power illusion in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis abstract one feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power game theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality we conduct an experimental test of the classical baron ferejohn model with five player groups holding real power constant we compare treatments with differences in nominal power we find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place finally and of particular importance as a methodological observation giving subjects a pause accelerates learning

taxes on tax exempt bonds implicit tax rates priced in the cross section of municipal bonds are approximately two to three times as high as statutory income tax rates with implicit tax rates close to 100 using retail trades and above 70 for interdealer trades these implied tax rates can be identified because a portion of secondary market municipal bond trades involves income taxes after valuing the tax payments market discount bonds which carry income tax liabilities trade at yields around 25 basis points higher than com parable municipal bonds not subject to any taxes the high sensitivities of municipal bond prices to tax rates can be traced to individual retail traders dominating dealers and other institutions the issue of how taxes affect asset prices is an important issue in finance accounting and economics in theoretical models examining the effect of taxes

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

political uncertainty and public financing costs evidence from u s gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets this research investigates how political uncertainty around u s gubernatorial elections in uences the borrowing costs of public debt measured by yields of municipal bonds our evidence from both the new issuance market and the secondary market shows that yields of municipal bonds increase sharply by 6 to 8 basis points before elections and then reverse afterward elections have more pronounced impact during economic downturns when outcomes are less predictable and when states have more outstanding debt several state institutions such as gaap budgeting spending limits and tax increase limits help to mitigate the adverse impact of political uncertainty

do after tax returns affect mutual fund inflows abstract this paper explores the relationship between the after tax returns that taxable investors earn on equity mutual funds and the subsequent cash inflows to these funds previous studies have documented that funds with high pretax returns attract greater inflows this paper presents evidence based on a large sample of retail equity mutual funds over the period 1993 1999 that after tax returns have more explanatory power than pretax returns in explaining inflows in addition funds with large overhangs of unrealized capital gains experience smaller inflows all else equal than funds without such unrealized gains a large capital gain overhang discourages both gross fund inflows and gross outflows but the inflow effect dominates the outflow effect

municipal bond liquidity and default risk this paper examines the pricing of municipal bonds i use three distinct complementary approaches to decompose municipal bond spreads into default and liquidity components and find that default risk accounts for 74 to 84 of the average spread after adjusting for tax exempt status the first approach estimates the liquidity component using transaction data the second measures the default component with credit default swap data and the third is a quasi natural experiment that estimates changes in default risk around pre refunding events the price of default risk is high given the rare incidence of municipal default and implies a high risk premium

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining we study a model of sequential bargaining in which in each period before an agreement is reached the proposer s identity is randomly determined the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer the theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique this generalizes eraslan 34 insofar as a there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions b different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions c there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected

government debt and private leverage an extension of the miller theorem abstract this paper shows how government financing decisions can influence the corporate decision to use debt or equity finance in particular it is shown that an increase in the stock of taxable government debt reduces the equilibrium quantity of corporate debt and that an increase in the stock of tax free government debt reduces the equilibrium quantity of corporate equity the effects of inflation rate and tax rate changes are also considered

fiscal foresight and information flows news or foresight about future economic fundamentals can create rational expectations equilibria with non fundamental representations that pose substantial challenges to econometric efforts to recover the structural shocks to which economic agents react using tax policies as a leading example of foresight simple theory makes transparent the economic behavior and information structures that generate non fundamental equilibria econometric analyses that fail to model foresight will obtain biased estimates of output multipliers for taxes biases are quantitatively important when two canonical theoretical models are taken as data generating processes both the nature of equilibria and the inferences about the effects of anticipated tax changes hinge critically on hypothesized information flows different methods for extracting or hypothesizing the information flows are discussed and shown to be alternative techniques for resolving a non uniqueness problem endemic to moving average representations

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

auction failures and the market for auction rate securities abstract the market for auction rate securities ars made headlines during the second week of february 2008 when auctions at which the bonds interest rates reset experienced a wave of failures contrary to headlines that attribute the failures to a frozen market or investors irrationality we find that 1 even at their height less than 50 of ars experienced auction failures 2 the likelihood of auction failure was directly related to the level of the bonds maximum auction rates 3 the implied market clearing yields of bonds with failed auctions were significantly above their maximum auction rates and 4 ars yields were generally higher than yields of various cash equivalent investment alternatives we infer that investors priced the possibility of auctions failures into ars yields and rationally declined to bid for bonds for which required market yields exceeded their maximum auction rates

the quantitative effects of tax foresight not all states are equal abstract this paper explores the effect of federal tax news on state economic activity we estimate a factor augmented vector autoregression favar model which allows us to consider the possibility that unobserved factors such as credit and fiscal conditions might be relevant for modeling the dynamic response of aggregate and state level economic activity we identify tax foresight as a shock to the implicit tax rate measured by the yield spread between the one year tax exempt municipal bond and the one year taxable treasury bond our results suggest that an increase in the implicit tax rate raises national output over much of the anticipation period in addition anticipated tax increases give rise to expansions in state personal income and employment we find that the variation in the responsiveness of economic activity across states is mostly explained by differences in industrial composition and income distribution as well as by some demographic characteristics such as median income and education finally using a proxy for exogenous changes in federal tax revenues we investigate the dynamics of state level personal income and employment our results point to considerable heterogeneity in the response across u s states moreover they reveal that the long run multiplier for an anticipated increase in tax revenues is about a tenth of the short run multiplier for an unanticipated increase in taxes

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

municipal debt and marginal tax rates is there a tax premium in asset prices we study the marginal tax rate incorporated into short term municipal rates using municipal swap market data using an affine model we identify the marginal tax rate and the credit liquidity spread in 1 week tax exempt rates as well as their associated risk premia the marginal tax rate averages 38 0 and is related to stock bond and commodity returns the tax risk premium is negative consistent with the strong countercyclical nature of after tax fixed income cash flows these results demonstrate that tax risk is a systematic asset pricing factor and help resolve the muni bond puzzle

hroot hamburg registration and organization online tool abstract hroot hamburg registration and organization online tool is a web based software designed for managing participants of economic experiments this package provides important features to assure a randomized invitation process based on a filtered pre specified subject pool and a complete documentation of the selection procedure for potential participants of an experiment

dealer intermediation and price behavior in the aftermarket for new bond issues municipal bonds trade in decentralized broker dealer markets and are underpriced when issued but unlike equities the average price rises slowly over several days newly issued municipal bonds have high levels of price dispersion and the average price rises because the mix of trade sizes changes over time while large trades occur close to the reoffering price small trades occur between the reoffering price to as much as 5 above the reoffering price using a mixed distribution model we quantify the losses uninformed traders or issuers give up to broker dealers

the tax rate induced bond substitution hypothesis and the traditional textbook treatment of the relationship between tax free and taxable bond yields abstractthis empirical study posits and tests the tax rate induced bond substitution hypothesis wherein the propensity for bond buyers to substitute tax exempt municipal bonds for taxable bonds

gamson s law versus non cooperative bargaining theory we compare gamson s law a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining with two noncooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does gamson s law we also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non cooperative bargaining models namely proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under the baron ferejohn model and a significant number of bargaining rounds tend to take more than two steps under demand bargaining and more than one stage under baron ferejohn counter to the models predictions regressions using the experimental data provide results similar to the field data but fail to do so once one accounts for predictions regarding coalition composition under gamson s law

tax arbitrage and the existence of equilibrium prices for financial assets in models where both investors and securities are subject to differential taxation there may be no set of prices that rule out infinite gains to trade or tax arbitrage this paper characterizes the joint restrictions on financial asset returns and investors tax schedules that preclude tax arbitrage in the absence of short sale constraints the authors show that if there exists any configuration of marginal tax rates on investors tax schedules that rule out infinite gains to trade then no tax arbitrage prices will exist they also show that the existence of no tax arbitrage prices ensures the existence of equilibrium prices the effects of differential taxation on the equilibrium prices of financial assets have attracted much attention from financial economists in recent years otherwise identical securities that contribute to taxable income to different degrees will in general be valued differently by taxable investors as a result tax considerations have been useful in helping explain the effect of dividend yield on stock returns the effect of coupon levels and term to maturity on bond prices 2 the timing of investors portfolio transactions 3 and the observed capital structures of firms 4 while a rich set of observed behaviors can be better understood by reference to differential taxation there are well known difflculties in dealing with taxes in a general equilibrium setting to clear markets relative prices must reflect the marginal rates of substitution of all agents simultaneously when tax rates differ across investors however this condition can be impossible to achieve to illustrate consider a world of perfect certainty with two assets a tax exempt municipal bond and a taxable government bond to equate marginal rates of substitution the rate of return on the government bond rg must equal that on the municipal rm grossed up by one minus the investor s marginal tax rate ti that is rg rm 1 ti if there are investors in more than one tax bracket this condition will obviously be impossible to satisfy for all of them simultaneously both authors from graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university we wish to thank scott richard steven spear and an anonymous referee for helping us sort through the issues considered here seminar participants at columbia wharton the johnson symposium on asset pricing at the university of wisconsin madison and the 1986 western finance association meeting also provided valuable comments we are also grateful for the financial support provided by the center for public policy research carnegie mellon university all errors are our own responsibility

secondary trading costs in the municipal bond market using new econometric methods we separately estimate average transaction costs for over 167 000 bonds from a 1 year sample of all u s municipal bond trades municipal bond transaction costs decrease with trade size and do not depend significantly on trade frequency also municipal bond trades are substantially more expensive than similar sized equity trades we attribute these results to the lack of bond market price transparency additional cross sectional analyses show that bond trading costs increase with credit risk instrument complexity time to maturity and time since issuance investors and perhaps ultimately issuers might benefit if issuers issued simpler bonds

tax efficient trading of municipal bonds the author proposes a dynamic strategy to optimize the after tax performance of a municipal bond portfolio this study extends previous work on one time tax loss selling he considers a potential tax driven trading opportunity as an option with quantifiable value acquired automatically and without cost in a taxable account within this formulation selling a bond and reinvesting in another also entails the swap of the associated tax options when considering the value of the tax option acquired upon reinvestment the time to optimum execution is drastically reduced in comparison to one time selling the author assumes that the choice of reinvestment bonds maintains the same interest rate exposure as that from before the sale

taxation portfolio choice and debt equity ratios a general equilibrium model this paper explores the portfolio behavior of investors differing with respect to both tax rates and risk aversion emphasizing the role of constraints on individual and firm behavior in ensuring the existence of and characterizing portfolio equilibrium under certain conditions on the securities available in the market which also are necessary for shareholders to be unanimous in supporting firm value maximization investors will be segmented by tax rate into two groups one specialized in equity and the other in debt though the relative wealths of the two groups determine the aggregate debt equity ratio each firm will be indifferent to its financial policy

portfolio choice with illiquid assets we present a model of optimal allocation to liquid and illiquid assets where illiquidity risk results from the restriction that an asset cannot be traded for intervals of uncertain duration illiquidity risk leads to increased and state dependent risk aversion and reduces the allocation to both liquid and illiquid risky assets uncertainty about the length of the illiquidity interval as opposed to a deterministic nontrading interval is a primary determinant of the cost of illiquidity we allow market liquidity to vary from normal periods when all assets are fully liquid to illiquidity crises when some assets can only be traded infrequently the possibility of a liquidity crisis leads to limited arbitrage in normal times investors are willing to forgo 2 of their wealth to hedge against illiquidity crises occurring once every 10 years this paper was accepted by itay goldstein finance

ex dividend price behavior of common stocks this study examines common stock prices around ex dividend dates such price data usually contain a mixture of observations some with and some without arbitrageurs and or dividend capturers active our theory predicts that such mixing will result in a nonlinear relation between percentage price drop and dividend yield not the commonly assumed linear relation this prediction and another important prediction of theory are supported empirically in a variety of tests marginal price drop is not significantly different from the dividend amount thus over the last several decades one for one marginal price drop has been an excellent average rule of thumb article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining i propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play the equilibrium majorities and the policy outcome the ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is however invariant to fundamental institutional differences and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power the bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office the order of play is endogenous and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker the role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

hostile environmental jolts transaction set and new business abstract in this exploratory study we examine empirically the effects of environmental jolts on the evolution of the set of relationships that entrepreneurs have with their customers and suppliers which we call the transaction set we believe that understanding how turbulence in the environment affects the ability of entrepreneurs to hold on to their existing relationships or to add new relationships is fundamental to understanding the evolution and growth of an organization from a start up to a stable wealth creating enterprise in the long run using longitudinal data spanning 7 to 10 years from five start up firms we investigate three questions on the connection between environmental jolts and changes in the transaction set of the firm first do environmental jolts during the early life of the firm induce significant reductions in the set of relationships of a new small firm second are entrepreneurs able to add new relationships in greater numbers than the exit of old relationships following a jolt and third do start ups enjoy a honeymoon period when environmental jolts do not induce significant reductions in the set of relationships after a jolt our study yielded several findings that may be of interest to entrepreneurs academics and incubator managers first environmental jolts have a significant impact on the exits of relationships from the transaction set of a new small firm but not necessarily on the entry of new relationships into the set thus although liabilities of newness and small size seem to affect the ability of entrepreneurs to hold on to their existing relationships during environmental jolts these jolts do not seem to affect the entrepreneur s ability to add ties at least in the very early life of the firm second the level of reduction after environmental jolts seems to be less severe during the early life and greatest during the adolescent period further entries of new relationships decrease with each succeeding jolt one implication of our findings is that environmental selection pressures are more severe after an incubation period called the honeymoon period a second implication of our findings is the way in which liability of adolescence manifests itself the honeymoon does not provide incubation against exits of relationships rather the incubation manifests itself in the form of the willingness of new customers and suppliers to join the entrepreneur s transaction set even during a jolt however this goodwill shown by new customers and suppliers decreases with each succeeding jolt thus making the firm very vulnerable to failure during its adolescent phase of life we believe our study emphasizes the role that chance plays in the early survival and growth of firms firms lucky to avoid hostile jolts after their honeymoon period will be in a better position to grow rapidly other things being equal despite sound management and superior exercise of enterprise jolts appear in the life of firms in a stochastic often unpredictable fashion although it is not clear that firms who have superior enterprise ability or slack are more likely to succeed than those who don t what is clear is that the ability to survive and grow is seriously affected with each succeeding jolt whatever the ability if our findings and our inference from the findings are general they have an important public policy implication for new small companies conventional wisdom holds that given liabilities of newness and small size incubator environments are best provided to start up firms we would recommend a different strategy incubator environments are best provided not at the start up stage to new business but at the adolescent stage incubators should be provided to companies that show during the honeymoon phase that their ideas and products have merit and that they can attract customers and investors to their venture it is during the adolescent stage that firms are most vulnerable to environmental disturbances and where ability may not be a sufficiently good discriminator between survival and failure

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

malapportionment and multilateral bargaining an experiment abstract members of collective decision making bodies often represent communities that differ in population sizes malapportionment results when decision making power is not allocated evenly across the population two well known institutions with malapportionment have emerged bicameralism and weighted voting this paper studies experimentally how agenda setting power affects the distribution of resources comparing across those two institutions conventional wisdom suggests that malapportionment favors scarcely populated states i find that this is the case under weighted voting but not necessarily in a bicameral system in the later case the allocation of agenda setting power can be used to eliminate distortions stemming from malapportionment

default risk cannot explain the muni puzzle evidence from municipal bonds that are secured by u s treasury obligations fama 1977 and miller 1977 predict that one minus the corporate tax rate will equate after tax yields from comparable taxable and tax exempt bonds empirical evidence shows that long term tax exempt yields are higher than theory predicts two popular explanations for this empirical puzzle are that relative to taxable bonds municipal bonds bear more default risk and include costly call options i study u s government secured municipal bond yields which are effectively default free and nonmalleable these municipal yields display the same tendency to be too high i conclude that differential default risk and call options do not explain the municipal bond puzzle article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

tax distortions and bond issue pricing abstract original issue premium oip bonds are the norm in the us tax exempt market but very rare in the taxable market a tax subsidy helps explain this disparity unlike bonds issued at par or discount the price of oip bonds can fall and yet remain above par providing secondary market buyers with more tax exempt coupon and less taxable market discount gain the subsidy for oip bonds explains additional previously undocumented empirical facts in a calibration exercise the subsidy s expected cost to the u s treasury is estimated at 1 7 billion per year

arbitrage pricing transaction costs and taxation of capital gains abstract this paper examines one of the few cases of seemingly redundant securities sets of three government bonds with the same maturity date within the bounds on relative bond prices established by tax exempt investors in a market with proportional transaction costs the taxation of capital gains on the basis of realization has a significant impact on relative prices the empirical evidence supports the tax option effect discussed by constantinides and ingersoll but does not generally support the segmented tax clientele equilibrium discussed by schaefer

a simple model of the taxable and tax exempt yield curves i examine the anomalous behavior of the taxable and tax exempt yield curves long municipal yields appear too high relative to the equivalent after tax yield that can be earned in treasury or corporate bonds i discuss existing explanations of the problem and propose a simple model that relates the yields of taxable bonds to the yield curve for par tax exempts the ratio of the tax exempt yield to the taxable yield increases with maturity in the model so it is consistent with observed phenomena such as inverted yield curves for taxables and contemporaneous rising yield curves for tax exempts statistical and descriptive comparisons between the yields predicted by the model and observed yields on par bonds that the model has some promise in explaining the apparent anomalies in the behaviors of the two yield curves article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price