production costs scope economies and multi client outsourcing under quantity competition abstract two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi client outsourcing mco phenomenon analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers high in house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor under certain conditions if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria if both firms make decisions sequentially collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium furthermore the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of mco with regard to diverse market parameters finally it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when mco occurs this research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls supply chain cities and the china price

downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose regulated wholesale prices are above costs we examine the consequences of allowing a bottleneck input supplier to vertically integrate downstream and compete with users of the input when the input has a regulated price above cost if the supplier maximizes the sum of short run profits from the downstream market and input market then allowing the vertical integration will increase social surplus even if it causes sellers of competing differentiated products to exit the market if the bottleneck supplier wishes to engage in predatory pricing increasing the regulated price of the input above cost reduces the incentive to engage in predation these questions are motivated primarily by assertions made in the public record that allowing bell operating companies into long distance can be harmful if access rates are above cost copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

multi product newsboy problem with limited capacity and outsourcing this paper considers a multi product newsboy system that produces multiple products for fulfilling independently uncertain demands which share the same production capacity to deal with possible shortage of limited capacity productions can be outsourced we consider two outsourcing strategies zero lead time outsourcing and nonzero lead time outsourcing the structural properties and solution procedures for the profit maximization models are developed numerical results are provided for obtaining some managerial insights

brand equity and vertical product line extent this paper addresses the question of how the vertical structure of a product line relates to brand equity does the presence of premium or high quality products in a product line enhance brand equity conversely does the presence of economy or low quality products in a product line diminish brand equity economists and marketing researchers refer to variation in quality levels of products within a category as vertical differentiation whereas variation in the function or category of the products is referred to as horizontal differentiation much of the existing research on the relationship between product line structure and brand equity has focused on the horizontal structure of the product lineand has been primarily concerned with brand extensions what happens when the product line of a brand is extended horizontally into new categories researchers have been concerned primarily with how the extension fares but the effect of the extension on the core products is also important there is an analogous question of what happens when the product line of a brand is extended vertically either up market or down market this question of vertical extensions is part of the more general issue of how the vertical structure of a product line relates to brand equity the specific research questions addressed in this paper are 1 do premium or high quality products enhance the brand equity associated with the other products in the line 2 conversely do economy or low quality products diminish the brand equity associated with the other products in the line these research questions are relevant to three managerial issues in product line strategy first what are the costs and benefits of including down market products within a brand second what are the implications of including high end models within a brand third when should high end and low end products be offered under an existing brand umbrella and when should these products be offered under separate brands we address these research questions empirically through an analysis of the models and brands within the u s mountain bicycle industry we use price premium above that which can be explained by the physical characteristics of the bicycle as a metric for brand equity we then test several hypotheses related to the relationship between extension of the product line upward and downward and the price premium commanded by the brand we further support this analysis with a simple laboratory experiment the analysis reveals that price premium in the lower quality segments of the market is significantly positively correlated with the quality of the lowest quality model in the brand s product line and that for the upper quality segments of the market price premium is also significantly positively correlated with the quality of the highest quality model in the brand s product line the results of the analysis are supported by the outcome of an experiment in which 63 percent of the subjects preferred a product offered by a high end brand to the equivalent product offered by a low end competitor these results imply that managers wishing only to maximize the equity of their brands would offer only high quality products and avoid offering low quality products however this result must be moderated by the overall objective of maximizing profits maximizing profits is likely to involve a tradeoff between preserving high brand equity and therefore high margins and pursuing the volume typically located in the lower end of the market one of the most significant implications of this research is that product line managers need to be mindful not just of the incremental cannibalization or stimulation of sales of products that are immediate neighbors of an extension to the product line but also the effect of such an extension on the brand equity in other possibly quite different parts of the product line

on the optimal design of place based policies a structural evaluation of eu regional transfers we quantify general equilibrium effects of place based policies in a multi region framework with population mobility trade and agglomeration economies using detailed data on eu transfers we infer the local effects of different transfer types on productivity income and transportation cost based on these estimates and the general equilibrium model we derive the spatial distribution of economic activity and the resulting aggregate welfare effects if i no transfers were paid and taxes set to zero ii transfers were distributed uniformly iii transfers were welfare optimally distributed characterizing the optimal distributions we reveal complementarities between transfer types and between transfers and local endowments

majority preference for subsidies over redistribution abstract among other activities democratic governments redistribute resources directly through tax schemes that explicitly benefit the poor and indirectly through subsidizing particular goods and services that do not indeed in some cases the effective redistribution under subsidy policies is clearly away from the poor this paper studies when a majority might prefer subsidy policies over direct income redistribution in economies with mean greater than median income the main result is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for subsidies to be majority preferred to direct redistribution in sum subsidies are strictly majority preferred to redistribution when the gap between median and mean incomes is not too great

collaborate or consolidate assessing the competitive effects of production joint ventures we analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger under standard regularity conditions the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger though the effect on prices quantities and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition in light of our results regarding profits we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge imperfect information cost synergies and organizational asymmetries we further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture i e by delegation of input pricing jel l13 l23 l42

testing alternative theories of the firm transaction cost knowledge based and measurement explanations for make or buy decisions in information services firms boundary choices have undergone careful examination in recent years particularly in information services while transaction cost economics provides a widely tested explanation for boundary choice more recent theoretical work advances competing knowledge based and measurement cost explanations similar to transaction cost economics these theories examine the impact of exchange attributes on the performance of markets and hierarchies as institutions of governance these theories however offer alternative attributes to those suggested by transaction cost economics or offer alternative mechanisms through which similar attributes influence make buy choices traditional empirical specifications of make buy models are unable to comparatively test among these alternative theories by developing and testing a model of comparative institutional performance rather than institutional choice we examine the degree of support for these competing explanations of boundary choice hypotheses are tested using data on the governance of nine information services at 152 companies our results suggest that a theory of the firm and a theory of boundary choice is likely to be complex requiring integration of transaction cost knowledge based and measurement reasoning 1998 john wiley sons ltd

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

manufacturers channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products abstract manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision namely whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary to address this issue extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing equally substitutable products however in reality many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity in this paper we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products following some recent studies we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function based on this model we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains cournot quantity competition bertrand price competition and bertrand cournot competition we find that brand equity substitutability as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures specifically in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity moreover when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability manufacturers tend to sell directly our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and bertrand competition

a mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing an emerging phenomenon in the management of information systems is outsourcing outsourcing is the contracting of various system management functions by user firms to vendors this paper focuses on the outsourcing bidding process pertinent to the selection of one contractor by a user firm the paper explores bidding situations where the vendors have different levels of expertise and cost structures truth revealing mechanisms that induce the vendors to bid competitively in line with their costs are utilized and a mixed integer programming model is presented the model allows the user firm to obtain the optimal expected contract cost some interesting conclusions emerge from the analysis of representative examples used in the paper first the results clearly show that truth revealing strategies always result in lower contract costs for the user firm than if the user firm were to follow the straightforward strategy of always choosing the lowest bid second the user firm can reduce contract costs by deploying a discriminatory selection policy vis a vis the different vendors third subsidies need to be given in order to ensure truth revealing behavior of the vendors thus the qualitative interpretations of the model parallel bidding behavior practices observed in the real world

strategy research governance and competence perspectives business strategy is a complex subject and is usefully examined from several perspectives this paper applies the lenses of governance and competence to the study of strategy both the governance and the competence perspectives have had the benefit of distinguished antecedents they have also had to deal with tautological reputations i begin with the governance perspective with emphasis on the six key moves through which it has been operationalized i then examine the competence perspective in these same six respects governance challenges the competence perspective to apply itself more assiduously to operationalization including the need to choose and give definition to one or more units of analysis of which the routine is a promising candidate the research challenges posed by competence to which governance can and should respond include dynamic transaction costs learning and the need to push beyond generic governance to address strategy issues faced by particular firms with their distinctive strengths and disabilities a lively research future for these two perspectives individually and in combination is projected copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd business strategy is an expansive enterprise not only do all of the functional areas in the business school relate but strategy is by nature interdisciplinary all of the social sciences especially economics and organization theory plus contract law are implicated indeed in the high technology arena where some of the most difficult strategy issues reside engineering and the law on intellectual property rights also have a bearing of the various approaches to the study of strategy this paper focuses on the governance and competence perspectives both perspectives combine economic reasoning with organization theory as between these two the governance

going nuts the effect of eu structural funds on regional performance the european union eu provides grants to disadvantaged regions of member states to allow them to catch up with the eu average under the objective 1 scheme nuts2 regions with a per capita gdp level below 75 of the eu average qualify for structural funds transfers from the central eu budget this rule gives rise to a regression discontinuity design that exploits the discrete jump in the probability of eu transfer receipt at the 75 threshold for identification of causal effects of objective 1 treatment on outcome such as economic growth of eu regions we find positive per capita gdp growth effects of objective 1 transfers but no employment growth effects

vertical governance change and product differentiation under decreasing component costs in deciding on whether and when to outsource component production firms should consider the trade off between total production costs and the ability to horizontally differentiate products we study the outsourcing decision in a duopoly under decreasing but uncertain market rates for components given that outsourcing increases the substitutability of the final products we find that there is at least one firm that eventually outsources component production because it cannot differentiate its product enough by in house production to justify the eventually higher costs the follower outsources at a lower market rate or may even remain vertically integrated the follower thus incurs the eventually much higher in house component costs longer while the low substitutability is enjoyed by both firms under endogenous roles firms thus engage in a preemption game to be the first to outsource we also find that firms generally outsource at lower market rates if uncertainty is higher but seek to preempt at remarkably higher market rates if substitutability remains low

commuting migration and local employment elasticities many changes in the economic environment are local including policy changes and infrastructure investments the effect of these changes depends crucially on the ability of factors to move in response therefore a key object of interest for policy evaluation and design is the elasticity of local employment to these changes in the economic environment we develop a quantitative general equilibrium model that incorporates spatial linkages between locations in goods markets trade and factor markets commuting and migration we find substantial heterogeneity across locations in local employment elasticities we show that this heterogeneity can be well explained with theoretically motivated measures of commuting flows without taking into account this dependence estimates of the local employment elasticity for one location are not generalizable to other locations we also find that commuting flows and their importance cannot be accounted for with standard measures of size or wages at the county or commuting zone levels

outsourcing and capacity planning in an uncertain global environment firms employing offshore outsourcing strategies may face both exchange rate and demand uncertainties in this paper we show that the firms may benefit from operational option to switch production by keeping capacities with both domestic and foreign suppliers the value of the operational option increases as the exchange rate uncertainty or demand uncertainty increases in addition when the firms become risk averse they may use domestic capacity to hedge against offshore capacity as a result the firms may choose to hold local capacity even if it exhibits negative marginal contribution to the profit furthermore risk averse firms may keep more total capacity than risk neutral firms

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

can vertical integration by a monopsonist harm consumer welfare abstract vertical integration by a monopsonist is generally believed not to harm consumers this paper demonstrates in a natural economic setting that this conventional wisdom may not hold we model one on one bargaining between a monopsonist and independent suppliers when the set of suppliers cannot be expanded easily ex post and show that a vertically separated monopolist is vulnerable to holdup without integration we demonstrate that a bottleneck monopsonist has an incentive to encourage more upstream entry than would arise in a pure neoclassical monopoly having more suppliers mitigates the holdup power of any one this however distorts the cost structure of the industry toward greater industry output and hence lowers final good prices vertical integration mitigates the hold up problem faced by the monopsonist it allows it to generate and appropriate a greater level of industry profits at the expense of consumers

games with strategic complementarities new applications to industrial organization this paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization oligopoly pricing comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two stage games

network competition ii price discrimination our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing this article relaxes this assumption and allows networks to charge different prices for calls terminating on the subscriber s network and those terminating on a rivals network this creates a price differential between services that are identical for the consumer and generates network externalities despite network interconnection we show that in both the mature and entry phases of the industry the nature of competition is substantially affected by such price discrimination

local economic development agglomeration economies and the big push 100 years of evidence from the tennessee valley authority we study the long run eects of one of the most ambitious place based economic development policies in u s history the tennessee valley authority using a rich panel dataset of counties we conduct an evaluation of the dynamic eects of the tva on local economies in the seventy years following the program s inception we nd that the tva led to short run gains in agricultural employment that were eventually reversed while impacts on manufacturing employment continued to intensify well after the program s subsidies had lapsed a pattern consistent with the presence of strong agglomeration economies in the manufacturing sector economists have long cautioned that the local gains created by place based policies may be oset by losses elsewhere yielding ambiguous eects on the u s as a whole building on the framework in glaeser and gottlieb 2008 we develop a novel approach to assessing the aggregate consequences of shifting the spatial distribution of manufacturing employment our ndings suggest the aggregate productivity gains associated with relocating manufacturing activity to the tva region were probably minimal

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

strategic outsourcing revisited this paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market we apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by fudenberg and tirole 1984 to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market if firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals costs we illustrate our analysis using a linear cournot model

bertrand competition with subcontracting we investigate how the possibility of subsequently subcontracting production to each other influences rivals initial competition for a contract or a market as a two stage game in its first stage the two firms engage in price competition to supply a contract or a market in the second stage the firms may subcontract production to each other it is supposed that the firms produce the identical product with the same strictly convex cost function the incentive for subcontracting comesfrom the strictly convex production costs a firm is obliged to supply the entire quantity demanded at its quoted price our analysis discloses that if the winner of the game s first stage determines the terms of the subcontract in its second stage there exists a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne in pure strategies in which the firms bid the same price in the first stage and both receive zero profits on the other hand if the loser of the game s first stage sets the terms of the subcontract in the second stage there exists a unique spne in pure strategies in which the firms bid the same price in the first stage and both receive positive profits the presence of the possibility of subcontracting supports a unique spne in pure strategies even though no actual subcontracting may occur the spne price is below the socially optimal price in the first case and is above it in the second case we also consider other modes of sharing the gains from subcontracting between the two firms such as the nash bargaining solution

outsourcing vertical integration and price vs quantity competition abstract we show that standard conclusions about duopoly competition can be reversed when the production of key inputs is outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power under such outsourcing bertrand competition can produce higher prices higher industry profit lower consumer surplus and lower total surplus than cournot competition in addition to limiting the intensity of retail competition bertrand competition can limit the extent of wholesale competition by reducing the incentive of retail providers to produce key inputs themselves

inequality and convergence in europe s regions reconsidering european regional policies europe s regions income disparities and regional policies in this paper we take a critical look at current european regional policies first we document the motivation for such policies that is the large income disparities across the regions of the eu15 large disparities are certainly present second we illustrate the various instruments adopted and discuss their underpinnings in established economic theories next we look at available data searching for three kinds of evidence 1 if disparities are either growing or decreasing we conclude they are neither 2 which are the major factors explaining such disparities and in particular if they are the factors predicted by the economic models adopted by the commission to justify current policies we conclude this is most certainly not the case 3 if there are clear signs that eu policies as opposed to other social and economic factors are actually reducing such disparities we cannot find any clear sign of such desired impact our conclusion is that regional and structural policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the european union is built they have little relationship with fostering economic growth this casts a serious doubt on their social value and furthermore strongly questions extending such policies to future members of the european union a successful eu enlargement in our view calls for an immediate and drastic revision of regional economic policies michele boldrin and fabio canova

experimentation and learning in a differentiated products duopoly abstract this paper explores price setting behavior in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation firms learn from the difference in their realized demands in light of the price differential the informativeness of this market experiment is shown to be increasing in size of the price differential in markets with highly substitutable products price dispersion is enhanced as firms adjust their prices so as to generate more information in markets with highly differentiated products firms compress their prices as they prefer to reveal less about the extent of product differentiation journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l13

broader product line a necessity to achieve success strategic product line breadth decisions evoke differential responses from the manufacturing and the marketing areas manufacturing prefers keeping process disruptions to a minimum and as a result discourages product proliferation however marketing in its attempt to match products to heterogeneous consumer needs and gain market share emphasizes a broader product line we systematically investigate the market benefits and cost disadvantages of broader product lines on a large sample of over 1 400 business units our results indicate significant market share benefits and increases in firms profitability with broader product lines moreover widely held beliefs of increases in production costs are not empirically supported american manufacturing firms may indeed be flexible enough to accommodate product variety without significant detrimental effects on costs

selection of contract suppliers under price and demand uncertainty in a dynamic market in this paper we consider a supply contracting problem in which the buyer firm faces non stationary stochastic price and demand first we derive analytical results to compare two pure strategies i periodically purchasing from the spot market and ii signing a long term contract with a single supplier the results from the pure strategies show that the selection of suppliers can be complicated by many parameters and is particularly affected by price uncertainty we then develop a stochastic dynamic programming model to incorporate mixed strategies purchasing commitments and contract cancellations computational results show that increases in price demand uncertainty favor long term short term suppliers by examining the two way interactions of contract factors price demand purchasing bounds learning and technology effect salvage values and contract cancellation both intuitive and non intuitive managerial insights in outsourcing strategies are derived

the aggregate productivity effects of internal migration evidence from indonesia we estimate the aggregate productivity gains from reducing barriers to internal labor migration in indonesia accounting for worker selection and spatial differences in human capital we distinguish between movement costs which mean workers will move only if they expect higher wages and amenity differences which mean some locations must pay more to attract workers we find modest but important aggregate impacts we estimate a 22 percent increase in labor productivity from removing all barriers reducing migration costs to the us level a high mobility benchmark leads to a 7 1 percent productivity boost these figures hide substantial heterogeneity the origin population that benefits most sees a 104 percent increase in average earnings from a complete barrier removal or a 25 percent gain from moving to the us benchmark

on the irrelevance of input prices for make or buy decisions this paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make or buy decisions because of strategic downstream considerations entrants may always undertake efficient make or buy decisions regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers

firm sorting and agglomeration to account for the uneven distribution of economic activity in space i propose a theory of the location choices of heterogeneous firms in a variety of sectors across cities in equilibrium the distribution of city sizes and the sorting patterns of firms are uniquely determined and affect aggregate tfp and welfare i estimate the model using french firm level data and find that nearly half of the productivity advantage of large cities is due to firm sorting the rest coming from agglomeration economies i quantify the general equilibrium effects of place based policies policies that subsidize smaller cities have negative aggregate effects

equilibrium prices in the bertrand and cournot oligopolies abstract the equilibrium prices for the bertrand and cournot oligopolies with product differentiation are compared if all firms have linear demand and cost functions and if in addition the jacobian matrix of the demand functions has a dominant negative diagonal the cournot equilibrium prices are not lower than the bertrand ones the general condition for the comparison of the bertrand and cournot equilibrium prices can be derived even if the nonlinearity is involved in the cost and or demand functions

strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure abstract we consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival with linear input pricing at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship for either cournot or bertrand competition with a two part tariff for the input the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements but is reversed for cournot with strategic substitutes we analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival customer

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

supplier initiated outsourcing a methodology to exploit synergy in transportation over the last decades transportation has been evolving from a necessary though low priority function to an important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive edge over their competitors to cut down transportation costs shippers often outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice this paper proposes a new procedure that puts the initiative with the service provider instead supplier initiated outsourcing this procedure is based on both operations research and game theoretical insights to stress the contrast between the traditional push approach of outsourcing and the here proposed pull approach where the service provider is the initiator of the shift of logistics activities from the shipper to the logistics service provider we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking insinking has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proactively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential moreover these synergies can be allocated to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of a so called shapley monotonic path of customized tariffs insinking is illustrated by means of a practical example based on data from the dutch grocery transportation sector

a resource based theory of the firm knowledge versus opportunism this paper develops a resource based knowledge based theory of the firm its thesis is that the organizational mode through which individuals cooperate affects the knowledge they apply to business activity we focus on the polar cases of organization within a firm as compared to market contracting there will be a difference in the knowledge that is brought to bear and hence in joint productivity under the two options thus as compared to opportunism based transaction cost theory we advance a separate yet complementary answer to the question why do firms exist our aim is to develop an empirically relevant and complementary theory of why firms are formed a theory based on irreducible knowledge differences between individuals rather than the threat of purposeful cheating or withholding of information we assume limited cognitive abilities on the part of individuals bounded rationality and assume that opportunistic behavior will not occur the latter allows us to determine whether resource based

offshore outsourcing decision making a policy maker s perspective this research aims at finding the best governing policy for offshore outsourcing of business activities we use analytical network process a multicriteria decision making methodology to create the evaluation framework from the perspective of decision makers stakeholders and influence groups four policy options are evaluated with respect to approximately 50 economic political technological and other factors the model provides both long term and short term views of the outsourcing issue concerned to all parties the all inclusive approach helps policy makers to decide on the best policy and has the potential to ease tension between proponents and opponents of offshore outsourcing

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

the future of operations management an outlook and analysis abstract managing operations in both manufacturing and service organizations have evolved tremendously over the years with the change in market requirements the market has become global thereby compelling enterprise operations to keep up the application of information technology information systems it is and outsourcing in managing operations have significantly altered the landscape of operations management om strategies techniques and technologies consciousness towards environmental and safety also urges companies to examine their om approach and manufacturing from various perspectives recently energy cost and protection against terrorism have changed the portfolio of enterprise operations and therefore the approach to om now it is time to revisit the om principles curriculum and training at the institution of higher learning and industries moreover manufacturing has become more of a service activity indicating significant service om including project management the profile of service industries has also changed in view of the emergence of globalization outsourcing and it coupled with the rapid economic growth of emerging economies such as brazil russia india and china bric in fact services account for approximately 80 of the us gross domestic product gdp this is also a growing figure of the gdps of other countries over the world again service om needs to be revisited in the context of the abovementioned paradigm shifts in considering the significance of the above mentioned changes in the market and society as a whole an attempt is made to study the evolution of om and subsequently to develop a framework for new om strategies and tactics that will support the competitiveness of organizations within the next 10 20 years

the determinants and welfare implications of us workers diverging location choices by skill 1980 2000 abstract from 1980 to 2000 the rise in the us college high school graduate wage gap coincided with increased geographic sorting as college graduates concentrated in high wage high rent cities this paper estimates a structural spatial equilibrium model to determine causes and welfare consequences of this increased skill sorting while local labor demand changes fundamentally caused the increased skill sorting it was further fueled by endogenous increases in amenities within higher skill cities changes in cities wages rents and endogenous amenities increased inequality between high school and college graduates by more than suggested by the increase in the college wage gap alone jel d31 i26 j24 j31 j61 r23

evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization abstract theoretically federal transfers that make household location decisions efficient should ignore local cost differences subsidize positive externalities and offset differences in federal tax payments and local taxes levied on non residents but not local tax revenues from residents transfers that redistribute resources equitably across regions will likely target areas with individuals of low earnings potential or low real incomes applying these criteria empirically canadian equalization policy appears neither efficient nor equitable but exacerbates pre existing inefficiencies and underfunds minorities locational inefficiencies cost canada 0 41 of income annually and cause over funded provinces to have populations of 30 beyond their efficient long run levels

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

a simulation study of it outsourcing in the credit card business the use of monte carlo simulation for evaluation of financial risk of an information technology project selection decision is described a major thai bank considered the opportunity to expand credit card operations through information technology it alternatives considered were in house development and outsourcing there were many strategic reasons for the initiative however there were also many risks associated with the proposal a monte carlo simulation spreadsheet model was used to model risk parameters and to analyze key performance variables of financial performance key output variables were the number of cardholders expected project net present value net profit and expected return on investment the spreadsheet model made entry of model elements transparent and monte carlo simulation provided clear visual display of the financial output variables the bank used this information in its decision to outsource its credit card operations

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

credible commitments further remarks i distinguish between unilateral and bilateral trading relations in an earlier article in this review 1983 in which i examined the use of hostages or their commercial equivalents to support exchange the purposes of this note are 1 to confirm the optimality of reciprocal trading by explicitly displaying the combined net benefit relations and 2 to acknowledge a previously unremarked complication that arises when nonsalvageable assets are used as hostages in a unilateral trade

performance measures and metrics in outsourcing decisions a review for research and applications outsourcing an operations strategy that influences the performance of a supply chain has become an important component of global operations management an effective global sourcing strategy helps companies to manage the flow of parts and finished products in meeting the needs of overseas and domestic markets outsourcing reduces the cost of assets facilitates core competencies to reduce production costs leads to strategic flexibility and reduces administrative and overhead costs some of the reasons why companies are against outsourcing include integration challenges sacrificing their competitive base opportunistic behaviour rising transaction and coordination costs limited innovation and higher procurement costs despite these shortcomings outsourcing will continue to play an important role in enhancing organizational competitiveness therefore an attempt has been made to review the literature on outsourcing with particular reference to performance measures and metrics pmms used in arriving at outsourcing decisions the main objective of this paper is to present a taxonomy classification of pmms in outsourcing decisions at the pre outsourcing during outsourcing and post outsourcing stages also based on the literature review and analysis an attempt is made to determine a list of specific tools and techniques for pmms in outsourcing finally the limitations of the paper and future research directions are presented

outsourcing suppliers as downstream competitors biting the hand that feeds abstract in this paper we highlight an aspect of supplier opportunism in the outsourcing paradox that has largely been ignored by extant research the supplier as a direct competitor of the buyer firm in light of this paradox we offer a game theoretic framework in which we identify conditions under which firms could alleviate or mitigate this outsourcing problem our results show that apart from transaction costs firm level capabilities both ordinary and dynamic play important roles in determining the make only buy only or make and buy options a firm could exercise in countering the threat of the supplier as a potential competitor in the downstream marketplace

how to compete cournot versus bertrand in a vertical structure with an integrated input supplier we study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and its retail competitor in a differentiated duopoly using a similar vertical structure arya et al 2008 show that bertrand competition is more profitable than cournot competition which contrasts with conventional wisdom in this article we first demonstrate that such a result is robust to the endogenous determination of the type of contract second by introducing managerial incentives in the model we find that delegation to managers may lead each firm to choose a quantity contract and as long as products are sufficiently differentiated entails conflicting choices causing nonexistence of equilibrium in pure strategies significantly high product substitutability reconciles firms objectives under delegation leading unique or multiple equilibria with symmetric types of contracts to arise

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

price vs quantity competition in a vertically related market this paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of cournot and bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two part tariffs in such a market downstream cournot competition yields higher output lower wholesale prices lower final prices higher consumers surplus and higher total welfare than bertrand competition

bidding for contests the procurement of product development and production services brings special strategic considerations to the buyer seller relationship in industrial and institutional markets multiple sourcing in particular dual sourcing is a likely way of dealing with the increased risks faced by buyers however there is lack of dual sourcing models that analyze the selection and control process in an integrated fashion this omission had led to apparently contradictory findings in agency and auction theory the paper models the strategic issues for a cost containment contest between two suppliers the suppliers are drawn from several vendors who participate in a bidding competition the supplier with the lower final cost in the contest wins a larger share of the pooled profit fee propositions are derived for the optimal cost plus contest and comparisons are made with the common incentive contract for the integrated selection and control model the larger the winner s share the greater the effort the buyer can make a credible commitment to the optimal winner s share as the winner s share rises however the bid prices increase due to increased contract risk this incentive risk tradeoff determines a the optimal winner s share that minimizes expected procurement price b the corresponding profit fee bid by suppliers c the ensuing cost control effort and d the final price for the procurement comparisons with the common incentive contract tell us when the cost plus contest induces more effort and when bidding for a contest results in a lower final procurement price

brand loyalty and market equilibrium two concepts of brand loyalty are defined inertial brand loyalty resulting from time lags in awareness and cost based brand loyalty resulting from intertemporal utility effects their market level implications are formally derived in a continuous time model it is found that inertial brand loyalty leads to equilibria with price dispersion while cost based brand loyalty also may allow single price equilibria in all cases as brand loyalty vanishes so does the difference between the average trading price and the price which obtains with no brand loyalty consistent with empirical results the theory predicts that the relationship between market share and performance is positive in cross sectional studies but flat in time series studies the theory is also consistent with the view that market share is an asset in itself after developing the theory several strategic implications are drawn in the end some questions for further theoretical and empirical research are raised