financial intermediation reserve requirements and inside money a general equilibrium analysis abstract reserve requirements are examined in a general equilibrium context the paper develops a simple general equilibrium model that includes diverse opportunities for investment and a role for financial intermediaries two versions of the model are considered one is a thought experiment in which currency serves purely to satisfy legal reserve requirements the other is more realistic the model is used to analyze the comparative static effects of changes in reserve requirements the effects of changes in other parameters of the economy in the presence of reserve requirements and some qualitative issues raised by reserve requirements

optimal seigniorage and financial liberalization abstract this paper analyzes the effect of financial integration for countries relying on the taxation of their domestic financial system a two country model with overlapping generations and explicit financial intermediation is used goverments derive revenues from seigniorage and set optimally but non cooperatively the rate of inflation and the level of required reserves on bank deposits a financial liberalizations leads to lower reserve ratios higher inflation rates and larger stocks of government debt when the liberalization is anticipated governments may temporarily increase the reserve ratios before the liberalization occurs jel f30 e60

accounts receivable management policy theory and evidence this paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain the choice of accounts receivable management policies the tests focus on both cross sectional explanations of policy choice determinants as well as incentives to establish captives we find size concentration and credit standing of the firm s traded debt and commercial paper are each important in explaining the use of factoring accounts receivable secured debt captive finance subsidiaries and general corporate credit we also offer evidence that captive formation allows more flexible financial contracting however we find no evidence that captive formation expropriates bondholder wealth firms typically sell merchandise on credit rather than requiring immediate cash payment such credit sales generate accounts receivable although credit terms and credit collection procedures have been studied see smith 1980 there has been little systematic analysis of the organizational and financial structures employed to manage the firm s accounts receivable these decisions merit more careful attention for two reasons first receivables are a substantial fraction of corporate assets for example 1986 compustat data indicate that accounts receivable are 21 0 of u s manufacturing corporations total assets second we observe substantial diversity in firms use of specialized contracts and intermediaries in their accounts receivable management policies firms can 1 establish a captive finance subsidiary 2 issue accounts receivable secured debt 3 factor 4 employ a credit reporting firm 5 retain a credit collection agency or 6 purchase a credit insurance policy 1 in this paper we demonstrate that accounts receivable management policy offers opportunities for both the development of a robust theory as well as empirical testing of the theory s implications although the data necessary to

trade credit and taxes abstract this paper analyzes the extent to which tax differences affect the use of trade credit u s owned affiliates in low tax countries use trade credit to lend whereas those in high tax countries use trade credit to borrow 10 lower local tax rates are associated with net trade credit positions that are 1 4 higher as a fraction of sales the use of trade credit to get capital out of low tax low return environments is also illustrated by the temporary repatriation tax holiday in 2005 which was used most intensively by affiliates with positive net trade credit positions

the exploitation of relationships in financial distress the case of trade credit this paper develops optimal pricing lending and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other long term trade creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit the model also explains the existence of teaser interest rates and convenience classes findings are consistent with those of the relationship lending literature

government policy for a partially deregulated industry deregulate it fully alfred kahn was a major force behind regulatory reform that initially benefited air travelers and subsequently consumers in other industries by placing greater reliance on markets than on regulators to allocate resources kahn also believed that effective governance was important for deregulation s success in this paper i argue that such governance has not occurred in practice and that problems that persist in partially deregulated industries are more likely to be solved by full deregulation and if necessary privatization than by government intervention

taxes and the theory of trade debt in this paper we show that taxes motivate the flow of trade credit without involving the assumption of credit market imperfections the direction of trade credit flow depends on the distribution of marginal tax rates among buyers and sellers in equilibrium the trade credit decision follows a tax induced clientele on both the supply and demand side a glance at the balance sheet of a typical corporation reveals the sizeable investment firms make in accounts receivable 1 in spite of its quantitative importance the analysis of trade credit policy figures far less prominently than other corporate policies in the finance literature although there exists a body of literature on the subject its focus is on the monetary policy implications of trade credit flow and therefore holds only indirect relevance to micro aspects such as the trade credit decision as part of corporate policy in this paper we examine the trade credit decision as a short term financing decision the decision to either grant or issue trade debt is analyzed in the familiar framework of miller 12 this approach establishes the link between existing paradigms on the financing of firms and the formulation of trade credit policies the existing literature provides three possible motives for trade credit they are respectively the transaction motive the price motive and the financial motive the first two motives have been discussed extensively elsewhere see for example smith 18 for a summary it is at the third motive the financial motive that the present paper is directed 2 past studies on the financial motive such as brechling and lipsey 3 jaffee and modigliani 7 laffer 10 schwartz 15 and schwartz and whitcomb 16

monetary policy banking and growth i introduction fischer and modigliani 1978 exhaustively list the costs associated with inflation in recent years a growing body of evidence is consistent with the notion that slower output growth may be added to the fischer modigliani list specifically analyses by kormendi and meguire 1985 fisher 1991 degregario 1992 gomme 1993 wynne 1993 barro 1996 and others find a negative correlation between the inflation rate and output growth both across countries and over time 1 moreover the studies consistently find that the growth rate response to a change in the inflation rate is quite large the different studies produce a range of correlation coefficients a country in which the inflation rate is 10 will grow between 1 4 and 3 4 percentage points slower than a country in which the inflation rate is 0 the purpose of this paper is to determine whether a reasonably calibrated model economy can account for the size of the regression coefficients the model economy is a modified version of a member of the ak class in which bank deposits are used to finance capital accumulation in this model economy fiat money is valued because the bank is required to hold reserves against its deposits throughout this paper bank deposits is used in a narrow sense to include only those deposits against which a reserve requirement applies because monetary policy has two tools at its disposal it is possible to conduct two separate policy experiments the results from these experiments particularly the inflation rate experiment sheds light on the potential importance on the share of investment financed through bank deposits researchers have long been interested in the interaction between financing and growth schumpeter 1911 argued that the financial sector more specifically its stage of development affected a country s growth rate 2 cameron 1967 described financial development in scotland england and france in the late 18th and early 19th centuries cameron concluded that scotland and england entered the industrial revolution ahead of france because it had the financial infrastructure capable of financing capital accumulation on the needed scale king and levine 1993 find that countries with more developed financial sectors tend to grow faster than countries with less developed financial sectors it seems natural therefore to investigate whether the means of financing can yield any insights into the inflation growth relationship other researchers have also quantified the effect that movements in the inflation rate has on the growth rate in particular jones and manuelli 1995 use several variants of economies in which people hold fiat money to satisfy a cash in advance constraint they demonstrate that large growth rate effects cannot be accounted for in these model economies in these models inflation does not materially alter capital accumulation rates affecting instead the allocation between the credit good and cash good purchases jones and manuelli find small growth rate effects in an economy in which the tax code has nominally denominated depreciation rates in two papers that focus on inflation and growth chari jones and manuelli 1995 1996 consider economies in which capital accumulation can be financed through either bank deposits or directly as in the economy specified in this paper reserve requirements are applied against bank deposits agents can avoid the inflation tax by using the direct financing means more intensively consequently the growth rate effects are muted in the chari jones manuelli model economies and are too small to account for the size of the regression coefficients reported in kormendi and mcguire fischer and barro in this paper i assume that all investment is financed through bank deposits with this extreme assumption the model economy can account for the size of the growth rate effects observed in the data 3 thus there is a potentially useful lesson learned from the quantitative results in the all bank financing economy and those reported in chari jones manuelli

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

after airline deregulation and alfred e kahn among alfred e fred kahn s many accomplishments none is better remembered than his pivotal role in deregulation of the us airline industry kahn s commitment to marry core microeconomic principles with institutional analysis willingness as chairman of the civil aeronautics board to step outside the regulation as usual box and appealing wit made him the face of the airline deregulation act of 1978 one of the great microeconomic policy triumphs lessons drawn from kahn s work and the airline deregulation experience remain instructive for current academic research and regulatory policy design across broad sectors of the economy

is reserve ratio arithmetic more pleasant does it matter in a revenue neutral setting if the government changes the inflation tax base or the inflation tax rate we answer this question within the context of an overlapping generations model in which government bonds capital and cash reserves coexist we consider experiments that parallel those studied in sargent and wallace s unpleasant monetarist arithmetic the government uses seigniorage to service its debt choosing between changing either the money growth rate the inflation tax rate or the reserve requirement ratio the inflation tax base in the former case we obtain standard unpleasant arithmetic in the long run a permanent open market sale results in higher money growth and higher long run inflation somewhat surprisingly it turns out that for a given money growth rate lower reserve requirements fund the government s interest expense associated with the lower reserve requirements is lower long run inflation and higher welfare compared with the money growth case the broad message is that reserve ratio arithmetic can be pleasant even when money growth arithmetic is not

in kind finance a theory of trade credit it is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash therefore suppliers may lend more liberally than banks this simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets the model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes among other things the model explains why trade credit has short maturity why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms

distinguished lecture on economics in government the private uses of public interests incentives and institutions as a long time student of the public sector i welcomed the opportunity to come to washington as a member of the council of economic advisers and later to become the chairman of the council partly because it gave me an opportunity to study at first hand this immensely important part of our economy and society and to test my ideas against the reality of government in action to be sure i came also as an activist if not with a fully articulated agenda at least with a view about what it was that government should and should not be doing my reference point was the fundamental theorems of welfare economics which as some describe them proved that the market left to itself would produce efficient allocations many saw in these theorems the vindication of adam smith s faith in the invisible hand leading the self interested decisions of each person to maximize the well being of the nation as a whole today many of us look at the fundamental theorem not as a description of the world but as an explication of the conditions under which a market equilibrium will be pareto efficient these conditions are quite strong the importance of some of the more explicit assumptions like the lack of externalities and the completeness of markets has long been known in the last two decades we have explored much more seriously the consequences of the informational assumptions implicit in the belief that markets are efficient in particular it has been shown that in the presence of imperfect information or incomplete markets the economy will not be pareto efficient in other words there joseph stiglitz is senior vice president and chief economist world bank washington d c stiglitz was a member of the council of economic advisers from 1993 95 and chairman

can privatization of u s highways improve motorists welfare abstract we assess the welfare effects of highway privatization accounting for government s behavior in setting the sale price firms strategic behavior in setting tolls and motorists heterogeneous preferences for speedy and reliable travel we find motorists are able to benefit from privatization by negotiating tolls with private providers that increase their consumer surplus surprisingly we find that by obtaining tolls and service that align with their varying preferences motorists may be better off negotiating with a monopolist than with duopoly providers or under public private competition toll regulation may be counterproductive because it is likely to treat motorists as homogeneous

an equilibrium analysis of central bank independence and inflation a dynamic equilibrium model is constructed to analyze the implications of different degrees of central bank independence in the main model agents are permitted to vote on the desired inflation and labor taxes to finance government spending multiple perfect foresight equilibria arise and one of them exhibits fluctuations in output investment and the inflation rates as a result of permitting agents to vote if instead of having agents vote each period on these parameters inflation and labor taxes in the model are set at fixed levels these fluctuations do not arise and a lower inflation rate can appear

reserve requirements and optimal seigniorage abstract this note presents a model of optimizing agents who chose to hold deposits at financial intermediaries which are required to hold fractional reserves of fiat money when the stock of fiat money is expanded the reserve requirement functions as a tax on deposits the combination of reserve requirements and inflation results in a lower steady state utility than a direct tax on deposits the optimal monetary policy when reserves are required is to minimize reserve requirements and inflate without limit the stock of fiat money

miller s equilibrium shareholder leverage clienteles and optimal capital structure the purpose of this paper is twofold first we examine the individual portfolio decisions when income from stocks and bonds is taxed at different rates second a rationale for the existence of risky debt in the presence of leverage related costs and differential personal income taxation is provided previous studies on capital structure with differential personal income taxation have ignored either the portfolio risk consideration and or the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable earnings e g 8 2 3 14 13 6 7 1 9 19 20 21 23 in section i of this paper both the portfolio risk consideration and the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields are explicitly introduced this enables us to provide a rationale for the shareholder leverage clientele phenomenon within a mean variance framework we also demonstrate a non corner solution for the optimal corporate capital structure in a tax environment similar to that of miller s debt and taxes 14 in sections ii and iii of this paper miller s world is further modified to include risky debt and the attendant costs we re examine and synthesize recent studies on the theory of optimal capital structure which have appeared since the publication of debt and taxes e g 4 6 7 13 19 20

the role of money in two alternative models when is the friedman rule optimal and why abstract in models of money with an infinitely lived representative agent ilra models the optimal monetary policy is almost always the friedman rule in overlapping generations og models by contrast the friedman rule may not be optimal in this paper we use this difference in monetary policy prescriptions to help us identify and study the key difference between these two models as models of money we study the welfare properties of monetary policy in a simple og model under two very different money demand specifications and two alternative assumptions about the generational timing of taxes for money retirement we conclude that the key difference between ilra and og monetary models is that in the latter the standard method for constructing a monetary regime causes transactions involving money to become intergenerational transfers under alternative government fiscal monetary regimes that offset these intergenerational transfers the friedman rule is always optimal

competitive banks and the inflation tax abstract the purpose of this note is to show that the presence of a competitive banking sector has important quantitative implications for the revenue maximizing rate of inflation

monetary policy and bank regulations in an economy with financial innovations this is a study of financial innovations and moves towards the cashless society in a general equilibrium cash in advance model it is assumed that a subset of goods cash goods and check goods

u s industry adjustment to economic deregulation conomic deregulation does not happen overnight it takes time for lawmakers and regulators to dismantle regulatory regimes and then it takes more time for the deregulated industries to adjust to their new competitive environment federal regulatory agencies and the u s congress began liberalizing pricing entry and exit in the transportation financial energy and communications industries during the mid 1970s but while some smaller industries such as intercity bus transportation and air cargo have been fully deregulated during that time the only major american industries fully deregulated to date are airlines and motor carriers as to the pace of industry adjustment consider airlines economic deregulation of the airline industry began in 1974 when the civil aeronautics board first encouraged experiments with discount fares it was completed in 1983 when all regulations on fares entry and exit were eliminated yet more than 20 years after the deregulatory process began the airline industry continues to shed inefficiencies that accumulated over decades of regulation and to find new ways to market their service indeed the airlines latest marketing innovation selling discount fares on the internet would be illegal if fares were still regulated it is not surprising that deregulated or partially deregulated industries are slow to achieve maximum efficiency when regulatory restrictions on pricing operations and entry especially from new firms have been enforced for decades managers and employees of regulated firms settle into patterns of inefficient production and missed opportunities for technological advance and entry into new markets deregulation frees an industry from the state s control over prices entry and exit although of course firms are still subject to antitrust laws and safety regulations after deregulation some costs usually fall in short order but it takes

macroeconomic activity and monetary policy actions some preliminary evidence monetary policy is conducted through open market operations loans at the discount window and changes in the reserve requirement structure the purpose of this paper is to formally investigate the notion that the effect of changes in reserve requirement ratios is different from the effect of other policy tools this is accomplished by decomposing the monetary base into those changes caused by changes in reserve requirement ratios and those caused by other monetary policy actions some preliminary evidence suggesting differential real effects from the policy tools is provided copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

an agency model to explain trade credit policy and empirical evidence this article explains trade credit policy based on the agency theory according to this theory we have developed an agency model based on the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena arising from the relation between sellers and buyers this model has been estimated by using panel data methodology applied to uk companies our findings strongly support the model proposed we find that smaller firms those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets and those that are less profitable extend more trade credit whereas firms with a high proportion of variable costs and high percentage of bad debts extend less