on the efficiency of law a public choice perspective economists have not yet developed a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating transaction cost economics within a public choice perspective for predicting when there will be an efficiency problem with the law transaction cost reasoning and the rent seeking insight have not been applied systematically in a dynamic institutional context to evaluate when the law will be used to increase or not minimize problems of bounded rationality and opportunism this paper takes a first step at identifying and remedying this deficiency the paper first provides a critical review of relevant theoretical contributions made by becker 1983 1985 posner 1977 priest 1977 rubin 1977 1982 williamson 1975 1985 and others we then show how analysis of the efficiency of law can be synthesized into a broader whole by incorporating transaction cost economics more fully into existing understanding of rentseeking in the political realm thus within the public choice paradigm this paper develops a deeper transaction cost analysis of the efficiency of law building on prior research by the authors crew and rowley 1988a 1988b twight 1983 1988 the paper identifies variables that position legal rules on a spectrum that ranges from those that are predominantly transaction cost

a spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error this paper presents a unidimensional spatial model of voting in which members of congress vote based on an imprecise perception of roll call alternatives the model is applied to the senate roll call votes of 1977 to estimate the ideal points of the senators and to examine the role of a liberal conservative dimension in describing votes on economic issues relative to social issues in light of the spatial model the paper argues that standard models of roll call voting are not based on a theory of choice and hence that it is difficult to interpret their results alternatives to standard models based on the spatial model are developed and are used to analyze the role of ideology in deciding a specific economic issue coal strip mining

competition in political and economic markets do anomalies play an important role in explaining economic and political choices are political decisions more prone to anomalies irrationality and inefficiency than economic decisions in their integration of results derived from experimental psychology and applied political economy frey and eichenberger 1990 argue that social scientists ought to answer these questions in the affirmative after examining a large body of choice data frey and eichenberger conclude that individuals deviate from the axioms of rational choice in their view the resultant anomalies in individual behavior are unaffected by the aggregation which occurs in the economic marketplace they conclude that political decision making systems correct no larger a proportion of these anomalies than are corrected by the economic market in many institutional settings outlined in their paper decision making systems can be expected to magnify individuals deviations from rational behavior system wide irrational behavior will then produce less frequent trading and a less efficient allocation of resources in this note we examine two components of frey and eichenberger s argument first we reconsider their evidence for irrational behavior in light of a larger body of experimental data which includes choices made in market settings second we argue that competition in political markets will tend to eliminate aggregate anomalies just as it does in economic markets experimental economists often generate data which distinguish between choices individuals indicate in unstructured environments and transactions individuals consummate in markets initial statements regarding choices are often inconsistent with subsequent trading behavior these data indicate that the economist s maximization paradigm based on tenets of rational choice is

endogenizing the median voter public choice goes to school this paper investigates implications of the relationship between voter self selection and the behavior of politicians voter self selection arises in elections because only a portion of eligible voters actually vote it is likely to be more pronounced whenever the implied net benefits from a given electoral choice are disproportionately distributed across voters public choice theory predicts that incumbent officials will manipulate this self election pursuant to the maximization of their personal objective functions this paper provides evidence from school bond elections that politicians influence voter self selection via manipulation of election parameters

toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation its many dimensions from the perspective of market economics this new thrust was consolidated in 1976 by s peltzman who developed a formal market model in which regulations were viewed as commodities brokered via political markets in response to bids and counter bids by those who stood to gain or to lose from specific regulation outcomes the subsequent contribution by becker 1983 added insights and institutional flesh to the stigler peltzman embryo confirming regulation as an integral component of mainstream market economics an important implication of such contributions especially those from the chicago perspective is that regulation for the most part confirms resource efficiency within market process that political markets in the absence of entry barriers are just as effective as are competitive commodity markets in achieving economic efficiency defined within a comparative institutions framework nowhere is this complacency more apparent than in the conclusion drawn by becker 1983 from a detailed formal analysis of competition among pressure groups for political influence

inventories stock outs and production smoothing if stock outs are ignored and if demand shocks are additive then optimal behaviour requires that the marginal cost of production mc be equated with the expected marginal revenue of increasing expected sales by one unit emr however with more general demand shocks and still ignoring stock outs the excess of mc over emr has the same sign as the covariance of the slope of the demand curve and the marginal valuation of inventory the equality of emr and mc is also broken by taking account of stock outs even if demand shocks are additive if there is a production lag then taking account of stock outs implies that optimal behaviour will be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost of production is linear two alternative definitions of production smoothing are presented and optimal behaviour in the presence of stock outs displays each type of smoothing it is a well known proposition that a firm producing a storable good under conditions of increasing marginal cost will tend to smooth the time profile of its production relative to the time profile of its sales the incentive to smooth production arises from the fact that the cost function is a convex function of the level of production for a given average level of production average costs can be reduced by reducing the variation in production of course if the cost function is linear in the level of production then this incentive to smooth production disappears however we will demonstrate in this paper that if the possibility of stock outs is explicitly incorporated into the firm s dynamic optimization problem i e if we impose a non negativity constraint on inventories and if there is a lag in production then optimal behaviour can be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost function is linear

a note on lead time reduction strategies in a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with lot size dependent lead times and stochastic demand glock 2012 lead time reduction strategies in a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with lot size dependent lead times and stochastic demand international journal of production economics 136 37 44 recently presented an integrated inventory model where the lead time can be reduced by crashing the setup and transportation time by increasing the production rate or by decreasing the lot size in this note we introduce a more realistic lead time crashing cost and propose a modified integrated inventory model by adding the transportation time as a decision variable and assuming that there are two different safety stocks furthermore we give some numerical examples to illustrate the advantages of the modified model

a note on integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time abstract ben daya and hariga 2004 integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time international journal of production economics 92 75 80 recently proposed the paper about integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time the lead time is proportional to the lot size produced by the vendor in addition to a fixed delay due to the transportation setup and nonproductive time the end customers accept backorders when the shortage occurs at the buyer side an order to the vendor is placed each time the inventory level reaches the reorder point in this note a modified model is proposed under a different assumption that there are two different reorder points and service levels

environmentalism democracy and pollution control this paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature based on predictions generated by a lobby group model first we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries second we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political electoral competition the empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy moreover political competition tends to raise policy stringency in particular where citizens participation in the democratic process is widespread

international institutions and economic sanctions economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policy makers despite the widespread use of sanctions many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness this article reviews two books that analyze the factors that influence cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions these books indicate that international institutions can do much to promote cooperation of this sort however this essay argues that the extent to which international institutions facilitate cooperation among senders of sanctions is likely to depend on the domestic politics of members the type of institution being used for this purpose the nature of the strategy being pursued and the distribution of power among members although these books make significant contributions to our understanding of the factors that promote cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions they examine the factors that promote the effectiveness of sanctions in only a peripheral manner one potential influence on the effectiveness of sanctions that are organized by an international institution however is the likelihood that the institution will be captured by member states or by interest groups within them additional research that investigates the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be captured and the implications of institutional capture for their performance may therefore prove useful to scholars of international relations and economic statecraft

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

taking stock a critical assessment of recent research on inventories empirical and theoretical aspects of inventory behavior became hot topics in the 1950s and early 1960s no one seemed to notice the tension that was developing between the emerging macroeconomic and microeconomic views of inventories macroeconomists routinely thought of inventories as a destabilizing factor yet the prevailing micro theory viewed inventories as a stabilizing factor it was a fascinating question that was barely explored instead somewhat inexplicably interest in inventories dried up as if inventories were of minor economic significance and little intrinsic interest by the early 1980s then economists once again knew something they had known in the 1950s that inventory investment is of first order importance in business cycles but they were also beginning to realize that the standard production smoothing buffer stock model of inventories was in deep trouble this paper focuses on developments since that realization

incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice abstract this paper extends the economic literature on the incomplete enforcement of social regulation by incorporating regulatory choice in an institutional environment of limited regulatory resources and powers we show how regulatory decisions determine the structure of incentives faced by regulated firms our results indicate that the expense of monitoring relative to the regulator s power to levy penalties helps to explain the differences between compliance and deterrence enforcement styles we find that in most circumstances firms with higher abatement costs will receive a larger share of regulatory resources and thus face higher penalties than firms with lower costs

integrated single vendor single buyer model with stochastic demand and variable lead time abstract in this paper we consider the single vendor single buyer integrated production inventory problem we relax the assumption of deterministic demand and assume that the lead time is varying lineraly with the lot size the lead time is composed of a lot size dependent run time and constant delay times such as moving waiting and setup times a solution procedure is suggested for solving the proposed model and numerical examples are used to illustrate the benefit of integration a sensitivity analysis is also performed to explore the effect of key parameters on lot size reorder point and expected total cost

why is production more volatile than sales theory and evidence on the stockout avoidance motive for inventory holding this paper argues that the macroeconomically interesting features of inventory behavior are well captured by a model in which firms face only demand uncertainty with a nonnegativity constraint on inventories empirical implications of the stockout avoidance model of inventory behavior are derived and then tested on disaggregated automobile industry data the results largely support the model though they suggest a small role for production smoothing as well subsidiary evidence on the relative variance of demand and cost shocks suggests that demand shocks are indeed more important

the interrelationship between price and output decisions and investment decisions microfoundations and aggregate implications abstract this paper develops a model of firm behavior in which both price and output decisions and investment decisions are made the model permits an analysis of the dynamics of inventory and capital accumulation on price and output behavior there are two main results 1 short run price and output levels will differ from long run levels as desired stocks of inventory and capital diverge from actual levels 2 the size of the elasticities of price and output to changes in demand and cost variables depends on the speed with which gaps between desired and actual stocks are closed through investment

towards an understanding of the role of standard setters in standard setting abstract we investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting we examine how certain professional and political characteristics of fasb members and sec commissioners predict the accounting reliability and relevance of proposed standards notably we find fasb members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that decrease reliability and increase relevance partly due to their tendency to propose fair value methods we find opposite results for fasb members affiliated with the democratic party although only when excluding financial services background as an independent variable jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

some empirical evidence on the production level and production cost smoothing models of inventory investment the production smoothing model of inventories has long been the basic paradigm within which empirical research on inventories has been conducted the basic hypothesis embedded in this model is that inventories of finished goods serve primarily to smooth production levels in the face of fluctuating demand and convex cost functions however once we allow for shocks to technology and the costs of producing output firms will also use inventories to shift production from periods in which production costs are relatively high to periods in which production costs are relatively low in this sense inventories can serve to smooth production costs rather production levels in this paper we examine the empirical plausibility of the production level and production cost smoothing models of inventories our basic strategy is to derive and contrast a set of unconditional moment restrictions implied by these models in a way that minimizes the role of auxiliary assumptions regarding market structure and industry demand we find overwhelming evidence against the production level smoothing model and very little evidence against the production cost smoothing mode1 we conclude that the variance of production exceeds the variance of sales in most manufacturing industries because the production cost smoothing role of inventories is quantitatively more important than the production level smoothing role of inventories this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

demand for environmental goods evidence from voting patterns on california initiatives this article studies voting behavior on 16 environmental ballot propositions in california in order to characterize the demand for environmental goods the environment is found to be a normal good for people with mean incomes but some environmental goods are inferior for those with high incomes at least when supplied collectively an important price of environmental goods is reduced income in the construction farming forestry and manufacturing industries income and price can explain most of the variation in voting there is little need to introduce preference variables such as political ideology

the production and inventory behavior of the american automobile industry understanding inventory movements is central to an understanding of business cycles this paper presents an empirical study of the behavior of inventories in the automobile industry it finds that inventory behavior is well explained by the assumption of intertemporal optimization with rational expectations the underlying cost structure appears to have substantial costs of changing production as well as substantial costs of being away from target inventory thelatter being a function of current sales given this cost structure whether inventory behavior is stabilizing or destabilizing depends on the characteristics of the demand process in the automobile industry inventory behavior is destabilizing the variance of production is larger than the variance of sales

the statistical analysis of roll call data modern studies of legislative behavior focus upon the relationship among the policy preferences of legislators institutional arrangements and legislative outcomes in spatial models of legislatures policies are represented geometrically as points in a low dimensional euclidean space each legislator has a most preferred policy or ideal point in this space and his or her utility for a policy declines with the distance of the policy from his or her ideal point see davis hinich and ordeshook 1970 for an early survey the primary use of roll call data the recorded votes of deliberative bodies 1 is the estimation of ideal points the appeal and importance of ideal point estimation arises in two ways first ideal point estimates let us describe legislators and legislatures the distribution of ideal points estimates reveals how cleavages between legislators reflect partisan affiliation or region or become more polarized over time e g mccarty poole and rosenthal 2001 roll call data serve similar purposes for interest groups such as americans for democratic action the national taxpayers union and the sierra club to produce ratings of legislators along different policy dimensions second estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative behavior for instance roll call analysis has been used in studies of the u s congress both contemporary and

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

nonconvex costs and the behavior of inventories this paper explores one possible explanation for the apparent excess volatility of production relative to sales nonconvexities in the technology facing firms it is shown that if firms operate in a region of declining marginal costs then small shifts in demand can cause production to jump substantially estimates for six production to stock industries as well as the automobile industry suggest that all these industries behave as if they were operating in the region of nonconvex costs the results have important implications not only for inventory investment but also for the cyclical behavior of productivity and prices

a roll call analysis of the endangered species act amendments public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers the lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group thereby maximizing their rent from the political market this article examines endangered species act esa amendments from a public choice perspective congressional voting on the esa amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology the results show that the lawmakers voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation ideology and several characteristics of their home state such as number of endangered species proportion of urban population contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product and geographical location copyright 2001 oxford university press

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

avoidance screening and optimum enforcement a standard assumption in the economic literature on crime and punishment is that fines are costless transfers given this assumption several economists have argued that it is optimal to set the fine for engaging in a proscribed activity as high as possible the argument is a simple one raising the probability of a fine is costly since it requires devoting more resources to monitoring and apprehending individuals in contrast raising the magnitude of a fine is costless therefore the least costly way to achieve a given expected fine is to set the fine as high as possible presumably equal to the offender s wealth and adjust its probability so that the desired expected fine is obtained

inventories and sticky prices note in a recent contribution to this review alan blinder provides an interesting analysis of the relationship between optimal inventory decisions and the process of price adjustment arguing that inventory permits separation of production and sale decisions and allows the firm greater flexibility in responding to anticipated demand disturbances blinder shows that the responsiveness of relative prices depends critically upon the cost of storage and the temporal structure of the demand shocks few economists would fault the intuitive substance of blinder s basic proposition and the proposition is justified with characteristic precision the analysis however is considerably less general than blinder maintains the formal argument of his paper relies upon a simple model of a monopolist capable of backlogging orders and storing unsold goods as the model is constructed order backlogs assume a role of fundamental importance in any stationary equilibrium this feature of the model vitiates blinder s extension of his result to situations in which order backlogs are prohibited the basic monopoly model developed in sections i and ii of blinder s paper places no restriction upon the sign of inventory negative inventory is interpreted as net unfilled orders while no distinction is drawn between reductions in gross inventory and additions to the order backlog as a result the cost of holding inventory is symmetric around an arbitrary minimum point the only role of inventory is to permit the time paths of production and sales to differ gross inventory allows production to antedate sales while order backlogs generate revenue before production costs are borne under these circumstances if future costs and revenues are discounted it is natural to expect any stationary equilibrium level of net inventory to be negative this can be shown to be true of blinder s model it is useful to distinguish in general between the nonstochastic stationary level of inventory n and the stochastic stationary level n the former is realized when the current expected demand disturbance eo is zero and production equals sales the latter which differs from customary usage represents the level of inventory expected to prevail when adjustment to the current nonzero expected demand disturbance is complete if the demand disturbance is not a random walk so that p 1 in blinder s 5 the two equilibria coincide relatively little attention is devoted to either stationary solution because blinder s main interest is in the optimal current solution level n1 the stochastic stationary level is crucially important however since it represents the goal toward which the current choice must provide an optimal first step to verify that both nand n are negative whenever production is strictly positive note that blinder s necessary condition 7 with the coefficient cl set equal to zero together with the definition of xa as the deviation of the shadow value of inventory q from its nonstochastic stationary value q implies

enforcement costs and regulatory reform the agency and firm response influenced by models of optimal law enforcement several authors have recently revised the work on efficient levels of regulatory control to accommodate the realities of underenforcement and imperfect compliance however most of these efforts have centered on either the enforcement agency or the firm and have largely ignored the decentralized nature of the enforcement process this paper extends these results by modelling both the firm and the local agency and by incorporating detection uncertainty and concealment activity each model is then evaluated with respect to the alternative regulatory regimes of direct controls and emission taxes

self reporting of pollution and the firm s behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations abstract motivated by the nature of u s laws a model is developed for a firm that maximizes expected profit and faces imperfectly enforceable pollution standards with imperfectly enforceable reporting requirements some previous models of imperfectly enforceable standards and taxes are special cases of this general mode when the fine for violating the pollution standard is linear in excess pollution the form will equate the marginal cost of control to the marginal fine rate and thus actual pollution will be insensitive to enforcement parameters related to under reporting the more complex comparative statics that exist when the fine is non linear are analyzed and comparisons with other models are made

inventories and the volatility of production a stylized fact associated with inventory behavior is that the variance of production exceeds the variance of sales this paper presents a model of production decisions with demand uncertainty that incorporates no nnegativity constraints on inventories even with no productivity shocks optimal behavior by the firm is consistent with this stylized fact either if demand exhibits positive serial correlation or if the firm can backlog excess demand the reason is that a demand shock affects both the actual inventory level given unchanged production and the desired level production must replenish the stock and adjust to the new desired level copyright 1987 by american economic association

production smoothing evidence from physical product data we reconsider the paradox that the variance of production often exceeds the variance of shipments a result that casts doubt on the production smoothing model of inventory behavior most studies of production smoothing have analyzed two digit sic dollar value data from commerce department surveys in contrast this paper examines disaggregated physical product data and finds that production is smoother than shipments in about two thirds of the 38 industry or product groupings considered however doubts about the model persist most notably euler equation estimates of the model s cost parameters are usually imprecise and often do not have the signs postulated by production smoothing models

firms compliance to environmental regulation is there really a paradox it has often been claimed that firms compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory a result labeled the harrington paradox in the literature enforcement data from norway presented here appears at first glance to confirm this stylized fact firms are inspected less than once a year detected violators are seldom fined but still serious violations seem relatively rare however at a closer look the pattern seems less paradoxical enforcement of minor violations is lax but such violations do flourish serious violations on the other hand are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment and such violations are more uncommon this seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory we argue that the empirical existence of the harrington paradox is not well documented in the international literature the claim that firms compliance with environmental regulations is generally higher than predicted by standard theory should thus be regarded as a hypothesis rather than an established fact

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

estimating the linear quadratic inventory model maximum likelihood versus generalized method of moments abstract we compare generalized method of moments gmm and maximum likelihood ml estimators of the parameters of a linear quadratic inventory model using nondurable manufacturing data and monte carlo simulations data based gmm estimates for five normalizations vary widely generally rejecting the model the ml estimate generally supports the model monte carlo experiments reveal that the gmm estimates are often biased apparently due to poor instruments statistically insignificant economically implausible and dynamically unstable the ml estimates are generally unbiased even in misspecified models statistically significant economically plausible and dynamically stable asymptotic standard errors for ml are 3 to 15 times smaller than for gmm

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations lessons from a natural field experiment in norway abstract relying on a small natural field experiment conducted by the norwegian environmental protection agency i estimate effects of three fundamental elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices self reporting audit frequency and specific deterrence i find evidence of under reporting of violations in firms self audits as more violations are detected in on site audits than in self audits announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on firms compliance but an audit raises subsequent compliance substantially

cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment abstract when pollutants are persistent and the polluter has private information regarding the occurrence of accidental releases and the cost of clean up we show that the penalty regime which most effectively protects the environment will involve penalties which are less than maximal the extent to which these penalties will be less than maximal is interestingly a non monotonic function of the persistence of the hazardous substance being handled with the highest penalties being appropriate in the case of pollutants of medium persistence our analysis complement consisting work which predicts that setting the penalties faced by some classes of violator below their maximal level may be compliance enhancing see for example harrington journal of public economics 1988 37 29 53 greenberg journal of economic theory 1984 32 1 13 kambhu journal of regulatory economics 1989 1 103 114

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

lead time reduction strategies in a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with lot size dependent lead times and stochastic demand this paper studies alternative methods for reducing lead time and their impact on the safety stock and the expected total costs of a q s continuous review inventory control system we focus on a single vendor single buyer integrated inventory model with stochastic demand and variable lot size dependent lead time and assume that lead time consists of production and setup and transportation time as a consequence lead time may be reduced by crashing setup and transportation time by increasing the production rate or by reducing the lot size we illustrate the benefits of reducing lead time in numerical examples and show that lead time reduction is especially beneficial in case of high demand uncertainty further our studies indicate that a mixture of setup time and production time reduction is appropriate to lower expected total costs

the cost effective choice of policy instruments to cap aggregate emissions with costly enforcement we study the cost effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits our analysis considers abatement monitoring and sanctioning costs as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters abatement costs under perfect information we find that a the total cost effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced and b the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system except under special conditions this is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not under imperfect information nevertheless it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty

self interest altruism and health risk reduction an economic analysis of voting behavior while classical economic theory suggests that the demand for private goods is motivated by economic self interest a growing body of literature suggests that the demand for public goods is driven both by self interest and by altruistic motives the political arena has been a major testing ground for this hypothesis recently a number of studies have tried to empirically isolate and determine the importance of economic versus ideological factors in explaining political choices by representatives kau and rubin 1979 peltzman 1984 kalt and zupan 1984 while congressional voting records have provided a rich source of data for empirical analysis a consensus opinion on the importance of self interest versus altruism has not been reached and remains controversial altruistic motivations have also been

on the theory of the firm underlying empirical models of aggregate price behavior recent empirical work on aggregate and industrial price behavior has been conducted within the framework of a static neo classical theory of price formation 2 the purpose of this paper is to propose a more general theoretical framework for analyzing price behavior the proposed framework is neo classical in its basic characteristics but unlike the recent literature it is based on a dynamic theory of firm behavior in which decisions on price inventories and the capital stock are integrated to serve as a basis for comparison with the model developed here it is useful to state briefly the main propositions of the static neo classical model the model presumes that the typical firm behaves as if it were a simple monopolist that faces competitive factor input markets and sets its price so as to maximize current profits assuming a log linear demand function and production function the model yields the result that the firm s long run optimal price policy in general is

political shirking opponent quality and electoral support several recent papers in the public choice literaturesuggest that legislators shirk or vote in a mannercontrary to constituent interest this paper exploresthe relationship between senatorial shirking andelectoral consequences i model political shirking opponent quality and election outcomes assimultaneous and find significant evidence of arelationship between shirking over the senatorial termand electoral outcomes however i find that voterspunish recent shirking much more than they punishearly term shirking and that senators apparently actconsistently with this relationship

coalitions in congressional voting scholars of congress generally agree on four points concerning roll call votes first roll call votes are important to members of congress who care about reelection public policies or both second members have neither sufficient resources nor incentives to acquire process and interpret information about the content and consequences of hundreds of roll call votes considered on the floor each year 1 third insufficient resources and incentives induce members to apply simple decision rules on most votes fourth a voting model should conform to the choices members make under uncertainty 2 the scholars however differ in their specification of the simple rules members adopt familiar specifications include voting decisions rooted in two or three party alignments one or more policy dimensions self interest or ideology and cue taking to varying degrees most command an intuitive appeal and empirical support clearly it is important to evaluate each model based on its a refutable implications or b performance relative to the competing models to test a unidimensional voting model in which members vote based on an imprecise perception of the issues involved 4 this paper adopts the first approach it seeks to refute a pair of comparative static implications of the model two reasons account for the adoption of approach a and not b first to the extent feasible a comparison of the unidimensional model with the competing voting models appears in poole and rosenthal 1985a 1985b second the likelihood ration test considered to be statistically unambiguous requires that competing models generate a nested set of hypotheses see amemiya 1981 unfortunately models of roll call voting with substantially different origins 5 seldom meet this requirement

environmental enforcement when inspectability is endogenous a model with overshooting properties if a firm can influence its monitorability vis a vis an environmental regulator it is shown that increasing the thoroughness of inspections induces the firm to substitute towards more transparent technologies whilst increasing their frequency may cause substitution the other way perversely when the effect of such substitution is taken into account an increase in the frequency of inspections or equally the stringency of penalties may worsen the firm s environmental performance the agency should favour more thorough inspections than existing theory suggests particularly in sectors where the scope for such substitution is great moreover when monitorability adjusts only sluggishly to policy shocks because it is an embodied characteristic of capital for example the environmental impacts of increased frequency and increased thoroughness well over and under shoot their respective long run impacts in assessing regulatory reform therefore it is important to leave sufficient time for the class of adjustments identified to occur the possibility of overshooting can be used as an alternative to existing regulatory capture theories to explain why the efficacy of some classes of regulatory reform may fade through time

an analysis of the inventory behavior in a q theoretic framework this paper develops a generalized q model in which a monopolist with perfect foresight holds inventories this model permits an analysis of the dynamics of inventories in the presence of various types of deterministic demand and supply shocks the results suggest that if only positive inventories are allowed inventories are more successful in smoothing expected upward than downward variations in demand if unfilled orders are permitted then production smoothing accompanies any type of demand shock but inventories are generally negative the estimation of the linear quadratic model on data generated using the two versions of the generalized q model shows that incentives to smooth production appear only when the firm is allowed to have negative inventories

inventories and sticky prices more on the microfoundations of macroeconomics the role of inventories in making prices sticky is studied by analyzing a dynamic linear quadratic model of a monopoly firm facing stochastic demand but able to store its finished goods in inventory it is shown that in contrast to the usual presumption firms that exhibit the smallest output responses to demand fluctuations may also exhibit the smallest price fluctuations specifically firms which have very flexible inventory storage facilities or are subjected to very transitory demand shocks will rely on inventories as buffers and will change neither production nor price very much on the other hand firms which have very inflexible storage facilities or whose demand shocks are quite permanent will display large swings in both price and output the standard assumption about inventory carrying costs that has been used in the literature that they are linear is shown to imply that production is impervious to fluctuations in demand it is also established that prices may respond more strongly to positive demand shocks than to negative ones if it is impossible to hold negative inventories i e to have unfilled orders the model offers an explanation for stickiness in relative prices however under certain circumstances it may help explain the persistence of inflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

non binding linked issues referenda analysis and an application non binding referenda petitions are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle this paper provides a simple theoretical and empirical analysis of a particular form of non binding referenda so called linked issues petitions it analyzes the ability of issue linkage to increase participation levels above those of single issue petitions and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and eastern enlargement of the european union

can the production smoothing model of inventory behavior be saved the production smoothing model of inventory behavior has a long and venerable history and theoretical foundations that seem very strong yet certain overwhelming facts seem not only to defy explanation within the production smoothing framework but actually to argue that the basic idea of production smoothing is all wrong most prominent among these is the fact that the variance of detrended production exceeds the variance of detrended sales this paper first documents the stylized facts then it derives the production smoothing model rigorously and explains how the model can be amended to make it consistent with the facts finally it reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence and tries to draw some tentative conclusions

on the mis measurement of legislator ideology and shirking in this paper we show that current statistical measures of legislator s shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested we note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross sectional regressions where legislators voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis specified we also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct the uncovered set and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate we argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by senators is equally consistent with senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data

separating economic from political influences on government decisions abstract the public interest theory is a poor predictor of government decisions relative to interest group theories but a sophisticated public interest theory is a more serious alternative to the former testing the sophisticated theory s predictions is problematic however when public interest is coincident with an interest group s interests a four step method is developed that disentangles public interest and interest group interests by separating economic from political incentives applying the method to the national forest service decisions about wilderness designations indicates whether interest groups were successful in influencing allocation decisions and whether allocation decisions were in the public interest

campaign war chests as a barrier to entry in congressional races i introduction issues surrounding the nature and degree of competition in political races have been examined extensively in both the economic and political science literature with most attention focused on the interplay between incumbent and challenger expenditures and electoral success this study extends our understanding of political competition by investigating the impact of an incumbent s war chest on a challenger s decision to mount a campaign 1 for this purpose a war chest is defined as a pool of unencumbered funds accumulated prior to the start of a campaign for elective office 2 sorauf 1988 182 has observed that early receipts even without early spending discourage competition in the primary and attractive challengers in the general election jacobson 1985 26 has argued the most effective strategy for keeping a seat in congress is to avoid serious opposition contemporary critics and reformers of campaign financing practices use such words as frighten intimidate and overpower to describe the role of an incumbent s war chest 3 despite this kind of attention little is actually known about the degree to which war chests diminish entry or reduce the quality of a challenge we present three alternative mechanisms to explain how an incumbent s war chest might deter entry each is based upon a war chest serving as a credible commitment to spend heavily if challenged specifically war chests may either represent excess capacity in financing a campaign or serve as a signal of non observable incumbent characteristics that define a formidable opponent aside from determining whether an incumbent is challenged a war chest might also affect the quality of the challenger for example potential candidates with prior political experience may be unwilling to risk their political capital on a long shot proposition to test for these effects on entry into house races a trichotomous logit model is estimated the choices are uncontested race contested by an ordinary challenger and contested by an experienced challenger although the empirical model is not sufficiently rich to fully distinguish among competing mechanisms the regression results are robust incumbent war chests negatively affect the likelihood of a contested race and the quality of the challenger ii war chests as a barrier to entry becker 1958 106 in comparing economic and political competition observed i n an ideal political democracy competition is free in the sense that no appreciable costs or artificial barriers prevent an individual from running for office in the theory of the firm entry occurs when the expected postentry stream of profits minus the cost of entry is positive analogously an individual will enter a political race when the expected gain from holding office is positive expected gain as defined by baron 1989 is a function of campaign costs the probability of winning and the personal valuation placed by the candidate on the office the first two determinants are partly endogenous depending upon the strategic interplay of the candidates the third aside from its direct effects indirectly affects the first two for example persons hungry for office may be committed to expending greater effort and funds on their campaigns thus increasing their probability of winning similarly as lott has emphasized nontransferable brand name capital would be another factor creating a commitment to aggressively pursue office thereby affecting campaign costs and the probability of winning 4 that some challengers are deterred however need not imply the existence of a political market failure in a contestability sense the lack of a viable challenger on the ballot does not imply a lack of competition good representation will discourage entry similarly the fact that some incumbents will aggressively seek re election frightening away potential challengers is not a sign that competition is lacking

earning through learning in legislatures this inquiry applies gary becker s theoretical notions of general and specific training to the experiential learning that occurs within political institutions in particular the u s congress in the process we isolate economic facets of these legislative experiences that influence the rental value of human capital derived from congressional training we identify four factors that structure legislators post elective wages pre congressional salary year of entry tenure and variables closely related to general training in congress specifically assignment to powerful legislative committees acquisition of broad skill packages investment in expanding skill set proficiencies and to a lesser extent life cycle driven declines in such investments