modeling local growth control decisions in a multi city case do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter our article analyzes the determinants of local growth control decisions which are modeled as the result of a political struggle between different groups of voters and organized lobbies we show that under specific hypotheses a higher homeownership rate can induce lower levels of controls considering residential choices as endogenous to growth control policies the local decisions to control growth become strategically interdependent assuming imperfect mobility we show that a spatial econometric specification can be directly derived from our theoretical model our empirical analysis concerning the determinants of the taxelocale d equipement a french local development tax is thus naturally based on spatial econometrics its results confirm the major predictions of our model

the market evolution and sales takeoff of product innovations in contrast to the prevailing supply side explanation that price decreases are the key driver of a sales takeoff we argue that outward shifting supplyand demand curves lead to market takeoff our fundamental idea is that sales in new markets are initially low because the first commercialized forms of new innovations are primitive then as new firms enter actual and perceived product quality improves and prices possibly drop which leads to a takeoff in sales to provide empirical evidence for this explanation we explore the relationship between takeoff times price decreases and firm entry for a sample of consumer and industrial product innovations commercialized in the united states over the past 150 years based on a proportional hazards analysis of takeoff times we find that new firm entry dominates other factors in explaining observed sales takeoff times we interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand shifts during the early evolution of a new market due to nonprice factors is the key driver of a sales takeoff

a percolation based model explaining delayed takeoff in new product diffusion a model of new product diffusion is proposed in which a site percolation dynamics represents socially driven diffusion of knowledge about the product s characteristics in a population of consumers a consumer buys the new product if her valuation of it formed after her witnessing the product in use among her friends or neighbors is not below the price of the product announced in a given period our model attributes the empirical finding of a delayed takeoff of a new product to a drift of the percolation dynamics from a nonpercolating regime to a percolating regime this drift is caused by learning effects lowering the price of the product or by network effects increasing its individual valuations by consumers both with an increasing number of buyers

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

demand heterogeneity and technology evolution implications for product and process innovation the evolution of technology has been a central issue in the strategy and organizations literature however the focus of much of this work has been on what is essentially the supply side of technical change the evolution of firm capabilities we present a demand based view of technology evolution that is focused on the interaction between technology development and the demand environment in which the technology is ultimately evaluated we develop a formal computer simulation model that explicitly considers the influence of heterogeneity in market demand the presence of consumers with different needs and requirements on firms innovation choices the model is used to examine the dynamics of product and process innovation utterback and abernathy 1975 the analysis reveals that demand heterogeneity offers an alternative to supply side explanations of the technology life cycle further by considering the implications of decreasing marginal utility from performance improvements the model highlights the role of technologically satisfied consumers in shaping innovation incentives and suggests a rationale for a new stage in the technology life cycle characterized by increasing performance at a stable price the stage has not yet been treated formally in the literature but is widely observed most prominently in digital and information based technologies

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

do voters demand responsive governments evidence from indian disaster relief abstract using rainfall public relief and election data from india we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses the data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control however fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters we also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election in accordance with these electoral incentives governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years these results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes

bargaining in the shadow of the ballot box causes and consequences of local voter initiatives this paper provides one of the first empirical analyses of the local voter initiative using a unique and comprehensive dataset from california it analyzes determinants of local initiatives and effects of these measures on municipal finances results indicate that initiatives occur more frequently in large and diverse jurisdictions with more recent movers voters unaffiliated with a major political party and public employees effects of city size are partly offset by district or ward level elections contrary to previous research on statewide initiatives this study detects a positive and weakly significant relationship between local initiative use and own source revenues per capita and no association between initiatives and the proportion of funds raised from fees these divergent findings may reflect distinctive features of the local context including greater latitude for political bargaining and the centrality of land use as well as potential constraining effects of statewide initiatives in california

the condorcet jury theorem free speech and correlated votes one of the more optimistic if obscure propositions about democracy is condorcet s jury theorem cjt the theorem establishes that under certain conditions a majority of a group with limited information about a pair of alternatives is more likely to choose the better alternative than any one member of the group the theorem thus provides a mathematical basis for majority rule voting and potentially gives an important clue to our understanding of the strength of democratic government yet cjt makes two overly restrictive assumptions it assumes that individuals vote independently and that they share a common goal clearly the assumptions preclude any application of the theorem to democratic politics not surprisingly black 1963 163 ruled that the theorem offers truly an unpromising start recently interest in the theorem was revived by miller 1986 who permits voters to have conflicting goals and by grofman and feld 1988 who link it with rousseau s general will miller 1986 and grofman and feld 1988 however retain the assumption of independence in this paper i generalize cjt for correlated votes and offer an analytical basis for free speech moreover i apply the generalized theorem to organization theory who should a chief executive choose as advisers the main results of the paper are summarized for large groups condorcet s result would hold under fairly general conditions for small groups the conditions are severe finally under reasonable assumptions p the probability that a majority selects the

federalism and accountability with distorted election choices abstract random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re election of politicians and can reduce accountability such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions furthermore equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions

technological extinctions of industrial firms an inquiry into their nature and causes after a buildup in the number of firms new industries commonly experience a shakeout in which the number of firms declines sharply three theoretical perspectives on how technological change contributes to industry shakeouts are analyzed the theories are used to synthesize predictions concerning technological change and industry evolution the predictions inform an analysis of four us industries that experienced sharp shakeouts automobiles tires televisions and penicillin using data on firm participation and innovation from the commercial inception of the four products through their formative eras we uncover regularities in how the products evolved the regularities suggest that shakeouts are not triggered by particular technological innovations nor by dominant designs but by an evolutionary process in which technological innovation contributes to a mounting dominance by some early entering firms copyright 1997 by oxford university press

will it ever fly modeling the takeoff of really new consumer durables a consistent pattern observed for really new household consumer durables is a takeoff or dramatic increase in sales early in their history the takeoff tends to appear as an elbow shaped discontinuity in the sales curve showing an average sales increase of over 400 in contrast most marketing textbooks as well as diffusion models generally depict the growth of new consumer durables as a smooth sales curve our discussions with managers indicate that they have little idea about the takeoff and its associated characteristics many managers did not even know that most successful new consumer durables had a distinct takeoff their sales forecasts tend to show linear growth yet knowledge about the takeoff is crucial for managers to decide whether to maintain increase or withdraw support of new products it is equally important for industry analysts who advise investors and manufacturers of complementary and substitute products although previous studies have urged researchers to examine the takeoff no research has addressed this critical event while diffusion models are commonly used to study new product sales growth they do not explicitly consider a new product s takeoff in sales indeed diffusion researchers frequently use data only from the point of takeoff therefore nothing is known about the takeoff or models appropriate for this event our study provides the first analysis of the takeoff in particular we address three key questions i how much time does a newly introduced product need to takeoff ii does the takeoff have any systematic patterns iii can we predict the takeoff we begin our study by developing an operational measure to determine when the takeoff occurs we found that when the base level of sales is small a relatively large percentage increase could occur without signaling the takeoff conversely when the base level of sales is large the takeoff sometimes occurs with a relatively small percentage increase in sales therefore we developed a threshold for takeoff this is a plot of percentage sales growth relative to a base level of sales common across all categories we define the takeoff as the first year in which an individual category s growth rate relative to base sales crosses this threshold the threshold measure correctly identifies the takeoff in over 90 of our categories we model the takeoff with a hazard model because of its advantages for analyzing time based events we consider three primary independent variables price year of introduction and market penetration as well as several control variables the hazard model fits the pattern of takeoffs very well with price and market penetration being strong correlates of takeoff our results provide potential generalizations about the time to takeoff and the price reduction nominal price and penetration at takeoff in particular we found that on average for 16 post world war ii categories the price at takeoff is 63 of the introductory price the time to takeoff from introduction is six years the penetration at takeoff is 1 7 the time to takeoff is decreasing for more recent categories for example the time to takeoff is 18 years for categories introduced before world war ii but only six years for those introduced after world war ii many of the products in our sample had a takeoff near three specific price points in nominal dollars 1000 500 and 100 in addition we show how the hazard model can be used to predict the takeoff the model predicts takeoff one year ahead with an expected average error of 1 2 years it predicts takeoff at a product s introduction with an expected average error of 1 9 years even against the simple mean time to takeoff of six years for recent categories the model s performance represents a tremendous improvement in prediction it represents an immeasurable improvement in prediction for managers who currently have no idea about how long it takes for a new product to takeoff the threshold rule for determining takeoff can be used to distinguish between a large increase in sales and a real takeoff some limitations of this study could provide fruitful areas for future research our independent variables suffer from endogeneity bias so alternative variables or methods could address this limitation also the takeoff may be related to additional variables such as relative advantage over substitutes and the presence of complementary products finally examination of sales from takeoff to their leveling off could be done with an integrated model of takeoff and sales growth or with the hazard model we propose generalizations about this period of sales growth could also be of tremendous importance to managers of new products

fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered recent studies examining the relation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth have failed to take account of the extent of the independent taxing powers available to sub national governments and thus have substantially overstated the degree of effective decentralization results from a cross section study of 19 oecd member countries suggest that when the measure of fiscal decentralization is limited to the revenues over which sub national governments have full autonomy its impact on economic growth is not statistically significant

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

a diffusion model incorporating product benefits price income and information we start by assuming that a major benefit of many new durable products such as dishwashers and microwave ovens is time savings others such as vcrs also enhance the value of our leisure time using a household production framework we demonstrate that a utility maximizing individual will have a reservation price for the product which is a function of the product benefits and his wage rate by assuming that the wage rate has an extreme value distribution across the population we are able to derive for the aggregate process an income price dependent logistic adoption equation we then allow for the possibility that certain eligible consumers may delay their purchase of the product because they are unaware that it exists are suspicious of its quality or expect its price to fall unawareness uncertainty and hope for further price declines are assumed to decrease with the increase in the number of previous adopters the resulting diffusion model has the property that the product life cycle phenomenon can be explained jointly or separately by the income price process and the awareness uncertainty expectations process using data on household income on durable penetration within different income classes and on first purchase sales the aggregate diffusion model and its premises are tested and supported it is found that both the income price and awareness uncertainty expectations processes are at work however the dependence of the awareness uncertainty expectations delay process on the number of previous adopters e g word of mouth type effect exists only in certain product categories and is usually relatively weak it is demonstrated that if the word of mouth type effects are weak a price skimming strategy is optimal for a monopolist and also is likely to be implemented by oligopolists the sales forecasting implications of the model also are pursued

innovation diffusion in the presence of supply restrictions innovation diffusion models are developed to represent the spread of a new product from its manufacturers to its ultimate users in the marketplace however the growth of a new product can be retarded by supply restrictions such as the unavailability of the product due to limitations on the production capacity or difficulties encountered in setting up distribution systems in the presence of supply restrictions diffusion models must be developed to capture the dynamics of supply restrictions and to allow management to evaluate the impact of such supply restrictions on the growth of a new product in the market place based on the bass innovation diffusion model the objective of this paper is to suggest a parsimonious diffusion model that integrates the demand side dynamics with the supply side restrictions the sensitivity of innovation diffusion patterns in the presence of supply restrictions is examined an application examining the diffusion of new telephones in israel is documented to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed model

direct democracy and land use policy exchanging public goods for development rights to counter the power of pro development interests growth opponents in american communities have increasingly turned to the institutions of direct democracy this study analyses the effects of one type of direct democracy voter requirements for new development on municipal growth analysing data from a sample of california communities we consider the impact of voter requirements on the land use process and outcomes we find that in general voter requirements fail to stop new development property owners and developers can and do adapt to the constraints created by these direct democracy institutions we also find however that voter requirements change the land use process in important ways specifically they change the way developers interact with interest groups in the community and force developers to compensate current residents for enduring some of the negative aspects of growth

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization abstract this paper explores the endogenous formation of jurisdictions assuming the political process is a costly fight to acquire shares of the gnp pie in such a setting the stability of a unified jurisdiction is not necessarily determined by the preferences of the richest member region we also show that a system of federalism is especially significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict less resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierarchical system of federalism than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central government

shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision abstract recent decentralization reforms in developing countries have often lead to the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in given policy areas triggering new accountability issues this paper provides a novel theoretical treatment of the efficiency consequences of such partial expenditure decentralization it develops a political agency model in which two levels of government are involved in the provision of a local public good with voters imperfectly informed about each government s contribution to the public good a central result of the model is that partial decentralization is desirable only if the benefits of vertical complementarity in public good provision outweigh the costs of reduced accountability which result from detrimental vertical strategic interactions operating through the electoral process through variants of the model the interplay between decentralization and democratization is analyzed from a positive point of view the model predicts a relationship between electoral incentives and equilibrium decentralization

evolutionary trends of industry variables abstract the paper offers empirical evidence on the evolutionary trends of industry variables it investigates the time path of patents product price and quantity and number of firms from the first introduction of a product to maturity of the market the paper extends earlier work by gort and klepper by expanding the data on products through 1991 and augmenting it with new products and new data sources the reexamination of the aging patterns reveal the gort and klepper results to be robust the time trends follow the expected patterns with remarkable consistency and are strongly significant for most products new evidence on patenting activity reveal an eventual decline in technological activity over the later years of the product market life cycle

revealed yardstick competition local government efficiency patterns in norway this paper investigates whether the production efficiency of norwegian local governments exhibits a spatial pattern that is compatible with the hypothesis of yardstick competition in order to check whether yardstick competition is really responsible for the observed spatial pattern and rule out alternative theoretical explanations the paper exploits unique information from a survey on local politicians attitudes towards comparative evaluation of local bureaus performances against other jurisdictions benchmarking merging the latter information with the observed interdependence in efficiency the paper provides evidence that comparative performance evaluation generates positive spatial auto correlation in local efficiency indicators

the making of an oligopoly firm survival and technological change in the evolution of the u s tire industry the number of producers in the u s tire industry grew for 25 years and then declined sharply and the industry evolved to be an oligopoly the role of technological change in shaping the industry s market structure is explored a model of industry evolution featuring technological change is used to derive predictions that are tested using a novel data set on firm entry exit size location distribution networks and technological choices prior to the shakeout of producers consistent with the model earlier entering and larger firms survived longer principally because of the influence of age and size on technological change

social contagion and income heterogeneity in new product diffusion a meta analytic test standard diffusion models capture social contagion only coarsely and do not allow one to operationalize different contagion mechanisms moreover there is increasing skepticism about the importance of contagion and as has long been known s shaped diffusion curves can also result from heterogeneity in the propensity to adopt we present hypotheses about conditions under which specific contagion mechanisms and income heterogeneity are more pronounced and test these hypotheses using a meta analysis of the q p ratio in applications of the bass diffusion model the ratio is positively associated with the gini index of income inequality in a country supporting the heterogeneity in thresholds interpretation the ratio also varies as predicted by the gamma shifted gompertz diffusion model but the evidence vanishes after controlling for national culture as to contagion the q p ratio varies with the four hofstede dimensions of national culture for three of them in a direction consistent with the social contagion interpretation furthermore products with competing standards have a higher q p ratio which is again consistent with the social contagion interpretation finally we find effects of national culture only for products without competing standards suggesting that technological effects and culturally moderated social contagion effects might not operate independently from each other

the choice of municipal government structure and public expenditures numerous empirical studies have attempted to measure the effect of varying government structures on public expenditures i argue that these prior may have produced biased estimates as they are predicated on the assumption that government structures are exogenous

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

fiscal effects of the voter initiative in the first half of the twentieth century abstract this paper compares the fiscal policy of initiative and noninitiative states in the first half of the twentieth century states with initiatives had higher combined state and local expenditure after controlling for income and other demographics but a lower ratio of state to local expenditure this together with existing evidence from later in the century suggests that the voter initiative does not have a consistent effect on the overall size of state and local government however it does systematically lead to more decentralized expenditure

demand heterogeneity and technology evolution the evolution of technology has been a central issue in the strategy and organizations literature however the focus of much of this work has been on what is essentially the supply side of techn

accountability and fiscal equalization abstract a common feature of multi jurisdictional systems is equalization programs the implementation of such programs that is based on some measurement of sub national fiscal capacity and effort is particularly complex within a political economy model this paper analyzes the impact of such systems on accountability identifying a positive and a negative effect the positive effect arises because with equalized fiscal resources a consequence of equalization citizens attach more importance to any remaining variation in public good supplies and so punish rent taking more severely this induces politicians to restrain themselves and so accountability improves the negative effect arises because the complexity of such programs reduces the informational content of observed public good supplies this introduces a perverse fiscal incentive that reduces accountability thus the overall impact of equalization programs on accountability depends on the balance of these effects

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

empirical generalizations and marketing science a personal view marketing has matured to the point where it seems desirable to take stock of where we are what we have learned and fruitful directions for extending the knowledge base that has developed science is a process involving the interaction between empirical generalizations and theory an empirical generalization is a pattern or regularity that repeats over different circumstances and that can be described simply by mathematical graphic or symbolic methods one of the purposes of the empirical generalizations conference held at wharton on february 16 18 1994 was to develop a list of examples of such empirical generalizations in marketing empirical generalization can precede a theory to explain it or it can be predicted by a theory science is the process of interaction between theory and data that leads to higher level theories examples are provided here of empirical generalizations in marketing and their theoretical counterparts one example is provided of a higher level theory

fiscal decentralization and economic growth a cross country study abstract we use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970 1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth we find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries but none in developed countries several explanations are offered for our findings

a political agency model of coattail voting abstract this paper provides a theoretical model for the coattail effect where a popular candidate for one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government i assume a political agency framework with moral hazard in order to analyze the coattail effect in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections i show that coattail voting is the outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians efforts in a retrospective voting environment i assume that an office motivated politician executive or member of congress prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party this correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or to different parties two sided coattail effects then arise on the one hand an executive s success props up while failure drags down her partisan ally in the congressional election which implies a presidential coattail effect on the other hand the executive s reelection itself is affected by a congress member s performance which results in a reverse coattail effect

the life cycle of a competitive industry firm numbers first rise then later fall as an industry evolves this nonmonotonicity is explained using a competitive model in which innovation opportunities fuel entry and relative failure to innovate prompts exit equilibrium time paths for price and quantity also share features of the data the model is estimated using data from the u s automobile tire industry a particularly dramatic example of the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

rent seeking spillovers and the benefits of decentralization abstract in the presence of spillovers decentralized provision of local public goods may lead to a higher surplus than centralized provision even though localities have identical preferences indeed free riding costs associated to decentralization can be lower than the costs of rent seeking and influence activities under centralization actually centralization yields a higher level of regional surplus only if both the spillover effect from local public spending is sufficiently large and the elasticity of the influence function is sufficiently small

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines