nonparametric measures of scale and technical change for competitive firms under uncertainty measures of scale elasticity and rate of technical change can be obtained nonparametrically in the sandmo model of competitive firms with nonlinear risk preference responding to output price risk information on risk attitudes is not needed for measurement of scale elasticity because it is observable as the ratio of average to marginal cost as in certainty models the cross section of panel data sets can be used to develop a nonparametric marginal cost measure which permits identification of scale elasticity the technical change measure then follows from the scale measure and the time series portion of the panel data set

empirical evidence on competitive bidding some surprising results abstract this paper compares the assumptions and predictions of common values auction theory with ocs leasing data we find that the general assumption of continuous bid density functions is not supported by the empirical evidence this leads us to suggest several lines for future theoretical experimental and empirical research

number of bids number of bidders and bidding behavior in outer continental shelf oil lease auction markets abstract theoretical models of auction bidding markets typically treat number of bids and number of bidders as equivalent measures when joint bidding opportunities exist this assumption will often not hold in cases such as offshore oil auctions joint bidding is an extremely common occurrence our analysis of these auctions suggests that the actual number of bidding participants is more closely related with variables of interest winning bids average bid per acre etc than is the simple number of bids we argue that analyses such as that presented here are important in developing theoretical models that are useful in explaining or predicting actual bidding auction outcomes

permit trading merely an efficiency neutral redistribution away from climate change victims in this paper we present a climate policy game with international emissions trading where governments first select their amounts of emissions permits these permits are transferred to firms and then traded competitively on an international market compared with a game without trading we find that the potential efficiency gains from permit trading which have been identified in other studies are totally undone if governments also employ a tax or subsidy on domestic emissions the only effect of permit trading in this case is a redistribution of income away from those most affected by climate change

uncertain climate change and the international policy response abstract the implications of alternative policy responses to uncertain climate change are analyzed within the context of a simple dynamic economic model the analysis emphasizes two sources of uncertainty that surround climate change scientific uncertainty about how greenhouse gas emissions affect the climate and natural climatic variability the analysis also incorporates an economy s ability to mitigate climate changes through emissions reductions as well as its ability to adapt to such changes through adjusting production decisions while the model is very stylized and excludes some broader issues of social optimality and the allocation of rights to resources across generations basic implications of uncertainty in a dynamic world are highlighted that have not been previously discussed these results suggest that analysts will have a difficult time trying to determine whether a certain emissions strategy improves economic efficiency whether the benefits are greater than the costs when uncertainty is explicitly incorporated into the analysis

fiscal federalism approach for controlling global environmental pollution this paper finds that optimal international carbon taxes are country specific and we can decompose a tax on a domestically produced carbon intensive commodity into a revenue tax a tax to control local atmospheric pollution and an international carbon tax it shows that an institutional arrangement for the world economy similar to the fiscal federalism in the federal countries can be useful to internalize the global externalities of atmospheric pollution

producer surplus and risk this paper examines the welfare economics of producer behavior under risk aversion hicksian marshallian and money equivalent measures are explored it is found that under decreasing absolute risk aversion compensating variation is less than the ordinary marshallian surplus which is less than the money equivalent measure under constant absolute risk aversion all measures coincide finally bounds on compensating and equivalent variations using ordinary producer surplus in a manner analogous to willige approach in consumer theory under certainty are studied similar results hold mutatis mutandis for input demands

the risk of policy tipping and stranded carbon assets if global warming is to stay below 2 c there are four risks of assets stranding first substantial fossil fuel reserves will be stranded at the end of the fossil era second this is true for exploration capital too third unanticipated changes in present or expected climate policy cause discrete jumps in today s valuation of physical and natural capital fourth if timing and intensity of climate policy are uncertain revaluation of assets occurs as uncertainty about future climate policy is resolved to highlight these four effects we use an analytical model of investment in exploration capital with intertemporal adjustment costs reserves depletion and market capitalization and calibrate it to the global oil and gas industry climate policy implements a carbon budget commensurate with 2 c peak warming and we allow for immediate or delayed carbon taxes and renewable subsidies the social welfare ranking of these instruments is inverse to that of the oil and gas industry which prefers renewable subsidy and delaying taxes for as long as possible we also pay attention to how the legislative risk of tipping into policy action affects the timing of the end of the fossil era the profitability of existing capital and green paradox effects

the proposals for a european tax on co2 and their implications for intercountry distribution this paper analyzes the advantages andimplications of the implementation of aeuropean tax on carbon dioxide emissions as anown resource of the eu and it focuses on itseffects on intercountry distribution incontrast to a harmonized tax which would onlyhave distributive effects within each memberstate a tax collected at european scale wouldalso have important distributive effects amongdifferent countries these effects would alsodepend on the use of tax revenues the paperinvestigates through a simple empiricalanalysis the distributive effects among themember states of three tax models a pureco2 model a 50 50 energy co2model and a co2 model with a burden onnuclear power

climate policy under technology spillovers we study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries as there is no instrument that directly corrects for these externalities without an international climate agreement the non cooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments all countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case two types of international climate agreements are then studied one is a kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas in the second type of agreement a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries none of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum even if the quota price is equal to the pigovian level r d investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case it is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher r d expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement

does voluntary participation undermine the coase theorem abstract the coase theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes we argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of voluntary it requires a two stage game a non cooperative participation decision followed by coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate we illustrate this in a simple public goods model and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient however the efficient equilibrium is not robust to even very small transaction costs thus we cast doubt on coaseian claims of universal efficiency finally we outline a kind of coercion that restores efficiency

the economics of the greenhouse effect the recognition that economic activity is contributing to climatic change with attendant costs that may be of large magnitudes has set in motion a substantial research effort this paper seeks to review the contribution of economics to analysis of the greenhouse effect and to the policies and instruments suggested as means of mitigating its damage a brief overview of the causes and consequences of global warming is given and a number of energy economy forecasting models are examined as the costs of global warming depend upon the extent to which preventative and adaptive measures are undertaken the techniques available to evaluate these costs are surveyed we examine extant targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction and explore the frameworks within which optimal policy targets can be designed the paper also considers the narrower question of minimized abatement costs and surveys the types of models used to estimate them the merits of alternative policy instruments are examined paying particular attention to the role that risk and uncertainty and the costs of monitoring and implementation of policy under conditions of imperfect information may play in the choice of instruments problems of international co operation in the development of abatement policy are examined and we consider the compensations across both nations and generations that are likely to be necessary conditions for effective action

how fast should we graze the global commons unlike the vast preponderance of planets earth has been bequeathed a hospitable environment in which to thrive up to now man s activities have affected this environment negligibly scientists are becoming convinced however that release of carbon dioxide co2 from combustion of fossil fuels will lead to a significant modification of the global climate see woodwell how should we think about such a destruction of our heritage should it be treated as anathema like bondage or should the pace and extent of use of our global commons be subject to the same reasoned balancing of costs and benefits as other economic activities the present paper takes the second approach asking how fast the global economy should allow a buildup of atmospheric co2 the first section reviews the current scientific knowledge on this subject while the second puts this into an optimal growth framework the third section then presents a numerical example while the last presents some realistic policy views on the subject this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

negotiating a uniform emissions tax in international environmental agreements abstract a consensus appears to be emerging that a global carbon tax is the best policy for managing greenhouse gas emissions emissions tax systems are relatively straightforward cost effective and can generate revenues used to offset other distortionary taxes moreover recent theoretical research weitzman 2014 has demonstrated that under some conditions the globally efficient tax rate can be implemented through a majority voting rule we extend this area of research by examining a uniform emissions tax system in the framework of an international environmental agreement in which only countries that voluntarily participate are subject to the tax we show that in the simplest situation in which countries have identical marginal benefit and cost functions the largest stable agreement consists of two countries and the tax system has little impact on abatement levels our analysis highlights that by ignoring the participation decision and assuming commitment by all parties the efficiency gains from a uniform emissions tax system are overstated

long run industry equilibrium with uncertainty abstract in this paper we consider the effects of uncertainty on industry equilibrium when firms must commit themselves to production before prices are revealed we show that a an increase in demand uncertainty will i not affect the equilibrium number and size of firms if they are risk neutral ii reduce the equilibrium number of firms if they are risk averse but will have an ambiguous effect on their size b in equilibrium firms operate at capacity if they are risk neutral but at excess capacity if they are risk averse

the climate policy hold up green technologies intellectual property rights and the abatement incentives of international agreements the success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of green technologies this requires that international environmental agreements ieas and trade related intellectual property rights trips interact productively using a simple and tractable model we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold up effect in anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non signatories turning the iea brown self enforcing ieas have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under trips countries hosting patent holders extract rents from trips but may be better off without them

the theory of the firm in long run equilibrium in a recent series of articles economists have investigated the comparative statics of the neoclassical firm in a competitive environment with the specific proviso that output price adjusts in response to changes in factor prices the older theory of the firm such as is found for example in paul samuelson 1947 is deficient in this regard metaphors such as short run have been used to gloss over the inconsistency of holding output price constant in the face of changing costs through changing factor prices in this paper a simple yet thorough analysis of a firm in a competitive industry i e a firm facing zero entry and adjustment cost conditions is given new results pertaining to restrictions on the behavior of such firms are offered also the length and complexity of established results is substantially reduced

a social cost of carbon for almost every country this paper uses imputed national climate change impact functions to estimate national social costs of carbon which are largest in poor countries with large populations the national social costs of carbon of faster growing economies are less sensitive to the pure rate of time preference and more sensitive to the rate of risk aversion the pattern of national social costs of carbon is not sensitive to the assumed impact function climate sensitivity and scenario although the global social cost of carbon is income convergence raises the national social costs of carbon of poorer countries and lowers them for richer countries both global and national social costs of carbon are most sensitive to the income elasticity of climate change impacts a parameter about which we know little

industry equilibrium uncertainty and futures markets abstract this paper studies competitive long run industry equilibrium with uncertainty and futures trading we also provide a long run analysis of futures trading instead of the conventional short run analysis it is shown without using a general equilibrium model that given uncertain demand and risk aversion a bias backwardation or contango arises in long run industry equilibrium given risk neutrality such a bias however disappears we find that the occurrence of the bias depends not only on the existence of a risk premium but also on the length of the period considered each risk averse firm operates at a less efficient scale and moreover an expected spot price never accords with marginal cost when the expected spot price is less than marginal cost the risk averse firm can secure profit by selling futures contracts more than the amount of its output in the presence of production supply uncertainty a risk neutral firm operates with excess capacity under additive risk while the firm operates with proper capacity under multiplicative risk the key lies in whether its average cost curve is shifted by production risk

does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption when the rate of technology adoption is inverted u shaped abstract we show that for a broad class of technologies the relationship between policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted u shaped this happens when the marginal abatement cost mac curves of conventional and new technologies intersect which invariably occurs when emissions are proportional to output and technological progress reduces emissions per output this outcome does not result from policy failure on the contrary in social optimum the relationship between the slope of the marginal damage curve and the rate of technology adoption is also inverted u shaped under more general conditions these curves can look even more complicated e g such as inverted w shaped

optimal consumption and the environment choosing between clean and dirty goods in this paper a model with heterogeneous consumption goods is presented consumers are assumed to choose between two different consumption goods characterized by a different impact on the environment this implies that in a decentralized economy government can sustain the social optimum by setting two pigouvian taxes one on production as a whole and the other on dirty consumption acting as an incentive in favour of clean consumption in accordance with the previous literature a trade off between a clean environment and economic activity evolves however this trade off is now mitigated by the additional taxation on polluting consumption which allows the control of pollution stock evolution through the substitution between clean and dirty commodities

no regret potentials and technical innovation a viability approach to integrated assessment of climate policies abstract this paper aims to demonstrate the advantages of a sequential approach to decision making in climate policies this sequential approach is necessary because of the uncertainties regarding both the avoided costs of climate change and the costs of ghg emission abatement this assessment focuses on the minimization of learning time the reduction of technical and institutional inertia and the possible unexpected non linearities in abatement curves a stylized representation of so called no regret short term potentials of long term innovation trends and of backstop technologies is used we show that if we do take care of the inertia constraints in the decision process both policies namely the no regret and the innovation process exploitation becomes crucial in terms of minimization of the learning time

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

steering the climate system using inertia to lower the cost of policy common views hold that the efficient way to limit warming to a chosen level is to price carbon emissions at a rate that increases exponentially we show that this hotelling tax on carbon emissions is actually inefficient the least cost policy path takes advantage of the climate system s inertia to delay reducing emissions and allow greater cumulative emissions the efficient carbon tax follows an inverse u shaped path and grows more slowly than the hotelling tax economic models that assume exponentially increasing carbon taxes are overestimating the cost of limiting warming overestimating the efficient near term carbon tax and overvaluing technologies that mature sooner

on sustainability and the economics of survival this paper investigates the implications of sustainability and survival strategies for economic analysis it reviews connections between the approaches used by economists and biological scientists in the study of survival the paper emphasizes the role of irreversibility and uncertainty in the investigation of sustainability issues implications of the results for the analysis of economic behavior are discussed

testing the continuity of individual bid density functions some further results abstract this brief paper analyzes the bidding behavior in ocs oil auctions of six individual bidders using solo bids only and of a consortium bidder over the period 1963 1979 included are bidders that bid over the entire period one that bids for only a short time at the beginning and one that first makes such bids in 1970 our findings strongly support those reported in an earlier paper for five bidders and a brief three auction sample period bidders commonly utilize multiple bids of single dollar values within a given auction the strength of the present results for three of the seven bidders over 30 of the bids made fell into this category further buttresses our conjecture that the use of continuous bid functions is inappropriate for modelling offshore oil lease auctions

competitive industry equilibrium under uncertainty and free entry this paper investigates the properties of industry equilibrium under price uncertainty given free entry and exit for any form of risk averse behavior it is shown that an increase in demand uncertainty as measured by a mean preserving spread increases mean output price and reduces output of firms in long run equilibrium

long run scale adjustments of a perfectly competitive firm and industry an alternative approach the purpose of this note is to use the cost function technique to derive the results of the recent article in this review by c e ferguson and thomas saving hereafter f s our interest lies not so much in the results as in the simplicity and power of the technique itself in contrast to the rather cumbersome conventional apparatus of comparative statics micro theory 1 we shall not therefore discuss in detail the f s interpretations of their results although the technique should give the reader a more intuitive grasp of what is going on following f s we assume that the production function f x is increasing in each input strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable on the positive orthant all equilibrium input vectors are assumed strictly positive we start from the duality between production and cost functions demonstrated by shephard uzawa and mcfadden under our assumptions the production function may be uniquely characterized by its minimum total cost function defined for all p 0 by2 c min ptixi f x q

after kyoto alternative mechanisms to control global warming after more than a decade of negotiations and planning under the framework convention on climate change fccc the first binding international agreement to control the emissions of greenhouse gases has come into effect in the kyoto protocol the first budget period of 2008 2012 is at hand moreover the scientific evidence on greenhouse warming strengthens steadily as observational evidence of warming accumulates the institutional framework of the protocol has taken hold solidly in the european union s emissions trading scheme ets which covers almost half of europe s carbon dioxide emissions notwithstanding this apparent success the kyoto protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and terminal early troubles came with the failure to include the major developing countries along with lack of an agreedupon mechanism to include new countries and extend the agreement to new periods the major blow came when the united states withdrew from the treaty in 2001 by 2002 the protocol covered only 30 percent of global emissions while the hard enforcement mechanism in the ets accounts for about 8 percent of global emissions even if the current protocol is extended models indicate that it will have little impact on global temperature change unless there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design the protocol threatens to be seen as a monument to institutional overreach nations are now beginning to consider the structure of climate change policies for the period after 2008 to 2012 some countries states cities companies and even universities are adopting their own climate change policies are there in fact alternatives to the scheme of tradable emissions permits embodied in the protocol the fact is that alternative approaches have not had a serious hearing among natural scientists or among policymakers what are some alternatives for global public goods there are three potential approaches command and control regulation quantity oriented market approaches and taxor price based regimes of these only the tradable quantity and the price like regimes have any hope of being reasonably efficient under a tradable quantity approach an agreement proceeds by setting limits on emissions by different countries the limits are partially or wholly transferable among countries this is the approach taken under the kyoto protocol this approach has very limited international experience under existing protocols such as the cfc chlorofluorocarbon mechanisms and somewhat broader experience under national trading regimes such as the u s sulfur dioxide regime a radically different approach is to use harmonized prices fees or taxes as a method of coordinating policies among countries this approach has no international experience in the environmental area although it has modest experience nationally in such areas as the u s tax on ozone depleting chemicals on the other hand the use of harmonized price type measures has extensive international experience in fiscal and trade policies such as with the harmonization of taxes in the european union and harmonized tariffs in international trade these thoughts on the structure of international agreements to control global warming should not be regarded as negotiating strategies

climate clubs overcoming free riding in international climate policy notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic under standing of climate change it has proven difficult to forge inter national agreements because of free riding as seen in the defunct kyoto protocol this study examines the club as a model for international climate policy based on economic theory and empirical modeling it finds that without sanctions against non participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement by contrast a regime with small trade penalties on non participants a climate club can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement jel q54 q58 k32 k33

on international equity weights and national decision making on climate change abstract estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the aggregation of monetised impacts of climate change over people with different incomes and in different jurisdictions implicitly or explicitly such estimates assume a social welfare function and hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice we show that previous approaches to equity weighting are inappropriate from a national decision maker s point of view because domestic impacts are not valued at domestic values we propose four alternatives sovereignty altruism good neighbour and compensation with different views on concern for and liability towards foreigners the four alternatives imply radically different estimates of the social cost of carbon and hence the optimal intensity of climate policy

international environmental agreements with consistent conjectures we introduce consistent conjectures into barrett 1994 canonical model of international environmental agreements the existing literature assumes inconsistent nash conjectures despite the fact that policymakers recognize that abatement levels are strategic substitutes and increases in abatement generate carbon leakage with consistent conjectures much of the conventional wisdom is reversed the non cooperative abatement level is below the nash equilibrium the difference between nash and consistent conjectures is greatest when benefits are large and costs are small we find that large coalitions cannot form however small coalitions can result in substantial increases in abatement relative to the non cooperative outcome

controlling stock externalities flexible versus inflexible pigovian corrections abstract this paper examines the use of inflexible pigovian taxes subsidies to correct a stock externality an optimal control framework is first used to characterize the first best path for a pigovian correction that varies continuously this first best path is then contrasted with inflexible second best paths in which the level of the correction can be set only once or twice the optimal timing of a fixed one time correction is also studied a deferment of this correction is desirable when the initial state of the environmental stock is less deteriorated than the first best steady state or the adjustment costs are sufficiently great

constant utility paths and irreversible global warming this paper shows that the hartwick rule for sustainable utility with depletable resources still applies to the case of the greenhouse effect from fossil fuel carbon emissions although a carbon tax is necessary for sustainable utility it is sufficient that the sum of net energy rents and carbon tax revenues is invested in reproducible capital examination of recent savings rates and energy cost shares suggests that this may be difficult to achieve with current global savings rates jel classification q32

simple rules for climate policy and integrated assessment a simple integrated assessment framework that gives rules for the optimal carbon price transition to the carbon free era and stranded carbon assets is presented which highlights the ethical economic geophysical and political drivers of optimal climate policy for the ethics we discuss the role of intergenerational inequality aversion and the discount rate where we show the importance of lower discount rates for appraisal of longer run benefit and of policy makers using lower discount rates than private agents the economics depends on the costs and rates of technical progress in production of fossil fuel its substitute renewable energies and sequestration the geophysics depends on the permanent and transient components of atmospheric carbon and the relatively fast temperature response and we allow for positive feedbacks the politics stems from international free rider problems in absence of a global climate deal we show how results change if different assumptions are made about each of the drivers of climate policy our main objective is to offer an easy back on the envelope analysis which can be used for teaching and communication with policy makers

confining the coase theorem contracting ownership and free riding if individuals own the right to take any action that they please and are free to contract about behaviour will outcomes be efficient in all situations that is does the coase theorem hold we study this classic question through the lens of a non cooperative model of contract negotiations considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations in either case we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players but if participation is voluntary and there are more than two players there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient specifically the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting free riding on others agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions when actions involve the use of assets efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership

environmental policy choice with an uncertain chance of irreversibility abstract an uncertain chance of irreversibility leads to lower levels of investment than in the reversible case if there is downward irreversibility higher levels of investment if there is upward irreversibility and a possible effect in either direction in the case of complete irreversibility in all of these situations there will be an effect on initial policy investments whenever there is a nonzero probability that the irreversibility constraint is binding the policy design is based on equating initial marginal costs to conditional marginal benefits over the states in which the initial policy scale decision will be the policy choice the maximum attainable policy value is convex with respect to the probability of irreversibility

climate treaties and breakthrough technologies an effective climate change treaty must promote the joint supply of two global public goods climate change mitigation and knowledge of new technologies that can lower mitigation costs r d is especially needed to bring about substantial long term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases for this will require the development and diffusion of revolutionary breakthrough technologies martin i hoffert et al 2002 in principle such an outcome could be realized by the kyoto protocol approach if that agreement were strengthened over time however that response may be inadequate kyoto makes no provision for r d and as i shall demonstrate unlikely to succeed can a treaty system relying directly on targeted r d and the adoption of breakthrough technologies perform better in this same setting of anarchic international relations i will show that as a general rule the answer is no essentially the same forces that undermine kyoto also challenge the r d and technology approach there is one exception to this rule r d leading to breakthrough technologies exhibiting increasing returns can improve dramatically on the kyoto approach even when these technologies are otherwise inferior to the alternatives available this suggests that our approach to treaty design should be strategic

a note on endogenous risks and exhaustibility abstract this paper demonstrates that stock dependent risks do not qualify to be treated as a resonance problem of certainty equivalent exhaustibility it shows that this result holds without assuming risk aversion

bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change this model deals with the problem of the greenhouse effect a problem of transfrontier pollution it consists of determining through the description of a bargaining process the conditions under which it is preferable for the developing countries to speak with a united voice and those conditions under which it is preferable for them to negotiate separately one from the other in particular it is shown that the agreements arising from the bargaining cannot be equitable and for that reason they include only a limited number of countries

targets for global climate policy an overview a survey of the economic impact of climate change and the marginal damage costs shows that carbon dioxide emissions are a negative externality the estimated pigou tax and its growth rate are too low to justify the climate policy targets set by political leaders a lower discount rate or greater concern for the global distribution of income would justify more stringent climate policy but would imply an overhaul of other public policies catastrophic risk justifies more stringent climate policy but only to a limited extent

a comparison of emission taxes and permit markets for controlling correlated externalities this paper provides an answer to the question are emission taxes an efficient and self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated externalities we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions this mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection we find that unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self enforcing

economic benefits of dolphins in the united states eastern tropical pacific purse seine tuna industry this paper provides a profit maximizing model with vessel level dolphin mortality limits for purse seiners harvesting tunas in the eastern tropical pacific ocean the model analytically derives the shadow price estimated economic value for dolphin mortality the fishing fleet size and the annual tuna harvest as functions of a few key fishing parameters the model also provides a statistical method to determine the accuracy of all needed parameter estimates the paper then applies the model to the year 1996 and the period from 1985 to 1987 the shadow price measures the economic value to the us tuna fleet of dolphins lost in the harvesting of tuna this value is essential when attempting to evaluate the economic benefits and costs to society of any action designed to reduce the mortality of dolphins in the harvesting of tuna in the eastern tropical pacific ocean

on the theory of the competitive firm under uncertainty when initial wealth is random since sandmo s seminal paper on the theory of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty there has been considerable research on this topic 2 5 6 10 11 14 in all these studies it is assumed that in the absence of complete contingent markets output price risk is the only source of uncertainty for the firm however this may not be a realistic assumption in particular as argued by kihlstrom et al 7 it appears reasonable to consider the case where some of the initial wealth of the firm is held in risky assets in that case initial wealth is uncertain and should be modelled as a random variable the objective of this paper is to investigate the introduction of random initial wealth in sandmo s theory of the firm under price uncertainty in sandmo s model a number of important comparative static results e g the conditions under which the supply function is upward sloping 14 69 or under which increased price uncertainty reduces supply 5 depends critically on the sign of a particular expression stated in lemma 2 in ishii 5 while sandmo 14 69 shows this expression is non negative under arrow pratt decreasing absolute risk aversion it can be verified that his proof no longer holds when initial wealth is random therefore the comparative static analysis conducted by sandmo 14 batra and ullah 2 and ishii 5 is no longer valid and gives ambiguous results under initial wealth uncertainty the reason is that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion 1 12 are too weak for making comparisons in situations where there is more than one source of uncertainty 13 then what can be deduced from the theory of the competitive firm in the realistic case where both initial wealth and output price are uncertain we will show here that meaningful results on the behavior of the competitiv firm under uncertainty can be obtained provided that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion 1 12 are replaced by the ross measures of risk aversion 13 in particular a comparative static analysis of the production decisions using ross characterization of risk behavior is presented a number of new results are derived on the properties of risk responsive supply and input demand functions under both price and initial wealth uncertainty

the nobel memorial prize for william d nordhaus william d nordhaus and paul m romer received the 2018 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel this paper surveys nordhaus contributions on integrating climate change into long run macroeconomic analysis for which he was recognized with this prize

managing the international commons resource use and pollution control the simultaneous management in an international context of free access renewable resources and transboundary pollution is examined in a dynamic game framework first best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear markov strategies an international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting with international redistribution of tax receipts is used to achieve the cooperative solution in addition side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable

participation and duration of environmental agreements we analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies if complete contracts are feasible participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments however most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate if investments are noncontractible countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate but the free rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem under well specified conditions even the first best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete

self enforcing environmental agreements and international trade abstract in the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements ieas barrett 1994 rubio and ulph 2006 the number of signatories of self enforcing ieas does not exceed three if non positive emissions are ruled out we extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced and consumed in each country and traded on world markets when signatory countries act as a stackelberg leader and emissions are positive the size of stable ieas may be significantly larger in our model with international trade this would be good news if larger self enforcing ieas would lead to stronger reductions of total emissions unfortunately in the presence of self enforcing ieas total emissions turn out to be only slightly less than in the business as usual scenario independent of the number of signatories we also investigate the role of international trade by comparing our free trade results with the outcome in the regime of autarky our autarky model turns out to be coincident with the basic model of the literature alluded to above we contribute to that literature by showing that in autarky the outcome of self enforcing ieas is also almost the same as in the business as usual scenario

a critical review of distance function based economic research on china s marginal abatement cost of carbon dioxide emissions abstract the last few years have witnessed a rapidly emerging literature estimating the marginal abatement cost or the shadow price of carbon dioxide co2 emissions in china using parametric or non parametric distance function approaches this is largely driven by the fact that china has become the world s largest carbon emitter and thus faced mounting domestic and international pressure to mitigate emissions there is an urgent policy need to model and predict the cost burdens of various mitigation scenarios consistent information about the marginal abatement cost of co2 emissions plays a crucial role in addressing this need however the existing literature has suffered from various issues that have severely weakened the scientific support that these studies could potentially provide for sound policy making this paper provides a thorough and critical review of this rapidly emerging literature and identifies important research directions that need the most attention from scholars

constant returns to scale and competitive equilibrium under uncertainty abstract this paper considers the implications of the assumption of constant returns to scale in expected utility maximizing models of the competitive firm or industry in which markets for risk are absent under widely used assumptions about risk preferences it is shown that with constant returns to scale average profits are more than necessary to cover the implicit costs of risk bearing when the free entry of identical firms is possible this assumption about technology is shown to be incompatible with the assumption that entrepreneurs are risk averse

alleviating soil erosion pollution stock externalities alternative roles for government abstract this paper addresses two temporal externalities due to agriculture soil erosion and related pollution the possibility of decentralization of decisions the appropriate role of a resource manager and the efficiency of alternative policies are examined using traditional welfare economics concepts for a two sector model of rural urban linkage three alternative types of policies can be socially efficient but imply different involvement by government and have different knowledge requirements a pigouvian policy requires full information a bargaining solution involves government only in setting an entitlement but it may require too much knowledge by rural households in terms of understanding dynamic environmental relationships a third way is that government and rural households be co producers of environmental goods this concept assigns government the responsibility for maintaining knowledge about environmental relationships and government is a participant in a market system that determines prices for environmental related goods

the merits of new pollutants and how to get them when patents are granted the performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa this interaction is studied for a type of innovation where a new technology reduces emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time causes a new type of damage if the new pollutant associated with this technology is sufficiently different from existing ones such that marginal damage is increasing in each of them but additive across pollutants a diversification of the pollution portfolio is socially desirable in a situation where the incentives to develop such a technology are created by patents the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent holding firm this result carries over to other types of innovation the performance of taxes is limited by either the inability to implement specific pollution mixes or monopoly pricing for constant returns to scale at the industry level the combined use of taxes and permits ensures the first best mix of technologies and provides positive research incentives

pollution control under uncertainty and sustainability concern we analyze the implications of environmental policy on pollution in a stochastic framework with finite horizon and sustainability concern the social planner seeks to minimize the social environmental and economic costs associated with pollution we allow for the planner to attach different relative weights to the discounted and end of planning horizon costs in order to assess how sustainability concern might affect the optimal level of policy intervention we show that the optimal environmental policy increases with the degree of sustainability concern reducing thus the amount of pollution the society is forced to bear a calibration based on world textit co 2 data supports our conclusions further highlighting the importance of higher degrees of sustainability concern to achieve greener long run outcomes it also allows us to show that under a realistic model s parametrization the optimal environmental policy tends to rise with higher degrees of uncertainty in a precautionary manner

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way