market frictions a unified model of search costs and switching costs it is well known that search costs and switching costs can create market power by constraining the ability of consumers to change suppliers while previous research has examined each cost in isolation this paper demonstrates the benefits of examining the two types of friction in unison the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important differences in their effects upon consumer behaviour competition and welfare in addition the paper also illustrates a simple empirical methodology for estimating separate measures of both costs while demonstrating a potential bias that can arise if only one cost is considered

behavioral heterogeneity in dynamic search situations theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper presents models for search behavior and provides experimental evidence that behavioral heterogeneity in search is linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences observed search behavior is more consistent with a new model that assumes dynamic updating of utility reference points than with models that are based on expected utility maximization specifically reference point updating and loss aversion play a role for more than a third of the population the findings are of practical relevance as well as of interest for researchers who incorporate behavioral heterogeneity into models of dynamic choice behavior in for example consumer economics labor economics finance and decision theory

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

product market competition and managerial slack this article analyzes the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives in contrast to hart 1983a i show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem the difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences the importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism through which competition affects incentives

retail competition in electricity markets abstract the introduction of competition into retail electricity supply gave rise to great expectations however to date its performance has proven less than stellar owing primarily to the theoretical concepts underpinning this reform which draw heavily on the austrian school neither consumers decision processes nor this sector s technical paradigm were adequately accounted for leading to an uncorrect estimation of the expected impact of opening to competition short and medium term prospects for the evolution of retail markets must be reconsidered from the perspective of greater stability not a generalization of competition but rather a persistent segmentation between active and inactive clients not a large and rapid diffusion of radical innovations in commercialisation with the potential for undermining the incumbents positions

r d concentration under endogenous fixed costs evidence from genetically modified corn seed we examine the role of fixed costs in research and development r d in the market for genetically modified gm corn seed in a mixed model of horizontal differentiation by genetic traits and vertical differentiation by productivity we derive the empirically testable lower bounds to r d concentration when r d investments and market entry are jointly determined when r d investments translate into higher product quality industries are said to be characterized by endogenous fixed costs such that the lower bound to r d concentration increases with market size but is less than the lower bound to market concentration based on sales using data on field trial applications of gm corn seed we estimate the lower bound to r d concentration and find evidence of endogenous fixed costs with r d concentration that is significantly greater than perfectly competitive levels these endogenous fixed costs imply that concentration in the agricultural biotechnology industry is occurring due to the nature of r d investment in product quality and not through anticompetitive practices adjusting for past merger and acquisition activity significantly raises the lower bound for infinitely sized markets but has no impact upon current market sizes implying the industry may still undergo additional consolidation

risky business the decline of defined benefit pensions and firms shifting of risk since the early 1980s employment in the united states has undergone significant transformation as the large corporations that once safeguarded employees with stable jobs and rewards for loyalty have replaced these employment relationships with ones based on cost containment and flexibility one important consequence of these developments is that firms have abdicated their role as a critical risk bearer in society although evidence suggests that firms have increasingly shifted market risks onto their workforce to date there have been few detailed analyses exploring what factors have driven this phenomenon this study adds to our understanding of why firms have transferred risk to their employees by examining the decline of a highly institutionalized practice wherein large u s firms used to bear retirement risk the defined benefit db pension plan through a detailed analysis i show that variance in the presence power and interests of shareholders and employees at the firm level differentially affect a firm s willingness to shift the risk of retirement onto its workers specifically i demonstrate empirically that different types of shareholders have differential effects on a firm s retirement practices suggesting that the changing equity ownership structure of large u s firms has played a key role in how risk is allocated between workers and firms declines in employee power have also played a role because firm levels of unionization positively affect rates of db participation for both unionized and nonunionized workers

household internal and external electricity contract switching in eu countries abstractusing a representative sample of more than 13 000 households from eight countries in the european union eu this article empirically studies the factors related to household electricity c

private equity jobs and productivity private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses and few gains in operating performance to evaluate these claims we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers us buyouts from 1980 to 2005 we track 3 200 target firms and their 150 000 establishments before and after acquisition comparing to controls defined by industry size age and prior growth buyouts lead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creation and destruction buyouts also bring tfp gains at target firms mainly through accelerated exit of less productive establishments and greater entry of highly productive ones jel d24 g24 g32

an analysis of bundle pricing the case of biotech seeds biotechnology has provided opportunities for strategic management and pricing of patented products this article analyzes the economics and strategy of bundling and bundle pricing of biotech traits in seeds when the bundling of genes traits is decided by biotech firms firms may choose among subadditive pricing component pricing or superadditive pricing strategies we argue that complementarity among component genes contributes to subadditive pricing while substitution among components contributes to superadditive pricing the nature of bundle pricing is explored empirically using u s seed corn data from 2000 to 2007 we document that subadditive bundle pricing of traits is commonly found in the seed corn market however we also present evidence of superadditive pricing and component pricing the presence of different pricing and bundling strategies suggests a rapidly advancing and complex market the preponderance of subadditive pricing suggests that trait bundling offers benefits to farmers exhibiting strong demand for multiple complementary genetic traits jel classifications l4 l13 l65

valuing product innovation genetically engineered varieties in us corn and soybeans we develop a discrete choice model of differentiated products for us corn and soybean seed demand to study the welfare impact of genetically engineered ge crop varieties using a unique data set spanning the period 1996 2011 we find that the welfare impact of the ge innovation is significant in the last five years of the period analyzed our preferred counterfactual indicates that total surplus due to ge traits was 5 18 billion per year with seed manufacturers appropriating 56 of this surplus the seed industry obtained more surplus from ge corn whereas farmers received more surplus from ge soybeans

mutual monitoring and corporate governance abstract mutual monitoring in a well structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem i empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm if given authority incentive and channels for communication and influence is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self interested ceo i find strong evidence that 1 measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the no 2 executive are positively related to future firm value tobin s q 2 the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the no 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the ceos and 3 mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms the results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on ceo power

contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality experimental evidence from the vietnamese dairy sector in emerging markets for high value food products in developing countries processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality one widely embraced approach is contract farming but relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context we use the example of the vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk a framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk on farmers investment in quality improving inputs statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use resulting in better output quality the bonus payment generates even higher quality milk we also find that input choice levels depend on farmers socio economic characteristics such as wealth while individual risk preferences seem to be less important implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed

vertical integration and firm boundaries the evidence since ronald h coase s 1937 seminal paper a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input output structures in the last twenty five years empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating we review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions first what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and second what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices quantities investment and profits throughout we highlight areas of potential cross fertilization and promising areas for future work

decision support for retirement portfolio management overcoming myopic loss aversion via technology design as firms continue to abandon pensions in favor of employee managed retirement plans tremendous demands are being placed on the decision making proficiency of future retirees as reflected in the equity premium puzzle individual investors tend to hold overly conservative portfolios that provide meager payoffs over time consequently there is growing concern that the vast majority of retirement accounts might be insufficiently funded when employees reach retirement given that most retirement plans can now be managed online a potential solution lies in designing a web based decision support system dss that helps future retirees make more profitable portfolio management decisions this paper reports the results of a study in which 159 retirement plan participants were asked to use an experimental website to manage a portfolio of retirement investments over a simulated 30 year period using a psychological approach toward designing the dss myopic loss aversion is put forth as a theoretical explanation for the psychological mechanisms that encourage investors to hold overly conservative portfolios armed with this knowledge three design features information horizon system restrictiveness and decisional guidance are implemented as part of an overarching design strategy targeted at increasing investors willingness to take calculated risks the results indicate that investor conservatism diminishes when the dss presents prospective probabilities and payoffs over long time horizons in contrast short term information horizons constitute a major stumbling block for investors however when confronted with short term information horizons risk aversion can be successfully counteracted by configuring a dss to either restrict the frequency of decisions or to suggest a relatively aggressive portfolio allocation these findings carry important implications for theory and practice

consumer myopia imperfect competition and the energy efficiency gap evidence from the uk refrigerator market abstract the empirical literature on the energy efficiency gap concentrates on demand inefficiencies in the energy using durables markets and finds evidence that consumers underestimate future energy costs when purchasing a new appliance we take a broader view and also consider the impact of imperfect competition using data on the uk refrigerator market 2002 2007 we find that the average energy consumption of appliances sold during this period was only 7 2 higher than what would have been observed under a scenario with a perfectly competitive market and non myopic consumers one reason for this small gap is that market power actually reduces energy use

are you risk averse over other people s money decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others such as in the typical corporate structure does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences we examine this question in two simple settings lottery choices and sealed bid auctions using controlled laboratory experiments we find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion this reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others this result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents

competition and cooperation in corporate governance the effects of labor institutions on blockholder effectiveness in 23 european countries we provide an analysis of the costs and benefits of blockholding in europe where it is a dominant but certainly not universal corporate governance strategy for shareholders of publicly listed firms we find that the effectiveness of blockholding is conditioned by the specific labor institutions that distinguish european countries from the rest of the world and that these institutional effects involve both competition and cooperation between blockholders and collective labor interests we also find that relational blockholders are better able to cope with or benefit from these institutional effects than arm s length blockholders empirically we use advanced meta analytic methods on a total sample of 748 569 firm year observations derived from 162 studies covering 23 european countries

state regulation of takeovers and shareholder wealth the case of new york s 1985 takeover statutes past studies of takeover regulations have found that such rules increase the premiums paid to the shareholders of successfully acquired targets jarrell and bradley argue that these higher premiums harm shareholders by discouraging takeover activity and protecting inefficient managers bebchuk argues that the higher premiums do not significantly reduce the number of takeovers so that shareholders benefit on average from the higher premiums paid in successful acquisitions this article uses the event study method to measure the net effect of two takeover statutes passed by the new york state legislature in 1985 the results support the conclusion of jarrell and bradley that despite the higher premiums paid to successfully acquired target shareholders ex post these laws on average harm shareholders ex ante

state intervention in the market for corporate control abstract this study investigates the impact of pennsylvania senate bill 1310 on the share prices of pennsylvania corporations considered the most severe of the second generation antitakeover laws the statute limits the ability of shareholders to challenge management through the proxy process and eliminates the traditional fiduciary obligation of directors to promote shareholders interests we find that pa sb1310 significantly decreased share values and estimate the loss to shareholders of pennsylvania firms at 4 billion however firms with antitakeover charter amendments already in place were less affected and firms that exempted themselves from pa sb1310 recovered a portion of shareholders wealth

exploring the diffusion of low energy houses an empirical study in the european union abstract diffusion of low energy houses is an important part of energy and climate policy in the european union eu and in individual eu countries key barriers to the adoption of low energy houses include additional construction costs and uncertainty surrounding actual energy and cost savings in this paper we econometrically analyze determinants of low energy house adoption including time and risk preferences we rely on original data from a large survey conducted among households in eight eu countries to our knowledge this is the first empirical study of low energy building adoption to rely on a demographically representative sample our set of covariates includes parameters of time and risk preferences that were elicited via state of the art incentivized multiple price list experiments and via self assessment scales we find mixed results for the effects of time discounting on low energy house adoption risk preferences do appear to matter as risk proneness increases so does the adoption of zero net or energy plus building but not passive houses consistent with the low cost hypothesis about environmental attitude and action we find no results for environmental attitudes and social norms

agricultural biotechnology s complementary intellectual assets we formulate and test a hypothesis for the dramatic restructur ing that the plant breeding and seed industry has recently undergone the reorganization can be explained in part by the desire to exploit comple mentarities between intellectual assets needed to create genetically mod ified organisms this hypothesis is tested using data on agricultural biotechnology patents notices for field tests of genetically modified organisms and firm characteristics the presence of complementarities is identified with a positive covariance in the unexplained variation of asset holdings results indicate that coordination of complementary assets has increased under the consolidation of the industry ne of the central problems in the economics of inno vation concerns how industries change as they absorb fundamental research breakthroughs rarely has change been more pronounced than in agriculture following the introduction of recombinant dna technology and affiliated techniques of genetic engineering by offering breeders the ability to alter plant traits by directly manipulating se quences of genetic code tools of agricultural biotechnology change the possibilities for crop improvement profoundly the new techniques enhance the speed and precision of agricultural research and development r d while ex panding the space of potential new products seed firms now offer farmers crop varieties embodying new ap proaches for controlling pests managing physical stresses on plants increasing crop yields and growing differenti ated quality enhanced crops concurrent with these technical changes in the r d process the agricultural inputs industry has over the past two decades witnessed a comprehensive restructuring sev eral large chemical firms including monsanto dow and dupont moved aggressively into plant biotechnology mak ing huge investments in the life sciences as newly minted agronomic systems companies these firms acquired all of the large national seed firms in north america including pioneer dekalb asgrow garst and others meanwhile the research intensive agricultural biotechnology sector from its appearance in the 1980s as a large set of small startup firms had by the end of the 1990s already reached a second stage with most of the startups either folded or acquired by the new agronomic systems giants the industry s consoli dation was surprising not only for its rapid pace and com prehensive scope but also for the extremely high valuations at which some firms were acquired in 1997 for example monsanto acquired holdens foundation seeds of wil liamsburg iowa together with two marketing subsidiaries for 1 02 billion 25 times the annual sales of the mature privately held firm whose revenues derived entirely from the breeding and distribution of corn seed the emergent industry structure with a relatively small number of tightly woven alliances each organized around a major life sciences firm each vertically integrated from basic r d through to marketing stands in contrast to the more diffuse structure of twenty years ago this structure is likewise noteworthy when one considers trends in other research intensive fields the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry for example maintains a large number of free standing firms specializing in r d and earning revenues through various licensing agreements majewski 1998 hall and ziedonis 2001 observe that the u s semiconduc

institutional and legal context in natural experiments the case of state antitakeover laws we argue and demonstrate empirically that a firm s institutional and legal context has first order effects in tests that use state antitakeover laws for identification a priori the size and direction of a law s effect on a firm s takeover protection depends on i other state antitakeover laws ii preexisting firm level takeover defenses and iii the legal regime as reflected by important court decisions in addition iv state antitakeover laws are not exogenous for many easily identifiable firms we show that the inferences from nine prior studies related to nine different outcome variables change substantially when we include controls for these considerations

the value of private versus public risk and pure altruism an experimental economics test in 1996 johannesson et al published a paper entitled the value of private safety versus the value of public safety based on the preliminary evidence from a hypothetical contingent valuation study for public and private safety these authors argue that consumers behave as pure altruists who consider the cost of a program that might be imposed on other voters when they determine their maximum willingness to pay for public safety programs the authors conclude that further empirical research in this area is warranted this article presents a set of laboratory economics experiments to test johannesson et al s conjecture under controlled conditions in which participants face an actual risk of financial loss the laboratory results extend those of johannesson et al s providing strong evidence of pure altruism in coercive settings involving public risks

an analysis of selectivity in the productivity evaluation of biotechnology an application to corn we investigate selectivity bias in the evaluation of biotech hybrid productivity the analysis is applied to experimental data on wisconsin corn yields from 1990 to 2010 relying on a heckman like factor that accounts for selectivity we find evidence of selection bias indicating that some of the observed yield advantage associated with gm hybrids can be attributed to their conventional genes we document how the rising market concentration of biotech firms has contributed to increasing selectivity bias in corn yield the impact however is offset by the negative effect of the rising adoption rate of gm corn on selectivity bias copyright 2013 oxford university press

the influence of serotonin deficiency on choice deferral and the compromise effect abstractpsychological and physiological states such as mood hunger stress and sleep deprivation are known to affect decision making processes and therefore crucially influence consumer behavior a possible biological mechanism underlying the observed variability of consumer behavior is the context sensitive variation in the levels of neuromodulators in the brain in a series of four experimental studies the authors pharmaceutically reduce the levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain to diminish the availability of subjects cognitive resources in doing so they study how serotonin brain levels influence 1 subjects tendency to avoid buying and 2 consumers preference for product options positioned as a compromise in a given choice set rather than for more extreme alternatives i e the compromise effect using realistic product choice scenarios in a binding decision framework they find that a reduction of brain serotonin levels leads to choice deferral and decreases the compromise

optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly contrasting complements and substitutes from independently valued products we develop an analytical model of contingent valuations and address two questions of import to a monopolist i should a given pair of complements or substitutes be sold separately pure components together pure bundling or both mixed bundling and at what prices ii how do optimal bundling and pricing strategies for complements and substitutes differ from those for independently valued products we find that the combination of marginal cost levels and the degree of complementarity or substitutability determines which of the three bundling strategies is optimal complements and substitutes should typically be priced higher than independently valued products

within firm pay inequality financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms using a proprietary data set of public and private firms this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality relative wage differentials between top and bottom level jobs are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance moreover firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent received march 14 2016 editorial decision january 21 2017 by editor itay goldstein

assessing farmers risk preferences and their determinants in a marginal upland area of vietnam a comparison of multiple elicitation techniques we examine the consistency of risk preference measures based on eight hypothetical elicitation methods and a lottery game applied to smallholder farmers in a marginal upland environment in vietnam using these measures we identify influencing factors of risk aversion via regression analysis whereby unlike previous studies we include several proxies of social capital such as social networks and norms data were collected from household heads and spouses separately in a random sample of 300 households although correlations between most of the various risk preference measures are all statistically highly significant most are weak on average respondents have a high degree of risk aversion and specific characteristics gender age idiosyncratic shocks education social norms network reliance with extended family and connections to local authorities are significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods whereas others the household s dependency ratio wealth and covariate shocks are significant in a few methods only the explanatory power of the models is limited indicating that other factors are likely to be of greater importance in determining risk preferences the results can help target safety nets encourage investments and lead to the development of more applicable methods for assessing risk preferences of smallholders in developing countries

an analysis of bundle pricing in horizontal and vertical markets the case of the u s cottonseed market the u s cottonseed market has seen the rapid development and adoption of seeds with differing bundles of genetically modified gm traits it has also seen an increase in vertical integration by biotechnology firms in this article we investigate the price impacts associated with structural changes in the u s cottonseed market from 2002 to 2007 we develop a structural model to examine the substitution complementarity relationships among cottonseeds sold with different genetic trait bundles and under different vertical arrangements we examine the price impacts emanating from product differentiation market concentration and market size the econometric investigation finds evidence of subadditive bundle pricing in patented biotech traits while higher own market concentrations are found to be associated with higher prices we also uncover evidence of cross product complementarity effects that lead to lower prices simulations are used to evaluate net price effects illustrating the usefulness o ft he approach in the analysis of changing market structures

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

do union wealth concessions explain takeover premiums the evidence on contract wages abstract this paper investigates whether union wealth concessions caused by changes in real wage growth following takeovers explain target firm share price premiums point estimates imply that union wealth changes in the six years following the acquisition account for 1 to 2 of shareholder premiums this figure rises to 5 over 18 years for hostile takeovers union wealth increases by roughly 3 and 10 of shareholder gains over 6 and 18 year periods the 95 confidence interval for wage changes implies that unions may lose up to a quarter or gain up to a fifth of what target shareholders gain

identifying control motives in managerial ownership evidence from antitakeover legislation this study uses the introduction of second generation antitakeover legislation as a natural experimental setting to infer the value that managers place on the control rights conferred by stock ownership we conjecture that managers will reduce their stockholdings in the post legislation period because they can ensure their prior level of control while holding fewer risky shares using a variety of specifications we find robust evidence consistent with this revealed preference hypothesis further demonstrating the key role played by control considerations in managers stockholding decisions the reductions in ownership are concentrated in management teams with higher levels of initial ownership and in firms without poison pills

heterogeneous preferences and the individual change to alternative electricity contracts abstract based on data from a large scale computer based survey among more than 3700 citizens in germany this paper empirically disentangles the determinants of the general change of electricity contracts and the specific change from any green or non green to current green electricity contracts within the last ten years our econometric analysis reveals a strong relevance of behavioral factors and individual values and norms for example patience which was measured by an incentivized experiment included in the survey has a significantly positive effect on both general switches to alternative electricity contracts and specific switches to green electricity contracts furthermore trust and less robust social preferences also measured by an incentivized experiment have additional significantly positive effects on the specific change to green electricity contracts our estimation results also imply an important role of political identification i e an ecological policy orientation is strongly significantly positively correlated with the change to green electricity contracts furthermore several household specific factors like relocation decisions as well as socio demographic and socio economic variables like household income are also relevant the empirical analysis thus provides new explanation patterns for the phenomenon that relatively few households regularly change their electricity contracts and specifically switch to green electricity contracts although they have high stated preferences for such changes our insights suggest several directions for policy and electricity suppliers to increase these switching rates for example the high importance of trust for the change to green electricity contracts suggests transparency initiatives of electricity suppliers to decrease concerns against renewable energies

elicitation formats and the wta wtp gap a study of climate neutral foods we conduct a field valuation experiment where we vary the valuation method contingent valuation vs inferred valuation as well as the payment format dichotomous choice vs payment card willingness to accept and willingness to pay valuations are elicited in a within subjects design for foods with climate neutral labels we find a similar gap for valuations elicited with the contingent or the inferred valuation method however we also find that the gap can be muted by using a payment card elicitation format

a review of international green power markets recent experience trends and market drivers green power marketing the act of differentially selling electricity generated wholly or in part from renewable sources has emerged in more than a dozen countries around the world almost two million customers worldwide buy green power today this paper reviews green power marketing activity in australia canada japan the us and in a number of countries in europe to gain an understanding of consumer demand for electricity generated from renewable sources it also examines key factors that influence market penetration of green power products such as product designs pricing incentives marketing strategies policies and product certification 2002 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

bundling and licensing of genes in agricultural biotechnology we examine the strategic incentive for gene holders to vertically integrate with seed companies and chemical input companies with homogeneous conventional seeds we find that a pure bundling strategy produce the genetically modified seed only is dominant when the gene holder and breeder are respectively the monopolistic producers of genetically modified and conventional seeds they may commit to mixed bundling supply both genetically modified and conventional seed to deter potential entry to the conventional seed market a vertical merger may solve the credibility issue of the mixed bundling commitment through third party licensing agreements in the conventional seed market copyright 2009 oxford university press

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

is there discretion in wage setting a test using takeover legislation anecdotal evidence suggests that uncontrolled managers let wages rise above competitive levels testing this popular perception has proven difficult however because independent variation in the extent of managerial discretion is needed in this paper we use states passage of anti takeover legislation as a source of such independent variation passed in the 1980s these laws seriously limited takeovers of firms incorporated in legislating states since many view hostile takeovers as an important disciplining device these laws potentially raised managerial discretion in affected firms if uncontrolled managers pay higher wages we expect wages to rise following these laws using firm level data we find that relative to a control group annual wages for firms incorporated in states passing laws did indeed rise by 1 to 2 or about 500 per year the findings are robust to a battery of specification checks and do not appear to be contaminated by the political economy of the laws or other sources of bias our results suggest that discretion significantly affects wages they challenge standard theories of wage determination which ignore the role of managerial preferences

to bundle or not to bundle commodity bundling is studied in an environment where the dispersion of valuations unambiguously decreases when two or more goods are sold as a bundle only bundling is more likely to dominate separately selling the goods if marginal costs are low relative to the average valuation or if the distribution of valuations is very peaked around the mean

measuring market power and cost efficiency effects of industrial concentration in this paper i show how appelbaum s framework for testing price taking behavior in a single industry can be formally extended to consider concentration explicitly in so doing i separate the market power effect of concentration from its cost efficiency effect data from the us beef packing industry are used to illustrate an empirical application of the model the findings support oligopsonistic market power and slaughter cost efficiency in the industry however the cost efficiency effect outweighs the market power effect

discounting behavior a reconsideration we re evaluate the theory experimental design and econometrics behind claims that individuals exhibit non constant discounting behavior theory points to the importance of controlling for the non linearity of the utility function of individuals since the discount rate is defined over time dated utility flows and not flows of money it also points to a menagerie of functional forms to characterize different types of non constant discounting behavior the implied experimental design calls for individuals to undertake several tasks to allow us to identify these models and to several treatments such as multiple horizons and the effect of allowing for a front end delay on earlier payments the implied econometrics calls for structural estimation of the theoretical models allowing for joint estimation of utility functions and discounting functions using data collected from a representative sample of 413 adult danes in 2009 we draw striking conclusions assuming an exponential discounting model we estimate discount rates to be 5 6 on average this is significantly lower than all previous estimates using controlled experiments we also find no evidence to support quasi hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting and only modest evidence to support other specifications of non constant discounting furthermore the evidence for non constant discounting while statistically significant is not economically significant in terms of the size of the estimated discount rates we undertake extensive robustness checks on these findings including a detailed review of the previous comparable literature

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

ceo turnover and volatility under long term employment contracts we study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers ceos for ceo turnover and corporate policies using hand collected data on 3 954 fixed term ceo contracts we show that remaining time under contract predicts ceo turnover when contracts are close to expiration turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance we also show a positive within ceo relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or ceo survival nor technological cycles they are consistent with incentives to take long term projects with interim volatility

risk aversion and incentive effects comment charles a holt and susan k laury 2002 develop an experimental design to determine the risk attitude of an individual they use their observations to argue that increased incentives appear to change risk attitudes leading to greater risk aversion popular utility functions that do not allow for such effects are therefore misspecified building on this finding they estimate a flexible utility function that characterizes their aggregate data well but that does not assume constant absolute or relative risk aversion the basic holt and laury 2002 hl design should become an important tool for the interpretation and design of experiments in which risk attitudes could play a role however their most important result showing the effect of scaling up the stakes of the lottery choice task is confounded by a possible order effect an order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task the primary methodological contribution of experiments in economics is to enhance control ideally such control makes the explanatory variables of interest in this case scale orthogonal to other explanatory variables such as order allowing clearer inferences about behavior than one could get from field econometric data we argue that not controlling for order effects results in a misspecification of utility functions that is as important as that of scale the subjects in the hl design were given sequences of three or four tasks as shown in table 1 task 1 involved choices over lotteries with a baseline level of prizes which we will refer to as the 1 scale task 2 involved hypothetical choices over prizes with a scaled up level of prizes either 20 50 or 90 task 3 repeated task 2 but with choices that involved real payoffs task 4 was a return to the baseline task with real 1 prizes in some sessions subjects were not given task 2 or task 3 what could one infer from the comparison of measured risk attitudes in the 1 and 20 tasks in hl unfortunately any observed difference could be due either to the scale of the prizes involved or the task order or some combination of both thus the effect of scale is intrinsically confounded with the possible effect of task order this is a logical flaw in their design which

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

the role of local depositors in controlling expenses in small scale financial intermediation an empirical analysis using data on irish loan funds a nineteenth century quasi bank system we explore how the capital structure affects managerial agency to impact non interest expenses these organizations had no equity holders and were financed by deposits and capital comprising donations and accumulated profits creating problems of managerial moral hazard higher net income before non interest expenses is associated with higher salaries and other non interest expenses more surprisingly higher capital deposit ratios led to higher expenses even after controlling for net income while this institution is unique the findings suggest that depositors could assist in controlling expenses in microfinance organizations

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage payments hostile takeovers may have significant implications for long term employment contracts if they facilitate the opportunistic expropriation of extramarginal wage payments we test the expropriation hypothesis by studying the relationship between proxies for extramarginal wage payments and subsequent hostile takeover activity this paper improves on existing research by using firm and establishment level data from a salary survey of employers in addition we observe characteristics of wage and employment structures both before and after the occurrence of a hostile takeover and hence can see whether the data are consistent with reductions in extramarginal wage payments following such takeovers results from this ex post experiment provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that hostile takeovers result in reductions of extramarginal wage payments to more tenured workers mostly through cutbacks in senior positions at firms with relatively steep wage profiles

choice under uncertainty evidence from ethiopia india and uganda we review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in ethiopia india and uganda using these data we estimate that just over 50 of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately however when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory

consumer inequality aversion and risk preferences in community supported agriculture abstract in community supported agriculture csa consumers face a tradeoff between i the desire to support a csa farmer and obtain environmentally friendly goods and ii the risk associated with a long term commitment we elicit inequality aversion and risk preferences of a sample of 162 french csa consumers using incentivized field experiments we find that csa consumers are concerned about payoff inequalities while we obtain evidence of advantageous inequality aversion toward csa farmers we also find disadvantageous inequality seeking we find that csa consumers are risk averse and loss averse and distort probabilities we also observe that inequality and risk preferences in the loss domain might complement each other to strengthen consumers support for csa farmers

ownership agency and wages an examination of franchising in the fast food industry this paper estimates the difference in compensation between company owned and franchisee owned fast food restaurants the contrast is of interest because contractual arrangements give managers of company owned outlets less of an incentive to monitor and supervise employees estimates based on two data sets suggest that employee compensation is slightly greater at company owned outlets than at franchisee owned outlets the earnings gap is 9 percent for assistant and shift managers and 2 percent for full time crew workers furthermore the tenure earnings profile is steeper at company owned restaurants these findings suggest that monitoring difficulties influence the timing and generosity of compensation

loss aversion under prospect theory a parameter free measurement agrowing body of qualitative evidence shows that loss aversion a phenomenon formalized in prospect theory can explain a variety of field and experimental data quantifications of loss aversion are however hindered by the absence of a general preference based method to elicit the utility for gains and losses simultaneously this paper proposes such a method and uses it to measure loss aversion in an experimental study without making any parametric assumptions thus it is the first to obtain a parameter free elicitation of prospect theory s utility function on the whole domain our method also provides an efficient way to elicit utility midpoints which are important in axiomatizations of utility several definitions of loss aversion have been put forward in the literature according to most definitions we find strong evidence of loss aversion at both the aggregate and the individual level the degree of loss aversion varies with the definition used which underlines the need for a commonly accepted definition of loss aversion

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

enjoying the quiet life corporate governance and managerial preferences much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers when they are not closely monitored will pursue goals that are not in shareholders interests but what goals would managers pursue this paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences we use plant level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws we find that when managers are insulated from takeovers worker wages especially those of white collar workers rise the destruction of old plants falls but the creation of new plants also falls finally overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life

an analysis of the pricing of traits in the u s corn seed market we investigate the pricing of traits in the u s corn seed market under imperfect competition in a multiproduct context we examine how substitution complementarity relationships among products can affect pricing this is used to motivate generalizations of the herfindahl hirschman index capturing cross market effects of imperfect competition on pricing the model is applied to pricing of u s conventional and biotech seeds from 2000 to 2007 we reject the standard component pricing in biotech traits in favor of subadditive bundle pricing the econometric estimates show how changes in market structure as measured by both own and cross herfindahl indexes affect u s corn seed prices

the effects of firm initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting abstract although firm initiated clawbacks reduce accounting manipulation they also induce managers to engage in suboptimal activities e g reduce research and development r d expenses to achieve earnings targets to assess the effectiveness of clawback provisions we examine their impact from debtholders point of view we find that banks use more financial covenants and performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts and decrease interest rates after firms initiate clawbacks moreover we also find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral decreases subsequent to clawback adoption taken together our findings indicate that firm initiated clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality thereby reducing the information uncertainty that financing providers face