limited liability moral hazard and share tenancy abstract this paper contributes to the literature on share tenancy by reexamining a framework developed in basu 1992 it is shown that limited liability and moral hazard in effort provides a richer theory of share contracts when the tenant also has discretion in the choice of projects

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases a patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified the patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement his reaction may be to go to court to settle or to accept entry we investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision in a simultaneous game even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial the likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty in sequential games regardless who plays first entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game

tilting the table the use of preliminary injunctions abstract this paper examines the economic role of preliminary injunctions in legal disputes we present a model in which differences in financing costs drive the use of preliminary injunction and explore the implications of this legal remedy for ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives controlling for the nature of the dispute we examine the relationships between the financial status of litigating parties and whether a preliminary injunction is requested the empirical analysis uses detailed data compiled for a sample of 252 patent suits and reveals patterns generally consistent with those suggested by the model

patenting in the shadow of competitors this article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs i show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards particularly those of firms with low litigation costs this pattern is consistent with the literature on costly litigation which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation these results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

innovation and firm value an investigation of the changing role of patents 1985 2007 abstract this paper examines how the relationship between firm value and patent based indicators of inventive activity has changed over time we use data from more than 33 000 mergers and acquisitions deals between 1985 and 2007 and distinguish between american uspto and european epo patents our results indicate that over time epo patents have become the dominant indicator of innovative activity while uspto patents have no effect on firm value near the end of the sample period the results are robust to controlling for citations and are especially strong for small firms for firms operating in the drug and chemical industries and when target and acquiring firms operate in different industries or countries

the role of patent rights in mergers consolidation in plant biotechnology few micro level empirical papers have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure using firm level patent data for public and private firms in plant biotechnology we develop a measure of patent enforceability duration models show that patent statistics are a useful predictor of the timing of merger activity we find that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of mergers mergers in plant biotechnology may be partially motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies some of the merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology as exemplified in the case of roundup ready corn

private equity jobs and productivity private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses and few gains in operating performance to evaluate these claims we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers us buyouts from 1980 to 2005 we track 3 200 target firms and their 150 000 establishments before and after acquisition comparing to controls defined by industry size age and prior growth buyouts lead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creation and destruction buyouts also bring tfp gains at target firms mainly through accelerated exit of less productive establishments and greater entry of highly productive ones jel d24 g24 g32

a bottom up approach to the risk adjusted performance of the buyout fund market we use the burgiss dataset to study private equity buyout fund performance our findings on performance before risk adjustments are consistent with those in the literature and indicate significant outperformance of buyout fund investments using a bottom up approach we identify the systematic risks of underlying companies in buyout funds to inform an appropriate risk adjusted benchmark which we determine to be a levered size and sector adjusted public index after making these risk adjustments we find no significant outperformance of buyout fund investments versus the public market equivalent on a dollar weighted basis we contend that even without significant risk adjusted outperformance buyout funds can play a valuable role in institutional investors portfolios

the u s patent system in transition policy innovation and the innovation process abstract this paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the u s and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change it also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few possible reasons for these limited results are discussed and possible avenues for future research are suggested

optimal taxation in theory and practice the optimal design of a tax system is a topic that has long fascinated economic theorists and flummoxed economic policymakers this paper explores the interplay between tax theory and tax policy it identifies key lessons policymakers might take from the academic literature on how taxes ought to be designed and it discusses the extent to which these lessons are reflected in actual tax policy we begin with a brief overview of how economists think about optimal tax policy based largely on the foundational work of ramsey 1927 and mirrlees 1971 we then put forward eight general lessons suggested by optimal tax theory as it has developed in recent decades 1 optimal marginal tax rate schedules depend on the distribution of ability 2 the optimal marginal tax schedule could decline at high incomes 3 a flat tax with a universal lump sum transfer could be close to optimal 4 the optimal extent of redistribution rises with wage inequality 5 taxes should depend on personal characteristics as well as income 6 only final goods ought to be taxed and typically they ought to be taxed uniformly 7 capital income ought to be untaxed at least in expectation and 8 in stochastic dynamic economies optimal tax policy requires increased sophistication for each lesson we discuss its theoretical underpinnings and the extent to which it is consistent with actual tax policy to preview our conclusions we find that there has been considerable change in the theory and practice of taxation over the past several decades although the two paths have been far from parallel overall tax policy has moved in the y n gregory mankiw is professor of economics matthew weinzierl is assistant professor of business administration and danny yagan is a ph d candidate in economics all at harvard university cambridge massachusetts their e mail addresses are ngmankiw

protecting intellectual property rights are small firms handicapped this paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978 99 by linking information from the u s patent office the federal courts and industry sources we find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade or other characteristics that facilitate cooperative resolution of disputes are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits however postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics these findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs

contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality experimental evidence from the vietnamese dairy sector in emerging markets for high value food products in developing countries processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality one widely embraced approach is contract farming but relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context we use the example of the vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk a framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk on farmers investment in quality improving inputs statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use resulting in better output quality the bonus payment generates even higher quality milk we also find that input choice levels depend on farmers socio economic characteristics such as wealth while individual risk preferences seem to be less important implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed

the benefits and costs of strong patent protection a contribution to the current debate abstract today s conventional wisdom is that strong patent rights are conducive to economic progress yet not long ago students of the patent system took a more nuanced position arguing that often strong patents were not necessary to induce invention and entailed significant economic costs several empirical studies have supported this position however the current advocacy invokes theories of the positive benefits of patents that were repressed in the earlier more negative analyses this essay reviews these theories and the empirical evidence that might bear on them the authors conclude that there is reason for concern that the present movement towards stronger patent protection may hinder rather than stimulate technological and economic progress

a theory of sharecropping the role of price behavior and imperfect competition this paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets we consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage we consider two different classes of contracts i tenancy contracts and ii crop buying contracts it is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping

worldwide venture capital intellectual property rights and innovation this study based on the historical data of venture capital vc investment and patenting for 99 countries and 83 industries explores the effects of vc investment on firms innovation in different intellectual property rights ipr environments worldwide utilizing large data sets and various empirical models our negative binomial and panel data analysis presents the significant and positive impacts of vc investment and ipr parameters on firms innovation controlling for cultural regulatory and economic and market conditions of the business environment however vc investment is more effective in weaker ipr environments this effect is robust to a number of different specifications for endogeneity among other things the economic effect is pronounced the impact of vc on patents is up to five times more pronounced between the weakest and strongest ipr regime in the sample

limited liability and the existence of share tenancy abstract the paper considers the problem confronting an absentee landlord who can lease out his land on a fixed rent contract share rent contract or a mixture of the two it is argued that in poor areas it is natural to have each contract underwritten by an implicit limited liability clause which allows a person to forego paying rent under extreme crop failures in the presence of such an implicit clause a certain tension appears between a tenant and a landlord with the former preferring risky projects and the latter preferring safe ones it is shown that in such a case share tenancy turns out to be the dominant system from among the class mentioned above because it minimises the tension between the landlord and the tenant the result is then used to discuss conditions under which share tenancy will tend to wither away

letting rivals come close or warding them off the effects of substitution threat on imitation deterrence a resource based theory postulate is that firms must defend their resources against imitation to sustain competitive advantage however by deterring imitation firms may induce rivals to create su

the effect of environmental regulation on optimal plant size and factor shares the method for measuring the effects of environmental regulation on the size distribution of industrial plants and the distribution of factor shares described in this paper focuses on the 20 industries with highest per unit pollution abatement costs and the 20 with the lowest costs the study finds that compliance with environmental laws has not only reduced the number of plants in the affected industries but has placed a greater burden on small rather than on large plants besides redistributing within industry market shares environmental regulation has increased the use of capital relative to labor although the disproportionate burden placed on small plants in the high abatement cost industries may have been unintended it is likely that large firms will be less vocal opponents of environmental regulation than are small firms 22 references 12 tables

patent office in innovation policy nobody s perfect abstract the number of patent applications and bad patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years based on this trend we study the overload problem within the patent office and its consequences on the firms r d incentives we assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect and that its quality is poorer under congestion depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non obviousness requirement the system may result in a high r d equilibrium in which firms self select in their patent applications or in an equilibrium with low r d opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents multiple equilibria often co exist which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments we investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy

on the existence of share contracts under limited liability abstract in a principal agent relationship under limited liability the agent in general receives the full share of revenue we show that when the agent exerts effort in multiple tasks the effort substitution effect helps explain the existence of share contracts even under limited liability

a survey of the economics of patent systems and procedures the last several decades have seen increases in patenting activity worldwide as well as growing issues related to patent quality in response to these quality issues a recent patent literature has emerged that investigates the behavior and incentives of patent examiners applicants and third parties in this paper we provide an overview of patent procedures patent systems and a survey of the new economic literature on patent systems both theoretical and empirical papers are considered policy implications coming from this literature are presented

litigation and settlement an empirical approach litigants in civil lawsuits involving monetary damages often find an out of court settlement preferable to a trial most theoretical models of settlement choice employ an expected utility maximizing framework that emphasizes the importance of risk preferences litigation costs and the distribution of trial awards an empirical model of settlement choice is used to examine whether the variables prominent in the theoretical literature are statistically useful in explaining the occurrence and monetary value of settlements estimates from a sample of civil filings provide new empirical evidence of how the legal system affects the behavior of litigants during the settlement process copyright 1989 by mit press

the settlement of patent litigation in this article i develop a model to analyze patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid litigation of the issue of patent validity the patentee possesses private information about patent validity and makes a take it or leave it settlement offer to a single potential rival an essentially unique sequential equilibrium exists if out of equilibrium beliefs are restricted appropriately the model analyzes the effect of the probability of settlement and litigation

compulsory licensing evidence from the trading with the enemy act compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners this paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after world war i under the trading with the enemy act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention difference indifferences analyses of nearly 130 000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent jel d45 l24 n42 031 034 compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners 1 countries such as brazil thailand and india have used the policy to procure life saving drugs for millions of patients and are proposing it as a means to access foreign technologies to combat climate change 2 opponents of compulsory licensing however fear that the policy may reduce access to critical innovations that are invented abroad as it weakens incentives for foreign firms to transfer new technologies into developing countries for example the us pharmaceutical company merck criticized brazil s licensing of its hiv drug efavirenz as an expropriation of intellectual property which will hurt patients who require new life saving therapies http www ip watch org

the costs of inefficient bargaining and financial distress abstract this study provides the first large sample analysis of the stock market reactions to interfirm litigation when a suit is filed the common stock of the typical defendant declines by about 1 while the plaintiff experiences no significant gains for the average pair of firms the combined drop in value upon filing is 21 million much of the loss is regained if the suit is settled the findings suggest that bargaining among firm claimants sometimes leads to very inefficient outcomes part of the leakage is explained by the costs of increased financial distress imposed on the defendant

what makes companies pursue an open science strategy whereas recent scholarly research has provided many insights about universities engaging in commercial activities there is still little empirical evidence regarding the opposite phenomenon of companies disseminating scientific knowledge our paper aims to fill this gap and explores the motivations of firms that disclose research outcomes in a scientific format besides considering a dimension internal to the firm we focus particularly on knowledge sourcing from academic institutions and the appropriability regime we conduct an econometric analysis with firm level data from the fourth edition of the french innovation survey cis and matched scientific publications for a sample of 2512 rd performing firms from all manufacturing sectors this analysis provides evidence that firms are more likely to adopt academic principles if they need to access scientific knowledge that is considered important for their innovation development whereas the mere existence of collaborative links with academic institutions is not a strong determinant furthermore the results suggest that the inclination of firms to publish is sensitive to the level of knowledge spillovers in a sector and the effectiveness of legal appropriation instruments c 2013 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the firm strikes back non compete agreements and the mobility of technical professionals this study explores how firms shape labor markets and career paths using employee non compete agreements the sociology of work has overlooked non competes but data indicate that nearly half of technical professionals in the united states are asked to sign such employment contracts fearing loss of investments in talent and trade secrets firms use non competes to strike back against technical professionals increased mobility following the decline of internal labor markets in depth interviews with 52 randomly sampled patent holders in a single industry coupled with a survey of 1 029 engineers across a variety of industries reveal that ex employees subject to non competes are more likely to take career detours that is they involuntarily leave their technical field to avoid a potential lawsuit moreover firms strategically manage the process of getting workers to sign such contracts waiting for workers bargaining position to weaken these findings inform our understanding of the social organizati

private equity performance what do we know we study the performance of nearly 1400 u s buyout and venture capital funds using a new dataset from burgiss we find better buyout fund performance than has previously been documented performance consistently has exceeded that of public markets outperformance versus the s p 500 averages 20 to 27 over a fund s life and more than 3 annually venture capital funds outperformed public equities in the 1990s but underperformed in the 2000s our conclusions are robust to various indices and risk controls performance in cambridge associates and preqin is qualitatively similar to that in burgiss but is lower in thomson venture economics

patents and cumulative innovation causal evidence from the courts cumulative innovation is central to economic growth do patent rights facilitate or impede such follow on innovation this paper studies the effect of removing patent protection through court invalidation on the subsequent research related to the focal patent as measured by later citations we exploit random allocation of judges at the u s court of appeal for the federal circuit to control for the endogeneity of patent invalidation we find that patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent on average but the impact is highly heterogeneous patent rights appear to block follow on innovation only in the technology fields of computers electronics and medical instruments moreover the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers entry of small innovators suggesting that patents may impede the democratization of innovation

contract duration and investment incentives evidence from land tenancy agreements this paper analyzes the empirical determinants of contract length a key and yet neglected dimension of contractual structure i estimate contract length and contract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between 1870 and 1880 in the district of siracusa italy the findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by the need to provide incentives for nonobservable investment taking into account transaction costs and imperfections in the credit markets that make incentive provision costly the results also illustrate that because both length and the compensation scheme are used to provide incentives within the same contract joint analysis is important for a correct interpretation of the evidence jel d82 o12 q15

moral hazard experimental evidence from tenancy contracts agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries output sharing rules that make farmers less than full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agr

what percentage of innovations are patented empirical estimates for european firms abstract a 1993 survey on the innovative activities of europe s largest industrial firms obtained useable results on patenting activities for 604 respondents the data are used to calculate the sales weighted propensity rates for 19 industries the propensity rates equal the percentage of innovations for which a patent application is made the propensity rates for product innovations average 35 9 varying between 8 1 in textiles and 79 2 in pharmaceuticals the average for process innovations is 24 8 varying from 8 1 in textiles to 46 8 for precision instruments only four sectors have patent propensity rates for both product and process innovations combined that exceed 50 pharmaceuticals chemicals machinery and precision instruments regression results that control for the effect of industry sector show that patent propensity rates increase with firm size and are higher among firms that find patents to be an important method for preventing competitors from copying both product and process innovations the effect of secrecy is not so straightforward firms that find secrecy to be an important protection method for product innovations are less likely to patent as expected but secrecy has little effect on the propensity to patent process innovations the r d intensity of the firm has no effect on patent propensity rates for both product and process innovations the sector of activity has a strong influence on product patent propensities but very little effect on process patent propensities after controlling for the effect of other factors

patent pools and cross licensing in the shadow of patent litigation this paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable it analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives it shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges this result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other s patents if litigation costs are not too large

regulation and firm size fda impacts on innovation this article estimates the highly differential impacts of fda regulations on pharmaceutical firms of various sizes where size is measured as scale of r d expenditures estimation is performed using the method of maximum quasi likelihoods using productivity trends of the united kingdom as a control to isolate fda regulatory effects in the united states it is shown that smaller u s pharmaceutical firms suffered devastating reductions in research productivity because of fda regulations in contrast the largest u s pharmaceutical firms apparently benefited from regulation as sales gains due to reduced competition more than offset their quite moderate declines in research productivity

litigation liability and incentives for care abstract in this paper potential injurers are subject to a negligence standard and differ in cost of taking care in the event of accident the injurer s degree of care is private information in litigation that follows award of damages for pain and suffering will lead to a general increase in care and hence reduce the likehood of accident a tighter negligence standard will lead some potential injurers to take more care and others to take less adoption of a rule under which the loser at trial must pay the litigation costs of the winner will reduce the pressure for punitive damages

what is behind the recent surge in patenting abstract we investigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of us patenting over the past decade conventional wisdom points to the establishment of the court of appeals of the federal circuit by congress in 1982 we examine whether this institutional change which has benefited patent holders explains the burst in us patenting using both international and domestic data on patent applications and awards we conclude that the evidence is not favorable to the conventional view instead it appears that the jump in patenting reflects an increase in us innovation spurred by changes in the management of research

does sharecropping affect long term investment evidence from west bengal s tenancy reforms in india land reform has been high on the political agenda since independence in 1947 and early efforts at abolishing intermediaries are widely credited with having brought about significant social benefits the most prominent type is tenancy reform as it does not extinguish landlords ownership rights tenants who may have benefited from rent ceilings and cannot be evicted still have to pay annual share rent this weakness of rights may fail to create the incentives for effort supply and long term investment that have underpinned the success of land reforms elsewhere effectively adding a dynamic inefficiency to the disincentives created by the marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping this could imply that despite the high political price of implementing land reform in india the schemes so far have failed to reach their productivity and poverty reduction potential

the economics of private equity funds this article analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel model and dataset we obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds with detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006 we build a model to estimate the expected revenue to managers as a function of their investor contracts and we test how this estimated revenue varies across the characteristics of our sample funds among our sample funds about two thirds of expected revenue comes from fixed revenue components that are not sensitive to performance we find sharp differences between venture capital vc and buyout bo funds bo managers build on their prior experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than vc managers do this leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional in later bo funds the results suggest that the bo business is more scalable than the vc business and that past success has a differential impact on the terms of their future funds jel g10 g20 g24

institutional ownership and governance this paper describes different forms of ownership across countries and how these forms influence the way companies are governed in most stock markets in the world listed companies frequently have a controlling shareholder usually a family however japan the uk and to a lesser extent the us are exceptions in these three countries ownership is frequently highly fragmented where share stakes are held by different institutional owners including asset managers both active and passive and by shareholder activists the paper focuses in particular on the governance structure of different institutional shareholders how they engage with target firms and their effectiveness the paper concludes with recommendations for regulators to enhance different forms of ownership

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk we analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard on the part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique of cultivation in the presence of limited liability high powered incentive contracts such as fixed rental contracts will induce the farmer to adopt techniques of cultivation that are too risky from the point of view of the landlord on the other hand low powered incentive contracts such as fixed wage contracts will induce the farmer to supply too little effort we show that sharecropping contracts emerge as a natural solution to balance these two conflicting considerations

patents and patent policy a patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention this right is sometimes termed an intellectual property right and is viewed as an incentive for innovation this article surveys the evidence on patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews the current controversies in patent policy

unintentional unavoidable and beneficial knowledge leakage from the multinational enterprise knowledge leakage as an undesirable outcome for mnes is an accepted view in ib literature we challenge this view and argue that knowledge leakage is often unintentional unavoidable and beneficial for the mne in a highly networked and information rich society knowledge leakage from mnes 1 happens naturally due to interfirm relationships interactions and socialization 2 is unavoidable due to employee mobility and 3 facilitates knowledge inflows due to the reciprocity nature of knowledge exchange and hence is beneficial for mnes in addition the costs of protecting knowledge incurred by an mne will often outweigh the benefits

the value of intellectual property rights to firms and society economists view intellectual property rights iprs as policy tools for encouraging innovation but they recognize that they can also inhibit competition there are many types of iprs and institutions concerned with their administration we begin by outlining how these complex and varied rights are supposed to work and how they interact with other characteristics of firms and markets we then survey the available literature on patents trade marks and copyright to assess the value of these iprs to firms and the costs to firms of acquiring and defending their rights the paper concludes with suggestions for topics requiring further research to inform public policy better

appropriate intellectual property protection and economic growth in countries at different levels of development this paper examines how the role of patents and utility models in innovation and economic growth varies by level of economic development using a panel dataset of over 70 countries we find that patent protection is an important determinant of innovation and that patentable innovations contribute to economic growth in developed countries but not in developing instead in developing economies a minor form of intellectual property rights iprs namely utility models is conducive to innovation and growth controlling for other factors using korean firm level data as a case study we find that utility model innovations contribute to firm performance when firms are technologically lagging and that those minor innovations can be a learning device and thus a stepping stone for developing more patentable inventions later on upon reaching higher levels of technological capabilities firms become more reliant upon patents and less on utility models thus the lesson here is that patent protection enhances innovation and economic growth in countries where the capacity to conduct innovative research exists where this capacity is weaker a system that provides incentives to conduct minor incremental inventions is more conducive to growth the significance of this paper is to emphasize the importance not just of the strength of iprs but of the appropriate type of iprs for economic development

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

collaborative promotion of technology standards and the impact on innovation industry structure and organizational capabilities evidence from modern patent pools this study explores the impact of modern patent pools inter organizational collaborative arrangements for promoting the adoption of technology standards on the rate of follow on innovations based on pooled technologies the vertical structure of associated industries and organizational capabilities of noncollaborating firms on one hand the formation of modern pools can boost follow on innovation by lowering the search negotiation and licensing costs associated with pooled standards on the other hand modern pools may decrease the incentives to invest in follow on innovations because of cannibalization risks and grant back provisions to the extent that modern pools succeed in establishing a dominant standard their collaborative nature and their reliance on markets for technology can reduce technological uncertainty and appropriation hazards hence triggering vertical disintegration in related industries moreover by establishing a dominant standard modern pools can effectively diminish the relati

the economics of product patents this paper develops a model of product patents in which the patent changes the nature of market entry behavior rather than preventing entry entirely the model incorporates three levels of action namely the innovator s patenting decision the potential entrant s location decision and possible court action the analysis demonstrates how the characteristics of the patents system and the enforcement framework can influence rivals variety choices and thus the market equilibrium it also considers how the system can in principle be adjusted to improve social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

rural organization and land reform in brazil the role of nonagricultural benefits of landholding abstract this article examines the effects of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization and land reform in an economy characterized by limited credit and land rental markets the nonagricultural demand for land under credit constraint generates a potential mismatch between the distribution of land and the distribution of farming skills this disparity reduces the agricultural output if the land rental market is absent a perfect land rental market is shown to determine the highest possible agricultural output policy implications from the model include in addition to market improvements the fact that small farmers rather than landless people should be the target of redistributive land reform programs

josh lerner recipient of the 2010 global award for entrepreneurship research this article describes the academic contributions of the 2010 recipient of the global award for entrepreneurship research professor josh lerner of the harvard business school lerner s empirical research on the inter relationship between venture capital innovation and entrepreneurship has greatly extended and improved our understanding of one of the major drivers of growth in modern economies the first part of this article explains lerner s contributions as regards the structure and organization of the venture capital industry later his most important publications on entrepreneurship innovation and intellectual property rights are surveyed several aspects of lerner s policy oriented work are then outlined before the article closes with a brief conclusion

patent pools and innovation in substitute technologies evidence from the 19th century sewing machine industry patent pools which combine complementary patents of competing firms are expected to increase overall welfare but potentially discourage innovation in substitutes for the pool technology this article exploits a new historical data set on changes in patenting and firm entry for a clearly defined pool technology and substitutes in the 19th century sewing machine industry this analysis reveals a substantial increase in innovation for an albeit technologically inferior substitute technology historical evidence suggests that the creation of a pool diverted innovation toward an inferior substitute technology by creating differential license fees and litigation risks

the administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy a note in this paper we present evidence on the direct administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy the investigation is directed toward providing evidence that may be helpful in answering questions about the role of bankruptcy costs as a determinant of corporate capital structures the importance of bankruptcy costs as a determinant of corporate financing policy has been extensively debated in the finance literature the origins of the debate can be traced to modigliani and miller 8 and robichek and myers 9 under the assumption that debt is default free and interest payments are taxdeductible modigliani and miller demonstrated that firms will maximize their market values by maximizing their use of debt financing robichek and myers demonstrated that this conclusion also holds when debt is not default free but bankruptcy is costless to explain observed corporate debt to total value ratios which typically fall in the range of 20 percent to 30 percent robichek and myers 9 and baxter 1 appealed to the existence of bankruptcy costs as a possible counterweight to the tax deductibility of interest payments subsequently kraus and litzenberger 5 scott 10 lee and barker 6 kim 4 and turnbull 13 developed formal models in which firms maximize value by increasing their use of debt financing to the point where the marginal present value of future tax shields equals the marginal present value of future bankruptcy costs the bankruptcy cost literature has identified three types of costs as potentially relevant to the determination of a firm s optimal mix of debt and equity financing 1 the direct administrative expenses paid to various third parties involved in the bankruptcy proceedings 2 the shortfall in realized value when assets are sold in liquidation or the indirect costs of reorganization and 3 the loss of tax credits which the firm would have received had it not gone bankrupt contrarily haugen and senbet 3 and to a lesser extent miller 7 and warner 14 have argued that the only bankruptcy costs relevant to the determination of a firm s optimal capital structure are the direct administrative costs of bankruptcy the crux of their argument is that the shortfall costs of liquidation the indirect costs of reorganization and the loss of tax credits which occurs upon dissolution of the firm are in fact relevant to the liquidation investment decisions of the firm these costs would be borne by the security holders of a failing firm

patent enforcement a review of the literature without the confidence that patent rights can be enforced quickly and efficiently when needed the patent system will not stimulate innovation for this reason governments academics international institutions and the private sector have poured significant resources into gathering and analysing statistics on patent enforcement over the last two decades this paper reviews these studies and finds that while infringement is relatively common much enforcement occurs informally and less than 1 2 of patents incur litigation new strategic uses of the enforcement system especially by nonpracticing entities are the major emerging enforcement issue especially in the united states while the old problem of litigation costs attracts the lion s share of empirical attention it has produced remarkably few solutions to date

limited liability wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies abstract an explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare differences in tenants wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments in this context the inability of landlords to specify their tenants effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered the selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts these results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots

product liability research and development and innovation product liability ideally should promote efficient levels of product safety but misdirected liability efforts may depress beneficial innovations this paper examines these competing effects of liability costs on product r d intensity and new product introductions by manufacturing firms at low to moderate levels of expected liability costs there is a positive effect of liability costs on product innovation at very high levels of liability costs the effect is negative at the sample mean liability costs increase r d intensity by 15 percent the greater linkage of these effects to product r d rather than process r d is consistent with the increased prominence of the design defect doctrine

why put all your eggs in one basket a competition based view of how technological uncertainty affects a firm s technological specialization conventional wisdom suggests that when a firm faces technological uncertainty it responds by becoming less technologically specialized so as to remain adaptable to subsequent resolution of this uncertainty we adopt a competition based view of technological uncertainty to identify an opposite effect in competitive settings the firm may instead become more specialized when faced with greater technological uncertainty so as to focus on advancing its technologies against competition and influence the resolution of uncertainty in its favor over rivals we propose that this effect is accentuated when the firm expects that it cannot easily adapt to rivals technologies subsequently specifically when rivals are a greater deterrent through being litigious or innovative using u s government funding for fuel cell research as a policy shock with stock option implied volatilities to measure expected uncertainty we find empirical support for our propositions among firms active in research and development in the u s communications equipment industry through these findings we demonstrate that a competition based view of uncertainty identifies an alternative path for the firm s resource accumulation under uncertainty and we stress that the resolution of uncertainty can be something the firm attempts to influence rather than adapt to

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

tax incentives and r d activity firm level evidence from taiwan this paper investigates the effect of tax incentives on r d activities in taiwanese manufacturing firms specifically we assess the potential r d enhancing effect on recipients of r d tax credits compared with their non recipient counterparts moreover the potential difference in the r d enhancing effect between high tech and non high tech firms is also examined utilizing a firm level panel dataset during 2001 and 2005 empirical results obtained by propensity score matching show that recipients of r d tax credits appear on average to have 93 53 higher r d expenditures and a 14 47 higher growth rate for r d expenditures than non recipients with similar characteristics the r d enhancing effect of r d tax credits is not found to be particularly relevant to high tech or non high tech firms we further employ a generalized method of moment gmm of the panel fixed model to control for the endogeneity of r d tax credits and firm heterogeneity in determining r d expenditure various estimates based on the entire sample and high tech firms are quite similar and there is a significantly r d enhancing effect of r d tax credits this result suggests that the r d preferential policy has induced more r d expenditure by firms in taiwan while the existence of the r d enhancing effect brought on by tax incentives is intuitive the estimates can provide insightful implications for the r d tax policy

secrecy the patent puzzle and endogenous growth abstract endogenous growth models typically assume that innovations are protected solely by patents consequently they predict that strengthening patent protection stimulates innovation by increasing the private return to r d this contrasts with empirical evidence that 1 firms routinely employ a combination of patents and secrecy and 2 stronger patent regimes have been associated with increased patenting but not increased innovation a finding referred to as the patent puzzle in this paper i develop a novel model of endogenous growth that is consistent with this evidence successful innovators choose an appropriation strategy in the form of a patent secrecy mix both protection methods are imperfect and innovators face a trade off between secrecy s superior protection against imitation and patenting s protection against rival innovation i demonstrate that growth oriented policy changes generate important economic effects through their impact on the endogenous appropriation strategies of innovators

it s the market the broad based rise in the return to top talent abstract one explanation that has been proposed for rising inequality is that technical change allows highly talented individuals or superstars to manage or perform on a larger scale applying their talent to greater pools of resources and reaching larger numbers of people thus becoming more productive and higher paid others argue that managerial power has increased in a way that allows those at the top to receive higher pay that social norms against higher pay levels have broken down or that tax policy affects the distribution of surpluses between employers and employees we offer evidence bearing on the different theories explaining the rise in inequality in the united states over recent decades first we look the increase in pay at the highest income levels across occupations we consider the income share of the top 1 percent over time and we turn to evidence on inequality of wealth at the top in looking at the wealthiest americans we find that those in the forbes 400 are less likely to have

how valuable are the patents behind section 337 cases a us patent protects the owner of the intellectual property from imitators producing in the us and foreign imitators selling in the us market there are two venues for filing infringement cases against international infringement of us patents with the international trade commission itc using section 337 of the tariff act of 1930 or with federal district courts three indicators of patent value suggest that patents litigated under section 337 are on average more valuable however their values tend to be more variable the latter suggests that some firms may be using section 337 not for protection against international infringement of us patents but for protection against imports