occupation and the political economy of trade job routineness offshorability and protectionist sentiment the recent backlash against globalization in many advanced economies raises questions about the source of this protectionist sentiment traditional accounts generally attribute the welfare consequences of trade to skill level or industry characteristics or instead emphasize the nonmaterial determinants of support for openness consequently we know little about how a major labor market characteristic occupation shapes both the distributional consequences of and preferences toward trade openness we propose and test a new theory of trade policy preferences based on occupation characteristics drawing from the tasks literature in economics we argue that occupation characteristics are a key determinant of how trade affects workers and thus individuals trade preferences our theory suggests that in advanced economies individuals in routine task intensive occupations will be negatively affected by trade and thus more protectionist this relationship will increase in the degree to which occupation job tasks can be provided from a distance i e offshorable we find support for our theory using data from the 2003 and 2013 international social survey programme in high income democracies our results suggest that the occupational characteristics of routineness and offshorability are important determinants of trade preferences offering additional understanding of the sources of protectionist sentiment even after controlling for labor market characteristics suggested by conventional wisdom

political cleavages and changing exposure to trade combining the classical theorem of stolper and samuelson with a model of politics derived from becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors a traditional three factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land labor and capital depending only on the given country s level of economic development and its land labor ratio a preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and contracting trade and of such specific cases as the german marriage of iron and rye u s and latin american populism and asian socialism suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis while the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation

endogenous trade policy through majority voting an empirical investigation abstract the median voter approach to trade policy determination within a heckscher ohlin framework as in mayer am econ rev 74 5 1984 970 predicts that an increase in inequality holding constant the economy s overall relative endowments raises trade barriers in capital abundant economies and lowers them in capital scarce economies we find support for this prediction using cross country data on inequality capital abundance and diverse measures of protection we perform certain robustness checks that include controlling for the effects of political rights and schooling as well as using alternative datasets on factor endowments

provoking preferences unionization trade policy and the ilwu puzzle if any group of american blue collar workers has benefited from the growth of trade it is the unionized dockworkers along the us west coast nevertheless the international longshore and warehouse union ilwu representing these workers is vocally opposed to trade liberalization we examine several competing explanations for this puzzle and evaluate them by tracing the union s stance on trade over several decades we also use an original survey to compare ilwu affiliates attitudes on trade with those of nonmembers with otherwise similar characteristics consistent with a model of organizational socialization the data support the hypothesis that ilwu membership affects the members revealed political opinions the data are difficult to reconcile with standard theories of international trade our findings indicate that the political support for trade depends not just on voters structural positions in the economy but also on the organizations and networks in which they are embedded

citizens preferences and the portfolio of public goods evidence from nigeria summary developing countries have undertaken decentralization reforms to increase the efficiency of public goods provisioning by tailoring the goods to the preferences of smaller groups the reforms aim to ensure that the resulting supply of public goods matches local demands we analyze if local politicians tasked with supplying public goods in a developing country respond to citizens preferences we ask two questions first faced with demands for increased spending on a particular type of public good will politicians increase the overall spending on public goods or keep it constant while reallocating resources between different public goods second if politicians reallocate resources rather than increase overall spending which public good will receive additional funds at the expense of another good we examine these questions using sub national spending and preference data in nigerian districts our empirical strategy accounts for interdependency between spending areas as increased spending in one area can be offset by decreasing expenditures elsewhere we find that local politicians reallocate resources across education health infrastructure and agricultural support to match the preference profile of citizens across these goods but do not increase overall spending for public goods

trade turnover and tithing this paper examines the hypothesis that turnover affects trade preferences high turnover industries are similar to the stolper samuelson assumption of perfect factor mobility so factor of production drives trade preferences among low turnover industries as in the specific factors model net export position determines trade preferences we show that pac contribution patterns are consistent with this hypothesis in high turnover industries capital groups give significantly larger shares of their campaign contributions to free trade supporters than labor groups do among low turnover industries on the other hand exporting and import competing groups differ significantly in their financial support for free traders d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

the effect of trade openness on women s welfare and work life summary this study of 134 countries analyzes whether women are generally the losers or winners of globalization the results show that economic integration does not directly improve women s life expectancies women s access to primary and secondary education may improve slightly although women s welfare does not seem to improve more than that of men on the other hand economic integration does influence women s professional lives in developing countries trade openness increases female labor force participation in industrialized states it decreases the share of working women trade openness in developed countries increases the number of women employed in the service sector while in developing states it increases the number of women working in industrial jobs and in agriculture

the partisan paradox and the u s tariff 1877 1934 whereas historical accounts of u s tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects a formal model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters preferences provides empirical equations to test for partisan effects subsequent time series analysis shows that even after controlling for interest group demands partisan control of government did significantly affect the tariff moreover during the period under study the two political parties enacted tariff policies that benefited different sets of producer groups at the expense of others thus political institutions did play a significant role in shaping the interests that influence u s foreign economic policy

international trade and domestic politics improving on rogowski s model of political alignments ronald rogowski s work offers valuable insight into the impact of changing trade exposure on domestic politics exploring the political implications of the well known factor endowments model of international trade theory rogowski argues that owners of relatively abundant productive factors will form a free trading coalition against owners of relatively scarce productive factors who will align in favor of protection rogowski s parsimonious three factor version of the factor endowments theory although offering valuable insight into the politics of less developed economies including today s developed economies in earlier centuries produces significant anomalies when applied to advanced economies intuitive logic and empirical research especially the leontief paradox suggest that the highly complex division of labor found in developed countries will confound the simplicity of the three factor model edward learner s multifactor model suggests solutions to the anomalies that afflict rogowski s simpler model when applied to recent politics in the united states and europe

the performance of the heckscher ohlin vanek model in predicting endogenous policy forces at the individual level this study tests the hypothesis that agents base their opinions about trade liberalization on the distribution effects as predicted by the heckscher ohlin vanek hov model the hov model is utilized to derive the probable effect of a liberalization move on the returns to different canadian occupations the predicted effect is then compared with the opinions that canadians with known occupations held about the proposed canadian u s free trade agreement of 1988 it is found that these agents took positions that were generally consistent with the prediction from the hov model

what determines individual trade policy preferences abstract this article provides new evidence on the determinants of individual trade policy preferences using individual level survey data for the united states there are two main empirical results first we find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers second we find that home ownership also matters for individuals trade policy preferences independent of factor type home ownership in counties with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative disadvantage industries is correlated with support for trade barriers this finding suggests that in addition to current factor incomes driving preferences as in standard trade models preferences also depend on asset values

ideology and voter preferences as determinants of financial globalization we propose that the global spread of ideas affects international economic openness policies and that to omit ideology as an explanatory variable for economic globalization is to risk omitted variable bias using voting data we create measures of global ideology regarding economic openness and propose that changes in both global and domestic ideology influence how open or closed to international finance an economy is we also test other influences on liberalization including proposed state centered diffusion mechanisms using pcsts and system gmm models we estimate the determinants of change in international capital account regulation for 82 countries 1955 to 1999 we thereby examine diffusion of both liberalizations 1950s and 1990s and closures 1960s and 1970s changes in both global and domestic ideology robustly influence liberalization and closure the capital account policies of neighboring countries positively and of the leading economies negatively also influenced a country s capital account liberalization

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

electoral competition and agricultural support in oecd countries agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue we consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers based on cox 1987 1990 and myerson 1993 we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to appeal to a narrow constituency tend to have a higher level of agricultural support we test this theoretical hypothesis using oecd agricultural support data disaggregated by commodity and country a cross classified multilevel model is employed to account for complex variation of agricultural support across countries commodities and time our empirical results show that electoral systems that encourage politicians to target narrow broad constituencies are associated with relatively high low levels of agricultural subsidies

a referendum on trade theory voting on free trade in costa rica research on mass opinion in international political economy overwhelmingly relies on survey data this poses problems of external validity especially for a frequently low salience issue such as trade policy to examine whether survey findings about attitudes toward economic openness apply outside of surveys this note considers patterns of voting in the 2007 costa rican plebiscite about joining the central american free trade area several extant theories appear to explain voting patterns but the results are less in line with traditional economic models based on locally important economic sectors

jobs jobs jobs a new perspective on protectionism this paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions in this environment jobs generate rents whose access depends on the level of trade protection by raising the domestic price of a good a government may attract more firms in a particular industry this raises the probability that workers will find jobs in this sector and in turn will benefit from the associated rents though simple this channel may help explainavarietyofstylizedfactsonthestructureoftradeprotectionandindividualtrade policy preferences jel f130 f160

who supports free trade in latin america this paper examines individual trade policy preferences across 17 countries in latin america the focus is on whether skilled or unskilled workers are more likely to support liberalised trade and on whether country characteristics such as factor endowments alter the preferences of skilled and unskilled workers based on the standard heckscher ohlin model and the stolper samuelson theorem wage inequality in developing countries will decrease under free trade and unskilled workers will benefit we find that on average skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to support free trade in latin american countries separate country regressions reveal that this pattern is only statistically significant in 8 out of 17 latin american countries however there are no countries in our sample in which unskilled workers are statistically more likely to support free trade than skilled workers not even in the lowest skill endowed country in the sample we also find that people from latin american countries with higher gdp faster growth more cropland and a longer period of time since reform were more likely on average to support free trade

agricultural productivity in developing countries abstract this paper examines changes in agricultural productivity in 18 developing countries over the period 1961 1985 we use a nonparametric output based malmquist index and a parametric variable coefficients cobb douglas production function to examine whether our estimates confirm results from other studies that have indicated declining agricultural productivity in ldcs the results confirm previous findings indicating that at least half of these countries have experienced productivity declines in agriculture

the political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry a similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the new economics of institutions the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity in this survey the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined in addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or where there are answers no strong evidence in support of them this essay then in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics

asset specificity and the political behavior of firms lobbying for subsidies in norway previous research into endogenous trade policy has described extensively the political incentives of firms with specific assets but no studies have shown directly that firms behave as predicted we adopt insights from transaction costs economics to develop measures of asset specificity and to investigate how variation in these measures affects the political behavior of firms in particular we examine the lobbying choices of norwegian firms in the 1980s given available subsidy funds from norway s oil boom and some government decisions in the 1970s firms with more specific assets faced potentially greater losses from adjusting to new activities in the face of competitive pressures and thus had greater incentives to lobby for subsidies to protect themselves joint contacting of parliament and government on behalf of firm interests by representatives of both management and labor should be particularly likely where firms had specific assets data analysis shows that asset specificity as indicated by r d intensity and job immobility predicts joint contacting independently of plausible alternative explanatory variables like firm size and export orientation

determining trade policy do voters hold politicians accountable models of trade policy often depend on the efficient aggregation of individual preferences while much of the recent empirical work on trade focuses on whether domestic coalitions form along class or sectoral lines the process of preference aggregation itself remains understudied in democratic countries voting is typically assumed to be an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences but such an assumption may be misleading when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate using data from a survey of 36 501 potential voters in the 2006 u s midterm congressional elections this article explores the salience of trade policy for voters as a whole and for populations predicted to be most affected by changing trade patterns the article offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on the central american free trade agreement relative to roll call votes on other issues of the day the article finds trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance in voters knowledge of their representatives policy positions and in its effect on voters propensity to vote for the incumbent the low salience of trade policy particularly among highly affected groups calls into question voter driven models of trade policy

why are some people and countries more protectionist than others we analyze two cross country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio demographic and other indicators we nd that pro trade preferences are signi cantly and robustly correlated with an individual s level of human capital in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed individuals in non traded sectors tend to be the most pro trade while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist third an individual s relative economic status has a very strong positive association withpro trade attitudes finally non economic determinants in the form of values identities and attachments play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade high degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism patriotism are associated withprotectionist tendencies c