industrial pollution abatement the impact on balance of trade this paper uses an ex post partial equilibrium framework to measure the impact of marginal changes in industrial p ollution abatement costs on the u s balance of trade in general and balance of trade with canada in particular the impacts are found to be negative for most industries growing with trade volume and smal l relative to domestic consumption in addition some evidence is fou nd that pollution control programs have changed the u s comparative advantage such that more high abatement cost goods are imported and m ore low abatement cost goods are exported

an environmental performance index for products reflecting damage costs abstract several studies have demonstrated how to use dea data envelopment analysis based techniques to estimate environmental performance indices none of these studies however are taking information on the environmental damage costs of the pressure types considered into account this study is bridging a gap between environmental indices founded in physical pressures and damage costs founded in welfare economics the aim of the paper is twofold first to demonstrate how to implement the information on environmental damage costs within a dea based environmental performance index and second to estimate these indices at product level by using danish input output data and environmental data from 1997

stochastic stability in a double auction abstract in a k double auction a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with probability 1 k we show that the stable equilibria of a complete information k double approximate an asymmetric nash bargaining solution with the seller s bargaining power decreasing in k note that ceteris paribus the payoffs of the seller of the one shot game increase in k nevertheless as the stochastically stable equilibrium price decreases in k choosing the seller s favorite price with a relatively higher probability in individual encounters makes him worse off in the long run

environmental protection policies and the structure of the us economy the policy of regulation has been used to abate pollution in the usa however a number of other measures such as a tax cum subsidy program and taxes on polluters have been frequently suggested in the literature in this paper the impact of these policies on the structure of pices production income distribution and the input requirements of labour and capital is determined the input output methodology is used for this purpose the direct and primary input requirement coefficients of the 1971 input output table are adjusted to reflect the input requirements of pollution abatement technology the policy of regulation is found to be more effective in controlling pollution than the tax cum subsidy program though the latter will create more jobs the reason for this is that the tax cum subsidy program is not as successful as the policy of controls or taxes on polluters in steering consumption away from the polluting industries

optimization of manufacturing systems under environmental considerations for a greenness dependent demand abstract in this work we show that the optimization models for manufacturing systems should evolve to consider the environmental impacts of manufacturing activities and to integrate the environmental performance of finished products in particular the selection of manufacturing processes technologies and input items components should be revised with environmental consideration with this scope in mind we develop two optimization models where we consider the selection of production processes and the choice of input products in the first model a single product is offered by the firm and the demand of this product depends on its greenness in the second model the market is segmented between ordinary and green customers and the firm offers a different variety of the output product to each segment in this case both the demand and the price depend on the product greenness in both models the greenness of the output product is a decision variable that is simultaneously determined along with the other decisions in addition the models integrate environmental legislations we conduct numerical experiments on a case study from the textile sector in order to show how the integration of the product greenness impacts on the system profit and decisions

the short run impact of environmental protection costs on u s product prices using an input output framework this paper investigates the magnitude of the impact that environmental protection costs had on prices in the united states in 1977 with the imposition of environmental protection costs the projected total price increases for individual industries range from 0 12 to 6 58 due to data limitations the constraints of input output analysis and the structural changes that occurred in the economy from 1972 to 1977 the results should not be taken as definitive however the results do indicate the typical sort of variation in impact likely to occur across industries and that the average impact on prices was modest

uniform compliance costs for mineral commodities who gains and who loses changes in energy and nonfuelmineral production consumption and net export revenue that result from environmental protection are estimated by income class and geographic region unlike previous assessments of unilateral adoption of standards i assume that all producers incur equal cleanup costs adjustment is therefore accomplished through changes in prices and quantities rather than altered trade patterns the estimated magnitude of worldwide changes is not large moreover many poor countries are forecast to benefit since their terms of trade improve however the problem of obtaining foreign exchange for investment remains a financing scheme that divorces efficiency from equity is suggested

pollution control and inputs to production abstract the primary concern of this paper is to identify the inputs required for air water and solid waste pollution abatement in the united states industry level data on pollution abatement expenditures in 1976 are decomposed into expenditures on various intermediate inputs and on two primary inputs labor and capital the 1971 input output table is adjusted to reflect the input needs of pollution abatement technology this revised direct input coefficients matrix is used to derive the gross output and primary input requirements of the 1971 final bill of goods

coalitional game theory approach to modeling suppliers collaboration in supply networks abstract suppliers collaboration is a new paradigm to improve the utilization of collective intelligence in supply networks although existing literature advocates the notion of cooperation in supply networks there is a dearth of studies quantitatively analyzing cost and benefit of cooperation in this study we first develop a model for suppliers dynamic coalition formation using coalitional game theory the proposed cost structure influences the utility of each possible coalition and restricts the coalition size and search space for finding possible coalitions to distribute the profit earned by cooperation in a fair manner a criterion named shared capacity index is developed according to suppliers capacity share in the corresponding coalition a suppliers cooperation algorithm is then proposed to resolve possible conflicts among network members whereby each supplier is able to explore coalitional structures autonomously the efficiency of the proposed approach is evaluated through simulation studies and compared to other solution methods including shapley value and proportional fairness results demonstrate that long term cooperation among suppliers leads to enhanced average individual profit in the network

a derivation of the marginal abatement cost curve abstract the relationship between a firm s technology and its marginal abatement cost mac curve is explored even under the simplest specifications the mac curve will be kinked at some point except under a special assumption which in reality could easily be violated the nondifferentiability implies that the choice of instrument under uncertainty may depend on the targeted level of emissions reduction also stability conditions for dynamic tax mechanisms may be violated in the neighborhood of the kink point a policy implication is that in some cases output restrictions are as efficient as emissions restrictions in contrast to previous results

directional shadow price estimation of co2 so2 and nox in the united states coal power industry 1990 2010 abstract shadow prices also termed marginal abatement costs provide valuable guidelines to support environmental regulatory policies for co 2 so 2 and no x the key contributors to climate change this paper complements the existing models and describes a directional marginal productivity dmp approach to estimate directional shadow prices dsps which present substitutability among three emissions and are jointly estimated we apply the method to a case study of co 2 so 2 and no x produced by coal power plants operating between 1990 and 2010 in the united states we find that dsp shows 1 1 times the maximal shadow prices estimated in the current literature we conclude that estimating the shadow prices of each by product separately may lead to an overestimation of the marginal productivity and an underestimation of the shadow prices

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

corporate environmental and resource management in search of a new managerial paradigm abstract sustainable development is close to becoming the catchword of the 1990s but it is still far from being an operational concept for individual companies this paper attempts to transform the brundtlandian contradictory of sustainable development into a corporate and more operational concept as it is argued economists interest in the environment is not new whether to implement sustainable corporate environmental and resource management practices or not is no longer a real choice for industrialists today given the ultimate limitations of nature limitations that are close to being reached the implications of such a new corporate development philosophy will be far reaching however the new managerial paradigm which is outlined here challenges not only the way in which industry is run today but attacks the very bedrock on which mainstream economics is based

a theory of endogenous coalition structures consider an environment with widespread externalities and suppose that bind ing agreements can be written we study coalition formation in such a setting our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game we establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilib rium coalition structures we develop an algorithm that generates under certain conditions an equilibrium coalition structure our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions in particular we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a cournot oligopoly journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78 d62 q 1999 academic press

dynamic coalition formation and the core this paper presents a dynamic model of endogenous coalition formation in cooperative games with transferable utility tu the players are boundedly rational at each time step a player decides which of the existing coalitions to join and demands a payoff these decisions are determined by a best reply rule given the coalition structure and allocation in the previous period further the players experiment with myopically suboptimal strategies whenever there are potential gains from trade we establish an isomorphism between the set of absorbing states of the process and the set of core allocations and show that the process converges to one of these states with probability one whenever the core is non empty these results do not require superadditivity of the characteristic function and they carry over to the case of coalitional values depending on the coalition structure and to non transferable utility ntu games

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

conventional contracts intentional behavior and logit choice equality without symmetry abstract when coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents non best response behavior we show that the egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm without intentional bias a new solution the logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm these results contrast with results under non payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior where it has previously been shown that the kalai smorodinsky and nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms we complement the theory with experiments on human subjects results of which suggest that non best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias this suggests the egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm

unpacking the meaning of market access evidence from rural kenya summary this paper critically examines the dimensions of market access using farm panel survey data from kenya we investigate changes in ten indicators of market access during the 1997 2010 post liberalization period we find major improvements in certain market access conditions and little change in others there is generally low correlation between alternative indicators of market access all purpose indicators may not accurately reflect specific market access conditions of interest distances to physical infrastructure are often not representative of farmers access to markets changes in specific market access conditions may have more to do with the behaviors of marketing agents we consider the implications of these findings for agricultural marketing policies and for research methods

an evolutionary model of bargaining abstract individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the nash demand game they make their demands by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly there is no common knowledge over the long run typically one division will be observed almost all of the time this stochastically stable division is close to the nash solution when all agents in the same population are alike when the populations are heterogeneous a generalization of the nash solution results if there is some mixing between the two populations the stable division is fifty fifty journal of economic literature classification number c78

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

the impact of remanufacturing in the economy very few durable goods are recovered at the end of their useful lives however this situation could reverse with the development of a stronger remanufacturing industry in the economy this paper evaluates the impact of remanufacturing in a hypothetical situation where remanufacturing holds a significant share of the economy presently dominated by the original manufacturing industries it would have direct impacts on the demand for several inputs we adapt the inter industry input output framework with the development of a methodology to consider these changes subsequently we apply the model to the 30 sector aggregation of the french input output national data to illustrate the nethod and to evaluate the impact that remanufacturing may have on the economy the analysis assumes that remanufacturing sectors substitute labor and transport services for the usual inputs such as raw materials and semi finished goods we find that remanufacturing may satisfy the same final demand from all sectors requiring fewer intermediate resources with proportionally higher demand of labor

the impact of pollution abatement investment on productivity change anempirical comparison of the u s germany and canada since environmental quality became an important focus of government regulations in most industrialized countries in the early 1970s many researchers have assessed the impact of these regulations on economic performance for example leontief and ford 11 and pasurka 15 investigated the impact that environmental protection costs had on prices in the u s walter 24 calculated the effect of pollution abatement expenditures on u s trade and robinson 19 measured the distributional impact of the burden of industrial pollution abatement a related issue involves the productivity consequences of environmental regulations in this paper we address this issue by considering the impact of pollution abatement investment on productivity growth

a prospect theory nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability abstract we consider the long run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory we extend the evolutionary bargaining model of young 1993 to a two stage nash demand game two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the nash demand game in the second stage which will be reached only if neither player exercises the outside option we address the influence on the stochastically stable division of reference dependent preferences where the reference point is the value of the outside option we show that the division consistently differs from the nash bargaining solution under expected utility theory inspired by this we propose a prospect theory nash bargaining solution which coincides with the stochastically stable division

marginal co2 abatement costs findings from alternative shadow price estimates for shanghai industrial sectors abstract shanghai one of the most developed cities in china is implementing a pilot regional carbon emission trading scheme estimating the marginal abatement costs of co2 emissions for the industrial sectors covered in shanghai s emission trading scheme provides the government and participating firms useful information for devising compliance policies this paper employs multiple distance function approaches to estimating the shadow prices of co2 emissions for shanghai industrial sectors our empirical results show that the overall weighted average of shadow price estimates by different approaches ranges between 394 5 and 1906 1 yuan ton which indicates that model choice truly has a significant effect on the shadow price estimation we have also identified a negative relationship between the shadow price of co2 emissions and carbon intensity and the heavy industries with higher carbon intensities tend to have lower shadow prices it has been suggested that shanghai municipal government take various measures to improve its carbon market e g using the marginal abatement costs of participating sectors firms as a criterion in the initial allocation of carbon emission allowances

agroindustrialization through institutional innovation transaction costs cooperatives and milk market development in the east african highlands abstract some small holders are able to generate reliable and substantial income flows through small scale dairy production for the local market for others a set of unique transaction costs hinders participation cooperative selling institutions are potential catalysts for mitigating these costs stimulating entry into the market and promoting growth in rural communities trends in cooperative organization in east african dairy are evaluated empirical work focuses on alternative techniques for effecting participation among a representative sample of peri urban milk producers in the ethiopian highlands the variables considered are a modern production practice cross bred cow use a traditional production practice indigenous cow use three intellectual capital forming variables experience education and extension and the provision of infrastructure as measured by time to transport milk to market a tobit analysis of marketable surplus generates precise estimates of non participants distances to market and their reservation levels of the covariates measures of the inputs necessary to sustain and enhance the market policy implications focus on the availability of cross bred stock and the level of market infrastructure both of which have marked effects on participation the velocity of transactions in the local community and inevitably the social returns to agroindustrialization

export sectors and rural development the export base hypothesis is that a region s growth is led by export demand given perfectly elastic factor supplies it is a rationale for sector based rural development policies and it is formalized by input output models but it is contested by modern trade migration and growth theories and there is little research about its empirical relevance we investigate the hypothesis for contemporary u s rural development by estimating the influence of export sector employment on subsequent rural development outcomes the results reject the hypothesis that emphasizing traditional export employment results in rural growth reject the assumption of perfectly elastic factor supply and support alternative explanations copyright 2009 oxford university press

a resource based perspective on corporate environmental performance and profitability drawing on the resource based view of the firm we posited that environmental performance and economic performance are positively linked and that industry growth moderates the relationship with the returns to environmental performance higher in high growth industries we tested these hypotheses with an analysis of 243 finns over two years using independently developed environmental ratings results indicate that it pays to be green and that this relationship strengthens with industry growth we conclude by highlighting the study s academic and managerial implications making special reference to the social issues in management literature

stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems abstract this study examines a dynamic process of n person coalitional bargaining problems we investigate the evolution of social conventions by embedding a coalitional bargaining setting in a dynamic process in each period a group of players may make some coalitional move that is forming a new team or negotiating the division of a surplus players revise their coalitions and surplus divisions over time in the presence of stochastic noise which leads players to make a suboptimal decision under a logit specification of choice probabilities we find that the stability of a core allocation decreases in the wealth of the richest player furthermore stochastically stable allocations are core allocations that minimize the wealth of the richest player

a consistent bargaining set abstract both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency in excluding imputations to which there exist objections the core does not assess the credibility of such objections the bargaining set goes a step further only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified however the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed we formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a chain of objections is tested in precisely the same way as its predecessor various properties of the consistent bargaining set are also analyzed

game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the talmud abstract for three different bankruptcy problems the 2000 year old babylonian talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games a rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in terms of the talmudic principle of equal division of the contested amount this rationale leads to a unique solution for all bankruptcy problems which always coincides with the nucleolus two other rationales for the same rule are suggested in terms of other talmudic principles needless to say the rule in question is not proportional division

impact analysis of a water quality enhancing policy a simple input output approach it is generally believed that there exists a trade off between economic activity and environmental quality since pollutants are generated in the process of production and consumption of commodities the literature shows however that there have been relatively few empirical attempts to analyse this trade off relationship this tendency may stem from the fact that there is insufficient data to represent the environmental sector this paper has constructed the environmental sector endogenized multi region input output esemrio model in order to measure the impacts of water quality enhancing policy on the korean economy of two regions recognizing the environmental sector as a resourceusing sector the esemrio model specifically estimates the impacts of the policy on the economy in terms of the policy costs industrial output and employment en regle generale l idee recue c est qu il existe un compromis entre l activite economique et la qualite de l environnement dans la mesure o ugrave la production et

non users willingness to pay for a national park an application and critique of the contingent valuation method bateman i j and langford i h 1997 non users willingness to pay for a national park an application and critique of the contingent valuation method reg studies 31 571 582 a great deal of the ongoing academic debate concerning the contingent valuation cv method has focused upon whether or not the method is suitable for assessing non use values this paper presents results from a study examining non users values for preserving the norfolk broads a wetland area of recognized international importance from the threat of saline flooding discussion of results centres upon the validity of the cv method for eliciting unbiased estimates of non use value a graphical representation of findings from a variety of studies is presented to suggest that such results are logically ordered across goods and valuation scenarios however as the paper concludes logicality and validity are not necessarily synonymous bateman i j et langford i h 1997 la volonte des non usagers de payer les parcs nationaux

perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games abstract players adaptively learn how to bargain a characteristic function describes the available surplus the underlying bargaining game extends the nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement players demands must be multiples of a money unit we show that stochastically stable allocations ssa i e allocations that are most stable to unlikely errors are a subset of the core uniqueness does not obtain even when the money unit becomes arbitrarily small nonetheless every ssa is related to the allocation that maximizes the product of players utilities over the core i e constrained egalitarian solution for tu games journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78

closed loop supply chains what reverse logistics factors influence performance this paper analyses the inventory and order flow dynamics in closed loop supply chains clscs in this kind of supply chains the reverse flow of materials entering the system for recycling purposes complicates the way in which inventories should be managed and replenishment policies should be designed specifically we analyse the relationships between some reverse logistics factors remanufacturing lead time return rate of recycled products reverse order policy and number of supply chain tiers on the order and inventory variance amplification we firstly perform a systematic literature review of the related studies secondly by adopting a difference equation math approach and design of experiment we perform a robust what if analysis of a clsc under a variety of operational and market conditions results show that ceteris paribus clsc outperforms a forward supply chain both in mono echelon and multi echelon structures and under both stationary and turbulent market demands furthermore reducing remanufacturing lead time and promoting information transparency may be crucial to improve clsc dynamics finally we use the research findings to provide interesting managerial consideration about how to reduce unnecessary operational members costs

adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations we study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning for a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function we first show that all self perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf following this we provide a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide the surplus according to some core allocation regardless of the initial history

grey input output analysis and its application for environmental cost allocation abstract deterministic input output analysis has been applied to solving a variety of economic problems nevertheless uncertainty plays an important role in decision making and should be properly addressed in future input output analysis this study therefore describes a method of including systematic parameter uncertainties in an input output model and develops its solution procedure using the genetic algorithm based ga based grey mathematical programming technique as a tool in particular the model for assessing the impacts of recent pollution charges and water resource fees to a textile dyeing factory is formulated and solved for the purpose of illustration to account for the gross impact from systematic variations most parameters are expressed as interval expressions as that are frequently used in the grey systems theory research findings indicate that the grey input output analysis is an applicable tool to evaluate various environmental cost impacts influential for corporate production planning and management

coalition formation as a dynamic process abstract we study coalition formation as an ongoing dynamic process with payoffs generated as coalitions form disintegrate or regroup a process of coalition formation pcf is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value compared to inaction this future value in turn is endogenous it depends on coalitional movements at each node we study existence of equilibrium pcfs we connect deterministic equilibrium pcfs with unique absorbing state to the core and equilibrium pcfs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set in addition we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium pcfs

transactions costs and agricultural household supply response we develop and estimate a model of supply response when transactions costs create a situation where some producers buy others sell and others do not participate in markets we present two rationales for why producing households may have different relationships to the market proportional and fixed transactions costs using data on mexican corn producers we estimate an empirical model that allows for separate tests of the significance of both types of transactions costs revealing that both fixed and proportional transactions costs matter for the estimation the results provide consistent estimates of supply elasticity and measures of the relative importance of factors determining both proportional and fixed transactions costs

input output simulations of energy environment economy interactions in the uk this paper shows how a number of the complex interrelationships between energy environment and economic welfare can be investigated with the aid of a 10 sector input output i o model of the uk with pollution emission coefficients and a european sulphur deposition vector the paper reviews relevant past applications of i o analysis in the energy environment area and describes the endam program and its operation it is used to simulate the effects of a variety of policies and possibilities not only through changes in exogenous variables final demand and income taxes and transfers but also through changes in the structural matrices and their coefficients in each case the full effects direct indirect and income induced can be traced and the changes in comparative static equilibrium values discovered in this way policy issues connected with energy use and environmental impacts employment and economic welfare have been investigated

performance evaluation and a flow allocation decision model for a sustainable supply chain of an apparel industry abstract there is a growing concern that business enterprises and their supply chains focus primarily on economic activities and ignore their impact on the environment and society this paper aims to help decision makers managers and practitioners to achieve economic growth societal development and environmental protection by developing sustainable supply chain performance measures and proposes a partner selection and flow allocation decision making model survey data from 278 business organizations from the indian apparel industry supply chain network were used and an integrated method of structural equation modeling fuzzy analytical hierarchy process and fuzzy multi objective linear programming was applied to the proposed model the results of the structural equation modeling analysis indicate that the survey respondents considered sustainable production performance to be of prime importance which thus indicates its significance in developing a sustainable supply chain for the apparel industry to illustrate the use of the proposed model for partner selection and flow allocation decision making real time data from an apparel manufacturer are presented optimal results were obtained for two strategies sustainability and cost saving to show a cost benefit trade off when developing a sustainable supply chain using comparative performance a decision maker can choose an appropriate strategy based on cost benefit analysis of the presented trade offs

shadow prices environmental stringency and international competitiveness abstract empirical tests of the relationship between international competitiveness and the severity of environmental regulations are hampered by the lack of pollution abatement cost data for non u s countries the theory of the firm suggests that environmental stringency can be measured by the difference between a polluting input s shadow price and its market price we make a first attempt at quantifying such a measure for two industries located in nine european oecd countries overall we provide i a new approach to measure cross country regulatory differences in that we use a theoretically attractive measure of industry specific private compliance cost and ii empirical estimates that are an attractive tool for researchers and policymakers who are interested in examining how economic activity is influenced by compliance costs

dynamic coalition reformation for adaptive demand and capacity sharing abstract to deal with volatile product demand and rapidly changing manufacturing technologies for sustainable returns selective collaboration among companies in supply networks sns is required recently demand and capacity sharing among independent and non competitive manufacturers at the same horizontal layer in sns has been studied through an appropriate coalition for collaborative demand and capacity sharing manufacturers can minimize their lost sales as well as maximize production capacity utilization against lumpy real demand in a previous study we have developed the collaborative demand and capacity sharing cdcs protocol which addresses a long term profitable and well balanced collaboration for each manufacturer through distributed decision making however the uncertainty of circumstances calls for an effective and timely reformation of coalitions in reality there is a trade off between frequent accommodation to changeable environments and high additional costs incurred by reformation hence in this paper we design the adaptive cdcs protocol based on dynamic contract mechanism in each period our protocol suggests whether to reform existing coalitions or not based on theoretical analyses of long term expected net profit to evaluate its performance a numerical experiment is conducted by comparing three models no collaboration static collaboration and dynamic collaboration by adaptive cdcs protocol dynamic collaboration results in more profits and its balanced redistribution by accommodating with changeable conditions

policy options promoting market participation among smallholder livestock producers a case study from the phillipines we investigate the factors precipitating market entry where smallholders make decisions about participation a discrete choice about whether to sell quantities of products and supply a continuous valued choice about how much quantity to sell in a cross section of smallholders in northern luzon philippines in a model that combines basic probit and tobit ideas is implemented using bayesian methods and generates precise estimates of the inputs required in order to effect entry among the non participants we estimate the total amounts of cattle buffalo pig and chicken livestock input required to effect entry and compare and contrast the alternative input requirements to the extent that our smallholder sample may be representative of a wide and broader set of circumstances our findings shed light on offsetting impacts of conflicting factors that complicate the roles for policy in the context of expanding the density of participation

conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining abstract we consider a multilateral nash demand game in which short sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource we prove that the resulting process converges with probability one to a state in which all players agree on a strictly self enforcing division of resources i e a strict core allocation highlighting group dynamics we show how the myopic actions of players may lead to the break up of groups in the short run but can ultimately bring about a situation from which a strictly self enforcing allocation can be reached

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

shadow prices of environmental outputs and production efficiency of household level paper recycling units in vietnam abstract the production efficiency and shadow prices of three environmental outputs bod cod and ss of 63 household level paper recycling units from a recycling craft village in vietnam are assessed a two stage procedure linear programming and stochastic estimation is used to estimate output distance function social capital as a production factor and environmental outputs are included in the output distance function results indicate that production efficiencies could potentially be improved by 28 there is a substantial variation in the shadow prices of environmental outputs among the production units of different types of paper products furthermore the average shadow prices of the three environmental outputs are all positive this indicates a potential for improving environmental quality though introducing pollution prevention methods to paper recycling production processes in vietnam e g recirculation of wastewater and suggests that it may be inappropriate to restrict the shadow prices of environmental outputs to be non positive for the analysis of some production processes

when green isn t mean economic theory and the heuristics of the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness and opportunity cost abstract the conventional neoclassical economic wisdom argues that the opportunity costs of environmental regulations are high with negative implications for costs and profits and by implication for growth and per capita gross domestic product gdp the minority view that environmental controls induce cost offsets that minimise such opportunity costs is marginalised by the conventional wisdom which assumes that economic agents are x efficient in production a behavioral model of the firm is presented in this paper whereby x inefficiency in production prevails even in a world of perfect product market competition that is dominated by rational economic agents in this model environmental regulations affect both the level of x efficiency and the extent of technological change and greener firms can be cost competitive and profitable however private economic agents cannot be expected to adopt green economic policy independent of regulations since in this model there need not be any economic advantage accruing to the affected firms in becoming greener

corporate optimal production planning with varying environmental costs a grey compromise programming approach abstract corporate environmental and resources management has become more strategically oriented when many pollution charges environmental taxes and resources conservation fees have been gradually imposing to the industry the need for explicit consideration and incorporation of varying environmental costs within production planning program is becoming critical to corporate management this paper attempts to assess an optimal production planning program in response to varying environmental costs in an uncertain environment the optimal production strategy concerning numerous screening of possible production alternatives of dyeing cloth in a textile dyeing firm in terms of market demand resources availability and impact of environmental costs is treated as an integral part of the multi criteria decision making framework based on the grey compromise programming approach it covers not only the regular part of production costs and the direct income from product sales but also the emission effluent charges and water resource fees reflecting part of the goals for internalization of external cost in a sustainable society in particular all the crucial variables in the model are addressed by interval expressions the same as they are frequently applied in the grey systems theory in support of a vital uncertainty assessment which is much better suited for this particular study than other approaches research results demonstrate the applicability and significance of such an approach based on a case study industry looking for the competitive advantage of environmental management must be aware of the potential benefits from such an integrated production planning program once the trend of increasing pollution charges environmental taxes and resources conservation fees remains

optimal input substitution of a firm facing an environmental constraint abstract in this paper we consider the dynamic behavior of a firm subject to environmental regulation as a social planner the government wants to reduce the level of pollution to reach that aim it can among others set an upper limit on polluting emissions of the firm the paper determines how this policy instrument influences the firm s decisions concerning investments abatement efforts and the choice whether to leave some capacity unused or not the abatement process is modeled as input substitution rather than end of pipe using standard control theory in determining the firm s optimal dynamic investment decisions it turns out that it is always optimal to approach a long run optimal level of capital in some cases this equilibrium is reached within finite time but usually it will be approached asymptotically different scenarios are considered ranging from attractive clean input to unattractive clean input and from a mild emission limit to a very tight one it is shown that for large capital stocks and or when marginal cash flow per unit of emissions is larger for the dirty input than for the clean input it can be optimal to actually leave some production capacity unused also since the convex installation costs suggest to spread investments over time it can happen that investment in productive capital is positive although capacity remains unused

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

average shadow price and equilibrium price a case study of tradable pollution permit markets abstract shadow prices indicate implicit values of limited resources at the margin and provide important information in decision making for resource management in continuous economic models shadow prices associated with demand supply balance constraints represent consumers willingness to pay and producers marginal cost hence they correspond to market equilibrium prices as well known however marginal analysis fails in the case of discrete optimization such as mixed integer programming an alternative concept has been introduced in the literature to measure the value of an extra unit of a limited resource in such cases this concept is based on average rather than marginal values thus called the average shadow price and interpreted in the same way as conventional shadow prices whether average shadow prices in a discrete economic model can serve as market equilibrium prices has not been addressed in the related literature the present paper addresses this issue in an empirical setting using a tradable pollution permit market as an example where firms yes no type technology adoption decisions are represented by binary variables we show that the average shadow price of tradable permits can be interpreted as the equilibrium price only when certain conditions related to the cost structure and emission levels hold on the other hand we show that an iterative procedure based on individual firms cost minimizing behavior presents a better approach for finding a price that can eliminate or reduce the gap between demand and supply of permits in the market

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

developing an input output activity matrix ioam for environmental and economic analysis of manufacturing systems and logistics chains abstract an activity matrix am shows the activities that transform an organization s inputs into outputs the inputs are the system targets and the materials energy and other resources that are used to achieve these the outputs are the system performance expressed in terms of production quality profit environmental performance waste etc performance may be measured against the financial environmental technical social or other system targets a concurrent enterprise view is used to represent the manufacturing system activities and the paper examines how an am may be used to represent and design systems two kinds of am are examined an unconstrained activity matrix and an input output activity matrix ioam with an unconstrained am the system designer chooses system outputs attributes or requirements intuitively this provides great flexibility and allows e g the social and organisational implications of proposed changes to be investigated the inputs are not formally stated although a systems designer normally focuses on identifying the stages of a product life cycle and analysing their impact on the system s outputs the main emphasis of the paper is on the ioam and its use to represent the transformation of an organization s inputs into outputs the input output representation developed in the paper is used to examine manufacturing and logistics systems first the ioam is used to represent a manufacturing system as one tier of a logistics chain and its performance secondly the ioam representations may be derived for a multi tier system to represent its production economic and environmental performance

multi item production planning with carbon cap and trade mechanism abstract carbon emission control becomes a challenge in recent years and carbon emission trading is an effective way to curb carbon emission this paper investigates the multi item production planning problem with carbon cap and trade mechanism in which a firm uses a common capacity and carbon emission quota to produce multiple products for fulfilling independent stochastic demands and the firm can buy or sell the right to emit carbon on a trading market of carbon emission a profit maximization model is proposed to characterize the optimization problem the optimal policy of production and carbon trading decisions is analyzed and an efficient solution method with linear computational complexity is presented for solving the optimal solution the impacts of carbon price carbon cap on the shadow price of the common capacity production decisions carbon emission and the total profit are investigated the comparisons of the carbon cap and trade policy and the taxation policy are given to show the effectiveness of the policies numerical analyses are presented for illustrating our findings and obtaining some managerial insights and policy implication

constrained egalitarian allocations abstract this paper proposes a constrained egalitarian solution concept for tu games which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of individual interests in a consistent manner the paper shows that the set of constrained egalitarian allocations is nonempty for weakly super additive games the solution is almost unique if the desirability relation between players is complete

determination of income production and employment under pollution control an input output approach it can be shown that a variation of the multiplier approach solves the leontief pollution model in a more directly interpretable and computationally efficient manner than the conventional method of directly using the augmented leontief inverse matrix the solution of each endogenous variable of the model can be expressed in terms of the non augmented leontief inverse exogenous variables and two important multipliers the pollution control multiplier and a modified keynesian multiplier modified by pollution control the so called induced effect and the effect of pollution control on a given economy can be separated from the model 6 references 5 footnotes 1 table

environmental tariffs on polluting imports this paper examines the implications for the use of trade measures as weapons to address global environmental concerns there are already proposals in the u s senate to impose an environmental tariff against foreign nations whose cost advantages stem from less stringent environmental standards than the u s the paper argues that trade policy measures typically are not the first best instruments for achieving environmental objectives even theoretically they could be shown to be welfare improving only under a very narrow range of circumstances their use in place of more efficient policy instruments may not only end up distorting the patterns of world trade but also may worsen the overall patterns of environmental quality simulation exercises undertaken here suggest that it is highly unlikely that countries would alter their environmental behavior because of the imposition of the proposed u s tariff hence the proposed legislation has very uncertain environmental consequences even if the policy has been mainly designed to protect domestic industries it would only provide a minor margin of protection because the costs of complying with the environmental standards represent a relatively small element in the total costs the analysis suggests that trade policy introduced in this fashion will have no significant impact on the patterns of world trade and pollution

capturing the least costly way of reducing pollution a shadow price approach abstract the production analysis literature is increasingly concerned with estimating marginal abatement costs yet most studies do not emphasize the ways in which pollutants may be reduced and their costs which makes them unable to identify the least costly compliance strategy this paper utilizes the materials balance principle to relate pollution to the employment of material inputs a production model which allows input and output substitution downscaling of operations pollution control and emission permits purchases as compliance strategies is proposed and the implications of joint and non joint pollution controls for the trade off between pollutants and desirable outputs are considered marginal abatement costs reflecting the least costly way of compliance are derived by exploiting the duality between the directional distance function and the profit function

messy marginal costs internal pricing of environmental aspects on the firm level abstract internal pricing of environmental aspects is usually not embedded in management accounting systems therefore we first show that pricing from a corporative perspective is possible and applicable contrary to common belief we also show that marginal costs curves of environmental aspects are often not monotonic and price changes are highly context specific we introduce a model that addresses different environmental aspects that translate into constraints or change direct cost factors in the objective function environmental constraints originate from different types of limit values concerning emissions and production processes as well as restraining the potential environmental damage as the outcome of ecological valuation methods direct cost factors include the taxation of emissions and costs stemming from being involved in the emissions trading market our model allows for calculating the marginal indirect costs of these environmental aspects as the constraints might enforce factor and product substitutions we show that the marginal costs differ substantially from the direct costs and do not follow a predictable pattern sensitivity analysis and parametric programming are applied to set up an internal pricing and cost allocation scheme for environmental aspects specifically focusing on the pricing of emissions resources and processes of production and recycling the model s implications on corporate decision making are illustrated by a numerical example that draws on the opportunity of process substitution e g producing a product on different machines even though we cannot use original data for proprietary reasons such settings are highly relevant in industry and the energy sector

recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games abstract an evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game unlike its predecessors in the evolution learning literature this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors the stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a rawlsian swf for a common class of utility functions in contrast to previous analyses the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions