labor market regulation and the winner s curse i introduction in march 1992 the government of british columbia b c canada introduced the skill development and fair wage policy sdfwp which mandated the payment of fair wages on provincial public construction projects and promulgated the wage scales for construction crafts in 1994 sdfwp was enacted as legislation similar laws have been enacted in england and the united states in the past and as allen s 1983 survey shows their impact is a subject of controversy opponents argue that regulated wages distort the labor market reduce competition and increase construction costs proponents of the law on the other hand not only emphasize its long term positive effects on the living and working conditions of workers training and the consequent productivity increases but also claim that the alleged inflationary effect is counterbalanced by the improved labor and product quality in this paper i focus on another consequence of wage regulation namely its impact on bidding for public construction contracts i propose that the wage regulation will affect the construction market not only by changing the costs and quality of inputs but also through the transformation of the nature of the uncertainty that the contractors face during the bidding process the auction theory predicts that the optimal bid is responsive to the type of uncertainty under the so called common values cv model bidders face some common source of uncertainty regarding the construction cost and the winner is prone to underestimate the true cost rational and experienced bidders avoid this winner s curse by adding a surcharge to their estimated cost as uncertainty assumes a less collective and more private nature however the winner s curse becomes less of a problem and the rational bidder does not need to resort to the additional surcharge as a protection from underbidding the sdfwp may result in such a transformation in the bidding environment by reducing the uncertainty over labor costs that are common to all nonunion contractors elimination of the surcharge in turn may even offset the possibly higher labor cost in this paper i will test indirectly the hypothesis that the sdfwp influenced the bidding environment in b c in this fashion under the working assumption that contractors follow optimal rules in determining bids for this purpose i will use data from 54 public school construction projects tendered between 1989 and 1995 and compare the pre and post sdfwp unit bid prices the paper is organized as follows in section ii i discuss the relevant auction literature and the hypotheses i state the main hypotheses of the paper concerning the sdfwp and bidding behavior in section iii section iv describes the data an empirical model of bid price determination is presented and estimated in sections v vi and vii the final section concludes ii bidding and the winner s curse bidders for public school construction projects in b c submit sealed bids at a specified date and the lowest bidder wins the contract 1 many of the early sealed bid first price optimal bidding models presented in economics civil engineering and operations research literatures follow friedman 1956 according to these models bidders are risk neutral non colluding expected profit maximizers competing over a single project friedman suggests that the probability of being the lowest competitor is equal to the product of the probabilities of underbidding each competitor probability distributions of the competitors bids are to be obtained from the data on previous tenders this approach lays bare critical elements in competitive bidding first the contractor faces a trade off between profitability and the probability of winning the contract the bid must be high enough to yield a positive profit and low enough to win over other bids second superior cost efficiency enables the contractor to change the parameters of this trade off in his or her favor

competitive bidding under asymmetrical information behavior and performance in gulf of mexico drainage lease sales 1959 1969 in past outer continental shelf oil and gas lease sales winners of drainage tracts have tended to realize a higher economic return than winners of wildcat tracts this paper finds empirical support for the hypothesis that adjacent lessees have an information advantage when bidding for drainage tracts under the cash bonus bidding system this leads to superior economic returns and thus explains the difference in returns between wildcat and drainage leases the paper concludes that this difference and its cause do not pose a policy problem given empirical evidence that the government receives fair market value for the two lease categories combined

structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model we consider the structural estimation of the affiliated private value apv model in first price sealed bid auctions the model allows for bidders individual efficiencies and opportunity costs while permitting dependence among bidders private values through affiliation we establish the nonparametric identification of the apv model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a computationally convenient and consistent two step nonparametric estimation procedure for estimating the joint private value distribution from observed bids using simulated bid data we provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure and show the good behavior of our estimator in small samples

the labor market four years into the crisis assessing structural explanations four years after the beginning of the great recession the labor market remains historically weak many observers have concluded that structural impediments to recovery bear some of the blame the author reviews such structural explanations but after analyzing u s data on unemployment and productivity he finds there is little evidence supporting these hypotheses he finds that the bulk of the evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that continued poor performance is primarily attributable to shortfalls in the aggregate demand for labor

an empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in road construction auctions this paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions we find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents the differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant s costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent s and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs we also find that more efficient firms bid on average more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively

birth order and human capital development evidence from ecuador in this paper we examine the effect of birth order on human capital development in ecuador using family fixed effects models we find positive and persistent birth order effects earlier born children stay behind in their human capital development from infancy to adolescence turning to potential mechanisms we find that earlier born children receive less quality time from their mothers additionally they are breastfed shorter poverty plays a key role in explaining these birth order patterns we observe the largest birth order effects in poor and low educated families accompanied with reversed birth order effects in rich and high educated families

public enforcement private monitoring evaluating a new approach to regulating the minimum wage this paper examines compliance with federal minimum wage laws in the u s apparel industry and analyzes the impact of new methods of intervention designed to improve regulatory performance drawing

do auctions induce a winner s curse new evidence from the corporate takeover market abstract we contrast the winner s curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers the winner s curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover in our empirical estimation we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals controlling for endogeneity we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition we also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding analysis of post takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition as a whole the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner s curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids

the price effects of increased competition in auction markets bidding theory predicts low er selling winning bids higher buying winning bids as numbers of bidders incre ase alternative versions predict that winning bids fall rise with the second order statistic the maximum order statistic or 1 n the authors test these pre dictions using data on underwriters spreads on tax exempt bonds offshore oil t racts and national forest timber they estimate winning bids using general vari ables for the product and dummies for 1 2 11 bidders in all cases mor e bidders meansignificantly lower selling winning bids the expected maximum order statistic fits better than either the second order statistic or1 n in te n out of twelve cases copyright 1987 by mit press

strategic delay in market entry two firms are contemplating entry into a market that is viable for only one firm in a good state we show that even if each firm receives a signal that perfectly reveals a good state both might strategically delay entry owing to the fear that the other firm might enter in the same period as well we also find the conditions where the informed firm will let the rival firm know about the market s profitability and the two will merge to enter the market we discuss the applications of this model to the oil industry and the generic drug industry jel classification l71 d8

okun s law and productivity innovations a long tradition in macroeconomics dating back to arthur okun 1965 and walter oi 1962 regards cyclical productivity fluctuations as an artifact a residual generated from the incomplete and lagged response of employment and labor hours to demand driven fluctuations in real output in okun s version a one percent decline in output relative to trend is divided up into a reduction of 1 3 point in productivity and 2 3 point in aggregate hours the latter is further subdivided into a reduction of 1 3 point in the employment rate with the remaining adjustment taking the form of lower hours per employee and in the labor force participation rate hereafter lfpr yet this tradition of regarding cyclical productivity fluctuations as a byproduct of demand driven output cycles has been almost forgotten over the past three decades as a result of widespread adoption of the real business cycle rbc model in which productivity shocks are treated as exogenous as unexplained as unrelated to aggregate demand and as the sole driver of business cycles even in the more enlightened modern macro work on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models aggregate demand and sticky prices have reappeared but most recent papers still include an autonomous technology shock as one of several causes of short term business cycle fluctuations revisiting and rethinking the business cycle

status quo maintenance reconsidered changing or incomplete preferences after reviewing the evidence for status quo maintenance sqm i consider how to reconcile sqm with traditional consumer theory behavioural economists usually let agents preferences change as a function of their endowments treating the same person with different endowments as a set of distinct agents many properties of preferences then become immune to empirical test and it becomes impossible to judge whether an agent s decisions make the agent better or worse off this impedes prediction of when decision rules are likely to change sqm can alternatively be explained with unchanging preferences if preferences are incomplete sqm is then consistent with self interest and there is no reason why it should not persist

the economics of child labor if child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents concern for the household s survival the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force however this assumption about parental decision making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work the paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications copyright 1998 by american economic association

do better informed investors always do better a buyback puzzle we explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source auctions of yearling racehorses horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction however those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average earning 30 less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders moreover this underperformance is concentrated in male horses despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes these puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities or by nonfinancial objectives or by behavioral or selection biases jel g02 g11 g14 l83 d44

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

resource allocation models with risk aversion and probabilistic dependence offshore oil and gas bidding bidding for offshore u s oil and gas leases is a major corporate resource allocation problem involving enormous uncertainties and very high stakes this paper presents two new operationally useful decision analysis models to aid in bidding for oil and gas leases they are unique in that they consider risk aversion and probabilistic dependence among the values of the leases with both bid levels and partnership shares as continuous decision variables they are suitable for use in evaluating proposed bidding policies or as objective functions in optimization formulations practicality of their data requirements is evidenced by use of one of the models for several years in a major oil company comparison of optimal solutions to these models on a small example using actual oil company data demonstrates the importance of taking risk aversion and probabilistic dependence into account and provides insight into the adequacy of independence and conditional dependence as approximations for dependence these results are pertinent to other real world allocation problems that share many of the characteristics of bidding problems such as r d funds allocation

revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders an important managerial question is the choice of the pricing rule we study whether this choice depends on the uncertainty about the number of participating bidders by comparing expected revenues under discriminatory and uniform pricing within an auction model with affiliated values stochastic number of bidders and linear bidding strategies we show that if uncertainty about the number of bidders is substantial then the discriminatory pricing generates higher expected revenues than the uniform pricing in particular the first price auction might generate higher revenues than the second price auction therefore uncertainty about the number of bidders is an important factor to consider when choosing the pricing rule we also study whether eliminating this uncertainty i e revealing the number of bidders is in the seller s interests and discuss the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium

the effect of shill bidding upon prices experimental evidence this paper explores through a series of experiments the effect of shill bidding upon revenues and prices in auctions we study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework our findings are consistent with the prediction that if bidders are aware of the possibility of seller participation in an auction profits will be reduced on average we also study factors that affect bidder and seller participation decisions shill bidding can alleviate the problem of the winner s curse by lowering the price and it can thus provide benefits to bidders

how auctions work for wine and art interview auctioneers and even to buy a little wine in the meantime i have also had the opportunity with john abowd 1988 to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings this paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that i and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items in view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain 2

why do mothers breastfeed girls less than boys evidence and implications for child health in india breastfeeding is negatively correlated with future fertility because nursing temporarily reduces fecundity and because mothers usually wean on becoming pregnant again we model breastfeeding under son biased fertility preferences and show that breastfeeding duration increases with birth order especially near target family size is lowest for daughters and children without older brothers because their parents try again for a son and exhibits the largest gender gap near target family size when gender is most predictive of subsequent fertility data from india confirm each prediction moreover child survival exhibits similar patterns especially in settings where the alternatives to breastmilk are unsanitary

birth order and the intrahousehold allocation of time and education this paper develops a model of intrahousehold allocation with endogenous fertility which captures the relationship between birth order and investment in children it shows that a birth order effect in intrahouse hold allocation can arise even without assumptions about parental preferences for specific birth orders of children or genetic endowments varying by birth order the important contribution is that fertility is treated as endogenous a possibility that other models of intrahousehold allocation have ignored the implications of the model are that children with higher birth orders that is who are born later have an advantage over siblings with lower birth orders and that parents who are inequality averse will not have more than one child the model furthermore shows that not taking account of the endogeneity of fertility when analyzing intrahousehold allocation may seriously bias the results the effects of a child s birth order on its human capital accumulation are analyzed using a longitudinal

bayesian inference in structural second price common value auctions structural econometric auction models with explicit game theoretic modeling of bidding strategies have been quite a challenge from a methodological perspective especially within the common value framework we develop a bayesian analysis of the hierarchical gaussian common value model with stochastic entry introduced by bajari and hortacsu a key component of our approach is an accurate and easily interpretable analytical approximation of the equilibrium bid function resulting in a fast and numerically stable evaluation of the likelihood function we extend the analysis to situations with positive valuations using a hierarchical gamma model we use a bayesian variable selection algorithm that simultaneously samples the posterior distribution of the model parameters and does inference on the choice of covariates the methodology is applied to simulated data and to a newly collected dataset from ebay with bids and covariates from 1000 coin auctions we demonstrate that the bayesian algorithm is very effici

adult outcomes for children of teenage mothers using data from the british household panel survey this study examines the relationship between several outcomes in early adulthood e g education inactivity earnings and health and being born to a teenage mother besides standard cross sectional multivariate regression estimates we also present evidence from non parametric estimates and from estimates that account for unmeasured family background heterogeneity by comparing siblings born to the same mother who timed their births at different ages regardless of the econometric technique being born to a teenage mother is usually associated with worse outcomes an important channel of transmission of this adverse effect is childhood family structure which plays a more powerful role than childhood family poverty albeit smaller some of the detrimental effects are also found for children of mothers who gave birth in their early 20s

unions norms and the rise in u s wage inequality from 1973 to 2007 private sector union membership in the united states declined from 34 to 8 percent for men and from 16 to 6 percent for women during this period inequality in hourly wages increased by over 40 percent we report a decomposition relating rising inequality to the union wage distribution s shrinking weight we argue that unions helped institutionalize norms of equity reducing the dispersion of nonunion wages in highly unionized regions and industries accounting for unions effect on union and nonunion wages suggests that the decline of organized labor explains a fifth to a third of the growth in inequality an effect comparable to the growing stratification of wages by education

contract selection and performance in competitive bidding for electricity generation third parties bidding to supply utilities with electric generation facilities is a new and increasingly important practice six states have either establishes bidding programmes or are considering doing so the paper uses data from maine the first state to use electric generation bidding to examine which bids are awarded contracts and which contracts fail to fulfill their provisions results show that bid price plays a very small role if any in the selection process

exploration and development of u s oil and gas fields 1955 2002 we study the exploration and development of oil and gas fields in the u s over the period 1955 2002 we make four contributions to explain the economic evolution of the oil and gas industry during this period first we derive a testable model of the dynamics of competitive oil and gas field exploration and development second we show how to empirically distinguish hotelling scarcity effects from effects due to technological change third we test these hypotheses using statewide panel data of exploration and development drilling we find that the time paths of exploration development and total wells drilled are dominated by hotelling scarcity effects finally we offer an explanation for why fixed costs from exploration can make the contracting equilibrium in the mineral rights market efficient

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

synergies in recurring procurement auctions an empirical investigation this article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions the study reveals that projects are spatially correlated when bidders with potential synergies participate the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively finally the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained

some evidence of the winner s curse the mathematical complexity of auction theory has restricted empirical work to qualitative tests of its basic predictions with mixed results this paper exploits the theory of order statistics to derive a nash bid function that is linear in its parameters allowing direct estimati on by linear least squares the bid function is fitted to a cross section of auctions for highway construction contracts from thirty three states and provides support for several hypotheses of the theory of common value auctions copyright 1988 by american economic association

hindsight foresight and insight an experimental study of a small market investment game with common and private values we experimentally test an endogenous timing investment model in which sub jects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return subjects overinvest relative to nash we separately consider whether subjects draw inferences in hindsight and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity in contrast to nash cursed equilibrium and level k predictions behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief based theories we offer an explanation in terms ofboundedly ratio nal rules of thumb based on insights about the game which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium jel c72 d82 d83 gil

do farmers value the environment evidence from a conservation reserve program auction the paper uses data from one conservation reserve program crp auction to elicit farmers attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids the crp pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use an interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land

bidder behavior in multiunit auctions evidence from swedish treasury auctions we analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 swedish treasury auctions first we document that bidders vary their prices bid dispersion and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding second we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner s curse driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies third we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information the winner s curse and the champion s plague while the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

do education and health conditions matter in a large cash transfer evidence from a honduran experiment the paper analyzes a new honduran conditional cash transfer experiment bono 10 000 in which 150 poor villages of 300 were treated the transfers were much larger in size than an earlier experiment galiani mcewan 2013 but yielded smaller full sample effects on school enrollment child labor participation and measures of health service use one explanation is that bono 10 000 did not apply conditions to children only one child in eligible households was subject to the education condition and young children and mothers were only subject to health conditions in the absence of older children consistent with this we find a large effect on enrollment and a nearly off setting one on child labor among only children and smaller and insignificant effects on children in larger households we only find significant effects on health service use among children and mothers in the absence of older children despite a much smaller household transfer the heterogeneity does not appear to be driven by correlated variables such as household size child age or poverty

auctions for initial sale of annual catch entitlement we use a laboratory experiment calibrated to a representative new zealand fishery to assess three sealed bid multi unit demand auction mechanisms under consideration for allocating quota for species being introduced into the quota management system these auctions allocate the k units to the k highest bids but prices are determined according to discriminative kth price and k 1st price rules in our experiment the auctions are equally efficient but revenue is highest in the discriminative auction and lowest in the k 1st price auction results are robust to industry subjects and subjects are responsive to the across unit bidding incentives present in multi unit demand auctions

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

bidding in common value auctions how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner s curse experienced construction industry executives suffer from a winner s curse in laboratory common value auction markets dyer et al dyer d j h kagel d levin 1989 a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions laboratory analysis econom j 99 108 115 this paper identifies essential differences between field environments and the economic theory underlying the laboratory markets that account for the executives success in the field and a winner s curse in the lab these are 1 industry specific mechanisms which enable contractors to escape the winner s curse even when they bid too low 2 learned industry specific evaluative processes which enable experienced contractors to avoid the winner s curse in the first place and 3 important private value elements that underlie bidding also identified are a number of industry specific bidding characteristics whose evolution can be explained using modern auction theory lessons are drawn regarding the use of experime

the more the merrier the effect of family size and birth order on children s education there is an extensive theoretical literature that postulates a tradeoff between child quantity and quality within a family however there is little causal evidence that speaks to this theory using a rich dataset on the entire population of norway over an extended period of time we examine the effects of family size and birth order on the educational attainment of children while we find a negative correlation between family size and children s education when we include indicators for birth order and or use twin births as an instrument family size effects become negligible in addition birth order has a significant and large negative effect on children s education we also study adult earnings employment and teenage childbearing and find strong evidence for birth order effects with these outcomes particularly among women these findings suggest the need to revisit economic models of fertility and child production focusing not only on differences across families but differences within families as well

asymmetric information information externalities and efficiency the case of oil exploration in this article we examine the efect of private information and information externalities on the ex post eficiency of investment in oil exploration we show that too much drilling tends to occur ifjirms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil and too little drilling occurs if the opposite is true bargaining with well defined property rights to the information externality can eliminate underinvestment but overinvestment remains a problem because firms have an incentive not to disclose their private information

first price common value auctions bidder behavior and the winner s curse first price common value auctions bidder behavior and the winners curse john h kagel dan levin raymond c battalio and donald j meyer experimental auction markets are characterized by a strong winner s curse in early auction periods as high bidders consistently lose money failing to account for the adverse selection problem inherent in winning the auction with experience and bankruptcy on the part of the worst offenders subjects earn positive average profits but these are far below nash equilibrium predictions as a sizable minority of bids exceed the expected value of the item conditional on having the highest estimate of value individual bidding behavior is explored to identify the mechanism whereby market outcomes no longer display the worst effects of the winner s curse i introduction numerous occurrences of the winner s curse have been reported in bidding for items of uncertain value resulting in below normal or even negative average profits for bidders the winner s curse results from bidders failure to account for the adverse selection problem inherent in winning auctions for items of uncertain value capen clapp and campbell 1971 claim that the winner s curse resulted in low profits for oil companies in the 1960s in bidding on offshore oil and gas leases regarding corporate takeovers and mergers roll 1986 proposes a hubris hypothesis acquiring firms generally fall prey to the winner s curse paying too much on average for their targets he claims that from the samples he has observed the hubris hypothesis explains merger data as well as tax factors synergy or inefficient target management cassing and douglas 1980 find that many baseball players in the free agency market have been overpaid on account of the winner s curse and dessauer 1981 reports a similar finding of overbidding in auctions for the book publishing rights based on these occurrences it appears that many agents are not fully cognizant of the intricacies involved with bidding on alternatives that have uncertain worth the winner s curse results from the fact that although bidders may hold unbiased estimates of the auctioned item s value this estimate can be overly optimistic given that participants bids are influenced by their estimates of value in other words the winner s curse results from an adverse selection problem that bidders fail to account for fully in submitting their bids the existence of a winner s curse implies a breakdown of rational expectations on the bidder s part as discussed by milgrom 1981 and identifies a market that is out of equilibrium a winner s curse need not result from bidding on items with uncertain value provided proper adjustments are made one adjustment to the adverse selection problem is to deflate the expected value of the item and hence the bid before any action is taken for example cox and isaac 1984 show that agents who maximize expected utility will revise their expectations downward and submit bids that are strictly less than the expected value conditional on the event of winning when agents behave in this fashion a winner s curse does not result in the sense of bidders paying more on average than the items are worth this paper focuses on sealed bid auctions for objects of uncertain value a market institution for which theoretical predictions and empirical evidence concerning a winner s curse are mixed current theoretical development excludes the possibility of bidders paying more on average than the items are worth yet some empirical evidence in the sale of oil tracts as seen in capen clapp and campbell 1971 lohrenz and dougherty 1983 and mead moseidjord and sorenson 1983 suggests that the winner s curse may be present a series of experiments is designed and conducted in order to answer the following empirical research questions does the winner s curse exist in this auction framework and if it does what is its duration its relation to agent experience in the market and its breadth of impact across agents

the american jobs crisis and its implication for the future of employment policy a call for a new jobs compact the author proposes a new jobs compact to close the nation s jobs deficit to create sufficient high quality jobs to raise wages and end thirty years of wage stagnation and to update and strengthen labor and employment policies a set of market and institutional failures are identified as root causes of these problems and local innovations and policy proposals are suggested for overcoming them achieving these objectives will require a stronger voice in national policymaking as well as proactive efforts to mobilize and coordinate the constituencies that share an interest in and responsibility for employment policy and practice the author calls on the president and the secretary of labor to lead these efforts by mobilizing and engaging business labor women ethnic community and education leaders at regional and national levels

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

some evidence on the winner s curse comment the theory of auctions has developed extensively since robert b wilson s 1977 seminal paper due to the complexity of equilibrium strategies however empirical researchers have been slow to incorporate and test the most basic theoretical precepts typical empirical studies estimate ad hoc bidding models with no attempt to ascertain whether the implied behaviors are theoretically plausible the recent paper by stuart e thiel 1988 attempts to bridge this gap thiel obtains closed form equilibrium bidding functions that are theoretically motivated and linear in parameters and which facilitate empirical estimation and testing if widely applicable thiel s empirical approach would constitute a major methodological breakthrough unfortunately thiel s approach applies only in special cases that are of limited practical interest linear bidding strategies emerge only under circumstances that are unlikely in the real world the limited range of thiel s approach may not be apparent to casual readers of his paper even when linear strategies do exist they are not unique under the special assumptions of thiel s model for each nash equilibrium in linear strategies there exists a related family of nonlinear strategies thus further justification must be found for basing empirical research on the linear specification we also note a significant error in thiel s work the symmetric strategies he derives on the basis of order statistics do not constitute a nash equilibrium we derive proper expressions for the symmetric nash strategies and discuss a specification error in thiel s regression analysis that would account for the mixed results obtained in his application to the highway construction industry

the performance of corporate alliances evidence from oil and gas drilling in the gulf of mexico abstract i use data on oil and gas drilling in the gulf of mexico to measure how a corporate alliance a group of firms that jointly develops an offshore tract performs relative to a solo firm i employ a regression discontinuity strategy based on bids in first price sealed bid auctions for the rights to develop leases by focusing on leases where one organizational form narrowly outbids the other i measure drilling outcomes while controlling for the endogenous matching of projects and organizational forms solo firm leases are less profitable than alliance leases because alliance members combine their information and expertise

the eyes of the needles a sequential model of union organizing drives 1999 2004 this paper models three stages of the union organizing drive using a new dataset covering more than 22 000 drives that took place between 1999 and 2004 the correlated sequential model tracks drives through all of their potential stages holding an election winning an election and reaching first contracts only one seventh of organizing drives that filed an election petition with the nlrb managed to reach a first contract within a year of certification the model which controls for the endogeneity of unfair labor practice ulp charges finds that a ulp charge was associated with a 0 smaller cumulative chance of reaching such a contract ulp charges had less effect on the votes cast than on the decision to hold an election and the ability to reach a first contract a sequential model such as this one could be extended to test between some competing theories about the determinants of union organizing

bidding behaviour in ocs drainage auctions theory and evidence empirical economists frequently criticize game theoretic models of markets on the grounds that they fail to generate empirically testable hypotheses the complaint is that prices and quantities or entry decisions are explained using factors that are not observable to the econometrician such as private valuations and beliefs of agents the corollary to this argument is that the only way to proceed empirically is through experiments however this approach suffers from the problem that the experience of the subjects may be too limited and the compensation too small for them to perform the requisite optimizing calculations the objective of this paper is to discuss the above criticism of gametheoretic models in the context of our work on markets of offshore oil and gas leases in this case study one group of buyers is better informed about the unknown value of the leaae being sold that another group and the two groups can be identified game theoretic models of markets with informational asymmetries generate restrictions on the relative behaviour and performance of the two groups of buyers and some of these restrictions are empirically testable we examine them using bid and profit data more generally the work serves to illustrate a basic point about testing models of

bid dispersion competition and wage regulation some field evidence from public contract bidding in british columbia the paper uses data from british columbia to show that bid dispersion the difference between the winning and next lowest bids in public school construction contract bidding is very compact and that it varies inversely with the degree of competition it also examines the impact of the skill development and fair wage law sdfwp which promulgated wage scales and required contractors to pay them in public construction projects on the bid dispersion multivariate analysis shows that bid dispersion declined after sdfwp one possible interpretation of this result is that the contractors became less prone to the winner s curse following the sdfwp

structural econometric analysis of descending auctions since vickrey s 1961 paper the theory of auctions has considerably expanded particularly over the last decade see e g milgrom 1985 1986 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 for recent surveys in contrast except for some experimental work only a few empirical studies have attempted to validate the new theoretical auction models using field auction data two approaches have emerged the first has concentrated upon testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced form econometric models with observed bids as the explained variables explanatory variables might then be the reservation price the number of potential bidders when observed and some characteristics of the auctioned object examples are hansen 1985 1986 hendricks et al 1987 and hendricks and porter 1988 the second approach which is structural has a long tradition in econometrics starting from the work of the cowles commission this approach is followed in this paper the basic idea is simple and relies upon

bidding behaviour in second price auctions rare stamp sales 1923 1937 we find significant asymmetries between bid functions of the low and high mail bidders in auctions of rare stamps over the extremes of the business cycle 1923 1937 we also find a strong negative relationship between the number of bidders and the bids suggesting that the common value characteristics of stamps outweigh their private value characteristics finally we show that stamp returns are positively related to inflation and to stock yields and negatively to interest rates these last results correspond to other studies of stamps over more stable sample periods

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd