preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning abstract we analyze a three country model of trade negotiations in which countries can form bilateral free trade areas bilateral customs unions or a trilateral preferential trading arrangement and can continue negotiating after reaching an agreement in contrast to the literature on multilateral bargaining the set of agreements can form a nonpartitional network while in contrast to the network literature players can reach multilateral agreements patient enough countries only reach bilateral agreements if insiders gain more than outsiders which allows them to manipulate the status quo in subsequent negotiations however a hub and spoke pattern may then emerge and insiders then dissipate the advantages of strategic positioning we also use variants on the model to explain why a us commitment not to bargain bilaterally sustained progress at gatt negotiations and the rarity of open access preferential trading arrangements

competition in posted prices with stochastic discounts we study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers can subsequently receive discounts with some probability such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets in which sellers use the marketing practice of couponing even though bargainers receive reductions off the posted prices the potential to discount dampens competitive pressure in the market thus raising all prices and increasing profits welfare falls because of the stochastic nature of the discounts which generates some misallocation of products to consumers stochastic discounts facilitate collusion by reducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying abstract this paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a free trade agreement fta it uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously the effect of foreign lobbying under the fta is examined empirically using canadian industry level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin the analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy the heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important the presence of an organized lobbying group in an fta partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the fta is associated with less protection

imperfect competition information heterogeneity and financial contagion this study examines how heterogeneity of private information may induce financial contagion using a model of multi asset trading in which the three main channels of contagion through financial linkages in the literature correlated information correlated liquidity and portfolio rebalancing are ruled out by construction i show that financial contagion can still be an equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneous fundamental information risk neutral speculators trade strategically across many assets to mask their information advantage about one asset asymmetric sharing of information among them prevents rational market makers from learning about their individual signals and trades with sufficient accuracy incorrect cross inference about terminal payoffs and contagion ensue when used to analyze the transmission of shocks across countries my model suggests that the process of generation and disclosure of information in emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financial contagion jel d82 g14 g15

designing self reporting regimes to encourage truth telling an experimental study abstract we report results from an experiment that investigates truthfulness in self reporting under different reporting regimes the experiment involves a production task with self reporting of accidents with reporting compulsory for some participants but only voluntary for others we find that dishonesty is prevalent but accident reporting is more frequent with compulsory reporting compared with voluntary our results suggest that the lie aversion effect is stronger than any potential crowding out of intrinsic motivation to voluntarily report and that careful design of self reporting regimes is necessary by enforcement agencies to achieve satisfactory compliance outcomes our results are relevant for areas beyond regulatory compliance including dishonesty in social security claims insurance claims workplace expense claims income tax returns and financial reporting

endogeneity in brand choice models applications of random utility models to scanner data have been widely presented in marketing for the last 20 years one particular problem with these applications is that they have ignored possible correlations between the independent variables in the deterministic component of utility price promotion etc and the stochastic component or error term in fact marketing mix variables such as price not only affect brand purchasing probabilities but are themselves endogenously set by marketing managers this work tests whether these endogeneity problems are important enough to warrant consideration when estimating random utility models with scanner panel data our results show that not accounting for endogeneity may result in a substantial bias in the parameter estimates

race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car more than three hundred paired audits at new car dealerships reveal that dealers quoted significantly lower prices to white males than to black or female test buyers using identical scripted bargaining strategies ancillary evidence suggests that the dealerships disparate treatment of women and blacks may be caused by dealers statistical inferences about consumers reservation prices but the data do not strongly support any single theory of discrimination copyright 1995 by american economic association

portfolio manager behavior and global financial crises abstract i develop a two market agent based model to study how global portfolio managers affect global financial crises and stability first i create an agent based model where fund managers make their allocation decisions between two markets and a risk free asset based on the mean variance framework simulation results reveal that global managers do not create global financial crises second i extend the base model by incorporating insights from behavioral finance where risk is instead determined by fund manager losses simulation results reveal that slight global manager losses can trigger a widening of both markets risk premium accelerating the decline in asset prices worldwide statistical analysis reveals that global managers are a stabilizing force in smaller numbers however they become destabilizing in larger numbers the ability to reduce risk by diversifying across markets results in excessive risk taking if global managers exist in larger numbers systematic over leverage may result such that a deleveraging process can lead to the spreading of financial crises

momentum investment strategies portfolio performance and herding a study of mutual fund behavior this study analyzes the extent to which mutual funds purchase stocks based on their past returns as well as their tendency to exhibit herding behavior i e buying and selling the same stocks at the same time the authors find that 77 percent of the mutual funds were momentum investors buying stocks that were past winners however most did not systematically sell past losers on average funds that invested on momentum realized significantly better performance than other funds the authors also find relatively weak evidence that funds tended to buy and sell the same stocks at the same time copyright 1995 by american economic association

bilateralism multilateralism and the quest for global free trade abstract we develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature bilateral or multilateral of trade liberalization are endogenously determined to determine whether and how bilateralism matters we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis we find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements by contrast under symmetry both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade

nash s theory of cooperative games as a predictor of the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations an experiment in media purchasing the authors report an experimental investigation of the ability of nash s theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations using the purchase of media time as an ex

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

modeling interdependent consumer preferences abstract a consumer s preference for an offering can be influenced by the preferences of others in many ways ranging from social identification and inclusion to the benefits of network externalities in this article the authors introduce a bayesian spatial autoregressive discrete choice model to study the preference interdependence among individual consumers the autoregressive specification can reflect patterns of heterogeneity in which influence propagates within and across networks these patterns cannot be modeled with standard random effect specifications and can be difficult to capture with covariates in a linear model the authors illustrate their model of interdependent preferences with data on automobile purchases and show that preferences for japanese made cars are related to geographically and demographically defined networks

preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization permitted by article xxiv of the gatt on country s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade we present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups we show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization on one hand the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations on the other hand when countries share similar political preferences multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization

competitive pricing behavior in the auto market a structural analysis in a competitive marketplace the effectiveness of any element of the marketing mix is determined not only by its absolute value but also by its relative value with respect to the competition for example the effectiveness of a price cut in increasing demand is critically related to competitors reaction to the price change managers therefore need to know the nature of competitive interactions among firms in this paper we take a theory driven empirical approach to gain a deeper understanding of the competitive pricing behavior in the u s auto market the ability motivation paradigm posits that a firm needs both the ability and the motivation to succeed in implementing a strategy boulding and staelin 1995 we use arguments from the game theoretic literature to understand firm motivation and abilities in different segments of the auto market we then combine these insights from the game theoretic literature and the ability motivation paradigm to develop hypotheses about competition in different segments of the u s auto market to test our hypotheses of competitive behavior we estimate a structural model that disentangles the competition effect from the demand and cost effects on prices the theory of repeated games predicts that firms with a long run profitability objective will try to sustain cooperative pricing behavior as a stable equilibrium when conditions permit for example markets with high concentration and stable market environments are favorable for sustaining cooperative behavior and therefore provide firms with the ability to cooperate the theory of switching costs suggests that in markets in which a firm s current customers tend to be loyal firms have a motivation to compete very aggressively for new customers recognizing the positive benefits of loyalty from the customer base in the long run as consumer loyalty in the market increases the gains from increasing market share by means of aggressive competitive behavior are more than offset by losses in profit margins firms therefore have the motivation to price cooperatively empirically we find aggressive behavior in the minicom pact and subcompact segments cooperative behavior in the compact and midsize segments and bertrand behavior in the full size segment these findings are consistent with our theory based hypotheses about competition in different segments in estimating a structural model of the auto market we address several methodological issues a particular difficulty is the large number of car models in the u s auto market existing studies have inferred competitive behavior only in markets with two to four products they also use relatively simple functional forms of demand to facilitate easy estimation functional forms of demand however impose structure on cross elasticities between products such structure when inappropriate can bias the estimates of competitive interaction we therefore use the random coefficients logit demand model to allow flexibility in cross elasticities we also use recent advances in new empirical industrial organization neio to extend structural estimation of competitive behavior to markets with a large number of products we use the simulation based estimation approach developed by berry et al 1995 to estimate our model a frequent criticism of the neio approach is that its focus on industry specific studies limits the generalizability of its findings in this study we retain the advantages of neio methods but partially address the issue of generalizability by analyzing competitive behavior in multiple segments within the auto industry to see whether there is a consistent pattern that can be explained by theory theoretical modelers can use our results to judge the appropriateness of their models in predicting competitive outcomes for the markets that they analyze a by product of our analysis is that we also get estimates of demand and cost apart from competitive interactions for the market managers can use these estimates to perform what if analysis they can answer questions about what prices to charge when a new product is introduced or when an existing product s characteristics are changed

who loses when prices are negotiated an analysis of the new car market we establish that there are large and persistent differences in final transaction prices for identical new cars and that demographic characteristics explain at least 20 of the observed variation older consumers perform progressively worse in negotiations and the age premium is greater for women than for men our results suggest that the complex nature of vehicle transactions leads to price dispersion in this market and that the worst performing groups older women have the lowest rates of market participation we conjecture that the results are driven by the sharp increases in women s education and labor force participation in recent decades

shrewd crude or simply deluded comovement and the internet stock phenomenon we show that i return comovement among internet stocks during the late 1990s and early 2000 was not exceedingly high ii there was substantial consistency in the manner by which investors distinguished among internet stocks and iii high comovement is most common during periods of price erosion these results cast doubt on the view that the extraordinary appreciation of internet stocks was due to the crude classification of all such stocks as members of a hot category

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

foreign portfolio investors before and during a crisis different categories of foreign portfolio investors in korea have differences as well as similarities in their trading behavior before and during the currency crisis first non resident institutional investors are always positive feedback traders whereas resident investors were negative feedback contrarian traders before the crisis but switch to be positive feedback traders during the crisis second individual investors herd significantly more than institutional investors non resident institutional as well individual investors herd significantly more than their resident counterparts third differences in the western and korean news coverage are correlated with differences in net selling by non resident investors relative to resident investors

a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in this paper we develop a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in the highly relevant marketing context of automobile transactions consumer brand choice is modeled as a multinomial probabilistic outcome and the individual consumer level transaction price is modeled to be consistent with the nash bargaining solution our simultaneous model introduces a natural way to account for price endogeneity in a microlevel choice setting when the price paid is individual specific and correlated with the idiosyncratic preference of a buyer it also accounts for the potential selectivity bias in studying the negotiated price by integrating consumer brand choice modeling we apply the proposed model to a data set of 4 795 consumer automobile purchases the empirical results show that the proposed approach not only better fits the data of consumer choice and negotiated price but it also provides additional insights into buyers and sellers behaviors in comparison with models that study only consumer choice or the negotiated price but not both simultaneously

costs of control the source of economic rents for mcdonald s franchisees the main purpose of this article is to establish empirically using financial data that there are both ex ante and ex post rents left downstream at mcdonald s we find that the present value of the ex ante rents is around 300k 455k 1982 dollars ex post rents are of course even larger we argue that the ex post rents represent an incentive mechanism that complements the use of profit sharing rights at mcdonald s we also argue that ex ante rents arise here because franchisees wealth constraints prevent the up front extraction of the full present value of the ex post rents finally we note that mcdonald s desire for a particular type of individual to operate its franchises namely owner operators whose livelihoods are tied to the success of their outlets increases the likelihood that downstream operators face liquidity constraints this in turn contributes to the need for mcdonald s to leave ex ante rents downstream

advance production in posted offer markets abstract data from market sessions in which production is to demand are compared with data from sessions requiring that output decisions be made and production costs incurred prior to the start of trading in each period no inventory carry over is permitted differences in aggregate output measures such as average contact price sales and market efficiency tend to disappear as traders gain experience in an unchanging environment however the addtional risk introduced by the sunk cost aspect of advance production appears to offset any advantage regarding sellers share of the surplus conferred by the power to post prices

split incentive effects on the adoption of technical and behavioral energy saving measures in the household sector in western europe abstract significant differences in the adoption of energy saving measures between homeowners and renters were found in the survey data of 1 248 households from the netherlands germany and belgium in this study we examined the influence of split incentive effects between homeowners and renters which stem from differences between those who pay and those who enjoy the benefits of the adoption of energy efficient ee technology and energy saving behaviors average marginal effects were used to measure the magnitude of the split incentive effect by considering many ee technologies and energy saving behaviors both split incentive effects were measured and compared for the first time producing some interesting results there is clear evidence of split incentive problems for both measures and on average homeowners were found to be16 08 more likely than renters to have access to adoptable ee technologies while the effects were much smaller only 4 28 for adopting behavioral measures the results were highly robust for household characteristics and specific psychological determinants such as willingness to pay and environmental beliefs policy implications are provided to address the split incentive problems in rental markets in household sectors based on our results

mutual funds flows and the geography of contagion abstract this paper studies the dynamics and geography of investments made by international mutual funds located in advanced markets i identify precise global and regional dynamics in equity and bond flows very few countries receive or lose funding in isolation i also find strong evidence of global contagion when financial conditions in developed markets change emerging markets funding is heavily affected i illustrate this finding by deriving contagion maps showing where contagion spreads and with what intensity in general the results suggest that push effects from advanced market investors affect massively developing countries and expose them to sudden stops and surges

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

predicting currency fluctuations and crises do resident firms have an informational advantage the authors investigate whether resident enterprise managers have an informational advantage about the countries in which they work they propose a method for extracting information available to resident managers but unknown to investors and forecasters they rest their hypothesis of informational advantage using a unique data set the global competitiveness survey the survey asks local managers about their outlook for the country in which they reside they find that local managers do have useful private information local managers responses improve on conventional forecasts of future volatility and changes in the exchange rate which are based on economic fundamentals or interest rate differentials they find that the local business community perceived in advance the recent crises in the republic of korea russia and thailand but not those in indonesia and malaysia markets have had limited success predicting crises and might do better by drawing on private information available to resident enterprise managers who seem to know better than markets about future movements in exchange rates

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

economic determinants of the timing of preferential trade agreement formations and enlargements preferential trade agreements ptas have proliferated over the past 60 years while a small number of recent studies have examined empirically the economic determinants of the likelihood of a pair of countries having a pta this study explains empirically the timing of all pta formations and enlargements from 1950 through 2006 using duration analysis our main and novel goal is to predict in and out of sample a substantive share of these 1 560 pta events using a parsimonious model with mainly economic variables taking selection dynamics into account our analysis reveals that we can predict correctly in sample the actual year of entry into force for 26 of the 1 560 bilateral pta formations enlargements in the period 1950 2006 among 10 518 pairings of 146 countries using only a few economic and political variables moreover we can predict correctly in sample 57 of these pta events within a 10 year window leading up to the event using this model the model also performs well out of sample for the near term 82 but not if the out of sample period is very long we conclude with an evaluation of the model s ability to predict the timing of the north american free trade agreement the european union s formation and enlargements and the model s ten most likely post 2006 pta events jel f14 f15

on crises contagion and confusion abstract since the tequila crisis of 1994 1995 the asian flu of 1997 and the russian virus of 1998 economists have been busy producing research on the subject of contagion yet few studies have examined empirically through which channels the disturbances are transmitted if there are indeed fundamental reasons for the spillovers we observe we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing how both trade links and the largely ignored financial sector links influence the pattern of fundamentals based contagion we examine the role of international bank lending the potential for cross market hedging and bilateral and third party trade in the propagation of crises

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

a bargaining theory of distribution channels abstract a critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties in this article the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer one retailer channel to establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract they show that the institution of bargaining has force and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present the authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination thus there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members the authors rec

foreign direct investment and endogenous growth in vietnam foregin direct investment s fdi s contribution to growth has been a controversial topic in economic literature and appears to be country specific in this article we use time varying coefficients in an augmented production function and let fdi indirectly affect gross domestic product growth through labour productivity this approach creates built in heteroskedasticity so the feasible generalized least square estimation is employed the results show that fdi has significant and positive effect on labour productivity and economic growth in vietnam but the effect is not equally distributed among economic sectors

feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism recent research has underlined the efficiency of the gatt wto rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium such an equilibrium is however economically inefficient global free trade in particular is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world provided that governments have distributive motivations in such a context we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare superior equilibrium the reason is that as members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another they are induced to reduce their multilateral tariff sa s well once we account for these endogenous changes and only then we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative but political world we also find however that members are likely to gain too much from regional integration thereby harming outsiders

multilateral bargaining and downstream competition we examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships that involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers in these relationships the negotiations are interdependent and bargaining externality may arise across the retailers in addition the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important in simultaneous bargaining the retailers negotiate without knowing if an agreement has been reached in the other retail channel whereas in sequential bargaining the retailer in the second negotiation is able to observe whether an agreement was reached in the first negotiation we show that simultaneous bargaining is optimal for the manufacturer when the retail prices and profitability are similar and sequential bargaining is preferred when the dispersion in the retail prices is sufficiently large as a result of ex post renegotiations the manufacturer may strategically stock out the less profitable retailer who charged a relatively low retail price and exclusively supply only the retailer who charged a relatively high retail price and maintained high channel profitability moreover ex post multilateral bargaining can buffer downstream competition and thus lead to positive retail profits even in markets that are close to perfect competition

attitudes and behaviours of private sector landlords towards the energy efficiency of tenanted homes abstract the uk s housing stock generates approximately 27 of the country s total annual carbon emissions in light of the legally binding targets to reduce carbon emissions new housing is subject to a tightening of regulations governing energy demand and efficiency resulting in a gradual improvement in carbon emissions the question is how to achieve the deep carbon emission reductions from existing domestic properties of which 75 will still be in use in 2050 government has sought to provide incentives to homeowners to improve the energy efficiency of their households and mandate improvements in socially rented housing using a range of fiscal measures most recently the green deal there has however been little consideration of the 18 of uk households who privately rent their home a tenure that is growing fast the aim of this research is to investigate the factors that influence private sector landlords when considering energy efficiency improvements to their tenanted homes the results indicate that government policy has consistently failed to engage private sector landlords in the issue of energy efficiency and thus measures must be taken to understand the motivations of landlords in order to design effective incentives and interventions

overreaction in capital flows to emerging markets booms and sudden stops this paper applies the overreaction hypothesis of de bont and thaler de bont w thaler r 1985 does stock market overreact journal of finance 40 3 793 805 developed for stock price behavior to capital flows to emerging markets we find that a surge in capital flows or what we call a capital boom can predict future sharp contractions in capital flows or sudden stops we use a large list of possible economic fundamentals as control variables and the results show that the best predictor of a sudden stop is a preceding capital boom moreover the probability of a country undergoing a sudden stop increases considerably with the length of the boom this probability more than doubles when the boom is three years old and rises by three to four times when the boom lasts for four years these results are interesting for two reasons in the first place they contradict previous studies that emphasize worsening fundamentals as the ultimate cause of a sudden stop second they are of policy interest because of the enormous negative impacts that sudden stops have on the real economy

winner loser reversals in national stock market indices can they be explained this article examines possible explanations for winner loser reversals in the national stock market indices of 16 countries there is no evidence that loser countries are riskier than winner countries either in terms of standard deviations covariance with the world market or other risk factors or performance in adverse economic states of the world while there is evidence that small markets are subject to larger reversals than large markets perhaps due to some form of market imperfection the reversals are not only a small market phenomenon the apparent anomaly of winner loser reversals in national market indices therefore remains unresolved

stars and standards energy efficiency in rental markets abstract evidence suggests that rental properties are often associated with lower levels of energy efficiency than owner occupied buildings policy makers are increasingly concerned about this energy efficiency gap in this paper we investigate the energy investments made and the market efficiency gains associated with different policy interventions at the point of lease we introduce key features of the housing rental market in the laboratory and examine four policy options mandatory information on energy efficiency voluntary information mandatory minimum standards and a cost share treatment i e landlords pay a share of the tenants energy bill we find that enabling landlords to post the energy efficiency of their properties increases investment in energy efficiency voluntary information achieves efficiency levels comparable to those under a mandatory programme but may lead to lower levels of tenant participation mandatory minimum standards lead to higher investments in energy efficiency but also reduce the number of properties available for lease cost sharing leads to low market efficiency levels perhaps due to the uncertainty landlords face regarding the energy bill of their tenants

managers investors and crises mutual fund strategies in emerging markets the authors address the trading strategies of mutual funds in emerging markets the data set they develop permits analyses of these strategies at the level of individual portfolios a methodologically novel feature of their analysis they disentangle the behavior of fund managers from that of investors for both managers and investors they strongly reject the null hypothesis of no momentum trading funds momentum trading is positive they systematically buy winners and sell losers contemporaneous momentum trading buying current winners and selling current losers is stronger during crises and stronger for fund investors than for fund managers lagged momentum trading buying past winners and selling past losers is stronger during noncrises and stronger for fund managers investors also engage in contagion trading selling assets from one country when asset prices fall in another these findings are based on data about mutual funds that represent only 10 percent of the market capitalization in the countries considered were it a larger share of the market finding counterparties for their trades the investors who buy when they sell and sell when they buy would be difficult and the premise that funds respond to contemporaneous returns rather than causing them would become tenuous

informational channels of financial contagion two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion one is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets using global games i present a two country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and i test its predictions experimentally the experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly base rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior and thus weakens the fundamental channel an overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others even when this information is irrelevant these results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior

institutional investors and long term investment evidence from chile developing countries are trying to develop long term financial markets and institutional investors are expected to play a key role this paper uses unique evidence on the universe of institutional investors from the leading case of chile to study to what extent mutual funds pension funds and insurance companies hold and bid for long term instruments and which factors affect their choices the paper uses monthly asset level portfolios to show that despite the expectations mutual and pension funds invest mostly in short term assets relative to insurance companies the significant difference across maturity structures is not driven by the supply side of debt or tactical behavior instead it seems to be explained by manager incentives related to short run monitoring and the liability structure that combined with risk factors tilt portfolios toward short term instruments even when long term investing yields higher returns thus the expansion of large institutional investors does not necessarily imply longer term markets

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

rational contagion and the globalization of securities markets this paper argues that globalization may promote contagion by weakening incentives for gathering costly information and by strengthening incentives for imitating arbitrary market portfolios in the presence of short selling constraints the gain of gathering information at a fixed cost may diminish as markets grow moreover if a portfolio manager s marginal cost for yielding below market returns exceeds the marginal gain for above market returns there is a range of optimal portfolios in which all investors imitate arbitrary market portfolios and this range widens as the market grows numerical simulations suggest that these frictions can have significant implications for capital flows in emerging markets

international asset allocations and capital flows the benchmark effect this paper studies channels through which well known benchmark indexes impact asset allocations and capital flows across countries the study uses unique monthly micro level data of benchmark compositions and mutual fund investments during 1996 2012 benchmarks have important effects on equity and bond mutual fund portfolios across funds with different degrees of activism benchmarks explain on average around 70 percent of country allocations and have significant impact even on active funds benchmark effects are important after controlling for industry macroeconomic and country specific time varying effects reverse causality does not drive the results exogenous pre announced changes in benchmarks result in movements in asset allocations mostly when these changes are implemented not when announced by impacting country allocations benchmarks affect capital flows across countries through direct and indirect channels including contagion they explain apparently counterintuitive movements in capital flows generating outflows from countries when upgraded and with large market capitalization and better relative performance

the ability of nash s theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations a dyad level test this research develops and implements a dyad level procedure for testing whether the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations correspond to settlements prescribed by nash s theory of cooperative games the procedure entails a multivariate statistical test in which some parameters are estimated by simulation while others are provided directly from the assessment of negotiator utility functions by means of conjoint analysis the procedure is applied to an experiment in which subjects participated in a realistic role playing exercise that replicated the purchase of television advertising time results indicate that at the 0 01 significance level 57 8 of the dyads can be rejected as not having achieved nash solutions these results and their implications for marketing practitioners as well as future research are discussed

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

the unholy trinity of financial contagion over the last 20 years some financial events such as devaluations or defaults have triggered an immediate adverse chain reaction in other countries which we call fast and furious contagion yet on other occasions similar events have failed to trigger any immediate international reaction we argue that fast and furious contagion episodes are characterized by the unholy trinity i they follow a large surge in capital flows ii they come as a surprise and iii they involve a leveraged common creditor in contrast when similar events have elicited little international reaction they were widely anticipated and took place at a time when capital flows had already subsided

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

the gatt and gradualism abstract this paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the gatt created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually trade liberalization must be gradual and free trade can never be achieved if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a withdrawal of equivalent concessions and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited the paper shows how sufficiently patient countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under gatt dispute settlement procedures

on the different geographic characteristics of free trade agreements and customs unions abstract casual observation reveals a striking phenomenon of preferential trade agreements ptas while customs unions cus are only intra regional free trade agreements ftas are inter and intra regional using a farsighted dynamic model we endogenize the equilibrium path of ptas among two close countries and one far country rising transport costs mitigate the cost of discrimination faced by the far country as a cu non member and diminish the value of preferential access as a cu member thus sufficiently large transport costs imply that an fta is the only type of pta that can induce the far country s participation in pta formation unlike cu formation fta formation can induce participation because ftas provide a flexibility benefit an fta member can form further ptas with non members but a cu member must do so jointly with all existing members hence in equilibrium cus are intra regional while ftas are intra and inter regional

advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments i introduction for years the federal trade commission ftc has attacked unfair and deceptive advertising recently it has turned its attention to errors of omission rather than commission by challenging agreements among sellers to limit advertising even when it is truthful one reason for eliminating advertising restrictions is to stimulate competition in the advertised dimension of the good or service for example price advertising may result in more price competition on the other hand professional associations argue that price competition causes product quality to deteriorate because sellers of high quality services are forced to match the lower prices of sellers of low quality products and through their codes professional associations have implicitly or explicitly discouraged some forms of advertising including price advertising restrictions of this nature still exist in some local markets although they have become the subject of ftc litigation 1 the quality deterioration argument of professional associations is plausible only when buyers are unable to observe quality prior to purchase 2 when buyers cannot distinguish quality moral hazard invites sellers to lower cost by providing lower quality adverse selection can result from price advertising causing lower cost products to drive out higher cost products as argued by akerlof 1970 the opposite point of view is that even when quality cannot be determined prior to purchase price advertising may enable sellers to signal quality and develop reputations 3 moreover transactions repeatedly involving the same buyers and sellers may enable buyers to form expectations about seller quality based on their experience that can make it worthwhile for a seller to provide higher quality the series of laboratory experiments described here permits the evaluation of market performance when buyers have very limited information the claim to be investigated is that price advertising prevents quality deterioration and improves market efficiency reputation formation through advertising is emphasized instead of other mechanisms such as warranties that may prevent quality deterioration 4 so that quality can be kept relatively neutral and easily understood by subjects we represent it as the grade of a commodity the structure underlying the experiments is based on holt s model of the determination of industry quality which is summarized in schmalensee 1979 demand is induced through the values for which buyers can redeem their purchases value is linearly related to grade so that no difference between average and marginal valuation of quality can arise to cause nonoptimal quality as it did in spence 1976 the production cost for each seller is quadratic in the grade selected by the seller therefore the efficient grade level is unique the most closely related experimental work on product quality decisions is reported in lynch miller plott and porter 1986 in their experiments sellers chose one of two quality levels prices were determined in an oral double auction efficient price and quality outcomes resulted when prospective buyers were given full information about quality removing the identities of sellers and allowing only post purchase quality information sometimes resulted in a lemons outcome in which sellers offer a low quality product even though the market would be more efficient with the production and sale of a high quality product private information tended to yield less efficient outcomes than full public information the posted offer experiments reported in this paper differ from the oral double auction experiments in lynch miller plott and porter because one of our objectives was to examine the effect of advertising restrictions on market efficiency in our experiments price advertising is implemented in a standard posted offer auction

is the gatt wto s article xxiv bad the gatt wto article xxiv prevents a customs union cu from raising its common external tariff in this paper we compare cu formation with and without this article xxiv constraint we show in a multi country oligopoly model that for a given cu structure article xxiv improves world welfare by lowering trade barriers however we also show that article xxiv has a composition effect on cu formation it affects the endogenous choice of cus by encouraging more symmetric cus article xxiv causes more trade to be subject to trade barriers as a result article xxiv may be bad for world welfare 2012 elsevier b v

demand signalling under unobservable effort in franchising linear and nonlinear price contracts we study the signalling strategy of a principal who is privately informed about its high demand potential to an uninformed risk neutral agent we analyze the model in the context of a contract between a franchisor and a franchisee we examine the distortions of a two part pricing scheme necessary to credibly inform the franchisee agent we also study whether the inability of the franchisor principal to observe the agent s effort moderates or exaggerates the distortions from the first best two part pricing scheme a surprising outcome is that even though the principal incurs greater signalling cost the magnitude of distortion in the two part scheme is smaller when service is unobservable than when it is not thus a signalling strategy employing the fixed and variable fees is harder to detect under moral hazard empirical studies failing to control for moral hazard may incorrectly conclude that signalling strategy does not occur we later consider a three part scheme to verify whether or not the schem

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

when in peril retrench testing the portfolio channel of contagion abstract the impact of past gains and losses on international investors risk aversion is an important factor in the propagation of financial shocks across countries we first present a stylized model illustrating how changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio decisions and stock prices we then examine empirically the behavior of international mutual funds when funds returns are below average they reduce their exposure to countries in which they were overweight and vice versa an index of financial interdependence that reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds helps explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries and the pattern of contagion during crises

the informational role of product trade ins for pricing durable goods this research theorizes that sellers of durable goods can utilize inferences about the buyer s willingness to pay based not only on her decision to trade in the old good but also on its characteristics we find empirical support for this theory using transaction data for new car purchases the results support the notion that dealers infer a higher willingness to pay and charge higher prices to consumers who trade in a used vehicle than to those who do not we also find that dealers charge even higher prices to those consumers who trade in used cars that are similar to the new one

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

endogeneity and individual consumer choice abstract in many markets there is likely to be correlation both across periods in terms of the choices of one consumer and across consumers in terms of their choices in each period the former is caused by consumer heterogeneity and the latter may be the result of demand common shocks across consumers furthermore if firms partially observe these common shocks their market decisions may end up being endogenous and correlated with the common shocks because researchers cannot typically fully observe consumer heterogeneity and the common shocks the estimation method must account for the endogeneity of firms decisions in this article the authors present a test for endogeneity under unobserved consumer heterogeneity and common shocks which is based on a quasi likelihood estimation method to estimate the model parameters consistently when endogenous firm behavior unobserved heterogeneity and common shocks are present the test examines the differences in general method of moments coefficient estima

why do emerging economies borrow short term the authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long term debt they first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders by issuing long term debt the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis transferring risk to bondholders in equilibrium this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost therefore the government faces a tradeoff between safer long term borrowing and cheaper short term debt second the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance they show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium a higher risk premium on long term bonds than on short term bonds during crises the term premium increases with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities this suggests that changes in bondholders risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises

how resilient and countercyclical were emerging economies to the global financial crisis during the crises of the 1990s emerging economies usually lacked the policy tools to deal with external shocks that were available to advanced economies worldwide turbulent episodes found most emerging economies unable to perform countercyclical policies and in many cases their own vulnerabilities and poor institutional frameworks amplified negative external shocks leading to sharper recessions this paper shows that the 2008 2009 global financial crisis represents a structural break in the way emerging economies conduct their policies with more countercyclical policies pursued before and during the global crisis moreover breaking with the past emerging economies did not fall more than developed economies during the global financial crisis thus becoming more similar to developed economies the resilience of emerging economies during the 2008 2009 crisis might be partly attributed to a combination of sounder macroeconomic and financial policy frameworks with a shift towards safer domestic and international financial stances

identifying policy solutions for improving the energy efficiency of rental properties abstract world leaders have acknowledged that climate change is one of the biggest challenges we face in the 21st century and have committed to pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1 5 degrees above pre industrial levels unfccc 2015 to do this further efficiencies in energy use are needed across all sectors many of which still offer considerable potential for improving energy efficiency rental properties in particular have seen very few improvements in energy efficiency due to a range of barriers and market failures including misinformation split incentives and an uneven power dynamic between renters and landlords this is important as not only do rental properties account for a significant proportion of housing stock the high proportion of low income households in rental properties are particularly vulnerable to rising energy prices this study aimed to identify feasible policy solutions for overcoming the barriers to energy efficiency improvements in rental properties renters landlords and agents were presented with five possible solutions to determine their level of support eight key recommendations for overcoming the barriers to energy efficiency improvements in rental properties are provided these create a foundation for policy makers councils and businesses to develop and target energy efficiency solutions for rental properties

empirics on the long run effects of building energy codes in the housing market we study the effectiveness of building energy codes taking a long run perspective the focus is on regulation s impact on energy demand in both high and low quality residences in other words the diffusion and the entry of green buildings in the housing market we develop a measure for regulation intensity and apply this to a panel error correction regression model for energy requirements of a large sample of german apartment houses built between 1950 and 2005 we show that regulation is effective in saving energy in particular regulation pushes investors in the low quality housing market segment toward the technological frontier indirectly it also affects the high quality segment jel q41 r52

to bargain or not to bargain the role of fixed costs in price negotiations abstract retailers routinely allow consumers to negotiate a discount off the posted price especially for big ticket items such as home appliances furniture automobiles and real estate as well as on online platforms such as amazon ebay and alibaba the profitability of such a strategy relative to selling only at posted prices depends on consumers willingness to initiate a negotiation and ability to negotiate a discount in this paper we incorporate a consumers decision of whether or not to negotiate into a demand model the decision to negotiate hinges on how the expected discount from negotiation compares to the magnitude of a non pecuniary cost that the consumer incurs by initiating the negotiation this cost has implications for consumer demand and firm profitability the current study shows how this cost can be non parametrically identified separately from consumers ability to get a discount and marginal utility of income the application of this model to individual level data on refrigera

third country effects on the formation of free trade agreements the recent proliferation of free trade agreements ftas has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships the economics literature has generally examined the formation of ftas as a function of the participating countries economic characteristics alone in this paper we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to enter into an fta is also crucially dependent on the participating countries existing fta relationships with third countries accounting for the interdependence of ftas helps to explain a significant fraction of fta formations that would not otherwise be predicted by countries economic characteristics

an empirical investigation of returns to search using data on search and choice behavior from a local automobile market we estimate monetary returns to search in terms of lower prices resulting from additional time invested in price search for our analytical framework we adapt a model developed in the job search literature to the problem of consumer search this framework is especially useful for illuminating the relationship between time spent searching the outcome of search and demand and supply side variables our results indicate that for this particular sample of buyers marginal returns to search are broadly consistent with what one might expect if consumers balance costs and benefits of search and that potential gains from additional search for lower car prices do not appear to be large for most consumers our study highlights many of the methodological difficulties involved in estimating returns to search including isolating returns to different outcomes of search and sensitivity of results to model specification and sampling error we deal with these problems by trying to isolate time spent searching for price from other uses of search time by deriving our model used in estimation from a specific conceptual framework and by extensive specification testing

external trade diversion exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements in a game of endogenous trade agreements between three countries we show that while the pursuit of customs unions cus prevents global free trade from emerging as a coalition proof nash equilibrium the pursuit of free trade agreements ftas does not this result reflects the relatively flexible nature of ftas whereas each fta member can independently undertake further trade liberalization with respect to the non member cu members must do so as a group due to their common external tariff by diverting members exports away from the non member both types of trade agreements induce the non member to voluntarily lower its import tariffs

bargaining search costs and equilibrium price distributions this paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions consumers choose a seller at random and face search costs to switching to another store in the market equilibrium the prices at all stores are determined simultaneously as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game in this game the buyer has the outside option to search for another seller differences between the sellers types create price dispersions typically the number of active sellers increases with higher search costs the market equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium under perfect information when search costs become small

environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets abstract survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher price for a product that generates less environmental harm we induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers incentives to offer products of differing quality buyers are unaware of the product quality before purchase as is often the case for goods with differing environmental quality we first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible we then study various treatments that could remedy this failure seller reputations and unverified cheap talk signals sometimes increase the number of higher valued green goods the only reliable way to improve product quality in the experiment however is to use a third party that charges a fee to certify product quality claims