contracting with wealth constrained agents we examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input e g effort when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and if necessary a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts the project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators under plausible conditions limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner

small and large stakes risk aversion implications of concavity calibration for decision theory abstract a growing literature reports the conclusions that a expected utility theory does not provide a plausible theory of risk aversion for both small stakes and large stakes gambles and b this decision theory should be replaced with an alternative theory characterized by loss aversion this paper explains that the arguments in previous literature fail to support these conclusions either concavity calibration has no general implication for expected utility theory or it has problematic implications for all decision theories that involve concave transformations utility or value functions of positive money payoffs which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument

screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness we analyze a principal s ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents who have private information about the circumstances of the exchange honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully as long as the mechanism is suciently fair the probability that an equilibrium allocation is chosen by an agent who is lying should not be too large without intolerance for lying the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest with even a small intolerance for lying the optimal mechanism is discontinuously altered it may still involve ethics screening whereby some allocation chosen by a dishonest agent is never chosen by an honest agent it happens either when the dishonest is overstating circumstances or when the principal is forced to allow for some suboptimal announcements due to an excessive intolerance for lying with limited intolerance for lying ethics screening allows for doing better than in the standard setup where the agent is dishonest with certainty even if honesty is unlikely however if intolerance for lying is too strong the principal cannot improve upon the standard setup

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

a spot forward model for electricity prices with regime shifts 2014 elsevier b v all rights reserved this is the authors manuscript preprint to the article

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

inflexible rules in incentive problems in practice contracts involve standard terms or rules allowing for variations only under exceptional circumstances we develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature even in the absence of transactions costs rules arise when an agent has countervailing incentives to misrepresent private information these incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante applications in regulatory labor and legal settings

robust estimation and forecasting of the long term seasonal component of electricity spot prices when building stochastic models for electricity spot prices the problem of uttermost importance is the estimation and consequent forecasting of a component to deal with trends and seasonality in the data while the short term seasonal components daily weekly are more regular and less important for valuation of typical power derivatives the l ong term seasonal components ltsc seasonal annual are much more diffi cult to tackle surprisingly in many academic papers dealing with electricity spot price modeling the importance of the seasonal decomposition is neglected and the problem of forecasting it is not considered with this paper we want to fill the gap and present a thorough study on estimation and forecasting of the ltsc of electricity spot prices we consider a battery of models based on fourier or wavelet decomposition combined with linear or exponential decay we find that all considered wavelet base d models are significantly better in terms of forecasting spot prices up to a year ahead than all considered sine based models this result questions the validity and usefulness of stochastic models of spot electricity prices built on sinusoidal long term seasonal components

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

the hodrick prescott filter the slutzky effect and the distortionary effect of filters abstract i construct a metric based on optimal filtering for measuring the distortionary effect of business cycle filters the distortionary effect of a filter depends both on the power transfer function of the filter and on the spectrum of the filtered time series the metric is used for two purposes first to determine the optimal value of the smoothing parameter in the hodrick prescott filter hp filter secondly to measure the size of distortions of ten different filters the slutzky effect is a special case of a more general pattern of distortions and it is shown that the alleged slutzky effect of the hp filter is due to an insufficient distinction between the effect of filtering with an ideal high pass filter and the distortionary effect of the hp filter

adverse selection without single crossing monotone solutions abstract the single crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility if single crossing is violated global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account this paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one time violation of single crossing the results show that local and non local incentive constraints distort the solution in opposite directions therefore the optimal decision might involve distortions above as well as below the first best decision furthermore the well known no distortion at the top property does not necessarily hold the results show that the decision can even be distorted above first best for all types sufficient conditions for existence strict monotonicity and continuity of the solution are presented a new necessary condition satisfied by such solutions is found an algorithm based on this condition can calculate continuous and strictly monotone solutions

factor models in the german electricity market stylized facts seasonality and calibration abstract the class of arithmetic factor models is flexible enough to model all stylized facts occurring in electricity markets including negative prices while still yielding tractable derivative prices in this paper we conduct a thorough review of the requirements and possibilities of factor models we compare different seasonality functions and study their power to deseasonalise day ahead spot prices from the epex germany austria market furthermore we introduce an alternative method to estimate mean reversion speed based on arma time series and a method to evaluate the distributional fit of the model to realised market prices which we apply to two non gaussian estimated models

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

reputation for quality and adverse selection abstract we analyze a dynamic market with a seller who can make a one time investment that affects the returns of tradable assets the potential buyers of the assets cannot observe the seller s investment prior to the trade or verify it in any way after the trade the market faces two types of inefficiency the ex ante inefficiency i e the seller s moral hazard problem and the ex post inefficiency i e inefficient ex post allocations due to the adverse selection problem we analyze how the observability of information by future buyers through which the seller builds a reputation affects the two types of inefficiency as well as the interplay between them

the dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts abstract in a two period model of costly state verification the optimal contract is characterized and shown to exist the optimal contract is interpreted as a bond contract the model extends the result of one period models that the verification region must be a left tail interval to a multi period setting conditions are identified for the optimal contract to exhibit features such as call prepayment option coupon payment or sinking fund the optimality of certain bond covenants such as refinancing covenants and dividends covenants is also studied

cost padding in regulated monopolies abstract this paper considers the regulated monopoly that pads or falsifies its costs to increase the cost reimbursement it receives from the regulator contrary to the standard literature on cost regulation the firm engages in cost reducing investment before it enters into a regulatory contract this pre contractual investment in cost reduction determines the firm type at the contracting stage the paper derives both the optimum incentive compatible falsification contract and the equilibrium type distribution with the distribution of cost types determined endogenously by the pre contractual investment choice an increase in the cost of falsification has two effects first there is a direct effect that reduces cost padding because it becomes more expensive to do so second there is an indirect effect that increases cost padding because the firm responds by choosing lower investments and lower investments are associated with more cost padding it is demonstrated that the direct effect will dominate and both expected levels of cost padding and expected costs for falsification will be reduced however the indirect effect increases real costs and despite the reduction in cost padding the net effect can reduce welfare it is determined that these conclusions are significantly different from those obtained when the distribution of cost types is exogenously fixed

a note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation abstract laffont and tirole s using cost observation to regulate firms j polit econ 94 1986 614 641 pioneering analysis identifies the optimal procurement contract when the supplier can readily inflate his innate production cost without detection when the buyer has some ability to limit such cost inflation an alternative contract can outperform the contract identified by laffont and tirole the alternative contract induces substantial pooling discontinuous production costs and effort supply and rent that varies non monotonically with innate cost

hourly electricity prices in day ahead markets this paper focuses on the characteristics of hourly electricity prices in day ahead markets in these markets quotes for day ahead delivery of electricity are submitted simultaneously for all hours in the next day the same information set is used for quoting all hours of the day the dynamics of hourly electricity prices does not behave as a time series process instead these prices should be treated as a panel in which the prices of 24 cross sectional hours vary from day to day this paper introduces a panel model for hourly electricity prices in day ahead markets and examines their characteristics the results show that hourly electricity prices exhibit hourly specific mean reversion and that they oscillate around an hourly specific mean price level furthermore a block structured cross sectional correlation pattern between the hours is apparent

optimal collusion resistant mechanisms with verification abstract we present the first general positive result on the construction of collusion resistant mechanisms that is mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations sometimes referred to as transferable utilities or side payments this is a much stronger solution concept as compared to truthful or even group strategyproof mechanisms and only impossibility results were known for this type of mechanisms in the classical model we describe collusion resistant mechanisms with verification that return optimal solutions for a wide class of mechanism design problems which includes utilitarian ones as a special case note that every collusion resistant mechanism without verification must have an unbounded approximation factor and in general optimal solutions cannot be obtained even if we content ourselves with truthful non collusion resistant mechanisms all these results apply to problems that have been extensively studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature like for instance task scheduling and inter domain routing

non commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions abstract auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment the manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker s output taking into account all interim information he has obtained the worker will work just hard enough and show it to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult this usually raises the costs of setting work incentives so incentives are softened sometimes drastically moreover when a worker s on the job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information

is honesty the best policy curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts an incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims we demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones the differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss contingent insurance payments

time specific disturbances and cross sectional dependency in a small sample heterogeneous panel data unit root test in their seminal work im et al 1997 2003 suggested that time series for several cross sectional units could be used to increase the power of the dickey fuller unit root test they argued that when cross sectional correlation is a problem that can be modelled by a time specific factor demeaning across the cross sectional units can solve the problem in this study this proposition is proven valid but it is also shown that previously supplied standardizing moments are inappropriate when the number of cross sections are small causing size to differ from the significance level to correct this size distortion the current paper supplies response surface parameters that can be used to obtain moments that are valid when a time specific factor suffices for modelling cross sectional correlation in the heterogeneous panel data unit root framework the correct size of the panel data unit root test comes at the cost of a somewhat lower power against a stationary alternative less

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

noisy observation in adverse selection models we consider a principal agent contracting problem under incomplete information where some of the agent s actions are imperfectly observable contracts take the form of reward schedules based on the noisy observation of the agent s action we first review situations where the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence of noise then we focus on the use of linear reward schedules which allow universal implementation i e implementation of a given mechanism for any unbiased noise of observation and on quadratic reward schedules which only require the knowledge of the variance of the noise we exhibit sufficient conditions under which linear reward schedules implement a given mechanism finally we characterize necessary conditions for a mechanism to be implementable under noisy observation by a linear schedule and by quadratic schedules we give the geometric intuition behind all results

payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk abstract this paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of yaari s econometrica 55 1987 95 dual theory of choice under risk it is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions

efficient modeling and forecasting of electricity spot prices abstract the increasing importance of renewable energy especially solar and wind power has led to new forces in the formation of electricity prices hence this paper introduces an econometric model for the hourly time series of electricity prices of the european power exchange epex which incorporates specific features like renewable energy the model consists of several sophisticated and established approaches and can be regarded as a periodic var tarch with wind power solar power and load as influences on the time series it is able to map the distinct and well known features of electricity prices in germany an efficient iteratively reweighted lasso approach is used for the estimation moreover it is shown that several existing models are outperformed by the procedure developed in this paper

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

a note on using the hodrick prescott filter in electricity markets abstract recently nowotarski et al 2013 have found that wavelet based models for the long term seasonal component ltsc are not only better in extracting the ltsc from a series of spot electricity prices but also significantly more accurate in terms of forecasting these prices up to a year ahead than the commonly used monthly dummies and sine based models however a clear disadvantage of the wavelet based approach is the increased complexity of the technique as compared to the other two classes of ltsc models and the resulting need for dedicated numerical software which may not be readily available to practitioners in their work environments to facilitate this problem we propose here a much simpler yet equally powerful method for identifying the ltsc in electricity spot price series it makes use of the hodrick prescott hp filter a widely recognized tool in macroeconomics

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

public goods with costly access abstract we examine the optimal allocation of excludable public goods with a private access cost that some consumers may not be able to afford the full information benchmark is presented first then individuals access costs and income levels are private information when high income consumers have low access cost asymmetric information increases the cost of subsidizing the poor for accessing the public good and inequality increases when the low access cost consumers have the lower income subsidizing the poor may involve countervailing incentives but inequality decreases finally monopoly provision exacerbates underprovision of the poor particularly of those with low access cost

weekly self scheduling forward contracting and pool involvement for an electricity producer an adaptive robust optimization approach abstract this paper addresses the optimization under uncertainty of the self scheduling forward contracting and pool involvement of an electricity producer operating a mixed power generation station which combines thermal hydro and wind sources and uses a two stage adaptive robust optimization approach in this problem the wind power production and the electricity pool price are considered to be uncertain and are described by uncertainty convex sets to solve this problem two variants of a constraint generation algorithm are proposed and their application and characteristics discussed both algorithms are used to solve two case studies based on two producers each operating equivalent generation units differing only in the thermal units characteristics their market strategies are investigated for three different scenarios corresponding to as many instances of electricity price forecasts the effect of the producers approach whether conservative or more risk prone is also investigated by solving each instance for multiple values of the so called budget parameter it was possible to conclude that this parameter influences markedly the producers strategy in terms of scheduling profit forward contracting and pool involvement these findings are presented and analyzed in detail and an attempted rationale is proposed to explain the less intuitive outcomes regarding the computational results these show that for some instances the two variants of the algorithms have a similar performance while for a particular subset of them one variant has a clear superiority

a new measure of cross sectional risk and its empirical implications for portfolio risk management abstract litterman et al litterman r scheinkman j weiss l 1991 volatility and the yield curve journal of fixed income 1 june 49 53 and engle and ng engle r f ng v k 1993 time varying volatility and the dynamic behavior of the term structure journal of money credit and banking 25 3 336 349 provide empirical evidence of a relation between yield curve shape and volatility this study offers theoretical support for that finding in the general context of cross sectional time series we introduce a new risk measure quantifying the link between cross sectional shape and market risk a simple econometric procedure allows us to represent the risk experienced by cross sections over a time period in terms of independent factors reproducing possible cross sectional deformations we compare our risk measure to the traditional cross yield covariance according to their relative performance empirical investigation in the us interest rate market shows that 1 cross shape risk factors outperform cross yield risk factors i e yield curve level slope and convexity in explaining the market risk of yield curve dynamics 2 hedging multiple liabilities against cross shape risk delivers superior trading strategies compared to those stemming from cross yield risk management

optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly inexact verification abstract this paper integrates the often dichotomized models of costly state verification and costly claim falsification it is found that when verification is inexact it is possible for an optimal insurance contract to consist of both positive claim falsification and positive insurer verification provided that falsification cost and verification cost are sufficiently low and the insured is risk averse satisfying constant absolute risk aversion this result certainly contrasts with the common belief that falsification and verification are mutually exclusive in an optimal insurance contract some characteristics of the optimal falsification verification and indemnification profiles including implementability are analyzed

on the merit of equal pay performance manipulation and incentive setting abstract work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly used metrics we created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities using two independent experiments we show that whenever pay for performance is used manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives by contrast paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

time specific disturbances in a panel data stationarity test in this article we investigate the performance of a panel data stationarity test when cross sectional correlation is modelled by a time specific factor size distortions that occur especially when the number of cross sections is small are documented to eliminate these distortions a new set of critical values is supplied when investigating the rejection frequency under the alternative hypothesis it is found that the panel data stationarity test that uses the supplied critical values maintain good power characteristics even when only a subset of the cross sectional units have a unit root

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

pricing german energiewende products intraday cap floor futures abstract in this paper we introduce a model for the pricing of german intraday cap floor futures introduced by the eex in 2015 we give a thorough overview of the german intraday market and in particular introduce the id3 price index which is the underlying for intraday cap floor futures to price these derivatives we propose a hull white model from interest rate theory with seasonality from futures prices we apply our theoretical results to market data and conduct an empirical analysis involving the initial fit and empirical distribution of intraday cap futures prices

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

ceo replacement under private information this article examines the optimal ceo compensation and replacement policy when the ceo is privately informed about the firm s continuation value under his leadership ex ante moral hazard implies that the ceo must receive ex post quasi rents which endogenously biases him toward continuation our model shows that to induce bad ceos to quit it may be best to make continuation costly through steep incentive pay rather than simply rewarding quitting through severance pay incentive pay makes continuation attractive for good ceos who can expect high future on the job pay but unattractive for bad ceos who may instead prefer to take their outside option payoff our model generates novel empirical implications that jointly relate ceo compensation and turnover to corporate governance firm size cash flow risk and the informativeness of performance measurement jel g34

panel stationarity tests for purchasing power parity with cross sectional dependence we investigate the purchasing power parity ppp hypothesis for a group of 17 countries using a new panel based test of stationarity that allows for arbitrary cross sectional dependence we treat the short run time series dynamics nonparametrically and thus avoid the need to fit separate and potentially misspecified models for the individual series the statistic is simple to compute and uses standard normal critical values even in the presence of a wide range of different deterministic components we also evaluate the behavior of the test using a factor model to approximate cross sectional dependence and find that it generally improves finite sample performance taken together these features provide a widely applicable solution to the problem of testing for stationarity versus unit roots in macro panel data the test finds significant evidence against the ppp null hypothesis being true even when allowance is made for structural breaks

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

electricity futures price models calibration and forecasting a new one factor model with a random volatility parameter is presented in this paper for pricing of electricity futures contracts it is shown that the model is more tractable than multi factor jump diffusion models and yields an approximate closed form pricing formula for the electricity futures prices on real market data it is shown that the performance of the new model compares favourably with two existing models in the literature viz a two factor jump diffusion model and its jump free version i e a two factor linear gaussian model in terms of ability to predict one day ahead futures prices further a multi stage procedure is suggested and implemented for calibration of the two factor jump diffusion model which alleviates the difficulty in calibration due to a large number of parameters and pricing formulae which involve numerical evaluation of integrals we demonstrate the utility of our new model as well as the utility of the calibration procedure for the existing two factor jump diffusion model by model calibration and price forecasting experiments on three different futures price data sets from nord pool electricity data for the jump diffusion model we also investigate empirically whether it performs better in terms of futures price prediction than a corresponding jump free linear gaussian model finally we investigate whether an explicit calibration of jump risk premium in the jump diffusion model adds value to the quality of futures price prediction our experiments do not yield any evidence that modelling jumps leads to a better price prediction in electricity markets

costly verification of cost performance and the competition for incentive contracts this article analyzes the optimal linear incentive contract to offer to would be agents competing for a principal s project when the principal finds it costly to observe an agent s cost performance ex post and cannot commit to monitoring policy ex ante cost sharing reduces the winning bidder s informational rents but creates an incentive for the agent to pad costs ex post to slacken his effort the optimal cost sharing parameter generally differs from that when monitoring is costless and it is higher the fewer the number of bidders and the larger the variance of their idiosyncratic cost

competition for talent under performance manipulation abstract we study the effects of introducing competition for ceos assuming that the talent of ceos is not observable and that they can misreport their performance without competition for talent firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low powered incentive contracts competition for talent removes those inefficiencies but it leads to excessively high powered incentive contracts causing efficiency losses that can be more severe than the inefficiencies that competition mitigates if misreporting is not a concern however then competition for talent has unambiguously positive effects on efficiency

congestion management rules and trading strategies in the spanish electricity market abstract this paper analyses the economic incentives embodied in the rules governing the resolution of transmission constraints in the spanish wholesale electricity market and the way these incentives may have influenced on the trading behaviour of both the generators and the demand side the evidence obtained is consistent with them responding to these incentives in particular buyers would respond to the way congestion costs are billed to them by abandoning the daily market in favour of the intraday market as far as possible additionally some strategic generators may have been prompted the system operator to require them to inject electricity into the system to solve network congestions finally these results may contribute to shed light on what should be expected of the reform in the aforementioned rules

are you a good employee or simply a good guy influence costs and contract design we develop a principal agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal the level of output and a soft behavioral signal the supervision signal about the agent s level of effort in our model the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal these activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task we show that the agent s ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result interestingly the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high powered incentives this result implies that the optimal contract and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not depends on the magnitude of the productivity based influence costs we show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

the effect of earnings forecasts on earnings management we develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting earnings management is modeled as a window dressing action that can increase the firm s reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm s real cash flows earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager s communication of the firm s future cash flows we show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings we also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts finally our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the revelation principle by contrast in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted nonetheless earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

convergence of interest rates around the pacific rim this article applies the panel data unit root tests provided by im pesaran and shin discussion paper 1997 to examine the interest rate convergence of small open asian countries with major financial centres with monthly data from 1988 1 to 1997 6 it was found that the nominal interest rates of these countries converge to the us rates rather than to japan s this finding is consistent with the view that the monetary authorities of non japan asian economies pegged their exchange rates overwhelmingly to the dollar rather than the yen before the financial crisis of 1997

endogenous punishments in agency with verifiable ex post information the article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible imperfect signal on the agent s type is revealed ex post the agent is wealth constrained which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction e g the volume of trade first we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem e g whether the agent is in a buyer or a seller position second the distortions caused by informational asymmetries may become more severe although more information is now available finally the signal can actually serve to increase the agent s informational rents

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

electricity forward curves with thin granularity theory and empirical evidence in the hourly epexspot market we propose a constructive definition of electricity forward price curve with cross sectional timescales featuring hourly frequency on the curve is jointly consistent with both risk neutral market information represented by baseload and peakload futures quotes and historical market information as mirrored by periodical patterns exhibited by the time series of day ahead prices from a methodological standpoint we combine nonparametric filtering with monotone convex interpolation such that the resulting forward curve is pathwise smooth and monotonic cross sectionally stable and time local from an empirical standpoint we exhibit these features in the context of epex spot and eex derivative markets we perform a backtesting analysis to assess the relative quality of our forward curve estimate compared to the benchmark market model of benth koekebakker and ollmar 2007

the classical soviet type economy nature of the system and implications for reform i t is increasingly apparent that the traditional soviet type command economy is a catastrophic failure despite the touted statistical gains of real socialism during the last 40 years we now understand that these gains were largely a statistical illusion fostered by mismeasurement faulty methodology systemic incentives for exaggeration and ideologically and politically motivated distortion winiecki 1988 ericson 1990 moreover the economic system of real socialism in each of these states has imposed large negative social political ecological and personal externalities significant economic reform is now generally accepted as an imperative i am however convinced that successful economic reform of the soviet type economy will require a more comprehensive attack than hitherto attempted to understand the immense difficulties facing radical reform in the soviet union and eastern europe one needs to perceive the soviet type economy as a coherent whole a true system with its own inherent logic necessary components and natural interaction of those components it like any other economic system is as much an organism as a mechanism tending to counteract forces impinging frorn outside and to equilibrate the natural forces and tendencies that arise within it the logic and natural equilibrium of a command economy differ qualitatively and significantly from that of a largely private enterprise market economy hence reforms of a soviet type economy that are consistent with the basic nature of the system survive without altering the qualitative characteristics of

the design of income maintenance programmes this paper provides a comprehensive treatment of a basic income maintenance problem for a group of individuals who differ in their income generating abilities it stresses the impact that imperfect information about such abilities has on programme design the analysis serves two purposes first we are able to unify the theoretical literature on the income maintenance problem second we examine the impact of allowing the government to impose workfare on recipients of income support in addition to being of policy interest this is a theoretically challenging problem since it requires solving a multi dimensional screening problem the solution that we find is strikingly simple it separates the poor into two categories with the lower income groups subject to workfare while facing a 100 marginal tax rate on earnings the second group does no public work and is offered a benefit schedule which taxes earnings at a lower rate

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

constructing forward price curves in electricity markets we present and analyze a method for constructing approximated high resolution forward price curves in electricity markets because a limited number of forward or futures contracts are traded in the market only a limited picture of the theoretical continuous forward price curve is available to the analyst our method combines the information contained in observed bid and ask prices with information from the forecasts generated by bottom up models as an example we use information concerning the shape of the seasonal variation from a bottom up model to improve the forward price curve quoted on the nordic power exchange

efficient moral hazard abstract this paper presents an infinite horizon discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals an agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals since each principal s return is not maximized by the agent s optimal allocation moral hazard occurs in equilibrium however since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects the agent s allocation of effort is efficient if the agent chooses a single principal then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient these results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal agent p a and common agency c a models

implementation with partial provability we extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence we show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences including state dependent with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f if transfers can be large f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption for both results transfers only occur out of equilibrium the use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others preferences our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost

mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints abstract we study an adverse selection problem where an agent is able to understate his productivity but not allowed to overstate it the solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent we identify a sufficient condition that does not depend on the distribution of types under which these two solutions coincide

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

evidence on the purchasing power parity in a panel of cities evidence is provided on the ppp hypothesis using a sample of 50 spanish cities for a long time period through the application of panel data unit root tests although results suggest non rejection of the ppp short run deviations as measured by half lives indicate that real factors might be causing a slow rate of convergence to a common price index even in highly integrated economies

the overvaluation of purchasing power parity abstract recent panel studies of purchasing power parity have reported strong evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates however these studies fail to control for cross sectional dependence in the data this failure has dramatic consequences raising the significance level of tests with a nominal size of 5 percent to as much as 50 percent it is shown in this paper that controlling for cross sectional dependence no evidence against the random walk null can be found in panels of up to 64 real exchange rates this finding cannot be attributed to low power as there is ample power in panels of this size to reject the unit root null