barriers to knowledge seeking within mnc teams which differences matter most do international or non international differences between members matter most for multinational corporation mnc teams we consider two types of international differences arising from geographic locations and national origins and two types of non international differences arising from structural affiliations and demographic attributes examining the barriers to knowledge seeking between mnc team members we argue that whether international or non international differences create greater barriers depends on whether they are position based or person based using the social relations model to analyze 13 616 dyadic interactions among 2090 members of 289 teams in a large mnc we find that for both international and non international differences those that are position based i e geographic and structural differences created greater barriers than those that are person based i e nationality and demographic differences in addition familiarity from a prior team reduced the barriers created by international and non international differences that are position based more than those that are person based we discuss the implications of our study for understanding the micro foundations of knowledge flows in mncs

a political economy model of congressional careers our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we assess reelection probabilities estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages and quantify the value of congressional seat moreover we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in congress

reducing bureaucratic corruption interdisciplinary perspectives on what works abstract this article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti corruption policies with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants drawing on the work of economists political scientists sociologists and anthropologists we examine seven policy categories 1 rewards and penalties 2 monitoring 3 restructuring bureaucracies 4 screening and recruiting 5 anti corruption agencies 6 educational campaigns and 7 international agreements notably rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti corruption policies nevertheless we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring including anti corruption audits and e governance in addition adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption an emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature we conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem it cannot be treated in the long term with individual level solutions

term limits and electoral accountability abstract periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable from this perspective term limits which restrict voters ability to reward politicians with re election appear counterproductive we show that despite the disciplining effect of elections term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters by reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences such truthful behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents we characterize under which circumstances two term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

is voter competence good for voters information rationality and democratic performance a long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence this literature got its start arguing that voters lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability a more recent literature deepens the debate with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so we argue that regardless of its conclusions about voter competence this literature s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided we use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians when this strategic interaction is taken into account increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse one simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the

proportionality and turnout evidence from french municipalities many studies find that voter turnout is higher in proportional representation pr elections than in plurality elections but because the two systems differ in multiple ways and are used in differe

experiential knowledge and cost in the internationalization process using a behavioral approach this study identifies and delineates components of experiential knowledge in the internationalization process three hypotheses are developed and tested they center ar

management of bureaucrats and public service delivery evidence from the nigerian civil service we study how the management practices bureaucrats operate under relate to the quantity and quality of public services delivered we do so exploiting data from the nigerian civil service for 4700 public sector projects we have hand coded independent engineering assessments of project completion rates and delivered quality we supplement this with a survey eliciting management practices for bureaucrats in the 63 civil service organizations responsible for these projects building on bloom and van reenen 2007 management practices matter a one standard deviation increase in bureaucrat s autonomy signi cantly increases project completion rates by 18 a one standard deviation increase in practices related to incentives monitoring of bureaucrats signi cantly lowers project completion rates by 14 we show the negative impacts of incentive provision monitoring arise because bureaucrats multi task and incentives are poorly targeted and because these management practices capture elements of subjective performance evaluation that leave scope for dysfunctional responses from bureaucrats to support a causal interpretation of our ndings we document the determinants of management practices and examine channels through which organizations might endogenously adjust management practices our results provide novel insights into how changes in how bureaucrats are managed can have potentially large impacts on public service delivery in a developing country context jel classi cation j33 j38 o20

foreign entry cultural barriers and learning this paper examines the longevity of foreign entries hypotheses are developed on the mode start ups vs acquisitions and ownership structure wholly owned vs joint ventures in relation to cultural distance the hypotheses are tested within a framework of organizational learning using data on 225 entries that 13 dutch firms carried out from 1966 onwards results show that the presence of cultural barriers punctuates an organization s learning cultural distance is a prominent factor in foreign entry whenever this involves another firm requiring the firm to engage in double layered acculturation we also identify locational paths of learning the longevity of acquisitions is positively influenced by prior entries of the firm in the same country similarly the longevity of foreign entries in which the firm has a majority stake improves whenever the expanding firm engaged in prior entries in the same country and in other countries in the same cultural block

the liability of foreignness in capital markets sources and remedies the accelerating pace of global capital market integration has provided new opportunities for firms to raise capital abroad through global debt issues cross listings and initial public offerings in foreign stock exchanges however existing empirical evidence suggests that foreign firms tend to be at a disadvantage compared with domestic firms and they often suffer from investors home bias the objective of this paper is to understand why firms are facing problems when accessing capital in foreign markets and possible mechanisms that can help to mitigate these problems it expands the liability of foreignness lof research beyond the product market domain to include liabilities faced by firms attempting to secure resources in foreign capital markets we identify key differences between product and capital markets related to information environment time structure of transactions and linkages between buyers and sellers we analyze institutional distance information asymmetry unfamiliarity and cultural differences as the main sources of capital market lof cmlof we suggest possible mechanisms that managers can employ to mitigate cmlof and overcome investors home bias bonding signaling organizational isomorphism and reputational endorsements we also outline directions for further theoretical and empirical development of the cmlof research

the role of past performance in export ventures a short term reactive approach this paper employs organizational learning theory to examine the short term effect of past export performance and internal management and external market forces on marketing strategy adaptation and current export performance results from a survey of over 500 export managers indicate that current period performance improvement in terms of performance achievement export intensity and performance satisfaction in the current year is influenced by the firm s commitment to exporting further the authors found that while performance satisfaction feeds performance improvement in the following year both the previous year s export intensity and export performance achievement produce a negative impact on current period performance improvement more importantly the level of development in the export market facilitates marketing strategy adaptation in the short term as does export intensity in the previous year however satisfaction with previous year performance negatively influences the degree of distribution adaptation implications for international business researchers and practitioners are also discussed

the role of career and wage incentives in labor productivity evidence from a two stage field experiment in malawi we study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self selection and incentive effect channels using a two stage field experiment in malawi first recent secondary school g

strategic public policy around population thresholds abstract political economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both re election and financial incentives this article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether when and how local office holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases using data from all 589 belgian municipalities over the period 1977 2016 our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits particularly for apartments these policy changes occur early in the election cycle and at least for housing policy are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold

regression discontinuity designs based on population thresholds pitfalls and solutions in many countries important features of municipal government such as the electoral system mayors salaries and the number of councillors depend on whether the municipality is above or below arbitrary population thresholds several papers have used a regression discontinuity design rdd to measure the effects of these threshold based policies on political and economic outcomes using evidence from france germany and italy we highlight two common pitfalls that arise in exploiting population based policies compound treatment and sorting and we provide guidance for detecting and addressing these pitfalls even when these problems are present population threshold rdd may be the best available research design for studying the effects of certain policies and political institutions

local knowledge transfer and performance implications for alliance formation in asia foreign firms in host country environments frequently face location based disadvantages this study proposes three means channels of overcoming local knowledge disadvantages based on a sample of 558 japanese joint ventures jvs located in southeast and east asia we find that partnering with local firms the first channel can be a primary strategy for accessing local knowledge and improving jv performance jv experience in the host country the second channel also mitigates local knowledge disadvantages and leads to increased jv performance the third channel the foreign parent s host country experience leads to increased performance in the absence of a local partner however when a jv is formed with a local partner increased parent experience in the host country leads to decreased performance suggesting that the need for a local partner declines as parent experience in a host country increases

the causes of legal rents extraction evidence from spanish municipalities this paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it namely local top politicians wages in particular we investigate whether local politicians incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information we use a sample of the largest spanish municipalities over the years 2008 2010 the results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction in an additional analysis we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management these findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries higher wages do not mean better management but they are just political rents

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

gender quotas and the quality of politicians we analyze the effects of the introduction of gender quotas in candidate lists on the quality of elected politicians as measured by the average number of years of education we consider an italian law which introduced gender quotas in local elections in 1993 and was abolished in 1995 as not all municipalities went through elections during this period we identify two groups of municipalities and use a difference in differences estimation we find that gender quotas are associated with an increase in the quality of elected politicians with the effect ranging from 0 12 to 0 24 years of education this effect is due not only to the higher number of elected women who are on average more educated than men but also to the lower number of low educated elected men the positive effect on quality is confirmed when we measure the latter with alternative indicators it persists in the long run and it is robust to controlling for political ideology and political competition

active and passive waste in government spending evidence from a policy experiment we propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services active waste entails utility for the public decision maker whereas passive waste does not we analyze purchases of standardized goods by italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency we find that i some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods ii differences are correlated with governance structure iii the variation in prices is principally due to variation in passive rather than active waste and iv passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste

does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians evidence from pay harmonization in the european parliament we study the harmonization of the base pay for the members of the european parliament meps prior to this reform implemented in 2009 base pay was aligned with that of national parliamentarians causing large differences in pay between the meps representing 27 member states based on detailed information on individual meps between 2004 and 2011 we find that the reform which introduced an exceptional base pay increase of 200 per national delegation on average has a positive incentive effect on in office effort proxied by the number of speeches written declarations and reports drafted however more generous remuneration is associated with higher rates of absenteeism with respect to political selection we find that higher pay also raises reelection rates the composition of the pool of meps in terms of ex ante quality approximated by formal education previous political experience in elected office and occupational background is however unaffected if we restrict our attention to newly elected meps a salary increase is related to fewer meps with previous political experience at the highest national level

infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns the roots of public discontent abstract this paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers we show that there are cases in which privatization even though it fosters investments in infrastructure also opens the door to more corruption the public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in latin america where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency enhancing and have fostered investments and at the same time popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high especially among the middle class we show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region

on the returns to holding political office is it worth it abstract the paper estimates causal effects of being elected in a local election on monetary returns the claim for causality is made in a research design where the income of some candidate who just barely won a seat is compared to that of some other candidate who was close to winning a seat for the same party but ultimately did not this research design is made possible thanks to a comprehensive detailed data set covering all swedish politicians who have run for office in the period 1991 2006 the analysis establishes that monetary returns from local politics are absent both in the short and long run by relating this null result to effects on the future political career the paper provides suggestive evidence that local politicians are not primarily motivated by money

higher pay worse outcomes the impact of mayoral wages on local government quality in peru abstract in this paper i study how wages earned by local politicians affect local government quality to identify the effects i use caps imposed by the peruvian central government on mayoral wages as an excluded instrument the results show that mayoral wages do not improve government performance in particular there is a negative impact on public investment implementation and on performance goals set by the central government moreover there is no evidence of a positive effect on politician selection municipal bureaucratic capacity and political effort wages do strongly affect the local political landscape increasing political competition and reducing political support for the mayor these changes may help explain the drop in performance as local authorities may face more political obstacles when implementing their policy agenda overall the results show that higher politician wages need not improve local government quality

political accountability and regulatory performance in infrastructure industries an empirical analysis the aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes the authors investigate for the case of telecommunications its impact on the performance of regulation in two time series cross sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985 99 in addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance the analysis of the data sets shows that the positive effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries an important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

productivity crowding out in labor markets with motivated workers abstract when workers intrinsic motivation matters a wage increase has mixed consequences on applicants productivity and motivation as shown in public service healthcare education and politics in a simple theoretical framework where ability and motivation are workers private information we rationalize these differentiated responses and identify intuitive conditions for higher wages inducing self selection of more or less productive and motivated workers the selection patterns depend both on the statistical association between workers characteristics and on the difference between the incentivized returns to ability across sectors we emphasize a crowding out effect of wage on workers productivity that has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature before

moderating political extremism single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule we compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule allowing for partly endogenous party formation under runoff elections the number of political candidates is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections the predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in italy where cities above 15 000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system while those below hold single round elections jel c78 d72

determinants of cross national knowledge transfer and its effect on firm innovation this study examines the determinants of international knowledge flow from a resource based perspective it evaluates the impact of cross national knowledge transfer on firm innovative performance based on 56 027 us patents owned by 53 selected firms in the us based pharmaceutical industry the results suggest that innovative performance is a curvilinear function of the international knowledge content used by a firm to innovate as hypothesized it was found that at 1 low and moderate levels of international knowledge content a firm s strategy to transfer international knowledge improves its innovative performance and at 2 higher levels of international knowledge content there are diminishing marginal returns to transferring knowledge from overseas

a time to make laws and a time to fundraise on the relation between salaries and time use for state politicians we study the relationship between the level of compensation and time use for us state legislators using survey data on time use we show that higher salary is robustly associated with legislators spending more time on fundraising in contrast higher salary is also robustly associated with less time spent on legislative activities and has no clear relation to time spent on constituent services the fundraising results are particularly strong for legislators who do not intend to run for higher office our results are consistent with an interpretation that higher salary raises the value of office and politicians respond with more fundraising because increased fundraising raises the chance of getting re elected more than does increased legislative activity back of the envelope calculations suggest that a 30 000 increase in salary is associated with politicians annually devoting 13 more hours to fundraising and 18 fewer hours to legislative activity resume un temps pour faire les lois et un autre pour lever des fonds etude du rapport entre le salaire et l emploi du temps des legislateurs d etat dans cet article nous examinons le lien entre le niveau de remuneration et l emploi du temps des legislateurs d etat aux etats unis en nous appuyant sur plusieurs donnees d enquetes relatives a la gestion du temps nous montrons que plus leur salaire est eleve plus les legislateurs ont tendance a consacrer du temps a lever des fonds le temps devolu aux activites legislatives ayant quant a lui tendance a diminuer sans lien evident avec le temps passe en circonscription au service des citoyens les resultats relatifs aux levees de fonds sont particulierement forts des lors que les legislateurs ne briguent pas de plus hautes fonctions et sont conformes a l interpretation selon laquelle un salaire eleve accroit l interet pour une fonction et puisque l augmentation des activites de financement ne se traduit pas par davantage d activites legislatives mais par des chances de reelection accrues les politiciens multiplient les levees de fonds des calculs rapides et approximatifs suggerent qu une hausse du salaire des politiciens de 30 000 par an representerait 13 heures de collecte de fonds en plus mais 18 heures d activites legislatives en moins annuellement

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

the experience factor in foreign market entry behavior of service firms the paper examines the effect of international experience on service firms selection of foreign markets and entry modes the investigation utilizes survey date from 151 united states based service firms results on market selection suggest that as their experience increases and becomes geographically more diversified service firms tend to choose markets that are culturally less similar to their home country on entry mode choice the paper departs from traditional linear conceptualizations and hypothesizes a u shaped relationship between experience and propensity for integrated entry modes results generally support the hypothesis the paper explains these findings and describes how service firms resemble and differ from manufacturing firms in their foreign market entry behavior

organizational learning and diversification employing concepts of lateral and longitudinal learning we examined the dissolution of 462 expansions of dutch firms both acquisitions and new ventures we interpreted the endurance of an expansi

the causal effect of coalition governments on fiscal policies evidence from a regression kink design proportional election systems are widespread across countries and often lead to coalition governments this creates interest in how the form of government single party or coalition governments causally influences fiscal policies it is difficult to estimate this causal effect empirically because the form of government is not randomly assigned to political units i overcome this problem by using a regression kink design which exploits that there is a slope change in the treatment probability at the 50 vote share of the strongest party this method is applied to a large panel data set of german local governments i find that contrary to the theoretical prediction coalition governments significantly decrease expenditures

ghost house busters the electoral response to a large anti tax evasion program the incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance we study the electoral response to the ghost buildings program a nationwide anti tax evasion policy in italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities two million buildings were registered as a result of the program our difference in differences identification strategy exploits both variation across towns in the ex ante program scope to increase enforcement as well as administrative data on actual building registrations local incumbents experience an increase in their reelection likelihood as a consequence of the policy in addition these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher speed of public good provision implying complementarity among enforcement policies the underlying tax culture and government efficiency

an econometric analysis of telecom competition privatization and regulation in africa and latin america this paper explores the effects of privatization competition and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 african and latin american countries from 1984 through 1997 fixed effects regressions reveal that competition measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines payphones and connection capacity and with decreases in the price of local calls privatization combined with an independent regulator is positively correlated with telecom performance measures privatization alone however is associated with few benefits and is negatively correlated with connection capacity

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

customer involvement and service firm internationalization performance an integrative framework to overcome the costs of doing business abroad researchers have suggested either legitimacy or efficiency based solutions however both types of solutions still treat host country customers as external to the theory we highlight the role of customers in the international professional business service setting and argue that customer involvement is positively related to the perceived internationalization performance of multinational corporations mncs mncs with managers who perceive higher legitimacy pressures and greater needs for local knowledge tend to undertake greater efforts to build customer involvement furthermore we develop a configuration framework between perceived strategic needs and mncs capabilities specifically mncs that match relational capability with legitimacy needs and absorptive capacity with knowledge needs are more likely to engage in customer involvement our survey of 175 chinese mncs provides evidence that customer involvement is positively related to perceived internationalization performance when mncs relational capabilities are stronger the positive relationship between legitimacy pressure and customer involvement increases by contrast mncs with greater perceived market ambiguity improve customer involvement only when they have stronger absorptive capacity we conclude that mncs may simultaneously reduce legitimacy and efficiency costs through customer involvement after considering the fit between perceived environmental pressures and firm capabilities

gender interactions within hierarchies evidence from the political arena this paper studies gender interactions within hierarchical organizations using a large data set on the duration of italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003 a municipal government can be viewed as a hierarchy whose stability over time depends on the degree of cooperation between and within ranks we find that in municipalities headed by female mayors the probability of early termination of the legislature is higher this result persists and becomes stronger when we control for municipality fixed effects as well as for non random sorting of women into municipalities using regression discontinuity in gender mixed electoral races decided by a narrow margin the likelihood that a female mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the council is entirely male and in regions with less favourable attitudes towards working women this evidence is suggestive that group dynamics are an important factor in driving the gender difference other interpretations receive less support in the data our results may provide an alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions

diagnosing measurement equivalence in cross national research many researchers have pointed out that it is necessary to ensure measurement equivalence in cross national comparative research three aspects of measurement equivalence translation metric and calibration equivalence are necessary to establish the cross national reliability and validity of items used to measure theoretical constructs this paper discusses these issues and proposes two recently developed empirical techniques multiple group lisrel and optimal scaling for use in diagnosing cross national measurement equivalence these techniques are illustrated by reanalysis of a pioneering u s and japanese study the two techniques yield convergent results indicating measurement equivalence for some but not all ordinal level items under consideration the findings demonstrate that the proposed methods are useful diagnostic tools for exploring measurement equivalence several suggestions for reducing the likelihood of problems with measurement equivalence and a number of methods for dealing with items where lack of equivalence persists are also discussed

national capital city location and subsidiary portfolio expansion the negative effect of geographic distance to the capital city at inception on the speed of subsequent investments a multinational enterprise develops its subsidiary portfolio by investing in new foreign markets and subsequently pursuing further investments within these host countries we find that firms which locate their first equity investment closer to the national capital city can subsequently expand their subsidiary portfolio within the host country at a higher speed this effect is particularly strong in emerging economies further analyses of various contingencies support the robustness of our findings we discuss different theoretical mechanisms which could cause these effects in particular face to face interactions with governmental actors and opportunities to develop political connections our research contributes to the literature on internationalization processes by analyzing how the initial location choice affects the development of the subsidiary portfolio

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

a structural model of electoral accountability this paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the eects of electoral ac countability we estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection eects using data on u s governors for 1982 2012 we nd that the possibility of reelection provides a signi cant incentive for incumbents to exert eort we also nd a selection eect although it is weaker in terms of its eect on average governor performance according to our model the widely used two term regime improves voter welfare by 4 2 compared to a one term regime and nd that a three term regime may improve voter welfare even further

the right type of legislator a theory of taxation and representation abstract we develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen candidate model of legislatures individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics when these are positively correlated rich voters always prefer a rich legislator but poor voters face a trade off a rich legislator will secure more pork for the district but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution parties and class representation in legislatures we demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases as the standard common pool intuition suggests and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect

how firms grow clustering as a dynamic model of internationalization this paper provides a methodology for identifying the dynamics of international firm expansion demonstrating systematic evidence of both toe in the water and concentrated bursts of internationalization by us multinational enterprises we use the methodology of statistical process control to analyze initial investments in host countries and develop a numerical measure of temporal clustering or bunching using this measure we identify two distinct patterns of growth whereas some firms cluster their investments over time others do not cluster their investments for firms that cluster three types of clustering strategy are identified concentrating hibernating and hybrid arguments based on internal firm architecture experience and learning are advanced to explain these findings

pay for politicians and candidate selection an empirical analysis abstract a growing theoretical literature on the effect of politicians salaries on the average level of skills of political candidates yields ambiguous predictions in this paper we estimate the effect of pay for politicians on the level of education of parliamentary candidates we take advantage of an exceptional reform where the salaries of finnish mps were increased by 35 in the year 2000 intended to make the pay for parliamentarians more competitive a difference in differences analysis using candidates in municipal elections as a control group suggests that the higher salary increased the fraction of candidates with higher education among female candidates while we find no significant effect for male candidates

bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation do wages in the civil service affect corruption and by how much abstract this paper presents what is to our knowledge the first empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the civil service on corruption first we show that theory is ambiguous on the relationship between civil service pay and corruption then we examine the issue using a new data set on wages for low income countries we find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross country averages where we control for a wide array of variables the relationship implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages

correlating social mobility and economic outcomes we apply a novel measure of intergenerational mobility im developed by guell rodr guez mora and telmer 2014 to a rich combination of italian data allowing us to produce comparable measures of im of income for 103 italian provinces we then exploit the large heterogeneity across italian provinces in terms of economic and social outcomes to explore how im correlates with a variety of outcomes we nd that i higher im is positively associated with a variety of good economic outcomes such as higher value added per capita higher employment lower unemployment higher schooling and higher openness and ii that also within italy the the great gatsby curve exists in provinces in which mobility is lower cross sectional income inequality is larger we nally explore the correlation between im and several socio political outcomes such as crime and life expectancy but we do not nd any clear systematic relationship on this respect

political selection under alternative electoral rules we study the patterns of political selection in majoritarian versus proportional systems political parties face a trade off in choosing the mix of high and low quality candidates high quality candidates are valuable to voters and thus help to win elections but they crowd out loyal candidates who are most preferred by the parties under proportional representation politicians selection depends on the share of swing voters in the entire electorate in majoritarian elections it depends also on the distribution of competitive versus safe single member districts we show that a majoritarian system with only a few competitive districts is less capable of selecting good politicians than a proportional system as the share of competitive districts increases the majoritarian system becomes more efficient than the proportional system however for a large enough share of competitive districts a non monotonic relation arises the marginal positive effect of adding high quality politicians on the probability of winning the election is reduced and highly competitive majoritarian systems become less efficient than proportional ones in selecting good politicians

internal capital market controls and financial performance in multidivisional firms it is proposed that within the population of m form firms the control systems necessary to realize economic benefits from interrelationships between subunits o f a firm are incompatible with the systems necessary to realize benef its from an m form type internal capital market this hypothesis is t ested on 156 large u k firms questionnaire data are used to classif y the firms according to their internal control characteristics the findings provide tentative support for the hypothesis copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

are women pawns in the political game evidence from elections to the spanish senate abstract this paper investigates the reasons behind the low representation of women among legislators using data from spain we find that parties tend to nominate female candidates to poorer positions on the ballot we examine whether this is due to voter bias or party bias and find two pieces of evidence supporting the latter female candidates attract more votes and political competition improves the quality of positions to which female candidates are assigned moreover gender quotas fail to erode the strategic nomination of female candidates the evidence in this paper helps explain why quotas in candidate lists might often lead to disappointing increases in the number of elected female politicians

politicians payments in a proportional party system abstract are there monetary returns to politics this question is approached in this paper as one of few to quantify the monetary returns to holding political office in a country with proportional representation system i apply a difference in difference setting with a carefully chosen control group to rich data on candidates to the swedish national parliament both short and long run effects of being elected on different types of income are estimated results show that yes mostly thanks to relatively high remuneration while still in office politics can yield positive monetary returns in the long run however the effect is instead compositional in the sense that ex politicians receive more pension income and work less

the privatization of the fixed line telecommunications operator in oecd latin america asia and africa one size does not fit all summary this paper challenges the idea that there exists a unique model of reform for infrastructure sectors which is equally applicable across regions and countries and expected to yield similar outcomes we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of privatization of the fixed line activity of the traditional telecommunications operator on network expansion tariffs and labor efficiency in a 1985 2007 data set on a selection of 108 countries that we split into regional sub samples we find that the performance of privatization depends to a large extent on regional factors related to market profitability wealth and geography

do better paid politicians perform better disentangling incentives from selection the wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed first if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector an increase in politicians pay may change their mind second if the re election prospects of incumbents depend on their in office deeds a higher wage may foster performance we use data on all italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi experimental setup in italy the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds we apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase 5 000 inhabitants exploiting the existence of a two term limit we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance our results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates and that better paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency importantly most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians rather than by the incentive to be re elected

experiential knowledge and costs in the internationalization process using a behavioral approach this study identifies and delineates components of experiential knowledge in the internationalization process three hypotheses are developed and tested they center around the lack of knowledge in the areas of foreign business foreign institutions and firm internationalization as well as the effect that this lack of knowledge has on managers perceived cost in the internationalization process with the help of a lisrel based structural model the three hypotheses are tested on a sample of 362 service firms the analysis shows that lack of internationalization knowledge has a strong impact on the lack of both business and institutionalization but there is no direct effect of lack of internationalization knowledge on perceived cost of internationalization

does head start improve children s life chances evidence from a regression discontinuity design this paper exploits a new source of variation in head start funding to identify the program s effects on health and schooling in 1965 the office of economic opportunity oeo provided technical assistance to the 300 poorest counties to develop head start proposals the result was a large and lasting discontinuity in head start funding rates at the oeo cutoff for grant writing assistance we find evidence of a large drop at the oeo cutoff in mortality rates for children from causes that could be affected by head start as well as suggestive evidence for a positive effect on educational attainment i introduction head start was established in 1965 as part of the war on poverty to provide preschool health and other social services to poor children age three to five and their families and currently serves over 900 000 children each year at a cost of around 7 billion hhs 2006 this paper provides new evidence on the effects of the head start program on schooling and health by drawing on a new source of variation in program funding spe

applying regression discontinuity designs to american political development students of american political development apd have long been interested in questions related to the development of state capacity in the united states the apparent macro level nature of those questions may appear to discourage the pursuit of micro level causal inferences yet attention to causal inference is not necessarily incompatible with inquiry into macro level phenomena this article explores the application of a specific causal inference strategy namely regression discontinuity design rdd to three questions of interest to apd scholars of state capacity first the article illustrates the use of a geographic rdd to estimate the causal impacts of a reconstruction era federal civil rights statute during the period prior to the development of significant federal state capacity second it explores the possible causes of the late 19th century decline in the use of monetary rewards to motivate civil servants by using a population based rdd to estimate the causal impacts of financial incentives on law enforcement effort and civilian compliance third it illustrates an opportunity to test claims about the impacts of the growth of the carceral state by applying a resource constraint rdd to estimate the causal impacts of law enforcement effort on a variety of outcomes

the good the bad and the different can gender quotas raise the quality of politicians the debate over political gender quotas is unduly confined to a supposed trade off between diversity and competence we characterize the effects of a political gender quota in a citizen candidate model to find that quotas do increase the overall quality of those elected whenever the rewards from public office are high or the skill premium or political gender discrimination are sufficiently low in such cases high skill women candidates run for office in sufficiently high numbers driving off low skill male and female candidates our model compares quotas with other policies in terms of their impact on the number and quality of those elected

the political resource curse this paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians both with theory and data the theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates the data refer to brazil where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design the empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor these and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory jel d72 d73 h77 o17 o18

popularity shocks and political selection abstract we observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters behaviors by focusing on brazilian politics we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the mis use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election when the audit finds low levels of corruption the parties supporting the incumbent select less educated candidates on the contrary parties pick more educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption these effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media

measurement issues in cross national research substantive inference from cross national studies have important implications for theory e g because they reveal insights into generalizability and boundary conditions and managerial practice e g because they offer guidelines to mnc managers however few empirical studies attend to measurement issues involved in cross national research and still fewer recognize the risk of inferential errors that are likely to occur by overlooking measurement issues we discuss four measurement issues namely 1 standardized versus unstandardized coefficients 2 the impact of measurement error and unequal reliability 3 the overall error rate and simultaneous analysis and 4 construct equivalence using illustrate examples we demonstrate the nature of each of these problems the likely impact they can have on substantive conclusions and approaches for tackling these problems additionally we reanalyze a recently published three nation study by dubinsky michaels kotabe lim and moon 1992 to clarify these measurement concerns highlight a methodological approach and delineate the extent and severity of inferential errors our reanalysis shows that the interactive effects of these measurement issues are pervasive complex and unpredictable we close with implications for cross national research in general

democracy redistribution and political participation evidence from sweden 1919 1938 in this paper we compare how two different types of political regimes direct versus representative democracy redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation most importantly we exploit the existence of a population threshold which partly determined a local government s choice of democracy to implement a regression discontinuity design the results indicate that direct democracies spend 40 60 percent less on public welfare our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite s potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization

adaptive learning in international business building on daniel levinthal s seminal theories on learning adaptation and innovation this article elucidates an adaptive view of organizational learning undertaken by multinational enterprises mnes levinthal s perspectives have tremendous implications for theorizing and examining processes pathways and mechanisms of dynamic learning for mnes competing in a complex environment this article extends these perspectives considering unique organizational traits and environmental characteristics facing mnes for a more nuanced understanding of contexts in which adaptive learning creates global competitive advantage discussion also includes levinthal s perspectives that are not yet adequately extended to but valuable for ib research such as learning mindfulness cognitive search organizational architecture for adaptation and co evolution with technological change we offer additional research questions as well as possible solutions to adaptive learning for international business

direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism this paper exploits the introduction of the right of referenda at the local level in the german state of bavaria in 1995 to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy in the first part of the paper we establish the relationship between referenda activity and fiscal performance by using a new dataset containing information on all 2500 voter initiatives between 1995 to 2011 this selection on observables approach however suffers from obvious endogeneity problems in this application the main part of the paper exploits population dependent discontinuities in the signature and quorum requirements of referenda to implement a regression discontinuity design rdd to safeguard against co treatments that might affect fiscal outcomes simultaneously at the same thresholds we validate our results by extending the rdd approach to a difference in discontinuity did design by studying direct legislation in an archetypical cooperative federation as germany our paper extends the literature to a novel institutional setting the results indicate that in our setting and in contrast to most of the evidence from switzerland and the us direct democracy causes an expansion of local government budgets

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

organizational learning about new international markets exploring the internal transfer of local market knowledge this study examines the transfer of local market knowledge within the diversified firm as its divisions expand into a new host country within the u s based corporations in our sample both the nature of local market knowledge itself and differences in organizational structures significantly influence the extent of internal knowledge transfer among divisions the results suggest that as firms expand into new international markets their organizational learning processes differ significantly

electoral rules and political selection theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own this article explores how electoral rules such as district magnitude mediate this trade off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes we show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates results from a unique field experiment in afghanistan are consistent with these predictions specifically representatives selected by elections with a single multi member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences

are politicians really paid like bureaucrats abstract we provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay using u s data for 1950 90 we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians both across states and over time gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes we estimate that governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each 10 percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4 5 percent increase in pay for each 10 percent increase in income per capita in their states there is evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward for performance the evidence for the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive but is suggestive of rent extraction motives finally we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping pay for example voter initiatives and the presence of political opposition significantly reduce the income elasticity of pay and increase tax elasticities of pay

property tax and property values evidence from the 2012 italian tax reform abstract this paper assesses the extent to which property taxes are capitalized into property values exploiting the 2012 italian tax reform municipal level variation in the level of the property tax rates is instrumented using the exogenous staggered timing of local elections we show that the incumbent local governments with upcoming elections in 2013 shifted the composition of fiscal revenues towards lower property tax our 2sls estimate shows that a one standard deviation increase in municipal level property tax intensity leads to a 2 7 reduction of municipal property values in the year of the reform we elicit information on the characteristics of the compliers and show that these municipalities feature inefficient public spending and low social capital