the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

pension profile preferences the influence of trust and expected expenses this paper studies the influence of people s expectations about expenses during retirement and trust in pension funds on preferences for different pension arrangements although most workers prefer

contingent capital tail risk and debt induced collapse we study the design and incentive effects of contingent convertible debt with contingent convertibles the endogenous bankruptcy boundary can be at either of two levels one with lower default risk or one at which default precedes conversion an increase in debt moves the firm from the first regime to the second a phenomenon we call debt induced collapse setting the conversion trigger sufficiently high avoids this hazard given this condition we investigate the effect of contingent capital and debt maturity on optimal capital structure debt overhang and asset substitution we calibrate the model to large banks during the financial crisis received april 10 2015 editorial decision march 20 2017 by editor leonid kogan

market triggered changes in capital structure equilibrium price dynamics we analyze the internal consistency of using the market price of a firm s equity to trigger a contractual change in the firm s capital structure given that the value of the equity itself depends on the firm s capital structure of particular interest is the case of contingent capital for banks in the form of debt that converts to equity when conversion is triggered by a decline in the bank s stock price we analyze the problem of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium values for a firm s liabilities in this context meaning values consistent with a market price trigger discrete time dynamics allow multiple equilibria in contrast we show that the possibility of multiple equilibria can largely be ruled out in continuous time where the price of the triggering security adjusts in anticipation of breaching the trigger our main condition for existence of an equilibrium requires that the consequences of triggering a conversion be consistent with the direction in which the trigger is crossed for the design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger this condition may be interpreted to mean that conversion should be disadvantageous to shareholders and it is satisfied by setting the trigger sufficiently high uniqueness follows provided the trigger is sufficiently accessible by all candidate equilibria we illustrate precise formulations of these conditions with a variety of applications

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

contingent capital with a capital ratio trigger contingent capital in the form of debt that converts to equity when a bank faces financial distress has been proposed as a mechanism to enhance financial stability and avoid costly government rescues specific proposals vary in their choice of conversion trigger and conversion mechanism we analyze the case of contingent capital with a capital ratio trigger and partial and ongoing conversion the capital ratio we use is based on accounting or book values to approximate the regulatory ratios that determine capital requirements for banks the conversion process is partial and ongoing in the sense that each time a bank s capital ratio reaches the minimum threshold just enough debt is converted to equity to meet the capital requirement so long as the contingent capital has not been depleted we derive closed form expressions for the market value of such securities when the firm s asset value is modeled as geometric brownian motion and from these we get formulas for the fair yield spread on the convertible debt a key step in the analysis is an explicit expression for the fraction of equity held by the original shareholders and the fraction held by converted investors in the contingent capital this paper was accepted by gerard p cachon stochastic models and simulation

an experimental test on retirement decisions i introduction the reform of social security systems is now one of the main issues on the economic policy agenda of most industrialized countries it is widely considered that unless serious changes take place the aging of the population implying a rise in the number of retirees relative to that of workers will threaten the viability of pay as you go public pension systems in the long run this threat is being reinforced by the progressive reduction in the retirement age of the working population the central reforms that are being proposed to neutralize these future financing problems are the raising of the contribution rate the decreasing of pension benefits or and the delay of the retirement age with reference to this latter reform as blondal and scarpetta 1998 state a direct way to encourage people to work longer would be to raise the pensionable age but delaying the retirement age may not be very popular according to recent surveys most workers claim that they are happy with the current retirement age see cremer and pestieau 2003 this may help to explain why reforms on the legal retirement age have currently become a very delicate matter for governments 1 on the other hand pension systems in virtually all organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries in the mid 1990s made it financially unattractive to work after the age of 55 see gruber and wise 1997 or blondal and scarpetta 1998 indeed the general consensus in the theoretical literature related to social security and retirement decisions is that pension systems create enormous incentives to leave the labor force early 2 therefore increasing the retirement age as a tool to improve the financial problems of public pensions systems faces two sensitive problems the opposition of workers to a delay in the standard retirement age and the disincentives to continuous work being embedded in the pension system the large decline in labor force participation is attributed to the specific fact that to keep on working implies a reduction in the present value of total pension benefits the terms old age pension wealth and implicit tax on postponing retirement have been frequently used to illustrate these disincentives in the pension system the old age pension wealth is the discounted value of expected pension benefits minus the discounted cost of obtaining such benefits after the earliest age at which pensions can be accessed working for an extra year may imply changes in this pension wealth by foregoing 1 yr of pensions paying contributions for an additional year and maybe increasing the pension benefits per year therefore if the costs of postponing retirement are higher than the gains then it is considered that the pension system is implicitly taxing to prolong the working period that is the drop in pension wealth acts as an implicit tax on income from continued work and as such is a clear incentive to retire early actually reforms aiming to increase the effective retirement age to improve the financial problems of public pensions systems have mainly focused on the reduction of this implicit tax on prolonging the working period it is also considered that when the increase in pension benefits is exactly offset by the higher cost in terms of contributions and forgone pensions the pension system is not distorting the retirement decision that is the pension systems that are marginally actuarially fair will not distort individual decisions concerning retirement age and consequently they are defined as neutral systems for this reason the main economic policy measures move in the direction of strengthening the link between lifetime contributions and pension benefits 3 indeed this reform is one of the policy conclusions of maintaining prosperity in an ageing society oecd 2000 the most appropriate reform would be to allow people to retire at the age of their own choice and to adjust pension level so that the pension system is neutral on average

a real options approach to bankruptcy costs evidence from failed commercial banks during the 1990s literature identifies three main aspects of liquidation costs firm size asset specificity and industry concentration this paper unifies the theory behind these aspects of bankruptcy costs by treating them as components of a broader option valuation problem faced by the liquidating trustee testing the hypothesized asset price relationships on fdic failed bank liquidation data yields the appropriate results furthermore it appears that liquidation time alone can be used as an effective second order proxy for asset value growth where market value estimates are unavailable

deposit insurance and money market freezes in the presence of deposit insurance a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets we show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank based retail financial markets in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings rich regions which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits and in savings poor regions which have to pay large spreads in money markets this asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and in the presence of demand externalities can cause large output losses

social security and retirement decision a positive and normative approach social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement in a world of laissez faire or in a first best setting there would be no such trend however when first best instruments are not available because health and productivity are not observable the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision the main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early in many countries a complete elimination of this bias i e a switch to an actuarially fair system is not the right answer this is so and for two reasons first some distortions are secondbest optimal this is the normative argument second and on the positive side the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective depending on the political process it may either not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself

when does it take a nixon to go to china substantial policy changes like market oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by hawks are sometimes implemented by unlikely parties to account for such episodes this paper develops a framework in which incumbent politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters the incumbent is unable to credibly transmit all this information since voters are also imperfectly informed about his ideology the paper identifies conditions under which an incumbent party s electoral prospects increase the more atypical the policy it proposes popular support for a policy or its credibility depends on the policymaker policy pair copyright 1998 by american economic association

the labor market effects of rising health insurance premiums we estimate the effect of rising health insurance premiums on wages employment and the distribution of part time and full time work using variation in medical malpractice payments driven by the recent medical malpractice crisis we estimate that a 10 increase in health insurance premiums reduces the aggregate probability of being employed by 1 2 percentage points reduces hours worked by 2 4 and increases the likelihood that a worker is employed only part time by 1 9 percentage points for workers covered by employer provided health insurance this increase in premiums results in an offsetting decrease in wages of 2 3

would you like to reform the pension system the opinions of european citizens most economists would subscribe to the view that the public pay as you go payg pension systems in many european countries are unsustainable and in need of reform yet such reforms are politically very difficult a recent line of research has tried to understand the nature of these difficulties by analyzing the citizens opinions on different aspects of the welfare state and its redistributive programs here we focus specifically on the pension system reporting the results of a survey conducted in germany and italy in fall 2001 germany and italy are particularly interesting countries in this respect because their payg pension systems are very generous and provide about 85 percent of the average retiree s income germany carried out a reform in 2001 in between two waves of our survey thus we also have a natural experiment to draw upon our questionnaire was designed to shed light on the following issues are citizens aware of the unsustainability of the pension system and informed of its costs are reforms opposed by a majority or by a powerful minority which reform options seem politically more feasible and why which groups of citizens are more likely to favor reforms do citizens opinions reflect their economic self interest as presumed by the literature on political economics here is what we find citizens are aware of unsustainability but lack information about the cost of the payg system the status quo is a majoritarian outcome along many dimensions most reform proposals lack a majority and reformers rarely support more than one reform option later retirement is the easier reform in italy where effective retirement age is lower while lower pensions are more popular in germany where the effective replacement rate is higher preferences over policy options seem to reflect both economic self interest and one s normative view about the role of the state opposition to any reform is high even among those aware of unsustainability this could be procrastination or selfishness shifting the burden onto future generations some answers suggest that the latter could play an important role

strategic responses a survey experiment on opposition to pension reforms the responses given in opinion polls on future policy reforms reflect both subjective expectations and preferences we disentangle these factors using data from a controlled survey experiment conducted in germany at the time of the experiment an increased retirement age had been proposed as part of a pension reform thus the survey respondents faced an incentive to give biased responses by understating their expected work ability at the age of retirement they could make the increase of the retirement age a less attractive policy option we find evidence for such strategic response behavior and this strategic bias appears to be stronger in former communist east germany

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

the impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking abstract from 1863 1935 regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to discourage risk taking using data from 1900 to 1915 i find that banks subject to stricter liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility hold a lower proportion of risky assets and are less likely to increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines consistent with the hypothesis that stricter liability discourages commercial bank risk taking these findings provide lessons for current bank regulatory policy and show that the shape of the residual claimant s payoff function has a significant impact on managerial incentives and firm performance

effects of the tax treatment of fringe benefits on labor market segmentation current federal tax law requires that all workers having the same experience with a firm must receive essentially the same package of fringe benefits in order for those benefits to qualify for preferential tax treatment the authors argue that this nondiscriminatory provision of fringe benefits promotes labor market segmentation by inducing workers to sort themselves across the economy according to their demand for fringe benefits several empirical tests using 1968 78 data confirm the existence of sorting and suggest that labor market segmentation increased over time as workers responded to changes in incomes and marginal tax rates

the growth of social security electoral push or political pull the growth of social security electoral push or political pull i introduction during the post world war ii period the social security program was among the fastest growing programs in the federal budget surpassing defense spending as the largest category of expenditures in the mid seventies the program which disbursed only 132 million dollars in 1942 disbursed more than 156 billion dollars forty years late a thousand fold increase as a consequence of this growth and the program s recent financial problems a number of economists have turned their attention to the economics of social security recent examples include kahn 1988 boskin et al 1987 and veall 1986 yet only weaver 1982 and turner 1984 attempt to analyze the growth of the social security program weaver s legislative history of the program suggests that special interest groups had a major impact on social security programs turner argues that program benefit levels are affected by demographic changes which affect the cost of intergenerational redistribution in this paper we use the public choice approach to explain increases in benefit levels from 1946 1980 we develop and test three alternative public choice models of the politics of retirement benefit levels our analysis thus sheds light on an important question neglected by previous research have social security expenditures grown because special interest groups have effectively captured the congress or is congress simply responding to demands placed on it by the electorate the answer to this question is relevant to normative analysis of existing programs and to alternative proposals for reform in addition our study of the principal determinants of the growth of program benefit levels serves as an event study for assessing the merits of alternative theories of political decision making borcherding 1985 discusses two public choice explanations for the growth of public expenditures first public programs may expand as a result of the voting rules which underlie the political process when decisions are made by majority rule an increase in the median voter s demand for public services tends to increase public service levels because prospective candidates will revise their policy positions in order to be elected the wagner 1958 hypothesis for example maintains that increases in real income cause individuals to prefer both absolutely and relatively larger public expenditures borcherding notes that about 40 percent of the rate at which public sector spending has replaced private sector spending over the past eighty years can be explained with a median voter approach such an approach does better in what borcherding calls traditional areas of public expenditure where a median voter model can account for about 73 percent of the rate at which public expenditures excluding transfers have displaced private expenditures the median voter might favor public transfers to the elderly for two reasons first he may have an interdependent utility function in which the plight of the elderly poor arouses a charitable response while the redistribution from young to old does not simply target the old poor as a group the elderly do seem to be relatively less wealthy than the middle aged and the yound if one considers the average capitalized value of future income receipts from labor and capital second to the extent that the social security program offers a connection between reductions in current consumption and increases in future consumption it is a rather complex savings and insurance program the median voter s motivation for transferring monies to today s elderly may be a vehicle for ensuring future transfers to himself while this explanation is difficult to motivate at the individual level since a savings program for future retirement need not pay anything to today s elderly a continuing program of tax funded transfers is plausible method of establishing the moral constitution necessary to ensure that future transfers do in fact take place

would you like to shrink the welfare state a survey of european citizens welfare state reform a survey of what europeans want the fundamental problems facing european welfare states high unemployment and unsustainable public pensions plans in particular have been in the political debate for years so why have we seen so little reform to find out we surveyed the opinions of citizens in france germany italy and spain on their welfare states and on various reform options this is what we found first most workers underestimate the costs of public pensions though they are aware of their unsustainability second the status quo is a majoritarian outcome a majority of citizens opposes cuts to social security and welfare spending but also opposes further increases since population ageing without reform implies an automatic expansion our results suggest that most citizens would favour reforms that stabilize but do not shrink the current welfare states third many would welcome changes in the allocation of benefits a large number of workers in italy and germany would be willing to opt out of public pensions and replace them with private pensions though the details of how this scheme is formulated matter for its popularity and many italians and spaniards would welcome an extension of the coverage of unemployment insurance fourth conflicts over the welfare state are mainly shaped by the economic situation of the respondent while political ideology plays a limited role disagreements are found along three dimensions young versus old rich versus poor and outsider versus insider in terms of labour market status from a practical point of view this suggests that there is scope to bundle reforms strategically in order to build a large and mixed coalition of supporters tito boeri axel borsch supan and guido tabellini

the elusive wage benefit trade off the case of employer provided health insurance this study shows that standard regressions estimated to measure a trade off between wages and health insurance are misspecified by insufficiently accounting for establishment and firm size an interactive size corrected specification is more likely to reveal a trade off furthermore because insurance decisions are typically made by firms and wages set by establishments the insurance constraint on establishments in multi establishment firms weakens the trade off we use model generated data to show that both factors contribute to the failure in previous research to identify a trade off and data from a cross section of northern californian establishments to test for a trade off in multi establishment and single establishment firms

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

the effects of business models on bank risk before during and after financial crisis evidence from china using chinese data from 2004 to 2016 we investigate the effects of business models on bank risk before during and after financial crisis three main results emerge first insolvency risk and roa

the joint determination of union status and union wage effects some tests of alternative models the problems of estimation and interpretation of union wage differentials are examined the properties of cross section and longitudinal estimators are compared estimates are presented and those in the literature summarized conflicting results are obtained longitudinal estimators typically produce results smaller than those of ols while cross section methods instrumental variables or inverse mills ratio raise the estimate the paper offers a reconciliation of these results it supports a more optimistic conclusion than that reached in reviews by freeman and lewis who argued that little has been learned from attempts to deal with the endogeneity issue comparisons between estimators are used to throw light on the process governing union status and to suggest interpretations of union differentials consistent with the current evidence

the costs of worker displacement this study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship a bargaining model is used to link wage tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship if information is good the profile will flatten as displacement approaches using psid data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981 wage tenure profiles are found not to change this suggests that either workers or both firms and workers are surprised by the displacement the present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker s share of firm specific capital is around 7 000 1980 dollars

the fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage abstract during a financial crisis when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash the paper explains this phenomenon we argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds combined with low market liquidity creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds arbitrage capabilities we present a model of hedge funds optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors we show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions the model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

reflections on northern rock the bank run that heralded the global financial crisis in september 2007 television viewers and newspaper readers around the world saw pictures of what looked like an old fashioned bank run that is depositors waiting in line outside the branch offices of a united kingdom bank called northern rock to withdraw their money the previous u k bank run before northern rock was in 1866 at overend gurney a london bank that overreached itself in the railway and docks boom of the 1860s bank runs were not uncommon in the united states up through the 1930s but they have been rare since the start of deposit insurance backed by the federal deposit insurance corporation in contrast deposit insurance in the united kingdom was a partial affair funded by the banking industry itself and insuring only a part of the deposits at the time of the run u k bank deposits were fully insured only up to 2 000 pounds and then only 90 percent of the deposits up to an upper limit of 35 000 pounds when faced with a run the incentive to withdraw one s deposits from a u k bank was therefore very strong for economists the run on northern rock at first seemed to offer a rare opportunity to study at close quarters all the elements involved in their theoretical models of bank runs the futility of public statements of reassurance the mutually reinforcing anxiety of depositors as well as the power of the media in galvanizing and channeling that anxiety through the power of television images however the storyline of the northern rock bank run does not fit the conventional narrative on september 13 2007 the bbc s evening television news broadcast first broke the news that northern rock had sought the bank of england s support the next morning the bank of england announced that it would provide emergency liquidity support it was only after that announcement that is after the

worker sorting compensating differentials and health insurance evidence from displaced workers this article introduces an empirical strategy to the compensating differentials literature that i allows both individual observed and unobserved characteristics to be rewarded differently in firms based on health insurance provision and ii selection to jobs that provide benefits to operate on both sides of the labor market estimates of this model are used to directly test empirical assumptions that are made with popular econometric strategies in the health economics literature our estimates reject the assumptions underlying numerous cross sectional and longitudinal estimators we find that the provision of health insurance has influenced wage inequality finally our results suggest there have been substantial changes in how displaced workers sort to firms that offer health insurance benefits over the past two decades we discuss the implications of our findings for the compensating differentials literature

informality and the expansion of social protection programs evidence from mexico many countries are moving from employer based to universal health coverage which can generate crowd out in mexico seguro popular provides public health coverage to the uninsured using the gradual roll out of the system at the municipality level we estimate that seguro popular had no effect on informality in the overall population informality did increase by 1 7 for less educated workers but the wage gains for workers who switch between the formal and the informal sector were not significantly affected this suggests that marginal workers do not choose between formal and informal jobs on the basis of health insurance coverage

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

do banks have a future abstract are banks special intermediaries do they play any unique role in the economy and if so will they retain their specialness in the ever faster changing world of finance the rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking e age revolution have persuaded many that eventually banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can at least as efficiently be carried out by nonbanks this study re explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject and presents an approach which identifies the banks specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money the study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks lending to production has become relatively less important and the use of e money may soon be dominating financial transactions

the creditor channel of liquidity crises this paper presents a model to study the transmission of liquidity shocks across financial institutions through the creditor channel in the model a borrower institution obtains funds from a large institutional lender and small investors when the large lender s asset market is hit by a liquidity shock it might decide to withdraw funding extended to the borrower the potential withdrawal by the large lender causes small investors to panic and to close positions even if the large lender does not facing funding problems the borrower has to cut its activities contributing to further shocks to the supply of market liquidity the original shock is exacerbated which reinforces withdrawals by all creditors the model helps explain how the spreading of liquidity shocks from the broker dealer sector to the hedge fund sector and the feedback contribute to a systemic crisis

financial regulation and securitization evidence from subprime mortgage loans we examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate to distribute otd market the information asymmetries in the otd market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders we find using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality we interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators capital structure can mitigate moral hazard in addition we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have skin in the game and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting finally having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent overall our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the otd market the findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders incentives with the investors of mortgage backed securities 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

money financial stability and efficiency most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts however in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here we consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks we show that with non contingent nominal deposit contracts the first best efficient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized banking system what is required is that the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money variations in the price level allow full sharing of aggregate risks an interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk in contrast idiosyncratic bank specific return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone real transfers are needed

what factors drive systemic risk during international financial crises abstract we analyze the determinants of the contribution of international banks to both global and local systemic risk during prominent financial crises we find no empirical evidence supporting conjectures that bank size leverage non interest income or the quality of the bank s credit portfolio are persistent determinants of systemic risk across financial crises in contrast our results show that global systemic risk in particular is predominantly driven by characteristics of the regulatory regime we also confirm for the subprime crisis that the banks contribution to moderately bad tail events in the past predicts the financial sector s crash risk

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

a macroprudential approach to financial regulation many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely microprudential in nature a microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions by contrast a macroprudential approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole in the aftermath of the crisis there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction in this paper we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks is likely to be fragile we begin by identifying the key market failures at work why individual financial firms acting in their own interests deviate from what a social planner would have them do next we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures we conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the united states and to proposed global banking reforms

uninsured deposits as a monitoring device their impact on bond yields of banks abstract we empirically analyze the impact of uninsured deposits on a bank s cost of public debt uninsured depositors can exert market discipline over a bank and potentially reduce its agency cost of debt through informed monitoring we use a sample of public bond issues by u s bank holding companies from 1994 to 2013 and find statistically strong evidence that banks with more uninsured deposits relative to their assets issue bonds with a lower interest rate findings suggest a one standard deviation increase in uninsured deposits is associated with a 46 64 basis point decrease in bond yield in addition we find that bonds issued by banks with higher default risk or lower reputation benefit more from uninsured savers our paper contributes to the literature that explores market discipline and provides evidence that banks can benefit from it through a lower borrowing cost

estimating the effects of unions on wage inequality in a panel data model with comparative advantage and nonrandom selection this article considers the estimation of the structure of wages in union and nonunion sectors it proposes an estimator that extends standard panel data techniques to the case in which the return to the permanent component of the error term is differently rewarded in the two sectors the econometric model is used to estimate the effect of unions on both the level and the variance of wages in canada the findings indicate that unions increase the average wage of workers and compress the returns to observable measures of skill and to a time invariant unobservable measure of skill

union effects on health insurance provision and coverage in the united states during the past two decades union density has declined in the united states and employer provision of health benefits has changed substantially in extent and form using individual survey data spanning the years 1983 97 combined with employer survey data for 1993 the authors update and extend previous analyses of private sector union effects on employer provided health benefits they find that the union effect on health insurance coverage rates has fallen somewhat but remains large due to an increase over time in the union effect on employee take up of offered insurance and that declining unionization explains 20 35 of the decline in employee health coverage the increasing union take up effect is linked to union effects on employees direct costs for health insurance and the availability of retiree coverage

delegated monitors large and small germany s banking system 1800 1914 banks play a greater role in the german financial system than in those of the united states or britain germany s large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the united states others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance many discussions distort the german banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups tracing the historical development of the german banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

the shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management we study the role that repos play in a bank s financing structure in our model the bank s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos long term debt deposits and equity repos are a cheap source of funding but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk we show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect shadow costs on the bank s shareholders first it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk second it adds to the cost of long term debt financing these shadow costs limit the bank s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding this effect is however weakened under poor returns on risky assets access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule we also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank s reliance on repos

a jump diffusion model for option pricing brownian motion and normal distribution have been widely used in the black scholes option pricing framework to model the return of assets however two puzzles emerge from many empirical investigations the leptokurtic feature that the return distribution of assets may have a higher peak and two asymmetric heavier tails than those of the normal distribution and an empirical phenomenon called volatility smile in option markets to incorporate both of them and to strike a balance between reality and tractability this paper proposes for the purpose of option pricing a double exponential jump diffusion model in particular the model is simple enough to produce analytical solutions for a variety of option pricing problems including call and put options interest rate derivatives and path dependent options equilibrium analysis and a psychological interpretation of the model are also presented

employment based health insurance and job mobility is there evidence of job lock the majority of privately insured americans obtain their health insurance through their own or a family member s employment the rationale for employers to provide health insurance is straightforward by pooling the risks of individuals employers can reduce adverse selection and lower administrative expenses in addition they benefit from tax laws allowing businesses to deduct their health insurance costs these advantages of employer provision however must be weighed against the distortions they may generate in individual labor market decisions in particular health insurance may distort job mobility if employees decide to keep jobs they would rather leave for fear of losing coverage for preexisting conditions a possibility that has been termed job lock this paper attempts to quantify the effect of employer provided health insurance on the labor market mobility of individuals the link between employer provided health insurance and

on the design of contingent capital with a market trigger contingent capital cc which intends to internalize the costs of too big to fail in the capital structure of large banks has been under intense debate by policy makers and academics we show that cc with a market trigger in which direct stake holders are unable to choose optimal conversion policies does not lead to a unique competitive equilibrium unless value transfer at conversion is not expected ex ante the no value transfer restriction precludes penalizing bank managers for taking excessive risk multiplicity or absence of an equilibrium introduces the potential for price uncertainty market manipulation inecient capital allocation and frequent conversion errors these results point to the need to explore alternative designs of a prudential capital structure for banks jel classication

how elastic is the firm s demand for health insurance abstract we investigate the impact of tax subsidies on the firm s decision to offer insurance and on conditional firm spending on insurance we do so using the micro data underlying the employment cost index which has a major advantage for this exercise the matching of very high quality compensation data with information on a sample of workers in the firm we find that overall there is a moderately sized elasticity of insurance offering with respect to after tax prices 0 25 and a larger elasticity of insurance spending 0 7 we also find that the elasticities are driven primarily by small firms for whom the elasticity is larger and we find that there is significant value added to this employer based data replicating methods from standard micro data sources in our data lead to misleading estimates of these key parameters our simulation results suggest that major tax reform could lead to an enormous reduction in employer provided health insurance spending

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

the hazards of debt rollover freezes incentives and bailouts we investigate the trade o between incentive provision an di ne ient rollover freezes for a firm financed with short term debt first debt maturity that is too short term is ine cient even with incentive provision th eo ptimal maturity is an interior solution that avoids excessive rollover risk whil ep roviding su ient incentives for the manager to avoid risk shifting when the firm is in good health second allowing the manager to risk shift during a freeze actually increase sc reditor conf idence debt policy should not prevent the manager from holding what may appear to be otherwise low mean strategies that have option value during a freeze third a limited but not perfectly reliable form of emergency financing during a freeze a bailout may improve the terms of the trade o and increase total ex ante va lue by instilling confidence in the creditor markets our conclusions highlight the endogenous interaction between risk from the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet

coco issuance and bank fragility abstract the promise of contingent convertible capital securities cocos as a bail in solution has been the subject of considerable theoretical analysis and debate but little is known about their effects in practice we undertake the first comprehensive empirical analysis of bank coco issues a market segment that comprises over 730 instruments totaling 521 billion four main findings emerge 1 the propensity to issue a coco is higher for larger and better capitalized banks 2 coco issues result in a statistically significant decline in issuers cds spread indicating that they generate risk reduction benefits and lower costs of debt this is especially true for cocos that convert into equity have mechanical triggers and are classified as additional tier 1 instruments 3 cocos with only discretionary triggers do not have a significant impact on cds spreads and 4 coco issues have no statistically significant impact on stock prices except for principal write down cocos with a high trigger level which have a positive effect

the limitations of industry concentration measures constructed with compustat data implications for finance research industry concentration measures calculated with compustat data which cover only the public firms in an industry are poor proxies for actual industry concentration these measures have correlations of only 13 with the corresponding u s census measures which are based on all public and private firms in an industry also only when u s census measures are used is there evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that moreconcentrated industries which should be more oligopolistic are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price cost margins further the significant relations of compustatbased industry concentration measures with the dependent variables of several important prior studies are not obtained when u s census measures are used one of the reasons for this occurrence is that compustat based measures proxy for industry decline overall our results indicate that product markets research that uses compustat based industry concentration measures may lead to incorrect conclusions jel g10 g30 l10 a growing number of studies that consider the effects of product markets on financial economics related phenomena use industry concentration measures calculated with compustat data which cover only the public firms in an industry these studies examine issues related to asset pricing hou and robinson 2006 informed trading tookes 2008 idiosyncratic stock return volatility gaspar and massa 2006 mergers and acquisitions song and walkling 2000 fee and thomas 2004 shahrur 2005 corporate governance defond and park 1999 engel hayes andwang2003 rennie2006 karuna2007 capitalstructure lang and stulz 1992 kaleand shahrur 2007 corporate disclosurepolicy

what drives public acceptance of reforms longitudinal evidence from a dutch pension reform governments often find it hard to pursue economic reforms even if they eventually will benefit a majority of voters the literature remains inconclusive about the reasons for this some scholars on the one hand stress the role of distributional conflicts between different classes for instance dividing the young and the old in the case of pay as you go pensions others have highlighted that resistance to reform is rather broad based owing to the public s poor understanding of the need for reform this paper attempts to disentangle the drivers of public acceptance of reform by means of a case study the 2012 increase of the dutch statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 we exploit a unique longitudinal dataset on the attitudes of dutch households respecting pension reform in the 2003 2013 period our findings offer various new insights first we find that education occupational status and psychological traits were the most systematic drivers of reform preferences while age had a limited impact second and significantly we find that the year fixed effects were the main drivers of respondents acceptance of reform we interpret the pattern of the year coefficients as evidence of a collective learning process whereby households gradually updated their expectations and reform preferences in light of new information

free banking and information asymmetry a traditional argument against free banking is that it will collapse because of information externalities it is impossible for depositors to tell whether a high deposit rate offered by a bank is due to its high efficiency or risky lending strategy this paper shows that in a separating equilibrium a higher quality bank offers a lower deposit rate and holds a smaller proportion of risky loans than a lower quality bank to signal its underlying quality hence free banking is not inherently unstable the empirical results for the hong kong banking system during 1964 65 are consistent with the hypothesis of a separating equilibrium

voters commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs when will a vote seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost it votes using a game theoretical model we show that a government enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times but not during good ones the key reason is that voters cannot commit to re elect a government that does not reform during bad times this voters commitment problem stems from economic voting i e voters tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy the voter commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

building an incentive compatible safety net abstract bank safety nets originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems have become an important destabilizing influence government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net

the role of interbank markets in monetary policy a model with rationing the empirical research on monetary transmission has reported a number of puzzles challenging extant theoretical models of the transmission mechanism in this paper we argue that asymmetric information in the interbank market may be important to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the transmission process we show that asymmetric information may induce an equilibrium with rationing this in turn has two major implications first it reconciles the apparent irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy magnitude puzzle and second it shows that this impact will not be limited to short term credit supply but will also affect long term lending even if the corresponding interest rate is unaffected composition puzzle

heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school finance this paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of education finance affect inequality and growth agents interact through local public goods or externalities school funding neighborhood effects and economywide linkages complementary skills knowledge spillovers sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster integration therefore tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run a move to state funding of education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade off local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and educational structures copyright 1996 by american economic association

the social construction of an imperative why welfare reform happened in denmark and the netherlands but not in germany this article seeks to explain why denmark and the netherlands made dramatic progress reforming their welfare systems in the 1990s and why germany had a relatively slow start some possible explanations found to be incomplete are institutional differences in welfare programs the uniqueness of circumstances for example german unification and the balance of political power in governing institutions an important part of the puzzle is an increasing perception of the need to reform that was more widespread in denmark and the netherlands the social construction of an imperative to reform in these countries generated a political consensus that was elusive in germany but that may be developing under gerhard schroder s government

do workers accept lower wages in exchange for health benefits compensating wage theory predicts that workers receiving more generous fringe benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer fewer fringe benefits this study tests this prediction for employer provided health insurance by modeling the wages of married women employed full time in the labor market husband s union status husband s firm size and husband s health coverage through his job are used as instruments for his wife s own employer health insurance benefits the estimates suggest wives with own employer health insurance accept a wage about 20 lower than what they would have received working in a job without benefits

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

bank runs deposit insurance and capital requirements diamond and dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs we extend the diamond dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors we find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first best outcome depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects however an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first best allocation

general equilibrium pricing of options on the market portfolio with discontinuous returns when the price process for a long lived asset is of a mixed jump diffusion type pricing of options on that asset by arbitrage is not possible if trading is allowed only in the underlaying asset and a risk less bond using a general equilibrium framework we derive and analyze option prices when the underlying asset is the market portfolio with discontinuous returns the premium for the risk of jumps and the diffusion risks forms a significant part of the prices of the options in this economy an attempted replication of call and put options by the black scholes type of trading strategies may require substantial infusion of funds when jumps occur we study the cost and risk implications of such dynamic hedging plans article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a positive theory of social security in many countries social security accounts for a large fraction of the government budget why is this so given that at any point in time the number of recipients of social security benefits is smaller than the number of contributors in the overlapping generations model studied in this paper all individuals currently alive vote on social security in every period in equilibrium the size of social security is larger the greater is the proportion of elderly people in the population and the greater is the inequality of pre tax income within each generation both predictions of the theory are supported by the empirical evidence in cross country data

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

strategic loan defaults and coordination an experimental analysis this paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment we find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank s expected strength is low although loan repayment is a pareto dominant nash equilibrium borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers expected repayment capacity is low regardless of banks fundamentals we show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers coordination problem and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults for the individual borrower loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

debt financing in asset markets short term debt such as overnight repurchase agreements and commercial paper was heavily used by financial institutions to fund their investment positions during the asset market boom preceding the financial crisis of 2007 2008 and later played a major role in leading to the distress of these institutions during the crisis what explains the popularity of short term debt in financing asset market investments geanakoplos 2010 presents a dynamic model of the joint equilibrium of asset markets and credit markets in which optimistic buyers of a risky asset use the asset as collateral to raise debt financing from less optimistic creditors the asset s collateral value depends on the marginal creditor s asset valuation and determines the buyers purchasing capacity to bid up the asset price geanakoplos posits that short term debt allows the asset buyers to maximize riskless leverage 1 short term debt however exposes the asset buyers to rollover risk e g acharya gale and yorulmaker 2011 and he and xiong 2012 forthcoming which is reflected in the fact that the asset buyers in geanakoplos model may not be able to obtain refinancing after a negative fundamental shock as a result they are forced to transfer their asset holdings to the

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence