an experimental investigation of the hahn noll revenue neutral auction for emissions licenses abstract this paper reports on three series of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of the hahn noll revenue neutral auction rna an alternative institution a no rebate uniform price auction upa is also examined as a benchmark in these experiments the rna markets were little different from upa markets in terms of either prices or market efficiencies the two institutions did differ in terms of the distribution of the gains from exchange and of the propensity of bidders to engage in a certain type of overbidding

bidding behavior in descending and ascending auctions this research examines how individual differences and institutional practices influence consumer bidding in auctions bidders may be motivated by different goals e g thrill of winning the item with minimal attention to what they pay for it versus prudence winning the item at a price at or below its perceived value also innate or auctioneer induced differences may exist in the precision and salience of bidder cognitions about the item s value we report two studies on how these motivational and cognitive factors influence bids in descending and ascending auctions respectively each study also manipulated a situational variable wait time at each price step the two auctions realized different average prices for the same item set average bids were higher in the descending versus ascending auction in several study conditions in both auction formats bidders primed with thrill versus prudence bid higher but more precise and or salient values attenuated this goal effect among other results in the descending auction longer wait times elicited higher bids from bidders primed with thrill but not prudence in the ascending auction longer wait times produced lower bids for bidders primed with prudence but not thrill these findings on consumer bidding behavior have practical implications for auction design

rebates matches and consumer behavior an experiment conducted to examine the effects of different discount formats on consumer purchases is reported participants made a series of purchase decisions for chocolate bars given 1 rebates from the listed price 2 matching quantities of chocolates for each bar purchased and 3 simple price reductions contrary to standard theoretical predictions and consistent with results in the context of charitable contributions by eckel and grossman 2003 we find that participants purchase significantly more chocolate bars under a matching sales format than under a comparable rebate format inattention to the net consequences of decisions as well as some rebate aversion explain the preference for matching discounts

news a decision oriented model for new product analysis and forecasting modeling efforts in the area of new product introductions have had a significant impact on marketing planning and strategy one result of these efforts bbdo s new product early warning system news has been used since the late 1960s to provide marketing managers with forecasts and diagnostic information regarding their new product strategies this article presents the specification of the news model its parameter estimation methods and its validation a brief case history is also included which illustrates how the model is applied in a typical new product situation news is designed to use a variety of readily obtainable input data to generate forecasts of consumer awareness trial repeat purchase usage sales and market share for a new brand these outputs combined with diagnostics from the model can then be incorporated into the marketing plan in a way that will improve the new entry s chances of success in the marketplace the model can be used to project early test market data news market

the disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value psychologists have long argued that people are much more averse to a loss than attracted to an equivalent gain this behavior termed loss aversion has been formalized by kahneman and tversky 1979 in their reformulation of expected utility theory prospect theory in prospect theory the utility function is replaced by a value function that evaluates changes in income from the current level increases in income are weighted by a relatively small marginal utility decreases in income are weighted by a much larger marginal utility in effect the value function implies that a kink in the relationship between utility and income occurs at the initial income or reference point and that the slope of the utility function for losses in income is steeper than it is for gains in a recent paper knetsch and sinden 1984 report a series of experiments that demonstrate the existence of a large disparity between willingness to accept wta and willingness to pay wtp measures of value they argue that the psychological theory of loss aversion explains this difference economic theory would suggest that individuals who exhibit a large disparity between wta and wtp are perhaps underperceiving the value of gains or overperceiving the value of losses are behaving in an irrational manner and will consequently achieve a lower level of well being than if they behaved in a true utility maximizing manner this would in contrast to loss aversion usually imply near equal values for wta and wtp see willig 1976 further documentation of a larger than expected disparity between wta and wtp has been obtained in surveys asking for the value of a variety of public goods for example cummings brookshire and schulze 1986 document six

defensive marketing strategies this paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response in particular we show that if products can be represented by their position in a multiattribute space consumers are heterogeneous and maximize utility and awareness advertising and distribution can be summarized by response functions then for the profit maximizing firm it is optimal to decrease awareness advertising it is optimal to decrease the distribution budget unless the new product can be kept out of the market a price increase may be optimal and even under the optimal strategy profits decrease as a result of the competitive new product furthermore if the consumer tastes are uniformly distributed across the spectrum a price decrease increases defensive profits it is optimal at the margin to improve product quality in the direction of the defending product s strength and it is optimal at the margin to reposition by advertising in the same direction in addition we provide practical procedures to estimate 1 the distribution of consumer tastes and 2 the position of the new product in perceptual space from sales data and knowledge of the percent of consumers who are aware of the new product and find it available competitive diagnostics such as the angle of attack are introduced to help the defending manager this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 4 pages 319 360 in 1983

reservation price as a range an incentive compatible measurement approach abstract drawing from the literature on buyers uncertainty in preference and product knowledge the authors suggest and empirically test the proposition that a consumer s reservation price for a product is more meaningfully and accurately represented as a range than as a single point given this conceptualization they propose an approach for incentive compatible elicitation of a consumer s reservation price range icerange that builds on becker degroot and marschak s 1964 point of purchase method two empirical applications of the approach provide an assessment of its practicality and its predictive performance relative to current methodologies for reservation price elicitation the results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms the benchmark approaches in terms of predictive validity and yields valuable incremental information about uncertainty in product valuation

willingness to pay versus expected consumption value in vickrey auctions for new experience goods over the past two decades vickrey auctions have been widely used to elicit willingness to pay for new food products this article shows that in a multiperiod context it can be optimal for consumers to bid higher than the expected consumption value for a new experience good to obtain information about how the new good fits into their preference set the degree of uncertainty about the consumption value the purchasing frequency and expected future market prices affect both the expected value of the quality information and the subgame perfect bidding strategy in vickrey auctions for new experience goods

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

the hubris of hybrids in the pages of this journal a fruitful debate has evolved on the ethical legitimacy of fractional reserve banking in this article we respond to the new arguments raised by evans j bus ethics 2014 as we clarify our bagus et al in j bus ethics 128 197 206 2015a position on the unethical and illegitimate nature of fractional reserve banking fractional reserve banking is not a recent financial innovation unlike e g money market mutual funds but represents a long standing legal aberration the co mingling of two mutually exclusive financial contracts deposit and loan confounds the contracting parties purposes intents rights and obligations as a result it creates unsolvable legal difficulties and ethical dilemmas while these problems are most evident in the case of a bank run they also arise when trying to answer the simple question of who owns a deposit

how does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate national and subnational government size abstract beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate government size national and subnational combined this paper makes the first attempt to examine how different fiscal decentralization measures affect the sizes of national and subnational state and local combined governments an econometric analysis using panel data from 32 industrial and developing countries 1980 1994 finds that 1 expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national governments larger subnational governments and larger aggregate governments 2 revenue decentralization increases subnational governments by less than it reduces national governments hence leads to smaller aggregate governments and 3 vertical imbalance tends to increase the sizes of subnational national and aggregate governments

experimental auction procedure impact on valuation of quality differentiated goods despite increased use of experimental auctions a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results this study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than english becker degroot marschak bdm and random nth price auctions especially in latter bidding rounds and that random nth price auction yields lower valuations than english and bdm auctions we find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations but the effect varies across auction mechanism

comparing open ended choice experiments and experimental auctions an application to golden rice we use two experimental valuation methods to estimate consumer demand for genetically modified golden rice the first is an open ended choice experiment oece where participants name the quantities of golden rice and conventional rice demanded at each of several price combinations one of which will be randomly chosen as binding this allows us to estimate market demand by aggregating demand across participants this estimate of market demand also allows us to estimate own price elasticity and consumer surplus for golden rice comparing willingness to pay wtp estimates from the oece with those from a uniform price auction we find that oece wtp estimates exhibit less affiliation across rounds and the effects of positive and negative information under the oece are more consistent with prior expectations and existing studies we also find that while auction wtp estimates more than double across five rounds oece wtp estimates are stable across rounds and are always roughly equal to those from the final auction round

valuing an eu animal welfare label using experimental auctions the aim of this article is to determine consumers valuation for an eu animal welfare eu caw label for products providing higher animal welfare standards than the current legal requirements using revealed preference data from random nth price auction mechanism and two auction procedures our results generally suggest that consumers are willing to pay a premium for an eu animal welfare eu caw label for cured ham this finding is consistent in both the endowment and full bidding auction approaches we employed in our experiments conducted in spain the average premium that consumers are willing to pay for a cured ham with the eu caw label ranges between 19 and 23 of the average price of the regular cured ham that is currently available in supermarkets

measuring consumers willingness to pay at the point of purchase abstract economists psychologists and marketing researchers rely on measures of consumers willingness to pay wtp in estimating demand for private and public goods and in designing optimal price schedules existing market research techniques for measuring wtp differ in whether they provide an incentive to consumers to reveal their true wtp and in whether they simulate actual point of purchase contexts the authors present an empirical comparison of several procedures for eliciting wtp that are applicable directly at the point of purchase in particular the authors test the applicability of becker degroot and marschak s 1964 well known incentive compatible procedure for assessing the utility of lotteries to measuring consumers wtp in three studies the authors explore the reliability validity and feasibility of the procedure and show that it yields lower wtp estimates than do non incentive compatible methods such as open ended and double bounded contingent valuation they show experimentally t

willingness to pay and willingness to accept how much can they differ comment i agree with the point made by edoh y amiran and daniel a hagen 2003 that there can be a substantial or even infinite divergence between the wta and wtp for a public good even where there is a nonzero elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good provided that the indifference curves are asymptotically bounded with respect to market goods in the manner they describe this is an important point they are also correct to point out that the elasticity of substitution is a local concept whereas their asymptotic boundedness condition applies also for discrete changes my 1991 paper used a local analysis because it was following the structure of the analysis in robert d willig 1976 and alan randall and john r stoll 1980 i wanted to show that while randall and stoll appeared to extend willig s local result on wta versus wtp from price changes to changes in the quantity of a public good the relevant elasticity was in fact different and involved the substitution elasticity as well as the income elasticity i view these points by amiran and hagen as not two separate results but essentially the same result their asymptotic boundedness condition generalizes my zero elasticity of substitution condition to discrete changes the asymptotic boundedness condition can be expressed as follows assuming a bivariate utility function u x q and given a reference point x q associated with a reference utility level u u x q there exists some q q such that for all q q there exists no x such that u x q u in other words no amount of x can substitute for the reduction in public good from q to q q in the case of a zero elasticity of substitution q q but as amiran and hagen show in their theorem 1 this is unnecessarily restrictive when dealing with a discrete reduction in q furthermore their theorem 2 can be viewed as a special case of their theorem 1 in which q 0 which makes q an essential commodity it is well known in consumer theory that the wta to avoid the loss of an essential market good is infinite their theorem 2 extends this result to the case of an essential nonmarket good but as their theorem 1 shows essentialness is not necessary for an infinite wta the boundedness condition is the key and this implies a fundamental lack of substitutability between money market goods and the public good

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

benefit evaluation of the country of origin labeling in taiwan results from an auction experiment this research is aimed at investigating the consumer s preference for food produced in taiwan and the economic benefits for the country of origin labeling cool the study used vickrey second price sealed bid auction to elicit the consumer s willingness to pay wtp for products under cool the study compared the bid functions estimated with tobit model and the premium functions estimated with ordinary least squares ols due to price affiliation it is more reliable to use the estimated premium functions the estimated premiums are 67 5 84 7 and 99 for taiwan products over their alternatives of china olives china oolong tea and vietnam oolong tea respectively the study concludes that enacting and rigorously enforcing a cool law would increase economic benefits to consumers in taiwan and at the same time placing the imported products in the leveled playing field

using laboratory experimental auctions in marketing research a case study of new packaging for fresh beef this paper illustrates the use of laboratory experimental auctions in a pretest market research program for new products we review the experimental auctions literature discuss the range of auction mechanisms available and present the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular mechanism for a laboratory pretest market we then present a step by step example of how a theoretically incentive compatible auction mechanism fifth price sealed bid was used in a laboratory pretest market for vacuum packaged beef based on the illustration we discuss the potential for using laboratory experimental auctions in pretest market research we present the limitations that may be encountered in such applications and outline research aimed at improving the behavioral properties of the technique

the effect of marketing messages and payment over time on willingness to pay for fuel efficient cookstoves abstract smoke from inefficient biomass cookstoves contributes to global climate change and kills approximately four million people per year cooking technologies such as manufactured fuel efficient cookstoves that mitigate the negative effects of traditional cookstoves exist but adoption rates are low the international development community debates whether this low adoption of fuel efficient cookstoves is due to a lack of adequate product information or due to household financial constraints we ran vickery second price auctions in rural uganda to elicit willingness to pay for fuel efficient cookstoves comparing the effect of informational marketing messages and time payments on willingness to pay a randomized trial tested the following marketing messages this stove can improve health this stove can save time and money and both messages combined none of the messages consistently increased willingness to pay in a second experiment we compared willingness to pay for two different contracts one with payment due within a week and one with equal installment payments over 4 weeks consistent with household financial constraints time payments raised willingness to pay by 40

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

bid sensitivity and the structure of the vickrey auction a research study explored a version of economist w vickrey s second price sealed bid auction used for the valuation of nonmarket goods the sensitivity of revealed values generated by this variation were examined a standard second price auction with repeated market trials was compared to a random nth price auction and a combinatorial private collection auction with sequentially revealed values results showed the consistency of revealed values in a low probability risk scenario