the informational role of stock and bond volume in a kyle 1985 model the sign of the correlation between a firm s debt and equity returns is the same as the sign of the cross market kyle s lambda the sign is positive negative if private information concerns the mean risk of the firm s assets we show empirically that information conveyed by order flows is primarily about asset means the cross market lambdas are quite large consequently the portions of bond and stock returns explained by order flows are highly correlated even though the order flows themselves are virtually uncorrelated

median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

option pricing with an illiquid underlying asset market abstract we examine how price impact in the underlying asset market affects the replication of a european contingent claim we obtain a generalized black scholes pricing pde and establish the existence and uniqueness of a classical solution to this pde unlike the case with transaction costs we prove that replication with price impact is always cheaper than superreplication compared to the black scholes case a trader generally buys more stock and borrows more shorts and lends more to replicate a call put furthermore price impact implies endogenous stochastic volatility and an out of money option has lower implied volatility than an in the money option this finding has important implications for empirical analysis on volatility smile

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

the many faces of information disclosure in this article we ask what kind of information and how much of it should firms voluntarily disclose three types of disclosures are considered one is information that complements the information available only to informed investors to be processed complementary information the second is information that is orthogonal to that which any investor can acquire and thus complements the information available to all investors preprocessed complementary information and the third is information that substitutes for the information of the informed investors in that it reveals to all what was previously known only by the informed substitute information our main results are as follows first in equilibrium all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information second in contrast to the existing literature complementary information disclosure by firms strengthens investors private incentives to acquire information substitute information disclosure weakens private information acquisition incentives third while complementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effect on financial innovation incentives substitute information disclosure weakens those incentives

digital contracts and price manipulation corporate insiders holding derivative contracts on their firm s stock have an incentive to engage in stock price manipulation i examine several derivative contracts susceptible to manipulation and the price impact of the insiders strategic behavior digital contracts the basic building blocks for valuing complex financial derivatives are vulnerable to manipulation the impact of the strategies from holding digital contracts is consistent with an implied volatility skew and volatility clustering even seemingly innocuous derivatives such as ordinary bull spreads generate these manipulation incentives this has strong implications for corporate policy since firms often use option spreads in their stock repurchase programs

financial innovation and information the role of derivatives when a market for information exists we study the effects of financial innovation in a model of endogenous information acquisition we determine the conditions under which the introduction of a derivative written on an existing stock increases or decreases the incentive to purchase information we show that financial innovation produces some effects which hold across informational structures and others which differ the former coincide with the few empirical results that are robust in the literature effects on prices risk premia and volatility while the latter coincide with the ones that differ experiment by experiment effects on volume correlation between volume and volatility and market informational efficiency copyright 2002 oxford university press

redistribution policy and the expansion of the public sector abstract during the first part of this century life cycle and insurance type considerations seem to have dominated redistribution policy in particular when we look at the consequences for the expansion of public spending by contrast during recent decades fragmented horizontal redistributions between various minority groups have probably been the most important mechanisms the self interest of different groups of the electorate seems to have provided the most powerful motive behind these various policies although welfare altruism and what in this paper are called considerations of consequential externalities have probably been important motives behind redistribution in favor of the poor

imperfect competition information heterogeneity and financial contagion this study examines how heterogeneity of private information may induce financial contagion using a model of multi asset trading in which the three main channels of contagion through financial linkages in the literature correlated information correlated liquidity and portfolio rebalancing are ruled out by construction i show that financial contagion can still be an equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneous fundamental information risk neutral speculators trade strategically across many assets to mask their information advantage about one asset asymmetric sharing of information among them prevents rational market makers from learning about their individual signals and trades with sufficient accuracy incorrect cross inference about terminal payoffs and contagion ensue when used to analyze the transmission of shocks across countries my model suggests that the process of generation and disclosure of information in emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financial contagion jel d82 g14 g15

the effect of derivative assets on information acquisition and price behavior in a rational expectations equilibrium this article shows that introducing derivative assets increases incentives to collect information about asset payoffs the increase in information collection makes the price of the underlying asset more informative and causes the expected price to increase extending the model to a dynamic setting with multiple risky assets we find the introducing derivative assets for one asset increases the expected prices of positively correlated assets and reduces price reaction to future earnings announcements these findings are consistent with the bulk of the empirical evidence on the relationship between the introduction of derivative assets and the behavior of asset prices article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

asymmetric information and options in an extension of the kyle 1985 model of continuous insider trading it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage even when an option would appear to be redundant its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic this eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option the change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

an empirical example of the condorcet paradox of voting in a large electorate social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon especially in large groups of decision makers however empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real world examples of such and none in large electorates this paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of danish voters preferred prime minister using pair wise comparisons this result is compared with those of a similar poll but by using different voting methods each resulting in different choices the example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions

cost disease versus leviathan explanations of rising government cost an empirical investigation in this paper we reexamine the apparently conflicting empirics of borcherding et al 1977 versus those of barry and lowery 1984 the latter designed to test the cost disease versus bureau voting power hypotheses on us citibase annual data between 1947 to 1979 was retested for the longer period available through 1989 second and more importantly we isolate and test for the presence of a second channel for the exercise of bureaucratic power that channel is the bureau s ability to use its information advantage to capture a portion of newly generated government rents through higher personal benefits such as higher salaries such an analysis following west 1991 requires first that those factors generating new rents for government actually result in successful bureaucratic rent seeking in the form of higher compensation levels in addition the analysis requires that these artificial increases in bureaucratic wages show up as significant determinants of the higher cost of providing government services incorporating a constructed kau rubin variable into the barry and lowery database is then shown to improve the predictive power of both the cost disease and bureaucratic power hypotheses for us annual data between 1948 and 1989

smart fund managers stupid money we develop a model of mutual fund manager investment decisions near the end of quarters we show that when investors reward better performing funds with higher cash flows near quarter ends a mutual fund manager has an incentive to distort new invest ment toward stocks in which his fund holds a large existing position the short term price impact of these trades increase the fund s reported returns higher returns are rewarded by greater subsequent fund inflows which in turn allow for more investment distortion the next quarter because the price impact of trades is short term each subsequent quar ter begins with a larger return deficit eventually the deficit cannot be overcome thus our model leads to the empirically observed short run persistence and long run rever sal in fund performance in doing so our model provides a consistent explanation of many other seemingly contradictory empirical features of mutual fund performance jel classification d82 g2 g14

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates although political scientists have in the last few decades learned much about the abstract properties of multicandidate electoral systems we have accumulated little theoretical knowledge on the ways in which strategic behavior of voters and candidates changes when we move from one voting system to another this essay has illustrated how the relative desirability of voting systems can change when the number of candidates usually considered fixed in such comparisons is taken as endogenous to the voting system in force at the time our main conclusion is therefore that the method of voting must be understood in relation to the total electoral system it is not enough to analyze properties of voting systems in the abstract but also in terms of the interactions that voting systems have with political groups and the constitutional setting

option volume and stock prices evidence on where informed traders trade this paper investigates the informational role of transactions volume in options markets we develop an asymmetric information model in which informed traders may trade in option or equity markets we show conditions under which informed traders trade options and we investigate the implications of this for the linkage between markets our model predicts an important informational role for the volume of particular types of option trades we empirically test our model s hypotheses with intraday option data our main empirical result is that negative and positive option volumes contain information about future stock prices the information content of trading activity is a subject of widespread interest if trades are correlated with private information then the outcome of the transaction process may portend future movements in price the extension of trading to different venues or to derivative instruments however means that this link between transactions and information need not be easily discernible if there are alternative markets in which informed traders can profit from their information then where informed traders choose to trade may have important implications not only for security p rice movements but for the behavior of related prices as well this suggests that transactions in derivative markets may be an important predictor of future security price movements in this paper we investigate the informational role of transactions volume in options markets for some readers this focus may seem puzzling an option is a derivative security so its price should be dictated unilaterally by the behavior of the stock price this unidirectional linkage is only true however in complete markets if information is impounded into prices by trading then the ability of informed traders to transact in options markets mearns

heterogeneous beliefs and the effect of replicatable options on asset prices we present two ways in which trading in a replicatable option can affect the price process of the underlying asset in the first situation trading an option that each investor views as pay off redundant breaks a non fully revealing equilibrium that exists when the option market is absent the second situation involves a market that is dynamically complete without options but in which introducing an option market allows self confirming conjectures of additional uncertainty about the future price of the underlying asset heterogeneous beliefs play important though different roles in both situations article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

imperfect competition in a multi security market with risk neutrality the central purpose of this paper is to develop a model of insider trading i e trading based on private information in the context of an imperfectly competitive multi security market with risk neutral agents imperfect competition allows us to consider strategic behavior and a multi security market lets us study the effect of a correlated environment on equilibrium we employ the informational assumption that market makers can observe all order flows and so portfolio diversification arises in this model for strategic reasons given correlated fundamentals market makers can potentially learn about every security from each order flow this causes even a risk neutral trader who does not face short selling restrictions to refrain from determining the demand for each security independently this contrasts with traditional multi asset models which focus on the incentive to reduce portfolio variance or the effect of short selling restrictions or budget constraints under imperfect competition correlation has two effects one ceteris paribus it allows the uninformed to learn from additional variables since each order flow could potentially have information about all payoffs on the other hand it creates an incentive for informed traders to restrict what others can learn from public information thus our analysis can be viewed as an application to the multi security heterogeneous information model in admati 1985 of the imperfectly competitive equilibrium concept which kyle 1985 first applied to the single security homogeneous information model of grossman and stiglitz 1980 our principal results include an explicit characterization of a linear equilibrium as a function of three general covariance matrices associated with payoffs noise trading and errors in private signals under general covariance structures we show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the relationship between the vector of prices and the vector of order flows is governed by a symmetric positive definite matrix the plan of the paper is as follows in section 2 we introduce our model we derive the equilibrium in section 3 and section 4 comments on the properties of the equilibrium the proofs of the results are in the appendix

illiquidity contagion and liquidity crashes liquidity providers often learn information about an asset from prices of other assets we show that this generates a self reinforcing positive relationship between price informativeness and liquidity this relationship causes liquidity spillovers and is a source of fragility a small drop in the liquidity of one asset can through a feedback loop result in a very large drop in market liquidity and price informativeness a liquidity crash this feedback loop provides a new explanation for comovements in liquidity and liquidity dry ups it also generates multiple equilibria

informed trading and portfolio returns we solve a multi period model of strategic trading with long lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in fundamental values market makers in each asset can only condition their price functions on trading in the that asset but not on trading in the other asset using daily non public data from the new york stock exchange we test the model s predictions on the lead lag relations of institutional order ows and returns within portfolios we flnd support for the model prediction of positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order ow positively predicts future returns and future informed order ow as the model predicts we flnd these relations strengthen for portfolios formed from assets with higher correlation of fundamental values

testing theories of real government size u s experience 1959 89 in a recent article west 17 argued that the existence of so many strands of analysis attempting to explain the growth of government calls ultimately for one consolidated or generalized theory accordingly he produced a model that integrated four such theories two on the cost side and two on the demand side the purpose of the present paper is to derive empirical measures of all four theories using u s data for the period 1959 1989 the presumption is that each one separately might contribute in its own way to a composite explanation of government growth and that what is currently most needed is a set of jointly determined empirical estimates showing relative importance while all our measures of government size consolidate federal state and local government expenditures two other measurement issues should be emphasized since they distinguish our work from other contributions to this literature the government component of our main dependent variable the real size of government is measured in two different ways the first uses the national accounts definition of government purchases which excludes transfer payments from the measure of size whereas the second includes final purchases plus net government transfer payments since we are interested in the effects of changes in the productivity of supplying government services the first of these definitions is expected to be more relevant and is so used as the basis of our empirical work however since there is a sense in which changes in the productivity of government may affect the output of transfers we also use the second definition to produce a more complete empirical exercise the other distinguishing feature of our analysis is that both definitions of government size are analyzed in real as distinct from the more usual nominal share of government in gross domestic product gdp this distinction becomes immediately more striking when it is pointed out that while most authors hitherto have attempted to explain the phenomenon of positive growth in the ratio of nominals over the past half century the ratio of reals has actually fallen for most of our

cross asset speculation in stock markets in practice heterogeneously informed speculators combine private information about multiple stocks with information in prices taking into account how their trades influence the inferences of other speculators via prices we show how this speculation causes prices to be more correlated than asset fundamentals raising price volatility the covariance structure of asset fundamentals drives that of prices while the covariance structure of liquidity trade drives that of order flows we characterize how speculator profits vary with the distributions of information and liquidity trade across assets and speculators and relate the cross asset factor structure of order flows to that of returns

continuous time methods in finance a review and an assessment i survey and assess the development of continuous time methods in finance during the last 30 years the subperiod 1969 to 1980 saw a dizzying pace of development with seminal ideas in derivatives securities pricing term structure theory asset pricing and optimal consumption and portfolio choices during the period 1981 to 1999 the theory has been extended and modified to better explain empirical regularities in various subfields of finance this latter subperiod has seen significant progress in econometric theory computational and estimation methods to test and implement continuous time models capital market frictions and bargaining issues are being increasingly incorporated in continuous time theory the roots of modern continuous time methods in finance can be traced back to the seminal contributions of merton 1969 1971 1973b in the late 1960s and early 1970s merton 1969 pioneered the use of continuous time modeling in financial economics by formulating the intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice problem of an investor in a stochastic dynamic programming setting merton 1973b also showed how such a framework can be used to develop equilibrium asset pricing implications thereby significantly extending the asset pricing theory to richer dynamic settings and expanding the scope of applications of continuous time methods to study problems in financial economics 1 within a span of about 30 years from the publication of merton s inf luential papers continuous time methods have become an integral part of financial economics indeed in certain core areas in finance such as e g asset pricing derivatives valuation term structure theory and portfolio selection continuoustime methods have proved to be the most attractive way to conduct research and gain economic intuition the continuous time approach in these areas has produced models with a rich variety of testable implications the econometric theory for testing continuous time models has made rapid strides in the last decade and has thus kept pace with the impressive progress on the theoretical front one hopes that the actual empirical investigations and estimation using the new procedures will follow suit soon

information expected utility and portfolio choice we study the consumption investment problem of an agent with a constant relative risk aversion preference function who possesses noisy information about the future prospects of a stock we also solve for the value of information to the agent in closed form we find that information can significantly alter consumption and asset allocation decisions for reasonable parameter ranges information increases consumption in the vicinity of 25 information can shift the portfolio weight on a stock from 0 to around 70 thus de pending on the stock beta the weight on the market portfolio can be considerably reduced with information causing the appearance of underdiversification the model indicates that stock holdings of informed agents are positively related to wealth unrelated to systematic risk and negatively related to idiosyncratic uncertainty we also show that the dollar value of information to the agent depends linearly on his wealth and decreases with both the propensity to intermediate consumption and risk aversion

tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance the optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion similarly the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired

government intervention and strategic trading in the u s treasury market we study the impact of permanent open market operations pomos by the federal reserve on u s treasury market liquidity using a parsimonious model of speculative trading we conjecture that i this form of government intervention improves market liquidity contrary to conclusions drawn by existing literature and ii the extent of this improvement depends on the market s information environment evidence from a novel sample of federal reserve pomos during the 2000s indicates that bid ask spreads of on the run treasury securities decline when pomos are executed by an amount increasing in proxies for information heterogeneity among speculators fundamental volatility and pomo policy uncertainty consistent with our model

a characterization of the daily and intraday behavior of returns on options the daily and intraday behavior of returns on chicago board options exchange options is examined option returns contain systematic patterns even after adjusting for patterns in the means and variances of the underlying assets this is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trading in options can make the order flow in the options market informative about the value of the underlying asset making options nonredundant the intraday patterns in adjusted option return variances are further consistent with a model of strategic trading by informed and discretionary liquidity traders this paper examines the daily and intraday behavior of returns on options we have two goals our first objective is to identify systematic patterns in the means and variances of daily and intraday returns on options our second objective is to decompose option returns into patterns that are related to the means and variances of the underlying stocks and by inference those patterns that are independent of patterns in the means and variances of the underlying assets 1 our work is important for a number of reasons first options have become as important as common stocks yet there is no detailed investigation of the behavior of returns on options second it is important to identify similarities and differences in return patterns across different securities and market structures an understanding of these similarities and differences would allow us to develop better models of returns that capture these properties closely related to this it is instructive to examine option returns in light of the partial equilibrium models we use to value them specifically are the return patterns in options driven exclusively by the underlying stocks or do option returns contain patterns of their own identifying independent yet similar patterns in options returns may lead to an identification of factors that are common across two different market structures the new york

forecasting stock return variance toward an understanding of stochastic implied volatilities we examine the behavior of measured variances from the options market and the underlying stock market under the joint hypotheses that markets are informationally efficient and that option prices are explained by a particular asset pricing model forecasts from time series models of the stockreturn process should not have predictive content given the market forecast as embodied in option prices both in sample and out of sample tests suggest that this hypothesis can be rejected using simulations we show that biases inherent in the procedure we use to imply variances cannot explain this result thus we provide evidence inconsistent with the orthogonality restrictions of option pricing models that assume that variance risk is unpriced these results also have implicationsfor optimal variance forecast rules

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

firm specific information and the correlation between individual stocks and bonds abstract this paper examines the correlation between the returns on individual stocks and the yield changes of individual bonds issued by the same firm and finds that they are negatively and contemporaneously correlated this suggests that individual stocks and bonds are driven by firm specific information that is predominantly related to the mean rather than the variance of the firm s underlying assets furthermore i find that lagged stock returns have explanatory power for current bond yield changes while current stock returns are unrelated to lagged bond yield changes this shows that stocks lead bonds in reflecting firm specific information

the informational role of stock and option volume this article analyzes the intraday interdependence of order flows and price movements for actively traded nyse stocks and their chicago board options exchange cboe traded options stock net trade volume buyer initiated volume minus seller initiated volume has strong predictive ability for stock and option quote revisions but option net trade volume has no incremental predictive ability this suggests that informed investors initiate trades in the stock market but not in the option market on the other hand both stock and option quote revisions have predictive ability for each other thus while information in the stock market is contained in both quote revisions and trades information in the option market is contained only in quote revisions copyright 2002 oxford university press

an analysis of the implications for stock and futures price volatility of program trading and dynamic hedging strategies the notion that a real security is redundant when it can be synthesized by a dynamic trading strategy ignores the informati onal role of real securities markets portfolio insurance uses a dyna mic strategy to synthesize a european put the absence of trading in an appropriate real put option prevents the transmittal of informatio n to market participants about the future price volatility associated with current dynamic hedging strategies less information is transmi tted to potential liquidity providers it will therefore be more di fficult for the market to absorb the trades implied by the dynamic he dging strategies and the stocks future price volatility will rise copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

financial system architecture this article builds a theory of financial system architecture we ask what is a financial market what is a bank and what determines the economic role of each starting with basic assumptions about primitives the types of agents and the nature of the informational asymmetries we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesce to form banks and which trade in the capital market it is shown that borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financial market moreover a financial system in its infancy will be bank dominated and increased financial market sophistication diminishes bank lending article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a general equilibrium analysis of option and stock market interactions the traditional pricing methodology in finance values derivative securities as redundant assets that have no impact on equilibrium prices and allocations this paper demonstrates that when the market is incomplete primary and derivative asset markets generically interact the valuation of derivative and primary security prices depend on the contractual characteristics of the derivative assets available in a version of the mossin mean variance model the authors analyze an equilibrium in which a call option derivative asset is traded and the equilibrium stock price primary asset increases when the options market is opened copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

financial markets with trade on risk and return in this paper i develop a model in which risk averse investors possess private information regarding both a stock s expected payoff and its risk these investors trade in the stock and a derivative whose payoff is driven by the stock s risk in equilibrium the derivative is used to speculate on the stock s risk and to hedge against adverse fluctuations in the stock s risk i analyze the derivative price and variance risk premium that arise in this equilibrium and their predictive power for stock returns finally i examine the relationship between prices and trading volume in the stock and derivative received july 31 2017 editorial decision december 3 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

the size of government most research on the causes of growth in government expenditure has focused on the demand for government services in this paper we argue that in fact this growth may have occurred because of changes in supply changes in technology leading to increased specialization and thus increased opportunity costs of self production have led to increased market production and increased record keeping also female labor force participation has increased both of these factors serve to reduce the efficiency cost of collecting taxes if the demand for government spending has not changed this increase in supply would lead to a larger public sector we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for the period 1929 1970 incorporating this hypothesis and the results are consistent with the theory we are able to explain virtually all of the growth of government increases in female labor force participation seems to be a very important variable in this explanation

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the growth of competitive governments consumers are indifferent about the provenance of the goods and services they consume given their information income and preferences they choose from the lowest price source with price defined to include transaction and deadweight costs there are many supply sources families charitable and humanitarian organizations cooperatives business enterprises and governments these compete with each other competitive success is determined by comparative advantage which in turn depends not only on differential economies of scale and other standard factors but also on the differential capacity to control free riding and to reduce the deadweight burdens of the sums that have to be levied to pay for the goods and services demanded

pricing credit default swaps with option implied volatility using the industry benchmark creditgrades model to analyze credit default swap cds spreads across a large number of companies during the 2007 09 credit crisis the authors demonstrate that the performance of the model can be significantly improved by calibrating it with option implied volatility rather than with historical volatility moreover the advantage of using option implied volatility is greater among companies with more volatile cds spreads more actively traded options and lower credit ratings

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

information sales and insider trading with long lived information fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good hence the eects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow similarly to a durable goods monopolist a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself this forces her to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders conversely an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information comparing market patterns i show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades

stock market quality in the presence of a traded option we use an economic experiment to examine the implications of asymmetric information for linkages between a stock and a traded option we find the presence of the option splits price discovery across markets and changes the process by which conditional expectations are updated the time series properties of the stock price depend directly on the intrinsic value of the option when the intrinsic value of the option is positive informational efficiency is higher in the market for the stock and volatility is lower we provide evidence that the introduction of an option improves market quality in the underlying asset

the cost disease and government growth qualifications to baumol changes in real world wage movements across sectors account for about a third of the rise in the cost of u s government services between 1959 and 1989 while relatively slower productivity in the public sector accounts for the remaining two thirds even though it is slower however the productivity record still is positive even in the labor intensive government sector consequently baumol argues that the public s likely future objection to necessary increases in the share of expenditures over the next 50 years will betray a fiscal illusion unless policymakers take pains to dissolve it but slower productivity may be equally due to the structural organization removing public monopolies reducing bureaucracies and undertaking privatization in education for example are other policy options that could radically change the productivity record meanwhile in his recent calculations of dramatic government expenditure increases expected in the next half century baumol omits reference to the marginal welfare cost of public funds which on our estimates will increase at least ten times to reach 1 71 by the year 2040

information trade and derivative securities hellwig s 1980 model is used to analyze the value of improving trading opportunities by more frequent trading in the underlying asset or by trading in a derivative asset with multiple trading sessions uninformed investors behave as rational trend followers while more informed investors follow a contrarian strategy as trading becomes continuous pareto efficiency is achieved with trading in an appropriate derivative security pareto efficiency may be achieved in only a single round of trading all derivative claims are then priced on black and scholes 1973 principles and in the absence of further supply shocks no trading will take place in subsequent trading rounds article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the speed of information revelation in a financial market mechanism abstract the paper studies the rate at which dispersed private information about the value v of a risky financial asset is incorporated into prices in an information adjustment mechanism the mechanism in the presence of competitive market makers aggregates the information of risk averse agents at a rate of n 1 2 where n is the number of rounds of the adjustment process without market makers convergence of prices to v is much slower in any case the asymptotic precision of prices is negatively related to the degree of risk aversion and the amount of noise in the system journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 g14

trading breaks and asymmetric information the option markets abstract we find that weekend holiday and overnight trading breaks generate excessive perceived risk in the option markets presumably due to asymmetric information which in turn encourages uninformed option traders to postpone trading this perceived risk subsides after two days accompanied by an increase in the option trading volume and the underlying index s actual price volatility these results shed light on the informational role of index options and suggest that the theoretical models results regarding information processing and price discovery in the presence of private information are not limited to single stocks but also apply to the market as a whole

measuring multi product banks market power using the lerner index abstract the aggregate lerner index is a popular composite measure of multi product banks market power based on total assets as the single aggregate output factor we show that the aggregate lerner index only qualifies as a consistently aggregated lerner index if three conditions hold under these conditions the aggregate lerner index reduces to a weighted average of the product specific lerner indices we test the three conditions for a sample of u s banks covering the years 2011 2017 all three conditions are rejected and we show that they may cause an economically relevant bias to the aggregate lerner index depending on the economic context as a general solution we propose using the always consistently aggregated weighted average lerner index whenever a composite lerner index is needed

the on the run liquidity phenomenon abstract we test the implications of a model of multi asset speculative trading in which liquidity differentials between on the run and off the run u s treasury bonds ensue from endowment shocks in the presence of two realistic market frictions information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders and a public signal our evidence suggests that i off on the run liquidity differentials are economically and statistically significant even after controlling for several of the bonds intrinsic characteristics such as duration convexity repo rates or term premiums and ii off on the run liquidity differentials are smaller immediately following bond auction dates and larger when the uncertainty surrounding the ensuing auction allocations is high when the dispersion of beliefs across informed traders is high and when macroeconomic announcements are noisy consistent with our model

short term investment and equilibrium multiplicity abstract i study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders horizons in a 2 period nree model where all traders are risk averse owing to risk premia short termism generates multiple equilibria in particular two distinct patterns arise along the low trading intensity equilibrium short termists anticipate a thinner second period market and owing to risk aversion scale back their trades this reduces both risk sharing and information impounding into prices enforcing a high returns volatility low price informativeness equilibrium along the high trading intensity equilibrium the opposite happens and a low volatility high price informativeness equilibrium arises thus in the presence of short term behavior and traders risk aversion periods of high volatility are a signal of poor price informativeness

equilibrium open interest abstract this paper analyses what determines an individual investor s risk sharing demand for options and aggregating across investors what the equilibrium demand for options we find that agents trade options to achieve their desired skewness specifically we find that portfolio holdings boil down to a three fund separation theorem that includes a so called skewness portfolio that agents like to attain our analysis indicates also however that the common risk sharing setup used for option demand and pricing is incompatible with a stylized fact about open interest across strikes

complete markets informed trading and equity option introductions this paper proposes and tests a new hypothesis concerning the price impact of option introductions on the underlying asset we argue that the leverage properties of options induce a higher level of informed trading in the aggregate market underlying plus derivative resulting in excess listing day price movements in the newly optioned equity using an alternative dataset our results suggest that this may be an explanation for the observed positive than negative excess listing day returns of us optioned stocks over the past thirty years

picking a loser a social choice perspective on the danish government formation of 1975 all democratic systems are theoretically open to so called election inversions i e instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another the paper examines the complex 1975 danish government formation process which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives we demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head to head comparisons the danish procedural system of negative parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion

disclosure decisions by firms and the competition for price efficiency this paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied it is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal this is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure this paper develops a model of the relationship between firms investment decisions and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied the costs of disclosure are twofold first there are costs of producing and disseminating the information included here are opportunity costs of firms employees auditing and legal expenses costs of printing and distribution and costs associated with the release of any proprietary information second there are traders costs of assimilating the information for instance while it is not very costly to obtain a firm s 8 k and 10 k once produced it is quite costly to understand the implications of their contents while the former costs have been recognized in the literature on disclosure the latter costs have not that is while traders are sometimes viewed as having access to some costly information the information contained in firms disclosures is typically taken to be costlessly observed by all see for instance diamond 1985 and dye 1987 1 taking traders costs of learning the information content of firms disclosures into account leads to new conclusions regarding incentives to expend resources on disclosure in particular it is shown that firms may spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal this overdisclosure results from firms competing for the attention of traders this is an interesting result given the public policy concern that firms on their own will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

speculations in option markets enhance allocation efficiency with heterogeneous beliefs and learning abstract many studies investigate the impact of heterogeneous beliefs in the first moment while very few in the second moment this is partially due to continuous time setup which makes it difficult to incorporate heterogeneous beliefs in the second moment in a two period exponential normal model with bayesian learning i demonstrate that heterogeneous prior variances give rise to the economic value of option markets investors speculate in option market and public information improves allocation efficiency of markets only when there is heterogeneity in prior variances heterogeneity in mean is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for generating speculations in option markets with heterogeneous beliefs options are non redundant assets which can facilitate side betting and enable investors to take advantage of the disagreements and the differences in confidence this fact leads to a higher growth rate in the investors certainty equivalents and thus a higher equilibrium interest rate furthermore option exhibits a unique feature of enabling signal precision to affect the ex ante risk premium of underlying asset which quadratic derivative and stock do not have

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

option and forward contracting with asymmetric information valuation issues in supply chains we investigate the role of forward commitments and option contracts between a seller supplier and a buyer retailer in the presence of asymmetric information in our case both parties face price and demand uncertainty but the retailer being closer to the market has additional information about the true demand and price the supplier aware of this asymmetry and acting as a stackelberg leader designs a contracting arrangement that best meet his interest we contrast the role of forward and option contracts in this environment and identify cases where combinations of the two are dominant finally we investigate how alternative contracting arrangements alter the expected value of obtaining information that eliminates asymmetric information

information quality and options microstructure researchers have long understood that information quality has an effect on price formation in the underlying asset market however option researchers have largely ignored the fact that information quality might also impact the options market this article characterizes the nature of the impact by showing how option prices and implied volatility levels are related to the forward looking information quality path this result follows from a noisy rational expectations model that abandons the normal distribution in favor of the gamma distribution but maintains the standard assumption of exponential utility thus the new model bridges the gap between the microstructure literature that relies so heavily on the normal exponential framework and the options literature that relies exclusively on models that are consistent with the limited liability of stock prices the model s tractability allows for a robustness check against the standard framework and provides a viable setting for analyzing the empirical implications of information quality for the options market jel d8 gl

multimarket trading and market liquidity when a security trades at multiple locations simultaneously an informed trader has several avenues in which to exploit his private information the greater the proportion of liquidity trading by large traders who can split their trades across markets the larger is the correlation between volume in different markets and the smaller is the informativeness of prices we show that one of the markets emerges as the dominant location for trading in that security when informed traders can use their information for more than one trading period the timely release of price information by market makers at one location adversely affects the profits informed traders expect to make subsequently at other locations market makers competing to offer the lowest cost of trading at their location consequently deter informed trading be voluntarily making the price information public and by cracking down on insider trading article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

interest groups and the size of government the results of the previous section estimates of a three equation model from 23 observations must obviously be regarded as tentative the consistent positive relationship between number of interest groups and size of government observed with changing sets of included independent variables changing samples of nations and treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined does imply rather unequivocally that interest groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size beyond helping to reinforce this conclusion the results of the previous section should be regarded as first steps in the development of a model of the polity that can explain participation in the political process by interest groups and citizens as well as the size of government

trending economic factors and the structure of congress in the growth of government 1930 2002 we investigate the role of congress in the growth of federal public expenditure since 1930 building on the work of kau and rubin public choice 113 389 402 2002 the model incorporates majority party strength and the extent of party control of congress in addition to the median ideological position of elected representatives we first provide estimates of the relative importance of the state of congress and of trending supply and demand side economic factors in the evolution of federal spending the resulting models are then used to simulate the consequences of the radical and historically unprecedented shift to the right of congress in 1994 95

speculation spillovers this paper demonstrates that speculative activities can be contagious and spill over across markets specifically we test the hypothesis that during china s warrants bubble period speculative activities in the warrants market grabbed investors attention and caused them to trade more speculatively in the underlying stocks consistent with this hypothesis we find that turnover and return volatility of the underlying stocks are positively associated with the warrants unexpected turnover and price deviation from their fundamental values during the previous day controlling for information driven trading and hedging motives and that such a spillover effect is more pronounced when warrants attract more investor attention data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1914 this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

a comparison of stock market mechanisms i analyze a multi asset market under two trading mechanisms in the first the unrestricted system traders demand for each asset depends on all equilibrium prices and prices reflect the information contained in all order flows in the second the restricted system traders demand depends on the traded asset price and prices reflect single order flow information i show that informed traders use of multidimensional private information depends on the number of prices they observe and on the price formation process i then give conditions rendering the restricted system more efficient than the unrestricted system

modelling round the clock price discovery for cross listed stocks using state space methods u s trading in non u s stocks has grown dramatically around the clock these stocks trade in the home market in the u s market and potentially in both markets simultaneously we develop a general methodology based on a state space model to study 24 hour price discovery in a multiple markets setting as opposed to the standard variance ratio approach this model deals naturally with 1 simultaneous quotes in an overlap 2 missing observations in a nonoverlap 3 noise due to transitory microstructure effects and 4 contemporaneous correlation in returns due to market wide factors we apply our model to dutch stocks cross listed in the united states our findings suggest a minor role for the new york stock exchange in price discovery for dutch shares in spite of its nontrivial and growing market share

risk aversion market liquidity and price efficiency a model of a noncompetitive speculative market is analyzed in which privately informed traders and market makers are risk averse market liquidity is found to be nonmonotonic in the number of informed traders their degree of risk aversion and the precision of their information it is also shown that increased liquidity trading leads to reduced price efficiency and that under endogenous information acquisition market liquidity may also be nonmonotonic in the variance of liquidity trades article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

high frequency lead lag effects and cross asset linkages a multi asset lagged adjustment model motivated by the empirical evidence of high frequency lead lag effects and cross asset linkages we introduce a multi asset price formation model which generalizes standard univariate microstructur