economic performance and u s senate elections reply major criticisms made by chressanthis and shaffer c s are addressed the authors failure to include noneconomic variables in the regression model the inclusion of open elections in the sample and the use of variables other than the state unemployment rate as economic performance measures errors in c s s interpretations are noted additional regression results are reported using modifications of the authors original model these suggest that the change notrelative change as in c s in state unemployment rate is superior and that the authors model yields a stronger effect of state economic performance on election outcomes than does the c s model

causality testing of the popularity function an empirical investigation for the federal republic of germany 1971 1982 relying on allensbach and infratest data it is asked if there is a relation between the perception of the general economic situation and the voting intention modern time series techniques are employed box jenkins analysis and granger causality tests the test results as well as ex post predictions show that voting intentions are strongly influenced by the perceived economic situation thus the null hypothesis of no relationship between the variables can not only be rejected by using classical econometric methods as is done in previous studies but also by employing modern time series procedures

neighborhood information exchange and voter participation an experimental study we study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters decisions we do so in a participation game in which we distinguish between early and late voters each late voter is told about one early voter s turnout decision cases are distinguished where the voters are allies support the same group or adversaries with opposing preferences and where they are uncertain about each other s preferences our experimental results show that the social embeddedness matters this information increases aggregate turnout by approximately 50 the largest effect is observed for allies early voters strategically try to use their first mover position and late voters respond to this

unemployment rates and political outcomes an incentive for manufacturing a political business cycle in recent years the interdependence of politics and economics has received an increasing amount of attention by both economists and political scientists the explanation for this interest lies in the rediscovery of political economy and may be at least partly due to the recent experiences that governmental advisors have had with simultaneously increasing inflation and unemployment conventional macroeconomic approaches have failed to pin point causes for the stagflation and to provide methods for solving the problem the traditional economic policies may have failed in part because these traditional solutions were simply not plausible in the political environments in which they were proposed it is the intent of a growing body of work to develop macromodels with endogenous political sectors the inference made in this literature is that 1 the economy can be manipulated or affected by a political sector and that 2 there is an incentive for the political sector to manipulate the economy this literature has however just begun to formalize the interaction of the political and economic sectors and empirical work is virtually nonexistent the purpose of this paper is to present some evidence on these two inferences in section 1 the first inference is examined in section ii literature on which the first inference is based is reviewed and evidence on the possible incentive to create such a cycle is presented in section iii concluding remarks are offered

welfare consequences of the six year presidential term evaluated in the context of a model of the u s economy we evaluate the six year presidential term proposal in the context of a model of the u s economy characterized by a short run but not a long run trade off between inflation and unemployment votes and public welfare are separately conceptualized as functions of inflation and unemployment which are indirectly controlled by the president through manipulation of government spending in a series of simulation experiments the vote maximizing choice of policy instruments led to less we fare loss with six than with four year terms under most conditions ironically vote maximizing was shown to lead not only to short and long term welfare loss but also to long run political disadvantage

multiparty electoral competition in the netherlands and germany a model based on multinomial probit a typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share here we use euro barometer survey data and european elite study data from 1979 for the netherlands and germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response based on multinomial probit estimation for each of these countries we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model the latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics the pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions we use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions we go on to propose a model of internal party decision making based both on pre election electoral estimation and post election coalition bargaining this model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions we argue that maximizing expected vote will not in general be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation

reinterpreting the role of inflation in politico economic models the author attempting to analyze the interplay between politics and economics is faced with a large number of problems ranging from an always too small and idiosyncratic data set to the lack of any generally accepted theory of the process which has testable implications my aims have been 1 to show that past studies have typically treated inflation in an extremely naive way disregarding the fact that it may have political pluses if unanticipated and 2 to test the sensitivity of established formulations to what i believe is the more useful view of voter behavior given in model ii since model i and model ii represent polar extremes of amnesiac and eidetic behavior tests of intermediate lag structures are clearly in order because of administration peculiarities however lost data points will pose a serious problem

an irrational party of rational members the collision of legislators reelection quest with party success in the japan socialist party this study presents a new explanation to a puzzle regarding the reluctance of the japan socialist party jsp to moderate its hard liner marxist platform the author does so by focusing on the pref

the variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 canadian election formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean recent research has found no evidence of such convergence in order to explain non convergence the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election that is the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions we introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties an electoral survey of the 2004 election in canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions quebec and the rest of canada the survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space the variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share we find that in the local nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence the liberals and conservatives locate at the national electoral mean and the bloc quebecois with the highest competence valence locates at the quebec electoral mean the new democratic party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean the greens with lowest competence valence locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share

conflicting tasks and moral hazard theory and experimental evidence abstract we study a multi task principal agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other in theory it is difficult to induce a single agent to exert efforts in two conflicting tasks because effort in one task decreases the success probability of the other task we have conducted an experiment in which we find strong support for the relevance of this incentive problem in the presence of conflict subjects choose two efforts significantly less often when both tasks are assigned to a single agent than when there are two agents each in charge of one task

evasive lying in strategic communication abstract information asymmetries in economic transactions are omnipresent and a regular source of fraudulent behavior in a theoretical and an experimental analysis of a sender receiver game we investigate whether sanctions for lying induce more truth telling the novel aspect in our model is that senders may not only choose between truth telling and explicit lying but may also engage in evasive lying by credibly pretending not to know while we find that sanctions promote truth telling when senders cannot engage in evasive lying this is no longer true when evasive lying is possible then explicit lying is largely substituted by evasive lying which completely eliminates the otherwise positive effect of sanctions on the rate of truth telling as outlined in our model the necessary prerequisite for such an erosion effect is that evasive lying is perceived as sufficiently less psychologically costly than direct lying evidence from our experimental data and a survey conducted with additional participants indicate that the shift towards evasion can indeed be attributed to lower psychological costs overall our results clearly demonstrate the limitations of sanctioning lying to counteract the exploitation of informational asymmetries and may explain the empirical evidence from the finance industry that sanctions for financial misconduct eventually appear to be not very effective

securing the base electoral competition under variable turnout i evaluate the securing the base strategy which prescribes that candidates position themselves away from the political center in order to maximize turnout among their supporters and reduce defections of their supporters to third party candidates my results support the notion that voters abstain due to indifference and imply that candidate positioning has a large effect on voter turnout and third party voting nonetheless my results indicate that the candidates can best compete by adopting centrist positions while a candidate can increase turnout among his supporters by moving away from the center many moderate voters will defect to his opponent

general economic conditions and national elections the fact that economic conditions influence voters is a leading commonplace of conversation in election years the question is is this fact in fact a fact despite the overwhelming popularity of the fact it has received neither an explicit theoretical analysis presumably because it is so obvious that economic adversity should create political adversaries nor until recently a satisfactory statistical analysis gerald h kramer has presented a multivariate analysis of congressional elections which would strongly suggest that fluctuations in the rate of unemployment have no appreciable effect upon elections but that fluctuations in per capita real income are influential in the following pages i propose to 1 reaffirm his finding on the electoral unimportance of ordinary fluctuations in unemployment 2 argue that contrary to kramer fluctuations in real income also do not have important electoral effects and 3 present an argument based upon rational voter behavior for the unimportance of general economic conditions in national elections

money politics and the post war business cycle abstract the political economy literature has enshrined as stylized fact the view that lower inflation and temporarily lower growth follow the election of republican presidents and has emphasized political manipulation of monetary policy as an explanation support for the monetary explanation comes in econometric work that largely ignores identification issues that dominate the literature on measuring the effects of monetary policy we generalize a standard vector autoregression framework to accommodate discrete political party variables we find almost no support for the view that political effects on the macroeconomy operate through monetary policy and only weak evidence that political effects are significant at all

the determinants of vote intentions in portugal this paper offers new insights on theinteractions between economics and politicsin portugal we use two unexplored datasets consisting of monthly polls on voteintentions for the main political partiesin portugal and responses to a consumersurvey containing a battery of questions oneconomic evaluations the analysis coversthe interval from 1986 to 2001 we findthat 1 right wing governments arepenalized for higher inflation while theleft wing ones are not 2 left winggovernments are more penalized forincreases in the unemployment rate 3 voters base their evaluations ofincumbents performances on perceptions ofpast and current economic conditions rather than on expected future economicoutcomes

business cycle and political election outcomes evidence from the chilean democracy this paper explores the influence of economic variables in chilean presidential elections we use a panel where the dependent variable corresponds to the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent at a municipal level in the presidential elections of 1989 1993 and 1999 we focus on the unemployment rate and the output gap and find that both have a significant influence on the vote we also find that if the mayor is from the same coalition as the incumbent people will further punish the incumbent when regional unemployment is above national unemployment

issues economics and the dynamics of multiparty elections the british 1987 general election we offer a model of multiparty elections that combines voters retrospective economic evaluations with consideration of parties issue positions and the issue preferences of voters we show that both policy issues and the state of the economy matter in british elections in 1987 voters made a largely retrospective evaluation of the conservatives based on economic performance those who rejected the conservative party chose between labour and alliance based on issue positions through simulations we move the parties in the issue space and reestimate vote shares as well as hypothesize an alternative distribution of views on the economy and we show that labour had virtually no chance to win with a centrist party as a viable alternative the predictions from our 1987 simulations are supported in an analysis of the 1992 british election we argue for multinomial probit in studying three party elections because it allows for a richer formulation of politics than do competing methods

economic voting and the symbolic politics argument a reinterpretation and synthesis economic voting is generally regarded as a straightforward political demand for the amelioration of economic grievances this assumption about motives underlies the implicit theories of politicians and the imputations of interests to voters in aggregate time series models several recent articles have argued that voting is not self interested but a manifestation of symbolic preferences at the level of the collectivity this article places the dispute between personal and collective decision referents into the broader perspective of a multi stage model of information processing and decision making personal and collective decision referents are shown to define the poles of a continuum and several hypotheses are derived to predict the relative weights assigned to each in the voter s calculus the model is used in analyses of both the public s evaluations of incumbent economic management and economic voting in different electoral arenas by varying issue publics designed to maximize comparability with aggregate studies this research includes both objective and subjective measures of economic conditions and indexes changes in personal conditions over time from panel data

economic conditions and national elections post sample forecasts of the kramer equations there has long been a division of opinion among economists concerning the effects of economic developments on voting behavior in his well known study kramer 1971a concluded that the fluctuations in economic activity have a systematic influence on u s congressional elections his findings were challenged by various economists including stigler 1973 the purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis of kramer s results by examining the post sample forecast performance of his models as noted by christ 1966 pp 546 49 the acid test of a time series model is its ability to perform well outside the sample period the results discussed below demonstrate that kramer s equations have relatively good post sample predictive ability the findings thus support the view that short term economic fluctuations have important effects on national elections however the results also suggest that economic factors alone are not sufficient to account for all variations of voter behavior

bread and peace voting in u s presidential elections a simple bread and peace model shows that aggregate votes forpresident in postwar elections were determined entirely byweighted average growth of real disposable personal income percapita during the incumbent party s term and the cumulativenumbers of american military personnel killed in action as aresult of u s intervention in the korean and vietnamese civilwars the model is subjected to robustness tests against twenty two variations in functional form inspired by the extensiveliterature on presidential voting not one of these variationsadds value to the bread and peace model or significantly perturbsits coefficients

econometric estimations of popularity functions a case study for austria in this paper we investigate the effects of changes in economic conditions on the popularity of political parties in austria after a brief description of the austrian political system we estimate single equations and simultaneous systems of popularity functions for different parties based on traditional theoretical foundations results show that some effects of economic variables on popularity exist although they are different between different policy regimes traditional popularity functions nevertheless outperform models based on the assumption of voters rational expectations which claim that only unexpected changes in economic conditions affect political popularity

presidential and congressional vote share equations three vote share equations are estimated and analyzed in this paper one for presidential elections one for on term house elections and one for mid term house elections the sample period is 1916 2006 considering the three equations together allows one to test whether the same economic variables affect each and to examine various serial correlation and coattail possibilities the resulting three equation model can then be analyzed dynamically which is done in section 4 the main conclusions are briefly 1 there is strong evidence that the economy affects all three vote shares and in remarkably similar ways 2 there is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on term house elections the presidential vote share and the on term house vote share are highly positively correlated but this is because they are affected by some of the same variables 3 there is positive serial correlation in the house vote in that the previous mid term house vote share positively affects the on term house vote share and the previous on term house vote share positively affects the mid term house vote share 4 the presidential vote share has a negative effect on the next mid term house vote share the most likely explanation for this is a balance argument where voters are reluctant to let one party become too dominant ruled out as possible explanations for this fourth result is any reversal of a coattail effect since there is no evidence of an effect in the first place and a regression to the mean since the positive serial correlation in the house vote implies no such regression also it is not simply voting against the party in the white house because the presidential variable is a vote share variable not a 0 1 incumbency variable

do increases in petroleum product prices put the incumbent party at risk in us presidential elections this article investigates the impact of petroleum product prices on recent united states presidential elections by modelling the probability of the incumbent presidential party losing a state under the united states electoral college system it had carried the previous presidential election the main finding is that the probability of the incumbent party losing a state previously carried increases with petroleum product prices but only in those states that have primarily energy consuming economies we also find that increases in the number of international conflicts increases in real state per capita income growth and increases in state per capita grants in aid all reduce the likelihood of losing previously carried states while higher taxation growth increases this likelihood

the determinants of voting by the national labor relations board on unfair labor practice cases 1955 1975 this study has employed logit analysis in an attempt to determine important variables that influence the voting by the nlrb on unfair labor practice cases pooled regression results on the odds of voting prolabor were reported for the administrations of eisenhower kennedy johnson and nixon and for the entire period 1955 1975 a number of interesting findings are offered in this empirical investigation of the nlrb first it was found that if a board member is reappointed to the board the greater will be the odds that the member will vote prolabor this verifies the speculation that the democrats preferred a solidly prolabor voting board and that the republicans desired a strong prolabor voting minority on the board secondly political variables such as the party of the administration appointing the nlrb member and the member s own political party had an influence on the odds of voting prolabor if the administration in power was democratic or if the board member was a democrat the greater were the odds that the member would vote prolabor even if a member of the board professed to be an independent politically which was the case for two members during the eisenhower administration this variable was found to have a positive effect on prolabor voting for that particular administration and for the entire study period also in the eisenhower and nixon administrations being a former nonmember employee of the nlrb may have had some impact on the voting behavior finally variables for economic conditions in the economy were introduced into the regression equations to test whether or not these variables had any effect on the voting behavior of the nlrb members in almost all of the logit models reported the unemployment rate had an influence on voting by board members the effect was found to be positive in the eisenhower period and negative in the kennedy johnson and nixon periods the effect for the entire period was positive it is suggested that whether or not the influence of the unemployment rate on the voting on unfair labor practice cases was positive or negative depended on how the board perceived the role of organized labor in the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment if the members believe that organized labor s demands for higher wages caused accelerated inflation when the administration in power was simultaneously trying to reduce unemployment then the odds of the member voting prolabor were reduced besides the unemployment rate some other economic condition variables that were found to have a possible effect on nlrb voting during the kennedy johnson administration were real gnp strike days lost and union membership in the united states while admittedly this study is only a first attempt at modeling the voting behavior of the nlrb on important unfair labor practice decisions we believe that we have captured some of the most important political and economic variables that effect the behavior of a quasi judicial agency the nlrb

multicandidate equilibrium in american elections the united states presidential election of 1992 is anexample of a multicandidate contest involving bothdemocratic and republican candidates using a spatialmodelling approach i analyze candidate policystrategy for such elections under the assumption thatvoters choose according to the multivariate votingmodel of behavioral research this model representsvoters decisions as probabilistic functions of theirpolicy preferences and political partisanship isuggest reasons why partisan voting motivatescandidates to locate near their party s partisans inthe policy space and illustrate this argument withrespect to the 1992 presidential election the resultsof computer simulations suggest that these motivationslead to multicandidate spatial equilibria which arerobust to changes in the model s parameters partisanship appears to be an important source ofstability in multicandidate electoral competition

electoral cycles and the earnings of federal bureaucrats this paper analyzes the relationship between the timing of federal elections and the pay raises received by civilian employees of the federal government the theoretical framework discusses how electoral wage cycles are generated as a result of optimizing behavior on the part of voters bureaucrats and the government the empirical analysis uses a time series of wage rates for the twenty eight largest federal agencies over the period 1961 1978 the study indicates that pay hikes during the presidential election year are significantly greater about 2 to 3 percent higher than bureaucratic pay raises in other years

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

fairness and incentives in a multi task principal agent model this paper reports on a two task principal agent experiment in which only one task is contractible the principal can either offer a piece rate contract or a voluntary bonus to the agent bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks in contrast almost all agents with a piece rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts this behavior contradicts the self interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness

revisiting the trade off between risk and incentives the shocking effect of random shocks despite its central role in the theory of incentives empirical evidence of a trade off between risk and incentives remains scarce we reexamine this trade off in a workplace lab environment and find that in line with theory principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier unexpectedly agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite weaker incentives in addition principals earnings are significantly higher in the noisy environment we show that these findings can be accounted for when agents maximize a non cara utility function or when they exhibit loss aversion data and the online appendix are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2914 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

the keynesian and political determinants of unbalanced budgets u s fiscal policy from eisenhower to reagan the political business cycle proposition that politicians manipulate fiscal policy for political advantage is largely untested more often than not such manipulation is only assumed to occur on the basis of observed movements in inflation and unemployment and the few direct tests of the manipulation hypothesis are characterized by limited consideration of the full possibilities for political influence inadequate control for nonpolitical stabilization policy and inconsistent results this paper constructs several models of political fiscal policy incorporates them into a simple model of keynesian stabilization policy and tests the combined models using u s budget surplus deficit data from fy54 to fy83 the results provide little support for either the electoral motivation or partisan differences interpretations of the political business cycle the implications of these findings for the political business cycle literature long term economic management and deficit directed proposals for institutional reform are discussed

the political theory of the business cycle two strands of recent empirical work pose a challenge for the macro theorist when brought together one is the rational expectations interpretation of the business cycle the other is the political theory of the business cycle this paper attempts a reconciliation of these two strands in a theory where national political parties have to satisfy the preference of their own supporters as well as the floating voter the implications are that party voters evaluate government performance with respect to expected inflation and output and their variances and that parties will pursue different feedback rules

when politics and models collide estimating models of multiparty elections theory the spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional logit models which consider the position of the parties in issue spaces than by multinomial logit models which only consider the position of voters in the issue space the spatial model and random utility models in general suffer from a failure to adequately consider the substitutability of parties sharing similar or identical issue positions hypotheses multinomial logit is not necessarily better than successive applications of binomial logit conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions than does multinomial logit the spatial model may not correspond to voter decision making in multiple party settings multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the iia condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties methods comparisons of binomial logit multinomial logit conditional logit and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from multiparty elections results multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit conditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties whereas multinomial logit is not multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters estimation of multinomial probit with more than three choices is feasible

theories of behavior in principal agent relationships with hidden action abstract in a laboratory experiment we investigate behavior in a principal agent situation with moral hazard we evaluate the predictive success of two theories one is the standard agency theory which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation constraint typically requiring zero expected utility the other is the fair offer theory suggested by keser and willinger 2000 principals principles when agents actions are hidden international journal of industrial organization 18 1 163 185 which requires that the principal provide full insurance against losses to the agent and leave him a share of at most 50 of the generated surplus the treatment variable of our experiment is the cost of effort as effort costs increase expected net surplus of a contract decreases we observe that fair offer theory generally predicts observed contract offers better than standard agency theory however the predictive success of the fair offer theory decreases while the one of standard agency theory increases with decreasing expected net surplus

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

economic expectations and voting behavior in united states house and senate elections past individual level studies of economic voting 1 have incorrectly operationalized the model they employ by using past oriented rather than future oriented questions and 2 have failed to examine the level of economic voting in united states senate elections using the 1978 national election study we show that economic voting exists in senate but not house elections presumably due to the differences in electoral context even when economic voting occurs however there is no guarantee that the public will influence the direction of macroeconomic policy

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

letting the good times roll a theory of voter inference and experimental evidence this paper examines inference and attribution in a simple and ubiquitous strategic situation a voter is faced with discerning whether a leader worked on his or her behalf after observing an informative but noisy signal about the leader s performance we characterize perfect bayesian equilibria quantal response equilibria qre and provide a simple model of a heuristic based approach referred to as strategic naivete within a wide class of such environments we also discuss experiments conducted to examine human behavior within such an environment while it is clear that the observed behavior is inconsistent with perfect bayesian equilibrium distinguishing between qre and strategic naivete will require further work we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of probabilistic and or heuristic based attribution processes for electoral politics and political economy

how lasting is voter gratitude an analysis of the short and long term electoral returns to beneficial policy dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightednessmayobstructthewelfare improvingeffectofdemocraticaccountability however weknowlittleabouthow long governments receive electoral credit for beneficial policies we exploit the massive policy response to a major natural disaster the 2002 elbe flooding in germany to provide an upper bound for the short and long term electoral returns to targeted policy benefits we estimate that the flood response increased vote shares for the incumbent party by 7 percentage points in affected areas in the 2002 election twenty five percent of this short term reward carried over to the 2005 election before the gains vanished in the 2009 election we conclude that given favorable circumstances policy makers can generate voter gratitude that persists longer than scholarship has acknowledged so far and elaborate on the implications for theories of electoral behavior democratic accountability and public policy

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

business cycles and the political process the interrelationship between the political sector and the macroeconomy in democratic societies has been examined extensively in recent years research in this area has generally been concerned with two issues first following the lead of kramer 16 various authors have examined the impact of economic conditions on congressional 1 13 21 24 and presidential elections 4 5 the results at the congressional level have been mixed but it is reasonably safe to conclude that economic conditions do affect presidential elections the second issue and the one of primary concern in this study has dealt with the development of models of politico economic interaction the basic concept in these models is that an administration s popularity and therefore the probability of staying in power depends critically on economic conditions knowing this the administration seeks to manipulate the economy in order to maintain power the use of economic tools for political goals by governments is well established in the literature theoretical contributions by nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 have demonstrated the potential for a politically motivated business cycle in a world of politico economic interaction empirical support for the existence of such a cycle is provided by the work of frey and schneider 7 8 9 the main purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the political business cycle that generates empirically testable proposition the goal is to integrate the theoretical conclusions of a formal model similar to the nordhaus 20 and macrae 18 framework with the empirical support provided by frey and schneider 7 8 9 the possibility of a political business cycle is important for several reasons in macroeconometric models government policy that is endogenous to the system is usually treated as if it were exogenous this may cause serious misspecification errors further forecasts of the future course of economic events which depend heavily on government action will be inaccurate unless the political motivations of governments are considered

presidential popularity and the economy abstract this study tests the hypothesis that the sensitivity of the president s popularity to economic events differs across distinct demographic groups assuming that presidental popularity is negatively related to both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate the electorate is disaggregated according to sex age race education income and political affiliation and separate regressions are estimated for the individual subgroups using quarterly data covering 1976 through 1988 statistically significant differences in the marginal effects of unemployment and inflation on presidential approval are discovered for the various subgroupings

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

the paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income with political ideology with respect to the income distribution measured by proxy as the fraction of conservative coalition victories it is found that over the period 1961 1984 the degree of conservative coalition strength is positively associated with changes in inequality holding the effects of unemployment and inflation constant

rational adaptive and learning behavior of voters evidence from disaggregated popularity functions for sweden the disaggregated study confirms earlier aggregated studies showing that unemployment strongly affects the popularity of the swedish government the results presented here however suggest that there are differences among popularity functions estimated across groups differing in age income and gender consequently popularity functions estimated at an aggregated level ignore reaction patterns within various groups in society

does the fed contribute to a political business cycle in contrast to findings of other studies evidence is presented to support the existence of a federal reserve induced political monetary cycle that corresponds to the u s presidential election cycle using various taylor rules we find support for the view that fed policy turns significantly more expansionary in the seven quarters prior to the election but only when the fed chair and incumbent presidential party have partisan affiliations

econometrics and presidential elections this paper discusses an econometric equation that explains votes for president as a function of economic events and incumbency information the history of the equation is reviewed the update after the 1992 election is discussed and a prediction for the 1996 election is made conditional on an economic forecast

voting and the economic cycle sophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by filtering out economic cycles which they do not like from trend growth which they do naive voters on the other hand respond only to raw economic growth this implies that voting in the aggregate should respond asymmetrically to the economic cycle upswings are rewarded by the naive but punished by the sophisticated downswings are punished by all voters using an established dataset of over 400 general elections we find that the incumbent vote share a responds differently to trend growth than to the cycle b does not respond significantly to positive variation in the economic cycle and c responds significantly and negatively to negative realizations in the economic cycle in contrast to standard formulations of the grievance asymmetry this asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth

some results of experimental duopoly markets with demand inertia subjects played twice a multistage duopoly game with demand inertia their actual behavior is different from the unique subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the game in the second plays of the game subjects tend to behave more cooperatively than in the first plays profits prices and price stability are significantly higher the individual markets in the second plays are classified into strongly cooperative weakly cooperative and aggressive markets each market type shows a particular pattern of behavior average price and price instability of a market can be used as indicators for classification copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

economic performance and u s senate elections 1958 1986 despite the use of several alternative estimation model specifications no relationship was found between state economic performance and u s senatorial votes on the other hand a significantly positive relation was found between election year national real per capita income growth and the vote share of candidates of the incumbent president s party both of these results are broadly consistent with earlier findings for other state level elections upon further examination we find this effect to be operative only in the negative sense that the presidential party s senatorial vote share declines when economic performance is poor but is not positively associated with above average economic performance further the vote share of incumbent candidates independent of party affiliation is found to be lower in slow growth pre election years than in years of above average growth the estimate of the difference is such as to suggest a large and direct impact of national economic performance on votes for incumbent candidates themselves independent of effects acting through party affiliation such an effect despite its intuitive plausibility has been sought and found in one previous study adams and kenny since the high growth and the low growth sample means differ by about three percent the 4 to 6 percent difference in vote plurality associated with incumbent candidacy in good versus poor performance periods translates into about the same impact as that operating through presidential party affiliation taking these effects together one may surmise than an incumbent senator of the president s party may rightly fear a pre election recession

the rational behavior theory of voting participation evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections in recent years a substantial literature on the determinants of voting participation has been developed in many of these studies voting is assumed to be an expression of rational behavior that is people vote when they expect that the benefits will exceed the related costs voting is largely an act of consumption based upon the widely held belief that one should vote to fulfill a civic duty or upon some combination of personal characteristics which is sufficiently vague to make precise measurement impossible the rational behavior theory however holds that voting is influenced at the margin by personal and environmental factors which incrementally affect expected benefits and costs making the act of voting more or less rational those factors which increase expected benefits will ceteris paribus enhance the probability that one will vote those factors which increase expected costs will of course have the opposite effect this study is presented as a primarily empirical contribution to the literature which assumes that since voting is an expression of rational behavior it can be modeled and tested using standard economic analysis and methodology

policy oriented voting in response to economic issues this study explores the hypothesis that voting in response to economic problems is policy oriented voters concerned about unemployment ore predicted to give greater support to democratic candidates while those concerned about inflation are predicted to vote more republican in light of evidence from previous research this study investigates the electoral effects of inflation and unemployment as 1 problems directly experienced by the individual and 2 problems deemed serious for the nation as a whole support is strongest for the unemployment side of the hypothesis voters personally affected by unemployment gave a modest boost to democratic candidates in virtually every election and in years of high unemployment the large percentage of voters who fell it was a serious national problem voted heavily democratic as well this study concludes by discussing the important implications these findings have for our understanding of how economic conditions influence voting behavior in american national elections

the dynamics of the partisan gender gap genderdifferencesinvotechoice opinion andpartyidentificationhavebecomeacommonfeature of the american political landscape we examine the nature and causes of gender differences in partisanship using a time series approach we show that gender differences are pervasive existing outside of the context of specific elections or issues and that they are a product of the interaction ofsocietalconditionsandpolitics wefindthatfrom1979to2000 thepartisangendergaphasgrownwhen the political climate moved in a conservative direction the economy deteriorated and the percentage of economically vulnerable single women increased the gender gap is likely to be a continual feature of the american political landscape one that shapes everything from elite political behavior to election outcomes t he partisan preferences of men and women have both converged and diverged at different times in history the late 1970s for example saw a period in which men and women shared similar levels of democratic and republican partisan support since the early 1980s however partisan preferences have diverged the divergences are fundamentally political oftendecidingelectionoutcomes helpingstructure policy debates and election campaigns and also contributing to policy outcomes each of these may in turn either fuel or diminish the original differences in the partisanship of men and women and lead to a politics more or less divided on the basis of gender politicians for example may be well served by reaching out and supporting issues designed to minimize differences in support from men and women especially when the parties find themselves in rough parity electoral motivations may also lead politicians to support policy that exacerbatesgenderdifferenceswhengapsworkintheir favor further contributing to them to the extent that partisandifferencesacrossgendersarepersistent these implications become more profound characterizing thepoliticallandscapeforlongperiodsoftime convergence in the partisan preferences of men and women

granger causality rational expectations and aversion to unemployment and inflation this paper presents a new test for rational expectations this is done within the context of public concern or aversion over inflation and unemployment it is found that inflation aversion granger causes inflation but unemployment aversion does not granger cause unemployment this implies both that inflation aversion is partially determined by expected inflation and that such expectations have a rational element however rational expectations of unemployment do not determine unemployment aversion the consequences of these results for political business cycle theory are then examined

principals principles when agents actions are hidden abstract we examine the behavior of subjects in a simple principal agent game with hidden action while subjects in the role of agents tend to choose the actions which maximize their expected profits subjects in the role of principals offer contracts which differ from the theoretical predictions we identify three principles of contract design 1 the agent s remuneration for the better outcome is at least as high as the remuneration for the worse outcome 2 the agent must not risk making a loss 3 the net profit of the agent should not be higher than the net profit of the principal

vertical integration in west africa s cotton industry are parastatals a second best solution this article provides a framework to compare market outcomes among vertically integrated monopsonies in the cotton sector of west africa and alternative more competitive market structures based on a principal agent framework in the presence of factor market constraints as well as capital market failure efficiently operated cotton parastatals increase sector welfare and efficiency by providing input credits in equilibrium outcomes with the principal agent model suggest growers receive the reservation income to participate in cotton production while the principal cotton company extracts the surplus above the reservation income competitive markets entail more equitable distribution of benefits than with parastatal vertical integration but credit and factor market constraints can still persist promotion of a competitive market system will not support cotton productivity growth unless stakeholders pursue complementary programs to develop credit markets and research and extension institutions in the presence of current market failures parastatals may be a second best solution

the mean voter theorem necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution this paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence valence can be interpreted as the non policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders the theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence the condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance when the condition fails the low valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre the inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the israel election in 1996 copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

determinants of county level voting patterns in the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections county level data are used to estimate the incumbent party share of the two party vote in the 2012 and the 2016 u s presidential elections using a seemingly unrelated estimation procedure the r

rational voting and candidate entry under plurality rule we analyze a formal model of electoral competition under plurality rule that is characterized by two novel features first rather than assuming a fixed field of candidates we allow candidates to make decisions regarding entry as well as location second voters in our model are strategically rational that is they maximize utility over expected policy outcomes rather than simply voting for the ideologically closest candidate given these assumptions all equilibria in this model are such that the set of entrants locates at the median voter s ideal point this result stands in sharp contrast to earlier models of multicandidate competition in which entry is not allowed and voters vote sincerely

the role of economic issues in elections the case of the 1988 chilean presidential referendum in this paper we tested the hypothesis that the performance of the economy is a determinant factor in the voter s preferences the results obtained enable us to corroborate this notion since the model has a high predictive value and the behavior of the economy both in terms of level of activity as well as in its changes comes up consistently as a determinant factor of voting behavior these results are also consistent with those obtained through chilean polls in which it has been ascertained that economic events particularly in the case of those who favored the anti pinochet option no were of utmost importance in the voters decisions the results also confirm the idea that in chile women tend to give economic issues a lesser weight in their political preferences

it s the economy and then some modeling the presidential vote with state panel data using data for the 50 us states for presidential elections from 1972 to 2004 two theories for determining state voting outcomes are considered jointly the economy matters and home grown ness theories fixed effects regressions show that measures of the economy matters real income unemployment and a proxy for inflation have the predicted effects on state voting patterns for presidential elections the home grown theory receives mixed support there is weak evidence that incumbent party candidates garner greater support in their home states there is strong support however for the proposition that incumbent party candidates fare worse in the home state of rival party candidates

a spatial analysis of candidate competition in dual member districts the 1989 chilean senatorial elections this study uses empirical spatial theory to evaluate candidate and voter behavior in senate elections contested during the 1989 chilean general election the study evaluates whether senatorial candidates competing in dual member districts under chilean d hondt locate near the periphery or interior of the electoral space spatial analyses demonstrate the chilean senatorial electoral system is characterized by centrifugal forces in particular candidates of the right locate on the periphery of the space and face few incentives to pursue moderate electoral strategies the study also characterizes bases of party and candidate support and the underlying dimensions of political competition spatial analysis reveals both change and continuity in the pre and post authoritarian electoral universes

the economics of choice in the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authories the empirical study and modelling of processes and motivations behind government behavior has been relatively meager this paper has formulated and estimated a model designed to explain the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authorities the model takes into consideration the fact that this process is governed by mixed motivations associated with both the desire to adopt policies and actions based on the concept of public interest and with the desire for re election the model was applied to data pertaining to 52 local authorities in israel under two governments the principal findings of the foregoing analysis can be summarized as follows first the behavioral mechanism operating beyond intergovernmental grants allocation is inherent in the political system and equally applies to the two governments second this mechanism is governed both by factors representing objective criteria describing the needs of the populations and by political factors representing the desire for re election differences in the behavior of the two governments seem to be significant as far as some objective variables are concerned but are almost insignificant as far as the political variable is concerned third as in other studies conducted in the u s our findings support the hypothesis that in their attempt to maximize the prospects for re election governments find it preferable to pursue policies which reward their supporters rather than buy off their opponents lastly by allowing per capita grants to be a non monotonous function of the political variable it was found that indeed both governments have increased per capita grants as a function of pol up to a certain level and decreased it thereafter

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

the ecological fallacy revisited aggregate versus individual level findings on economics and elections and sociotropic voting several aggregate level studies have found a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and election outcomes operating in intuitively plausible directions more recent survey based studies however have been unable to detect any comparable relationship operating at the individual voter level this persistent discrepancy is puzzling one recently proposed explanation for it is that voters actually behave in an altruistic or sociotropic fashion responding to economic events only as they affect the general welfare rather than in terms of self interested pocketbook considerations it is argued here that the discrepancies between the macro and micro level studies are a statistical artifact arising from the fact that observable changes in individual welfare actually consist of two unobservable components a government induced and politically relevant component and an exogenous component caused by life cycle and other politically irrelevant factors it is shown that because of this individual level cross sectional estimates of the effects of welfare changes on voting are badly biased and are essentially unrelated to the true values of the behavioral parameters of interest they will generally be considerable underestimates and may even be of the wrong sign an aggregate level time series analysis on the other hand will often yield reasonably good if somewhat attenuated estimates of the underlying individual level effects of interest thus in this case individual behavior is best investigated with aggregate rather than individual level data it is also shown that the evidence for sociotropic voting is artifactual in the sense that the various findings and evidence which ostensibly show sociotropic behavior are all perfectly compatible with the null hypothesis of self interested pocketbook voting

the rationality of economic voting and the macroeconomic regime since voter rationality plays a major role in theories of political economics it is important for political analysts to investigate the extent of voter sophistication a conventional strategy for addressing this question is to determine what decision rule voters appear to use by estimating rival political support models that embody varying assumptions about voter rationality however under some circumstances such a strategy may be incapable of identifying the descriptively superior model due to an observational equivalence problem the paper estimates the competing political support models under alternative macroeconomic regimes and finds evidence favoring the nonrationalist or adaptive model

the effect of government ideology on an exchange rate regime some international evidence this paper comprehensively investigates the effect of government ideology on the type of exchange rate regime that a country implements via multinomial logit and multinomial probit models for 147 countries in the period 1974 2009 our results clearly indicate that a left wing government increases the likelihood that a country implements a flexible regime in the classifications of exchange rate regimes nevertheless evidence is weaker when using the de jure imf course classification which is set up by ilzetzki et al 2008 in a deeper investigation we find that left wing governments are more likely to choose a flexible regime relative to a fixed one in our sample of oecd non oecd and non eurozone countries as the impacts from government ideology on the determinant of the choice of exchange rate regime in eurozone countries disappear more importantly we present many explanations for exchange rate regime choices when macroeconomic conditions political constraints and institutions impact the choice of exchange rate regime

political accountability for price stability and unemployment in a multi party system with coalition governments a model of party popularity for multi party systems is presented and applied to the netherlands main conclusions are first inflation and unemployment and their interaction affect the popularity of parties second it is important to take into account that voters may reckon with a trade off between these variables third it is wrong to handle a coalition government as a homogeneous entity

rationality causality and the relation between economic conditions and the popularity of parties an empirical investigation for the federal republic of germany 1971 1982 abstract two questions are discussed using german popularity data from 1971 to 1982 it is asked whether it is true that using time series methods no relation can be found between economic variables and the popularity of parties taking ex post predictions strong evidence is presented that such a relation exists even if usual granger causality tests cannot detect it but is this relation compatible with rational expectations of the electorate this is at best partly the case as the anticipated part of the unemployment rate has a significant impact on the popularities of the two major german parties

government subsidies and presidential election outcomes evidence for a developing country summary we explore the effects of government subsidies on presidential elections in chile in 1989 99 we use a panel with three periods the elections of 1989 1993 and 1999 and 229 counties we correct for the potential simultaneity problem deriving from the fact that an incumbent facing a difficult political scenario might react by increasing subsidies to improve his her electoral performance our results indicate that the greater the coverage of these types of programs i e the percentage of people receiving subsidies the higher the votes for the incumbent

multiparty spatial competition with probabilistic voting i develop a general model of multiparty competition in which parties model voters choices by means of probabilistic choice rules the model is specified in terms of an issue salience coefficient which varies with the importance voters attach to issues as opposed to unmeasured nonissue motivations i show that when the policy salience coefficient is sufficiently low then both vote maximizing and rank maximizing parties have a dominant strategy to adopt the most popular platform which maximizes voter utilities over the entire electorate this most popular platform therefore represents a convergent equilibrium when all parties are vote or rank maximizing numerical estimates suggest that this equilibrium result holds for degrees of issue voting which exceed the parameters behavioral researchers have estimated for various historical elections

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates