cross country variation in the liquidity effect the role of financial markets this paper examines cross country variation in the liquidity effect the negative response of interest rates to money supply shocks focusing on the role of financial factors in explaining this variation we estimate the liquidity effect for each of 21 countries using var models in which money supply shocks are restricted to be neutral in the long run then regress the estimated liquidity effect on financial market variables across countries we find that financial factors play an important role in determining the magnitude of the liquidity effect and that this evidence is most consistent with generalised versions of limited participation models

an experimental examination of competitor based price matching guarantees we use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies our findings establish that when costs are symmetric price matching guarantees significantly increase market prices in markets with cost asymmetries guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference lesser use of guarantees combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior

price discrimination through offers to match price in this paper a firm discriminates between two classes of customer who have a different cost of information by coupling a list price with an offer to match the pr ice of any other shop if the list price elsewhere is lower the firm will be successful in discrimination the list price of each firm is increasing in the number of sellers and the total sales are decreasi ng in the number of sellers furthermore if sellers coordinate they discriminate more efficaciously and increase their profits by increa sing their total sales copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

household debt consumption and inequality abstract this paper examines the link between household credit shocks consumption and income inequality at the national level empirically we use country specific var models to estimate the dynamic responses of aggregate consumption to household credit shocks we then show in cross country regressions that the consumption response is more sensitive to such shocks in countries with higher levels of inequality even after controlling for financial development theoretically we construct and simulate a dynamic model based on the effect of inequality on the incidence of credit constraints to illustrate potential causal mechanisms

debt deleveraging and the liquidity trap a fisher minsky koo approach in this paper we present a simple new keynesian style model of debt driven slumps that is situations in which an overhang of debt on the part of some agents who are forced into rapid deleveraging is depressing aggregate demand making some agents debt constrained is a surprisingly powerful assumption fisherian debt deflation the possibility of a liquidity trap the paradox of thrift a keynesiantype multiplier and a rationale for expansionary fiscal policy all emerge naturally from the model we argue that this approach sheds considerable light both on current economic difficulties and on historical episodes including japan s lost decade now in its 18th year and the great depression itself

an experimental and theoretical analysis of price matching refund policies abstract price matching refund policies or offers by firms to match competitor s prices are common in both consumer and industrial marketing much of the previous theoretical work in economics suggests that price matching refunds are associated with higher prices in contrast the trade press postulates that price matching policies are associated with lower prices given these inconsistent views regarding price matching policies the authors experimentally examine how consumers view and interpret such policies and then develop a model that incorporates these consumer interpretations as well as asymmetries across stores in the model the asymmetry across stores is the key to deriving the conditions under which a signaling equilibrium exists in the presence of price matching policies the critical point is that the competition reducing and price discrimination effects which seem to form the basis of most of the previous theoretical literature can be counteracted by the presence of differentiated firms

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

finance and business cycles the credit driven household demand channel what is the role of the financial sector in explaining business cycles this question is as old as the field of macroeconomics and an extensive body of research conducted since the global financial crisis of 2008 has offered new answers the specific idea put forward in this article is that expansions in credit supply operating primarily through household demand have been an important driver of business cycles we call this the credit driven household demand channel while this channel helps explain the recent global recession it also describes economic cycles in many countries over the past 40 years

viewpoint canadian competition policy progress and prospects this paper discusses the state of competition policy in particular the economics of competition policy in canada today and considers its prospects going forward it argues that i the importance of competition policy has become accepted widely in canada and indeed throughout much of the world ii competition policy design and enforcement is in general well done in canada iii economists including many canadians have played a central role in the development of an efficient and effective competition policy in canada and elsewhere and iv competition policy in canada is today facing very serious challenges and economists should be concerned la politique de concurrence au canada progres et prospective ce memoire discute de l etat de la politique de concurrence en particulier l economie de la politique de concurrence au canada aujourd hui et examine ce qui l attend on suggere que i l importance de la politique de concurrence est devenue largement acceptee au canada et dans le gros du reste du monde ii le dessein et l application de la politique de concurrence sont en general bien faits au canada iii les economistes et plusieurs canadiens parmi eux ont joue un role central dans le developpement d une politique de concurrence efficace et effective au canada et ailleurs et iv la politique de concurrence au canada fait face a des defis tres serieux ces temps ci et les economistes devraient s en inquieter

guaranteed lowest prices do they facilitate collusion abstract the effects of a policy guaranteeing lowest price are analyzed in a two stage game where firms first decide whether to adopt such a policy and then choose prices symmetric and asymmetric games are solved to examine the extent to which prices can rise to collusive levels

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

on the competitive effects of price matching policies abstract this paper challenges the conventional wisdom that price matching policies lead to supracompetitive prices by reducing firms incentives to undercut rivals i argue that price matching and price beating policies are more appropriately viewed as a means of price discrimination and develop a model that demonstrates their use as such analysis of this model shows that in contrast to the results of the existing literature price matching and price beating may raise or lower equilibrium prices relative to the equilibrium in which firms may not adopt such policies

does natural gas consumption mitigate co2 emissions testing the environmental kuznets curve hypothesis for 14 asia pacific countries abstract this study aims to investigate the nexus of per capita carbon dioxide co2 emissions per capita gross domestic product gdp and per capita natural gas consumption by examining the validity of the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis and analyzing the effectiveness of natural gas consumption for a panel of 14 asia pacific countries for 1970 2016 to do so a granger causality framework covering panel unit root cointegration estimation and causality tests allowing for cross sectional dependence is employed the main findings are i the augmented mean group amg estimates provide strong evidence in favor of the ekc hypothesis as the ekc holds in 13 of the 14 countries the ekc exists independent of the individual country s per capita gdp ii the turning points tps lie between 1937 23 bangladesh and 58 235 90 australia while the turning years tys are estimated to stay between 2019 australia and 2048 bangladesh per capita gdp positively and negatively affects the tps and tys respectively iii natural gas consumption has a significantly negative effect on co2 emissions the significantly negative effect of natural gas consumption on co2 emissions is also independent of per capita gdp but conversely may be affected by the proportion of natural gas in the primary energy mix and iv bidirectional causality runs between natural gas consumption and co2 emissions in both the short run and long run important policy implications are highlighted for asia pacific countries policymakers with respect to halting global warming and promoting growth in the natural gas industry

how does credit supply expansion affect the real economy the productive capacity and household demand channels credit supply expansion can affect an economy by increasing productive capacity or by boosting household demand in this study we develop a test to determine if the household demand channel is present and we implement the test using both a natural experiment in the united states in the 1980s and an international panel of 56 countries over the last several decades consistent with the importance of the household demand channel we find that credit supply expansion boosts nontradable sector employment and the price of nontradable goods with limited effects on tradable sector employment such credit expansions amplify the business cycle and lead to more severe recessions

soil fertility management and socio economic factors in crop livestock systems in burkina faso a case study of composting technology abstract the relation between technology adoption and farmers socio economic characteristics has increasingly been given attention in developing countries however most of the studies conducted by economists dealt with the adoption of external technologies here we test the determinants of compost adoption an alternative indigenous technology for soil fertility management the results of analysis of data from burkina faso using logit model strongly support the hypothesis that farmers socio economic characteristics and their agro ecological location significantly affect their adoption decisions there are two main conclusions of this study first the agro ecological location of farmers influence their decision to widely adopt compost technology second among farmers characteristics affecting compost adoption three groups can be distinguished the most important socio economic characteristics are farmers age their comparative perception on the yield effect of compost with regards to other fertilizers and their annual agricultural income a second group of characteristics include the institutional factors which are represented by the farmers participation in extension workshops a third group of factors comprises the farmer s labor force participating rate the number of ruminants owned and farmers gender

neglected risks financial innovation and financial fragility abstract we present a standard model of financial innovation in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek but modify two assumptions first investors and possibly intermediaries neglect certain unlikely risks second investors demand securities with safe cash flows financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks because the risks are neglected security issuance is excessive as investors eventually recognize these risks they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile even without leverage precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive

price matching guarantees are price matching guarantees anticompetitive we examine the incentives for price matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly the conventional explanation of price matching as facilitating cartel pricing finds some theoretical support but our model provides an additional explanation a price matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed consumers that a firm is low priced the credibility of the signal is assured by the behavior of informed consumers we contrast the testable implications of our model with those arising from two theories of price matching as anticompetitive and show that available evidence supports the signalling theory

inequality leverage and crises the paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution empirically the periods 1920 1929 and 1983 2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich a large increase in leverage for the remainder and an eventual financial and real crisis the paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes a financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction but restoration of the lower income group s bargaining power is more effective

asymmetric phase shifts in u s industrial production cycles abstract we identify cyclical turning points for 74 u s manufacturing industries and uncover new empirical regularities a industries tend to comove between expansion and contraction phases over the business cycle b clusters of industry turning points are highly asymmetric between peaks and troughs troughs are much more concentrated and sharper than peaks c the temporal pattern of phase shifts across industries supports the spillovers through input output linkages and d macroeconomic shocks such as unanticipated changes in monetary policy government spending oil prices and financial conditions are significant drivers of industrial phase shifts

contractible contracts in common agency problems this article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents the agents have private information and the principals take actions principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals contracts are required to be representable in a formal language the main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game we then restrict attention to exclusive contracting environments in which the agent may select the contract of at most one principal in this setting our characterization result implies that principals can collude to implement the monopolist outcome finally in general equilibrium contracts turn out to be incomplete that is a contract will restrict the action space of a principal but will not necessarily determine a single action

price match announcements in a consumer search duopoly using a model of sequential search we show that announcements to price match raise prices by altering consumer search behavior first price matching diminishes firms incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs second for consumers with positive search costs price matching lowers the marginal benefit of search inducing them to accept higher prices finally price matching can lead to asymmetric equilibria where one firm runs fewer sales and both firms tend to offer smaller discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium price increases grow in the proportion of consumers who invoke price matching guarantees and in the level of equilibrium asymmetry

contingent pricing to reduce price risks the price for a product may be set too low causing the seller to leave money on the table or too high driving away potential buyers contingent pricing can be useful in mitigating these problems in contingent pricing arrangements price is contingent on whether the seller succeeds in obtaining a higher price within a specified period we show that if the probability of obtaining the high price is not too high sellers profit from using contingent pricing while economic efficiency increases the optimal contingent pricing structure depends on the buyer s risk attitude a deep discount is most profitable if buyers are risk prone a consolation reward is most profitable if buyers are risk averse to motivate buyers to participate in a contingent pricing arrangement the seller must provide sufficient incentives consequently buyers also benefit from contingent pricing in addition because the buyers with the highest willingness to pay get the product contingent pricing increases the efficiency of resource allocation

on the incidence and variety of low price guarantees abstract this paper provides evidence of the incidence and variety of low price guarantees promises to match or beat a rival s price using data obtained from newspaper advertisements in 37 metropolitan areas in the united states we have a total of 515 low price guarantees in our sample we document their features and we infer firms motives and effects from these features the evidence suggests that the majority of low price guarantees are not consistent with their use as a facilitating device because they tend to apply only to rival firms advertised prices or they are associated with high hassle costs the evidence also suggests that price beating and price matching guarantees differ significantly in their features the former are associated with higher hassle costs apply disproportionately to rival firms advertised prices and are more likely to allow postsale search than are price matching guarantees

dynamic duopoly with best price clauses this article investigates best price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game best price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase two different price clauses are distinguished most favored customer and meet or release i examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods in each period new consumers enter the market i show that in this context meet or release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most favored customer clauses

global oil prices macroeconomic fundamentals and china s commodity sector comovements abstract this paper investigates the common movements of commodity sectors in china as well as the economic underpinnings of the comovements we employ a bayesian dynamic latent factor model to disentangle the common and idiosyncratic sector specific factors of the prices of a group of china s commodity sectors petrochemicals grains energy non ferrous metals oils fats and softs the results indicate that the common factor accounts for a significant portion of the fluctuations of china s commodity sectors providing evidence of the strong commodity sector comovements in china we further use a var model to link the common movements across china s commodity sectors to the underlying determinants including global oil price shocks and domestic macroeconomic fluctuations we find that the global oil price shocks have strong effects on the common movements across commodity sectors in china in addition to its domestic macroeconomic fluctuations at long horizons however at short horizons the common movements across commodity sectors in china respond more strongly to the global oil shocks than to its domestic macroeconomic fluctuations

household debt and income inequality 1963 2003 i construct an economy with heterogeneous agents that mimics the time series behavior of the earnings distribution in the united states from 1963 to 2003 agents face aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and accumulate real and financial assets i estimate the shocks that drive the model using data on income inequality aggregate income and measures of financial liberalization i show how the model economy can replicate two empirical facts the trend and cyclical behavior of household debt and the diverging patterns in consumption and wealth inequality over time while business cycle fluctuations can account for the short run changes in household debt its prolonged rise of the 1980s and the 1990s can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality

how low is a guaranteed lowest price a game based on the bertrand duopoly model is constructed to study the effects of price guarantee policies before it chooses a list price a firm can make a binding commitment to match or beat its competitor s price the effectiveness of these price guarantee policies in facilitating price collusion depends on the solution concept used furthermore there exists an equilibrium in which neither firm offers any price guarantees and each firm sets price equal to marginal cost

house prices borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle i develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices credit constraints nominal loans and asset prices changes in asset prices modify agents borrowing capacity through collateral value changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction and are amplified and propagated over time the financial accelerator is not constant across shocks nominal debt stabilises supply shocks making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate i discuss the role of equity debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism finally i find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility

output decisions and price matching theory and experiment we study the effects of price matching in a setting in which each firm selects both its price and output simultaneously we show that the availability of a price matching option leads to the cournot outcome in this setting our experimental study confirms this result in the laboratory our finding is a stark contrast to the one obtained in the standard price competition that the most likely market price in the presence of a price matching option is the monopolistic price in addition we show that price matching benefits consumers in markets with a large number of firms if a market has a few firms then the effects of price matching on consumers depend on the market demand and cost functions thus our study suggests that the effect of price matching depends on the strategic variables of the firms data and the online appendix are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2788 this paper was accepted by eric anderson marketing

coordination economies advertising and search behavior in retail markets we introduce a model of the retail firm in which consumers and active firms benefit collectively from coordination of sales at fewer firms using this model we show that ostensibly uninformative advertising plays a key role in bringing about coordination economies by directing consumer search toward firms that offer the best deals optimal consumer search takes the form of a simple rule of thumb that uses observed advertising information to guide search both industry concentration and social surplus are higher in the presence of advertising relative to a no advertising benchmark jel d83 l15 many observed advertisements seem to be at odds with rational behavior in a variety of ads mostly on tv and radio multiproduct sellers provide little hard information choosing instead to impart only vague slogans that are suggestive of good deals examples are plentiful a hardware store

dissecting the cycle a methodological investigation following burns and mitchell we define the cycle as a pattern in the level of aggregate economic activity an algorithm to locate turning points is developed as is a new measure of pro cyclicality a link between turning points and the moments of the series is established thereby providing the statistical foundation that burns and mitchell s work lacked using these tools we are able to dissect cycles in terms of the contributions made by trend growth volatility serial correlation and non linear effects we dissect several models and find little evidence that certain non linear effects are important to the nature of business cycles

automated pricing rules in electronic posted offer markets i introduction electronic commerce affords the opportunity to automate the process by which buyers and sellers engage in an exchange at a mutually agreeable price for example buyers on the internet can use software agents to automate the gathering of information on price and other product attributes in online retail markets that are traditionally organized as posted offer markets 1 this technology obviously reduces the consumer transaction costs of comparing prices which presumably would induce stronger competition among sellers however as hal varian remarked in the e commerce magazine wired everybody thinks more information is better for consumers that s not necessarily true bayers 2000 215 the same technology that reduces consumer transaction costs can be employed by sellers to automate the monitoring of rivals prices which might mitigate or even overwhelm the procompetitive effect of reduced consumer search costs in addition electronic markets grant more than just ideal information on competitors pr ices with electronic commerce a seller can commit to implementing an automated algorithm that could possibly sustain tacitly collusive prices in this article we study the supply side effects of three automated pricing algorithms that use price information as an input that could be retrieved from consumer price gathering technology in an electronic market two of the three algorithms that we study have the theoretical potential to facilitate collusion low price matching and a trigger strategy the third and presumably more competitive algorithm which we refer to as undercutting is drawn from the common retail practice of beating competitors prices using the experimental method this article explores how sellers deploy these three automated pricing algorithms in electronic markets more specifically we ask 1 do sellers prefer to set their price manually or to adopt automated algorithms that adjust price more frequently 2 are markets with automated pricing algorithms more competitive or less competitive than markets with manually posted prices 3 does increased commitment to an automated pricing mechanism facilitate tacit collusion to study the impact of automated pricing on seller behavior we base our work on the model of price dispersion in retail markets by varian 1980 thus our article also explores how well a theory of mixed strategy pricing organizes the behavior of sellers in a market with a nearly continuous stream of differentially informed fully revealing customers 2 as a preview of the results we find that 1 sellers employ automated pricing algorithms more often than they manually set their own price 2a automated undercutting leads to prices similar to the game theoretic prediction 2b automated low price matching generates prices significantly higher than the game theoretic prediction 2c automated trigger pricing results in market prices below the game theoretic prediction and 3 greater commitment to automated low price matching shifts prices closer to the joint profit maximizing outcome the structure of the article is as follows section ii presents the three automated pricing algorithms we consider the experimental design and procedures are in section iii section iv presents and discusses our results and section v briefly concludes ii automated pricing algorithms the market environment is motivated by the model of sales in varian 1980 3 in this model there are n sellers that supply buyers who each desire to purchase at most one unit of a homogeneous product each seller has a commonly known constant marginal cost c of supplying a unit to a buyer and posts a price p which the buyer can accept or reject the private value v for each nonstrategic buyer is assumed to be a random variable drawn independently from a known uniform distribution with a support v v buyers differ based on the number of firms from which price quotes are received prior to making a purchasing decision

competitive price matching guarantees equilibrium analysis of the availability verification clause under demand uncertainty price matching guarantees involve a retailer matching the lower price of a competitor for an identical product in reality retailers often make such guarantees contingent on the verification of product availability at the competitor s location and decline a price match request if the product is not available there this creates certain consternation on the part of customers in this paper we investigate the availability contingency strategy from the perspectives of both the retailers and the customers our analysis shows that availability contingency clauses intensify inventory competition between retailers and reinstitutes price competition which is otherwise eliminated by unconditional price matching guarantees consequently despite what customers may think about the availability verification it actually increases their surplus on the other hand such a clause reduces profits and hence is not the equilibrium strategy for retailers subsequently we discuss how a likely customer behaviour pattern may be a plausible explanation regarding the use of the clause by the retailers in practice this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

unilateral most favored customer pricing a comparison with stackelberg abstract if one firm in a price setting duopoly adopts a most favored customer pricing policy it can commit to a price which is higher than the bertrand price the equilibrium price however must be lower than the stackelberg leader price

can low price guarantees deter entry abstract this paper examines the strategic use of low price guarantees lpgs as an entry deterrent the entire space of contemporaneous lpg messages is partitioned according to their ability to deter entry and or increase the incumbent s profits while most price matching and price beating guarantees cannot deter entry into a perfectly contestable market there do exist special classes of price beating guarantees that enable the incumbent to prevent entry interestingly both price matching and price beating can be a part of the incumbent s strategy in subgame perfect equilibria of the game where the firms choose lpgs from 14 classes defined in the paper

linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty an overview we review different generic conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships their logical relationship is explored two kinds of conditions are considered however the property for an action profile to be compatible plays a crucial role in both kinds also two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition

credit crises precautionary savings and the liquidity trap we use a model a la bewly huggett ayagari to explore the eects of a credit crunch on consumer spending households borrow and lend to smooth idiosyncratic income shocks facing an exogenous borrowing constraint we look at the economy response after an unexpected permananent tightening of this constraint the interest rate drops sharply in the short run and then adjusts to a lower steady state level this is due to the fact that after the shock a large fraction of agents is far below their target holdings of precautionary savings and this generates a large temporary positive shock to net lending we then look at the eects on output here two opposing forces are present as households can deleverage in two ways by consuming less and by working more we show that under a reasonable parametrization the eect on consumer spending dominates and precautionary behavior generates a recession if we add nominal rigidities two things happen i supply side responses are muted and ii there is a lower bound on the interest rate adjustment these two elements tend to amplify the recession caused by the credit tightening

the quantitative effects of tax foresight not all states are equal abstract this paper explores the effect of federal tax news on state economic activity we estimate a factor augmented vector autoregression favar model which allows us to consider the possibility that unobserved factors such as credit and fiscal conditions might be relevant for modeling the dynamic response of aggregate and state level economic activity we identify tax foresight as a shock to the implicit tax rate measured by the yield spread between the one year tax exempt municipal bond and the one year taxable treasury bond our results suggest that an increase in the implicit tax rate raises national output over much of the anticipation period in addition anticipated tax increases give rise to expansions in state personal income and employment we find that the variation in the responsiveness of economic activity across states is mostly explained by differences in industrial composition and income distribution as well as by some demographic characteristics such as median income and education finally using a proxy for exogenous changes in federal tax revenues we investigate the dynamics of state level personal income and employment our results point to considerable heterogeneity in the response across u s states moreover they reveal that the long run multiplier for an anticipated increase in tax revenues is about a tenth of the short run multiplier for an unanticipated increase in taxes

relationship lending under asymmetric information a case of blocked entry abstract a national bank with a low cost of capital can choose to enter a two period credit market and compete with incumbent banks to supply relationship loans to de novo entrepreneurs under short term contracting the terms on loan contracts are determined by market competition in the current period in this setting we find that the second period competitive pressure the national bank exerts on the incumbent banks turns out to give the incumbent banks a first period advantage when trying to attract new clients as a result the low cost bank may be blocked from entering the market

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

oligopolistic competition as a common agency game oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi principal common agency framework where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer we first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games and a parameterization of the set of equilibria based on the lagrange multipliers associated with the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints of each principal this is used to characterize the set of equilibria in the intrinsic and non intrinsic games the former includes the latter as well as the standard price and quantity equilibrium outcomes it may also include the collusive solution

effective price matching a comment abstract corts economic lett 47 1995 417 showed that when allowing for price beating policies in addition to price matching policies the competitive outcome prevails in lieu of monopoly pricing i show by expanding the strategy set further to include effective price strategies the possibility of monopoly pricing is restored

the kinked demand curve a game theoretic approach in a simple model of duopoly firms price moves are modelled as an extensive form game where firms can respond to undercutting without delay when firms are not too dissimilar kinked demand strategies enforcing an arbitrary price may be nash equilibria however these strategies are dominated and perfect equilibrium is unique at the minimum optimal common price rather than implying price rigidity kinked demand strategies are a device for ensuring compliance with a collusive price leadership

on the use of low price guarantees to discourage price cutting abstract this paper formulates a novel test to assess whether and to what extent firms might be using low price guarantees to discourage their rivals from cutting prices the test is based on a comparison of paired observations of advertised prices that are set by competing firms at the same point in time on similar items where one price is set by a firm that has a low price guarantee and the other by a firm that does not have a low price guarantee using data on retail tire prices we find that the majority of paired observations involving firms that have price matching guarantees are consistent with what one would expect if firms were using them to discourage price cutting whereas the majority of paired observations involving firms that have price beating guarantees are not this suggests that price matching and price beating guarantees may be serving different purposes the evidence also suggests that guarantees that apply to advertised prices only may be serving different purposes than guarantees that apply to both advertised and selling prices

experimental duopolies under price guarantees in a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of price guarantees pgs to raise prices above the competitive levels different types of pgs aggressive and soft price beating and price matching are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy our results show that pgs may lead close to the collusive outcome depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the aggressive price beating type

what do facilitating practices facilitate an empirical investigation of most favored nation clauses in natural gas contracts long term contracts often include most favored nation clauses mfns which are nondiscrimination guarantees that obligate a buyer or seller to treat all trading partners symmetrically in pricing decisions recent theoretical work has shown that such clauses can facilitate tacit collusion by increasing the cost of selective price changes aimed at attracting new business an alternative view is that mfns serve to facilitate efficient price adjustment in extended exchange relationships we test these competing hypotheses using data from long term natural gas contracts many of which employ mfns our conclusion is that the pattern of mfn adoption in conjunction with the structure of the nondiscrimination regions and the parallels with other nonstrategic price escalation provisions lends strong support to the efficiency rationale

different selling strategies in bertrand oligopoly abstract i analyse a bertrand oligopoly game where firms can choose between selling strategies i price announcements ii price announcements and offers to price match i establish the set of nash equilibria and show that only the monopoly price nash equilibrium satisfies iterative dominance

what do vars tell us about the impact of a credit supply shock in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis a variety of structural var models have been proposed to identify credit supply shocks using a monte carlo experiment we show that the performance of these models can vary substantially with some identification schemes producing particularly misleading results when applied to us data the estimates from the best performing var models indicate on average that credit supply shocks that raise spreads by 10 basis points reduce gdp growth and inflation by 1 after one year these shocks were important during the great recession accounting for about half the decline in gdp growth this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

determinants of the global and regional co2 emissions what causes what and where using the stochastic impacts by regression on population affluence and technology stirpat model and an unbalanced panel dataset of 128 countries covering 1990 2014 this study aims to examine t

on the robustness of the argument that price matching is anti competitive abstract the existing literature suggests that price matching leads to monopoly prices i show that this argument relies on an arbitrary and unrealistic restriction of the firms strategies in particular if firms may adopt price beating policies the competitive outcome prevails

matching own prices rivals prices or both many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals and extend their promise to include their own future prices that is many retailers combine elements of both price matching guarantees and retroactive most favored customer clauses this is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each practice independently has the potential to facilitate supracompetitive prices and thus one might think the two practices are substitutes in this paper we show that price matching guarantees and most favored customer clauses complement each other when offered unilaterally by a single firm and can lead to higher prices than either one could have facilitated by itself

price matching guarantees as a direct signal of low prices if consumers believe that stores offering price matching guarantees pmgs charge low prices high search cost consumers will purchase from pmg stores this leads pmg stores demand to be less pric

the effect of house prices on household borrowing a new approach we investigate the effect of house prices on household borrowing using administrative mortgage data from the united kingdom and a new empirical approach the data contain household level information on house prices and borrowing in a panel of homeowners who refinance at regular and quasi exogenous intervals the data and setting allow us to develop an empirical approach that exploits house price variation coming from the idiosyncratic and exogenous timing of refinance events around the great recession we present two main results first there is a clear and robust effect of house prices on borrowing second the effect of house prices on borrowing can be explained largely by collateral effects we study the collateral channel through a multivariate and nonparametric heterogeneity analysis of proxies for collateral and wealth effects

price matching guarantees and consumer search abstract this paper examines the effect of price matching guarantees pmgs on market outcomes in a sequential search model pmgs are simultaneously chosen with prices and some consumers shoppers know the firms decisions before buying while others non shoppers enter a shop before observing the price and whether or not the firm has a pmg in such an environment pmgs increase the value of buying the good and therefore increase consumers reservation prices this increase is so large that even after accounting for the possible execution of pmgs firms profits are larger in an equilibrium where pmgs are offered than in an equilibrium without pmgs we also consider the incentives of firms to choose pmgs and show that an equilibrium where all firms offer pmgs does not exist because of a free riding problem

a model of duopoly and meeting or beating competition this paper analyzes the use of meeting and beating competition clauses in duopoly markets a differentiated products price setting model is considered in which firms have the option of precommitting themselves to contracts which bind their own price to be some prespecified function of their competitor s price the analysis establishes conditions under which these contracts facilitate oligopoly coordination under which they result in price discrimination and under which they can actually be procompetitive

the welfare losses from price matching policies several recent papers argue that price matching policies raise equilibrium prices we add to this literature by considering potential welfare losses which have two sources harberger triangles from high prices and posner rectangles from over entry we compare price matching markets with entry to monopoly and price matching markets without entry and find that price matching with entry creates greater welfare losses than monopoly in markets with a low ratio of fixed to marginal cost we illustrate this result using parameters from the us wholesale gasoline and air travel markets and relate our model to price matching among nasdaq market makers

general equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition a cournotian approach in a pure exchange economy we propose a general equilibrium concept under imperfect competition the cournotian monopolistic competition equilibrium and compare it to the cournot walras and the monopolistic competition concepts the advantage of the proposed concept is to require less computational ability from the agents the comparison is made first through a simple example then through a mon abstract concept the p equilibrium based on a general notion of price coordination c 1997 academic press

research note price matching guarantees retail competition and product line assortment price matching guarantees pmgs are offers to match a competitor s price on a specific item such guarantees are extremely common in u s retail practice and their impact has been studied in several published papers the existing analytic literature models each retailer as a single product seller most work assumes that each retailer s product is identical with or completely substitutable for the competitor s product in reality competing retailers often sell multiple products and these products do not always overlap or may overlap partially but not totally furthermore retailers that offer pmgs routinely exclude certain offerings from pmg coverage this raises the interesting question of how product variety and product stocking factors affect retailer decisions about offering pmgs in this paper we simultaneously consider three factors of retailing importance that imply results consistent with pmg use and nonuse the ability to choose to stock the same product as or a product differentiated from a competitor s offering the possibility of shelf space limitations on the ability to stock complete variety and the category demand enhancing effect of variety these are sensible and realistic descriptive factors shaping retailers product and pricing decisions and because they have not been considered jointly in the prior literature on pmgs their joint consideration helps to expand our understanding of the drivers of pmg implementation and impact in the presence of these three factors we examine retailers decisions about whether to offer a pmg what product s to stock and how to price the product s stocked our results show that shelf space limitations have an important influence on pmg provision in particular when retailers are shelf space constrained and product substitutability in the category is sufficiently large choosing to use pmgs which by definition also requires stocking identical products is strictly less profitable than enduring bertrand price competition but enjoying retail product differentiation the result that pmgs can be profit reducing relative to head to head retail competition is a novel one driven in our model by the opportunity costs of stocking identical products i e the inability to benefit from the demand enhancing effects of variety and the differential small or large between bertrand pricing and pmg pricing levels we further show that under asymmetric shelf space availability either product variety will be severely limited or retailers will offer a different array of products weak substitution between products leads to the latter with pricing between the differentiated products bertrand and monopoly levels strong substitution leads to the former with pricing at the monopoly level our results also show that with unlimited shelf space both competing retailers offer pmgs stock the entire available product line and enjoy monopoly pricing given our focus on product variety issues we also relate our results to the literature on branded variants our results demonstrate that the nature of product variety the availability of retail shelf space and the category demand enhancing effect of variety are key market characteristics that jointly and strongly affect the optimality of pmgs and the resulting pricing and profitability characteristics of the market

do low price guarantees guarantee low prices evidence from competition between amazon and big box stores it has long been understood in theory that price match guarantees can be anticompetitive but to date scant empirical evidence is available outside of some narrow markets this paper broadens the scope of empirical analysis studying a wide range of products sold on a national online market using an algorithm that extracts data from charts i obtain a novel source of data from online price trackers i examine prices of goods sold on amazon before and after two big box stores target and best buy announced a guarantee to match amazon s prices employing both difference in difference and regression discontinuity approaches i robustly estimate a positive causal effect of six percentage points the effect was heterogeneous with larger price increases for initially lower priced items my results support anticompetitive theories which predict price increases for amazon a firm that did not adopt the guarantee and are consistent with plausible mechanisms for the heterogeneous impact

characteristics and determinants of asymmetric phase shifts in china s manufacturing industrial production cycles employing a panel of 30 chinese manufacturing industries from january 2003 through may 2017 2003m01 2017m05 this study is the first attempt to investigate the characteristics and determinants of

analyzing business cycle asymmetries in a multi level factor model abstract we study the business cycle in the us over 1959 2011 using a large dimensional multi level factor model we find notable asymmetries over the business cycle but the bulk of common dynamics is stable over time the comovement among variables is larger in recessions compared to expansions the recession factor is highly correlated with monetary and financial variables whereas expansion and symmetric factors are mainly related to real activity variables

research note consumer heterogeneity and competitive price matching guarantees price matching guarantees are widely used in consumer and industrial markets previous studies argue that they are a marketing tactic that facilitates implicit price collusion this is because once a store adopts this marketing tactic its rivals can no longer steal its customers by undercutting its price and hence they have little incentive to initiate price cuts while a store with price matching guarantees has no fear of losing customers to rivals price cuts it has every incentive to raise its own price to charge a higher price to its loyal consumers a growing body of legal literature uses this argument today to justify calls for antitrust actions against stores employing this marketing tactic however this theoretical conclusion baffles practitioners and industry experts in practice sellers typically embrace this marketing tactic in response to heavier competition and a growing bargain consciousness among shoppers the introduction of price matching guarantees by a store is frequently interpreted by industry observers as the initiation of a price war rather than a signal of price collusion this assertion is supported in many instances by the fact that stores that introduce price matching guarantees also roll back their prices and typically suffer subsequent loss of profits most ironically the favorite examples used by researchers to illustrate how price matching guarantees can enforce price collusion crazy eddie and nobody beats the wiz have subsequently either gone bankrupt or filed for federal bankruptcy protection in this study we show that price matching guarantees can indeed facilitate competition the expected prices and profits can be strictly lower when all stores adopt price matching guarantees than when they are not allowed to this is because the adoption of price matching guarantees generates not only a competition dampening effect which has been recognized in the literature but also a competition enhancing effect this latter effect comes from the fact that price matching guarantees encourage price search by those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are mindful of saving opportunities these consumers will have incentives to obtain the rival store s price when their favorite store offers price matching guarantees to avail themselves of the lowest possible price at their favorite store as a result price matching guarantees reduce the number of purchases at the store from those consumers who would have paid the full price and thus prompt a store to price more aggressively to bid for more incremental sales this competition enhancing effect can more than offset the competition dampening effect in markets where consumers differ in their price search costs and store loyalty thus our study casts doubt on the advisability of blanket prohibition on price matching guarantees our argument relies only on consumer segmentation and on the phenomenon of periodic sales both of which are common in retail markets we arrive at our conclusion by incorporating bargain shoppers and opportunistic loyals into the standard sales promotion models in contrast the past literature on price matching guarantees ignores the ubiquitous phenomenon of sales in retail markets and overlooks those consumers who prefer to shop at a particular store but are alert to saving opportunities as a result it is troubled by two awkward conclusions on the one hand price matching guarantees simply remove rivals incentives to undercut in price and hence also their incentives to run sales this implies that the adoption of price matching guarantees in a market will eliminate the phenomenon of sales which is obviously counterfactual on the other hand in equilibrium no consumer actually invokes price matching guarantees as each player has incentives to close any price gap in the market this is obviously false based on our casual observations and our conversations with store managers theoretical research on the subject thus far has been overwhelmingly one sided and empirical or experimental studies are conspicuously lacking we hope that our conclusion will spark further research in both directions a healthy debate will broaden our perspective on an issue of great importance in formulating public policies and in managerial decision making

platform monopolization by narrow ppc bpg combination booking et al abstract the price parity clauses ppcs that online booking platforms impose have come under antitrust scrutiny wang and wright 2017 show how by preventing showrooming a narrow ppc can reduce search costs and benefit consumers under between platform competition in response to having to give up its wide ppc to hotels booking com emphasized its best price guarantee bpg to customers we observe that a narrow ppc combined with a low hassle costs bpg leaves only wang and wright s price parity and monopoly equilibrium ppme in which consumers are worse off than with no platform operating at all a more efficient incumbent platform can deter entry with the bpg while the narrow ppc eliminates competition from direct sales channels an equally efficient platform could enter and compete consumer prices down because of the existence of hassle costs yet this equilibrium is fragile to network effects if sellers have incentives not to price differentiate between platform s and their direct sales channel a narrow ppc alone suffices to sustain the ppme in both cases the detrimental pricing contract combination that we point out calls for different platform competition policy