scarce collateral the term premium and quantitative easing abstract a model of money credit and banking is constructed in which the differential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium an upward sloping nominal yield curve purchases of long maturity government debt by the central bank are always a good idea but for unconventional reasons a floor system is preferred to a channel system as a floor system permits welfare improving asset purchases by the central bank

nonmonetary effects of financial crises abstract this paper empirically examines the nonmonetary effects of financial crises it exploits the special nature of the great depression in canada to test propositions linking financial structure and aggregate economic activity canada s large domestic debt and shrinking banking system had little impact on the course of the depression in comparison with results for the united states this implicates bank failures as a prime factor in the real effects of financial crises

bank runs and investment decisions revisited we examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the deposit contract offered and the investment decisions made by a competitive bank cooper and ross 1998 have shown that when the probability of a run is small the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank run equilibrium we show that in this case the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur in other words precautionary or excess liquidity will not be held this result allows us to determine how the possibility of a bank run affects the level of illiquid investment chosen by a bank we show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high the level of investment is decreasing in the probability of a run however when liquidation costs are moderate the level of investment is actually increasing in the probability of a run

why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity abstract in this paper we argue that the observed difference in the cost of intraday and overnight liquidity is part of an optimal payments system design in our environment overnight liquidity affects output while intraday liquidity affects only the distribution of resources between money holders and non money holders the low cost of intraday liquidity is explained by the friedman rule the optimal cost differential achieves the twin objective of reducing the incentive to overuse money at night and encouraging payment risk sharing during the day

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

clearinghouse banks and banknote over issue abstract the paper presents a model of banks as clearinghouses of private debt where money is used as the means of payment implications of the model include i the private provision of banknotes or a discount window may be needed to avoid the insufficient debt clearing that results from an inflexible currency stock and ii an uncontrolled total money stock may result in a multiplicity of equilibria including an inflationary banknote over issue

identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets lessons from the founding of the fed abstract we use the founding of the federal reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort we examine stock return and interest rate volatility during september and october when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest stock volatility fell by 40 and interest rate volatility by more than 70 following the monetary regime change the drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis however because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises our results suggest that the existence of the federal reserve reduced liquidity risk

exchange rate regimes banking and the non tradable sector abstract this paper presents a small open economy two good version of the diamond and dybvig model with cash constraints to analyze the implications on banking of different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies i show that fixed exchange rates with a central bank providing liquidity in local currency imply pareto efficiency with conditions for a run equilibrium stronger than in the literature in a flexible exchange rate regime multiple equilibria may not be eliminated in particular for very a expansive monetary policy there exists an equilibrium where a fraction of patient consumers purchases dollars in the interim period which constitutes a partial currency run a dollarized banking system without international short run credit may also implement the efficient allocation under certain conditions

inflation financial markets and long run real activity abstract empirical evidence suggests that real activity the volume of bank lending activity and the volume of trading in equity markets are strongly positively correlated at the same time inflation and financial market activity are strongly negatively correlated in the long run as are inflation and the real rate of return on equity inflation and real activity are also negatively correlated in the long run particularly for economies with relatively high rates of inflation we present a monetary growth model in which banks and secondary capital markets play a crucial allocative function we show that at least under certain configurations of parameters the predictions of the model are consistent with these and several other observations about inflation finance and long run real activity

payments systems and monetary policy abstract a dynamic spatial model is constructed where there is a role for money and for centralized payments arrangements and where there are aggregate fluctuations driven by fluctuations in aggregate productivity with decentralized monetary exchange and no centralized payments arrangements there is price level indeterminacy and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient a private clearinghouse arrangement improves efficiency but produces a real indeterminacy the pricing of daylight overdrafts is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation efficiency is achieved with a zero nominal interest rate on overnight central bank lending or through private overnight interbank lending

reconciling bagehot and the fed s response to september 11 bagehot 1873 states that to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity at a very high rate of interest in contrast most of the theoretical literature on liquidity provision suggests that central banks should lend at an interest rate of zero this is broadly consistent with the federal reserve s behavior in the days following september 11 2001 this paper shows that both policies can be reconciled with commodity money as in bagehot s time liquidity is scarce and a high price allows banks to self select in contrast the fed has a virtually unlimited ability to temporarily expand the money supply so self selection is unnecessary

financial fragility and the exchange rate regime abstract we study financial fragility exchange rate crises and monetary policy in a model of an open economy with diamond dybvig banks the banking system the exchange rate regime and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare if the mechanism fails banking crises and speculative attacks on the currency become possible we compare currency boards fixed rates and flexible rates with and without a lender of last resort a currency board cannot implement a social optimum in addition it allows bank runs to occur a fixed exchange rate system may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board a flexible rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs provided that the exchange rate and credit policies of the central bank are appropriately designed journal of economic literature classification numbers f3 e5 g2

imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort abstract this paper presents a monetary model in which interbank markets have limited commitment to contracts limited commitment reduces the proportion of assets that can be used as collateral and thus banks with high liquidity demands face borrowing constraints in interbank markets these constraints can be relieved by the central bank a lender of last resort through the provision of liquidity loans i show that the constrained efficient allocation can be decentralized by controlling only the money growth rate if commitment to interbank contracts is not limited otherwise a proper combination of central bank loans and monetary policy is needed to bring the market equilibrium into a state of constrained efficiency

from drafts to checks the evolution of correspondent banking networks and the formation of the modern u s payments system 1850 1914 checks remained local payments instruments throughout virtually the entire nineteenth century their significant use in interregional transactions dates only to the 1890s we explain their lagged spatial diffusion by the evolution of centralized payments institutions to coordinate transactions among myriad banks not real technological changes to annihilate distance the pivotal institutions were large correspondent banks especially in new york after the civil war new york funds constituted a national settlement medium and the concentration of bankers balances in new york yielded liquidity and other externalities smoothing the flow of check payments

reprint of central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

the role of financial sector competition for monetary policy in this paper we examine the impact of competition in the banking industry on financial market activity in particular we explore this issue in a setting where banks simultaneously insure individuals against liquidity risk and offer loans to promote intertemporal consumption smoothing in addition spatial separation and private information generate a transactions role for money interestingly we demonstrate that the industrial organization of the financial system bears significant implications for the effects of monetary policy under perfect competition higher rates of money growth lead to lower interest rates and a higher volume of lending activity in contrast in a monopoly banking sector money growth restricts the availability of funds and raises the cost of borrowing

evolution coordination and banking panics abstract i study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with multiple equilibria one of which involves a banking panic the analysis is built on a repeated version of the diamond dybvig 1983 model the optimal equilibrium is uniquely selected if it is also risk dominant when there are multiple banks the probability of observing a panic increases as the size of the banks decreases local interaction generates contagion effects that allow a bank run to spread first among banks in the same geographic location and then throughout the population

banking crises and liquidity in a monetary economy abstract this study investigates banks liquidity provision using the lagos and wright model of monetary exchange with aggregate uncertainty we show that banks sometimes exhaust their cash reserves and fail to satisfy their depositors needs for consumption smoothing we also show that banking crises can be eliminated by a rate of return equalizing policy under perfect risk sharing but the first best outcome can be only achieved with the friedman rule these results cannot be obtained with other monetary models e g overlapping generations models we also derive a rich array of non trivial effects of inflation on equilibrium deposits the probability of banking crises and banks portfolios

redemption costs and interest rates under the u s national banking system interest rates under the u s national banking system 1863 1914 appear to imply that banks failed to exploit an arbitrage opportunity for two reasons yields on government bonds exceeded the tax rate on note issue by approximately 150 basis points and short term interest rates varied seasonally this paper examines whether note redemption costs can explain observed interest rates we present a model in which redemption costs create a spread between the tax rate on note issue and bond yields and in which temporary seasonal fluctuations in currency demand generate seasonal movements in short term interest rates calibration of the model to actual data lends support to the model s implications further interest rates are shown not to vary seasonally when banks do not incur the costs of note redemption the banking system that existed in the united states between 1863 and 1914 the so called national banking system is unique in u s history under this system private commercial banks national banks were permitted to issue payable on demand liabilities banknotes that were required to be fully collateralized by government bonds and that carried an explicit government guarantee against noteholder loss should the issuing bank fail banks were taxed based on the quantity of their notes in circulation and each bani had to redeem its own notes at par in lawful money specie or greenbacks the national banking system gave rise to a national currency because each bank was required to accept the notes of other national banks at par a bank holding notes issued by another bank could redeem those notes at par in lawful money through redemption centers established by the u s treasury with the costs of redemption borne by the issuing bank during the period of the national banking system observed interest rates were characterized by two features first yields on intermediated government bonds ex

should bank runs be prevented abstract this paper extends diamond and dybvig s model j political economy 91 1983 401 to a framework in which bank assets are risky there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high in this environment both information induced and pure panic runs will occur however banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately it is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior

new estimates of the canadian money stock 1871 1967 in this paper the authors construct historical data series beginning in 1871 for canadian m1 m2 and monetary base the new series are at a monthly frequency and use the bank of canada s definition of the monetary aggregates institutional and reporting changes however make perfect backwards extrapolation of the bank s series impossible there are only end of month data rather than average weekly since january 1994 daily data and the authors cannot precisely match savings accounts at chartered banks and trust companies that are included in the modern monetary aggregates their adjustments for these changes and their impact on the aggregates are documented

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

optimal monetary policy and economic growth abstract a question at the center of many analyses of optimal monetary policy is why do central banks never implement the friedman rule to the list of answers to this question we add neoclassical production specifically the tobin effect as one possible explanation to that end we study an overlapping generations economy with capital where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for fiat money we assume a production function with a knowledge externality romer style that nests economies with endogenous growth ak form and those with no long run growth the diamond model the tobin effect is shown to be always operative under crra preferences a mild degree of social increasing returns is sufficient but not necessary for some positive inflation to dominate zero inflation and for the friedman rule to be sub optimal irrespective of the degree of risk aversion

the real bills doctrine versus the quantity theory a reconsideration two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models the real bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation the quantity theory prescription in contrast is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate money from credit although our models are consistent with quantity theory predictions about money supply and price level behavior under these two policy prescriptions the models imply that the quantity theory prescription is not pareto optimal and the real bills prescription is

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

economic organization with limited communication this paper presents formal stylized representations of communication accounting systems oral assignment portable object written message and telecommunication systems are considered the environments that allow this formalization are characterized by spatial separation private information and a need to keep track of past actions transfers and shocks in environments that have spatial separation and private information beneficial multilateral arrangements can depend critically on agents ability to communicate to one another values of contemporary shocks and to keep track of histories of past transfers or past announced shocks this paper formalizes this idea and focuses on com

money financial stability and efficiency most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts however in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here we consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks we show that with non contingent nominal deposit contracts the first best efficient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized banking system what is required is that the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money variations in the price level allow full sharing of aggregate risks an interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk in contrast idiosyncratic bank specific return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone real transfers are needed

banking crises in monetary economies this paper analyzes the effect of inflation on banking crises in a model in which money and banks play essential roles the model s equilibrium replicates some key features of actual banking crises namely the partial suspension of payments and the desire to hold cash even in the absence of pressing liquidity needs when banks have access to a stable foreign currency inflation has a threshold effect on banking crises higher inflation reduces the likelihood of crises when inflation is below the threshold the reverse happens when inflation exceeds the threshold this result appears to be broadly consistent with available evidence jel category e40 e50

monetary growth in a turnpike environment abstract a general equilibrium model of monetary growth in a turnpike economy is constructed it is shown that money lifts the economy up to a pareto superior growth path by eliminating the investment in projects with low returns the growth rate of the monetary economy is larger than that of the nonmonetary economy and mckinnon s complementarity hypothesis holds provided that the agents degree of relative risk aversion is not too large the main theorem states a sufficient condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium with a constant rate of return on money

search limited participation and monetary policy a model is developed that employs recent developments in the literature on search models of money to capture the distributional effects of monetary policy in a tractable way deterministic and stochastic versions of the model are studied money is not neutral and these nonneutralities persist whether or not the change in the money supply is anticipated or unanticipated at the optimum monetary policy is geared to correcting distortions in the search sector of the economy while correcting for the persistent effects of past monetary policy actions there is no consensus among macroeconomists concerning the role of monetary policy in the short run however an influential idea is that limited participation in financial markets is an important mechanism behind the short run macroeconomic effects of central bank actions that is there is a component of economic activity that is centralized and interconnected this economic activity involves financial transactions among banks and other financial intermediaries and the agents who hold the assets and liabilities of these financial intermediaries when the central bank injects outside money into the economy or withdraws it the economic agents who are immediately affected by the monetary injection or withdrawal are the participants in these centralized transactions other economic agents who are engaged in more decentralized and less interconnected transactions will not be affected directly by the first round effects of central bank actions thus there will be a distributional effect of monetary injections and withdrawals as first captured in heterogeneous agent models by grossman and weiss 1983 and rotemberg 1984 this distributional effect will matter in interesting ways for the price level nominal interest rates aggregate output foreign exchange rates and the distribution of consumption across the population the grossman weiss and rotemberg models are not analytically tractable because of the difficulty in tracking the distribution of wealth over time however lucas 1990 fuerst 1992 and alvarez and atkeson 1997 among others

crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems we study a monetary general equilibrium economy in which banks exist because they provide inter temporal insurance to risk averse depositors a banking crisis is defined as a case in which banks exhaust their reserve assets this may but need not be associated with liquidation of a storage asset when such liquidation does occur the result is a real resource loss to the economy and we label this a costly banking crisis there is a monetary authority whose only policy choice is the long run constant rate of growth of the money supply and thus the rate of inflation under different model specifications the banking industry is either a monopoly bank or a competitive banking industry it is shown that the probability of a banking crisis may be higher either under competition or under monopoly this is shown to depend on the rate of inflation in particular if the nominal rate of interest rate of inflation is below above some threshold a monopolistic banking system will always result in a higher lower crisis probability thus the relative crisis probabilities under the two banking systems cannot be determined independently of the conduct of monetary policy we further show that the probability of a costly banking crisis is always higher under competition than under monopoly however this apparent advantage of the monopoly banking is strictly due to the fact that it provides relatively less valuable inter temporal insurance

money banking and capital formation we consider a monetary growth model in which banks arise to provide liquidity in addition there is a government that issues not only money but interest bearing bonds these bonds compete with capital in private portfolios when the government fixes a constant growth rate for the money stock we show that there can exist multiple nontrivial monetary steady states one of these steady states is a saddle while the other can be a sink moreover paths approaching a steady state can display damped endogenous fluctuations and development trap phenomena are common across different steady states low capital stocks are associated with high nominal interest rates the latter signal the comparative inefficiency of the financial system also increases in the steady state inflation rate can easily reduce the steady state capital stock journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e13 e44 e50 g20 o16

monetary policy banking crises and the friedman rule banking crises are frequent events gerard caprio and daniela klingebiel 1997 catalog over 80 banking crises during the last 25 years interestingly some banking crises are associated with no output losses whatsoever while others involve massive recessions finally it is known that the probability of a banking crisis rises as the rate of inflation rises see asli demirguc kunt and enrica detragiache 1997 john boyd et al 2001a b while received wisdom exists about the conduct of monetary policy while a crisis is underway there is no formal treatment of how the conduct of monetary policy during normal times affects the potential for banking crises to occur to fill that gap i consider economies where spatial separation and limited communication create a transactions role for money and random shocks to agents liquidity preferences create a role for banks in addition banks confront randomness in withdrawal demand when withdrawal demand is sufficiently high banks exhaust their cash reserves there are good reasons to associate this with a banking panic the output lost during a banking panic depends on how great withdrawal demand is some banking crises generate no output losses while others generate large reductions in resource availability in addition the conduct of monetary policy during normal times affects the probability of a banking crisis the higher the nominal interest rate the inflation rate the higher is the probability of a panic driving the nominal interest rate to zero following the friedman rule eliminates bank panics this constitutes a new rationale for the friedman rule nonetheless conventional methods of implementing the friedman rule never produce an optimal resource allocation in particular low nominal interest rates induce banks to hold large cash reserves thereby forgoing socially more productive investments in effect the friedman rule induces banks to become narrow banks voluntarily the banking system is very safe but it undertakes a suboptimal level of investment less conventional methods for implementing the friedman rule such as allowing unrestricted access to the discount window at a zero nominal interest rate lead either to the nonexistence of equilibrium or to massive indeterminacies none of the equilibria will be consistent with full optimality

central bank liquidity management and unconventional monetary policies central banks that work under an inflation targeting regime generally use an interest rate as the main instrument to implement monetary policy the latter can be denominated conventional monetary policy central banks often deviate from this practice however and engage in other policies to deal with particular situations as these alternatives depart from the usual practice they are generally labeled unconventional policies during the recent global financial crisis and recession of 2008 09 central banks around the world and in latin america in particular responded to exter nal shocks in a variety of ways canales kriljenko and others provide a precise description of how different latin american central banks reacted to the u s financial crisis shock in 2008 with an emphasis on the heterogeneity in the use of unconventional monetary policy instruments 1 for example while colombia and peru lowered reserve requirements in their banking systems the central bank of chile relaxed the collateral requirements for repurchase repo transac tions 2 also chile and peru extended the repayment period in repo transactions these examples illustrate not only the heterogeneity in responses but also the prevalent use of unconventional instruments ishi stone and yehoue note that the central bank interest rate increased rather than decreased in many emerging countries in the months immediately following the fall of lehman brothers 3deviations from conventional policies were observed in latin america even before the recent global financial crisis and before the central banks implemented inflation targeting frameworks most notably central banks have often engaged in sterilized exchange rate interventions to smooth the effects of capital inflows due in part to commodity price booms and the resulting nominal exchange rate appreciation some countries like peru have used these inter ventions quite frequently whereas others have implemented these policies only after extreme movements in the nominal exchange rate for instance in chile even after the inflation targeting policies were already in place in this regard one important policy discussion is the relationship between inflation targeting regimes and liquidity management responses 4 in particular it is not obvious whether the application of such liquidity management policies implied some type of threat to the good implementation of the inflation targeting framework ishi stone and yehoue highlight the difficulties of using econometric time series techniques to evaluate the impact of liquidity man agement policies implemented in an inflation targeting framework because it requires disentangling the impact of each type of policy as well as the impact of the external shocks that presumably triggered the implementation of such policies 5 the fact that such policies were usually in place for just a few quarters further complicates the application of the time series based impact evaluation this paper contributes to the evaluation of such policies by constructing solving and simulating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model that explicitly includes the central bank s balance sheet as a key modeling input the model can explicitly predict the impact of selected unconventional monetary policies on the major macroeconomic variables including gross domestic product gdp consumer price index cpi inflation and the real exchange rate and it pays special attention to the role played by the specific facilities used by the central bank to manage market liquidity this paper uses chile as the main case for the application of the model providing a detailed account of its experience with these alternative tools since the introduction of the flexible inflation targeting framework in 1999 and calibrating the model to then analyze the effects of some of the policies implemented the theoretical framework is an extension of a new keynesian model of a small open economy with banks that take deposits from households which is the only way for the latter to finance consumption extending the more traditional cash in advance assumption borrow abroad lend to productive firms and hold bonds issued by the central bank

origins of the federal reserve system international incentives and the domestic free rider problem from the civil war to 1914 the united states had one of the worst e nancial systems in the world the dominant institutional feature of the system was the absence of a central bank and its most salient performance characteristics were the recurrence of banking panics and severe seasonal interest rate e uctuations these e nancial problems were economically costly panics were accompanied by sharp declines in the money supply reduced economic activity and increased unemployment and business failures in 1913 congress created the federal reserve system to safeguard the nation from panics and smooth out interest rate seasonals in more general terms the federal reserve was established to provide the national public good of e nancial system stability in this study i explain how american society overcame the collective action problems that normally constrain the production of public goods to inadequate levels in other words the article is about the political effort that produced an infrastructural cornerstone of the modern u s economy in the face of incentives that should have left few people with sufficient motivation to pay for the improvement i bring to bear a joint products selective incentives argument to explain the voluntary collective action behind the federal reserveact 1 the lobbying effort was aboutsolving thepanic problem tobe sure but becausethisexpected benee t approximated a societywide public good it did not on its own motivate collective action instead the united states faced a second problem of e nancial organization before 1914 and it was this problem that created a private inducement to lobby for the federal reserve the structure of the domestic e nancial machinery contributed not only to instability at home but also to the near complete absence of the u s dollar in global e nancial affairs indeed the united states was the only major trading country whose currency did not function as an international currency before 1914 the new this article is a revision of a paper delivered at the 1996annual convention of the southern economic association washington d c 23 25 november i thank michael bordo marc busch william r clark benjamin j cohen barry eichengreen jeffry frieden william keech stephen krasner charles lipson jameslivingston louispauly georgeselgin bethsimmons richardtimberlake danielverdier eugene n white and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 1 see olson 1965 and sandler 1992

discussion of banking in a matching model of money and capital the paper by bencivenga and camera 2011 this issue studies how banks can improve the allocation of resources in an environment where trading frictions make money useful for certain types of exchange its starting point is the observation that the random nature of trading opportunities commonly used in modern monetary models is structurally similar to a type of liquidity preference uncertainty that appears in the banking literature it seems natural therefore to ask what insights can be gained by combining these separate strands of research the paper presents a model of decentralized trade in which banks arise endogenously as an arrangement for efficiently distributing cash to agents when they have attractive buying opportunities it then studies the relationship between inflation and the functioning of the banking system as well as the effects of a central bank policy of paying interest on bank reserves the paper is part of an important research agenda that aims to study financial institutions in general equilibrium models where money plays an explicit role the model in the paper builds on that in lagos and wright 2005 where agents alternate between trading in centralized and decentralized markets and the information structure is such that decentralized trade requires the use of money agents can hold their wealth in either money or capital capital typically offers a higher rate of return but cannot be used to purchase goods in decentralized trade when making portfolio adjustments in the centralized market an agent is unsure what trading opportunities will be available to her in the subsequent decentralized market and hence how much money she will want to hold the banking literature that began with bryant 1980 and diamond and dybvig 1983 showed how an institution that resembles a bank can be welfare enhancing when agents face a similar type of uncertainty the models in this literature were written entirely in real terms however which limits their ability to address monetary issues such as the effects of inflation bencivenga

financial fragility liquidity and asset prices we define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have disproportionately large effects in a model of financial intermediation we show that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset price volatility or bank defaults or both furthermore as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small the asset price volatility is bounded away from zero in the limit economy with no shocks there are many equilibria however the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small liquidity shocks are those with non trivial sunspot activity

rediscounting under aggregate risk abstract this paper compares three institutions that offer an elastic currency open market operations a discount window and a private banknote issuing clearinghouse in an economy with financial markets otherwise hampered by a lack of liquidity when this economy is subject to aggregate financial shocks these alternative forms of central banking are shown to differ in their implications for risk sharing interesting implications include i central bank losses and monetary innovations that are part of an efficient equilibrium and ii desirable quantity restrictions at the discount window

central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks abstract the tug o war for supremacy between inflation targeting and monetary targeting is a classic yet timely topic in monetary economics in this paper we revisit this issue within the context of a pure exchange overlapping generations model in which spatial separation and random relocation create an endogenous demand for money we study ar 1 shocks to both real output and the real interest rate irrespective of the nature of the shocks the optimal inflation target is always positive under monetary targeting shocks to output necessitate negative money growth rates for shocks to real interest rates money growth rates may be either positive or negative depending on the elasticity of consumption substitution also for output shocks monetary targeting welfare dominates inflation targeting but the gap between the two vanishes as the shock process approaches a random walk in sharp contrast for shocks to the real interest rate we prove that monetary targeting and inflation targeting are welfare equivalent only in the limit as the shocks become i i d the upshot is that persistence of the underlying fundamental uncertainty matters depending on the nature of the shock policy responses need to be either more or less aggressive as persistence increases

market set up in advance of federal reserve policy rate decisions textabstractthis paper considers the uncertainty associated with upcoming federal open market committee fomc announcements and the extent to which participants in the fed funds futures market prepare for such announcements before they actually occur we demonstrate that markets set up well in advance of known announcement days going back as far as six months prior to an fomc meeting as a result there is often less variation in fed funds futures prices in the period immediately preceding an fomc announcement despite greater volume of activity as the market has already incorpo rated anticipated signals we find that macro announcements and central bank officials speeches and congressional testimony are of comparable importance in addition while macro announcements have stronger effects when they are released during the fed s blackout period congressional testimony is more important when it coincides with days when important macro variables are released

the role of money in two alternative models when is the friedman rule optimal and why abstract in models of money with an infinitely lived representative agent ilra models the optimal monetary policy is almost always the friedman rule in overlapping generations og models by contrast the friedman rule may not be optimal in this paper we use this difference in monetary policy prescriptions to help us identify and study the key difference between these two models as models of money we study the welfare properties of monetary policy in a simple og model under two very different money demand specifications and two alternative assumptions about the generational timing of taxes for money retirement we conclude that the key difference between ilra and og monetary models is that in the latter the standard method for constructing a monetary regime causes transactions involving money to become intergenerational transfers under alternative government fiscal monetary regimes that offset these intergenerational transfers the friedman rule is always optimal

money banking and financial markets the fact that money banking and financial markets interact in important ways seems self evident the theoretical nature of this interaction however has not been fully explored to this end we integrate the diamond 1997 journal of political economy 105 928 956 model of banking and financial markets with the lagos and wright 2005 journal of political economy 113 463 484 dynamic model of monetary exchange a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets where banks are subject to runs and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort among other things the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender of last resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic free banking system

real time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy abstract using a neoclassical monetary model we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that operates as a real time gross settlement rtgs system we illustrate how the cost of such systems ultimately derives from the credit constraints imposed by rtgs the effects of these constraints can be undone if the central bank makes intraday credit freely available if intraday credit is only available on a collateralized basis however rtgs will always impose a liquidity cost

the effects of terrorism and war on the oil price stock index relationship abstract the effects war and terrorism have on the covariance between oil prices and the indices of four major stock markets the american s p500 the european dax cac40 and ftse100 using non linear bekk garch type models are investigated the findings indicate that the covariance between stock and oil returns is affected by war a tentative explanation is that the two wars examined here predispose investors and market agents for more profound and longer lasting effects on global markets on the other hand terrorist incidents that are one off unanticipated security shocks only the co movement between cac40 dax and oil returns is affected and no significant impact is observed in the relationship between the s p500 ftse100 and oil returns this difference in the reaction may tentatively be interpreted as indicating that the latter are more efficient in absorbing the impact of terrorist attacks

intermediaries and payments instruments abstract we study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium we show that with arbitrarily small transactions costs only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate and not those of other private sector agents therefore our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media a connection that has not been made in earlier literature we use our model to suggest a resolution of the banknote underissue puzzle of cagan in d carson ed banking and monetary studies richard d irwin publishing homewood il 1963

the optimal public expenditure financing policy does the level of economic development matter i introduction does the growth effect of public expenditures depend on the way these expenditures are financed over the years a substantial volume of theoretical and empirical research has been directed toward identifying the elements of public expenditure at its aggregated and disaggregated level that bear significant association with economic growth in contrast only a handful of studies have paid particular attention to examine the extent to which the growth effect of public expenditures depends on the method of financing such expenditures e g de gregorio 1993 miller and russek 1997 palivos and yip 1995 the consensus appears to be that the two primary modes of financing income taxation and seigniorage are distortionary opinions however are divided as to their relative merits for example according to palivos and yip 1995 income tax financing is more detrimental to growth than seigniorage financing at the same time de gregorio 1993 suggests that as long as the rate of return on indexed bonds is substantially responsive to changes in the rate of inflation seigniorage financing of public expenditure is more growth reducing pecorino 1997 on the other hand prescribes a mix of both modes of financing despite these differences the above mentioned studies share a common characteristic the optimal mode of financing public expenditure in these studies is viewed as being not contingent on the stages of economic development accordingly there remains little understanding of the process by which public expenditure financing policies shape the prospect of economic growth for developing vis a vis developed countries the primary objective of this paper is to bridge this gap in the existing literature it is a long standing belief among development experts that outcomes of public expenditures and revenue policies are conditional on the state of an economy recent evidence supports such belief for example miller and russek 1997 suggest that for developing countries a deficit financed increase in public expenditure retards economic growth and a tax financed increase leads to higher growth for developed countries a deficit financed increase in government expenditure does not affect economic growth and a tax financed increase leads to a lower growth in light of these findings and in light of the theoretical controversy about the relative merits of seigniorage versus tax finance it is meaningful to ask the following question does the relative merit of seigniorage vis a vis tax financing of public expenditure depend on the stage of economic development this paper seeks an answer to this question using both theoretical and empirical analyses the theoretical framework developed in this paper shares many of the characteristics of the models proposed by espinosa vega and yip 1999 2000 and schreft and smith 1997 in particular we consider a two period overlapping generations model where agents are subjected to stochastic relocations shocks which act like shocks to their portfolio preferences these shocks have the same consequence as liquidity preference shocks as in diamond and dybvig 1983 and create a role for financial intermediaries who take deposits and make a portfolio decision on behalf of the households in addition there is a government that relies on two alternative sources of revenue seigniorage and tax revenue to finance its exogenously given expenditure sequence the results that we derive are shaped by the portfolio decision of the financial intermediaries in particular at each point in time financial intermediaries are required to allocate their portfolios between a nonproductive liquid asset money and a productive illiquid asset the illiquid asset takes the form of financing risky investment projects which in turn generate productive capital stock for the economy the financial intermediaries optimal portfolio allocation rules depend on the relative rate of return of the two available assets

monetary stability and liquidity crises the role of the lender of last resort we study an economy where agents are subject to liquidity demand shocks and banks arise endogenously to insure consumers against these shocks in this environment we evaluate the desirability of a lender of last resort who can provide liquidity loans to banks in distress in the absence of a lender of last resort the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium the introduction of unlimited and costless lender of last resort services allows the economy to achieve a steady state allocation that is pareto optimal however this economy also displays a continuum of hyperin ationary equilibria we then explore restrictions on the provision of lender of last resort services that rule out such monetary instability while preserving some of the e ciency obtained by unrestricted lender of last resort services when the lender of last resort charges an interest rate on liquidity loans the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium and when the interest rate charged is high enough no hyperin ationary equilibria arise finally when the lender of last resort faces an upper bound on loanable funds there is again a unique long run equilibrium and when the upper bound on loanable funds is small enough hyperin ationary equilibria are ruled out

optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks faced with real and nominal shocks what should a benevolent central bank do x the money growth rate or target the in ation rate in this paper we make a rst attempt at studying the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a micro founded model of money speci cally we produce an overlapping generations economy in which limited communication and stochastic relocation creates an endogenous transactions role for at money we nd that when the shocks are real welfare is higher under money growth targeting when the shocks are nominal and not large welfare is higher under in ation rate targeting while under in ation rate targeting it is always optimal to pursue an expansionary policy it is never optimal to do so under money growth targeting

monetary policy and banking structure in this paper i examine the differences in optimal monetary policy in various banking systems in particular i compare two monetary economies one with a competitive banking system and the other with a monopolistic one in addition the optimality of the discount window policy is considered it is shown that the friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy in a monopolistic banking economy and the zero inflation policy is optimal in a competitive banking economy under appropriate parameters in addition the combination of the friedman rule and the discount window policy can achieve efficient allocation in both banking systems

on the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking such as the ability to undertake more profitable long term investment opportunities and the difficulties associated with it such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders i show that a specific banking arrangement a joint liability scheme provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

the evolution of cash transactions some implications for monetary policy this paper considers the implications for monetary policy of a decreasing demand for outside money it finds that even perpetual declines in the demand for base money pose no threat to the traditional methods employed for conducting monetary policy the effects of such reductions in the demand for central bank liabilities however do depend on how monetary policy is conducted four monetary policy regimes are analyzed with a policy of nominal interest rate targeting a secular decline in the volume of cash transactions unambiguously leads to accelerating inflation a policy of maintaining a fixed composition of government liabilities leads to accelerating decelerating inflation if agents have sufficiently high low levels of risk aversion inflation targeting produces falling nominal and real interest rates while a policy of fixing the rate of money growth can easily lead to indeterminacy and endogenous oscillation in interest rates it is argued that a policy of fixing the composition of government liabilities has several advantages if it is known that agents are not too risk averse and that the asymptotic demand for base money is small if this information is not known then interest rate or inflation targeting have an advantage because their consequences are not sensitive to such environmental features

banks and markets in a monetary economy abstract modern financial sectors consist of banks asset markets and a central bank this paper builds a model where these institutions provide different financial services and their interaction supports efficient allocations when one institution is missing equilibria are by construction inefficient the paper analyzes how interest rates and asset prices depend on the structure of the financial sector and characterizes the central bank policy that supports efficient allocations the analysis relies on the difference between liquidity and real shocks and relates the notion of liquidity used in this paper to the one adopted in other studies

contagion and bank failures during the great depression the june 1932 chicago banking panic the authors examine the social costs of asymmetric information induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance their case study is the chicago bank panic of june 1932 the authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks copyright 1997 by american economic association

the value of inside and outside money abstract we study dynamic economies in which agents may have incentives to hold both privately issued a k a inside and publicly issued a k a outside circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium our analysis emphasizes spatial separation and limited communication as frictions that motivate monetary exchange we isolate conditions under which a combination of inside and outside money does and does not allow the economy to achieve a first best allocation of resources we also study the extent to which the use of private circulating liabilities alone or the use of public circulating liabilities alone can address the frictions that lead to monetary exchange

sequential markets and the suboptimality of the friedman rule a cash in advance model with sequential markets is constructed where unanticipated monetary injections are nonneutral and can potentially produce large liquidity effects however if the monetary authority adheres to an optimal money rule money should not respond to unanticipated shocks so that a friedman rule is suboptimal and the monetary authority does not exploit the liquidity effect quantitatively the model can generate variability in money and nominal interest rates close to what is observed and can produce data with no obvious evidence of the existence of liquidity effects

could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs abstract restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity based runs even when a run does not occur welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset

private and public circulating liabilities abstract legal and technological changes have made private banknote issue or its electronic equivalent possible we construct a model where private liabilities circulate either by themselves or alongside outside money we provide results on existence and multiplicity of equilibria and characterize dynamics near steady states our results support friedman in that circulating private liabilities are associated with endogenous volatility but implementing friedman s advice the government should ban private currency substitutes causes significant inefficiency the proposal of hayek that the government should leave currency creation to the market also is often constrained suboptimal both public and private circulating liabilities are required for optimality journal of economic literature classification numbers e3 e4 e5

dollarization and the inflation threshold this paper analyzes the relationship among inflation dollarization financial intermediation and real activity empirical evidence suggests non linearity in the eects of inflation on financial intermediation and real activity i e the existence of an inflation threshold evidence also suggests that one way in which inflation aects financial intermediation in high inflation economies is through the substitution of dollars under the mattress for savings in domestic banks our model captures these empirical regularities inflation and real activity are positively related at low levels of inflation when the inflation rate exceeds certain threshold however agents substitute in their portfolios dollars a non productive asset of constant value that also provides liquidity services for deposits issued by domestic banks this substitution reduces the scale of financial intermediation and the capital investment in the economy as a consequence at high levels of inflation the levels of capital stock and output become negatively related to the inflation rate

financial markets in development and the development of financial markets what is the relationship between markets and development it is argued that markets promote growth and that growth in turn encourages the formation of markets two models with endogenous market formation are presented to analyze this issue the first examines the role that financial markets banks and stock markets play in allocating funds to the highest valued use in the economic system it is shown that intermediation will arise under weak conditions the second focuses on the role that markets play in supporting specialization in economic activity the consequences of perfect competition in market formation are highlighted