currency competition a partial vindication of hayek abstract this paper establishes the existence of equilibria for environments in which outside money is issued competitively such equilibria are typically believed not to exist because of a classic overissue problem if money is valued in equilibrium an issuer produces money until its value is driven to zero by backward induction money cannot have value in the first place this paper shows that overissuance is not a problem if agents believe that if an issuer produces more than some threshold number of notes then only those notes issued up to the threshold will be valued additional notes will be worthless this result is very general applying to any monetary economy in which equilibria with and without valued money exist if the money supply is finite the paper also compares the allocation achieved by a monopolist to that achieved with competitive issuance in both a search and an overlapping generations environment the results depend on the environment considered but two general conclusions arise first it is ambiguous whether competitive issuers can achieve a more desirable allocation than a monopolist second with competitive issuance a licensing agency can always improve on pure laissez faire and achieve the efficient allocation in the long run

interest bearing currency legal restrictions and the rate of return dominance of money note the rate of return dominance of money is the crucial anomaly of monetary theory at least this is the position taken by j r hicks in his seminal paper a suggestion for simplifying the theory of money 1935 hicks was concerned about the coexistence of non interest bearing money and real assets whether real assets which are innately risky actually dominate money is of course debatable as tobin 1958 points out the dominance seems unambiguous however when the money is unbacked non interest bearing currency and the competing asset is default free interest bearing government bonds such bonds are promises to pay the unbacked currency and the government is typically the sole legal provider of the unbacked currency the promised currency being unbacked makes the default free claim of the government more plausible this paper considers various explanations of the rate of return dominance of money and defends the legal restrictions view the rate of return dominance of money has been explained by costs of trips to the bank this explanation was the one put forward by hicks baumol 195 and tobin 1956 developed this idea in the inventory model of money this approach assumes that trade is carried out in a non interest bearing currency and that trade directly using a bank s portfolio is impossible the rate of return dominance of money has been explained by costs of intermediation banks intermediate their portfolios into claims that are convenient for trade but doing so is costly friedman 1969 considers the costly intermediation of bonds into interest bearing demand deposits and currency stating competition among banks would force them to pay interest on deposits at a rate falling short of rb the bond rate by the costs of running the banks competition would force banks also to pay interest on currency at a rate below the rate paid on deposits by the extra costs of administering the payment of interest on currency they would of course have an incentive to devise an economical way to pay such interest p 39 bryant and wallace 1979 1980a model the costly intermediation of government bonds into

endogenous transfer institutions in overlapping generations abstract we characterize the set of equilibrium transfers between overlapping generations when transfer institutions are endogenous in stationary economies pareto improving transfers require institutions cost as much to construct as they convey even if less costly institutions exist that make the same transfer if institutions can be built upon they may cost less and convey more but transfers may become excessive interpreting such institutions as social security we introduce private saving with time social security crowds out savings still the potential to save limits any excess transfer endogenous costly to create gold money institutions are examined and the role of compulsion in evolving to costless to create fiat currency detailed

is the ak model still alive the long run relation between growth and investment re examined to explore the empirical validity of ak type endogenous growth models the long run relation between growth and investment is examined contrary to jones s 1995 findings the broadly measured rate of investment exerts a long run positive effect on the growth rate this result is supported by evidence from twenty four oecd countries 1950 92 and five major industrialized countries 1870 1987 the panel data evidence from oecd countries also supports an extended ak model based on the uzawa 1965 lucas 1988 two sector model with transitional dynamics these findings suggest that the long run relation between growth and investment is consistent the ak model jel classification o4 est ce que le modele ak est encore en vie un autre coup d il sur la relation a long terme entre croissance et investissement pour explorer la validite empirique des modeles de croissance endogene de type ak l auteur jette un autre coup d il sur la relation a long terme entre croissance et investissement contrairement a ce que suggerent les resultats de l etude de jones 1995 le taux d investissement mesure d une maniere assez comprehensive exerce un effet positif sur le taux de croissance a long terme ce resultat est supporte par les donnees recoltees pour vingt quatre pays de l ocde entre 1950 et 1992 et pour cinq pays industrialises importants entre 1870 et 1987 les resultats tires des etudes longitudinales des pays de l ocde supportent aussi une version generale du modele ak fondee sur le modele a deux secteurs a la uzawa 1965 lucas 1988 avec dynamique de transition ces resultats suggerent que la relation en longue periode entre croissance et investissement est consistante avec le modele ak

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

minority voting rights can maximize majority welfare i use condorcet s information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to enforce its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority special voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully and more participation means more information is aggregated which makes the majority better off this result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of lani guinier s arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation benefitting everyone

china s macroeconomic performance and management during transition since reforms started in 1978 china has combined rapid growth with moderate price stability this paper analyzes china s macroeconomic performance over the past fifteen years with special attention to factors responsible both for the pace of economic expansion and the periodic fluctuations regarding the former the author identifies four sources of stimuli administrative decentralization high levels of fixed capital investment the elastic supply and quality of the labor force and the increasing volume of savings supplemented in recent years by a large inflow of foreign direct investment future growth with stability calls for controlling and implementing banking and fiscal reform

in defense of unanimous jury verdicts mistrials communication and strategic voting the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials is widely believed to reduce the likelihood of convicting the innocent this belief depends largely upon the assumption that jurors will vote nonstrategically based on their impression of the trial evidence recent literature however has questioned this assumption and feddersen and pesendorfer propose a model in which it is never a nash equilibrium for jurors to vote nonstrategically under unanimity rule and equilibrium behavior produces higher probabilities of both convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty under unanimity rule than under numerous alternatives i extend this work by incorporating two additional features of actual jury procedure the possibility of mistrial and communication among jurors under each circumstance i demonstrate that nonstrategic voting is a nash equilibrium under fairly general conditions and that unanimity performs better than any alternative rule in minimizing probability of trial error and maximizing expected utility

a clower constraint model of unbacked money abstract the stylized monetary facts 1 money growth causes inflation 2 inflation is bad 3 money demand depends upon the nominal interest rate 4 the real interest rate equals a parametrically fixed rate of time preference and 5 investment depends upon the real interest rate are produced in a grandmont younes modified clower constraint model of money inflation is distorting but is no one s intertemporal rate of substitution inflation discourages trade but not investment as a by product the friedman hypothesis that the optimal deflation equals the rate of time preference is confirmed in the model

costly transfer institutions and the core in an overlapping generations model we examine an overlapping generations economy with no pre existing intergenerational transfers and study the set of transfer institutions in the core of the economy that is institutions that would be admissible for the first generation to create and would not be rejected by any future generation institution building is assumed to be costly we allow the cost of creating a new institution to vary with the size of the transfer it institutes and show that all institutions in the core must cost as much to build as they transfer in fact the core set is nonempty if and only if the institution that supports the golden rule transfer costs as much to create as it transfers the core set is characterized for various cost functions we conclude that costs associated with the creation of transfer institutions are essential to make intergenerational transfers socially viable but they may induce the choice of institutions making suboptimal transfers

is physical investment the key to china s growth miracle i introduction unprecedented high rates of economic growth in china over the past decades have stimulated a wide interest among researchers and policymakers in establishing whether rapid physical capital accumulation is the main driving force behind such outstanding growth performance and whether it suffices to sustain china s rapid economic growth in the next decades by exploiting the different implications that the relation between investment and growth has according to the neoclassical paradigm pioneered by solow 1956 and cass 1965 and endogenous growth models of the ak type this paper will attempt to test the empirical validity of the ak model for the chinese economy the main difference between the ak model and the solow model is that the former allows for the existence of constant returns to a sufficiently broad definition of capital which in turn enables investment to have a long run impact on growth in contrast under the neoclassical paradigm diminishing returns to reproducible capital leads inevitably to only temporary growth effects along the transitional path and long run growth depends on exogenous technological progress constant returns to reproducible capital characterizing linear accumulation driven models may stem from different sources like 1 positive externalities as in the models of frankel 1962 lucas 1988 and romer 1986 2 bounding the marginal product of reproducible factors away from zero jones and manuelli 1990 or 3 the existence of constant returns to all accumulable factors characterizing the different sectors of the economy barro 1990 rebelo 1991 according to standard linear accumulation driven models steady state output growth directly depends on the total investment rate in physical capital hence the dynamics of output growth should behave similarly to the dynamics of the investment rate as noted by jones 1995a a hallmark of the endogenous growth literature implies that any large permanent change in total investment should translate into a permanent change in long run growth in the same direction jones 1995a constitutes the first attempt at testing the ak type growth models using a time series framework his sample includes 15 organization for economic co operation and development oecd countries with data spanning over the period 1950 1988 he shows that the investment share in producer durables and to a lesser extent the total investment rate presents an upward deterministic trend and is generally found nonstationary when augmented dickey fuller adf 1979 tests are applied in contrast rates of economic growth remain fairly stable jones then claims that the fact that output growth rates exhibit no large permanent movements imposes a strong and testable restriction on endogenous growth models if an endogenous growth model predicts that permanent movements in some variable x have permanent effects on growth then either a x must exhibit no large persistent movements or b some other variable or variables must also have persistent effects on growth that offset the movements of x in a way that is determined by the endogenous growth model jones 1995a 502 despite the considerable effort using this framework to try to test the empirical validity of ak type growth models for the oecd countries jones 1995a li 2002 romero avila 2006 no work has been conducted along these lines for the chinese economy this is surprising because this issue should be particularly important for a country like china which is expected to become the leading economy in the coming decades with a population more than 1 3 billion which is more than four times the population of the united states this paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by applying jones test to the chinese economy over the past five decades the chinese economy has shown spectacular growth performance with an average annual growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product gdp equal to 6

beyond balanced growth balanced growth models are commonly used in macroeconomics because they are consistent with the well known kaldor facts regarding economic growth these models however are inconsistent with one of the most striking regularities of the growth process the massive reallocation of labour from agriculture into manufacturing and services this paper presents a simple model consistent with both the kaldor facts and the dynamics of sectoral labour reallocation

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

changes in sectoral composition associated with economic growth in this paper the author uses dynamic general equilibrium methods to examine the interrelationship between sectoral composition and growth she shows that growth is affected by sectoral composition and vice versa the model is basically a solow model of sustained growth with multiple consumption goods and nonhomothetic preferences each consumption good is produced using different factor intensities the rate of exogenous technological change is different in each sector nonhomotheticity of preferences drives the result that sectoral composition affects growth rates copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

rivalrous money supply among overlapping generations this note explores endogenous rivalrous money supply by different generations of an overlapping generations economy money gold is intrinsically useless but is costly to create the authors show how a government representing the young has an incentive to tax its constituency to mine gold to redistribute among the young in order to inflate the aggregate money stock and thereby reduce the value of the money holdings of the old this additional money also reduces the inflationary impact of the money creation by the succeeding generation equilibrium dynamics of prices and consumption are explored

an experimental study of jury decision rules we present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury we consider three treatment variables group size three or six number of votes needed for conviction majority or unanimity and pre vote deliberation we find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule a large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence this is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of feddersen and pesendorfer although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision contrary to feddersen and pesendorfer in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule in the case of no deliberation we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium

human capital and convergence a production frontier approach using nonparametric production frontier methods we decompose labor productivity growth into components attributable to technological change shifts in the world production frontier technological catch up movements toward or away from the frontier and physical and human capital accumulation movements along the frontier we find that 1 technological change is decidedly nonneutral 2 productivity growth is driven primarily by physical and human capital accumulation 3 the increased international dispersion of productivity is explained primarily by physical capital accumulation and 4 international polarization the shift from a unimodal to a bimodal distribution is brought about primarily by efficiency changes technological catch up

a theory of conservatism a free rider problem arises when a group choice between two alternatives has to be made on the basis of privately collected evidence leading to insufficient effort in gathering evidence and an ex ante welfare loss for the group to alleviate the free rider problem the group can commit to a conservative rule whereby the decision is made against the alternative favored by the group s preference or prior when evidence supports it but is not preponderant optimal conservatism increases private incentives to gather evidence and improves the quality of the group decision my result explains why sometimes groups appear overly cautious toward favored alternatives

information aggregation in polls we study information transmission via polling a policymaker polls constitu ents who differ in their information and ideology to determine policy full rev elation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample but not with a large one in large polls full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists who respond truth fully and extremists who do not we find polling statistics that ignore strate gic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the polvs margin of error we construct estimators that account for strategic behavior finally we compare polls and elections jel c42 d83

long run implications of investment specific technological change an attempt is made to disentangle its effects from the more traditional hicksneutral form of technological progress the balanced growth path for the model is characterized and calibrated to u s national income and product account nipa data the quantitative analysis suggests that investment specific technological change accounts for the major part of growth jel e13 030 041 047