efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

effects of announcements of reorganization outcome less is known about whether the market perceives the final resolution of post reorganization filing to be idiosyncratic or to carry endemic implications for the corresponding industries this study observes the presence of intra industry information transfers the magnitude and direction of the reactions in response to three separate resolution outcome differs in a systematic way across industry portfolios specifically portfolio rivals that are affected by competitive realignments in the industry experience stock price reactions in the opposite manner to those of the distressed firms thus suggesting dominant competitive effects in addition this study reveals that the discriminatory power and forecast performance of three hybrid neuro fuzzy models are stable and unimpaired across time and are generally superior in classifying rival cumulative prediction error rcpe candidates

formulating research policy on expert advice abstract national research assessments represent the principal policy used by countries with public university systems to improve the quality of their universities research they typically employ expert panels of local academics to assess journal quality and use such assessments to reward publications we propose a model of how experts assess quality and test this model using data from the recent australian assessment controlling for objective quality we show that experts cognitive biases dominate their assessments consequently such assessments exaggerate the quality of the experts research and understate that of their colleagues our model can explain 95 of the variation in assessments

dividend changes abnormal returns and intra lndustry firm valuations previous empirical research has established that dividend changes are associated with sig nificant abnormal returns this association is rationalized on the basis that the dividend announcement acts as a signal of future earnings another body of research has documented the existence of intra industry transfers of information where news about one firm is extrapolated to other companies in the same industry earnings information transfers have been found to be positive in nature with good news about one company leading to stock price increases for rival firms linking dividend signaling and information transfer tests were constructed to ascertain whether the dividend change of one firm is associated with the stock price performance of other companies in the same industry the results indicate there is some small positive information transfer the magnitude of information transfer is related to the degree of the dividend surprise the recent dividend history of the other companies and correlations in stock returns between the dividend announcer and the other companies information transfer is found to affect earnings and earnings growth estimates of the other firms and this leads to revisions in their stock prices

the role of international fragmentation in the development process much of what has been written about the process of economic development has concentrated on macroeconomic factors that affect the growth process such as the community s savings rate its ability to attract foreign investment and the composition and quality of its factor endowment base less formally dealt with but nonetheless often cited as important in the development process is the nature of government regulations and the type of institutions that are reflective of the community s own cultural inheritance

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

think locally act locally spillovers spillbacks and efficient decentralized policymaking we analyze models with interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions such as co 2 emissions that affect the global environment each jurisdiction s emissions depend upon the local stock of capital which is interjurisdictionally mobile and subject to local taxation in important cases decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocation even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher level governments or coordination of policy through coasian bargaining in particular even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents the decentralized system can result in globally efficient allocation

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal the case of private values we analyze the principal agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three stage noncooperative game contract proposal acceptance refusal and contract execution we assume that the information does not directly affect the agent s payoff private values equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique moreover it is pareto optimal for the different types of principal the principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information equilibrium allocations are the walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints

reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform comprehensive reforms often fail despite being beneficial to society politicians may block comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions in which they benefit from a piecemeal reform at the expense of others because formal commitment devices for vote trading are frequently missing trust and reciprocity among legislators can play an important role for vote trading we investigate in a laboratory experiment whether legislators will impede comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions even if formal commitment devices for vote trading after reform failure are missing we find that open ballots allow for vote trading without commitment based on trust and reciprocity in turn legislators frequently reject efficient comprehensive reforms in such institutions

group decision making in the shadow of disagreement abstract a model of group decision making is studied in which one of two alternatives must be chosen while agents differ in their preferences over alternatives everybody prefers agreement to disagreement our model is distinguished by three features private information regarding valuations differing intensities in preferences and the option to declare neutrality to avoid disagreement there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice however under general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance provided that the group is large enough such equilibria invariably display a tyranny of the minority the increased aggression of the minority always outweighs their smaller number leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative we fully characterize the asymptotic behavior of this model as group size becomes large and show that all equilibria must converge to one of three possible limit outcomes

contagion effects in the electric utility industry following the fukushima nuclear accident this article examines intra industry information transfers in the european and japanese electric industry in the wake of the fukushima nuclear accident for european conventional utilities the downward price drift is relatively small and transient in nature yet we find positive and lingering effects of the accident on the shares of alternative electric utilities japanese utilities were hit the hardest and the shock seems to be long lasting an interesting finding of this article is the abrupt increase decrease in the systematic risk of conventional alternative electric utilities following the event in europe we could only document a decrease in the idiosyncratic risk of conventional utilities pointing to enhanced return synchronicity in the conventional power industry in turn total risk seems to be stationary around the accident in rebuttal idiosyncratic and systematic risks and consequently total risk have substantially risen in japan since the event finally intercept values related to

price discrimination by a many product firm determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unknown tastes is a difficult task this paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products becomes large

a theory of focal points the paper presents a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the strategic structure of a game the existential game and the way the players describe the game to themselves each player works with a private description of the game in which strategies are identified by labels labels are generated by a stochastic labeling procedure each player chooses a decision rule which for each possible private description picks one of the available strategy labels a criterion of collective rationality is applied to choices among decision rules the implications of collective rationality are explored for a range of games with different labeling procedures copyright 1995 by royal economic society

collusion with almost no information we analyze noncooperative collusion in an infinitely repeated bertrand game where each of the n firms receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period and firms only and privately observe whether they have won the unit mass of consumers no other information is available and no communication is allowed we prove that there exist equilibria in private strategies approximating first best profits when firms are sufficiently patient in particular productive efficiency obtains in the limit

tacit collusion in repeated auctions abstract this paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring mcafee and mcmillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to the availability of transfers monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus a folk theorem proved by fudenberg et al econometrica 62 1994 997 1039 shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if players are patient and communicate before auctions we ask how the scope of collusion is affected if players dispense with explicit communication and their monitoring is limited collusion better than bid rotation is still feasible but full surplus cannot be extracted this constraint becomes less severe with more players and large cartels can become asymptotically efficient even with very limited monitoring

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information we investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent we characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 that restricts the message spaces the principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss we show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes we also extend the results of the single agent model to the multi agent model

when costly voting is beneficial abstract we present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote when there is a zero cost to voting all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be by having a cost to voting only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost we show that by adding this cost welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough

a dominant strategy double auction a double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed this mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer s bid double auction in addition the mechanism always produces full information first best prices the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism the mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

the organisational morphology of rural industries and its dynamics in liberalised india a study of west bengal the paper presents an empirical investigation into alternative forms of organisation of rural industries and their dynamics in the post reform period of india by means of a field survey carried out in the state of west bengal in 2001 02 the selected industries handloom brassware hornware clay works conchshell and lac works all belong to traditional crafts the major organisational forms are independent units and tied units the latter being tied to traders and or master enterprises for raw materials and work orders each of which account for more than 40 of our sample units the third form cooperative units is clearly in the decline tied units appear to define the upcoming trend bringing the forces released by liberalisation e g the growth of exports drawn to the level of village artisans in particular the system appears to be a vehicle for product differentiation and innovation both of which are very much evident in our study area copyright the author 2008 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

beyond export led growth abstract in light of the adverse conditions in the current international economic environment this paper reassesses the feasibility of continuing to rely on manufacturing export led growth as the major development dynamic for most ldcs during the next decade this paper argues that after the initial stages of industrial development the emphasis in policy toward agriculture should shift from surplus extraction to surplus creation and to the generation of demand linkages with the rest of the economy the author compares the relative merits of two alternative open development strategies export led industrialization and agricultural demand led industrialization adli by means of several simulation experiments the experiments are performed with a computable general equilibrium model of a small low income semi industrial open economy which is a stylization of south korea of 1963 they are carried out in an international environment assumed to represent the next decade based on a rate of growth of international demand for imports of about half the 1960 1973 rate the results support the adli approach on all counts

continuous decisions by a committee median versus average mechanisms abstract a group of strategic agents with diverse private information and interdependent preferences has to take a continuous collective decision i study the design of the decision making procedure from the viewpoint of a utilitarian social planner for uniformly distributed information the implementation of the average report as decision dominates the implementation of the median report when the set of admissible reports is optimally designed this is true for any number of agents and for any degree of interdependence the result extends to a general class of distributions when the number of agents is large

efficient repeated implementation this paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function scf with innitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of possibly history dependent mechanisms such that i its nash equilibrium set is non empty and ii every nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty we show with minor qualications that in the complete information environment an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if and only if it is ecient we also discuss several extensions of our analysis including constructions employing only nite mechanisms

cheap talk comparisons in multi issue bargaining abstract bargaining over two issues as a bundle permits credible cheap talk about their relative importance even when interests are directly opposed on each issue the resulting communication gains can exceed the gains from bundling previously identified in the monopoly pricing literature

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

coordination in auctions with entry abstract we examine self enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria under slightly stronger conditions within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders if preplay communication is possible every no communication equilibrium payoff is interim pareto dominated for the bidders by some cheap talk equilibrium payoff when the number of auctions is large communication equilibria exist that yield ex post efficient payoffs for the bidders almost surely journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d44 d82

the comparative advantages of firms markets and contracts a unified theory the most efficient labour market mechanism depends on the advantages of specialization workers costs of switching between entrepreneurs and the frequency with which needs change multilateral mechanisms are more efficient when specialization is more advantageous when it is cheap for workers to switch between entrepreneurs and when individual entrepreneurs cannot occupy a worker on a full time basis given a bilateral mechanism employment a firm is more efficient than contracts when in process adjustments arise more frequently there exist three regions in which firms markets and sequences of bilateral contracts are weakly more efficient than all other mechanisms in a big class

optimal voting rules we study dominant strategy incentive compatible dic and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives the agents are privately informed about their preferences and have single crossing utility functions monetary transfers are not feasible we use an equivalence between deterministic dic mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as say a rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained

agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions we study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals we show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs jel c92 d71 d72

an experimental study of voting with costly delay a conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached we study experimentally welfare properties of simple three voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs the resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition our key finding is that consistent with theoretical predictions when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting we also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave when social cost of waiting is taken into account the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version

do microsoft acquisitions benefit the computer industry we examined whether acquisitions by microsoft corporation affect the stock prices of its competitors in the computer industry we found that microsoft s acquisitions in the internet online services segment adversely affect the stock prices of the internet online services rival portfolio these competitors appear to be threatened by microsoft s moves anticompetitive or otherwise to further its industry leadership and affirm the future success of the targets technologies furthermore the results of our study do not indicate that the financial market perceives microsoft s operating system acquisitions to be instrumental in achieving synergies from microsoft s dominant role in the operating system segment to the detriment of its internet online services rivals indeed we found the portfolio of internet online services rivals to respond favorably to microsoft s operating system acquisitions perhaps because microsoft is essentially diverting resources away from the internet online services segment

rural nonagricultural activities in development theory and application abstract this paper focusses on the potentially important role of rural nonagricultural activity in the development process using the hymer resnick z goods model as a point of departure we first show that its pessimistic conclusions are based on rather restrictive assumptions as applied to the colonial period we relax these assumptions indicating the theoretical possibility of a substantially more positive scenario for that period subsequently we analyze the role of z goods traditional and nontraditional in the post independence era again distinguishing between archetypal pessimistic and optimistic cases finally the comparative historical experience of the philippines and taiwan is brought to bear to illustrate the argument empirically

public goods participation constraints and democracy a possibility theorem abstract it is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational however the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided this paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost sharing as the relevant status quo efficient mechanisms may then exist which also satisfy all agents interim participation constraints in this case ex post inefficient voting mechanisms can be replaced by efficient ones without reducing any individual s expected utility intuitively agents with a low willingness to pay have to contribute more under majority rule than under an efficient mechanism with a balanced budget although this possibility theorem is not universal in the sense of schweizer 2006 an asymptotic possibility is obtained for certain type distributions

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

minority voting and long term decisions in this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation we consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first period project may have a long lasting impact in the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place voting splits the committee into three groups voting winners voting losers and absentees under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period we show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

amicable divorce dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms abstract this paper considers mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership that can be specified without information on the distribution of valuations of the asset or the level of risk aversion of the participants for the case of a single asset and risk averse agents three simple mechanisms are considered these mechanisms can be ranked in terms of ex post efficiency and partially ranked in terms of interim expected utility the efficiency of the alternating selection mechanism is considered for environments when there are many items to be allocated agents are risk neutral and transfers are prohibited conditions are given when a myopic strategy of picking the most preferred abailable item forms an equilibrium and these conditions are satisfied under independence under the further assumption of identical distributions of valuations it is shown that the total expected efficiency loss is at most 1 2 of the maximal value of a single item regardless of how many items are to be allocated

ordinal versus cardinal voting rules a mechanism design approach abstract we consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a bayesian environment agents have independent private values there are at least three alternatives and monetary transfers are prohibited first we show that in a neutral environment meaning alternatives are symmetric ex ante essentially any ex post pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible importantly however we can improve upon ordinal rules we show that we can design an incentive compatible cardinal rule which achieves higher utilitarian social welfare than any ordinal rule finally we provide numerical findings about incentive compatible cardinal rules that maximize utilitarian social welfare

mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences we experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences with random matching subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences which leads to ineciency we analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 as well as repeated interaction in dierent settings which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve we find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable eciency gains whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and eciency only in

dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo we analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players conflict of interest players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo this leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia under certain conditions the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock players never reach an agreement gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences provided they are sufficiently patient in legislative settings our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks

decentralised production organisation and institutional transformation large and small firm networks in chile and nicaragua this paper analyses changing production organisation and new governance that contribute to productive upgrading in developing economies it discusses research conducted in chile and nicaragua focused on agroindustrial clusters recent analyses of small firms in developing countries highlight the important presence of clusters and local factors in building global competitiveness this paper argues for an approach that focuses on the institutional arrangements to coordinate decentralised production networks it emphasises the role of learning by monitoring as the key to successful adjustment in the face of liberalisation and globalisation it identifies the institutional reshaping of relations between firms and between the state and the economy copyright 2003 oxford university press

efficiency and observability with long run and short run players we present a general algorithm for computing the limit as 1 of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long run and short run players allowing for the possibility that the players actions are not observable by their opponents we illustrate the algorithm with two economic examples in a simple partnership we show how to compute the equilibrium payoffs when the folk theorem fails in an investment game we show that two competing capitalists subject to moral hazard may both become worse off if their firms are merged and they split the profits from the merger finally we show that with short run players each long run player s highest equilibrium payoff is generally greater when their realized actions are observed journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d21 d82 d92 e22