inequality and the dynamics of public opinion the self reinforcing link between economic inequality and mass preferences this article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public s policy mood recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality public opinion and government redistribution one group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time series data from 1952 to 2006 supplemented with cross sectional analysis where appropriate we show that economic inequality is in fact self reinforcing but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments

cycles in politics wavelet analysis of political time series spectral analysis and arma models have been the most common weapons of choice for the detection of cycles in political time series controversies about cycles however tend to revolve around an issue that both techniques are badly equipped to address the possibility of irregular cycles without fixed periodicity throughout the entire time series this has led to two main consequences on the one hand proponents of cyclical theories have often dismissed established statistical techniques on the other hand proponents of established techniques have dismissed the possibility of cycles without fixed periodicity wavelets allow the detection of transient and coexisting cycles and structural breaks in periodicity in this article we present the tools of wavelet analysis and apply them to the study of two lingering puzzles in the political science literature the existence of cycles in election returns in the united states and in the severity of major power wars

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in britain a lot of energy is currently being expended in trying to understand what has been happening to unemployment in britain and the rest of the developed world in this paper we look at this question in the british context by trying to confront some possible explanations with the data since the data we use are quarterly over rather a short period we are setting the explanations a very hard test most explanations tend to be rather casual and the theories underpinning them ill developed thus for example the so called real wage argument is based on the idea that real wages affect labour demand and that the equilibrium real wage bears some relatively stable relationship to output per head but how stable is not clear thus whether or not we can expect a well defined stable ceteris paribus dynamic relationship between real product wages as a proportion of output per head and unemployment is equally unclear so if such a relationship does not show up in a quarterly regression model this may not be that serious for the theory nevertheless we must look for the relationship for how else are we ever to discriminate between a plethora of conflicting views the primary emphasis in this paper is on the secular factors affecting unemployment rather than the cyclical variables consequently we shall not be concerned with developing a coherent theory of cyclical fluctuations and in the empirical work we shall control for the cycle simply by making use of those exogenous or predetermined variables which other work in this field suggests are important 2 the remainder of the paper is set out as follows the next section is concerned with specifying a model which generates a definition of equilibrium unemployment the outline of this model is a pair of equations determining the flows into and out of unemployment and these are specified in section ii which looks closely at the possible variables involved section iii then deals with the results and presents some general conclusions

business political power the case of taxation we examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in u s politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation we find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship with democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners how far corporations engage in electoral financing measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees is also influential the models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by bowles gordon and weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign in this article a two party contest where candidates allocate their campaign resources strategically between two salient issues is studied the analysis aims to determine the circumstances under which there is issue convergence both parties emphasizing the same issue or issue divergence different parties emphasizing different issues during a political campaign for this purpose the concepts of a party s absolute and comparative advantage are used a party has an absolute advantage on an issue if a majority of voters prefer its position on this issue to that of its opponent a party has a comparative advantage on an issue if the percentage of votes that it would obtain if voters cared only about that issue is larger than those that it would obtain if voters cared only about the other issue it is shown here that issue convergence can occur only if one of the parties has an absolute advantage on both issues but its comparative advantage is not too large otherwise there will be issue divergence in the political campaign

rhetoric on the economy have european parties changed their economic messages abstractthis study analyses the determinants of dispersion of economic issue mentions in european party manifestos we examined three main economic domains governmental control of the economy free market capitalism and support for the welfare state as consequences of globalization forces economic conditions partisanship and electoral turnout employing aggregate level comparative manifesto project cmp data from legislative elections in 15 european countries from 1970 to 2010 we confirm that parties hold a common view of the salience of economic control of the state as a consequence of globalization pressure and economic growth levels partisanship of the cabinets regardless of the political orientation counteracted issue salience concentration in the welfare domain government size favoured dispersion in the free market realm our results do not indicate clear homogenization of parties economic messages in elections over the last 40 years

a broken public americans responses to the great recession did americans respond to the recent great recession by demanding that government provide policy solutions to rising income insecurity an expectation of state of the art theorizing on the dynamics of mass opinion or did the recession erode support for government activism in line with alternative scholarship pointing to economic factors having the reverse effect we find that public support for government social programs declined sharply between 2008 and 2010 yet both fixed effects and repeated survey analyses suggest economic change had little impact on policy attitude formation what accounts for these surprising developments we consider alternative microfoundations emphasizing the importance of prior beliefs and biases to the formation of policy attitudes analyzing the general social surveys panel our results suggest political partisanship has been central gallup and evaluations of government and society surveys provide further evidence against the potentially confounding scenario of government o

election campaigns agenda setting and electoral outcomes framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes this paper uses a two party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties campaign decisions alternations of power emerge naturally even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant

what moves policy sentiment in spite of the fact that political eras in the united states are widely and often ambiguously defined in terms of a general policy sentiment or mood political scientists have done little in the way of rigorous analysis regarding this subject i argue that shifts in domestic policy sentiment along a liberal conservative continuum may be understood in part as responses to changing economic expectations specifically expectations of a strong economy result in greater support for liberal domestic policies whereas anticipation of declining economic conditions pushes the national policy mood to the right using quarterly data for the period 1968 88 i present a multiple time series error correction model that lends considerable support to the hypothesis

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

policy and the dynamics of political competition informed discussions of political competition by journalists pundits novelists country specialists or indeed practicing politicians usually describe a system in perpetual motion perpetual motion is seen as a normal state of affairs not a manifestation of chaotic instability and it is usually seen as having an endogenous dynamic what the actors do at cycle c of the political process feeds back to affect the entire process at cycle c 1 these informed discussions thus see politics as a complex dynamic system evolving under its own steam a system unlikely to reach steady state in stark contrast mainstream models of political competition are usually static with key model parameters and rules of interaction fixed exogenously although static models do not necessarily imply equilibrium almost invariably the core intellectual approach is to specify a model and solve for equilibrium authors of such models are typically driven by what cederman describes as a metaphysical conviction that equilibria are always out there waiting to be discovered a conviction that can blind the analyst to the possibility of adjustments never settling cederman 1997 34 35 but if common sense tells us party competition is a complex dynamic process then it also tells us party competition may never achieve equilibrium this paper addresses the striking disjuncture between the static nature of most formal models of party competition and the dynamic way in which informed observers who hardly ever talk about politics in terms of equilibrium think about the political process while many theorists would willingly concede in general terms that real political competition is a complex dynamic process the hard question concerns how to model this in a way that is both theoretically tractable and substantively plausible in what follows i set out

investments in modern production technology and the cash flow oriented epq model in this study we analyze investments in setup and production processes in the context of the traditional inventory problem the comparison of the results of a cash flow and a cost oriented model suggests the use of the net present value as a decision criterion the analysis shows that an additional investment which reduces setup cost decreases the optimal capital investment necessary to reduce production cost and vice versa an investment which increases the production rate however may increase or decrease the capital expenditure of an investment in the setup process

what moves parties the role of public opinion and global economic conditions in western europe do western european political parties adjust their ideological positions in response to shifts in public opinion and to changing global economic conditions based on a time series cross sectional analysis of parties ideological dynamics in eight western european democracies from 1976 1998 the authors conclude that both factors influence parties ideological positions but that this relationship is mediated by the type of party specifically they find that parties of the center and right react to both public opinion and the global economy whereas parties of the left display no discernible tendency to respond to public opinion and also appear less responsive to global economic conditions the findings on leftist parties distinctiveness support arguments about these parties long term policy orientations as well as about their organizational structures the authors also find little support for neoliberal convergence arguments

from eoq towards zi zero inventory zi is a new and powerful concept to improve production efficiency underpinning zi is set up reduction and this paper examines what eventuates when set up costs are cut the folklore is that set up reduction lowers inventory and costs we obtain results contrary to that reducing set up costs need not reduce inventory for example likewise lowering set up costs need not necessarily lower total production and inventory costs furthermore most investments produce marginally decreasing returns set up cost reduction prompts the opposite it produces marginally increasing not decreasing returns a parametric algorithm that calculates the benefit of set up cost reduction is provided most presentations of zi have been descriptive with very few mathematical models of it yet untaken by modeling certain zi concepts mathematically we scrutinize their validity and sometimes invalidity

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

searching for political business cycles in germany one reslt of the revitalised literature on political business cycles is that there are signs in german data that elections and ideology have an impact however using monthly data for the period 1950 1989 and standard methods of time series analysis we reject both the nordhaus hypothesis of opportunistic cycles and the partisan approaches by hibbs ans alesina we show that some results are sensitive to the assumption of stationarity there are signs of policy cycles in m1 it is hard though to bring this in line with the rogoff hypothesis of rational opportunistic cycles because of the german institutional setting

a downsian spatial model with party activism a unidimensional spatial model is proposed in this article although its formal structure parallels the spatial model of electoral competition this model examines the decisions of individuals as they choose whether or not to become activists in one of two political parties an individual calculus of participation is developed that is similar to the spatial interpretation of the calculus of voting this calculus is then generalized by examining conditions that may hold for aggregate activism probabilities and the relationship between the two forms is investigated some results are then presented which concern the distributions of activists in the two parties these results in general conform to the existence of party cleavages in which there are two stable equilibrium distributions of activists such that the two parties activists are relatively cohesive internally and relatively distinctive externally finally some suggestions are offered about how this model can be combined with the spatial model of candidate competition to provide a more complete model of elections

the public as thermostat dynamics of preferences for spending theory democratic accountability requires that the public be reasonably well informed about what policymakers actually do such a public would adjust its preferences for more or less policy in response to policy outputs themselves in effect the public would behave like a thermostat when the actual policy temperature differs from the preferred policy temperature the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly and once sufficiently adjusted the signal would stop hypotheses in domains where policy is clearly defined and salient to the public changes in the public s preferences for more policy activity are negatively related to changes in policy methods a thermostatic model of american public preferences for spending on defense and a set of five social programs is developed and then tested using time series regression analysis results changes in public preferences for more spending reflect changes in both the preferred levels of spending and spending decisions themselves most importantly changes in preferences are negatively related to spending decisions whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward upward when appropriations increase decrease thus consistent with the eastonian model policy outputs do feed back on public inputs at least in the defense spending domain and across a set of social spending domains

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

constituency opinion and congressional policy making the reagan defense buildup representatives votes on a series of defense budget roll calls in the first year of the reagan administration s pentagon buildup are related to constituency opinions on defense spending during the 1980 election campaign the strong aggregate constituency demand for increased defense spending in 1980 is estimated to have added almost 17 billion about 10 to the total fiscal year 1982 pentagon appropriation the impact of constituency opinion was largely independent of specific political circumstances differential responsiveness in districts with partisan turnover intense districtlevel competition and strong presidential coattails together accounted for less than 1 billion in additional appropriations with the remaining 16 billion attributable to across the board responsiveness by even the most safely incumbent representatives t he appeal of representative democracy hinges on the responsiveness of elected politicians to the preferences and interests of their constituents given the theoretical and practical significance of the connection between constituents opinions and their representatives legislative activities it is remarkable that the large and in some ways quite sophisticated empirical literature addressing this connection includes so few direct estimates of the relationship between constituency opinion and specific legislative outcomes 1 my aim here is to provide one such estimate the policy issue i have chosen to examine is the level of total pentagon spending in the first fy 1982 defense appropriations bill of the reagan administration that bill the first in a series of annual appropriations resulting in a 40 real increase in defense spending during reagan s first five years in office is of obvious political significance but the issue of defense spending is also especially interesting from a broader theoretical perspective because the strong public demand for a defense spending increase at the beginning of the reagan era provides unusual analytical leverage for assessing the potential impact of public opinion on the making of public policy i shall describe some alternative mechanisms of congressional responsiveness to constituency opinion briefly characterize the politics of defense at the beginning of the reagan era present my analysis of representatives preferences regarding fy 1982 defense appropriations relating those preferences to constituency opinions on the defense spending issue and to other political characteristics of the representatives and their districts extend the analysis of fy 1982 defense appropriations from the individual to the aggregate level in an attempt to estimate the impact of congressional responsiveness on the total level of pentagon appropriations and finally touch upon some of the implications of my analysis for the study of linkages between public opinion and public policy

the cost of ruling cabinet duration and the median gap model in a recent article paldam and skott 1995 provide atheoretical explanation for an important empirical phenomenonin democratic countries incumbent governments tend to losevotes in this paper i show that paldam and skott stheoretical explanation for this cost of ruling ispotentially much stronger than they recognize specifically when generalized in a straightforward way their modelexplains not only the cost of ruling itself but also a secondwell established empirical fact that the longer an incumbentgovernment has been in power the more votes it loses further this generalization of the model produces twoadditional empirical hypotheses that have not yet been testedin the empirical literature

the politics of inequality voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted and why is it that in other countries where inequality has increased much less the left has become substantially more redistributive the answer the authors argue has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low income voters the authors make two points in this article first high levels of inequality move left parties to the left second although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of left parties to the left it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics the authors argue that left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low income voters are politically mobilized they explore these claims through a comparative analysis of left party programs in 10 organisation for economic cooperation and development countries over the period 1966 to 2002

granger causality and the time series analysis of political relationships political scientists have employed causal modeling techniques for quite some time in most cases however they have relied on methods of a static cross sectional variety time series methods have been disseminated and applied but these have not been expressly causal the problem of assessing the causal character or direction of political relationships over time has not been addressed granger 1969 has suggested a notion of causality that is applicable in longitudinal analysis the study and application of granger s idea of causation now is widespread in economics and business this discussion evaluates the usefulness of applying granger causality in the study of political relationships granger s definition of causality is introduced several popular procedures for assessing granger causality are reviewed and certain problems surrounding interpretation of those empirical tests are elucidated the virtues and pitfalls of granger causal analysis then are illustrated in an analysis of an important topic in international political economy and also in a reanalysis of a recent granger causal investigation of arms races

r d and endogenous asymmetries between firms abstract we endogenize competitiveness asymmetries between firms through commitment power asymmetries in r d we show that relatively to firms with no commitment power in r d firms with a first mover advantage in r d achieve higher competitiveness levels

a rational voter explanation of the cost of ruling it is well known that the average government loses votes the so called cost of ruling we show that the loss can be explained as a perfectly rational demand for change in a median voter model once the model is amended to let the two parties be visibly different

does public support help democracy survive it is widely believed that democracy requires public support to survive the empirical evidence for this hypothesis is weak however with existing tests resting on small cross sectional samples and producing contradictory results the underlying problem is that survey measures of support for democracy are fragmented across time space and different survey questions in response this article uses a bayesian latent variable model to estimate a smooth country year panel of democratic support for 135 countries and up to 29 years the article then demonstrates a positive effect of support on subsequent democratic change while adjusting for the possible confounding effects of prior levels of democracy and unobservable time invariant factors support is moreover more robustly linked with the endurance of democracy than its emergence in the first place as lipset 1959 and easton 1965 hypothesized over 50 years ago public support does indeed help democracy survive

estimated output price interest rate and exchange rate linkages amongcountries this article provides quantitative estimates from an econometric model of the output price interest rate and exchange rate linkages among a number of countries the linkages are examined by changing various policy variables and observing the resulting changes in the endogenous variable the model is also used to estimate what is called the exchanging rate effect on inflation one of the ways in which monetary and fiscal policies may affect a country s inflation rate is by first influencing its exchange rate which in turn influences import prices which in turn influence domestic prices the model allows this exchange rate effect on inflation to be estimated

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

globalization party positions and the median voter the authors argue that the effects of economic globalization on social democratic parties in western europe are conditional on the position of the median voter if the median is far enough to the right such parties will adopt business friendly policies because they are required to win office only when the median is relatively far to the left will globalization constrain social democratic parties forcing them to adopt policies further to the right in order to retain credibility it is on this basis the authors argue that empirical studies are misspecified unless they include an interaction between measures of globalization and the position of the median in addition to presenting formal theoretical arguments the article reports empirical findings from fifteen countries in the period from 1973 to 2002 that support the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent on the median the authors find that the effects of globalization are significant for social democratic parties only in circumstances in which the median is relatively far to the left

public acceptance of energy technologies the effects of labeling time and heterogeneity in a discrete choice experiment public acceptance is crucial for successful implementation of energy technologies in society however studies that use the concept do so in diverse and often inconsistent ways they also often limit themselves to specific technologies and do not account for the effects of labeling time and the heterogeneity of the general public which may lead to a biased and incomplete understanding of public acceptance this study first conceptualizes three forms of public acceptance socio political acceptance market acceptance and community acceptance it then relates the concept of socio political acceptance to preference formation next it uses two discrete choice experiments that were conducted in 2010 and 2012 to investigate these concerns our results show that public preferences for energy technologies are temporally stable even in the face of exogenous shocks such as the fukushima incident using mixed logit models we further show that labeling has a profound influence on stated preferences when technology labels are revealed respondents favor renewable and natural gas technologies when labels remain unobserved nuclear energy and biomass take prominence however latent class models show that there are distinct classes of respondents tied to specific socio demographic characteristics that differ greatly in their sensitivity to labeling and in the temporal stability of their preferences it follows that changes in public acceptance are not population wide but remain limited to specific sub groups we discuss the theoretical and policy implications of our findings and conclude that future studies and policy initiatives may overlook important insights if they disregard the effects of labels time and heterogeneity

peasants or bankers the american electorate and the u s economy t he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the retrospective economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience voter as peasant a second model assumes a sophisticated economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations voter as banker using the components both retrospective and prospective of the index of consumer sentiment ics as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series with aggregate consumer expectations about long term business conditions in the approval equation neither the usual economic indicators not the other ics components matter moreover short term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy the qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen economics moves political behavior with hard times administrations lose support with good times they gain it we know this to be true but when we ask how by what processes the political translation of economic experience occurs the an

phoenix risen the resurrection of global finance of all the many changes of the world economy since world war ii few have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance a review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial globalization leaving much room for further research competing historical interpretations stressing the contrasting roles of market forces and government policies need to be reexamined for dynamic linkages among the variables they identify likewise impacts on state policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions and what policymakers can do about them finally questions are also raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally used for the study of international political economy and international relations more generally

public attitudes toward government spending this study examines the nature sources and consequences of citizens attitudes toward government spending data from the 1984 cps national election study are used to perform a scaling analysis of mass spending preferences across a set of 10 public policies the empirical results indicate that there is a coherent structure underlying citizens attitudes toward social welfare spending in contrast spending preferences for nonwelfare programs are separate and largely unrelated concerns i argue that this distinction is essential for understanding public opinion on government spending and further analyses incorporating the difference between welfare and nonwelfare spending preferences provide important theoretically relevant insights about the relationship between citizens in the mass public and stimuli in the political world

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

income distribution in the united states political action has affected postwar income distribution in the united states mainly through policy induced variations in macroeconomic activity and government transfer benefits in proportion to total income we present a small dynamic model of the connections among the partisan balance of power macroeconomic fluctuations transfer spending trends and income distribution outcomes the model is based on the premise that the parties have different distributional goals and it is designed to identify how shifts in party control of the presidency and the strength of the parties in congress have affected the distribution of after tax after transfer income by influencing cyclical economic performance and the flow of resources to transfer programs we therefore extend the partisan theory of macroeconomic policy to the domain of income distribution outcomes

random walk or planned excursion continuity and change in the left right positions of political parties implicit in theories of democratic elections is the idea of change or at least the potential for change elections provide the opportunity for citizens to change their party preferences and thus al

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

how economic integration affects party issue emphases the economic dimension has typically been considered the primary dimension of political party competition however parties often rally voters on the basis of non economic issues in this article we argue that integration into global markets and into the european union eu constrains parties abilities to credibly differentiate themselves on economic issues given these constraints and voters awareness of them parties activate other non economic issues along which to compete using data across 49 countries between 1961 and 2010 this study shows that increased economic integration is associated with increased emphasis on non economic issues during election campaigns this effect persists over time and remains robust to a number of alternative explanations and modeling strategies we also explore the proposed causal mechanisms and show that integration is indeed associated with convergence of party positions on economic issues and that all types of parties not just new and niche parties respond to int

party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes although the nature of the differences between parties in democratic electoral politics is an enduring question in political science surprisingly little is understood about the subject but substantial progress has been made in recent years most notably in understanding party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes the first breakthrough was douglas hibbs s 1977 analysis of party related differences in the unemployment rate in his time series analysis for the united states hibbs modeled the path of unemployment as an autoregressive moving average process subject to a dummy variable intervention term indicating party of the president his analysis indicated that democratic administrations were associated with lower unemployment than republicans by 2 36 points after eight years in office and even larger differences in long run equilibrium a subsequent article by nathaniel beck 1982 addressed the same issue and found the party differences less sharp when administration specific policy differences are considered the techniques employed by hibbs and beck focus directly on an outcome unemployment rather than on the policy instruments that are presumably responsible for altering outcomes this approach can be misleading when there are long lags between implementation of policies and ultimate effects or when shocks occasionally intrude upon the regular connections between instruments and outcomes macroeconomic theories can provide information about constraints linking macroeconomic variables but hibbs and beck fail to incorporate theoretical constraints such constraints could help determine what kinds of outcomes are feasible and sustainable and to what extent outcomes are induced by policies as opposed to shocks our purpose here is to consider how one might go about estimating party differences in a framework that takes advantage of some insights offered by macroeconomic theories and to report some preliminary results a more complete description of the analysis is provided in our working paper available upon request

the international economy as a constraint on u s macroeconomic policymaking international economic factors increasingly influence american trade and exchange policy and interdependence also circumscribes the autonomous choice of domestic policies but the growing concern of organization for economic cooperation and development oecd policymakers over the potential for macroeconomic policy coordination to enhance national as well as world welfare implies that international economic relations present opportunities rather than constraints under some circumstances this suggests that understanding domestic economic policy choice within its international context involves not only how policy choices are made within the bounds of international constraints but also when countries might cooperate to modify the constraints themselves this research looks to four important historical cases for information on these questions the first three are the series of cumulating crises in the international monetary system during the 1960s and early 1970s the fourth is the energy supply shock of 1973 and the recession that followed the article describes the process of policy selection in each of these cases contrasting domestic versus international premises for policy choice the economics literature has emphasized the magnitude of domestic welfare gains available from coordinated national economic policies although the cases considered here do not contradict the importance of payoffs they underline the corresponding role of political economic and strategic uncertainty in conditioning elites policy choices

inter country differences in voter satisfaction with the democratic process a study of world elections using data from the comparative study of electoral systems this paper examines differences between west and east european countries in their levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works compared to east european countries satisfaction levels were considerably higher in western countries west europe north america and oceania moreover there was considerably greater inequality in the distribution of satisfaction in east european compared to western countries when these facts were combined to construct equity sensitive satisfaction averages the gap between western countries and east european countries was even greater than suggested by a comparison of average satisfaction levels this raised the question of why satisfaction levels varied so markedly between these two sets of countries a logit model suggested that a number of factors were important for determining whether people were satisfied with the way democracy worked in their countries while there was a difference between western countries and east european countries in their endowments of these satisfaction inducing factors income gender participation education among others when the equations were estimated separately for the western countries and east european countries the coefficient responses associated with several of these factors also differed markedly between the two groups

party policy diffusion do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems this research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating foreign successful incumbent parties spatial econometric analyses of parties election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed by showing that parties respond to these foreign incumbent parties this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition furthermore we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion as we suggest that political parties are important vehicles through which public policies diffuse

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

the dynamics of state policy liberalism 1936 2014 applying a dynamic latent variable model to data on 148 policies collected over eight decades 1936 2014 we produce the first yearly measure of the policy liberalism of u s states our dynamic measure of state policy liberalism marks an important advance over existing measures almost all of which are purely cross sectional and thus cannot be used to study policy change we find that in the aggregate the policy liberalism of u s states steadily increased between the 1930s and 1970s and then largely plateaued the policy liberalism of most states has remained stable in relative terms though several states have shifted considerably over time we also find surprisingly little evidence of multidimensionality in state policy outputs our new estimates of state policy liberalism have broad application to the study of political development representation accountability and other important issues in political science abstract from author

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

voters commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs when will a vote seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost it votes using a game theoretical model we show that a government enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times but not during good ones the key reason is that voters cannot commit to re elect a government that does not reform during bad times this voters commitment problem stems from economic voting i e voters tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy the voter commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose

public provision of intergenerational goods the case of preserved lands theory as with other goods and services the provision of intergenerational goods is determined by the interaction of demand and supply conditions the major conditions affecting provision of intergenerational goods are supportive advocacy coalitions and the impact of a relevant public agency hypotheses 1 the more evident the supportive advocacy coalitions the higher the level of intergenerational good provided 2 the more durable the presence of a centrally located public agency responsible for the good the higher the quantity of good provided methods ordinary least squares regression is used to test the impact of demand and supply variables on the preservation of lands in nearly 100 nations results 1 nations vary considerably in provision of intergenerational goods 2 higher quantities of the goods provided are correlated to high levels of domestic demand and the longer presence of a relevant public agency

social policy responsiveness in developed democracies do mass policy preferences influence the policy output of welfare states in developed democracies this is an important issue for welfare state theory and research and this article presents an analysis that builds from analytical innovations developed in the emerging literature on linkages between mass opinion and public policy the authors analyze a new dataset combining a measure of social policy preferences with data on welfare state spending alongside controls for established causal factors behind social policy making the analysis provides evidence that policy preferences exert a significant influence over welfare state output guided also by statistical tests for endogeneity the authors find that cross national differences in the level of policy preferences help to account for a portion of the differences among social christian and liberal welfare state regimes the results have implications for developing fruitful connections between welfare state scholarship comparative opinion research and recent opinion policy studies

public policy towards r d in oligopolistic industries the importance of determining optimal policy towards r d cannot be exaggerated given the worldwide interest in fostering r d and given the significant differences between european and u s policies towards interfirm cooperation on r d moreover the problem is an inherently difficult one because of the complex nature of the r d process since r d is a component of fixed costs industries where it is important tend to be concentrated hence r d policy must go hand in hand with competition policy at the same time r d is like any form of investment in that it precedes the production stage hence issues of time consistency and strategic commitment inevitably arise in considering the choice of r d policy finally r d by one firm typically leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms so that r d exhibits many of the character department of economics university college dublin belfield dublin 4 ireiatid for helpful discussions and comments we are grateful to two anonymous referees to pedro bartos steve martin massimo motta and damien neven and to participants at seminars in birmingham st andrew s and warwick at a cepr workshop on r d spillovers in lausanne at erwit 94 in caslel gandolfo eea 95 in prague the 1996 conference on industrial economics at universidad carlos iii de madrid and a meeting of the dublin economics workshop this paper was produced as part of the international economic performance programme of the centre for economic performance london school of economics supported by the u k esrc an earlier version was circulated as cepr discussion paper no 1243 see alexis jacquemin 1988 and stephen martin 1996 istics of a public good albeit one that is mostly privately produced tbe degree to which such spillovers occur and can be internalized is another crucial influence on the desirable pattem of intervention

inflation unemployment and government collapse a poisson application as democracies enter an era of economic retrenchment the political costs associated with economic decline have come under close scrutiny by students of comparative politics and public policy of particular concern is the linkage between inflation unemployment and the collapse of incumbent governments the present study provides an initial application of an alternative approach to measuring this linkage across 8 european democracies and offers significant evidence linking political costs for cabinet governments with rising prices and the growing unemployment by utilizing the poisson method of determining probabilities of discrete events increasing probabilities of government collapse are significantly associated with rising inflation and unemployment in european democracies between january 1958 and december 1979 subsequent use of the sanders and herman s 1977 and warwick 1979 analyses of cabinet stability provides a useful means to disaggregate the nation sample of the study into four discrete s

note can a reduction in set up costs indeed increase total costs zangwill zangwill w i 1987 from eoq towards zi management sci 33 1209 1223 has constructed an example which purports to show that reducing set up costs can increase total cost we show that this happened as a result of restricting the policies to be of a greedy nature the expected cost of truly optimal policies is shown not to increase

policy mis representation and the cost of ruling u s presidential elections in comparative perspective the cost of ruling effect on electoral support is well established that is governing parties tend to lose vote share the longer they are in power although we know this to be true we do not know why it happens this research examines whether the cost of ruling results at least in part from the tendency for governing parties to shift policy further away from the average voter it first considers differences in political institutions and how they might influence cost of ruling owing to policy drift and then tests the hypothesis focusing on u s presidential elections which is an unfavorable case to find such an effect results confirm a clear cost of ruling effect in these elections and demonstrate that policy misrepresentation is an important mechanism that is the policy liberalism of presidents from different parties diverges over time as their tenure in the white house increases and the degree to which it does matters for the presidential vote policy is not the only thing that matters and other

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

don t stand so close to me spatial contagion effects and party competition in this article we bring together elements from the literatures on economic voting and spatial voting to gain theoretical leverage on the combined role of clarity of responsibility party policy positions and economic performance in elections building on evidence of voter knowledge we develop a theory of spatial contagion effects to explain how factors drawn from both of these literatures combine to shape changes in support for political parties we test this theory with a spatial autoregressive model of party competition in 23 nations from 1951 to 2005 as expected we find evidence of strong spatial contagion effects in elections with low clarity of responsibility

political reinforcement how rising inequality curbs manifested welfare generosity we propose a political reinforcement hypothesis suggesting that rising inequality moves party politics on welfare state issues to the right strengthening rather than modifying the impact of inequality we model policy platforms by incorporating ideology and opportunism of party members and interests and sympathies of voters if welfare spending is a normal good within income classes a majority of voters moves rightward when inequality increases as a response the left in particular shift their welfare policy platform toward less generosity we find support for our arguments using data on the welfare policy platforms of political parties in 22 oecd countries

political choice public policy and distributional outcomes i address the functioning of the u s governing system by analyzing distributional outcomes from 1947 to 2000 the key question is whether public policy influences distributional outcomes the macropolitics model and power resource theory suggest that left policies should equalize the distribution of income i utilize single equation error correction models to assess the impact of policy on income inequality through two mechanisms market conditioning and redistribution since nearly every government action influences markets in some way i examine policy in the aggregate rather than focusing only on policies explicitly designed to redistribute income the analysis indicates that policy influences inequality through both mechanisms with left policy producing more equality the results are consistent with power resource theory and strongly support the macropolitics model furthermore i find that market conditioning is as important as and works in tandem with explicit redistribution

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding