preserving religious identity through education economic analysis and evidence from the us abstract this paper models the decision of religious parents to send their children to private religious schools as reflecting their desire to shield their children from external influences and thus preserve their religious identity it follows that when the share of the minority in the local population grows and outside influences become less threatening the demand for separate religious schooling among the members of the religious group decreases this pattern implies concavity in the relationship between enrollment in private and religious schooling and the share of the religious group in the population we present empirical evidence from united states county data on catholic and private school enrollment that strongly supports our theory the paper contributes to a better understanding of the demand for religious education

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

voting on pensions a survey abstract the paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence size and political sustainability of pay as you go pension systems it proposes a simple framework of analysis a small open two overlapping generation economy model around which some variants are displayed dictatorship of the median voter is assumed the text is organized to answer the following questions i do political equilibria with payg pension schemes exist ii why do they emerge iii what are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified and finally iv what is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous e g demographic shock

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

optimal redistribution with productive social services publicly provided private goods are conventionally considered consumer goods departing from this perspective we analyze the public provision of inputs that improve household productivity e g education and childcare in a two class economy with distorting taxation public provision is always welfare improving with respect to pure taxation given that the public input directly affects household productivity moreover the case for public provision strengthens as households heterogeneity in input demand fades out contrary to consolidated results in the literature the features of optimal provision schemes depend on the nature of publicly provided input namely if it substitutes household productive capacity or just helps households to exploit it

educational vouchers and cream skimming educational vouchers and cream skimming epple and romano 1998 show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most able students and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming here we study voucher design that injects private school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming however by adding restrictions like tuition constraints such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification this is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases

self interest and public funding of education abstract the objective of this paper is to study whether publicly funded education can emerge as a political and economic equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy in which selfish agents vote for public funding of education the presence of complementarities between capital and labor in the production function implies that by improving the skills of next period s workers public funding of education increases the return on capital as a result savers will support a publicly financed education system in order to enhance their future income a version of the model calibrated using u s data generates large shares of gnp allocated to education hence the non altruistic incentive to support public education is quantitatively important

education policies equity efficiency and voting equilibrium this paper investigates the effects of two specific forms of intelvention in the market for education an ability test for admission to university and a subsidy to tuition fees financed through general taxation both these measures enhance equality of opportunity but their equity and efficiency effects are ambiguous this ambiguity is reflected in the political economy equilibrium which would emerge as the result of voting on the level of the ability test and of the subsidy

majority voting in a model of means testing abstract we study a model of endogenous means testing where households differ in their income and where the in kind transfer received by each household declines with income majority voting determines the two dimensions of public policy the size of the welfare program and the means testing rate we establish the existence of a sequential majority voting equilibrium and show that the means testing rate increases with the size of the program but the fraction and the identity of the households receiving the transfers are independent of the program size furthermore the set of subsidy recipients does not depend on households preferences but depends only on income heterogeneity

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

two tier public provision comparing public systems abstract the paper considers a two tier institution in which government provides public services but individuals can opt out of public provision but not taxes funding for the public service is chosen endogenously by majority vote and we first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority vote equilibrium in line with existing results the equilibrium tax rate usually falls below the one found in a one tier system opting out of public consumption is prohibited as the public system loses the political support of the rich who exit we prove that when the two tier system majority dominates a purely private system a majority in society always welcomes a transition from a one tier public system to a two tier system it is the only system that is stable in an evolutionary sense otherwise a majority consisting of the middle class may be in favor of staying in a one tier system prohibiting exit because of a slippery slope argument

private school vouchers and student achievement an evaluation of the milwaukee parental choice program in 1990 wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low income students to attend nonsectarian private schools controlling for individual fixed effects i compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the milwaukee public schools i find that students in the milwaukee parental choice program had faster math score gains than but similar reading score gains to the comparison groups the results appear robust to data imputations and sample attrition although these deficiencies of the data should be kept in mind when interpreting the results

should i stay or should i go exit options within mixed systems of public and private health care finance abstract mixed public private finance is widespread in health care systems internationally in one variant of mixed finance some countries e g germany allow eligible beneficiaries to fully exit from the public social insurance system and purchase private insurance using a controlled laboratory experiment we empirically investigate the predictions of a political economy model of mixed systems of public and private finance with two types of exit universal exit when all individuals can choose to exit the public system and conditional exit when only individuals with an income at or above a threshold income level can choose to exit we find that high income individuals are less likely to exit under universal exit than under conditional exit despite having the same incentive to exit in both treatments sensitivity treatments suggests that a number of factors may be at play in explaining this result including learning effects a priming effect and a framing effect but that other regarding preferences do not appear to be an important factor

the micro empirics of collective action the case of business improvement districts abstract this paper carries out a micro level analysis of collective goods provision by focusing on the formation of business improvement districts bids the paper s theoretical and empirical analysis is unusually complete in that it considers the entire process of collective action including participation in initial organization voting and ultimate impact on property values bid benefits are shown to be highly uneven and bid formation is not a pareto improvement furthermore large anchor participants benefit disproportionately and are crucial for the viability of the institution consistent with olson 1965 these results while demonstrated in a particular setting apply to collective action more generally whenever a market failure leaves room for a collective response the presence of anchor participants encourages collective action and the action even though in a sense voluntary has uneven benefits

international capital flows abstract the surge in international asset trade since the early 1990s has lead to renewed interest in models with international portfolio choice we develop the implications of portfolio choice for both gross and net international capital flows in the context of a simple two country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model we focus on the time variation in portfolio allocation following shocks and resulting capital flows endogenous time variation in expected returns and risk which are the key determinants of portfolio choice affect capital flows in often subtle ways the model is consistent with a broad range of empirical evidence an additional contribution of the paper is to overcome the technical difficulty of solving dsge models with portfolio choice by developing a broadly applicable solution method

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

the political economics of not paying taxes this paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance when tax avoidance is possible the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay this affects both redistributive outcomes as well as political attitudes towards taxation depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge when the avoidance possibilities are limited the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained if the tax avoidance technology is more effective however the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation where a coalition of poor and the very richest favor a higher tax rate comparing the model predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity it comes surprisingly close to actual observations

public education expenditures and private school enrollment in this paper i investigate whether increases in public education expenditures lead to reductions in private school enrollment in order to deal with the endogeneity of public expenditures i use as a natural experiment the 1998 fundef reform in brazil that caused exogenous variations in local public school funding using data from brazilian school and population censuses i show that public education expenditures increases are associated with reductions in the share of private school enrollment for grade 1 however the effect is smaller for grades 2 to 4 which is consistent with the existence of costs associated with switching schools resume depenses pour l instruction publique et inscriptions dans les ecoles privees dans ce memoire on fait enquete pour etablir si des accroissements dans les depenses pour l instruction publique menent a des reductions dans les inscriptions dans les ecoles privees conscient de l endogeneite des depenses publiques l auteur utilise la reforme fundef de 1998 au brazil qui a entraine des variations exogenes dans le financement des ecoles publiques locales a partir des donnees des recensements bresiliens des ecoles et de la population on montre que les accroissements de depenses pour l instruction publique sont associes a des reductions dans la part des ecoles privees dans les inscriptions en premiere annee cependant l effet est plus faible pour les inscriptions dans les annees 2 a 4 qui suivent ce qui est coherent avec l existence de couts associes aux changements d ecole

a dynamic tiebout theory of voluntary vs involuntary provision of public goods this paper considers a dynamic model of tiebout like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods at issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time we model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated sequential location decisions over one of two communities each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods the first is one in which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community the second is a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by a majority vote opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation of public capital the markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied our main result shows that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state individuals locational choices eventually select the involuntary provision mechanism this holds despite the fact that unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a nash equilibrium of the static game each period we also describe conditions under which voluntary provision survives these conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to decrease wealth dispersion over time the results are shown to be consistent with findings relating inequality to school choice

egalitarianism and the returns to education during the great transformation of american education secondary school education greatly expanded in the united states from 1910 to 1940 setting its schooling attainment apart from that of all other countries barely 10 percent of youth were high school graduates in 1910 but by the mid 1930s the median youth had a high school diploma in some regions by the 1930s enrollment and graduation rates rose to levels that were as high as they would be two decades later the issue addressed here concerns the economic impact of the large increase in the supply of educated labor evidence is presented concerning the sharp decline in the wage premium to ordinary white collar workers with the expansion of the high school large numbers of americans competed for positions in the coveted white collar sector although the return to a year of high school remained considerable on the eve of world war ii egalitarianism had evened the playing field for a substantial segment of americans

transfers in cash and in kind theory meets the data we review theoretical explanations for in kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence after reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self targeting we then discuss the large literature on in kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the samaritan s dilemma pecuniary effects credit constraints asymmetric information amongst agents and political economy considerations our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases political economy considerations must also be part of the story

prospect theory and market quality abstract we study equilibrium trading strategies and market quality in an economy in which speculators display preferences consistent with prospect theory kahneman and tversky 39 tversky and kahneman 63 i e loss aversion and mild risk seeking in losses loss aversion risk seeking in losses induces speculators to trade less more and less cautiously more aggressively with their private information but also makes them less more inclined to purchase private information when it is costly in order to mitigate enhance their perceived risk of a trading loss we demonstrate that these forces have novel nontrivial state dependent effects on equilibrium market liquidity price volatility trading volume market efficiency and information production

selective versus universal vouchers modelling median voter preferences in education under the majority voting rule a system of universally available vouchers uv is politically less feasible than a system of selective vouchers sv confined to families with incomes equal to or less than median voter income after the introduction of uv public expenditure on education will have to be shared with previous private school users per capita expenditure will then drop and or tax will increase since these events will injure the median voter he will reject uv he will be indifferent between the status quo and sv indifference will turn into enthusiasm however if as can be expected the new regime sv brings effective new competition this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

the effect of rising income inequality on taxation and public expenditures evidence from u s municipalities and school districts 1970 2000 the income distribution in many developed countries widened dramatically from 1970 to 2000 some scholars argue that income inequality contributes to a host of social ills by undermining voters will ingness to support public expenditures in contrast we find that growing income inequality is associated with an expansion in government reven ues and expenditures on a wide range of services in u s municipalities and school districts results are robust to a number of model specifica tions including instrumental variables that address the endogeneity of the local income distribution our results are inconsistent with models pre dicting that heterogeneous societies provide lower levels of public goods public sector 3 two types of identification problems com plicate estimation of the empirical relationship between income inequality and public goods provision the cross country variation often used for this exercise suffers from omitted variable bias that is countries with high income inequality may also have other characteristics that could limit the size of the public sector cross state comparisons also suffer from endogenous household sorting if low or high income families migrate to states with high public expenditures the positive association observed in the litera ture between state public expenditures and income inequal ity may be spurious in this paper we examine the relationship between income inequality and government finances in municipali ties and school districts in the united states from 1970 to 2000 local government represents a large segment of the economy in fiscal year 2009 local governments disbursed more than 3 trillion for such important services as educa tion and public safety 4 our study has several advantages over existing empirical work first the large number of local governments in our data exhibit much greater variation in income inequality over time than do the small number of countries or states used in previous studies a large sample size allows us to separately control for changes in the top end or bottom end of the income distribution and for initial levels of inequal ity thus ruling out a mechanical association between tax revenues and rising income for the affluent second we develop an instrumental variable strategy to mitigate con cerns about potential reverse causality from the endogenous

euro area inflation persistence in an estimated nonlinear dsge model abstract we estimate the approximate non linear solution of a small dsge model on euro area data using the conditional particle filter to compute the model likelihood our results are consistent with previous findings based on simulated data suggesting that this approach delivers sharper inference compared to the estimation of the linearised model we also show that the non linear model can account for richer economic dynamics the impulse responses to structural shocks vary depending on initial conditions selected within our estimation sample

voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed the overtaxation bias abstract usual models on voting over basic income flat tax schedules rest on the assumption that voters know the whole distribution of skills even if at equilibrium some individuals do not work if individuals productivity remains unknown until they work it may be more convincing to assume that voters have only beliefs about the distribution of skills and that a learning process takes place in this paper at each period individuals vote according to their beliefs which are updated when getting new information from the job market the voting process converges towards some steady state equilibrium that depends on both the true distribution of skills and the initial beliefs the equilibrium tax rate is higher than or equal to the tax rate achieved in the perfect information framework an illustration is provided on french data if voters are over pessimistic as to the potential productivity of unemployed people majority voting may lock the economy in an informational trap with a high tax rate and a high level of inactivity

determinants of local school spending some consistent estimates the traditional median voter model predicts that median income and taxprice are the primary determinants of local school spending levels it further implies that lump sum grants wills be utilized like private income and thus income and grant coefficients should be the same our comprehensive search technique shows that excluding equalized assessed value these predictions hold up quite well over 2048 specifications income and taxprice elasticities are reasonable and tightly distributed with income and blockgrant effects of the same general size as note above any hint of flypaper effect is completely dependent on the inclusion of equalized assessed value in the regression equation since the state of new york has annual district level tax levy elections it would be hard to rationalize bureaucratic power or agenda control as capable of producing flypaper type effects so this absence is not surprising future research should 1 investigate the specification sensitivity of flypaper effects with other datasets and wealth variables and 2 examine election and tax rules for the possibility of budget maximizing actions by school officials finally the consistently positive effects of private schooling nonwhite and in poverty suggest that future work should attempt to model non linear income effects

school vouchers a survey of the economics literature we review the theoretical computational and empirical research on school vouchers with a focus on the latter our assessment is that the evidence to date is not sufficient to warrant recommending that vouchers be adopted on a widespread basis however multiple positive findings support continued exploration specifically the empirical research on small scale programs does not suggest that awarding students a voucher is a systematically reliable way to improve educational outcomes and some detrimental effects have been found nevertheless in some settings or for some subgroups or outcomes vouchers can have a substantial positive effect on those who use them studies of large scale voucher programs find student sorting as a result of their implementation although of varying magnitude evidence on both small scale and large scale programs suggests that competition induced by vouchers leads public schools to improve moreover research is making progress on understanding how vouchers may be designed to limit adverse effects from sorting while preserving positive effects related to competition finally our sense is that work originating in a single case e g a given country or in a single research approach e g experimental designs will not provide a full understanding of voucher effects fairly wide ranging empirical and theoretical work will be necessary to make progress

lessons for an aging society the political sustainability of social security systems what is the future of social systems in oecd countries in our view the answer belongs to the realm of politics we evaluate how political constraints shape the social security system in six countries france germany italy spain the uk and the us under population aging two main aspects of the aging process are relevant to the analysis first the increase in the dependency ratio the ratio of retirees of workers reduces the average profitability of the unfunded social security system thereby inducing the agents to reduce the size of the system by substituting their claims towards future pensions with more private savings second an aging electorate leads to larger systems since it increases the relevance of pension spending on the policy makers agenda the overall assessment from our simulations is that the political aspect dominates in all countries albeit with some differences spain the fastest aging country faces the largest increase in the social security contribution rate when labor market considerations are introduced the political effect still dominates but it is less sizeable country specific characteristics not accounted for in our simulations such as the degree of redistribution in the pension system and the existence of family ties in the society may also matter our simulations deliver a strong policy implication an increase in the effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the voters while often increasing its generosity finally delegation of pension policy to the ec may reduce political accountability and hence help to reform the systems

heterogeneous preferences and in kind redistribution theory and evidence abstract this paper examines the impact of social heterogeneity on in kind redistribution we contribute to the previous literature in two ways we consider i the provision of several public goods and ii agents different not only in income but also in their preferences over the various goods provided by the public sector in this setting both the distribution and size of goods provision depend on the heterogeneity of preferences our main result is that preference heterogeneity tends to decrease in kind redistribution while income inequality tends to increase it an empirical investigation based on united states census bureau data confirms these theoretical findings

downward wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a monetary union this paper analyses the implications of heterogeneity in the type of downward wage rigidity nominal or real for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric wage adjustment costs indexation in one region of the union reduces optimal grease inflation in the presence of common productivity shocks large common shocks may have sizeable and persistent effects on the intra union terms of trade whereby the region characterized by downward real wage rigidity adjusts with a persistent loss of competitiveness in response to asymmetric productivity shocks there is no role for grease inflation because relative price changes facilitating the real wage changes dominate the adjustment mechanism

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

majority rule and the public provision of a private good this paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good health care

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education abstract we study the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education this conflict arises because older households without children have weaker incentives to support the provision of high quality educational services in a community than younger households with school age children we develop an overlapping generations model for households in a system of multiple jurisdictions this model captures the differences in preferred policies over the life cycle we show that the observed inequality in educational policies across communities is not only the outcome of stratification by income but is also determined by the stratification by age and a political process that is dominated by older voters in many urban communities with low quality of educational services the mobility of older households creates a positive fiscal externality since it creates a larger tax base per student this positive tax externality can dominate the negative effects that arise because older households tend to vote for lower educational expenditures as a consequence sorting by age can reduce the inequality in educational outcomes that is driven by income sorting

the melting pot and school choice abstract in the united states parents are offered free public education in the mainstream culture but must pay the full cost of tuition if they educate their children privately this creates strong economic incentives for remaining within the public system which promotes the assimilation of minorities a pareto improvement can be achieved by subsidizing private education in exchange for modifying its social content so as to reduce polarization popular opposition to voucher programs that facilitate school choice without regulating cultural content may partly reflect voters concerns that such programs threaten to erode the common ground created by public education

all school finance equalizations are not created equal school finance equalization has probably affected american schools more than any other reform of the last 30 years understanding it is a prerequisite for making optimal social investments in human capital yet it is poorly understood in this paper i explain why it differs from conventional redistribution because it is based on property values which are endogenous to schools productivity taste for education and the school finance system itself i characterize equalization schemes and show why some level down and others level up schemes that strongly level down have unintended consequences even poor districts can end up worse off i also show how school finance equalization affects property prices private school attendance and student achievement

interregional redistribution and mobility in federations a positive approach the paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice we find that paradoxical consequences of inter jurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile while self sufficient regions are nec essarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes thus interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality at the same time however transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region the voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence empirical evidence from panel data from oecd countries and candian provinces is consistent with the theory

financing and funding health care optimal policy and political implementability health care financing and funding are usually analyzed in isolation this paper combines the corresponding strands of the literature and thereby advances our understanding of the important interaction between them we investigate the impact of three modes of health care financing namely optimal income taxation proportional income taxation and insurance premiums on optimal provider payment and on the political implementability of optimal policies under majority voting considering a standard multi task agency framework we show that optimal health care policies will generally differ across financing regimes when the health authority has redistributive concerns we show that health care financing also has a bearing on the political implementability of optimal health care policies our results demonstrate that an isolated analysis of optimal provider payment rests on very strong assumptions regarding both the financing of health care and the redistributive preferences of the health authority

on the political economy of educational vouchers abstract two significant challenges hamper the analyses of the collective choice of educational vouchers one is the multi dimensional choice set arising from the interdependence of the voucher public education spending and taxation second even absent a voucher preferences over public spending are not single peaked a middling level of public school spending may be less attractive to a household than either high public school spending or private education coupled with low public spending we show that besley and coate s 1997 representative democracy model provides a viable approach to overcome these hurdles we provide a complete characterization of equilibria with an endogenous voucher a voucher is adopted in political equilibrium provided the coefficient of variation of income is sufficiently small we undertake a parallel quantitative analysis and we find that no voucher arises in equilibrium for the u s income distribution which exhibits too much heterogeneity for a tighter income distribution including those in douglas county colorado where a voucher was recently adopted our model predicts a positive voucher public support for a not too large voucher arises because the cross subsidy to public school expenditure from those switching to private schools outweighs the subsidy to those who attend private school in the absence of a voucher

public provision of private child goods abstract this paper analyzes the public provision of private goods for children in a politico economic model with endogenous fertility the government provides every child with goods that can also be purchased by parents in private markets and the level of provision is determined by majority rule households with many children benefit from the public provision more than those with fewer children thus a political conflict arises between them the distribution of the number of children across households which is a crucial factor for determining which group is politically dominant is endogenously determined by households fertility decision the sequential interaction between fertility and political decisions might lead to multiple equilibria equilibrium with high fertility and low private public spending ratio and equilibrium with low fertility and high private public spending ratio our model could explain the large differences in fertility and structure of child related spending across countries

community membership aspirations the link between inequality and redistribution revisited the issue at stake is to explain why redistributive policies may vary so greatly for a given distributional skewness to this end we abandon the stylized median voter and study how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on social affinity between the different economic classes and their prospect of upward or downward mobility in particular we consider that socioeconomic group membership through its implied social interactions and peer effects is an important determinant of an individual s outcome hence agents while voting on a social contract must take into account the consequences of their choice over their ex post belonging to a particular community this allows us to shed light on how the endogenous sorting of the population into clusters may interact with the balance of political power leading to a non monotonic relationship through the pattern of community formation in the economy between inequality and the pressure for redistributive policies

on the political economy of means tested education vouchers abstract we use computational experiments to study the impact of means tested education vouchers on the level and distribution of educational expenditures our benchmark is a regime where public and private schools coexist our means tested voucher regime is one where households with lower incomes receive a larger voucher both the level of funding and the allocation of vouchers by income are endogenously determined by sequential majority voting we examine the effect on educational expenditures of switching from a mixed public private education regime to a means tested voucher regime or to a uniform voucher regime where all households receive the same voucher we find that i under means tested vouchers public funding for education is the smallest but average educational expenditure is the largest ii inequality of educational resources is smaller under means tested than that under uniform vouchers or the mixed regime iii the poor and the rich households prefer means testing to either the mixed or uniform regime

relying on the private sector the income distribution and public investments in the poor abstract what drives governments with similar revenues to provide very different amounts of goods with private sector substitutes education is a prime example i use exogenous shocks to brazilian municipalities revenue during 1995 2008 generated by non linearities in federal transfer laws to demonstrate two things first municipalities with higher income inequality or higher median income allocate less of a revenue shock to education and are less likely to expand public school enrollment they are more likely to invest in public infrastructure that is broadly enjoyed like parks and roads or to save the shock second i find no evidence that the quality of public education suffers as a result if anything unequal and high income areas are more likely to improve public school inputs and test scores following a revenue shock given their heavy use of private education i further provide evidence that an increase in public sector revenue lowers private school enrollment

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

support for public provision of a private good with top up and opt out a controlled laboratory experiment abstract this paper presents the results of a revealed choice experiment testing the theoretical predictions of political economy models regarding public support for a publicly provided private good financed with proportional income taxes when individuals can purchase the good privately and either continue to consume public provision top up or forego public provision opt out but in each case continue to pay income taxes our laboratory results confirm behavior is consistent with the predicted majority preferred tax rate under mixed financing with top up but we identify preferences for significantly higher rates of public provision than predicted under mixed financing with opt out using non parametric regression analysis we explore the relationship between individuals top up and opt out decisions and both their income levels and the implemented tax rates

immigration and spending on public education california 1970 2000 abstract the evolution of education spending in california has received plenty of attention from both academics and practitioners after this state s education finance reform in the 1970 s this paper quantifies the contribution of immigration to the relative decline in elementary and secondary public education spending per student in california in the period 1970 2000 a quantitative model of school choice and voting over public education is used to perform the counterfactual experiments of interest the model predicts that education spending per student in california would have been 24 higher in the year 2000 if u s immigration had been restricted to its 1970 level

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

the redistributive design of social security systems countries with low intragenerational redistribution in social security systems bismarckian are associated with larger public pension expenditures a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than countries with more redistributive social security beveridgean this article introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for these features agents different in age income and in their ability to invest in the capital market vote on the degree of redistribution of the social security system and on the size of the transfer in an economy with three income groups a small beveridgean system is supported by low income agents who gain from its redistributive feature and high income individuals who seek to minimise their tax contribution and to invest in a private scheme middle income individuals instead favour a large bismarckian system

the political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public private mixed health care system this paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public private mixed health care system where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income and public policy choices are part of a multi dimensional competitive political equilibrium we show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence we also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure ce texte examine les determinants des depenses en sante publique dans un regime mixte public prive de soins de sante quand un temps d attente plus long est la difference majeure entre les secteurs public et prive les preferences des electeurs dans le monde de la sante varient selon l ge et le revenu et les choix de politique publique sont partie d un equilibre politique concurrentiel multidimensionnel on montre que les depenses en sante publique et les temps d attente en equilibre dependent de la demographie et que cela explique pourquoi elles sont independantes de la repartition des revenus et de l influence politique on montre aussi que le vieillissement de la population peut ne pas toujours entrainer des depenses en sante publique additionnelles

optimal higher education enrollment and productivity externalities in a two sector model abstract we analyze the optimal share of the skilled workforce over the course of development with two sectors using skilled and unskilled labor respectively and technological spillovers from higher education enrollment productivity in each sector depends on the average quality of workers and the size of the workforce when skill biased technological change prevails this structure of externalities coupled with the endogenous ability sorting of workers may well produce a pattern of overenrollment in early and late stages of development and underenrollment in between our normative analysis is followed by a positive analysis exploring how policy would differ under alternative political objectives

computing second order accurate solutions for rational expectation models using linear solution methods this paper shows how to compute a second order accurate solution of a non linear rational expectation model using algorithms developed for the solution of linear rational expectation models the result is a state space representation for the realized values of the variables of the model this statespace representation can easily be used to compute impulse responses as well as conditional and unconditional forecasts

one dollar one vote this paper revisits the relationship between inequality and redistribution in a panel of advanced oecd countries using panel data methods that hold constant a variety of determinants of redistributive spending i find a non monotonic relationship between pre tax and transfer distribution of income and redistribution relative to mean income a more affluent rich and middle class are associated with less redistribution and a richer poor class is associated with more redistribution these results are consistent with a one dollar one vote politico economic equilibrium when the income of a group of citizens increases aggregate redistributive policies tilt towards this group s most preferred policies

wealth inequality educational environment and school enrolment evidence from mexico using data from the extended section of the 2010 mexican census 2 9 million households we study how school enrolment is associated with wealth inequality and with the educational environment the child is exposed to at the household and municipal levels we provide robust evidence of wealth inequality as a negative predictor of school enrolment for children in primary secondary and high school age ranges while a positive role is played by the educational environment through the introduction of interaction terms we account for how economic and educational variables are intertwined at both the household and the municipal level and we are able to illustrate the considerable heterogeneity in the role of adult education for households at different standards of living

endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages abstract this paper studies the endogenous determination of public budget allocation across hierarchical education stages in less developed economies the top class has dominant political power to implement its most preferred policy which is characterized by exclusive participation and large schooling expenditure at higher education at the expense of basic education in developed economies the budget allocation is more balanced under certain parameters it leads to expanded participation of the middle class in higher education the model offers an explanation to the observed cross country policy difference and is broadly consistent with historical evidence

collective choice and voluntary provision of public goods some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions others with a mixture of public and private funding and still others are entirely publicly funded in order to study this variation a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions while permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision a majority always favors permitting private contributions results are developed for small and large economies and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated

sorting and long run inequality many social commentators have raised concerns over the possibility that increased sorting in society may lead to greater inequality to investigate this we construct a dynamic model of intergenerational education acquisition fertility and marital sorting and parameterize the steady state to match several basic empirical endings we end that increased sorting will signiecantly increase income inequality four factors are important to our endings a negative correlation between fertility and education a decreasing marginal effect of parental education on children s years of education wages that are sensitive to the relative supply of skilled workers and borrowing constraints that affect educational attainment for some low income households

calculating and using second order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models we describe an algorithm for calculating second order approximations to the solutions to nonlinear stochastic rational expectations models the paper also explains methods for using such an approximate solution to generate forecasts simulated time paths for the model and evaluations of expected welfare differences across different versions of a model the paper gives conditions for local validity of the approximation that allow for disturbance distributions with unbounded support and allow for non stationarity of the solution process

openness and optimal monetary policy abstract we show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate above and beyond the size of trade flows using an analytically tractable small open economy model we characterize the impact of the trade composition on the policy trade off and on the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for price misalignments contrary to models where openness can be summarized by the degree of home bias we find that openness can be a poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies using input output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non tradable content of final demand components and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production the estimates are used in a richer small open economy dsge model to quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports we find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non traded goods in final demand

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

spurious welfare reversals in international business cycle models several papers have documented spurious welfare reversals incompletemarkets economy produces a higher level of welfare than the completemarkets economy this paper first demonstrates how conventional linearization can generate approximation errors that can result in welfare reversals using a two country production economy we argue that spurious welfare reversals are not only possible but also plausible under reasonable values for model parameters this paper then proposes an approximation method that modifies the conventional linearization by a bias correction this method can be easily implemented and approximates welfare as accurately as a second order perturbation method

inefficient households and the mix of government spending a model is presented in which individuals can vote over government subsidies to a private good and over redistributive taxation the subsidized good is purchased and shared by couples who act noncooperatively while possibly being altruistic towards each other the framework allows a separation of the subsidy policy from redistributive policy in a majority voting equilibrium the subsidy is used exclusively to correct the individuals spending pattern the results suggest that spending on private goods should be an important item in government expenditures when there is strong positive income bias in the political process and or when household decisions are relatively inefficient

exact likelihood computation for nonlinear dsge models with heteroskedastic innovations abstract phenomena such as the great moderation have increased the attention of macroeconomists towards models where shock processes are not log normal this paper studies a class of discrete time rational expectations models where the variance of exogenous innovations is subject to stochastic regime shifts we first show that up to a second order approximation using perturbation methods regime switching in the variances has an impact only on the intercept coefficients of the decision rules we then demonstrate how to derive the exact model likelihood for the second order approximation of the solution when there are as many shocks as observable variables we illustrate the applicability of the proposed solution and estimation methods in the case of a small dsge model

the mix of social and private provision of goods and services abstract in some countries health insurance and education are supplied as social goods at near zero prices and funded from taxation this paper analyses a case where such provision competes with income supplements as a redistribution device and where taxes or transferable vouchers influence the take up of the social goods compared to alternatives available in a private market each consumer chooses to consume either social or private goods and a vertical market segmentation results from differential demand for quality

country portfolio dynamics this paper presents a general approximation method for characterizing timevarying equilibrium portfolios in a two country dynamic general equilibrium model the method can be easily adapted to most dynamic general equilibrium models it applies to environments in which markets are complete or incomplete and it can be used for models of any dimension moreover the approximation provides simple easily interpretable closed form solutions for the dynamics of equilibrium portfolios

static and dynamic in efficiency in public goods provision we analyze with a methodological focus in which cases and under which hypotheses the dispersion of the distribution of individual demands affects the provision of public goods we derive implications in terms of static and dynamic in efficiency

the religious factor in private education abstract we quantify the religious factor in private education in the united states by calibrating a political economy model of school choice among public private nonsectarian and subsidized religious schools in which parents differ in their incomes and in their preferences for religious education this shows strong latent demand for religious schooling conditioned on current subsidized tuition levels in parochial schools which is suppressed by the need to pay twice for private education applying the results of the calibration to gauge the effect of means tested school voucher programs on religious and nonsectarian private enrollment we find that when the amount of the voucher is relatively small including subsidized religious schools in such programs is necessary for providing low income families effective access to private education

does school choice lead to sorting evidence from tiebout variation a question commonly raised about school choice is whether it would result in sorting or stratification previous research has asked this with respect to inter district or tiebout choice but has generated no consensus in part because areas district concentrations may be endogenous this paper addresses this by exploiting the fact that some metropolitan areas mas have different numbers of districts operating at the primary and the secondary level the resulting within ma between educational level variation in district concentration suggests that increases in district availability do affect children s district and school level peer groups and that they lower private enrollment jel h1 h7 i2

education choice endogenous growth and income distribution this paper studies an economy where parents can choose between public or private schools and can vote on taxes used to fund public schools the model is calibrated to us data and studied using simulations a bimodal income distribution emerges where public education students converge to a low income equilibrium while private education students experience endogenous growth with higher incomes however public education students experience long run growth through a spillover from private education students possible problems with the existence of a private alternative to pubic education such as the emergence of a education based class structure are identified

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

optimal inflation with corporate taxation and financial constraints abstract how does inflation affect the investment decisions of financially constrained firms in the presence of corporate taxation inflation interacts with corporate taxation via the deductibility of i capital expenditures and ii interest payments on debt through the first channel inflation increases firms taxable profits and further distorts their investment decisions through the second expected inflation affects the effective real interest rate and stimulates investment when debt is collateralized the second effect dominates therefore present a tax advantage to debt financing positive long run inflation enhances welfare by mitigating or even eliminating the investment distortion

income inequality and the quality of public services a developing country perspective abstract that the high growth rising inequality phenomenon experienced by many high growth developing economies in the recent past may lead to discontent among the poor is a well discussed issue this paper argues that as the demand for higher quality of the public services rises with income the rising income in the hands of the rich leads to their dissatisfaction about the quality of available public services thereby inducing them to form their own club for self provision of the public services whenever possible this however results in a lowering of quality available to the others outside the club despite less crowding at the publicly provided facilities

the global child labor problem the problem of child labor has moved from a matter of regional and national concern to one of international debate and possible global persuasion and policy intervention in crafting policy for mitigating this enormous problem of our times it is important to start with a proper theoretical and empirical understanding of the phenomenon what gives rise to child labor and what are its consequences what interventions might end child labor without hurting children a well meaning but poorly designed policy can exacerbate the poverty in which these laboring children live even leading to starvation the article surveys the large and rapidly growing literature on this subject focusing mainly on the new literature based on modern economic theory and econometrics it also looks at some of the broad policy implications of these new findings with the objective of contributing to better informed discussion and policy design

inequality as a determinant of child labor abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between the phenomenon of child labor and public education under majority voting it shows that under unequal income distribution public schooling is not supported by the majority and the amount of child labor becomes enormous

a tale of two unions divergent platforms and their constituencies the median voter theorem has regularly been used in economics to represent the behaviour of teachers unions little empirical work however tests whether this framework is a good fit for teachers

centralized vs decentralized contests we compare two contests decentralized in which there are several independent contests with non overlapping contestants and centralized in which all contestants fight for a unique prize which is the sum of all prizes in the small contests we study the relationship between payoffs and efforts between these two contests

an empirical investigation of the determinants of asymmetric pricing abstract this article empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases using daily price data for over 11 000 retail gasoline stations i find that prices fall more slowly than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs premium gasoline prices are shown to fall more slowly than regular fuel prices which supports theories based upon competition with consumer search further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing

a re examination of the use of ability to pay taxes by local governments abstract the orthodox view of local finance in the u s is that local governments should abstain from using ability to pay taxes because migration would result in a misallocation of resources and would nullify any attempt to redistribute income this paper uses a general equilibrium model of a metropolitan area to examine the efficiency and redistributive properties of local income taxation relative to local head taxes contrary to the orthodox assertion the results indicate that local governments can use income taxation without substantially misallocating resources in addition some redistribution results from the use of local income taxes