marriage bequest and assortative matching in rural ethiopia abstract this article examines the determinants of human and physical capital at marriage using detailed data from rural ethiopia we find that assets brought to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner for first unions assets brought to marriage are positively associated with parents wealth indicating that a bequest motive affects assets at marriage parental wealth affects the inheritance of neither groom nor bride sibling competition from brothers affects grooms inheritance but sisters have no effect the marriage market is a major conduit for rural and gender inequality although avenues do exist for couples to accumulate wealth over their life cycle

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

revisiting the role of education for agricultural productivity while the majority of micro studies finds that rural education increases agricultural productivity various recent cross country regressions analysing the determinants of agricultural productivity were only able to detect insignificant or even surprising negative effects of schooling in this paper we argue and show that this failure to find a positive impact of education in the international context is rather a data problem related to the use of enrolment and literacy indicators using a panel of 95 developing and middle income countries from 1961 to 2002 together with the newest version of the barro lee educational attainment dataset we show that education indeed has a highly significant positive effect on agricultural productivity which is robust to changes in the control variables and in the econometric methods applied distinguishing between different levels of education further reveals that only primary and secondary schooling have significant positive impacts while tertiary education remains insignificant finally the effect of education is estimated separately for countries with different income levels results indicate that the coefficient of the education variable remains insignificant for countries from the poorest three income quintiles while it is positive and highly significant for the richest two quintiles this finding can be interpreted as support for the prominent argument claiming that education leads to higher agricultural productivity only in the presence of rapid technical change where education will help farmers to adjust more readily to the new opportunities

formal schooling and workforce participation in a rapidly developing economy evidence from compulsory junior high school in taiwan abstract using 18 consecutive household surveys this study explores the impact of taiwan s extension of tuition free education from 6 to 9 years upon schooling and labor market outcomes participation sector class of activity and work income i estimate upward shifts relative to preexisting trends of more than 0 4 years of education for males and 0 25 years for females in the first six cohorts affected by compulsory junior high schooling utilizing inter cohort variation within an instrumental variables iv strategy i find larger effects of schooling on females workforce participation and total earnings even controlling for selection

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

skills schooling and household income in ghana this article examines the impact of cognitive skills on the income of households in ghana it uses scores on mathematics and english tests to measure cognitive skills and estimates the returns to these skills based on farm profit off farm income and total income the article uses powell s censored least absolute deviations and symmetrically trimmed least squares estimators to estimate farm and off farm income in contrast to heckman s two step or the tobit estimator powell s estimators are consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and are robust to other violations of normality the results show that cognitive skills have a positive effect on total and off farm income but do not have a statistically significant effect on farm income

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

the dispersion of employees wage increases and firm performance previous studies examining intra firm wage dispersion and firm performance have focused on wage levels the authors of this study argue that for purposes of comparing wage dispersion s positive inc

the returns from schooling in a diversified rural economy controlling for the endogeneity of activity choice and considering both household head and family schooling we findevid ence of high returns from schooling in both crop andnoncrop activities as schooling levels increase the returns from schooling shift away from crop production failure to control for activity selection andfamily schooling is likely to result in biasedestimates of the returns from schooling in individual activities copyright 2000 oxford university press

labor market participation of chinese agricultural households empirical evidence from zhejiang province abstract this work is devoted to the analysis of the different labor market participation regimes of chinese farm households over the reform process in the 1980s and 1990s using household data over the period 1986 2002 from the province zhejiang we apply a multinomial logit model to empirically examine household farm and regional characteristics affecting the probability that farmers participate in one of four alternative labor market regimes as generally accepted off farm participation is the dominant form of farm households labor market participation but rural households show additionally a significant impact on rural employment mainly linked with non agricultural household business results suggest that labor market decisions are significantly related to several family farm and village characteristics in particular we find education to be a key determinant of participation furthermore results point to a higher probability of female household members to take up off farm work

the impact of education in rural ghana examining household labor allocation and returns on and off the farm most of the human capital literature pertaining to developing countries focuses on the returns to education in either farm work or wage work few studies examine how education affects the allocation of time between these activities this paper estimates the returns to education in farm and off farm work and consequently the role of education in determining the allocation of labor the results from this study show that off farm work has a much higher return to education than does farm work and suggest that this divergence in returns affects the allocation of labor in farm households between farm and off farm work

rural urban disparity and sectoral labour allocation in china this study examines china s rural urban segmentation and its causes in the context of economic reforms household survey and aggregate data indicate a v shaped process in which rural urban consumption and income differentials decreased between 1978 and 1985 but then have continually increased to historically high levels this sectoral division is consistent with production function estimates based on provincial data that reveal higher labour productivity in urban state owned industries than in rural industries and agriculture to explain the v shaped change we argue that the precedent of successful rural reforms raised farmers relative earnings but the remaining obstacles to an efficient sectoral allocation of labour have prevented china from eliminating dualism recent financial policies consisting of urban price subsidies and increased investment credits have also had influential distribution effects that are biased against the rural sector

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

keynesian government spending multipliers and spillovers in the euro area the global financial crisis has led to a renewed interest in discretionary fiscal stimulus advocates of discretionary measures emphasize that government spending can stimulate additional private spending the keynesian multiplier effect thus we investigate whether the spending package announced by euro area governments for 2009 and 2010 is likely to boost gdp by more than one for one because of modelling uncertainty it is essential that such policy evaluations be robust to alternative modelling assumptions and parameterizations we use five different empirical macroeconomic models with keynesian features such as price and wage rigidities to evaluate the impact of the fiscal stimulus four of them suggest that the planned increase in government spending will reduce private consumption and investment significantly only a model that largely ignores the forward looking behavioural response of consumers and firms implies crowding in of private spending we review a range of issues that may play a role in the recession of 2008 2009 implementation lags are found to reinforce crowding out and may even cause an initial contraction zero bound effects may lead the central bank to abstain from interest rate hikes and increase the gdp impact of government spending crowding in however requires an immediate anticipation of at least two years at the zero bound using a multi country model we find that spillovers between euro area countries are negligible or even negative because direct demand effects are offset by the indirect effect of a euro appreciation new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models provide a strong case for government savings packages announced with sufficient lead time spending cuts induce a significant short run stimulus and crowding in of private spending tobias cwik and volker wieland

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

incentives for helping on the job theory and evidence recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers performance through helping efforts this article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation the model is tested with australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups the evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced while individual efforts are increased when promotion incentives are strong piece rates and profit sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated

heterogeneity and performance in tournaments a test for incentive effects using professional tennis data this article provides an approach to test whether greater heterogeneity of contestants leads to lower effort exertion in elimination tournaments as predicted by conventional tournament models this prediction is difficult to test with real world data because the effort is difficult to measure based on a simple behavioural model testable implications are derived and an identification strategy is suggested that allows to test for an incentive effect of heterogeneity even when the effort is unobservable the application uses data from professional tennis tournaments and provides evidence that heterogeneity affects the incentives to exert effort

competition between and within teams abstract we consider the effect of team size the observability of effort and the competitiveness of the team s environment in determining team members allocations of effort between team oriented and selfish efforts

output effects of government purchases the theoretical analysis focuses on the distinction between temporary and permanent movements in government purchases under plausible conditions the temporary case involves an output response that is positive less than one to one with the change in government purchases and larger than that generated by an equal sized but permanent shift in purchase the equilibrium real rate of return rise in the temporary case but changes little in the permanent one defense purchases are divided empirically into permanent and temporary components by considering the role of temporary wars no temporary shifts in nondefense purchases were isolated empirical results verify an expansionary output effect for temporary purchases that exceeds that of permanent purchases the results for some other expectational hypotheses are found to be generally supportive of the theory

incentives and wage rigidity with the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect that is they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall this paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

quitters never win the adverse incentive effects of competing with superstars internal competition may motivate worker effort yet the benefits of competition may depend critically on workers relative abilities large skill differences may reduce efforts i use panel data from professional golf tournaments and find that the presence of a superstar is associated with lower performance on average golfers first round scores are approximately 0 2 strokes worse when tiger woods participates relative to when woods is absent the overall tournament effect is 0 8 strokes the adverse superstar effect varies with the quality of woods s play there is no evidence that reduced performance is attributable to media attention intensity or risky strategy adoption

rural nonfarm employment and incomes in the himalayas abstract nonfarm activities generate on average about 60 of rural households incomes in the himalayas this article analyzes the determinants of participation in nonfarm activities and of nonfarm incomes across rural households a unique data set collected in the himalayan region of india allows us to deal with the heterogeneity of rural nonfarm activities by using aggregations into categories that are useful both analytically and for policy purposes we conduct an empirical inquiry that reveals that education plays a major role in accessing more remunerative nonfarm employment other household assets and characteristics such as land social status and geographical location also play a role

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

the determinants of nonfarm activities and incomes of rural households in mexico with emphasis on education abstract this paper presents the main results of a study of the effects of education as well as other household assets on the choice of activities and incomes of rural mexican households our study examines the various income sources as well as the education of the household s head and its members implications are drawn for rural education and development policies to promote rural nonfarm incomes and employment

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

temporal and spatial modelling of tropical deforestation a survival analysis linking satellite and household survey data we estimate a spatially explicit model of the forest clearance process among smallholder farmers in an agricultural frontier of southern mexico our analysis takes as its point of departure a simple utility maximising model that suggests many possible determinants of deforestation in an economic environment characterised by missing or thin markets hypotheses from the model are tested on a data set that combines a time series of satellite imagery with data collected from a survey of farm households whose agricultural plots were geo referenced using a global positioning system gps we implement a survival analysis to identify the effect of household level explanatory variables on the probability of deforestation this approach allows us to introduce a measure of the time until clearance as a covariate thereby affording a control for the effect of potentially important explanatory variables that vary through time but are not directly observable in addition to identifying several variables relevant for policy analysis including household demographics proximity to roads and government provision of agricultural support model results suggest that the deforestation process is characterised by non linear duration dependence with the probability of forest clearance first decreasing and then increasing with the passage of time

macroeconomic effects from government purchases and taxes for u s annual data that include world war ii the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0 4 0 5 contemporaneously and 0 6 0 7 over 2 years if the change in defense spending is permanent gauged by ramey s defense news variable the multipliers are higher by 0 1 0 2 since all estimated multipliers are significantly less than 1 greater spending crowds out other components of gdp particularly investment the lack of good instruments prevents estimation of reliable multipliers for nondefense purchases multipliers in the literature of two or more likely reflect reverse causation from gdp to nondefense purchases increases in average marginal income tax rates measured by a newly constructed time series have significantly negative effects on gdp when interpreted as a tax multiplier the magnitude is around 1 1 the combination of the estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that the balanced budget multiplier for defense spending is negative we have some evidence that tax changes affect gdp mainly through substitution effects rather than wealth effects

pull and push individual farming in hungary this paper is motivated by the fact that part time individual farming is commonly observed among rural households in a number of transition economies but it is not clear prima facie if such resource allocation is optimal a conceptual model of household labor allocation between individual farming and off farm wage employment is developed the model explicitly accounts for the role of household endowments in labor allocation as the analysis is conditioned on the status of factor markets the hypotheses are empirically tested using 1998 data from a country representative survey of rural households in hungary an advanced transition country which only recently became eu member state results provide evidence that capital market imperfections still remain implications for the policies related to agricultural sector restructuring employment and rural development are discussed

are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions field evidence from multistage tournaments abstract this paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices using data from professional and semi professional basketball tournaments we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present the results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low

lying to level the playing field why people may dishonestly help or hurt others to create equity unethical and dishonest behavior has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines recent work has begun to focus on a previous overlooked factor predicting dishonest behavior the beneficiary or victim of dishonest acts in two laboratory experiments we manipulate the level of resources allocated to our participants their wealth and investigate whether perceived inequity from wealth that is randomly or subjectively assigned leads individuals to cross ethical boundaries through helping or hurting others the results show that dishonest behavior is influenced by positive and negative inequity that motivates helping and hurting acts furthermore a third experiment shows that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries to hurt or help others when the action restores equity

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

losing to win tournament incentives in the national basketball association the focus of tournament models has been rank order compensation schemes whereby participants receive higher payments for higher relative performance either incrementally or winner takes all our research focuses on a unique tournament that offers rewards for both winning and losing specifically the national basketball association s regularly scheduled season of games we examine three nba seasons to determine whether team performance responded to changes in the underlying tournament incentives provided by the nba s introduction and restructuring of the lottery system to determine draft order our results yield strong evidence that nba teams are more likely to lose when incentives to lose are present

managerial objectives capital structure and the provision of worker incentives worker incentive schemes are invariably assumed to be administered by an owner entrepreneur who has an incentive to understate worker performance after the event while tournaments can overcome this problem they discourage cooperation between workers we show that a professional manager concerned with equality between workers and with avoiding bankruptcy rather than maximizing shareholder wealth will conduct a tournament that preserves individual effort incentives while promoting cooperation between workers the theory predicts lower debt levels and more compressed pay scales as cooperation becomes more important in the limit this becomes a group bonus scheme supported by blue chip debt

best of three contest experiments strategic versus psychological momentum abstract we conduct an experimental analysis of a best of three tullock contest intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts while increasing the role of luck as opposed to effort leads to lower efforts both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of the contest ending in two rounds the patterns of players efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds are consistent with strategic momentum i e a momentum generated due to strategic incentives inherent in the contest we do not find evidence for psychological momentum i e a momentum which emerges when winning affects players confidence similar to the previous studies of contests we find significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between the subjects

multiplicador del gasto publico en argentina this paper provides the first empirical estimates of argentina s public sector spending multiplier using a structural vector autoregression methodology svars at the same time it exploits the economic classification of expenditures to make a very interesting contribution by differentiating the multiplier between consumption expenditure and capital expenditure public investment results support the great importance of such differentiation as consumption spending has moderate effects on output while public investment has much more expansive macroeconomic effects resulting from the synergies it generates with the private sector these facts reveal the importance of thinking public and private sectors as complements rather than substitutes or rivals and the need to abandon the pro cyclical fiscal policies are emphasized

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

early round upsets and championship blowouts i introduction popular discussions of tournament play often celebrate the success of underdogs in early rounds and decry the prevalence of unexciting finals such a pattern might be just a statistical illusion there are many early round matches so some upsets are inevitable and there is only one final so it is unlikely to be the most exciting match of the tournament in this article we consider instead whether the pattern might have a real foundation in the strategic allocation of effort by tournament participants we analyze a two round tournament in which a favorite and underdog play in each of the two semifinals and then one player from each match advances to the final victory in a match is probabilistic in that the chance of winning is increasing in each player s relative quality and in his relative effort expenditure 1 each player has a fixed amount of effort to exert over the two rounds unused effort is of no value and the only payoff is from winning the tournament to maximize the chance of winning each player must balance out the benefits of expending more effort in the semifinal against the opportunity cost of having less effort available for the final favorites and underdogs both have an incentive to conserve resources for the final but the trade offs they face are different a favorite plays a weak opponent in the semifinal but is likely to face a tough opponent in the final so it has a strong incentive to hold back conversely an underdog already plays a tough opponent in the semifinal so it has less incentive to conserve effort for the final 2 because of these different incentives we find that in any symmetric nash equilibrium underdogs exert more effort than favorites do in the semifinal the extra effort does not fully compensate for lower ability and underdogs are still likely to lose but the chance of an upset rises in the final round each player expends all its remaining resources so differences in abilities are no longer compressed by strategic considerations instead an underdog who makes it to the final has fewer resources left to spend than the favorite so differences in abilities are amplified and the chance of a blowout by the favorite rises if a favorite loses to an underdog in the early rounds it is often accused of looking past the underdog to its next match even if a player s strategy is optimal ex ante it might turn out to be unsuccessful ex post so such criticism is often unfair our results imply that it is rational for the favorite to hold back on resources in the semifinal even if it correctly anticipates that in equilibrium the underdog will be playing harder sometimes the strategy will backfire but on average the favorite benefits from being in a better position for the final these results are derived using a standard contest model in which each player s probability of victory in a match is a strictly increasing function of his ability and effort 3 such models were first developed to analyze rent seeking tullock 1967 1980 and similar models appear in a wide variety of areas including patent races loury 1979 election campaigns snyder 1989 compensation schemes nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 career ladders lazear and rosen 1981 lobbying baye et al 1993 and sports contests szymanski 2003 4 more specifically we model the contest as a sequential elimination ladder tournament in which players first compete in separate groups and the winners then compete against each other rosen 1986 our result that underdogs do indeed try harder than favorites in the semifinals contrasts with that of rosen 1986 p 707 8 because the favorite has a better chance of victory in the final rosen finds that winning a semifinal match is more valuable to the favorite so the favorite tries harder than the underdog we reach the opposite conclusion because we assume that there is a fixed supply of effort to be used across rounds and unused effort in the tournament has no value

whose education matters in the determination of household income evidence from a developing country the plan of this article is as follows section ii discusses the data used and presents a few descriptive statistics on headship in ghana and labor activities of ghanaian households section iii presents three simple paradigms about whose education matters in regression models of household income this section also describes the composition of household income and proposes the appropriate explanatory variables for estimation section iv describes the estimation methodology consistent estimates for the farm and off farm income functions are obtained by using j l powells censored least absolute deviations estimators standard errors are obtained by using a bootstrap methodology that mimics the two stage sample design section v contains a summary of the estimation results most notably the results suggest that the allocative effect is the largest effect for total income while the productivity effect appears to dominate when considering farming and nonfarming activities separately all specifications of household income and its components reject the use of the minimum level of household schooling as well as the schooling level of the head of the household section vi provides some concluding comments excerpt

designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants an experimental study is the right amount of effort exerted in multiperson tournaments where contestants have two different levels of initial endowments termed favorites and underdogs we develop theoretical predictions for the level of effort and the effect of varying the prize structure we test these predictions for three person tournaments using an economic experiment in a social environment where contest outcomes are publicly announced we find that both favorites and underdogs overexert effort relative to the theoretical point predictions moreover in the treatment with two favorites and one underdog favorites increase their effort when the number of prizes is increased from one to two contrary to the theory prediction we show that a generalized model that allows for psychological losses from losing for favorites and psychological gains from winning for underdogs because of social comparisons tracks the experimental results better than the standard theoretical model this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

piece rate contracts for other regarding workers when workers are paid with piece rates inequality arises naturally we consider workers who care about income comparisons and are either status seeking or inequality averse we identify circumstances under which inequality attitudes lead workers to exert more effort than they would otherwise and also circumstances under which workers inequality attitudes lead firms to set lower piece rates than they would otherwise the key behavioral assumption for both of these results to hold when workers are identical is behindness aversion the property that changes in inequality matter more to the worker when he is behind than when he is ahead jel d01 j33 m52

promotions demotions halo effects and the earnings dynamics of american executives this paper explores the determinants of earnings growth in corporate hierarchies using static and dynamic panel data techniques the novelty derives from the distinction between base pay and bonus the asymmetric effects of promotion and demotion and the consideration of dynamic effects we find that the convexity of pay structures is robust to the allowance for unobserved individual heterogeneity demotion has a stronger effect on compensation growth in absolute value than promotion dynamic models indicate that the causal effect of past promotion is positive on the growth in base and total pay but has no significant effect on bonus growth

what are the effects of fiscal policy shocks we propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions specifically we use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue shock as well as a government spending shock while controlling for a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock we explicitly allow for the possibility of announcement effects i e that a current fiscal policy shock changes fiscal policy variables in the future but not at present we construct the impulse responses to three linear combinations of these fiscal shocks corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit spending deficit financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion we apply the method to us quarterly data from 1955 to 2000 we find that deficit financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve gdp with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total additional gdp per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

executive compensation and tournament theory empirical tests on danish data this article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation i test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2 600 executives in 210 danish firms during a 4 year period i ask are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance most of the predictions gain support in the data

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

union relative wage effects a survey of macro estimates this paper surveys union wage effect estimates drawn from empirical cross section wage equations fitted to macro aggregated data in 34 post 1963 studies containing such equations each estimate is the partial derivative of the dependent wage variable in logarithmic units with respect to the extent of unionism fraction unionized variable in the equation this paper shows that these estimates contain a mixture in uncertain ratio of the union nonunion wage differential or wage gap on the one hand and an extent of unionism effect on the other therefore the macro estimates should not be interpreted as wage gap estimates

fiscal policy in general equilibrium this paper studies four classic fiscal policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model the authors main findings are as follows 1 permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short run and long run output multipliers that exceed one 2 permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes 3 the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases and 4 public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment these findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

tax multipliers pitfalls in measurement and identification abstract to analyze the pitfalls in measuring and identifying tax shocks we build a novel value added tax rate dataset for the period 1980 2009 the problem of identification i e changes in tax policy not triggered by output fluctuations is clearly disentangled from the problem of measurement i e finding a tax policy variable under the direct control of policymakers on the identification front our results favor the use of narratives a la romer and romer 2010 on the measurement front our findings support the use of tax rates as the true measure of tax policy as opposed to revenue based measures such as cyclically adjusted revenues

equality under threat by the talented evidence from worker managed firms does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality are high ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes the article revisits this long standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker managed firms the analysis is based on novel administrative data sources which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers ability type the article s key findings are that worker managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms and high ability members are more likely than other members to exit

the off farm labor supply of farmers theoretical and empirical models are developed to examine the off farm wages labor force participation and hours of work of farmers econometric estimates use data from a 1971 survey of illinois farmers the off farm wage depends on farmer human capital and the local labor market the major result confirms the sensitivity of off farm work to economic incentives a 10 increase in the off farm wage entails an 11 increase in hours of off farm work holding farm characteristics constant results also indicate effects of seasonality risk and life cycle factors on off farm work

rural industry and labor market integration in eastern china abstract this paper tests the competitiveness of the labor market in a semi industrialized county located in eastern china labor market segmentation is linked to the degree of government interventions and the management structures of the local enterprises and two forms of rationing labeled entrance and time rationing are identified a test based on income maximizing behavior is developed to find the form of rationing that is consistent with the data the results show that the labor market is not competitive and time rationing prevails in the county in addition industrial wages are not responsive to experience and education but strongly biased against women and varying to government interventions

the payoff to consistency in performance this study investigates whether firms are willing to pay higher wages to workers who demonstrate consistent performance than to those whose performance is more volatile a formal model reflects a production technology view assuming the law of diminishing marginal product this model suggests that a more consistent worker produces higher expected output and therefore receives a higher wage the test of the model uses data from the national basketball association the empirical data support the model players whose performances were more consistent than the performances of other players received higher wages on average jel d41 j31 m52 z20

human capital entrepreneurship and farm household earnings abstract the allocation of resources between agriculture and non agriculture is a central decision of the farm household in this paper we formulate a profit maximization model in which human capital enhances efficiency through both within sector effects and across sector allocation of quasi fixed inputs the model is estimated using chinese household data that contain detailed information on production activities we find that schooling and experience improve the sectoral uses of household supplied inputs accounting for 27 of their total contribution to earnings the evidence suggests that conventional estimates of human capital returns obtained within sectors would undervalue the role of human capital in development

education and off farm work an investigation is presented of the determinants of educational selectivity in a framework that emphasizes the coordination of household members sectoral time allocation is based on members comparative advantage which in turn depends on the utilization and returns to schooling in the farm and nonfarm sectors central to the model is a knowledge spillover hypothesis that workers who participate in off farm work may still contribute knowledge to farm management estimation of the model is based on cross sectional chinese farm household data collected in 1990 from 204 households in sichuan province it is concluded that schooling does not enhance labour productivity when carrying out routine tasks that the contribution to farm efficiency by the most educated members is not affected by their non farm participation and that schooling increases labour market wage rates these empirical results give comparative advantage for the better educated farmers to work off the farm

promotions and incentives the case of multistage elimination tournaments promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms we analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments in our two main treatments we compare a two stage tournament to a one stage tournament subjects in the two stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage both with respect to nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one stage tournament additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing

incidence and consequences of risk taking behavior in tournaments evidence from the nba we empirically explore the relevance and efficiency of risk taking behavior in tournaments we use data from the national basketball association nba and measure risk taking by the fraction of three point shots in basketball games we examine how point differences between teams during games affect their subsequent risk taking behavior it is found that teams that are trailing are more likely to increase their use of three point shots we additionally analyze the consequences of this change in behavior enhanced risk taking is inefficient in the vast majority of cases and is only beneficial if a team is trailing by a rather large margin we discuss possible explanations for these decision errors jel m5 d81 j30

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

expectations as reference points field evidence from professional soccer we show that professional soccer players and their coaches exhibit reference dependent behavior during matches controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity we show on a minute by minute basis that players breach the rules of the game measured by the referee s assignment of cards significantly more often if their teams are behind the expected match outcome measured by preplay betting odds of large professional bookmakers we further show that coaches implement significantly more offensive substitutions if their teams are behind expectations both types of behaviors impair the expected ultimate match outcome of the team which shows that our findings do not simply reflect fully rational responses to reference dependent incentive schemes of favorite teams to falling behind we derive these results in a data set that contains more than 8 200 matches from 12 seasons of the german bundesliga and 12 seasons of the english premier league this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

productivity spillovers in team production evidence from professional basketball we estimate a model where workers are heterogeneous both in their own productivity and in their ability to facilitate the productivity of others we use data from professional basketball to measure the importance of peers in productivity because we have clear measures of output and members of a worker s group change on a regular basis our empirical results highlight that productivity spillovers play an important role in team production despite this we find that worker compensation is largely determined by own productivity with little weight given to productivity spillovers

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

fishing and nonfishing income decisions the role of human capital and family structure resource dependent households often diversify their income we model demand for remittances and supply of off resource labor as a joint decision and discuss household trade offs we extend the off farm labor supply literature to a rural fishery contrasting our results to common findings in the farm literature and providing empirical evidence of the interdependence between education and family structure in determining income diversification using a unique dataset from malaysia we find that more educated households are less likely to diversify their income with caveats depending on family composition policy implications for resource management in a remittance economy with alternative livelihoods are discussed