do legislators votes reflect constituency preference a simple way to evaluate the senate u s senators frequently vote against the preference of their constituency assuming that such a preference exists both of a state s senators represent the same constituency whenever they split their votes one or the other is necessarily going against the constituency preference for the sample of defense related votes analyzed above misrepresentation either observable vote splitting or unobservable vote matches that go against the constituency preference occurred at least 37 percent of the time at least 46 percent on one vote although party differences accounted for more than two thirds of the vote splitting a substantial number of splits remained besides a party difference for a state s senatorial pair is itself problematical

additional aspects of rational insurance purchasing the purchase of insurance provides an individual with the ability to shift risk associated with either timeless or temporal uncertain prospects see dreze and modigliani 1972 previous insurance decision analysis can be further divided into cases in which the insurance contract is exogenously specified see mossin 1968 smith 1968 and cases in which the optimal form of contract is to be determined see raviv 1979 brennan and solanki 1981 this note is concerned with extending some of the results for timeless uncertain prospects with the insurance contract exogenously specified many of the properties associated with the purchase of insurance for timeless uncertain prospects are analyzed by mossin 1968 for different forms of contracts see also gould 1969 utilizing the arrow pratt measure of absolute risk aversion the effect of wealth upon the optimal amount of insurance is determined for the different forms of contracts recent work by ross 1981 demonstrates that in situations where individuals face more than one timeless uncertain prospect and they can purchase insurance only for a subset of these prospects then a more risk averse individual in the arrow pratt this paper examines the use of the arrowpratt and ross measures of risk aversion it is shown that in situations where the individual faces more than one uncertain prospect and can purchase insurance only for a subset of these prospects then in many cases the arrow pratt and ross measures of risk aversion are not sufficient to describe the behavior of the individual in purchasing insurance

optimal insurance design with random initial wealth abstract an optimal insurance policy is designed when the policyholder faces both insurable and uninsurable risks under a realistic behavioral assumption it may display a disappearing deductible if the uninsurable loss becomes riskier according to any degree of stochastic dominance as the insurable loss increases

optimal insurance in incomplete markets this paper examines the theory of optimal insurance purchasing in the presence of uninsurable background risk existing theorems concerning the optimal level of insurance and the optimal form of an insurance contract are shown to hold only under restricted market and risk assumptions in particular conditions sufficient for the optimality of full coverage or sufficient for the optimality of deductible policies depend on the correlation between insurable and uninsurable risks these results may provide a partial explanation why existing theory is often contradicted by observable behavior

constrained efficient contracts for area yield crop insurance with area yield crop insurance indemnification occurs when area yield falls below a yield trigger that is chosen by the producer the maximum value for this yield trigger is generally restricted e g 80 of the long term area average yield the impact of this trigger constraint on the optimal design of an area yield insurance contract is examined within the constrained efficient contract indemnities consist of both a lump sum payment and a payment that is proportional to the yield shortfall because lump sum payments may not be feasible to implement efficiency enhancing modifications to standard contracts are also proposed copyright 2000 oxford university press

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

the analytical derivation and empirical test of a tax adjusted fundamental value model in implementing the theory of current valuation for fixed assets accountants encounter a range of difficult estimation problems many of these problems arise because fixed assets yield their productive potential over many accounting periods theoreticians regulators users and preparers have sought to overcome difficulties in estimating values for owned used assets by estimating the historical cost or the current cost of a new asset and applying a depreciation factor that adjusts for diminished productive capacity the resulting depreciated cost estimate then serves as a proxy for the economic value of the owned used asset previous research has demonstrated that this depreciated cost estimate of economic value is sensitive to both the valuation model and the assumed depreciation schedule see for example greenball 1969 beaver and dukes 1973 beaver and landsman 1983 mohr and dilley 1984 swenson 1987 and kim and moore 1988 the purpose of our study is to extend prior research by examining the interactive

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

optimum area yield crop insurance cet article determine le contrat optimal d assurance dont l indemnite depend du rendement agrege sur recoltes d un bassin de production le schema optimal d assurance est base sur le coefficient individuel de regression qui mesure la sensibilite du rendement agrege a des variations du rendement agrege une indemnite est versee lorsque le rendement agrege est inferieur superieur a un rendement critique si le coefficient de regression est positif negatif le contrat optimal contient une franchise evanescente si le coefficient de regression est superieur a l unite

optimal coverage for incompletely reliable insurance abstract optimal actuarially fair coverage of insurance subject to default risk can be less or more than full depending upon the relation between the recovery rate under default and a positive trigger level that is independent of the insured s risk preference

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

optimal risk sharing with background risk this paper examines qualitative properties of efficient insurance contracts in the presence of background risk in order to get results for all strictly risk averse expected utility maximizers the concept of stochastic increasingness is used different assumptions on the stochastic dependence between the insurable and uninsurable risk lead to different qualitative properties of the efficient contracts the new results obtained under hypotheses of dependent risks are compared to classical results in the absence of background risk or to the case of independent risks the theory is further generalized to nonexpected utility maximizers

insurance with multiple insurers a game theoretic approach this paper studies the set of pareto optimal insurance contracts and the core of an insurance game our setting allows multiple insurers with translation invariant preferences we characterise the pareto optimal contracts which determines the shape of the indemnities closed form and numerical solutions are found for various preferences that the insurance players might have determining associated premiums with any given optimal pareto contract is another problem for which economic based arguments are further discussed we also explain how one may link the recent fast growing literature on risk based optimality criteria to the pareto optimality criterion and we show that the latter is much more general than the former one which according to our knowledge has not been pointed out by now further we extend some of our results when model risk is included i e there is some uncertainty with the risk model and or the insurance players make decisions based on divergent beliefs about the underlying risk these robust optimal contracts are investigated and we show how one may find robust and pareto efficient contracts which is a key decision making problem under uncertainty

contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets insurance contracts may fail to perform leading to a default on valid claims we relax the standard assumption of known probabilities for such defaults by allowing for uncertainty within a large behavioral experiment we show that introducing risk and uncertainty each leads to significant reductions in insurance demand and that the effects are comparable in magnitude 17 1 and 14 5 percentage points furthermore risk and ambiguity averse participants are affected most these findings are in line with models incorporating ambiguity attitudes or alternatively pessimistic beliefs an analysis of the belief and decision dynamics suggests persistent pessimistic priors and disregard of peer experiences leading to a stable uncertainty effect

wealth inequality and asset pricing in an arrow debreu exchange economy with identical agents except for their initial endowment we examine how wealth inequality affects the equilibrium level of the equity premium and the risk free rate we first show that wealth inequality raises the equity premium if and only if the inverse of absolute risk aversion is concave in wealth we then show that the equilibrium risk free rate is reduced by wealth inequality if the inverse of the coefficient of absolute prudence is concave we also prove that the combination of a small uninsurable background risk with wealth inequality biases asset pricing towards a larger equity premium and a smaller risk free rate the model of the representative consumer a la lucas 1978 failed to explain observed security prices more specifically as first stated by mehra and prescott 1985 the model predicts an equity premium that is too low and a risk free rate that is too high given the observed low variability of consumption growth a recent strand of the literature with papers by constantinides and duffie 1996 heaton and lucas 1996 and krusell and smith 1997 for example explores whether incomplete asset markets and heterogeneity among consumers can explain these puzzles constantinides and duffie 1996 in particular conclude that it is at least in principle possible to generate larger equity premia when such ingredients are introduced the aim of this paper is not to provide another explanation of the puzzles but rather to better understand the relationship between asset prices the heterogeneity of consumers wealth and the market incompleteness when markets are complete heterogeneous consumers are able to equalize their marginal rates of substitution across states and across time as shown by constantinides 1982 this implies that the equilibrium of the heterogeneous consumer economy can be duplicated by the equilibrium in a lucas economy with a representative agent this means that taking account of the heterogeneity in the population alone cannot explain why the representative agent model is rejected hansen and singleton 1982 this does not mean however that the distribution of wealth in the population for example has no effect on asset prices in general in order to understand this consider the departure from an egalitarian distribution of wealth by introducing a mean preserving transfer of endowment under decreasing absolute risk aversion poorer agents will be more risk averse whereas wealthier people will be less risk averse there is no reason a priori for that the group s attitude towards risk be unaffected by this transfer we first show that if absolute risk tolerance i e the inverse of the arrow pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is concave then the risk aversion of the agent with the mean wealth will be smaller than the risk aversion of the representative agent thus if an outside observer overlooks wealth inequality he consequently underestimates the aversion to risk of society this leads to

moral hazard and background risk in competitive insurance markets we examine the effect of background risk on competitive insurance markets with moral hazard if policy holders have non negative prudence then background risk does not decrease effort and when effort increases expands the set of feasible policies however the effect of background risk on equilibrium is indeterminate we analyse the choice between stock and mutual insurance mutual insurance is equivalent to a fair policy plus background risk our results imply that competitive insurance markets with moral hazard should be dominated by stock insurers

increases in risk and deductible insurance abstract this paper examines how mean preserving transformations in the loss distribution affect the optimal level of deductibility in an insurance contract if marginal utility is convex increases in risk affecting losses only below the deductible are shown to lead to a reduction in coverage higher deductible which can be viewed as an increase in precautionary savings on the other hand a transformation that spreads losses more towards the tails of the distribution leads to an increase in coverage lower deductible whenever preferences exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion

livestock disease indemnity design when moral hazard is followed by adverse selection averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves the government and individual livestock producers producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak ex ante moral hazard and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected ex post adverse selection we investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government in the presence of asymmetric information we compare the relative magnitude of the first and second best levels of biosecurity investment and indemnity payments to demonstrate the tradeoff between risk sharing and efficiency and we discuss the implications for status quo u s policy

a note on insurance coverage in incomplete markets in this paper full insurance coverage on average is defined as the coinsurance rate that eliminates all insurable risk when the uninsurable risk is evaluated at its mean the regressibility assumption is used to derive the conditions on the correlation between background and insurable risks and the actuarial unfairness of insurance under which full over or underinsurance on average is optimal these conditions are compared to those for the case of default risk together they explain intuitively the different results under the cases of background risk and default risk obtained in the literature

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

a reexamination of the principal agent relationship in politics abstract that senators from the same state often have a large difference in their ideological voting records has proven inconvenient for a literature that has largely relied on a median voter model of elections one exception is palfrey review of economic studies 1984 51 139 156 whose analysis implies the hypothesis that the expected difference in such voting records varies directly with the variance of that state s density function of constituent ideological preferences this paper provides empirical testing consistent with this hypothesis the paper then argues that currently accepted methodology for measuring senatorial shirking is systematically biased towards indicating shirking and provides empirical analysis consistent with this argument

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

optimal area yield crop insurance reconsidered the implementability of area yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer s beta linking his yield to the risk pool s yield is examined in the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information mahul s result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer s beta is confirmed when there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer however this full insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures the optimal area yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized

second best insurance contract design in an incomplete market the optimal form of insurance contracts for multiple risks is examined a well known result in the literature is that under fairly general conditions an insurance policy with a deductible for aggregate losses is optimal real world markets however are typically incomplete in that they require separate contracts for separate loss exposures for instance insurable damage to one s home is not generally allowed to affect the insurance indemnity for unrelated insurable damage to one s automobile we show that separate deductibles are second best optima in this setting we compare the indemnity provided in this second best setting with first best solutions the effect of second best contracts on the individual s total insurance demand is also examined

the influence of ideology on congressional voting i introduction the question of what determines congressional voting on legislation has inspired a number of recent empirical analyses all are in agreement that congressional voting on specific bills is correlated with the economic self interest of the representative s constituents and a measure of the representative s ideology as indicated by his broader voting record however the interpretation of the empirical results regarding the influence of ideology has generated more debate than consensus in the current literature kau and rubin 1979 find evidence that a congressman s ideology influences his voting but also find evidence for an alternative but not mutually exclusive hypothesis that a congressman s rating by ideological groups reflects membership in a logrolling coalition kalt and zupan 1984 argue that although a representative s votes are likely to reflect the economic interests and the ideology of his constituents the weak incentive for the constituent principal to monitor the voting behavior of his representative agent gives the representative the opportunity to shirk or vote according to his personal ideology rather than his constituents both nelson and silberberg 1987 and mcarthur and marks 1988 find that the degree of shirking increases as the opportunity cost of shirking decreases in contrast to the above findings peltzman 1984 argues that ideological voting by congressmen need not necessarily reflect shirking but instead may be a way for the representative to cheaply provide his constituents with information about his general position on issues what appears to be shirking allowed by an imperfect principal agent relationship may instead be signaling designed to at least partially overcome the imperfect nature of the relationship lott 1987 extends peltzman s signaling argument by hypothesizing that if politicians are viewed by constituents as search goods rather than experience goods then they will have an incentive to establish a political brand name by establishing a consistent ideological voting record dougan and munger s 1989 approach is similar to lott s they argue that politicians with strongly held views that match those of their constituents make ideal representatives because they are less likely to vote against their constituents interests when pressured by special interest groups an incumbent therefore has an incentive to invest in reputational capital by maintaining the consistency over time of his broader voting record because this reputational capital generates quasi rents in electoral competition with candidates who possess less of it neither lott nor dougan and munger find evidence of shirking in their analyses of congressmen s broader voting records as measured by ideological groups ratings dougan and munger also develop a variable intensity of commitment version of the reputational capital hypothesis this version contends that voters with unambiguously liberal or conservative ideologies may prefer a candidate whose voting record indicates that his views are more extreme than their own such a zealous candidate voters believe is even less likely to be influenced by special interest groups a congressman serving an unambiguously liberal or conservative constituency therefore has an incentive to establish and maintain an extremely ideological overall voting record in contrast a congressman serving a constituency with centrist ideological preferences has an incentive to establish an overall voting record that matches his constituency s ideological leanings the systematic deviation of a congressman s voting record from his constituents preferences when near either extreme of the ideological spectrum is not inconsistent with a faithful principal agent relationship one cannot help but be struck by the observation that those researchers finding evidence consistent with shirking studied voting on specific legislation whereas those researchers finding no evidence of shirking studied representatives broader voting records as measured by ideological ratings

the design of an optimal insurance policy almost every phase of economic behavior is affected by uncertainty the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms the most apparent and familiar form for shifting risks is the ordinary insurance policy previous insurance decision analyses can be divided into those in which the insurance policy was exogenously specified see john gould jan mossin and vernon smith and those in which it was not see karl borch 1960 and kenneth arrow 1971 1973 in this paper the pioneering work of borch and arrow the derivation of the optimal insurance contract form from the model is synthesized and extended

the structure of technology with endogenous capital utilization a model is presented for the estimation of production technology when capital is endogenously utiliz ed the present model permits the firm to choose the rate of utilizat ion and level of maintenance applied to its capital equipment such th at the user cost of capital services is minimized the model is one o f two stage optimization and estimation the two stages are integrate d using duality theory through the generation of an instrumental us er cost variable in the first stage the instrumental user cost is th en utilized for the estimation of the aggregate technology the resul ts are compared to results obtained from standard models with exogeno us capital utilization and the emerging biases are discussed copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

q and the tax bias theory abstract a growing body of literature analyzes the variation in q the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power profitability managerial performance etc these studies ignore potential biases embedded in q that result from non neutral tax policies this study examines the association between q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in q the implication that q should be adjusted for tax biases before use in empirical research is examined further adjusting q for tax biases at least with the factors herein leads only to minor changes in econometric analyses

economic vs accounting depreciation abstract in this paper we present and estimate a model of economic depreciation consistent with producer s optimization the estimated economic depreciation which is a function of the rate of utilization and level of maintenance is about half of that used according to tax accounting depreciation the difference between the economic and tax rates of depreciation results in a subsidy and earlier capital replacement the implicit maximum net tax subsidy expressed as a proportion of the acquisition price of the asset is 13 3 for a sample of canadian trucking firms

optimal insurance against climatic experience an optimal insurance contract against a climatic risk is derived in the presence of an uninsurable and dependent aggregate production risk the optimaldesign depends on the stochastic dependency between both sources of uncertainty and on the producer s attitude towards risk especially on his prudent behavior rationalweather insurance purchasing decisions are al so derived the prudent producer responds to actuarially fair weather insurance by increasing his exposure towards risk the u s multiple peril crop insurance program in which indemnity payments are based on the producer s individualyiel ds has been disappointing in that premiums have not been sufficient to cover indemnity payments and administrative costs this failure has induced the u s government to promote alternative insurance policies since 1993 the risk management agency has offered areayield contracts under its group risk plan in selected counties skees black and barnett another alternative is to base the indemnity on a weather index such as rainfall or temperature this policy was proposed in the past by sanderson but has failed to gain acceptance among policy makers the difficulties of rainfall insurance were a subject of debate in australia e g bardsley abey and davenport quiggin 1986 patrick the recent development of weather based instruments on financialmarkets known as weather derivatives for which the payoff depends on the cause of risk rather than on its effect on yield provide new opportunities for covering exposure to unfavorable weather events the objective of this article is threefold first a stochastic production function affected by a climatic risk and by an aggregate production risk where both sources of risk are stochastically dependent is de

a utility and cpt based comparison of life insurance contracts with guarantees abstract some recent literature studies whether contracts including financial guarantees can be preferred by a utility maximizing investor the main result for contracts exposed solely to financial risk e g doskeland and nordahl 2008 dichtl and drobetz 2011 is that expected utility theory eut fails to interpret demand for guarantees while cumulative prospect theory cpt is able to support the demand while the development of the financial market has a significant impact on the portfolio choice some other non financial risk might play an important role too in the present paper we take life insurance products as an example where the long term nature of these contracts places a special emphasis on the uncertain lifetime of the investor we incorporate the mortality risk and investigate its effect on the attractiveness of contracts offering minimum interest rate guarantees to eut and cpt investors for this purpose we introduce two approaches for the consideration of multiple risk sources within cpt we illustrate the theoretical framework with numerous simulations and our numerical results show that a long term risk averse eut investor prefers products with guarantees

the design of an optimal insurance policy note in an article in this review arthur raviv 1979 examines pareto optimal insurance policies when an insurer incurs settlement costs c induced by indemnity i for loss x raviv s main result is that a necessary and sufficient condition for the pareto optimal deductible to equal zero is c i 0 this implies that deductible policies give the best tradeoff between risk sharing and economizing on costly claim settlements since in practice these costs are significant the theorem is of considerable importance among others this has been recognized by robert townsend 1979 michael brennan and ray solanki 1981 david mayers and clifford smith 1981 gur huberman mayers and smith 1983 harris schlesinger 1981 and stuart turnbull 1983 the theorem is correct but raviv s proof is not in this note a corrected proof for the theorem is given the corrected proof is important in itself because it allows for a generalization to a greater variety of transactions costs than has previously been considered see my 1984 paper for details section i develops the setting for the problem and the notation to be subsequently used raviv s error and the corrected proof are presented in section ii

pricing in microinsurance markets summary microinsurance markets have exhibited strong growth rates in recent years great parts of the industry are however challenged by fundamental issues of providing insurance products one of the most significant of which is pricing risk in this paper we provide a nontechnical analysis of insurance pricing problems and a review of the set of opportunities that can address some of the specific pricing constraints in microinsurance markets a key contribution of this paper is the investigation of conventional techniques as potential solutions for improving the pricing of insurance risk in microinsurance markets

income tax deductions for losses as insurance the federal income tax allows deductions for some categories of personal losses notably for casualty losses such as destruction of one s home or car and medical expenses above a threshold the latter even with lower marginal rates and further restrictions brought about by the 1986 tax reform involves more than a 3 billion annual revenue loss office of management and budget 1990 1 deductions like these act as partial insurance individuals receive a tax benefit equal to their marginal rate multiplied by the magnitude of their loss however this form of insurance is unnecessary when private insurance is available moreover as will be emphasized here these deductions have a perverse effect because they are allowed only for the uninsured portion of losses this induces individuals to be less protected against risk in the aggregate than if the implicit insurance provided by the tax system were unavailable if the tax rate is sufficiently high individuals would forgo insurance coverage altogether 2 it will be demonstrated that a tax system with no deductions for personal losses pareto dominates the current system these conclusions are demonstrated in section i using a simple model in which risk averse individuals may purchase actuarially fair insurance against loss and individual behavior does not affect the risk of loss no moral hazard section ii considers the applicability of the results when one allows for moral hazard administrative costs and other imperfections it also discusses the applicability of traditional notions of tax equity

risk sharing in the adjustable rate loan market are existing contracts efficient abstract a previous paper arvan and brueckner 1986 showed that in an optimal loan contract interest rate risk should be shared between lender and borrower with the slope of the loan rate function which relates the loan interest rate to the lender s uncertain cost of funds lying between zero and one existing adjustable rate mortgage arm contracts violate this rule since they require complete risk absorption by the borrower when interest rate caps are not binding the present paper shows that when the earlier model is modified by adding a second type of borrower efficient loan contracts look more like existing arms

rational insurance purchasing consideration of contract nonperformance much of the analysis of rational insurance purchasing and hedging strategies has been undertaken on the basis of the expected utility hypothesis this decision framework has been used to reformulate the bernoulli principle that a risk averter rationally would fully insure at a fair premium other applications include the analysis of insurance at unfair premiums mossin 1968 and smith 1968 the effects of state dependent utility on the rational insurance purchase cook and graham 1977 the effects of risky background wealth doherty and schlesinger 1983 and mayers and smith 1983 and the design of the optimal insurance policy raviv 1979 such analyses have been conducted on the assumption that insurance policies are free of insolvency default risk this assumption stands in sharp contrast to the actuarial literature in which the insolvency risk or probability of ruin is a central focus of attention

a state contingent production approach to principal agent problems with an application to point source pollution control two basic representations of principal agent relationships the state space and parameterized distribution formulations have emerged although the state space formulation appears more natural analytical studies using this formulation have had limited success this paper develops a state space formulation of the moral hazard problem using a general representation of production under uncertainty a closed form solution for the agency cost problem is derived comparative static results are deduced next we solve the principal s problem of selecting the optimal output given the agency cost function the analysis is applied to the problem of point source pollution control c 1998 published by elsevier science s a all rights reserved

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

a test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting a politician s preferences do matter he is not simply a captured agent speaking only for his constituent s interests some latitude exists for him to shirk his responsibility to serve his constituents interests and to cast votes consistent with his own personal ideology more important to our understanding and modeling of voting behavior shirking for ideological consumption is seen to increase with age once a threshold of about 53 years old is reached shirking is not a phenomena of the politicians final term in office rather it likely exists in every term and begins to increase significantly two terms prior to the expected horizon sixty percent of the sample of senators were seen to exhibit increasing ideological consumption with age

further toward a theory of agricultural insurance the economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that given full information pareto optimal insurance contracts are actuarially fair provide full coverage and differ for each individual the information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection prevent pareto optimality from being attained several second best solutions to these problems are applied to agricultural insurance it is shown that information collection and the application of contract design principles are second best solutions which may achieve the benefits of insurance at less cost than the current practice of public subsidies in theory agricultural insurance is an efficient risk sharing mechanism in practice however agricultural insurance has been a costly means of transferring risk from farmers to governments and or other insurers to induce farmers to participate in agricultural insurance governments have borne significant subsidy costs hazell pomareda and valdes p 295 in a recent study ahsan ali and kurian aak concluded that public subsidies are necessary to make agricultural insurance viable they also showed that insurance will increase output relative to a case with no insurance thus insurance is beneficial particularly in less developed countries where increasing food supplies is a policy goal for this reason they concluded that public subsidization of insurance also is desirable their conclusions are derived from a simplified model of production with one output and one input in this article we consider a more general production model with multiple inputs and outputs we show that aak s conclusion about the benefits of insurance may not hold depending on the nature of the inputs and outputs as defined by the production function carl h nelson is an assistant professor of agricultural economics

designing optimal crop revenue insurance when the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer s price and individual yield an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer s gross revenue however this design is not efficient if as is the case with available contracts the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and or price the producer s degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule in this broader context optimal protection is not provided by available u s crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance yield insurance futures and options contracts

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance we investigate the demand for insurance when contracts are subject with positive probability to two distinct types of incomplete performance when partial performance means payment of some fraction of the indemnity under full performance the latter exhibits a disappearing deductible when partial performance is due to insufficient financial capacity optimal insurance contracts for any given level of financial capacity offer full marginal coverage above a deductible for either type of non performance the optimal deductible under full performance is positive when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair price

the basis risk of catastrophic loss index securities abstract using a windstorm simulation model developed by applied insurance research we analyze the effectiveness of catastrophic loss index options in hedging hurricane losses for florida insurers the results suggest that insurers in the two largest size quartiles can hedge losses almost as effectively using contracts based on four intrastate indices as they can using contracts that settle on their own losses many insurers in the third largest size quartile also can hedge effectively using the intrastate indices but most insurers in the smallest quartile would encounter significant basis risk hedging using a statewide loss index is effective only for the largest insurers

political shirking opponent quality and electoral support several recent papers in the public choice literaturesuggest that legislators shirk or vote in a mannercontrary to constituent interest this paper exploresthe relationship between senatorial shirking andelectoral consequences i model political shirking opponent quality and election outcomes assimultaneous and find significant evidence of arelationship between shirking over the senatorial termand electoral outcomes however i find that voterspunish recent shirking much more than they punishearly term shirking and that senators apparently actconsistently with this relationship

insurability and moral hazard in agricultural insurance markets pareto optimal and constrained pareto optimal all risk insurance contracts are studied conditions required for emergence of competitive insurance markets are isolated and discussed full insurance contracts are shown to be dominated by contracts involving coinsurance and deductibles if insurers are pseudo risk averse the effect of moral hazard on all risk agricultural insurance indemnity schedules is examined results for indemnity schedules under moral hazard and constant absolute risk aversion show that providing farmers with the incentives to take appropriate actions may imply lower deductibles in the presence of moral hazard than in the absence of moral hazard

inflation and the tax treatment of firm behavior in the past decade economists have be gun to realize that inflation even when fully anticipated constitutes a great deal more than a tax on money balances the primary reason for inflation s wider impact is the existence of a tax system designed with stable prices in mind this paper offers a brief summary of the effects of inflation on the tax treatment of the firm focusing on four important decisions the firm makes the scale of investment the method of finance the durability of assets used in production and the holding period of these assets there are a number of interesting and related issues which cannot be covered in a paper of this length as i will be considering inflation that is both uniform and fully anticipated questions concerning the behavior of the firm in response to uncertainty about inflation or to a concommitant change in relative prices will not arise this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

efficient contracts in credit markets subject to interest rate risk an application of raviv s insurance model interest rate risk borne by financial institutions has increased markedly as the credit markets have become more unstable in recent years the burden of this new instability has been especially severe for lending institutions whose balance sheets show the greatest mismatch between the maturities of assets and liabilities the savings and loan industry for example which borrows short and lends long suffered serious losses in recent years as income from its portfolio of old mortgages failed to keep pace with the escalating cost of short term funds the specter of such losses has led to the emergence of adjustable rate mortgages arms as well as other types of variable rate contracts these contracts often specify a complex functional relationship between the future loan interest rate and the lender s uncertain future cost of funds in view of the growing popularity of variable rate loans it is important to know what features an efficient contract of this type would possess to answer this question the present paper derives the form of the optimal variable rate contract focusing especially on the contractual relationship between the loan rate and the future cost of funds the framework used in the analysis is very similar to artur raviv s 1979 optimal insurance model section i derives the form of the optimal loan contract and evaluates the risk sharing efficiency of arms in light of the results subsequent sections discuss extensions of the model and offer conclusions 1 i analysis

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district