological progress is embodied in new equipment capital the difference in the intensity of use of human capital across sectors creates aggregate dynamic non convexities and hence the model may generate multiple balanced growth paths under standard parameter values our model can explain the observed correlations found for a pool of countries between investment rates in equipment capital and income growth on the one hand and between the rate of decline in equipment prices and income growth on the other the model is then used to study the effectiveness of two public policies that have been widely implemented to promote economic growth an equipment investment tax credit and a tax incentive to human capital accumulation our results indicate that both policies have positive effects on equipment investment and on long run growth

balancing environmental protection and energy production in the federal hydropower licensing process the u s federal energy regulatory commission ferc must balance environmental protection of riverine resources with the nation s growing demand for power production every time it issues a hydroelectric license this paper models the bureaucratic agency s decision making process in issuing these licenses data on nearly 500 hydro power licenses issued from 1983 to 2005 are utilized it is discovered that legislative and institutional constraints are by far the largest influences on ferc s regulatory decisions implying that if the current allocation of surface water in the united states is considered inefficient the most effective way to alter this allocation is by passing new legislation or by implementing institutional reform at ferc

interest group politics under majority rule abstract we develop a model of interest group politics in which the groups and coalitions that arise and the form of redistributive policies sought are jointly determined the model generates three key results first programs intended to reduce income inequality are more likely to involve direct payments than are programs that redistribute wealth across groups with similar incomes second nonequalizing redistribution is unlikely unless the various participants in the political process face significantly different political and economic costs of obtaining transfers third many policies that induce asymmetries among interest groups also impose significant deadweight costs stable nonequalizing redistribution will therefore tend to involve indirect and economically inefficient methods of transferring income

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

the marginal welfare cost of capital taxation discounting matters we interpret the marginal welfare cost of capital income taxes as the present discounted value of consumption distortions such an asset market interpretation emphasizes the importance of the interest rate used to value future distortions especially in the presence of uncertainty we find that the interest rate decreases as the tax rate increases thus increasing the welfare cost the variations in the interest rate are caused by amplified responses of consumption to exogenous shocks as a result of capital taxation the welfare cost may be underestimated if variations in interest rates are ignored especially when tax rates are high

political systems and distortions an empirical study this paper studies empirically why price distortions are more prevalent in some countries than in others we find no significant difference between democracies and dictatorships but frequent regime changes reduce distortions political systems factional subordinate that encourage redistributive activities rda tend to have more distortions allowing for different effects of rda in democracies and dictatorships there is a positive and significant effect of rda on distortions in dictatorships in democracies distortions destroying lobbying seems more important since no significant relation between rda and distortions can be found

separating economic from political influences on government decisions abstract the public interest theory is a poor predictor of government decisions relative to interest group theories but a sophisticated public interest theory is a more serious alternative to the former testing the sophisticated theory s predictions is problematic however when public interest is coincident with an interest group s interests a four step method is developed that disentangles public interest and interest group interests by separating economic from political incentives applying the method to the national forest service decisions about wilderness designations indicates whether interest groups were successful in influencing allocation decisions and whether allocation decisions were in the public interest

tight oil market dynamics benchmarks breakeven points and inelasticities abstract when comparing oil and gas projects their relative attractiveness robustness and contribution to markets various dollar per barrel benchmarks are quoted in the literature and in public debates among these benchmarks are a variety of breakeven points also called breakeven costs or breakeven prices widely used to predict producer responses to market conditions these analyses have not proved reliable because 1 there has been no broadly accepted agreement on the definitions of breakeven points 2 there are various breakeven points and other benchmarks each of which is applicable only at a certain stage of the development of a resource and 3 each breakeven point is considerably more dynamic than many observers anticipated changing over time in response to internal and external drivers in this paper we propose standardized definitions of each breakeven point showing which elements of field and well development are included in each we clarify the purpose of each breakeven point and specify at which stage of the development cycle the use of each becomes appropriate we discuss in general terms the geological geographical product quality and exchange rate factors that affect breakeven points we describe other factors that contribute to tight oil market dynamics including factors that accelerate the growth and retard the decline of production technological and legal influences on the behavior of market participants and infrastructure labor and financial inelasticities the role of tight oil in short term and medium term oil market stability is discussed finally we explore the implications of a broader more rigorous and more consistent application of the breakeven point concept taking into account the inelasticities that accompany it

industry effects of oil price shocks a re examination abstract sectoral responses to oil price shocks help determine how these shocks are transmitted throughout the economy textbook treatments of oil price shocks often emphasize negative supply or cost effects on oil importing countries by contrast the seminal contribution of lee and ni 2002 has shown that almost all u s industries experience oil price shocks largely through a reduction in their respective demands only industries with very high oil intensities face a supply driven reduction in this paper we re examine this seminal finding using two additional decades of data further we apply updated empirical methods including structural factor augmented vector autoregressions that take into account how industries are linked among themselves and with the remainder of the macro economy our results confirm the original finding of lee and ni that demand effects of oil price shocks dominate in all but a handful of u s industries

lobbying and adjustment in declining industries abstract this paper explains the persistence of protection in terms of interaction between industry adjustment lobbying and the political response faced with a trade shock owners of industry specific factors can respond in two ways they can undertake costly adjustment or they can lobby politicians for trade protection and thereby mitigate the need for adjustment the choice will depend on the relative returns from adjusting relative to lobbying by introducing an explicit lobbying process it can be shown that the current level of protection is an increasing function of past protection and that declining industries contract more slowly over time the more responsive are politicians to lobbying in addition the model makes clear that the type of senescent industry collapse predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 is only possible under fairly special assumptions about the technology of lobbying

the political economy of farmland ownership regulations and land prices one of the most ubiquitous forms of agricultural regulation is a restriction on farmland ownership one canadian example of a farmland ownership restriction is the saskatchewan farm security act fsa passed in 1974 the purpose of this article is to explain using a political economy framework why the fsa was implemented and to estimate the effect of the fsa on saskatchewan farmland values a present value pv model is used to estimate the relationship between land values rents and the regulation the hausman endogeneity test reveals that the regulation variable is endogenous with the land price the sign of the regulation variable is negative which fits with the theory i e the more stringent the regulation the lower the land value we estimate that the regulation lowered saskatchewan farmland prices by an average of 4 to 34 us acre depending on whether ordinary least squares ols or two stage least squares tsls is employed in the estimation over the period of 1974 2001

the political economy of coal subsidies in europe abstract both the mining and the burning of coal is polluting so we might expect to observe taxes on coal production and consumption yet several countries of western europe subsidize coal production and most east european countries subsidize coal consumption the first part of this paper shows that those subsidies which are emulated by other rich and poor countries respectively have become enormous neoclassical political economy is used to examine why governments adopt such inappropriate policies when they are so wasteful of resources and damaging to the environment several new and offsetting political forces have been at work in western europe in recent years though causing some countries to dismantle their coal producer subsidies the paper concludes that these pressures for reform will continue to operate in the few remaining protectionist countries if coupled with more commercial diplomatic pressure from coal exporting countries they could be sufficient to see the end of such protection by early next century