strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts this paper characterizes equilibrium exclusionary contracts between buyers an incumbent firm and a potential entrant when buyers can either vertically integrate or contract with the outside entrant in this setting exclusionary contracts are generally shown to be efficient and to deter inefficient entry that would otherwise occur with multiple unorganized buyers equilibrium contracts are shown to take a divide and conquer form and in some cases to deter some efficient entry in such cases efficient contracting can be restored by a policy that prohibits price discrimination and gives agents free reign to sign exclusionary agreements copyright 1994 by american economic association

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

are judges leading economic theory sunk costs the threat of entry and the competitive process in this paper we attempt to bring theoretical form to a particular entry argument that has found favor in the courts we suggest that sunk costs may not be a major impediment to entry when a group of customers can commit to an entry enhancing strategy buyers have strong incentives to adopt such strategies because they benefit directly from the resulting lower prices the simplest example involves a large buyer that is able to guarantee an entrant a market for its product long term contracts or even informal purchase commitments backed by customer reputation may also allow the entrant to obtain a guarantee of sufficient business to make the entry profitable once entry is thought likely to occur the existing competitors may be unwilling to attempt a price increase of any magnitude thus the threat of entry can maintain competitive prices even in the presence of sunk costs in section ii we motivate the analysis by discussing the current controversy over the role entry conditions play in an antitrust merger review then we discuss the necessary assumptions for a model of how the threat of entry can deter any price increase in the presence of sunk costs we note that these conditions are different from those commonly used in the economic literature

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

overcoming the dual liability of foreignness and privateness in international corporate citizenship partnerships responding to increased demands from stakeholder groups many companies have instituted corporate citizenship programs in recent years leveraging their specialized resources to create public goods and services at home and abroad significant suspicion nonetheless remains about the motives and impact of corporations acting in domains traditionally served by government and third sector organizations we argue that such ambivalence undermines the perceived legitimacy of private investments in public goods and that this fundamental liability of privateness lop constitutes a significant obstacle to corporations acting in the public domain through corporate citizenship initiatives for multinational corporations mncs the challenges stemming from the lop are further amplified by the liability of foreignness lof commonly associated with international business operations we discuss the origins of the lop and derive implications of the dual liability of lop and lof for partnering choices in mncs corporate citizenship programs we highlight limitations on the set of credible governance mechanisms available to participants in these partnerships describe a set of alternative governance arrangements that serve to realign incentives among alliance partners and link these to the severity of the lop in a particular setting we illustrate our arguments with a case description of microsoft s partners in learning program

economies of scale and barriers to entry dixit has recently presented a model in which established firms select capacity to discourage entry but cannot employ threats they would not rationally execute after entry entry deterrence in a slight modification of this model involves the classical limit price output under linear or concave demand however the capital cost of a firm of minimum efficient scale is an upper bound on the present value of the monopoly profit stream that can be shielded from entry it is argued that this suggests the general unimportance of entry barriers erected by scale economies

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

a consumer as an entrant in the norwegian cement market this paper sheds light on the strategy of two entrants in the norwegian cement market where both started importing cement one entrant was an initial consumer of the incumbent s product and thus imported for own consumption the author demonstrates that this type of entrant will undertake a sunk investment to have access to a second supplier in cases where other types of entrants are deterred both types of entrants must accept a high import price if the incumbent can purchase the exclusive right to import from foreign suppliers the author finds that the two observed entry attempts are consistent with the model s predictions copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

non insurance markets loss size manipulation and competition experimental evidence the common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in extracting price concessions however in markets where the buyer is an insurer the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly misaligned the positive dependence between loss size and the insurer s expected profits limits the insurer s incentives to reign in loss sizes in markets with small initial loss sizes insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance after having defined insurance and non insurance markets based on the initial loss size we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives to create insurance markets insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not return to the initial non insurance state this constitutes a welfare loss we design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find support monopolistic insurer subjects in non insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish insurance markets insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss size to uninsured consumers this provides an additional reason to be careful in granting insurers buyer power jel classification c92 d81 g22 i11 l13

cooperatives as entrants a potential shortcoming of game theoretic models in industrial organization is their failure to consider consumers as players we introduce a customer coalition a cooperative as a potential entrant and compare the cooperative entry threat with that posed by the usualforprofit entrant we identify four fundamental distinctions between cooperative andfor profit entrants and demonstrate that the strategic interplay between a cooperative and an incumbent firm may differ markedly from that between the incumbent and a for profit entrant the results impart a prospectively powerful role to potential cooperatives in beneficially regulating free market performance

internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm abstract the transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form simultaneously several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game these complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place through unilateral modifications in production technology because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi rent component of fifirm income this process may persist in equilibrium asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

explaining interfirm cooperation and performance toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource based view and organizational economics interfirm cooperation and its performance implications are examined in the context of two widely cited theoretical approaches to organizations broadly speaking the resource based view suggests that firms seek to capitalize on and increase their capabilities and endowments whereas organizational economics asserts that firms focus on minimizing the costs of organizing although these perspectives agree on managers likely actions in many areas their predictions diverge when interfirm cooperation is considered we take a step toward reconciling these differences by positing that firms place resource based concerns in front of considerations from organizational economics when deciding whether or not to engage in interfirm cooperation we examined this prediction using data from 94 publicly held restaurant chains the results support our integrated view but also suggest that giving primacy to resource concerns detracts from the performance of some firms we derive several implications of these findings in an effort to guide subsequent inquiry copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

trust interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial district an essential feature of the industrial district is trust among individuals and firms within it this paper focuses mainly on trust based on investments in building up a good reputation that is a personal capital that can even substitute for collateral in obtaining credit informal credit often linked to other transactions and especially subcontracting is therefore an important way of financing economic development in the industrial district moreover the importance of trust as personal capital gives rise to a double financial intermediation in the industrial district this double intermediation constitutes a device to reduce information problems that are usually responsible for credit rationing c 1994 academic press inc copyright 1994 by oxford university press

exchange rate policy and wage formation in an economy with many trade unions abstract exchange rate policy may confront governments with an important credibility problem while there is usually a long run gain from abstaining from devaluations there may also be a short run benefit from a devaluation this short run benefit may cause expectations of future devaluations resulting in wage and price rises that make the expectations self fulfilling this issue is analysed within a model with many trade unions if the government pursues a non devaluation policy the trade unions gain from voluntary wage restraint however if the non devaluation policy isn t credible the cooperation on wage restraint may break down

exchange rate policy wage formation and credibility abstract since the collapse of the bretton woods system some european countries have pursued discretionary exchange rate policies in order to maintain or enhance the international competitiveness of the traded goods sector these countries which typically feature centralized wage setting have also tended to experience high nominal wage increases the overall outcome may be described as a devaluation wage spiral this paper applies two models of repeated games to analyze the strategic interaction between an exchange rate setting policy maker and a wage setting trade union it is shown how a devaluation wage spiral may result from a conflict of interest over the real wage it is also shown how reputational forces may provide a way out of the devaluation wage spiral

mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment abstract mandated countertrade is a policy to restrict unilateral imports a country s government thereby in effect commits domestic firms not to purchase from a foreign trading partner unless there are reciprocal sales we argue that the policy may be a rational response to fundamental contracting failures our key assumption being that sellers are incompletely informed about buyers valuations in line with observed practices the analysis suggests that an optimal mandated countertrade policy will target high mark up imports and low mark up exports implications for global welfare are ambiguous and depend upon the extent of a double coincidence of wants

why corporations insure corporations insure to reduce the shirking information problem of joint production insurance encourages specialization in ownership increasing the returns to monitoring and lowering shareholders demand for a more diversified portfolio it enhances the credibility of specific capital as a performance bond and it lowers the cost to shareholders of compensating other members of the team for investing in firm specific assets tax and other factors may further encourage individual corporations to insure

uncertainty and monetary policy in a wage bargaining model in a wage bargaining model increased uncertainty concerning monetary and real aggregates is shown to give rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate moreover the equilibrium unemployment rate is found to depend on the choice of monetary policy regime as this choice affects the uncertainty wage setters face when setting the nominal wage rate it is also shown that the equilibrium inflation rate may depend on uncertainty in such a way that increased uncertainty gives rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate as well as a higher equilibrium inflation rate or what has been called stagflation

hyperbolic discounting and the phillips curve using a standard dynamic general equilibrium model we show that the interaction of staggered nominal contracts with hyperbolic discounting leads to inflation having significant long run effects on real variables

beware of the watchdog rethinking the normative justification of gatekeeper liability one of the prevailing explanations of the corporate scandals of the enron era and the recent financial crisis is the failure of professional gatekeepers such as auditors corporate lawyers and securities analysts to detect and disrupt corporate misconduct the alleged solution to this failure typically proposed and justified on consequentialist grounds is to impose legal liability on professionals the purpose of this paper is to critically examine the normative foundations of gatekeeper liability in the course of this paper i shall defend the claim that gatekeeper liability may be morally objectionable not only on grounds of fairness but also on consequentialist grounds the expected contribution of this paper is threefold first it systematizes the framing and moral justification of gatekeeping duties second it calls into question the normative underpinnings for targeting intermediaries instead of primary wrongdoers third it anticipates some negative and often overlooked results of gatekeeping strategies in the accounting profession specifically in the realm of clientele selection the expectation gap and auditor compensation

monetary institutions monopolistic competition unionized labor markets and economic performance recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy but not both this leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness we evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework we find that i the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation and ii for plausible values of this relative aversion and more than one union social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank we also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation

firm survival and industry evolution in vertically related populations this paper examines how the density and governance of vertically related populations affect the life chances of organizations we integrate the literatures on organizational ecology and vertical integration to develop a theory of how 1 specialized upstream industries affect downstream survival rates 2 the prevalence of different governance forms among upstream and downstream organizations moderates this relationship and 3 different forms of governance exert differential competitive pressures on focal organizations we find evidence supporting our hypotheses in an empirical examination of the downstream laser printer industry and upstream laser engine industry this paper was accepted by jesper sorensen organizations

a general tce model of international business institutions market failure and reciprocity in this study i propose a general transaction cost economics tce model of international business institutions in which cross border transactions can be conducted at multiple market levels e g output asset and equity and the buyer seller relationship can go both ways a sells to b and b sells to a this general model addresses two major gaps in the literature first although market failure is the driving force behind the rise of multinational enterprises mnes most researchers have focused on the failure of a single market without exploring the presence of substitute markets for cross border transactions second many previous studies have begun their analysis with a bilateral setup between an mne and an indigenous firm for example a licensing agreement but concluded with a unilateral decision made by the mne to evade the indigenous firm in the case of direct investment in bridging the two literature gaps i propose a general tce model to integrate all institutional modes available to firms for governing international business such as licensing outsourcing acquisitions and joint ventures built on a multi market framework my analysis reveals that the choice of the optimal international business institution is tantamount to the selection of the most efficient market to conduct cross border transactions drawing on a bilateral setup it explicitly recognizes the power of reciprocity in solving the problem of market failure this distinct approach points out promising directions for future researchers to advance international business studies particularly after my transaction level analysis has been expanded to also consider institutional contexts and firm capabilities

long term sustainability of third party facilitated market linkages evidence from the usda marketing assistance program in the armenian dairy industry abstract public private partnerships are increasingly seen as an important tool to build agri food supply chains and develop markets for agri food products in emerging economies however many of these initiatives fail when the public component of the program ends one exception is the usda market assistance program map that facilitated the redevelopment of the armenian dairy sector after privatization this paper presents a case study of this initiative and hypothesize that the usda map facilitated farmer investment in private enforcement capital this investment resulted in sustainable market relationships between farmers and dairy processors even after the usda map expired we find empirical evidence to support this hypothesis using a panel dataset collected from 172 armenian dairy farmers in 2004 and 2009

multiple wage bargaining systems in the single european currency area little attention in the emu literature has been paid to the interaction between central bank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining analytically and empirically coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraint to non accommodating monetary policy since wage determination is dominated by collective bargaining in all the emu member states and wage coordination within the member states has grown since 1980 this is a topic of potential importance in particular the replacement of the bundesbank directly targeting german inflation by an ecb targeting european inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in germany the consequences of this for emu are worked out under two scenarios that inflation expectations will be generated by ecb monetary policy and that they will reflect german inflation outcomes possible institutional developments are discussed including government union bargains the bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in germany again its replacement by the ecb targeting if at all european rather than german fiscal policy loosens fiscal constraints for underlying structural reasons therefore it is possible that germany and other emu countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

stabilisation policy targets and unemployment in imperfectly competitive economies this paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the central bank in a model where the central bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output money or nominal gdp the intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target we show that this leads to a lower mark up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment

gifts as economic signals and social symbols gift giving has often puzzled economists especially because efficient gifts like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for seem crass or inappropriate it is shown in a formal game theoretic model that gifts serve as signals of a person s intentions about future investment in a relationship and inefficient gifts can be better signals other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced and some stylized facts about gift giving practices are described many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts

union cooperation and nontraded goods in general equilibrium a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods and sector specific trade unions is set up wage formation is either noncooperative or cooperative egalitarian union wage policy is shown to be the equilibrium under cooperation important asymmetries are encountered and an alternative model of cooperative behavior called bargaining cooperation is proposed bargaining cooperation is shown to have qualitatively different implications than simple cooperation the welfare and employment effects of bargaining cooperation compared to simple cooperation are ambiguous

licensee technological potential and exclusive rights in international licensing a multilevel model granting of exclusive rights is an important consideration for firms using licensing as a mode of entry into foreign markets as exclusive contracts reduce licensors flexibility in a given market during the term of the agreement by granting exclusivity to a licensee with greater technological potential the exchange partners can increase the potential transactional value of the licensing agreement at the same time a licensee with strong technological potential will increase the threat of transactional hazards due to underinvestment and rent appropriation in this paper we develop and empirically test a model that evaluates the balancing of transactional value and transaction costs in exclusive licensing in particular we identify the conditions under which exclusive contracts are likely to be granted to foreign licensees with strong technological potential empirical results from a multilevel model based on 375 international licensing agreements of us firms in high technology industries during 1995 2008 show that licensees with a stronger technological potential are more likely to be granted exclusive rights in countries with strong intellectual property rights protection and in industries with a high rate of technological change but are less likely to be granted exclusive rights when there is a high degree of overlap between licensor and licensee products

how to deliver foreign aid the case of projects governed by the spanish international agency summary international agencies use two alternative modes of governance to deliver international aid projects under bilateral agreements with recipient governments in house or through incumbent ngos through the lenses of institutional and transaction cost economics this article examines 95 international aid projects delivered in morocco and ecuador by the spanish international agency finding that those projects delivered in house present different features than those projects outsourced through incumbent ngos specifically international aid projects delivered in house involve important investments in specific assets are much more complex and can turn the public agency into a hostage of its own disbursement

labour markets and monetary union a strategic analysis this paper shows that the effects of a monetary union depend on several labour market features in particular the switch from national monetary policies to a common monetary policy usually affects both inflation and unemployment even when all structural parameters of the economy and of unions and policymakers preferences remain the same the benchmark case of a monetary union between identical countries suggests that the switch to a monetary union is likely to make labour unions more aggressive increasing unemployment qualifications to this result are provided under alternative institutional scenarios like cross country asymmetries pre union erm membership and wage leadership

the term structure of interest rates and the demand for money during the great depression new estimates of the term structure of interest rates are used to investigate movements of and along the u s money demand function during the period 1920 38 the entire term structureand not just its short end is found to be important to the interwar demand for money function therefore the low short term interest rates of the early 1930s cannot be identified as evidence of easy money instead the widened spread between shortand long term interest rates is evidence of the liquidity crisis proposed by friedman and schwartz f s 10 in their explanation of the great depression this finding critically depends on use of new correctly measured term structures of interest rates the received estimates which are widely recognized to be crude approximations mask the important role played by the term structure in the monetary dynamics of the inter war period

instabilities of strategic alliances an internal tensions perspective the instabilities of strategic alliances have been examined in the literature through a number of theoretical approaches alliance instabilities refer to major changes or dissolutions of alliances that are unplanned from the perspective of one or more partners although the literature identifies certain characteristics of strategic alliances that may lead to their unplanned dissolution the extent of our understanding of this subject appears to be fragmented and incomplete in this article we propose a comprehensive framework for adequately understanding alliance instabilities based on the notion of internal tensions we suggest that strategic alliances are sites in which conflicting forces develop and which can be viewed as being constituted by three key pairs of competing forces namely cooperation versus competition rigidity versus flexibility and short term versus long term orientation this tensions framework helps us in explaining the intrinsic vulnerability of alliances in terms of a wide range of internal contradictions and enables us to examine in an integrated manner the incidence dynamics and eventual dissipation of the inherent instabilities we discuss the interrelationships among the different internal tensions and their impacts on different types of strategic alliances we also examine the termination of alliances through mergers acquisitions and dissolution finally we suggest ways to empirically test the various ideas and propositions developed here and indicate directions for further research

watta satta bride exchange and women s welfare in rural pakistan in a setting where husbands wield considerable coercive power forms of marriage should adapt to protect the interests of women and their families the authors study the pervasive marriage custom of watta satta in rural pakistan a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation they show that watta satta may be a mechanism to coordinate the actions of two sets of in laws each of whom wish to restrain their sons in law but who only have the ability to restrain their sons the authors empirical results support this view the likelihood of marital inefficiency as measured by estrangement domestic abuse and wife s mental health is significantly lower in watta satta arrangements as compared with conventional marriages but only after properly accounting for selection

buyers strategies entry barriers and competition in markets where sellers have customer specific investments and buyers can make credible but costly commitments to switch suppliers buyers strategies attenuate the market power of sellers furthermore since current prices and a buyer s decision to switch suppliers are related limit pricing becomes an equilibrium limit prices increase with the time it takes a buyer to switch suppliers and with buyers switching costs but fall with the level of sunk investments thus sunk investments may restrain the sellers ability to exert market power the paper questions then the standard inverse relationship between market performance and sunk investments

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

relative prices in monetary union and floating we analyse a small open economy with a tradable and a sheltered sector if the unions that operate in each sector coordinate their wage demands sectorwise the choice of monetary regime floating cum inflation target vs emu may affect the relative wages and prices of the economy we show that emu results in lower prices for tradable goods and lower real wages in the traded sector while opposite results hold for sheltered sector prices and wages thus if large unions behave strategically the choice of monetary regime has far reaching structural implications

macroeconomic policy wage setting and employment what difference does the emu make the likely impact of the emu on the variability and level of employment is analysed the major conclusions are 1 although an inflation target regime will constrain monetary policy of a non parti

policy credibility and inflation in a wage setting game this paper combines the conventional monetary policy game with a wage setting game among several non cooperating wage setters each with some monopoly power the inflationary bias in market economies is explained in terms of the wage competition bias this bias does not disappear even when the central bank communicates its policy goals precisely and credibly in a policy game with several non cooperative monopolistic wage setters and a central bank if discretionary policy is interpreted as wage setters being stackelberg leaders relative to the central bank a discretionary policy leads to both higher inflation and lower output

cross function and same function alliances how does alliance structure affect the behavior of partnering firms firms collaborate to develop and deliver new products these collaborations vary in terms of the similarity of the competencies that partnering firms bring to the alliance in same function alliances partnering firms have similar competencies whereas in cross function alliances partners have very different competencies on examining managers view of these alliances we find that on average same function alliances are expected to perform better than cross function alliances holding fixed the level of inputs a game theoretic analysis shows that this apprehension about cross function alliances is consistent with a pareto inferior equilibrium a pareto superior equilibrium however suggests that partners in cross function alliances may invest more in their alliances than those in same function alliances it is also often believed that increasing the number of partnering firms is not conducive for collaborative effort our analysis shows that this belief is correct for same function alliances but not for cross function alliances we test these equilibrium predictions in an experiment where we exogenously vary the type of alliance and the number of partnering firms the experimental results lend support for the pareto superior equilibrium partners in cross function alliances invested more than their counterparts in same function alliances and this difference in investment levels increased with the number of partnering firms we extend our model to consider alliances where firms have an opportunity to learn from their partners and later leverage this knowledge outside the scope of their alliance though such learning increases the resources committed by alliance partners in the learning phase it decreases investment in the subsequent competition and also dampens the overall investment across the two stages in addition an increase in interalliance competition decreases investments in the focal alliance but increases investment in the competition outside the scope of the alliance

transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise an assessment abstract this paper applies transactions cost principles to the multinational enterprise in order to ascertain its distinctive properties as a mode of economic organization the analysis helps identify just when and where contractual alternatives to the multinational firm are likely to be viable this turns out to depend upon the nature of the technology the regime of appropriability within which the firm operates and the characteristics of the markets in question transactions cost analysis is also extended to the multinational enterprise host country relationship implications for management and public policy are derived

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

leniency policies and illegal transactions abstract we study the consequences of leniency reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self report to law enforcers on sequential bilateral illegal transactions such as corruption manager auditor collusion or drug deals it is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction here we find that when not properly designed leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence

the nonneutrality of monetary policy with large price or wage setters monetary rules matter for the equilibrium rate of employment when the number of price wage setters is small even when assuming rational expectations complete information central bank precommitment and absence of nominal rigidities if the central bank is nonaccommodating sufficiently large unions bargaining independently have an incentive to moderate sectoral money wages and thereby expected real wages the result is an increase in the real money supply and hence higher demand and employment this does not hold with accommodating monetary policy since unions wage decisions cannot then affect the real money supply a similar argument holds for large monopolistically competitive price setters

buyer power from joint listing decision we consider a model of vertically related markets in which an upstream firm faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates with customers that compete in a downstream market we allow downstream firms to form a buyer group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members we show that transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harmful for a group member which in turn enhances the group members bargaining position at the expense of the upstream firm we also discuss the implication for upstream investment incentives

natural gas contracts in an emerging competitive market natural gas is being viewed by many as the fuel of the 1990s and beyond because of its environmental qualities relatively low cost and significant domestic resource base however in the fall of 1991 a group of electric utility executives met with then deputy secretary of energy henson moore and asserted that an inability to obtain long term gas contracts meant that supplies are unreliable and construction of gas fueled generating stations is being discouraged this study was requested by the deputy secretary to address the issues surrounding long term gas contracts and supply reliability the relationship between supply reliability and contracts is explained in terms of the number of buyers and sellers in a market with the appropriate state regulatory policies utilities can contract for gas and obtain reliable supplies at competitive market prices public utility commissioners are encouraged to permit utilities a free choice in signing gas contracts but to allow only competitive market prices to be reflected in allowable fuel costs

pattern bargaining and wage leadership in a small open economy pattern bargaining where the tradables manufacturing sector acts as wage leader is a common form of wage bargaining in europe our results question the conventional wisdom that such a bargaining set up produces wage restraint we find that all forms of pattern bargaining give the same macroeconomic outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate under monetary union a fixed exchange rate wage leadership for the non tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint and high employment whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not loss aversion and comparison thinking in wage setting where unions evaluate the utility of the wages of their members relative to a wage norm may lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector and promote high employment

the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms our study investigates the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms we argue that in early relationships the level of expected cooperative norms in an exchange is the result of a calculative process facilitated by transaction attributes joint transaction specific investments and observability the greater the level of these two exchange attributes the greater the level of cooperative exchange norms all else being equal we further argue that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms can deviate from the expected level because the development of such norms is the result of social processes that management cannot directly and fully control this gap between realized and expected norms affects exchange performance performance suffers when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms falls below the expected level but overshooting expectations lays a critical groundwork for repeat transactions the analysis of a survey of 182 collaborative r d alliances provides initial support for our theory

the role of buying consortia among smes in the electricity market in italy we model the electricity market in italy focusing on the impact of buying consortia among smes on the behaviour of the large electricity producers and sellers we show that consortia may in certain circumstances produce a pro competitive result i e they may induce a reduction of prices not only for consortia members but also for firms not in the consortia

monetary regimes and the co ordination of wage setting abstract a recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction however in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co ordinate their wage setting the present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco ordinated wage setting thus lowering unemployment in the unco ordinated outcome it also reduces wage setters incentives to co ordinate it is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment via the strengthening of the wage setters incentives to co ordinate

modes of foreign entry a transaction cost analysis and propositions a frontier issue in international marketing is the appropriate choice of entry mode in foreign markets the objective of this paper is to offer a transaction cost framework for investigating the entry mode decision this framework provides 1 a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions 2 propositions about interactions which resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date specifically the paper illustrates the feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant proposes that the most appropriate i e most efficient entry mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of resource commitment advances testable propositions delimiting the circumstances under which each mode maximizes long term efficiency

money demand and the term structure of interest rates some consistent estimates heller and khan 1979 hereafter hk employ a quadratic function of the term structure of interest rates to obtain quarterly coefficient estimates of its level slope and curvature these estimates are substituted for the interest rate variable in a short run money demand function hk conclude that their specification is stable during the turbulent 1972 1974 period this note shows that hk s stability findings are dependent upon their use of the cochrane orcutt iterative technique hereafter corc not the inclusion of term structure variables we show that money demand equations incorporating term structure information specifically the specifications of hk bilson and hale 1980 hereafter bh and our own which uses a cubic function of the term structure are not stable when the hatanaka 1974 hereafter hat procedure is employed to correct for serial correlation

on the economic efficiency of liquidated damages abstract recently aghion and bolton american economic review 1987 77 388 401 have shown that liquidated damages can serve as a barrier to entry and may therefore be socially harmful in this paper i show that liquidated damages remain excessive and continue to serve as a barrier to entry even in the presence of relationship specific investment but may nevertheless have an overall positive effect on welfare

wage setting under different monetary regimes in an economy with large wage setters like industry unions the monetary regime affects the trade off between consumer real wages and employment and profits faced by the wage setters this paper shows that an exchange rate target including participation in a monetary union is likely to involve lower wages in the traded sector and higher wages in the non traded sector than does a price target an exchange rate target also involves higher prices on non traded goods relative to on traded goods overall welfare is likely to be higher under a price target

product complementarities capabilities and governance a dynamic transaction cost perspective the organization and governance of the transactions that comprise a bundling arrangement depend on the distribution of capabilities among firms and the amount of time during which the window of opportunity for earning rents is expected to remain open firms engaged in inter firm collaboration must undertake support transactions related to billing marketing customer support and product repair these support transactions differ from the core transactions that have traditionally been perceived as sufficient to provide a product bundle since support transactions create costs of their own the market may turn out to be an expensive means of governing collaborative arrangements undertaken for bundling purposes the telecommunications service sector provides an illustration copyright 1997 by oxford university press

monetary factors in the great depression this paper examines the role of monetary policy in the early stages of the great depression and considers the mechanism whereby this policy may have affected real activity i conclude that the depression was preceded by a dramatic shift towards a highly contractionary monetary policy the economic impact of this policy seems unlikely to have come through the conventional keynesian channels of a shortage of liquidity and high ex ante real interest rates but instead may have operated through unanticipated deflation and after 1930 through the disruption of financial intermediation as a consequence of the banking panics

disorganization and financial collapse since the fall of communism the former soviet union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter we develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected we introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and show how these problems can alleviate the hold up problem we argue further that barter creates a hostage that allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement becomes prohibitively costly based on a firm survey in ukraine in 1997 we test how input shortages financial shortages and barter affect output growth of firms

central bank independence centralization of wage bargaining inflation and unemployment theory and some evidence abstract this paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables on real wages unemployment and inflation in a framework in which unions are averse to inflation this aversion moderates union s wage demands as they attempt to induce the central bank to inflate at a lower rate an increase in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining a decrease in the number of unions triggers two opposite effects on real wages unemployment and inflation it reduces the substitutability between the labor of different unions and therefore the degree of effective competition between them this reduced competition effect raises real wages unemployment and inflation but the decrease in the number of unions also strengthens the moderating effect of inflationary fears on the real wage demands of each union this strategic effect lowers real wages unemployment and inflation for sufficiently inflation averse unions the interaction between those two effects produces a calmfors driffill type relation between real wages and centralization the paper analyzes the effects of central bank independence on the position and the shape of this relation as well as on inflation and unemployment the paper features two mechanisms one of which is novel through which monetary institutions have real effects the model implies that if there is a single union social welfare is maximized when the central bank attaches a zero weight to inflation but when the number of unions is larger than one this result is no longer true in general empirical evaluation of some of the theoretical implications using data from 19 developed economies is for the most part supportive of those implications

formation of buyer seller trade networks in a quality differentiated product market we examine the formation of buyer seller links when exchange can take place only if such a link exists sellers produce products of different qualities and multiple sellers can form a sellers association to pool their customers setting uniform prices buyers form trade links with individual sellers or sellers associations we show which buyer seller links will form and find the set of links that are stable and show how these links influence prices we also show that a trade network mismatch may occur where a high quality good remains unsold even without an economy wide excess supply of goods jel classification d40 d51 d82