when behavior matters games and computation in a behavioral theory of the firm abstract a behavioral theory of the firm presents a computational model of a duopoly that is based on observations of firm behavior and that incorporates a range of behavioral constructs because this model is starkly different from the traditional game theoretic analysis of duopoly it useful to compare the performance of a game theoretic version of this model shorn of all behavioral constructs with the original cyert and march paradigm to do this we calibrate the game theoretic model with all the economic components of the computational model and we assume that firms could choose either cooperative or non cooperative strategies we find that the pricing strategy of the computational firms is similar to that found in a non cooperative game theoretic outcome and that the advertising choice of the computational firms is less than what non cooperative or cooperative game theoretic behavior would predict we also consider how initializing the choices of the computational firm with those of the game theoretic firms affects their performance informing the computational firms in this way led to greater changes in advertising than pricing strategies profits of the computational firms were greatest when their initial choices were those found in a non cooperative equilibrium

dynamic oligopolies without full information and with continuously distributed time lags abstract dynamic oligopolies are examined without full information on the price function with each firm using a perceived price function that usually differs from the actual inverse demand function of the market it is assumed that firms experience time lags in obtaining and implementing information on the price and also on output under realistic assumptions we show that without time lags the steady state is always locally asymptotically stable whereas in the presence of time lags situations of local instability may occur the possibility of limit cycles is examined and some special cases are considered

laboratory tests of equilibrium predictions with disequilibrium data we examine a common practice used within previous studies of laboratory markets testing equilibrium models using some data from markets that have not reached an equilibrium we examine the effect of this practice when it is applied to some laboratory markets where an appreciable number of them eventually satisfied an operational definition of an equilibrium our data suggest that for our markets significantly different equilibrium test results would be obtained when using all data available in market periods analysed in previous studies rather than using only equilibrium data for our markets choices made in disequilibrium are quite different from those in equilibrium this paper is primarily concerned with examining one common practice used in previous studies of laboratory markets this practice is testing equilibrium models using some data from markets that have not reached an equilibrium the data set used typically consists of all available laboratory data from the last period an average of the last few periods an average of all periods or from the nth period for some fixed n i know of no attempt at least formally to assure all data were from markets in equilibrium markets where market choices have stabilized recently some laboratory markets were run where an appreciable number of them eventually satisfied an operational definition of an equilibrium could the use of disequilibrium data significantly affect the results of tests we might make of some equilibrium models for these laboratory markets this practice would be desirable if the disequilibrium data provided a useful estimate of the behaviour that would have been observed if an equilibrium had been obtained on the other hand if some disequilibrium behaviour is qualitatively different from the behaviour that would be observed in an equilibrium this practice could produce misleading results within this paper we examine the effect of this practice when it is used on our laboratory data

decoupled farm program payments are really decoupled the theory lump sum transfers to farmers are commonly believed to affect the production choices of farmers in the presence of risk and uncertainty this paper shows that if farmers have off farm investment and employment opportunities production decisions are decoupled from lump sum subsidies in the presence of risk and uncertainty our results are reconciled with existing results by showing that previously identified production adjustments are portfolio adjustments

oligopoly game price makers meet price takers abstract the paper studies an oligopoly game where firms can choose between price taking and price making strategies on a mixed market price takers are always better off than price makers though the profits of both types decline in the number of price takers we investigate and confront two possibilities of firms decisions about their types forward looking equilibrium reasoning and backward looking individual learning we find that the cournot outcome is the only equilibrium prediction and it is learnable if firms are sufficiently sensitive to profit differences however with a larger number of firms a unilateral deviation from cournot behavior becomes profitable under learning this incentive creates a space for permanent oscillations over different markets with a positive but low number of price takers

the decoupling of farm programs revisiting the wealth effect recent reforms of agricultural policies in developed countries have introduced direct payments as replacements for traditional production enhancing instruments whereas these new instruments can in principle influence production through several channels current empirical studies show no significant impact on production direct payments mainly increase land values in this article we revisit the evaluation of the coupling effects passing through the wealth of agricultural households the initial wealth of these agents while mainly being in the form of land asset holding is always assumed to be fixed to the contrary we show theoretically and through an empirical simulation exercise that once the impact of farm programs on initial wealth is properly accounted for the measure of the coupling effects is not as negligible as found in previous studies copyright 2010 oxford university press

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

cournot oligopoly reconsidering cournot the cournot equilibrium is consistent this article uses an infinite regress model of firm level decisions to find a rational expectations equilibrium for a duopoly and to relate concepts of conjectural variations and consistency to the cournot equilibrium the model derives a conjectural variation instead of assuming it in particular the cournot equilibrium is shown to be consistent in the usual sense of the literature the conflict between notions of consistent conjectures and the cournot equilibrium results from a compounding problem inherent in the earlier models we extend these results to the n firm problem alternatively the article can be viewed as providing a purely static model that generates the cournot equilibrium without reference to conjectures or quasi dynamics

did the federal trade commission s advertising substantiation program promote more credible advertising this paper examines the effects of the federal trade commission s advertising substantiation program developed in the early 1970s this program coupled changes in the legal definition of deception with more vigorous ftc enforcement the authors analyze changes in advertising intensity media choice media wealth and the progress of new entrants the evidence suggests that adoption of substantiation requirements increased the credibility of advertising copyright 1990 by american economic association

an economic analysis of the possibility of reducing pesticides in french field crops the paper aims to study the effects of reducing pesticide use by farmers in the arable sector in france and the feasibility of a policy target of reducing pesticide use by half the originality of the approach is to combine statistical data and expert knowledge to describe low input alternative techniques at the national level these data are used in a mathematical programming model to simulate the effect on land use production and farmers income of achieving different levels of pesticide reduction the results show that reducing pesticide use by 30 could be possible without reducing farmers income we also estimate the levels of tax on pesticides necessary to achieve different levels of reduction of pesticide use and the effect of an incentive mechanism combining a pesticide tax with subsidies for low input techniques

acreage decisions under risk the case of corn and soybeans an acreage supply response model is developed under expected utility maximization the resulting framework is used to specify and estimate a system of risk responsive acreage equations for corn and soybeans in the united states particular attention is given to the truncation effects of government price supports on the distribution of corn and soybean prices also a wealth variable is included in the acreage equations the empirical results indicate that risk and wealth variables play an important role in cornsoybean acreage decisions the analysis also shows that cross commodity risk reduction is important in acreage allocation decisions

the impact of the 1999 cap reforms on the efficiency of the cop sector in spain the cereal oilseeds and protein crop sector cop occupies a prominent position within the european union s agricultural sector within spain the cop sector accounts for almost a third of total agricultural guidance and guarantee fund expenses and half of the utilized agricultural area uaa the cop sector is not only relevant because of its physical and economic magnitude but also because of the political attention it receives the common agricultural policy cap reforms that occurred during the 1990s paid special attention to this sector this article aims to determine the impacts of agenda 2000 on a sample of spanish cop farmers production decisions by using an output oriented stochastic distance function the distance function allows for an assessment of the reform motivated changes on total output input used input composition and crop mix it also permits an assessment of the impacts of the reform on farms technical efficiency results show that the reform has shifted the production frontier inward and changed output composition in favor of voluntary set aside land with respect to input composition agenda 2000 induced a decrease in land fertilizers pesticides and other inputs in favor of labor in addition agenda 2000 has had a negative impact on technical efficiency

supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods this paper develops an indirect evolutionary game model with two vertically integrated channels to study evolutionarily stable strategies ess of retailers in the quantity setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods and analyzes the effects of the demand and raw material supply disruptions on the retailers strategies every channel consists of one manufacturer and many a sufficiently large number of retailers that sell products in different markets by adopting two pure marketing strategies profit maximization and revenue maximization we find that revenue maximization strategy may prevail and profit maximization strategy may become extinct two strategies may coexist i e all retailers in one channel will choose profit maximization strategy and all retailers in the other will choose revenue maximization strategy the ess of retailers depends on the relative size of the market scale and unit cost the supply chain disruptions affect the ess of retailers we also introduce a recovery model of the supply chain under disruptions and illustrate the effect of disruptions on the ess and on the average profits of channels in a market using a numerical simulation

estimation of moments and production decisions under uncertainty the purpose of this paper is to examine production decisions under output price uncertainty using a nonparametric estimation technique to estimate the first four moments of the unknown price distribution and applying duality we provide a simple empirical framework for the analysis of supply and demand decisions under price uncertainty the model is used to examine the importance of higher moments in the firm s production decisions and to investigate underlying attitudes toward risk

the impact of external parties on brand name capital the 1982 tylenol poisonings and subsequent cases an examination of the 1982 tylenol poisonings reveals stock market losses to johnson johnson that far exceed direct costs and losses shared with other pain reliever producers this evidence provides support for the klein and leffler 1981 theory of brand names as quality assuring mechanisms of the subsequent cases only the 1986 tylenol poisonings were associated with significant stock market losses prior to the 1982 and 1986 tylenol poisonings tylenol was the number one pain reliever whereas the other pain relievers that were poisoned had a much lower level of brand name capital to lose

market incentives for safe commercial airline operation using a sample of nearly all fatal u s airline accidents between 1960 and 1985 this paper attempts to quantify the costs that airlines incur due to crashes the potential costs include those due to loss of life and equipment tort liability increased regulatory oversight and loss of demand as consumers turn away from products perceived to be unsafe examination of the deviations from expected demand following accidents reveals little or no effect prior to airline deregulation and weak indication of a response to recent crashes these results are consistent with the changes in an airline s equity value following an accident which are statistically significant but quite small relative to the total social cost of the accident

dynamic analysis of discontinuous best response with innovation abstract starting from the static analysis in eckert et al 2017 we study a cournot duopoly where firms can decide to incur fixed costs in activities that improve their competitiveness i e product development or process innovation innovation costs generate discontinuities in the firms quantity best response functions and in turn a variety of equilibrium configurations including multiple equilibria we provide a dynamic global analysis of the equilibria and show the way in which firms initial expectations regarding the rivals level of output are crucial in defining the configuration of the long run equilibrium

bounded rationality dynamic oligopoly and conjectural variations abstract we propose a dynamic model of n firm oligopoly that provides a logically consistent reinterpretation of conjectural variations each firm solves a dynamic optimization problem believing that the other firms will alter their future choices in proportion to its own current change these beliefs adapt in light of observed behavior we show that steady state equilibria can range from complete cooperation to predatory play and provide conditions under which the firms behavior and beliefs converge to a steady state the sufficient conditions for stability are more easily satisfied the smaller the cross effects among firms through demand or belief parameters they are also more easily satisfied in a price setting than in a quantity setting differentiated products model

brand names ignorance and quality guaranteeing premiums recent literature contains several theories of how self enforcing agreements rely on repeat purchase mechanisms to ensure product quality some have suggested the use of advertising as a signal of future actions in such games this article extends these recent studies for the case where firms face temporary changes in cost or demand curves and offers an initial attempt at providing a statistical test of the klein leffler model it is found that the deviations in the advertising sales ratio from the levels that can be explained by industry specific characteristics are consistently contrary to what their model predicts these results hold over a very wide range of depreciation rates for advertising and for the many individual industries examined the results are only weakly affected when the presence of measurement error is explicitly recognized

structural agricultural land use modeling for spatial agro environmental policy analysis this paper develops a spatially disaggregated structural econometric model of agricultural land use and production based on the joint multi output technology representation introduced by chambers and just 1989 starting from a flexible specification of the farm profit function we derive land use allocation input application crop yield and livestock intensity equations in a joint and theoretically consistent framework to account for the presence of censored observations in micro level data the model is estimated as a system of two limit tobit equations via quasi maximum likelihood we present an empirical application using fine scale spatial data covering the entirety of england and wales and including the main economic policy and environmental drivers of land use change in the past forty years a simulation of the effects of diffuse pollution reduction measures illustrates how our approach can be applied for agro environmental policy appraisal

evolutionary dynamics in club goods binary games abstract a dynamic adjustment mechanism based on replicator dynamics in discrete time is used to study the time evolution of a population of players facing a binary choice game with social influence characterized by payoff curves that intersect at two interior points also denoted as thresholds so besides the boundary equilibria where all players make the same choice there are two further steady states where agents playing different strategies coexist and get identical payoffs such binary game can be interpreted as a club good game in which players have to choose either joining or not the club in the presence of cost sharing so that they can enjoy a good or a service provided that a participation threshold is reached at the same time congestion occurs beyond a second higher threshold these binary choice models can be used and indeed have been used in the literature to represent several social and economic decisions such as technology adoption joining a commercial club r d investments production delocalization programs for environmental protection existence and stability of equilibrium points are studied as well as the creation of more complex attractors periodic or chaotic related with overshooting effects the study of some local and global dynamic properties of the evolutionary model proposed reveals that the presence of the participation threshold causes the creation of complex topological structures of the basins of coexisting attracting sets so that a strong path dependence is observed the dynamic effects of memory both in the form of convex combination of a finite number of previous observation moving average and in the form of memory with increasing length and exponentially fading weights are investigated as well

what does reputation really assure the relationship of trademarks to expectations and legal remedies i introduction klein and leffler 1981 and shapiro 1982 1983 have shown that a firm that engages in repeat transactions has an incentive to use the market as distinct from formal legal processes to assure the quality of its product the firm charges a price above salvageable costs of production and invests the premium in reputation trademark capital that it forfeits wholly or in part if it allows quality to fall below the standards it represents to its customers 1 the quality assurance hypothesis seems to be supported by stock market event studies such as those by jarrell and peltzman 1985 and karpoff and lott 1993 which show that product recalls airline crashes deceptive advertising and fraud result in trademark losses the quality assurance hypothesis however does not explain the massive size of these losses which typically are many times the outlays incurred by the firm as a result of the event the law and economics literature on contracts offers an answer to this and related puzzles suggesting that trademark capital does more than assure quality it assures specific performance that is fulfillment of the precise terms of the contract 2 after developing the specific performance hypothesis section ii we show that it is supported by the evidence from event studies furthermore it explains other phenomena not covered by the quality assurance hypothesis including why competitors of firms whose products are recalled lose wealth why some damages such as those in airline crashes intentionally fail to provide full compensation and why firms who sell to other firms also invest in trademark capital section iii we conclude with a summary and a few remarks on the issue of market versus legal forces section iv ii the specific performance hypothesis the quality assurance hypothesis focuses on the problems that arise when the physical characteristics of a commodity are costly to determine even after purchase and sellers warranties and quality representations are costly to enforce because higher quality usually costs more to produce and can be sold at a higher price producers have an incentive to represent their goods as being of higher quality than they really are or having established a reputation to cut quality and costs when consumers observe that the quality of the goods they purchase is lower than they had been led to believe they shift to lower cost lower quality goods whose quality is easier to determine higher quality goods seemingly are driven off the market klein and leffler 1981 hypothesize that a firm that engages in repeat transactions can gain by producing higher quality goods charging a price above salvageable costs of production and investing the premium in firm specific trademark capital the value of this trademark also described as reputation or goodwill is the present value of the expected stream of price premiums misrepresentation causes a reduction in this income stream and a corresponding loss in trademark capital 3 thus trademarks assure quality without a third party to enforce the contract 4 a buyer however is concerned about other characteristics of a transaction besides the physical attributes of the product the expected harm if the seller breaches the contract for example by misrepresenting the product failing to deliver it on time or failing to provide future service and the ability of the legal system to assure full compensation also matter accordingly a seller who engages in repeat transactions has an incentive to provide a bond that assures specific performance rather than just product quality when a breach results in damages that are hard to measure and the legal system does not enforce contracts costlessly the next task therefore is to examine the limitations of the legal system in enforcing contracts and providing compensation in case of breach specific performance and penalty clauses the courts could require contracting parties to provide specific performance

are rational conjectures rational the concepts of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures are critically reviewed it is shown that their operation depends crucially on an invisible non optimizing deus ex machina hence these concepts are not really suitable for understanding competition among optimizing firms in addition the widely claimed fact that bertrand conjectures are locally rational conjectural variations is shown to be erroneous the message of this paper should be plain from the title it reflects a disillusionment with the concepts of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures for helping us understand economic interactions under imperfect competition on the face of it these concepts seem to offer the economic modeller some useful tools hence this paper is in some sense intended as a friendly warning to other economic modellers there are inherent conceptual weaknesses in these concepts that do not become apparent until one begins to penetrate their inner logic to make plain the weaknesses of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures we shall concentrate on the simplest application of the ideas to duopoly and we shall illustrate our points using the classical cournot example of duopolists facing a common linear demand curve and having the same constant marginal cost the reader may know that this example figures prominently in the rational conjectures literature it being shown that bertrand conjectures are locally rational conjectural variations we shall see in section vi that this claim is not really valid although widely asserted but our real message is on a different plane and pertains to the usefulness of the concepts in general

repeated contests a general parameterization abstract contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year this paper characterizes equilibrium effort both individual and aggregate in a general parameterization of such repeated contests

decoupled farm payments and the role of base acreage and yield updating under uncertainty we analyze the coupling effect of expectations about base acreage and yield updating in future farm policy on production decisions in the presence of price yield and policy uncertainty for a risk averse farmer producing a single crop the farmer receives market revenue and government payments using stochastic dynamic programming optimum decisions under present value calculations positively link current acreage and fertilizer decisions to future government payments through expected updates of base acreage and yield in the future regime moving from a zero probability of updating to a probability of one increases optimum acreage and yield by 6 25 and 0 134 respectively copyright 2010 oxford university press

average crop revenue election a revenue based alternative to price based commodity payment programs this article develops a stochastic model of the average crop revenue election acre program which offers revenue based commodity payments under the 2008 farm act our analysis shows that adding acre revenue payments to gross revenue reduces downside revenue risk for corn wheat and soybean farmers in 2009 on average by 16 21 and 23 respectively results indicate that farms with higher expected yields and lower variance of yields tend to benefit the most from acre integrating federal crop insurance with acre lowers insurance premiums from 10 to 40 depending on the crop and location

what s in a sign trademark law and economic theory the aim of this paper is to summarize the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of literature the proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics copyright 2006 the authors journal compilation 2006 blackwell publishing ltd

cross subsidization due to inframarginal support in agriculture a general theory and empirical evidence a general theory of cross subsidization due to inframarginal support is developed two sources of output distortion are identified exit deterrence and extramarginal output some firms would not be in business without the subsidy cost savings due to declining average costs are always greater than the losses incurred where price equals marginal cost moreover it is theoretically possible for inframarginal subsidies to expand output more than equivalent fully coupled subsidies empirical analysis of u s dairy subsidies isolates these components of cross subsidization and finds distortions from inframarginal support to be substantial with implications for trade negotiations dispute settlement and policy formulation copyright 2008 oxford university press

oligopoly experimentation of learning with simulated markets abstract learning is investigated using experimental methods agents have no information about demand conditions the same oligopoly market is finitely repeated and the only link between successive markets is that agents acquire experience over time as the game is played adaptive as well as least squares learning are tested the model of price adjustment followed by firms indicates that the non cooperative bertrand nash equilibrium constitutes an attractor to players strategies

the benefits of asymmetric markets economists have long been fascinated by the paradox that given favorable conditions people s selfish greed for power and profits can annihilate the very power and profits they lust after and in the process turn the chaos and anarchy of unbridled greed into order and harmony ever since the paradox was first noted generations of economists have admired taught and argued it and the arrow debreu theory of general competitive equilibrium is the culmination of the profession s long struggle to understand fully all its conditions and implications the resulting theory of general equilibrium with its careful setting out of the many conditions on which the conclusions depend and its clarification of the way in which conclusions and underlying conditions are interconnected has rightly been hailed as a remarkable intellectual achievement of course the conditions set out have been chosen with a view to obtaining the conclusions not for their realism and some of them are admittedly and blatantly unrealistic accordingly the important and remarkable results of the theory pertain to an imaginary economy however the theory s portrayal of the market forces that govern resource utilization and allocation resembles our actual economy closely enough to be of great practical importance hence the great attention that the theory has received and the consensus that it represents an important milestone in our understanding of the market economy one must be careful however not to read more into general equilibrium theory than what it says everybody knows that the u s economy is far removed from the theory s imaginary model of perfect competition the empirical evidence on unemployment and capacity underutilization makes that clear but the intellectual pleasure one gets from following the theory s elegant logic and beautiful results easily makes one forget its limitations economists are often so mesmerized by the magic of perfect competition that they neglect or fail to notice other equally important

product reliability and firm value the experience of american and japanese automakers 1973 1992 in a typical month several recall campaigns of motor vehicles are announced by automobile manufacturers they are carried out to correct defective vehicles whether safetyor pollution related recalls imply that the products made available to consumers are not what they were supposed to be a question arises then as to whether and how much the offending automakers are affected by these recall campaigns the answer to this question has been ambiguous in the literature we have two purposes in this paper first on the basis of a longer and broader database we offer additional and more conclusive evidence that documents significant and negative market reactions to automobile recall announcements our finding therefore helps to resolve the ambiguity in the literature on this question second we offer new evidence on japanese automobile companies they too suffer from significant and negative stock market reactions but the incidence of recalls is less frequent perhaps as a result the magnitude of the stock market reaction to each recall is somewhat larger nevertheless because recalls are much less frequent the total losses

modeling the reforms of the common agricultural policy for arable crops under uncertainty the size of the insurance and wealth effects of a change in the common agricultural policy cap for arable crops is estimated the impact of price uncertainty is accounted for in the specific decision making structure of the european union eu arable crop producers under nonlinear mean variance risk preferences a system of output supply input demand and land allocation equations is estimated on a sample of italian specialized arable crop farms the simulation of the impact of the recent reforms confirms that farmers output responses are consistently affected by the size of the insurance and wealth effects

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

the inconsistency of consistent conjectures abstract conjectural variation models have been criticized because firms are right for the wrong reasons and because possible equilibria are abundant lately several papers have attempted to meet these difficulties by some condition of consistency or rationality on the conjectural variation this paper shows that stronger versions of such conditions lead into paradoxes while the weaker forms are of little use in solving the conceived problems the original cournot assumption actually satisfies consistency enterions the problems with consistent conjectures illuminates fundmental problems with too demanding information assumptions like perfect foresight such assumptions may create non trivial structures of self reference

does structure matter the impact of switching the agricultural policy regime on farm structures abstract this paper investigates the relationship between structural change in agriculture and a policy regime switch at the regional level using the agent based spatial and dynamic simulation model agripolis we simulate structural change for two different farm structures in response to a policy change results show that structural adjustment differs depending on the initial structure

multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly in a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding bertrand nash equilibria subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model in the presence of intense multiproduct activity and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms strategies tend to confirm the non cooperative multiproduct solution

shifting foundations of agricultural policy analysis welfare economics when risk markets are incomplete the neat alignment of resources output and prices specified by the perfect competition model is far from duplicated in free markets and the equally neat alignment assumed under the constraints of a program is not experienced when programs are in effect in particular areas under empirically determined supply curves are unlikely to represent opportunity costs the basic theory is invaluable in providing a conceptual orientation for the analysis of programs but the assumptions implicit in the literal use of simple forms of it for policy conclusions are breathtakingly heroic

the combined effect of salary restrictions and revenue sharing in sports leagues i introduction invariance principles are the golden eggs of economics franco modigliani merton miller and ronald coase were awarded nobel prizes for their formulations of important invariance principles a predecessor of the famous coase theorem is rottenberg s invariance proposition according to rottenberg 1956 the distribution of playing talent between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of property rights to players services el hodiri and quirk 1971 fort and quirk 1995 and vrooman 1995 extend this invariance proposition to gate revenue sharing based on their models they claim that revenue sharing does not change the level of competitive balance within a league this form of invariance proposition has become one of the most heavily disputed issues in sports economics because its centerpieces revenue sharing and the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis represent two of the most important idiosyncrasies in the professional team sports industry according to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis fans prefer to attend games with uncertain outcomes and enjoy close championship races unlike toyota which benefits from weak competitors in the automobile industry real madrid and the new york yankees need strong competitors to maximize their revenues in sports a weak team produces a negative externality on its stronger competitors revenue sharing arrangements have been introduced as a measure to improve the competitive balance by partially internalizing this externality if the invariance proposition held revenue sharing would be worthless current revenue sharing schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues all over the world in north america the most prominent is possibly that operated by the national football league nfl where the visiting club secures 40 of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue in 1876 major league baseball mlb introduced a 50 50 split of gate receipts that was reduced over time since 2003 all the clubs in the american league have put 34 of their locally generated revenue gate concession television etc into a central pool which is then divided equally among all the clubs the national basketball association nba and the national hockey league nhl also operate with a pool sharing arrangement moreover in the australian football league afl gate receipts were at one time split evenly between the home and the visiting team this 50 50 split was finally abolished in 2000 other measures to increase competitive balance are salary caps and floors a salary cap floor puts an upper lower bound on a club s payroll since most leagues compute their salary caps and floors on the basis of the revenues of the preceding season caps and floors can be treated as fixed limits the nba was the first league to introduce a salary cap for the 1984 1985 season for the 2008 2009 season the soft salary cap is fixed at us 58 7 million today salary caps are in effect in professional team sports leagues all over the world in the nhl for example each team had to spend between us 34 3 million and 50 3 million on player salaries in the 2007 2008 season in the nfl the salary cap in 2009 is approximately us 128 million per team whereas the salary floor was 87 6 of the salary cap which is equivalent to us 112 1 million the afl also operates with a combined salary cap and floor for 2009 the salary cap was fixed at a 7 69 million the floor at 7 12 million another australian league the national rugby league nrl has implemented a salary cap and floor system which forced each team to spend between a 3 96 million and 4 4 million in 2009 in europe salary caps are in effect in the guiness premiership in rugby union and the super league in rugby league 1 in most industries payroll caps would be regarded as an exploitation of market power and would be prohibited by anti trust authorities

nominal shocks in monopolistically competitive markets an experiment abstract a market experiment examines the capacity of price and information frictions to explain real responses to nominal price shocks results indicate that both price and information frictions impede the response to a nominal shock as predicted by the standard dynamic adjustment models observed adjustment delays however far exceed predicted levels results of a pair of subsequent treatments indicate that a combination of announcing the shock privately to all sellers rather than publicly and a failure of many sellers to best respond to their expectations explains the observed adjustment inertia

how much do decoupled payments affect production an instrumental variable approach with panel data how much decoupled payments such as direct payments in the u s affect agricultural production remains an open empirical question with implications for policy using data from multiple years of the census of agriculture we exploit a provision of the 2002 farm act that departed from previous policy by making oilseeds eligible for direct payments thus increasing payments to areas that historically produced more oilseeds our instrumental variable estimates in contrast to ols estimates suggest that changes in payments over the period 2002 to 2007 had little effect on aggregate production at the zip code level copyright 2012 oxford university press

pesticide taxation and multi objective policy making farm modelling to evaluate profit environment trade offs abstract many countries in western europe have introduced voluntary programmes to encourage farmers to adopt environmentally more benign practices such as integrated pest management but more policy action appears to be needed to meet the environmental quality levels now demanded input taxes could assist in meeting policy objectives the issue considered here is the identification of the most appropriate specification of a tax instrument to reduce the environmental problems of agricultural pesticide usage this paper takes a farm systems approach to evaluation a case study illustration is given for a specialist arable farm in the uk combining an economic model of land use and production with a set of environmental indicators for pesticides linking these two components allows the identification of the potential trade offs between achieving reductions in the environmental burden to a number of ecological dimensions and farm income different pesticide tax specifications vary in both the magnitude and the direction of their impacts the results of the model indicate that either compromises will have to be made in environmental policy or additional instruments will be required to counter act the negative side effects of some instruments

market incentives for safe foods an examination of shareholder losses from meat and poultry recalls meat and poultry recalls while voluntary are carried out under governmental oversight if firms have financial incentives to avoid being implicated in a recall situation governmental involvement in recalls may cause firms to internalize social costs when making investment decisions concerning food safety controls to examine these incentives we analyze federally supervised meat and poultry recalls from 1982 to 1998 within an event study results show significant shareholder losses when publicly traded food companies are implicated in a recall involving serious food safety hazards we find no evidence that the stock market reacts negatively when recalls involve less severe hazards each year unsafe foods sicken millions and lead to losses in terms of life and productivity mead et al estimate that foodborne pathogens account for 76 million illnesses and 5 000 deaths in the united states given human error and the limitations of food safety technology food items that pose undue risks to the public will be distributed from time to time when this occurs the firms involved stand to incur expenses related to recovering disposing of or reconditioning potentially contaminated products already placed on the market in addition negative publicity can lead to reductions in product demand and may erode prior investments in reputation and brand capital these firms may also face costs from liability claims associated with an outbreak of food related illnesses or injury our main objective in this paper is to examine reductions in food company valuations that result from food contamination incidents we focus specifically on meat and poultry firms that have shipped products that were later recalled for food safety reasons because preventative actions taken by firms can affect the probability of being implicated in a product recall situation the wealth that is lost when companies are required to recall

experimental duopolies under price guarantees in a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of price guarantees pgs to raise prices above the competitive levels different types of pgs aggressive and soft price beating and price matching are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy our results show that pgs may lead close to the collusive outcome depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the aggressive price beating type

conjectures rationality and duopoly theory abstract the main results of this paper are twofold first we show that any sustainable pair of production programs can be obtained as a locally rational conjectural equilibrium for appropriately chosen linear conjectural functions for the duopolists then we show that constant conjectural variations duopoly models could in a sense be made rational if the value of the conjectural variation is considered not as a constant but rather as a specific value taken at the equilibrium

risk aversion and yield uncertainty in duality models of production a mean variance approach a duality model of production is developed that endogenizes stochastic output decisions under risk aversion the model incorporates both yield and price uncertainty and nonlinear mean variance risk preferences this permits modeling of the firm s expected output supply and input demand decisions under risk and also in principle the firm s output variance decisions the duality model is tractable for empirical research

risk aversion and price risk in duality models of production a linear mean variance approach a duality model of production is developed that permits risk aversion and price uncertainty the linear mean variance framework employed is tractable for empirical research in contrast to duality models of risk based on a generalized expected utility function the framework is more general than in standard price certainty models while retaining the simplicity needed for empirical research

the existence of nash equilibria in reaction functions for dynamic models of oligopoly consider cournot s stability analysis of his mineral spring duopoly cournot 1838 each of the two firms believes that its rival s output in the next period will simply equal that observed currently profit maximization yields reaction functions which are explicitly dynamic and are assumed to govern the actual evolution of the system cournot proved that the system is asymptotically stable in this simplest case cournot s result was shown by theocharis 1960 not to generalize to three or more firms fisher 1961 discusses more general cost and demand functions than those used by cournot even in the case considered by cournot however there is an obvious conceptual objection each firm s output will generally vary from one period to the next flagrantly violating its rival s conjecture some of james friedman s work especially 1968 1973 1976 and 1977 might best be viewed as an attempt to eliminate this delusional quality from dynamic models of oligopoly consider a typical duopoly scenario with two firms making repeated simultaneous quantity determinations friedman more commonly discusses price setting models but these are straightforwardly analogous each firm believes that the other firm s behavior is determined only by the quantity pair selected in the previous period in friedman s work as distinct from cournot s these beliefs are ultimately required to be consistent with the other firm s actual behavior for example firm 2 believes that firm l s output in the current period is given as

the influence of direct payments on farmers hail insurance decisions we analyze determinants of hail insurance use of swiss farmers using fadn panel data covering the period 1990 2009 mixed effect logistic regression models are estimated to identify the most important farm and farmer characteristics that trigger insurance use in addition information on local hail risk is taken into account in these models it shows that larger farms with specialization in crop production and with larger local hail risks are more likely to adopt the hail insurance moreover insurance users are usually older and better educated since the early 1990s swiss agricultural policy has reduced price support and introduced general and ecological direct payments this has led to a much higher importance of direct payments for farmers incomes our analysis shows that this development has contributed to decreasing hail insurance adoption rates in switzerland over the period considered our results indicate that the larger the share of direct payments for total farm revenue the less attractive is insurance as a risk management strategy for farmers this interdependency should be explicitly considered by agricultural policy in the design of support mechanisms

the semiflexible almost ideal demand system abstract the concept of a semiflexible functional form is applied to the almost ideal ai demand system this yields a demand model that is more parsimonious than standard ones while preserving a degree of flexibility that satisfies the curvature property of concavity of the underlying expenditure function at least locally and that preserves the desirable properties of the ai model aggregation across consumers and nonlinearity of the engel curves the model is illustrated with an application to a relatively large demand system emphasizing food consumption

implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity amanufacturer writes supply contracts with n buyers then the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer builds capacity finally demand is realized and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers the court remedy for breach of contract specific performance versus expectation damages affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation and hence how the firms make investments ex ante the firms may also engage in renegotiation design inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation for example when a buyer grants a financial hostage to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation tradable options which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers this paper proves that under surprisingly general conditions the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts fixed quantity contracts this may require renegotiation design and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly

conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games abstract a family of constant conjectural variations strategies is defined and examined in the natural context of infinitely repeated cournot duopoly games with discounting it is shown that any pair of linear reaction functions in the family gives rise to a unique pair of quantities in stationary equilibrium as the conjectures and discount parameter vary the sum of the stationary quantities will vary anywhere between the competitive and the monopoly outcomes equilibrium is strongly stable and credible in the sense of exhibiting a variation of selten s subgame perfection provided that firms can react quickly enough to one another s actions

the production effects of agricultural income support policies under uncertainty this analysis decomposes the production impacts of income support programs into wealth insurance and coupling effects under the usual assumptions about preferences the wealth and insurance effects of many support programs increase optimal input levels even for supposedly decoupled programs if the program is coupled in the usual sense then all three effects often act in the same direction it is concluded that studies of trade and domestic policy reform in stochastic environments should consider insurance and wealth effects the derivative conditions required to obtain results are also subjected to scrutiny simulations for an iowa corn producer confirm the comparative statics

adapting behaviors through a learning process this paper concerns the concepts of conjectures and reactions of agents in a dynamic context a framework where agents form conjectures on how the other agents would react to their actions and update this belief according to observations they decide based on this conjecture without knowing profit functions of other agents agents somehow learn about the behavior including the conjectures of the other agents we show that some type of consistency of these conjectures spontaneously appears we discuss the pareto optimality and the local stability of the strategies obtained in the long run and analyze the example of cournot s oligopoly

appropriating signs and meaning the elusive economics of trademark this paper deals with economic analysis of trademark its presence in markets is originally connected with the problem of information asymmetries and the need to provide information for assisting exchanges so as to avert the market failure brought about by adverse selection however this information conveying function is also accompanied by a differentiation effect arising from the power of persuasion that signs can exert on individuals the exploitation of differentiation has given rise to the practice of branding which ties markets and consumption to the realms of meaning and experience branding is so all pervasive in today s economy as to have somehow transfigured it so that the role of persuasion is now pre eminent nonetheless the mainstream economic theory tends to resist acknowledging this change which would to a large extent call into question well established hypotheses and theoretical tools the general response has therefore been to assume that the informational role of trademark predominates and to use this hypothesis to construct models welfare evaluations and policy prescriptions that bear little or no relation to the actual markets the opposing approach in the shadow of the nelson s and arrow s seminal papers on economics of information is recognising the idiosyncratic character of information and therefore drawing conclusions and devising solutions that while still based upon the welfare criterion also incorporate a wider awareness and a deeper representation of the scenario under study the present work attempts to move in this direction showing how different disciplines can provide some key epistemological tools for enabling economists to effectively evaluate the welfare outcomes of the introduction and progressive alteration of a particular intellectual property right within the realm of signs and meanings

pesticide risk valuation in empirical economics a comparative approach abstract pesticide use in agriculture poses several risks to both human health and nontarget agro ecosystems due to lack of information on the monetary value of reducing pesticide risks it is difficult to perform an economic analysis that addresses social efficiency of policy and draws conclusions about the appropriate degree of regulation the aim of the current paper is to present a critical overview of the empirical literature on pesticide risk valuation that provides disaggregate willingness to pay estimates wtps of pesticide risks reduction recent multidimensional classification methods such as coined decision tree analysis are used in a comparative approach as tools for explaining the differences in empirical research findings the analysis shows that the order of magnitude of wtps is related to both the valuation technique and to the data available from biomedical and ecotoxicological literature it also shows that wtp estimates of pesticide risks cannot be simply averaged over several empirical studies the order of magnitude of a wtp estimate is in fact related to the specific type of risk and to the nature of the risk scenario considered as well to lay people s subjective perception of risks

subjective games and equilibria applying the concepts of nash bayesian and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents strategies such knowledge is often not available the proposed notions of subjective games and of subjective nash and correlated equilibria replace essential but unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments when playing a subjective game repeatedly subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium we apply this approach to some well known examples including single and multi person multi arm bandit games and repeated cournot oligopoly games journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 and c83

economic behavior under uncertainty a joint analysis of risk preferences and technology a method is developed to estimate jointly risk preferences and technology under general conditions the approach is illustrated in an application to the analysis of u s corn soybean acreage decisions over time the results provide useful information on the nature of farmers risk preferences and on the influence of price risk and production risk on acreage allocation and farmers welfare copyright 1996 by mit press

impact of organizational structure on oligopolistic pricing abstract the main point of this paper is to suggest that to maintain price discipline certain organizational and historical features of an industry s information set need to be maintained in particular the place of the pricing decision in the organizational structure of firms is a critical determinant of the equilibrium price level in oligopolistic industries offering products that are commodities the model identifies the dynamics of oligopolistic pricing with price discipline breaking down as a result of intensified non price competition and decentralization of the pricing decision examples from the steel nuclear turbine airline and the telecommunication industries provide some empirical support for the model the analysis integrates industrial organization theory and the behavioral theory of the firm in fact the one thing that his decentralization in early 1988 had accomplished was that it gave the sales force more freedom to interpret orders such as akers s 1989 edict that losing market share would no longer be tolerated salesmen now had much of the control over pricing that had previously been reserved for senior management and they realized even if akers didn t that competitors products were now so similar to ibm s that the only weapon ibm could use to stop market share losses was lower prices the salesmen used their weapon they began a price war that gave customers discounts as high as 50 percent and that eventually rendered list prices meaningless buying a mainframe started to include as much wheeling and dealing as buying a used car in paul carrll s big blues the unmaking of ibm page 221

panel data estimation techniques and farm level data models econometric models wishing to estimate relevant parameters for agricultural policy analysis are increasingly relying on unbalanced panels of farm level data since in the agricultural economics literature such models have often been estimated through simplified approaches in this paper we try to verify whether the adoption of more sophisticated panel data techniques may impact the estimation results for this reason the policy model by moro and sckokai 1999 has been re estimated using techniques recently developed in the econometric literature the preliminary results show a strong impact on the estimations this seems to suggest that the adoption of proper panel data techniques is likely to be very important in order to obtain reliable estimates of some key policy parameters

demand for coffee in sweden the role of prices preferences and market power there is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from third world countries this issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices preferences and market power influence coffee demand in sweden a demand function is estimated for the period 1968 2002 and used together with information on import prices of coffee beans to simulate an oligopoly model this approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level the maximum level of market power is found to be low but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values moreover the impact of a price decrease would be small because long run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups hence a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports

credit market imperfections and the distribution of policy rents this article shows that credit market imperfections have important implications for the distribution of policy rents in a model with land as fixed factor and credit market imperfections when an area payment is given land rents go up by more than the subsidy on aggregate farms may lose from the subsidy the results depend on the extent to which subsidies have direct and indirect effects on the credit constraints on whether farms rent or own land and on farm heterogeneity

the impact of decoupled payments on farm choices conceptual and methodological challenges abstract in this paper we review the methodological framework for analysing decoupled payments in models of agricultural production market and technological uncertainty farm efficiency credit constraints farm household choices involving extra agricultural decisions policy uncertainty and long run impact of decoupling on investment and land values are the relevant issues that should be pursued by methodological and empirical analysis future research should refine the analysis of decoupled payments mainly trying to provide results that can be useful for policy simulation to bridge the gap between analysis at the individual level and sector policy models

economic and environmental impact of the cap mid term review on arable crop farming in south western france the issue addressed in this paper is whether implementation of the cap mtr involving decoupled payments reduced by modulations and subject to cross compliance measures can be effective in improving the environmental impact of arable farming the focus is on two french cross compliance measures compulsory buffer strips along rivers and crop diversity a farm level bio economic model incorporating yield uncertainty is built and adjusted to represent two typical arable farms in the southwest of france the model also combines agro environmental indicators the results indicate that a simple decoupling of direct payments without cross compliance measures has no impact on allocations between different crops if cross compliance measures are imposed a small reduction in the cultivated area of irrigated crops is observed the penalty levied 1 of the total subsidy paid when farmers do not comply with the buffer strips requirement is sufficient for both farm types decoupling and modulation result in a fall in the total gross margin of around 3 principally because of the 5 modulation rate while the buffer strips requirement leads to a further decrease of around 1 moreover this requirement improves the environmental indicators at the farm level