a cost function of greek non ferrous metal industry abstract a translog cost function in the form of a third order series taylor expansion was used for the estimation of cost in the greek non ferrous metal industry which is based on an annual time series for the period 1969 1990 concerning the price of production factors the production volume and the total cost of production the estimated cost function permit us to have average and marginal cost curves of typical form for each time point also it is useful for projecting costs and the optimum scale of production under conditions which concern 1 i the development of prices production and product factors and 2 ii demand

is perfect competition an empirically inadequate model this paper examines the empirical content of the neoclassical theory of the firm the main models perfect competition monopolistic competition pure monopoly are specified in terms of observable anomalies these models are then tested against data and against each other the findings pave the way for an appraisal of the empirical status of the perfectly competitive model relative to the data and relative to the other neoclassical models

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

on the concepts of returns to scale abstract we clarify various concepts of returns to scale scattered in the literature by presenting their six different concepts we find the global relationship among them and apply some of the results to determine the shape of the average cost curves

estimating dynamic demand for cigarettes using panel data the effects of bootlegging taxation and advertising reconsidered abstracct a dynamic demand for cigarette consumption is estimated using pooled data of 46 states over the period 1963 to 1980 a price elasticity of 0 2 and an insignificant income elasticity is found using pooled estimation techniques the bootlegging effect is modeled explicitly using neighboring price the effect is found to be significant two major policy issues are analyzed in light of these new estimates 1 cigarette taxation is found to be an effective tool for generating revenues even though there may be spillover effects to neighboring states where bootlegging is significant 2 the effects of the fairness doctrine act and the advertising ban on cigarette consumption are re examined we find mild support for the effectiveness of subsidized anti smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption and no support for the thesis that the ban on advertising helps to increase per capita consumption

alternative regulatory methods and firm efficiency stochastic frontier evidence from the u s electricity industry the use of incentive regulation and other alternative regulatory programs in u s electricity markets has grown during the past two decades within a stochastic frontier framework i investigate the effect of individual programs on the technical efficiency of a large set of coal and natural gas generation units i find that those programs tied directly to generator performance and those that modify traditional fuel cost pass through programs to provide a greater incentive to reduce fuel costs are associated with greater efficiency levels other programs have no statistical association with efficiency levels

dynamic efficiency estimation the shadow cost approach is developed in the context of the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making to formulate theoretical and econometric models of dynamic efficiency the dynamic efficiency model is applied to a panel of 72 u s major investor owned electric utilities using fossil fuel fired steam electric power generation over the period 1986 1999 the major results show that most electric utilities underutilized fuel relative to the aggregated labor and the maintenance input and overutilized capital in production states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of utilities in terms of the technical efficiency of variable inputs

parametric efficiency tests economies of scale and input demand in u s electric power generation duality theory has been applied increasingly in recent years to study the structure of production a major advantage of using duality theory is that systems of input demand equations can be derived by simple differentiation facilitating the use of flexible functional forms also use of duality theory makes it possible to choose a representation of the technology which has desirable properties for estimation such as exogeneity of the regressors however the use of a dual representation of production structure is appropriate only if the corresponding maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior e g cost minimization or profit maximization is valid the perceived advantages of the dual approach to studying production structure have led to some applications in which the maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior is unlikely to be appropriate for example neoclassical cost functions have been used to study the characteristics of production in regulated industries despite an extensive theoretical literature indicating that a profit maximizing regulated firm would not minimize costs subject to market prices 2 in this paper we propose a generalized cost function that retains the principal advantages of the neoclassical cost function but does not require that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis in our model firms are assumed to base their production decisions on unobservable shadow prices which reflect the effects of regulation on the effective prices of inputs parametric tests for cost minimization are obtained by expressing shadow prices as functions of market prices the generalized cost function is estimated with data for regulated electric utilities the parametric restrictions corresponding to cost minimizing behavior subject to market prices are rejected implying that the use of a neoclassical cost function is not appropriate in this application 3

the effectiveness of anti smoking legislation a review abstract this survey focuses on government efforts to curb the use of undesirable goods notably tobacco products we synthesize the economics literature and examine the effectiveness of government curbs on tobacco consumption through non price controls such as bans on cigarette advertising health warnings and workplace smoking bans and price measures or higher prices through higher taxes this literature review is unique in that we do not merely aim to provide a summary of the literature rather our main focus is to draw conclusions from the literature regarding the effectiveness of alternate policy measures across countries in checking smoking and to provide directions suggestions for extending the scope of government intervention to other tobacco products

aggregate cigarette demand and regional differences in china national educational level final consumption expenditure average propensity to cigarette consumption apcc and cigarette price are adopted to research the regional and national aggregate cigarette demand of china under the condition that the effects of anti smoking education in the chinese current educational system are not remarkable the theoretical model shows that cigarette demand will increase with the increase of national educational level empirical analysis points out that cigarette demand increases with the increase of educational level estimates also suggest that cigarette price consumption expenditure and apcc will affect cigarette demand significantly and that there are great differences for cigarette demand by region

comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract abstract each period a firm must carry out an indivisible project the cost of which depends on the firm s constant efficiency and its variable level of effort only the cost is observed by the regulator who has to choose the incentive scheme the optimal dynamic mechanism is derived under possible commitment of the regulator over time then under non commitment it is shown that there are four types of continuation equilibria also the profile of effort levels is compared to the commitment case finally some numerical comparative statics is performed and it is shown that all types of equilibria can be optimal

the ratchet effect and the coordination of production in the absence of rent extraction valuable to offset the cost these net gains may help explain why the ratchet has been observed in situations as diverse as managerial reward systems in the soviet union and salesman bonus arrangements in capitalist countries

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

do large banks have lower costs new estimates of returns to scale for u s banks this paper presents new fully nonparametric estimates of ray scale and expansion path scale economies for u s banks based on a model of bank costs unlike prior studies that use models with restrictive parametric assumptions or limited samples our methodology uses local polynomial estimators and data on all u s banks over the period 1984 2006 our estimates indicate that as recently as 2006 most u s banks faced increasing returns to scale suggesting that scale economies are a plausible but not necessarily only reason for the growth in average bank size and that the tendency toward increasing scale is likely to continue unless checked by government intervention

variable costs and the visible hand the re regulation of electricity supply 1932 37 national transmission grid and rationalize uk electricity generation a constrained cost model estimates the gains from this re regulation of the electricity generating industry the new regime reduced costs by one third radically improving the utilization of capital and boosting the average scale of operations it did so by persuading private and municipal enterprises to accept central direction of the extent and timing of their electricity generation this voluntarism saved on enforcement costs but perhaps one half of the industry cost reduction the ceb actually achieved by 1937 was apparently forgone

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

cigarette demand health scares and education in turkey the purpose of this paper is to examine the demand characteristics of cigarettes in turkey aggregate time series date for the 1960 88 period are used in estimation income and price elasticities of cigarette demand are obtained the effect of health warning is estimated to reduce cigarette consumption by about 8 since the inception of warnings in 1982 imports of cigarettes have been allowed since 1984 in addition to advertising of cigarettes in the non electronic media the effect of health warnings are found to be stronger than the opposing effect of advertising the results also suggest that public education about adverse health effects of smoking may be more effective in reducing consumption and less regressive on consumer incomes than raising the price of cigarettes

the elasticity of scale and the shape of average costs different concepts of returns to scale the first which is most widely used for defining returns to scale is the relative increase in output as all input quantities are increased proportionally along a ray through the origin the second which is the more relevant concept for micro economic analysis is the increase in output relative to costs for variations along the expansion path where input prices are constant and costs are minimized at every output 2 as it turns out these two concepts yield equal measures for the elasticity of scale3 e at every minimum cost point in the input space however the change in e with output is generally different for the two concepts 4 since expansion paths do not coincide with rays unless the production function is homothetic 5 but it is the change of e along the expansion path and not along the raywhich determines the shape of the average cost curve ac and which is therefore relevant for the analysis of firms and industry behavior under competition 6 these relations are stated and analyzed below it is shown that assumptions made in the literature7 which are related to the behavior of e along rays or to the slope of the technically optimal surface where returns to scale are locally constant are irrelevantbeing neither necessary nor sufficient for implying classical u shaped average cost curves the following definitions and results are used here

modeling location and production an application to u s fully integrated steel plants i n weber s 1929 theory of the location of industry spatial firms produce under conditions of fixed proportions and constant returns to scale while their spatial consumers have priceinelastic demands weber s assumptions are relaxed separately in previous work moses 1958 and alonso 1967 allow either for flexible technologies but inelastic demands or for pricesensitive demands but fixed proportions technologies this paper presents a behavioral and econometric model of spatial firms which simultaneously relaxes restrictive assumptions on both technology and demand assumptions of earlier models become testable hypotheses the behavioral model is general to any spatial firm the econometric model can be estimated for any industry the paper reports an estimation of the model for a sample of fully integrated steel plants in the united states the steel industry is appropriate for illustrating the general model for two reasons first the important inputs in steel are localized weight losing materials while transportation charges are a nontrivial part of the delivered prices of both these inputs and of steel products second previous research lacks agreement about the principal determinants of steel plant locations disagreement also exists over the structure of production and the extent of scale economies in production and the existence of substitution possibilities among inputs each of these disagreements is treated as a hypothesis within this paper first a model which includes the influences of both consumers and materials on location can distinguish the comparative influence of each the literature lacks agreement on whether the steel industry is transport oriented in which case consumer demands are price inelastic and an optimal location minimizes transport costs or market oriented in which case consumer demands are price elastic and an optimal location reflects that sensitivity isard 1948 suggests the influences on location change over time due to changes in technology and relative prices isard and capron 1949 conclude the steel industry is transport oriented more recently hekman 1978 reports that the demand for steel is priceelastic he concludes that locations in the steel industry are sensitive to consumer demands the evidence in this paper portrays the steel industry as transport oriented second there are differing estimates of the extent of scale economies in steel production ranging from constant returns to scale hekman 1978 to a minimum efficient scale m e s of twelve million tons cockerill 1974 scherer 1973 and weiss 1976 estimate m e s of four million tons while tarr 1977 gives the mid1970s m e s at six million tons an estimate reported in this paper as well third the existence of substitution possibilities among inputs has implications for both location and production if substitution possibilities are limited weber models of location may be applied to the steel industry previous research has characterized steelnmaking technology as fixed proportions tsao and day 1971 cobb douglas hekman 1978 or having wide variation in substitution possibilities kopp and smith 1980 moroney and trapani 1981 this paper presents estimated elasticities of substitution suggestive of great substitution possibilities among inputs the behavioral model of location and production is presented and then transformed into an econometric model in section ii a brief discussion of regional markets for steel products and a description of the data appears in section iii received for publication july 31 1981 revision accepted for publication july 7 1982 wayne state university this research is based on my ph d dissertation at the university of wisconsin madison the advice of frank m gollop eugene smolensky and charles a wilson is gratefully acknowledged i have benefited from discussions with james hamilton and li way lee and comments by jan brueckner and several anonymous referees computing support has been provided by the graduate schools at the university of wisconsin madison and wayne state university the responsibility for any remaining errors is mine an earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1980 north american meetings of the econometric society

input substitution economies of scale and productivity growth in the us upholstered furniture industry cost factor demand and productivity growth are considered in the upholstered furniture industry over 1958 87 factors are divided into labour capital and materials it is found that all inputs are substitutes in production although substitution elasticities are small factor demand is price inelastic for all inputs the industry operates around minimum average cost productivity growth is small but significant the results indicate that labour will continue to be important in the industry however regional comparative advantage is not related to labour alone the results suggest that policies to attract or retain the industry must consider the low degree of factor substitution

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

multiple input multiple output production choices and technology in the u s wheat region duality theory motivates a translog expected profit function consistent with multiple products price uncertainty preseason climate constraints acreage control policies and possibly nonhomothetic technology although multiple outputs are allowed enterprise specific data is not necessary instead time series measures of output revenues and expected prices input expenses and prices and fixed input flows are employed appropriate measures of elasticities of choice returns to size and biases in technological change are derived results indicated decreasing returns to size rather limited though complementary responsiveness of choices to price changes and the nature of biases in technological changes

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

a scale elasticity measure for directional distance function and its dual theory and dea estimation abstract in this paper we focus on scale elasticity measure based on directional distance function for multi output multi input technologies explore its fundamental properties and show its equivalence with the input oriented and output oriented scale elasticity measures we also establish duality relationship between the scale elasticity measure based on the directional distance function with scale elasticity measure based on the profit function finally we discuss the estimation issues of the scale elasticity based on the directional distance function via the dea estimator

measuring productivity in an imperfect world most measures of multifactor productivity mfp assume constant returns to scale and perfect competition using a general aggregate production function together with duality theory and allowing for the possibilities of disequilibrium markups and economies of scale the study derives a more generalized mfp measure the model was used to assess the economic performance in us manufacturing for the 1949 to 1988 period the results suggest that scale and markups have substantial power in explaining mfp growth for all periods and that half of the measured mfp growth as measured within the conventional framework comes from biases due to scale economies market power and interaction effects

the target incentive system vs the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect abstract in a dynamic adverse selection type of principal agent relationship where the principal is committed over time to a particular incentive system with fixed structure but variable parameters but not to any intertemporal incentive scheme with both fixed structure and parameters the ratchet effect arises but varies with different incentive systems we show that compared with using prices as the sole planning mode the principal can attenuate the ratchet effect by stipulating targets as well as a result the target incentive system entails higher expected welfare than the price incentive system in a perfect bayesian equilibrium

kalman filter and the demand for cigarettes kalman filter estimates of price income and advertising elasticities are presented an analysis of structural change in the demand for cigarettes in the us for the period 1929 86 is made estimated price and income elasticities are generally smaller and the advertising elasticity larger than estimates previously found cigarette demand is inelastic with respect to price and income and advertising elasticity is statistically insignificant for the most part furthermore both income and price elasticities decline over time while advertising elasticity tends to rise four time periods where structural change has occurred are identified the health scare reports and the fairness doctrine act have a significant impact on per capita cigarette consumption

production location decision and free entry oligopoly abstract this paper presents a simple oligopolistic model of location in which all firms in an imperfectly competitive industry are assumed to produce a homogeneous output and make cournot conjectures about their rivals input and location decisions within this framework this paper points out that the key difference between oligopoly and monopoly is the following in the case of monopoly a positive shift in demand requires that a monopolist increase his output but in the case of oligopoly an increase in industry output may or may not increase output per firm because of the number of firms at free entry equilibrium is not constant it is shown that in an oligopoly model of location that allows free entry the demand condition plays an important role on the determination of industrial location

monopolistic competition nonhomotheticity and the stability of the chamberlinian tangency solution the focal point in the recent literature on international trade and monopolistic competition is to recast the chamberlinian partial equilibrium theory in a general equilibrium framework using a similar setting this paper asks whether the chamberlinian tangency solution is stable under general equilibrium paradoxical results follow when entry occurs profit per firm can increase and the tangency solution can be unstable a necessary and sufficient condition for stability is obtained the concepts of average and marginal factor intensities play an important role in obtaining the stability copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

returns to scale in electricity generation replicated and revisited abstract we replicate the findings of two influential studies on returns to scale in the united states electricity generation market the main results are contrasted using both local linear nonparametric regression a technique robust to parametric functional form assumptions as well as an updated data set while the quantitative findings across all of the estimators deployed differ somewhat regarding the magnitude of returns to scale we document a decrease in returns to scale within the electricity generation market from 1955 to 1996

health scare excise taxes and advertising ban in the cigarette demand and supply the cigarette industry is a fascinating laboratory for industrial economists because of its concentrated market structure and history of conflicts over health and tax issues the industry has been the focal point of many economic studies most of the recent studies have concentrated on the demand side of the market for example bass schmalensee hamilton and fujii deal with the impact of advertising and the health scare on cigarette demand 4 15 10 8 barzel johnson and sumner ward assessed the importance of the excise tax or ad valorem tax on consumers cigarette demand 3 12 16 on the supply side vernon rives naylor developed an econometric model of the tobacco industry 20 which however is more concerned with the agricultural aspects of the product than the industry s market organization a careful review of the above studies suggests serious shortcomings which appear to limit their application to policy formulation or market analysis first the variables are introduced in an ad hoc fashion without reference to existing demand or supply theories second none of the above studies recognizes explicitly the interactions among the variables in the demand and the supply equations in the context of the determination of market equilibrium this paper has three objectives 1 to apply the standard neoclassical market theory to the cigarette industry 2 to identify the interactions between cigarette demand and supply using a simultaneous equations approach the first such attempt in a cigarette industry study and 3 to evaluate the effects of cigarette taxes advertising and health scare issues on the industry s output based on the empirical results obtained from the simultaneous equations analysis the judicious selection of explanatory variables careful data

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

an economic analysis of technology in the meat products industry the meat products industry underwent significant structural change during the last two decades the relocation and expansion of commercial cattle feeding stimulated development of new single species slaughtering facilities to replace older multi species plants an essentially new processing industry arose specializing in breaking and packaging carcasses this forward integration has significantly changed distribution methods of slaughtering and fabricating firms increased emphasis on coordination of inputs led to interest in backward integration from packing into cattle feeding the steer and heifer slaughtering sector which was decentralized and competitive in the 1950s has turned toward centralization and concentration although the largest firm accounted for only 13 of total u s steer and heifer slaughter in 1977 it had more than doubled its share since 1970 in 1978 this firm slaughtered more than twice as many steers and heifers as its nearest competitor in addi

a censored system of cigarette and alcohol consumption many previous studies of us cigarette and alcohol consumption have focused on single equations however the addictive nature of consumption suggests that it is more appropriate to model these products as a system we propose a two step estimation procedure and apply the procedure to a system of equations for cigarette beer and wine consumption results differ from those derived from an existing two step procedure findings suggest that consumption of cigarettes beer and wine is responsive to income changes but the elasticities are rather small personal physiques education age race ethnicity health gender employment status and regions also play significant roles in consumption

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

dynamic income taxation redistribution and the ratchet effect abstract in this paper we extend the classic optimum linear income tax model to a twice repeated game a utilitarian policy maker decides on the second period tax system on the basis of observed first period behaviour we summarise our findings as follows first the static optimal linear tax results cannot be expected to hold in a dynamic setting second more productive households are likely to mimic the behaviour of less productive households third the optimal dynamic first period tax rate might be negative then income is redistributed from low to high income households fourth if the utility function is well behaved then the optimal dynamic first period tax rate is lower than the optimal static tax rate fifth if the optimal static tax rate separates then the dynamic and the static optimal tax rates coincide sixth if a zero tax rate separates then the optimal dynamic tax rate is positive

structural change in the demand for meat economists have long thought that shocks in the economy sometimes lead to permanent changes in behavioral relationships hence supply or demand elasticities estimated from econometric models may change over time the source of such structural change may be technological adoption a shift in consumer preferences or an institutional change one way to handle this problem in linear models is to allow the parameters to change as the situation changes so that the model provides a local approximation of the behavioral relationship this approach is an attractive way to deal with structural change problems econometricians have extended the classical