the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

the cyclical behavior of the department of justice s antitrust enforcement activity abstract we study the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the us department of justice the key result is that antitrust case activity is countercyclical this finding is robust across alternate indicators of economic activity which include stock prices corporate profits and business cycles and across different types of cases the finding of countercyclical case activity does not appear to lend support to interest group theories that predict greater regulatory protection towards producers during economic contractions one interpretation of our result would be that antitrust violations tend to increase during economic downturns leading to an increase in the number of cases initiated the broad implication being that the antitrust division primarily acts as an antitrust law enforcement agency our results show that politics as measured by the party of the president and the republican versus democrat composition of the house and senate does not have a clear impact on case activity finally the number of cases initiated are significantly affected by the extent of funding

technical note impact of inventory on quota bonus contracts with rent sharing we study the impact of limited inventory on optimal sales force compensation contracts we adopt a principal agent framework characterized by limited liability and rent sharing with the agent a commonly invoked assumption in the inventory management literature is that the demand distribution satisfies the increasing failure rate ifr property under this assumption however past research has established that a quota bonus contract a widely adopted sales force compensation contract in the practice cannot sustain in equilibrium we show that because of demand censoring in the presence of limited inventory i e demand realizations higher than the inventory level are unobservable a quota bonus contract is the optimal equilibrium contract and it exists even for a demand distribution with the ifr property since most well known distributions satisfy the ifr property and inventory constraints are operative in many real world situations our results significantly extend the scope of the optimality of q

internal competition for corporate resources and incentives in teams invoking thefree rider problem in teams many observersfind profit sharing in large organizations puzzling because it should have negligible incentive effects we show that a firm can be decomposed into two separate teams whose outputs can be observed thenprofit sharing combined with competition between these two teamsfor internal resourcesfrequently solves thefree rider problem using this result we endogenize thefirm s organizational structure and show that in the presence of economies of scale small firms tend to organize as unita y firms while largefirms choose the multidivisional organizationalform

the influence of attitudes toward risk on the value of forecasting consider a price taking firm that faces a random demand function in the sense that the market price varies randomly around some mean to minimize the complications we shall assume that the firm s cost function is nonstochastic and that the product is highly perishable thereby eliminating inventory problems the firm s profit function is still a random variable if the owner s output decision must be made prior to the random resolution of the price the firm is worse off than if the decision could be made after the price has been determined if the owner could obtain a perfect forecast ex ante output decisions could be made as though they were ex post decisions since the owner is better off with a perfect forecast forecasting services are valuable 2 we are concerned with the relative value of forecasting to risk averse and risk neutral owners in spite of the fact that risk averters dislike uncertainty whereas risk neutral owners are indifferent we show that risk averters often place a lower value on forecasting than do risk neutral agents initially we provide a sufficient condition for risk averters to value forecasting less than do risk neutral decision makers next we illustrate this possibility in the context of forecasting random price we conclude with some remarks on imperfect forecasting and some related work on temporal risk versus timeless risk

planting decisions and uncertain consumer acceptance of genetically modified crop varieties there exists much uncertainty about consumer attitudes towards genetically modified foods if it happens that sufficient insufficient acres are planted under non modified seed to meet post harvest demand then a price premium will not will emerge for the non modified varieties a non linearity originates in the fact that a price premium may be supported this non linearity interacts with the extent of demand uncertainty to determine equilibrium varietal plantings and the probability that post harvest varietal prices will differ also as planting approaches signals will be received by growers about the nature of demand they will be planting into we show how the non linearity affects the order on the types of signals that risk neutral growers will prefer to receive

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

input use decisions with greater information on crop conditions implications for insurance moral hazard and the environment emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater information on crop conditions this greater information occurs by providing improved predictions of crop yields using remote sensing and crop simulation models and by allowing farms to apply inputs within the growing season when some crop conditions are already realized we use a stylized model with uncertainty in yield and price to examine how greater information on crop conditions i e a forecast affects input use for insured and uninsured farms we show that moral hazard decreases farms apply more inputs as the forecast accuracy improves when the forecast indicates good yields and vice versa when the forecast indicates bad yields in the long run moral hazard decreases in response to an improvement in forecast accuracy even though moral hazard decreases in the long run indemnity payments are likely to increase in the long run driven by the increase in moral hazard when the forecast indicates bad crop conditions we use the results of our model to discuss the potential impact of different technologies and types of inputs on the federal crop insurance program and the environment

self control and incentives an analysis of multiperiod quota plans it is well known that individuals often fail to exert proper self control in organizational settings this can lead to reduced productivity and profits we use the literature on present biased preferences to model employees self control problems and examine how firms can design compensation plans to reduce the negative consequences of their employees self control problems our results suggest that firms can mitigate self control problems by delaying payment to the employees this can be achieved by using multiperiod quotas such as annual quotas to compensate employees for their cumulative performance although such plans are prevalent in the market there is little theoretical research that shows when multiperiod quota plans can be optimal the paper provides one potential explanation for the widespread use of such quota plans interestingly we find that such plans may be optimal despite the fact that they encourage more procrastination we also find that such plans lead to higher effort by the employees and can sometimes improve the welfare of not only the firm but also the employees

information exchange and distributional implications of price discrimination with internet marketing in agriculture a price discrimination model is proposed to explain why firms provide extraneous information on internet sites selling agricultural inputs whether an informative site is offered depends on price discrimination potential which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet behavior price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with farm size or other characteristics explaining why extraneous not product related information is offered on internet sales sites price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on average because it generates free information outcomes depend on whether internet users are aware of price differentials on the basis of clickstream information

using usda forecasts to estimate the price flexibility of demand for agricultural commodities we estimate the general equilibrium price flexibility of demand for corn and soybeans using monthly changes in expected supply published by the usda our estimates reflect the demand response to a one year supply shock and thus correspond to the inverse demand elasticity we derive the conditions under which our estimates are consistent and we show how demand flexibility varies by season inventory time horizon and demand composition at average inventory and without accounting for corn ethanol use we obtain price flexibility estimates of 1 35 and 1 03 for corn and soybeans respectively current corn ethanol production levels are associated with much larger absolute flexibilities for both commodities copyright 2012 oxford university press

bonus pools and the informativeness principle abstract previous work on moral hazard problems has shown that under certain conditions bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk neutral workers in our paper we demonstrate that if a firm employs at least two workers it may further benefit from combining worker compensation via a bonus pool contract and relative performance evaluation such combination leads to saved rents under a wide class of luck distributions in addition if the employer is wealth constrained complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can increase the set of implementable effort levels all our results hold even though workers outputs are technically and stochastically independent so that in view of holmstrom s informativeness principle individual bonus contracts would be expected to dominate bonus pool contracts

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

multiperiod contracting and salesperson effort profiles the optimality of hockey stick giving up and resting on laurels the authors study multiperiod sales force incentive contracting in which salespeople can engage in effort gaming a phenomenon that has extensive empirical support focusing on a repeated moral haz

consumption of economic information in agriculture we develop a model of decision makers demand for agricultural economic information services this modeltreats choice of externaldecision support services as a function of actors assessment of how alternative investments in information complement their internal competencies data from a survey in four commodity systems are used to evaluate hypotheses as to how human capital and functional role of actors in commodity systems affect demand for variously formatted information by focusing on three axes of heterogeneity diversity among decision makers information service providers and information we are abl e to identify key structuraland functionalrel ationships in agricultural economic information systems

flexible tests for usda report announcement effects in futures markets the value of usda reports in commodity futures markets has been intensively researched but statistical hypothesis tests have been limited by the sheer number of reports and the consequent need to limit parameters to be estimated this has led most tests of usda report announcement effects to be based on single coefficients for each report series we relax the implicit assumption that a report series has a constant impact on futures price volatility or returns in two ways in order to introduce more flexible tests for announcement effects first we introduce a time trend into the impact of announcements on futures price volatility to determine if usda reports are becoming more or less influential over time then we allow each report to have a different impact on futures price returns using theil goldberger mixed estimation the results show that many but not all usda reports have significant effects on corn and soybean futures market returns or volatility

how much of commodity price behavior can a rational expectations storage model explain a rational expectations competitive storage model was applied to the u s corn market to assess the aptness of this framework in explaining monthly price behavior in an actual commodity market relative to previous models extensive realism was added to the model in terms of how production activities and storage costs are specified by modeling convenience yield backwardation in prices between crop years did not depend on the unrealistic assumption of zero ending stocks our model generated cash prices that were distributed with positive skewness and kurtosis and mean and variance that increased over the storage season comparable to the persistence and the occasional spikes observed in commodity prices futures prices were generated as conditional expectations of cash prices at contract maturity and the variances of futures prices exhibited realistic time to maturity and seasonal patterns model realizations of cash and futures prices over many years were used to demonstrate the wide variety of price behaviors that could be observed in an efficient market with a similar market structure implying that economic and policy implications drawn from short historical samples of prices could be misleading

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

pre harvest price expectations for corn the information content of usda reports and new crop futures this article examines the puzzle of why futures prices continue to react to usda crop reports despite the fact that reports appear to be no longer newsworthy that is provide no better production estimates than private forecasts the information value of reports is measured in terms of their influence on rational agents harvest time corn price expectations which are uncovered using a hamilton type modeling approach results show that reports are still newsworthy as they would contribute to agents price expectations if released a day early thus futures price reactions which closely reflect price expectations are rational and consistent with efficient markets hypothesis copyright 2008 oxford university press

intraday market effects in electronic soybean futures market during non trading and trading hour announcements abstractthis article investigates market reactions to major united states department of agriculture announcements during non trading and trading hours in the soybean futures market using microstruc

effect of information formats on information services analysis of four selected agricultural commodities in the usa we analyze sources of information in agricultural markets to understand patterns of demand for decision support services and the division of labor in the supply of these services information formatting qualitative variation that determines accessibility and relevance of information in specific contexts prohibits universal access to informational content information formats give rise to both transaction costs and complementarities reflected in patterns of information exchange in commodity systems controlling for actors structural roles and levels of education we develop a hedonic model of information demand such that actors seek information that is formatted to meet their needs and capabilities employing survey data we explain elements of observed patterns of information exchange in four commodity systems in the usa results point to opportunities to expand our understanding of socioeconomic processes underlying production and consumption of decision support

do states free ride in antitrust enforcement i introduction recent research has examined the role of state governments in the united states in antitrust enforcement over the past 20 years what has not been explored is the extent to which states make strategic decisions on their involvement in antitrust litigation in particular while most state antitrust cases involve purely local matters a significant number of these concern more than one state states then need to decide whether to invest in leading an investigation or letting other states take the lead and participating in some lesser role which includes simply signing on to a settlement we view the decision by a state to delay entry into antitrust litigation to be a type of free tiding behavior 1 in this paper we analyze this issue of free riding by states in antitrust activity ii previous literature one of the defining characteristics of a pure public good is the nonexcludability of the benefits from its consumption as benefits can be received by individuals without having to pay for the goods this nonexcludability creates the possibility for a free rider problem as a consequence of this free tiding behavior the private market cannot exact a price for this good and this may mean the private market will provide a suboptimal amount of the good free riders are usually used as justification for government intervention into the private market to allocate these so called public goods in order to correct the market failure while this behavior would seem rational it is not easily observed so the extent of free riding is not generally known researchers have employed experimental game evidence to measure the extent of free riding with results ranging from none to an extreme amount factors found in this literature that appear to decrease the degree of free riding behavior under certain conditions include smaller group size isaac walker and thomas 1984 experience through repeated game play fischbacher and gachter 2010 pregame communication among participants and an ability to exclude players from the group or other sanctions delmas and keller 2005 while the free rider problem and the experimental evidence have focused on private market decision makers it is straightforward to extend these behaviors to self interested governments one possibility is that governments reduce the amount of certain appropriations as a result of private contributions becker and linsday 1994 find a considerable degree of government free riding behavior in the context of appropriations to public higher education institutions an alternative source of free riding does not involve the private sector but is between government activities particularly those with significant spillover effects lee 1988 considers the issue of free riding among countries in their efforts devoted to fighting terrorism more recently sav 2010 finds a similar impact chati and kehoe 2007 provide a theoretical discussion of what they call a free rider problem among members of a monetary union in their fiscal and regulatory policies caused by an inability of the monetary authority to commit to their policies sigman 2002 finds that water pollution control is affected by the degree of spillovers crossing international borders somewhat closer to the focus of this paper konisky and woods 2010 investigate whether u s states free tide in environmental regulatory actions their results are somewhat mixed while they report some impact in reducing state enforcement of the clean air act in their counties adjacent to international borders they do not find this pattern in counties bordering other u s states a recent theoretical paper by choi and gerlach 2012 raises the concern that national antitrust enforcement in a global economy with multi market contact among exporters may be suboptimal due to free riding on the antitrust activity of other countries however no empirical evidence is provided

a theory of political cycles abstract we study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances policymakers equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election typically incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election for a given reputation level as argued in the political cycles literature and these political cycles are less important when the policymaker s reputation is better our analysis sheds light on other agency relationships in which part of the compensation is decided upon infrequently

antitrust economics and consumer protection economics in policy and litigation why the disparity the lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust competition policy and litigation has at least three causes a considerably shorter period of intellectual development the specific historical origins and culture of the u s federal trade commission ftc where this disparity is especially noticeable and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies this paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics jel b12 b13 b21 d18 l41

the deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement in this paper we formulate and test a model of collusive pricing in the presence of antitrust enforcement we show that a cartel s optimal price is likely to be neither the competitive price nor the price that the cartel would set in the absence of antitrust enforcement but rather an intermediate price that depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties our empirical results reveal that increasing antitrust enforcement in the presence of a credible threat of large damage awards has the deterrent effect of reducing mark ups in the bread industry

optimal sales force compensation in dynamic settings commissions vs bonuses this paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multiperiod moral hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales the sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales and his incentive responsiveness might change over time the paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive scheme a pure commission dominates a bonus plan and vice versa a commission is optimal if the agent is most difficult to motivate in the last period otherwise combining the commission with a bonus plan can lower the firm s cost of providing incentives in earlier periods the results are robust to different types of cost externalities and demand externalities across periods however if the firm obtains intermediate sales information bonus plans dominate commissions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

announcement effects and the theory of storage an empirical study of lumber futures we investigate how lumber futures returns are affected by monthly housing starts announcements and analyze the dependence of the response on lumber inventories and time to delivery to do so we develop a generalized least squares gls method to jointly analyze simultaneously traded contracts we find that increases in the unanticipated component of housing starts announcements increase returns on lumber futures contracts further and as predicted by the theory of storage but previously unrecorded the effects of housing starts shocks decline with lumber inventories there is also a time to delivery effect near delivery contracts respond more sharply to housing starts news than do farther out contracts

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

strategic and deterrent pricing responses to antitrust investigations abstract this paper examines the issue of the effects of antitrust on pricing through two empirical studies the first analyzes time series of prices in five industries involved in antitrust cases to determine whether the various stages of the antitrust process influenced pricing behavior some evidence of a deterrent effect is found with real prices lower than their pre investigation level following the conclusion of the case a major part of the pricing reaction occurs prior to the filing of formal charges the second study provides additional evidence of the existence of such a strategic reaction to the onset of investigation through an examination of prices in 23 industries investigated but not charged with price fixing

the value of public information in commodity futures markets abstract the informational value of u s department of agriculture usda corn and soybean production forecasts is investigated for the period 1971 1992 three tests of informational content are applied overall the results suggest usda corn and soybean forecasts provide valuable information to participants in commodity futures markets this value does appear to have declined especially since the mid 1980s

minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems abstract consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m this paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent we present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal observed by the principal and on the agent s utility under which when m increases induced effort and hence productivity falls we also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level varies in m we present an efficient algorithm for numerically calculating optimal contracts for given parameters and show that induced effort falls when m is increased in many cases even when our sufficient conditions fail

quantifying the wasde announcement effect this article uses a two stage gls model to quantify the world agricultural supply and demand estimates wasde announcement effect for cotton soybeans and hard winter wheat controlling for important factors associated with commodity price volatility the information presented by the overlapping nature of futures contracts is exploited to estimate conditional effects by month inventory conditions and delivery horizon results in this article show that the wasde announcement effect persists across contract positions is not limited to months that include nass crop survey data is amplified during low carryover periods for soybeans and wheat and is rapidly incorporated into futures prices

quota based compensation plans for multiterritory heterogeneous salesforces we compare quota based salesforce compensation plans with the blss plan i e the optimal curvilinear agency theory based compensation plans proposed in basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 a quota plan pays a fixed salary which is supplemented by commission income that is a prespecified fraction of the dollar sales that exceed the quota for a salesforce comprised of multiple salespersons territories we consider a basic quota plan where the commission rate and salary remain the same across salespersons however quotas vary across salespersons territories compared to the blss plan that is individually tailored to each salesperson territory the basic quota plan s total nonoptimality in profit has two components i a shapeinduced nonoptimality arising from the fact that the quota based plan does not have the same optimal shape as the curvilinear blss pl

end user preferences for usda market information abstract buyers and sellers of agricultural commodities benefit from public provision of information in decision making processes the purpose of this study is to improve understanding of current preferences for public agricultural information results indicate preference for farm level reports by extension agents and leading economic indicators by agribusiness or market analysts implications are outlined for ongoing discussions regarding maintenance of public investment in an era of tightening u s federal budgets

are harvest forecasts news usda announcements and futures market reactions futures market price data for maize and soyabeans are used to examine reactions to us department of agriculture harvest forecasts these forecasts are widely known and reasonably accurate so failure to find significant reaction would indicate that the usda did not contribute additional news relative to information already possessed by traders various t tests f tests and nonparametric chi square tests indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no significant difference between means of absolute values or variances of changes in closing prices on days following a usda announcement and other days thus the data indicate that significant information is contained in the forecasts

modelling the determination of research output in british universities abstract the paper begins by noting some of the recent proposals for restructuring research activity in british universities mainly through a process of concentration of research resources we then review the available evidence which shows that there is little support for such concentration except in the most resource intensive disciplines since there is little firm information about the shape of research production functions either for institutions or for the system as a whole the core of the paper studies the factors likely to be important in such functions and investigates the consequences of particular functional forms finally it is concluded that more research is needed to gain a better understanding of the research process in universities and that in the meantime it would be unwise to embark on a wholesale restructuring of the system

when do the usda forecasters make mistakes this study analysed forecasts for all us corn soya bean and wheat categories published within the world agricultural supply and demand estimates wasde reports over the 1987 88 through 2009 10 marketing years in an attempt to identify patterns and better understand when the usda forecasters make mistakes two general sources of errors were investigated behavioural and macroeconomic factors the first objective was to examine how these factors affect the size of the forecast error and the second concentrated on the direction of the error due to these effects our findings suggest that the largest increase in the size of usda forecast errors was associated with structural changes in commodity markets that took place in the mid 2000s corn soya bean and wheat forecast errors also grew during the periods of economic growth and with changes in exchange rates while inflation and changes in oil price had a much smaller impact with respect to behavioural sources we identified patterns consistent with leni

a theory of sales quotas with limited liability and rent sharing sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus this article shows that under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota the results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed the model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job specific skill

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

estimating the structure of market reaction to news information events and lumber futures prices we develop a new event study technique the distributional event response model derm appropriate to relatively slowly evolving information events we apply the model to twelve years of daily lumber futures prices and analyze the effects of three different types of information releases a monthly housing starts estimates b aperiodic administrative and judicial announcements about u s canada trade disputes and c novel and unprecedented court decisions related to the endangered species act esa the information releases are different in ways that predict their relative speeds of impoundment in prices we find that housing start events are absorbed more quickly than trade events which are absorbed more quickly than esa events

small firm entry in us manufacturing a cross section empirical analysis examining the entry behavior of small firms is provided in this paper while the authors find that certain traditional market structure characteristics and entry barriers have a strong impact on small firm entry behavior the reliance upon innovative strategy by small firms also explains a significant amount of the variation in the pattern of entry by small firms they conclude that small firm entry is at least partially determined by entry barriers industry specific characteristics facilitating retaliatory conduct by incumbent firms and the reliance upon innovative strategy by small firms copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

the ubiquity of habits and rules under what circumstances is it necessary or convenient for an agent to rely on habits or rules this paper focuses on the types of decision situations giving rise to their use even optimization requires the deployment of rules and for this reason mainstream economics cannot legitimately ignore these questions the argument is that habits and rules are ubiquitous in human activity in a new taxonomy seven types of decision situations are considered classified according to the type of information problem involved neither neoclassical nor behavioral economics can provide a complete account of the bases of habits or rules in these cases copyright 1997 by oxford university press

evaluating information in multiple horizon forecasts the doe s energy price forecasts abstract the united states department of energy s doe quarterly price forecasts for energy commodities are examined to determine the incremental information provided at the one through four quarter forecast horizons a direct test for determining information content at alternative forecast horizons developed by vuchelen and gutierrez vuchelen j and gutierrez m i a direct test of the information content of the oecd growth forecasts international journal of forecasting 21 2005 103 117 is used the results suggest that the doe s price forecasts for crude oil gasoline and diesel fuel do indeed provide incremental information out to three quarters ahead while natural gas and electricity forecasts are informative out to the four quarter horizon in contrast the doe s coal price forecasts at two three and four quarters ahead provide no incremental information beyond that provided for the one quarter horizon recommendations of how to use these results for making forecast adjustments is also provided

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the value of weather information in market equilibrium increased accuracy of weather forecasts does not necessarily increase commodity supply or farmer welfare this study presents a stylized model of competitive production with rational expectations and demonstrates that improved weather information harms farmers facing an inelastic demand contrary to the conclusions of previous studies the decline in farmer welfare does not require an expansion in expected supply better weather information may signal farmers to produce less on average under an inelastic demand a supply decrease occurs when increases in the physical productivity of applied inputs are dominated by adverse price consequences

the impact of public and semi public information on cotton futures market abstractthis study estimated the impact of all major public and semi public reports on the cotton futures market from 1995 through 2012 the estimation was based on the event study approach with the events measured by the release of five major reports export sales crop progress world agricultural supply and demand estimates wasde and prospective plantings public reports from us department of agriculture and cotton this month semi public report from international cotton advisory committee the best fitting igarch 1 1 t model that accounted for the day of week seasonality and stock levels was used to measure the report effects on daily nearby cotton close to close futures returns prospective plantings and wasde reports appeared to be the most important sources of information in the cotton markets moving the conditional standard deviation of returns by an average of 14 4 and 9 6 percentage points respectively however significant market reaction was not found for the other three reports our an

salesforce compensation theory and managerial implications this paper discusses recent advances in the study of salesforce motivation and compensation special emphasis is given to quantitative approaches from the economics finance and marketing literatures the paper summarizes the findings in this analytical work in the context of some examples of compensation practice in order to illustrate the usefulness of the paradigm for the evaluation and setting of compensation systems we consider some major issues in setting compensation such as the firm s own objective the salesperson s objective and the nature of the sales response function variations in these factors imply significant variation in optimal compensation policy where optimal takes into account the components in the plan the parameter levels of the components and whether or not a menu of such plans should be made available to the salesforce by highlighting the results in the literature in light of some relevant compensation examples we show the applicability of theory to the practical concerns of salesforce management we close with a summary of these insights and directions for future research in the area

evaluation of usda interval forecasts of corn and soybean prices usda world agricultural supply and demand estimates wasde price forecasts are published as an interval but are typically analyzed as point estimates thus all information about uncertainty imbedded in the forecast is ignored the purpose of this article is to evaluate the accuracy of wasde corn and soybean price forecasts using methodology suitable for testing judgmental interval forecasts accuracy tests suggest that wasde forecasts are not calibrated at the 95 confidence level for both commodities and generally not calibrated for corn but calibrated for soybeans at the implied confidence level elicited from the survey of forecast providers

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

state antitrust enforcement in the us and implications for small business entry and relocation this article examines the impact of the important yet little studied state level antitrust enforcement activity on entry and relocation behaviour by small us firms feinberg and husted 2011 have shown that this enforcement especially nonhorizontal cases may be viewed by potential entrants as a negative aspect of the state business climate however they did not pursue a more disaggregate analysis of small firm entry behaviour nor did they investigate different responses between manufacturing wholesaling and retailing firms another related issue is the extent to which state cases filed in tandem with federal investigations have the same impact on establishment entry as do purely independent cases these considerations are dealt with in this article the author uses annual state level data from the statistics of us business to examine entry and relocation reactions to state antitrust enforcement by firms within three small business categories 1 19 employees 20 99 employees 100 499 employees g

optimal sales force compensation we analyze a dynamic moral hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts we explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice fixed salaries quota based bonuses commissions or a combination thereof are optimal fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue cost ratios quota based bonuses commissions should be used if the revenue cost ratio takes intermediate large values if firms face demand uncertainty markets are rather thin and the revenue cost ratio large firms should combine a commission with a quota based bonus if word of mouth advertising affects sales a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal when entering a new market or launching a new product firms should install long term bonus plans

the timing of discretionary bonuses effort signals and reciprocity abstract in a real effort experiment we investigate the relationship between reciprocity and the timing of discretionary bonuses in a two period principal agent manager worker setting we vary the timing of the manager s bonus decision in order to examine two main channels reward and trust through which discretionary bonuses may operate average worker performance improves when bonus decisions are made between the two periods since both channels are simultaneously active first period output significantly increases as workers attempt to signal their trustworthiness to managers when the bonus decision is made upfront or at the end average output is no different than in a baseline setting without the bonus mechanism furthermore output after a bonus is not paid decreases substantially consistent with negative reciprocity our main findings are reinforced by using time spent on the available real leisure activity as an alternative measure of subjects effort

are revisions to usda crop production forecasts smoothed this article uses nordhaus framework to determine the efficiency of the revision process for usda corn and soybean production forecasts over the 1970 1971 through 2004 2005 marketing years positive autocorrelation and consistency of directional changes in forecast revisions suggest these forecasts are smoothed evidence is provided that the loss in forecast accuracy due to smoothing is statistically and economically significant in several cases a conservative bias in farm operators assessments of yield potential and in the procedure for translating enumerator s information about plant fruit counts into objective yield estimates are identified as plausible sources of smoothing

the rationality of usda forecasts under multivariate asymmetric loss a large number of previous studies suggest that many usda forecasts are biased and or inefficient these findings however may be the result of the assumed loss function of usda forecasters we test the rationality of the usda net cash income forecasts and the wasde production and price forecasts between 1988 and 2018 using a flexible multivariate loss function that allows for asymmetric loss and non separable forecast errors our results provide robust evidence that usda forecasters are rational expected loss minimizers yet demonstrate a tendency to place a greater weight on under or overprediction as a result this study provides an alternate interpretation of previous findings of forecast irrationality

the price variability volume relationship on speculative markets this paper concerns the relationship between the variability of the daily price change and the daily volume of trading on the speculative markets our work extends the theory of speculative markets in two ways first we derive from economic theory the joint probability distribution of the price change and the trading volume over any interval of time within the trading day and second we determine how this joint distribution changes as more traders enter or exit from the market the model s parameters are estimated by fiml using daily data from the 90 day t bills futures market the results of the estimation can reconcile a conflict between the price variability volume relationship for this market and the relationship obtained by previous investigators for other speculative markets this paper concerns the relationship between the variability of the daily price change and the volume of trading on speculative markets previous empirical studies 2 3 6 12 14 16 of both futures and equity markets always find a positive association between price variability as measured by the squared price change ap2 and the trading volume 2 there are two explanations for the relationship clark s 2 explanation which is secondary to his effort to explain why the probability distribution of the daily price change is leptokurtic emphasizes randomness in the number of within day transactions in clark s model the daily price change is the sum of a random number of within day price changes the variance of the daily price change is thus a random variable with a mean proportional to the mean number of daily transactions clark argues that the trading volume is related positively to the number of within day transactions and so the trading volume is related positively to the variability of the price change the second explanation is due to epps and epps 6 their model examines the mechanics of within day trading the change in the market price on each within day transaction or market clearing is the average of the changes in all of the traders reservation prices epps and epps assume there is a positive relationship between the extent to which traders disagree when they revise their reservation prices and the absolute value of the change in the market price that is an increase in the extent to which traders disagree is associated with a larger absolute price change the price variability volume relationship arises then because the volume of trading is positively related to the extent to which traders disagree when they revise their reservation prices

implementing high powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply we characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk neutral wealth constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem the optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting the large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment

compensation plans for single and multi product salesforces an application of the holmstrom milgrom model the agency theory approach to understanding salesforce compensation plans is modified to incorporate the intratemporal nature of the salesperson s effort rate decision i e the decision about the effort rate at any given point in time potentially depends upon the sales performance up to that point in time in the accounting period under the assumptions considered in this paper holmstrom and milgrom 1987 have shown that the optimal compensation plan is linear in total sales over the accounting period the comparative statics results obtained here corroborate most of the corresponding results in the salesforce compensation literature moreover we derive many additional results not available in the literature it is demonstrated that the commission income as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of the sales effort or an increase in base sales on the other hand the salary component of the total compensation goes up with increases in uncertainty absolute risk