how large are search frictions textabstractthis paper presents strong evidence for the concavity of wages in job and worker characteristics by adding second order terms to a mincerian earnings function for 6 oecd countries under a standard normality assumption this concavity cannot be attributed to unobserved components in those characteristics an assignment model with search frictions provides a parsimonious explanation for our findings this model yields two restrictions on the coefficients which fit the data very well the impact of search frictions on wages is large our results relate to the literature on industry wage differentials on structural identification in hedonic models and on wage posting versus nash bargaining in search models

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

estimating a market equilibrium search model from panel data on individuals from albrecht and axell 1984 and is based on workers who are homogeneous in terms of market productivity and heterogeneous in terms of nonmarket productivity and on firms which are heterogeneous in terms of productive efficiency the equilibrium model is contrasted in terms of its fit to the data with an unrestricted version of the model which is based on a mixture of negative binomial distributions the equilibrium model fails to conform to the data in exactly the dimension of its major focus namely it implies that measurement error accounts for almost all of the dispersion in observed wages the equilibrium model also does not do well in fitting the unemployment duration distribution compared to the unrestricted model the problem is that the duration distribution itself does not support the existence of significant heterogeneity as evidenced by the estimates of the unrestricted model the paper also illustrates the use of such models for policy analysis by simulating the welfare effects of a minimum wage

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

an empirical equilibrium job search model with search on the job and heterogeneous workers and firms in this article we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models allowing for continuous distributions of workers opportunity costs of employment as well as firms productivities the model allows for on the job search and we assume that job offer arrival rates for workers are independent of their labor market state we derive the theoretical implications of these assumptions we provide simulations and we develop a semiparametric estimation procedure that we apply to a dataset of individual labor market histories

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

the right man for the job this paper describes a search model with a continuum of worker and job types free entry and transferable utility we apply a second order taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium derive the cost of search and show that it is decreasing in the substitutability of worker types this cost of search is then decomposed into three components unemployment vacancy costs and mismatch our contact technology rules out congestion effects between different worker types and therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale one third of those increasing returns in contacts are shown to be absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy the resulting equilibrium is not efficient unemployment benefits can reduce the loss by serving as a search subsidy numerical simulations of the model show that our taylor expansions are quite accurate 2004 the review of economics studies limited

a search based theory of the on the run phenomenon we propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market we show that short sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed that asset enjoys greater liquidity a higher lending fee specialness and trades at a premium consistent with no arbitrage we derive closed form solutions for small frictions and provide a calibration generating realistic on the run premia

an equilibrium model of search unemployment this paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined we use this model to analyze the comparati

equilibrium search with continuous productivity dispersion theory and nonparametric estimation in this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market we characterize equilibrium derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions and characterize the set of wage distributions that can be generated by the model we develop a structural nonparametric estimation method for the productivity distribution we estimate the model using french longitudinal survey data on labor supply and we compare the results with those from a french panel data set of firms the results are informative on the degree to which firms exploit search frictions

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

technology policy interaction in frictional labour markets does capital embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labour market outcomes to address this question we develop a model with vintage capital and search matching frictions where irreversible investment in new vintages of capital creates heterogeneity in productivity among firms matched as well as vacant we demonstrate that capital embodied technological change reduces labour demand and raises equilibrium unemployment and unemployment durations in addition the presence of labour market regulations unemployment benefits payroll taxes and firing costs exacerbates these effects thus the model is qualitatively consistent with some key features of the european labour market experience relative to that of the u s it features a sharper rise in unemployment and a sharper fall in the vacancy rate and the labour share a calibrated version of our model suggests that this technology policy interaction could explain a sizeable fraction of the observed differences between the u s and europe copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

an empirical equilibrium model of a decentralized asset market i estimate a search and bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations and asset prices and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade using business aircraft data i find that relative to the walrasian benchmark 12 4 percent of the assets are misallocated and prices are approximately 27 3 percent lower dealers play an important role in reducing frictions in a market with no dealers 15 7 percent of the assets would be misallocated perhaps surprisingly in a market with no dealers prices would increase by 2 8 percent because sellers outside options improve relative to buyers thus counteracting the effects of higher search costs and slower trade on asset prices

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

capital reallocation and liquidity this paper studies the cyclical properties of capital reallocation and the frictions which inhibit such reallocation we show that the amount of capital reallocation and the benefits to reallocation vary at the business cycle frequency the amount of capital reallocation is procyclical in contrast the benefits to capital reallocation appear countercyclical we measure the amount of reallocation using data on flows of capital across firms and the benefits to capital reallocation using several measures of the cross sectional dispersion of the productivity of capital we then study a calibrated model of an economy where capital reallocation is costly and impute the cost of reallocation which is consistent with the amount of and benefits to reallocation in the data we find that the cost of reallocation needs to be substantially countercyclical to be consistent with the observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion the cyclical variation in this cost is interpreted as variation in the liquidity of capital broadly defined since physical costs are unlikely to vary countercyclically

the effect of globalization on the performance of small and medium sized enterprises in the united states does owners race ethnicity matter small and medium sized enterprises smes i e firms with fewer than 500 employees play an important role in the us economy smes represent 99 9 percent of the 25 8 million businesses and have generated 60 80 percent of net new jobs annually over the last decade thus in order to understand the effect of globalization on the us economy one has to know how globalization affects smes this paper examines whether firms that operate in more globalized regions earn less profit we carry out a separate analysis for white owned and minority owned firms because the determinants of profits are different for the two types of firms and therefore estimates from an analysis using pooled data will be biased we use total exports exports by smes and assets of multinational corporations mncs as measures of globalization exports by smes reflect the extent of globalizationinduced competition by small firms and the assets of mncs are a measure of competition by foreign firms and also a proxy for foreign direct investment fdi in a region furthermore the measures capture two important aspects of globalization international trade and fdi

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

liquidity premia in dynamic bargaining markets abstract this paper develops a search theoretic model of the cross sectional distribution of asset returns abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity in contrast with much of the transaction cost literature it is not assumed that different assets carry different exogenously specified trading costs instead different expected returns due to liquidity are explained by the cross sectional variation in tradeable shares the qualitative predictions of the model are consistent with much of the empirical evidence

idiosyncratic return volatility cash flows and product market competition over the past 40 years the volatility of the average stock return has drastically outpaced total market volatility thus idiosyncratic return volatility has dramatically increased we estimate this increase to be 6 per year consistent with an efficient market this result is mirrored by an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of fundamental cash flows we argue that these findings are attributable to the more intense economy wide competition various cross sectional and time series tests support this idea economic competitiveness facilitates reinterpretation of the results from the cross country r2 literature as well as the us idiosyncratic risk literature jel g12 g14

excess sensitivity and asymmetries in consumption an empirical investigation most empirical studies on liquidity constraints classify a consumer as being constrained on the basis of a single indicator such as the asset to income ratio in this analysis the authors model the probability that a consumer faces liquidity constraints as a function of multiple social and economic factors this probability function is estimated simultaneously with the degree of excess sensitivity of consumption to income in a switching regressions framework the switching regressions apply optimal weights to the densities for the euler equations in the two states and are less susceptible to sample misclassification our results based on data from the cex confirm that liquidity constrained consumers are excessively sensitive to variables already known to economic agents however there is also evidence that the unconstrained consumers exhibit behavior that is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions further analysis suggests that such behavior could be explained by time non separable preferences copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

an empirical stationary equilibrium search model of the housing market this article specifies and estimates a computationally tractable stationary equilibrium model of the housing market the model is rich and incorporates many of its unique features buyers and sellers simultaneous search behavior heterogeneity in their motivation to trade transaction costs a trading mechanism with posting prices and bargaining and the availability of an exogenous advertising technology that induces endogenous matching estimation uses maximum likelihood methods and multiple listing services data the estimated model is used to simulate housing market outcomes when a the amount of information displayed on housing listings increases and b real estate agent s commission rates change

turnover of used durables in a stationary equilibrium are older goods traded more this paper develops a dynamic model with transaction costs to determine the equilibrium resale pattern in a market for a durable good the key result is that the probability of resale is nonmonotonic in the age of the good trade volume is relatively low in the very beginning and in the middle of a good s life this result helps explain observed variations of resale rates across vintages for the u s market of used cars

on the turnover of business firms and business managers this paper develops a model of small business failure and sale that is motivated by recent evidence concerning how the failure and sale of small businesses vary with the age of the business and the tenure of the manager this evidence motivates two key features of the model a match between the manager and the business and characteristics of businesses that survive beyond the current match the parameters of the model are estimated and the properties of this parametric model are studied this analysis results in a simple characterization of the workings of the small business sector

an empirical equilibrium search model of the labor market in structural empirical models of labor market search the distribution of wage offers is usually assumed to be exogenous however because in setting their wages profit maximizing firms should consider the reservation wages of job seekers the wage offer distribution is essentially endogenous we investigate whether a proposed equilibrium search model in which the wage offer distribution is endogenous is able to describe observed labor market histories we find that the distributions of job and unemployment spells are consistent with the data and that the qualitative predictions of the model for the wages set by employers are confirmed by wage regressions the model is estimated using panel data on unemployed and employed individuals we distinguish between separate segments of the labor market and we show that productivity heterogeneity is important to obtain an acceptable fit to the data the results are used to estimate the degree of monopsony power of firms further the effects of changes in the mandatory minimum wage are examined

leaning against the wind during financial disruptions market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure they buy when the pressure is large accumulate inventories and sell when the pressure alleviates this paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure and order execution delays i show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity provided they have access to sufficient capital if raising capital is costly this suggests a policy role for lenient central bank lending during financial disruptions

a structural model of the retail market for illicit drugs we estimate a model of illicit drugs markets using data on purchases of crack cocaine buyers are searching for high quality drugs but they determine drugs quality i e their purity only after consuming them hence sellers can rip off first time buyers or can offer higher quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again in equilibrium a distribution of qualities persists the estimated model implies that if drugs were legalized in which case purity could be regulated and hence observable the average purity of drugs would increase by approximately 20 percent and the dispersion would decrease by approximately 80 percent moreover increasing penalties may raise the purity and affordability of the drugs traded by increasing sellers relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first time buyers

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association