efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

fuel consumption for road transport in the usa abstract this study provides both a historical analysis of fuel demand for road transport and an example of using econometric results for projections fuel consumption by all motor vehicles in the usa has been analysed by splitting total demand into passenger car truck and other demands distance travelled and fuel efficiency equations have been estimated for both the passenger car fleet and trucks an essentially five equation model has been constructed and used to simulate likely fuel demand patterns up to 1990

optimal auction with resale this paper investigates the design of seller optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good in that case the optimal allocation characterized by myerson 1981 cannot be achieved without resale i find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale in two bidder cases i prove that the myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions with three or more bidders achieving the myerson allocation is more difficult i prove that it can be implemented in special cases in those cases the myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions each optimally chosen by a reseller

energy consumption and economic growth revisited does the size of unrecorded economy matter abstract we analyze the long run relationship between energy consumption and real gross domestic product gdp in turkey taking into account the size of unrecorded economy since in developing countries mainly due to the unrecorded economic activities the official gdp is not measured correctly the investigation of the linkage between energy consumption and official gdp may not give reliable results in this study empirical results for the case of turkey over the period 1970 2005 suggest that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between the officially calculated gdp and energy consumption besides using the error correction modeling technique we find out that unidirectional causality runs from official gdp to energy in both short and long runs however when we take into account unrecorded economy we detect neither cointegration nor causality between energy consumption and true gdp these empirical findings imply that first energy conservation policies can be implemented in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without any adverse effect on the recorded economic activities second the production function in the unrecorded economy is not stable furthermore economic policies to combat unrecorded economy may not serve as a complement to energy conservation policies

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

the relationship between energy and production evidence from turkish manufacturing industry this paper investigates the relationship between energy and production at the industry level in an emerging market turkey in a multivariate framework the electricity consumption and value added relation is examined in the turkish manufacturing industry while also accounting for labor and fixed investment we find that labor fixed investment electricity consumption and value added are related via three cointegrating vectors the vec results indicate uni directional causality running from electricity consumption to value added generalized impulse response and variance decomposition analyses confirm these results thus energy input appears to be closely related to production hence energy saving technologies and increased energy efficiency may increase the growth in manufacturing value added

seasonality in dynamic regression models this paper examines the implications of treating seasonality as an unobserved component which changes slowly over time this approach simplifies the specification of dynamic relationships by separating non seasonal from seasonal factors we illustrate this approach using the consumption model of davidson et al 1978 and estimate a stable error correction model between consumption income and prices over the period 1958 92 more generally we argue that autoregressive models are unlikely to successfully model slowly changing seasonality and may confound seasonal effects with the dynamic responses of prime interest our approach can be used in a wide range of cases and we show that there is little loss in efficiency even if seasonality is deterministic

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

relationships and traders in madagascar this article documents the role that personal relationships play in economic exchange original survey data show that agricultural traders in madagascar perceive relationships as the most important factor for success in their business evidence details the extent to which relationships are used to serve a variety of purposes such as the circulation of information about prices and market conditions the provision of trade credit the prevention and handling of contractual difficulties the regularity of trade flows and the mitigation of risk of these the regularity of supply and demand and the sharing of risk appear particularly important larger and more prosperous traders are those with quantitatively and qualitatively better relationships family plays little role in business beyond assistance at start up

bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers abstract we analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium this paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the walrasian outcome

power brokers middlemen in legislative bargaining abstract we study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers we establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon we show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes and can be inefficient to fulfill this role the middleman s policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible but the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change the results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies

the role of networks in antitrust investigations antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming from within the defined markets of interest however competitive pressures can also come from other markets even when individually these markets place only weak constraints on one another collectively they may matter a networks approach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can sometimes paint a more accurate picture we demonstrate this through some simple examples and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets as a leading example we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation

electricity demand analysis using cointegration and arima modelling a case study of turkey in the early 2000s the republic of turkey has initiated an ambitious reform program in her electricity market which requires privatization liberalization as well as a radical restructuring the most controversial reason behind or justification for recent reforms has been the rapid electricity demand growth that is to say the whole reform process has been a part of the endeavors to avoid the so called energy crisis using cointegration analysis and autoregressive integrated moving average arima modelling the present article focuses on this issue by both providing an electricity demand estimation and forecast and comparing the results with official projections the study concludes first that consumers respond to price and income changes is quite limited and therefore there is a need for economic regulation in turkish electricity market and second that the current official electricity demand projections highly overestimate the electricity demand which may endanger the development of both a coherent energy policy in general and a healthy electricity market in particular

residential electricity demand dynamics in turkey abstract this article provides fresh empirical evidences for the income and price elasticies of the residential energy demand both in the short run and long run for turkey over the period 1968 2005 using the bounds testing procedure to cointegration the computed elasticities of income and price are consistent with the previous studies and as expected the long run elasticities are greater than the short run elasticities an augmented form of granger causality analysis is implemented among residential electricity income price and urbanization in the long run causality runs interactively through the error correction term from income price and urbanization to residential energy but the short run causality tests are inconclusive the parameter stability of the short run as well as long run coefficients in the residential energy demand function are tested the results of these tests display a stable pattern

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

the digital provide information technology market performance and welfare in the south indian fisheries sector when information is limited or costly agents are unable to engage in optimal arbitrage excess price dispersion across markets can arise and goods may not be allocated efficiently in this setting information technologies may improve market performance and increase welfare between 1997 and 2001 mobile phone service was introduced throughout kerala a state in india with a large fishing industry using microlevel survey data we show that the adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers was associated with a dramatic reduction in price dispersion the complete elimination of waste and near perfect adherence to the law of one price both consumer and producer welfare increased

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

bilateral bargaining in networks abstract each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus a maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus according to the protocol proposed by rubinstein and wollinsky equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining econometrica 53 1985 1133 1150 all pairs which reach an agreement obtain the discounted payoffs and are removed from the network this bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the dulmage mendelsohn decomposition partition of the bipartite network of the set of nodes in this network

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

incomplete information bargaining with outside opportunities we consider two kinds of outside opportunity that a seller of an indivisible good might have selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself in both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer s valuation and becomes more pessimistic over time when the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic she prefers the outside opportunity so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer despite the resulting finite horizon nature of negotiations the link between the buyer s willingness to accept an offer and the seller s eagerness to go outside generates multiple equilibria

energy consumption and economic activity in industrialized economies a note abstract in industrialized countries the income elasticity of primary energy demand is not far off unity furthermore it can be argued that there is little use in distinguishing between short and long term income elasticities a long term income elasticity does not have a direct impact on energy demand and hence it is of doubtful use in energy demand projections via an aggregate oecd model it was estimated that the short term impact of prices on primary energy demand is about 0 15 while the long term impact is 0 43 but increasing over time

strategic entry in a triopoly market of firms with asymmetric cost structures abstract this paper examines the strategic investment timing decision in a triopoly market comprising firms with asymmetric cost structures we present three novel results first in the case where there are relatively small cost asymmetries between firms and a relatively small first mover advantage the firm with the lowest cost structure is not always the first investor in other cases the firm with the lowest cost structure is the first investor second an increase in volatility increases the possibility that a firm without the lowest cost structure is the first investor finally even in the three asymmetric firm model we show that the first investor threshold is larger in a triopoly than in a duopoly although it is smaller in a duopoly than in a monopoly

resale markets and the assignment of property rights the consumption of an indivisible good causes identity dependent externalities to non consumers we analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure but cannot commit to future actions we ask the following questions 1 doer the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer 2 is the outcome always efficient the major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency this result complements the coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

the causality between energy consumption and economic growth in turkey abstract this paper applies the causality test to examine the causal relationship between primary energy consumption ec and real gross national product gnp for turkey during 1970 2006 we employ unit root tests the augmented dickey fuller adf and the philips perron pp johansen cointegration test and pair wise granger causality test to examine relation between ec and gnp our empirical results indicate that the two series are found to be non stationary however first differences of these series lead to stationarity further the results indicate that ec and gnp are cointegrated and there is bidirectional causality running from ec to gnp and vice versa this means that an increase in ec directly affects economic growth and that economic growth also stimulates further ec this bidirectional causality relationship between ec and gnp determined for turkey at 1970 2006 period is in accordance with the ones in literature reported for similar countries consequently we conclude that energy is a limiting factor to economic growth in turkey and hence shocks to energy supply will have a negative impact on economic growth

bilateral trading in networks in many markets goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric we study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features we show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non monotonic but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time with the possible exception of the last period the price dynamic is therefore reminiscent of fire sales and hot potato trading traders who intermediate the object arise endogenously and make a positive profit the profit earning intermediaries are not necessarily traders with many connections for the case of multilayer networks they belong to the path that reaches the maximum number of potential buyers using the minimal number of intermediaries this is not necessarily the path of the network that maximizes the probability of consumption by traders who value the most the object i e welfare

electricity consumption and economic growth evidence from turkey abstract this study investigates the causal relationship between electricity consumption and real gdp in turkey during the period of 1950 2000 both of the series were found to be a stationary process around a structural break by the zivot and andrews test thus two different methodologies have been employed to test the granger non causality the dolado lutkepohl test using the vars in levels and the standard granger causality test using the detrended data both tests have yielded a strong evidence for unidirectional causality running from the electricity consumption to the income this implies that the supply of electricity is vitally important to meet the growing electricity consumption hence to sustain the economic growth in turkey

liquidity risk in sequential trading networks abstract this paper studies a model of intermediated exchange with liquidity constrained traders intermediaries are embedded in a trading network and their financial capacities are private information we characterize our model s monotone pure strategy equilibrium agents earn positive intermediation rents in equilibrium an experimental investigation supports the model s baseline predictions concerning agents strategies price dynamics and the division of surplus while private financial constraints inject uncertainty into the trading environment our experiment suggests they are also a behavioral speed bump preventing traders from experiencing excessive losses due to overbidding

efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too interconnected to fail institutions abstract the regulation of large interconnected financial institutions has become a key policy issue to improve financial stability regulators have proposed limiting banks size and interconnectedness i estimate a network based model of the over the counter interbank lending market in the us and quantify the efficiency stability implications of this policy trading efficiency decreases with limits on interconnectedness because the intermediation chains become longer while restricting the interconnectedness of banks improves stability the effect is non monotonic stability also improves with higher liquidity requirements when banks have access to liquidity during the crisis and when failed banks depositors maintain confidence in the banking system

asymmetric auctions with resale we study first and second price auctions with resale in a model with indepen dent private values with asymmetric bidders the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post auction trade which in our model takes place via monopoly pricing the winner makes a take it or leave it offer to the loser we show a a first price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium and b with resale the expected revenue from a first price auction exceeds that from a second price auction the inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a gen eral revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded jel d44

accounting for technical progress in aggregate energy demand abstract researchers have not reached a consensus on how to account for technical progress when modeling aggregate energy demand some include a time trend in a dynamic model while others omit the trend in a model that disallows for long run income effects we show that the latter approach can be directly tested as a nested case of the former so that model selection need not be made a priori solely on theoretical grounds using annual data over 1960 1990 we find that long run income effects are not significant however including a time trend improves the model s fit while rendering much more credible long run price elasticities

diagnostic checking of unobserved components time series models diagnostic checking of the specification of time series models is normally carried out using the innovations that is the one step ahead prediction errors in an unobserved components model other sets of residuals are available these auxiliary residuals are estimators of the disturbances associated with the unobserved components they can often yield information that is less apparent from the innovations but they suffer from the disadvantage that they are serially correlated even in a correctly specified model with known parameters this article shows how the properties of the auxiliary residuals may be obtained how they are related to each other and to the innovations and how they can be used to construct test statistics applications are presented showing how residuals can be used to detect and distinguish between outliers and structural change

underlying trends and seasonality in uk energy demand a sectoral analysis this paper demonstrates the importance for energy demand modelling of allowing for trends and seasonal effects that are stochastic in form inherent underlying trends may be non linear and reflect not only technical progress which usually produces greater energy efficiency but also other factors such as changes in consumer tastes and the economic structure that may be working in the opposite direction using quarterly unadjusted data for various sectors in the uk it is shown that unless energy demand models are formulated so as to allow for stochastic trends and seasonals estimates of price and income elasticities could be seriously biased

bargaining under two sided incomplete information the unrestricted offers case chatterjee and samuelson chatterjee k l samuelson 1987 bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers rev econ stud 54 175 192 recently examined a noncooperative game theoretic bargaining model with two sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon results were obtained from the model with the help of restrictions on agents strategies this paper examines the model without these restrictions by doing so we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model and hence might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work we find that the basic results generalize as with the restricted model we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages a terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows compar

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

industrial electricity demand for turkey a structural time series analysis abstract this research investigates the relationship between turkish industrial electricity consumption industrial value added and electricity prices in order to forecast future turkish industrial electricity demand to achieve this an industrial electricity demand function for turkey is estimated by applying the structural time series technique to annual data over the period 1960 to 2008 in addition to identifying the size and significance of the price and industrial value added output elasticities this technique also uncovers the electricity underlying energy demand trend uedt for the turkish industrial sector and is as far as is known the first attempt to do this the results suggest that output and real electricity prices and a uedt all have an important role to play in driving turkish industrial electricity demand consequently they should all be incorporated when modelling turkish industrial electricity demand and the estimated uedt should arguably be considered in future energy policy decisions concerning the turkish electricity industry the output and price elasticities are estimated to be 0 15 and 0 16 respectively with an increasing but at a decreasing rate uedt and based on the estimated equation and different forecast assumptions it is predicted that turkish industrial electricity demand will be somewhere between 97 and 148 twh by 2020

sectoral energy consumption by source and economic growth in turkey this paper provides a detailed analysis of the energy consumption in turkey during the last 40 years it investigates the causal relationships between income and energy consumption in two ways first the relationship is studied at the aggregate level then we focus on the industrial sector previous findings suggest that in the case of turkey there is a unidirectional causality running from energy consumption to growth however our findings suggest that in the long run income and energy consumption appear to be neutral with respect to each other both at the aggregate and at the industrial level we also find a strong evidence of instantaneous causality which means that contemporaneous values of energy consumption and income are correlated furthermore a descriptive analysis is conducted in order to reveal the differences in the use of energy resources we conclude that energy conservation policies are necessary for environmental concerns and our empirical results imply that such policies would not impede economic growth in the long term

energy consumption and economic activity in industrialized countries the dynamic aggregate time series relationship abstract most econometric studies suggest that the income elasticity of demand for energy is approximately unity for the developed market economies it is shown that over the period 1950 1978 the long run income elasticity is substantially higher than unity in terms of a ces energy demand function this result reflects the application of a generalized dynamic estimation methodology where serial correlation is regarded as a diagnostic guide to distributed lag fitting price elasticities are also estimated but these are in line with conventional estimates

arima forecasting of primary energy demand by fuel in turkey abstract forecasting of energy demand in emerging markets is one of the most important policy tools used by the decision makers all over the world in turkey most of the early studies used include various forms of econometric modeling however since the estimated economic and demographic parameters usually deviate from the realizations time series forecasting appears to give better results in this study we used the autoregressive integrated moving average arima and seasonal arima sarima methods to estimate the future primary energy demand of turkey from 2005 to 2020 the arima forecasting of the total primary energy demand appears to be more reliable than the summation of the individual forecasts the results have shown that the average annual growth rates of individual energy sources and total primary energy will decrease in all cases except wood and animal plant remains which will have negative growth rates the decrease in the rate of energy demand may be interpreted that the energy intensity peak will be achieved in the coming decades another interpretation is that any decrease in energy demand will slow down the economic growth during the forecasted period rates of changes and reserves in the fossil fuels indicate that inter fuel substitution should be made leading to a best mix of the country s energy system based on our findings we proposed some policy recommendations

speculation in standard auctions with resale in standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale we study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private value bidders for second price and english auctions the efficient value bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits first price and dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders the value distribution and the discount factor speculators do not make profits in first price or dutch auctions

decentralized trading with private information the paper studies how asset prices are determined in a decentralized market with asymmetric information about asset values we consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings a fraction of the agents has private information about the asset values we show that over time uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers this form of experimentation allows the uninformed agents to acquire information as long as there are potential gains from trade in the economy as a consequence the economy converges to a pareto efficient allocation

getting prices right the impact of the market information service in uganda the market information service project in uganda collected data on prices for the main agricultural commodities in major market centers and disseminated the information through local fmradio stations in various districts exploiting the variation across space between households with and without access to a radio we find evidence suggesting that better informed farmers managed to bargain for higher farm gate prices on their surplus production

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets the paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades a model is presented in which the identity of buyers of sellers and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy the analysis first considers small economies and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence a characterization of prices and flows and some negative results relating welfare to network structure the second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets and presents necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately efficient when the number of players is large

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

energy consumption and gdp in turkey is there a co integration relationship energy consumption and gdp are expected to grow by 5 9 and 7 annually until 2025 in turkey this paper tries to unfold the linkage between energy consumption and gdp by undertaking a co integration analysis for turkey with annual data over the period 1970 2003 the analysis shows that energy consumption and gdp are co integrated this means that there is a possibly bi directional causality relationship between the two we establish that there is a unidirectional causality running from gdp to energy consumption indicating that energy saving would not harm economic growth in turkey in addition we find that energy consumption keeps on growing as long as the economy grows in turkey