how does advertising depend on competition evidence from u s brewing the relationship between market structure and advertising has been extensively studied but has generated sharply opposing theoretical predictions as well as inconclusive empirical findings likely because of severe endogeneity concerns we exploit the 2008 merger of miller and coors in the u s brewing industry to examine how changes in local concentration affect firms advertising behavior well established regional preferences over beer brands and the sharp increase in concentration from the merger make this an excellent setting to analyze this question we find a significant positive effect of local market concentration on advertising expenditures a 100 point increase in the herfindahl hirschmann index measure of concentration increases advertising per capita by about 5 our findings shed light on how and when firms choose to deploy advertising the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2889 this paper was accepted by eric anderson marketing

democracy visibility and public good provision we examine the role of visibility in influencing government resource allocation across a multiplicity of public goods we show that a visibility effect distorts governmental resource allocation such that it helps explain why governments neglect provision of essential public goods despite their considerable benefits we show that greater democratization widens the gap in resource allocation between more visible such as famine prevention versus less visible such as malnutrition prevention public goods up to an intermediate level of democracy beyond this level this gap decreases furthermore public goods with low visibility are prone to multiple equilibria in resource allocation with voter expectations being shown to be important

the cost of road infrastructure in low and middle income countries the connections between transport infrastructure and economic development have been extensively analyzed in previous research but little is known about the cost of infrastructure investments in poor countries this paper examines drivers of unit costs of construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure in low and middle income countries and documents that i there is a large dispersion in unit costs for comparable road work activities ii after accounting for environmental drivers of costs residual unit costs are significantly higher in conflict countries iii there is evidence that costs are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption iv these effects are robust to controlling for a country s public investment capacity and business environment our findings have implications for governments aiming to increase connectivity in poor countries

market structure and product quality a study of the 2002 japanese airline merger abstract this study examines the economic consequences of a horizontal merger between japanese airlines that took place in 2002 with particular emphasis on quality responses to the airline merger a structural model allows firms to determine not only prices but also flight frequencies the obtained estimates would reject the hypothesis that the merger facilitated coordinated effects efficiency gains from the merger are estimated as not trivial and are more strongly observed in marginal costs per flight rather than in marginal costs per passenger welfare effects of the merger are positive but vary by market structure neglecting endogenous flight frequency overstates the welfare gains especially for smaller markets finally remedial measures imposed by the authority did little for the merger outcomes

estimation of the structure and elasticities of mexican imports in the period 1961 1979 abstract this paper examines the changing structure of mexican imports over the period 1961 1979 and its relationship to the acceleration of imports in 1978 1979 it is found that the more lenient policies adopted by the government in that period seem to be associated with the higher import levels a review of mexican policy with respect to foreign trade in 1980 seems to be consistent with the results reported in this paper

how aid targets votes the impact of electoral incentives on foreign aid distribution despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage little is known about how recipient governments electoral incentives influence aid spending this article proposes a distributional politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters allowing governments to translate aid into votes to evaluate this argument the author codes data on the spatial distribution of multilateral donor projects in kenya from 1992 to 2010 and shows that kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters a bias that holds for each of kenya s last three regimes he confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote share this evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes

the political economy of public income volatility with an application to the resource curse abstract in recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in greece or to unstable oil prices in venezuela we study the political consequences of such public income volatility as is standard in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re election probabilities but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power making policy more efficient yet at the same time it also reduces the re election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future this makes inefficient policy such as patronage public employment less costly our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth in the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices a characteristic of many developing countries we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction jointly interacting with increased patronage employment

history path dependence and development evidence from colonial railroads settlers and cities in kenya little is known about the extent and forces of path dependence in developing countries colonial era railroad construction in kenya provides a natural experiment to study the emergence and persistence of spatial equilibrium data spanning over one century shows that railroads determined the location of european settlers asian traders and the main cities at independence europeans then left asians departed and railroads declined in the immediate post independence period constituting local shocks to physical and human capital yet the colonial cities persisted we test four explanations for path dependence based on institutional persistence technological change sunk investments and spatial coordination failures

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

de facto political power and institutional persistence much of the empirical work and the conceptual discussion of the impact of institutions on economic development either implicitly or explicitly assumes that institutions persist although acemoglu et al 2001 provide evidence that constraints on the executive persist many aspects of institutions change frequently less developed countries cycle between democracy and dictatorship and often change their constitutions relatedly while the current economic problems in latin america are often traced back to colonial times stanley l engerman and kenneth l sokoloff 1997 acemoglu et al 2002 the specific institutions that once underpinned the colonial economy such as the encomienda the mita or slavery vanished long ago these observations suggest that we need to develop a framework in which changes in certain dimensions of institutions are consistent with overall institutional persistence in this paper we make an attempt to highlight some important mechanisms for understanding simultaneous change and persistence in institutions institutional persistence in this context refers to the persistence of a cluster of economic institutions such as the extent of enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of society acemoglu et al 2001 such lack of property rights enforcement may be driven by quite different specific institutions e g risk of expropriation entry barriers or economic systems such as serfdom or slavery in turn these different specific economic institutions may exist under different political institutions including dictatorships absolutist monarchies oligarchies and corrupt or even populist democracies given this rich array of possibilities a useful framework must specify which aspects of institutions can change which others have a tendency to persist in equilibrium and how the persistence of certain types of institutions could have lasting effects on economic outcomes in this paper we provide a simple model of the coexistence of change and persistence in institutions first we describe some existing approaches to the persistence of social arrangements as well as the essence of the mechanism we propose next we illustrate the key issues using the experience of the southern united states and last we provide a simple model that formalizes the main mechanism in the paper we conclude by discussing a complementary mechanism to the one presented in this paper

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

king makers local leaders and ethnic politics in africa much of the literature on electoral politics in africa has focused on one mechanism of electoral mobilization reliance on shared ethnic identity between politicians and voters on the contrary the author argues that politicians pursue two distinct modes of nonprogrammatic electoral mobilization 1 by directly relying on the support of voters from one s own ethnic background and 2 by indirectly working through electoral intermediaries local leaders who command moral authority control resources and can influence the electoral behavior of their dependents yet the power of local leaders varies greatly hence the option to use electoral intermediaries is not available in all settings the choice of electoral mobilization affects national electoral outcomes by severing the direct link between politicians and voters intermediaries reduce a campaign s reliance on shared identity and create cross ethnic electorates the evidence for this argument is based on original interviews with political leaders collected during fieldwork in senegal and benin during the 2006 7 electoral season media coverage of elections and a historical analysis of first mass elections in the 1950s

understanding the price effects of the millercoors joint venture we document abrupt increases in retail beer prices just after the consummation of the millercoors joint venture both for millercoors and its major competitor anheuser busch within the context of a differentiated products pricing model we test and reject the hypothesis that the price increases can be explained by movement from one nash bertrand equilibrium to another counterfactual simulations imply that prices after the joint venture are 6 8 higher than they would have been with nash bertrand competition and that markups are 17 18 higher we relate the results to documentary evidence that the joint venture may have facilitated price coordination

executive legislative relations party defections and lower level administrative unit proliferation evidence from kenya over the past 25 years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of subnational administrative units within developing countries existing literature argues that presidents create new units

the determinants of import demand in trinidad and tobago 1967 84 1988 the determinants of import demand in trinidad and tobago 1967 84 applied economics vol 20 no 3 pp 303 313

has democratization reduced infant mortality in sub saharan africa evidence from micro data does democracy help babies survive in sub saharan africa by using retrospective fertility surveys conducted in 28 african countries i compare the survival of infants born to the same mother before and after democratization to disentangle the effect of democracy from that of changes in population characteristics which is infeasible with country level statistics on infant mortality i find that infant mortality falls by 1 2 percentage points 12 of the sample mean after democratization in the post cold war period relevant aspects of democracy appear to be the combination of multiparty elections and leadership change

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

the ethnic logic of campaign strategy in diverse societies theory and evidence from kenya much of the existing ethnic politics literature suggests that in settings where ethnicity is politically salient electoral competition encourages rival parties to focus narrowly on mobilizing thei

ethnic diversity and economic development abstract this paper analyzes the role that different indices and dimensions of ethnicity play in the process of economic development firstly we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative data sources for the construction of indices of religious and ethnic heterogeneity secondly we compare the index of fractionalization and the index of polarization we argue that an index of the family of discrete polarization measures is the adequate indicator to measure potential conflict we find that ethnic religious polarization has a large and negative effect on economic development through the reduction of investment and the increase of government consumption and the probability of a civil conflict

enfranchising your own experimental evidence on bureaucrat diversity and election bias in india this paper investigates the effects of polling station administrator diversity on elections in india using a natural experiment the random assignment of government officials to teams managing stations on election day together with surveys conducted with voters and election officers i demonstrate that changes in the religious and caste composition of officer teams impact voting at the polling station level causing shifts in coalition vote shares large enough to influence election outcomes effects are strongest when officers have greater discretion over the voting process i also provide evidence suggesting own group favoritism by election personnel as one relevant mechanism

holding on ethnic divisions political institutions and the duration of economic declines abstract we analyze the duration of large economic declines and provide a theory of delayed recovery we show theoretically that uncertain post recovery incomes lead to a commitment problem which limits the possibility of cooperation in ethnically heterogeneous countries strong constraints on the executive solve this problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with cooperative behavior we test the model using standard data on linguistic heterogeneity and detailed data on ethnic power configurations our findings support the central theoretical prediction countries with more constrained political executives experience shorter economic declines the effect is large in ethnically heterogeneous countries but virtually non existent in homogeneous societies our main results are robust to a variety of perturbations regarding the estimation method the estimation sample measures of heterogeneity and measures of institutions

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

ethnic diversity social sanctions and public goods in kenya abstract this paper examines ethnic diversity and local public goods in rural western kenya the identification strategy relies on the stable historically determined patterns of ethnic land settlement ethnic diversity is associated with lower primary school funding and worse school facilities and there is suggestive evidence that it leads to poor water well maintenance the theoretical model illustrates how inability to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads to collective action failures and we find that school committees in diverse areas do impose fewer sanctions on defaulting parents we relate these results to the literature on social capital and economic development and discuss implications for decentralization in less developed countries

internal borders ethnic based market segmentation in malawi summary ethnic diversity is associated with poorer economic development but why i argue that market segmentation is one mechanism linking diversity to economic underdevelopment when ethnic groups are geographically segregated and trust is concentrated within groups markets will be tend to be segmented along ethnic lines i evaluate this argument using maize price data from seventy malawian markets over 14 years and combine it with census data on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups i find that maize price differences a key indicator of market segmentation are indeed larger for ethnically dissimilar markets even after taking sub national administrative borders geographic barriers and climatic differences into account these statistical findings are complemented by interview data from farmers and traders in three markets across malawi which highlight the centrality of trust in small scale maize trading as well as a preference for coethnic trading partners together these findings suggest that ethnic diversity and ethnoregional segregation in particular can have a negative impact on market integration an important driver of food security and long term economic development

the value of democracy evidence from road building in kenya ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development this paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in kenyan districts across the 1963 2011 period guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism across the post independence period we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have five times the length of paved roads built this favoritism disappears during periods of democracy jel d72 h54 j15 o15 o17 o22 r42

the control of politicians in divided societies the politics of fear autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power in addition they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending i present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare the fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters the model predicts extensive use of patronage ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader these predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance ethnic bias wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post colonial africa

international isolation and regional inequality evidence from sanctions on north korea abstract this paper examines how the spatial distribution of economic activity evolved within north korea during a period of economic sanctions countries have used economic sanctions to isolate north korea from the benefits of international trade and finance china however has not imposed the sanctions and consequentially has offset the trade restrictions imposed by other countries i hypothesize three channels by which north korea could have responded in this context regional favoritism by the ruling elites reallocation of commerce that reflects the trade diversion to china and import substitution using nighttime lights from north korea i find that the capital city trade hubs near china and manufacturing cities become relatively brighter when sanctions increase however production shifts away from capital intensive goods potentially deterring industrial development the results imply that despite the intention to target the ruling elites sanctions may increase regional inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands

collective action in diverse sierra leone communities scholars have identified ethnic divisions as a leading cause of underdevelopment due partially to their adverse effects on public goods we investigate this issue in post war sierra leone one of the world s poorest and most ethnically diverse countries to address concerns over endogenous local ethnic composition we use an instrumental variables strategy using earlier census data on ethnicity and include several historical and geographic covariates perhaps surprisingly we find that local diversity is not associated with worse public goods provision across multiple outcomes and specifications with precisely estimated zeros we investigate the role of historical factors in generating the findings

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

re election incentives and deforestation cycles in the brazilian amazon abstract despite expansive research on amazonian deforestation and its drivers the role of local politics is not well understood using a panel data set that combines municipal level deforestation and election data from 2002 to 2012 i estimate the effect of an incumbent mayor running for re election on deforestation rates in election periods i find that deforestation rates increase 8 10 in election years when an incumbent mayor runs for re election an amount equivalent to four percent of the total forest lost since the 2004 elections electoral deforestation cycles do not appear to be driven by changes in agricultural policy implementation and activity but are linked to corruption and campaign finance suggesting that weak institutional constraints facilitate electoral manipulation of forest resources this phenomenon is not likely limited to amazonian forests re election incentives could very well lead to misallocation of other natural resources in alternate geographies

independent candidates and political representation in india we estimate the causal effect of independent candidates on voter turnout and election outcomes in india to do this we exploit exogenous changes in the entry deposit candidates pay for their participation in the political process changes that disproportionately excluded candidates with no affiliation to established political parties a one standard deviation increase in the number of independent candidates increases voter turnout by more than 6 percentage points as some voters choose to vote rather than stay home the vote share of independent candidates increases by more than 10 percentage points as some existing voters switch who they vote for thus independents allow winning candidates to win with less vote share decrease the probability of electing a candidate from the governing coalition by about 31 percentage points and ultimately increase the probability of electing an ethnic party candidate altogether the results imply that the price of participation by independents is constituency representation in government

devaluation and the balance of payments adjustment in a developing economy an analysis relating to jamaica 1954 72 jamaica is a small open and structurally dependent export propelled country the island spans an area of 4411 square miles and has a population of nearly 2 million measured at 1965 prices the gross domestic product gdp increased from 297m j in 1954 to 912m j in 1972 or grew at an average rate of around 5 per annum 1 unemployment averaged around 20 and is increasing explosively exports are concentrated in three commodities bauxite alumina sugar and bananas together these three commodities averaged 76 of total commodity exports between 1954 and 1972 tourism is the second largest earner of foreign exchange increasing from 11 4m in 1954 to 107 9m in 1972 on the other hand the economy is heavily dependent on imports for capital goods raw materials fuels and intermediate goods for its import substitution and industrialization programmes also consumer goods to complement domestic supply or in some cases to meet the entire requirement of domestic demand for the period 1954 72 the im

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

money flows water trickles understanding patterns of decentralized water provision in tanzania summary over the past three decades an increasing number of low and middle income countries have decentralized water provision to the local government level and have sought to more thoroughly involve users in service delivery such reforms reflect the twin goals of encouraging greater responsiveness to local needs and promoting sustainability this study illustrates how the aims of decentralization can be undermined in the absence of robust democratic competition and how governments interpret demand by voters in such settings focusing on the tanzanian water sector the paper first traces the distribution of money for water from the central government to the district level next i consider how district governments use these funds to distribute water infrastructure within their jurisdictions using geo referenced data on all 75 000 water points serving rural tanzanians i find that the central government s allocation of money to districts is fairly unresponsive to local needs however the pattern of distribution cannot primarily be explained by politics with the exception of consistent favoritism of the minister for water s home district political favoritism is more pronounced at the local level within districts the distribution of new water infrastructure is skewed to favor localities with higher demonstrated levels of support for the ruling party in addition wealthier and better connected communities those with the resources to more effectively express their demands are significantly more likely to benefit from new construction this suggests that demand responsive approaches to water provision can entrench regressive patterns of distribution

electoral motives and the subnational allocation of foreign aid in sub saharan africa abstract this paper examines how electoral motives shape the subnational allocation of foreign aid commitments by employing a newly constructed geocoded dataset for 14 sub saharan african countries over the period 2000 2012 our results provide strong evidence of a core voter strategy african leaders diverting chinese aid towards regions with a high concentration of political supporters however no evidence of such preferential treatment is found for world bank aid suggesting that aid from traditional donors is less vulnerable to political manipulation our results also reveal that checks and balances in recipient countries are an important mediating factor of aid misallocation while copartisan regions receive larger amounts of chinese aid in environments with weak checks and balances these effects disappear when stronger checks and balances are in place this paper also offers case study evidence from ghana exploiting the 2009 regime change in ghana and using a difference in differences framework we provide further support of copartisan targeting and confirm that chinese aid is more manipulable than world bank aid in this respect

are devaluations contractionary recently a number of authors have criticized the role of devaluations in traditional stabilization programs it has been argued that contrary to the traditional view devaluations are contractionary and generate a decline in aggregate output in spite of the renewed theoretical interest in the possible contractionary effects of devaluations the empirical evidence on the subject has been quite sketchy in this paper the khan and knight 1981 model is extended to empirically address the issue of contractionary devaluations the extended model considers the effect of money surprises fiscal factors terms of trade changes and devaluations on the level of real output the results obtained using a variance components procedure on data for 12 developing countries provide some support to the short run contractionary devaluation hypothesis the results obtained indicate that in the short run a devaluation will generate a decline in aggregate output it is also found that after one year a devaluation will have an expansionary effecton output the evidence suggests that in the long run devaluations will have no effect on output this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tax me if you can ethnic geography democracy and the taxation of agriculture in africa it is typically assumed that african leaders enact policies that benefit their ethnoregional group using all types of patronage crop production and political power are geographically concentrated in many african countries and this paper exploits this overlap to cast doubt on this conventional wisdom it shows using data on 50 country crop combinations that cash crop farmers who are ethnically identified with the head of state face higher taxes furthermore democratic regimes impose lower taxes this paper shows that farmers who have few alternatives face higher taxes african leaders have used local intermediaries to exert control over the countryside and to ensure that farmers do not support alternative candidates it suggests that as leaders are better at selecting and monitoring these intermediaries in their home areas they can extract more from the majority at home than abroad using taxes on cash crops which are regionally but not individually targetable

stabilization the political economy of overkill abstract this paper considers whether national and international aspects of the imf s stabilization programmes during the 1970s and early 1980s have resulted in a process of overkill or in other words a process of economic retrenchment which went much further than was strictly necessary in terms of what could have been regarded as reasonable objectives in the international context the author describes how the attack on inflation has become an end in itself at the expense of other stated objectives of the imf thus creating a distortion of its priorities the paper discusses errors of diagnosis which have led to this disorientation and explains why deflationary policies should not be regarded as a panacea the paper then considers the nead for equity and efficiency in the distribution of the political and economic costs of adjustment the next section of this paper discusses the assumptions underlying the imf s treatment of fund members and to what extent even handedness in the application of stabilization measures may result in inequality of burden sharing among borrowers problems related to monetarist theories and the consequent policies are examined followed by a consideration of the dangers involved in devising straightforward performance criteria in the form of precise monetary targets that can readily be monitored by the imf this means of evaluating the national adjustment policies success is seen to be unsatisfactory viz the frequency of stand by arrangement breakdowns and mistakes in forecasting the paper concludes that the concept of unilateral adjustment is not an acceptable basis for imf supervision of the international monetary system in addition care should be taken to avoid overkill in determining the degree and character of adjustment needed in stabilization programmes one possible solution to the extra burden imposed on the ldcs might be a liberalization of the compensatory financing facility with the objective of applying the same kind of regime to imports as to exports

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

party connections interest groups and the slow diffusion of infrastructure evidence from britain s first transport revolution economic and political interests often block or delay infrastructure improvements this paper examines their effects by studying britain s river navigation improvements in the early 1700s a subject of intense lobbying in parliament it shows that stronger party connections and influence in neighboring areas likely to oppose or support projects affected whether a town got a river navigation act their estimated effects are comparable to geography and town economic characteristics in magnitude and help explain whether towns were blocked from getting navigation improvements the findings address institutions following the glorious revolution and broader issues concerning infrastructure technology diffusion and political connections this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

dynamic efficiencies of the 1997 boeing mcdonnell douglas merger we evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 boeing mcdonnell douglas merger in the medium sized wide body aircraft industry we find that the merger led to lower prices to explain the price drop we develop a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing we quantify the welfare effects of the merger by incorporating both increased market power and merger efficiencies from accelerated learning by doing our dynamic analysis indicates that net consumer surplus increased by as much as 5 14 billion whereas a static model ignoring efficiencies of learning by doing predicts a 0 92 billion loss

crossing party lines the eects of information on redistributive politics this paper explores how the quality of information available to voters in uences the choices they make in the polling booth and in turn aects the strategies of political parties competing for their support to do so the paper builds a model of redistributive politics under asymmetric information and then tests the resulting propositions with data from recent elections in sierra leone using the lindbeck and weibull 1987 model as a foundation i incorporate a new determinant of voting choice candidate quality which is only imperfectly observed by voters i show that voters with better information about candidates are more likely to cross ethnic party lines to support a high quality candidate furthermore since information encourages voters to consider characteristics like candidate charisma that are di cult for parties to observe it makes party forecasting of expected vote shares more uncertain such electoral uncertainty in turn induces parties to spread their resources more evenly across jurisdictions two institutional attributes of the empirical setting ethnicity based politics and decentralization enable direct tests of these informational propositions as well as a novel identi cation strategy for the classic swing voter hypothesis my results suggest that information could break the low accountability equilibrium in which citizens cast their votes blindly along partisan lines creating little incentive for political parties to invest in candidate quality or provide resources to areas outside the most tightly contested jurisdictions

some estimates of the price and income elasticities of import demand for three caribbean countries this paper provides estimates of the short run and long run price and income elasticities of import demand for three developing economics the econometric evidence confirms that devaluation is an appropriate policy to correct for balance of payments disequilibrium in the caribbean and it supports the imf stabilization approach

clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin the author conducted a field experiment in benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior in collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters using the survey data collected after the elections the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to clientelism or public policy messages treatment groups with voting behavior in the other villages control groups the author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates the author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the south but a negative and significant effect in the north in addition public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates finally the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters