tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

is there a leviathan in your neighborhood this paper measures effects of decentralization in local government hierarchies on local public sector size this sector shrinks if decentralization encourages competition among governments it expands if decentralization sacrifices scale economies in a sample of 3 022 counties larger county governments reduce competition and increase aggregate local public sector size relative to aggregate county income more cities and towns increase competition and reduce its size more special and school districts sacrifice scale economies and increase it two recent articles have attempted to identify the effects of decentralization in state and local government on the size of the state and local public sector wallace oates 1985 finds no important effects michael nelson 1987 finds modest evidence that increased competition among government units reduces the size of the public sector this article demonstrates that the effects of decentralization are important and complex decentralization which encourages competition reduces the size of the local public sector decentralization which discourages scale economies increases it

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

trade competition and domestic pollution a panel study 1980 2003 this research note examines whether trade competition abets regula tory races in the environmental area to analyze trade competition we develop a new measure structural equivalence which assesses competitive threats that a country faces from other countries whose firms export the same products to the same destination countries employing this new measure we analyze air pollution intensity sulfur diox ide or so2 and water pollution intensity biochemical oxygen demand or bod for a panel of 140 countries for the time period 1980 2003 we find that trade competi tion is a significant predictor of water pollution intensity among structurally equiva lent countries we then test separately whether trade competition abets upward and downward regulatory races we find that in the case of water pollution countries respond symmetrically to downward and upward races that is they follow their struc turally equivalent competitor countries both when they ratchet down their regula tions and when they ratchet up regulations in the case of air pollution however countries are responsive to downward policy changes only in competitor countries

fractionalization and the size of government i study the effect of voters with a group based social conscience voters care more about the well being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population within a model of political tax determination both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution inequality between groups has the opposite effect these results hold even if a poor group forms a majority using a panel constructed from us micro data i find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution

diffusion and the international context of democratization democracy does not evolve sui generis the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions suggests that international factors play a prominent role in forg ing democracies as well as influencing their durability we argue that democracy often comes about as a result of changes in the relative power of important actors and groups as well as their evaluations of particular institutions both of which are often influenced by forces outside the country in question the scope and extent of con nections with other democratic countries in a region can strengthen support for dem ocratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies results from a transition model demonstrate that international factors can exert a strong influence on the prospects for transitions to democracy and the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions cannot adequately be explained by the hypothesized domestic social requisites of individual countries

dependency revisited international markets business cycles and social spending in the developing world while increased exposure to the global economy is associated with increased welfare effort in the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd the opposite holds in the developing world these differences are typically explained with reference to domestic politics tradables unions and the like in the developing world are assumed to have less power or interests divergent to those in the oecd interests that militate against social spending i claim that such arguments can be complemented with a recognition that developed and developing nations have distinct patterns of integration into global markets while income shocks associated with international markets are quite modest in the oecd they are profound in developing nations in the oecd governments can respond to those shocks by borrowing on capital markets and spending countercyclically on social programs no such opportunity exists for most governments in the developing world most of which have limited access to capital markets in tough times more significant incentives to balance budgets and as a result cut social spending at the times it is most needed thus while internationally inspired volatility and income shocks seem not to threaten the underpinnings of the welfare state in rich nations it undercuts the capacity of governments in the developing world to smooth consumption and particularly consumption by the poor across the business cycle the author would like to thank steph haggard kristin bakke wongi choe tim jones and seminar participants at duke university penn state university washington university mit and the university of new mexico for their helpful comments nancy brune mark hallerberg and rolf strauch and nita rudra were very generous in providing their capital account oecd fiscal and potential labor power data respectively

does centralization increase the size of government abstract are fiscal programs larger or smaller if they are run centrally rather than locally in a prospective federation we abstract completely from well understood economic issues and focus instead on the political effects of centralization for fiscal programs with benefits broadly spread in the population such as redistributive transfer schemes social insurance and general government consumption centralization changes the coalition of voters who favor a large program in a direction that depends on the nature of the redistributive instrument for fiscal programs with localized benefits such as provision of local public goods centralization creates opportunities for rent seeking which increases the size of government

the flypaper effect what happens to a state s spending when it receives an unconditional grant from the federal government the standard theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in spending will be the same as that generated by an equivalent increase in local incomes or roughly 5 10 percent for most states in contrast numerous empirical analyses have found that spending increases by much more with some estimates near 100 percent this result is known as the flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where it hits the authors review this evidence as well as other studies that find similar behavior in firms

fiscal decentralization and government size numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors this paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth fiscal decentralization the results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy

the international diffusion of public sector downsizing network emulation and theory driven learning we examine change in the size of the public sector between 1980 and 1997 across twenty six organization for economic cooperation and development oecd member nations with particular attention to diffusion dynamics general method of moments gmm analyses demonstrate imitation of shifts in government employment within the united states and mutual influence among nations that are geographically proximate and that trade extensively disaggregated analyses show that downsizing is contagious while upsizing is not proximate downsizers but not upsizers are imitated and states act on evidence that downsizing is economically beneficial while ignoring evidence that it is harmful we argue that these asymme tries in emulation and learning are a product of the dominance of neoliberal and managerialist discourses that legitimate and theorize shrinking the public sector the twentieth century as a whole and particularly the three decades after world war ii witnessed steady growth in government size and responsibility states devel oped extensive social safety nets actively managed aggregate demand and regu lated a widening swath of economic and social life this trajectory of expansion was linked to powerful forces of economic development and demographic change and anchored in a broad political consensus 1 the 1980s and 1990s saw a sea change in the rate of public sector growth brit ish prime minister margaret thatcher and u s president ronald reagan led the way with privatization outsourcing and load shedding of public responsibilities but the shift in direction was not limited to radicals on the right country reports

the rebirth of the liberal creed paths to neoliberalism in four countries1 since the 1970s market based economic policies have been institutionalized as a nearly global policy paradigm using four national case studies this article shows that economic and financial globalization played a critical role in fostering the transition to neoliberal policies but that local institutional conditions were decisive in shaping the nature and meaning of the shift while the analysis finds that developing countries appear more dependent upon direct external pressures than developed ones it also shows that institutionalized patterns of state society relations determined the way in which neoliberal transitions were carried out somewhat irrespectively of the level of economic development in chile and britain poorly mediated distributional conflict created the ideological conditions for a monetarist revolution in mexico and france on the other hand neoliberalism was understood mainly as a necessary step to adapt the country to the international economy

on government centralization and fiscal referendums abstract several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum this outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy it may also be caused by citizens fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature in this paper we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision making in the unique institutional setting of switzerland using a panel of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

decentralized taxation and the size of government evidence from swiss state and local governments according to the leviathan model fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue maximizing government the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states however empirical results concerning the leviathan hypothesis are mixed this study uses a state and local level panel data set of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub national swiss governments it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size the results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for swiss cantons the overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges thus revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges

remodeling the competition for capital how domestic politics erases the race to the bottom this paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital using the analogy of a tournament as a substitute for the race to the bottom model our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms while countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility we examine the capital tax policies in oecd countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform we define two potential sources of political costs of reform transaction costs due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process and constituency costs due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms hat are the policy consequences of the elimination of various barriers to international capital and labor mobility robert frost in mending wall instructed that good fences make good neighbors scholars have increasingly expressed this sentiment s converse i e the pessimistic viewpoint that as the mobility of factors of production increases international competition assumes a beggar thy neighbor character when fences separate countries and make it difficult for factors of production to move from country to country governments can operate essentially as monopolistic suppliers of services governments can extract a price from the owners of productive resources in the form of taxes or can place regulatory restrictions on production without fear that factors of production will emigrate when the fences fall and governments must compete with each other for the same resources a state s or country s ability to tax or regulate diminishes in the extreme countries lose sovereignty over domestic policymaking e g andrews 1994 and lee and mckenzie 1989 the model that most scholars employ implicitly or explicitly to understand international or interstate competition is known commonly by its central prediction the race to the bottom e g oates 1972

inequality in the world polity the structure of international organization recent research reveals strong effects of involvement in international organizations on state policies but much of this research downplays inequality in world political participation and there is only a limited understanding of what explains world polity ties using data on memberships in intergovernmental and international non governmental organizations igos and ingos for 1960 through 2000 this study analyzes inequality in the world polity igo ties are fairly evenly distributed but the level of inequality in ingo ties is as high as the level of world income inequality since 1960 inequality in ties to igos decreased sharply but inequality in ties to ingos remained more stable a conflict centered model of the world polity is developed here that explains world political participation as a function of material and symbolic conflict rich core western states and societies have significantly more ties to the world polity than do others powerful states dominate igos less now than they did in 1960 but rich core western societies have grown more dominant in the ingo field

globalization and the changing logic of collective action globalization transforms collective action in domestic and international politics as the scale of markets widens and as economic organization becomes more complex the institutional scale of political structures can become insufficient for the provision of an appropriate range of public goods a process of this sort occurred prior to the emergence of the modern nation state which itself constituted a paradigmatic response to this predicament today however a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state based collective action overlapping playing fields are developing made up of increasingly heterogeneous transnational local and intermediate arenas the residual state retains great cultural force and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried nevertheless the state s effectiveness as a civil association has eroded significantly and this may lead to a crisis of legitimacy

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

some evidence on the effect of the separation of spending and taxing decisions it is often argued that separation of public spending and taxing decisions engenders in the voter overoptimistic hopes that someone else will bear the cost of public services thereby inducing an increase in the size of government but are perceived tax prices systematically and persistently reduced by separation although in stock markets all agents expectations may be unbiased they may or may not be unbiased in political markets this paper analyzes the separation created in federal states when the central government finances local expenditures evidence from a dynamic decisive voter model is presented that indicates that the separation introduced by federal grants to canadian provinces did in fact reduce the perceived tax price of provincial public services and raise provincial expenditures the results suggest also that the effect of separation diminished over time

the selection principle and market failure in systems competition abstract if governments stepped in where markets failed reintroducing markets through the backdoor of systems competition will again result in market failure three models are presented which illustrate this wisdom the first is concerned with congestion prone public goods and shows that fiscal competition may be ruinous for the governments the second considers the insurance function of redistributive taxation and shows that systems competition may suffer from adverse selection the third studies the role of quality regulation and shows that systems competition may be a competition of laxity resulting in inefficiently low quality standards

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

how does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate national and subnational government size abstract beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate government size national and subnational combined this paper makes the first attempt to examine how different fiscal decentralization measures affect the sizes of national and subnational state and local combined governments an econometric analysis using panel data from 32 industrial and developing countries 1980 1994 finds that 1 expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national governments larger subnational governments and larger aggregate governments 2 revenue decentralization increases subnational governments by less than it reduces national governments hence leads to smaller aggregate governments and 3 vertical imbalance tends to increase the sizes of subnational national and aggregate governments

federalism and the growth of government revisited recent research in public economics has been testing for a relationship in federal states between the decentralization of governments and the total and individual size of government shares in gnp according to one view economic theory offers no unambiguous empirical predictions provided there is a competitive political environment at each government level the rivalry between political parties will result in an outcome that conforms approximately to the preferences of the citizens as interpreted in the conventional median voter model under this scenario it is not certain what differences might be caused by more decentralization oates 1985 to determine any difference we would have to possess considerable knowledge about the distribution of tastes and the location of the populace it has been hypothesized nevertheless that increased decentralization could result in a higher level of government expenditure quoting the economic historian john wallis oates 1985 749 suggests that since individuals have more control over public decisions at the local than at the state or national level they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and responsibility where these activities are carried out at more localizedlevels of government

patent pools and cross licensing in the shadow of patent litigation this paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable it analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives it shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges this result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other s patents if litigation costs are not too large

searching for leviathan comment and extension in a recent article wallace oates 1985 investigated whether fiscal decentralization tended to act as a constraining influence on the overall size of the public sector this hypothesis has been advanced by several alternative theories of government behavior including richard musgrave s 1959 model of how the distribution function of government would be carried out by subnational governments geoffrey brennan and james buchanan s 1980 leviathan model and the more traditional public choice model for example walter hettich and stanley winer 1984 all contend that the decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources and thereby constrains taxing power oates analyzed two data sets one pertaining to the state and local sector in the united states and the other consisting of a sample of 43 countries and found little empirical support for the decentralization hypothesis the purpose of this paper is to reconsider his analysis in the case of state and local governments specifically it will be argued that oates s measures of decentralization may be inappropriate to test the hypothesis furthermore by taking into account the structure or composition of local governmental jurisdictions within a state empirical support of the decentralization hypothesis can be marshaled for general purpose local governments such as counties and municipalities i measuring fiscal decentralization among the states

the international labor organization and the welfare state institutional effects on national welfare spending 1960 80 national welfare programs are importantly affected by models of welfare activity institutionalized at the global level this article examines the impact of the welfare regime advocated by and within the international labor organization ilo countries that have recently ratified ilo conventions related to welfare show increased growth in spending net of national characteristics subanalyses show that the effects of ilo ratification are strong in the industrialized capitalist democracies particularly where prior welfare spending is low and the working class has a weakly institutionalized role in policymaking ilo ratification seems disconnected from spending in the less developed countries legislative case studies point to similar patterns these findings suggest that international norms contribute to policy where they offer compelling models that powerful actors can use to legitimate policy innovation

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

fragmentation and the growth of local government an assumption of the post world war ii metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient increasing the cost and size of government more recently polycentrists have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources in this article i explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels

using geographic information systems to study interstate competition scholars have proposed two distinct explanations for why policies diffuse across american states 1 policymakers learn by observing the experiences of nearby states and 2 states seek a competitive economic advantage over other states the most common empirical approach for studying interstate influence is modeling an indicator of a state s policy choice as a function of its neighbors policies with each neighbor weighted equally this can appropriately specify one form of learning model but it does not adequately test for interstate competition when a policy diffuses due to competition states responses to other states vary depending on the size and location of specific populations we illustrate with two substantive applications how geographic information systems gis can be used to test for interstate competition we find that lottery adoptions diffuse due to competition rather than to learning but find no evidence of competition in state choices about welfare benefits our empirical approach can also be applied to competition among nations and local jurisdictions

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

public information and performance the role of spatial dependence in the worldwide governance indicators among african countries summary the worldwide governance indicators wgi provide transparent and comparable country statistics for different dimensions of governance linked to under development yet does the public availability of governance data actually enhance performance if investors donor agencies and citizens are made aware of relative governance performance competition for inward investment such as fdi and oda and domestic legitimacy become plausible mechanisms for diffusion of good governance we test whether such mechanisms operate using the wgi for africa and find evidence for spatial diffusion of democracy rule of law and corruption control there is no evidence for diffusion of regulatory quality and government effectiveness

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

the globalization of liberalization policy diffusion in the international political economy one of the most important developments over the past three decades has been the spread of liberal economic ideas and policies throughout the world these policies have affected the lives of millions of people yet our most sophisticated political economy models do not adequately capture influences on these policy choices evidence suggests that the adoption of liberal economic practices is highly clustered both temporally and spatially we hypothesize that this clustering might be due to processes of policy diffusion we think of diffusion as resulting from one of two broad sets of forces one in which mounting adoptions of a policy alter the benefits of adopting for others and another in which adoptions provide policy relevant information about the benefits of adopting we develop arguments within these broad classes of mechanisms construct appropriate measures of the relevant concepts and test their effects on liberalization and restriction of the current account the capital account and the exchange rate regime our findings suggest that domestic models of foreign economic policy making are insufficient the evidence shows that policy transitions are influenced by international economic competition as well as the policies of a country s sociocultural peers we interpret the latter influence as a form of channeled learning reflecting governments search for appropriate models for economic policy

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

room to move international financial markets and national welfare states a central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes to what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices i evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of interest rates this evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators including inflation rates and government deficit gdp ratios but not with micropolicy indicators such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories in these areas governments retain policymaking autonomy i conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research

the political economy of direct legislation direct democracy and local decision making local fiscal referenda the dampening effect on taxes and spending local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and given the decentralization trend in oecd nations this is likely to increase how should this spending be governed this article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision making at the state and local level to support this we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes the basic argument concerns voter control under representative democracy citizens only have direct control at election time with referenda and initiatives citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens preferences as a result fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences we empirically test this on swiss data since switzerland provides a natural laboratory for local governance the governance structures of swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels specifically we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 swiss cantons and 1990 data on 134 local communities it is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue and at the local level also on public debt combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens lars p feld and gebhard kirchgassner

globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democracies this article contributes to the growing literature on the role that domestic political institutions play in mediating globalization pressures by arguing that the capital tax constraints arising from international economic integration are the most severe for countries with majoritarian political institutions in doing so the author solves a tax puzzle that challenges conventional thinking about how institutions condition the relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics he presents a formal game theoretic model to sharpen the basic logic of his argument and then tests some of the model s predictions empirically using both quantitative and qualitative evidence

centralization and government competition this paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal centralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmentation on the size of public sector in the united states the empirical findings at the national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller government the findings at the state and local levels however show no empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

environmental policy convergence the impact of international harmonization transnational communication and regulatory competition in recent years there is growing interest in the study of cross national policy convergence yet we still have a limited understanding of the phenomenon do we observe convergence of policies at all under which conditions can we expect that domestic policies converge or rather develop further apart in this article we address this research deficit from a theoretical perspective we concentrate on the explanatory power of three factors namely international harmonization transnational communication and regulatory competition in empirical terms we analyze if and to what extent we can observe convergence of environmental policies across twenty four industrialized countries between 1970 and 2000 we find an impressive degree of environmental policy convergence between the countries under investigation this development is mainly caused by international harmonization and to a considerable degree also by transnational communication whereas regulatory competition does not seem to play a role

globalization domestic politics and social spending in latin america a time series cross section analysis 1973 97 this study examines the effects of globalization democratization and partisanship on social spending in fourteen latin american countries from 1973 to 1997 using a pooled time series error correction model the authors examine three sets of issues first following debates in the literature on oecd countries they want to know whether social spending has been encouraged or constrained by integration into global markets within this context they examine the extent to which such outcomes might be influenced by two additional sets of domestic political and institutional factors discussed in work on developed countries the electoral pressures of democratic institutions and whether or not popularly based governments are in power the authors show that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital markets this is the strongest and most robust finding in the study neither democratic nor popularly based governments consistently affect overall social spending the authors then disaggregate spending into social security transfers and expenditures on health and education they find that popularly based governments tend to protect social security transfers which tend to flow disproportionately to their unionized constituencies but they have a negative impact on health and education spending conversely a shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending which reaches a larger segment of the population the authors conclude by emphasizing the contrasting political logics of the different types of social spending

a theory of user fee competition we develop a two region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees we show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient if the regional spillover goods are substitutes user fees tend to be inefficiently low whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements

fiscal decentralization and government size an extension this paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants grants it is argued serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self finance their expenditures the results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector the results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling

welfare state retrenchment revisited entitlement cuts public sector restructuring and inegalitarian trends in advanced capitalist societies in recent years it has become commonplace for comparativists to emphasize the resilience of welfare states in advanced capitalist societies and the failure of neoliberal efforts to dismantle the welfare state challenging some tenets of the resilience thesis this article seeks to broaden the discussion of welfare state retrenchment the authors argue that a sharp deceleration of social spending has occurred in most oecd countries since 1980 that welfare states have failed to offset the rise of market generated inequality and insecurity and that welfare programs have become less universalistic they stress the distributive and political consequences of market oriented reforms of the public sector

the intergovernmental network of world trade igo connectedness governance and embeddedness membership in certain intergovernmental organizations igos such as the world trade organization has long been argued to stimulate trade yet evidence linking igos to trade is mixed the authors argue that identifying the influence of igos requires attention not only to the institutions igos enact but also to the network through which they enact them this approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58 with every doubling of the strength of igo connection between the countries they also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic igos but also through igos that were formed for social and cultural purposes and that connections through igos that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist igos

globalization and the decline of the welfare state in less developed countries why have trends in government welfare spending in developing countries diverged from those in developed countries i address this question by investigating the effects of capital and trade flows on government welfare spending in fifty three developing countries using an original measure of labor power in developing countries i test the links between international markets labor s political strength and the welfare state i argue that labor s collective action problems caused by large populations of low skilled and surplus workers offset labor s potential political gains from globalization i show that when the proportion of low skilled workers in a nation is high globalization will lead to a decline in welfare spending most significantly the results suggest that in nations where labor market institutions are not yet well developed government social welfare spending is constrained by international market forces

global networks and domestic policy convergence a network explanation of policy changes national economies are embedded in complex networks such as trade capital flows and intergovernmental organizations igo s these globalization forces impose differential impacts on national economies depending on a country s network positions this article addresses the policy convergence divergence debate by focusing on how networks at the international level affect domestic fiscal monetary and regulatory policies the author presents two hypotheses first similarity in network positions induces convergence in domestic economic policies as a result of peer competitive pressure second proximity in network positions facilitates policy learning and emulation which result in policy convergence the empirical analysis applies a latent space model for relational dyadic data and indicates that position similarity in the network of exports induces convergence in fiscal and regulatory policies position similarity in the network of transnational portfolio investments induces convergence in fiscal policies and position proximity in igo networks is consistently associated with policy convergence in fiscal monetary and regulatory policies

globalization taxation and burden shifting in latin america most researchers interested in the relationship between global markets and public policy focus on advanced industrial democracies in contrast we examine competing hypotheses as to globalization s effect on governments by expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing nations more specifically we investigate the relationship between international market integration and the evolving burden of taxation on capital as well as the subsequent response of markets to shifts in tax policy in latin america since the late 1970s consistent with our theoretical expectations we find that global market forces are more constraining vis a vis tax policy in latin america than in the world s wealthiest nations despite these market based pressures however national politics continue to influence tax policy in latin america in a manner consistent with findings on advanced industrial democracies as such developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate policy though within the context of a more strictly neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

the elusive flypaper effect abstract the flypaper effect is the common empirical result that lump sum intergovernmental grants stimulate more local government spending than increases in private income which are theoretically equivalent in this paper four of the best known explanations of the flypaper effect are tested using data from michigan school districts none of these explanations are confirmed by the data the cause of the flypaper effect is likely to be much more deeply rooted in the nature of local decision making than is currently recognized

the empirical analysis of fiscal illusion this paper examines the empirical analysis of the five main hypotheses subsumed under the generic term fiscal illusion after placing these hypotheses within a common theoretical framework the paper attempts to evaluate empirical research into the revenue complexity hypothesis the revenue elasticity hypothesis the flypaper effect renter illusion and debt illusion

international systems and domestic politics linking complex interactions with empirical models in international relations following older debates in international relations literature concerning the relative importance of domestic versus systemic factors newer debates emphasize interdependence among states and the complex interactions between systemic and domestic factors as globalization and democratization advance theories and empirical models of international politics have become more complicated we present a systematic theoretical categorization of relationships between domestic and systemic variables we use this categorization so that scholars can match their theory to the appropriate empirical model and assess the degree to which systemic factors affect their arguments we also present two advances at the frontier of these empirical models in one we combine hierarchical models of moderating relationships with spatial models of interdependence among units within a system in the other we provide a model for analyzing spatial interdependence that varies over time this enables us to examine how the level of interdependence among units has evolved we illustrate our categorization and new models by revisiting the recent international political economy ipe debate over the relationship between trade policy and regime type in developing countries

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

ex ante versus ex post equality of opportunity we study the difference between the ex post and ex ante perspectives in equality of opportunity we show that the well documented conflicts between compensation and reward are but an aspect of a broader conflict between ex ante and ex post perspectives the literature that takes the goal of providing equal opportunities as the guiding principle generally considers that this is implemented only when ex post all individuals with the same effort obtain equal success it is easy to believe that ex ante compensation is another natural embodiment of the same idea we show that this is not true