threshold management in a coupled economic ecological system abstract economic analysis of optimal ecosystem management in the presence of a threshold has typically ignored the potential for induced behavioral responses this paper contributes to the literature on non convex ecosystem management by considering the implications of a particular behavioral response in a regional economy that of amenity led growth to changes in ecosystem services generated by a lake ecosystem subject to a eutrophication threshold the essential policy challenge is to achieve optimal levels of lake nutrients and urbanization given that improvements to water quality will induce additional migration and urbanization in the region with attendant ecological impacts we show that policies that ignore the recursive relationship between urbanization and water quality unintentionally exacerbate boom bust cycles of regional growth and decline and risk pushing the system towards long run economic decline in contrast the optimal policy accounts for the behavioral feedbacks to improved ecosystem services and balances regional growth and ecological degradation

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

determinants of corporate leasing policy the existing finance literature assumes the real operating cash flows from leasing or owning are invariant to the ownership of the asset and focuses on tax related incentives for corporate leasing policy our analysis suggests that taxes are important in identifying potential lessees and lessors but are less important in identifying the specific assets leased we provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease versuspurchase decision we then show how these incentives explain the use of contractual provisions such as maintenance clauses deposits options to purchase the asset and metering when a firm buys an asset it obtains both the right to the services of that asset over the period it is owned plus the right to sell the asset at any future date with a lease the firm acquires only the right to the asset s services for a period specified in the contract the existing finance literature analyzing corporate leasing policy concentrates on the tax related incentives to lease or buy e g see miller and upton 19 myers et al 21 lewellen et al 13 franks and hodges 11 and brealey and young 4 we believe that taxes play an important role in explaining certain dimensions of leasing policy for example the choice between manufacturer and third party leasing however taxes provide only a limited explanation of why specific assets are leased rather than owned and for the choice of provisions in lease contracts in this paper we want to accomplish two things 1 to provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease versus buy decision and 2 to employ that analysis to explain observed variation in corporate leasing policy in deriving testable hypotheses about the characteristics of lessees lessors the assets leased and provisions in lease contracts we extend the standard leaseversus buy analysis found in corporate finance textbooks e g brealey and myers

efficiency wage models of unemployment one view h lorne carmichael persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies what could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models this paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments it concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment persistent involuntary unemployment of workers is a recurrent problem in labor markets all over the world unemployed workers seem unable to find work even though they are willing to accept lower wages than those being paid employed workers with similar skills what could be preventing wages from adjusting to clear these markets many recent papers known collectively as the efficiency wage literature now claim to have the answer this paper will survey the efficiency wage literature and critically evaluate some of its accomplishments efficiency wage models have already been examined by yellen 1984 katz 1986 and stiglitz 1987 and have received generally favorable reviews this paper is more critical its overall conclusion is that efficiency wage models provide some useful insights into the workings of the labor market but they do not provide a satisfactory account of wage rigidity or involuntary unemployment there are at least five separate versions of the efficiency wage model they share a common structure however and this is outlined in the first section of the paper this section also attempts to relate efficiency wage models to other recent models of unemployment section ii examines and criticizes the different approaches in detail section iii evaluates the achievements of this approach and suggests some directions for future work i a general efficiency wage model efficiency wage models as the name suggests are first of all models of wages they generate unemployment by showing that firms will sometimes want to set wages at non market clearing levels it is useful to begin therefore by reviewing how wages and employment are determined in some related models in a perfectly competitive labor market the wage for each type of labor is adjusted constantly to maintain equality of supply and demand overall employment fluctuates in response to demand changes as workers move up and down their labor supply curves unemployment is voluntary in that anyone who is not working prefers that state to employment at the going wage for people of his skills as well the value of a worker s marginal product is equal to the marginal value of his leisure so there are no unexploited wage bargains between unemployed workers and firms this model is successful in predicting the long term response of wages to shifts in demand and supply but it is clear that in the short run its depiction of voluntary unemployment and flexible wages is unrealistic a natural way to generate more realism is to assume that wages are inflexible in the short run in this case a reduction in demand away from a long run equilibrium will lead to rationing of jobs by employers as they attempt to stay on their labor demand curves the unemployment here is involuntary in that the unemployed would prefer to be working at the going wage and is inefficient in that there are lost gains from trade between these workers and firms the weakness of this model is that it is silent about the mechanism that keeps wages rigid unemployed workers who offer to work for less than the fixed wage ought to find work the early implicit contract models of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 provide one explanation for wage rigidity these models introduced the idea that wages can do more than just clear the market for labor wages in an implicit contract model are used to shift the risk generated by uncertain output market conditions from risk averse workers to the risk neutral firm

optimal pest control in agriculture abstract based on economic methodology we model an ecosystem with two species in predator prey relationship mice feed on grain and grain feeds on a resource with optimizing behavior of individual organisms a short run ecosystem equilibrium is defined and characterized that depends on the farmer s use of fertilizer and pesticide and on the mice population which in turn is affected by pesticides in that way a microfounded agricultural production function is derived linking a sequence of short run ecosystem equilibria yields the growth function of the mice population which is thus derived rather than assumed in each period the farmer harvests all grain in excess of some given amount of seed if she maximizes her present value profits optimal farming is characterized by either using no pesticide or a moderate amount of pesticide or by applying a chattering control pest eradication is never optimal on the other hand if the farmer takes into account steady state mice populations only it may be optimal to eradicate mice or to use no or a moderate amount of pesticide depending on prices as well as on the shape of the grain production function which is determined by microparameters of grain reproduction

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

what does she see in him the effect of sharing on the choice of spouse all husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs however because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant each may be inclined to provide a suboptimal level of marital inputs the choice of spouse influences the level of distortion and under some circumstances the eficient mating is between individuals of equal value people tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one s desire to capture an ideal partner and one s realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves

market segmentation and wind curtailment an empirical analysis abstract china s wind power has experienced explosive growth and reshaped the overall energy mix since 2009 however increasing investment in the wind power industry has been accompanied by persistent and serious wind curtailment since 2010 leading to significant efficiency loss this paper argues that the interprovincial market segmentation which is driven by political motivations is a key factor contributing to wind curtailment we first construct an interprovincial electricity market segmentation index this is then used as an independent variable to explain the variation in wind curtailment rates a panel dataset of 28 provinces during the 2009 2016 period is used for empirical analysis the results clearly show that market barriers positively contribute to wind power curtailment specifically a 10 decrease in the market segmentation index will lead to a 4 3 5 3 decrease in wind power curtailment

money back contracts with double moral hazard we analyze money back contracts in which a seller promises to refund some fraction of the buyer s purchase price if an item is returned as a three stage game in a cooperative first stage the players determine a price and refund share in the second stage they noncooperatively choose inputs the buyer decides whether to return the item in the final stage this process economizes on the information necessary to enforce a contract and serves an incentive function when transactions involve double moral hazard efficient contracts exist when uncertainty is moderate inefficiencies result when there is either insufficient or excessive uncertainty

econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories avoiding biological management failures abstract economics of the fishery has focused on the wastefulness of common pool resource exploitation pure open access fisheries dissipate economic rents and degrade biological stocks biologically managed fisheries also dissipate rents but are thought to hold biological stocks at desired levels we develop and estimate an empirical bioeconomic model of the gulf of mexico gag fishery that questions the presumptive success of biological management unlike previous bioeconomic life history studies we provide a way to circumvent calibration problems by embedding our estimation routine directly in the dynamic bioeconomic model we nest a standard biological management model that accounts for complex life history characteristics of the gag biological intuition suggests that a spawning season closure will reduce fishing pressure and increase stocks and simulations of the biological management model confirm this finding however simulations of the empirical bioeconomic model suggest that these intended outcomes of the spawning closure do not materialize the behavioral response to the closure appears to be so pronounced that it offsets the restriction in allowable fishing days our results indicate that failure to account for fishing behavior may play an important role in fishery management failures

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

efficiency wage models of unemployment a second view kevin lang and shulamit kahn efficiency wage models in which firms find it profitable to pay wages above workers reservation wages provide a promising explanation for unemployment and interindustry wage differentials one criticism of such models is they imply firms should sell jobs by requiring up front bonds from new workers however only some efficiency wage models imply this moreover firms might not require bonds for many reasons we show that moral hazard and adverse selection models together explain many labor market phenomena the efficiency wage model conforms well to empirical finding but certain anomalies suggest the need to consider rent sharing models carmichael s paper in this volume is an important contribution to the debate over the importance of efficiency wages he clearly outlines some of the deficiencies in the theory and thus points out areas needing further research nevertheless his conclusions are far too negative he greatly exaggerates the theoretical weakness of the efficiency wage model and gives insufficient recognition to the empirical implications generated by this model and to tests of these implications i shirking models there is direct empirical evidence that shirking is a serious problem for firms firms spend significant sums monitoring workers levine 1987 reviews the evidence that worker shirking is widespread and costly the evidence in burroway 1979 and mars 1982 also demonstrates the importance of shirking and stealing carmichael s primary argument against shirking models is that if the payment of efficiency wages to deter shirking led to an excess supply of workers workers would buy their jobs by posting bonds since we do not observe workers posting bonds he concludes that firms do not pay efficiency wages either given the importance of shirking the absence of market clearing bonds needs explaining one explanation is that the market has found some reasonable substitute for bonds such as deferred wage payments it is theoretically feasible to substitute deferred wage payments for up front bonds as noted by akerlof and katz 1989 however the empirical evidence of industries with deferred payments i e where low beginning wages are balanced by high subsequent wages is mixed dickens and katz 1987b krueger and summers 1988 and abraham and farber 1987 indicate that industries which pay high wages to high tenure workers tend to pay high wages to low tenure workers on the other hand high wage industries also tend to have steeper earnings profiles which may be evidence of deferred earnings in these industries as shapiro and stiglitz 1984 note a second possible explanation for the absence of market clearing bonding is that bonding gives firms an incentive to fire workers immediately upon collecting their bonds however this explanation assumes that a firm will immediately fire every worker who posts a bond if there are any reputation costs at all some firms sometimes will not fire bond posting workers and we should observe some bonding yet with finite length contracts there must be some reputation costs because otherwise firms would never pay workers in the last period thus firm incentives to cheat and fire workers cannot explain the complete absence of bonding clearly the absence of market clearing bonding is not fully understood and further theoretical work is needed dickens katz lang and summers 1989 review a wide variety of possible reasons that bond posting is limited the important point is that there are many potential reasons for limited bonding other than the absence of efficiency wages on the other hand the lack of bonding despite the importance of shirking does not demonstrate that firms pay efficiency wages there may be reputation or other costs to the worker caught shirking even in the absence of bonding as dickens katz lang and summers 1989 demonstrate in the absence of bonding whether paying efficiency wages dominates relying solely on increased monitoring depends on the parameters of the model and is therefore an empirical issue

diffusion induced instability and pattern formation in infinite horizon recursive optimal control this paper develops local stability analysis for deterministic optimal control theory for recursive infinite horizon intertemporal optimization problems where there is a continuum of spatial sites and the state variable can diffuse over these sites we identify sufficient conditions for a type of local instability which emerges from the interaction of the discount rate on the future the curvature of the hamiltonian and the spatial features of the problem we call this phenomenon optimal diffusion induced instability odi we illustrate our analytical methods with three stylized applications the first application is the optimal management of spatially connected human dominated ecosystems the second and third applications are harvesting of spatially interconnected renewable resources jel classification c6 q2

choice of contracts in turkish agriculture sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy have coexisted under extremely diverse settings for centuries from labor abundant south and east asia to land abundant west africa and the americas this fact has intrigued generations of economists since adam smith marshall s lucid exposition of the productive inefficiencies of sharecropping in the principles paved the way for a major effort to reconcile neoclassical theory with the reality of coexistence 1 another substantial segment of the literature condemned sharecropping as an exploitative mechanism in semifeudal societies and predicted its downfall 2 more recent theoretical treatments however hail the share contract as a simple yet ingenious arrangement that guarantees the second best outcome in environments characterized by risk input market imperfections and moral hazard 3 the intuition underlying this argument is widely accepted but has yet to yield a general explanation of the real world coexistence phenomenon nor should we expect such an explanation each country and historical episode has its unique climatic technological and institutional characteristics and different motives for the adoption of share contracts may dominate in different settings 4 it is troublesome in fact that our empirical knowledge is so thin given that our theory of agricultural contracts is so rich 5 one reason of course is that appropriate data are costly and difficult to collectfor contractual choice is stubbornly complex and is best observed at the individual agent or household level there has been empirical work but much of it has examined the well worn marshallian theme is sharecropping less efficient than self cultivation 6 our knowledge of the conditions under which different contracts are likely to arise is limited to a handful of studies on the indian subcontinent or the united states in this article i examine the determinants of contractual choice during the 1970s for samples of individual turkish landlords and tenants the data were drawn from a 1973 survey that was national in

on the existence of share contracts under limited liability abstract in a principal agent relationship under limited liability the agent in general receives the full share of revenue we show that when the agent exerts effort in multiple tasks the effort substitution effect helps explain the existence of share contracts even under limited liability

economic and climate impacts of reducing china s renewable electricity curtailment a comparison between cge models with alternative nesting structures of electricity abstract to mitigate climate change impacts and achieve low carbon transformation china has accelerated the development of renewable energy which is severely challenged by the curtailment of renewable electricity this study uses a dynamic multi sectoral cge model with alternative nesting structures and substitution elasticities for electricity with different power sources to capture the economic and environmental feasibility of reducing renewable electricity curtailment across all economic sectors in china the reduction of renewable electricity curtailment is simulated during 2021 2030 from the curtailment rates of 2015 2017 we found that the reduction of renewable electricity curtailment would lead to a significant expansion in the output of renewable electricity and a moderate decrease in non renewable electricity production among the renewable electricity wind power has the most significant output gain over 9 with solar power and hydropower outputs rising by over 5 and 1 5 respectively however without the cost neutrality assumption the impacts of reducing electricity curtailment would be largely over estimated with cge models simulated by improved technology the disparity between results from the models with alternative nesting constant elasticity of substitution ces functions for electricity sectors is highly dependent on the difference between their substitution elasticities accompanying the changes in electricity generation the reduction of renewable electricity curtailment would bring multiple green co benefits like significantly reducing co2 and air pollutants emitted from electricity sectors and improvements in real gdp and employment

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

moral hazard asset specificity implicit bonding and compensation the case of franchising i introduction there is a large and growing interest in the structuring of compensation to deal with the moral hazard problem much of this literature treats various forms of income sharing such as piece rates and sharecropping as a means for a principal to provide incentives to an agent this literature has been extended to the case of two sided moral hazard where both parties to an exchange may shirk another mechanism to induce effort discussed in the literature is bonding where workers post a bond that is forgone if effort is inadequate klein 1980 and klein and leffler 1981 treat the possibility of specific assets as constituting an implicit bond where poor performance by a firm is penalized by bankruptcy and sale of assets at a loss this paper studies a situation where these issues coalesce the case of compensation arrangements in franchising the typical franchise contract calls for the sharing of franchise income between franchisee and franchisor additionally franchisees may be terminated for poor performance if franchise assets have a degree of specificity the ensuing sale of assets at a loss provides a penalty for poor performance we examine the determinants of franchise royalty rates and fees in this setting while there is a literature on two sided moral hazard and some empirical work on franchising based on this idea none incorporates the potential influence of asset specificity we explicitly consider the role of implicit bonding and asset specificity in conjunction with moral hazard on the part of both trading parties we go beyond previous work in franchising by estimating the effects of asset specificity and other influences on the royalty rate further part of our empirical work utilizes improved micro data on actual franchise contracts our approach and its implications are discussed in section ii consistent with previous work we expect the royalty rate to decrease increase as the importance of the franchisee s franchisor s input increases however more specific capital with the threat of termination acts as an implicit bond and substitutes for a reduced royalty rate in inducing franchisee effort thus we expect royalty rates to increase with asset specificity also unlike other approaches we do not necessarily expect an inverse relationship between the royalty rate and the franchise fee for example the greater the importance of franchisor effort the higher the royalty rate but the franchise fee may also increase if franchise revenue rises by enough our hypotheses are tested using two different data sets an original firm level data set is taken from federal trade commission ftc required uniform franchise offering circulars ufoc 1 in addition data are obtained from bond s 1989 the source book of franchise opportunities the data are discussed and the results presented in section iii we find substantial support for our approach for example factors that increase the importance of the franchisee s effort such as the number of employees supervised lower the royalty rate and increase the franchise fee also a reduction in the specificity of the franchisee s investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee 2 section iv summarizes our findings and concludes the paper ii the approach and the hypotheses the typical franchising contract consists of a two part payment by the franchisee to the franchisor the franchisee pays an up front nonrefundable franchisee fee and a continuing royalty payment usually a percentage of sales in return the franchisee receives the right to use the franchisor s brand name capital and a method of operation in addition the franchisor provides on going support to the franchisee however the franchisor maintains the right to unilaterally terminate the contract if the franchisor determines that the franchisee is not delivering a product consistent with the quality guaranteed by the brand name

franchising and risk management franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states fairness in franchising laws the advisability of such regulation depends on the long run incentives to franchise if franchising is a temporary step on the path to complete ownership integration regulation may be called for alternatively if complete or partial franchising is a permanen t market solution regulation is at least contestable this paper offer s new evidence on the incentives to franchise copyright 1988 by american economic association

land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers this paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated prior to acquisition the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural productivity efficiency considerations are shown to require farmers be over compensated in the event of conversion

does supervision matter some hypothesis tests using indian farm level data abstract a model is developed and estimated to test for heterogeneity of family and hired labor in agricultural production and to estimate the impact of employer supervision on the productivity of hired labor plot level data are used from a rice growing village in semi arid tropical india the hypothesis that family and hired labor are homogeneous inputs was rejected results indicate that family member supervision is required to increase hired labor productivity output loss attributable to operating at reduced supervision intensity was greater than 10 on over 40 of the plots

development ecological resources and their management a study of complex dynamic systems abstract human well being depends to a large extent on services provided by ecological systems in poor countries this dependence is more transparent than in industrialised countries where the dependence is more indirect effective management of these systems requires a good understanding of their properties and in particular a knowledge of the dynamics of the systems in the article the dynamics of one simple system is analysed economically the system is a lake and the interaction between the run off of nutrients into the lake and the growth of either algae eutrophication in lakes in northern europe and north america or water hyacinths in lakes in southern and eastern sfrica is studied it turns out that the dynamics exhibit bifurcation points so that there are two basins of attraction if the system flips to one basin and it is regarded desirable to return to the other basin there will be hysteresis assuming that there are different users of the lake a differential game is constructed that captures the strategic interests of the users the resulting equilibrium shows first the conventional negative externality that will force the system to a different basin od attraction finally we investigate the use of a tax for bringing back the system to a pareto optimum

allocating resources in an uncertain world water management and endangered species instream flows may be essential in protecting aquatic species that are threatened or endangered an economic model of the optimal allocation of water under pure uncertainty is developed with particular attention paid to the situation when a species characterized by critical depensation is affected by instream flows we adopt the notion of pure uncertainty that frank knight and daniel ellsberg intended which applies when decision makers cannot reduce their uncertainty to a unique probability distribution following recent work by hansen sargent and others we employ robust control as a way to deal with this problem copyright 2008 oxford university press

a hierarchy model of associative farming abstract acceptance of the need for complementary services when agrarian reform is introduced such as credit and technical assistance has led many countries in latin america to organize land reform projects into collectives or production cooperatives but the disincentives to effort inherent in group farming have been a continual source of underproduction and disappointment with cooperative farming experiments the paper suggests an intermediate farming structure currently successful in the dominican republic in the framework of an agency contract incorporating the hierarchical relations between beneficiary administrator and governing agency the advantages of the associative over either individual or collective farming are illustrated

optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock externalities abstract underlying some of the most pressing environmental problems are the interlinked resource and environmental stock externalities with threshold effects using a simple dynamic model it is shown how in the face of such externalities the static market based policy instruments such as pigouvian taxes should be modified it is shown that even if for an initial period there is going to be no pollution stock damage the optimal policy still requires that abatement begins immediately and at increasing rates simulation of the model for the case of fossil fuel burning and the consequent global warming shows that the optimal carbon tax and therefore the optimal control strategy is particularly sensitive to changes in the marginal abatement cost and the level of fossil fuel demand policy simulations contrast the optimal control policy with and estimate the welfare losses from alternative policies deriving from arbitrary tax paths the latter include i a no tax policy ii a constant carbon tax rate iii the european community s proposed carbon tax path and iv a delayed optimal tax path

the fee structure in franchising a property rights view abstract the paper offers a property rights explanation for the structure of royalties and initial fees in franchise relationships we argue that the structure of royalties and fees depends on the distribution of intangible assets between the franchisor and franchisee contrary to the agency theory our property rights approach predicts a positive relationship between royalties and fees this hypothesis was tested by using data from the austrian franchise sector

economic curtailment of intermittent renewable energy sources abstract in a power system featuring a large share of intermittent renewables and inflexible thermal generators efficiency gains could be achieved by curtailing the production of renewables however as renewables feature very low variable production costs over curtailment can be costly in this article we use a stylised analytical model to assess this trade off we show that while curtailing renewables when their variability is high and the system flexibility is low can reduce generation costs the different stakeholders will not necessarily benefit from such measures as a consequence leaving this decision to generators will lead to a sub optimal level of curtailment either incentives to provide accurate res availability forecasts or alternatively centralised forecasting should be put into place to solve the resulting problem of asymmetry of information

the role of feed in tariff in the curtailment of wind power in china abstract while china s wind power initiative has experienced rapid growth serious curtailment issues persist though some studies have investigated this matter we explain this phenomenon from the novel perspective of excess capacity we first set up a theoretical model to explore the mechanism behind excess investment and find that the sticky feed in tariff fit and declining costs of wind power generate high mark up for wind power investors leading to a higher probability of excessive investment the theoretical prediction is empirically tested with a probit and tobit model using provincial level data between 2009 and 2016 the estimation results show that a 0 1 yuan increase in the mark up leads to a 2 3 increase in the rate of curtailed wind power based on the estimation results we simulate several scenarios to assess quantitatively how an improved policy design could have alleviated the curtailment issue simply increasing the frequency of the fit rate adjustment while maintaining the same subsidy reduction level between 2009 and 2016 could have reduced the curtailed wind power by 23 to 27 billion kwh accounting for 15 17 of actual curtailed wind power if the policy were better designed to reflect the declining trend of wind power costs more accurately the curtailment rates could have been further reduced by 2 81 corresponding to a reduction in wasted wind energy of 43 billion kwh or 28 of actual curtailment although accepting curtailment for a certain period could help to accelerate renewable energy deployment our analysis shows that the fit policy design could have been improved to reduce welfare loss these findings can not only assist the chinese government in framing effective policies but also may be applied to other emerging technologies or industries that require subsidy support

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

a dynamic model of the choice of mode for exploiting complementary capabilities this paper examines the choice of mode for a multinational enterprise and a local firm to exploit their complementary capabilities we develop a combined real options and game theoretic model of modal choice by incorporating a range of factors drawn from the dynamic capabilities theory and transaction cost or organizational economics the factors scrutinized in the model include the parties absorptive capacities frictions in knowledge and asset markets and associated incentive problems cost of switching from one mode to another and cost associated with power jockeying the model uses simulation to examine how these factors interact to influence the choice of mode the results identify a number of conditions for one factor to dominate another and help to reconcile different theories that have made contradicting predictions with regard to the effects of such factors as uncertainty and capability divergence on the optimal choice of mode

tenancy and family resources a model and some empirical analysis abstract in this paper we discuss with the help of a simple model the role of family resource endowments in determining the extent of land leased in or leased out by a household this becomes important when the market for some of these resources is either not functioning at all or is functioning imperfectly we focus on three such resources which have some relevance in indian agriculture these are 1 the family s managerial skill 2 its endowment of human labour and 3 its endowment of draft animal labour household level data from six villages of maharashtra and andhra pradesh are also utilized to test some of the hypotheses

the nature of the agricultural firm abstract models explaining the choice between rent wage and share contracts in agriculture abstract from the large variations within the classes of rent share and owner managed forms of organization regarding the extent to which a specific form accommodates specialization between labor and management as a result modern explanations of agricultural organizations are misleadingly dependent on risk aversion or the assumption that landowners have an absolute advantage in production decisions viewing the agricultural firm as a constitution instead of as a nexus of contracts facilitates an agency explanation of alternative organizational forms and their amenability to specialization

labor markets and poverty in village economies we study how women s choices over labor activities in village economies correlate with poverty and whether enabling the poorest women to take on the activities of their richer counterparts can set them on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty to do this we conduct a large scale randomized control trial covering over 21 000 households in 1 309 villages surveyed four times over a seven year period to evaluate a nationwide program in bangladesh that transfers livestock assets and skills to the poorest women at baseline the poorest women mostly engage in low return and seasonal casual wage labor while wealthier women solely engage in livestock rearing the program enables poor women to start engaging in livestock rearing increasing their aggregate labor supply and earnings this leads to asset accumulation livestock land and business assets and poverty reduction both accelerating after four and seven years these gains do not come at the expense of others non eligibles livestock rearing businesses are not crowded out and wages received for casual jobs increase as the poor reduce their labor supply in such labor activities our results show that i the poor are able to take on the work activities of the non poor but face barriers to doing so and ii one o interventions that remove these barriers lead to sustainable poverty reduction

the economics of non convex ecosystems introduction the word convexity is ubiquitous in economics but absent from economics in this paper we explain why and show what difference it makes to economic analysis if ecosystem non convexities are taken seriously a simple proof is provided of the connection between self similarity and power laws we also provide an introduction to each of the papers in the symposium and draw out the way in which they form a linked set of contributions

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

the law and economics of franchise tying contracts this paper analyzes from an economic perspective current antitrust law with regard to franchising requirements contracts where a franchisee must purchase an input from the franchisor or from a particular supplier designated by the franchisor the law takes an extremely hostile view toward such tie in contracts at least on the surface by stating that tying is a per se offense the court has said that such contractual arrangements generally serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition 2 and has held it not necessary to demonstrate anticompetitive effect before declaring them illegal the per se standard under which tying arrangements are analyzed is unusual because of the essential role of economic analysis to prove the existence of a per se illegal tying arrangement one must demonstrate economically that three conditions are met first that two separate products exist second that there is sufficient market power in the tying good and third that a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied good market is affected 3 in addition the per se standard permits affirmative defenses such as the use of tying for quality control and these also often entail sophisticated economic analysis as justice o connor correctly

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

tenure systems in traditional china i a general equilibrium model of tenure preference classical marginalists at least after john clark provide an unequivocal solution for the conventional factor market where people sell the productive services of their resources to producers the productexhaustion theorem says that if factors are priced according to their marginal products incomes of all resource owners will exactly exhaust the value of total products in the long run competitive equilibrium this holds true regardless of which factor is variable and which is fixed and regardless of which group of resource owners perform as producers who buy productive services of other resources in the market and claim residuals for themselves in an agrarian economy with land and labor as the inputs a land owner may cultivate his land and purchase the labor input from outside paying a wage rate in accordance with labor s marginal product the land owner is then the residual claimant alternatively he may lease out his land and receive a fixed rental rate per unit of area equal to the marginal product of land in this case the tenant is the producer and claims the residual income distribution between the two parties remains the same under each land arrangement wage and rent are therefore identical conceptually the classical marginal analysis has not presented a satisfactory theory of share tenancy which instead of being a seller buyer transaction in a conventional factor market is essentially a partnership arrangement between two persons who own complementary factors hence the term land renting will hereafter denote the fixed rent system exclusively in fact the direct application of marginal analysis to share tenancy has created considerable confusion in early economic literature only recently some general equilibrium models of land tenure systems have been developed for better understanding of the

uncertainty and irreversibility in groundwater resource management abstract optimal exploitation of renewable groundwater resources when extraction affects the probability of occurrence of an irreversible event is studied the term irreversible signifies that the event occurrence renders the resource obsolete it is found that uncertainty concerning the event occurrence has a profound effect under certainty when the stock level below which the event occurrence has a profound effect the optimal state process converges to a unique equilibrium state under uncertainty when the event occurrence level is unknown we identify equilibrium intervals and show that optimal processes initiated elsewhere converge to a boundary of one of these intervals inside an equilibrium interval the expected loss due to the event occurrence is so high that it does not pay to extract in excess of recharge even though under certainty doing so would be beneficial

the long reach of cotton in the us south tenant farming mechanization and low skill manufacturing abstract this paper examines the long run impact of cotton agriculture on local development in the us south focusing on a novel aspect of structural change exploiting climate based variation in cotton production i show that cotton specialization in the late 19th century had a negative impact on local development that lasts through 2010 this negative relationship however only became evident in the second half of the 20th century i argue that the change was caused by the mechanization of cotton production which began in the 1950s after the mechanization local manufacturing absorbed displaced cotton tenants with low human capital in response to the inflow of cotton tenants labor productivity in manufacturing began to decline and the effects persisted in the long run the persistent decline in manufacturing productivity is explained by directed technical change that reduced demand for skills in manufacturing these results indicate that depending on the agricultural background structural change can negatively affect the evolution of technology and productivity in the industrial sector

contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk we analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard on the part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique of cultivation in the presence of limited liability high powered incentive contracts such as fixed rental contracts will induce the farmer to adopt techniques of cultivation that are too risky from the point of view of the landlord on the other hand low powered incentive contracts such as fixed wage contracts will induce the farmer to supply too little effort we show that sharecropping contracts emerge as a natural solution to balance these two conflicting considerations

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

economic land use ecosystem services and microfounded species dynamics abstract in an integrated economy ecosystem model humans choose their land use and leave the residual land as habitat for three species forming a food chain the size of habitat determines the diversity and abundance of species that biodiversity generates in turn a flow of ecosystem services with public good characteristics for human consumption the ecosystem submodel yields rather than assumes population growth functions with each species growth depending on the size of habitat first the relationship between habitat and species growth sustenance decline and extinction is explored the laissez faire economy is shown to result in an underprovision of habitat making the case for land use restrictions for nature protection the optimal land use policy is characterized with full regard of ecosystem dynamics finally labor augmenting technical change is introduced to generate ever increasing pressure towards further habitat reductions in the laissez faire economy the habitat is consequently squeezed to zero in the long run so that all species are doomed social optimality demands however to refrain from using all land for economic purposes despite ever growing labor productivity

effects of technology on incentive design of share contracts do observed contracts have the properties predicted by the principal agent model with moral hazard in contract theory this paper tests the predictions of such an agency model in the context of sharecropping in north india the most well known explanation for sharecropping is based on the principal agent model with a trade off between risk and incentives even though sharecropping contracts are quite prevalent in rural areas of developing countries there is very little evidence on factors determining the instruments used to provide incentives in such contracts using information in the data giving rise to exogenous variation in technology across regions this paper tests for the effect of cultivation technology on the incentive structure of share contracts as predicted by the agency model existing empirical evidence on sharecropping seems to indicate that yield on sharecropped plots is lower than on owner operated plots i e there is an incentive problem or moral hazard radwan a shaban 1987 jean jacques laffont and mohamed s matoussi 1995 there is some informal evidence that landowners use various mechanisms to improve efficiency in sharecropping by participating in cost sharing and by repeating contracts robert m townsend and rolf a mueller 1994 examine the nature of these mechanisms in detail but their data do not permit econometric tests more generally though the principal agent model has been widely studied there is little existing empirical evidence for it michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 find that executive compensation is only weakly sensitive to firm performance in recent work rajesh k aggarwal and andrew a samwick 1999 find that executive s pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of firm s performance however their results are sensitive to the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms in the regressions as pierre a chiappori and bernard salanie 2003 note in a recent survey empirical work on contract theory using nonexperimental data needs to be careful in adequately correcting for underlying heterogeneity across agents otherwise the parameters of interest would be hard to interpret if such heterogeneity affects contract choice for example douglas w allen and dean lueck 1995 find no role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contracts but they do not take the heterogeneity across agents into account in a recent paper addressing the issue of heterogeneity across agents ackerberg and botticini 2002 find a significant role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contract after correcting for endogenous matching between landowners and tenants they find that wealthier tenants are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts in this paper we are able to address such estimation issues and check for the robustness of our results regarding the relationship between technology and the design of share contracts department of economics pennsylvania state university university park pa 16801 e mail pxp22 psu edu this paper derives from related work done earlier in my dissertation i am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions i thank james heckman lars stole robert townsend kala krishna and seminar participants for useful comments financial support from the andrew mellon foundation for both rounds of fieldwork is gratefully acknowledged any errors remain my own 1 see nirvikar singh 1991 for a survey of various theories of sharecropping including steven n cheung 1969 c h hanumantha rao 1971 joseph e stiglitz 1974 david newbery and stiglitz 1979 avishay braverman and stiglitz 1982 mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal 1985 and sudhir shetty 1988 a common feature of the different theories is an emphasis on uncertainty and asymmetric information 2 an exception is daniel a ackerberg and maristella botticini 2002 ackerberg and botticini differ from our paper in that they examine the role of tenant s risk aversion in the choice between fixed rental contract and share contract they do not examine share contracts per se 3 see john e core and wayne guay 2000

complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions an empirical study of it services contracts an increasing volume of business activity appears to be occurring via alliances or other interfirm arrangements in which complex contracts are featured yet there has been relatively little study of contract design in the strategy or management literatures the economics literature on contracting has been extensive but it has been less concerned with learning and evolution phenomena in which strategy and organization scholars are deeply interested in this paper we investigate the relationship between two types of contractual provisions that are important in high technology contracts or contracts for which environmental uncertainty or technological complexity are significant namely contingency planning and task description previous research suggests that contracts can vary significantly in the degree of detail with which such key provisions are written and that they are each subject to learning in this paper we find evidence from a sample of 386 contracts that contingency planning and task description behave as complements in contractual design we argue that this complementarity reflects patterns of learning to contract we also find that repeated exchange between two firms leads to greater effort at contingency planning in subsequent contracts a finding that is also consistent with learning effects but not with frequently made claims that contracts and trust are substitutes

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

the choice of organizational form the case of franchising abstract we examine companies that franchise some units and centrally operate own others the agency problems confronting these two organizational forms are analyzed testable hypotheses are developed the empirical results support the notion that owning versus franchising reflects a trade off among agency related problems the cost of monitoring store managers appears to be especially important in the own franchise decision the level of repeat business and initial investment requirements per unit also appear to be important

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

agricultural workers credit rationing and family networks in rural mexico abstractwe use mixed methods and first hand household data in mexico to investigate credit practices by households engaged in agricultural wage employment quantitative analysis shows evidence of rationing in the formal sector but also suggests the existence of mitigating mechanisms qualitative analysis provides additional insights first income patterns associated with agricultural wage generate income smoothing needs that are sometimes better met by the informal sector second family networks can perform key functions as gateways to the formal sector through specific informal arrangements that inject flexibility into formal rules and procedures

the response of peasant farmers to price incentives the use and misuse of profit functions recent famines in chad ethiopia and the sudan have highlighted a major problem facing less developed countries how does an ldc become self sufficient in food production the answers to this question range from the narrowly defined economic one or economistic approach to the more widely based institutional reforms approach the former approach typified by say schultz 1964 or the world bank 1982 would emphasise the importance of mainly price incentives the latter approach as typified by myrdal 1968 in his monumental work asian drama would emphasise the importance of land reforms as a pre condition for agricultural development the debate has sometimes followed a misleading path and discussed whether peasants are rational or whether they are lazy inert tradition bound etc the aim of this article is to show that the use of profit functions to model peasant behaviour in ldcs is seriously flawed neo classical economic theory within which profit functions are embodied ignores the historical social institutional and political context within which peasant farmers operate peasant farmers do not operate in full blooded capitalist impersonal competitive input and output markets the article is structured as follows section ii outlines the profit function approach and section iii provides a survey and critique of applications of the profit function to ldc agriculture section iv concludes with some general remarks on analysing peasant behaviour in an alternative paradigm

transactions costs and the efficient organization of production a study of timber harvesting contracts a transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber harvesting contracts predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from north carolina the empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk based model the transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures

wind and solar energy curtailment a review of international experience greater penetrations of variable renewable generation on some electric grids have resulted in increased levels of curtailment in recent years studies of renewable energy grid integration have found that curtailment levels may grow as the penetration of wind and solar energy generation increases this paper reviews international experience with curtailment of wind and solar energy on bulk power systems in recent years with a focus on eleven countries in europe north america and asia it examines levels of curtailment the causes of curtailment curtailment methods and use of market based dispatch as well as operational institutional and other changes that are being made to reduce renewable energy curtailment

the economics of polygyny in sub saharan africa female productivity and the demand for wives in cote d ivoire polygyny is still practiced throughout much of sub saharan africa with important social consequences this paper makes the first attempt to link african polygyny directly to the productivity of women in agriculture using micro data i develop a structural model of the demand for wives that disentangles wealth and substitution effects using a large household survey from cote d ivoire i find that marked geographic diversity in cropping patterns leads to regional variation in female labor productivity i also find that conditional on wealth men do have more wives when women are more productive that is cheaper this substitution effect may explain why polygyny declined in rural areas of cote d ivoire during agricultural development

leaders managers and the organization of township and village enterprises in china abstract the managerial contractual form in china s township and village enterprise tve sector has evolved rapidly during the past 10 years our paper uses descriptive data and a theoretical model to demonstrate that these changes may be occurring in response to the rapid development of markets in transitional rural china we econometrically test the model s main hypotheses showing that the driving force behind the movement from a leader run fixed wage contract to a fixed payment contract with better incentives for the manager is the relative value of non marketed inputs owned by local leaders and firm managers firm technical structure and local market setting also plays a role in the determination of firm contractual form

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

collective agricultural production a solution for transition economies abstract the paper examines theoretical reasons and provides examples for productivity differences between agricultural service cooperatives and collectives service cooperatives can utilize economies of scale enhance competitiveness and provide technical information advantages that often outweighed problems of free riding low investment and excessive political intervention agricultural collectives while not adding substantial advantages are in addition associated with problems of supervision and effort supply tendencies to substitute casual workers or mechanization for regular members and low investment incentives while collective forms of organization in transition economies respond to high risk and market imperfections they do so inefficiently policies that create conditions for service cooperatives to compete may lead to large productivity gains

using fast and slow processes to manage resources with thresholds economists have relied on convexity assumptions for a long time but many natural resources that stem from ecosystems have non convexities in their dynamics this article illustrates the consequences of relaxing convexity assumptions for management and the role of fast and slow variables the paper presents a general framework to handle systems with fast and slow variables and illustrates the method using a model of coral reefs subject to fishing pressure the insights obtained are used to discuss alternative management strategies

off farm work technical efficiency and rice production risk in taiwan this article investigates the differences in yield production production efficiency and yield risk for farmers both with and without off farm work using a nationwide survey of rice farmers in taiwan we estimate two stochastic production frontier models that accommodate technical inefficiency and production risk simultaneously for farmers both with and without off farm work the stochastic dominance criterion is then applied to compare the differences in the distributions of the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between groups the empirical results indicate that these two groups of farmers use resources in different ways and off farm work is not necessarily associated with lower technical efficiency for farmers in the lower percentiles of the efficiency distribution those with off farm work are more efficient than their counterparts without off farm work in addition farmers with off farm work face higher production risk and this result is robust for the entire distribution

the economics of franchise contracts as an organizational arrangement the franchise contract lies between anonymous price mediated exchange and centralized intrafirm employment in contrast to conventional market exchange franchise contracts typically impose on franchisees retail quality standards common hours of business price controls and nonlinear payment schedules for example fixed initial royalty fees plus a percentage of gross retail revenues while franchisors typically provide national advertising and training programs monitor and inspect the franchisees performance with varying intensity across industries and hold the residual power to terminate the franchise agreement observations of actual terminations indicate that franchisors sometimes exclude this power franchisors sometimes face persistent queues of potential franchisees in contrast to simple employment contracts franchise agreements provide for sharing of profits through royalties on revenue or output and considerable freedom for independent decisions by local franchisees 1 why do these franchise contracts exist