strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases dynamic pricing offers the potential to increase revenues at the same time it creates an incentive for customers to strategize over the timing of their purchases a firm should ideally account for this behavior when making its pricing and stocking decisions in particular we investigate whether it is optimal for a firm to create rationing risk by deliberately understocking products then the resulting threat of shortages creates an incentive for customers to purchase early at higher prices but when does such a strategy make sense if it is profitable to create shortages what is the optimal amount of rationing risk to create we develop a stylized model to study this problem in our model customers have heterogeneous valuations for the firm s product and face declining prices over two periods customers are assumed to have identical risk preferences and know the price path and fill rate in each period via its capacity choice the firm is able to control the fill rate and hence the rationing risk faced by customers customers behave strategically and weigh the payoff of immediate purchases against the expected payoff of delaying their purchases we analyze the capacity choice that maximizes the firm s profits first we consider a monopoly market and characterize conditions under which rationing is optimal we examine how the optimal amount of rationing is affected by the magnitude of price changes over time and the degree of risk aversion among customers we then analyze an oligopoly version of the model and show that competition reduces the firms ability to profit from rationing indeed there exists a critical number of firms beyond which a rationing equilibrium cannot be supported

the hidden information content of price movements dynamic patterns of prices in different markets may motivate strategic consumers who could be monitoring price movements over time to game vendors do past price movements carry information about the probability and magnitude of future price drops conducting empirical work in the airline industry on near 1000 us domestic routes we find that some price metrics carry information about future price swings these variables can assist in predicting the likelihood and magnitude of price drops these price metrics yield significantly different signals which also vary as the prediction horizon changes

research note optimal selling in dynamic auctions adaptation versus commitment this paper analyzes optimal selling strategies of a monopolist facing forward looking patient unit demand bidders in a sequential auction market such a seller faces a fundamental choice between two selling regimes adaptive selling that involves learning about remaining demand from early prices and commitment selling that forgoes such learning and makes all selling decisions in the beginning of the game a model of the game between the seller and the bidders is proposed to characterize the optimal regime choice the model implies that the relative profitability of the two regimes depends on the expected gains from trade when the expected gains from trade are low commitment dominates adaptation and vice versa

learning by doing and the introduction of new goods a dynamic general equilibrium model is developed in which goods are valued according to the characteristics they contain the set of goods produced in any period is endogenously determined and learning by doing is the force behind sustained growth it is shown that the set of produced goods changes in a systematic way over time with goods of higher quality entering each period and those of lower quality dropping out the model is then used to study the effect of introducing a traditional sector in which there is no learning

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

behavioral anomalies in consumer wait or buy decisions and their implications for markdown management the decision to buy an item at a regular price or wait for a possible markdown involves a multidimensional trade off between the value of the item the delay in getting it the likelihood of getting it and the magnitude of the price discount such trade offs are prone to behavioral anomalies by which human decision makers deviate from the discounted expected utility model we build an axiomatic preference model that accounts for three well known anomalies and produces a parsimonious generalization of discounted expected utility we then plug this behavioral model into a stackelberg nash game between a firm that decides the price discount and a continuum of consumers who decide to wait or buy anticipating other consumers decisions and the resultant likelihood of product availability we solve the markdown management problem and contrast the results of our model with those under discounted expected utility we analytically show that accounting for the behavioral anomalies can result in larger markdowns a

an economic evaluation of peru s liquefied natural gas export policy abstract peru s camisea gas fields hold nearly 90 of the country s natural gas reserves in the 1990s the government had a policy to prioritize camisea gas for domestic consumption the revocation of this policy in the 2000s allowed private developers to export 40 of camisea s proven reserves equivalent to one third of peru s total this usd 3 9 billion liquefied natural gas lng export project boasts the largest single foreign direct investment in peru s history a major component of the financing was granted by international financial institutions on economic grounds while the project was expected to yield a substantial return to private investors the export of one third of peru s total proven natural gas reserves is not in line with its long term interests we undertake cost benefit analyses for a series of scenarios starting with the project s formative stage in the mid 2000s and then in 2012 two years after it began its commercial operation in all cases peru does not have sufficient reserves to warrant export and the economic costs far exceed the benefits this policy of lng exports should not have been approved by the government nor should the loans have been granted by international financial institutions to make it possible

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

introduction strategy for new products with positive and negative word of mouth existing innovation diffusion models assume that individual experience with the product is always communicated positively through word of mouth for certain innovations however this assumption is tenuous since communicators of the product experience may transfer favorable unfavorable or indifferent messages through word of mouth this paper examines a diffusion model for products in which negative information plays a dominant role discusses its implications for optimal advertising timing policy and presents an application to forecast attendance for the movie gandhi in the dallas area

pricing substitutable products under consumer regrets abstract since many firms provide consumers with substitutable products which may be launched sequentially over several periods strategic consumers need to make their purchase or wait decisions at the beginning of the first period however they may face second period valuation uncertainty when such decisions are made and decisions made under uncertainty may lead to regrets ex post lots of empirical studies show that consumers anticipate these regrets and take anticipated regrets into consideration this paper studies the impact of valuation uncertainty and consumer anticipated regrets on consumer purchasing behavior firm s prices and pricing strategy we consider a firm selling two substitutable products over two periods one product for one period in a selling season the firm announces all its prices at the beginning of the selling season price commitment or announces each price at the beginning of each period dynamic pricing besides a consumer may experience purchase regret from missing a better choice if she chooses to buy in the first period and otherwise wait regret if she chooses to wait consumers make decisions based on the firm s prices and strategies and the anticipated regrets we find that a firm may need to set a lower price in the first period even when the average valuation in this period is higher second with price commitment the impact of each type of regret on the optimal second period price can be opposite and depends on the value of the uncertainty and regret parameters finally we show that price commitment dominates dynamic pricing and the value of price commitment depends on the uncertainty and anticipated regret

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic analysis of posted and contingent pricing schemes abstract we study dynamic pricing policies for a monopolist selling perishable products over a finite time horizon to strategic buyers buyers are strategic in the sense that they anticipate the firm s price policies it is expensive and administratively difficult for most brick and mortar retailers to change prices placing limits on the number of price changes and the types of pricing policies they can adopt the simplest policy is to commit to a set of price changes a more complex alternative is to let the price depend on sales history we investigate two pricing schemes that we call posted and contingent pricing using the posted pricing scheme the firm announces a set of prices at the beginning of the horizon in the contingent pricing scheme price evolution depends upon demand realization our focus is on the posted pricing scheme because of its ease of implementation counter to intuition we find that neither a posted pricing scheme nor a contingent pricing scheme is dominant and the difference in expected revenues of these two schemes is small limiting the number of price changes will result in a decrease in expected revenues we show that a multi unit auction with a reservation price provides an upper bound for expected revenues for both pricing schemes numerical examples suggest that a posted pricing scheme with two or three price changes is enough to achieve revenues that are close to the upper bound dynamic pricing is only useful when strategic buyers perceive scarcity we study the impact of scarcity and derive the optimal stocking levels for large markets finally we investigate whether or not it is optimal for the seller to conceal inventory or sales information from buyers a firm benefits if it does not reveal the number of units it has available for sale at the beginning of the season or subsequently withholds information about the number of units sold

clearance pricing and inventory policies for retail chains clearance pricing and end of season inventory management are challenging and important problems in retailing sales rates depend upon price seasonal effects and the remaining assortment of items available to customers there is little time to react to observed sales and pricing errors result in either loss of potential revenue or excess inventory to be liquidated this paper develops optimal clearance prices and inventory management policies that take into account the impact of reduced assortment and seasonal changes on sales rates versions of these policies have been tested and implemented at three major retail chains and these applications are summarized and discussed

strategic waiting for consumer generated quality information dynamic pricing of new experience goods in this paper we study the impact of consumer generated quality information e g consumer reviews on a firm s dynamic pricing strategy in the presence of strategic consumers such information is useful not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product but also to the firm the informativeness of the consumer generated quality information depends however on the volume of consumers who share their opinions and thus depends on the initial sales volume hence via its initial price the firm not only influences its revenue but also controls the quality information flow over time the firm may either enhance or dampen the quality information flow via increasing or decreasing initial sales the corresponding pricing strategy to steer the quality information flow is not always intuitive compared to the case without consumer generated quality information the firm may reduce the initial sales and lower the initial price interestingly the firm may get strictly worse off due to the consu

fare prediction websites and transaction prices empirical evidence from the airline industry the marketing and operations disciplines have increasingly accounted for the presence of strategic consumer behavior theory suggests that such behavior exists when consumers are able to consider future distribution of prices and that this behavior exposes firms to intertemporal competition that results with a downward pressure on prices however deriving future distribution of prices is not a trivial task online decision support tools that provide consumers with information about future distributions of prices can facilitate strategic consumer behavior this paper studies whether the availability of such information affects transacted prices by conducting an empirical analysis in the context of the airline industry studying the effect at the route level we find significant price reduction effects as such information becomes available for a route both in fixed effects and difference in differences estimation models this effect is consistent across the different fare percentiles and amounts to a red

social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition abstract this paper studies dynamic price competition between two firms selling differentiated durable goods to two buyers whose valuations of the two goods depend on their own private type as well as that of the other buyer we derive a key intertemporal property of the equilibrium prices and construct an equilibrium based on this property we show that social learning reduces the equilibrium prices in the sense that when the buyers are more interdependent and hence have a stronger incentive to wait and see the firms respond by lowering their period 1 prices interestingly we find that this response by the firms along with the intertemporal property of the equilibrium prices implies that buyers delay their decisions less often when they become more interdependent

competition with targeted product design price variety and welfare abstract we consider the price and welfare effects of competition in targeted product design in the context of the salop circle model changes in product design lead to demand rotations that set the stage for our analysis with an exogenous number of firms we show that the degree of targeted product design tends to increase with the number of firms moreover under reasonable conditions price increasing competition takes place for intermediate levels of the number of firms this effect is associated with the possibility of lower consumer welfare with endogenous firm entry an interesting insight from our analysis is that in some situations an increase in market size or a technological progress that reduces entry costs both might reduce consumers welfare

intertemporal price discrimination and sales strategy under incomplete information this article examines intertemporal price variations to provide a theoretical explanation for them when firms have only incomplete information about consumers reservation prices for the commodity we contend that some intertemporal price variations can result from attempts by firms to discriminate among consumers we demonstrate that such price discrimination is the optimal policy for a seller if consumers have a higher time discount rate than producers

optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers this paper considers the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist marketing a new product the key feature differentiating this paper from the extant management science literature on intertemporal pricing is the assumption that consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers a subgame perfect nash equilibrium pricing policy is characterized and shown to involve intertemporal price discrimination we compare this policy to the optimal policy for a monopolist facing myopic consumers and find that for any given state prices are always lower with rational consumers than with myopic consumers for plausible parameter values the assumption of consumer rationality can be shown to lead to large differences in optimal prices moreover if a monopolist facing rational consumers implements the optimal myopic consumer pricing policy profits can be significantly less than if the monopolist follows the equilibrium pricing policy for rational consumers

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

pricing and manufacturing decisions when demand is a function of prices in multiple periods in most deterministic manufacturing decision models demand is either known or induced by pricing decisions in the period that the demand is experienced however in more realistic market scenarios consumers make purchase decisions with respect to price not only in the current period but also in past and future periods we model a joint manufacturing pricing decision problem accounting for that portion of demand realized in each period that is induced by the interaction of pricing decisions in the current period and in previous periods we formulate a mathematical programming model and develop solution techniques we identify structural properties of our models and develop closed form solutions and effective heuristics for various special cases of our models finally we conduct extensive computational experiments to quantify the effectiveness of our heuristics and to develop managerial insights

markdown or everyday low price the role of behavioral motives we study a seller s optimal pricing and inventory strategies when behavioral nonpecuniary motives affect consumers purchase decisions in particular the seller chooses between two pricing strategies markdown or everyday low price and determines the optimal prices and inventory level two salient behavioral motives that impact consumers purchase decisions and the seller s optimal strategies are anticipated regret and misperception of product availability regret arises when a consumer initially chooses to wait but encounters stockout later or when the consumer buys the product at the high price but realizes that the product is still available at the markdown price in addition consumers often perceive the product s future availability to be different than its actual availability we determine and quantify that both regret and availability misperception have significant operational and profit implications for the seller for example ignoring these behavioral factors can result in up to 10 profit

modifying customer expectations of price decreases for a durable product we study the introductory signalling strategy for a durable product that faces optimistic expectations among customers about price declines over time the firm introducing the product knows that experiential learning is low for the product however customers being uncertain about the extent of experiential learning assign a nonzero probability that the firm s new product will enjoy a high cost reduction with cumulative experience the optimistic expectations of customers reduce their willingness to pay a high price at the product s introduction while predisposing them to buying later the challenge facing the low experience firm is to choose an introductory strategy that will credibly convey the low experience curve effect to customers we use the sequential equilibrium concept in a game theoretic framework to identify the firm s signalling strategy we identify the unique separating equilibrium of the game after refining the set of separating equilibria we demonstrate that a high introductory price credibly signals the low experiential learning to customers we also show that signalling causes an artificial learning curve effect

retail replenishment models with display space elastic demand we study a single store multi product inventory problem in which product sales are a composite function of shelf space since sales tend to deplete the amount of product on display the effective shelf space assigned to the product diminishes with time unless replenishment occurs we consider the problem of optimal replenishment times under these conditions we assume a linear dependence of sales rate to effective shelf space in all our analysis we present exact and approximate solutions for the single product and multi product cases for the single product case we study the effect of space elasticity cross elasticity and empty space elasticity on the optimal replenishment period for the multi product case we present a computationally attractive method using matrix exponentials and develop error bounds for this method

purchasing pricing and quick response in the presence of strategic consumers we consider a retailer that sells a product with uncertain demand over a finite selling season the retailer sets an initial stocking quantity and at some predetermined point in the season optimally marks down remaining inventory we modify this classic setting by introducing three types of consumers myopic consumers who always purchase at the initial full price bargain hunting consumers who purchase only if the discounted price is sufficiently low and strategic consumers who strategically choose when to make their purchase a strategic consumer chooses between a purchase at the initial full price and a later purchase at an uncertain markdown price in equilibrium strategic consumers and the retailer make optimal decisions given their rational expectations regarding future prices availability of inventory and the behavior of other consumers we find that the retailer stocks less takes smaller price discounts and earns lower profit if strategic consumers are present than if there are no strategic consumers we find that a retailer should generally avoid committing to a price path over the season assuming such commitment is feasible committing to a markdown price or to not mark down at all is often too costly inventory may remain unsold even in the presence of strategic consumers the better approach is to be cautious with the initial quantity and then mark down optimally furthermore we discuss the value of quick response the ability to procure additional inventory after obtaining updated demand information albeit at a higher unit cost than the initial order we find that the value of quick response to a retailer is generally much greater in the presence of strategic consumers than without them on average 67 more valuable and as much as 558 more valuable in our sample in other words although it is well established in the literature that quick response provides value by allowing better matching of supply with demand it provides more value often substantially more value by allowing a retailer to control the negative consequences of strategic consumer behavior