a political economy model of congressional careers our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we assess reelection probabilities estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages and quantify the value of congressional seat moreover we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in congress

expectations about voter choices a comment the only essential differences in the examples analyzed above are in the assumptions that are used to derive or directly specify the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function when the central behavioral assumption from the traditional models was used the equilibrium was a median outcome a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the corresponding unidimensional traditional voting models when the central behavioral assumptions from the probabilistic voting model developed in coughlin and nitzan 1981 were used the equilibrium was at the maximum of the expected log utility function a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the model in coughlin and nitzan 1981 indeed it was only when the corresponding assumptions from ledyard 1984 were used i e the particular assumptions that ledyard used to derive the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function that the conclusions were substantially different from the conclusions derived from earlier models this reflects the important role these assumptions play in making ledyard s conclusions about candidate strategies substantially different from earlier results in the literature on spatial models of elections

electoral competition with privately informed candidates we consider a model of elections in which two office motivated candidates receive private signals about the location of the median voter s ideal point prior to taking policy positions we show that at most one pure strategy equilibrium exists and provide a sharp characterization if one exists after receiving a signal each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter s location conditional on the other candidate receiving the same signal it follows that a candidate s position conditional on his her signal is a biased estimate of the true median with candidate positions tending to the extremes of the policy space we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium essentially the pure strategy equilibrium exists if for each signal the other candidate is sufficiently likely to receive a signal in the same direction that is at least as extreme though the electoral game exhibits discontinuous payoffs for the candidates we prove that mixed strategy equilibria exist generally that equilibrium expected payoffs are continuous in the parameters of the model and that mixed strategy equilibria are upper hemicontinuous we investigate the robustness of the median voter theorem to private information pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist in models close to the downsian model but mixed strategy equilibria must and they will be close to the downsian equilibrium finally we provide bounds on the support of mixed strategy equilibria and restrictions on possible atoms of equilibrium mixed strategies

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

a model of target changes and the term structure of interest rates abstract we investigate the effects of short term rate targeting by the federal reserve on the term structure of interest rates and make contributions at two levels using a new series of interest rate targets made available by the federal reserve bank of new york we develop a family of models that highlight the implications of discrete changes in interest rate targets for the term structure of interest rates we show that spreads between short term rates and the overnight federal reserve funds rate are mainly driven by expectations of changes in the target not by the transitory dynamics of the overnight rate around the target hence the bias in tests of the expectations hypothesis that we document can be mainly attributed to the erroneous anticipation of future changes in monetary policy our modeling assumptions and newly available data make it possible to extract a series of market expectations of the next target change which are compared with a series of realized target changes

was there a peso problem in the u s term structure of interest rates 1979 1982 during the period following october 1979 through 1982 the u s federal reserve allowed interest rates to fluctuate widely in contrast to its previous policy of targeting these rates in the 1970s the policy was abandoned in 1982 in favor of an operating procedure that reduced the variation in interest rates this paper implements an estimation method to identify from the term structure of eurodollar returns the market s beliefs that the federal reserve may revert to interest rate targeting the model is not rejected and gives plausible estimates of the probability of a switch in monetary regimes copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

political motivations and electoral competition equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence we study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of nash equilibria of a classical one dimensional majority rule election game with two candidates who might be interested in power as well as in ideology but not necessarily in the same way apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two sided policy differentiation outcome the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations called one sided and probabilistic policy differentiation respectively our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power resp ideology and the uncertainty about voters preferences the theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a series of laboratory experiments as we observe convergence to the nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the individual levels in all treatments and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters abstract we analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate s policy choice voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy in equilibrium the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan policy even though his opponent s policy is preferred by all voters the departure from the downsian prediction is most pronounced when candidates have a weak policy preference and care mostly about winning the election in that case uninformed voters choose the candidate with the preferred personality even if electing this candidate implies a lower payoff on average

do direct democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation are direct democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures we conduct an experimental online vignette study with a german sample to investigate how voters acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is reached for a set of different issues we investigate how acceptance varies depending on whether the decision is the result of a direct democratic institution a party in a representative democracy or an expert committee our results show that for important issues direct democracy generates greater acceptance this finding holds particularly for those voters who do not agree with a collectively chosen outcome however if the topic is of limited importance to the voters acceptance does not differ between the mechanisms our results imply that a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy conditional on the distribution of issue importance among the electorate may be optimal with regard to acceptance of political decisions

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

were price changes during the great depression anticipated abstract this paper reassesses whether the large swings in prices during the 1930 s were anticipated we argue that uncertainty about monetary fiscal and exchange rate policies induced systematic differences between the rate of price change expected by economic agents at the time and the time series forecasts of inflation our analysis of nominal interest rates and ex post inflation strongly supports this view in fact our results suggest that the deflation of the early depression years and the inflation that followed were both largely unanticipated

productive investment and growth testing the validity of the ak model from a panel perspective in this article we analyse the relationship between productive physical investment and economic growth from a panel perspective for a sample of 61 countries spanning the period 1950 to 1992 the analysis can be thought of as two fold first we test the empirical validity of ak models following the logic by jones 1995 for that purpose we determine the degree of persistence of physical investment rates and growth by employing recently developed panel unit root tests that enable us to make more reliable inferences about the existence of stochastic trends in the series second we estimate the long run effect of physical investment on growth by using panel data techniques rather than cross section regressions overall our findings cast doubts on the rejection of the empirical validity of the ak model as suggested by jones analysis

political reputations and campaign promises we analyze conditions under which candidates reputations may affect voters beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election we develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological we analyze an equilibrium in which voters strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates we characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate s reputation jel d8

political parties and political shirking using ada roll call voting scores for the 1947 2006 period i find that senators shirk in their last term the degree of shirking is limited by political parties which constrain the politician in his last term and varies by post senate career choices the results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics

testing limits to policy reversal evidence from indian privatizations abstract we examine the effect of regime change on privatization in the 2004 indian election the pro reform bjp was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition stock prices of government controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the bjp dropped 3 5 relative to private firms government controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7 5 relative to private firms this is consistent with investor belief of a point of no return where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse further analysis suggests that layoffs combined with the privatization announcement served as a credible commitment to privatize

uninformed votes information effects in presidential elections theory recent scholarship has emphasized the potential importance of cues information shortcuts and statistical aggregation processes in allowing relatively uninformed citizens to act individually or collectively as if they were fully informed hypotheses uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed failing that individual deviations from fully informed voting cancel out in a mass electorate producing the same aggregate election outcome as if voters were fully informed methods hypothetical fully informed vote choices are imputed to individual voters using the observed relationship between political information and vote choices for voters with similar social and demographic characteristics estimated by probit analysis of data from national election study surveys conducted after the six most recent united states presidential elections results both hypotheses are clearly disconfirmed at the individual level the average deviation of actual vote probabilities from hypothetical fully informed vote probabilities was about ten percentage points in the electorate as a whole these deviations were significantly diluted by aggregation but by no means eliminated incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points better and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better than they would have if voters had in fact been fully informed

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

dormancy as a strategic response to detrimental public policy organizations in democratic societies often encounter detrimental public policies that are later reversed through rather predictable political cycles the standard organizational responses to detrimental public policies examined in the literature include exiting the market altogether attempting to change the public policy through various political strategies or passively complying with the policy however these responses might not be suitable when a detrimental policy is likely to be reversed in this paper i consider organizational dormancy which entails a temporary reduction in an organization s level of activity as a viable alternative response i propose that some organizations might be able to undergo a period of strategic inactivity in response to the onset of a detrimental public policy and maintain this inactivity until a favorable public policy returns i also propose that such dormancy is rewarded when the favorable policy returns an investigation of a panel of private commercial banks in the indian banking industry from 1981 to 2004 lends support to this proposal

the politics of persuasion when voters are rational a democratic society is considered where the voters but not the politicians are uncertain about how the economy works the parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient it turns out that the degree of polarization of the political parties is crucial if the parties are very polarized voters will not trust the parties and the policy will not reflect how the economy actually works whereas the opposite is true if the parties are less polarized

political ignorance and collective policy preferences in contrast with the expectations of many analysts i find that raw policy specific facts such as the direction of change in the crime rate or the amount of the federal budget devoted to foreign aid have a significant influence on the public s political judgments using both traditional survey methods and survey based randomized experiments i show that ignorance of policy specific information leads many americans to hold political views different from those they would hold otherwise i also show that the effect of policy specific information is not adequately captured by the measures of general political knowledge used in previous research finally i show that the effect of policy specific ignorance is greatest for americans with the highest levels of political knowledge rather than serve to dilute the influence of new information general knowledge and the cognitive capacities it reflects appears to facilitate the incorporation of new policy specific information into political judgments

the case for responsible parties electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars arguably to paraphrase it does not provide enough choice between candidates this article provides a formal account of the perceived negative effects of platform convergence we show that when parties do not know voters preferences precisely all voters ex ante prefer some platform divergence to convergence at the ex ante median after characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium of competition between responsible policy motivated parties we conclude that all voters ex ante prefer responsible parties to opportunistic purely office motivated ones when parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized that platforms diverge but not so polarized that they diverge excessively however greater polarization increases the scope for office benefits as an instrument for institutional design we calculate the socially optimal level of platform divergence and show that office benefits can be used to achieve this first best outcome if parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized

special interest groups and the allocation of public funds i propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income in this model violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government the predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry although windfalls are legally unrestricted the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to 2 30 per capita upon receipt of funds the marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0 20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income states which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less these results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature

do stationary risk premia explain it all evidence from the term structure abstract predictable variations in excess returns have often been attributed to the presence of time varying risk premia in this paper we use an insight based upon new techniques from time series analysis to test whether stationary risk premia can alone explain the behavior of excess returns to long bonds relative to rolling over short rates surprisingly we reject this hypothesis using u s t bill returns we then show that either permanent shocks to the risk premia and or rationally anticipated shifts in the interest rate process could produce anomalous results

democracy as an equilibrium observation shows that while democracy is fragile in poor countries it is impregnable in developed ones to explain this pattern i develop a model in which political parties propose redistributions of incomes observe the result of an election and decide whether to comply with the outcome or to launch a struggle for dictatorship democracy prevails in developed societies because too much is at stake in turning against it more income can be redistributed in developed than in poor countries without threatening democracy limits on redistribution arise endogenously so that constitutions are not necessary for democracy to endure a democratic culture characterizes the equilibrium

what do you expect imperfect policy credibility and tests of the expectations hypothesis abstract the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates describes a conventional view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy where bond rates reflect current and expected movements in the policy controlled rate however empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis are commonplace and lead many to question this description of policy transmission this paper argues that failure to account for imperfect policy credibility may explain empirical rejections empirical rejections may occur even when changing anticipations of future short rates are the primary source of variation in bond rates and the standard term structure transmission channel remains valid

almost efficient information transmission in elections abstract we study a model in which two parties compete by announcing their policies after receiving conditionally independent private signals about the true state of the world parties are both office and policy motivated our model can explain radically different policy positions even when parties receive identical signals and have unbiased preferences this holds in an asymmetric equilibrium in which both parties reveal their private information to the voters and the implemented policy is almost first best for all possible realizations of parties signals in this equilibrium one party adopts extreme and the other one moderate policy positions

flexibility vs protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority abstract we derive the equilibrium institutional design of representative democracy by citizens who first vote on the supermajority required for a new policy to be adopted and then delegate decision making to a legislature that selects policy given that institutional constraint a legislature that can freely tailor policy to reflect society s current preferences is good however the views of the median legislator or agenda setter may differ from the median citizen s and an unchecked legislature can implement bad policy we characterize how the primitives describing the preferences of actors and the status quo policy affect the equilibrium degree of legislative flexibility

retrospective voting and party polarization we provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization we contrast sophisticated nash versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy instead they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance as determined in equilibrium we show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective compared to nash voting moreover this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals

conditional time varying interest rate risk premium evidence from the treasury bill futures market existing studies of the term structure of interest rates often use spot treasury rates to represent default free interest rates however part of the premium in treasury rates is compensation for the risk that short sellers may default since treasury bill futures are default free they provide cleaner data to estimate the interest rate risk premium the mean excess return in defaultfree treasury bill futures is zero this suggests that the interest rate risk premium could be economically negligible we find that although the mean unconditional premium is zero futures returns contain economically and statistically significant time varying conditional interest rate risk premiums the conditional premium depends significantly positively on its own conditional variance and its conditional covariance with the equity premium the conditional premium is large in the volatile 1979 82 period but small afterwards

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance the norwegian political business cycle this is the author s final accepted and refereed manuscript to the article the final publication is available at www springerlink com

competition between specialized candidates opposing candidates for a political office often differ in their professional backgrounds and previous political experience leading to both real and perceived differences in political capabilities we analyze a formal model in which candidates with different productivities in two policy areas compete for voters by choosing how much money or effort they would allocate to each area if elected the model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median voter model although candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter moreover no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium the model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way from a welfare perspective candidates are excessively moderate almost certainly a majority of voters would prefer that the winning candidate focus more on his or her strength

nonlinear mean reversion in the term structure of interest rates abstract the expectations hypothesis implies that the yield curve provides information on the future change in the short term interest rate however transaction costs exist in the financial market which prevent investors from realizing the arbitrage opportunity when the arbitrage does not fully cover the transaction costs the purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of transaction costs on the predictability of the term structure by using the threshold vector error correction model which allows for the nonlinear adjustment to the long run equilibrium relationship a significant amount of threshold effect is found and the adjustment coefficients are regime dependent the empirical result supports the nonlinear mean reversion in the term structure of interest rates

dynamic portfolio adjustment and capital controls a euler equation approach we present a multiasset dynamic portfolio balance model that is based on the maximization of an intertemporal utility function in consumption when investors operate under uncertainty quadratic adjustment costs and capital market regulations we estimate the model s structural parameters on quarterly portfolio data of the german private sector asset demand is insensitive to return changes although the coefficients are significant adjustment costs are low but highly significant giving rise to moderate lags of adjustment still existing capital controls and adjustment costs cannot explain the currently observed home bias in the portfolio overall our results imply a strong rejection of the portfolio model

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

political business cycles and central bank independence this paper develops a dynamic model of rational partisan business cycles in which wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the election result empirical analysis of 20 oecd countries supports the theoretical implication that left wing incumbents increase output but increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it the model is extended to incorporate the effects of alternative measures of central bank independence cbi the measure of objective independence outperforms the other measures and it is found that cbi reduces politically induced business cycles

electoral accountability and responsive democracy we consider a canonical two period model of elections with adverse selection hidden preferences and moral hazard hidden actions in which neither voters nor politicians can commit to future choices we prove existence of electoral equilibria and we show that office holders mix between taking it easy and going for broke in the first period even in the presence of a finite horizon we establish that increasing office motivation leads to arbitrarily high expected policy outcomes we conclude that the mechanism of electoral accountability has the potential to achieve responsiveness of democratic politics when electoral incentives are sufficiently large

tree structured multiple regimes in interest rates this article develops a generalized tree structured gts model of the short term interest rate that accommodates regime dependent mean reversion and regime dependent volatility clustering and level effects in the conditional variance the model is constructed using the idea of multivariate tree structured thresholds and nests the popular generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and square root processes as simple special cases it allows us to estimate the optimal number of regimes endogenously from the data and to exploit possible additional information in the term structure and in other macroeconomic variables we provide empirical evidence of the strong potential of the gts model in forecasting conditional first and second moments also in comparison with alternative models of the short rate

the strength of issues using multiple measures to gauge preference stability ideological constraint and issue voting a venerable supposition of american survey research is that the vast majority of voters have incoherent and unstable preferences about political issues which in turn have little impact on vote choice we demonstrate that these findings are manifestations of measurement error associated with individual survey items first we show that averaging a large number of survey items on the same broadly defined issue area for example government involvement in the economy or moral issues eliminates a large amount of measurement error and reveals issue preferences that are well structured and stable this stability increases steadily as the number of survey items increases and can approach that of party identification second we show that once measurement error has been reduced through the use of multiple measures issue preferences have much greater explanatory power in models of presidential vote choice again approaching that of party identification

a theory of self fulfilling political expectations abstract in their pursuit of being re elected politicians might not choose high quality policies but just conform to popular wisdom the larger are the office spoils and the more precise is an incumbent s knowledge of voter opinion the more likely that she will resort to such populism my main result is that the public s trust or distrust in politicians behavior may be self fulfilling when voters assess the quality of an incumbent politician they will compare her policy choices with their own prior opinion if voters think that the incumbent was just trying to conform a failure to do so will be even more damaging for the incumbent s election chances however this only increases the incumbent s incentives to conform which indeed confirm voters skepticism loosely put a skeptic voter attitude tends to generate conformist politicians while a trusting attitude tends to generate confident ones

capital accumulation and growth a new look at the empirical evidence using annual data for 75 countries in the period 1960 2000 we present evidence of a positive relationship between investment as a share of gross domestic product gdp and the long run growth rate of gdp per worker this result is robust for our full sample and for the subsample of non oecd countries but not for the subsample of oecd countries our analysis controls for time invariant country specific heterogeneity in growth rates and for a range of time varying control variables we also address endogeneity issues and allow for heterogeneity across countries in model parameters and for cross section dependence

negative voters electoral competition with loss aversion this paper studies how voter loss aversion affects electoral competition in a downsian setting assuming that the voters reference point is the status quo we show that loss aversion has a number of effects first for some values of the status quo there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo regardless of other parameters second there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters ideal point than in the absence of loss aversion in a dynamic extension of the model we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage and we find that this increases policy rigidity finally we show that with loss aversion incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences the underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent this prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new and we test it using elections to us state legislatures the results are as predicted incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter

optimal districting with endogenous party platforms representation is one of the most important criteria by which to judge electoral systems in this paper i focus on one aspect of representative democracy the formation of electoral district boundaries it is well known that majoritarian systems give rise to highly biased seat vote curves causing representation to be less than ideal what should therefore be the optimal constituency design when the objective is to maximize voters welfare i show that when parties take account of districting while setting platforms then the district design problem reduces to a very simple rule do nothing when voters are risk neutral and when voters are risk averse choose a bias that is against the largest partisan group calibrating the model on data of the u s state legislative elections during the 1990s i show that the welfare gain due to optimal districting is very small

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

searching for good policies policymaking is hard policymakers typically have imperfect information about which policies produce which outcomes and they are left with little choice but to fumble their way through the policy space via a trial and error process this raises a question at the heart of democracy do democratic systems identify good policies to answer this question i introduce a novel model of policymaking in complex environments i show that good policies are often but not always found and i identify the possibility of policymaking getting stuck at outcomes that are arbitrarily bad notably policy stickiness occurs in the model even in the absence of institutional constraints this raises the question of how institutions and the political environment impact experimentation and learning i show how a simple political friction uncertainty over voter preferences interacts with political competition and policy uncertainty in a subtle way that surprisingly improves the quality of policymaking over time

short rate nonlinearities and regime switches abstract using non parametric estimation methods various authors have shown distinct non linearities in the drift and volatility function of the us short rate which are inconsistent with standard affine term structure models we document how a regime switching model with state dependent transition probabilities between regimes can replicate the patterns found by the non parametric studies to do so we use data from the uk and germany in addition to us data and include term spreads in some of our models we also examine the drift and volatility function of the term spread

the behavior of eurocurrency returns across different holding periods and monetary regimes recent empirical studies of the risk premium across foreign exchange and other asset markets such as equity and longer term bonds have found conflicting evidence about the latent variable model restrictions of the consumption based intertemporal capital asset pricing model while studies using data for holding periods of one month or less generally reject the model evidence using three month holding periods indicates that the model cannot be rejected when including the returns on long relative to short deposit rates this paper investigates the sources of differences in results using returns on foreign exchange and eurocurrency deposits at three different maturities

a theory of decisive leadership abstract we present a theory that rationalizes voters preferences for decisive leaders greater decisiveness entails an inclination to reach decisions more quickly conditional on fixed information although speed can be good or bad agency problems between voters and politicians create preferences among voters for leaders who perceive high costs of delay and have little uncertainty about how to weigh different aspects of the decision problem and hence who make decisions more rapidly than typical voters officials who aspire to higher office therefore signal decisiveness by accelerating decisions in elections candidates with reputations for greater decisiveness prevail despite making smaller compromises and therefore earn larger rents from office holding

electoral ambiguity and political representation we introduce a downsian model in which policy relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election the electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information but limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate s policy preferences optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate no discretion and trustee full discretion models ambiguous electoral platforms are essential for achieving beneficial representation nevertheless electoral competition does not ensure optimal representation the winning candidate s platform is generally overly ambiguous while our theory rationalizes a positive correlation between ambiguity and electoral success it shows that the relationship need not be causal

the political economy of dynamic elections accountability commitment and responsiveness we survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians we define stationary electoral equilibrium which encompasses notions used by barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 banks and sundaram 1998 and others we show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions term limits however attenuate the responsiveness finding we also touch on related applied work and we point to areas for fruitful future research including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics

is there a dead spot new evidence on fomc decisions before elections using new data that chronicle the fed s internal forecast of the output gap from 1973 to 1998 this paper tests for an electoral cycle in the decisions of the federal open market committee fomc the paper provides evidence of a dead spot in the committee s decisions before presidential elections for given values of these internal forecasts the fomc is less likely to decide to tighten monetary policy in the year preceding a presidential election than at other times

signaling character in electoral competition we study a one dimensional hotelling downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform this is unobservable to voters character is desirable and a voter s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate s character this structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters since a policy platform affects voters utilities not only directly but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate s character the model generates a number of predictions starting with a failure of the median voter theorem jel d72 d82

spatial voting in the 2004 presidential election the theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory however has not been possible with existing data using a novel survey design this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions the results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and furthermore that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in congress these ideology estimates are then used to uncover the actual relationships between ideology and vote choice for citizens of various types in the 2004 presidential election although the choices of independent voters are shown to be largely consistent with the assumptions of spatial voting theory the decision rules used by partisans differ strongly from what unbiased spatial voting would imply although partisans do converge toward the behavior of independents and hence toward the assumptions of spatial voting theory as information levels increase we see that even highly informed partisans show significant differences from what would be implied by unbiased spatial voting theory

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

do expected shifts in inflation affect estimates of the long run fisher relation recent empirical studies suggest that nominal interest rates and expected inflation do not move together one for one in the long run a finding at odds with many theoretical models this article shows that these results can be deceptive when the process followed by inflation shifts infrequently we characterize the shifts in inflation by a markov switching model based upon this model s forecasts we reexamine the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation interestingly we are unable to reject the hypothesis that in the long run nominal interest rates reflect expected inflation one for one

candidates credibility and re election incentives i study elections between citizen candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re election in each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences the elected candidate chooses the policy to implement and how much rent seeking to engage in when in office as the voter decides both which candidate to elect and subsequently whether the candidate is retained this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability i show that in the best stationary equilibrium when utility functions are concave over policy non median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter in this equilibrium there are two candidates who are elected at some history and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge this divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent seeking increasing voter welfare copyright 2013 oxford university press

the term structure of interest rates and regime shifts some empirical results abstract a test of the expectations theory of the term structure in the framework of a regime switching var model for a change in the short rate and the short long spread with euro us and euro swiss franc rate data points to the importance of uncertainty about the procedures of monetary policy for the rejection of the expectations theory in the us case whereas in the swiss case a time varying term premium also seems to be relevant

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

private polling in elections and voter welfare we study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions in the essentially unique equilibrium candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms policy convergence does not maximize voters welfare although candidates platforms diverge in equilibrium they do not do so as much as voters would like we find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals and thus private over public polling some noise in the polling technology raises voters welfare

learning about challengers we examine a political agency problem in repeated elections where an incumbent runs against a challenger from the opposing party whose policy preferences are unknown by voters we first ask do voters benefit from attracting a pool of challengers with more moderate ideologies when voters and politicians are patient moderating the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians those close to the median voter reduces voter welfare by reducing an extreme incumbent s incentives to compromise we then ask do voters benefit from informative signals about a challenger s true ideology we prove that giving voters informative but sufficiently noisy signals always harm voters because they make it harder for incumbents to secure re election

flip flopping from primaries to general elections abstract i consider a model in which candidates must win a primary election to compete in the general election candidates may choose different policies in the primary and the general election but doing so results in accusations of flip flopping i show that candidates adopt extreme policies in the primaries but then try to move closer to the center for the general election even though primary voters are forward looking and anticipate this policy moderation the extent to which candidates move closer to the center is constrained by flip flopping costs and candidates choose divergent policies in the general election i obtain comparative statics results on candidate policy choices in terms of voter preferences