the optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer abstract this paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget constrained we consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function if the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint textbook monopoly pricing is optimal by contrast the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing to commit to a declining price sequence to require the buyer to disclose his budget or to offer financing journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d42 d45 d89 l12

multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders in the last few years governments in many parts of the world have aggressively sought to privatize socially held assets this wave of privatization has included the sale of industrial enterprises in the former soviet union and eastern europe the sale of public transportation systems in britain and scandinavia and the sale of radio spectra in the u s both the enormity and the importance of these sales have naturally led to an examination of how best to accomplish this task auctions have been proposed and have frequently been used as time honoured convenient and attractive mechanisms for such sales this in turn has led to a revival of interest in the theory of auctions particularly those involving multiple objects the magnitude of these privatization sales has meant that in many instances it is realistic to consider that buyers may run up against liquidity or borrowing constraints the presence of these financial constraints introduces important differences into traditional auction theory for instance pitchik and schotter 1986 and che and gale 1996 1998 have shown that when bidders are subject to such constraints the conclusion of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds when multiple objects are auctioned in the presence of budget constraints it may be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object with a view to raising the price paid by his rival and depleting his budget so that the second object may then be obtained at a lower price in effect a bidder may wish to raise a rival s costs in one market in order to gain advantage in another thus unlike in traditional auction theory a particular bidder s payoff is affected by the price paid by a rival bidder it is important to note that this effect comes into play only when several objects are sold

utilitarian aggregation of beliefs and tastes harsanyi s utilitarianism is extended here to savage s framework we formulate a pareto condition that implies that both society s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals an indiscriminate pareto condition has been shown to contradict linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes we argue that such a condition is not compelling society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs our pareto condition is restricted to choices that involve identical beliefs only

regulation of trades based on differences in beliefs abstract some trades based on differences in beliefs might cause more harm than good should they be restricted if yes how we propose three properties ensuring that regulation does not prevent beneficial trade and is consistent unanimity the regulator should not object to trades with identical beliefs merge proofness of autarky if the regulator does not object to finitely many unrelated trades all with identical beliefs then it should not object to the mere juxtaposition of the trades and independence of irrelevant trade if the regulator does not object to the juxtaposition of two unrelated trades then it should not object to any of the two trades standing alone we show that there is a unique policy having these three properties namely laissez faire

efficient education subsidization and the pay as you use principle abstract we investigate whether the pay as you use principle of public finance should apply to education subsidization for children to internalize human capital externalities in an intergenerational model with endogenous fertility leisure and accumulations of human and physical capital we characterize social optimality concerning physical and human capital accumulation leisure labor and fertility to guide the design of efficient education subsidization we show that efficient education subsidization requires future generations benefitting from it pay for it when fertility and leisure are endogenous namely the government should uphold the pay as you use principle to subsidize children s education by deficit and repay the debt by future taxes

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

community membership aspirations the link between inequality and redistribution revisited the issue at stake is to explain why redistributive policies may vary so greatly for a given distributional skewness to this end we abandon the stylized median voter and study how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on social affinity between the different economic classes and their prospect of upward or downward mobility in particular we consider that socioeconomic group membership through its implied social interactions and peer effects is an important determinant of an individual s outcome hence agents while voting on a social contract must take into account the consequences of their choice over their ex post belonging to a particular community this allows us to shed light on how the endogenous sorting of the population into clusters may interact with the balance of political power leading to a non monotonic relationship through the pattern of community formation in the economy between inequality and the pressure for redistributive policies

social networks and technology adoption in northern mozambique despite their potentially strong impact on poverty agricultural innovations are often adopted slowly using a unique household dataset on sunflower adoption in mozambique we analyse whether and how individual adoption decisions depend upon the choices of others in the same social networks since farmers anticipate that they will share information with others we expect farmers to be more likely to adopt when they know many other adopters dynamic considerations however suggest that farmers who know many adopters might strategically delay adoption to free ride on the information gathered by others we present empirical evidence that shows that the relationship between the probability of adoption and the number of known adopters is shaped as an inverse u in line with information sharing the network effect is stronger for farmers who report discussing agriculture with others the data contains information which is needed to ameliorate the identification issues that commonly arise in this context in particular social networks are precisely identified and in addition we can control for village heterogeneity and endogenous group formation

no betting pareto dominance we argue that the notion of pareto dominance is not as compelling in the presence of uncertainty as it is under certainty in particular voluntary trade based on differences in tastes is commonly accepted as desirable because tastes cannot be wrong by contrast voluntary trade based on incompatible beliefs may indicate that at least one agent entertains mistaken beliefs we propose and characterize a weaker no betting notion of pareto domination which requires on top of unanimity of preference the existence of shared beliefs that can rationalize such preference for each agent

robust social decisions we propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs in addition to conflicting tastes or interests to do so we adapt the standard pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle we also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle the former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied when it cannot the latter always provides minimal guidance

optimal debt endogenous fertility and human capital externalities in a model with altruistic bequests abstract this paper explores optimal debt in a model with altruistic bequests endogenous fertility and human capital externalities because of such externalities education investment is too low and fertility is too high while education subsidies are the conventional means to deal with these problems we show that the optimal policy also comprises debt even when distortionary taxes are used the reason is that debt tips the usual trade off between children s quantity and quality in favor of the latter by increasing the bequest cost of children the optimal debt output ratio exceeds 10 for plausible parameterization

the optimum quantity of debt abstract we find that the welfare gains to being at the optimum quantity of debt rather than the current us level are small and therefore concerns regarding the high level of debt in the us economy may be misplaced this finding is based on a model of a large number of infinitely lived households whose saving behavior is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints this model incorporates a different role for government debt than is found in standard models and it captures different cost benefit trade offs on the benefit side government debt enhances the liquidity of households by providing an additional means of smoothing consumption and by effectively loosening borrowing constraints on the cost side the implied taxes have adverse wealth distribution and incentive effects in addition government debt crowds out capital via higher interest rates and lowers per capita consumption

distributional effects of public education in an economy with public pensions we study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays education and pay as you go social security affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents we consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs and allocates tax revenues to finance them in our model human capital is one of the factors of production it is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs parents decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism heterogeneous in its strength across the population which leads to heterogeneity of incomes we investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution we show that in this framework contrary to some earlier results increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology

productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital evidence from the cities abstract based on recent theoretical developments the argument is made that the average level of human capital is a local public good cities with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents after conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings this prediction is supported by data for standard metropolitan statistical areas smsas in the united states where the smsa average levels of formal education and work experience are used as proxies for the average level of human capital the alternative explanations of omitted smsa variables and self selection are evaluated an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity is computed

the evolution of modern educational systems technical vs general education distributional conflict and growth abstract we study the evolution of an educational system founded on a hierarchical differentiation between vocational and general education with vocational playing an inferior role in the society the dynamics are best summarized by the ratio of the fraction of the population in vocational to that in general education which we interpret as a measure of the degree of stratification of the society we show that this ratio first rises and then declines with the level of development displaying an inverted u shape which reflects the complex interaction between economic and political forces including aggregate income growth wealth inequality and political participation

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

centralization fiscal federalism and private school attendance a cge model is used to analyze the impact of public school financing on private school attendance the common perception that public school finance centralization will necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not correct in such a model even when that centralization involves an extreme equalization as in california furthermore if centralization is less dramatic as in most states declines in private school attendance are even more pronounced this weakens the speculation that low exit rates to private schools in centralizing states imply that general public school quality does not drop as a result of such centralization

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

a welfare criterion for models with distorted beliefs this paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief neutral ine cient if it is ine cient under any convex combination of agents beliefs while this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations it can identify negative sum speculation in a broad range of prominent models with distorted beliefs

financial complexity and trade what are the implications on trading activity if investors are not sophisticated enough to understand and evaluate trades that have a complex payoff structure can frictions generated by this type of financial complexity be so severe that they lead to a complete market freeze like that of the recent financial crisis starting from an allocation that is not pareto optimal we find that whether complexity impedes trade depends on how investors perceive risk and uncertainty for smooth convex preferences such as subjective expected utility complexity cannot halt trade even in the extreme case where each investor is so unsophisticated that he can only trade up to one arrow debreu security without being able to combine two or more in order to construct a complex trade however for non smooth preferences which allow for kinked indifference curves such as maxmin expected utility complexity can completely shut down trade

expected revenue of all pay auctions and first price sealed bid auctions with budget constraints we show that all pay auctions dominate first price sealed bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints this ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all pay auctions which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

public versus private education when differential fertility matters we assess the merits of different education systems in a framework that accounts for the joint decision problem of parents regarding fertility and education specifically we compare the implications of a public and a private schooling regime for economic growth and inequality we find that private schooling leads to higher growth when there is little inequality in human capital endowments across families in contrast when inequality is high public education yields higher growth by reducing fertility differentials in addition public schooling leads to income convergence while private schooling can result in ever increasing inequality our analysis highlights theimp ortanceof accounting for endogenous fertility differentials when analyzing educational policies

inequality and crime this paper considers the relationship between inequality and crime using data from urban counties the behavior of property and violent crime are quite different inequality has no effect on property crime but a strong and robust impact on violent crime with an elasticity above 0 5 by contrast poverty and police activity have significant effects on property crime but little on violent crime property crime is well explained by the economic theory of crime while violent crime is better explained by strain and social disorganization theories

linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers abstract this paper opens a new perspective from which one can explain the presence of government intervention in education even in the absence of human capital externality it argues that consumption externalities can provide rationale for government intervention in education within the context of overlapping generations economy it has also been shown that competitive equilibrium either underaccumulates both physical and human capital or overaccumulates both thus the result rules out the possibility of competitive equilibrium deviating from the social optimum in its allocation of physical and human capital in opposite directions immediate policy issues have also been discussed

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in american public education naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation i derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area my results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling little of the effect of tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting this finding may be explained by another finding students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of tiebout choice among districts

asymmetric budget constraints in a first price auction abstract i solve a first price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object i show that in any equilibrium the expected utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique if budgets are sufficiently low the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium for sufficiently high budgets mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise a less restrictive budget distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off if the budget distribution of one bidder is dominated by the budget distribution of the other bidder in the reverse hazard rate order the weaker bidder will bid more aggressively than the stronger bidder in contrast to existing results for symmetric budget distributions with asymmetric budget distributions a second price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a first price auction under an additional assumption i derive the unique equilibrium utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an all pay auction

educational vouchers and cream skimming educational vouchers and cream skimming epple and romano 1998 show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most able students and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming here we study voucher design that injects private school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming however by adding restrictions like tuition constraints such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification this is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases

the effect of rising income inequality on taxation and public expenditures evidence from u s municipalities and school districts 1970 2000 the income distribution in many developed countries widened dramatically from 1970 to 2000 some scholars argue that income inequality contributes to a host of social ills by undermining voters will ingness to support public expenditures in contrast we find that growing income inequality is associated with an expansion in government reven ues and expenditures on a wide range of services in u s municipalities and school districts results are robust to a number of model specifica tions including instrumental variables that address the endogeneity of the local income distribution our results are inconsistent with models pre dicting that heterogeneous societies provide lower levels of public goods public sector 3 two types of identification problems com plicate estimation of the empirical relationship between income inequality and public goods provision the cross country variation often used for this exercise suffers from omitted variable bias that is countries with high income inequality may also have other characteristics that could limit the size of the public sector cross state comparisons also suffer from endogenous household sorting if low or high income families migrate to states with high public expenditures the positive association observed in the litera ture between state public expenditures and income inequal ity may be spurious in this paper we examine the relationship between income inequality and government finances in municipali ties and school districts in the united states from 1970 to 2000 local government represents a large segment of the economy in fiscal year 2009 local governments disbursed more than 3 trillion for such important services as educa tion and public safety 4 our study has several advantages over existing empirical work first the large number of local governments in our data exhibit much greater variation in income inequality over time than do the small number of countries or states used in previous studies a large sample size allows us to separately control for changes in the top end or bottom end of the income distribution and for initial levels of inequal ity thus ruling out a mechanical association between tax revenues and rising income for the affluent second we develop an instrumental variable strategy to mitigate con cerns about potential reverse causality from the endogenous

on the nexus of fertility and debt abstract this paper examines the effects of debt on fertility with panel data the baseline model confirms that both public and non financial private debt significantly mitigate fertility whereas the dynamic panel suggests that only the effects of private debt are significant

human capital accumulation and endogenous public expenditures in this paper we present an overlapping generations model where individuals accu mulate human capital through formal schooling we model the role of the public sector in schooling as one of collecting taxes from households and providing inputs to the learning technology public expenditures on schools are determined endogenously under plausible restrictions our model s predictions qualitatively match the observations on schooling pub lic expenditures on education and student teacher ratios jel classification el 3 e62 accumulation de capital humain et depenses publiques endogenes dans ce memoire les auteurs presentent un modele de generations qui se chevauchent ofu les individus accumulent du capital humain via l education formelle le r6le du secteur public dans l education est defini comme celui de collecteur d imp6ts aupres des menages et de fournisseur d intrants dans la technologie d apprentissage les depenses publiques en education sont determinees de maniere endogene a partir de restrictions plausibles les predictions du modele s arriment qualitativement aux observations sur le monde scolaire aux depenses publiques en educa tion et aux ratios 6leves enseignants

a case for incomplete markets we propose a new welfare criterion that allows us to rank alternative financial market structures in the presence of belief heterogeneity we analyze economies with complete and incomplete financial markets and or restricted trading possibilities in the form of borrowing limits or transaction costs we describe circumstances under which various restrictions on financial markets are desirable according to our welfare criterion

economic and mechanical models of intergenerational transmission the author critically examines gary beckers attempt to integrate the theory of income distribution intragenerational differences with the theory of mobility intergenerational differences in an economic model of the family he assesses beckers claims of distinctiveness integration explanatory power and surprise and arrives at a rather skeptical view of the contribution that the core of microeconomics has made to this study of the family a reply by becker is included pp 514 8 excerpt

government debt human capital and endogenous growth the effect of government debt on capital accumulation has been debated for more than a century the debate has focused on the validity of the ricardian equivalence hypothesis which asserts that the mix of government debt and nondistorting taxes to finance government expenditures has no real effect on an economy in models with infinitely lived agents government bonds increase private assets by the full amount that offsets the rise in future tax liabilities for interest payments and the retirement of public debt even in a model with finitely lived agents barro 1 showed that government debt is neutral when private intergenerational transfers are positive and when the rate of growth is lower than the interest rate with operative intergenerational transfers carmichael 4 extended the debt neutrality into a regime where the rate of growth is greater than the interest rate while suggesting some sources of nonneutrality of public debt such as heterogeneous tastes and uncertainty moreover drazen 6 argued that when intergenerational transfers take the form of investments in human capital which have higher marginal returns than investments in physical capital government bonds affect the equilibrium solution and increase welfare in contrast assuming that private intergenerational transfers are zero van der ploeg and alogoskoufis 10 argued that an increase in government debt depresses real growth through reducing savings in an endogenous growth overlapping generations model with constant population the models mentioned above ignore possible responses of fertility to changes in government debt in an overlapping generations model with operative bequests becker and barro 3 showed that the neutrality of social security needs modification if fertility is endogenous lapan and enders 9 extended the insight of becker and barro 3 to examine the effects of government debt and found that a rise in government debt reduces fertility and raises capital intensity through increasing bequests which are part of the cost of having children wildasin 11 also obtained similar results while endogenizing fertility none of these models has endogenous growth of per capita income

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

persistent parochialism trust and exclusion in ethnic networks decentralized groups such as close knit residential neighborhoods and ethnically linked businesses often achieve high levels of cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices that we call parochialism we investigate the contribution of within group cultural affinity to the ability of parochial groups to cooperate in social dilemmas we analyze parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders we show that there is a range of degrees of parochialism for which parochial networks can coexist with an anonymous market offering unrestricted trading opportunities

the desegregating effect of school tracking this paper makes the following point detracking schools that is preventing them from allocating students to classes according to their ability may lead to an increase in income residential segregation it does so in a simple model where households care about the school peer group of their children if ability and income are positively correlated tracking implies that some high income households face the choice of either living in the areas where most of the other high income households live and having their child assigned to the low track or instead living in lower income neighbourhoods where their child would be in the high track under mild conditions tracking leads to an equilibrium with partial income desegregation where perfect income segregation would be the only stable outcome without tracking

speculation and risk sharing with new financial assets while the traditional view of nancial innovation emphasizes the risk sharing role of new nancial assets belief disagreements about these assets naturally lead to speculation which represents a powerful economic force in the opposite direction this paper investigates the eect of nancial innovation on portfolio risks in an economy when both the risk sharing and the speculation forces are present financial assets provide hedging services but they are also subject to speculation because traders do not necessarily agree about their payos i de ne the average variance of traders net worths as a measure of portfolio risks for this economy and i decompose it into two components the uninsurable variance de ned as the average variance that would obtain if there were no belief disagreements and the speculative variance de ned as the residual variance that results from speculative trades based on belief disagreements financial innovation always decreases the uninsurable variance because new assets increase the possibilities for risk sharing my main result shows that nancial innovation also always increases the speculative variance this is true even if traders completely agree about the payos of new assets the intuition behind this result is the hedge more bet more eect traders use new assets to hedge their bets on existing assets which in turn enables them to place larger bets and take on greater risks my second set of results concern endogenous nancial innovation when belief disagreements are su ciently large a pro t seeking market maker introduces assets that maximize the average variance among all possible choices completely disregarding the risk sharing motive for nancial innovation my third set of results concern a calibration of the model in the context of the gdp indexed assets proposed by athanasoulis and shiller 2001 when traders have reasonable amounts of belief disagreements these assets would have the unintended consequence of increasing their consumption risks

time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and a balanced government budget this paper analyzes optimal time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget when tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump sum transfers leisure would be higher than its social optimum pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax also it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax and hence it is not a practical guide to policy further a consumption tax or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income ce memoire analyse la fiscalite optimale et consistante dans le temps dans un modele de famille dynastique avec capital humain et physique et un budget gouvernemental equilibre quand le revenu fiscal est utilise pour financer la consommation publique ou pour des transferts forfaitaires le niveau de loisir sera plus eleve que l optimum social la fiscalite optimale paretienne exige qu on taxe le revenu du capital plus fortement que celui du travail et qu on subventionne l investissement au meme taux que la taxe elle exige aussi soit qu on subventionne le travail au meme taux que la taxe a la comsommation soit qu on subventionne la consommation au meme taux que l impot sur le revenu du travail et donc ce n est pas un guide pratique pour la politique de plus un regime de taxe sur la consommation ou de maniere equivalente d impot uniforme sur le revenu avec subvention a l investissement au meme taux peut etre ameliore en taxant le revenu du capital plus fortement que celui du travail

utilitarian preferences with multiple priors this paper proposes a method for aggregating individual preferences in the context of uncertainty individuals are assumed to abide by savage s model of subjective expected utility in which everyone has his her own utility and subjective probability disagreement on probabilities among individuals gives rise to uncertainty at the societal level and thus society may entertain a set of probabilities rather than only one we assume that social preference admits a maxmin expected utility representation in this context two pareto type conditions are shown to be equivalent to social utility being a weighted average of individual utilities and the social set of priors containing only weighted averages of individual priors thus society respects consensus among individuals beliefs and does not add ambiguity beyond disagreement on beliefs we also deal with the case in which society does not rule out any individual belief

multi unit auctions with budget limits abstract we study multi unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature our main result is an impossibility there is no deterministic auction that 1 is individually rational and dominant strategy incentive compatible 2 makes no positive transfers and 3 always produces a pareto optimal outcome in contrast we show that ausubel s clinching auction satisfies all these properties when the budgets are public knowledge moreover we prove that the clinching auction is the unique auction that satisfies all these properties when there are two players this uniqueness result is the cornerstone of the impossibility result few additional related results are given including some results on the revenue of the clinching auction and on the case where the items are divisible

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

ethnic capital and intergenerational mobility this paper analyzes the extent to which ethnic skill differentials are transmitted across generations i assume that ethnicity acts as an externality in the human capital accumulation process the skills of the next generation depend on parental inputs and on the quality of the ethnic environment in which parents make their investments or ethnic capital the empirical evidence reveals that the skills of today s generation depend not only on the skills of their parents but also on the average skills of the ethnic group in the parent s generation

endogenous fertility ricardian equivalence and debt management policy abstract the paper develops a model in which dynastic families optimally determine fertility government debt represents a tax on future generations and on childbearing the ricardian equivalence hypothesis does not hold debt is welfare reducing in that it distorts the fertility decision an increase in government debt induces a decline in fertility and an increase in the steady state capital labor ratio if a government inherits an existing stock of debt the first best policy is to eliminate the debt immediately in other situations the optimal debt management policy will not in general entail a total elimination of the debt

second best public debt with human capital externalities this paper studies optinnal public debt in a dynastic model with human capital externalities that cause human capital investment fertility to be below above its socially optimal level by reducing fertility and raising human capital investment the optimal debt can exceed 10 of output for plausible parameterizations

more equal but less mobile education financing and intergenerational mobility in italy and in the us a centralised and egalitarian school system reduces the cost of education for poor families and so it should reduce income inequality and make intergenerational mobility easier in this paper we provide evidence that italy compared to the usa displays less income inequality as expected given the type of school system but also less intergenera tional upward mobility between occupations and between education levels we explore some of the reasons which can explain this puzzling result and conclude that in a world in which family background is important for labor market success a centralised and egalitarian tertiary education does not necessarily help poor children and may take away from them a fundamental tool to prove their talent and to compete with rich children 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

efficient equilibrium convergence heterogeneity and growth abstract an endogenous growth model arising from task specialization is used to examine the effects of differing initial human capital distributions two macroeconomic phenomena are produced income convergence and leapfrogging of living standards income convergence occurs for all countries in the same market arising from diminishing returns to individual human capital leapfrogging occurs by comparing countries in two separate markets income leapfrogging can occur because the stationary growth rate increases with market size and human capital heterogeneity reduces growth the introduction of coordination costs of task assignment can produce gains in welfare and growth from human capital heterogeneity

endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages abstract this paper studies the endogenous determination of public budget allocation across hierarchical education stages in less developed economies the top class has dominant political power to implement its most preferred policy which is characterized by exclusive participation and large schooling expenditure at higher education at the expense of basic education in developed economies the budget allocation is more balanced under certain parameters it leads to expanded participation of the middle class in higher education the model offers an explanation to the observed cross country policy difference and is broadly consistent with historical evidence

honey i shrunk the kids benefits revisiting intergenerational conflict in oecd countries intergenerational conflict may arise when the interests of different age groups do not align we examine cross country data to find evidence for this conflict in oecd countries we derive our results from a fgls estimation model which is complemented by a system gmm estimation to account for potential endogeneity the data are from a panel of 22 oecd countries over the time period 1985 2005 we find little support for intergenerational conflict in general however those who are close to statutory retirement age dislike public expenditure on families and education because once they retire they will have less income compared to their work income this effect is transitory however implying a change in voting behavior during retirement age

revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions abstract the revenue equivalence theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his her distribution function

social security and endogenous growth abstract this paper examines the effects of social security on the steady state growth of per capita income in an endogenous growth model in which agents care about their own consumption the number of children and the welfare of each child it shows that an unfunded program may simulate growth by reducing fertility and increasing the ratio of human capital investment per child to per family income when bequests are positive also it may cause faster growth than funded programs especially when receipts from funded programs are independent of contributions when voluntary saving is positive funded social security is neutral if receipts are linked to contributions and most likely depresses growth if receipts are independent of contributions

auctions with almost homogeneous bidders abstract we prove that around the symmetric case where the values are identically distributed the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder specific parameters of the value distributions we show that the revenue equivalence between the first price and the second price auctions to the first order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the revenue equivalence theorem thereby formally establishing the first order equivalence fibich et al g fibich a gavious a sela revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions j econ theory 115 2004 309 321 noticed for their particular perturbation

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

the intended and unintended consequences of financial market regulations a general equilibrium analysis in a production economy with trade in financial markets motivated by the desire to share labor income risk and to speculate we show that speculation increases volatility of asset returns and investment growth increases the equity risk premium and reduces welfare regulatory measures such as constraints on stock positions borrowing constraints and the tobin tax have similar effects on financial and macroeconomic variables borrowing limits and a financial transaction tax improve welfare because they substantially reduce speculative trading without impairing excessively risk sharing trades

tiebout sorting and neighborhood stratification tiebout s classic 1956 paper has strong implications regarding stratification across and within jurisdictions predicting in the simplest instance a hierarchy of internally homogeneous communities ordered by income typically urban areas are less than fully stratified and the question arises how much do departures from standard tiebout assumptions contribute to observed within neighborhood mixing this paper quantifies the separate effects of employment geography via costly commuting and preferences for housing attributes on neighborhood stratification it does so using an equilibrium sorting model estimated with rich census micro data simulations based on the model and credible preference estimates show that counterfactual reductions in commuting costs lead to marked increases in racial and education segregation and to a lesser degree increases in income segregation given that households now find it easier to locate in neighborhoods with like households while turning off preferences for housing characteristics increases racial segregation especially for blacks doing so reduces income segregation indicating that heterogeneity in the housing stock serves to stratify households based on ability to pay further we show that differences in housing help to accentuate differences in the consumption of local amenities

neighborhood income distributions this paper studies the distribution of income within neighborhoods and contrasts it with the national income distribution it relies on a unique feature of the american housing survey whose 1985 1989 and 1993 waves of interviews provide data for small residential neighborhoods these consist of a dwelling unit and up to ten of its nearest neighbors most previous work on neighborhoods has used information for much larger groupings of the population such as census tracts the paper employs a variety of parametric and nonparametric econometric tools to study income sorting across us residential neighborhoods it documents the patterns of dependence among neighbors income and imperfect sorting with moderate but very significant correlation among incomes of neighbors and of considerable income mixing in u s neighborhoods

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

education finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california abstract this paper examines the effect of different education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public education we focus on california which in the 1970 s was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state finance and subsequently saw its funding of public education fall between 10 and 15 relative to the rest of the us we show that a simple political economy model of public finance can account for the bulk of this drop we find that while the distribution of spending became more equal this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade off between equity and resources we show that if california had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether funding for public education would also have dropped by almost 10

the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education abstract we study the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education this conflict arises because older households without children have weaker incentives to support the provision of high quality educational services in a community than younger households with school age children we develop an overlapping generations model for households in a system of multiple jurisdictions this model captures the differences in preferred policies over the life cycle we show that the observed inequality in educational policies across communities is not only the outcome of stratification by income but is also determined by the stratification by age and a political process that is dominated by older voters in many urban communities with low quality of educational services the mobility of older households creates a positive fiscal externality since it creates a larger tax base per student this positive tax externality can dominate the negative effects that arise because older households tend to vote for lower educational expenditures as a consequence sorting by age can reduce the inequality in educational outcomes that is driven by income sorting

bertrand without fudge abstract this paper reexamines bertrand competition with homogeneous products and different marginal costs it is shown that the conventional outcome is supported by an equilibrium in the original game under the standard rationing rule

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school finance this paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of education finance affect inequality and growth agents interact through local public goods or externalities school funding neighborhood effects and economywide linkages complementary skills knowledge spillovers sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster integration therefore tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run a move to state funding of education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade off local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and educational structures copyright 1996 by american economic association

interregional redistribution and mobility in federations a positive approach the paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice we find that paradoxical consequences of inter jurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile while self sufficient regions are nec essarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes thus interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality at the same time however transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region the voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence empirical evidence from panel data from oecd countries and candian provinces is consistent with the theory

comment on the intended and unintended consequences of financial market regulations a general equilibrium analysis by adrian buss bernard dumas raman uppal and grigory vilkov