bank capital liquidity and systemic risk we analyze the impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank insolvency and aggregate investment we develop a model of the banking system that is characterized by the interaction of many heterogeneous banks with the real sector interbank credit relations as a consequence of bank liquidity management and an insolvency mechanism this allows us to study the impact of capital adequacy regulation on systemic risk in particular we can analyze the impact of regulation on contagious defaults arising from mutual credit relations we show that the impact of capital adequacy on systemic stability is ambiguous and that systemic risk might actually increase as a consequence of imposing capital constraints on banks furthermore we analyze the indirect consequences of capital adequacy regulation that are transmitted to the real economy by their impact on equilibrium interbank rates and thus the opportunity costs of liquidity within the banking system

partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector theory and evidence from norway this paper provides an empirical test of a principal tenet of fiscal federalism that spending discretion when granted to localities allows public good levels to adjust to suit local demands the test is based on a simple model of partial fiscal decentralization under which earmarking of central transfers for particular uses is eliminated allowing funds to be spent according to local tastes the greater role of local demand determinants following partial decentralization is confirmed by the paper s empirical results which show the effects of the 1986 norwegian reform

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

bank risk within and across equilibria abstract the global financial crisis highlighted that the financial system can be most vulnerable when it seems most stable this paper models non linear dynamics in banking small shocks can lead from an equilibrium with few bank defaults straight to a full freeze the mechanism is based on amplification between adverse selection on banks funding market and moral hazard in bank monitoring our results imply trade offs between regulators microprudential desire to shield individual weak banks and the macroprudential consequences of doing so moreover limiting bank reliance on wholesale funding always reduces systemic risk but limiting the correlation between bank portfolios does not

jurisdictional homogeneity and the tiebout hypothesis abstract in this paper an alternative to the capitalization approach to testing the tiebout model is presented the tiebout foot voting mechanism suggests that households will sort and stratify into approximately homogeneous local public goods jurisdictions at a point in time the efficiency of the sort will be positively related to the number of existing jurisdictions using a measure of homogeneity introduced by theil the relationship between stratification homogeneity within jurisdiction and number of jurisdictions is tested for a sample of school districts within 33 smsas the tiebout stratification hypothesis is confirmed

effects of the tax treatment of fringe benefits on labor market segmentation current federal tax law requires that all workers having the same experience with a firm must receive essentially the same package of fringe benefits in order for those benefits to qualify for preferential tax treatment the authors argue that this nondiscriminatory provision of fringe benefits promotes labor market segmentation by inducing workers to sort themselves across the economy according to their demand for fringe benefits several empirical tests using 1968 78 data confirm the existence of sorting and suggest that labor market segmentation increased over time as workers responded to changes in incomes and marginal tax rates

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

on the determinants of school district efficiency competition and monitoring abstract a number of researchers have asserted that inefficiency in the u s school system arises from a lack of incentives for public schools to behave efficiently this paper uses a shephard input distance function to model educational production and a switching regressions estimation to explore the relationship between school district efficiency and two existing incentive mechanisms competition and voter monitoring we find evidence that ease of monitoring enhances both technical and allocative efficiency of urban school districts and that increased competition reduces allocative inefficiency in communities above a competitive threshold we find no evidence that competition is related to technical inefficiency

does school choice lead to sorting evidence from tiebout variation a question commonly raised about school choice is whether it would result in sorting or stratification previous research has asked this with respect to inter district or tiebout choice but has generated no consensus in part because areas district concentrations may be endogenous this paper addresses this by exploiting the fact that some metropolitan areas mas have different numbers of districts operating at the primary and the secondary level the resulting within ma between educational level variation in district concentration suggests that increases in district availability do affect children s district and school level peer groups and that they lower private enrollment jel h1 h7 i2

the decline in the number of school districts in the u s 1950 1980 between 1950 and 1980 the number of school districts fell from 83 642 to 15 987 data for the fifty states for 1950 1960 1970 and 1980 are used to identify the factors that contributed to this decline the focus is on the tradeoff between cost savings through scale economies a few large districts and a diverse population s demand for choice in public schooling many small districts we find that much of the decline in the number of school districts has resulted from 1 the decline in the farm population and increase in population density which has made it easier to take advantage of scale economies 2 the growing importance of state aid which reduces quality variation among districts within a state and 3 the increase in the fraction of teachers that belong to the national education association teacher s union which may reflect increased political influence used to lower the costs of organizing

a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector abstract this paper develops a test for pareto efficiency in the local public sectorusing the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the samuelson condition for efficiency by using cross section data it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property value maximizing and hence efficient fashion the empirical results show no systematic tendency to either under or over provide public goods in a sample of massachusetts communities

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

buying a home with a resale value location location location we develop a dynamic multiregion model where a household s choice of housing location depends on its current wealth and its current type and involves both consumption and investment considerations the relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive determines the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting a strong investment consumption motive implies sorting according to household type wealth the model predicts that large house price fluctuations are associated with a low degree of sorting by type this prediction is consistent with evidence from us metropolitan areas when income education and age are used as proxies for household type

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

local authority fiscal stance and the pattern of residential migration in the north west of england the degree of fiscal mobility present in household migration flows between local authority areas in northwestern england is assessed following an introduction the paper is divided into three sections the first reviews the methodologies of previous attempts to assess the extent of fiscally induced migration noting the dominance of american studies and outlines a choice theoretic structure within which it is possible to model human migration patterns section iii considers the problems inherent in modelling migration flows and section iv presents results for a compound poisson analysis of migration between local authority areas within the four counties of the north west region of england as well as an assessment of the prevalence of fiscal mobility excerpt

price cap versus rate of return regulation in a stochastic cost model a stochastic cost model is used to show that both price cap and rate of return regulation lead to overinvestment in capital and to excessive managerial slack however they differ in stochastic versus fixed intervals between hearings and in the use of test year costs versus average costs since the previous hearing a numerical example illustrates that fixed intervals between hearings improve welfare if hearings are not held too frequently but most gains go to the firm more significantly the use of average cost data combined with fixed intervals results in dramatic welfare improvements with most gains going to consumers

the legacy of serrano the impact of mandated equal spending on private school enrollment 1 introduction the california supreme court decision in serrano v priest in 1971 was the first state supreme court ruling to declare a state s education finance system unconstitutional 1 the suit originally filed by a class of los angeles county public school children and their parents argued that the california public school finance system was unconstitutional because of its reliance on a local property tax system under this system large differences in property wealth created enormous variations in educational resources across the state in its subsequent 1976 serrano h decision the california supreme court found that the state legislature s response to the first serrano decision was insufficient the court ordered the state legislature to follow a trial court s requirement to implement a funding formula that reduces wealth related per pupil expenditure disparities i e property tax revenue exclusive of categorical aid and special needs to 100 across school districts the serrano ii decision resulted in a nearly complete shift of the fiscal responsibility for k 12 education in california from local to state government in the aftermath of the initial serrano decision suits were filed in several other states claiming unconstitutional inequities in the state education system many of these suits were successful between 1973 and 1983 six state supreme courts new jersey 1973 connecticut 1977 washington 1978 west virginia 1979 wyoming 1980 arkansas 1983 found their systems of educational finance unconstitutional similar rulings followed in 1989 in kentucky montana and texas in 1993 in massachusetts and tennessee in 1994 in arizona and in 1997 in new hampshire ohio and vermont a third of the states education finance systems now have been ruled unconstitutional as a result of these rulings and legislative based education reforms in a number of other states education expenditure inequality has been reduced 2 this in turn has left local districts with less latitude in determining spending levels parents in richer districts are expected to be especially frustrated with the limits on spending that accompany equalization changes in state educational finance systems to gain greater equity affected average spending on education in these states the initial research on this issue focused on the california experience where raw expenditure figures reveal the dramatic change in per pupil spending in california since the initial serrano decision in 1971 in academic year ay 1969 1970 per pupil spending in california s public elementary and secondary schools was slightly greater than the national average 106 25 of the national average ranking 14th among all states however by ay 1992 1993 education expenditures in california had fallen to 85 6 of the national average and its rank had dropped to 34th silva and sonstelie 1995 concluded that education spending in california in 1989 1990 was significantly lower than they would have otherwise predicted they attributed about half of the lowered spending to the legislation following serrano ii and the other half to the growth of the student population in california but the california experience of reduced expenditures appears to be atypical manwaring and sheffrin 1997 found spending to be higher in many states as a result of litigation or legislativebased educational finance reform downes and shah 1995 similarly estimated that school finance reform raised spending in some states and lowered spending in other states murray evans and schwab 1998 found state per pupil spending rose with successful state education finance litigation the variation across states in the spending effects of education finance reforms may be due to the source court ordered or legislative and or degree e g weak reform strong reform etc of the reforms in any case there should be greater interest in supplementing what the public schools do or opting out of the public system if reforms cause spending in a state to fall

efficient regulation with little information reality in the limit we present a regulatory scheme that converges to ramsey pricing and productive efficiency even if regulators have little information about technology or demand the model has firms selecting prices subject to the regulator s requirement that the firm earn a fair return on capital at today s capital stock and output levels regulators then review later performance and are more likely to request new rate hearings as the firm s return deviates more from the fair return as long as regulators do not review negative returns too fast relative to positive returns these conditions are sufficient for convergence to ramsey prices and productive efficiency public utility regulators generally set prices not rates of return per se these prices however often are meant to achieve approximately some target rate of return but when projecting how prices will affect rates of return regulators are often at the mercy of the firms for economic projections about the effects of various price vectors e g across customer classes upon profits so if realized rates of return deviate from targets regulators may call new rate hearings and they may expedite these hearings if the deviations are large 2 by formalizing these real world observations some rather surprising efficiency results appear suppose that regulators have no knowledge of demands and technologies but can observe past realizations of prices and quantities if the review probabilities are as noted above and satisfy an asymmetry condition then this regulatory process may converge not only to productive efficiency overcoming averch johnson over capitalization effects but to ramsey prices these conclusions are derived from unifying and extending work by bawa and sibley 1980 and vogelsang and finsinger 1979

a mechanism to induce ramsey pricing for natural monopoly firms this paper considers a model with m independent natural monopoly firms it then proposes a taxation subsidy scheme that the regulator can implement to induce the m price setting firms acting independently to jointly adopt ramsey pricing the scheme has the following desirable features 1 the regulator needs only book keeping data on quantities prices and profits 2 the scheme induces cost minimization behaviour 3 the firms will not behave strategically 4 at each step of the convergence process to optimum each firm earns a non negative return and welfare is improved

credible regulatory threats abstract as competition emerges in parts of utility industries and utility regulation policy is reviewed it is useful to examine alternative forms of regulation that may be implemented when hit and run entry is believed to be a non credible threat potential entry may not constrain incumbent firms pricing and production decisions this paper proposes that the credible threat of intervention by a regulator may impact upon incumbent firms decisions empirical evidence from the english and welsh electricity pool market is investigated to discover whether the threat of regulator intervention may have influenced the pricing strategies of the dominant firms in this market

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

household location and tiebout do families sort according to preferences for locational amenities abstract if households sort efficiently across locations then at a given location families receive the same marginal benefit from the locational amenities we test for such sorting by imposing cross equation restrictions on hedonic regressions that difference away location versus house specific effects estimates are obtained using a unique subset of the american housing survey in which adjacent housing units are grouped together and observed in both 1985 and 1989 rejection of the cross equation restrictions unambiguously implies an inefficient sorting of households in contrast the data support the cross equation restrictions which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient sorting

political economy of the inequality in school spending abstract this paper employs data from 45 states between 1972 and 1992 to investigate the basic forces affecting school resource inequality within a state we consider a wide range of determinants of inequality including voter preferences the tax and political structure within the state and the legal standing of education within the state constitution we find that state constitutional language regarding equity affects the degree of school spending equality in the state as does the political environment in the state and factors associated with the benefits and costs of tiebout sorting into school districts

systemic risk in financial systems we consider default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism the obligations of all firms within the system are determined simultaneously in a fashion consistent with the priority of debt claims and the limited liability of equity we first show via a fixed point argument that there always exists a clearing payment vector that clears the obligations of the members of the clearing system under mild regularity conditions this clearing vector is unique next we develop an algorithm that both clears the financial system in a computationally efficient fashion and provides information on the systemic risk faced by the individual system firms finally we produce qualitative comparative statics for financial systems these comparative statics imply that in contrast to single firm results even unsystematic nondissipative shocks to the system will lower the total value of the system and may lower the value of the equity of some of the individual system firms

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had