cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

the structure of canadian inter industry r d spillovers and the rates of return to r d this paper estimates the effects of interindustry r d spillovers on the production cost of nine major canadian industries production costs in all nine are affected by spillovers and six industries are influenced by at least two different source industries rates of return to r d capital for each industry are also estimated private rates of return on r d are at least two and a half times those on physical capital rates of return on r d inclusive of spillovers are also computed for industries that are major sources of spillover the spillover inclusive returns are at least twice the private returns copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

the determinants of growth the growth theories of the 1950s and 1960s emphasized capital accumulation and technical progress as explanations of growth more recently theoretical attention has focused on the understanding of progress in terms of learning human capital in the tradition of k arrow and investment in research following h uzawa these newer developments have made some but only limited progress the experience of developing countries suggests that the agenda should be broadened to include the efficiency of factor use infrastructure broadly interpreted and sectoral allocation these aspects together with the kaldorian concern for dynamic increasing returns provide substantial promise for future research copyright 1991 by royal economic society

government r d subsidies as a signal for private investors abstract government subsidies for r d are intended to promote projects with high returns to society but too little private returns to be beneficial for private investors this may be caused by spillovers or a low appropriability rate apart from the direct funding of these projects government grants may serve as a signal for good investments for private investors we use a simple signaling model with different types of r d projects to capture this phenomenon the agency has a preference for basic research projects as they promise high expected social returns while banks prefer applied research projects with high private returns in a setup where the subsidy can only be used to distinguish between basic and applied research projects government agency s signal is not very helpful for banks however if the subsidy is accompanied by a quality signal it can lead to increased or better selected private investments

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

treble damage awards in private lawsuits for price fixing the traditional model for assessing the effects of treble damage pena lties on price fixing is reexamined and shown to yield surprising res ults unless the probability of detection is extremely sensitive to the price charged increasing the damage multiple will affect neither market efficiency nor expected distribution and will raise the mark et price copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

innovation policy in an open economy a normative framework for strategic and tactical issues abstract in this paper we present a normative analysis of innovation policy grounded in traditional economic principles which responds to the schumpeterian critique of previous efforts in the neoclassical vein focusing directly on specific policy issues we pursue our analysis in two main directions investigating the role of government in developing an infrastructure for innovation and the optimal design of support schemes for r d projects the analysis suggests that while the structural and developmental issues stressed by the schumpeterian school are of fundamental importance identification of disparities between social and private gains the market failure approach provides an invaluable tool for understanding and formulating innovation policy focusing our attention on such factors as economics of scale the incidence of externalities and the supranormal profits offered by imperfectly competitive markets it provides a rational and realistic basis for anticipating where and how government intervention on behalf of industrial innovation is likely to be most effective we view our contribution as a step towards bridging the gap between the neoclassical mainstream of economic analysis and the practice of innovation policy

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

complementarities of innovation activities an empirical analysis of the german manufacturing sector abstract innovation strategies in manufacturing often involve internal rd it is based on data from the german part of the community innovation survey cis 3 the results provide evidence for significant complementarities between internal r d and r d cooperation but cast doubt on the complementarity of internal and contracted r d since a productivity effect on firms patenting probability or sales with new products cannot be found

inter industry r d spillovers what difference do they make the analytical framework of d aspremont and jacquemin the american economic review 1988 78 1133 1137 is extended to a two industry two firm perindustry model allowing for r d spillovers to occur within industries as well as between industries in the first part of the paper we analyze the impact of intra and inter industry r d spillovers on the level of strategic r d investments output profits and total welfare when firms compete in both the r d and output stage in the second part we compare the equilibrium outcomes that result from r d cooperation which includes both intra and inter industry r d agreements inter industry r d spillovers have a very important effect on a firm s incentives to invest in r d both directly and indirectly because of their influence on the likely impact of intra industry r d spillovers also r d agreements that cut across industries may be more socially beneficial than cooperatives whose membership comes from a single industry

globalization and specialization abstract the popular dixit stiglitz ethier framework proposes that globalization increases the menu of intermediate goods available to downstream firms and that gains from specialization raise welfare unambiguously this study shows that both results depend critically on the assumption that demand elasticities are invariable the more general framework presented here provides two main insights first whether specialization rises or falls depends ultimately on the shape of the cost function and second globalization can actually reduce welfare in the case when specialization falls

an economic perspective on experience curves and dynamic economies in renewable energy technologies this paper analyzes dynamic economies in renewable energy technologies the paper has two contributions the first is to test the robustness of experience in solar photovoltaic solar thermal and wind energy to the addition of an explicit time trend which has been done in experience studies for other industries but not for renewable energy technologies estimation is carried out on the assumption that cumulative capacity industry production average firm production and electricity generation affect experience and thus the fall in price the second contribution is to test the impact of r d on price reduction in general cumulative experience is found to be highly statistically significant when estimated alone and highly statistically insignificant when time is added to the model the effect of r d is small and statistically significant in solar photovoltaic technology and statistically insignificant in solar thermal and wind technologies

a structural model on the impact of prediscovery licensing and research joint ventures on innovation and product market efficiency abstract using a novel database on prediscovery licensing agreements one type of r d cooperation as well as detailed firm level and semiconductor market specific information we estimate the impact of prediscovery licensing agreements pdlas on innovation and product market efficiency our results show that pdlas reduce innovative activity in the semiconductor industry by 10 percent or 4089 patents throughout the 1989 1999 period on the contrary research joint ventures a different type of r d cooperation increase innovative activity based on a structural model we provide evidence that pdlas increase production costs and semiconductor prices by 1 percent which results in customers paying an additional 1 1 billion for semiconductors per year beyond the common concern that r d cooperations facilitate coordination activities in product markets via price fixing our study highlights that pdlas can be used as an instrument to coordinate r d activities which can reduce innovation activity and increase costs and prices

earnings quality research advances challenges and future research abstract this discussion makes several observations regarding the earnings quality research reviewed in dechow ge and schrand 2010 dgs i discuss some of the factors that led to the large growth in the earnings quality literature over the past two decades and note a few of the important contributions from this literature i also present what i view as several major challenges the literature faces as well as some avenues for future research in addition i discuss the difficulties in evaluating such a diverse body of literature and comment on dgs s major conclusions

what the seller won t tell you persuasion and disclosure in markets imagine that you are considering an investment in a new public offering of a firm s shares the firm s officers make a presentation that includes an audited financial statement an earnings forecast reviewed by its prestigious investment bankers and an impressive demonstration of its new technology or suppose that you are buying a new furnace to replace an old one that is not working well the salesman displays a chart showing that the projected total life cycle cost of one particular model including capital costs and fuel usage over the projected lifetime of the furnace is lower than that of some competing models you have considered this paper reviews the theoretical arguments about how sellers disclose information in an attempt to encourage buyers and the potential role for regulation in encouraging efficient disclosure of information how well does a system of private reporting work when should we expect all the relevant information to be reported if testing and reporting by the seller are costly will too little testing and reporting be done or too much when some information is withheld what sort of information is withheld how do rational buyers respond to such withholding how are prices and welfare affected what role is there for laws and regulations to improve the functioning of markets we address these questions by studying the theory of persuasion games games in which one or more sellers provide verifiable information to buyers to influence the actions they take

long run effects of public private research joint ventures the case of the danish innovation consortia support scheme subsidized research joint ventures rjvs between public research institutions and industry have become increasingly popular in europe and the us we study the long run effects of such a support scheme that has been maintained by the danish government since 1995 to cope with identification problems we apply nearest neighbor matching and conditional difference in difference estimation methods our main findings are that i program participation effects are instant for annual patent applications and last for three years ii employment effects materialize first after one year and iii there are no statistically significant effects on value added or labor productivity we further show that these overall results are primarily driven by firms that were patent active prior to joining the rjv and that there are no statistically significant effects for large firms the insignificant results we document for large firms coupled with the fact that these type of firms are over represented in many support programs including the one considered here leads us to suggest a rethinking of support policies that often aim at large firms

a comparison of optimal tariffs and welfare under no lobbying domestic lobbying and domestic foreign lobbying whether and what type of the lobbying induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare we show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying the domestic foreign lobbying may achieve the lowest tariff and may also realise the highest welfare for the domestic country our finding provides a theoretical explanation to the prevalent lobbying competition between asian firms and us firms in usa recently we argue that the domestic foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in the domestic country and lobbying competition may be one of the strongest forces pushing for trade liberalisation

news management and the value of firms the literature on asymmetric information has been concerned mainly with the problem of the informed party lying to the uninformed parties however in many cases the informed party will stop short of lying but will seek to gain from private information by managing the disclosure of news this article examines the pricing of a firm when there is such manipulation of news i model this situation as a variant of the persuasion game of milgrom and roberts 1986 in which i can parameterize the notion of the degree of credence placed by the market on the disclosures of the informed party an empirical hypothesis thrown up by the theory is that for otherwise identical firms a low price earnings ratio will be associated with a greater degree of positive skewness of the disclosure strategy

selective disclosures in the presence of uncertainty about information endowment abstract this paper analyzes a setting where firms could have private information from various sources and disclose a selective subset of that information investors have uncertainty about how much information firms have using a stylized model where there are two signals about a firm s future value and the firm may be privately informed of none one or all of those signals this paper establishes an equilibrium link between the cutoff value characterizing the partially informed firm s disclosure strategy and the partition of the signal space characterizing the fully informed firm s disclosure strategy the paper also discusses potential extensions of the model

market competition r d and firm profits in asymmetric oligopoly we investigate a cournot model with strategic r d investments wherein efficient low cost firms compete against less efficient high cost firms we findthat an increase in the number of high cost firms can stimulate r d by the low cost firms while it always reduces r d by the high cost firms more importantly this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition the low cost firms profits may indeed increase with the number of high cost firms an implication of this result is far reaching as it gives low cost firms an incentive to help rather than harm high cost competitors we relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure especially ford s strategy of disclosing its know how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information abstract we present a model of cost reducing r d investments where the marginal cost realization is private information of the innovating firm the main contribution is the conclusion according to which with merger anticipations the innovating firm does not have ex ante incentives to reveal its cost realization prior to the takeover interestingly we also find the expected consumer surplus to be higher for the regime characterized by incomplete information as compared to a regime based on information sharing

noncooperative versus cooperative r d with endogenous spillover rates this paper deals with a general version of a two stage model of r d and product market competition we provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative r d dispensing in particular with ex post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions we also characterize the structure of profit maximizing r d cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide r d expenditure as well as internal spillover levels we establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers and within the context of a standard specification derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover

the theory of warranty contracts abstract this paper surveys theories of the existence and design of warranty contracts insurance signalling and incentive motives are used to explain the existence of warranties the incorporation of imperfections that prevent warranties from serving their basic purposes in a first best way describes actual warranty practices

technology strategies of large enterprises in indian industry some explorations abstract a firm s technology strategy is influenced by the technology regime in which it operates the regime is broadly defined by a combination of variables capturing industrial structure nature of technical knowledge and the policy environment together these variables determine the opportunity and appropriability conditions faced by a firm in a well defined industry given these broad relationships a heuristic framework is developed to analyze firms technology strategies across industry groups four firm level strategies are identified 1 a undertake research and development 2 b purchase disembodied foreign technology 3 c combine a and b 4 d remain technologically inactive i e do neither a nor b the framework is translated into a multinomial logit model to explore empirically the determinants of technology choices made by indian firms in two different industries non electrical machinery and chemicals the impact of the following determinants is explored firm size capital and material imports foreign equity participation and foreign domestic technology spillovers

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes abstract we examine how refunding emission taxes to firms dependent on market shares should be designed while refunding is harmful under perfect competition a first best self financing tax tax refunding scheme exists if the marginal damage from pollution exceeds the marginal distortion in an imperfectly competitive output market with symmetric firms under pre investment in cleaner technology with short term abatement opportunities a first best refunding scheme exists if pollution refunding can be made dependent on both market and investment shares

the degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective r d abstract the amount of cost reduction or effective r d that results in a symmetric sequential nash equilibrium with quadratic payoffs and differentiated goods is shown to increase with spillovers in oligopolies with a few rivals and to achieve a maximum for spillovers that are not perfect in industries with many firms similar tendencies apply for consumer surplus profits and static welfare more rivals typically lead to reduced investments output and profitability while consumer surplus and welfare increase or at least do not decrease limited entry in markets with a few rivals may enhance innovative investments profitability and consumer surplus if only product differentiation and spillovers are sufficiently high and r d costs sufficiently low too many rivals will then again lead to reductions and a decrease in static welfare

consistent conjectures in monopolistic competition abstract models of monopolistic competition such as dixit and stiglitz and spence typically assume firms take market variables as parametric this conjectural variation corresponds to chamberlin s large group approximation although these models need not have a large number of firms the present note following perry shows that consistent conjectures about the size and number of rivals can provide a more satisfactory basis for this assumption

on the competitive pressure created by the diffusion of innovations abstract we consider the decision of a dominant firm to adopt a sequence of potential cost reducing innovations where the latest technology adopted diffuses to a competitive fringe at an exogenous rate with price competition on the product market the leader optimally spaces apart the adoption dates of successive innovations so the industry is characterized by schumpetarian cycles of alternating innovation and diffusion an increase in the rate of diffusion has ambiguous effects on innovative activity and up to a point hastens the pace of innovation these results may however be reversed in the case of quantity competition

firm heterogeneity imitation and the incentives for cost reducing r d effort i develop and test a model of strategic r d investments where innovating and non innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals i find that a larger proportion of non innovating rivals stimulates cost reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level r d key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of r d using the 1994 carnegie mellon survey of u s industrial r d results also suggest that r d and size are simultaneously determined with r d being proportional to size as predicted by the theoretical model

optimal disclosure decisions when there are penalties for nondisclosure we study a seller of an asset who is liable for damages if the seller fails to disclose to buyers an estimate of the asset s value he knew prior to the sale our results include as either the damages multiplier that determines the size of the damages the seller must pay buyers increases or as the probability the seller is caught withholding his estimate from buyers increases the seller discloses his estimate less often and as the precision of the seller s estimate increases he sells a larger fraction of the asset

are treble damages neutral sequential equilibrium and private antitrust enforcement a sequential equilibrium model of private antitrust enforcement is presented consumers have incomplete information about cartel costs and cannot accurately estimate a priori the damage recovery from an antitrust action consumers are able to infer cartel costs from the equilibrium pricing strategy of firms the universal divinity criterion is used to characterize the sequential equilibrium it is shown that for a sufficiently large damage multiple antitrust enforcement effectively increases social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of r d the undiscounted case abstract will r d increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time we examine this issue in the context of a dynamic alternate move duopoly model of non cooperative r d the asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market utilizing a value loss process constructed from the optimality equation of dynamic programming we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time we obtain this convergence to symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to r d through the notion that r d investment cannot be changed instantaneously by allowing research externalities complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated r d and either increasing decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival r d

cost reducing r d in oligopoly abstract this paper provides a conjectural variations model to explore competition in cost reducing r d and the nature of the inter firm externalities it is shown that 1 r d investment in a market with price competition becomes optimal if firms expect that changes in their own r d investment are followed by the rival firms 2 the optimal r d subsidies are positive in collusive oligopolies but negative in competitive oligopolies 3 joint r d ventures in oligopoly could reduce total surplus by causing underinvestment and 4 promoting price competition reduces welfare if firms are not collusive in their r d decisions

strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers this paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay offs a unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other at most is able to receive only small spillovers the leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome

r d spillovers patents and the incentives to innovate in japan and the united states national surveys of r d labs across the manufacturing sectors in the us and japan show that intraindustry r d knowledge flows and spillovers are greater in japan than in the us and the appropriability of rents due to innovation less patents in particular are observed to play a more central role in diffusing information across rivals in japan and appear to be a key reason for greater intraindustry r d spillovers there suggesting that patent policy can importantly affect information flows uses of patents differ between the two nations with strategic uses of patents particularly for negotiations being more common in japan

competition cooperation and the neighboring farmer effect abstract in this paper we propose a model that explains how cooperation can emerge spontaneously between firms in a highly competitive market environment the basic idea is that the more competitive is the market the less costly it is for firms to help each other like good neighbors cooperation takes the form of sharing technical know how which speeds up the adoption of new technologies normally developed elsewhere that spur industrial development the model comports with the development history of japan s first example of successful industrial development its cotton spinning industry whose conditions match those of firms in small open economies today

market structure and innovation a survey economics we all recite deals with allocation of limited resources towards satisfaction of unlimited wants resources are typically identified as land labor and capital plus a technology that determines their transformation into consumer goods disparity between the available goods and services and the desired gives rise to scarcity and the question of what how and for whom to produce the focus then shifts to description and evaluation of alternative resource allocation mechanisms for making the choices the pareto criterion by which an allocation of resources is deemed efficient if any reallocation improving the position of some individual worsens the position of others is a commonly employed gauge of a mechanism s performance in the absence of externalities increasing returns to scale and uncertainty a perfectly competitive market system yields a pareto optimal allocation of resources this underlies the view that individual self interest is compatible with society s interest the further conclusion that pareto optimality may not be achieved via the market system in the presence of monopoly elements provides an economic rationale for antitrust laws the objective of a resource allocation mechanism appears to be according to the analysis described above to make the best of available resources the alternative objective of relaxing constraints through expanding the resource base or developing new technology seems to be beyond its scope thus until rather recently technical advance had been regarded in the mainstream of economic theory as unmotivated by the quest for profits and substantially unaffected by resource allocation instead as j schmookler observed technology had been viewed as a parameter like the weather affecting the outcome of resource allocations but itself unaffected by them 84 1965 evidence that technological progress has significantly contributed to growth in productivity together with a substantial increase in research and development activity largely financed by government and carried out by industry see f machlup 51 1962 may have spurred reconsideration of this view once technical advance is regarded as an economic variable it is natural to in

inter firm complementarities in r d a re examination of the relative performance of joint ventures we compare duopoly outcomes between two alternative modes of research and development rd the reverse holds for high spillovers when rjvs yield higher technological improvement they also yield higher industry profit and social welfare

in search of complementary assets the determinants of alliance formation of high tech start ups abstract why do new technology based firms ntbfs cooperate starting from teece s teece d j 1986 profiting from technological innovation implications for integration collaboration licensing and public policy research policy 15 285 305 conceptual framework and taking advantage of subsequent literature on alliance formation in the resource and competence based tradition and in the social structure perspective we derive an empirical model that aims at highlighting the inducements and obstacles that these firms face in alliance formation according to firm specific characteristics and the nature of the alliance in particular a distinction is made between exploitative commercial alliances and explorative technological alliances the econometric estimates based on a large sample of italian young high tech firms that are observed from 1994 to 2003 provide strong evidence supporting two key intuitions of teece s work first the combination of specialized complementary assets appears to be a key driver of the formation of exploitative commercial alliances by ntbfs more specifically patent holding affects positively the likelihood to establish commercial alliances but this propensity is found to rapidly decrease with firm size suggesting that as long as ntbfs become larger and possess specialized commercial assets their urge for commercial alliances diminishes second following the parallelism set forth by teece between search for alliance partners and access to external financing the analysis indicates that potentially beneficial alliances may not take place because of the high transaction costs faced by smaller ntbfs in this respect our results clearly support the view that sponsor institutions as public research organizations venture and corporate venture capitalists may sensibly reduce these costs and that their role crucially depends on both the identity of the sponsor and the type of alliance

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

individual preferences organization and competition in a model of r d incentive provision abstract understanding the organization of rd 2 knowledge is not perfectly appropriable 3 scientists are responsive to both monetary and non monetary incentives and 4 firms compete on the product market we show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists and these effects interact first high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high and to strengthen incentives when competition is low second the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is u shaped with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers we also show that the performance contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research while the fixed component decreases we relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence and also discuss their implications for management and public policy

public r d policies and cost behavior of the us manufacturing industries abstract this paper estimates and evaluates the contribution of r d tax incentives and publicly financed r d investment policies in promoting the growth of output and privately funded r d investment in us manufacturing industries publicly financed r d induced cost savings but crowds out privately financed r d investment while the incremental r d tax credit and immediate deductibility provision of r d expenditures have a significant impact on privately financed r d investment the optimal mix of both instruments is an important element for sustaining a balanced growth in output and productivity in the manufacturing sector

determining firm level it investments to facilitate value chain activities should spillovers accruing to value chain members be incorporated abstract in recent years the relationship between intermediaries in a value chain has undergone significant changes in which information technology it has played a critical role of importance is the formation of alliances between channel members and the effect of it investments on these evolving relationships a critical aspect of a firm s it investment is that it not only provides gains for the investing firm but also creates positive spillovers for value chain members these spillovers are attributable to the fact that firm level it investments result in the automation and or reengineering of internal processes downstream in this paper we address the issue as to how a firm should determine its investment in an it system which is primarily designed to facilitate value chain activities under the assumptions of perfect information in terms of potential gains for value chain members from this it investment and the fact that each member may need to be guaranteed some minimum gain i e a reservation utility to adopt the it we model the it investment decision under two alternative strategies the first strategy referred to as the myopic strategy is where the firm simply makes the it investment decision by maximizing its own gains and ignoring those of the value chain under an alternative strategy referred to as the global strategy the firm decides to make the it investment decision by simultaneously maximizing not only its own gains but also the gains accruing to the entire value chain in this case the firm could make a sub optimum decision regarding the it investment from its own perspective however under the latter strategy the firm could also structure a simultaneous one time charge for each value chain member which could compensate for this sub optimum decision after modeling both these strategies we then proceed to characterize conditions under which each strategy is the preferred choice for the firm through an illustration of our framework we show that the global strategy dominates the myopic strategy in a number of situations

internal r d expenditures and external technology sourcing abstract the paper examines the two way relationship between external r d activities and internal r d expenditures on a cross section of flemish r d active companies the analysis extends the classical explanatory variables like size diversification ownership structure and technological opportunities to include the impact of various external sourcing strategies r d cooperation and to a lesser extent r d contracted out are found to have a significant positive effect on internal r d but only if the companies have absorptive capacity in the form of a full time staffed r d department at the same time firms are found to be more frequently engaged in r d cooperation the more they spend on internal r d

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

the international economics of intellectual property right protection a welfare theoretic trade policy analysis abstract this paper provides an analytical construct for examining the trade policy effects of greater intellectual property protection in technology importing countries it is shown that two types of conflict are likely to arise between net technology importers and exporters the first relates to the level of protection with importers preferring a low level and exporters a high one the second conflict hitherto unexplored relates to the manner of protection with importers likely to prefer discriminatory regimes favoring local r d creation whereas exporters would prefer nondiscriminatory protection in importing countries

schumpeterian competition in experimental markets abstract we report on a series of laboratory experiments that capture key elements of research and development r d rivalry the experimental environment has a small number of sellers who compete in terms of pricing and production decisions and in terms of cost reducing r d rewards for innovation depend on the profitability of product market competition the experiments capture a kind of dynamic schumpeterian competition there is a sharp contrast in experimental results between monopolies and four seller competitive markets aggregate r d is higher under competition than under monopoly and prices follow marginal cost reductions much more quickly under competition than under monopoly the paper examines market performance in the experiments and the sources of market performance problems

patent replacement and welfare gains abstract patents were chosen in an era when modern public finance tools were unavailable the same innovation outcomes can be achieved with higher welfare if patent elements are replaced by modern features this paper constructs two theoretical models of product innovation and simulates the welfare effects of replacing patents with an intertemporal bounty arrangement we find that replacing patents with this alternative has the potential to increase welfare in the united states through reform of pharmaceutical patents by 43 9 194 billion when measured in present value terms this is 0 3 1 3 of annual gdp based on simulations involving four selected drug sectors the potential to increase welfare would be higher if applied to the larger sector of drugs as a whole in principal patents could be replaced in other sectors as well

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

patents vs trade secrets knowledge licensing and spillover we develop a model of two stage cumulative research and development rd yet the contracting parties choose the closed sale whenever the interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high if the extent of leakage is lower more rus choose open sales generating a nonmonotonic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights and aggregate r d expenditures and the overall likelihood of development by either du jel d23 o32 o34

the origins and dynamics of taiwan s r d consortia a series of collaborative r d ventures have emerged in taiwan within a quite distinctive institutional framework unlike the case of many of the collaborative arrangements between established firms in the us europe or japan where mutual risk reduction is frequently the driving influence in the case of taiwan it is technological learning upgrading and catch up industry creation that is the object of the collaborative exercises the taiwan r d alliances were formed hesitantly in the 1980s but have flourished in the 1990s as institutional forms have been found which encourage firms to cooperate in raising their technological levels several alliances could be counted in taiwan in the late 1990s bringing together firms and public sector research institutes with the added organizational input of trade associations and catalytic financial assistance from government the article discusses the evolving organizational architecture of these r d alliances utilizing several case studies and seeks to draw comparisons between these institutional innovations in taiwan and established collaborative arrangements in the usa japan and europe