the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

the optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents tournaments are widely used in organizations explicitly or implicitly to reward the best performing employees for example by promotion or bonuses and or to penalize the worst performing employees for example by demotion withholding bonuses or unfavorable job assignments these incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees relative performance while the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents we show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity under a wide range of conditions loser prize tournaments that is tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers are optimal for the firm the reason is that low ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments as compared to winner prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints jel m52 j33 j24

tournaments with midterm reviews in many tournaments investments are made over time the question whether to conduct a review once at the end or additionally at points midway through the tournament is a strategic decision if the latter course is chosen then the designer must establish both a rule for aggregating the results of the different reviews and a rule for determining compensations we first study the case of a fixed exogenously given prize and then extend the analysis to the case where the prize is not fixed but may vary with the tournament s outcome it is shown that 1 it is always optimal to assign a higher weight to the final review 2 this weight increases with the dominance of the first stage effort in determining the final review s outcome when the prize is not fixed the optimal design generates an asymmetric tournament in the second stage that favors the winner of the midterm review

the beauty of bigness on optimal design of multi winner contests abstract this paper examines the variation in total effort expended by participants when prizes are awarded in a grand contest as opposed to a number of subcontests when contestants are homogeneous under a mild and plausible condition regular contest technology a grand contest generates more effort than any set of subcontests when no restrictions are placed on the contest technology the results further demonstrate an increasing return to scale property such that each individual responds to a proportional increase in the number of contestants and the number of each prize by increasing individual effort therefore when a collection of identical subcontests forms a grand contest the total effort always increases and the grand contest leads to a higher rent dissipation rate our results apply to a wide variety of competitive activities such as high profile sports e g diving and gymnastics in the olympic games the internal labor market and the quota system for public resource allocation

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

boom bust cycle asymmetrical fiscal response and the dutch disease this paper investigates the changes in expenditure policy in oil exporting countries during boom bust in commodity price cycles and their implications for real exchange rate movements to do so we introduce a dutch disease model with downward rigidities in government spending to revenue shocks this model leads to a decoupling between real exchange rate and commodity export price movement during busts we test our model s theoretical predictions and underlying assumptions using panel data for 32 oil exporting countries over the period 1992 to 2009 results are threefold first we find that changes in current spending have a stronger impact on real exchange rate compared to capital spending second we find that current spending is downwardly sticky but increases in boom time and conversely for capital spending third we find limited evidence that fiscal rules have helped reduce the degree of responsiveness of current spending during booms in contrast we find evidence that fiscal rules are associated with a significant reduction in capital expenditure during busts while responsiveness to booms is more muted this raises concerns on potential adverse consequences of this asymmetry on economic performance in oil exporting countries

a multi winner nested rent seeking contest this paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent seeking contest in which there may be several winners we first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest in contrast to the previous work we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large

the optimal prize structure of symmetric tullock contests we show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n player tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists if such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner take all structure we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts if no such optimal equilibrium exists no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

understanding rent dissipation on the use of game theory in industrial organization game theory has had a deep impact on the theory of industrial organization in a similar but less controversial way as the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics the reason it has been embraced by a majority of researchers in the field is that it imposes some discipline on theoretical thinking it forces economists to clearly specify the strategic variables their timing and the information structure faced by firms as is often the case in economics the researcher learns as much from constructing the model the extensive form as from

news shocks in open economies evidence from giant oil discoveries this article explores the effect of news shocks in open economies using worldwide giant oil and gas discoveries as a directly observable measure of news shocks about future output the delay between a discovery and production is on average four to six years we first analyze the effects of a discovery in a two sector small open economy model with a resource sector we then estimate the effects of giant oil and gas discoveries on a large panel of countries our empirical estimates are consistent with the predictions of the model after an oil or gas discovery the current account and saving rate decline for the first five years and then rise sharply during the ensuing years investment rises robustly soon after the news arrives whereas gdp does not increase until after five years employment rates fall slightly and remain low for a sustained period

tournament rewards and heavy tails abstract heavy tailed fluctuations are common in many environments such as sales of creative and innovative products or the financial sector we study how the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of shocks affects the optimal allocation of prizes in rank order tournaments a la lazear and rosen 1981 while a winner take all prize schedule maximizes aggregate effort for light tailed shocks prize sharing becomes optimal when shocks acquire heavy tails increasingly so following a skewness order extreme prize sharing rewarding all ranks but the very last is optimal when shocks have a decreasing failure rate such as power laws hence under heavy tailed uncertainty typically associated with strong inequality in the distribution of gains providing incentives and reducing inequality go hand in hand

axiomatizing multi prize nested lottery contests a complete and strict ranking perspective abstract multiple prizes are usually awarded in contests e g internal promotions school admissions sports etc and players exert effort to increase their chances for winning a higher prize a multi prize contest model must provide each player s probabilities of winning each prize as functions of all players efforts we find that the key notion of hypothetical subcontests in the contest axiomatization literature initiated by skaperdas 1996 can be appropriately interpreted and precisely defined from a ranking perspective as well as the relevant axioms of subcontest consistency and independence of irrelevant contestants iic when there are less than four contestants exclusive a set of axioms properly adapted from those in skaperdas 1996 and clark and riis 1998a are sufficient and necessary for axiomatizing the widely adopted multi prize nested lottery contest of clark and riis 1996a when there are more than four contestants inclusive including a new axiom of independence of irrelevant ranks iir is necessary and sufficient

the design of rent seeking competitions in the standard tullock model of rent seeking as a noncooperative game aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal exceed or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker s investment if the supply of an input into the rent seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem he supplies it and designs the rent seeking game to maximize his wealth the author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician s wealth in one input and two input rent seeking processes

growth friendly fiscal rules safeguarding public investment from budget cuts through fiscal rule design abstract we study patterns of public investment behavior during fiscal consolidations in seventy five advanced and emerging economies during 1990 2018 and find that results differ significantly depending on fiscal rule design fiscal rules can be flexible meaning that they include mechanisms to accommodate exogenous shocks e g cyclically adjusted fiscal targets well defined escape clauses and differential treatment of investment expenditures or rigid meaning they establish numerical limits on fiscal targets without taking into account flexible features we find that in countries with either no fiscal rule or with a rigid fiscal rule a fiscal consolidation of at least 2 percent of gdp is associated with an average 10 percent reduction in public investment instead in countries with flexible fiscal rules the negative effect of fiscal adjustments on public investment vanishes which implies that flexible rules protect public investment during consolidation episodes the corollary is that the design of fiscal rules can add a growth friendliness dimension to the fiscal sustainability objective that has typically been the focus of fiscal rules in the past provided public investment is productive

portfolio redistribution impacts within the narrow monetary aggregate a number of important monetary and financial changes occurred in the 1980s a rising question among monetary economists is whether the character of m1 has changed substantially as a result in particular a frequent contention is that interest bearing checkable deposits behave as a savings type asset thus subjecting m1 to portfolio redistribution effects in the modern era this research examines the elasticities of substitution for a variety of financial assets pre and post 1980 results indicate that m1 subcomponents do show significant substitution with savings type assets however the portfolio redistribution impacts are not confined to the interest bearing checkable deposits further results indicate that this behavior is not unique to the 1980s copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

the dutch disease a disease after all many third world oil producers are encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base while west european oil and gas producers netherlands united kingdom are suffering a decline in their traded goods manufacturing sector induced by real wage pressures it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil revenues may be somewhat ora mixed blessing the quip of the economist notwithstanding the mechanism behind this unbalance is clear enough part of the oil revenues is spent on non traded goods which leads to a real appreciation i e a rise in the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods this in turn draws resources out of the non oil traded sector into the non traded goods producing sector corden and neary 1982 van wijnbergen 1980 one may say that this is an efficient response to the increase in income from oil production the united kingdom mexico egypt simply should move into oil derived industries and non traded goods and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are exhausted however many developing countries are hesitant to take this advice after all the post world war ii success stories in economic development involve without exception countries that promoted their traded goods sector aggressively moreover it is a well established stylised fact that technological progress is faster in the traded non sheltered sectors of an economy than in the non traded sector balassa 1964 is an early reference considering the hypothesis that technological progress rather than taking place exogenously with the passage of time is a function of accumulated experience the concern of countries like egypt mexico or indonesia is much easier to understand since solow 1957 and denison 1962 it is known that capital accumulation explain only a small part of economic growth if most of economic growth is caused by learning by doing induced technologica

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

good bad or ugly on the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting abstract do fiscal rules lead to fiscal adjustment or do they encourage the use of creative accounting this question is studied with a model in which fiscal rules are imposed on measured fiscal variables which can differ from true variables because there is a margin for creative accounting the probability of detecting creative accounting depends on its size and the transparency of the budget the model studies the effects on fiscal policy of a budget rule separating structural from cyclical effects and examines how these effects depend on the underlying fiscal distortion and on the degree of transparency of the budget

asymmetric oil price shocks tax revenues and the resource curse abstract the paper proposes an asymmetric relationship between oil rents and institutions such that only positive oil windfalls adversely affect institutional quality and negative oil windfalls have no impact we test this theory empirically by studying the dynamics of institutional quality in russian regions we find that increases in tax revenues caused by exogenous positive oil price shocks do not change regional income but increase corruption and reduce regional democracy and governance quality declines in tax revenues from negative oil price shocks do not affect institutional quality but decrease regional income

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

the demand for divisia money in the united states a dynamic flexible demand system this paper applies the anderson and blundell 1982 approach to the analysis of the demand for money and attempts to establish the nature of the relationship between divisia money defined from narrow to broad and the nested like assets at different levels of aggregation this is achieved by conducting the analysis within a microtheoretical framework utilizing the demand system approach and by estimating a sequence of nested dynamic specifications and performing tests of the nested structures as well as on economic theory to establish the most restrictive dynamic specification acceptable to the data copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

company sector liquid asset holdings a systems approach liquid asset holdings of the u k company sector are modeled using a money in the utility function theoretical approach symmetry homogeneity and negativity but not homotheticity restrictions are found to hold in a dynamic model using quarterly data the authors examine the usefulness of cointegration techniques in a systems framework the preferred dynamic equations are estimated using the engle granger two step procedure and have coefficients that are satisfactory on a priori grounds and are stable copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

booming sector and de industrialisation in a small open economy this paper presents a theoretical analysis of the dutch disease the phenomenon whereby a boom in one traded goods sector squeezes porfitability in other traded goods sectors both by directly bi

translog flexible functional forms and substitutability of monetary assets this article attempts to establish the nature of the relationship between monetary assets by estimating a sequence of four nested demand systems the generalized translog the basic translog the linear translog and the homothetic translog the principal attraction of the empirical work is that i am able to test separately for both homothetic and quasi homothetic preferences over monetary assets the tests reject both homotheticity and quasi homotheticity and thus consistency of the strotz gorman two stage optimization i also perform tests on economic theory to establish whether the parameter estimates are consistent with the utility maximizing hypothesis underlying the models these tests indicate that the generalized translog is the preferred model

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

gordon tullock entrepreneur of public choice when gordon tullock first encountered james m buchanan in 1957 as an initial step in his transition from the bureaucracy of the u s department of state to the ivy league atmosphere of the university of virginia he carried with him a voluminous manuscript on bureaucracy that he had tried unsuccessfully to publish buchanan 1987a 11 although eight years would pass before that manuscript eventually would be published three years after publication of the calculus of consent 1962 tullock s pioneering instincts already had directed him to the as yet uncharted path of public choice already had alerted him to the ubiquitous presence of homo economicus in the marketplace of politics buchanan quickly recognized the potential importance of combining tullock s insight with his own wicksellian notion of the importance of consent in political process as the basis for a radical research program trespassing across the traditional boundaries of economics and politics ignoring tullock s lack of formal training in economics buchanan installed him in the thomas jefferson center for studies in political economy and thereby provided that crucially important initial support absent which many a potential entrepreneur has failed to fulfill his talent steadfast in this judgment and firm in his resolve buchanan later was to gamble his own career together with the future of the virginia school of political economy in a 1968 exodus from charlottesville as the left leaning ideologically activist bureaucracy of thomas jefferson s academy thrice denied tullock a well earned promotion to full professor breit 1986 buchanan s judgment was sound and the virginia school reemerged unscathed and fortified as buchanan and his protege regrouped in the foothills of the appalachian mountains to carry the baton of the virginia public choice research

microfoundations and the demand for money the reader should note that i write this piece in a style that aims to be accessible to that much neglected representative agent the woman on the eurostar train hence unlike the man on the clapham omnibus i assume my intrepid traveller has reasonable knowledge of monetary economics and econometrics but not of the details of the demand for money space constraints force me to indulge in a certain amount of poetic licence but i hope this results in poetic justice there have been many wars fought on this particular battlefield some with almost religious zeal on the theoretical side of the debate we sometimes have the equivalent of religious fundamentalists be they muslims jews christians etc who would dismiss almost any evidence unless it were associated with a strong microtheoretic basis as laid down in the koran talmud or bible the empirical side encompasses agnostics atheists as well as born again econometricians pure theorists inhabit the sunlit uplands while applied economists and policymakers flounder in the muddy plain below occasionally gaining solace from their copy of zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance in general in economics we do not have the luxury of controlled experiments as is the case in the natural sciences what distinguishes good microfoundations from bad and how to weight priors and statistical evidence is subject to much dispute leamer i983 hendry et al i990 as in religion sometimes there is the occasional miracle proclaimed after a suitable interval a new saint may be declared and disciples flock to the new shrine later doubts may arise as to whether a miracle really did occur human behaviour is difficult to explain let alone predict so the search for the equivalent of the holy grail ark of the covenant etc is bound to be arduous in scholarly journals we generally read of the success of the demand for money like diplomats who are sent abroad to lie for the good of their country publication may require applied economists to be somewhat economical with the actualite lovell i983 leamer i983 in this article i want to be as honest as possible about our success and failures in this area the prior information an armchair economist would consider when thinking about the demand for money over the past 40 years in western industrialised countries which have experienced moderate inflation might

long run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking a comment although corcoran is mathematically correct i believe his comment is not very helpful in order to discuss the matter in some detail the reader should consult table 7 1 from my original efficient rent seeking reproduced on page 92 1 this shows the equilibrium investment of each individual different numbers of individuals playing the game n and differing values of r table 7 2 also reproduced on page 93 shows the total investment

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

the money multiplier simple sum divisia and innovation divisia monetary aggregates cointegration tests for the uk the possibility is investigated of establishing a cointegrating relationship between various competing monetary aggregates and a high powered money base for the uk 1977 1994 the aggregates are constructed from the bank of england s m4 cointegrating equations are found for all aggregates with little to choose between them and divisia being at least as good as its simple sum counterpart the ecm causality results are not as promising though they all suggest that high powered money is weakly exogenous the simple sum provides the best dynamic results closely followed by the divisia adjusted for implicit interest payments on cheque accounts

the demand for assets and optimal monetary aggregation this paper uses a highly disaggregated demand system to estimate the degree of substitutability among monetary assets and to address the issue of optimal monetary aggregation in the united states we address the problems of dimensionality and nonlinearity estimating a very detailed monetary asset demand system encompassing the full range of assets based on the locally flexible normalized quadratic expenditure function we treat the concavity property as a maintained hypothesis and provide evidence consistent with neoclassical microeconomic theory statistical tests reject the appropriateness of the aggregation assumptions for all the money measures published by the federal reserve as well as for a large number of groupings suggested by earlier studies this supports and reinforces barnett s 2016 assertion that we should employ the broadest m4 monetary aggregate published by the center for financial stability

long run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking the lure of excess profits or rents associated with monopoly power gives rise to expenditures to obtain these rents competitive rent seeking behavior is recognized as a factor which must be included among the wastes associated with monopoly power tullock 1967 posner 1975 1 the expenditures are aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society how important rent seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits

agreeing on efficient emissions reduction we propose a simple contest based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed the scheme balances its budget and requires no principal in a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version which could potentially inform policy decisions we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the gradual formation of international environmental agreements

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

optimal prize structures in elimination contests abstract we consider multi stage elimination contests where agents efforts at different stages generate some output for the principal depending on the output function various prize structures can be optimal if the output function depends much more on efforts applied at later stages than on those applied at the earlier ones the optimal prize structure can be non monotone that is at some stages prizes fall and the agents who are more successful may earn less necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of such structures are provided we also show that for any increasing prize shape there exists an output function such that this prize shape is optimal further we consider the case of limited liability where the principal is not allowed to use negative prizes but can choose a contest success function csf there is always an efficient equilibrium under which the principal is able to extract the full surplus from the agents and the corresponding optimal prize structure is always increasing moreover under some plausible assumptions the optimal csf is necessary convex which corresponds to the most frequently used prize schemes in practice

divisia aggregation and substitutability among monetary assets in this paper the authors estimate the degree of substitutability among the services of money checkable deposits savings deposits and time deposits in a quasi homothetic translog utility framework for canada the four composites mentioned are formed by aggregating more basic assets such as checkable deposits at banks checkable deposits at trust companies etc traditionally the simple sum aggregation has been used in this context the authors investigate both this alternative and divisia aggregation of the assets they find a low degree of substitution among the services of monetary assets and provide some evidence favoring divisia aggregation over simple sum aggregation copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

do commodity price shocks weaken the financial sector this paper investigates the impact of commodity price shocks on financial sector fragility using a large sample of 71 commodity exporters among emerging and developing economies it shows that negative shocks to commodity prices tend to weaken the financial sector with larger shocks having more pronounced impacts more specifically negative commodity price shocks are associated with higher non performing loans bank costs and banking crises while they reduce bank profits liquidity and provisions to non performing loans these adverse effects tend to occur in countries with poor quality of governance weak fiscal space as well as those that do not have a sovereign wealth fund do not implement macroprudential policies and do not have a diversified export base these findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks

the incidence of overdissipation in rent seeking contests tullock s analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered we show that while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation for particular realizations of players mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize we also show that the cross sectional incidence of overdissipation in the perfectly discriminating contest ranges from 0 50 to 0 44 as the number of players increases from two to infinity thus even though the original analysis of overdissipation is flawed there are instances in which rent seekers spend more than the prize is worth

the composition and construction of monetary aggregates an economic monetary aggregate is composed from a set of monetary goods that are at least weakly separable from other goods in the optimizing agent s utility function we construct such an aggregate using a divisia index number we demonstrate that through the middle of the 1980s forecasts of the inflation rate based on our economic monetary aggregate are superior to forecasts based on the simple sum monetary aggregates m1 or m2

are risky assets substitutes for monetary assets i introduction financial innovation over the past couple of decades has enhanced the liquidity of many financial assets particularly noncapital certain risky assets further financial assets previously not regarded as monetary assets such as mutual funds and particularly money market mutual funds now provide monetary services such as liquidity and transactions services l given the increased liquidity of such funds the question arises as to whether risky assets are substitutes for capital certain monetary assets if noncapital certain assets are indeed substitutes for capital certain assets and are also being used for transactions purposes then agents may be treating risky assets as money although this issue has been addressed in the united states in the context of the addition of bond funds to m2 by for example duca 1995 no such research has yet been conducted in the united kingdom including risky assets in the analysis contradicts the work of ando and shell 1975 spencer 1986 appendix i pp 184 93 and spencer 1994 broadly they argue that since some nonrisky assets provide monetary services and probability also liquidity individuals would not hold risky assets for these purposes 2 in contrast hicks 1935 states that falling transaction costs and rising wealth encourages individuals to increase the proportion of risky assets in portfolio holdings most studies generally assume that risky assets fail to provide significant monetary services and for example have been excluded from the asset demand analysis of barr and cuthbertson 1991a drake fleissig and swofford 1997 and money demand studies such as taylor 1987 belongia and chrystal 1991 drake and chrystal 1994 and drake 1996 alternatively barr and cuthbertson 1991b use only risky assets in their asset demand system analysis the degree of substitution between risky assets and capital certain assets is an empirical issue while noncapital certain risky assets mutual funds and other financial assets may well be becoming closer substitutes for what people are using as money they are in no way perfect substitutes for the highly liquid cash assets to evaluate the role of noncapital certain assets we construct a noncapital certain risky divisia aggregate consisting of equities government bonds and unit trusts the divisia index allows for less than perfect substitution between assets and weights component assets according to their differing degrees of moneyness which may vary over time due to many factors for example financial innovation see barnett 1980 this methodology has been widely applied to monetary aggregation and money demand studies in a number of countries as in belongia 1996 drake 1996 drake and chrystal 1997 and anderson jones and nesmith 1997 to determine whether risky assets are substitutes for capital certain assets we use two other divisia aggregates constructed from traditional measures of money the first of these is an aggregate of highly liquid zero yield cash assets given that the component assets all have zero own rates of return however divisia aggregation is equivalent in this case to simple summation the second aggregate is a divisia aggregate of interest bearing capital certain assets including risky assets complicates the analysis because the degree of risk aversion will affect the estimates of substitution between capital certain and noncapital certain assets thus we also analyze how different degrees of risk aversion affect the results the substitution relationship between assets is estimated from an asymptotically ideal model aim the choice of an aim is in line with the recommendation of barnett fisher and serletis 1992 that flexible systems of demand equations should be used that allow for nonlinear optimizing behavior by economic agents furthermore this paper can be seen as an extension of the recent application of this model to u