a multi winner nested rent seeking contest this paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent seeking contest in which there may be several winners we first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest in contrast to the previous work we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large

relative prices and investment rates abstract we construct a panel for the price of aggregate investment over consumption and report the following observations 1 relative price differences across countries are large over the entire sample period and this conclusion is not affected by excluding non tradable consumption goods 2 relative price dispersion has decreased during the sample period 3 relative price changes are not persistent across periods while average price levels are moreover the persistence in relative price levels is higher for countries at low relative prices we show that the relative price of investment is negatively correlated with investment rates in a cross section of countries the standard one sector growth model is a natural framework to study quantitatively the effects of barriers to capital accumulation since there is a very simple mapping between barriers to investment and relative prices in this environment we simulate a calibrated version of the model in which barriers follow a stochastic process common to all countries and estimated using relative price data and obtain statistics for investment rates that closely resemble what we observe in the data in particular the model accounts for 90 of the 1985 gini index of relative investment rates and the decline in investment rate dispersion over time the model has two limitations as a theory of development first it cannot account for the income disparity in the data unless we assume unmeasured capital with barriers affecting the broad measure of capital second even under these extreme assumptions the model cannot account for the evolution of income disparity over time

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

workers machines and economic growth this paper models technology adoption as replacing workers by machines which perform the same job in the production process the paper shows that such modelling of technology adoption affects significantly the analysis of economic growth this model can explain large and persistent international differences in output levels and growth rates caused by small differences in underlying parameters

legal expenditure as a rent seeking game legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent seeking contest in civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent seeking contests the endogenous decision to participate in the rent seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case and the decision by the defendant to defend it the desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology

homework in development economics household production and the wealth of nations we introduce home production into the neoclassical growth model and examine its consequences for development economics in particular we study the extent to which one can account for international income differences with differences in policies that distort capital accumulation in models with home production such policies not only reduce capital accumulation but also change the mix of market and nonmarket activity hence these models can generate larger differences in output than standard models for a given policy differential we also show how the welfare implications change when we incorporate home production

the quantitative importance of openness in development this paper deals with a classic development question how can the process of economic development transition from stagnation in a traditional technology to industrialization and prosperity with a modern technology be accelerated lewis 1954 and rostow 1956 argue that the pace of industrialization is limited by the rate of capital formation which in turn is limited by the savings rate of workers close to subsistence we argue that access to capital goods in the world market can be quantitatively important in speeding up the transition we develop a parsimonious open economy model where traditional and modern technologies coexist a dual economy in the sense of lewis 1954 we show that a decline in the world price of capital goods in an open economy increases the rate of capital formation and speeds up the pace of industrialization relative to a closed economy that lacks access to cheaper capital goods in the long run the investment rate in the open economy is twice as high as in the closed economy and the per capita income is 23 higher jel o11 f43 o14

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

efficient rent seeking under varying cost structures the rent seeking paradigm which was introduced by tullock 1967 has proven useful for exploring a variety of economic decisions that lie outside the traditional profit maximizing framework early applications of tullock s insight becker 1968 krueger 1974 posner 1975 demsetz 1976 foster 1981 and others usually assumed the entire value of the rent would be dissipated by competition following the fashion of economic profits in competitive markets in 1980 tullock structured a simple game reflecting the decisions made in rent seeking the results generated by his model suggest residual rents may accrue to rent seekers and under certain conditions resist dissipation a number of studies followed tullock s 1980 paper corcoran 1984 corcoran and karels 1985 higgins shugart and tollison 1985 tullock 1984 1985 and 1987 which explore the dissipation of excess rents under various assumptions

long run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking a comment although corcoran is mathematically correct i believe his comment is not very helpful in order to discuss the matter in some detail the reader should consult table 7 1 from my original efficient rent seeking reproduced on page 92 1 this shows the equilibrium investment of each individual different numbers of individuals playing the game n and differing values of r table 7 2 also reproduced on page 93 shows the total investment

a general analysis of rent seeking games in this paper we reconsider the basic model of efficient rent seeking we stress the importance of the shape of the players reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game we give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria moreover the possibility of preemption by a stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent seeking available to the agents

barriers to entry and development we ask whether barriers to entry are a quantitatively important reason for the income gap between developing countries and the united states we develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the effects of barriers to entry and the other main distortions typically considered in the development literature we carry our model to the data and ask it to match the main development facts from the penn world table we find that this requires large barriers to entry in developing countries which account for about half of the income gap with the united states

government production of investment goods and aggregate labor productivity abstract in this paper i estimate the impact on aggregate labor productivity of having government rather than private industry produce investment goods this policy was pursued to varying degrees by egypt india and turkey among others the policy has a large impact because there is both a direct effect it lowers productivity in the investment sector and a secondary effect it lowers the economy wide capital stock per worker i estimate that this policy alone reduced egypt s aggregate productivity by 30 and accounted for 20 of egypt s aggregate labor productivity gap with the united states during the 1960s

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

how progressive is the u s federal tax system a historical and international perspective this paper provides estimates of federal tax rates by income groups in the united states since 1960 with special emphasis on very top income groups we include individual and corporate income taxes payroll taxes and estate and gift taxes the progressivity of the u s federal tax system at the top of the income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s this dramatic drop in progressivity is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with a sharp change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor income the sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only moderately to the decline in tax progressivity international comparisons confirm that is it critical to take into account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent of overall tax progressivity both for time trends and for cross country comparisons the pattern for the united kingdom is similar to the u s pattern france had less progressive taxes than the united states or the united kingdom in 1970 but has experienced an increase in tax progressivity and has now a more progressive tax system than the united states or the united kingdom

long run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking the lure of excess profits or rents associated with monopoly power gives rise to expenditures to obtain these rents competitive rent seeking behavior is recognized as a factor which must be included among the wastes associated with monopoly power tullock 1967 posner 1975 1 the expenditures are aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society how important rent seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits

education and income growth implications for cross country inequality this paper examines the extent to which patterns of human capital convergence can account for observed patterns of income inequality between countries to do this i decompose national income into three components one due to education levels one reflecting the return to education and a residual component i then examine in turn the contribution of each of them to changes in income dispersion among the developed countries convergence in education levels has resulted in a reduction in income dispersion however for the world as a whole incomes have diverged despite substantial convergence in education levels this is a result of increases in the return to education that favor the developed countries at the expense of the less developed countries

how much do distortions affect growth abstract this paper presents a simple endogenous growth model with two types of capital which can display sizeable long run growth effects of distortionary policies the model applies to many different types of distortions of relative prices common in developing countries such as differential taxes and tariffs black market exchange rates and price controls the model shows that a subsidy to one type of capital financed by a tax on another capital good lowers growth a measure of the variance of relative prices of investment goods across sectors has a negative and statistically significant effect on growth

rent seeking rent defending and rent dissipation in the preceding analyses of rent defending the posner model yielded welfare losses in excess of the combined areas of the tullock rectangle and the harberger triangle in only one instance furthermore this particular circumstance necessitated voluntary participation in a game with a negative expected value 13 for the tullock rogerson model the explicit addition of rent defenders had no impact on aggregate dissipation

world product and income international comparisons of real gross product the volume reports on the third phase of the united nations international comparison project icp the main results provide comparisons of real gross domestic product gdp per capita for thirty four countries in 1975 quantity and price comparisons are given also for personal consumption capital formation and public consumption and further subdivisions of final expenditures on gdp are estimated

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back