political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas abstract tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances this paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance domestic market power for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives in the presence of revenue seeking ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels also some welfare implications emerge

political economy and contingent protection the growing interest in the political economy of protection and the extensive literature which has already developed around the theme are mainly due to the wide gap between what policy makers practice and what economists preach notwithstanding the interesting nuances brought forth by the new trade theory most economists do not seriously contest the superiority of free trade over protection but policy makers in almost all countries practice some form of trade protection further the context within which such practices occur the extent to which they are resorted or the industries that benefit from them do not often seem to conform to the traditional explanations of protection such as optimal tariffs infant industry protection or the new arguments in favour of international rent shifting in specific strategic sectors this being the case the study of the positive theory of trade policy determination has continued to gain ground with economists borrowing concepts from political science most but not all such analyses have attempted to explain tariff protection particularly inter industry differences in nominal or effective tariff rates but successive multilateral trade negotiations have brought down average tariffs to single digit figures also agreement has been reached through the uruguay round negotiations to reduce the levels of some important types of non tariff barriers such as agricultural subsidies and export restraints although the trend has thus been clearly towards a reduction of the levels of protection the use of certain selective unilateral protectionist measures such as anti dumping and countervailing duty ad cvd measures are very much on the increase this has raised genuine fears that the codes and regulations which were meant for a corrective purpose are now being increasingly used for legitimising selective unilateral protection although the political economy analysis of this type of contingent protection is still in its infancy from the trade policy point of view this is an area of considerable importance

import penetration and the politics of trade protection abstract in this paper we reconsider a key empirical prediction generated by an important class of political economy models of trade policy namely that trade protection should be higher in sectors characterized by lower import penetration we call this the standard prediction the existing empirical evidence offers little support for this prediction in this paper we argue that the standard prediction depends critically on the assumptions that trade taxes are the only policy instruments and that the government has access to non distortionary taxation we analyze a model in which the government can use quotas and vers in addition to trade taxes and raising public funds may be costly under a simple sufficient condition our model predicts that the protection level increases with import penetration both in sectors that are protected with tariffs and in sectors that are protected with quantitative restrictions

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

the political economy of israeli protectionism an empirical analysis the aim of this study was to examine the tariff structure in israel in terms of the four main theoretical models of endogenous commercial policy the empirical results for levels of protection in israel support several of the models in particular the pressure group model performs well and especially the variable that represents the lobbying power of the histadrut public sector in israel this is consistent with the longstanding political power of the histadrut in israel the histadrut s role in the israeli economy rises above the western concept of a labor union and takes on a quasi governmental function the clearest example of this elevated status is seen when the government included the histadrut as part of the commission charged with the responsibility of carrying out the nominal liberalization process of the 1960s evidently it is this kind of political economic power that allowed the histadrut to affect the level of protection histadrut dominated industries received

endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment abstract using bernheim and whinston 1986 common agency game we endogenize trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm where both firms influence the domestic government s trade policy via their contributions the foreign firm can jump over trade restrictions by undertaking foreign direct investment fdi in the domestic market the government prefers a voluntary export restraint ver to a tariff for two reasons first a ver leads to higher contributions from the foreign firm than a tariff second a ver provides a higher level of protection to the domestic firm without generating fdi by the foreign firm

intra national home bias new evidence from the united states commodity flow survey abstract this paper estimates the us intra national home bias in trade using poisson pseudo maximum likelihood methodology to complement and extend wolf s 2000 work we use wolf s data from the 1993 commodity flow survey cfs and add the 1997 2002 2007 and 2012 waves we claim that wolf s home bias magnitude is overestimated due to the log linearization of the gravity equation and the control for distance used in the cross sectional study our results with panel data and latest econometric estimators show that the levels of us states home bias are in between 50 and 60 lower than in wolf s however since 2002 the home bias has experienced substantial growth which suggests that the us market is less commercially integrated in 2012 than in 1993

the economic significance of national border effects to address the economic significance of national border effects this paper provides evidence on two fundamental questions 1 do large border effects arise because of high perceived price wedges between foreign and domestic products or because imports and domestic goods are very close substitutes and 2 if price wedges are important do they reflect distortionary barriers to trade or do they arise from nondistortionary factors such as differences in transactions costs or product characteristics i conclude that while border effects may imply barriers welfare costs and a role for policy distortions are probably not as substantial as initial border results suggested jel f1

europe 1992 and the western pacific economies the main stimulus to completing the integration of the economies of the european community under the i992 programme has been the ec s relatively slow economic growth during the past two or three decades while japan s share of world gdp has trebled since the early i96os to about one sixth the eci 2 s share has fallen slightly to around one quarter many expect or at least hope that the removal of remaining barriers to movements of goods services people and capital within the ec not only will provide a one off boost to ec output cecchini et al i988 but will set ec incomes on a permanently higher growth path baldwin i989 numerous non europeans worry however that the trade diverting consequences of the ec reforms together with possible enlargements of ec membership and changes in ec preferential trading arrangements will be much more significant than any external trade creation and may make some excluded economies worse off this paper seeks to assess the effects of the ec92 programme and related changes currently underway in europe on the trade and growth prospects of a particularly vulnerable group namely the western pacific economies the next section of the paper explains why the western pacific region defined to include northeast and southeast asia plus australia and new zealand is a natural grouping of economies for considering external effects of european policy changes 2 the subsequent section summarizes the likely effects of those changes on the volume and commodity composition of europe s external trade and hence on the trade and welfare of different western pacific economies the fourth section examines possible responses by that region to these developments and their likely repercussions for europe the paper concludes that while the western pacific economies are likely to respond positively to whatever changes take place in europe welfare there in europe

border effects in the enlarged eu area evidence from imports to accession countries by looking at imports of eastern european countries we provide novel insights on the importance and magnitude of border effects and on how they are linked with technical barriers to trade all central eastern european countries ceecs traded with themselves more than with other countries we grouped products into three categories depending on the importance of applicaple technical barriers our results show border effects are the largest for products where we expect to have the most important technical barriers we assess if border effects changed over the transition period and we find that for products where technical barriers are less important the magnitude of border effects was declining at the end of the 90s

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

trade flows in a spatial oligopoly gravity fits well but what does it explain large distance and border effects on trade flows in some industries may result from the collusive division of geographic markets in the brazilian cement industry traditional gravity equations fit the data well yet limited regional flows are due to firms strategic behaviour thanks to a unique institutional setting and an unusually rich data set i directly control for trade costs which despite their importance cannot account for the observed segmentation of local markets at current prices the paper highlights how collusive behaviour can magnify the effects of distance as firms use geography to coordinate on higher prices and less cross hauling les effets de grande distance et de frontieres sur les flux de commerce dans certaines industries peuvent etre le resultat d une division collusive des marches geographiques dans l industrie bresilienne du ciment les equations de gravite s ajustent bien aux donnees mais les flux regionaux limites entre regions sont attribuables au comportement strategique des firmes gr ce a un contexte institutionnel unique et a une base de donnees inhabituelles l auteur a pu prendre en compte directement les couts du commerce qui malgre leur importance ne peuvent pas expliquer la segmentation observee des marches locaux aux prix courants le memoire met en lumiere comment le comportement de collusion peut magnifier les effets de distance a proportion que les firmes utilisent la geographie pour assurer une coordination fondee sur des prix plus eleves et moins de transport transfrontalier

national borders and international trade evidence from the european union in this paper the impact of national borders on international trade within the european union is considered using a gravity model i find that averaged over all eu countries intranational trade is about ten times as high as international trade with an eu partner country of similar size and distance this relatively strong home bias suggests that even within the european union national borders still have a decisive impact on trade patterns jel classification f02 f14 f15 o52 ce memoire examine l impact des frontieres nationales sur le commerce international a l interieur de l union europeenne on montre que en moyenne pour tous les pays de l union europeenne le commerce intranational est a peu pres dix fois plus important que le commerce international avec un pays partenaire de l union europeenne de meme taille et a meme distance ce degre relativement important de preference nationale suggere que meme dans le cadre de l union europeenne les frontieres nationales ont encore un impact determinant sur les patterns de commerce

regional free trade and social integration this paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective in contrast to most other literature which fails to take into account geographical factors it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners a political support maximizing government will consider these factors when balancing political support from free traders and protectionists

the disappearance of the border barrier in some european union countries bilateral trade this paper estimates the tariff equivalent of the border barrier in each bilateral trade among european union countries the results show that there are large differences in the border barrier across european union countries bilateral trade in some bilateral trade flows the border barrier has almost disappeared whereas in other cases it is still equivalent to a 75 per cent tariff the results also show that some countries have low border barriers in most of their bilateral trade flows with other eu members whereas other countries persistently present large border barriers

the public choice of superior sanctions this paper analyzes the public choice of specific forms of sanctions current sanctions are essentially quantity constraints q sanctions which are like quotas in that they might bestow benefits on certain special interest groups in the target country revenue sanctions r sanctions may be able to recapture such benefits in the form of sender government revenue which could either compensate for the costs of sanctions to the sending country or finance other sanction enhancing activities aimed at the target country hence r sanctions may be superior to q sanctions in general or on the basis of target efficiency however public choice analysis suggests that q sanctions will generally be chosen over r sanctions by democratic countries

internal trade productivity and interconnected industries a quantitative analysis does trade within a country affect welfare and productivity what are the magnitude and consequences of costs to such trade to answer these questions we exploit unique canadian data to measure internal trade costs in a variety of waysthey are large and vary across sectors and provinces to quantify their consequences for welfare and productivity we use a recent multi sector trade model featuring rich inputoutput relationships we find interprovincial trade is an important contributor to canada s gdp and welfare though there are significant costs to such trade reducing interprovincial trade costs by 10 yields aggregate gains of 0 9 eliminating our preferred estimates of costs gains average between 3 and 7 equivalent to real gdp gains between 50 billion and 130 billion finally as policy reforms are often sector specific we liberalize sectors one at a time and find gains are largest in highly interconnected industries

price and quantity controls as facilitating devices abstract this letter examines three cases in which a regulation imposed on one of two duopolists can increase the profit levels of both firms the regulations examined include a price floor an output quota and a sales tax

towards a new trade policy between the usa and middle east countries estimating trade resistance and export potential at the time of the conclusion of free trade areas ftas between the usa and middle east and north african mena countries there is a lack of literature concerning the measurement of the current us export position with regards to these countries and the us export potential in this area from recent developments of gravity models this paper derives an estimable equation which includes various trade resistance variables notably border effects multilateral resistance as well as specific bilateral effects the model is tested in order to scrutinise the impact of these variables on us exports to mena countries as well as the us export potential in this area to that end a selection of panel data specifications is proposed mainly hausman and taylor models as well as arellano and bond dynamic models results unambiguously indicate that as compared to the other oecd countries the usa suffers from a substantial trade integration deficit with mena countries this is reflected by the strongly negative values of the us mena bilateral fixed effects as well as the high bilateral border effects in addition the estimated actual potential us export ratio to these countries is only 0 76 therefore implementing an fta between the usa and mena countries may allow the former to progressively improve its export position in this area this would also help mena countries diversify their supplying sources

within u s trade and the long shadow of the american secession using data from the us commodity flow surveys we show that the historical union confederacy border lowers contemporaneous trade between us states by about 16 percentrelative to trade flows within the former alliances amongst one million placebos there is no other constellation of state grouping that would yield a larger border effect the finding is robust over different econometric models treatment of the rest of the world available survey waves or levels of aggregation including contemporaneous controls such as network institutional or demographic variables and heckscher ohlin or linderterms lowers the estimate only slightly historical variables such as the incidence of slavery do not explain the effect away adding us states unaffected by the civil war we argue that the friction is not merely reflecting unmeasured north south differences finally the estimated border effect is larger for differentiated than for homogeneous goods stressing the potential role for cultural factors and trust

protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry the political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import competing producers the regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving or instigating international collusion hence voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import competing producers and a de emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement similarly trigger price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti dumping measures to preserve fair competition likewise the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated but as demonstrated by kalt s econometric analysis contentious complaint of unfair foreign competition voluntary export restraints trigger price mechanisms and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors

trade and insurance with imperfectly observed outcomes abstractthe following sections are included introductionthe modelunobserved outcomescostly observationconcluding remarksreferences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

internal borders ethnic based market segmentation in malawi summary ethnic diversity is associated with poorer economic development but why i argue that market segmentation is one mechanism linking diversity to economic underdevelopment when ethnic groups are geographically segregated and trust is concentrated within groups markets will be tend to be segmented along ethnic lines i evaluate this argument using maize price data from seventy malawian markets over 14 years and combine it with census data on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups i find that maize price differences a key indicator of market segmentation are indeed larger for ethnically dissimilar markets even after taking sub national administrative borders geographic barriers and climatic differences into account these statistical findings are complemented by interview data from farmers and traders in three markets across malawi which highlight the centrality of trust in small scale maize trading as well as a preference for coethnic trading partners together these findings suggest that ethnic diversity and ethnoregional segregation in particular can have a negative impact on market integration an important driver of food security and long term economic development

intra national trade costs assaying regional frictions abstract the effects of intra regional inter regional and international frictions on the trade flows of canada s provinces are disentangled by gravity model techniques unexplained trade barriers utbs are the difference between inter provincial trade barriers inferred from pair fixed effects and from bilateral distance and contiguity the estimates reveal large intra national trade costs and utbs that vary significantly across canada s provinces decomposition of utbs into relative border effects and a systematic residual utb is based on a novel cobb douglas aggregator of intra provincial and pure inter provincial trade costs variation of both components across provinces is big

trade in the triad how easy is the access to large markets in this paper we measure market access between the united states the eu and japan the triad using the effect of national borders on trade patterns we investigate overall and industry level trends of bilateral trade openness and provide explanations for those using proxies for bilateral observed protection tariffs and ntbs home bias of consumers product differentiation and levels of fdi the explanations related to actual protection home bias and substitutability of goods put together explain a large part of the border effect between blocs of the triad although they do not explain the whole of the border effect puzzle jel classification f12 f15 commerce dans la triade jusqu a quel point l acces aux grands marches est il facile cet article mesure le niveau d integration commerciale entre les pays de l ue le japon et les etats unis la triade en utilisant l effet des frontieres nationales sur le commerce international nous etudions le niveau et l evolution du degre d ouverture bilateral ainsi que les differentes explications possibles des effets frontiere estimes qui sont testees a l aide de variables capturant la protection tarifs et bnts le biais domestique des consommateurs le degre de differenciation des produits et les niveaux d ide bilateraux les explications liees a la protection au biais domestique et a la substituabilite entre produits considerees ensemble expliquent une bonne partie de l effet frontiere entre pays de la triade meme si elles n expliquent pas la totalite de l enigme

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

political competition rent seeking and the choice of environmental policy instruments this paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments it is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour the model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard there is therefore a convergence of policies moreover it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups this feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by green parties in europe australia new zealand and elsewhere

tear down this wall on the persistence of borders in trade why do borders still matter for economic activity the reunification of germany in 1990 provides a unique natural experiment for examining the effect of political borders on trade both in the cross section and over time with the fall of the berlin wall and the rapid formation of a political and economic union strong and strictly enforced administrative barriers to trade between east germany and west germany were eliminated completely within a very short period of time the evolution of intra german trade flows after reunification then provides new insights for both the globalization and border effects literatures our estimation results show a remarkable persistence in intra german trade patterns along the former east west border political integration is not rapidly followed by economic integration instead we estimate that it takes at least one generation between 33 and 40 years or more to remove the impact of political borders on trade this finding strongly suggests that border effects are neither statistical artefacts nor mainly driven by administrative or red tape barriers to trade but arise from economic fundamentals

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

does brain drain lead to institutional gain a country s endowment of human capital affects its institutions through various channels this raises the possibility that skilled emigration can leave its mark on a country s institutional development we explore the impact of emigrant human capital on home country s institutional quality using geographical and genetic distance based instrumental variables for emigration and a dynamic panel estimation method we find that human capital emigration helps the home country s political institutions but hurts economic institutions the conventional brain drain argument therefore needs to incorporate the institutional changes due to skilled labour emigration

do countries influence neighbouring pollution a spatial analysis of the ekc for co2 emissions abstract by considering spatial relationships this study aims to analyse to what extent per capita co2 emissions are determined by renewable energy consumption the share of the services sector in gdp energy intensity and real per capita income a panel data set composed of 173 countries over the 1990 2014 period is used to estimate an environmental kuznets curve ekc augmented by neighbouring per capita income and energy intensity both standard and spatial forms are estimated for seven different sets of countries to assess the robustness of the results finally several forecasts are performed to verify global sustainability and to provide some policy suggestions for the period 2015 2100 the empirical results indicate that i most areas support the standard ekc ii there seems to be an inverted u shaped relationship between neighbouring per capita income and national per capita emissions in europe asia and the world as a whole iii neighbouring energy intensity increases national per capita emissions and iv forecasts show that economic growth will accelerate climate change however a steady annual growth in renewable energy consumption and a steady decrease in energy intensity both close to 2 5 may guarantee environmental sustainability prior to 2100

educational reform ability and family background in this paper we evaluate the impact of a major school reform that took place in the 1950s in sweden on educational attainment and earnings the reform which has many common elements with reforms in other european countries including the uk consisted of increasing compulsor schooling imposing a national curriculum and abolishing selection by ability into academic and non academic streams at the age of 12 comprehensive school reform our data combines survey data with administrative sources we find that the reform increased both the educational attainment and the earnings of children whose fathers had just compulsory education however the earnings of those with educated parents declined possibly because of a dilution of quality at the top end of the education levels the overall effect of the reform was however positive

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

peer group effects and educational attainment abstract given the aims of an educational system the relationship between educational inputs and educational outputs the educational production function a frequency distribution of students by ability and a fixed educational budget how should students and educational expenditures be allocated over classrooms the paper focuses on peer group effects which capture the influence of a student s classmates on his educational attainment and the determinants of whether streaming or mixing is preferable it should be noted that peer group effects arise in other contexts notably in the workplace thus the paper casts some light on the optimal composition of teams

cleaning up while cleaning up pollution abatement interest groups and contingent trade policies this paper analyzes the political economy of environmental policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection we argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing the preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

do state borders matter for u s intranational trade the role of history and internal migration empirical evidence of the impact of borders on international trade flows using the gravity equation approach abounds this paper examines the empirical relevance of state borders in u s interstate trade for various specifications of the gravity equation we find a large and economically significant subnational border effect for some specifications however two model specifications drastically reduce if not eliminate the border effect i dynamic panel specifications controlling for past levels of trade and ii models conditioning on internal migration les resultats empiriques de l analyse des impacts des frontieres sur les flux de commerce international en utilisant les modeles de gravite sont devenus monnaie courante ce texte examine l impact des frontieres entre etats a l aide de cette technique il s avere que les effets de frontieres infranationales sont grands et significatifs pour certaines specifications du modele cependant deux specifications du modele reduisent dramatiquement s ils n eliminent pas l effet de frontiere i des specifications qui prennent en compte les niveaux anterieurs de commerce et ii des specifications qui dependent de la migration interne

thick and thin borders in the european union how deep internal integration is within countries and how shallow between them the existence of large border effects is one of the main puzzles of international macroeconomics the seminal paper by mccallum found that trade between any two canadian provinces was on average 22 times greater than trade between any canadian province and any united state us although various authors have estimated internal and external border effects for the whole european union and some specific european countries none has done so in the manner that mccallum s seminal paper stymied by lack of data on region to region international trade flows this study uses a novel data set that captures intra and international truck shipments between spanish regions and regions in seven european countries during the period 2004 11 it computes internal and external border effects offering novel results for aggregate flows and the importing countries and estimates several specifications of the gravity equation so as to tackle such issues as the multilateral resistance term heteroskedasticity and zero flows and non linear relation between trade and distance the paper also adds a detailed analysis on the external border effect for each spanish exporting region and each of the seven european countries considered by means of this analysis we shed new light on the relative integration between regions of these seven countries and spanish exporting regions finally we conduct an extrapolation exercise computing the trade potentials that would be expected in a fully integrated europe and estimating how long full integration would take to achieve between each spanish exporting region and each european importing country to this regard two alternative scenarios are considered one using the growth rates of the spanish exports before the crisis 2001 08 and other considering the postcrisis growth rates 2011 13

border effects and the availability of domestic products abroad trade between countries could fall short of trade within a country because 1 the volume of international trade is less than the volume of domestic trade for a given product the intensive margin or 2 some goods that are sold domestically are simply not exported the extensive margin my theoretical model illustrates that either of these two factors could explain a given aggregate border effect i examine the empirical relevance of this distinction by isolating the fraction of total domestic production attributable only to exporters finding that around one half of the border effect may be attributed to each explanation jel classification f1 les effets de frontieres et la disponibilite de produits domestiques a l etranger le commerce entre pays peut etre moindre que le commerce a l interieur d un pays parce que 1 le volume de commerce international est moindre que le volume du commerce interieur pour un produit donne la marge intensive ou 2 certains biens qui sont vendus a l interieur d un pays ne sont tout simplement pas exportes la marge extensive un modele theorique montre que l un et l autre de ces facteurs pourraient expliquer un certain effet de frontiere au niveau agrege on montre l importance empirique de cette distinction en isolant la fraction de la production interieure totale attribuable strictement aux exportateurs et il s avere qu a peu pres la moitie de l effet de frontiere est attribuable a chacune des deux explications

the impacts of exchange rate volatility on vegetable trade flows trade flows of commodities are generally affected by the principles of comparative advantage in a free trade however trade flows might be enhanced or distorted not only by various government interventions but also by exchange rate fluctuations among others this study applies a commodity specific gravity model to selected vegetable trade flows among organization for economic co operation and development oecd countries to determine the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on the trade flows using the data from 1996 to 2002 the results show that while the exchange rate uncertainty significantly reduces trade in the majority of commodity flows there is evidence that both short and long term volatility have positive effect on trade flows of specific commodities this study also tests the regional preferential trade agreements such as the north american free trade agreement nafta the asia pacific economic cooperation apec and the eu and their different effects on commodities

ec trade protection law produmping or antidumping this paper argues that the anticipation of protection can have astimulating effect on exports instead of the commonly claimed effect of harassment if protection serves market cartelization by fixing export quantities or prices exporters may have an incentive to increase their sales abroad in order to secure a large share of the expected rent which is brought about by the anticipated import restriction this may even result in sales below marginal costs or dumping the effect of the protectionist threat may then be the reverse of what is intended it can raise the speed of import penetration and it can provoke dumping a formal model and a supportive institutional analysis of ec trade protection is supplemented by preliminary empirical evidence

lobbying and cournot nash competition abstract arguments for strategic trade intervention with cournot duopolists are reconsidered in a model where domestic firms can lobby for increased subsidies an export subsidy may not improve national welfare if lobbying costs are included even if an optimal positive subsidy exists the government needs information about lobbying effectiveness in order to correctly implement the program

trade barriers as bargaining outcomes whether bilateral trade barrier data conform with the grossman helpman 1995 model s predictions about trade talks is examined in this article a simple form of the prediction from the model is tested bilateral us japan and us eu data from the 1990s are employed the results are the first in the literature

foreign influence and welfare how do foreign interests inuence the policy determination process what are the welfare implications of such foreign inuence in this paper we develop a model of foreign inuence and apply it to the study of optimal taris we develop a two country voting model of electoral competition where we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically aect the electoral outcome in the other country we show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare and we study the determinants of this weight we show that although foreign inuence is zero in equilibrium its threat may be welfare enhancing from the point of view of aggregate world welfare this is because foreign inuence helps alleviate externalities arising from cross border eects of policies the threat of foreign inuence can however prove harmful in the presence of large imbalances in inuence power across countries we apply our model of foreign inuence to the study of optimal trade policy we derive a modied formula for the optimal import tariand show that a country s import tariis more distorted whenever the inuenced country is small relative to the inuencing country and whenever natural trade barriers between the two countries are small

the border effect in spain this paper analyses the border effect in spain using a unique dataset on intranational trade flows over the period 1995 98 the results indicate that after controlling for market size and distance spanish regions trade around 22 times more with the rest of spain than they do with oecd countries moreover the size of the spanish bias is lower in the case of the spanish regions exports than in the case of imports although the difference is not statistically significant in most cases finally the border effect is not uniform across spanish regions

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

on the size of home bias home bias in consumption refers to consumers strongly preferring domestic over foreign products however if the products were to be differentiated would there then be a taste for country of origin if this were the case what would be the market shares if consumers were to only value prices and characteristics and not the brand s nationality using a structural demand we account for home bias in the european car market and compute the counterfactual market shares in the absence of home bias we find that home biased preferences explain more than half of the market shares of domestic car manufacturers in their domestic markets limiting the role of trade frictions

political reform and trade policy abstract the welfare effects of partial restrictions on political competition are investigated in a model in which two candidates receive campaign contributions from import competing industries in return for tariff protection ceilings on allowable contributions per industry may be welfare worsening particularly if the contributor elasticity is high because they induce candidates to seek additional contributors restrictions that reduce the number of industries allowed to contribute may also worsen welfare because candidates respond by increasing contributions and tariff protection for each active contributor the results suggest that the ability of candidates to circumvent partial restrictions may eliminate any potential benefits

the trade creating effects of business and social networks evidence from france using theory grounded estimations of trade flow equations this paper investigates the role that business and social networks play in shaping trade between french regions the bilateral intensity of networks is quantified using the financial structure and location of french firms and bilateral stocks of migrants compared to a situation without networks migrants are shown to double bilateral trade flows while networks of firms multiply trade flows by as much as four in some specifications finally taking network effects into account divides the estimation of the impact of transport costs and of the effect of administrative borders by around three

the distributional effects of early school stratification non parametric evidence from germany whether early school stratification is conducive or detrimental to scholastic performance has been subject to controversial debates in educational policy and science across many countries we exploit a unique exogenous variation in lower saxony germany where performance based tracking was preponed from grade 7 to grade 5 in 2004 i e with the completion of primary school in particular we measure the long run effects of this reform on pisa achievement test scores based on a difference in differences setup in order to disentangle average from distributional achievement effects we complementarily rely on a changes in changes framework our results indicate that preponed school tracking increased test scores at the upper tail of the skill distribution and lowered test scores at the lower tail of the skill distribution compensating each other on average

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

intra national home bias some explanations wolf demonstrates that trade within the united states appears substantially impeded by state borders we revisit this finding with improved data we show that much intranational home bias can be explained by wholesaling activity shipments by wholesalers are much more localized within states than shipments from manufacturing establishments controlling for relative prices and the use of actual rather than imputed shipment distances also reduces home bias estimates

the effects of class size on student achievement new evidence from population variation abstract i identify the effects of class size on student achievement using longitudinal variation in the population associated with each grade in 649 elementary schools i use variation in class size driven by idiosyncratic variation in the population i also use discrete jumps in class size that occur when a small change in enrollment triggers a maximum or minimum class size rule the estimates indicate that class size does not have a statistically significant effect on student achievement i rule out even modest effects 2 to 4 percent of a standard deviation in scores for a 10 percent reduction in class size

antidumping duties undertakings and foreign direct investment in the eu we study the effects of eu antidumping policy when foreign firms can jump antidumping duties through foreign direct investment fdi in the eu we show that duty jumping or duty pre empting fdi occurs if the eu administration has broader objectives than protecting eu industry s profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad the expectation of price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in fdi and may even discourage fdi as long as products are not too differentiated the results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping fdi

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

international trade policy benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians the claim that sophisticated non operational efficiency based arguments for intervention facilitate obfuscatory policy induced income transfers will meet in some quarters the counterclaim that this is an overly cynical interpretation of politicians policy motives rent seeking can likewise be argued to be an overly cynical conception the theory of rent seeking would impute self interest motives to the offer of payment for a cup of coffee

using maimonides rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic achievement the twelfth century rabbinic scholar maimonides proposed a maximum class size of 40 this same maximum induces a nonlinear and nonmonotonic relationship between grade enrollment and class size in israeli public schools today maimonides rule of 40 is used here to construct instrumental variables estimates of effects of class size on test scores the resulting identiecation strategy can be viewed as an application of donald campbell s regression discontinuity design to the class size question the estimates show that reducing class size induces a signiecant and substantial increase in test scores for fourth and efth graders although not for third graders when asked about their views on class size in surveys parents and teachers generally report that they prefer smaller classes this may be because those involved with teaching believe that smaller classes promote student learning or simply because smaller classes offer a more pleasant environment for the pupils and teachers who are in them mueller chase and walden 1988 social scientists and school administrators also have a longstanding interest in the class size question class size is often thought to be easier to manipulate than other school inputs and it is a variable at the heart of policy debates on school quality and the allocation of school resources in many countries see e g robinson 1990 for the united states ofsted 1995 for the united kingdom and moshel ravid 1995 for israel this broad interest in the consequences of changing class size

intra national versus international trade in the european union why do national borders matter the first objective of this paper is to estimate border effects among european union countries in this context the specification of the gravity equation together with the choice of the distance measure are shown to be crucial for assessing the size of the border effect the second objective is to evaluate the determinants of the cross commodity variation in national border effects contrary to previous findings reported in the literature we show that trade barriers do provide an explanation in particular technical barriers to trade together with product specific information costs increase border effects whereas non tariff barriers are not significant our results further suggest that these barriers are not the only cause since the spatial clustering of firms is also found to matter

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

north south and distance in the gravity model abstract it is generally assumed that distance in the gravity model strictly reflects frictions impeding bilateral trade however distances north south could also reflect differences in factor endowment that provide opportunities for profitable trade this paper investigates the hypothesis that if we control for distance in the ordinary sense differences north south promote international trade the hypothesis receives ample support moreover the significance of differences north south survives a battery of robustness tests concerning period distinctions between differences in latitude north north north south and south south and controls for other measures of differences in factor endowment such as differences in per capita output and differences in average temperature rainfall and seasonal range in temperature the impact of differences north south on bilateral trade has also been falling this decline in turn might be partly responsible for the weakening of the influence of distance that has been occurring since world war ii this last hypothesis receives confirmation as well finally the paper examines the impact of internal distance and remoteness on trade since both variables are country specific this is done by studying their impact on the country fixed effects themselves in the earlier estimates internal distance turns out to have a far greater impact than remoteness by an order of 10

ec members fighting about surplus vers fdi and japanese cars the distribution of consumer and producer surplus among ec members of three different trade regimes free trade a voluntary export restraint ver and a ver in conjunction with foreign direct inv

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

trade and insurance with moral hazard abstract previous literature on the use of trade policy for insurance has relied implicitly on moral hazard and adverse selection as the reasons for the failure of private markets for risk bearing this paper begins with the observation that such forces should be incorporated explicitly into the models to ensure a fair comparison between markets and governments for the case of moral hazard it is found that market equilibrium given exclusive insurance is an informationally constrained pareto optimum in one case of non exclusive insurance a systematic role for government insurance is found but the scope of trade policy is ambiguous

trade and insurance with adverse selection this paper considers a small open economy with a safe sector and a risky sector the probability of success in the risky activity differs across individuals and is private information it is shown that policies that sustain informationally constrained pareto optima should not include tariffs a laissez faire competitive equilibrium if it exists is pareto optimal these results contrast with previous literature on the role of tariffs as insurance where private risk markets are assumed away in an ad hoc manner

political competition rent seeking and the choice of environmental policy instruments comment in this comment i analyze damania s political economy model environmental and resource economics 13 415 433 1999 correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities i arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument standards or taxation and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign inequilibrium both parties choose the same platform so that both have anequal probability of winning the election

the use and effect of political propaganda in democracies this paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised by propaganda semi truths are distributed among the electorate the decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives the analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate the pecuniary interest of an interest group is however also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group it has finally become appar ent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies

measuring internal trade distances a new method applied to estimate provincial border effects in canada in this paper we suggest an improved methodology for comparing the intensity of trade across and within national and provincial boundaries earlier efforts to assess border effects for provinces or for countries without internal trade statistics made fairly arbitrary assumptions about average distances for internal trade flows we improve on earlier efforts by taking more complete account of the distribution of population within each province or country internal distance is estimated as a population weighted average of intra city and intercity distances as well as distances to and within rural areas we find higher estimates of internal distances and hence border effects than found in previous studies

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

to ban or not to ban foreign lobbying and cross national externalities this paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying we show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities we argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying we also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country a key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not we illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation bannir ou ne pas bannir lobbying etranger et effets externes transnationaux ce texte etudie les couts et avantages du lobbying etranger on montre quand et comment que le lobbying etranger peut aider a internaliser des effets externes transnationaux on suggere que c est souvent un avantage qu on est porte a negliger du lobbying etranger on etudie sous quelles conditions une regle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying etranger peut etre dans l interet national d un pays un facteur cle dans ce calcul est le fait que les interets des groupes etrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non organises on illustre la logique sous jacente a l aide d exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la reglementation environnementale

a welfare comparison between vers and tariffs under the gatt economic theory suggests that tariffs are welfare superior to voluntary export re straints vers in the presence of perfect competition however with imperfectly competitive markets some authors have found that vers may be welfare superior to tariffs we reconsider the comparison between a ver and a tariff in the context of gatt based constraints using a model of perfect competition we show that a ver can welfare dominate a tariff increase that is accompanied by a compensatory reduction in the tariff on another good or if the tariff is matched with a retaliatory tariff on domestic exports une comparaison des effets de bien e tre des restrictions volontaires a 1 exportation et des tarifs douaniers dans le cadre du regime du gatt la theorie economique suggere que

peer effects teacher incentives and the impact of tracking evidence from a randomized evaluation in kenya to the extent that students benefit from high achieving peers tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones however all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level lower achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution we propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in kenya while the direct effect of highachieving peers is positive tracking benefited lower achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level jel i21 j45 o15

freight transportation costs and the thickening of the us mexico border border regulatory requirements and administrative practices changed subsequent to the september 11 2001 9 11 terrorist attacks in the united states research in this study examines the manners in which transportation cost data for merchandise imports from mexico behaved before and after 2001 evidence is obtained that confirms results earlier tabulated for imports from canada empirical results further indicate that beyond freight cost changes growth in the value of imports from mexico was disrupted by events associated with the aftermath of 9 11

general equilibrium effects of import constraints under variable labour supply public goods and income taxation we consider a general equilibrium trade model of a small open economy with a representative consumer where labour supply is variable where imports are restricted by a small tariff a quota or a voluntary export restraint ver and where alongside the production of two traded goods one imported and one exported a pure public good is produced and funded through an income tax within this framework we demonstrate among other things that under certain conditions while a small tariff or quota reduces employment and welfare a ver may increase them thus in the context of a small open economy contrary to standard results in certain cases vers may become the welfare and employment dominant instrument over the alternative import restrictions

trade in polarized america the border effect between red states and blue states political and cultural polarization in the united states is widely discussed but does it relate to any economic disconnection among states we estimate the border effect between red and blue states using the gravity equation with a nonlinear generalized method of moments estimator to simultaneously overcome the problems associated with endogeneity cross state price differences and zero trade flow the border effect is robustly confirmed for the 2000s while not so robustly detected for the 1990s notably in 2007 the border reduces trade between red and blue states to approximately 75 of the trade within each set of states this estimated border effect is much smaller than the united states canada national border effect estimated by anderson and van wincoop 2003 and by feenstra 2002 yet is comparable to the border effect that nitsch and wolf 2009 find for the former west and east germanies approximately loyears after reunification while the border effect in germany after reunification is decreasing the border effect between the red and blue states is emerging we also find the border effect is more significant for consumption rather than intermediate goods the border effect is an important indicator for a potential dismantling of the economic connectivity in the united states jel d72 f10 fi5 r1 i introduction recent u s presidential elections have raised concern about polarization in u s politics and culture namely the united states is divided into two nations the red states we call it the red nation preserving the term state for an individual state and the blue states the blue nation in the red nation culturally and religiously conservative republicans are dominant while in the blue nation liberal democrats are the majority so far the focus of the discussion is the extent of the polarization abramowitz and saunders 2008 fiorina et al 2008 its determinants gelman et al 2010 and its implications on federal policy making glaeser et al 2005 mellow and trubowitz 2005 economic implications have not been largely discussed however the polarization may suggest economic divisions because it is a sign of geographic sorting of people and their preferences this article provides evidence that economic disconnectivity between the red and blue nations emerged in the 2000s we explore 1 whether there is a border effect on interstate trade 2 if the effect exists how large it is and 3 what types of goods are most affected in the context of existing literature and recent u s political and cultural events we then provide possible explanations for our findings this study uses a gravity equation of international trade to examine the effect of the fictional national border between the red and blue nations the methodology was originally applied by mccallum 1995 to estimate the degree of impact of the national border on trade between the united states and canada he finds that intercountry trade is less than 5 of the intracountry trade of canada controlling for other factors following mccallum s 1995 work several studies have proposed methodological improvements we apply an updated estimation method nonlinear generalized method of moments gmm estimator of a gravity equation to examine the border effect between the red and blue nations our analysis finds a statistically and economically significant border effect between the red and blue nations especially in years 2002 and 2007 we examine the border effect in 1993 1997 2002 and 2007 the years in which trade flow data are available from the federal commodity flow survey cfs the border effect is not robustly found in 1993 and 1997 however it is robustly detected in 2002 and 2007 even with additional controls or alternative specifications at the industry level analysis we find that the border effect is significant for consumption goods such as food tobacco and printed products but not for intermediate products i