the pricing of durable exhaustible resources partial or total durability characterizes a large class of exhaustible resources hotelling s r percent rule will apply to a durable resource produced in a competitive market but will not apply if the resource is produced in a monopolistic market however the r percent rule does not mean that price is steadily rising it is shown that in general the competitive market price will fall initially as the stock in circulation increases and later will rise as the stock decreases and eventually depreciates toward zero after production ceases accounting for durability may thus help explain the u shaped long term price profiles observed for many resources 11 references 3 figures

long term competition in a dynamic game the cold fish war this article presents a model of credible voluntary collective agreements in a dynamic game these agreements are implicit in collections of history dependent threat strategies i consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium voluntarism requires at least that all behavior be supported by the threat of collapse of the agreement which would return the players to the memoryless equilibrium collective rationality requires that the agreement be robust to the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation i analyze the set of agreements meeting each of these restrictions

some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

the tragedy of the commons in a violent world earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by folk theorems for dynamic games in this article we graft on a standard natural resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted the threat supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect and thus credible the unique equilibrium is such that players exploit noncooperatively the resource when it is abundant and they revert to conflict when it becomes scarce the players utility is shown to be lower even if conflict wastes no resources

sectoral shocks and aggregate fluctuations abstract this paper presents a multisector dynamic general equilibrium model of business cycles with a distinctive feature aggregate fluctuations are driven by independent sectoral shocks the model hypothesizes that trade among sectors provides a strong synchronization mechanism for these shocks due to the limited but locally intense interaction that is characteristic of such input trade flows limited interaction characterized by a sparse intermediate input use matrix reduces substitution possibilities among intermediate inputs which strengthens comovement in sectoral value added and leads to a postponement of the law of large numbers in the variance of aggregate value added the chief virtue of this model is that reliance on implausible aggregate shocks is not necessary to capture the qualitative features of macroeconomic fluctuations building on horvath 1998 review of economic dynamics 1 781 808 which establishes the theoretical foundation for the relevance of limited interaction in the context of a stylized multisector model this paper specifies a more general multisector model calibrated to the us 2 digit standard industrial code economy simulations prove the model is able to match empirical reality as closely as standard one sector business cycle models without relying on aggregate shocks

price changes in the euro area and the united states some facts from individual consumer price data prices of goods and services do not adjust immediately in response to changing demand and supply conditions this paper characterizes the average frequency and size of price changes in the euro area and its member countries investigates the determinants of the probability of price changes and compares the evidence for the euro area with available u s results the facts documented in this paper are based on evidence from individual price data recorded at the store level in all euro area countries except ireland and greece that is in datasets covering austria belgium finland france germany italy luxembourg the netherlands portugal and spain which together account for around 97 percent of euro area gdp the data used are the monthly price records underlying the computation of national consumer price indices and harmonized consumer price indices these data cover a large number of products selected on the basis of extensive household budget surveys

common property resources storage facilities and ownership structures a cournot model of the oil market during the last decade economists have tried hard to convince meadows and his followers that market forces do not tend to exhaust our natural resources too rapidly as compared with the requirements of an intertemporal pareto optimum it is well known now that under well defined property rights and correct price expectations a competitive extraction industry brings about a pareto optimal depletion path and it has been shown that oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures may even produce a bias towards conservation 1 it is still an unresolved issue however which extraction path will result if property rights are imperfectly defined following the pioneering work of gordon 1954 there has been a large body of literature demonstrating that in the extreme case of free entry and myopic profit maximization there are strong reasons for excessive extraction 2 but this literature hardly yields reliable conclusions for the perhaps more realistic case where firms derive their behaviour from intertemporal optimization and where there is a common ownership but limited access to the resource the basic intuition behind the common pool problem is that the individual agent chooses an extraction policy other than the one he would choose under well defined property rights since he is afraid that part of the resource he leaves underground will be extracted and sold by others 3 despite the simplicity of this intuition there does not seem to be any publication that analyses it within an intertemporal equilibrium model with rational and far sighted agents this is the motivation for the present approach the approach studies the common pool problem in the context of an oligopolistic world market for oil it posits a given number of identical firms extracting oil from holdings between some of which there is mutual seepage the firms sell the extracted oil in the same market or they store it in privately owned seepage proof tanks each firm derives its behaviour from intertemporal optimization under perfect foresight of the time paths of the model variables but cournotesque conjectures about the reactions of its competitors except for the assumption of storage facilities this specification is closely related to models previously studied by khalatbari 1977 and kemp and long 1980 essay 10 4 the two models are very similar but they yield strikingly different conclusions while kemp and long find that the extraction path chosen by the firms is pareto optimal i e that the price of the resource rises at a rate given by the market rate of interest khalatbari contends that there is over extraction kemp and long convincingly demonstrate that khalatbari s model suffers from an inconsistency in the way the individual firm expects its rivals to respond to its own actions and they argue that this inconsistency is the reason for the divergence in results thus the casual reader gets the

assessing nominal income rules for monetary policy with model and data uncertainty nominal income rules for monetary policy have long been debated but two issues are of particular recent interest first there are questions about the performance of such rules over a range of plausible empirical models especially models with and without explicit rational inflation expectations second there are questions about the performance of these rules in real time using the type of data that is actually available contemporaneously to policy makers rather than final revised data this paper determines optimal monetary policy rules in the presence of such model uncertainty and real time data uncertainty and finds only a limited role for nominal output growth

product replacement bias in inflation and its consequences for monetary policy the paper examines a new keynesian model with product entry and exit and with two types of households households consume different product baskets and therefore face different inflation rates the statistical bureau used in the model measures aggregate inflation but observes product entry with a probabilistic delay consequently measured inflation suffers from product replacement bias with respect to aggregate inflation measured inflation is less volatile but more persistent than aggregate inflation and the correlation between aggregate inflation and aggregate output is lower than the correlation between measured inflation and measured output when monetary policy responds to measured variables it stabilizes aggregate inflation insufficiently nevertheless under discretionary monetary policy responding to measured variables improves welfare

a private property rights regime to replenish a groundwater aquifer groundwater management is often reactive and in some cases the groundwater stock groundwater table of an aquifer may fall below its optimal steady state level before any thought is given to management this paper examines a private property rights regime to restore a groundwater resource to its optimal steady state results from a stochastic dynamic programming model of madera county california show that the private property rights regime recovers about 95 percent of the potential gain from groundwater management

the extensive margin and monetary policy abstract the creation of new firms referred to as the extensive margin is a significant but overlooked dimension of monetary policy a monetary var documents that monetary policy has significant effects on firm creation an analytically tractable model combining sticky prices and firm entry shows that entry alters the transmission of monetary policy innovations acting much like a type of investment in more standard models monetary policy rules that offset the uncertainty of productivity shocks can raise the mean level of entry and thereby welfare suggesting a new motivation for stabilization policy

strategic complementarity in business formation aggregate fluctuations and sunspot equilibria the extent to which changes in beliefs can be important factors in initiating economic fluctuations has been a prominent area of investigation for macroeconomists the notion that beliefs about the future influence current decisions is a property of almost all dynamic economic systems the more challenging task is identifying economic environments in which changes in beliefs alone influence current choices in such a way that the variations in beliefs are self fulfilling because the resulting fluctuations arise in the absence of variations in fundamental variables such as preferences and technology they are often termed sunspot equilibria apart from suggesting that instability of expectations may be a distinct source of cyclical volatility sunspot equilibria may also explain why apparently small disturbances in fundamentals lead to large change in macroeconomic aggregates in this study we demonstrate the possibility of sunspot equilibria in an overlappinggenerations economy characterized by a plausible form of strategic complementarity as more agents enter as producers in any particular sector of the economy they create an incentive for agents to enter as producers into other sectors as well 2 the basis for this

optimal monetary policy in a currency area abstract this paper investigates how monetary policy should be conducted in a two region general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness this framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that can be used to evaluate monetary policy in a currency area if the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity the terms of trade are completely insulated from monetary policy and the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates these weights coincide with the economic sizes of the region if the degrees of rigidity are different the optimal plan implies a high degree of inertia in the inflation rate but an inflation targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal

comparing dynamic multisector models we construct a multisector dsge model with input output linkages and a single type of physical capital that is costly to reallocate across sectors our model with intratemporal costs of allocating capital fits sectoral output data as well as existing models with sector specific capital both in terms of volatility and comovement with aggregate output as well as pairwise correlations between sectors the spectra of sectoral output produced by our model is similar to those from the other models the importance of sectoral shocks in our model is also similar to those from other models however our simplified model is much more amenable to extensions involving occasionally binding constraints than the competitor models that feature large state spaces

governing a groundwater commons a strategic and laboratory analysis of western water law we examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the american west solving a dynamic common pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments three forms of legal rules common pool depletion with a rule of capture to establish ownership absolute ownership doctrine entry restrictions prior appropriation doctrine and stock quotas correlative rights doctrinekre examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments

the pricing of durable exhaustible resources comment in its simplest form hotelling s 1931 r percent rule states that in a competitive market with no extraction costs the price of an exhaustible resource will grow at the rate of interest for instance if price grows at a rate slower than the rate of interest it is in the interest of each firm to sell its entire stock immediately the hypothesized price path is obviously not an equilibrium even if there are extraction costs and firms are not identical it remains true that price net of marginal cost rises at the rate of interest the proposition generalizes to monopolized resources along the equilibrium path of extraction net marginal revenue grows at the rate of interest in a recent article in this journal levhari and pindyck 1981 henceforth l p show the r percent rule extends to durable exhaustible resources in a competitive market but they conclude that it does not hold in a monopoly market this is a surprising result following the hotelling logic should it not be possible for the monopolist to rearrange production from low net marginal revenue dates to high net marginal revenue dates and raise its present value the primary purpose of this comment is to show that hotelling s rule does in fact hold this is shown in section ii our result is compared with that of l p in section iii the conflict is shown to arise from a disagreement over the relevant marginal revenue in continuous time increasing the flow of production of a durable good at a particular point in time has no effect on the sales price at that or any other point in time hence the rate of change in the flow of revenue at that particular point in time is the sales price this is the definition of marginal revenue l p use however durables are different from nondurables in that a perturbation in the production trajectory over some length of time will affect the entire sales price trajectory in choosing its

cartel stability in an exhaustible resource model a simple oligopolistic common pool exhaustible resource game is considered by analysing punishment strategies including optimal punishments it is possible to determine which cartel agreements are implementable in a non cooperative play of the game joint profit maximizing allocations are sustainable for sufficiently low discounting but in general it is shown that no folk theorem exists for this model in particular for sufficiently high elasticities of demand it is shown that optimal punishments are not sufficiently severe to enforce most stationary symmetric extraction paths thus confirming the hypothesis that sufficient market power is needed for a cartel to be stable a simple common property exhaustible resource model in a discrete time infinite horizon framework will be considered by looking at punishments levelled against firms that deviate from an implicitly agreed extraction path it is possible to examine the extent to which different allocations can be supported as non cooperative equilibria we shall pay particular attention to the question of whether punishments can be severe enough to sustain implicit agreements that maximize joint profits and to the idea pindyck 1979 that cartel stability depends crucially upon market power this non cooperative approach to the question of cartel stability has been used by porter 1983 in a repeated oligopoly model with imperfect information see also green and porter 1984 while we assume perfect observability here the model is compli cated by the existence of a state variable in the form of the resource stock moreover we shall apply the idea of optimal punishments in this dynamic model abreu et al 1986 1990 have looked at general properties of the equilibrium set in the green porter model what we find is that by considering a more general strategy space than that conventionally studied cooperative extraction rates are sustainable in equilibrium for low enough discount rates in contrast to the over extraction results often obtained moreover in this model the predictions concerning the range of possible sustainable equilibria as the discount rate approaches zero are sharp while the cooperative solution belongs to the set of equilibria for low discount rates constant symmetric extraction paths below the maximum possible rate fail to be sustainable in the limit if the elasticity of demand is sufficiently high thus for low discount rates only extraction rates close to the cooperative rate are sustainable together with disagreement equilibria which involve very high extraction rates these results are in sharp contrast to those obtained from repeated games where in the limit the range of equilibria is very large the difference is explained by the existence of a state variable in the form of a declining stock of the resource these results are also in contrast to what can happen in our model when the demand elasticity is lower all constant symmetric extraction paths may be sustainable for low enough

taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic competition abstract many positive and normative results in models using the monopolistic competition framework of the dixit stiglitz spence type depend on the value of an important parameter the taste for variety in these models however the taste for variety is linked in a close but arbitrary manner to the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors in this paper we make a simple modification to the basic model which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power we then show how this changes the usual comparisons between social optimum and market outcomes

the role of intratemporal adjustment costs in a multisector economy abstract in this paper we construct a multisector business cycle model which is capable of reproducing the procyclical behavior of cross sector measures of capital employment and output we start by documenting the difficulty that a standard variant of a conventional real business cycle model has in accounting for these facts we then show how the introduction of intratemporal adjustment costs for investment can significantly enhance the performance of such a model these costs make it difficult to alter the composition of production of new capital goods the presence of these costs eliminates many counterfactual observations of the model that would otherwise be present the dynamic response of variables in the model is different from what one would observe in the standard one sector model we also examine the implications of imposing intratemporal adjustment costs for labor the model can also account for the cross sector behavior of employment observed in the data

monetary policy rules based on real time data this paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules using taylor s rule as an example i demonstrate that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data further estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the federal reserve in real time these results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules

indicator variables for optimal policy the optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward looking variables are derived and interpreted both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment an example of optimal monetary policy with a partially observable potential output and a forward looking indicator is examined the optimal response to the optimal estimate of potential output displays certainty equivalence whereas the optimal response to the imperfect observation of output depends on the noise in this observation

common pool equities an arbitrage based non cooperative solution to the common pool resource problem abstract it is proposed that a new type of property right termed a common pool equity can solve the common pool resource problem this equity may be presented to any firm that extracts from the resource for a share in profits it is shown that a profit arbitrage condition ensures that the market and socially efficient solutions correspond whenever market power is absent the cost externalities are fully internalized

reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information abstract this paper analyses the effect of partial information on optimal policy design for stochastic macroeconomic models incorporating forward looking expectations the main theoretical result is that reputational and nonreputational policies are certainty equivalent as has previously been conjectured and it is also shown that the welfare loss does not necessarily increase with decreasing information of particular additional interest in the analysis of reputational policy design is the issue of sustainability and it is shown using an example that weak sustainability may be information dependent

welfare and macroeconomic interdependence we develop a baseline model of monetary and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies the welfare effects of expansionary policies are related to monopolistic supply in production and monopoly power of a country in trade an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar thyself rather than beggar thy neighbor as gains in domestic output are offset by deteriorating terms of trade smaller and more open economies are more prone to suffer from inflationary shocks larger economies benefit from moderate demand led expansions but may be worse off if policy makers attempt to close the output gap fiscal shocks are generally beggar thy neighbor in the long run in the short run they raise domestic demand at given terms of trade thus reducing the welfare benefits from monetary expansions analytical tractability makes our model uniquely suitable as a starting point to approach the recent new open economy macroeconomic literature

aggregation and irrelevance in multi sector models abstract this paper studies the ability of input output relationships to generate fluctuations in aggregate output in several multi sector models including that of long and plosser 1983 in these models the manufacture of each sector s output depends on other sectors for materials these interconnections provide a mechanism for transmission of shocks across sectors and over time we ask how aggregates from these multi sector models behave relative to single sector models we provide conditions under which the second moment properties of aggregates in these models are the same as their single sector counterparts we further demonstrate that a broad class of input output structures generate aggregates with identical second moment properties and that the input output structures in this class provide a poor amplification mechanism for sector shocks

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty abstract the implications of different information patterns for firms in oligopolistic resource markets are considered the traditional open loop nash equilibrium with static information sets is one of many possible nash equilibria and is not suitable for stochastic environments when shocks to resource growth are serially uncorrelated there are no gains from conditioning the harvest on past stock levels and the feedback or credible nash equilibrium is the appropriate nash equilibrium concept this credible equilibrium assumes that firms have knowledge of current stocks of reserves which typically leads to more rapid extraction of the resource and possibly extinction since the open loop nash equilibrium is efficient when demand is iso elastic and extraction costs are zero it is clear that an increase in information can be detrimental to firms in the industry

groundwater use under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces a game theoretic model of groundwater extraction in a two cell aquifer under incomplete information a novel assumption is that individual users have incomplete knowledge of the speed of lateral flows in the aquifer although a user is aware that his neighbor s water use has some influence on his future water stock he is uncertain about the degree of this impact we find that the lack of information may either increase or decrease the rate of water use and welfare in a two period framework the relevant characteristic is the ratio of the periodic marginal benefits of water use depending on whether this ratio is convex or concave the average speed with which the aquifer is depleted decreases or increases when users learn more about the local hydrologic properties of groundwater in principle welfare may decrease even in cases when the groundwater allocation is closer to the efficient groundwater allocation

on the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators abstract we describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness in our model a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so called wicksellian natural rate of interest this is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank s estimates of both current inflation and output gap as advocated by taylor 1993 it is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness a reduced form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest rate smoothing which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions

sources of bias and solutions to bias in the consumer price index four sources of bias in the consumer prices index cpi have been identified the most discussed is substitution bias which creates a second order bias in the cpi three other changes besides prices changes create first order effects on a correctly measured cost of living index coli i explain in this paper that a pure price based approach of surveying prices to estimate a coli cannot succeed in solving the 3 problems of first order bias i discuss economic and econometric approaches to measuring the first order bias effects as well as the availability of scanner data that would permit implementation of the techniques

on the oligopolistic extraction of non renewable common pool resources in recent literature the extraction of common pool resources ha s been discussed under the aspect of whether or not they can be used efficiently when a finite number of agents has access to the resource the objective of this paper is the derivation of a necessary equilibrium condition in a simple model this condition has severe consequences for existence propositions in papers of m c kemp and n v long 1980 j mcmillan and h w sinn 1984 and j f reinganum and n l stokey 1985 copyright 1986 by the review of economic studies limited

efficiency inducing tax for a common property oligopoly the author characterizes the markov perfect tax that induces a common property oligopoly to extract efficiently a nonrenewable resource for linear and isoelastic demand he provides closed form expressions of the unique specific tax industry profits may be higher or lower in the oligopoly with the tax relative to the competitive equilibrium with property rights for linear or isoelastic demand there exists no feasible open loop tax that induces efficient extraction in this case the policymaker gains no advantage from being able to make binding commitments copyright 1992 by royal economic society

the effects of well management and the nature of the aquifer on groundwater resources we compare groundwater use under collective well management in china where village leaders allocate water among households and under private well management where farmers either pump from their own wells or buy water from wells owned by other farmers villages are divided into connected or isolated groups depending on whether there are lateral groundwater flows between aquifers underlying a village and neighboring ones in rural china households under collective well management use less water even under collective management households located in connected villages use more water indicating that the connectedness of the aquifers may undermine leaders incentives to conserve water

the structure of a contract and the theory of a non exclusive resource the process of arriving at a useful concept of analysis is not only slow and painful but also may go astray and attain nothing useful someone begins with one example or observation followed by a theory which is intuitively plausible a theoretical term associated with a vague concept is coined examples of a seemingly different type emerge which call for another theory the process goes on as examples and theories continue to accumulate the different categories under the same heading of analysis serve only to confuse and each associated theory becomes ad hoc such has been the fate of the concept of externality a more useful approach i think is via contractual conditions the example chosen for illustration is marine fisheries where the fishing right is taken

competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource the groundwater case abstract in this paper socially optimal and private extraction of a common property aquifer are compared open loop equilibrium and feedback equilibrium in linear strategies have been computed to characterize private extraction the use of these two equilibrium concepts allows us to distinguish between cost and strategic externalities as long as the open loop solution captures only the cost externality and the feedback solution captures both the results show that strategic behaviour increases the overexploitation of the aquifer compared to the open loop solution however if the groundwater storage capacity is large the difference between the socially optimal and private extraction the latter characterized by a feedback equilibrium is negligible

real exchange rate fluctuations and the dynamics of retail trade industries on the u s canada border consumers living near the u s canada border can shift their expenditures between the two countries so real exchange rate fluctuations can act as demand shocks to border areas retail trade industries using annual county level data we estimate the effects of real exchange rates on the number of establishments and their average payroll in border counties for four retail industries in three of the four industries we consider the number of operating establishments responds either contemporaneously or with a lag of one year to real exchange rate movements for these industries the response of retailers average size is less pronounced the rapid response of net entry is inconsistent with any model of persistent deviations from purchasing power parity that depends on retailers costs of changing nominal prices

appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration the relevance of the open loop concept in this paper the open loop equilibrium is rehabilitated as a sensible concept for analyzing common property situations in a model of natur al resource exploration in which the sole motivation to explore prior to extraction arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competito rs a consistency rule to the exploration game is applied under which the commonality of reserves is preserved even if strategies are open loop under this rule the so often claimed efficiency of the common property open loop equilibrium is lost copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a note on optimal sectoral policies in production networks i study optimal sectoral policies in models with input output linkages and distortions labor subsidies cannot implement the first best allocation intermediate input subsidies or the right combination s between subsidies to labor and intermediates can optimally correct for network externalities

what determines aggregate returns to scale abstract this paper develops a unified framework that incorporates four features important in existing models with increasing returns fixed costs decreasing marginal costs product variety and market power when fixed costs are not allowed to vary and profits are imposed to be zero in every period only the degree of returns to variety determines the degree of aggregate increasing returns to scale when fixed costs respond to changes in aggregate activity or the zero profit condition does not hold in the short run aggregate returns depend not only on product variety but also on diminishing marginal costs or market power the degree of market power however does not affect input prices which are critical to determine the uniqueness of equilibrium

firm dynamics and markup variations implications for sunspot equilibria and endogenous economic fluctuations this paper analyzes how the interaction between firms entry and exit decisions and variations in competition gives rise to self fulfilling expectation driven fluctuations in aggregate economic activity and in measured total factor productivity tfp the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which net business formation is endogenously procyclical and leads to endogenous countercyclical variations in markups this interaction leads to indeterminacy in which economic fluctuations occur as a result of self fulfilling shifts in the beliefs of rational forward looking agents when calibrated with empirically plausible parameter values and driven solely by self fulfilling shocks to expectations the model can quantitatively account for the main empirical regularities characterizing postwar u s business cycles and for 65 of the fluctuations in measured tfp

optimal commitment policy under noisy information abstract this paper studies an advantage of commitment over discretion when a central bank observes only noisy measures of current inflation and output in the context of an optimizing model with nominal price stickiness under a commitment regime if current policy turns out to be too expansionary contractionary because of the bank s information problem subsequent policies should be slightly contractionary expansionary by following this approach the central bank can improve the trade off between the fluctuations of its goal variables caused by economic shocks and their fluctuations caused by the bank s response to measurement error

sectoral versus aggregate shocks a structural factor analysis of industrial production using factor methods we decompose industrial production ip into components arising from aggregate and sector specific shocks an approximate factor model finds that nearly all of ip variability is associated with common factors we then use a multisector growth model to adjust for the effects of input output linkages in the factor analysis thus a structural factor analysis indicates that the great moderation was characterized by a fall in the importance of aggregate shocks while the volatility of sectoral shocks was essentially unchanged consequently the role of idiosyncratic shocks increased considerably after the mid 1980s explaining half of the quarterly variation in ip

unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly abstract this paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly a closed loop nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction surprisingly such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long run asset s stock we also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset s stock and the long run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction moreover a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production