haggling over substitutes abstract using a model of substitutable goods i determine generic conditions on tastes which guarantee that fixed prices are not optimal the fully optimal tariff includes lotteries that is a profit maximising seller would employ a haggling strategy we show that the fully optimal selling strategy in a class of cases requires a seller to not allow themselves to focus on one good but to remain haggling over more than one good this throws new light on the selling strategies used in diverse industries these insights are used to provide a counter example to the no lotteries result of mcafee and mcmillan j econ theory 46 1988 335

revenue management with forward looking buyers a seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline for example the end of a season potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases each period the profit maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs we show that these cutoffs are deterministic depending only on the inventory and time remaining in the continuous time limit the optimal mechanism can be implemented by posting anonymous prices when incoming demand decreases over time the optimal cutoffs satisfy a one period look ahead property and prices are defined by an intuitive differential equation

the valuation of floating rate instruments abstract a framework for valuing floating rate notes is developed to examine the effects of 1 lags in the coupon formula 2 special contractual features and 3 default risk evidence from a sample of floaters indicates they sold at significant discounts while lags in the coupon formulas and other contractual features make these notes more variable they do not account for the magnitude of the discounts we conclude that the fixed default premium in the coupon formula of a typical note is inadequate to compensate for time varying default premiums demanded by investors who treat other corporate short term paper as close substitutes

prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this paper puts forward a valuation framework for mortgage backed securities rather than imposing an optimal value minimizing call condition we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depends upon the prevailing state of the economy to implement our valuation procedure we use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a prepayment function in light of recent aggregate gnma prepayment experience by integrating this empirical prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgagebacked securities given an optimal value minimizing call policy a mortgage should never be called when its market value is less than its call price similarly a mortgage should be called if it is worth more than its call price however mortgagors often call their loans when the prevailing refinancing rate exceeds the contract rate on the loan dunn and mcconnell 1981 in addition some mortgagors do not call their loans when the loan s contract rate exceeds the prevailing refinancing rate the purpose of this paper is to put forward a valuation framework for mortgagebacked securities consistent with these stylized facts associated with mortgage prepayments the mortgagor s prepayment decision is integral to our valuation framework however we do not impose an optimal value minimizing call condition to price these securities rather we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depending upon the prevailing state of the economy by integrating this prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgage backed securities to implement our valuation procedures we estimate a prepayment function given recent gnma prepayment experience we follow green and shoven 1986 by using a proportional hazards model to estimate the influence of various explanatory variables or covariates on the mortgagor s prepayment decision distinct from green and shoven we explicitly model the effects of seasoning as well as investigating the influence of interest cost savings from refinancing in addition we also consider the effects of lagged refinancing rates heterogeneity

an equilibrium model of bond pricing and a test of market efficiency in two previous and related papers 3 4 the authors have reported the results of estimating a particular equilibrium model of bond pricing using quarterly data on canadian government bonds for the period 1964 to 1979 this paper reports the results of applying a similar model to the pricing of u s government bonds for the period 1958 1979 using data from the crsp government bond file the paper also extends the previous empirical analysis by evaluating the ability of the pricing model to detect underpriced and overpriced bonds the data reveal a strong relation between price prediction errors and subsequent bond returns

bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple good monopolist abstract multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price bundle pair of his choice we identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules we then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the n object case we use these results to characterize environments mainly distributions of valuations where bundling is the optimal mechanism in the two and three good cases

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

intertemporal price discrimination with two products we study the two product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy we show that if consumers valuations are not strongly ordered then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date for general valuations we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling so we show that the established no discrimination across time result does not extend to two product sellers under standard taste distributions

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

a more general theory of commodity bundling this paper extends the standard model of bundling as a price discrimination device to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers whether integrated or separate firms have an incentive to introduce a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand alone products product substitutability typically gives an integrated firm a greater incentive to offer a bundle discount relative to the model with additive preferences while substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to offer inter firm discounts when separate sellers coordinate on an inter firm discount they can use the discount to overturn product substitutability and relax competition

intertemporal price discrimination structure and computation of optimal policies we study a firm s optimal pricing policy under commitment the firm s objective is to maximize its long term average revenue given a steady arrival of strategic customers in particular customers arrive over time are strategic in timing their purchases and are heterogeneous along two dimensions their valuation for the firm s product and their willingness to wait before purchasing or leaving the customers patience and valuation may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion for this general formulation we prove that the firm may restrict attention to cyclic pricing policies which have length at most twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population to efficiently compute optimal policies we develop a dynamic programming approach that uses a novel state space that is general capable of handling arbitrary problem primitives and that generalizes to finite horizon problems with nonstationary parameters we analyze the class of monotone pricing policies and establish their suboptimality in general optimal policies are in a typical scenario characterized by nested sales where the firm offers partial discounts throughout each cycle offers a significant discount halfway through the cycle and holds its largest discount at the end of the cycle we further establish a form of equivalence between the problem of pricing for a stream of heterogeneous strategic customers and pricing for a pool of heterogeneous customers who may stockpile units of the product this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly contrasting complements and substitutes from independently valued products we develop an analytical model of contingent valuations and address two questions of import to a monopolist i should a given pair of complements or substitutes be sold separately pure components together pure bundling or both mixed bundling and at what prices ii how do optimal bundling and pricing strategies for complements and substitutes differ from those for independently valued products we find that the combination of marginal cost levels and the degree of complementarity or substitutability determines which of the three bundling strategies is optimal complements and substitutes should typically be priced higher than independently valued products

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

institutions and the r d of gm crops abstract this paper analyzes how different institutional structures shape the research and development r d of genetically modified crops gm crops whether this r d is conducted within companies cooperatives or public research organizations both publicly and privately funded r d is expected to influence the type of crops and traits that are developed and therefore the effects on society and ecosystems that potentially could follow from the use of gm crops this issue is analyzed empirically by statistical analysis of 1323 notifications for field trials with gm crops that have been submitted under two eu directives in seven european countries the results show that the type of r d organization influences the traits and crops that are developed companies are more likely to submit notifications that concern gm crops that secure the potential for profit than are other types of r d organizations while r d organizations that are purely publicly funded are more likely to submit notifications that only concern biosafety research than are cooperatives and companies consideration of the environment food safety and food security might justify institutional reforms of r d of gm crops this might include increased public funding combined with changes in intellectual property rights

the effects of interest rates on mortgage prepayments three main types of mortgages are fixed interest contracts which automatically fall due on the sale of a dwelling fixed rate loans which are assumable by a buyer and floating rate instruments when interest rates rise the fall in the economic value of these assets in savings and loan associations portfolios varies from one form of mortgage to another for either of the fixed interest rate contracts the cash flow from the mortgage is constant as long as it has not been prepaid if the interest rate rises the homeowner has a nominal capital gain since his loan is then at a below market interest rate he would therefore be less likely to prepay the fall in the savings and loans net worth arises from two factors 1 the interest rate differential for mortgages of a fixed duration and 2 the endogenous lengthening of the duration this paper is an attempt to measure the dependence of the duration of mortgages on the implicit unrealized capital gain of mortgage holders resulting from interest rate changes our estimate is based on a sample of 4 000 mortgages issued in california which were active in 1975 we follow their payment history from 1975 to 1982 using a proportional hazards model we estimate the percentage reduction in prepayment probability associated with interest rate changes our results indicate that for due on sale fixed interest rate mortgages a sudden increase in the interest rate from 10 to 15 percent would induce a 23 percent loss in the economic value of the mortgage if the mortgage were assumable this loss would be 28 percent correspondingly the 6 year average time to repayment of mortgages at a constant interest rate would be lengthened to nine years for due on sale mortgages and 13 1 2 years for assumable ones the definitive version is available at www blackwell synergy com this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

strong duality for a multiple good monopolist we characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them we show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure derived from the buyer s type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions this measure expresses the marginal change in the seller s revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types as a corollary we characterize the optimality of grand bundling mechanisms strengthening several results in the literature where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived as an application we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on c c 1 is a grand bundling mechanism as long as c is sufficiently large extending pavlov s result for two items pavlov 2011 at the same time our characterization also implies that for all c and for all sufficiently large n the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on c c 1 is not a grand bundling mechanism

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

the value of purchase history data in target marketing an important aspect of marketing practice is the targeting of consumer segments for differential promotional activity the premise of this activity is that there exist distinct segments of homogeneous consumers who can be identified by readily available demographic information the increased availability of individual consumer panel data open the possibility of direct targeting of individual households the goal of this paper is to assess the information content of various information sets available for direct marketing purposes information on the consumer is obtained from the current and past purchase history as well as demographic characteristics we consider the situation in which the marketer may have access to a reasonably long purchase history which includes both the products purchased and information on the causal environment short of this complete purchase history we also consider more limited information sets which consist of only the current purchase occasion or only information on past product choice without causal variables proper evaluation of this information requires a flexible model of heterogeneity which can accommodate observable and unobservable heterogeneity as well as produce household level inferences for targeting purposes we develop new econometric methods to implement a random coefficient choice model in which the heterogeneity distribution is related to observable demographics we couple this approach to modeling heterogeneity with a target couponing problem in which coupons are customized to specific households on the basis of various information sets the couponing problem allows us to place a monetary value on the information sets our results indicate there exists a tremendous potential for improving the profitability of direct marketing efforts by more fully utilizing household purchase histories even rather short purchase histories can produce a net gain in revenue from target couponing which is 2 5 times the gain from blanket couponing the most popular current electronic couponing trigger strategy uses only one observation to customize the delivery of coupons surprisingly even the information contained in observing one purchase occasion boasts net couponing revenue by 50 more than that which would be gained by the blanket strategy this result coupled with increased competitive pressures will force targeted marketing strategies to become much more prevalent in the future than they are today

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

sequentially optimal mechanisms this paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment a risk neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line the seller has all the bargaining power she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t 1 we show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism a methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent s type 2006 the review of economic studies limited