bank stability and managerial compensation abstract we investigate the relationship between insolvency risk and executive compensation for bhcs over the 1992 2008 period we employ ceo compensation sensitivity to risk vega and pay share inequality between the ceo and other executives as measures of compensation and employ a system model to account for the endogeneity problem between vega and risk five main results are obtained first ceo compensation sensitivity to risk of bhcs has risen in response to deregulation to resemble those of the industrial firms second higher vegas lead to greater bank instability third the association between bank stability and managerial compensation is bi directional higher vegas induce greater risk and vice versa fourth bhcs in the next to the largest size group increase ceo vegas the most and have the strongest potential to create instability fifth increased pay share inequality has effects opposite to those of the increase in vega greater pay share inequality is associated with greater stability

analysis of energy intensity in japan this study discusses the causes of the increase in japan s energy intensity defined as energy consumption divided by gdp since the early 1990s the significant reduction in japan s energy intensity ceased in the early 1980s and has even slightly increased since the early 1990s indicating that japan seemingly stopped taking aggressive action to improve energy use however further analysis at prefecture level and sector level provides additional insight on energy intensity trends to analyze the causes of the increase in japan s energy intensity energy intensity is decomposed into energy efficiency improvements in energy efficiency and energy activity structural changes from the secondary sector to the tertiary sector of the economy our result indicates that the non uniform energy intensity trends between prefectures are attributed to a high variability in energy efficiency at sector level we estimate the income elasticity of energy consumption in each sector and find that a structural change in energy consumption behaviors occurred in all sectors at different time points the industrial sector and commercial sector became less energy efficient after 1981 and 1988 respectively which is presumably responsible for the deterioration of japan s energy intensity since the early 1990s

is the efficiency wage efficient the social norm and organizational corruption the effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption we model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem we find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect the snowball effect which intensifies the corruption effect this intensified effect due to the snowballing character of social norms may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm jel classification d82 j41

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

accounting for asymmetric price responses and underlying energy demand trends in oecd industrial energy demand abstract this paper explores the way technical progress and improvements in energy efficiency are captured when modelling oecd industrial energy demand the industrial sectors of the developed world involve a number of different practices and processes utilising a range of different technologies consequently given the derived demand nature of energy it is vital when modelling industrial energy demand that the impact of technical progress is appropriately captured however the energy economics literature does not give a clear guide on how this can be achieved one strand suggests that technical progress is endogenous via asymmetric price responses whereas another strand suggests that it is exogenous more recently it has been suggested that potentially there is a role for both endogenous technical progress and exogenous technical progress and consequently the general model should be specified accordingly this paper therefore attempts to model oecd industrial energy demand using annual time series data over the period 1962 2010 for 15 oecd countries using the structural time series model framework the general specifications allow for both asymmetric price responses for technical progress to impact endogenously and an underlying energy demand trend for technical progress and other factors to impact exogenously but in a non linear way the results show that almost all of the preferred models for oecd industrial energy demand incorporate both a stochastic underlying energy demand trend and asymmetric price responses this gives estimated long run income elasticities in the range of 0 34 to 0 96 estimated long run price maximum elasticities in the range of 0 06 to 1 22 estimated long run price recovery elasticities in the range of 0 00 to 0 27 and estimated long run price cut elasticities in the range of 0 00 to 0 18 furthermore the analysis suggests that when modelling industrial energy demand there is a place for endogenous technical progress and an exogenous underlying energy demand trend consequently it is argued that any modelling strategy should start by including both and only imposed restrictions if accepted by the data

empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking abstract we examine whether executive stock options esos provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects for a sample of oil and gas producers we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity our proxy for exploration risk increases with the sensitivity of the value of the ceo s options to stock return volatility eso risk incentives both eso risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach we find evidence that eso risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk taking additional tests indicate that eso risk incentives exhibits a negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where eso risk incentives and hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined overall our results are consistent with esos providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk related incentive problems

alternative mechanisms for corporate control we examine performance and management characteristics of fortune 500 firms experiencing one of three types of control change internally precipitated management turnover hostile takeover and friendly takeover we find that firms experiencing internally precipitated management turnover perform poorly relative to other firms in their industries but are not concentrated in poorly performing industries in contrast targets of hostile takeovers are concentrated in troubled industries there is also weaker evidence that hostile takeover targets underperform their industry peers we interpret this evidence as consistent with the idea that the board of directors is capable of firing managers whose leadership leads to poor performance relative to industry but that an external challenge in the form of a hostile takeover is often required when the whole industry is in decline the evidence also indicates that firms run by a member of the founding family are less likely to experience either internally precipitated top management turnover or a hostile takeover on the other hand firms whose top management team is dominated by a single relatively young top executive while lacking in internal discipline are more likely to experience a hostile takeover this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the reliability of aggregate energy demand functions an application of statistical specification error tests abstract the paper examines the unbiasedness and efficiency of various energy elasticity estimates by means of statistical specification error tests the model selection procedure is applied to energy consumption data of eight industrialized countries it is found that models which describe dynamic behaviour by including the lagged dependent variable among the regressors are most frequently accepted and that long term income effects are important for all countries strong differences among countries prevail concerning the appropriateness of including a time trend elasticities derived from accepted models differ considerably among countries

bank ceo pay performance relations and the effects of deregulation the authors test the deregulation hypothesis that posits that bank ceo compensation became more sensitive to performance as bank management became less regulated they observe a significant increase in pay performance sensitivities from their 1976 81 regulation subsample to their 1982 88 deregulation subsample these increases in pay sensitivities after deregulation are observed for salary and bonus stock options and common stock holdings the authors observe increases in the pay performance relation associated with high capitalization ratio banks consistent with providing incentives for wealth creation while even larger increases in pay performance sensitivity for lower capitalization ratio banks suggest an federal deposit insurance corporation moral hazard problem copyright 1995 by university of chicago press

the dispersion of employees wage increases and firm performance previous studies examining intra firm wage dispersion and firm performance have focused on wage levels the authors of this study argue that for purposes of comparing wage dispersion s positive inc

diversification in banking is noninterest income the answer this paper assesses potential diversification benefits in the u s banking industry from the steady shift toward activities that generate fee income trading revenue and other types of noninterest income in the aggregate declining volatility of net operating revenue reflects reduced volatility of net interest income not diversification benefits from noninterest income which is quite volatile and increasingly correlated with net interest income at the bank level greater reliance on noninterest income particularly trading revenue is associated with lower risk adjusted profits and higher risk this suggests few obvious diversification benefits from the ongoing shift toward noninterest income

short and long run elasticities in energy demand a cointegration approach abstract short and long run energy demand elasticities are estimated on danish annual data for 1948 1990 energy consumption the real price of energy and real gdp appear to be non stationary variables cointegration and error correction methods are therefore applied all estimated parameters have the expected signs and magnitudes and no evidence is found of a structural break in energy demand caused by the increases in real energy prices since 1973 74

rewards to academia the remuneration of vice chancellors and principals this paper models the financial remuneration to vice chancellors and principals at uk higher education institutions after describing the alternative theoretical underpinnings for the determination of pay an earnings function is estimated utilizing institutional and personal characteristics the model suggests only a partial linkage of managerial and performance related indicators to remuneration levels this suggests substantial scope for reorientation of rewards towards such indicators rather than relying on an efficiency wage this would appear particularly appropriate given the present and continued disclosure of this information together with the increased focus on performance indicators relating to teaching and research within the uk higher education sector

risk aversion intertemporal substitution and the term structure of interest rates an equilibrium model of the term structure of interest rates is derived from a representative agent framework with recursive utility preferences a key ingredient is a time varying subjective discount factor which is linked to the short term rate of interest the proposed model incorporates a vector autoregression description of macroeconomic dynamics and links them to those of the term structure so that nominal bond yields are affine functions of observable state variables the model is estimated and compared to both a restricted expected utility version of the model and a reduced form no arbitrage model we find that all three models can fit the term structure equally well but that only the unrestricted non expected utility model can empirically account for the tent shaped pattern and magnitude of coefficients from predictive regressions of excess bond returns on forward rates documented by cochrane and piazzesi 2005 bond risk premia american economic review 95 138 160 the unrestricted equilibrium model fits the term structure and captures the important features of bond risk premiums with economically plausible values for the structural preference parameters

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

deposit insurance and wealth effects the value of being too big to fail this paper investigates the effect on bank equity values of the comptroller of the currency s announcement that some banks were too big to fail and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided using an event study methodology we find positive wealth effects accruing to tbtf banks with corresponding negative effects accruing to non included banks we demonstrate that the magnitude of these effects differed with bank solvency and size we also show that the policy to which the market reacted was that suggested by the wall street journal and not that actually intended by the comptroller the role of deposit insurance has become a topic of increasing debate advocates argue that by removing the incentive to run deposit insurance protects individual financial institutions from instability in the intermediation process thereby providing stability to the financial system as a whole 1 the recent rise in bank failures and the concomitant crises in the s l industry however demonstrate that this stability is not guaranteed moreover critics note that deposit insurance may introduce incentive problems and wealth effects into the financial system both of which can impede the effective functioning of any deposit insurance system these problems have prompted concern about the structure of the current deposit insurance system and have led to numerous proposals regarding its restructuring 2 this paper investigates one aspect of this debate by analyzing the effect on bank equity values of the policy decision to insure completely some banks but not others specifically in september 1984 the comptroller of the currency testified before congress that some banks were simply too big to fail tbtf and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided while not explicitly naming the banks the comptroller admitted that this policy would apply to the eleven largest banks using an event study methodology we analyze

incentives for helping on the job theory and evidence recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers performance through helping efforts this article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation the model is tested with australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups the evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced while individual efforts are increased when promotion incentives are strong piece rates and profit sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

interfuel competition in the industrial sector of seven oecd countries abstract the purpose of this article is to present an analysis of interfuel substitution in the industrial sector of seven major oecd countries the united states canada japan germany france the united kingdom and italy over the 1960 1993 period translog models are used to provide estimates of price elasticities from annual data for each country results outline the weakness of price elasticities and changes in behaviour over the last 35 years and show evidence of asymmetric effects since the collapse of oil prices in 1986 substitution has stopped industrial energy demand and oil consumption have stagnated interfuel substitution is widely induced by events other than relative price changes energy policy political and institutional constraints changes in economic activity characteristics within individual country sectors

competition between and within teams abstract we consider the effect of team size the observability of effort and the competitiveness of the team s environment in determining team members allocations of effort between team oriented and selfish efforts

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

functional form and aggregate energy demand elasticities a nonparametric panel approach for 17 oecd countries this paper studies whether the commonly used linear parametric model for estimating aggregate energy demand is the correct functional specification for the data generating process parametric and n

the sensitivity of consumption of oil products to price changes an econometric investigation abstract this paper presents a small econometric model of the supply and demand of motor spirit diesel fuel oil and other gas diesel oil by modelling at this level of disaggregation it is possible to identify the dynamic structure of each market and estimate own price and cross price elasticities

incentives and wage rigidity with the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect that is they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall this paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

the volatility and price sensitivities of managerial stock option portfolios and corporate hedging we use estimates of the black scholes sensitivity of managers stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers risk preferences and hedging activities we find that as the sensitivity of managers stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases firms tend to hedge more however as the sensitivity of managers stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to hedge less one of the agency costs associated with the corporate form of ownership comes from the risk aversion of the firm s managers the typical corporate manager has a significant portion of his or her wealth invested in the corporation both through portfolio holdings and the value of firm specific human capital as a result managers have an incentive to reduce firm risk more than may be desirable from the perspective of an unaffiliated diversified shareholder one way to mitigate managerial risk aversion is to provide the manager with contracts that have a payoff structure that is a convex function of the firm s stock price smith and stulz 1985 guay 1999 finds that stock options are an important way in which convexity is added to managers portfolios however as recognized by carpenter 2000 and lambert larcker and verrecchia 1991 stock options create two opposing effects on managerial incentives the first effect is sensitivity to stock return volatility due to the convex payoff structure of options the value of a manager s stock option portfolio increases with the volatility of the firm s stock returns this sensitivity to stock return volatility should ceteris paribus give the manager an incentive to take more risk the second effect is sensitivity to stock price this effect comes from the direct link between the payoff of an option and

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

habit persistence and the nominal term premium puzzle a partial resolution i introduction the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm has become the dominant paradigm in asset pricing theory because of its intuitive characterization of asset risk that is unlike expectations based asset pricing theories e g the present value model of stock prices which inherently assume risk neutrality the ccapm is predicated upon risk averse agents attempting to achieve a smooth consumption profile through the trading of assets from this perspective the risk of an asset is captured by the covariance of the asset s return with agents marginal utility of consumption or more broadly agents intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of wealth with this characterization the ccapm extends the results of the standard capm i e the risk of an asset is reflected in the covariance of the asset s return with the market portfolio to a general equilibrium setting however this intuitively appealing theory has not found much empirical support perhaps the most famous demonstration of inconsistency between the theory and data was rajnish mehra and edward prescott s 1985 analysis of the equity premium i e the difference between the average return on equity and that on government bonds using calibration methods rather than a formal statistical approach they showed that a standard ccapm severely underpredicts the size of the risk premium on equity the important implication of this finding is that the basic ccapm incorrectly models the covariance structure between the return on equity and asset holders intertemporal marginal rate of substitution economists response to this empirical rejection has been to either identify new sources of risk e g that implied by a particular monetary environment as in labadie 1989 or define alternative preferences toward risk e g the use of non expected utility theory as presented in weil 1989 and epstein and zin 1989 the potential for this research was illustrated recently by george constantinides s 1990 resolution of the equity premium puzzle in a model that included habit formation in consumption by relaxing the standard ccapm s assumption of time separable preferences constantinides demonstrated that a relatively smooth consumption profile and large risk premium on equity are consistent with equilibrium in a complete markets rational expectations framework 1 i use this insight to study another risk premium puzzle specifically the behavior of the nominal term premium the existence of a nominal term premium puzzle was demonstrated in papers by backus gregory and zin 1989 and salyer 1990 in which the term structure implications within a lucas 1982 type cash in advance cia economy were studied while some equilibrium characteristics of this model were consistent with the data both papers demonstrated that the model predicts the wrong sign of the term premium the theory implies the term premium should be negative while based on quarterly data for yields of three and six month u s treasury bills over the period 1959 1 1989 4 the observed term premium is positive similar to the equity premium puzzle as posed by mehra and prescott 1985 the prediction of a negative average term premium signals a critical discrepancy between the risk associated with nominal bonds as perceived by market participants and as captured by the models moreover this term premium puzzle is in some sense a stronger rejection of the underlying asset pricing model than that embodied by the equity premium puzzle to see this recall that within the consumption based asset pricing model the sign of the risk premium on any asset depends on the sign of the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and that asset s return applying this reasoning to the case of the equity premium suggests that while the discrepancy in size between the observed equity premium and that generated within the model is troubling the model s prediction of a positive equity premium implies that the basic payout structure of equity within the model is consistent with that in the data e

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

modelling oecd industrial energy demand asymmetric price responses and energy saving technical change abstract the industrial sector embodies a multifaceted production process consequently modelling the derived demand for energy is a complex issue made all the more difficult by the need to capture the effect of technical progress of the capital stock this paper is an exercise in econometric modelling of industrial energy demand using panel data for 15 oecd countries over the period 1962 2003 exploring the issue of energy saving technical change and asymmetric price responses although difficult to determine precisely it is tentatively concluded that the preferred specification for oecd industrial energy demand incorporates asymmetric price responses but not exogenous energy saving technical change

lying to level the playing field why people may dishonestly help or hurt others to create equity unethical and dishonest behavior has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines recent work has begun to focus on a previous overlooked factor predicting dishonest behavior the beneficiary or victim of dishonest acts in two laboratory experiments we manipulate the level of resources allocated to our participants their wealth and investigate whether perceived inequity from wealth that is randomly or subjectively assigned leads individuals to cross ethical boundaries through helping or hurting others the results show that dishonest behavior is influenced by positive and negative inequity that motivates helping and hurting acts furthermore a third experiment shows that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries to hurt or help others when the action restores equity

the sensitivity of ceo wealth to equity risk an analysis of the magnitude and determinants abstract to control risk related incentive problems equity holders are expected to manage both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance and managers wealth i find stock options but not common stockholdings significantly increase the sensitivity of ceos wealth to equity risk cross sectionally this sensitivity is positively related to firms investment opportunities this result is consistent with managers receiving incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from underinvestment in valuable risk increasing projects is greatest firms stock return volatility is positively related to the convexity provided to managers suggesting convex incentive schemes influence investing and financing decisions

energy consumption and economic activity in industrialized economies a note abstract in industrialized countries the income elasticity of primary energy demand is not far off unity furthermore it can be argued that there is little use in distinguishing between short and long term income elasticities a long term income elasticity does not have a direct impact on energy demand and hence it is of doubtful use in energy demand projections via an aggregate oecd model it was estimated that the short term impact of prices on primary energy demand is about 0 15 while the long term impact is 0 43 but increasing over time

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

managerial objectives capital structure and the provision of worker incentives worker incentive schemes are invariably assumed to be administered by an owner entrepreneur who has an incentive to understate worker performance after the event while tournaments can overcome this problem they discourage cooperation between workers we show that a professional manager concerned with equality between workers and with avoiding bankruptcy rather than maximizing shareholder wealth will conduct a tournament that preserves individual effort incentives while promoting cooperation between workers the theory predicts lower debt levels and more compressed pay scales as cooperation becomes more important in the limit this becomes a group bonus scheme supported by blue chip debt

elasticities of electricity demand in india abstract the paper examines econometric relationship between electricity consumption and variables like income price of electricity and diesel used in for captive power generation to meet the shortages and reliability of power supply from utilities in five major consumer categories in india these categories are residential commercial agriculture small and medium industries and large industries income and price elasticities of electricity consumption are estimated at the national level for these consumers by pooling data across 19 states spread over 9 years 1985 86 1993 94 the results show that electricity consumption in commercial and large industrial sectors are income elastic 1 while residential agricultural and small and medium industries are income inelastic

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

piece rate contracts for other regarding workers when workers are paid with piece rates inequality arises naturally we consider workers who care about income comparisons and are either status seeking or inequality averse we identify circumstances under which inequality attitudes lead workers to exert more effort than they would otherwise and also circumstances under which workers inequality attitudes lead firms to set lower piece rates than they would otherwise the key behavioral assumption for both of these results to hold when workers are identical is behindness aversion the property that changes in inequality matter more to the worker when he is behind than when he is ahead jel d01 j33 m52

accounting for technical progress in aggregate energy demand abstract researchers have not reached a consensus on how to account for technical progress when modeling aggregate energy demand some include a time trend in a dynamic model while others omit the trend in a model that disallows for long run income effects we show that the latter approach can be directly tested as a nested case of the former so that model selection need not be made a priori solely on theoretical grounds using annual data over 1960 1990 we find that long run income effects are not significant however including a time trend improves the model s fit while rendering much more credible long run price elasticities

rigging elections with violence in most developing countries even today political parties spend a substantial fraction of their resources in attracting voters through ideological exhortation as well as force in this paper we present a model of political contest between two parties that compete in two distinct arenas though the goal of the contest in both arenas is the same to garner more political support in the first which we call ideological the contest involves no use of force in the second which we call conflictual party activists use violence either to force ideological supporters of the competing party to vote in their favor or restrain them from voting we show that a party with lower initial political support will resort to more political violence ceteris paribus and as the fraction of undecided voters goes up elections will tend to be less conflictual we also show that if there is an incumbency advantage then the resources devoted to creating political unrest increase in equilibrium and political competition is more violent we also provide some historic and journalistic evidence that supports our results

road transport energy demand in australia a cointegration approach abstract a cointegration framework is used to examine the short run and long run characteristics of energy demand in the australian road transport sector a lagged endogenous equation based on a partial adjustment process is proposed and estimated results indicate that energy demand output and real energy prices are integrated of order 1 and cointegrated the long run output and price elasticities of energy demand are estimated to be 0 52 and 0 12 respectively causality tests ervealed a bidirectional causality path between output and energy demand and a unidirectional path from energy consumption to prices no other causality paths between output prices and energy demand are detected the short run output elasticity of energy demand is estimated to be 0 25 based on an error correction model the short run price elasticity is found to be insignificant the inertia parameter is 0 48 corresponding to 95 of the demand adjustment occurring after five periods the results are compared with previous findings and the variations are partially attributed to the structural changes in the road transport sector in the 1980s some of which are discussed

estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility the costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives accounting choice financing decisions and the valuation of equity we present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year s proxy statement or annual report this method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm wide option plans in broad samples of actual and simulated ceo option portfolios we show that these proxies capture more than 99 of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics and is most severe in samples of ceos with a large proportion of out of the money options however the proxies explanatory power remains above 95 in all subsamples

top management compensation and capital structure the interrelationship between top management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied the optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus we analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are 1 equity and risky debt and 2 equity and convertible debt in addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt the optimal management compensation derived has low pay performance sensitivity with convertible debt instead of straight debt the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay to performance sensitivity a negative relationship between pay performance sensitivity and leverage is derived our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of jensen and murphy 1990 with agency theory other testable implications include 1 a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top management compensation structures and 2 the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices the model yields implications for management compensation in banks and federal deposit insurance reform our results explain the dynamics of top management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization

metaanalisis de las elasticidades ingreso y precio de la demanda de energia algunas implicaciones de politica publica para america latina the aim of this paper is to analyze the variation in empirical estimates of the income and price elasticities of energy demand the evidence presented through a meta analysis allows identification of the weighted average of the income and price elasticities shows that the estimates are very heterogeneous that there is publication bias and that factors such as region energy sector among others affect its volatility the evidence also indicates that income elasticity in latin america is greater than in the oecd countries and that the price elasticity of energy demand is lower in latin america than in the oecd countries therefore continued economic growth in latin america will be accompanied by a growth in energy demand moreover the establishment of a tax in latin america under the current elasticities is less effective and will be insufficient to control the increase in energy consumption

union relative wage effects a survey of macro estimates this paper surveys union wage effect estimates drawn from empirical cross section wage equations fitted to macro aggregated data in 34 post 1963 studies containing such equations each estimate is the partial derivative of the dependent wage variable in logarithmic units with respect to the extent of unionism fraction unionized variable in the equation this paper shows that these estimates contain a mixture in uncertain ratio of the union nonunion wage differential or wage gap on the one hand and an extent of unionism effect on the other therefore the macro estimates should not be interpreted as wage gap estimates

tournament rewards and risk taking this article considers a lazear rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution risk taking and its mean the unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort by modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the most moderate output a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium the first result can be useful to understand the relative performance evaluation puzzle of executive compensation and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace norms promoting mediocrity

how sensitive to time period sampling is the asymmetric price response specification in energy demand modelling abstract the purpose of this paper is to investigate the criticism that energy demand estimates based on a specific price decomposition are sensitive to the chosen time period used for the estimation to analyse this in a systematic way different time series sample periods are constructed from annual data for 17 oecd countries covering the overall period 1960 to 2008 the specific price decomposition under consideration often used to estimate asymmetric price response models of energy demand separates the impact of prices above the previous maximum of a price recovery below the previous maximum and of a price cut therefore the analysis does not just involve using different time periods instead for each time period investigated a new dataset is constructed and for each dataset the price variable is decomposed in this way an energy demand relationship allowing for asymmetric price responses is therefore estimated for each different sample period and the results suggest that recalculation of the decomposed price variables for each different period does affect the stability of the estimated energy demand responses in contrast a similarly estimated energy demand relationship with symmetric price responses for each different sample period is found to have less instability

equality under threat by the talented evidence from worker managed firms does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality are high ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes the article revisits this long standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker managed firms the analysis is based on novel administrative data sources which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers ability type the article s key findings are that worker managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms and high ability members are more likely than other members to exit

demand elasticities in oecd dynamical aspects abstract four models with different lag structures are used to express final energy demand in oecd from 1960 1982 as a function of real gdp and average energy price the income and long run price elasticities are not significantly dependent on the model specification but the koyck lag scheme estimated in its distributed lag form is found to give the most satisfactory results the statistical properties of the data together with evidence of trends in the elasticities both suggest that the period of falling real prices prior to 1971 is not comparable to the present period for the period after 1971 an income elsticity of 1 02 and a long run price elasticity of 0 37 are obtained

ceo compensation and bank risk is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking abstract this paper examines whether executive compensation in banking is structured to promote risk taking we find that on average bank ceos receive less cash compensation are less likely to participate in a stock option plan hold fewer stock options and receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the form of options and stock than do ceos in other industries cross sectional differences in the structure of compensation contracts within banking are also examined we find a positive and significant relation between the importance of equity based incentives and the value of the bank s charter this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that compensation policies promote risk taking in banking

the term structure of interest rates departures from time separable expected utility this paper assesses the ability of general equilibrium models of asset pricing using two recently developed sets of preferences to quantitatively account for the observed variability in the canadian term structure of interest rates the preference structures are non expected utility and habit persistence associated with epstein and zin 1989a and constantinides 1990 respectively the framework adopted follows backus gregory and zin 1989 where a numerical version of the theory is specified and empirical features of the artificial economy are compared against actually data neither preference structure is able to satisfactorily mimic the magnitude or the variability of the risk premiums

economic modelling of energy services rectifying misspecified energy demand functions abstract although it is well known that energy demand is derived since energy is required not for its own sake but for the energy services it produces such as heating lighting and motive power energy demand models both theoretical and empirical often fail to take account of this feature in this paper we highlight the misspecification that results from ignoring this aspect and its empirical implications biased estimates of price elasticities and other measures and provide a relatively simple and empirically practicable way to rectify it which has a strong theoretical grounding to do so we develop an explicit model of consumer behaviour in which utility derives from consumption of energy services rather than from the energy sources that are used to produce them as we discuss this approach opens up the possibility of examining many aspects of energy demand in a theoretically sound way that have not previously been considered on a widespread basis although some existing empirical work could be interpreted as being consistent with this type of specification while this formulation yields demand equations for energy services rather than for energy or particular energy sources these are shown to be readily converted without added complexity into the standard type of energy demand equation s that is are typically estimated the additional terms that the resulting energy demand equations include compared to those that are typically estimated highlight the misspecification that is implicit when typical energy demand equations are estimated a simple solution for dealing with an apparent drawback of this formulation for empirical purposes namely that information is required on typically unobserved energy efficiency indicates how energy efficiency can be captured in the model such as by including exogenous trends and or including its possible dependence on past energy prices the approach is illustrated using an empirical example that involves estimation of an aggregate energy demand function for the uk with data over the period 1960 2011

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

cleaning house the impact of information technology monitoring on employee theft and productivity this paper examines how firm investments in technology based employee monitoring impact both misconduct and productivity we use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology it product we use difference in differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of it monitoring on theft and productivity we find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover we examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result economic and cognitive multitasking fairness based motivation and perceived increases of general oversight the observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip based earnings of workers our results suggest that employee misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and employees this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives