risk aversion and prudence in rent seeking games this paper considers a common n agent symmetric rent seeking game it derives conditions so that risk aversion and risk always decrease rent seeking efforts these conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk averse rent seekers are also prudent under n 2 prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk aversion to decrease rent seeking efforts compared to risk neutrality an intuition for this result is given based on a self protection model

an experimental examination of competitor based price matching guarantees we use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies our findings establish that when costs are symmetric price matching guarantees significantly increase market prices in markets with cost asymmetries guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference lesser use of guarantees combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior

price discrimination through offers to match price in this paper a firm discriminates between two classes of customer who have a different cost of information by coupling a list price with an offer to match the pr ice of any other shop if the list price elsewhere is lower the firm will be successful in discrimination the list price of each firm is increasing in the number of sellers and the total sales are decreasi ng in the number of sellers furthermore if sellers coordinate they discriminate more efficaciously and increase their profits by increa sing their total sales copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

winner s curse without overbidding abstract we report the results of a series of second price auction experiments where each bidder s signal is given by a normally distributed value plus a normally distributed error while bidders values differ in one treatment they are the same in another which allows for a direct test of the winner s curse irrespective of confounding factors bidders may also fall prey to a news curse when they do not sufficiently take into account that signals and errors are correlated we find that the effects of the winner s curse are mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

guaranteed lowest prices do they facilitate collusion abstract the effects of a policy guaranteeing lowest price are analyzed in a two stage game where firms first decide whether to adopt such a policy and then choose prices symmetric and asymmetric games are solved to examine the extent to which prices can rise to collusive levels

residential mobility with job location uncertainty abstract this paper investigates the relationship between job changes and residential mobility a job change may be prompted by reasons unrelated to factors associated with housing consumption however a job change may lead to an adjustment to housing consumption i e residential relocation previous studies find that job relocations are positively associated with residential mobility this paper departs from previous studies by looking at the effects of an uncertain future job location on residential mobility and mobility expectation it is conjectured that with the existence of costs of residential mobility a household head s likelihood for changing jobs in the future dampens the household s propensity to move but encourages the formation of mobility expectation these conjectures are examined empirically using data from the panel study of income dynamics and they are confirmed

the effects of market practices in oligopolistic markets an experimental examination of the ethyl case this study reports on the performance of experimental markets characterized by industrial structure and practices similar to those at issue in the ethyl case the central question is whether price competition is affected by the practices of advanced notification of price changes and most favored nation contracts or is determined by industrial organization and concentration alone

price matching in a model of equilibrium price dispersion some sellers announce openly to prospective buyers that they will match any competitor s lower price on similar products this practice is visible among many retailers of consumer durables such as tv sets stereo components cameras and personal computers in more covert and informal forms price matching is ubiquitous it exists whenever individual sellers of a product are known to be generally willing to lower their prices when confronted by prospective buyers who can demonstrate information of lower prices elsewhere attempts to demonstrate and verify such information usually constitute part of the haggling process one often wonders will prices consumers ultimately pay indeed be lower with such haggling will apparently aggressive price matching strategies result in lower or higher equilibrium prices this paper deals with an environment in which information is not perfect and buyers engage in costly sequential search it will be shown that with price matching prices ultimately charged to consumers are higher the crucial assumption here is that buyers marginal search cost increases with the number of searches already performed with this assumption the main idea driving our results is as follows in the presence of increasing marginal search cost price matching encourages search therefore there will be more prospective buyers who will have performed a larger number of searches their marginal search cost will be higher on the average thus firms will be able to take advantage of this and charge higher prices but why would price matching encourage search if marginal search cost is increasing the answer lies in that price matching implies costless recall in sequential search models with consumers facing a known price distribution and constant marginal search cost whether recall is costless or costly is immaterial for then consumers optimal strategy is a constant reservationprice strategy implying that prices rejected earlier will never be acceptable the desire to recall never arises so that it does not matter to the searcher whether recall is costly or costless in such an environment firms do not have the incentive to offer price matching but as rothschild 7 has cautioned us the two assumptions of costly and costless recall are not always interchangeable they are not when marginal search cost is increasing for then if a consumer having a price

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

on the job search behavior the importance of commuting time using search theory we show that job search effort is increasing and under some conditions convex in commuting time we show that the effect of commuting time on job search effort levels may be small in case of uncertainty caused by future job and residential moving behavior thus we provide a microeconomic explanation for the finding that commuters behave as if they are footloose our empirical analysis supports the behavioral implications of the model for the netherlands surprisingly we do not find any evidence that the effect of commuting time on search behavior depends on the commuters socioeconomic characteristics

unemployment and urban labour markets two quite distinct views on how metropolitan labour markets work have co existed for over three decades both claim empirical support and after a brief period of confrontation they continue to co exist today giving quite conflicting signals to policy makers according to the first model the urban labour market consists of a number of spatially defined sub markets so that local unemployment exists primarily because of deficiencies in highly localised demand for labour by this argument unemployment rates remain high in the absence of a renewed supply of appropriate jobs within short commuting distances of the jobless the solution according to this model is to attract private and public sector production into such areas in contrast a second model views the city as a single market in which transactions between labour and capital take place regardless of the location of residence and employment sites according to this perspective the spatial incidence of unemployment simply reflects the residential

optimal best price policy abstract a best price policy bp is a promise by a seller to give her customer a refund if she reduces her price after the customer has already purchased the product we characterize the optimal bp policy as when the seller can control both the policy length when the promise expires and the refund scale what portion of the price difference is refunded we explain why the policy length is finite and varies across industries in a setting where consumers valuations decline over time we show that a finite length bp allows the seller to commit to not lowering her price too soon while at the same time letting her capture some of the benefits of intertemporal price discrimination however because the decline in consumers valuations is uncertain a bp does not allow the monopolist to achieve the profit she could earn with a full commitment

durable good monopoly and best price provisions best price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available if the seller subsequently cuts price then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund a durable good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments the provisions require special circumstances to be practical but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings three applications are discussed international commodity agreements markets for electric turbogenerators and markets for financial claims copyright 1990 by american economic association

putting risk in its proper place this paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs we show how such concepts as prudence and temperance can be fully characterized by a preference relation over these lotteries if preferences are defined in an expected utility framework with differentiable utility the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the nth derivative of the utility function what makes our characterization appealing is its simplicity which seems particularly amenable to experimentation

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

an experimental study of precautionary bidding auctions often involve goods exhibiting a common knowledge ex post risk in such auctions precautionary bidding predicts that under expected utility dara bidders reduce their bids by more than the appropriate risk premium because the degree of riskiness of an auctioned good and bidders levels of risk aversion are difficult to observe in field settings we conduct experimental auctions that allow us to identify the precautionary premium directly we find strong evidence for precautionary bidding the effect is robust to changes in experimental design features our experiment provides the first empirical demonstration of precautionary motives in a strategic setting

the influence of uncertain job location on urban form and the journey to work abstract standard urban models assume residents never think about their next job more likely the individual value of a given home and the choice of commute length are based not only on the current job site but also on the expectation of where future jobs will be and the likelihood of both job separations and residential moves the first factor lessens the value of access to the present job while the second determines the opportunity cost of moving both sets of factors lead to flatter rent gradients and more sprawl than predicted by standard theories the analysis further suggests that relatively stable jobs are likely associated with relatively shorter commutes past studies of the regional balance of jobs and housing of wasteful commuting of differences in the length of commute by gender and of spatial tests for discrimination in housing and local labor markets have neglected these considerations and may yield biased results as a consequence

dynamic duopoly with best price clauses this article investigates best price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game best price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase two different price clauses are distinguished most favored customer and meet or release i examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods in each period new consumers enter the market i show that in this context meet or release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most favored customer clauses

commuting distances in a household location choice model with amenities abstract observed commuting distances generally exceed those predicted by standard models of household location choice this paper develops a model with locational amenities and two job centers it is shown that differences in household preferences for amenities can lead to various types of residential location patterns some of which result in higher average commuting distances in the city

fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination we investigate the effect of a ban on third degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion we build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups two cases are analyzed i best response symmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are higher if price discrimination is allowed ii best response asymmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are lower if price discrimination is allowed in both price discrimination scenarios firms discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim trigger strategies than under uniform pricing

measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games this paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries we apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives both framed in a similar way despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable the pure or mixed nash equilibria cannot describe subjects behaviour we present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion while previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well the global game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players given the observed distribution of actions we also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities

bargaining with a residual claimant an experimental study we conduct an experiment of two player bargaining in which the payo to one player is subject to ex post risk while the other player receives a xed payment eectively making the player exposed to risk a residual claimant contrary to intuition recent theoretical work argues that exposure to risk may actually be benecial to the residual claimant and we test this in a controlled lab experiment our results suggest that asymmetric exposure to risk creates dierent self serving notions of fairness for the two types of players which leads to bargaining conict and even disagreements residual claimants are able to extract a larger share of the pie when bargaining over a risky distribution moreover some residual claimants actually do better in an expected utility sense by being exposed to risk however contrary to the theoretical prediction it is the comparatively less risk averse residual claimants who appear to benet the most through their exposure to risk in a subsequent study where residual claimants are able to choose between a less risky or a more risky distribution over which to bargain few choose the riskier distribution except when the possibility of an ex pose fair split exists consistent with our earlier results the relatively less risk averse residual claimants are more likely to choose the riskier distribution

the antitrust prohibition of excessive pricing abstract excessive pricing by a dominant firm is unlawful in many countries to assess whether it is excessive the dominant firm s price is often compared with price benchmarks we examine the competitive implications of two such benchmarks a retrospective benchmark where the price that prevails after a rival enters the market is used to assess whether the dominant firm s pre entry price was excessive and a contemporaneous benchmark where the dominant firm s price is compared with the price that the firm charges contemporaneously in another market we show that the two benchmarks restrain the dominant firm s behavior when it acts as a monopoly but soften competition when the dominant firm competes with a rival moreover a retrospective benchmark promotes entry but may lead to inefficient entry

auctioning risky conservation contracts conservation auctions have the potential to increase the efficiency of payments to farmers to adopt conservation friendly management practices by fostering competition among them the literature considers bidders that have complete information about the costs of adoption and optimal bidding behavior reflects this information advantage farmers seek information rents and bids decrease when risk aversion increases because farmers are more averse to losing the auction we contribute to the literature by allowing for cost risk our paper shows that farmers must balance the risk of losing the auction thus foregoing information rent with the risk of submitting a bid that is not high enough to pay the costs of adopting conservation practices thus incurring losses we design an experiment to trade off these two risks and examine how risk aversion affects bidding behavior when participants face different sources and levels of risk our experiment contributes to a small literature on experimental auctions with risky product valuations we find that participants decrease their bids as risk aversion increases even in auctions with cost risk suggesting that the risk of losing the auction dominates these findings uncover new challenges for the practical implementation of conservation auctions as an efficient policy instrument

the effects of platform most favored nation clauses on competition and entry abstractin the context of sellers who sell their products through intermediary platforms a platform most favored nation pmfn clause is a contractual restriction requiring that a particular seller will not sell at a lower price through a platform other than the one with which it has the pmfn agreement contractual restrictions observed in markets for e books and travel services among other settings can be viewed as examples of this phenomenon we show that pmfn clauses typically raise platform fees and retail prices and curtail entry or skew positioning decisions by potential entrants pursuing low end business models

higher order risk attitudes a review of experimental evidence abstract this paper reviews the recent but fast growing experimental literature on higher order risk attitudes after introducing the theoretical context we first review the basic evidence and empirical moderators of these risk attitudes we then discuss recent extensions to ambiguity time risk and multi attribute utility in the last part we review indirect evidence from applied economic decision tasks

different selling strategies in bertrand oligopoly abstract i analyse a bertrand oligopoly game where firms can choose between selling strategies i price announcements ii price announcements and offers to price match i establish the set of nash equilibria and show that only the monopoly price nash equilibrium satisfies iterative dominance

prudence in bargaining the effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes abstract we investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player s pay off from agreement is risky we find that a risk averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay off is made risky this is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave more patiently in bargaining strong analogies are drawn to the precautionary saving literature we show that the effect of risk on receipts can be sufficiently strong that a decreasingly risk averse player may be better off receiving a risky pay off than a certain pay off

bilateral most favored customer pricing and collusion in a two period differentiated products duopoly model most favored customer mfc pricing policies allow firms to commit to prices above the bertrand prices it is shown here however that unless a restrictive and unappealing assumption is made about demand there is no equilibrium in which both firms adopt mfc policies the restrictive assumption is that at least one firm s demand is more responsive to changes in its opponent s price than to changes in its own price otherwise firms have an incentive to deviate from a greater than bertrand price in the first period

exploring higher order risk effects higher order risk effects play an important role in examining economic behavior under uncertainty a precautionary demand for saving has been linked to the property of prudence and the property of temperance has been used to show how the presence of an unavoidable risk affects one s behavior towards a second risk these two properties also play key roles in aversion to negative skewness and to kurtosis respectively both properties recently have been characterized by preferences over lottery pairs in simple 50 50 gambles the simplicity of this characterization is ideal for experimental investigation this article reports the results of such experiments and concludes that there is behavioral evidence for prudence but not for temperance implications of these results for both expected utility and non expected utility models are examined

experimental development of sealed bid auction theory calibrating controls for risk aversion we offer a brief survey of bidding theory in high price auctions of experimental studies of behavior in such auctions and of the interplay between the design and results of the experiments and efforts to further develop the theory two new series of experiments are reported the first applies a convex transformation of payoffs in an attempt to induce a lowering of subject bids as if the bidders had become less risk averse the second applies a method for inducing any prespecified utility function for risky choices on an individual we use it to induce as if risk neutral behavior both series use baseline control to calibrate the hypothesized effect of the procedures on riskaverse behavior

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

can uncertainty alleviate the commons problem global commons problems such as climate change are often affected by severe uncertainty the paper examines the effect of uncertainty on pollution emissions and welfare in a strategic context we find that emissions are always lower under uncertainty than under certainty reflecting risk reducing considerations we show that uncertainty can have a net positive impact on the welfare of risk averse polluters we extend the analysis to increases in risk increases in risk aversion and to risk heterogeneity jel d81 c72 q54 h23

changes in background risk and risk taking behaviour economic decision making under uncertainty often takes place in the presence of multiple risks and in markets that are less than complete as a consequence choices about endogenous risks sometimes must be made while simultaneously facing one or more immutable exogenous background risks that are not under the control of the agent and that are independent of endogenous risks it is somehow natural to assume that an exogenous deterioration in background wealth will cause an individual to take more care elsewhere if we define a deterioration for example as making the individual poorer by removing a fixed amount of initial wealth we know from pratt 1964 that decreasing absolute risk aversion dara of an individual s von neumann morgenstern utility function yields this natural result if on the other hand background wealth becomes riskier due to the addition of a zero mean risk that is also statistically independent of all other risks behavior will be more risk averse if and only if preferences are risk vulnerable as defined by gollier and pratt 1996 risk vulnerability described below in section 4 is a stronger notion than dara and includes proper risk aversion pratt and zeckhauser 1987 and standard risk aversion eeckhoudt and kimball 1992 kimball 1993 as particular cases but a deterioration in background wealth may encompass more complicated distribution changes than the introduction of another statistically independent risk in this paper we examine background wealth deteriorations that take the form of both general firstand second degree stochastic dominance changes in risk fsd and ssd respectively in particular we determine conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for each of these two types of background risk changes to imply more risk averse behavior on the part of the individual for the case of fsd changes this condition turns out to be ross stronger characterization of decreasing absolute risk aversion in the case of general ssd changes in the distribution of background wealth the condition derived is a stronger version in ross sense of the conditions characterizing preferences that are locally risk vulnerable in the sense of gollier and pratt the necessary and sufficient conditions derived are fairly restrictive upon preferences however if we take as positive behavior that individuals act in a more risk averse manner whenever the distribution of background wealth deteriorates these conditions place canonical limits upon appropriate utility representations at the very least they

commuting in search of jobs and residences abstract this paper introduces a model which includes residential job moving and commuting behavior when labor and housing markets are characterized by market imperfections imperfect information and moving costs we examine the consequences of these market imperfections on commuting behavior an empirical analysis of commuting behavior indicates that workers commute less if they receive more job offers

testing for prudence and skewness seeking numerous theoretical predictions such as precautionary saving or preventive behavior have been derived for prudent decision makers further prudence can be characterized as downside risk aversion and plays a key role in preference for skewness we use a simple experimental method to test for prudence and skewness preference in the laboratory and compare the two to this end we introduce a novel graphical representation of compound lotteries that is easily accessible to subjects and test it for robustness using a factorial design prudence is observed on the aggregate and individual level we find that prudence does not boil down to skewness seeking we further provide some theoretical explanations for this result this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

commuting migration housing and labour markets complex interactions commuting migration housing and labour markets are important for the overall economy and for the everyday life of many people commuting makes up a large part of all journeys world wide and many resourcedemanding transport investment projects are initiated to cope with this type of travelling in a range of countries increasing flows of national and international migration are central determinants of demographic developments in industrialised countries the working age population or those aspiring to be part of the economically active population constitute a large proportion of the total population consequently income earned through working represents a major component of total earnings in these economies cahuc and zylberberg 2004 in order to obtain an efficient labour market workers should locate and relocate to where the relevant jobs are to be found from an economic point of view commuting and migration are essential elements for obtaining a well functioning labour market fischer et al 1996 lux and sunega 2012 zabel 2012 finally housing is a basic good and for many people rents or loan repayments make up a relatively large proportion of their overall budget oecd 2011 moreover housing represents a dominating element of homeowners wealth or equity due to its central role during the financial and economic crisis starting around 2007 it has become clear that housing prices are important for the development of the overall economy in many countries for example muellbauer and murphy 2008 zabel 2012 housing and labour markets are linked in many ways when explaining these links it is useful to start with some of the distinguished features of housing markets as already mentioned houses frequently constitute a major part of households wealth moreover earned income from employment is a major

higher order risk attitudes demographics and financial decisions we conduct an experiment to study the prevalence of the higher order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance in a large demographically representative sample as well as in a sample of undergraduate students participants make pairwise choices between lotteries of the form proposed by eeckhoudt and schlesinger 2006 the choices in these lotteries isolate prudent from imprudent and temperate from intemperate behavior we relate individuals risk aversion prudence and temperance levels to demographics and financial decisions we observe that the majority of individuals decisions are consistent with risk aversion prudence and temperance in both the student and the demographically representative sample an individual s level of prudence is predictive of his wealth saving and borrowing behavior outside of the experiment while temperance predicts the riskiness of portfolio choices our findings suggest that the coefficient of relative prudence for a representative individual is approximately equal to two

exploring the consistency of higher order risk preferences this study measures higher order risk preferences and their consistency we explore the role of country differences the variation of stakes and the framing of lotteries we observe a robust dichotomous pattern of choice behavior in china in the usa and in germany the majority of choices are consistent with mixed risk aversion or mixed risk loving behavior we also find this pattern after a tenfold increase in the stakes finally our results reveal that this pattern is strengthened if the lotteries are displayed in compound rather than reduced form in a follow up study we explore potential explanations for this framing effect

precautionary bidding in auctions we analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky we show that when the risk in the valuations increases dara bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium ceteris paribus buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price second price and english auctions with affiliated common interdependent values this precautionary bidding effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly we also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make dara bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk neutral or cara bidders would be indifferent thus the potential for a winner s curse can be a blessing for rational dara bidders

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society