can falling supply explain the rising return to college for younger men a cohort based analysis although the college high school wage gap for younger u s men has doubled over the past 30 years the gap for older men has remained nearly constant in the united kingdom and canada the college high school wage gap also increased for younger relative to older men using a model with imperfect substitution between similarly educated workers in different age groups we argue that these shifts reflect changes in the relative supply of highly educated workers across age groups the driving force behind these changes is the slowdown in the rate of growth of educational attainment that began with cohorts born in the early 1950s in all three countries

asset based unemployment insurance this article studies a model of consumption savings and job search in which a borrowing constraint limits self insurance the government administers the unemployment insurance program that may condition on an individual s asset position but not on her efforts of finding a job to compensate for the impediments to self insurance benefit payments should optimally be set higher at lower wealth levels and peak for borrowing constrained individuals with zero liquid funds a quantitative exercise reveals that the u s unemployment insurance program is surprisingly close to optimal for the asset poor but far too generous for wealthier individuals

an adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance abstract we ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous population we adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in shavell and weiss 1979 supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents job opportunities our main theoretical contribution is a quasi recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem including a geometric characterization of the state space our main economic result is that optimal contracts for bad searchers tend to be upward sloping due to an adverse selection effect this is in contrast to the well known optimal decreasing time profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environments that continue to be optimal for good searchers in our model

monotone stochastic choice models the case of risk and time preferences suppose that when evaluating two alternatives x and y by means of a parametric utility function low values of the parameter indicate a preference for x and high values indicate a preference for y

optimal unemployment insurance for older workers this paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal agent model where the search intensity of risk averse workers the agents is not observed by the risk neutral insurance agency the principal when unemployment benefits are the only available tool the insurance agency is not able to induce older workers to search for a job this is because of the short time horizon of workers close to retirement we propose to introduce a pension tax dependent on the length of the unemployment spell we show that this device performs better than a wage tax after re employment first it makes jobs more attractive as they are free of tax second because re employment will be short lived a pension tax is a more powerful incentive than a wage tax and provides more substantial fiscal gains to the agency finally a pension tax allows those workers near retirement who still do not exercise job search to smooth their consumption during their unemployment spell as if they could borrow against their future pension

assessing the effects of reemployment bonuses on job search a regression discontinuity approach abstract this study examines the impacts of reemployment bonuses that is the incentive payments to unemployment insurance ui recipients who find a job within a specified period using korean data a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at age 55 identifies the effect of increased reemployment bonuses on unemployment duration and on subsequent job duration the results indicate that increases in the reemployment bonus boost the job finding hazards of ui claimants early in their unemployment spells during the bonus qualification period and significantly shorten the duration of ui spells by 0 16 to 0 42 months 0 68 to 1 82 weeks in addition employment stability is not significantly affected by an increased bonus which implies no negative influence of the bonus on subsequent job match quality the simulated estimates show that the increase in tax revenue and the decrease in ui benefit payment caused by the behavioral response of ui recipients are large enough to offset the increased cost of the reemployment bonus

a measurement error approach for modeling consumer risk preference von neumann morgenstern vn m utility theory is the dominant theoretical model of risk preference recently market researchers have adapted vn m theory to model consumer risk preference but most applications assess utility functions by asking just n questions to specify n parameters however any questioning format especially under market research conditions introduces measurement error this paper explores the implications of measurement error on the estimation of the unknown parameters in vn m utility functions and provides procedures to deal with measurement error we assume that the functional form of the utility function but not its parameters can be determined a priori through qualitative questioning we then model measurement error as if question format and other influences cause the consumer to choose the unknown risk parameter from a probability distribution and to make his decisions accordingly we provide procedures to estimate the unknown parameters when the measurement error is eith

optimal welfare to work programs a welfare to work wtw program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed e g unemployment insurance m job search monitoring m social assistance sa wage subsidies this paper provides a dynamic principal agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal wtw program such as the sequence and duration of the different policies the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell and the emergence of taxes subsidies upon re employment the optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort social assistance characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal wtw program the typical sequence of policies is quite simple the program starts with standard ui then switches into monitored search and finally into sa the optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both jm and sa whereas taxes subsidies can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during ui they must decrease increase during a phase of jm in a calibration exercise we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the u s economy with respect to the existing u s system the optimal wtw scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively

the economic effects of unemployment insurance in canada an empirical analysis of ui disentitlement this article provides an overview of the canadian unemployment insurance ui program including its evolution salient features relative size and knowledge about its labor market impacts understanding of these impacts is limited and we conclude that an event study approach is a promising way to further this knowledge we examine the effects of the 1976 ui disentitlement of the elderly on their labor force behavior and find evidence of significant adverse selection effects interactions with the public pension system suggest that poverty among the elderly could be best addressed through changes in programs other than ui

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

dynamic contracts with worker mobility via directed on the job search this article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on the job search in a frictional labor market the optimal long term contract exhibits an increasing wage tenure profile with increasing wages worker effort also increases with tenure these two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment given these results workers experience differing labor market transitions between employment unemployment and across different employers and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers abstract from author

optimal unemployment insurance in a matching equilibrium this article considers optimal unemployment insurance ui in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining it compares the outcome with the standard nash bargaining approach which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider outsider distortion it also shows that a coordinated policy approach one that chooses job creation subsidies and ui optimally generates a much greater welfare gain than a policy that simply varies ui payments by duration

breakthroughs deadlines and self reported progress contracting for multistage projects we study the optimal incentive schemes for multistage projects staged financing pervasive in both venture capital and research grants arises as a feature of the optimal contract the nature of progress plays an important role when progress is tangible incentives are provided through a series of deadlines and a reward scheme that decreases over time early progress in one stage gives the agent more time and funding to complete the next one when progress is intangible unverifiable progress reports are used despite the fact that the information in the report has no social value the optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date if the agent reports progress at that date then the principal gives him a relatively short deadline to complete the project if not then a probationary phase begins in which the project is terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported we explore the implications for welfare and optimal project design

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

is there a threat effect of labour market programmes a study of almp in the danish ui system this article focuses on unemployed individuals reaction to compulsory labour market programmes prior to participation in denmark after having received ui benefits for a given period of time continued benefits are made conditional on participation in a labour market programme i estimate individuals reaction to compulsory programmes using legislative changes in the duration of benefits period as identification i find that compulsory programmes do indeed motivate individuals to find employment prior to participation the effect is large and is even comparable in size to the effect of benefits exhaustion found in studies of american ui systems

job search requirements effort provision and labor market outcomes abstract how effective are effort targets this paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes based on large scale register data we estimate the returns to required job search effort instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers we find that the duration of un and non employment both decrease by 3 if the requirement increases by one monthly application when instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4 in line with theory we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individual s voluntary effort finally the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability reducing the duration of re employment spells by 0 3 per required application we find a zero effect on re employment wages

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

productivity gains from unemployment insurance this paper argues that unemployment insurance increases labor productivity by encouraging workers to seek higher productivity jobs and by encouraging rms to create those jobs we use a quantitative model to investigate whether this eect is comparable in magnitude to the standard moral hazard eects of unemployment insurance our model economy captures the behavior of the u s labor market for high school graduates quite well with unemployment insurance more generous than the current u s level unemployment would increase by a magnitude similar to the micro estimates but because the composition of jobs also changes total output and welfare would increase as well

unemployment insurance strengthening the relationship between theory and policy ever since the u s federal state system of unemployment insurance was founded in the 1930s it has provided partial temporary replacement of wages to eligible workers who lose jobs through no fault of their own as determined by state level regulations unemployment insurance is one of the largest social insurance programs in the united states with benefits paid totaling about 34 billion in 2004 this figure is considerably smaller than for social security medicare or medicaid but it exceeds spending on such major programs as workers compensation temporary assistance to needy families tanf or food stamps in this paper we focus on the ways economic theory can help us understand the challenges that this complex program is likely to face over the next few years we begin by summarizing the salient characteristics of the unemployment insurance program and then examine the theoretical and econometric research much of this research revolves around the main goals of the program which include 1 sustaining consumption for workers and their families 2 helping recipients to make efficient job choices during a period of financial stress and 3 minimizing the adverse incentives that may accompany partial wage replacement of course these goals can come into conflict for example if replacing wages for an unemployed worker also discourages that worker from aggressively searching for or accepting a new job and our discussion will focus on these conflicts with this background we then conclude with a discussion of the key policy issues that the unemployment

job separation in a non stationary search model a structural estimation to evaluate alternative unemployment insurance systems this paper considers a job search model in which the environment is not constant throughout the unemployment spell and where jobs do not last for ever in this situation reservation wages can be lower than they would be in a model without consideration of such separations but they can initially be higher precisely because of the non constant environment the model is estimated structurally by using spanish data for the period 1985 1996 the main finding is that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity the unemployment hazard rate is almost flat during the first six months however after this duration the highly decreasing job offer arrival rate comes to be the only significant factor given that acceptance probabilities become equal to one the estimated parameters are used to evaluate different unemployment insurance designs we conclude that a non monotonic pattern in unemployment benefits joint with a tax paid by workers and based on unemployment duration makes this duration 13 2 lower than it currently is in spain copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

a micro econometric analysis of risk aversion and the decision to self insure this study estimates a von neumann morgenstern utility function using market data and micro econometric methods we investigate the decision whether to purchase insurance against the risk of telephone line trouble in the home using the choices of approximately 10 000 residential customers we determine the shape of the utility function and the degree of risk aversion we find that risk aversion varies systematically in the population and varies with the level of income and that the observed choice behavior is consistent with expected utility maximization we are unable to detect the presence of ambiguity effects or over weighting of low probability events

income distribution and growth in east asia it is widely believed that the east asian economies performed exceptionally well not only in generating growth but also in keeping inequality low this study tries to answer the questions raised by the claims of exceptionality of income distribution in east asia central findings are that only japan korea and taiwan have legitimate claims to low inequality that the east asian economies distinguished themselves by their ability to translate high profit shares into high savings and investment rates and that low inequality and high profit shares coexisted primarily due to the unusually even distribution of wealth

labor market effects of unemployment insurance design with the emergence of the great recession unemployment insurance ui is once again at the heart of the policy debate in this paper we review the recent theoretical and empirical evidence on the labor market effects of ui design we also discuss policy issues related to ui design including the structure of benefits the role of liquidity constraints and the pros and cons of a ui system in which the generosity of ui benefits is varying over the business cycle finally we identify potential areas of future research

an empirical examination of the sources of changes over time in the job finding rate using reservation wages and rejected wage offers we consider a structural dynamic job search model where nonstationarity originates from the change over time in the benefit level the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution the model is estimated on the french sample of the echp taking advantage of direct observation of reservation wages rejected job offers and associated rejected wages we find that the offered wages deteriorate rapidly 13 8 over six months 19 2 over one year and 30 over two years and that changes in the wage offer distribution are the unique source of negative duration dependence in the hazard

the value of marketing expertise this paper has three objectives 1 to construct a theoretical model that aids in evaluating marketing expertise 2 to use that theoretical model to identify factors influencing the value of marketing expertise and 3 to empirically test the model by observing how different market conditions influence whether companies emphasize marketing expertise we accomplish these objectives as follows first we use decision theory to find an expression for the expected value of marketing expertise we do not use decision analysis in the normative tradition nor do we assume that firms actually use formal decision analysis rather we assume that firms are rational and that decision theory describes their actions given that assumption we predict how firms should evaluate marketing here marketing expertise helps a firm make better marketing decisions at least on average hence the value of marketing expertise increases as marketing decisions become more important second consistent with decision theory

unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market abstract we consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance ui in a repeated moral hazard framework unlike existing literature unemployed individuals can secretly participate in a hidden labor market this extension modifies the standard problem in three dimensions first it imposes an endogenous lower bound for the lifetime utility that a contract can deliver second it breaks the identity between unemployment payments and consumption and third it hardens the encouragement of search effort the optimal unemployment insurance system in an economy with a hidden labor market is simple with an initial phase in which payments are relatively flat during unemployment and with no payments for long term unemployed individuals this scheme differs substantially from the one prescribed without a hidden labor market and resembles unemployment protection programs in many countries

adverse selection and moral hazard quantitative implications for unemployment insurance abstract a model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed the model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance qualitatively for some agents incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non employment calibrating the model to a stylized version of the u s economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions the optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1 94 relative to the current u s system an additional 0 87 of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard

opportunity and social mobility the fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of poor parents unequal opportunity is generally thought to be one of the weak points of modem capitalist societies the ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor social mobility is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies here i argue that both of these characteristics are in fact necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided i argue this point using a generational version of the model of phelan and townsend 1991 an infinitely repeated general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints in my model each household s stochastic output is a function of its level of effort since effort is assumed to be costly and privately observed households can shirk higher than minimal effort levels must be induced by making a household s present or future consumption dependent on the household s observed output history a large literature considers models similar to this including green 1987 atkeson and lucas 1992 phelan 1994 1995 wang 1995 hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 khan and ravikumar 2002 the main difference between the economies in that literature and here is that here instead of a household consisting of a single infinitely lived individual a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals a familial dynasty each of whom lives for one period this difference affects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations when households consist of a single infinitely lived individual allocations can be ranked according to their implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities if one allocation delivers a distribution of ex ante utilities dominated by another allocation then the first allocation is inefficient however if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals then the appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious how those in the first generation rank allocations will in general differ from how their descendants rank allocations this paper addresses this conflict between generations by ranking allocations according to a rawlsian veil of ignorance criterion rawls 1971 that is here society seeks to maximize the expected dynastic utility utility including altruism toward descendants of an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and the identity or output levels of his ancestors 1 i argue that this corresponds to a societal ranking which does

optimal unemployment insurance with non separable preferences abstract in this paper we characterize the shape of optimal unemployment contracts when the preferences are non separable we show that the optimal contract generates an endogenous minimum replacement ratio

unemployment insurance design inducing moving and retraining evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes aect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain realistically such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the iden tity of those may be unobservable ex ante the problem of characterizing con strained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature we construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled the model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobserv able job search in particular we derive closed form solutions showing that when the moving retraining incentive constraint binds unemployment bene ts should increase over the unemployment spell with an initial period with low bene ts and an increase after this period has expired

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

the role of unemployment insurance in an economy with liquidity constraints and moral hazard the potential welfare benefits of unemployment insurance along with the optimal replacement ratio are studied using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model to provide a role for unemployment insurance agents in our economy face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks and are unable to borrow or insure themselves through private markets in the absence of moral hazard replacement ratios as high as 65 are optimal and the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance are quite large however if there is moral hazard and the replacement ratio is not set optimally but is instead set to an empirically plausible value the economy can be much worse off than it would be without unemployment insurance

optimal unemployment insurance with human capital depreciation and duration dependence this paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance ui scheme our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies benefits should decrease with unemployment duration the optimal program also generates two main novel features which are not present in stationary models first if human capital depreciates rapidly enough during unemployment ui transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient program second we study the optimality of imposing a history contingent wage tax after reemployment our numerical simulations based on the spanish and us economies show that the wage tax should decrease with the length of worker s previous unemployment spell and become a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers as a by product of our study we develop a systematic approach suitable for studying recursively a wide range of dynamic moral hazard problems and other models with similar characteristics

unemployment insurance and the business cycle an equilibrium model is developed to study the interaction of the business cycle unemployment insurance and the labor market for young men in canada the model combines optimal job oer layo and recall decisions within a numerically solved and restricted bayesian nash equilibrium we consider the long run implications of changes made to unemployment insurance in canada during the 1990s the changes lead to equilibrium increases in average rates of unemployment layos and recalls eliminating ui lowers the equilibrium unemployment

duration dependent unemployment insurance payments and equilibrium unemployment this paper develops a model of equilibrium unemployment with duration dependent unemployment insurance ui payments as the government does not observe job offers there is a moral hazard problem because the option of receiving further ui payments raises the job seeker s value of remaining unemployment extending the duration of ui payments while reducing the level of payments to hold total generosity constant results in higher negotiated wages simulations suggest that a generosity neutral switch from a six month ui scheme to a one year scheme has small effects but a switch to an indefinite scheme has a large impact on wages and unemployment

optimal unemployment insurance in search equilibrium should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline or increase over a worker s unemployment spell we examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment the model features worker firm bargaining over wages free entry of new jobs and endogenous search effort among the unemployed the main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the spell of unemployment numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system

wage inequality and returns to skill in taiwan 1978 96 since 1980 income inequality has risen faster in taiwan than in the united states inequality rose despite a rapid increase in the share of educated workers in the labour market that might have been expected to depress returns to education returns to a college education rose in taiwan for all but the least experienced college graduates who were the most substitutable by the large new cohorts of college graduates this pattern of changes in relative employment and relative wages is consistent with persistent shifts in relative demand toward skilled labour the shifts are not sector specific as might have been the case if shifts in trade flows were responsible for the shifts in relative wages growth of relative employment of more educated workers occurred in all sectors of the economy consistent with the hypothesis of skill biased technical change these results are similar to findings reported for oecd countries suggesting that taiwan has been exposed to the same types of skill biased shifts in relati

moral hazard vs liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance this paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance ui benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from ui using this evidence i show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by ui benefits is due to a liquidity effect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search moral hazard by combining two empirical strategies first i find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity constrained households second lump sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households i derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities the formula implies that the optimal ui benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage the exact identification approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives

optimum income taxation and layoff taxes this paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment it is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income the optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits that the state pays to unemployed workers and payroll taxes that the state does not get when workers are unemployed

getting it done dynamic incentives to complete a project a principal wants an agent to complete a project the agent undertakes unobservable effort which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed we characterize the contracts that the principal sets with and without commitment with full commitment the contract involves the agent s value and wage declining over time in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal also involves the agent s wage declining over time while the worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal has a constant wage and is in fact the unique stationary equilibrium the best weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium for the principal is achieved by a constant wage that maximizes the principal s payoff conditional on wages being constant we compare these solutions to the efficient outcome

unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector we study the effect of ui bene ts in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent in a partial equilibrium environment ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of ui benefits we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector short run unemployed receiving ui benefits or long run unemployed without ui benefits we perform comparative static exercises to understand how ui benefits affect unemployed workers effort to secure a formal job and their labor supply in the informal sector our model reveals that an increase in ui benefits generates two opposing effects for the short run unemployed first since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort second it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort even though in general it is ambiguous which effect dominates we show that for short durations ui benefits increase unemployed worker s effort to secure a formal sector job and decreases informal sector work

integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance abstract this paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment this paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration we show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension funded self insurance this system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives we also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

the role of effort for self insurance and its consequences for the wealth distribution i explore the effect of effort as a mechanism to alleviate the idiosyncratic risk faced by individuals in the presence of incomplete markets i construct a dsge model where costly effort determines the probability of being employed the next period and a riskless asset can be used to smooth consumption i first show how effort and assets are inverse related and that a unique stationary equilibrium exists then in a calibrated version of the model to the us economy i show that in the stationary equilibrium a positively skewed wealth distribution arises which is closer to the observed data and has not been obtained by models without ex ante heterogeneity i then use the model to evaluate the effect of unemployment insurance on the wealth distribution

endogenous adverse selection and unemployment insurance in this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance in particular we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance we also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public sector in providing unemployment insurance

experience rating of unemployment insurance and the incidence of unemployment among workers who are laid off from their previous jobs more than 70 percent collect benefit payments from the unemployment insurance ui system these benefits are widely asserted to reduce the rate at which unemployed individuals find new jobs so that measured unemployment is increased by unemployment insurance a large body of empirical evidence now exists that shows this effect on the duration of unemployment spells 2 far less attention both in policy debate and in research has been paid to the fact that the unemployment insurance system encourages persons to become unemployed in this paper i focus on the empirical structure and the effects of these incentives the results show that unem

taxation and redistribution of residual income inequality this paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality caused by the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market we study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms the optimal redistribution can be attained using a positive unemployment benefit and an increasing and regressive labor income tax the positive unemployment benefit serves the purpose of lowering the search risk faced by workers the increasing and regressive labor tax serves the purpose of aligning the cost to the firm of attracting an additional applicant with the value of an application to society

the impact of prior decisions on subsequent valuations in a costly contemplation model this paper develops and tests a model of how recall of information from past decisions affects subsequent related decisions a boundedly rational individual has to determine her willingness to pay for a good that she previously considered purchasing at a given price or provide valuations for a set of goods that she previously ranked in order of preference the individual is ex ante uncertain about her utility from consumption of the goods and can exert costly cognitive effort to reduce this uncertainty we show that incorporating information from a prior decision has three primary effects a valuations are expected to exhibit higher variance in particular the spread of valuations between the most and least preferred alternatives increases b decision makers will in expectation exert more effort during the valuation phase and c the relative impact of prior decisions on valuation spread increases the more each attribute contributes to overall utility the model predictions are then tested in a series of controlled lab experiments

optimal workfare with voluntary and involuntary unemployment this paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy we consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment job search behavior is unobservable which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance ui benefits intended for unemployed workers as a consequence pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment we show that requiring unproductive activities workfare in exchange for ui benefits may generate a pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers and we characterize the situations where this is the case

unemployment insurance and the business cycle what adjustments are needed author affiliation jeremy schwartz loyola university maryland department of economics 4501 north charles street sellinger 315 baltimore md 21210 usa e mail jsschwartz1 loyola edu acknowledgment i wish to thank donald parsons kerry richmond tara sinclair roberto samaniego and anthony yezer for their helpful comments and discussions regarding this article 1 introductionin most developed countries unemployment insurance ui is a static program that remains constant regardless of labor market conditions the united states along with canada are the only oecd countries that routinely adjust the generosity of their ui programs with the business cycle for instance during the 2007 2011 labor market downturn the length of time that ui benefits could be collected in the united states increased to an unprecedented 99 weeks from the standard 26 weeks available under normal economic conditions and the weekly benefit amount increased by 25 from an insurance perspective losing one s job during a recession is a greater loss than during an expansion and consequently a greater benefit may be appropriate however it is also known that increasing ui generosity has a negative effect on job search intensity and puts upward pressure on wages leading to lower job creation given these benefits and costs i seek to answer the following questions what structure of benefits over the business cycle is welfare maximizing is the current policy of increasing the generosity of ui during recessions optimal to accomplish this i develop a dynamic search model of the u s labor market which connects two parts of the optimal ui literature the first takes a partial equilibrium approach to determine the optimal adjustments to ui when job finding rates fall but does not consider ui s impact on job creation the second endogenizes job creation but does not address how the benefit system should adjust with the business cycle the model i present is unique in that it allows for both similar to studies that use the partial equilibrium approach one of the main factors driving the optimal ui program in this article is the moral hazard problem that arises from the inability to monitor the unemployed s job search shavell and weiss s 1979 seminal work shows that a sequence of ui benefits that declines with the length of unemployment provides the necessary incentives to encourage job search when the government s objective is to maximize welfare subject to a fixed budget although not explicitly modeling firm behavior hansen and imrohoroglu 1992 allow the ui budget to be endogenously determined similar to this article the authors also frame the moral hazard problem in terms of the government s inability to monitor rejections of job offers as well as allow for private savings they find that the optimal replacement rate is quite low just 0 15 in their baseline moral hazard case hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 focus on unobservable search intensity and develop a widely used recursive contract approach to determine the cost minimizing ui benefit schedule and employment tax where the policy parameters are contingent on an individual s complete work history a benefit amount that declines during one s unemployment spell and a subsequent employment tax that increases with the length of unemployment is optimal and results in utility falling continuously during unemployment pavoni 2007 extends this approach by including a guaranteed lower bound on utility which results in an optimal benefit schedule that falls sharply and includes a one time drop in benefits to a subsistence level alvarez parra and sanchez 2009 explicitly model this lower bound by including a hidden labor market where workers can continue to receive ui benefits undetected in this study the optimal benefit schedule falls slowly at first to ensure workers search in the formal sector and then falls sharply to zero allowing workers to derive consumption from the informal sector

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

the cost of job loss this article identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and endogenous quit turnover in a labour market with on the job search where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning by doing and lose skills while unemployed optimal contracting implies the wage paid increases with experience and tenure indirect inference using german data determines the deep parameters of the model the estimated model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages and earnings following job loss a new structural decomposition finds foregone human capital accumulation while unemployed is the worker s major cost of job loss

optimal unemployment insurance a survey unemployment insurance improves the allocation of risk bearing at the cost of reduced incentives for work in the past two decades a branch of the literature has emerged that deals with the optimal design of unemployment insurance this literature has been influenced by ideas and methods from information economics and by theories from labor economics the result is a collection of models designed to highlight a variety of issues pertaining to the provision of optimal unemployment insurance this paper reviews these issues summarizes the relevant literature assesses its accomplishments and points out problems that require further study

should unemployment insurance vary with the unemployment rate theory and evidence we study how the marginal welfare gain from increasing the unemployment insurance ui bene t level varies over the business cycle we do this by estimating how the moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing bene t of ui vary with labor market conditions which we identify using variation in the interaction of ui bene t levels with the unemployment rate within u s states over time we nd that the moral hazard cost is procyclical greater when the unemployment rate is relatively low by contrast we do not nd evidence that the consumption smoothing bene t varies with the unemployment rate we use these empirical results to estimate the marginal welfare gain and we nd that it is modest on average but varies positively with the unemployment rate jel h5 j64 j65

the optimal timing of unemployment benefits theory and evidence from sweden this paper provides a simple yet robust framework to evaluate the time profile of benefits paid during an unemployment spell we derive sufficient statistics formulae capturing the marginal insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during a spell our approach allows us to revisit separate arguments for inclining or declining profiles put forward in the theoretical literature and to identify welfare improving changes in the benefit profile that account for all relevant arguments jointly for the empirical implementation we use administrative data on unemployment linked to data on consumption income and wealth in sweden first we exploit duration dependent kinks in the replacement rate and find that if anything the moral hazard cost of benefits is larger when paid earlier in the spell second we find that the drop in consumption affecting the insurance value of benefits is large from the start of the spell but further increases throughout the spell in trading off insurance and incentives our analysis suggests that the at benefit profile in sweden has been too generous overall however both from the insurance and the incentives side we find no evidence to support the introduction of a declining tilt in the profile

the joint design of unemployment insurance and employment protection a first pass unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation in this paper we argue that they are tightly linked and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model with risk averse workers risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity we show that in the first best unemployment insurance comes with employment protection in the form of layoff taxes indeed optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits we then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best limits on insurance limits on layoff taxes ex post wage bargaining and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers we show how the design must be modified in each case finally we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals from the financing of unemployment insurance to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

the effects of labour market policies in an economy with an informal sector in this article we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector our model extends mortensen and pissarides 1994 by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal sector productivity we use the model to analyse the effects of labour market policy on informal sector and formal sector output on the division of the workforce into unemployment informal sector employment and formal sector employment and on wages finally we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy specifically we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal sector matches in this article we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the effects of labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector what we mean by an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly affected by labour market policies such as severance or payroll taxes we find that labour market policies that apply only to the formal sector nonetheless affect the size and the composition of employment in the informal sector this is important since there is substantial economic activity in the informal sector in many economies particularly in developing countries estimates for some latin american countries put the informal sector at more than 50 of the urban work force 1 the informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some developed economies 2 although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a segmented labour market framework this interpretation is not consistent with recent empirical evidence from latin america under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the secondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal sector jobs maloney 2004 presents evidence for several latin american countries that challenges this view and instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector similarly using data from the argentinian household survey pratap and quintin 2006 reject the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater buenos aires area concluding that there is no evidence of a formal sector wage premium after controlling for individual and establishment we thank mauricio santamaria for stimulating conversations that inspired our interest in this topic we also thank bob hussey and fabien postel vinay as well as our editor steve pischke and two anonymous

optimal state contingent unemployment insurance since the probability of finding a job is aected not only by individual eort but also by the aggregate state of the economy designing unemployment insurance payments conditional on the business cycle could be valuable this paper answers a fundamental question related to this issue how should the payments vary with the aggregate state of the economy

unemployment insurance and capital accumulation abstract in this paper i examine a model economy with production search and unemployment insurance the introduction of capital into the economy of wang and williamson j monetary econom 49 7 2001 1337 generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero the result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise unlike most of the literature i compute explicitly the cost of the transition path agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path i then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

drowned by numbers stabilization properties of an eu wide unemployment insurance system the recent crisis has given rise to proposals for the creation of a european unemployment insurance system we simulate an eu wide mechanism under various scenarios varying methods of financing common or country specific contribution rates and triggers for pay outs all time or contingent clauses we analyse the impact of the system using different measures of stabilization under different fiscal multipliers a system operating during bad times periods where the increase in unemployment is large would reduce gdp growth variability but also growth correlation among member countries hence there is a trade off between stabilization and synchronization of national business cycles

reference dependent job search evidence from hungary we propose a model of job search with reference dependent preferences with loss aversion relative to recent income the reference point in this model newly unemployed individuals search hard since consumption is below their reference point over time though they get used to lower income and thus reduce their search effort in anticipation of a benefit cut their search effort rises again then declines once they get accustomed to the lower postcut benefit level the model fits the typical pattern of exit from unemployment even with no unobserved heterogeneity to distinguish between this and other models we use a unique reform in the unemployment insurance ui benefit path in 2005 hungary switched from a single step ui system to a two step system with overall generosity unchanged the system generated increased hazard rates in anticipation of and especially following benefit cuts in ways the standard model has a hard time explaining we estimate a model with optimal consumption endogenous search effort and unobserved heterogeneity the reference dependent model fits the hazard rates substantially better than plausible versions of the standard model including habit formation our estimates indicate a slow adjusting reference point and substantial impatience likely reflecting present bias jel codes d03 j64 j65

optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions this article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable we examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient we find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt

on optimal unemployment compensation abstract the design of an optimal unemployment compensation scheme is analyzed using a dynamic principal agent relationship between a risk neutral planner the principal and risk averse workers the agents where the planner s inability to observe workers job search efforts creates a moral hazard problem to design an implementable scheme we require that each agent is guaranteed a minimum level of expected discounted utility regardless of his past history in contrast with previous studies we find that the optimal contract is quite close to actual unemployment compensation schemes both qualitatively and quantitatively

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

factor proportions and relative wages the supply side determinants of wage inequality supply side factors may contribute to rising wage inequality first certain changes in the supply of skills allegedly exacerbate wage inequality women s increased labor force participation and increased immigration are the leading candidates both allegedly reduce the wages of less skilled men however immigration s impact on wage inequality has been minor and the effects of women s participation is inconclusive second in evaluating the likelihood that human capital investment will mitigate future inequality evidence suggests that rising returns to education have increased the proportion of young people attending college limiting the growth of inequality among high wage workers

structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring to evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers it is important to take account of post unemployment wages and job to job mobility we structurally estimate a model with search channels using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized the data include registers and survey data on search behavior we find that the opportunity to move to better paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment job mobility compensates for adverse long run effects of monitoring on wages we examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path

optimal conflict in preference assessment conflict arises indecision making when the choice alternatives present strong advantages and disadvantages over one another that is when the trade offs involved are large conflict affects human response to choice in particular it increases decision difficulty and response unreliability on the other hand larger trade offs i e higher conflict reveal more information about an individual s preferences and mitigate the influence of measurement unreliability on preference model estimation this suggests somewhat counterintuitively that there may exist some optimal level of conflict for efficient measurement of preferences how to determine this level this issue is examined from behavioral and analytical angles we outline a general analysis of the interaction between trade off size and modeling accuracy and demonstrate its application on a simple example the kind of analysis developed here can be conveniently implemented in a computer spreadsheet and would be especially valuable when large amounts of preference data are to be collected as in consumer preference studies experimental research and contingent valuation surveys

the wealth of the unemployed many studies have investigated the adequacy of unemployment insurance ui benefits as a form of income replacement but few have looked at other resources with which the unemployed can finance their unemployment spells this paper focuses on one form of resources own wealth holdings the author finds that the median worker s financial assets can cover roughly two thirds of the income loss from an unemployment spell wealth holdings vary tremendously however and almost one third of workers are unable to replace even 10 of their income loss moreover predicted wealth holdings decline precipitously with realized unemployment durations both absolutely and especially relative to actual income loss this finding together with the finding that individuals who are eligible for more generous ui draw down their wealth more slowly than do others during unemployment spells suggests that ui benefit adequacy could be increased if the benefits were targeted to those with longer unemployment spells

sick pay insurance and sickness absence some european cross country observations and a review of previous research all european countries have some form of compulsory insurance against the loss of income due to temporary disability the insurance schemes vary widely between countries both in terms of measurable

on the first order approach in principal agent models with hidden borrowing and lending we provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first order approach for two period dynamic moral hazard problems where the agent can save and borrow secretly the first order approach is valid if the following conditions hold i the agent has non increasing absolute risk aversion utility niara ii the output technology has monotone likelihood ratios mlr and iii the distribution function of output is log convex in effort lcdf moreover under these three conditions the optimal contract is monotone in output we also investigate a few possibilities of relaxing these requirements

a general formula for the optimal level of social insurance in an influential paper baily 1978 showed that the optimal level of unemployment insurance ui in a stylized static model depends on only three parameters risk aversion the consumption smoothing benefit of ui and the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the benefit rate this paper examines the key economic assumptions under which these parameters determine the optimal level of social insurance i show that a baily type expression with an adjustment for precautionary saving motives holds in a general class of dynamic models subject to weak regularity conditions for example the simple reduced form formula derived here applies with arbitrary borrowing constraints durable consumption goods private insurance arrangements and search and leisure benefits of unemployment