a test of the theory of reference dependent preferences eight alternative methods of eliciting preferences between money and a consumption good are identified two of these are standard willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures these methods differ with respect to the reference point used and the dimension in which responses are expressed the loss aversion hypothesis of tversky and kahneman s theory of reference dependent preferences predicts systematic differences between the preferences elicited by these methods these predictions are tested by eliciting individuals preferences for two private consumption goods the experimental design is incentive compatible and controls for income and substitution effects the theory s predictions are broadly confirmed

using repeated choice experiments to evaluate the impact of policy changes on cervical screening australia was one of the first countries to introduce a publicly funded human papilloma virus hpv vaccine program and its introduction coincided with a media campaign to promote regular cervical screening one issue with hpv vaccination is how it impacts on demand for screening this study examines changes in women s screening preferences following these two interventions using a novel approach to policy evaluation based on repeated discrete choice experiments the study extends our previous analysis of attitudes to screening by taking advantage of the timing of the choice experiments to examine the impact of the two policy changes on determinants of screening we find that unexpectedly willingness to screen is generally lower post interventions the reason for this trend appears to be related to hpv vaccination we also find that interventions have minor impacts on how women value screening attributes our approach allows us to examine the impact of provider behaviour a simulation demonstrates tha

testing preference formation in learning design contingent valuation using advance information and repetitive treatments policymakers have largely replaced single bounded discrete choice valuation by the more statistically efficient repetitive method double bounded discrete choice and discrete choice experiments repetitive valuation permits classification into rational and irrational preferences 1 a priori well formed 2 consistent nonarbitrary values discovered through repetition and experience 3 consistent but arbitrary values as shaped by preceding bid level and 4 inconsistent and arbitrary values policy valuations should demonstrate behaviorally rational preferences we outline novel methods for testing this in double bounded discrete choice experiments applied to renewable energy premiums in chile

gender specific starting point bias in choice experiments evidence from an empirical study abstract in this paper we test whether preferences and willingness to pay estimates obtained in a choice experiment study are susceptible to starting point bias as is often the case in dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies on the basis of a multinomial probit model we find that preferences are indeed susceptible to starting point bias in a split sample design our results suggest that varying the price levels displayed in a so called instructional choice set presented prior to the actual preference eliciting choice sets significantly impacts respondents preferences and willingness to pay for protecting danish nature areas from new motorway development in particular our results show that the bias is gender specific only female respondents are significantly affected results further reveal that the impact of the starting point bias decays as respondents evaluate more and more choice sets this supports the discovered preference hypothesis and on the basis of this we suggest a number of ways to potentially mitigate the starting point bias

a three person game theory model arising in stochastic inventory control theory abstract in this paper we build a game theory model for a single period inventory problem where each of three retailers tries to determine his optimal order quantity their products are substitutable and have random demands therefore multiple direction demand transfers occur when one or more retailers are sold out it is shown that by using nash equilibrium optimal decision exists for each retailer when they work independently the optimal order quantity in this case is larger than that under the newsboy problem model this is because substitution can be a source of sales and hence a justification for inventory in situations where some retailer may act irrationally to inflict a damage on the others the defensive strategy for the latter is to totally ignore the existence of the irrational player we also study the cooperation of retailers by switching excess inventory to those who have excess demand both when side payments are and are not allowed if side payments are not allowed secure nash strategies always exist for each retailer and cooperation will reduce inventory the latter is especially true when the depreciation of value of the item and or inventory carrying cost are large we give conditions for cooperation in both cases and show that although all player cooperation is often feasible it may not always be obtainable even if side payments are allowed

the effects of changing cost vectors on choices and scale heterogeneity choice experiments ce are widely used to estimate the values of changes in non market goods and services a cost attribute is typically included in a ce questionnaire to enable the estimation of monetary values for changes in the non market attributes presented notwithstanding the central importance of the cost attribute relatively little research has been undertaken on the impacts of varying cost attribute levels on value estimates or on individual heterogeneity in this paper i present results from mixed logit and generalised mixed logit models that account for unobserved idiosyncratic preference and scale heterogeneity respondents are found to anchor their choices on the relative cost levels presented in the survey with results suggesting that people are more sensitive to relative rather than absolute cost vectors however the higher cost levels do not lead to significantly higher value estimates partly because of observed preference heterogeneity towards the environmental attributes an important observation is that scale heterogeneity is important accounting for scale as well as preference heterogeneity in the generalised mixed logit model leads to significantly improved model fit the results indicate significant unobserved error variance across respondents unrelated to whether a high or low cost vector is used

exploring preference anomalies in double bounded contingent valuation double bounded dichotomous choice dbdc contingent valuation offers increased efficiency of willingness to pay wtp estimates compared with the single bounded format however evidence suggests dbdc generates anomalous respondent behaviour this paper provides the first investigation and explanation of these anomalies in health results suggest the incentives for truthful preference revelation are altered in the presence of a follow up question this result is found using both regression techniques and analysis of raw responses although findings suggest very certain respondents exhibit less anomalous behaviour inconsistencies remain across bounds the results of this study question the use of iterative valuation formats

the estimation of a preference based measure of health from the sf 36 this paper reports on the findings of a study to derive a preference based measure of health from the sf 36 for use in economic evaluation the sf 36 was revised into a six dimensional health state classification called the sf 6d a sample of 249 states defined by the sf 6d have been valued by a representative sample of 611 members of the uk general population using standard gamble models are estimated for predicting health state valuations for all 18 000 states defined by the sf 6d the econometric modelling had to cope with the hierarchical nature of the data and its skewed distribution the recommended models have produced significant coefficients for levels of the sf 6d which are robust across model specification however there are concerns with some inconsistent estimates and over prediction of the value of the poorest health states these problems must be weighed against the rich descriptive ability of the sf 6d and the potential application of these models to existing and future sf 36 data set

test retest reliability of choice experiments in environmental valuation the paper presents the results of the first test retest study on choice experiments in environmental valuation in a survey concerning landscape externalities of onshore wind power in central germany respondents answered the same five choice sets at two different points in time each choice set comprised three alternatives described by five attributes and the time interval between the test and the retest was eleven months the analysis takes place at three different levels investigating choice consistency at the choice task level and repeatability of the latent construct utility at the level of parametric models as well as at the level of willingness to pay estimates at the choice task level we observed 59 identical choices the parametric analysis shows that the test and retest estimates are not equal even when we control for scale that is differences in the error variance however comparing the marginal willingness to pay estimates among test and retest reveals only a statistically significant difference for one of the attributes overall this indicates a moderate test retest reliability taking into account that consistency at the choice task level overlooks the stochastic nature of the process underlying discrete choice experiments

position dependent order effects on the prediction of consumer preferences in repeated choice experiments abstractusing stated choice data collected by experimental design with repeated choice tasks this study developed an approach to quantify the position dependent order effects on the prediction of

changing with the tide semiparametric estimation of preference dynamics we contrast the discovered preference hypothesis against the theory of coherent arbitrariness in a split sample stated choice experiment on flood risk exposure a semiparametric local multinomial logit model is developed as an alternative to the swait and louviere 1993 test procedure controlling for preference dynamics within and between samples the proposed model supports the discovered preference hypothesis by means of a decaying starting point bias the swait and louviere 1993 test procedure reaches a different conclusion it rejects the assumption of stable preferences but most preference dynamics tend to be smoothed out causing a more erratic pattern of preference dynamics

resolving differences in willingness to pay and willingness to accept reply gwendolyn c morrison 1997 raises a logical point regarding our experimental test of the divergence between willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta measures of economic value shogren et al 1994 she argues that our design does not provide a true test of the existence of a fundamental endowment effect since we did not control for the potential of a pivoting indifference map daniel kahneman et al 1990 she concludes that even though our ev idence shows that the mean wtp and wta bids for market goods with close substitutes e g candy bars and coffee mugs converge after market experience the endowment effect might still be alive and well albeit at statisti cally insignificant levels

ordering effects and choice set awareness in repeat response stated preference studies we present an experiment designed to investigate the presence and nature of ordering effects within repeat response stated preference sp studies our experiment takes the form of a large sample full factorial discrete choice sp exercise investigating preferences for tap water quality improvements our study simultaneously investigates a variety of different forms of position dependent and precedent dependent ordering effect in preferences for attributes and options and in response randomness we also examine whether advanced disclosure of the choice tasks impacts on the probability of exhibiting ordering effects of those different types we analyze our data both non parametrically and parametrically and find robust evidence for ordering effects we also find that the patterns of order effect in respondents preferences are significantly changed but not eradicated by the advanced disclosure of choice tasks a finding that offers insights into the choice behaviors underpinning order effects

stated preferences over job characteristics a panel study when making choices over jobs with different characteristics what trade offs are decision makers willing to make such a question is difficult to address using typical household surveys that provide a limited amount of information on the attributes of the jobs to address this question a small but growing number of studies have turned to the use of stated preference experiments but the extent to which stated choices by respondents reflect systematic trade offs across job characteristics remains an open question we use two popular types of experiments profile case best worst scaling and multi profile case best worst scaling to elicit job preferences of nursing students and junior nurses in australia each person participated in both types of experiments twice within a span of about 15 months using a novel joint likelihood approach that links a decision maker s preferences across the two types of experiments and over time we find that the decision makers make similar trade offs across job characteristics in both types of experiments and in both time periods except for the trade off between salary and other attributes the valuation of salary falls significantly over time relative to other job attributes for both types of experiments also within each period salary is less valued in the profile case compared to the more traditional multi profile case

how deliberation affects stated willingness to pay for mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions an experiment respondents reported willingness to pay wtp for mitigating carbon dioxide emissions after structured group discussion or without this deliberation deliberation did not affect mean or median wtp but it increased the number of issues respondents considered with some issues becoming more frequently considered and others less survey only respondents considered issues relevant for responding to a request for a charitable contribution group mode participants considered issues relevant for a public policy assessment findings suggest that ordinary citizens can offer valid input to environmental policy decisions but that framing effects in ordinary wtp surveys may prevent them from providing such input

reliability of individual valuations of public and private goods choice consistency response time and preference refinement we examined the reliability of a large set of paired comparison value judgments involving public goods private goods and sums of money as respondents progressed through a random sequence of paired choices they were each given their response time decreased and they became more consistent apparently fine tuning their responses suggesting that respondents tend to begin a hypothetical value exercise with relatively imprecise preferences and that experience in expressing preference helps reduce that imprecision reliability was greater for private than for public good choices and greater for choices between a good and a monetary amount than for choices between two goods however the reliability for public good choices was only slightly lower than for the private goods published by elsevier b v

trading off positive and negative service changes in childcare a choice experiment using a latent class modelling approach theoretically the choice of childcare mode should be influenced by the quality of the childcare attributes however such preference relations have been difficult to identify in past studies one

valuing cultural heritage in developing countries comparing and pooling contingent valuation and choice modelling estimates a substantial part of the united nation s world heritage sites whss can be found in developing countries but many of them are in a bad state thus there is a need to document the social benefits of these global goods in order to justify the costs of restoration and preservation programmes rpps this study adds to the scarce literature on economic benefits of whss in developing countries and reduces the need to perform very uncertain benefit transfers from european or us valuation studies we apply contingent valuation cv and choice modelling cm to estimate the social benefits of rpps for the my son world cultural heritage site in vietnam both to foreign visitors and the local residents we then compare the estimates from the cv and cm methods and pool the results from the two methods the results show that both cv and cm are suited to estimating the economic benefits of preserving cultural heritage of my son the two methods produce very similar results which can be interpreted as a test of convergence validity the pooling results give evidence to show that the cv and cm models have the same underlying preference structures thus these valuation models can be successfully used in cost benefit analyses to assess the benefits to cultural heritage of measures to reduce air pollution soil erosion climate change and other causes to deterioration of cultural heritage sites

do anomalies disappear in repeated markets there is some evidence that as individuals participate in repeated markets anomalies tend to disappear one interpretation is that individuals particularly marginal traders are learning to act on underlying preferences which satisfy standard assumptions an alternative interpretation the shaping hypothesis is that individuals preferences are adjusting in response to cues given by market prices the paper reports an experiment designed to discriminate between these hypotheses with particular reference to the disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept

using discrete choice experiments to estimate a preference based measure of outcome an application to social care for older people this paper reports the results of a study that used discrete choice experiment dce methodology to estimate quality weights for a of social care outcome measure to reflect different states of need a five dimensional profile measure was developed experimental design techniques were used to derive a sample of states for which preferences were elicited the dce approach was employed to elicit values and regression techniques used to estimate a model that could predict index scores for all 243 possible outcomes the utility model estimated on the basis of 297 responses had good test retest reliability and converged with preferences elicited from a rating exercise

revenue management with limited demand information in this paper we consider the classical multifare single resource leg problem in revenue management for the case where demand information is limited our approach employs a competitive analysis which guarantees a certain performance level under all possible demand scenarios the only information required about the demand for each fare class is lower and upper bounds we consider both competitive ratio and absolute regret performance criteria for both performance criteria we derive the best possible static policies which employ booking limits that remain constant throughout the booking horizon the optimal policies have the form of nested booking limits dynamic policies which employ booking limits that may be adjusted at any time based on the history of bookings are also obtained we provide extensive computational experiments and compare our methods to existing ones the results of the experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of these new robust methods

reference dependent subjective expected utility abstract a reference dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented in this theory preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points which may be uncertain acts it is characterised by a set of axioms in a savage style framework a restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states encoded in a satisfaction function from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction given weak additional assumptions the restricted theory excludes cycles of choice explains observed disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept valuations of lotteries and predicts preference reversal

response strategies and learning in discrete choice experiments this study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent induce strategic behaviour we find evidence that strategic opportunities provided by the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents affect choice decisions strategic response the results suggest however that respondents may solely respond to high cost rather than low cost inconsistencies that is respondents are more cost sensitive and thus have a lower willingness to pay wtp if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a lower cost than if it was not yet the cost sensitivity and thus wtp remains unaffected if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a higher cost our findings further indicate that cost sensitivity increases and thus wtp decreases when respondents progress through the choice task with this increase decrease lessening as more choice questions are answered possible explanations are value learning and strategic learning

robust inventory management with stock out substitution abstract stock out substitution is a well documented phenomenon that occurs when customers seek a different product as a substitute for their first choice item if it runs out of stock we consider a single period inventory model with limited information regarding the external demands i e mean variance and covariance and focus on identifying the inventory levels that maximize the worst case expected profit we formulate a two stage optimization model the second stage characterizes the worst case joint demand distribution by treating the inventory levels as input parameters and the first stage identifies the optimal inventory levels based on the results of the second stage the closed form solution of the second stage problem is analytically intractable except for two special cases we develop closed form solutions for these two special cases and use them to develop a heuristic for the general case an extensive numerical study over a wide range of parameters indicates that the performance of the heuristic that we develop is nearly optimal we also provide insights into the effects of demand correlation substitution rate and other parameters on the optimal worst case expected profit of the system

goal based construction of preferences task goals and the prominence effect preferences inferred from choice are more likely to favor the alternative that is superior with respect to the prominent most important or salient attribute than are preferences inferred from matching direct tradeoff judgments this prominence effect violates standard models of rational choice and complicates the task of measuring preferences in this article we propose a new task goal hypothesis regarding the prominence effect the prominent attribute receives more weight in tasks whose goal is to differentiate among options than in tasks whose goal is to equate options we use this hypothesis to generalize the prominence effect beyond choice and matching to several additional tasks including the choice based matching and difference comparison methods that are widely employed in decision analysis the results of three studies provide strong support for the task goal account of the prominence effect and cast doubt on competing explanations we discuss the implications of these findings for descriptive decision theory and for preference measurement in decision analysis public policy and marketing

willingness to pay and willingness to accept how much can they differ comment i agree with the point made by edoh y amiran and daniel a hagen 2003 that there can be a substantial or even infinite divergence between the wta and wtp for a public good even where there is a nonzero elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good provided that the indifference curves are asymptotically bounded with respect to market goods in the manner they describe this is an important point they are also correct to point out that the elasticity of substitution is a local concept whereas their asymptotic boundedness condition applies also for discrete changes my 1991 paper used a local analysis because it was following the structure of the analysis in robert d willig 1976 and alan randall and john r stoll 1980 i wanted to show that while randall and stoll appeared to extend willig s local result on wta versus wtp from price changes to changes in the quantity of a public good the relevant elasticity was in fact different and involved the substitution elasticity as well as the income elasticity i view these points by amiran and hagen as not two separate results but essentially the same result their asymptotic boundedness condition generalizes my zero elasticity of substitution condition to discrete changes the asymptotic boundedness condition can be expressed as follows assuming a bivariate utility function u x q and given a reference point x q associated with a reference utility level u u x q there exists some q q such that for all q q there exists no x such that u x q u in other words no amount of x can substitute for the reduction in public good from q to q q in the case of a zero elasticity of substitution q q but as amiran and hagen show in their theorem 1 this is unnecessarily restrictive when dealing with a discrete reduction in q furthermore their theorem 2 can be viewed as a special case of their theorem 1 in which q 0 which makes q an essential commodity it is well known in consumer theory that the wta to avoid the loss of an essential market good is infinite their theorem 2 extends this result to the case of an essential nonmarket good but as their theorem 1 shows essentialness is not necessary for an infinite wta the boundedness condition is the key and this implies a fundamental lack of substitutability between money market goods and the public good

an experiment in the demand revealing process the principal findings of this experiment are it is somewhat time consuming but not otherwise difficult to employ the demand revealing process in groups of 10 to 60 the ability of the demand revealing process to take account of intensities of preferences is appreciated by many of the persons who have used the process but the departure from one man one vote is strongly resisted by others the outcomes reached by demand revealing differed from majority rule in about one tenth of the cases the improvement in efficiency associated with these reversals of majority rule was 2 25 percent of the net benefit of making the efficient decisions the clarke taxes which would decline in percentage terms as group size increased were 3 04 percent of the net value of efficient decisions for the decisions studied

contingent valuation of community forestry programs in ethiopia controlling for preference anomalies in double bounded cvm this study examines the welfare effects of community plantations in ethiopia via contingent valuation both single bounded and double bounded survey methods were considered and with respect to double bounded methods the potential for anomalous response behaviour was also taken into account the results generally confirm that there are statistically significant welfare benefits to be derived from community forestry however the range of the estimated benefits is large after controlling for anomalous response behaviour the range of estimated benefits narrows and our preferred estimates place the welfare gain between ethiopian birr etb 20 14 and 30 41 per household which is much lower than the estimated benefits without controlling for anomalous preference responses

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

newsvendor competition under asymmetric cost information abstract we study the newsboy duopoly problem under asymmetric cost information we extend the lippman and mccardle 1997 of competitive newsboy to the case where the two firms are privately informed about their unit costs the market demand is initially split between two firms and the excess demand for each firm is reallocated to the rival firm we show the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium and characterize its structure the equilibrium conditions have an interesting recursive structure that enables an easy computation of the equilibrium order quantities presence of strategic interactions creates incentives to increase order quantities for all firm types except the type that has the highest possible unit cost consequently competition leads to higher total inventory in the industry however contrary to intuition this is only true when the firms are non identical a firm s equilibrium order quantity increases with a stochastic increase in the total industry demand or with an increase in his initial allocation of the total industry demand we demonstrate our model and results in an application in a dual sourcing procurement setting using data that obtained from a large manufacturing company finally we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the game for the special case of uniform demand and linear market shares

beyond rationality towards reasonableness enriching the theoretical foundation of deliberative monetary valuation economic valuation is often deemed an important source of information for land use decisions stated preference sp methods are a particularly potent class of economic valuation methods but they are also particularly controversial in response to accumulating criticism of sp deliberative monetary valuation dmv has been proposed as an alternative approach and has gained considerable attention in recent years however being a combination of elements from two theories neoclassical welfare economics and theory of deliberative democracy it lacks a convincing consistent theoretical foundation in our paper we propose some clarifying adjustments regarding rationality assumptions and aggregation issues by drawing upon the work of amartya sen we find that many of his ideas lead to a harmonisation of dmv s theoretical foundations e g meta rankings of preferences impartial spectator and the plurality of impartial reasons

reducing gain loss asymmetry a virtual reality choice experiment valuing land use change abstract in the majority of choice experiments ces the attributes of non market goods are conveyed to respondents as a table of numeric and or categorical data recent research suggests that respondents may have difficulties evaluating data in this format in the context of a ce eliciting preferences for changes in coastal land use this study uses a split sample experiment to compare standard presentations with virtual reality vr visualisations conveying objectively identical information we find that compared to the standard presentation preferences elicited in vr treatments are less variable and exhibit a significant reduction in asymmetry between willingness to pay wtp for gains and willingness to accept wta for corresponding losses we conjecture that the greater evaluability of the vr presentation reduces respondent judgement error and moderates reliance on the loss aversion heuristic

expected value of distribution information for the newsvendor problem this paper extends previous work on the distribution free newsvendor problem where only partial information about the demand distribution is available more specifically the analysis assumes that the demand distribution f belongs to a class of probability distribution functions pdf f with mean and standard deviation while previous work has examined the expected value of distribution information evdi for a particular order quantity and a particular pdf f this paper aims at computing the maximum evdi over all f f for any order quantity in addition an optimization procedure is provided to calculate the order quantity that minimizes the maximum evdi

robust multi item newsboy models with a budget constraint abstract in this paper we present robust newsboy models with uncertain demand the traditional approach to describing uncertainty is by means of probability density functions in this paper we present an alternative approach using deterministic optimization models we describe uncertainty using two types of demand scenarios namely interval and discrete scenarios for interval demand scenarios we only require a lower and an upper bound for the uncertain demand of each item while for discrete demand scenarios we require a set of likely demand outcomes for each item using the above scenarios to describe demand uncertainty we develop several minimax regret formulations for the multi item newsboy problem with a budget constraint for the problems involving interval demand scenarios we develop linear time optimal algorithms we show that the corresponding models with discrete demand scenarios are np hard and that they are solvable by dynamic programming finally we extend the above results to the case of mixed scenarios where the demand of some of the items is described by interval scenarios and the demand of the remaining items is described by discrete scenarios

optimal soft order revisions under demand and supply uncertainty and upstream information abstract demand patterns for products with short life cycles or seasonal demand do not follow a discernible pattern for individual sales events and seasons due to uncertainty associated with effectiveness of product promotions willingness of major retailers to carry product and their support competition and other unforeseen marketplace events factors these atypical demand patterns can be volatile and unsuitable for traditional demand forecasting in such cases buyers utilize market signals to regularly update demand forecasts under these settings sharing early soft order i e order forecast with the supplier reduces buyer s risk of supply shortages in this study we propose an optimal order revision policy for a buyer facing atypical demand and supply uncertainty for a single selling season based on a stochastic dynamic program we demonstrate the value of soft orders as well as supplier s inventory position information for the buyer we make several key contributions i we introduce a decision model for buyer to optimally revise soft orders under supply uncertainty with or without supplier s inventory position information under a deposit scheme ii we characterize the relationship between the optimal soft order and final firm order under demand forecasts and revisions demonstrating that optimal orders may be aggressive conservative or match the demand forecast iii we identify settings under which inventory position information of the supplier is beneficial to the buyer iv we offer a mechanism for identifying the minimum unit deposit cost that will lead to truthful soft orders from the buyer a detailed analysis explores the structure of the optimal ordering policies as well as the effect of cost parameters and sources of uncertainty on buyer performance

preference refinement in deliberative choice experiments for ecosystem service valuation choice experiments have gained considerable popularity in ecosystem service valuation in a one shot survey respondents are faced with a strenuous task asking them to discover and monetize their preferences for often unfamiliar ecosystem services in a previously unknown hypothetical market situation we present a deliberative choice experiment that aims to generate well rationalized value estimates for policy advice two aspects of deliberation discussion and time to reflect are examined in terms of their effect on preference refinement we find more comprehensive choice motives after deliberation as well as indications for preference adjustment and a slight increase in choice certainty jel q51 q57

payoff dominance vs cognitive transparency in decision making i introduction there is a general question about how well laboratory markets work in eliciting true preferences given the low opportunity costs of making errors as in harrison 1989 vernon smith 1982 set out a series of conditions that must be adhered to if a laboratory market investigation is to provide insight into economic behavior in naturally occurring markets the opportunity cost question posed above is covered under smith s payoff dominance and reward saliency precepts for laboratory market experiments if the experimental setting is to elicit true preferences from the subjects the monetary payoffs in the experiment must be salient and dominate potential extraneous influences on subject behavior this paper reports on three series of experiments which employ the becker degroot marshak bdm mechanism to investigate the interaction between payoff dominance reward saliency and cognitive effort in the decision task the bdm mechanism is well suited to this task because it involves only individual choice is theoretically incentive compatible and offers a high degree of experimenter control over payoffs initial information and feedback on the results of decisions becker degroot and marschak 1964 introduced the following preference elicitation mechanism individuals state the most they would be willing to pay wtp 1 for a good then a random price is drawn from a distribution known to the individuals if the stated value is greater than or equal to the random price the individual buys the good at the randomly determined price otherwise the individual does not buy the good the bdm bidding mechanism can be shown to be incentive compatible the intuition is straightforward it is not in the individual s interest to understate true wtp if the random buying price falls between the stated wtp and the true wtp the individual has foregone a beneficial trade it is also not in an individual s interest to overstate true wtp if the random buying price is greater than the true value but less than the stated value the individual will be required to buy the good at a price greater than true wtp a more formal proof is easy to construct 2 let v the true value of one unit of the auction good b the bid submitted to purchase one unit of the good r the price randomly determined to be paid if the good is purchased p r probability that price r is randomly selected y sup o initial income u y utility a function of money income and the value of the good and e initial monetary balance provided in an experiment in the wtp version of the bdm auction the good is purchased if b greater than or equal to r with the subject paying only r and not purchased if b less than r in experiments using the bdm the subject cannot bid more than the experimental balance e so it must be that v less than e if the experiment is to be demand revealing assuming that subjects maximize expected utility they will submit bid b that maximizes eu integral of p r u y sup o e v r dr between limits b and 0 integral of p r u y sup o e dr between limits e and b the first integral describes the expected payoff for random prices r below the bid b and the second integral describes the expected payoff for random prices between the bid b and the maximum possible bid as limited by the balance e the maximum over b occurs when the derivative of eu with respect to b is zero in other words when deu db p b u y e v b u y e 0 so long as p b greater than 0 i e there is some probability the offered bid will be the price the above implies that the maximum occurs when b v in other words it is individually optimal to submit a bid b equal to one s true value v for the commodity although the bdm is incentive compatible in theory it is an empirical question whether it has this property in practice

the disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value psychologists have long argued that people are much more averse to a loss than attracted to an equivalent gain this behavior termed loss aversion has been formalized by kahneman and tversky 1979 in their reformulation of expected utility theory prospect theory in prospect theory the utility function is replaced by a value function that evaluates changes in income from the current level increases in income are weighted by a relatively small marginal utility decreases in income are weighted by a much larger marginal utility in effect the value function implies that a kink in the relationship between utility and income occurs at the initial income or reference point and that the slope of the utility function for losses in income is steeper than it is for gains in a recent paper knetsch and sinden 1984 report a series of experiments that demonstrate the existence of a large disparity between willingness to accept wta and willingness to pay wtp measures of value they argue that the psychological theory of loss aversion explains this difference economic theory would suggest that individuals who exhibit a large disparity between wta and wtp are perhaps underperceiving the value of gains or overperceiving the value of losses are behaving in an irrational manner and will consequently achieve a lower level of well being than if they behaved in a true utility maximizing manner this would in contrast to loss aversion usually imply near equal values for wta and wtp see willig 1976 further documentation of a larger than expected disparity between wta and wtp has been obtained in surveys asking for the value of a variety of public goods for example cummings brookshire and schulze 1986 document six

sequence effects in the valuation of multiple environmental programs using the contingent valuation method in contingent valuation the willingness to pay for hypothetical programs may be affected by the order in which programs are presented to respondents with inclusive lists economic theory suggests that sequence effects should be expected however when policy makers allocate public budgets to several environmental programs they may be interested in assessing the value of the programs without the valuations being affected by the order in which the programs are presented using single bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation questions we show that if respondents have the possibility to revise their willingness to pay answers sequence effects are mitigated

the causes of order effects in contingent valuation surveys an experimental investigation contingent valuation researchers have found that the hypothetical values respondents place on a nested sequence of environmental goods are sensitive to the order in which the goods are presented typically the smallest bundle of goods is valued more highly if presented first than if following more comprehensive bundles such effects appear even when each bundle is valued from an exclusive list or as an alternative to any other so that income and substitution effects are controlled we conduct lab experiments where participants are asked to value sequences of nested goods for purchase from an exclusive list using an incentive compatible becker degroot marschak mechanism we test whether order effects occur in valuation for a induced value goods b actual private goods and c identical private goods that are to be donated to charities we find significant order effects when the goods are valued for own use but not when they are valued for donation

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

the price of anarchy in supply chains quantifying the efficiency of price only contracts in this paper we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price only contracts with a price only contract a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price without specifying the amount that will be transferred it is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory capacity decisions we measure efficiency with the price of anarchy poa defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain that is fully coordinated and the decentralized supply chain we characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations push or pull inventory positioning two or more stages serial or assembly systems single or multiple competing suppliers and single or multiple competing retailers

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

distributionally robust equilibrium for continuous games nash and stackelberg models abstract we develop several distributionally robust equilibrium models following the recent research surge of robust game theory in which some or all of the players in the games lack of complete information on the true probability distribution of underlying uncertainty but they need to make a decision prior to the realization of such uncertainty we start with a distributionally robust nash equilibrium model where each player uses partial information to construct a set of distributions and chooses an optimal decision on the basis of the worst distribution rather than the worst scenario to hedge the risk arising from ambiguity of the true probability distribution we investigate the existence of equilibrium develop a numerical scheme for its computation and consider special cases where the distributionally robust nash equilibrium model can be reformulated as an ordinary deterministic nash equilibrium we then extend our modeling scheme to two possible frameworks of distributionally robust stackelberg setting a distributionally robust follower model and a distributionally robust leader model these two frameworks are employed to study an innovative problem of hierarchical competition in a supply chain where a buyer not only invests in its own capacity to supply an end product market under demand uncertainty but also outsources a certain amount of market supplies to multiply competing suppliers who invest in capacity for obtaining the buyer s orders in this application we show that the buyer has more incentives to invest in capacity whereas the suppliers have less to do so when those suppliers are confronted with more demand uncertainty in the end product market over the buyer

robust price setting newsvendor model with interval market size and consumer willingness to pay we consider a price setting newsvendor problem with partial information the newsvendor does not know the price dependent probability distribution of demand but is able to estimate lower and upper limits of the market size and consumer willingness to pay the objective is to minimize the maximum loss in expected profit or minimax regret we derive closed form expressions for optimal quantity and price and identify managerial insights

managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information abstract consider a firm that controls inventory centrally for two separate markets that are managed by regional managers having local demand information the central planner provides a dedicated inventory level to each market to ensure a minimum service level but can reallocate inventory once associated demands are filled how should such a firm solicit regional managers to share their local information so inventory levels can be set efficiently in this paper we study a forecast sharing game in such a firm where demand information lies within regions and inventory is managed by a central decision maker we show that incentives are misaligned and truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium we study two potential ways to improve the system a regional managers directly place orders rather than simply passing demand forecasts or b a pricing scheme for inventory reallocations is imposed we show that under direct ordering a unique pure strategy bayesian nash equilibrium exists and makes retailers place orders based on their true forecasts although the requested order quantities are not system optimal e g some inventory pooling benefits are lost under an endogenous transfer pricing mechanism set by the central planner we find that a first best truth telling equilibrium is possible under certain conditions we conduct a numerical study to examine the different cases and find that when the critical fractile is high direct ordering results in lower inventories while the reverse is true when the critical fractile is low expected profit comparisons show the value of local information

testing different stochastic specificationsof risky choice the harless camerer hc hey orme ho and random preference rp models of stochastic variation in choice under uncertainty are compared implications of these models including some that are independent of the deterministic theory with which they are combined are tested in an experiment in which participants respond to decision problems twice the hc model generally performs poorly the ho model predicts more violations of dominance than are observed while the rp model fails to account for those few violations which do occur additional regularities are observed which are inconsistent with all three models when combined with expected utility theory

are some lives more valuable an ethical preferences approach we develop a theoretical model of the ethical preferences of individuals combining individual social welfare functions and random utility theory the model is applied by conducting a choice experiment regarding safety enhancing road investments that target different age groups and road user types the relative value of a saved life is found to decrease with age such that the present value of a saved life year is almost independent of age at a pure rate of time preference of a few percent moreover a saved pedestrian is consistently valued higher than a saved car driver of the same age

preference stability and choice consistency in discrete choice experiments we investigate preference stability and respondents levels of choice consistency within discrete choice experiments these are investigated via a discrete choice experiment featuring four information treatments and a retest survey completed 6 months after the first three information treatments concern a novel stem cell food technology with the fourth information treatment featuring a non novel technology we find stable welfare estimates over the three information treatments the use of emotive keywords does not systematically change wtp to avoid the stem cell food technology we find a significant wtp to avoid the non novel technology we find high levels of intertemporal preference stability and choice consistency the determinants of choice consistency are examined two factors are significant a measure of the choice task s complexity entropy and a novel measure of respondents cognitive capability derived within the survey we find a significant selection issue not previously identified in discrete choice experiment test retest studies with those opting to take the retest exhibiting greater choice consistency in the initial survey this suggests that studies which report high levels of test retest choice consistency without accounting for the selection issue are overstating population choice consistency

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

tough and easy choices testing the influence of utility difference on stated certainty in choice in choice experiments respondents in stated preference studies may be uncertain about their preferences for the good presented to them inspired by wang j environ econ manag 32 219 232 1997 we hypothesize that respondents stated certainty in choice increases with the utility difference between the alternative chosen and the best alternative to that we test this hypothesis using data from two independent choice experiments both focusing on nature values in modelling respondents self reported certainty in choice we find evidence that the stated level of certainty increases significantly as utility difference in choice sets increases in addition stated certainty increases with income furthermore there is some evidence that male respondents are inherently more certain in their choices than females and a learning effect may increase stated certainty we find evidence of this in the first study where the good is described in rather broad and generic terms but not in the second study where a more specific description of the good is used

using a discrete choice experiment to estimate health state utility values in this study we explored a novel application of the discrete choice experiment dce that resembles the time trade off tto task to estimate values on the health utility scale for the eq 5d the dce was tested in a survey alongside the tto in a sample of english speaking canadians recruited by a market research company the study found that the dce is able to derive logical and consistent values for health states valued on the full health dead scale the dce overcame some issues identified in the version of tto currently used to value eq 5d notably allowing for fewer data exclusions and incorporating values considered worse than dead without introducing a separate valuation procedure this has important implications for providing robust values that represent the preferences of all respondents

reconsidering the effect of market experience on the endowment effect simple exchange experiments have revealed that participants trade their endowment less frequently than standard demand theory would predict list 2003a finds that the most experienced dealers acting in a well functioning market are not subject to this exchange asymmetry suggesting that a significant amount of market experience is required to overcome it in order to understand this market experience eect we introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty both of which could lead to exchange asymmetry we conjecture that trade uncertainty is most important for exchange asymmetry to test this conjecture we design an experiment where the two treatments impact dierently on trade uncertainty while controlling for choice uncertainty supporting our conjecture we find that forcing subjects to give away their endowment in a series of exchanges eliminates exchange asymmetry in a subsequent test we discuss why markets might not provide sucient

pre play learning and the preference reversal phenomenon elicited preference rankings for two lotteries are typically inconsistent across choice and pricing tasks we test whether pre play learning makes preference rankings consistent pre play learning denotes ex ante lottery learning where subjects observe playing lotteries before making decisions we find that pre play learning makes the average selling prices for the p bet of subjects who choose the p bet higher than their average selling prices for the bet however pre play learning is not strong enough to equalize the rates of standard and non standard reversals although pre play learning reduces the rate of standard reversals

on the relation between option and stock prices a convex optimization approach the idea of investigating the relation of option and stock prices based just on the no arbitrage assumption but without assuming any model for the underlying price dynamics has a long history in the financial economics literature we introduce convex and in particular semidefinite optimization methods duality and complexity theory to shed new light on this relation for the single stock problem given moments of the prices of the underlying assets we show that we can find best possible bounds on option prices with general payoff functions efficiently either algorithmically solving a semidefinite optimization problem or in closed form conversely given observable option prices we provide best possible bounds on moments of the prices of the underlying assets as well as on the prices of other options on the same asset by solving linear optimization problems for options that are affected by multiple stocks either directly the payoff of the option depends on multiple stocks or indirectly we have information on correlations between stock prices we find nonoptimal bounds using convex optimization methods however we show that it is np hard to find best possible bounds in multiple dimensions we extend our results to incorporate transactions costs

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

how much is too much an investigation of the effect of the number of choice sets context dependence and the choice of bid vectors in choice experiments in a split sample design we examine how the number of choice sets design of the first choice set context dependence and the choice of attribute levels in the cost attribute affect the precision in the elicited preferences in otherwise completely identical choice experiment surveys these issues are investigated for swedish households marginal willingness to pay to reduce power outages our results indicate that neither the number of choice sets nor the design of the first choice set has a significant impact on estimated marginal willingness to pay while the effect was significant for the additive scaling of the cost vector at the end of the article we discuss the implications of our results on future developments and applications of choice experiments

modelling heterogeneity in response behaviour towards a sequence of discrete choice questions a probabilistic decision process model there is a growing body of evidence in the non market valuation literature suggesting that responses to a sequence of discrete choice questions tend to violate the assumptions typically made by analysts regarding independence of responses and stability of preferences decision processes or heuristics such as value learning and strategic misrepresentation have been offered as explanations for these results while a few studies have tested these heuristics as competing hypotheses none has investigated the possibility that each explains the response behaviour of a subgroup of the population in this paper we make a contribution towards addressing this research gap by presenting a probabilistic decision process model designed to estimate the proportion of respondents employing defined heuristics we demonstrate the model on binary and multinomial choice data sources and find three distinct types of response behaviour the results suggest that accounting for heterogeneity in response behaviour may be a better way forward than attempting to identify a single heuristic to explain the behaviour of all respondents

designing testing and implementing a trial dryland salinity credit trade scheme this article describes implementation and outcomes of a credit trading trial focussed on dryland salinity in victoria australia in lieu of extant specified property rights participants were invited to agree to obligations to provide groundwater recharge credits in exchange for pecuniary compensation participants were able to meet their obligations to supply groundwater recharge credits through land management actions resulting in monitored outcomes consistent with contractual obligations to reduce recharge alternatively those in deficit were provided the option to obtain sufficient credits through market exchange surplus transferable recharge credits were produced by those participants who exceeded their own contractual obligations through improved land management the paper describes the process of contract design and implementation the trial involved a design and testing phase and an on ground implementation phase we describe composite methodologies deployed in the design and testing of alternative policy instruments and institutional arrangements conducted prior to implementation these involved community consultation an attitudinal and behavioural survey experimental economics and the development of a transparent and credible monitoring protocol the conclusions drawn as a result of this analysis provided an empirical basis to implement the on ground trial phase results of on ground implementation are described finally the methods and results of a benefit cost analysis bca of the on ground trial implementation are outlined the bca accounted for salinity damage reduction forgone river flow carbon sequestration production benefits and costs the result of bca was an estimated net benefit

value learning and the willingness to accept willingness to pay disparity the assumption that individual preferences are rational and consistent with standard economic theory is often appropriate but may be optimistic if consumers are uncertain about either their preferences or how the market operates both sources of uncertainty may present themselves in lab experiments exploring the well known disparity between individuals willingness to accept and willingness to pay this paper explores the role of value uncertainty in the observed disparity and finds that providing subjects with a value learning opportunity can reduce the value disparity to insignificance

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information an experimental evaluation exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant the goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal we study a two tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments in the experiments the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end consumer demand than the human supplier the supplier offers either a quantity discount contract with two or three price blocks or a price only contract contracts that are commonplace in practice yet different in complexity results show that contrary to theoretical predictions quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier s profits we also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts these observations can be described with three decision biases the probabilistic choice bias the reinforcement bias and the memory bias and can be modeled using the experience weighted attraction learning model our results demonstrate that simpler contracts such as a price only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations and supply chain management

towards a fair constructive and consistent criticism of all valuation languages comment on kallis et al 2013 we provide critical notes to the paper by kallis et al 2013 on monetary valuation we evaluate the four criteria they propose for assessing valuation studies we argue that no clear distinction is made between monetary valuation and pricing instruments the selected criteria are more relevant to assessing policy than monetary valuation the examples provided are not representative of the diversity of valuation studies encountered in the literature moreover no clear examples are provided of where valuation and associated cost benefit analysis of environmental policy go wrong we plea for a more fair constructive and consistent criticism of all valuation languages and offer relevant issues for consideration

market experience eliminates some anomalies and creates new ones we report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals we investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions a tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes we find little support for the former but strong support for the latter also whilst just enough market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly therefore although market experience shapes behaviour in our experiments it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory

price information and bidding behavior in repeated second price auctions examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second price auction markets with repeated trials we observe that i posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder ii posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods and iii anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials the results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism

choice certainty and consistency in repeated choice experiments the main objective of this study is to examine how repeated choice affects preference learning in stated preference experiments we test different hypotheses related to preference learning by analyzing response patterns and asking respondents in a choice experiment to report their experienced certainty when going through the choice tasks in a split sample test we show that follow up choice certainty questions are procedural invariant the self reported certainty results indicate that learning occurs but econometric testing procedures do not identify any significant impact of learning effects on parameter estimates or variance across choice tasks additional tests of choice consistency suggest that preferences in the choice experiment are stable and coherent

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

technical note robust newsvendor competition under asymmetric information we generalize analysis of competition among newsvendors to a setting in which competitors possess asymmetric information about future demand realizations and this information is limited to knowledge of the support of demand distribution in such a setting traditional expectation based optimization criteria are not adequate and therefore we focus on the alternative criterion used in the robust optimization literature the absolute regret minimization we show existence and derive closed form expressions for the robust optimization nash equilibrium solution for a game with an arbitrary number of players this solution allows us to gain insight into the nature of robust asymmetric newsvendor competition we show that the competitive solution in the presence of information asymmetry is an intuitive extension of the robust solution for the monopolistic newsvendor problem which allows us to distill the impact of both competition and information asymmetry in addition we show that contrary to the intuition a competing newsvendor does not necessarily benefit from having better information about its own demand distribution than its competitor has

continuous attribute values in a simulation environment offshore energy production and mid atlantic beach visitation abstract there is a large and growing offshore energy distance siting disamenity literature we offer a new approach to understanding public preferences for renewable wind turbine and conventional oil platform siting which uses an original stated preference response choice in the form of distance rather than referendum style willingness to pay distance preference data are collected from beach visitors and analyzed in part by adapting a duration model where time is modeled as distance at which utility indifference occurs the results show that the public consists of two highly contrasting groups one large group that views wind turbines as a substantial disamenity while another large group views them as an amenity when pooled these groups tend to wash out their impacts revealing that average preference results suggesting that wind turbines might not be amenities or disamenities however when viewed in this new model one finds that policy is much more complicated and no single siting strategy far or close will satisfy the public because the two main groups have largely irreconcilable preferences

a calibrated auction conjoint valuation method valuing pork and eggs produced under differing animal welfare conditions this paper develops a valuation method which generates consistent and systematic estimates of people s preferences for complex multi attribute goods by inextricably linking auction bids with conjoint ratings the advantage of the valuation approach is that it permits the estimation of people s values for many potential goods allows one to decompose people s values for a good into its sub components and permits the study of preference heterogeneity without distributional assumptions we apply the method to an important and increasingly controversial topic animal welfare the method is used to determine people s preferences for eggs and pork produced from different production systems data from experiments conducted in three diverse u s locations chicago il dallas tx and wilmington nc indicates that people are on average willing to pay 0 95 more for a dozen eggs raised in an aviary pasture system vs a cage system and are willing to pay 2 02 more for two pounds of pork chops raised in a pasture system as opposed to a crate system

a general equilibrium model for industries with price and service competition this paper develops a stochastic general equilibrium inventory model for an oligopoly in which all inventory constraint parameters are endogenously determined we propose several systems of demand processes whose distributions are functions of all retailers prices and all retailers service levels we proceed with the investigation of the equilibrium behavior of infinite horizon models for industries facing this type of generalized competition under demand uncertainty we systematically consider the following three competition scenarios 1 price competition only here we assume that the firms service levels are exogenously chosen but characterize how the price and inventory strategy equilibrium vary with the chosen service levels 2 simultaneous price and service level competition here each of the firms simultaneously chooses a service level and a combined price and inventory strategy 3 two stage competition the firms make their competitive choices sequentially in a first stage all firms simultaneously choose a service level in a second stage the firms simultaneously choose a combined pricing and inventory strategy with full knowledge of the service levels selected by all competitors we show that in all of the above settings a nash equilibrium of infinite horizon stationary strategies exists and that it is of a simple structure provided a nash equilibrium exists in a so called reduced game we pay particular attention to the question of whether a firm can choose its service level on the basis of its own input characteristics i e its cost parameters and demand function only we also investigate under which of the demand models a firm under simultaneous competition responds to a change in the exogenously specified characteristics of the various competitors by either i adjusting its service level and price in the same direction thereby compensating for price increases decreases by offering improved inferior service or ii adjusting them in opposite directions thereby simultaneously offering better or worse prices and service

learning and fatigue effects revisited investigating the effects of accounting for unobservable preference and scale heterogeneity using multiple choice tasks per respondent in discrete choice experiment studies increases the amount of available information however respondents learning and fatigue may lead to changes in observed utility function preference taste parameters as well as the variance in its error term scale they need to be controlled to avoid potential bias a sizable body of empirical research offers mixed evidence in terms of whether these ordering effects are observed we point to a significant component in explaining these differences we show how accounting for unobservable preference and scale heterogeneity can influence the magnitude of observed ordering effects

inventory competition under dynamic consumer choice we analyze a model of inventory competition among n firms that provide competing substitutable goods each firm chooses initial inventory levels for their good in a single period newsboy like inventory model customers choose dynamically based on current availability so the inventory levels at one firm affect the demand of all competingfirms this creates a strategic interaction amongthe firms inventory decisions our work extends earlier work on variations of this problem by karjalainen 1992 lippman and mccardle 1997 and parlar 1988 specifically we model demand in a more realistic way as a stochastic sequence of heterogeneous consumers who choose dynamically from amongthe available goods or choose not to purchase based on a utility maximization criterion we also use a sample path analysis so minimal assumptions are imposed on this demand process we characterize the nash equilibrium of the resulting stocking game and prove it is unique in the symmetric case we show there is a bias toward overstocking caused by competition specifically reducing the quantity stocked at any equilibrium of the game increases total system profits and at any joint optimal set of stocking levels each firm has an individual incentive to increase its own stock for the symmetric case we show that as the number of competing firms increases the overstockingbecomes so severe that total system and individual firm profits approach zero finally we propose a stochastic gradient algorithm for computing equilibria and provide several numerical examples

stability of willingness to pay for coastal management a choice experiment across three time periods a key assumption of stated preference methods is that individuals have well formed preferences that are robust over time both the discovered and constructed preference perspectives imply this is not necessarily the case there can be a large situational component to expressed preferences that add to the uncertainty of sampling error most non market valuation studies only collect data from one point in time so the degree of temporal variability cannot be tested test retest studies that provide data from two points in time generally find significant differences in preference structure and willingness to pay wtp in this study we test stability of wtp for beach erosion management using a fully ranked discrete choice experiment survey with not one but two retests over a six month period we find that stability does not improve with the additional repetition as the preference discovery hypothesis implies it might wtp confidence intervals overlap but the models are significantly different at each point in time even after allowing for variation in choice error either the survey did not facilitate sufficient preference discovery or preferences were reconstructed however respondents with high scores of self reported certainty in their choices in the first survey had significantly more stable wtp estimates

learning design contingent valuation ldcv noaa guidelines preference learning and coherent arbitrariness we extend the contingent valuation cv method to test three differing conceptions of individuals preferences as either i a priori well formed or readily divined and revealed through a single dichotomous choice question as per the noaa cv guidelines k arrow r solow p r portney e e leamer r radner h schuman report of the noaa panel on contingent valuation fed reg 58 1993 4601 4614 ii learned or discovered through a process of repetition and experience j a list does market experience eliminate market anomalies q j econ 2003 41 72 c r plott rational individual behaviour in markets and social choice processes the discovered preference hypothesis in k arrow e colombatto m perleman c schmidt eds rational foundations of economic behaviour macmillan london st martin s new york 1996 pp 225 250 iii internally coherent but strongly influenced by some initial arbitrary anchor d ariely g loewenstein d prelec coherent arbitrariness stable demand curves without stable preferences q j econ 118 1 2003 73 105 findings reject both the first and last of these conceptions in favour of a model in which preferences converge towards standard expectations through a process of repetition and learning in doing so we show that such a learning design cv method overturns the stylised facts of bias and anchoring within the double bound dichotomous choice elicitation format

preferences with and without prices does the price attribute affect behavior in stated preference surveys the experimental as well as the non market valuation literature include several examples of how an introduced price can affect behavior in otherwise not expected ways it has become standard to include a price vector as an attribute in choice experiments something that enables us to estimate a marginal willingness to pay for other attributes we test the impact on preferences by an inclusion of a price in a choice experiment preferences are affected as might be expected however also the relative ranking of individual attributes is affected

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

willingness to pay and compensation demanded experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value aside from possible income effects measures of the maximum amounts people will pay to avoid a loss and the minimum compensation necessary for them to accept it are generally assumed to be equivalent unexpectedly wide variations between these sums however have been noted in survey responses to hypothetical options this paper reports the results of a series of experiments that confronted people with actual money payments and cash compensations the results indicate that the compensation measure of value seems to exceed significantly the willingness to pay measure which would appear to call into some question various rules of entitlement damage assessments and interpretations of indifference curves