joseph schumpeter lecture ideology i develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained yet individually rational distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets in processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education health insurance pensions etc individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects or their children s versus the costs of misinformed decisions because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial endogenous social cognitions emerge thus an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government conversely an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand with public sector capital this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history dependent dynamics the model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views even when ex post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news jel h11 d72 d83 p16 z1

option pricing with downward sloping demand curves the case of supply chain options this article investigates the role of option contracts in a supply chain when the demand curve is downward sloping we consider call put options that provide the retailer with the right to reorder return goods at a fixed price we show that the introduction of option contracts causes the wholesale price to increase and the volatility of the retail price to decrease in general options are not zero sum games conditions are derived under which the manufacturer prefers to use options when this happens the retailer is also better off if the uncertainty in the demand curve is low however if the uncertainty is sufficiently high then the introduction of option contracts alters the equilibrium prices in a way that hurts the retailer

the financing of social housing in integrating financial markets a view from developing countries the housing sector is the last major sector of the national economy for which analytical foundations for economic and financial policy evaluation have developed however the application of this analytical framework to international comparisons of housing policies or the evaluation of housing finance systems still lags considerably behind the strong foundations laid over the years for trade finance or industry policy analyses none the less the era when improvisation and fragmented policy making in housing and housing finance could be excused is well past today there is a deep and expanding body of basic research and policy analysis that can be shared for the design of housing policies and housing finance institutions whether it is in the european union or developing countries obviously social and economic contexts as well as wealth levels differ greatly common analytical foundations can lead to very different prescriptions in countries where macroeconomic and financial policies financial infrastr

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

socialist cities without land markets abstract how does the spatial dynamics of the socialist city compare with that of the market city what happens when all investment decisions are made administratively in the absence of land markets russian development is the longest socialist experiment on record its outcome is of paramount interest to urban economists this paper reports the first analysis of the structure of russian cities after 70 years of soviet development the main finding is a perversely positive population density gradient the soviet city also has a disproportionate share of industrial land often in prime locations free property trading started in russia in 1992 the emerging negative price gradient contrasts totally with the positive population gradient that is the legacy of administrative land allocation these two conflicting gradients highlight the land misallocation and inefficiency of the socialist city

presidents and the u s economy an econometric exploration the us economy has performed better when the president of the united states is a democrat rather than a republican almost regardless of how one measures performance for many measures including real gdp growth our focus the performance gap is large and significant this paper asks why the answer is not found in technical time series matters nor in systematically more expansionary monetary or fiscal policy under democrats rather it appears that the democratic edge stems mainly from more benign oil shocks superior total factor productivity tfp performance a more favorable international environment and perhaps more optimistic consumer expectations about the near term future jel d72 e23 e32 e65 n12 n42 an extensive and well known literature of scholarly research documents and explores the fact that macroeconomic performance is a strong predictor of us presidential election outcomes scores of papers find that better performance boosts the vote of the incumbent s party 1 in stark contrast economists have paid scant attention to predictive power running in the opposite direction from election outcomes to subsequent macroeconomic performance the answer while hardly a secret is not nearly as widely known as it should be 2 the us economy performs much better when a democrat is president than when a republican is

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

strategic public policy around population thresholds abstract political economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both re election and financial incentives this article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether when and how local office holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases using data from all 589 belgian municipalities over the period 1977 2016 our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits particularly for apartments these policy changes occur early in the election cycle and at least for housing policy are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold

partisan preferences electoral prospects and economic expectations research shows that economic expectations reflect partisan preferences those who support the current government tend to think the future will go well at least by comparison with those who oppose the government but there always is uncertainty surrounding the political future especially in the period before elections this article considers whether the uncertainty matters specifically it examines whether people s economic expectations are conditional on their own estimates of who will win the analysis relies on data from five election study panels in the united states and the united kingdom both majoritarian systems where the effects of partisan winning and losing are most likely the results imply that people in these countries do anticipate election outcomes that is economic expectations prior to elections reflect both the political present and future this tells us not only that expectations in these systems are substantially rational but that politics plays a much bigger role in our economic

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

supply contract with bidirectional options the buyer s perspective abstract this paper develops a single period two stage supply contract with bidirectional options by which the buyer can adjust the initial order both upward and downward at the beginning of the planning horizon the buyer places an initial order and purchases options after updating the demand forecast the buyer exercises options to adjust the initial order we analyze the contract from the buyer s perspective and formulate the buyer s optimal policies in particular we obtain closed form formulae to describe the buyer s optimal behavior when the demand is uniformly distributed we also analyze how the parameters affect the buyer s behavior and prove numerically that using bidirectional options can improve the buyer s profit

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

partisan bias in inflation expectations we examine partisan bias in inflation expectations our dataset includes inflation expectations of the new york fed s survey of consumer expectations over the period june 2013 to june 2018 the results show that inflation expectations were 0 46 points higher in republican dominated than in democratic dominated us states when barack obama was us president compared to inflation expectations in democratic dominated states inflation expectations in republican dominated states declined by 0 73 points when donald trump became president we employ the blinder oaxaca decomposition method to disentangle the extent to which political ideology and other individual characteristics predict inflation expectations around 25 of the total difference between inflation expectations in democratic dominated versus republican dominated states is based on how partisans respond to changes in the white house s occupant partisan bias the results also corroborate the belief that voters misperceptions of economic conditions decline when the president belongs to the party that voters support

endogenous default risk in supply chain and non linear pricing abstract based on incomplete contract theories we studied the strategic behaviors of up stream and down stream manufacturers by option game model and obtain some conclusions first the down stream s pay off function is a concave function of its investment in fixed assets so there is an optimal investment which ensures the down stream s maximal pay off and prevents it from being holdup second in presence of endogenous default risks the up stream can improve its pay off level through non linear pricing last increasing business risks of the down stream may lead to an increased price fluctuation of the up stream while the down stream s technological advancement can make such fluctuation less

nonlinear pricing in vertically related duopolies a vertically separated duopolistic market is analyzed in which manufacturers compete in wholesale price schedules and retailers in quantity under certainty there exists a continuum of equilibria the introduction of an uncertain demand parameter observed only by retailers dramatically reduces the set of equilibria quantity discounts emerge in markets with only moderately decreasing returns to scale in manufacturing and quantity competition downstream with additive shocks to demand the equilibria coincide with those of markets in which vertically integrated firms compete in supply functions before market uncertainty is resolved however generically equilibria in my model are not supply function equilibria

market vs rationing the case of soviet housing economists devote considerable effort to the analysis of various forms of nonprice rationing these analyses generally disregard forces that act to foil rationing schemes even with a commodity that seems to be easy to control however in a system with extensive rationing experience nonprice rationing schemes can be circumvented this thesis is examined for the case of housing distribution in the u s s r utilizing the data from a survey of recent soviet emigres it is shown that administrative rationing of soviet urban housing is partially replaced by market forces acting usually through the second economy copyright 1988 by mit press

housing tenure choice in transitional urban china a multilevel analysis summary using a 1996 national survey of housing in china and a multilevel modelling technique we examine housing tenure choice in transitional urban china where households have been granted limited freedom of choice in the housing market since the housing reforms of 1988 we e nd that both market mechanisms and institutional forces affect households tenure choice in urban china while some socioeconomic factors such as age household size household income and housing price have similar effects on tenure choice as in the west others such as the number of workers and marital status have rather different effects in addition factors characterising institutional relationships among the state work units and households such as hukou job rank and work unit rank still play important roles in tenure choice

do political factors affect stock returns during presidential elections abstract this study investigates whether or not political factors such as government policy and political connections affected stock returns during the 2008 taiwanese presidential election we find that firms that benefitted from were threatened by the proposed three links policy of the winning party experienced positive negative stock returns during the election we use the sensitivities of firms returns to bilateral trade flows between taiwan and china to measure the government policy effect our results show that the effects of political connections weakly exist but they become more significant when the support ratio of the winning party increased in polling data we also find that only the government policy effect holds for different crash risk and corporate governance levels finally investment strategies based on both political factors can generate positive abnormal returns with respect to the fama french three factor model

sluggish inflation and optimizing models of the business cycle abstract many researchers have added sticky prices to quantitative business cycle models i simulate several of these models in order to evaluate their success at reproducing two features of us data the lagged reaction of inflation to monetary growth and the persistence of inflation

employers discriminatory behavior and the estimation of wage discrimination this paper considers the linkage of empirical estimates of wage discrimination between two groups introduced by oaxaca 1973 to a theoretical model of employers discriminatory behavior it is shown that conditional on different assumptions about employers discriminatory tastes oaxaca s estimators of wage discrimination can be derived that the approach is more generally useful is demonstrated by deriving an alternative estimator of wage discrimination based on the assumption that within each type of labor e g unskilled skilled the utility function capturing employers discriminatory tastes is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to labor inputs from each of the two groups the estimators are compared empirically in an application to male female wage differentials

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes although the nature of the differences between parties in democratic electoral politics is an enduring question in political science surprisingly little is understood about the subject but substantial progress has been made in recent years most notably in understanding party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes the first breakthrough was douglas hibbs s 1977 analysis of party related differences in the unemployment rate in his time series analysis for the united states hibbs modeled the path of unemployment as an autoregressive moving average process subject to a dummy variable intervention term indicating party of the president his analysis indicated that democratic administrations were associated with lower unemployment than republicans by 2 36 points after eight years in office and even larger differences in long run equilibrium a subsequent article by nathaniel beck 1982 addressed the same issue and found the party differences less sharp when administration specific policy differences are considered the techniques employed by hibbs and beck focus directly on an outcome unemployment rather than on the policy instruments that are presumably responsible for altering outcomes this approach can be misleading when there are long lags between implementation of policies and ultimate effects or when shocks occasionally intrude upon the regular connections between instruments and outcomes macroeconomic theories can provide information about constraints linking macroeconomic variables but hibbs and beck fail to incorporate theoretical constraints such constraints could help determine what kinds of outcomes are feasible and sustainable and to what extent outcomes are induced by policies as opposed to shocks our purpose here is to consider how one might go about estimating party differences in a framework that takes advantage of some insights offered by macroeconomic theories and to report some preliminary results a more complete description of the analysis is provided in our working paper available upon request

comparing the point predictions and subjective probability distributions of professional forecasters we use data from the survey of professional forecasters spf to compare point predictions of gross domestic product gdp growth and inflation with the subjective probability distributions held by forecasters we find that most spf point predictions are quite close to the central tendencies of forecasters subjective distributions tend to be asymmetric with spf forecasters tending to report point predictions that give a more favorable view of the economy than do their subjective means medians modes

partisan monetary policies presidential influence through the power of appointment we investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy making influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the federal open market committee fomc or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the board of governors to investigate these two channels of influence we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the fomc our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

heterogeneity in perceptions of national economic conditions empirical findings concerning economic voting differ according to the level of analysis employed a widely accepted explanation for the inconsistency between macroand microlevel evidence of economic voting is the high degree of random variation that plagues survey data according to this explanation aggregation purges individual level noise from mass opinions on policy issues and outcomes building on the research of bartels 1996 we debate the validity of this explanation by demonstrating that public evaluations of the national economy vary systematically with information media exposure political attitudes personal experiences and demographic characteristics furthermore we show that these sources of subjective heterogeneity produce systematic biases when national economic evaluations are aggregated these findings challenge a widely accepted notion that because error in individual level measures or expressions of preferences is random the aggregation of these individual measures ensures that they correctly represent the collective preference mpirical findings concerning the influence of the economy on political behavior differ depending on the level of analysis employed using aggregate level data numerous studies have established a statistical relationship between economic conditions and election outcomes or executive popularity e g kramer 1971 mackuen erikson and stimson 1992 on the basis of the macro level evidence alone one would have little reason to doubt that the economy matters in contrast individual level studies using survey data have produced only mixed evidence that voters consider economic conditions when evaluating the incumbent government and its leaders e g fiorina 1978 1981 kinder and kiewiet 1979 1981 moreover the strongest survey evidence of economic voting suggests that voters primarily care about national economic conditions not their personal financial situation this finding contradicts the egocentric theory posited by early macro level research that national economic indicators matter because they are correlated with personal financial circumstances the micro macro dichotomy in economic voting research reflects a similar dichotomy in research on voter sophistication and representation aggregate level studies tend to indicate that voters are reasonably well informed about the economy and make forward looking rather sophisticated voting decisions e g alesina londregan and rosenthal 1993 suzuki and chappell 1996 palmer and whitten 1999 these studies infer that mass political decisions conform to rational expectations or at least limited information rationality e g mackuen erikson and stimson 1992 in contrast to this macro level image of the voter individual level survey research has shown that the public in general has low levels of political sophistication lacking much knowledge of and interest in politics e g

the real estate economy and the design of russian housing reforms part i the transition from plan to market in socialist economies dominates the economic agenda of this decade this two part paper on the russian housing reforms addresses four questions first what is the legacy of the administrative command system and why were demands for major reforms so widespread in the housing sector secondly in what manner does the severe contraction of the russian economy complicate the reformers task thirdly how has the russian government responded so far to the reform challenge fourthly why are the privatisation of housing and rent reforms at the core of the transition to market the first part of the paper deals with the first two questions the second part addresses the last two questions priority goes to an integrated perspective on the early stages of russian reforms over an in depth analysis of individual issues the modern analysis of the real estate economy distinguishes two markets the property market for the allocation of space and the asset market where investm

option and forward contracting with asymmetric information valuation issues in supply chains we investigate the role of forward commitments and option contracts between a seller supplier and a buyer retailer in the presence of asymmetric information in our case both parties face price and demand uncertainty but the retailer being closer to the market has additional information about the true demand and price the supplier aware of this asymmetry and acting as a stackelberg leader designs a contracting arrangement that best meet his interest we contrast the role of forward and option contracts in this environment and identify cases where combinations of the two are dominant finally we investigate how alternative contracting arrangements alter the expected value of obtaining information that eliminates asymmetric information

sentiments and economic activity evidence from u s states we examine whether sentiment influences aggregate demand by studying the relationship between the michigan survey expectations concerning national output growth and future economic activity at the state level we instrument for local sentiments with political outcomes positing that agents in states with a higher share of congressmen from the political party of the sitting president will be more optimistic this instrument is strong in the first stage and our results confirm a positive relationship between sentiments and future state economic activity that is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests