strengthening agricultural and natural resource policy through intrahousehold analysis an introduction in this paper we argue that understanding both the patterns and processes of intrahousehold resource allocation is important for the success of agricultural and natural resource policy the paper focuses specifically on policies and projects that address income generation of the rural poor the mitigation of seasonal fluctuations in consumption and sustainable natural resource management that is to insure income earned today does not compromise future income streams

do two earner households base their choice of residential location on both incomes this article focuses on the role of individual incomes in the residential location decisions of two earner households conventional studies often treat households as a black box and describe them by a single utility function the article raises the question is the household utility paradigm an adequate framework for understanding the location decisions of two earner households it tests an implication of the household utility paradigm the income pooling hypothesis for location decisions the results provide evidence for rejecting the hypothesis among childless families but fail to provide evidence for rejecting it when children are present the results raise the need to address intrahousehold dynamics in modelling location decisions

economics and the family match or mismatch a review of beckers a treatise on the family the author reviews and evaluates beckers a treatise on the family which concerns a the allocation of roles and resources and distribution of income within families b the formation dissolution growth and structure of families and c the implications of these analyses for inequality and social mobility in the present paper beckers approach and substantive conclusions regarding the role of theory and empirical evidence in the study of economics and the family are critically examined it is suggested that while beckers discussion is a source of many useful insights the theory does not attempt a systematic treatment of the transition from traditional to modern types of family excerpt

collective labor supply a single equation model and some evidence from french data in chiappori s 1988 collective model of labor supply hours of work are supposed flexible in many countries however male labor supply does not vary much in that case the husband s labor supply is no longer informative about the household decision process and individual preferences to identify structural components of the model additional information is needed we thus consider an approach in which the wife s labor supply is expressed as a function of the household demand for one specific good we demonstrate that the main properties of chiappori s initial model are preserved and apply our results on french data

self enforcing exchange among generations implications for consumption and mobility abstract a three generation olg model with one directional altruism and two directional intra family transfers is presented adults invest in their children s education and make transfers to their elderly parents however due to lack of altruism adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children s education this allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility i consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family ii consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations and iii the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution

collective labour supply taxes and intrahousehold allocation an empirical approach most empirical studies of the impact of labor income taxation on the labor supply behavior of households use a unitary modeling approach in this article we empirically analyze income taxation and

child labor and the labor supply of other household members evidence from 1920 america this paper analyses the effect of child labor on household labor supply using 1920 us census micro data the aim of the analysis is to understand who in the household benefits from child labor in order to identify a source of exogenous variation in child labor i use state specific child labor laws i find that a rise in the proportion of working children by household is associated with no variation in parents labor supply i also find a strong negative externality among children as the proportion of working children by household rises everything else equal the probability that each child works falls while the probability that he attends school rises this suggests that parents redistribute entirely the returns from child labor to the children in the household consistent with a model of household labor supply with fully altruistic parents

control and ownership of assets within rural ethiopian households this article investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce and on control over assets during marriage using detailed household data from rural ethiopia we show that assets brought to marriage ownership of assets control within marriage and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related productive resources are controlled by the household head disposition upon death or divorce only loosely depends on individual ownership during marriage but control is associated with larger claims upon divorce assets brought into marriage have little impact on disposition upon death but matter in case of divorce

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

nonparametric estimation of the impact of taxes on female labor supply this paper proposes a simple extension of nonparametric estimation methods for nonlinear budget set models derived in blomquist and newey 2002 to censored dependent variables the nonparametric method is applied to estimate female labor supply elasticities using data on married women from the 1985 and 1989 waves of the panel study of income dynamics exploiting the substantial variation in budget sets caused by the tax reform act of 1986 as a source of identification the estimated wage elasticities from this new method are 0 56 overall and 0 27 on the intensive margin the income elasticity estimates are close to 0 67 overall and 0 13 on the intensive margin compared with the linear labor supply model the estimated elasticities are usually larger for the nonparametric specifications that account for nonlinear budget sets copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

welfare analysis of tax reforms using household data abstract this paper discusses a methodology for calculating the distribution of gains and losses from a policy change using data for a large sample of households estimates are based on the equivalent income function which is money metric utility defined over observable variables this enables calculations to be standardised and a computer program to compute the statistics presented in the paper is available for a general demand system equivalent income is related to measures of deadweight loss and standard errors are computed for each of the welfare measures an application to u k data for 5 895 households is given which simulates a reform that involves eliminating housing subsidies

time allocation within the family welfare implications of life in a couple a collective model of leisure demand generalised to the production of a household public good is estimated on the british household panel survey the sharing rule is identified by using an original parametric framework based on the change of family status from single living to couple or from couple to single living womens ratios of private household expenditures are 40 on average the level of intra household inequality appears highly dependent on the intra household wage gap omitting household production in the model would overestimate the ratio by 7 percentage points on average

the influence of household composition on household expenditure patterns theory and spanish evidence a concept of demographic separability is proposed that formalizes the notion that there are groups of goods adult goods that have little or no relationship to specific classes of household demographics the numbers or ages of children that there exist adult goods demographically separable from children is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the validity of rothbarth s method for measuring child costs we propose two different methods for testing demographic separability and present results from a 1981 survey of spain the econometric evidence is in fair agreement with the theoretical presuppositions

endogenous gender power household labor supply and the demographic transition abstract we present a microeconomic model of the household in which there exists no difference in spousal preferences but childrearing is more time costly for women bargaining between the wife and the husband forms the basis of household decisions marital bargaining power is determined according to the incomes of the spouses which in turn help to determine their reservation utility levels outside the marriage the endogeneity of bargaining power introduces a non cooperative element to the couples decision making problem because both the husbands and the wives take into account how their pre marital education decisions affect their marital power and the share they extract from household resources in the future the model predicts that wives invest more than is pareto efficient in their education in order to increase their bargaining power in marriage as a consequence couples have fewer children and consume more when exogenous structural changes lead women to invest more in education a corollary of the model is that empowering women directly through social reforms such as a lower gender wage gap leads to lower fertility and higher spousal consumption and leisure

pareto improving social security reform when financial markets are incomplete this paper studies an overlapping generations model with stochastic production and incomplete markets to assess whether the introduction of an unfunded social security system leads to a pareto improvement when returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated a system that endows retired households with claims to labor income enhances the sharing of aggregate risk between generations our quantitative analysis shows that abstracting from the capital crowding out effect the introduction of social security represents a pareto improving reform even when the economy is dynamically efficient however the severity of the crowding out effect in general equilibrium tends to overturn these gains

household bargaining and the design of couples income taxation this paper studies the design of couples income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses utilities bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple information structure and labor supply decisions follow the mirrleesian tradition however while the household s total consumption is publicly observable the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable with a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses marginal income tax rate includes a pigouvian paternalistic and an incentive term the pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy tax for the high weight low weight spouse whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low high the sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples in some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low weight spouse who may be female and a negative one for the high weight spouse possibly the male this is at odds with the traditional boskin and sheshinski results our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions finally we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model the calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower and possibly even negative marginal tax rate

opening the black box of intra household decision making theory and non parametric empirical tests of general collective consumption models we provide revealed preference tests of general collective consumption models that account for public consumption and externalities within the household we further propose a novel approach to model special cases of this model which imply alternative assumptions regarding the sharing rule our application uses the panel data from the russia longitudinal monitoring survey we find that the general model together with a large class of special cases cannot be rejected by contrast we do reject the standard unitary model since our tests are entirely nonparametric this provides strong evidence in favor of models focusing on intrahousehold decision making

intergenerational household formation female labor supply and informal caregiving a bargaining approach children s provision of in kind services to their elderly parents informal caregiving represents an important form of economic transfers to the elderly in this paper we develop and estimate a joint model of informal caregiving and labor force participation decisions of adult daughters who have a frail elderly parent in a broader framework of intergenerational household formation parent and daughter agree to a nash bargaining rule as the solution to the household formation and intrahousehold decision making process however rather than severed relationships the threat point is given by a noncooperative equilibrium defined in terms of voluntary contributions toward a public good the parental well being maximum likelihood parameter estimates derived from the simultaneous multiequation endogenous switching model are generally consistent with expectations our results indicate that competing demands on daughters time reduce both coresidence and informal caregiving we also find that intergenerational coresidence is an important mode of assistance to elderly persons a simulation based on the estimated parameters suggests that public programs designed to meet the long term care needs of elderly persons by subsidizing formal home care services may have substantial effects on intergenerational living and care arrangement decisions

economic decision making by cohabitors findings regarding income pooling cohabitation rates are increasing in the us but little is known about how cohabitors make economic decisions for instance do female cohabitors treat their male partner s income as shared household income when choosing hours worked does income sharing differ among types of cohabitors this study investigates whether or not cohabitors pool income by drawing inferences from a generalized model of labour supply the empirical work uses data from the 1993 current population survey and the 1987 national survey of families and households these data sets provide evidence that cohabitors taken as a group do not pool all income however there is also evidence that cohabitors are not homogeneous in their behaviour income pooling is not rejected for cohabitors in longer term relationships and for those who have a biological child together

child labor school attendance and intrahousehold gender bias in brazil an extensive survey data set of brazilian households is used to test whether intrahousehold gender bias affects the decisions of mothers and fathers to send their sons and daughters to work and to school an intrahousehold allocation model is examined in which fathers and mothers may affect the education investment and the child labor participation of their sons and daughters differently because of differences in parental preferences or differences in how additional schooling affects son s and daughter s acquisition of human capital brazilian household survey data for 1998 are used to estimate the impact of each parent s education on the labor market participation and school attendance of their sons and daughters for labor market participation the father s education has a greater negative impact than the mother s education on the labor status of sons the father s education also has a greater impact on son s labor status than on daughter s for schooling decisions the mother s education has a greater positive impact than the father s education on daughter s school attendance but fathers have a greater positive impact on sons school attendance than on daughter s

domestic violence and divorce law when divorce threats become credible the cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage this study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence results suggest a 30 decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible cheaper option

identification of random resource shares in collective households without preference similarity restrictions abstractresource shares defined as the fraction of total household spending going to each person in a household are important for assessing individual material well being inequality and poverty

the saving behaviour of a two person household the facts that wives are typically younger than their husbands and that women typically live longer than men imply that wives may have more incentive to save for old age than do husbands a theoretical model of the determination of household saving and portfolio choice is introduced which takes into account differences in preferences for saving the most important result is that the level and the composition portfolio of saving and the time path of consumption are dependent on the distribution of income within the household women typically live longer than men and wives are typically younger than their husbands these two facts imply that preferences about saving for old age in married households with forward looking members may differ between husband and wife this paper presents a theoretical analysis of saving and portfolio behaviour if the members of the household have differ ent preferences over future consumption as compared to current consump tion the analysis stands in contrast to unitary models of household intertemporal allocation which assume that the household has a single utility function thus this paper is a contribution in a novel context to the burgeoning literature on intra household decision making the base case analysis is for a simple two person husband and wife1 two period model in which there is only one asset saving it is assumed that because of the two facts given at the start of the introductory paragraph the husband discounts the future more than the wife in section ii the implications of a non cooperative decision making process for the base case are derived see ulph 1988 for a non cooperative model of demand and

estimating utility consistent labour supply functions some results on pooled budget data abstract demand systems aids les are augmented to include labour supply and then estimated on pooled u k budget data allowing for time series and cross section variation in wages the results point to the danger of constraining the labour supply curve a priori by use of restrictive utility systems in addition hypothesis relating to effects of price wage movements on composition of full income are tested

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

welfare and family stability do benefits affect when children leave the nest the welfare system has long been criticized for its incentives against marriage this paper examines one way in which welfare actually may keep families together the fact that benefits increase with family size may encourage teenagers to stay in welfare recipient households welfare benefit incentives affecting coresidence are twofold 1 a parent loses benefits if a child leaves the household and 2 a child may receive additional benefits if s he leaves the parental household at a theoretical level these incentives are shown to have an ambiguous effect on the coresidence decision empirically ifind that children are more likely to leave their parents the smaller the benefit loss that the parent suffers this result illustrates a potential side effect of welfare time limits which effectively make children less valuable to welfare parents who reach the time limit when children no longer increase the benefits available to lowincome parents more children may leave the parental household before age 18 welfare s effects on living arrangements are estimated to be considerably stronger than most previously estimated effects on childbearing or female headship

an empirical model of collective household labour supply with non participation i present a structural empirical model of collective household labour supply that includes the non participation decision i specify a simultaneous model for hours participation and wages of husband and wife i discuss the problems of identification and statistical coherency that arise in the application of the collective household labour supply model the model includes random effects and it is estimated using a panel data set of dutch couples the estimates allow me to check the underlying regularity conditions on individual preferences and to obtain estimates of the sharing rule that governs the division of household income between husband and wife

the impact of conditional cash transfers on marriage and divorce abstracta growing number of less developed countries have introduced conditional cash transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women economic models of the family suggest that these transfer programs may lead to marital turnover among program beneficiaries data from the experimental evaluation of the progresa program in mexico is used to provide new evidence on the short run impacts of targeted transfers on couples union dissolution and individuals new union formation decisions we find that although the overall share of women in union does not change as a result of the program marital turnover increases intact families eligible for the transfers experienced a modest 0 32 percentage points increase in separation rates with most of the effect concentrated among young and relatively educated women households in contrast young single women with low educational attainment levels experienced a substantial increase in new union formation rates the marital transition patterns are consistent

extended families and child well being studies of household behavior have established the distribution of resources among household members predicts spending and savings patterns however there is a paucity of evidence on the relationship between the well being of individual family members and the distribution of resources within an extended family including non co resident family members given the central role the family plays in many models of economic behavior this is an important gap in the literature using rich longitudinal survey data from the indonesia family life survey ifls evidence is presented on the relationship between three measures of health and education related human capital of children and the distribution of resources among extended family members ifls is ideally suited for this research since the survey collects detailed information about income and wealth from both coresident and non co resident family members the empirical model is founded on a natural extension of the collective model of household decision making chiappori 1988 1992 to the extended family the model is particularly appealing in this context because it places few restrictions on preferences of individual family members and does not specify a specific bargaining mechanism that underlies negotiations the collective model yields empirical tests of whether the behavior of family members is pareto efficient a special case of the model allows all family members to be completely altruistic which is observationally equivalent to a unitary model of family behavior that special case is rejected by the data however the restrictions of the efficient model are not rejected indicating that non co resident family members are able to co ordinate allocation decisions with respect to child human capital investments in such a way as to make no family member better off without another member being worse off

intra household resource allocation and familial ties abstract in this paper we investigate the link between intra household resource allocation and familial ties between household members we show that within the same geographic economic and social environments households where members have stronger familial ties nuclear family households achieve near pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with weaker familial ties extended family households do not we propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns

implications of spillover effects within the family for medical cost effectiveness analysis medical cost effectiveness analyses traditionally treat patients as isolated individuals and neglect the effects of improvement in patients health on the welfare of their family members we use a model based on a family utility function with altruistic linkages to show that there can be direct and indirect effects on the welfare of all family members we focus specially on a model of how the spillover effects to the spouse in a two person family might affect choice of treatments for prostate cancer we then test the predictions of this model by analyzing treatment choices of prostate cancer patients using the linked seer medicare database we find that our results are consistent with the model s predictions we conclude that cost effectiveness analyses may better reflect the full costs and benefits of medical interventions if they incorporate these family effects however concerns about equity present a dilemma for the practice of cea from the societal perspective

a cournot nash model of family decision making this paper models a two person family each family member is utility maximising yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family the two family members interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non cooperative or cournot nash game theoretic framework the cournot nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game the paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands a full analysis of the determinants of intra household resource allocation including the effect of varying household bargaining power and consideration of policy implications

the marriage market labor supply and education choice we develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education marriage labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context individuals start by choosing their investments in education anti

putting the puzzle together why people join public interest groups why people join organizations especially public interest groups has been an unsolved puzzle in this analysis choice based probability methods are employed to combine data from the 1980 national election study with comparable information about common cause members and to estimate models of the participation calculus that put the pieces of the puzzle together the results demonstrate the primary importance of political interest and policy preferences for the membership choice citizens who are politically interested and have preferences that roughly match an organization s reputation find that associational membership has both greater benefits and lower costs for them than it does for others variations in the costs of communication to the degree that they can be measured are unimportant for the joining decision an ability to pay is also irrelevant regardless of educational attainment and despite members high incomes organizational leaders deliberately keep the costs of membership low relative to most citizens ability to pay this encourages potential contributors to join in order to learn about the organization

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

inefficiency of male and female labor supply in agricultural households evidence from uganda this article analyzes the efficiency of the intra household allocation of female and male labor inputs in agricultural production in a collective household model spouses optimal on farm labor supply is such that the marginal rate of technical substitution between male and female labor is equated over different crops using the uganda national household survey 2005 06 we test whether this condition holds by estimating production functions and controlling for endogeneity using a method proposed by gandhi navarro and rivers 2009 we find that women are less productive than men that there is more female labor input on low productivity parcels and that men are relatively more productive on female controlled plots compared with male controlled plots total farm output could be higher and pareto improvements could be possible if male labor was reallocated to female controlled plots and or female labor was reallocated to male controlled plots

demographic variables in demand analysis in this paper the authors discuss five procedures for incorporating demographic variables into theoretically plausible demand systems translating scaling and the gorman reverse gorman and implicit prais houthakker procedures these five procedures are used to incorporate a single demographic variable the number of children in a household into the generalized ces demand system using household budget data for the united kingdom for the period 1966 1972 excerpt

how serious is the neglect of intrahousehold inequality in this report the authors develop a framework for assessing the consequences of ignoring intrahousehold inequality in the measurement and analysis of poverty and inequality they apply this framework to data for the philippines and conclude that 1 the result of neglecting intrahousehold inequality will probably be considerable understatement of the levels of poverty and inequality with the philippine data measured levels of inequality and poverty were off 30 percent as a result of ignoring intrahousehold variation and 2 patterns of inequality revealed by household level data are somewhat different from patterns revealed by individual level data but the differences seem not to be dramatic to confirm these results the exercise should be repeated with data from other countries

college choice as a collective decision although the choice between colleges can be thought of as being made collectively by a family models of educational choice almost universally portray the decision as made by the student alone using a novel experimental method for identifying collective decision functions i find that students have more influence than parents over the decision but not exclusive control students care more than parents about classroom experience and future earnings ignoring the dual agent nature of the decision can weaken predictions and lead to poorly targeted policy designs jel i21 j24 d13

structural models of family labor supply a discrete choice approach a static neoclassical structural model is presented explaining labor supply of both spouses in two adult households in the netherlands family preferences are described with a direct translog utility function with the husbands leisure the wifes leisure and family income as its arguments we assume that the choice set of each family is finite account is taken of the dutch tax and benefits system we allow for hours restrictions and random preferences and account for unobserved wages of nonworkers the models are estimated using smooth simulated maximum likelihood results based upon dutch cross section data from 1987 are illustrated by confidence intervals for elasticities and by several policy simulations excerpt

too poor to be green consumers a field experiment on revealed preferences for firewood in rural guatemala the paper reports on a field experiment that investigates whether households in guatemala are willing to surrender a small material gain in order to buy legal rather than illegal firewood given the ineffectiveness of command and control policies to curb the problem of illegal logging in guatemala the experiment assesses the potential viability of market oriented solutions local consumers in developing countries are generally believed to be too poor to pay a premium for green ethical products therefore little information has been gathered on willingness to pay wtp for such products and its determinants in non affluent consumer markets while our experiment on firewood consumption in central guatemala only implies a weak and indirect test of wtp for green products the results indicate that it is premature if not unwarranted to assume that the poor are not ready to make pro ethical choices in the marketplace moreover we find that information on the legal procedures for firewood extraction significantly affects consumer choice between legal and illegal firewood

religion and the demand for membership in environmental citizen groups i test the hypothesis that religious affiliation is an empirical measure of tastes and beliefs that affect the demand for membership in environmental citizen groups the number of adherents to judeo christian denominations per household has a significant negative effect on state membership rates for nine groups advocating a preservationist approach to environmental policy particularly in states with many catholics baptists and mormons religious affiliation has a marginally significant positive effect on membership rates for two sportsmen groups advocating private stewardship these results suggest that religious affiliation should also be a significant determinant of constituent preferences for environmental policies

changing the rules midway the impact of granting alimony rights on existing and newly formed partnerships this article analyses the effect of a reform granting alimony rights to cohabiting couples in canada a collective household model with a matching framework predicts that changes in alimony laws would affect existing couples and couples to be differently for existing couples it benefits the intended beneficiary but for couples not yet formed it generates offsetting intra household transfers and lower intra marital allocations for the beneficiary our empirical analyses confirm these predictions among couples united before the reform obtaining the right to petition for alimony led women to lower their labour force participation but not among newly formed cohabiting couples

social security and old age unemployment risk with efficient wage bargaining i analyze a life cycle economy with old age productivity risk where wages employment and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse unions and risk neutral firms allocations with limited union membership are second best inefficient as they generate too little labor supply in young age too much consumption before retirement too little employment of older workers early retirement and too little insurance against old age unemployment providing public transfers to early retirees disability benefits or early pensions might help to increase the degree of risk sharing at the cost of lower old age employment depending on whether absolute risk aversion is increasing or decreasing in consumption these policies might or might not produce efficiency gains at equilibrium

sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models we propose a method to identify bounds i e set identi cation on the shar ing rule for a general collective household consumption model unlike the eects of distribution factors it is well known that the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identi ed without strong assumptions on preferences across households of dierent compositions our new results show that though not point identi ed without these assumptions narrow bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained we get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the collective model to the household s continuous aggregate demand functions we obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about whether each good is public private or assignable within the household though having such infor mation tightens the bounds we apply our method to us 1999 2009 psid data this application obtains tight sharing rule bounds that yield useful conclusions regarding the eects of income and wages on intrahousehold resource sharing and on the prevalence of individual as opposed to household level poverty

spending time and money within the household we consider both theoretically and empirically the allocation of time and money within the household the research question is whether a married person who enjoys more leisure than their partner also receives more consumption which seems to indicate the outcome of power within the household or receives less consumption which seems to indicate differing intrahousehold preferences we develop a simple parametric structural model with household production that is tested on survey data we find that relative wages have an impact on power for leisure this effect is dominated by a conventional wage effect in which the partner who has the higher wage takes less leisure

children s resources in collective households identification estimation and an application to child poverty in malawi children s resources matter but they are hard to identify because consumption is typically mea sured at the household level modern collective household models permit some identication of indi vidual household member resources but these models typically either ignore children or treat them as attributes of adults we propose a collective household model in which children are people with their own utility functions possibly assigned to them by parents extending the frameworks of browning chiappori and lewbel 2007 and lewbel and pendakur 2008 we show identication of children s resource shares within households we invoke semiparametric restrictions on individual preferences and use data on the household level consumption of assignable private goods to achieve identication of each individual s resource share within the household we show this without being able to observe consumption by individual household members of goods that are partly or wholly shared goods within the household further we obtain identication using only engel curves and so do not require ob served price variation in the data we estimate our model using data from malawi andnd that as the number of children in a household grows women s resource shares fall and children s resource shares rise and men s resource shares are basically unchanged we alsond evidence of gender bias against girls and observe that the resource shares of mothers and children are increasing in the education level of the mother finally we use our estimates to construct poverty indices at the person level andnd that per capita poverty indices understate the incidence of child poverty in malawi

voting and imitative behavior political behavior generates private benefits by helping people fit in with desired friends a voter imitates other voters but at the same time they imitate him an equilibrium solution requires exogenous variables the narrow self interest of the participants the reduced form makes one s vote a function of the narrow self interest of others as well as one s own in accord with the model a person s party identification depends on his ethnic group s current income and its income in 1909 as well as his own income i introduction what determines how people vote most economists such as peltzman 1980 have emphasized self interested motivations but kau and rubin 1982 and kalt and zupan 1984 claim that ideology based in part on altruism influences voting patterns both hypotheses have the same fundamental flaw they focus on the consequences of the policies for which people vote in the peltzman model a person votes for those policies which maximize his real income i call this narrow self interest in the standard altruism models of economists a person maximizes some weighted average of the real income of himself and others 1 however an individual s vote has a minuscule impact on the outcome of any election therefore his vote for a policy yields extremely small expected returns through the impact of that policy on the voter other returns from voting will dominate in determining behavior if such returns exist some economists for example brennan and buchanan 1984 have recognized this problem with the standard or economic view no one however has developed an alternative theory based on other returns to voting the key point of this paper is that political behavior can generate private benefits by helping people fit in with desired friends and associates a herd effect to give this phenomenon a name political positions are thus chosen not because they produce the desired outcomes for voters but rather because voters want to associate with certain people who have certain positions that is people imitate others in choosing political positions the idea for imitation in political positions is hardly new berelson et al 1954 provide a prima facie case for imitation in voting behavior they found that a person s political position was closely related to the political positions of his coworkers and friends of course these results could be attributable to the fact that these groups share common characteristics but the berelson data also show that people change their political position toward that of their associates a phenomenon more difficult to explain by the common characteristic hypothesis imitation is uninteresting as a predictor of behavior by itself however a voter imitates other voters but at the same time they imitate him an equilibrium solution requires exogenous variables i assume these to be the narrow self interest of the participants the resulting model differs from a simple narrow self interest model in the reduced form one s political decision is a function of the narrow self interest of others as well as one s own narrow self interest imitation along with the self interest of the participants leads both to additional tests of imitation and makes the imitation model of interest in understanding political behavior imitation could be an attempt to please others who have a primitive preference for friends who imitate themselves alternatively imitation could signal an offer of friendship by the imitator without invoking preferences for friends who imitate such signalling could therefore explain why people care whether somebody imitates their political behavior or not imitation could also arise from another process people s views of appropriate behavior could be determined by the behavior of those with whom they associate 2 narrow self interest can also generate a form of imitation imitating the behavior of people with like interests who are more informed

environmental regulation whose self interests are being protected special interest can explain why environmental policy limits economic activity in areas where air quality is above minumum standards locational competition among region helped create a policy that raised factor mobility cost from slower to faster growing regions analysis of votes shows greater support for this policy was received from northern urban constituencies and the greatest opposition came from the south and the west pollution abatement costs per unit of output are higher in areas with higher not lower air quality

incentive effects of social security on labor force participation evidence in germany and across europe abstract all across europe old age labor force participation has declined dramatically during the last decades this secular trend coincides with population aging the european social security systems therefore face a double threat retirees receive pensions for a longer time while there are less workers per retiree to shoulder the financial burden of the pension systems this paper shows that a significant part of this problem is homemade most european pension systems provide strong incentives to retire early the correlation between the force of these incentives with old age labor force participation is strongly negative the paper provides qualitative and econometric evidence for the strength of the incentive effects on old age labor supply across europe and for the german public pension program

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

married with children a collective labor supply model with detailed time use and intrahousehold expenditure information we propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of blundell chiappori and meghir 2005 in our model adults individual preferences not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods they also depend on the consumption of domestic goods which are produced by combining goods bought on the market with individuals time we apply our model to new and unique data on dutch couples with children the data contains detailed information about the spouses time use and the intrahousehold allocation of all expenditures our application uses a novel estimation strategy that builds upon the familiar two stage allocation representation of the collective model we obtain interesting and plausible empirical results spouses preferences depend on the consumption of domestically produced goods including children s welfare in addition pareto weights depend on variables like the individual wages and the share in the household s nonlabor income finally and perhaps surprisingly we do not nd evidence that mothers care more for their children than fathers this paper draws on data of the liss panel of centerdata special thanks go to marika de bruijne and arthur van soest who helped to construct the questionnaire and to guillaume schollier

parental wealth and adult children s welfare in marriage abstract many studies find that parental resources importantly determine children s human capital schooling returns and earnings the collective household approach suggests that in addition parental resources of marital partners may importantly affect resource distributions within marriage this paper presents empirical results consistent with this framework they suggest that parental wealth continues to play roles in augmenting welfare of children into adulthood beyond provision of human capital in early life cycle stages or direct financial aid during adulthood and that actual transfers from parents to adult children do not fully measure influences of parental wealth on behaviors and welfare of adult children

consumption over the life cycle facts from consumer expenditure survey data this paper uses consumer expenditure survey data and a seminonparametric statistical model to estimate life cycle profiles of consumption controlling for demographics cohort and time effects we construct age profiles for total and nondurable consumption as well as expenditure patterns for consumer durables special emphasis is placed on the comparison of different approaches to control for changes in demo graphics over the life cycle we find significant humps over the life cycle for total nondurable and durable expenditures changes in household size account for roughly half of these humps bootstrap simulations suggest that our empirical estimates are tight in that standard errors are small

it s raining men hallelujah the long run consequences of male biased sex ratios we document the short and long run effects of male biased sex ratios we exploit a natural historical experiment where large numbers of male convicts and far fewer female convicts were sent to australia in the 18th and 19th centuries in areas with more male biased sex ratios women were historically more likely to get married and less likely to work outside the home in these areas today both men and women continue to have more conservative attitudes towards women working and women work fewer hours outside the home while these women enjoy more leisure they are also less likely to work in high ranking occupations we demonstrate that the consequences of uneven sex ratios on cultural attitudes labour supply decisions and occupational choices can persist in the long run well after sex ratios are back to the natural rate we document the roles of vertical cultural transmission and marriage homogamy in sustaining this cultural persistence

economic well being and poverty among the elderly an analysis based on a collective consumption model we apply the collective consumption model of browning chiappori and lewbel 2006 to analyse economic well being and poverty among the elderly the model focuses on individual preferences a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple and a sharing rule that governs the intra household allocation of resources the model is applied to a time series of dutch consumption expenditure surveys our empirical results indicate substantial economies of scale and a wife s share that is increasing in total expenditures we further calculated poverty rates by means of the collective consumption model collective poverty rates of widows and widowers turn out to be slightly lower than traditional ones based on a standard equivalence scale poverty among women men in elderly couples however seems to be heavily underestimated overestimated by the traditional approach finally we analysed the impact of becoming a widow er based on cross sectional evidence we nd that the drop increase in material well being following the husband s death is substantial for women in high low expenditure couples for men the picture is reversed

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

gender of children bargaining power and intrahousehold resource allocation in china abstract based on the prevalent son preference in china this paper proposes a new measure of relative bargaining power within the household using data from china health and nutrition survey we show that a woman with a first born son has a 3 9 percentage points greater role in household decision making than a woman with a first born daughter having a first born son improves the mother s nutrition intakes and reduces her likelihood of being underweight while thinking of these impacts as being channeled through intrahousehold bargaining power we cannot fully rule out other possible direct effects of a first born son on the outcomes

legislative voting and the economic theory of politics empirical studies of legislative voting have multiplied since the mid 1970s early work 13 distinguished two modes of representation delegates who vote as voters want and trustees who use their own judgment more recently researchers have considered only delegates claiming that legislators who use their own ideology are shirking following principal agent theory representatives are conceived as conduits through which citizens transmit and express interests empirical work on this question however has found that the legislator s ideology explains more variation in vote choices than is explained by measures of constituent interest the seeming contradiction has led some 9 10 17 to reject the economic theory of legislator behavior as erroneous the truth is that no such theory has ever been fairly stated much less tested estimating equations have been ad hoc and the usual approach to measuring ideology has imposed correlation between the equation error and an explanatory variable 8 in both cases the result is

marital matching economies of scale and intrahousehold allocations we propose a novel nonparametric method to empirically identify economies of scale in multiperson household consumption we assume consumption technologies that define the public and private nature

intra family distribution of paid work time this article analyses the intra family distribution of paid work time in five european countries france germany italy spain and the uk to that end we formulate a collective model which allows us to characterize the efficient labour supply decisions of each spouse this two equation model is then simultaneously estimated by using national panel data drawn from the european community household panel echp 1994 2001 empirical results clearly show that in all sample countries the labour supply of wives is affected by own wages household and own nonlabour incomes and the number of children whereas evidence for husbands differs across countries

canadian contributions to family economics canadian scholars have made substantial contributions to the relatively new field of family economics these include new models of how men and women match in marriage markets and of how decisions are made in multi person households several were early contributors to the literature on married women s labour supply and labour supply in a family context and helped to develop empirical methods in this area a particular focus has been on the impacts of policy relevant parameters such childcare costs on family labour supply and child well being new work on child development the impact of early life conditions and the processes of intergenerational transmission also highlight the importance of family context in determining economic well being

the joint design of unemployment insurance and employment protection a first pass unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation in this paper we argue that they are tightly linked and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model with risk averse workers risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity we show that in the first best unemployment insurance comes with employment protection in the form of layoff taxes indeed optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits we then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best limits on insurance limits on layoff taxes ex post wage bargaining and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers we show how the design must be modified in each case finally we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals from the financing of unemployment insurance to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits

the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior in households whose allocation decisions can be represented as nash bargained household decisions extrahousehold environmental parameters eeps serve as pure shifters of the threat points the comparative statics of changes in demands due to changes in these eeps are given these are incorporated into a comprehensive statement of the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior including a nash generalization of barten s 1966 fundamental matrix equation of the theory of consumer demand estimation and data requirements are discussed along with nested testing of the following structure the neoclassical model is nested in the nash bargained model which in turn is nested in an unrestricted model of household demands emphasized throughout is the enriched menu of explanatory variables for demand analysis provided by the nash model as well as the model s ability to jointly analyze i household formation and ii intrahousehold allocation decisions

household labour supply in britain and denmark some interpretations using a model of pareto optimal behaviour this paper analyses the labour supply behaviour of households in denmark and britain it employs models in which the preferences of individuals within the household are explicitly represented the households are then assumed to decide on their labour supply in a pareto optimal fashion describing the structure of the household decision in this way allows preliminary results to be obtained on the internal weighting of utilities within the household

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

welfare analysis when people are different inequality and poverty estimation indeed all welfare analysis must deal with the fact that people are heterogeneous equivalence scales and indifference scales are tools that may be used for this an equivalence scale gives the relative costs faced by different people an indifference scale gives the relative cost of living for people in different types of households equivalence scales and indifference scales can be estimated using off the shelf household level consumer expenditure data and standard econometric techniques for nonlinear equation systems i offer a short introduction to the identification estimation and use of equivalence scales and indifference scales and argue that these are complementary tools in the analysis of inequality and poverty the methods are illustrated with canadian household expenditure data from the surveys of household spending 20042009 estimated equivalence scales for disability are presented along with estimated household model parameters and an analysis of consumption poverty

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

household portfolio choice and retirement this study examines household portfolio choice through the retirement transition i show that couples significantly decrease their stock allocations after retirement whereas singles allocations remain relatively unchanged reallocations are concentrated among couples in which the wife is more risk averse than her husband husbands and wives respective retirement events are followed by opposite signed changes in stock allocations these findings are consistent with a model of collective household decision making in which spouses have heterogeneous risk preferences and suggest that dynamics in the distribution of intrahousehold bargaining power generate time varying household risk aversion

consume now or later time inconsistency collective choice and revealed preference this paper develops a revealed preference methodology for exploring whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of nonstationarities at the individual level or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit an empirical application to household level microdata highlights that an explicit recognition of the collective nature of choice allows the vast majority of household behaviour to be rationalised by theory that assumes preference stationarity at the individual level for our particular short panel data set simply permitting limited intrahousehold heterogeneity in time preferences allows the choices of 98 4 of the sample to be rationalised by a model that assumes exponential discounting at the individual level we also find that couples characterized by lower divergence in spousal discount rates are older more likely to have children and wealthier which we take as indications of experiencing higher match quality

the politics of pollution party regimes and air quality in canada environmental concerns often figure prominently in opinion polls but do election outcomes actually affect the environment i test the influence of the party in power on urban air pollution in 13 canadian cities the government s political stripe is not reliably associated with positive or negative effects on air pollution provincial parties on both the right and the left are associated with elevated levels of some air contaminants federal effects also go in contrasting directions overall it appears a change in government is unlikely to be a reliable predictor of changes in air pollution jel classification q51 q58 d78

work intensity gender and sustainable development abstract is labour intensive employment compatible with social justice and environmental sustainability this paper examines the question of how far small scale intermediate technology based on energy intensive human work which is central to prescriptions for poverty alleviation and sustainable development is compatible with development objectives emphasizing gender equity work intensity is a neglected characteristic of labour but significant in the determination of human well being and in the intra household distribution of welfare the intensification of energy expenditure does not affect men and women in a uniform way and needs to be gender disaggregated in order to reveal potential trade offs between development strategies based on labour intensive growth and the well being of men and women the paper draws upon the experience with treadle pumps for irrigation in bangladesh as an illustration of such potential trade offs and argues for more rigorous analyses of gender divisions of labour which include work intensity in combination with time allocation

a general formula for the optimal level of social insurance in an influential paper baily 1978 showed that the optimal level of unemployment insurance ui in a stylized static model depends on only three parameters risk aversion the consumption smoothing benefit of ui and the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the benefit rate this paper examines the key economic assumptions under which these parameters determine the optimal level of social insurance i show that a baily type expression with an adjustment for precautionary saving motives holds in a general class of dynamic models subject to weak regularity conditions for example the simple reduced form formula derived here applies with arbitrary borrowing constraints durable consumption goods private insurance arrangements and search and leisure benefits of unemployment

universal decentralisation a demand system for collective and unitary models with household public goods the paper defines demand systems that exhibit universal decentralisation we argue that this concept is important in household consumption and labour supply models we show that the concept nests many approaches to the analysis of individual and family behaviour we find conditions for demand with universal decentralisation to be the result of an individual utility maximisation process and also for such demands to be the result of a household welfare maximisation procedure we explore the link between universal decentralisation and quasi separability there are connections between universal decentralisation and a nonlinear idea of the rank of a demand system

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed