option pricing with downward sloping demand curves the case of supply chain options this article investigates the role of option contracts in a supply chain when the demand curve is downward sloping we consider call put options that provide the retailer with the right to reorder return goods at a fixed price we show that the introduction of option contracts causes the wholesale price to increase and the volatility of the retail price to decrease in general options are not zero sum games conditions are derived under which the manufacturer prefers to use options when this happens the retailer is also better off if the uncertainty in the demand curve is low however if the uncertainty is sufficiently high then the introduction of option contracts alters the equilibrium prices in a way that hurts the retailer

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

supply contracts profit sharing switching and reaction options a common theme in the studies of flexible supply contracts has been the producer s profit maximization problem without regard to the suppliers reactions however suppliers do react and protect their downside against producer s operating policies by revising their strategies in a manner consistent with their profitmaximization objectives this fact motivates our work using a real options contingent claims approach we analyze and value supply contracts in a setting characterized by exchange rate uncertainty supplier switching options order quantity flexibility profit sharing and supplier reaction options we also use basic diversification concepts from portfolio theory to analyze risk reduction in a unique framework given this setup we explicitly model how flexibility can be mutually beneficial to both the producer and the suppliers using this model we concurrently solve and examine the dual optimization problem for the suppliers and the producer our approach also endogenizes the extent and degree of profit sharing through the resulting optimal policies we also analyze what induces the producer and the suppliers to accept flexibility in their contracts

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

reference points in revenue sharing contracts how to design optimal supply chain contracts abstract coordinating supply chains is an important goal for contract designers because it enables the channel members to increase their profits recently many experimental studies have shown that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account when choosing the type of contract and specifying the contract parameters in this paper we analyze behavioral aspects of revenue sharing contracts we extend the classical normative decision model by incorporating reference dependent valuation into the decision model and show how this affects inventory decisions we conduct different lab experiments to test our model as a result human inventory decisions deviate from classical normative predictions and we find evidence for reference dependent valuation of human decision makers we also show how contract designers can use the insights we gained to design better contracts

hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy abstract in several european countries governments have chosen to put a global budget cap on health care expenditure this paper analyzes the strategies of the providers facing this policy and evaluates its effects on provider and patient surplus we consider this policy when it is applied to local monopoly hospitals and when it is applied to hospitals playing as cournot competitors using a two stage model to characterize the optimal expenditure cap policy taking the hospitals optimal responses as given we prove that this policy induces a level of welfare lower than the first best outcome however we show that a second best outcome may be achieved under this policy when the number of hospitals becomes large

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

cournot oligopoly characterization and applications preface part 1 introduction 1 introduction purpose and overview andrew f daughety part ii background 2 of the competition of producers augustin cournot translation by nathanial t bacon 3 review of walras s theorie mathematique de la richesse sociale and cournot s reserches sur les principles mathematiques de la theorie des richesses joseph bertrand translation by james w friedman 4 non cooperative games john nash part iii examining cournot s model 5 on the existence of cournot equilibrium william novshek 6 collusive behavior in non cooperative epsilon equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives roy radner 7 a non cooperative equilibrium for supergames james w friedman 8 reconsidering cournot the cournot equilibrium is consistent andrew f daughety 9 an experimental test of the consistent conjectures hypothesis charles a holt 10 quantity precommitment and bertrand competition yield cournot outcomes david m kreps and jose a scheinkman 11 on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentiation xavier vives 12 price competition vs quantity competition the role of uncertainty paul klemperer and margaret meyer part iv applications 13 cournot and walras equilibrium william novshek and hugo sonnenschein 14 duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand xavier vives 15 information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria esther gal or 16 uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit thomas r palfrey 17 losses from horizontal merger the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on cournot nash equilibrium stephen w salant sheldon switzer and robert j reynolds 18 delegation and the theory of the firm john vickers 19 a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 robert h porter 20 oligopoly and financial structure the limited liability effect james a brander and tracy r lewis

complementarities momentum and the evolution of modern manufacturing in the nineteenth century the railroad and telegraph were at the center of a set of technological advances physical investments and managerial innovations that transformed american industry alfred chandler 1977 later the automobile and telephone played a similar role in another transformation today the high tech industries include computers telecommunications and electronics working on our remarkably powerful computers even as they rapidly become obsolete co authoring papers by electronic mail and fax and conversing on our portable cellular telephones we are struck by what appears to be a self supporting and reinforcing dynamic to the technological improvements across the electronics industries an advance almost anywhere in the sector seems to call forth more advances across the sector these advances are occurring contemporaneously with a broad pattern of other changes not only in the electronics industries but in manufacturing more generally and not just in hardware but in methods and organization as well a new paradigm has begun to emerge in contrast to traditional manufacturing firms modern firms frequently 1 make greater use of flexible programmable equipment and of computeraided design and manufacturing technologies 2 have fewer job classifications 3 offer more varieties of their major products and or update their product lines more frequently 4 put more emphasis on speed in order processing production and delivery 5 hold much lower inventories of intermediate and finished goods 6 rely on subcontractors to supply a greater proportion of the total value added and 7 overlap design product and process engineering to speed the introduction of new products these features of modern manufacturing firms encompass technology choices marketing strategies personnel policies supplier relations lines of internal communications and other operational policies in a far reaching and coherent pattern whose existence in the words of michael piore 1986 poses a challenge to economic theory in a recent paper milgrom and roberts 1990 proposed a theory to explain the emergence of this new paradigm arguing that the various characteristics and activities described are mutually complementary and so tend to be adopted together with each making the others more attractive in that theory the falling costs of high speed data communication data processing and flexible multitask equipment lead to increases in the directly affected activities which through a web of complementarities then lead to increases in a set of related activities as well although the costs of flexible machinery and data communication and processing surely have fallen substantially in recent decades an analysis that takes these changes as exogenous does not constitute a full explanation of the pattern of change that we observe one must ask why are these particular costs falling relative to others here we enrich the milgrom roberts analysis by adding a dynamic to it innovations in the manufacture of basic inputs both arise in response to a growing market for those inputs and simultaneously encourage that growth this reflects a fundamental complementarity between the level of any activity and investments that reduce its marginal department of economics milgrom and qian and graduate school of business roberts stanford university stanford ca 94305 we thank avner greif for his helpful comments on an earlier draft financial support from the national science foundation milgrom and roberts and the robert and anne bass faculty fellowship roberts is gratefully acknowledged

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes we examine the problem of developing supply contracts that encourage proper coordination of forecast information and production decisions between a manufacturer and distributor of high fashion seasonal products operating in a two mode production environment the first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead time while the second is expensive but offers quick turnaround we focus on contracts of the form w1 w2 b wherewi is the wholesale price offered for production modei andb is a return price offered for items left over at the end of the season we find that such a contract can coordinate the manufacturer and distributor to act in the best interest of the channel the pricing conditions needed to ensure an efficient solution vary depending on the degree of demand forecast improvement between periods and the manufacturer s access to forecast information we also examine whether these conditions ensure a pareto optimal solution with respect to two traditional production settings

equilibrium search unemployment endogenous participation and labor market flows the sustainability of welfare states requires high employment and high participation to raise the tax base to analyze labor supply in a world with market frictions we propose and solve a macro model of the labor market with unemployment and labor force participation as endogenous and distinct states in our world workers decisions of participating are determined by an entry decision and an exit decision a calibration of the model improves the usual representations of labor markets since it quantitatively accounts for the observed flows between employment and nonparticipation the paper investigates also the effect of payroll taxes and unemployment benefits on participation decisions taxes reduce entries and increase exits whereas unemployment benefits at a given job finding rate raise entries and have ambiguous effects on exits jel j2 j6

demand uncertainty inventories and resale price maintenance we show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers in our model discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand full price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell we show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer s wholesale demand and profits and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase

designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers does the framing of the fixed fee matter the format of pricing contracts varies substantially across business contexts a major variable being whether a contract imposes a fixed fee payment this paper examines how the use of the fixed fee in pricing contracts affects market outcomes of a manufacturer retailer channel standard economic theories predict that channel efficiency increases with the introduction of the fixed fee and is invariant to its framing we conduct a laboratory experiment to test these predictions surprisingly the introduction of the fixed fee fails to increase channel efficiency moreover the framing of the fixed fee does make a difference an opaque frame as quantity discounts achieves higher channel efficiency than a salient frame as a two part tariff although these two contractual formats are theoretically equivalent to account for these anomalies we generalize the standard economic model by allowing the retailer s utilities to be reference dependent so that the up front fixed fee payment is perceived as a loss and the subsequent retail profits as a gain we embed this reference dependent utility function in a quantal response equilibrium framework where the retailer is allowed to make decision mistakes due to computational complexity the key prediction of this behavioral model is that channel efficiency decreases with loss aversion for sufficiently nash rational retailers consistent with this prediction the estimated loss aversion coefficient is 1 37 in the two part tariff condition significantly higher than 1 27 in the quantity discount condition at the same time loss aversion dominates contract complexity in explaining the data lastly we conduct a follow up experiment to confirm the central role of loss aversion as a behavioral driver in one condition the retailer becomes less loss averse when we temporally compress the fixed fee payment and the realization of retail profits which supports the loss aversion theory in the other condition the retailer s contract acceptance rate does not decline when we reward the manufacturer a higher cash payment for each experimental point earned which rules out the competing hypothesis that the retailer rejects contract offers due to fairness concerns

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

contracting in supply chains a laboratory investigation the coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically we investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms the wholesale price contract the buyback contract and the revenue sharing contract the simplified setting we consider utilizes a two echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem the supplier has no capacity constraints and delivery occurs instantaneously we compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier results indicate that although the buyback and revenue sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts we also find that although the buyback and revenue sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance

market design and investment incentives the purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives for this purpose we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market we analyse a number of different market design elements including i two commonly used auction formats the uniform price and discriminatory auctions ii price caps and iii bid duration we find that although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices this does not imply that investment incentives at the margin are poorer indeed aggregate capacity is the same under both auction formats

decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution experimental evidence in the newsvendor problem a decision maker orders inventory before a one period selling season with stochastic demand if too much is ordered stock is left over at the end of the period whereas if too little is ordered sales are lost the expected profit maximizing order quantity is well known but little is known about how managers actually make these decisions we describe two experiments that investigate newsvendor decisions across different profit conditions results from these studies demonstrate that choices systematically deviate from those that maximize expected profit subjects order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit products these results are not consistent with risk aversion risk seeking preferences prospect theory preferences waste aversion stockout aversion or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs two explanations are consistent with the data one subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce ex post inventory error the absolute difference between the chosen quantity and realized demand two subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias feedback and training did not mitigate inventory order errors we suggest techniques to improve decision making

on price caps under uncertainty this paper shows how standard arguments supporting the impo sition of price caps break down in the presence of demand uncertainty in particular though in the deterministic case the introduction or lowering of a price cap above marginal cost results in increased production increased total welfare decreased prices and increased consumer welfare we show that all of the above comparative statics predictions fail for generic uncertain demand functions for example for price caps su ciently close to marginal cost a decrease in the price cap always leads to a decrease in production and total welfare under certain mild conditions under stronger regularity assumptions all of the monotone comparative statics predictions from the deterministic case also do not hold for a generic uncertain demand if we restrict attention to price caps in an arbitrary flxed interval as long as the price caps are binding for some values in that interval

labour market participation in matching equilibrium this paper uses ideas developed recently in models of equilibrium search to consider the participation decision of workers who have different preferences for leisure the matching process is random the production process deterministic and wages are determined by a nash bargain among participants in steady state equilibrium the number of participants is inefficient due to externalities resulting from private decisions a condition for efficient worker participation is derived which turns out also to be the condition for efficient firm entry copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited