asymmetric benchmarking in compensation executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad abstract principal agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm s own performance recently it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests that is they can enjoy pay for luck as well as pay for performance we first show that this argument is incomplete the positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk if executives pay is tied to market movements they can only expect to receive the market determined return for risk bearing this argument however assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck if executives can truly influence the setting of their pay they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest namely when the benchmark has fallen using industry benchmarks we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down in which case pay for luck would reduce compensation than when it is up these empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks and they suggest that the average executive loses 25 45 less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

the return of the wage phillips curve the standard new keynesian model with staggered wage setting is shown to imply a simple dynamic relation between wage inflation and unemployment under some assumptions that relation takes a form similar to that found in empirical applications starting with the original phillips 1958 curve and may thus be viewed as providing some theoretical foundations to the latter the structural wage equation derived here is shown to account reasonably well for the comovement of wage inflation and the unemployment rate in the u s economy even under the strong assumption of a constant natural rate of unemployment

slow recoveries any role for corporate leverage abstract this paper examines whether financial conditions of the non financial corporate sector can explain why the recovery from recessions in the united states is slower since the mid 1980s leverage by the corporate sector has increased significantly since the financial deregulation of the mid 1980s empirical evidence shows that slow recoveries are associated with a significant drop in the growth rates of investment and bank loans and with a surge in the growth rates of corporate bonds in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a financial accelerator counterfactual experiments based on estimates of two samples 1965 1983 and 1984 2007 show that the non financial corporate indebtedness affects only marginally the speed of the recovery in the two samples

okun s law across time and frequencies abstract we present the first assessment of u s okun s law across time and frequencies we use a set of continuous wavelet tools that allows for estimating okun s coefficient and the lead lag of output over unemployment at each moment and for each cyclical frequency we find similar results for the gaps and the first differences specifications at business cycles frequencies but not at lower frequencies okun s coefficient has increased in absolute value since the mid 1960s except in 1985 1995 and is not particularly sensitive to recessions the lead of output varies considerably over time and also at different frequencies we observe especially with the gaps specification that there are at least two cyclical processes relevant for the okun s relationship one at the business cycle and another at lower frequencies methods that do not take this into account are bound to mix the information embedded in both cycles

great recession slow recovery and muted fiscal policies in the us this paper reconsiders the role of macroeconomic shocks and policies in determining the great recession and the subsequent recovery in the us the great recession was mainly caused by a large demand shock and by the zlb on the interest rate policy in contrast with previous findings the subsequent jobless recovery is explained by the zlb effect we estimate a fraction of non ricardian households which is close to 50 and obtain comparatively large fiscal multipliers however we cannot detect a significant contribution of fiscal policies in stabilizing the us economy for instance the 2007 2009 large increase in expenditure to gdp ratios was apparently determined by the adverse non policy shocks that caused the recession

the determinants of efficiency the case of the spanish industry the aim of this paper is to analyse the factors explaining the technical efficiency of spanish industrial sectors during the period 1991 1994 using the survey of business strategies sbe of the ministry of industry and energy it analyses whether efficiency can be explained by factors external to the firm such as the degree of competition in the markets in which it operates characteristics of the firm size organization advantages of location participation of public capital etc as well as the effects of dynamic disturbances that may affect the degree of utilization of the productive capacity

deciphering the causes for the post 1990 slow output recoveries abstract this paper explores the causes for the slow output recoveries in the u s since 1990 via estimating a time varying parameter vector autoregressive model with stochastic volatilities the model incorporates routine employment as a share of total employment and two financial variables to simultaneously evaluate the roles of labor market related and credit related factors in determining output dynamics based on the estimated model the counterfactual experiments highlight the crucial roles of routine biased technological changes and structural changes that shift investment dynamics in explaining post 1990 slow output recoveries

measures of per capita hours and their implications for the technology hours debate structural vector autoregressions give conflicting results on the effects of technology shocks on hours the results depend crucially on the assumed data generating process for hours per capita we show that the standard measure of hours per capita and productivity have significant low frequency movements that are the source of the conflicting results hodrick prescott hp filtered hours per capita produce results consistent with those obtained when hours are assumed to have a unit root we show that important sources of the low frequency movements in the standard measure are sectoral shifts in hours and the changing age composition of the working age population when we control for these low frequency components to determine the effect of technology shocks on hours using long run restrictions we get one consistent answer hours decline in the short run in response to a positive technology shock we further extend the analysis by examining the effects of demographic controls on the impulse responses to investment specific technology shocks our results are less conclusive

jobless recoveries stagnation or structural change within the existing literature a number of competing explanations for jobless recoveries have emerged on the one hand there is evidence of dynamic structural change including offshoring globalization and technological advances that are resulting in the loss of middle skill routine employment other studies emphasize a less dynamic economy with slower growth reduced labor market fluidity a decline in startup activity and even economic stagnation this study exploits variation among u s states to assess the degree that stagnation and or important structural changes in the economy contribute to the recent phenomenon of jobless recoveries we find support for both the stagnation and structural change theories of jobless recoveries on the stagnation side we find evidence that lower startup rates are a significant predictor of jobless recoveries we also find evidence that links dynamic structural change to the jobless recovery phenomenon more specifically states experiencing a long run downward trend in the share of routine employment are more likely to experience a jobless recovery our results are consistent with the polarization theory where routine replacing technological advances permanently reduce demand for middle skill labor thus contributing to jobless recoveries jel e32 e24

sticks or carrots optimal ceo compensation when managers are loss averse this paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse we calibrate a stylized principal agent model to the observed contracts of 595 ceos and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations we also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible payout for low outcomes finally we identify the critical features of the loss aversion model that render optimal contracts convex

estimation of the efficiency of structural funds a parametric and nonparametric approach this article seeks to perform an analysis of the efficiency of the application of the structural funds in the regions classified as objective 1 over the period 2000 to 2006 applying the techniques known as data envelopment analysis dea and stochastic frontier in the first place we are going to identify which are the most efficient regions finally we will analyse the extent to which certain factors have repercussions on the efficiency such as country geographical location and contribution of agriculture of gross domestic product gdp and the result indicates that some of these variables have significantly influences of technical efficiency

on unemployment cycles in the euro area 1999 2018 abstract this paper studies the recurrent sources of unit root unemployment fluctuations in greece italy portugal spain and the euro area by integrating wage markup and labor disutility shocks that exhibit permanent euro area wide shifts country specific trend developments and stationary changes in an estimated dsge model in all economies these labor market shocks account for a negligible share of unemployment cycles demand shocks explain about 40 of them contribute to the pre crisis convergence of unemployment rates and shape the unemployment spikes during the great recession cross country relative price distortions and supply factors account for about 40 and 20 of those cycles respectively

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

is modern technology responsible for jobless recoveries since the early 1990s recoveries from recessions in the us have been plagued by weak employment growth we investigate whether a similar problem afflicts other developed economies and whether technology is a culprit we study recoveries from 71 recessions in 28 industries and 17 countries from 1970 2011 we find that though gdp recovered more slowly after recent recessions employment did not industries that used more routine tasks and those more exposed to robotization did not recently experience slower employment recoveries finally middle skill employment did not recover more slowly after recent recessions and this pattern was no different in routine intensive industries

strategic managerial incentive compensation in japan relative performance evaluation and product market collusion in an oligopolistic product market shareholders strategically use information on rival firms performances when designing management incentive contracts when shareholders use industry performance information through relative performances evaluation rpe they evaluate their manager s effort more easily but hinder collusive behavior in the product market however when compensation is positively linked to the industry performance through strategic group performance evaluation sgpe the credibility of a manager s commitment to product market collusion increases and the sustainability of a collusive outcome increases i test how industry performance affects management incentive compensation using the data from 796 japanese firms during the period 1968 to 1992 the results show that management compensation is positively linked to industry profit suggesting the use of sgpe in management incentive compensation cross sectional analysis shows that the positive effect of industry profit on management compe

have standard vars remained stable since the crisis small or medium scale vars are commonly used in applied macroeconomics for forecasting and evaluating the shock transmission mechanism this requires the var parameters to be stable over the evaluation and forecast sample or to explicitly consider parameter time variation the earlier literature focused on whether there were sizable parameter changes in the early 1980s in either the conditional mean or variance parameters and in the subsequent period till the beginning of the new century in this paper we conduct a similar analysis but focus on the effects of the recent crisis using a range of techniques we provide substantial evidence against parameter stability the evolution of the unemployment rate seems particularly different relative to its past behavior we then discuss and evaluate alternative methods to handle parameter instability in a forecasting context while none of the methods clearly emerges as best some techniques turn out to be useful to improve the forecasting performance

the determinants of efficiency in municipal governments this article investigates efficiency in the municipal sector of the region of murcia spain with that aim data of 31 municipalities 69 of the response rate have been collected services analysed are police culture sports green areas refuse collection and water supply ratios of efficiency have been related to other control variables such as economic level size of the municipality decentralization political sign and financial situation a weak positive relation between economic level and efficiency arises some weak evidence also exists that public management of refuse collection is more efficient than private in water supply public management by means of a company controlled by the local government is clearly more efficient than private it also seems that the higher the tax burden the greater the efficiency in providing services

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

dissecting us recoveries abstract we propose a set of new quantitative measures to characterize more fully the features of economic recoveries we apply these measures to post war us expansions and use cluster analysis to determine that there are two different types of recoveries in recent us economic history with most expansions before 1984 great moderation looking quite different from those after

why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects this paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward luck i consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees outside opportunities are correlated with their firms performance the model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad based stock option plans as well as other financial instruments even when these pay plans have no effect on employees on the job behavior the model suggests that agency theory s often overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks many compensation plans reward or punish employees for factors they cannot control an often discussed example of this phenomenon is executive compensation where stock options are not generally indexed to the overall market however many firms also offer firm wide stock options and profit sharing plans that provide even weaker incentives than executive plans after all most workers can expect to reap trivial personal gain from their contribution to firm value or profits i consider an explanation for this phenomenon in which firms contract with employees as a means of indexing wages to market rates rather than to provide incentives while much of the agency literature has concentrated on inducing optimal effort i consider the importance of the generally overlooked participation constraint i study a model in which employees outside opportunities are correlated with firm profits or stock price and in which both turnover and adjusting the pay scheme parameters are costly given these assumptions the firm may find it most profitable to pay the employee in a way that is correlated with the outside options presented by the outside labor market despite the requisite risk premium rather than pay a fixed wage that insures participation in all states the model derived below starts from the assumption that wage adjustments are costly but that workers are willing to make part of their pay contingent

slow recoveries a structural interpretation an analysis of the speed of recovery of employment unemployment and gdp following business cycle troughs in the postwar u s economy points to much slower recoveries in the three most recent episodes but does not reveal any signi cant change in the relation between gdp and employment or unemployment across recoveries this leads us to characterize the last three episodes as slow recoveries as opposed to jobless recoveries we use the estimated new keynesian model in gali smets wouters 2011 to provide a structural interpretation for the slower recoveries since the early nineties

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

paying for observable luck this article examines why ceos are rewarded for luck namely for observable shocks beyond their control i propose a simple hidden action model where the agent has implicit incentives to avoid bankruptcy after signing the contract but before acting the agent observes a signal on future luck implicit incentives are weaker after good news and call for higher pay for performance sensitivity in good times as a result managerial pay is tied to luck the model is also consistent with recent evidence of asymmetric pay for luck that is a larger exposure of managerial pay to good luck than to bad

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

monetary policy shocks we got news abstract we assess the role of monetary policy news shocks in the context of a medium scale dsge model estimated on us data we estimate several versions of the model and find decisive evidence in favour of the inclusion of monetary policy news shocks over a two quarter horizon according to our results monetary policy news shocks account for a non negligible fraction of the variance of real variables especially at shorter forecast horizons further we document that the importance of monetary policy news shocks goes beyond what was observed in recent years the historical importance of monetary policy news shocks dates back to the 1999 2006 period when the official fomc statements provided information about both the current policy setting and the expected future policy path we also show that adding monetary policy news shocks to the model does not lead to identification problems

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

measures of technical efficiency abstract fare and lovell j econom theory 19 1978 150 162 suggest four properties that a measure of technical efficiency should satisfy the commonly employed debreu farrell measure fails three of them necessary and sufficient conditions for a measure to satisfy the four conditions are provided and recently proposed measures are analyzed in the light of this result also it is argued that the debreu farrell measure has several desirable properties when one takes account of 1 perhaps unknown market prices and the relationship between technical and economic efficiency and 2 its characterization as a measure of economic efficiency using the shadow prices implicit in the production technology

money and capital in a persistent liquidity trap abstract using a monetary model with asset scarcity we show that a liquidity trap caused by a persistent deleveraging shock increases real cash holdings and decreases investment and output in the medium term this medium term supply side effect arises when firms face financial constraints policy implications differ from shorter run analyses implied by nominal rigidities quantitative easing leads to a deeper liquidity trap exiting the trap by increasing expected inflation or applying negative interest rates does not solve the asset scarcity problem a higher government debt helps exiting the liquidity trap and reduces asset scarcity but may hurt investment in the medium run

efficiency and technical progress sources of convergence in the spanish regions the paper analyses the contribution of efficiency as a mechanism of labour productivity convergence taking as the unit of analysis the spanish regions in the period 1964 1993 using the stochastic frontier approach a translogarithmic production function is estimated for the different sectors of the spanish regional economy demonstrating on this basis the existence of substantial differences in efficiency between sectors as well as between regions with regard to convergence the results obtained indicate that at aggregate level the convergence observed in labour productivity is explained by the faster growth of the capital labour ratio of the initially poorer regions and the contribution of technical change and the efficiency hence by the convergence of tfp however the information by sectors shows different results thus on the one hand the importance of the convergence in production per employee is seen in all sectors except agriculture and on the other it is observed that technical change is a