capital management in mutual financial institutions abstract capital management by mutual financial institutions such as credit unions provides a valuable testing ground for assessing the impact of capital regulation and theories of managerial behaviour in financial institutions limited access to external equity capital means that capital accumulation must be met primarily by reliance on retained earnings to deal with shocks to the capital position and avoid breaching regulatory requirements managers will aim to have a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum moreover mutual governance arrangements and an absence of capital market discipline mean that managers have discretion to set target capital ratios which differ significantly from industry averages this paper develops a formal model of capital management and risk management in mutual financial institutions such as credit unions which reflects these industry characteristics the model is tested using data from larger credit unions in australia which have been subject to the basel accord risk weighted capital requirements since 1993 the data supports the hypothesis that credit unions manage their capital position by setting a short term target profit rate return on assets which is positively related to asset growth and which is aimed at gradually removing discrepancies between the actual and desired capital ratio desired capital ratios vary significantly across credit unions there is little evidence of short run adjustments to the risk of the asset portfolio to achieve a desired capital position

capital requirements and bank behaviour empirical evidence for switzerland abstract in recent years regulators have increased their focus on the capital adequacy of banking institutions to enhance the stability of the financial system the purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on whether and how swiss banks react to constraints placed by the regulator on their capital building on previous work by shrieves and dahl cf shrieves r e dahl d 1992 the relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks journal of banking and finance 16 439 457 we use a simultaneous equations model to analyse adjustments in capital and risk at swiss banks when those approach the minimum regulatory capital level our results indicate that regulatory pressure induce banks to increase their capital but does not affect the level of risk

does smoking affect schooling evidence from teenagers in rural china youth smoking can biologically reduce learning productivity it can also reduce youths expected returns to education and lower their motivation to go to school where smoking is forbidden using rich household survey data from rural china this study investigates the effect of youth smoking on educational outcomes youth smoking is clearly an endogenous variable to obtain consistent estimates of its impact we use counts of registered alcohol vendors and a food price index as instrumental variables since the variable that measures smoking behavior is censored for non smoking adolescents we implement a two step estimation strategy to account for the censored nature of this endogenous regressor the estimates indicate that smoking one cigarette per day during adolescence can lower students scores on mathematics tests by about 0 08 standard deviations however we find no significant effect of youth smoking on either chinese test scores or total years of schooling

the effectiveness of bank capital adequacy regulation a theoretical and empirical approach the aim of this paper is to analyse how banking firms set their capital ratios that is the rate of equity capital over assets in order to study this isue two theoretical models are developed both models deal with the existence of an optimal capital ratio the first one for firms not affected by capital adequacy regulation the second one for firms which are the models have been tested by estimating a disequilibrium model using data of spanish savings banks

joint effects of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on optimal bank portfolio adjustments the 1980 depository institution deregulation and monetary control act didmca mandates that regulation q be phased out by 1986 with deregulation of interest rate ceilings the cost of raising capital funds for commercial banks would become more volatile and more closely related with interest rates in the money and capital markets thus value maximizing bank managers would need to be concerned not only with the internal risk but also with the external risk in bank portfolio management decisions based upon the cash flow version of the capital asset pricing model this paper analyzes the joint impact of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on the portfolio behavior of a banking firm the 1980 depository institution deregulation and monetary control act didmca mandates that regulation q be phased out by 1986 with deregulation of interest rate ceilings the cost of raising capital funds for commercial banks would become more volatile and more correlated with interest rates in the money and capital markets the bank s cash profit would be more dependent on the interest rate fluctuation ceteris paribus thus the value of a banking firm would also be more dependent on the correlation of the banking firm s cash profit with that of the external market ceteris paribus therefore as deregulation continues a value maximizing bank manager would need to be concerned not only with variance and covariances among the returns on bank assets but also with covariances between rates on bank assets and liabilities as well as that in the external markets study of portfolio behavior of a banking firm should distinguish between the impact of internal risk and external risk on firm value furthermore with interest rate deregulation and the ensuing interactions among various risks banks may also react differently to capital regulation imposed by the regulatory agency despite numerous studies on regulation of bank capital the joint effects of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on bank

theories of bank behavior under capital regulation abstract this paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the basel i and basel ii systems of risk based capital requirements the theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk adjusted assets this literature produces highly mixed predictions however regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole thus the intellectual foundation for the present capital regulation regime is not particularly strong the mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements these widely ambiguous results do suggest however that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area

power market long term stability a hybrid madm ga comprehensive framework stabilizing the long term electricity markets by providing new generation resources is one of the most important challenges that are surfaced to the industry regulators to deal with this complex problem this paper proposes a comprehensive multiple attribute decision making madm framework in which the genetic algorithm ga is used to model the investment decisions of the market generation firms the fitness function of the ga is itself a decentralized optimization problem that simulates the short term behavior of these profit oriented firms a simple fuzzy inference system and an elasticity relation between price and demand represent the power market as the link among all firms the framework is augmented by tradeoff risk analysis to incorporate the effects of the uncertainties finally a realistic case study is presented to show the advantages of the proposed framework

estimating dynamic demand for cigarettes using panel data the effects of bootlegging taxation and advertising reconsidered abstracct a dynamic demand for cigarette consumption is estimated using pooled data of 46 states over the period 1963 to 1980 a price elasticity of 0 2 and an insignificant income elasticity is found using pooled estimation techniques the bootlegging effect is modeled explicitly using neighboring price the effect is found to be significant two major policy issues are analyzed in light of these new estimates 1 cigarette taxation is found to be an effective tool for generating revenues even though there may be spillover effects to neighboring states where bootlegging is significant 2 the effects of the fairness doctrine act and the advertising ban on cigarette consumption are re examined we find mild support for the effectiveness of subsidized anti smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption and no support for the thesis that the ban on advertising helps to increase per capita consumption

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

financial intermediation as a beliefs bridge between optimists and pessimists this paper proposes a new framework for understandingnancial intermediation in contrast to previous research we consider a setting in which intermediaries possess no inherent information processing or monitoring advantages instead in an economy with overly optimistic entrepreneurs who require funding from overly skeptical pessimistic investors we show that intermediaries can arise endogenously in such a setting only a rational intermediary will be su ciently optimistic tond it worthwhile to invest in a technology for screening entrepreneurs projects and yet be pessimistic enough to use this technology our framework produces implications consistent with heretofore unexplained stylized facts and a number of others which are as of yet untested

the potential for using excise taxes to reduce smoking we examine the potential for reducing cigarette smoking through increases in cigarette excise taxes by estimating the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes using information on individual smoking behavior from the 1976 health interview survey we estimate the adult price elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be 0 42 we find that price has its greatest effect on the smoking behavior of young males and that it operates primarily on the decision to smoke rather than via adjustments in the quantity of cigarettes smoked an excise tax increase would discourage smoking by successive cohorts of young adults and those reduced smoking levels would be reflected in aggregate smoking as these cohorts mature

does the basle capital accord reduce bank fragility an assessment of the value at risk approach abstract we examine the economic implications arising from a bank using a var constrained mean variance model for the selection of its trading portfolio as a consequence of the basle capital accord surprisingly we show that when a var constraint is imposed it is plausible that certain banks will end up selecting riskier portfolios than they would have chosen in the absence of the constraint accordingly regulators such as the basle committee on banking supervision should be aware that allowing a bank to use var to determine its minimum regulatory capital may increase its fragility alternatives to var based bank capital regulation that mitigate or even preclude its perverse implications are presented

how bank capital buffers vary across countries the influence of cost of deposits market power and bank regulation abstract this paper analyzes the bank and country determinants of capital buffers using a panel data of 1337 banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002 after controlling for adjustment costs and the endogeneity of explanatory variables the results show that capital buffers are positively related to the cost of deposits and bank market power although the relations vary across countries depending on regulation supervision and institutions their impact is the result of two generally opposing effects restrictions on bank activities and official supervision reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline but at the same time they promote higher capital buffers by increasing market power institutional quality has the two opposite effects better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance however have a clear positive effect on capital buffers by both strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce risk taking incentives

is addiction rational theory and evidence this paper makes two contributions to the modeling of addiction first we provide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward looking in their smoking decisions using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective and monthly data on consumption second we recognize the strong evidence that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent with individuals both not recognizing the true dife culty of quitting and searching for self control devices to help them quit we develop a new model of addictive behavior that takes as its starting point the standard rational addiction model but incorporates time inconsistent preferences this model also exhibits forward looking behavior but it has strikingly different normative implications in this case optimal government policy should depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the internalities imposed by smokers on themselves we estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case

tax incidence when individuals are time inconsistent the case of cigarette excise taxes abstract one of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups we argue that traditional quantity based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive time consistent model of consumption of sin goods a model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot this self control function benefits lower income groups more since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking calibrations show that as a result cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values

assessing the risk return trade off in loan portfolios abstract this paper proposes a methodology to analyse the risk and return of large loan portfolios in a joint setting i propose a tractable model to obtain the distribution of loan returns from observed interest rates and default frequencies i follow a sectoral approach that captures the heterogeneous cyclical features of different kinds of loans and yields moments in closed form i investigate the validity of mean variance analysis with a value at risk constraint and study its relationship with utility maximisation finally i study the efficiency of corporate and household loan portfolios in an empirical application to the spanish banking system

evaluation of regulatory impacts on dynamic behavior of investments in electricity markets a new hybrid dp game framework a new hybrid framework based on game theory and dynamic programming dp with random demands and prices is proposed for studying the impacts of regulatory interventions on the dynamics of investment in power generation in electricity markets in our approach using markov chains the electric demand and growth of fuel prices have been modeled dp has been used for solving the generation expansion planning gep problem investment strategies of other investors in the market are modeled as constraints the income of the investor is calculated by modeling strategic interactions among market players in the spot energy market the cournot game concept has been applied and the nash equilibrium is calculated for each state and stage of dp simulation results confirm that the proposed framework is an appropriate decision support tool that provides useful information about dynamics of investment

managing efficient capital allocation with emphasis on the chinese experience responsible risk management is central to banking ethics with the 1999 publication of the basel committee s proposal basel ii for a new capital accord to replace the 1988 agreement basel i an attempt has been made to address the problem of correlating banks risk management with their capital requirements the basel ii framework finalised in june 2004 is designed to improve risk management by using models based on past performance to help set the amount of capital banks are required to hold by regulators with the purpose of improving the efficiency of capital allocation the objectives of this study are to investigate how banks generally but particularly those located in china could improve their risk management systems and what the implications of these new regulations are for them three relevant propositions were formulated namely basel ii will improve risk management basel ii will improve capital allocation efficiency and compliance with advanced risk management systems is biased in favour of the large banks evidence was assembled with which to evaluate these three propositions by gathering relevant primary data by means of a representative survey of chinese banking executives involved in risk management the findings strongly support the first two of the above propositions and partly support the third proposition

risk based capital requirements and bank portfolio risk abstract we construct a linear programming model and analyze the effectiveness of r b capital adequacy standards when bank deposits are fully insured we derive a set of optimal asset risk weights given a constraint in raising equity and using these weights the r b capital plan is an effective regulation mechanism without a constraint on equity maximum leverage restrictions and r b capital plans are mutually exclusive alternatives as we deviate from the optimal risk weights a combination of a leverage restriction and a r b equity ratio seems to be the more appropriate approach to controlling bank portfolio risk

banks buffer capital how important is risk abstract most banks hold a capital to asset ratio well above the required minimum defined by the present capital adequacy regulation basel i using bank level panel data from norway important hypotheses concerning the determination of this buffer capital are analyzed focus is on the importance of i risk ii the buffer as an insurance iii the competition effect iv supervisory discipline and v economic growth a negative or non significant risk effect is found which suggests that introducing a more risk sensitive capital regulation basel ii is likely to affect norwegian banks support is found for the hypothesis that buffer capital serves as an insurance against failure to meet the capital requirements

bank regulation risk and return evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises in this paper we analyze whether regulation reduced risk during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis for a cross section of global banks in this regard we examine distance to default laeven and levine 2008 systemic risk acharya et al 2010 idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk we employ world bank survey data on regulations to test our conjectures we find that regulatory restrictions official supervisory power capital stringency along with private monitoring can explain bank risk in both crises additionally we find that deposit insurance schemes enhance moral hazard as this encouraged banks to take on more risk and perform poorly during the sovereign debt crisis finally official supervision and private monitoring explains the returns during both crisis periods

optimal bank capital with costly recapitalization we study optimal bank capital choice as a dynamic trade off between the opportunity cost of equity the loss of franchise value following a regulatory minimum capital violation and the cost of recapitalization we introduce a recapitalization delay that results in a strictly positive probability of capital adequacy violation we calibrate the model to bank accounting return data and evaluate the model s ability to explain observed bank capital ratios differences in return volatility explain a significant fraction of the cross sectional variation in bank capital ratios differences in the level of capital market imperfections across banks constitute a secondary explanation

forbearance deposit insurance pricing and incentive compatible bank regulation abstract this paper examines the incentive compatible role of regulatory forbearance policy in the context of optimal bank regulation under moral hazard we show that when a bank s asset portfolio returns have market risk the regulator can influence the bank s choice of ex ante risk by delaying the closure of an insolvent bank the optimal closure policy involves co ordinating the closure decision with market wide performance such a policy may significantly alleviate the bank s ex ante risk shifting problem furthermore even fixed rate deposit insurance can be optimal when combined with a sound forbearance policy and a minimum capital standard

cigarette smoking and self control this paper empirically studies time inconsistent preferences in the context of cigarette smoking behavior with hyperbolic discounting an individual has time inconsistent preferences which give rise to a lack of self control i e she may perpetually postpone the execution of a plan this implies that a smoker who wants to quit has a demand for control devices e g a smoking ban in public areas or a hike in cigarette excise taxes this paper empirically tests this implication using a sample that is based on survey data from taiwan the estimation results indicate that a smoker s intention to quit has a positive effect on the smoker s support for smoking bans and a cigarette excise tax increase these results lend support to the validity of the time inconsistent preferences in the context of cigarette smoking behavior this casts doubt on the validity of the assumption that individuals have time consistent preferences in becker and murphy s becker g s murphy k m 1988 a theory of rational addiction journal of political economy 96 4 675 700 rational addiction model

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

locational marginal price calculations using the distributed slack power flow formulation in practice locational marginal prices lmps are usually calculated by assembling their three components the reference price the congestion price and the loss price explicit formulas for calculating the three components based on the single slack power flow formulation can be found in the literature this letter presents the formulas for calculating the three components based on a distributed slack power flow formulation

re evaluating the role of energy efficiency standards a behavioral economics approach abstract the economic models that prescribe pigovian taxation as the first best means of reducing energy related externalities are typically based on the neoclassical model of rational consumer choice yet consumer behavior in markets for energy using durables is generally thought to be far from efficient giving rise to the concept of the energy efficiency gap this paper presents a welfare analysis of energy policies that is based on a behavioral model of temptation and self control introduced by gul and pesendorfer 23 24 we find that in the presence of temptation i pigovian taxes alone do not yield a first best outcome ii when viewed as substitutes energy efficiency standards can dominate pigovian taxes and iii a policy combining standards with a pigovian tax can yield higher social welfare than a pigovian tax alone implying that the two instruments should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes

can regulators allow banks to set their own capital ratios abstract basel regulators have received widespread criticism for failing to prevent two credit crises that hit the u s over the last two decades nonetheless banks were considerably overcapitalized prior to the onset of the 2007 2009 subprime crisis compared to those which had undergone the 1990 1991 recession therefore if capital requirements were achieved prior to the subprime crisis how could the basel framework be blamed again for having accelerated if not caused another credit crunch we find that the answer to this question lies in the relationship between the capital ratio and the leverage ratio which is governed by risk weights categories determined by the basel regulation we show that changes to risk weight categories which affect the correlation pattern between both ratios are not reflected in the subprime crisis this minimizes the implication of the basel ii regulation in the crunch that succeeded its announcement in contrast to basel i we demonstrate that these dynamics are governed by a formula linking the two ratios together which derives from the sensitivity of the risk based capital ratio to a change in its risk weight s one implication of our work regarding the basel iii regulation consists in validating the newly established capital increments in a mathematical rather than heuristical approach

risk in banking and capital regulation this paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control it is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk utilizing the mean variance model the following results are shown a the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks b as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation the theoretically correct risk weights under the risk based capital plan are explicitly derived and c the theoretically correct risk weights are restrictions on asset composition which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms the recent increase in bank failures especially after the 1980 and 1982 deregulatory acts has again ignited a controversy over the risk portfolio of the banking industry given the importance of this sector there has been increased scrutiny of the industry s motives for risk taking and possible regulatory changes to improve its stability these investigations have centered around two rather complementary areas the first of these is the role of deposit insurance and how its current pricing procedure encourages risk taking and justifies current bank regulations the works of buser chen and kane 4 kane 9 and benston et al 2 have made substantive contributions the authors demonstrates the way in which our current fixed rate insurance system rewards risk taking by the firm and insulates it through deposit insurance from the market discipline that needs to exist to ensure proper risk evaluation this realization has led these authors to propose a series of regulatory changes to encourage proper portfolio choice within the industry these include a shift to market value accounting risk based deposit insurance premiums and additional capital regulation the last of these serves as a method of coinsurance whereby higher capital levels require the bank to absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourage additional prudence in management in essense it is one method of risk reduction that may offset the risk preference imposed on the industry due to the inappropriate insurance pricing because the amount of capital influences the probability of bank insolvency and thus the soundness of the entire banking system the regulators ceteris paribus prefer more capital to

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

the cyclical behaviour of european bank capital buffers using an unbalanced panel of accounting data from 1997 to 2004 and controlling for individual bank costs and risk we find capital buffers of the banks in the eu15 have a significant negative co movement with the cycle for banks in the accession countries there is significant positive co movement capital buffers of commercial and savings banks and of large banks exhibit negative co movement those of co operative and smaller banks exhibit positive co movement speeds of adjustment are fairly slow we interpret these results and discuss policy implications noting that negative co movement of capital buffers will exacerbate the pro cyclical impact of basel ii

bank capital and equity investment regulations abstract this paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks minimum required capital asset ratio and the regulation that limits and in some countries forbids banks investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms there are two sources of moral hazard in the model one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project among other things the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank s stability and can also be pareto improving equity regulation is never pareto improving and does not increase the bank s stability

the effects of closure policies on bank risk taking abstract this paper models bank closure policy for a risk averse bank that enjoys flat rate deposit insurance we find that increasing the level of net worth at which banks are closed can increase or decrease induced risk aversion as well as increase the likelihood that marginally healthy banks would be subject to extreme moral hazard these result suggest that more timely closure policies should be imposed in conjunction with greater monitoring of bank portfolio risk and with restrictions on risk taking for marginally healthy banks in addition we find that changes in closure policy can increase or decrease desired leverage and that this effect depends on the degree of correlation among asset returns

or forum design of risk weights banking regulations set minimum levels of capital for banks these requirements are generally formulated through a ratio of capital to risk weighted assets a risk weighting scheme assigns a weight to each asset or category of assets and effectively functions as a linear constraint on a bank s portfolio choice it also changes the incentives for banks to hold various kinds of assets in this paper we investigate the design of risk weights to align regulatory and private objectives in a simple mean variance framework for portfolio selection by setting risk weights proportional to profitability rather than risk the regulator can induce a bank to reduce its overall level of risk without distorting its asset mix because the regulator is unlikely to know the true profitability of assets we introduce an adaptive formulation in which the regulator sets weights by observing a bank s portfolio the adaptive scheme converges to the same combination of weights and portfolio choice that would hold if the regulator knew the asset profitability we also investigate other objectives including steering banks to a target mix of assets adding robustness mitigating procyclicality and reducing system wide risk in a setting with multiple heterogeneous banks

on the sources of heterogeneity in banking efficiency literature one learns two main lessons from studying the great quantity of banking efficiency literature these lessons regard the heterogeneity in results and the absence of a comprehensive review aimed at understanding the reasons for this variability surprisingly although this issue is well known it has not been systematically analyzed before in order to fill this gap we perform a meta regression analysis mra by examining 1 661 efficiency scores retrieved from 120 papers published over the period 2000 2014 the meta regression is estimated by using the random effects multilevel model reml because it controls for within study and between study heterogeneity the analysis yields four main results firstly parametric methods yield lower levels of banking efficiency than nonparametric studies this holds true even after controlling for the approach used in selecting the inputs and outputs of the frontier secondly we show that banking efficiency is highest when using the value added approach followed by estimates from studies based on the intermediation method whereas those based on the hybrid approach are the lowest thirdly efficiency scores also depend on the quality of studies and on the number of observations and variables used in the primary papers as far as the effects of sample size dimension and quality of papers are concerned there are significant differences in sign and magnitude between parametric and nonparametric studies finally cost efficiency is found to be higher than profit and production efficiency interestingly mra results are robust to the potential outliers in efficiency and sample size distributions

liquidity provision banking and the allocation of interest rate risk abstract the paper studies the efficient allocation of technology induced interest rate risk and the implications of such risk for efficient liquidity provision complete immunization against interest rate risk is shown to be undesirable as it precludes the exploitation of favourable reinvestment opportunities under the assumptions of diamond dybvig 1983 interest induced valuation risks of long term assets should be born by early withdrawers reinvestment opportunity risks of short term assets by late withdrawers efficient liquidity provision thus entails no shifting of interest rate risk in the absence of additional moral hazard second best allocations can be implemented through unregulated competition among banks

systemic risk and bank business models textabstractin this paper we decompose banks systemic risk into two dimensions the risk of a bank bank tail risk and the link of the bank to the system in financial distress systemic linkage based on extreme value theory we estimate a systemic risk measure that can be decomposed into two subcomponents reflecting these dimensions empirically we assess the relationships of bank business models to the two dimensions of systemic risk the observed differences in these relationships partly explain why micro and macroprudential perspectives sometimes have different implications for banking regulation

bank resolution a framework for the assessment of regulatory intervention more than ever the current crisis has highlighted the cost of banking crises in budgetary and economic growth terms whether or not to restructure a bank is a key determinant of who bears the costs the present article surveys the main issues concerning banks restructuring by considering the bargaining game that is played between regulators and shareholders when a bank is in distress this revolves around the framework of negotiation that was established by the regulator the fall back position which is determined by bankruptcy legislation and the objective function of the regulator in this context we argue that it is possible to improve upon existing restructuring mechanisms by making banks bail outs less costly to taxpayers and improving the ex ante incentives of banks managers and shareholders the authors 2012 published by oxford university press

banks regulatory buffers liquidity networks and monetary policy transmission based on a quarterly regulatory dataset for german banks from 1999 to 2004 this paper analyzes the effects of banks regulatory capital on the transmission of monetary policy in a system of liquidity networks the dynamic panel regression results provide evidence in favor of the bank capital channel theory banks holding less regulatory capital and less interbank liquidity react more restrictively to a monetary tightening than their peers

discounting the distant future an experimental investigation we use a laboratory experiment to elicit discount rates over a 20 year time horizon using government savings bonds as a payment vehicle when using a constant exponential discount rate function we find an implied average discount rate of 4 9 which is much lower than has been found in previous experimental studies that used time horizons of days or months however we also find strong support for non constant declining discount rates for longer time horizons with an extrapolated implied annual discount rate approaching 0 5 in 100 years there is heterogeneity in discount rates and risk preferences in that people with more optimistic beliefs about technological progress have higher discount rates these findings contribute to the debate over the appropriate discount rate to use in comparing the long term benefits of climate change mitigation to the more immediate costs

the cyclical effects of the basel ii capital requirements abstract capital requirements play a key role in the supervision and regulation of banks the basel committee on banking supervision is in the process of changing the current framework by introducing risk sensitive capital charges some fear that this will unduly increase the volatility of regulatory capital furthermore by limiting the banks ability to lend capital requirements may exacerbate an economic downturn the paper examines the problem of capital induced lending cycles and their pro cyclical effect on the macroeconomy in greater detail it finds that the capital buffer that banks hold on top of the required minimum capital plays a crucial role in mitigating the impact of the volatility of capital requirements

does collateral fuel moral hazard in banking this paper presents two models in which the fluctuating value of loan collateral real estate generates the problem of moral hazard between a bank and a deposit insurance agent the bank finances risky projects against collateral and relies on the rising collateral value if the collateral value later appreciates the bank enjoys handsome profits otherwise the bank fails the findings are rather consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis

bank size and risk taking under basel ii this paper discusses the relationship between bank size and risk taking under pillar i of the new basel capital accord using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard we find that small banks and hence small borrowers may profit from the introduction of an internal ratings based irb approach if this approach is applied uniformly across banks however the banks right to choose between the standardized and the irb approaches unambiguously hurts small banks who are pushed towards higher risk taking due to fiercer competition this may even lead to higher aggregate risk in the economy

accounting for banks capital regulation and risk taking this paper examines risk taking incentives in banks under dierent accounting regimes with capital regulation in the model the bank s decisions of capital issuance and investment policy are jointly determined given exogenous minimum capital requirement the bank is more likely to issue equity capital in excess of the minimum required level and implement less risky investment policy under either lower of cost ormarket accounting or fair value accounting than under historical cost accounting but fair value accounting may induce more risk taking compared to lower of cost or market accounting due to short term interest in the part of the bank however the disciplining role of lower of cost or market accounting may discourage bank s incentive to exert project discovery eort

capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks abstract i study the consequences of capital regulations on the portfolio choices of commercial banks elaborating on previous work by kareken and wallace 1978 koehn and santomero 1980 and kim and santomero 1988 i obtain the following results if the objective of commercial banks is maximization of the market value of their future profits value maximizing banks capital regulations cannot prevent banks from choosing very specialized and very risky portfolios risk based insurance premia are in fact the relevant instrument for that purpose on the other hand if banks behave as portfolio managers utility maximizing banks capital regulations can be effective but only if the weights used in the computation of the ratio are proportional to the systematic risks of the assets their betas because of limited liability of commercial banks a minimum capital regulation or a closing rule may become necessary as well to prevent failing banks from betting for resurrection

a comparison of the original and revised basel market risk frameworks for regulating bank capital abstract recognizing that many banks suffered trading losses that notably exceeded their minimum capital requirements during the recent crisis the basel committee on banking supervision 2011 revised its regulatory framework for trading portfolios in this paper we compare 1 the relative effectiveness of risk management systems based on the original and revised frameworks in controlling tail risk and 2 the relative adequacy of these frameworks in setting minimum capital requirements our main findings are as follows first both systems allow the selection of portfolios with substantive tail risk but one based on the revised framework tends to be less effective in controlling tail risk second the minimum capital requirements set by the revised framework are much less likely to be wiped out by trading losses than those set by the original framework hence on balance the revised framework improves upon the original framework we also suggest further improvements for consideration by bank regulators

banks debt and risk assessing the spillovers of corporate taxes we find evidence of tax driven strategic allocation of debt and asset risk across group entities of european banks we evaluate the effects that establishing tax neutrality between debt and equity finance has on systemic risk and show that the degree of coordination in implementing the hypothetical tax reform matters in particular a coordinated elimination of the tax advantage of debt would significantly reduce systemic losses in the event of a severe banking crisis by contrast uncoordinated tax reforms are not equally beneficial precisely because national tax policies generate spillovers through cross border bank activities jel g21 g28 h25

a reexamination of mean variance analysis of bank capital regulation abstract the mean variance framework has been used to analyze the effects of bank capital regulation on the asset and bankruptcy risk of insured utility maximizing banks this literature claims that more stringent capital regulation will increase asset risk and can increase bankruptcy risk these conclusions are notable because they are opposite to those obtained for insured value maximizing banks in this paper we show that the utility maximization literature does not support its conclusions regarding the effects of bank capital regulation because it has mischaracterized the bank s investment opportunity set by neglecting the option value of deposit insurance

mean variance portfolio selection with at risk constraints and discrete distributions we examine the impact of adding either a var or a cvar constraint to the mean variance model when security returns are assumed to have a discrete distribution with finitely many jump points three main results are obtained first portfolios on the var constrained boundary exhibit k 2 fund separation where k is the number of states for which the portfolios suffer losses equal to the var bound second portfolios on the cvar constrained boundary exhibit k 3 fund separation where k is the number of states for which the portfolios suffer losses equal to their vars third an example illustrates that while the var of the cvar constrained optimal portfolio is close to that of the var constrained optimal portfolio the cvar of the former is notably smaller than that of the latter this result suggests that a cvar constraint is more effective than a var constraint to curtail large losses in the mean variance model 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

discount rates inferred from decisions an experimental study two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 4 4 factorial design scenario postponing a receipt postponing a payment expediting a receipt expediting a payment time delay 0 5 1 2 and 4 years and size of cashflow 40 200 1000 and 5000 individual discount rates were inferred from the responses and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios time delays and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected a market segmentation approach was found lacking the results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position

a game theoretic model for generation expansion planning problem formulation and numerical comparisons this paper presents an application of noncooperative game theory to generation expansion planning gep in a competitive electricity industry the authors apply the cournot model of oligopoly behavior to formulate a gep model that may characterize expansion planning in a competitive regime particularly in pool dominated generation supply industries numerical experiments are conducted on a test system to analyze generation investment and market participation decisions of candidate expansion units that vary in costs and forced outage rates the numerical results point to 1 greater industry expansion and system reliability under cournot competition than under centralized expansion planning and 2 higher probabilistic measures of reliability from multi player expansion than from expansion by a traditional monopolist with an equivalent reserve margin requirement furthermore the authors summarize analytical results involving a simplified version of the gep game

multicriteria methods for resource planning an experimental comparison multicriteria decision making mcdm methods are widely used for comparing alternatives when there are multiple objectives for instance utilities use them for resource bidding externality quantification facility siting and resource planning there are many alternative methods differing in their ease of use validity results and appropriateness to resource planning several mcdm methods are compared in an experiment involving the choice of resource portfolio for seattle city light planners and interest group representatives applied direct weight assessment tradeoff weight assessment additive value functions and goal programming most of the participants concluded that mcdm methods could promote insight and confidence in decision making however the authors also confirmed the existence of method biases previously identified by psychologists no single method emerged as best thus application of two or more methods as consistency checks is recommended to guard against bias and to stimulate insight

capital and risk in property liability insurance markets abstract this paper investigates the capital and portfolio risk decisions of property liability insurance firms a theoretical model based on option pricing theory is developed which predicts a positive relationship between insurer capital and risk as firms balance these two factors to achieve their desired overall insolvency risk the implications of the model are then tested empirically using a simultaneous equations methodology the results support the predictions of the model they also provide evidence that managerial incentives play a role in determining capital and risk in insurance markets the findings have significant implications for insurance solvency regulation

gaming the uniform price spot market quantitative analysis in this paper a range of indices have been derived to quantify the incentives to game the uniform price spot market the gain of a portfolio generator due to withdrawing capacity and or inflating the price bid has been found to be proportional to the in merit market share of the gaming generator and the inverse combined price elasticity of supply demand a gaming index has also been derived as a modification of the herfindahl hirschman index which takes into account the reduction in the number of competitors as the demand goes up and the benefit the portfolio generators take from gaming price elastic loads reduce gaming opportunities but do not remove them application of the indices has been illustrated using the the spot market in england and wales the results seem to confirm practical evidence from many countries that spot markets are vulnerable to gaming

does traditional price policy work for achieving low smoking rate empirical and theoretical evaluation based on the united states aggregate data in the united states smoking has been strictly restricted by both federal and state governments almost all the policies have imposed high tax on cigarettes for decreasing the number of smokers i

capital regulation heterogeneous monitoring costs and aggregate loan quality abstract this paper develops a banking sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure after analyzing an unregulated banking system we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks to gauge the impact of capital requirements we define loan quality in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population under the assumption of a specific cross sectional distribution of banks our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending but has an ambiguous effect on loan quality nevertheless once capital requirements are in place the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan quality by toughening capital requirements

why basel ii may need a leverage ratio restriction abstract we analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks it is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks an additional risk independent leverage ratio restriction may be necessary to induce truthful risk reporting the leverage ratio helps to offset the banks potential capital savings of understating their risks by i reducing banks put option value of limited liability ex ante and by ii increasing the banks net worth which in turn enhances the supervisors ability to sanction banks ex post

capital controls and bank risk abstract we analyze the effects of deposit guarantees on banks loan portfolio in contrast to earlier work we view bank loans net of evaluation and monitoring costs as non zero npv investments e g market securities deposit guarantees lead to inefficient investment and under plausible circumstances capital requirement increases lead banks to increase asset risk the risk increase reduces the beneficial effects of capital increases on the probability of default and on the economic efficiency of bank lending in some cases a tightening of the capital constraint even leads to an increase in the probability of default and financial instability and to higher expected costs of transferring assets to regulatory agencies increases in bank capital are not a substitute for risk monitoring and control and may imply an increased need for such surveillance

capital regulation and bank risk taking a note abstract this paper examines theoretically the effects of more stringent capital regulation on bank asset portfolio risk the analysis shows that for a value maximizing bank incentives to increase asset risk decline as its capital increases thus as long as regulatory efforts to contain asset risk and size are not reduced more stringent capital regulation unambiguously reduces the expected liability of the deposit insurance system

challenges when electricity markets face the investment phase abstract deregulation of electricity industry in europe has tended to start with a grace period of energy surplus inherited from the previously expansive coordinated economies and further amplified by better resource utilisation from extended international trade the regulatory challenge has therefore primarily been to allocate existing generation to consumers in an efficient way however as energy demand increases due to economic growth the challenge of providing new capacity surfaces the nordic region which has been a pioneer in internationalising and deregulating electricity is now approaching this stage ahead of most of the rest of europe while the nordic case is characterised by specificities related to hydropower it also raises the more general challenge of capacity expansion under a deregulated market economy the article therefore discusses how the nordic investment challenges of today shed light on more generic challenges that may become more general european challenges of tomorrow in a final section the article discusses policy options available to address the investment price hike challenge the argument is put forward that recursion to some degree of coordinated governance might seem necessary if solutions are confined within large scale technical systems however within the context of a small scale decentralised technological development one may be more confident of competitive solutions

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

when more is less using multiple constraints to reduce tail risk abstract financial institutions suffered large trading losses during the 2007 2009 global financial crisis these losses cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulations and risk management systems based on a single value at risk var constraint while some researchers have recommended using conditional value at risk cvar to control tail risk var remains popular among practitioners and regulators accordingly our paper examines the effectiveness of multiple var constraints in controlling cvar under certain conditions we theoretically show that they are more effective than a single var constraint furthermore we numerically find that the maximum cvar permitted by the constraints is notably smaller than with a single constraint these results suggest that regulations and risk management systems based on multiple var constraints are more effective in reducing tail risk than those based on a single var constraint

unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation abstract we analyze a bank that operates under the basel credit and market risk requirements and that maximizes its value through recapitalizations dividends and liquid asset investments according to our model the market risk requirement may postpone recapitalization and this way increase the bank s default probability we show that this is indeed the case if the expected return and volatility of the liquid asset portfolio are high i e then the market risk requirement raises the default probability of the bank in this sense the market risk requirement is inefficient

the impact of bank capital on profitability and risk in asian banking abstract this article applies the generalized method of moments technique for dynamic panels using bank level data for 42 asian countries over the period 1994 to 2008 to investigate the impacts of bank capital on profitability and risk ignoring influence factors the extant literature presents an ambiguous impact of bank capital on profitability risk however when the effects from the influencing factors are taken into consideration three conclusions are reached first along with the change in the categories of banks investment banks have the lowest and positive capital effect on profitability whereas commercial banks reveal the highest reverse capital effect on risk second banks in low income countries have a higher capital effect on profitability banks in lower middle income countries have the highest reverse capital effect on risk while banks in high income countries have the lowest values third banks in middle eastern countries own the highest and positive capital effect on profitability far east central asian banks have the largest reverse capital effect on risk while the lowest value occurs in middle eastern countries banks finally our results also reveal that persistence of profit is greatly affected by different profitability variables and all risk variables show persistence from one year to the next

taxation regulation and addiction a demand function for cigarettes based on time series evidence this work analyzes the effects of prices taxes income and anti smoking regulations on the consumption of cigarettes in california a 25 cent per pack state tax increase in 1989 enhances the usefulness of this exercise analysis is based on monthly time series data for 1980 through 1990 results show a price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the short run of 0 3 to 0 5 at mean data values and 0 5 to 0 6 in the long run we find at least some support for two further hypotheses that antismoking regulations reduce cigarette consumption and that consumers behave consistently with the model of rational addiction

banks non traditional activities under regulatory changes impact on risk performance and capital adequacy using the big six canadian chartered banks quarterly financial statements and daily stock market data from 1982 to 2018 we examine the impact of non interest income on canadian banks risk perfor

an empirical analysis of milk addiction we show the estimable rational addiction model tends to yield spurious evidence in favor of the rational addiction hypothesis when aggregate data are used direct application of the canonical model yields results seemingly indicative that non addictive commodities such as milk eggs and oranges are rationally addictive monte carlo simulation demonstrates that such results are likely to obtain whenever the commodity under scrutiny exhibits high serial correlation or when even a small amount of the variation in prices is endogenous or when overidentified instrumental variables estimators are used or when commonly imposed restrictions are employed we conclude that time series data will often be insufficient to differentiate rational addiction from serial correlation in the consumption series