optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

health plan choice using a unique panel dataset of health plan choices and personal characteristics of employees at a single firm this paper provides estimates of price elasticities for health insurance plans in a managed competition setting estimated price elasticities are larger in absolute value than most previous estimates and the magnitude of the price elasticity suggests that there is a place for price competition in this market we also find evidence of transition costs in switching health plans for older and less healthy employees such differential responses to price may contribute to adverse selection in this market

managed competition and consumer price sensitivity in social health insurance this paper examines whether the introduction of managed competition in dutch social health insurance has resulted in effective price competition among insurance funds we find evidence of limited price competition which may be caused by low consumer price sensitivity using aggregate panel data from all insurance funds over the period 1996 1998 estimated premium elasticities of market share are 0 3 for compulsory coverage and 0 8 for supplementary coverage these elasticities are much smaller than in managed competition settings in us group insurance this may be explained by differences in switching experience and higher search costs associated with individual insurance

a probabilistic choice model for market segmentation and elasticity structure marketing scholars commonly characterize market structure by studying the patterns of substitution implied by brand switching though the approach is useful it typically ignores the destabilizing

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the health insurance market we test the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the hmo market federal employees were provided with report cards on a limited basis in 1995 and then on a widespread basis in 1996 exploiting this natural experiment we find that subjective measures of quality and coverage influence plan choices after controlling for plan premiums expected out of pocket expenses and service coverages the effect is stronger within a small sample of new hires compared to a larger sample of existing federal employees we also find evidence that report cards increase the price elasticity of demand for health insurance

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

zero as a special price the true value of free products when faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products or possibly buying nothing according to standard theoretical perspectives people will choose the option with the highest cost benefit difference however we propose that decisions about free zero price products differ in that people do not simply subtract costs from benefits but instead they perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher we test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that maintain the price difference between the goods but vary the prices such that the cheaper good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price in contrast with a standard cost benefit perspective in the zero price condition dramatically more participants choose the cheaper option whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more expensive option thus people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits after documenting this basic effect we propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect including social norms mapping difficulty and affect affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect

how individuals choose health insurance an experimental analysis an individual choosing a health insurance policy faces a complex decision environment where a large set of alternatives differ on a variety of dimensions there is uncertainty and the choice is repeated at least once a year we study decisions and decision strategies in a laboratory experiment where we create a controlled environment that closely mirrors this setting we use an electronic information board that allows to carefully monitor the individual s decision strategy the number of alternatives switching costs and the speed at which health deteriorates are varied across treatments we find that most subjects search is based more on attributes than on policies moreover we find that an increase in the number of alternatives increases decision making time makes subjects consider a lower fraction of the available information makes it more likely that subjects will switch and decreases the quality of their decisions the introduction of positive costs of switching makes people switch less often but improves the quality of their decisions finally if health deteriorates only gradually individuals tend to stick to their current policy too long

demand for health insurance marketplace plans was highly elastic in 2014 2015 abstract a major provision of the affordable care act was the creation of health insurance marketplaces which began operating for the 2014 plan year although enrollment initially grew in these markets enrollment has fallen recently amid insurer exits and rising premiums to better understand these markets we estimate premium elasticity of demand for marketplace plans using within plan premium changes from 2014 to 2015 accounting for state specific trends and simultaneous changes in generosity our preferred estimate implies that a one percent premium increase reduces plan specific enrollment by 1 7 percent we argue that this high elasticity reflects the rapid growth and high churn in this market as well as the high degree of standardization and the availability of many close substitutes

switching costs price sensitivity and health plan choice we investigate the extent to which sensitivity to health plan premiums differs across individuals according to characteristics related to the cost of switching plans our results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity related to expected health care costs younger healthier employees are between two and four times more sensitive to price than employees who are older and who have been recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer we also find evidence of status quo bias estimated premium elasticities are significantly higher for new hires than for incumbent employees simulations combining our results with actuarial data illustrate the cost implications of risk related differences in price elasticity

the welfare impact of medicare hmos we estimate the welfare associated with the medicare hmo program now known as medicare choice m c we find that the creation of the m c program resulted in approximately 15 6 billion in consumer surplus and 52 billion in profits from 1993 to 2000 in 2000 dollars this program most likely generated significant net social welfare however we find that consumer surplus is geographically unevenly distributed prescription drug coverage accounts for approximately 45 of the estimated consumer surplus for 2000 consumer surplus increases in the number of plans in a county and most of the increase in welfare is due to increased premium competition

price elasticity and adverse selection in the demand for supplementary health insurance probit regression estimates show the effects of the price of insurance anticipated medical expenditures and other factors on reported decisions about purchasing hypothetically offered supplementary insurance policies the demand estimates can characterize how much supplemental insurance would be purchased under different tax policies affecting health insurance purchases although eliminating the current tax subsidy to insurance is shown to decrease demand the results indicate a substantial demand for supplementary insurance even in the absence of present tax incentives however our results on adverse selection raise concerns about the potential stability of supplemental insurance markets

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

pricing and welfare in health plan choice premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs either because consumers have private information or because prices are not risk rated this creates inefficiencies when consumers self select into plans we develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers we find a welfare loss of 2 11 percent of coverage costs compared to what is feasible with risk rating only about one quarter of this is due to inefficiently chosen uniform contribution levels we also investigate the reclassification risk created by risk rating individual incremental premiums finding only a modest welfare cost

dominated choices and medicare advantage enrollment research in behavioral economics suggests that certain circumstances such as large numbers of complex options or revisiting prior choices can lead to decision errors this paper explores the enrollment decisions of medicare beneficiaries in the medicare advantage ma program during the time period we study 2007 2010 private fee for service pffs plans offered enhanced benefits beyond those of traditional medicare tm without any restrictions on physician networks making tm a dominated choice relative to pffs yet more than three quarters of medicare beneficiaries remained in tm during our study period we analyze the role of status quo bias in explaining this pattern of enrollment our results suggest that status quo bias plays an important role the rate of ma enrollment was significantly higher among new medicare beneficiaries than among incumbents these results illustrate the importance of the choice environment that is in place when enrollees first enter the medicare program

modeling loss aversion and reference dependence effects on brand choice based upon a recently developed multiattribute generalization of prospect theory s value function tversky and kahneman 1991 we argue that consumer choice is influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points and that consumers weigh losses from a reference point more than equivalent sized gains loss aversion we sketch implications of this model for understanding brand choice we develop a multinomial logit formulation of a reference dependent choice model calibrating it using scanner data in addition to providing better fit in both estimation and forecast periods than a standard multinomial logit model the model s coefficients demonstrate significant loss aversion as hypothesized we also discuss the implications of a reference dependent view of consumer choice for modeling brand choice demonstrate that loss aversion can account for asymmetric responses to changes in product characteristics and examine other implications for competitive strategy

incorporating reference price effects into a theory of consumer choice although there has been a good deal of research on incorporating the effects of reference price formation into empirical models of consumer buying behavior little formal theoretical work had been undertaken to date this paper incorporates reference price effects into the traditional economic theory of consumer choice and examines the effects of reference price formation on the results of the traditional theory its marketing implications and the implications for empirical models which examine the effects of reference price formation on actual consumer behavior several implications of the theoretical model are empirically tested using weekly retail egg sales data from southern california this analysis indicates that reference price formation does have significant effects on consumer behavior furthermore these effects are asymmetric with consumers two and a half times more responsive to egg price increases that are in excess of the reference price than they are to comparable egg price decreases

when more seems like less differential price framing increases the choice share of higher priced options four experiments supported by six supplemental studies show that premium but higher priced products e g direct flights larger capacity data storage devices are more popular when the additional

assessing social costs of inefficient procurement design this paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first price sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders we adopt a constrained piecewise linear strategye quilibriumc oncept and estimatet he structural parameterso f the bidders d is tribution of costs we estimate social costs defined as the predicted cost difference between the winning firm and the most efficient bidding firm we also compare the expected procurement costs under two different auction formats the data is collected from procurement auctions of road painting in sweden during 1993 1999 the results indicate that the social costs of inefficient contract allocation is about 2 of total potential production cost and that an effi cient second pricea uction would lower the expected procurementc ost by 2 5 jel d 44 h57 c15

an individual health plan exchange which employees would benefit and why on average us workers fortunate enough to be offered health insurance through their place of work are given a small number of choices 80 percent of firms accounting for 37 percent of workers offered only one plan in 2005 although there are merits of limited choice including lower administrative costs for sponsoring employers and better pooling of risk within a given employee population substantial consumer surplus is forgone by preventing employees from selecting plans that best suit their needs in dafny ho and varela 2010 we build a model to quantify this deadweight loss using data on plan offerings and enrollment for 800 large us firms in 139 geographic markets over the period 1998 2006 we estimate a model of consumer preferences for characteristics of health plans we use the parameters of that model to predict employee choices under different hypothetical scenarios of expanded choice assuming employers total outlays for health insurance remain constant and plans are made available to new enrollees at large group rates we quantify those gains for each employee group year we observe for example big box retailer s employees in houston in 2003 and conclude these gains are sizable compared to average premiums we estimate that employees would be willing to forgo ten to 40 percent or more of their employer subsidies for the right to apply those subsidies to the plan of their choosing with the exact magnitude depending on the demand specification as well as the definition of the expanded choice set an individual health plan exchange which employees would benefit and why

how elastic are preferences for redistribution evidence from randomized survey experiments we analyze randomized online survey experiments providing interactive customized information on us income inequality the link between top income tax rates and economic growth and the estate tax the treatment has large effects on views about inequality but only slightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences an exception is the estate tax informing respondents of the small share of decedents who pay it doubles support for it the small effects for all other policies can be partially explained by respondents low trust in government and a disconnect between concerns about social issues and the public policies meant to address them jel d31 d72 h23 h24

price endings left digit effects and choice past research has found that changes in price endings can result in left digit effects whereby the magnitude of an item s price relative to the price of a reference product is influenced by the leftmost digits of both prices we extend this work by investigating the impact of changes in price endings and associated leftmost price digits on choice findings indicate that assigning different combinations of price endings to two products e g 2 00 and 2 99 vs 1 99 and 3 00 vs 2 00 and 3 00 can shift choice share toward the lower or higher priced alternative we also find that changes between just below e g 29 99 and 39 99 and round e g 30 00 and 40 00 pricing affect choice with just below pricing shifting share toward lower priced alternatives the latter effects are found to be moderated by price level and shopping goals a three path mediation model reveals the processes underlying the influence of price endings on choice

market price variation perceived price variation and consumers price search decisions for durable goods previous studies have consistently found that most consumers undertake relatively little prepurchase search for durable goods and do even less price comparison shopping despite the reported importance of price to consumers purchase decisions this article proposes and tests two possible explanations for why consumers willingness to engage in price search does not increase concomitantly with the price variation of durable goods the first potential explanation that consumers simply underestimate the market price variation was not supported the second possible explanation which builds upon weber s law of psychophysics and thaler s transaction utility theory was supported the data indicate that the psychological utility that a consumer derives from saving a fixed amount of money is inversely related to the price of the item in this case even if consumers believe that the price variation of more expensive items tends to be greater their motivation to spend time in price comparison shopping for these items may not increase as much as expected

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

competition leverage how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment we study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low risk consumers insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences to achieve first best risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high risk agents second we identify a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low risk market to the less elastic high risk market third mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further at the cost of efficiency

empirical generalizations from reference price research considerable theoretical justification for consumers use of psychological reference points exists from the research literature from a managerial perspective one of the most important applications of this concept is reference price an internal standard against which observed prices are compared in this paper we propose three empirical generalizations that are well supported in the marketing literature first there is ample evidence that consumers use reference prices in making brand choices second the empirical results on reference pricing also support the generalization that consumers rely on past prices as part of the reference price formation process third consistent with other research on loss aversion consumers have been found to be more sensitive to losses i e observed prices higher than reference prices than gains we also propose topics for further research on reference prices

estimating price elasticities of convalescent care programmes this study is the first to estimate price elasticities of demand for convalescent care programmes in 1997 the german legislature more than doubled the daily co payments for the publicly insured from 6t o 13 the measure caused the overall demand for convalescent care treatments to fall by 20 to 25 i estimate the price elasticity for medical rehabilitation programmes aimed at preventing work disability to be about 0 3 whereas the elasticity for medical rehabilitation programmes for recovery from accidents at work lies around 0 5 the demand for preventive treatment at health spas is elastic and less than 1 how does the demand for medical care change when prices change since the early days of the profession of health economics the question of the price elasticity for health services has been central joseph p newhouse one of the founders of the field of health economics has published more than 100 articles alone on health care demand newhouse was also the leader of the rand group that designed and directed the famous rand health insurance experiment that focused on the impact of costsharing on the demand for medical care not only newhouse but also many other economists have devoted a great deal of attention to this topic

the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care market summary managed care health insurers in the usa restrict their enrollees choice of hospitals to within specific networks this paper considers the implications of these restrictions a three step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer the results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans a welfare analysis assuming fixed prices implies that restricting consumers choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately 1 billion per year across the 43 us markets considered this figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

reward structures in a planned economy the problem of incentives and efficient allocation of resources this paper considers a reward mechanism for inducing the choice of a socially optimal level of output by a socialist price setting manager under this mechanism the planner is assumed to have no information other than the observed output and price level it thus has informational advantages over other schemes thus far discussed in the literature the other schemes require the additional knowledge of demand elasticities of all the products produced in the economy besides this informational advantage the reward structure suggested here also eliminates other basic weaknesses of those schemes suggested previously

does price framing affect the consumer price sensitivity of health plan choice this paper provides field evidence on how price framing affects consumers decision to switch health plans in 2009 german federal regulation required insurers to express premium differences between standardized health plans in absolute euro values relative to a federal reference price rather than in percentage point payroll tax differences representative individual level panel data and aggregated health plan level panel data on the universe of health plans show that the reform strongly increased enrollees willingness to switch plans with demand elasticities increasing fourfold the salience of premium differences and the default premium are obviously key driving forces in the decision to switch insurers

asymmetric information and excessive budgets in government bureaucracies abstract this paper develops an optimal sequential mechanism for setting the budget of a bureaucracy where the budget setter the principal has only partial information concerning the minimum required budget bureaucratic slack is constrained by the existence of managers who can replace the current manager but only at a cost due to the need to learn the job the principal s initial information and the cost of turnover of managers is related to the expected bureaucratic slack the principal gains information over the budget setting process so that a previous budget level provides important information for current budget setting

an empirical analysis of latitude of price acceptance in consumer package goods scanner panel data analyses for sweetened and unsweetened drink categories with four brands in each support the presence of a region of price insensitivity around a reference price the analyses also suggest that consumers with higher average reference price have a wider latitude of price acceptance consumers with a higher frequency of purchase i e shorter average interpurchase time interval are found to have a narrower latitude of price acceptance because they are more aware of the range of price distributions finally consumers with a higher average brand loyalty have a wider latitude of price acceptance demonstrating greater tolerance of price fluctuations

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

beating irrationality does delegating to it alleviate the sunk cost effect we investigate the impact of delegating decision making to information technology it on an important human decision bias the sunk cost effect to address our research question we use a unique data set containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7 000 pay per bid auctions in contrast with the laboratory experiments of previous related studies our research presents the unique advantage of investigating the effects of it enabled automated bidding agents on the occurrence of a decision bias in real market transactions we identify normatively irrational decision scenarios and analyze consumer behavior in these situations our findings show that participants with a higher behavioral investment are more likely to violate the assumption of normative economic rationality because of the sunk cost effect more importantly we observe that the delegation of auction participation i e actual bidding to it significantly reduces the occurrence of the sunk cost effect in subsequent decisions made by the same individual we can attribute this reduction to the comparably lower behavioral investments incurred by auction participants who delegate their bidding to it in particular by mitigating different contributors of behavioral investments delegating to it reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of the sunk cost effect by more than 50 this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

joint production and pricing decisions with setup costs and capacity constraints we consider the problem of setting prices and choosing production quantities for a single product over a finite horizon for a capacity constrained manufacturer facing price sensitive demands there is a fixed cost per production run and a variable cost per unit produced both of which may vary by period we characterize properties of the optimal solution considering cases with constant and time varying capacity and with and without speculative motive for holding inventory we show that counter to intuition optimal prices may increase as the capacity increases even when capacity is constant over the horizon we also show that increases in capacity do not always exhibit diminishing marginal returns our procedure produces solutions with much higher profits than can be obtained from a sophisticated sequential procedure in which a well informed and optimum seeking marketing department makes pricing decisions and the manufacturing department seeks to satisfy the resulting demands at minimum cost our results also suggest that firms with seasonal demand and tight capacity constraints should be more aggressive in setting prices to manage their demands than what is typically done in practice finally we discuss how a decision maker can use our procedure as an aid in solving multiproduct versions of the problem

effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers abstract management incentive schemes leading to welfare optimal pricing and efficient production of public enterprises have so far been mainly concerned with the information advantages that public enterprise managers hold over their supervising government or central planning agency managers under these schemes are induced to improve their firm s performance in adjustment processes which in the limit lead to optimal firm decisions such managers are supposed to be income maximizers disregarding any personal effort which could influence their performance and utility in this paper i show that two incentive schemes recently proposed by tam 1981 and finsinger and vogelsang 1982 can also help to induce managers to provide an optimal level of effort here effort is assumed to reduce managers utility and the firm s costs the result depends crucially on myopic managerial utility maximization once managers maximize the discounted value of future utility levels they will deviate from the optimal behavior under tam s scheme this can hold independent of the optimal effort level under the finsinger vogelsang performance index managers will always show suboptimal effort levels in a steady state equilibrium because the index only rewards welfare improvements effort however has to be rewarded even with no improvement in behavior an improved performance index which provides cumulative rewards is shown to be strategy proof and lead to a welfare optimum this reward structure basically treats managers as if they were private entrepreneurs it looks extremely generous in that it gives managers the fruits of all costs reductions due to increases in effort suggestions are made to mitigate this income distributional impact

health insurance for humans information frictions plan choice and consumer welfare traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk in practice choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information in this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences information frictions and hassle costs our additional friction measures are important predictors of choices and meaningfully impact risk preference estimates we study the implications of counterfactual insurance allocations to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between these micro foundations for welfare analysis

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

the value of consumer choice and the decline in hmo enrollments i introduction and overview health insurance contracts may restrict consumers choice of medical provider in order to minimize moral hazard for example consumers who are insured for their marginal healthcare expenses have no incentive to enforce price discipline on their own in this case insurers may impose this discipline by restricting consumers choice of medical provider to those who offer competitive prices 1 this practice known as selective contracting sc may have other benefits as well including channeling consumers to efficient providers and achieving other efficiencies associated with partial vertical integration sc has been utilized by insurers both in the united states and abroad 2 however it is not a universal feature of health insurance contracts in part this is because reducing the choice set of medical providers imposes costs on consumers to the extent that consumers assign option value to choice capps dranove and satterthwaite 2003 for example sc was widely employed in the united states by health maintenance organizations hmos and other insurers in the 1990s and appears to have been an important cost control mechanism cutler mcclellan and newhouse 2000 robinson and phibbs 1989 however most private u s health insurers moderated their use of sc during the past decade at the same time that healthcare costs accelerated anecdotally a consumer and regulatory backlash against provider choice restrictions forced insurers to expand choice and largely abandon the practice blendon et al 1998 vita 2001 simultaneously hmo enrollments declined the purpose of this article is to explore the economic tradeoffs of sc with a particular focus on directly measuring the value that consumers assign to choice in medical markets i am interested in assessing whether the magnitude of any utility loss from choice restrictions can be offset by volume based price discounts that insurers may receive from hospitals my results bear on the larger question of whether an economic linkage can be drawn between consumers demand for choice and their apparent rejection of what is called tightly managed care they also have implications for many healthcare reform proposals that necessarily imply restrictions on the consumers choice sets i analyze health plan s sc of hospitals in the state of florida between 1999 and 2003 hospital sc restricts consumer choice in multiple ways including their choice of hospital in addition hospital choice restrictions imply restrictions over the use of specific physicians 3 i start by constructing hospital networks for each of a set of plan choices and then estimate a discrete choice model of health insurance demand conditional on each plan s restricted network for these purposes i use the capps dranove and satterthwaite 2003 measure of sc disutility that focuses on the option value of choice i employ several different discrete choice estimators to estimate the model including models with plan metropolitan statistical area msa fixed effects designed to control for unobserved plan attributes this provides me with estimates of disutility resulting from choice restrictions subsequently i project the estimated plan effects onto an instrumented value of plan price in order to estimate the price elasticity and also convert my disutility estimates into dollars my results show that consumers associated restrictive hospital networks with plan disutility during each of the years of the study period with choice elasticities that range from 0 10 to 0 32 in pooled estimates greater effects are obtained in 2003 using models where i allow the estimates to vary by year using my instrumental variables methodology to recover unbiased price coefficients i show that consumers associated a one standard deviation reduction in the size of a plan s hospital network with a reduction in plan value of between 62 and 118

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

estimating housing consumption adjustments from panel data abstract although time series analysis of panel data has generally not been used in the study of housing demand longitudinal analysis provides the opportunity to increase our understanding of housing adjustments over time in particular time series analysis of housing choice using panel data permits appropriate use of both time series and cross sectional variation in housing prices provides the opportunity to separate age and cohort effects and facilitates integration of mobility analysis with housing choice analysis in this paper a longitudinal discrete choice model of the choice of housing tenure and size is presented and estimated using panel data this conditional fixed effects multinomial logit model developed by g chamberlain is computationally convenient and successfully accounts for time invariant differences among households while household specific unobserved characteristics can be readily accounted for in a linear model this is not the case for a quantitative choice model the use of a model of the type employed here thus provides a crucial link between time series analysis and a discrete choice setting estimation of this model yields results with respect to age and price that differ from results obtained from individual and pooled cross sections this provides support for the plausible proposition that housing choices are intertemporally correlated and more importantly emphasizes the importance of accounting for this correlation to estimate consistently the parameters of housing choice models

the theory of state owned enterprises in market economies abstract four topics are covered the circumstances under which state owned enterprises soes are more effective than private firms the different approaches to modelling public and private firms the performance of soes and strategies including privatization to limit their more damaging effects it is argued that ideological or development motives are important in their genesis but that if efficiency and innovation are key considerations the normative case for their existence is more doubtful various types of soe model are identified deriving from the variety of circumstances in which they operate and the theoretical perspective of the modeller these include the property rights school the public choice tradition neoclassical behavioural and budget maximizing approaches all models assume the existence of monitoring problems created by informational asymmetry the consequences can include high non pecuniary benefits for managers a concentration on monitored activities and lower innovation levels and efficiency than private firms curiously this is not necessarily reflected in higher prices or costs possible remedial strategies include a change of ownership a change of objectives the introduction of incentive compatible payment schemes improved performance indicators and privatization

the welfare impact of hmo mergers abstract this paper estimates the welfare consequences of hmo mergers using data from california s small group market the analysis estimates the parameters from a differentiated products demand system the parameters are then used to simulate the effects of several hmo mergers by solving for the nash equilibrium in prices under different ownership structures even small mergers in moderately concentrated markets can result in significant consumer surplus reductions however these welfare losses can be offset by large efficiency gains the welfare consequences of hmo mergers turn less upon demand side considerations than on the health plan s ability to realize efficiencies

reference effects of price and promotion on brand choice behavior when consumers are exposed to pricing and promotional activity by frequently purchased packaged goods they may develop expectations that are used as points of reference in evaluating future activi

the impact of reference price effects on the profitability of price promotions this paper investigates the impact of reference price effects on retailer price promotions and describes why these effects can make promoting profitable first we analyze the profit impact of reference price effects generated by a single period of promotion the promotion can increase profit if the gain that these effects create in the promotion period outweighs the loss they create in future periods we then describe how retailers can estimate the optimal strategy of recurring promotions that maximizes profits from reference price effects over a time horizon examples of such strategies are presented for a retailer selling a national brand of peanut butter we obtain insights into how promotion prices timing and profits are affected by changes in costs interest rates consumers reactions to reference price effects and error in estimates used in the model the retailer s optimal reaction to a trade deal is also examined this strategy involves a phase of increased promotion activity sandwiched between phases of decreased activity we explain these results using the effects described in the single period model

paying for health insurance the trade off between competition and adverse selection we use data on health plan choices by employees of harvard university to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection moving to a voucher type system induced significant adverse selection with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending but increased competition reduced harvard s premiums by 5 to 8 percent the premium reductions came from insurer profits so while harvard was better off the net effect for society was only the adverse selection loss adverse selection can be minimized by adjusting voucher amounts for individual risk we discuss how such a system would work governments are increasingly turning to market forces as a way to limit the cost of social insurance traditionally social insurance programs were operated as nonmarket goods governments mandated participation in a central program collected revenues to finance the program and ran the insurance system there was no role for competition among suppliers in providing the basic benefit as the costs of social insurance have increased however the centralized model of social insurance is coming under increasing strain in the united states for example recent proposals have called for replacing the medicare program with a health care voucher for the elderly aaron and reischauer 1995 cutler 1996 the voucher would guarantee people a basic insurance plan but the plans would be privately run competition among plans would generate plan premiums and enrollments similarly longstanding proposals for social security reform have called for replacing the current system with a system of individual accounts where people would make saving investment and annuitization decisions on their own advisory council on social security 1996 feldstein 1996 the trend is not just domestic in the united kingdom the national health service has moved to encourage more competition in recent years with the establishment of hospital trusts that bid for patients and partially fixed payments to physicians

an empirical analysis of internal and external reference prices using scanner data single source yogurt data are used to examine whether both internal and external reference prices affect purchase decisions internal reference prices are memory resident prices based on actual fair or other price concepts external reference prices are observed stimuli such as regular prices that stores may display along with a sale price for comparability discrete choice models with variables representing the two types of reference prices are estimated and both types of variables are found to have significant effects on purchase probabilities this suggests that consumers may use multiple reference points in evaluating price in purchase decisions in addition a model using an indicator of a sale price discount explains purchase probabilities as well as one that models the actual discount which suggests that consumers may be reacting to the indication of savings rather than to the amount of the discount

incorporating consumer price expectations in diffusion models in this paper the sensitivity of the optimal price path of a new durable product to the price expectations of consumers is examined consumers enter the market every period in a diffusion type framework during the initial periods more consumers enter the market due to word of mouth influence but in the latter periods saturation effects set in the entering set of cohorts form expectations about future prices and in a stable equilibrium these expectations are fulfilled it is shown that the price path is cyclical with the following properties at the beginning of the cycle the price is at its highest level it falls monotonically over time reaching a low price at the end of the cycle equal to the reservation price of the consumers willing to pay less the cycle lengths are not equal the sensitivity of the optimal price path to model parameters is explored through a numerical procedure

quality perceptions and asymmetric switching between brands rotating indifference curves are used to induce an income effect that favors superior brands at the expense of inferior brands in a discrete choice model when calibrated on scanner panel data the model yields an objective measure of brand quality which is related to the rate of rotation the model also leads to asymmetric responses to price promotions where switching up to high quality brands is more likely than switching down the model is capable of nesting the standard logit model and is similar to a nested logit model when there exists clusters of brands of like quality the model is used to explore a product line pricing decision where profits are maximized subject to the constraint that consumer utility is maintained

paying medicare advantage plans to level or tilt the playing field medicare beneficiaries are eligible for health insurance through the public option of traditional medicare tm or may join a private medicare advantage ma plan both are highly subsidized but in different ways medicare pays for most of costs directly in tm and subsidizes ma plans based on a benchmark for each beneficiary choosing a private plan the level of this benchmark is arguably the most important policy decision medicare makes about the ma program many analysts recommend equalizing medicare s subsidy across the options referred to in policy circles as a level playing field this paper studies the normative question of how to set the level of the benchmark applying the versatile model developed by einav and finkelstein ef to medicare the ef framework implies unequal subsidies to counteract risk selection across plan types we also study other reasons to tilt the field the relative efficiency of ma vs tm market power of ma plans and institutional features of the way medicare determines subsidies and premiums after review of the empirical and policy literature we conclude that in areas where the ma market is competitive the benchmark should be set below average costs in tm but in areas characterized by imperfect competition in ma it should be raised in order to offset output enrollment restrictions by plans with market power we also recommend specific modifications of medicare rules to make demand for ma more price elastic

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

price and the health plan choices of retirees abstract this study analyzes health plan choices of retirees in an employer sponsored health benefits program that resembles premium support models proposed for medicare in this program out of pocket premiums depend on when an individual retired and his or her years of service as of that date since this price variation is exogenous to unobserved plan attributes and retiree characteristics it is possible to obtain unbiased premium elasticity estimates the results indicate a significantly negative effect of premiums the implied elasticities are at the low end of the range found in previous studies on active employees

the effect of price on switching among health plans a recent policy change by the university of california uc provides a unique natural experiment for investigating the sensitivity of consumers to health plan premiums when the uc moved to a policy of limiting its contribution to the cost of the least expensive plan out of pocket premiums increased for roughly one third of uc employees we examine the extent to which uc employees switched plans in response to this change in premiums our results indicate a strong response individuals facing premium increases of less than 10 were roughly 5 times as likely to switch plans as those whose premiums remained constant

the elasticity of demand for health maintenance organizations this paper analyzes a national sample of firms where employees faced a choice between a health maintenance organization hmo and a conventional insurer such as blue cross a regression analysis is specified as a partial adjustment model and a logit functional form the long run price elasticity of demand for hmos is estimated to be 0 6 to the extent that employers pass on increases in the total premium the price elasticities facing insurers are higher furthermore the demand for hmos is a negative function of the copayment charged by the hmo for an office visit

distortion of price discount perceptions the right digit effect we use four experiments to examine consumers processing of comparative regular and sale price information in advertisements consistent with our hypothesized right digit effect we find that when consumers view regular and sale prices with identical left digits they perceive larger price discounts when the right digits are small i e less than 5 than when they are large i e greater than 5 as a result they may attribute greater value and increased purchase likelihood to higher priced lower discounted items we examine alternate processing explanations for this right digit effect as well as the moderating impact of price presentation format

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

premium levels and demand response in health insurance relative thinking and zero price effects abstract in health care systems with a competitive health insurance market governments or other sponsors e g employers often subsidize premiums to encourage enrolment these subsidies are typically independent of plan choice leaving the absolute premium differences in place so as not to distort consumer choice of plan such subsidies do however change the relative premium differences across plans which according to theories from behavioral economics can affect choice consumers might be sensitive to differences relative to a reference premium relative thinking furthermore consumers might be particularly sensitive to a reference premium of zero zero price effect a relevant range for some subsidized health insurance markets this paper tests these ideas with two sources of evidence we argue that observed equilibria in germany and the u s medicare advantage markets are consistent with a powerful zero price effect resulting in an equilibrium focal pricing at zero this contrasts with the netherlands where equilibrium premiums are well above zero in an empirical test using hypothetical questions in a web based survey in these three countries we also find evidence for both a relative thinking and a zero price effect in the demand for health insurance our findings imply that well designed subsidies can leverage relative thinking to increase demand elasticity for health plans creation of a powerful reference price e g at zero however risks subverting price competition

a consumer perspective on price matching refund policies effect on price perceptions and search behavior although price matching refund policies are common in many retail environments the impact of such policies on consumers has largely been ignored this article reports the results of three studies that examine price matching policies from a consumer perspective study 1 shows that consumers perceive price matching policies as signals of low store prices and that the presence of a refund increases the likelihood of discontinuing price search contrary to the predictions based on signaling theory in information economics studies 2 and 3 show that when search costs are low the number of stores searched increases in the presence versus absence of a price matching policy when search costs are high consumers appear to accept the price matching signal at face value and search less in the presence of a refund the article concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of the findings and suggesting directions for future research