partisan bias in economic news evidence on the agenda setting behavior of u s newspapers abstract we study the agenda setting political behavior of a large sample of u s newspapers during the 1996 2005 period our purpose is to examine the intensity of coverage of economic issues as a function of the underlying economic conditions and the political affiliation of the incumbent president focusing on unemployment inflation the federal budget and the trade deficit we investigate whether there is any significant correlation between the endorsement policy of newspapers and the differential coverage of bad good economic news as a function of the president s political affiliation we find evidence that newspapers with pro democratic endorsement pattern systematically give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a republican than when the president is democratic compared to newspapers with pro republican endorsement pattern this result is robust to controlling for the partisanship of readers we find similar but less robust results for the trade deficit we also find some evidence that newspapers cater to the partisan tastes of readers in the coverage of the budget deficit we find no evidence of a partisan bias or at least of a bias that is correlated with the endorsement or reader partisanship for stories on inflation

does informative media commentary reduce politicians incentives to pander abstract elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander i e to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn prior to the election whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest this suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices we show that although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent s incentive to pander in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse furthermore in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a yes man suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice we explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

media competition and electoral politics we build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout while information pushes up independent turnout partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate and on average they vote less when informed

sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition we analyze free entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition in which locations of established firms are fixed and entrants profit expectations are rational our most interesting results concern large economies economies in which the number of firms is arbitrarily large when the average cost function is u shaped free entry equilibrium is unique socially optimal and characterized by zero profit in contract when there are no diseconomies of scale even large economies are stubbornly imperfect firms can earn substantial pure profit and free entry equilibrium is neither unique nor socially optimal

when starting with the most expensive option makes sense optimal timing cost and sectoral allocation of abatement investment this paper finds that it is optimal to start a long term emission reduction strategy with significant short term abatement investment even if the optimal carbon price starts low and grows progressively over time moreover optimal marginal abatement investment costs differ across sectors of the economy it may be preferable to spend 25 dollars to avoid the marginal ton of carbon in a sector where abatement capital is expensive such as public transportation or in a sector with large abatement potential such as the power sector than 15 dollars for the marginal ton in a sector with lower cost or lower abatement potential the reason distinct from learning spillovers is that reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires investment in long lived abatement capital such as clean power plants or public transport infrastructure the value of abatement investment comes from avoided emissions but also from the value of abatement capital in the future the optimal levelized cost of conserved carbon can thus be higher than the optimal carbon price it is higher in sectors with higher investment needs those where abatement capital is more expensive or sectors with larger abatement potential we compare our approach to the traditional abatement cost curve model and discuss implications for policy design

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

on the nature of competition with differentiated products there is an old debate going back to bertrand 1883 and edgeworth 1925 about the fragility of market equilibrium when competition arises among a few sellers it was hotelling s belief that price instability vanishes when products are differentiated hotelling 1929 recently attention was drawn to the fact that even if product differentiation can weaken the forces leading to price instability it cannot eliminate completely the possibility of price cycles d aspremont et al 1979 the purpose of this paper is to show that vertical and horizontal product differentiation do not operate in the same manner a stable market outcome including an endogenous product specification arises more frequently with the former than with the latter horizontal product differentiation is rooted in taste differences more precisely the potential customers have heterogeneous preferences about the proportion in which the attributes of the product should be combined a wide range of substitute products can then survive in the same market simply because each of them combines the various attributes of the product in a proportion suitable to a particular segment of customers between two products in the range the level of some attributes is augmented while that of others is lowered each variety has its own circle of customers exactly as the inhabitants located around a particular shop form its potential market none the less competitors can raid these privileged market shares by adequate price cuts by contrast vertical product differentiation refers to a class of products which cohabit simultaneously on a given market even though customers agree on a unanimous ranking between them between two products in the range the level of all attributes is augmented or lowered the survival of a low quality product then rests on the seller s ability to sell it at a reduced price compensating thereby for the higher a priori attractiveness of a more desirable quality the seller of a low quality product will specialise in the segment of customers whose propensity to spend on the corresponding range of products is low either because they have relatively lower income or relatively less intensive preferences than other customers at the same time the seller of a high quality product will enjoy an absolute advantage over his competitor 2 interestingly it turns out that price and product competition does not lead to the same results in these two situations regarding the stability of the market equilibrium to stress the differences we have chosen to concentrate on two

multi market competition r d and welfare in oligopoly we investigate a multi market cournot model with strategic process research and development r d investments wherein a multi market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets we show that entry can enhance the total r d expenditures of the multi market firm moreover the incumbent s profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases depending on the fixed entry costs and r d technologies both insufficient and excess entry can appear our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms

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mass media instrumental information and electoral accountability journalism is widely believed to be crucial for holding elected officials accountable at the same time economic theory has a hard time providing an instrumental explanation for the existence of accountability journalism according to the common downsian reasoning rational voters should not be willing to pay for information out of purely instrumental motives because the individual probabilities of casting the decisive vote are typically very low we show that this rationale does not apply when a group of voters shares a common goal such as accountability and information is delivered via mass media in contrast to the pessimistic downsian view rational voters can have a considerable willingness to pay for the provision of instrumental information in these scenarios our model thus reconciles the rational voter approach with the common perception of journalism as a watchdog that holds elected officials accountable

media and gridlock abstract i develop a model of the relation between the media environment and political obstructionism i show that when voters are less informed by media obstructionism becomes a more effective political signal for the minority party the model thus implies that media change can cause gridlock via signaling by contrast the previous literature on causes of gridlock focuses on polarization and other factors the model also makes several auxiliary predictions consistent with recent trends in u s politics

independent auditors bias and political agency abstract this paper analyzes political agency with endogenous information collection and revelation by third party auditors while increasing incentives for auditors to provide information straightforwardly improves political control a small amount of pro incumbent bias can also be useful for maintaining high levels of control when the equilibrium level of control is high most investigations uncover positive information about the incumbent since positive information increases reelection rates mildly pro incumbent auditors are willing to work harder than unbiased auditors in these equilibria for moderate levels of control pro incumbent auditors are again useful due to their extra effort even though they may suppress some negative information in equilibrium only when market incentives are low so equilibrium control is weak are unbiased or anti incumbent biased auditors better for voters than mildly pro incumbent auditors

cycles in nonrenewable resource prices with pollution and learning by doing we study how environmental regulation in the form of a cap on aggregate emissions from a fossil fuel e g coal interacts with the arrival of a clean substitute e g solar energy the cost of the substitute is assumed to decrease with cumulative use because of learning by doing we show that optimal energy prices may initially increase because of pollution regulation but fall due to learning and rise again because of scarcity of the resource finally falling after transition to the clean substitute thus nonrenewable resource prices may exhibit cyclical behavior even in a purely deterministic setting

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

optimal abatement technology adoption based upon learning by doing with spillover effect abstract we specify a general model of the dynamic abatement technology adoption process and show how the accumulated experience among them can alter the adoption timing learning by doing lbd effect is considered to describe the reduction of the costly price to the adoption moreover spillovers effect which reflects how accumulated experience can be shared among different technologies is integrated into the learning process to ensure the specification convincing some reasonable assumptions are considered such as one abatement technology must conduct its own experience in order to realize the spillover besides to investigate how the abatement process is influenced by the technology allocation under the spillovers effect an endogenous emission path is considered to necessitate a meaningful optimization problem finally apart from obtaining some basic properties of the model we implement an empirical study to verify the effectiveness of the model data from the iron industry in china is used to specify the process which can highlight the spillovers effect among different technologies from a sector angle in the results we find that intrinsic mechanism in the model results in the interplay among abatement coefficient spillover factor and the growing rate of the emission etc collaborative relationships between variables are discussed as well

competition and truth in the market for news in this essay we evaluate the case for competition in news markets from the perspective of economics first we consider the simple proposition that when more points of view are heard and defended beliefs will converge to the truth this concept of competition is several steps removed from market competition among actual media firms but it has played a prominent role in the legal arguments for a free press we then explore three mechanisms by which increasing competition or more precisely increasing the number of independently owned firms can limit bias or distortions that originate on the supply side of the media market first when governments attempt to manipulate news competition can increase the likelihood that the media remain independent second when news providers have an interest in manipulating consumers beliefs diversity in such incentives can reduce the risk of information being suppressed or distorted third competition may drive firms to invest in providing timely and accurate coverage overall we argue that there are robust reasons to expect competition to be effective in disciplining supply side bias next we ask how the effect of competition changes when distortions originate on the demand side of the market when consumers themselves demand biased or less socially relevant news we find that increased competition may or may not improve welfare in these cases though we caution against using this as a justification for concentrating media power in the hands of state controlled or regulated firms

voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information we analyze two candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters each voter has noisy private information about the state variable we show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity nevertheless elections fully aggregate information in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change if all private information were common knowledge equilibrium voting behavior is to a large extent determined by the electoral rule i e if a candidate is required to get at least x percent of the vote in order to win the election then in equilibrium this candidate gets very close to x percent of the vote with probability close to one finally if the distribution from which preferences are drawn is uncertain then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero

optimal policy and network effects for the deployment of zero emission vehicles abstract we analyze the impact of indirect network effects in the deployment of zero emission vehicles in a static partial equilibrium model in most theoretical analyses direct and indirect effects are conflated and relatively few authors have explicitly considered indirect network effects we also introduce the market power of vehicle producers and scale effects in the production function the model exhibits a multiplicity of local social critical points and market equilibria suggesting a possibility of lock in the optimal two subsidies for vehicles and stations are derived so that the pareto dominating market equilibrium would coincide with the social optimum configurations associated with different values of the parameters are explored to revisit the policy issues at various stages of deployment of hydrogen and battery electric vehicles

a nonparametric method to estimate a technical change effect on marginal abatement costs of u s coal power plants the literature usually assumes that technical change reduces marginal abatement cost however recent results suggest that precisely the opposite occurs this paper proposes a nonparametric method to determine the effect of technical change on marginal abatement cost the method decomposes nox marginal abatement cost changes in 2000 2004 and in 2004 2008 for 325 boilers operating in 134 u s bituminous coal power plant into technical and non technical change effects we find that technical change reduces the nox marginal cost about 28 3 in 2000 2004 and 26 5 in 2004 2008 however more stringent regulations enacted the nox budget program results in lower nox emission levels as plant operators install more advanced nox abatement equipment which in turn causes an overall increase in marginal abatement cost

equilibrium existence in the linear model of spatial competition this paper considers a generalization of the hotelling model of spatial competition it is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two stage location price game exists only under very stringent conditions these conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair when the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strategies if transport costs are not sufficiently convex the convexity of transport costs is crucial in determining whether there is excessive or insufficient diversity of products copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

citizen editors endogenous information acquisition and news accuracy abstract this paper provides a model of the market for news where profit maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens the analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias the bias in a media outlet s news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor in particular the results show that the expected accuracy of news reports is lower the more ideological an editor is nevertheless citizens find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences depending on the distribution of citizens ideological preferences a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in a monopolistic market moreover ideological editors are more likely to be present in the market for news i the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for news ii the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information

the balanced us press we measure the relative ideological positions of newspapers voters interest groups and political parties using data on ballot propositions we exploit the fact that newspapers parties and interest groups take positions on these propositions and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them we find that on average newspapers in the united states are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states that is they are balanced around the median voter still there is a significant amount of ideological heterogeneity across newspapers which is smaller than the one found for interest groups however when we group propositions by issue area we find a sizable amount of ideological imbalance broadly speaking newspapers are to the left of the state level median voter on many social issues and to the right on many economic issues to complete the picture we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions

time scarcity and the market for news abstract we develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance time constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets they choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits we show that even when readers or television viewers and firms are rational and unbiased they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer in particular relevant news items may be crowded out we then study how reader efficient standards can be restored and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media these include tabloidization and polarization of the news and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout

mass media and public policy abstract if more informed voters receive favorable policies then mass media should influence policy because it provides most of the information people use in voting this paper uses a simple model to analyze the effect of mass media provision of news on a number of policy issues redistribution the size of the government sector rents and corruption the effectiveness of lobby groups and political business cycles it is easy to deal with such a wide range of issues because existing models of political competition often include informed and uniformed voters modelling mass media simply endogenizes who is informed and who is not the paper also discusses empirical evidence and point to areas for future research

technical change and the marginal cost of abatement abstract we address one aspect of the treatment of technical change in the environmental economics literature how technical change impacts the marginal cost of abatement we review a selection of papers that employ a variety of representations of technical change and show that these representations have quite different and sometimes surprising effects on the marginal costs of pollution reductions we argue that these varied representations in fact correspond to a variety of different technology options we then present results indicating that this representation matters the impacts of technical change on the marginal cost of abatement can crucially impact policy analysis

optimal transition from coal to gas and renewable power under capacity constraints and adjustment costs this paper studies the optimal transition from existing coal power plants to gas and renewable power under a carbon budget it solves a model of polluting exhaustible resources with capacity constraints and adjustment costs to build coal gas and renewable power plants it finds that optimal investment in renewable energy may start before coal power has been phased out and even before investment in gas has started because doing so allows for smoothing investment over time and reduces adjustment costs gas plants may be used to reduce short term investment in renewable power and associated costs but must eventually be phased out to allow room for carbon free power one risk for myopic agents comparing gas and renewable investment is thus to overestimate the lifetime of gas plants e g when computing the levelized cost of electricity and be biased against renewable power these analytical results are quantified with numerical simulations of the european commission s 2050 energy roadmap

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

a spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition we characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news when there are two media outlets each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones but voter welfare is not always higher copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

knowledge is power a theory of information income and welfare spending no voters cast their votes based on perfect information but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others we develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters in us election survey data we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters as predicted by the model further in a panel of us states we fi nd that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information congress representatives vote more conservatively which is also in line with our theory

extremist platforms political consequences of profit seeking media we analyze how information about candidate quality affects the choice of electoral platforms made by an office motivated political challenger the incumbent is of known quality and located at the ideal policy of the voter the voter cares for both policy and the candidates quality and can learn about the challenger s quality by buying information a high quality challenger then has an incentive to signal her quality by choosing a policy that induces the voter to buy information we first study the benchmark case in which the information is supplied exogenously and its quality is independent of the challenger s platform this yields multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibrium platforms by contrast when the information is supplied by a profit maximizing media outlet its quality depends on the challenger s platform and we obtain a unique equilibrium platform in particular when the incumbent s quality is relatively low the media coverage rises and the challenger s platform diverges further from the voter s ideal policy as the voter s preference for quality increases

intertemporal links in cap and trade schemes in a two period general equilibrium model i study the effects of intertemporal emission permit trading in a cap and trade scheme when firms investments in abatement have long term effects to meet their caps firms optimally choose levels of trading and investment in each period by equalizing the marginal benefit of abatement to the marginal cost of abatement in each period the fact that investments have long term effects introduces new effects investments in period 1 have both an additional benefit the reduction of emissions in period 2 and an additional cost the decrease in abatement opportunities in period 2 this changes the standard condition of equalization of marginal costs across periods for cost effectiveness without intertemporal trading some investments in period 1 are entirely driven by second period abatement needs in that case allowing intertemporal trading may reduce investment in period 1 as some long term investments are substituted by intertemporal permit trading descriptive evidence from the eu emissions trading system ets illustrates this potential effect

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand abstract this paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york and salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity we find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small otherwise there is insufficient entry in the limiting case of unit elastic demand the market is monopolized we broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

on monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity workers rents also matter in the dixit stiglitz model of monopolistic competition entry of firms is socially too small other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity we sow that workers rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits which entices too many firms to enter we discuss the possibility of over provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled

allocation of pollution abatement under learning by doing abstract this paper examines how learning by doing affects the allocation of pollution abatement between heterogeneous technologies over time the optimal policy balances current abatement costs against reductions in future costs and infant technologies may be preferred to mature technologies despite greater initial costs we characterize when a technological winner might emerge and we identify conditions under which optimal abatement is shared across all technologies pigouvian taxes can implement the first best but may need to be differentiated across technologies when technical change is induced an important role of environmental policies is to put abatement on the right technological trajectories

political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias abstract we develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings and maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information that the partisan audience does not like hearing while voters are rational understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately important information is lost through bias and can lead to electoral mistakes we characterize those conditions that give rise to electoral mistakes showing that heightened political polarization and asymmetric distributions of voter ideologies make electoral mistakes more likely even if the median ideology is a centrist and centrist voters gain access to unbiased news media bias can generate excessive cross over voting which in turn can lead to the election of the wrong candidate

manipulated news model electoral competition and mass media abstract this paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media and self mediatization the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates in elections in the model a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two office motivated candidates the voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place while the media outlet suppresses some of this information because the voter s decision making could be incorrect direct distortion the candidates have an incentive to win the election by influencing the media coverage through policy settings indirect distortion as a result policy convergence to the voter s ideal policy occurs if and only if the media bias is sufficiently small we then characterize the set of equilibria in terms of the degree of distortion the results suggest that if either strategic media manipulation or competition among the candidates is omitted then the distortion is nonnegligibly misspecified

mass media and special interest groups abstract media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior it is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups however existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias we present a theoretical model that reconciles these results the model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group and media outlets reliance on subscription in addition to advertising revenues

government control of the media abstract we present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the government has a particular interest in mobilizing citizens to take actions that further some political objective but are not necessarily in citizens individual best interest however the distinction between state and private media is smaller large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media media bias in state and private media markets diverge as governments become more democratic whereas media bias in democracies and autocracies converge as positive externalities from mobilization increase

media as watchdogs the role of news media in electoral competition abstract we develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition when policy payoffs are state dependent party policies do not converge to the median voter s ideal policy if the media report only party policies news analysis about the state though possibly biased can discipline off equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies since voters are rational the party favored by the media need not win with a higher probability instead media bias may reduce the effectiveness of electoral competition and lead to more polarized policies

emission path planning based on dynamic abatement cost curve abstract global climate change is one of the most serious environmental problems that has attracted an unprecedented global attention the scientific community has recognized that human activity is mostly responsible for global climate warming therefore states participating in the united nations framework convention on climate change unfccc have initiated a series of negotiations on how to develop their own emission reduction targets however the realization of these targets is at the expense of economic development to a great extent therefore an abatement plan is necessary to decide how and when to implement emission reduction targets a marginal abatement cost curve macc often used as an important quantitative tool to estimate abatement burden or evaluate abatement performance should be considered carefully in this paper we enrich the traditional macc by introducing the concept of an immediate unit marginal abatement cost to describe its intrinsic incremental abatement difficulty this cost is proved to be agreed with the actual situation in many ways and is therefore very suitable for practical use two factor learning curve are considered in the model which can go some way in improving the performance of the revised macc using a parameterization method the original problem can be converted into a tractable nonlinear programming problem we use an algorithm to search for the approximate global optimal solution the effectiveness and the efficiency of the algorithm are discussed respectively in the results we find that the abatement path distinguishes largely under different abatement targets some plausible reasons and policy advices are given

emission regulation of markets with sluggish supply structures i examine regulation in the presence of convex investment costs and technology specific capacity stocks announcement of future emission taxes reduces current emissions unless fossil fuels are scarce in which case the effect is ambiguous substantial future emission reductions require action today because it takes time to build up clean production capacity and phase out dirty capacity the pigou tax must be coupled with sector specific investment taxes or subsidies to induce the socially optimal trajectory if the private discount rate differs from the social discount rate if such investment taxes or subsidies are unavailable a time inconsistent second best alternative may be to tax emissions above the pigouvian level during the transition phase the theory is complemented with a stylized numerical model of the us electricity market

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

product variety and welfare under tough and soft pricing regimes we re examine the economic justification for the regulation of firms price policies existing analysis of the relative benefits of alternative pricing policies by treating market structure as exogenous loses an important trade off price deregulation leading to for example discriminatory pricing on the one hand enhances competition between incumbents but on the other acts as a strong deterrent against entry we illustrate this trade off by analysing the familiar address model of product differentiation and show that product variety is determined by the degree of spatial contestability of the market the ability of entrants to make binding location commitments and by whether firms are free to price discriminate copyright 1996 by royal economic society

would rational voters acquire costly information abstract we analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them voters can acquire some costly information about the alternatives in agreement with downs s rational ignorance hypothesis individual investment in political information declines to zero as the number of voters increases however if the marginal cost of information is near zero for nearly irrelevant information there is a sequence of equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to correspond to the interests of the majority for arbitrarily large numbers of voters thus rationally ignorant voters are consistent with a well informed electorate

on the determinants of political polarization in this article we aim to identify the main determinants of political polarization using bayesian model averaging to overcome the problem of model uncertainty we find that the level of trust within a country and the degree of income inequality are the most robust determinants of political polarization

the market for news we investigate the market for news under two assumptions that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs we show that on the topics where readers share common beliefs one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media competition results in lower prices but common slanting toward reader biases on topics where reader beliefs diverge such as politically divisive issues however newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions yet in the aggregate a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective generally speaking reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se

minimal and maximal product differentiation in hotelling s duopoly abstract hotelling s 1929 model of duopolistic competition is re examined a family of utility functions is used which has as a special case hotelling s original utility function in a two stage location price game it is shown that an equilibrium exists when the curvature of the utility functions in the space of characteristics is sufficiently high the subgame perfect equilibrium never exhibits minimum product differentiation on the other hand not all equilibria are at maximal product differentiation

demand for slant how abstention shapes voters choice of news media political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into information cocoons and segregate along ideological lines we show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates cross over in news consumption voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist this non monotonicity in the demand for slant makes voters ideologies non recoverable from their choice of news media and generates disproportionate demand for media outlets that are centrist or only moderately biased it also implies that polarisation of the electorate may lead to an ideological moderation in news consumption

learning by doing and the costs of a backstop for energy transition and sustainability we assess the impact of being able to substitute an unlimited but costly energy substitute like wind solar for a non renewable resource like oil coal in a model of sustainable growth the prospects for sustainability on the optimal path depend crucially on the costs of this substitute furthermore the poorer a country measured in terms of capital stock at a given point in time the later it should switch to the renewable substitute and the more likely it will be unsustainable taking learning by doing in account we find that this leads to an earlier switching time but does not guarantee sustainability

ideological media bias abstract i develop a model of the market for news in which consumers and reporters both ideologically misinterpret information and have biased beliefs about the extent to which others misinterpret information i show that for some parameter values in equilibrium i a monopolist media outlet hires a politically moderate reporter but duopolist outlets use relatively extreme differentiated reporters ii in duopoly consumers think of their preferred outlet s news reporter as relatively unbiased and the other outlet s reporter as relatively biased iii consumers in the aggregate may be less informed in duopoly than monopoly despite more consumers receiving news in duopoly

information manipulation and climate agreements it appears that news media and some pro environmental organizations have the tendency to accentuate or even exaggerate the damage caused by climate change this article provides a rationale for this tendency by using a modified international environmental agreement iea model with asymmetric information we find that the information manipulation has an instrumental value as it ex post induces more countries to participate in an iea which will eventually enhance global welfare from the ex ante perspective however the impact that manipulating information has on the level of participation in an iea and on welfare is ambiguous

reporting for sale the market for news coverage this paper proposes a formal model of the market for political news under reasonable market conditions and when the audience has psychological biases it may be profitable for outlets to differentiate their coverage moreover the implications of the model speak to a deeper impact of political polarization of the electorate

price discrimination and equilibrium in monopolistic competition modern theories of monopolistic competition have borrowed extensively from techniques developed in location theory and the theory of spatial pricing the monopolistically competitive firm is assumed to choose a location and price for its product a subject that has been of increasing concern in this corpus of theory is that there exists no free entry price location equilibrium in this paper we demonstrate that free entry price location equilibrium exists provided only that producers are allowed to price discriminate among customers in a reasonable manner equilibrium is modelled as a two stage game using the selten concept of subgame perfect nash equilibrium it is shown that the equilibrium discriminatory price system is one initially identified by hoover in addition we show that equilibrium is not unique the precise nature of equilibrium in a particular market will be dependent upon the history of that market

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution abatement under learning by doing in 2013 beladi et al constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution and characterized a steady state equilibrium in this paper we extend beladi et al s model to an even more general model in which the pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are taken into account in our model the instantaneous abatement costs depend on both the rate of abatement and the experience of using a technology our objective is to apply optimal control theory to investigate the dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution abatement and derive the steady state equilibrium properties and optimal levels of emission permits and pollution treatment

social connectivity media bias and correlation neglect we propose a model of political persuasion in which a biased newspaper aims to convince voters to vote for the government each voter receives the newspaper s report as well as an independent private signal voters then exchange this information on social media and form posterior beliefs neglecting correlation among signals an increase in connectivity increases the newspaper s bias if voters are ex ante predisposed to vote against the government and reduces the bias if they are predisposed in favour of the government while more precise independent signals reduce the newspaper s optimal bias the bias remains positive even when connectivity becomes large thus even with a large number of social connections the election produces an inefficient outcome with positive probability implying a failure of the condorcet jury theorem

who owns the media the authors examine patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world they find that almost universally the largest media firms are controlled by the government or by private families government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media government ownership is generally associated with less press freedom fewer political and economic rights inferior governance and most conspicuously inferior social outcomes in education and health the adverse effects of government ownership on political and economic freedom are stronger for newspapers than for television the adverse effects of government ownership of the media do not appear to be restricted solely to instances of government monopoly the authors present a range of evidence on the adverse consequences of state ownership of the media state ownership of the media is often argued to be justified on behalf of the social needs of the disadvantaged but if their findings are correct increasing private ownership of the media through privatization or by encouraging the entry of privately owned media can advance a variety of political and economic goals especially those of meeting the social needs of the poor

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

are biased media bad for democracy this paper assesses the normative and positive claims regarding the consequences of biased media using a political agency framework with a strategic voter polarized politicians and news providers my model predicts that voters are always better informed with unbiased than biased outlets even when the latter have opposite ideological preferences however biased media may improve voter welfare contrary to several scholars fear partisan news providers are not always bad for democracy my theoretical findings also have important implications for empirical analyses of the electoral consequences of changes in the media environment left wing and right wing biased outlets have heterogeneous effects on electoral outcomes which need to be properly accounted for existing empirical studies are unlikely to measure the consequences of biased media as researchers never observe and can rarely approximate the adequate counterfactual elections with unbiased news outlets

downs meets d aspremont and company convergence versus differentiation in politics and the media abstract media firms have incentives to differentiate their news products to soften price competition when consumers value cognitive consistency between the news they read and the policies they support politicians are induced to propose more polarized policies to conform to a polarized media landscape a stronger commercial motive or a weaker preference for editorial neutrality in the media exacerbates this effect and causes party policies to become more extreme we find that prices for news products are higher when consumers have a demand for cognitive consistency despite the fact that maximal product differentiation does not hold for media firms

the self perpetuation of biased beliefs to overcome strong prior beliefs strong evidence to the contrary is needed if a person is predisposed to choosing a certain action the advice from an advisor who sets a low threshold for recommending the alternative action is not of much use the preference for like minded advisors who supply coarse information implies that the advice a person receives is likely to reinforce his existing priors this effect can lead to polarisation of opinion and the emergence of self serving beliefs the learning process is prolonged and the induced short run bias can become perpetual if information is costly

fox news and political knowledge abstract the effects of partisan media on political knowledge are theoretically ambiguous knowledge effects are important because of their close connection to welfare effects but the existing empirical literature on knowledge is limited we study the knowledge effects of the fox news channel following dellavigna and kaplan 2007 we exploit naturally random variation in fox s availability to identify causal effects we use knowledge survey data from 2000 2004 and 2008 our final sample has nearly one million question level observations we first confirm and expand on previous findings of fox effects on voting we then present an array of results from our knowledge analysis while average effects across issues over the full time frame are near zero and most precise we find evidence of positive effects both for issues that were more favorable to republicans and for issues that fox covered more often and negative effects for issues fox neglected we also present evidence of fox being associated with a decline in newspaper readership