foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization countries differ in their government architecture some countries are characterized by a high degree of concentration of fiscal administrative judicial executive and lawmaking powers whereas others have decentralized many functions and responsibilities of government to different jurisdictions and various levels of government the cross country differences in the organization of government are also not static but have been subject to substantial change in many countries the co existence of different organizational patterns of government has created an important debate regarding the determinants of particular government structures as well as questions regarding the optimality of different forms of organization

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

what drives returns to euro area housing evidence from a dynamic dividend discount model abstract we apply a dynamic dividend discount model to analyse housing returns for eight euro area countries comprising over 90 of euro area gdp both individually and as a panel a vector autoregressive model var is estimated for four variables excess return to housing rents the real interest rate and real disposable per capita income using quarterly data over the period 1978 2009 this empirical investigation which allows for a decomposition of house price movements into movements in rent cash flow and expected return news components indicates that the bulk of the variability of euro area house price movements can be attributed to movements in fundamentals there remains nonetheless an important but less sizeable influence of market wide or expected return variations in house prices country specific estimation indicates considerable heterogeneity around the euro area result both for what concerns long term impacts and dynamics notably changes in expected returns play a relatively strong role in the house prices of ireland and spain

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

the informal sector in developed and less developed countries a literature survey the main goal of this study is two fold 1 to provide ageneral overview of the contributions to the literature on theinformal sector with a special focus on the public choiceapproach and 2 to compare these contributions across twoinstitutionally different types of countries developed andless developed developing and transition countries thepaper focuses on the criteria used to define the informalsector the relationship between the formal and informaleconomy tax evasion and public choice analysis it isstressed throughout this paper that the distinction betweenthe two types of countries is of key importance

monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy we lay out a small open economy version of the calvo sticky price model and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap we use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rulebased policy regimes for the small open economy domestic inflation and cpi based taylor rules and an exchange rate peg we show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail we also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules

decentralization political competition and corruption abstract we study the effect of decentralization on corruption in a political agency model from the perspective of a region in a model where corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time decentralization makes it easier for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents as a consequence the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is conditional on political competition decentralization is associated with lower higher levels of corruption for sufficiently high low levels of political competition we test this prediction and find that it is empirically supported also we show how the preferences of voters and politicians about fiscal decentralization can diverge in situations where political competition is weak

explosive dynamics in house prices an exploration of financial market spillovers in housing markets around the world abstract asset prices in general and real house prices in particular are often characterized by a nonlinear data generating process which may display at times mildly explosive behavior in this paper using the recursive right tailed unit root test methodology proposed by phillips et al 2015a b we find widespread evidence of episodes of explosiveness or exuberance in international real house prices and establish a timeline of such episodes for a panel of 23 countries between first quarter 1975 and fourth quarter 2015 motivated by theory we adopt a dynamic panel logit probit framework to empirically investigate whether macro fundamentals and more specifically financial variables help predict such episodes of exuberance in international real house prices we find that interest rate spreads and real stock market growth together with standard housing fundamentals growth in real personal disposable income per capita and inflation are indeed among the best predictors furthermore we argue that financial developments in other asset markets can play a significant role as a trigger in the emergence of explosiveness in housing markets

commodity trade and international risk sharing how much do financial markets matter abstract this paper evaluates the social gains from international risk sharing in some simple general equilibrium models with output uncertainty a simulation model calibrated to selected moments of u s and japanese data estimates the incremental loss from a ban on international portfolio diversification to be on the order of 0 20 percent of output per year even the theoretical gains from asset trade may disappear under alternative sets of assumptions on preferences and technology the paper argues that the small magnitude of potential trade gains may help explain the apparently inconsistent findings of empirical studies on the degree of international capital mobility

testing the efficiency of the norwegian housing market abstract the question of whether or not the housing market is efficient is posed by an increasing number of economists policymakers homebuyers and homesellers this article tests the efficiency hypothesis on data from the housing market in oslo over the period 1991 2002 employing the case shiller time structure test on a repeat sales house price index and returns to housing we demonstrate that both the repeat sales house price index and returns contain time structure and that the housing market is characterized by inefficiencies we also find surprisingly that the housing market consistently yields higher appreciation at lower volatility than the stock market over the period

testing the present value relation for housing prices should i leave my house in san francisco abstract we examine the efficiency of residential housing markets by examining price rent and cost of capital indices generated from a transactions level data base for alameda and san francisco counties in northern california we can reject both constant and nonconstant discount rate versions of the housing price present value relation in the short run long run results are consistent with the housing price present value relation when we adjust the discount factor for changes in both tax rates and borrowing costs that characterize our 1970 1988 sample period our preferred explanation for the short run rejection of but long run consistency with the present value model is the high transaction costs that characterize the housing market however we cannot rule out the possibility that deviations of actual and present value price are due to asset market bubbles or nonrational expectations

estimating the consumption and investment demands for housing and their effect on housing tenure status theoretical work suggests that families live in owner occupied housing if their investment demand for housing exceeds their consumption demand for housing using household data from the 1983 survey of consumer finances the authors test this theory by estimating an ordered probit model of whether families rent without owning property rent while owning property other than their home own their home without owning other properties or own their home in addition to other properties for owner occupiers who own additional property both the investment and consumption demands are directly observed enabling the authors to separately identify these functions copyright 1994 by mit press

new directions for stochastic open economy models the paper develops a simple stochastic new open economy macroeconomic model based on sticky nominal wages explicit solution of the wage setting problem under uncertainty allows one to analyze the effects of the monetary regime on welfare expected output and the expected terms of trade despite the potential interplay between imperfections due to sticky wages and monopoly the optimal monetary policy rule has a closed form solution to motivate our model we show that observed correlations between terms of trade and exchange rates are more consistent with our traditional assumptions about nominal rigidities than with a popular alternative based on local currency pricing 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

courts the lex mundi project in cooperation with lex mundi member law firms in 109 countries we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non payment of rent and to collect a bounced check we use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country we find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries moreover procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings more corruption less consistency less honesty less fairness in judicial decisions and inferior access to justice these results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism particularly in developing countries

state corroding federalism competition among local governments in a decentralized political system is often thought to discipline lazy or corrupt officials improving public good provision and increasing welfare some scholars note possible distortions due to spillovers or a race to the bottom but suggest that central transfers or regulations can remedy these both arguments take for granted a framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect taxes allocate transfers and enforce regulations autonomously but what if it can t we show that if central enforcement capacity is endogenous interjurisdictional competition may itself erode the center s ability to channel competition in welfare enhancing directions regional governments may compete for capital by shielding firms from central tax collectors bankruptcy courts or regulators the equilibrium result is weaker central law enforcement and usually lower welfare interjurisdictional competition corrodes the state we illustrate with three examples from russia china and the us of cases in which such competition apparently encouraged subnational politicians to help firms evade central taxes or regulations

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

incentives to provide local public goods fiscal federalism russian style abstract based on a unique data set on russian city budgets this paper shows that revenue sharing between regional and local governments provides local governments with no incentive to increase tax base or provide public goods any change in local government s own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues this leads to governmental over regulation of private businesses it is shown that fiscal incentives are a determinant of the formation of private business and the efficiency of public goods provision the russian federalism is compared to the chinese federalism where fiscal incentives reputedly are stronger in many provinces

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

local autonomy tax morale and the shadow economy policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale however there is an alternative bottom up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems this paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy we use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in switzerland the findings suggest that there is a positive negative relationship between local autonomy and tax morale size of the shadow economy

global implications of self oriented national monetary rules author s obstfeld maurice rogoff kenneth abstract it is well known that if international linkages are relatively small the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited but what if goods and financial markets are tightly linked is it then problematic if countries unilaterally design their institutions for monetary stabilization are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination we argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no unless risk aversion is very high lack of coordination in rule setting is a second order problem compared to the overall gains from monetary policy stabilization

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

decentralization and the shadow economy oates meets allingham sandmo this article studies the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy we argue that decentralization may decrease the size of the shadow economy mainly through two transmission channels 1 decentralization enhancing public sector efficiency efficiency effect and 2 decentralization reducing the distance between bureaucrats and economic agents which increases the probability of detection of shadow economic activities deterrence effect using various measures of fiscal political and government employment decentralization in a cross section of countries we find the deterrence effect to be of more importance the deterrence effect is stronger the lower the degree of institutional quality we find no robust evidence of the efficiency effect

property rights and finance which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment weak property rights or limited access to external finance from a survey of new firms in post communist countries we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits even when bank loans are available where property rights are relatively strong firms reinvest their profits where they are relatively weak entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

on the determinants of fiscal centralization theory and evidence abstract this paper presents a simple model that unifies most of the results of the literature on fiscal federalism the model describes an economy characterized by two levels of government one public good and a private good the predictions of the model are tested by using a new set of measures of fiscal centralization the main findings are that country size income per capita ethnic fractionalization and level of democracy are negatively correlated with the degree of fiscal centralization the model is tested using ols tobit and semi parametric estimators the paper also shows that the variables included in the regression are helpful in the prediction of changes in the level of centralization

federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives the authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures the salient features of federalism decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition help provide credible commitment or these purposes in addition the authors suggest that some federalism are self sustaining

fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union abstract this paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes a tractable linear quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules in the optimal equilibrium monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules conversely the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions

financial and legal constraints to growth does firm size matter using a unique firm level survey database covering 54 countries we investigate the effect of financial legal and corruption problems on firms growth rates whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size it is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial legal and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most there is only a weak relation between firms perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth we also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth

welfare and macroeconomic interdependence we develop a baseline model of monetary and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies the welfare effects of expansionary policies are related to monopolistic supply in production and monopoly power of a country in trade an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar thyself rather than beggar thy neighbor as gains in domestic output are offset by deteriorating terms of trade smaller and more open economies are more prone to suffer from inflationary shocks larger economies benefit from moderate demand led expansions but may be worse off if policy makers attempt to close the output gap fiscal shocks are generally beggar thy neighbor in the long run in the short run they raise domestic demand at given terms of trade thus reducing the welfare benefits from monetary expansions analytical tractability makes our model uniquely suitable as a starting point to approach the recent new open economy macroeconomic literature

federalism and the shadow economy this paper analyzes the relationships between federalism and the shadow economy the theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that the shadow economy is smaller in federal countries than in unitary states the mobility of individuals among competing jurisdictions leads policy makers to adopt policies that are more efficient in terms of taxation and public good provision this increases the return for activities in the formal sector relative to those in the informal one thus reducing activity in the shadow economy a cross sectional empirical analysis of a sample of 73 countries confirms this theoretical prediction

fiscal federalism and monetary unions a quantitative assessment abstract in this paper i provide a quantitative analysis of three different forms of fiscal federalism in monetary unions fully decentralized regional fiscal authorities as the benchmark fiscal equalization with nominal tax revenue sharing and a common central fiscal authority i assess the capability of the different arrangements to stabilize regional consumption output and employment over the business cycle i also study the implications for interregional income consumption risk sharing and welfare from this analysis the following results emerge first a central fiscal authority stabilizes consumption fluctuations and increases the scope of interregional income and consumption risk sharing second fiscal equalization destabilizes consumption fluctuations and also reduces the scope of interregional income and consumption risk smoothing third a central fiscal authority leads to welfare gains whereas fiscal equalization leads to welfare losses

optimal fiscal transfers in a monetary union abstract we derive the optimal fiscal transfer scheme for countries in a monetary union to offset the welfare losses resulting from asymmetric shocks and nominal rigidities optimal transfers involve a tradeoff between reducing national output gaps and the provision of consumption insurance across countries where the weight of the former increases relative to the latter as consumption home bias rises the welfare gains from optimal transfers increase in wage rigidity and trade elasticities and are particularly large when risk sharing through financial markets breaks down for the average euro area economy the welfare gains from optimal transfers range from 0 50 of permanent consumption under complete markets and low wage rigidity to 6 09 of permanent consumption under financial autarky and high wage rigidity

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

electoral rules and corruption is corruption systematically related to electoral rules recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer but little is known about the data we try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s we exploit the cross country variation in the data as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform the evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to entry are associated with less corruption whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists and thus less individual accountability are associated with more corruption individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality rule elections even though open party lists also seem to have some effect because different aspects roughly offset each other a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption jel e62 h3

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

political centralization and government accountability boffa acknowledges financial support from the free university of bolzano ww82 piolatto from the spanish ministry of science and innovation eco 2012 37131 and the government of catalonia 2014 sgr 420 ponzetto from the spanish ministry of science and innovation jci 2010 08414 and eco 2011 25624 the spanish ministry of economy and competitiveness ryc 2013 13838 the government of catalonia 2009 sgr 1157 and 2014 sgr 830 the barcelona gse and the bbva foundation through its first grant for researchers innovators and cultural creators

the economic effects of federalism and decentralization a cross country assessment this paper explores the idea that institutional details matter and that attempts to estimate the economic effects of federalism by employing a simple dummy variable neglect potentially important institutional details based on a principal component analysis seven aspects of both federalism and decentralization are used as variables for explaining differences in 1 fiscal policy 2 government effectiveness 3 economic productivity and 4 happiness the results show that institutional details do indeed matter different aspects of federalism impact on the outcome variables to different degrees this study adds to our knowledge on the transmission mechanisms of federalism and decentralization

decentralisation as an incentive scheme recent changes have introduced more decentralization in a number of traditionally centralized countries 1 in the case of france it is sometimes claimed that the 1982 1983 reform of subcentral government is of historical importance although the principles of that reform are not contested any more by the new majority elected in 1986 opinions still differ on a number of policy issues some of the issues are presented in this introductory section but the main purpose of this paper is not to expose or discuss in detail the problems of decentralization in france as argued in the second part of the introductory section the theoretical framework in which the policy issues of decentralization are usually discussed by economists is somewhat unsatisfactory in particular when applied to unitary states such as britain or france the bulk of the paper is devoted to the exploration of a different approach to decentralization it is not purported however that this approach could completely replace the more traditional one consequently when in the concluding section we return briefly to the policy issues identified here this is to be read as a preliminary attempt to evaluate the relevance of the reasoning developed in the paper

the devil is in the shadow do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity this paper assesses the relationship between institutions output and productivity when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy however once output is corrected for the shadow economy the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker the impact of institutions on total corrected factor productivity becomes insignificant differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor endowments these results survive several tests for robustness

decentralization as a constraint to leviathan a panel cointegration analysis this paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions it distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures common pool versus own resources it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses the results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub national governments leads to a long term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect in addition a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending when the short term is considered these influences work slowly as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish in addition in the short run there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government these results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables countries and periods included the sample

consumption and investment motives in housing wealth accumulation a french study abstract the dual motives of housing behavior consumption and investment make the analysis of housing purchases quite difficult nevertheless it is better to refer to a model that keeps the two dimensional aspect of housing henderson and ioannides am econ rev 73 93 111 1983 in the absence of institutional considerations this model predicts that it is the difference between the investment demand for housing and the consumption demand that explains decisions to purchase dwellings for owner occupation and for renting out we have tested the model on the french data of the survey actifs financiers 1992 results show that the difference between the two demands cannot in itself explain housing purchases transaction costs the tax system the public aid policies for home ownership and other market imperfections are inadequately dealt with moreover estimation and identification of housing demand functions both for consumption and investment tend to show that there are portfolio motives in the factors that determine housing demand for owner occupation french households behave in a different way than u s households for them the difference between the two demands for housing explains behavior and consumption motives dominate primary residence purchase ioannides and rosenthal rev econ statist xx 127 141 1994

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro founded model of a monetary union abstract this paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro founded new keynesian model of a two country monetary union which is hit by supply shocks we also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization while monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union wide economy fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade besides exploring optimal policies we also consider monetary and fiscal rules we study these rules both under coordination and non coordination by the fiscal authorities

tax rights in transition economies a tragedy of the commons abstract this paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies a government s tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base existing evidence suggests that chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their russian counterparts using the big push model of industrialization murphy k shleifer a vishny r 1989 industrialization and the big push journal of political economy 95 1003 1026 within a common property resource framework we show that this difference in tax rights helps explain why china has been significantly more successful than russia

the influence of direct democracy on the shadow economy we analyze both theoretically and empirically the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of shadow economies our model suggests that as the extent of direct democracy increases implemented fiscal policies more nearly reflect the preferences of citizens and so reduce their incentives to operate in the informal sector this theory implies a negative relationship between the extent of direct democracy and the size of the country s shadow economy we also theorize that direct democracy has a greater effect in reducing the informal sector when the former is at low or intermediate values and when the electoral system is characterized by a larger district magnitude an empirical investigation of a sample of 57 democracies confirms our model s predictions

optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union we lay out a tractable model for the analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union the monetary authority sets a common interest rate for the union whereas fiscal policy is implemented at the country level through the choice of government spending in the presence of country specific shocks and nominal rigidities the policy mix that is optimal from the viewpoint of the union as a whole requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank whereas fiscal policy has a country specific stabilization role one beyond the efficient provision of public goods

which countries have state religions among 188 countries 72 had no state religion in 2000 1970 and 1900 58 had a state religion throughout and 58 had 1 or 2 transitions we use a hotelling spatial competition model to analyze the likelihood that the religion market would be monopolized similar forces influence a government s decision to establish a state religion consistent with the model the probability of state religion in 1970 and 2000 is increasing with the adherence rate to the main religion has a nonlinear relation with population and has little relation with per capita gdp the probability of state religion decreases sharply under communism but lagged communism has only a weak effect with costly adjustment for institutions the probability of state religion in 1970 or 2000 depends substantially on the status in 1900 this persistence is much stronger for countries with no major regime change than for countries with such a change

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

international dimensions of optimal monetary policy abstract this paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities an inward looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms markups are exposed to currency fluctuations such a policy raises exchange rate volatility leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis a vis increased uncertainty in the export market as higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices optimal rules in a world nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward looking rules and discretionary policies even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary or deflationary bias gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass through

tax morale in latin america in the tax compliance literature there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of tax morale in developing countries as a novelty this paper focuses thus on latin america analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically affect tax morale working with the two data sets latinobarometro and world values survey our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy furthermore people who said they knew have heard about practised tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others looking at individuals perception of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden lacking honesty and corruption are seen as the main factors we observed a significantly lower tax morale in south america mexico than in the central american caribbean area furthermore trust in the president and the officials the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax morale

using micro surveys to measure and explain corruption summary this paper discusses survey techniques aimed at a better measurement of corruption at the micro level and argues that with appropriate survey methods and interview techniques it is possible to collect quantitative micro level data on corruption public expenditure tracking surveys service provider surveys and enterprise surveys are highlighted with several applications these surveys permit measurement of corruption at the level of individual agents such as schools health clinics or firms they also permit the study of mechanisms responsible for corruption including capture of public funds and bribery 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

does globalisation affect the shadow economy we investigate the impact of globalisation on the shadow economy using panel data for 119 countries our evidence suggests that globalisation matters in mitigating shadow development more specifically we find that political globalisation reduces the shadow economy whereas economic and social globalisations have limited statistical support after controlling for important factors that affect the size of the shadow economy overall these results are robust after accounting for an alternative measure of the shadow economy outliers endogeneity and alternative model specifications

bank supervision and corruption in lending abstract which commercial bank supervisory policies ease or intensify the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance based on new data from more than 2500 firms across 37 countries this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms financing obstacles we find that the traditional approach to bank supervision which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to monitor discipline and influence banks directly does not improve the integrity of bank lending rather we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance in extensions we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions

m form hierarchy with poorly diversified divisions a case of khrushchev s reform in soviet russia we test the premise of the theoretical literature that m form political hierarchies are effective in creating yardstick competition between regional divisions only when those divisions have sufficiently diversified or similar industrial composition the reason for this is that the competition among poorly diversified inter related divisions creates incentives for regional leaders to pursue policies that inhibit industrial growth in neighboring regions in order to make their own region look better from the point of view of the center we use a unique episode in soviet history when a traditional soviet unitary form u form hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional form m form organization namely khrushchev s sovnarkhoz reform first we demonstrate that during this reform regional leaders were subjected to relative performance evaluation which created incentives to generate industrial growth second we show that these career concerns resulted in higher growth in regions with sufficiently diversified and therefore self contained economies and lower growth in highly specialized regions

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions abstract this paper considers simple rules for federal fiscal transfers that automatically redistribute funds among member states of a monetary union to counteract adverse idiosyncratic shocks the transfer rules target regional differences in nominal gdp consumption spending labor income and fiscal deficits targeting regional fiscal deficits is the only rule that reduces consumption fluctuations and that promotes interregional consumption risk sharing but the overall welfare effect is negative in contrast targeting regional differences in labor income yields the largest welfare gains but it also yields the largest fluctuations in consumption and real gdp it is demonstrated that the welfare gains primarily stem from reducing the allocative inefficiency of input factors caused by nominal rigidities the optimal transfer rule essentially implies a combination of consumption spending and labor income targeting and it primarily targets the allocative inefficiency of factor inputs at the cost of lower interregional consumption risk sharing

corruption in bank lending to firms cross country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing abstract building on the important study by beck demirguc kunt and levine 2006 bank supervision and corruption in lending journal of monetary economics 53 2131 2163 we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus registries on corruption in bank lending using the unique world bank data set wbes covering more than 4 000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus registries assembled by djankov mcliesh and shleifer 2007 private credit in 129 countries journal of financial economics 84 299 329 and bank regulation data collected by barth caprio and levine 2006 rethinking bank regulation till angels govern cambridge university press new york to measure bank competition and information sharing we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption we also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks legal environment and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption