the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

how to identify trust and reciprocity this paper uses a three games or triadic design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior a large literature on single game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality averse other regarding preferences such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other regarding preferences do not affect behavior in contrast experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

asymmetric information auditing commitment and economic growth we analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences arising from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification specifically two endogenous growth models of which one allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies to identify borrowers investment returns and the other does not are compared we show that the inability to commit acts as an additional source of informational friction that leads to more stringent contractual terms which in turn result in lower capital accumulation growth and welfare in addition when a tax on capital is considered the tax induced investment distortions are amplified by the absence of auditing commitment from the policy perspective our analysis can be interpreted as suggesting a new micro economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare

the ban on indexed bonds 1933 77 in a recent article in this review nissan liviatan and david levhari attempt to explain the phenomenon that in spite of recent marked inflationary trends the important capital markets have not developed a significant free private enterprise market for cost of living linked bonds p 366 they note that the familiar theoretical complete dominance of indexed bonds over nonindexed bonds holds unambiguously only in an economy in which there are no nominal assets they demonstrate that borrowers may in theory insist on hedging the inflation risk on their nonindexed cash balances by issuing some nonindexed bonds at a discount that makes them attractive in spite of the risk they impose on lenders their model leads them to conclude that indexed bonds might not completely dominate nonindexed bonds however they do not claim that their model explains the phenomenon they set out to explain why is it that the free market to use their expression has come up with virtually no indexed bonds at all fortunately a simple explanation for the nonexistence of indexed bonds in the united states was provided two years

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

reputation and discretion in financial contracting the authors explain the use of legally unenforceable discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible a discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract it is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states in addition discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation this explains discretion among highly confident letters holding company relationships mutual fund contracts bank loan commitments and other financial and nonfinancial contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism abstract this paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal agent relationship with moral hazard the key aspect is that rewards have informational content when the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent s performance she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent in accordance with the often observed compression of ratings we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent s interim performance imperfectly i e she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance furthermore we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent s effort provided that the principal s stake in the project is small

banking scope and financial innovation we explore the implications of financial system design for financial innovation we begin with assumptions about the investment opportunities of firms their observable attributes and the roles of commercial banks investment banks and the financial market we examine the borrower s choice between bank and financial market funding the commercial bank s choice of monitoring capacity and the investment bank s choice of whether to invest in financial innovation our main result is that financial innovation in a universal banking system is stochastically lower than innovation in a financial system in which commercial and investment banks are functionally separated article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

bad news an experimental study on the informational effects of rewards both psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have hidden costs one possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to oer higher rewards when she knows the task to be di cult our experiment tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is perceived by their recipients our design allows us to decompose the overall eect of rewards on eort into a direct incentive and an informational eect the results show that most participants correctly interpret high rewards as bad news in accordance with theory the negative informational eect co exists with the direct positive eect

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

costly state verification with varying risk preferences and liability abstract in the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification we examine how the properties of the set of states different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments in particular we show that with risk averse debtors a general set of states a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states if the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral this non monotonicity of consumption disappears moreover given the loan size there is more monitoring under debtor risk aversion than risk neutrality we present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability finally we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework

uninsured deposits as a monitoring device their impact on bond yields of banks abstract we empirically analyze the impact of uninsured deposits on a bank s cost of public debt uninsured depositors can exert market discipline over a bank and potentially reduce its agency cost of debt through informed monitoring we use a sample of public bond issues by u s bank holding companies from 1994 to 2013 and find statistically strong evidence that banks with more uninsured deposits relative to their assets issue bonds with a lower interest rate findings suggest a one standard deviation increase in uninsured deposits is associated with a 46 64 basis point decrease in bond yield in addition we find that bonds issued by banks with higher default risk or lower reputation benefit more from uninsured savers our paper contributes to the literature that explores market discipline and provides evidence that banks can benefit from it through a lower borrowing cost

the price of a price on the crowding out and in of social norms we study the impact of financial incentives on social approval showing that in a society with altruists and egoists who all care about social approval introducing financial incentives to agents to contribute to a socially desirable outcome may actually decrease the number of contributions withdrawing the financial incentive does not restore the norm to contribute and may reduce the level of contributions even further when the norm has disappeared it may be possible to restore voluntary contributions by first introducing high price and then reducing it but such an operation is costly and its success uncertain

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

loan size as a commitment device the authors model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy the borrower underreports with a positive probability in the successful state and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure under lack of commitment to audit probabilities an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit this reduces the probability of underreporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commitment case however there is underinvestment relative to the level under full information copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets abstract this paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type insurers can at some cost verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out however insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy the paper analyzes the relationship between second best pareto optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework it characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium the individuals contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists

gaming against managers in incentive systems experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers we examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in china comparing behavior between i students and managers with field experience with this situation ii standard versus increased monetary incentives and iii sessions conducted in context making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers and those without any such references the dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually and incompletely converging on a pooling equilibrium a fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers with minimal impact on students

contextual inference in markets on the informational content of product lines context can influence decisions this malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings in a market equilibrium however context conveys payoff relevant information to consumers consequently these consumers rationally violate naive formulations of standard choice theoretic principles i identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors namely the compromise effect and choice overload arise as market equilibria firms respond to consumers contextual inference in case of the compromise effect a firm may introduce premium loss leaders expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods

information reusability competition and bank asset quality this paper explains the recent decline in bank asset quality using the notion of information reusability banks are viewed as information processors they exist because of their advantage in extracting the surplus associated with the reusability of borrower specific information it is shown that a bank s incentive to screen loan applicants and hence maintain the quality of its assets depends on the surplus this screening can produce which in turn depends on information reusability two recent changes in banks operating environment are increased competitition and greater temporal volatility in borrower credit risks the former has directly reduced banks informational surplus while the latter has impaired information reusability hence screening expenditures have been reduced and the diminution of screening has lowered the quality of bank assets it is also shown that an increase in deposit insurance premia has an effect similar to that of narrowing interest spreads and therefore will result in reduced asset screening and impaired asset quality

costly verification of cost performance and the competition for incentive contracts this article analyzes the optimal linear incentive contract to offer to would be agents competing for a principal s project when the principal finds it costly to observe an agent s cost performance ex post and cannot commit to monitoring policy ex ante cost sharing reduces the winning bidder s informational rents but creates an incentive for the agent to pad costs ex post to slacken his effort the optimal cost sharing parameter generally differs from that when monitoring is costless and it is higher the fewer the number of bidders and the larger the variance of their idiosyncratic cost

signaling in credit markets in this paper we show that under a variety of alternative assumptions about the private information of loan applicants a competitive market for loans is characterized by screening banks separate out loan risks by offering higher loans at higher interest rates depending on the nature of the informational asymmetry it may be that applicants with less risky projects select larger rather than smaller loans comparative statics implications are also examined in particular we explore the effects of an increase in banks cost of funds on average loan quality

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

the hidden advantage of delegation pareto improvements in a gift exchange game this paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees our results how that such delegation significantly increases effort levels moreover we observe a pareto improvement as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not interestingly we also find that the employees performance under delegation is higher than under non delegation even for similar wages while there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations this result also holds for one shot interactions a possible non strategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

effect of the number of banking relationships on credit availability evidence from panel data of spanish small firms this paper investigates how the choice between single or multiple banking relationships affects credit availability for a complete panel of small and medium sized spanish firms the results seem to indicate the existence of rationing since a substitution relation has been found between trade and bank credit we also analyse the relationship between the level of indebtedness and the interest rate for each group of firms the results show that those smes that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain fewer funds for the same increase in the interest rate which indicates that these companies have more financial restraints