constrained efficiency in the neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we investigate the welfare properties of the one sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first order condition of a constrained planner s problem this condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low the factor composition of income of the consumption poor using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature we illustrate that there can be either over or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long run distribution of wealth for the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking it has much too low a steady state capital stock

public investment and social risk sharing abstract how the government uses market rates of return to discount risky public projects is intrinsic to the efficient allocation of capital and the choice of public investment policy this paper shows that social discount rates for risk can be higher than lower than or equal to private rates previous analyses which argue for one sided rules where social discount rates are always lower or equal to private rates are shown to be inappropriate in general the paper shows in a general model that the difference between the social value of a public project and its market value is determined by the social insurance value that the project has from improving risk sharing relative to the market depending on the project and degree of market imperfection this term can be positive negative or zero explaining the different possibilities for the social evaluation of risk

relative wealth concerns and financial bubbles we present a rational general equilibrium model that highlights the fact that relative wealth concerns can play a role in explaining financial bubbles we consider a finite horizon overlapping generations model in which agents care only about their consumption though the horizon is finite competition over future investment opportunities makes agents utilities dependent on the wealth of their cohort and induces relative wealth concerns agents herd into risky securities and drive down their expected return even though the bubble is likely to burst and lead to a substantial loss agents relative wealth concerns make them afraid to trade against the crowd

idiosyncratic risk and financial policy in economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient reallocations of assets support pareto superior allocations this is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete

commodity trade and international risk sharing how much do financial markets matter abstract this paper evaluates the social gains from international risk sharing in some simple general equilibrium models with output uncertainty a simulation model calibrated to selected moments of u s and japanese data estimates the incremental loss from a ban on international portfolio diversification to be on the order of 0 20 percent of output per year even the theoretical gains from asset trade may disappear under alternative sets of assumptions on preferences and technology the paper argues that the small magnitude of potential trade gains may help explain the apparently inconsistent findings of empirical studies on the degree of international capital mobility

pareto optimality and competition there is a general consensus that u s financial markets are very competitive and efficient with prices quickly reflecting the available information there is also a widespread belief that these competitive and efficient markets enable the efficient allocation of scarce capital among alternative investment opportunities this belief is not based on direct observation it is virtually impossible to obtain the data concerning the joint probability distribution of returns to all possible projects which would be required for a direct assessment of the efficiency of the resource allocations to which the market gives rise rather it is based on the well known result that perfectly competitive markets generate pareto efficient resource allocations the object of this paper is to question that conclusion to show that even with apparently competitive and efficient markets resource allocations may not be pareto efficient

fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy governments are present biased toward spending fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks we compare coordinated rules chosen jointly by a group of countries to uncoordinated rules if governments present bias is small coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates however if the bias is large coordinated rules are slacker countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates surplus limits enhance welfare and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest

trade in services and the multilateral trade negotiations the dispute between developed and developing countries over the inclusion of services in the uruguay round of trade negotiations reflects critical differences in perspective on substantive issues in particular these substantive divisions arise from the differences between services and goods in matters such as regulation and the requirement in many instances offreedom to move productive factors across national boundaries for example the right to establish that would permit the provider of services to get to the user in addition developing countries see the developed countries as seeking concessions on service trade in exchange for removal of the latter s existing and potential barriers on trade in goods rather than establishing quid pro quos within the service compact itself developing countries have possible export advantages in the service sector and have much to gain by joining actively in negotiating a services compact that permits them to exploit these advantages

capital regulation and credit fluctuations we provide a rationale for imposing counter cyclical capital ratios on banks in our simple model bankers cannot pledge the entire future revenues to investors which limits borrowing in good and bad times complete markets do not sufficiently stabilize credit fluctuations as banks allocate too much borrowing capacity to good states and too little to bad states as a consequence bank credit output capital prices or wages are excessively volatile imposing a stricter capital ratio in good states corrects the misallocation of the borrowing capacity increases expected output and can be beneficial to all agents in the economy although in our economy all agents are risk neutral counter cyclical capital ratios are an effective stabilization tool to ensure this effectiveness capital ratios have to be based on ex ante equity capital as classical capital ratios can be bypassed

south korean green growth and the jevons paradox an assessment with democratic and degrowth policy recommendations the policy instruments at the core of the notion of green growth are central to south korea s national strategy for green growth nsgg 1 green stimulus packages 2 price based or market corrective policies and 3 green research and development to bring about a technological shift that increases resource efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources this assessment of the nsgg explores the potentials and limitations of 3 in light of the jevons paradox the commonly found association between improved efficiency and increased resource use greenhouse gas ghg emissions and total energy use have increased since the implementation of the nsgg despite overall improvements in energy efficiency we argue that the jevons paradox is a fundamental limitation of the nsgg and suggest policy alternatives to the nsgg 1 increased public participation in environmental decision making and 2 economic degrowth

regulating capital flows to emerging markets an externality view abstract we show that capital flows to emerging market economies create externalities that differ by an order of magnitude depending on the state contingent payoff profile of the flows those with pro cyclical payoffs such as foreign currency debt generate substantial negative pecuniary externalities because they lead to large repayments and contractionary exchange rate depreciations during financial crises conversely capital flows with an insurance component such as fdi or equity are largely benign we construct an externality pricing kernel and use sufficient statistics and dsge model simulations to quantify the externalities that materialized during past financial crises we find stark differences depending on the payoff profile justifying taxes of up to 3 for dollar debt but close to zero for fdi these findings contrast with the existing literature which has suggested that policymakers should focus on reducing over borrowing rather than changing the composition of external liabilities

optimal bank regulation and fiscal capacity financial regulation is synchronized across countries despite the fact that countries vary widely in their ability to bail out their banking sector in the event of a nancial crisis this paper addresses the question of whether countries with dierent scal capacity should optimally have dierent ex ante minimum bank capital requirements in an environment with endogenously in complete markets and overinvestment because of moral hazard and pecuniary externalities i show that countries with larger scal capacity should have lower ex ante minimum bank capital require ments this result is the opposite of what one may expect given that countries with larger scal capacity often have stronger moral hazard i also show that in addition to a minimum bank capital requirement regulators in countries with strong moral hazard which are countries with a concen trated nancial sector and large scal capacity should impose a limit on the amount of liquidity pledged by nancial institutions in a crisis state this would entail restricting the amount of put options cds contracts sold by nancial institutions among other measures

a macroeconomic model with a financial sector this paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents we pursue four sets of results i the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes as volatility spikes agents precautionary motive increases depressing prices even further log linear approximations fail to capture these non linear effects that can cause economies to be significantly depressed for long periods of time ii endogenous risk during volatile episodes increases asset price correlations iii financial experts impose a negative externality on each other and on the labor sector by not maintaining adequate capital cushion and funding structure iv while risk sharing within the financial sector through securitization and derivatives contracts reduces many inefficiencies it can also amlify systemic risks

a reconsideration of minsky s financial instability hypothesis the worst and longest depressions have tended to occur after periods of prolonged and reasonably stable prosperity this results in part from agents rationally updating their expectations during good times and hence becoming more optimistic about future economic prospects investors then increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that would previously have been considered too risky so when a downturn does eventually occur the financial crisis and the extent of default become more severe whereas a general appreciation of this syndrome dates back to minsky 1992 jerome levy economics institute wp 74 and even beyond to irving fisher 1933 econometrica 1 337 357 we model it formally in addition endogenous default introduces a pecuniary externality since investors do not factor in the impact of their decision to take risk and default on the borrowing cost we explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare

credit wages and bankruptcy laws we analyze how bankruptcy laws affect the general equilibrium interactions between credit and wages soft laws reduce the frequency of liquidations and thus ex post inefficiencies but they worsen credit rationing ex ante this hinders firm creation and thus depresses labor demand rich agents who need few outside funds can invest even if creditor rights are weak hence they favor soft laws that exclude poorer agents from the credit market and reduce the competition for labor such laws can generate greater utilitarian welfare than under perfect contract enforcement by barring access to credit to some agents soft laws lower wages which increases the pledgeable income of richer agents and decreases the liquidation rates they must commit to when they induce strong credit rationing however soft laws are pareto dominated by tougher laws combined with subsidies to entrepreneurs

managing credit booms and busts a pigouvian taxation approach we study a dynamic model in which the interaction between debt ac cumulation and asset prices magni es credit booms and busts we nd that borrowers do not internalize these feedback eects and therefore suf fer from excessively large booms and busts in both credit ows and asset prices we show that a pigouvian tax on borrowing may induce borrowers to internalize these externalities and increase welfare we calibrate the model by reference to i the us small and medium sized enterprise sector and ii the household sector and nd the optimal tax to be countercycli cal in both cases dropping to zero in busts and rising to approximately half a percentage point of the amount of debt outstanding during booms

are the economy and the environment decoupling a comparative international study 1960 20051 ecological modernization theory posits that even though economic development harms the environment the magnitude of the harmful link decreases over the course of development in contrast the treadmill of production theory argues that the strong relationship between environmental harms and economic development will remain constant or possibly increase through time to evaluate these competing propositions interactions between economic development and time are used in cross national panel analyses of three measures of carbon dioxide emissions the results vary across the three outcomes as well as between developed and less developed countries providing mixed support for both theoretical perspectives the authors conclude by discussing how both theories could benefit from engaging contemporary research concerning changes within the transnational organization of production and the structure of international trade and how these global shifts influence environment economic development relationships

shifting foundations of agricultural policy analysis welfare economics when risk markets are incomplete the neat alignment of resources output and prices specified by the perfect competition model is far from duplicated in free markets and the equally neat alignment assumed under the constraints of a program is not experienced when programs are in effect in particular areas under empirically determined supply curves are unlikely to represent opportunity costs the basic theory is invaluable in providing a conceptual orientation for the analysis of programs but the assumptions implicit in the literal use of simple forms of it for policy conclusions are breathtakingly heroic

a model of financial market liquidity based on intermediary capital we present a model ofnancial market liquidity provided bynanciallyconstrained inter mediaries we show that market liquidity increases with the level of intermediary capital we also characterize conditions under which intermediaries play a stabilizing or destabi lizing role in markets finally we sketch a number of areas including welfare and public policy on which the model can shed light jel g01 g11 g12 g15 g18

some policy lessons from the opening of the korean insurance market this article examines the recent dispute between the united states and the republic of korea over the opening of korea s insurance market to u s companies the article assesses the interests and motivations of both countries that lay behind the formal arguments presented during the negotiation process it also analyzes whether the longrun interests of both developing and industrial countries would be well served by the approach to the opening of the market adopted in this case sharing the rent while continuing to regulate the insurance market the analysis suggests that the opening of a developing country s insurance market or the wider financial services market would serve the long run interests of both developing and industrial countries only if it were accomplished in the context of overall domestic liberalization of the finance industry opening of the market if this means only the sharing of the rents that were generated by regulation of the market is unlikely to be beneficial to developing countries this examination of the recent united states korea trade dispute over the limitations placed on the access of u s firms to the korean insurance market provides an opportunity to investigate the interests and motivations of industrial and developing countries with respect to international transactions in financial services the article also derives some policy lessons for other developing countries that may face a similar trade negotiation environment section i of the article briefly discusses the policies of the government of the republic of korea with respect to the insurance market describes the structure and size of the market and suggests some reasons for the strong interest of u s firms in entering the market section ii introduces the trade dispute and describes the issues between the two countries and their respective positions on these issues during the negotiations pursued under section 301 of the u s trade act see appendix it also investigates the motivations underlying the formal arguments during negotiations and describes the bargaining counters the author is an economist in the technical department of the asia region of the world bank this article was prepared for the world bank conference on developing countries interests and international transactions in services washington d c july 15 16 1987 the author is grateful to j michael finger and brian hindley for their valuable suggestions to jagdish bhagwati and andrej olechowski for helpful comments and to peter bocock for editorial assistance

pecuniary externalities in economies with financial frictions this article characterizes the efficiency properties of competitive economies with financial constraints in which phenomena such as fire sales and financial amplification may arise we show that financial constraints lead to two distinct types of pecuniary externalities distributive externalities that arise from incomplete insurance markets and collateral externalities that arise from price dependent financial constraints for both types of externalities we identify three sufficient statistics that determine optimal taxes on financing and investment decisions to implement constrained efficient allocations we also show that fire sales and financial amplification are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate inefficient pecuniary externalities we demonstrate how to employ our framework in a number of applications whereas collateral externalities generally lead to over borrowing the distortions from distributive externalities may easily flip sign leading to either under or over borrowing both types of externalities may lead to under or over investment

contractual externalities and systemic risk we study effort and risk taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort principals write contracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations ape and rpe respectively to make individually optimal risk return trade offs but do not take into account their impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables this results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks in contracts contractual externalities have welfare changing effects when principals put too much weight on ape or rpe due to information frictions relative to the second best if the expected productivity is high risk averse principals over incentivize their own agents triggering a rat race in effort exertion resulting in over investment in effort and excessive exposure to industry risks the opposite occurs when the expected productivity is low inducing pro cyclical investment and risk taking behaviours

financial markets and the political structure of the enterprise abstract this paper argues that competitive financial markets disfavor democratic enterprises even assuming such enterprises suffer no allocational deficiencies this conclusion follows from five assertions a the democratic enterprise requires access to credit markets b access to credit presupposes access to equity markets c the democratic firm s optimal risk level is lower than that desired by stockholders d the risk level assumed by the firm is costly to observe subject to inaccurate measurement and contractually unenforceable and e the incentives required to induce stockholder favorable risk behavior are more costly for democratic firms than for firms with stockholder accountable management

the taxation of trades in assets when the asset market is incomplete there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are pareto improving this fiscal policy is anonymous it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders and it results in ex post pareto optimal allocations as such it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions

green growth from a growing eco industry to economic sustainability abstract there are many questionable assumptions in the discussion of economic growth one of them is the idea that governments are able to achieve sustained high growth another one is the believe that the solution to pressing financial and social problems centers on higher growth it is also questionalble however to say that giving up on economic growth as a paradigm is the necessary condition to tackle the environmental crisis in actuality solving such problems is about radical growth in environmental and resource saving technologies it is also about radical de growth in products and processes that undermine long term living and production conditions this paper describes some best practice cases of green growth and the conceptual generalisations given by the oecd and other established institutions in europe and asia it traces the transformation of the concept of green growth and evaluates the strategy that accompanies it

diversification as a public good community effects in portfolio choice within a rational general equilibrium model in which agents care only about personal consumption we consider a setting in which due to borrowing constraints individuals endowed with local resources underparticipate in financial markets as a result investors compete for local resources through their portfolio choices even with complete financial markets and no aggregate risk agents may herd into risky portfolios this yields a pareto dominated outcome as agents introduce community risk unrelated to fundamentals moreover if some agents are behaviorally biased or cannot completely diversify their holdings rational agents may choose more extreme portfolios and amplify the effect

efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time inconsistent abstract we consider an exchange economy with time inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable if consumers have identical discount factors then allocations that are pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation proof in an economy with a sequence of markets competitive equilibria are pareto efficient in this sense and for generic endowments only if preferences are locally homothetic

the inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium this paper establishes that when there is not a complete set of markets but more than one commodity the stock market equilibrium will not in general be a constrained pareto optimum the economy will lack both the property of exchange and production efficiency necessary conditions which must be satisfied if the economy is to be a constrained pareto optimum for all technologies are derived if all individuals have identical homothetic indifference maps then either there must be unitary price elasticities so there is no effective risk or all individuals must have the same degree of risk aversion so there is no trade on the stock market

approximating the effective protection coefficient without reference to technological data when proposals for reform of tariff or subsidy policies are made attempts to predict the effect on incentives are frequently hampered by the need for input output technical data this article develops and illustrates the use of a methodology for approximating effective protection coefficients epcs when such data are unavailable or outdated it derives the equations which approximate the epc from statistical analysis of a cross section of existing epc studies for four agricultural commodities corn cotton rice and wheat informational requirements for computing approximations include the nominal protection coefficients on output and tradable inputs and readily available macroeconomic data these approximation equations perform well in an out of sample test

why environmental sustainability can most probably not be attained with growing production the concepts of welfare economic growth production environmentally sustainable national income environmental sustainability environmental function and asymmetric entering are defined because the confusion about these concepts hampers sound information based on these concepts the arguments are enumerated why it is plausible that environmental sustainability most probably cannot be attained with a growing production level national income ni and why broad acceptance of a lower production level meaning de growth of production will make attaining this goal much easier or at least possible some consequences of unsustainable development are provided and the alleged conflict between employment and environment is refuted the conclusion is that our planet is threatened by a wrong belief in a wrongly formulated growth

symposium on organizations and economics m t r ost production in modern economies occurs within organizations and this production is regulated only to a limited extent by prices the size of some of the largest organizations like general motors or ibm or att if managers didn t they would be replaced and firms that didn t maximize value wouldn t survive accordingly what went on inside the black box was mere detail the behavior of the firm could be described completely without knowledge of those details

stationary equilibria with incomplete markets and overlapping generations recent work on general equilibrium models with incomplete financial markets has demonstrated that when assets pay off in units of account equilibrium prices and allocations are indeterminate the equilibria in such models are also generically constrained suboptimal a central planner can typically reallocate assets in such a way as to pareto dominate the competitive equilibrium in this paper the authors consider an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets in which one asset is fiat money they show that when outside money has value in equilibrium the stationary equilibrium prices and allocations are both locally isolated and constrained optimal copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association