wage posting and business cycles the canonical framework of burdett and mortensen 1998 derives wage dispersion as the unique equilibrium outcome in a stationary environment with meeting frictions and random search firms derive monopsony power from search frictions and commit to wage offers workers earn rents wages are not compressed to the opportunity cost of work owing to the ability of employed workers to receive additional offers and quit directly from one job into another without experiencing unemployment in previous work moscarini and postel vinay 2016 we explored the implications of this job ladder for the aggregate dynamics of unemployment wages and the firm size distribution at business cycle frequencies the model establishes a natural connection between the average wage growth in the economy and the pace of employer to employer ee transitions through two channels first a composition effect workers typically quit a job when they receive a better offer hence the faster these transitions the higher the pace of reallocation toward high wages and the higher average wage growth second a strategic effect the more opportunities workers have to quit the more aggressive are their employers with their wage responses to try and retain them the first effect benefits only job movers the second both movers and stayers therefore we expect wage growth to be positively related to the pace of ee reallocation for all workers but especially for movers we verify this empirically with longitudinal micro data from the survey of income and program participation sipp

estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition an experimental investigation we evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data using an entry exit game we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a markov perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior if behavior was collusive however the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals the laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments our main finding is that prediction errors due to collusion are modest in size we also document a different deviation from equilibrium behavior inertia that can lead to large prediction errors

the relative power of employment to employment reallocation and unemployment exits in predicting wage growth we study the cyclical comovement nominal wage growth either monthly earnings or hourly wage rate and labor market flows we use microdata from the survey of income and program participation over 1996 2013 to purge composition effects in worker and job characteristics and to isolate the reallocative effect of employer to employer ee transitions we find an ee wage phillips curve wage inflation comoves positively with ee as strongly as with the employment rate this correlation holds for job stayers we interpret the ee rate as a measure of labor demand we find no analogous evidence for the job finding rate from unemployment

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

do job to job transitions drive wage fluctuations over the business cycle we investigate the importance of job to job jj transitions for cyclical wage dynamics by exploiting cross state variation we find that wage growth is tightly linked to variation in the jj transition probability and conditional on this the job finding probability of the unemployed has no explanatory power we investigate the robustness of our results to several caveats and find the result to hold finally we discuss the implications of our findings for competing theories of wage dynamics

on communication and collusion we study the role of communication within a cartel our analysis is carried out in stigler s 1964 model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals for a xed discount factor we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with cheap talk that result in near perfect collusion whereas all equilibria without such communication are bounded away from this outcome in our model communication improves monitoring and leads to higher prices and pro ts jel classi cation c73 d43

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

individual learning and cooperation in noisy repeated games we investigate whether two players in a long run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown specifically we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and or the monitoring structure each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned we show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a belief free equilibrium we also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples copyright 2014 oxford university press

collusion under monitoring of sales collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms prices are private information and their quantities are public information such an information structure is consistent with several recent price fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins for a class of symmetric oligopoly games it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion an asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas in practice cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

the allocation of future business dynamic relational contracts with multiple agents we consider how a firm dynamically allocates business among several suppliers to motivate them in a relational contract the firm chooses one supplier who exerts private effort output is non contractible and each supplier observes only his own relationship with the principal in this setting allocation decisions constrain the transfers that can be promised to suppliers in equilibrium consequently optimal allocation decisions condition on payoff irrelevant past performance to make strong incentives credible we construct a dynamic allocation rule that attains first best whenever any allocation rule does this allocation rule performs strictly better than any rule that depends only on payoff relevant information

private monitoring and communication in cartels explaining recent collusive practices motivated by recent cartel practices a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms prices and quantities are private information conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports the properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid lysine and vitamins

introduction to repeated games with private monitoring abstract we present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring the literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents actions although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price cutting exchange of goods with uncertain quality and observation errors it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players this is in sharp contrast to the well explored case of repeated games under public information with the celebrated folk theorems and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case however rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d43 d82 l13 l41

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

a theory of hub and spoke collusion abstract we develop a model of hub and spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers demand is stochastic and collusion between retailers is difficult the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient rotemberg and saloner 1986 in the hub and spoke collusive agreement retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier the supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price by organizing the collusion the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain we show that surprisingly this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare

collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring abstract this paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs prices nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm s continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms the mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by harrington and skrzypacz 24

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

dealing with dealers sovereign cds comovements abstract we show that sovereign cds that have common dealers tend to be more correlated especially when the dealers display similar quoting activity in those contracts over time this commonality in dealers activity is a powerful driver of cds return comovements over and above fundamental similarities between countries including default liquidity and macro factors we posit that the mechanism causing the excess correlation is the buying pressure faced by cds dealers for credit enhancements and regulatory capital reliefs an instrumental variable analysis helps alleviate the endogeneity concerns in our analysis

collusion in dynamic bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication abstract this paper studies collusion in repeated bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated it derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim trigger strategy this analysis is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations in this model it is shown that the above sufficient conditions hold if idiosyncratic noise terms are sufficiently small journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

price cutting and business stealing in imperfect cartels although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns important puzzles remain standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment but they fail to explain two important factual observations first apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs second it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected we propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation

the shadow margins of labor market slack we use a mix of new and existing data to develop the aggregate hours gap ahg a novel measure of labor market underutilization our measure differentiates individuals by detailed categories of labor market participation and uses data on their desired work hours as a measure of their potential labor supply we show that desired hours vary widely by demographics and detailed labor force status and that the gap between desired and actual work hours is strongly positively correlated with reported search effort the aggregate hours gap suggests a more sluggish labor market recovery since the great recession than either the official unemployment rate or alternative measures of labor market underutilization modest amounts of underutilization among the part time employed and a substantial degree of underutilization among those out of the labor force account for the disparity the aggregate hours gap also does well in accounting for wage movements over our sample period

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association