markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant the problem of noncompliance and enforcement in transferable discharge permit tdp markets has not received much attention this paper examines the consequences of noncompliance for a tdp market given fairly general assumptions about the characteristics of the enforcement policy in place the analysis reveals that when firms are noncompliant tdp markets retain their efficiency property only under some fairly stringent conditions the effect of noncompliance on the equilibrium permit price raises some important questions about the ability of a tdp market to achieve and remain in equilibrium when firms are noncompliant

using a policy mix for pollution control a review of economic literature this article provides a review of economic studies analyzing the use of multiple policies a socalled policy mix to cope with single pollution problems to guide and structure the review an analytical framework is developed and applied the framework integrates transaction costs into the analysis of pollution problems and policies to overcome them moreover it understands a pollution externality not only as a market failure but more generally as the failure of private governance structures based on this insight two rationales for using a policy mix are identified first a policy mix may help to correct for multiple reinforcing failures of private governance structures such as pollution externalities and technological spillovers second a policy mix can be employed if the implementation of single first best policies brings about high transaction costs e g when marginal pollution damages are heterogeneous or polluters are unlikely to comply with the policy for each rationale the relevant literature is presented based on the review avenues for future research are identified

ex day behavior tax or short term trading effects this study examines the behavior of share prices around the ex dividend dates before and after the introduction of the 1988 income and corporation taxes act that reduced substantially the tax differential between dividends and capital gains in the united kingdom we find that in the pre 1988 period when the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains is high ex day returns are positive and significant in contrast in the post 1988 period ex day returns are in most cases negative and insignificant further analysis reveals that while ex day returns are significantly related to dividend yield and to the length of the settlement period they are not affected by the commonly used measures of transaction costs such as the bid ask spread and trading volume or by the day of week month of the year type of dividend distribution or number of days to the actual receipt of the cash dividend we conclude that taxation affects significantly ex day share prices in the previous studies have documented that the risk adjusted abnormal returns on the ex dividend dates are positive and significantly related to the dividend yield the interpretation of these findings is however controversial the question relates to what category of investors sets ex day prices elton and

policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities abstract with the development of modern information technologies relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers consumers or travelers road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agents our contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time we determine the second best tax rates the pattern of monitoring technology adoption and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time simulations show the welfare gains compared to alternative policies

return autocorrelation and institutional investors abstract we propose and test the hypothesis that trading by institutional investors contributes to serial correlation in daily returns our results demonstrate that nyse particles and individual security daily return autocorrelationsare an increasing function of the level of institutional ownership moreover the results are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional trading reflects information and increases the speed of price adjustment the relation between autocorrelation and institutional holdings does not however apparent to be driven by market frictions or rational time varying required rates of return we conclude that institutional investors correlated trading patterns contribute to axial correlation in daily returns

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

converting technology to mitigate environmental damage there are many situations where policy makers would like to induce firms to make a major discrete conversion in production technology to help the environment this paper examines how heterogeneity in the operating condition of firms plant and equipment which cannot be observed by policy makers can affect the choice between incentives to encourage conversion to a cleaner technology by relating different conditions of firms plant and equipment to production costs extent of environmental damage and cost of conversion to a cleaner technology we show when a perfectly discriminating incentive to encourage conversion is not feasible in addition we show that firms with plant and equipment in better condition will convert their technology to mitigate their environmental damage and firms with plant and equipment in poorer condition will not this and a series of additional results lead to conditions under which an administratively simple uniform lump sum incentive to switch to cleaner technology is preferable to one based on output these results and conditions extend to cases where there are network externalities in conversion and where there is strategic timing in firms choice of when to convert

optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information abstract a market model of environmental regulation with interdependent production and pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous firms is developed firms have private information about costs which have a quadratic form firms pursue bayes nash strategies in communication with the regulator the full information optimum cannot be attained unless gains from trade in the product market net of external damages exceed the information rents earned by firms aggregate output and externality levels are lower at the regulated equilibrium than at the full information social optimum

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

portfolio rebalancing and the effective taxation of dividends and capital gains following the tax reform act of 1986 abstract the tax reform act tra of 1986 among other things equalized the nominal taxation of dividend and capital gains income the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that ordinary investors rebalanced their portfolio holdings in response to the new taxes such rebalancing appears to have concentrated on liquid stocks indicating that transaction costs are an important consideration for ordinary investors involved in restructuring their portfolio holdings the tax clientele relationships that existed prior to the new act were distorted temporarily but have reappeared by 1988 interestingly investors post reform effective tax rates still give a preference to capital gains as they did prior to the tax reform

noisy observation in adverse selection models we consider a principal agent contracting problem under incomplete information where some of the agent s actions are imperfectly observable contracts take the form of reward schedules based on the noisy observation of the agent s action we first review situations where the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence of noise then we focus on the use of linear reward schedules which allow universal implementation i e implementation of a given mechanism for any unbiased noise of observation and on quadratic reward schedules which only require the knowledge of the variance of the noise we exhibit sufficient conditions under which linear reward schedules implement a given mechanism finally we characterize necessary conditions for a mechanism to be implementable under noisy observation by a linear schedule and by quadratic schedules we give the geometric intuition behind all results

guilty until proven innocent regulation with costly and limited enforcement abstract we consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring fines or subsidies for enforcing compliance are also limited the optimal regulations resemble a deposit refund system the firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report if the firm is monitored it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide the enforcement constraints and the firm s rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance the monitoring probability or the initial tax

the behavior of stock prices around institutional trades all trades executed by 37 large investment management firms from july 1986 to december 1988 are used to study the price impact and execution cost of the entire sequence package of trades that we interpret as an order we find that market impact and trading cost are related to firm capitalization relative package size and most importantly to the identity of the management firm behind the trade money managers with high demands for immediacy tend to be associated with larger market impact financial economists have long studied the equity trading process and its impact on stock prices much prior empirical research isolates individual trades and analyzes the behavior of the stock price around each trade see for example kraus and stoll 1972a holthausen leftwich and mayers 1987 1990 keim and madhavan 1991 petersen and umlauf 1991 hausman lo and mackinlay 1992 and chan and lakonishok 1993 evaluating the behavior of stock prices around trades provides a means of discriminating among various hypotheses as to the elasticity of the demand for stocks yields an estimate of the cost of executing trades and a measure of the liquidity of a market and permits tests of different models of the determination of quotes and transaction prices for many institutional investors however even a moderately sized position in a stock may represent a large fraction of the stock s trading volume accordingly an investment manager s order is often broken up into several trades it is often misleading therefore to consider an individual trade as the basic unit of analysis in the study of trading activity and its effects on prices this paper uses the record of trades executed by 37 large investment manage

the choice between emission taxes and output taxes under imperfect monitoring we consider a regulator s choice between environmentally motivated emissions taxes and output taxes we investigate how the optimal instrument depends on the monitoring cost function the firm s technology and on social preferences regarding output and environmental quality pure emissions taxes are usually not optimal with monitoring costs pure output taxes are optimal under sufficiently high monitoring costs sufficiently limited options for emission reduction by means other than output reduction and sufficiently high substitutability of the output finally conditions for the optimality of mixed taxes are given

verifiable and non verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist abstract optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum existing non bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function while bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution we introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information our p rice based s ubsidy ps mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period the regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand cost or damage functions of the firm all of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost either immediately or asymptotically

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

trading cost the critical link between investment information and results 1983 trading cost the critical link between investment information and results financial analysts journal vol 39 no 3 pp 39 44

institutional investors and stock market volatility statement of responsibility on t p reads xavier gabaix parameswaran gopikrishnan vasiliki plerou h eugene stanley

enforcement costs and regulatory reform the agency and firm response influenced by models of optimal law enforcement several authors have recently revised the work on efficient levels of regulatory control to accommodate the realities of underenforcement and imperfect compliance however most of these efforts have centered on either the enforcement agency or the firm and have largely ignored the decentralized nature of the enforcement process this paper extends these results by modelling both the firm and the local agency and by incorporating detection uncertainty and concealment activity each model is then evaluated with respect to the alternative regulatory regimes of direct controls and emission taxes

the structure of the investment management industry revisiting the new paradigm will a new paradigm of investment management lead to concentration of the money management business will the merger trend continue will fees decline and what accounts for product proliferation in an industry that struggles to deliver on the implied promise of its products answers some that may surprise to these questions and more

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

self reporting of pollution and the firm s behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations abstract motivated by the nature of u s laws a model is developed for a firm that maximizes expected profit and faces imperfectly enforceable pollution standards with imperfectly enforceable reporting requirements some previous models of imperfectly enforceable standards and taxes are special cases of this general mode when the fine for violating the pollution standard is linear in excess pollution the form will equate the marginal cost of control to the marginal fine rate and thus actual pollution will be insensitive to enforcement parameters related to under reporting the more complex comparative statics that exist when the fine is non linear are analyzed and comparisons with other models are made

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

tax induced trading around ex dividend days abstract this paper investigates trading volume around ex dividend days for taxable distributions cash dividends it is found that trading volume increases significantly around the ex dividend day this increase is more pronounced for high yield actively traded stocks and after brokerage commissions became negotiable the results are consistent with the hypothesis that short term traders have an impact on ex day price behavior at least for taxable distributions for non taxable distributions stock splits and stock dividends we find negative abnormal volume around ex day

self reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution abstract existing environmental regulations frequently require firms to self report their compliance status to regulatory agencies using a principal agent framework i derive and compare incentive compatible regulatory policies with and without self reporting i find the firm needs to be audited less often when self reporting is required but punished more often the sign and magnitude of the gains from self reporting depend on the relative size of audit and sanction costs the accuracy of the regulator s monitoring technology and the desired level of abatement effort

returns to education evidence from u k twins we use a new sample of uk female identical twins to estimate private economic returns to education we report findings in three areas first we use identical twins to control for family effects and genetic ability bias and the education reported by the other twin to control for schooling measurement error our estimates suggest a return to schooling for uk females of about 7 7 second we investigate within twin pair ability differences by examining within twin pair and between family correlations of education with observable correlates of ability including birthweight ability tests and reading scores our findings suggest lower ability bias in within twin pair regressions than pooled regressions third using data on twins smoking we show smoking reflects family background and using it as an instrument exacerbates ability bias this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a flexible assurance bonding system for improved environmental management abstract current methods of regulating activities that are known or suspected to be environmentally danaging are not working well they induce legal confrontation obfuscation and government intrusion into the inner workings of firms they tend to suppress technical and social innovation aimed at long term solutions they do not mesh well with the market signals that firms use to make decisions this paper discusses some of the underlying reasons for this problem and outlines a flexible environmental assurance bonding system designed to incorporate environmental criteria and uncertainty into the market system and to induce positive environmental technological innovation in addition to direct charges for known environmental damages an assurance bond equal to the current best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages would be levied and kept in an interest bearing escrow account the bond plus a portion of the interest would be returned if and only if the firm could prove that the suspected damages had not occured or would not occur if damages did occur the bond would be used to rehabilitate or repair the environment and to compensate injured parties by requiring the users of environmental resources to post a bond adequate to cover potential future environmental damages with the possibility for refunds the burden of proof is shifted from the public to the resource user and a strong economic incentive is provided to research the true costs of environmentally innovative activities and to develop innovative cost effective pollution control technologies

initial and continuing compliance and the trade off between monitoring and control cost abstract the trade off between firm abatement costs and regulatory monitoring costs modeled by amacher and malik 1 2 am is reinterpreted extended and critiqued in part the notion of technology is replaced with the quantity of abatement capital and a constant fine per unit is replaced with a lump sum maximum total fine analysis of first and second best regulatory situations indicate that the first best allocation involves a higher capital to labor ratio than that which would minimize the firm s costs of meeting the standard the relationship between initial and continuing compliance is analyzed the curvature of iso abatement curves is related to the extent of net cost saving possible from more capital intensive abatement and the effect of a delayed commitment to the pollution standard by the regulator is considered am s comparison of pollution taxes versus pollution standards fails to hold up under the modified assumption on fines

truth or consequences enforcing pollution standards with self reporting abstract evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalties for noncompliance are low we offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self reporting requirement and enforcement power these extensions are enough to challenge the conventional result that higher fines lead to higher compliance rates we find that under plausible conditions higher compliance rates are achieved with lower fines for noncompliance and the cost of enforcing a given level of aggregate pollution is minimized by setting the fine for noncompliance equal to zero

optimal replication of options with transactions costs and trading restrictions this paper analyzes the strategy that minimizes the initial cost of replicating a contingent claim in a market with transactions costs and trading constraints the linear programming and two stage backward recursive models developed are applicable to the replication of convex as well as nonconvex payoffs and to a portfolio of options with different maturities the paper s formulation conveniently accounts for fixed and variable transactions costs lot size constraints and position limits on trading the article shows that in the presence of trading frictions it is no longer optimal to revise one s portfolio in each period at the optimum cash flows in excess of the desired ones may be generated the optimal policy trades off the curvature of the payoff that is generated against the terminal slack

random wastes imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards abstract this paper considers a firm s choice of optimal pollution abatement strategy in an environment where pollution licences are purchased through a market and a fine is levied for pollution in excess of the licences held the pollution associated with any level of abatement is stochastic and the authority monitors pollution via a random sample of observations firms choose cost minimising values for the mean and variance of emissions and the authority selects its sample size and the number of licences issued to achieve an exogenous level of environmental quality with abatement costs and monitoring costs at a minimum level

the cost of institutional equity trades presented are an overview of the findings from the recent literature on the cost of u s equity trades for institutional investors and new evidence on trading costs from a large sample of institutional trades the findings discussed have important implications for policymakers and investors implicit trading costs are economically significant equity trading costs vary considerably and vary systematically with trade difficulty and order placement strategy and whether a trade price represents best execution depends on detailed data for the trade s entire order submission process especially information on pretrade decision variables such as the trading horizon

volume and turn of the year behavior abstract this paper studies the trading characteristics of listed companies by size and year end behavior there were no transactions on nearly 25 of the days for the smallest decile even at the turn of year which is an active trading period for small companies as a result of low levels of trading and the regulations governing exchange specialists transaction prices and quotations of small listed companies may require several days to fully reflect equilibrium price changes the data confirm the existence of a year end seasonal pattern in rates of return for small companies and suggest that there may be a seasonal pattern for large companies as well

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

institutional trades and intraday stock price behavior abstract this paper examines the price effect of institutional stock trading using a unique data set that reports the transactions large and small of 37 large institutional money management firms the direction of each trade and the identity of the management firm behind each trade are known although institutional trades are associated with some price pressure we find that the average effect is small there is also a marked asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells we relate our findings to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks the cost of executing transactions and the determinants of market impact although market capitalization and relative trade size influence the market impact of a trade the dominant influence is the identity of the money manager behind the trade

optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy abstract we study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when i the regulator does not know the firms abatement costs ii penalties for tax evasion are limited and iii monitoring of pollution is costly we show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms incentives to over estimate their abatement costs in particular depending on the firms abatement costs the optimal policy may involve over or under deterrence compared to the full information outcome we then investigate the properties of a pollution standard we show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered