planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

an equilibrium model of the business cycle with household production and fiscal policy the authors estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model of the u s economy that includes an explicit household production sector and stochastic fiscal variables they use their estimates to investigate two issues first the authors analyze how well the model accounts for aggregate fluctuations they find that household production has a significant impact and reject a nested specification in which changes in the home production technology do not matter for market variables second the authors study the effects of some simple fiscal policy experiments and show that the model generates different predictions for the effects of tax changes than similar models without home production copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

political instability capital taxation and growth abstract in cross country studies of economic growth average growth rates of gdp per capita tend to be negatively associated both with the size of government and with measures of political instability we show that a linear endogenous growth model with a very simple model of government spending and taxation in the presence of political instability can account for both empirical correlations in addition the model predicts that both correlations are intimately linked thus greater political instability leads to both lower growth rates and a higher share of government spending in gdp

electoral uncertainty fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract in this paper we study the link between elections fiscal policy and aggregate fluctuations the setup is a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both technology and political re election shocks the latter are incorporated via a two party model with elections the main theoretical prediction is that forward looking incumbents with uncertain prospects of re election find it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies and that this hurts capital accumulation our econometric estimation using u s data finds a statistically significant link between electoral uncertainty and policy instruments and in turn macroeconomic outcomes

government size and macroeconomic stability abstract we analyze the effects of government size on output variability in the context of a rbc model in which government size is parameterized by the income tax rate and the share of government purchases in output the model implies that i income taxes are destabilizing and ii for most specifications considered government purchases are stabilizing we compare those predictions with the results of simple cross country regressions using data for 22 oecd countries the estimated relationship between empirical indicators of government size and measures of gdp variability appears far stronger than the model predicts and often has the opposite sign

second order sustainability conditions for the development of sustainable innovations in a dynamic environment abstract in particular radical innovations can be important means to achieving improved sustainability due to the existence of path dependency and lock in however the transition from one technological trajectory to another more sustainable one is often impeded by significant barriers fortunately these barriers are by their nature subject to substantial changes in time so it makes sense to carefully distinguish between periods of stability showing high barriers in which the given trajectory can hardly be left and periods of instability characterized by low barriers where a new trajectory can be reached more easily the latter distinction matters since sustainable innovations often rely on governmental regulation and the economic burden arising from this regulation will be much lower in periods of instability moreover due to the complexity and dynamics of change in their respective environments innovations are generally associated with fundamental uncertainty such that it becomes impossible to predict the degree of sustainability yielded by specific innovations in the longer run under these circumstances it is essential to facilitate the change between trajectories and to allow for the possibility to select between a variety of alternative trajectories within a process of trial and error sustainability as viewed from this evolutionary perspective is therefore better understood as the general capability to adapt that is to readily change from less to more sustainable technological trajectories since the latter kind of sustainability determines the conditions under which the former kind i e sustainability related to a specific technology can be achieved the two kinds are respectively called second order and first order sustainability finally a series of determinants and corresponding indicators from the techno economic political and socio cultural sphere is identified which after proper measurement and weighting allow for making an assessment whether and when the incumbent industry is sufficiently destabilized and the political system rendered sufficiently favorable to the new more sustainable technology such that a transition to the preferred trajectory is possible without too much effort

a method for taking models to the data abstract this paper develops a method for combining the power of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the flexibility of a vector autoregressive time series model to obtain a hybrid that can be taken directly to the data it estimates this hybrid model via maximum likelihood and uses the results to address a number of issues concerning the ability of a prototypical real business cycle model to explain movements in aggregate output and employment in the postwar us economy the stability of the real business cycle model s structural parameters and the performance of the hybrid model s out of sample forecasts

fitness and age review of carroll and hannan s demography of corporations and industries the demography of corporations and industries 2000 by glenn r carroll and t michael hannan is a welcome addition to a body of empirical analysis of firms and industries that studies the effects of technological change and other changes that occur over time the book contains a wealth of facts and some new insights too it will make useful secondary reading in some graduate courses in economics and i would recommend it to anyone whose research relates to the concept of creative destruction

rational expectations and monetary models of exchange rate determination an empirical examination abstract one asset model of exchange rate determination that has received substantial attention in the literature is the monetary model as with other asset models expectations of future exchange rates play a key role usually these expectations are assumed to be formed rationally however to date there has been no attempt to empirically estimate a complete monetary model with rational expectations in this paper such a model is estimated and the restrictions implicity imposed by the rational expectation hypothesis tested the results suggest that both the parameter constraints associated with the monetary model and those implied by the reh are consistent with recent exchange rate behavior

a theory of soft capture in this paper wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information in a three tier model a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator the firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator in a self enforcing equilibrium the regulator transmits the firm produced signal internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents the main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator

an incomplete contract perspective on public good provision abstract this paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided the paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods the rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric information it is constituted of two main parts in the first one the social planner has complete contracting ability we discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade offs it generates the second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness such incompleteness can emerge from various sources which we present and discuss we then study the case of a politically chosen decision maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups finally we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision the concluding section summarizes the main policy lessons

time consistent optimal fiscal policy this article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period s capital income tax rate we find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment first capital income tax rates are very high 65 on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment second labor income taxes are rather low on average about 12 versus a value of around 31 under full commitment finally labor income taxes are quite volatile whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero

political economy information and incentives abstract this paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups first treating politicians as informed supervisors to whom economic policy is delegated we show the usefulness of the separation of powers to increase the transaction costs of collusion the relevance of asymmetric control for avoiding reciprocal favors the incompleteness of the constitutional contract leaves discretion to politicians who become residual decision makers we study the trade offs between greater efficiency obtained by allowing powerful instruments to politicians and less discretion by restricting on the contrary those instruments determinants of those trade offs are the variability of the environment the extent of asymmetric information about tastes and technologies and the size of majorities finally we show the new theory of incentives for group behavior can be used to determine the transaction costs of collusion under asymmetric information and to which extent these costs relax the constraints imposed on government by collusive behavior

collusion delegation and supervision with soft information this paper derives an equivalence principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities we consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent s type in a centralized organization the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent however these two agents can collude against the principal in a decentralized organization the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub contracts with the agent we show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome we discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the e ciency of supervisory structures

on the dynamics of growth and fiscal policy with redistributive transfers abstract this paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by studying the case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures public production services public consumption services and state contingent redistributive transfers we make two contributions to the literature firstly we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which rational voters choose the capital tax rate and the allocation of total tax revenues between productive government expenditures public production services and non productive ones public consumption services and redistributive transfers we study the properties of these policies and their impact on growth secondly we deliver analytic results for the long run and transitional dynamics of optimal fiscal policies and endogenous growth in particular we establish existence and investigate the possibility of uniqueness and dynamic determinacy and how this possibility is affected by the chosen allocative and redistributive policies

fiscal policy public debt stabilisation and politics theory and uk evidence this paper presents a two party model of fiscal and debt policy in which the parties do not care about policy outcomes when out of office unlike other models of this type our model has predictions that are largely consistent with existing empirical findings about partisan and electoral effects on government expenditure tax revenue and debt it also yields new predictions about how the feedback of fiscal policy on lagged debt may depend on partisan and electoral effects these new predictions are not rejected by a test of the model on uk data in multi party democracies the motives of the party in power undoubtedly affect fiscal and monetary policy many economists and political scientists believe that economic policy makers are driven by two not mutually exclusive motives first they wish to remain in office as long as possible the survival or opportunistic motive second they wish to benefit their constituencies partisan motive the effects of these motives may show up in two ways in the data first there may be effects of ideological differences of the parties in power on fiscal and monetary policy so called partisan effects for example we might expect left wing governments to tax and spend more and possibly accumulate more debt second there may be attempts by the incumbent party to use fiscal and monetary policy to bribe the electorate prior to elections e g by cutting taxes and interest rates so called electoral effects recent econometric work has established some interesting stylised facts which are broadly consistent with these predictions several studies report evidence of electoral effects on various fiscal policy instruments for the united states tufte i978 for transfers bizer and durlauf i990 for taxes and macdonald i99i for state level public expenditure more recently alesina et al i 992 i 993 have found evidence of electoral effects on government debt in a panel study of oecd countries evidence of partisan effects on fiscal policy is scarcer alesina et al i 993 report partisan effects on debt and roubini and sachs i989 report in a study of oecd democracies that countries with a higher percentage of left wing governments have significantly higher longrun government spending to gnp ratios concurrently with the accumulation of this evidence a theoretical literature notably alesina and tabellini 1990 rogoff 1990 and rogoff and sibert i 988 has provided new explanations of observed electoral effects on

the informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics we use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors optimal policies result from a trade off between imposing rules which are non responsive to the groups preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better within a strong coalition interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups joint interests an informativeness effect competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences a screening effect the socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature with more congruence a strong coalition is preferred finally within a weak coalition interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information such weak coalitions are always inefficient

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

the agency cost of internal collusion and schumpeterian growth this paper analyzes the link between the internal organization of rms and the whole process of macroeconomic growth we present a schumpeterian growth model in which monopolies face dynamic agency costs due to the formation of vertical collusions between agents of the organization these agency costs aect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation however when collusion is a self enforcing implicit relationship a higher growth rate shortens the time horizon of colluding agents and makes thus collusion more dicult to enforce we analyze this two ways mechanisms between the growth process and agency problems within the rm and show how the transaction costs of side contracting within the rm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived

public private partnerships and government spending limits abstract we consider public private partnerships in which a public official selects a project that is then developed and operated by a private contractor we derive optimal public accounting rules when the official s choice among projects is biased by ideology or social ties or because of pandering to special interests we give particular emphasis to how the rules should constrain the official s incentive to understate the costs of her pet projects in the basic model we show that the optimal accounting rule takes the form of a budget cap with a project s expected cost modified to reflect the official s distortionary incentives if the project can be partially financed privately then fixed price contracts can serve to curb political misbehavior by securitizing public sector liabilities we also consider the possibility that development and operations are each handled by different contractors such unbundling deprives public accountants of forward information about future costs but can prevent the official from funneling hidden future rents to contractors

long run growth and welfare effects of public policies with distortionary taxation abstract in a one sector growth model with infrastructure investment we study the impact of fiscal policies on growth the government collects taxes on labor income and profits the government uses these revenues to purchase infrastructure investment provide utility enhancing government services and to provide transfer payments to the households we show that the balanced growth rate is an increasing function of the percent of government revenues that goes to infrastructure we find that the growth maximizing mix of taxes depends on the elasticity of substitution between inputs in particular with distortionary taxes the growth maximizing tax rate on capital is higher the lower the elasticity of substitution between private physical capital and public capital in addition the growth maximizing size of the government is higher when the elasticity of substitution between public and private inputs is low we also investigate welfare effects of other public expenditures as well depending on the elasticity of substitution in production the welfare implications of different public policies can be substantial

the macroeconomic effects of distortionary taxation abstract prescott 1986 estimates that technology shocks account for 75 of the fluctuations in the postwar u s economy this paper reestimates the contribution of technological change for a standard business cycle model that includes a public sector and fiscal disturbances i find that a significant fraction of the variance of aggregate consumption investment output capital stock and hours of work can be explained by disturbances in labor and capital tax rates and government consumption i also use the model to quantify the welfare costs of capital and labor taxation for both the time series and welfare calculations maximum likelihood estimates of taste technology and policy parameters are used

government debt government spending and private sector behavior a current period tax reduction financed by issuing government debt shifts the timing of tax collection from the current period to the future if the future taxes implied by government debt are not fully perceived and discounted by the private sector there will be a net wealth effect that increases private sector consumption thus reducing capital accumulation and growth if on the other hand the implied future taxes are perceived and discounted by the private sector the current period tax reduction will be used to increase private saving to pay for the future taxes and government debt will be absorbed without any real effects on the economy the effects of government spending financed by current period taxation also depend upon private sector perceptions 2 if the benefits of government spending are ignored private sector consumption will decrease in accordance with the reduction in permanent disposable income to the extent that government spending is on consumption type goods that are perceived as substitutes for privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively greater reduction in private sector consumption to the extent that government spending is on investment type goods yielding future goods and services that are perceived as substitutes for future privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively smaller reduction in private sector consumption the standard approach to modeling private sector consumption saving behavior involves a rather asymmetric set of assumptions as to how the private sector perceives the various elements of government fiscal policy 3 current period taxes are assumed to be fully perceived but current period government spending is implicitly assumed to be completely ignored by the private sector in considering permanent personal disposable income the private sector is assumed to be forward looking in its assessment of income and taxation the stock of government debt is nevertheless included as part of the stock of private wealth the implicit assumption associate professor of economics graduate school of business university of chicago 1101 east 58th street chicago il 60637 i thank eugene fama levis kochin michael mussa paul evans and an anonymous referee for helpful comments i am particularly grateful to daniel benjamin for contributing many hours of discussion and laura lahaye who was a research assistant and valuable adviser on earlier drafts the theoretical debate on the burden of the debt has been long standing gerald o driscoll 1977 documents ricardo s nineteenth century position robert barro 1974 reopened the debate by introducing the fundamental issue of intergenerational transfers also discussed in merton miller and charles upton 1974 the empirical side of the debate was initiated by levis kochin s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of deficits on consumption and by martin feldstein s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of social security wealth on consumption other empirical contributions include jess yawitz and laurence meyer 1976 myself 1978 and j earnest tanner 1978 1979 with respect to the effects of government deficits and debt and barro 1978 michael darby 1979 and dean leimer and selig lesnoy 1982 with respect to social security wealth see also interesting recent papers by john seater 1982 who generates detailed tests of the effects of deficits and debt on consumption charles plosser 1982 who explores the effects of government spending and debt shocks on interest rates and feldstein 1982 who attempts tests similar to some in this paper see fn 29 2martin bailey s 1962 1971 development of the effects of government spending on private consumption and aggregate economic activity is the seminal contribution paul david and john scadding 1974 extend bailey s ideas and provide some supporting empirical evidence more recently willem buiter 1977 and myself 1978 developed models based on bailey s earlier work barro 1981 has an interesting paper on related issues see also david aschauer 1982 3the standard approach incorporates fiscal policy through the concept of personal disposable income and by including the stock of government debt as part of personal wealth see for example the empirical specification of albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 which has been the basis of most empirical consumption studies since and feldstein 1974 for one of the more influential papers based on the ando modigliani specification

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

is public expenditure productive abstract this paper considers the relationship between aggregate productivity and stock and flow government spending variables the empirical results indicate that i the nonmilitary public capital stock is dramatically more important in determining productivity than is either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending ii military capital bears little relation to productivity and iii a core infrastructure of streets highways airports mass transit sewers water systems etc has most explanatory power for productivity the paper also suggests an important role for the net public capital stock in the productivity slowdown of the last fifteen years

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

behind the revolving door a new view of public utility regulation regulatory officials frequently work for firms they regulate after they leave office this revolving door has been the subject of much scrutiny owing to the natural suspicion of corruption in a time dependent supergame i take a strategic look behind the revolving door and find it can lead to improved performance of regulated industries when firm managers and regulators have finite and concurrent terms investment incentives are minimal staggered terms and revolving doors can result in improved performance of regulated firms when each side s actions at each date are contingent on past outcomes

fiscal policy in general equilibrium this paper studies four classic fiscal policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model the authors main findings are as follows 1 permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short run and long run output multipliers that exceed one 2 permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes 3 the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases and 4 public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment these findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

indeterminacy and fiscal policies in a growing economy this paper studies the dynamic properties of a standard one sector model of endogenous growth with inelastic labor supply in which capital taxes are used to nance public production and consumption services the government is benevolent and chooses its tax policy by taking into account the decentralized competitive equilibrium within this second best setup we establish conditions for multiple balanced growth paths in conjunction with indeterminacy of transitional dynamics the mechanism for global and local indeterminacy is a simple combination of public production services that provide production externalities to private rms and hence cause a wedge between private and social returns public consumption services that provide direct utility to households and endogenously chosen distorting taxes

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

the composition of public expenditure and economic growth abstract noting that the literature has focused on the link between the level of public expenditure and growth we derive conditions under which a change in the composition of expenditure leads to a higher steady state growth rate of the economy the conditions depend not just on the physical productivity of the different components of public expenditure but also on the initial shares using data from 43 developing countries over 20 years we show that an increase in the share of current expenditure has positive and statistically significant growth effects by contrast the relationship between the capital component of public expenditure and per capita growth is negative thus seemingly productive expenditures when used in excess could become unproductive these results imply that developing country governments have been misallocating public expenditures in favor of capital expenditures at the expense of current expenditures

honest certification and the threat of capture abstract this paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture these conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets 1 honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price 2 honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a natural monopoly 3 price competition tends to a monopolization the results derive from a general principle of reputation models that favors concentration this principle implies benefits from specialization and explains specialized certifiers as efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms

the dynamic efficiency of regulatory constitutions in this article we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment rate of return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate of return regulation without such a commitment furthermore rate of return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion assuming that the regulator is unable to make state contingent transfer payments

the life cycle of regulatory agencies dynamic capture and transaction costs the dynamics of regulation is analysed in a model where regulatory capture comes from the repeated interaction between an interest group and a regulatory agency regulatory institutions offer a framework for this dynamic process they put constraints on the interest group s influence the dynamics of regulation and its long run outcome depend on the political principal s the regulator s and the regulated firm s time preferences and their information some foundations for the transaction costs of side contracting used in the standard literature on collusion are provided those transaction costs are linked to the precise nature of regulatory institutions