who gives who receives and who wins transforming capital into political change through nongovernmental organizations how does international support for nongovernmental organizations ngos lead to political change in the developing world massive amounts of domestic government spending and international aid are now distributed through ngos instead of state bureaucracies recent scholarship suggests that this decentralization of developmental aid to ngos has unintended political effects on recipient communities but the mechanisms driving political effects are unclear in this article the authors test whether ngo type affects the results of ngo aid comparing the political impact of politicized and nonpoliticized ngos they do not find any difference between politicized and nonpoliticized ngos the results imply that to create political change ideological predispositions held by individual ngos are less important than is their ability to raise the level of social capital and civil society simply providing the infrastructure necessary to develop social capital and civil society can have a measurable political impact

time series analysis of market power evidence from g 7 manufacturing abstract this paper estimates the mark up of price over marginal cost in manufacturing for the seven major oecd countries applying hall s approach to market power measurement we have estimated the cyclical behaviour of the mark up a substantial degree of market power has been estimated in all countries examined and procyclical movements in the mark up competition seems to affect the level of mark up negatively

opposition parties and the urban poor in african democracies africa s urban poor increasingly represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization opposition parties which are pivotal for democratic consolidation have nevertheless exhibited disparate success at obtaining votes from this constituency to explain why this study focuses on the case of zambia and draws on interviews with political elites as well as a survey of informal sector workers in lusaka instead of vote buying ethnic alignments or economic voting these data show that the urban poor s voting decisions are related to the strategies used by political parties to incorporate them into the political arena opposition parties that employ populist strategies are more likely to win support from the urban poor than parties reliant on alternative modes of mobilization the advantages of a populist strategy include greater differentiation from the myriad of purely personalistic parties in africa and greater congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor including service delivery and jobs

international macroeconomic policy coordination an overview this article which serves as an introduction to the oxford review of economic policy s issue on macroeconomic policy coordination global imbalances and global growth charts the evolution of international macroeconomic policy coordination from the end of the second world war until the present day the arrangements laid out at the bretton woods conference in 1944 provide an intellectual framework with which to assess the evolving need for and feasibility of international coordination across three historical periods the fixed but adjustable exchange rate arrangements of the bretton woods system the subsequent flexible exchanges period of the non system which led into the great moderation and finally the period since the global financial crisis of 2008 increased economic integration particularly through the capital account combined with asymmetries in exchange rate regimes between china and the us have shown that reliance on the automatic adjustment mechanisms of the non system are no longer feasible so that a return to policy cooperation is necessary in order to rebalance the world economy and reduce the adverse spill over impacts that uncoordinated rebalancing would entail the article explores the nature of this coordination and provides a context for other contributions to the issue analysing positive and normative aspects of macroeconomic policy coordination from a global perspective and from the prospective of key global players including china and the european union copyright 2013 oxford university press

unemployment institutions and reform complementarities re assessing the aggregate evidence for oecd countries there is no or limited consensus on the quantitative impact of institutions on unemployment which has led some to question the case for structural reforms recent studies suggest also that institutions interact with each other and cannot be analysed in isolation in this paper we estimate a standard reduced form model to explore the institutional determinants of unemployment and assess its robustness using a large battery of robustness checks we show that although the impact of each individual policy varies across countries due to policy interactions the simple linear model can be used to draw inferences for countries with an average mix of institutions the model is then extended to encompass systemic interactions in which individual policies interact with the overall institutional framework we find relatively robust evidence of broad reform complementarities

subjective and objective measures of governmental regulations in oecd nations abstract since government regulations may have an important impact on the macroeconomic performance of market economies it is necessary to devise quantitative indicators of the regulatory regime which raises some difficult methodological issues after reviewing some of these problems we compare the results of several recent quantitative studies of regulation in oecd nations some based on an extensive review and quantification of laws and regulations others based on observational data of those familiar with these regulations despite their very different methodologies and coverage of particular types of governmental regulation the results of the three studies are significantly correlated which suggests that they all capture the same underlying reality

does commercialization undermine the benefits of decentralization for local services provision evidence from mexico s urban water and sanitation sector summary decentralization has been promoted as a means to better reflect citizen preferences and improve local services many developing countries decentralized and promoted neoliberal policies such as commercialization simultaneously leaving mayors with the responsibility of improving public services through self financing reforms this study evaluates experiences in three mexican cities to assess whether decentralization and commercialization practices have resulted in improved water and sanitation services it finds that commercialization has increased social conflict surrounding urban services provision and that local institutional constraints further undermine mayor s ability to adopt politically contentious policies the result has been stalled and uneven service improvements

public participation and poverty alleviation the experience of reform communists in india s west bengal abstract public participation is essential to making poverty alleviation programs responsive to the needs of the poor but it requires a political process that adequately represents their interests yet as long as the poor remain poor they are disadvantaged in securing equitable representation this article highlights the problems stemming from this paradox of participation it shows how implementing poverty alleviation programs through elected governing councils has simultaneously made policy more responsive to the poor while permitting the organizational interests of the ruling communist party to distort implementation the article highlights the importance of political competition among parties and nongovernment organizations for maximizing responsiveness to the poor

the creation and capture of rents wages and innovation in a panel of u k companies this paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of british firms a head count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information innovating firms are found to have higher average wages but rival innovation tends to depress own wages this appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation in other words innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability quasi rents or tobin s average q instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0 29

rent sharing and workers bargaining power an empirical cross country cross industry panel analysis this paper studies how rents are shared between capital and labour using industry level panel data for 19 oecd countries over the 1988 2007 period the first step is an explanation of the rent creation process we provide evidence of a significant impact of regulation on value added prices at the industry level relative to the value added price for the overall economy rent in the second step we dissect the value added sharing process running ols and iv estimations our results confirm the blanchard giavazzi 2003 prediction the impact of rents on the capital share depends on workers bargaining power this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

profit margins and the business cycle evidence from uk manufacturing firms this paper presents some empirical models of profitability using panel data covering 709 large u k companies ove r the 1970s and 1980s focusing specifically on the role of aggregate demand shocks in shaping firm level profitability in basic regressi ons and in quite complex econometric models the results suggest that firm level profit margins fell heavily during the deep manufacturing recession of the early 1980s and as such are consistent with model s predicting the procyclical nature of profit margins this result hol ds across different product groups producer goods consumer durables a nd nondurables though the timing of the impact of aggregate shocks appears to differ copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention industrial workers in kerala india abstract this paper argues that state intervention and class mobilization in the state of kerala india have produced two forms of social capital kerala s high level of social development and successful redistributive reforms are a direct result of mutually reinforcing interactions between a programmatic labor movement and a democratic state this synergy between state and labor has also created the institutional forms and political processes required for negotiating the class compromises through which redistribution and growth can be reconciled these dynamics are explored through a close examination of both the organized factory sector and the unorganized informal sector

rent creation and rent sharing new measures and impacts on total factor productivity this analysis proposes new measures of rent creation and rent sharing and assesses their impact on productivity on cross country industry panel data we find first that 1 anticompetitive product market regulations positively affect rent creation and 2 employment protection legislation boosts hourly wages particularly for low skill workers however we find no significant impact of this employment legislation on rent sharing as the hourly wage increases are offset by a negative impact on hours worked second using regulation indicators as instruments we find that rent creation and rent sharing both have a substantial negative impact on total factor productivity jel e22 e24 o30 l50 o43 o47 c23

making land rights accessible social movements and political legal innovation in the rural philippines abstract in recent years rule of law and legal reform has grown to be a major concern of national governments international financial institutions development agencies and donor organisations part of this concern has focused on expanding access to justice for the poor however little effort has gone into understanding the role of justice sector institutions in shaping the opportunities and limits of redistributive justice little attention has been paid to the actual workings of obstacles entrenched within the justice sector to land reform for example instead pro market scholars cite difficult legal problems as a reason to turn away from state led land reform and toward market oriented land policies yet as this paper shows a closer look at the details of dynamics around land reform in the philippines suggests that political legal problems associated with implementation of the agrarian reform law can be overcome under certain conditions it is argued that for rural poor claimants it is important

the g 20 framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth glass half empty or half full the g 20 framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth was launched by the g 20 leaders in 2009 to strengthen coordination of national economic policies as the world emerged from the 2008 9 financial crisis building on earlier attempts at international economic policy coordination the framework has made significant advances in the detailed institutional procedures for policy coordination including information sharing analytical tasking and the development of structured policy discussions to address medium term issues some politically difficult challenges have been overcome using varied techniques including enabling the system of collaboration to evolve incrementally over time however further progress is needed if the framework is to deliver on the remit set by leaders copyright 2013 oxford university press

macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution it typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects to study these effects we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions monopolistic competition in the goods market which determines the size of rents and bargaining in the labor market which determines the distribution of rents product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers we show the effects of deregulation we then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation and recent macroeconomic evolutions in europe

rent sharing and collective bargaining coverage evidence from linked employer employee data using a linked employer employee data set this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage to address this issue we distinguish sector specific wage agreements firm specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm specific rents in the non union sector and under firm specific contracts industry wide wage contracts however seem to suppress firm level rent sharing while pooled ols estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi rents under centralised contracts estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coefficient of zero differenced gmm estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our profitability measure even point to a negative relationship under centralised contracts

political competition and violence in mexico hierarchical social control in local patronage structures many countries that have recently undergone transitions to democracy have experienced increases in violent crime yet sociological theories have generally failed to consider the impact of political factors on crime the author examines the relation between greater electoral competition and homicide at the subnational level in a country undergoing an uneven transition to democracy in societies characterized by the presence of patronage networks social and political changes that undermine the source of unequal exchange between actors at different levels in the social hierarchy result in a temporary loss of social control and an increase in crime the relation between electoral competition and homicide is tested using electoral results from a sample of 1 800 mexican municipalities greater electoral competition is associated with higher homicide rates across municipalities and over time even after controlling for standard correlates of violent crime consistent with the hypothesis that the increase is due to the disruption of patronage networks this association is present only in rural areas where patron client relations are more common

competition and the capital labor conflict abstract this paper analyzes the distributional effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition the focus is on the interaction between imperfect competition in product markets and bargaining in the labor market the main result is that while a uniform intensification of product market competition increases employment it may cause real wages to fall in the short run as well as in the long run this is especially likely if labor market regulations are favorable to workers therefore product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce each other politically and compensatory fiscal transfers may be needed in order to enact employment enhancing deregulation policies

capital market imperfections and countercyclical markups theory and evidence during recessions output prices seem to rise relative to wages and raw material prices one explanation is that imperfectly competitive firms compete less aggressively during recessions that is markups of price over marginal cost are countercyclical the authors present a model of countercyclical markups based on capital market imperfections during recessions liquidity constrained firms boost short run profits by raising prices to cut their investments in market share the authors provide evidence from the supermarket industry in support of this theory during regional and macroeconomic recessions more financially constrained supermarket chains raise their prices relative to less financially constrained chains copyright 1996 by american economic association

the difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship lessons from mexico author s fox jonathan a abstract electoral competition is necessary but not sufficient for the consolidation of democratic regimes not all elections are free and fair nor do they necessarily lead to actual civilian rule or respect for human rights if there is more to democracy than elections then there is more to democratization than the transition to elections but in spite of the rich literature on the emergence of electoral competition the dynamics of political transitions toward respect for other fundamental democratic rights is still not well understood political democracy is defined here in classic procedural terms free and fair electoral contestation for governing offices based on universal suffrage guaranteed freedoms of association and expression accountability through the rule of law and civilian control of the military although analyses of democratization typically acknowledge that these are all necessary criteria most examine only electoral competition this study however develops a framework for explaining progress toward another necessary condition for democratization respect for associational autonomy which allows citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention or punishment

democracy by undemocratic means elites political pacts and regime transition in brazil why has brazil failed to develop strong democratic institutions despite widespread opposition to authoritarianism and support for civilian rule in the 1980s this article argues that the political pacts bargained by elites that made the regime transition possible limited the extension of democracy by restoring to old regime elites many sources of their political power as the price for their support for democratization political pacts left the military with a substantial degree of formal and informal power over civilians preserved clientelism and undermined the ability of political parties to transform themselves into genuine transmission belts for nonelite interests the undemocratic character of the brazilian state as embodied by military autonomy technocratic modes of policymaking and executive dominance over the legislature moreover was reinforced by the defeat of parliamentarism by the constituent assembly in 1988

the decline of the labor income share in mexico 1990 2015 abstract the paper studies the decline of the labor income share lis in mexico during the period 1990 2015 the decline is mostly explained by reductions within the economy s major sectors including manufacturing tradables and non tradables rather than by a recomposition of value added towards sectors with low labor shares in contrast to agriculture where lis fell due to a shift of labor force from self employment to wage employment in other major areas of the economy the fall in lis is explained by reductions within the wage employment sector econometric estimations indicate that parallel declines in the wage share and relative productivity of non tradables and in the us manufacturing labor share all played a large role in the reduction of the manufacturing wage share in mexico more generally the analysis suggests that the lagging productivity of the economy s informal non tradable sector itself a reflection of the country s low aggregate rate of economic growth is a crucial factor in the fall of lis in the formal sectors the paper concludes by discussing possible explanations for the paradox of the slow rate of economic growth in mexico despite the rise in the profit share

shadow prices of social capital in rural india a nonparametric approach this article studies the role of social capital on cotton production efficiency and productivity for a sample of small farms in maharashtra india using data envelopment analysis input shadow prices are computed as an indicator of the importance of social capital relative to other inputs results suggest social capital to be the input with the highest contribution to production efficiency after land the luenberger indicator is used to assess the productivity improvement associated to an investment in social capital which is found to be on the order of 12 undertaking collective production activities is found to play an important role in improving productivity this is especially relevant to agricultural households facing important economic and institutional restrictions that make it difficult to increase conventional expensive inputs

hands off my regime governments restrictions on foreign aid to non governmental organizations in poor and middle income countries many resource strapped developing country governments seek international aid but when that assistance is channeled through domestic civil society it can threaten their political control as a result in the last two decades 39 of the world s 153 low and middle income countries have adopted laws restricting the inflow of foreign aid to domestically operating nongovernmental organizations ngos governments recognize that such laws harm their international reputations for supporting democracy and may invite donor punishment in terms of aid reductions yet they perceive foreign aid to ngos as supporting political opponents and threatening their grip on power in the aftermath of competitive electoral victories governments often take new legal steps to limit these groups funding we test this argument on an original dataset of laws detailing the regulation of foreign aid inflows to domestically operating ngos in 153 low and middle income countries for the period 1993 2012 using an event history approach we find that foreign aid flows are associated with an increased risk of restrictive law adoption a log unit increase in foreign aid raises the probability of adoption by 6 7 this risk is exacerbated after the holding of competitive elections the interaction of foreign aid and competitive elections increases the probability of adoption by 11

endogenous scope of firm union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons abstract there is strong evidence that employees motivation and incentives in the workplace are affected by vertical pay comparisons in a stylized cournot duopoly model with firm specific unions that institutionalize workers vertical fairness concerns we show that universal wage employment w e bargaining may arise as the equilibrium scope of bargaining institution we thus propose that intra firm vertical fairness concerns may resolve the mismatch between recent findings in the empirical literature on labor market institutions and the predictions of traditional models that universal w e bargaining will never arise in equilibrium the scope of bargaining puzzle we derive a number of testable hypotheses that address the recent shift towards more decentralized bargaining institutions the decline in unions bargaining power and the prevalence of w e bargaining

political capital mexican financial policy under salinas market reform is advocated in developing countries to improve economic efficiency and prevent privileged groups from obtaining rents from the policy making process yet this prescription fails to address the complex political process that governments are likely to confront when moving toward the market this study shows how political considerations during president salinas s administration distorted economic reform in mexico during the 1990s mexican finance policy contradicted the government s declared neoliberal principles while the banks were reprivatized and deregulated they were also given a high degree of protection from competition enabling the new owners to charge excessive interest rates in addition the government artificially inflated the value of the currency through exchange rate intervention these contradictory policies are best understood as a coherent political response to the electoral vulnerability of the ruling party pri at the end of the 1980s when viable political opposition threatened the pri s ability to maintain power it responded by using financial policies to distribute economic benefits to social groups particularly business the middle class and the poor whose support was critical for electoral victory

beyond the machine clientelist brokers and interest organizations in latin america organizational membership is one of the strongest yet overlooked predictors of vote buying across latin america we argue that this relationship is driven by the fact that politicians outsource some of their vote buying efforts to interest associations in contrast to the existing literature that focuses on party brokers who are loyal to a single political machine we introduce the concepts of organizational brokers who represent interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles and hybrid brokers who split their loyalties between an interest association and a single political party we illustrate the operation of these alternative broker types through case studies of street vending organizations in an uninstitutionalized party system colombia and peasant organizations in an institutionalized party system mexico attention to the role of brokers and the organizations that they represent has implications for political accountability collective action and the

from local strongman to facilitator institutional incentives for participatory municipal governance in latin america efforts to engage citizens in democratic forms of governance in developing societies are complicated by deeply rooted socioeconomic and political inequalities in this article the authors analyze

government action social capital and development reviewing the evidence on synergy abstract instead of assuming a zero sum relationship between government involvement and private cooperative efforts the five preceding articles argue for the possibility of state society synergy that active government and mobilized communities can enhance each others developmental efforts this article draws on these articles to explore the forms and sources of state society synergy i argue that synergy usually combines complementarity with embeddedness and is most easily fostered in societies characterized by egalitarian social structures ard robust coherent state bureaucracies i also argue however that synergy is constructable even in the more adverse circumstances typical of third world countries

political parties and uncertainty in developing democracies this article lays out a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of political uncertainty on party development and strategies of mobilization and competition defining uncertainty as the imprecision with which political actors are able to predict future interactions the authors identify three types of political uncertainty regime uncertainty economic uncertainty and institutional uncertainty they argue that political uncertainty is particularly high among developing democracies contributing to puzzling empirical patterns of party development and competition in these contexts taking into account the role of uncertainty in the strategic decision making of party elites will help scholars better understand the differences between parties in advanced and developing democracies but it can also help scholars understand the less dramatic differences between parties even within advanced democracies the authors theoretical framework can be applied broadly since uncertainty informs the strategic

monetary and fiscal policy in the great moderation and the great recession in this paper we argue for a new approach to monetary and fiscal policy during the great moderation the inflation targeting regime worked well central banks used the interest rate to stabilize inflation and subject to inflation being controlled stabilized the level of demand fiscal policy exerted discipline over the public sector deficits thereby indirectly managing the level of public debt such fiscal housekeeping worked well because the monetary authorities were stabilizing the economy but once private sector deleveraging led to the great recession and interest rates hit their zero bound the outcome could no longer be managed by monetary policy recovery depended on the automatic stabilizers output and tax revenues have fallen public debt has been created and assets have been created which a deleveraging private sector wishes to hold but the effect has been very gradual recovery would have been faster if fiscal policy had been responsible for the restoration of full employment in an environment which tolerated the necessary rises in public debt conversely policies of austerity designed to reduce public debt have slowed the recovery growth will not be resumed until the private sector begins to invest strongly again creating the financial assets which the private sector wishes to hold thereby enabling public debt to be retired this has not yet happened because the private sector correctly does not believe that macroeconomic policy is capable of sustaining a strong recovery

supporters or challengers the effects of nongovernmental organizations on local politics in bolivia how do nongovernmental organizations ngos affect local politics in developing democracies specifically do ngos have systematic effects on the fortunes of incumbent political parties in local elections existing work predicts starkly contradictory political effects some scholars claim that ngos most likely help incumbents by providing services for which politicians can claim credit whereas others believe that ngos most likely hurt incumbents by facilitating political opposition the authors argue that both of these effects are possible depending on the size of a jurisdiction s population in smaller populations the authors hypothesize that ngos facilitate collective action and decrease the ability of an incumbent to claim credit for projects larger jurisdictions water down the effect of ngos on collective action and permit incumbents credit claiming strong support is found for hypotheses using electoral sociodemographic and ngo data for all of 314 municipalities in bolivia