distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in latin america for much of the discipline of economics a closed economy is seen as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers to maintain sector specific protections accordingly economic liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of uncompromising reform elites students of the politics of economic adjustment in the developing world in turn have argued that reform programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in the future hence losers are prepared to engage in collective action whereas prospective winners facing uncertainty about payoffs remain disorganized they thus posit the cohesiveness and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining successful reform both economists and political scientists therefore adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how groups organize in support of liberalization in the recent latin american experience however these reforms have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political support to and often colluded with policymaking elites this setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent seeking behavior even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization this evidence supports two interrelated theoretical claims first distributional coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the economy not only when it intervenes second interest based variables retain explanatory power in political economy which state autonomy arguments disregard irrespective of whether the economy is closed or open which neoclassical perspectives overlook to highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization therefore the article suggests modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment

divestment investment sanctions and disinvestment an evaluation of anti apartheid policy instruments pressure for divestment and mandatory disinvestment sanctions directed against south africa are an instance of domestic interest groups in one country seeking policy change in another the link from shareholder divestment to disinvestment by firms is tenuous however since south africa active firms do not seem to suffer as a consequence of divestment pressure and legislated sanctions are likely to have unpredictable and sometimes perverse effects on the extent of apartheid practices

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does the type of political regime matter for trade and labor market policies this article uses cross country data to examine the link between a country s type of political regime and its degree of openness and labor market distortion the analysis indicates that more authoritarian regimes are associated with higher trade protection and greater labor market distortions this supports the view that political authoritarianism may be counterproductive to development in important respects

a comparison of three institutions for monetary policy when central bankers have private objectives how do different institutional arrangements for the central bank perform when central bankers have private objectives and society objectives vary with time this paper evaluates three benchmark monetary institutions from a constitutional perspective i a contract with an inflation or monetary target announcement ii an inflation rule and iii the laissez faire policy i e the absence of any contractual arrangement at the stage of institutional choice there is uncertainty about both society s mean inflation target and the central banker s future inflation target a target announcement reveals the type of the central banker and solves the credibility vs flexibility trade off but it can not prevent that the central banker follows private objectives the announcement based contract is the optimal institution if i the initial uncertainty about the central banker s objectives is small and ii if unemployment is sufficiently high

to harmonize or to compete that s not the question abstract neoclassical public economists stress economic distortions induced by differential taxation and therefore favour harmonization political economists focus on political distortions and therefore reject harmonization however policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political distortions tend to be biased economic advisers politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization harmonization is moreover undermined by incentives to re establish tax differences both activities prevent the possibility frontier from being simply a menu of choice popular referenda and functional overlapping competing jurisdictions focjs are institutions able to reduce political distortions and to shift the possibility frontier

tax perceptions and preferences over tax structure in the united kingdom do voters know their tax liabilities accurately or do they systematically misperceive them could such misperceptions influence voters choices over alternative tax structures proposed by politicians this paper assesses the accuracy of individuals tax perceptions in the uk using micro data from the british social attitudes survey 1995 and tests an empirical model of the determinants of tax structure preferences including tax misperceptions a systematic bias towards over estimation of income and expenditure tax vat liabilities is found and individ uals tax preferences appear to be both dominated by self interest and distorted by tax misperceptions whether using a traditional utility maximisation framework or a variety of public choice frameworks economists agree that consumer voters or taxpayer voters dislike taxes taxes lower the consumption possibility set and thereby utility politicians proposing higher taxes expect to lose votes unless they can persuade voters that the utility gain from the use of those taxes will exceed the tax induced utility loss of course the extent of individuals losses will depend on their circumstances and how revenues are raised the tax structure traditional tax incidence and excess burden analyses and models of political costs associated with the tax structure hettich and winer 1984 1988 each provide guidance on the extent to which different individuals may be expected to suffer and vote differently under alternative tax structures much will depend on attitudes towards and perceptions of specific taxes especially personal income taxes and consumption taxes underlying most such analyses are two common presumptions i tax preferences are dictated by self interest and ii individuals accurately assess their tax liabilities and so make informed choices two largely independent areas of literature have challenged these assumptions first models incorporating altruism

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

from theory to practice canadian economists contributions to public finance we survey canadian economists contributions to the field of public finance from the mid 1980s to 2016 we highlight the development and extension of the models and tools of public economics and the empirical studies that have deepened our understanding of the efficiency and distributional issues over a wide range of public finance issues we also highlight contributions to the development of policies through commissioned reports and the important role that canadian institutions the canadian tax foundation the think tanks and the federal and provincial departments of finance have played in shaping tax and fiscal policies de la theorie a la pratique contributions des economistes canadiens a la finance publique on examine les contributions des economistes canadiens au domaine de la finance publique du milieu des annees 1980 a 2016 on souligne le developpement et l extension des modeles et des outils d economie publique et les etudes empiriques qui ont aide a approfondir notre comprehension des enjeux d efficacite et de distribution dans un vaste eventail de questions de finance publique on souligne aussi les contributions des rapports commandites au developpement de politiques publiques ainsi que le role important d institutions canadiennes l association canadienne d etudes fiscales les groupes d experts ainsi que les ministeres des finances du gouvernement federal et des gouvernements provinciaux dans le design des politiques fiscales

interest profits and suboptimality in a demand constrained macro model keynes argues that under pessimistic expectations investment demand falls short of full employment savings consequently income adjusts to bring savings into line with investment resulting in unemployment and or excess capacity classical theory as reconstituted in postwar textbooks counters that investment and full employment savings are equilibrated by adjustment of the interest rate thus current output will obtain its optimal level at full employment and full capacity despite pessimistic expectations of future demand the only way this can fail is if some type of wage or price rigidity prevents the stock of real money balances from accommodating the demand for them at the fullemployment interest rate fig i illustrates the keynesian and classical views in a traditional loanable funds diagram here the full employment supply of savingsis given by s investment demand under optimistic expectations is i and the full employment interest factor unity plus the interest rate is r pessimistic expectations shift investment demand to it reducing the full employment interest factor to r in the classical model or reducing employment income and hence savings to s in the simplest keynesian model general equilibrium theory provides a third view on interest rate determination here competition over prospective profits leads the interest rate to adjust to the return on capital adjusted for risk so prospective profits are eliminated provided capital is mobile to reconcile this view with either the keynesian or classical view depicted in fig i it should first be noted that the general equilibrium model of interest rates is a multi period model while the textbook models of fig i are not they are one period models with views of the future imprecisely summarised in the investment demand function furthermore in those models views of the future are not analysed for prospective profits or their consequences graphically the inframarginal triangle between the investment demand curve and the interest rate line is not analysed or explained how can such prospective profits survive competitive activities the present paper proposes to examine this issue in as simple a model as possible the key simplifications are as follows first the simplest multi period

partial fiscal decentralization and sub national government fiscal discipline empirical evidence from oecd countries recent theoretical research suggests that financing sub national governments expenditure out of own revenue sources is linked to more responsible budgeting because the financial implications of spending decisions then are internalized within a jurisdiction we test this proposition empirically on a sample of 23 oecd countries over the 1975 2000 period and find evidence in line with the hypothesis that greater revenue decentralization measured as sub national governments share of own source tax revenues in general government tax revenue is associated with improved sub national government budget deficits surpluses this finding is cross validated with a novel independent dataset consisting of all 34 oecd member states from 2002 to 2008

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

divergent cultures when public organizations perform well in developing countries abstract throughout the developing world there are organizations that perform relatively well despite dauntingly unfavorable contexts and despite overall poor public sector performance this article explores evidence from 29 organizations in six countries to suggest that the concept of organizational culture provides a useful hypothesis to explain why some of them performed relatively well while others did not organizational mystique management style and performance expectations contributed to positive organizational cultures in better performing organizations while some autonomy in personnel management provided a facilitating context for these characteristics to be developed

financial crises and political crises abstract the simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public multiple equilibria are possible if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country s stability they demand a high interest on the debt exacerbating distortions and possibly leading to political crisis but if lenders are optimistic the cost of the debt falls and political crises disappear in such a case international liquidity packages can select the best equilibrium and rule out political crises at negligible cost

tax structure in a federation abstract does national taxation of a base influence the degree to which the local government will use the same tax base does the tax rate chosen by one local government influence the choices made by another local government the theoretical answer to these questions is often in the affirmative because of vertical and horizontal externalities that result when several governments are operating at the same time in a fiscal system however little empirical information is available this paper estimates the impact of horizontal and vertical externalities on the choice of tax rates by local governments operating in a federation higher national income tax rates and lower poverty rates are found to lead to lower local income tax rates

strategic public policy around population thresholds abstract political economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both re election and financial incentives this article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether when and how local office holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases using data from all 589 belgian municipalities over the period 1977 2016 our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits particularly for apartments these policy changes occur early in the election cycle and at least for housing policy are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold

taxation and presidential approval separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians this literature however focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden in this paper we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the us president s approval ratings over the 1959 2006 period our results support this proposition specifically we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings

rent seeking and market structure comment if the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government two conditions must be met 1 there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile and 2 the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free rider problem in fund raising this argument though seemingly intuitively appealing has been under recent empirical attack this paper seeks to restore the parapets

illusory revenues import tariffs in resource rich and aid rich economies abstract where imports are financed predominantly by rents from resource extraction or aid the revenue generated by tariffs is illusory revenue earned by the tariff is offset by a reduction in the real value of aid and resource rents revenue is however moved between accounts in the government budget which in the case of aid may reduce the burden of donor conditionality we demonstrate this proposition for a simple central case and show that the result is not overturned by generalisations around this case we argue that trade policy formulation in such economies should recognize the illusory nature of tariff revenues

incremental protection and efficient political choice between tariffs and quotas this paper offers a new political economy explanation for the increasing use in recent years of quotas instead of or in combination with tariffs as a form of trade protection we show that under domestic monopoly the comparative efficiency of tariffs and quotas in achieving political objectives will vary depending on the nature of the mark et and the level of protection at high levels of protection quotas can become more politically efficient than tariffs we also show that at low levels of protection a price equivalent quota may not exist

the political costs of taxes and government spending the marginal political costs of different types of taxes and government spending as well as voter preferences over different fiscal variables are examined using two different specifications for political cost one based on the probability of incumbent defeat and the other based on the incumbent s percentage of the vote models associated with these two specifications in which voting behaviour depends on disaggregated taxes and government expenditures are estimated using clata from canadian provincial elections the empirical results which indicate that different types of taxes and expenditures have quite different marginal political costs have important implications for models that incorporate voter pref erences

the origins of tax systems a french american comparison this article examines the origins of tax systems through a historical comparison of france and the united states and analysis of several shadow cases the article explains why the united states has relied more heavily on progressive income taxation than france which has favored regressive sales taxes this study traces the origins of these two tax systems to the early 20th century arguing that decisions about tax structure were shaped by resistance to the concentration of economic power in the united states and the centralization of state power in france in the united states the rapid concentration of economic power in the late 19th century spurred a political movement for a tax with clear redistributive purposes in france resistance to the centralization of state power and concomitant fears of fiscal inquisition weakened the drive for an effective income tax leaving the state to rely on consumption taxes to meet its revenue needs these 19th century movements of resistance to modernization shaped the foundations of contemporary political economy

decentralized taxation and the size of government evidence from swiss state and local governments according to the leviathan model fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue maximizing government the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states however empirical results concerning the leviathan hypothesis are mixed this study uses a state and local level panel data set of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub national swiss governments it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size the results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for swiss cantons the overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges thus revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges

informational contagion of bank runs in a third generation crisis model abstract this paper highlights the international spread of bank runs in a third generation model of financial crises through an informational channel banks short term liabilities include loans granted by foreign creditors who have imperfect information about the liquidation costs of banks assets a bank panic in a country induces lenders to downgrade early liquidation yields in other countries and thus to require higher interest rates to enable their banks to roll over their maturing debt those banks become therefore more prone to self fulfilling depositors runs the paper then studies the effect on contagion of increased transparency and bailouts

tax mix corners and other kinks abstractthis paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of statewide fiscal limitations the decentralized government finance archetype and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed flypaper effect arises in the constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind and how it cannot in general be taken as a symptom of local government overspending an empirical application to italian province panel data provides consistent evidence of the role of corner solutions produced by two sided tax limits in explaining the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants

revealed preferences for property taxes an empirical study of perceived tax incidence voting in an election over removal of a homestead exemption is examined to determine different groups perceptions of the incidence of the property tax homeowners in two categories appear to evaluate accurately the effects on them of the homestead exemption renters with higher cost rental contracts are more likely to believe they are significantly affected by the change in the property tax structure these results demonstrate the ability of local governments to discriminate in tax share price across groups of voters copyright 1992 by mit press

external shocks politics and private investment some theory and empirical evidence abstract the manner in which the political system responds to external economic shocks in developing countries is a key determinant of the private investment response we look at a simple model of political economic equilibrium to make this intuition more precise and developed the idea of a political transmission mechanism even in the confines of this simple model we find that ambiguities abound domestic politics can magnify or dampen the effect of the external shock in our empirical work we find that a high level of urbanization magnifies the investment reduction in response to an external shock this is consistent with the supposition that high levels of urbanization are conductive to distributive politics with pernicious economic effects we also find that the provision of political rights is conductive to superior private investment behavior

corruption and rent seeking the rent seeking theory was one of thefirst economic instruments developed tomodel corruption in the public sector comparing corruption with lobbying itproposes that the former is the lesser oftwo evils since lobbying entails the wastage of resources inthe competition forpreferential treatment this study showsthat the traditional rent seeking theorymisunderstands three factors first theimpact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent ssize second corruption as a motivationfor supplying preferential treatment andthird that corruption involves a narrowerrange of interests than those ofcompetitive lobbying taking these factorsinto consideration the opposite argumentis valid corruption has worse welfareimplications than alternative rent seekingactivities

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

the taxman tools up an event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax abstract the introduction of income taxation was a landmark in the historical development of the fiscal state of the now developed world this paper presents an event history study of the adoption of the income tax in 17 countries from western europe north america oceania and japan between 1815 and 1939 we find evidence that spending pressures reductions in tax collection costs and to a lesser extent social learning played a significant role for the adoption decision we also find evidence that the extension of the franchise at first reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax but eventually as universal suffrage was approached increased the likelihood

market sentiment and macroeconomic fluctuations under pegged exchange rates this paper models changes in market sentiment as a temporary increase in the premium faced by domestic private borrowers on world capital markets the effects of this shock are studied in an intertemporal optimizing framework of a fixed exchange rate economy where firms demand for working capital is financed by bank credit depending on the perceived length of this shock the model is capable of predicting a rise in domestic interest rates capital outflows and a drop in official reserves a reduction in bank deposits and the supply of credit a fall in private consumption a contraction in output and an increase in unemployment these predictions are consistent with observed facts associated with several recent episodes of turbulence on international financial markets

the political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public private mixed health care system this paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public private mixed health care system where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income and public policy choices are part of a multi dimensional competitive political equilibrium we show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence we also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure ce texte examine les determinants des depenses en sante publique dans un regime mixte public prive de soins de sante quand un temps d attente plus long est la difference majeure entre les secteurs public et prive les preferences des electeurs dans le monde de la sante varient selon l ge et le revenu et les choix de politique publique sont partie d un equilibre politique concurrentiel multidimensionnel on montre que les depenses en sante publique et les temps d attente en equilibre dependent de la demographie et que cela explique pourquoi elles sont independantes de la repartition des revenus et de l influence politique on montre aussi que le vieillissement de la population peut ne pas toujours entrainer des depenses en sante publique additionnelles

demographic structure and the political economy of education subsidies this paper investigates the politico economic impact of a society s age structure on the extent of public funding of education education subsidies serve to internalize positive spillovers of human capital investment but redistribute resources from the working old to the non working young thus creating a conflict of interest between the two generations the political process is characterized by a representative democracy

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

the nature of the agricultural firm abstract models explaining the choice between rent wage and share contracts in agriculture abstract from the large variations within the classes of rent share and owner managed forms of organization regarding the extent to which a specific form accommodates specialization between labor and management as a result modern explanations of agricultural organizations are misleadingly dependent on risk aversion or the assumption that landowners have an absolute advantage in production decisions viewing the agricultural firm as a constitution instead of as a nexus of contracts facilitates an agency explanation of alternative organizational forms and their amenability to specialization

the economics and politics of the structure of public expenditure the paper derives a complete system ofdemand equations for public consumptionexpenditures as the outcome of rationalbehaviour in a model where governmentmaximizes expected electoral support theallocation of expenditures is found todepend not only on the prices of publicservices and total expenditure and tosatisfy the constraints of demand theory which have been the focus of attention ofprevious empirical studies of theallocation of public expenditures but inaddition on the prices of privateconsumption goods the distribution ofvoter incomes and the expected change invoter support from varying the levels ofpublic provision

fundamentals beliefs and financial contagion abstract we study contagion in a model in which financial crises can occur due to both weak fundamentals and adverse self fulfilling expectations contagion emerges only if a crisis in one country leads international investors to rationally update beliefs about fundamentals in other countries but purely expectational crises may be contagious as investors may infer that fundamentals are weak hence the structure of information is crucial the analysis delivers useful lessons for assessing which countries are more vulnerable to contagion which types of crises are more infectious and whether increased transparency ameliorates contagion effects

the institutional framework and economic development the compound growth rates of per capita output and farrell type efficiency measures for 115 market economies over the period 1960 80 were compared with measures of political civil and economic liberty it was found that the institutional framework has significant and large effects on the efficiency and growth rate of economies politically open societies which subscribe to the rule of law to private property and to the market allocation of resources grow at three times the rate and are two and one half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are abridged

debt and tariffs an empirical investigation of the evolution of revenue systems abstract this paper presents a theoretical framework where government chooses fiscal structure so as to maximize political support and where the evolution of fiscal systems is determined by changing economic political and administrative factors estimating equations are derived and the model is used to explain the development of revenue structure in canada from 1871 to 1913 a period when major revenue sources consisted of the tariff debt and excises the empirical analysis distinguishes between government plans and ex post observations of public revenues and places particular emphasis on the derivation of hypotheses linking economic political and administrative variables to revenue structure

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

the politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects this paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome in our model with endogenous income there is no majority condorcet winning tax schedule we then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions we follow three strategies i reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter ii elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard downsian two party competition game iii assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior they point to the same simulation based conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle

the role of tax bases and collections costs in the determination of income tax rates seigniorage and inflation a growing theoretical literature on optimal taxation predicts that governments will set the tax rates on money holdings and on more traditional tax bases to minimize the deadweight losses of collecting government revenue under the presumption that relative collection costs and tax bases have not changed significantly over time the empirical time series seigniorage literature has focused on the theory s tax smoothing implication finding only weak support we show that changes in collections costs and tax bases played an important role in the determination of tax composition and find stronger support for tax smoothing when this is taken into account

redistributive politics a theory of taxation for an incumbent in a democracy in order to maximize votes incumbent politicians design and implement redistributional programs these programs benefit some voters at the expense of others in the simple two group or tax payers and beneficiaries case we identify the nature of vote maximizing transfer policies this model s basic approach is shown to hold for multiple group models as well strategic implications for the organizers of sub groups of the population or group leaders are developed other extensions of the model are discussed

is new zealand s reserve bank act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract this paper evaluates the reserve bank of new zealand act of 1989 from a principal agent perspective arguing that the act represents a dismissal rule the optimal dismissal rule requires that the central banker be dismissed whenever inflation exceeds a critical level that depends on aggregate supply disturbances and measurement error in the inflation index this is essentially the structure established by the act the scope for renegotiating the target rate however creates an incentive for the government to set the critical rate too high consequently the inflation bias of discretion is reduced but not completely eliminated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

legal constraints and the choice of educational grant structures recent empirical work suggests that legalconstraints are significant in choosingstate educational grant structures unfortunately the literature has not takensuch constraints into account thus callinginto question particular grant structurerecommendations this paper studies theconditions under which a legislature underorder to reform its educational grantstructure prefers foundation grants overdistrict power equalization grants atheoretical model is presented in which thechoice is shown to depend on the legalbasis of the court s decision and theempirical validity of this conclusion isdemonstrated using connecticut data and aseparate model of school districtexpenditure choice

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

the political economy of growth a critical survey of the recent literature this article reviews the recent literature on the political economy of growth focusing on the research that has developed at the intersection of the endogenous growth literature and the new political economy it explores the relationship among four key variables economic growth and capital accumulation political instability political freedom and democratic institutions and income inequality

pareto efficiency and majority voting why high taxes on the middle class may be desirable in this paper we use a simple median voter model to analyze the effects of tax systems with differing degrees of progressivity we find that relatively high taxes on middle incomes have two important advantages on the one hand they help to ensure that all citizens are better off than they would be in a world without government and on the other hand they reduce the tax level chosen in the election therefore the progression in the middle income range not only ensures that wicksell s requirement of ex post efficiency of the tax system is achieved it may also increase social welfare

defense spending in a neo ricardian world this paper shows that ricardian equivalence no longer holds once we recognize that govern ment acts as an intermediary between generations in the provision of national defence conse quently the level of public debt is positively related to defence spending since this component of government expenditures insures the transferability of bequests as well as protecting savings it is shown that defence spending has an adverse effect on both national saving and the saving rate that has not been considered in the economic growth literature more gener ally the paper emphasizes that in developing a positive theory of taxation the composition of government spending plays an integral role the separation of government expenditures from the methods used to finance them has been an extremely useful assumption employed in economics it has allowed economists to analyse a series of problems which would be much more difficult to study if individual taxpayers were assumed to perceive a link between the tax structure and the expenditure structure of an economy hettich and winer 1988 for example following this tradition develop a positive theory of a tax system this separation has been used most frequently and fruitfully to address the important question do fiscal deficits matter more specifically does the way that government finances its expenditures between taxing and issuing public debt matter in terms of their impact on the real economy barro 1974 employed an overlapping generations model with altruism to show that if individuals are not bequest constrained then government bonds are not perceived as net wealth the recipients of government transfers financed by bonds realize that their descendants will have to finance the debt through higher taxes and so they offset the increase in public debt by increas ing the size of the bequest to their children by the same amount the effect is that interest rates wages and the level of output of the economy are unaltered this result usually referred to as the ricardian equivalence theorem presented a challenge to the profession to find circumstances under which it would not hold and when therefore financing government spending with debt would

structure of public support for national agricultural research systems a political economy perspective abstract this paper initiates development of a set of stylized facts concerning the structure of public support for national agricultural research systems nars within a neoclassical political economy framework the aim is to place public funding of nars in the broader context of the overall level of direct government assistance to agriculture using a newly constructed data set on nars expenditures over the 1970 1985 period we observe a growing disparity in agricultural research intensity ratios which measure the level of public support for nars in relation to agricultural gross domestic production aggdp between low and high income countries this growing disparity appears to be driven by much larger increases in support for agricultural research by high income countries coupled with a significantly slower growth in the size of their agricultural sector despite the propensity of low and middle income countries to increase real support to agricultural research as per capita incomes rise the public agricultural expenditure ratio which measures public expenditures on agriculture relative to the size of the agricultural sector aggdp increases substantially public expenditures on agriculture were indexed on agricultural and non agricultural populations to give a rough indication of the increasing incentives for rural distributional coalitions to seek a redistribution of public expenditures in their favor a relative research expenditure rre ratio is developed which measures the proportion of total public expenditure on agriculture spent on agricultural research it provides an indication of the relative importance given to research on agriculture within the constraints imposed by overall public spending on agriculture in contrast to the agricultural research intensity ratios the rre ratios suggest that agricultural research appears to command as large a share of the public purse devoted to agriculture in low and middle income countries as it does in high income countries expectations derived from the neoclassical political economy literature that research may have fared relatively better in high compared with low income countries were not supported by the data

dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions the paper asks whether members of central bank decision making committees should communicate with the public in a collegial manner by conveying the consensus or majority view of the committee or in an individualistic way by providing the diversity of views among the committee members it finds that more active as well as more consistent communication by committee members improves the predictability of monetary policy decisions significantly this effect is sizeable as communication dispersion across committee members accounts on average for one third to one half of the market s prediction errors of fomc policy decisions moreover more active and more consistent communication are found to also reduce the degree of uncertainty about the future path of interest rates these findings suggest that a collegial communication which stresses the consensus view on policy inclinations can enhance the effectiveness of central bank communication

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

public utility regulation and bond ratings this paper investigates the extent to which political factors which vary across state public utility commissions affect electric utility bond ratings the paper focuses on the effects of the commissioner selection method election or appointment and other politically determined variables on bond ratings of privately owned and regulated electric utilities the paper develops a generalization of ordered logit that allows the latent risk measure to have a skewed and thicktailed distribution the distributional assumption underlying the standard logit model is strongly rejected empirically both political variables and financial variables are determinants of electric utility bond ratings and election of the puc has a strong negative effect on bond ratings

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

local governments monopoly power and local tax reform theory and evidence from the u k this paper hypothesises the existence of several sources of monopoly power for local governments when the system of local taxation is reformed by central government in particular we argue that information asymmetries between tax payers and central and local government at the time of reform provide opportunities for local politicians to set tax levels which differ from those expected in a full information setting we predict that compared to pre reform tax levels local tax levels post reform will differ according to four local government characteristics i the size of the seat majority of the ruling local party ii whether the party controlling local government is the same as or is different from the ruling party of central government iii whether the local government structure has one or two tiers and whether the same party controls both tiers and iv the degree of indebtedness of the local authority testing the model on the u k local tax reform of 1990 we find strong evidence consistent with the hypothesis that inter authority differences in local tax levels reflect differences in the degree of local political monopoly power resulting from information asymmetries this monopoly power appears to have been used generally but not exclusively to raise tax levels

vertical externalities in tax setting evidence from gasoline and cigarettes abstract a common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property consequently state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses we find that when the federal government increases taxes there is a significant positive response of state taxes for example a 10 cent per gallon increase in the federal tax rate on gasoline leads to a 3 2 cent increase in the state tax rate

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

international capital markets and interest groups capital market integration has increased the scale and mobility of capital movements within and among nations to unprecedented levels integration is fairly recent frankel concludes from his review of the literature that barriers in the major world financial markets were sufficiently low that by 1989 financial markets could be viewed as being fully integrated the scale and mobility of capital flows among nations has numerous implications to currency values interest rates wealth and through current capital account linkages to relative product and factor prices capital flows that have real economic effects also affect the functioning of policy instruments and how effective they are in remunerating an interest group at the expense if any of others this paper provides insights into the process and linkages by which the integration of capital markets has altered economic policy through interest group pressures on government if economic policy is viewed as the outcome of interest groups seeking through the power of the state that which cannot be provided by the market alone then capital market adjustments that affect the return to policy instruments can also affect the returns to lobbying resources and hence the balance of political influence among the various groups 2 this type of explanation for economic policy has been forwarded under the rubric of models of rent seeking krueger 1974 3 the paper is organized as follows 4 selected historical evidence linking capital markets to pressures for legislation in the united states and other countries is briefly reviewed in some cases capital market adjustments have eased pressures for protection while in other cases adjustments either forced policy change because of a liquidity constraint or made unprofitable the lobbying for sustaining policy in face of these adjustments the discussion in the next section provides deeper insight into capital market lobbying linkages discussion focuses on the results from a simple model of rent seeking where government intervenes in markets and provides sector specific public goods

auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector abstract this paper investigates the impact of a ministry s budget size on the choice between auditing a niskanen bureau and employing competitive bidding in the provision of a publicly funded good the ministry s marginal expected payoff increases fastest with budget size for auctioning as opposed to auditing however the ministry is shown to switch from a purely public provision to a competitive provision as the budget size increases even if expected fixed costs favor the audit the study contributes to the literature by extending the niskanen framework and by endogenizing the institutional arrangements for the provision of public sector goods

neoclassical political economy an application to trade policies abstract this paper starts with a review of the literature on neoclassical political economy and then goes on to apply this perspective to the issue of trade liberalization in this connection the paper critically discusses various political economy models which have been advanced to explain patterns of trade policies in both developed and developing countries and assesses them in light of recent empirical evidence the paper also makes a brief review of the empirical planning studies which estimate the gains from trade liberalization

a positive model of tax reform this paper is devoted to the explanation of tax policy from a behavioural theoretic point of view it for the first time brings together within a unified framework behavioural determinants of government expenditure taxation and tax reform administrative and compliance costs associated with taxation factors generally neglected in models of taxation as well as tax avoidance evasion deadweight losses and the costs that are involved in the tax reform process itself play a crucial role in the model the paper investigates how these factors influence the development of taxation and expenditure and the occurrence of tax reform

a proposal for using incentive precommitments in public enterprise funding abstract among the central problems of less developed countries ldcs is the poor performance of their public enterprises pes and the seemingly limited ability of governments and other agencies to improve this performance this paper proposes that project agencies be induced as a part of the initial financing of pes to undertake specific types of precommitments a precommitment to liquidate the project if its ex post performance falls below some threshold level and a precommitment to link a non negligible part of employee compensation to actual performance our proposal is not guaranteed to improve pe performance because there are no perfect solutions to what is inherently a politically difficult problem nevertheless we argue that as long as public enterprises exist independent of whether this is a good idea or not a precommitment to use performance based incentives is likely to improve their performance we discuss the primary sources of pe losses compare their probable magnitudes and explain how various precommitments are likely to ameliorate such losses our proposal is aimed at stimulating more thought on this subject and is addressed to a broad audience

tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies evidence from oecd countries with implications for the european union tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy such as local governments should not and will not rely on non benefit taxes such as the income tax yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries and such reliance changes over time evidence from a panel data set of 13 oecd countries over the period 1975 1984 suggests that competition between levels of government resulting in a vertical fiscal externality and between levels of government at the same level resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality provide some economic rationale for these changes moreover the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact these results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the european union particulary as the eu continues to evolve one implication for the eu is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the eu and is not accompanied by an eu level income tax will tend to lower national income tax rates although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population a second implication is that fiscal expansion of the eu to include an eu levelincome tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality

endogenous public sector budgeting to centralize or not in this paper the impact of budget size on a government s choice to centralize or decentralize the budgetary process is investigated using asymmetric information differing preferences and endogenous budgetary arrangements the central government chooses between a budgetary process that excludes the regional board centralization and one that includes the board decentralization in the determination of program budget levels it is predicted that the central government will decentralize the budgetary process at low and centralize at high overall budget levels switching from decentralization to centralization is predicted to

exit voice and mimicking behavior evidence from swiss cantons previous empirical literature hasshown that in order to overcome agencyproblems voters make inter jurisdictionalcomparisons of fiscal performance whenmaking electoral decisions incumbents therefore anticipate voters feedback by copying fiscal policy decisionsfrom neighbors this paper argues thatfiscal autonomy exit as well as directlegislation voice enrich politicalcompetition reducing thus the influence of electoral competition onfiscal decisions consequently policymimicking does not matter in circumstancesof direct legislation and fiscal autonomywhere the impact of voters on the politicalagenda is particularly strong based onpanel data between 1980 and 1998 we findencouraging evidence supporting ourtheoretical arguments

trade policy issues and empirical analysis interest in u s trade policy has been stimulated in recent years by the massive american trade deficit by the belief that intervention by foreign governments in international markets has given other countries a competitive edge over the united states and by concern about the increase in protectionism among industrial countries in turn major analytical developments in international economics have revolutionized trade theory broadening its scope both by introducing in a more formal manner such concepts as imperfect competition increasing returns product differentiation and learning effects and by including the study of political and economic factors that shape trade policy decisions this collection of papers the result of a conference held by the nber applies these new trade theories to existing world cases and also presents complementary empirical studies that are grounded in more traditional trade theories the volume is divided into four parts the papers in part 1 consider the problem of imperfect competition empirically assessing the economic effect of various trade policies introduced in industries in which the new trade theory seems to apply those in part 2 isolate the effects of protection from the influences of the many economic changes that accompany actual periods of protection and also examine how the effects from exogenous changes in economic conditions vary with the form of protection part 3 provides new empirical evidence on the effect of foreign production by a country s firms on the home country s exports finally in part 4 two key bilateral issues are analyzed recent u s japanese trade tensions and the incident involving the threat of the imposition of countervailing duties by the united states on canadian softwood lumber

elections and income redistribution this paper has analyzed a model of elections in which each candidate selects a reputation for the distribution of income that can be expected if he is elected the first result established that whenever there are three or more groups of voters and no single group has half or more of the voters if the candidates believe that the voters choices are determined solely by the candidates redistributional reputations then there is no electoral equilibrium the candidates expectations about the voters choices were then reformulated using a qualitative response model the next result established that this alternative model leads to the existence of electoral equilibria the remainder of the paper analyzed the nature of these equilibria for any given electorate among other things the results established that there is always a unique equilibrium provided a simple procedure for finding the precise location of this equilibrium and showed that this location implicitly maximizes the sum of the voters utility functions on the possible income distributions the penultimate sections provided some simple examples which illustrate the main results in the paper and a discussion of these results in terms of the politics of redistribution

public employees as swing voters empirical evidence on opposition to public reform reform offers economic gains for society atlarge but can represent a threat to theinterests of public employees publicsector reform faces opposition from votersemployed in public sector norwegian dataallow for an analysis this interpretation survey data show that public employeesprefer less reform than the rest of thepopulation the voting behavior of publicemployees is more sensitive to reform thanis that of other voters the swing voterhypothesis and hence shares of publicemployees in a local jurisdiction have anegative impact on the probability ofreform

unproductive accumulation in the usa a new analytical framework in this paper i offer an innovative analysis of unproductive accumulation in the united states economy from 1947 to 2011 i develop a new theoretical and empirical framework to analyze the accumulation of capital in its productive and unproductive forms i also develop a methodology to compute marxist categories predicated on the idea that the production of knowledge and information is an unproductive activity that relies on the creation of knowledge rents in particular i provide new empirical estimates to uncover the shifting balance between productive and unproductive forms of accumulation the accumulation pattern observed during the 1947 1979 phase that prioritized productive accumulation gave way after the 1980s to a contrasting pattern prioritizing unproductive accumulation unproductive activity has been growing at a fast pace in terms of incomes fixed assets and employment among all forms of unproductive activity my approach places special attention on how the production of knowledge and information has constituted a rising share of total unproductive income and capital stock additionally productive stagnation and rapid unproductive accumulation have been related to greater exploitation of productive workers and to widening income inequality

toward a presumption of efficiency in politics in the preceding pages i have returned time and again to the idea that in the next quarter century the profession will devote more of its resources to an understanding of politics and of political organizations with a presumption that the behaviors and institutions we observe in the real world represent efficient responses to exogenously given constraints and to competitive forces that does not mean of course that normative preoccupations critical evaluations and reformist drives will not continue to motivate a good number of scholars that is to be expected and praised however i believe that in relative terms more attention will come to be given to understanding and less to re designing and reforming in this context the economic approach to politics will flourish and as an important carrier of these research results public choice will continue to play an indispensable role we can already see the future and it is promising

politicians opinions on tax reform this paper examines politicians stated preferences on tax reforms which aim to bring about a given change in revenue the paper starts from a simple framework inwhich politicians are vote maximisers analyses how disequilibria may affect tax choices and considers possible asymmetries in decisions the empirical examination of the problem uses the stated preferences of 637 flemish local politicians for both raising and lowering taxes by the same amount using multinomial logit estimation symmetric and asymmetric effects are found and so the symmetry assumption underlying the standard approach is questioned in the analyses of tax choices