dynamic price competition with fixed capacities in this paper we study price competition for an oligopoly in a dynamic setting where each of the sellers has a fixed number of units available for sale over a fixed number of periods demand is stochastic and depending on how it evolves sellers may change their prices at any time this reflects the fact that firms constantly and almost costlessly change their prices reacting to updates in their estimates of market demand competitor prices or inventory levels in a setting with demand uncertainty we show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for a duopoly in which all states sellers engage in bertrand competition and the seller with the lower equilibrium reservation value sells a unit at a price equal to the competitor s equilibrium reservation value this structure therefore extends the marginal value concept of bid price control used in many revenue management implementations to a competitive model we give a closed form solution to the equilibrium price paths for a duopoly and extend all the results to an n firm oligopoly we then study extensions to multiple customer types uncertain valuations and differentiated products this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

price discrimination in broadway theater a common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms relative to uniform pricing in this study i resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm i describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second degree and third degree price discrimination using data from a broadway play i estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate the implications of alternative pricing policies the observed price discrimination may improve the firm s profit by approximately 5 relative to uniform pricing while the difference for aggregate consumer welfare is negligible also i show that the gain from changing prices in the face of fluctuating demand is small under the observed price discrimination

if not computers then what returns to computer use in the uk revisited in recent years much attention has been paid to the effect on wages of skill biased technology especially the use of computers although empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between computer use and earnings doubts have been cast on whether this is a causal relationship or merely represents unobserved other factors which are themselves positively linked to computer usage this study provides evidence that computers themselves raise wages although their impact on wages falls as other controls are included in the regression it still remains significant whilst the effect of another proxy for unobserved factors becomes insignificant furthermore improvements in computer use have an additional impact on earnings supporting the productivity interpretation

informative advertising and optimal targeting in a monopoly this paper analyzes how the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect the market outcomes to that end we consider a particular technology of information transmission which allows a monopolist to decide the optimal targeting strategy from this starting point we show that the use of targeted advertising is likely to increase the market price and reduce the level of advertising and that the degree of media specialization chosen by the monopolist tends to exceed the socially optimal furthermore our model indicates that the social loss resulting from the greater monopoly power might exceed the gain due to the lower wasting of ads in such a way that targeting could reduce consumer surplus and what is more important the level of social welfare

the impact of price discrimination on revenue evidence from the concert industry abstract concert tickets can be sold at the same price or at different prices that reflect different seating categories price discrimination generates about 5 greater revenues than single price ticketing the return to price discrimination is higher in markets with greater demand heterogeneity as predicted by price discrimination theory the return to an increase from three to four concert seat categories is roughly half that of an increase from one to two

airline market power and intertemporal price dispersion this paper analyzes the empirical relationship between market structure and price dispersion in the airline markets connecting the u k and the republic of ireland price dispersion is measured by the gini coefficient calculated using fares posted on the internet at specific days before takeoff we control for passengers heterogeneity in their purpose of travel as well as for such peak periods as christmas and easter our finding of a negative correlation between competition and price dispersion suggests that competition is likely to hinder the airlines ability to price discriminate although this effect appears to be lessened in peak periods

does competition reduce price dispersion new evidence from the airline industry we analyze the effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 q1 through 2006 q3 competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination this effect is pronounced for routes with consumers characterized by relatively heterogeneous elasticities of demand on routes with a homogeneous customer base the effects of competition on price dispersion are smaller our results contrast with those of borenstein and rose who found that price dispersion increases with competition we reconcile the different results by showing that the cross sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias

price discrimination in the airline market the effect of market concentration we test the hypothesis that price discrimination increases with competition in the airline market using a large cross section of tickets offered by several carriers on various routes we approximate price discrimination with marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions that carriers typically use to price discriminate saturday night stayover re quirements and advanced purchase discounts we find that the restrictions are associated with lower airfares but that the discounts are smaller on routes with higher market concentration the results suggest that price dispersion attributed to ticket restrictions increases as markets becomemore competitive

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

dynamic pricing advance sales and aggregate demand learning in airlines this paper uses a unique u s airlines panel data set to empirically study the dynamic pricing of inventories with uncertain demand over a finite horizon i estimate a dynamic pricing equation and a dynamic demand equation that jointly characterize the adjustment process between prices and sales as the flight date nears i find that the price increases as the inventory decreases and decreases as there is less time to sell consistent with aggregate demand learning and price adjustment demand shocks have a positive and much larger effect on prices than the positive effect of anticipated sales

a system of demand equations satisfying effectively global regularity conditions a parametric specification of an indirect utility function in terms oaf expenditure and two unit cost functions is proposed specification of these unit cost functions in terms of regular functions leads to the notion of an effectively globally regular system of demand equations that is a system of demand equations that is regular over a cone in expenditure price space and for which the regular region includes all points in any given sample and all values of nominal expenditure and prices generating higher values of real expenditure than the sample minimum this general model nests a number of popular demand systems such as the linear expenditure system as special cases an empirical application illustrates some of these ideas copyright 1996 by mit press

targeted advertising the role of subscriber characteristics in media markets this paper seeks to establish the importance of targeted advertising in media markets using zip code level circulation for us daily newspapers i show that newspapers facing more competition have lower circulation prices but higher advertising prices than similar newspapers facing little or no competition i explain this by showing that newspapers in more competitive markets are better able to segment readers according to their location and demographics this leads to greater homogeneity in the characteristics of subscribers and raises advertisers willingness to pay for such readers the results imply a substantial benefit to advertisers and media firms from targeted advertising

the efficiency of advance purchase discounts in the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty abstract the pricing behavior of two airlines is examined one is operated by a welfare maximizing social planner the other by an unregulated monopolist total capacity is fixed and aggregate demand is uncertain it is shown that advance purchase discounts can assist in attaining an efficient allocation of capacity when it is not feasible to operate a spot market on the day of the flight it is further shown that the planner may offer larger or smaller discounts than the monopolist

dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer we analyze a simple dynamic durable good model two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game we solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the necessarily mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller a buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller

estimating components of ict expenditure a model based approach with applicability to short time series this article develops a microeconomic model based approach to estimation of national information and communications technology expenditure that is helpful when only very short time series are available the model specification incorporates parameters for network effects and national e readiness finally the model allows for observed nonhomotheticity and noise found in sample data with the latter attributed to country specific influences

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

an empirically oriented demand system with improved regularity properties while the almost ideal demand system has received increasing attention in empirical studies of consumer demand the fact that the underlying piglog cost function is not globally regular has often led to violation of negative semidefiniteness in the estimated slutsky matrix this paper suggests a modification to the piglog class of preferences termed mpiglog which preserves regularity in a wider region of expenditure price space in an empirical section the almost ideal demand system special case of piglog is compared with the analogous special case of mpiglog which the authors term maids the comparison demonstrates the improved regularity features of maids

de targeting advertising an assortment of products to loss averse consumers we consider product markets in which consumers are interested only in a specific product category and initially do not know which product category matches their tastes using sophisticated tracking technologies an intermediary can make inferences about a consumer s preferred product category and offer advertising firms the possibility to target their ads to match the consumer s taste such targeting reduces overall advertising costs and as a direct effect increases industry profits however as we show in this paper when consumers form reference prices and are loss averse more precise targeting may intensify competition between firms as a result firms may earn higher profits from de targeted advertising i e when the intermediary deliberately informs about some products and their price quotes from outside a consumer s preferred product category

monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty when a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices this article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing when there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist s optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

dynamic oligopoly pricing evidence from the airline industry we explore how pricing dynamics in the european airline industry vary with the competitive environment our results highlight substantial variations in pricing dynamics that are consistent with a theory of intertemporal price discrimination first the rate at which prices increase towards the scheduled travel date is decreasing in competition supporting the idea that competition restrains the ability of airlines to price discriminate second the sensitivity to competition is substantially increasing in the heterogeneity of the customer base reecting further that restraints on price discrimination are only relevant if there is initial scope for price discrimination these patterns are quantitatively important explaining about 83 percent of the total within ight price dispersion and explaining 17 percent of the observed cross market variation of pricing dynamics

segmentation advertising and prices this paper explores the implications of market segmentation on firm competitiveness in contrast to earlier work here market segmentation is minimal in the sense that it is based on consumer attributes that are completely unrelated to tastes we show that when the market is comprised by two consumer segments and when there is sufficient variation in the per consumer costs firms need to incur to access the different consumer populations then firms obtain positive profits in symmetric equilibrium otherwise the equilibrium is characterized by zero profits as a result a minimal form of market segmentation combined with advertising cost asymmetries across consumer segments give firms an opportunity to generate positive rents in an otherwise bertrand like environment

combined effects of capacity and time on fares insights from the yield management of a low cost airline abstract based on two strands of theoretical research this paper provides new evidence on how fares are jointly affected by in flight seat availability and purchasing date as capacity based theories predict it emerges that fares monotonically and substantially increase with flight occupancy after controlling for capacity utilization our analysis also supports time based theories indicating a u shaped temporal profile over a two month booking period as well as a sharp increase in fares in the two weeks prior to departure