prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

entry its deterrence and its accommodation a study of the u s photographic film industry this work set in the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1987 examines firm level demand based and cost based explanations for entry and accommodation strategies in the u s photographic film industry i first estimate preentry and postentry market structures then using the estimated demand cost and market conduct parameters i show how entry by fuji photo or lack thereof by others is a function of two market structures i also show how market structure and conduct and changes in them over the pre and postentry periods are in turn functions of entry its deterrence and it accommodation

commitment and compromise in bargaining abstract this paper studies observable and irrevocable commitment in bargaining we investigate when commitment tactics can cause an impasse and when compromise is feasible in the static model in which a player s commitment decision is made simultaneously with his choice of bargaining stance compromise becomes unattainable ellingsen and miettinen 2008 we first analyze a static bargaining model in which the players decide whether to attempt commitment after announcing their demands in contrast to the aforementioned strong result our model accommodates both incompatible commitments and compromises as equilibrium outcomes we then extend our analysis to a dynamic setting it is shown that compromise is possible if the players can alter their demands quickly and the chances of successful commitment are low

bargaining and waning commitments this paper presents a non cooperative two agent two period complete information bargaining model that introduces gradual concession as observed for example in labor negotiations the capacity of concession may affect the agents payoffs in a non monotonic way since its change may cause the timing of agreement to change d 2006 elsevier b v all rights reserved

favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts abstract this paper studies the rationale for giving preference to domestic firms in the award of government contracts when the regulator is interested in maximizing domestic welfare it is seen that in the absence of comparative advantages the regulator should discriminate in favor of the domestic firms because foreign firms profits do not enter in domestic welfare furthermore i show that the form of the discrimination function depends on the mechanism being used in order to simplify the implementation of an optimal policy the regulator should choose mechanisms based on second price auctions

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

reaping what you sow an empirical analysis of international patent harmonization abstract this paper extends analysis of the gatt uruguay round by quantifying the impact of international patent harmonization as implied by the trips agreement patent harmonization has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries the us being the major beneficiary developing countries are major contributors to these transfers but canada the uk and japan also make sizable contributions

the competitive effects of a new product introduction a case study this paper analyzes the competitive effect of a new product introduction we break the overall competitive effect into two parts the effect on the prices of existing products due to increased competition and the effect of having additional product variety using data from both before and after the introduction we directly estimate the price effects and the additional variety effect then using only the estimated post introduction demand structure along with an assumed model of competition we estimate the price effects indirectly by comparing the indirect and direct estimates we assess the validity of alternative models of competition for the industry

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

no compromise uncertain costs in reputational bargaining abstract i show how uncertainty about agents future costs of delay can lead to substantial bargaining delays when agents have reputational concerns reputational concerns arise because with positive probability agents are behavioral types committed to demanding a fixed share of the surplus in equilibrium rational agents may demand almost the entire surplus and then wait with the deadlock only broken by the arrival of news about future costs even as the probability of behavioral types vanishes although both agents would benefit from a compromise reached immediately they do not propose such agreements because doing so would increase an opponent s option value of waiting

determinants of patent rights a cross national study abstract this paper presents an index of patent rights for 110 countries for the period 1960 1990 the index is used to examine what factors or characteristics of economies determine how strongly patent rights will be protected the evidence does indicate that more developed economies tend to provide stronger protection but the underlying factors which influence patent protection levels are the country s level of research and development r d activity market environment and international integration which are correlated with its level of development the results qualify however that r d activity influences patent protection levels after a nation s research sector reaches a critical size an implication of this is that to raise patent protection levels in weakly protecting countries it is important to foster a significant research base in those countries and thereby create incentives for protecting patent rights

foreign patent rights and high tech exports evidence from taiwan this paper conducts a consecutive pooled data analysis from 1989 to 2000 to investigate the relationship between foreign patent rights fprs and the exports of three high tech industries in taiwan the semiconductor the information and the communication equipment industries following smith s model setup empirical results indicate that both market expansion and market power effects do exist in taiwan s case in addition this paper proposes a new hypothesis in which the importing country may exhibit a stronger r d ability than the exporting country a case that has not been considered in earlier empirical work finally a test is made to determine if a trips trade related intellectual property rights agreement has any impact on the fprs exports relationship and no evidence is found of a structural change after the implementation of trips

bargaining without a common prior an immediate agreement theorem in sequential bargaining models without outside options each player s bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when this paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement the main result states that despite this if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future then in equilibrium they will agree immediately this result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism

bargaining with imperfect commitment abstract we study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two person bargaining games by establishing the reputation for being stubborn a player sometimes commits to her initial demand becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent when the probability of being stubborn is small the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness a player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and or is more likely to be stubborn journal of economic literature classification number c78

patent rights and trade analysis of biological products medicinals and botanicals and pharmaceuticals this article analyzes the effects of foreign patent rights on u s bilateral exports the empirical analysis covers three highly disaggregated drug industries over three decades we estimate bilateral trade equations for each industry using cross country data on the strength of national patent rights the findings show that strong foreign patent rights enhance the market power of u s drug exporters across countries with weak imitative abilities alternatively strong foreign patent rights stimulate the market expansion of u s drug exports across countries with strong imitative abilities these effects are larger in magnitude during the 1980 90s relative to the 1970s copyright 2002 oxford university press

tough negotiations bilateral bargaining with durable commitments abstract we offer a tractable model of tough negotiations and delayed agreement the setting is an infinite horizon bilateral bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers commitments decay stochastically but uncommitted negotiators can make new commitments the game s unique markov perfect equilibrium outcome takes the form of a war of attrition negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers but agreement occurs once a negotiator s commitment decays if commitments decay more quickly the terms of the agreement become more equal in expectation more patient committed and less risk averse negotiators obtain a larger fraction of the surplus

optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining we study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non cooperative bargaining game two impatient players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant recognition probabilities before bargaining a player can commit to some part of the surplus this commitment remains binding until the surplus has shrunk below the amount that the player is committed to intuitively one cannot remain committed to something which has become impossible the model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for the bargaining outcome in a version of the game where both players may simultaneously choose their commitments the equal split emerges from within a range of equilibrium divisions as a focal point which is robust to changes in the model parameters 2012

innovative activity and sunk cost abstract we analyze innovative activity in a general framework with time dependent rewards and sunk costs when firms are identical innovation is delayed by an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the size of the reward when one firm has higher profit potential it is more likely to innovate first our framework generalizes an all pay auction however we show that under certain conditions there is qualitatively different equilibrium behavior

gambling over public opinion we consider bargaining environments in which public opinion provides leverage by making compromises costly two parties make initial demands before knowing the public opinion if deadlocked they can bargain again after public opinion forms but suffer reputation costs if they compromise i e scale back their demands we show that in equilibrium parties may choose to make incompatible demands initially and gamble over public opinion even though one or both parties must bear a cost later we characterize when deadlocks arise and how this affects the welfare of the public in a representative two party democracy compared to a direct democracy

reputation and patience in the war of attrition this article presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame perfect equilibria that exist in a standard concession game with complete information the authors extend the description of a game to include a specific irrational mixed strategy for each player depending on the irrational strategies chosen the authors demonstrate that this approach may select a unique equilibrium in which the weaker player concedes immediately a player is weaker if he is more impatient or if his irrational strategy is to wait in any period with the higher probability copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

an empirical model of optimal dynamic product launch and exit under demand uncertainty this paper considers the decision problem of a firm that is uncertain about the demand and hence profitability of a new product we develop a model of a decision maker who sequentially learns about the true product profitability from observed product sales based on the current information the decision maker decides whether to scrap the product central to this decision problem are sequential information gathering and the option value of scrapping the product at any point in time the model predicts the optimal demand for information e g in the form of test marketing and it predicts how the launch or exit policy depends on the firm s demand uncertainty furthermore it predicts what fraction of newly developed products should be launched on average and what fraction of these products will fail i e exit the model is solved using numerical dynamic programming techniques we present an application of the model to the case of the u s ready to eat breakfast cereal industry simulations show that the value of reducing uncertainty can be large and that under higher uncertainty firms should strongly increase the fraction of all new product opportunities launched even if their point estimate of profits is negative alternative simpler decision rules are shown to lead to large profit losses compared to our method finally we find that the high observed exit rate in the u s ready to eat cereal industry is optimal and to be expected based on our model

a bargaining model based on the commitment tactic abstract this paper studies a one shot simultaneous move bargaining game each bargainer makes a partial commitment a share of the unit size cake that she would like to get which can later be revoked at some cost to the player the payoffs are defined in part by the nash bargaining solution where the feasible utility set is affected by the players partial commitments under certain assumptions on the two cost of revoking functions we establish that the model has a unique nash equilibrium it is shown that a player s equilibrium share of the cake is strictly increasing in her marginal cost of revoking a partial commitment an application of our model selects a unique equilibrium in nash s demand game journal of economic literature classification number c78

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

commitment and conflict in bilateral bargaining building on crawford 1982 we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c our primary solution concept is iterated strict dominance if commitment attempts never fail there are three solutions in two solutions all the surplus goes to one player in the third solution there is a high probility of con ict if commitment attempts succeed with probability q 1 the unique solution entails con ict with probability q 2 when c 0 analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests a two person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a commitme nt type who will always play this strategy then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one this result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the folk theorem for games with incomplete information copyright 1993 by the econometric society

patents and patent policy a patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention this right is sometimes termed an intellectual property right and is viewed as an incentive for innovation this article surveys the evidence on patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews the current controversies in patent policy

are weak patent rights a barrier to u s exports abstract this paper assesses whether how and to what extent u s exports are sensitive to national differences in patent rights i estimate bilateral trade equations that account for trade distortions related to patent rights using data on state to country manufacturing exports in 1992 i find that weak patent rights are a barrier to u s exports but only to countries that pose a strong threat of imitation e g china the stronger patent rights required under the wto agreement increase u s exports to these high threat markets alternatively strengthening patent rights in countries that pose a weak threat of imitation reinforces monopoly power and reduces u s exports to these markets

the north s intellectual property rights standard for the south abstract we build a multi sectoral north south trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights ipr protection by comparing the nash equilibrium ipr protection standard of the south the developing countries with that of the north the developed countries we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter moreover we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the south to harmonize its ipr standards with those of the north and the north to liberalize its traditional goods market this demonstrates the merits of multi sectoral negotiations in the gatt wto

bargaining with revoking costs abstract a simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed the players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie if the demands add up to more than one the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the other s offer while both parties sticking to their offers leads to an impasse accepting a lower share than the original demand is costly for each party the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the game is characterized for continuously differentiable payoff and cost functions strictly increasing in the pie share and the amount conceded respectively higher cost functions are shown to improve bargaining power the limit equilibrium prediction of the model as the cost functions are made arbitrarily high selects a unique equilibrium in the nash demand game that corresponds to a proportional bargaining solution of kalai 1977

bargaining reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts consider a two person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period and collect payoffs as a function of that period s actions while bargaining proceeds this can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split because a folk theorem applies perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided as the perturbation probabilities approach zero behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent s play in equilibrium rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues how much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining in both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the nash bargaining with threats nbwt theory developed for two stage games in any perfect bayesian equilibrium she can guarantee herself virtually her nbwt payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy in every period ask for and accept nothing less than that player s nbwt share and while waiting for the other side to concede take the action nash recommends as a threat in his two stage game the results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others this is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two sided reputational perturbations and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go

on the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties the presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes this paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining when parties have access to stationary outside options we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible a similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option

how trade related are intellectual property rights abstract there is little empirical evidence about whether differing international levels of patent protection influence trade flows if a nation strengthens its patent laws it could experience higher or lower imports we specify an empirical model in which deviations of bilateral sectoral imports from anticipated levels are related to income trade barriers and patent laws patent regulations in the importing country are corrected for endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables the results of the final equations indicate that increasing patent protection has a positive impact on bilateral manufacturing imports into both small and large developing economies

the impact of patent rights on international trade evidence from canada the extent to which canadian manufacturing exports are sensitive to national differences in patent rights are examined the conclusion is that overall canadians tend to export more to those countries where their patent rights are highly safeguarded stronger patent protection induces canadians to export relatively more to high income countries than to low income countries in addition the effect of stronger patent rights is to increase exports to those countries that pose a strong threat of imitation and to reduce exports to those countries that pose the weakest threat of imitation jel classification f13 o34 impact de la propriete des brevets sur le commerce international resultats pour le canada ce memoire examine jusqu a quel point les exportations manufacturieres canadiennes sont sensibles aux differences dans la propriete des brevets entre pays l etude conclut que les canadiens tendent a exporter davantage vers les pays ou la propriete des brevets est hautement protegee il appert que la plus forte protection de la propriete des brevets tend a faire que les canadiens exportent relativement plus vers les pays a hauts revenus que vers ceux a plus faibles revenus de plus il appert que l effet de la plus forte protection des brevets est d accroitre les exportations vers les pays qui posent une forte menace d imitation et de reduire les exportations vers les pays qui posent la plus faible menace d imitation

patent enforcement a review of the literature without the confidence that patent rights can be enforced quickly and efficiently when needed the patent system will not stimulate innovation for this reason governments academics international institutions and the private sector have poured significant resources into gathering and analysing statistics on patent enforcement over the last two decades this paper reviews these studies and finds that while infringement is relatively common much enforcement occurs informally and less than 1 2 of patents incur litigation new strategic uses of the enforcement system especially by nonpracticing entities are the major emerging enforcement issue especially in the united states while the old problem of litigation costs attracts the lion s share of empirical attention it has produced remarkably few solutions to date

a reputation refinement without equilibrium the economic literature concerning agents reputations has grown steadily since the seminal work of kreps milgrom roberts and wilson 2 early work focused on how incomplete information leads to equilibria that are vastly different but more intuitive than those possible in the complete information game recently however game theorists have been studying how incomplete information might refine the set of equilibria 3 one important class of games is that in which a single long run agent plays a simultaneous move stage game with a sequence of opponents each of whom plays only once yet observes all previous play fudenberg and levine 1989 study the reputation of the long run player in this type of game they argue that the most reasonable equilibrium is the one which the long run player most prefers their intuition is sustained when one perturbs the game with the stackelberg strategy fudenberg and levine show that in the perturbed game the equilibrium payoffs of the long run player are bounded below by a number that converges to the stackelberg payoff

the effect of patents on trade abstract in contrast with quotas and tariffs it is theoretically ambiguous whether fewer or weaker rules over intellectual property rights will increase or decrease trade in patentable goods the prevailing view is that anticipation of imitation reduces exporters incentive to export goods to jurisdictions with weak patent regimes this empirical paper uses new measures of how the destination country patent system can affect trade in contrast with existing studies which assume would be exporters can always get a patent in the target foreign market we construct measures of the bias against foreign patent applicants and patents which may block imported goods we find evidence that the presence of destination country blocking patents has the larger negative impact on international trade being refused a patent also has a negative impact on trade but the magnitude is smaller

do stronger patent rights raise high tech exports to the developing world abstract despite over 20 years of debate the trips agreement remains very contentious this paper evaluates the impact of strengthening patent rights prs in developing countries on developed countries exports over the 1962 2000 period colonial origin is used to isolate exogenous variation in prs the impact is then identified by examining the cross industry difference in sensitivity to prs i find that the increase in prs made in response to the trips agreement added about 35 billion 2000 us dollars to the value of developed countries patent sensitive exports into 18 developing countries this amount is equivalent to an 8 6 increase in these developing countries annual value of patent sensitive imports the increase in the value of exports was driven by a quantity rather than a price increase

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment abstract bilateral sequential negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal and if the common discount factor is close enough to one journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c78 j52

how do foreign patent rights affect u s exports affiliate sales and licenses abstract this paper analyzes how foreign patent rights fprs affect us exports affiliate sales and licenses our approach is distinctive in three ways we apply ownership location and internalization concepts to link fprs with servicing decisions we account for the simultaneity of servicing decisions we estimate the relative effects of fprs on exports affiliate sales and licenses empirical findings show strong fprs increase us affiliate sales and licenses particularly across countries with strong imitative abilities further fprs have a larger effect on us knowledge transferred outside the country and firm relative to knowledge located inside the country and internalized inside the firm

bargaining with history dependent preferences abstract two impatient players bargain over a pie of size one according to the infinite alternating offers procedure players payoffs depend not only on the outcome but also on the process of the bargaining specifically they prefer impasse to any agreement that gives them lower discounted utility than would have been derived from accepting earlier offers we characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium path which consists of gradual concessions the more patient players are the longer it takes them to reach an agreement when players become infinitely patient the efficiency loss is substantial yet the equilibrium division converges to the nash solution

international protection of intellectual property we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy we consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation after describing the determination of national patent policies in a non cooperative regime of patent protection we ask why is intellectual property better protected in the north than in the south we also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency jel o34 f13 during the 1980 s and early 1990 s the united states and several european countries expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of intellectual property in many developing countries the developed countries made the upgrading of intellectual property rights iprs one of their highest priorities for the uruguay round of trade talks their efforts bore fruit in the agreement on traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights trips which was approved as part of the final act of the uruguay round trips establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intellectual property for example in the area of new technology it essentially harmonizes

audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining in crisis bargaining literature it is conventional wisdom that the ability of generating higher audience costs is an advantage for a leader of a state however empirical studies show that democratic states use this mechanism only occasionally this paper formally shows that higher audience costs may be good or bad depending on 1 the benefit cost ratio of the crisis 2 initial probability of resolve and 3 how fast states generate audience costs with time in particular if the value of the prize over the cost of attacking is low or the initial probability of resolve is high enough then having greater ability to generate audience costs may undermine democratic states diplomatic success

markov perfect equilibrium in the us digital camera market abstract this paper examines the model launch and withdrawal decisions of the major digital camera makers for the period 1996 1999 these manufacturers produce differentiated products and some have the experience of participating in a similar market the film camera market this paper investigates to what extent the following four factors affect firms decisions to launch a new model of digital camera the effects of competition with within brand models the effects of competition with cross brand models the level of experience in the film camera market and market conditions the empirical findings suggest that good market conditions can accommodate more products which has a positive effect on product launches on the other hand existing cross brand models have a negative effect on product launches while within brand models and experience in similar markets have an ambiguous effect on product launches