auditors response to political connections and cronyism in malaysia this paper extends the literature on the role of political economy in financial reporting and auditing by testing two hypotheses the first hypothesis predicts that there will be a greater increase in audit effort and audit fees for malaysian firms with political connections as a result of the asian financial crisis than for non politically connected firms because these firms have a higher risk of financial misstatements the second hypothesis predicts that the audit fees of politically connected firms will decline when capital controls are introduced by the government as a ploy to financially assist politically connected firms to rebound from the crisis and thus reduces the risk of financial misstatements the results show that there is a greater increase in audit fees for firms with political connections than for non politically connected firms as a result of the asian financial crisis however there is a decline in audit fees for politically connected firms after the capital controls are implemented

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

are health insurance markets competitive to gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry i investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums ceteris paribus to more profitable firms such direct price discrimination is feasible only in imperfectly competitive settings using a proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large multisite firms from 1998 2005 i find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth even for the same health plans moreover within a given firm those sites located in concentrated insurance markets experience the greatest premium increases the findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets

competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection market power and adverse selection are prevalent features of the market for pre paid health plans however most of the literature on adverse selection considers extreme cases either perfect competition or monopoly if instead health plans are horizontally differentiated then i profits derived from each low risk are higher than from each high risk and ii when the profits derived from each high risk are negative cross subsidization a health authority as informed as the health plans can implement a pareto improvement both local and global deviations from cross subsidization are addressed within a nash equilibrium framework

health plan choice using a unique panel dataset of health plan choices and personal characteristics of employees at a single firm this paper provides estimates of price elasticities for health insurance plans in a managed competition setting estimated price elasticities are larger in absolute value than most previous estimates and the magnitude of the price elasticity suggests that there is a place for price competition in this market we also find evidence of transition costs in switching health plans for older and less healthy employees such differential responses to price may contribute to adverse selection in this market

trust and stock price crash risk evidence from china abstract this paper examines the impact of social trust on stock price crash risk social trust measures the level of mutual trust among the members of a society using a large sample of chinese listed firms for the 2001 2015 period we find that firms headquartered in regions of high social trust tend to have smaller crash risks this result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests and is more prominent for state owned enterprises soes for firms with weak monitoring and for firms with higher risk taking moreover we observe that firms in regions of high social trust are associated with higher accounting conservatism and fewer financial restatements our study suggests that social trust is an important variable that is omitted in the literature investigating the predictors of stock price crashes

political connections and stock price crash risk evidence from china abstract we examine how political connections may influence a firm s crash risk in china we find that politically connected firms have lower crash risk than their counterparts moreover the effect of political connections varies according to their strength and types

can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting u s securities laws abstract the study tests the functional convergence hypothesis which states that foreign firms can leapfrog their countries weak legal institutions by listing equities in new york and agreeing to follow u s securities law evidence shows that the sec and minority shareholders have not effectively enforced the law against cross listed foreign firms detailed evidence from mexico further shows that while some insiders exploited this weak legal enforcement with impunity others that issued a cross listing and passed through an economic downturn with a clean reputation went on to receive privileged long term access to outside finance as compared with legal bonding reputational bonding better explains the success of cross listings

does inflation adjust faster to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks this paper studies u s inflation adjustment speed to aggregate technology shocks and to monetary policy shocks in a medium size bayesian vector autoregression model according to the model estimated on the 1959 2007 sample inflation adjusts much faster to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks these results are robust to different identification assumptions and measures of aggregate prices however by separately estimating the model over the pre and post 1980 periods this paper further shows that inflation adjusts much faster to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks in the post 1980 period but not in the pre 1980 period

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

switching costs price sensitivity and health plan choice we investigate the extent to which sensitivity to health plan premiums differs across individuals according to characteristics related to the cost of switching plans our results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity related to expected health care costs younger healthier employees are between two and four times more sensitive to price than employees who are older and who have been recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer we also find evidence of status quo bias estimated premium elasticities are significantly higher for new hires than for incumbent employees simulations combining our results with actuarial data illustrate the cost implications of risk related differences in price elasticity

competition leverage how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment we study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low risk consumers insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences to achieve first best risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high risk agents second we identify a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low risk market to the less elastic high risk market third mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further at the cost of efficiency

optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition abstract paying insurers risk adjusted prices for covering different individuals can correct selection incentives and induce the market to provide optimal insurance policies to calculate the optimal risk adjusted prices we need to know a what the optimal policies are b how much they cost and c how competitive the market is we examine these issues in a model with spatial heterogeneity and adverse selection market equilibrium is characterized and delivery of the socially optimal insurance policies is possible as long as providers are paid risk adjusted fees for each individual they serve when the payment can be made on the basis of an individual s risk it should be sufficient to cover the expected cost of the socially optimal policy for that person plus a mark up if payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal the optimal risk based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation identified by glazer and mcguire glazer j mcguire t 2000 optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums an application to managed care american economic review 90 4 1055 1071

reimbursing health plans and health providers efficiency in production versus selection the tradeoff between an insurer s or medical provider s incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply price analog to the demand price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee for service payments empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon the presence of contracting costs in a rothschild stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome

political incentives to suppress negative information evidence from chinese listed firms this paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms i e firms operating in their province temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives we examine the stock price behavior of chinese listed firms around two visible political events meetings of the national congress of the chinese communist party and promotions of high level provincial politicians that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news the costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies the result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows followed by an increase in crashes after the event consistent with these predictions we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction an increase in negative stock return skewness before after the event these effects are strongest in the three month period directly preceding the event among firms that are more politically connected and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms information environment

network competition in nonlinear pricing previous research assuming linear pricing has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion i show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing i as long as subscription demand is inelastic profits can remain independent of the access charge even when customers are heterogeneous and networks engage in second degree price discrimination ii when demand for subscriptions is elastic networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost relative to cost based access pricing welfare is typically increased by setting the access charge above marginal cost

opaque financial reports r2 and crash risk abstract we investigate the relation between the transparency of financial statements and the distribution of stock returns using earnings management as a measure of opacity we find that opacity is associated with higher r2s indicating less revelation of firm specific information moreover opaque firms are more prone to stock price crashes consistent with the prediction of the jin and myers 2006 r2 around the world new theory and new tests journal of financial economics 79 257 292 model however these relations seem to have dissipated since the passage of the sarbanes oxley act suggesting that earnings management has decreased or that firms can hide less information in the new regulatory environment

ownership concentration in privatized firms the role of disclosure standards auditor choice and auditing infrastructure we rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration since the expropriation of corporate resources by insiders hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden after controlling for other country level and firm level determinants we find weak no evidence that extensive disclosure standards auditor choice reduce ownership concentration in contrast we provide strong robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors consistent with ball s 2001 predictions collectively our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a big five auditor and better disclosure standards

political connections and industrial pollution evidence based on state ownership and environmental levies in china we investigate how state involvement in the ownership of non listed entrepreneurial firms affects pollution fees levied by national and provincial governments in china environmental levies while the national government sets minimum environmental standards provincial governments can enact requirements that exceed these minimums and they are largely responsible for enforcing even the national standards so environmental levies can measure concessions that provinces make to encourage development and employment furthermore state ownership is a good proxy for a firm s political connections which can influence the relationship between the firm and the environmental authorities we find that firms with state ownership pay lower environmental levies which indicates that concessions are made for political or economic purposes however these concessions are conditional on the level of development of the province offering them with better developed provinces providing fewer concessions

national elections and tail risk international evidence abstract we investigate stock tail risk around national elections worldwide over the period of 1982 2012 we find that firm stock is less likely to crash during the election years and is more likely to crash during the post election period this inter temporal pattern is consistent with the suppression of negative information when there is heightened political uncertainty around elections and with the subsequent release of adverse news when the uncertainty is reduced further analysis shows that the impact of political uncertainty on tail risk is stronger in countries with poorer investor protection fewer electoral checks and balances more uncertain election outcomes and pro business incumbent governments in industries which are more politically sensitive and in firms with larger information asymmetry

the endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing abstract this paper analyzes the deadweight loss of delegated auditing in a three tier hierarchy in a costly state verification model this cost depends on the endogenous information structure the auditor s degree of risk aversion and the size of the punishment we identify the optimal contractual outcome of this delegation model with the solution obtained in a standard three tier hierarchical model of collusive auditor we then derive from this identification the set of parameters of the physical environment which may affect the efficiency of side contracting within the firm

politicians and the ipo decision the impact of impending political promotions on ipo activity in china abstract this paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering ipo activity in certain politicized environments focusing on china we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development firms rely on political connections for access to capital rent seeking behavior is rampant and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency we find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an ipo temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events this effect holds for both state owned and non state owned entities for state owned firms the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity for non state owned firms the temporary increase in ipo activity appears to be rationally opportunistic in nature with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms political connections promotion period ipos underperform non promotion period ipos in terms of both future financial performance and long run stock returns have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering

self regulation and government oversight self regulation is a feature of a number of professions for example in the u s the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self regulatory organizations sros like the new york stock exchange and the national association of securities dealers we analyse one regulatory task of an sro enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers specifically we model contracting enforcement as a two tier problem an sro chooses its enforcement policy the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule given an enforcement policy agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers expected utility we assume that the sro s objective is to maximize the welfare of its members the agents we show that the sro chooses a more lax enforcement policy meaning less frequent investigations than what customers would choose a general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents we also investigate government oversight of the self regulatory process the threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the sro just enough to pre empt any government enforcement copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous the paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies pool high and low risk individuals in a spatial product differentiation model the normal forces of competition induce quality provision but selection incentives induce insurers to under provide quality to offset selection incentives the government can reimburse some of the insurers costs however such a subsidy can in some cases reduce quality further as well as discourage production efficiency in such cases the optimal reimbursement rate is negative 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

efficiency and the bear short sales and markets around the world we analyze cross sectional and time series information from 46 equity markets around the world to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices we find some evidence that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced a common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic we find strong evidence that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced market returns display significantly less negative skewness

the effects of media slant on firm behavior abstract the media can impose reputational costs on firms because of its important role as an information intermediary and its ability to negatively slant coverage we exploit a quasi natural experiment that holds constant the information event across firms but varies the availability of a major news outlet in local markets we find that firms subject to the threat of slanted coverage suppress the release of negative information before the event and release it subsequently our results are consistent with theory on the active role firms can play in managing their reputational capital through anticipatory actions to avoid negative media coverage

risk sharing as a supplement to imperfect capitation a tradeoff between selection and efficiency this paper describes forms of risk sharing between insurers and the regulator in a competitive individual health insurance market with imperfectly risk adjusted capitation payments risk sharing implies a reduction of an insurer s incentives for selection as well as for efficiency in a theoretical analysis we show how the optimal extent of risk sharing may depend on the weights the regulator assigns to these effects some countries employ outlier or proportional risk sharing as a supplement to demographic capitation payments our empirical results strongly suggest that other forms of risk sharing yield better tradeoffs between selection and efficiency

reinsuring risk to increase access to health insurance at least 41 million americans are currently without health insurance in any given month u s bureau of the census 2002 they are uninsured for a variety of reasons and most people who lack coverage are affected by more than one reason two generalizations can be made however first a majority simply cannot afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily subsidized most do not have access to employer sponsored coverage and so must purchase any insurance in the non group individual health insurance market a market where as i explain below insurance is typically twice as expensive as employer group coverage if it is not denied outright since about two thirds of the uninsured have incomes below 35 000 non group health insurance premiums often exceed 10 percent of their incomes the second generalization is that to an important extent high premiums in the non group market and denial of coverage reflect market failure due to asymmetric information insurers can never know as much as an individual does about his or her health family history of health problems and tendency to seek medical care because of this asymmetry it is impossible for an insurer to set premiums that accurately reflect the non random portion of health care costs for different individuals the non group market is the only health insurance option for people without employersponsored coverage tax related subsidies as proposed by members of congress and the bush administration do not address the market failure problems and so are unlikely to make insurance much more affordable to increase access to health insurance risk in the non group market needs to be shifted to a broader population base in what follows i first describe the three distinct health insurance markets in which people can obtain health insurance and the special nature of competition among insurance companies in the non group market then i make the case for government to act as reinsurer and assume the risk of extremely high cost people efficiency in the non group health insurance market would be improved if the government reinsured the market equity also would be increased if the government acted as reinsurer because more uninsured people would have access to insurance finally i describe precedents for this role for government in other markets and why tax related subsidies will not succeed in increasing health insurance coverage unless the risks of extremely high costs are shifted to the government

setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care minimum variance optimal risk adjustment abstract risk adjustment refers to the practice of paying health plans a premium per person or per family based on a formula using risk adjusters such as age or gender and weights on those adjusters one role of risk adjustment is to make sure plans have an incentive to accept all potential enrollees another role at least as important in our view is to lead health plans to choose the efficient level of quality of care for the various services they offer most of the research and policy literature on risk adjustment focuses on the first problem this paper proposes a new way to calculate weights in a risk adjustment formula that contends with both problems for a given set of adjusters we identify the weights that minimize the variance in plan predictable health care costs that are not explained by risk adjustment addressing the access problem subject to the payments satisfying conditions for an optimal risk adjuster making sure plans provide the efficient quality we call the formula minimum variance optimal risk adjustment mvora

optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection an application to managed care it is well known that adverse selection causes distortions in contracts in markets with asymmetric information taxing inefficient contracts and subsidizing the efficient ones can improve market outcomes bruce c greenwald and joseph e stiglitz 1986 although regulators rarely seem to implement tax and subsidy schemes with adverse selection motives in mind contracts are often complex and incomplete and it is the inefficient elements of the contract that are difficult to verify and hence tax or subsidize this is precisely the reason that in health insurance markets rather than subsidizing contracts regulators and payers contend with adverse selection by taxing and subsidizing the price paid to insuring health plans on the basis of observable characteristics of the persons joining the plan a practice known as risk adjustment risk adjusted premiums are paid to managed care plans plans that ration care by management rather than by conventional approaches like coinsurance and deductibles and offer a bundle of characteristics quality access for many services that is fundamentally outside the scope of direct regulation selection related incentives threaten the efficiency and fairness of this organization of health insurance markets by inducing plans to distort the quality of the services they offer to discourage high cost persons from joining the plan as managed care becomes the predominant source of health care for residents of the united states and many other countries payers attempt to address this incentive by setting a risk adjusted price that pays more for more expensive enrollees as it is conventionally practiced risk adjustment sets prices for people proportional to their expected cost based on observable characteristics the federal medicare program for example has used age sex welfare status and county of residence adjusters to set prices to managed care plans to convey how what we term conventional risk adjustment works suppose age is the risk adjuster for a medicare population over 65 if it is determined that the 75to 84 year old population costs 20 percent more than the overall average in medicare the assumption in conventional risk adjustment is that the premium paid to plans for someone in this group should be 20 percent above the average we fundamentally disagree that this is the right way to think about and do risk adjustment

do star analysts know more firm specific information evidence from china abstract using a unique database in china we extend the literature to further distinguish the information production role of star vs non star analysts we confirm the general conclusion of a positive association between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity measured by a firm s r2 in china the findings from star analysts however show that star analyst coverage actually decreases stock return synchronicity we contend that the firm specific human capital in star analysts helps the analysts overcome the challenges of information production in an emerging market the superior firm specific human capital argument of star analysts is further supported by the negative association of star analysts firm specific experiences and stock return synchronicity our conclusions are robust to different specifications of star analyst presence and different definitions of analysts firm specific experiences we also find that star analysts exhibit a more accurate earnings forecast than non star analysts

price and the health plan choices of retirees abstract this study analyzes health plan choices of retirees in an employer sponsored health benefits program that resembles premium support models proposed for medicare in this program out of pocket premiums depend on when an individual retired and his or her years of service as of that date since this price variation is exogenous to unobserved plan attributes and retiree characteristics it is possible to obtain unbiased premium elasticity estimates the results indicate a significantly negative effect of premiums the implied elasticities are at the low end of the range found in previous studies on active employees

corporate philanthropy and stock price crash risk evidence from china how to mitigate stock price crash risk has become a focus in the theoretical and practical fields building on the work of kim et al j bank finance 43 1 13 2014b this paper investigates the relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk under the unique chinese institutional background the results show that both state ownership and the 2005 split share reform attenuate the mitigating effect of corporate philanthropy on crash risk specifically the negative relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk is less pronounced for state owned enterprises than for non state owned enterprises and it is also less pronounced after firms accomplish the split share reform further this effect is more pronounced for firms with greater financial risks and poorer performance our paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and the economic consequences of corporate philanthropy it also offers useful guidance to firms that are seeking to reduce stock price crash risk in emerging markets

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had