sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division this paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors i show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game if stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games furthermore symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players a general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c71 1996 academic press inc

modelling long run comovements in equity markets a flexible approach abstract international equity markets linkages are characterized by nonlinear dependence and asymmetries we investigate shifts in long run comovements in stock markets by means of an interrupted markov switching cointegration specification this flexible approach allow us to study to what extent documented changes in global integration are permanent or whether market linkages are subject to changes using an illustrative sample from 1980 to 2012 for usa uk and hong kong stock price indices we find evidence of interrupted cointegration across these markets between may 1997 and april 2002 which is consistent with the decoupling of stock prices from fundamentals during the dot com bubble

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

structural analysis of cointegrating vars this survey uses a number of recent developments in the analysis of cointegrating vector autoregressions vars to examine their links to the older structural modelling traditions using autoregressive distributed lag ardl and simultaneous equations models sems in particular it emphasizes the importance of using judgement and economic theory to supplement the statistical information after a brief historical review it sets out the statistical framework discusses the identification of impulse responses using the generalized impulse response functions reviews the analysis of cointegrating vars and highlights the large number of choices applied workers have to make in determining a specification in particular it considers the problem of specification of intercepts and trends and the size of the var in more detail and examines the advantages of the use of exogenous variables in cointegration analysis the issues are illustrated with a small u s macroeconomic model

a theory of endogenous coalition structures consider an environment with widespread externalities and suppose that bind ing agreements can be written we study coalition formation in such a setting our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game we establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilib rium coalition structures we develop an algorithm that generates under certain conditions an equilibrium coalition structure our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions in particular we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a cournot oligopoly journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78 d62 q 1999 academic press

the strategy structure of some coalition formation games in coalitional games with side payments the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared the predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully these difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form as the collection of pairs of buyer seller in an assignment game the incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection furthermore the relationships with vickrey clarke groves mechanisms are drawn

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

recent developments in modelling nonstationary vector autoregressions in this paper we review some recent developments in the modelling of nonstationary vector autoregressions vars which we feel have great potential for furthering applied researchers understanding of the relationships linking the variables making up a var the developments surveyed are the use of model determination criteria in selecting lag length trend order and cointegrating rank causality testing in vector error correction models fm var estimation of levels vars common trends and cycles analysis permanent and transitory decompositions impulse response asymptotics and the links between cointegrated vars and structural models the techniques are illustrated by applications to the modelling of u k equities dividends and interest rates

endogenous risk in a portfolio balance rational expectations model of the deutschemark dollar rate abstract a portfolio balance model of the dm s rate under rational expectations is specified in which systematic risk induced deviations from uncovered interest parity are allowed this leads to a reduced from containing a potentially time varying risk premium which we approximate and estimate using an arch in mean approach the maximum likelihood estimator and a lagrande multiplier test for arch in mean are developed the estimation results indicate a small but non negligible time varying risk premium

in search of the exchange risk premium a six currency test assuming mean variance optimization abstract a number of authors examining deviations of actual rates of currency depreciation from forward discounts have claimed to find evidence of risk premiums if these deviations are indeed partly due to risk premiums rather than being entirely due to expectational errors then they should be systematically related to those variables on which risk premiums are thought to depend finance theory tells us that if investors optimize with respect to mean and variance the risk premium depends in a specific way on 1 the supplies of assets denominated in the various currencies 2 the variance covariance matrix of the rates of return and 3 the coefficient of risk aversion the null hypothesis of this paper is that the coefficient of risk aversion is zero countries assets are perfect substitutes and risk premiums are nonexistent the alternative hypothesis is that rates of return are systematically related to asset supplies by a macroeconomic portfolio balance function the maximum likelihood technique used dominates previous attempts to find such a relationship in that the parameters of the portfolio balance function are constrained to depend on the variance covariance matrix as the finance theory says they should on the other hand the technique also dominates previous applications of the finance theory in that the expected returns are allowed to vary over time as the macroeconomic portfolio balance theory says they should the paper s finding is a statistical inability to reject the null hypothesis for a portfolio of six currencies although this could be due to low power in the test

mistakes in cooperation the stochastic stability of edgeworth s recontracting in an exchange economywith a finite number of indivisible goods we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability we show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed mistake free process consist of i all core allocations as absorbing states and ii cycles of non core allocations next we introduce a perturbed process where the resistance of each transition is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes do not improve in the transition and of the seriousness of each mistake if preferences are always strict we show that the unique stochasticallystable state of the perturbed process is the walrasian allocation in economies with indifferences non core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable while some core allocations are not

common stochastic trends in international stock markets abstract this paper presents evidence concerning the number of common stochastic trends in the equity markets of the u s japan england germany and canada monthly and quarterly data from january 1974 through august 1990 on morgan stanley s capital international indices are used to compute johansen 1990 tests for common trends the results indicate the presence of a single common trend driving these countries stock markets estimates of the factor loadings suggest that this trend is most important in the japanese market and least important in the canadian market to interpret this evidence the paper demonstrates that under weak conditions the unit root and cointegration structure of stock prices should mirror the unit root and cointegration structure of their dividend payments the paper tests this prediction by constructing national dividend series from capital international s dividend yield data as well as by using gnp data as with stock prices the evidence points to a single common trend although the stochastic properties and relative importance of this trend differs somewhat from the trend in stock prices

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

using survey data to test standard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferes we estimate extrapolative adaptive and regressive models of expectations static or random walk expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight in comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias no variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors expectations regarding exchange rates in the past expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way often by using the forward exchange rate there is however a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate in that the two may not be equal the gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate for example has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium if the aim

asset pricing and foreign exchange risk econometric evidence for the g 7 abstract this paper uses an error correction model ecm to examine the dynamic behavioural relationship between the excess returns of foreign exchange and the variables that measure the stock market risk factor the test results for the major currencies of the g 7 over the period january 1982 to january 1994 support the hypothesis that the excess foreign exchange returns are related to relative risks of the two national equity markets and hence supports the notion of a risk premium in foreign exchange markets in addition we find evidence of non monotonic adjustment in some of the equations with respect to the us dollar which suggests some short run exchange rate overshooting

the emerging market crisis and stock market linkages further evidence this study examines the long run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission among the usa germany and four major eastern european emerging stock markets with particular attention to the impact of the 1998 russian financial crisis the results show that both the long run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission were strengthened among these markets after the crisis the influence of germany became noticeable on all the eastern european markets only after the crisis but not before the crisis we also conduct a rolling generalized var analysis to confirm the robustness of the main findings copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

price and volatility spillovers in scandinavian stock markets abstract new evidence is provided on price and volatility spillovers among the danish norwegian swedish and finnish stock markets the impact of good news market advances and bad news market retreats is described by a multivariate exponential generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic egarch model volatility transmission is asymmetric spillovers being more pronounced for bad than good news significant price and volatility spillovers exist but they are few in number

a consistent bargaining set abstract both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency in excluding imputations to which there exist objections the core does not assess the credibility of such objections the bargaining set goes a step further only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified however the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed we formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a chain of objections is tested in precisely the same way as its predecessor various properties of the consistent bargaining set are also analyzed

a model of agreements in strategic form games abstract because in a strategic form game all the possibilities of communication available to the players must be explicitly listed in the strategy spaces coalitions and coalitional behaviour are not very often taken into account in noncooperative games however it may be desirable especially in applications to separate the basic strategic features of a situation from those strategic features added as a consequence of the possibility of coalitional behaviour we define an equilibrium for the bargaining procedure called by greenberg the theory of solid situations an alternative game theoretic approach cambridge university press cambridge uk 1990 coalitional contingent threat situation we argue that the crucial problem of expectations on the counterdeviations following a deviation can be addressed by defining coalitional strategies and studying the equilibrium of the extended game journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c70 c71

stock market volatility and the crash of 1987 evidence from six emerging markets abstract this paper studies volatility risk premia and the persistence of volatility in six emerging stock markets before and after the 1987 stock market crash the empirical investigation is conducted by means of the garch in the mean model garch m and monthly data from argentina greece india mexico thailand and zimbabwe between january of 1976 and august of 1994 results indicate changes in the arch parameter risk premia and persistence of volatility before and after the 1987 crash but these noted changes are not uniform and depend upon the individual markets factors other than the 1987 crash may also be responsible for the changes

charts noise and fundamentals in the london foreign exchange market this paper presents some empirical evidence on the prevalence perceived importance and nature of chartist or technical analysis in the london foreign exchange market if noise traders see e g de long et al i987 are defined as those speculators who do not base their trading strategies on a consideration of market fundamentals then it clearly encompasses those traders who employ chart analysis i e those who base their strategies on the analysis and extrapolation of past price movements alone

ecb monetary policy and the dmdollar exchange rate evidence from a bayesian var since the start of the european monetary union emu in january 1999 the dm has depreciated considerably against the currencies of major industrial countries whether there is a systematic failure of vector autoregressive var models fitted to the pre emu period to predict forward looking variables in the year 1999 is investigated conditional forecasts are used in order to capture the potential effects of real shocks and to assess the ecb s reaction to these shocks the findings suggest that neither real shocks nor the actual ecb policy reaction can explain the exchange rate devaluation this points to important effects of increased uncertainty following the regime shift resulting in an increased risk premium in the foreign exchange market

coalition formation as a dynamic process abstract we study coalition formation as an ongoing dynamic process with payoffs generated as coalitions form disintegrate or regroup a process of coalition formation pcf is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value compared to inaction this future value in turn is endogenous it depends on coalitional movements at each node we study existence of equilibrium pcfs we connect deterministic equilibrium pcfs with unique absorbing state to the core and equilibrium pcfs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set in addition we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium pcfs

evolution in dynamic linkages across daily national stock indexes abstract this article investigates how dynamic linkages among the daily rates of return of eight national stock indexes have evolved since 1972 a dynamic simultaneous equations model is estimated to describe the contemporaneous and lead lag relationships across national equity markets over three different years 1972 1980 and 1987 results reveal growing market interdependence within the same geographical region over time while there are many significant intermarket relationships within the same 24 hour period there are few significant lagged responses across markets beyond 24 hours this suggests a high degree of international market efficiency furthermore japan s market influence has been growing to rival that of the usa

structural breaks and diversification the impact of the 1997 asian financial crisis on the integration of asia pacific real estate markets abstract currently there exists relatively little research on the influence that the 1997 asian financial crisis has had upon capital flows within the property market and the associated long run implications of it this paper examines the impact that the crisis has had upon the integration and dynamic links between a number of asia pacific real estate markets the results show that asia pacific property markets are integrated despite a structural shift occurring at the time of the crisis these results are a particularly important finding for fund managers concerned with the impact of globalization on the performance of their real estate portfolios showing that in the asia pacific region diversification benefits are actually less than that suggested by an analysis incorrectly ignoring the crisis

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

structure and performance global interdependence of stock markets around the crash of october 1987 using a new data source on share price indices this paper finds no evidence that the substantial variations in the reactions to the crash of october 1987 across countries are related to the structure of markets however trading halts and capital controls on residents may have moderated the speed of declines in some markets the paper also examines one measure of interlinkages between markets the trading of foreign stocks on domestic markets and finds this to be closely related to interdependence between markets

common trends and convergence south east asian equity markets 1988 1999 abstract this paper uses two different estimation approaches to demonstrate that equity markets in south east asia have shown signs of converging during the 1990s according to the haldane and hall economic journal 101 436 443 1991 method of measuring convergence a subset of asian markets had converged by mid 1997 this process appears to have been abruptly halted and somewhat reversed by the recent financial crisis we find that in general there are two common trends present in the eight asian equity market indices modeled here and also two trends when the us market is additionally included in a johansen var

asymmetric volatility transmission in international stock markets abstract the transmission mechanism of price and volatility spillovers across the new york tokyo and london stock markets is investigated the asymmetric impact of good news market advances and bad news market declines on volatility transmission is described by an extended multivariate exponential generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic egarch model using daily open to close returns we find strong evidence that volatility spillovers in a given market are much more pronounced when the news arriving from the last market to trade is bad a before and after october 1987 crash analysis reveals that the linkages and interactions among the three markets have increased substantially in the post crash era suggesting that national markets have grown more interdependent

confining the coase theorem contracting ownership and free riding if individuals own the right to take any action that they please and are free to contract about behaviour will outcomes be efficient in all situations that is does the coase theorem hold we study this classic question through the lens of a non cooperative model of contract negotiations considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations in either case we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players but if participation is voluntary and there are more than two players there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient specifically the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting free riding on others agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions when actions involve the use of assets efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership

recent estimates of time variation in the conditional variance and in the exchange risk premium abstract the optimal diversification model of investors portfolio behavior can give a linear relationship between the exchange risk premium and the conditional exchange rate variance this note surveys recent empirical work that allows the conditional variance itself and therefore the risk premium to vary over time in particular it examines the implications of recent empirical estimates for earlier arguments based on the assumption that the conditional variance was constant over time that the exchange risk premium had to be small in magnitude and variability

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

russian equity market linkages before and after the 1998 crisis evidence from stochastic and regime switching cointegration tests abstract this paper examines the relationships between russian and other equity markets over the period of 1995 2004 to account for potential instability in the market relationships we apply a number of cointegration approaches gregory hansen 1996 residual based tests for cointegration in models with regime shifts journal of econometrics 70 99 126 test which allows for a structural break in the relationships a stochastic cointegration framework by mccabe 2003 testing for stochastic cointegration and evidence for present value models working paper the non parametric test by breitung 2002 nonparametric tests for unit roots and cointegration journal of econometrics 108 2 343 363 and a regime switching cointegration model in the spirit of ho 1999 financial liberalization and international capital mobility of taiwan a regime switching approach asian economic journal 13 4 407 417 the tests point to a significant agreement that the russian equity market remained isolated from the influence by international markets in the long run and that while a structural break might have occurred in august 1998 this did not alter the nature of long run relationships

a property of the core abstract for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core we show that given any allocation outside the core there is an allocation in the core that indirectly dominates it journal of economic literatureclassification number c71

a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers abstract we extend the stahl rubinstein s alternating offer model ton person coalitional bargaining the key feature of the model is the random selection of proposers at every round no delay of agreement occurs in equilibrium for a super additive game in contrast to the fixed order model of chatterjeeet al rev econ stud 60 1993 463 477 when the discount factor of future payoffs is sufficiently high the agreement on the grand coalition is reached if and only if it has the largest value per capita among all coalitions moreover in the limit as the discount factor goes to one all players divide equally the value of the grand coalition regardless of who makes a proposal journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73 c78

the stability of hedonic coalition structures we consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings i e where each player s payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition we first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings we then focus on a weaker stability condition individual stability where no player can benefit from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition we show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single peaked preferences or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences then there exists an individually stable coalition partition examples show that without these conditions individually stable coalition partitions may not exist we also discuss some other stability concepts and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 a14 d20

dynamics and stability of constitutions coalitions and clubs a central feature of dynamic collective decision making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions for example current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations we develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness we show how this framework can be applied in political economy coalition formation and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs the explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision making 1 a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society 2 efficiency enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender

sterling s relationship with the dollar and the deutschemark 1976 89 this paper evaluates the linkages between bilateral exchange rates using a time varying parameter model which can be estimated using the kalman filter the technique solves many of the statistical problems which arise when ordinary least squares is used to estimate currency correlation applying the technique to the dollar sterling dm sterling and dm dollar bilateral exchange rates the results suggest a market weakening strengthening of sterling s relationship with the dollar dm since the mid 1970s additionally these currency linkages are shown to have undergone a number of regime shifts suggesting that the timing of the weakening of the dollar sterling relationship is different to that proposed by previous studies copyright 1991 by royal economic society

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open

conditional variance and the risk premium in the foreign exchange market abstract we investigate the existence of a risk premium in the foreign exchange market based on the conditional variance of market forecast errors the forecast errors are assumed to follow the arch process introduced by engle 1982 estimation and diagnostic testing of the model are discussed and results are presented for the currencies of the united kingdom france germany japan and switzerland