debt contracts with partial commitment this paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments and the lender offers long term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated no commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one respectively i show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare furthermore properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment in particular investment is positively related to cash flow consistent with empirical findings

unraveling the effects of environmental outcomes and processes on financial performance a non linear approach abstract we examine the roles of the outcome and process dimensions of environmental performance in determining financial performance as measured by tobin s q outcomes refer to the impacts of the firm on the natural environment while processes are the firm s actions to reduce these outcomes we focus on a specific outcome carbon emissions and suggest that it affects tobin s q non linearly we find that firms achieve the highest financial performance when their carbon performance is neither low nor high but intermediate we also find that environmental processes moderate this relationship as they reinforce firms financial performance through improved stakeholder management this mixed picture suggests that firms do not generally internalize the costs of poor carbon performance but those that stand out in both environmental outcomes and processes achieve net financial benefits these findings are based on a sample of carbon intensive firms that disclosed their greenhouse gas ghg emissions through the carbon disclosure project from 2007 through 2013

financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

does the type of political regime matter for trade and labor market policies this article uses cross country data to examine the link between a country s type of political regime and its degree of openness and labor market distortion the analysis indicates that more authoritarian regimes are associated with higher trade protection and greater labor market distortions this supports the view that political authoritarianism may be counterproductive to development in important respects

using maimonides rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic achievement the twelfth century rabbinic scholar maimonides proposed a maximum class size of 40 this same maximum induces a nonlinear and nonmonotonic relationship between grade enrollment and class size in israeli public schools today maimonides rule of 40 is used here to construct instrumental variables estimates of effects of class size on test scores the resulting identiecation strategy can be viewed as an application of donald campbell s regression discontinuity design to the class size question the estimates show that reducing class size induces a signiecant and substantial increase in test scores for fourth and efth graders although not for third graders when asked about their views on class size in surveys parents and teachers generally report that they prefer smaller classes this may be because those involved with teaching believe that smaller classes promote student learning or simply because smaller classes offer a more pleasant environment for the pupils and teachers who are in them mueller chase and walden 1988 social scientists and school administrators also have a longstanding interest in the class size question class size is often thought to be easier to manipulate than other school inputs and it is a variable at the heart of policy debates on school quality and the allocation of school resources in many countries see e g robinson 1990 for the united states ofsted 1995 for the united kingdom and moshel ravid 1995 for israel this broad interest in the consequences of changing class size

predatory versus productive government the case of u s agricultural policies this essay will argue that agricultural policy in the united states has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through productive policies and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or predatory policies these two activities can be labeled as pests and perts pest policies or political economic seeking transfers are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency in contrast perts or political economic resource transactions are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods these policies have neutral distributional effects at least in design a review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the pert and pest roles of the public sector but also some coordination between these two types of activities as different interest groups pressure the political process the government trades off pests and perts in its attempts to acquire balance and secure political power at times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent in such a world the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

dividend policy creditor rights and the agency costs of debt we show that country level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm s agency costs of debt using a sample of 120 507 firm years from 52 countries we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights a reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41 reduction in the probability of paying a dividend and a 60 reduction in dividend payout ratios these results are robust to numerous control variables sample variations model specifications and alternative hypotheses we also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity overall our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision making outside of bankruptcy

black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory political economy in general equilibrium preface acknowledgments list of results 1 a preview of the results 2 endogenous policy theory a diagrammatic approach part i endogenous policy theory with specific factors the theory of industry tariffs in partial equilibrium 3 the probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4 endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5 endogenous tariff theory 6 the power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7 three simple tests of the stolper samuelson theorem 8 the invisible foot and the waste of nations lawyers as negative externalities part ii endogenous policy theory in general equilibrium a long run theory of national tariff levels 9 the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10 a prisoner s dilemma theory of endogenous protection the leontief model 11 the compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12 increasing returns to politics and factor endowments economic development and brazilian vitality versus the indian disease 13 endogenous protection in the united states 1900 88 14 a cobb douglas model 15 black hole tariffs 16 the endowment effect cross national evidence on endogenous tariffs part ii postscript 17 the senile industry argument for protection 18 optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst the politically efficient policy mathematical appendices references author index subject index

political agency government responsiveness and the role of the media abstract the role of mass media in making governments responsive to the needs of citizens is a relatively neglected area in economics we sketch a theoretical example with a role for media in enhancing government responsiveness based on asymmetric information between citizens and government we then use data for the period 1958 1992 on the extent to which indian state governments responded to food shortages via the public distribution of food correlating these with proxies of media political and economic development we find that states that are more responsive tend to also be those with high levels of newspaper circulation electoral turnout and literacy in contrast richer states do not tend to be more responsive than poorer states

are observed capital structures determined by equity market timing contrary to baker and wurgler 2002 i find that the importance of historical average market to book ratios in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market timing al though equity transactions may be timed to equity market conditions they do not have sig nificant long lasting effects on capital structure debt transactions exhibit timing patterns that are unlikely to induce a negative relation between market to book ratios and leverage i also find that historical average market to book ratios have significant effects on current financing and investment decisions implying that they contain information about growth opportunities not captured by current market to book ratios

information the cost of credit and operational eﬃciency an empirical study of microfinance we provide direct evidence on the impact of asymmetric information on both financing and operating activities through a study of credit evaluations of microfinance institutions mfis we employ a regression discontinuity model that exploits the eligibility criteria of an evaluation subsidy ofered by a nonprofit consortium evaluations dramatically cut the cost of financing this efect is strongest for commercial lenders and for short term mfi lender relationships the impact of evaluations on the supply of finance is mixed evaluated mfis lend more efciently extending more loans per employee the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

control rights and capital structure an empirical investigation we show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit the effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower s alternative sources of finance are costly in addition despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation a fundamental question in financial economics is how do firms choose their financial policies extant empirical research on this question has focused primarily on the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs e g scott 1976 information asymmetry e g myers and majluf 1984 and more recently market timing behavior e g baker and wurgler 2002 however beginning with jensen and meckling 1976 a large body of theoretical research examines how incentive conflicts between managers and external investors affect corporate financial policies in particular theoretical research on financial contracting shows that in the presence of incentive conflicts optimal debt contracts will allocate certain rights to creditors after negative performance in order to help firms secure financing ex ante e g aghion and bolton 1992 and dewatripont and tirole

disproportional control rights and the governance role of debt we examine the governance role of debt in the context of u s based dual class ownership structures we hypothesize that the use of debt alleviates the conflict between shareholder classes by balancing the power of controlling insiders we document that dual class firms have higher leverage and a greater propensity to issue private debt they also more frequently use cash sweeps and performance based covenants dual class firms with greater agency conflicts and a greater need to access the capital market appear to rely more extensively on debt these findings are consistent with controlling insiders bonding against the agency costs associated with dual class ownership the governance role of debt is further corroborated by the valuation effect of debt for dual class companies private debt issuances trigger greater positive market reactions to the inferior dual class stock in relation to both the superior dual class stock and a matched sample of single class firms further leverage attenuates the previou

covenants in venture capital contracts this paper studies how covenants are included in contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs i show that vcs hold covenanted veto rights even though they are shareholders who have access to other powerful governance solutions unlike bank loans and bonds venture capital vc contracts exhibit considerable variation in their contractual designs i exploit this variation to confirm the argument that covenants are in place to overcome a conflict of interest that arises from debt like contractual features of a venture capitalist s preferred stock in particular i find that contracts with higher fixed payoffs include 1 6 more covenants than do contracts with lower fixed payoffs similarly vc contracts with no vc board majority requirement include 0 6 more covenants than do contracts that require a vc board majority covenants are also more common with older companies and when fewer vcs invest in a round my findings contribute to both the debt covenant literature and the entrepreneurial finance literature this paper was accepted by brad barber finance

the relation between earnings based measures in firm debt contracts and ceo pay sensitivity to earnings abstract i investigate how implicit incentives provided by earnings based debt covenants affect the structure of ceo compensation contracts this provides a new and unique view of how the ceo s incentives are shaped by not only his compensation contract but also debt contracts i find when debt contracts contain an earnings based covenant the ceo s pay sensitivity to earnings is muted additionally i find some evidence that pay sensitivity to earnings varies with earnings based covenant slack this study provides evidence consistent with shareholders rebalancing the ceo s earnings incentives in the presence of earnings based covenants thereby tilting incentives away from earnings performance

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

human capital inequality and growth a local perspective abstract a recent body of work has demonstrated the crucial role played by local human capital externalities and local school funding in generating socio economic segregation persistent poverty and low aggregate income or productivity growth we present a simple model which captures the main insights from this literature and prove three general propositions first minor differences in education technologies preferences wealth or minor imperfections in capital markets can lead to a high degree of stratification second stratification makes inequality in education and income more persistent across generations the same is true for total wealth provided the rich succeed in capturing the rents created by their secession finally this polarization or urban areas can be very inefficient especially in the long run

optimal financial instruments debt and equity are developed as optimal financial instruments in a model where cash flows and control rights are allocated to investors endogenously when investment decisions must be made by a single party the debtholder s cash flows are fixed in order to provide the equityholder with efficient incentives for investment ownership of control may be transferred to the debtholder to attenuate the impact of asymmetric information concerning the investment opportunity on the efficiency of the decision making since the classic article by modigliani and miller 1958 a great deal of attention has been focused on the problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm spanning taxes and or transaction cost agency cost and signalling arguments have been offered as explanations for why a firm s cash flows might be split between debt and equity claimants in a particular way here we address the more basic question of the optimal design of the securities that firms issue the majority of the existing literature takes the form of the allowable financial instruments as given in defense of this approach it may be noted that to a first approximation firms have used two standard financial instruments debt and equity we argue here however that the characterization of the standard instruments used in much of the literature has been incomplete and that the incentives of decision makers within the firm cannot be completely understood until the problem is addressed from a more basic level than is typically done by concentrating on the cash flow characteristics of these instruments the equally important issue of the way the standard instruments distribute the control rights of the firm has been ignored as a consequence the objectives in corporate decision making have been assumed rather than developed endogenously we consider the allocation of cash flows and the distribution of control rights to optimal financial instruments in a security design problem by considering the design of securities in this way we are able to consider the

political preference functions and public policy reform a model of policy making is developed where governments seek to maximize support from social groups through the combination of both pert social welfare increasing and pert welfare transferring policies the implicit weights of a political preference function shift with a change in the relative cost of interest group organizing attention is paid to the degree of wealth transfers as total social welfare increases because of pert policy changes the model demonstrates that in the case of two competing groups the weight given to one group in the allocation of social surplus will increase as total social welfare increases with a bias toward the other group the relative weights placed on consumers and producers based on pest policies alone are misleading indicators of the political influence of groups a number of general implications of this political economic analysis for the reform of public policies are investigated

the growth of agricultural protection in europe in the 19th and 20th centuries 1247 johan f m swinnen dramatic changes took place in agricultural policies in europe in the 19th and 20th centuries in the 1860s european nations agreed on a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the continent in the 1960s european nations concluded an international agreement which spread heavy government intervention and protection against imports across the continent this paper quantifies these changes in protection over the course of a century relates them to changes in policies and offers a political economy explanation for the growth in agricultural protection in europe

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

are firms underleveraged an examination of the effect of leverage on default probabilities a commonly held view in corporate finance is that firms are less leveraged than they should be given the potentially large tax benefits of debt in this paper i study the effect of firms leverage on default probabilities as represented by the firms ratings using an instrumental variable approach i find that the leverage s effect on ratings is three times stronger than it is if the endogeneity of leverage is ignored this stronger effect results in a higher impact of leverage on the ex ante costs of financial distress which can offset the current estimates of the tax benefits of debt

debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals abstract this paper examines the abnormal accruals of a sample of 94 firms that reported debt covenant violations in annual reports we expect debt covenant restrictions to influence accounting choices in the year preceding and the year of violation time series and cross sectional models are used to estimate normal accruals in the year prior to violation both models indicate that abnormal total and working capital accruals are significantly positive in the year of violation there is evidence of positive abnormal working capital accruals after controlling for management changes and auditor going concern qualifications

on the existence of an optimal capital structure theory and evidence one of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure the geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions by modigliani and miller 18 19 the general academic view by the mid 1970s although not a consensus was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy costs no sooner did this general view become prevalent in the profession than miller 16 presented a new challenge by showing that under certain conditions the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level since then there has developed a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting to reconcile miller s model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure e g deangelo and masulis 5 kim 12 and modigliani 17 the general result of this work is that if there are significant leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs agency costs of debt and loss of non debt tax shields and if the income from equity is untaxed then the marginal bondholder s tax rate will be less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing the firm s optimal capital structure will involve the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and various leverage related costs the upshot of these extensions of miller s model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage related costs are economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing the miller model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several timeseries studies which provide evidence on the existence of leverage related costs trczinka 28 reports that from examining differences in average yields between taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds one cannot reject the miller hypothesis that the marginal bondholder s tax rate is not different from the corporate tax rate however trczinka is careful to point out that this finding does not necessarily imply that there is no tax advantage of corporate debt if the personal tax rate on equity is positive indeed buser and hess 1 using a longer time series of data and more sophisticated econometric techniques estimate that the average effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically positive and is not of a trivial magnitude more importantly they document evidence that is consistent with the existence of significant leverage related costs in the economy

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

the paradox of pledgeability abstract we develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other creditors we find that paradoxically borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is high this is when taking on new debt is easy which dilutes existing creditors creditors thus require collateral for protection against possible dilution by collateralized debt there is a collateral rat race but collateralized borrowing has a cost it encumbers assets constraining future borrowing and investment there is a collateral overhang our results suggest that policies aimed at increasing the supply of collateral can backfire triggering an inefficient collateral rat race likewise upholding the absolute priority of secured debt can exacerbate the rat race

the wto trade effect this paper reexamines the gatt wto membership efiect on bilateral trade ows using nonparametric methods including pair matching permutation tests and a rosenbaum 2002 sensitivity analysis together these methods provide an estimation framework that is robust to misspeciflcation biases allows general forms of heterogeneous treatment efiects and addresses potential hidden selection biases this is in contrast to most conventional parametric studies on this issue our results suggest large gatt wto trade promoting efiects robust to various restricted matching criteria alternative indicators for gatt wto involvement different matching methodologies non random incidence of positive trade ows and inclusion of multilateral resistance terms

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

estimating the benefits of contractual completeness i provide a revealed preference based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts i use a rational expectations based panel estimator of covenant prices which does not require quasi experimental variation to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices i find that firms surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan leverage and interest rate covenants produce the largest benefits lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants once covenants are chosen the benefits from fine tuning them are small thus rationalizing boilerplate covenants i conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

debt covenant violations and managers accounting responses abstract this paper examines accounting changes costs of default and accounting based covenants violated by 130 firms reporting violations in annual reports i find that managers of firms approaching default respond with income increasing accounting changes and that the default costs imposed by lenders and the accounting flexibility available to managers are important determinants of managers accounting responses i also document that private lending agreements are the first violated that net worth and working capital restrictions are the most frequently violated restrictions and that in 52 percent of the cases lenders require concessions from borrowers to resolve default

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

accounting information in financial contracting the incomplete contract theory perspective this paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research we argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved by discussing its rich theoretical implications we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency

spillovers stratification and inequality this paper surveys some recent work which seeks to model persistent income inequality and explain such phenomena as ghetto formation and poverty traps the paper illustrates how a number of these models possess a common structure in which local spillover effects interact with income based stratification of neighborhoods to transmit parental economic status from generation to generation as such these models represent an extension of the macroeconomic literature on spillovers and coordination failures to economic environments which endogenize the interaction environments of individual agents the theoretical and empirical justifications of these spillover and stratification effects are discussed finally some empirical implications of these models are analyzed

capital structure and debt structure using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation relative to high credit quality firms lowcredit quality firms are more likely to have a multi tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non bank debt with loose covenants we discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts jel g32

dynamic instability of a mixed city in the presence of neighborhood externalities it has been often asked whether a city currently accommodating a variety of economic social and racial groups will continue to be a mixed city or will become exclusively occupied by a single group particularly poor blacks with all other groups moving out of the city in the long run in order to answer this question properly it seems essential to develop a long run dynamic model of a city with emphasis on socioeconomic factors like neighborhood externalities within or among various groups of residents as well as spatial factors like the individual choice of residential space and location it might be safely said that in the literature the only theoretical work which employs a long run dynamic approach to this kind of problem is a paper on dynamic models of segregation by thomas schelling 197 1 although his socioeconomic analysis has revealed some of the dynamic properties of a racially mixed area with neighborhood externalities his model itself is quite unsatisfactory from the economic point of view since it lacks individual utility functions and thereby disregards the aspect of the individual choice of space and location within the city 2 as a result he failed to analyze the effect of spatial segregation within the city on the long run nature of the residential composition of the city in this paper i develop a long run dynamic model of an open city which accommodates two groups of households for example blacks and whites rich and poor young and old with their utility functions depending on a consumption good and residential space i also assume two kinds of neighborhood externalities the first is called negative intergroup externalities that is the utility level of a typical household in one group is adversely affected by an increase in the number of households in the other group living in the city the second is called positive intragroup externalities that is the utility level of a typical household in one group is positively affected by an increase in the size of its own group in in the city first i define a mixed city equilibrium as a long run equilibrium which allows the two groups to coexist in the city in the long run and then introduce a dynamic adjustment process of household movement into and out of the city it is proved that the mixed city equilibrium is always unstable in the presence of negative intergroup externalities and or positive intragroup externalities if residential land is perfectly homogeneous and there is no differential transport cost incurred within the city it turns out however that in the case of a monocentric city with positive transport cost the mixed city equilibrium may be stable or unstable depending on the degree of neighborhood externalities because of the stabilizing effect of spatial segregation between the two groups within the city

arm s length financing and innovation evidence from publicly traded firms using a large panel of u s companies i document that firms that rely more on arm s length financing such as public debt and equity innovate more and have higher quality innovations than firms that use other sources such as relationship based bank financing i hypothesize that one possible reason for this finding is the greater flexibility and tolerance to experimentation associated with arm s length financing i find support for this hypothesis by showing that firms with more arm s length financing have greater volatility of innovative output and are more likely to innovate in new technological areas furthermore focusing only on bank financing i demonstrate that firms have more novel innovations if they borrow from multiple banks use predominantly credit lines and have less intense covenants i address potential endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variable analysis and by showing that innovation increases significantly after new public debt offerings and seasoned equity offerings but d

is there a pecking order evidence from a panel of ipo firms abstract we test the pecking order model of capital structure by examining the financing of firms that went public in 1983 we estimate a logit to predict external financing and a multinomial logit to predict the type of financing using data on the ipo firms security offerings during 1984 1992 our results indicate that the probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internally generated funds although firms with cash surpluses avoid external financing firms that access the capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer

equity and efficiency in human capital investment the local connection a general model of community formation and human capital accumulation with social spillovers and decentralized school funding is used to analyse the causes of economic segregation and its consequences for equity and efficiency significant polarization arises from minor differences in endowments preferences or access to capital markets this makes income inequality more persistent across generations but the same need not be true for wealth equilibrium stratification tends to be excessive resulting in low aggregate surplus whether state equalization of school resources can remedy these problems hinges on how purchased social and family inputs interact in education and in mobility decisions

a pecuniary reason for income mixing abstract empirical studies have found a high degree of income mixing in american neighborhoods we give a new explanation of this phenomenon that is based on consumer search a low price for a given good benefits high valuation buyers more than low valuation buyers but with search the probability of obtaining a low price is increasing in the proportion of low valuation buyers this gives high valuation buyers an incentive to live near low valuation buyers with many goods a buyer has an incentive to live near neighbors whose valuations are uncorrelated with hers

price search in a product market regressions using panel data on grocery purchases show lower purchase costs are significantly associated with a larger number of stores visited per week there is also evidence but somewhat weaker of diminishing gains from such search an economic model of the determinants of search suggests that prices paid quantities purchased and number of store visits are interrelated a view supported by results of estimating a proposed simultaneous equations model

the value of creditor control in corporate bonds this paper introduces a measure that captures the premium in bond prices that is due to the value of creditor control we estimate the premium as the difference in the bond price and an equivalent synthetic bond without control rights that is constructed using credit default swap cds contracts we find empirically that this premium increases as firm credit quality decreases and around important credit events such as defaults bankruptcies and covenant violations the increase is greatest for bonds most pivotal to changes in control changes in bond and cds liquidity do not appear to drive increases in the premium

the political economy of the media coverage of the lumber tariff dispute the political economy of groups suggest that policies are more likely to be implemented if the benefits are concentrated and the costs are dispersed the importance of the role of media in society changes the classic models media can awaken the sleeping masses to the dispersed costs of a policy and raise resentment towards the group who benefits thus the content of media coverage can affect policy stromberg s 2001 model shows that the amount of newspaper space devoted to an issue should rise as the square of the number of people affected this paper finds empirical support for stromberg s theoretical findings with content analysis of newspaper coverage of the lumber tariff dispute

equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects public service output depends on input expenditures on own personal characteristics and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community the peer group effect in a community model with public expenditures set by voting with migration between communities and with land price differentials capitalization it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and second best inefficient this equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither too strong nor too weak the inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration the land price differential does not play the part of the price of the better peer group but of a transfer payment

news droughts news floods and u s disaster relief this paper studies the influence of mass media on u s government response to approximately 5 000 natural disasters occurring between 1968 and 2002 these disasters took nearly 63 000 lives and affected 125 million people per year we show that u s relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the olympic games which are obviously unrelated to need we argue that the only plausible explanation of this is that relief decisions are driven by news coverage of disasters and that the other newsworthy material crowds out this news coverage

the use of bank lines of credit in corporate liquidity management a review of empirical evidence abstract this paper reviews empirical evidence on the use of bank lines of credit as a source of corporate liquidity traditional explanation for lines of credit is that they provide insurance against liquidity shocks in much the same as way hoarding cash does however recent empirical research suggests that access to lines of credit is contingent on the credit quality of the borrower as well as the financial condition of the lender these findings suggest that lines of credit are an imperfect substitute for cash as a source of corporate liquidity

what s your identification strategy innovation in corporate finance research we study the diffusion of techniques designed to identify causal relationships in corporate finance research we estimate that the diffusion started in the mid 1990s lagged 20 years compared to economics and is now used in the majority of corporate finance articles consistent with recent theories of technology diffusion the adoption varies across researchers based on individuals expected net benefits of adoption younger scholars holders of phds in economics and those working at top institutions adopt faster adoption is accelerated through networks of colleagues and alumni and is also facilitated by straddlers who cross over from economics to finance our findings highlight new forces that explain the diffusion of innovation and shape the norms of academic research this paper was accepted by gustavo manso finance

proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate abstract this paper focuses on how best to measure the corporate marginal tax rate which is an important input into financial analysis of the cost of capital financing policy corporate hedging and corporate reorganizations the results indicate that the simulated tax rate used by shevlin 1990 and graham 1996 although difficult to calculate is the best available proxy for the true marginal tax rate if the simulated rate is unavailable an easy to calculate trichotomous variable or the statutory marginal tax rate which captures the progressivity in the tax schedule are reasonable alternatives better than most commonly used tax variables

state contract law and debt contracts abstractthis paper examines the relationship between debt contracts and state contract law we first develop an index to evaluate whether each state s law is favorable or unfavorable to lenders we then analyze how the contract terms the frequency of covenant violations and the repercussions of covenant violations vary across states we find that cash collateral is most likely to be used when the contract is governed by law that is favorable to debtors and that out of state borrowers who use favorable law pay higher yield spreads in addition when the law is favorable to lenders there are significantly fewer covenant violations and the repercussions of covenant violations measured as changes in the borrower s investment policy are more severe we also compare the characteristics of relevant parties across states and the results provide support for the theory that there is a market for contracts similar to the market for incorporations

performance measures in earnings based financial covenants in debt contracts this paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures i find an earnings based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest tax amortization and depreciation expenses ebitda however my empirical analyses show that ebitda is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses ebit and even the bottom line net income thus measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings based covenants i conjecture that contracting parties choose an ebitda related measure instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses e g ebit to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities which can be controlled through other contractual terms such as a restriction on capital expenditure and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture

bank skin in the game and loan contract design evidence from covenant lite loans in a model of dual agency problems where borrower lender and bank nonbank incentives may conflict we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness as bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread we find support for the hockey stick relation with bank s stake in covenant lite loans averaging 8 0 median we also find that covenant lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high

determinants of store level price elasticity using weekly scanner data representing 18 product categories the authors estimated store specific price elasticities for a chain of 83 supermarkets they related these price sensitivities to a com

fighting corruption to improve schooling evidence from a newspaper campaign in uganda what are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning we argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption we illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment a newspaper campaign in uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools parents with information to monitor local officials handling of a large education grant program the campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrollment and student learning jel d73 i22 o12

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

state market civil institutions the case of eastern europe and the soviet republics abstract the transition tasks facing the countries of central and eastern europe are monumental the public sector will play a dominant role during the transition process available evidence suggests that orthodox prescriptions for public sector reform cannot be effectively implemented without an underlying constitution and a legal and regulatory infrastructure lri a well designed constitution and lri instill confidence and policy credibility with perfectly rational expectations and confidence in the constitution and lri the sequence of reforms matters little future reforms are perfectly anticipated today and agents act as though the reforms will occur with certainty short of such confidence reforms need to be simultaneously pursued on many fronts the most important activity is to redefine the role of the state setting a constitution that clearly defines and secures basic political civil and economic freedoms and designing an lri that creates a fertile environment for a vibrant market economy

political institutions and international patterns of agricultural protection this paper analyzes the influence of political systems and rights in patterns of agricultural protection across commodities countries and over time four political systems and a qualitative index of political rights account for differences in political institutions the analysis incorporates the effects of development of constraints on tax collection feasibility and of comparative advantages and terms of trade pluralistic systems are associated with higher agricultural protection levels although in a nonlinear fashion access to pluralism appears to be important although further democratization partly dissipates protection copyright 1994 by mit press

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

asymmetric information debt capacity and capital structure capital structure choice based on costs associated with asymmetric information is examined in order to present a new perspective on the standard pecking order and trade off theories in the model both the face value of debt and the restrictiveness of the associated debt covenants are chosen as part of the financial structure allowing a more complete characterization of this decision debt structure choice balances ex ante adverse selection against ex post moral hazard providing a natural integration of the pecking order and trade off theories and the development of interesting empirical implications

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

how does industry affect firm financial structure we examine the importance of industry to firm level financial and real decisions we find that in addition to standard industry fixed effects financial structure also depends on a firm s position within its industry in competitive industries a firm s financial leverage depends on its natural hedge its proximity to the median industry capital labor ratio the actions of other firms in the industry and its status as entrant incumbent or exiting firm financial leverage is higher and less dispersed in concentrated industries where strategic debt interactions are also stronger but a firm s natural hedge is not significant our results show that financial structure technology and risk are jointly determined within industries these findings are consistent with recent industry equilibrium models of financial structure copyright 2005 oxford university press