the new role for the world bank the world bank was founded to address what we would today call imperfections in international capital markets its founders thought that countries would borrow from the bank temporarily until they grew enough to borrow commercially nac 1946 p 312 black 1952 some critiques and analyses of the bank are based on the assumption that this continues to be its role for example some argue that the growth of private capital flows to the developing world has rendered the bank irrelevant however we will argue that modern analyses should proceed from the premise that the world bank s central goal is and should be to reduce extreme poverty and that addressing failures in global capital markets is now of subsidiary importance the bank s stated goal is reducing poverty the overwhelming majority of bank subsidies from its shareholder countries go to the international development association ida its arm for making grants and highly concessional loans to the lowest income countries the bank s greatest impact comes from its role in the dramatic policy changes many developing countries have undertaken in multiple sectors that most economists would consider likely to reduce poverty either by increasing growth or promoting equity why might donor countries choose to work through an international organization to advance the goal of reducing poverty effective aid often involves

dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation abstract we study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely repeated screening model with long term contracts we propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist s profit is maximized after every history we show that the monopolist sequentially screens high type consumers and characterize second degree price discrimination policies the monopolist s ability to extract rent from high type consumers by distorting the allocation of low type consumers vanishes as all parties become more patient as a result all distortions disappear and the allocation becomes efficient

did high debts distort loan and grant allocation to ida countries summary we examine the allocation of net loans net transfers and grants to ida countries over the period 1982 2008 focusing on the role of debt and debt sustainability in the decisions of multilateral and bilateral donors we find no evidence of defensive lending but strong evidence of defensive granting a significant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio indeed characterizes the decisions of both multilateral and bilateral creditors the impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries is however accommodated through higher grants in addition to debt relief these findings are consistent with a substitution of grants for loans and with the new approach to debt sustainability but question the efficiency and selectivity of foreign aid

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

policy selectivity forgone debt and donor behavior in africa authors assess the dynamics behind the high net resource transfers by donors and creditors to sub saharan african countries analyzing the determinants of overall net transfers for a panel of 37 recipient countries in 1978 98 authors find that country policies mattered little donors especially bilateral donors actually made greater transfers to countries with high debt largely owed to multilateral creditors when policies were bad authors conclude that comprehensive debt relief has the potential though not the certainty to restore selectivity in support of good policies that would make development assistance more effective going forward and increase public support in donor countries

optimal regulation of network expansion we model the optimal regulation of continuous irreversible capacity expansion where a regulated firm has private information about capacity costs investments are financed from the firm s cash flows and demand is stochastic the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a revenue tax that increases with the level of the price cap if the asymmetric information has large support then the optimal mechanism consists of a laissez faire regime for low cost firms that is the firm s price cap corresponds to that of an unregulated monopolist and it is not taxed this maximal distortion at the top is necessary to provide information rents as direct subsidies are not feasible

no lease is short enough to solve the time inconsistency problem the author provides a model of endogenous lease duration determination in the context of the durable goods monopolist problem he shows that infinitely many leases per finite unit of time are required to solve completely the time inconsistency problem thus suggesting that leasing may not provide a practical solution the author also provides a warning regarding the results that can be derived by exogenously setting lease durations equal to one period by resolving a paradoxical result in the literature copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

dynamic yardstick mechanisms abstract this paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated this sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation the paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long term contracts we found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay in contrast short term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers second absent current yardstick the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first best with a renegotiation proof long term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short term contracting

concessions of infrastructure in latin america government led renegotiation this paper analyzes government led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in latin america based on the same sample used in guasch laffont and straub 2003 to examine firm led renegotiations after extending the theoretical framework to a multiple period context in which both pareto improving and rent shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results while some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing as well as the corruption variables we provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

grants versus loans for development banks in recent years economists have increasingly debated whether multilateral development banks such as the world bank should switch from making subsidized loans to giving outright grants it is no small question the combined loans of the world bank group and brethren regional entities such as the asian and inter american development banks approach 300 billion their funds constitute a main channel through which rich country governments provide assistance to developing country governments in bulow and rogoff 1990 we first developed the case for a shift to outright grants we argued that under the status quo a vastly disproportionate share of aid goes to middle income countries via disguised interest subsidies rather than to the poorest countries we also argued that a shift to grants would protect donor banks from sometimes having to play a bad cop role when trying to collect net repayments rather than fully rolling over loans the meltzer commission international financial institution advisory commission 2000 report on government sponsored international lending institutions famously took a similar view supporters of the status quo often argue that development bank loans to middle income countries are in fact highly profitable and are essential for allowing institutions like the world bank to subsidize aid to poor countries we shall argue that the bank s profitability is an accounting artifice that greatly underestimates the risks of the bank s portfolio another argument for loans is that multilateral development banks have a superior enforcement technology that helps international debt markets to function more efficiently thus loans allow financially strapped governments including in middle income countries to borrow more than they could otherwise we will argue that this benefit too is an illusion in those cases when official lending does expand a developing country government s borrowing capacity it effectively enables the government to commit the country to repayment levels beyond that supported by domestic political consensus creating moral hazard for shortsighted rulers in theory better credit access to finance say public infrastructure projects can be highly beneficial in practice however the increased risk of debt crisis all too often outweighs any gain ordinary citizens might enjoy from the loans furthermore moral hazard on the part of lenders who may be able to induce rich countries into subsidizing the bailout of troubled middle income borrowers may mean that aggregate lending is excessive even if multilaterals merely displace equivalent private debt we do not argue for eliminating assistance to middle income countries on the contrary we would favor expanding aid in general albeit in far greater proportion to the world s poorest countries note that in principle any country with market access could use grant flows to help defray interest rate costs on loans if it so chose but development banks would never need to assume a bad cop role in enforcing debt

contract based motivation for keeping records of a manager s reporting and budgeting history this paper analyzes the role of the agent s bankruptcy constraints in multiperiod principal agent models with asymmetric information conditions are provided under which commitment to a long term contract involving n rounds of investment improves upon repetition of n identical single period contracts further when the agent s reservation wage is sufficiently low the optimal contract is always long term keeping records of a manager s history of reporting activity facilitates contracting since optimal contracts may require a link between past reports and future investments over a duration of two or more periods

policy watch debt relief at the gleneagles summit in july 2005 the heads of state from the g 8 countries the united states canada france germany italy japan russia and the united kingdom called on the international monetary fund imf the world bank and the african development bank to cancel 100 percent of their debt claims on the world s poorest countries the world s richest countries have agreed in principle to forgive roughly d55 billion dollars owed by the world s poorest nations this article considers the wisdom of the proposal for debt forgiveness from the standpoint of stimulating economic growth in highly indebted countries in the 1980s debt relief under the brady plan helped to restore investment and growth in a number of middle income developing countries however the debt relief plan for the heavily indebted poor countries hipc launched by the world bank and the international monetary fund in 1996 has had little impact on either investment or growth in the recipient countries we will explore the key differences between the countries targeted by these two debt relief schemes and argue that the gleneagles proposal for debt relief is at best likely to have little effect at all debt relief is unlikely to help the world s poorest countries because unlike the middle income brady countries their main economic difficulty is not debt overhang but an absence of functional economic institutions that provide the foundation for profitable investment and growth we will show that debt relief may be more valuable for brady like middle income countries than for low income ones because of how it leverages the private sector

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

the regulation of environmental innovations abstract we offer mechanisms to regulate environmental r d projects that are intertemporal and indivisible and involve high monitoring cost screening and contracting the r d performer are based solely on the project completion time when the project duration is ex ante uncertain to all parties including the performing firm the mechanism is formulated in terms of a completion time limit the mechanism extends to other intertemporal public projects as well as to principal agent settings with dynamic agent s tasks

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

stochastic price modeling of high volatility mean reverting spike prone commodities the australian wholesale spot electricity market it is commonly known that wholesale spot electricity markets exhibit high price volatility strong mean reversion and frequent extreme price spikes this paper employs a basic stochastic model a mean reverting model and a regime switching model to capture these features in the australian national electricity market nem comprising the interconnected markets of new south wales queensland south australia and victoria daily spot prices from 1 january 1999 to 31 december 2004 are employed the results show that the regime switching model outperforms the basic stochastic and mean reverting models electricity prices are also found to exhibit stronger mean reversion after a price spike than in the normal period and price volatility is more than fourteen times higher in spike periods than in normal periods the probability of a spike on any given day ranges between 5 16 in nsw and 9 44 in victoria

debt relief and governance quality in developing countries summary in this paper we empirically discuss whether or not debt relief has been economically rational in the past 15 years from analyzing the determinants of debt relief our results suggest that governance quality did not play a role in the decision of creditor countries to forgive debt in the 1990s furthermore even the actual debt burden of highly indebted poor countries was not crucial in deciding whether or not debt forgiveness was granted rather debt relief followed a strong path dependence those countries whose debt had been forgiven in the first half of the 1990s were also granted debt forgiveness in the second half of the decade however this allocation pattern changed at the beginning of the 21st century when path dependence diminished and some dimensions of governance quality were taken into account by donor countries

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

online shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements we study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a nonmonetary cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information we derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the firm moreover we consider the effectiveness of discounts store credit as a means to influence the consumers registration decision finally we confirm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2595 this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

the optimal sequencing of carrots abstract when aid organizations contract with local agents aid funds have the potential to be diverted to purposes other than the intended project a multi stage game is presented where the benefit from the project is cumulative with the application of funds in each stage increasing both the agent s and the organization s benefit from the project as the agent s utility of diversion increases the allocation in each stage decreases and the project takes more stages to complete when contracting with agents with high utilities of diversion the optimal contract involves bloated projects and a side payment to the agent upon completion if the organization s commitment to the contract is not credible both the agent s and the organization s benefit is reduced

durable products time inconsistency and lock in many durable products cannot be used without a contingent consumable product e g printers require ink ipods require songs razors require blades etc for such products manufacturers may be able to lock in consumers by making their products incompatible with consumables that are produced by other firms we examine the effectiveness of such a strategy in the presence of strategic consumers who anticipate the future prices of both the durable product and the contingent consumable under a lock in strategy the manufacturer has pricing power over the contingent consumable which she can use to extract additional rents from higher valuation consumers but such pricing power may also reduce consumers willingness to pay for the durable because it subjects them to being held up with higher consumables prices in the future restricting our attention to linear pricing policies we find that if the manufacturer can commit to shutting down production of her durable after an initial one time sale then competition from another consumable of an appropriately degraded level of quality can benefit the manufacturer by mitigating consumers fears of being held up on the other hand when the manufacturer cannot commit to shutting down production of her durable then her own output of additional durables gives her an incentive to keep consumables prices low and competition in the consumables market is less beneficial this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

optimal long term financial contracting we develop an agency model of financial contracting we derive long term debt a line of credit and equity as optimal securities capturing the debt coupon and maturity the interest rate and limits on the credit line inside versus outside equity dividend policy and capital structure dynamics the optimal debt equity ratio is history dependent but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and in some cases the severity of the agency problem in our model the agent can divert cash flows we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort or can control cash flow risk

aid quality and donor rankings this paper offers new measures of aid quality covering 38 bilateral and multilateral donors as well as new insights about the robustness and usefulness of such measures the 2005 paris declaration on aid effectiveness and the follow up 2008 accra agenda for action have focused attention on common donor practices that reduce the development impact of aid using 18 underlying indicators that capture these practices derived from the oecd dac s survey for monitoring the paris declaration the new aiddata database and the dac aid tables the authors construct an overall aid quality index and four coherently defined sub indexes on aid selectivity alignment harmonization and specialization compared with earlier indicators used in donor rankings this indicator set is more comprehensive and representative of the range of donor practices addressed in the paris declaration improving the validity reliability and robustness of rankings one of the innovations is to increase the validity of the aid quality indicators by adjusting for recipient characteristics donor aid volumes and other factors despite these improvements in data and methodology the authors caution against overinterpretation on overall indexes such as these alternative plausible assumptions regarding weights or the inclusion of additional indicators can still produce marked shifts in the ranking of some donors so that small differences in overall rankings are not meaningful moreover because the performance of some donors varies considerably across the four sub indexes these sub indexes may be more useful than the overall index in identifying donors relative strengths and weaknesses

other people s money debt denomination and financial instability in emerging market economies barry eichengreen ricardo hausmann the university of chicago press chicago and london 2005