dynamic investment and financing under personal taxation this paper examines the effects of capital gains taxation on firms investment and financing decisions we develop a real options model in which the timing of investment the decision to default and the firm s capital structure are endogenously and jointly determined our analysis demonstrates that the asymmetric taxation of capital gains and losses fosters investment by eroding the option value of waiting it also shows that firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing the higher the firm s stock price and the worse the firm s historical performance using a large sample of u s industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors between 1970 and 2008 we present new evidence on corporate investment and financing policies which is supportive of the model s predictions

taxes and financial frictions implications for corporate capital structure abstract according to data from compustat we observe three general trends between 1980 and 2012 first firms have been reducing their reliance on debt as leverage ratios have fallen and an increasing fraction of firms are now actually net lenders second the frequency at which firms neither issue external equity nor distribute dividends to shareholders has fallen third marginal corporate income tax rates have fallen significantly as well using compustat balance sheet data we structurally estimate a model in which heterogeneous firms finance investment with equity and debt our model incorporates costly external finance as well as a detailed tax structure including personal dividend and corporate income taxes we conclude that there has been a significant reduction in the cost of external equity while overall leverage ratios have fallen mainly because of a lower tax advantage of debt

monetary fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union abstract we consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union if monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets the nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities leadership of either authority is better fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment the optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary fiscal symbiosis yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives for any order of moves without fiscal co ordination and without monetary commitment

nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices abstract we discuss nonlinear strategies in an infinite horizon duopoly game with sticky prices where firms maximize their discounted sum of profit we construct a stationary feedback equilibrium without guessing value functions and feedback strategies that solve the hamilton jacobi equation for this purpose we study the auxiliary equation that is derived from the hamilton jacobi equation we show that the domain of the state space plays an crucial role in characterizing feedback equilibria and discuss several implications of this observation in particular we find that when the upper bound of the state space is not very high previously unknown feedback equilibria emerge

signalling with many signals this paper examines a market with asymmetric information where there are many signals available and where both the costs of signaling and the product value may depend on many privately known characteristics under a weak condition on the relationship between the marginal cost of increasing the signals and the product value a separating set exists whereby the value of every seller s product is inferred from the seller s optimal choice of signals the separating set constructed is pareto dominant and corresponds to recently proposed equilibrium notions in signaling and screening models copyright 1987 by the econometric society

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

fair transfer price and inventory holding policies in two enterprise supply chains abstract a key issue in supply chain optimisation involving multiple enterprises is the determination of policies that optimise the performance of the supply chain as a whole while ensuring adequate rewards for each participant in this paper we present a mathematical programming formulation for fair optimised profit distribution between echelons in a general multi enterprise supply chain the proposed formulation is based on an approach applying the nash bargaining solution for finding optimal multi partner profit levels subject to given minimum echelon profit requirements the overall problem is first formulated as a mixed integer non linear programming minlp model a spatial and binary variable branch and bound algorithm is then applied to the above problem based on exact and approximate linearisations of the bilinear terms involved in the model while at each node of the search tree a mixed integer linear programming milp problem is solved the solution comprises inter firm transfer prices production and inventory levels flows of products between echelons and sales profiles the applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated by a number of illustrative examples based on industrial processes

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

a repeated game model of monetary union given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank s operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation this is modelled as a repeated game and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries incentive compatibility constraints is found the optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level so as to maintain the worse hit country s incentive to abide by the rule

is transparency about central bank plans desirable a central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation to increase the public s perception of its inflation aversion and lower expected future inflation a regime is said to be transparent if planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank s preferences and to be non transparent if planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation a central bank in the non transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation i find several results about transparent and non transparent regimes some are novel and some contrast with the results of earlier papers in particular i demonstrate that in a non transparent regime increased transparency need not improve the public s ability to infer a central bank s private information i show that society and central banks are better off with more transparency my numerical results suggest that society and central banks prefer the transparent to the non transparent regimes

optimal consumption and investment with capital gains taxes this article characterizes optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio decisions in the presence of capital gains taxes and short sale restrictions the optimal decisions are a function of the investor s age initial portfolio holdings and tax basis our results capture the trade off between the diversification benefits and tax costs of trading over an investor s lifetime the incentive to rediversify the portfolio is inversely related to the size of the embedded gain and investor s age contrary to standard financial advice the optimal equity holding increases well into an investor s lifetime in our model due to the forgiveness of capital gains taxes at death taxes play an important role in the decision making process of individuals concerning their consumption and investment plans the taxation of returns on financial assets alters the benefits of saving for future consumption and thus affects the trade off between current consumption and investment moreover the ability of investors to defer the taxation of capital gains alters the relative valuation of stocks and bonds and thus affects the optimal portfolio composition of investors the deferral feature of capital gains taxes also affects the trade off investors face regarding taxes and diversification investors would like to maintain an optimally diversified portfolio over time

the value of the tax subsidy on risky debt the effect of corporate taxes on the market value of a levered firm continues to be a central issue in recent contributions in finance theory e g miller 1977 deangelo and masulis 1980 kim 1982 modigliani 1982 in these and other studies e g krause and litzenberger 1973 scott 1976 brennan and schwartz 1978 kim 1978 the relationship between market value and capital structure is established by formulating a tax subsidy function that specifies the partial effect of debt on the expected tax savings at the corporate level under the existing u s tax code a working assumption in most of these studies is that both principal and interest are tax deductible this assumption is made in the spirit of the original modigliani and miller 1963 formulation in which debt is taken to be perpetual and riskless indeed it is well known that the tax shield provided by the deduction of principal in a singleperiod framework has the same value as the tax shield from interest deductions in the case of perpetual and riskless debt under this assumption it is shown that in the absence of non debtthis paper examines the relationship between leverage and the value of the firm when non debt related tax shields are available and the corporate tax is levied as an income tax in a previous paper de angelo and masulis argue that in the presence of nondebt related tax shields the relationship between debt and firm value is concave resulting in an interior optimal capital structure when there is a tax induced differential in the cost of corporate debt their result derives from the fact that they assume the payment of debt principal and non debt related depreciation charges are deductible however the former deduction is consistent with a wealth tax while the latter is consistent only with an income tax we show that if the interest alone is deductible the debt firm value function is convex resulting in corner solutions to the capital structure problem the authors wish to thank richard castanias richard green lemma senbet and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and richard green and robert dammon for computational assistance

optimal pricing and production in an inventory model abstract this paper deals with the problem of simultaneously determining the optimal price policy and production rate over a given planning horizon for nonlinear demand functions and convex inventory and shortage cost functions the optimal solution paths are derived by using optimal control theory the treatment of linear nonsmooth cost functions requires the use of a generalized maximum principle the solution method is a phase portrait analysis providing insight into the optimal pricing and production policies as well as the resulting inventory paths moreover it is shown that in the case of nonsmooth piecewise linear cost functions the equilibrium is approached within finite time although the model is nonlinear in the control variables finally it is illustrated that exogenous fluctuations in the demand rate seasonal demand pattern amount to cyclical optimal solutions

dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel abstract in this paper we study a dynamic two player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price we consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its variations contribute to the building of an internal reference price one of the model s distinctive features is that it accounts for the two meanings of price i e its classical objective measure of the cost of acquiring a particular quantity of the product and its subjective roles as an assessment of the quality of the product and an evaluation of gains or losses deal vs sacrifice resulting from buying a cheap or an expensive product this dual computation is done with respect to the internal reference price our objective is to investigate the impact of retailer s myopia on the pricing strategies and payoffs of channel members in this context a myopic retailer is an agent that disregards the effects of its pricing strategy on the evolution of the perceived brand quality and the reference price

optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking den meisten akademikern und politischen entscheidungstragern zufolge ist transparenz in der geldpolitik wunschenswert ich untersuche diese behauptung anhand eines kleinen theoretischen models das das vorausschauende verhalten des privaten sektors hervorhebt transparenz erleichtert es denjenigen die preise festsetzen auf die kunftigen geldpolitischen absichten der zentralbank zu schliesen wodurch die laufende inflation starker auf stabilitatspolitische masnahmen reagiert dies fuhrt dazu dass die zentralbank sich eher auf die inflation als auf die stabilisierung der produktionslucke konzentriert in diesem fall kann transparenz negative folgen haben sie kann sich sogar als eine die geldpolitik verzerrende zwangsjacke herausstellen wenn die zentralbank sich stabilitatspolitischer glaubwurdigkeit erfreut und eine aktive monetare stabilisierungspolitik benotigt wird

multidivisional firms internal competition and comparative advantage baye et al meet neary abstract we present a tractable general equilibrium model to capture the effects of divisionalization on trade in oligopolistic industries divisionalization reduces the incentives for diversification in production the extensive margins of trade expand as a result of divisionalization facilitating specialization toward the direction of comparative advantage with exports rising in the case of domestic divisionalization and imports rising in the case of foreign divisionalization this effect of internal competition on specialization is magnified when competition between divisions is staggered the factor market effects of divisionalization domestic and or foreign strengthen the expansionary effects on the extensive margins of trade

an oligopoly model of dynamic advertising competition abstract an oligopoly model is presented that allows the determination of feedback nash equilibrium advertising strategies for an oligopoly analyses of symmetric and asymmetric oligopolies with the model show that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness have positive effects on a competitor s own advertising and steady state sales while discount rate and decay rate have negative effects an asymmetric analysis further shows that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness affect positively and discount rate and decay rate negatively a competitor s rivals advertising but have effects in opposite directions regarding rivals steady state sales the symmetric and asymmetric analyses also show that steady state sales per competitor decline with the number of competitors in the oligopoly while total oligopoly steady state sales increase the model is applied empirically to the triopolistic competition involving anheuser busch sabmiller and molson coors in the beer industry

inflation risk premia and the expectations hypothesis abstract we study the properties of the nominal and real risk premia of the term structure of interest rates we develop and solve the bond pricing implications of a structural monetary version of a real business cycle model with taxes and endogenous monetary policy we show the relation of this model with the class of essentially affine models that incorporate an endogenous state dependent market price of risk we characterize and estimate the inflation risk premium and find that over the last 40 years the ten year inflation risk premium has been has averaged 70 basis points it is time varying ranging from 20 to 140 basis points over the business cycle and its term structure is sharply upward sloping the inflation risk premium explains 23 42 of the time variation in the five ten year forward risk premium and it plays an important role in help explain deviations from the expectations hypothesis of interest rates

quality improvement vs advertising support which strategy works better for a manufacturer abstract we consider a marketing channel with a single manufacturer and a single retailer where both advertising and quality improvement contribute to the build up of goodwill in a non coop scenario the retailer controls the advertising efforts while the manufacturer controls the quality improvements and wholesale price although improving quality positively contributes to goodwill it also increases the production cost thereby reducing the manufacturer s profit in a coop scenario the manufacturer supports the retailer s advertising while decreasing his investments in quality we investigate the conditions under which a coop program is beneficial when such a trade off occurs our results demonstrate that only when advertising significantly contributes to goodwill the manufacturer has an incentive to cooperate and a coop program turns out to be pareto improving conversely the retailer is always better off with a coop program moreover the channel is operational and marketing driven when quality effectiveness is high independent of advertising effectiveness or when both quality and advertising effectiveness are large in all other cases the channel is marketing driven

the impact of capital structure on advertising competition an empirical study this article examines the interaction between capital structure and advertising competition using a sample of firms that raise significant amounts of capital we find that firms whose financial leverage has decreased as a result of their new funding increase their advertising significantly more than firms whose leverage has increased we also find that these firms industry rivals respond less aggressively with their own advertising when they have more debt in their capital structure overall our results support the view that financial leverage has a dampening effect on the intensity with which a firm chooses to compete in the product market

repeated signalling games and dynamic trading relationships a seller of a nondurable good repeatedly faces a buyer who is privately informed about the position of his demand curve the seller offers a price in each period the buyer chooses a quantity given the price the quantity demanded reveals information about the buyer an equilibrium is characterized with the feature that buyer types separate completely in the first period this equilibrium uniquely satisfies a modified refinement of the cho kreps criterion despite the immediate separation the buyer distorts his behavior throughout the game the requirement to signal types can raise the utility of all types of informed players copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising abstract this paper develops a differential duopolistic game where price is sticky and firms can invest in market enlarging promotional activities which have a public good nature one finding indicates that advertising and not output as in fershtman and kamien econometrica 55 1987 1151 1164 is responsible for the higher stationary price found in the open loop equilibrium relative to the linear feedback one that is free riding is more intense when firms play linear markov feedback strategies however the collusive outcome can be approximated and opportunism eliminated if firms can engage in preplay negotiations where they select a nonlinear markov perfect strategy for output and advertising achieving the collusive outcome requires as in the folk theorem for infinitely repeated games the discount rate to be sufficiently small

taxes and corporate policies evidence from a quasi natural experiment we document important interactions between tax incentives and corporate policies using a quasi natural experiment provided by a surprise announcement that imposed corporate taxes on a group of canadian publicly traded firms the announcement caused a dramatic decrease in value prospective tax shields partially offset the losses adding 4 6 to firm value on average and vary with the tax status of the marginal investor further firms adjust leverage payout cash holdings and investment in response to changing tax incentives overall the event study and time series evidence supports the view that taxes are important for corporate decision making

a simple model of the taxable and tax exempt yield curves i examine the anomalous behavior of the taxable and tax exempt yield curves long municipal yields appear too high relative to the equivalent after tax yield that can be earned in treasury or corporate bonds i discuss existing explanations of the problem and propose a simple model that relates the yields of taxable bonds to the yield curve for par tax exempts the ratio of the tax exempt yield to the taxable yield increases with maturity in the model so it is consistent with observed phenomena such as inverted yield curves for taxables and contemporaneous rising yield curves for tax exempts statistical and descriptive comparisons between the yields predicted by the model and observed yields on par bonds that the model has some promise in explaining the apparent anomalies in the behaviors of the two yield curves article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

debt leases taxes and the endogeneity of corporate tax status we provide evidence that corporate tax status is endogenous to financing decisions which induces a spurious relation between measures of financial policy and many commonly used tax proxies using a forward looking estimate of before financing corporate marginal tax rates we document a negative relation between operating leases and tax rates and a positive relation between debt levels and tax rates this is the first unambiguous evidence supporting the hypothesis that low tax rate firms lease more and have lower debt levels than high tax rate firms many theories of capital structure imply that all else equal the incentive to use debt financing increases with a firm s marginal tax rate due to the tax deductibility of interest expense e g modigliani and miller 1963 deangelo and masulis 1980 conversely leasing models generally predict that firms with low marginal tax rates employ relatively more leases than do firms with high marginal tax rates the logic behind the leasinlg prediction is that leases allow for the transfer of tax shields from firms that cannot fully utilize the associated tax deduction lessees to firms that can lessors e g myers dill and bautista 1976 smith and wakeman 1985 ross westerfield and jaffe 1996 despite these straightforward predictions empirically testing for tax effects is difficult because a spurious relation exists between the financing decision and many commonly used tax proxies specifically both interest expense and lease payments are tax deductible thus a firm that finances its operations with debt or leases reduces its taxable income potentially lowering its expected marginal tax rate if not properly addressed this endogeneity of the tax rate can bias an experiment in favor of finding a negative

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

dynamic promotional budgeting and media allocation this paper address the managerial problem of promotional budgeting and media allocation in a dynamic competitive framework we develop an extended lanchester model that is able to analyze multi instrument promotion in an oligopoly the competitors each with a different initial position as well as economic value of the market share and communication effectiveness adopt the strategy of maximizing their net present value of discounted profits taking the other players actions into account the resulting differential game is solved using a novel method providing both the open loop strategy and the closed loop strategy for each firm we prove that our solution is a global nash equilibrium we develop a simple formula that when applied to an open loop strategy readily generates a feedback strategy we also show that for both open and closed loop strategies the proportion of the budget allocated to each instrument is invariant with time and depends only on instrument effectiveness we illustrate the results and provide several managerial rules and discuss their application in practice finally we show that our model favorably compares with other model in the literature in explaining actual data

optimal advertising when envisioning a product harm crisis how should forward looking managers plan advertising if they envision a product harm crisis in the future to address this question we propose a dynamic model of brand advertising in which at each instant a nonzero probability exists for the occurrence of a crisis event that damages the brand s baseline sales and may enhance or erode marketing effectiveness when the crisis occurs because managers do not know when the crisis will occur its random time of occurrence induces a stochastic control problem which we solve analytically in closed form more importantly the envisioning of a possible crisis alters managers rate of time preference anticipation enhances impatience that is forward looking managers discount the present even when the crisis has not occurred more than they would in the absence of crisis building on this insight we then derive the optimal feedback advertising strategies and assess the effects of crisis likelihood and damage rate we discover the crossover interaction the optimal precrisis advertising decreases but the postcrisis advertising increases as the crisis likelihood or damage rate increases in addition we develop a new continuous time estimation method to simultaneously estimate sales dynamics and feedback strategies using discrete time data applying the method to market data from the ford explorer s rollover recall we furnish evidence to support the proposed model we detect compensatory effects in parametric shift ad effectiveness increases but carryover effect decreases or vice versa we also characterize the crisis occurrence distribution that shows that ford explorer should anticipate a crisis in 2 1 years and within 6 3 years at the 95 confidence level finally we find a remarkable correspondence between the observed and optimal advertising decisions

modeling asymmetric competition the effects of the marketing actions of one brand can be distributed among its competitors market shares in a complex manner this paper presents and illustrates methods for modeling brand competition and brand strategies in markets where competitive effects can be differentially and asymmetrically distributed we discuss the empirical specification parameter estimation and competitive strategy implications of the models proposed price and advertising competition among eleven brands of an australian household product is used to illustrate the application of these procedures

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

on modeling the advertising operations interface under asymmetric competition abstract using a market share attraction structure of advertising competition and following a supermodular game approach this article demonstrates for an asymmetric oligopoly the directional impact of changes in model parameters on the marketing controlled variables of all rivals advertising budgets and the operations controlled variables of all rivals ordered quantities importantly the various changes are examined analytically empirically and numerically in both non dominated and dominated asymmetric oligopolies in this regard the results indicate that firms in a dominated oligopoly one firm of market share larger than or equal to 50 behave differently compared to firms in a non dominated oligopoly each firm of market share less than 50 in response to changes in model parameters furthermore changes in model parameters are investigated in terms of their relative influential impact on a variety of equilibrium measures in this regard the findings indicate that for the analyzed model the marketing parameters exert much more influence on the equilibrium measures than the operations parameters additionally a change in the mode of competition from non cooperation oligopoly to cooperation joint ownership dictates that strong asymmetric firms of favorable marketing and operations parameters continue advertising but at lower levels and weak asymmetric firms of less favorable parameters cease advertising altogether

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

price coordination in distribution channels a dynamic perspective abstract in this study we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels i are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry over effects on demand ii should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities to answer these questions we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price the latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy we then compute and compare strategies total channel profits and individual profits under vertical integration and decentralization at steady state and along the optimal time paths one of our main findings states that for some values of the initial reference price there is a time interval where channel decentralization performs better than coordination during this transition period at least one of the channel members could be tempted to end his cooperation especially if he is not farsighted and if there are no binding agreements with the other channel partners

optimal management of fringe entry over time abstract in this paper we investigate the problem of a dominant company facing entry of a competitive fringe smaller competitor or fringe of smaller competitors we seek to identify pricing and advertising or other promotional strategies that maximize long term profits for the dominant firm under possible reactions of the competitive fringe two main situations are considered the firms in the fringe are price takers but they advertise the firms in the fringe are not price takers and advertise the possibility of a passive reaction in the case of a very small fringe is considered as a particular case we assume that the rate of change of fringe sales is dynamically related to the current sales price and advertising efforts of both the dominant firm and the fringe the higher the dominant firm price the faster fringe entry the higher dominant firm advertising effort the slower fringe entry fringe advertising and pricing may counterbalance these effects formulating a dynamic game with the dominant firm as a leader and the fringe as a follower we present a new methodology for providing time invariant feedback stackelberg equilibrium the methodology relies on finding the relationship between the co state variables and the state variable the equilibrium solution is obtained in an implicit form by solving a set of two backward differential equations to show the applicability of our solution to real situations we use data from the u s long distance market and find optimal decision rules for at t facing the entry of mci and sprint during the 1980 1990 period the feedback equilibrium indicates that while at t s price is decreasing when fringe mci and sprint sales increase the fringe price is increasing at t s advertising is increasing with fringe sales while the fringe s advertising increases and then decreases the comparison with actual behavior indicates that at t has adhered closer to the optimal solution in both price and advertising than the fringe

managing beliefs about monetary policy under discretion in models of monetary policy discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs however when a policymaker possesses private information policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies this article derives the optimal time consistent policy for a general linear quadratic setting the optimal policy is illustrated in a simple new keynesian model where analytical solutions can be derived as well in this model imperfect information about the policymaker s output target leads to lower policy losses

market share pioneering advantage a theoretical approach in this paper we present an industry in which a pioneer has entered accumulated capital in the form of goodwill and in his monopoly period has also reduced his cost of production as a result of some form of learning by doing at some later date a newcomer enters his production cost is higher than that of the monopolist at that date however due to diffusion of information the costs of the two firms equate at some future date once the new firm enters the market a duopolistic game begins in which the firms choose prices and investment rates analyzing this game we discover the conditions under which the final market shares no longer depend on the order of entry the initial cost advantage the length of the monopoly period or the length of time it took the newcomer to overcome the pioneer s cost advantage we analyze the speed and pattern of convergence to the final market shares and the capital path of the pioneer in his monopoly period depending on his beliefs concerning the possibility of entry

on the generalizability of advertising pulsation monopoly results to an oligopoly this paper introduces for the first time an analytical framework for modeling and analyzing sales response to advertising pulsation for competitive markets of mature products in continuous time for discrete piecewise policies that allow unequal cycle lengths employing a nash equilibrium solution concept this study supported with numerical analysis demonstrates that there is an oligopolistic as opposed to a monopolistic justification for advertising at a constant rate in the presence of concave response functions or advertising according to a pulsing policy in the presence of s shaped response functions the article employs a modeling framework whereby each of a set of competitors responses to advertising spending is governed mainly by lanchester type response is used to analyze the game resulting from cyclical advertising policies that are strictly adhered to by all players a non discounted averaged performance is used to assess the purported optimality of different variants of piecewise constant policies

dynamic competition valuation and merger activity we model the interactions between product market competition and investment valuation within a dynamic oligopoly to our knowledge the model is the first continuous time corporate finance model in a multiple firm setting with heterogeneous products the model is tractable and amenable to estimation we use it to relate current industry characteristics with firm value and financial decisions unlike most corporate finance models it produces predictions regarding parameter magnitudes as well their signs estimates of the model s parameters indicate strong linkages between model implied and actual values the paper uses the estimated parameters to predict rivals returns near merger announcements

transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing operations interface abstract a transfer price mechanism is proposed to coordinate the strategies of the marketing and operations functional areas operating in a dynamic interface environment in a decentralized firm marketing and operations are strategic decision makers in a differential game in which marketing has price and advertising and operations has production as control variables and advertising goodwill and production backlog are state variables a constant transfer price is entered into the objective functionals for marketing and operations and subgame perfect feedback strategies are derived for price advertising and production as functions of the state variables the feedback strategies allow a solution for the dynamic system involving goodwill and backlog and the total payoff to the firm the sum of the payoffs to marketing and operations is determined as a function of the transfer price finally for certain parameter conditions an interior maximum of the payoff function is achieved and the optimal transfer price is identified

closed loop advertising strategies in a duopoly using the lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market where two firms compete for customers by advertising we solve the problem of determining an optimal advertising strategy for maximum discounted profits we develop both open and closed loop strategies and explain the relationship between them using a new mathematical approach we prove that our closed loop solution is a global nash equilibrium the closed loop strategy is time variant and depends linearly on the actual market share the time variant coefficient incorporates the discount factor its computation requires the solution of a backward differential equation and a set of two nonlinear differential equations for an initial value problem the closed loop advertising expenditures are proportional to the open loop advertising expenditures and to the square of the competitor s actual market share this provides a very practical adaptive control rule that allows the manager to adjust the actual advertising expenditure and to deviate f

first impressions matter signalling as a source of policy dynamics we provide the first direct empirical support for the importance of signalling in monetary policy by testing two key predictions from a novel structural model first all policymaker types should become less tough on inflation over time and secondly types that weigh output more should have a more pronounced shift voting data from the bank of england s monetary policy committee strongly support both predictions counterfactual results indicate signalling has a substantial impact on interest rates over the business cycle and improves the committee designer s welfare implications for committee design include allowing regular member turnover and transparency regarding publishing individual votes

endogeneity and simultaneity in competitive pricing and advertising a logit demand analysis in this article we use four data sets to provide a benchmark study of the effects of accounting for endogeneity and simultaneity in estimating marketing mix effects in a logit demand framework we compare the results obtained from accounting for endogeneity only to those from accounting for both endogeneity and simultaneity and in the latter case we allow for more general models of firm behavior to examine the consequences of imposing assumptions about the behavior of firms we find that accounting for both endogeneity and simultaneity not only affects the parameter estimates but also results in efficiency gains that affect the statistical significance of the estimates

a game theoretic approach to transfer pricing in a vertically integrated supply chain we study the problem of setting transfer prices in a vertically integrated supply chain in which the divisions share technology and transactions costs we develop a cooperative game that provides transfer prices for the intermediate products in the supply chain this model is applied both when the market prices for these products are known and also when their valuations differ we provide a solution that is fair and acceptable to all divisions in the perfect information case the shapley value generates the transfer prices while in the asymmetric case we obtain transfer prices from the solution to a linear program

optimal pricing and advertising in a durable good duopoly abstract this paper analyzes dynamic advertising and pricing policies in a durable good duopoly the proposed infinite horizon model while general enough to capture dynamic price and advertising interactions in a competitive setting also permits closed form solutions we use differential game theory to analyze two different demand specifications linear demand and isoelastic demand for symmetric and asymmetric competitors we find that the optimal price is constant and does not vary with cumulative sales while the optimal advertising is decreasing with cumulative sales comparative statics for the results are presented

debt policy corporate taxes and discount rates abstract this paper applies the standard risk neutral valuation framework to tax shields generated by dynamic debt policies we derive a partial differential equation pde for the value of the debt tax shield for a class of dynamic debt policies that depend on the asset s free cash flows value and past performance we obtain closed form solutions for the pde we also derive the tax adjusted cost of capital for free cash flows and analyze the conditions under which the weighted average cost of capital is an appropriate discount rate finally we derive closed form solutions for equity betas which differ from the formulas that have traditionally been used to lever and unlever equity betas

taxes capital structure choices and equity value we use a multitude of tax reforms across the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries as natural experiments to estimate the market value of the tax benefits of debt financing we report time series evidence that tax reforms are followed by large changes in the value of corporate equity however the impact of tax reforms is greatly mitigated by the presence of leverage the value of debt tax savings is greater among top taxpayers among highly profitable firms and in countries where tax laws are more strongly enforced importantly the value of debt tax savings is in line with the benchmark implied by a traditional approach

incorporating financing related determinants of value in the discounted cash flow model abstract the paper discusses how some of the main types of interaction between financing and value can be incorporated in the discounted cash flow model of valuation including effects arising from taxes transactions costs disclosure information asymmetry and agency problems it explains whether a given effect should appear in a project s cash flows in its cost of capital or as an upfront adjustment to value most of the effects imply that the principle of value additivity does not hold

effects of capital gains taxation on life cycle investment and portfolio management we examine the impact of capital income taxation both accrual forms of taxation and taxation of realized capital gains on total savings and the demand for corporate financial instruments we find that investors may hold both debt and equity in the face of effective collection of capital gains taxation even in a flat tax system we also find that the two taxes will have substantially different effects on saving and consumption behavior making it unlikely that the tax structure can be summarized by any single equivalent accrual tax rate this paper examines the impact of income taxation on the demand for various corporate financial instruments focusing on unique features due to taxation of realized capital gains we take a life cycle view of investment behavior and examine how accrual and realization taxation jointly affect an individual s allocation of intertemporal resources we shall consider the impact on his demand for debt and equity showing that taxation of realized capital gains generates an intrapersonal tax clientele effect at any one point of time an individual will strictly prefer either to buy debt or equity but that choice may be different at different ages therefore many individuals will simultaneously hold both debt and equity we also find that any attempt to measure the effective capital gains tax rate will be difficult and that existing approaches appear flawed since they do not correspond to the pattern of distortions which we find in this explicit model of asset demand and saving this analysis deviates from earlier work on capital gains taxation in several substantial dimensions whereas much of the capital gains taxation literature focuses on how capital gains tax regulations generate arbitrage opportunities in perfect capital markets the analysis used below essentially assumes effective enforcement of the intent of capital gains taxation this is desirable since contrary to the perfect capital market implication capital gains tax revenues are nontrivial therefore in examining the nature of asset demand and choice it is reasonable to assume somewhat effective collection of the capital gains tax liabilities our analysis will assume completely effective enforcement to highlight the impact of capital gains taxation it will be clear that several types of leakages will not substantially alter the qualitative conclusions

stochastic competitive entries and dynamic pricing abstract how should firms price new products when they do not know the timing nor the nature of the next competitive entry to guide managers pricing decisions in such contexts we propose a dynamic pricing model with two types of randomly timed entry i e imitative and innovative the characterization of the equilibrium strategies reveals how optimal prices vary with the manager s knowledge about the timing of future competitive entries we show that price skimming is not always optimal when entry dates are unknown to managers everything else equal we demonstrate that the randomness of competitive entries make forward looking managers to choose constant prices even though the characteristics of the market would have justified skimming the demand in the normal course moreover we show that the constant pricing policy remains optimal even when the incumbent s optimal pricing strategy influences the probability of facing a competitive entry finally we find that uncertainty does not necessarily hurt firms profits

a differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods and sticky prices we investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where goods are differentiated and prices are sticky we study the open loop and the closed loop memoryless nash equilibrium and show that the latter equilibrium entails a larger level of steady state production as compared to the former both equilibria entail a larger level of production in steady state than the static game we also study the effects of price stickiness and product differentiation upon the steady state equilibrium allocation and profits the per firm equilibrium output is increasing in both product differentiation and price stickiness while profits are increasing in both product differentiation and the speed of price adjustment the steady state social welfare monotonically increases in the speed of price adjustment and the overproduction entailed by dynamic competition has beneficial effect from a social standpoint

investigating dynamic multifirm market interactions in price and advertising diagnosing the nature and magnitu de of competitive interactions among firms is important for developing effective marketing strategies in this paper we formulate a game theoretic model of firm interaction to analyze the dynamic price and advertising competition among firms in a given p roduct market firm or brand level demand functions account for the contemporaneous and carry over effects of these marketing activities and also allow for the effects of competitor actions firms take into consideration the actions of their rivals as well as their own demand and cost functions both production and advertising when determining the profit maximizing price and advertising levels our formulation enables us to quantify not only the direction and magnitude of competitive reactions but also to identify the underlying form of market conduct that generates the particular pattern of interaction we specify and estimate a fully structural econometric model for three firms constituting a distinct sub market within a personal care product category we estimate the demand and competitive interaction parameters as well as the production and advertising cost functions for each firm we then derive implications for competitive interactions and market structure interestingly we find that while firms seem to compete on advertising they price cooperatively thereby enhancing their price cost margins

differential game models of advertising competition abstract differential game methodology combines two attractive features that are critical to the study of advertising competition dynamics and multi competitor decision making a focused review of two decades of differential game modeling of advertising competition indicates that insights gained to date while valuable are of a limited nature and research in the area needs to extend beyond present limits four recent studies are offered as examples of possible directions to follow in continued research

the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game abstract we study the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game i e the ability of a country to control its emissions taking into account the relationship between current emissions and future levels of pollution and thus on future damages we show that when all countries are myopic i e choose the laisser faire policy their payoffs are smaller than when all countries are farsighted i e non myopic however in the case where one myopic country becomes farsighted we show that the welfare impact of foresight on that country is ambiguous foresight may be welfare reducing for the country that acquires it this is due to the reaction of the other farsighted countries to that country s acquisition of foresight the country that acquires foresight reduces its emissions while the other farsighted countries extend their emissions the overall impact on total emissions is ambiguous moreover our results suggest that incentive mechanisms that involve a very small possibly zero present value of transfers can play an important role in inducing a country to adopt a farsighted behavior and diminishing the number of myopic countries these incentives would compensate the myopic country for the short run losses incurred from the acquisition of foresight and can be reimbursed by that country from the gains from foresight that it enjoys in the long run

a note on feedback sequential equilibria in a lanchester model with empirical application we study in this paper dynamic equilibrium advertising strategies in a duopoly with asymmetric information structure and sequential play the advertising model of lanchester is used in a game where the relevant solution concept is feedback stackelberg equilibrium which is subgame perfect an algorithm is devised for the computation of this equilibrium and numerical results are reported and discussed using a data set from the cola market we obtain the resulting advertising strategies and provide a comparison with closed loop and open loop nash equilibria

a differential game model of the marketing operations interface in the development of their dynamic strategies the marketing and operations functions within a firm have differing objectives and conflict between the two functions is common the strategic interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions is modeled as a noncooperative differential game demand is assumed to be a function of price and advertising goodwill and marketing controls price and advertising to maximize its discounted stream of revenue net of advertising costs backlogging is allowed and operations controls production to minimize its discounted stream of production and backlog costs a feedback nash equilibrium is derived for the game which allows a solution of the system of differential equations for goodwill and backlog and is analyzed to study the nature of the dynamic strategies for price advertising and production

credibility and flexibility with independent monetary policy committees independent monetary policy committees are a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role for monetary policy if central bankers types are unknown then for a wide range of parameters an independent committee achieves higher social welfare than either a zero inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker a key reason for the committee s superior performance is that committee members are relatively likely to opt for low inflation and building a reputation when shocks are small when large shocks hit the economy the incentive to react outweighs the reputationbuilding benefit

competitive dynamic advertising a modification of the case game abstract in this paper we consider a modified version of the advertising differential game of case 1979 we derive non cooperative nash equilibria for open loop controls as well as for feedback strategies we consider finite and infinite planning horizons the feedback equilibrium is shown to be robust against stochastic disturbances of the state equation

inflation forecast contracts we introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers inflation forecast contracts which make central bankers remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts we show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more eectively thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts but have adverse consequences for output on balance paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare

dynamic pricing product and process innovation abstract the question of simultaneous dynamic pricing product and process investment policies is crucial for manufacturing and high tech industries this paper models these policies in an optimal control setting on the supply side the firm sets prices product and process investment levels over time on the demand side current demand depends on price and quality under an additive separable demand function dynamic pricing increases with quality and cost therefore both product innovation and process innovation impact the pricing policy under a multiplicative separable demand function dynamic pricing policy follows the dynamic of production cost and is independent of the evolution of product quality thus process innovation is the main determinant of a firm s pricing policy over time and product innovation has no impact

could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels a game theoretic analysis abstract we identify the conditions under which a myopic pricing behavior could be a profit enhancing tool in the distribution channel a channel member is myopic when he ignores the evolution of the retail prices when actual and past retail prices affect consumers purchasing decisions a differential game is formulated where channel members control transfer and retail prices we start by examining a bilateral monopoly and then introduce competition at the manufacturing level the competing manufacturers play a la nash and can be both myopic both farsighted or one myopic while the other is farsighted we show that for a bilateral monopoly myopia enhances total channel profit when the effect of the reference price is small enough this remains true under competition at the manufacturing level when products are differentiated enough

empirical analysis of closed loop duopoly advertising strategies closed loop perfect equilibria in a lanchester duopoly differential game of advertising competition are used as the basis for empirical investigation two systems of simultaneous nonlinear equations are formed one from a general lanchester model and one from a constrained model two empirical applications are conducted in one involving coca cola and pepsi cola a formal statistical testing procedure is used to detect whether closed loop equilibrium advertising strategies are used by the competitors rather than open loop strategies in the second application involving anheuser busch and miller the general model is estimated results indicate that closed loop equilibria better explain dynamic advertising competition than do open loop equilibria also closed loop equilibrium advertising strategies implied by model estimates show that competitive advertising levels may or may not be monotonic in market share

transfer pricing and decentralized dynamic lot sizing in multistage multiproduct production processes abstract this paper presents the use of a transfer pricing system to coordinate business units in a wagner whitin type model for a decentralized lot sizing problem in a dynamic multistage multiproduct environment the paper includes two major proofs 1 a transfer pricing system enabling optimal decentralized lot sizing is characterized the transfer pricing system can be interpreted as a generalization of the reciprocal method or step down allocation method in cost location accounting and 2 based on a wagner whitin type theorem and the kakutani fixed point theorem it is shown that such a transfer pricing system exists

chapter 4 competitive marketing strategies game theoretic models publisher summary this chapter reviews the key developments in the understanding of competitive marketing strategies product price advertising and distribution competition are all addressed while the emphasis is on models the chapter surveys the empirical literature as well there is a significant amount of empirical work to report but the ratio of theoretical to empirical work is nevertheless unpleasantly large much progress has been made in the last ten years or so in the study of competitive marketing strategies most of this chapter has been theoretical using simple models of firm and consumer behavior these models serve the function of demonstrating rigorously the existence of certain effects factors which need to be considered in analyzing real world competition

monetary policy committees individual and collective reputations this paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness i show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group but group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare not publishing individuals votes raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare if the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers the incentive to build a reputation is greater but expected social welfare may be higher or lower

controlling measurement errors in models of advertising competition abstract commercial market research firms provide information on advertising variables of interest such as brand awareness or gross rating points that are likely to contain measurement errors this unreliability of measured variables induces bias in the estimated parameters of dynamic models of advertising consequently advertisers either under or overspend on advertising to maintain a desired level of brand awareness monte carlo studies show that the magnitude of bias can be serious when conventional estimation methods such as ordinary least squares and errors in variables are employed to obtain parameter estimates therefore the authors have developed two new approaches that either reduce or eliminate parameter bias using these methods advertisers can determine an unbiased optimal advertising budget even if advertising variables are measured with error the application of these methods to estimate the extent of measurement noise in empirical advertising data is illustrated

strategic transfer pricing most research into cost systems has focused on their motivational implications this paper takes a different approach by developing a model where two oligopolistic firms strategically select their cost based transfer prices duopoly models frequently assume that firms game on their choice of prices product prices however are ultimately based on the firms transfer prices that communicate manufacturing costs to marketing departments it is for this reason that transfer prices will have a strategic component to them we derive implications for cost system choice and transfer pricing including showing that firms may cross subsidize their products a result consistent with the empirical evidence

monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences this paper considers monetary policy when policy makers preferences are private information i show that in the first period of a two period term all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less but respond more to shocks than if there were no private information moderately inflation averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most a tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first with t period terms inflation depends solely on the policy maker s time left in office with unchanging preferences and no discounting inflation is lower the longer he has left

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

investigating the sensitivity of equilibrium profits to advertising dynamics and competitive effects the author investigates the validity of the flat maximum principle the insensitivity of a firm s profits to changes in its optimal advertising level in a duopolistic market in which advertising by the two firms has carryover effects two alternative competitive scenarios are examined i in which total industry sales are allowed to vary over time and ii where firms are engaged in market share rivalry for i the open loop nash equilibrium advertising strategies for the firms are derived assuming a specific sales response function and an infinite time horizon a numerical analysis of the sensitivity of firms profit functions to advertising expenditures is performed at different levels of the a discount rate b advertising elasticity and c advertising decay rate an empirical illustration from the pharmaceutical industry is provided special cases of the model formulation are examined analytically in order to highlight the intuition behind the flatness of the maximum and to study the sensitivity of results obtained to choice of equilibrium strategy closed loop vs open loop for the market share game closed loop policies are considered and the flat maximum principle is illustrated in the context of coke pepsi rivalry in the soft drinks market

coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems supply chain management scm has become an important management paradigm as supply chain members are often separate and independent economic entities a key issue in scm is to develop mechanisms that can align their objectives and coordinate their activities so as to optimize system performance in this paper we provide a review of coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems in a framework that is based on supply chain decision structure and nature of demand this framework highlights the behavioral aspects and information need in the coordination of a supply chain the identification of these issues points out several directions of future research in this area

a model of advertising competition using a dynamic model of advertising rivalry between competitors in a duopoly the author obtains analytical results for the case of pure market share rivalry in a mature market a more general mod

market valuation of tax timing options evidence from capital gains distributions we examine a distribution that is taxed as a capital gain rather than as a dividend since the distribution induces a realized capital gain while the price change is an unrealized gain ex day return behavior provides evidence of the value of tax timing capital gains we show that investors are compensated 7c in unrealized gains for each dollar of realized capital gains that is 1 of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93c of unrealized gains an investor with a tax rate on realized gains of 15 has an effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains of 8 6 capital gains taxes can be deferred until assets are sold this feature provides the investor who purchases a security with an option regarding the timing of the realization of capital gains and losses this option can be used to lower one s expected tax liability even if capital gains tax rates remain constant for different holding periods an investor who delays the realization of a gain effectively enjoys compound returns on the postponed taxes if capital losses are tax deductible or partially tax deductible tax timing is even more valuable since investors can follow the strategy of selling stocks with capital losses early while postponing the sale of winners recent evidence lends support to the contention that some investors respond to this tax timing option for example odean 1998 shows that u s investors are more likely to sell losers in december than other months similarly grinblatt and keloharju 2002 show that at the end of the tax year finnish investors are more likely to realize losses than gains this type of tax motivated trade seems to affect market returns as shown by poterba and weisbenner 2001 who demonstrate that end of year tax loss selling is related to return variation in the month of january

transfer pricing and ownership structure we study the performance of jointly owned production units where upstream firms sell inputs to a downstream final market producer it is found that compared to integrated firms co ownership leads to overinvoicing of input prices transfer prices resulting in lower aggregate profits tax and tariff policy may lessen the organizational inefficiencies of jointly owned firms the analysis suggests that firms must have other reasons for forming jointly owned production units than those guided by production efficiency and benefits from delegation of decision making jel classification f23 l23

an empirical analysis of dynamic nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry this article develops a dynamic model of nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to analyze advertising competition in the u s cigarette industry the model generalizes existing studies by allowing advertising to affect both firm market shares and the total size of the market the model also allows dynamic conjectural variations to arise from the intertemporal links created by the durability of advertising we use these dynamic conjectural variations to distinguish alternative models of competitive interaction we estimate the complete model of firm production demand and advertising choice by using data for u s cigarette producers the results indicate that firm advertising primarily affects the level of market demand with a firm s effect on rival firms market shares arising through variations in the number of brands sold empirical results on firm behavior suggest that firms act as if their advertising choices will alter the future advertising choices of rival firms in both the high tar and low tar cigarette markets

on the robustness and strategic implications of a parsimonious advertising inventory competitive model with extensions to pricing competition abstract using a market share attraction structure of advertising competition this research introduces first a parsimonious inventory advertising model for which competition is limited to two symmetric firms thus obtaining its related comparative statics following a supermodular game approach the derived comparative statics remain robust upon considering non dominant firms each with a market share of less than 50 competing in an asymmetric oligopoly of n rivals where each firm controls the inventory advertising decision variables furthermore changes in model parameters are investigated in terms of their relative impact on equilibrium measures in this regard the findings indicate that for the analyzed model the marketing parameters possess much more influence on the equilibrium measures than the operations parameters the generalization appears applicable to both non dominated oligopolies as well as dominated oligopolies where one firm has a market share equal to or greater than 50 where each firm controls the inventory advertising decision variables in addition to price however changes in shift parameters elicit a response from the dominant firm which will differ from its non dominant rivals for products and services additionally while the literature shows that the non dominant firm will pursue a defensive strategy of decreasing both the equilibrium price and the amount of equilibrium advertising in response to competitive entry our findings show that results for a fixed market potential may not continue to be robust once inclusion of the operations variables of order quantity are considered finally the study explores the implications of the free entry equilibrium for which the number of firms in the industry is determined endogenously

the personal tax advantages of equity abstract we value a firm that pays its cash flows to equity through share repurchases in a dynamic environment where personal taxes are paid on capital gains upon realization the cost of capital is reduced by approximately 0 8 through the use of repurchases relative to dividends we use the empirical distribution of pre tax free cash flows in fama and french 1999 to evaluate the tradeoffs between the costs of financial distress the personal tax advantages of equity and the corporate tax advantage to debt the optimal capital structure is interior with a 3 bankruptcy cost

an empirical investigation of advertising strategies in a dynamic duopoly the equilibrium profit maximizing advertising policies of firms operating in a dynamic duopoly are derived by linking in a single framework the econometric estimation of the market response function and the technique of differential games that characterizes dynamic competitive behavior we use the lanchester model of combat to represent the system dynamics that capture the competitive shifts due to investments in advertising by the two market rivals we determine the equilibrium advertising levels using both closed and open loop policies we also compare these equilibrium advertising policies for each firm to those obtained using an optimal control theory formulation wherein the advertising spending levels of the rival are assumed to be known the empirical results obtained by analyzing the advertising rivalry between coke and pepsi for the period 1968 1981 under the above three alternative spending policies provide some interesting insights into the nature of competition between these two market rivals a significant contribution of this paper is to extend the existing literature on advertising competition by integrating theoretical and empirical analyses

production inventory and pricing under cost and demand learning effects abstract the paper considers a monopolist firm that plans its production inventory and pricing policy over a fixed and finite horizon the problem is represented by an optimal control model which combines elements from three streams of literature the first of these is a classical or area and deals with optimal production and inventory under exogenously given demand conditions the second is an area of marketing science which studies dynamic pricing under demand learning effects demand learning refers to the situation where current demand for a product is influenced by past demand the third area belongs to microeconomics and industrial organization and is concerned with the effects of learning by doing in a firm s production process learning is reflected in a unit production cost that decreases with cumulative production using a path synthezising procedure we obtain closed form characterizations of optimal production pricing and inventory policies

prisoner s dilemma on behavioral choices in the presence of sticky prices farsightedness vs myopia abstract when making decisions in a dynamic environment myopic supply chain members tend to ignore the future effects of their decisions on the evolution of state dynamics by contrast far sighted decision makers consider about the impacts of current decisions on both current profits and future profits in order to study how behavioral choices affect the operation decisions and profits of supply chain members we develop a differential game with sticky prices where one manufacturer purchases components from one supplier and makes final products for end customers the supplier decides on its wholesale price while the manufacturer sets its production quantity either of supply chain members has two behavioral choices myopia and farsightedness we derive and compare equilibrium solutions under four different behavioral combinations our analysis shows that there always exists a prisoner s dilemma caused by behavioral choices farsightedness is a dominant strategy for either the supplier or the manufacturer but both to act myopically makes both of them better off furthermore comparing with other scenarios the whole supply chain obtains the highest profit when both players are myopic in addition we introduce a revenue sharing contract with static wholesale price to mitigate the adverse impacts of the prisoner s dilemma

an empirical study on the lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions this paper presents an empirical study on the lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions three issues are evaluated i the specification of the market share response model ii the effect of inflation on the estimation of the response model and iii the performance of competitive strategies it is shown that a the square root function that is used in previous studies is often inappropriate to characterize the market share response model b market share variations are more responsive to current advertising expenditures c closed loop nash equilibrium strategies are better competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits than open loop nash equilibrium strategies and d finally general perfect equilibria nash equilibrium strategies developed by case are usually not good competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits