intersectoral externalities and indeterminacy abstract we consider a two sector economy with positive intersectoral external effects and nonincreasing social returns we show that if the discount factor is close to 1 then local indeterminacy may be obtained with mild market imperfections moreover with additional conditions when is made smaller the steady state becomes totally unstable and quasi periodic cycles along which equilibrium paths are indeterminate may appear through a hopf bifurcation this will be proved even if the investment good is capital intensive at the private level while this condition guarantees local determinacy in the sector specific case journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 e32 o41

the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

production function regressions returns to scale and externalities a number of recent papers have used simple linear regressions in an attempt to identify market structure the extent of returns to scale and possible external effects in u s manufacturing industries the results obtained from these regressions have important implications for several branches of modern macroeconomics as a result the macro literature frequently cites specific numerical evidence from caballero and lyons 1992 and hall 1990 which suggests that there are quantitatively significant increasing returns to scale or external effects in u s manufacturing in contrast it is the argument of this paper that this evidence is not convincing the most robust evidence suggests that the typical u s manufacturing industry displays constant returns with no external effects on the other hand there is significant heterogeneity across industries

corruption investments and contributions to public goods experimental evidence from rural liberia we analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods we obtain a proxy for corruption among liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to the chief we then use the gap between these measurements missing inputs to explain variation in investment behavior of villagers investment behavior is gauged with two simple artefactual field experiments our main results are that corruption i undermines incentives for voluntary contributions to local public goods and ii may reduce private investments of individuals subject to rent seeking by the chief in real life we also provide weaker evidence that the impact of corruption on investments and contributions to public goods is heterogeneous this impact may be gender specific and appears to vary with accessibility of communities

are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth firm level evidence exploiting a unique data set containing information about the estimated bribe payments of ugandan firms the authors study the relationship between bribe payments taxes and firm growth in uganda for the period 1995 97 using industry location averages to circumvent the potential problem of endogeneity and to deal with issues of measurement error they find that both the rate of taxation and the rate of bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth for the full data set a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with three percentage point reduction in firm growth an effect about three times that of taxation moreover after excluding outliers the authors find that bribery has a much greater negative impact on growth and taxation a considerably smaller one this provides some validation of firm level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards development even more than taxation does

fickle consumers durable goods and business cycles abstract this paper develops a three sector dynamic general equilibrium model with the specific aim of evaluating the role of consumer durables in the generation and propagation of business cycles the model displays indeterminacy at commonly considered realistic parameter restrictions and basically constant returns to scale if calibrated at modest increasing returns to scale the sunspots driven model version produces a close match to moments of aggregate u s data journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e00 e32

ruling out multiplicity and indeterminacy the role of heterogeneity it is well known that economies of scale that are external to the individual decision makers can lead to self fulfilling prophecies and the multiplicity or even indeterminacy of equilibrium we argue that the importance of this source of multiplicity and indeterminacy is overstated in representative agent models as they ignore the potential stabilizing effect of heterogeneity we illustrate this in a version of matsuyama s 1991 two sector model with increasing returns to scale two main results are shown first sufficient homogeneity with respect to individual productivity leads to the instability and non uniqueness of a given stationary state and the indeterminacy of the corresponding stationary state equilibrium second sufficient heterogeneity leads to the global saddle path stability and the uniqueness of a given stationary state and the global uniqueness of equilibrium

do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis two behavioral concepts loss aversion and mental accounting have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle recent experimental evidence supports the theory as students behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion mla yet much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision making these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals using traders recruited from the cbot we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with mla to a greater extent than students

can vouchers reduce elite capture of local development projects experimental evidence from the solomon islands abstract external financing of local public goods can potentially create political resource curses by reducing citizen oversight exacerbating elite capture and producing policy outcomes that are sub optimal for the general population this paper experimentally tests a novel mechanism that seeks to mitigate elite capture of local development projects control communities are provided with block grants to fund local public goods while households in treatment communities are provided with vouchers that they may either contribute to a public good or redeem at a discount for a private capital good we find that the use of vouchers as a mechanism for aid delivery increases community participation in local public decision making changes the nature of allocation outcomes and improves community satisfaction with allocation outcomes

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

relative prices complementarities and comovement among components of aggregate expenditures abstract recent work suggests that the standard real business cycle framework has difficulty accounting for co movement among aggregate expenditure components when they are disaggregated even slightly to include business and household investment in addition relative prices of these goods have displayed substantial variation over the post war period this paper reports that incorporating a source of empirically plausible relative price variability makes the framework s implications for comovement even worse compounding the comovement problem the possibility that complementarities in the production of household and business capital may help account for observed co movement is considered the results suggest that complementarities improved the framework s empirical performance

indeterminacy and sunspots with constant returns recently there has been a renewed interest in the possibility of indeterminacy and sunspots or alternatively put in the existence of a continuum of equilibria that arises in dynamic economies with some market imperfections much of the research in this area has been concerned with the empirical plausibility of indeterminacy in markets with external effects or with monopolistic competition and which exhibit some degree of increasing returns while the early results on indeterminacy relied on relatively large increasing returns and high markups more recently benhabib and farmer 1996a showed that indeterminacy can also occur in two sector models with small sector specific external effects and very mild increasing returns

the impact of corruption on investment predictability matters abstract this paper argues that it is not only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption corruption regimes that are more predictable in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable using the data collected by world bank in preparing the world development report of 1997 we provide empirical support for the conjecture

indeterminacy under constant returns to scale in multisector economies recently there has been a renewed interest in indeterminacy or alternatively put in the existence of a continuum of equilibria in dynamic economies that exhibit some market imperfections one of the primary concerns of this literature has been the empirical plausibility of indeterminacy which arises in markets with external effects or with monopolistic competition often coupled with some degree 10 of increasing returns

endogenous business cycles and the dynamics of output hours and consumption abstract this paper studies the business cycle fluctuations predicted by a two sector endogenous business cycle model with sector specific external increasing returns to scale it focuses on aspects of actual fluctuations that have been identified both as defining features of business cycles and as ones standard real business cycle models cannot explain for empirically realistic calibrations of the degree of returns to scale the results suggest that endogenous fluctuations do not provide the dynamic element that is missing in existing real business cycle models jel e32

the role of intratemporal adjustment costs in a multisector economy abstract in this paper we construct a multisector business cycle model which is capable of reproducing the procyclical behavior of cross sector measures of capital employment and output we start by documenting the difficulty that a standard variant of a conventional real business cycle model has in accounting for these facts we then show how the introduction of intratemporal adjustment costs for investment can significantly enhance the performance of such a model these costs make it difficult to alter the composition of production of new capital goods the presence of these costs eliminates many counterfactual observations of the model that would otherwise be present the dynamic response of variables in the model is different from what one would observe in the standard one sector model we also examine the implications of imposing intratemporal adjustment costs for labor the model can also account for the cross sector behavior of employment observed in the data

indivisible labor lotteries and equilibrium abstract this paper considers an economy where labor is indivisible and agents are identical although the discontinuity in labor supply at the individual level disappears as a result of aggregation it is shown that indivisible labor has strong consequences for the aggregate bahavior of the economy it is also shown that optimal allocations involve lotteries over employment and consumption

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

corruption and the costs of redistribution micro evidence from indonesia this paper examines the degree to which the corruption in developing countries may impair the ability of governments to redistribute wealth among their citizens specifically i examine a large antipoverty program in indonesia that distributed subsidized rice to poor households i estimate the extent of corruption in the program by comparing administrative data on the amount of rice distributed with survey data on the amount actually received by households the central estimates suggest that on average at least 18 of the rice appears to have disappeared ethnically heterogeneous and sparsely populated areas are more likely to be missing rice using conservative assumptions for the marginal cost of public funds i estimate that the welfare losses from this corruption may have been large enough to offset the potential welfare gains from the redistributive intent of the program these findings suggest that corruption may impose substantial limitations on developing countries redistributive efforts and may help explain the low level of transfer programs in developing countries d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

indeterminacy and increasing returns abstract we investigate properties of the one sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms the first involves input externalities the second involves monopolistic competition we show for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of business fluctuations driven by self fulfilling beliefs in our first class of models growth is generated by exogenous increases in factor productivity in the second class the marginal product of capital is large enough for endogenous growth journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 o40

obtaining a driver s license in india an experimental approach to studying corruption we conduct two experiments to understand the process of obtaining a driver s license in india in the first experiment we randomly assign license candidates to one of three groups bonus offered a financial reward if they could obtain their license fast lesson offered free driving lessons upfront and control the control group alone illustrates bureaucratic failures 71 of the license getters in that group avoided the mandated driving test and 62 failed a surprise driving test the system responds to private needs there are more license getters in the bonus group but at a social cost there are more license getters who cannot drive in the bonus group the system however also appears to respond to social considerations as there are more license getters in the lesson group large extra legal payments are made by license getters those in the control group pay 2 5 times the official fee more of these extra legal payments take place in the bonus group surprisingly these extra legal payments are not direct bribes to bureaucrats but instead payments to agents in the second experiment we perform an audit study to better understand the role of agents the audit shows that agents can provide licenses to individuals even if they cannot drive but the audit also shows that agents cannot as easily circumvent all other rules we argue that our findings are most consistent with agents being the channel for corruption in this system we also report some suggestive evidence that bureaucrats create red tape possibly to induce more license candidates to use agents

corrupting learning evidence from missing federal education funds in brazil abstract this paper examines if money matters in education by looking at whether missing resources due to corruption affect student outcomes we use data from the auditing of brazil s local governments to construct objective measures of corruption involving educational block grants transferred from the central government to municipalities using variation in the incidence of corruption across municipalities and controlling for student school and municipal characteristics we find a significant negative association between corruption and the school performance of primary school students students residing in municipalities where corruption in education was detected score 0 35 standard deviations less on standardized tests and have significantly higher dropout and failure rates using a rich dataset of school infrastructure and teacher and principal questionnaires we also find that school inputs such as computer labs teaching supplies and teacher training are reduced in the presence of corruption overall our findings suggest that in environments where basic schooling resources are lacking money does matter for student achievement

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

quadratic concavity and determinacy of equilibrium one of the central features of classical models of competitive markets is the generic determinacy of competitive equilibria for smooth economies with a finite number of commodities and a finite number of consumers almost all initial endowments admit only a finite number of competitive equilibria and these equilibria vary locally smoothly with endowments thus equilibrium comparative statics are locally determinate this paper establishes parallel results for economies with finitely many consumers and infinitely many commodities the most important new condition we introduce quadratic concavity rules out preferences in which goods are perfect substitutes globally locally or asymptotically our framework is sufficiently general to encompass many of the models that have proved important in the study of continuous time trading in financial markets trading over an infinite time horizon and trading of finely differentiated commodities

chaos sunspots and automatic stabilizers abstract we consider a real business cycle model with an externality in production depending on parameter values the model has sunspot equilibria cyclical and chaotic equilibria and equilibria with deterministic or stochastic regime switching we study the implications of this model environment for automatic stabilizer tax systems stabilization is desirable because the efficient allocations are characterized by constant employment and output growth we identify an automatic stabilizer income tax subsidy schedule with two properties i it specifies the tax rate to be an increasing function of aggregate employment and ii earnings are subsidized when aggregate employment is at its efficient level the first feature eliminates inefficient fluctuating equilibria while the second induces agents to internalize the externality

customer and supplier driven externalities the purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence helpful for distinguishing different types of externalities we pursue this by extending the productionfunction framework of robert e hall 1990 and caballero and lyons 1990 1992 to exploit two key dimensions of the data disaggregate input output relationships and differences between estimates emphasizing time series versus cross sectional aspects of the data we obtain three main results first from the within estimates using annual data which emphasize the time series properties common across sectors we find a strong reduced form relationship between industry productivity and the activity level input growth of customers in sharp contrast supplier activity levels are insignificant the second result derives from between estimates which emphasize the cross sectional dimension of the data here we find the opposite is true there is a strong reduced form relationship between industry productivity and the activity level of suppliers but no relationship with customer activity levels we interpret the first two results as suggesting that over shorter horizons the linkage between an industry and its customers is pivotal in the transmission of external effects while in the long run external effects are mostly related to intermediate goods linkages the third result concerns the transition from short to long run we find that as the number of periods over which the variables are averaged is incrementally increased from one year toward the full sample period 27 years the significance of customers versus suppliers smoothly reverses itself the remainder of the paper is organized in four sections section i presents the core model and the econometric methods for disentangling the external effects section ii describes the data and estimation section iii presents the main results and our conclusions are presented in section iv

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

in search of homo economicus behavioral experiments in 15 small scale societies we can summarize our results as follows first the canonical model is not supported in any society studied second there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross cultural research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments third group level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games fourth individual level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups fifth behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies

indeterminacy home production and the business cycle a calibrated analysis abstract in this paper i present a business cycle model with one market sector that produces a standard good and another that produces a non market or home good the model can have multiple equilibria and therefore cycles driven only by self fulfilling expectations with low externalities to market production in particular an upward sloping aggregate labor demand as e g in farmer and guo j economic theory 63 1994 42 72 is not required for indeterminacy the effect of technology shocks is also studied in all cases the time series that are generated have properties that are comparable to the real us postwar series

a controlled field experiment on corruption abstract this paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues the experimenter s scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption in the experiment a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade we find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous it lowers the bribe s acceptance but it fosters reciprocation monitoring and punishment can deter corruption but we cannot reject that it may also crowd out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified finally our results suggest several micro determinants of corruption including age ability religiosity but not gender

can good projects succeed in bad communities abstract the lack of social capital is frequently given as an explanation for why communities perform poorly yet to what extent can project design compensate for these community specific constraints i address this question by examining determinants of collective success in a costly problem for developing economies the upkeep of local public goods it is often difficult to obtain reliable outcome measures for comparable collective tasks across well defined communities in order to address this i conducted detailed surveys of community maintained infrastructure projects in northern pakistan the findings show that while community specific constraints do matter their impact can be mitigated by better project design inequality social fragmentation and lack of leadership in the community do have adverse consequences but these can be overcome by changes in project complexity community participation and return distribution moreover the evidence suggests that better design matters even more for communities with poorer attributes the use of community fixed effects and instrumental variables offers a significant improvement in empirical identification over previous studies these results provide evidence that appropriate design can enable projects to succeed even in bad communities

the relation between price and marginal cost in u s industry an examination of data on output and labor input reveals that some u s industries have marginal cost well below price the conclusion rests on the finding that cyclical variations in labor input are small compared with variations in output in booms firms produce substantially more output and sell it for a price that exceeds the costs of the added inputs the paper documents the disparity between price and marginal cost where marginal cost is estimated from annual variations in cost it considers a variety of explanations of the findings that are consistent with competition but none is found to be completely plausible

power to the people evidence from a randomized field experiment on community based monitoring in uganda this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled power to the people evidence from a randomized field experiment on community based monitoring in uganda intervention started in 2004 and consisted of a training and a six month follow up in uganda the study observed that localized nongovernmental organizations encouraged communities to be more involved with the state of health service provision and strengthened their capacity to hold their local health providers to account for performance the community based monitoring project increased the quality and quantity of primary health care provision the program led to a significant increase in the weight of infants by 14 z scores and a significant decrease in child mortality by 33 utilization of outpatient services was significantly higher 20 percent in the treatment group and the overall effect across utilization measures is large and significant funding for the study derived from bank netherlands partnership program world bank research committee world bank africa region division swedish international development agency department for research cooperation

indeterminacy dynamic adjustment costs and cycles abstract recent work suggests that the standard real business cycle framework possesses multiple equilibria indeterminacy and dampened oscillations in the presence of externalities this paper reports that empirically plausible costs of adjustment make indeterminacy disappear easily while the oscillation mechanism is however perfectly preserved

self commitment of combined cycle units under electricity price uncertainty day ahead energy market clearing relies on a deterministic equivalent model with a limited time horizon which may lead to inefficient scheduling of generating units from the point of view of generators for this reason generators may wish to assume the risk of self committing their units with the hope of securing greater profits this phenomenon may reduce the room for economic signals in the day ahead market in this paper we investigate the influence of risk aversion and price volatility on the decision of generators to self commit units we present a stochastic programming model for self committing combined cycle units under price uncertainty with a conditional value at risk criterion we use benders decomposition to solve the problem and present results on a case study to draw conclusions

local capture evidence from a central government transfer program in uganda according to official statistics 20 percent of uganda s total public expenditure was spent on education in the mid 1990s most of it on primary education one of the large public programs was a capitation grant to cover schools nonwage expenditures using panel data from a unique survey of primary schools we assess the extent to which the grant actually reached the intended end user schools the survey data reveal that during 1991 1995 the schools on average received only 13 percent of the grants most schools received nothing the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians the data also reveal considerable variation in grants received across schools suggesting that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding we find that schools in better off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements as a result actual education spending in contrast to budget allocations is regressive similar surveys in other african countries confirm that uganda is not a special case

tracing externalities as sources of indeterminacy abstract this paper offers further inquiry into sources of indeterminacy in general equilibrium we take a more agnostic approach than previous work as we allow for a more general interpretation of externalities in particular we identify the origin of scale economies as being from either labor or capital we find that in the one sector model it is primarily the externalities associated with labor that generate the result however in the two sector model indeterminacy can be ultimately traced back to the externalities from capital in the investment sector

how corruption influences foreign direct investment a panel data study abstract this article analyzes the sign and development of the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment fdi economic theory distinguishes grabbing hand corruption from helping hand corruption the former suggests a negative impact of corruption on fdi the latter one a positive effect empirically we apply a data set of 21 home and 59 developed and less developed host countries covering between 1983 and 1999 to investigate the corruption impact we employ a panel data model that particularly refers to the knowledge capital model of multinational activity we find a negative relationship between corruption and fdi this in turn suggests that the helping hand effects of corruption are outweighed by the grabbing hand effects further we observe that corruption is an important impediment of fdi in developed economies but not in less developed ones finally we demonstrate that the importance of corruption has decreased over the years

leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods field evidence from bolivia abstract we conduct a controlled field experiment in 52 communities in rural bolivia to investigate the effect that local authorities have on voluntary public good provision in our study community members pool resources to provide environmental education material for local schools we find that voluntary contributions increase when democratically elected local authorities lead by example the results are driven by two factors 1 authorities like other individuals give more when they are called upon to lead than when they give in private and 2 high leader contributions increase the likelihood that others follow both effects are stronger when authorities as compared to randomly selected community members lead by example we explore two underlying sources of leadership influence first we provide evidence that the effect of a leader s contribution is not limited to signaling the value of the public good second we examine how leader characteristics affect the likelihood that others follow specifically our study shows that authority influence is driven by a combination of formal leadership status observable characteristics and the amount that authorities contribute when they give publicly before others

evolution of time preferences and attitudes toward risk this paper explores a general model of the evolution and adaption of hedonic utility it is shown that optimal utility will be increasing strongly in regions where choices have to be made often and decision mistakes have a severe impact on fitness several applications are suggested in the context of intertemporal preferences the model offers an evolutionary explanation for the existence of conflicting short and long run interests that lead to dynamic inconsistency concerning attitudes toward risk an evolutionary explanation is given for s shaped value functions that adjust to the decision maker s environment jel d81 d83 this paper is based on the hypothesis that individual decisions are guided by hedonic util ity an individual who faces several alternatives will choose the one that promises the greatest pleasure or happiness then given that the properties of a hedonic utility function determine individual behavior and individual behavior determines biological fitness evolutionary forces will have shaped our utility during the long time in which the modern human being evolved in this sense hedonic utility can be considered as a reward system that induces individuals to make optimal choices a view that is supported both by theory and evidence from neuroscience 1 as irving kupfermann eric r kandel and susan iversen 2000 express it pleasure is unques tionably a key factor in controlling the motivated behaviors of humans 1007 for the econo mist the interesting question is then about the properties of the evolutionary optimal reward system and how these properties adapt to the environment in which individuals make choices the present paper reconsiders and solves a general model of the evolution of utility suggested by arthur j robson 2001a which predicts how cardinal properties of utility functions should adapt to the decision environment it turns out that the optimal utility function will be steep in regions where decisions have to be made frequently and where wrong decisions would lead to large losses in fitness in those regions even small changes in consumption will cause large changes in happiness the evolution of context specific utility functions is then shown to be optimal whenever the decisions our ancestors had to make arrived in distinct choice situations the model can also be extended to incorporate learning about evolutionary relevant attributes of available options

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

animal spirits technology shocks and the business cycle the last few years have witnessed a revival of business cycle models in which beliefs of agents have played a leading role in explaining economic fluctuations 1 most of these models involve strong economy wide increasing returns to scale in order for sunspot equilibria to exist in a recent paper however basu and fernald 1996 present evidence that returns to scale are far from evenly distributed across the u s economy in particular they report that scale economies are present mainly in the domain of durable goods production in the nondurable goods sector of the u s economy evidence of increasing returns to scale cannot be found

toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems play in standard laboratory public good games suggests that on average humans are quite prone to cooperate yet cooperation is often absent in real world social dilemmas including many environmental problems we propose that this discrepancy arises because in the public good game the worst freeriders can do is to not contribute to the public account while in many real world environmental situations freeriders can even appropriate contributions made by others before the public good is produced we introduce the claim game that modifies the public good game by allowing for appropriating the contributions of others before the public good is produced the impact of such possible takings on public good production is dramatic no public good is produced not even in the initial stages of interaction we link our findings to the relevance of common pool games for modeling environmental problems and stress the need to experimentally test environmental institutions within harsher social dilemmas than the standard public good game

corruption and culture an experimental analysis article i nfo article history why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions in 2005 we conducted a bribery experiment and found that among undergraduates we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country among graduate students we could not in 2007 we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the uk was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour we conclude that while corruption may in part be a cultural phenomenon individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin

real business cycles and the animal spirits hypothesis abstract we calibrate a quantitative equilibrium macroeconomic model with an aggregate technology that is subject to increasing returns and show that this model may display fluctuations at business cycle frequencies even when there are no shocks to the fundamentals of the economy these fluctuations are due to the self fulfilling beliefs of investors which we call animal spirits we compare the impulse response functions predicted by our model and by two other more standard models with a four variable vector autoregression on u s data our animal spirits economy is the most successful of the three at matching broad features of the dynamic responses in the data journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 e32

indeterminacy in a model with sector specific externalities abstract i examine a model with two sectors of production consumption and investment in the model indeterminacy of equilibria results due to the presence of small sector specific externalities in production in fact i find that indeterminacy results with a certain minimum value of the externality in the investment sector even with no externality in the consumption sector i find that the indeterminacy properties of the model vary depending on the form of the utility function for example with utility that is logarithmic in consumption these properties are completely independent of the value of the externality in the consumption sector

chiefs economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone we study the effect of constraints on chiefs power on economic outcomes citizens attitudes and social capital a paramount chief in sierra leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by british colonial authorities in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families chiefs face less political competition and development outcomes are significantly worse today variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism paradoxically with fewer ruling families the institutions of chiefs authority are more highly respected and measured social capital is higher we argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs

on the stability of the two sector neoclassical growth model with externalities we study a class of two sector growth models with sector specific externalities in which one sector produces consumption and the other sector produces investment the novelty is that investment allocated to the consumption sector is an imperfect substitute for investment allocated to the investment sector we show analytically that in this case local indeterminacy near the steady state is impossible for every empirically plausible specification of the model parameters more specifically we show that a necessary condition for local indeterminacy is an upward sloping aggregate labor demand curve in the investment sector which requires a counterfactual strength of the externality we show numerically that an elasticity of substitution of plausible size implies determinacy near the steady state these findings differ sharply from the standard result for two sector models that if the investments allocated to the two sectors are perfect substitutes then local indeterminacy occurs for a wide range of plausible parameter values