radio spectrum and the disruptive clarity of ronald coase abstractin the federal communications commission ronald coase exposed deep theoretical foundations via normative argument the government controlled scarce frequencies spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic coase saw that regulators limited conflicts by restricting uses and that property owners routinely perform such functions via the price system the fundamental insight was that analytical symmetry was demanded accounting for the net benefits of both regulation and markets coase augured that the price system would outperform administrative allocation a conclusion mocked by communications policy experts yet one specific slice of the coasean program competitive bidding for licenses commenced at the federal communications commission in 1994 today over 70 u s auctions have been held 31 305 licenses sold and 52 6 billion paid to the treasury the reform is a textbook example of economic policy success even as it raises the question why have market mechanisms not been further implemen

on competitive price adjustment for a storable good and abstention from trade the public good aspect of information is used to account for periods in which the aggregate level of trade is low it is shown that abstention from trade may occur when the uncertainty with respect to the market clearing price there is no auctioneer gets large relative to the cost of getting information about it and relative to the cost of postponing transactions in this case all agents are aware of bilateral pareto improving trading opportunities but these opportunities are not exploited

intraindustry structure and the ease of strategic change there has been considerable recent work in industrial organization emphasizing the importance of group stratification within industries the thrust of this literature is that in empirical work and in particular in investigating public policy problems differences across firms within an industry may be crucial this paper is intended as a contribution to the empirical literature of group structures in this paper i examine patterns of strategic group membership in a number of industries and analyze changes in the strategies used by firms in particular i provide a series of rather simple exploratory tests of the importance of intraindustry strategic differences in a number of industries

how trading institutions affect financial market performance some laboratory evidence i introduction trading institutions vary considerably across contemporary financial markets 1 but most can be classified into one of two basic types the continuous double auction da allows traders to submit public offers to buy or to sell and to accept other traders offers at any moment in time the double auction institution offers immediacy but non uniform transaction prices the other basic trading institution the clearinghouse ch gathers offers and clears them at a unified price at a pre specified time it sacrifices immediacy for uniform transaction prices 2 the two types of institutions have co existed and evolved for centuries but now are emerging in new electronic versions market participants and policy makers would like to know which institution or variant or combination is most efficient but theoretical and empirical work to date provides little guidance this paper reports on a series of laboratory asset markets experiments designed to compare variants of the double auction and clearinghouse trading institutions the markets are small usually with eight or nine traders but the traders are profit motivated and experienced with the trading institutions the traded asset has uncertain market value and traders receive useful but inconclusive private information they can only learn the asset s true value during the course of trade laboratory markets offer several advantages for empirical study of financial market institutions first private information is observable even controllable in the laboratory and therefore the investigator can directly measure market efficiency 3 second the complexity of the environment can be varied systematically in the laboratory and its effects on market performance can be separated from the effects of the market institution and other forces finally the market institution itself is controllable in the laboratory so it is possible to make valid causal inferences on how the market institution shapes market performance i begin with a survey of relevant literature and other preliminaries in the rest of this section section ii outlines the laboratory procedures the creation of trading environments of varying complexity the electronic implementation of the clearinghouse and double auction trading institutions the computation of theoretical benchmark prices and allocations and the measurement of market performance section iii collects the results following an illustrative account of a double auction trading period and a clearinghouse trading period i use descriptive statistics to summarize market performance in each of the thirty nine experiments the main conclusions are based on statistical comparisons of market performance across alternative market institutions the clearinghouse institution does surprisingly well it delivers greater market depth than the double auction discovers prices at least as efficiently and produces final allocations almost as efficient as the double auction the main institutional variants examined in this paper concern the amount of information made public regarding order placement orderflow the data suggest that public display of the orderflow enhances double auction efficiency but may impair clearinghouse efficiency a study of trading volume shows higher volume in the double auction in both institutions volume increases when important private news arrives and when the trading period is about to end the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the results a companion paper friedman 1991 considers the effects of awarding various privileges to some but not all traders copeland and friedman 1987 1991 provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets instructions for the current experiments are available on request the need for empirical work a skeptic might argue that empirical work is unnecessary the mere fact that the double auction and clearinghouse institutions both persist in major financial markets implies that both are highly efficient because a more efficient institution would displace less efficient institutions

strategic group formation and performance the case of the u s pharmaceutical industry 1963 1982 the focus of this paper is on three major questions 1 what is the theoretical rationale for the strategic group concept 2 does strategic group membership have performance implications and 3 are strategic groups and membership in strategic groups stable characteristics of industries a statistical procedure is proposed to longitudinally identify strategic groups the empirical setting is the u s pharmaceutical industry over the period 1963 82 while performance differences are found in terms of market share profitability differences between groups are not observed neither are differences found in terms of risk and risk adjusted performance these results are attributed to the existence of performance variation within each strategic group a dynamic model of competitive repositioning is proposed which helps integrate the findings from the study

efforts in two sided contests the degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two sided contests that in volve two types of efforts while usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize potential recipients of the rent seeking efforts also participate in the con test this is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent seeking efforts by try ing to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize we show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation

trading mechanisms and stock returns an empirical investigation this paper examines the effects of the mechanism by which securities are traded on their price behavior we compare the behavior of open to open and close to close returns on nyse stocks given the differences in execution methods applied in the opening and closing transactions opening returns are found to exhibit greater dispersion greater deviations from normality and a more negative and significant autocorrelation pattern than closing returns we study the effects of the bid ask spread and the price adjustment process on the estimated return variances and covariances and discuss the associated biases we conclude that the trading mechanism has a significant effect on stock price behavior

how effective are fiscal incentives for r d a review of the evidence this paper surveys the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for r d we describe the effects of tax systems in oecd countries on the user cost of r d the current position changes over time and across different firms in different countries we describe and criticize the methodologies used to evaluate the effect of the tax system on

market incentives and pharmaceutical innovation i study the impact of the orphan drug act oda which established tax incentives for rare disease drug development i examine the flow of new clinical drug trials for a large set of rare diseases among more prevalent rare diseases the oda led to a significant and sustained increase in new trials the impact for less prevalent rare diseases was limited to an increase in the stock of drugs tax credits can stimulate rd yet because they leave revenue margins unaffected tax credits appear to have a more limited impact on private innovation in markets with smaller revenue potential

price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets abstract price bubbles relative to intrinsic dividend value are observed using a call market trading institution market prices tend to track intrinsic value only when the same group of highly experienced traders participate in three consecutive 15 round markets

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

intergroup conflict and intra group punishment in an experimental contest game we study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio political conflict the relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not we find first that our results contradict the independence of groupsize prediction conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals and both are substantially above equilibrium towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257 of the predicted level there is however substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members second allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures now material losses are 869 of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members investments these results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs

r d intensity firm performance and the identification of the threshold fresh evidence from the panel threshold regression model this article tests whether there is an optimal level of research and development r d intensity at which point a firm is able to maximize its performance an advanced panel threshold regression model is employed to investigate the panel threshold effect of r d intensity on firm performance among publicly traded taiwan information technology and electronic firms the results confirm that a single threshold effect does exist and show an inverted u correlation between r d intensity and firm performance this article demonstrates that it is possible to identify the definitive level beyond which a further increase in r d expenditure does not yield proportional rewards some important policy implications emerge from the findings

papers in experimental economics competitive market institutions double auctions vs sealed bid offer auctions consider a market with the following characteristics 1 privacy that is each agent knows only his own valuation or cost conditions 2 exchange follows the rules of the oral double auction that is buyers freely announce bids or accept offers and sellers freely announce offers or accept bids 3 aggregate market supply and demand per trading period is stationary for at least two to three periods and 4 there are at least four buyers and as many sellers the literature reporting the results of a large number of experimental markets with these characteristics documents what appears to be a remarkably rapid convergence to a competitive equilibrium ce however any claim of double auction da convergence to the ce can only have meaning in one of three senses i the ce is attained immediately ii after t periods of trading some measure of the market s state such as mean price is nearer relative to experimental sampling variability to a ce than to some distinct alternative equilibrium such as a monopoly or nash equilibrium iii after t periods of trading this measure is nearer to a ce in da experimental markets than in markets organized under a different institution of contract for example a sealed bid auction since everything from electrons and the stars to rats and people yield state measures subject to error or random variation the deterministic criterion i can have no serious scientific standing by such criteria any hypothesis can be rejected and there could be no science of physics biology or economics 2 with the exception of certain very simple markets such as single object auctions or certain idealized markets such as the cournot quantity adjuster model economics has only two concepts of equilibrium monopoly and competitive the only formal model of da trading that has been proposed see david easley and john ledyard p 6 predicts stochastic convergence in finite time with probability one to a ce hence the only test alternative to the ce research hypothesis in da markets is a monopoly or monopsony equilibrium experimentalists have not reported statistical tests of the ce professor department of economics university of arizona assistant professor department of economics indiana university instructor department of economics university of arizona and sandia national laboratories albuquerque nm respectively we are indebted to the national science foundation for research support and to art denzau and mort kamien for helpful comments there is an early and recently growing body of experimental evidence for convergence to a competitive equilibrium under double auction rules the earliest evidence contained in experiments initiated in january 1956 is reported in smith 1962 1964 1965 1976 however these early experiments used between twenty and fifty or so participant buyers and sellers because in keeping with prevailing professional beliefs it was thought that a ce was unlikely to be approached unless numbers were quite large using large numbers was not unreasonable since it is a good beginning procedure to give a theory whatever is believed to be its best shot more recent evidence using six buyers six sellers and two traders in speculative da markets with cyclical demand is reported by r m miller charles plott and smith and williams 1979 for evidence from a comparison of oral and computerized da experiments with four buyers and four sellers see williams 1980 for further evidence in the context of the study of price controls see m isaac and plott 1981b and smith and williams 1981b in the context of a conspiracy study see isaac and plott 1981a in the context of comparisons between da and posted offer pricing see jon ketcham smith and williams in the context of a study of four variations on da rules see smith and williams 1980 all of these more recent papers report double auction experiments using no more than four buyers and four sellers 2as frederick mosteller once noted if you wanted to reject the inverse square law of attraction try tossing a sheet of paper out the window

rent seeking in natural resource quota allocations this paper examines the incentives for rent seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas to competing user groups by political bodies the political body has discretion in making the allocation and competing user groups rent seek to influence the allocation we investigate ways in which the governmental body can affect the behavior of the players by setting the ground rules for the competition a political body can affect an allocatively pareto efficient outcome by choosing an appropriate default pre rent seeking policy surprisingly an allocatively efficient default policy is unlikely to minimize social costs however winner take all default policies are likely to maximize not minimize rent seeking a competitive post allocation market reduces rent seeking but is not either itself or in combination with an efficient default policy capable of minimizing social costs however forcing winners in political redistributions to fully compensate losers both lowers the rent seeking levels relative to a potential compensation criterion and when used together with an efficient default policy is capable of obtaining the first best solution of an allocatively efficient allocation with zero rent seeking

the design of rent seeking competitions in the standard tullock model of rent seeking as a noncooperative game aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal exceed or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker s investment if the supply of an input into the rent seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem he supplies it and designs the rent seeking game to maximize his wealth the author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician s wealth in one input and two input rent seeking processes

simultaneous decision making in competitive and cooperative environments we experimentally investigate simultaneous decision making in two contrasting environments a competitive environment a contest and a cooperative environment a voluntary contribution mechanism we find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest decreasing sub optimal overbidding in the contest however contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest there is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments i e more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa this correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory

conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent seeking models in a symmetric two person rent seeking game it is shown that nonzero conjectural variations can be incorporated to yield a larger class of solutions than has been hitherto analyzed the author shows that the fraction of rents dissipated as expenditures by seekers depends on the conjectural variation which is assumed and that posner s assertion of full dissipation in his model only holds under a bertrand conjecture all admissible constant conjectural variations which are held by both players yield conjecturally consistent equilibria but the result no longer holds if the game has a systematic bias toward one player

classroom games rent seeking and the inefficiency of non market allocations economics is often taught at a level of abstraction that can hinder some students from gaining basic intuition however lecture and textbook presentations can be complemented with classroom exercises in which students make decisions and interact the approach can increase interest in and decrease skepticism about economic theory this feature offers short descriptions of classroom exercises for a variety of economics courses with something of an emphasis on the more popular undergraduate courses suggestions for future columns and comments on past ones should be sent to charles holt c o journal of economic perspectives department of economics university of virginia charlottesville virginia 22903 3288

spectrum flash dance eli noam s proposal for open access to radio waves abstract as ronald coase posited in his famous article on the nature of the firm there are situations in which decentralized markets are relatively efficient for coordinating economic activity and situations in which they are not with spectrum access assigning property rights to clearly specified private owners is the socially efficient policy because the relevant transaction efficiencies will be internalized by competitive spectrum owners selecting to what degree rights should be subdivided and in what manner marketed where spot markets are optimal an owner will maximize profits by using them where long term contracts are efficient the owner will enter profitably into them hence eli noam s solution imposing open access rules on bands of radio frequencies by government mandate is a mistaken attempt to duplicate the efficiencies of markets by mandating a particular subset of market solutions such a policy predictably will result in underutilization of the spectrum resource

the microeconomics of market making this paper examines the influence of risk aversion on the pricing policies of a market maker for securities it is shown that a market maker s bid ask spread can be decomposed into a portion for the known limit orders a risk neutral adjustment for expected market orders and a risk adjustment for market order and inventory value uncertainty it is dem onstrated that a risk averse market maker may set a smaller spread than a risk neutral specialist finally this paper demonstrates the pervasive role of inventory in affecting both the placement and size ofthe spread

market behavior in a clearing house one of the most fundamental market mechanisms is the clearing house where orders are accumulated over time and the market is cleared periodically the issue addressed in this study is the statistical behavior of the market under this neutral mechanism in the framework of a tractable stochastic model which captures the underlying uncertainties and indivisibilities in the demand and supply schedules applying renewal theory we derive closed form results for the behavior of prices and quantities and pursue the implications of the possibility of no trade and the multiplicity of market clearing prices

on intraday risk premia this article presents a framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of anticipated large demand pressures on asset risk premia we show that large institutions who can time their entry into the market will trade either at the open or during periods of unusual demand pressures we show that if these institutions do enter later in the day they trade in the same direction as institutions which provide liquidity continuously institutions therefore appear to exhibit herding behavior we also explore how changing the uncertainty of demand pressures late in the day affects trading costs throughout the day most financial market investors do not continuously monitor intraday fluctuations in stock prices other activities e g outside employment often take precedence over following the stock market and there are limitations to processing information for example a reader of this page is likely to be unaware of current financial market prices in fact for many investors entry into financial markets occurs once a day or even less frequently given these institutional realities it is of interest to explore how asset markets react when it is known that a set of very large predictable demands will arrive during the afternoon does their arrival affect prices only when they arrive or throughout the day if the price impact is spread out then how do trading costs behave during the day if some traders have the flexibility to time their entry into the market when will they arrive during the day and how will their entry decisions affect asset risk premia if market participants anticipate that demands in the afternoon will be unusually volatile how does this affect the intertemporal behavior of prices and expected returns earlier in the day the primary focus of this article is the development of tractable methodologies that can address these issues

the effectiveness of tax incentives for r d i in developing countries the case of argentina abstract there is increasing interest in developing countries in granting tax incentives in order to encourage private investment in research development and innovation r d i however evidence on the effectiveness of such schemes in achieving policy goals in weak innovation systems contexts is still very scarce this paper aims at narrowing this knowledge gap by focusing on the effects of a tax credit scheme for promoting firm level innovation investment in argentina the analysis applies dynamic panel data techniques to a novel dataset merging several waves of the national innovation survey collected by the national institute of statistics and censuses the results suggest that the elasticity of r d i investment to its user cost of capital is a greater than 1 in absolute terms which implies that the intervention has been effective in increasing firms innovation efforts however effects vary depending on the type of innovation investment being subsidized industrial sector and size of the firm moreover when innovation investment is divided into innovation related capital goods expenditures and only r d the results suggest that the absolute value of the elasticity for the r d component of the innovation investment is less than 1 these heterogeneous effects should be exploited for further policy design

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

micro adjustment toward long term equilibrium abstract a dynamic model is constructed in which the behavior of economic agents is based on adjustment decisions are made in disequilibrium prices respond to differences between supply and demand inventories capital is moved according to profitability differentials and money is issued by a bank which reacts to the general price level a proof of local stability of long term equilibrium with production prices is demonstrated we further distinguish between two aspects of the stability problem concerning the allocation of capital and relative prices stability in proportions and with respect to the general levels of activity and prices stability in dimension

the effects of r d tax credits and allowances in canada abstract in canada as in many other countries that have adopted r d tax credits and allowances there has been considerable controversy over their effectiveness in increasing company financed research and development this study seems to be one of the first systematic attempts to estimate the effects of canada s r d tax credits and allowances the results present a very consistent picture the survey results the econometric results and some simple calculations based on rough measures of the price elasticity of demand for r d all suggest that the special research allowance increased r d expenditures by about 1 percent and that the investment tax credit increased them by about 2 percent these increases seem to be appreciably less than the revenue losses to the government

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained in the original tullock 1975 1980 game an individual bidder s probability of winning with a bid b is proportional to br where the exponent reflects economies of scale in rent seeking different interpretations can be given to these probabilities first one may view r as a reflection of the political culture alternatively one may view r as a choice variable for a politician intuition suggests that a society with a high tolerance for the selling of political favors and politicians who are receptive to rent seeking would both induce greater rent seeking expenditures than other societies all else equal this paper shows that a lower value of r can actually lead to more rent dissipation than a higher value this paper also reinforces two points concerning rent seeking first the analysis confirms the robustness of under dissipation of rents even in the face of entry second it points out the importance of distinguishing between rent seeking expenditures and rent dissipation when bidders must borrow for example total expenditure may understate rent dissipation

allocation of goods by lottery i introduction many goods such as hunting permits oil drilling leases cellular telephone licenses and rights to fishing berths as well as some buds such as the military draft jury duty and who is to be thrown overboard on a sinking life raft are or have been allocated by lotteries in neo classical welfare economics the random distribution of property rights does not affect allocative efficiency as long as transferability is allowed and the transactions costs are non prohibitive lottery allocations however are generally not transferable thus lottery allocations are inefficient since the goods are not ultimately allocated to the users who value them the most a number of authors such as aubert 1959 fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 36 122 have argued that lotteries are chosen as the allocative instrument because it represents a fair or just means of allocating the goods rawls 1971 374 and eckhoff 1989 have noted that where it is impractical to divide the goods equally among those who desire them a lottery serves to satisfy both the requirement that the process be fair and that the allocation problem be resolved relatively costlessly elster 1989 113 however notes that lotteries are not the only fair allocation mechanism for example he points out that in jewish ethics the problem of allocating an indivisible good such as life saving resources is resolved by denying it to everyone even economists would probably prefer a lottery to this resolution the fairness hypothesis has a rich history in the old testament lotteries are deemed a fair way of allocating goods such as the inheritance of land numbers 33 54 lotteries are also used to allocate bads in perhaps the most famous biblical example of use of lots jonah was chosen by lot to be sacrificed to appease god who had brought a storm that threatened to wreck the ship the story goes that the lot selected jonah because he was shirking his duties elsewhere and should not have even been on the vessel jonah 1 6 1 notice that fair here is taken to mean just given this theological foundation it is not surprising that the lottery has seen frequent use in legal history as well one of the most interesting cases occurred in swedish and finnish trials in the 17th and 18th centuries in cases where a man was murdered by a mob lotteries were used to allocate punishment since the law required an eye for an eye no more and no less eckhoff says that if it was impossible to ascertain which of them had dealt the mortal blow the courts determined that one of the responsible parties be sentenced to death and that the person be selected by lottery 1989 19 a similar use of lotteries occurs in military history to deal with cases of mass desertion in roman armies every tenth man was executed decimated and the remainder pardoned in more modern times the lottery has been used in u s law 2 first of course is the use of a lottery to decide who shall sit on a jury a connection between fairness and lotteries however has also appeared in the common law in an 1842 case u s v holmes which has been discussed by fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 a ship sank in a heavy storm and the lone surviving life raft was in grave danger of sinking the crew threw overboard fourteen male passengers in an effort to save the rest when back in port after being rescued a crewman named holmes the only crew member who had not disappeared upon arrival to port was brought to trial for the deaths of the passengers the court ruled that the non essential members of the crew should have been thrown overboard before any passengers and if that was not sufficient then passengers should have been selected by lot which is the fairest mode elster 1989 65 the fact that a human life presumably a large cost was at stake ex post did not affect the decision 3 the environmental economics literature contains a number of references to the social preferences for and benefits of lottery allocations

the trading decision and market clearing under transaction price uncertainty this paper models an individual s trading decision given 1 his her demand function to hold shares of an asset 2 his her expectation on what the market clearing price will be and 3 the design of the market which determines how orders will be translated into trades the particular market design we consider is the batched trading periodic call regime assuming investors are distributed according to their propensities to hold shares we model the aggregation of orders to obtain market clearing values of price and volume and to show the way in which with trading friction these solutions differ from pareto efficient values the importance of this analysis for various issues concerning market design is noted when markets are not frictionless and transaction prices are uncertain the act of trading requires analysis this paper models an individual s trading decision in secondary financial asset markets in so doing we study the order flow as an endogenous part of the system we show how given an underlying demand curve the trader will choose an optimal price quantity order to transmit to the market and we model the aggregation of orders to obtain market clearing values for price and volume these models are used to show the way in which the prices and trading volume established on the market will in general differ from their pareto efficient values much of the microstructure literature that studies the behavior of transaction prices in a nonfrictionless market has assumed that orders are generated by some exogenously given stochastic process this has been true for instance in the

estimating the impact of the r d tax credit on strategic groups in the pharmaceutical industry abstract the economic recovery and tax act of 1981 provided a 25 percent tax credit for increases in research and experimentation expenditures previous studies have shown considerable controversy about the effectiveness of various tax credits this study focuses on the response of the strategic groups in the pharmaceutical industry to the credit four strategic groups were formed using different levels of research intensity research sales and relative cash flow margin cash flow sales the change in research intensity following enactment of the tax credit was estimated the analysis found that the tax credit caused an increase in r d expenditures in addition the r d tax credit appears to have contributed to increased competitive r d spending among the firms in the pharmaceutical industry

tax incentives and r d spending a review of the evidence abstract since 1981 u s firms have been allowed to claim a tax credit for r d spending in excess of some base amount this paper assesses the evidence gathered to date about the effectiveness of the r d tax credit in the united states there is considerable evidence that the r d tax credit has had some effect on the behavior of american firms in the early 1980s but it is not as yet clear how much of the initial response of firms to the credit is due to increases in total r d as opposed to increases in r d that is qualified for the r d credit moreover different empirical approaches produce substantially different estimates of the size of the effect of the r d credit analyses based on time series data imply that the credit has had a substantial effect on r d spending however indirect evidence based on estimates of the price elasticity of demand for r d as well as studies based on more direct evidence from survey data and corporate tax returns imply that the effect of the credit has been rather modest there are several ways in which these divergent estimates of the size of firms responses can be reconciled however each suggested reconciliation points toward using the more modest estimates to gauge the effects of a permanently enacted incentive for r d these estimates imply that had the incremental 25 percent r d credit been made permanent it would have stimulated between 0 35 and 0 93 of additional company funded r d spending per each 1 of tax revenue forgone

the cost of rent seeking evidence from cellular telephone license lotteries the inventors of the theory of rent seeking used an analogy with competitive markets to conclude that all monopoly rents would be dissipated in the competition to obtain the property rights to them 23 29 subsequent theorists showed that this conclusion is quite sensitive to assumptions about foresight risk aversion conjectures and bias 15 21 30 since little quantitative information about actual rent seeking competitions is available the theory has developed in an empirical vacuum in this paper we attempt to fill that vacuum with an estimate of rent seeking expenditure by applicants in the federal communications commission s fcc cellular telephone license lotteries held between 1986 and 1989 we go on to compare expenditures with estimates of the value of the licenses at stake these lotteries constitute a unique natural experiment any u s citizen was eligible to enter each geographic lottery once and only once for an expense which we calculate as modest the lotteries were widely publicized and heavily entered there were over 320 000 applications one per market filed for 643 cellular licenses and third party application preparers entered the market rapidly because licenses were awarded sequentially prospective participants in later lotteries could find out that expected net returns from earlier lotteries were positive because of undersubscription the value of the prize was known because sales of previously awarded licenses had begun to take place before later lotteries were held and market analysts were using such sale prices to value licenses not yet awarded the later lotteries seem almost optimally contrived to maximize the dissipation of rents yet comparing the resources invested in entry the price of a fully prepared application with the rents available the market value of cellular telephone licenses shows that dissipation was far short of complete

assigning property rights to radio spectrum users why did fcc license auctions take 67 years abstract while leo herzel 1951 and ronald coase 1959 persuasively argued for auctioning licenses issued by the federal communications commission fcc not until 1993 did the u s congress grant the fcc authority to assign wireless operating permits via competitive bidding why were auctions with obvious efficiency and equity advantages so long in coming why were comparative hearings in the public interest first abandoned as assignment tools in 1981 not for auctions but for lotteries and why were radio and tv licenses pointedly excluded from auctions four factors the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the u s constitution the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services and the agency problem embedded in central planning are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms

beggar thy neighbor the in state out of state and aggregate effects of r d tax credits abstract the proliferation of r d tax incentives among u s states in recent decades raises two questions i are these tax incentives effective in increasing in state r d ii how much of any increase is due to r d being drawn away from other states this paper answers i yes and ii nearly all the paper estimates an augmented r d factor demand model using state panel data from 1981 to 2004 i estimate that the long run elasticity of in state r d with respect to the in state user cost is about 2 5 while its elasticity with respect to out of state user costs is about 2 5 suggesting a zero sum game among states

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

privileged traders and asset market efficiency a laboratory study the 39 experiments reported here examine the impact on trading profits and on market performance of awarding special trading privileges to some traders and not others in call market experiments the last mover and orderflow access privileges are both modestly prof itable and neither impairs market performance in continuous market experiments quicker access to orderflow information is quite profitable and more detailed access is possibly prof itable both privileges seem to enhance market performance slightly by contrast privileged marketmaking is extremely profitable and greatly impairs market performance

the political economy of the pharmaceutical industry e conomicsis a practical science since its inception as an independent discipline it has probed the major policy issues of the day the topics that aroused the interests of its practitioners have generally been those that presented government officials with critical choices the modern literature on the economics of the pharmaceutical industry is no exception this body of material originated with the investigations of the kefauver committee in late 1959 public interest was aroused by the spectacle of confrontation between committee and industry the record made by this committee and its successors grew to tens of thousands of pages as claims and counterclaims were offered regarding industry conduct and performance the primary line of attack concerned pharmaceutical prices and profits the committee demonstrated that prices generally exceeded direct costs of manufacturing for 22 major pharmaceutical firms in 1958 costs of goods sold were merely 32 percent of total sales u s senate report 1961 p 31 the committee argued that this fact alone demonstrated the presence of monopoly power while the substantial difference between revenues and production costs permitted high expenditures on research and development it also paid for even higher selling outlays moreover reported rates of return after taxes during this period on the order of 21 to 22 percent exceeded twice the average for all manufacturing the industry replied that on the contrary prices were low relative to the value afforded consumers and high returns on successful products were required to balance the losses from the large numbers of unsuccessful ones the relevant concept of marginal costs according to the industry position must include the costs of developing and marketing new products and therefore prices were not excessive at all although it admitted earning substantial profits the industry argued that without these returns research outlays would be limited and the number of new drugs reduced the committee countered that little of social value arose from industry research molecules were manipulated and the new drugs that resulted were therapeutically similar to those already on the market indeed it suggested that much