involuntary unemployment in economies with efficient risk sharing abstract we study economies where employment lotteries determine random layoffs and incomes for employed and unemployed agents allocate risk efficiently we ask for which specifications are unemployed agents worse off a situation we call involuntary unemployment we show unemployed agents are worse off iff an exogenous increase in wealth decreases aggregate unemployment in a monetary economy we show that in equilibrium the unemployed are worse off iff high inflation implies high unemployment our model also generates nominal wage stickiness as an equilibrium phenomenon but neither involuntary unemployment nor nominal stickiness implies these economies are operating inefficiently or are out of equilibrium

europe vs america institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model we show how the differences in us and european institutions can arise in a normative model the paper focuses on the labor market and the government s decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock the government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse incentive effects whereby benefits increase unemployment it is found that when an adverse shock occurs benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post oil shock benefits remained high in europe but not in the us desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non negative and self correcting empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed

gender sorting and the glass ceiling in high tech firms with few exceptions studies have conceived of the glass ceiling as reflecting internal promotion biases in this article the authors argue that glass ceiling patterns can also be the result of external recruitment and hiring processes using data on people applying by means of the internet for jobs at 441 small and medium sized high tech firms they find evidence that the glass ceiling is produced by both internal and external hiring processes on the supply side females are sorted into lower level job queues than males on the demand side screening biases against women also are evident but a series of what if simulations suggest that demand side screening processes play a comparatively minor role in producing the glass ceiling pattern these results suggest that bias remediation policies designed to equalize gender differences in hiring chances are likely to be less effective than recruitment and outreach policies designed to improve gender disparities in candidate pools

unemployment insurance taxes and unemployment unemployment insurance is financed by a tax on wages below a given ceiling daniel s hamermesh 1977 advocates raising this ceiling on distributional grounds in a job search model this does decrease unemployment among low wage workers but also increases unemployment among high wage workers and lowers everyone s expected after tax wage an increase in the ceiling combined with a proportionate reduction in the tax rate decreases unemployment for low wage workers while increasing their after tax wage without affecting high wage workers at all when unemployment benefits and wages are taxed at one rate employment and wages are independent of that rate

gender difference in promotions new evidence from the internal labor market in china gender differences in the labor market have attracted significant attention from economists who focus on gender differences not only in wages but also in promotions however the research on gende

rent dissipation through electricity prices of publicly owned utilities a public choice model is presented in order to explain the fact that publicly owned electricity utilities rarely price at marginal cost in practice it is shown that if i government revenues are raised through proportional taxes ii median income is less than mean income and iii the share of a consumer s spending on electricity decreases with income then the price resulting from a majority rule and universal voting is below marginal cost the determination of a fixed subscription fee is also considered empirical evidence of our results is obtained from pricing and consumption data for hydro qu6bec

does centralization increase the size of government abstract are fiscal programs larger or smaller if they are run centrally rather than locally in a prospective federation we abstract completely from well understood economic issues and focus instead on the political effects of centralization for fiscal programs with benefits broadly spread in the population such as redistributive transfer schemes social insurance and general government consumption centralization changes the coalition of voters who favor a large program in a direction that depends on the nature of the redistributive instrument for fiscal programs with localized benefits such as provision of local public goods centralization creates opportunities for rent seeking which increases the size of government

internal labor markets too many theories too few facts that firms employ internal labor markets in which wages and careers are partly shielded from the vagaries of external labor markets seems well accepted yet peter doeringer and michael piore s 1985 seminal work on internal labor markets has had a rather limited impact on the economics profession in contrast to textbooks on human resource management which have adopted their paradigm wholeheartedly labor economics texts tend to pay only cursory attention to internal labor markets the competitive model in which wages reflect an individual s marginal product remains the paradigm of choice there are many reasons for this lackluster reception including intellectual convenience a more acceptable excuse is that while doeringer and piore s study which was based on interviews with 75 companies identified several key regularities ports of entry career ladders etc that have come to shape our perception of internal labor markets the book never presented a theory to explain these findings with the advent of information economics and contract theory models of internal labor markets or at least selected features of these markets have begun to emerge the objective of these theories is to show that internal labor market outcomes can be construed as second best solutions to contracting problems under incomplete information for instance tournament theory edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 sees the attachment of wages to jobs as part of an efficient incentive scheme michael waldman 1984 explains the same phenomenon as an insurance arrangement against variations in individual productivity seniority rules in promotion and wagesetting can be understood as responses to problems of collusion or influence activities paul milgrom and john roberts 1988 the list could be extended at this point there is hardly any feature of internal labor markets that cannot be given some logical explanation using the right combination of uncertainty asymmetric information and opportunism doeringer and piore 1985 in the preface to the second printing of their book take exception with this line of theoretical research they believe that internal labor markets are inherently a social group phenomenon and that something fundamental is missed by pursuing individualistic models be that as it may we think there is another more serious problem with the direction that this research has taken too much of it relies on the old empirical stereotype the original study was done 25 years ago and focused almost exclusively on blue collar male unionized manufacturing workers one might rightly wonder how relevant these findings are in today s environment and whether they extend to white collar work as most discussions seem to assume before proceeding with the theory it is prudent to ask do we have the facts right in this paper we report on two recent case studies of individual firms that use personnel records to analyze wage and career paths of managerial workers lazear 1992 and baker et al 1994a b 1 person

institutional labor economics the new personnel economics and internal labor markets a reconsideration the author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a case for a reconsideration of it two recent developments motivate this effort the rise of new personnel economics npe as a significant subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the 1990s understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches the author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets ilms emerge from the competition between organizational interest groups unions personnel professionals and the government and competing views of firms objectives resulting in the rise of ilms the slow diffusion of high performance work systems strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers the use of contingent employees and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment opportunity pressures as such the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern though more conventional npe considerations also remain important

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

a positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits in a wage bargaining model a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages therefore the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process we consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential using panel data for 19 oecd countries we find support for these theoretical predictions moreover we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness

corporatism labor unions and the safety net abstract this paper models corporatism as the attainment of outcomes superior to those when individual parties act alone this idea is developed in the context of union government interactions in the determination of wages and unemployment benefits a central finding is that while corporatism is welfare improving for the actors involved it yields few clear implications for the evolution of wages employment benefits or output it may therefore be unwise to employ corporatism indices in macroeconometric analyses without explicitly accounting for bargaining structures information and especially preferences

unemployment insurance and redistributive taxation abstract this paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance income taxation and experience rating it argues that there is a normative justification for state unemployment insurance when the government wishes to use redistributive taxes but cannot enforce lump sum transfers it is not socially optimal for there to be full experience rating of unemployment insurance schemes one distortion should be used to off set another the state must then intervene in the provision of insurance for those without jobs

unemployment insurance and union wage setting the authors examine alternative systems of financing unemployment insurance benefits in an economy with wage sett ing unions where as in some nordic countries each union runs its o wn unemployment insurance system it is shown that a higher lump sum grant to the union s unemployment insurance fund increases employment whereas higher marginal subsidies have ambiguous effects an unempl oyment insurance tax on wages has no effect on employment whereas an unemployment insurance tax on profits unambiguously increases employ ment the authors also analyze a case where wages are set at the firm level and premiums at the industry level copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

the macroeconomics of social pacts in this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions the central bank and the fiscal policymaker we explicitly model unions concern for public expenditure paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions i e the so called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of european countries in the last few decades we also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the maastricht criteria and the stability and growth pact the former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes the latter is likely to backfire

an equilibrium analysis of optimal unemployment insurance and taxation a two person two period general equilibrium model with uncertainty about second period labor productivity is developed the model is used to consider potential welfare pareto gains from both a stylized unemployment insurance system and from a negative income tax system welfare gains are possible if individuals are sufficiently homogeneous when both programs are operated simultaneously complete insurance is always feasible but is optimal only if the labor supply curve is negatively sloped

job search and cyclical unemployment a model economy is described that integrates job search and signal extraction analysis equilibrium differs from search models without signal extraction in that even with a fixed real sector unemployment fluctuates stochastically it differs from standard signal extraction models because search introduces persistence in fact unemployment follows a second order difference equation with coefficient that are functions of current and lagged values of the stochastic shocks thus the model has the potential to mimic actual business cycle data despite the fact that the underlying shocks are independently and identically distributed policy implications are discussed

unemployment insurance and short time compensation the effects on layoffs hours per worker and wages we analyze two unemployment insurance systems in one unemployed workers receive benefits while those on reduced hours do not as in north america at least until recently in the other short time compensation is paid to workers on reduced hours as in europe the first system causes inefficient temporary layoffs for some parameters the latter does not but implies inefficient hours per worker some evidence is presented regarding these effects despite policymakers recent enthusiasm for short time compensation the clear implication of this project is that changes should come on the tax not benefit side of the system

unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment the case of adverse selection abstract this paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device it is shown that private provision will not occur essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage respecting the same informational constraints public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate

optimal firm size taxes and unemployment abstract we analyze a model similar to the standard implicit contracting framework but assume that the size of the firm the number of workers under contract is endogenous some well known predictions from contract theory with firm size fixed exogenously are reversed in particular a result obtained by feldstein concerning unemployment insurance does not hold when firm size is chosen optimally he concludes an increase in experience rating the extent to which firms pay for unemployment benefits through their taxes reduces unemployment while we show that it increases unemployment under reasonable conditions

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

unemployment insurance design inducing moving and retraining evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes aect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain realistically such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the iden tity of those may be unobservable ex ante the problem of characterizing con strained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature we construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled the model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobserv able job search in particular we derive closed form solutions showing that when the moving retraining incentive constraint binds unemployment bene ts should increase over the unemployment spell with an initial period with low bene ts and an increase after this period has expired

reconsidering institutional labor economics the author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a case for a reconsideration of it two recent developments motivate this effort the rise of new personnel economics npe as a significant subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the 1990s understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches the author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets ilms emerge from the competition between organizational interest groups unions personnel professionals and the government and competing views of firms objectives resulting in the rise of ilms the slow diffusion of high performance work systems strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers the use of contingent employees and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment opportunity pressures as such the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern though more conventional npe considerations also remain important

exploring the political economy of labour market institutions labour markets how reforms took place many economists argue that the european unemployment problem relates to large labour market rigidities this paper argues that many of those inflexibilities and the underlying institutional regulations can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees this is because many policies that increase unemployment actually benefit these insiders an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour market institutions demonstrates that the observations are consistent with this view the findings imply 1 higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection 2 unemployment benefits are lower the more employment reacts to wages 3 a higher level of unemployment and the existence of a right wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage giles saint paul

the political economy of public employment programs abstract what are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs almps have to please the employed majority this issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker firm wage bargaining it turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of almps and the political weight attributed to firm interests if firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure the employed will opt for excessive program activity

social policy by popular demand why are unemployment benefits more generous in some countries this article argues that citizens trade off the redistributive and insuring effect of social insurance as a result the distribution of risk in a society has important consequences via popular demand for social policy making at the microlevel the article shows that in addition to income the risk of unemployment is a key predictor of individual level preferences for unemployment benefits based on the microlevel findings the article argues that at the macrolevel the homogeneity of the risk pool is an important determinant of benefit generosity the more equally unemployment risk is distributed the higher unemployment replacement rates are empirical testing at both levels finds support for this account of social policy by popular demand

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

on the merit of equal pay performance manipulation and incentive setting abstract work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly used metrics we created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities using two independent experiments we show that whenever pay for performance is used manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives by contrast paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production

work incentive effects of taxing unemployment benefits before 1979 unemployment insurance ui benefits were not treated as taxable income in the united states several economists criticized this policy on the ground that not taxing ui benefits while taxing earned income allegedly encourages unemployed persons to conduct longer than socially optimal job searches since 1979 however ui benefits received by persons in higher income families have been subject to income tax this paper investigates whether the introduction of benefit taxation has had the predicted effect of reducing unemployment duration the study uses data on a sample of persons that filed for ui in 1978 or 1979 to examine whether high income claimants collected benefits for shorter periods after the tax change than they did before benefits became taxable as part of the empirical analysis the paper develops a generalization of the weibull distribution and applies a limited dependentvariable technique for this distribution similar to the tobit technique for the normal distribution despite some variation in the results from different model specifications the analysis presents persuasive evidence of a tax effect on unemployment duration the 1979 policy change is estimated to have reduced average compensated unemployment duration among the sampled high income claimants by about one week

stretchwork managing the career progression paradox in external labor markets changes in employment relationships have diminished the degree to which internal labor markets shape careers using comparative field studies we examine how contract workers try to achieve career

arbitraging a discriminatory labor market black workers at the ford motor company 1918 1947 the 1918 47 employee records of the ford motor company provide a rare opportunity to study a firm willing to hire black workers when similar firms would not the evidence suggests that ford did profit from discrimination elsewhere but not by paying blacks less than whites an apparent wage equity constraint prevailed resulting in virtually no racial variation in wages inside ford an implication was that blacks quit ford jobs less often than whites holding working conditions constant arbitrage profit came from exploiting this nonwage margin as ford placed blacks in hot dangerous foundry jobs where quit rates were generally high

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

layoffs wages and unemployment insurance abstract the influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract the degree of workers risk aversion and the resolution of bargaining conflict layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the ui benefit product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation an implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in ui provision

gone fishing reported sickness absenteeism and the weather i introduction the principal agent problem of contracting employee work effort that is imperfectly monitored arises in a number of areas of economic theory including models of remuneration by seniority lazear 1979 involuntary unemployment e g shapiro and stiglitz 1984 performance based pay macleod and malcomson 1998 and labor hoarding depken redmount and snow 2001 given the importance of this mechanism in the theoretical work the empirical research on the agency problem is remarkably scant in part this reflects the limited availability of personnel data as baker and holmstrom argue in their review article internal labour markets too many theories too few facts 1995 but more fundamentally it reflects the inherent difficulty of empirically capturing the employee effort levels that underlie the models using direct measures of employee or firm level productivity is unquestionably the preferred approach but these measures are notoriously problematic and the studies that use them tend to be case studies introducing external validity issues it is also unlikely to isolate the type of malfeasant shirking behavior that concerns variants of the models where the employee effort decision entails disciplinary risk to inform employee incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior economists have relied on two measures employee disciplinary rates e g cappelli and chauvin 1991 ichino and maggi 2000 and absenteeism rates e g arai and thoursie 2005 bradley green and leeves 2007 ichino and riphahn 2005 the difficulty is that disciplinary rates capture only shirking activity that is identified by employers not that which goes undetected while reported absenteeism particularly sickness absenteeism rates may be entirely legitimate one can therefore never be sure whether differences in these rates across workers facing different shirking costs reflect actual shirking activity as opposed to differences in employers willingness or ability to detect and punish shirkers or differences in employee health that may be correlated with these costs in this paper we identify a different type of shirking activity that potentially addresses both of these shortcomings employees misreporting health in order to exploit weather conditions favorable to high utility outdoor recreation 1 we begin by considering a shirking model of sickness absenteeism in which employees marginal utility of outdoor leisure is increasing in the interaction of two state dependent parameters health and outdoor weather quality the intuition being that ideal weather conditions for engaging in outdoor recreation are valued more when one is physically and perhaps also mentally healthy this assumption leads to two main propositions first increases in sickness absenteeism associated with marginal improvements in weather quality reflect the decisions of the inframarginal workers those workers who in the absence of the weather improvement would be present at work who are the healthiest implying an increase in absenteeism that is unambiguously illegitimate second comparing across workers marginal weather improvements should have the largest impact on sickness absenteeism where shirking costs are highest the reason is that where existing incentives to misreport health are the weakest such as where sick pay is not offered or job protection is weak existing sickness absenteeism levels will be lowest and the inframarginal workers will be the healthiest thereby benefitting most from the weather improvement we examine the empirical relevance of these propositions using a two step approach first we construct an index of weather preferences by linking temperature relative humidity precipitation wind speed and cloud cover data to time use data identifying the weekend and weekday evening outdoor recreational activities of employees with regular daytime work schedules we then examine the empirical relation between the resulting index of the recreational quality of the weather hereafter referred to simply as weather quality and the incidence of short term spells of sickness absenteeism reported in survey data comparing the magnitude of this relation across workers facing different levels of sick pay job protection and job finding rates

the impact of hierarchies on wages abstract hierarchical production theory has only one consistent prediction that wages increase with level in a hierarchy theoretical disagreement exists as to what causes this wage premium and how it might be affected by the number of levels of superiors above an employee by empirically analyzing these issues we find that i level one supervisors receive a premium due to some unobserved characteristic ii higher level supervisors receive a premium through higher rates of return on human capital and iii the marginal effect on wages of increasing the level of an employee declines with the number of levels above the employee

unemployment insurance and market structure abstract this paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance ui on employment and unemployment in an industry in which the prices can vary due to some market power some non conventional results are obtained it is shown that if there is free entry and exit average industrial employment may be a decreasing function of the experience rating because the number of firms in the industry is itself a decreasing function of this parameter this contradicts the conventional view which was arrived at using models of a perfectly competitive industry with no entry and according to which employment should be an increasing function of the experience rating the general conclusion is that for industries with different degrees of market power the same ui scheme has different impacts on employment and unemployment

internal labor markets firm specific human capital and heterogeneity antecedents of employee idiosyncratic deal requests a field study of 615 managers in 11 korean manufacturing firms extends theory regarding labor contracting to the study of idiosyncratic deals i deals despite i deals potential to benefit both employees and employers economic theory asserts that employers attempt to reduce individual contracting by use of internal labor markets ilms this study identifies limits to that assertion by identifying conditions under which i deals are sought despite employee participation in ilms furthermore we develop and test theory reconciling the roles of ilms and firm specific human capital in employee requests for i deals employee reports of ilm practices are negatively related to i deal requests whereas firm specific human capital is positively related to these requests in addition we find an interaction between the two such that the suppressive effects of ilm reports on i deal requests hold largely for workers with low firm specific human capital individuals with high firm specific human capital tend to seek i deals despite reported ilm practices i deal requests also increase with group level heterogeneity in firm specific human capital in all our findings suggest that ilms function as economic theory asserts for workers with limited firm specific human capital but they are less able to reduce i deal requests among workers with higher firm specific human capital

public choice and the social insurance paradox a note grant e k and j vanderkamp 1976 the economic causes and effects of migration canada 1965 71 ottawa economic council of canada jenkins g p and c y kuo 1978 on measuring the social opportunity cost of permanent and temporary employment this journal 11 220 39 jenkins g p g glenday j c evans and c montmarquette 1978 trade adjustments assistance the costs ofadjustment and policy proposals ottawa department of industry trade and commerce canada kuo c y 1976 an analysis of the construction workers at glace bay heavy water plant ottawa department of regional economic expansion canada wood k s and h verge 1966 a study of the problems of certain cape breton communities halifax institute of public affairs dalhousie university