control and performance of international joint ventures control is a critical concept for successful management and performance of international joint ventures ijvs this paper reviews and synthesizes prior studies addressing the conceptualization and operationalization of control within ijvs as well as the ijv control performance relationship the paper also presents a new conceptualization of ijv control as well as a conceptual frame work for studying control of ijvs

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

sale of visas a smuggler s final song is there a way of eliminating human smuggling we set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would be migrants a visa selling policy may be successful at eliminating human smugglers by eroding their profits but it necessarily increases immigration in contrast re enforced repression decreases migration but uses the help of cartelized smugglers to overcome this trade off we study how legalisation and repression can be combined to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows this policy mix also has the advantage that the funds raised by visa sales can be used to finance additional investments in border and internal controls employer sanctions and deportations simulations of the policy implications highlight the complementarities between repression and legalisation and call into question the current policies

the impacts of international migration on remaining household members omnibus results from a migration lottery program this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled the impacts of international migration on remaining household members omnibus results from a migration lottery program conducted in 2002 in tonga the study observed the impact of migration lottery program on the remaining household members of tongan emigrants on the individual and intra household level income falls rapidly by 22 to 25 percent with a rise in remittances failing to offset a large fall in labor earnings ownership of livestock durable and access to financial services is lower for the remaining household members diets change to be less nutritious and more rice and root crops immigration has a negative impact on household size there is no significant impact of migration on labor supply for men nor women funding for the study derived from the world bank stanford university the waikato management school and mardsen fund

r d and technology policy in nics as learning processes abstract this paper presents a dynamic learning perspective to research and development activity and to policies promoting these activities and technological development more generally the basic idea is that successful penetration of research and development rd multidisciplinary learning both technoeconomic and managerial organizational and learning which is cumulative through time this is especially so at an early infant phase of diffusion of this process through the economy a dynamic view of externalities and market failures is presented one that provides the basis for a catalytic perspective of technological policy this perspective is based on the distinction between an infant and a mature phase of policy where massive flexible search oriented support in the early phase sets the base for endogenization routinization of r d in the economy and for the possibility of drastic reductions in government support for traditional forms of r d in the later phase

risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public private partnerships we study the agency costs of delegated public service provision focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation we consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between efiort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may come along during operations our analysis points out at the e ciency gains that bundling planning and implementation as under public private partnerships can bring in terms of better project design and lower operational costs bundling also results in increasingly better performance as uncertainty is reduced by growing experience in the sector bundling should instead be viewed with caution when the private sector seeks to radically innovate on public service provision or to introduce new services but lacks the knowledge and expertise to anticipate the impact of the innovative design procedure technology on the cost of operations the compounding of asymmetric information ex post plus moral hazard and renegotiation may generate diseconomies of scope in agency costs which for high operational risk can make unbundling optimal in this context the use of private flnance can help re establishing the beneflt of bundling only if lenders have su cient expertise to help assessing project risks

did migration in the 1980s narrow the north south divide this paper integrates empirical analysis of the decision to migrate from a region with that of destination choice thus we are able to study how net migration and not just gross outflows are influenced by regional labour market circumstances the results suggest that relative regional wages rates but not relative unemployment and vacancy rates are effective in reallocating labour from regions experiencing adverse demand shocks we find little evidence that manual labour is migrating from those regions with relatively high manual unemployment but that migration plays a more conventional role in the regional adjustment process for non manual workers

optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic r d alliances we explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in r d alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by grossman hart and moore in contrast to the standard analysis the productive asset is an excludable public good such as a patent moreover both firms can decide whether to disclose their know how and invest effort know how that has once been released cannot be concealed later we characterize different scenarios in which the optimal ownership structure may change over time due to a trade off between inducing know how disclosure and ensuring maximum effort

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

reputation and the allocation of ownership we show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to cooperate the optimal control structure of the static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the lowest but also the punishment will be minimal the worst ownership structure of the one shot game is good in the repeated setting because it provides the highest punishment but bad because the gain from deviation is also highest we show that when investment costs are very elastic partnership and a hostage type solution arise in equilibrium while when costs are moderately elastic the results of the one shot game apply

information gathering transaction costs and the property rights approach the property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives while bargaining is ex post efficient in contrast transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies in the present paper a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory in particular ownership by party b may be optimal even though only the indispensable party a makes an investment decision

europe s tired poor huddled masses self selection and economic outcomes in the age of mass migration during the age of mass migration 1850 1913 one of the largest migration episodes in history the united states maintained a nearly open border allowing the study of migrant decisions unhindered by entry restrictions we estimate the return to migration while accounting for migrant selection by comparing norway to us migrants with their brothers who stayed in norway in the late nineteenth century we also compare fathers of migrants and nonmigrants by wealth and occupation we find that the return to migration was relatively low 70 percent and that migrants from urban areas were negatively selected from the sending population keep ancient lands your storied pomp cries she with silent lips give me your tired your poor your huddled masses yearning to breathe free the wretched refuse of your teeming shore send these the homeless tempest tost to me i lift my lamp beside the golden door emma lazarus 1883

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

noncooperative bargaining hostages and optimal asset ownership this paper re examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels it obtains some results which contradict findings by sanford j grossman oliver d hart and john moore in particular it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser s investment incentive the difference between this paper and those authors papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining this paper also clarifies the role of relationship specific investments as a cause of integration copyright 1998 by american economic association

market stimulating technology policies in developing countries a framework with examples from east asia abstract this paper proposes an analytical framework for technology development based upon evolutionary approaches and drawing upon asian development strategies the analysis rests on the concept of market stimulating technology policies comprising a broad array of policies to promote industrial and technological development some market and others government determined these policies may be functional horizontal or vertical and can be analyzed at three levels national strategic and specific the paper suggests that strategic choices are involved at all stages that cannot be resolved entirely by recourse to free markets

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

underinvestment in a profitable technology the case of seasonal migration in bangladesh hunger during pre harvest lean seasons is widespread in the agrarian areas of asia and sub saharan africa we randomly assign an 8 50 incentive to households in rural bangladesh to temporarily out migrate during the lean season the incentive induces 22 of households to send a seasonal migrant their consumption at the origin increases significantly and treated households are 8 10 percentage points more likely to re migrate 1 and 3 years after the incentive is removed these facts can be explained qualitatively by a model in which migration is risky mitigating risk requires individual specific learning and some migrants are sufficiently close to subsistence that failed migration is very costly we document evidence consistent with this model using heterogeneity analysis and additional experimental variation but calibrations with forward looking households that can save up to migrate suggest that it is difficult for the model to quantitatively match the data we conclude with extensions to the model that could provide a better quantitative accounting of the behavior

delegating the decision making authority to terminate a sequential project abstract this paper considers a two stage project which requires investments to be made by different agents who have career concerns at each stage the principal needs to decide whether the project should be continued or not after the first stage outcome is realized the principal can either keep the decision making authority regarding the termination policy or else delegate it to one of the agents with career concerns the first stage agent always wants to continue the project in which case the sunk cost fallacy occurs on the contrary the second stage agent may prefer to stop it voluntarily to protect his reputation therefore when the career concerns are strong the principal should delegate the authority to the second stage agent if an early termination of the project is also the best policy for the principal while if the career concerns are weak the principal should keep the authority

transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm the standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations we explore the implications of such transaction costs prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned a party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure intuitively an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable because it implies large gains from trade such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

testing the brain gain hypothesis micro evidence from cape verde abstract does emigration really drain human capital accumulation in origin countries this paper explores a unique household survey designed and conducted to answer this research question we analyze the case of cape verde a country with allegedly the highest brain drain in africa despite a marked record of income and human capital growth in recent decades we propose the first explicit test of brain drain arguments according to which the prospects of own future migration can positively impact educational attainment our most conservative estimates using individual specific variation in economic conditions at the destination indicate that a 10 pp increase in the probability of own future migration improves the probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling by nearly 4 pp for individuals who do not migrate before age 16 these findings are robust to the choice of instruments and econometric specification counterfactual simulations point to significant human capital gains from lowering migration barriers

the dynamics of learning alliances competition cooperation and relative scope we show how the tension between cooperation and competition affects the dynamics of learning alliances private benefits and common benefits differ in the incentives that they create for investment in learning the competitive aspects of alliances are most severe when a firm s ratio of private to common benefits is high we introduce a measure relative scope of a firm in an alliance to show that the opportunity set of each firm outside an alliance crucially impacts its behavior within the alliance finally we suggest why firms might deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior patterns 1998 john wiley sons ltd

innovation systems and technological specialization in latin america and the caribbean abstract this paper examines the national systems of innovation nsi of latin american and caribbean lac countries and attempts to assess their performances although it points out at a number of specific successes overall the region s nsi have evolved since their inception in the 1950s into weak entities science and technology institutions and organisations are not fully performing an enabling role links and interactions between government support organisations businesses and academia are tenuous investment in intangibles and human capital is low and public policy is only partially effective the main result of such weakness is that lac countries innovative performance has as measured by the index of the technological specialisation its which relates the world s normalised shares of high to low tech exports with the only exception perhaps of mexico remained stagnant or has fallen and has lost relatively to many countries that started at similar levels twenty years ago

accounting for selectivity and duration dependent heterogeneity when estimating the impact of emigration on incomes and poverty in sending areas the impacts of international emigration and remittances on incomes and poverty in sending areas are increasingly studied with household survey data but comparing households with and without emigrants is complicated by a triple selectivity problem first households self select into emigration second in some emigrant households everyone moves while others leave members behind and third some emigrants choose to return to the origin country allowing for duration dependent heterogeneity introduces a fourth form of selectivity one must now worry not just about whether households migrate but also when they do so this paper clearly sets out these selectivity issues and their implications for existing migration studies and then addresses them by using survey data designed specifically to take advantage of a randomized lottery that determines which applicants to the over subscribed samoan quota may immigrate to new zealand the analysis compares incomes and poverty rates among left behind members in households in samoa that sent samoan quota emigrants with those for members of similar households that were unsuccessful in the lottery policy rules control who can accompany the principal migrant providing an instrument to address the second selectivity problem while differences among migrants in which year their ballot was selected allow for estimation of duration effects the authors find that migration reduced poverty among former household members but they also find suggestive evidence that this effect may be short lived as both remittances and agricultural income are negatively related to the duration that the migrant has been abroad

a catalytic and evolutionary approach to horizontal technology policies htps abstract this paper presents an evolutionary framework for horizontal technology policies htps especially market friendly ones involving project based incentives e g rd and they complement the more specific and well known selective and vertical policies aimed at individual sectors and technologies the analysis is conducted within a learning to innovate framework with emphasis on collective organizational learning search and market building the outcome is a technology policy cycle with distinct infant growth and mature phases proactive generation of a critical mass of projects for efficient learning and diffusion of innovation routines becomes the aim of the infant phase while the mature phase of the policy should focus on policy restructuring including drastic reductions in the support of routi projects and enhanced support of more complex types of innovation the paper also emphasizes the importance of a neutrality component in incentives in the infant phase of increasing selectivity and of building policy capabilities for efficient policy design and implementation

agency problem institutions and technology policy explaining taiwan s semiconductor industry development abstract taiwan has made significant progress in the semiconductor industry with government agencies and bureaucrats as the driving forces over the past 30 years taiwan s impressive achievement in the semiconductor industry clearly indicates that the government failures and agency problem usually associated with deep government involvement did not occur in taiwan why is that the case this paper proposes a principal agent framework for technology policy and applies the framework to discuss the institutional arrangements through which bureaucrats were controlled effectively in executing the semiconductor industry policies in taiwan by analyzing the institutional and organizational arrangements taiwanese leaders made to mitigate the agency problem this paper brings bureaucrats into the popular developmental state theory and emphasizes that the success of state intervention should not be taken for granted and it also brings politics into technology policy analysis and stresses the importance and complexity of agency problem in technology policy

some essentials of a workable guest worker program a guest worker program provides an appealing way of addressing labor shortages in an advanced country it requires however that foreign workers are willing to return home when their work permit expires i examine how immigration policies enforcement measures and opportunities available in various markets at home and abroad affect the behavior of program participants welfare of a migrant who obeys the rules of the program is compared with that of workers who choose other options in order to define the conditions under which temporary migration is attractive to potential migrants and at the same time consistent with voluntary return

migration risk and liquidity constraints in el salvador abstract this article utilizes panel data from el salvador to investigate the use of transnational migration as an ex post risk management strategy i show that adverse agricultural conditions in el salvador increase both migration to the united states and remittances sent back to el salvador i show that in the absence of any agricultural shocks the probability that a household sent members to the united states would have decreased on average by 24 26 i also show that the 2001 earthquakes reduced net migration to the united states a one standard deviation increase in earthquake damage reduced the average probability of northward migration by 37 11 the evidence suggests that the effects of the earthquakes had more to do with households retaining labor at home to cope with the effects of the disaster than with the earthquakes disrupting migration financing

after you sir hold up direct externalities and sequential investment we propose a solution to the hold up problem the parties in a contract can avoid the inefficiencies caused by the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and implement the first best level of investment if they make their investment decision sequentially one party observing the choice made by the other party before making his own choice unlike the existing literature the proposed solution leads to the efficient choice of investment even when there are two sided direct externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d23 d82

liquidity constrained migrants liquidity constraints represent a major obstacle for potential migrants trying to meet the high cost of undocumented international migration some cover it by borrowing from a smuggling organization with a commitment to repay the loan by working in the destination country as bonded laborers this paper compares alternative ways of financing migration and shows that debt bondage is optimal only if the international wage differential is sufficiently large in relation to migration costs tougher border controls as well as internal enforcement measures can be expected to reduce the incidence of debt bonded relative to self financed migration although they may not necessarily lower the overall inflow of illegal aliens

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

does asset ownership always motivate managers outside options and the property rights theory of the firm this paper studies the grossman hart moore ghm property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating offers bargaining when managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation the ghm results obtain if taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining outcomes are very different sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with sometimes independent assets should be owned together sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately

who leaves deciphering immigrant self selection from a developing country abstract using a novel data set from a developing country the federated states of micronesia fsm i analyze an emigration flow to the united states that has no legal barriers to entry and contains detailed information on the immigrant at home and in the united states i find that highly educated workers relative to the home country average have the highest likelihood of migrating from the fsm to the united states i also compare the premigration wages for the migrants and an observationally equivalent matched nonmigrant group and find that there is a positive and statistically significant difference between the two groups indicating that immigrants are also positively selected on unobserved characteristics the observed selection is consistent with the relatively large differences in home country and destination skill prices at the highest skill levels information on the immigrants characteristics before migration is central to my analysis of determining the nature of immigrant self selection on

passenger shipping cartels and their effect on trans atlantic migration abstract we investigate the impact of passenger shipping cartels on trans atlantic migration during the early twentieth century we assemble from primary sources a detailed database of passenger flows and cartel operations and show that cartel operation reduced migratory flows by approximately 20 to 25 further we show that there was no strong intertemporal substitution in migration to north america at least in the short run and therefore that the effects of cartel operation were not undone by later migration lastly we find that cartel operation had no appreciable effect on the variability of migration flows providing evidence against the notion that unfettered competition was destabilizing to turn of the century transportation markets

the r d performance through time of young high technology firms methodology and an illustration abstract this paper summarizes the pilot stage of a microeconomic study of the innovation performance through time of young high technology israeli firms it reports some results for a successful firm designing producing and selling electronic instruments and systems the paper begins by surveying some of the difficulties surrounding the collection and organization of data on r d projects one of them concerns the definition of the unit for analysis the r d project three criteria are suggested for dividing the stream for innovative activities into r d projects and these are applied to group the tens of products accessories and systems included in the analysis into nine projects the paper subsequently defines a measure of direct project performance or profitability estimate discounted operating profits per unit of fixed costs and provides estimates based on r d and sales data for the products of each project the final sections analyze the variation of project profitability through time the increasing profitability observed across generations of a product class is attributed to the adaptability of the firm to changes in the environment particularly to the availability of new technology which requires the swift design and sale of more complex products the qualitative history of the various projects suggests that this adaptability is due to a large extent to the skills infrastructure and reputation of the firm accumulated from prior projects i e that the indirect profitability of the latter is high some estimates of the indirect profitability of early projects are presented a comparison of the spin off mechanisms observed in the firm analyzed with those observed in firms of other industries is also undertaken

does high inequality attract high skilled immigrants this study examines how the sources and levels of income inequality affect how a country attracts and retains high skilled workers with parameter values that yield realistic levels of emigration our model shows that emigration rates increase with education when the returns to education are higher abroad however the relationship between unobservable skills residual wages and emigration can display an inverse u shaped pattern if unobservable skills are composed of both general and country specific skills using data on israeli emigrants before they decide to emigrate we find strong empirical evidence in support of the model s predictions

what s driving mexico u s migration a theoretical empirical and policy analysis using data gathered in 25 mexican communities the authors link individual acts of migration to 41 theoretically defined individual household community and macroeconomic level predictors the indicators vary through time to yield a discrete time event history analysis over the past 25 years probabilities of first repeat and return migration have been linked more to the forces identified by social capital theory and the new economics of migration than to the cost benefit calculations assumed by the neoclassical model the authors find that mexico u s migration stems from three mutually reinforcing processes social capital formation human capital formation and market consolidation

the place premium bounding the price equivalent of migration barriers large international differences in the price of labor can be sustained by differences between workers or by natural and policy barriers to worker mobility we use migrant selection theory and evide

risk preference immigration policy and illegal immigration abstract the paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration the model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of ethier s one small country model of illegal immigration to a two country context we distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior the relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria moreover attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance

recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change this famous passage from marshall s principles of economics it first appeared in the fifth edition which came out in 1907 nicely brings out two issues which are as germane to economics today as they were when marshall wrote the first is the heavy reliance by economists in their formal theorizing on the notion of equilibrium the other is the appeal that biological conceptions3x201d have for many economists particularly when their focus is on economic change

coordinating research through research joint ventures abstract in a simple model we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms research abilities are private information this can be done with budget balance even though there are participation constraints there is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities the conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable we give a condition under which the profit maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance

industrial r d as a national policy horizontal technology policies and industry state co evolution in the growth of the israeli software industry the israeli software industry has been an indisputable success since the 1990s this paper utilizes the development of the israeli industry to empirically explore the argument of the horizontal technology policies htp framework on the impact of neutral science and technology policies on industrial development the paper micro analyzes the israeli software industry and compares its unique historical development pattern with other emerging countries it describes 1 the rise of this industry as one outcome of the development of the entire it industry in israel 2 the reasons behind the industry s ability to conduct and focus on intensive rd 3 the industry s success in becoming an integral part of the american financial and it industrial sector it argues that only by understanding the intricate co evolution of state industry relations and the specific htp regime employed in israel can we understand the current behavior conditions business models and capability of the industry therefore the argument is that israel s industrial science and technology developmental agencies did not aim at creating a software industry but rather at the development of novel products r d based industry however the software industry has been significantly influenced throughout its development by the specific system of innovation which these policies fostered thus the paper argues that public policy is one of the main reasons why the industry has focused almost entirely on product r d activities in addition the paper suggests that the state s science and technology industrial policy has propelled the industry into its intimate relationship with the american financial sector 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

endogenous spillovers and the performance of research joint ventures we present a model of r d with endogenous spillovers and demonstrate that noncooperation can produce maximal spillovers the only other noncooperative outcome is minimal spillovers when noncooperation achieves maximal spillovers so does an rjv whereas minimal noncooperative spillovers imply partial but not necessarily maximal spillovers by an rjv partial rjv spillovers are chosen for anti competitive reasons and an rjv may also close a lab for anti competitive reasons the possibility of anti competitive outcomes is precluded in the existing literature on rjvs which focuses on symmetric outcomes our model predicts when anti competitive behaviour by an rjv arises

networks in the modern economy mexican migrants in the u s labor market this paper attempts to identify job networks among mexican migrants in the u s labor market the empirical analysis uses data on migration patterns and labor market outcomes based on a sample of individuals belonging to multiple origin communities in mexico over a long period of time each community s network is measured by the proportion of the sampled individuals who are located at the destination the united states in any year we verify that the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job when his network is exogenously larger by including individual fixed effects in the employment and occupation regressions and by using rainfall in the origin community as an instrument for the size of the network at the destination

international migration self selection and the distribution of wages evidence from mexico and the united states we use the 1990 and 2000 mexican and u s population censuses to test borjas s negative selection hypothesis that the less skilled are those most likely to migrate from countries with high skill premia earnings inequality to countries with low skill premia earnings inequality we find that mexican immigrants in the united states are more educated than nonmigrants in mexico and were mexican immigrants to be paid according to current skill prices in mexico they would be concentrated in the middle of mexico s wage distribution these results are inconsistent with the negative selection hypothesis and instead suggest that there is intermediate selection of immigrants from mexico

patents vs trade secrets knowledge licensing and spillover we develop a model of two stage cumulative research and development rd yet the contracting parties choose the closed sale whenever the interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high if the extent of leakage is lower more rus choose open sales generating a nonmonotonic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights and aggregate r d expenditures and the overall likelihood of development by either du jel d23 o32 o34

migration incentives migration types the role of relative deprivation the authors explore the role of relative deprivation versus absolute income as an incentive for migration in developing countries in section i of this paper we outline the relative deprivation model of migration and present an illustration of the divergent policy implications of a relative deprivation model versus an absolute income model an attempt is made to identify distinct empirical implications of relative and absolute income motives for migrating in section ii a migration decision model is estimated and is used to explore absolute and relative income motives for internal and international migration in a sample of rural mexican households as well as to test the extent to which discontinuity in labour markets shapes the choice of migrant destination in section iii we present our conclusions excerpt