bureaucrats or politicians part ii multiple policy tasks abstract policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats this paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non elected bureaucrats politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short termism is an issue or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome we then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ

additions to bank loan loss reserves good news or bad news abstract this paper examines the effects of citicorp s and succeeding banks loan loss reserve announcements in 1987 it was found that while the average effect on bank stock return portfolios was weak the effect on individual bank returns was heterogeneous tests were undertaken to determine which bank specific variables explained the latter result two significant variables were the size of a banks ldc debt exposure and its position in ldc rescheduling committees

effects of the 1970 bank holding company act evidence from capital markets this study measures the effects of the 1970 amendment to the bank holding company bhc act on the profitability and risk of bhcs using capital market data differences in abnormal returns and risk among three portfolios of bank shares which differ in their regulatory status are examined in various periods preceding and following the enactment no significant differences in performance and no change in the relative risk of any pair of portfolios were observed thus the null hypothesis that the nonbank expansion provisions of the 1970 amendment had no effect on bhcs risk and profitability cannot be rejected the growth of bank holding companies and their expansion into nonbank activities following the 1970 amendment to the bank holding company bhc act of 1956 produced striking structural changes in the banking industry the nonbank expansion provisions of the statute triggered a continuing debate about the costs and benefits of these provisions black miller and posner 2 consider the amendment to be an important innovation that can increase the efficiency and hence the profitability of financial intermediaries other writers however suggest that nonbank activities of bank holding companies may increase the risk of bank failure thereby increasing the regulatory involvement silverberg 14 orgler and wolkowitz 13 and mayne 10 2 this study analyzes the effects of the 1970 amendment to the bank holding company act on the profitability and riskiness of bank holding companies capital market data are used to measure risk and return fama 6

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

the wealth effects of deregulation of canadian financial institutions abstract canada like other industrial countries recently introduced various financial reforms to remove the barriers separating the operations and ownership of banks from non bank financial institutions this study analyzes the wealth effects of the reforms on the banks and non bank financial institutions and the changes in their systematic risk resulting from financial deregulation over the period 1984 to 1991 the results indicate that while there was a significant cumulative gain for the insurance industry unlike a number of u s studies there was no evidence of wealth transfer among the institutions during the period of deregulation of the canadian financial system additional tests indicate that although the regulatory changes did not have a significant effect on the risk of the banks the systematic risk of the non bank financial institutions increased significantly during the period of regulatory reforms

measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data this article examines the usefulness of stock returns in measuring the effects of regulation when the dates on which market expectations change are not known and standard sources e g the wall street journal are used to choose announcement dates twenty major changes in regulatory constraint since 1887 are considered tests using either monthly or daily data are found to have surprisingly little ability to detect the effects of regulation the evidence shows that formal regulatory announcements are generally anticipated in cases where it is unclear when expectations change

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

capital gains tax and equity values empirical test of stock price reaction to the introduction and reduction of capital gains tax exemption abstract this paper evaluates the differential effect on stock prices of the introduction in canada of 500 000 capital gains tax exemption and the reduction of this limit to 100 000 two years later using the seemingly unrelated regression methodology and controlling for thin trading and heteroscedasticity the empirical evidence indicates that the changes in capital gains tax laws had a differential effect on low dividend yield and high dividend yield stocks on both occasions while the evidence indicates that the stock market anticipated the 1985 capital gains tax law changes the significant market reaction to the 1987 reduction of the exemption occurred a day before and after the reading of the tax reform proposals in parliament thus it can be inferred from the results that despite the presence of tax sheltering opportunities in canada changes in capital gains tax laws affect equity values

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

bank foreign lending mandatory disclosure rules and the reaction of bank stock prices to the mexican debt crisis this paper examines the effects of the mexican debt mora torium in august 1982 on bank valuation the mexican default resulted in the passage of regulations requiring public disclosure of bank fo reign lending exposure the authors find that even in the absence of public disclosure regulations investors were able to discriminate a mong banks with different levels of exposure copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

market expectations of the effects of the tax reform act of 1986 on banking organizations abstract this study investigates market expectations regarding the effect of the tax reform act of 1986 on the banking industry the evidence shows that overall the tax reform did not adversely affect the stocks of banking institutions the findings suggest that overall banking organizations were expected to largely mitigate any negative effects of the tax reform on their cash flow by rebalancing and or repricing their portfolios of assets and liabilities the most significant provision of the new act was the limitation on foreign tax credits interestingly the markets did not expect any adverse valuation effects from the recapture of loan loss reserves or the elimination of the interest deductibility for carrying tax exempt securities

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

short interest and the asymmetry of the price volume relationship in the canadian stock market abstract several studies have revealed an asymmetry in the price volume relationship in the equities markets this paper verifies this relationship using canadian data and presents an alternative test of the costly short sales hypothesis based on the volume of outstanding short interest in the stock market contrary to previous studies the empirical tests in this study do not rely on futures markets data but rather measure and compare the effects of relative short interest positions on the price volume relationship for positive and negative price changes the results suggest that the greater the ratio of short positions to the number of shares outstanding the greater the trading volume associated with price increases relative to that accompanying price decreases

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

an analysis of the impact of deposit rate ceilings on the market values of thrift institutions this paper examines the impact of changes in deposit interest rate regulations on the common stock values of savings and loan institutions the analysis indicates that stockholder owned savings and loans s l s have experienced statistically significant declines in equity market values at the announcement of the removal of ceilings on certain consumer small saver certificate accounts and the introduction of short term variable rate money market certificates we find the evidence to be consistent with the hypothesis that s l s have earned economic rents from restrictions on interest rates paid to small saver accounts and that relaxation of interest rate ceilings has reduced these rents a central issue in the economics of regulation is whether regulators behave in a way that primarily benefits the economic agents whose actions they are supposed to regulate the proposition that regulation is demanded and acquired by the regulated and that regulations are designed and administered primarily for their benefit was originally put forth by stigler 19 and has come to be known as the capture theory of regulation an alternative view is that regulators adopt policies which serve some other perhaps public or possibly the regulators own interest and that administration of these policies does not benefit the regulated entities this paper examines the regulation of savings and loan associations deposit interest rates and reports evidence pertaining to the impact of the administration of regulation regulation of interest rates paid to depositors in federally insured savings and loan associations began in 1966 since that time several changes in the maximum allowed interest rates deposit rate ceilings have been made these changes present an opportunity to observe the impact of one form of regulatory action on savings and loan institutions deposit rate regulation has been the subject of extensive previous research the empirical investigations have focused primarily on two issues 1 the allocational efficiency and wealth redistribution effects of rate ceilings and 2 the impact of deposit rate ceilings on the flow of funds into the residential

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

twin deficits apparition or reality this paper uses cointegration and multicointegration analysis to explore the issue of twin deficits for the usa in the post world war ii period the results suggest that prior to 1974 the systems of fiscal and foreign sector variables exhibit multicointegration these results do not rule out short run correlations between government deficits and external deficits however they do preclude the possibility that the twin deficit phenomenon describes a long run structural relationship in the post world war ii bretton woods era in the more recent period 1974 forward neither system exhibits evidence of multi cointegration but weak evidence of cointegration is present between fiscal deficits and trade deficits error correction models suggest that causality runs from internal to external deficits in the dynamic adjustment process this evidence provides some support for the notion that more recently fiscal deficits may have contributed to external deficits in combination with the results from the early s

an approach to statistical inference in cross sectional models with security abnormal returns as dependent variable several recent event studies test hypotheses about the association between event related abnormal security returns and firm characteristics using a three step procedure first forecast model parameters are estimated usually parameters of a market model second prediction errors or residuals are computed over an event period third prediction errors are regressed cross sectionally on firm characteristics hypothesized to influence the impact of the event on share values results of these regressions are used to draw inferences about the relation between abnormal returns and firm characteristics researchers who employ three step procedures acknowledge that crosssectional ols regressions lead to valid inferences if the disturbances are iid normal in cross section see for example leftwich 1981 p 23 and lustgarten 1982 p 138 while sufficient assumptions to draw valid inferences from ols regressions are clear these assumptions are violated if there is cross correlation and cross sectional heteroscedasticity in the firm return processes from which the prediction errors are estimated assumptions about the processes generating these prediction

the effects of the international banking act on domestic bank profitability and risk the passage of the international banking act of 1978 was the first major step towards imposing consistent and uniform federal regulations on the growing number of foreign banks entering the united states prior to this date foreign banks had been subject to a patchwork of state laws of varying degrees of stringency covering their entry expansion and portfolio behavior see white 1982 and walker 1983 the net result of this patchwork of state regulation was that by 1978 foreign banks had developed certain competitive advantages over domestic banks these advantages emanated from the fact that foreign bank branches and agencies i were not required to meet federal reserve determined reserve requirements on liabilities such as large cds and ii they were not subject to federal laws governing interstate banking the 1927 mcfadden act and activity diversification the 1933 glass steagall act and the 1956 bank holding company act including its 1970 amendments however foreign banks were also subject to certain disadvantages compared to domestic banks in particular they were inhibited from entering into retail banking markets by being ineligible for fdic insurance and being denied access to fed services such as check collection and the discount window to eliminate these discrepancies in relative regulation the international banking act iba was introduced in the house of representatives in february 1978 re

political budget cycles and the civil service evidence from highway spending in us states abstract we study political budget cycles in infrastructure spending that are conditional on bureaucratic organization bureaucrats can facilitate or hinder politicians ability to engage in voter friendly spending around elections to test this idea we use civil service reforms undertaken by us states in the second half of the 20th century to study political budget cycles in highway spending under civil service and patronage we find that under patronage highway spending is 12 higher in election years and 9 higher in the year before an election by contrast under civil service highway spending is essentially smooth over the electoral cycle these findings provide a novel way through which civil service rules can stabilize government activity

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted

the effects of a shift in monetary policy regime on the profitability and risk of commercial banks abstract this paper examines the effects of the fed s october 6th 1979 change in monetary policy regime on the profitability and risk of commercial banks using capital market data and an event study methodology it was found that bank stocks exhibited significant abnormal returns during the announcement week of the policy change when these abnormal returns were decomposed into a part related to unexpected interest rate changes and a part assumed to reflect increased rate variability the results were consistent with a negative relationship between bank returns and interest rate surprises as well as between bank returns and rate variability