taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

optimal progressive labor income taxation and education subsidies when education decisions and intergenerational transfers are endogenous abstract we quantitatively characterize the optimal mix of progressive income taxes and education subsidies in a model with endogenous human capital formation borrowing constraints income risk and incomplete financial markets in addition to the distortions of labor supply progressive taxes weaken the incentives to acquire education the latter distortion can potentially be mitigated by an education subsidy we find that the welfare maximizing fiscal policy is indeed characterized by a substantially progressive labor income tax code and a positive subsidy for college education both the degree of tax progressivity and the education subsidy are larger than in the current us status quo

some talk money in politics a partial review of the literature the financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study i review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empir ical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions the effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot measure elections are summarized as are the impacts of contributions on contributors welfare many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years and i describe work that exploits variations in these laws a discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors motives

the power of the last word in legislative policy making we examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves we demonstrate that these institutions select condorcet winners when they exist provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals in policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics where a condorcet winner does not exist the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near dictator under relatively weak conditions

the surprising power of age dependent taxes this paper provides a new empirically driven application of the dynamic mirrleesian framework by studying a feasible and potentially powerful tax reform age dependent labour income taxation i show analytically how age dependence improves policy on both the intratemporal and intertemporal margins i use detailed numerical simulations calibrated with data from the u s panel study of income dynamics to generate robust policy implications age dependence 1 lowers marginal taxes on average and especially on high income young workers and 2 lowers average taxes on all young workers relative to older workers when private saving and borrowing are restricted finally i calculate and characterize the welfare gains from age dependence despite its simplicity age dependence generates a welfare gain equal to between 0 6 and 1 5 of aggregate annual consumption and it captures more than 60 of the gain from reform to the dynamic optimal policy the gains are due to substantial increases in both efficiency and equity when age dependence is restricted to be pareto improving the welfare gain is nearly as large

optimal taxation in life cycle economies abstract we use a very standard life cycle growth model in which individuals have a labor leisure choice in each period of their lives to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income the intuition for our result is straightforward in a life cycle model the individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual s lifetime one way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age if tax rates cannot be conditioned on age a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal as it can imperfectly mimic age conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates journal of economic literature classification numbers e62 h21

insurance and taxation over the life cycle we consider a dynamic mirrlees economy in a life cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement individual productivity evolves as a markov process and is private information we use a first order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour income tax rate when productivity is an ar 1 our formula resembles an ar 1 with a trend where i the auto regressive coefficient equals that of productivity ii the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the frisch elasticity of labour and iii the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth the last property implies a form of short run regressivity our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights the average labour tax rises from 0 to 37 over 40 years whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12 to 0 at retirement we compare the second best solution to simple history independent tax systems calibrated to mimic these average tax rates we find that age dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains in this way our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems copyright 2013 oxford university press

side effects of campaign finance reform because campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation cannot effectively prevent campaign contributions to buy favors this article assumes that contributions influence political decisions but given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups achieve influence by providing political decision makers with policy relevant information we also assume that lobbies engage in non negligible informational lobbying we focus on a single political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying instruments our main result is to show that campaign finance reform may have important side effects it may deter informational lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient jel c72 d72

information access and contributions a signaling model of lobbying interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker if their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker s constituency they have costless access and report their private information truthfully if their interests conflict they are forced to pay a strictly positive contribution in order to enhance the credibility of their reports the policymaker bases her policy decision on the competing reports and the size of the contributions accompanying these reports the interest groups contribution decisions are plagued by a free rider problem i derive the implications of this problem for the size and pattern of contributions and for the degree of information aggregation

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

education and optimal dynamic taxation the role of income contingent student loans we study the optimal design of integrated education finance and tax systems the distribution of wages is endogenously determined by the costly education decisions of heterogeneous individuals before labor market entry consistent with empirical evidence this human capital investment decision is risky we find that an integrated education and tax system in which the government provides education loans to young individuals coupled with income contingent repayment can always be designed in a pareto optimal way we present a simple empirically driven application of the framework to us data in which individuals make a college entry decision we find the optimal repayment schemes for college loans can be well approximated by a schedule that is linearly increasing in income up to a threshold and constant afterwards so although the full optimum could lead to complicated non linear schedules in theory very simple instruments can replicate it fairly well the welfare gains from income contingent repayment are significant

an information rationale for the power of special interests political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority this article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free rider problem first incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor their activities second because smaller groups are better able to overcome the free rider problem of costly monitoring policy will be biased in their favor third the effect of asymmetric monitoring on voter welfare is ambiguous the inefficiencies created by the policy bias are offset by a positively valued selection bias incumbents of above average quality are more likely to survive voter scrutiny than are low quality types

insurance and opportunities a welfare analysis of labor market risk abstract using a model with constant relative risk aversion preferences endogenous labor supply and partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk this paper provides an analytical characterization of three welfare effects a the welfare effect of a rise in wage dispersion b the welfare gain from completing markets and c the welfare effect from eliminating risk the analysis reveals an important trade off for these welfare calculations on the one hand higher wage uncertainty increases the cost associated with missing insurance markets on the other hand greater wage dispersion presents opportunities to raise aggregate productivity by concentrating market work among more productive workers welfare effects can be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters defining preferences and wage risk or alternatively in terms of changes in observable second moments of the joint distribution over individual wages consumption and hours

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

determining the motives for a positive optimal tax on capital previous literature demonstrates that in a computational life cycle model the optimal tax on capital is positive and large given the computational complexities of these overlapping generations models it is helpful to to determine the relative importance of the economic factors driving this result i highlight the impact of changing two common assumptions in a benchmark model that generates a large optimal tax on capital similar to the model in conesa et al 2009 first the utility function is altered such that it implies an agent s frisch labor supply elasticity is constant as opposed to increasing over his lifetime second the government is allowed to tax accidental bequests at a separate rate from ordinary capital income the main nding of this paper is that these two changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half furthermore i nd that the welfare costs of adopting the high optimal tax on capital from the benchmark model in the model with the altered assumptions which calls for a lower tax on capital are equivalent to 0 35 percent of total lifetime consumption quantifying the impact of these assumptions in the benchmark model is important because the rst has limited empirical evidence and the second although included for tractability confounds a motive for taxing capital with a motive for taxing accidental bequests jel e62 h21

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

on the optimality of age dependent taxes and the progressive u s tax system abstract in life cycle economies where an individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant the optimal marginal tax rates on capital and labor income vary with age conversely the progressivity imbedded in the u s tax code implies that marginal tax rates vary with age because tax rates vary with earnings and earnings vary with age using numerical simulations this paper shows that if the tax authority is prevented from conditioning tax rates on age some degree of progressivity is desirable as progressive taxation better imitates optimal age dependent taxes than an optimal age independent tax system this role for progressive taxation emanates from efficiency reasons and does not rely on any insurance nor re distribution arguments

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

disentangling the effect of arthritis on earnings a simultaneous estimate of wage rates and hours worked poor health affects both wage rates and hours of work here we develop a procedure for examining the separate impact of a specific chronic disease arthritis on wages and hours worked and then translate these results into earnings our methodology provides a consistent approach for measuring how a specific chronic disease affects total earnings as well as its component parts we find that arthritis affects wage rates and hours worked differently and the pattern of these effects differs considerably between men and women

age dependent taxes with endogenous human capital formation we assess the gains attained by the introduction of age dependent labor income taxes in an overlapping generations economy where individuals live a meaningful life cycle and endogenously accumulate human capital the model is sufficiently rich to isolate the role of general equilibrium effects credit market imperfections and different forms of human capital accumulation the large welfare gains we obtain cannot be attained without age dependence nor can they be attained with age dependent taxes if progressivity of labor income taxes and capital income tax rates are not suitably adjusted to profit from the complementarity of these instruments

tax incentives for import substituting foreign investment abstract this paper constructs a game theoretic model to study host country policy to attract import substituting foreign direct investment fdi investors are assumed to be incompletely informed about local investment conditions and taxes and tariffs are determined endogenously we show that in certain situations countries will offer tax incentives while in others they will impose a tariff wall to induce fdi tax incentives are motivated by the need to signal favorable investment conditions the paper predicts that tax incentives are more likely to be used the larger is the investment risk the smaller is the local market the smaller is the stock of previous fdi and the lower are trade barriers moreover we conjecture that incentives are positively correlated with the number of jobs created by the investment we test these predictions using data from the us department of commerce benchmark survey of us foreign investment and find that they are supported by the empirical evidence

informational lobbying and political contributions abstract interest groups can potentially influence political decision makers by offering contributions and by providing relevant information that sways the decision in the group s favor what mix of these two instruments should an interest group choose and how does the use of one instrument affect the effectiveness of the other in this paper we identify an information externality that raises the cost of offering contributions and show that this indirect search cost reduces the group s incentive to gather information when contributions are allowed furthermore we analyze how competition among lobby groups as providers of information and contributions affect the choice and effectiveness of the instruments we show that the information externality rewards the group that can abstain from information search and focus its influence on contributions

incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout an empirical test this study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective it reviews the paradox of voting and finds one model which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders to be a promising solution it tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout using an ecological analysis of turnout in five montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections the 1993 canadian federal the 1994 quebec provincial and the 1994 montreal municipal elections data on mobilization are taken from semi directed interviews with association leaders in each community the results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election the overall results are weak indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout

your vote counts on account of the way it is counted an institutional solution to the paradox of not voting when we explicitly lay out all its steps we find that the paradox of not voting since the chance of one vote s making a difference is about zero why trouble to vote rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections my solution to the paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed and it yields a rational choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout

optimal taxation and human capital policies over the life cycle this paper derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a life cycle model with risky human capital the government faces asymmetric information regarding agents ability its evolution and labor supply when the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base and falls with age income contingent loans or a deferred deductibility scheme can implement the optimum numerical results suggest that full deductibility of expenses is close to optimal and that simple linear age dependent policies perform very well

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

winner pay contests we analyze winner pay contests in which players select bids the winner is determined probabilistically through a contest success function and only the winner must pay her bid we show that a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists and is unique under weak assumptions on the contest success function we determine the nash equilibrium for several examples we also consider how equilibrium bids are influenced by private information about the value of winning the contest

how a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy this paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators the firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy in equilibrium no one vote may be decisive so each legislator who seeks the firm s investment votes for the policy though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy and when votes reveal information about the district the firm s implicit promise or threat can be credible unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades