linking permit markets multilaterally we formally study the determinants magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains generated in multilateral linkages between permit markets we provide two novel decomposition results for these gains characterize individual preferences over linking groups and show that our results are largely unaltered with strategic domestic emissions cap selection or when banking and borrowing are allowed using the paris agreement pledges and power sector emissions data of five countries which all use or considered using both emissions trading and linking we quantify the efficiency gains we find that the computed gains can be sizable and are split roughly equally between effort and risk sharing

environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies abstract this paper analyses the effects of the environmental policy instruments taxes and standards on the investment behaviour of firms in the context of an international duopoly two production factors are considered the capital stock and a polluting input the government of each country values high profits for its firm and a good environmental quality through standards on the polluting input firms get commitment on output which is not the case under taxes standards thus seem a better environmental policy instrument because for the same use of the polluting input taxes lead the duopolists to higher investment with lower profits this result was derived in a two stage game model it was confirmed in a differential game model with open loop strategies the paper shows that in a differential game model with feedback strategies an effect occurs that counteracts the first effect the cause of this is that taxes induce substitution between capital and the polluting input the conclusion is that under taxes firms invest more due to the absence of commitment but invest less due to substitution between the inputs the net effect depends on the values of the parameters taxes are better than standards for low rates of depreciation and discount for low investment costs and for high productivity of capital

trade s dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution abstract this study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the u s mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs public health damages and trade benefits noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages results show trade liberalization leads mexico to curtail pollution in both games cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the united states from mexico s pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game

non monetary incentives and opportunistic behavior evidence from a laboratory public good game this study reports data from a laboratory experiment that investigates the incentive effect of three distinct social communication schemes on free riding behavior we use performance based approval and disapproval ratings and a linear public good game to address the above issues the treatments vary in terms of subjects opportunities to anonymously assign 1 only the approval ratings to other group members 2 only the disapproval ratings to other group members and 3 either the approval or the disapproval ratings to other group members but not both to the same group member after they play a standard linear public good game despite the nash prediction of zero individual contribution in all three treatments the data show that the disapproval points generate significantly higher contribution than the approval points the treatment in which subjects could communicate either the approval or the disapproval points produces the highest level of contribution we discuss the implications that these findings may have for efficient design of organizations jel d03 h41 c72 c92

climate change heterogeneities and stability of international fiscal harmonization this paper analyzes the instability introduced into multilateral agreements by two types of heterogeneity heterogeneity of countries size and number of producing members and heterogeneity of lobbies asymmetric influence at the national versus the international level the work extends theoretical prospective analyses on environmental taxation as illustrated by the harmonization of fuel taxes we show that the acceptability of the tax set at the multilateral level depends on the type of coalitions that participate in the multilateral negotiation size and number of producing countries and the asymmetry in the local state level power of lobbies during negotiations

game theoretic modelling of transboundary pollution transboundary pollution is pollution which is emitted in one country and deposited or causing harm in another country due to the absence of a supranational institution that could enforce international legislation transboundary externalities cannot be approached in the same way as domestic pollution problems in an attempt to find non traditional solutions to such crossborder problems recent environmental economics literature incorporates behavioural assumptions with the help of game theory this paper discusses how different types of transboundary pollution have been approached and which static and dynamic game theoretic solution concepts have been evaluated while full cooperation among countries yields the economically optimal outcome it is difficult to reach because countries are faced with an inequitable sharing of the burden of pollution abatement and with the incentive to free ride side payment schemes to aid burden sharing and strategies to circumvent free riding are reviewed issues such as transaction costs information and motivation are briefly discussed

serial nonparticipation in repeated discrete choice models we consider alternative econometric strategies for addressing serial nonparticipation that is repeated choice of the same alternative or same type of alternative across a series of choice occasions in data typically analyzed within the repeated discrete choice framework single and double hurdle variants of the repeated discrete choice model are developed and applied to choice experiment and multisite seasonal recreation demand data our results suggest that hurdle models can generate significant improvements in statistical fit and qualitatively different policy implications particularly in choice experiment applications where the proper treatment of serial nonparticipation is relatively more ambiguous

emission trading with fiscal externalities the case for a common carbon tax for the non ets emissions in the eu a government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first best level of public spending when involved in emission trading a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales this fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries our theory explains how and when fiscal externalities may be expected to arise moreover we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect 1 the price of emission permits 2 the global distribution of abatement effort and 3 total greenhouse gas mitigation costs this is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets our findings are especially relevant for the eu which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between eu member countries for all emissions outside the european emissions trading system

types and patterns an experimental east west german comparison of cooperation and solidarity abstract in a study of public good and solidarity experiments conducted in eastern and western germany we found in both games that eastern subjects behave in a significantly more selfish manner than do western subjects besides that we found that many qualitative results of both data sets are similar since our experiments were conducted in two parts of one nation we present an unusually well controlled cross cultural study by avoiding difficulties that usually arise in multinational settings we conclude that cooperation and solidarity behavior seem to depend strongly on different culture specific norms resulting from opposing economic and social histories in the two parts of germany

environmentalism democracy and pollution control this paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature based on predictions generated by a lobby group model first we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries second we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political electoral competition the empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy moreover political competition tends to raise policy stringency in particular where citizens participation in the democratic process is widespread

the acid rain differential game this paper considers an acid rain differential game countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil countries face a trade off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not this paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open loop and markov perfect nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game it will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady state levels of the buffer stocks differ the theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between great britain and ireland finally some results are given for the whole of europe

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

use of damage schedules in environmental valuation the case of urban singapore increasing concerns over environmental degradation have amplified the role of environmental economics and the valuation of non pecuniary environmental resources as tools of analysis to facilitate the design of policies to date however environmental valuation methods have continued to be unreliable misleading and contentious as a guide to resource allocations and damage compensations in this paper a damage schedule is developed based on the scales of relative importance translated from people s judgments about values of various environmental damages or losses the variance stable rank method is applied to the paired comparison responses to obtain the scale values as well as the importance of rankings statistical tests of significance are used to determine the level of the agreement among the survey respondents and the degree of correspondence between different respondent groups this will determine the number of relative importance scales required to adequately represent the responses from all respo

evaluating the relative strength of product specific factors in fuel switching and stove choice decisions in ethiopia a discrete choice model of household preferences for clean cooking alternatives switching from conventional stoves to modern clean safe and efficient stoves will improve health and social welfare for the 2 7 billion people worldwide that lack reliable access to modern energy services in this paper we critically review some key theoretical dimensions of household consumer behaviour in switching from traditional biomass cooking stoves to modern efficient stoves and fuels we then describe the results of empirical research investigating the determinants of stove choice focusing on the relative strength of product specific factors across three wealth groups a stated preference survey and discrete choice model were developed to understand household decision making associated with cooking stove choice in addis ababa ethiopia the study found that with the exception of price and usage cost factors for the high wealth group the product specific factors that were investigated significantly affect stove and fuel choices the relative strength of factors was assessed in terms of marginal willingness to pay and provides some evidence that consumer preference for higher quality fuels and stoves tends to increase with increasing wealth

confronting the environmental kuznets curve t he environmental kuznets curve posits an inverted u relationship between pollution and economic development kuznets s name was apparently attached to the curve by grossman and krueger 1993 who noted its resemblance to kuznets s inverted u relationship between income inequality and development in the first stage of industrialization pollution in the environmental kuznets curve world grows rapidly because people are more interested in jobs and income than clean air and water communities are too poor to pay for abatement and environmental regulation is correspondingly weak the balance shifts as income rises leading industrial sectors become cleaner people value the environment more highly and regulatory institutions become more effective along the curve pollution levels off in the middle income range and then falls toward pre industrial levels in wealthy societies the environmental kuznets curve model has elicited conflicting reactions from researchers and policymakers applied econometricians have generally accepted the basic tenets of the model and focused on measuring its parameters their regressions typically fitted to cross sectional observations across countries or regions suggest that air and water pollution increase with development until per capita income reaches a range of 5000 to 8000 when income rises beyond that level pollution starts to decline as shown in the conventional ekc line in figure 1 in developing countries some policymakers have interpreted such results as conveying a message about priorities grow first then clean up numerous critics have challenged the conventional environmental kuznets curve both as a representation of what actually happens in the development process and as a policy prescription some pessimistic critics argue that crosssectional evidence for the environmental kuznets curve is nothing more than a

transboundary pollution in the black sea comparison of institutional arrangements this paper analyses the transboundary pollution between romania and ukraine coastal states along the black sea and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem to achieve this goal we use a dynamic and strategic framework we compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first best case with three different institutional arrangements the non cooperative game of countries the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the black sea commission our findings indicate that the non cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules

selecting public goods institutions who likes to punish and reward we study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand and preferences over as well as behavior within various public goods institutions on the other hand we incentive compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions we find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment somewhat surprisingly preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics conversely individual characteristics including institutional preferences are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game for instance risk averse individuals preemptively punish more often this suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty although they may not affect the original selection into institutions

crime in the lab detecting social interaction abstract according to the standard economic perspective criminal activities vary with the price of crime which depends on the severity of punishment and the detection probability an alternative view claims that crime is also influenced by social interaction phenomena such as peer pressure or neighbourhood effects detecting social interaction in the field is fraught with difficulties however in this paper we argue that given its extensive control possibilities experiments are well suited to show the potential existence of social interaction effects we present an experimental study where people can engage in criminal activities we find support for the importance of social interaction on average subjects steal the more the more others steal this behaviour can be interpreted in terms of reciprocity

group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas a survey and meta analytic evidence abstract we survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games public goods games common pool resources and the prisoner s dilemma the 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms endogenous endogenous with the option to play the game and exogenous on cooperation rates our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free riders independently of the sorting mechanism we complement the survey with a meta analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting what is more we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups these observations are related as we show in the survey the success of a sorting method in matching like minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked

the clean development mechanism in a world carbon market this paper discusses the role of the clean development mechanism cdm on the market for carbon quotas and countries commitments to reduce their carbon emission levels we show that the cdm contributes to an efficient funding of clean technology investments in least developed countries however the cdm is not neutral on the global level of carbon emissions as it entices countries to raise their emission caps the cdm may also make inappropriate the inclusion of any country that takes no emission abatement commitment it can even make inefficient a country s decision to commit to an emission target

trade transboundary pollution and foreign lobbying in this paper we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution we show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream polluted country but if the upstream polluting country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country s social welfare and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country thus the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments susceptibility to foreign political influence

decentralized and efficient control of transboundary pollution in federal systems abstract decentralized control of transboundary pollution in federal systems can be efficient when population crowding is socially costly in this paper an upstream region abates pollution or makes an interregional income transfer to the downstream region with the sole intent of deterring immigration because either instrument abatement expenditure or interregional income transfer alone implements an efficient population distribution between the regions interregional income transfers are unnecessary for efficiency without explicit income transfers each region provides the efficient portion of the aggregate level of pollution abatement in the nash equilibrium

valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics 1 valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics relevance and scope h folmer e van ierland part i the valuation of public goods 2 non market asset prices a comparison of three valuation approaches r c d arge j f shogren 3 valuing public goods in a risky world an experiment p o johansson 4 recreational values pareto optimality and timber supply p o johansson k g lofgren k g maler 5 estimating social benefits of environmental improvements from reduced acid rain deposition a contingent valuation survey s navrud part ii the valuation of health and life 6 benefits of reduced morbidity from air pollution control a survey m dickie s gerking 7 valuing a public good direct and indirect valuation approaches to the measurement of the benefits from air pollution abatement m shechter m kim l golan 8 environmental regulation and the valuation of life interindustry mobility and the market price of safety h w herzog jr a m schlottmann part iii cost benefit analysis 9 disequilibrium cost benefit rules an exposition and extension p o johansson k g lofgren 10 macroeconomic cost benefit analysis of environmental programmes a nentjes part iv aspects of policy making 11 benefit estimation for complex policies a randall j hoehn 12 the acid rain game k g maler index

analyzing the effectiveness of international environmental policies the case of the kyoto protocol we study the effectiveness of emission targets under the kyoto protocol with respect to reducing co2 emissions using country level and us state level panel data and employing the synthetic control method we find very little evidence for an emission reduction effect for the major emitters among the annex b countries with binding emission targets more generally we also show that evaluating the effectiveness of international environmental policies at the country level comes with a number of empirical challenges that may invalidate findings based on more traditional panel data approaches

plant location wind direction and pollution policy under offshoring we examine pollution policy in a unified three country framework with the country in the middle playing double roles as both a polluter and a victim we find that government preference over profits and consumer surplus to be important and so is environmentalism in particular the most downwind country has the least incentives to control pollution under oligopoly several additional undesirable scenarios may arise due to the interaction between wind direction and the incentive trade offs in rent shifting and pollution control we analyse the mechanisms behind and provide policy guidance

foreign influence and welfare how do foreign interests inuence the policy determination process what are the welfare implications of such foreign inuence in this paper we develop a model of foreign inuence and apply it to the study of optimal taris we develop a two country voting model of electoral competition where we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically aect the electoral outcome in the other country we show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare and we study the determinants of this weight we show that although foreign inuence is zero in equilibrium its threat may be welfare enhancing from the point of view of aggregate world welfare this is because foreign inuence helps alleviate externalities arising from cross border eects of policies the threat of foreign inuence can however prove harmful in the presence of large imbalances in inuence power across countries we apply our model of foreign inuence to the study of optimal trade policy we derive a modied formula for the optimal import tariand show that a country s import tariis more distorted whenever the inuenced country is small relative to the inuencing country and whenever natural trade barriers between the two countries are small

kyoto protocol cooperation does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying in this paper we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby we use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of kyoto protocol ratification to test this hypothesis we find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification and the effect rises with the degree of corruption

welfare ranking of environmental policies in the presence of capital mobility and cross border pollution we construct a model of two regions with cross border pollution and with inter regional regional capital mobility rcm or international international capital mobility icm capital mobility each region uses emission taxes or intra regionally or inter regionally tradable emission permits to reduce pollution we show that the non cooperative settings of all three instruments are always inefficient relative to their cooperative settings when regions are symmetric then i with rcm the non cooperative setting of intra regionally tradable emissions permits is welfare superior to that of the other two instruments ii with icm the non cooperative settings of intra regionally tradable emission permits and of emission taxes are equivalent and superior to that of inter regionally tradable emission permits and iii with icm the three instruments are equivalent only when cross border pollution is perfect

political influence on non cooperative international climate policy we analyze non cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups in the first stage countries decide whether to link their domestic emission permit markets to an international market which only forms if it is supported by all countries in the second stage countries non cooperatively decide on the number of tradable emission allowances in both stages special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor we find that i both the choice of regime and the levels of domestic and global emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups and ii an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the lobby group s less preferred regime

the spillover effects of good governance in a tax competition framework with a negative environmental externality we investigate the impact of a political regime shift affecting consumers business interests and lobby contributions when countries engage in tax competition in capital and a polluting resource when consumers have more influence than resource owners the resource tax rate and public spending rise while environmental damages lobbying contribution and the capital tax rate fall this response can spillover to other countries leading to lower welfare capital tax harmonization improves welfare of consumers and resource owners resource tax harmonization and governance harmonization both reduce the influence of lobbying and improve consumer welfare but resource owners are worse off

market power and hot air in international emissions trading the impacts of us withdrawal from the kyoto protocol ten years after the initial climate change convention from rio in 1992 the industrialized world is finally likely to ratify the kyoto protocol which will impose legally binding greenhouse gas emission reductions on the developed world however the kyoto protocol will enter into force without the usa which withdrew under president bush in march 2001 accounting for hot air and market power of the former soviet union on emission permit markets it is shown that us withdrawal has important consequences on environmental effectiveness compliance costs and excess costs of market power under the kyoto protocol non compliance of the usa implies a dramatic decrease in environmental effectiveness as well as compliance costs of oecd countries whereas the former soviet union and transitional economies in eastern europe suffer from a huge decline in permit sales revenues excess costs of market power in permit trade increase in relative terms but decline substantially in absolute terms due to us withdrawal pol

lexicographic preferences in contingent valuation a theoretical framework with illustrations this paper considers some implications of l ordering an incommensurable preference model proposed in earlier cvliterature the structure and existence of inverse demand functions is shown to be a function of three elements the relationship between goods and wants wta wtp formats and the endowment of the good in a many to many relationship uncompensated and even compensated inverse demand functions may exist whereas a one to one relationship implicitly assumed in earlier literature does not necessarily produce either an illustration is provided in support of the theoretical framework especially the hypothesis that one to one relationship and high share of cv responses revealing lexicographic preferences are correlated

social welfare in a common property oligopoly output in a markov nash cournot equilibrium to a noncooperative differential game in which in oligopolists extract a common property nonrenewable resource is bounded by the output of in firm and in i firm static oligopolies we discuss the welfare effects of the number of firms and of the divergence between private and social discount rates we compare extraction under the markov and open loop equilibria and then offer an explanation for the possibility that the resource is exhausted instantaneously in a continuous time game this explanation does not depend on the fact that the period of commitment is infinitesimal this essay models the extraction by an oligopolistic industry of a common property nonrenewable resource we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium mpe in a game amongst firms and then provide general conditions under which the resource is exhausted instantaneously if there is unrestricted access to a resource agents perceive its shadow value to be 0 and extract too rapidly when access is restricted to a finite number of agents in none of whom possess exclusive property rights an additional complication may arise if firms behave as oligopolists in the product market they have an incentive to extract the resource too slowly in order to increase the price thus where m firms exploit a resource in the absence of property rights there are conflicting tendencies the absence of property rights encourages excessive exploitation whereas the finite number of firms encourages insufficiently rapid exploitation there are a number of situations where the lack of property rights and the presence of market power coexist examples include i national fisheries which are large enough to affect fish populations and output prices ii common exploitation of aquifers or rivers where individual use affects the price of an agricultural output or of another input iii production by oligopolistic firms which degrades the environment we consider the case of nonrenewable resources such as oil this implies a simple equation of motion for the stock of the resource and emphasizes the role of the number of firms and the stock size such models are often appropriate even if the resource is not literally nonrenewable for example tropical forests or groundwater aquifers are potentially renewable given enough time as indeed oil deposits may be however the rate of replenishment may be insignificant given

the impact of selected abatement strategies on transnational pollution the terms of trade and factor rewards a general equilibrium approach abstract widespread publicity of international conflict over transfrontier pollutants such as acid deposition and the november 1986 chemical spill in the rhine river has increased the public s awareness of the need to devise abatement strategies appropriate for transnational pollution this article develops a general equilibrium approach for analyzing the economic impacts of selected abatement strategies the model includes internationally mobile goods capital and pollution flows and flexible output and factor prices the general equilibrium approach provides policymakers with important information which is usually not revealed by a partial equilibrium approach that is demonstrated by applying the model to the north american acid deposition issue

international coordination on climate policies given the current trend in global emissions the latest round of climate change negotiations at the durban meeting of december 2011 for the adoption of a comprehensive global treaty on climate change mitigation as soon as possible and no later than 2015 and to come into force in 2020 has hardly shown the results one would have hoped for even for the most optimistic it remains unclear whether one can expect a successful negotiating outcome by 2015 there are inherent difficulties associated with climate change negotiations ranging from which countries should bear most responsibility for a given emission reduction target to the assessment of a globally efficient time path for pricing harmful greenhouse gas emissions ghgs these difficulties become even more complex and challenging under the pervasive uncertainty of climate science and the uncertainty about the feedback loop between climate change damages and economic growth during the past decades the environmental economics literature has provided important insights regarding the design of environmental fiscal policies and treaties but there is a host of issues that remain relatively unexplored for instance we know little about the cooperative solution for carbon and trade policies when climate change affects the productive possibilities of countries in this context it is also not obvious whether observed policies could be improved upon in such a way that all countries gain in welfare it remains also unclear what the carbon extraction path should be in the absence of a comprehensive treaty such as for example if environmental policy is unilaterally chosen subject to an agreed ceiling in global temperature though carbon pricing instruments like carbon taxes cap and trade and hybrids have been well studied not much is known about their properties in the presence of offset schemes such as the clean development mechanism more work is also required to understand the strategic implications of the uncertainty surrounding climate change and how this affects for example the choice of climate change strategy precautionary or wait and see how uncertainty impacts the propensity of countries to sign a climate treaty and the extent to which the possibility of a climate catastrophe fosters or hinders cooperation understanding political economy issues is also vital in tackling climate change because efficient climate policies stand little chance of being successfully negotiated and implemented if they do not receive the support of the electorate the papers in the special issue of the journal of environmental economics and management are precisely devoted to this broad research agenda

harmonizing tailpipe policy in symmetric countries improve the environment improve welfare abstract we show that harmonizing emissions policy may be bad for the environment and or global welfare even when pollution is transboundary and countries are identical in every way harmonization effectively internalizes the transboundary aspects of pollution but it also changes the politics surrounding tailpipe regulation with harmonization producers can no longer avoid strict local regulation by simply exporting their products to overseas markets with weak standards for consumer goods as a result harmonization may raise political opposition to regulation to examine these competing effects we develop a generic treatment of the politics of environmental regulation a treatment we show to be isomorphic to three popular models of political economy majority rules a political elite and a political contributions approach we find that harmonization both weakens environmental regulation and reduces global welfare when the level of political capture by dirty industry is high relative to the rate of pollution transmission across borders

conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods we compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations subjects in the partners conditi on contribute from t he first period on significantly more to the publi c good than subjects in the strangers conditi on in the strangers conditi on contributions show a continual decay whil e in the partners conditi on contributions fluctuate on a high level until t hey decrease in the final periods we interpret subjects behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future oriented and reactive behavior

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

international emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices abstract this paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non tradable emission allowances by non cooperative countries i find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution in particular environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries moreover if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous approval of all countries there may be no agreement on trading even if it were to lead to less pollution overall conversely a trading system may find unanimous approval even if it induces more pollution

domestic and international influences on green taxation economists have made a strong case for the relative efficiency of market based mechanisms for environmental regulation such as cap and trade and green taxes yet the spread of these forms has been limited and traditional command and control regulation still predominates the authors explain geographical and temporal variation in green tax burdens by considering their domestic and international determinants modeling international influences using spatial lags hypotheses are tested using panel data on organisation for economic co operation and development member states from 1995 to 2004 at the domestic level the authors show that green tax burdens are influenced by the left right and environmental positions of legislative medians and the power of the energy producing sector among other factors the authors also show that ideas about policy diffuse through international networks generated by trade and environmental intergovernmental organizations but they do not find compelling evidence for intern

environmental taxes and first mover advantages this paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies to analyze this question i assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously when taxes are set sequentially an effect denoted as the sequential setting effect arises that raises the equilibrium taxes i show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners when this overspill is low enough taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting however the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower in this case governments set taxes sequentially when the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously in this case each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes

how do governments actually use environmental taxes this paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretation

play it again partner choice reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games often the fuller the reputational record people s actions generate the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation however inability to wipe clean one s past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation s value in a cycle of bad behaviour whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their reforming themselves in a laboratory experiment we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous symmetric partner choice we find that with a high cooperation premium and good information investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts although earlier end game behaviours are observed

an assessment of four popular auction mechanisms in the siting of nimby facilities some experimental evidence the issue of locating locally unfriendly but socially beneficial facilities such as landfills and power stations is an important public policy concern in many countries local residents in the area where such facilities are to be located tend to exhibit strong opposition no doubt due to the asymmetric distribution of the costs and benefits of such not in my backyard nimby facilities a potentially useful mechanism for the siting of such facilities is by compensation auctions which attempt to incorporate the market mechanism into the decision making process in such auctions communities name the compensation they require to host such facilities and the community demanding the least amount of compensation gets to host the facility this research attempts to evaluate the performance of such compensation auctions using laboratory exepriments four popular auction formats are evaluated first and second price and all pay first and second price sealed bid auctions the latter two formats correspond to th

unilateral co2 reductions and carbon leakage the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model featuring six world regions with trade in energy and non energy goods is used to simulate the period from 1990 through 2100 in 10 year intervals the simulations explore the effect of unilateral action by the oecd to curb global co2 emissions unilateral cuts create incentives for free riding by non participating regions so that global emissions are reduced by less than the amount that the oecd cuts back its regional emissions carbon leakage occurs through two channels first basic materials production increases in unconstrained regions resulting in increased carbon intensity of gdp second reductions in oecd oil imports cause the world oil price to fall leading to an increased energy intensity in the non participant regions in this paper we use a general equilibrium model to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of oecd reductions in curbing global co2 concentrations

temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences abstract a core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable preferences we test this assumption in public goods games by repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed subject pool over a period of five months we find that cooperation preferences are very stable at the aggregate level and to a smaller degree at the individual level allowing us to predict future behavior fairly accurately furthermore our results provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences the personality dimension agreeableness is closely related to both the type and the stability of cooperation preferences

what drives carbon dioxide emissions in the long run evidence from selected south asian countries abstract this study empirically investigates the relationship between co 2 emission and four of its potentially contributing factors i e energy consumption income trade openness and population using time series data from 1971 to 2013 on five selected economies of south asia after confirming that all the series are stationary using unit root test process the study incorporates three different and advance panel cointegration tests i e pedroni kao and johansen fisher panel cointegration all the panel cointegration tests confirm that all the variables cointegrated the long run association between the variables is checked using fmols grouped and individual cross section country in the panel the fmols grouped results show that energy consumption trade openness and population increases environmental degradation in the panel countries with exception of income which has negative impact and sounds the existence of environmental kuznet curve between income and emission the innovative accounting approach using variance decomposition test and impulse response function is applied to examine the causality amongst the underlined vectors the results show that there is bidirectional causality between energy consumption and trade openness and uni directional causality running from energy consumption trade openness and population to co 2 emission the results enumerate that the energy consumption and population density will increase in long run and foresee further environmental degradation in the region

charitable bequests and taxes on inheritances and estates aggregate evidence from across states and time this paper examines the impact of wealth transfer taxes on charitable bequests we exploit the fact that federal and state taxes on estates and inheritances vary over time states and real wealth levels the effects of taxes are estimated using pooled cross sectional data spanning several decades based on aggregated information from federal estate tax returns under several different specifications we find evidence of a strong incentive effect of estate and inheritance taxes on charitable bequests

gains from emission trading under multiple stabilization targets and technological constraints abstract this study quantified the effectiveness of emission trading by considering multiple technological constraints burden sharing schemes and climate stabilization targets we used a global computable general equilibrium model and evaluated the effectiveness of emission trading using welfare losses associated with climate mitigation for scenarios with and without emission trading as measured by the hicksian equivalent variation hev we found that emission trading contributed to a reduction in the economic losses associated with climate mitigation for all technological assumptions burden sharing schemes and stabilization targets the net global welfare losses in scenarios without emission trading ranged between 0 7 and 1 9 whereas emission trading reduced the losses by 0 1 to 0 5 the range depended on the assumptions in the burden sharing schemes technological constraints and stabilization targets the percentage change in welfare gain from emission trading varied regionally and was relatively high in low income or middle income countries 0 2 to 1 0 and 0 1 to 1 2 respectively compared to high income countries 0 1 to 0 3 some regions displayed negative values with regard to the effectiveness of emission trading which might be due to the change in goods and service trades associated with emission trading if the usage of carbon capture and storage was constrained welfare loss became large and the effectiveness of emission trading ultimately increased the use of a burden sharing scheme was a significant factor in changing the effectiveness of emission trading and the per capita emission convergence in 2050 was more effective for emission trading than a per income convergence

social learning and voluntary cooperation among like minded people many people contribute to public goods but stop doing so once they experience free riding we test the hypothesis that groups whose members know that they are composed only of likeminded cooperators are able to maintain a higher cooperation level than the most cooperative randomly composed groups our experiments confirm this hypothesis we also predict that groups of like minded free riders do not cooperate yet we find a high level of strategic cooperation that eventually col lapses our results underscore the importance of group composition and social learning by heterogeneously motivated agents to understand the dynamics of cooperation and free riding

asymmetric tax policy responses in large economies with cross border pollution we build a model of cross border pollution between two large open economies one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it and derive their non cooperative trade and environmental tax policies we show among other things that 1 in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries the former country s optimal policy is to lower its nash emissions tax while the latter s is to raise it and 2 in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries the former country s optimal reaction is to raise its nash import tariff while the latter s is to reduce its nash export tax that is in the present context freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies

theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems the negotiations model is described by a dynamic process bearing on a multilateral externality that converges to an individually rational pareto optimum the process embodies a cost sharing rule for pollutant abatement in the countries involved derived from a sharing rule of the surplus that is also shown to have strategic stability in the game theoretic sense of an imputation in the core of some cooperative game associated with the negotiation process the connections are explored between this cost sharing rule and the free rider problem in public goods theory

bioeconomics of spatial exploitation in a patchy environment abstract this paper presents a model of renewable resource exploitation that incorporates both intertemporal dynamics and spatial movement the model combines the h s gordon vernon smith hypothesis of a rent dissipation process with ricardian notions that resources are exploited across space in a pattern dependent upon relative profitabilities the population structure is characterized in a manner consistent with modern biological ideas that stress patchiness heterogeneity and interconnections among and between patches generally we find the equilibrium patterns of biomass and effort across the system to be dependent upon bioeconomic conditions within each patch and the nature of the biological dispersal mechanism between patches we use simple examples to illustrate how the distribution of effort throughout the system reflects the heterogeneity and the spatial biological linkages

modeling disinterest and dislike a bounded bayesian mixed logit model of the uk market for gm food mixed logit models represent a powerful discrete choice analytical model but require assumptions about the functional form of the parameter distributions the use of unbounded distributions such as the normal distribution may be regarded as unsuitable where theory indicates that all are negatively affected by increases in an attribute such as price bounded distributions such as the triangular and log normal are unable to model the case where a section of the population is indifferent towards an attribute while the remainder are negatively disposed toward it train and sonnier s bounded mixed logit model accommodates these features and is employed in this paper a censored normal and johnson s s b distribution are used to model preferences in the uk for food attributes including price and gm technology bi modal distributions are identified regarding gm food some are unlikely to ever consume it some are close to indifference and willing to consume at relatively small discounts while the remainder are fairly unresponsive to further price reductions

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

mixed logit model performance and distributional assumptions preferences and gm foods using mixed logit models to analyse choice data is common but requires ex ante specification of the functional forms of preference distributions we make the case for greater use of bounded functional forms and propose the use of the marginal likelihood calculated using bayesian techniques as a single measure of model performance across non nested mixed logit specifications using this measure leads to very different rankings of model specifications compared to alternative rule of thumb measures the approach is illustrated using data from a choice experiment regarding gm food types which provides insights regarding the recent wto dispute between the eu and the us canada and argentina and whether labelling and trade regimes should be based on the production process or product composition

the political economy of trade liberalization and environmental policy a pressure group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support in return for favorable pollution tax policies is used to explain and predict the equilibrium pollution tax in sectors protected by tariffs the political economy effects of trade liberalization are investigated the pollution tax is shown to decrease if the lobbying effort by the environmental lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby ceteris paribus the level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization pollution may increase because of a reduction of the pollution tax and tax revenues may fall simultaneously as pollution increases the global trading system is currently undergoing another round of multilateral trade liberalization and regional economic integration is occurring in several parts of the world the trade environment link has become an important part of trade liberalization talks it is commonplace for industry representatives to argue that less stringent environmental regulations give less developed countries ldcs a comparative advantage in pollution intensive goods and that industries with high abatement costs will migrate to ldcs environmentalists argue that international differences in environmental laws and regulations may be reduced to their lowest common denominator through political pressure this is not a fear of trade liberalization itself but of the effects of lower trade barriers on the political determination of environmental regulation

model selection and misspecification in discrete choice welfare analysis this study extends the work by herriges and kling 1997 to further evaluate the impact of discrete choice modelling techniques on welfare measures particularly we evaluate the performance of the increasingly popular mixed logit model and the computational strategy for deriving discrete choice welfare measures our simulation results show that model misspecification can have profound effects on welfare measures in general the flexible mixed logit model performs relatively well in the presence of misspecification however when the nesting structure can be appropriately identified via statistical tests and a priori knowledge experience the nested logit model provides more reliable welfare measures than the mixed logit model

a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions abstract in recent years the transboundary pollution problems in the world are becoming more and more serious the diffusion of pollutants is common and each region which suffers from the pollution wishes that the polluter in neighboring regions would either reduce polluting or compensate for the damages this paper studies a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric regions there are two novel features in this paper first there is a stackelberg game between the industrial firms and their local government while the governments can cooperate in pollution reduction second transboundary pollution damages the regions in two ways through a global accumulative pollutant and a regional non accumulative pollutant the paper characterizes the parameter spaces that governments in two neighboring regions can collaborate and gives the feedback nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms it is found that only when the governments get cooperation the regional impact caused by the neighboring region pollution diffusion could be taken into consideration when the governments develop strategies additionally a payment distribution mechanism is proposed and a subgame consistent cooperative solution is provided with such a payment distribution both governments will receive a higher payoff in a cooperative solution than in a non cooperative solution at any instant of time during the game

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

skew and attribute non attendance within the bayesian mixed logit model abstract we investigate non attendance to choice set attributes and the accommodation of preference heterogeneity within the mixed logit model we propose a generalisation of the mixed logit enabling the degree of skew of marginal utility distributions to be estimated the implementation is bayesian with the marginal likelihood used as an arbiter of model performance we find strong evidence of skew in the distributions of marginal utilities for most attributes models incorporating skew are preferred in all cases the irrelevance of an attribute to significant numbers of respondents is a possible cause of such skew we test alternative empirical accommodations of self reported attribute non attendance ana and continue to find strong evidence of skew in the distributions of marginal utilities even having accounted for ana we find that contrary to some recent findings respondents who report having ignored an attribute typically do indeed have a zero marginal utility for that attribute

transitional restricted linkage between emissions trading schemes linkages between emissions trading systems are deemed an important element of the future climate policy landscape they are however difficult to agree and remain few and far between temporary restrictions on permit trading have potential to facilitate and gradually approach unrestricted full linkage we compare the relative merits of several link restrictions in this respect namely quantitative transfer limits border taxes on transfers exchange and discount rates and unilateral linkage to this end we develop a simple model to have a unifying framework which in conjunction with lessons we draw from real world experiences serves as a basis for a broader policy oriented discussion while quantitative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage they can lead to uncertain distributional effects and weaken price signals these aspects are mitigated under a border permit tax but this policy seems harder to implement exchange rates have potential to adjust for programmes stringencies and raise ambition over time but can be challenging to select as experience corroborates unilateral linkage can be a convenient approach

the political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy abstract this paper develops a positive theory explaining pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy the equilibrium tax rate depends on lobby group membership the relative importance of lobbying activities and the tax elasticity of pollution the equilibrium properties are investigated the model is extended to incorporate pollution abatement and a pollution abatement subsidy we show that total pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate this effect arises because the equilibrium pollution tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium

international emissions trading good or bad abstract using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency

to ban or not to ban foreign lobbying and cross national externalities this paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying we show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities we argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying we also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country a key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not we illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation bannir ou ne pas bannir lobbying etranger et effets externes transnationaux ce texte etudie les couts et avantages du lobbying etranger on montre quand et comment que le lobbying etranger peut aider a internaliser des effets externes transnationaux on suggere que c est souvent un avantage qu on est porte a negliger du lobbying etranger on etudie sous quelles conditions une regle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying etranger peut etre dans l interet national d un pays un facteur cle dans ce calcul est le fait que les interets des groupes etrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non organises on illustre la logique sous jacente a l aide d exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la reglementation environnementale

the participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty a spatial probit analysis abstract this paper represents treaty participation as a two stage game for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages this spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages when the procedure is applied to the helsinki protocol we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized

optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second best world evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players abstract this paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question in a second best world should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally we find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small this result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution i e it uses uniform standards whereas local authorities use different shadow prices and therefore different standards

political economy of the kyoto protocol the kyoto protocol negotiated in december 1997 is the first international treaty to limit emissions of greenhouse gases but kyoto does not mark the conclusion to international cooperation on climate change it is really just a beginning this paper shows that in the aggregate the benefits of undertaking the kyoto reductions should exceed the corresponding costs provided these are achieved cost effectively but although kyoto seeks to promote cost effectiveness it may yet prove very costly moreover the agreement may not even achieve the reductions that it promises either because emissions will relocate to the countries that are not required to stay within kyoto prescribed ceilings or because paper trades will be promoted by the protocol s mechanisms more fundamentally kyoto does not deter non compliance and it only weakly deters non participation these flaws need to be mended but the nature of the problem makes that an especially difficult task copyright 1998 by oxford university press

international emission permit markets with refunding we propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the eu trading scheme each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer a fraction of these permits is grandfathered the remainder is auctioned revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions we show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets if the share of grandfathered permits is sufficiently small we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions

the optimal number of firms in the commons a dynamic approach we consider a common property resource sold in imperfectly competitive markets there is a dynamic externality current harvests lower future stocks raising future harvest costs and a static crowding externality increasing industry size raises costs but lowers prices thus it has ambiguous welfare effects the optimal industry size typically changes over time so that a first best outcome cannot be obtained with a fixed number of firms single firm exploitation is optimal only under special circumstances the socially optimal open loop steady state industry size corresponds to the static optimum both generally differ from the closed loop steady state optimum

green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies abstract we employ a common agency model of policy making to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policies in two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution we show that the impact of green lobbying on environmental policy outcomes depends crucially on the prevailing trade regime cooperative or non cooperative on whether environmental agencies act in a unilateral or coordinated manner and on the size of the emission leakages and transboundary spillovers under free trade a unilateral increase in pollution taxes reduces domestic emissions at the cost of increased foreign emissions in this case if the emission leakages and the associated transboundary spillovers are large enough green lobbying can create a bias towards lower pollution taxes

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

pursuing economic growth in asia the environmental challenge this paper identifies and discusses the five main areas of environmental management public policy that pose serious challenges to asian governments the first is the emerging issue of siting environmentally unfriendly facilities that may be necessary for growth but with the social and environmental costs borne primarily by local host residents and neighbourhood municipalities more commonly known as the not in my backyard syndrome the second issue is the critical need for pricing of non market environmental goods third is the issue of waste generation the fourth challenge is that of transboundary pollution which has become increasingly important with regard to its effects on health and foreign relations lastly the paper discusses global warming and climate change discussions on cost benefit analysis and the more novel method of establishing damage schedules are also presented this is particularly relevant to fundamental differences between developed and less developed countries

cooperation and norm enforcement the individual level perspective abstract we explore the relationship between individuals disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas using a modified strategy method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns classifying n 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals however the data also reveal a sizable share of free riders that punish pro socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment we show that pro social punishers are important for achieving cooperation incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between and within group variation in cooperation

the case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy we evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self interest to do so we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies countries decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made noncooperatively so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains despite this we find that emission trade agreements can be effective that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes