electricity fuel contracting relationships with coal and gas suppliers the growth of competition in the electricity generation industry along with changes in natural gas and coal regulation have led to renewed interest in the nature of efficient transactional arrangements for procuring coal and gas this study examines the evolution of major influences on the incentives for choosing among different transactional forms we find that the asset specificity hypothesis continues to be an important explanation for transactional arrangements in fuel acquisition the degree of asset specificity in a fuel supply arrangement is a function of technological factors of inherent market characteristics and of regulatory rules the expanding role of more flexible fuel supply arrangements in gas and to a lesser extent coal markets is a natural response to current regulatory and technological trends

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

price adjustment in long term contracts the case of coal in two recent papers i examined the effects of relationship specific investment on the duration of contracts negotiated between electric utilities and coal suppliers that work demonstrated that when relationshipspecific investment is important for a cost minimizing supply relationship contracts are frequently utilized that specify ex ante the terms and conditions of trade over many future years in this article i examine the characteristics of the price adjustment provisions specified in these long term coal contracts i utilize a sample of about 250 coal contracts to analyze the structure of formal price adjustment provisions in coal contracts in order to determine the factors that affect initial negotiated contract prices and to examine actual transaction price behavior over time there has been much recent theoretical work as well as some related empirical work that has focused on the benefits of long term contracts when relationship specific investments are important 2 there has also been some theoretical work that focuses on the contractual arrangements that may be chosen to mitigate opportunism problems and guard against

should we be worried about the green paradox announcement effects of the acid rain program this paper presents the first empirical test of the green paradox hypothesis according to which well intended but imperfectly implemented environmental policies may lead to detrimental outcomes due to supply side responses we use the introduction of the acid rain program in the u s as a case study the theory predicts that owners of coal deposits expecting future sales to decline would supply more of their resource between the announcement of the acid rain program and its implementation moreover the incentive to increase supply would be stronger for owners of high sulfur coal this would all else equal induce an increase in sulfur dioxide emissions using data on prices heat input and sulfur content of coal delivered to u s power plants we find strong evidence of a price decrease and of an increase in the sulfur premium some indication that the amount of coal used might have increased and no evidence of fuel switching towards higher sulfur coal overall our evidence suggests that while the mechanism indicated by the theory might be at work market conditions and concurrent regulation largely prevented a green paradox from arising these results have implications for the design of climate policies

empirical contract theory the case of insurance data abstract while contract theory has reached a high degree of sophistication econometric applications remain scarse one often invoked reason is that adequate data is hard to find we argue that insurance data fit especially well the requirements of econometric testing then we propose some insights on how insurance data can be used to test the predictions of contract theory as an illustration we present some preliminary empirical results relative to the existence of adverse selection of the rothschild and stiglitz type in automobile insurance

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

prospects for non opec oil supply abstract the political and economic importance which has been attached to the oil industry in recent decades relates to the rapid increase in the demand for oil over the period from 1950 1980 and to the dominant role played by the politically volatile middle east in its supply although global demand for oil has grown little over the last decade during which period the role of middle east supplies has fallen both relatively and absolutely contemporary conventional wisdom on the future of oil envisages the reestablishment of middle east supply dominance this paper will challenge the validity of this view in the context of a realistic evaluation of the longterm demand prospects for the commodity

supplier performance in vertical alliances the effects of self enforcing agreements and enforceable contracts the paper examines the significance of enforceability and adaptability in governing vertical alliances and their performance ramifications for suppliers literature on supplier relations suggests that suppliers are skeptical of close ties with their buyers helper 1991 helper and sako 1995 such skepticism persists in spite of the fact that buyers are writing longer enforceable contracts with fewer suppliers in this context the paper develops a transaction cost economics tce based model that distinguishes between the verifiable and nonverifiable aspects of governance attributes of safeguards incentive intensity and adaptability in explaining supplier performance variations the paper argues that the following factors prove valuable for suppliers 1 the adaptive and collaborative orientation fostered by the original equipment manufacturer s oem s credible commitment to the exchange and by information sharing on the part of the supplier 2 the presence of certain nonverifiable safeguards and 3 the incentives inherent in target pricing these assertions have been tested using data from the home appliance industry results indicate that information sharing together with 1 oem dependence and 2 target pricing does indeed enhance supplier performance also results suggest that while nonverifiable safeguards can help verifiable safeguards do not have a positive association with supplier interests under certain conditions then suppliers can venture into closer relationships with buyers and benefit

do country level institutional frameworks and interfirm governance arrangements substitute or complement in international business relationships interfirm relationships among partners from institutionally distant environments are subject to governance difficulties owing to the paucity of shared cognitive and regulatory frameworks we examine the potential of formal contracting and relational governance developed at the partnership level to overcome the formal and informal institutional gap at the country level empirical results from a sample of 184 international partnerships of large us firms support an overall substitutive relationship between informal institutional frameworks and interorganizational relational arrangements whereby the performance benefits of relational governance are reinforced at higher degrees of informal institutional distance contrastingly formal institutional frameworks and contractual governance are found to have a complementary relationship with performance gains from formal contracting undermined at higher degrees of formal distance

transactional characteristics institutional environment and joint venture contracts this study examines how transactional characteristics and the institutional environment influence contractual governance for international joint ventures ijvs unlike previous studies that view joint venture contractual governance as a unidimensional construct clause specificity thus causing a debate upon whether ijv contracts should be more specific contractual governance herein is defined as a three dimensional construct that includes the extent to which contractual terms are clearly specified term specificity possible contingencies are accounted for contingency adaptability and joint venture parties are legally bound to the contract contractual obligatoriness our analysis of ijvs in china suggests that term specificity and contractual obligatoriness increase when the proprietariness of resources to be invested in the ijv or the incompleteness of the host country s legal system increase contractual obligatoriness appears to be an increasing function of economic exposure and environmental volatility whereas contingency adaptability in a contract rises when interparty dependency investment uncertainty and knowledge proprietariness intensify or when environmental hazards escalate these results suggest that an ijv contract if structured multidimensionally as above can curtail opportunism and guide venture evolution at the same time these contractual dimensions should not be prefixed but properly aligned with transactional and institutional characteristics this alignment has strong implications in reducing transaction costs and spurring ijv evolution in the complex and volatile institutional environment

an imbalanced development of coal and electricity industries in china china s coal and electricity industries have a strong reliance on each other however because of excessive invasion of government it is difficult for these two industries to form a stable reasonable and transaction cost saving relationships but long run disputes and quarrels this paper discusses the pricing policies and transaction relationship between these two industries from the historical perspective it begins with the discussion of coal coal market has become competitive since 1980 due to the system of dual track approach but coal sold to electricity was still tightly controlled by government guided pricing then the paper examines electricity investment and tariff reform unlike coal entry to electricity generation sector was gradually relaxed but generation and retailing tariffs are still strictly regulated as energy demand and prices soared after 2002 coal and electricity enterprises are all unsatisfied with the rule of price setting of coal sold to electricity industry this paper concludes that the deliberate low coal price policy does protect electricity industry from fuel cost fluctuation but harm coal industry allocative and productive efficiency are difficult to achieve in the long run

oligopsony power asset specificity and hold up evidence from the broiler industry in this article we look for empirical evidence of hold up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross sectional national survey of broiler growers first we focus on the problem of under investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent s grower s under investment systematically depends on the principal s integrator s market power and the level of asset specificity second we provide an indirect test of hold up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal s market power the results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold up

contract renegotiation and rent re distribution who gets raked over the coals policy shocks affect the rent distribution in long term contracts which can lead to such contracts being renegotiated we seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design in the face of a substantial policy shock affect the propensity to renegotiate we test our hypotheses using data on u s coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 clean air act amendments contracts are divided into two categories those that were renegotiated following the shock and those that were not characteristics of the contract are used to explain whether or not the contract was ultimately renegotiated results provide guidance on rent re distribution and contract renegotiation more generally and are applicable to contemporary policy issues such as climate change legislation

circular economy and the opportunity cost of not closing the loop of water industry the case of jordan abstract the water industry is moving from an end of pipe approach consistent with the linear economic model to a circular approach consistent with the circular economy model the economic dimension of wastewater circularity has not received the attention that other dimensions have this study attempts to fill this research gap by studying the economic dimension in order to estimate the net opportunity cost of a non circular water industry the financial and environmental benefits of treating wastewater along with the associated operating and capital costs are calculated to arrive at the opportunity cost and the closing the loop charge the analytical results reveal an estimated net opportunity cost of 643 million jordanian dinar jod 907 million us if the option not to go circular is chosen with jod 212 million us 299 million of this amount currently squandered furthermore this indicates an average closing the loop charge of jod0 70 m3 1 0 m3 which represents the average shadow price of the associated environmental externalities having thus shown a strong economic case for the circular model in the water industry movements in all economic sectors to adhere to this model appear to be highly desirable

the governance of transactions joskow s coal burning generating plants example revisited abstract in a classical paper joskow 1985 journal of law economics and organization 1 1 fall 33 80 discussed governance mechanisms for transactions between coal suppliers and electric power companies vertical integration long term and short term contracts according to the foundations of transaction cost economics vertical integration and long term contracts would be the most probable outcome when a coal burning generating plant requires durable transaction specific investments a mine mouth plant is an extreme situation this hypothesis is evaluated in the spanish context through a case study of 14 power plants located in coalfields and which have historically had poor transportation infrastructure the analysis shows that the role played by long term contracts in joskow s us example was taken in spain by state interventionist arrangements established to promote thermoelectric development in the coalfields such arrangements induced electric utilities to carry out specific investments whose only guarantee was a tacit commitment to recovery through regulation these plants would have become stranded in a pure competitive scenario so the government accepting the implicit contract argument recognised the value of these stranded investments within a highly controversial package of transition costs in the process of liberalising the electricity industry

choice of contracts in the british national health service an empirical study following major reforms of the british national health service nhs in 1990 the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts using a mixed multinomial logit analysis we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model based on contract theory in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form the paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform

hedging in coal contracts under the acid rain program tradable permit schemes introduce uncertainty into the cost of regulatory compliance due to the permits uncertain price regulated firms can hedge this uncertainty through their contracts for fuel procurement data on coal contracts are used to estimate how the option not to be delivered higher sulfur coal is priced results show that under a tradable permit scheme coal prices are reduced for an increase in the sulfur bound controlling for reductions in price due to higher delivered sulfur content jel q48 q53

implementing supplier codes of conduct in global supply chains process explanations from theoretic and empirical perspectives western buying companies impose supplier codes of conduct scc on their suppliers in developing countries however many suppliers cannot fully comply with scc and some of them even cheat in scc in this research we link contract characteristics price pressure production complexity contract duration to the likelihood of supplier s commitment to scc through a mediating process how the buying companies govern their suppliers our structural equation model analysis shows that the hierarchy relational norms governance is a perfect mediator of contract characteristics effects on the likelihood of supplier s commitment the market governance an insignificant one the managerial implications are provided for successfully implementing scc in global supply chains

the performance of long term contracts further evidence from coal markets this article extends my previous work on price adjustment in long term coal contracts to cover a period in which the nominal market prices for coal were below the prices specified in the preexisting long term contracts two related sets of questions are explored first did actual transactions prices for coal delivered pursuant to old contracts follow contractual pricing formulas leading to higher rather than lower prices or did they adapt quickly to changing market conditions second what were the relative roles offormal contractual provisions voluntary renegotiation and breach of contractual promises in determining actual transactions prices quantities and the durability of contractual relations it appears that actual transactions prices for coal delivered pursuant to old contracts were rigid downward following written contractual provisions rather than changes in current market values changing economic conditions led to an increase in renegotiation breach and litigation but the vast majority of existing long term contracts endured through the market downturn without major changes in prices or quantities from those previously agreed to by contract the threat of legal sanctions appears to have played an important role in sustaining contractual promises

market price uncertainty risk aversion and procurement combining contracts and open market sourcing alternatives abstract we evaluate the implications of concurrent utilization of contracts and open market arrangements by a risk averse buyer in continuous procuring of a standardized product of known demand over a specified time period the buyer being risk averse is concerned about the magnitude and uncertainty of expenses the contract price is deterministic and the market price is stochastic cases when the two price processes are exogenous and when the contract price is endogenously linked to volume of procurement and market price are examined models are developed to determine the optimal pattern of procurement from the two arrangements for specified price risk aversion and contract duration parameters the study finds that optimal procurement from market increases with contract price premium but decreases with degree of risk aversion and market price uncertainty usefulness of alternate forms of contracts when contract and market alternatives are used concurrently is discussed application of the models to hypothetical datasets compares the relative usefulness of alternate forms of integrating contract and market alternatives and of complete reliance on contract or market alternatives