the output inflation tradeoff and central bank reform evidence from new zealand the 1989 reserve bank of new zealand act provides a natural experiment in which the effects of institutional change on economic relationships can be studied the act set price stability as the single objective of monetary policy and gave the bank great independence reforms of this nature may lead to a greater short run output inflation tradeoff by altering optimal stabilisation policy and wage indexation allowing for environments where learning about the new regime is assumed to be rapid as well as slow we find that a large rise in the new zealand tradeoff has occurre d since implementation of the act

wage indexation and discretionary monetary policy since the early 1970 s both academic researchers and policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the macroeconomic effects of wage indexation however these two groups have focused on different effects starting with jo anna gray 1976 and stanley fischer 1977a formal models emphasize the role of indexation in stabilizing or destabilizing output in contrast informal policy discussions usually focus on the allegation that indexation is inflationary e g arthur okun 1971 mario simonsen 1983 eliana cardoso and rudiger dornbusch 1987 to reduce this gap this paper presents a model of the effects of indexation on inflation and asks whether indexation raises economic welfare when these effects are taken into account until recently it was difficult to formalize the argument that indexation is inflationary because economists lacked models of the sources of inflation this paper applies the insight of robert barro and david gordon 1983a that with discretionary policy the employment gains from surprise inflation tempt the monetary authority to create positive trend inflation as stressed by fischer and lawrence summers 1989 policies that reduce the costs of inflation such as indexation cause barro gordon policymakers to choose higher inflation indeed inflation can rise so much that welfare falls despite greater protection against inflation this effect is appealing because it captures the common argument that indexation weakens policymakers will to fight inflation 1 this is not the end of the story however because wage indexation has a second effect it reduces the employment effects of surprise inflation that is unlike most policies to reduce the costs of inflation such as indexation of interest rates wage indexation steepens the phillips curve in the barrogordon model a steeper phillips curve reduces the temptation to inflate and hence reduces equilibrium inflation since indexation has one inflationary effect lower costs of inflation and one anti inflationary effect a steeper phillips curve the net effect appears ambiguous even if the net effect on inflation is determined the welfare effect may remain unclear if inflation rises the welfare loss might or might not be outweighed by the lower cost of a given amount of inflation 2 these ambiguities cannot be resolved with the barro gordon model alone because the phillips curve and the effect of inflation on welfare are ad hoc it is plausible that indexation affects these relations but the relative strengths of the effects are unclear resolving the ambiguities requires a more structural model in which the effects of indexation are derived rather than assumed this paper studies such a model specifically we use a model of staggered wagesetting based on gray 1976 fischer 1977a b and john taylor 1980 the degree of indexation is an explicit parameter and so we can derive its net effects on inflation and welfare section i of this paper presents our basic model and derives equilibrium inflation in

aggregate demand shocks central bank preferences and macroeconomic outcomes with imperfect information abstract assuming imperfect information regarding aggregate demand shocks the paper shows first the distribution of the impact of such shocks between employment and prices depends crucially on central bank preferences second optimal stabilization is achieved by a conservative central banker

the forgotten property rights evidence on land use rights in vietnam summary studies of land property rights usually focus on tenure security and transfer rights rights to determine how to use the land are regularly ignored however user rights are often limited relying on a unique vietnamese panel data set at both household and plot levels we show that crop choice restrictions are widespread and prevent crop diversification restrictions do not decrease household income but restricted households work harder and there are indications that they are supplied with higher quality inputs our findings are consistent with the view that it is possible to intervene effectively in agricultural production to promote output and food security nevertheless potential benefits of a more diversified crop pattern must be carefully considered in a period where global food markets are in turmoil

supply shocks private sector information and monetary policy is there inevitably a stabilization trade off we assume that while the central bank has an information advantage in respect of aggregate productivity shocks the private sector has superior knowledge of local disturbances it is shown that there is no policy trade off between inflation and employment stability moreover macroeconomic outcomes are independent of the weight assigned to inflation by the central bank

partial land rights and agricultural outcomes evidence from thailand to disentangle the issue concerning which dimensions of land rights among security tradability and pledgeability affect agricultural outcomes this paper exploits a unique partial land rights entitlement program in thailand that guarantees only security allows a limited access to credit and prohibits any land sale based on an instrumental variables strategy i find that the entitlement increases 1 second rice but not major rice productivity 2 land use intensity and 3 land related investment and leads to 4 better soil quality this suggests that the security dimension alone can play an important role in improving farm activities

computing economies of vertical integration economies of scope and economies of scale using partial frontier nonparametric methods abstract so far in the nonparametric literature only full frontier nonparametric methods have been applied to search for economies of scope and scale particularly the data envelopment analysis method dea however these methods present some drawbacks that might lead to biased results this paper proposes a methodology based on more robust partial frontier nonparametric methods to look for scope and scale economies through this methodology it is possible to assess the robustness of these economies and in particular to assess the influence that extreme data or outliers might have on them the influence of the imposition of convexity on the production set of firms was also investigated this methodology was applied to the water utilities that operated in portugal between 2002 and 2008 there is evidence of economies of vertical integration and economies of scale in drinking water supply utilities and in water and wastewater utilities operating mainly in the retail segment economies of scale were found in water and wastewater utilities operating exclusively in the wholesale and in some of these utilities diseconomies of scope were also found the proposed methodology also allowed us to conclude that the existence of some smaller utilities makes the minimum optimal scales go down

union wage setting and exchange rate policy the performance of an optimally managed float is compared with that of a credibly fixed exchange rate in a small open economy framework where wages are set by a monopoly union two key results emerge first a sufficient condition for the managed float to outperform a fixed rate is that the union be no less inflation averse than society second introducing an inflation target into the central bank s loss function ensures the superiority of the managed float regardless of the weight attached to inflation by the union both results reflect the sensitivity of the union mark up to the policy regime

central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy abstract a shared feature of models used to investigate the welfare enhancing potential of a central bank inflation contract is their stochastic nature central to the benefits conferred by such a contract is the presence of supply shocks in constructing a framework where wages are set strategically by a number of nonatomistic inflation averse unions this note identifies circumstances in which an inflation contract improves macroeconomic outcomes even in the absence of supply shocks

vertical economies in electric power evidence on integration and its alternatives abstract the restructuring of the electric power industry raises questions about the possible sacrifice of economies previously secured by integrating generation with downstream transmission and distribution this study utilizes a data set of u s electric utilities that differ widely in their degree of vertical integration in order to model estimate and measure such economies cost savings from vertical integration are found to be quite substantial for all but the smallest utilities and are largest for those that are nearly fully integrated the study goes on to investigate alternatives to sources of and determinants of vertical integration among other findings it appears that some holding companies achieve economies comparable to those from vertical integration

exchange rate policy wage formation and credibility abstract since the collapse of the bretton woods system some european countries have pursued discretionary exchange rate policies in order to maintain or enhance the international competitiveness of the traded goods sector these countries which typically feature centralized wage setting have also tended to experience high nominal wage increases the overall outcome may be described as a devaluation wage spiral this paper applies two models of repeated games to analyze the strategic interaction between an exchange rate setting policy maker and a wage setting trade union it is shown how a devaluation wage spiral may result from a conflict of interest over the real wage it is also shown how reputational forces may provide a way out of the devaluation wage spiral

tenure insecurity gender low cost land certification and land rental market participation in ethiopia abstract there is a renewed interest in whether land reforms can contribute to market development and poverty reduction in africa this paper assesses effects on the allocative efficiency of the land rental market of the low cost approach to land registration and certification of restricted property rights that was implemented in ethiopia in the late 1990s four rounds of a balanced household panel from 16 villages in northern ethiopia are analysed showing that land certification initially enhanced land rental market participation of potential tenant and landlord households especially those that are headed by females

factors affecting entry and intensity in informal rental land markets in southern ethiopian highlands abstract informal land transactions particularly rental land markets are emerging in rural ethiopia in response to the inadequacies of the administratively based land distribution system to meet the growing demand for land and correct imbalances in factor proportions at the farm level these informal land markets provide a vehicle to equalise factor proportions at the farm level and to improve productivity and hence households welfare among the farmers who lease out land those who live in the highland areas where land is scarce and unequal are more likely to engage in these markets increases in the size of land holdings relative to labour and livestock ownership the number of non working household members and pressure for subsistence increase the likelihood of leasing out land on the other hand increases in the number of working adults improved nutritional status and greater wealth affect negatively the supply of land into these markets the potential exists for these markets to improve factor equalisation reduce inequality in land holdings and shift the income position of participating households however success depends on whether other factor markets are functioning to thwart forced disposal of land to meet subsistence public policy has pivotal role in fostering the growth of these markets and their land transfer and factor equalisation functions by ensuring their legally enforceable status and removing legal restrictions that constrain choices of contracts and trading over greater distances in addition both long and short term policy measures are needed to reduce the extent to which poor farmers engage in distress transactions

monetary institutions monopolistic competition unionized labor markets and economic performance recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy but not both this leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness we evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework we find that i the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation and ii for plausible values of this relative aversion and more than one union social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank we also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation

the effects of land sales restrictions evidence from south india abstract the effects of land sales restrictions on credit use land investment and cultivation decisions are investigated using data from two villages in south india sales restrictions are found to have little effect on credit supply and demand or demand for land improvements some household characteristics are found to affect investment demand on plots subject to sales restrictions in one village suggesting that the transactions effect of such restrictions may be inhibiting allocative efficiency however we also find that household characteristics influence investment on titled plots and that the magnitude of impact of such characteristics is greater on titled plots these results imply that sales restrictions are not a major source of inefficiency in the villages studied and suggest that the nature of village credit and land markets and enforcement of sales restrictions are critical determinants of the impacts of such restrictions

corporatism monetary policy and macroeconomic performance a simple game theoretic analysis the effects of corporatism on inflation and output are analyzed in a model of a game between a government and a union this model allows consideration of aspects of corporatism other than centralization of wage bargaining and permits monetary policy to be endogenized corporatist attitudes on the part of the union have beneficial effects on economic performance provided the game is played noncooperatively with simultaneous moves through the nature of their impact depends critically on the government s preferences if the government leads certain forms of corporatism can be inflationary cooperative play reduces inflation but has an ambiguous effect on output copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

investment and equity effects of land regularisation the case of nicaragua we use data from nicaragua to examine the impact of award of registered and non registered title on land values and changes in land attached investment registration acquisition through purchase and agrarian reform title all are associated with significant increases in the value of plots receipt of registered title is found to increase land values by 30 and at the same time greatly increase the propensity to invest bringing such investment closer to the optimum in line with descriptive statistics indicating great demand for land right regularisation especially from the poor this suggests that titling can have a positive distributional effect at the same time the legal validity and official recognition of the titles issued appears to be of great importance

determinants of smallholder farmers participation in banana markets in central africa the role of transaction costs a bivariate probit model was employed to jointly and separately estimate banana market participation decisions of buying and selling households in rwanda and burundi using household survey data selectivity bias was corrected for estimating the transacted volumes using heckman s procedure the results showed that transaction cost related factors such as geographical location of households market information sources and travel time to the nearest urban center influence market participation non price related factors such as security of land tenure labor availability off farm income gender of the household head and years of farming experience had a significant influence on the transacted volumes output prices had a significant correlation with sales volume indicating price incentives increased supply by sellers generally the findings suggest that policies aimed at investments in rural road infrastructure market information systems collective marketing and value addition of banana products may provide a potential avenue for mitigating transaction costs and enhancing market participation and production of marketed surplus by rural households

separability test for the electricity supply industry this paper examines the vertical integration issue of the electricity industry this industry is typically vertically integrated and heavily regulated the paper investigates the potential technological efficiency loss due to the vertical disintegration using the translog production function three separability hypotheses using the allen uzawa elasticity of substitution are tested to examine the feasibility of various degrees of disintegration of the current industry structure all three separability hypotheses are rejected and the cost of disintegration is estimated further estimates indicate that the electricity industry appears to have exhausted economies of scale unlike other deregulated industries disintegration of the electricity industry will entail technological efficiency loss

the measurement of vertical economies and the efficient structure of the electric utility industry in this article the concept of multiproduct cost economies is modified to the case of production at vertically related stages to derive an explicit and general measure of economies of vertical integration the utility of this measure is then demonstrated by estimating the vertical cost structure of the electric utility industry and by carrying out the calculations necessary to determine the magnitude of vertical economies in this industry the results provide empirical evidence of the existence of significant economies of vertical integration between the generation and transmission distribution stages of electricity supply copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

property rights and natural resource management incentives do transferability and formality matter this article examines how property rights expectations affect resource management incentives it utilizes expected property rights over different timespans and of different strengths corresponding to a investments of different intensities and b farmers sense of security regarding their often de facto property rights the results suggest that property rights and their alienability in ten year time matter to intensive infrastructural investments although not to lighter investments formality of property rights is shown to be insignificant to investment incentives indicating that there is no functional difference between formal rights and customary rights at present in indigenous communities of the philippines copyright 2008 oxford university press

property rights productivity and common property resources insights from rural cambodia summary this paper uses data from the 2003 04 cambodia household socioeconomic survey to investigate the effects of property rights to land plots held with a paper documenting ownership in rural cambodia are found to have higher productivity and land values than other plots while property rights have weak effects on access to credit the paper also investigates whether the introduction of private property rights leads to decreased availability of common property resources the data offers only weak support for this hypothesis the general insight is that policies to strengthen land property rights can have important positive effects on the rural economy even in an environment of low state capacity

tenure security investment and productivity in gambian agriculture a generalized probit analysis the determinants of investment input use and productivity are investigated under customary tenure in peri urban areas of the gambia a structural model is specified to investigate the role of tenure security on farm investments and input use and thereby on yield testing of the structural form hypotheses requires simultaneous equation estimation containing both continuous and discrete endogenous variables the model is estimated as a feasible generalized least squares amemiya s generalized probit some of the positive relationships hypothesized between tenure security investment and yields are corroborated in particular tenure security is found to enhance long term investments which in turn enhance yields

the macroeconomics of social pacts in this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions the central bank and the fiscal policymaker we explicitly model unions concern for public expenditure paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions i e the so called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of european countries in the last few decades we also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the maastricht criteria and the stability and growth pact the former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes the latter is likely to backfire

measuring economies of vertical integration in network industries an application to the water sector this paper provides a framework that aims at distinguishing the technological economies of vertical integration from the vertical economies resulting from an inefficient input allocation due to upstream market imperfections to illustrate our analysis we use consistent panel data econometric methods to estimate cost functions on a sample of north american water utilities contrary to what has been found for other network industries electricity and gas for instance we show that the global and technological economies of vertical integration are not significant except for the smallest utilities

the effects of consolidation amongst japanese water utilities a hedonic cost function analysis in many parts of the world water is supplied by very small local undertakings in recent years there has been a move to consolidation of these utilities in a number of countries this paper look

tenure security resource poverty public programs and household plot level conservation investments in the highlands of northern ethiopia land degradation poses a serious problem for the livelihoods of rural producers furthermore there is rarely enough private investment taking place to commensurate the scale of the problem this article examines the role of tenure insecurity resource poverty risk and time preferences and community led land conservation on differentiated patterns of household investment in land conservation in northern ethiopia we control for biophysical household characteristics market access conditions and village level factors investments in soil bunds and stone terraces are specifically studied so as to capture the link between these various factors and the durability of conservation investments we introduce the distinction between the determinants of the decision to invest and how much to invest in conservation regression results show that publicly led conservation programs seem to significantly stimulate private investment a host of plot level variables and household perceptions of returns on conservation investments expressed in terms of perceived improvements in land quality and increased crop yields were found to be critical to the decision to invest and intensify soil conservation the evidence on the significance of households attitudes toward risk aversion suggests the important role of risk and the household s risk bearing capacity in the decision to intensify conservation measures at the same time tenure security indicators and households resource endowments resource poverty had weaker effects in increasing willingness to invest and the level of investment made the policy implications of these results point to the importance of agricultural research and extension efforts that target technologies which reduce household risk and poverty while enabling sustainable investments in conservation measures by individual households

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

centralised wage setting inflation contracts and the optimal choice of central banker the paper examines the appropriate design of central banking institutions in an economy in which the nominal wage is set by an inflation averse monopoly union as a positive mark up over its market clearing value the analysis considers both the optimal choice of central banker and the potential role for a linear inflation contract the optimal set of arrangements is a central banker who attaches less significance to inflation than does society combined with an inflation contract where the value of the contract parameter is related to the union s degree of inflationaversion following the important contribution of rogoff 1985 the appointment of a conservative central banker has been widely accepted as a potential albeit partial solution to the time inconsistency problem associated with discretionary policy making in placing a greater weight on inflation than does the government and society as a whole in the setting of monetary policy the central bank s temptation to create inflation surprises is reduced this then leads to a lower inflation rate in equilibrium than would otherwise prevail whilst in rogoff s stochastic framework this reduction in the inflationary bias has to be weighed against an increase in output variability the appropriate choice of central banker ensures a net improvement in welfare an important feature of rogoff s model is the assumption of an atomistic labour market in which nominal wages embodied in single period contracts reflect interaction between agents who hold no market power such a representation of the labour market also characterises most subsequent extensions of rogoff s analysis e g lohmann 1992 and waller 1992 however a number of recent papers in considering the time inconsistency issue have employed the assumption of unionised wage setting assuming either an allencompassing monopoly union or alternatively a number of individual unions each of which has a non negligible impact on macroeconomic variables examples include agell and ysander 1993 bleaney 1996 cubitt 1992 1995 horn and persson 1988 hutchison and walsh 1998 and skott 1997 these contributions have examined the implications of the assumed labour market imperfection from a variety of perspectives but only those of bleaney and skott directly consider its consequences for the appropriate specification of central bank objectives in what follows we explore the significance of unionised wage setting for

the organization of regulated production complementarities correlation and collusion we analyze the choice between vertical separation vs and vertical integration vi when two regulated firms produce complementary inputs with correlated costs and are protected by ex post break even constraints first in the absence of collusion the regulator prefers vi vs for negative and weak positive respectively strong positive correlation second if the firms can collude under vs and know all costs then vs is equivalent to vi however if firms collude under asymmetric information then collusion does not affect the choice between vs and vi since the regulator takes advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information

investment in soil conservation in northern ethiopia the role of land tenure security and public programs abstract a double hurdle statistical analysis of 250 farms in the tigray region of ethiopia reveals different causal factors for soil conservation adoption versus intensity of use farmers reasons for adopting soil conservation measures vary sharply between stone terraces and soil bunds long term investments in stone terraces were associated with secure land tenure labour availability proximity to the farmstead and learning opportunities via the existence of local food for work ffw projects by contrast short term investments in soil bunds were strongly linked to insecure land tenure and the absence of local food for work projects public conservation campaigns on private plots reduced adoption of both stone terraces and soil bunds whereas capacity factors largely influenced the adoption decision expected returns carried more influence for the intensity of stone terrace adoption measured as metres of terrace per hectare more stone terracing was built where fertile but erodible silty soils in higher rainfall areas offered valuable yield benefits intensity of terracing was also greater in remote villages where limited off farm employment opportunities reduced construction costs these results highlight the importance of the right kind of public interventions direct public involvement in constructing soil conservation structures on private lands appears to undermine incentives for private conservation investments when done on public lands however public conservation activities may encourage private soil conservation by example secure land tenure rights clearly reinforce private incentives to make long term investments in soil conservation

thanks but no thanks a new policy to reduce land conflict abstract land conflicts in developing countries are costly both directly and through increased land degradation an important policy goal is to create respect for borders this often involves mandatory expensive interventions we propose a new policy design which in theory promotes neighborly relations at low cost a salient feature is the option to by pass regulation through consensus the key idea combines the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction as a first low cost pass at empirical evaluation we conduct an experiment among farmers in the ethiopian highlands a region exhibiting features typical of countries where borders are often disputed

technological externalities and economies of vertical integration in the electric utility industry abstract this paper investigates economies of vertical integration of the electric utility industry focusing on the technological externality between the generation and transmission distribution stages for this purpose a shadow cost function of the symmetric generalized mcfadden form is estimated using panel data on the transmission distribution stage of nine japanese electric utility firms the results show that there exist the technological externality effects of generation facilities on the cost of the transmission distribution stage suggesting economies of vertical integration

land tenure security and investment incentives puzzling evidence from burkina faso abstract the commonsense logic associating higher land security and higher incentives to invest has been recently called into question in the case of african agriculture to be meaningful empirical tests have to be carefully designed so as to take account of the possible endogeneity of the land rights variable this is done in this paper by applying suitable econometric methods to the original data collected in burkina faso the results obtained cast doubt on the existence of a systematic influence of land tenure security on investment by reviewing the justifications for scepticism in the recent literature we are able to conclude that the traditional village order where it exists provides the basic land rights required to stimulate small scale investment

imperfect competition and the fiscal multiplier the impact of fiscal policy in an economy with a monopolistic output market but a perfectly competitive labor market is examined both in the short run with a fixed number of firms and in the long run with free entry the main innovation of the paper is the generality of the assumptions about preferences and technology which enable the authors to examine the robustness of the relationship between the degree of monopoly and the fiscal multiplier found by r startz 1989 n g mankiw 1988 and h d dixon 1987 the specific results of these papers are found to rest on two assumptions constant returns and cobb douglas preferences copyright 1996 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

the case for a populist central banker abstract we present a general equilibrium optimizing model in which we study the joint effects of centralization of wage setting and central bank conservatism on economic performance several striking conclusions emerge in relatively centralized labor markets employment and output are decreasing and inflation is intially increasing and then decreasing in the degree of central bank conservatism a radical populist central banker who cares not at all about inflation alternatively who is not conservative maximizes social welfare economic performance is not u shaped in the degree of centralization of the labor market in contrast to conventional wisdom

monetary regimes and the co ordination of wage setting abstract a recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction however in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co ordinate their wage setting the present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco ordinated wage setting thus lowering unemployment in the unco ordinated outcome it also reduces wage setters incentives to co ordinate it is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment via the strengthening of the wage setters incentives to co ordinate

land tenure and investment incentives evidence from west africa abstract the existing literature on the relationship between property rights in land and agricultural investment in africa has given results that are often confusing and contradictory i make two clarifying contributions to this literature first i pull together existing studies and investigate whether the results they find have been affected by research methods or local contexts studies with small sample sizes those that use binary investment measures and those that control for household fixed effects are less likely to find a statistically significant link between land tenure and investment self reported tenure security has been a poor predictor of investment outcomes second i test for a relationship between land tenure and agricultural investment in nine data sets from west africa while the link between tenure and investment is significant for fallow and tree planting it is less robust for labor use and other inputs such as manure or chemical fertilizer

central bank independence and monetary control ing from details these conclusions imply that inflation is lower the higher is cbi and that given independence countries that pre announce monetary policy have even lower rates of inflation furthermore there is no evidence that cbi retards growth or investment as a matter of fact for ldcs the evidence points in the opposite direction low independence is associated with lower growth and investment some economists feel that excessive independence may interfere with the potential stabilisatory function of monetary policy since fluctuations in the growth rate of the economy are found to be unrelated to cbi this does not appear to be the case iii commitment via central bank independence and

might a conservative central banker reduce employment variability abstract this note identifies circumstances under which increased inflation aversion by the central bank can contrary to the conventional wisdom reduce employment variability this result reflects three key features of the model developed a monopolistically competitive goods market strategic wage setting by non atomistic unions partial anticipation of shocks by unions

the effect of decentralized governance on timber extraction in european russia good governance is often promoted for economic growth but its impact on natural resource use in developing and transitional economies is not well understood for example many scholars promote improved governance as a means to slow resource use whereas others have found that better governance increases extractive resource activities in this paper we use within country variation in russia to test the impact of governance on timber harvesting using a reduced form fixed effects model and satellite based estimates of forest cover we find a statistically significant and non linear effect of governance on the area of timber harvested for a marginal improvement in governance timber harvesting increases but this effect decreases at high levels of governance these results are robust to alternative specifications and when instrumenting for economic growth governance could impact timber harvesting in russia through ownership risk i e tenure security through the costs of doing business i e bribes or both nonparametric regressions and qualitative evidence suggest that both factors are at play in russia this analysis provides additional evidence that improving governance may increase natural resource extraction this has important implications for policy prescriptions that suggest good governance will slow resource use in developing and transitional economies

property rights and productivity the case of joint land titling in vietnam this paper explores the effect of land titling on agricultural productivity in vietnam and the productivity effects of single versus joint titling for husband and wife using a plot fixed effects approach our results show that obtaining a land title is associated with higher yields for both individually and jointly held titles we conclude that there is no tradeoff between joint titling and productivity and so joint titles are potentially an effective way to improve women s bargaining power within the household with no associated efficiency losses

measuring the production efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts in a mixed crop livestock system in ethiopia abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that land held under varying configurations of property rights will be farmed at different levels of production efficiency production data were collected from 477 plots in a fairly productive mixed farming system in the ethiopian highlands interspatial measures of total factor productivity based on the divisia index were used to measure the relative production efficiency of three informal and less secure land contracts rented share cropped and borrowed relative to lands held under formal contract with the ethiopian government although the informally contracted lands are farmed 10 16 less efficiently the analysis indicates that farmers of such lands actually apply inputs more rather than less intensively i e more inputs per unit of land the gap in total factor productivity thus results from the inferior quality of inputs or lack of skills in applying them rather than a lack of incentive to allocate inputs to mixed crop livestock farming for this reason we find no empirical basis to support the hypothesis that land tenure is a constraint to agricultural productivity

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

central banker contracts incomplete information and monetary policy surprises in search of a selfish central banker approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problemprovides a useful framework for interpreting alternativedelegation schemes in this paper we consider theeffectiveness of central banker incentive schemes when theprincipal delegates monetary policy through contracts butremains uncertain about the central banker s responsiveness tosuch schemes we adopt a simple principal agent model andassume that the central banker s trade off between socialwelfare and the incentive scheme is private information weconsider two types of central bankers one who responds to theincentive scheme selfish and one who does not and onlycares about social welfare benevolent we demonstratethat when a benevolent central banker accepts a contractdesigned for a selfish central banker positive inflationsurprises occur and output exceeds its natural rate wefurther show that a benevolent central banker with aninflation bias has an incentive to masquerade as selfish mechanisms exist that solve that problem by achievingpreference revelation we consider a simple mechanism indominant strategies that induces the benevolent type eithernot to breach or not to accept the appointment contract inthe first place this multi period mechanism works with eitherinflation targets or the appointment of a conservativecentral banker our results suggest that more complicatedincentive schemes embedded within broader constitutionalarrangements are required in the presence of privateinformation for them to work effectively

is monetary union necessarily counterproductive abstract this paper analyses the case of a monetary union between identical countries characterised by oligopolistic competition in their labour market it suggests that the switch to a common currency may improve their macroeconomic performances depending on labour market features

state led land reform and local institutional change land titles land markets and tenure security in mexican communities summary this article focuses on the interactions between state and community mechanisms in the design and delivery of a titling program and a land market reform in rural mexico whereas the titling program did provide a greater sense of tenure security among landholders legalizing transactions has unexpectedly generated an informal land market resulting in tenure insecurity for the corresponding buyers these contrasting outcomes are not a matter of technical failure unaffordable fees or rent seeking rather they can be traced back to differentiated processes of policy delivery by the administration officials with regard to acknowledging prevailing local institutions and managing local information

discretionary monetary policy and socially efficient wage indexation it is not uncommon for policy makers especially when they are trying to reduce inflation to create incentives or restrictions that change individual decisions regarding nominal wage indexation this raises a very interesting question for economists if indexation of nominal contracts is the result of utility maximizing behavior why would policy makers try to alter private indexation decisions the usual rationale for governmental involvement in markets provided by microeconomic theory is that individual decisions may cause externalities that create a conflict between individual and social optima extending this logic to the case of indexation suggests that private indexation decisions may create an inflation externality and thus are not socially efficient blanchard 1979 and ball 1988 have investigated the social efficiency of private decisions to index to the price level they find that the equilibrium degree of wage indexation to the price level is socially inefficient if indexation to other relevant variables is costly since indexation costs do not appear to be empirically significant these models do not provide a very convincing argument for governmental involvement in the indexation process furthermore these models do not tie the degree of indexation to the trend inflation rate which seems to be the crucial element for justifying governmental intervention thus in order to pinpoint the exact nature of this externality a model is required that considers endogenous wage indexation but links indexation to the trend inflation rate devereux 1987 1989 uses such a model to examine the relationship between indexation and mean inflation by combining a gray 1976 indexation model with a barro gordon 1983 inflation model he shows that wage indexation affects the mean inflation rate but he does not address the issue of indexation efficiency in this paper we use a synthesis of ball and devereux s models to demonstrate that individual indexation decisions are in general socially inefficient however in contrast to blanchard and ball s

central bank independence centralization of wage bargaining inflation and unemployment theory and some evidence abstract this paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables on real wages unemployment and inflation in a framework in which unions are averse to inflation this aversion moderates union s wage demands as they attempt to induce the central bank to inflate at a lower rate an increase in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining a decrease in the number of unions triggers two opposite effects on real wages unemployment and inflation it reduces the substitutability between the labor of different unions and therefore the degree of effective competition between them this reduced competition effect raises real wages unemployment and inflation but the decrease in the number of unions also strengthens the moderating effect of inflationary fears on the real wage demands of each union this strategic effect lowers real wages unemployment and inflation for sufficiently inflation averse unions the interaction between those two effects produces a calmfors driffill type relation between real wages and centralization the paper analyzes the effects of central bank independence on the position and the shape of this relation as well as on inflation and unemployment the paper features two mechanisms one of which is novel through which monetary institutions have real effects the model implies that if there is a single union social welfare is maximized when the central bank attaches a zero weight to inflation but when the number of unions is larger than one this result is no longer true in general empirical evaluation of some of the theoretical implications using data from 19 developed economies is for the most part supportive of those implications

land ownership security and farm productivity evidence from thailand the article discusses the impact of land ownership security on farmers input use and output value economic theory suggests that farmers with secure legal ownership will have more incentives and better ability to invest due to a lower perceived risk and a favourable access to institutional credit this leads to higher variable inputs use and higher output per unit of land the article uses farm level data from three provinces in thailand to test the above propositions the data pertain to samples of squatters who lack secure legal ownership as contrasted with legally titled farmers the results confirm that the provision of secure ownership in ldcs can increase productivity significantly

what should central banks do what should be their macroeconomic objectives and operations before turning to the normative question of what central banks hereafter cbs should do we need to deal with the contentious issue of what cbs actually can do in the field of monetary control one might think that this should be a relatively straightforward matter of fact instead there is a yawning chasm of mutual misunderstanding which has persisted for decades between economists and those working in cbs which has bedevilled the subject virtually every monetary economist believes that the cb can control the monetary base hereafter mo and subject to errors in predicting the monetary multiplier the broader monetary aggregates as well after all mo apart from some relatively unimportant qualifications about coins from the mint represents the liabilities of the cb and the cb should be able to control its own liabilities by open market operations hence the normal assumption is that mo is controllable within a narrow margin if the central bank should fail to do so it must be because it has chosen some alternative operational guide for its open market operations e g holding interest rates constant at some level which operational rule is frequently decried as sub optimal assuming that cbs can almost perfectly control mo economists have constructed several simulated schemes of how an optimal rule for so doing might be set up mccallum i993a b provides good recent examples almost all those who have worked in a cb believe that this view is totally mistaken in particular it ignores the implications of several of the crucial institutional features of a modern commercial banking system notably the need for unchallengeable convertibility at par between currency and deposits and secondly that commercial bank reserves at the cb receive a zero or belowmarket rate of interest the first means that fluctuations in the public s demand for cash which are both strongly seasonal and somewhat unpredictable must be accommodated the second means that commercial banks will not willingly hold free reserves at the end of each day assuming for this purpose that a stated reserve ratio has to be held on each day rather than averaged over say a couple of weeks beyond that needed to meet late fluctuations in the demand for cash after the money market has closed or become thin only if interest rates fall to the very low levels of the i930s and or risks of interest rate variability or late in the day cash runs increase would commercial banks increase their desired free reserves thus given the