time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

from production networks to geographical economics abstract although standard economics textbooks are seldom interested in production networks modern economies are more and more based upon supplier customer interactions one can consider entire sectors of the economy as generalised supply chains we will take this view in the present paper and study under which conditions local failures to produce or simply to deliver can result in avalanches of shortage and bankruptcies and in localisation of the economic activity we will show that a large class of models exhibit scale free distributions of production and wealth among firms and that regions of high production are localised

tax competition among u s states racing to the bottom or riding on a seesaw abstract dramatic declines in capital tax rates among u s states and european countries have been linked by many commentators to tax competition an inevitable race to the bottom and underprovision of local public goods this paper analyzes the reaction of capital tax policy in a given u s state to changes in capital tax policy by other states our study is undertaken with a novel panel data set covering the 48 contiguous u s states for the period 1965 to 2006 and is guided by the theory of strategic tax competition the latter suggests that capital tax policy is a function of foreign out of state tax policy preferences for government services and home state and foreign state economic and demographic conditions the slope of the reaction function the equilibrium response of home state to foreign state tax policy is negative contrary to casual evidence and many prior empirical studies of fiscal reaction functions this result which stands in contrast to most published findings is due to two critical elements that allow for delayed responses to foreign tax changes and responses to aggregate shocks omitting either of these elements leads to a misspecified model and a positively sloped reaction function our results suggest that the secular decline in capital tax rates at least among u s states reflects synchronous responses among states to common shocks rather than competitive responses to foreign state tax policy while striking given prior empirical findings these results are fully consistent with the implications of the theoretical model developed in this paper and presented elsewhere in the literature rather than racing to the bottom our findings suggest that states are riding on a seesaw consequently tax competition may lead to an increase in the provision of local public goods and policies aimed at restricting tax competition to stem the tide of declining capital taxation are likely to be ineffective

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

economy wide estimates of the implications of climate change sea level rise the economy wide implications of sea level rise in 2050 are estimated using a static computable general equilibrium model this allows for a better estimate of the welfare effects of sea level rise than the common direct cost estimates and for an estimate of the impact of sea level rise on greenhouse gas emissions overall general equilibrium effects increase the welfare costs of sea level rise but not necessarily in every sector or region in the absence of coastal protection economies that rely most on agriculture are hit hardest although energy is substituted for land overall energy consumption falls with the shrinking economy hurting energy exporters with full coastal protection gdp increases particularly in regions with substantial dike building but utility falls least in regions that protect their coasts and export energy energy prices rise and energy consumption falls the costs of full protection exceed the costs of losing land the results also show direct costs the usual method for estimating welfare changes due to sea level rise are a bad approximation of the general equilibrium welfare effects previous estimates of the economic impact of sea level rise are therefore biased

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

public input competition abstract public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive this paper analyzes the nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition even though the regions are assumed identical the equilibrium may not be symmetric the problem with non cooperative behaviour is not only that regions invest too much but that too many regions may choose to invest depending on the parameter values the nash equilibrium may be efficient may be inefficient or may not exist at least not in pure strategies better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition the analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments competition to attract mobile factors

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

equilibrium capital taxation in open economies under commitment abstract this paper analyzes equilibrium capital taxation in open economies with strategic interaction in a neo classical growth model under perfect commitment i show that non cooperative capital taxes are zero in the long run for a large open economy thereby generalizing the result previously established only for the special cases of a closed and a small open economy this does not represent a race to the bottom though since the result is independent of the degree of capital mobility the number of countries or a country s size relative to the rest of the world moreover when countries cooperate they still set capital taxes to zero in the long run these outcomes are robust to different equilibrium specifications the inclusion of endogenous government spending and heterogeneous agents and non linear labor income taxation governments find it optimal to implement the efficient capital allocation in the long run both in a closed and an open economy this trumps incentives to tax foreigners domestic capital holdings by raising capital taxes and attracting capital from abroad by lowering capital taxes

does tax competition really promote growth abstract this paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input absent stochastic shocks decentralized tax setting two or more jurisdictions maximizes the rate of growth as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies extreme tax competition stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem which dampens down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level growth can be lower with decentralization our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth with decentralization

a spatial model of tax competition with multiple tax instruments abstract this paper presents a model of tax competition with two local jurisdictions in each metropolitan area located along a line segment and many metropolitan areas in the world economy the residents in each local jurisdiction are allowed to commute at a constant cost per mile to work in the other jurisdiction if a lump sum tax can be used then other taxes are not used if source based wage and business capital taxes can both be used then only the former is used in this case or if only a business capital tax can be used the local public good is underprovided

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

policy cooperation among benevolent governments may be undesirable this paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable it also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency since the work of hamada 1976 investigating the effects of increasing policy cooperation among countries has been a major topic in international economics a standard conclusion of this work is that increasing policy cooperation among countries is desirable in a seminal paper rogoff 1985 has challenged this view using a simple monetary model rogoff shows that cooperation among policy makers can lead to a lower level of welfare than noncooperation does rogoff s result has caused much consternation among those who advocate policy cooperation and his work has been criticized along several dimensions for example some authors including canzoneri and henderson 1988 have noted that a key assumption in rogoff s model is that the objective function of each country s policy maker does not coincide with the objective function of its residents indeed if in his model policy makers maximize the welfare of their country s residents the counterexample is overturned and cooperation strictly dominates noncooperation this feature leads some to interpret rogoff s result as simply saying that if policy makers form a coalition against the private sector they may be worse off than if they do not others such as neck and dockner 1988 have claimed that rogoff s result depends on private agents acting strategically under this interpretation rogoff s result is relevant to say economies with a large trade union but not to economies with a large number of competitive private agents in a somewhat different vein persson 1988 and especially devereux 1986a b have questioned the significance of welfare comparisons across different institutional regimes in a model without a solid foundation for the behavioural relationships this paper presents a simple model in which governments are benevolent but cooperation is still undesirable the model is a two country version of fischer s 1980 optimal tax model in it private agents are competitive in that each agent takes both prices and government policies as uninfluenced by his actions and each government maximizes the welfare of its country s residents in the paper the two different regimes cooperative and noncooperative

financial globalization inequality and the rising public debt abstract during the last three decades government debt has increased in most developed countries during the same period we have also observed a significant liberalization of international financial markets we propose a multicountry model with incomplete markets and show that governments may choose higher levels of debt when financial markets become internationally integrated we also show that public debt increases with the volatility of uninsurable income idiosyncratic risk to the extent that the increase in income inequality observed in some industrialized countries has been associated with higher idiosyncratic risk the paper suggests another potential mechanism for the rise in public debt jel d31 e62 f65 h63

residence and source based capital taxation in open economies with infinitely lived consumers abstract in this paper we investigate tax competition in a neoclassical growth model where each country may use both residence and source based capital taxes we show that both types of capital taxes are zero at any interior steady state just as in a closed economy for symmetric countries and even for countries that differ only with respect to size and productivity we prove analytically and verify numerically that the open economy policies coincide exactly with the closed economy policies in all time periods for countries that are asymmetric in other dimensions we find that source based taxes are used to manipulate the intertemporal terms of trade in the short run either way the fiscal externalities of source based taxes vanish once residence based taxes are allowed

schumpeterian dynamics an evolutionary model of innovation and imitation abstract this paper develops a simple evolutionary model of innovation and imitation it analyzes how dynamic interactions between equilibrating force of imitation and disequilibrating force of innovation mold the evolutionary pattern of an industry s state of technology and shows that in this schumpeterian world the industry will never approach a neoclassical equilibrium with perfect knowlwdge even in the long run the paper also examines the steady state efficiency distribution of firms that characterizes the industry s long run and obtains some comparative dynamics results

international coordination of fiscal deficits abstract nearly all existing studies of international coordination of fiscal deficits focus on aggregate demand aspects of the problem in contrast this paper adopts a dynamic general equilibrium perspective and emphasizes the public finance side of fiscal deficits in a world with international capital mobility the fiscal deficit of any single government affects world interest rates and therefore influences intertemporal resource allocation in all countries the paper shows that these international externalities may result in inefficiently large fiscal deficits high interest rates and low levels of welfare if international policy coordination is absent

the macroeconomic consequences of disasters abstract natural disasters have a statistically observable adverse impact on the macro economy in the short run and costlier events lead to more pronounced slowdowns in production yet interestingly developing countries and smaller economies face much larger output declines following a disaster of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies a close study of the determinants of these adverse macroeconomic output costs reveals several interesting patterns countries with a higher literacy rate better institutions higher per capita income higher degree of openness to trade and higher levels of government spending are better able to withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the macro economy these all suggest an increased ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction financial conditions also seem to be of importance countries with more foreign exchange reserves and higher levels of domestic credit but with less open capital accounts appear more robust and better able to endure natural disasters with less adverse spillover into domestic production

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

evolutionary modelling of the macro economic impacts of catastrophic flood events this paper examines the possible contribution of evolutionary economics to macro economic modelling of flood impacts to provide guidance for future economic risk modelling most macro economic models start from a neoclassical economic perspective and focus on equilibrium outcomes either in a static or dynamic way and describe economic processes at a high level of aggregation as a consequence they typically fail to account for the complexity of social interactions and other behavioural responses of consumers and producers to disasters which may affect the macroeconomic impacts of floods employing evolutionary principles and methods such as agent based modelling may help to address some of the shortcomings of current macro economic models we explore and discuss the implications of applying consumer and producer heterogeneity bounded rationality network effects social and technological learning co evolution and adaptive policy making concepts into existing economic frameworks for the assessment of macro economic impacts of floods authors abstract

unidimensional downsian politics median utilitarian or what else abstract in this note we show that in the probabilistic version of the standard unidimensional downsian model with two candidates maximizing their expected pluralities there do not exist nash equilibria in pure strategies whenever the probabilistic component is arbitrarily small but not degenerate we argue that empirical research on electoral competition should pay more attention to the magnitude of partisanship in each group of voters since equilibrium predictions will be very sensitive to that specific electoral parameter

can natural disasters have positive consequences investigating the role of embodied technical change it has been suggested that disasters might have positive economic consequences through the accelerated replacement of capital this possibility is referred to as the productivity effect this effect is investigated using a model with embodied technical change in this framework disasters can influence the production level but cannot influence the growth rate in the same way than the saving ratio in a solow like model depending on reconstruction quality indeed accounting for embodied technical change can either decrease or increase disaster costs but is never able to turn disasters into positive events moreover a better but slower reconstruction amplifies the short term consequences of disasters but pays off over the long term regardless the productivity effect cannot prevent the existence of a bifurcation when disaster damages exceed the reconstruction capacity potentially leading to poverty traps c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

openness government size and the terms of trade this paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments both theoretically and empirically we argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels 1 a terms of trade externality whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and 2 the demand for insurance whereby trade raises risk and public transfers we provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods moreover while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare the second is instead optimal in the empirical part of the paper we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants consistently with the terms of trade externality channel we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments

the dynamics of government abstract we model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations we find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment the difference is larger the lower is the political influence of young agents the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations and the lower is risk aversion furthermore there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium finally smooth preference aggregation as under probabilistic voting produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria which occur under majority voting aggregation

dynamic fiscal competition a political economy theory abstract i develop a political economy theory of dynamic fiscal competition via public spending and debt with internationally mobile capital strategic policies generate two cross border externalities that voters in each country fail to internalize 1 an increase in public spending that bolsters capital accumulation but also 2 a race to the top in public debt which crowds out capital the relative size of these two externalities varies with the number of financially integrated countries and interacts with the domestic political conflict between young and old voters despite residence based taxation capital tax rates are lower under strategic policies than under coordination furthermore they may decline with financial integration strategic policies lead to lower long run output and welfare relative to coordination but are preferred by subsequent generations of voters if the number of financially integrated countries is low or the political weight of the young is high

schumpeterian dynamics part ii technological progress firm growth and economic selection abstract business firms strive for survival and growth they innovate in order to grow they imitate in order to survive the purpose of this paper the second in the series on schumpeterian dynamics is to construct a simple mathematical model which is capable of studying the evolution of an industry s state of technology as a dynamic outcome of the interactions among innovation imitation and capacity growth at the micro level of firms the doctrine of economic selection insists by means of the analogy to the biological theory of natural selection that only the most efficient firms will survive the long run competitive struggle for capacity growth indeed if neither innovation nor imitation is possible for the firm a firm or a group of firms which is lucky enough to start with the most efficient technology will outgrow all the other firms in the long run once however the possibility of technological imitation is allowed for the firms the industry will settle down to a static equilibrium of perfect technological knowledge not by the success of the most efficient firms in their striving for the higher growth rate but by the success of the less efficient in their effort to imitate the others the blind force of economic selection is thus outwitted by the human force of imitative activities finally when firms are allowed to innovate in their technology the selective force of market competition is no longer capable of weeding out the less fit even in the long run indeed it is shown in the present paper that the dynamic interplay of the processes of innovation imitation and growth will keep the industry s state of technology from settling down to the static equilibrium but reproduce in the long run a relative dispersion of efficiencies across firms in a statistically balanced form

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

property taxation nash equilibrium and market power abstract differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area following wildasin 4 and bucovetsky 2 the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a nash game in the tax rate the tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases

fiscal competition and growth when capital is imperfectly mobile is tax competition good for economic growth we address this question using a simple model of endogenous growth governments in a system of many small jurisdictions benevolently maximize the welfare of immobile residents quadratic de installation costs limit the mobility of capital we look at optimal taxation and long run growth and we analyse the effects of cost parameter variations on taxation and growth a race to the bottom in capital tax rates is only one possibility the relationship between capital mobility and capital tax rates is not monotonic growth and capital mobility are unambiguously positively related

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

time to build and investment the paper investigates the effect of the time to build technology on investment dynamics it explains the positive autocorrelation of investment by showing that investment is serially correlated once the time to build technology is taken into account the paper also shows that the time to build technology can explain a substantial portion of the variation in aggregate investment data using estimated marginal q the paper illustrates that investment responds asymmetrically to different levels of q a fact in favor of the irreversibility argument