optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge we study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting the resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems since both the difficulty of the questions posed to consultants and the knowledge of those consultants are hard to assess we show that spot contracting is not efficient because lemons in this case self employed producers with intermediate knowledge cannot be appropriately excluded from the market however an ex ante firm like contractual arrangement uniquely delivers the first best this arrangement involves hierarchies in which consultants are full residual claimants of output and compensate producers via incentive contracts this simple characterization of the optimal ex ante arrangement suggests a rationale for the organization of firms and the structure of compensation in knowledge intensive sectors our findings correspond empirically to observed arrangements inside professional service firms and between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs

an empirical examination of quality certification in a lemons market i introduction researchers have long understood that a variety of mechanisms may be used to overcome problems of adverse selection stigler 1961 224 notes that s ome forms of economic organization may be explicable chiefly as devices for eliminating uncertainties in quality and akerlof 1970 cites independent groups such as the consumers union and united laboratories that test and certify the quality of goods there is however little empirical evidence that illustrates the effectiveness of such mechanisms in this article we examine the effect certification has on a market characterized by adverse selection using data from the market for young thoroughbreds we compare the performance of sales where auction houses provide certification services with sales where certification is absent the thoroughbred racehorse market consists of two distinct types of public auctions certified and noncertified sales in a certified sale auction houses physically inspect the horses nominated to their sales selling only the horses they conclude are from the upper end of the quality distribution in noncertified sales auction houses sell all horses nominated to a sale our empirical strategy is to perform tests that indicate whether adverse selection affects market outcomes in either certified or noncertified sales a finding that adverse selection is present in noncertified sales but absent in certified sales is consistent with the hypothesis that certification alleviates problems of adverse selection we adopt three approaches to test for the presence of adverse selection 1 the first approach is in the spirit of chiappori and salanie 2000 who examine the relationship between unobservable factors from participation and performance equations we model adverse selection as a case of sample selection bias and examine the correlation between errors in participation and price equations 2 to accomplish this we use a unique data set that allows us to estimate how breeder decisions to sell or retain horses affect market prices the data set consists of a 10 random sample of all thoroughbreds born in 1993 and includes both horses retained by their breeders who own a horse at the time of its birth and horses that breeders chose to sell our second test follows genesove 1993 and chezum and wimmer 1997 by examining the relationship between seller characteristics and price theoretically when observable seller characteristics are correlated with seller incentives to select goods adversely prices should reflect these differences chezum and wimmer observe that some breeders sell all of their horses whereas others retain a portion to race they find that market prices are inversely related to the extent of a breeder s involvement in racing concluding that adverse selection affects market outcomes we extend this work in two respects first we isolate the effect seller characteristics have on price through the decision to sell or retain a horse second we compare the effect seller characteristics have on observed prices in certified and noncertified sales our last test follows bond 1982 who attempts to identify adverse selection in the market for used trucks by comparing the repair records of trucks that were sold with the records of trucks retained by their original owners because the horses in our sample had not begun their racing careers at the time they were sold we use data on racetrack earnings as an ex post measure of quality and compare the quality of horses sold in noncertified sales with certified horses and horses retained by their breeders the results from each approach are consistent with certification alleviating problems of adverse selection we find that holding observable attributes constant horses that would receive unusually high market prices in noncertified sales are even more valuable in other options and are less likely to be sold in a noncertified sale

the market for lawyers and quality layers in legal services we study the functioning of the market for lawyers considering the strategic interaction among litigants lawyers and judges we investigate the value of legal representation and of systems of quality certification such as the queen s counsel system in our setting higher quality lawyers obtain better quality evidence and are better able to interpret it judges receive information from the lawyers and have reputational concerns we show that reputational concerns generate a decision bias in favor of certified lawyers and that this causes misallocation of lawyers at the market equilibrium as a result whereas a higher quality of lawyers increases welfare public information over quality may be welfare reducing

optimal wage taxation when human capital and employment are endogenous this paper studies how optimal wage tax conclusions from the classic two period life cycle model of human capital accumulation are affected by endogenizing the number of taxpaying workers in the absence of a corrective policy young individuals underinvest in human capital from a social perspective because tax premiums for transfers to nonworkers are not actuarially adjusted downward for human capital attainment a combination of wage taxes and wage subsidies can restore proper price signals numerical simulations suggest that even modest employment elasticities can be sufficient to substantially impact the magnitudes and even the signs of optimal wage tax rates jel h21 h3 j24

marginal welfare costs of taxation with human and physical capital i introduction marginal welfare cost of taxation is the amount by which the social cost of an additional tax dollar differs from 1 because of distortionary taxation browning and johnson 1984 stuart 1984 browning 1987 ballard 1988 and allgood and snow 1998 use static models of the u s economy in which labor supplies adjust but the stocks of human and physical capital are fixed to calculate estimates of this welfare cost relevant to cost benefit analysis the studies by lucas 1990 and perroni 1995 incorporate human and physical capital into calculations of excess burden for the purpose of comparing alternative tax systems but do not address the welfare costs of marginal tax and spending reforms ballard et al 1985 and judd 1987 provide estimates of welfare cost using models that allow the stock of physical capital to change in response to marginal reforms but the stock of human capital is exogenous in these studies however judd 2001 argues that there is ample evidence indicating that human capital investment decisions have a significant effect on the cost of altering the tax system which suggests that these decisions could also have an important influence on marginal welfare cost in this article we present estimates of welfare costs for marginal reforms to government tax and spending policies when labor supply saving and education decisions are all endogenous we focus our analysis on marginal reforms because as skinner and slemrod 1985 observe most policy reforms enacted do not involve replacing one tax or spending system with another but instead typically entail marginal adjustments in tax laws and government appropriations using a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with a three period life cycle we derive analytical expressions for the changes in labor supply saving and education and use them to calculate marginal welfare cost as shown by auerbach et al 1983 in overlapping generations models steady state welfare comparisons of alternative tax policies are biased unless households are compensated for intergenerational redistribution along the transition path to arrive at our steady state estimates of welfare costs we adapt the compensation method introduced by gravelle 1991 for analyzing fundamental tax reforms to the context of incremental tax and spending reforms in a static one consumer model triest 1990 has shown that marginal welfare cost mwc is positive solely because of tax leakage the decline in tax revenue caused by reductions in the tax base we extend this insight to an intertemporal context that incorporates tax leakage arising from changes in both human and physical capital investment we evaluate three sets of reforms first a revenue neutral reduction in the tax on capital income funded by a higher tax on labor income second spending on a public good financed by either a higher tax on labor or interest income third a per capita lump sum transfer or demogrant also funded by either a higher tax on labor or interest income we find that marginal welfare costs are uniformly lower in the dynamic model where investment decisions are endogenous than in the static model where investment decisions are fixed and that the majority of the difference between the dynamic and static estimates is attributable to human capital decisions the principal reason is that a reallocation of time between labor hours and human capital investment has opposing and potentially offsetting effects on effective labor supply as a result labor supply responds less elastically in the dynamic model and changes in labor supply are the main source of tax leakage because wage taxation is the main source of tax revenue we also find that shifting marginal financing from capital to labor results in a lower welfare cost the reason being that such a change encourages saving which increases wage rates and stimulates labor supply leading to a reduction in marginal welfare costs

the impact of regulations on the supply and quality of care in child care markets we examine the impact of state child care regulations on the supply and quality of care in child care markets we exploit panel data on both individual establishments and local markets to control for state time and where possible establishment specific fixed effects to mitigate the potential bias due to policy endogeneity we find that the imposition of regulations reduces the number of center based child care establishments especially in lower income markets however such regulations increase the quality of services provided especially in higher income areas thus there are winners and losers from the regulation of child care services

the effect of taxation on human capital this study finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital of the few earlier studies to address this issue most suggested a negligible effect of taxation on investment in human capital this earlier conclusion is shown to be incorrect by using a model that is more general in several respects than the models used previously

longevity and public old age pensions i introduction conventional economic analysis of intertemporal or intergenerational resource allocation takes longevity as exogenously determined by biological or technological factors within this framework the institution of a mandatory public old age pensions of a pay as you go type unambiguously reduces capital accumulation the intuition behind this result is that when the young expect an old age pension after retirement and at the same time pay an earmarked payroll tax that lowers disposable income the ability and the incentive to save are reduced such a result however ignores the possibility that an individual who has a survivorship contingent title to an old age pension might use resources to increase the likelihood of survival to acquire the promised pension the fact that over the past century both longevity and the size of old age pensions have risen suggests that a more complete model that incorporates longevity as a choice variable may be useful in understanding the simultaneous increase in longevity and old age pensions ehrlich and chuma 1990 consider the demand for longevity in a world where the certain length of life is a fixed function of health care expenditures thus making longevity endogenous in their model consumers choose the optimal depreciation rate for human capital by choosing the path of health care expenditures their work paves the way for consideration of the effect of longevity contingent property rights on behavior in a more recent paper philipson and becker 1998 build on the work of ehrlich and chuma by modeling longevity contingent claims in the form of old age pensions among other things they find that an increase in a longevity contingent old age pension will induce individuals to live longer as a result of this longer life philipson and becker question the traditional result that pay as you go old age pensions always reduce the capital stock because workers who choose greater longevity may also choose to save more during their working years to finance their longer retirement period in this paper we introduce endogenous and uncertain lifetime into a two period overlapping generations olg model we depart from the traditional diamond type olg model by measuring longevity as the probability of survival into the second period and by allowing individuals to affect their survival probability through spending on longevity extending activities within this framework we examine the effects of a pay as you go old age pension on longevity and capital accumulation under two polar assumptions concerning the existence and absence of a fair intragenerational annuity market in either case the longevity effect of an increase in the old age pension is neutral while the capital stock effect is strictly negative if the interest rate and population growth rate are equal e g if the economy is on a golden rule path surprisingly increasing the old age pension produces both a negative longevity and savings effect for the more relevant case where the interest rate is larger than the population growth rate that an increase in the old age pension produces a negative capital stock effect is anticipated but the neutral or negative effect on longevity is counterintuitive it is counterintuitive because the empirical evidence seems to show lockstep increases in both longevity and government provided retirement benefits in the form of pensions and heath care benefits furthermore longevity insurance conjures up the moral hazard problem where increased utilization is expected with government provision the funding pool expands with use the cost being borne by workers the fact that the workers bear the burden of increasing the old age pension helps explain the longevity results we obtain when the population grows at the same rate as the return on capital an increase in the pension is offset by a dollar for dollar reduction in private savings leaving second period consumption unchanged

government debt and economic growth in an overlapping generations model prior studies have shown that an increase in government debt raises the real interest rate and lowers the rate of economic growth in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth this paper shows that an increase in government debt may not increase the real interest rate with the real interest rate being greater than the growth and that an introduction of government debt will increase the growth rate of per capita output if the growth rate is greater than the real interest rate and will decrease the growth rate if the growth rate is less than the real interest rate recent decades have seen a large increase in the share of government debt in national income in many countries this paper develops an endogenous growth model of overlapping generations to examine the effect of government debt on the rate of economic growth most prior studies of the effects of government policies on economic growth have assumed that government debt is absent romer 1986 jones and manuelli 1990 king and rebelo 1990 and rebelo 1991 showed that when government spending is not productive an increase in the income tax rate will lower the rate of per capita output growth 2 barro 1990 showed that an increase in government spending may either increase or decrease the rate of growth in a model with productive government spending government debt was incorporated in endogenous growth models by king 1992 and van der ploeg and alogoskoufis 1994 king 1992 developed a model of endogenous growth and showed that a necessary condition for the feasibility of perpetual debt finance is that labor s share of income must be greater than two thirds van der ploeg and alogoskoufis 1994 developed a blanchard type overlapping generations og model of endogenous growth and found that an increase in government debt arising from an intertemporal shift in taxation reduces the growth rate this paper analyzes the effect of government debt by developing a diamond type of og

taxing capital in a large open economy abstract this paper analyzes capital taxation in a dynamic optimizing equilibrium model of a large open economy it is shown that the existence of current account imbalances may yield surprising results for example if a country has a current account deficit the tendency of an increased tax on investment to lower wages is dampened if the deficit is sufficiently large an increased investment tax may actually increase both wages and welfare in the long run a country with a current account surplus may find that temporary investment incentives improve its current account in all but the short run

labor income taxation and human capital accumulation abstract this paper provides alternative analytical results concerning the effect of labor income taxation on human capital accumulation with the tax revenues being consumed by the government and savings being negatively related to the labor tax rate an increase in the labor income tax rate reduces the incentive for human capital accumulation and thus decreases human capital with tax revenues being consumed by government and savings being positively related to the labor tax rate an increase in the tax rate increases the incentive for human capital accumulation and increases human capital with the tax revenues being used to compensate the individuals who pay the taxes an increase in the tax rate has no effect on human capital

quality reputation and the choice of organizational form this paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior we extend the glaeser and shleifer glaeser e shleifer a 2001 not for profit entrepreneurs journal of public economics 81 99 115 framework which studies an entrepreneur s optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non contractible into a repeated interaction setting the main result is that when reputations can be sustained then for profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured this finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer consumer relationship may be inadequate

the new closed shop the economic and structural effects of occupational licensure during the past few decades licensure a state enforced mechanism for regulating occupational entry quickly became the most prevalent form of occupational closure broad consensus among researchers holds that licensure creates wage premiums by establishing economic monopolies this article demonstrates that contrary to established wisdom licensure does not limit competition nor does it increase wages results are based on a new occupational dataset covering 30 years that exploits interstate variability in licensure across the 300 census identified occupations i argue that licensure instead of increasing wages creates a set of institutional mechanisms that enhance entry into the occupation particularly for historically disadvantaged groups while simultaneously stagnating quality

experience and gender effects in an acquiring a company experiment allowing for value messages this paper focuses on a bargaining experiment in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for acquiring the company participants are constantly in the role of either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with randomly changing partners in the other role we test how overstating the value of the company underpricing the received value message and acceptance of price offers are affected by experience and gender constellation like in our companion paper on single play di cagno et al 2015 we control via treatments for awareness of gender constellation one main hypothesis is that gender constellation matters but that the effects become weaker with more experience and that the main experience effects apply across gender constellations

investment moral hazard and occupational licensing i analyse occupational licensing as an input regulation that requires minimum levels of human capital investment by professionals by raising professionals training levels licensing helps alleviate moral hazard problems associated with the provision of high quality services i also consider certification whereby consumers are provided information about professionals training levels i show that licensing and certification tend to benefit consumers who value quality highly at the expense of those who do not licensing may raise total surplus if sellers investments are not observable but is pareto worsening if training levels are observable certification may however lead to excessive investment as a signalling device and thus be pareto inferior to either licensing or to a policy of laissez faire

factor taxation and labor supply in a dynamic one sector growth model abstract this paper studies a class of ak type growth models with factor income taxes public capital stock and labor leisure trade offs while a higher capital tax rate reduces economic growth in the short run the long term growth effect is ambiguous and remains ambiguous even if the level of tax rate is larger than the degree of government externality a higher labor income tax rate has ambiguous growth effects both in the short and long runs however if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply is sufficiently small a higher labor tax rate always lowers economic growth in the long run despite the existence of productive government taxation

wage effects of unionization and occupational licensing coverage in the united states recent estimates in standard models of wage determination for both unionization and occupational licensing have shown wage effects that are similar across the two institutions these cross sectional estimates use specialized data sets with small sample sizes for the period 2006 to 2008 the authors analysis examines the impact of unions and licensing coverage on wage determination using new data collected on licensing statutes that are then linked to longitudinal data from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy79 from 1979 to 2010 they develop several approaches using both cross sectional and longitudinal analyses to measure the impact of these two labor market institutions on wage determination the estimates of the economic returns to union coverage are greater than those for licensing statutes

capital income taxation in a world economy a territorial system versus a residence system this paper investigates the effects of a tax reform of conversion from capital income to consumption taxes on capital accumulation in a two country model in the territorial system the tax reform will normally lead to a negative comovement between capital accumulation in two countries while in the residence system it will lead to a positive comovement copyright 1991 by royal economic society

tax reform and external balance abstract this paper examines the effect of a transformation from capital taxation to consumption in an open economy with the residential capital tax rate being endogenous an increase in the domestic consumption tax rate decreases the interest rate increases capital accumulation and increases the domestic country s net foreign asset holdings and trade surplus with the territorial capital tax rate being endogenous an increase in the domestic consumption tax rate may either increase or decrease the domestic country s interest rate net foreign asset holdings and trade surplus depending on the interest elasticity of capital demand

the self regulating profession slayton and treblicock 1978 the formal analysis of the economics of the self regulating profession has received little attention from theorists if a profession is self regulating in the sense that its current members being the sole suppliers of a certain type of service are free to determine in one way or another whether or not to admit a potential recruit then it might seem prima facie that such a profession could simply be regarded as a monopolistic seller of the service in question so that the effects of self regulation would appear to involve an unambiguous welfare loss the whole rationale for self regulation however rests on the notion that it provides a vehicle through which the quality of the service may be maintained in markets where the consumer cannot readily measure this quality himself it is the analysis of the interplay of these two elements the enhanced price of such services associated with the monopolistic power of the profession and the improved quality of the service which may accompany a reduction in supply which forms the focus of the present paper it is tempting to begin the analysis of such a profession by first positing some particular