price wars caused by switching costs in many markets consumers have switching costs for example learning costs or transaction costs of changing between functionally equivalent brands of a product or of using any brand for the first time we analyse a four period complete information model of a market with switching costs in which new entry occurs after the second period the new entry results in equilibrium in a price war that is the new entrants prices are higher in the post entry period than in the entry period and the incumbent s price falls in either the pre entry period or the entry period and subsequently rises we can interpret the incumbent s lowering its price in the pre entry period as limit pricing behaviour we distinguish between two types of price war that can occur and show how the type or mixture of types that arises depends on the size of switching costs

collusive pricing patterns in the us airline industry abstract we formulate two empirical tests for collusive behavior based on the theoretical insights of werden and froeb 1994 and athey bagwell and sanchirico 2004 the first predicts that colluding firms will reduce pair wise differences in prices within a market if demand satisfies certain properties the second predicts that colluding firms will sacrifice efficiency in production by increasing price rigidity to avoid informational costs using panel data from the us airline industry and fixed effects estimation we find that greater multimarket contact between carriers leads to pricing patterns consistent with both theoretical predictions while code share agreements are consistent with the second prediction

informational asymmetries strategic behavior and industrial organization one of the most active and exciting areas of economic research over the last several years has been the use of noncooperative games of incomplete information to model industrial competition this work has yielded not only a remarkable number of papers but also several new insights on and explanations of fundamentally important issues the purpose of this paper is to attempt an appreciation and evaluation of this work because most of our individual and joint work since about 1979 has been in this mode it will come as no surprise that we are proponents of this line of research however there are several questions and potential problems that we see as arising in connection with this methodology and we will attempt to address these first a disclaimer we are not attempting a survey of the applications of asymmetric information games aig to industrial organization although we will refer in a highly selective fashion to a number of prominent strands in this literature in particular where any references are provided at all they are typically only to the earliest contributions to a subject even more we do not deal with work in which informational asymmetries are important but the analysis is not game theoretic for example search and price dispersion or the early work on the lemons problem and on moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets or with game theoretic treatments that assume complete information i aig methods and applications

price wars in price setting supergames this paper presents a method of generating price wars in price setting supergames the market is one where symmetric oligopolists produce a differentiated product and use price as a strategic variable prices are posted and can be observed by all there is thus little uncertainty or scope for secret price cutting nevertheless price wars occur they are precipitated by periodic but infrequent demand shocks firms use the wars to learn about changed conditions in the market so that they can calculate the new stationary nash equilibrium learning is modeled in a bayesian fashion via the kalman filter copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

switching regression models with imperfect sample separation information with an application on cartel stability an exogenous switching regression model with imperfect reginme classificationi information is specified and applied to a study of cartel stability an efficient estimation method is proposed which takes this imperfect information into account the consequences of misclassification are analyzed the direction of the least squares bias is derived an optimal regime classification rule is obtained and compared theoretically and empirically with other classification rules we then examine the joint executive committee a railroad cartel in the 1880 s the econometric evidence indicates that reversions to noncooperative behavior did occur for the firms in our sample and these reversions involve a significant decrease in market price this article is concerned with the possibility of estimating a switching regression model and its application to a study on cartel stability the switching regression model is the exogenous switching model proposed by quandt 24 which generalized a problem of mixture distributions day 4 the sample in this model is generated from distinct regression equations or regimes for each time period if the investigator has a priori information on how the sample is partitioned into the underlying regimes it is a switching regression model with known sample separation otherwise it is a model with unknown sample separation estimation of these latter models has been considered by quandt 24 goldfeld and quandt 8 and kiefer 14 16 among others a switching regression model is appropriate for the study of cartel behavior when there are price wars as firms will revert from cooperative to noncooperative behavior and so the industry supply function shifts occasionally this model will allow us to exploit the fact that there will be periodic stochastic switches or reversions between cooperative and noncooperative conduct in order to identify collusive episodes

joint management of capacity and inventory in make to stock production systems with multi class demand we evaluate the benefits of coordinating capacity and inventory decisions in a make to stock production environment we consider a firm that faces multi class demand and has additional capacity options that are temporary and randomly available we formulate the model as a markov decision process mdp and prove that a solution to the optimal joint control problem exists for several special cases we characterize the structure of the optimal policy for the general case however we show that the optimal policy is state dependent and in many instances non monotone and difficult to implement therefore we consider three pragmatic heuristic policies and assess their performance we show that the majority of the savings originate from the ability to dynamically adjust capacity and that a simple heuristic that can adjust production capacity based on workload fluctuation but uses a static production rationing policy can result in significant savings

the cyclical behavior of the department of justice s antitrust enforcement activity abstract we study the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the us department of justice the key result is that antitrust case activity is countercyclical this finding is robust across alternate indicators of economic activity which include stock prices corporate profits and business cycles and across different types of cases the finding of countercyclical case activity does not appear to lend support to interest group theories that predict greater regulatory protection towards producers during economic contractions one interpretation of our result would be that antitrust violations tend to increase during economic downturns leading to an increase in the number of cases initiated the broad implication being that the antitrust division primarily acts as an antitrust law enforcement agency our results show that politics as measured by the party of the president and the republican versus democrat composition of the house and senate does not have a clear impact on case activity finally the number of cases initiated are significantly affected by the extent of funding

airport congestion when carriers have market power this paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic showing how the results of the road pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power the analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist congestion is fully internalized yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions under a cournot oligopoly however carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves a toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic the analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence

regulation and the theory of legislative choice the interstate commerce act of 1887 this article concerns the economic incidence of the interstate commerce act of 1887 ica our focus is the short haul pricing constraint a provision of the ica that prohibited railroads from charging higher rates to isolated primarily agrarian shippers than it charged to intercity shippers of similar commodities utilizing the event study methodology we find that the impending passage of the ica generated a distribution of abnormal returns to railroads and shipping firms that is consistent with the theoretical implications of our analysis of the short haul pricing constraint shpc however early interpretations of the shpc by the interstate commerce commission reduced some of the abnormal returns to railroads in a manner that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the short haul pricing constraint was an important mechanism of early railroad regulation the analysis does support a multiple interest interpretation of the interstate commerce act and has implications for the positive theory of regulation

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee this article reexamines the experience of the joint executive committee an 1880s railroad cartel to assess the applicability of the green and porter 1984 and rotemberg and saloner 1986 theories of price wars after discussing necessary modifications to the theories i estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars the cyclical nature of pricing and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given the estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory

the demand for nominal and real money balances in a large macroeconomic system cointegration has become a popular empirical technique used to estimate the existence and stability of money demand relationships a common approach has been to estimate a single equation system with real money balances ml real income and an interest rate although hafer and jansen 13 friedman and kuttner 10 and stock and watson 29 find only minimal support for this specification baba hendry and starr 6 estimate a more complicated ml relation by including specific opportunity cost variables and find stronger support for the ml relation using post wwii data there have been four reasons put forth to explain the lack of a cointegrating relation between ml real income and the interest rate stock and watson 29 conclude that a stable money demand relation exists in data from 1900 89 but not for the post war period alone their explanation is that sufficient variation exists in the longer sample to identify money demand but excessive multicollinearity among variables during the post war period prevents unique identification baba hendry and starr 6 bhs maintain that misspecification of the ml relation is the reason for poor results they augment the money demand function with inflation a measure of long term bond yield and risk and learning curve weighted yields on newly introduced ml and m2 assets bhs claim their specification is able to account for the missing money period of 1975 76 the velocity decline of 1982 83 and the ml explosion of 1985 86 while standard ml models cannot friedman and kuttner 10 offer a third reason why the simple money demand equation fails they estimate a single equation model for several periods and conclude that a money demand vector exists over the 1960 2 79 4 period for ml however when data is included

multiple cointegrating vectors and structural economic models an application to the french franc u s dollar exchange rate structural models of the exchange rate have performed very poorly for the industrialized nations during the post bretton woods period the time series behavior of exchange rates seems to conform to other asset prices in that volatility is large and short term changes seem to respond primarily to the news using the engle and granger 16 technique studies by baillie and selover 4 baillie and mcmahon 5 and kim and enders 21 among others provided evidence that there are no long run relationships between bilateral nominal exchange rates and the so called fundamentals more recently papers by baillie and pecchenino 6 and adams and chadha 1 used the maximum likelihood johansen 18 and johansen and juselius 19 method to provide evidence of cointegration between exchange rates and some of the fundamentals however none of these papers is able to validate any of the standard models of exchange rate determination our departure from the previous literature is that we develop a simple modelling strategy that is useful in the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors in our view a well specified economic model indicates the number of cointegrating vectors that exist among a set of variables moreover the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors conveys valuable information that should not be wasted we extend the suggestion of bagliano favero and muscatelli 3 and smith and hagan 26 and interpret each cointegrating vector as a behavioral or as a reduced form equation from a structural model the technique is illustrated using u s french exchange rate and money market data in doing so it is shown that it is not possible to reject a popular structural exchange rate determination model we demonstrate that in the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors the theory can guide us in identifying the behavioral equations the exactly identified long run relationships can be properly considered to be behavioral equations resulting from a structural model of exchange rate determination given that these equations represent long run properties

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

cartel contract duration empirical evidence from inter war international cartels a formal cartel organization sets up a multilateral relationship between firms in a given industry while standard contracting literature has studied bilateral monopoly relationships in detail there are horizontal relationships like cartels that also have contractual aspects to shed light on how these contracts work this paper takes a sample of legal formal cartel contracts and examines their structure and durability borrowing from industrial organization theories and transaction cost theories the empirical model tests for the importance of demand uncertainty and cartel organizational characteristics in determining cartel contract duration the results show that the more uncertain the environment within which the cartel operates the shorter the expected cartel duration other industry structure characteristics and cartel organization variables included in the empirical model have a much weaker influence on duration copyright 2005 oxford university press

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

the demand for m1 in the u s a 1960 1988 estimated u s m1 demand functions appear unstable regularly breaking down over 1960 1988 e g missing money great velocity decline m1 explosion we propose a money demand function whose arguments include inflation real income long term bond yield and risk t bill interest rates and learning curve weighted yields on newly introduced instruments in m1 and non transactions m2 the model is estimated in dynamic error correction form it is constant and with an equation standard error of 0 4 variance dominates most previous models estimating alternative specifications explains earlier breakdowns showing the model s distinctive features to be important in accounting for the data

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

a stock rationing policy in a s s controlled stochastic production system with 2 phase coxian processing times and lost sales abstract this paper analyzes a s s controlled stochastic production system with multi class demands and lost sales demands in each class are assumed to arrive according to a poisson process and the time required to process an item is assumed to follow a 2 phase coxian distribution for each class a stock rationing level is set when customers arrive if the inventory level is lower than the predetermined rationing level the demands are lost for future demands with higher priorities a behavior of the production system is modeled as a continuous time markov chain and an efficient algorithm to calculate the steady state probability distribution of the system is proposed the average operating cost under the stock rationing policy is compared with the one without stock rationing numerical experiment shows that the proposed stock rationing policy reduces the average operating cost significantly depending on the system parameters

market share stability in commercial airline markets and the impact of deregulation while the degree of rivalry in a market is often concealed and therefore difficult to observe directly various measures of market share variation have been used in the literature as an indicat or of behavior using a similar measure the primary task of this stu dy is to estimate the degree to which rivalry both price and nonpric e had actually increased during the first two years of deregulation the paper also provides an analytical framework which may be used to assess the impact of regulatory reform on rivalry in other industrie s copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

the effects of horizontal mergers on competition the case of the northern securities company several recent articles have studied the competitive effects of horizontal mergers by examining rival firms stock price reactions to the merger announcement and subsequent antitrust challenge these articles have consistently failed to find any evidence of anticompetitive effects this article considers two alternative explanations for the previous findings and it sheds some new light on the issue by presenting a case study of the merger that resulted in the formation of the northern securities company in 1901

an empirical investigation of private label supply by national label producers private labels pls are ubiquitous in several categories including groceries apparel and appliances however existing empirical work has not examined the differential impact of various upstream supply arrangements for pl products or the strategic motives for pl supply to do so requires one to model the interaction between private and national label nl products both upstream and downstream while accounting for strategic behavior on the part of manufacturers and retailers and retaining essential differences between nl and pl products we build a model that satisfies these requirements and lets us answer our two research questions first can an nl firm profit from being an outsourced pl supplier second what are the upstream and downstream impacts of different pl supply arrangements we answer these questions by modeling private labels as homogenous products at wholesale but as differentiated products at retail in contrast national label products are differentiated at both wholesale and retail levels using structural model estimates for fluid milk in a major metropolitan area we conduct three counterfactual experiments we find that both nl producers and retailers profit from adding private labels we also find that a vertically integrated supply of pl leads to lower prices for end consumers

accounting for real and nominal exchange rate movements in the post bretton woods period abstract using the technique developed by blanchard and quah we decompose real and nominal exchange rate movements into the components induced by real and nominal factors nominal shocks have had a minor effect on the real and nominal bilateral exchange rates between the us and canada japan and germany there is little evidence of exchange rate overshooting real demand rather than supply shocks have been responsible for volatile exchange rate movements structural models of exchange rate determination need to consider such shocks as an important fundamental determinant

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

multimarket contact and pricing evidence from the u s cement industry abstract we empirically examine the effect of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s cement industry a model of price and quantity formation is estimated for a panel of 25 regional cement markets over 16 years the results indicate that the divergence of price from marginal cost in a particular market is directly related to the extent of multimarket contact among firms in that market

learning and price volatility in duopoly models of resource depletion the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model that can account for price fluctuations in depletable resource markets we do so by introducing learning into a hotelling style duopoly model of optimal resource depletion before the depletable resource becomes scarce the self confirming equilibrium of the model mirrors noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium in that supply is high and price is low although learning does induce occasional upward price spikes that are followed by a long period of falling price once the depletable resource becomes scarce the dynamics of the market change significantly with the self confirming equilibrium mirroring the cooperative rather than noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium supply is low and price is high price spikes still occur but against a background of increasing prices when scarcity is sufficient then the market is permanently in a self confirming equilibrium that is equivalent to cooperative rational expectations equilibrium

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

price ceilings as focal points to reach price uniformity evidence from a chinese gasoline market abstract this paper studies the price uniformity in the chinese gasoline market using station level data of hohhot city inner mongolia we first document that the mode prices of the gasoline stations are consistent with the price ceilings set by the government implying that the price ceiling regulation in the chinese gasoline market may serve as a focal point for the gasoline stations to reach price uniformity we corroborate the focal point hypothesis by providing evidence showing that some stations would jump to the ceilings as their prices approach the ceilings also we find that local market structure distance between stations station capacity market characteristics and past pricing behavior could affect the probability of gas stations to price at the ceilings moreover a higher price ceiling would reduce the probability that stations reach price uniformity our results provide another piece of evidence to the literature regarding the unintended effect of price ceiling regulation

dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry abstract this paper examines the dynamic interaction between united airlines and american airlines on a set of duopoly routes we estimate quarterly conduct parameters or conjectural variations and test constant behaviour bertrand cournot and collusive models we also test two regimeswitching models derived from the green porter price war model one based on reversion to bertrand behaviour during price wars the other on reversion to cournot behaviour the three constant behaviour models are all rejected the regime switching models can both describe the data but the cournot based version is preferred

stock rationing in an m ek 1 make to stock queue this paper considers the stock rationing problem of a single item make to stock production system with several demand classes and lost sales when demand is poisson and processing time has an erlang distribution we show that a single state variable called work storage level can be employed to completely capture the information regarding inventory level and the status of current production the optimal rationing policy can be characterized by a sequence of monotone critical work storage levels for each demand class there exists a work storage level at or below which it is optimal to start rejecting the demand of this class in anticipation of future arrival of higher priority demands the optimal production policy can also be characterized by a critical work storage level our numerical examples indicate that a critical stock level policy which ignores information on the status of current production performs very well

impulse response analysis of cointegrated systems abstract impulse response or dynamic multiplier analysis of vector autoregressive systems with cointegrated variables is considered the asymptotic distribution of the responses estimated with johansen s 1988 maximum likelihood procedure is derived the results are illustrated with an analysis of a west german money demand system the investigation shows that a direct interpretation of the cointegration relations may be difficult or misleading thereby the virtue of impulse response analysis for applied work is illustrated

inventory rationing in a make to stock production system with several demand classes and lost sales this paper considers the stock rationing problem of a single item make to stock production system with several demand classes and lost sales for the case of poisson demands and exponential production times we show that the optimal policy can be characterized by a sequence of monotone stock rationing levels for each demand class there exists a stock rationing level at or below which it is optimal to start rejecting the demand of this class in anticipation of future arrival of higher priority demands a simple queueing model is analyzed to compute the operating cost of a rationing policy in a numerical study we compare the optimal rationing policy with a first come first served policy to investigate the benefit of stock rationing under different operating conditions of the system

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

welfare effects of entry into markets with switching costs in many markets consumers have costs of switching between products that are functionally identical this note shows that entry of efficient low cost competitors into these markets may be socially detrimental in a linear model entry reduces social welfare as conventionally defined in more than half of the relevant parameter space in a more general model there is always a range of values of switching costs for which entry reduces welfare even if the entrant s production costs are lower than the incumbent s copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

vancouver s gasoline price wars an empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies this paper uses a unique data set to determine which dynamic model of tacit collusion best describes behaviour in a particular industry the area investigated is a region of the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market players are service station managers who compete daily firms choose price in each period using strategies that depend on prices chosen in the previous period periodically unanticipated demand shocks precipitate price wars when shocks occur the firms in the market must determine the new demand conditions and adjust their strategies from an econometric point of view slopes of intertemporal reaction functions are latent variables the resulting system of equations with time varying parameters is estimated via the kalman filter different repeated game oligopoly models correspond to different transition matrices for the latent variables the models can thus be assessed in terms of their power to explain firm behaviour in this market

tacit collusion with imperfect monitoring in the canadian manufacturing industry an empirical study this article undertakes a cross sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by abreu pearce and stachetti 1986 specifically we assess the prevalence of a first order markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods through nonparametric tests the analysis focuses on 30 different industries in canada the evidence provides weak support for optimal collusion in one industry which is consistent with the idea that such kind of collusive arrangements is unusual or if collusion is all too common that price wars as deviations from collusion are rare

price cost margins exports and productivity growth with an application to canadian industries a model is estimated for oligopolistic industries producing multiple outputs in short run equilibrium outputs are sold domestically and exported while capital is treated as a quasi fixed factor the model is applied to the canadian non electrical machinery electrical products and chemical products industries the results show that there is significant oligopoly power in each of the industries and that the degree of this power differs between the domestic and export markets total factor productivity is decomposed price cost margins exert little influence but the rate of technological change returns to scale and the rate of capital adjustment determine productivity growth

margins concentration unions and the business cycle theory and evidence for britain abstract a number of recent studies have examined the cyclical relationship between price cost margins concentration and unions u s data has concluded that unions reduce margins margins vary over the cycle and concentration unionisation and the cycle interact in their effect on margins however there is almost no theory to account for these results we propose a simple theory that assumes only that there is overhead labour present at the firm this produces theoretical predictions that can explain these results and discriminate between existing theories we present results of our own using u k panel data and show similar findings to the u s

real and monetary causes of real exchange rate movements in the pacific rim modem models of exchange rate determination suggest that real shocks can induce changes in the real exchange rate a real shock which is permanent can induce a permanent deviation from purchasing power parity ppp nominal shocks on the other hand can induce temporary but not permanent deviations from ppp even if money is not neutral in the short run long run money neutrality guarantees that monetary shocks of any variety have no permanent effects on the long run value of the real exchange rate for example in the well known dornbusch 4 overshooting model an increase in the money supply initially causes real and nominal exchange rate depreciation over time the real rate converges to its original level and the proportional change in the nominal rate approaches the percentage change in the money supply to date the vast majority of tests concerning ppp have been conducted for the u s european and japanese economies most of these tests are not supportive of the hypothesis for example corbae and ouliaris 1 and enders 5 use unit root and co integration tests to reject ppp for this group of nations however as shown by mussa 9 and enders 6 ppp works quite well for nations experiencing very different rates of inflation these findings are consistent with the theoretical models of the exchange rate if the industrialized nations experience permanent real shocks while the high inflation nations experience substantial monetary growth in this light it is interesting to consider behavior of the real exchange rate for the pacific rim nations these nations particularly japan and korea represent rapidly growing nations with strong trading ties to the united states and europe comparing of the behavior of the real exchange rate between japan and korea two rapidly growing nations might provide an interesting contrast to that of korea versus other pacific rim nations and korea versus the united states

living by the golden rule multimarket contact in the u s airline industry this paper examines empirically the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s airline industry the analysis of the time series and cross sectional variability of airline fares in the 1000 largest domestic city pair routes reveals the presence of statistically significant and quantitatively important multimarket effects fares are higher in city pair markets served by carriers with extensive interroute contacts these findings are consistent with the claims of industry experts that airlines live by the golden rule i e that they refrain from initiating aggressive pricing actions in a given route for fear of what their competitors might do in other jointly contested routes during his testimony mr steven b elkins senior director of marketing systems development for northwest airlines cited an example in which northwest lowered fares on night flights that were flying with empty seats in a number of routes from minneapolis and upper midwest cities to various west coast cities he said that continental airlines swiftly responded by cutting prices in important northwest markets mr elkins s memo advises northwest pricing analysts we will live by the golden rule in his testimony he explained that the golden rule in that context was that i did not want my pricing analyst initiating actions in another carrier s market like chicago for fear of what that other carrier might do to retaliate wall street journal october 9 1990 p b1

federal timber restrictions and interregional arbitrage in u s lumber harvesting restrictions to protect the habitat of the northern spotted owl on federal forests in the pacific northwest pnw substan tially reduced timber available for processing by the forest products industry we consider the ex tent to which these restrictions may have altered the degree of integration of the pnw and u s south in a national market for lumber descrip tive statistics and econometric analysis of monthly price data suggest that a structural break occurred in the relationship between the two re gions product prices around the time of the har vest restrictions leading to a more integrated market after the restrictions were imposed jel q23

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

dynamic inventory rationing strategies for inventory systems with two demand classes poisson demand and backordering we study inventory systems with two demand classes critical and non critical poisson demand and backordering we analyze dynamic rationing strategies where the number of items reserved for critical demand depends on the remaining time until the next order arrives different from results in the literature we do not discretize demand but derive a set of formulae that determine the optimal rationing level for any possible value of the remaining time moreover we show that the cost parameters can be captured in a single relevant dimension which allows us to present the optimal rationing levels in charts and lookup tables that are easy to implement numerical examples illustrate that the optimal dynamic rationing strategy outperforms all static strategies with fixed rationing levels

monetary accommodation in transition economies econometric evidence from yugoslavia s high inflation in the 1980s abstract a conjecture advanced by some ad hoc evidence and the theory that money accommodates wage inflation in transition economies is tested and accepted for yugoslavia s high inflation of the 1980s within a cointegration framework an overidentified long run structure is estimated and accepted where money is cointegrated with wages while not with prices furthermore two independent common stochastic trends emerge suggesting that aggregate supply shocks i e those to wages and prices and exchange rate shocks were driving yugoslavia s high inflation while the impact of money supply shocks was transitory these results are due to the presence of soft budget constraint where money passively validated wage and price decisions and to the yugoslav debt and balance of payments crises in the 1980s which triggered exchange rate shocks the results on the role of aggregate supply shocks might bear general relevance for transition economies