reaganomics and reputation revisited this paper considers a reformulation of backus and driffill s model of credibility following a change in regime following tabellini we alter their model to better fit macroeconomic policymaking as it is formulated in the u s where monetary and fiscal policies are made by independent policymakers by assuming that policymakers of divergent views have recently entered office and so have no track record the game s equilibrium corresponds to the u s experience during the first years of the reagan administration

reputation and impermanent types i consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm s type evolves according to a markov process with two states a tough type who always fights entry and a weak type who prefers to accommodate there exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough above that level as the number of markets t increases in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence when t is infinite then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the incumbent s payoff is bounded below her stackelberg payoff both results are in contrast to the outcome when the incumbent s type is fixed one interpretation is that reputation is not permanent but must be renewed occasionally

reputation in dynamic games abstract we analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long lived small players in which state variables affect players payoffs the large player s type is private information we give conditions under which in every nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game while our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government policy we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail to improve the monopolist s payoff journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73

public preferences for hydrogen buses comparing interval data ols and quantile regression approaches we use a quantile regression qr approach to analyse contingent valuation estimates of public willingness to pay wtp for the air and noise pollution reductions associated with the introduction of hydrogen buses in london qr results show that variables that were not significant in interval regression or ordinary least squares regression become significant at certain quantiles along the wtp distribution in addition the determinants of wtp at the lower tail of the distribution differ from those at the higher end of the distribution our findings illustrate the usefulness of quantile regression methods for analysing contingent valuation data enhancing our understanding of the determinants of willingness to pay

analyst reputation communication and information acquisition earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents opportunistic behavior however a recent study by morris argued that analysts experts reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors in this paper i examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned in equilibrium aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts as a result investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts type when the report is proven to be accurate therefore both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully the paper also derives conditions under which the analysts reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts equilibrium precision choices and investors welfare

joint confidence intervals for income shares and lorenz curves in a recent paper beach and davidson 1983 extended the principles of statistical inference to lorenz curves and income shares by establishing the asymptotic distribution and covariance structure of a vector of lorenz curve ordinates corresponding to a set of quantile abscissae one can thus use the lorenz curve and income shares no longer just as descriptive devices for summarizing distribution information but now also as analytical tools for comparing alternative distributions and carrying out conventional statistical inference on them it would clearly be desirable however to extend and complement this work by providing a method for computing a set of joint confidence intervals about these income shares and for illustrating graphically a joint confidence band about a set of estimated lorenz curve ordinates the present paper provides a new and simple technique for doing this when analyzing differences between sets of income shares or lorenz curves one typically wants to elicit more detailed information than is provided by a standard joint chi square test on the overall set of shares that is when the hypothesis of two sets of shares being the same is rejected we generally want to know further which particular differences in shares are different from zero and of these nonzero differences which are positive and which negative savin 1980 a natural way of providing such information is through multiple comparison procedures developed in this paper in a recent work richmond 1982 has developed a general method of finding multiple comparison intervals that is particularly suited to the present problem and in this situation appears to dominate other conventional alternatives in contrast for example to scheff s s projection method richmond s approach focuses on a set of primary points of interest income shares among a more general set of points including the lorenz curve ordinates and optimizes the joint confidence interval lengths on this primary set of points since estimated lorenz curve ordinates are built up from underlying income shares these shares perhaps further supplemented are natural choices for the primary set the method however also provides a joint confidence band that geometrically bounds the set of lorenz curve ordinates and interpolated segments between them the present

material interests moral reputation and crowding out species protection on private land we consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good such as endangered species this paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality we examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior we find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent rather they buy reputation

inequality in male and female earnings the role of hours and wages the authors decompose annual earnings into hours of work and hourly earnings and analyze male female differences in earnings inequality using canadian data their results indicate that the larger female inequality in earnings is due to a greater inequality in the distribution of hours of work the distributions of wages for men and women are either statistically indistinguishable or more equal for women the authors compare two data points 1988 and 1981 and find the same structure in the gender comparisons also changes between 1988 and 1981 in earnings inequality are generated from movements in the hours distributions copyright 1996 by mit press

street crime and street culture a model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime a street culture where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak there are social benefits to street reputations but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it the model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns disproportionate victimization of the young and poor and high variance in rates across small distances the model generates novel implications for policy and social science including a negative effect of social capital

predation firm specific assets and diversification this study examines the relationship between diversification and predation focusing on the firm s investments in sunk cost assets unlike the single product firm the diversified firm may employ assets that are not sunk to a product the ability to transfer these assets among uses or locations may lower the costs of predation the long purse and multimarket reputation may be viewed as special cases of this phenomenon the likelihood of predation may be reduced when the diversified firm is the target since it may be able to transfer assets back into an industry when the predator raises the price copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

the breakdown of hierarchies in the soviet union and china a neoinstitutional perspective why did modest attempts to decentralize the centrally administered soviet system lead to its collapse while more far reaching decentralization in china left central political and administrative hierarchies intact this article analyzes the disintegration of centrally planned organizations in the context of a neoinstitutional model of the breakdown of authority within hierarchies an agency model of hierarchy is presented that incorporates the ambiguous property rights authority relations and risk sharing conditions that prevailed under central planning and then persist during postcommunist transitions this model suggests that decentralizing reforms could trigger an organizational bank run prompting local agents to seize organizational assets under their control the article also considers reputation preserving strategies that central authorities might use to avert disintegration as an application of this model the collapse of soviet political industrial and state fiscal hierarchies are considered and compared with the experience of analogous sectors in china reforms in both states transferred significant autonomy from the center to local field agents in the soviet case these agents appropriated organizational assets with little interference from the center in china by contrast the center preserved both its capacity for monitoring and its reputation for disciplining transgressions and the rise of hybrid ownership forms made expropriation of state and party assets far less attractive

demographic change and income inequality in the united states 1976 1989 the u s economy experienced significant increases in the degree of income inequality over the past two decades in this paper we consider the effects of race age female headship and college education on the distribution of family income by developing a multivariate methodology that allows us to gauge the influence of one factor while holding other determinants of family incomes constant over the period studied we find that race had only a minor effect on the overall size distribution of income age had a somewhat greater effect than race in contrast the impact of female heads and college education were quite substantial the multivariate estimates reveal that the effects of female heads and college education both increase the gini to a much greater extent than the progressivity of federal income taxes decreases it the effects of college education and female headed families on inequality have grown larger across time while the influence of age has declined we find that the effects of race on inequality have changed little over the 1976 to 1989 period excerpt

a satisfactory benefit cost indicator from contingent valuation abstract standard economic concepts are used to develop a model of individual behavior when subject to the constraints of the contingent valuation choice context the model yields refutable consequences that are consistent with previously reported empirical findings including some that have been thought to be anomalous the model is used to show that different contingent valuation formats have predictably different performance characteristics notably the hicksian compensating measures are satisfactory benefit cost indicators when elicited using any one of several formats identified in the text of the formats examined one form of a policy referendum appears to have the most satisfactory characteristics overall we conclude that contingent valuation is a progressing research program

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

reputation and exogenous private learning abstract short run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long run incumbent firm s type the history of signals which in the limit is fully revealing is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent as long as there is sufficient noise in the signals then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff

generalized additive models for nonmarket valuation via revealed or stated preference methods single site recreation demand and dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses are typically conducted by implementing models containing strong parametric assumptions which are rarely underpinned by theoretical arguments this work illustrates how these assumptions can be relaxed and the estimation conducted semiparametrically by using generalized additive models gams this approach directly estimates the degree of the variables nonlinearities from the data thereby avoiding subjective choices on the smoothing parameters and offering many advantages when compared to the conventional modeling techniques that dominate the environmental economics literature additionally this paper illustrates how gams can be specified to construct theoretically consistent willingness to pay measures jel c14 q51

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

the earnings of male immigrants in england evidence from the quarterly lfs in this paper we estimate earnings functions for native born and foreign born white and non white males in the english labour market using data from the quarterly labour force survey our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between native born and foreign born males when investigating the labour market experience of ethnic minorities furthermore the earnings performance amongst white immigrants varies considerably

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

entry in monopoly market this paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game theoretic models of entry we construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants equilibrium strategies in simultaneous move and sequential move games and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles from estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer we also find that entry does not cause price cost margins to fall by much

on the rationality of buying from a price predator abstract by means of a simple example i demonstrate that it may be rational for consumers to purchase at predatory prices even though the exit of the intended victim and the consequent price increase are correctly anticipated

testing for marginal changes in income distributions with lorenz and concentration curves asymptotically distribution free statistical tests for comparing absolute and relative lorenz and concentration curves are provided the procedures do not require independent samples and can be used to test for marginal changes in income distributions the tests are illustrated using a large sample of tax returns that have been randomly selected for audit by the internal revenue service the tests reveal the marginal effects of systematic underreporting of income and tax liabilities on the u s income distribution copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a note on reputation more on the chain store paradox abstract this note considers the reputation phenomenon in the context of the chain store paradox two major aspects of the perfect information assumption are relaxed potential entrants do not know the ordering in which they have to make their entry decisions and they do not have full knowledge of the past history of the market it is shown that without introducing private information or changing the nature of the conflict there exist sequential equilibria of the game with imperfect information in which the monopolist is willing to build reputation journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82 l13

a new paradigm for valuing non market goods using referendum data maximum likelihood estimation by censored logistic regression abstract this paper challenges the w m hanemann amer j agr econom 66 332 341 1984 and c sellar j p chavas and j r stoll j environ econom management 13 382 390 1986 utilizations of logit models to estimate the value of non market resources from referendum survey data these data are more informative than conventional choice data the random utility interpretation of logit models is therefore too restrictive bypassing the utility function entirely it will be shown that parameters and standard errors for utility theoretic inverse hicksian demand functions can be extracted directly and much more simply estimated demand functions need not be limited to those corresponding to the linear in parameters utility difference specifications which can be handled by packaged logit programs

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions an economic and institutional analysis abstract green building councils gbcs have been established in many different countries in recent years this paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a gbc can contribute positively to the development of a greener or more sustainable stock of buildings the paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view we argue that the investor s uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners dilemma trap the corresponding barriers for a transition toward a greener buildings market are analyzed gbcs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems they can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors by certifying the quality of a building they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer this task however raises some severe management challenges for the gbcs

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

predation by public enterprises abstract this paper demonstrates that in addition to the usual niskanen type losses generated by excess production by public firms there is an unrecognized second type of loss in order to sell their excess production public firms have to price their output below the competitive price and thereby cause more efficient firms at the margin to be eliminated the discussion is then extended to include the case where public enterprises finance additional expansions of output by price discriminating against inframarginal customers but then face the threat of competition for these inframarginal customers from new potential entry public enterprises are further shown to provide more credible threats to potential entrants since unlike private firms they value the increased output associated with predation and not merely the higher future benefits produced by it

bargaining with imperfect commitment abstract we study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two person bargaining games by establishing the reputation for being stubborn a player sometimes commits to her initial demand becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent when the probability of being stubborn is small the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness a player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and or is more likely to be stubborn journal of economic literature classification number c78

special interest groups and the allocation of public funds i propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income in this model violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government the predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry although windfalls are legally unrestricted the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to 2 30 per capita upon receipt of funds the marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0 20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income states which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less these results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

semiparametric approaches to welfare evaluations in binary response models applied welfare analysis is commonly based on mean or median benefit estimates however the whole conditional distribution of benefits is often of interest for policy makers this article compares the distributional information recovered by competing semiparametric methods results obtained using a valuation study for the improvement of water resources in brazil suggest that the semiparametric approaches are in line with each other capturing a rich heterogeneity structure that is ignored by the logit approach failure to take this structure into account may lead to the undue rejection of the project according to the kaldor hicks criterion

willingness to pay in different policy planning methods insights into respondents decision making processes willingness to pay in different policy planning methods insights into respondents decision making processes

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

corporate compliance with debt covenants in this paper i present and test a model of corporate compliance with the debt covenant requiring payment of a current obligation this study adds to the empirical literature on forecasting financial distress by showing conditions under which debt default may be a rational economic decision by the firm s shareholders this analysis departs from empirical financial distress studies which are often not linked to an underlying economic theory the focus on covenant default also extends the literature which has modeled bankruptcy bulow and shoven 1978 and liquidation decisions titman 1984 but which has not considered a common first symptom of financial distress covenant default briefly the model examines the costs that influence shareholders decision to comply with or violate a particular debt covenant payment of a current obligation these costs include those associated with bondholders reaction to possible default the model predicts that shareholders will default when holding other factors constant i interest rates have declined relative to coupon rates stated in the debt issue ii the probability of paying future obligations is high and iii the cost of obtaining funds to pay the obligation is high the model also predicts when stockholders and bondholders will renegotiate the debt contract and the amount of wealth transferred in the renegotiation finally the

evaluating changes in the distribution of capital wealth i introduction over the last several years increasing concern has been expressed about wealth and income inequality 1 while most of the concern centers on the deteriorating economic condition of the poor some of it is directed against the very wealthy 2 proposals are being put forward from direct taxation of wealth to taxation of inheritances whose purpose is to foster greater equality in the distribution of wealth and particularly in the distribution of capital wealth 3 serious study of the potential economic consequences of greater capital wealth equality has been limited many economic models utilized to examine policy issues either ignore capital wealth distribution or take it as a given as a result opinions on the matter tend to be influenced largely by ideological preconceptions some tend to view very large capital fortunes mainly as desirable incentives to vigorous entrepreneurial effort and or high saving while others tend to view them mainly as a dysfunctional outgrowth of the institution of inheritance together with a high degree of randomness in the determination of capital asset values it is widely accepted that there are at least two principal justifications for capital property income as a return to the active process of entrepreneurship and or investment analysis and as a return to the passive process of saving 4 in a strict logical sense these justifications for capital property income even if legitimate do not necessarily justify a high level of inequality in capital wealth if a small number of very wealthy capitalists were replaced by a much larger number of less wealthy capitalists the amount of entrepreneurship investment analysis and saving provided to the economy would not necessarily be reduced the purpose of this research is to throw some objective light on the potential economic consequences of greater capital wealth equality by specifying implementing and computing a small scale general equilibrium model in which the distribution of capital wealth is a key parameter the model is designed to address directly various concepts and issues which at the present time lie mostly within the province of ideological preconception rather than scientific analysis the model includes saving as a primary factor of production provided by the household but many other general equilibrium models include saving and hence are able to some extent at least to evaluate the saving justification for capital property income and by extension for capital wealth inequality the innovative feature of the present model is its inclusion as a primary factor of production provided by the household of capital management effort capital management effort is defined as any and all active behavior by the household designed to increase the rate of return on its capital wealth such behavior might include corporate supervision such as provided by a member of a board of directors corporate supervision is distinguished from corporate management provided by salaried executives investment analysis such as provided by a private investor or entrepreneurship such as provided by the founder owner of a new business firm households allocate their available time resources to labor capital management effort and leisure standard household theory encompasses only labor and saving as primary factors adding the capital management effort concept enables a direct assessment of the role of such critical factors as entrepreneurship in the economy and thereby enables a more thorough and reliable evaluation of the potential economic consequences of increasing equality in capital wealth distribution 5 on the whole the results described below support the conclusion that greater equality in capital wealth would be economically beneficial the results are strong in the sense that every performance indicator examined in the research aggregate income consumption equality social welfare in the sum of utilities sense and aggregate saving is improved by greater capital wealth equality

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

flexible mixture distribution modeling of dichotomous choice contingent valuation with heterogenity abstract this paper considers the performance of a model of mixture normal distributions for dichotomous choice contingent valuation data which allows the researcher to consider unobserved heterogeneity across the sample the model is flexible and approaches a semi parametric model since the normality assumption can be removed by augmenting the number of mixture distributions bayesian inference allows for simple estimation of the model and is particularly appropriate for conducting inference with finite data sets the proposed model is compared with other semi parametric and parametric approaches using monte carlo simulation under alternative assumptions regarding heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity in sample observations it is found that the mixture normal model reduces bias and improves performance with respect to an alternative semi parametric model particularly when the sample is characterized by heterogeneous preferences the application of the model to empirical data on the recreational value of natural areas in the canary islands confirmed the expected results

semiparametric estimation of the binary choice model for contingent valuation this paper is concerned with the estimation of the binary choice model without imposing any parametric structure on the distribution of the stochastic term we adapt the distribution free maximum l

antitrust predation and the antitrust paradox abstractthe widely recognized influence that the chicago school of law and economics had on the institution of antitrust is nowhere more apparent than in predatory pricing law starting with aaron director this movement had many distinguished contributors but even in this company robert bork stands out for his part in persuading the judiciary to refocus antitrust law on the interests of consumers rather than on the interests of competing firms in the antitrust paradox and other writings bork advanced the chicago school insight that the kind of aggressive price cutting that at the time passed for predatory pricing is instead an essential and for consumers beneficial attribute of competition the resulting change in direction that antitrust has taken in predatory pricing cases culminated in the court s matsushita matsushita electric industrial co v zenith ratio corp 475 u s 574 1986 and brooke group brooke group ltd v brown williamson tobacco corp 509 u s 209 1993 opinions both

sacrifice tests for predation in a dynamic pricing model ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 meet ericson and pakes 1995 abstract to detect the presence of predatory pricing antitrust authorities and courts routinely ask whether a firm sacrifices current profit in exchange for the expectation of higher future profit following the exit of its rival because predatory pricing is an inherently dynamic phenomenon we show in this paper how to construct sacrifice tests for predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework along the lines of ericson and pakes 1995 in particular we adapt the definitions of predation due to ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 to this setting and construct the corresponding sacrifice tests

reputation and the flow of information in repeated games this paper derives payoff bounds from reputation effects akin to those of fudenberg and levine 1992 for repeated moral hazard games in which a long run player interacts frequently with a population of short run players and the monitoring technology varies with the length of the period of interaction the bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on the relative entropy examples are shown where under complete informatione the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long run player converges as the period length tends to zero to the set of static equilibrium payoffs whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types reputation effects remain powerful in the frequent interaction limit

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

the trend behavior of alternative income inequality measures in the united states from 1947 1990 and the structural break this article tests the hypothesis that the time series process of income inequality has experienced a structural break the timing of the structural break is treated as an unknown parameter to be estimated from the data because it is not possible to associate a single episodic policy event with the break year and to avoid bias in favor of a unit root hypothesis if the break was near the selected year for several measures of income inequality a segmented trend model is more appropriate to account for the fundamentals affecting the behavior of income inequality as opposed to a stochastic trend model

lorenz dominance and welfare changes in the u s distribution of income 1967 1986 this paper examines income inequality in the untied states over the period 1967 86 using recently developed tests for differences in lorenz curves the authors are able to rank eighteen of nineteen annual comparisons in contrast standard techniques are able to rank only twelve these results suggest that the lorenz dominance principle is more empirically relevant than previously thought the tests reveal a sharp rise in u s inequality between 1978 and 1982 as well as a shift toward greater inequality over the entire period the authors also examine changes in economic welfare using the joint mean lorenz dominance principle copyright 1991 by mit press

welfare evaluations in contingent valuation experiments with discrete response data comment in the case of private goods individuals reveal their preferences in the market place no similar market mechanism exists in the case of public goods however one obvious possibility is to ask people about their maximal willingness to pay for public goods or government expenditure johansson 1987 1990 miller in some recent contingent market valuation studies people instead have been asked to accept or reject a specified amount of money for a change in the provision of a public good different subsamples are confronted with different bids the resulting yes and no responses usually are analyzed by logit or probit techniques e g johansson and kristrom this raises the question of how to compute the average willingness to pay when only yes and no responses are available this point was advanced by hanemann in his seminal 1984 paper on welfare evaluations with discrete responses see also hanemann 1987 however we believe a minor imperfection in hanemann s presentation may confuse and mislead practitioners hanemann s approach assumes that negative bids cannot occur but at the same time gives the impression that it also applies to models that allow for negative bids we also extend hanemann s discussion of the choice of money measure in cost benefit analysis

collusion under financial constraints collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one abstract this paper considers the possibility of collusion between financially constrained firms it is found that they cannot collude when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one while collusion emerges at lower discount factors

corporate and industry effects on business unit competitive position we partition the variances of market shares which we use as surrogates for competitive position of the business units of all public manufacturing companies available in the trinet data base into industry factors corporate parent specific factors and business unit specific factors our results differ somewhat from rumelt s 1991 which decomposed variances in profitability we find that corporate parent effects on market share are considerably greater than zero when lines of business are defined more narrowly when small business units are included and when firms are medium sized our results suggest that the relative importance of corporate industry and business unit effects depends on the types of criteria such as the level of industry aggregation whether small business units are included and firm size that are used to construct samples copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

the measurement and trend of housing inequality in the united states 1978 85 inequality in housing services for renters owners and all households in the united states is estimated for 1978 and 1985 hedonic techniques are applied to data from the american housing survey to derive values for housing services that include publicly provided as well as subsidized housing we find significant disparities in housing but substantially less inequality than in incomes in 1978 the top decile garnered 19 2 of housing services while the bottom decile received only 5 1 the trend however is towards greater equality in housing with large and statistically significant shifts across all deciles by 1985 the share of the top decile dropped to 16 3 a percentage decrease in share of 15 3 while that of the bottom decile rose to 5 7 a percentage increase of 11 4

fulfilled expectations of entry i develop a two period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer s expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium i find that both expectations duopoly and monopoly are fulfilled in the incumbent s price setting game while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity setting game i also find that quantity is more entry deterring than price in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity setting game

a response to glazer and rosenthal we are most grateful to glazer and rosenthal for the attention they have paid to our work abreu and matsushima 1992a b c in the process of criticizing our mechanism they have provided an elegant exposition of it which usefully supplements our own efforts the criticisms themselves we feel are misplaced and based on a close reading but narrow interpretation of our results glazer and rosenthal seek to show that in our mechanisms the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies is or indeed ought to be controversial in terms of conventional decision theory the iterative logic is impeccable when iterative deletion leads to a unique profile that profile is the unique rationalizable profile the unique nash equilibrium and so on of course the logic of iterative dominance entails common knowledge of rationality the theoretical coherence of this assumption has been questioned in the context of backward programming in extensive form games see luce and raiffa 1957 pp 80 81 rosenthal 1981 basu 1988 reny 1992a 1992b bonanno 1991 binmore 1987a 1987b and gul 1989 among others these paradoxes of common knowledge of rationality have been highlighted in stylized examples such as the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma and rosenthal s centipede game which in fact has been a seminal inspiration for this recent literature 2 but our mechanisms are simultaneous there is no opportunity to demonstrate irrationality strategic or otherwise and therefore no scope to rationalize iteratively dominated behavior from a decision theory perspective the glazer and rosenthal critique might therefore be viewed as an elaborate revival of the indefensible claim that players in a one short prisoners dilemma will choose not to confess because they are both better off doing so than by both playing their dominant strategies within the standard game theory paradigm there is really nothing more to be said before turning to issues of bounded rationality we note that the glazer and rosenthal critique is essentially premised on the existence of a countervailing focal point but what is a focal point the notion is notoriously vague and we are aware of no widely accepted definition 3 this is not to deny that in very simple and particular games certain behavior may be focal frequently focalness is identified with a pareto dominating equilibrium and this is the point of view glazer and rosenthal seem to adopt 4 this is implicit in their acknowledgement that when the social choice function does satisfy pareto optimality our objection loses much of its immediate

merging reputation and repeated games with incomplete information we relate and unify several results that appeared in the following domains merging of probabilities perturbed games and reputation phenomena and repeated games with incomplete information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d83

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

semi parametric discrete choice measures of willingness to pay abstract a semi parametric discrete choice method is proposed to recover welfare measures from individual choice data the proposed method is compared with the traditional binary choice models in an application to measure benefits of recreation trips

efficient estimation methods for closed ended contingent valuation surveys closed ended contingent valuation surveys can be very useful in the evaluation of nonmarket resources respondents merely state whether they would accept or reject a hypothetical threshold amount either as payment for giving up access to the resource or as a fee for its use the authors develop a maximum likelihood procedure which exploits the variation in the threshold values to allow direct and separate point estimates of regression like slope coefficients and error standard deviations without truncation bias their illustration uses data from a survey of recreational fisherman to examine factors which influence individuals willingness to pay copyright 1987 by mit press

nutrition and nonparticipation in the us food stamp programme microdata from the national food consumption survey are used to test for differences in caloric and protein intake distributions we compare poor households that participate in the us food stamp programme to eligible households that do not participate tests for stochastic dominance provide unambiguous evidence that eligible nonparticipants suffer from relative undernutrition compared to participating households probit analysis is used to identify characteristics of participating and nonparticipating households

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit markets welfare increasing reputation effects arise in credit markets when adverse selection gives rise to borrower reputation formation incentives that mitigate moral hazard problems this paper shows that welfare stemming from reputation effects will diminish over time as the private information of borrowers is revealed to lenders in the form of lengthening credit histories aggregate borrower welfare may therefore decrease over time unless reputation effects can be sustained restricting a lender s access to a borrower s credit history via credit bureau policy is shown to be one method of sustaining reputation effects and preventing a decline in welfare copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

efficiency gains afforded by improved bid design versus follow up valuation questions in discrete choice cv studies interval data analysis of cv dis crete choice responses delivers efficiency gains which must be weighed against the risk of intro ducing strategic response bias efficiency gains are also achievable by improved bid design we assess these gains on median wtp estimates first in an empirical application then by means of a monte carlo experiment comparing three differ ent bid designs improved but sub optimal bid design delivers comparable gains to those achieved by one and two follow up questions the first follow up captures more than 50 of the efficiency gain provided by a second follow up jel q26

show them your teeth first a game theoretic analysis of lobbying and presure this paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying words and pressure actions in order to influence a policymaker both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker however only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker the interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game in equilibriumpressure in contrast to lobbying only occurswhen the interest group s reputation is sufficientlylow and always improves its reputation it is shownthat repeated lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation lobbying to maintain a reputation

international comparisons of income inequality tests for lorenz dominance across nine countries this paper examines income inequality across nine countries using the luxembourg income study data set new statistical tests and comparability of data provide an exceptionally clear picture of relative income inequality only 4 comparisons out of a possible 108 cannot be ranked in most cases differences in the definition of the recipient unit make little difference in the rankings irrespective of recipient units sweden norway and germany come out at the top of the ordinal lorenz ranking with australia canada and the united kingdom in the middle and the united states and switzerland at the bottom copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

switching costs in the wholesale distribution of cigarettes recent theories of price wars triggered by entry assign a critical role to switching costs in explaining price and output changes earlier elzinga and mills 1998 showed that actual switching patterns following an episode of new entry in an industry are driven by the fact that buyers have different switching costs the current paper draws on transaction specific price and shipments data surrounding the 1984 1985 price war in generic cigarettes to explore the size and determinants of switching costs among wholesale cigarette distributors results show that switching costs vary across firms and are nontrivial in magnitude several implications of the findings are discussed

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

truncation bias and the ordinal evaiuation of income inequality lorenz dominance analysis is used to examine the effect of top coding on the ordinal evaluation of u s income inequality across time current population survey microdata are adjusted for truncation bias and statistical inference procedures are used to examine biennial changes in unadjusted and adjusted lorenz curves beginning in 1985 the truncation bias has a significant effect on ordinal rankings of income inequality

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation