allocation of fixed transmission cost to wheeling transactions by cooperative game theory this paper describes a methodology to allocate the cost of transmission network facilities to wheeling transactions in decentralized power systems the authors propose that the responsibility placed on transmission facilities involved in each transaction be according to the transmission usage pattern their proposal incorporates the mw mile method and considers economies of scale of transmission network facilities they also incorporate a nucleolus scheme in the cooperative game theory to deal with matters of conflict the applicability of their method is demonstrated in a numerical example

the motivation and bias of bureaucrats many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper and three primary results are shown first bureaucrats should be biased second sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests for a range of bureaucracies those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes third self selection need not produce the desired bias instead selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal and those who are least preferred

transmission system management and pricing new paradigms and international comparisons the transmission system once the necessary but nearly invisible component of the electric power system is now the focus of physical electrical and financial attention of the utility and more significantly their potential suppliers customers this paper has three primary objectives the first is to present a discussion of a new paradigm for the electric power industry the second is to review transmission pricing options specifically those utilizing either long run lrmc or short run srmc marginal cost based approaches the third is to provide a review of innovative approaches to transmission asset management and finance as seen from international experience

sincerity in corporate philanthropy stakeholder perceptions and firm value this study extends the literature on symbolic management by incorporating the role of stakeholder perceptions into the context of corporate philanthropy in particular we differentiate between the quantitative generous giving and qualitative innovative giving aspects of giving we argue that although stakeholders may perceive both types of giving as being substantive rather than symbolic innovative giving is likely to be perceived as more substantive than generous giving is and thus has a greater impact on firm value furthermore stakeholder perceptions of corporate philanthropy as being more symbolic or substantive are influenced by firm characteristics the type of products or services that a firm provides and the life cycle stage that the firm is in which provide stakeholders with a context to better assess the nature of a firm s philanthropic actions and the substantiveness of its giving we find support for our predictions using a sample covering u s firms philanthropic activities over a 19 year period

trade offs in the investment decisons of european venture capitalists abstract previous studies of venture capital investment criteria which have tended to utilize traditional likert scaled survey methods have produced some general findings which indicate that the human factor is of utmost importance however virtually all of these studies have been undertaken with u s based venture capitalists in addition the studies have generally been exploratory and have assumed a single hierarchy of decision criteria in all cases and across all venture capitalists we do not accept that this is valid therefore our study tested this assumption by investigating the trade offs made by venture capitalists in europe thirty five investment criteria were identified from the literature and from experts in the field and a questionnaire was developed that required the venture capitalist to make 53 pairwise trade offs with multiple levels seventy three venture capitalists from across europe were interviewed and completed the questionnaire conjoint analysis was used to compute relative rankings and overall rankings were computed to provide some general insight into the overall importance of the various criteria after this cluster analysis was used to identify different decision groupings the trade offs were randomized in the questionnaire but for descriptive purposes fall into the following groupings financial product market strategic competitive fund management team management competence and deal all five management team criteria as opposed to management competence criteria were ranked among the first seven product market criteria appeared to be only moderately important and fund and deal criteria were at the bottom of the rankings overall we conclude that the venture capitalists interviewed would as a group prefer to select an opportunity that offers a good management team and reasonable financial and product market characteristics even if the opportunity does not meet the overall fund and deal requirements it appears quite logically that without the correct management team and a reasonable idea good financials are generally meaningless because they will never be achieved cluster analysis identified three groupings of venture capitalists those primarily concerned with investing nationally those who focus solely upon the deal and those mainstream investors who consistently and instinctively rank the five management team criteria at the top of their list however there was no evident country bias a conclusion that is sustained if the countries are grouped by physical proximity northern versus southern europe or by size of the local venture capital community a surrogate for experience moreover there was no relationship to the scale of the fund the typical round of financing or the apparent network the article concludes by outlining the implications of the study for venture capitalists entrepreneurs and the research community

tariffs and load management the french experience the aim of an electric public utility is the optimum control of the electrical energy generating and consumption system consistency is required between the means of control at level of supply and the means of control at level of demand on the demand side marginal cost pricing is an efficient tool to achieve a good management this paper presents the french experience in this field

the investor specific price of renewable energy project risk a choice experiment with incumbent utilities and institutional investors abstract renewable energy investments in germany have recently soared trebling the output of wind and solar power generation in only ten years while incumbent utilities have lagged behind in terms of investment new entrants have significantly contributed to this growth existing literature has primarily focused on explaining the lethargy of incumbents former investments although there is a growing need to investigate recent investment drivers to secure the necessary power plant capacity at a moderate cost from incumbents and new entrants alike to close this gap a choice experiment involving 1 659 investment choices by 52 european professional investors was conducted in significant contrast to the case with altruistic investors this survey underlines the importance of using financial incentives to attract professional investors given full exposure to electricity price risk incumbent utilities would facilitate projects at a 3 04 risk premium whereas institutional investors demand 6 61 generally incumbent utilities and institutional investors are equally attracted by low risk projects however when risk increases institutional investors are more hesitant to become involved while incumbent utilities confidently navigate these higher risk projects

utility cogenerator game for pricing power sales and wheeling fees the authors have studied an extensive game model of an electricity market where a cogenerator sells excess electricity to an electric utility or to an end user they found that a buy back system the utility purchases cogenerated power is as efficient as a cogenerator customer wheeling system and that these two systems are more desirable than a monopoly system for the regulator the buy back rate should be equal to lp bargaining solution or less than nash bargaining solution the marginal cost of the electric utility they also conducted an analysis of a two period electricity market in which they found that the cogenerator that can supply excess power during peak period obtains the market advantage

optimal pricing of non utility generated electric power the importance of an optimal pricing policy for pricing nonutility generated power is pointed out in this paper an optimal pricing policy leads to benefits for all concerned the utility industry and the utility s other customers in this paper it is shown that reliability differentiated real time pricing provides an optimal nonutility generated power pricing policy from a societal welfare point of view firm capacity purchase and hence an optimal price for purchasing firm capacity are an integral part of this pricing policy a case study shows that real time pricing without firm capacity purchase results in improper investment decisions and higher costs for the system as a whole without explicit firm capacity purchase the utility makes greater investment in capacity addition in order to meet its reliability criteria than is socially optimal it is concluded that the nonutility generated power pricing policy presented in this paper and implied by reliability differentiated pricing policy results in social welfare maximizing investment and operation decisions

going beyond best technology and lowest price on renewable energy investors preference for service driven business models abstract renewable energy is becoming increasingly important for economies in many countries but still in an emerging industry renewable energy requires supportive energy policy helping firms to develop and protect competitive advantages in global competition as a guideline for designing such policy we consult well informed stakeholders within the renewable energy industry investors their preferences serve as explorative indicator for assessing which business models might succeed in competition to contribute to only limited research on renewable energy investors preferences we ask which business models investment managers for renewable energy prefer to invest in we report from an explorative study of 380 choices of renewable energy investment managers based on the stated preferences we modelled three generic business models to calculate the share of investors preferences we find exiting evidence a customer intimacy business model that proposes best services is much more preferred by investors than business models that propose lowest price or best technology policy makers can use those insights for designing policy that supports service driven business models for renewable energy with a scope on customer needs rather than technology or price additionally we state important implications for renewable energy entrepreneurs managers and research

intelligent agents for negotiations in market games 2 application for part i see ibid vol 13 no 5 p 1103 8 1998 in competitive markets human decision makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of note that such coalitions are legal provided market power is not monopolized we present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt our negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory however it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential coalition partners in the part i we presented the negotiation model in this paper we apply it to power markets

strategic generation capacity expansion planning with incomplete information to study the competitive behavior among individual generating companies gencos an incomplete information game model is proposed in this paper in which each genco is modeled as an agent each agent makes strategic generation capacity expansion decisions based on its incomplete information on other gencos the formation of this game model falls into a bi level optimization problem the upper level of this problem is the gencos own decision on optimal planning strategies and energy reserve bidding strategies the lower level problem is the iso s market clearing problem that minimizes the cost to supply the load which yields price signals for gencos to calculate their own payoffs a co evolutionary algorithm combined with pattern search is proposed to optimize the search for the nash equilibrium of the competition game with incomplete information the nash equilibrium is obtained if all gencos reach their maximum expected payoff assuming the planning strategies of other gencos remain unchanged the physical withholding of capacity is considered in the energy market and the herfindahl hirschman index is utilized to measure the market concentration the competitive behaviors are analyzed in three policy scenarios based on different market rules for reserve procurement and compensation

bidding strategies for electricity producers in a competitive electricity marketplace this paper presents a methodology for the development of bidding strategies for electricity producers in a competitive electricity marketplace initially the problem is modeled as a two level optimization problem where at the first level a market participant tries to maximize his expected profit under the constraint that at the second level an independent system operator dispatches power solving an optimal power flow problem that minimizes total system cost it is assumed that each supplier bids a linear supply function and chooses his bidding strategy based on probabilistic estimates of demand and rival behavior monte carlo simulation is used to calculate the expected profit and genetic algorithms are employed to find the optimal strategy subsequently the formulation is expanded to account for different market participants risk profiles it is shown that risk aversion may influence the optimal bidding strategy of an individual

evaluation of alternatives for power system coordination and pooling in a competitive environment the paper defines and classifies essential issues that relate the need for electric power system coordination with the increasing development of competition principles are formulated and a coordination model and a market structure are proposed emphasizing the need for economic dispatch in the wholesale market a detailed comparison is made of the market and pooling implementations developed in argentina and chile countries that have pioneered the creation of competitive markets in the electric energy sector an evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of those two implementations is included

modeling greenhouse gas reduction from the australian electricity sector the australian electricity sector is expected to undergo major changes to reduce the current sectoral co2 emission of 190 million tons to 96 million tons by 2050 this paper summarizes two major modeling studies that have been undertaken since 2006 to understand the full set of investment price and financial impact on existing generators especially coal based generators we have used a long term capacity and dispatch optimization model to comprehensively analyze both least cost and market led expansion of the system to accommodate alternative emission reduction targets from a shallow cut to a deep cut the modeling results demonstrate the cost of meeting the target can be over 30 billion in npv terms a mix of clean coal technologies gas and nuclear technologies is expected to displace the existing stock of conventional coal which varies significantly depending on the emission reduction target the analysis also show that mandatory renewable targets or technology standards are inefficient policies in comparison to a market based policy such as the proposed emissions trading scheme

application of games with incomplete information for pricing electricity in deregulated power pools the authors present a game theory approach to the problem of pricing electricity in deregulated marketplaces they assume that an independent operator receives bids by pool participants and defines transactions among participants by looking for the minimum price that satisfies the demand in the pool the competition among pool participants is modeled as a noncooperative game with incomplete information they assume that each pool participant knows its own operation costs but does not know his opponents operation costs the game with incomplete information is transformed into a game with complete but imperfect information and solved using the nash equilibrium idea the approach presented in this paper is geared towards providing support for pricing electricity in deregulated pools

market equilibrium under incomplete and imperfect information in bilateral electricity markets in contrast to the centralized pool model bilateral markets present a decision making situation in which information plays a major role along with the physical and operative constraints of the network we propose a model that includes network constraints for competitive bilateral electricity markets based on an evolutionary bipartite complex network in which the nodes and weighted links represent the players and transactions respectively the strong stable equilibrium of the network is applied to detect possible market equilibria obtained through a dynamic game with incomplete and imperfect information in which the players form an evolutionary network while trying to maximize their own utilities the model is conceptually illustrated with a four bus test system and then applied to the ieee30 test system to analyze the impact of the transmission network and information on the equilibria and market performance

nash equilibrium bidding strategies in a bilateral electricity market this paper examines bidding strategies in a bilateral market in which generating companies submit bids to loads a load accepts electricity delivery from the generator with the lowest bid at its bid price as long as this price is not higher than the load s willingness to pay necessary and sufficient conditions of nash equilibrium ne bidding strategy are derived based on a generic generating cost matrix and the loads willingness to pay vector the study shows that in any ne efficient allocation is achieved furthermore all nash equilibria are revenue equivalent for the generators based on the necessary and sufficient conditions this problem is formulated as an optimal assignment problem network optimization techniques are applied to calculate ne bid prices for the generators

impacts of network constraints on electricity market equilibrium nash equilibrium is usually used as the solution of generator s strategic bidding in electricity markets the available literature has shown by simulation that multiple market equilibria or no pure equilibrium may be induced after the inclusion of network constraints transmission constraints this paper presents a systematical analysis for the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium in oligopolistic electricity markets in our modeling the independent system operator iso dispatches generation and determines nodal prices via solving an optimal power flow opf and the individual generator optimizes its submitted supply function with nash supply function equilibrium sfe strategy after taking into account iso s decision making process on dispatched generations and nodal prices the conditions for the existence of equilibrium are given and it is shown that there may be multiple equilibria or no pure nash equilibrium the equilibrium if it exists will be at a point where generators pay no congestion charge

using game theory to analyze electric transmission pricing policies in the united states abstract us public policy towards the private electric power industry is moving away from restrictive regulation and towards promotion of competition alternative policies concerning access to and pricing of transmission are now being discussed similar issues may arise in europe as trade barriers fall our purpose is to show how game theory can help illuminate that debate and identify desirable policies game theory models are used to estimate the possible effects of various policies upon productive efficiency and the distribution of gains among sellers transmitters and buyers of power static cooperative models are used to calculate the possible outcomes of short run transmission games long run games in which the amount of transmission capacity is a decisition variable are modeled as dynamic noncooperative stackelberg games one conclusion is that under some conditions price regulation and mandatory access could hurt power buyers by removing incentives for building transmission capacity another conclusion is that under a system of voluntary access and price regulation it may be better to allow wheeling prices to exceed the marginal cost of transport rather than to risk losing the benefits of cooperation

reliability differentiated pricing of spinning reserve this paper derives the spinning reserve pricing policy implied by the reliability differentiated pricing model and illustrates the importance of such a pricing policy the purchase of additional spinning reserve capacity at the prices derived leads to benefits for the customers through reduced real and reactive power prices and improved reliability of the power system and for the power system as a whole through reduced societal costs and less investment in system reinforcements the magnitudes and behavior of the optimal prices for real and reactive spinning reserve are illustrated in two case studies one case study determines reliability differentiated prices of real and reactive power for a sample four area power system with and without spinning reserve purchase and the optimal purchase prices for both real and reactive power spinning reserve capacities the results of this case study show that when reliability differentiated pricing is extended to both real and reactive power reserve it leads to benefits for customers and the power system as a whole a second case study examines the locational dependence of optimal prices for real and reactive reserves on the operating status of equipment in the 24 bus ieee reliability test system it is concluded that even small amounts of reliable reserve capacity purchase from neighboring electric utilities can improve the reliability of the power system and lower expected real and reactive power prices leading to gains in social welfare

electric power system planning under time of use rates investment decisions under time of use rates and their relationship to utility system planning are examined optimal investment and price under social welfare maximization are derived and compared with the results of static analyses for a multiplant case the optimal pricing and investment policy are characterized by a plant of lower cost in a wide range of cost parameters it is found that the second best price the so called ramsey price is higher than the best price by an amount proportional to the ratio of deficit to revenue of an electric utility

an introduction to field experiments in economics this special issue highlights an empirical approach that has increasingly grown in prominence in the last decade field experiments while field experiments can be used quite generally in economics to test theories predictions to measure key parameters and to provide insights into the generalizability of empirical results this special issue focuses on using field experiments to explore questions within the economics of charity the issue contains six distinct field experimental studies that investigate various aspects associated with the economics of charitable giving the issue also includes a fitting tribute to one of the earliest experimenters to depart from traditional lab methods peter bohm who curiously has not received deep credit or broad acclaim hopefully this issue will begin to rectify this oversight this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

game theory approach to use of noncommercial power plants under time of use pricing the authors use the game theory approach for evaluating the impact of the introduction of customer owned noncommercial power plants ncp when time of use pricing is used various results from this analysis are derived some of which are that the conflict between ncp customer and the supplier forces the supplier to reduce the price of ncp customers perception of the situation in which they are involved in plays an important role in this conflict the game model analysis presented provides a detailed quantitative information on electricity prices and on the ways of using ncp

a continuous strategy game for power transactions analysis in competitive electricity markets this article presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as poolco where participants especially generating entities maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies i e bidding prices and bidding generations in this article the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a noncooperative game with complete information where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the nash equilibrium idea in order to provide more apprehensible analysis we suggest a new hybrid solution approach employing a two dimensional graphical approach as well as an analytical method finally the proposed approach is demonstrated on a sample power system

what experimental protocol influence disparities between actual and hypothetical stated values preferences elicited in hypothetical settings have recently come underscrutiny causing estimates from the contingent valuation method to bechallenged due to perceived hypothetical bias given that the receivedliterature derives value estimates using heterogeneous experimentaltechniques understanding the effects of important design parameters onthe magnitude of hypothetical bias is invaluable in this paper we addressthis issue statistically by using a meta analysis to examine data from 29experimental studies our empirical findings suggest that on averagesubjects overstate their preferences by a factor of about 3 in hypotheticalsettings and that the degree of over revelation is influenced by thedistinction between willingness to pay and willingness to accept publicversus private goods and several elicitation methods

multicriteria decision aid in financial management abstract the financial decisions of an organization are usually included in the context of optimization concerning a long term period there are decisions related to the optimal allocation of funds and decisions related to the optimal financial structure in the short term case the decisions are related to the optimization of stocks cash accounts receivable current liabilities etc the financial theory analyzes these decisions mainly from an optimal point of view the optimal character of such decisions has led researchers to propose operations research techniques to solve the problems that are inherent in such decisions this paper examines the contribution of multicriteria analysis in solving financial decision problems in a realistic context the paper also includes an extensive bibliography on the subject

bidding strategy of virtual power plant for participating in energy and spinning reserve markets part i problem formulation this paper addresses the bidding problem faced by a virtual power plant vpp in a joint market of energy and spinning reserve service the proposed bidding strategy is a non equilibrium model based on the deterministic price based unit commitment pbuc which takes the supply demand balancing constraint and security constraints of vpp itself into account the presented model creates a single operating profile from a composite of the parameters characterizing each distributed energy resources der which is a component of vpp and incorporates network constraints into its description of the capabilities of the portfolio the presented model is a nonlinear mixed integer programming with inter temporal constraints and solved by genetic algorithm ga

whither the nonprofit wage differential estimates from the 1990 census this article provides new estimates of the nonprofit for profit wage differential in the u s economy using observations on 4 1 million private sector employees from the 1990 census i find either zero or slightly positive economy wide wage differences between nonprofit and for profit employees in a standard earnings equation format significant wage differentials are found at the disaggregated occupation and industry level and provide a basis for testing hypotheses explaining nonprofit for profit wage differences

social responsibility messages and worker wage requirements field experimental evidence from online labor marketplaces this paper examines the effects of employer social responsibility on the wages workers demand through randomized field experiments in two online labor marketplaces workers were recruited for short term jobs and i manipulated whether or not they received information about the employer s social responsibility i then observed the payment workers were willing to accept for the job in the first experiment information about the employer s social responsibility marginally reduced prospective workers wage requirements on average and had a significant effect on the highest performers who were willing to give up the wage differential they would otherwise demand in the second prospective workers submitted 44 lower wage bids for the same job after learning about the employer s social responsibility this paper provides causal empirical evidence of a revealed preference for social responsibility in the workplace and of a greater preference among the highest performers more broadly it provides evidence that

industry or academia basic or applied career choices and earnings trajectories of scientists we extend life cycle models of human capital investments by incorporating matching theory to examine the sorting pattern of heterogeneous scientists into different career trajectories we link differences in physical capital investments and complementarities between basic and applied scientists across industry and academic settings to individual differences in scientist ability and preferences to predict an equilibrium matching of scientists to careers and to their earnings evolution our empirical analysis using the national science foundation s scientists and engineers statistical data system database is consistent with theoretical predictions of i sorting by ability into basic versus applied science among academic scientists but not among industry scientists and ii sorting by higher taste for nonmonetary returns into academia over industry the evolution of an earnings profile is consistent with these sorting patterns the earnings trajectories of basic and applied scientists are distinct from each other in academia but are similar in industry this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

generator bidding in oligopolistic electricity markets using optimal control fundamentals and application in this paper optimal control is applied to study generator bidding in an oligopolistic electricity market the repeated bidding process in hourly based real time electricity markets is modeled as a dynamic feedback system an optimal control problem is then formulated to explore individual generator s long term multiperiod optimization behavior particularly in our formulation the periodic property of the system demand is considered several lemmas are included for concerning system stability based on the necessary conditions for optimality from the pontryagin maximum principle a sweeping method is proposed and an optimal state feedback control rule is then obtained via backward induction numerical results suggest that the generator who unilaterally applies optimal control for generation decisions will obtain more profits a sensitivity analysis is also performed identifying these market factors that affect the performance of optimal control

the corporate social performance financial performance link strategic managers are consistently faced with the decision of how to allocate scarce corporate resources in an environment that is placing more and more pressures on them recent scholarship in strategic management suggests that many of these pressures come directly from sources associated with social issues in management rather than traditional arenas of strategic management using a greatly improved source of data on corporate social performance this paper reports the results of a rigorous study of the empirical linkages between financial and social performance corporate social performance csp is found to be positively associated with prior financial performance supporting the theory that slack resource availability and csp are positively related csp is also found to be positively associated with future financial performance supporting the theory that good management and csp are positively related 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

transaction analysis in deregulated power systems using game theory the electric power industry is in transition to a deregulated marketplace for power transactions in this environment all power transactions are made based on price rather than cost a regional power pool is noted as the most straightforward path to a deregulated electricity marketplace however many questions remain unanswered regarding the economics of power pool participation in a deregulated energy marketplace participants are interested in maximizing their own profits regardless of the system wide profits it is perceived that competition will reduce the price of electricity for retail customers however the key issue for participants is related with the price definition to remain competitive in this paper the authors use game theory to simulate the decision making process for defining offered prices in a deregulated environment the outcome of this study may be used by power pool coordinators to discourage unfair coalitions a modified ieee 30 bus power system is used as a deregulated power pool to illustrate the main features of the proposed method

charity as a substitute for reputation evidence from an online marketplace consumers respond positively to products tied to charity particularly from sellers that are relatively new and hence have limited alternative means for assuring quality we establish this result using data from a diverse group of ebay sellers who experiment with charity by varying the presence of a donation in a set of otherwise matched product listings most of charity s benefits accrue to sellers without extensive ebay histories consistent with charity serving as a quality signal we find fewer customer complaints among charity intensive sellers

signaling and screening of workers motivation abstract this paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm we characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers motivation is private information while posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply the optimal wage scheme entails a trade off between the probability of filling the vacancy the rents left to the worker and the expected worker s motivation

why do firms have purpose the firm s role as a carrier of identity and reputation abstract this article develops a theory in which a firm s adoption of a prosocial purpose can increase profitability by strengthening employees reputation and identity leading to higher effort and

private equity investment decisions in family firms the role of human resources and agency costs abstract this study examines decision making criteria that are employed by private equity pe investors selecting family firms hypotheses test the likelihood of investment based on family firm characteristics findings show that pe professionals take into account family specific criteria including human resources and opportunities to reduce agency costs furthermore pe professionals prefer family firms that are already professionalized this research contributes to the family firm literature on both a theoretical and a methodological level exploring nonfamily succession routes and employing techniques conjoint analysis for data collection and multilevel models for data analysis that have seldom been used in this context

exploring the link between products and services in low income markets evidence from solar home systems one of the key challenges of energy access in emerging markets and developing countries is how to reach households and communities that are unlikely to get a grid connection in the long term or those that are connected to the grid but suffer from regular blackouts or low voltage by surveying entrepreneurs selling solar home systems shss on a commercial basis in emerging and developing countries this study is one of the first attempts to quantify the key elements of four potential product service systems psss cash credit leasing and fee for service whereas the fee for service approach was found to be suitable only under certain conditions all psss share two key elements for successful market deployment one or more years of maintenance and customer support in financing these customers new asset moreover it appears that private sector companies are in principle able to deliver shss to households with incomes greater than usd 1000 per year the implications for policy makers and development aid agencies are first to include maintenance services into public programmes or public private partnerships and second to explicitly consider financial risks for entrepreneurs e g customer commitment and repayment conditions

corporate philanthropy and productivity evidence from an online real effort experiment contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and nonprofit sectors as well as in firms that engage in corporate philanthropy or other corporate social responsibility policies this paper compares the effectiveness of a social incentive that takes the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject s choice to a financial incentive we find that social incentives lead to a 13 rise in productivity regardless of their form lump sum or related to performance or strength the response is strong for subjects with low initial productivity 30 whereas high productivity subjects do not respond when subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation with women more likely to do so than men furthermore offering subjects some discretion in choosing their own payment schemes leads to a substantial improvement in performance comparing social incentives to equally costly increases in private compensation for low productivity subjects reveals that the former are less effective in increasing productivity but the difference is small and not statistically significant data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1985 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

hybrid conjoint analysis an estimation probe in new venture decisions abstract how venture capitalists select start ups for financing has been an interesting topic for many researchers and practitioners the underlying assumption is that people who make money investing in new businesses by assessing the proposals should be experienced enough to distinguish losers from winners our research study tested three models self explicated conjoint and a hybrid comprising the two previous ones conjoint in order to find out 1 if these models could be applied to venture capital decision making and if so 2 to demonstrate the potential of conjoint analysis as a practical research method 3 to test whether or not the characteristics of the entrepreneur the product and the market replicate the venture capital decision this research study confirms what normative literature on decision making emphasizes that in the first stage of an evaluation screening venture capitalists focus on a small subset of criteria in a non compensatory process i e an unacceptable value on one criterion cannot be offset by a high value of another one the important criteria in this phase appear to be the entrepreneur s experience and the existence of a prototype for some decision makers or unique features of the product for others the screening step is more judgemental than analytic in a second stage the evaluation phase however venture capitalists end a detailed examination due diligence process by choosing the most preferred ventures through processes approximating compensatory rules that is a low but acceptable value on one criterion can be compensated by a high value on another the most important criteria identified by the research in this second stage are criteria found in the previous stage product gross profit margin and patent our research demonstrates agreement among venture capitalists in terms of one criterion to evaluate research proposals managerial experience as to the rest of the attributes tested there was variation in the weights assigned to them the findings of this pilot study also confirm the applicability of conjoint analysis as a research method in venture capital decision the approach helps shed light on the decision rules applied and permits the testing of previously researched criteria for predictive validity the method has the advantage of retaining individual preferences and clustering them around venture capitalists demographic and psychographic backgrounds i e years of experience type of education life style and the like or other types of information such as venture fund policies size of the investment type of industry etc the major implication of the study for entrepreneurs is the importance of previous experience in the industry where they expect to develop their ventures and a deep knowledge of the product advantages over competition technical production and cost feasibility they are to produce and market these are the factors that have the greatest influence on venture capitalists evaluation of such projects

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

a model of venture capitalist investment activity the paper describes the activities of venture capitalists as an orderly process involving five sequential steps these are 1 deal origination the processes by which deals enter into consideration as investment prospects 2 deal screening a delineation of key policy variables which delimit investment prospects to a manageable few for in depth evaluation 3 deal evaluation the assessment of perceived risk and expected return on the basis of a weighting of several characteristics of the prospective venture and the decision whether or not to invest as determined by the relative levels of perceived risk and expected return 4 deal structuring the negotiation of the price of the deal namely the equity relinquished to the investor and the covenants which limit the risk of the investor 5 post investment activities the assistance to the venture in the areas of recruiting key executives strategic planning locating expansion financing and orchestrating a merger acquisition or public offering 41 venture capitalists provided data on a total of 90 deals which had received serious consideration in their firms the questionnaire measured the mechanism of initial contact between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the venture s industry the stage of financing and product development ratings of the venture on 23 characteristics an assessment of the potential return and perceived risk and the decision vis i vis whether to invest the modal venture represented in the database was a start up in the electronics industry with a production capability in place and seeking 1 million median in outside financing there is a high degree of cross referrals between venture capitalists particularly for the purposes of locating co investors factor analysis reduced the 23 characteristics of the deal to five underlying dimensions namely 1 market attractiveness size growth and access to customers 2 product differentiation uniqueness patents technical edge profit margin 3 managerial capabilities skills in marketing management finance and the references of the entrepreneur 4 environmental threat resistance technology life cycle barriers to competitive entry insensitivity to business cycles and down side risk protection 5 cash out potential future opportunities to realize capital gains by merger acquisition or public offering the results of regression analyses showed expected return to be determined by market attractiveness and product differentiation r2 0 22 perceived risk is determined by managerial capabilities and environmental threat resistance r2 0 33 finally a discriminant analysis correctly predicted in 89 4 of the cases whether or not a venture capitalist was willing to commit funds to the deal on the basis of the expected return and perceived risk the reactions of seven venture capitalists who reviewed the model s specification were used to test its validity

new venture strategy and profitability a venture capitalist s assessment abstract this study uses theoretically justified criteria from the industrial organization io strategy literature and applies it to a new domain namely venture capitalists decision making specifically the study investigates the types of information venture capitalists utilize when evaluating new ventures and how venture capitalists use this information to assess likely new venture profitability in the interest of advancing our understanding of the decision making policies of venture capitalists this study addresses many of the limitations of previous research a review of io research suggests important relationships between a number of strategy variables and new venture profitability some of the relationships proposed by io strategy research are contingent in nature the strategy variables and their relationships with profitability are investigated in the domain of venture capitalists decision making individual and aggregate decision making analyses identified those strategy variables criteria venture capitalists utilize in assessing likely new venture profitability namely timing key success factor stability lead time competitive rivalry educational capability industry related competence timing key success factor stability interaction timing lead time interaction and timing educational capability interaction on average the most important criterion for venture capitalists in their assessment of profitability is industry related competence the second tier of importance is competitive rivalry timing and educational capability the third tier of importance is lead time key success factor stability and timing lead time interaction other interactions are less important therefore while venture capitalists use contingent decision policies main effects dominate if venture capitalists use a reported 8 to 12 minutes on average to evaluate a business plan sandberg 1986 then this study s findings may help the inexperienced venture capitalist allocate time towards assessing those attributes of primary importance although more complex relationships exist between the attributes the inexperienced venture capitalist can take comfort from this study s findings that main effects dominant amongst senior venture capitalists senior venture capitalists may take less comfort from their importance placed on main effects in light of research from io which suggests the importance of contingent relationships the results may also have practical application towards training how should venture capital firms train their new employees should venture capital firms rely solely on experienced venture capitalists lecturing the inexperienced on the criteria they use in assessing a new venture proposal like most decision makers venture capitalists have limited insight into their assessments and venture capital firms need to be aware of the gap between espoused policies and policies in use the information being taught needs to be supplemented with venture capitalists decision making research that investigates decision policies in use such as this study venture capitalist training could also involve experiential learning in conjunction with cognitive feedback about the decision policies used to accelerate the learning process experiential learning using cognitive feedback maximizes industry related learning while minimizing the cost of inexperienced decisions for the entrepreneur seeking capital this increased understanding of venture capitalists decision making may help them better target their business plans and presentations at those criteria venture capitalists find most critical to the profitability of a new venture

the price of policy risk empirical insights from choice experiments with european photovoltaic project developers managing the transition to a renewable energy future is an important policy priority in many countries solar photovoltaic pv technology is expected to make an important contribution but due to relatively higher cost its growth to date has been largely driven by public policy notably feed in tariffs feed in tariffs have been implemented in various countries however with widely differing outcomes in terms of installed pv capacity previous research indicates that the level of policy risk may be an important driver for differences in renewable energy policy effectiveness more specifically we suggest that investors who take a decision between pv investment opportunities in different countries carefully weigh feed in tariff induced returns against a set of policy risks and choose the country with the most favorable risk return profile we empirically test this model based on a stated preference survey among european pv project developers consisting of 1575 choice decisions by 63 investors the findings of our study demonstrate that risk matters in pv policy design and that a price tag can be attached to specific policy risks such as the duration of administrative processes or uncertainty induced by an approaching capacity cap governments can build on our empirical results to design policies that will be effective in attracting private pv investment while at the same time maintaining efficiency by providing an adequate compensation for policy risk

optimal multi area wheeling an important consideration in wheeling is where a transaction involves several parties that is multi area wheeling power from seller to buyer flows through several intermediate utilities each utility represents an individual control area engaged in part of a more complex wheeling transaction individual wheeling rates then have to be computed for each area the question of how much energy should be transported through each path and what wheeling price should be paid is then an issue of importance this is formulated as a nonlinear optimisation program with linear constraints and solved by a gradient projection method the availability of facts capability to implement the optimal wheeling strategy once determined is assumed in this paper

evaluation of wheeling and nonutility generation nug options using optimal power flows the application of optimal power flow for the evaluation of wheeling and nonutility generation nug related options is presented both wheeling and nug options affect vital attributes such as system security voltage profile losses and var reserves these options put a strain on the existing transmission system and may restrict economic utility dispatching optimal power flows may be used to determine the best control settings to accommodate wheeling or nug options so as to maintain system security while minimizing losses or production cost short term marginal wheeling costs may be derived using optimal power flows case studies involving the northeast utilities and ieee test systems are presented these cases show that optimal power flows can be used effectively to address a broad range of wheeling or nug related planning issues

cost of wheeling methodologies the cost of wheeling and the methodology by which it is computed is a high priority problem throughout the power industry due to the growth in transmission facilities the cost differentials between utility companies and the dramatic growth in nonutility generation capacity this paper contains descriptions and summaries of computational procedures and data requirements of four embedded cost methodologies two long run incremental cost methods and the short run marginal cost method four methodologies are also presented for allocating the wheeling costs among a number of wheels when simultaneously present on a company s system as required for the standard long run incremental cost method

the costs of wheeling and optimal wheeling rates wheeling is the transmission of electrical energy from a buyer to a seller through a transmission network owned by a third party this paper provides a theoretically sound yet practical to implement basis for setting wheeling rates these wheeling rates are based on marginal costs determined by losses and effects of line flow and voltage magnitude constraints adjusted up or down as necessary to account for embedded capital costs i e revenue reconciliation simple numerical examples are provided to illustrate interesting phenomena such as negative wheeling rates which yield positive net revenue comparisons with present day wheeling rates show that major differences exist the wheeling rates of this paper yield a no lose situation for the buying selling and wheeling utilities

optimization based inter utility power purchases effective power transaction decisions can result in significant savings since marginal generation costs of neighboring utilities could be quite different transactions however are coupled with the scheduling of units through system demand and reserve requirements and are confined by many accustomed rules how to make effective transaction decisions is therefore a very difficult problem in this paper an optimization based method for the integrated consideration of power purchase transactions and the scheduling of thermal units is presented based on the augmented lagrangian decomposition and coordination method after the system wide demand and reserve requirements are relaxed by using lagrange multipliers and penalty coefficients the overall problem is decomposed into purchase and thermal subproblems for a purchase subproblem the optimal purchase level for each purchase interval is first determined the subproblem is then efficiently solved by using the dynamic programming approach without discretizing purchase levels thermal subproblems are solved by extending the author s previous method the multipliers and penalty coefficients are then updated at the high level so that system demand and reserve requirements are gradually satisfied over iterations numerical testing results based on modified northeast utility s data show that the algorithm is efficient and significant savings can be obtained

r d in a model of search and growth just how important a determinant of economic growth is the efficacy with which markets are organized it is clear that in order to answer this question it is necessary to have both a well articulated theory of economic growth and a precise notion of what it means for one market to be better organized than another the newly developed theory of endogenous growth pioneered by among others paul m romer 1986 robert e lucas 1988 nancy stokey 1988 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1991 has equipped economists with a rigorous microeconomic foundation of the growth process since its original inception research in this area has bifurcated one strand of work has continued to emphasize the importance of capital accumulation both physical and human in environments in which agents are competitive price takers the other strand has a distinctly neo schumpeterian flavor in which firms are price setters and purposive innovative activity leads to technological advancement but what of the role played by market organization the growth literature has remained relatively silent on this issue the reason is that the canonical growth model is one in which trade either competitive or monopolisticly competitive is coordinated by the walrasian auctioneer given that ex hypothesi trade is frictionless it is meaningless to use this framework to discuss issues pertaining to improvements in market organization however beginning with the seminal contributions of peter diamond 1982 dale t mortensen 1982 and christopher pissarides 1985 economists have begun to construct models that dispense with the auctioneer s coordinating function in this setting it is possible to make precise the notion of an improvement in market efficacy since search and bargaining frictions are explicitly incorporated as an integral part of the trading environment yet it is only very recently that this literature has begun to explore the consequences for perpetual economic growth

breaking monotony with meaning motivation in crowdsourcing markets abstract we conduct the first natural field experiment to explore the relationship between the meaningfulness of a task and worker effort we employed about 2500 workers from amazon s mechanical turk mturk an online labor market to label medical images although given an identical task we experimentally manipulated how the task was framed subjects in the meaningful treatment were told that they were labeling tumor cells in order to assist medical researchers subjects in the zero context condition the control group were not told the purpose of the task and in stark contrast subjects in the shredded treatment were not given context and were additionally told that their work would be discarded we found that when a task was framed more meaningfully workers were more likely to participate we also found that the meaningful treatment increased the quantity of output with an insignificant change in quality while the shredded treatment decreased the quality of output with no change in quantity we believe these results will generalize to other short term labor markets our study also discusses mturk as an exciting platform for running natural field experiments in economics

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

crowding out in the labor market a prosocial setting is necessary recent studies mostly from prosocial settings suggest that monetary rewards may crowd out effort exertion by economic agents we design a field experiment with data entry workers to investigate the extent of such crowding out effects in a labor market using simple variations in the job description of a task we induce a natural work setting under the work frame and emphasize social preference under the social frame we find that crowding out of labor participation critically depends on framing whereas small monetary rewards reduce the participation rate under the social frame the participation rate is nondecreasing in the wage rate under the work frame moreover among the workers who participate in the task those who receive a positive wage perform a considerably higher amount of work than those who are paid zero wage under either frame thus there is weak evidence of crowding out only when the task is explicitly given a prosocial flavor and not under a regular work setting furthermore emphasizing social preference in the labor market in such a way reduces the overall labor supply and seems to have an adverse effect on the quality of work data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1807 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

an energy brokerage system with emission trading and allocation of cost savings an energy brokerage system can achieve lower emission levels for interconnected electric utilities in a cost effective way the paper presents a linear programming formulation of an energy brokerage system in an operational planning framework emission trading among utilities is envisaged to achieve emission reduction targets the power and emission buy sell quotes for individual utilities are computed and communicated to a central broker the broker determines the power and emission interchange schedule which maximizes the power system savings for all participating utilities the shapley value criterion is proposed for allocation of cost savings among the utilities this criterion reflects the true marginal contribution of a utility to the aggregate system savings and hence is superior to the existing methods of cost savings allocation

congestion influence on bidding strategies in an electricity market much of the research on bidding strategies in an electricity market has focused on idealized situations where participants have limited market power and the transmission system is not constrained yet congestion may act to effectively give a bidder market power and consequently the ability to influence the market clearing price in such a noncompetitive situation the bidding strategies of market participants will change in this paper the electrical power market is modeled as an oligopoly market and the cournot quantity model is applied to the bidding strategy problem the bidding process with congestion management is modeled as a three level optimization problem a statistical methodology is then proposed as a solution for large systems

benefit optimization of centralized and decentralized power systems in a multi utility environment the objective is to examine the theoretical bases for benefit optimization in centralized and decentralized electric power systems in a centralized single control power system cost revenue and profit are used as system performance criteria for benefit optimization and the conditions are compared the results show that conventional cost minimization is not necessarily equivalent to benefit optimization based on other criteria in a decentralized multi utility power system benefit optimization and its allocation are investigated at the unconstrained economic optimum economic optimum with constraints and conditions under which the solution is an economic suboptimum the data from the epri regional systems are used to show practical examples of the benefit allocation with wheeling transactions although some rules are better for society than others there still is not one right answer to determine the rules for benefit optimization

price taker bidding strategy under price uncertainty this paper provides a framework to obtain the optimal bidding strategy of a price taker producer an appropriate forecasting tool is used to estimate the probability density functions of next day hourly market clearing prices this probabilistic information is used to formulate a self scheduling profit maximization problem that is solved taking advantage of its particular structure the solution of this problem allows deriving a simple yet informed bidding rule results from a realistic case study are discussed in detail

transmission analysis by nash game method this paper describes an open access transmission method for maximizing profits in a power system the proposed method is based on the nash bargaining game for power flow analysis in which each transaction and its optimal price are determined to optimize the interests of individual parties transmission losses are considered by the proposed method and test cases and results are discussed to present the merits of the proposed method

a new game theoretic framework for maintenance strategy analysis in this paper a new approach to maintenance scheduling of generating units msu in competitive electricity markets is presented the main contribution of this study can be focused on modeling a game theoretic framework for the msu problem to analyze strategic behaviors of generating companies gencos the msu problem is formulated as a dynamic noncooperative game with complete information the player corresponds to the profit maximizing individual genco and the payoff of each player is defined as the profit from the energy auction market the optimal strategy profile is defined by the nash equilibrium of the game numerical results for two genco systems are used to demonstrate the basic ideas of the proposed scheme and large scale ieee reliability test systems are also considered to show the applicability of the proposed framework the results obtained indicate that maintenance schedule can be one of the crucial strategic behaviors whereby genco maximizes their profit in a competitive market environment

man s search for meaning the case of legos we investigate how perceived meaning influences labor supply in a laboratory setting we manipulate the perceived meaning of simple repetitive tasks and find a strong influence on subjects labor supply despite the fact that the wage and the task are identical across the conditions in each experiment subjects in the less meaningful conditions exhibit reservation wages that are consistently much higher than the subjects in the more meaningful conditions the result replicates across different types of tasks moreover in the more meaningful conditions subjects productivity influences labor supply more strongly

solving three player games by the matrix approach with application to an electric power market in models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets the key task is to find the nash equilibrium ne the approaches for finding the ne have had two major bottlenecks computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multiplayer games this paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks the proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multiplayer game the formulation of the ne condition for a three player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed in order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs several techniques are adopted in this paper two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a cournot and a bertrand model respectively are investigated for verifying the proposed method the proposed method outperforms a publicly available game theory software for the application problems

capacity and energy only markets under high renewable penetration this paper presents a multi nodal intertemporal cournot gaming model with transmission constraints and uses it to simulate energy only and capacity energy market designs in the presence of uncertainties stemming from intermittent renewable power generation both market paradigms are compared to a competitive benchmark in order to determine which one performs better in a concentrated market with significant penetration of wind and solar generation as a specific example the model is applied to the south australian zone of the australian national electricity market nem the simulation results for the time interval 2013 2030 show that the capacity energy market has the potential to induce significant new capacity and push prices much closer to the competitive level in contrast to the current energy only market design

games with incomplete information game theory is a theory of strategic interaction that is to say it is a theory of rational behavior in social situations in which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the other players countermoves are likely to be