governmental behavior in representative democracy a synthesis of the theoretical literature what is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates what is preferable a bureaucrat or a partisan politician does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies this article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice 1 the median voter model 2 the leviathan model 3 the slack maximizing model 4 a general model of bureaucracy 5 the partisan politicians model and 6 a general model of lobbying among several results it is shown that the median voter s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good tax package even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter s utility the article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect

voter preferences and state regulation of smoking i introduction tobacco taxation and smoking restrictions are two areas of regulation for which states have maintained a high level of control relative to the federal government 1 given this flexibility states have established a wide range of restrictions on smoking in areas such as government workplaces restaurants bars shopping malls indoor arenas and hospitals 2 although most states restrict smoking in hospitals there is considerable variation among states in restrictions in other areas in the 1998 99 period of this study about two thirds of states restricted smoking in restaurants whereas only four states restricted smoking in bars what has led to variation in smoking restrictions across states in a democratic society one would expect voter preferences to play an instrumental role in determining which policies are enacted and which are not this article provides the first empirical exploration of whether state level smoking restrictions are consistent with preferences of the citizenry taking into account both voting behavior and the role of smoking status in influencing whether an individual votes specifically we examine whether voters preferences for smoking restrictions in restaurants bars malls indoor sporting events and hospitals are consistent with state level restrictions on smoking in each of these public areas 3 our research draws on public choice models of policy making by state and local governments voters preferences typically play a central role because voting affects legislators incentives to support regulations 4 public choice research also finds that nonvoter factors may influence state and local policy making 5 in the case of smoking regulations public health advocates or tobacco industry lobbyists might influence regulatory policies the specific building block of our analysis of state restrictions on smoking is information on individuals voting behavior which we link to their smoking status and preferences over smoking restrictions our analysis uses measures of political pressure that account for individual preferences as well as their voting behavior to examine the possible role of interest group pressures we also control for nonvoter influences on smoking regulation including the proportion of the state population who smoke measures of state ideology and size of the tobacco industry with the exception of smoking in bars there is majority support for smoking restrictions unsurprisingly smokers are less supportive of restrictions than are nonsmokers nonetheless even smokers demonstrate a high level of support for many restrictions smokers are also less likely to vote than are nonsmokers even after controlling for other demographic factors the lower voting rate diminishes voter opposition to antismoking regulation but is usually not critical in view of the substantial support that most smoking restrictions have among smokers the political pressure indices for restrictions on smoking in each public area are generally significantly related to the probability that a state restricts smoking in that public area the nonvoter factors such as the smoking rate in the state and tobacco s role in the state economy are rarely influential policy debates over the desirability of smoking restrictions emphasize possible health risks due to exposure to environmental tobacco smoke ets and effects on business profitability the primary argument for expanding smoking restrictions is to protect workers and customers from exposure to ets 6 as our results show voters are generally supportive of smoking restrictions in public areas which would thereby protect workers as well as themselves and other customers however there is a substantial controversy over the extent of health risks associated with exposure to ets the basis for the push by the u s occupational and safety health administration osha for increased smoking restrictions to protect workers is the highly controversial u

time preference and international lending and borrowing in an overlapping generations model two economies represented by diamond type overlapping generations models and differing only in their pure rates of time preference are joined together capital formation balance of payments behavior and welfare are compared under autarky and openness with a positive natural rate of growth the low time preference country runs a current account surplus in the steady state but not necessarily outside it if preexisting capital is not shiftable between countries integration in the world economy makes the high time preference country worse off in the short run the ranking of stationary utility levels under autarky and openness is ambiguous

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

a dynamic model of redistribution inheritance and inequality comparing steady states of an overlapping generations economy gary s becker and nigel tomes 1979 and james b davies 1986 have noted that redistributive taxation can be disequalizing this paper solves for the full transition path of inequality after a redistributive tax increase the authors find in contrast to the steady state results that redistribution works in the first generation under quite general conditions even when fully anticipated by all previous generations further inequality is likely to fall for several generations before approaching its new steady state level from below

patenting in the shadow of competitors this article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs i show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards particularly those of firms with low litigation costs this pattern is consistent with the literature on costly litigation which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation these results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations

does redistribution reduce inequality the steady state effect on inequality of linear redistributive schemes based on the taxation of earnings inheritances or some combination of the two is examined dynasties that exhibit asexual reproduction and altruism are modeled earnings ability which may be correlated across generations is exogenous and drawn from a stationary distribution taxing inheritances increases inequality by reducing the intergenerational averaging of luck in an example paying out the tax revenue in uniform transfers typically does not reverse this result taxing lifetime wealth or income adds a lump sum tax on earnings making redistribution more successful however this success is sensitive to the relative size of mean earnings and inheritances

the changing technology of technological change general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour abstract in the past most innovations have resulted from empiricist procedures the outcome of each trial yielding knowledge that could not be readily extended to other contexts while trial and error may remain the primary engine of innovation developments in many scientific disciplines along with progress in computational capabilities and instrumentation are encouraging a new approach to industrial research instead of relying purely on trial and error the attempt is also to understand the principles governing the behaviour of objects and structures the result is that relevant information whatever its source can now be cast in frameworks and categories that are more universal the greater universality makes it possible for the innovation process to be organised in new ways firms can specialise and focus upon producing new knowledge and the locus of innovation may be spread across both users and producers more generally the use of general and abstract knowledge in innovation opens up the possibility for a division of labour in inventive activity the division of innovative labour the implications for public policy especially that on intellectual property rights are discussed

a patent system for both diffusion and exclusion public policy analysis of optimal patent regimes is often framed as a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency in this analytical framework weak patent protection and strict antitrust policy are taken to be directed toward static concerns while protection of intellectual property through strong patent laws is taken as a reflection of broader social concerns for long run growth and technological progress this characterization has some truth but the magnitude of the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency can easily be exaggerated in this article i want to argue that weak patent protection need not be inimical to economic growth and conversely that strong patent protection need not be an enemy of diffusion appropriately structured patent law and antitrust rules can together ensure incentives for r d and also induce cooperation among firms in diffusing r d results through licensing and other means at the same time cooperation among firms at the r d stage can counterbalance weak patent protection by internalizing spillovers from ongoing r d programs and such cooperation may also produce additional spillovers from the existing knowledge

how valuable is patent protection estimates by technology field i present evidence on the private value of patent rights in france for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal i find that the distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed that patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to r d and that these characteristics vary across technology fields i compute the r d cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights measure the variations in value of time technology fields and nationalities and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates

effects of patent policy on income and consumption inequality in a r d growth model what are the effects of strengthening patent protection on income and consumption inequality to analyze this question this paper incorporates heterogeneity in the initial wealth of households into a canonical quality ladder growth model with endogenous labor supply in this model i firstly show that the aggregate economy always jumps immediately to a unique and stable balanced growth path given the balanced growth behavior of the aggregate economy and an exogenous distribution of initial wealth i then show that the endogenous distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary and equal to its initial distribution the model predicts that strengthening patent protection increases a economic growth by stimulating r d investment and b income inequality by raising the return on assets however whether it also increases consumption inequality depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution if and only if this elasticity is less greater than unity strengthening patent protection increases decreases consumption inequality for standard parameter values strengthening patent protection leads to a larger increase in income inequality than consumption inequality

the u s patent system in transition policy innovation and the innovation process abstract this paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the u s and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change it also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few possible reasons for these limited results are discussed and possible avenues for future research are suggested

patents versus ex post rewards a new look abstract economic studies that aim at comparing the patent system social efficiency versus an ex post reward system rest on an outdated view of patents they assume that firms use the patent system only in order to be granted a short term commercial monopoly rent this assumption is convenient because it allows straightforward comparisons between patents and rewards but it is not confirmed by empirical studies which stress that in many industries most firms use patents as strategic devices to trade technologies and to ease r d collaborations this change leads to rethinking the framework of the patent reward debate

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

the growth of social security electoral push or political pull the growth of social security electoral push or political pull i introduction during the post world war ii period the social security program was among the fastest growing programs in the federal budget surpassing defense spending as the largest category of expenditures in the mid seventies the program which disbursed only 132 million dollars in 1942 disbursed more than 156 billion dollars forty years late a thousand fold increase as a consequence of this growth and the program s recent financial problems a number of economists have turned their attention to the economics of social security recent examples include kahn 1988 boskin et al 1987 and veall 1986 yet only weaver 1982 and turner 1984 attempt to analyze the growth of the social security program weaver s legislative history of the program suggests that special interest groups had a major impact on social security programs turner argues that program benefit levels are affected by demographic changes which affect the cost of intergenerational redistribution in this paper we use the public choice approach to explain increases in benefit levels from 1946 1980 we develop and test three alternative public choice models of the politics of retirement benefit levels our analysis thus sheds light on an important question neglected by previous research have social security expenditures grown because special interest groups have effectively captured the congress or is congress simply responding to demands placed on it by the electorate the answer to this question is relevant to normative analysis of existing programs and to alternative proposals for reform in addition our study of the principal determinants of the growth of program benefit levels serves as an event study for assessing the merits of alternative theories of political decision making borcherding 1985 discusses two public choice explanations for the growth of public expenditures first public programs may expand as a result of the voting rules which underlie the political process when decisions are made by majority rule an increase in the median voter s demand for public services tends to increase public service levels because prospective candidates will revise their policy positions in order to be elected the wagner 1958 hypothesis for example maintains that increases in real income cause individuals to prefer both absolutely and relatively larger public expenditures borcherding notes that about 40 percent of the rate at which public sector spending has replaced private sector spending over the past eighty years can be explained with a median voter approach such an approach does better in what borcherding calls traditional areas of public expenditure where a median voter model can account for about 73 percent of the rate at which public expenditures excluding transfers have displaced private expenditures the median voter might favor public transfers to the elderly for two reasons first he may have an interdependent utility function in which the plight of the elderly poor arouses a charitable response while the redistribution from young to old does not simply target the old poor as a group the elderly do seem to be relatively less wealthy than the middle aged and the yound if one considers the average capitalized value of future income receipts from labor and capital second to the extent that the social security program offers a connection between reductions in current consumption and increases in future consumption it is a rather complex savings and insurance program the median voter s motivation for transferring monies to today s elderly may be a vehicle for ensuring future transfers to himself while this explanation is difficult to motivate at the individual level since a savings program for future retirement need not pay anything to today s elderly a continuing program of tax funded transfers is plausible method of establishing the moral constitution necessary to ensure that future transfers do in fact take place

behind the recent surge of chinese patenting an institutional view abstract this paper examines a number of forces that have possibly contributed to the explosive growth of chinese patenting over the past decade after a review of previous hypotheses and conventional wisdom this study proposes an additional explanation and argues that patent subsidy programs implemented by each provincial region have played an important role in the growth of chinese patenting this institutional change taking place at the province level has induced an increase in patent propensity among not only firms universities and research institutes but also individuals empirical evidence based on publicly available data provides solid support for this argument it was also found that a larger fraction of applications are granted patent rights since the implementation of such programs suggesting that reduction in patent application quality may not be a serious concern unless the criteria used for patent examination have been lowered

specification of the joy of giving insights from altruism this paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest depends only on the size of the bequest it exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parameter using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving parameter we demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing literature this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

are more resources always the answer a supply and demand analysis for public health services in brazilian municipalities abstract the aim of this paper is to determine whether it is necessary to increase available resources to local governments or if better use of these funds is sufficient the paper contributes to the literature by looking both at the supply and demand for public health services if the demand is estimated correctly one can compare its expected value to actual health expenditures even if actual expenditures are lower than the estimated demand it is not certain that additional spending is necessary if the efficiency scores supply side indicate that local governments can simply save resources to make up for the difference then it is possible to reduce or bring to zero new resources only by requiring local governments to efficiently manage their expenditures since municipalities in brazil are very heterogeneous we estimate their efficiency using the metafrontier approach o donnell et al 2008 while we estimate the demand through an equation derived from the median voter theorem model using 2010 data we find evidence that efficient management of spending is sufficient to meet excess demand for goods and services in the health sector

effects of aspirations and habits on the distribution of wealth we analyze how the introduction of habits and aspirations affects the distribution of wealth when the labor productivity of individuals is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and when bequests arise from a joy of giving motive in the presence of either bequests or aspirations labor income shocks are transmitted intergenerationally and this transmission together with contemporaneous shocks determines the distribution of wealth we show that the introduction of aspirations habits decreases increases the average wealth and increases decreases both its intragenerational variability and the degree of intergenerational mobility therefore a distinction between aspirations and habits is relevant because they involve different implications for the distribution of wealth

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

estate taxation with intended and accidental bequests abstract in this paper we examine the properties of the optimal estate tax in the presence of a complete set of tax instruments available to the social planner we allow for both types of bequest motives namely altruistic and accidental we examine the case for estate taxation which seems to be the strongest but not impeccable with accidental bequests in general the estate tax is highly sensitive to the relative importance of the two bequest motives

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

political equilibrium and the provision of public goods this paper treats interest groups peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers asthe unit of account for representativevoting each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand at the margin the effort benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits

the political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities this paper applies a public choice approach to the problem of unfunded pension liabilities and adopts the methodology of congleton and shughart 1990 to model underfunding of state level public pension plans using the median voter theorem along with the theory of capture by special interest groups and a combined model of the two with panel data from 2001 to 2009 the paper finds that the combined model provides the strongest explanation for the current levels of unfunded liabilities hence both median voter preferences and special interest group influence are affecting political outcomes the special interest group model slightly outperforms the median voter model in direct comparisons

patents and other intellectual property rights in this article the author reviews intellectual property rights iprs with some emphasis on the protection of agricultural and life sciences innovations the main institutional features of iprs are first discussed along with a brief historical background and an articulation of the main rationale for the existence of such rights this is followed by an overview of the principal economic issues related to iprs the author explains the main benefit cost trade offs of allowing patents and other iprs and then analyzes specific issues in some depth including the scope of patent protection the effects of patent races and the problems arising when iprs concern cumulative and or complementary innovations the author further illustrates the economics of iprs by considering instruments alternative to patents such as prizes and government procurement contracts finally the author briefly discusses some open policy issues in this area

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

demand for locally provided public services within the median voter s framework the case of the brazilian municipalities in this paper we estimated the demand for local public spending for the brazilian municipalities within a median voter s framework the rationale for applying that framework came from the fact that in federal systems voters preferences are more likely to be reflected at the local level as the consumers of public services have a better knowledge of the benefits and costs of the local public expenditures results obtained are consistent with the theoretical background thus suggesting that this hypothesis might be useful to describe the demand for local public goods in brazil in particular the use of quantile regression permitted us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables on local public expenses across different expenditures classes thus allowing for heterogeneity across municipalities our results also suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club goods shows crowding effects as is between zero and one however in the estimated models marginal congestion slightly d

the effect of intellectual property rights on domestic innovation in the pharmaceutical sector summary there is little empirical evidence concerning the effect of intellectual property rights ipr protecting pharmaceutical products and processes on pharmaceutical domestic innovation indeed existing literature does not provide a punctual estimate of this effect for developing countries this paper fills this gap by exploiting a self constructed dataset which provides for a 22 year period information concerning ipr reforms involving pharmaceuticals for 74 developed and developing countries the identification strategy exploits the different timing across these countries of two sets of ipr reforms domestic innovation is measured as citation weighted domestic patent applications filed at the european patent office epo the highly skewed distribution of the dependent variable and the high number of zero observations are taken into account using count data models in particular a zero inflated negative binomial model is adopted to overcome previous literature assumption that all innovations are patented in the main markets of reference and to take into consideration the choice not to patent at the epo results show that innovation is sensitive to ipr protection but not to its degree moreover the effect is not long lasting my study also finds that developing countries profit significantly less than developed ones from the protection benefiting from an effect that is roughly half of that for developed countries consequent policy implications are examined and include the conclusions that a one size fits all approach can be inappropriate and that gradual reforms should be preferred to rare reforms that greatly alter the level of ipr protection

non linear taxation of bequests equal sharing rules and the tradeoff between intra and inter family inequalities this paper studies the design of the tax and regulatory regime applied to bequests bequests are observable while parent s wealth and children s earning abilities are not parents know their children s earning abilities parents are altruistic their utility depends on their children s utilities but weights may differ between children the optimal tax schedule strikes a balance between the often conflicting incentive and corrective effects when parents attach identical weights to their children an estate taxation is sufficient equal sharing rules appear to be appropriate only in extreme cases such as in presence of the so called cinderella effect

the impact of intergenerational transfers on household wealth inequality in japan and the united states our paper sheds light on the implications of intergenerational transfers for wealth inequality by examining whether or not individuals who receive intergenerational transfers from their parents are more likely to leave bequests to their children than those who do not using microdata for japan and the united states the estimation results show that the receipt of intergenerational transfers from parents and or parents in law increases the likelihood of individuals leaving bequests to their children in both japan and the united states which in turn is likely to contribute to the persistence or widening of wealth disparities however such a tendency is found to be stronger among less better off households in both countries and this may help alleviate the disequalising effect of intergenerational transfers on the distribution of wealth at least to some extent

determinants of local school spending some consistent estimates the traditional median voter model predicts that median income and taxprice are the primary determinants of local school spending levels it further implies that lump sum grants wills be utilized like private income and thus income and grant coefficients should be the same our comprehensive search technique shows that excluding equalized assessed value these predictions hold up quite well over 2048 specifications income and taxprice elasticities are reasonable and tightly distributed with income and blockgrant effects of the same general size as note above any hint of flypaper effect is completely dependent on the inclusion of equalized assessed value in the regression equation since the state of new york has annual district level tax levy elections it would be hard to rationalize bureaucratic power or agenda control as capable of producing flypaper type effects so this absence is not surprising future research should 1 investigate the specification sensitivity of flypaper effects with other datasets and wealth variables and 2 examine election and tax rules for the possibility of budget maximizing actions by school officials finally the consistently positive effects of private schooling nonwhite and in poverty suggest that future work should attempt to model non linear income effects

simulating the transmission of wealth inequality via bequests abstract this paper develops calibrates and simulates a dynamic 88 period olg model to study the intergenerational transmission of u s wealth inequality via bequests the model features marriage realistic fertility patterns random death assortative mating based on skills heterogeneous skill endowments heterogeneous rates of return skill inheritability progressive income taxation and resource annuitization via social security all bequests arise from imperfect annuitization nonetheless the model generates a realistic ratio of aggregate wealth to aggregate labor income a realistic bequest flow relative to the stock of wealth and a realistic wealth distribution at retirement skill differences assortative mating social security and the time preference are the primary determinants of wealth inequality bequests do propagate wealth inequality but only in the presence of social security which disproportionately disinherits the lifetime poor intergenerational wealth immobility also considered here is primarily determined by the inheritance of skills from one s parents and the magnification of the impact of this inheritance by marital sorting

the case against patents evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity unless productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equiboth theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on librium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects strong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generstrong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from ally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with

motives to patent empirical evidence from germany abstract against the background of the patent upsurge we first analyse the role of patenting and alternative instruments to protect intellectual property based on a sample of german companies active in patenting in a second step we investigate the motives to patent considering sector and company size effects we find that company size matters both for the importance of instruments and the motives to patent especially important are the new strategic motives to patent like using patents to improve a company s own position in negotiations with partners licensees and the financial sector or to use patents as incentives for r d personnel or performance indicators these correlate positively with company size we derive some possible challenges for future patent policies from these insights

the quality factor in patent systems this article develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in three major patent systems quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with the patentability conditions in a transparent way the methodology consists of a two layer analytical framework encompassing legal standards ls and their operational design od which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process the comparison of patent systems in europe japan and the united states shows that their operational designs differ substantially the european system provides higher quality and more expensive examination services than the united states one while the japanese patent system is in an intermediate position the results illustrate that different system designs lead to different outcomes in terms of backlogs patent propensity and the number of dubious patent rights in force in this respect these findings i provide an empirical validation of the conjecture of a vicious cycle linking the quality of examination and demand for patents and ii highlight the need for a multifaceted convergence of patent systems before mutual recognition is put in place the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved

induced technological change in a multi regional multi sectoral integrated assessment model wiagem impact assessment of climate policy strategies abstract this paper illustrates the representation of induced technological change in the multi regional multi sectoral integrated assessment model wiagem the main aim of the paper is to investigate quantitatively the economic impacts of climate policy measures due to the induced technological changes that are considered improved technological innovations are triggered by increased r d expenditures that advance energy efficiency model results show that induced technological changes due to increased investment in r d reduce compliance costs although r d expenditures compete with other investment expenditures we find that increased r d expenditures improve energy efficiency which substantially lowers abatement costs without the inclusion of induced technological changes emission targets are primarily reached by declines in production resulting in overall welfare reductions with the inclusion of induced technological changes emission mitigations can be achieved with fewer production drawbacks technological spillover effects also lead to improved terms of trade effects

an option perspective on generating and maintaining plant variety rights in china notwithstanding the ambiguous research and productivity promoting effects of plant variety protections pvps even in developed countries many developing countries have adopted pvps in the past few years in part to comply with their trade related aspects of intellectual property rights trips obligations seeking and maintaining pvps reserves options to an expected revenue stream from the future sale of protected varieties the value of which varies for a host of reasons in this article we empirically examine the pattern of pvp applications in china since its pvp laws were first introduced in 1997 we place those pvp rights in the context of china s present and likely future seed markets to identify the economic incentives and institutional influences on decisions to develop and apply for varietal rights

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

changes to university ipr regulations in europe and the impact on academic patenting this article develops a general framework to describe the changes in university ipr regulations in europe and their effects on the patenting activities of universities and on knowledge transfer processes understanding the effects of changes in ipr regulations on academic patenting is a complex issue and parallels with the us case can be misleading first despite the general trend towards institutional ownership university ipr regulations in europe remain extremely differentiated and there is no one to one mapping to the us system second it is difficult to disentangle the quantitative and qualitative effects of changes in ipr ownership regulations on academic patenting activities from the effects of concurrent transformations in the institutional cultural and organizational landscape surrounding academic knowledge transfer the article proposes a review and typological classification of national university ipr ownership systems on the basis of their development since 2000 and uses it to analyze the aggregate dynamics of academic patent ownership in several european countries the analysis of patterns of ownership of academic patents shows that there has been a general increase in university patenting since 1990 with a significant slowdown and even reduction in some countries after early 2000s accompanied by a switch in academic patents ownership in favor of university ownership though preserving the european specificity of high company ownership of academic invented patents

on the distribution of wealth and intergenerational transfers we develop a simple behavioral model of intergenerational transfers with individuals being subject to uncertainty about their children s incomes individuals differ with respect to innate ability and to wealth transfers they receive at birth the distributions of total wealth of total income and of their components are uniquely determined from the equilibrium distribution of intergenerational transfers for which existence and uniqueness are proven for a particular utility function and provided that earned income follows a stable law we show that so do all endogenous distributions intergenerational transfers are relatively more equally distributed than earnings capital income and lifetime wealth

the diffusion of regional innovation capabilities evidence from italian patent data quatraro f diffusion of regional innovation capabilities evidence from italian patent data regional studies this paper investigates the diffusion of regional innovation capabilities within the manufacturing sector the competence based theory of the region allows for combining the schumpeterian view upon innovation and business cycles and the growth poles theory innovation capabilities spread within the region after the expansion of the propulsive sector due to learning dynamics adopting a methodology for the analysis of diffusion processes the paper presents empirical evidence on italian regions the results show that in late industrialized regions the diffusion of innovation capabilities is faster than in the early industrialized ones the role of research and development and complementary changes in the economic structure is also investigated quatraro f la diffusion des capacites d innovation regionale des preuves provenant des donnees italiennes sur les brevets regional studies cet article

the economics of product patents this paper develops a model of product patents in which the patent changes the nature of market entry behavior rather than preventing entry entirely the model incorporates three levels of action namely the innovator s patenting decision the potential entrant s location decision and possible court action the analysis demonstrates how the characteristics of the patents system and the enforcement framework can influence rivals variety choices and thus the market equilibrium it also considers how the system can in principle be adjusted to improve social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

bequests taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model this paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth we investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests we obtain all results analytically using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth from a policy perspective taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality

should continued family firms face lower taxes than other estates abstract taxes on estates and inheritances may induce heirs to discontinue family firms because firm dissolution incurs transaction costs a preferential tax treatment of transferred family businesses seems to be desirable from a macroeconomic viewpoint the support of dynastic succession however entails also a cost on the economy if firm continuation by less able heirs prevents entry into entrepreneurship here we investigate analytically and quantitatively the trade off between transaction costs saved and creative destruction prevented we find that a unique general equilibrium exists at which depending on the institutional setup low ability heirs either abandon type 1 or continue type 2 a family business a calibration of the model with german data suggests that preferential tax treatment of family firms has severe negative consequences on macroeconomic performance if it causes a threshold crossing from type 1 to type 2 equilibrium it also reveals that the descendants of less able entrepreneurs who were caused by continuation friendly tax policy to keep a family business always lose relative to their status in an economy without such a policy

novelty and disclosure in patent law the stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms it also affects ex ante profitability of research we compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency we ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology the possible rules are first to invent which applies in the u s and first to file which applies everywhere else

wealth distribution and optimal inheritance taxation in life cycle economies with intergenerational transfers we introduce intergenerational transfers into a general equilihrium life cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity in our overlapping generations model heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their cinldren furthermore agents face stochastic employment opportunities the model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the us economy our resuits indicate that hequests onl account for a sniall proportion of ohserved wealth heterogeneitv the introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare are measured by the average value of the newborn and equality of the wealth distribution preliminary versions of this paper have been presented at conference on intergenerational transfers taxes and the distribution of wealth in uppsala 1999 and the econoinetric societv european meetirig in santiago dc compostela 1999 we would like to thank michael kaganovieli john laitner james smith frank stafford and carl cristian von weizsacker for comments on earlier versions of the paper all remaining errors are ours

campaign finances and political platforms the economics of political controversy one implication of the widely used median voter model is that candidates have little to gain by disagreement apart from some epsilon of controversy necessary to demonstrate which candidate is closer to the median voter position in the policy dimension in question votes are maximized by taking essentially identical position this is true at the nash median voter equilibrium and is true away from equilibrium as a consequence two candidate competition within one dimensional policy domain is expected to generate considerable agreement about appropriate policy we do in fact observe that in many elections candidate positions converge to very similar positions on matters of broad concern it is largely this convergence that gives the median voter model its considerable credence in spite of the fragility of the underlying theory on the other hand the convergence is rarely as complete as might have been expected and there are elections where candidates take substantively different positions this paper explores the extent to which the campaign contributions of politically active groups may draw candidates away from the median voter position as candidate seek funds to run effective election campaigns candidates gener

capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable this paper extends the atkinson stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics productive ability and inherited wealth bequests are motivated by the joy of giving a child s inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution that depends on his parent s investment in a bequest technology public borrowing is assumed and implies the modified golden rule we study the optimal tax policy when two instruments are available a non linear wage income tax and a proportional tax on capital income we show that the second instrument ought in general to be used but that the tax rate is not necessarily positive however a positive tax rate is more likely when there is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability

the inheritance of inequality how level is the intergenerational playing field what are the causal mechanisms that underlie the intergenerational transmission of economic status are these mechanisms amenable to public policies in a way that would make the attainment of economic success more fair these are the questions we will try to answer

do estate and gift taxes affect the timing of private transfers abstract proposals to alter the estate tax are contentious and have been considered largely in an empirical vacuum this paper examines time series and cross sectional variation to identify the effects of estate and gift taxation on the timing of private transfers the analysis is based on data from the 1989 1992 1995 1998 and 2001 surveys of consumer finances legislative activity during this period reduced the tax disadvantage of bequests relative to gifts moreover the magnitude of this reduction differed systematically across identifiable household categories we find that households experiencing larger declines in the expected tax disadvantages of bequests reduced inter vivos transfers relative to households experiencing small declines in the tax disadvantages of bequests this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the timing of transfers is responsive to applicable gift and estate tax rates the results also provide evidence of a systematic bequest motive for high wealth households

is the median voter a clear cut winner comparing themedian voter theory and competing theories in explaining localgovernment spending this paper attempts to test the power of the median model againstthe respective strength of other alternate models based onredistributive political institutional and interest group theoriesin explaining the demand for public spending in new york statecounties during 1990 1980 and 1970 to execute the comparison ofthe performance of median voter model with that of each of thenonmedian voter ones various nonnested tests such as j and jatests n tilde w and encompassing tests have been employed results of the study show that although the median voter model hasa marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternativetheories it may not be relied upon solely when many otherinstitutional redistributive and interest group factors are alsorelevant for explaining public spending the results of this studydiffer from those in congleton and bennett 1995 we do not findthat interest group models are substantially weaker than the medianvoter model

why parents play favorites explanations for unequal bequests economists have invested a great deal of effort in trying to understand the motivation for family transfers yet recent empirical work testing the seemingly appealing models of altruism and exchange has led to decidedly mixed results a major stumbling block has been the lack of adequate data we take a fresh look at the issue using responses to an innovative survey question that directly asks mother about the planned division of their estates we find that both altruism and exchange are frequently offered as explanations of behavior and are of nearly equal importance furthermore the explanations are consistent with observable characteristics of the mother lending support to the validity of the question we also find that among step or adopted families genetic ties play an important role because motivating factors appear to differ across families the lack of a consensus among previous researchers about motives ought not to be surprising

on the political economy of state highway expenditures some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models this paper explores the extent to which the public demand for roads and or power of special interest groups determines road expenditures at the state level using an extension of the methodology developed in congleton and shughart 1990 reduced form models of median voter demand special interest group equilibria and a combined model are estimated using cross sectional state data from the united states we generally find support for the hypothesis that voting matters the pure median voter models have a better fit than the pure special interest group models moreover in our combined model we find that variables from the median voter model can not be dropped without significantly reducing the combined model s fit

digital copyright and the new controversy is the law moulding technology and innovation abstract this exploratory article sets out to examine if and how the new digital copyright laws in the u s and europe are affecting innovation on the internet it argues that these laws in balance at least to date are having a positive effect on internet innovation despite the strident argument that these laws will inhibit innovation the innovations the article discusses are peer to peer p2p file sharing technology and the new business models for music retailing that p2p has spawned it concludes that digital copyright laws could create perverse incentives for innovation and wonders if legislators may not require a better understanding of the innovation process when crafting ip laws