why don t people trust experts abstractcredence goods such as health care legal and financial services and auto repair create a conflict of interest by requiring experts to diagnose and provide services to uninformed consumers mistreatment of consumers appears widespread empirically but a simple explanation for mistreatment under realistic assumptions has proved elusive i generalize uwe dulleck and rudolf kerschbamer s credence good model to incorporate the highly realistic assumption that consumers do not observe experts cost functions the model guarantees equilibrium mistreatment in a wide range of price setting and market environments the model also yields testable implications regarding the nature of mistreating firms and the direction of mistreatment

dynamic analysis of innovation and international transfer of technology through licensing abstract this paper develops a quality ladder type dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous innovation and technology licensing as a major source of international technology transfer in developing countries examining the dynamic characteristics of the model fully we explore the short and long run effects of both an improvement in the probability of reaching a licensing agreement with a given effort and an increase in the license fee rate the model shows that the former promotes innovation and technology transfers in both the long and short run while the latter discourages them

credence goods markets with conscientious and selfish experts i study credence goods markets when there are both selfish and conscientious experts the selfish expert is a profit maximizer the conscientious expert wants to maximize profit and repair the consumer s problem there are two classes of equilibria uniform price equilibria and nonuniform price equilibria a consumer cannot infer the expert s type from his price list in a uniform price equilibrium but can do that in a nonuniform price equilibrium when the fraction of the conscientious expert is small the selfish expert will be honest about the severity of the consumer s problem when the fraction of the conscientious expert is large the selfish expert will cheat the consumer overcharging the consumer whenever he offers to repair the problem finally more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss when the fraction of the conscientious expert is close to one of the two extremes 0 and 1 more conscientious experts will result in smaller social loss when the fraction of the conscientious expert is in a middle range more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss

demand inducement and the physician patient relationship the physician patient relationship is a paradigm for any expert client relationship the physician both diagnoses the patient s illness and recommends a treatment this dual role gives the physician incentive to recommend treatments whose costs outweigh their medical benefits these socially inefficient treatments correspond to the notion of physician induced demand the level of inducement chosen by the physician is shown to depend on the price and potential medical benefits of treatment and the relative diagnostic skills of physician and patient this model offers several testable hypotheses some of which are confirmed by related studies

a comparison of event study methodologies using daily stock returns a simulation approach accounting research studies commonly use measures of abnormal security returns to test hypotheses about accounting information and policies alternative methods are used in these studies to detect abnormal performance and thereby examine the information content of identified events the ability of these methods to detect abnormal returns using simulation techniques is examined by brown and warner 1980 1984 morse 1984 addresses this issue analytically the analytical approach presumes that the event study data is generated by the process modeled while the simulation approach uses the security return data generated by the market simulation provides a tractable means of dealing with situations where an analytical approach may yield results suggesting direction but not magnitude or where such techniques are unusually cumbersome both limitations face us in this study brown and warner 1980 use monthly data to examine the comparative abilities of several combinations of return generating models and

a welfare analysis of global patent protection in a model with endogenous innovation and foreign direct investment abstract this paper constructs a north south quality ladder model in which foreign direct investment fdi is determined by the endogenous location choice of firms and examines analytically how strengthening patent protection in the south affects welfare in the south strengthening patent protection increases the south s welfare by enhancing innovation and fdi but it also allows the firms with patents to charge higher prices for their goods which decreases welfare however the model shows that the former positive welfare effect outweighs the latter negative effect moreover introducing the strictest form of patent protection in the south that is harmonizing patent protection in the south with that in the north may maximize welfare in the south as well as in the north further a similar result can also be obtained in a nonscale effect model

patent protection innovation and technology transfer in a schumpeterian economy abstract this paper analyzes the cross country effects of intellectual property rights ipr protection on the relative wage innovation and technology transfer in a north south quality ladder model with innovative northern r d and adaptive southern r d the degree of ipr protection in two countries differs in terms of patent breadth which determines the markups of northern firms and their southern affiliates respectively in this model stronger ipr protection in the south leads to a permanent decrease in the north south wage gap a temporary increase in the northern innovation rate and a permanent increase in technology transfer by contrast stronger ipr protection in the north leads to a permanent increase in the north south wage gap ambiguous effects on the northern innovation rate and a permanent decrease in technology transfer finally we perform a quantitative analysis by calibrating the model to the us china data and the numerical results support these policy implications in addition to a welfare implication such that strengthening patent protection in one country leads to sizable welfare improvements in both countries

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

second opinions and price competition inefficiency in the market for expert advice we consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer s need in our model experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions we explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort in particular the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum an intervention that limits price competition via price control increases welfare

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment abstract this paper develops a product cycle model with endogenous innovation imitation and foreign direct investment fdi we use this model to determine how stronger intellectual property rights ipr protection in the south affects innovation imitation and fdi we find that stronger ipr protection keeps multinationals safer from imitation but no more so than northern firms instead the increased difficulty of imitation generates resource wasting and imitation disincentive effects that reduce both fdi and innovation the greater resources absorbed in imitation crowd out fdi reduced fdi then transmits resource scarcity in the south back to the north and consequently contracts innovation

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

consumer information in a market for expert services abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of the valuation they place for getting a serious problem fixed we introduce consumer information into this framework by assuming that prior to visiting an expert some consumers receive an information signal about whether they have a serious or a minor problem we show that when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is sufficiently high the expert does not cheat any low valuation consumer regardless of their information status but cheats the high valuation consumers those high valuation consumers with bad signals are the most frequent victims of cheating whereas those with good signals are the least likely victims when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is below a certain threshold however the unique equilibrium involves no cheating

on the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets a client has a problem but does not know whether it is serious or minor she consults an expert who can correctly diagnose and fix her problem this paper characterizes the equilibrium pricing and recommendation strategies of an expert under the assumptions that i the type of treatment is verifiable by the client ii the client has the option of rejecting any treatment recommendation and iii the expert is not liable for the outcome of the treatment it is found for any parameter configuration that there exist equilibria in which the expert makes fraudulent recommendations resulting in inefficient treatment the market outcome is compared with that under an alternative market environment in which the expert is liable for treatment outcome but the type of treatment performed is non verifiable it is shown that for some parameter configurations the equilibrium is more efficient when liability is in place than when the treatment is verifiable these findings stand in sharp contrast to the received wisdom that the market outcome under verifiability of treatment is efficient while the market outcome under liability for outcome is not finally this paper shows that the existence of some honest experts may induce more fraudulent behavior by opportunistic experts

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

concession bargaining the impact on shareholders equity this analysis of bargaining settlements in 1982 83 shows that on average shareholders in those firms that negotiated concessionary settlements enjoyed an 8 to 10 percent increase in the value of their holdings the author interprets this result to mean not that the value of the firm increased but rather that concessions enlarged the shareholders portion of the firm s value at the expense of the workers portion on the other hand concession bargaining does not seem to have reallocated business risk between shareholders and labor finally the evidence suggests that firm specific sources of risk can explain in part not only the magnitude of the concession effects but also the probability that concession bargaining will occur

when do experts cheat and whom do they target a credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer this information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed i propose two new theories of expert cheating suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers according to these theories cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination and experts cheat selectively for instance experts target high valuation and high cost customers finally selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services

international patent protection 1960 2005 abstract this note provides an update to the index of patent protection published in this journal in 1997 the original paper presented the index for 1960 1990 for 110 countries the index has now been updated to 2005 and extended to 122 countries the adoption of stronger patent laws and the composition of patent rights vary across countries by level of economic development

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

when unions mattered the impact of strikes on financial markets 1925 1937 this examination of the stock market s responsiveness to strikes looks specifically at strike actions that labor historians generally view as the major ones occurring in the united states in the years 1925 37 the authors find that strikes had large negative effects on industry stock value longer strikes violent strikes strikes in which unions won industry wide strikes strikes that led to union recognition and strikes that led to large wage increases were associated with larger negative share price reactions than were other strikes much of the news generated by the typical strike seems to have been registered by the stock market very early in the strike however there were also some fairly large stock price reactions to news that could be fully revealed only at the end of a strike

unionization and profitability evidence from the capital market this paper examines the effect of unionization on the profitability of firms abnormal monthly common stock returns for a sample of 253 nyse listed firms are estimated for the month in which the union petitions for an election and for the month in which the national labor relations board certifies the election outcome the results suggest that unionization on average is associated with a reduction in equity value when unions win an election the average loss associated with the unionization drive is 3 8 percent of equity value when unions lose an election there is an average net reduction of 1 3 percent in the equity value of the firm

intellectual property rights and quality improvement this paper explores why theories about the effects of intellectual property rights ipr protection on foreign direct investment fdi and innovation have reached mixed conclusions in our model northern firms innovate to improve the quality of existing products and may later shift production to the south through fdi southern firms may then imitate the products of multinationals we find that imitation can increase fdi and innovation for quality improvements whereas the opposite occurs when innovators develop new varieties hence stronger ipr protection by reducing imitation may shift innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products

experts vs discounters consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods this paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis the unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures this makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters we explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free riding on experts advice and we discuss policy options to solve the free riding consumers cheating experts problem

intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment a welfare analysis abstract this paper examines how intellectual property rights ipr protection affects innovation and foreign direct investment fdi using a north south quality ladder model incorporating the exogenous and costless imitation of technology and subsidy policies for both r d and fdi we show that for the interior steady state to be stable either r d or fdi subsidy rates must be positive our findings also indicate that strengthening ipr protection promotes both innovation and fdi moreover a strengthening of ipr protection can also improve welfare if the initial ipr protection in the south is weak and the r d subsidy rate is not too high

the economic effect of strikes on the shareholders of nonstruck competitors prior research has established that strikes incur significant economic losses for the struck firms this event study of intraindustry strike effects in highly concentrated industries focuses on two samples firms that experienced a strike involving 1 000 or more workers between 1982 and 1990 and the nonstruck firms that were their closest competitors contrary to the prediction of some models that the economic losses incurred by struck firms are captured by their nonstruck competitors the results indicate that the total spillover from shareholders of the struck firms to shareholders of the nonstruck competitors in this sample was not statistically significant the authors speculate that the struck firms were able to limit spillover effects through such tactics as stockpiling inventory before a strike also concessions by labor which were common outcomes of collective bargaining during the sample period probably significantly reduced the struck firms total strike cost

credence goods experts and risk aversion abstract the existing literature on credence goods and expert services has overlooked the importance of risk aversion in this paper we extend a standard expert model of credence goods with verifiable service quality by considering risk averse consumers our results show that the presence of risk aversion reduces the expert s incentive to invest in diagnosis and may thus lead to consumers mistreatment

endogenous growth without scale effects comment segerstrom 1998 demonstrates that the social optimum requires radical technological breakthroughs to be treated less favorably than incremental innovations in a growing economy the aim of this note is to assess the robustness of this welfare result on the basis of two levels of generalization i the elasticity of substitution between any two goods is allowed to be larger than one and ii inter industry spillovers are introduced we show that segerstrom s results can be reversed it is also shown that in contrast to segerstrom r d subsidies can be globally optimal irrespective of the size of innovation when inter industry spillovers are large

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

intellectual property rights multinational firms and economic growth abstract this paper develops a model of north south trade with multinational firms and economic growth in order to analyze formally the effects of stronger intellectual property rights ipr protection in developing countries in the model northern firms invent new higher quality products multinational firms transfer manufacturing operations to the south and the southern firms imitate products produced by multinational firms it is shown that stronger ipr protection in the south i e the adoption and implementation of the trips agreement leads to a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer to the south within multinational firms a permanent increase in r d employment by southern affiliates of northern multinationals a permanent decrease in the north south wage gap and a temporary increase in the northern innovation rate

unobserved investment endogenous quality and trade a seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset s future returns the potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller s investment prior to trade nor does he receive any signal of it nor can he verify it in anyway after trade despite this severe moral hazard problem this paper shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability the outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining power between the parties with a holdup problem existing if the buyer has the bargaining power a consequence of the holdup problem is surplus reducing distortions in investment level perhaps counterintuitively in many situations this distortion involves an increase in the expected amount invested vis a vis the situation without holdup

international protection of intellectual property we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy we consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation after describing the determination of national patent policies in a non cooperative regime of patent protection we ask why is intellectual property better protected in the north than in the south we also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency jel o34 f13 during the 1980 s and early 1990 s the united states and several european countries expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of intellectual property in many developing countries the developed countries made the upgrading of intellectual property rights iprs one of their highest priorities for the uruguay round of trade talks their efforts bore fruit in the agreement on traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights trips which was approved as part of the final act of the uruguay round trips establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intellectual property for example in the area of new technology it essentially harmonizes

the effect of wage bargains on the stock market value of the firm the author estimates the change in the value of common stock resulting from an unexpected change in collectively bargained labor costs using bargaining unit wage data and nyse stock returns he estimates a dollar for dollar trade off between these variables this result is consistent with stock valuations based on present value maximizing managerial decisions that is the results are consistent with hotelling s lemma the author also finds support for the hypothesis that collective bargains maximize the sum of shareholder and union member wealth that is the results are consistent with strong efficiency in the contracting environment copyright 1989 by american economic association

the impact of strikes on shareholder equity from an analysis of data for 1962 82 the authors find that strikes substantially affect shareholder equity as measured by the change in stock prices associated with strikes over that period the a

search bargaining and signalling in the market for legal services over the last eight centuries lawyers in common law countries have generally been precluded from buying their clients cases recently a number of economists and lawyers have argued that sale should be allowed so as to eliminate moral hazard particularly when contingent fees are used this argument is based on full information reasoning however if the lawyer has private information about the case value then compensation demands potentially signal this value when the client can search over lawyers we provide a formal model and a family of computational examples that show that allowing possibly partial purchase can reduce expected social efficiency