marshall s scale economies using panel data this paper estimates plant level production functions for machinery and high tech industries that allow for scale externalities from other plants in the same industry locally and from the scale or diversity of local economic activity outside the own industry the paper finds that the count of other own industry plants representing a count of local information spillover sources has strong productivity effects in high tech but not machinery industries single plant firms both benefit more from and generate greater external benefits than corporate plants given their greater reliance on external environments on dynamic externalities high tech single plant firms benefit also from the scale of past own industry activity i find little evidence of economies from the diversity or scale of local economic activity outside the own industry

the long term consequences of resource based specialisation using geological variation in oil abundance in the southern us i examine the long term effects of resource based specialisation through economic channels in 1890 oil abundant counties were similar to other nearby counties but after oil was discovered they began to specialise in its production from 1940 90 oil abundance increased local employment per square kilometre especially in mining but also in manufacturing oil abundant counties had higher population growth higher per capita income and better infrastructure 2010 the author s the economic journal 2010 royal economic society

localization economies vertical organization and trade this paper develops a model of regional production networks based on localization economies i consider an industry with two activities one with location specific external economies the other with constant returns under autarky localization economies imply the formation of an industry center agglomeration drives up wages in the center causing the constant returns activity to disperse to outlying regions trade recreates the regional production network on a global scale i apply the model to data from the mexican apparel industry estimation results on mexico s pre and post trade regional apparel wage structure are consistent with localization economies implications for the north american free trade agreement nafta are discussed this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

economies of scope and economies of agglomeration abstract agglomeration economies are economies external to the firm and plant but internal to a particular location in this paper the notion of agglomeration economies is formally investigated the implications of the concept for urban structure and industrial organization are then traced under specified considerations weak economies of agglomeration as defined in this paper are shown to be necessary for the existence of an urban area

geography industrial organization and agglomeration this paper makes two contributions to the empirical literature on agglomeration economies first the paper uses a unique and rich database in conjunction with mapping software to measure the geographic extent of agglomerative externalities previous papers have been forced to assume that agglomeration economies are club goods that operate at a metropolitan scale second the paper tests for the existence of organizational agglomeration economies of the kind studied qualitatively by saxenian 1994 this is a potentially important source of increasing returns that previous empirical work has not considered results indicate that localization economies attenuate rapidly and that industrial organization affects the benefits of agglomeration

rising trade costs agglomeration and trade with endogenous transaction costs while transport costs have fallen the empirical evidence also points at rising total trade costs in a model of industry location with endogenous transaction costs that seeks to replicate features from the machinery industry we show how and under which conditions a decline in transport costs can lead to an increase in the total cost of trade the subtle relationship between endogenous transport costs and the sensitivity of trade

do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal armed conflicts we use new data to examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries around the world since 1946 on average these discoveries increase per capita oil production and oil exports by up to 50 percent but these giant oilfield discoveries also have a dark side they increase the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5 8 percentage points this increased incidence of conflict due to giant oilfield discoveries is especially high for countries that had already experienced armed conflicts or coups in the decade prior to discovery

an empirical analysis of a regional dutch disease the case of canada while there has been extensive research on the dutch disease dd very little attention if any has been devoted to the regional mechanisms through which it may manifest itself this is the first empirical attempt to research a regional dd by looking at the local and spatial impacts of resource windfalls across canadian provinces and territories we construct a new panel dataset to examine separately the key dd channels namely the spending effect and the resource movement effect our analysis reveals that the standard dd mechanisms are also relevant at the regional level specifically we find that a resource windfalls are associated with higher inflation and a labour capital shift from to non primary tradable sectors b resource windfalls in neighbouring regions are associated with a capital labour shift from to non primary tradable sectors in the source region c the spatial dd explains 51 20 of the adverse effects of resource windfalls in neighbouring regions on region specific non mineral international exports in the source region and does not significantly affect domestic ones

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

bundling as an entry barrier in this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment we show that bundling is a particularly effective entry deterrent strategy a company that has market power in two goods a and b can by bundling them together make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each the traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry deterrent effect i introduction in this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment we show that bundling is a particularly effective entry deterrent strategy a company that has market power in two goods a and b can by bundling them together make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market bundling allows an incumbent to defend both products without having to price low in each while it is still possible to compete by offering a rival bundle a monopolist can significantly lower the potential profits of a one product entrant without having to engage in limit pricing prior to entry we also show that bundling continues to be an effective pricing tool even if entry deterrence fails or if there is already an existing one product rival a company with a monopoly in product a and a duopoly in product b makes higher profits by selling an a b bundle than by selling a and b independently leveraging market power from a into b and accepting some one product competition against the bundle is better than using the monopoly power in good a all by itself since bundling mitigates the impact of competition on the incumbent an entrant can expect the bundling strategy to persist even without any commitment the traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist see stigler 1968 adams and yellen

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

is the division of labour limited by the extent of the market evidence from french cities abstract this paper provides supportive evidence to the notion that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the local market we first propose a theoretical model its main prediction is that scarce specialists occupations are over represented in large cities using census data for french cities we find strong empirical support for this prediction

price discrimination and patent policy patent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict as an important example there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power in this article we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases even ignoring the dynamic effects on incentives for innovation third degree price discrimination by patent holders can raise static social welfare in fact pareto improvements may well occur welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders to open new markets and to achieve economies of scale or learning further even in cases where discrimination incurs static welfare losses it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms such as length of patent life for rewarding innovators with profits

natural resource access and local economic growth abstract we explore the existence of a local resource curse related to brazil s oil using oil price annual changes interacted with measures of local proximity to oil reserves we find that oil royalty receiving locations in brazil that are closer to an oil field are characterized by a higher level of income per capita when controlling for a range of potentially confounding factors furthermore in a panel setting we find that better geographical access to oil fields generates a greater positive effect of oil prices on local income per capita moreover this positive impact of oilfield proximity on the effect of oil prices is enhanced in oil rich states importantly these effects appear to be independent of the amount of oil royalties suggesting the role of an indirect linkage effect

oil rents corruption and state stability evidence from panel data regressions abstract we examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil exporting countries during the period 1992 2005 we find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties we argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict we support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low

agglomeration opportunism and the organization of production abstract recent economic analysis of outsourcing has emphasized its international dimension in contrast this paper focuses on local outsourcing the paper specifies and solves a model where the organization of production vertically integrated or not and the location of production agglomerated or not are jointly determined the paper shows that agglomeration reduces opportunism a thick market effect and so serves as a substitute for integration this force will lead firms to agglomerate the paper also shows that the normative properties of equilibrium with local outsourcing are not as clear cut as for international outsourcing since local agglomeration is achieved at the cost of congestion local markets may be too thick which would not be the case for an increase in the thickness of a world market finally the many changes in economic and social circumstance that have been labeled globalization do not impact only vertically integrated firms they also impact cities and industry clusters to the extent that agglomeration is a substitute for vertical integration

competition by choice the effect of consumer search on firm location decisions this paper relates firm location choice and consumer search firms that cluster together attract consumers by facilitating price comparison but clustering increases the intensity of local competition the author constructs a simple model which shows that firms may choose head on competition by locating together under reasonable conditions this is the only equilibrium outcome copyright 1990 by american economic association

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

antitrust predation and the antitrust paradox abstractthe widely recognized influence that the chicago school of law and economics had on the institution of antitrust is nowhere more apparent than in predatory pricing law starting with aaron director this movement had many distinguished contributors but even in this company robert bork stands out for his part in persuading the judiciary to refocus antitrust law on the interests of consumers rather than on the interests of competing firms in the antitrust paradox and other writings bork advanced the chicago school insight that the kind of aggressive price cutting that at the time passed for predatory pricing is instead an essential and for consumers beneficial attribute of competition the resulting change in direction that antitrust has taken in predatory pricing cases culminated in the court s matsushita matsushita electric industrial co v zenith ratio corp 475 u s 574 1986 and brooke group brooke group ltd v brown williamson tobacco corp 509 u s 209 1993 opinions both

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

local market size social capital and outsourcing evidence from emilia romagna based on a unique dataset concerning small firms operating in the machinery and equipment industry in emilia romagna italy we estimate the separate effects of social capital and local market size on the probability to either fully or partially outsource parts of the production process we are able to distinguish 29 different phases of the production cycle from design to early processing to post production our estimates show that 1 social capital influences the full outsourcing of core assembly and post assembly activities while local market size affects the full outsourcing of early processing activities 2 neither social capital nor local market size have a statistically significant effect on the probability of partially outsourcing any step of the production process robustness tests confirm our results vis a vis the endogeneity of the local market size and social capital and the potential modifiable area unit problem relating to local market size

booming sector and de industrialisation in a small open economy this paper presents a theoretical analysis of the dutch disease the phenomenon whereby a boom in one traded goods sector squeezes porfitability in other traded goods sectors both by directly bi

outsourcing labor market pooling and labor contracts this paper considers the interaction between input sharing and labor market pooling in urban areas in particular it examines the impact of the size of a city and business risks on the organizational structures of firms located in urban agglomerations and it also discusses the impact of organizational structure on incentives to insure workers against income risks it is shown that manufacturing firms suffer from a coordination game in their decision to outsource production the existence of idiosyncratic risks causes manufacturers to refrain from outsourcing the incentives to offer wage and employment protection to workers are more pronounced when manufacturers outsource the production of their inputs to a local market which mitigates the impact of labor market pooling

robert bork s contributions to antitrust perspectives on tying behavior abstractrobert bork was one of the key proponents of the traditional chicago school view of tying and antitrust which is that tying can never be used to extend or leverage market power from one market to another so it should also never be an antitrust violation in this paper we review the traditional chicago school perspective and in particular bork s arguments on the topic and then discuss how these arguments relate to the more recent theoretical literature on the subject which takes a game theoretic approach we then discuss bork s later views on tying concerning the microsoft case we include a discussion of whether these later views of tying and antitrust were different from his earlier views or instead whether it was the nature of the cases that had changed

a strategic motivation for commodity bundling the analytical literature on commodity bundling explains the practice of selling two or more differentiated products in a single package as a surrogate for direct price discrimination in contrast this paper shows that imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive to bundle the profitability of bundling whether it adversely affects rival producers and whether it yields an overall efficiency gain depends inter alia on the nature of product market competition the role of complementarity in explaining why firms bundle is also explored copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

the fable of fisher body abstract general motors s gm s acquisition of fisher body is the classic example of market failure in the literature on contracts and the theory of the firm according to the standard account in 1926 gm merged vertically with fisher body a maker of auto bodies because of concerns over transaction specific investment and contractual holdup that account exhibits errors of historical fact and interpretation general motors acquired a 60 percent interest in fisher body in 1919 moreover the contractual arrangements and working relationship prior to the 1926 merger exhibited trust rather than opportunism fisher body s production technology did not exhibit asset specificity the merger reflected economic considerations specific to that time not some immutable market failure we demonstrate that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of production and inventories assuring gm of adequate supplies of auto bodies and providing gm with access to the executive talents of the fisher bro

refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets abstract a number of recent antitrust cases in north america and europe have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products this paper analyzes such refusals in a competitive market and connected aftermarket in this model the refusals help to support higher prices for high intensity high value users however these higher charges permit the recovery of higher costs incurred during an initial warranty period since full prices equal full marginal costs in equilibrium the refusals permit the attainment of a first best outcome and an attempt by antitrust authorities to force supply will be welfare reducing

creating holdup through vertical integration fisher body revisited abstract general motors s gm s 1926 acquisition of fisher body has long served as a cornerstone of hold up arguments for vertical integration this paper utilizes primary historical evidence to make three related claims first it shows that gm s initial investment in fisher body occurred primarily to gain access to the fisher brothers specialized human assets second it shows that holdup was not the cause of gm s purchase of fisher body instead the primary factors leading to vertical integration were gm management s fears over the fisher brothers impending departure coupled with problems of financing new body plants finally i show that while holdup was not an issue prior to integration the fisher brothers successfully held up gm after they became employees far from reducing opportunistic behavior vertical integration increased gm s vulnerability to rent seeking behavior based in human asset specificity

equilibrium product bundling this article offers an equilibrium theory of product bundling by rival firms in several models where a primary good is produced in a duopoly market and one or more other goods is produced under perfectly competitive conditions bundling is shown to emerge as an equilibrium strategy of one or both of the duopolists for its role as a product differentiation device when the rival firms can commit to bundling sales their profits are higher but social welfare is reduced copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

globalization outsourcing and wage inequality there is considerable debate over whether international trade has contributed to the declining economic fortunes of less skilled workers one issue that has become lost in the current discussion is how firms respond to import competition and how these responses in turn are transmitted to the labor market in previous work we have argued that outsourcing by which we mean the import of intermediate inputs by domestic firms has contributed to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in the united states if firms respond to import competition from low wage countries by moving non skill intensive activities abroad then trade will shift employment towards skilled workers within industries in this paper we extend our previous work by combining new import data from the revised nber trade database with disaggregated data on input purchases from the census of manufactures we construct industry by industry estimates of outsourcing for the period 1972 1990 and reexamine whether outsourcing has contributed to an increase in relative demand for skilled labor our main finding is that outsourcing can account for 31 51 of the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor that occurred in u s manufacturing industries during the 1980s compared to our previous estimate of 15 33 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

product differences and prices abstract under assumptions following hotelling s 1929 paper stability in competition the possibility of constructing an example in which equilibrium prices exist everywhere and the two merchants display tendencies to agglomerate is ruled out

urban diversity and economic growth at the risk of some simplification it is possible to identify four periods of intense study of cities by economists each of these has led to an increased understanding of the economics of urban areas and the unique role played by cities in the modem economy the first of these periods occurred in the decade after world war i only about ten years after the truck revolutionized the transport of goods within urban areas this period included the first systematic empirical analysis of the forces affecting the location of firms and households within cities robert murray haig 1926 and a number of other microeconomists at columbia analyzed the spatial pattems of manufacturing activity in lower manhattan and in the rest of new york city haig jmd his colleagues devoted considerable attention to where things belong in an urban area p 402 providing the first systematic economic analysis of urban spatial structure for example they analyzed the garment industry concluding that it was destined by nature to disperse north of 14th street and predicting that it would follow the estabhshed spatial pattem of the cooperage barrelmaking industry standardization in size and quality of barrels had meant that identical barrels could be made throughout the new york metropolitan area even in new jersey and the introduction of the truck meant that they could be transported cheaply throughout the region and exported the second of these periods though not in chronological order began in the mid 1960s it formalized many of the insights about location incentives within urban areas which had been uncovered a half century before mixed them with the logic of heinrich von thunen s 1826 ancient theories about agricultural crops and land values and applied them to the hotisehold sector the works of william alonso 1964

outsourcing in a global economy we study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade we model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts the extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers the relative cost of searching in each market the relative cost of customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each country

orders to supply as substitutes for commitments to aftermarkets a number of recent antitrust cases in canada and other countries have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service or ganizations earlier work suggested that the inability of manufacturers to commit to low aftermarket prices creates an inefficiency that might be removed by a judicial order to supply this paper examines this view critically with a specific model of repairs and demonstrates that under plausible conditions there is no welfare loss due to the inability to commit it goes on to show that an order to supply can create its own distortion and welfare loss if it encourages

does oil corrupt evidence from a natural experiment in west africa abstract this paper explores the oil discovery announcements in sao tome and principe 1997 1999 to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption for this purpose we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts sao tome and principe to cape verde a control west african country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries the unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents we analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations we find clearest increases on vote buying education namely in the allocation of scholarships and customs ranging from 31 to 40 of the subjective scale we interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources