competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

monetary policy for rationally inattentive economies with staggered price setting the paper examines the optimal monetary policy when firms are constrained by information processing capability and infrequent price adjustments firms information processing limit gives rise to imperfect knowledge about macroeconomic aggregates and endogenous information learning contingent on the monetary policy staggered price setting introduces the observed price duration and additional policy tradeoffs resulting from the interactions between nominal rigidities and imperfect information processing the integrated model implies an optimal policy that commits to complete price stabilization in response to natural rate shocks but not in response to markup shocks in the presence of markup shocks it is optimal for the central bank to focus on price stabilization in the initial periods following markup shocks and shifts the emphasis to output gap stabilization later moreover larger information capacity stronger complementarities and more persistent shocks require more aggressive price stabilization in the short run

imperfect information and staggered price setting many keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times this paper presents an explanation for this staggered price setting the authors develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others this gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs staggering can be the equilibrium outcome in addition the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations copyright 1988 by american economic association

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

how do unemployment insurance and recall expectations affect on the job search among workers who receive advance notice of layoff this paper explores how advance notice of layoffs recall rehiring expectations and unemployment insurance ui benefits affected on the job search among a random sample of arizona ui recipients in 1975 76 the analysis which includes extensive controls for the characteristics of workers and their jobs indicates that pre unemployment search increased with length of notice and decreased with expected recall also among workers not expecting recall pre unemployment search decreased with the level of ui benefits available after layoff the authors argue that improved experience rating would encourage firms to give employees advance notice when layoffs are imminent and re employment bonuses for workers with zero or short unemployment spells would encourage early search

the inflation persistence of staggered contracts one of the criticisms routinely advanced against models with staggered contracts is their inability to generate inflation persistence this paper finds that staggered contracts a la taylor are in fact capable of reproducing the inflation persistence implied by u s data following fuhrer and moore i capture the moments that the model needs to replicate by using the correlograms from a small vector autoregression var i estimate the contract parameters using the method of maximum likelihood the correlogram of inflation for the contract model is very close to the correlogram from the var by the same metric taylor contracts fare poorly in reproducing the comovements of inflation and output

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

price discrimination with partial information does it pay off abstract this paper investigates the profit effects of price discrimination when firms have partial information about consumer preferences it shows that price discrimination can boost industry profit if firms have access to the right kind of information about consumer preferences while remaining ignorant of other relevant information

matriculation in u s economics ph d programs how many accepted americans do not enroll using a sample of 26 u s economics ph d programs in fall 2003 we estimate that only about 12 percent of the u s and canadian students accepted for doctoral study did not enroll in any u s economics ph d program in fall 2003 or fall 2004 it is not possible to increase the supply of new ph d economists substantially by closing the sale on accepted applicants additional qualified applicants are needed nonmatriculants are remarkably similar to enrollees in demographics prior education test scores and fields of special interest but express less interest in economic research and are less likely to have been offered financial aid an expected financial aid deficiency was also the most cited reason for deciding not to matriculate followed by how long it takes to earn an economics ph d and the expectation of higher lifetime earnings in a career other than economics most who decided against an economics ph d enrolled in an alternative graduate program this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge we study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy information imperfections emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite shannon capacity to process information we then ask how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms processing capacity when price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark up shocks for a large range of capacity values this fi nding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms processing capacity when mark up shocks are persistent accommodation may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in the long run thereby generating a hump shaped price response and a slow reduction in output instead when prices are strategic substitutes policy tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark up shocks in addition there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

inertia of forward looking expectations macroeconomic variables exhibit inertia on the face of it such inertia sits uncomfortably with the behavior of rational forward looking agents who form expectations on the basis of the best information available at the time christopher sims 2003 sect 8 offers a three fold taxonomy of attempts to rationalize inertia the first is the idea of robert lucas 1973 and edmund phelps 1970 that agents face a signal extraction problem so that their actions react only partially to shifts in fundamentals due to the residual uncertainty the second is the sticky expectations approach of n gregory mankiw and ricardo reis 2002 where otherwise rational and forward looking agents receive information with some delay the third is the rational inattention approach favored by sims himself where agents with informationprocessing constraints choose the optimal coarsening of their information sims 2003 our approach is a variation on the signalextraction theme but has implications for the sticky expectations and rational inattention approaches as explained recently by michael woodford 2003 the original contribution of lucas 1973 had limited success in explaining the persistence of macroeconomic aggregates due to the feature that the underlying fundamentals are fully revealed after a delay of one period without this simplifying feature however the complexity of the problem increases rapidly as expectations of others expectations become relevant in one s calculations robert townsend 1983 phelps 1983 tractability aside the approach holds much promise when agents are differentially informed events in the distant past are more common knowledge than events in the recent past not only has enough time elapsed for the agents to ascertain the facts in the distant past but more importantly enough time has elapsed for each agent to be more confident that other agents have ascertained the facts when common knowledge is important as in coordination problems for example events in the distant past take on significance paradoxically the farther the agents peer into the future the farther they must look into the past to establish the informational platform for their actions to an outside observer the aggregate action betrays all the outward signs of adaptive expectations in order to demonstrate this principle in a transparent way we employ other drastic simplifications but do not assume that realizations are revealed after a delay of one period we thereby preserve the nontrivial nature of dynamic higher order beliefs and show how persistence arises as a natural consequence of the original lucas and phelps insight

observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity in brand choice models this paper extends the scanner based choice literature by explicitly incorporating individual level brand preference data we illustrate our model using a unique data set that combines survey and scanner data collected from the same individuals the addition of individual specific brand preference information significantly improves fit and prediction furthermore this observed heterogeneity better explains choice than does unobserved heterogeneity in the standard scanner model s parameters more importantly we find that the standard model underestimates the importance of consumers brand preferences and overestimates both brand loyalties and price sensitivities brand loyalty is overestimated because models without preference information confound state dependence heterogeneity and preference effects price sensitivities are inflated because the average preference based consumer is implicitly assumed to be more willing to switch from his preferred brand than is the real preference based consumer further standard models overestimate the heterogeneity in price and loyalty sensitivities and misidentify both price and loyalty sensitive consumers the managerial implications of our findings and the applicability of our methodology when survey data are collected infrequently and for only a subsample of consumers are pursued we demonstrate that even under these circumstances better populationwide pricing and promotion decisions are identified and more accurate targeting results

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

imperfect common knowledge staggered price setting and the effects of monetary policy this paper studies the consequences of a lack of common knowledge in the transmission of monetary policy by integrating the woodford 2003a imperfect common knowledge model with taylor calvo staggered price setting models the average price set by monopolistically competitive firms depends on their higher order expectations about not only the current state of the economy but also about the states in the future periods in which prices are to be fixed this integrated model provides a plausible explanation for the observed effects of monetary policy it shows analytically how price adjustments are delayed and how the response of output to monetary disturbances is amplified

targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals it is increasingly observable that competitors in different industries share customer data which can be used for targeted pricing we propose a modified hotelling model with two dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such sharing and its ensuing welfare effects we show that these incentives depend on the type of customer data and on consumer heterogeneity in the strength of brand preferences only data on consumer transportation cost parameters is shared the incentives to do so are stronger if consumers are relatively homogeneous customer data sharing is most likely to be detrimental to consumer surplus while the effect on social welfare can be positive

noisy information distance and law of one price dynamics across us cities abstract us micro price data at the city level suggests that both the volatility and the persistence of law of one price deviations are rising in the distance between us cities a standard two city equilibrium model with trade costs can predict the relationship between volatility and distance but not between persistence and distance we show that if there is imperfect information about the state of nominal aggregate demand with noisy signals that are asymmetric across cities then distance and persistence will be positively correlated our main results are shown to be robust to the introduction of sticky prices and multiple cities

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association