international risk and perceived environmental uncertainty the dimensionality and internal consistency of miller s measure increasingly scholars have suggested that there is a need to approach the problem of international risk from a multidimensional perspective brouthers 1995 miller 1993 shan 1991 miller 1992 1993 developed and tested the most comprehensive framework to date miller 1993 showed high inter rater reliability in his measure of perceived environmental uncertainty peu in this paper we test the dimensionality of the scales from a statistical viewpoint and find that the statistical determination is reasonably consistent with miller s conceptual determination we also investigate miller s measure by comparing scales conceptualized by miller with ones determined by factor analysis we test the reliability of these scales and find that the conceptualized scales have generally high internal consistency in samples of both manufacturing and service firms however the findings also suggest that several changes in the peu measure are warranted resulting in a refinement of miller s measure which we have labeled peu 2

meta paradigm change and the theory of the firm many seemingly unrelated debates on the theory of the firm are in fact part of a single deeper transformation of the social sciences as the foundational assumptions of 20th century social science have slowly been shown by science to be false new sub paradigms have emerged which cumulatively drop i theoretical assumptions about markets to explain firms ii epistemological assumptions about knowledge to explain diversity and iii metaphysical assumptions about causality to explain technical change debates occur across each of these levels

social influence and mne strategic response to political risk a global network approach abstract according to the conventional view of mne host country relations mnes faced with political risk condition their strategic responses on each party s relative power positions or bargaining influence drawing insight from network theory institutional theory and international relations research i argue that firm sensitivity to political risk is contingent upon a complementary concept social influence social influence arises through the mutual embeddedness of mne and host government in a complex global network of nations to test my hypotheses i construct a global network of trade relations that i combine with a unique transaction level dataset from the global petroleum industry my results demonstrate that social influence as modeled by home host structural equivalence moderates the effects of political risk further my findings provide support for a conceptual and empirical distinction between social influence and the traditional bargaining influence examined in the literature

sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk decreasing and increasing price sequences a large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds this article introduces a tractable form of risk aversion called aversion to price risk and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk when there are informational externalities there is a countervailing effect which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction even if bidder s signals are independent the article shows how to decompose the effect of aversion to price risk from the effect of informational externalities

integrative capabilities vertical integration and innovation over successive technology lifecycles the analysis presented here provides a new explanation for why vertically integrated and specialized firms may continue to coexist as industries evolve especially during time periods when conditions unequivocally favor lower cost specialized firms in contrast to the common view that firms should match their organizational form to the prevailing nature of technology vertically integrated firms may rationally choose to stay integrated and bear the sunk costs of developing integrative capabilities as well as the ongoing costs of maintaining them even when they lose money during some time periods due to competition from lower cost specialized firms in particular in industries characterized by successive systemic innovations which entail interdependence across stages of production some firms may remain vertically integrated to maintain their capability to innovate over multiple cycles of technological innovation the results hinge on the sunk costs of long lived investments in integrative capabilities an extension to the analysis suggests that vertically integrated firms may retain their organizational form to pioneer systemic innovations in other industries including industries not subject to frequent technology lifecycles providing another explanation of product market diversification and market entry over time

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

general training in labor markets common value auctions with unobservable investment abstract this paper studies the puzzle of employer financing for the general training of workers a parsimonious theory is developed based on asymmetric information between employers about the quantity of training the labor market is modeled as a common value auction with an informed and an uninformed bidder the novel feature of the game is that one of the bidders can make an unobservable investment that increases the value of the item before the auction by randomizing the amount of training provided an employer can create an endogenous adverse selection problem enabling it to compress the wage structure and capture some returns from its training investment the model generates continuous equilibrium wage and training distributions and identical employees can receive different wage offers and training levels a parametric example is used to illustrate how the shape of the wage distribution depends on the elasticity of production with respect to human capital

state ownership and transparency in foreign direct investment we contribute to ib literature on state owned multinationals by examining an understudied element of mne strategy transparency drawing insight from accounting finance and political science we develop theory and hypotheses regarding ownership effects on fdi disclosure we argue that transparency of outward fdi depends on both state ownership and home and host country institutions we also posit that host governments harness their soes to exploit information disclosed by foreign mnes discouraging inward fdi transparency we test our hypotheses using a unique transaction level database from the global petroleum industry analyzing a sample of 965 investment disclosures across 81 developing and developed countries we find state ownership reduces mne transparency soes are less sensitive to host country political risk than private firms soes from better governed countries are more transparent and regardless of ownership foreign mnes are more opaque when investing in the presence of a host country soe

reputation and cooperation in the repeated second price auctions this paper shows that there are strong reputational effects in a general class of second price auctions if reputation is one sided and bidders are patient then the bidder without reputation does not challenge the other bidder often consequently the bidder with reputation obtains most of the surplus the other bidder and the seller get very little if reputation is two sided then the bidders engage in a game akin to war of attrition the resulting payoff is very low for the bidders and very high for the seller in any case the folk theorem fails collusion in the second price auctions is impossible the predictions of the model are that prices in early auctions should reach levels that are higher than the value of the object then declining towards the reserve price a set of strong bidders emerges a recent series of auctions of spectrum for umts services in europe seems to be consistent with the predictions of the model

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

the entrepreneur s reward for self policing the collaboration among people is often subject to shirking the net gain from the collaboration depends on the contract governing it i argue that the entrepreneur assumes the role of the residual claimant because his actions are more costly to monitor than those of the factors with which he collaborates by offering fixed pay contracts to others and himself becoming residual claimant the entrepreneur curtails his incentive to gain at the expense of his partners and the net gain from the collaboration is then maximized costly monitoring applies to both labor and capital and thus the entrepreneur may supply both labor services and capital the entrepreneur s capital serves to guarantee the pay of the other factors

sequentially optimal auctions abstract in auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results when the time between auctions goes to zero seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price with many bidders the seller equilibrium reserve price approaches the reserve price in an optimal static auction an auction in which the simple equilibrium reserve price policy of the seller mirrors a policy commonly used by many auctioneers is computed journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d44 d82

the declining price anomaly abstract data from wine auctions indicate that identical products sold sequentially typically follow a decreasing pattern of prices known as the declining price anomaly this is explained for both first and second price auctions by appealing to risk averse bidders earlier bids are then equal to expected later prices plus a risk premium associated with the risky future price we show that this logic rests on the assumption of nondecreasing absolute risk aversion which is necessary for pure strategy equilibrium bidding functions to exist thus decreasing absolute risk aversion implies ex post inefficiency with positive probability data from wine auctions are used to confirm the existence of the declining price anomaly journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d44 d81 d82 l81

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

interpenetration of organization and market japan s firm and market in comparison with the u s abstract resource allocation mechanisms used in the market and within the firm are quite often a mixture of the pure market principle and the pure organization principle market principles penetrate into the firm s resource allocation and organization principles creep into the market allocation interpenetration occurs to remedy the failure of pure principles other in the market or in the organization after presenting this new perspective we analyze resource allocation mechanisms in japan and the u s one conclusion is that interpenetration patterns are rather different between the two countries due to institutional economic and societal differences we also analyze the ways in which these differences affect japanese and american corporate behavior in such areas as diversification strategy corporate financing and innovation and venture business activity

a learning approach to auctions we analyze a repeated first price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round it is proved that if every player is using either a belief based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme then for sufficiently large time the players bids are in equilibrium in the one shot auction in which the types are commonly known

equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions abstract we study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending price auctions the seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction despite the lack of commitment by the seller we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties strategic non disclosure of information takes the form of non participation in the early auction by low valuation bidders while high valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations some buyers who would profitably buy at the reserve price refrain from participating in order to decrease the second auction reserve price

how auctions work for wine and art interview auctioneers and even to buy a little wine in the meantime i have also had the opportunity with john abowd 1988 to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings this paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that i and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items in view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain 2

speculation in international crises report from the gulf recent years have seen recurring international financial crises as well as a tremendous rise in trading and speculation how are the two related are speculators and trading responsible for market volatility this paper presents a study of the gulf crisis of 1990 1991 examining the behavior of the international oil market during a period of unprecedented volatility the analysis suggests that a combination of political events and market fundamentals rather than trading was behind this volatility

uncovering the complex relationships between political risk and mne firm legitimacy insights from libya using the before after natural experiment occasioned by the arab spring in libya we explore how market and non market activity affect foreign firm legitimacy in times of political turmoil although all mnes in libya had to cultivate strong ties to qadhafi to succeed during his 40 years of rule we found that those that also invested in social benefit projects and in social ties with families with few ties to the qadhafi family earned a broad based legitimacy that helped them survive qadhafi s overthrow our findings contribute to the political risk and political behavior literature the notion that the pursuit of firm legitimacy in general and especially in the eyes of social sector actors is an effective hedge against political risk more theoretically our findings support the addition of a social sector based path to firm legitimacy in the host country that complements and may at times substitute for the government based path to foreign firm legitimacy practically our findings suggest that mnes facing severe political risk can improve their prospects for survival by investing in relationships with influential social groups and by offering goods or services that are perceived as socially valuable

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

does foreign aid mitigate the adverse effect of expropriation risk on foreign direct investment abstract we construct a model of fdi risk and aid where a country loses access to fdi and aid if the country expropriates fdi we show that i the threat of expropriation leads to under investment ii the optimal level of fdi decreases as the risk of expropriation rises and iii aid mitigates the adverse effect of expropriation risk on fdi the empirical analysis employs data for 35 low income countries and 28 countries in sub saharan africa over the period 1983 2004 we find that risk has a negative effect on fdi and that aid mitigates but cannot eliminate the adverse effect of risk

imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations we study the long run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types thus a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

cooperation between rivals informal know how trading it has long been recognized that it is difficult for an innovating firm to fully appropriate the benefits arising from its innovations and that desired research might therefore not be performed nelson 1959 pp 297 306 one sometimes possible solution to this dilemma is cooperative r d conducted by firms who share the costs and benefits of particular r d projects johnson 1973

empirical models of political risks in u s oil production operations in venezuela in 9 of the years between 1961 and 1978 venezuelan regimes took actions adverse to the profitability of u s oil companies local production operations in this study 2 time series discriminant models were developed for classifying each of the 18 years according to the occurrence of such action in the first model adverse government action was found more likely to occur following years of economic decline and periods when u s companies earned high profits from petroleum investments in venezuela in the second model government action tended to occur after periods of relative deprivation experienced by venezuelans to illustrate the use of discriminant models in forecasting political risks hypothetical scenarios were formulated from which projections were made through 1985 of the likelihood of government action against those u s oil companies operations remaining since the nationalization of petroleum

absentee bidders and the declining price anomaly in wine auctions the anomaly is concerned with the observation that in multiple item auctions of identical objects prices tend to decline over time i show that in the case of wine auctions which have been analyzed frequently the anomaly is likely to be caused by the fact that most bids are entered by absentees who use nonoptimal bidding strategies therefore wine auctions can hardly be used to illustrate the standard multiple object auction model

the effect of domestic uncertainty on the real options value of international investments scholars have noted that international investments have the potential to provide firms with real options value under uncertainty to assess this issue prior studies have tended to focus primarily on exchange rate volatility although multinational firms face other types of uncertainty as well including those stemming from their domestic operating environment the role of such uncertainty for firms flexibility needs has not been previously considered in this study we compare the influence of both domestic economic uncertainty and exchange rate uncertainty on the real option value of international investments of korean firms over 16 years of varying uncertainty we find evidence that an international investment network characterized by greater breadth and lower depth is associated with higher firm value under domestic economic uncertainty exchange rate uncertainty however was not found to play a role in firms need for flexibility the results suggest that firms are able to hedge exchange rate uncertainty by using mechanisms such as forward contracts or derivatives thus potentially reducing the impact of this type of uncertainty on their operations

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

bargaining power of multinationals and host governments one of the outcomes of negotiation between multinationals and host governments in developing countries the extent of foreign ownership of subsidiaries is influenced by the bargaining power of the two parties foreign ownership measured in various ways appears to be affected by the level of technology of the multinational the degree to which a multinational attempts to differentiate its products the extent to which a subsidiary s output is exported to other parts of the multinational the diversity of products offered by the multinational and the extent of competition by other multinationals the relationship between some of these variables and ownership is not a simple one one variable that others have mentioned as probably affecting bargaining power size of the investment in question appears not to play a significant role in government policies toward ownership but many large projects tend to be located in countries that have lenient ownership policies

the effect of asset and ownership structure on political risk some evidence from mitterrand s election in france abstract previous research suggests that political risk varies considerably from firm to firm yet few empirical tests of the cross sectional variation in political risk exist french assets were massively revalued the day after mitterrand was elected in 1981 providing a unique opportunity to test for the effect of firm specific factors on political risk although foreign ownership tends to increase political risk other factors can reduce it a simple model of political behavior is presented in which politicians value among other things economic growth a foreign firm with significant future growth options is likely to experience less political risk than other foreign firms and under certain circumstances less risk than even other domestic firms tests of these hypotheses are conducted using data from the french and u s capital markets the results are generally consistent with the hypotheses

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

the effect of national context on perceptions of risk a comparison of planned versus free market managers a model is developed to explain the effect of national context on risk related decisions an essential feature of risk related decisions is substantial uncertainty or inadequate information as well as significant consequences regarding future outcomes we argue that differences in information flows and consequences across national institutional environments affect the perceived uncertainty of decision situations for this reason the institutional environment in which managers reside should play a fundamental and systematic role in influencing their perceptions of risk we test our model on managers from two environments that contrast in terms of information and consequences related to risk a free market economy the u s and a centrally planned economy the czech republic in 1992 our results indicate that the institutional environment does indeed play a strong and systematic role in explaining managers risk related decisions thus national environment appears to be an important contextual condition to which the propensity to take risks is sensitive

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

asymmetric information and adverse selection in mauritian slave auctions information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection this paper applies this sequence of tests to mauritian slave auctions the theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher we conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave indicative of information asymmetry we then test for adverse selection using sale motivation our results indicate large discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales consistent with adverse selection the market anticipated that predominantly low productivity slaves would be brought to the market in voluntary sales copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

stability vs flexibility the effect of regulatory institutions on opportunity type how entrepreneurial opportunities are formed and exploited depends upon the institutional environment in which they are embedded the varying amounts of risk and uncertainty across and within heterogeneous institutional environments have important implications for the types of opportunity developed while the international business and entrepreneurship literatures consider the effect of environmental risk and uncertainty on firms risk and uncertainty are often treated as interchangeable or synonymous and rarely are both considered to be present together to address this we develop a new theoretical model based on institutional economics describing how institutional arrangements promoting stability thus supporting an entrepreneur s ability to assess risk will lead to more imitative opportunities while institutions promoting flexibility thus supporting an entrepreneur s ability to respond to uncertainty by iterating will foster more innovative opportunities we test this framework using cross national data across 40 countries from the gem survey finding that institutional arrangements that promote stability do lead to more imitation while institutions that promote flexibility foster more innovation by treating risk and uncertainty as distinct constructs our study makes theoretical contributions to research on institutional environments and opportunity types with implications for future research on subsidiary initiatives the evolution of mnes and born global firms

government intervention in the venezuelan petroleum industry an empirical investigation of political risk two important aspects of political risk analysis that have not received much attention in the literature are a the reasons why multinational firms experience different types of intervention and b the timing of intervention in order to address these issues this research develops a conceptual model of political risk based on the premise that host government intervention is related to specific objectives of the government vis a vis multinational firms information reflecting the attainment of objectives motivates the government to intervene in a given manner the application of this model to the case of the venezuelan petroleum industry from years 1947 to 1976 provides some support for this model and gives insight into the timing of specific types of intervention

government intervention in less developed countries the experience of multinational companies it is a fact of international business that governments intervene in the operations of foreign direct investors these government actions create a high level of uncertainty in international planning and are very costly to the foreign investor it appears however that not all firms experience the same degree of intervention within almost all nations the government appears to intervene in some foreign companies more than in others at one extreme some firms are forced out of the nation while at the other extreme firms tend to grow and prosper the purpose of this paper is first to explain these different experiences of foreign firms and then to address the question how can foreign firms reduce the amount of intervention they experience the conclusions are based on the intervention histories of more than 100 firms

the instability of governments and the instability of controls on funds transfers by multinational enterprises implications for political risk analysis this article represents a departure from previous empirical political risk studies it explicitly focuses on the association between specific governmental policy changes and other forms and political instability a cross national study of 115 countries finds positive but weak relationships between policy instability and other indicators of political instability the findings indicate the need to reconsider common assumptions about political risks

merging reputation and repeated games with incomplete information we relate and unify several results that appeared in the following domains merging of probabilities perturbed games and reputation phenomena and repeated games with incomplete information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d83

frank knight on risk uncertainty and the firm a new interpretation we attempt to interpret frank knight by taking him on his own terms among our conclusions are the following 1 knight s distinction between risk and uncertainty is not solely a distinction between insurable and uninsurable risk 2 knight s explanation for the existence of firms does not reduce to a moral hazard theory except perhaps in the broadest and least interesting sense and 3 knight s treatment of the problem of the separation of ownership from control is not as obviously wrong as commentators have made it out to be

firms corporate social responsibility behavior an integration of institutional and profit maximization approaches understanding firms behavior across countries a key concern in the international business literature requires the joint consideration of both institutional influences and firms profit maximization goals in the corporate social responsibility csr area however researchers have utilized theories that take into account only one or the other institutional theory which explains csr as legitimacy seeking activities in line with national level institutions or economic based approaches that consider csr effects only in terms of firm profitability while an institutional argument implies convergence in csr behavior among firms in similar institutional contexts profit maximization logic treats csr as a firm specific behavior we integrate these perspectives by demonstrating the moderating effects of firms economic motivations for seeking legitimacy on the relationship between institutional environment and csr responsiveness we argue that variations in firms economic visibility and economic vulnerability can bring about differences in their need for societal goodwill and in turn their legitimacy seeking findings on a database of apparel firms employee related csr across 23 countries support this overall argument the integration of such fundamentally different theoretical perspectives allows us to contribute new theoretical insights to international business on the influence of national institutions on firms behavior

sequential common value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders we study an in nitely repeated rst price auction with common values we focus on one sidedincomplete information in which one bidder learns the objects value which itself does not change overtime learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids the proprietaryinformation is eventually revealed and the seller extracts essentially the entire rent for large discountfactors both players pay offs tend to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1 however the uninformed bidderdoes relatively better than the informed bidder we discuss the case of two sided incomplete informationand argue that under a markovian re nement the outcome is pooling as information is revealed onlyinsofar as it does not affect prices

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

transaction cost economics in real time this paper attempts to place the theq of the boundaries of thejirm within the context of the passage of time more precisely it resurrects and places in a modem frame some of the insights of the chsical and marshallian theories of organization the modem reinterpretation of those theories centers around the capabilities view of the jirm taken together with governance costs the capabilities ofjirm and market determine the boundaries of the jirm in the short run ovw time capabilities change as firms and markets learn which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost the cost of trandewing the firm s capability to the market w vice versa these dynamic governance costs are the costs of persuading negotiating and coordinating with and teaching others they arise in the face of change notably txchnological and organizational innovation in fit they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them dynamic transaction costs provide an explanation for vertical integration that is arguably more general than those dominant in the literature in the face of uncertainty and divwgent views ofthe future common ownership of multiple stages of production is a supwior institutional arrangement for coordinating systemic change asset specrfity is neither necessary nor suffient for this to be true dynamic governance costs may also affit internal organization it may sometimes be costly in 3 terms of persuasion negotiation and teaching to create within the firm capabilities readily available on the market indeed in cases in which systemic coordination is not 4 the issue the market may turn out to be the superior institution of coordination in e 2 genwal the capabilities view of the jirm suggests that we look atfim2 and market as alternative and sometimes overlapping institutions of learning 1 transaction costs in the long rzln and the short 9 x classical and neoclassical perspectives

resource nationalism meets the market political risk and the value of petroleum reserves this paper investigates the effect of resource nationalism on the value of petroleum crude oil and natural gas reserves we develop a framework for treating resource nationalism as political risk and utilize data on reserve transactions from john s herold and political risk ratings from international country risk guide and institutional investor for the period 2000 2006 controlling for other factors that affect reserve value we demonstrate the value destruction of political risk and estimate the political risk discount for 37 countries the paper contributes to both the international business literature and practitioner approaches to political risk analysis in demonstrating use of publicly available market data from real asset transactions to measure the cost of political risk we also show that the discount depends on market conditions the higher expected future petroleum prices are the larger is the discount at any level of political risk this insight adds a new dimension to analysis of political risk which is typically measured and examined without regard to market conditions

networks and innovation in a modular system lessons from the microcomputer and stereo component industries in this paper we examine theoretically and through case studies the phenomenon of the modular system which we distinguish from a product conceived of as a prepackaged entity or appliance we argue that such systems offer benefits on both the demand side and the supply side supply side benefits include the potential for autonomous innovation which is driven by the division of labor and provides the opportunity for rapid trial and error learning demand side benefits include the ability to fine tune the product to consumer needs and therefore blanket the product space more completely both of our case studies suggest that innovation in a modular system can lead to vertical and horizontal disintegration as firms can often best appropriate the rents of innovation by opening their technology to an outside network of competing and cooperating firms we conclude by speculating on the increased importance of modular systems in the future since flexible manufacturing and rising incomes are likely to increase the driving requisites of modular systems low economies of scale in assembly and sophisticated consumer tastes

organizational change skill formation human capital measurement evidence from italian manufacturing firms basing on a job competition approach in this paper we provide a labour demand oriented measure of human capital as defined by the amount of specific skills a firm generates through work based training wbt activities by merging three rich firm level datasets we estimate the impact of a set of variables that are supposed to affect both the propensity to invest in wbt and the intensity of training within the italian manufacturing industry over the period 2001 2005 the estimates show that the effects of innovation on wbt is higher when the introduction of new technologies is supported by organizational innovations when looking at the nature of wbt we investigate the different determinants of the firms propensity to provide both in house and outside training finally we estimate training intensity in terms respectively of the number of training activities provided private and total training costs and the share of trainees

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

harmonization of the european balancing power auction a game theoretical and empirical investigation abstract the shift towards renewable energies is accompanied by great volatility on the supply side demanding european wide instead of national balancing services for the integrated european procurement of balancing reserves the european commission proposes a multi attributive auction mechanism which is very similar to the current german auction the key difference however is a switch from pay as bid to uniform pricing we develop a game theoretical model of the current german and the future european balancing market design both market designs have desirable economic properties in their one shot version i e an efficient auction outcome and competitive prices we show that a switch to uniform pricing does not induce bidders to report their true costs in their bids but leads to underbidding we contrast the equilibrium outcomes with german market data and find a substantial discrepancy i e non competitive prices we provide a game theoretical grounded explanation that is based on the regular repetition of the auction combined with the invariant supplier side

the declining price anomaly in dutch dutch rose auctions in symmetric independent private value auctions of a single object with risk neutral bidders the english second price auction has strategic simplicity it is optimal for bidders to reveal their valuation of the object and make bids accordingly in that case the auction is won by the person with the highest valuation who pays a price equal to the second highest valuation in a dutch first price auction this simplicity vanishes here winning bidders have to pay their bid to make a profit they shade their bids and bid below their valuation of the object somewhat loosely one may state that an english auction is truth revealing whereas a dutch auction requires strategic behavior the simple structure of the one unit english auction vanishes if two identical objects are auctioned sequentially now in the first round it is optimal for bidders to shade their bids to account for the option value of participating in the subsequent second round robert j weber 1983 bidders with a higher valuation also have a higher option value therefore they shade their bids in the first round by a greater amount than do bidders with a lower valuation as the auction proceeds the number of bidders decreases over the sequence of auctions the number of objects decreases as well the first fact has a negative effect on the competition for an object and the second has a positive effect both effects cancel out and prices follow a martingale as a result all gains to waiting are arbitraged away and the expected prices in both rounds are the same the latter result also holds for sequential auctions of more than two objects and does not depend on whether the auction is english or dutch this neat theoretical result is not supported by empirical research which usually finds price declines orley ashenfelter 1989 found a mild price decrease in sequential auctions of identical units of wine mcafee and daniel vincent 1993 also present empirical evidence on sequential wine auctions they found that on average the second unit of wine was sold at a price 1 4 percent lower than the price of the first unit victor ginsburgh 1998 uses data from wine auctions in which the auctioneer acted as an agent for bidders who were not present at the auction he found price declines but apparently the absent bidders entered bids that did not fit with the theory empirical studies by ashenfelter and david genesove 1992 see also jean jacques laffont 1997 and alan beggs and kathryn graddy 1997 concern heterogeneous objects they also detected price declines because of the contradiction between theory and empirical studies the declining price phenomenon is regarded to be an anomaly

theoretical isolation and explanatory progress transaction cost economics and the dynamics of dispute two related goals are pursued first the development of and debates around oliver williamson s version of transaction cost economics are organised in terms of an emerging metatheoretical framework it proposes looking at economic theorising and its changes in terms of rival theoretical isolations which are often responses to challenging explanatory questions as a side product williamson s strategy of theorising is portrayed second using transaction cost economics as an illustration and as a source of inspiration the paper amends and refines the earlier framework of theoretical isolation by incorporating notions of explaining and explained items notions of progress in questions as well as increased causal penetration and increased degree of unification and the notion of the dynamics of dispute copyright 2004 oxford university press