evaluating leases with complex operating options abstract the paper deals with the numerical valuation of leasing contracts with a variety of embedded operating options unlike earlier work which either ignores such options or focuses on only one type of operating option in isolation this paper recognizes that leasing is a context in which complex options typically occur as well as the importance of using computational methods to quantify the interactions among several options present in combination it describes a contingent claims analysis cca of operating lease options and suggests a cca based numerical analysis method for valuing leasing contracts with multiple such options a numerical leasing example with the options to cancel the lease early extend its life and purchase the leased asset is presented for illustration

dynamic interaction between markets for leasing and selling automobiles we develop a model of dynamic interactions between price variations in leasing and selling markets for automobiles our framework assumes a differential game between multiple bertrand type competing firms which offer differentiated products to forward looking agents empirical analysis of our model using monthly us data from 2002 to 2011 shows that variations in selling cash market prices lead rapidly dissipating changes of leasing market prices in the opposite direction we discuss the practical implications of these results by augmenting a standard leasing valuation formula the additional terms represent the leased asset value changes that can be expected on the basis of past variations in automobile selling market prices

the nature of option interactions and the valuation of investments with multiple real options this paper deals with the nature of option interactions and the valuation of capital budgeting projects possessing flexibility in the form of multiple real options it identifies situations where option interactions can be small or large negative or positive interactions generally depend on the type separation degree of being in the money and the order ofthe options involved the paper illustrates through a generic example the importance of properly accounting for interactions among the options to defer abandon contract or expand in vestment and switch use it is shown that the incremental value of an additional option in the presence of other options is generally less than its value in isolation and declines as more options are present therefore valuation errors from ignoring a particular option may be small however configurations of real options exhibiting precisely the opposite behavior are identified comparative statics results confirm that the value of flexibility despite interactions manifests familiar option properties

if we knew ability how would we tax individuals abstract the suggestion to tax people on earnings capacity instead of earnings has been around for a long time and is attractive in terms of economic efficiency in this paper we reflect on the feasibility of such a system and give an exploratory empirical implementation we apply the leyden welfare function of income a survey based measure of an individual s welfare associated with income to derive implications for ability taxation under the assumption that iq and schooling reflect earnings capacity we derive the tax functions using different criteria to distribute the utility loss due to taxation

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

ambiguity aversion in buyer seller relationships a contingent claims and social network explanation negotiations between buyers and sellers or suppliers of goods and services have become increasingly important due to the growing trend towards international purchasing outsourcing and global supply networks together with the high uncertainty associated with them this paper examines the effect of ambiguity aversion on price negotiations using multiple priors based real options with non extreme outcomes we study price negotiation between a buyer and seller in a dual contingent claims setting call option holding buyer vs put option holding seller to derive optimal agreement conditions under ambiguity with and without social network effects we find that while higher ambiguity aversion raises the threshold for commitment for the seller it has equivocal effects on the buyer s negotiation prospects in the absence of network control conversely when network position and relative bargaining power are accounted for we find the buyer s implicit price or negotiation threshold decreases or increases unequivocally with increasing aversion to ambiguity extending extant real options research on price negotiation to the case of ambiguity this set of results provides new insights into the role of ambiguity aversion and network structures in buyer seller relationships including how they influence the range of negotiation agreement between buyers and sellers the results also help assist managers in formulating robust buying selling strategies for bargaining under uncertainty by knowing their network positions and gathering background information or inferring the other party s ambiguity tolerance beforehand buyers and sellers can anticipate where the negotiation is heading in terms of price negotiation range and mutual agreement possibilities

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

the undesirability of randomized income taxation under decreasing risk aversion abstract for the standard specification of the utilitarian optimal income tax problem with hidden characteristics the paper shows that randomized tax schemes are undesirable if preferences exhibit a property of weakly decreasing risk aversion according to the multidimensional risk aversion concept of hellwig hellwig m f 2004 risk aversion in the small and the large with multidimensional outcomes max planck institute for research on collective goods bonn preprint 2004 6 http www mpp rdg mpg de pdf dat 2005 23online pdf this property of decreasing risk aversion also implies that the optimal income tax schedule is unique and depends continuously on the data of the problem

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

a contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation abstract the paper provides a new formulation of the mirrlees seade theorem on the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax under weaker assumptions and in a more general model the formulation of the theorem is independent of whether the model involves finitely many types or a continuous type distribution the formal argument makes the underlying logic transparent relating the mathematics to the economics and showing precisely how each assumption enters the analysis

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

the identification of preferences from equilibrium prices under uncertainty the competitive equilibrium correspondence which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete

how important are idiosyncratic shocks evidence from labor supply the notion that individuals face idiosyncratic labor market uncertainty is a common one government programs such as unemployment insurance and social security are motivated by such an idea economic theory ranging from labor supply to savings behavior to asset pricing often presupposes that such risks are important a number of papers however have questioned this orthodoxy sumru altug and robert a miller 1990 for instance are unable to reject a set of factor structure restrictions implied by complete markets john h cochrane 1991 and barbara j mace 1991 find evidence of consumption insurance although not against all types of risks robert m townsend 1994 documents evidence of risk sharing in indian villages michael p keane and kenneth i wolpin 1997 argue that 90 percent of the labor market uncertainty faced by a group of males is resolved by age 16 other studies have suggested the opposite papers by joseph g altonji et al 1991 orazio attanasio and steven j davis 1996 and attanasio and guglielmo weber 1992 as well as some evidence in cochrane 1991 and mace 1991 suggest that risk sharing is far from complete in particular for low frequency shocks angus deaton and christina paxson 1994 show that inequality in labor earnings total income and consumption increases with age they suggest that this is difficult to reconcile with standard models of complete consumption insurance in storesletten et al 2000 we ask similar questions using a general equilibrium life cycle model we conclude that increasing inequality with age consumption inequality in particular is difficult to explain in the absence of uninsured idiosyncratic shocks received throughout the working years we argue that between 40 percent and 50 percent of an individual s lifetime uncertainty remains unresolved prior to entering the workforce this paper further examines the implications of increasing inequality with age we begin by asking if a very different model one which features full risk sharing can account for the data the idea which deaton and paxson 1994 attribute to steven davis is that increasing income and consumption inequality can arise in a perfect insurance setting if i dispersion in labor productivity increases with age and ii preferences are nonseparable between leisure and consumption if this is true an efficient allocation may feature increasing consumption dispersion because higher productivity workers will supply relatively more labor and be compensated with more consumption we develop a specific model and find that for plausible parameter values this is exactly what happens what also happens however is that such an allocation features increasing inequality in hours worked using data from the panel study on income dynamics psid we show that inequality in hours worked is roughly constant across age this casts doubt on the full risksharing model and strengthens the argument in favor of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk the remainder of our paper provides a more general discussion of the evidence on inequality and age and how this suggests an important role for idiosyncratic labor market shocks

idiosyncratic risk and financial policy in economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient reallocations of assets support pareto superior allocations this is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete

corporate venturing and value creation a review and proposed framework abstract over the past decade companies worldwide have used corporate venturing cv as a means of revitalizing their operations building new capabilities and achieving strategic renewal creating value for shareholders business interest in cv has stimulated academic interest in the topic resulting in a rapidly growing but fragmented body of literature despite the growing international scholarly interest in cv researchers have devoted little effort to integrating prior findings in a cumulative fashion as a result studies do not build upon one another making it difficult to gauge the progress being made in addressing the fundamental research questions related to cv in this paper we examine the literature on cv seeking to synthesize integrate and link its key findings to do so we analyze this literature over the past decade to identify its major themes and research findings setting the stage for greater coherence in future research on cv we give special attention to the challenges and rewards of theory building in future cv research our review clearly shows that cv is an area of scholarly inquiry that has important implications for managerial practice

real investment options with multiple sources of rare events abstract we value real investment options when the underlying asset follows a mixed jump diffusion process involving various types sources of rare events jumps these jumps are assumed independent of each other with each type having a log normally distributed jump size and a random poisson distributed arrival time they may represent uncertainties about the arrival and impact on the underlying investment of new information concerning technological innovation competition political risk regulatory effects and other sources an analytic solution is presented for european claims call or put options with multiple sources of jumps a discrete time markov chain methodology implemented within a finite difference scheme is proposed for the valuation of american as well as european options the approach is also applicable to financial options with multiple types of rare events the approach is illustrated through valuing complex real options with compound features involving interactions between optimal investment and subsequent operating decisions specifically we value a growth option and an extension option

on the optimality of optimal income taxation abstract the mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence i e the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others it has been argued by piketty 2009 12 that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms in this paper we assess the validity of piketty s critique in an independent private values model as a main result we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism or equivalently a mirrleesian income tax system

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

the game form approach to redistribution this paper reviews the game form approach to redistributive policies this approach provides a justiucation for studying tax systems as good institutional arrangements for reallocating resources in a heterogeneous society after situating the problem of asymmetric information for public policy the paper provides a short overview of the main concepts and results in implementation theory next these tools are used to inquire about the possibility to decentralise the reallocation of resources in a production economy with the help of tax transfer systems finally the paper deals with some recent extensions of the theory a simple example is used throughout to illustrate the different results

options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets analysis and applications this paper provides analytical formulas for european put and call options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets the properties of these formulas are discussed in detail options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets are useful to price a wide variety of contingent claims of interest to financial economists applications discussed in this paper include the valuation of foreign currency debt option bonds compensation plans risk sharing contracts secured debt and growth opportunities involving mutually exclusive investments

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

the effects of moral hazard on asset prices when financial markets are complete abstract this paper discusses the implications for prices and quantities of an alternative trading arrangement in kahn s 1990 economic environment with moral hazard unlike kahn s model of asset trade my model does not impose any unmotivated restrictions on short sales instead it features complete markets and publicly observable asset transactions like kahn s model my model implies that allocations are constrained pareto optimal however the implications of my model for asset prices are considerably different in particular when all agents have log utility asset prices satisfy an aggregation theorem also unlike kahn s model the model in this paper does worse than the standard representative agent model in terms of explaining the equity premium

coordinating development can income based incentive schemes eliminate pareto inferior equilibria individuals inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development in this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome a general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual s incomes from investment and noninvestment are equal we show that arbitrarily small errors in the government s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome we conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government s ability to use income based incentive schemes as a coordination device

welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets economies with several consumption goods abstract we show that in almost every incomplete markets economy with more than one consumption good and with sufficiently many uninsured states of nature at any general equilibrium of this economy it is possible to arbitrarily perturb the equilibrium utilities merely by introducing the appropriate asset making for example all agents worse off this result demonstrates that the examples given by hart on the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete j econ theory11 1975 418 443 and others are actually general phenomena and is in sharp contrast to the intuition that innovation since it expands financial opportunities should benefit all agents journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d60 g10

should speculators be taxed a number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets we examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of a financial market where some agents have superior information and others have a hedging motive we show that a tax on speculators may actually increase speculative profits this occurs if the speculators benefit from less informative prices offsets the cost of the tax the effect on the welfare of other agents depends on how information revelation changes risk sharing opportunities it is possible for the introduction of a tax to cause a pareto improvement copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

revisiting corporate growth options in the presence of state dependent cashflow risk abstract given a non trivial market price of risk we study the impact of state dependent cashflow risk on the optimal investment policy and on the ensuing value of an unlevered firm that holds the option of scaling up cashflows from its assets in place upon incurring an irreversible cost the firm s investment decision and value are studied as a function of the market price of risk and of the degree of state dependence in cashflow risk

implementation of first best allocations via generalized tax schedules abstract the classical problem of optimal taxation introduced by j mirrlees rev econ stud 38 1971 175 208 is addressed and it is argued that by using generalized tax schedules i e schedules which depend not only on individual income but also on the whole profile of incomes announced by the society a planner can implement any pareto optimum which stands in great contrast with the set of second best pareto optima attainable via classical tax schedules the mechanism relies crucially on the fixed probability distribution of characteristics and on a finite number of agents journal of economic literature classification numbers d78 d82 h21

efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance abstract this paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance we impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward and show with this feature added that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility the paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question what is the trade off between equality and efficiency in resource allocation journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 d82 j65

incentives and aggregate shocks this paper presents an incentive based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks the paper builds on the models concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of green 1987 thomas and worrall 1991 phelan and townsend 1991 and atkeson and lucas 1992 by incorporating aggregate production shocks the model allows an examination of the interactions between individual and aggregate consumption series given incomplete insurance further the methodology outlined allows the incorporation of incentive considerations to macroeconomic environments similar to rogerson 1988 and hansen 1985

anonymity and optimality of competitive equilibria when markets are incomplete abstract we study the optimality or efficiency of competitive equilibria in a standard two period economy where markets are incomplete statistical information about consumers preferences and endowments is known to a social planner but the planner cannot observe consumers types directly a competitive equilibrium is anonymous constrained optimal if the social planner cannot pareto improve upon the equilibrium allocation by intervening in asset markets with any asset trade rule satisfying anonymity in some cases a competitive equilibrium is robustly anonymous constrained optimal whereas it is known that competitive equilibria are generically constrained suboptimal for the case of completely observable types journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d82 h21

direct versus indirect taxation the design of the tax structure revisited this article studies the optimal direct indirect tax mix problem when individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics productivity and endowments it presents general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to atkinson and stiglitz s 1976 result differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods when cross substitution effects are zero the expressions resemble traditional many households ramsey rules in a cobb douglas illustration where endowments differ only in good 1 interpreted as wealth the tax on good 2 provides an indirect way to tax the unobservable wealth

earnouts in mergers and acquisitions a game theoretic option pricing approach abstract this paper presents a valuation approach for merger and acquisition m a deals employing contingent earnouts it is argued that these transactions have option like features and the paper uses a game theoretic option approach to model the value of such claims more specifically the paper examines the impact of uncertainty on the optimal timing of m a using earnouts and it also investigates the impact of uncertainty on the terms of the earnout optimal earnout and initial payment combinations are endogenously derived from the model and testable hypotheses are developed the theoretical contribution of this paper is a dynamic decision making model of the invest to learn option generated upon investment in an acquisition the paper also offers practical implications for the design of acquisitions employing earnouts

voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules abstract majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who have quasilinear in consumption preferences is considered roell 2012 has shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single peaked in this article a complete characterization of selfishly optimal schedules is provided each selfishly optimal schedule has a bunching region in a neighborhood of the proposer s skill type coincides with the maxi max schedule below this region and coincides with the maxi min schedule above it using techniques introduced by vincent and mason 1967 the bunching region is identified by solving an unconstrained optimization problem information about the optimal schedules is used to provide a relatively simple proof of single peakedness the condorcet winning tax schedule features marginal tax rates that are negative resp positive on the maxi max resp maxi min part of the schedule except at the endpoints of the skill distribution where they are zero

payroll tax financed social insurance with variable retirement the optimal relationship between retirement benefits and retirement age is derived the model assumes ex ante identical workers zero one labor supply no private savings wages and payroll taxes constant over life random onset of an inability to work and the impossibility of distinguishing those unable to work from those choosing retirement this formulation is meant to capture some issues for retirement programs where governments commonly do not measure disability e g ages 65 70 with intertemporally additive preferences optimal benefits rise with the age of retirement but more slowly than would be actuarially fair a nonadditive example is also considered

a note on optimal income taxation public goods provision and robust mechanism design abstract this paper extends the model of optimal income taxation due to mirrlees mirrlees j 1971 an exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation review of economic studies 38 175 208 and includes private information on public goods preferences a mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result if policies are required to be robustly implementable in the sense of bergemann and morris bergemann d morris s 2005 robust mechanism design econometrica 73 1771 1813 then the optimality conditions in the extended model with uncertainty about tax and expenditure policies are the same as in the standard model of optimal income taxation the paper provides a foundation for a widely used assumption in public finance namely that individuals optimize their behavior subject to a predetermined and commonly known tax system

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

information and incentives the economics of carrots and sticks prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1996 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

the taxation of trades in assets when the asset market is incomplete there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are pareto improving this fiscal policy is anonymous it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders and it results in ex post pareto optimal allocations as such it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions

on the robustness of laissez faire abstract this paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their type their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods while preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an agent s private type we assume that the planner government is both uncertain about the nature of this joint distribution and unable to choose among multiple equilibria of any given social mechanism we model the planner government as having a maxmin objective in the face of this uncertainty our main theorem is as follows once we allow for this kind of uncertainty and assume no wealth effects in preferences the uniquely optimal social contract is laissez faire in which agents trade in unfettered markets with no government intervention of any kind

optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population abstract in the standard optimal income taxation problem tax payments depend only on each consumer s own actions piketty j econ theory 61 1993 23 41 shows that if one individual s tax schedule depends on others actions and the government knows the exact ability distribution it can implement any undistorted allocation as the unique revelation game outcome if some individuals misreveal their types piketty s mechanism may assign infeasible allocations we require that tax schedules must balance the government budget for every possible vector of revelations when individuals reveal their type by simple announcements all undistorted allocations can be still implemented even with off equilibrium feasibility constraints

the inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium this paper establishes that when there is not a complete set of markets but more than one commodity the stock market equilibrium will not in general be a constrained pareto optimum the economy will lack both the property of exchange and production efficiency necessary conditions which must be satisfied if the economy is to be a constrained pareto optimum for all technologies are derived if all individuals have identical homothetic indifference maps then either there must be unitary price elasticities so there is no effective risk or all individuals must have the same degree of risk aversion so there is no trade on the stock market

efficiency welfare and political competition we study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences our framework covers models of income taxation public goods provision or publicly provided private goods politicians are vote share maximizers they can propose any policy that is resource feasible and incentive compatible they can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate we prove two main results first the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus maximizing and hence first best pareto efficient second there is a surplus maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare maximizing policy thus in our model policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible jel codes c72 d72 d82 h21 h41 h42

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

nonlinear price discrimination with a finite number of consumers and constrained recontracting abstract in the monopoly nonlinear pricing problem with unobservable consumer types we study mechanisms in which the firm makes the set of consumer options conditional on the aggregate reports of consumer types it receives previous mechanisms that exploit knowledge of the true type distribution often have multiple equilibria or use noncredible contracts off the equilibrium path when the monopolist can replace contracts after initial reports subject to the constraint that truthful consumers are not made worse off the outcome is essentially the same as when the monopolist has full information this holds whether or not the monopolist can make offers to consumers who reject all original contract offers when the monopolist must guarantee nonnegative surplus to all truthful consumers in all contingencies the equilibrium outcome has undistorted contracts but lower profits for the monopolist

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic