efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

one man one bid abstract we compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice e g adopt one of two proposals we show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome we introduce a simple bidding mechanism where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost and voters receive rebates equal to the average of others payments this mechanism is budget balanced individually rational and fully efficient in the limit moreover the mechanism redistributes from those that gain from the outcome to those that lose and everyone is better off under bidding compared to voting we test the two mechanisms in the lab using an environment with moderate and extremist voters the observed efficiency losses under voting are close to theoretical predictions and significantly larger than under bidding because of redistribution the efficiency gain from bidding benefits mostly the moderate voters

the effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets abstract we report the results of twelve double auction market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium the proposition convergence bias that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above below when consumer surplus is greater less than producer surplus cannot be rejected we do however reject the proposition convergence symmetry that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices

job change patterns and the wages of young men this study uses data from the national longitudinal survey of youth to distinguish empirically between mover stayer search good and experience good models of job mobility we estimate wage models in which the pattern of overall job mobility affects both the level and tenure slope of the log wage path after controlling for the correlation between mobility patterns and time constant person and job specific unobservables we find that workers who undergo persistent mobility have lower log wage paths than less mobile workers this finding is consistent with models in which job mobility is driven by time varying unobservables such as experience good models where changes in perceived match quality cause turnover

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

how trading institutions affect financial market performance some laboratory evidence i introduction trading institutions vary considerably across contemporary financial markets 1 but most can be classified into one of two basic types the continuous double auction da allows traders to submit public offers to buy or to sell and to accept other traders offers at any moment in time the double auction institution offers immediacy but non uniform transaction prices the other basic trading institution the clearinghouse ch gathers offers and clears them at a unified price at a pre specified time it sacrifices immediacy for uniform transaction prices 2 the two types of institutions have co existed and evolved for centuries but now are emerging in new electronic versions market participants and policy makers would like to know which institution or variant or combination is most efficient but theoretical and empirical work to date provides little guidance this paper reports on a series of laboratory asset markets experiments designed to compare variants of the double auction and clearinghouse trading institutions the markets are small usually with eight or nine traders but the traders are profit motivated and experienced with the trading institutions the traded asset has uncertain market value and traders receive useful but inconclusive private information they can only learn the asset s true value during the course of trade laboratory markets offer several advantages for empirical study of financial market institutions first private information is observable even controllable in the laboratory and therefore the investigator can directly measure market efficiency 3 second the complexity of the environment can be varied systematically in the laboratory and its effects on market performance can be separated from the effects of the market institution and other forces finally the market institution itself is controllable in the laboratory so it is possible to make valid causal inferences on how the market institution shapes market performance i begin with a survey of relevant literature and other preliminaries in the rest of this section section ii outlines the laboratory procedures the creation of trading environments of varying complexity the electronic implementation of the clearinghouse and double auction trading institutions the computation of theoretical benchmark prices and allocations and the measurement of market performance section iii collects the results following an illustrative account of a double auction trading period and a clearinghouse trading period i use descriptive statistics to summarize market performance in each of the thirty nine experiments the main conclusions are based on statistical comparisons of market performance across alternative market institutions the clearinghouse institution does surprisingly well it delivers greater market depth than the double auction discovers prices at least as efficiently and produces final allocations almost as efficient as the double auction the main institutional variants examined in this paper concern the amount of information made public regarding order placement orderflow the data suggest that public display of the orderflow enhances double auction efficiency but may impair clearinghouse efficiency a study of trading volume shows higher volume in the double auction in both institutions volume increases when important private news arrives and when the trading period is about to end the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the results a companion paper friedman 1991 considers the effects of awarding various privileges to some but not all traders copeland and friedman 1987 1991 provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets instructions for the current experiments are available on request the need for empirical work a skeptic might argue that empirical work is unnecessary the mere fact that the double auction and clearinghouse institutions both persist in major financial markets implies that both are highly efficient because a more efficient institution would displace less efficient institutions

residential mobility with job location uncertainty abstract this paper investigates the relationship between job changes and residential mobility a job change may be prompted by reasons unrelated to factors associated with housing consumption however a job change may lead to an adjustment to housing consumption i e residential relocation previous studies find that job relocations are positively associated with residential mobility this paper departs from previous studies by looking at the effects of an uncertain future job location on residential mobility and mobility expectation it is conjectured that with the existence of costs of residential mobility a household head s likelihood for changing jobs in the future dampens the household s propensity to move but encourages the formation of mobility expectation these conjectures are examined empirically using data from the panel study of income dynamics and they are confirmed

the wage effects of voluntary labor mobility with and without intervening unemployment this study investigates how an unemployment spell between jobs affects a job changer s new wages one hypothesis holds that the search and mobility costs associated with unemployment between jobs are compensated for by increased wage gains resulting from more intensive job search opposing hypotheses are that unemployed job changers are at a disadvantage because they have fewer job contacts than job changers who move directly from one job to another or because they are unable to gain new skills or develop good work habits while unemployed the results of this analysis of 1979 81 data from the national longitudinal survey of young men support the first hypothesis an unemployment spell between jobs is associated with wage gains higher than those obtained when the job change was made with no intervening unemployment

vote trading with and without party leaders two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority individuals have different privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money we study theoretically and experimentally the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market the theory has strong predictions in both cases trading falls short of full efficiency but for opposite reasons with group leaders the minority wins too rarely with market trades the minority wins too often as a result with group leaders vote trading improves over no trade with market trades vote trading can be welfare reducing the theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data

price quantity strategic market games this paper is yet another in a rapidly growing series e g 2 11 on strategic approaches to economic equilibrium our aim here is to make precise the remark implicitly due to bertrand 1 or 10 ch 4 5 that if the agents in an economy use price setting strategies then the strategic nash equilibria will in fact be walrasian and this without any assumption of a large number of small agents however in our models not only prices but also quantities are set by the agents thus it might actually be more appropriate to call them bertrand cournot types of models we begin with a standard walras exchange economy with a finite number of traders and commodities this is recast as a game in strategic form in essentially two different ways there is a trading post for each commodity to which traders send contingent statements about how much they wish to buy and sell and at what prices in model 1 the trading point is determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply and demand curves in model 2 trade takes place so as to meet as many contingent statements as possible each buyer whose orders are filled pays the price he quoted using a fiat money which can be borrowed costlessly and limitlessly but after trade is over there is a settlement of accounts and a penalty is levied on those who are bankrupt no attempt is made to model the penalty in any detail it is simply described in the form of a disutility but this in turn may be imagined to stem from confiscation of assets see remark 5 or the necessity of procuring highly priced loans etc call a noncooperative equilibrium active if it turns out that no trader is isolated i e trapped as the sole buyer or seller at some trading post then our results may be described as follows in model 1 the active2 n e of the game coincide with the c e of the market furthermore there is a subset of tight active n e which also coincide with the c e and each n e in this subset is strong

an examination of the market for favors and votes in congress this paper examines the strategies that horse traders and power brokers adopt in trading favors to pass legislation although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading with data from the senate vote on the byrd amendment to the 1990 clean air act i conduct such a test the test provides evidence that on this vote i favor trading occurred ii the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination and iii the coalition leaders did not collude with each another

introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium abstract this paper surveys the literature which examines the stability of the expectations that agents are assumed to have in a rational expectations equilibrium ree this issue is more complex than the usual statistical estimation problem because the relationship between observable variables and payoff relevant variables is endogenous one approach taken in the literature yields convergence to a ree but requires agents to have extensive knowledge about the structure and dynamics of the model that prevails while they learn a second approach does not assume that agents have correctly specified likelihood functions and finds that ree may not be stable

the multiple unit double auction the note outlines institutional features of an open outcry market that permit multiple unit or block trades the purpose of the note is to introduce the process as a tool to be used in economics experiments the detailed rules governing the multiple unit double auction muda are stated for the case where offers are tendered by voice as opposed to through a computer the results of markets that use the rules are reported as a demonstration that convergence to equilibrium price traditionally observed in experimental markets remains with the use of the muda process

interrelated quits an empirical analysis of the utility maximizing mobility hypothesis this paper demonstrates how the circumstances of quitting a previous job affect the probability of a later voluntary job change the theoretical section describes a model of expected utility maximizing job search and mobility although the inability to observe utilities associated with specific jobs precludes a direct test of the utility maximizing mobility hypothesis a testable implication is derived in the context of a simple job search model utility maximization implies that workers who rely exclusively on employed search to find a new job are less likely to quit again this theoretical implication is confirmed by the parameter estimates copyright 1988 by mit press

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

the returns to mobility and job search by gender using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth the authors estimate the returns to job search mobility and the interaction of search and mobility for young men and women they find st

an empirical test of the theory of on the job search preunemployment search is the fundamental labor market process generating beneficial effects of advance notice yet theory indicates that workers receiving notice may not search whereas others may search even without advance notice our weighted results

competitivity in auction markets an experimental and theoretical investigation the authors report successive rounds of theory and laboratory experiments investigating price taking behavior and market efficiency they focus on the impact of structural parameters as well as trading institution the structural parameters involve noncompetitive supply and demand and a new odd lot trading procedure for divisible goods the trading institutions include the continuous double auction and the one shot clearinghouse as well as a new quantities only clearinghouse institution the authors present and justify an as if complete information theory that explains the competitive outcomes and that correctly predicts highly noncompetitive outcomes in quantities only clearinghouse markets copyright 1995 by royal economic society

rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets the idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization hurwicz 1972 and rational expectations lucas 1972 we report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations in two of the three series one in which participants trade a complete set of arrow debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium

financial institutions business models and the global transmission of monetary policy abstract global financial institutions play an important role in channeling funds across countries and therefore transmitting monetary policy from one country to another in this paper we study whether such international transmission depends on financial institutions business models in particular we use dutch spanish and u s confidential supervisory data to test whether the transmission operates differently through banks insurance companies and pension funds we find marked heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy across the three types of institutions across the three banking systems and across banks within each banking system while insurance companies and pension funds do not transmit home country monetary policy internationally banks do with the direction and strength of the transmission determined by their business models and balance sheet characteristics

job mobility and gender based wage growth differentials i introduction evidence presented by goldin 1989 o neill 1985 and others shows that the gender wage gap is narrowing much of the narrowing has been attributed to changes in female employment behavior such as the increased consistency of labor force participation and investment in education however because wages are not yet equal questions remain for example does mobility play a role in the remaining wage gap in this paper we examine the role of mobility because this has been a relatively neglected area of interest for researchers concerned about the gender wage gap some evidence on gender differences in mobility and the returns to mobility has been presented but there is little consistency in the reported evidence keith and mcwilliams 1995 demonstrate that the mobility histories of young men and women differ significantly loprest 1992 reports that for a sample of individuals who worked full time for four consecutive years young men s wages grew twice as much when they changed jobs i e employers as young women s did however abbott and beach 1994 find that the wage effects of mobility for women are similar in magnitude to the gains that mincer 1986 and holmlund 1984 find for men given the sometimes conflicting results reported so far determining the extent and the cause of gender differences in wage mobility effects has important implications for gender wage gap arguments in this study we examine the patterns and the returns to mobility for young men and women to examine mobility patterns we disaggregate mobility into involuntary or employer initiated and voluntary or employee initiated separations we further disaggregate involuntary separations into layoffs and discharges and we further disaggregate voluntary separations into family related and non family related quits by examining the impact of each of these different types of job separation on wage growth and the difference in the relative frequency of each type of separation for men and women we can make inferences about the impact of early career mobility on the gender wage gap the remainder of this paper is organized as follows in section ii we review evidence on the returns to different types of mobility in section iii we present evidence on gender differences in mobility and wage growth we use data from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy to examine the mobility patterns of men and women and to calculate average wages and average wage growth in section iv we describe how we selected a sample and specified a model for estimating the determinants of wage growth in section v we examine the wage growth effects of different types of mobility controlling for starting wages and individuals fixed effects in section vi we discuss our conclusions ii the returns to different types of mobility workers change jobs for different reasons some voluntary and some involuntary there is some evidence that the returns to different types of mobility differ not surprisingly there is consistent evidence that employee initiated separations quits increase wage growth and that employer initiated separations layoffs and discharges decrease wage growth relative to staying with the same employer 1 additional evidence on the job mobility and wage growth of men has been offered as well bartel and borjas 1981 show that job related quits have a larger positive impact on wage growth than do non job related quits with the highest wage growth resulting from those quits that are associated with successful job shopping parsons 1989 shows that for young men an employer initiated separation with prejudice a discharge results in a larger wage penalty than an employer initiated separation without prejudice a layoff keith 1993 and keith and mcwilliams 1995 show that the number of previous discharges decreases and the number of previous job related quits increases the current wage for samples of young men

advance production in oral double auction markets abstract the effects of advance production in oral double auction markets are investigated price distributions under advance production ap and production to demand td conditions do not differ however production and efficiency in ap markets tend to be lower than in td markets

costly employment contract renegotiation and the labor mobility of young men the distinction of quits and permanent layoffs remains a contentious issue in the labor economics literature basically there appear two contrasting views of such turnover while both interpretations of turnover are derived from job matching models that assume wealth maximizing behavior of workers and firms each involves different assumptions about the feasibility of individual labor contract negotiations following hire on the one hand application of the coase theorem to employment contracts implies that turnover will occur only when the value of the worker s product in some alternative employment exceeds current job productivity since the actual division of the job match rent is assumed costlessly renegotiable only the presence of a truly more productive job assignment would prevent the renegotiation of the current rent sharing contract to the mutual benefit of both worker and firm the likelihood of a job change is thus directly related to the level of total match productivity irregardless of whether the worker in response to some later survey question characterizes the separation as a quit or permanent layoff according to this formulation of worker and firm attachments quits and permanent layoffs are at least in any sense relevant to actual resource allocation indistinguishable an implication of this model is of course that mobility enhances productivity see gary becker elisabeth landes and robert michael 1977 counter to this view stand models of job matching that suggest that the presence of transactions costs in the form of costly contract renegotiations preclude any easy application of the coase theorem to employment contracts most forcefully advocated by masanori hashimoto 1981 these models of job matching imply that quits and permanent layoffs are different the difference results from the fact that with costly contract renegotiation mobility is to a large extent determined by the actual rent sharing agreement formulated at the beginning of employment according to this view then the total value of the match does not exclusively determine job change and thus not all mobility is productivity augmenting this paper offers a model of job matching with costly post hire negotiations in some aspects similar to that of hashimoto but with particular relevance to the population of young workers only beginning their labor force participation while hashimoto s discussion concentrates on longer term firmspecific training decisions the current model focuses on the period immediately following hire when worker productivity is to a large extent governed by endowed capabilities rather than determined by learning on the job the theoretical focus on inexperienced workers as well as the corresponding youthful composition of the empirical sample are motivated to control for unobserved factors such as firm specific human capital stocks as much as possible in further contrast to hashimoto s emphasis the model yields empirical implications concerning the role of wages in the determination of mobility that contrast to the implications of an otherwise similar zero negotiations cost model of job matching derivation of the empirical implications concerning the relationship of wages to quits and layoffs represents the primary contribution of this paper finally empirical results are presented that at least for a sample of very young men over a short period of time department of economics university of houston houston tx 77004 i thank finis welch dan mitchell and the referee for comments on an earlier version of this paper

group specific effects of interregional mobility on earnings a microdata analysis for germany lehmer f and moller j group specific effects of inter regional mobility on earnings a microdata analysis for germany regional studies the paper analyses the relationship between regional mobility and earnings for different groups of workers using a large panel microdata set the authors find negative earnings differentials of movers in the year before migration and strong evidence for significant wage gains through mobility a decomposition of blinder oaxaca type reveals different group specific rewards effects suggesting a positive post mobility wage differential of movers over the incumbent workforce for some groups irrespective of the region of destination the existence of a general wage growth effect of mobility appears to be robust and cannot be explained by the time invariant part of unobserved heterogeneity lehmer f et moller j l impact sur les revenus la mobilite interregionale des groupes specifiques des groupes sur les revenus une analyse des donnees microeconomiques pour l allemagne

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

democracy undone systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets we study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule we identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium in equilibrium only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority the equilibrium strongly resembles an all pay auction for decision power it makes clear that votes are only a medium for the allocation of power the probability of a minority victory is always higher than efficient and converges rapidly to one half as the electorate increases for any minority size the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant democracy is undone by the market

when costly voting is beneficial abstract we present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote when there is a zero cost to voting all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be by having a cost to voting only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost we show that by adding this cost welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough

price formation in double auction markets abstract this paper reports 14 laboratory experiments that examine existing theories of the price formation process in the continuous double auction the experiments feature random values and costs and therefore a new price formation observation each period we find that efficiency is high and rises with experience in this environment we also find that trades with greater exchange surplus tend to occur earlier in the period that increased trader experience reduces an anomalous intertemporal arbitrage opportunity observed previously and that only when traders are very experienced does exchange surplus accrue disproportionately to the side of the market with a smaller number of traders

competing for loyalty the dynamics of rallying support abstract we consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group we focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially we show that competition reduces agents welfare with public goods or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents and increases agents welfare with public bads we apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers vote buying and exclusive deals jel d42 d62 d72 d82 g34 h41

markups in double auction markets abstract we study the continuous double auction cda market with simulated traders using three simple markup rules relative to analytic results obtained for markups in the simpler call market cm we find that uniform cda markups have a more complex and non monotonic impact on cda market outcomes such as price volume and efficiency the symmetric nash equilibrium markup in the cda is remarkably close to the most efficient markup in thick markets which may partially explain the mysterious efficiency for cda market

violence bribery and fraud the political economy of elections in sub saharan africa post soviet african democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation vote buying and ballot fraud we propose a model of electoral competition where although some voters oppose violence it is effective in intimidating swing voters we show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence which corresponds to a terrorism strategy similarly a nationally weak incumbent will use repression however a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud we discuss the applicability of the model to several african elections

the relative effects of employed and unemployed job search a lthough many early models of job search assumed that job seekers were unemployed economists have come to recognize the importance of on the job search mattila 1974 for example found that roughly 60 of quitters experienced no unemployment between jobs implying that the majority of voluntary job changers engaged in on the job search the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search has been modelled in the theoretical search literature barron and mccafferty 1977 burdett 1978 however there have been no attempts to estimate empirically the determinants of this choice 2 some researchers have however examined the resulting wages associated with these two types of search and found a greater wage return to employed than to unemployed search mattila 1969 black 1980 however because voluntarily unemployed search involves forgoing income burdett 1978 while employed search does not abstracting from voluntary reductions in hours incomemaximizing job seekers would never quit to search unless the expected net return to unemployed search exceeded that for employed search thus the previously mentioned empirical findings at first glance might appear to contradict the assumption of income maximization by job seekers because some workers do quit into unemployment 3 in this paper it is argued that previous attempts to compare the returns of employed and unemployed job search suffer from a selectivity problem specifically searchers who accept offers without experiencing any unemployment are likely to have unobservable variables such as informal job contacts and ability which will raise the relative return to employed search compared to that of voluntarily unemployed job seekers 4 providing an explanation for higher wages for on the job searchers than for unemployed searchers this paper estimates the relative wage effects of employed and unemployed search and the determinants of the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search unlike earlier work mattila 1969 black 1980 the previously mentioned selectivity problems are accounted for this is the first attempt to estimate the determinants of choice of search mode 5 without adjusting for selectivity bias as regards employed vs unemployed search it is found that employed search is associated with greater expected wage offers than unemployed search controlling for measurable personal characteristics however accounting for selectivity the expected wage offer given unemployed search is greater than that given employed search finally the greater is the difference between the expected offer given unemployed and that given employed search the more likely one is to choose unemployed search these findings suggest that quitting to search unemployed may be a wealth maximizing decision received for publication november 5 1980 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 university of illinois at urbana champaign and arizona state university respectively professor low is partially supported by a faculty grant from the graduate college at arizona state university the authors thank francine blau wallace hendricks and two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions i for a summary of this literature see lippman and mccall 1976 2 barron and mccafferty 1977 do estimate an aggregate time series model of the log of the proportion of quits entering unemployment as a function of the vacancy rate proxied by the help wanted advertising index however such a model ignores search that does not lead to quits and does not include variables beyond the vacancy rate that influence an individual s choice of search mode i it is also possible that the forgone earnings due to unemployed search could in principle be less than the possible savings in direct search costs due to unemployed search relative to employed search see burdett 1978 in this case a lower wage return to unemployed search could imply that quitting was based on income considerations further individuals may have quit for nonwage reasons 4 black 1980 found that other things equal those who planned to seek new employment but did not quit had significantly lower wage growth than those who did not plan to search and did not quit this finding strongly suggests the likelihood of a selectivity bias black 1980 p 227 black s 1976 1980 data the michigan panel study of income dynamics psid for his work on employed search did not allow him to distinguish employed and unemployed search

the wage effects of cumulative job mobility this analysis of data from the national longitudinal survey of youth shows that cumulative job mobility had statistically significant effects on wages in the years 1979 88 the direction of the wage effects positive or negative and their magnitude varied depending on the type of cumulative mobility examined employee initiated versus employerinitiated separations economic versus family related quits layoffs versus discharges the results also indicate that although men and women had different mobility histories men for example had been discharged more often than women and women had quit for family related reasons more often than men the wage effects of each type of cumulative mobility economic quits family related quits layoffs and discharges were similar for men and women tn this paper we examine the impact of cumulative job mobility on the subsequent wages of young men and women most previous work on this subject has focused on the impact of specific mobility events such as quits or layoffs rather than on the impact of total job history on wages researchers looking at single mobility decisions have consistently reported evidence that a change in employers does affect a worker s subsequent wage therefore it is reasonable to ask whether the impact ofjob change is cumulative that is does a worker s current wage reflect the impact of all past mobility decisions quits layoffs and discharges also since most of the

market power in emissions trading markets ruled by a multiple unit double auction further experimental evidence we discuss selected methodological problems of previous double auction da experiments and test the hypothesis that a multiple unit double auction muda is able to prevent market power in an emissions trading market additionally we analyze how the information subjects receive about the market structure and different levels of subjects experience influence the behavior based on a larger number of independent observations than analyzed in previous studies the experiment generates two main results first emissions trading markets ruled by a muda realize a high degree of efficiency even under market power conditions however a muda is in general not able to restrict market power we observe persistent price discrimination in two market power environments i e the distribution of profits is strongly shifted in favor of the strong market side without greatly harming efficiency this result is independent of the information to subjects about the market structure second when subjects are experienced the efficiency is higher and the ability of the strong market side to exercise market power declines strongly however the variability of behavior is large and the strong market side is still able to realize supracompetitive profits in some groups

can a corrupt ruling party win a re election through vote buying abstractin many developing countries it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes we develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party s chances of being re elected the results show because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

job mobility and earnings over the life cycle previous studies have shown that in the short run quits generally lead to wage increases on the next job and layoffs to no increase or to a wage cut the author of this study argues however that the prospect of a job change for any reason creates a disincentive for a worker to invest in training that is specific to the current job and therefore those who change jobs frequently may earn less over their life cycle than those who other things equal seldom change jobs an analysis of data from the national longitudinal survey of mature men supports that expectation showing that for white males job separations usually lead to wage gains in the short run but nonmobile workers tend to achieve significantly higher wages over the long run

leverage across firms banks and countries we present new stylized facts on bank and rm leverage during the period 2000 2009 using internationally comparable micro level data from many countries we document the following patterns a there was an increase in leverage for investment banks prior to the sub prime crisis b there was no visible increase in leverage for the typical commercial bank and non nancial rm c o balance sheet items constitute a big fraction of assets especially for large commercial banks in the us whereas investment banks do not report these items d the leverage ratio is procyclical for investment banks and for large commercial banks in the us e banks in emerging markets with tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection experienced signicantly less deleveraging during the crisis the results suggest that excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality rather than the quantity of assets

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

real interest rates leverage and bank risk taking do low interest rate environments lead to greater bank risk taking we show that when banks can adjust their capital structures reductions in real interest rates lead to greater leverage and higher risk for any downward sloping loan demand function however if the capital structure is fixed the effect depends on the degree of leverage following a decrease in interest rates well capitalized banks increase risk while highly levered banks may decrease it if loan demand is linear or concave further the capitalization cutoff depends on the degree of bank competition this effect therefore should vary across countries and over time

logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism theory and evidence from china this paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of logrolling between interest groups on social welfare in a non democratic political system in particular we focus on china where bureaucratic interest groups are separate vertical organizations reaching down from beijing to the provinces and cities the key question in this paper is what are the effects of the logrolling of parochial interest groups on state policies and social welfare in autocracies we address this question both theoretically and empirically the theory predicts a specific distortion in resource allocation because of logrolling while the empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction we find policy outcomes under logrolling are characterized by excessive spending on all the interest groups preferred goods and insufficient spending on public goods we test the existence of logrolling between the ministry of civil affairs and ministry of health in china our result shows logrolling between the two ministries lead to inefficiencies in social security and health care policies

credit default swaps and the credit crisis many observers have argued that credit default swaps contributed significantly to the credit crisis of particular concern to these observers are that credit default swaps trade in the largely unregulated over the counter market as bilateral contracts involving counterparty risk and that they facilitate speculation involving negative views of a firm s financial strength some observers have suggested that credit default swaps would not have made the crisis worse had they traded on exchanges i conclude that credit default swaps did not cause the dramatic events of the credit crisis that the over the counter credit default swaps market worked well during much of the crisis and that exchange trading has both advantages and costs compared to over the counter trading though i argue that eliminating over the counter trading of credit default swaps could reduce social welfare i also recognize that much research is needed to understand better and to quantify the social gains and costs of derivatives in general and credit default swaps in particular

price dynamics in general equilibrium experiments general equilibrium ge theory faces several related challenges classical theories of out of equilibrium adjustment are intuitive but implausibly centralized further standard restrictions on individual preferences place little structure on aggregate excess demand functions amongst other issues this fact implies that economies can be unstable under classical dynamics and thus instability appears to be an unavoidable feature of ge theory this paper recounts laboratory studies of ge environments which reveal that classical theories of dynamics do in fact organize market activity surprisingly well these experiments suggest that the walrasian auctioneer for example appears to be a constructive abstraction and that instability should be accommodated within theory rather than circumscribed laboratory applications of ge theory focused on issues beyond stability and dynamics are also briefly surveyed

redistributive politics with distortionary taxation abstract this paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments we present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of myerson r myerson incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems amer polit sci rev 87 1993 856 869 and lizzeri and persico a lizzeri n persico the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives amer econ rev 91 2001 225 239 two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes we solve for the case of both targetable and non targetable taxes we prove that there is an imperfect efficiency targetability trade off on the tax side politicians prefer targetable taxes over non targetable ones especially when the latter are less efficient yet targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non targetable taxes

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

suspiciously timed trade disputes abstract this paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes focusing on wto disputes filed by the united states during the 1995 2014 period we find that u s presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re election moreover u s trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states to explain these regularities we develop a theoretical model in which re election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity

distributive politics with vote and turnout buying the objective of this paper is to model the incumbent s allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying persuasion and turnout buying mobilization the existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts this paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party a third option should be taken into account in fact the optimal allocation of resources rather than focusing on safe or swing districts should target opposition strongholds that is the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored the intuition for this result is simple since the incumbent does not know individual preferences he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts all voters in a given district look identical to him hence when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters who would have voted for him anyway

allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders market as a partial substitute for individual rationality we report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by zero intelligence programs that submit random bids and offers imposing a budget constraint i e not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure independent of traders motivation intelligence or learning adam smith s invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality

a simple testable model of double auction markets abstract we propose a model of price formation in double auction markets which employs the strong simplifying assumption that agents neglect strategic feedback effects and regard themselves as playing a game against nature agents otherwise are strict expected utility maximizers employing bayesian updating procedures we prove the optimality of simple aggressive reservation price strategies in our general model and propose a parametric form that yields very detailed and computable predictions of market behavior

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

the federal reserve s large scale asset purchase programmes rationale and effects we provide empirical estimates of the effect of large scale asset purchases lsaps on longer term us treasury yields within a framework that allows for several transmission channels including the scarcity channel associated with the preferred habitat literature and the duration channel associated with interest rate risk we also clarify lsaps role in the broader context of historical monetary policy strategy results indicate that lsap style operations mainly impact longer term rates via the nominal term premium within that premium the response is predominantly embodied in the real term premium the scarcity and duration channels both seem to be of considerable importance

centralized vote trading this paper presents a model of centralized vote trading in a legislature in this model legislators trade only with party leaders who set prices at which they will buy needed vote changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders and purchases promises from the leaders to pass or defeat particular bills of high concern to the legislator relative to the price the leguslator must pay

beyond chopsticks symmetric equilibria in majority auction games majority auction games are simultaneous sealed bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction more than a half of the objects each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it symmetric equilibria having simple intuitive forms are shown to exist in first price second price and all pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large this contrasts with earlier results for the two bidder pure chopstick majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated

human capital investment specialization and the wage effects of voluntary labor mobility ahstract analyses of voluntary labor mobility suggest that job search facilitates job change while specific training inhibits mobility further given that specific skills cannot be transferred between jobs and since both search and training are costly it is reasonable for workers to specialize in search or specific training on a given job training or search specialization however implies that estimation methods which treat the incidence of a quit as exogenous underestimate mobility effects on wages the larger wage effects reported here result from simultaneous estimation but also reflect more accurate measurement of wage growth between jobs

an empirical model of employed search unemployed search and nonsearch the 1969 1971 national longitudinal surveys data on young men were used to study the employed worker s choice among employed search unemployed search and not searching for a new job we assume that an unobserved variable search intensity governs this choice such that unemployed search involves a greater intensity than employed search which of course is associated with greater intensity than nonsearch the principal results are that current wages seniority collective bargaining coverage employment outside construction and employment by government are each ceteris paribus negatively associated with search intensity further each of these variables lowers the probability of not searching and raises the probabilities of employed and unemployed job search

risk taking spillovers of u s monetary policy in the global market for u s dollar corporate loans abstract we study the effects of u s interest rates and other factors on risk taking in the global market for u s dollar syndicated term loans we find that before the global financial crisis both u s and non u s lenders originated ex ante riskier loans to non u s borrowers in response to a decline in short term u s interest rates and after the crisis in response to a decline in longer term u s interest rates after the crisis this behavior was more prominent for shadow banks and less prominent for banks with relatively low capital separately before the crisis lenders originated less risky loans in response to u s dollar appreciation across the periods the responses to risk appetite and economic uncertainty varied to the extent that the federal reserve affects u s interest rates we provide evidence of global risk taking spillovers of u s monetary policy which are important but not dominant factors for risk taking in the market

loan syndication and credit cycles cyclicality in the supply of business credit has been the focus of a considerable amount of research this cyclicality can stem from shocks to borrowers collateral which affect firms ability to raise capital if agency and information problems are significant ben s bernanke and mark gertler 1989 or it can stem from shocks to bank capital which affect the supply of bank loans if agency and information problems limit the ability of banks to raise additional capital bernanke 1983 both of these channels may have been at work during the financial crisis that started in 2007 ran duchin oguzhan ozbas and berk a sensoy 2010 show that firms with more collateral were better able to withstand the contraction in credit and victoria ivashina and david scharfstein 2010 show that reductions in bank capital had an adverse effect on lending in this paper we examine cyclicality in the supply of credit in the context of modern forms of banking often referred to as the originateto distribute model in particular we are interested in the role of syndicated lending in traditional bank lending the focus of most models of banking banks originate and hold loans on their balance sheets this exposes banks to risk but provides them with strong incentives to screen and monitor borrowers douglas w diamond 1984 over the last 20 years however the development and growth of the syndicated loan market has enabled a bank to originate a loan but retain only a fraction of it on average the originating bank or lead bank retains about a third of each syndicated loan and sells the remaining share to a syndicate of investors which includes banks and institutional investors such as pension funds mutual funds hedge funds and sponsors of structured loan syndication and credit cycles

vote trading in power sharing systems a laboratory investigation in theory decentralized vote trading in power sharing systems promotes a efficiency by assigning greater decision making power to individuals that care a lot about the election s outcome and b dispersion of benefits since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes we experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that indeed allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election importantly these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions thus reinforcing their empirical relevance

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact in the european monetary union tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact borrowing from the experience of environmental markets this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the european monetary union having chosen an aggregate target for the union and an initial distribution of permits emu countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation the scheme exploits countries incentives to minimize their costs is transparent and flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of europe wide recessions in addition it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to gdp ratios finally the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance lending credibility to the stability pact s goal of a balanced budget in the medium run alessandra casella

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

loans on sale credit market seasonality borrower need and lender rents abstract the market for corporate credit is characterized by significant seasonal variation both in interest rates and the volume of new lending firms borrowing from banks during seasonal sales in late spring and fall issue at 19 basis points cheaper than winter and summer borrowers issuers during cheap seasons appear to have less immediate needs but are enticed by low rates to engage in precautionary borrowing high interest rate periods capture borrowers with unanticipated non deferrable investment needs consistent with models of intertemporal price discrimination seasonality is strongly associated with market concentration among a few large banks with repeated interactions

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

market power in oral double auctions this paper reports the results of a series of oral double auction experiments in which some traders possess market power a market is set up in which the configuration of the supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices this market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive equilibrium price despite the competitive nature of the oral double auction institution the nonconvergence occurs most frequently in the experiments involving experienced subjects

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press