the role of consumption credit in agricultural tenancy abstract in traditional agriculture it is common practice for landlords to give consumption loans to their own tenants if the tenant derives all his income from the landlord it is puzzling that the landlors needs another means of expropriating the surplus he could just raise the rent the paper suggests that consumption credit may be a side payment designed to enable the landlord to absorb the tenant s risk due to weather uncertainty without weakening his incentive to work tenancy is modelled as an agency contract designed in terms of information may be available to the landlord

theories of bank behavior under capital regulation abstract this paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the basel i and basel ii systems of risk based capital requirements the theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk adjusted assets this literature produces highly mixed predictions however regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole thus the intellectual foundation for the present capital regulation regime is not particularly strong the mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements these widely ambiguous results do suggest however that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area

interlinkage limited liability and strategic interaction abstract the literature on interlinkage is inconclusive regarding the strict superiority of this arrangement we analyze a landlord and a moneylender as two players making non cooperative decisions regarding the terms of their respective contracts with a tenant in the sequential game where the landlord moves first and the tenant has limited liability we demonstrate that there exist circumstances in which interlinkage is superior even with nonlinear loan contracts a result that carries over when there is moral hazard the incorporation of risk aversion yields strict superiority in general the main result is unaffected by changes in the seniority of claims but is sensitive to changes in the order of moves limited liability ceases to ensure the strict superiority of interlinked contracts if the principal who provides the variable factor of production moves first even if he has junior claims to the output

what does she see in him the effect of sharing on the choice of spouse all husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs however because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant each may be inclined to provide a suboptimal level of marital inputs the choice of spouse influences the level of distortion and under some circumstances the eficient mating is between individuals of equal value people tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one s desire to capture an ideal partner and one s realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves

credit as insurance in agrarian economies abstract this paper examines consumption credit as an insurance mechanism in agrarian economies it explains the more rapid adoption of new technology in the green revolution by large farmers who had greater access to consumption credit the paper also demonstrates how the emergence and expansion of consumption credit markets by mitigating the need for hoarding in order to meet consumption contingencies enhances growth by encouraging investment

risk based capital requirements and bank portfolio risk abstract we construct a linear programming model and analyze the effectiveness of r b capital adequacy standards when bank deposits are fully insured we derive a set of optimal asset risk weights given a constraint in raising equity and using these weights the r b capital plan is an effective regulation mechanism without a constraint on equity maximum leverage restrictions and r b capital plans are mutually exclusive alternatives as we deviate from the optimal risk weights a combination of a leverage restriction and a r b equity ratio seems to be the more appropriate approach to controlling bank portfolio risk

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

limited liability and the existence of share tenancy abstract the paper considers the problem confronting an absentee landlord who can lease out his land on a fixed rent contract share rent contract or a mixture of the two it is argued that in poor areas it is natural to have each contract underwritten by an implicit limited liability clause which allows a person to forego paying rent under extreme crop failures in the presence of such an implicit clause a certain tension appears between a tenant and a landlord with the former preferring risky projects and the latter preferring safe ones it is shown that in such a case share tenancy turns out to be the dominant system from among the class mentioned above because it minimises the tension between the landlord and the tenant the result is then used to discuss conditions under which share tenancy will tend to wither away

the management of interest rate risk during the crisis evidence from italian banks abstract we use a unique dataset to analyze how italian banking groups managed their exposure to interest rate risk during the recent financial crisis first of all we document that on average the interest rate risk exposure measured by duration gap approach has been limited and well below the alert level enforced by regulators second our econometric results indicate a relation of substitutability between banks on balance sheet interest rate risk and their use of interest rate derivatives suggesting that banks used these two instruments to curb their overall interest rate risk exposure in case of an increase in interest rates furthermore we also find robust evidence of a negative correlation between banks interest rate risk and liquidity risk

market reaction to the thrift bailout abstract this paper examines the share price reaction of depository institutions to the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act firrea passed august 1989 we find a favorable share price response for thrifts which could be attributed to enhanced depositor confidence reduced risk premiums on deposits reduced agency costs or reduced loan losses among other reasons however the effects of firrea on commercial banks were negligible an intra industry analysis revealed that the variation in share price responses could not be explained by cross sectional differences in thrift capital levels

do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking abstract in a dynamic framework it is shown that capital adequacy rules may increase a bank s riskiness in addition to the standard negative effect of rents on risk attitudes of banks a further intertemporal effect has to be considered the intuition behind the result is that under binding capital requirements an additional unit of equity tomorrow is more valuable to a bank if raising equity is excessively costly the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to increase risk today

can regulators allow banks to set their own capital ratios abstract basel regulators have received widespread criticism for failing to prevent two credit crises that hit the u s over the last two decades nonetheless banks were considerably overcapitalized prior to the onset of the 2007 2009 subprime crisis compared to those which had undergone the 1990 1991 recession therefore if capital requirements were achieved prior to the subprime crisis how could the basel framework be blamed again for having accelerated if not caused another credit crunch we find that the answer to this question lies in the relationship between the capital ratio and the leverage ratio which is governed by risk weights categories determined by the basel regulation we show that changes to risk weight categories which affect the correlation pattern between both ratios are not reflected in the subprime crisis this minimizes the implication of the basel ii regulation in the crunch that succeeded its announcement in contrast to basel i we demonstrate that these dynamics are governed by a formula linking the two ratios together which derives from the sensitivity of the risk based capital ratio to a change in its risk weight s one implication of our work regarding the basel iii regulation consists in validating the newly established capital increments in a mathematical rather than heuristical approach

a hierarchy model of associative farming abstract acceptance of the need for complementary services when agrarian reform is introduced such as credit and technical assistance has led many countries in latin america to organize land reform projects into collectives or production cooperatives but the disincentives to effort inherent in group farming have been a continual source of underproduction and disappointment with cooperative farming experiments the paper suggests an intermediate farming structure currently successful in the dominican republic in the framework of an agency contract incorporating the hierarchical relations between beneficiary administrator and governing agency the advantages of the associative over either individual or collective farming are illustrated

price uncertainty and trader farmer linkage abstract we show that the pareto superiority of loan repayment in kind within a tied credit arrangement to a cash for cash scheme under uncertain output price depends crucially on the farmer loan demand elasticity and his risk aversion for the risk neutral trader the cash for cash scheme is shown to be pareto dominated by credit tying and the price premium he offers depends on farmer loan demand elasticity

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

tenancy and family resources a model and some empirical analysis abstract in this paper we discuss with the help of a simple model the role of family resource endowments in determining the extent of land leased in or leased out by a household this becomes important when the market for some of these resources is either not functioning at all or is functioning imperfectly we focus on three such resources which have some relevance in indian agriculture these are 1 the family s managerial skill 2 its endowment of human labour and 3 its endowment of draft animal labour household level data from six villages of maharashtra and andhra pradesh are also utilized to test some of the hypotheses

credit and sharecropping in agrarian societies this paper considers a model of linkage between land labor and credit transactions in the context of sharecropping the paper s objectives are a to derive and characterize the equilibrium in a model of a land scarce labour abundant economy under sharecropping given an infinitely elastic supply of identical sharecroppers at a reservation utility and b to demonstrate that in an imperfect market a landlord may offer credit to his tenant sometimes even at a subsidized rate of interest without necessarily insisting that the sharecropper borrow only from him precluding an involuntary linkage between credit and land transations it has been demonstrated that regardless of the presence or absence of linkage or any other control by the landlord as long as he can vary the size of the plot given to a tenant and there are enough potential tenants in equilibrium contracts a tenants utility under sharecropping will be the same as that which he could have obtained as a full time wage laborer this result implies that policies other than land reform will not affect the welfare of tenants

tenure systems in traditional china i a general equilibrium model of tenure preference classical marginalists at least after john clark provide an unequivocal solution for the conventional factor market where people sell the productive services of their resources to producers the productexhaustion theorem says that if factors are priced according to their marginal products incomes of all resource owners will exactly exhaust the value of total products in the long run competitive equilibrium this holds true regardless of which factor is variable and which is fixed and regardless of which group of resource owners perform as producers who buy productive services of other resources in the market and claim residuals for themselves in an agrarian economy with land and labor as the inputs a land owner may cultivate his land and purchase the labor input from outside paying a wage rate in accordance with labor s marginal product the land owner is then the residual claimant alternatively he may lease out his land and receive a fixed rental rate per unit of area equal to the marginal product of land in this case the tenant is the producer and claims the residual income distribution between the two parties remains the same under each land arrangement wage and rent are therefore identical conceptually the classical marginal analysis has not presented a satisfactory theory of share tenancy which instead of being a seller buyer transaction in a conventional factor market is essentially a partnership arrangement between two persons who own complementary factors hence the term land renting will hereafter denote the fixed rent system exclusively in fact the direct application of marginal analysis to share tenancy has created considerable confusion in early economic literature only recently some general equilibrium models of land tenure systems have been developed for better understanding of the

accounting for banks capital regulation and risk taking this paper examines risk taking incentives in banks under dierent accounting regimes with capital regulation in the model the bank s decisions of capital issuance and investment policy are jointly determined given exogenous minimum capital requirement the bank is more likely to issue equity capital in excess of the minimum required level and implement less risky investment policy under either lower of cost ormarket accounting or fair value accounting than under historical cost accounting but fair value accounting may induce more risk taking compared to lower of cost or market accounting due to short term interest in the part of the bank however the disciplining role of lower of cost or market accounting may discourage bank s incentive to exert project discovery eort

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

the regulation of international lending imf support the debt crisis and bank stockholder wealth abstract in a recent article cornell landsman and shapiro 1986 provide insight in to the impact of selected regulatory responses to the international debt crisis on bank stock prices the current study concentrates on the reaction of bank shareholders to the legislative events that ultimately led to the passage of the international lending supervision act ilsa and to greater u s support of the international monetary fund imf while cornell landsman and shapiro restricted their legislative analysis to when the relevant bills were passed this study also examines when such legislation was introduced in the house or the senate the empirical results indicate that the introduction of such legislation materially influenced bank stockholder expectations in contrast to cornell landsman and shapiro the effect of these events on the risk return complexion of banks is measured furthermore the sensitivity of bank stockholders reactions to the above legislative events is appraised in light of banks latin american loan portfolio risk analysis of the expected impact of greater imf support and the ilsa on bank stockholders supplements the work of cornell landsman and shapiro by providing additional insight into the expected impact of such legislation on bank industry risk unlike cornell landsman and shapiro this study provides evidence that the joint effect of a greater imf quota and the ilsa was a net benefit to stockholders analysis suggests that the perceived benefit of a greater imf quota was apparently diminished by the ilsa however stockholders evidently perceived a general decrease in the risk of the banking industry as a result of the legislative events

the long reach of cotton in the us south tenant farming mechanization and low skill manufacturing abstract this paper examines the long run impact of cotton agriculture on local development in the us south focusing on a novel aspect of structural change exploiting climate based variation in cotton production i show that cotton specialization in the late 19th century had a negative impact on local development that lasts through 2010 this negative relationship however only became evident in the second half of the 20th century i argue that the change was caused by the mechanization of cotton production which began in the 1950s after the mechanization local manufacturing absorbed displaced cotton tenants with low human capital in response to the inflow of cotton tenants labor productivity in manufacturing began to decline and the effects persisted in the long run the persistent decline in manufacturing productivity is explained by directed technical change that reduced demand for skills in manufacturing these results indicate that depending on the agricultural background structural change can negatively affect the evolution of technology and productivity in the industrial sector

bank holding company capital targets in the early 1990s the regulators versus the markets abstract several studies suggest that the credit crunch was due in large part to banks needs to raise their capital ratios the changes in bank capital ratios may have been in response to financial market or regulatory standards this study develops a model to test the relative impact of the regulators and the financial markets on bank holding companies bhcs capital ratios the results suggest that most bhcs were relatively satisfied with their capital ratios in 1989 however the regulators appear to have placed increased pressure on banks in 1990 1991 and 1992 especially bhcs that were subject to regulatory orders

a reexamination of mean variance analysis of bank capital regulation abstract the mean variance framework has been used to analyze the effects of bank capital regulation on the asset and bankruptcy risk of insured utility maximizing banks this literature claims that more stringent capital regulation will increase asset risk and can increase bankruptcy risk these conclusions are notable because they are opposite to those obtained for insured value maximizing banks in this paper we show that the utility maximization literature does not support its conclusions regarding the effects of bank capital regulation because it has mischaracterized the bank s investment opportunity set by neglecting the option value of deposit insurance

the brady plan the 1989 mexican debt reduction agreement and bank stock returns in the united states and japan the authors investigate the impact of the menu approach to debt rescheduling on the market value of two major creditors u s and japanese banks they try to understand how major creditor banks are affected by debt reschedulings and the menu choices they make so that debt deals can be structured in a way that appeals to both creditors and debtor countries they measure the stock market s reaction to the announcement of the brady plan and the mexican debt reduction agreement the brady plan was implemented through the menu approach which acknowledges creditor heterogeneity and provides financing packages that meet the country s financing requirements while still allowing the banks to reduce their exposure the mexican agreement provides an opportunity to test the impact of the brady plan s implementation by examining individual bank s menu choices exposure levels and the market s reaction they explore whether banks were able to make optimal portfolio choices when confronted with the obligation to participate they show that stock prices for different groups of banks reacted quite differently to focal events among all banks u s multinationals showed the strongest positive reaction to the brady announcement and the mexican agreement u s non multinationals do not appear to have been significantly affected by these international debt related events the reaction experienced by all japanese banks was much weaker than that of u s multinationals and was negative for the brady announcement and the initial mexico announcement the authors contend that the lack of a strong reaction was because of the japanese banks relatively low exposure to developing country risk they see the negative market reaction as a reflection of the expectation that a u s initiated debt reduction strategy would not be favorable for japanese banks indeed after the menu choices were announced the market recognized that the japanese banks were treated fairly and corrected itself they do not find that banks that made different choices were treated differently by the market so banks were able to negotiate menu choices in their best interest and to make portfolio choices consistent with their business objectives the results here confirm that the menu approach to debt restructuring may benefit both the creditor banks and the debtor countries

capital and risk in property liability insurance markets abstract this paper investigates the capital and portfolio risk decisions of property liability insurance firms a theoretical model based on option pricing theory is developed which predicts a positive relationship between insurer capital and risk as firms balance these two factors to achieve their desired overall insolvency risk the implications of the model are then tested empirically using a simultaneous equations methodology the results support the predictions of the model they also provide evidence that managerial incentives play a role in determining capital and risk in insurance markets the findings have significant implications for insurance solvency regulation

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

capital regulation heterogeneous monitoring costs and aggregate loan quality abstract this paper develops a banking sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure after analyzing an unregulated banking system we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks to gauge the impact of capital requirements we define loan quality in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population under the assumption of a specific cross sectional distribution of banks our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending but has an ambiguous effect on loan quality nevertheless once capital requirements are in place the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan quality by toughening capital requirements

short term safety or long term failure empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk based on a sample of u s commercial banks from 2002 to 2012 this paper shows that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on both z scores and the likelihood of bank failure indicating a short term risk reduction and a long term risk increase effect we also find disparate impacts between mortgage and non mortgage securitization loan sale activities are found to have a similar impact to securitization

why basel ii may need a leverage ratio restriction abstract we analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks it is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks an additional risk independent leverage ratio restriction may be necessary to induce truthful risk reporting the leverage ratio helps to offset the banks potential capital savings of understating their risks by i reducing banks put option value of limited liability ex ante and by ii increasing the banks net worth which in turn enhances the supervisors ability to sanction banks ex post

capital controls and bank risk abstract we analyze the effects of deposit guarantees on banks loan portfolio in contrast to earlier work we view bank loans net of evaluation and monitoring costs as non zero npv investments e g market securities deposit guarantees lead to inefficient investment and under plausible circumstances capital requirement increases lead banks to increase asset risk the risk increase reduces the beneficial effects of capital increases on the probability of default and on the economic efficiency of bank lending in some cases a tightening of the capital constraint even leads to an increase in the probability of default and financial instability and to higher expected costs of transferring assets to regulatory agencies increases in bank capital are not a substitute for risk monitoring and control and may imply an increased need for such surveillance

capital regulation and bank risk taking a note abstract this paper examines theoretically the effects of more stringent capital regulation on bank asset portfolio risk the analysis shows that for a value maximizing bank incentives to increase asset risk decline as its capital increases thus as long as regulatory efforts to contain asset risk and size are not reduced more stringent capital regulation unambiguously reduces the expected liability of the deposit insurance system

optimal capacity in the banking sector and economic growth the paper investigates from the welfare and growth point of view the determination of the optimal capacity of the banking system for that purpose we consider an overlapping generation model with endogenous growth there is horizontal differentiation and imperfect competition in the banking sector macroeconomic shocks affect the return on capital and together with the expectations of depositors condition the stability of the banking sector we specify to what extent deposit insurance may reduce instability and increase the number of deposits welfare and growth we also characterize the conditions under which excess banking capacities may appear and how their reduction may improve welfare

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

risk in international banking this paper differentiates between country risk the probability that a country will default on its obiigations and two forms of international banking risk 1 the extent to which a bank s foreign activities affect the cost of equity capital and 2 the extent to which a bank s foreign activities affect the probability of bankruptcy the paper focuses on the latter form of international banking risk using chebyshev s inequality it is pointed out that the risk of bankruptcy is influenced by the mean as well as the variance of the return distribution consequently restrictions on the international composition of a bank s portfolio may increase rather than reduce the probability of bankruptcy

unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation abstract we analyze a bank that operates under the basel credit and market risk requirements and that maximizes its value through recapitalizations dividends and liquid asset investments according to our model the market risk requirement may postpone recapitalization and this way increase the bank s default probability we show that this is indeed the case if the expected return and volatility of the liquid asset portfolio are high i e then the market risk requirement raises the default probability of the bank in this sense the market risk requirement is inefficient

collective agricultural production a solution for transition economies abstract the paper examines theoretical reasons and provides examples for productivity differences between agricultural service cooperatives and collectives service cooperatives can utilize economies of scale enhance competitiveness and provide technical information advantages that often outweighed problems of free riding low investment and excessive political intervention agricultural collectives while not adding substantial advantages are in addition associated with problems of supervision and effort supply tendencies to substitute casual workers or mechanization for regular members and low investment incentives while collective forms of organization in transition economies respond to high risk and market imperfections they do so inefficiently policies that create conditions for service cooperatives to compete may lead to large productivity gains

off farm work technical efficiency and rice production risk in taiwan this article investigates the differences in yield production production efficiency and yield risk for farmers both with and without off farm work using a nationwide survey of rice farmers in taiwan we estimate two stochastic production frontier models that accommodate technical inefficiency and production risk simultaneously for farmers both with and without off farm work the stochastic dominance criterion is then applied to compare the differences in the distributions of the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between groups the empirical results indicate that these two groups of farmers use resources in different ways and off farm work is not necessarily associated with lower technical efficiency for farmers in the lower percentiles of the efficiency distribution those with off farm work are more efficient than their counterparts without off farm work in addition farmers with off farm work face higher production risk and this result is robust for the entire distribution