rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

keep your friends close the effect of local social networks on child human capital outcomes abstract social networks can affect demand for human capital investments by relaxing household time or budget constraints or by defining and reinforcing human capital preferences however empirically identifying the effect of social networks on human capital investment is usually problematic because households self select their networks in ways that may be correlated with their abilities to make these investments in northern ugandan internally displaced persons camps networks were not entirely self selected rebel activity which forced households into camps in 2002 disrupted pre existing social networks in ways that were exogenous to household human capital preferences this paper uses the exogenous variation in network disruption to identify a positive impact of networks on children s long term nutritional outcomes

assessing the consumers willingness to adopt a prepayment metering system in nigeria abstract despite the rising popularity in the adoption and usage of prepayment meters little is still known about the drivers of its adoption we examine the willingness to adopt prepayment metering ppm for a sample of nigerian households that were not prepayment users double hurdle models were estimated to account for households decisions concerning billing system switching behaviour and households willingness to pay wtp the estimated results revealed that decisions to adopt a prepayment meter are significantly affected by current electricity spending current billing method and the split incentive problem whereas current electricity spending significantly increased the tendency to adopt ppm the split incentive problem reduced the probability of adoption although unmetered consumers were more likely to express a willingness to adopt a ppm system than post paid customers they did not intend to pay a significantly higher amount to obtain the prepayment service income did not play a significant role in decision making concerning ppm adoption and the corresponding wtp amount these results cast doubt on the validity of the widely held belief that low income may be responsible for ppm adoption reflecting the widespread usage of ppm by low income households

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

savings in transnational households a field experiment among migrants from el salvador abstract we implemented a randomized field experiment that tested ways to stimulate migrants savings in their origin country we find that migrants value opportunities to exert greater control over financial activities in their home countries we offered u s based migrants bank accounts in el salvador randomly varying migrant control over el salvador based savings by offering different accounts across treatments migrants offered the greatest degree of control accumulated the most savings impacts likely represent increases in total savings there is no evidence that savings increases were simply reallocated from other savings mechanisms enhanced control over home country savings does not affect remittances sent home

the economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation this paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations roscas detailed evidence from roscas in a kenyan slum nairobi suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income to explain this phenomenon we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption the empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in kenya

gender disparity in access to information do spouses share what they know summary the united nations un has declared lack of access to information to be the third major challenge confronting women in developing countries after poverty and violence analyzing a unique dataset of husbands and wives in rural paraguay we identify systematic differences between women and men s knowledge of financial markets and find that the factors that help predict individuals knowledge of these markets vary by gender specifically women are less likely than men to be informed about the financial institutions operating in their communities women are more likely to know what is required to obtain loans from financial institutions if they are more educated live with other adult women belong to wealthier households are in a stronger bargaining position vis a vis their spouses or have their husbands approval to take out entrepreneurial loans

can group incentives alleviate moral hazard the role of pro social preferences abstract incentivizing unobservable effort in risky environments such as in insurance credit and labor markets is vital as moral hazard may otherwise cause significant welfare losses including the outright failure of markets ensuring incentive compatibility through state contingent contracts between principal and agent however is undesirable for risk averse agents we provide a theoretical intuition on how pro social preferences between agents in a joint liability group contract can ensure incentive compatibility two independent large scale behavioral experiments framed in an insurance context support the hypotheses derived from our theory in particular effort decreases when making agents payoff less state dependent but this effect is mitigated with joint liability in a group scheme where agents are additionally motivated by pro social concerns activating strategic motives slightly increases effort further particularly in non anonymous groups with high network strength the results support existing evidence on joint liability groups and further suggest that even if peer pressure to ensure effort provision is absent such group policies can improve efficiency when agents are pro social

who gets the job referral evidence from a social networks experiment we use recruitment into a laboratory experiment in kolkata india to analyze how job networks select individuals for employment opportunities we present evidence that individuals face a tradeoff between choosing the most qualified individual for the job and the individual who is ideal from the perspective of their social network the experiment allows randomly selected subjects to refer members of their social networks to subsequent rounds of the experiment and varies the incentive schemes offered to these participants we find that when faced with performance pay individuals are more likely to refer co workers and less likely to refer family members high ability participants who are offered performance pay recruit referrals who perform significantly better on a cognitive ability task and also prove to be more reliable as evidenced by their choices in the trust game and performance on an effort task

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

the retirement consumption puzzle a marital bargaining approach abstract evidence from several countries reveals a substantial drop in household consumption around the age of retirement that is difficult to explain with life cycle models using food consumption data from more than 550 households from the panel study of income dynamics for the years 1979 1986 and 1989 1992 we find that married couple households decrease their expenditures on both food consumed at home and away from home by about 9 following the retirement of the male household head no significant decrease in consumption is found for single households either in a sample of males or a pooled sample of single males and females these results are consistent with a model of marital bargaining in which wives prefer to save more than their husbands do to support an expected longer retirement period and relative control over household decisions is affected by control over market income the pattern of the consumption decline which is increasing in the age gap between husband and wife lends further support to this interpretation

bargaining and distribution in marriage the standard economic model of the family is a common preference model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources in recent years this model has been challenged by game theoretic models of marriage that do not impose pooling and are therefore consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior in this paper the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage

women empowerment and economic development women empowerment and economic development are closely related in one direction development alone can play a major role in driving down inequality between men and women in the other direction empowering women may benefit development does this imply that pushing just one of these two levers would set a virtuous circle in motion this paper reviews the literature on both sides of the empowerment development nexus and argues that the interrelationships are probably too weak to be self sustaining and that continuous policy commitment to equality for its own sake may be needed to bring about equality between men and women

the saving behaviour of a two person household the facts that wives are typically younger than their husbands and that women typically live longer than men imply that wives may have more incentive to save for old age than do husbands a theoretical model of the determination of household saving and portfolio choice is introduced which takes into account differences in preferences for saving the most important result is that the level and the composition portfolio of saving and the time path of consumption are dependent on the distribution of income within the household women typically live longer than men and wives are typically younger than their husbands these two facts imply that preferences about saving for old age in married households with forward looking members may differ between husband and wife this paper presents a theoretical analysis of saving and portfolio behaviour if the members of the household have differ ent preferences over future consumption as compared to current consump tion the analysis stands in contrast to unitary models of household intertemporal allocation which assume that the household has a single utility function thus this paper is a contribution in a novel context to the burgeoning literature on intra household decision making the base case analysis is for a simple two person husband and wife1 two period model in which there is only one asset saving it is assumed that because of the two facts given at the start of the introductory paragraph the husband discounts the future more than the wife in section ii the implications of a non cooperative decision making process for the base case are derived see ulph 1988 for a non cooperative model of demand and

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

intra household resource allocation and familial ties abstract in this paper we investigate the link between intra household resource allocation and familial ties between household members we show that within the same geographic economic and social environments households where members have stronger familial ties nuclear family households achieve near pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with weaker familial ties extended family households do not we propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns

perceived price complexity of dynamic energy tariffs an investigation of antecedents and consequences dynamic tariffs have the potential to contribute to a successful shift from conventional to renewable energies but tapping this potential in europe ultimately depends on residential consumers selecting them this study proposes and finds that consumer reactions to dynamic tariffs depend on the level of perceived price complexity that represents the cognitive effort consumers must engage in to compute the overall bill amount an online experiment conducted with a representative sample of 664 german residential energy consumers examines how salient characteristics of dynamic tariffs contribute to perceived price complexity subsequently a structural equation model sem reveals that the depth of information processing is central to understand how price complexity relates to consumers behavioral intentions the results suggest that it will be challenging to convince european consumers to select complex dynamic tariffs under the current legal framework policymakers will need to find ways to make these tariffs more attractive

keeping the doctor away experimental evidence on investment in preventative health products household investment in preventative health products in developing countries is typically low even though the returns to such products are high in this paper we experimentally estimate demand curves for health products and test whether 1 information about health risk 2 cash liquidity 3 peer effects and 4 intra household differences in preferences affect demand in our main experiment in kenya involving children s shoes critical for preventing hookworm infection price is by far the most important predictor of purchase providing liquidity and targeting women also increased demand information had no effect even though we find that genuine learning occurred we find no peer effects even though people discussed the product purchase decision extensively we find similar results for price and information in three smaller studies in guatemala india and uganda in experiments involving soap and multivitamins

saving risk sharing and preferences for risk saving decisions are made jointly by household members who generally earn risky incomes consequently to interpret saving patterns it is crucial to analyze the relationship between intrahousehold risk sharing and intertemporal choices to that end in this paper the household is characterized as a group of agents with possibly heterogeneous preferences making efficient decisions two results are obtained first it is shown that risk sharing can increase the amount saved by the household second i find that an increase in risk aversion and prudence of an individual member can reduce household risk aversion and prudence these results are consistent with the empirical evidence collected using the hrs

extended families and child well being studies of household behavior have established the distribution of resources among household members predicts spending and savings patterns however there is a paucity of evidence on the relationship between the well being of individual family members and the distribution of resources within an extended family including non co resident family members given the central role the family plays in many models of economic behavior this is an important gap in the literature using rich longitudinal survey data from the indonesia family life survey ifls evidence is presented on the relationship between three measures of health and education related human capital of children and the distribution of resources among extended family members ifls is ideally suited for this research since the survey collects detailed information about income and wealth from both coresident and non co resident family members the empirical model is founded on a natural extension of the collective model of household decision making chiappori 1988 1992 to the extended family the model is particularly appealing in this context because it places few restrictions on preferences of individual family members and does not specify a specific bargaining mechanism that underlies negotiations the collective model yields empirical tests of whether the behavior of family members is pareto efficient a special case of the model allows all family members to be completely altruistic which is observationally equivalent to a unitary model of family behavior that special case is rejected by the data however the restrictions of the efficient model are not rejected indicating that non co resident family members are able to co ordinate allocation decisions with respect to child human capital investments in such a way as to make no family member better off without another member being worse off

can higher prices stimulate product use evidence from a field experiment in zambia the controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests in part on whether higher prices can increase use either by targeting distribution to high use households a screening effect or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk cost effect we develop a methodology for separating these two effects we implement the methodology in a field experiment in zambia using door to door marketing of a home water purification solution we find evidence of economically important screening effects by contrast we find no consistent evidence of sunk cost effects jel c93 d12 i11 m31 o12

flypaper effects in transfers targeted to women evidence from brac s targeting the ultra poor program in bangladesh abstract many development interventions target transfers to women however little evidence directly explores the flypaper effects of whether women retain control over these transfers once within the household and how reallocation of the transfers affects women s empowerment we study these dynamics in the context of brac s randomized cfpr tup program in bangladesh which provides livestock and training to rural women in ultra poor households our analysis confirms previous findings that cfpr tup increased household asset ownership but shows complex effects on targeted women women appear to retain ownership over transferred livestock but new investments from mobilized resources are largely owned by men cfpr tup also reduces women s movement outside the home and control over income consistent with transferred livestock requiring maintenance at home however beneficiary women also report intangible benefits such as increased social capital and even with limited mobility a preference for work inside the home given a hostile environment outside the home

what are the headwaters of formal savings experimental evidence from sri lanka the world s poor are seeing a rapid expansion in access to formal savings accounts what is the source of savings when households are connected to a formal account we combine a high frequency panel survey spanning two and a half years with an experiment in which a sri lankan bank used mobile point of service pos terminals to collect deposits directly from households each week we find that the headwaters of formal savings lie in sacrificed leisure time households work more and improved savings options generate an increase in labour effort in both self employment and in the wage market the results suggest that the labour allocation channel is an important mechanism linking savings opportunities to income

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

estimating the personal distribution of income with adjustment for within family variation the 1970 and 1979 current population surveys are used to compute the personal distribution of income the major innovation in this paper is that all individuals in the household are not treated identically in particular children receive a different proportion of income than do adults that proportion is estimated its variations with respect to household characteristics are discussed and a final distribution of personal income is computed that distribution has considerably fatter tails than does the one normally used

household decision making in rural china using experiments to estimate the influences of spouses abstract many economic decisions are made jointly within households running an experiment on intertemporal choice we investigate the relative influence of spouses on joint household decisions we let each spouse first decide individually and then jointly with the other spouse we propose the use of a random parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions we find that joint choices are in between husbands and wives choices with respect to impatience indicating that both spouses have an influence on joint decisions however we estimate that in 99 of households husbands have a stronger influence than wives

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

noncooperative bargaining models of marriage in this paper we discuss some simple noncooperative models of distribution within marriage in which the equilibria are not necessarily pareto optimal in which history and culture can affect which equilibrium is realized and in which distribution may depend on whether resources are controlled by the husband or by the wife recent moves away from single decision maker models of the family have permitted economists to address distribution within marriage and cooperative bargaining models have played the central role in these moves the next step is to permit strategic interaction between family members by modeling distribution within marriage as a noncooperative game noncooperative game theory allows great flexibility in specifying the rules of the game and unlike cooperative game theory imposes few a priori restrictions on the nature of equilibrium outcomes in particular noncooperative models neither assume nor imply that all equilibria are pareto optimal

the abcs of financial education experimental evidence on attitudes behavior and cognitive biases this paper uses a large scale field experiment in india to study attitudinal behavioral and cognitive constraints that stymie the link between financial education and financial outcomes the study complements financial education with i participant classroom motivation with pay for performance on a knowledge test ii intensity of treatment with personalized financial counseling and iii behavioral nudges with financial goal setting the analysis finds no impact of pay for performance but significant effects of both counseling and goal setting on real financial outcomes these results identify important complements to financial education that can bridge the gap between financial knowledge and financial behavior change

household intertemporal behaviour a collective characterization and a test of commitment in this paper a formal test of intra household commitment is derived and performed to that end two models of household intertemporal behaviour are developed in both models household members are characterized by individual preferences in the first formulation household decisions are always on the ex ante pareto frontier in the second model the assumption of intra household commitment required by ex ante efficiency is relaxed it is shown that the full efficiency household euler equations are nested in the no commitment euler equations using this result the hypothesis that household members can commit to future allocations of resources is tested using the consumer expenditure survey i strongly reject this hypothesis it is also shown that the standard unitary framework is a special case of the full efficiency model however if household members are not able to commit household intertemporal behaviour cannot be characterized using the standard life cycle model these findings have two main implications first policy makers can change household behaviour by modifying the decision power of individual household members second to evaluate programmes designed to improve the welfare of household members it would be beneficial to replace the standard unitary model with a characterization of household behaviour that allows for lack of commitment

why don t present biased agents make commitments since self control problems were first analyzed by strotz 1956 researchers have frequently emphasized that dynamically inconsistent preferences such as present biased preferences engender a demand for commitment 1 here and throughout this paper i define commitment as a pure restriction on one s choice set with no confounding extrinsic benefits such as tax deferral in a savings plan or intra household strategic advantages 2 commitment is a problematic prediction since we see so little of it in the economy researchers have been able to induce some experimental participants to commit themselves e g ashraf karlan and yin 2006 but across a growing literature it is usually the case that only a minority of experimental subjects choose to tie their own hands 3 moreover subjects rarely express a willingness to pay a significant price to have their choice set reduced 4 most importantly very little commitment has arisen in the marketplace without the direct involvement of behavioral economists or their students 5 in the current paper i quantitatively explore the reasons for the missing commitment extending the present biased procrastination model in carroll et al 2009 i show how equilibrium commitment is related to i the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time ii the cost of delay iii the degree of partial naivete and iv the direct cost of commitment my quantitative analysis implies that commitment is not a robust implication of present biased discounting once one calibrates the model commitment vanishes in many leading cases in other words the benefits of commitment as perceived by the present biased agent are frequently overwhelmed by the costs of commitment this does not imply that we should never expect to see commitment rather in some natural settings like the one studied here commitment is a hothouse flower that survives only under special parameterizations a demand for commitment is a special case rather than the general case section i explains the basic model with sophisticated beliefs and solves it under the assumption that commitment is not available section ii introduces a free commitment technology and characterizes the cases under which commitment will be chosen section iii extends that analysis under the assumption of partial naivete section iv completes the analysis by studying the case in which commitment has a direct cost i e a hassle cost or a market price for setting up a commitment contract section v concludes an associated nber working paper contains proofs

payment mechanisms and antipoverty programs evidence from a mobile money cash transfer experiment in niger abstractcash transfers have become an increasingly important component of social protection policies in both developed and developing countries while such programs are often implemented electronically in developed countries in many developing countries with weak financial infrastructure such transfers are distributed manually resulting in significant costs to program recipients and the public sector alike the introduction of mobile money systems in many developing countries offers new opportunities for distributing cash transfers using data from a randomized experiment of a mobile money cash transfer program in niger we find evidence of benefits of this new system household diet diversity was 9 16 higher among households who received mobile transfers and children ate an additional one third of a meal per day these results can be partially attributed to time savings associated with mobile transfers as program recipients spent less time traveling to and waiting for their transfer they are also

do spouses realise cooperative gains experimental evidence from rural uganda summary we use experimental data from variants of public good games to test for household efficiency among married couples in rural uganda spouses frequently do not maximise surplus from cooperation and perform better when women are in charge of allocating the common pool women contribute less to this household common pool than men and opportunism is widespread these results cast doubts on many models of household decision making experimental results are correlated with socio economic attributes and suggest that assortative matching improves household efficiency developing non cooperative household models sensitive to the context specificity of gender relations emerges as a promising future research agenda

the home economics of e money velocity cash management and discount rates of m pesa users m pesa a service operated by the mobile phone network safaricom in kenya allows users to deposit money onto their telephone handsets transfer e money to another user with a simple text message and withdraw cash at one of thousands of outlets throughout the country the system is safer cheaper and far faster than the money transfer systems that it replaced although only five years old m pesa has achieved remarkable penetration into the kenyan economy as of september 2011 there were 32 000 m pesa outlets at which individuals could exchange cash for e float or vice versa in a country that as of 2009 had 491 bank branches 500 postbank branches and 352 atms mas and ng weno 2009 in the six month period april september 2011 the volume of transfers was ksh 314 billion compared to nominal gdp of ksh 2 99 trillion that year for the period from which our data are drawn the market exchange rate was approximately 75 ksh dollar and the ppp exchange rate was approximately 35 ksh dollar at present m pesa is primarily a money transfer system however it has the potential to evolve in two exciting directions first as a gateway via which unbanked households can access financial services and second as a transaction medium with e money partially replacing cash 1 even in its current form however m pesa represents a dramatic change in the economic environment of kenyan households further data on how households use m pesa allows for insight into the objectives of and constraints on their money management choices and consumption more generally

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

efficient intra household allocations a general characterization and empirical tests the neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members this paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member we make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts all we assume is that however decisions are made outcomes are efficient we refer to this as the collective setting we show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the slutsky matrix we also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made we apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from canada the tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two person households but not for one person households we also show that income pooling is rejected for two person households we then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data none of the collective setting restrictions are rejected we conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior

is there a daily discount rate evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle abstract quasi hyperbolic discounting predicts impatience over short run tradeoffs i present a direct non laboratory test of this implication using data on the nutritional intake of food stamp recipients caloric intake declines by 10 to 15 percent over the food stamp month implying a significant preference for immediate consumption these findings constitute a rejection of the permanent income hypothesis and are extremely difficult to reconcile with exponential discounting the data support an explanation based on time preference and reject several alternative explanations including highly elastic intertemporal substitution i explore implications for the optimal timing of transfer payments under alternative assumptions about preferences

shared agency the dominant spouse s impact on education expenditure summary in this paper we consider whether it is the gender of the decision maker or the extent of agency that they wield that is crucial to increasing household welfare this is an important question as development policy is often formed on the basis that placing resources in the hands of women results in greater household welfare indonesia provides the ideal opportunity to study this issue because it is home to ethnic groups with very different gender norms from male dominance the patrilineal batak to female dominance the matrilineal minangkabau using ifls data for three rounds we consider the impact of decision making by the dominant spouse on household expenditure on education we find that in indonesia when the dominant spouse male or female has sole control of decision making there is an overall negative impact on education expenditure this leads us to argue that it is more important to consider the issue of spousal dominance than to wholly focus on gender

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

estimation of limited dependent variable models with dummy endogenous regressors applied economists have long struggled with the question of how to accommodate binary endogenous regressors in models with binary and nonnegative outcomes i argue here that much of the difculty with limited dependent variables comes from a focus on structural parameters such as index coefcients instead of causal effects once the object of estimation is taken to be the causal effect of treatment several simple strategies are available these include conventional two stage least squares multiplicative models for conditional means linear approximation of nonlinear causal models models for distribution effects and quantile regression with an endogenous binary regressor the estimation strategies discussed in the article are illustrated by using multiple births to estimate the effect of childbearing on employment status and hours of work

look who s talking the impacts of the intrahousehold allocation of mobile phones on agricultural prices abstract using data from the philippines we study the impact of mobile phones on the prices agricultural producers receive for their cash crop we first look at the impact on price of mobile phone ownership at the household level because this masks a considerable amount of heterogeneity we then look at the impact on price of the intrahousehold allocation of mobile phones we find that whether the household owns a mobile phone has no impact on price but whether a farmer or spouse owns a mobile phone is associated with a 5 to 8 per cent increase in price

discount rates inferred from decisions an experimental study two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 4 4 factorial design scenario postponing a receipt postponing a payment expediting a receipt expediting a payment time delay 0 5 1 2 and 4 years and size of cashflow 40 200 1000 and 5000 individual discount rates were inferred from the responses and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios time delays and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected a market segmentation approach was found lacking the results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position

alimony rights and intrahousehold allocation of resources evidence from brazil can family policy affect well being of individuals without altering the resources available to their families this article examines the extension of alimony rights and obligations to cohabiting couples in brazil for women in intact relationships alimony rights upon dissolution should improve outside options strengthening their negotiating positions and increasing their influence over intrahousehold allocation of resources robust econometric evidence indicates that more decision power in the hands of women impacts hours worked by female adults and investments in the education of children this suggests that family policy and models of family decision making should take intrahousehold heterogeneity of preferences into account

creating a lab in the field economics experiments for policymaking in this paper i focus on the role that artefactual and certain framed field experiments what i term lab like field experiments or lfes play in informing policymaking using examples primarily from rural contexts in developing countries i identify four main purposes of lfes 1 to test theories or heuristic principles 2 to identify and estimate parameters associated with characteristics 3 to explore the structural nature of parameters derived from empirical methods including other types of experiments and 4 to assess methodological difficulties associated with lfes and how these can impact parameter estimates i address the importance of generalizability for lfes that are intended to inform policymaking and in the process emphasize the complementary role between lfes and other empirical methods in particular other experiments finally i discuss nine basic principles for conducting lfes and suggest four directions for future research

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

don t tell on me experimental evidence of asymmetric information in transnational households although most theoretical models of household decision making assume perfect information empirical studies suggest that information asymmetries can have large impacts on resource allocation i demonstrate the importance of these asymmetries in transnational households where physical distance between family members can make information barriers especially acute i implement an experiment among migrants in washington dc and their families in el salvador that examines how information asymmetries can have strategic and inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions migrants make an incentivized decision over how much of a cash windfall to remit and recipients decide how they will spend a remittance migrants strategically send home less when their choice is not revealed to recipients recipients make spending choices closer to migrants preferences when the migrants preferences are shared regardless of whether or not the spending choices are revealed to the migrants suggesting that recipients choices are inadvertently affected by imperfect information

labor supply and household dynamics abstract using the panel study of income dynamics we provide evidence that to understand household decisions and evaluate policies designed to affect individual welfare it is important to add an intertemporal dimension to the by now standard static collective models of the household specifically we document that the observed differences in labor supply by gender and marital status do not arise suddenly at the time of marriage but rather emerge gradually over time we then propose an intertemporal collective model that has the potential of explaining the observed patterns

financial decision making are women really more risk averse 40 males 33 females gain gambling gain domain loss gambling loss domain a contextual frames b abstract gambling frames studies the application of experimental methods provided stronger control of the economic environment in which decisions were made we elicited data which call into question the prevalence of stereotypic risk attitudes in financial decision making first we find that the comparative risk propensity of male and female subjects is strongly dependent on the financial decision setting second and more important we observe no gender differences in risk propensity when subjects face contextual decisions since in practice financial decisions are always contextual our results suggest that the above gender stereotype may not reflect true male and female attitudes toward financial risks i gender specific risk behavior an experimental design our experiment was designed to examine gender specific risk propensity in decisions relevant for investors and managers table 1 gives an overview of the experimental design in the main treatment we implemented risky choices in the form of investment and insurance decisions choice behavior in this treatment henceforth called the context treatment directly measures the risk behavior of male and female subjects in contextual financial decisions we also ran a control treatment in which the same risky choices were presented as abstract gambling decisions this control treatment henceforth called the abstract treatment allows us to validate the risk behavior induced by our experimental procedure in the light of the above mentioned gambling evidence in the context treatment subjects were confronted with risky choices in two different decision contexts subjects first had to complete a series of investment decisions they were then presented with a series of identical choices this time however framed as insur1 wealth effects from income differences outside the laboratory may still affect risk behavior in our experiment they are controlled for in our model 2 experimental instructions are available in german from the authors or in english from our web page www wif ethz ch publikationen htm ance decisions each investment and insurance decision incorporated a choice between a risky lottery and a certain payoff with the series of choices implemented in the two frames we elicited our subjects certainty equivalents for the same four risky lotteries l1 l2 l3 l4 in both contexts we implemented two frames in the context treatment in order to measure the risk propensity of subjects toward both perceived gains and perceived losses in both frames all possible payoffs for each decision were positive in the investment frame these payoffs were also presented as gains while in the insurance frame the same payoffs were presented as losses relative to an initial endowment therefore elicited certainty equivalents in the investment frame measure subjects risk propensities in the gain domain while certainty equivalents in the insurance frame measure risk propensity in the loss domain if in contextual financial decisions female subjects are generally more risk averse than men our results should display ceteris paribus lower female certainty equivalents in both the investment and insurance frames 3 the four lotteries l1 l2 l3 and l4 each had two possible outcomes payoffs in swiss francs 1 sfr a 0 60 and their probabilities were 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 30 sfr 2 10 sfr 2 30 sfr 6 10 sfr 6 and 50 sfr 2 20 sfr 2 respectively 4 experimental evidence suggests that individual risk propensity will vary systematically between the gain and loss domain daniel kahneman and amos tversky 1979 383 vol 89 no 2 gender and economic transactions 3y16 my68 mp 383 friday dec 10 08 20 am lp aer my68 figure 1 differences in mean certainty equivalents ce between male and female subjects by frame note certainty equivalents and male female differences are measured in swiss francs in the abstract treatment we confronted a different group of subjects with exactly the same risky decisions as those in the main treatment however as mentioned before all choices in this control treatment were framed as abstract gambling decisions again two frames were implemented in the gaingambling and loss gambling frames we measured the risk attitudes of subjects toward gambles in the gain and loss domain respectively subjects in both treatments were told in advance that one of their choices would determine their experimental earnings further all subjects completed a post experimental questionnaire which yielded information on each subject s disposable income this information is necessary to exclude wealth effects due to income differences outside the laboratory as an explanation of gender specific choice behavior

household bargaining and excess fertility an experimental study in zambia we posit that household decision making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman using an experiment in zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 less likely to seek family planning services 25 less likely to use concealable contraception and 27 percent more likely to give birth however women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well being suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable

the effect of social pressure on expenditures in malawi abstract i vary the observability of windfall payments to 291 members of agricultural clubs in rural malawi in order to study the effect of redistributive pressure on the timing of expenditures while other studies have documented that social pressure affects the quantity of income and consumption i focus on timing because spending money quickly may be a strategy for reducing obligatory transfers respondents who receive money in the presence of their agricultural club anticipate spending an extra 14 percent 0 28 standard deviations in the week immediately following the payment than those who receive equivalent transfers in private settings there are limited changes in the composition of spending but some evidence that social pressure to share windfall income has a larger effect on poorer households

fairness and efficiency in smallholder farming the relation with intrahousehold decision making abstractagricultural households face collective action dilemmas when making decisions about investments in their common household farm and the allocation of resources and benefits derived from it we relate intrahousehold decisions as measured in a lab in the field experiment conducted with spouses in agricultural households in western uganda with actual investments and intrahousehold resource allocation intrahousehold decision making that supports cooperation and equitable sharing is associated with greater investment in the intensification of cash and food crop production and more equitable access and control over income freeriding behaviour by husbands is associated with the intensification of cash crop production but not with equitable sharing

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

the effect of marketing messages and payment over time on willingness to pay for fuel efficient cookstoves abstract smoke from inefficient biomass cookstoves contributes to global climate change and kills approximately four million people per year cooking technologies such as manufactured fuel efficient cookstoves that mitigate the negative effects of traditional cookstoves exist but adoption rates are low the international development community debates whether this low adoption of fuel efficient cookstoves is due to a lack of adequate product information or due to household financial constraints we ran vickery second price auctions in rural uganda to elicit willingness to pay for fuel efficient cookstoves comparing the effect of informational marketing messages and time payments on willingness to pay a randomized trial tested the following marketing messages this stove can improve health this stove can save time and money and both messages combined none of the messages consistently increased willingness to pay in a second experiment we compared willingness to pay for two different contracts one with payment due within a week and one with equal installment payments over 4 weeks consistent with household financial constraints time payments raised willingness to pay by 40

household portfolio choice and retirement this study examines household portfolio choice through the retirement transition i show that couples significantly decrease their stock allocations after retirement whereas singles allocations remain relatively unchanged reallocations are concentrated among couples in which the wife is more risk averse than her husband husbands and wives respective retirement events are followed by opposite signed changes in stock allocations these findings are consistent with a model of collective household decision making in which spouses have heterogeneous risk preferences and suggest that dynamics in the distribution of intrahousehold bargaining power generate time varying household risk aversion

human and financial capital for microenterprise development evidence from a field and lab experiment microenterprises constitute an important source of employment and developing such enterprises is a key policy concern in most countries but what is the most efficient tool for microenterprise development we study this question in a developing country context tanzania where microenterprises are the source of employment for more than half of the labor force and we report from a field experiment that jointly investigated the importance of a human capital intervention business training and a financial capital intervention business grant using data from three survey rounds a lab experiment and administrative records of the microfinance institution we present evidence on business performance management practices happiness business knowledge and noncognitive abilities our study demonstrates strong effects of the combination of the two interventions on male entrepreneurs while the effects on female entrepreneurs are much more muted the results suggest that long term finance is an important constraint for microfinance entrepreneurs but that business training is essential to transform financial capital into productive investments our study also points to the need for more comprehensive measures to promote the businesses of female entrepreneurs data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1933 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

risk sharing and information in village economies arrangements for achieving efficient risk sharing vary depending on the information available to agents in the economy the usual euler equation restricts efficient allocations in an economy which obeys the permanent income hypothesis while efficient allocations in an economy with private information and long term contracts satisfy a symmetric restriction but not the euler equation full insurance arrangements are unique in that they satisfy both restrictions we look at an environment in which it seems likely that long term contracts play a role in mitigating the effects of private information three village economies in south india the evidence that consumption allocations satisfy the private information restriction is quite strong for households in two of the three villages the evidence for the third village suggests that while consumption for some households satisfies the private information restrictions other households consumption obey the permanent income hypothesis

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth

unitary or noncooperative intrahousehold model evidence from couples in uganda we present an overview of the evidence regarding the unitary collective and non cooperative models of household decision making and discuss how they can affect individual and household welfare we then discuss the results of an artefactual experiment conducted in uganda with spouses in order to test whether household members maximize common preferences or instead are willing to pay a significant cost to hide money from their spouse we find that both the unitary and non cooperative models exist in the intra household decision making process and that a one size fits all model of household decision making is unlikely to be satisfactory

testing for nonstationarity of market risk an exact test and power considerations this paper reexamines the issue of common stock market risk stationarity by applying a newly available exact test for random walk regression coefficients for each eight year subperiod tested in the 1951 1974 interval betas for individual new york stock exchange listed stocks appeared to be nonstationary the statistical powers of the exact test and of locally most powerful tests are compared to the power of the test employed previ ously by sunder these power considerations are cited to explain the differences between test results obtained here and those reported by sunder