capital malleability emission leakage and the cost of partial climate policies general equilibrium analysis of the european union emission trading system computable general equilibrium cge models are the premier analytical platform for assessing the economic impacts of climate change mitigation but these models tend to treat physical capital as malleable capable of reallocation among sectors over the time period for which equilibrium is solved because the extent to which capital adjustment costs might dampen reallocation is not well understood there is concern that cge assessments understate the true costs of greenhouse gas ghg reduction policies this paper uses a multi region multi sector cge model to investigate cap and trade schemes such as the european union emission trading system which cover a subset of the economy elucidating the effects of capital malleability on ghg abatement the potential for emission leakage from abating to non abating sectors and the impacts on welfare to simplify the complex interactions being simulated within the cge model that analysis is complemented with an analytical model a partial climate policy results in negative internal carbon leakage with emissions declining not only in capped sectors but also in non regulated ones this result is stronger when capital is intersectorally mobile interestingly in partial climate policy settings capital malleability can amplify or attenuate welfare losses depending on the attributes of the economy

an equilibrium model of asset trading with sequential information arrival in an effort to better understand the dynamic market price adjustment process this paper develops a model which describes the impact of new information on a financial market the primary emphasis is on the price change volume relationship in the presence of a margin requirement we find that the margin requirement significantly affects the relation of price change to volume furthermore this relationship is shown to be affected by the number of investors in the market the degree of information dissemination differences in interpretation of information and the implicit cost of the margin requirement

unintended consequences of price controls an application to allowance markets abstract price controls established in a cap and trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor however they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions in particular when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price regardless of the prevailing market price in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for u s firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper although in practice many other conditions will determine its use

hedging with mispriced futures this paper analyzes the correspondence between arbitrage sector pricing efficiency and the short term hedging costs and effectiveness of futures contracts reversals of initial contract mispricings by arbitrage sector trading leads to an important mispricing retum component in the total retum to hedge portfolios the existence of the mispricing retum has implications for initial hedge ratio selection hedging effectiveness and expected hedge retum the analysis is used to interpret the hedge ratio guidance and performance of short term hedges between the standard and poor s 500 stock index futures contract and the underlying s p 500 cash stock index portfolio over the 1982 1986 period

digital contracts and price manipulation corporate insiders holding derivative contracts on their firm s stock have an incentive to engage in stock price manipulation i examine several derivative contracts susceptible to manipulation and the price impact of the insiders strategic behavior digital contracts the basic building blocks for valuing complex financial derivatives are vulnerable to manipulation the impact of the strategies from holding digital contracts is consistent with an implied volatility skew and volatility clustering even seemingly innocuous derivatives such as ordinary bull spreads generate these manipulation incentives this has strong implications for corporate policy since firms often use option spreads in their stock repurchase programs

a theory of trading volume a theory of trading volume is developed based on assumptions that market agents frequently revise their demand prices and randomly encounter potential trading partners the model describes two distinct ways informational events affect trading volume one is consistent with conjectures made by empirical researchers that investor disagreement leads to increased trading but the observation of abnormal trading volume does not necessarily imply disagreement and volume can increase even if investors interpret the information identically if they also have had divergent prior expectations simulation tests support the model and are used to contrast the random pairing environment with costless market clearing volume is lower in the costly market and volume increases caused by an informational event persist after the event period this is consistent with existing empirical evidence and suggests that markets do not immediately clear all orders or that investors have demands to recontract

salomon brothers and the may 1991 treasury auction analysis of a market corner abstract in may 1991 the treasury sold 12 29 billion in two year notes through improper bidding salomon brothers gained control of at least 86 percent of the issue this study investigates the impact of salomon s attempted corner by examining the postauction price behaviour of the two year note based on a no arbitrage relation the results show that the two year note was substantially overpriced for approximately six weeks following the auction the typical mispricing during this period is estimated at 0 16 to 0 25 percent of par in dollar terms the aggregate misvaluation averaged 20 30 million and by controlling the supply of the issue salomon stood to gain substantially from the squeeze

capital malleability macro performance and policy effectiveness capital has distinguished itself as one of the more controversial concepts in economics it has fostered debate spanning volumes years and at least one ocean it has given rise to different schools of thought and it has even become a trademark of the schools that house the different schools of thought from the midst of the controversy however comes one point about which there seems to be some albeit hardly unanimous agreement capital s relationship to labor differs ex ante and ex post during its design stage capital admits substitution with labor to an extent restricted only by what might be called the technology of the moment after its construction capital admits substitution less readily because then it is subject to an additional constraint namely the constraint of capital in place 3 65 8 this property can be described another way the ex post elasticity of factor substitution a is smaller than the ex ante elasticity a for the past several decades and certainly since 1959 theorists formulating models of production and economic growth have given careful attention to malleability and they have ventured beyond the neoclassical postulate of putty putty which holds that the ease of substitution is the same ex ante and ex post and therefore that the constraint of capital in place is not binding a a 0 some scholars such as johansen 14 phelps 17 bliss 2 and gapinski 8 10 argued that capital is putty clay factor substitution is possible only ex ante the constraint of capital in place is binding and it is absolute a a 0 other scholars such as hu 13 and gordon 11 stepped away from the limiting case and adopted the more lenient view that the capital in place constraint is binding but not absolute capital is putty tin a a 0 2 malleability matters it governs entrepreneurs in their attempts to adjust existing inputs to contemporaneous price events and it typically obligates them to search the future in choosing the specification of new capital since failure to do so would likely mean a faulty design higher input cost and lower quasi rent malleability matters for entrepreneurial behavior and hence it should matter for macro performance and for policy intended to improve that performance those relationships which have been largely ignored in the literature are studied here underlying the inquiry is a dynamic macro model that features putty tin capital and

implicit delivery options and optimal delivery strategies for financial futures contracts abstract futures contract specification usually allow the short position some variation as to when where how much and what is to be delivered in this paper we derive the optimal delivery policy for the treasury bond futures contracts and find that our policy produces profits that are positive and statistically significant this indicates that future prices are too high in that the short position can earn profits by skillfully exercising his delivery options we find the actual delivery policies of market participants depart substantially from the optimal strategy the implications of these findings for futures traders and bond dealers are discussed

a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits in this paper the joint problem of ordering and offering price discount by a supplier to his sole major buyer is analyzed the objective is to induce the buyer to alter his order schedule and size so that the supplier can benefit from lower set up ordering and inventory holding costs we generalize the quantity discount pricing model of monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 6 720 726 to 1 explicitly incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and 2 relax the implicit assumption of a lot for lot or order for order policy adopted by the supplier an algorithm is developed to solve the supplier s joint ordering and price discount problem

valuation and optimal exercise of the wild card option in the treasury bond futures market the chicago board of trade treasury bond futures contract allows the short position several delivery options as to when and with which bond the contract will be settled the timing option allows the short position to choose any business day in the delivery month to make delivery in addition the contract settlement price is locked in at 2 00 p m when the futures market closes despite the facts that the short position need not declare an intent to settle the contract until 8 00 p m and that trading in treasury bonds can occur all day in dealer markets if bond prices change significantly between 2 00 and 8 00 p m the short has the option of settling the contract at a favorable 2 00 p m price this phenomenon which recurs on every trading day of the delivery month creates a sequence of 6 hour put options for the short position which has been dubbed the wild card option this paper presents a valuation model for the wild card option and computes estimates of the value of that option as well as rules for its optimal exercise the treasury bond futures contract on the chicago board of trade gives several delivery options to the short position the quality option which allows the short to deliver any of several eligible delivery bonds has already been studied fairly extensively because many bonds are eligible to be delivered against the futures contract and the conversion factors used to adjust for the bond actually delivered do not perfectly reflect relative price differences the short side trader will choose to deliver the cheapest eligible bond kilcollin 71 presents a discussion and analysis of conversion factors and their effects on the optimal delivery bond gay and manaster 4 present a theoretical valuation model for the quality option when two classes of commodities with uncertain end of period spot prices may be delivered garbade and silber 3 provide a similar analysis and estimate parameters of the valuation formula for a variety of agricultural commodity futures kane and marcus 6 have used monte carlo simulations to value the quality option in the treasury bond futures market in contrast the various timing options embedded in the delivery process have received comparatively little attention one of the most important of these is the so called wild card option the wild card option arises because the futures market closes each trading day at 2 p m central standard time which locks in the futures settlement price for the rest of the day while the short trader has until 8 p m of each trading day in the delivery month to declare an intent to deliver

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

a strategic analysis of sinking fund bonds abstract unlike most securities the pricing of sinking fund bonds is influenced by the distribution of ownership which summarizes the extent to which the market is cornered the effect of the distribution of ownership on the pricing of sinking fund bonds is examined by an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend upon the size of the investor s position this framework is used to contrast the valuation of sinking fund bonds with the valuation of amortizing bonds and straight debt we show that it is generally incorrect to view sinking fund bonds as being equivalent to serial bonds

market manipulation price bubbles and a model of the u s treasury securities auction market this paper models the u s treasury securities auction market and demonstrates that mar ket manipulation can occur in a rational equilibrium it is a dynamic model with traders participating in a when issued market a treasury auction and a resale market manipu lations occur when dealers in the when issued market use their knowledge of the net order flow in order to corner the auction and squeeze the shorts from the when issued market this manipulation equilibrium generates bubbles in treasury security prices and specials in repo rates we also compare discriminatory and uniform price auction rules with respect to manipulation our analysis shows that manipulations can occur in long run equilibrium under discriminatory price auctions but not under uniform price auctions

treasury auction bids and the salomon squeeze recent press accounts claim that collusion is common practice in treasury auctions and that as a result the auction profits are excessive but this paper finds that the auction prices are on average marginally higher than the secondary market bid prices the auction profits however are systematically related to the total fraction of winning bids tendered by banks and dealers the postauction prices of the two year notes in which salomon brothers had a 94 percent holding are also examined the secondary market prices of these notes were significantly higher than the estimated competitive prices in the four week postissue period

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

special repo rates this article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements a repo rate is in effect an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument a special is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates this article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials this article characterizes competitive repurchase or repo markets and the equilibrium relationship between repo rates and the underlying cash market prices repurchase markets are often called financing markets since they are effectively vehicles for collateralized borrowing that are often used to finance the purchase of the underlying collateral this article provides causes and effects of specials meaning specific repo rates significantly below prevailing market interest rates for loans of similar maturity and credit risk the example of united states treasury instruments is emphasized because of the extensive use of the treasury repo market as a means of hedging against or speculating on changes in u s interest rates and because of the high incidence of specials in treasury repo rates numerous specific instru

a quantity discount approach to supply chain coordination abstract quantity discounts provide a practical foundation for inventory coordination in supply chains however typical supply chain participants may encounter difficulties in implementing the coordination policy simply because 1 specified lot size adjustments may deviate from the economic lot sizes and 2 the buying firm may face amplified overstocking risks related to increased order quantities the main objective of this study is to develop a quantity discount model that resolves the practical challenges associated with implementing quantity discount policies for supply chain coordination between a supplier and a buyer the proposed buyer s risk adjustment b ra model allows the supplier to offer discounts that capitalize on the original economic lot sizes and share the buyer s risk of temporary overstocking under uncertain demand the analytical results suggest that the proposed b ra discount approach is a feasible alternative for supply chain coordination under uncertain demand conditions

the effect of futures markets and corners on storage and spot price variability when a futures market is introduced the volume of storage should become more sensitive to changes in the return to storage the increase in storage sensitivity means that storage will absorb a larger proportion of demand and supply shocks than it did previously reducing spot price volatility data from the chicago board of trade support the hypotheses of increased storage sensitivity and reduced spot price volatility the effect of futures on spot price volatility is sensitive to the competitive structure of the futures market futures market manipulation causes spot price variance to increase despite manipulation the development of the wheat futures market caused the coefficient of variation of spot price to decline significantly

negative option values are possible the impact of treasury bond futures on the cash u s treasury market abstract this paper uses a unique financial instrument in the u s treasury market to study the price behavior of the put option embedded in the november 2009 14 callable u s treasury bond we find that beginning in august 1993 the estimated option value was persistently negative on nearly every day for the ensuing eight months we show that the anomalous pricing behavior arose because the underlying callable bond became the cheapest to deliver issue against u s treasury bond futures contracts hence this paper provides direct evidence that derivative assets can significantly distort pricing in the primary asset market

the value of wildcard options wildcard options are embedded in many derivative contracts they arise when the settlement price of the contract is established before the time at which the wildcard option holder must declare his intention to make or accept delivery and the exercise of the wildcard option closes out the underlying asset position this paper provides a simple method for valuing wildcard options and illustrates the technique by valuing the sequence of wildcard options embedded in the s p 100 index oex option contract the results show that wildcard options can account for an economically significant fraction of oex option value many exchange traded derivative securities contain embedded delivery

the quality delivery option in treasury bond futures contracts this paper uses three methods to estimate quality option values for cbot treasury bond futures contracts it presents evidence regarding 1 payoffs from exercising this option at delivery 2 estimates from a t bond futures pricing model that incorporates this option and 3 estimates obtained from an exchange option pricing formula the results indicate that this option is worth considerably less than reported by kane and marcus 1986a for example payoffs obtained by switching from the bond cheapest to deliver three months prior to delivery to the one cheapest at time of delivery average less than 0 30 percentage points of par

strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market anatomy of a squeeze abstract this paper investigates an attempted delivery squeeze in a bond futures contract traded in london using cash and futures trades of dealers and customers we analyze their strategic trading behavior price distortion and learning in a market manipulation setting we argue that marked differences in settlement failure penalties in the cash and futures markets create conditions that favor squeezes we recommend that regulators require special flagging of forward term repurchase agreements on the key deliverables that span futures contract maturity dates and that exchanges mark to market their contract specifications more frequently or consider a cash settled contract on a basket of bonds

hedging performance and basis risk in stock index futures in early 1982 trading began at three different exchanges in futures contracts based on stock indexes stock index futures were an immediate success and quickly led to a proliferation of new futures and options markets tied to various indexes one reason for this success was that index futures greatly extended the range of investment and risk management strategies available to investors by offering them for the first time the possibility of unbundling the market and nonmarket components of risk and return in their portfolios many portfolio management and other hedging applications in investment banking and security trading have been described elsewhere1 ranging from use by a passive fund manager to reduce risk over a long time horizon to use by an underwriter to hedge the market risk exposure in a stock offering for one or two days in considering the potential applications of index futures it is clear that in nearly every case a cross hedge is involved that is the stock position that is being hedged is different from the underlying portfolio for the index contract 2 this means that return and risk for an index futures hedge will depend upon the behavior of the basis i e the difference between the futures price and the cash price hedging a position in stock will necessarily expose it to some measure of basis risk risk that the change in the futures price over time will not track exactly the value of the cash position basis risk can arise from a number of different sources and is a more significant problem for stock index contracts than for other financial futures like treasury bills and bonds 3 the most apparent cause of basis risk is the nonmarket component of return on the cash stock position since the index contract is tied to the behavior of an underlying stock market index nonmarket risk cannot be hedged this is the essential problem of a cross hedge however basis risk can be present even when the hedge involves a position in the index portfolio itself and there is no nonmarket risk for one thing returns to the index portfolio include dividends while the index and the index future only track the capital value of the portfolio any risk associated with dividends on the portfolio will become basis risk in a hedged position still dividends are fairly low and also quite stable so this may not be a terribly important shortcoming

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

a global stock and bond model six fundamental risk factors four for stocks and two for bonds explain most of the common volatility of individual stocks and bonds worldwide some of the risk factors have a strong international component and others are more purely national the cross national component of the risk factors tends to be stronger within the european union than worldwide the model proposed in this article can be used for integration of worldwide asset selection and asset allocation decisions

futures trading and volatility in the gnma market futures markets for agricultural commodities have existed for well over 100 years recently there has been a major expansion of futures trading into nontraditional areas particularly interest bearing securities and foreign currenciesthe so called financial futures the introduction of exchange traded futures contracts for treasury bills gnma pass through certificates and other securities has created new hedging arbitrage and speculative opportunities for the investors issuers and dealers who are active in the cash markets for these securities futures trading has also opened these markets to participation by new classes of traders particularly private and smaller institutional investors through the process of arbitrage a financial futures market will be closely linked to the cash market for the underlying securities an important concern of the regulatory authorities is what effect opening a futures market is likely to have on an existing cash market the purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of futures trading in government national mortgage association gnma passthrough certificates on price volatility in the cash market for these securities there are several major ways in which opening futures trading can increase efficiency and smooth price variations in a cash market most importantly futures provide a mechanism for those who buy and sell the actual security or commodity to hedge themselves against unfavorable price changes through the futures market risk can be spread across a large number of investors and transferred away from those hedging spot positions to professional speculators who are more willing and able to bear it this risk transfer may substantially improve the functioning of the spot market because it reduces the need to incorporate risk premia in cash market transactions to compensate for the risk of price fluctuations second futures market may increase the informational efficiency of a cash market since futures prices are determined in a unified highly visible market by traders who specialize in gathering and evaluating information the futures market is expected to be an efficient market in the sense that prices will reflect the best estimate of true future values given the information currently available if anything an informationally efficient futures market should lead to more efficient pricing in the cash market the importance of both of these effects will depend upon the structure of the existing cash market the more developed and integrated is the cash market the

an incremental discount pricing schedule with multiple customers and single price break abstract this paper analyzes how a supplier can formulate the terms of a quantity discount pricing schedule assuming a single incremental discount system a model is developed from which an algorithm is derived for an optimal discount schedule the cases are investigated in which both the discount rate and the break point are unknown and either one is prescribed a numerical example is presented to illustrate the algorithm developed

bidder behavior in multiunit auctions evidence from swedish treasury auctions we analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 swedish treasury auctions first we document that bidders vary their prices bid dispersion and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding second we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner s curse driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies third we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information the winner s curse and the champion s plague while the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions

difference systems in financial futures markets many financial futures markets allow substitutions for the par grade of security at delivery substitutes are deliverable at premiums or discounts differences in commodities parlance to the futures price the rule that establishes these differences is called a difference system this paper characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yield based difference systems and investigates particular systems in use the major finding is that currently used difference systems effectively limit deliverable supply in the futures markets and lead to futures prices which understate the cash market price of the par security in order to increase deliverable supply many financial futures markets allow the delivery of a variety of grades issues of securities in fulfillment of a financial futures contract the par grade of security on which the futures contract is based is deliverable at the futures price various other grades of securities are deliverable at premiums or discounts to the futures price in commodities parlance these premiums and discounts are called differences and the rule that establishes the set of premiums and discounts is called a difference system see hoffman 2 chapter xv for an excellent discussion of difference systems in commodity futures contracts there are two types of difference systems currently in use in financial futures markets both are based on security yields the first is called variable rate or yield maintenance pricing under this system nonpar securities are deliverable at the futures price times a factor which is the price of the delivered security relative to the par security where both are discounted by the yield of the par security selling at the futures price the second is called fixed rate or factor pricing under this system nonpar securities are deliverable at the futures price times a factor which is the price of the delivered security relative to the par security where both are discounted at the yield of the par security selling at par this paper first characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yieldbased difference systems and then investigates theoretically and empirically the particular characteristics of factor pricing and yield maintenance pricing the major finding is that currently used differences systems produce financial futures prices which systematically understate the spot market price of the par security vice president chicago mercantile exchange this research was conducted while the author was economist financial studies section board of governors of the federal reserve system the opinions in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the board

note on a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits monahan monahan james p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 june 720 726 develops a model for establishing an optimal quantity discount schedule from a vendor s viewpoint in this note we show that this model is limited to the case where the vendor buys from another supplier incorporating vendor s inventory carrying costs we develop a generalized version of monahan s model and demonstrate its equivalence with the joint economic lot size approach suggested by banerjee banerjee avijit 1986 a joint economic lot size model for purchaser and vendor decision sci 17 summer 292 311

two echelon supply chain coordination through the unified number of annual orders abstract this paper studies the problem of how to coordinate a one supplier multi retailer supply chain by requiring retailers to adopt the unified number of annual orders proposed by the supplier the paper presents two coordination models one considering a small number of retailers the other considering a large number of retailers in the proposed models the supplier views all retailers or some selected retailers if more beneficial in the supply chain as one group then offers a price discount to entice the retailers in this group placing their orders only with the specific number of annual orders a heuristic is developed for each model to let the supplier know which retailers will be selected to implement the common number of annual orders and how to determine the corresponding optimal number of annual replenishments and price discount by using a numerical study we evaluate the benefit of the proposed coordination strategy

a model of competitive stock trading volume a model of competitive stock trading is developed in which investors are heterogeneous in their information and private investment opportunities and rationally trade for both informational and noninformational motives i examine the link between the nature of heterogeneity among investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics it is found that volume is positively correlated with absolute changes in prices and dividends i show that informational trading and noninformational trading lead to different dynamic relations between trading volume and stock returns

special repo rates an empirical analysis duffie 1996 examines the theoretical impact of repo specials on the prices of treasury securities and concludes that all else the same an issue on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue we examine this hypothesis and find strong evidence in support of it we also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with on the run issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect finally we investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to dealers are related to subsequent specialness and find that both variables are generally significant underlying the cash market for u s treasury securities is the financing or repo market at any given time the repo rate for most treasury issues the general collateral rate is the same but a few issues are typically on special an issue on special has associated with it a repo rate that is less than the prevailing general collateral rate as a result the owner of a security that is on special is able to obtain below market financing rates via a repurchase agreement duffie 1996 examines the theoretical causes of repo specials and their impact on the prices of treasury securities in the context of a general equilibrium model his primary conclusion is that specialness will be priced in the cash market meaning that all else the same an issue on special or likely to go on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue we investigate this hypothesis using data on repo specials and find clear evidence in support of it we conclude that specialness is priced and that the magnitude of the cash market premium reflects both the future duration and magnitude of repo specialness we also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with on therun issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect finally as a test of duffie s model we investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to nonbank primary dealers are related to subsequent specialness the evidence is consistent with predictions with both variables generally significant

the self regulation of commodity exchanges the case of market manipulation influential economists argue that government regulation of manipulative practices in financial markets is unnecessary because exchanges have incentives to take nearly first best precautions against the exercise of market power this article shows that the theoretical arguments underlying this proposition are weak because exchange members are likely to ignore the effects of manipulation on inframarginal traders and price informativeness competition between exchanges may be limited and collective action problems preclude efficient exchange intervention for these reasons exchanges will likely take few precautions against market power an examination of the history of self regulation at 10 exchanges prior to the passage of laws proscribing manipulation shows that they took few if any measures to curb manipulation since the characteristics of manipulation imply that it can be deterred efficiently through the use of harm based sanctions this theory and evidence strongly suggest that self regulation is a

taxation corporate financial policy and the cost of capital the cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system the purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest via the cost of capital taking full account of important issues that arise independently from the question of taxation included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

quality option profits switching option profits and variation margin costs an evaluation of their size and impact on treasury bond futures prices this paper provides empirical evidenee that the quality option in f bond futures is much less valuable than previously indicated in addition a dynamic trading strategy involving multiple switches of the cash bonds held in a long cash versus short futures position is shown to produce substantially greater profits than the single exercise of the quality op tion these findings suggest that the optimal management of long cash short futures positions is likely to involve dynamic trading strategies while passive strategies appear more appropriate for short cash long futures positions it is also shown that required variation margin payments are frequently large and may impact the profitability and risk of such positions to a greater extent than either of these options further evidenee is given indicating that observed t bond futures prices reflect an imputed value for the options and risks inherent in such positions

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions evidence from when issued transactions abstract we use when issued transactions data to assess the treasury s current experiment with uniform auctions when issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions suggesting a higher information release which should reduce pre auction uncertainty and the winner s curse under uniform auctions when issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement the pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions this is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre auction information and lower the short squeeze a direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

volume volatility and the dispersion of beliefs i examine a two period noisy rational expectations model of a futures market and show that the dispersion of expectations about a weighted average of future prices measures both the additional volatility and the additional expected volume of trade associated with noisy information the role played by dispersion helps clarify several stylized facts concerning volume and price behavior specifically dispersion can be a factor contributing to the positive correlation between volume and absolute price changes and the positive correlation between consecutive absolute price changes article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

manipulation of the commodity futures market delivery process an analysis of the futures market delivery end game specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for long and short traders to manipulate futures prices at contract expiration the empirical and welfare implications of manipulation are derived as well manipulation is most likely to occur in markets where economic frictions such as transportation and transactions costs make it inefficient to return excessive deliveries to their original owners these consumption distortions induce price changes that favor manipulators manipulation may also occur in markets where such costs are unimportant but the necessary conditions for the manipulation of a frictionless market are very restrictive copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

a reexamination of option values implicit in callable treasury bonds abstract longstaff 1992 and edleson fehr and mason 1993 examine option values implicit in callable treasury bonds and report a significant puzzle implied option values are frequently negative using an alternative approach we reexamine this issue and find that implied option values are generally positive and in contrast to previous studies instances of option values sufficiently negative to overcome the bid ask spread are rare we explain the findings in other studies by showing that the method used may lead to the appearance of a negative option value when the true value is positive

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function