trade and protection in vertically related markets abstract we consider home country tariff and subsidy policies in a setting where a home firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated firm for supplies of a key input the firms are cournot competitors in the home market for the final product we show that a tariff on final product imports may cause the foreign vertically integrated firm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price supply conditions for the input significantly affect whether imports of the input should be taxed or subsidized

a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one sided incomplete information we characterize the sequential equilibria of a class of infinite horizon bargaining games with one sided incomplete information when the seller the uninformed party makes all the offers we prove a folk theorem every incentive compatible individually rational direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria introducing buyer counteroffers eliminates outcomes which are unfavorable to that party as the proportion of buyer offers increases the set of implementable mechanisms shrinks continuously when the proportion reaches one only the single outcome most favorable to the buyer remains thus depending on the offer structure sequentiality may or may not impose restrictions beyond static incentive compatibility

market power in emission permit markets theory and evidence from the eu ets a well known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm i show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone i then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase i of the eu ets i find that some firms excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions my results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets

the limits of attraction consumer research has documented dozens of instances in which the introduction of an irrelevant third option affects preferences between the remaining two in nearly all such cases the unattractive dominated option enhances the attractiveness of the option it most resembles a phenomenon known as the attraction effect in the studies presented here however the authors contend that this phenomenon may be restricted to stylized product representations in which every product dimension is represented by a number e g a toaster oven that has a durability rating of 7 2 and ease of cleaning rating of 5 5 such effects do not typically occur when consumers experience the product e g taste a drink or when even one of the product attributes is represented perceptually e g differently priced hotel rooms whose quality is depicted with a photo the authors posit that perceptual representations of attributes do not support the sorts of comparisons that drive the attraction effect with highly stylized e

how limiting deceptive practices harms consumers there are two competing sellers of an experience good one offers high quality one low the low quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer we show that he could be better off when the low quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not we characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt we show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor with transshipment abstract this paper discusses a family of two stage decentralized inventory problems using a unifying framework taxonomy depicted as a multilevel graph this framework allows us to model and link different problems of competing retailers who independently procure inventory in response to uncertain demand and anticipated inventory decisions of other retailers in this family of problems in the ex post stage the retailers exercise recourse actions in response to the realized demand and competitors chosen procurement levels for example retailers could coordinate inventory transshipment to satisfy shortage with overage based on profit sharing agreements our framework provides a unifying parsimonious view using a single methodological prism for a variety of problems equally importantly as recourse options are laid out our framework clarifies and contributes a modeling connection between problems in a clear taxonomy of models this unifying perspective explicitly links work that appeared in isolation and offers future research directions

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

could ralph nader s entrance and exit have helped al gore the impact of decoy dynamics on consumer choice abstract people are frequently faced with making a new choice decision after a preferred option becomes unavailable prior research on the attraction effect has demonstrated how the introduction of an option into a choice set increases the share of one of the original options the authors examine the related but previously unaddressed issue of whether the unexpected exit of an option from a choice set returns the choice shares of the original options to the status quo in a series of experiments they observe that when an option turns out to be unselectable following a choice problem in which it was selectable the choice shares of the remaining options are predictably different from those of a choice problem in which the option was unselectable from the start they also observe that this attraction effect due to the disappearance of a decoy is likely a consequence of changes in the importance of decision criteria they conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of the research

asymmetric decoy effects on lower quality versus higher quality brands meta analytic and experimental evidence prior research demonstrates that adding decoys to choice sets can increase choice shares of brands similar to decoys while reducing shares of brands dissimilar to decoys such effects have been dubbed attraction effects and violate the principles of independence of irrelevant alternatives ha and regularity we report a meta analysis that in addition to revealing heretofore unsupported range effects demonstrates an effect of brand quality decoys reduce shares of lower quality competitors more than they reduce shares of higher quality competitors moreover whereas iia is violated throughout regularity is violated only when higher quality brands are targeted decoys increase shares of higher quality brands but typically do not increase shares of lower quality brands to assess the generalizability of the meta analytic pattern we tested decoy effects on two distinct populations in a large experiment the more traditional population replicated the meta analytic pattern standard asymmetry while the more nontraditional population reversed it these findings suggest that while the standard asymmetry is replicable it may not generalize to all market segments

reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus the share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first order knowledge of rationality is determined as a function of her probability of becoming committed as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much this maxmin share of the surplus is large relative to the probability of becoming committed e g it equals 30 if the commitment probability is 1 in 10 and equals 13 if the commitment probability is 1 in 1000 and the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement

modeling loss aversion and reference dependence effects on brand choice based upon a recently developed multiattribute generalization of prospect theory s value function tversky and kahneman 1991 we argue that consumer choice is influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points and that consumers weigh losses from a reference point more than equivalent sized gains loss aversion we sketch implications of this model for understanding brand choice we develop a multinomial logit formulation of a reference dependent choice model calibrating it using scanner data in addition to providing better fit in both estimation and forecast periods than a standard multinomial logit model the model s coefficients demonstrate significant loss aversion as hypothesized we also discuss the implications of a reference dependent view of consumer choice for modeling brand choice demonstrate that loss aversion can account for asymmetric responses to changes in product characteristics and examine other implications for competitive strategy

trips trade and technology transfer a north south model of unintentional technology transfer is developed where the stringency of southern patent protection provides the institutional backdrop for a strategic game in a high tech goods market the appropriability regime is set endogenously and combines elements of imperfect southern patent protection with the protection afforded by market made northern technology masking less stringent protection of northern intellectual property can work much like other strategic trade policies therefore developed countries appear to be right in demanding discussion of intellectual property rights in gatt

firm survival and industry evolution in vertically related populations this paper examines how the density and governance of vertically related populations affect the life chances of organizations we integrate the literatures on organizational ecology and vertical integration to develop a theory of how 1 specialized upstream industries affect downstream survival rates 2 the prevalence of different governance forms among upstream and downstream organizations moderates this relationship and 3 different forms of governance exert differential competitive pressures on focal organizations we find evidence supporting our hypotheses in an empirical examination of the downstream laser printer industry and upstream laser engine industry this paper was accepted by jesper sorensen organizations

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

monotonicity and rationalizability in a large first price auction this paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases wilson 1977 instead of analysing the symmetric nash equilibrium we examine rationalizable strategies bernheim 1984 pearce 1984 among the set of monotonic bidding strategies to prove that any monotonic rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the truthful valuation of the object conditioned on the signal received by the bidder we obtain an information aggregation result similar to that of wilson 1977 while dispensing with almost all symmetric assumptions and using a milder solution concept than the nash equilibrium in particular if every bidder is ex ante identical then any rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the symmetric nash equilibrium in a symmetric first price auction the symmetry of outcomes is implied rather than assumed copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

market boundaries and product choice illustrating attraction and substitution effects what happens to the share of choices each item receives when the choice set boundaries are extended by adding a new item that is extremely good on one dimension but poor on the others first there is a substitution effect whereby the new item takes choice share mainly from similar items in the set second there is an attraction effect resulting in a general shift of preference toward the added item experimental studies show that choice patterns conflict with current theoretical and common sense ideas about the effect of added alternatives on choice

strategic outsourcing revisited this paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market we apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by fudenberg and tirole 1984 to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market if firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals costs we illustrate our analysis using a linear cournot model

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

the effects of a content requirement on a foreign duopsonist abstract this paper considers the operation of a local content requirement in a duopsony between domestic and foreign firms and demonstrates its consequences for the domestic producer of a final good it is shown that content protection may have perverse effects on a foreign firm s profits and may be welfare improving overall shifting profits from the domestic firm to both the foreign firm and domestic input producers

the grouping of stars an application to professional sports abstract this paper uses a two period model to analyze competition for high quality labor in a professional sports market leagues vertically differentiate their products by competing for the services of a small number of stars thereby endogenizing the cost of product quality if utility is linear or convex in the number of stars one league successfully employs all of them this grouping of stars results in an equilibrium market structure of either a monopoly or a duopoly depending on the opportunity costs of players and the number of consumers market efficiency of the resulting equilibrium is then discussed

adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis an asymmetrically dominated alternative is dominated by one item in the set but not by another adding such an alternative to a choice set can increase the probability of choosing the item that dominates it this result points to the inadequacy of many current choice models and suggests product line strategies that might not otherwise be intuitively plausible

misleading advertising in duopoly this paper builds a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic markets with horizontal product differentiation and advertising externality between firms we investigate the effects of regulating misinformation on market competition behaviour of firms and social welfare we show that the degree of advertising externality and the magnitude of advertising costs are crucial for determining the welfare effects of several regulations including prohibiting misleading advertising educating consumers taxing production and taxing misleading advertising we extend the model by introducing heterogeneous consumers heterogeneous production costs between firms and the degree of advertising informativeness our results have important policy implications for the debate regarding regulation of advertising especially direct to consumer advertising for prescription and over the counter drugs ce texte construit un modele de publicite mensongere strategique dans des marches duopolistiques ou il y a differentiation horizontale des produits et externalites de publicite entre firmes on examine les effets d une reglementation de la desinformation sur la concurrence dans le marche sur le comportement des firmes et sur le bien etre social on montre que le degre d externalites de la publicite et la magnitude des couts de publicite sont des elements cruciaux pour determiner les effets de bien etre de plusieurs reglementations y compris prohiber la publicite mensongere eduquer les consommateurs taxer la production et taxer la publicite mensongere on developpe le modele pour prendre en compte les consommateurs heterogenes des couts de production heterogenes entre firmes et le contenu informationnel de la publicite ces resultats ont des implications importantes pour la politique publique dans les debats concernant la reglementation de la publicite en particulier la publicite directe au consommateur pour les medicaments avec et sans ordonnance

alternating offer bargaining with two sided incomplete information i study alternating offer bargaining games with two sided incomplete information about the players discount rates for both perfect bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability style notion i characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game i also construct bounds on agreements that may be made the set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models my main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players discount rates is of wide support yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution i prove a lopsided convergence result each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

close encounters of two kinds false alarms and dashed hopes people are frequently exposed to potentially attractive events that are subsequently and unexpectedly reversed and to potentially painful events which are also unexpectedly reversed in the process of being returned to the initial asset position does the sequence in which the positive and negative events occur matter this issue of the combined effect of pleasurable and painful stimuli has received scant theoretical or empirical attention we attempt to fill this lacuna in the literature by studying the retrospective evaluation of surprises that return individuals to their original economic state although such surprises do not change an individual s original economic state we argue that the individual s psychological state changes and the final affective state is among other things a function of the sequence in which the events occur from a theoretical standpoint several perspectives can be brought to bear on the issue for instance one reading of mental accounting based on prospect theory s value function would predict that losses should dominate gains and therefore regardless of sequence people should be unhappy when exposed to two economically equivalent outcomes of different signs conversely the literature on intertemporal choice would suggest that a series that ends on an up note is preferred to a series that ends on a down note because people like to defer gratification so that they may savor positive outcomes similarly people apparently have a preference for happy endings finally the extant literature on recency effects would predict that the last event in a series should have a disproportionate influence on overall affect our model relies on a shift in the reference point to explain how a surprising reversal of an event will lead to a nonzero evaluation of the sequence we suggest that people s reference points shift immediately but imperfectly after a stimulus is presented intuitively this implies that the first stimulus will shift the reference point in its direction as a result of which the evaluation of a sequence of events in which an initial event is unexpectedly reversed will be more favorable if the first event is a loss than if it is a gain this model captures the unanticipated nature of the second event i e the surprise element by allowing the first event to move the reference point consequently by the time the next event occurs the reference point has been updated as a result of which the zero economic outcome of the sequence yields nonzero utility we further posit that the magnitude of the reference point shift should be affected by the time elapsed between the two stimuli specifically the reference point shifts gradually with time until it is fully updated consequently the final affective state of the sequence is also a function of the temporal distance between the two events the main predictions of the model were empirically supported first in a survey using a mall intercept sample subsequently we conducted a study of student subjects involving a coin tossing game in which real money was at stake and in which subjects in one condition experienced the second outcome after a two day delay our results from this second study supported the model s prediction regarding the impact of the elapsed time between the events the experimental tasks involved surprising reversals of initial outcomes thus ensuring that savoring dread types of explanations which require that subjects anticipate the second event could not be operating finally in a series of three follow up studies we tested the claim that the magnitude of outcomes would have an impact on observed affect and consistent with our theory and contrary to recency predictions we observed similar results across different magnitudes while theoretically interesting we should also note that our research is of potential pragmatic significance people s reactions to a series of events is of considerable interest to marketers desirous of generating enhanced attitude affect purchase intention and the like without offering economic inducements such as rebates coupons or other costly discounts additionally public policy officials may be interested in protecting people from being manipulated into purchasing a product simply because of changes in the sequence in which a series of offers is made by the merchant

political consumerism and public policy good complements against market failures political consumerism has become over the past years an ever growing phenomenon by which citizens express through their consumption their political environmental and ethical opinions this paper discusses political consumerism from an economic science perspective focusing on the link between political consumerism and public policies it wonders to what extent political consumerism may represent an effective and fair instrument against market failures overall it seems that it would be better to consider it as a complement to conventional public policies

deviations dynamics and equilibrium refinements existing equilibrium refinements rule out nash equilibria susceptible to deviations we propose a framework for considering not only equilibria impervious to deviations but also equilibria likely to recur in the long run because they are repeatedly deviated to we explore which equilibria are recurrent with respect to the deviations underlying some existing signaling refinements we show that the set of recurrent equilibria based on cho and kreps s 1987 intuitive criterion is equivalent to their solution concept but that applying our framework to existing cheap talk refinements make those solution concepts more realistic and guarantee existence where their current formulations do not journal of economic literatureclassification numbers b49 c72 c73

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

context dependent preferences the standard theory of choice based on value maximization associates with each option a real value such that given an offered set the decision maker chooses the option with the highest value despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal there is a growing body of data that is inconsistent with this theory in particular the relative attractiveness of x compared to y often depends on the presence or absence of a third option z and the market share of an option can actually be increased by enlarging the offered set we review recent empirical findings that are inconsistent with value maximization and present a context dependent model that expresses the value of each option as an additive combination of two components a contingent weighting process that captures the effect of the background context and a binary comparison process that describes the effect of the local context the model accounts for observed violations of the standard theory and provides a framework for analyzing context dependent p

exposing false advertising countries rely on different public and private agents to enforce consumer protection and fair competition regulations to analyze the repercussions of different regimes on social welfare we consider the possibility of false advertising by a firm in an environment with duopolistic competition and with consumers who can be rational or naive regarding the trustworthiness of advertising claims we compare the incentives for and outcomes of false advertisement verification and injunction requests made by one of three parties a government agency with a broad focus maximizing ex post total welfare and two narrowly focused parties the first a public or private party focused on consumer welfare net of its own enforcement costs and the second a competitor interested exclusively in its own profits considering ex ante welfare we find that having a narrowly focused party as the plaintiff can be optimal due to government agency commitment problems the optimal regime depends on both the share of the population s naive consumers and the level of enforcement costs resume denonciation de la publicite mensongere pour veiller a l application des reglementations en matieres de protection des consommateurs et de concurrence loyale les etats s appuient sur differents regimes de controle representes par des agents publics et prives afin d analyser les repercussions de ces differents regimes sur le bien etre nous evaluons la possibilite qu une entreprise puisse diffuser de la publicite mensongere dans un environnement concurrentiel duopolistique avec des consommateurs potentiellement rationnels ou naifs relativement a la veracite des allegations publicitaires nous comparons les mesures incitatives pour controler la publicite mensongere et leurs resultats ainsi que les mises en demeure initiees par l une de ces trois parties une agence gouvernementale a visee large aux fins de maximisation totale du bien etre ex post et deux autres parties a visee plus ciblee l une publique ou privee tournee vers le bien etre des consommateurs deduction faite de ses propres co ts de mise en uvre et l autre representee par un concurrent s interessant exclusivement a ses propres profits en tenant compte du bien etre ex ante et en raison des problemes d engagement des agences gouvernementales nous constatons qu une procedure peut s averer optimale des lors que le demandeur represente une partie a visee plus ciblee le regime optimal depend a la fois de la proportion de consommateurs naifs et du niveau des couts de mise en uvre

consumer loss aversion product experimentation and tacit collusion abstract two firms compete to attract loss averse consumers that are uncertain about how well the goods on sale fit their needs to resolve valuation uncertainty firms can allow prospective customers to test experiment their products before purchase we investigate firms dynamic incentives to allow experimentation and analyze the resulting effects on the profitability and the stability of tacit collusion depending on the regulatory regime in place i e whether experimentation is forbidden mandated or simply allowed but not imposed laissez faire the degree of loss aversion has ambiguous effects both on the profits that firms can achieve through tacit collusion and on the stability of these agreements while in static environments consumer welfare is always maximized by a policy that forbids experimentation the opposite happens in a dynamic environment

optimal cross licensing arrangements collusion versus entry deterrence this paper analyzes optimal cross licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants the optimal cross licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis a vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation we show that a positive cross licensing royalty rate which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome dulls incentives to litigate against entrants our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry deterrence mechanism

frontrunners and laggards the strategy of environmental regulation under uncertainty the extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts first companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation second ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates finally regulators use limited information provided by the industry i construct a game theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator in equilibrium companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry this profit driven behavior is not always socially detrimental however as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost additionally the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates if companies condition compliance on the installation cost only low cost companies install in equilibrium the analysis combines regulatory capture with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator

multi sector model of tradable emission permits this paper presents a multi sector model of tradable emission permits which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries the firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well as in the product market specifically we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets it is shown that raising the number of initial permits allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm under certain conditions raising a clean less polluting firm s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices we discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits considering the trade off between production inefficiency and consumer benefit

good times bad times and vertical upstream integration abstract we consider a set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input downstream firms can produce the input themselves yet do not trade it upstream firms produce the input to sell it through a walrasian market to downstream firms efficient pooling of capacities requires the input to be produced by upstream firms and traded in the market yet downstream firms will always vertically integrate by producing some of its own input needs a downstream firm cuts down on aggregate input demand thus depressing prices in the market

raising search costs to deter window shopping can increase profits and welfare consumers tend to browse products they are interested in and firms often invest resources in selling to them a consequence i show is that it is optimal for a firm to increase the cost of browsing even though this drives away potential customers because doing so allows it to target sales efforts at those consumers most likely to buy despite representing pure waste this can increase welfare by facilitating efficient allocation of sales or marketing resources for a similar reason consumers often benefit from search costs in aggregate and prefer them to other means of screening such as price increases

the failing firm defense this paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm defense ffd in the eu and u s merger laws to this end i combine an oligopoly model with an endogenous valuations auction model the ffd is shown to work reasonably well for consumers unless small firms are too small the ffd may however lead to total surplus losses due to a least danger to competition ldc condition which favors small and thus possibly inefficient firms it is also shown that in a multi firm setting the ffd increases the incentive for predation only when the assets are industry specific

endogenous protection foreign direct investment and protection building trade abstract we introduce the possibility of foreign direct investment fdi in a strategic oligopolistic setting with endogenous protection and find that a number of unique subgame perfect equilibria may arise including a new result we call protection building trade this phenomenon occurs in our model when foreign firms locating production in the home country try to increase protectionist pressures in the home country through increased exports to provide larger barriers against other foreign competitors in future periods we discuss how the foreign firm behavior surrounding significant u s protectionist actions including the vers on japanese automobiles may be consistent with protection building trade behavior

a characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a cournot model with linear costs under linear demand a small reduction in a firm s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1 2n 2 or equivalently its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market a large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value the paper also extends the results to non linear demand but the characterizations become less tractable

national treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities we analyze the role of national treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy a social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good we show that whether national treatment of standards interferes with welfare maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker consumption or emissions tax and differences in the cost of complying with the standard we also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal this asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare maximizing policy to violate national treatment on analyse le role du principe de traitement identique des entites domestiques ou importees dans la reglementation des normes environnementales dans une economie ouverte un gouvernement utilise des normes pour controler les emissions decoulant de la consommation d un produit transige internationalement on montre que le fait que le traitement identique des normes va ou non interferer avec l objectif poursuivi qui est de maximiser le niveau de bien etre va dependre de l ensemble des instruments disponibles pour l architecte des politiques une taxe sur la consommation ou sur les emissions et des differences dans les couts a encourir pour se conformer aux normes on souligne aussi l incidence asymetrique des normes sur les produits domestiques et importes quand les taxes sont sous optimales cette incidence asymetrique peut faire que la politique qui vise la maximisation du bien etre soit en violation du principe de traitement identique

choice based on reasons the case of attraction and compromise effects building on previous research this article proposes that choice behavior under preference uncertainty may be easier to explain by assuming that consumers select the alternative supported by the best reasons this approach provides an explanation for the so called attraction effect and leads to the prediction of a compromise effect consistent with the hypotheses the results indicate that 1 brands tend to gain share when they become compromise alternatives in a choice set 2 attraction and compromise effects tend to be stronger among subjects who expect to justify their decisions to others and 3 selections of dominating and compromise brands are associated with more elaborate and difficult decisions

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

selective contracts foreclosure and the chicago school view abstract i examine a mechanism by which exclusive supply contracts may inefficiently deter entry into the market in the model the incumbent supplier selectively offers contracts only to some buyers and convinces them to consent by guaranteeing them low prices the contracts strengthen the monopoly position of the incumbent supplier and allow it to extract rents from the remaining buyers that were not offered contracts aside from the favorable contract terms buyers have another reason to consent to the exclusivity scheme the latter raises the input costs of rival buyers that were not offered contracts the model has potential applications to the recent microsoft antitrust case 1994 i define exclusive supply contract as an agreement under which an upstream firm becomes the exclusive supplier of a downstream firm the downstream firm is prohibited from buying from other suppliers

competition policy in the united states an overview this paper provides a summary of the basic policies in the united states that affect the state of competition in u s markets much of the paper focuses on antitrust policy but a substantial fraction of the paper is devoted to regulatory policies for both types of policies the paper explains the basic structures of the policies and also provides discussions of recent developments copyright 1993 by oxford university press

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

the social value of information on product quality in the context of a seller with private information about product quality i show that revelation of information on product quality is sometimes but not always socially valuable when it is socially valuable there is generally a tradeoff between the acquisition and revelation of finer but more costly information and the revelation of coarser but less costly information as a result it can be socially optimal for firms to reveal only coarse private information

an empirical test of the resource based theory strategic regulation in the dutch audit industry the resource based view of the firm is a recent strategic management theory that seeks to identify the resources that may provide firms with a sustainable competitive advantage this paper has two purposes first the paper relates strategic management arguments to parallel lines of reasoning in industrial organization theory and argues that strategic regulation is a major source of sustainable competitive advantage the second purpose of the paper is to report the results of an empirical test of the resource based theory on the basis of a longitudinal data set on the postwar history of the dutch audit industry a key determinant of this history proves to be strategic regulation which stimulates demand for audit services and protects rent producing resources

asymmetric competition in choice and the leveraging of competitive disadvantages studies of grocery sales show that consumers of store brands switch to price discounted national brands more than consumers of national brands switch to discounted store brands such asymmetric price competition can be explained with numerous mechanisms proposed here and elsewhere we report a choice experiment that replicates asymmetric price competition favoring higher quality competitors and demonstrates asymmetric quality competition favoring lower quality competitors also demonstrated are multiple mechanisms contributing to competitive asymmetries where dominance involving the otherwise preferred brand is particularly potent e g when a higher quality competitor matches the price of an otherwise preferred lower quality brand the findings implicate modifications to 1 theories of decision making when extended to repeat choice 2 empirical models of secondary purchase data and 3 strategies for positioning and attacking brands whereas improving competitive disadvantages often attracts consumers from competitors more than does improving competitive advantages this benefit must be weighed against the differentiation sacrificed by improving competitive disadvantages improving competitive advantages in contrast increases differentiation

a reputation refinement without equilibrium the economic literature concerning agents reputations has grown steadily since the seminal work of kreps milgrom roberts and wilson 2 early work focused on how incomplete information leads to equilibria that are vastly different but more intuitive than those possible in the complete information game recently however game theorists have been studying how incomplete information might refine the set of equilibria 3 one important class of games is that in which a single long run agent plays a simultaneous move stage game with a sequence of opponents each of whom plays only once yet observes all previous play fudenberg and levine 1989 study the reputation of the long run player in this type of game they argue that the most reasonable equilibrium is the one which the long run player most prefers their intuition is sustained when one perturbs the game with the stackelberg strategy fudenberg and levine show that in the perturbed game the equilibrium payoffs of the long run player are bounded below by a number that converges to the stackelberg payoff

exclusive dealing before bork and beyond abstractantitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that bork articulated in the antitrust paradox indeed they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does some albeit not all of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges

upgrades switching costs and the leverage theory of tying this article investigates the role of product upgrades and consumer switching costs in the tying of complementary products previous analyses have found that a monopolist of one product will not increase its profits and reduce social welfare by tying and leveraging its monopoly position into a complementary market if the initial monopolised product is essential where essential means that all uses of the complementary good require the initial monopolised product we show that this is not true in settings characterised by product upgrades and consumer switching costs we also discuss various extensions including the role of the reversibility of tying

caveat innovator strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions abstract the assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction the assumption underlying earlier strategic models that the entrant does not know the incumbent s payoffs after strategic have been tested does not appear to apply instead strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns in this environment strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

stationarity rationalizability and bargaining strategies for the seller and the buyer which are weakly stationary we demonstrate that any initial offer from the seller induced by a strategy rationalized by a weakly stationary acceptance rule for the buyer must entail the coase property our result does not presume the selection of a particular equilibrium and follows directly from the weak stationarity assumption of the buyer s acceptance rule and the rational behaviour of the players

regional free trade and social integration this paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective in contrast to most other literature which fails to take into account geographical factors it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners a political support maximizing government will consider these factors when balancing political support from free traders and protectionists

government manipulation of constitutional level transaction costs a general theory of transaction cost augmentation and the growth of government transaction costs are pivotal to the ongoing political choice of where to draw the line between the private sector and the public sector contrary to the dominant paradigm politically important transaction costs are actively manipulated in the public sector by those who perceive potential personal gain from such action over time transaction cost changes so created by government decision makers may fundamentally redefine the role and scope of government to analyze the role of transaction costs in the growth or decline of government it is essential to distinguish transaction costs that are unavoidable realworld constraints from those that are contrived in the sense that they are created by government officials use or extension of their existing authority once discretionary power is vested in the government its officials have both the capacity and the incentive to restructure the transaction costs constraining the revision ofgovernrnental authority this restructuring of transaction costs may take two forms 1 altering people s perceptions of the costs and benefits of governmental authority in a given sphere an information cost problem 1 2 altering the cost of acting upon one s perceptions of the costs and benefits of collectivization in order to procure revision of the scope of governmental authority 2

access to natural gas storage facilities strategic and regulation issues abstract in this paper we analyze the strategic function of gas storage focusing on how gas storage decisions impact competition between gas companies on both spot and downstream markets using a two tier oligopolistic structure we first show that gas storage is actually used strategically even in a symmetric oligopolistic setting along the gas value chain storage is then a way to intensify competition on the spot market second we analyze the setting where a company has favored access to storage for example due to a historical monopolistic position and we analyze this as a leadership situation in the context of tpa regulation we then show that this setting compels the leader to adopt a strategic storage decision this strategy consists of levels of gas stored being greater than supplies available in the downstream market such a leader decision is part of a strategy to raise a rival s costs furthermore one can think that optimal regulation of the access to storage facilities would prevent such a behavior however especially when storage is not too costly we show that preventing a storage strategy for the leader is not optimal since the strategy helps to reduce the spot market price

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

a signaling model of environmental overcompliance abstract we present a theory of unilateral regulatory overcompliance as a signaling device firms that have a competitive advantage in the use of a cleaner but more costly technology overcomply in order to signal to an imperfectly informed benevolent government that compliance costs are low thereby triggering tougher regulation we identify the conditions under which such an overcompliance signaling equilibrium arises showing that there may be over overcompliance in that firms may overcomply even when tougher regulation is not socially desirable we also discuss the differential implications of the signaling theory as compared to other theories of unilateral regulatory overcompliance

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

on decisions that lead to decisions direct and derived evaluations of preference many consumer choices lead to subsequent decisions in such situations any choice option may be evaluated based on its own characteristics direct evaluations or evaluated based on the characteristics of alternatives it makes available in subsequent decisions derived evaluations we contrast direct and derived evaluations in the context of two consumer research issues first in choices between a lone option and a group of alternatives direct evaluations bias preferences toward the group whereas derived evaluations bias preferences away from the group second in choices between stores sensitivity to price is greater under derived than direct evaluations