high water marks high risk appetites convex compensation long horizons and portfolio choice we study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high water mark contracts we find that even risk neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets despite option like contracts instead they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset acting as would constant relative risk aversion crra investors this result is a direct consequence of the in de finite horizon of the contract we show that the risk seeking incentives of option like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone

selling the farm silver understanding water sales to the australian government in 2007 2008 the australian federal government committed 3 1 billion over 10 years to purchase water from irrigators in the murray darling basin and to deliver this water to key environmental assets given that water entitlements often represent one of the most valuable assets owned by irrigators this study investigates irrigators willingness to sell water and their actual water sales to the government it uses 1 570 surveys from 2008 2009 and 2010 2011 in the southern murray darling basin water sales can be classified as either last resort or strategic overall the results suggest that farmers who do not hold strong traditional farming attitudes and have higher debt lower farm income larger high security water entitlements lower water allocations over the past 5 years and those who have been net sellers of water allocations are more likely to have sold water or are thinking of selling water to the government a dynamic comparison of how water sale preferences change and an estimate of the total amount of water entitlements irrigators are willing to sell indicates that it is probable that there will be enough water offered to the program in the future at least to meet initial minimum environmental water targets however other concerns indicate that a potential restructure of the program may be required

rewarding risk taking or skill the case of private equity fund managers abstract we examine whether typical private equity fund compensation contracts reward excessive risk taking rather than managerial skill our analysis is based on a novel model of investment value cash flows and fee dynamics of private equity funds given the embedded option like fee components our results demonstrate that fund managers indeed have an incentive for excessive risk taking when only fee income from the current fund is considered however when managers also consider potential compensation from follow on funds their risk taking incentives depend on their individual skill levels and skilled managers will have an incentive to reduce fund risk we also show that managers must generate substantial abnormal returns in order to compensate investors for the given fee components

changing one s mind when the facts change incentives of experts and the design of reporting protocols experts often collect and report information over time what reporting protocol elicits the most information here a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability who observes two signals about the state of the world the signals differ in initial quality and unlike previous work differ in quality improvement the paper finds that mind changes inconsistent reports can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster also sequential reports dominate when the principal s decision is very sensitive to information a single report dominates if the mediocre agent s signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

combining revealed and stated preference data to estimate the nonmarket value of ecological services an assessment of the state of the science this paper reviews the marketing transportation and environmental economics literature on the joint estimation of revealed preference rp and stated preference sp data the rp and sp approaches are first described with a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of each recognizing these strengths and weaknesses the potential gains from combining data are described a classification system for combined data that emphasizes the type of data combination and the econometric models used is proposed a methodological review of the literature is pursued based on this classification system examples from the environmental economics literature are highlighted a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of jointly estimated model is then presented suggestions for future research in particular opportunities for application of these models to environmental quality valuation are presented

private equity performance what do we know we study the performance of nearly 1400 u s buyout and venture capital funds using a new dataset from burgiss we find better buyout fund performance than has previously been documented performance consistently has exceeded that of public markets outperformance versus the s p 500 averages 20 to 27 over a fund s life and more than 3 annually venture capital funds outperformed public equities in the 1990s but underperformed in the 2000s our conclusions are robust to various indices and risk controls performance in cambridge associates and preqin is qualitatively similar to that in burgiss but is lower in thomson venture economics

the evolution of buyout pricing and financial structure in the 1980s we examine changes in the pricing and financial structure of large management buyouts in the 1980s over time 1 buyout price to cash flow ratios rose in absolute terms particularly in deals financed using public junk bonds 2 required bank principal repayments accelerated leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt obligations 3 private subordinated and bank debt were replaced by public junk debt and 4 management teams and dealmakers took more money out of transactions up front these patterns are consistent with an overheating phenomenon in the buyout market preliminary post buyout evidence lends some support to this interpretation

drive and talent we analyze ways in which heterogeneity in responsiveness to incentives drive affects employees incentives and firms incentive systems in a career concerns model on the one hand because more driven agents work harder in response to existing incentives than less driven ones and therefore pay is increasing in perceived drive there is a motive to increase effort to signal high drive these drive signaling incentives are strongest with intermediate levels of existing incentives on the other hand because past output of a more driven agent will seem to the principal to reflect lower ability there is an incentive to decrease effort to signal low drive the former effect dominates early in the career and the latter effect dominates towards the end to maximize incentives the principal wants to observe a noisy measure of the agent s effort such as the number of hours he works early but not late in his career jel c70 d82 d23

the economics of private equity funds this article analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel model and dataset we obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds with detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006 we build a model to estimate the expected revenue to managers as a function of their investor contracts and we test how this estimated revenue varies across the characteristics of our sample funds among our sample funds about two thirds of expected revenue comes from fixed revenue components that are not sensitive to performance we find sharp differences between venture capital vc and buyout bo funds bo managers build on their prior experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than vc managers do this leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional in later bo funds the results suggest that the bo business is more scalable than the vc business and that past success has a differential impact on the terms of their future funds jel g10 g20 g24

signaling drive over the long term abstract an agent s productivity depends on his responsiveness to existing incentives drive over the long term this heterogeneity in drive may create significant incentives for the agent to work hard even with vanishingly small amount of existing incentives explicit or implicit

equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management abstract this paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio the contract parameters the extent of delegation and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider symmetric fulcrum performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the sharpe ratios asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and sharpe ratios with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds excess performance

the bright and dark side of staging investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns we believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship we find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry however staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely

venture capital funds flow performance relationship and performance persistence this paper finds that venture capital funds that are expected to be backed by more skilled investors show no performance persistence but a significant flow performance relationship in contrast funds that are expected to be backed by less skilled investors show performance predictability and have a non significant flow performance relationship these results suggest that only skilled investors use all available information to adjust their capital allocation and as a result eliminate performance predictability as argued theoretically by berk and green 2004 results also show that kaplan and schoar 2005 overstate the persistence in fund performance by not using an ex ante measure of the performance of earlier funds whether or not an ex ante measure is used however the persistence is largely due to unsophisticated investors when investors are sophisticated the performance of earlier funds sequence and fund size do not help predict the performance of the focal fund

compensation incentives and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness the common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false in fact no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse this paper finds simple intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse the paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse and gambles that increase or decrease risk with the growing interest in executive compensation and agency problems

an analysis of compensation in the u s venture capital partnership abstract venture capital limited partnerships are an attractive arena to study cross sectional and time series variations in compensation schemes we empirically examine 419 partnerships the compensation of new and smaller funds displays considerably less sensitivity to performance and less variation than that of other funds the fixed base component of compensation is higher for younger and smaller firms we observe no relation between incentive compensation and performance our evidence is consistent with a learning model in which the pay of new venture capitalists is less sensitive to performance because reputational concerns induce them to work hard

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal