quality disclosure under consumer loss aversion consumers experience a sense of loss when a product s quality does not match their expectations to alleviate consumer loss aversion cla firms can disclose information to reduce consumers uncer

buyer initiated vs seller initiated information revelation sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects one challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople s ability to communicate or customers ability to process there is limited bandwidth between the firm and customers one important decision then is which information should customers see what the firm chooses to tell customers may be informative in itself when constrained to a seller initiated information revelation format where the firm chooses which feature to show the firm never finds it optimal to offer more features than it is able to inform customers about consequently customers never find credible a claim that the product has all features the important implication is that price alone cannot serve as a signal of quality in this setting in contrast a buyer initiated information revelation format where customers decide which information to receive increases the probability of a sale and also results in the production of higher quality products in a competitive setting by adopting buyer initiated information revelation firms are able to attain positive profits this is due to the fact that customers infer the product s quality from the price along with the information revelation format customers know that at some prices firms find it profitable to produce high quality products and at other lower prices this is not the case thus customer empowerment leads to higher profits

information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace this paper examines the interaction of information provision product quality and pricing decisions by competitive firms to explore the following question in a competitive market where consumers face uncertainty about product quality and or their preference for quality which firms those that sell higher or lower quality products have the higher incentive to provide what type of information we find that while the higher quality firm should always provide information resolving consumer uncertainty on product quality the lower quality firm under certain conditions will have the higher incentive to and will be the one to provide information resolving consumer uncertainty about their quality preferences in the analysis we trace the latter result to competition and to free riding on the information provision specifically in a monopoly market or when consumer free riding is restricted by the costliness of store visits the lower quality firm would have a lower incentive to provide information resolving consumer preference uncertainty than otherwise the model is also adapted to examine product returns as a possible strategy of information provision

joint pricing and production decisions with yield uncertainty and downconversion abstract we consider a firm who supplies two types of products high end and low end because of the uncertainty in the production process the yield rate of the high end products is uncertain the substandard high end products caused by the yield uncertainty can be transformed into the low end products with a certain cost we characterize the optimal pricing and production decisions and develop an algorithm to compute the optimal solution we also investigate the impact of the yield uncertainty on the firm s performance and explore how stability of market demand emergent fulfillment costs and downconversion cost influence this effect we find that i the profit of the firm deteriorates when the risk of the yield uncertainty is high in the face of yield uncertainty the firm prefers to decrease increase the production quantity of the high end low end products ii when the market demands are quite unstable the emergent fulfillment costs are low or the downconversion cost is high the firm has a low incentive to eliminate the yield uncertainty

scale effects in markets with search estimates of aggregate matching functions may miss important scale effects in frictional labour markets because of the reactions of job seekers to scale we estimate a semi structural model of search and matching on a british sample of unemployed people testing for scale effects on the probability of receiving an offer and on the distribution of wage offers we find them only in wage offers but we also find that reservation wages rise to deliver higher post unemployment wages but not faster matches so aggregate matching functions should be unaffected by scale but wage equations should be showing them

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

selling formats for search goods the paper offers a comparative analysis of different ways to sell products selling formats when buyers incur evaluation costs since these costs are sunk at the moment of trade buyers may refrain from incurring them for fear of later opportunism on the part of sellers it is found that the use of many common selling formats can be explained in terms of their ability to alleviate this problem specifically i explain price advertising seller colocation and bargaining the theory explains much of the divergence in retail trading institutions and leads to several testable predictions

trade policy home market effect versus terms of trade externality we study trade policy in a two sector krugman 1980 trade model allowing for wage import and export subsidies taxes we study non cooperative trade policies first for each individual instrument and then for the situation where all instruments can be set simultaneously and contrast those with the efficient allocation we show that in this general context there are four motives for non cooperative trade policies the correction of monopolistic distortions the terms of trade manipulation the delocation motive for protection home market effect the fiscal burden shifting motive the nash equilibrium when all instruments are available is characterized by first best level wage subsidies and inefficient import subsidies and export taxes which aim at relocating firms to the other economy and improving terms of trade thus the dominating incentives for non cooperative trade policies are the fiscal burden shifting motives and terms of trade effects

market segmentation self selection and product line design the purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of market segmentation based on consumer self selection the extant theory is based on the third degree price discrimination model of pigou central assumptions of which are that the firm can directly address individual segments and isolate them by using consumer self selection i am relaxing these assumptions in the context of a monopolist designing a product line i show that this relaxation has significant implications for how the products and prices are chosen and what they look like in particular segments may be aggregated even though there are no economies of scale furthermore consumer self selection enables us to model cannibalization and competition among firms

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

price as a stimulus to think the case for willful overpricing consumers aware of a new benefit will often experience uncertainty about its personal relevance or usage value this paper shows that the decision to deliberate further to resolve this uncertainty and reach a polarized judgment of personal relevance critically depends on the posted price in particular a price above the consumer s initial willingness to pay might be thought provoking and enhance the perception of relevance with a certain probability this behavioral mechanism is introduced formally and by way of an experiment with reference to the purchase of organic lettuce and fair trade coffee accounting for the effect of price as a stimulus to think a monopolistic firm should either over price transgressive pricing or under price regressive pricing in comparison to the consumer s willingness to pay under certain circumstances the firm should also empower consumers with means that reduce the effort of deliberation

context dependent preferences the standard theory of choice based on value maximization associates with each option a real value such that given an offered set the decision maker chooses the option with the highest value despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal there is a growing body of data that is inconsistent with this theory in particular the relative attractiveness of x compared to y often depends on the presence or absence of a third option z and the market share of an option can actually be increased by enlarging the offered set we review recent empirical findings that are inconsistent with value maximization and present a context dependent model that expresses the value of each option as an additive combination of two components a contingent weighting process that captures the effect of the background context and a binary comparison process that describes the effect of the local context the model accounts for observed violations of the standard theory and provides a framework for analyzing context dependent p

product variety and endogenous pricing with evaluation costs one important decision firms must make is to select the product line characteristics and number of products to offer consumers this paper explores the effect of the interaction between consumer evaluation costs and pricing on the optimal product line length to offer consumers before deciding to buy a product among all products offered a consumer learns the product line length given the product line length a consumer decides whether to evaluate the products available and their prices this decision to evaluate depends on the expected consumer surplus after the evaluation being greater than the evaluation costs when the firm offers few products the firm may not attract many consumers because of lack of product fit and may be forced to offer low prices when the firm offers many products all consumers will find a great product fit that is the variance of consumer valuations per product chosen is lower this allows the firm to charge high prices to extract ex post consumer surplus resulting in lower ex ante expected consumer surplus which may lead consumers not to evaluate the products in the first place that is by offering fewer products a firm can commit not to extract all possible consumer surplus these two forces may then lead to the existence of an interior optimal number of products to offer the optimal number of products offered is decreasing in the evaluation costs

consumer deliberation and product line design this paper studies optimal product line design when consumers need to incur costly deliberation to uncover their valuations for quality to induce deliberation a firm must maintain quality dispersion and cut the price of the high end product so that consumers are motivated to deliberate in the hope that high end consumption fits their needs to prevent deliberation the firm may have to offer downgraded quality at a low price so that an impulsive purchase will not appear too wasteful whether the firm should induce deliberation depends on how much surplus it creates by aligning the supply of quality with heterogeneous demand for quality and how much surplus it captures during this process interestingly equilibrium firm profit consumer surplus and social welfare can all increase with the cost of deliberation we extend the model to accommodate consumers heterogeneous prior beliefs of their valuations for quality we also discuss how market research could benefit from taking into account the endogeneity of consumer deliberation

returns to scale in a matching model of the labor market abstract this paper presents evidence on the degree of returns to scale in the labor market using a transcendental logarithmic model of the labor market matching technology the empirical results imply locally increasing returns to scale and are consistent with multiple equilibria thereby suggesting a potentially welfare enhancing role for macroeconomic policy intervention

varieties and the transfer problem abstract we revisit the classic transfer problem accounting for two channels of adjustment increased trade in existing goods and services the intensive margin and net creation and destruction of product varieties the extensive margin over the medium term the latter reduces the scope for real exchange rate and terms of trade variability in response to cross border flows we embed our transfer analysis in popular models of current account adjustment where initial imbalances are driven by domestic demand for or foreign supply of net saving possibly associated with over optimistic expectations simulation exercises based on 2006 data suggest that a transfer of the size of the pre crisis u s current account deficit may require only moderate trend depreciation in real terms and that the aggregate welfare impact of the transfer is disconnected from the size of the relative price correction

a rational reconstruction of the compromise effect using market data to infer utilities this article explores the possibility that consumers use market data to make inferences about product utilities the argument is made by means of an example based on the compromise effect found in extant experimental data this phenomenon is generally looked at as a manifestation of deviations from rationality in choice however assuming full rationality i describe a decision rule that is based on consumers inferences about their personal valuation of alternatives from the portfolio of market offerings and some information about their own relative tastes through a number of examples i will argue that consumers often use this or similar decision rules to make inferences about utility i then show that the decision rule may generate compromise effects in experiments and that it may be sustainable the compromise effect could therefore be seen as preliminary evidence that consumers make such inferences

optimal product line design when consumers exhibit choice set dependent preferences in a market of consumers with varying willingness to pay using product line as a discrimination tool may extract higher profits than serving all consumers with a single product local context effects however point to yet another consideration in designing product lines how the appeal of a product changes with the context provided by other products in the choice set i present a model of product line design that incorporates both discrimination and context management goals and offers recommendations for the variety and positioning of products to this end the model makes use of a framework that allows preferences to be choice set dependent given this framework i study how the firm manages externalities between products created by such dependencies the firm creates distortions above and beyond those resulting from discrimination motives alone for example in a vertically differentiated market for quality quality distortions exist even for the consumers with the highest valuations the range of quality provisions given the number of products is compressed as the relative importance of unfavorable comparisons among products increases surprisingly this compression may even lead the firm to forego discrimination among consumers regardless of the cost of offering distinct products

profits in the new trade approach to trade negotiations ever since johnson s 1954 seminal work initiated the formal analysis of trade negotiations the terms of trade theory has been the dominant paradigm of the field as is well known it holds that trade negotiations serve to internalize termsof trade externalities resulting from countries noncooperative tariff choices its standard formulation is due to bagwell and staiger 1999 who show that it can not only explain the purpose of trade negotiations but also rationalize many features of the gatt wto s institutional design for all its merits this standard theory has two significant limitations first it predicts that trade negotiations should revolve solely around the issue of terms of trade manipulation which seems implausible to many observers of gatt wto negotiations second it is based on conventional neoclassical trade models which are difficult to calibrate convincingly so that little is known about its quantitative implications for important variables such as the gains from gatt wto negotiations in this article i present a variant of my analysis in ossa 2011a which aims to overcome these limitations the main idea is to depart from the conventional neoclassical trade model and instead build on a krugman 1980 new trade model the key difference from ossa 2011a is that i now rule out free entry which turns the production relocation effects into profit shifting effects such profit shifting effects are intuitively appealing since they allow for a view of trade negotiations in which producer interests play a prominent role i keep the analysis deliberately simple to highlight the novel elements of my approach specifically i shut off all terms of trade effects and allow trade policy to operate only at the most aggregate level so that a single tariff is

lowering customer evaluation costs product differentiation and price competition when match uncertainty is resolved via costly evaluation the first product sampled by a customer is more likely to make the sale this prompts firms to lower their products evaluation costs to attract customers to sample their products first such efforts by firms are called customer learning investment cli when product quality is freely observable but horizontal match is not we examine how cli choices interact with quality and price competition in a duopoly cli has a competition effect in that a higher cli of a firm increases its demand but decreases that of its rivals in the market covered duopoly both qualities will decrease increase when the high end low end firm invests more in customer learning and remain unchanged when they invest equally relative to when neither firm invests we further show that the firm with a higher relative production efficiency invests more in customer learning than the competitor in the market not covered duopoly cli by the low end firm also creates a market

behavior based pricing an analysis of the impact of peer induced fairness firms tracking consumer purchase information often use behavior based pricing bbp i e price discriminate between consumers based on preferences revealed from purchase histories however behavioral research has shown that such pricing practices can lead to perceptions of unfairness when consumers are charged a higher price than other consumers for the same product this paper studies the impact of consumers fairness concerns on firms behavior based pricing strategy profits consumer surplus and social welfare prior research shows that bbp often yields lower profits than profits without customer recognition or behavior based price discrimination by contrast we find that firms profits from conducting bbp increase with consumers fairness concerns when fairness concerns are sufficiently strong practicing bbp is more profitable than without customer recognition however consumers fairness concerns decrease consumer surplus in addition when consumers fairness concerns are sufficiently stron

why are bad products so hard to kill it is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low we argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers incentives rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low to avoid investing in low demand products the firm must also reward decisions to kill products however rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success the inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low demand products we explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions

the discriminating consumer product proliferation and willingness to pay for quality abstract the authors propose that a crowded product space motivates consumers to better discriminate between options of different quality specifically this article reports evidence from three controlled experiments and one natural experiment that people are prepared to pay more for high quality products and less for low quality products when they are considered in the context of a dense as opposed to a sparse set of alternatives to explain this effect the authors argue that consumers uncertain about the importance of quality learn from observing market outcomes product proliferation reveals that other consumers care to discriminate among similar alternatives and in turn this inference raises the importance of quality in decision making

when more alternatives lead to less choice this paper shows that when the alternatives offered to consumers span the preference space as it would be chosen by a firm search or evaluation costs may lead consumers not to search and not to choose if too many or too few alternatives are offered if too many alternatives are offered then the consumer may have to engage in many searches or evaluations to find a satisfactory fit this may be too costly and result in the consumer avoiding making a choice altogether if too few alternatives are offered then the consumer may not search or choose fearing that an acceptable choice is unlikely these two forces result in the existence of a finite optimal number of alternatives that maximizes the probability of choice

global imbalances revisited the transfer problem and transport costs in monopolistic competition we study the welfare eects of trade imbalances in a two sector model of monop olistic competition as in perfect competition a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the de cit country and possibly a terms of trade deterioration unlike the conventional wisdom however trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries this is because of a production delocation eect which leads to a reduction in the local price index in the presence of intermediate goods new results arise a trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate to a terms of trade improvement and to a welfare increase under standard parameter con gurations in addition policies that stabilize the exchange rate can make the balanced trade equilibrium unstable these results can explain why the manufac turing sector may agglomerate in countries that resist the real appreciation of their currency and suggest that a xed exchange rate and nominal rigidities may generate short run instability

the determinants of equilibrium unemployment the paper takes the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market to the data it tests the model s empirical validity and employs structural estimation to generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers the model is applied to israeli data that are uniquely suited for this kind of empirical investigation the structural estimates are used to quantify the frictions embodied in the model including the costs of search the congestion and trading externality effects and the matching process a calibration simulation analysis then studies the effect of several key variables on equilibrium unemployment

exchange rates and prices the adjustment of relative prices to exchange rate movements is explained in an industrial organization approach given labor costs in the respective currencies exchange rate movements change costs for firms selling in the home market and thus disturb the industry equilibrium the extent of absolute and relative price adjustment is shown to depend on market integration product substitutability the relative number of domestic and foreign firms and the market structure the impact of exchange rates on prices is illustrated in a variety of approaches including the cournot a dixit and j stiglitz 1977 and s salop 1979 models some empirical evidence is offered in support of the theory copyright 1987 by american economic association