population agglomeration and the effectiveness of enterprise subsidies a chinese analysis this paper investigates the impact of population agglomeration on the relation between government subsidies and firm innovation it constructs a parsimonious model to show that the positive effect

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

internal and external effects of r d subsidies and fiscal incentives empirical evidence using spatial dynamic panel models abstract most studies evaluating the macroeconomic effects of financial support policies on business funded r d use econometric methods that do not consider the existence of spatial effects and generate biased estimates in this paper we discus and address this problem using spatial dynamic panel data methods this allow us to provide new insights on the internal in country and external out of country effects of both research and development r d subsidies and fiscal incentives we use a database of 25 oecd countries for the period 1990 2009 in relation to internal effects for both instruments we find a non linear relationship between their effect on private r d and their level suggesting the possibility of leveraging and crowding out effects we also find a substitution effect between the r d subsidies and fiscal incentives implemented within a country concerning the spatial component we find evidence of positive spatial spillovers among private r d investments however our results suggest the existence of competition substitution effects between national r d policies

eductive stability in real business cycle models we reexamine issues of coordination in the standard rbc model is the unique rational expectations equilibrium attainable by rational agents who contemplate the possibility of small deviations from equilibrium surprisingly we nd that coordination cannot be expected even with strong common knowledge assumptions rational agents anticipating small but persistent deviations are led to take actions that eventually contradict the common knowledge assumption this impossibility theorem for eductive learning is not fully overcome when adaptive learning is incorporated into the framework

government r d subsidies as a signal for private investors abstract government subsidies for r d are intended to promote projects with high returns to society but too little private returns to be beneficial for private investors this may be caused by spillovers or a low appropriability rate apart from the direct funding of these projects government grants may serve as a signal for good investments for private investors we use a simple signaling model with different types of r d projects to capture this phenomenon the agency has a preference for basic research projects as they promise high expected social returns while banks prefer applied research projects with high private returns in a setup where the subsidy can only be used to distinguish between basic and applied research projects government agency s signal is not very helpful for banks however if the subsidy is accompanied by a quality signal it can lead to increased or better selected private investments

wealth effects distribution and the theory of organization abstract we construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem because incentives vary with an agent s wealth different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances when borrowing is not costly firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently but when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth with enough inequality it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d2 d31 j41 l2

the costs of urban property crime this paper estimates the impact of recorded domestic property crime on property prices in the london area crimes in the criminal damage category have a significant negative impact on prices a one tenth standard deviation decrease in the local density of criminal damage adds 1 to the price of an average inner london property burglaries have no measurable impact on prices even after allowing for the potential dependence of burglary rates on unobserved property characteristics one explanation we offer here is that vandalism graffiti and other forms of criminal damage motivate fear of crime in the community and may be taken as signals or symptoms of community instability and neighbourhood deterioration in general

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

moving to opportunity in boston early results of a randomized mobility experiment this paper examines the short run impacts of a change in residential neighborhood on the well being of low income families using evidence from a program in which eligibility for a housing voucher was determined by random lottery we examine the experiences of households at the boston site of moving to opportunity mto a demonstration program in five cities families in high poverty public housing projects applied to mto and were assigned by lottery to one of three groups experimental offered mobility counseling and a section 8 subsidy valid only in a census tract with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent section 8 comparison offered a geographically unrestricted section 8 subsidy or control offered no new assistance but continued to be eligible for public housing our quantitative analyses of program impacts uses data on 540 families from a baseline survey at program enrollment a follow up survey administered l to 3 5 years after random assignment and state administrative data on earnings and welfare receipt 48 percent of the experimental group and 62 percent of the section 8 comparison group moved through the mto program one to three years after program entry families in both treatment groups were more likely to be residing in neighborhoods with low poverty rates and high education levels than were families in the control group however while members of the experimental group were much more likely to be residing in suburban communities than were those in the section 8 group the lower program take up rate among the experimental group resulted in more families remaining in the most distressed communities households in both treatment groups experienced improvements in multiple measures of well being relative to the control group including increased safety improved health among household heads and fewer behavior problems among boys experimental group children were also less likely to be a victim of a personal crime to be injured or to experience an asthma attack there are no significant impacts of either mto treatment on the employment earnings or welfare receipt of household heads in the first three years after random assignment

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

the determinants of housing maintenance and upkeep a case study of providence rhode island housing maintenance and upkeep poses a concern to the health and well being of the urban environment while the number of substandard residences continues to grow especially in the older north eastern and midwestern industrial centres an awareness and understanding fo residential maintenance and upkeep its causes and its impact on the economic and social well being of the urban area remain vague and inconclusive several theories of housing maintences have been developed with each attributing maintenance and unkeep decisions to a variety of institutions and individuals the market failure of the market profit seeking bebaviour of the landlord and public policies each theory emphasizes only one or maybe two of these institutions in providing an explanations of maintenance and upkeep often using cross sectional data to test their hypotheis this study using a combination of cross sectional and to upkeep as a dynamic phenomenon part of a complex process of housing quality change for this reaso

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

homeownership community interactions and segregation the authors consider a multi community city where community quality is linked to residents civic efforts such as being proactive in preventing crime and ensuring the quality of publicly provided goods homeownership increases incentives for such efforts but credit market imperfections force the poor to rent within community externalities can lead to segregated cities with the rich living with the rich in healthy homeowner communities and the poor living with the poor in dysfunctional renter communities the pattern of tenure segregation across communities in the united states accords well with the study s prediction the authors analyze alternative tax subsidy policies to alleviate inefficiencies in the housing market and identify the winners and losers under such policies

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games abstract this paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non atomistic agents it shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by basu 1991 and the seminal result by guesnerie 1992 in the context of cournot oligopoly models

contractual structure and wealth accumulation can historical wealth distributions affect long run output and inequality despite rational saving convex technology and no externalities we consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability if agents have no bargaining power poor agents have no incentive to save poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes with no interclass mobility if instead agents have all the bargaining power strong saving incentives are generated the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and history does not matter eventually d31 d91 i32 o17 q15

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

the impact of r d investment on productivity new evidence using linked r d lrd data the impact of r d investment on productivity new evidence using linked r d lrd data this paper uses confidential census longitudinal microdata to examine the association between r d and productivity for the period 1972 1985 these data allow for significant improvements in measurement and model specification yielding more precise estimates of the returns to r d our results confirm the findings of existing studies 1 positive returns to r d investment 2 higher returns to company financed research 3 a productivity premium on basic research these results are robust to adjustments for influential outliers also our evidence suggests that the return to company financed r d is an increasing function of firm size i introduction robert solow s studies in the late 1950s dramatically changed perceptions of the sources of economic growth until this time the commonly held view was that improvements in economic welfare were achieved primarily through the use of more inputs in particular capital input however solow 1957 reported that only 10 percent of the twofold rise in u s per capita output during the years 1909 1949 was due to growth in the capital labor ratio the remainder was attributed to more efficient use of inputs or technological change solow also established a framework for estimating technological change a productivity residual or a measure of changes in output that could not be explained by changes in input use the solow residual in modified form has become virtually synonymous with the measurement of total factor productivity tfp growth jorgenson and griliches 1967 demonstrated that under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and competitive factor pricing changes in total factor productivity measure shifts in a production function rather than treat technological change as exogenous or manna from heaven many economists have explored its determinants r d investment is generally regarded as having a strong impact on productivity growth empirical analysis of the r d productivity connection has often been based on estimation of reduced form equations derived from the r d capital stock model griliches 1979 which extends the solow model to include the stock of technical knowledge or knowledge capital as a factor of production in addition to the standard factors of production physical capital labor intermediate materials and energy if the rate of depreciation of knowledge capital is assumed to be negligible tfp growth dtfp is a function of the intensity of r d investment rdint which is usually measured as the ratio of r d expenditure to sales 1 dtf p sub t alpha beta rdin t sub t u sub t where u sub t is a classical disturbance term the coefficient on r d intensity beta is interpreted as both the marginal product of knowledge capital and the rate of return to r d investment 1 estimates of beta at the company or line of business level are interpreted as measures of the private rate of return to r d or those that accrue to the firm or its investors due to incomplete appropriability or other factors this return may not equal the social return to this activity most empirical studies especially those based on aggregate and sectoral data have found evidence of a strong positive correlation between tfp growth and r d investment however results using firm level data have been mixed the finding that these two variables are uncorrelated is cause for concern because it implies that firms may not be able to earn significant returns on their investment in r d making them less likely to undertake this investment in the future even if it is socially desirable for them to do so we believe that it is important to reestimate this relationship because it is highly likely that existing firm level studies have been based on measures of tfp that are crude imprecise and unrepresentative

defense related r d as a model for grand challenges technology policies national defense represents a significant share of most oecd governments r d budgets and an even higher share of their mission oriented r d spending this public r d investment has focused on research and innovation supporting defense missions and in many cases the military services of these governments have purchased weapons systems incorporating the resulting technologies defense related r d investment has influenced innovation in the broader civilian economy of several oecd nations including the united states the united kingdom and france the scope and nature of this influence remains uncertain and subject to considerable debate nonetheless policymakers throughout the industrialized economies have expressed interest in applying the lessons of defense related and other mission oriented r d programs to such challenges as climate change this paper examines the characteristics of defense related mission r d programs in the industrial economies with particular attention to the subset of nations for which reliable longitudinal data on defense r d spending are available i highlight the characteristics that distinguish mission oriented r d in this field from mission oriented r d in other sectors and to point out some significant differences among oecd economies in the structure of their defense related r d programs the discussion also emphasizes the ways in which the unique structure of defense related r d limit its utility as a model for mission oriented r d programs aimed at other goals

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

a von thunen model of crime casinos and property values in new jersey urban economic models suggest that ceteris paribus land values diminish with distance from a central business district cbd which produces employment income and other amenities a new industry like casino gaming may have jobs and increased income associated with it these amenities will induce an increase in property values the size of that increase diminishes with distance from the city centre the new industry may have the negative by product of crime which is hypothesised to have a reversed although systematic effect upon land values that is it pays to live in the hinterlands far from the source of crime thus theoretically the net effect of amenities as a function of distance from the central city is ambiguous applying the model to atlantic city shows that the casinos have brought jobs additional income and greater real estate values to the region but the positive impact diminishes with distance from the city centre however crime has increased at a rate greater than that which exist

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

new housing supply and the dilution of social capital this paper examines the role of local housing supply conditions for social capital investment using an instrumental variables approach and data from the social capital community benchmark survey it is documented that the positive link between homeownership and individual social capital investment is largely confined to more built up neighborhoods with more inelastic supply of new housing the empirical findings provide support for the proposition that in these localities house price capitalization provides additional incentives for homeowners to invest in social capital the findings are also largely consistent with the proposition that built up neighborhoods provide protection from inflows of newcomers that could upset a mutually beneficial equilibrium involving reciprocal cooperation however the results do not appear to be driven by selection based on inherent differences in social aptitudes or by tiebout sorting

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

equilibrium without independence abstract because players whose preferences violate the von neumann morgenstern independence axiom may be unwilling to randomize as mixed strategy nash equilibrium would require a nash equilibrium may not exist without independence this paper generalizes nash s definition of equilibrium retaining its rational expectations spirit but relaxing its requirement that a player must bear as much uncertainty about his own strategy choice as other players do the resulting notion equilibrium in beliefs is equivalent to nash equilibrium when independence is satisfied but exists without independence this makes it possible to study the robustness of equilibrium comparative statics results to violations of independence

the mortgage interest deduction and its impact on homeownership decisions abstract this paper examines the impact of the combined u s state and federal mortgage interest deduction mid on homeownership attainment using data from 1984 to 2007 and exploiting variation in the subsidy arising from changes in the mid within and across states over time we test whether capitalization of the mid into house prices offsets the positive effect on homeownership we find that the mid boosts homeownership attainment only of higher income households in less tightly regulated housing markets in more restrictive places an adverse effect exists the mid is an ineffective policy to promote homeownership and improve social welfare

equity and efficiency in human capital investment the local connection a general model of community formation and human capital accumulation with social spillovers and decentralized school funding is used to analyse the causes of economic segregation and its consequences for equity and efficiency significant polarization arises from minor differences in endowments preferences or access to capital markets this makes income inequality more persistent across generations but the same need not be true for wealth equilibrium stratification tends to be excessive resulting in low aggregate surplus whether state equalization of school resources can remedy these problems hinges on how purchased social and family inputs interact in education and in mobility decisions

equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects public service output depends on input expenditures on own personal characteristics and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community the peer group effect in a community model with public expenditures set by voting with migration between communities and with land price differentials capitalization it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and second best inefficient this equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither too strong nor too weak the inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration the land price differential does not play the part of the price of the better peer group but of a transfer payment

federal funding and the level of private expenditure on basic research economists have long been interested in questions concerning the role of government in stimulating private sector innovation in the late 1950s blank and stigler 2 asked in particular whether government funded industrial research and development r d activity was likely to stimulate or substitute for private sector expenditure on r d a number of studies have since addressed this issue and most conclude in favor of the existence of a positive relationship between federal r d expenditures and the level of private r d investment leyden and link 8 have provided a theoretical rationale for this observed complementarity they suggest that federallyfunded industrial r d activity may generate knowledge spillovers and other infratechnology that may raise the productivity of inputs into private r d r d is a heterogeneous activity and a question which has received relatively little attention in the literature is the extent to which the apparent complementarity between federal and private industrial r d spending holds for the different components of firms r d budgets cross section evidence on this issue produced by link 13 suggests that

do urban neighborhoods benefit from homeowners evidence from housing prices homeownership is heavily subsidized in most countries the adverse effects of this policy on economic efficiency and income distribution are well documented in the economics literature the main argument in favor of subsidizing homeownership is that it creates positive externalities that offset these adverse effects in this paper we test whether homeowners create positive externalities that capitalize into housing prices in multi storey buildings using semi parametric hedonic regressions with and without instrumental variables we find no evidence of positive externalities although the results with instrumental variables are somewhat imprecise this result is robust to several sensitivity checks and to a relaxation of the identification assumptions of our instrument using set identification

assessing the effect of public subsidies on firm r d investment a survey this survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public r d subsidies and private r d investment over the past five decades the survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues we aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity in particular we emphasise a set of issues that in our view are critical to understanding the potential effect of public r d subsidies on private r d spending special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm r d the constraints faced by the firm such as financial constraints and the amount and source of public subsidies none of these issues have been investigated in depth we formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

why are governmental r d and private r d complements it is well known that government r d and private r d have a complementary relationship however no previous study has provided an explanation for why that complementary relationship exists this paper argues that infratechnology is the critical link between governmental and private r d and that the observed complementarity is the result of technical complementarity at the production level between funding infratechnology and knowledge sharing a theoritical framework based on this argument is developed and examined empirically for supporting evidence evidence of technical complementary is found as well as evidence that governmental r d stimulates the sharing of knowledge

the effect of government funding on private industrial research and development a re assessment a number of previous studies have attempted to determine the effect of federal support of research and development r d performed in industry on the rate of private investment in r d by estimating regressions of private r d expenditure on federal industrial r d expenditure controlling for total demand sales and in some cases other variables this paper presents arguments and econometric evidence in support of the hypothesis that due to misspecification of the private r d equation i e failure to distinguish government sales from other sales previous estimates of the effect of federal industrial r d on private r d funding are seriously upwardly biased

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

rationalizable bidding in first price auctions abstract we analyze the consequences of strategically sophisticated bidding without assuming equilibrium behavior in particular we characterize interim rationalizable bids in symmetric first price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals we show that 1 every nonzero bid below the equilibrium is rationalizable 2 some bids above the equilibrium are rationalizable 3 the upper bound on rationalizable bids of a given player is a nondecreasing function of her signal in the special case of independent signals and quasi linear valuation functions i the least upper bound on rationalizable bids is concave hence ii rationalizability implies substantial proportional shading for high valuations but is consistent with negligible proportional shading for low valuations we argue that our theoretical analysis may shed some light on experimental findings about deviations from the risk neutral nash equilibrium

de stabilizing speculation on futures markets an alternative view point abstract this paper offers a new interpretation for possible destabilizing effects of opening futures markets in our model adapted from stein 1987 speculation on futures markets reduces the likelihood of occurrence of a rational expectations equilibrium although the equilibrium price is less volatile after the futures market is opened which is usually viewed as a stabilizing effect traders may find it more difficult or even impossible to coordinate their expectations in order to implement this equilibrium

stability with one sided incomplete information two notions of stability ex ante stability and bayesian stability are investigated in a matching model with non transferrable utility interdependent preferences and one sided incomplete information ex ante stable matching outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner s type while bayesian stable matching outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs ex ante stability is a minimal requirement bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties

stationarity rationalizability and bargaining strategies for the seller and the buyer which are weakly stationary we demonstrate that any initial offer from the seller induced by a strategy rationalized by a weakly stationary acceptance rule for the buyer must entail the coase property our result does not presume the selection of a particular equilibrium and follows directly from the weak stationarity assumption of the buyer s acceptance rule and the rational behaviour of the players

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

estimating the impact of government r d abstract if we do not pay for an input it is important it is suggested that the r d literature by ignoring the fact that government r d is given away has confused zero value of marginal product with zero marginal physical product

r d subsidy and self financed r d the case of japanese high technology start ups this paper examines whether public r d subsidies constitute a substitute or complement for private financed r d the empirical analysis is based on a panel data of 223 japanese high technology start ups our evidence is consistent with the complement hypothesis i e that publicly funded r d does promote private r d the complement effects are stronger for more mature firms this is because such firms in the growth phase might have greater demands for r d funds