dynamic interaction between markets for leasing and selling automobiles we develop a model of dynamic interactions between price variations in leasing and selling markets for automobiles our framework assumes a differential game between multiple bertrand type competing firms which offer differentiated products to forward looking agents empirical analysis of our model using monthly us data from 2002 to 2011 shows that variations in selling cash market prices lead rapidly dissipating changes of leasing market prices in the opposite direction we discuss the practical implications of these results by augmenting a standard leasing valuation formula the additional terms represent the leased asset value changes that can be expected on the basis of past variations in automobile selling market prices

ingredients of famine analysis availability and entitlements famines often take place in situations of moderate to good food availability without any significant decline of food supply per head the paper presents an alternative approach to famines which does not concentrate on availability but on people s ability to command food through legal means available in the society including the use of production possibilities trade opportunities entitlements vis a vis the state etc the approach is explained focusing on exchange entitlement mappings fluctuations in which can lead to big shifts in the intergroup distribution of food command the approach is then applied to the bengal famine of 1943 the ethiopian famine in wollo in 1973 and the bangladesh famine in 1974 and some general conclusions are drawn about the nature and classes of famines

the realization effect risk taking after realized versus paper losses abstract understanding how prior outcomes affect risk attitudes is critical for the study of choice under uncertainty a large literature documents the significant influence of prior losses on risk attitudes the findings appear contradictory some studies find greater risk taking after a loss whereas others show the opposite that people take on less risk i reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings by distinguishing between realized versus paper losses using new and existing data i replicate prior findings and demonstrate that following a realized loss individuals avoid risk if the same loss is not realized a paper loss individuals take on greater risk jel d11 d14 d81 g11

vive la difference social banks and reciprocity in the credit market social banks are financial intermediaries paying attention to non economic i e social ethical and environmental criteria to investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit market this paper proposes both theory and empirics our theoretical model rationalizes the idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances based on a unique hand collected dataset released by a french social bank our empirical results are twofold first we show that the bank charges below market interest rates for social projects second regardless of their creditworthiness motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by significantly lowering their probability of default we interpret this outcome as the first evidence of reciprocity in the credit market

sales and collusion in a market with storage sales are a widespread and well known phenomenon documented in several product markets this paper presents a novel rationale for sales that does not rely on consumer heterogeneity or on any form of randomness to explain such periodic price fluctuations the analysis is carried out in the context of a simple repeated price competition model and establishes that firms must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the market is large the largest equilibrium profits are characterized at any market size a trade off between the size of the industry and its profits arises sales foster collusion by magnifying the inter temporal links in consumers decisions

equilibrium price dispersion with consumer inventories abstract a model with two types of consumers shoppers and captives is constructed that leads to an equilibrium price dispersion shoppers may hold inventories of the good the level of consumer inventories leads to state dependent price dispersions it is shown that prices and quantities display negative serial correlation the model is tested using grocery store data which display the predicted correlations journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13 d83 l81

asymmetric price adjustments a supply side approach using a model of dynamic price competition we provide an explanation from the supply side for the well established observation that output prices react faster in response to input cost increases than to decreases when costs decline the opportunity of profitable storing in anticipation of higher future costs allows competitive firms to coordinate on prices above current marginal costs the initial price response is only partial and profitable storing relaxes competition conversely when costs rise storing is not beneficial in anticipation of lower future costs and firms immediately adjust their prices to current marginal costs which entails the standard bertrand outcome our results shed new light on the empirical evidence about asymmetric pricing and can stimulate further empirical investigation on this puzzle

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

retail pricing and clearance sales sellers of new products are faced with having to guess demand conditions to set price appropriately but sellers are able to adjustprice over time and to learn from past mistakes additionally it is not necessary that all goods be sold with certainty it is sometimes better to set a high price and to risk no sale this process is modeledto explain retail pricing behavior and the time distribution of transactions prices start high and fall as a function of time on theshelf the initial price and rate of decline can be predicted and depends on thinness of the market the proportion of customers who are window shoppers and other observable characteristics copyright 1986 by american economic association

some examples of dynamic cournot duopoly with inventory this article analyzes a two period game where firms can produce inventory in the first period for sale in the second period we assume that revenues and costs are time invariant and that the firms are symmetric we focus on the nature and the existence of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model we use examples to show that the nash value functions defined on the joint inventory vector are likely to be ill behaved in particular they need not be concave nor even continuous in the firm s own inventory as a result asymmetric equilibrium is possible when average production costs are falling single firm operation can occur in equilibrium nonexistence is also a distinct possibility

durable goods monopoly with varying demand this paper solves for the proflt maximising strategy of a durable goods monopolist when incoming demand varies over time each period additional consumers enter the market these consumers can then choose whether and when to purchase we flrst characterise the consumer s utility maximisation problem and under a monotonicity condition show the proflt maximising allocation can be solved through a myopic algorithm which has an intuitive marginal revenue interpretation consumers ability to delay creates an asymmetry in the optimal price path which exhibits fast increases and slow declines this asymmetry pushes the price level above that charged by a flrm facing the average level of demand applications of this framework include deterministic demand cycles one ofi shocks and iid demand draws the optimal policy outperforms renting and can be implemented by a time consistent best price provision

codes of ethics partly as a result of much recent evidence of business and government crime a large proportion of major corporations have adopted codes of ethics government service is also making more use of them the electrical manufacturing anti trust conspiracy and 1973 1976 investigation of foreign and domestic bribery were immediate prods there are also government codes of which the aspa code is most widely distributed corporate codes discuss relations to employees interemployee relationships whistle blowing effect on environment commercial bribery insider information other conflicts of interest anti trust accounting consumer relations and political activities a discussion of use of codes shows partly favorable results a number of corporation decisions have not yet become a subject of code provisions codes will be more useful if the reasons behind each order are stated and team work is encouraged

can prospect theory explain the disposition effect a new perspective on reference points there has been recent debate about whether prospect theory can explain the disposition effect using both theory and simulation this paper shows that prospect theory often predicts the disposition effect when lagged expected final wealth is the reference point under the principle of preferred personal equilibrium regardless of whether the reference point is updated or not when initial wealth is the reference point however there is often no disposition effect models that use a reference point with no lag under the principle of preferred personal equilibrium or that determine the reference point using the principle of disappointment aversion cannot explain why the investor bought a stock in the first place reference point adjustment weakens the disposition effect leads to more aggressive initial stock purchase strategies and predicts history dependence in stock holding this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

simulation study of the price differentiation effect in a stochastic deteriorating inventory with heterogeneous consumers freshness sensitivity a fixed price policy regardless of expiration date may result in unsold inventory and sales loss price reduction over time as the expiration date approaches motivates customers to purchase all items including the ones that are left with only a short interval until their expiration we conduct a discrete event simulation that captures the main characteristics of this phenomenon results show that a moderate differentiation of price increases profits by 6 a larger differentiation reduces profits profits are the highest for freshness oriented customers a fixed price policy is preferred in an environment of large variance and expected near term expirations

speculative storage in imperfectly competitive markets markets for many commodities are characterized by imperfectly competitive production as well as substantial storage by speculators who are attracted by significant price volatility we examine how speculative storage affects the behavior of an oligopoly producing a commodity for which demand is subject to random shocks speculators compete with consumers when purchasing the commodity and then subsequently compete with producers when selling their stocks resulting in two opposing incentives on the one hand producers would like to increase production to capture future sales in advance by selling to speculators while on the other hand they would like to withhold production to deter speculation thereby eliminating the additional supply from speculators in future periods we find that the incentive to sell to speculators can be quite strong potentially resulting in prices sufficiently high to drive consumers from the market furthermore these incentives are non monotonic in the number of producers speculative storage occurs more frequently in a relatively concentrated oligopoly than in the extremes of monopoly or perfect competition

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

taking stock a critical assessment of recent research on inventories empirical and theoretical aspects of inventory behavior became hot topics in the 1950s and early 1960s no one seemed to notice the tension that was developing between the emerging macroeconomic and microeconomic views of inventories macroeconomists routinely thought of inventories as a destabilizing factor yet the prevailing micro theory viewed inventories as a stabilizing factor it was a fascinating question that was barely explored instead somewhat inexplicably interest in inventories dried up as if inventories were of minor economic significance and little intrinsic interest by the early 1980s then economists once again knew something they had known in the 1950s that inventory investment is of first order importance in business cycles but they were also beginning to realize that the standard production smoothing buffer stock model of inventories was in deep trouble this paper focuses on developments since that realization

up close and personal investor sophistication and the disposition effect this paper analyzes the trading records of a major discount brokerage house to investigate the disposition effect the tendency to sell stocks that have appreciated in price winners sooner than stocks that trade below the purchase price losers in contrast to previous research that has demonstrated the disposition effect by aggregating across investors our main objective is to identify differences in the disposition bias across individuals and explain this in terms of underlying investor characteristics building on the findings in experimental economics and social psychology we hypothesize that differences in investor literacy about financial markets and trading frequency are responsible in part for the variation in individual disposition effect using demographic and socioeconomic variables as proxies for investor literacy we find empirical evidence that wealthier individuals and individuals employed in professional occupations exhibit a lower disposition effect consistent with experimental economics trading frequency also tends to reduce the disposition effect we provide guidelines for investment advisors regulators and investment communities to utilize our findings and help investors make better decisions

cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist in the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination a new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay within each cohort consumers vary in their tastes for the good under broad conditions the seller will vary the price over time in most periods he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay periodically however he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay

would higher salaries keep teachers in high poverty schools evidence from a policy intervention in north carolina abstract for a three year time period beginning in 2001 north carolina awarded an annual bonus of 1800 to certified math science and special education teachers working in public secondary schools with either high poverty rates or low test scores using longitudinal data on teachers we estimate hazard models that identify the impact of this differential pay by comparing turnover patterns before and after the program s implementation across eligible and ineligible categories of teachers and across eligible and barely ineligible schools results suggest that this bonus payment was sufficient to reduce mean turnover rates of the targeted teachers by 17 experienced teachers exhibited the strongest response to the program finally the effect of the program may have been at least partly undermined by the state s failure to fully educate teachers regarding the eligibility criteria our estimates most likely underpredict the potential outcome of a program of permanent salary differentials operating under complete information

world oil market or mayhem the world oil market is regarded by many as a puzzle why are oil prices so volatile what is opec and what does opec do where are oil prices headed in the long run is peak oil a genuine concern why did oil prices spike in the summer of 2008 and what role did speculators play any attempt to answer these questions must be informed and disciplined by economics such is the purpose of this essay to illuminate recent developments in the world oil market from the perspective of economic theory

inventories market structure and price volatility abstract the effect of inventories on the level and volatility of price is analyzed under alternative market structures in a fairly general setting it is shown that inventories have no effect on the average level of prices in a cournot duopoly in the absence of depreciation the effect of storage on price volatility is analyzed in a more restrictive linear quadratic setting in which it is found that imperfectly competitive producers make less use of inventories for smoothing random fluctuations than is efficient the effect of market structure on price volatility depends on whether demand shocks or cost shocks are more important

the methods used to implement an ethical code of conduct and employee attitudes in the process of implementing an ethical code of conduct a business organization uses formal methods of these training courses and means of enforcement are common and are also suitable for self regulation the usa is encouraging business corporations to self regulate with the federal sentencing guidelines fsg the guidelines prescribe similar formal methods and specify that unless such methods are used the process of implementation will be considered ineffective and the business will therefore not be considered to have complied with the guidelines business organizations invest enormous funds on formal methods however recent events indicate that these are not by themselves yielding the desired results our study based on a sample of 812 employees and conducted in an israeli subsidiary of a leading multinational high tech corporation headquartered in the us indicates that of the methods used in the process of implementation one of the informal methods namely the social norms of the organization is perceived by employees to have the most influence on their conduct this result when examined against employee tenure remains relatively stable over the years and stands in contradistinction to the formalistic approach embedded in the fsg we indirectly measure the effectiveness of the percieved most influential implementation process methods by analyzing their impact on employee attitudes namely personal ethical commitment and employees commitment to organizational values our results indicate that the informal methods manager sets an example or social norms of the organization are likely to yield greater commitment with respect to both employee attitudes than the formal method training and courses on the subject of ethics the personal control method my own personal values differs significantly from all the other methods in that it yields the highest degree of personal ethical commitment and the lowest degree of employees commitment to organizational values

neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice recent advances neuroeconomics combines methods and theories from neuroscience psychology economics and computer science in an effort to produce detailed computational and neurobiological accounts of the decision making process that can serve as a common foundation for understanding human behavior across the natural and social sciences because neuroeconomics is a young discipline a sufficiently sound structural model of how the brain makes choices is not yet available however the contours of such a computational model are beginning to arise and given the rapid progress there is reason to be hopeful that the field will eventually put together a satisfactory structural model this paper has two goals first we provide an overview of what has been learned about how the brain makes choices in two types of situations simple choices among small numbers of familiar stimuli like choosing between an apple or an orange and more complex choices involving tradeoffs between immediate and future consequences like eating a healthy apple or a less healthy chocolate cake second we show that even at this early stage insights with important implications for economics have already been gained

the effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking an experimental test myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently two implications of myopic loss aversion are tested experimentally 1 investors who display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often 2 if all payoffs are increased enough to eliminate losses investors will accept more risk in a task in which investors learn from experience both predictions are supported the investors who got the most frequent feedback and thus the most information took the least risk and earned the least money language en

salience and consumer choice we present a theory of context dependent choice in which a consumer s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods such as quality or price an attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good s attributes relative to that attribute s average level in the choice set or more broadly the choice context consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes and their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality price ratios the model accounts for a variety of disparate evidence including decoy effects and context dependent willingness to pay it also suggests a novel theory of misleading sales

commodity price stabilization in imperfect or cartelized markets most studies of commodity price stabilization assume that all agents behave competitively however many commodities suitable for stockpiling are produced by countries with a significant share of the world market and commodity agreements themselves often result in cartelization of the market the paper explores the consequences of market power for the choice of storage rule and the degree of price stabilization it finds that with linear demand dominant producers choose more stable prices than under perfect competition and price stability increases with their market share with constant elastic demand the competitive degree of price stabilization is achieved

the impact of salience on investor behavior evidence from a natural experiment we test whether the display of information causally affects investor behavior in a high stakes trading environment using investor level brokerage data from china and a natural experiment we estimate the impact of a shock that increased the salience of a stock s purchase price but did not change the investor s information set we employ a difference in differences approach and find that the salience shock causally increased the disposition effect by 17 we use microdata to document substantial heterogeneity across investors in the treatment effect a previously documented trading pattern the rank effect explains heterogeneity in the change in the disposition effect

storability market structure and demand shift incentives we consider a two period model in which buyers can store a good by purchasing in advance of consumption so as to realize potential gains from intertemporal arbitrage we find that storability introduces a kink in the aggregate period 1 demand when supply is oligopolistic quantity setting and consumers are sufficiently patient storage cost is relatively low each firm has a strong current incentive to capture future market share from a rival as a result in equilibrium the price path is increasing and there is rational in advance purchase by buyers in contrast the monopoly and perfectly competitive markets exhibit no such price dynamics intermediate storage costs result in multiple equilibria with at least one that involves advance purchase and one that does not

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

concurrent renting and selling in a durable goods monopoly under threat of entry this article analyzes the choice of contract sales or rental of a durable goods monopolist facing a threat of future entry although in the absence of such a threat a monopolist would prefer to rent his entire output we show that the threat of entry alters that preference there is an optimal preentry contract mix involving both rental and sales if both firms behave as cournot duopolists after entry the optimal choice of preentry contracts enables the erstwhile monopolist to gain the same profits as he would if he behaved as a von stackelberg leader

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

monopoly behaviour with speculative storage abstract we analyze the effects of competitive storage when the production of the good is controlled by a monopolist the existence of competitive storers serves to reduce the monopolist s effective demand when speculators are selling and to increase it when they are buying this results in the monopolist manipulating the frequency of stockouts and hence the price smoothing effects of competitive storage we find that competitive storage affects both the level and the volatility of price under monopoly the average price level is higher with storage due to the monopolist s desire to induce stockouts by occasionally keeping the price just at the level that induces a stockout although storage does reduce the volatility of prices under monopoly production prices are more volatile than they would be under perfectly competitive production even though stockouts occur less frequently under monopoly these results are demonstrated through closed form solutions of the two period version of the model and computational solutions to the infinite horizon version of the model

why does the law of one price fail an experiment on index mutual funds we conduct an experiment to evaluate why individuals invest in high fee index funds in our experiments subjects allocate 10 000 across four s p 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio s subsequent return subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees we can reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high fee index funds because of bundled non portfolio services search costs for fees matter but even when we eliminate these costs fees are not minimized instead subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception fees paid decrease with financial literacy interestingly subjects who choose high fee funds sense they are making a mistake

suppliers compliance with mncs codes of conduct behind the scenes at chinese toy suppliers despite increased academic and practitioner interest in codes of conduct there has been little research into the actual compliance of suppliers in developing countries with the codes of conduct of multinational corporations mncs this paper addresses this lack by analysing chinese suppliers level of compliance with swedish toy retailers codes of conduct based on unannounced and unofficial interviews with employees of chinese suppliers the study shows that all of the nine studied suppliers breached some of the standards in the toy retailers codes with over two thirds of the suppliers not complying with the majority of the studied standards while there are different explanations of this lack of compliance the main explanation seems to be that chinese suppliers successfully deceive toy retailers monitoring organisations by decoupling the formal monitored part of their organisation from the actual operational part of their organisation the paper concludes with a discussion of how to increase compliance with mncs codes of conduct

decentralized procurement in light of strategic inventories the centralization versus decentralization choice is perhaps the quintessential organizational structure decision in the operations realm this choice is particularly critical when it comes to the procurement function why firms may opt to decentralize procurement has been often studied and confirmed to be a multifaceted choice this paper complements existing studies by detailing the trade offs in the centralization versus decentralization decision in light of firms strategic use of inventories to influence supplier pricing in particular we demonstrate that a firm s decision to cede procurement choices to its individual divisions can help moderate inventory levels and provide a natural salve on supply chain frictions this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

licensing information goods abstract a significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis patent holders however may face a dynamic problem namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem there are situations however where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent the case of information goods or due to compulsory patenting laws we study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations relative to the existing literature we obtain the following main results i all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation ii royalty licensing may be superior to fixed fee or auction licensing from the licensor s point of view iii social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales iv even for non drastic innovations the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation before the innovation was discovered

scoring firms codes of ethics an explorative study of quality drivers research in the field of management has increasingly focused on strategies and tools related to corporate sustainability of the tools examined codes of ethics have been found to play a primary role many studies have investigated the content of such codes as well as their capacity to condition the behaviour of people within organizations however few studies have considered the intrinsic quality of codes of ethics this study aims to investigate the impact that specific factors firm size degree of internationalization and industry effect can have on the quality of codes of ethics based on a sample of 248 listed italian companies the results of the empirical analysis show that the quality standard is particularly high in larger companies and in those firms operating in industries in which relationships established with critical stakeholders and disclosure to those stakeholders play a crucial role these results have interesting implications for both researchers and practitioners

a simple competitive model with production and storage we study a rational expectations partial equilibrium model of a market for a single storable commodity whose output each period is a function of previous period effort on production and a realization of a shock that affects equally all producers i he final demand is non random and depends only on each period s price risk neutral producers make production and storage decisions based on forecasts of future price distributions existence of equilibrium is proved and for the case of i i d shocks several comparative statics results are established as well as the existence and stability of a unique stationary distribution and whose output at each period is a multiplicative function of previous period s planting and of the realization of a shock that affects equally all producers the final demand for this good is non random and depends only on this period s price this describes approximately markets for agricultural products which are not traded internationally and where most of the price uncertainty stems from supply shocks risk neutral producers make their decisions based on forecasts of future price distributions and of known cost functions of storage and production to maximize their discounted profits in order to close the model an assumption on how such price forecasts are made is needed we assume that agents make equilibrium forecasts i e that their forecast is common and that when producers act taking the forecasted prices as given they make decisions that yield the forecasted prices as equilibrium prices this is of course what has been sometimes called rational expectations the assumption of equilibrium expectations and the presence of risk neutral pro ducers will imply that the equilibrium variables may be obtained by considering a related market surplus maximization problem 1 this places strong restriction on the stochastic process of equilibrium prices for the case where the basic shocks are assumed to be independently and identically distributed over time one may thus show that equilibrium prices are a function of a certain state variable the total stocks kept from last period plus this period s output and this allows us to derive properties of equilibrium solutions our main results concerning this case are a storage is a non increasing function of price and expected production a non decreasing one b the elasticity of expected future prices with respect to today s prices is positive and less than one c this elasticity is non constant being zero for high enough prices d the price process follows a renewal process if prices are low

the role of obsolescence and inventory costs in providing commitment this paper modifies the cournot and stackelberg models to allow the firms to sell less than they have produced and to store the unsold portion of their output as inventory even if one of the firms can choose its output before the other if it is costless to carry unsold goods forward then the cournot outcome emerges we show however that costs of carrying the inventory forward endow the firms with a limited degree of commitment to sell what they have produced this partially restores the first mover advantage if the firms choose their outputs simultaneously the cournot outcome emerges and has locally consistent conjectures

markov puppy dogs and related animals abstract it is shown that steady state markov perfect equilibria of discrete time infinite horizon quadratic adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state in contrast to continuous time games the limit of these equilibria as adjustment costs approach zero is the same as the equilibria of their static counterpart games a classification scheme is presented and it is shown that the taxonomy is identical to that of analogous two stage games such as those analyzed by fudenberg and tirole american economic review papers and proceedings 1984 74 361 366 this classification is useful in that it implies that steady state equilibria need not be explicitly calculated to analyze qualitatively the effects of adjustment costs in strategic environments it is also argued that estimated conjectural variations parameters may capture a well defined property of strategic interaction in a dynamic game

commodity agreements and commodity markets lessons from tin in what follows we study the history of the tin market over the period i982 5 important questions this exercise will help to answer are was the collapse of the tin market a failure of the buffer stock operation and was it inevitable was the activity of the buffer stock a commodity market manipulation was there a deficiency in the drafting of the tin agreement was there a failure of commodity market regulation more generally while it has long been recognised that stabilisation schemes are vulnerable to speculative attacks the interconection between buffer stock managements and futures markets has not been explored in this sense our historical analysis will

small cues change savings choices we present evidence from randomized field experiments that 401 k savings choices are significantly affected by one to two sentence anchoring goal setting or savings threshold cues embedded in emails sent to employees about their 401 k plan even though these cues contain little to no marginal information cues that make high savings rates salient increased 401 k contribution rates by up to 2 9 of income in a pay period and cues that make low savings rates salient decreased 401 k contribution rates by up to 1 4 of income in a pay period cue effects persist between two months and a year after the email

does aggregated returns disclosure increase portfolio risk taking many experiments have found that participants take more investment risk if they see returns less frequently see portfolio level returns rather than each individual asset s returns or see long horizon rather than one year historical return distributions in contrast we find that such information aggregation treatments do not affect total equity investment when we make the investment environment more realistic than in prior experiments previously documented aggregation effects are not robust to changes in the risky asset s return distribution or the introduction of a multi day delay between portfolio choice and return realizations

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

the dynamics of markups and inventories in retailing firms this paper is concerned with the interaction between price and inventory decisions in retailing firms and its implications for the dynamics of markups and the existence of sales pro motions we consider a model where a monopolistically competitive retailer decides price and inventories and assumes lump sum costs when placing orders or changing nominal prices tn this model the existence of stockout probabilities and fixed ordering costs generate a cyclical price behaviour characterized by long periods without nominal price changes and short periods with very low prices i e sales promotions we estimate this model using a unique longitudinal dataset with information about retail and wholesale prices inventories orders and sales for several brands in a supermarket chain based on the estimated model we perform several counterfactual experi ments that show the important role that inventories and fixed ordering costs play in the dynamics of retail prices and the frequency of sales promotions in this dataset

vertical contracts in a supply chain and the bullwhip effect this paper shows that decentralized supply chains in which upstream firms use linear wholesale prices may experience lower upstream production and downstream sales volatility than vertically inte

revealed preference rational inattention and costly information acquisition we develop a revealed preference test for optimal acquisition of costly information the test encompasses models of rational inattention sequential signal processing and search we provide limits on the extent to which attention costs can be recovered from choice data we experimentally elicit state dependent stochastic choice data of the form the tests require in simple cases tests con rm that subjects adjust their attention in response to incentives as the theory dictates

on the behavior of commodity prices when speculative storage is bounded abstract this paper investigates the implications of bounded speculative storage storage bounded from below at zero and above at a capacity on commodity prices binding capacity mirrors the non negativity constraint on storage and leads to negative price spiking and higher volatility when the market is in deep contango i e low current prices at high stock levels with bounded storage there is no need to restrict storage to be costly to ensure a rational expectations equilibrium this allows the model to cover a wide range of storage technologies including free and productive storage we also provide an alternative expression for speculative prices that highlights the key role of the storage boundaries the competitive equilibrium price is the sum of discounted future probability weighted boundary prices the boundary prices can be viewed as dividends on commodities in storage reflecting the realization of economic profits from storage

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

the economic effects of energy price shocks large fluctuations in energy prices have been a distinguishing characteristic of the u s economy since the 1970s turmoil in the middle east rising energy prices in the u s and evidence of global warming recently have reignited interest in the link between energy prices and economic performance this paper addresses a number of the key issues in this debate what are energy price shocks and where do they come from how responsive is energy demand to changes in energy prices how do consumers expenditure patterns evolve in response to energy price shocks how do energy price shocks affect u s real output inflation and stock prices why do energy price increases seem to cause recessions but energy price decreases do not seem to cause expansions why has there been a surge in the price of oil in recent years why has this new energy price shock not caused a recession so far have the effects of energy price shocks waned since the 1980s and if so why as the paper demonstrates it is critical to account for the endogeneity of energy prices and to differentiate between the effects of demand and supply shocks in energy markets when answering these questions

do codes make a difference the case of bank lending and the environment codes of conduct are a conspicuous feature of modern business organization but doubts have been raised regarding their efficacy in ensuring high standards of behavior although some of the issues involved have been discussed at some length in the business ethics literature the amount of systematic empirical evidence on the impact of codes is very limited this paper seeks to make a contribution to that body of knowledge by studying the policies and procedures of a sample of banks which have signed a statement on banking and the environment promulgated by the united nations development programme although some differences are found when compared with a sample of banks which did not sign the statement they are not extensive the implications of the findings for codes of conduct and for future empirical studies are then discussed

competitive storage and commodity price dynamics by buying cheap and selling dear risk neutral commodity speculators can smooth commodity prices and induce serial dependence in price even when none would exist under a simple process of supply and demand commodity prices are variable and strongly positively correlated from one year to the next the variability is often explained by supply factors and the autocorrelation by the activities of speculators we show that this explanation is not consistent with the evidence speculation can substantially increase autocorrelation for prices that are weakly autocorrelated in its absence but not to the high levels that are observed in the data

the relation between religiosity and private bank outcomes abstract we examine the effect of headquarters local religiosity on private bank outcomes religiosity is associated with lower risk taking for public banks but the unique features of private banks may result in a different effect for private banks we find religiosity is associated with greater asset risk taking at the same time however religiosity is negatively associated with solvency risk and return on asset roa volatility and is associated with higher roas and fewer failures we reconcile these results by finding banks in areas with higher religiosity recognize larger fees from providing additional banking services likely due to relationships formed from more risky lending as a result these banks are more less likely to realize extreme positive negative performance we also find religiosity is associated with lower earnings management and increased conservatism collectively our results confirm private banks are unique and religiosity can have a significant and nuanced effect on bank outcomes

are college graduates more responsive to distant labor market opportunities abstract are highly educated workers better at locating in areas with high labor demand to answer this question i use three decades of u s census data to estimate a mcfadden style model of residential location choice i test for education differentials in the likelihood that young workers reside in states experiencing positive labor demand shocks at the time these workers entered the labor market i find effects of changes in state labor demand on college graduate location choice that are several times greater than for high school graduates nevertheless medium run wage effects of entry labor market conditions for college graduates equal or exceed those of less educated workers

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

sales and consumer inventory temporary price reductions sales are common for many goods and naturally result in a large increase in the quantity sold we explore whether the data support the hypothesis that these increases are at least partly due to demand anticipation at low prices consumers store for future consumption this effect if present has broad economic implications we test the predictions of an inventory model using scanner data with two years of household purchases the results are consistent with an inventory model and suggest that static demand estimates may overestimate price sensitivity

anti hoarding laws a stock condemnation reconsidered economists have regarded anti hoarding laws as irrational reactions to nonexistent monopoly in the storage of grain this paper shows that anti hoarding laws cannot be rationally directed against a monopolistic storer for he will always store less not more than would be stored under competition but seemingly perverse competitive storage in the form of excessive stockholding can arise when a price ceiling distorts the market additional public storage exacerbates this perverse private behavior and may even induce behavior that appears to be active market manipulation under such circumstances anti hoarding laws can be desirable second best measures

revenue management without commitment dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales a seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline at each time he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale over time buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases if a buyer does not purchase when she arrives she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price in the unique markov perfect equilibrium the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods a flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game when it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale the seller holds a big initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good

pricing and promotions in asymmetric duopolies this paper develops a modeling framework for making promotions decisions in contrast to some of the prior research the framework explicitly models promotions its central feature is the view of promotions competition as a multistage game in which regular prices are chosen first followed by the choice of promotion depths and frequencies it is used to illustrate the nature of competition between a national brand and private label in equilibrium the national brand promotes to ensure that the private label does not try to attract consumers away from the national brand moreover the private label does not promote this equilibrium is also contrasted with varian s framework used by other researchers in which mixed strategy equilibrium prices are interpreted as promotions

the disposition effect in securities trading an experimental analysis the disposition effect is the tendency to sell assets that have gained value winners and keep assets that have lost value losers disposition effects can be explained by the two features of prospect theory the idea that people value gains and losses relative to a reference point the initial purchase price of shares and the tendency to seek risk when faced with possible losses and avoid risk when a certain gain is possible our experiments were designed to see if subjects would exhibit disposition effects subjects bought and sold shares in six risky assets asset prices fluctuated in each period contrary to bayesian optimization subjects did tend to sell winners and keep losers when the shares were automatically sold after each period the disposition effect was greatly reduced

dealing temporary price cuts by seller as a buyer discrimination mechanism this paper is concerned with temporary price cuts deals sales and specials as a mechanism for the seller to price discriminate between buyers with different intensities of demand we analyze why a seller offers such price cuts which buyers take advantage of them and what the parameters are that determine the amount and frequency of the discount offered in the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature on price deals 1 in section ii simple models of buyer and seller behavior are developed and we show why and how a seller adopts a dealing strategy section iii summarizes the key implications of the model and indicates how the price discrimination hypothesis could be tested in practice section iv suggests possible extensions of the model finally section v gives our conclusions in the marketing literature the issue of who is deal prone has been extensively researched an explanation for temporary price cuts usually called deals sales or specials is provided we hypothesize that they are a mechanism that discriminates between more intense and less intense demanders we further hypothesize a positive relationship between demand elasticity and holding costs buyers with more intense demand with high holding costs are those who will be buying the product at its regular price the low holdingcost buyers take advantage of deals by forward buying the model is applicable to three relationships 1 manufacturer reseller where the reseller may be a wholesaler or a retailer 2 resellerreseller for example wholesaler retailer and 3 retailer consumer we are grateful to michael mussa and albert madansky for their comments we also benefited from comments made by the marketing faculty of the wharton school at a seminar where an earlier version of this paper was presented neil beckwith in particular is acknowledged 1 for a more detailed review of deals and similar pricecutting mechanisms e g mail in rebates cents off labels coupons etc see narsimhan 1982 chan 2 journal of business 1985 vol 58 no 3 1985 by the university of chicago all rights reserved 0021 9398185 5803 0004 01 50

storable good monopoly the role of commitment we study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time the literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive for consumers the key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling this stockpiling motive can be present in the case of standard durables as well in environments unmodeled in the prior literature we show that if the monopolist cannot commit then prices are higher in all periods and social welfare is lower than in the case in which the monopolist can commit this is in contrast with the durable goods analysis in the literature on the coase conjecture