too many to fail evidence of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak this paper studies bank failures in 21 emerging market countries in the 1990s by using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak this too many to fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors financial crises the too big to fail effect domestic financial development and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers the paper also shows that the too many to fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit

cartel quotas under majority rule the authors examine the choice of quotas by legal volume restricting organizations cartels commodity agreements agricultural marketing boards and prorationing boards unlike their illegal counterparts legal cartels have published regulations and broader enforcement capabilities however differences in costs and size among cartel members still make quota selection contentious conflicts over quotas are typically resolved by voting side payments to influence votes are prohibited the authors examine the predicted effects of this real world voting institution on prices and welfare they also deduce the economic consequences of exogenous political changes such as alterations in the voting weights or in the identity of the voters copyright 1995 by american economic association

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

on the operations of the international coffee agreement next to oil coffee is the most valuable commodity traded in world markets it is produced in the developing world and consumed within the developed nations moreover the international coffee agreement is the major successful international commodity agreement in this research note we analyze the allocation of quotas to export coffee in 1982 under the terms of the agreement the way in which entitlements to export are allocated offers insights into significant features of the international political economy

stock markets banks and growth panel evidence this paper investigates the impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth using a panel data set for the period 1976 98 and applying recent gmm techniques developed for dynamic panels on balance we find that stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth and these findings are not due to potential biases induced by simultaneity omitted variables or unobserved country specific effects

a dynamic model of oligopoly in the coffee export market a linear quadratic dynamic feedback oligopoly model that nests various market structures is used to estimate the degree of competitiveness and the adjustment paths of the two largest coffee exporters brazil and colombia their estimated behavior is relatively competitive this subgame perfect dynamic model is compared to a standard static oligopoly model and the open loop model the dynamic generalization of the standard static model both classical and bayesian tests of open loop and feedback dynamic models are reported

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

appearance and reality in deposit insurance the case for reform abstract this paper argues that the staffs and explicit insurance reserves of u s deposit insurers have been overwhelmed by de facto financial disaster the full costs of financing federal deposit insurance have become enormous and increasingly inequitable in distribution to reduce voluntary risk taking authorities must reprice and redesign the system of de facto deposit insurance coverage six complementary reforms are discussed 1 accounting for institutional assets liabilities and net worth at market value 2 enhancing opportunities for deposit insurers to manage their risk exposure 3 recalibrating insurance coverages 4 imposing risk rated premiums 5 mixed private and governmental competition in deposit insurance and 6 constraining insurance agency and federal reserve authority to bail out insolvent institutions

market evidence on the effective maturity of bank assets and liabilities the recent years increase in interest rate volatility has intensified concern over the exposure of commercial banks to interest rate or funding risk since the effect of interest rate changes on the equity value of a bank depends on the maturity or duration of the bank s assets and liabilities assessing an individual bank s interest rate risk exposure requires information about the maturity composition of its portfolio it is difficult however to assess a bank s risk exposure from balance sheet data because several important asset and liability items have theoretically ambiguous effective maturities in a frictionless market a security s effective maturity will equal its stated maturity or time to repricing with market imperfections e g depositors transaction or information costs however the equilibrium cost of some deposit items may respond sluggishly or incompletely to market rate changes see hester and pierce 1975 or flannery 1982 such liabilities market values discounted at market rates would therefore fluctuate with the level of interest rates these liabilities are sometimes called core deposits which manifest sticky responses to market rate changes we define an asset or liability s effective maturity as the maturity of a fixed rate perfectly elastically supplied security with the same market value elasticity as the bank balance sheet item under consideration naturally a balance sheet item s effective maturity is the relevant determinant of its contribution to the bank s overall interest rate risk sensitivity

capital standard forbearance and deposit insurance pricing under garch abstract we propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that simultaneously incorporates the capital standard and the possibility of forbearance the model employs the recently developed garch option pricing technique in determining the deposit insurance value our model offers two distinctive advantages first it explicitly considers the implications of the strict enforcement on capital standard as stipulated in fdic improvement act of 1991 second the use of the garch model allows us to capture many robust features exhibited by financial asset returns by the garch option pricing theory the value of a contingent claim is a function of the asset risk premium this unique feature is found to be prominent in determining the bank s deposit insurance value we also examine the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard behavior in this multiperiod deposit insurance setting

risky business multinationals uncertainty and asymmetric insurance a partial equilibrium model is used to examine the international production allocation of a two plant multinational firm that is confronted with uncertainty with respect to foreign sales the firm produces identical products in both plants using firm specific factors the internationally price discriminating multinational has monopoly power in both segmented markets the analysis focuses on how asymmetric insurance facilities between the firm s home and host country influence its international production allocation and level of intra firm trade

forbearance deposit insurance pricing and incentive compatible bank regulation abstract this paper examines the incentive compatible role of regulatory forbearance policy in the context of optimal bank regulation under moral hazard we show that when a bank s asset portfolio returns have market risk the regulator can influence the bank s choice of ex ante risk by delaying the closure of an insolvent bank the optimal closure policy involves co ordinating the closure decision with market wide performance such a policy may significantly alleviate the bank s ex ante risk shifting problem furthermore even fixed rate deposit insurance can be optimal when combined with a sound forbearance policy and a minimum capital standard

options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets analysis and applications this paper provides analytical formulas for european put and call options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets the properties of these formulas are discussed in detail options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets are useful to price a wide variety of contingent claims of interest to financial economists applications discussed in this paper include the valuation of foreign currency debt option bonds compensation plans risk sharing contracts secured debt and growth opportunities involving mutually exclusive investments

how does the stock market view bank regulatory capital forbearance policies during the subprime crisis the fdic has shown once again laxity in resolving and closing insolvent institutions ronn and verma 1986 call the tolerance level below which a bank closure is triggered the regulatory policy parameter we derive a model in which we make this parameter stochastic and bank specific to infer the stock market view of the regulatory capital forbearance value for 565 u s listed banks during 1990 to 2012 the countercyclical forbearance fraction in capital most substantial in recessions could represent 17 on average of the market valuation of bank equity and could go as high as 100

evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields 1983 1991 we examine debenture yields over the period 1983 1991 to evaluate the market s sensitivity to bank specific risks and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government s policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major u s banking firms an increasingly important issue in the regulation of financial institutions concerns the extent to which market investors can will recognize and control the risks of banking firms although the banking act of 1933 replaced some private risk bearing with federal deposit insurance legislators were reluctant to displace market discipline very extensively flood 1992 by the early 1980s however u s regulators had come to protect virtually all bank liability holders from credit losses most visibly at large banks which were deemed too big to fail sprague 1986 o hara and shaw 1990 this extension of the government safety net largely reflects a skepticism on the part of regulators that normal market forces could adequately identify and control bank risks while u s regulators have recently shown an increased willingness to let some bank investors bear default losses an official suspicion of the efficacy of market discipline remains widespread by contrast some prominent academic economists argue that market investors in bank debentures could provide timely and effective control over banking firms risk exposures and that the social cost of supervising banks would be lower if regulators ceded greater

is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation desirable the merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of diierent central banks is examined the lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies linking the central bank s forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners it is shown that in equilibrium a regression toward the worst closure policy may result the central banks of initially less forbearing economies also adopt greater forbearance i analyze the joint design of two bank regulatory mechanisms minimum capital requirements which are an ex ante mechanism to prevent bank failures and closure policy which is an ex post mechanism to manage the cost of bank failures at the heart of the paper is a simple but fundamental point ex post policies affect ex ante incentives and hence the design of an ex ante mechanism must take into account any feedback from the ex post policies the optimal design of capital requirements is thus tied to the extent of forbearance exercised by the central bank s closure policy this warrants a closer scrutiny of the merits of creating a level playing eld in capital requirements across countries as proposed and

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

incorporating equity market information into supervisory monitoring models we examine whether equity market variables such as stock returns and equity based default probabilities are useful to u s bank supervisors for assessing the condition of domestic bank holding companies we develop a model of supervisory ratings that combines supervisory and equity market information we find that the model s forecasts anticipate supervisory rating changes by up to four quarters relative to simply using supervisory variables the inclusion of equity market variables in the model does not improve forecast accuracy however we argue that equity market information should still be useful for forecasting supervisory ratings and should be incorporated into supervisory monitoring models

using market information in prudential bank supervision a review of the u s empirical evidence in principle market and government supervision provide alternative devices for controlling governing any type of corporation most national governments have instituted nonmarket regulatory mechanisms for banking firms on the grounds that market based mechanisms do not adequately discipline banks but what evidence supports this assessment why must governments assure bank solvency but not the solvency of other firms government oversight naturally displaces private efforts to evaluate and control financial firms moreover if the banking business changes over time as it assuredly has in the past decade or two the best combination of government and private supervision may change concurrently this paper reviews and evaluates the growing empirical literature on private investors abilities to assess the financial condition of banking firms the evidence supports the proposition that market investors and analysts could reasonably provide a greater proportion of corporate governance services for large traded u s financial firms

a macroprudential approach to financial regulation many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely microprudential in nature a microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions by contrast a macroprudential approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole in the aftermath of the crisis there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction in this paper we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks is likely to be fragile we begin by identifying the key market failures at work why individual financial firms acting in their own interests deviate from what a social planner would have them do next we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures we conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the united states and to proposed global banking reforms

the japanese export insurance arrangements promotion or subsidisation japan has promoted its exports by reducing the risks accompanying overseas sales through short term facilities for exporters short term export insurance schemes operated in line with rules on minimum premia are not prohibited according to current international trade rules the insured amount of underwriting has however grown steadily and the balance of accounts of export insurance has deteriorated over a sustained long term period the japanese government has supported the system by reinforcing its financial base in the 1980s and 1990s the amount of claims was almost three times higher than premium incomes although the japanese government may have subsidised exporters through the export insurance system such subsidisation is notionally at least in accordance with the current regulations of the global trading system the multilateral trading system has included export insurances at premium rates inadequate for covering the long term operating costs and losses of the programmes in the list of export subsidies the current members of the wto are obliged to abide by the agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures which comprises the illustrative list of export subsidies however the agreement also stipulates that export insurances consistent with the interest rate provisions of the oecd arrangement should not be considered as an export subsidy therefore provision of export insurances not prohibited by the wto regulations may be considered by developing countries undergoing trade deficits as a means of export promotion japan has done similarly for the past half century

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

market based risk adjusted examination schedules for depository institutions abstract among deposit insurance reforms considered by economists and policymakers have been prompt resolution of problem institutions risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums and risk adjusted capital requirements some economists have further suggested that risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums or capital ratios be calculated by applying option pricing models to stock market data alternatively the option methodology could be used to establish a risk based examination schedule whereby riskier banks would be examined on a more frequent basis such an examination schedule would be consistent with prompt resolution strategies since it would relate the frequency of examination and closeness of supervision to banks riskness this paper demonstrates how a risk adjusted examination schedule could be derived the paper also considers alternatives to the assumptions regarding examination policies made in standard applications of the option model which may not be valid for the sample periods previously used it discusses potential resulting biases and ways to mitigate their effects

the term structure of interbank risk we infer a term structure of interbank risk from spreads between rates on interest rate swaps indexed to the london interbank offered rate libor and overnight indexed swaps we develop a tractable model of interbank risk to decompose the term structure into default and non default liquidity components from august 2007 to january 2011 the fraction of total interbank risk due to default risk on average increases with maturity at short maturities the non default component is important in the first half of the sample period and is correlated with measures of funding and market liquidity the model also provides a framework for pricing hedging and risk management of interest rate swaps in the presence of significant basis risk

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

capital shortfall a new approach to ranking and regulating systemic risks the financial crisis of 2007 2009 has given way to the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 2012 yet many of the banking issues remain the same we discuss a method to estimate the capital that a financial firm would need to raise if we have another financial crisis this measure of capital shortfall is based on publicly available information but is conceptually similar to the stress tests conducted by us and european regulators we argue that this measure summarizes the major characteristics of systemic risk and provides a reliable interpretation of the past and current financial crises

forecasting bankruptcy more accurately a simple hazard model i argue that hazard models are more appropriate than single period models for forecasting bankruptcy single period models are inconsistent while hazard models produce consistent estimates i describe a simple technique for estimating a discrete time hazard model i find that about half of the accounting ratios that have been used in previous models are not statistically significant moreover market size past stock returns and idiosyncratic returns variability are all strongly related to bankruptcy i propose a model that uses both accounting ratios and market driven variables to produce out of sample forecasts that are more accurate than those of alternative models copyright 2001 by university of chicago press

a framework for assessing credit risk in depository institutions toward regulatory reform abstract this paper develops and illustrates a new method for evaluating the credit risk borne by depository institutions that may prove to be an important element in a regulatory mechanism sensitive to risk in our framework depository institutions are forced to bear the costs of their risk exposure and hence to internalize this cost when extending loans using various loan portfolios and alternative macroeconomic scenarios we present numerical calculations demonstrating the ability of our framework to capture variations in risk exposure and highlighting the significance of portfolio concentrations these calculations are based on an important new source of information that permits an econometric analysis of loan losses by industry

banking market structure and financial stability evidence from the texas real estate crisis in the 1980s abstract this paper examines the relationship between banking market structure and financial stability using data on thrifts a type of banking institution specializing in residential mortgage lending i test two related hypotheses first competition reduces franchise value second reduced franchise value induces risk taking testing the second hypothesis exploits predictions that when hit by an exogenous shock the slope of risk with respect to franchise value becomes more negative because thrifts adopt bang bang strategies and choose minimal or maximal risk using the texas real estate collapse in the 1980s as a natural experiment i find evidence supporting both hypotheses

the information content of bank exam ratings and subordinated debt prices do supervisory examinations of large commercial banking firms produce useful information not already reflected in market prices to investigate this question we apply a new research methodology to data on bank exam ratings and the subordinated debt risk spreads of their parent holding companies we find that government exams do produce new value relevant information that debenture prices do not immediately reflect this information and that the market prices the likely regulatory actions implied by this information these results have implications for market versus regulatory discipline at large banking firms and for proposals to make subordinated debt mandatory for these firms

a market evaluation of the risk based capital standards for the u s financial system abstract this paper evaluates u s risk based capital guidelines by comparing stock market measures of institutions risk with current regulatory risk based capital measures the first part of the evaluation compares overall market and regulatory risk based capital measures of current capital adequacy required capital and the capital infusion required to meet the capital requirement the second part compares regulatory risk weights on individual risk categories with market determined risk weights the results suggest that the market and risk based capital standards agree to some extent on the adequacy of institutions current capital and required capital infusion but that their measures of asset risk are not positively correlated further the 100 percent risk category for banks and the 50 and 200 percent categories for s ls do distinguish activities that are riskier by market measures however the market model makes limited distinctions among the other categories in addition the results suggest that some off balance sheet activities for banks may reduce asset risk

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

threshold arch models and asymmetries in volatility this paper attempts to enlarge the class of threshold heteroscedastic models tarch introduced by zakoian 1991a we show that it is possible to relax the positivity constraints on the parameters of the conditional variance unconstrained models provide a greater generality of the paths allowing for nonlinearities in the volatility cyclical behaviour is permitted as well as different relative impacts of positive and negative shocks on volatility depending on their size we give empirical evidence using french stock returns

interest risk sensitive deposit insurance premia stable ach estimates abstract the parameters of interest rate uncertainty are estimated by maximum likelihood for the period 1952 1982 and used to evaluate bank or thrift deposit insurance as a function of duration mismatching capital asset ratio and the recent history of interest rate forecasting errors homoskedasticity is overwhelmingly rejected in favor of adaptive conditional heteroskedasticity ach even after removing this heteroskedasticity normality gives much lower likelihood than paretian stable distributions with characteristic exponent in the range 1 614 to 1 714 the conditional deposit insurance values fluctuate by factors in excess of 300 for some duration gaps over the past three decades

the pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies the paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis despite of the potential moral hazard problems we argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance especially when the insured institution is insolvent applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option we first derive a closed form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies then we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for the properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk based pricing scheme

separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure abstract we use a split population survival time model to separate the determinants of bank failure from the factors influencing the survival time of failing banks basic indicators of a bank s condition such as capital troubled assets and net income are important in explaining the timing of bank failure however many of the other variables typically included in bank failure models such as measures of bank liquidity are not associated with the time to failure the results also suggest that the closure of large banks is not delayed relative to the closure of small banks

regulatory incentives and the thrift crisis dividends mutual to stock conversions and financial distress during the 1980s insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts regulators induced nearly 10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual to stock conversions we test a theory of how regulators encouraged capitalimpaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital we estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress