adapting contract theory to fit contract farming this article discusses the current state of contract theory and its usefulness for conceptualizing issues related to agricultural contracting i will discuss the limitations of existing theory for applied work and what methodological improvements are needed to enhance the usefulness of the theory to agricultural economists one pervasive problem is that the canonical economic literature on contracts is rather fragmented and the various methodological strands are narrow in their focus as such there is a need for agricultural economists to engage in methodological research to develop applied contracting models that can capture higher order features of real world agricultural contracts while delivering generalizable comparative statics predictions the need for such research is obvious as contracting continues to expand along the entire modern food marketing channel in the latter part of this article i develop a simple model to illustrate how classic methodological approaches can be combined with recent developments in contract and game theory to construct applied theory models that are useful for capturing some important features of agricultural contracts

section 337 and the protection of intellectual property in the united states the complainants and the impact under section 337 of the tariff act of 1930 a firm can challenge imports that infringe its u s intellectual property rights such as patents copyrights and trademarks based on publicly available information this paper examines the characteristics of firms that file complaints under section 337 and also evaluates how firms are affected by the outcomes we find a complaining firm compared with peer firms in the same industry is typically larger produces a more diverse range of products has invested more in intangibles and is no less profitable a finding of no violation significantly depresses the filing firm s profits compared to peers section 337 appears to protect innovators but its effectiveness in promoting more innovation cannot be demonstrated so clearly copyright 1996 by mit press

put call parity and arbitrage bounds for options on grain futures many arbitrage opportunities have become available for market participants since the inception of trading in options central to many of these is the put call parity relationship if this condition is violated arbitrage profits could be earned this paper examines arbitrage possibilities between put and call options on grain futures using two different tests one is a test of market efficiency over the duration of trading and the other evaluates arbitrage bounds on individual trading days in general the results suggest that the options markets on grain futures are not completely efficient however violations varied substantially across contracts and through time

input demand under yield and revenue insurance previous studies disagree on the effects of insurance on fertilizer application rates the effect of increased fertilizer on the probability of low yields primarily determines whether fertilizer and insurance are substitutes or complements we estimate conditional distributions of corn yields to determine if the technical relationship between yields and fertilizer supports the hypothesis that insurance increases optimal application rates our results indicate no support for this hypothesis at all nitrogen fertilizer rates and reasonable levels of risk aversion nitrogen fertilizer and insurance are substitutes suggesting that those who purchase insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications

simulating the impacts of contract supplies in a spot market contract market equilibrium setting this article embeds a principal agent model within a market equilibrium model of contract and cash markets to analyze the impact of contracting on the spot market for hogs the equilibrium model incorporates both quality differentiation in the contract market and an endogenously determined cash market price for three types of contracting scenarios market equilibrium conditions are derived and results are presented for a numerical example contrary to some empirical results our model shows that the increased supply of hogs under typical formula price contracts can increase or decrease the cash market price depending on the relative size of overall contract supplies

information asymmetry and traceability incentives for food safety abstract we define traceability by its precision that is the probability of finding the source of a problem we consider a downstream food processor firm principal that sets traceability precision and contingent payments so to induce homogeneous upstream suppliers agents to exert the principal s preferred level of food safety effort we focus on cases in which food safety crises originate from defects in raw material provided by upstream firms to analytically show that high precision can substitute for high intensive contingent payments and vice versa and thus traceability is not an unequivocal signal for safer food contrary to previous results in the literature we also show that government regulation based on mandatory traceability with sanctions may not necessarily lead to safer food while increasing the food processor s costs finally we use our analytical results to give managerial feedbacks for firms adopting and considering traceability

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

the econometrics of damage control why specification matters the contribution of damage control agents to production differs fundamentally from that of standard inputs lands labor capital this paper develops an econometric model based on the key characteristics of damage control agents and examines its properties it demonstrates that standard production function specifications overestimate damage control agent productivity and have erroneous implications for the evolution of damage control agent productivity and use in response to changing environments e g the spread of pest resistance it also proposes several alternative specifications and discusses methods for estimating them

the transition to modern agriculture contract farming in developing economies recent years have seen considerable interest in the impact of contract farming on farmers in developing countries motivated out of belief that contract farming spurs transition to modern agriculture in this article we provide a thorough review of the empirical literature on contract farming in bo

research note additional learning and implications on the role of informative advertising observers argue that evidence for the persuasive role of advertising comes from competitive categories where increases in advertising lead to higher average prices conversely others claim that advertising serves a purely informational role here higher levels of advertising lead to better informed consumers and this should increase competition and stimulate lower prices the objective of this study is to neither confirm nor refute either of these perspectives it is rather to show that increases in informative advertisingalone can lead to both higher or lower prices i further show that the direction of this relationship depends on the level of differentiation between competing firms similar to grossman and shapiro 1984 i examine conditions where the differences between competing products are small but i also examine conditions where the differences are significant the role of advertising is to inform consumers about individual products and higher advertising for a product means that more of the potential market knows about it higher levels of advertising increase the relative importance of fully informed consumers compared to partially informed consumers this dynamic is the basis for explaining why informative advertising can push prices either up or down in a uniformly distributed spatial market

insurance moral hazard and chemical use in agriculture this paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers fertilizer and pesticide use in the u s midwest crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of moral hazard insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers results suggest that insurance exerts considerable influence on corn farmers chemical use decisions those purchasing insurance applied significantly more nitrogen per acre 19 spent more on pesticides 21 and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides 7 and 63 than did those not purchasing insurance these results suggest that both fertilizer and pesticides may be risk increasing inputs

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

agribusiness economics and management agribusiness scholarship emphasizes an integrated view of the food system that extends from research and input supply through production processing and distribution to retail outlets and the consumer this article traces development of agribusiness scholarship over the past century by describing nine

agricultural supply response under contract agricultural producers typically face considerable production and price risk in their operations as a result the role of risk in shaping farm level decisions has been the focus of much research e g moschini and hennessy but why do risk averse producers face such risk in a world of complete markets and perfect information a profit maximizing intermediary would provide full insurance to producers thus some aspect of the production and marketing of agricultural commodities must limit the scope for this type of insurance when considering reasons why growers of fresh produce might face price risk hueth and ligon suggest the possibility of unobserved actions in the provision of quality if quality cannot be measured perfectly and some downstream price contains information about a farmer s investment in quality then conditioning a grower s compensation on this price may help the intermediary to monitor farmer effort a similar argument holds in the case of production risk if unobserved actions influence yield an optimal compensation scheme might expose farmers to considerable production risk in order to provide incentive for high output this suggests that the type of intermediation available to farmers can have important consequences for the risks that farmers face previous analyses of the role of risk in producer decisions make one of two polar assumptions regarding intermediation either there is none e g sandmo leland or producers have access to an exogenously specified source of intermediation that may take the form of a futures market e g holthausen public or private insurance e g ramaswami babcock and hennessy or perhaps a particular government program e g lin chavas and holt although each of these analyses represent important contributions toward an understanding of how producers respond in different risk environments they are each silent on how the institutions themselves

a simple theory of advertising as a good or bad our analysis treats advertisements and the goods advertised as complements in stable metautility functions and generates new results for advertising by building on and extending the general analysis of complements by assimilating the theory of advertising into the theory of complements we avoid the special approaches to advertising found in many studies that place obstacles in the way of understanding the effects of advertising we also use this approach to evaluate advertising from a welfare perspective whether there is excessive or too little advertising depends on several variables the effects on consumer utility the degree of competition in the market for advertised goods the induced changes in prices and outputs of advertised goods and whether advertising is sold to consumers

input versus output monitoring who is the residual claimant abstract we observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal agent relationship we show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by the identity of the residual claimant of the principal agent relationship the principal will find input monitoring more efficient if the principal is the residual claimant and he will find output monitoring more efficient if the agent is the residual claimant if residual claimancy is a choice the principal will be the residual claimant under input monitoring under output monitoring residual claimancy is not an issue if both residual claimancy and the monitoring instrument can be chosen the principal will choose to monitor input and to be the residual claimant journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l22

a theory of combative advertising in mature markets with competing firms a common role for advertising is to shift consumer preferences towards the advertiser in a tug of war with no effect on category demand in this paper we analyze the effect of such combative advertising on market power we show that depending on the nature of consumer response combative advertising can reduce price competition to benefit competing firms however it can also lead to a procompetitive outcome where individual firms advertise to increase their own profitability but collectively become worse off this is because combative advertising can intensify price competition such that an advertising war leads to a price war similar to price competition advertising competition can result in a prisoner s dilemma where all competing firms make less profit even when the effect of each firm s advertising is to enhance consumer preferences in its favor given such procompetitive effects we further show that cost of combative advertising could be a blessing in disguise higher unit cost of advertising resulting in lower equilibrium levels of advertising leading to higher prices and profits we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how combative advertising by competing brands influences consumer preferences our experimental analysis offers strong support for our conclusions

new issues in the uruguay round and beyond the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt is a treaty establishing a framework of rules and principles for policies affecting merchandise trade it also provides a forum in which sovereign states periodically engage in reciprocal trade liberalisation and rule making 2 as a result of substantial reductions in tariffs through periodic rounds of multilateral negotiations rule making has gradually become as if not more important than liberalisation per se starting with the kennedy round i964 7 but especially in the tokyo i973 9 and uruguay i986 rounds an increasing number of agenda items involved the negotiation of rules and disciplines for specific trade related domestic policies rather than further reductions in tariffs and other border measures rules pertaining to product standards subsidies and government procurement were prominent items on the agenda of the tokyo round the uruguay round further expanded the multilateral negotiating agenda by adding trade related investment measures trims trade related intellectual property rights trips and measures affecting the contestability of service markets the trend for multilateral trade negotiations to address domestic policies shows no sign of abating calls for a post uruguay round negotiation have identified issues such as competition policy foreign direct investment fdi regulations innovation policies and the interaction between trade and environmental policies as possible topics for discussion 3 in part the steady agenda expansion reflects changes in the structure of the global economy the managerial and technological innovations of the last decade such as just in time inventory management and the increased tradeability of services created pressures for greater specialisation and geographical splintering of production this in turn made regulations pertaining to services fdi transfer of technology and protection of intangible assets more important for both governments and firms flows associated with services fdi and intellectual property ip are smaller than merchandise trade but are quite substantial table i reveals that global merchandise trade in i990 was 3 5 trillion while world trade in commercial services was about 820 billion global receipts for ip were some 33 billion and income flows

adverse selection in crop insurance actuarial and asymmetric information incentives adverse selection is often blamed for crop insurance indemnities exceeding premiums plus subsidies however nationwide empirical evidence has been lacking or based on inadequate county level data this article uses nationwide farm level data on corn and soybeans to decompose incentives for participation in u s multiple peril crop insurance into a risk aversion incentive the conventional justification for insurance an actuarial or subsidy incentive reflecting government subsidization and an asymmetric information incentive which reflects farmers information advantage results show that the risk aversion incentive is small farmers participate in crop insurance primarily to receive the subsidy or because of adverse selection possibilities

the twilight of domestic economic policies twilight partial darkness fig gradual decay or destruction of something once glorious t state hysterical state of unawareness of external realities i annual report bank for international settlements basle june 1981 p 25 world economic outlook international monetary fund washington june 1981 pp 8 9 oecd observer organisation for economic cooperation and development paris july 1981 p 13

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

broiler production contracts as a multi agent problem common risk incentives and heterogeneity the broiler industry presents two puzzles regarding production contracts why do processors control growers inputs and why do they use a statistically insufficient estimator to calculate growers compensation this paper provides an agency theoretic framework that explains these puzzles in terms of processors response to grower heterogeneity and production risk and to grower risk aversion processors control inputs to reduce the information rents paid to agents by forcing agents to bear additional income risk through the use of an imprecise estimator processors can increase profits due to the combined moral hazard adverse selection nature of the informational problem

economics of agricultural supply chain design a portfolio selection approach agrifood firms in a globalizing and competitive market both in developing and developed countries often undertake innovations in products and technologies innovators such as firms and other agents develop supply chains to accommodate the nature of the innovations in this article we analyze an innovator s supply chain design problem the design of the supply chain involves three sets of decisions the first is how much to produce the second involves how to undertake production and how many resources to allocate to the production of feedstock agricultural products that are inputs for processing processing and marketing the third set involves deciding on the amount of feedstock to be obtained through contracts with farmers we show that the innovator determines its overall level of production by taking advantage of its monopoly power derived from the innovation in the output market and behaves as a monopsony in buying feedstock from contractors these decisions are constrained by the marginal cost of capital and the properties of production and marketing technologies when the innovator is risk averse risks in farm production processing and marketing will affect both processed output and the share of feedstock bought through contracts

vertical integration in west africa s cotton industry are parastatals a second best solution this article provides a framework to compare market outcomes among vertically integrated monopsonies in the cotton sector of west africa and alternative more competitive market structures based on a principal agent framework in the presence of factor market constraints as well as capital market failure efficiently operated cotton parastatals increase sector welfare and efficiency by providing input credits in equilibrium outcomes with the principal agent model suggest growers receive the reservation income to participate in cotton production while the principal cotton company extracts the surplus above the reservation income competitive markets entail more equitable distribution of benefits than with parastatal vertical integration but credit and factor market constraints can still persist promotion of a competitive market system will not support cotton productivity growth unless stakeholders pursue complementary programs to develop credit markets and research and extension institutions in the presence of current market failures parastatals may be a second best solution

detailing vs direct to consumer advertising in the prescription pharmaceutical industry the pharmaceutical industry has always used sales representatives to target physicians detailing who are a key link in sales and market share for prescription pharmaceuticals since august of 1997 when the food and drug administration eased the restrictions on direct to consumer advertising dtca there has been a dramatic increase in the use of dtca by pharmaceutical firms to target end customers patients dtca seems to have two different effects on pharmaceutical markets the first is to inform patients about the availability of drugs for some ailments thus expanding the market constructive the second is to persuade patients to talk about specific brands when they meet physicians with the objective of influencing market share combative we consider both effects of dtca in the presence of a detailing program in a competitive environment we incorporate the dynamics of physician patient interaction in a game theoretic model where firms decide on the form of dtca to adopt constructive or combative and then compete in the marketplace by choosing detailing and dtca levels we answer four questions what is the impact of adopting dtca on competitive intensity how do optimal detailing levels for a firm change with the adoption of dtca how should the dtca strategy for a firm vary depending on whether it is stronger or weaker in its degree of influence in the physician s office finally under what conditions would competing firms voluntarily decide to pursue constructive dtca

reading the fine print in agricultural contracts conventional contract clauses risks and returns one distinguishing feature of ongoing struc tural change in agriculture is increasingvertical coordination between agriculturalproducers and processors much of which hascome through agricultural production andmarketing contracts agricultural economists extension agents legal aid groups and othershave sought to provide farmers with infor mation that enables them to make informeddecisions regarding contract use while allsensible advice begins with suggesting thata farmer consult his or her attorney and ac countant before signing numerous outreachpublications provide information regardingspeci c contract provisions see for example holman feuz and baltensperger 2006 kunkel and larison 2006 of ce of the illinoisattorney general 2005 in contrast to the relatively comprehensiveanalysis in such outreach efforts agriculturaleconomists theoretical analyses of speci cagriculturalcontractprovisionshavetendedtofocusoncontractualprovisionsregardingcom pensation and to some extent on input provi sion when comparing the average theoreticalmodel to an actual agricultural contract thereare pages of the contract that do not appear inthe model at all much of the material omitted in theoreti cal analyses of agricultural contracts is boil erplate boilerplate is standardized contractterms that are used in multiple contacts these

implications of nash bargaining for horizontal industry integration this article shows how horizontal industry integration can arise from transferable asymmetry of technologies and endowments the nash bargaining solution suggests that greater technological diversity among coordinating parties yields greater gains from horizontal integration the framework fits the case where a firm with a superior technology franchises the technology by horizontal integration the results appear to fit hog production where integration has been primarily horizontal and in part broiler production where integration has been both vertical and horizontal specifically technology has been shared through uniform genetic traits fine tuned feed rations and veterinary services specified in grower contracts

investment policies in the gatt host country policies toward inward direct investment can have predictable effects on trade flows trade related investment measures trims such as local content requirements and minimum export requirements have recently come under official scrutiny in the general agreement on tariffs and trade this paper examines the economic and political context of the uruguay round negotiations on trims in the negotiations investment measures have been treated as a particular instance of a broader problem the proliferation of nontariff trade distortions as with other trade distortions the negotiating strategy has been to identify specific policies to be proscribed or limited however this approach ignores the typical interactions between multinational firms and host governments observed investment regimes are often the result of a lengthy and complex bargaining process while some investment regimes actually alter the allocation of resources in production and trade others affect mainly the distribution of rents between firms and host countries in particular the trade impact if any depends as much on economic conditions as on the specific combination of investment measures imposed this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

transactions costs and the efficient organization of production a study of timber harvesting contracts a transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber harvesting contracts predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from north carolina the empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk based model the transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures

the road to uruguay context and to show how its agenda and procedures as well as its problems and possible outcomes have arisen from the conjunction of developments in patterns of world trade and the evolution of the gatt itself the uruguay round has some novel features but it also strongly reflects the continuation of the trends of the last forty years the gatt has fostered the evolution of the world trading system from a highly restrictive form with two major players the us and the uk towards a more liberal and evenly balanced form the practices appropriate to the former circumstances achieved many of their objectives but they proved gradually less able to cope with the strains of the new circumstances and problems thus the gatt s traditional bilateral mode of tariff negotiations has given way first to a more multilateral form of tariff talks and then to a preoccupation with constitutional issues such as trading rules and the sectoral coverage of the gatt its procedures have become progressively more multilateral but especially when one considers trade policy implemented between gatt rounds its outcomes appear recently to have become less so it is paradoxical that whereas initially the gatt harnessed the crude power of bilateralism to achieve multilateral outcomes it has more recently adopted multilateral procedures but with more bi and pluri lateral results

marketing contracts and crop insurance contracts between farmers and intermediaries and crop insurers are important means for farmers to mitigate risks in modern u s agriculture in this paper we investigate the effect of crop insurance enrollment on contract terms and farmers participation in marketing contracts following ligon 2003 we set up a mechanism design framework to demonstrate an intermediary s contract design problem where farmers are assumed to be utility maximizing agents we depict farmers optimal choices of insurance coverage using the specification developed by babcock 2012 our model shows that improved terms of crop insurance lower premiums higher subsidies make contracts less appealing to farmers as mechanisms for mitigating risk therefore intermediaries may revise their contract offers so that they are more attractive however improvements in contract terms are limited by their cost to the intermediaries and will not lead to expanded participation in contracts

leadership and the provision of safe food modern food production typically involves many interacting stages and two or more decision makers there is reason to believe that inputs in determining quality likely complement and it is not possible to regulate many of these inputs in a food production system possessing these characteristics we show that leadership by one or more firms through communicating actions may be used as a mechanism to increase overall food quality as there may be no private incentive to lead there may be strategic merit in assigning liability through legislation we also suggest the possibility that genetics are leadership instruments in hog production systems copyright 2001 oxford university press