theoretical approaches to monetary disinflation abstract during the 1980s many countries adopted tight monetary policies to reduce high inflation rates which were the legacy of the 1970s as inflation threatens to rise at the beginning of this decade this paper provides a survey of the 1980s literature which sought to provide theoretical understandings of how monetary disinflation is achieved four models are presented monetarist neo keynesian new classical and post keynesian each model s explanation of the recession which accompanies the monetary disinflation is outlined as well as possible policy measures to reduce the extent of the recession and to hasten the return to full employment

a nonequilibrium analysis of unanimity rule majority rule and pareto i introduction voting theory is important for understanding economics as well as politics international organizations vote on trade regulations legislatures vote on minimum wage and governments vote on the provision of public goods voting also affects industrial organization for instance limited partnerships may vote on the allocation of resources to various units and shareholders may vote on investment decisions carrera and richmond 1988 what voting rule best achieves pareto optimal outcomes in such cases in the absence of transactions costs it is widely believed that unanimity rule is the best voting rule for promoting pareto efficiency berggren 1996 buchanan and tullock 1962 mueller 2003 buchanan 1967 writes it is evident that unanimous consent is the political counterpart of the pareto criterion for optimality p 285 traditionally viewed unanimity rule guarantees more efficient outcomes than majority rule because unanimity rule only passes proposals that make everyone better off other voting rules like majority rule can pass proposals that make some individuals worse off one of the assumptions that is either explicit or implicit in the these studies is the assumption of rational proposals we define a proposal as rational if it helps maximize the proposer s utility at the end of the game in our analysis proposals are not rational instead they are generated either randomly or sincerely in a single dimensional voting model and evaluated by the pareto criterion or pareto optimality this produces two striking results with regard to pareto optimality first if proposal generation is random then majority rule is usually more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule second if individuals propose their ideal points then majority rule always selects pareto optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule considering all possible proposals as done in our random generation models has a long tradition in social choice literature arrow 1951 caplin and nalebuff 1988 niemi and weisberg 1968 riker 1982 sen 1979 it also has the advantage of modeling certain types of incomplete information modeling votes where bills are introduced for reasons other than making them pass see stewart 2001 pp 338 41 modeling exogenously generated proposals and for allowing mistakes by the proposer such foundational work should be of interest to those who relate unanimity rule to pareto principles in the study of public goods cornes and sandler 1996 lindahl 1967 political parties aldrich 1995 and legislative institutions colomer 2001 niou and ordeshook 1985 tsebelis 2002 to name a few ii previous studies perhaps the first in depth study of the relationship between unanimity rule and a pareto principle was buchanan and tullock s calculus of consent 1962 buchanan and tullock argued that if decision making costs were negligible unanimity rule would always be the most desirable k majority rule simply because it preserved the pareto principle p 88 although the exact pareto principle they had in mind is not entirely clear it seems that buchanan and tullock were arguing for the criteria of accepting a change from the status quo only if it lead to a pareto improvement otherwise the status quo should be preferred pp 92 93 sen 1979 p 25 1 mueller 2003 pp 138 and 140 41 further compared unanimity rule to majority rule and concluded that unanimity rule typically performs better in terms of the pareto criterion to illustrate his reasoning mueller describes a community voting on both the purchase of a new firehouse and the taxes needed to pay for it in a single bill if the decision was made under unanimity rule the distribution of taxes would be redefined until the firehouse benefited all otherwise the bill would not pass if the decision was made under majority rule a majority might distribute the taxes on a minority such that members of the majority would be net gainers and members of the minority would be net losers

reinterpreting the role of inflation in politico economic models the author attempting to analyze the interplay between politics and economics is faced with a large number of problems ranging from an always too small and idiosyncratic data set to the lack of any generally accepted theory of the process which has testable implications my aims have been 1 to show that past studies have typically treated inflation in an extremely naive way disregarding the fact that it may have political pluses if unanticipated and 2 to test the sensitivity of established formulations to what i believe is the more useful view of voter behavior given in model ii since model i and model ii represent polar extremes of amnesiac and eidetic behavior tests of intermediate lag structures are clearly in order because of administration peculiarities however lost data points will pose a serious problem

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

ramsey discounting of ecosystem services most ecosystem services which are essential for human well being are globally declining while the production of consumption goods measured by gdp is still growing to adequately account for this opposite development in public cost benefit analyses it has been proposed based on a two goods extension of the ramsey growth model to apply good specific discount rates for manufactured consumption goods and for ecosystem services using empirical data for ten ecosystem services across five countries and the world at large we estimated the difference between the discount rates for ecosystem services and for manufactured consumption goods in a conservative estimate we found that ecosystem services in all countries should be discounted at rates that are significantly lower than the ones for manufactured consumption goods on global average ecosystem services should be discounted at a rate that is 0 9 pm 0 3 points lower than the one for manufactured consumption goods the difference is larger in less developed countries and smaller in more developed countries this result supports and substantiates the suggestion that public cost benefit analyses should use country specific dual discount rates one for manufactured consumption goods and one for ecosystem services

the unanimous voting rule is not the political equivalent to market exchange the unanimous voting rule is often viewed as analogous to voluntary market ex change this paper demonstrates that when third party pecuniary effects exist this analogy breaks down because unlike markets unanimous voting requires compensation for these ef fects thus efficient market outcomes typically will be rejected by the unanimous voting rule even when transactions costs are low enough to make compensation feasible the political outcome under unanimity will differ from the market outcome the distributional effects of unanimity provide the incentive for people to substitute rent seeking behavior for productive activity and reduce the incentive for productive change providing additional reasons why a less than unanimous voting rule may be optimal when resources are to be allocated politically

do group specific or national unemployment rates influence perceptions abstract we show that disaggregated social preference functions between inflation and unemployment may be modelled using the national unemployment rate rather than group specific rates we reach this conclusion by fitting presidential popularity functions to groups classified by age region sex and race

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

markets and morality it is common knowledge that adam smith the acknowledged father of economics as we know it had written the theory of moral sentiments 1759 before he wrote the wealth of nations 1776 more sophisticated students of economics today would also know that adam smith held the chair in moral philosophy from 1752 after a year as professor of logic at glasgow university therefore that economics has evolved from moral philosophy and has affinity by birth with it and therefore is a moral science should not surprise anyone yet the analysis of the interaction between economics and moral philosophy or perhaps simply morality has raised interesting issues over time in the following i concentrate on a few salient ones today

inflation unemployment and the median voter abstract we combine an econometric analysis of survey data on the relative seriousness of inflation and unemployment with the median voter theorem to derive the equilibrium rate of inflation if the natural rate of unemployment is 7 percent then the equilibrium inflation rate is 5 4 percent

money politics and the post war business cycle abstract the political economy literature has enshrined as stylized fact the view that lower inflation and temporarily lower growth follow the election of republican presidents and has emphasized political manipulation of monetary policy as an explanation support for the monetary explanation comes in econometric work that largely ignores identification issues that dominate the literature on measuring the effects of monetary policy we generalize a standard vector autoregression framework to accommodate discrete political party variables we find almost no support for the view that political effects on the macroeconomy operate through monetary policy and only weak evidence that political effects are significant at all

the determinants of vote intentions in portugal this paper offers new insights on theinteractions between economics and politicsin portugal we use two unexplored datasets consisting of monthly polls on voteintentions for the main political partiesin portugal and responses to a consumersurvey containing a battery of questions oneconomic evaluations the analysis coversthe interval from 1986 to 2001 we findthat 1 right wing governments arepenalized for higher inflation while theleft wing ones are not 2 left winggovernments are more penalized forincreases in the unemployment rate 3 voters base their evaluations ofincumbents performances on perceptions ofpast and current economic conditions rather than on expected future economicoutcomes

voters and macroeconomics are they forward looking or backward looking the political business cycle hypothesis has been criticized on the grounds that it is impossible for governments to generate a vote winning boom because voters judge political candidates by the performance they expect in the future in this paper we directly test the hypothesis that voters are forward rather than backward looking we compare the conventional view that presidential popularity depends on recently observed inflation and unemployment to three alternative models which assume varying forms of forward looking behavior non tested hypothesis tests reject the forward looking models in favor of the one with the recent actual variables

a nonlinear approach to us gnp a univariate nonlinear model is estimated for us gnp that on many criteria outperforms standard linear models the estimated model is of the threshold autoregressive type and contains evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks over the business cycle in particular the nonlinear model suggests that the post 1945 us economy is significantly more stable than the pre 1945 us economy

taxation and presidential approval separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians this literature however focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden in this paper we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the us president s approval ratings over the 1959 2006 period our results support this proposition specifically we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings

cointegration and threshold adjustment this article proposes an extension to the engle granger testing strategy by permitting asymmetry in the adjustment toward equilibrium in two different ways we demonstrate that our test has good power and size properties over the engle granger test when there are asymmetric departures from equilibrium we consider an application namely whether there exists cointegration among interest rates for instruments with different maturities this issue has been widely tested with mixed results we argue that either cautious policy or possibly opportunistic behavior on the part of the federal reserve implies that an equilibrium relationship between short and long term interest rates exists but that adjustments from disequilibrium are asymmetric in nature empirical tests using u s yields confirm the asymmetric nature of error correction among interest rates of different maturities

structural change in the united states social preference function 1953 88 many studies have used gallup poll data to estimate the relationship between presidential popularity and inflaion and unemployment typically these estimates are made over the terms of several presidents the only time varying effect included in these studies is an intercept dummy no account is taken of the possibility that there may be changes in the positions or slope of the indifference curves between inflation nd unemployment within this paper we estimate the us public s social preference function between inflation and unemployment as a quadratic within a sets of equations framework a series of f tests leads us to believe that there is structural change in the economic variables as well as in the intercepts over time thus estimating each administration individually or in the sets of equations format is superior to constraining slope coefficients to be equal across administrations by simply estimating the function over the entire time period we hypothesize that the public has become somewhat mo

does there exist a political business cycle a box tiao analysis theories of the political business cycle are by now common they range from the elegant theoretical work of nordhaus 1975 to the essentially empirical work of tufte 1978 they all assume that politicians manipulate the economy to aid their reelection efforts in particular politicians manipulate macroeconomic policy to create a boom just before election day golden and poterba 1980 provide an excellent review of this literature both tufte and nordhaus provide casual evidence for the existence of a political business cycle using inflation and unemployment rates as indicators of macroeconomic outcomes tufte and nordhaus predict at a minimum that unemployment should be decreasing before election day if presidents are really manipulating the economy very well then unemployment should be at a minimum in the october before the election and hence should be rising after the election in the nordhaus version the economy pays for the pre election boom with a post election surge in the inflation rate nordhaus also suggests that the president should engineer a recession early in his term to reduce inflationary expectations tufte 1978 20 presents graphs of the unemployment series and claims that visual examination shows them to be generally consistent with the hypothesis however he provides no statistical tests of the hypothesis nor does he estimate the quantitative impact of elections on unemployment tufte does not examine the inflation series nordhaus restricts himself to comparing unemployment rates in the two years preceeding and following an election with a simple nonparametric test supporting the hypothesis the literature provides several good empirical tests of the political business cycle hypothesis both paldam 1979 and mccallum 1978 test for the existence of four year cycles and find none however they do not test for discontinuous changes in the series around election day golden and poterba examine whether the use of policy instruments changes near election day and

emporiophobia fear of markets cooperation or competition there is widespread emporiophobia fear of markets and this has important policy implications as it leads voters to demand anti market policies there are many reasons for this anti market attitude however economists could reduce emporiophobia if we stressed cooperation rather than competition in our writings and policy discussions in a sample of introductory textbooks competition is mentioned on average 8 times as often as cooperation the fundamental economic unit is the transaction and transactions are cooperative the benefit of a market economy increased consumer surplus comes from cooperation through transactions not from competition competition in a market economy is competition for the right to cooperate competition is important because it guarantees that the best cooperators will win and because it establishes the efficient terms for cooperation but cooperation is fundamental for most people competition has negative connotations as it focuses on losers while cooperation implies a winwin situation as an example if we say wal mart outcompeted its rivals we think of losing firms being bankrupted if we say wal mart did a better job of cooperating with its customers we think of the benefits created by wal mart economists in our policy and textbook writing should strive to use the second sort of locution not the first other implications involve the morality of the market giving back and characteristics of market failures

unraveling the relationship between presidential approval and the economy a multidimensional semiparametric approach summary empirical studies analyzing the determinants of us presidential popularity have delivered quite inconclusive results concerning the role of economic variables by assuming linear relationships we employ penalized spline smoothing in the context of semiparametric additive mixed models and allow for flexible functional forms and thus possible nonlinear effects for the economic determinants by controlling for the well known politically motivated covariables we find strong evidence for nonlinear and negative effects of unemployment inflation and government consumption on presidential approval additionally we present new results in favor of nonparametric trivariate interaction effects between the macroeconomic covariables copyright 2014 john wiley sons ltd

voting for pareto optimality a multidimensional analysis we compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their abilities to produce pareto superior and pareto optimal alternatives in fixed number of rounds of voting using a two dimensional spatial voting model with random proposals sincere proposals and strategic proposals our findings show that for random or sincere proposals majority rule is at least as likely to select a pareto optimal outcome as unanimity rule for strategic proposals the subgame perfect equilibrium under unanimity rule is pareto optimal for other k majority rules the outcome is pareto optimal or very close to it for outcomes that are both pareto optimal and pareto superior unanimity rule outperforms majority rule

the vp function revisited a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years nannestad and paldam public choice 79 213 245 1994 published herein an extremely influential review of the literature linking economics and elections what they called the vp functions in that work they offered a number of conclusions in proposition form about the state of the evidence in this field we present the key ones 16 in all and assess the extent to which they continue to hold in light of the new evidence about what has come to be known as economic voting as shall be shown nannestad and paldam were prescient in their early establishment of many of the principal results explaining how the economy moves the vote choice

the duration of interstate wars 1816 1985 we present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables we hypothesize that strategy terrain capabilities and government type among other variables will play key roles in determining the duration of war we test these hypotheses using hazard analysis and find empirical support for our key arguments we find that the realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior and type in determining war duration we also find that historically on average mobilization and strategic surprise have little effect on war duration and that wars are not duration dependent

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

forecasting asymmetric unemployment rates asymmetric behavior has been documented in postwar quar terly u s unemployment rates this suggests that improvement over conventional linear forecasts may be possible through the use of nonlinear time series models in this note an out of sample forecasting competition is carried out for a set of leading nonlinear time series models it is shown that several nonlinear forecasts do indeed dominate the linear forecast the results are sensitive however to whether a stationarity inducing transfor mation is applied to the nonstationary unemployment rate series

presidential popularity and macroeconomic performance are voters really so naive f ollowing the pioneering work of kramer 1971 numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between the macroeconomic performance of political administrations and their popularity or vote getting ability kramer s work showed that the aggregate congressional vote for an incumbent party can be explained rather well by variables indicating recent economic performance subsequent works have extended kramer s research by explaining presidential vote or gallup poll popularity data with similar models on one point almost all of these studies agree 2 votes and popularity can be explained well by models which suppose that voters judge policymakers on the basis of retrospective evaluation of past macroeconomic outcomes most authors interpret their results as being supportive of the hypothesis of rational voters since the evidence indicates that voting decisions are not based purely upon personalities party affiliation or chance kramer argued that if voters regard past macroeconomic performance of an administration to be indicative of future performance then a concern with past performance indicates a concern for future performance voters who simply extrapolate from the past to predict the future are rather naive however a sophisticated voter who has an understanding of the important intertemporal constraints embodied in the structure of the economy would be able to forecast future consequences of current policy choices more accurately than one who simply extrapolates if votes and popularity are simply functions of past outcomes then voters must either be ignorant of the basic structure of the economy or unconcerned with the future the supposition that voters are so naive might run counter to the intuition of most economists who generally assume individual rationality as a central behavioral postulate nevertheless the empirical results noted above have been accepted by many as evidence that voters do misperceive their own long run interest the implications of the naive voter hypothesis for macroeconomic policymaking are disturbing nordhaus 1975 has developed a model which shows that voter naivete can encourage vote maximizing politicians to induce political business cycles and an inflationary bias there is some but not unanimous empirical support for the existence of politically motivated business cycles and casual empiricism also suggests that politicians themselves believe in the naive voter 3 while studies show that empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that voters are concerned with the recent past the results do not reject a sophisticated voter hypothesis none of the aforementioned studies has tested a model consistent with a sophisticated voter hypothesis i e a model in which voters understand what outcomes are feasible in the long and short runs and are concerned with future as well as current and past economic performance in this paper we develop such a model and estimate it using gallup poll data on presidential popularity results of this model are compared to results from a naive voter model similar to those employed in previous research received for publication february 4 1982 revision accepted for publication july 30 1982 university of south carolina i am grateful for helpful comments provided by ray fair douglas hibbs william keech daniel richards abel l da costa fernandes and an anonymous referee i also wish to thank william keech for providing me with the gallup poll data on presidential approval rates aurel schubert provided excellent research assistance fair 1978a bloom and price 1975 arcelus and meltzer 1975 and pollard 1981 a 1981 b have all estimated models to explain voting while frey and schneider 1978 and hibbs i 982a 1982b have developed models to explain presidential popularity 2 an exception is provided by arcelus and meltzer 1975 3nordhaus 1975 and tufte 1978 have provided evidence of political business cycles for a number of western democracies and frey and schneider 1978 and maloney and smirlock 1981 have estimated policy reaction functions suggesting that the timing of elections affects policymaking see tufte for a discussion of casual empirical evidence indicating that politicians believe that current economic conditions affect electoral outcomes

social preferences inflation unemployment and political business cycles econometric evidence for the reagan presidency it is now common for theoretical analyses of macroeconomic policy to assume that the public s social preferences between inflation and unemployment may be represented by an indifference map that is concave to the origin and most assume that the functional form is quadratic we estimate such a quadratic social preference function we proxy public satisfaction by the public s rating of presidential performance using gallup poll data 2 such data have been widely used by both economists and political scientists in analyses of the economic and non economic determinants of presidential popularity 3 as we have found 33 that over the period 1953 to 1988 there have been structural shifts in the relationship between presidential popularity and inflation and unemployment we limit our analysis to only one presidency the reagan administration

business cycles and the political process the interrelationship between the political sector and the macroeconomy in democratic societies has been examined extensively in recent years research in this area has generally been concerned with two issues first following the lead of kramer 16 various authors have examined the impact of economic conditions on congressional 1 13 21 24 and presidential elections 4 5 the results at the congressional level have been mixed but it is reasonably safe to conclude that economic conditions do affect presidential elections the second issue and the one of primary concern in this study has dealt with the development of models of politico economic interaction the basic concept in these models is that an administration s popularity and therefore the probability of staying in power depends critically on economic conditions knowing this the administration seeks to manipulate the economy in order to maintain power the use of economic tools for political goals by governments is well established in the literature theoretical contributions by nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 have demonstrated the potential for a politically motivated business cycle in a world of politico economic interaction empirical support for the existence of such a cycle is provided by the work of frey and schneider 7 8 9 the main purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the political business cycle that generates empirically testable proposition the goal is to integrate the theoretical conclusions of a formal model similar to the nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 framework with the empirical support provided by frey and schneider 7 8 9 the possibility of a political business cycle is important for several reasons in macroeconometric models government policy that is endogenous to the system is usually treated as if it were exogenous this may cause serious misspecification errors further forecasts of the future course of economic events which depend heavily on government action will be inaccurate unless the political motivations of governments are considered

perceived inflation under loss aversion building on prospect theory we apply the concept of loss aversion to the formation of inflation perceptions and test empirically for nonlinearities in the inflation perceptions relation for a panel of 10 euro area countries specifically under the assumption of loss aversion inflation changes above a certain reference rate will be perceived more strongly rejecting rationality of inflation perceptions in general under symmetric loss and in a majority of cases under flexible loss functions panel smooth transition models give evidence of nonlinearities in the inflation perceptions relation regarding both actual inflation and time this result is confirmed by dynamic fixed effects estimates where the slope of the estimated value function is significantly steeper in the loss region and the implied average reference inflation rate is found close to 2

presidential popularity and the economy abstract this study tests the hypothesis that the sensitivity of the president s popularity to economic events differs across distinct demographic groups assuming that presidental popularity is negatively related to both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate the electorate is disaggregated according to sex age race education income and political affiliation and separate regressions are estimated for the individual subgroups using quarterly data covering 1976 through 1988 statistically significant differences in the marginal effects of unemployment and inflation on presidential approval are discovered for the various subgroupings

peasants or bankers the american electorate and the u s economy t he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the retrospective economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience voter as peasant a second model assumes a sophisticated economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations voter as banker using the components both retrospective and prospective of the index of consumer sentiment ics as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series with aggregate consumer expectations about long term business conditions in the approval equation neither the usual economic indicators not the other ics components matter moreover short term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy the qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen economics moves political behavior with hard times administrations lose support with good times they gain it we know this to be true but when we ask how by what processes the political translation of economic experience occurs the an

presidential approval and macroeconomic conditions evidence from a nonlinear model abstractcontrary to previous empirical studies that find a linear link between economic conditions and presidential approval this study argues for and finds a nonlinear relationship a threshold regression is used to assess potential nonlinear relationships between macroeconomic variables and presidential popularity a quarterly data analysis for the 1960q1 2012q2 time period reveals that domestic factors prevail in shaping presidential approval most compelling is evidence of a threshold relationship involving economic conditions when unemployment is slightly over 7 its decline impacts significantly and favourably on presidential approval an effect that virtually disappears below the threshold value change in consumer sentiment affects presidential approval in a limited way while inflation shows no association at all these results combine to encourage further investigation of nonlinear processes in the nexus of economics and politics

electoral and partisan cycles between us economic performance and presidential popularity empirical voting popularity research examines parameters that relate economic performance to voting and popularity not the interaction of these parameters with movements in economic performance which is what actually influences voting and popularity this paper examines that interaction for the usa from 1953 1 1990 4 by decomposing the response of popularity to economic performance by both political party and the quarter of the electoral term averaged over the electoral term economic performance increases the popularity of democrats but decreases it for republicans whereas near the election the opposite occurs overall the results appear consitent with a mix of partisan and electoral influences so that no single approach seems fully adequate

nonlinear growth effects of taxation a semi parametric approach using average marginal tax rates summary one of the major challenges of empirical tax research is the identification and calculation of appropriate tax data while there is consensus that average marginal tax rates are most suitable for studying the effects of tax policy on economic growth because of data limitations the calculation of marginal tax rates has been limited to the usa and the uk this paper provides calculations of average marginal tax rates for the four scandinavian countries using the methodologies of seater 1982 1985 and barro and sahasakul 1983 1986 then by pooling the newly calculated tax rates for the scandinavian countries with the data for the usa and the uk we investigate the effects of tax policy shocks on the per capita gdp growth rate our results suggest that an increase in average marginal tax rates has a negative impact on economic growth employing additive mixed panel models with penalized splines as estimation approach we show that changes in tax rates have nonlinear effects increasing average marginal tax rates turn out to be the most distorting at relatively moderate tax rates copyright 2013 john wiley sons ltd

what makes people think like economists evidence on economic cognition from the survey of americans and economists on the economy abstract the positive economic beliefs of economists and the general public systematically differ what factors make noneconomists think more like economists using the survey of americans and economists on the economy this paper shows people think more like economists 1 if they are well educated 2 if they are male 3 if their real income rose over the last 5 years 4 if they expect their real income to rise over the next 5 years or 5 if they have a high degree of job security however neither high income nor ideological conservatism have this effect my findings for education gender and income have close parallels in political science on tests of objective political knowledge the better educated and males score higher controlling for numerous other variables and the independent effect of income is minor

reciprocity as a foundation of financial economics this paper argues that the subsistence of the fundamental theorem of contemporary financial mathematics is the ethical concept reciprocity the argument is based on identifying an equivalence between the contemporary and ostensibly value neutral fundamental theory of asset pricing with theories of mathematical probability that emerged in the seventeenth century in the context of the ethical assessment of commercial contracts in a framework of aristotelian ethics this observation the main claim of the paper is justified on the basis of results from the ultimatum game and is analysed within a framework of pragmatic philosophy the analysis leads to the explanatory hypothesis that markets are centres of communicative action with reciprocity as a rule of discourse the purpose of the paper is to reorientate financial economics to emphasise the objectives of cooperation and social cohesion and to this end we offer specific policy advice

an experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule dougherty and edward public choice 151 3 655 678 2012 make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random sincere or strategic we test these competing hypotheses in a two dimensional framework using laboratory experiments our primary results suggest 1 majority rule enters the pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule 2 majority rule leaves the pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule and 3 majority rule is more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game

public perceptions of macroeconomic policy during the bush presidency this paper analyzes the public s perceptions of macroeconomic policy during the bush presidency it links the public s view of president bush s performance with respect to unemployment and inflation to the actual behavior of unemployment and inflation and the public s expectations of their future behavior we find that both the level of unemployment and the expected change in unemployment significantly influenced the public s perception of the president s performance inflation and expectations about inflation did not play an important role

estimating investment rigidity within a threshold regression framework the case of u s hog production sector this article addresses the issues of investment disinvestment asymmetry and a possible existence of a sluggish regime in the demand for a quasi fixed input in the u s hog production sector adopting a new threshold estimation procedure quarterly data from 1970 through 2002 are used to estimate a regimedependent investment demand equation for a quasi fixed input taking sows as a proxy the results support the existence of three regimes over alternative specifications precluding the sluggish regime confirming the existence of asset fixity in hog production the results also highlight the importance of accounting for investment rigidity when estimating hog supply and variable input demands the importance of the u s swine industry is far reaching and can be highlighted by its economic contribution to different sectors along the supply chain involving hog producers pork processors and consumers according to the national pork producers council nppc 2002 the industry supported an estimated 800 000 domestic jobs in 2002 and generated more than 72 billion in total domestic economic activities furthermore the united stated is a leading pork exporter with its exports valued at 1 5 billion in 2002 of the 72 billion worth of domestic economic activities receipts from hog sales account for more than 11 billion per year the hog sector also contributes an additional 27 billion from the utilization of corn soybean and other inputs nppc the structure of the hog production sector has changed dramatically during the past decade with large hog operations becoming increasingly dominant between 1994 and 2004 the proportion of hog operations with more than 2 000 hogs has doubled from 38 to 79 of all hogs

globalization pressures and the state the worldwide spread of central bank independence the authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank following the world system world society and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology they assume that states are in cultural political and economic competition with each other thereby seeking to maintain their position and status frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment the authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade investment and multilateral lending increases they also model the cross national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role equivalent trade relationships between countries they find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000

central bank behavior a positive empirical analysis abstract the central bank is analyzed as a utility maximizing unit acting in the framework of a politico economic model it derives utility from keeping the price level stable and is constrained by government the structure of the economy and the political commitment to stable exchange rates it uses a satisficing strategy concentrating on keeping conflicts with government below a certain level in the case of serious conflict the central bank follows the policy directions undertaken by government but with a time lag the complete model comprising endogenous consumer voters government and central bank is econometrically tested for germany with good results

politics and the fed in the standard economic model of policy choice choices are made by analyzing the social welfare implications to find welfare optimizing policy choices in this paper i argue that in a democratic government and perhaps elsewhere policy choices emerge from a political process people vote the voting process chooses elected representatives with their appointees the representatives make policy choices the appropriate model for policy analysis is a political economy model this conclusion is reinforced by my fifteen years of studying the history of the federal reserve 1 from the start that study reflected the influence of james buchanan and many others who followed him by analyzing policy choices made by individuals or committees motivated by considerations other than optimal welfare some of my prior work with alex cukierman and scott richard is fully in that tradition meltzer cukierman and richard 1991 consider recent federal reserve policy the federal reserve has more than doubled the size of its balance sheet it has more than 1 trillion of excess reserves and more than 1 trillion of long term relatively illiquid mortgage backed securities no central bank in a developed country ever had so much long term debt in 1932 a much less informed federal reserve board refused a request from congress to support the mortgage market congress responded by creating the home loan banks a fiscal solution the current board undertook the fiscal operations this is a political decision who would claim it is optimal policy in the late 1970s congress gave the federal reserve a dual mandate except for the years of moderation it has acted lexicographically from 1979 to 1982 it pursued disinflation letting unemployment rise to 10 8 percent before 1979 it concentrated on 1

buchanan economics and politics author affiliation paul h rubin samuel candler dobbs professor of economics emory university department of economics 312e rich building 1602 fishburne drive atlanta ga 30322 2240 usa e mail prubin emory edu1 introductionmy work has been greatly influenced by jim buchanan much of my early work was in public choice see e g kau and rubin 1979 2002 of course this field would not exist without the calculus of consent buchanan and tullock 1962 more recently my research has gone in different directions but it still bears jim s influence i take as my text today a statement from jim buchanan s great presidential address to the southern economic association in 1963 economics is the study of the whole system of exchange relationships politics is the study of the whole system of coercive or potentially coercive relationships buchanan 1964 p 220 i agree with this statement but in this tribute i want to extend this analysis a little bit i want to point out some additional differences between thinking about economics and thinking about politics some of this analysis is based on my work on the biology of politics rubin 2002 2003 based on that work i have come to the conclusion that in some sense political thinking is more basic to our minds than is economic thinking that is when faced with an interpersonal issue that does not involve family or sex an individual untrained in economics is more likely to treat it as a political issue than as an economic issue indeed one of our tasks as economists is or should be to educate our students and the public about the distinction between economics and politics pinker 2003 not an economist argues that economics is one area where human intuitions are lacking and that it is important to teach economics for this reason 2 characteristics of political versus economic thinkinghere are some of the relevant characteristics of political thinking as contrasted with economic thinking i politics is about competition for resources while economics is about cooperation to generate surpluses ii political thinking tends to be zero sum division of a fixed pie economics allows for positive sum interactions iii politics is an us versus them conflict we are a tribal species with tribal competition economics is universal trade with anyone is beneficial iv perhaps because of its us versus them nature politics is dichotomous win or lose good or bad economics is continuous more or less how much v political processes are controlled by specific active agents the chief the king the general these agents may be heroes or villains but they are purposeful agents economics deals with processes as the market process or the invisible hand vi politics focuses on motives economics focuses on net outputs i now discuss each of these issues in turn competitionthe most important error in economic thinking is associated with one of the most fundamental concepts of economics competition as buchanan argues in his address the fundamental unit of economics is the transaction and transactions are cooperative competition is important but it is a tool to improve cooperation buchanan among others points out that in the purely competitive model there is no competition but we do not fully understand or analyze the implications even in nonperfectly competitive environments the degree of competition is overestimated firms in this environment do compete with each other but they are competing for the right to cooperate with consumers and suppliers including workers a monopolist is a firm with an exclusive ability or right to cooperate with consumers in some market we focus on competition rather than cooperation because of our political bias toward looking at markets through the lens of politics competition is between firms which are actively striving to accomplish some goal

inflation and the growth rate in the united states natural output the continuing and rising rate of inflation in the united states is of concern because inflation is not harmless inflation causes economic agents to waste time and resources reducing the growth rate of productivity and the natural level of output the size of this effect is estimated using in which an inflation variable natural growth rate is embedded in an expectations augmented phillis curve or lucas surprise function the effect is large for each one percentage point decrease in the annual inflation rate the annual growth rate in productivity is reduced by 0 223 percentage points thus a reduction in inflatin from 6 to zero would increase the natural rate of output growth by one and one third percentage points per year given the unwillingness of politicians and perhaps the chairman of the federal reserve system to attempt aggressively to lower the rate of inflation there is considerable merit in an institutional reform that directs the federal reserve to reduce inflation to zero and maintain p

economic experts versus average americans abstract we compare answers to policy questions by economic experts and a representative sample of the us population we find a 35 percentage point difference between the two groups this gap is on

the taylor rule and opportunistic monetary policy we investigate the possibility that the taylor rule should be formulated as a threshold process such that the federal reserve acts more aggressively in some circumstances than in others it seems reasonable that the federal reserve would act more aggressively when inflation is high than when it is low similarly it might be expected that the federal reserve responds more to a negative than a positive output gap although these specifications receive some empirical support we find that a modified threshold model that is consistent with opportunistic monetary policy makes significant progress toward explaining federal reserve behavior

the public s indifference map between inflation and unemployment empirical evidence for the nixon ford carter and reagan presidencies we have succesfully estimated the public s indifference map between inflation and unemployment the indifference curves are nonlinear and concave to the origin for most unemployment rates the data are insufficient to permit us to be sure of the form at low unemployment rates there is clear evidence of honeymoon and watergate effects and a reagan as president effect the public dislikes expected and unexpected inflation equally