submarkets and the evolution of market structure we construct a model of industry evolution in which the central force for change is the creation and destruction of submarkets firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the form of submarkets they contract and ultimately exit when the submarkets in which they operate are destroyed this simple framework can transparently explain a wide range of well known regularities about industry dynamics most notably the subtle relationships between size age growth and survival data on the laser industry where submarkets are prominent further illustrate the ability of the model to explain distinctive patterns in the evolution of industries and firms

ants rationality and recruitment this paper offers an explanation of behavior that puzzled entomologists and economists ants faced with two identical food sources were observed to concentrate more on one of these but after a period they would turn their attention to the other the same phenomenon has been observed in humans choosing between restaurants after discussing the nature of foraging and recruitment behavior in ants a simple model of stochastic recruitment is suggested this explains the herding and epidemics described in the literature on financial markets as corresponding to the equilibrium distribution of a stochastic process rather than to switching between multiple equilibria

optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market this article studies optimal linear and non linear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labour market unlike in standard taxation models firms do not know workers abilities and competitively screen them through non linear compensation contracts unobservable to the government in a miyazaki wilson spence equilibrium adverse selection leads to different optimal tax formulas than in the standard mirrlees 1971 model because of the use of work hours as a screening tool by firms which for higher talent workers results in a rat race and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross subsidies the most surprising result is that if the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not policies that endogenously affect adverse selection are discussed the model has practical implications for the interpretation estimation and use of taxable income elasticities which are central to optimal tax design

firm dynamics and financial development abstract using comprehensive firm level datasets this paper studies the impact of cross country variation in financial market development on firms financing choices and growth in less financially developed economies small firms grow faster and have lower leverage than large firms as financial development improves the growth difference between small and large firms shrinks while the leverage difference rises the paper then develops a quantitative model where financial frictions drive firm growth and debt financing through the availability of credit and default risk the model explains the observed cross country variations in firm size leverage and growth in response to changes in financial frictions

separation of powers and development abstract we model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion proofness then we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries unfortunately the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this institution

age effects leverage and firm growth abstract recent theories of firm dynamics emphasize the role of financial variables as determinants of firm growth empirically examining these relationships has been difficult since there is a lack of financial data on the small young and private firms using a unique administrative data set this paper considers the growth of new firms in canadian manufacturing from a financial perspective we find that financial factors such as leverage and initial financial size impact growth rates for new firms further the inclusion of leverage has little impact on the economic significance of the conditional age and size relationships with firm growth

symposium on organizations and economics m t r ost production in modern economies occurs within organizations and this production is regulated only to a limited extent by prices the size of some of the largest organizations like general motors or ibm or att if managers didn t they would be replaced and firms that didn t maximize value wouldn t survive accordingly what went on inside the black box was mere detail the behavior of the firm could be described completely without knowledge of those details

a simple tax structure for competitive equilibrium and redistribution in insurance markets with asymmetric information in their influential paper rothschild and stiglitz 6 demonstrated that the existence of nash equilibrium is not a general property of insurance markets when buyers have private information about their riskiness and firms face free entry and exit conditions this paper presents a simple and implementable system of taxes and subsidies applied to firms which permits a nash equilibrium always to exist we also show that more than one nash equilibrium is open to the regulator in particular government can effect risk discriminating redistribution without a priori knowledge of any individual buyer s riskiness hence it is not the case that the inability to distinguish between types of buyers rules out compensation risk discriminating transfers even in principle as claimed by schmalensee 7 442 finally we show that even when a nash equilibrium exists without government intervention there are always alternative and under some circumstances pareto superior equilibria open to the regulator since these alternative equilibria entail cross subsidization from low risk to high risk buyers our results suggest that the well known cross subsidization enforced through current regulatory practices is consistent with economic efficiency we conclude that the informational asymmetry assumed by rothschild and stiglitz poses distinct efficiency and distribution problems as do more conventional non informational situations of market failure and that regulators can influence the allocation of insurance through conventional instruments of intervention without assuming dictatorial control of the market

moderation in groups evidence from betting on ice break ups in alaska we use a large sample of guessed ice break up dates for the tanana river in alaska to study differences between outcomes of decisions made by individuals versus groups we estimate the distribution of guesses conditional on whether they were made by individual bettors or betting pools we document two major distinctions between the two sets of guesses 1 the distribution of guesses made by groups of bettors appears to conform more to the distribution of historical break up dates than the distribution of guesses made by individual bettors and 2 the distribution for groups has less mass in its tails and displays lower variability than the distribution for individuals we argue that these two pieces of evidence are consistent with the hypothesis that group decisions are more moderate either because groups have to reach a compromise when their members disagree or because individuals with extreme opinions are less likely to be part of a group

northwest coast indigenous institutions that supported resilience and sustainability abstract indians of the northwest coast of north america had cultural continuity for at least two millennia before contact with people from the old world this archeological fact suggests that their societies had achieved sustainability and resilience in relationships to their ecosystems and the salmon runs the governance principles used by northwest indians in managing fisheries and other resources provided resilience in addition to a land ethic these principles included exchange systems based on public reciprocity property rights were clear and trespass was a capital offense chiefs and titleholders had to be generous facilitators leadership authority over land was contingent upon adherence to ethical and generous behavior as well as good management these indigenous institutions were quite different from the rules currently governing the management of most ecosystems in critiquing current institutions many ideas similar to those in the indigenous systems have been proposed in isolation the example described in this paper suggests the importance of combining them

the relationship between firm growth size and age estimates for 100 manufacturing industries this study uses a sample of all firms operating in 100 manufacturing industries to examine some aspects of firm dynamics it finds that firm growth the variability of firm growth and the probability that a firm will fail decrease with firm age it also finds that firm growth decreases at a diminishing rate with firm size even after controlling for the exit of slow growing firms from the sample gibrat s law therefore fails although the severity of the failure decreases with firm size copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

imperfect information and the equitability of competitive prices in many markets sellers have imperfect information about the costs of sales to different buyers and the pattern of competitive pricing depends on the information available in order to analyze the equity implications of public policies requiring information suppression non utilitarian measures of the horizontal and vertical dimensions of pricing inequity caused by cross subsidization are proposed and examined better information generally reduces vertical inequity but if information about buyers is initially poor additional imperfect information may increase horizontal inequity if information is initially good more information generally lowers both dimensions of inequity

can sustainable consumption be learned a model of cultural evolution abstract this paper shows how sustainable consumption patterns can spread within a population via processes of social learning even though a strong individual learning bias may favor environmentally harmful products we present a model depicting how the biased transmission of different behaviors via individual and social learning influences agents consumption behavior the underlying learning biases can be traced back to evolved cognitive dispositions challenging the vision of a permanent transition toward sustainability we argue that green consumption patterns are not self reinforcing and cannot be locked in permanently

the concept and measurement of horizontal inequity abstract this paper discusses the concept of horizontal equity and presents three formal principles as a basis for making comparisons of the extent of horizontal inequity produced by different redistributions a condition analogous to the lorenz criterion used for inequality comparisons is established under which the horizontal inequities of redistributions can be ranked without recourse to a cardinal measure of inequity ordinal comparisons are not possible in many cases the three principles suggest three properties that reasonable measures of horizontal inequity should possess a class of measures which satisfies the properties is proposed most other existing measures are found not to satisfy them

agency models in different stages of ceo tenure the effects of stock options and board independence on r d investment this study examines how r d investment is shaped by governance devices combining the two agency models of limited competence and managerial opportunism it suggests that governance devices exert differing effects in early vs later stages of ceo tenure early in ceo tenure r d investment is reduced by stock options and board independence whereas in later stages these effects reverse r d investment is enhanced by stock options and board independence an empirical test on a sample of u s companies provides support for the hypothesized effects for policy makers this study implies that r d investment can be enhanced by setting rules and standards of good governance that take into account ceo time in office and firm context

interest rates and credit risk this paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default we develop a dynamic model in which the relationship between firms and their outside financiers is affected by a moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs initial wealth is scarce the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival the need to finance new investment with outside funding pushes firms leverage ratio above some state contingent target towards which they gradually adjust through earnings retention the dynamic response of leverage and default to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms both rises and cuts increase the aggregate default rate in the short run however a higher interest rate reduces firms target leverage and hence produces lower default rates in the longer run this helps rationalize some evidence regarding the risk taking channel of monetary policy

rules of thumb for social learning this paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use we analyze two learning environments one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better for some of them in both environments players use exogenously specified rules of thumb that ignore historical data but may incorporate a tendency to use the more popular technology in some cases these naive rules can lead to fairly efficient decisions in the long run but adjustment can be slow when a superior technology is first introduced

the impact of imperfectly categorizing risks on income inequality and social welfare the use of imperfect information to categorize risks is a pervasive and controversial phenomenon in the insurance industry although this activity reduces the average extent of vertical price discrimination it is shown in this paper that both highand low risk types may prefer ex ante to knowing the category to which they will be assigned that such information be suppressed furthermore for the lorenz criterion it is shown that under certain restrictive demand conditions the imperfect categorization of risks leads to an increase in inequality the paper employs the wilson e2 equilibrium concept l impact d une categorisation imparfaite des risques sur l inegalite du revenu et le bien etre social l utilisation de renseignements imparfaits pour categoriser les risques est un probleme important qui porte a controverses dans l industrie de i assurance meme si ce phenomene reduit le degre de discrimination verticale par les prix en moyenne i auteur montre que a la fois les personnes dont le coefficient de risques est faible et elev6 et ce avant de savoir a quelle categorie on va les assigner peuvent fort bien preferer que cette information soit supprimee de plus 1 auteur montre que sous certaines conditions de demande restrictives la categorisation imparfaite des risques conduit a un accroissement du degre d inegalite mesure par le critere de lorenz ce memoire utilise le concept d equilibre dit de wilson e2 if insurance firms are unable to distinguish between the risk types of their clients but consumers know their own probability of loss i e if asymmetric information persists then the complication of adverse selection may arise adverse selection occurs when the class of risks or set of classes that purchases insurance differs adversely from that anticipated by the firm for example if a firm offers a contract to low risk types at their actuarially fair rate then high risk types will also purchase it with the result that the firm will earn expected losses hence the problem of adverse selection restricts the ability of firms to offer efficient insurance contracts to low risk types it has been demonstrated by rothschild and stiglitz 1976 that provided the proportion of high risk types in the population is above some critical level a this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 of the author s phd thesis entitled the economics of risk classification in insurance london school of economics and political science 1982 i am indebted to my supervisor lucien foldes and an anonymous referee for useful comments the author alone is responsible for any errors herein canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xvil no 3 august aotlt 1984 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 84 557 568 1 50 c canadian economics association this content downloaded from 157 55 39 215 on wed 31 aug 2016 04 39 57 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

designing a private industry government auctions with endogenous market structure abstract this paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure doupoly dual sourcing monopoly sole sourcing or government owned production are a function of the bids in designing the optimal mechanism the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus producer surplus and revenue under incomplete information doupoly is implemented less frequently and government production more frequently than under complete information when bidders are symmetric the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second price auction applications to privatization deregulation and defense procurement are discussed

mixups in the warehouse centralized and decentralized multi plant firms lynn hunnicutt i introduction all firms receive information and use it to make decisions multi plant firms receive information at scattered locations and must choose how this knowledge will flow and how decisions will be made the firm might have a single decision maker which i call centralization or it might allow each location to make decisions based on any information available to them a situation i call decentralization this article considers issues affecting the choice between one and several decision makers first through a simple model of a multi plant firm and then through two case studies that illustrate many of the model s conclusions the model assumes and the case studies show that a single decision maker often has trouble handling all information available from widely scattered locations mixups shipping the wrong bundle to an outlet are an unavoidable consequence of having a single boss 1 when the firm has more than one decision maker mixups are avoided but overhead costs are larger one of the model s key results which is confirmed by the case studies is that the centralized firm often standardizes as a way to simplify the problem it faces that is it ships similar and less than optimal bundles to all outlets even though resizing or reforming bundles could increase the profitability of any one outlet there is a large literature in which delay and its minimization is the driving force behind organizational form radner 1993 van zandt and radner 1995 and van zandt 1999 analyze the time required to process a batch of information under different organizational structures bolton and dewatripont 1994 extend radner 1993 by explicitly including both processing and communication delay and differentiating between the two types the firm minimizes delay when agents specialize in processing particular types of information specialization also occurs in the model of geanakoplos and milgrom 1991 in which the firm may dictate which bits of information managers attend to the firm s problem then is to coordinate the different bits of information its managers hold communication delay is at issue in marschak and reichelstein 1998 who relate organizational structure to the size of communication costs and message complexity the issue of time to transmit information is also considered in govindarajan 1986 who notes that communication delay in a rapidly changing environment or in a firm where coordination is crucial may favor centralization a key assumption of these models is that no worker below the top of the hierarchy is empowered to act without direction from above a second function of organizational form is to prevent the firm from undertaking substandard projects sah and stiglitz 1986 1991 show that when overall project quality is low hierarchy is preferred as it is more profitable when individual managers hold potential projects to high standards this work was extended by koh 1992 who showed that the firm minimizes its costs if managers undertaking the first review of a project reject it when they work in a hierarchy and accept it when they work in a polyarchy thus managers working in a hierarchy should have a higher standard for acceptance than those working a polyarchy sali 1991 describes managerial ability as also affecting the choice of organizational form since a single manager s influence is larger in a centralized organization than under decentralization when the manager is not able centralization may lead to markedly lower profits than a decentralized firm would achieve discovery and implementation of optimal policies may also be affected by the organization s structure a single location may search for the optimal policy to be implemented everywhere centralization or all units may search and may or may not adopt policies selected by others decentralization better policies are discovered when the organization employs multiple searchers and or when the single searcher becomes more sophisticated

the value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities abstract this paper investigates the welfare implications of symmetrical improvements in information and accompanying screening mechanisms which allow for improved matching of individuals to their respective risk classes unlike previous models used to investigate this phenomenon this paper allows for the possibility that individuals differ not simply according to exogenously specified unequal loss probabilities but rather that individuals possess different self protection technologies moreover various insurance contracting possibilities are also considered it is demonstrated that the structural form of the heterogeneity of technologies and the type of insurance contracts available in the market determine in an interactive way the value of information which improves the matching of individuals to risk class

technological diffusion and preference learning in the world of homo sustinens the challenges for politics abstract this article relates agents learning of a preference for a technology competition of technologies and their relative diffusion among potential adopters competitive interactions between two technologies are captured by an extended lotka volterra model to also incorporate preference learning on the part of potential adopters of these technologies we combine it with a model of cultural learning based on role model conformist and hedonistic learning our theoretical analysis is illustrated by a concrete example the competition between electric mobility and conventional forms of individual mobility the model enables an evaluation of specific policy instruments as to the promotion of sustainable technology

competition and culture in an evolutionary process of equilibrium selection a simple example abstract competition tends to promote efficient equilibrium behavior through the higher survival of the organizations say firms that adopt it on the other hand culture understood as the inherited social pattern of behavior may induce certain short run inertias this paper analyzes a dynamic model of the struggle between these two forces in the evolution of alternative stable configurations of social behavior journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 l20

committees and rent seeking effort abstract this paper explores the extent to which administrative structures may influence the extent of rent seeking effort within the environments explored relatively smaller efforts tend to be invested to influence the deliberations of commitees than those of single administrators to the extent that these efforts may be considered unproductive rent seeking the widespread use of committees may reflect the fact that savings from reduced rent seeking more than offset the greater decision costs of committees

evidence on adverse selection equilibrium signaling and cross subsidization in the insurance market the configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system using contractual data from a representative insurer we estimate a reduced form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage the data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks

the social selection of flexible and rigid agents people differ in how they respond to their environment some individuals treat each situation as unique and tailor their behavior accordingly while others respond in the same manner regardless of the situation the authors objective is to explore how social systems select from such a heterogeneous population a class of simple hierarchical systems is considered which encompasses some features of corporations and electoral systems a selection process operates on this population which results in successful agents going on to compete against equally successful agents for further advancement the author characterizes the population dynamics and the type of agent that ultimately dominates copyright 1998 by american economic association

the quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized organizations a central task of the leadership of any organization is the choice of its successors and subordinates corporate presidents spend a significant part of their time selecting upper management tenured faculty sometimes spends months deciding whether particular individuals should be admitted into their ranks the effort and contentiousness which often go into this process suggests that it has important consequences for the organization it is recognized that there are large differences in individuals abilities and that the abilities of those in leadership inevitably affect the performance and survival of the organization our objective here is to examine how the centralization or decentralization of decision making authority affects the quality of the managers who are actually selected this question is naturally dynamic because the quality of current managers is not only influenced by that of past managers but it in turn affects the quality of future managers we consider stylized economies consisting of an arbitrary number of hierarchies organizations of different sizes the size of a hierarchy is the number of managers within the hierarchy one of whom is the hierarch the boss and others are subordinates the current hierarch appoints his own successor and those of his subordinates but has no influence on any other hierarchy this assumption exaggerates somewhat the typical asymmetry of authority between the hierarch and the subordinates our definition of a more or less centralized economy is intuitive an economy is more centralized if it has a larger proportion of the total number of managers in larger hierarchies our main result is that there is a greater variability over time in the steady state quality of managers in a more centralized economy this is because highly capable decision makers have greater beneficial effects on the managerial choices in a more centralized economy by the same token highly incapable managers placed in the same positions have greater deleterious effects

some evolutionary foundations for price level rigidity this paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb in the model firms must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks their payoff depends on the level of aggregate demand as well as on their own price and their neighbor s price the latter assumption captures local interactions despite the fact that the rational expectations equilibrium ree is characterized by a simple pricing rule that firms can easily adopt the economy does not converge to the ree for all parameter values when the volatility of monetary innovations is low and interactions among firms are high the aggregate price level exhibits rigidity in that it does not fully react to contemporaneous aggregate demand shocks we discuss the role of the nature of experimentation and of path dependence driven by interactions in explaining these results

the efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex age or race in insurance and similar markets we consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency when categorization entails a nonnegligible resource cost however no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible when categorization is costless we demonstrate that government having no better information than market participants can effect redistribution without assuming dictatorial control of the market implying that a market equilibrium with costless categorization is potentially pareto superior to one without it when categorization is costly however the market may categorize when pareto improvements are not possible

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

a naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm the role of cooperation and cultural evolution one reason why firms exist this paper argues is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve in addition we show how an entrepreneur given these predispositions can shape human behavior within a firm to illustrate these processes we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees behavior and the performance of the firm these biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life we also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better

financial determinants of firm dynamics evidence from a european panel i use a panel of large european firms for the period 1999 2007 to study scale dependence in firm dynamics i find that scale dependence is much more pronounced when focusing on within firm rather than between firm variation and that scale dependence is a decreasing function of financial development

rigidity of social systems the tendency for the members of a corporation or government to be resistant to change is explored in a model that encompasses two endemic features of such systems first the social system is modeled as a hierarchy and implicit within it is a selection process that determines who advances to higher levels second an agent s behavior is partially determined by imitating those who have risen in the ranks a behavioral norm of being rigid is found to be more prevalent and robust than one of being flexible a more volatile environment may also induce agents to be more resistant to change admirandi sed imitandi to be admired but not imitated st augustine

how altruism can prevail in an evolutionary environment abstract we study environments in which an individual gets a higher payoff from defecting than from cooperating and where copies of an individual are more likely to appear the higher is the individual s payoff we demonstrate that even in single shot prisoner s dilemma models where cooperation benefits one s opponent at a cost to oneself evolution can sustain cooperative behavior between relatives or neighbors in addition we show that selfish individuals who conciously choose their actions may find it in their interest to be altruistic when there is some probability that their practices will be imitated both genetic and cultural inheritance appear to be blunt instruments that do not operate on individuals in isolation those who inherit a genetic tendency to cooperate are more likely than others to enjoy the benefits of cooperative siblings similarly with culturel inheritance altruism can prevail when individuals are likely to interact with others who share the same role model

biased screening and discrimination in the labor market the traditional economic analysis of discrimination is based on gary becker s study of taste discrimination by employers employees and consumers more recent work by kenneth arrow 1972 1973 has attempted to interpret intergroup wage differences in an alternative framework as a rational reaction to uncertainty in labor markets his model of statistical discrimination demonstrates that when the screening process used to determine a worker s qualifications is costly and prior expectations of productivity differ across race or sex groups then wage differentials may arise between workers of identical productivity by implicitly assuming a perfect screening process arrow ignores a potentially important source of wage differentials namely the fact that the screening process might be a more reliable predictor of productivity for one group than for another our paper generalizes the arrow model in two ways first in contrast to arrow we assume that all groups have identical distributions of productivity secondly the screening process used by the firm to determine an applicant s productivity is biased in the sense that a members of various groups may pass the test in different proportions despite their identical productivity distributions and b the predictive power of the test might vary across groups our objective is to analyze the effects of these types of biases in the screening process on the wage differentials between different population groups

civil institutions and evolution concepts critique and models abstract the paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution the survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection the sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties this paper begins with a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions it then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games it is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one since it is the latter that is of interest to economists an attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51

does gibrat s law hold evidence from canadian retail and manufacturing firms this paper investigates the validity of gibrat s law holding for firms in manufacturing and retail trade sectors the object is to expand our knowledge of gibrat s law to include non manufacturing firms a unique longitudinal firm level database which contains information on canadian incorporated establishments enables the inter industry comparison the findings of the analysis are that gibrat s law is violated in both manufacturing and retail sectors violations of gibrat s law for both sectors include i growth rates that depend on firm size ii growth variability that depends on firm size and iii a negative persistence of firm growth finally age effects or selection effects are not the causes of these violations