banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

models of inflation expectations formation a comparison of household and economist forecasts the recent appreciation of the critical role played by expectations of inflation in the behavior of macromodels has stimulated empirical studies of the formation of expectations by different groups time series survey data on expectations of inflation exist now for economists households and businesses these data have been used as independent variables in explaining wage behavior gordon 16 turnovsky and wachter 34 and de menil and bhatta 5 prices turnovsky and wachter 34 and wachtel 36 interest rates gibson 14 hendershott and van horne 19 pearce 30 and mishkin 27 and consumption wachtel 36 generally with a significant improvement in explanatory power they have also been used as dependent variables in attempts to determine how expectations are formed by gordon 15 mullineaux 28 jacobs and jones 20 and figlewski and wachtel 9 for the economist survey van duyne 35 for the household survey and leonard 23 and de leeuw and mckelvey 4 for businesses given their different levels of knowlege of economics and perspectives one might expect that the models used by the different groups to forecast inflation would

dollarization bailouts and the stability of the banking system central bank policy suffers from time inconsistency when facing a banking crisis a bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate however a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization undesirable the results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the imf as international lolr we would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned actions that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the detriment of the united states alan greenspan to a congressional panel in 1999 iht january 19 2000

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

capital markets and the exchange rate with special reference to the dollarization debate in latin america the paper reviews the main challenges faced by policymakers in emerging market economies em in light of recent financial crises and taking into account salient factors like the existence of partial dollarization imperfect credibility weak financial systems and contagion the standard theory of optimal currency areas is discussed and criticized for omitting the above factors when these factors are taken into account an extreme foreign exchange regime like dollarization is shown to become much more attractive the paper discusses the pros and cons of dollarization and among other things shows that the lack of a lender of last resort is not necessarily a major drawback in em the paper also discusses inflation targeting it in a formal model it is shown that it could be subject to credibility problems similar to those found in exchange rate based stabilization programs

the determinants of global bank lending evidence from bilateral cross country data this paper finds that factors determined outside of a country at the quarterly frequency and especially after 2008 are more closely related to the global bank loans it receives these loans are generally more stable when global banks face more competition and have a higher presence in the recipient country we obtain our results by using bilateral lending data from 15 countries and a unique methodology to identify and compare the independent effects of external and internal factors we identify theoretical mechanisms that can explain our empirical findings and draw more detailed inferences for competition and global bank presence by solving a simple model of global banking

a dynamic model of firewalls and non traditional banking abstract over the last decade there has been considerable public debate in the u s on the need to maintain legal barriers firewalls between commercial and non traditional banking however no theoretical model has yet been developed that examines the joint influence of various factors suggested such as competition production economies and regulatory subsidies that affect the bank s incentive to undertake non traditional activities this paper applies a stochastic control model to examine the joint effects of these factors on a bank s optimal investment decisions in non traditional banking and develops some empirically testable hypotheses

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

bank regulation risk and return evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises in this paper we analyze whether regulation reduced risk during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis for a cross section of global banks in this regard we examine distance to default laeven and levine 2008 systemic risk acharya et al 2010 idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk we employ world bank survey data on regulations to test our conjectures we find that regulatory restrictions official supervisory power capital stringency along with private monitoring can explain bank risk in both crises additionally we find that deposit insurance schemes enhance moral hazard as this encouraged banks to take on more risk and perform poorly during the sovereign debt crisis finally official supervision and private monitoring explains the returns during both crisis periods

firm behaviour under the threat of liquidation abstract we study the optimal behaviour of a firm whose cash flow is determined by a diffusion process facing liquidation if internal cash balances fall below some threshold there is a conflict between the desire to pay dividends to satisfy shareholders and the need to retain cash as a barrier against possible liquidation stochastic optimal control characterises the value function and gives optimal decision rules for the firm the firm has a precautionary motive for retaining earnings the internal cost of funds and local risk aversion are both decreasing functions of cash held and in natural extensions to our model output and investment are both increasing functions of cash balances

information management in banking crises a regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences depositors who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital and banks which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital when the regulator s cost of injecting capital is private information it manages expectations by using costly signals i a regulator with a low cost of injecting capital may forbear on bad banks to signal toughness and reduce risk taking and ii a regulator with a high cost of injecting capital may bail out bad banks to increase confidence and prevent runs regulators perform more informative stress tests when the market is pessimistic

optimal bank capital with costly recapitalization we study optimal bank capital choice as a dynamic trade off between the opportunity cost of equity the loss of franchise value following a regulatory minimum capital violation and the cost of recapitalization we introduce a recapitalization delay that results in a strictly positive probability of capital adequacy violation we calibrate the model to bank accounting return data and evaluate the model s ability to explain observed bank capital ratios differences in return volatility explain a significant fraction of the cross sectional variation in bank capital ratios differences in the level of capital market imperfections across banks constitute a secondary explanation

one money one market the effect of common currencies on trade currency unions their dramatic effect on international trade a gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade the panel data bilateral observations for five years during 1970 90 covering 186 countries includes 300 observations in which both countries use the same currency i find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility even after controlling for a host of features including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime these effects statistically significant imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies currency unions like the european emu may thus lead to a large increase in international trade with all that that entails andrew rose

opaque bank assets and optimal equity capital abstract banks assets are opaque and therefore we model their true accounting asset values as partially observed variables we derive a stochastic control model to optimize banks dividend and recapitalization policies in this situation and calibrate that to a sample of u s banks by the calibrated model the noise in reported accounting asset values hides about one third of the true asset return volatility and raises the banks market equity value by 7 8 particularly those banks with a high level of loan loss provisions nonperforming assets and real estate loans and with a low volatility of reported total assets have noisy accounting asset values because of the substantial shock on the true asset values the banks assets were more opaque during the recent financial crisis

lending booms smart bankers and financial crises this paper develops a theory that explains why financial crises follow profitable lending booms when agents exhibit the availability heuristic and there is a long period of banking profitability all agents banks their investors and regulators end up in an availability cascade overestimating bankers risk management skills and underestimating the probability that observed outcomes are due to good luck consequently banks profitably invest in riskier assets subsequently if a public signal reveals that outcomes are luck driven investors withdraw funds liquidity evaporates and a crisis ensues a loan resale market improves liquidity but increases the probability of a crisis

the revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation abstract this paper traces career transitions of federal and state u s banking regulators from a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae and provides basic facts on worker flows between the regulatory and private sector resulting from the revolving door we find strong countercyclical net worker flows into regulatory jobs driven largely by higher gross outflows into the private sector during booms these worker flows are also driven by state specific banking conditions as measured by local banks profitability asset quality and failure rates the regulatory sector seems to experience a retention challenge over time with shorter regulatory spells for workers and especially those with higher education evidence from cross state enforcement actions of regulators shows gross inflows into regulation and gross outflows from regulation are both higher during periods of intense enforcement though gross outflows are significantly smaller in magnitude these results appear inconsistent with a quid pro quo explanation of the revolving door but consistent with a regulatory schooling hypothesis

economic growth and environmental degradation the environmental kuznets curve and sustainable development abstract in this paper we critically examine the concept of the environmental kuznets curve ekc it proposes that there is an inverted u shape relation between environmental degradation and income per capita so that eventually growth reduces the environmental impact of economic activity the concept is dependent on a model of the economy in which there is no feedback from the quality of the environment to production possibilities and in which trade has a neutral effect on environmental degradation the actual violation of these assumptions gives rise to fundamental problems in estimating the parameters of an ekc the paper identifies other econometric problems with estimates of the ekc and reviews a number of empirical studies the inference from some such ekc estimates that further development will reduce environmental degradation is dependent on the assumption that world per capita income is normally distributed when in fact median income is far below mean income we carry out simulations combining ekc estimates from the literature with world bank forecasts for economic growth for individual countries aggregating over countries to derive the global impact within the horizon of the bank s forecast 2025 global emissions of so 2 continue to increase forest loss stabilizes before the end of the period but tropical deforestation continues at a constant rate throughout the period

correct cointegration tests of the long run relationship between nominal interest and inflation the fisher 1930 hypothesis suggests that a long run equilibrium relationship exists between the non stationary series nominal interest and expected inflation testing such a cointegrating relationship is complicated by the presence of the unobserved ex antereal rate of interest in residuals from the cointegrating regression assumptions concerning the stochastic properties of the expected real rate of interest are examined and two proxies for the ex antereal rate are employed in multivariate cointegration tests of the fisher hypothesis

financial regulation and financial system architecture in central europe abstract at the beginning of the transition advice to central european countries with respect to how to set up their financial systems was based on models used in western economies this paper analyzes the experiences to set up a financial system in central europe the experience in the first transition years 1990 1996 with financial system architecture shows that changes are slow but that the central european countries tend to catch up more quickly with the western ones in the case of their banking systems than with respect to their stock markets

risk taking behavior of banks under regulation abstract this paper analyzes the value maximization of regulated banks within a moral hazard framework in the model regulators monitor both the capital ratio and the asset portfolio and banks simultaneously select the optimum capital ratio and asset portfolio a key assumption is that a bank cannot expect a positive put option value once it is classified as risky by regulators the optimum values of the two variables depend on investment opportunities and charter values as well as regulatory parameters the model that explicitly incorporates regulation can explain various phenomena that are seemingly inconsistent with the predictions of moral hazard models for example a positive relationship between the capital ratio and the riskiness of the asset portfolio a particularly interesting result is that a larger charter value results in a higher risk interior solution

imf concern for reputation and conditional lending failure theory and empirics one possible explanation for the unsatisfactory implementation of imf conditionality has been attributed to the lack of credibility of the imf threat of interrupting financial assistance in case of non compliance with the negotiated conditions in this paper we suggest that such lack of credibility might be due to the dual role played by the imf which acts at the same time as a creditor and a monitor of economic reforms we show that the imf incentive to hide its surveillance failures in order to preserve its reputation of being a good monitor may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity relative to social optimum in punishing non compliance with economic reforms we have empirically tested such theoretical result by supposing that larger departures from efficiency of the imf lending rule are associated with a longer relationship between a country and the imf the longer this relationship the stronger the imf reputation will be affected in case it ultimately decides to stop lending specifically we have empirically investigated whether imf disbursements are affected by the imf own share of debt which is taken as a proxy for the duration of the relationship between the fund and a country our empirical results show that a higher imf debt share does increase imf disbursements

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

bank capital regulation as an incentive mechanism implications for portfolio choice abstract this paper contrasts the conventional interpretation of prudential capital regulation as a system of ex ante enforcement hard wired with an alternative interpretation as a system of sanctions for ex post violation incentive based under the incentive based interpretation risk weightings affect portfolio choice only when assets are illiquid under both interpretations the medium term impact on portfolio allocation depends upon the relative costs of debt and equity finance viewing enforcement as incentive based suggests there is relatively less need to match risk weightings accurately to portfolio risk

systemic risks and the too big to fail problem the financial crisis of 2007 9 resulted in state intervention in financial markets around the world and the state became a major shareholder in many banks while state bailouts were politically sensitive policy makers had little alternative but to supply funds to financial institutions that were viewed as too big to fail or tbtf in this paper i review the history of and the rationale for the tbtf policy i argue that from a policy perspective the most important costs of the tbtf problem are incurred ex ante in the form of distorted incentives that arise as a consequence of distortions to the capital markets and to the choice of banks scale and scope i argue that it is impossible credibly to withdraw the tbtf policy and hence that it should be managed so as to minimize the costs of these distortions in this context i discuss the role of policy in institutional design in the restriction of bank scope and in designing appropriate capital regulations

implicit bank debt guarantees costs benefits and risks the expectation by market participants that public authorities might bailout the creditors of banks that are considered too important for financial system stability or another reason to be allowed to fail is commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee public authorities do not have any explicit commitment to intervene they may even honestly state that they not want to do so ex ante but may feel compelled to do so ex post a declared policy aim is to limit the value of implicit guarantees by making banks stronger more easily resolvable in case of distress as well as by imposing extra charges that rise as banks become more systemically important as part of the latter approach globally systemically important banks are identified and subjected to more costly and intrusive regulation there is little evidence that specific approach has been successful so far there is some evidence that the introduction of new resolution frameworks has been helpful while the use of newly available resolution tools and the involvement of bank creditors in the burden sharing associated with bank failure resolution has significantly reduced the value of implicit bank debt guarantees where it occurred in that sense actions speak louder than words

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

financial system architecture this article builds a theory of financial system architecture we ask what is a financial market what is a bank and what determines the economic role of each starting with basic assumptions about primitives the types of agents and the nature of the informational asymmetries we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesce to form banks and which trade in the capital market it is shown that borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financial market moreover a financial system in its infancy will be bank dominated and increased financial market sophistication diminishes bank lending article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

on partial contracting this paper investigates contracting situations where giving away some control rights enhances both the donor s and the receiver s incentives to cooperate in the future we define a partial contracting framework with nonverifiable actions for which either control is contractible contractible control actions or the right to transfer control ex post to another party is contractible transferable control actions under incomplete information when control over particular actions is transferable but not contractible it can be optimal to give one party the right to transfer control over a particular action to the other party in order for that party to build a reputation regarding her willingness to cooperate in the future c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

liquidity efficiency and bank bailouts governments can efficiently provide liquidity as when the banking system is bailed out we study a model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date agents sometimes want to sell projects the market price of the projects sold depends on the supply of liquidity which is determined in general equilibrium while private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante there is a role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities

the cyclical behaviour of european bank capital buffers using an unbalanced panel of accounting data from 1997 to 2004 and controlling for individual bank costs and risk we find capital buffers of the banks in the eu15 have a significant negative co movement with the cycle for banks in the accession countries there is significant positive co movement capital buffers of commercial and savings banks and of large banks exhibit negative co movement those of co operative and smaller banks exhibit positive co movement speeds of adjustment are fairly slow we interpret these results and discuss policy implications noting that negative co movement of capital buffers will exacerbate the pro cyclical impact of basel ii

bank competition and financial stability much ado about nothing the theoretical literature gives conflicting predictions on how bank competition should affect financial stability and dozens of researchers have attempted to evaluate the relationship empirically we collect 598 estimates of the competition stability nexus reported in 31 studies and analyze the literature using meta analysis methods we control for 35 aspects of study design and employ bayesian model averaging to tackle the resulting model uncertainty our findings suggest that the definition of financial stability and bank competition used by researchers influences their results in a systematic way the choice of data estimation methodology and control variables also affects the reported coefficient we find evidence for moderate publication bias taken together the estimates reported in the literature suggest little interplay between competition and stability even when corrected for publication bias and potential misspecifications this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

an evaluation of the forecast performance of alternative models of inflation the forecast performances of three groups of models of the inflation process are evalu ated in this paper ra tional expectations models with instantaneous market clearing monetarist models and expectations augmented phillips curves the dynamic simulations performed for the intervals between 1977 and 1984 are somewhat discouraging for all three theories the variation in forecasting performance within model groups often exc eeded the variation in performance across model groups nevertheless the philli ps curve formulation rarely performed worse than the other two models and in th e 1981 to 1984 period it performed substantially better than the alternative mod els of inflation copyright 1987 by mit press

bank resolution a framework for the assessment of regulatory intervention more than ever the current crisis has highlighted the cost of banking crises in budgetary and economic growth terms whether or not to restructure a bank is a key determinant of who bears the costs the present article surveys the main issues concerning banks restructuring by considering the bargaining game that is played between regulators and shareholders when a bank is in distress this revolves around the framework of negotiation that was established by the regulator the fall back position which is determined by bankruptcy legislation and the objective function of the regulator in this context we argue that it is possible to improve upon existing restructuring mechanisms by making banks bail outs less costly to taxpayers and improving the ex ante incentives of banks managers and shareholders the authors 2012 published by oxford university press

corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism we analyze the transmission effects of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model of the financial sector with bank lending and securities markets bank lending is constrained by capital adequacy requirements and asymmetric information adds a cost to outside bank equity capital in our model monetary policy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity rather it operates through changes in the spread of bank loans over corporate bonds which induce changes in the aggregate composition of financing by firms and in banks equity capital base the model produces multiple equilibria one of which displays all the features of a credit crunch this article is concerned with the monetary transmission mechanism through the financial sector in particular the banking sector and securities markets specifically it analyzes the effects of open market operations on bank lending and securities issues in a real economy by building on recent advances in the microeconomics of banking it provides some underpinnings for the credit view of monetary policy which in its simplest form relies on an exogenously assumed limited substitutability between bank loans and bonds the macroeconomics literature distinguishes between the money view and credit view of monetary policy transmission bernanke and blinder 1988 1992 the money view takes bonds and loans to be perfect substitutes and only allows for the effects of monetary policy on aggregate investment consumption and savings through changes in interest rates the credit view allows for an additional effect on investment and economic activity operating through bank credit supply

when and why did fslic resolve insolvent thrifts abstract this paper develops an optimal resolution triage strategy for a deposit insurance regulator the regulator seeks to maximize the market value of the deposit insurance enterprise subject to budget personal bureaucratic political informational and legal restraints testable hypotheses are derived concerning the timing of insolvency resolutions the paper tests these hypotheses using a two step hazards model and a data set of thrift resolutions during 1985 1989 the tests focus on the relative roles of value maximization and constraint pressures in decisions to grant capital forbearance the results suggest that regulators seldom conformed to the benchmark resolution timing strategy that an unconflicted agent would follow under only a budget constraint instead the evidence shows that the resolution timing decision was distorted by personal political informational and legal constraints

credit contagion from counterparty risk standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default some times described as credit contagion this paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects we find that bankruptcy announce ments cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in cds spreads for credi tors in addition creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later this suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion indeed the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institu tions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the lehman bankruptcy in september 2008

evolution of macro information systems for sustainable development abstract the changing perception of the environmental problem as articulated in the brundtland report has shifted the issue of environment information from an almost exclusive focus on pollution towards changes in natural productivity and resource depletion this has reorientated environmental data needs towards the macro perspective of national accounting as reflected in natural resource stocks and flows indicators of the state of environment and sustainable development the stockholm conference 1972 raised the question of the need for a system of environment statistics complementary to and integratible with the body of social and economic statistics we propose here a conceptual framework which tracks stocks and flows of natural resources incorporates a critical set of indicators of ecological integrity at the eco region level and has the capacity to integrate certain parameters in the system of national accounts sna with those found in natural resource accounts nra and state of environment reporting soe reports the emphasis is on the applied side of macro information systems of ecological economics as it has so far evolved from the experience of official government statistics the final section briefly reviews developments in canada and suggests some future directions

principal agent problems in s l salvage new legislation and traditional fdic insolvency resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal agent problems most responsible for the fslic mess these problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts the rtc the constraints slow insolvency resolution increase interim financing costs and undermine rtc recovery of asset value operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived franchise values the rtc allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis initiates bidding for one institution at a time holds back seriously troubled assets and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders although the federal savings and loan insurance corporation fslic is officially defunct its corporate corpse lives on in two successor institutions its deposit insurance business has been taken over by the savings association insurance fund saif while its liquidation or salvage business has been assigned to the resolution trust corporation rtc both saif and rtc have the same stockholder principals federal taxpayers also both are operated by the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic nevertheless their governing structures differ markedly and in a perverse way to maximize net returns from salvage experience suggests the theory that a salvage or value recovery operation requires the aggressive operating flexibility of an automobile junkyard in a junkyard essentially everything in the salvor s inventory is open for inspection stripping and sale to anyone at any time hardto market hulks are compacted into scrap metal i e pooled and shipped out on what can be compared to a bulk sales or auction basis on a strict timetable the yard either owns or transacts with a fleet of tow trucks and has enough operating capital to bring in new wrecks as they appear this paper argues that unlike a private salvor the rtc is saddled with the additional objective of slowing down official recognition of the full size of fslic s losses to this end the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act firrea underfunds the rtc requires delayed sales of residential properties ostensibly to promote the availability of affordable housing and creates a superfluous five person rtc oversight board whose incentives are to deprive rtc decisionmakers of desirable operating flexibility the rtc oversight board creates an appearance of improved accountability to taxpayers that runs exactly opposite to its true economic effects three of the

comment on competition and financial stability by franklin allen and douglas gale allen and gale 2004 this issue of jmcb provide a thought provoking tour d horizon i d call it ambitious except that what they label a prelude to the development of a theoretical framework is too honest to be ambitious they stead fastly refuse to give a definitive answer to their fundamental question does competi tion encourage or discourage adequate financial stability in other words is there a tradeoff between competition and financial stability or are the two goals mutually reinforcing in addressing this question allen and gale employ several different interpretations of the two goals in some sections competition means price taking behavior in others they interpret competition to be imperfect competition with some degree of market power by instability allen and gale sometimes simply mean the possibility of default often instability means the choice of overly risky or undiversi fied investments but in their most interesting case instability means a high degree of interdependence between bank defaults 1 the arguments

inconsistent regulators evidence from banking we find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented we study supervisory decisions of u s banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors state regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently under federal regulators banks report worse asset quality higher regulatory capital ratios and lower return on assets leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds the discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and to some extent differences in regulatory resources we find no support for regulator self interest which includes revolving doors

valuing the treasury s capital assistance program the capital assistance program cap was created by the u s government in february 2009 to provide backup capital to large financial institutions unable to raise sufficient capital from private investors under the terms of the cap a participating bank receives contingent capital by issuing preferred shares to the treasury combined with embedded options for both parties the bank gets the option to redeem the shares or convert them to common equity with conversion mandatory after seven years the treasury earns dividends on the preferred shares and gets warrants on the bank s common equity we develop a contingent claims framework in which to estimate market values of these cap securities the interaction between the competing options held by the buyer and issuer of these securities creates a game between the two parties and our approach captures this strategic element of the joint valuation problem and clarifies the incentives it creates we apply our method to the 18 publicly held bank holding companies that participated in the supervisory capital assessment program the stress test launched together with the cap on average we estimate that compared to a market transaction the cap securities carry a net value of approximately 30 of the capital invested for a bank participating to the maximum extent allowed under the terms of the program we also find that the net value varies widely across banks we compare our estimates with abnormal stock price returns for the stress test banks at the time the terms of the cap were announced we find correlations between 0 78 and 0 85 depending on the precise choice of period and set of banks included these results suggest that our valuation aligns with shareholder perception of the value of the program prompting questions about industry reactions and the overall impact of the program this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

is financial inclusion good for bank stability international evidence abstract financial inclusion has become an important public policy priority following the recent global financial crisis yet we know very little of how it impacts soundness of the providers of financial services using an international sample of 2635 banks in 86 countries over the period 2004 12 we find that higher level of financial inclusion contributes to greater bank stability the positive association is particularly pronounced with those banks that have higher customer deposit funding share and lower marginal costs of providing banking services and also with those that operate in countries with stronger institutional quality the results are robust to instrumental variables analysis controlling for bank fixed effects alternative measures of financial inclusion among several other robustness tests our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by banks as such a policy drive is good for their stability

in search of a strictly rational forecast this paper proposes criteria for classifying time series forecasts of inflation as weakly sufficiently strongly and strictly rational forecasts taken from the asa nber surveys some well known one step ahead forecasting techniques and a novel variable length autoregressive moving average model are tested against these criteria none of the forecasts series meets the criteria for strict rationality nor even the less demanding criteria for strong rationality while agents forecast as best they can their forecasts are not likely to meet stringent rationality criteria suggested by econometricians copyright 1991 by mit press

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance are caps on insured deposits optimal considerable academic and public policy attention has been focused on the deposit insurance contract and in particular its mispriced deposit insurance premium this has resulted in a burgeoning literature on the optimal pricing of deposit insurance guarantees see merton 1977 1978 pyle 1983 ronn and verma 1986 acharya and dreyfus 1989 and allen and saunders 1993 for examples in addition other authors have studied the ability of uninsured depositors or debtholders to provide market discipline in the form of marketbased risk premia in the absence of explicit risk based insurance premia see for example ellis and flannery 1989 and avery belton and goldberg 1988 however a third control instrument namely the setting of ceilings or caps on the amount of deposit insurance coverage has not been subject to rigorous investigation in particular while the fdic 1989 and others have considered the general pros and cons of limiting the scope of deposit insurance for instance by lowering the 100 000 ceiling on the amount of insurance per account or by restricting the brokering in of deposits l no formal analysis of the role of coverage caps can be

a sheep in wolf s clothing can a central bank appear tougher than it is abstract central banks cbs in europe and the us have been providing virtually unlimited amounts of liquidity to banks for quite some time now this may lead banks to expect that these cbs will be lenient in the future will this expectation be justified i present a model in which a commercial bank subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faces uncertainty about whether the cb is tough hawk or lenient dove specifically the cb knows its nature but the bank does not when uncertainty is high the cb can use this to its advantage and try to build a reputation for toughness in response the bank chooses higher liquidity reserves in equilibrium furthermore increasing bank capital and penalty rates make it easier to build a reputation while bailouts by the fiscal government make it more difficult

implicit bank debt guarantees costs benefits and risks implicit bank debt guarantees the expectation by market participants that public authorities might bailout the creditors of banks that are considered too important for financial system stability or another reason to be allowed to fail is commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee public authorities do not have any explicit commitment to intervene they may even honestly state that they not want to do so ex ante but may feel compelled to do so ex post a declared policy aim is to limit the value of implicit guarantees by making banks stronger more easily resolvable in case of distress as well as by imposing extra charges that rise as banks become more systemically important as part of the latter approach globally systemically important banks are identified and subjected to more costly and intrusive regulation there is little evidence that specific approach has been successful so far there is some evidence that the introduction of new resolution frameworks has been helpful while the use of newly available resolution tools and the involvement of bank creditors in the burden sharing associated with bank failure resolution has significantly reduced the value of implicit bank debt guarantees where it occurred in that sense actions speak louder than words

on banking and intermediation abstract the purpose of this lecture is to develop a framework for the study of prudential regulation and to derive policy implications following a discussion of the practice of banking supervision and of the raison d etre of regulation the paper emphasizes the importance of capital adequacy and balance sheet adjustments to shocks affecting either individual banks or the banking sector as a whole the ideas are then applied to the policy debates on market value accounting and on the indexation of the capital requirements to the business cycle the paper concludes with political economy questions and with a discussion of the too big to fail problem

a comparison of inflation forecasts interest rate models provide slightly better monthly forecasts and substantially better eight and fourteen month forecasts of inflation than a univariate time series model the livingston surveys underestimate eight and fourteen month inflation rates especially during the high inflation period of 1978 81 in contrast eight and fourteen month inflation forecasts extrapolated from one month interest rates show little bias and track ex post eight and fourteen month inflation rates better than the survey forecasts

bank capital interbank contagion and bailout policy abstract this paper develops a theoretical framework in which asset linkages in a syndicated loan agreement can infect a healthy bank when its partner bank fails we investigate how capital constraints affect the choice of the healthy bank to takeover or liquidate the exposure held jointly with the failing bank and how the bank s ex ante optimal capital holding and possibility of contagion are affected by anticipation of bail out policy capital requirements and the joint exposure we identify a range of factors that strengthen or weaken the possibility of contagion and bailout recapitalization with common stock rather than preferred equity injection dilutes existing shareholder interests and gives the bank a greater incentive to hold capital to cope with potential contagion increasing the minimum regulatory capital does not necessarily reduce contagion while the requirement of holding conservation capital buffer could increase the bank s resilience to avoid contagion

needed examples of applying ecological economics abstract nothing is as effective as examples in conveying the usefulness of ecological economics to present and potential practitioners i suggest ten example areas or problems where ecological economics can and should make specific analyses and recommendations one example a resolution or creative rephrasing of the dichotomous views of japan that contrast its economic successes with its precarious dependence on imported renewable and nonrenewable resources and its high population density for background i also briefly review nine efforts to date in the general direction of total environmental cost

charter value minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium abstract this paper shows that leaving insolvent banks with large enough charter values open can be optimal and derives normative bank closure reorganization policies based on the liquidation value of assets and the charter value the charter value of a bank is broadly defined as the value that would be foregone due to a closure our simulations of risk taking show that an optimal forbearance for an insolvent bank with a large enough charter value alleviates the moral hazard problem this is because increasing the risk raises the probability of losing the charter value although it generates a moral hazard gain

tests of the rational expectations hypothesis this paper reviews evidence on the structure of anticipation from a number of empirical studies jack muth s rational expectations hypothesis is compared with a variety of alternative models including ferber s law the implicit expectations model of edwin mills and muth s new errors in the variables model the cumulative evidence is of such strength as to compel the suspension of belief in the concept of rational expectations this implies that it is a mistake to proceed under the maintained hypothesis that expectations are rational instead it is necessary to test the sensitivity of empirical and theoretical results to alternative assumptions about the structure by which anticipations are generated copyright 1986 by american economic association

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

counterparty risk and the pricing of defaultable securities motivated by recent financial crises in east asia and the united states where the downfall of a small number of firms had an economy wide impact this paper generalizes existing reduced form models to include default intensities dependent on the default of a counterparty in this model firms have correlated defaults due not only to an exposure to common risk factors but also to firm specific risks that are termed counterparty risks numerical examples illustrate the effect of counterparty risk on the pricing of defaultable bonds and credit derivatives such as default swaps it has been well documented in moody s reports on historical default rates of corporate bond issuers that the number of defaults the number of credit rating downgrades and credit spreads are all strongly correlated with the business cycle this has motivated reduced form models such as duffie and singleton 1999 and lando 1994 1998 which assume that the intensity of default is a stochastic process that derives its randomness from a set of state variables such as the short term interest rate this approach has the convenient features that conditioning on the state variables defaults become independent events and default correlation arises due to the common inf luence of these state variables on the other hand a default intensity that depends linearly on a set of smoothly varying macroeconomic variables is unlikely to account for the clustering of defaults around an economic recession this is evident from a casual inspection of the exhibits in the latest moody s report see keenan 2000 within the usual affine framework one can model the state variables as jump diffusions see duffie pan and single

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

why bank credit policies fluctuate a theory and some evidence in a rational profit maximizing world banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit this paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions this leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies evidence from the banking crisis in new england in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

from low quality reporting to financial crises politics of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle abstract this paper examines how financial reporting regulations affect and respond to macroeconomic cycles by exploring a positive framework in which regulators subject to political pressures respond to cyclical demands by borrowers and lenders we establish that as economic conditions initially decline political power shifts toward interest groups favoring less financial transparency what follows is a counter cyclical increase in economic activity as more non reporting loans are financed possibly coincidental with more aggregate uncertainty during a recession reporting quality is increased potentially causing a crisis like adjustment of economic activity to the cycle we also discuss implications for event studies bank lobbying mark to market and cost of capital

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

the governance of financial supervision recent developments this paper examines the evolution of financial supervision as a policy tool over the last three decades with a focus on the issues raised by the global crisis it considers a sample of advanced and emerging economies to discuss the four main questions debated in the literature and addressed in the economic policy arena the architecture of supervision the role of the central bank as supervisor the governance of supervision and financial supervision vs the internationalization of finance our survey finds that on each of these issues theory and practice do not offer clear cut answers and unambiguous optimal solutions at the same time the most promising approach is to tackle financial supervision as a principal agent problem where economics and political economy approaches must be used in combination to improve both positive and normative analyses of supervisory governance