the effects of entry regulation on oligopolistic interaction the uruguayan banking sector this article develops a methodology to test alternative oligopoly models and to analyze the effects of entry restrictions on conduct this methodology is applied to the uruguayan banking sector whose legal entry barriers were significantly relaxed during the late 1970s the results are consistent with a von stackelberg type of industry where the degree of oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms is reduced as a consequence of the relaxation of the legal entry barriers

cultural conflict and merger failure an experimental approach we use laboratory experiments to explore merger failure due to conflicting organizational cultures we introduce a laboratory paradigm for studying organizational culture that captures several key elements of the phenomenon in our experiments we allow subjects in firms to develop a culture and then merge two firms as expected performance decreases following the merging of two laboratory firms in addition subjects overestimate the performance of the merged firm and attribute the decrease in performance to members of the other firm rather than to situational difficulties created by conflicting culture

the assessment competition policy the paper advances four propositions concerning the objectives content and institutions of competition policy first the role of policy should be to advance economic efficiency rather than competition for its own sake or some wider definition of the public interest second economic analysis is generally ambiguous a priori about the efficiency effects of particular market structures and conduct third the design of policy and institutions needs to reflect this ambiguity policy rules are essential but there should be scope for parties to argue countervailing efficiency benefits a policy institution should be empowered to identify investigate and propose remedies for failures of competition subject to review by an independent competition tribunal fourth international harmonization of competition policies is essential current policies in the u k and ec and relationships between the two are evaluated and the case made for a radical reform of u k policy copyright 1993 by oxford university press

are acquisitions worthwhile an empirical study of the post acquisition performance of privately held belgian companies few studies have addressed the performance of smaller unquoted companies involved in acquisitions especially in continental european countries therefore this study addresses the post acquisition financial characteristics of privately held companies involved in 143 belgian acquisitions between 1992 and 1994 specifically this paper examines the financial performance of the acquiring firm after the acquisition using statistical analysis of industry adjusted variables our findings show that following the acquisition the profitability the solvency and the liquidity of most of the combined companies decline this decline is also reflected in the failure prediction scores with respect to the added value acquisitions are found to be accompanied by increases in the labour productivity but this is caused by the general improvement of gross added value per employee of belgian companies in the last 10 years so it seems that contrary to the general expectations and beliefs acquisitions usually do not seem to improve the acquirer s financial performance

measuring market power in multi product oligopolies the us meat industry this paper develops and estimates an economic model for measuring market power in a quantity setting oligopoly engaged in the joint production of demand related goods the model which allows for firms conjectures about both same and cross market responses to own output variation is applied to the us meat beef and pork industry he hypothesis that the industry s equilibrium reflects price taking behaviour is rejected the hypothesis of no cross effects cannot be rejected roughly half of the farm to retail price spreads for beef and pork appear to be attributable to market power

life after takeover economic consequences of takeovers are investigated by analyzing profitability of enterprises acquired a s a direct or indirect white knight consequence of tender offer s target companies pre tender profitability averaged 0 97 percentag e points below peer industry norms nine years after takeover acquir ed lines of business had operating income assets percentages 3 10 poi nts below those of non tender lines with similar industry bases mark et shares and merger accounting methods most of the targets postta keover profit decline stemmed from asset value writeups there is no indication that on average the acquirers raised their targets operat ing profitability net of merger related accounting adjustments copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

shareholder protection compulsory acquisition and the efficiency of the takeover process this paper examines public good problems connected with takeovers two broad categories of exclusion device oppression of minority interests and compulsory acquisition of shares are evaluated it is argued that inability to control the level of oppression with any precision renders the first method unsatisfactory from the policy viewpoint but that strong protection of minorities coupled with compulsory acquisition rights for the acquiror can straightforwardly generate an efficient solution to the public good problems it is shown that in the u k company law and the city code on takeovers and mergers combine to produce an approximation to this efficient solution against managements which are performing poorly in the eyes of the capital market and since the work of marris 1964 this incentive mechanism has come to play a prominent role in the economic analysis of company behaviour the usual argument is that as the market value of a particular company falls relative to the level that it is generally believed could be obtained by other managers following different policies the firm becomes increasingly vulnerable to a takeover by a raider attracted by the prospect of the capital gains that would ensue following managerial changes in turn the threat to the incumbent managers acts as a deterrent to behaviour which runs counter to shareholders interests the effectiveness of the workings of the takeover mechanism is therefore of some importance for the efficient utilisation and allocation of resources potential obstacles to the smooth functioning of the takeover process have however been recognised for quite some time as long ago as 1926 the greene committee on company law reform identified cases where a takeover had been inhibited by the actions of small minorities of shareholders much more recently grossman and hart 1980 have formalised some of the earlier points in a way that clearly highlights one of the major difficulties that freeriding strategies on the part of shareholders in firms with dispersed share ownership can prevent successful bids the argument is that shareholders of the target company believing their own actions have a trivially small effect on

do bad bidders become good targets this paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value within the sample of acquisition by targets the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover this evidence is consistent with theories advanced by marris manne and jensen concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

do firms learn to create value the case of alliances we investigate whether firms learn to manage interfirm alliances as experience accumulates we use contract specific experience measures in a data set of over 2000 joint ventures and licensing agreements and value creation measures derived from the abnormal stock returns surrounding alliance announcements learning effects are identified from the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in alliance capabilities we find evidence of large learning effects in managing joint ventures but no such evidence for licensing contracts the effects of learning on value creation are strongest for research joint ventures and weakest for marketing joint ventures these results are consistent with the view that learning effects are more important in situations characterized by greater contractual ambiguity copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

banks as multioutput oligopolies an empirical evaluation of the retail and corporate banking markets the distinction between retail and corporate banking markets is of much importance in real life banking organizations the two markets differ with respect to concentration the importance of informational asymmetries and the extent of customer mobility within a standard conjectural variation model estimated on cost efficient banks as well as on the full sample of banks the authors empirically characterize the strategic behavior in each of these markets and also focus on cross market interactions to see whether initial moves in one market affect the equilibrium in the other market they compare their findings to the predictions that would follow from merely considering concentration ratios such as the herfindahl index

determinants of success in international strategic alliances evidence from the global aerospace industry this paper presents the results of a study linking the performance of international joint ventures and alliances set up in the global aerospace industry to their strategic and organizational features in a first stage an empirically based taxonomy of the observed alliances is generated then the economic performance of various types of alliances is evaluated on the basis of industry expert opinions and the difference in performance of different alliance types is tested

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

why is the labour force participation of women declining in india summary this paper explores the recent fall in female labour force participation and its socio economic determinants in india the major contribution of this paper is to explore both micro and macro level factors which determine female labour force participation rate lfpr to examine the u shape female lfpr by examining the likely income and substitution effects of the real wage increase to identify the sub sectors within manufacturing and service sectors that could create jobs for new female job aspirants and those older women displaced from agriculture in recent years and thus to understand the conditions under which female lfpr could be raised using both macro level and household survey nss data we find that the recent fillip in the process of structural transformation has pushed a large number of females out of agriculture the growing mechanization in agriculture and rising capital intensity in manufacturing sectors together have limited the opportunity for females because of their low education and skill and due to other cultural constraints we also found that the rise in real wages in rural areas and the consequent improvement in the standard of living has produced a strong negative income effect which outweighs the positive substitution effect and as a result female lfpr has declined substantially however with the massive increase in female enrollment in secondary and higher levels of education it could be expected that the substitution effect of the increase in real wage would become stronger if appropriate measures are taken by the government which are suggested

the gains from merger or collusion in product differentiated industries a merger in an industry with differentiated products increases the market power of the merging firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes such a merger makes the residual demand curve of each partner steeper by shifting each in the direction of the industry demand curve 2 the extent of this increase in market power depends upon the own elasticity of demand for each merging firm s product as well as the cross elasticity of demand for each with all other firms products as a result evaluating the effect of a merger between two firms with n 2 other competitors would seem to require the estimation of at least n2 parameters all of the price elasticities of demand a formidable task that extremely difficult estimation task is unnecessary however the necessary information is contained in the slopes of the two single firm residual demand curves before the merger and the extent to which the merged firm will face a steeper demand curve for example suppose a merger between two u s brewing firms say pabst and anheuser busch were proposed it is not particularly important to determine whether it is competition from miller or competition from stroh or from heileman or which puts the most effective brake on anheuser busch s pricing only the total effect of these other firms and the particular effect of competition from pabst are of interest this paper proposes econometric procedures for estimating the demand system that merger partners will face based only on pre merger data the key to the procedures is that the effects of all other firms in the industry are summed together formally we start with a model of an n firm product differentiated industry manipulation of the model removes the prices and quantities of all but two firms this reduces the dimensionality of the problem to manageable size rather than an n firm demand system we estimate a two firm residual demand system in this way the technique extends our econometric method for

trade contraction and employment in india and south africa during the global crisis summary the paper estimates the effects of the 2008 09 trade contraction on employment in india and south africa using social accounting matrices sams in a leontief multiplier model employment results are presented at aggregate and industry levels and examine gender and skills biases the most notable finding is that india and south africa experienced substantial employment declines as a result of trade contraction with the european union and the united states a large share of these declines occurred in the non tradable sector and resulted from income induced effects illustrating how a shock originating in the tradable goods sector had strong ripple effects throughout these economies

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control as moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers moreover share supply is shown to be upward sloping rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers furthermore higher takeover premia induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen tration and are thus beneficial finally one share one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting

investigating dynamic multifirm market interactions in price and advertising diagnosing the nature and magnitu de of competitive interactions among firms is important for developing effective marketing strategies in this paper we formulate a game theoretic model of firm interaction to analyze the dynamic price and advertising competition among firms in a given p roduct market firm or brand level demand functions account for the contemporaneous and carry over effects of these marketing activities and also allow for the effects of competitor actions firms take into consideration the actions of their rivals as well as their own demand and cost functions both production and advertising when determining the profit maximizing price and advertising levels our formulation enables us to quantify not only the direction and magnitude of competitive reactions but also to identify the underlying form of market conduct that generates the particular pattern of interaction we specify and estimate a fully structural econometric model for three firms constituting a distinct sub market within a personal care product category we estimate the demand and competitive interaction parameters as well as the production and advertising cost functions for each firm we then derive implications for competitive interactions and market structure interestingly we find that while firms seem to compete on advertising they price cooperatively thereby enhancing their price cost margins

the evolution of manufacturing technology and its impact on industrial structure an international study this paper shows that plant and firm size in manufacturing and especially in engineering industry in several western industrial countries has declined since the early 1970s two hypotheses explaining the decline are advanced one is de glomeration or specialization the divestiture of non core businesses in order to free up scarce resources particularly management time to defend and nurture core business activities the second hypothesis is that the emergence of new computer based technology has improved the quality and productivity of small and medium scale production relative to standardized mass production techniques which dominated previously

what explains the stagnation of female labor force participation in urban india female labor force participation rates in urban india between 1987 and 2011 are surprisingly low and have stagnated since the late 1980s despite rising growth fertility decline and rising wages and education levels married women s labor force participation hovered around 18 percent analysis of five large cross sectional micro surveys shows that a combination of supply and demand effects have contributed to this stagnation the main supply side factors are rising household incomes and husband s education as well as the falling selectivity of highly educated women on the demand side the sectors that draw in female workers have expanded least so that changes in the sectoral structure of employment alone would have actually led to declining participation rates

economic fluctuations market power and returns to scale evidence from firm level data recent research on aggregate fluctuations coupled with ongoing work in industrial organization has renewed interest in the existence magnitude and cyclical pattern of market power and the extent of increasing returns to scale by exploiting restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets we present a framework for generating quantitative evidence on market power and returns to scale tailoring the econometric model to firm level panel data we calculate the percentage differential between price and marginal cost the lerner index in terms of the parameters from the econometric system results for firms in eleven industries indicate that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the extent of market power industries with significantly positive lerner indices tend to have substantial increasing returns in the production technology we find that there is only a modest relation between our estimated lerner indices and traditional measures of market power and that when market power varies temporally it is usually procyclical thus variations in the markup of price over marginal cost may help dampen aggregate economic fluctuations

the outsourcing of r d through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry abstract we examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns these returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position a unique desperation index is employed to determine the current status of a firm s internal productivity we find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines

privatization in theory and practice privatization george yarrow this paper examines the theoretical and empirical case for private versus public ownership privatization usually leads managers to place greater emphasis on the pursuit of profits however whether this is beneficial to society depends on the trade off between possible market failures due to a lack of competition and deficiencies in government control of public firms the competitive and regulatory environment is more important than the question of ownership per se in competitive markets there is a presumption in favour of private ownership where there is a natural monopoly vigorous regulatory action is required the evidence suggests that privatization has led to improved performance by firms such as the national freight corporation and cable and wireless which operate in a relatively competitive environment the benefits are less clear in the case of firms like bp britoil and british aerospace however the most worrying case is that of british telecom and the projected privatization of british gas where little thought has been given to limiting the abuse of monopoly power rather the regulatory environment has been tailored to the needs of the existing management and to ensuring a successful share flotation privatization is also advanced as a weapon for reducing trade union power encouraging wider share ownership redistributing wealth and improving the public finances however there are other policy instruments better suited to achieving these objectives the existing privatization programme has not led to a marked widening of share ownership and has resulted in windfall gains to a small group of investors at the expense of taxpayers in general

learning from competing partners outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in europe north america and asia this paper investigates the outcomes and durations of strategic alliances among competing firms using alliance outcomes as indicators of learning by partner firms we show that alliance outcomes vary systematically across link and scale alliances link alliances are interfirm partnerships to which partners contribute different capabilities while scale alliances are partnerships to which partners contribute similar capabilities we find that partners are more likely to reorganize or take over link alliances than scale alliances by contrast scale alliances are more likely to continue without material changes the two types of alliances are equally likely to shut down at similar ages these results support the view that link alliances lead to greater levels of learning and capability acquisition between the partners than do scale alliances copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

entry barriers and multiproduct oligopolies do they forebear or spoil abstract we provide a flexible method to test for a variety of multiproduct oligopolistic models and to estimate the relevance of entry conditions on industrial conduct we find that for the case of the uruguayan banking sector during the late 1970s multiproduct oligopolistic interactions were present however the partial relaxation of legal entry barriers substantially removed the multiproduct nature of these interactions

effects of pro growth policies on employment evidence of regional disparities the main objective of our research is to study the direct impact of pro growth economic policies on employment creation globally and regionally as evidence has countered policy makers expectation

measuring multi product banks market power using the lerner index abstract the aggregate lerner index is a popular composite measure of multi product banks market power based on total assets as the single aggregate output factor we show that the aggregate lerner index only qualifies as a consistently aggregated lerner index if three conditions hold under these conditions the aggregate lerner index reduces to a weighted average of the product specific lerner indices we test the three conditions for a sample of u s banks covering the years 2011 2017 all three conditions are rejected and we show that they may cause an economically relevant bias to the aggregate lerner index depending on the economic context as a general solution we propose using the always consistently aggregated weighted average lerner index whenever a composite lerner index is needed

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

profitability concentration imports and exports the case of taiwan s midstream petrochemical industries based on an open economy oligopoly model causalities among domestic firms price cost margin pcm domestic concentration import and export shares are derived and a simultaneous equation system is established by utilizing the 1989 1997 data of taiwan s midstream petrochemical industries three stage least squares is used to estimate the system the empirical results confirm the derived results and demonstrate 1 there exist simultaneous relationships among domestic pcm domestic concentration import and export shares 2 import concentration affects domestic concentration positively but affects domestic pcm import and export shares negatively 3 diversifying international markets improves domestic firms pcm 4 domestic firms seem to be in a situation of collusion

profile of multiple versus single acquirers and their targets a research note few studies have addressed the pre take over financial characteristics of multiple versus single acquirers and their targets therefore this study investigates whether multiple acquirers with some experience in acquiring companies might acquire firms with different better financial characteristics than single acquirers results confirm this hypothesis in multiple ways it seems that multiple acquirers look for complementary firms in terms of sales and growth multiple acquirers specifically want to acquire companies with a high sales generating ability in order to improve their own sales generating ability

corporate takeovers the efficiency arguments in recent years the tender offer takeover has been praised and damned with a ferocity suggesting that the survival of capitalism is at stake the truth as in most disputes with substantial metaphysical content is more prosaic some takeovers enhance economic efficiency some degrade it and the balance of effects though not fully known is most likely a close one in this essay i try to lay bare the debate s foundations and bring it back to earth with an injection of evidence

the gains to bidding firms from merger abstract this study examines the effect of mergers on the wealth of bidding firms shareholders bidding firms gain significantly during the twenty one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids these results fail to support the capitalization hypothesis that bidders gains are captured at the beginning of merger programs bidders abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the merger partners and the gains during the announcement period are larger for mergers which are successful though the gains are larger prior to 1969 merger bids after 1969 also significantly increase the wealth of bidding firms shareholders the results suggest that the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological deficiencies the findings of this study are consistent with value maximizing behavior by the management of bidding firms

the price and profit effects of horizontal merger a case study the economic rationale behind antitrust concern for horizontal mergers rests primarily on the familiar structure performance paradigm that links market concentration with supra competitive profits and implicitly with higher prices a vast empirical literature has demonstrated a positive statistical relationship between measures of industry structure such as entry barriers and concentration and average industry profit using cross section data a small number of cross section studies most dealing with banking services have claimed to find a positive relationship between concentrated market structure and price measures aspinwall 1970 bell and murphy i969 heggestak and mingo 1976 hester i979 lamm i98i landon i97i marion et al 1979 and marvel 1978 but we are unaware of any study that traces the effect of an actual change in market structure on prices or profits in this paper we exploit an unusual opportunity to test for price effects and estimate profit consequences of two acquisitions that resulted in substantial increases in the market share of the acquiring firm the evidence we examine arises from a recent federal trade commission antitrust suit against xidex corporation the world s largest producer of duplicating microfilm the xidex case is unusual in three respects i although the size of the market is small sales under ioo million the acquisitions involved greater changes in market shares than are usual in antitrust actions 2 the suit was brought five years after the first acquisition and two years after the second so a post acquisition record of price behavior exists for this example furthermore the price data used in this study are actual transaction prices 3 special characteristics of the products allow a relatively straightforward test for price effects of the acquisitions the next section provides background information concerning the firms and products involved following that we describe the data and methodology used to estimate the price effects of the acquisitions and present results which indicate significant price increases traceable to the acquisitions we then offer estimates of the incremental profits attributable to those price increases a final section provides a summary the analysis and conclusions set forth in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of federal trade commission staff or the commission itself all data and other information used in the study are in the public domain this includes information obtained by the commission which has become part of the public record for helpful comments we thank allan fisher ron lafferty paul pautler and rich sciacca of the bureau of economics federal trade commission

merger and optimal number of firms an integrated simulation approach in a market where imperfect competition occurs as a result of mergers this study proposes a framework consisting of both efficiency and risk analyses that allow the simulation of pro forma mergers and hence the determination of the optimal number of firms in the industry this is valuable policy information for regulators concerned with possible intervention in the case of competition and anti trust violations and also for business managers seeking acquisition targets the framework is applied to the banking industry in taiwan results reveal the potential for industrial restructuring in a sector where the optimal number of bank holding companies bhcs is between four and six subject to whether partial control is assumed

freeze out mergers do freeze out mergers mitigate the free rider problem of corporate takeovers we study this question in a tender offer model with finitely many shareholders under a freeze out merger minority shareholders expect to receive the original offer price whether or not they tender their shares we show that the ability to freeze out shareholders increases the raider s expected profit however as the number of shareholders gets arbitrarily large the raider s expected profit in equilibrium converges to zero for any freeze out clause with an ownership threshold that is strictly above simple majority in this sense freeze out mergers do not solve the free rider problem received september 17 2016 editorial decision june 3 2018 by editor francesca cornelli

assessing the competitive interaction between private labels and national brands in this article we employ the linear approximate almost ideal demand system la aids and specify price reaction equations derived under the la aids specification we perform intracategory analyses using data on six individual categories as well as a pooled analysis on a sample of 125 categories and 59 geographic markets we find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions demand and firm pricing behavior supply jointly determine observed market prices and market shares further estimates of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete picture of the ability of brands to raise price copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

enterprise breakups and performance during the transition from plan to market using firm level data we estimate the effects of the major wave of 1991 breakups of czechoslovak state owned enterprises on the subsequent performance of the master enterprises and spun off divisions we estimate the performance effects of spinoffs by comparing the performance of enterprises that remained intact throughout the 1990 1992 period to the performance of the master enterprises that experienced spinoffs and the newly spun off subsidiaries our estimates suggest that the breakups had a significant immediate effect on the productive efficiency and on the profitability of industrial firms in 1991 and that the effect became much less significant in 1992 the effect is a negative function of the size of the spinoff being positive for small to slightly above average sized spinoffs and negative for very large ones we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated effect was identical for the spun off subsidiaries and the master enterprises that experienced the spinoffs our 1991 estimates sugges

information in tender offers with a large shareholder we study takeovers of firms whose ownership structure is a mixture of minority block holders and small shareholders we show that the combination of dispersed private information on the side of small shareholders and the presence of a large shareholder can facilitate profitable takeovers furthermore our analysis implies that even if some model of takeovers predicts a profit for the raider for example due to private benefits the profit will be underestimated unless the large shareholder and the dispersion of information among the small shareholders are modeled

event studies in management research theoretical and empirical issues we examined the use of event studies in management research and found that there was inadequate attention paid to theoretical and research design issues this lack of attention may lead to false in

code creation in endogenous merger experiments we study the conflict that can occur in a merger due to firms use of specialized language or code and whether participants accurately forecast this difficulty after creating a shared code to describe different pictures accurately subjects bid for extra payments to join a merged group the two lowest bidders are placed in the merged group values inferred from two different bidding procedures indicate fairly accurate general appraisals of the cost of the merger but the values of those subjects who bid the least and choose to join the merged group are too optimistic reflecting an organizational winner s curse

an examination of market power in the intrastate long distance telephone service markets evidence from a natural experiment abstract during the preceding 2 decades state public utility commissions have experimented extensively with regulating telecommunications carriers more recently many states have more or less deregulated long distance service this paper employs a panel data set of states to examine whether the competitive conduct of long distance carriers was affected by these events a methodology is developed to estimate changes in the market conduct parameter following states decisions to price deregulate long distance service this effect is isolated by using a difference in difference estimator that compares the change in market conduct of the treatment group states deregulated during the study period to the change in market conduct of the control group states deregulated throughout the study period my hypothesis is that elimination of price regulation altered the carriers market conduct and that this change in conduct explains in part the price differences in regulated and deregulated markets the result

strategic alliances and the rate of new product development an empirical study of entrepreneurial biotechnology firms abstract a key to success in industries populated by entrepreneurial high technology firms is the rate at which the firm develops new products rapid product development creates significant advantages for entrepreneurial firms including access to early cash flows external visibility legitimacy and early market share the higher a firm s rate of new product development the more likely the firm is to achieve and maintain these first mover advantages this is particularly true in industries such as pharmaceuticals where the effectiveness of patent protections leads to patent races in which a winner take all scenario exists but even in industries where patent protection is weak the advantages of being first in terms of market preemption reputation effects experience curve effects etc can still be of major importance we argue that one way an entrepreneurial firm can increase its rate of new product development is by entering into strategic alliances with firms that possess complementary assets the basic proposition advanced is that a firm s rate of new product development is a positive function of the number of strategic alliances that it has entered however the relationship between strategic alliances and the rate of new product development may be nonlinear specifically although strategic alliances may initially have positive effects on the rate of new product development this relationship may exhibit diminishing returns moreover past some point it is possible that negative returns may set in thus the relationship between the number of alliances and the rate of new product development may be an inverted u shape two reasons can be given to support such a relationship first not all alliances will make an equal contribution to increasing the rate of new product development the economic law of diminishing returns suggests that the more alliances a firm engages in the more likely it is to enter some alliances whose marginal contribution is relatively minor such a phenomenon on its own is enough to suggest diminishing returns second gaining access to complementary assets through strategic alliances is not without risks malperformance may occur when the firm discovers that the complementary assets provided by the partner are a poor match fail to live up to the promises made by the partner or a partner may opportunistically exploit an alliance expropriating the firm s know how while providing little in return these problems arise because the effectiveness with which the firm can select and manage alliance partners is likely to be negatively related to the number of alliances the firm is managing due to information processing requirements the quality of partner search and the ability to monitor the partners actions will decline as the firm increases the number of alliances in which it is involved this reasoning leads to a prediction that past some point alliances will be increasingly vulnerable to malperformance this raises not only the possibility of diminishing returns to the number of alliances but also negative returns as the number of alliances increases past some critical point this proposed relationship between alliances and new product development was tested on a sample of 132 biotechnology firms the results provide strong evidence to support the inverted u shaped relationship between the number of strategic alliances and the rate of new product development therefore at low levels strategic alliances are positively related to new product development but as the number of alliances increases the benefits begin to decrease and at high levels the costs of an additional alliance actually outweigh the benefits