investment and coordination in oligopolistic industries we examine investment by firms in 24 chemical product industries to determine whether firms invest preemptively to achieve persistent increases in market share or whether there is evidence of behavior to maintain market share the data indicate that investment reduces the probability that rival firms will expand capacity but the effect is temporary large firms tend to maintain market share while smaller firms tend to invest simultaneously with rivals the role of preemptive investment is limited to that of permitting a firm to invest with a lower probability of redundant investment by rivals preemption does not allow a persistent increase in market share but instead acts as a means by which firms may coordinate capacity investment to help avoid episodes of industry overcapacity

information spillovers gains from trade and interventions in frozen markets we study government interventions in markets suffering from adverse selection importantly asymmetric information prevents both the realization of gains from trade and the production of information that is valuable to other market participants we find a fundamental tension in maximizing welfare while some intervention is required to restore trading too much intervention depletes trade of its informational content we characterize the optimal policy that balances these two considerations and explore how it depends on features of the environment our model can be used to study a program introduced in 2009 to restore information production in the market for legacy assets

decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem in markets with adverse selection only low quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low we show that under decentralized trade however both high and low quality units trade although with delay moreover when frictions are small the surplus realized is greater than the static competitive surplus thus decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem remarkably payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish even though both high and low quality units continue to trade and there is trade at several prices markets differ in the degree to which trade is centralized call markets used to set opening prices on the nyse are highly centralized and all trade takes place at a single price the market clearing price in contrast in housing labor or used car markets trade is highly decentralized and prices are determined by bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers and may differ between trades the competitive model abstracts away from these institutional aspects thus providing a model suitable in principle for the study of both centralized and decentralized markets our results suggest that decentralized markets with adverse selection may perform better than anticipated by the static competitive model and therefore that these institutional features cannot be ignored it is known that in markets for homogenous goods decentralized trade tends to yield competitive outcomes when trading frictions are small because competitive equilibrium is efficient in these markets this implies that decentralized trade generates nearly efficient outcomes in markets with adverse selection however competitive equilibria ce need not be efficient which raises the possibility that alternative market structures perform better in this article we study a version of akerlof s 1970 market for lemons in which trade is decentralized each period an equal measure of buyers and sellers enters the market every seller is endowed with a unit of either high or low quality at each period every agent in the market has a positive probability of meeting an agent of the opposite type once matched a buyer without observing the quality of the seller s unit makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller accepts then they trade at the offered price and both agents exit the market if the seller rejects the offer then both agents remain in the market at the next period discounting of future gains and the possible delay in matching with a trading partner constitute trading frictions when the average quality of the good held by entering sellers is low the market has a unique competitive equilibrium ce in which the price equals the buyers value of a low quality unit

does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

efficiency in decentralised markets with aggregate uncertainty we study efficiency in decentralized markets with aggregate uncertainty and one sided private information there is a continuum of mass one of uninformed buyers and a continuum of mass one of informed sellers buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time and buyers make the offers we show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish

a bayesian model of voting in juries abstract we model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule we offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent regardless of the size of the jury and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed we prove a jury theorem for our general model as the size of the jury increases the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule for unanimity rule the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency a property that could emerge only in a continuous model journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

large versus small players a closer look at the dynamics of speculative attacks what is the role of large players e g hedge funds in speculative attacks recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack however many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest rate differentials we propose a model in which large players can do both using data on currency trading by foreign large and local small players we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the norwegian krone during the 1990s during the attack on the swedish krona after the russian moratorium in 1998 foreign players moved early gains by delaying attack were small however because interest rates did not increase

speculative attacks a laboratory study in continuous time abstract we examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous time size asymmetries and varying amounts of public information attacks succeeded in 233 of 344 possible cases when speculators have symmetric size and access to information a weaker fundamentals increase the likelihood of successful speculative attacks and hasten their onset and b contrary to some theory success is enhanced by public access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals the presence of a larger speculator further enhances success and experience with large speculators increases small speculators response to the public information however giving the large speculator increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials abstract saloner 1987 analyzes a cournot model with two production periods before the market clears if costs do not vary across periods any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between the firms stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne saloner s analysis is generalized by allowing for cost differences across periods the continuum of equilibria vanishes for any cost differential if costs fall slightly over time there are multiple leader follower equilibria otherwise the model generates a unique spne where both firms produce their single period cournot outputs in the period when production is cheaper

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

investment and competition this paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable consistent with these theories we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries however we find that investment q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting indeed oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries

dynamic signaling and market breakdown we consider the effects a public revelation of information e g rating grade has on trading in a dynamic signaling model competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration the external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium more interestingly we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices if signals are noisy no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information if signals are fully revealing then trade occurs even close to revelation however transaction prices are discontinuous

excess capacity as a barrier to entry an empirical appraisal this paper examines excess capacity barriers to entry and investment dynamics in a sample of thirty eight chemical product industries logit and log linear models of investment behavior are estimated and specific case examples are considered the results show that incumbents rarely built excess capacity pre emptively in an effort to deter entry in general entrants and incumbents exhibited similar investment behavior

matching markets with adverse selection abstract this paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of rothschild and stiglitz quart j econ 90 1976 629 the major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open ended and constantly refilled by new participants e g by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market the major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts as frictions become small we show that the least cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome regardless of the distribution of types among entrants moreover we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique

signaling and indirect taxation commodities communicate we investigate optimal indirect taxation when both the intrinsic qualities of goods and signaling motivate consumption choices optimal indirect taxes are introduced into a monotonic signaling game we provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the d1 sequential equilibrium strategies in the case of pure costly signaling signaling goods can in equilibrium be taxed without burden when commodities serve both intrinsic consumption and signaling optimal taxes are characterized by a ramsey rule which deals with distortions resulting from signaling

the home selling problem theory and evidence this paper formulates and solves the problem of a homeowner who wants to sell their house for the maximum possible price net of transactions costs including real estate commissions the optimal selling strategy consists of an initial list price with subs equent weekly decisions on how much to adjust the list price until the home is sold or withdrawn from the market the solution also yields a sequence of reservation prices that determine whether the homeowner should accept bids from potential buyers who arrive stochastically over time with an expected arrival rate that is a decreasing function of the list price this model was developed to provide a theoretical explanation for list price dynamics and bargaining behavior observed for a sample of homeowners in england in a new data set introduced by

incentive compatibility and differentiability new results and classic applications this note provides several generalizations of mailath s 1987 result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability the new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as leland and pyle 1977 glosten 1989 and demarzo and duffie 1999 that were not previously covered

existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring abstract we consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition of nash equilibria of the stage game surprisingly the conditions are consistent with uniqueness of the stage game equilibrium a class of repeated chicken is shown to satisfy the condition

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

mutually exclusive investment with technical uncertainty a firm which faces technical uncertainty as in pindyck 1993 can choose between two mutually exclusive investment projects projects 1 and 2 the added option to exercise project 2 makes the firm less likely to exercise project 1 an increase in the degree of technical uncertainty the investment rate or the investment value upon completion for project 2 encourages the firm to exercise project 2 by increasing the trigger level of the expected cost of project 2 this however ambiguously affects the firm s incentive to exercise project 1 as the firm would rather implement project 1 2 in a region where the expected cost of project 2 is relatively high low

information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values we study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values a trade of one asset or lack thereof can provide information about the value of other assets the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium we show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is suciently high the

intertemporal price discrimination dynamic arrivals and changing values we study the profit maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically the setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon contrary to the case with constant values optimal prices fluctuate with time we argue that consumers randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice

big elephants in small ponds do large traders make financial markets more aggressive abstract market participants often suspect that large traders have a disproportionate effect on financial markets increasing the aggressiveness of market responses prior studies have shown that the impact of a large trader on a currency crisis depends positively on his size and informational position by contrast this article highlights the role that market sentiment has on the impact of a large trader if the market believes that fundamentals are weak then the probability of a crisis depends positively on the trader s size but negatively on the precision of his information with these effects reversed in a generally optimistic market a large player therefore need not make market responses more aggressive

education signalling with preemptive offers offers before workers complete their education workers cannot commit to turning down such offers offers are private so that workers are unable to use one firm s offer in an attempt to elicit better offers from other firms in the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of the model with unproductive education there is no wasteful education when education is productive the standard model predicts that more able individuals become overeducated to separate themselves from less able workers in our model less able workers become overeducated to partially pool with more able workers the pooling mutes the incentives of high ability workers who in consequence actually choose to become undereducated we examine the robustness of our result to modifications to the basic model

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

the role of commitment in bilateral trade abstract this paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers as discounting vanishes the seller of a good is informed of its quality which affects both his cost and the buyer s valuation but the buyer is not to characterize this payoff set we derive an upper bound using mechanism design with limited commitment we then prove that this upper bound is tight by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment in bargaining in particular they imply that the buyer s inability to commit before observing the terms of trade is what precludes efficiency

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

incentive schemes as a signaling device abstract this paper considers a model of moral hazard where the principal has private information for instance in an organizational setting the firm may be better informed about the profitability of a sales area for which it seeks to employ a new sales representative we show how this information asymmetry may lead to a game of signaling which can mute incentives

search adverse selection and market clearing we examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing a seller who has private information about product quality and a buyer are matched to bargain over price they form a long term relationship if they reach agreement they return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved the market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold

experimental analysis on the role of a large speculator in currency crises abstract corsetti et al 2004 demonstrate that the presence of a large speculator in the foreign exchange market makes the remaining traders more aggressive in their speculative attacks we conduct an experiment designed to test their theoretical predictions and also use the experiment to analyze an additional aspect that has not been previously covered in the literature namely whether the entry of a large speculator and the exit of the same speculator have the same effect in magnitude on the probability of a successful speculative attack we obtain two main findings first the results support the main conclusion of corsetti et al 2004 that the presence of a large speculator makes other small speculators more aggressive second the results suggest that the effect of the entry of a large speculator on the probability of successful speculative attacks is larger than that of the exit of the same speculator

bidder solicitation adverse selection and the failure of competition we study a common value first price auction in which the number of bidders is endogenous the seller auctioneer knows the value and solicits bidders at a cost the number of bidders which is unobservable may thus depend on the true value therefore being solicited conveys information this solicitation effect may soften competition and impede information aggregation under certain conditions there is an equilibrium in which the seller solicits many bidders yet the resulting price is not competitive and fails to aggregate any information more broadly these ideas are relevant for markets with adverse selection in which informed traders initiate contacts

capital structure with countervailing incentives the regulatedjirm s choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives the jirm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases when the jim s investment is large countervailing incentives lead both high and low cost jims to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium thus decoupling capital structure from private information when investment is small or medium sized the model may admit separating equilibria in which high cost jirrns issue greater equity and low cost jims rely more on debt jinancing

the impact of lead time on capital investments abstract we study equilibrium investment strategies of firms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures investment with significant lead time or time to build and investment without or minor lead time we investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time to build versus when it is not we characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum we offer some new results the model predicts that controlling for demand and production and investment costs investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries which often exhibit time to build than in fast paced industries where time to build is insignificant furthermore for both investment types investment with or without time to build we offer a novel equilibrium in which firms incrementally invest this behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints also expected outputs are lower than cournot outputs as firms face uncertainty moreover the amount of uncertainty has different effects over investment types

a search model of rental markets who should pay the commission abstract we develop a dynamic search equilibrium model of rental markets with brokerage fees an endogenous mass of landlords and tenants is active in the search market while the mass of entering tenants is exogenous the mass of entering landlords is endogenously determined by the rate at which apartments become vacant brokerage fees paid by tenants are used as a device to screen short term and long term tenants we analyze a policy that requires fees to be paid by landlords such a policy decreases efficiency by preventing efficient screening but also increases turnover and hence efficiency in the search market we further provide empirically testable implications of our theory

undefeated equilibria of the shi trejos wright model under adverse selection abstract decentralized markets where assets are useful as media of exchange are also usually subject to private information to analyze the liquidity and prices of such assets i adapt the shi 1995 trejos and wright 1995 model with lucas trees under adverse selection while most studies focus on either a pooling or separating equilibrium i apply the undefeated equilibrium refinement by mailath et al 1993 to make the selection based on fundamentals under pooling the high quality asset holder accepts a pooled price and under separating signals quality through asset retention applying the refinement results in a regime switch from no information pooling to information revelation separating following a negative shock to the quality or quantity of lemons this change leads to a discontinuous fall in aggregate welfare

a model of search with price discrimination abstract we introduce observable heterogeneity across buyers into a model of simultaneous search buyers differences are informative about their willingness to search giving rise to price discrimination even if they all have the same willingness to pay we analyze and compare equilibrium outcomes when price discrimination is allowed and when it is not we find that the price comparison across consumers as well as the effects of banning price discrimination critically depend on the elasticity of the search cost distribution interestingly for normally distributed search costs there is an inverted u shape relationship between prices and buyers size similarly a ban on price discrimination hurts small and large buyers to the benefit of the medium size ones

learning about the arrival of sales abstract we analyse optimal stopping when the economic environment changes because of learning a primary application is optimal selling of an asset when demand is uncertain the seller learns about the arrival rate of buyers as time passes without a sale the seller becomes more pessimistic about the arrival rate when the arrival of buyers is not observed the rate at which the seller revises her beliefs is affected by the price she sets learning leads to a higher posted price by the seller when the seller does observe the arrival of buyers she sets an even higher price

selling a lemon under demand uncertainty we consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals assuming that the high quality seller insists on a price we show that the low quality seller s surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers knowledge about the demand state if they are also uncertain about demand then demand uncertainty increases the low quality seller s expected payoff and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time if buyers know the demand state then demand uncertainty does not affect the low quality seller s payoff but she must employ a sophisticated pricing strategy

reputation and survival learning in a dynamic signalling model we consider the impact of reputation on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods whose quality is learned slowly if the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling when she knows her quality a good seller never stops selling though at low reputations a bad seller does with some probability furthermore a seller with positive though imperfect information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public we further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller s opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited

costly search with adverse selection solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing we analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes a low quality seller benefits more from trade and therefore searches more intensively than a high quality seller this makes a seller s contact carry negative information but a seller s availability become a stronger indicator of high quality in the stationary environment the two effects exactly offset each other and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller in the nonstationary environment the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller

dynamic trading with developing adverse selection abstract we study a dynamic trading game in which the information asymmetry between the agents develops over time a seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good but the seller becomes informed after the game begins we show that this developing adverse selection gives rise to novel trading dynamics in particular if the seller s learning speed is high the equilibrium features collapse and recovery behavior both the equilibrium price and the trade probability first drop and then increase over time while the trade surplus monotonically decreases as the learning speed increases the seller s surplus may change non monotonically

bargaining and reputation in search markets in a two sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus the matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus the frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium even if the frequency of behavioral types is negligible they aect the terms of trade and eciency in an unbalanced market where the entering

learning and price discovery in a search market we introduce learning into an otherwise standard two sided search and bargaining market there is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand in the high state buyers are on the long side otherwise they are on the short side in equilibrium prices are on average higher in the high state individual agents learn about the distribution while searching agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining position buyers may initially insist on a low price and sellers on a high price after successive failures to trade agents become increasingly pessimistic about the market conditions and soften their bargaining stance when frictions are small equilibrium transaction prices are approximately market clearing despite aggregate demand being unknown thus the search and bargaining procedure enables price discovery in a decentralized market

sequential bargaining with correlated values the paper analyzes an infinite horizon sequential bargaining game with one sided offers between a buyer and a seller when the buyer s valuation depends on the seller s the seller knows the value of the object and the buyer does not the influence of relative discount factors on the solution is studied it is shown for example that an impasse may result if the buyer offeror is too impatient relative to the seller the buyer makes a single take it or leave it offer

optimal experimentation in a changing environment this paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes and who maximizes profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time we show that there are two qualitatively very different regimes determined by the discount rate and the intensities of demand curve switching and the dependence of the optimal policy on these parameters is discontinuous one regime is characterized by extreme experimentation and good tracking of the prevailing demand curve the other by moderate experimentation and poor tracking moreover in the latter regime the agent eventually becomes trapped into taking actions in a strict subset of the feasible set

search with adverse selection this paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection we study information aggregation by the price how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices when search frictions are small we identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small we trace this to a strong form of the winner s curse that is present in the sequential search model the failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations

a primer on financial contagion abstract this paper presents a theoretical framework to highlight possible channels for the international transmission of financial shocks we first review the different definitions and measures of contagion adopted by the literature we then use a simple multi country asset pricing model to classify the main elements of the current debate on contagion and provide a stylized account of how a crisis in one country can spread to the world economy in particular the model shows how crises can be transmitted across countries without assuming ad hoc portfolio management rules or market imperfections finally tracking our classification we survey the results of the empirical literature on contagion

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

explicit investment rules with time to build and uncertainty abstract we establish explicit socially optimal rules for an irreversible investment decision with time to build and uncertainty assuming a price sensitive demand function with a random intercept we provide comparative statics and economic interpretations for three models of demand arithmetic brownian geometric brownian and the cox ingersoll ross committed capacity that is the installed capacity plus the investment in the pipeline must never drop below the best predictor of future demand minus two biases the discounting bias takes into account the fact that investment is paid upfront for future use the precautionary bias multiplies a type of risk aversion index by the local volatility relying on the analytical forms we discuss in detail the economic effects for example the impact of volatility on the optimal investment is negligible in some cases it vanishes in the cir model for long delays and in the gbm model for high discount rates

production and spatial distribution of switchgrass and miscanthus in the united states under uncertainty and sunk cost abstract the u s cellulosic biofuel mandate has not been enforced in recent years uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of the mandate in addition to high production and harvest cost have contributed to a delay in the widespread planting of bioenergy crops such as switchgrass and miscanthus previous literature has shown that under uncertainty and sunk cost an investment threshold is further increased due to the value associated from holding the investment option in this paper we extend the previous literature by applying a real option switching model to bioenergy crop production first we calculate the county level break even price which triggers a switching away from traditional field crops corn soybeans and wheat to bioenergy crops under various scenarios differing by commodity prices production cost and biomass price expectations we show that the resulting break even prices at the county level can be substantially higher than previously estimated due to the inclusion of the option value in a second step we identify counties that are most likely to grow switchgrass or miscanthus by simulating a stochastic biomass price over time our results highlight two issues first switchgrass or miscanthus are not grown in the midwest under any scenario under low agricultural residue removal rates biomass crops are mostly grown in the southeast second under the assumption of a high removal rates bioenergy crops are not grown anywhere in the u s since the cellulosic biofuel mandate can be covered by agricultural residues

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

resolving the commitment versus flexibility trade off the role of resource accumulation lags we examine how time consuming resource accumulation influences the classic strategy trade off between commitment and flexibility in particular using 1975 95 data from the worldwide petrochemical

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

home production meets time to build an innovation in this paper is to introduce a time to build technology for the production of market capital into a model with home production our main finding is that the two anomalies that have plagued all household production models the positive correlation between business and household investment and household investment s leading business investment over the business cycle are resolved when time to build is added

the effect of time to build on strategic investment under uncertainty we show that time to build which creates a lag between the decision to invest and production is an important element of industry structure we study a multiperiod investment game where there is demand uncertainty adding time to build to the model alters the classic tradeoff between making strategic commitments and exploiting the option to wait furthermore time to build gives rise to novel equilibria in which firms invest incrementally which contrasts with most prior work on multiperiod investment games in which firms invest only once we show how time to build affects firm heterogeneity investment timing the option value of waiting the evolution of prices and social welfare copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

investing to access an adverse selection market abstract i analyse a market with asymmetric information and interdependent values accessing the market is costly and stochastic e g requires lobbying licences or r d for a range of parameter values interventions that raise production or entry costs for all seller types increase trade investment and payoff for all types this effect is driven by a novel feedback loop between the market composition and the investment in access

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings the paper presents a simple pairwise meetings model of trade the new feature is that agents have asymmetric information about the true state of the world the focus is on the transmission of the information through the process of trade the qualitative question is to what extent is the information revealed to uninformed agents through the trading process when the market is in some sense frictionless in particular does the decentralized process give rise to full revelation results as derived by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and competitive environments in the context of the model of this paper it turns out that the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents even when the market is in some sense approximately frictionless

revenue management without commitment dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales a seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline at each time he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale over time buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases if a buyer does not purchase when she arrives she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price in the unique markov perfect equilibrium the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods a flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game when it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale the seller holds a big initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good

information percolation in large markets we introduce a simple model of the percolation of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter each other over time and reveal information to each other some of which they may have received earlier from other agents we are particularly interested in the evolution over time of the cross sectional distribution in the population of the posterior probability assignments of the various agents we provide a market example based on privately held auctions and obtain a relatively explicit solution for the cross sectional distribution of posterior beliefs at each time our results contribute to the literature on information transmission in markets hayek 1945 argues that markets allow information that is dispersed in a population to be revealed through prices grossman s 1981 notion of a rational expectations equilibrium formalizes this idea in a setting with price taking agents milgrom 1981 pesendorfer and swinkels 1997 and reny and perry 2006 provide strategic foundations for the rational expectations equilibrium concept in centralized markets a number of important markets however are decentralized these include over the counter markets and private auction markets wolinsky 1990 and blouin and serrano 2002 study information transmission in decentralized markets in contrast to these two papers equilibrium behavior in our market example leads to full revelation of information we happily acknowledge conversations with manuel amador frank kelly jeremy stein and pierre olivier weill and research assistance from sergey lobanov rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 and gale 1986a 1986b study decentralized markets without asymmetric information satterthwaite and shneyerov 2003 study decentralized market with private value asymmetric information amador and weill 2006 study a more abstract setting regarding transmission of common and private i nformation

flexibility premium of emissions permits abstract investments in abatement technology are often characterised by irreversibility and significant implementation lags whereas emissions permits can be traded at any time as such abatement and emissions permit trading systems are hardly perfect substitutes we formally study the flexibility of emissions permits and propose a unified framework to rationalise the impact of both investment divestment lags and irreversibility in relation to the price of emissions permits using option pricing concepts we reformulate the technology adoption problem in terms of the technology s characteristics irreversibility and implementation lags and offer a conceptual quantification of the flexibility premium of emissions permits

firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry a choice between commitment and flexibility abstract this paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing we examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous with two identically sized firms there are symmetric cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria with one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms there is a unique stackelberg equilibrium we conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by stackelberg equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 l11

information percolation with equilibrium search dynamics we solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information when two agents meet they share their information the information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings and so on equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally a tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can in some cases increase welfare on the other hand endowing agents with public signals reduces information sharing and can in some cases decrease welfare

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation

learning from trades i study stationary cut off strategy equilibria of a dynamic market model where buyers sample sellers sequentially from an unknown distribution buyers learn about the distribution from the sampled sellers and a trade signal the trade signal reveals whether a randomly chosen seller traded yesterday observing a trade as opposed to no trade is good news about the distribution buyers who observe a trade use a higher cut off than buyers who observe no trade despite buyers learning from sampled sellers that puts a countervailing pressure on the cut offs the trade signal may reduce market efficiency while an appropriate exogenous signal increases efficiency