occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

wealth effects distribution and the theory of organization abstract we construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem because incentives vary with an agent s wealth different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances when borrowing is not costly firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently but when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth with enough inequality it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d2 d31 j41 l2

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

access to capital and agrarian production organisation there are two problems both universal that entrepreneurs in any economy must contend with firstly an agent generally has access only to a limited amount of working capital secondly workers hired by an agent are subject to moral hazard and this necessitates their supervision this paper models for an agrarian economy the constraints imposed on entrepreneurs activities by these two problems and endogenously determines the various organisational forms of production as well as the allocation of resources that will obtain with a simple model we endeavour to explain a diverse set of empirical observations pertaining to the less developed countries in terms of the general processes that determine the distribution of income among the various agents and the hierarchical relationships that develop among them agricultural production typically involves a period of several months between the time the inputs are purchased and the time the output is marketed access to working capital and hence to the credit market thus plays an important role in a farmer s production decisions the distribution of access to credit in turn tends to be an important determinant of income distribution in poor agrarian economies credit is invariably rationed according to the ability to offer collateral the amount of working capital a farmer can mobilise therefore depends on the amount of land he owns which is often a good proxy for his overall wealth and thus his ability to offer collateral further since hired hands have a propensity to shirk they need to be supervised and therefore the

property rights and the political organization of agriculture we propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined in particular because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency the model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others we test some implications of the theory using a five decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 indian states

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

insecurity of property rights and matching in the tenancy market this paper analyzes the functioning of land rental markets in the dominican republic using a new data set collected specifically to characterize the entire market we analyze the choice of the landlords and the tenants in the search for the optimal partner we show how insecure property rights leads to segmentation in the tenancy markets along socio economic group and hence severely limits access to land for the rural poor

squatters rights and urban development an economic perspective up to 35 per cent of urban dwellers in third world cities are squatters the characteristics of the squatting phenomenon are both varied and puzzling of particular interest are the observations that 1 landowners often do not collect rent from squatters for use of the land and 2 costly evictions are sometimes used without subsequent development of the land which in many cases is resettled by squatters we present an economic model of landowner squatter interaction which is consistent with these observations this model is then used to enlighten certain aspects of socially optimal land management policy for squatter areas the phenomenon of squatting in third world cities is widespread and growing recent studies have shown that up to 35 per cent of the total urban population of developing countries lives in squatter settlements the current and mostly non economic literature has mixed views regarding whether squatting is a problem or a solution to efficient urbanization attitudes concerning squatter settlements range from disgust concerning living conditions in such illegal or quasi illegal spontaneous settlements to admiration for the resourcefulness of the inhabitants as they provide themselves with at least some shelter using the minimal inputs available the literature has consequently not provided a useful conceptual framework to guide government policy in this paper we develop a formal economic model to understand the various forms of squatting in third world cities we then use the model to address some vexing policy questions do private landowners evict squatters too frequently or too infrequently should any or all squatters be evicted should they be provided with basic infrastructure services should they be given unambiguous property rights to the land they occupy applying the coase theorem to the squatting problem we might conclude that the observed rate of evictions was just right evictions occur only if the value of land use to squatters is less than the sum of the alternative development value to the landowner plus the cost of evictions this economic logic follows since squatters would outbid any competing use of the land if indeed they valued it more thus any policy that gave more property rights to squatters would be a pure transfer from landowners to squatters social welfare would be unaffected however transaction and bargaining costs associated with the transfer of ownership of land to squatters which are likely to be important in the squatting problem can invalidate this simple intuition 2 landowners incur costs when they try to enforce property rights either by collecting rent or evicting collect ing rent formalizes the relationship between renter and landowner the land owner would then have to incur the costs of providing basic services water

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

peasant household behaviour with missing markets some paradoxes explained a model of peasant household behavior under varying degrees of household specific food and labor market failures is constructed to show that these structural features can explain several well known patterns of peasant response which have often been attributed to peculiar motives presumed specific to peasants the model explains sluggish response to cash crops prices and high instability in perceived food and labor scarcities the key role of manufactured consumer goods prices in stimulating peasants effort in cash crops production the effectiveness of taxation as opposed to incentives in stimulating cash crops production and the key role of technological change in food production to enhance cash crop production results are obtained analytically in the case of one market failure and by numerical simulation with more than one

untitled a study of formal and informal property rights in urban ecuador we explore the substitutability of formal and informal property rights using new survey data from ecuador where households have both formal and informal claims to urban residential property we develop a model of property transactions that distinguishes between transferable and non transferable claims and show how this distinction affects the interpretation of hedonic price regressions the unconditional effect of title is to raise properties value by 23 5 however we also find that informal property rights can substitute effectively for formal property rights and suggest that titling programmes should be targeted at young disorganised communities if they are to benefit the recipients

land reform income redistribution and agricultural production in korea jeon yoong deok kim young yong january 2000 land reform income redistribution and agricultural production in korea articles chicago u s university of chicago 18

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

slavery and other property rights the institution of slavery is found mostly at intermediate stages of agricultural development and less often among hunter gatherers and advanced agrarian societies we explain this pattern in a growth model with land and labor as inputs in production and an endogenously determined property rights institution the economy endogenously transits from an egalitarian state with equal property rights to a despotic slave society where the elite own both people and land thereafter it endogenously transits into a free labor society where the elite own the land but people are free

the social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights costs must be incurred if an owner is to enforce private property rights effectively we show that in a perfectly competitive economy private decisions to enforce rights may result in either more or less enforcement than is socially efficient cases of multiple stable equilibria occur and an equilibrium may be locally but not globally efficient resources may not be employed in their socially most valuable uses and enforcement may be accompanied by inefficient investment in resource productivity

long run impacts of land regulation evidence from tenancy reform in india agricultural tenancy reforms have been widely enacted but evidence on their long run impact remains limited in this paper we provide such evidence by exploiting the quasi random assignment of linguistically similar areas to different south indian states that subsequently varied in tenancy regulation policies given imperfect credit markets the impact of tenancy reform should vary by household wealth status allowing us to exploit historic caste based variation in landownership thirty years after the reforms land inequality is lower in areas that saw greater intensity of tenancy reform but the impact differs across caste groups tenancy reforms increase own cultivation among middle caste households but render low caste households more likely to work as daily agricultural laborers at the same time agricultural wages increase these results are consistent with tenancy regulations increasing land sales to relatively richer and more productive middle caste tenants but reducing land access for poorer low caste tenants

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

the currency composition of international portfolio assets in this paper we empirically assess the importance of gravity type variables and measures of macroeconomic and financial volatilities in explaining portfolio holdings denominated across the main global currencies us dollar usd euro eur pound sterling gbp japanese yen jpy and swiss franc chf our findings underscore the importance of trade ties and common membership euro area we also find that international positions co move with the level of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty importantly we identify heterogeneous patterns at a currency level

making negotiated land reform work initial experience from colombia brazil and south africa abstract the paper describes background initial experience and future challenges associated with a new negotiated approach to land reform this approach has emerged as following the end of the cold war and broad macroeconomic adjustment many countries face a second generation of reforms to address deep rooted structural problems and provide the basis for sustainable poverty reduction and economic growth it reviews possible theoretical links through credit market or political channels between asset ownership and economic performance program characteristics in each country as well as lessons for implementation and implications for monitoring and impact assessment are discussed

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

land reform and agricultural productivity in india a review of the evidence in this paper we review as well as contribute to the empirical literature on the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in india we find that overall for all states land reform legislation had a negative and significant effect on agricultural productivity however this hides considerable variation across types of land reform as well as variation across states decomposing by type of land reform the main driver for this negative effect seems to be land ceiling legislation in contrast the effect of tenancy reform averaged across all states is insignificant there seems to be a wide range of state specific effects which suggests that focusing on average treatment effects can hide a considerable amount of heterogeneity in particular allowing a separate slope for west bengal one of the few states that implemented tenancy laws rigorously we find that land reform had a marginal positive effect relative to the rest of india

what unites right wing populists in western europe re examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases unlike for the green party family no empirically backed scholarly consensus exists about the grievances mobilized by populist right parties in western europe to the contrary three competing grie

insecure land rights and share tenancy evidence from madagascar most studies of tenurial insecurity focus on its effects on investment this paper studies the hitherto unexplored relationship between tenurial insecurity and land tenancy contracts based on distinct features of formal law and customary rights in madagascar this paper augments the canonical model of sharecropping by making the strength of the landlord s property right increasing in the amount of risk she bears within the contract using data on landlords subjective perceptions in rural madagascar empirical tests support the hypothesis that insecure property rights drive contract choice but offer little support in favor of the canonical risk sharing hypothesis