crossing network versus dealer market unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow the allocation of order flow to alternative trading systems can be understood as a game with strategic substitutes between buyers on the same side of the market as well as one of positive network externalities we consider the allocation of order flow between a crossing network and a dealer market we show that small differences in traders preferences generate a unique switching equilibrium in which patient traders use the crossing network while impatient traders submit orders directly to the dealer market our model explains why assets with large turnovers and low price volatility are likely to be traded on crossing networks while less liquid assets are traded on dealer markets

theories of bank behavior under capital regulation abstract this paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the basel i and basel ii systems of risk based capital requirements the theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk adjusted assets this literature produces highly mixed predictions however regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole thus the intellectual foundation for the present capital regulation regime is not particularly strong the mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements these widely ambiguous results do suggest however that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area

portfolio separation for stockholder owned depository financial intermediaries abstract the conditions leading to separation of asset composition and financing decisions for depository financial intermediaries have received considerable attention in the literature although research to date provides useful insights into the issue of separation none analyze separation from the point of view of shareholder approval in this paper a single period model of investor behavior is developed and analyzed based on market equilibrium the impetus for the existence of intermediaries is random cash payments of investors and liquidation costs the conditions for shareholder unanimity and optimal rules for intermediary decisions are derived the optimality conditions are then analyzed for separation

the estimation of surprise models and the surprise consumption function in the first part of the paper we outline a method for estimating a class of models in which news or surprises appear and expectations are formed rationally the method is an extension of the errors in variables method of mccallum and wickens as a by product some of pagan s results on the circumstances under which the commonly used two step method of estimating surprise models is efficient are shown to be a consequence of well known theorems on the efficiency of sub system estimation when a subset of equations are exactly identified in the second part of the paper the method is applied to hall s random walk model of consumption which is extended to allow for stochastic interest rates and for leisure and government spending to be substitutes for private spending the extended formulation is a great deal more successful at capturing the salient features of the data we also derive approximate restrictions across the parameters of the model due to the rational expectations hypothesis but find that they are marginally rejected by the data finally we evaluate the ability of the life cycle with rational expectations model to encompass alternative models

habit formation in consumer preferences evidence from panel data this paper tests for the presence of habit formation using household data a simple model of habit formation implies a condition relating the strength of habits to the evolution of consumption over time when the condition is estimated with food consumption data from the panel study on income dynamics the results yield no evidence of habit formation at the annual frequency this finding is robust to a number of changes in the specification it also holds for several proxies for nondurables and services consumption created by combining psid variables with weights estimated from consumer expenditure survey data

ruling out multiplicity and indeterminacy the role of heterogeneity it is well known that economies of scale that are external to the individual decision makers can lead to self fulfilling prophecies and the multiplicity or even indeterminacy of equilibrium we argue that the importance of this source of multiplicity and indeterminacy is overstated in representative agent models as they ignore the potential stabilizing effect of heterogeneity we illustrate this in a version of matsuyama s 1991 two sector model with increasing returns to scale two main results are shown first sufficient homogeneity with respect to individual productivity leads to the instability and non uniqueness of a given stationary state and the indeterminacy of the corresponding stationary state equilibrium second sufficient heterogeneity leads to the global saddle path stability and the uniqueness of a given stationary state and the global uniqueness of equilibrium

when do banks take equity in debt restructurings this article examines the conditions under which bank lenders make concessions by taking equity in financially distressed firms i show that the role banks play in debt restructurings depends on the financial condition of the firm the existence of public debt in the firm s capital structure and the ability of public debt to be restructured empirically i find that for firms with public debt outstanding banks never make concessions unless public debtholders also restructure their claims when banks do take equity on average they obtain a substantial proportion of the firm s stock and they maintain their position for over two years article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

is consumption too smooth long memory and the deaton paradox under common arima representations of income the permanent income hypothesis predicts that the volatility of consumption should be larger than the volatility of unanticipated shocks to income this prediction is not supported by the data the authors examine whether this apparent excess smoothness of consumption is the result of the arima representation s implicit restrictions on low frequency dynamics by using a generalized long memory stochastic representation the authors construct confidence intervals for the long run impulse response of income in the absence of such low frequency restrictions these intervals are quite wide and include regions in which excess smoothness vanishes copyright 1991 by mit press

consumption and fractional differencing old and new anomalies haubrich is an economic advisor at the federal reserve bank of cleveland the author would like to thank andrew abel angus deaton roger kormendi andrew lo and seminar participants at the university of pennsylvania the federal national mortgage association and the winter econometric society meetings for stimulating discussions working papers of the federal reserve bank of cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment the views stated herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of cleveland or of the board of governors of the federal reserve system september 1990

permanent and transitory movements in labor income an explanation for excess smoothness in consumption many have argued that if labor income is difference stationary the permanent income hypothesis predicts that consumption should be relatively volatile in u s aggregate data labor income is well characterized as having a unit root however consumption turns out to be relatively smooth this anomaly is known as deaton s paradox i resolve deaton s paradox by providing decompositions of labor income into permanent and transitory components these preserve the univariate dynamic properties of labor income however when agents distinguish permanent and transitory movements in their labor income as the rational expectations hypothesis asserts they should the permanent income hypothesis correctly predicts the observed smoothness in consumption

a new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle abstract this paper introduces a general procedure for decomposition of non stationary time series into a permanent and transitory component allowing both components to be stochastic the permanent component is shown to be a random walk with drift and the transitory or cyclical component is a stationary process with mean zero the decomposition methodology which depends only on past data and therefore is computable in real time is applied to the problem of measuring and dating business cycles in the portwar u s economy we find that measured expansions and contractions are of roughly equivalent duration and that our dating of cyclical episodes tends to lead the traditional nber dating and to a lesser extent the growth cycle chronology of zarnowitz and boschan 1977

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

long memory in foreign exchange rates using the geweke porter hudak test we find evidence of long memory in exchange rate data this implies that the empirical evidence of unit roots in exchange rates may not be robust to long memory alternatives fractionally integrated autoregressive moving average arfima models are estimated by both the time domain exact maximum likelihood ml method and the frequency domain approximate ml method impulse response functions and forecasts based on these estimated arfima models are evaluated to gain insight into the long memory characteristics of exchange rates some tentative explanations of the long memory found in the exchange rates are discussed

an incentive approach to banking regulation we examine the optimal design of a risk adjusted deposit insurance scheme when the regulator has less information than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank s assets adverse selection and when the regulator is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are being directed away from normal operations toward activities that lower asset quality moral hazard under a socially optimal insurance scheme 1 asset quality is below the first best level 2 higher quality banks have larger asset bases and face lower capital adequacy requirements than lower quality banks and 3 the probability of failure is equated across banks perihaps t he most troubling aspect of the current deposit insurance system is the distortions caused by the pervasive use of an insurance premium that is independent of risk the undesirable incentives that result when such a system is employed in a world with imperfect information have long been recognized in the literature of particular concern is the incentive banks have to increase the risk of their portfolio in order to maximize the value of the deposit insurance provided in some respects this problem is similar to the incentives generated by corporate debt however the solution to this problem may be different in a banking context because the creditors include the deposit insurer who has the power to regulate the banks conceivably regulation may be able to mitigate the informational problem at hand in this paper we examine some of the tradeoffs that arise in the design of a regulatory system for banks

deposit insurance and lender of last resort functions we consider issues concerning the design of a banking system safety net when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present in our model both entities have a role to play moreover issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not we discuss when and why or why not a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest and we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria

banks equity stakes and lending evidence from a tax reform abstract we study how a bank s equity stake in a borrowing firm affects lending to that firm similar to prior papers we find a positive association between a bank s equity stake in a borrowing firm and lending to that firm while such a positive cross sectional correlation may be due to equity stakes benefiting lending it may also be driven by endogeneity to distinguish the two explanations we study a german tax reform that permitted banks to sell their equity stakes tax free after the reform many banks sold their equity stakes but did not reduce lending to the firms this observation is robust to several alternative model specifications control groups and time windows our findings suggest that banks equity stakes may be less important for lending than previously thought

multicointegration in us consumption data the present study tests for the existence of multicointegration between real per capita private consumption expenditure and real per capita disposable personal income in the usa in doing so the study exploits the fact that the flows of disposable income and consumption expenditure on the one hand and the stock of consumers wealth which can be considered as cumulative past discrepancies between the flows of income and expenditure on the other hand can be thought of as a stock flow model in which multicointegration is likely to occur recently developed i 2 techniques are applied for testing for multicointegrating relations and find supporting evidence for the existence of multicointegration in us consumption data

universal banking and firm risk taking abstract this paper analyzes the welfare implications of banks taking equity stakes in firms under conditions of imperfect information and moral hazard two cases of bank control over investment decisions are analyzed in the first the bank does not control the investment decisions of the firm here the investment efficiency is higher and bank risk is lower for an optimal positive level of bank equity holdings however in the case when the bank has veto power over investment proposals by the firm there is a trade off between increased investment efficiency and increased bank risk

should banks own equity stakes in their borrowers a contractual solution to hold up problems abstract this paper develops a model to answer the question whether a bank should hold a share of the equity of a borrowing firm the model shows that a small equity stake held by the bank can have a significant and positive impact on the lending relationship the benefit of bank equity participation arises from the reduced ability of the bank to extract rents from the firm in multiple rounds of financing this in turn improves the firm s incentive to make investments in profitable projects that require future outside finance the benefit is likely to be significant for small to medium size firms growth firms and firms with ongoing capital needs the paper addresses from a corporate finance perspective the current debate about whether banks should be allowed to own equity stakes in corporations and how large these equity stakes should be

risk in banking and capital regulation this paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control it is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk utilizing the mean variance model the following results are shown a the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks b as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation the theoretically correct risk weights under the risk based capital plan are explicitly derived and c the theoretically correct risk weights are restrictions on asset composition which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms the recent increase in bank failures especially after the 1980 and 1982 deregulatory acts has again ignited a controversy over the risk portfolio of the banking industry given the importance of this sector there has been increased scrutiny of the industry s motives for risk taking and possible regulatory changes to improve its stability these investigations have centered around two rather complementary areas the first of these is the role of deposit insurance and how its current pricing procedure encourages risk taking and justifies current bank regulations the works of buser chen and kane 4 kane 9 and benston et al 2 have made substantive contributions the authors demonstrates the way in which our current fixed rate insurance system rewards risk taking by the firm and insulates it through deposit insurance from the market discipline that needs to exist to ensure proper risk evaluation this realization has led these authors to propose a series of regulatory changes to encourage proper portfolio choice within the industry these include a shift to market value accounting risk based deposit insurance premiums and additional capital regulation the last of these serves as a method of coinsurance whereby higher capital levels require the bank to absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourage additional prudence in management in essense it is one method of risk reduction that may offset the risk preference imposed on the industry due to the inappropriate insurance pricing because the amount of capital influences the probability of bank insolvency and thus the soundness of the entire banking system the regulators ceteris paribus prefer more capital to

a global game with strategic substitutes and complements abstract we study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region an agent s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents if the degree of congestion is sufficiently large agents strategies are non monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental in this case a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action because of the risk of overcrowding

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

bank capital and equity investment regulations abstract this paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks minimum required capital asset ratio and the regulation that limits and in some countries forbids banks investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms there are two sources of moral hazard in the model one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project among other things the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank s stability and can also be pareto improving equity regulation is never pareto improving and does not increase the bank s stability

are output fluctuations transitory according to the conventional view of the business cycle fluctuations in output represent temporary deviations from trend the purpose of this paper is to question this conventional view if fluctuations in output are dominated by temporary deviations from the natural rate of output then an unexpected change in output today should not substantially change one s forecast of output in say five or ten years our examination of quarterly postwar united states data leads us to be skeptical about this implication the data suggest that an unexpected change in real gnp of 1 percent should change one s forecast by over 1 percent over a long horizon

why is consumption so smooth for thirty years it has been accepted that consumption is smooth because permanent income is smoother than measured income this paper considers the evidence for the contrary position that permanent income is in fact less smooth than measured income so that the smoothness of consumption cannot be straightforwardly explained by permanent income theory the paper argues that in postwar u s quarterly data consumption is smooth because it responds with a lag to changes in income

capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks abstract i study the consequences of capital regulations on the portfolio choices of commercial banks elaborating on previous work by kareken and wallace 1978 koehn and santomero 1980 and kim and santomero 1988 i obtain the following results if the objective of commercial banks is maximization of the market value of their future profits value maximizing banks capital regulations cannot prevent banks from choosing very specialized and very risky portfolios risk based insurance premia are in fact the relevant instrument for that purpose on the other hand if banks behave as portfolio managers utility maximizing banks capital regulations can be effective but only if the weights used in the computation of the ratio are proportional to the systematic risks of the assets their betas because of limited liability of commercial banks a minimum capital regulation or a closing rule may become necessary as well to prevent failing banks from betting for resurrection

dynamism capital structure and performance in a sub saharan economy extending the institutional difference hypothesis extant research examining the capital structure performance relationship has been undertaken primarily in developed economies these studies integrate agency theory considerations with the contingency perspective and suggest a positive interaction between sector dynamism equity and performance our study extends this research stream by examining the capital structure performance link in a sub saharan economy an underresearched but economically emerging region using logic undergirding a substantial stream of institutional theory based studies that we term the institutional difference hypothesis we argue that the implications of the capital structure performance relationship are contingent on the extent of national level institutional underdevelopment taking into account institutional differences between developed economies and those in the sub saharan region we hypothesize a negative interaction between sector dynamism equity and firm performance in sub sahara using longitudinal data from ghanaia

a reexamination of mean variance analysis of bank capital regulation abstract the mean variance framework has been used to analyze the effects of bank capital regulation on the asset and bankruptcy risk of insured utility maximizing banks this literature claims that more stringent capital regulation will increase asset risk and can increase bankruptcy risk these conclusions are notable because they are opposite to those obtained for insured value maximizing banks in this paper we show that the utility maximization literature does not support its conclusions regarding the effects of bank capital regulation because it has mischaracterized the bank s investment opportunity set by neglecting the option value of deposit insurance

the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge the paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem two players have to play one of two possible coordination games only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played it is shown that the situation with almost common knowledge is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

a market evaluation of the risk based capital standards for the u s financial system abstract this paper evaluates u s risk based capital guidelines by comparing stock market measures of institutions risk with current regulatory risk based capital measures the first part of the evaluation compares overall market and regulatory risk based capital measures of current capital adequacy required capital and the capital infusion required to meet the capital requirement the second part compares regulatory risk weights on individual risk categories with market determined risk weights the results suggest that the market and risk based capital standards agree to some extent on the adequacy of institutions current capital and required capital infusion but that their measures of asset risk are not positively correlated further the 100 percent risk category for banks and the 50 and 200 percent categories for s ls do distinguish activities that are riskier by market measures however the market model makes limited distinctions among the other categories in addition the results suggest that some off balance sheet activities for banks may reduce asset risk

consumption and portfolio choice under internal multiplicative habit formation this paper explores the optimal consumption and investment behavior of an individual who derives utility from the ratio between his consumption and an endogenous habit we obtain closed form policies under general utility functionals and stochastic investment opportunities by developing a nontrivial linearization to the budget constraint this enables us to explicitly characterize how habit formation affects the marginal propensity to consume and optimal stock bond investments we also show that in a setting that combines habit formation with epstein zin utility consumption no longer grows at unrealistically high rates at high ages and investments in risky assets decrease

capital regulation and bank risk taking a note abstract this paper examines theoretically the effects of more stringent capital regulation on bank asset portfolio risk the analysis shows that for a value maximizing bank incentives to increase asset risk decline as its capital increases thus as long as regulatory efforts to contain asset risk and size are not reduced more stringent capital regulation unambiguously reduces the expected liability of the deposit insurance system

subordinated debt market discipline and bank risk this paper demonstrates that subordinated debt subdebt thereafter regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks by reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value destroying actions to benefit themselves subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk moreover subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks moral hazard problems to make subdebt regulation effective regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank s equity when the government provides assistance to the bank

deposit insurance a reconsideration abstract this paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls in our economy the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any fdic losses deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied fdic revenue shortfalls moreover local variations in the magnitude of fdic losses will generically be irrelevant for the determination of any equilibrium quantities that affect agent welfare however large enough changes in these losses can matter there is no presumption that keeping these shortfalls low is a good idea finally we show that multiple pareto ranked equilibria can be observed the potential for multiplicity of equilibria may depend on components of fdic policy our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions 1 actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable 2 implicit fdic subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable 3 large fdic losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system 4 risk based deposit insurance premia can easily be used to reduce moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance provision

international evidence on the persistence of economic fluctuations abstract this paper presents new evidence on the persistence of fluctuations in real gnp we estimate two measures of persistence nonparametrically using post war quarterly data from canada france germany italy japan the united kingdom and the united states we compare these estimates with monte carlo results from various ar 2 processes for six out of seven countries the point estimates indicate that a 1 shock to output should change the long run unvariate forecast of output by well over 1 low order arma models yield similar conclusions finally we examine the persistence in relative outputs of different countries

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks abstract how bankers choose the riskiness of their individual assets is an important question it is well known that fixed premium deposit insurance leads a bank to prefer a high variance asset portfolio but its effect on individual asset choice has not been carefully evaluated this paper demonstrates how bank examination procedures and capital adequacy standards can make the value of a bank s deposit insurance contract concave in individual asset risks insured bankers may therefore have a rational preference ceteris paribus for relatively safe individual loans even while they prefer risky portfolio returns the model s implications for loan securitization and the federal regulators new risk based capital standards are discussed

the deaton paradox in a long memory context with structural breaks this article contributes to the permanent income hypothesis pih and excess consumption smoothness debate in the context of fractional integration we show that the excess consumption smoothness result is a consequence of the quarterly data frequency commonly employed in the empirical work in fact the i 1 hypothesis is rejected for the income process with monthly data in favour of a fractional integration order lower than 1 moreover if a structural break is taken into account we observe a substantial reduction in the degree of consumption smoothness especially after the break found in 1975

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation