bank reserve requirements as an impediment to signaling bank reserve requirements as an impediment to signaling effective legal reserve requirements may hamper the private capital market s ability to price bank deposits in the model developed here the market has less information about bank assets than the banks have and a bank can therefore signal its superior information through its choice of excess reserves mandatory reserves can inhibit such signaling and therefore result in inefficient deposit pricing i introduction although the basic of fractional reserve banking were explained by edgeworth 1888 the rationale for legal reserve requirements as well as the details of their design have continued to evolve and the impetus for reform has been gathering momentum in recent years the time honored liquidity motivations as well as the more contemporary monetary control consideration have been widely debated and while the latter remains popular increasing skepticism has been expressed by benston 1978 greenbaum and kanatas 1982 laurent 1979 1981 robertson and phillips 1974 and starleaf 1975 among others like many of these papers this one questions the benefits of reserve requirements whereas most dispute their value as a monetary policy instruments however a new argument presented here shows that reserve requirements may subvert efficient deposit pricing and thereby aggravate asset quality and bank solvency problems the argument relates to the recent proposal that the private capital markets should play an expanded role in monitoring the exposure of banks we examine the potential of a commercial bank s excess reserves to signal asset quality in an environment without deposit insurance the results apply so long as deposit insurance remains incomplete and where the risk of each bank s assets is a priori unknown to all except the bank in such a setting the efficient pricing of deposit depends on a depositor s ability to ascertain the risk characteristics of the bank s assets it is shown that excess reserves can signal the unknown risk and thus resolve the informational asymmetry the ability to signal using excess reserves varies inversely however with reserve requirements thus reserve requirements may impede the ability of excess reserves to inform market participants reserve requirements are likely to impede signaling when i loan rates and reserve requirements are high or ii reserve requirements are low but a bank s deposit base is large reserve requirements are unlikely to impede signaling when banks are similar in their asset characteristics the underlying intuition is discussed in section iii excess reserves based signaling may be important because of its potential in facilitating the private sector s monitoring of banks we show that any effort to expand the private market s monitoring of bank asset quality through more accurate deposit pricing presupposes an appropriate regulatory milieu exposing large depositors to losses may be a precondition for expanding the role of the private capital markets but this analysis indicates that reserve requirements and or inappropriate discount window pricing can subvert such efforts the potential for conflict between the federal reserve focusing on monetary policy and the deposit insurers seeking to mitigate their monitoring burden and exposure is palpable thus the model clarifies the conditions necessary to engage the private market in monitoring bank asset quality through deposit pricing these requirements are formidable and the interdependence of regulatory constraints used for monetary policy and bank soundness purposes could frustrate programs based on piecemeal reform the model posits a risk neutral two period economy where each bank issues deposits and makes risky loans at the outset although asset quality varies across bank the choice of assets is not endogenous this is an important simplification since in general a bank s asset choice will impinge on the posited signaling problem

mark to market accounting for banks and thrifts lessons from the danish experience university of michigan tharvard university we appreciate helpful suggestions received from participants at the stanford summer camp and the price waterhouse symposium workshop participants at the university of chicago cornell university indiana university the ohio state university university of michigan university of pittsburgh university of rochester university of southern california tulane university and university of utah mary barth bill beaver george benston allen berger fisher black paul healy jack hughes robert kaplan richard leftwich jim leisenring niels nielsen finn ostrup bob ruland pete wilson and an anonymous referee we also appreciate the assistance of our contacts in denmark who shared their time and expertise with us so willingly these include mr ole bjarrum and mr lars nielsen of nykredit mr jesper jesperson and mr aksel olsen of kpmg revisionsfirmaet c jespersen mr lars tonnesen and mr birger schmidt of the danish bankers association mr kim hartvig olsen of the danish financial supervisoryauthority mr jorgen kock of den danske bank and professors jens elling merete christiansen finn ostrup and niels nielson of the copenhagen business school we thank professors dwight crane and bob kaplan of the harvard business school and bob swieringa and jim leisenring of the financial accounting standards board for help in conducting this research we are grateful for financial statement data furnished by the danish financial supervisory authority for access to the account database provided by professors elling and christensen of the copenhagen business school and for excellent research assistance by elizabeth andersen christine botosan marlene plumlee and james myers we also appreciate the willingness

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

hedging and coordinated risk management evidence from thrift conversions we provide an explanation for hedging as a means of allocating rather than reducing risk we argue that when increases in total risk are costly firms optimally allocate risk by reducing increasing exposure to risks that provide zero positive economic rents our evidence shows that mutual thrifts that convert to stock institutions increase total risk following conversion consistent with their increased abilities and incentives for risk taking they achieve this increase by hedging interest rate risk and increasing credit risk we provide some evidence that risk management activities are related to growth capacity and management compensation structure attained at conversion

axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary abstract this paper formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where both the feasibility constraints and the preferences may vary an axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle is presented the key axiom is a solidarity property with respect to changes that may occur possibly jointly in the feasibility constraints and the preferences solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and solidarity with respect to changes in the preferences together imply only a weaker form of egalitarianism journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d70

impartiality priority and solidarity in the theory of justice the ethic of priority is a compromise between the extremely compensatory ethic of welfare equality and the needs blind ethic of income equality we propose an axiom of priority and characterize resource allocation rules that are impartial prioritarian and solidaristic they comprise a class of rules which equalize across individuals some index of resources and welfare consequently we provide an ethical rationalization for the many applications in which such indices have been used e g the human development index index of primary goods etc

additions to bank loan loss reserves good news or bad news abstract this paper examines the effects of citicorp s and succeeding banks loan loss reserve announcements in 1987 it was found that while the average effect on bank stock return portfolios was weak the effect on individual bank returns was heterogeneous tests were undertaken to determine which bank specific variables explained the latter result two significant variables were the size of a banks ldc debt exposure and its position in ldc rescheduling committees

a new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation in a recent article fragnelli and gagliardo fragnelli v gagliardo s 2012 cooperative models for allocating an object economics letters 117 227 229 propose several procedures to solve a basic problem of fair allocation we scrutinize their proposal and contextualize it into recent developments of the literature on bankruptcy problems our analysis supports two of the procedures they propose namely the shapley and talmud rules

partial market value accounting bank capital volatility and bank risk abstract this paper presents evidence on the costs and benefits for the u s banking system of a partial version of market value accounting in which only securities are marked to market because accounting for liabilities is unchanged this accounting system has the same potential for misvaluing bank capital as historical cost accounting evidence from bank failure prediction models indicates the new system will not reduce bank failure rates other evidence indicates that net benefits will be small in absolute value and of uncertain sign

prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this paper puts forward a valuation framework for mortgage backed securities rather than imposing an optimal value minimizing call condition we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depends upon the prevailing state of the economy to implement our valuation procedure we use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a prepayment function in light of recent aggregate gnma prepayment experience by integrating this empirical prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgagebacked securities given an optimal value minimizing call policy a mortgage should never be called when its market value is less than its call price similarly a mortgage should be called if it is worth more than its call price however mortgagors often call their loans when the prevailing refinancing rate exceeds the contract rate on the loan dunn and mcconnell 1981 in addition some mortgagors do not call their loans when the loan s contract rate exceeds the prevailing refinancing rate the purpose of this paper is to put forward a valuation framework for mortgagebacked securities consistent with these stylized facts associated with mortgage prepayments the mortgagor s prepayment decision is integral to our valuation framework however we do not impose an optimal value minimizing call condition to price these securities rather we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depending upon the prevailing state of the economy by integrating this prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgage backed securities to implement our valuation procedures we estimate a prepayment function given recent gnma prepayment experience we follow green and shoven 1986 by using a proportional hazards model to estimate the influence of various explanatory variables or covariates on the mortgagor s prepayment decision distinct from green and shoven we explicitly model the effects of seasoning as well as investigating the influence of interest cost savings from refinancing in addition we also consider the effects of lagged refinancing rates heterogeneity

a real options approach to bankruptcy costs evidence from failed commercial banks during the 1990s literature identifies three main aspects of liquidation costs firm size asset specificity and industry concentration this paper unifies the theory behind these aspects of bankruptcy costs by treating them as components of a broader option valuation problem faced by the liquidating trustee testing the hypothesized asset price relationships on fdic failed bank liquidation data yields the appropriate results furthermore it appears that liquidation time alone can be used as an effective second order proxy for asset value growth where market value estimates are unavailable

a common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism resource egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism are two focal conceptions of distributive justice we show in this paper that they share a solid common ground to do so we analyze a simple model of resource allocation in which agents abilities to transform the resource into an interpersonally comparable outcome and starting points may differ both conceptions of egalitarianism are naturally modeled in this context as two allocation rules the two rules are jointly characterized by the combination of three appealing axioms no domination solidarity and composition

deposit insurance reform what are the issues and what needs to be fixed abstract the current problems in the commercial banking industry have led to widespread calls for reform of the deposit insurance contract on the grounds that it promotes moral hazard we review the empirical evidence for the significance of moral hazard as an important cause of the present crisis we then evaluate various reform proposals grouped into two broad classes proposals that seek to impose greater discipline on bank stockholders and proposals to increase the disciplinary role of bank debtholders finally we identify some issues that have received inadequate attention in the literature on bank regulation

a new axiomatic approach to the evaluation of population health in this paper we explore the implications of normative principles for the evaluation of population health we formalize those principles as axioms for social preferences over distributions of health for a given population we single out several focal population health evaluation functions which represent social preferences as a result of combinations of those axioms our results provide new rationale for popular theories in health economics such as the unweighted aggregation of quality adjusted life years qalys or healthy years equivalents hyes and generalizations of the two aimed to capture concerns for distributive justice without resorting to controversial assumptions on individual preferences

the limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative abstract market value accounting mva might improve market and regulatory discipline on financial institutions unfortunately there are serious conceptual measurement and incentive problems with implementing mva that have not received significant attention these problems are suggested by the theory of asymmetric information and the role intermediaries play in solving information and monitoring problems after analyzing the problems with mva we develop an alternative approach that applies mva principles where they are most feasible and uses a statistical procedure where asymmetric information problems make mva particularly problematic an empirical analysis suggests that this procedure may substantially improve the distribution of regulatory discipline

an evaluation of alternative scenarios for the gazprom monopoly of russian gas exports in june 2006 russian federal law legalized the exclusive right of gazprom to export natural gas to europe and thus thwarted efforts by the european union to bring competition to the russian gas industry an understanding of the motivation of the russian government to support this export monopoly is important if europe wishes to reduce its dependence on gazprom the principal aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of this important question our analysis employs a theoretical model and several numerical simulations of an alternative organization used for gas exports where independent gas producers in russia are permitted to export gas to europe we evaluate the effects of this alternative organization on consumer surplus industry profits and russian welfare the results demonstrate that while export by independent producers reduces gazprom s export profits it may also increase the total domestic and export profits earned by the russian gas industry however the results also suggest that russian gas consumers will not benefit if independent gas producers are able to supply both the domestic and international markets

organizational form and risk taking in the savings and loan industry abstract i hypothesize that risk taking is greater in stock thrifts than in mutual thrifts because the residual and fixed claims are separable i find that stock thrifts exhibit greater profit variability during the 1982 1988 period and that conversions from mutual to stock ownership are associated with increased investment in risky assets and increased profit variability these findings illustrate the relation between the structure of residual claims incentives and firm performance as well as the unintended consequences resulting from changes in thrift regulations

modeling structural and temporal variation in the market s valuation of banking firms hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm s net worth diverges from its economic value such unbooked capital has on balance sheet and off balancesheet sources this paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants in effect the analysis expands the twoindex model by endogenizing the market and interest rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on balance sheet and off balance sheet elements for a sample of banks during 1975 1985 the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital to the extent that an accounting representation of a firm s net worth diverges from its economic value the firm is said to have hidden capital two sources of hidden capital exist accountants misvaluations of portfolio positions that accounting principles designate as on balance sheet items and the systematic neglect of off balance sheet sources of value that these principles do not permit to be formally booked this paper develops a model for estimating both types of hidden capital the model makes direct use of accounting information on the bookable positions of a firm and separates bookable from unbookable sources of value we use regression analysis to partition the market value of a firm s stock i e its market capitalization mv into two components recorded capital reserves and unrecorded or hidden net worth hidden capital is in turn allocated between values that are unbooked but bookable through asset turnover or writedowns on a historical cost balance sheet under generally accepted accounting principles gaap and values which gaap currently designates as an unbookable offbalance sheet item we estimate the net unbooked value of on balance sheet positions by estimating an intermediate variation ratio k this variable expresses the ratio of the market value to the book value of the collected components of a firm s bookable

inferring market information from the price and quantity of s l deposits abstract this paper infers market information embedded in the price and quantity of s l deposits while previous empirical research typically treats the risk premium as the key element of deposit interest spread subsidy shifting theory suggests that deposit rates also contain a subsidy shifting premium that arises from an institution s eagerness to fund loan and investment opportunities that extract deposit insurance subsidies this paper examines the existence and the nature of both premiums and shows how regulators can use this information to make regulatory oversight more effective

market structure and the nature of price rigidity evidence from the market for consumer deposits panel data on consumer bank deposit interest rates reveal asymmetric impacts of market concentration on the dynamic adjustment of prices to shocks banks in concentrated markets are slower to raise interest rates on deposits in response to rising market interest rates but are faster to reduce them in response to declining market interest rates thus banks with market power skim off surplus on movements in both directions since deposit interest rates are inversely related to the price charged by banks for deposits the results suggest that downward price rigidity and upward price flexibility are a consequence of market concentration

fair allocation of disputed properties we model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims in this context we investigate procedural and end state principles of fairness their implications and relations to do so we explore procedural allocation rules represented by a composition of a rights assignment mechanism to assign each profile of claims individual property rights over the endowment and walrasian or other individually rational exchange rule using variants of fairness based on no envy as end state principles we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three focal egalitarian mechanisms known in the literature on rationing problems as constrained equal awards constrained equal losses and proportional mechanisms our results are connected to focal contributions in political philosophy and also provide rationale for market based environ mental policy instruments such as cap and trade schemes and personal carbon trading and moral foundation for the three proposals to allocate ghg emission rights known as the equal per capita sharing the polluter pays principle and the equal burden sharing the victims pay principle

taxpayer subsidies in failed thrift resolution the impact of firrea abstract we compare the wealth effects of acquisitions of failed thrifts before and after the passage of firrea in august 1989 in contrast to fslic assisted deals in the pre firrea period we find no evidence of significant acquirer gains in rtc assisted transactions in addition there is no significant correlation between acquirer gains and either the number of bidders or the amount of assistance provided by the rtc these results suggest the absence of any symmetric tax payer overpayments in rtc assisted transactions and indicate that regulatory and institutional changes instituted by firrea resulted in an improvement in the resolution process for failed thrifts

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

who pays for bank insolvency this paper discusses proposals for handling bank failures in a manner that is rapid enough to allow the business to continue respects the ranking of claims makes none of the parties worse off than under traditional insolvency and does not require taxpayer funds except to guarantee the new organization until recapitalization it considers the relationship between the regime for bank exit and the rest of the framework for regulation and supervision the role of market discipline in enabling solutions before the point of insolvency is reached the problems in assessing the costs of different exit regimes and public intervention

the winner s curse and bidder competition in acquisitions evidence from failed bank auctions this study examines the effect of bidder competition in acquisitions we use predictions from auction theory to test whether acquirers of failed banks overpay the winner s curse when bidding in fdic sealed bid purchase and assumption p a transactions auctions the empirical results indicate that winning bids tend to increase as the number of competitors increases as predicted by theory we also find that bid levels of all bidders increase with increased competition which is consistent with bidders failing to adjust for the winner s curse in a common value auction setting however additional tests using winning bids only are consistent with both a common value and a private values model so this result should be interpreted with caution the winner s curse hypothesis states that the winner of a sealed bid auction in which the value of the object being competed for is uncertain tends to be the one who most overestimates the true value of the auctioned object as a result auction winners who fail to recognize this possibility are likely to be cursed by having paid more for the object than its true worth this hypothesis has been applied to various situations including bidding on oil and gas leases capen et al 3 and corporate takeovers roll 16 varaiya 19 support for the existence of the winner s curse has been reported primarily from laboratory experiments bazerman and samuelson 1 kagel and levin 12 testing of the winner s curse hypothesis with market data is in its early stages gilley karels and leone s 7 study of bidding for oil leases provides mixed suport brannman klein and weiss 2 examine bidding behavior in a variety of auction markets and interpret some of their results as supporting the winner s curse hypothesis our study examines the effects of bidder competition and the winner s curse hypothesis within the context of fdic auctions of failed banks our study may also have relevance for the broader corporate control literature this literature uniformly indicates that shareholders of acquired firms earn large

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

the use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial banks abstract this paper examines the incentives banks have to engage in off balance sheet activities such as commercial loan sales and the issuance of standby letters of credit slcs i show that loan sales and loans backed by slcs have payoff characteristics similar to secured debt like secured debt off balance sheet activities permit banks to sell a portion of the cash flows associated with new investment oppurtunities this ability permits banks to invest in loans with positive net present values that they would pass up if restricted to deposit financing an examination of the risk premium on large certificates of deposit provides evidence consistent with the model

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

asymmetric parametric division rules we describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good as part of the characterization we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant we also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function

export orientation and domestic merger policy theory and some empirical evidence abstract recent open economy industrial organization literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post merger international competitive gains favouring lenient domestic merger policy however mergers seldom generate the significant synergies supportive of international competitive gains since a joint economies of production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses not gains export orientation favours strict not lenient domestic merger policy we show how non synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews a panel data set of u s merger policy by manufacturing sector 1990 2001 empirically supports export orientation leading to strict merger policy jel classification l40 f10

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

when is a break up of gazprom good for russia in the late 1990s several proposals for a structural reform that would bring competition and market prices to the russian gas industry were intensely debated splitting up russian gas monopolist gazprom into several producing companies was a considered option in this paper i examine theoretically and numerically how a split up of gazprom would affect russian national welfare results show that under the current gas market structures in europe and russia the split up of gazprom s monopoly might not be beneficial for russia however analysis in the paper indicates that the market shares that gazprom has in both russian domestic and european gas markets are important in determining whether gazprom s dominance is supported under the national welfare criteria when gazprom has small market share in europe and large market share in russia a break up of gazprom might plausibly result in increase of russian national welfare

domestic merger policy in an international oligopoly the nordic market for electricity many domestic markets are becoming integrated in international markets is this an argument for permitting mergers between domestic producers it is shown that a merger with no cost saving effects will always be detrimental to domestic welfare if the country is an importer of the good in question and may increase welfare if the country is an exporter and the price cost margin is sufficiently low initially we specify a general condition for a merger to improve welfare and apply the condition on the nordic market for electricity numerical calculations suggest that in this particular market the norwegian competition authority should ban domestic mergers with no cost savings

fair value disclosures by bank holding companies abstract this paper examines the value relevance of fair value data disclosed under sfas 107 by banks for 1992 and 1993 collectively the evidence suggests differences between fair and book values of financial instruments are associated with market to book ratios however fair value disclosures for financial instruments other than securities are value relevant only in limited settings in addition only in 1992 are fair value variables associated with market to book ratios after incorporating existing historical cost information further analysis suggests the weaker 1993 results are not necessarily due to increased measurement error in fair value numbers

effects of deregulation on failing thrift institutions the purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that much of the decline in the net worth of the failing saving and loan institutions was a result of deregulation variables are developed to represent major actions to deregulate sltime series analysis is developed to estimate the effects of financial deregulation on failing thrifts net worth the data are 1984 89 balance sheet adn income statement data for thrift institutions prior to the enactment of the 1989 legislation to solve the crisis the reuslts of the analysis indicate that deregulation of asset and deposit activities was not the cause of the financial distress of failing us thrift institutions the primary cause appears to be the increase in the federal deposit insurance limit to 100 000 and how attractive this legislative action made brokering deposits that became insured up to 100 000

when and why did fslic resolve insolvent thrifts abstract this paper develops an optimal resolution triage strategy for a deposit insurance regulator the regulator seeks to maximize the market value of the deposit insurance enterprise subject to budget personal bureaucratic political informational and legal restraints testable hypotheses are derived concerning the timing of insolvency resolutions the paper tests these hypotheses using a two step hazards model and a data set of thrift resolutions during 1985 1989 the tests focus on the relative roles of value maximization and constraint pressures in decisions to grant capital forbearance the results suggest that regulators seldom conformed to the benchmark resolution timing strategy that an unconflicted agent would follow under only a budget constraint instead the evidence shows that the resolution timing decision was distorted by personal political informational and legal constraints

time dependent variance and the pricing of bond options in this paper we develop a model for valuing debt options that takes into account the changing characteristics of the underlying bond by assuming that the standard deviation of return is proportional to the bond s duration the resulting model uses the bond price as the single state variable and thus preserves much of the simplicity and robustness of the black scholes approach the paper provides comparisons between option prices computed using this model and those using the black scholes and brennan and schwartz models the last decade has seen a dramatic increase in the volatility of bond markets leading to a growing interest in financial instruments that can be used to hedge this risk thus in the u s canada and the u k there has been a proliferation of new interest rate dependent securities such as bond futures options on bonds options on bond futures swap agreements and bonds with option features such as callability putability retractability and so forth with the development of these markets the problems of valuation and the derivation of the hedging strategies have become subjects of increasing importance to both practitioners and academics several valuation methods have been suggested in the literature but so far no consensus has emerged as to the best solution to these problems the simplest approach to the valuation of debt options and probably the most widely used in practice is the black scholes model 3 this method originally developed for the valuation of stock options assumes that the variance of the rate of return on the underlying security is constant while this assumption is plausible for common stocks it is clearly unreasonable for bonds with a finite maturity the distinctive feature of the problem of debt option valuation is that the characteristics of the underlying asset change over time because the price is constrained to converge to the face value of the bond at maturity a second drawback of the black scholes approach is that it assumes a constant short term interest rate an assumption that is clearly inconsistent with stochastic returns on bonds in spite of these problems the black scholes model has been frequently used in practice to value debt options because of its overwhelming simplicity in comparison with other available methods

measuring the true profile of taxpayer losses in the s l insurance mess abstract this research shows that conservative methods of projecting and discounting cash flows if applied to information already collected in the fhlbb s reporting system would have reflected the size of the s l deposit insurance losses long before taxpayers were aware of the extent of the mess official data show fslic reserves of 4 6 billion in 1986 in sharp contrast our conservative estimate puts imbedded losses for that year at 45 3 billion these methods prove insensitive to arbitrariness in the assumptions needed to operationalize the discounting process and measure the extent of guilty knowledge it is fair to presume officials possessed supporting an incentive breakdown theory of the problem over presumptions of innocent ignorance the policy implication is that taxpayers need to impose on government regulatory agents a better information system and better enforcement of those agents obligations to the public

a strategic model of european gas supply gasmod abstract this paper presents a model of the european natural gas supply gasmod which is structured as a two stage game of successive natural gas exports to europe upstream market and wholesale trade within europe downstream market and which explicitly includes infrastructure capacities we compare three possible market scenarios cournot competition in both markets perfect competition in both markets and perfect competition in the downstream with cournot competition in the upstream market eu liberalization we find that cournot competition in both markets is the most accurate representation of today s european natural gas market where suppliers at both stages generate a mark up at the expense of the final customer double marginalization our results yield a diversified supply portfolio with newly emerging lng exporters gaining market shares enforcing competition in the european downstream market would lead to lower prices and higher quantities by avoiding the welfare reducing effects of double marginalization binding infrastructure capacity restrictions strongly influence the results and we identify bottlenecks mainly for intra european trade relations whereas transport capacity in the upstream market is globally sufficient in the cournot scenario

accounting for banks capital regulation and risk taking this paper examines risk taking incentives in banks under dierent accounting regimes with capital regulation in the model the bank s decisions of capital issuance and investment policy are jointly determined given exogenous minimum capital requirement the bank is more likely to issue equity capital in excess of the minimum required level and implement less risky investment policy under either lower of cost ormarket accounting or fair value accounting than under historical cost accounting but fair value accounting may induce more risk taking compared to lower of cost or market accounting due to short term interest in the part of the bank however the disciplining role of lower of cost or market accounting may discourage bank s incentive to exert project discovery eort

merger policy in open economies abstract we extend farrell and shapiro s 1990 analysis of horizontal mergers to the case of an open economy we show how the rules for approving a merger ought to be adapted to account for the fact that the regulator is only concerned with domestic welfare that is ignores the effect of the merger on foreign firms and consumers we also explore the consequences of this externality in a model of a single market which includes consumers and producers of different countries in particular we provide conditions under which a decentralized process of evaluating merger proposals a la farrell shapiro can survive the externality mentioned above

the pricing of interest rate risk evidence from the stock market this paper addresses the issue of whether firms are required to pay an ex ante premium to investors for bearing the risk of interest rate changes a two factor apt model with the market and changes in the yield on long term government bonds as factors is employed the paper shows that empirically most of the interest sensitive stocks are in the utility industries and that there is reasonable evidence that the interest factor is priced in the sense of the apt several sources for the interest sensitivity are considered and regulatory lags are focused on as a likely candidate some firms exhibit ex post sensitivity in their stock returns to unanticipated changes in interest rates are these firms required to pay investors ex ante for bearing this risk of interest rate changes the framework for examining pricing of unanticipated interest rate changes is a two factor apt model with the market and changes in the yield on long term government bonds as factors the issue is whether the interest rate change premium is significant to study this the paper uses full information maximum likelihood fiml estimation on groups of twenty five individual firms with both cross equation constraints and withinequation nonlinear constraints on the parameters as mandated by the apt model whether the risk of unanticipated changes in interest rates is priced in the market is of particular interest with regard to regulated firms regulated firms especially electric utilities turn out to comprise the big majority of firms that are sensitive to unanticipated interest rate changes after some preliminary investigation the analysis focuses on electric utilities much empirical work on the apt relies on factor analysis e g roll and ross 30 bower bower and logue 5 use factor analysis in comparing the apt and the capm to explain utilities returns the present paper however uses observable variables at the macro level chan chen and hsieh cch 7 and chen roll and ross crr 8 also examine apt models with specific macroeconomic factors cch and crr use a traditional fama macbeth type of cross sectional estimation approach in the premia calculations rather than a fiml approach gibbons and stambaugh have applied fiml techniques to models using only the market as an explanatory variable gibbons 20 used a noniterative algorithm on portfolios of firms equivalent to a two step cross sectional approach stam

principal agent problems in s l salvage new legislation and traditional fdic insolvency resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal agent problems most responsible for the fslic mess these problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts the rtc the constraints slow insolvency resolution increase interim financing costs and undermine rtc recovery of asset value operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived franchise values the rtc allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis initiates bidding for one institution at a time holds back seriously troubled assets and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders although the federal savings and loan insurance corporation fslic is officially defunct its corporate corpse lives on in two successor institutions its deposit insurance business has been taken over by the savings association insurance fund saif while its liquidation or salvage business has been assigned to the resolution trust corporation rtc both saif and rtc have the same stockholder principals federal taxpayers also both are operated by the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic nevertheless their governing structures differ markedly and in a perverse way to maximize net returns from salvage experience suggests the theory that a salvage or value recovery operation requires the aggressive operating flexibility of an automobile junkyard in a junkyard essentially everything in the salvor s inventory is open for inspection stripping and sale to anyone at any time hardto market hulks are compacted into scrap metal i e pooled and shipped out on what can be compared to a bulk sales or auction basis on a strict timetable the yard either owns or transacts with a fleet of tow trucks and has enough operating capital to bring in new wrecks as they appear this paper argues that unlike a private salvor the rtc is saddled with the additional objective of slowing down official recognition of the full size of fslic s losses to this end the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act firrea underfunds the rtc requires delayed sales of residential properties ostensibly to promote the availability of affordable housing and creates a superfluous five person rtc oversight board whose incentives are to deprive rtc decisionmakers of desirable operating flexibility the rtc oversight board creates an appearance of improved accountability to taxpayers that runs exactly opposite to its true economic effects three of the

heterogeneous creditors and the market value of bank ldc loan portfolios abstract a standard proposition used in many empirical studies is that the value of an ldc loan does not depend on the identity of the lender i test this proposition using bank securities prices and prices for ldc loans trading in the secondary market i find significant cross sectional differences in the sensitivity of bank stocks to changes in the price of ldc loans differences in sensitivity appear to be related to changes in bank exposure to ldcs i also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that cds are implicitly insured

equality of resources implies equality of welfare if one is an egalitarian should one try to equalize resources available to agents or to equalize their welfares with a suitably general conception of what resources are these two conceptions cannot be distinguished an allocation mechanism is defined on a space of economies and is required to satisfy various axioms that are necessary conditions for equalizing resources among a population the unique mechanism satisfying these axioms on a large domain of economies is the one that allocates commodities so as to equalize utilities of the agents methodologically the theorem is a generalization of bargaining theory because the mechanisms are defined on commodity space

a market evaluation of the risk based capital standards for the u s financial system abstract this paper evaluates u s risk based capital guidelines by comparing stock market measures of institutions risk with current regulatory risk based capital measures the first part of the evaluation compares overall market and regulatory risk based capital measures of current capital adequacy required capital and the capital infusion required to meet the capital requirement the second part compares regulatory risk weights on individual risk categories with market determined risk weights the results suggest that the market and risk based capital standards agree to some extent on the adequacy of institutions current capital and required capital infusion but that their measures of asset risk are not positively correlated further the 100 percent risk category for banks and the 50 and 200 percent categories for s ls do distinguish activities that are riskier by market measures however the market model makes limited distinctions among the other categories in addition the results suggest that some off balance sheet activities for banks may reduce asset risk

determinants of thrift institution resolution costs this paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980 1988 a simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution this model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies the empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s this evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator s closure rule our econometric evidence moreover is consistent with the hypothesis that for troubled institutions tangible net worth systematically understates market value net worth in addition the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed the sharp increase in market interest rates in late 1979 and early 1980 and the deregulation of deposit rates led to record losses in the thrift industry in the early 1980s and to a major erosion of the industry s capital many institutions never fully recovered from these problems and most currently insolvent thrift

risk regulation and s l diversification into nontraditional assets abstract risk exposure is a central issue in the debate over allowing savings and loan associations s ls to expand into nontraditional activities this paper examines the relationship between risk and portfolio composition of three distinct groups of s l lenders based on their investment strategies real estate specialized res s l lenders with high holdings of adjustable rate mortgages arms res s l lenders with low arms and not real estate specialized nres s l lenders the major findings of this paper suggest that diversification into nontraditional assets leads to lower risk and higher average returns for res firms with low arms but for nres firms it leads to higher risk and in some cases lower average returns this latter group of institutions appears to be using nontraditional assets as a means to increase their risk exposure and not necessarily their average stock returns in addition we find that risk increases for res s ls with high arms as additional adjustable rate mortgages are added to their portfolios this is not the case for the low arms group and may indicate that at some level the increase in credit risk dominates the decrease in interest rate risk associated with additional arms relative to fixed rate mortgages these results strongly suggest that while additional diversification provides risk reduction opportunities for some s ls it also provides opportunities for other s ls to increase their risk exposure

securitization with recourse an instrument that offers uninsured bank depositors sequential claims abstract this paper expands on the observation that securitization with recourse offers a lender the protections of an uninsured bank deposit with an additional senior claim if the bank fails the senior claim derives from the commitment of the revenues from a group of securitized assets that pay off the securitized lender first thus securitization with recourse provides sequential claims for bank liability holders which improves the allocation of risk sharing among them securitization with recourse may also improve the selection of loans granted by partially offsetting the moral hazard incentives toward risk taking created by fixed rate deposit insurance empirical results are given which are consistent with the theoretical model

the pure compensation problem egalitarianism versus laissez fairism a binary choice problem with side payments and quasi linear utilities is considered we study two compensation rules called social choice functions the egalitarian rule divides equally the surplus above the average utility level the laissez faire rule chooses an efficient decision but performs no transfer egalitarianism is characterized by a monotonicity axiom called agreement no two agents ever disagree in comparing two distinct preferences of a third one laissez fairism is characterized by the no subsidy axiom a coalition would not be worse off if the other agents were not present

two markets and a weak link abstract we characterise the relationship between two network based oligopoly markets when local players share the interconnection s ownership to that purpose we analyse the case of the bacton uk zeebrugge belgium natural gas pipeline using vector auto regressive representation techniques we conclude that there is a threshold of capacity deployment after which the two local markets split as a result the relationship between local price differentials and capacity utilisation is increasing and convex we also show that the local prices dynamic structure is characterised by convergence features

regulatory incentives and the thrift crisis dividends mutual to stock conversions and financial distress during the 1980s insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts regulators induced nearly 10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual to stock conversions we test a theory of how regulators encouraged capitalimpaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital we estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress