transfers and the generalized theory of distortions and welfare recent theoretical attention devoted to the transfer paradox has included attempts to incorporate it into the body of commercial policy in this paper the existence of a family of always feasible corrective tax policies is proved which guarantees normal welfare response the set of pol icies is shown to contain the external trade fixing tariff and the op timal tariff the set of policies is then extended to include a capit al flow fixing profits tax to deal with the problems of foreign inves tment the results are then interpreted in terms of a general proposi tion in the theory of distortions and welfare copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

is protectionism on the rise assessing national trade policies during the crisis of 2008 to understand the role of trade policies in the crisis of 2008 this paper constructs the overall trade restrictiveness indices for a wide range of countries using their tariff schedules in 2008 and 2009 the index summarizes the trade policy stance of a country taking into account the share of each good in trade as well as its corresponding import demand elasticity results show that there is no widespread increase in protectionism via tariff policies since the global financial crisis has unfolded while many countries have adjusted tariffs upward on selected products only a handful of countries such as malawi russia argentina turkey and china focus on products that have significant impacts on trade flows the united states and the european union by contrast rely mainly on anti dumping duties to shield domestic industries overall while the rise in tariffs and anti dumping duties in these countries may have jointly caused global trade to drop by as much as us 43 billion during the crisis period it explains less than 2 percent of the collapse in world trade

the international telecommunications regime the political roots of regimes for high technology the international telecommunications regime provided a multilateral framework that reinforced domestic monopolies and bilateral cartel arrangements in the global market the regime s epistemic community believed that telecommunications services and equipment were best supplied by national monopolies and that international communications by telephone telegram and telex should be jointly provided by monopolists strong domestic political incentives reinforced this cognitive framework when technological innovation triggered a successful political attack on the domestic regulation of telecommunications in a few key countries the stage was set for a global challenge to the intellectual and political foundations of the regime two paths to reform have emerged their significance can be assessed by looking at changes in the distribution of benefits from the regime changes in the manner in which governments delegate power to the regime and shifts in the epistemic community associated with the regime

bipolarity multipolarity and free trade recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade i argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system security externalities explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two power system the real income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that impede it their ability to internalize these effects makes military alliances the natural basis of agreements to open international markets the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary however ones that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts i argue that less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in alliance altruism explain the advantage of a two power system several important limits of the argument should be made clear immediately i argue at the systemic level i attempt to isolate the political and economic incentives for free trade that occur at the level of the international system i do not therefore consider the impact of unitlevel factors on the pursuit of these incentives for example neither the role of special interest groups nor the organization of domestic exchange via hierarchies instead of markets is considered doyle 1986 frieden 1988 ruggie 1982 the conditions i assume are those of standard international trade theory ethier 1983 and illustrative rather than systematic empirical referents are used these restrictions are appropriate given my purpose to demonstrate analytically the advantage of a bipolar international political system with respect to free trade

off the cliff and back credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis abstract we study the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial crisis using detailed data on monthly us imports we show that credit conditions were an important channel through which the crisis affected trade volumes by exploiting the variation in the cost of capital across countries and over time as well as the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit markets exported less to the us during the peak of the crisis this effect was especially pronounced in sectors that require extensive external financing have limited access to trade credit or have few collateralizable assets exports of financially vulnerable industries were thus more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of less vulnerable industries and this sensitivity rose during the financial crisis the quantitative implications of our estimates for trade volumes highlight the large real effects of financial crises and the potential gains from policy intervention

international transfers the relative price of non traded goods and the current account this paper considers the role of the relative price of non traded goods and the current account in the adjustment of a small open economy to the receipt of an international transfer the paper shows that the economy s macroeconomic adjustment to the transfer depends upon the relative capital intensities of the traded and non traded sectors of the economy as well as on the duration of the transfer the paper provides a new interpretation of france s current account surplus in the 1870s that accompanied the payment of reparations to germany following the franco prussian war and of germany s trade deficit in the 1920s that accompanied reparations payments associated with the first world war

could tariffs be pro cyclical abstract conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter cyclical we analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied mfn tariffs using a disaggregated product level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011 strikingly and counter to conventional wisdom we find that tariffs are pro cyclical further investigation reveals that this pro cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries tariffs are acyclical in developed countries we present evidence that pro cyclical market power drives the pro cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy

multilateralism bilateralism and exclusion in the nuclear proliferation regime i use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism but an efficient component thereof although this point will not be new to most students of institutions no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy start ing from a characterization of proliferation as the result of a large number of prisoner s dilemmas played out between states engaged in local dyadic rivalries i demonstrate that it is possible for the superpowers to design an optimal mix of threats and bribes in which states with low compliance costs join the regime on the terms of the multi lateral treaty alone states with intermediate compliance costs need additional cus tomized incentives delivered through bilateral agreements and states with high compliance costs are not only left out of the regime but also punished for nonpartici pation i draw a few comparative statics that i systematically test on nuclear prolif eration treaty npt membership data i discuss the applicability of the model to the currency trade and aid regimes

the system worked global economic governance during the great recession prior to 2008 numerous international relations scholars had predicted a looming crisis in global economic governance policy analysts have only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis declaring that we live in a g zero world this article takes a closer look at the global response to the financial crisis and reveals a more optimistic picture despite initial shocks that were more severe than the 1929 financial crisis global economic governance structures responded quickly and robustly whether one measures results by outcomes outputs or process formal and informal governance structures displayed surprising resiliency multilateral economic institutions performed well in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies especially in contrast to the 1930s while there are areas where governance has either faltered or failed on the whole the system has worked misperceptions about global economic governance persist because the great recession has disproportionately affected the core economies analysts have conflated national with global governance and the efficacy of past periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated why the system has worked better than expected remains an open question but we can tentatively conclude that both the power of the united states and the resilience of neoliberal economic ideas were underestimated

intertemporal equilibrium and the transfer paradox the transfer paradox may occur in a world with only two countries at a dynamically stable intertemporal competitive equilibrium in a framework of overlapping generations with production and investment a transfer of income may immiserize the recipient while enriching the donor away from the golden rule a transfer may result in a pareto improvement

heckscher ohlin revisited implications of differential population dynamics for trade within an overlapping generations framework abstract this paper investigates the implications of the addition of differential population dynamics to a simple 2 2 2 model of international trade within an overlapping generations framework the two regions considered are assumed to be identical in every respect except for the way their populations evolve over time the effects of these demographic differences are explored by comparing autarky and trade on the basis of i the analytical solutions obtained for the steady state values of key variables and ii the paths of these variables plotted using numerical results from simulation experiments carried out under two different demographic scenarios unequal population dynamics are shown to affect the relative abundance of the factors of production in each region giving rise to differentials in wage rates and rentals for capital under autarky conditions this in turn causes costs of production and relative prices to differ creating the grounds for trade in the sense of heckscher ohlin ho yet the results reveal that static ho results cannot be generalized to hold in a dynamic setting where differences in demographics cause factor proportions to evolve independently of trade over time

economists capitalists and the making of globalization north american free trade in comparative historical perspective why did globalization happen current explanations point to a variety of conditions under which states have made the free market policy changes driving international economic integration since the 1980s such accounts disagree however about the key actors involved this article provides a reconciliation showing how two different combinations of actors and two different political economic pathways have led to globalization in recent decades in developed countries mobilization by business has been central elsewhere technocrats both constrained and empowered by international finance have pursued globalization more independently of business in both contexts economists technical authority has helped legitimate liberalization despite the limited diffusion of their ideas the article validates and elaborates this model using a comparative historical study of how the united states canada and mexico proposed negotiated and ratified agreements for free trade in north america

a result on the transfer problem in international trade theory abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide a result on the welfare effect of a transfer in a general equilibrium exchange model with no arbitrary restrictions on either the number of commodities traded or the number of countries our result can be stated as follows the donor country is worse off after a transfer if a all goods are net substitutes for the donor b all goods are gross substitutes for the other countries and c all goods are normal for all countries

the transfer paradox in a one sector overlapping generations model abstract this paper examines the effects of international income transfers on capital accumulation and welfare in a one sector overlapping generations model it is shown that a strong form of the transfer paradox in which the donor country experiences a welfare gain while the recipient country experiences a welfare loss may occur both in and out of steady state in addition it is shown that a weak form of the transfer paradox where either the donor or recipient but not both experiences a paradoxical welfare effect may characterize all segments of the transition path not already characterized by the strong transfer paradox

rational hegemons excludable goods and small groups an epitaph for hegemonic stability theory in defining international free trade as a public good hegemonic stability theory posited early in the 1970s that its reliable supply depended upon a distribution of international power analogous to that within a privileged group more recently however critics have challenged three assumptions fundamental to hegemonic theory its premises of free trade public goods and privileged groups they have concluded that hegemony is not necessary for and indeed may be antithetical to a stable world economy based on market exchange the author argues that the critics overstate their case the assumptions they attack allow hegemonic theory to represent analytically several critically important barriers to free trade among states among these are the existence of strategic interdependence among the actors and the prevalence of informational asymmetries the most significant flaw in hegemonic theory is its neglect of the essence of the domain to which it applies the politics of inter state trade in an anarchic world

global supply chains and trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis the collapse in trade and the contraction of output that occurred during 2008 9 was comparable to and in many countries more severe than the great depression of the 1930s however it did not give rise to the rampant protectionism that followed the great crash the idea that the rise in the fragmentation of production across global value chains vertical specialization may be a deterrent against protectionism is under appreciated in the literature institutions also played a role in limiting the extent of protectionist responses world trade organization discipline raises the cost of using trade policies for member countries and has proved to be a stable foundation for the open multilateral trading system that has been built over the past 50 years using tradeand protection data for seven large emerging market countries that have a history of active use of trade policy the influence of these and other factors on trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis are empirically examined an instrumental variables strategy is used to identify their impact participation in global value chains is found to be a powerful economic factor determining trade policy responses

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

cultural proximity a source of trade flow resilience while the significant influence of cultural proximity on bilateral trade flows has been extensively documented in the literature its possible role in times of crisis has not yet been raised relying on a panel estimation of a gravity model incorporating cultural proximity parameters we evidence the existence of a significant surge in the impact of the different components of cultural proximity during economic recession the trade resilience among countries sharing a cultural bond is not a pure composition effect as it also appears within product categories to understand this unexpected effect we discuss different mechanisms that emphasise the potential mitigating influence of cultural proximity on some determinants of the trade collapse namely the uncertainty shock the increased moral hazard and the emergence of ethnocentric preferences

bilateral treaties and the most favored nation clause the myth of trade liberalization in the nineteenth century textbook accounts of the anglo french trade agreement of 1860 argue that it heralded the beginning of a liberal trading order this alleged success holds much interest from a modern policy point of view for it rested on bilateral negotiations and most favored nation clauses with the help of new data on international trade the ricardo database the authors provide empirical evidence and find that the treaty and subsequent network of mfn trade agreements coincided with the end of a period of unilateral liberalization across the world they also find that it did not contribute to expanding trade at all this is contrary to a deeply rooted belief among economists economic historians and political scientists the authors draw a number of policy lessons that run counter to the conventional wisdom and raise skepticism toward the ability of bilateralism and mfn arrangements to promote trade liberalization

hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in europe although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime as an example great britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century but britain s behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability i advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a political business cycle

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

foreign aid domestic investment and welfare this paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two period two country model of trade domestic investment is endogenous providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two transfer induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient in the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly pareto improving

temporary transfers in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model abstract the main result of this paper is to demonstrate that if future discounting is sufficiently weak a temporary transfer of commodities has almost no effects on current economies although it is well known in the macroeconomic literature this proposition has not been given any rigorous proof that takes the dynamic general equilibrium effect of a transfer into account this study builds a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with two goods and demonstrates that the proposition can be derived from the equilibrium conditions of perfect foresight equilibrium

protectionism during the crisis tit for tat or chicken games abstract we explore the extent to which the adoption of protectionist measures during the recent financial crisis led to retaliation by trading partners we find no evidence of retaliation on the contrary there is strong evidence of chicken games being played

self organized criticality and economic fluctuations economists have long been interested in explaining the observed instability of economic aggregates though several reasons for variation in the pace of production are easily given such as exogenous variation in tastes or in production possibilities it is hard to see why there should be large variations in those factors that are synchronized across the entire economy instead it seems more likely to suppose that variations in demand or in production costs in different parts of the economy should be largely independent and hence that a law of large numbers would imply that significant variations in aggregate activity relative to the typical size of aggregate activity are not likely to occur an alternative approach proposes that economies possess intrinsically unstable dynamics which even in the absence of external shocks would result in persistent deterministic fluctuations this type of model implies however that aggregate fluctuations should involve motion on a low dimensional attractor while analysis of economic time series has not revealed structure of this kind another alternative proposes that the economy possesses multiple equilibria and that it can therefore switch between equilibria for arbitrary reasons this possibility suffers however from the difficulty that one must explain how people succeed in coordinating their expectations about the times at which a shift should occur here we explore another type of explanation which relies on an entirely different mechanism our proposal is that the effects of many small independent shocks to different sectors of the economy need not cancel out in the aggregate due to the presence of significantly nonlinear strongly localized interactions between different parts of the economy the type of macroscopic instability that can result has been studied by condensed matter physicists under the name of self organized criticality per bak and kan chen 1991 physicists have noted in several contexts the possibility of a critical state in which independent microscopic fluctuations can propagate so as to give rise to instability on a macroscopic scale this is a state in which chain reactions initiated by local disturbances neither damp out over a short distance the subcritical case nor propagate explosively so that the system cannot remain in that state the supercritical case as in the controlled nuclear fission that allows a reactor to generate power without exploding often this has seemed to depend upon parameters being carefully tuned to exactly their critical values in the case of a reactor an elaborate control mechanism is required to keep it near criticality more recently it has been argued that some systems may spontaneously evolve toward a critical state and return to it even if perturbed by an external shock the prototypical example of such selforganized criticality is a sandpile when the slope of the pile is nowhere too steep dropping on additional grains of sand at randomly chosen sites has no macroscopic effects as at most small numbers of grains will shift position in each case however randomly dropping on additional sand will eventually result in the slope of the pile increasing to a critical slope at which point large avalanches can occur in response to the dropping of a single additional grain of sand a sandpile with a slope that is initially greater than the critical slope also evolves toward it in this case through an immediate department of economics university of chicago 1126 east 59th st chicago il 60637 we thank per bak buz brock boyan jovanovic and paul krugman for discussions and the santa fe institute and the nsf for research support 1scheinkman 1990 surveys empirical work on this

the free trade epidemic of the 1860s and other outbreaks of economic discrimination why was there an abrupt increase in economic openness in europe in the 1860s this increase may have been the result of a contagion process in which the cobden chevalier treaty between britain and france threatened to displace third party exports to fra nce with british exports as a result most european states signed similar treaties with france which had further ripple effects this article outlines a formal model of this process based on the assumption that an agreement between two states incre ases the desirability of similar treaties to third parties propositions regarding the rate and pattern of spread of treaties are derived from this model this article then discusses the insights these propositions may offer into the rise and fall of the most favored nation network of treaties between 1860 and 1929 at a theoretical level the model aims to link the microlevel processes underlying state preferences to system level phenomena at a substantive level this analysis offers insight into the current explosion of regionalism

import protection business cycles and exchange rates evidence from the great recession this research estimates the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection policies over 1988 q1 2010 q4 for five industrialized economies the united states european union australia canada and south korea there is evidence of a strong countercyclical trade policy response in the pre great recession period of 1988 q1 2008 q3 during which increases in domestic unemployment rates real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and declines in the gdp growth rates of bilateral trading partners led to substantial increases in new temporary trade barriers it then applies this pre great recession empirical model to realized macroeconomic data from 2008 q4 2010 q4 and find it predicts a surge of new import protection during the great recession e g for the us and eu the model predicts new trade barriers would cover an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports well above the baseline level of 2 3 percent of import coverage immediately preceding the crisis finally the research examines why the realized trade policy response differed from model predictions while exchange rate movements played an important role in limiting new import protection during the great recession there is also evidence of one particularly important change in trade policy responsiveness i e in this period governments refrained from imposing new temporary trade barriers against foreign trading partners experiencing their own weak or negative economic growth

trade policy flexibilities and turkey tariffs antidumping safeguards and wto dispute settlement trade policy commitments to lower import tariffs and to maintain tariffs at low levels entail short and long run political economic costs and benefits empirical work examining the relationship between such commitments and the exercise of trade policy flexibilities is still relatively nascent especially for emerging economies this paper provides a rich empirically based assessment of ways that turkey exercised trade policy flexibilities during the global economic crisis of 2008 11 first and despite multilateral and customs union commitments that might limit changes to applied tariffs turkey made changes to both its applied most favored nation and preferential tariffs that cumulatively affect nearly 9 percent of manufacturing imports and 10 percent of import product lines second turkey s cumulative application of temporary trade barrier ttb policies antidumping safeguards and countervailing duties are estimated to impact by 2011 an additional 4 percent of imports and 6 percent of product lines other surprising results on turkey s use of flexibilities include extending the duration of previously imposed antidumping and safeguards beyond expected removal dates removing one ttb policy over a set of products and immediately reapplying a different ttb policy covering lengthy upstream and downstream segments of important industries and deepening discriminatory preference margins already inherent in existing preferential trade agreements

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

cooperation in the liberalization of international trade after hegemony what nations dwell in perpetual anarchy for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests because as states they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises the possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off yet at other times states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

international law and domestic institutions reconciling north american unfair trade laws while scholars have written much about the role played by international institutions in cooperative behavior among nations they have not examined the domestic political motives that may lie behind nations decisions to join such organizations two level games analysis provides a framework for studying domestic politics not as a constraint upon nations that enter into international agreements but as a catalyst for nations to enter into agreements the dispute settlement procedures of the north american free trade agreement and its predecessor the canada u s free trade agreement offer an empirical illustration of this point

interests power and multilateralism multilateralism characterizes to varying degrees patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct the utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront thus the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution as in coordination problems and those under which it will not as in collaboration problems within these constraints powerful states choose institutions that will serve their interests with multilateral arrangements becoming more attractive as the future is valued more highly multilateral institutions should be stable in circumstances of changing distributions of power relative to more hierarchical institutions the vulnerability of patterns of international cooperation to various exogenous changes depends on the type of strategic interaction underlying state behavior

system maker and privilege taker u s power and the international political economy there is striking consistency in the international economic behavior of the united states across the bipolar and unipolar eras the united states has been simultaneously a system maker and privilege taker and its ability to play that dual role has required the willing collaboration of foreign partners u s influence over those partners however has changed in important ways during the cold war the united states dominated international economic adjustment struggles its ability to prevail in those struggles after the cold war has been significantly compromised the united states notwithstanding its preponderant power no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed and the very success of the u s centered world economy has opened a greater range of international and domestic economic options for america s supporters in the unipolar era the united states may continue to act its own way but it can no longer count on getting its own way

the transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade in this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two country two period model when intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country alternatively when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods the effect of a transfer depends on a the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and b the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution

welfare aspects of the transfer problem using the standard trade model with three countries and allowing for substitutability in both production and consumption this paper demonstrates that a country may gain by giving a transfer that the receiver may lose and that these two phenomena may appear at the same time this result is an extension of gale s example in a fixed coefficient model where he shows both transferer and transferee may become better off harming the third country and it is contrasted with the traditional welfare proposition whereby a giver is immiserized and a recipient is enriched

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

views among economists professional consensus or point counterpoint to what degree do economists disagree about key economic questions we provide evidence by using the responses to a series of questions posed to a distinguished panel of economists put together by the chicago school of business based on our analysis we find a broad consensus on these many different economic issues particularly when the past economic literature on the question is large any differences are unrelated to observable characteristics of the panel members other than men being slightly more likely to express an opinion these differences are idiosyncratic with no support for liberal versus conservative camps

managing the evolution of multilateralism author s downs george w rocke david barsoom peter n abstract in the past five years a relatively extensive literature has emerged that explores the demand for multilateral cooperation that is those factors that motivate states to develop or resist developing formal institutions that operate to increase interstate economic military or environmental cooperation 1 these factors include the transaction costs associated with ad hoc and multiple bilateral arrangements increased interstate trade the diffusion of liberal trade theory information about the costs of environmental degradation and trends in elite ideology to date however our understanding of the supply side of multilateralism the standards that are set for admission the order and speed with which candidate states are admitted and the impact of expansion on cooperation and future evolution has been relatively undeveloped 2 partly as a result theorists have had little to say about how multilateral institutions are likely to evolve or what the policy consequences of their expansion will be 3 supply side issues are important because multilateral organizations usually do not spring forth full blown they grow instead of forming an inclusive agreement that is one that covers nearly all of the states that its designers eventually hope to include many multilateral organizations start out with substantially smaller memberships and generally expand over time we argue that among the many possible explanations for the choice of this design strategy there is a rational choice argument

tariff retaliation from a strategic viewpoint one of the most perplexing questions in international trade concerns the rationale for the existence of widespread barriers to trade in the current world economy 1 the numerous explanations that have been offered for the existence of tariffs are generally based on one of the following four arguments a the existence of market imperfections monopolies externalities etc invalidates the free trade theorem and thus free trade is not desirable or perhaps not obtainable b sluggish adjustment of the world economy to free trade implies that the existing tariffs are a temporary phase c non economic phenomena such as nationalism induce political or institutional tariff arrangements or d protectionist motives to improve the welfare of a country or a group of individuals in that country induce all countries to simultaneously impose tariffs while all of these factors can be important in the explanation of the existence of tariffs the purpose of this paper is to develop an extended analysis of the protectionist view the protectionist view is based on the optimal tariff theorem which states under very restrictive assumptions that a country can improve its welfare by imposing a tariff 5 12 a serious difficulty with this explanation is that the optimal tariff theorem assumes that no retaliation occurs as scitovsky 12 points out a country that could benefit from charging a tariff has monopoly power in trade surely a country sophisticated enough to exercise monopoly power in trade would expect its rivals to respond when tariffs are erected hence scitovsky argues that if protection is the monopolistic behavior of a collectivity two countries raising tariffs against each other are bilateral monopolists and we know that bilateral monopoly results in the two parties coming to some working agreement whose terms depend on their bargaining skill and are analytically indeterminate scitovsky concluded that a tariff war would result in an indeterminate solution with both countries worse off johnson 6 formalized scitovsky s agrument by allowing each country to adopt a cournot type assumption regarding its rival s reaction to a change in its own tariff thus

taking stock of antidumping safeguards and countervailing duties 1990 2009 antidumping safeguards countervailing duties 1990 2009 this article examines the evolving cross country use of antidumping safeguard and countervailing duty policies temporary trade barriers ttbs over the period 1990 2009 i construct two new measures of imported products subject to the combined use of these ttbs before applying these measures to new data drawn from the world bank s temporary trade barriers database i then establish a number of facts regarding trends in historical use to benchmark against policy activity during the global economic crisis of 2008 09 the 2008 09 economic shock mostly accentuates patterns and trends already visible in the precrisis data e g while the major users of such policies overall combined to increase the product lines subject to ttbs by 25 per cent during the crisis this was driven almost entirely by developing economies which increased their product coverage by 40 per cent perhaps surprisingly recession affected high income economies increased their stock of product coverage by only 5 per cent during the crisis a muted policy response consistent with earlier trends in which major developed economies like the united states and eu reduced the stock of imported products they subject to ttbs to 2007 levels that were only 50 per cent as high as their within period peak furthermore a previously unidentified feature of the data is that a much larger share of china s exported products to other developing economies is subject to foreign imposed antidumping than its exports to developed economies the evidence confirms this feature is shared by a number of other major developing economy exporters deepening concern that these discriminatory trade barriers are increasingly a south south phenomenon finally i also clarify emerging trends in countervailing duty anti subsidy use across countries

aid nontraded goods and the transfer paradox in small countries this paper constructs a model of the transfer paradox for a small open economy with nontraded goods it demonstrates that increased production of nontraded goods can change their domestic price so as to offset the otherwise beneficial effect of aid and under certain conditions to create a transfer paradox even in a small country the model is estimated with time series data for 44 aid dependent countries for the period 1970 90 the results support the model and show that the nontraded goods expansion effect is more likely to cause immiserization than harry g johnson s 1967 tariff distorting export displacement effect

regime dynamics the rise and fall of international regimes the dynamics of international regimes are treated as social institutions how and why do regimes arise from the interactions of individual actors over time three developmental sequences are identified and the resultant regimes are described as spontaneous orders negotiated orders and imposed orders how do regimes change once they have become established in specific social settings three major types of pressure for regime change arise from internal contradictions shifts in underlying power structures and exogenous forces the next task in studying the dynamics of international regimes is to seek a more sophisticated understanding of the factors determining the incidence of these developmental sequences and pressures for change

explaining institutional change policy areas outside options and the bretton woods institutions i propose and test a theoretical framework that explains institutional change in international relations like firms in markets international institutions are affected by the underlying characteristics of their policy areas some policy areas are prone to produce institutions facing relatively little competition limiting the outside options of member states and impeding redistributive change in comparison institutions facing severe competition will quickly reflect changes in underlying state interests and power to test the theory empirically i exploit common features of the bretton woods institutions the international monetary fund and world bank to isolate the effect of variation in policy area characteristics the empirical tests show that despite having identical membership and internal rules bargaining outcomes in the bretton woods institutions have diverged sharply and in accordance with the theory

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare exogenous policy imposed and endogenous transfer induced distortion this paper reconsiders the welfare effects of a transfer payment in a two commodity world with two agents countries by taking the presence of exogenous and endogenous distortions into account when there is an exogenous tax cumsubsidy on production consumption or trade the analysis demonstrates that a transfer may paradoxically enrich the donor and immiserize the recipient under certain specific conditions these welfare paradoxes are also shown to be possible if the transfer endogenously induces directly unproductive profit seeking activity of lobbyists concluding remarks emphasize the paper s relevance for policymakers

3 3 theory of customs unions abstract four recent models those of berglas corden meade and riezman which have extended the theory of customs union to 3 3 dimensions are reviewed the reasons for both apparent and real differences among the welfare propositions from these models are explained some new extensions are derived the main conclusions are that the family of 3 3 models introduce several effects which cannot be present in 3 2 models and that the distinctions among the models are due mostly to diverse assumptions concerning the trilateral pattern of trade which are not readily apparent

domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitment japan and the united states the domestic politics of great powers significantly influence the fate of such multilateral regimes at the general agreement on tariffs and trade and the north atlantic treaty organization unless great powers can make credible commitments to support those regimes few countries will offer more than token support domestic political constraints may bind national leaders to good faith adherence to multilateral regimes even if international circumstances do not compel adherence domestic politics also influence the ability of other countries to monitor national adherence to agreements case studies of u s and japanese responses to multilateral regimes show how the nature of the national electoral system the division of powers in the government and the transparency of the national political system influence credibility and lead to special features of multilateral economic and security regimes

the mercantilist index of trade policy we introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff quota structure our index overcomes the problems of the trade weighted average tariff it avoids substitution bias correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark empirical applications to international cross section and time series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results trade weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade volume equivalent index this in turn always underestimates the welfare equivalent index

introduction epistemic communities and international policy coordination the growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions what factors shape their behavior under conditions of uncertainty what are the origins of international institutions and how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge while a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights at its core the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system level factors unit level factors or some complex interplay between the two whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create defend or expand their own wealth and power to enhance collective material benefits or to promote nonmaterial values a related question of

the international politics of harmonization the case of capital market regulation the internationalization and globalization of capital markets greatly complicates the tasks of national financial regulators it is becoming increasingly difficult if not impossible to regulate the activities of banking and securities firms and the broad range of transactions in which they engage on a national level in this article i explore the process of international regulatory harmonization in capital markets focusing especially on the mechanisms political pressure market pressure and institutional arrangements that facilitate this process i argue that the united states and the united kingdom are dominant players in the capital market and that the factors most relevant for understanding harmonization processes are 1 whether other jurisdictions have incentives to emulate the regulatory innovations of the dominant financial centers and 2 whether the dominant centers experience negative externalities in the process these two factors shed considerable light on whether harmonization will be spurred primarily by market forces or by politics they also suggest the likely role of international institutions in the process of regulatory harmonization the argument is illustrated using four issue areas capital adequacy requirements for banks anti money laundering rules accounting standards and information sharing among securities regulators

the direct and relative effects of preferential market access abstract the proliferation of preferential trade agreements has resulted in a complex system of preferences in which market access conditions are often discriminatory in this paper we investigate how market access conditions have evolved between 2000 and 2009 and how this has affected international trade our results show that the proliferation of preferential access has increased bilateral trade not only due to lower tariffs but also because preferential access often resulted in higher preferential margins vis a vis foreign competitors the results also indicate that the evolution of the system of preferences has been disadvantageous for countries that did not actively engage in forming new trade agreements

the size of trading blocs market power and world welfare effects abstract we construct an n country n commodity trade model to analyze the implications of bloc size for nash equilibrium tariffs and welfare the relationship between the absolute size of symmetric trading blocs and their market power is ambiguous and we illustrate how this relationship varies with model parameters in contrast sufficiently large increases in the relative size of a bloc enhance its relative market power and cause the welfare of its country members to rise above the free trade level we establish the existence of an optimal bloc size and study the dependence of optimal size on the parameters of the model

trade diversion as firm adjustment to trade policy evidence from eu anti dumping duties on vietnamese footwear this paper evaluates the impact of the 2006 european union anti dumping ad action on vietnamese footwear in three markets imports to the eu footwear producers in vietnam and the trade diversionary adjustment of vietnamese firms in the us market we find that the ad action reduced vietnamese imports to the eu by as much as 65 per cent given that the eu makes up almost two thirds of vietnam s footwear exports and footwear is among the top four export industries for vietnam this reduction is economically significant consistent with predictions of our model we find evidence of trade diversion by vietnamese producers from the eu to the us market our difference in difference estimates of the ad actions on the value of vietnamese footwear imports to the united states ranged from 69 to 71 per cent over the period 2004 07 and 69 to 72 per cent in terms of quantity these results highlight the spillover effects of trade policy in third markets when firms adjust to trade barriers our results are robust to triple difference specifications where we adjust for trend differences and a series of placebo specifications

hidden protectionism evidence from non tariff barriers to trade in the united states abstract can the enforcement of product standards be protectionism in disguise this paper estimates the costs of non compliance with u s product standards using a new database on u s import refusals from 2002 to 2014 we find that import refusals decrease exports to the united states this trade reducing effect is driven by developing countries and by refusals without any product sample analysis in particular during the subprime crisis and its aftermath we also provide evidence that given product standards were enforced more strictly during the crisis while the quality of imported products did not deteriorate these results are consistent with the existence of counter cyclical hidden protectionism due to non tariff barriers to trade in the united states

coordination versus prisoners dilemma implications for international cooperation and regimes the study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the prisoners dilemma pd game model but there is a mistaken tendency to treat pd as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation by relaxing the assumptions of 2 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game i show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in pd the analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions number of strategies available number of iterations of the game numbers of players and the distribution of power among them the discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored the basic solutions for pd and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization stability and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system however the coordination model does not replace the pd model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions these results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations

institutional assets and adaptability nato after the cold war the puzzle of nato s persistence is best addressed as part of a larger inquiry into institutional change institutions persist because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain but this institutionalist argument is incomplete whether institutions adapt to change depends on whether their norms rules and procedures are specific or general assets and on whether the asset mix matches the kinds of security problems faced by their members assets specific to coping with external threats will not be useful for coping with problems of instability and mistrust so alliances with only the former will disappear when threats disappear alliances that have specific institutional assets for dealing with instability and mistrust and general institutional assets will be adaptable to environments that lack threats i assess these hypotheses in a test case of nato s institutional assets during and after the cold war

the american political economy macroeconomics and electoral politics here is the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on relationships between the economy and politics in the years from eisenhower through reagan extending and deepening his earlier work which had major impact in both political science and economics hibbs traces the patterns in and sources of postwar growth unemployment and inflation he identifies which groups win and lose from inflations and recessions he also shows how voters perceptions and reactions to economic events affect the electoral fortunes of political parties and presidents hibbs s analyses demonstrate that political officials in a democratic society ignore the economic interests and demands of their constituents at their peril because episodes of prosperity and austerity frequently have critical influence on voters behavior at the polls the consequences of eisenhower s last recession of ford s unwillingness to stimulate the economy of carter s stalled recovery were electorally fatal whereas johnson s nixon s and reagan s successes in presiding over rising employment and real incomes helped win elections the book develops a major theory of macroeconomic policy action that explains why priority is given to growth unemployment inflation and income distribution shifts with changes in partisan control of the white house the analysis shows how such policy priorities conform to the underlying economic interests and preferences of the governing party s core political supporters throughout the study hibbs is careful to take account of domestic institutional arrangements and international economic events that constrain domestic policy effectiveness and influence domestic economic outcomes hibbs s interdisciplinary approach yields more rigorous and more persuasive characterizations of the american political economy than either purely economic apolitical analyses or purely partisan politicized accounts his book provides a useful benchmark for the advocacy of new policies for the 1990s a handy volume for politicians and their staffs as well as for students and teachers of politics and economics

preferential trading agreements an investigation abstract a three country general equilibrium model of international trade in an arbitrary number of goods is constructed and the welfare effects of the formation of a preferential trading club e g customs union free trade area are analyzed

sanctions in networks abstract in this paper we contribute to the sender target models of sanctions by explicitly incorporating the linkages social political or economic that bind the sender and target to other agents given any network model and architecture we draw attention to two factors that play a key role in determining the efficacy of sanctions in reducing the frequency of violations these are respectively strategic complementaritiesbetween the sanctioning action deleting link with target and number of direct links of the sender and the externalities imposed on the sender by third parties we examine the role played by these factors both in the short run when links can only be deleted and the long run when links can also be added as well as when sanctions are unilateral the sender can only delete own links or multilateral the sender can impose on common allies to sever links to the target our analysis allows an active role to the target to build an opposing coalition to deflect sanctions and to third parties to engage in sanction busting it also extends to multiple senders and targets existence of interest groups within sender and target with dissimilar objectives and signed networks allowing both antagonistic and cordial bilateral relationships

who influences u s foreign policy research in international relations has identified a variety of actors who appear to influence u s foreign policy including experts and epistemic communities organized interests especially business and labor and ordinary citizens or public opinion this research however has often focused on a single factor at a time rather than systematically testing the relative importance of alternative possible influences using extensive survey data gathered over three decades we conduct a comparative test attempting to account for the expressed foreign policy preferences of policy makers by means of the preferences of the general public and those of several distinct sets of elites the results of cross sectional and time lagged analyses suggest that u s foreign policy is most heavily and consistently influenced by internationally oriented business leaders followed by experts who however may themselves be influenced by business labor appears to have significant but smaller impacts the general public seems to have considerably less effect except under particular conditions these results generally hold over several different analytical models including two observation time series and different clusters of issues economic military and diplomatic with some variations across different institutional settings the u s house senate and executive branch

transfers the terms of trade and capital accumulation in the context of a two sector overlapping generations model it is demonstrated that a steady state transfer paradox may arise under commodity trade with stability and without distortions or bystanders the existence of the paradox is due to the effect of the transfer on world capital accumulation which is shown to always i e for any ranking of factor intensities and savings rates improve the donor s terms of trade transfers may also improve steady state welfare for both donor and recipient and produce paradoxical welfare results along the transition path la litterature en statique du commerce international a conclu que en l absence de distorsions ou de tierces parties les mouvements des termes d echange induits par les transferts ne peuvent pas etre suffisamment importants quand il y a stabilite walrasienne pour engendrer le paradoxe du transfert on a tire la conclusion de modeles dynamiques a un secteur que le paradoxe du transfert est possible mais en comptant sur la mobilite internationale du capital et sur les mouvements dans le niveau mondial du taux d interet plutot que sur les prix et les marches des biens dans un modele dynamique a deux secteurs ou les generations se chevauchent ce qui permet des effets a la fois statiques et intertemporels dans les termes d echange le commerce des biens peut engendrer un paradoxe du transfert en regime permanent quand il y a stabilite walrasienne sans distorsions et tierces parties l existence du paradoxe est attribuable a l effet du transfert sur l accumulation du capital qui toujours pour tout ordre des intensites de facteur et des taux d epargne ameliore les termes d echange du donneur les transferts peuvent aussi ameliorer le bien etre du donneur et du recipiendaire en regime permanent et produire des resultats paradoxaux de bien etre dans le sentier de transition

multilateralism with small and large numbers multilateralism international governance of the many was defined by the united states after 1945 in terms of certain principles particularly opposition to bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict postwar multilateralism also expressed an impulse to universality john ruggie s generalized organizing principles that implied relatively low barriers to participation in these arrangements a ticket of admission was always required whether acceding to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt or joining the international monetary fund imf and the world bank nevertheless the price of that ticket was not set so high that less powerful or less wealthy states could not hope to participate

regional organizations and international politics japanese influence over the asian development bank and the un security council do regional hegemons use their power in regional organizations to advance foreign policy objectives the authors investigate whether japan leverages its privileged position at the asian development bank adb to facilitate project loans for the elected asian members of the united nations security council unsc a platform from which it seeks to shape global affairs analyzing panel data of adb loan disbursements to twenty four developing member countries from 1968 to 2009 the authors find that temporary unsc membership increases adb loans particularly during the post 1985 period when japan asserted greater influence in multilateral organizations they estimate an average increase of over 30 percent because of japan s checkered history of imperialism the adb provides a convenient mechanism by which the government can obfuscate favors for politically important countries acting through this regional organization enables japan to reconcile a low key approach to foreign affairs with the contradictory goal of global activism leading without appearing unilateralist

negotiation arithmetic adding and subtracting issues and parties students of international negotiations often examine strategic interactions among a given set of parties dealing with a specified group of issues the issues and parties themselves are often choice variables whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on a bargain s outcome using a variety of international cases i investigate the properties of several classes of moves that are intended to alter the issues and parties of an original negotiation a unified approach to the analysis of such situations suggests numerous distinct means by which the addition or subtraction of issues can yield one sided gains to the use of power can yield joint gains that create or enhance a zone of possible agreement and can reduce or destroy a zone of possible agreement the effects of adding or subtracting parties are similarly analyzed however unintended complexity unforeseen interrelationships organizational considerations transactions costs and informational requirements may alter the analysis of such moves

explaining government preferences for institutional change in eu foreign and security policy some member states of the european union eu want a supranational foreign and security policy while other member states oppose any significant limitation of national sovereignty in this domain what explains this variation answering this question could help us to better understand not only the trajectory of european unification but also the conditions and prospects of consensual political integration in other regional contexts and territorial scales the main research traditions in international relations theory suggest different explanations i examine the roles of relative power capabilities foreign policy interests europeanized identities and domestic multilevel governance in determining the preferences of the fifteen eu member governments concerning the institutional depth of their foreign and security policy cooperation i find that power capabilities and collective identities have a significant influence but the effect of ideas about the nature and locus of sovereignty as reflected in the domestic constitution of each country is particularly remarkable a previous version of this article was presented at the 4th ecpr pan european international relations conference canterbury 8 10 september 2001 for their valuable comments i would like to thank filippo andreatta daniele archibugi simone borra nicola dunbar fabio franchino alkuin kolliker leonardo morlino angelo panebianco eiko thielemann ben tonra the editors of io and three anonymous reviewers i am responsible for any mistakes

redistributive cooperation market failure wealth transfers and the basle accord indecember1987 policymakersbelongingtothegroupoften g 10 signeda far reaching agreement on international nancial regulation the basle accord ontheinternational convergence of capital measuresand capital standards underthetermsof thisagreement g 10 policymakersimplemented uniform risk based capitalrequirements on commercial banks the origins of the basle accord according tokapstein lay in the consequencesof international nancial integration international nancial integration by raising systemic risk and eroding regulators capacity toensure the soundness of national banking systems generated a market failure evi denced by thedebt crisis commercial bankshad accepted ariskier portfolioofloansthan society considered optimal and were now unwilling to bear the full costs of thislending behavior financial market failurecreated a demand for international regula tiontowhichpolicymakersrespondedby supplying thebasleaccord to theextentthat the payments system had the characterof apublic good it wasreasonable to askevery state to contribute to its maintenance bank supervisors responded to theneed for greater oversight by negotiating the basleaccord

recent regional agreements why so many why so much variance in form why coming so fast and where are they headed recent years have seen a sharp growth in the number of regional agreements both concluded and under negotiation this paper attempts to document and discuss this growth focusing on us eu chinese indian and other agreements the form coverage and content of these agreements vary considerably from case to case the paper asks why so many why the variation in form and why the recent acceleration implications for the trading system are discussed in a final section

immiserizing transfers from abroad abstract this paper shows that an international transfer payment may paradoxically immiserize the recipient country or increase the donor country s welfare even when world markets are stable despite the traditional view that such a paradox theoretically requires market instability to demonstrate this paradoxical possibility the paper extends the conventional trade theoretic analysis to admit exogenous distortions created by tax cum subsidies in domestic production or endogenous distortions due to additionality requirements imposed by the donor on the recipient this analysis of immiserizing transfers from abroad immediately suggests significant implications for important policy issues including the evaluation of real benefits from foreign aid

modeling the forms of international cooperation distribution versus information the problems of distribution and information impede international cooperation they arise when actors select how they will cooperate an exploration of the interaction between these problems using a limited information model of cooperation leads to six conclusions first leadership solutions to coordination problems always exist but leadership here is very different from hegemonic provision of public goods second actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy even without a shadow of the future third diffuse reciprocal strategies arise naturally in coordination problems fourth norms and institutions are intertwined within successful cooperation fifth the form of cooperation on an issue varies with the relative importance of distribution and information finally and most important distributional and informational problems interfere with each other arrangements to cooperate can successfully address one but not both of these problems

global communications and national power life on the pareto frontier regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building global communications regimes however have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power in those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms radio broadcasting and remote sensing no regime was formed in those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications regimes were created although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities

the unconditional most favored nation clause and the maintenance of the liberal trade regime in the postwar 1870s international institutions within the past thirty years become the subject of renewed interest as scholars vigorously dispute their utility neorealists draw on the post world war ii era to advance sweeping general claims of institutional inefficacy this study by contrast deploys the same hard test method grieco applied to the 1970s tokyo round negotiations to the crisis rife 1870s to construct a unique methodological objective a rigorous hard test of nineteenth century institutional autonomy three principal findings emerged first the maintenance of a liberal world economy in the turbulent 1870s is explained by an unlikely commercial instrument and the unprecedented regime design of an unexplored international institution respectively the unconditional most favored nation mfn clause and the informal conventional tariff system cts regime it underpinned not british hegemony second the international trade regime was not a public good unilaterally provisioned by hegemonic britain via the 1846 corn laws repeal the regime was instead a private good that was collectively provisioned by all its constituent member states via the unprecedented interstate practices institutionalized in the 1860 cobden chevalier treaty and then autonomously maintained by a negarchical and self enforcing sanctioning mechanism finally the informal cts regime s enforcement mechanism autonomously altered the interests and behaviors of states in directions incongruent with executive preferences solely through the brute force of rational calculations imposed by decentralized international institutional constraints both the french and british executives in the 1870s believed the regime was normatively inappropriate and unsuccessfully attempted to exit amid eight system threatening crises nonetheless the mfn based regime s self enforcing sanctioning mechanism autonomously induced compliance conceptualized as unitary states behavior deviating from executives first order preference the extraordinarily turbulent 1870s therefore provide an unexplored historical vantage point to make strong institutionalist claims in an era issue area and under conditions that they are least likely to be validated

international technology oriented agreements to address climate change much discussion has surrounded possible alternatives for international agreements on climate change particularly post 2012 among these alternatives technology oriented agreements toas are perhaps the least well defined we explore what toas may consist of why they might be sensible which toas already exist in international energy and environmental governance and whether they could make a valuable contribution to addressing climate change we find that toas aimed at knowledge sharing and coordination research development or demonstration could increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of international climate cooperation but are likely to have limited environmental effectiveness on their own technology transfer agreements are likely to have similar properties unless the level of resources expended is large in which case they could be environmentally significant technology specific mandates or incentives could be environmentally effective within the applicable sector but are more likely to make a cost effective contribution when viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute for flexible emissions based policies these results indicate that toas could potentially provide a valuable contribution to the global response to climate change the success of specific toas will depend on their design implementation and the role they are expected to play relative to other components of the policy portfolio

crisis era protectionism and the multilateral governance of trade an assessment this paper examines the multilateral governance of trade along with the prospects for its meaningful reform in the light of recent crisis era discrimination against the many types of cross border commerce prior episodes of protectionism provide a useful benchmark the findings are not optimistic the current set of multilateral rules is incomplete has weak incentives for compliance and can be readily circumvented only a far reaching revision of these rules could induce more restraint

measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy this article provides an introduction to the trade restrictiveness index tri which equals the uniform tariff that is welfare equivalent to a given pattern of trade protection unlike standard measures of trade restrictiveness the tri has a solid theoretical basis can incorporate both tariffs and quantitative restrictions and can be adapted to construct the trade policy equivalent of domestic distortions the article compares a number of applications and describes procedures for operationalizing the tri on a personal computer the authors conclude that the tri has considerable potential in empirical work