how not to extend models of inequality aversion abstract several authors have made attempts to improve the explanatory power of models of inequality aversion in particular the one by fehr and schmidt 1999 by adding concerns for total surplus or efficiency in this note i point out that these attempts are misguided because they are equivalent to a much simpler change not requiring an additional parameter unless we simultaneously consider games with different numbers of players in the latter case however such an approach yields implausible predictions

distributional concerns equity or efficiency oriented abstract this paper provides experimental evidence that in binary choice dictator games the majority of participants are efficiency rather than equity oriented even if their own payoff is reduced by the respective choice therefore altruistic and as a consequence reciprocal motives need to be modelled explicitly if we aim to predict behavior in experiments correctly

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

identifying uncertainty shocks using world diffusion index in this study a world diffusion index is developed to measure how uncertainty shocks have diffused among 179 economies and caused contractions in the world growth cycles this index is simply defi

contestable markets under uncertainty in this article we present a model of a market which is ex post contestable we show that in a market characterized by uncertainty a firm will face a tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility and generally will make some precommitments to take advantage of ex ante technologies we show that in the face of potential entry the incumbent will increase his precommitments and in so doing will affect the probability of entry the degree of market contestability is therefore endogenously determined by the choice of precommitments the extent to which precommitments will be used to affect entry probabilities is shown to depend on the efficiency of ex ante production adjustment costs and the degree of uncertainty in particular we show that the market becomes more contestable as the relative efficiency of ex post production increases and as market conditions become more uncertain

location choice product proliferation and entry deterrence within a slightly modified version of hotelling s model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise we show that entry deterrence although optimal need not be achieved through product proliferation in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation we also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry

first mover disadvantages with private information we consider a leader follower game with output quantities as strategies so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information at the equilibrium the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand in an attempt to signal low demand the leader contracts his output nevertheless unless the leader s information is infinitely noisy the follower can always correctly infer his signal we find a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better off compared to the leader

measuring world business cycles using kalman filtering and dynamic factor analysis the authors decompose aggregate output consumption and investment for the g7 countries into factors that are 1 common across all countries and aggregates 2 common across aggregates within a country and 3 specific to each individual aggregate in quarterly data for the period 1970 through 1993 fluctuations in all aggregates contain world and country specific common components that are both statistically significant and quantitatively important the authors find that the world and country specific common components play different roles in different business cycle episodes for each of the seven countries and that either may be dominant during a particular episode copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

entry deterrence and the free rider problem the public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant although incumbent firms act noncooperatively underinvestment in entry deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a pareto dominated arrangement in terms of profits by preventing entry

limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking abstract this paper extends an earlier paper by the author in which there were two economic agents an established firm and a potential entrant operating under complete information each agent being assumed to know the profit functions of both firms the present paper extends some of the results of the earlier work to a model in which it is not known with certainty to either agent what the profit functions would be after the entrant would come into the market

coordination with third party externalities abstract when agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties if an agent cares about them or believes others do they can affect equilibrium selection we present evidence from lab experiments showing that changes in the size and the sign of third party externalities have a significant impact on tacit coordination decision makers are more willing to incur a cost to try to avoid imposing a large negative externality on a third party than they are to avoid a small negative externality or to generate a large positive externality however when decision makers incentives are at odds with the interests of third parties many of them appear to ignore third party externalities even if they are large in magnitude and ignoring them implies substantial earning inequalities and reductions in group earnings individuals revealed to be other regarding in a non strategic allocation task often behave as if selfish when trying to coordinate we discuss explanations for our findings

dissecting the cycle a methodological investigation following burns and mitchell we define the cycle as a pattern in the level of aggregate economic activity an algorithm to locate turning points is developed as is a new measure of pro cyclicality a link between turning points and the moments of the series is established thereby providing the statistical foundation that burns and mitchell s work lacked using these tools we are able to dissect cycles in terms of the contributions made by trend growth volatility serial correlation and non linear effects we dissect several models and find little evidence that certain non linear effects are important to the nature of business cycles

noncooperative entry deterrence uncertainty and the free rider problem previous authors who have considered the issue of noncooperative entry deterrence have not found the free rider problem to be a significant factor these authors however have only considered models in which the exact investment needed to deter entry is known with certainty in this paper i add uncertainty to the models investigated by these previous authors and demonstrate that the free rider problem can be significant but is not so in all cases that is for certain types of entry deterring investments the introduction of uncertainty causes the oligopoly to underinvest in entry deterrence however for other types no underinvestment result arises

endogenous sequencing of firm decisions abstract when firms are symmetrically informed a stackelberg leader prefers to be leader rather than a cournot duopolist however when the leader has superior information about demand the leader may earn lower ex ante profits than it would earn if it was choosing quantities simultaneously with the follower in this paper i give the firm with superior information the option of delaying its quantity decision until the decision period of the less informed firm so that decisions are made simultaneously surprisingly in the unique stable outcome the informed firm moves first regardless of its private information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82 l10

endogenously determined price setting monopoly in an exchange economy abstract this note describes a noncooperative game in an exchange economy in which the players are strategically symmetric a price setting monopoly is a unique sequentially rational nash equilibrium of that game and the price setting monopolist emerges endogenously

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

have business cycles changed over the last two decades an empirical investigation abstract we document the properties of business cycles of 71 countries 23 industrial countries and 48 emerging market economies or emes from 1970q1 to 2012q4 using the harding and pagan dating algorithm first recessions are deeper steeper and costlier among emes especially in east asia and latin america second recoveries are swifter and stronger among emes partly due to stronger rebound effects third recessions became less costly during the globalization period 1985 2007 for industrial countries and emes thus reflecting institutional changes made during the great moderation fourth the dynamic behavior of macroeconomic indicators around peaks in real gdp is more volatile in downturns associated with crisis compared to other downturns fifth peaks in financial cycles credit and asset prices tend to precede peaks in real output cycles finally although both industrial and emerging markets have experienced deep recessions during the recent global financial crisis the emerging markets have recovered faster

time series decomposition and measurement of business cycles trends and growth cycles abstract a study of business cycles does not require trend estimation and elimination but a study of growth cycles does major cyclical slowdowns and speedups deserve to be analyzed but the needed time series decomposition presents difficult problems mainly because trends and cycles influence each other we compare cyclical movements in levels deviations from trend and smoothed growth rates for both the quarterly real gdp and the monthly u s coincident index using the phase average trend pat then we compare alternative trend estimates deterministic and stochastic linear and nonlinear and the corresponding series of deviations from these trends we discuss how the resulting estimates differ for u s growth cycles in the post world war ii period the results of pat show great similarity to the results obtained with the hodrick prescott local linear trend band pass filtering methods

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

equilibrium entry patterns under uncertainty abstract in this paper we develop a model in which incumbency patterns are determined endogenously we consider a two period duopoly game under uncertainty and show that the equilibrium entry patterns are determined by the costs and benefits of early entry and the strategic interactions between the firms we also show that under quite plausible cost conditions incumbency may not arise as an equilibrium pattern of the duopoly game

fairness risk preferences and independence impossibility theorems the most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes there are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries if we do so by expected utility theory so that the independence axiom is satisfied our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness if we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual so that individual risk preferences are preserved then ex ante fairness may be preserved but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied both ex ante and ex post fairness can be satisfied but then the individual does not have well defined preferences over own lotteries

can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior abstract this study examines whether gender differences in some economic behaviors are due to differences in social preferences as measured by dictator allocation decisions we find that compared to men women are significantly more likely to be inequity averters and significantly less likely to be social surplus maximizers these differences in social preferences explain to a large extent why women send less than men in trust games inequity averters can ensure equal payoffs if nothing is returned by sending one fourth of the endowment while surplus maximizers can increase total payoffs by a factor of three for each dollar sent social preferences also help explain the size of gifts in dictator games and choice of compensation method for simple tasks however after controlling for social preference type gender is still influential in these decisions women give significantly more to charity than men even after accounting for our measure of social preferences women prefer egalitarian payment systems both because they are inequity averters and because low self confidence may lead them to believe they will earn more with equal sharing

stackelberg leadership as a natural solution under cost uncertainty this paper analyzes a differentiated duopoly model with cost uncertainty in an environment where information sharing is prohibited the duopolists can commit themselves to be a stackelberg leader or follower at the time when they know the distribution but not the actual values of their own and the rival s costs in a natural stackelberg situation the firms agree on the assignment of roles and neither prefers the bayesian nash equilibrium an natural stackelberg situation is shown to be possible under quantity but not price competition total expected welfare is higher in the natural stackelberg situation than in the nash equilibrium copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd