addressing leakage in the eu ets border adjustment or output based allocation the eu ets has been criticised for threatening the competitiveness of european industry and generating carbon leakage i e increasing foreign greenhouse gas emissions two main options have been put forward to tackle these concerns border adjustments and output based allocation i e allocation of free allowances in proportion to current production we compare various configurations of these two options as well as a scenario with full auctioning and no border adjustment against this background we develop a model of the main sectors covered by the eu ets electricity steel cement and aluminium we conclude that the most efficient way to tackle leakage is auctioning with border adjustment which generally induces a negative leakage a spillover this holds even if the border adjustment does not include indirect emissions if it is based on eu rather than foreign specific emissions or for some values of the parameters if it covers only imports another relatively efficient policy is to combine auctioning in the electricity sector and output based allocation in exposed industries especially if free allowances are given both for direct and indirect emissions i e those generated by the generation of the electricity consumed although output based allocation is generally less effective than border adjustment to tackle leakage it is more effective to mitigate production losses in the sectors affected by the ets which may ease climate policy adoption c 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

equilibrium and government commitment abstract how should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome in this paper i show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question and i propose an alternative i show that the complete description of an optimal indeed of any policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected the specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and which ones leave room for multiple equilibria that depend on the expectations of the private sector

should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors abstract if some but not all countries are cooperating to reduce co2 emissions one could make the following argument a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors and therefore co2 emissions in the cooperating countries however this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy and since it is only total co2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate there is no point in a policy that simply relocates co2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy according to this line of reasoning carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy this paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods it is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods however informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

output based allocations and revenue recycling implications for the new zealand emissions trading scheme abstract the new zealand emissions trading scheme nz ets is more comprehensive in its coverage of emissions than schemes introduced or proposed to date in any other country in that it includes agricultural greenhouse gases which account for half of new zealand s total emissions but motivated by concerns for the international competitiveness of emissions intensive trade exposed industrial and agricultural activities current legislation provides for substantial ongoing free allocations to such activities linked to their output here we use a computable general equilibrium model to analyse the impacts of output based allocation given the possibility of recycling net revenues to reduce prior distorting taxes unlike previous modelling studies of alternative nz ets designs we allow for a more realistic modelling both of capital and labour supply we find that as suggested by theoretical results interactions between the ets and existing taxes are important given any level of output based allocation the negative macroeconomic impacts can be reduced by recycling net revenues as efficiently as possible less obviously we find that there may be an optimal non zero level of output based allocation this optimal level increases as the carbon price and or factor supply elasticities increase but decreases if revenues are recycled with greater efficiency

alternative designs for tariffs on embodied carbon a global cost effectiveness analysis in the absence of effective world wide cooperation to curb global warming import tariffs on embodied carbon have been proposed as a potential supplement to unilateral emissions pricing we consider alternative designs for such tariffs and analyze their effects on global welfare within a multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium cge model of global trade and energy our analysis suggests that the most cost efficient policy could be region specific tariffs on all products based on direct plus electricity emissions in the end however the potential cost savings through carbon tariffs must be weighed against the administrative costs as well as legal issues and political considerations

a game theoretic view of the fiscal theory of the price level the goal of this paper is to probe the validity of the fiscal theory of the price level by modelling explicitly the market structure in which households and the government make their decisions i describe the economy as a game and i am thus able to state precisely the consequences of actions that are out of the equilibrium path i show that there exist government strategies that lead to a version of the fiscal theory in which the price level is determined by fiscal variables alone these strategies are however more complex than the simple budgetary rules usually associated with the fiscal theory and the government budget constraint cannot be merely viewed as an equilibrium condition

testing for indeterminacy an application to u s monetary policy reply this paper considers a prototypical new keynesian model in which the equilibrium is undetermined if monetary policy is passive the likelihood based estimation of dynamic equilibrium models is extended to allow for indeterminacies and sunspot fluctuations we construct posterior weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter space and estimates for the propagation of fundamental and sunspot shocks according to the estimated model u s monetary policy post 1982 is consistent with determinacy whereas the pre volcker policy is not we find that before 1979 indeterminacy substantially altered the propagation of shocks

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information abstract this paper provides recursive methods for analyzing the credible equilibria of an incomplete information monetary policy game the policy game is one in which a discretionary government has a short run temptation to engage in a surprise monetary expansion it also has the opportunity to imitate a government that always implements the ex ante optimal monetary policy actions we derive an algorithm for computing the set of credible equilibrium payoffs we use this algorithm to explore the idea that incomplete information monetary policy games of this kind have fewer equilibria and less indeterminacy than their complete information counterparts

a positive theory of discretionary policy the cost of democratic government and the benefits of a constitution we offer an explanation of government s preference for discretionary policy action the main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects discretionary policy imposes a social cost we show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government an optimal state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government s opportunities to exploit its informational advantage rules of this kind and constitutional restrictions are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public

optimal sustainable monetary policy in recent monetary policy literature optimal commitment policy or its variant from a timeless perspective has been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment regardless of its time consistency problem called a stabilization bias with an optimizing model used in the literature we examine sustainable equilibrium of chari and kehoe 1990 and study optimal sustainable policy the policymaker s strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium in the absence of commitment technologies calibrated versions of the model show that the ramsey equilibrium generated by optimal commitment policy is not achievable suggesting that optimal sustainable policy is the desirable policy benchmark from the viewpoint of policy operationality the latter policy involves some issues due to its dependence on the entire history of lagrange multipliers on a sustainability constraint as a guidepost for actual policy conduct that contains no such issues and attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does we propose a sustainable policy conducted by following a policy rule that achieves the best markov equilibrium

cost effective unilateral climate policy design size matters given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on mitigating climate change pressure for unilateral abatement is increasing a major challenge is emissions leakage border carbon adjustments and output based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own we assess antileakage measures as a function of abatement coalition size we first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to see how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition we then employ a computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the strategies as the coalition grows we find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost effectiveness followed by import tariffs and output based rebates the differences across measures and their overall appeal decline as the abatement coalition grows in terms of cost the coalition countries prefer border carbon adjustments countries outside the coalition prefer output based rebates

changes in uk monetary policy rules and discretion in practice abstract in october 1992 following sterling s departure from the exchange rate mechanism britain adopted a new framework for monetary policy that comprised two components first an explicit target for inflation and second institutional changes designed to give greater influence to the bank of england by increasing the transparency and openness of the process by which interest rates are set this paper analyses those changes from the perspective of the debate on rules versus discretion and argues that an appropriate design of institutional arrangements can provide incentives for central bankers to pursue the first best state contingent monetary policy

competence implies credibility the credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the central bank s conservatism we show that another trait of the central bank cb her competence at doing her job or reputation thereof can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent we analyze a static barro and gordon 1983 s game where the effects of monetary policy depend on an unknown state of the economy the cb forms her own private and imprecise view of this state that she may announce to p in a cheap talk game to explain and motivate her policy intentions the precision of the noise in the cb s view measures her competence the more accurate her assessment the clearer an idea she has about what to do the fineness of the equilibrium message space measures monetary policy s transparency in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game the cb credibly announces one of finite inflation targets that differ by at least a multiple of the inflation bias competence ratio if this ratio is too large the cb can credibly communicate only the direction of monetary policy as the cb s competence rises and this ratio falls p knows that the cb puts increasing weight on pursuing her objective targets relative to surprising expectations to stimulate output therefore the equilibrium message space becomes finer a more competent cb is also less likely to erroneously observe extreme realizations of the shocks so she is more able tofine tune expectations at times of business as usual

non competitive market behaviour in the international coking coal market in this paper a primal dual programming model of international coking coal trade is constructed to test for non competitive market behaviour world trade in 1996 is simulated under perfect competition and various non competitive market structures statistical tests are used to compare simulated trade flows with actual data assuming cournot nash behaviour an all consumer oligopsony market structure is preferred to alternative models under an all consumer oligopsony world coking coal prices and trade are lower than under perfect competition under an oligopsonistic structure welfare gains from productivity increases in australian coal mines might largely accrue to coal buyers

investment shocks and business cycles abstract the origins of business cycles are still controversial among macroeconomists this paper contributes to this debate by studying the driving forces of fluctuations in an estimated new neoclassical synthesis model of the u s economy in this model most of the variability of output and hours at business cycle frequencies is due to shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment imperfect competition and to a lesser extent technological frictions are the key to their transmission although labor supply shocks explain a large fraction of the fluctuations in hours at very low frequencies they are irrelevant over the business cycle this finding is important because the microfoundations of these disturbances are widely regarded as unappealing

imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound as the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a new keynesian model during a large recession we characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect confronting monetary policy communication of the u s federal reserve and the swedish riksbank with such a framework the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

the optimal inflation rate in new keynesian models should central banks raise their inflation targets in light of the zero lower bound we study the effects of positive steady state inflation in new keynesian models subject to the zero bound on interest rates we derive the utility based welfare loss function taking into account the effects of positive steady state inflation and solve for the optimal level of inflation in the model for plausible calibrations with costly but infrequent episodes at the zero lower bound the optimal inflation rate is low typically less than two percent even after considering a variety of extensions including optimal stabilization policy price indexation endogenous and statedependent price stickiness capital formation model uncertainty and downward nominal wage rigidities on the normative side price level targeting delivers large welfare gains and a very low optimal inflation rate consistent with price stability these results suggest that raising the inflation target is too blunt an instrument to efficiently reduce the severe costs of zero bound episodes

comparing policies to combat emissions leakage border carbon adjustments versus rebates we explore conditions determining which anti leakage policies might be more effective complements to domestic greenhouse gas emissions regulation we consider four policies that could be combined with unilateral emissions pricing to counter effects on international competitiveness a border charge on imports a border rebate for exports full border adjustment and domestic output based rebating each option faces different potential legal hurdles in international trade law each also has different economic impacts while all can support competitiveness none is necessarily effective at reducing global emissions nor is it possible to rank order the options effectiveness depends on the relative emissions rates elasticities of substitution and consumption volumes we illustrate these results with simulations for the energy intensive sectors of three different economies the united states canada and europe although most controversial full border adjustment is usually most effective but output based rebating for key manufacturing sectors can achieve many of the gains

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

output based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour s backyard competitiveness leakage and welfare we investigate how in an open economy carbon taxes combined with output based rebating obr perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner analytical results suggest that whether the purpose of the obr policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare accounting for global emission reductions the obr rate should be positive in policy relevant cases numerical simulations for canada with the us as the neighbouring trading partner indicate that the impact of us policies on the obr rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the canadian obr policies if for a given us carbon policy canada s aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission intensive and trade exposed eite firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation we find that the necessary domestic obr rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies however if not only the canadian carbon tax but also an equally high us tax is introduced compensatory canadian obr rates will be up to 50 lower depending on the sector and on us obr policy if the policy objective is to increase economy wide allocative efficiency welfare of canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage the us policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable obr rates in canada practical choices of obr rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance thus output based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating eite industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy wide allocative efficiency

impacts of climate policy on the competitiveness of canadian industry how big and how to mitigate competitiveness concerns have been at the forefront of climate policy debates in canada particularly as a result of its high energy intensity and significant exposure to international markets this paper uses a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to assess the likely impacts on sectoral competitiveness that would accompany efforts to meet greenhouse gas mitigation targets that have been set by the canadian government additionally it evaluates several design mechanisms that could be used to reduce the negative competiveness impacts associated with adoption of domestic climate policies the analysis suggests that several sectors would likely face significant competiveness challenges under a reference scenario in which permits are given to emitters in lump sum however it finds that competiveness impacts can be minimized by using output based recycling of permits or by using border tax adjustments

credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank we start from two empirical facts 1 central banks target cpi inflation 2 independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital the first fact makes it difficult for a central bank to implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap because it makes a commitment to overshoot the inflation target not credible we show that the second fact helps to solve this credibility problem the optimal policy can take the form of a currency depreciation combined with a crawling peg a policy advocated by svensson as the foolproof way to escape from a liquidity trap jel e52 f31 f41 this paper starts from two empirical facts 1 central banks target infl ation measured by the consumer price index cpi 2 independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital we provide evidence for these facts below the first fact adds to the well known credibility problem of the optimal escape from a liquidity trap the second fact provides a mechanism through which the credibility problem can be solved and the optimal escape

the deflation bias and committing to being irresponsible i model deflation at zero nominal interest rate in a microfounded general equilibrium model i show that one can analyze deflation as a credibility problem if three conditions are satisfied first the government s only policy instrument is increasing the money supply by open market operations in short term bonds second the economy is subject to large negative demand shocks third the government cannot commit to future policy i call the credibility problem that arises under these conditions the deflation bias i propose several policies to solve it they all involve printing money or issuing nominal debt in addition they require cutting taxes buying real assets such as stocks or purchasing foreign exchange the government credibly commits to being irresponsible by pursuing these policies it commits to higher money supply in the future so that the private sector expects inflation instead of deflation this is optimal since it curbs deflation and increases output by lowering the real rate of return

the macroeconomics of trend inflation most macroeconomic models for monetary policy analysis are approximated around a zero inflation steady state but most central banks target an inflation rate of about 2 percent many economists have recently proposed even higher inflation targets to reduce the incidence of the zero lower bound constraint on monetary policy in this survey we show that the conduct of monetary policy should be analyzed by appropriately accounting for the positive trend inflation targeted by policymakers we first review empirical research on the evolution and dynamics of u s trend inflation and some proposed new measures to assess the volatility and persistence of trend based inflation gaps we then construct a generalized new keynesian model that accounts for a positive trend inflation in this model an increase in trend inflation is associated with a more volatile and unstable economy and tends to destabilize inflation expectations this analysis offers a note of caution regarding recent proposals to address the existing zero lower bound problem by raising the long run inflation target jel e12 e31 e32 e52 e58

central bank reputation in a forward looking model this paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time inconsistent optimal monetary policy in the standard new keynesian model interestingly the forward looking nature of this model enables us to account for the coordination of the private agents on the punishment length of their trigger strategy our results suggest that both the inflation bias and the stabilization bias can be overcome by a reputation concerned central bank for the calibrations used in the literature these results enable us to endogenize woodford s timeless perspective and tend to weaken the case for recent monetary policy delegation proposals

world crude oil and natural gas a demand and supply model abstract this paper examines world markets for crude oil and natural gas over the period 1918 1999 it analyzes the time series properties of output and prices and estimates demand and supply elasticities during 1918 1973 and 1973 1999 oil and gas prices were stable during the first period they became volatile afterwards reflecting deep changes in the market structure following the oil shock in 1973 demand price elasticities were too low however demand income elasticities were high supply price elasticities were also too low the elasticity estimates help to explain the market power of the oil producers and price volatility in response to shocks and corroborate elasticity estimates in energy studies

the signaling effect of raising inflation abstract this paper argues that central bankers should temporarily raise inflation when anticipating liquidity traps to ensure the credibility of otherwise time inconsistent forward guidance policies as stable inflation in normal times either stems from central bankers desire to maintain credibility or from aversion to inflation the private sector is unable to infer the central banker s willingness to follow through on promises from observing stable inflation jeopardizing the efficiency of forward guidance policy we show that this signaling motive can justify temporary deviations of inflation from target well above 2 but also that the low inflation volatility during the great moderation was insufficient to ensure fully efficient forward guidance when needed

the natural rate of interest and its usefulness for monetary policy we estimate a state of the art dsge model to study the natural rate of interest in the united states over the last 20 years the natural rate is highly procyclical and fell substantially below zero in each of the last three recessions although the drop was of comparable magnitude across the three recessions the decline was considerably more persistent in the great recession we discuss the usefulness and limitations particularly due to the zero lower bound of the natural rate for the conduct of monetary policy

measuring emissions avoided by international trade accounting for price differences abstract net emissions avoided by trade nea are the difference between the pollution that would have been produced in a country if it had not exported any products and all the imports required to satisfy its domestic demand had been produced internally and its actual emissions the domestic technology assumption dta applied to an input output model is the appropriate method to estimate the nea the usual implementation of the dta involves that the country analyzed should produce a quantity of products equivalent to the monetary value of the imports required to satisfy its final demand i e monetary dta however due to price differences the same physical quantity of goods in different countries could have a different monetary value and the estimation of the nea would be biased we show that a physical dta focused on the pollution to produce domestically the imports measured in physical units would be a better approach we have applied both methodologies to analyze greenhouse gas emissions in spain 1995 2007 both methodologies show that spain is avoiding emissions through trade however the nea increases up to three times when applying the physical dta showing that results from the monetary dta are biased by price differences

ambiguous policy announcements we study the effects of an announcement of a future shift in monetary policy when agents face knightian uncertainty about the commitment capacity of the monetary authority households are ambiguity averse and are differentially exposed to inflation due to differences in wealth in response to the announcement of a future loosening in monetary policy only wealthy households creditors will act as if the announcement will be fully implemented due to the potential loss of wealth from the prospective policy easing and when creditors believe the announcement more than debtors their expected wealth losses are larger than the wealth gains that debtors expect hence the economy responds as if aggregate net wealth falls which attenuates the effects of the announcement we study the quantitative properties of the model in a liquidity trap after allowing for a realistic characterization of households wealth portfolio