bubbles and experience an experiment we investigate the occurrence of bubble crash pricing patterns in laboratory financial markets with a mixture of experienced and inexperienced traders we find that even with a minority of experienced traders bubbles are substantially abated

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

does aid affect governance why is there little robust evidence that foreign aid significantly enhances the economic growth of poor countries the search for an explanation is becoming immensely important as industrial countries are being exhorted to increase their aid budgets in order to help developing countries achieve the millennium development goals perhaps one should not expect an impact on growth from the mere infusion of additional capital into a country but perhaps any beneficial effects are offset by adverse spillover effects and academic focus should shift to determining what these are and how to mitigate them in this regard figure is suggestive we plot the log of the manufacturing to gross domestic product gdp ratio in a country against the log of the ratio of aid received to gdp for that country for two separate time periods the late 990s and the early 980s conditional on a number of variables as the figure suggests the more aid a country has received the smaller its share of manufacturing the coefficient estimate suggests that a percentage point increase in the ratio of aid to gdp is associated with a reduced share of manufacturing in total gdp of about 0 2 to 0 3 percentage points

it is not just confusion strategic uncertainty in an experimental asset market to what extent is the observed mispricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic uncertainty and by confusion we address this question by comparing subjects initial price forecasts in two market environments one with six human traders and the other with one human and five computer traders we find that both strategic uncertainty and confusion contribute equally to the median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental value the effect of strategic uncertainty is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the cognitive reflection test and it is not significant for those with low scores

thar she bursts reducing confusion reduces bubbles to explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of smith suchanek and williams 1988 we vary the fundamental value process constant or declining and the cash to asset value ratio constant or increasing we observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing c a ratio a questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant running the experiment with a different context stocks of a depletable gold mine instead of stocks significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion jel c91 d14 g11 g12

legislative organization and pollution taxation the role of political institutions in shaping public policy has been analyzed in isolation from corruption and legislative organization specifically bicameralism has received minimal attention we analyze pollution taxation when decisions are influenced by several veto players such as legislative chambers our theory predicts that an increase in the number of veto players e g moving from uni to bi cameralism pushes the pollution tax towards the social optimum with the effect being conditional on corruption as such dispersion around the optimal tax is lower under bicameralism empirical tests using data from 86 countries support the theory

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

government growth in the twenty first century public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories budget maximization theories rational choice models and path dependent models like the ratchet hypothesis the strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty first century government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government s ability to continue to expand the tax base

on the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods this study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods in order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency we extend the model of volden and wiseman am polit sci rev 101 79 92 2007 by considering quasi linear utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements we show that pareto inefficiency is associated with non unanimous consent we also study how i the endogenous selection of the legislature s size or ii a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

leader driven primacy using attribute order to affect consumer choice leader driven primacy uses initial product information to install a targeted brand as the early leader in a choice between two brands biased evaluation of subsequent attributes builds support for the targeted brand causing the choice itself to be biased study 1 finds evidence of this effect in choices between two equally attractive brands study 2 extends the finding to a situation where one brand is inferior and to conditions where participants do not explicitly identify their leader study 3 shows how leader driven primacy can be reduced by encouraging brand based processing

traders expectations in asset markets experimental evidence we elicit traders predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15 period lived asset we find that individuals beliefs about prices are adaptive and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market and when experienced they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur when prices deviate from fundamental values belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks

goal reversion in consumer choice how do consumers manage goal conflicts before making a choice this question was studied by examining emerging preferences in choices involving two products that were means to conflicting goals these preference patterns revealed that an initially active goal which had been set aside to reconcile a goal conflict exerted greater than expected influence on the remainder of the choice process this influence was manifest in a tendency for consumers to revert to the product aligned with the initially active goal upon seeing information that objectively favored neither product the prevalence of the reversion i e flip flop preference pattern suggests that activation of a set aside goal escalates when it is set aside much as if its pursuit had been impeded by an external force in addition to revealing goal reversion in a variety of choice contexts the studies in this article also find that goal reversion is moderated by goal conflict

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

how do experienced traders respond to inflows of inexperienced traders an experimental analysis we conducted asset market experiments where one experienced subject interacts with five inexperienced subjects to investigate how experienced subjects change their price forecasts and trading behavior when faced with strategic uncertainty caused by inflows of inexperienced subjects only half the experienced subjects initially forecasted prices deviating more from the fundamental values in the market with five inexperienced subjects than in the final round of the experiment in which they had previously participated furthermore the majority of our experienced subjects did not change their trading behavior many experienced subjects act as price stabilizers when the inflow of inexperienced subjects is not associated with other changes in market conditions

price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets abstract price bubbles relative to intrinsic dividend value are observed using a call market trading institution market prices tend to track intrinsic value only when the same group of highly experienced traders participate in three consecutive 15 round markets

towards micropolitical foundations of public finance abstract observed fiscal policy reflects the incentives embedded in political institutions in this paper we illustrate the effects of two general institutional features separation of powers which is common in presidential congressional political systems and legislative cohesion which is typical of parliamentary systems compared to a simple legislative game separation of powers brings about a smaller size of government and lower waste legislative cohesion induces a more equal distribution but more waste and higher taxes than separation of powers

a quantitative easing experiment abstract we experimentally investigate the effect of a central bank buying bonds for cash in a quantitative easing qe operation in our experiment the bonds are perfect substitutes for cash and have a constant fundamental value which is not affected by qe in the rational expectations equilibrium we find that qe raises bond prices above those in the benchmark treatment without qe subjects in the benchmark treatment learned to trade the bonds at their fundamental value but those in treatments with qe became more convinced after repeated exposure to the same treatment that qe boosts bond prices this suggests the possibility of a behavioural channel for the observed effects of actual qe operations on bond yields

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

supplying trade reform political institutions and liberalization in middle income presidential democracies correcting the relative lack of attention to the supply side of trade policy this article addresses how political institutions channel societal demands for protection i hypothesize that strong presidents with significant legislative powers and strong party leaders empowered through electoral rules that rein in the personal vote can help overcome protectionist biases these arguments compare with two institutional alternatives first that protectionism should decrease as electoral district size grows because elections become more proportional and second that the collective action problems in fragmented party systems thwart trade reform i evaluate these hypotheses empirically using pooled time series cross sectional data involving 18 developing countries from 1971 to 1997 i find that delegation to presidents and party leaders is significantly related to trade liberalization and some evidence suggests that the effective number of parties and the size of electoral districts may also influence levels of protectionism

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

price dispersion in the lab and on the internet theory and evidence price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook bertrand competition we show that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion a variety of statistical tests based on datasets from two independent laboratory experiments and structural estimates of the parameters of our models suggest that bounded rationality based theories of price dispersion organize the data remarkably well evidence is also presented to suggest that the models are consistent with data from a leading internet price comparison site

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

the inflow effect trader inflow and price efficiency abstract we investigate the impact of cash and trader inflow on price efficiency in multi period experimental asset markets implementing eight treatments with 672 subjects we find that i the joint inflow of cash and traders triggers strong overvaluation and massive price run ups inflow effect remarkably the effect occurs in almost all of the 30 markets with joint cash and trader inflow and is very robust the effect even prevails in markets with complete and symmetric fundamental information we further show that ii in treatments with the joint inflow of cash and traders prices crash to fundamentals towards maturity of the asset the analysis of traders beliefs reveals that iii despite fundamental values staying constant beliefs about fundamentals co move with upwardly trending prices finally we report a speculative motive only among the optimists in treatments where we observe the inflow effect

theoretical comparisons of electoral systems abstract elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced a variety of electoral systems are reviewed cox s threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates positions when the number of serious candidates is given duverger s law and its generalizations are discussed to predict the number of serious candidates duverger s law is interpreted as a statement about electoral barriers to entry and this idea is linked to the question of the effectiveness of democratic competition as a deterrent to political corruption the impact of post electoral bargaining on party structure in presidential and parliamentary systems is discussed

political parties and the size of government in multiparty legislatures examining cross country and panel data evidence this article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of gdp in multiparty legislatures the author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure conversely as the size of the majority party grows from a bare minimum majority to above the supermajority level it has a nonlinear specifically cube effect on central government expenditure panel data on central government expenditure from 110 countries are used to test these arguments the results corroborate the theoretical claims and are robust in regression models where fixed effects were introduced and endogeneity was corrected finally an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher government spending on subsidies and transfers but to lower spending on public goods

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

heterogeneity of beliefs and trade in experimental asset markets we investigate the relationship between traders expectations and market outcomes with experimental asset market data the data show that those who have high price expectations buy more frequently and submit higher bids and those who hold low price expectations sell more frequently and submit lower bids traders who have more accurate expectations achieve greater earnings simulations using only belief data reproduce the pricing patterns observed in the market well indicating that the heterogeneity of expectations is a key to explaining market activity

bubbles and financial professionals the efficiency of financial markets and their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates yet little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency we run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502 students we find that professional markets with bubble drivers capital inflows or high initial capital supply are susceptible to bubbles although they are more efficient than student markets in mixed markets with students bubbles also occur but professionals act as price stabilizers we show that heterogeneous price beliefs drive overpricing especially in bubble prone market environments

aid effectiveness and the politics of personalism this article examines how political institutions that provide an incentive to cultivate a personal vote condition the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in developing country democracies politicians in aid recipient countries with high levels of personalism are more likely to pursue corruption and target government spending to narrow constituencies because personalism affects these outcomes it provides incentives to use foreign aid for politically motivated spending at the expense of investing foreign aid in growth promoting public goods using panel data from 61 aid recipient democracies from 1961 to 2001 the author finds that aid increases growth in democracies with less personalist institutions but decreases growth in countries with high personalism the author also shows that personalism conditions the relationship between aid and the composition of government spending aid increases spending on public goods relative to narrow particularistic goods in countries with low person

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

the impact of auction choice on revenue in treasury bill auctions an empirical evaluation abstract i evaluate whether uniform price or discriminatory auctions are revenue superior for selling treasury bills to this end i apply two structural econometric models hortacsu and mcadams 2010 and fevrier et al 2002 to a dataset on polish zero coupon bonds my secondary aim is to analyze mutual inconsistencies in prediction from these models i find that both agree on the revenue superiority of discriminatory auctions by between 0 01 and 1 5 the models predictions are contradictory in only 7 of auctions the large scale agreement of two vastly different models gives confidence that the conclusions on polish data are robust to varying many of the underlying economic and econometric assumptions and not likely just a modeling artifact

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

the cost of intraparty competition the single nontransferable vote and money politics in japan many scholars have argued that money politics in japan has been driven in part by the imperatives of intraparty competition under the single nontransferable vote sntv system used for lower house

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

the impact of competition on management quality evidence from public hospitals in this paper we examine the causal impact of competition on management quality we analyze the hospital sector where geographic proximity is a key determinant of competition and english public hospitals where political competition can be used to construct instrumental variables for market structure since almost all major english hospitals are government run closing hospitals in areas where the governing party has a small majority is rare due to fear of electoral punishment we find that management quality measured using a new survey tool is strongly correlated with financial and clinical outcomes such as survival rates from emergency heart attack admissions ami more importantly we find that higher competition as indicated by a greater number of neighboring hospitals is positively correlated with increased management quality and this relationship strengthens when we instrument the number of local hospitals with local political competition adding another rival hospital increases the index of management quality by one third of a standard deviation and leads to a 10 7 reduction in heart attack mortality rates

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

electoral rules and corruption is corruption systematically related to electoral rules recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer but little is known about the data we try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s we exploit the cross country variation in the data as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform the evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to entry are associated with less corruption whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists and thus less individual accountability are associated with more corruption individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality rule elections even though open party lists also seem to have some effect because different aspects roughly offset each other a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption jel e62 h3

buying war not peace the influence of corruption on the risk of ethnic war this article presents robust findings for the positive effect of corruption on the risk of ethnic civil war using binary time series cross section data that cover 87 to 121 countries per year between 1984 and 2007 following a grievance based explanation of violent intrastate conflict we argue that corruption increases the risk of large scale ethnic violence as it creates distortions in the political decision making process which lead to a deepening of political and economic inequalities between different ethnic groups the positive effect of corruption on the risk of ethnic civil war is robust to various model specifications including the interaction between corruption and natural resource wealth

nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets lack of common knowledge of rationality vs actual irrationality we report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets in a setting in which speculation is not possible bubbles and crashes are observed the results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation in markets where speculation is possible is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment

does foreign aid corrupt abstract we estimate the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality aid decreases corruption our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different controls

environmental policy in majoritarian systems abstract this paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental tax policies in majoritarian federal electoral systems such as the u s and derives implications for the environmental federalism debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental taxes in the absence of majority bias the socially preferred policy would be federal district level taxation which accounts both for cross boundary pollution and differences in industry concentration across districts in majoritarian systems however where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts the majority party at the national or state level favors home districts depending on the location of polluting industries and the associated damages the majority party may therefore impose sub optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias majority bias can influence the social welfare ranking of alternative environmental tax policies in some cases majority bias may make decentralized or federal uniform taxation the preferred solution

differentiating mixed member electoral systems mixed member majoritarian and mixed member proportional systems and government expenditures the increasing use of mixed member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems an analysis of mixed member system policy effects is problematic given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems this article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed member majoritarian mmm and mixed member proportional mmp systems lead to differences in policy outputs the political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that mmp systems which are more proportional than mmm systems are correlated with higher levels of government spending thus the mmm mmp

a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics we develop a novel model of campaigns elections and policy making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators this generates a distinction between policy rhetoric and policy reality and introduces an important role for party discipline in the policy making process we identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics when trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens i introduction in a democracy the majority rules often this means that the policies enacted by elected governments reflect the preferences of some citizens more than those of others this feature of democracy commonly known as tyranny of the majority arises in institutional settings in which elected officials represent disproportionately the interests of their own constituents and electees who represent the minority have limited means to influence policy in this paper we argue that tyranny of the majority imparts a protectionist bias to democratic politics this is so even when the average citizen covets free trade and when every citizen has an equal probability of being represented in the policy making process by protection we mean policies that favor quasi fixed factors of production thus protection in our parlance refers both to tariffs that shield import competing industries from foreign competition and subsidies that promote exports the bias refers to the average or expected policy outcome we focus on majoritarian systems in which elected legislators represent geographic regions the existence of a protectionist bias requires only that i national party leaders cannot fully commit their candidates to adopt particular policies if elected ii mem

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact abstract we show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification moreover with sanctions contingent on the observed state of the economy the pact avoids aggravating the situation of a country in recession moral hazard problems arise if the state also depends on unobservable politically costly fiscal effort this could explain why sanctions under the actual stability and growth pact are only automatically waived in extreme recessions and why the procedure linking observed deficits and sanctions involves a long and detailed assessment of a country s situation

monetary policy bounded rationality and incomplete markets this paper extends the benchmark new keynesian model by introducing two frictions i agent heterogeneity with incomplete markets uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and occasionally binding borrowing constraints and ii bounded rationality in the form of level k thinking compared to the benchmark model we show that the interaction of these two frictions leads to a powerful mitigation of the effects of monetary policy which is more pronounced at long horizons and offers a potential rationalization of the forward guidance puzzle each of these frictions in isolation would lead to no or much smaller departures from the benchmark model

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

taking time seriously dramatic world change has stimulated interest in research questions about the dynamics of politics we have seen increases in the number of time series data sets and the length of typical time series but three shortcomings are prevalent in published time series analysis first analysts often estimate models without testing restrictions implied by their specification second researchers link the theoretical concept of equilibrium with cointegration and error correction models third analysts often do a poor job of interpreting results the consequences include weak connections between theory and tests biased estimates and incorrect inferences we outline techniques for estimating linear dynamic regressions with stationary data and weakly exogenous regressors we recommend analysts 1 start with general dynamic models and test restrictions before adopting a particular specification and 2 use the wide array of information available from dynamic specifications we illustrate this strategy with data on congressional approval and tax rates across oecd countries

corruption and the composition of government expenditure abstract this paper asks whether predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure corruption is found to reduce government spending on education in a cross section of countries

irrelevance of open market operations in some economies with government currency being dominated in rate of return this paper describes an environment in which government issued currency is dominated in rate of return and in which there obtains a modigliani miller theorem for government open market operations earlier modigliani miller theorems for government finance have been stated for environments in which government issued currency is not dominated in rate of return in equilibrium since government issued currency is widely observed to be dominated in return it is useful to study how modigliani miller theorems hinge on absence of rate of return dominance

political selection under alternative electoral rules we study the patterns of political selection in majoritarian versus proportional systems political parties face a trade off in choosing the mix of high and low quality candidates high quality candidates are valuable to voters and thus help to win elections but they crowd out loyal candidates who are most preferred by the parties under proportional representation politicians selection depends on the share of swing voters in the entire electorate in majoritarian elections it depends also on the distribution of competitive versus safe single member districts we show that a majoritarian system with only a few competitive districts is less capable of selecting good politicians than a proportional system as the share of competitive districts increases the majoritarian system becomes more efficient than the proportional system however for a large enough share of competitive districts a non monotonic relation arises the marginal positive effect of adding high quality politicians on the probability of winning the election is reduced and highly competitive majoritarian systems become less efficient than proportional ones in selecting good politicians

city level analysis of the effect of political regimes on public good provision this paper uses u s city level data on five public expenditure categories to test empirically whether the form of local government affects the amount of public good provision this also serves as an empirical test of a theory of national politics that predicts higher provision of public good in parliamentary than in presidential regimes the robust results indicate that at the city level the mayor council form of government provides significantly more public good than the council manager form of government for two of the public expenditure categories and at the national level presidential regimes provide more public good than do parliamentary regimes

aid policies and growth comment in an extraordinarily influential paper craig burnside and david dollar 2000 p 847 find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies this finding has enormous policy implications the burnside and dollar 2000 henceforth bd result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid if aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies this suggests that 1 aid can promote economic growth and 2 it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies international aid agencies public policy makers and the press quickly recognized the importance of the bd findings this paper reassesses the links between aid policy and growth using more data the bd data end in 1993 we reconstruct the bd database from original sources and thus 1 add additional countries and observations to the bd data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses and 2 extend the data through 1997 thus using the bd methodology we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies given our focus on retesting bd we do not summarize the vast pre bd literature on aid and growth we just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth and disagreements over econometric specification see gustav f papanek 1972 robert cassen 1986 paul mosley et al 1987 peter boone 1994 1996 and henrik hansen and finn tarp s 2000 review since bd found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results including paul collier and jan dehn 2001 carljohan dalgaard and hansen 2001 patrick guillaumont and lisa chauvet 2001 hansen and tarp 2001 robert lensink and howard white 2001 and collier and dollar 2002 these papers conduct useful variations and extensions some of which had already figured in the pre bd literature such as introducing additional control variables using nonlinear specifications etc some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample we differentiate our paper from these others by not deviating from the bd specification thus we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations but instead maintain the bd methodology this paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to bd thus we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997 easterly department of economics new york university 269 mercer street new york ny 10003 center for global development and national bureau of economic research e mail william easterly nyu edu levine department of finance carlson school of management university of minnesota 321 19th avenue south minneapolis mn 55455 and national bureau of economic research e mail rlevine csom umn edu roodman center for global development 1776 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 e mail droodman cgdev org we are grateful to craig burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper thanks also to francis ng and prarthna dayal for generous assistance with updating the sachs warner openness variable and to three anonymous referees craig burnside and henrik hansen for helpful comments 1 see for instance the world bank 1994 2001 2002 the u k department for international development 2000 president george w bush s speech march 16 2002 the announcement by the white house on creating the millennium challenge corporation white house 2002 as well as a washington post editorial february 9 2002 a financial times column by alan beattie march 11 2002 and the economist march 16 2002

legislative organization and government spending cross country evidence abstract the law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact the law of 1 n has received only limited empirical scrutiny and the existing evidence for the american states provides mixed support for the thesis this paper examines the law of 1 n in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross section of democratic countries the results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures but bicameralism dampens the 1 n effect relative to unicameralism

effects of different ways of incentivizing price forecasts on market dynamics and individual decisions in asset market experiments in this study we investigate a whether eliciting future price forecasts influences market outcomes and b whether differences in the way in which subjects are incentivized to submit accurate price forecasts influence market outcomes as well as the forecasts in an experimental asset market we consider four treatments one without forecast elicitation and three with forecast elicitation in two of the treatments with forecast elicitation subjects are paid based on their performance in both forecasting and trading while in the other treatment with forecast elicitations they are paid based on only one of those factors which is chosen randomly at the end of the experiment we found no significant effect of forecast elicitation on market outcomes in the latter case thus to avoid influencing the behavior of subjects and market outcomes by eliciting price forecasts paying subjects based on either forecasting or trading performance chosen randomly at the end of the experiment is better than paying them based on both in addition we consider forecast only experiments one in which subjects are rewarded based on the number of accurate forecasts and the other in which they are rewarded based on a quadratic scoring rule we found no significant difference in terms of forecasting performance between the two

openness government size and the terms of trade this paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments both theoretically and empirically we argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels 1 a terms of trade externality whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and 2 the demand for insurance whereby trade raises risk and public transfers we provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods moreover while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare the second is instead optimal in the empirical part of the paper we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants consistently with the terms of trade externality channel we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments

the size and composition of government expenditure abstract this paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure the purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude using government financial statistics data from the imf covering over 100 countries from 1970 2000 i look at cross sectional and inter temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure such as defense education health care and different levels of government central and local among other results i find a new explanation for wagner s law widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

political conditionality and foreign aid this article argues that a new generation of political conditionalities has emerged during the last decade this requires an expansion of the original definition and research agenda beyond the traditional questions of use and effectiveness however there is also a need to dig deeper into the dynamics surrounding political conditionalities particularly the bargaining processes and outcomes along the aid chain from domestic donor politics donor harmonization fora policy dialog spaces to the political economy of recipient institutional reform and donor coping strategies because they influence the set up use follow up purpose and effectiveness of pcs

thar she blows can bubbles be rekindled with experienced subjects we report 28 new experiment sessions consisting of up to three experience levels to examine the robustness of learning and error elimination among participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles our answer to the title question is yes we impose a large increase in liquidity and dividend uncertainty to shock the environment of experienced subjects who have converged to equilibrium and this treatment rekindles a bubble however in replications of that same challenging environment across three experience levels we discover that the environment yields a rare residual tendency to bubble even in the third experience session therefore a caveat must be placed on the effect of twice experienced subjects in asset markets in order for price bubbles to be extinguished the environment in which the participants engage in exchange must be stationary and bounded by a range of parameters experience including possible error elimination is not robust to major new environment changes in determining the characteristics of a price bubble jel c91 d83

policy experimentation political competition and heterogeneous beliefs abstract we consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally but faces competition from a political opponent in the future both parties care about voters payoffs but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes we show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices policy experimentation future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies it manipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future thus avoiding facing competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself the model thus demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to over experiment relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods we thus identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on parties having conflicting objectives but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

the personal vote and the efficacy of education spending in this article we explore the ways in which incentives to cultivate a personal vote affect the efficiency of education spending in developing democracies we argue that where the electoral system provides incentives for political particularism resources are allocated less efficiently and the effect of increased spending on literacy is diminished we test our hypotheses using data on education spending and performance in over 40 developing democracies since 1980 we find that though personal vote systems spend just as much on education as party vote systems particularism in personal vote systems dampens the marginal effect of increased education spending on illiteracy and at its highest levels incentives to cultivate a personal vote completely undermine the positive effects of increased education spending on literacy

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

the devaluation effect activating a need devalues unrelated objects it is commonly assumed that an object capable of satisfying a need will be perceived as subjectively more valuable as the need for it intensifies for example the more active the need to eat the more valuable food will become this outcome could be called a valuation effect in this article we suggest a second basic influence of needs on evaluations that activating a focal need e g to eat makes objects unrelated to that need e g shampoo less valuable an outcome we refer to as the devaluation effect two existing studies support the existence of a devaluation effect using manipulations of the need to eat and to smoke and measuring attractiveness of consumer products and willingness to purchase raffle tickets furthermore the evidence suggests that consumers are not aware of the devaluation effect and its influence on their preferences

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

a review of bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets this paper discusses the literature on bubbles and crashes in the most commonly used experimental asset market design introduced by smith et al it documents the main findings based on the results from 41 published papers 3 book chapters and 20 working papers

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted