trade to aid eu s temporary tariff waivers for flood hit pakistan in this paper we study the effectiveness of the first large scale unilateral trade concessions as foreign aid for disaster relief i e eu tariff waivers on goods heavily exported by pakistan which was severely hit by the 2010 floods using a triple difference approach and a synthetic control approach we find that the tariff waivers substantially increased pakistan s exports to the eu the export hike occurred within a few months after the waivers became effective and did not significantly depress exports by competing countries while the export boost brought greater employment opportunities in the tariff waived industries we find little evidence that the greater labor demands from trade were particularly beneficial to the areas most affected by the floods our findings suggest that trade policy may complement traditional means of foreign aid but trade concessions alone may be inadequate as the areas most affected by natural disasters may be poorly targeted

optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

the labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality abstract unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies this paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality we build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction on the job search and intersectoral flows where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs we calibrate the model for mexico and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs even if they obtain informal jobs can lead to an increase in formality in the economy while also producing small increases in unemployment the exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits we also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market in particular combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality such as lower employment taxes and firing costs can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation

the effect of taxes on labor supply in the underground economy this paper uses micro data from a randomized survey carried out in the metropolitan area of quebec city canada to analyze the decision to evade taxes and work in the underground economy the results indicate that taxes distort labor market activities away from the regular sector to the underground sector but the distortion is small for the average worker the distortion is large however for particular groups of the population such as welfare claimants copyright 1994 by american economic association

lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation we develop a political economic model of foreign aid allocation each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups initial per capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium we also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption aid fatigue and ethnic composition in the donor country on the allocation of aid

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

does conditionality work a test for an innovative us aid scheme performance based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries however hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms we attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the millennium challenge corporation mcc was successful in promoting better control of corruption we employ a difference in difference in differences ddd approach considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized we find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the mcc while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of mcc aid appears to have weakened the incentive to fight corruption over time

a quantitative model of sovereign debt bailouts and conditionality in times of sovereign debt crises international financial institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies this paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy in the model the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long run increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump shaped pattern of sovereign default risk

price setting power vs private information an experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup abstract this paper investigates the extent of the holdup problem in a buyer seller relationship in which the seller has private information about his alternative opportunities theory predicts that compared to a situation in which outside options are publicly observed the seller obtains an informational rent whereas the buyer bears an informational loss as a result the seller is predicted to invest more while the buyer is expected to invest less in contrast to this private information has no impact on the investment levels observed in the experiment but actual investments do increase with the price setting power of the investor these findings are roughly consistent with a model in which agents are inequality averse overall the results question some recent theoretical suggestions that private information rents might substitute for price setting power in mitigating holdup

does aid availability affect effectiveness in reducing poverty a review article this paper addresses the impact of aid supply on aid effectiveness first we review theoretical literature that deals with the problem of governance in donor recipient relationships and are susceptible of highlighting effects of aggregate aid availability second we provide a conceptual framework that explicitly incorporates a trade off between considerations of needs and governance we examine the impact of aid supply on the manner in which a donor agency allocates the available money between countries differing in terms of both needs and domestic governance the central conclusion is that a donor s utility function that embodies the need governance trade off and the associated optimization mechanism yield a meaningful rule to guide inter country allocation of aid resources

human rights treaty ratification of aid receiving countries this paper studies the decision to ratify human rights treaties hrt at the united nations we present new empirical evidence that sheds light on who raties when and why controlling for the quality of domestic human rights institutions high levels of predetermined hrt participation relative to other aid recipients has a signicant positive eect on a country s foreign aid receipts suggesting that aid donors use treaty participation as a criterion to allocate foreign aid surprisingly though we nd that high levels of hrt participation precipitates a decline in the quality of domestic human rights institutions taken together with the result that donors reward treaty participation with foreign aid this suggests that using foreign aid as an incentive for treaty participation has indirect negative consequences for real human rights inconsistent with the traditional view that aid donors have a positive preference for human rights practices in developing countries we show however that the treaty participation of other aid recipients has a strong and positive eect on domestic human rights institutions that more than osets the negative eects

informal work networks we present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers in addition to formal income taxation and enforcement individuals labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good more connected social networks e g wheel complete feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks e g star empty average income may be non monotonic in tax enforcement on presente un modele d allocation du temps entre l offre de travail formel et informel dans le cas ou les travailleurs apprennent l existence de possibilites de travail informel de leurs pairs en plus de dependre de l imposition des revenus formels et de la rigueur de ce processus les decisions des individus dans leur offre de travail dependent du nombre des pairs qui ont du travail informel et de la force des liens sociaux les travailleurs allouent plus de temps aux activites informelles quand l application de la loi fiscale est rel chee et que la transmission de l information a propos du travail informel est bonne des reseaux sociaux mieux connectes e g roue complet se traduisent par un revenu moyen plus bas mais par une utilite moyenne plus elevee que des reseaux sociaux plus pauvrement connectes e g etoile vide le revenu moyen peut avoir un lien non monotone a la nature de l application de la loi fiscale

can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness the role of bureaucratic interest and public pressure can process conditionality enhance poverty reduction in developing countries we address this question in a political economic framework with political distortions on the recipient and the donor side process conditionality is a useful tool only if the international financial institutions hold all necessary information to assess the political situation in recipient countries and to select the true representatives of the poor into a participatory process if they do not hold this information or if bureaucratic interests reduce their incentive to acquire this information process conditionality loses its effectiveness

volunteerism after the tsunami the effects of democratization using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in aceh indonesia for 2005 09 the paper examines the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami volunteer labor is the village public sector labor force for maintenance clean up and renovation of public capital while also examining the effects on volunteerism of village destruction and trauma pre existing social capital diversity and aid delivery the papers focuses on the effects of democratization the tsunami and massive international aid effort prompted the settlement of the insurgency movement in aceh which had led to suspension of local elections over the prior twenty or more years until 2006 village heads who call volunteer days were effectively selected by village elites who may highly value the public facilities maintained by volunteer labor with elections volunteer days fall under the new regime with democratically elected village heads calling fewer volunteer days which may appeal more to the typical villager identification comes from pseudo randomized differential timing of elections

international coordination and the effectiveness of aid this paper discusses and seeks to quantify the effects of improved donor coordination on aid effectiveness empirical estimates are first provided of the reductions in transaction costs that can be achieved by better donor coordination via concentration to fewer partner countries and a shift from project aid to programme based approaches further estimates are presented showing how much could be gained in terms of poverty reduction by optimizing aid allocation across countries the potential gains of a coordinated reallocation would be huge but there are severe political implementation constraints still the overall conclusion of the paper is that there are huge potential gains from donor coordination

natural resources aid and democratization a best case scenario natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power attempts are being made therefore to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization i analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly the best case scenario the models show that even with institutional safeguards these resources diminish chances for democratization in addition to their practical importance the results have an important theoretical implication the political resource curse may not be due to dictators use of these resources but simply to their existence in nondemocracies

aid and domestic resource mobilization with a focus on sub saharan africa increasing tax revenues in low income countries is essential to address future development finance requirements this is particularly important for aid recipients the focus of this paper theory shows that although there are many ways in which aid can have indirect effects on tax revenue the direct effects arise because aid and tax are alternative sources of revenue and political economy factors influence the choices made by government aid may discourage tax effort if viewed as a politically less costly source of revenue under different conditions the policies and reforms associated with aid may increase revenue through promoting growth encouraging more efficient tax structures or supporting reforms to tax administration while cross country evidence reveals no systematic pattern country studies show that aid can be associated with administrative and efficiency reforms to increase tax revenue the conclusion discusses how aid and donors can promote increasing domestic tax revenue

job search and mobility in developing countries theory and policy implications abstract a labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive we show that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium in this dual economy we then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms profits we find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages we also find that an employment wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications in particular the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it

unemployment and international shadow economy gender differences abstractadding to the body of research on cross country determinants of the informal economy this article studies how unemployment differences across gender drive the propensities to work in the informal sector results accounting for possible simultaneity between unemployment and the shadow economy show that unemployed males rather than unemployed females were more likely to operate underground these findings about greater male propensities are generally robust to alternative considerations

corrupt governments do not receive more state to state aid governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non state actors abstract a core result of the aid allocation literature is that the quality of governance in recipient countries does not affect the amounts of foreign aid received donor countries may still give aid to poorly governed countries because of a dilemma they face those countries most in need typically also lack proper institutions this paper argues that donors try to resolve this dilemma by delivering aid through non state actors using aid shares as well as absolute amounts of aid allocated through state and non state channels and considering different dimensions of governance we provide evidence that bypassing governments via ngos and multilateral organizations is indeed a response to weak recipient state institutions the effect is stronger in aid sectors where donors can more easily switch between channels and weaker for higher levels of economic self interest among donors

the hard challenge of aid coordination aid coordination is a constant theme of discussion among national and international aid agencies in their search for more effectiveness and efficiency in delivering development assistance this paper seeks to clarify some of the arguments currently made in support of aid coordination and to precise unavoidable trade offs born of the existence of political costs it is anchored in the available literature on aid delivery while focusing on the implementation problems of aid coordination among donor countries in particular it deals with a the issue of consistently and collectively handling possible governance failures in recipient countries and b the impact of heterogeneity of donor countries on the effectiveness of aid coordination

tax evasion and labor markets abstract concern with revenue losses inequities and inefficiency that may result from tax evasion has produced a number of formal analyses of taxpayer dishonesty most of this work has concentrated on the behavior of individual evaders and has ignored the interaction between evasion and labor market equilibrium to remedy this our analysis uses a model with two labor markets which differ in the potential for evasion to examine how changes in various tax parameters affect evasion and labor market equilibrium we also simulate the effect of switching from a proportional to a progressive tax system in order to evaluate the well known claim that progressivity encourages evasion

approaches for estimating noncompliance examples from federal taxation in the united states crime and underground economic activity are a fact of life around the world most societies attempt to control these activities through the expenditure of resources on monitoring prosecution punishment and educational programmes gathering statistics about who is engaging in illegal or underground activity the frequencies with which various crimes or underground transactions are occurring and the severity or magnitude of these acts is crucial for making good decisions regarding our allocation of resources in this area unfortunately in general it is very difficult to obtain accurate information about these issues this is partly because the individuals engaged in such activities wish not to be identified and often take actions to avoid detection and partly because by their very nature the activities tend not to generate economic accounting legal demographic or other cultural records the fact that it is difficult to obtain accurate information about the activities however does not in any way imply that we should not make a concerted effort to try to obtain the best information we can i believe the cost associated with attempting to determine the extent and nature of these activities is in most circumstances well below the expected benefit which includes the likelihood of improved decisionmaking by relevant government personnel and the general public as a result i also believe the debate about developing estimates of illegal or underground economic activity should primarily focus on practical issues related to how best to go about developing estimates that are as reliable as possible in this short article i shall discuss the measurement of noncompliance with laws and regulations my particular area of expertise and shall not discuss the measurement of other kinds of hidden economic behaviours such as informal contracting unmeasured home production and grey market activities in particular i shall discuss three approaches for estimating the aggregate amount of noncompliance with respect to a specific law or regulation i intensive data collection for a focused subsample of the population ii detection controlled estimation and iii the comparision of estimates generated by distinct datasets and models for each i shall describe in general terms what the approach is and how it is implemented review limitations of the approach and present an example of the application of the approach to the measurement of tax noncompliance in the united states my discussion shall necessarily be short and i refer the interested reader to a variety of original research publications for more details especially about the specific examples

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

optimal policies with an informal sector abstract this paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers in equilibrium domestic workers may work exclusively in the formal sector or also in the informal sector surprisingly in equilibrium wages are always equalized between domestic and undocumented workers even if they do not work in the same sectors of the economy this is driven by the interaction of firm level decisions with optimal government policy we also find that enforcement may not always be decreasing in its cost and that governments will optimally enforce labour market segmentation if enforcement costs are not too high

is local beautiful fiscal decentralization in mexico summary in this study we present evidence from mexico regarding the weak effectiveness of federal transfers and low absorption capacity of sub national governments in poor areas when political opportunistic behavior is present we show that the distribution of conditional transfers is discretionary due to a monitoring problem and deficiency in institutional frameworks this may be the cause for opportunistic behavior by political elites the results suggest that more funds are distributed to areas with more voters in addition localities with a higher number of swing voters also receive more resources these results show that the poorest populations receive the least amount of money from the community based development funds

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

fragile states and development policy it is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under development in many parts of the world such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace as of yet mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance this paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states

counterpart funding requirements and the foreign aid procyclicality puzzle official development assistance is a key source of external finance in many developing countries a striking feature of these aid flows is their positive correlation with business cycles in recipient countries this pattern is puzzling in that it reinforces recipients already strong and costly macroeconomic fluctuations we propose a simple model of investment financing and aid provision under asymmetric information that rationalizes such a pattern we assume that donor agencies and recipient governments value projects differently and that donors know less than recipients do about project characteristics we show that donors can make a recipient government identify high return projects by requiring that the latter contribute some of its own funds to projects providing these matching grants or counterpart funds is less affordable for recipients during economic downturns which leads to aid procyclicality our model produces aid contracts consistent with those used by aid agencies rationalizes observed aid patterns and yields a rich set of testable empirical predictions

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

can the west save africa in the new millennium the western aid effort toward africa has surged due to writ ings by well known economists a celebrity mass advocacy campaign and decisions by western leaders to make africa a major foreign policy priority this survey contrasts the predominant transformational approach west comprehensively saves africa to occasional swings to a marginal approach west takes one small step at a time to help individual africans evaluation of one step at a time initiatives is generally easier than that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments although these have been oversold or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions we see two themes emerge from the literature survey 1 escalation as each successive western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results as judged at least by stylized facts since again the econometrics are shaky the response has been to try an even more ambitious effort and 2 the cycle of ideas rather than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas we see a cycle in aid ideas in many areas in africa with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience both escalation and cyclicality of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the transfor mational approach in contrast the marginal approach has had some successes in improving the well being of individual africans such as the dramatic fall in mortality

the underground economy in spain an alternative to unemployment this paper analyses the factors which determine whether an individual works in the formal sector in the informal sector or remains unemployed in the spanish labour market we highlight the implications of high unemployment on an individual s decision to work in the underground economy we postulate that an individual decides or is chosen whether to work in the formal sector or not in a first stage and if not in a second stage decides whether to work in the underground sector or to remain unemployed we estimate a bivariate probit model which controls for selectivity bias in the second stage the result indicates on the one hand that heads of household who benefit more from social security provisions obtained in formal sector jobs are more likely to work in such sector than others besides demand restrictions seem to operate as well individuals with higher education have easier access to the formal sector on the other hand among those who do not work in the formal sector the probability of wor

tax evasion and the size of the underground economy abstract the theoretical literature on the relationship between the tax system and the underground economy is extended using a model similar to the one examined by watson journal of public economics 1985 27 231 246 in which tax evasion is possible in one sector of the economy but is impossible in the other we prove that a rise in the tax rate increases decreases the number of agents in the sector in which tax evasion is possible if preferences exhibit increasing decreasing relative risk aversion we also use our model to investigate the relationship between the tax rate and the total amount of tax evaded

the optimal size of a tax collection agency the condition that characterizes the optimal size of a tax collection agency is derived and then given a simple interpretation in terms of excess burden the paper clarifies an earlier finding of sandmo which suggests that the optimal degree of enforcement is higher than a simple cost benefit calculation would indicate the appropriate condition is that at the margin the resource cost of increasing enforcement should equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in exposure to risk the increased revenue gained from stricter enforcement does not enter the expression because it merely represents a transfer among the economy s identical agents

estimating the size of the danish shadow economy using the currency demand approach an attempt the currency demand approach provides some insight into the size and development of the shadow economy in denmark currency demand is statistically affected by tax rates the difference in currency demand is calculated by comparing the actual tax burden over time to the lowest tax burden in the period 1952 82 the shadow economy grew steadily to 10 per cent of gnp in 1977 and then fluctuated between 7 10 per cent of gnp for the period 1978 82 the calculated size fits nicely with the results obtained using the same

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

wages and informality in developing countries we develop an equilibrium wage posting model with heterogeneous firms that decide to locate in the formal or the informal sector and workers who search randomly on and off the job we estimate the model on brazilian labor force survey data in equilibrium firms of equal productivity locate in different sectors a fact observed in the data wages are characterized by compensating differentials we show that tightening enforcement does not increase unemployment and increases wages total output and welfare by enabling better allocation of workers to higher productivity jobs and improving competition in the formal labor market jel e26 j24 j31 j46 o15 o17

income tax evasion an intersectoral analysis abstract this paper develops an intersectoral model of income tax evasion with general equilibrium effects key elements of the model are imperfectly substitutable outputs from the compliant and evading sectors and workers with heterogeneous evasion costs the model allows for biased public expenditures a wide range of behavioural responses and both legitimate and criminal activities evading tax as well as tax avoidance activities qualitative and quantitative assessments are undertaken for the effects of tax rate changes on evasion activity relative output prices and real tax revenues this approach offers useful findings for taxation policy and is amenable to further analytical extensions

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

investments as signals of outside options consider a seller who can make an observable but non contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer s needs the buyer then makes a take it or leave it offer to the seller the seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own compared to a situation with complete information additional investment incentives are generated by the seller s desire to pretend a strong outside option on the other hand ex post efficiency is not attained whenever the buyer mistakenly tries to call the seller s bluff with a low offer

labor market institutions taxation and the underground economy abstract the paper aims at qualifying the links between labor market institutions taxation tax monitoring and underground economic activity the proposed model is a continuous time matching model with one commodity roduced either overground or underground underground economic activity arises because of partial compliance with regulations and tax contributions imposed by the government vacancies and workers search are directed at a specific labor market workers are heterogenous in the subjective cost they face when operating in the irregular sector analytical and numerical investigations suggest that interactions between regular and irregular activities can affect standard results of policy interventions in that respect the paper supports the view that policies aiming at increasing individuals benefits of participating in the regular sector are more desirable than a deterrence policy

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

uses and abuses of estimates of the underground economy ered valuable by at least a part of society narcotics production and distribution prostitution gambling these activities can be large in some countries and should be counted in the national accounts of all countries although they rarely are their omission affects the comparability of data across countries the incomes generated by illegal activities are rarely taxed many other activities such as those associated with the subsistence or informal sectors are estimated rather than measured and are generally not taxed because of the low value they generate to those who engage in them in conclusion there are many reasons beside the ones discussed in this paper why the measurements of national output may not be complete about two decades ago a few economists became convinced that many normal economic activities that should be measured and taxed were taking place underground or in the shadow thus presumably escaping the attention of the statistical offices of the tax authorities and more generally of the government regulators some of these economists also claimed that like alice in wonderland these hidden activities were growing in a ridiculous fashion see gutmann 1977 and feige 1979 by the late 1970s the role of government had grown enormously so that the level of taxation and the tax rates had risen sharply and regulations had proliferated in many countries see tanzi and schuknecht 1997 these developments had created strong incentives for individuals and enterprises to go underground to avoid taxes and regulatory restrictions thus a good case could be made that what came to be called the underground economy was a phenomenon to worry about newspaper articles were ready to accept the

donor competition for aid impact and aid fragmentation we show that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique nash equilibrium this aid fragmentation result is robust to the introduction of fixed costs even if they are improbably large in equilibrium smaller donors have less fragmented aid and behave better from an efficiency viewpoint we present evidence that our theoretical results are in line with cross country correlations our analysis has important policy implications first short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable second since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness they may well backfire as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation

company interests and foreign aid policy playing donors off against one another abstract the evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works and sometimes does not work we suggest that third parties to the donor recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement the halt in aid that should follow non compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement we use a multi agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties like companies and others influence the disbursement decision failing to take account of third parties role yields the opposite result conditionality becomes successful

the roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror this paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries as does the recipient country s level of education due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results they suggest that western democracies which are the main targets of terrorist attacks should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

organization of disaster aid delivery spending your donations abstractthis article examines how different organizational structures in disaster aid delivery affect house aid quality we analyze three waves of survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in aceh indonesia following the 2004 tsunami we categorize four organizational structures based on whether and to whom donors contract aid implementation compared to bilateral contracting between donors and implementers donors that vertically integrate and do their own implementation offer the highest quality housing as rated by village heads and have fewer counts of faults such as leaky roofs and cracked walls as reported by fishermen however they shade in quality as they lose dominance as the leading aid agency in a village domestic implementers and the government agency that was responsible for significant portions of aid delivery provide significantly lower quality aid we also examine how the imposition of shared ownership the primary social agenda for boat aid agencies affects boat aid quality we

on the asymmetric relationship between the size of the underground economy and the change in effective tax rate in taiwan abstract this paper examines the asymmetric response of the underground economy ue in taiwan to an effective tax rate change the ue size in taiwan from 1962 to 2003 is estimated using a cash deposit ratio cdr approach and a currency demand approach the impact of an increase in the effective tax rate on ue is greater than that of a decrease in addition the impact on the ue is stronger for direct than for indirect taxes the difference between upward and downward movements is significant for both indirect and direct taxes in the cdr approach however the difference is only significant for indirect taxes in the currency demand approach

the political economy of conditionality an empirical analysis of world bank loan disbursements abstract traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies notably the world bank often fail to enforce conditions this pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality weakening incentives to implement policy reforms the standard critique attributes this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend defensive lending or short sighted altruism pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement this paper presents an empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality in international organizations using the case of the world bank and the united states the analysis examines panel data on world bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005 using un voting as an indicator of alignment with the u s the paper presents evidence that world bank structural adjustment loan disbursements are less dependent on macroeconomic performance in countries aligned with the united states

investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information this article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information bayesian environment an agent faces a hold up situation while making a cost reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal to prevent the hold up the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract the informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment for a large class of cost functions the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a power distribution

the boundaries of the firm revisited why do firms exist what is their function and what determines their scope these remain the central questions in the economics of organization they are also central questions for business executives and corporate strategists the worldwide volume of corporate mergers and acquisitions exceeded 1 6 trillion in 1997 it is hard to imagine that so much time effort and investment bankers fees would be spent on adjusting firm boundaries unless there was some underlying economic gain indeed the exceptional levels of merger and acquisition activity over the past two decades are a strong indication that economically significant forces do determine organizational boundaries the study of firm boundaries originated with the famous essay by coase 1937 who raised the question of why we observe so much economic activity inside formal organizations if as economists commonly argue markets are such powerful and effective mechanisms for allocating scarce resources coase s answer was in terms of the costs of transacting in a world of imperfect information when the transaction costs of market exchange are high it may be less costly to coordinate production through a formal organization than through a market in large part thanks to the work of williamson 1975 1985 recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in coase s fundamental insight that firm boundaries can be explained by efficiency considerations our understanding of firm boundaries has been sharpened by identifying more precisely the nature and sources of transaction costs in different circumstances in the process the focus of

does the samaritan s dilemma matter evidence from u s agriculture the samaritan s dilemma posits a downside to charity recipients may rely on free aid instead of their own efforts anecdotally the expectation of free assistance is thought to be important for decisions about insurance and risky behavior in numerous settings but reliable empirical evidence is scarce we estimate whether the samaritan s dilemma exists in u s agriculture where both private crop insurance and frequent federal disaster assistance are present we find that bailout expectations are qualitatively and quantitatively important for the insurance decision furthermore aid expectations reduce both expenditure on farm inputs and subsequent crop revenue jel d72 h84 q18

aid effectiveness opening the black box this paper examines the causality chain linking aid flows to development outcomes it argues that many of the questions policymakers and economists would like data to answer simply cannot be answered due to the complexity and noise along links in the chain and the problem of attribution it then examines what is known about aid effectiveness along different links in the causality chain finally it turns to recent trends in the way aid is delivered and the new model that appears to be emerging

the formal sector wage premium and firm size abstract we show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to be caught defaulting on labor taxes then large high wage firms will be in the formal and small low wage firms will be in the informal sector the formal sector wage premium is thus just a firm size wage differential using data from ecuador we illustrate that firm size is indeed the key variable determining whether a formal sector premium exists

on the delegation of aid implementation to multilateral agencies some multilateral agencies implement aid projects in a broad range of sectors with aid disbursements showing a strong overlap with those of bilateral donors the question then arises of why do bilateral donors delegate sizable shares of their aid to non specialized agencies for implementation this paper develops a game theoretic model to explain this puzzle donors delegate aid implementation to the multilateral agency ml to strengthen the policy selectivity of aid incentivizing policy improvements in recipient countries in turn improving aid s development effectiveness bilateral donors are better off delegating aid to ml even when they are purely altruistic but disagree on how aid should be distributed across recipients key for our result to hold is that ml searches some middle ground among disagreeing donors aid selectivity in terms of both policy and poverty emerges endogenously and is credible as it is the solution to ml s optimization problem moreover the model shows that if one sufficiently large donor is policy selective in its aid allocations there is no need for other donors to be policy selective the world bank s aid program for lower income countries the international development association ida is shown to fit the assumptions and predictions of the model specifically ida is a dominant donor in most of its recipient countries and is much more policy and poverty selective than bilateral aid donors view it as a public good and contribution more to it when bilateral aid is less selective potential threats to ida s role as a dominant policy selective donor include the emergence of nontraditional donors changes in voting shares and traditional donors increasing use of earmarked contributions

the effects of labour market policies in an economy with an informal sector in this article we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector our model extends mortensen and pissarides 1994 by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal sector productivity we use the model to analyse the effects of labour market policy on informal sector and formal sector output on the division of the workforce into unemployment informal sector employment and formal sector employment and on wages finally we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy specifically we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal sector matches in this article we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the effects of labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector what we mean by an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly affected by labour market policies such as severance or payroll taxes we find that labour market policies that apply only to the formal sector nonetheless affect the size and the composition of employment in the informal sector this is important since there is substantial economic activity in the informal sector in many economies particularly in developing countries estimates for some latin american countries put the informal sector at more than 50 of the urban work force 1 the informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some developed economies 2 although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a segmented labour market framework this interpretation is not consistent with recent empirical evidence from latin america under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the secondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal sector jobs maloney 2004 presents evidence for several latin american countries that challenges this view and instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector similarly using data from the argentinian household survey pratap and quintin 2006 reject the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater buenos aires area concluding that there is no evidence of a formal sector wage premium after controlling for individual and establishment we thank mauricio santamaria for stimulating conversations that inspired our interest in this topic we also thank bob hussey and fabien postel vinay as well as our editor steve pischke and two anonymous

regulation of entry labor market institutions and the informal sector abstract this paper develops a two sector matching model that incorporates the main features of latin american labor markets it has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries the model is numerically solved using brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed reducing formal sector s entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare thus the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal

minimum wage and tax evasion theory and evidence the paper investigates the role of the minimum wage in a competitive economy in which there is underreporting of earnings by employed labour the minimum wage induces higher compliance by some lowproductivity workers and transforms a nominally neutral scal system into a regressive one a spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage level appears and a positive correlation between the size of the spike and the size of the informal economy is predicted and documented using cross country data for europe a further result is that employees whose o cially declared earnings appear to be boosted by a minimum wage hike actually experience a decline in their true income this prediction nds support in an empirical test using the massive increase in the minimum wage that took place in hungary in 2001 as a quasi natural experiment

aid investment and incentives promoting productive investment and economic growth are among the key objectives of most aid organizations operating in poor countries however it is not possible to conclude from existing empirical evidence that aid contributes positively to growth in this paper it is shown that those rather negative results may be explained by important incentive problems built into the aid system itself the recipient countries own efforts to contribute to investment and growth may in reality be undermined and the result may be aid dependency

aid dutch disease and manufacturing growth abstract we examine the effects of aid on the growth of manufacturing using a methodology that exploits the variation within countries and across manufacturing sectors and corrects for possible reverse causality we find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country s competitiveness as reflected in the lower relative growth rate of exportable industries we provide some evidence suggesting that the channel for these effects is the real exchange rate appreciation caused by aid inflows we conjecture that this may explain in part why it is hard to find robust evidence that foreign aid helps countries grow

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

gradualism in aid and reforms abstract dynamic strategic interaction between an international donor and a recipient government is analyzed to review the efficacy of aid conditionality for governance reforms in ldcs it is shown that irrespective of whether the donor can fully commit to the aid program or not for maximal improvement in governance the aid should be disbursed in increments with each subsequent tranche being conditional on prior reforms demonstrating aid gradualism while the attraction of future aid incentivizes authorities to push through reforms these reforms in turn also make aid diversion less feasible further under full commitment the optimal aid package may involve offering scope for interim aid diversion to the elite for long term improvement in governance with such aid diversion being more likely to happen when the total aid budget is large with only partial commitment so that time consistency requires the donor to reconfigure aid in each round it is shown that a interim aid diversion is no longer viable and b both aid and reforms exhibit strong gradualism or what is known as the starting small and grow later principle in commitment models

what explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments such as roads and dams to promoting policy reform this change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment after nearly 20 years experience with policy based or conditional lending there have now been many studies of adjustment lending most of which take a case study approach many conclude that policy based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform the authors examine a database of 220 world bank supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail they find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time variables under the world bank s control resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions have no relationship with an adjustment program s success or failure what development agencies must do then is select promising candidates for adjustment support when the candidates is a poor selection devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform to improve its success rate with adjustment lending the world bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not that is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers to become more effective at supporting policy reform the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending

informality in the process of development and growth informality is a term used to describe the collection of firms workers and activities that operate outside the legal and regulatory systems it is widespread in the majority of developing countries in a typical developing economy the informal sector produces about 35 per cent of gdp and employs 70 per cent of the labour force this paper studies informality in the context of economic development by presenting a model and projections that link informality regulations migration and economic growth this analytical framework highlights the trade offs between formality and informality the relationship between the different types of informality and the connection between them and the forces of labour capital and productivity growth the paper models the behaviour of the informal sector based on the following fundamental asymmetry formal firms confront higher labour costs while informal firms face higher capital costs and lower productivity using mandated minimum wages as the policy induced distortion the model first studies the static allocation of formal and informal capital and labour in a modern economy second it opens the possibility of labour migration from a rudimentary economy with ample supply of labour e g rural areas or less advanced neighbouring countries third the model analyses the dynamic behaviour of the formal and informal sectors considering how they affect and are affected by economic growth and labour migration then the paper presents projections for the size of labour informality in the modern and rudimentary economies in the next two decades for a large group of countries representing all regions of the world the projections are based on the calibration and simulation of the model and serve to discuss its usefulness and limitations

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

clientelism and aid abstract using a model of probabilistic voting we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region we consider politicians with mixed motives they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office we label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power we find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption when elasticity is low the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set this substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy perhaps more surprising is the opposite case which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare maximizing policy set

informality in developing economies regulation and fiscal policies abstract this paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections they have monopoly power in the goods market they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers through either individual or collective bargaining our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis in this framework we study the impact on informality wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality we consider changes in product market regulation pmr and in two types of fiscal policies labor taxes and formality enforcement we find that lessening pmr decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment the tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used though moreover the impacts of pmr on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining with respect to wage inequality lessening pmr reduces it while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium

aid and growth what does the cross country evidence really show abstract we examine the effects of aid on growth in cross sectional and panel data after correcting for the possible bias that poorer or stronger growth may draw aid contributions to recipient co

unconditional aid and green growth abstract environmentally motivated aid can help developing countries to achieve economic growth while mitigating the impact on emission levels we argue that the usual practice of giving aid conditionally is not effective and we therefore study aid that is given unconditionally our framework is a differential open loop stackelberg game between a fully developed leader country and a developing follower country the leader chooses the amount of mitigation aid given to the follower which the follower either consumes or invests in either costly non polluting capital or cheap high emission capital we show that giving aid conditionally is only rarely effective and if so is based on a forced intertemporal savings effect in all other cases it is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst moreover we find that the leader gives unconditional mitigation aid only when sufficiently rich or when caring sufficiently about environmental quality if unconditional aid is given in steady state it decreases the steady state level of high emission capital and capital investments in the recipient country as well as the global pollution stock but it has no effect on the levels of non polluting capital and non polluting investments transitional aid accelerates the economic growth of the follower moreover we find that the increase in growth takes place in the non polluting sector

tax evasion and occupational choice this paper is concerned with the combined effect of tax compliance and tax audit policy on the occupational choice of individuals and on public policy objectives such as tax revenue total production and social welfare individuals are assumed to have a choice between riskless work and a risky entrepreneurial occupation they are only differentiated according to their attitudes towards risk more risk averse individuals go into the safe occupation and less risk averse people become entrepreneurs tax evasion is only accessible to the latter and therefore its control tends to discourage risk taking whether control of tax evasion is desirable for the economy as a whole depends on the objective function of the government it is shown that tax audit policy has conflicting effects on tax revenue per capita income and social welfare these conflicts are illustrated through a numerical example in this paper the emphasis is placed on the clarity and the simplicity of the presentation so as to argue that even though the tax schedule can hardly be differentiated across individuals tax evasion and its control can be used by policymakers to introduce variability in the individual s tax treatment

competition for environmental aid and aid fungibility abstract aid from environmentally conscious donors to developing recipients has long been thought of as a very promising way of preserving the global environment however aid is fungible and recipients cannot commit to using it for the purpose it was intended we analyze competition for aid games with aid fungibility and cross border pollution to gain insights on how to allocate environmental aid more efficiently we set up a two stage game of two recipients receiving aid from a donor interested in minimizing pollution recipients cannot commit on the use of aid but they can commit on the infrastructure necessary to use aid for pollution abatement we find that the success of competition for aid games depends critically on the degree of cross border pollution this determines whether it is more efficient to set up such games between recipients with little or a lot of cross border pollution between them

conditionalities and the performance of european structural funds a principal agent analysis of control mechanisms in eu cohesion policy bachtler j and ferry m conditionalities and the performance of european structural funds a principal agent analysis of control mechanisms in european union cohesion policy regional studies in the context of debates on the performance of european union cohesion policy this paper considers how the european union has used control mechanisms to influence the use of structural funds by member states using the principal agent model this paper examines empirically three case studies of conditionalities applied to the absorption of funding decommitment rule outcomes of interventions performance reserve and targeting of expenditure earmarking in european union programmes over the 2000 2013 period the findings reveal different levels of effectiveness of the three conditionalities attributable to the differential scope for trade offs during the regulatory negotiations external pressure and principal self interest the paper discusses an effectiveness threshold for introducing controls the tensions