financial markets and growth the last five years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth this issue had been extensively studied nearly two decades earlier by goldsmith 1969 mckinnon 1973 shaw 1973 and others who produced considerable evidence that financial development correlates with growth but their work though insightful lacked analytical foundations in traditional growth theory financial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity but not to their respective growth rates the latter were ascribed to exogenous technical progress the recent revival of interest in the link between financial development and growth stems mainly from the insights and techniques of endogenous growth models which have shown that there can be self sustaining growth without exogenous technical progress and that the growth rate can be related to preferences technology income distribution and institutional arrangements this provides the theoretical underpinning that early contributors lacked tinancial intermediation can be shown to have not only level effects but also growth effects the resulting models have offered important insights into the effect of financial development on growth and vice versa they have also provided new impetus to empirical research on these issues this paper reviews the ground covered so far on the theoretical and empirical front and points to some still unresolved issues

the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

herding with and without payoff externalities an internet experiment most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities yet the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities in this paper we experimentally investigate the effects of several different forms of payoff externalities e g network effects first mover advantage etc in a standard information based herding model our results are based on an internet experiment with more than 6000 subjects of which more than 2400 participated in the treatments reported here including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm we also replicate and review earlier cascade experiments finally we study reputation effects i e the influence of success models in the context of herding

endogeneity in brand choice models applications of random utility models to scanner data have been widely presented in marketing for the last 20 years one particular problem with these applications is that they have ignored possible correlations between the independent variables in the deterministic component of utility price promotion etc and the stochastic component or error term in fact marketing mix variables such as price not only affect brand purchasing probabilities but are themselves endogenously set by marketing managers this work tests whether these endogeneity problems are important enough to warrant consideration when estimating random utility models with scanner panel data our results show that not accounting for endogeneity may result in a substantial bias in the parameter estimates

voting on majority rules political economy models usually take as given the rules which govern the political decision making with the simple majority rule being the most popular model in this paper we develop a simple yet powerful positive model where the majority rule governing future elections is itself chosen in an election we observe a large variety of majority rules governing elections in the real world on the one side referenda are usually decided by a simple majority at the other extreme many international organizations require unanimity in votes among the member states in the european union s council of ministers some proposals require only a simple majority some a supermajority of about 71 62 votes out of 87 and some require unanimous consent 1 explicit supermajorities 2 are required in most countries for a change of the constitution but in some u s states also for a tax raise even more important could be what we might call implicit supermajorities in parliamentary systems with a strong committee organization a legislative proposal usually needs the support of both the respective committee and the house in parliamentary systems with two chambers certain legislative proposals need the support of both chambers 3 previous rationalizations of qualified majority rules focus on the problem of condorcet cycles under simple majority rule in n dimensional elections and on commitment problems see our literature review below our model presents a new rationale for rules requiring qualified majorities in elections we analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on reform opportunities which we model as similar to investment projects at first there is a cost and then there are benefits since voters have a finite lifetime old voters will be less keen on reforms

political bias and war we examine the incentives for countries to go to war as they depend on the comparison between how much their pivotal decision makers have at risk and how much they stand to gain from a war how this ratio compares to the country at large is what we term political bias if there is no political bias then there are always payments that one country would like to make to the other that will avoid a war in the presence of commitment or enforceability of peace treaties if there is a bias on the part of one or both countries then war can result and in some cases cannot be prevented by any transfer payments we examine how war technology and relative wealth levels interact with political bias in determining whether countries make transfers go to war and form alliances our results shed some new light on the uneven contender paradox and the interpretation of the democratic peace

mainstreaming microfinance social performance management or mission drift summary what scope is there for the pursuit of explicit development goals in the context of increasing integration of specialized microfinance and commercial banking sectors this question and the idea of mission drift is first analyzed using a model that distinguishes between institutions financial and social performance possibilities preferences and assessment systems the model is used to review findings from action research with an international sample of poverty oriented microfinance institutions that suggest some simple steps for improved social performance management it is then used to illustrate the relationship between social and financial performance more widely across the retail financial services sector and to offer pointers for more policy analysis at this level

rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions abstract this paper is about the determination of common external tariffs cets in customs unions cus we first examine how the relationship between preferences over cet levels technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a cu is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues we then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium cet among other things we find that when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members imports tariff preferences may be polarized the trade patterns of some cu members may be endogenous and as a result their payoff functions may not be single peaked this leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules e g the population and consumption rules and raises the possibility of a condorcet paradox

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

rational herding in financial economics abstract this paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets some models can predict perfect herding in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities negative externalities in bank runs positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition principal agent problems based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation or informational learning cascades the paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research

voting for voters a model of electoral evolution we model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote we adopt a number of simplifying assumptions the founders and the candidates are fixed the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period one vote is sufficient for admission and voters can support as many candidates as they wish voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society while they belong to it in spite of these simplifications we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem the vote for friends may be postponed and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies we discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies

collusion and price rigidity we consider an in nitely repeated bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each rm receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period we focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe wherein any punishments are borne equally by all rms we identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each rm is strictly increasing in its cost level such fully sorting schemes offer efficiency bene ts as they ensure that the lowest cost rm makes the current sale but they also imply an informational cost distorted pricing and or equilibrium path price wars since a higher cost rm must be deterred from mimicking a lower cost rm by charging a lower price a rigid pricing scheme where a rm s collusive price is independent of its current cost position sacri ces efficiency bene ts but also diminishes the informational cost for a wide range of settings the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires i the absence of equilibrium path price wars and ii a rigid price if rms are sufficiently impatient however the rigid pricing scheme cannot be enforced and the collusive price of lower cost rms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat when the model is modi ed to include i i d public demand shocks the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a rm s lower cost realization may occur only when current demand is high

performance and governance in microfinance institutions accepted version of article published in the journal journal of banking finance published version available on science direct http dx doi org 10 1016 j jbankfin 2008 11 009

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

self enforcing voting in international organizations some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule some others by a majority system still others have moved from one system to the other over time the existing voting models have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system we present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision or in other words the voting system must be self enforcing the model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance both across organizations and over time we thank james anderson matt jackson francois maniquet guido tabellini and jean tirole for very helpful comments arnaud costinot provided excellent research assistance we also bene

choosing how to choose self stable majority rules and constitutions constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society we study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society constitutions are stylized here to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly a different voting rule for making changes to the constitution we define an equilibrium notion for constitutions called self stability whereby under the rules of a self stable constitution the society would not vote to change the constitution we argue that only self stable constitutions will endure we prove that self stable constitutions always exist but that most constitutions even very prominent ones may not be self stable for some societies we show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic and there are many societies for which no such constitution is self stable we conclude with a characterization of the set of self stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business

financial performance and outreach a global analysis of leading microbanks microfinance contracts have proven able to secure high rates of loan repayment in the face of limited liability and information asymmetries but high repayment rates have not translated easily into profits for most microbanks profitability though is at the heart of the promise that microfinance can deliver poverty reduction while not relying on ongoing subsidy the authors examine why this promise remains unmet for most institutions using a data set with unusually high quality financial information on 124 institutions in 49 countries they explore the patterns of profitability loan repayment and cost reduction the authors find that institutional design and orientation matter substantially lenders that do not use group based methods to overcome incentive problems experience weaker portfolio quality and lower profit rates when interest rates are raised substantially for these individual based lenders one key to achieving profitability is investing more heavily in staff costs a finding consistent with the economics of information but contrary to the conventional wisdom that profitability is largely a function of minimizing cost

the unbanked evidence from indonesia to analyze the prospects for expanding financial access to the poor bank professionals assessed 1 438 households in six provinces in indonesia to judge their creditworthiness about 40 percent of poor households were judged creditworthy according to the criteria of indonesia s largest microfinance bank but fewer than 10 percent had recently borrowed from a micro bank or formal lender possessing collateral appeared as a minor determinant of creditworthiness in keeping with microfinance innovations although these households were judged able to service loans reliably most desired small loans calculations show that the bank given its current fee structure and banking practices will lose money when lending at the scales desired so while innovations have helped to extend financial access it remains difficult to lend in small amounts and cover costs

growth inequality and poverty looking beyond averages the evidence is compelling that the poor in developing countries do typically share in the gains from rising aggregate affluence and in the losses from aggregate contraction but how much do poor people share in growth do they gain more in some settings than others do some gain while others lose does pro poor growth mean more or less aggregate growth recent theories and evidence suggest some answers but deeper microeconomic empirical work is needed on growth and distributed change only then will we have a firm basis for identifying the specific policies and programs needed to complement and possibly modify growth oriented policies

incomplete social contracts there is a long normative social contract tradition that attempts to characterize ex post income inequalities that are agreeable to all behind a veil of ignorance this paper takes a similar normative approach to characterize social decision making procedures it is shown that quite generally some form of majority voting is preferred to unanimity behind a veil of ignorance whenever society faces deadweight costs in making compensating transfers deviations from unanimity or ex post pareto optimality are ex ante efficient to the extent that they economize on costly compensating transfers put another way the optimal decision rule trades off the benefits of minority protection and those from greater flexibility jel h11 g33 g34 d63 p16 p48

rational herding toward the poor evidence from location decisions of microfinance institutions within pakistan analyzing the geographical location of almost all the microfinance institutions mfis within pakistan this paper gives further evidence that microfinance activities do not reach the poorest rural areas especially we explore how this result is driven by the uncertainty faced by mfis in their location decision i e they can hardly predict accurately whether or not they will perform financially furthermore we find that mfis are spatially clustered and identify three main reasons for this common attraction factors i e the characteristics of one area fits to the preferences of all mfis so that they are all located in the same areas payoff externalities to be collocated and herd behavior i e mfis follow one another most importantly we find that a significant part of this herding process is rational i e early locations of mfis convey information used by later ones such that it reverses or neutralizes the negative impact of uncertainty resulting then in more locations in needier areas since it allows them to be located in poorer areas mfis improve the achievement of their social goal this latter result is rather good news for those who reckon that a better access to financial services enhances economic growth and fosters poverty alleviation indeed rational herding constitutes an endogenous moderator effect to the big issue that financial services penetration is too weak in the poorest rural areas

the challenge of rural financial inclusion evidence from microfinance financial inclusion is said to foster development and growth however progress in financial inclusion has been slow in rural areas where poverty is most pronounced this is often attributed to hig

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

power control and the logic of substitution in institutional design the case of international climate finance how do powerful states control international organizations ios in contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design we propose that funding rules are equally important our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an io are used are a design substitute for weighted voting from wealthy states perspective whether asymmetric control is incorporated in design through voting or funding rules depends on whether egalitarian norms emphasizing political and legal equality or shareholder norms emphasizing influence commensurate with financial power govern voting and representation rights at the io focusing on the domain of climate finance we demonstrate that weighted voting rules are used at international climate finance institutions icfis associated with multilateral development banks but that wealthy states pursued permissive earmark rules at icfis within the united nations system where egalitarian norms are strong in this way powerful donors can exert control over resource allocation even when developing states appear to hold equal influence on governing bodies in addition to providing a reassessment of how power translates into control at ios our framework offers insight into forum shopping behavior and sheds light on substitution dynamics that involve other dimensions of design across a range of issue areas

how rising competition among microfinance institutions affects incumbent lenders this article uses data from uganda s largest incumbent microfinance institution to analyse the impact of entry by competing lenders on client behaviour we observe that rising competition does not lead to an increase in client dropout rate but induces a decline in repayment performance and savings deposited with the incumbent suggesting rising multiple loan taking by clients this joint effect on dropout and repayment is consistent with some negative information about clients and is being shared across lenders however the observed decline in repayment rates in a context of rising multiple loan taking shows that information sharing about clients is far from complete

rational herding in microloan markets microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders we use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on prosper com the largest microloan market in the united states we find evidence of rational herding among lenders well funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities moreover instead of passively mimicking their peers irrational herding lenders engage in active observational learning rational herding they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences counterintuitively obvious defects e g poor credit grades amplify a listing s herding momentum as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd similarly favorable borrower characteristics e g friend endorsements weaken the herding effect as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits follow up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

repayment performance in group based credit programs in bangladesh an empirical analysis abstract this paper analyzes the repayment rates of 128 credit groups belonging to three group based credit programs in bangladesh the association for social advancement asa the bangladesh rural advancement committee brac and the rangpur dinajpur rural service rdrs using tobit analysis specific tests are performed on the following hypothesized determinants group size size of loans degree of loan rationing enterprise mix within groups demographic characteristics social ties and status and occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks the paper concludes that if basic principles of prudential banking are adhered to repayment rates can be good even in poor and remote communities the important thing for financial institutions is to tailor services such that it becomes worthwhile for the poor to establish a profitable long term association in addition more freedom to members in the process of group formation is recommended

microfinance with chinese characteristics abstract analyzing household survey data from three microfinance program sites we provide an early systematic assessment of chinese microfinance programs which have grown rapidly since 1994 are based on the grameen model and include an unprecedented large scale government initiative we examine the empirical propositions that underpin successful microfinance programs reaching the poor targeting financial and operational performance sustainability and program benefits impact we find that nongovernmental programs perform well in all three areas but that governmental programs perform poorly given the remote location and focus on agricultural projects in china s poor areas we advocate greater flexibility in loan contract terms especially repayment schedules

on 64 majority rule introduction d une definition de consensus social base sur deux restrictions une sur les preferences individuelles et l autre sur la distribution des preferences dans ce cas de consensus une regle de majorite a 64 presente de nombreuses proprietes interessantes par opposition aux regles de super majorite possedant des proprietes paradoxales comme les regles electorales americaines

endogeneity and individual consumer choice abstract in many markets there is likely to be correlation both across periods in terms of the choices of one consumer and across consumers in terms of their choices in each period the former is caused by consumer heterogeneity and the latter may be the result of demand common shocks across consumers furthermore if firms partially observe these common shocks their market decisions may end up being endogenous and correlated with the common shocks because researchers cannot typically fully observe consumer heterogeneity and the common shocks the estimation method must account for the endogeneity of firms decisions in this article the authors present a test for endogeneity under unobserved consumer heterogeneity and common shocks which is based on a quasi likelihood estimation method to estimate the model parameters consistently when endogenous firm behavior unobserved heterogeneity and common shocks are present the test examines the differences in general method of moments coefficient estima

structuring international institutions for the efficient provisioning of global security this paper analyzes the issue of security provision by an alliance against the threat of a rogue nation proactive security effort by an alliance member is assumed to be non rival and non excludable so the results of the effort jointly accrue to every other member this effort has both positive and negative effects as security measures mitigate the threat but also involve loss of commercial benefits collateral damages and infringement on human rights in this paper i suggest an institutional structure for the alliance which would lead to the achievement of the efficient level of world security through multilateral participation

sequential sales learning and cascades when ipo shares are sold sequentially later potential investors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors this can lead rapidly to cascades in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information and imitate earlier investors although rationing in this situation gives rise to a winner s curse it is irrelevant the model predicts that 1 offerings succeed or fail rapidly 2 demand can be so elastic that even risk neutral issuers underprice to completely avoid failure 3 issuers with good inside information can price their shares so high that they sometimes fail 4 an underwriter may want to reduce the communication among investors by spreading the selling effort over a more segmented market consider a scenario in which an issuer is selling a new security of uncertain value for example an ipo initial public offering of stock or high yield debt through an underwriter the s e c has banned variable price sales while the value of this new security is highly uncertain to individual market participants investors hold perfectly accurate information when aggregated moreover there are many potential investors and a small number of these investors can jointly determine the value of the firm or its project with high precision it would seem that in this scenario underpriced offerings would succeed and overpriced offerings would fail nevertheless this paper shows that if the distribution channels of invest ment banks are limited underpriced offerings can fail and overpriced offer ings can succeed with limited distribution channels it takes the under writer time to approach interested investors therefore later investors can observe how well an offering has sold to date or at least how successful it has sold relative to offerings previously undertaken by this underwriter

endogeneity and heterogeneity in a probit demand model estimation using aggregate data two issues that have become increasingly important while estimating the parameters of aggregate demand functions to study firm behavior are theendogeneity of marketing activities typically price andheterogeneity across consumers in the market under consideration ignoring these issues in the estimation of the demand function parameters can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates for the effects of marketing activities endogeneity and heterogeneity have achieved prominence in large measure because of the increasing popularity of logit models to characterize demand functions usingaggregate data the logit model accounts for purchase incidence and brand choice by including a no purchase alternative in the consumer s choice set this allows for category sales to change as a function of the marketing activities of brands in the category there are three issues with using the logit model with the no purchase option to characterize demand when studying competitive interactions among firms 1 the marketing literature dealing with brand choice behavior at the consumer level has found that the iia restriction is not appropriate as each brand in the choice set is more similar to some brands than it is to others 2 studies have found that the purchase incidence decision is distinct from the brand choice decision hence it may not be appropriate to model the no purchase decision as just another alternative in the choice set with the iia restriction holding across all brands and the no purchase option 3 even if the distinction between the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions is accounted for via for example a nested logit specification accounting for the purchase incidence decision with aggregate data requires assumptions for computing the share of the no purchase alternative which is otherwise unobserved in this paper we propose a probit model as an alternative to the logit model to specify the aggregate demand functions of firms competing in oligopoly markets the probit model avoids the iia property that affects the logit model at the individual consumer level furthermore the probit model can naturally account for the distinction between the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions due to the general covariance structure assumed for the utilities of the alternatives we demonstrate how the parameters of the proposed model can be estimated using aggregate time series data from a product market in the estimation we account for the endogeneity of marketing variables as well as for heterogeneity across consumers our results indicate that both endogeneity as well as heterogeneity need to be accounted for even after allowing for a non iia specification at the individual consumer level specific to our data we also find that ignoring endogeneity has a bigger impact on the estimated price elasticities than ignoring the effects of heterogeneity a comparison of the elasticities obtained from the probit model with those from the corresponding logit specification indicates that therange of elasticities obtained from the probit model across brands is larger than that obtained from the logit the results have implications for issues such as firm level pricing in addition to specifying a probit model and providing comparisons with the logit model the paper also addresses the third issue raised above we propose a simple alternative to the purchase incidence brand choice specification by decomposing the demand for a brand into a category demand equation and a conditional brand choice share equation we provide a comparison of results from this specification to those from the specification that includes the no purchase alternative and find that estimated elasticities are sensitive to the specification used we also estimate the demand function parameters using a traditional specification such as the double logarithmic model here we find that the estimated elasticities could be signed in such a manner as to be not useful for firm level pricing decisions one of the key limitations of the proposed model is that while it accounts for the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions of households it does not account for differences across consumers in their purchase quantities the model and analysis are best suited for product categories in which consumers typically make single unit purchases another limitation is more practical in nature while recent advances have been made in computing probit probabilities it could nevertheless be a challenge to do so when the number of alternatives is large