demand for money in open economies abstract the demand for real cash balances deduced from an underlying portfolio model of the financial market is shown to depend upon domestic variables and foreign monetary developments the model is estimated using quarterly postwar data for canada germany uk and us there is clear evidence that demand for money is affected not only by changes in domestic variables such as permanent income domestic interest rate and price expectations but also by fluctuations in exchange rate expectations and foreign interest rates the conclusion that domestic monetary policy is fairly ineffective and domestic financial markets are highly vulnerable to changes in foreign financial and monetary developments need to be modified in light of the results presented in this paper

a nonequilibrium analysis of unanimity rule majority rule and pareto i introduction voting theory is important for understanding economics as well as politics international organizations vote on trade regulations legislatures vote on minimum wage and governments vote on the provision of public goods voting also affects industrial organization for instance limited partnerships may vote on the allocation of resources to various units and shareholders may vote on investment decisions carrera and richmond 1988 what voting rule best achieves pareto optimal outcomes in such cases in the absence of transactions costs it is widely believed that unanimity rule is the best voting rule for promoting pareto efficiency berggren 1996 buchanan and tullock 1962 mueller 2003 buchanan 1967 writes it is evident that unanimous consent is the political counterpart of the pareto criterion for optimality p 285 traditionally viewed unanimity rule guarantees more efficient outcomes than majority rule because unanimity rule only passes proposals that make everyone better off other voting rules like majority rule can pass proposals that make some individuals worse off one of the assumptions that is either explicit or implicit in the these studies is the assumption of rational proposals we define a proposal as rational if it helps maximize the proposer s utility at the end of the game in our analysis proposals are not rational instead they are generated either randomly or sincerely in a single dimensional voting model and evaluated by the pareto criterion or pareto optimality this produces two striking results with regard to pareto optimality first if proposal generation is random then majority rule is usually more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule second if individuals propose their ideal points then majority rule always selects pareto optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule considering all possible proposals as done in our random generation models has a long tradition in social choice literature arrow 1951 caplin and nalebuff 1988 niemi and weisberg 1968 riker 1982 sen 1979 it also has the advantage of modeling certain types of incomplete information modeling votes where bills are introduced for reasons other than making them pass see stewart 2001 pp 338 41 modeling exogenously generated proposals and for allowing mistakes by the proposer such foundational work should be of interest to those who relate unanimity rule to pareto principles in the study of public goods cornes and sandler 1996 lindahl 1967 political parties aldrich 1995 and legislative institutions colomer 2001 niou and ordeshook 1985 tsebelis 2002 to name a few ii previous studies perhaps the first in depth study of the relationship between unanimity rule and a pareto principle was buchanan and tullock s calculus of consent 1962 buchanan and tullock argued that if decision making costs were negligible unanimity rule would always be the most desirable k majority rule simply because it preserved the pareto principle p 88 although the exact pareto principle they had in mind is not entirely clear it seems that buchanan and tullock were arguing for the criteria of accepting a change from the status quo only if it lead to a pareto improvement otherwise the status quo should be preferred pp 92 93 sen 1979 p 25 1 mueller 2003 pp 138 and 140 41 further compared unanimity rule to majority rule and concluded that unanimity rule typically performs better in terms of the pareto criterion to illustrate his reasoning mueller describes a community voting on both the purchase of a new firehouse and the taxes needed to pay for it in a single bill if the decision was made under unanimity rule the distribution of taxes would be redefined until the firehouse benefited all otherwise the bill would not pass if the decision was made under majority rule a majority might distribute the taxes on a minority such that members of the majority would be net gainers and members of the minority would be net losers

collective choice in the commons experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes we analyse and empirically examine a multi level common pool resource cpr game consisting of a collective choice level game and an operational level game in the collective choice game participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules majority and unanimity rules are investigated our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice but the distributional consequences of the rules differ to understand the process by which efficiency is improved better we examine four predictive theories related to proposals votes and outcomes

the short run demand for money a reconsideration the partial adjustment approach to the specification of the short run demand for money has dominated the literature for more than a decade there are three basic problems with this approach first the same lag structure is imposed on all variables and each independent variable enters only as a current value in contrast a rational individual would respond to different variables income interest rates prices with quite different lags second when the general price levelis subject to gradual adjustment hut can move quickly in response to supply shocks the influence of these supply shocks should enter with a negative sign third the estimated equation for real balances may not be a money demand equation at all but rather its coefficients may represent a shifting mixture of demand and supply responses the empirical work examines several alternative dynamic specifications including a generalized partial adjustment framework and the error correction model both of the latter specifications exhibit greater structural stability after 1973 than the standard partial adjustment specification and the generalized partial adjustment model also yields relatively small errors in post sample dynamic simulations shifts in coefficients as the sample period is extended after 1973 are consistent with the interpretation that the real balance equation no longer traces out structural demand parameters hut rather a mixture of demand and supply responses this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the identification of monetary policy disturbances explaining the liquidity puzzle abstract this paper examines recent work on the identification of monetary policy disturbances its main finding is that the empirical anomalies found in the literature reflect a failure to properly address the federal reserve s policy of accommodating reserve demand shocks a new method of identifying monetary policy using nonborrowed reserves is proposed using this specification policy has a strong persistent liquidity effect regardless of subsample policy granger causes output even in the presence of interest rates explaining approximately 49 of the variance in output at a two year horizon and the residual explanatory power of interest rates for output is negligible

estimating money demand functions the question of which functional forms of money demand regression equations are useful for empirical work is addressed here specifically it is argued that a functional form that focuses attention on the ability of the growth rate of nominal money to predict the inflation rate is a useful way of summarizing empirical evidence on the existence of a stable money demand function the results of estimating and simulating this functional form as well as standard functional forms are presented in the final part of this paper a typical equation expressing the public s demand for real money balances m is as follows

coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration abstract this paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model a vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a two part tariff exclusive dealing contract with its retailer coexistence emerges when more than two vertical cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes when vertical integration and separation coexist welfare could be improved by reducing the number of vertically separating firms the scope for coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed

territorial restrictions in franchise contracts i introduction efficient contracts establish the incentives for contractual parties through the assignment of rights or authority over decisions as well as shares of profit this insight has been widely used to explain the nature of the firm 1 the role of rights assignment in explaining specific business contracts however is relatively unexplored here we analyze contractual rights within franchise systems focusing on the right to add new franchisees to an existing franchise area the choice in a franchise contract is simple either grant the franchisor the right to add new franchisees in the future or allow existing franchisees the right to block the addition of new outlets the literature on vertical restraints assumes that the restraints specified in contracts are enforced and never renegotiated with respect to territorial exclusivity in particular the literature mainly takes two perspectives territorial protection either prevents franchisor hold up behavior the appropriation of franchisee returns from the investment in establishing the local market or it corrects distortions arising from competition among franchisees 2 our model extends the hold up story by recognizing the dynamic nature of contractual relations between parties contracts are always open for renegotiation and the initial contracts are designed with this in mind the key effect in assigning the right to add additional franchisees is on the status quo point in bargaining subsequent to the initial contract the central point is simple the party with the authority to add franchisees can extract a larger portion of the wealth created by investment in the system incentives depend on the appropriated portion of the return to investment therefore the optimal contract assigns the right to the party whose input is more valuable to the system 3 the next section offers a simple model that develops this theme in a subsequent section we examine some facts about franchise systems in place and illustrate alternative assignments of authority ii the model we consider the simplest franchise contract a franchisor f offers to a franchisee g a contract giving the right to collect profits from the use of the franchisor s brand name in a retail territory we assume that the level of economic profits cannot be verified by a third party such as a court this rules out explicit sharing rules for profits between the two parties 4 these profits depend upon the efforts of both the franchisor and franchisee in developing the market the efforts are undertaken immediately after the contract is signed the franchisee s input represents for example local advertising selling effort or quality and the franchisor s input represents for example national advertising or the maintenance of the brand name the profits from the venture are uncertain and depend on the realization of a draw should the system prove sufficiently successful it may be profitable to add another retail outlet the evolution of contracts will respond to any opportunity for profit enhancement and any restrictions in the initial contract preventing this realization will be open for renegotiation the role for territorial constraints in particular may be illustrated within a simple formal model the effort levels of the franchisor and franchisee are denoted by e sub f and e sub g and are measured in dollars the profits earned from the brand name depend upon a stochastic variable e g demand uncertainty denoted by theta which is realized after the efforts are undertaken after the realization of theta there is an opportunity for the franchisor to sell a position in the territory to a second franchisee a product idea that enjoys success warrants an expanded retail network as the market is mature at this point no further investment is required the key element of the contract for our interest is the allocation of authority over the admission of additional retailers to the territory in question does the contract guarantee to the original franchisee exclusive authority to the use of the brand name in the territory

cross country estimates of the demand for money and its components the demand for money aggregates m1 m2 and their components currency demand deposits and time deposits are estimated using a sample of 103 countries at two time periods money demand is found to be affected by age literacy industrial development and political structure as well as income and inflation this expanded demand function helps to explain the considerable changes in money demand that have occurred over long periods and the large variation in money demand found across countries the knowledge thus gained is useful for understanding differences in monetary and taxation policies across countries

rational expectations in elections some experimental results based on a multidimensional model while our experimental results do not show convincingly the superiority of our model over alternative hypotheses these results do not reject the rational expectations approach to handling incomplete information in elections this is not to say of course that our model provides the most appropriate treatment of incomplete information since it relies primarily on one source of information polls certainly other data exist such as the historical record of the parties primary election outcomes and the coalitions observed at nominating conventions which voters might use for information on their choices what we hope our analysis has begun however is a more rigorous study of how citizens can interpret such data and the role played by the various media in supplying these data

exclusive territories and manufacturers collusion this paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains we show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion first granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one shot game hence punishment profits are larger thereby rendering deviation more profitable second exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands adjust their prices to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer whereas intrabrand competition prevents such instantaneous reaction we show that the latter effect tends to dominate thereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to cooperate these insights are robust to endogenous communication between manufacturers we also consider retailers service investments here a novel effect emerges that softens the procollusive value of exclusive territories retailers of a deviant manufacturer increase investments which renders deviation more profitable this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

vertical control and price versus nonprice competition this paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good the mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the product margin whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins given search or travel costs consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins in considering customers on the wrong margin retailers are therefore biased toward price competition this distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints

new concepts of aggregated money the federal reserve board s recent redefinition of its monetary aggregates followed three years of intensive board staff research on monetary aggregation while the new aggregates ultimately were selected along conventional lines some of the staff s research was oriented towards more fundamental changes in monetary aggregation methods this paper reviews such proposals which are based upon the rigorous application of index number and aggregation theory and of principal components analysis in the construction of economic monetary aggregates the usefulness of aggregation and index number theory in acquiring price indices is widely known the theory of the true cost of living index is an application of aggregation theory examples of applied index number theory include the commerce department s implicit price deflator which is a paasche index and the labor department s consumer price index which is a laspeyres index somewhat less well known is the fact that dual to the theory of economic price aggregates and indices is a theory of economic quantity aggregates and indices an example of a highly reputable quantity index is the divisia quantity index the monetary aggregates traditionally are thought to measure the supplied quantity of an economic good called money whenever monetary aggregates are used in the context of economic theory rather than as simple accounting identities the theory of economic quantity aggregation is specifically applicable however published monetary aggregates in all countries have always been computed as simple sums but as fisher 1922 p 29 observed in the conclusion to his classic treatise on index number theory the simple arithmetic average produces one of the very worst of index numbers and if this book has no other effect than to lead to the total abandonment of the simple arithmetic type of index number it will have served a useful purpose with an example of the simple sum index fisher 1922 p 363 found that the bias alone reaches 36 percent although index number theory has not yet found its way into the monetary theory literature all of the literature on index number theory and aggregation theory for the past half century supports the result long ago deduced by fisher 1922 p 361 that the simple arithmetic index should not be used the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the board of governors of the federal reserve system this research was partially supported by national science foundation grant soc 76 84459 we are deeply indebted to the conference session s discussant of this paper w erwin diewert for volunteering to cede his allocated journal space to us so that the paper could take its current extended form federal reserve board washington d c

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

the search for a stable money demand function a survey of the post 1973 literature phe question of whether the demnand function for money is stable is one of the most important recurring issues in the theory and application of macroeconomic policy what is being sought in a stable demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank s control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy as such the notion of a stable demand function appears to involve three key elements e g john t boorman 1976 p 317 and david e w laidler 1977 pp 34 35 first the demand for money relation should be highly predictable in a statistical sense as measured by the usual goodness of fit statistics precision of estimated coefficients and presumably its ability to forecast accurately out of sample second a stable demand function for money has relatively few arguments a relationship that requires knowledge about a large number of variables in order to pin it down is in effect not predictable finally the variables that appear as arguments in the function should represent significant links to spending and economic activity in the real sector in sum a stable demand function for money means that the quantity of money is predictably related to a small set of key variables linking money to the real sector of the economy the importance of a stable money demand function for monetary policy can be illustrated with the standard is lm model in which interest rates and gnp are the endogenous variables in this context a stable demand function for money translates into a well defined relationship between money interest rates and gnp

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

experimental tests of ricardian equivalence this study employs laboratory experiments to test aspects of ricardian equivalence an overlapping generations model forms the basis of the experimental design whenever ricardian equivalence predicts a positive bequest outcomes close to those predicted occur after allowance for learning observed deviations from ricardian equilibrium are small but biased in a keynesian direction changes in bequests do not fully offset changes in government debt the imposition of a binding nonnegativity constraint on bequests produces the predicted neoclassical behavior the cost to the players of deviations from the theoretical equilibrium is apparently an important determinant of the variability of observed deviations

incentive conflicts and contractual restraints evidence from franchising abstract this study uses agency theory to develop testable implications about three provisions commonly observed in franchise contracts 1 restrictions on passive ownership 2 area development plans and 3 mandatory advertising expenditures the primary hypothesis is that these provisions are most likely when there are significant externalities among the units within the franchise system the evidence based on a large sample of franchise contracts is generally consistent with this hypothesis the evidence also suggests that these incentive instruments are complements in contrast to the theory most of the results do not support the hypothesis that the percentage of company owned units is related to externalities within the system franchisee risk aversion and or wealth constraints appear more important while the study focuses on franchising the results provide insights into related provisions in other contracts

recent instability of the demand for money an international perspective aggregate money demand functions once an apparent bulwark for macroeconomic research have had to be re examined in the light of the events and discoveries of the 1970s following goldfeld s extensive analysis it now is widely recognized that the demand for mi balances in the united states cannot be explained satisfactorily by standard functions apparently because of shifts occurring in the early 1970s similar reservations see below have been expressed with respect to m3 balances in the united kingdom where the demand relationships appear to have been upset by the introduction of regulatory reforms in 1971 in both cases part of the problem can be traced to specific events but the possibility remains that a more general instability may be present the rapid inflation experienced by all major industrial countries after 1973 the concurrent collapse of the bretton woods system of fixed exchange rates and the attempts by most major central banks to control growth in domestic money stocks may all have altered the responses of the demand for money to the standard functional arguments this paper presents a range of stability tests for a set of demand functions estimated for two monetary aggregates in each of six countries in order to determine whether money demand functions more generally have been stable over the recent period and to attempt to identify the nature and causes of any observed instabilities the major conclusions are that none of the other functions examined displays instabilities as severe as those of the mi function for the united states and that the latter may be unstable in a more persistent and fundamental way than has heretofore been recognized the equations estimated for this study are based on a variant of goldfeld s log linear real balances function the deflated value of money balances is related to real income interest rates and inflation with lagged adjustments introduced via a simple koyck transformation this function obviously is in a simplified form especially with respect to the lag struc

short run money demand abstract the conventional wisdom holds that the short run demand for money is unstable this paper challenges the conventional view by finding a stable demand for m1 in u s data from 1959 through 1993 the approach follows previous work in interpreting long run money demand as a cointegrating relation and it uses goldfeld s partial adjustment model to interpret short run dynamics the key innovation is the choice of the interest rate in the money demand function most previous work uses a short term market rate but this paper uses the average return on near monies the savings accounts and money market mutual funds that are close substitutes for m1 this choice helps rationalize the behavior of money demand in particular the increase in the volatility of velocity after 1980 is explained by increased volatility in the returns on near monies

universalism in experimental committees most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories however both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real world legislatures making distributive decisions these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits the results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members it will be selected competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative the results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation

the role of money supply shocks in the short run demand for money abstract previous money demand models are either inconsistent with contemporaneous adjustment of the price level to expected changes in the nominal money supply or imply implausible interest rate fluctuations in response to innovations in nominal money we propose a shock absorber money demand model in which money supply shocks affect the synchronization of asset transactions and so engender a temporary increase or decrease in desired money holdings expected changes do not engender such fluctuations in real money inventories in simultaneous estimates for eight industrial countries the shock absorber model proved empirically superior

an experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule dougherty and edward public choice 151 3 655 678 2012 make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random sincere or strategic we test these competing hypotheses in a two dimensional framework using laboratory experiments our primary results suggest 1 majority rule enters the pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule 2 majority rule leaves the pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule and 3 majority rule is more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game

unstable money demand and the monetary model of the exchange rate in this paper the authors investigate the importance for the monetary model of exchange rate determination of j frankel 1979 of allowing unrestricted dynamics and of accounting for shifts in the demand for money due to financial innovation based on estimation and simulation results for the canada u s bilateral exchange rate over the 1970 85 period the aut hors find strong evidence in favor of a generalized approach to dynamic specification but find that the shif t adjustment of official money supply data has only minor implications for the empirical results moreover neither modification is sufficient to generate a monetary model that is well supported by the data

veto games spatial committees under unanimity rule there exists a large literature on two person bargaining games and distribution games or divide the dollar games under simple majority rule where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else here we extend the study to an n person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo briefly we find a nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the pareto optimal set and the pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values and punishments are never implemented comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas sequential recognition and random recognition we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule we also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely

vertical restraints and the law evidence from automobile franchising abstract after a 2002 european commission regulation prohibited the use of dealer exclusive territories automobile franchise contracts in italy introduced price ceilings and standards on verifiable marketing and service inputs such as advertising and salespeople the contracts also imposed quantity floors a practice already in use before the regulatory change the introduction of standards suggests that consistent with a view of vertical restraints as coordination mechanisms manufacturers used exclusive territories to induce desired dealer services and once the use of exclusive territories was prohibited they switched to alternative contractual devices to achieve this goal the introduction of price ceilings despite free intrabrand competition also suggests that car manufacturers tried to prevent some dealers from gaming the quantity floors by selling to other dealers customers while charging monopolistic prices at their own locations

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

exclusive contracts foster relationship specific investment exclusive contracts prohibit one or both parties from trading with anyone else contrary to earlier findings we show that investments that are specific to the contracting parties may be encouraged by exclusivity results depend on the nature of investments and the bargaining solution the major part of the analysis shows that exclusivity deals designed to assure the supply of essential inputs promote investment infinite penalties for breach even if ex post renegotiable may result in excessive investment in which case a positive but finite damage payment yields the first best outcome

a comparison among partial adjustment rational expectations and error correction estimates of the canadian demand for money starting from a dynamic optimization principle the currently most popular approaches to modelling money demand functions are derived the partial adjustment adaptive expectations rational expectations and error correction mechanism formulations are then estimated using a common data set the error correction mechanism equation is found to dominate the others either because their implicit restrictions are rejected rational expectations or by employing the encompassing principle partial adjustment adaptive expectations surprisingly all three forms have similar long run solutions since the short run dynamics differ substantially the results have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy

an experimental test of the baumol tobin transactions demand for money historically generated data do not allow a clean test of any particular money dema nd theory by creating the artificial environment analyzed by william baumol and james tobin s work on the transactions demand for money one can observe how real people pursuing real rewards behave in that environment baumol and tobin assumed people were sufficiently rational to learn four axioms of rational behavior the authors subjects learned only three however trial and error methods plus subjects limited rationality did produce results similar to the baumol tobin predictions this supports the need to weaken the definition of rationality in the manner suggested by herbert simon copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

voting for pareto optimality a multidimensional analysis we compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their abilities to produce pareto superior and pareto optimal alternatives in fixed number of rounds of voting using a two dimensional spatial voting model with random proposals sincere proposals and strategic proposals our findings show that for random or sincere proposals majority rule is at least as likely to select a pareto optimal outcome as unanimity rule for strategic proposals the subgame perfect equilibrium under unanimity rule is pareto optimal for other k majority rules the outcome is pareto optimal or very close to it for outcomes that are both pareto optimal and pareto superior unanimity rule outperforms majority rule

identification and estimation of money demand in most natural sciences physics chemistry biology theories are validated by controlled experiment however in other natural sciences astronomy meteorology and in most social sciences including economics the data are characteristically generated not by experiment but by measurement of uncontrolled systems in economics theories take the form of restrictions on the models assumed to generate the data and statistical methods replace experimental controls in testing these restrictions and here is the difficulty in economics particularly macroeconomics the theory used to derive tests ordinarily does not generate a complete specification of which variables are to be held constant when statistical tests are performed on the relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables of primary interest accordingly in such cases there will be a set of often very different candidate regression based tests each of which has equal status with the others since each is based on a different projection of the same underlying multivariate model except in the unlikely event that the explanatory variables are mutually orthogonal the conditional regression coefficients which generally form the basis for the test statistic will depend on the conditioning set we conclude from this that if a theory which does not generate a complete specification of the regression test is nonetheless to have testable implications these implications must be robust over the permissible alternative specifications if the restrictions indicated by the theory are satisfied in some projections but not in others that have an equal claim to represent implications of the theory one cannot conclude that the theory has been confirmed the fact that the observable implications of valid theories must obtain over a broad but usually incompletely specified set of regressions rather than for a single regression introduces a large and unavoidable element of imprecision into hypothesis testing in macroeconomics generally it appears to be appropriate to weaken the statistical criterion for rejecting theories consider for example the theory of money demand which will engage our attention in this paper the tobin baumol square root formula implies that the elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate is exactly one half but which interest rate should wealth be held constant inflation in view of such uncertainties it would be inappropriate to insist in a literal minded fashion on rejecting the tobin baumol model if in some regression the measured interest elasticity differed from one half by more than two standard deviations and only then obviously a more flexible approach is called for the practice has been to conclude that the statistical evidence is consistent with the tobin baumol model as long as the interest rate coefficient is negative if it is negative and significant or negative and insignificantly different from minus one half that would provide somewhat stronger confirmation but a positive coefficient particularly a significantly positive coefficient would be viewed as raising questions about the validity of the theory in macroeconomics generally as in the money demand application the typical response to specification uncertainty has been to regard a theory as supported if the signs of the estimated coefficients agree with those expected from theory and as disconfirmed otherwise there is no theoretical justification for this procedure but it seems to be a reasonable course to follow the point that economic theory ordinarily generates incompletely specified statistical university of california santa barbara we have received helpful comments from andrew abel robert clower michael darby robert engle stephen goldfeld david laidler edward leamer robert lucas frederic mishkin and edward prescott thomas hall provided able research assistance

international evidence on misspecification of the standard money demand equation abstract this paper tests the proposition that the interest rate in the standard money demand equation acts as a proxy for the expected change in interest rates if this is true the interest elasticity in the standard equation will depend on the expectations process for interest rates using cross country data we find that there does exist a relationship between the observed interest elasticity in the standard equation and the predictability of future interest rates from current interest rates

the economics of franchise contracts as an organizational arrangement the franchise contract lies between anonymous price mediated exchange and centralized intrafirm employment in contrast to conventional market exchange franchise contracts typically impose on franchisees retail quality standards common hours of business price controls and nonlinear payment schedules for example fixed initial royalty fees plus a percentage of gross retail revenues while franchisors typically provide national advertising and training programs monitor and inspect the franchisees performance with varying intensity across industries and hold the residual power to terminate the franchise agreement observations of actual terminations indicate that franchisors sometimes exclude this power franchisors sometimes face persistent queues of potential franchisees in contrast to simple employment contracts franchise agreements provide for sharing of profits through royalties on revenue or output and considerable freedom for independent decisions by local franchisees 1 why do these franchise contracts exist