a theory of interlinked rural transactions this paper argues that the interlinking of labor output and credit contracts often observed in rural economies can be regarded as an attempt to improve allocative efficiency in the face of moral hazard it advances an economic explanation of the phenomenon which is rooted in the view that prevalent modes of transaction of which interlinked contracts are an example are shaped by technological considerations interlinking is shown to be an efficient economic response to unequally distributed information arising from the uncertainty which characterizes subsistence agriculture all pareto efficient allocations require a combination of wage cum output sharing with consumption credit contracts the analytical framework set up to demonstrate the results is used to examine the response of the contractual parameters to changes in i the returns to alternative occupations available to tenant laborers ii the cost of credit to the village economy and iii the riskiness of cultivation the analysis concludes that public policy to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the relationships between technological considerations and modes of transaction in the absence of a complete set of markets

state intervention and the microcredit market the role of business development services we analyze in this paper how various forms of state intervention can impact microfinance institutions lending behavior using a simple model where entrepreneurs receive individual uncollateralized loans we show that not surprisingly state intervention through the loan guarantee increases the number of entrepreneurs receiving a loan however after modeling business development services bds provided by the microfinance institution we show that the loan guarantee can have a counterproductive effect by reducing the number of entrepreneurs benefiting from such services we therefore analyze an alternative policy bds subsidization we show that if bds are efficient enough and are targeted toward less performing borrowers then for fixed government expenditures such subsidies do better in terms of financial inclusion than the loan guarantee moreover we argue that under similar conditions bds subsidization alone does better in terms of financial inclusion than a mix of policies

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

new perspectives on public finance recent achievements and future challenges abstract the advances in the economics of the public sector during the past quarter century have been as pronounced as in any field within economics public finance has become a rigorous branch of applied microeconomics incorporating the best thinking and most advanced tools of both theoretical economics and econometrics in the remarks below i will focus on a few key areas in applied and theoretical tax and expenditure policy drawing both upon the academic work of myself and others and my experiences in the policy arena both as chairman of the council of economic advisers and as chief economist of the world bank i shall address both the questions of what we have learned in the past few decades as well as the questions where further research is needed

privacy and time consistent optimal labor income taxation abstract incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems in the context of time consistent optimal labor income taxation privacy can lead to a pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy

pareto efficient taxation and expenditures pre and re distribution abstract this paper shows that there is a presumption that pareto efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital when tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset those effects need to be taken into account reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution the paper extends the 1976 atkinson stiglitz results to a dynamic overlapping generations model correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax that result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in fixed labor productivities in a general equilibrium model one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self selection constraints in a simple model with time separability but with non separability between consumption and leisure capital taxation depends on the complementarity substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption the final section constructs a simple two class model capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement whose productivity can be enhanced by publicly provided education it derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax which is positive so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high

the wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets abstract insurance premium subsidies are present in many insurance markets the swiss government for example paid out chf 4 26 billion or 0 72 of the swiss gdp for health insurance premium subsidies in 2011 analyses of premium subsidies have often highlighted that the increased insurance demand due to premium subsidies increases the effects of moral hazard in the market other consequences of premium subsidies however have mostly been neglected by the literature we show in our theoretical model that the wealth effects of premium subsidies decrease the sensitivity of the insured towards the monetary consequences of losses this leads to less prevention efforts by the insured and thus increases moral hazard in the market the effect is preserved if the subsidy is financed through proportional taxation using two alternative models we show that providing state dependent subsidies can either increase or reverse this effect depending on which state subsidies are paid we argue that whether demand effects or wealth effects of premium subsidies will dominate the insured s behavior depends on the market structure

moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation abstract this paper demonstrates that in an economy with moral hazard and more than one commodity competitive equilibrium is not constrained efficient to correct the market failure differential commodity taxation is necessary a general optimal tax formula is derived and special cases of is discussed

optimal linear income tax with random revenue abstract this paper introduces the concept of risk attitudes a government may take toward random revenue in the design of a linear income tax it shows that the familiar trade off formula between equity and efficiency can be derived either by assuming a risk neutral government attitude toward random revenue or by assuming no randomness of revenue we provide numerical analysis to demonstrate that optimum tax schedules for a non risk neutral government can significantly deviate from those for a risk neutral government

aggregation and simple dynamics the koyck geometric lag or ar 1 specification is a commonly proposed behavioral model sometimes after differencing the distribution of koyck lag or ar 1 coefficients across agents in an economy is shown to be completely identified just from the dynamic behavior of aggregate macroeconomic data aggregate testable implications of an economy composed of agents having koyck lags or ar 1 models are provided extensions to higher order and time varying lags are discussed aggregate u s consumption data are shown to support the hypothesis that some consumers have random walk consumption while the rest have arima 1 1 0 consumption with widely varying ar coefficients copyright 1994 by american economic association

labour income uncertainty taxation and public good provision this article examines optimal nonlinear income taxation commodity taxation and public good provision under income uncertainty in a moral hazard framework uniform commodity taxation and the samuelson rule for public good provision are desirable under similar conditions as in the conventional tax model deviations from these rules is warranted if one can encourage effort by subsidising certain goods and overproviding public goods we also determine a rule for the optimal marginal income tax rate and provide some numerical simulations conditions for the validity of the solution procedure used in this class of models the first order approach are also explored uncertainty is a key component of many important real world decision making processes consider for example an individual s decision to acquire specific skills through education educational investments must be made well before the resolution of uncertainty related to the returns to skill thus the tax system which affects the net returns of different skill levels has a potentially large impact on educational decisions skill attainment and productivity a progressive tax system offers insurance to workers by redistributing income from the lucky to the unlucky other forms of social insurance such as unemployment and health insurance work in a similar manner a well known problem in the design of optimal income tax under uncertainty or any insurance mechanism is asymmetric information between the government and individuals income is partly due to individual effort and partly due to luck but the planner can only observe realised income not effort the optimal redistribution scheme is a balance between providing the workers with adequate incentives to acquire skills and sufficient insurance mirrlees 1974 was the first to examine the design of optimal redistributive income tax under income uncertainty this moral hazard model later used among others by varian 1980 tuomala 1984 and low and maldoom 2004 is an alternative to the more well known adverse selection model of mirrlees 1971 where income dispersion arises from differences in innate skill levels the moral hazard model is perhaps most appealing in the tax context when effort is interpreted as an ex ante decision on educational investment alternatively one can interpret the discussion as a general analysis of social insurance 1 income tax is only one element albeit an important one in the design of optimal government redistributive policy indeed recent optimal tax literature has devoted a lot of attention to the use of other instruments such as commodity taxation minimum

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

government relief for risk associated with government action a significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy government action tax reform deregulation judicial decisions budgetary shifts produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules the effects of government relief compensation grandfathering phase ins on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined using a model in which private insurance is available it is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions i introduction a significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government action government action produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules government policy with regard to these effects transition policy varies widely full compensation for takings of real property in many jurisdictions partial relief through grandfathering and phase ins for tax reform and deregulation in some instances but not others and no relief for most budgetary shifts and

the role of the state in financial markets this paper reexamines the role of the state in financial markets and identifies seven major market failures that provide a potential rationale for government intervention in practice government interventions in capital markets even in industrial countries have been pervasive the paper provides a taxonomy of those interventions with respect to both the objectives they serve and the instruments they employ there is a role for the government in financial markets but the success of government interventions has been mixed it is important that interventions be well designed the paper sets out principles for government regulatory interventions and applies them to prudential regulation it then examines three other areas of intervention directed credit finanical repression and competition policy and identifies circumstances in which some amount of financial repression may actually be beneficial

on a fundamental advantage of permits over taxes for the control of pollution we extend the tax versus permits literature by considering permit supply functions and pollution tax functions that are generalizations of the usual constant permit supply and constant pollution tax rate in our model pollution is not uniformly mixed and the regulator is uncertain about the polluting firms abatement costs we determine the optimal permit supply functions and the optimal pollution tax functions using these functions we show that permits lead unambiguously to lower total expected costs than taxes we analyze the magnitude of this difference for a simple model of climate change by relating the optimal permit supply functions to weitzman am econ rev 68 683 691 1978 we provide a new interpretation of his results

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

capital structure investment and fire sales we study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capital structure trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default bankruptcy costs are endogenous as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid when the corporate income tax rate is positive firms have a unique optimal capital structure in equilibrium firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire sale prices the equilibrium features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient in particular there is too little debt and default

the welfare implications of costly monitoring in the credit market rationing is a pervasive feature of credit markets it has been suggested that credit rationing represents a suboptimal allocation of resources in a general equilibrium model of credit rationing with hidden information and costly monitoring we show that if credit is rationed it is suboptimal but that credit should be rationed more tightly in equilibrium loan applicants bear average monitoring costs whereas for efficiency they should bear marginal monitoring costs which are larger because average monitoring costs increase with quantity as extra loans are accompanied by a rise in the interest rate which increases the number of defaults copyright 1994 by royal economic society

hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy we analyze the general equilibrium of an economy in which a competitive industry produces nonexclusive insurance services the equilibrium is inefficient because insurance contracts cannot control moral hazard and welfare can be improved by policies that reduce insurance by increasing its price above marginal cost we discuss how insurance production costs that exceed expected claim payments interact with moral hazard in determining the equilibrium s inefficiency and show that these costs can make insurance premia so actuarially unfair as to validate the standard first order conditions we exploit in our analysis

in praise of frank ramsey s contribution to the theory of taxation frank ramsey s brilliant 1927 paper modestly entitled a contribution to the theory of taxation is a landmark in the economics of public finance nearly a half century later through the work of diamond and mirrlees 1971 and mirrlees 1971 his paper can be thought of as launching the field of optimal taxation and revolutionising public finance ramsey f p 1927 a contribution to the theory of taxation economic journal vol 37 145 pp 47 61