how general are time preferences eliciting good specific discount rates abstract this paper tests the commonly used assumption that people apply a single discount rate to the utility from different sources of consumption using survey data from uganda with both hypothetical and incentivized choices over different goods we elicit time preferences from about 2400 subjects we reject the null of equal discount rates across goods the average person in our sample is more impatient about sugar meat and starchy plantains than about money and a list of other goods we review the assumptions to recover discount rates from experimental choices for the case of good specific discounting consistently with the theoretical framework we find convergence in discount rates across goods for two groups expected to engage in or think about arbitraging the rewards traders and individuals with large quantities of the good at home as an application we evaluate empirically the conditions under which good specific discounting could predict a low asset poverty trap

time inconsistent preferences and the annuitization decision good news can involve difficult decisions for example winning a lottery jackpot can go along with the decision whether to have the jackpot paid out immediately as a lump sum or as periodic annual payments also when entering retirement most people face the decision whether they want their defined contribution account balance paid as a lump sum or to annuitize that amount the fact that people tend to choose the lump sum even if economic reasons suggest that they should choose the annuity is called the annuity paradox in a large online survey we find that people behave time inconsistent older people have a stronger tendency to choose the lump sum than younger people when they are asked to predict today what to choose when they retire this effect is considerably stronger for participants that answer simple time preference questions inconsistently our findings suggest to think about precommitment devices for the annuitization decision in the retirement case already at the time when the defined benefit plan is started

how hyperbolic discounting preference affects chinese consumers consumption choice between conventional and electric vehicles abstract this paper presents a theoretical model and addresses several issues related to life cycle cost analysis to illustrate how time inconsistent preferences affect consumer choice the particular case study selects involved consumer choice between a vehicle with high initial acquisition cost but low ownership cost e g an electric vehicle ev and one with a low initial acquisition cost but high ownership cost e g a conventional internal combustion engine vehicle icev to test our theoretical analysis we conduct an empirical study on how time discounting rates affect consumer choice between icevs and evs with different initial cost ratios from the survey results we find that individuals with higher present bias showed irrational purchase behavior even when controlling for wealth level specifically people making some stronger bias to present decisions chose higher total cost icevs with lower initial cost but higher ownership cost over lower total cost evs with higher initial cost and lower ownership cost however people s long term discount is not correlated with irrational vehicle purchase behavior furthermore we study the present bias and long term discount rate in one scenario and found present bias to be correlated with irrational behavior

the new economics of agriculture agriculture in the twentieth century was characterized first and foremost by technological innovation that began in the industrialized world and spread to the developing countries as the green revolution this revolution in biological chemical and mechanical technology made it possible for agricultural production to grow faster than the demand for food despite a rapidly growing world population the result was a decline in real agricultural commodity prices throughout this era a trend that is expected by many researchers to continue at least into the early part of the twenty first century antle et al johnson 1998 rosegrant and ringer at the same time virtually all governments intervened in their agricultural sectors through a wide array of policies resulting in a pattern of net taxation of agriculture in low income countries and subsidization of agriculture in high income countries this set of events and the agricultural economics literature that was generated to explain them is what i will refer to here as the economics of agriculture in the twentieth century a stylized demand andsupply model of an agricultural market can be used to represent these relationships with output prices p income i population n factor prices w capital k technology t and government policy g

axiomatization and measurement of quasi hyperbolic discounting this article provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi hyperbolic preferences we impose consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal trade offs by relying on what we call annuity compensations our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles discounting from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in a pilot experiment we use the partial identification approach to estimate bounds for the distributions of discount factors in the subject pool consistent with previous studies we find evidence for both present and future bias jel codes c10 c99 d03 d90

federal reserve independence abstract the federal reserve is always called an independent agency the term independent is rarely defined the only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on chairman martin s statement that the federal reserve is independent with the government not independent of the government martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the federal reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by congress and signed by the president financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when congress approved the federal reserve act in 1913 in fact the federal reserve has supported treasury operations many times i conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the taylor rule but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside

time tradeoff sequences for analyzing discounting and time inconsistency this paper introduces time tradeoff tto sequences as a general tool to analyze intertemporal choice we give several applications for empirical purposes we can measure discount functions without requiring any measurement of or assumption about utility we can quantitatively measure time inconsistencies and simplify their qualitative tests tto sequences can be administered and analyzed very easily using only pencil and paper for theoretical purposes we use tto sequences to axiomatize quasi hyperbolic discount functions we demonstrate the feasibility of measuring tto sequences in an experiment in which we tested the axiomatizations our findings suggest rejections of several currently popular discount functions and call for the development of new ones it is especially desirable that such discount functions can accommodate increasing impatience

eliciting discount functions when baseline consumption changes over time abstract many empirical studies on intertemporal choice report preference reversals in the sense that a preference between a small reward to be received soon and a larger reward to be received later reverses as both rewards are equally delayed such preference reversals are commonly interpreted as contradicting constant discounting this interpretation is correct only if baseline consumption to which the outcomes are added remains constant over time the difficulty with measuring discounting when baseline consumption changes over time is that delaying an outcome has two effects 1 due to the change in baseline consumption it changes the utility from receiving the outcome and 2 it changes the factor by which this utility is discounted in this paper we propose a way to disentangle the two effects which allows us to draw conclusions about discounting even when baseline consumption changes over time

monetary policy rules macroeconomic stability and inflation a view from the trenches i estimate a forward looking monetary policy reaction function for the federal reserve for the periods before and after paul volcker s appointment as chairman in 1979 using information that was available to the fomc in real time from 1966 to 1995 the results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inflation forecasts during both periods this contradicts the hypothesis based on analysis with ex post constructed data that the instability of the great inflation was the result of weak fomc policy responses to expected inflation a difference is that prior to volcker s appointment policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious drawing on contemporaneous accounts of fomc policy i discuss the implications of the findings for alternative explanations of the great inflation and the improvement in macroeconomic stability since then

a combined measure of uk core inflation estimates this article estimates uk core inflation in a structural vector autoregression var framework while building on the work of quah and vahey 1995 we extend their two variable var model to allow for different dynamics depending on the nature of the shocks that potentially influence the process of core inflation we also construct a combined measure of core inflation estimates on the basis of their reliabilities empirical evidence shows that the new measures demonstrate marked improvement in their eligibility to serve as core inflation estimators furthermore the combined measure is shown to perform best it appears that the conventional core measures such as the retail prices excluding mortgage interest payments rpix and the harmonized index of consumer prices hicp inflation series are not successful in capturing the underlying trend of inflation casting some doubt on their current use in the making of monetary policy decisions

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

a long history of fomc voting behavior we devise and apply a method for estimating monetary policy reaction functions for individual members of the federal open market committee fomc of the federal reserve our method uses members votes on the monetary policy directive in fomc meetings as the key source of data on individual preferences the analysis provides a ranking by preference for ease for 84 fomc members who served during the 1966 1996 period

electoral cycles and budgetary growth in veterans benefit programs while many studies have generated negative findings regarding the general existence of electoral cycles in economic phenomena we have found an apparently robust electoral cycle in veterans benefits this pattern was found between 1961 and 1978 but has disappeared since then we use this case to investigate the possibility that electoral cycles might contribute to the growth of government spending using two different methods of inference we find no strong basis to conclude that such cycles cause increasing public sector growth

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

politics and monetary policy abstract how and why do politicians preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks looking at the european central bank ecb this paper shows that politicians on average favor significantly lower interest rates three factors explain the different preferences first politicians put relatively less weight on inflation and more on output in their preferred monetary policy reaction function second their preferences are affected by political economy motives third different preferences are also and largely due to different constituencies as politicians primarily focus on national economic objectives rather than the euro area as a whole

monetary policy rules based on real time data this paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules using taylor s rule as an example i demonstrate that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data further estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the federal reserve in real time these results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

environment and development theory and international evidence the environmental effects of economic development have significant implications for a wide array of policy questions facing both low and high income countries today internationally agricultural research centers are considering how to incorporate sustainability issues into their research agendas while international lending institutions are taking a close look at the environmental consequences of industrial projects domestically the north american free trade agreement has brought the relationship between economic development and environmental quality to the forefront of u s public policy debate it is surprising that despite the postwar growth of development economics the genesis of environmental economics and the fusion of ideas from both fields into the theme of sustainable development economists have not made much progress in describing the impacts of long term economic growth on environmental quality yet a vigorous public debate has arisen between individuals who maintain that environmental degradation is a necessary outcome of economic growth and those who believe that economic growth and environmental quality go hand in hand this debate was highlighted at the 1992 united nations conference on environment and development in rio de janeiro in part this debate hinges on the properties of the aggregate demand for and supply of environmental quality if the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality or amenities is high then the increased prosperity engendered by economic growth could lead to significantly higher demand for environmental quality proponents of economic growth believe this demand will translate into a higher realized level of quality as both public and private institutions and organi

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

on increasing risk inequality and poverty measures peacocks lyrebirds and exotic options we extend the rothschild and stiglitz 1970 notion of increasing risk to families of random variables and in this way link their approach to the concept of stochastic processes which are increasing in the convex order these processes have been introduced in seminal work by strassen 1965 doob 1968 and kellerer 1972 who showed that such processes have the same marginals as a martingale in fact we demonstrate that their results include the results of rothschild and stiglitz as a special case further we show that it makes sense to look at a larger class of processes which we refer to as lyrebirds we also show how these processes link up with the concept of second order stochastic dominance and are helpful in studying the dynamics of inequality and poverty measures further applications discussed include geometric and hyperbolic discounting exotic derivatives and real options

econometrics and presidential elections this paper discusses an econometric equation that explains votes for president as a function of economic events and incumbency information the history of the equation is reviewed the update after the 1992 election is discussed and a prediction for the 1996 election is made conditional on an economic forecast

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

spatial dispersion of retail margins evidence from turkish agricultural prices the farmer share of retail prices is shown to be about 16 percent corresponding to about 84 percent of a distribution share on average across agricultural products and regions within turkey the share of transportation costs in retail prices is only about 7 percent while the share of retail margins is about 77 percent of retail prices the dispersion of retail prices across regions is shown to be mostly due to local wages and variable markups while the contribution of traded input prices is relatively small accordingly the high dispersion of farmer prices across locations is not reflected in the dispersion of retail prices due to the high contribution of retail margins these retail margins are also shown to account for about one third of the consumer welfare dispersion across regions and more than half of the consumer welfare dispersion across products

hyperbolic discounting and the standard model eliciting discount functions abstract experiments on static intertemporal choice find evidence of particularly extreme impatience toward immediate rewards while this is often taken as support for hyperbolic discounting it could also arise because the most likely participants in experiments may be those with the most immediate need for money we conduct a calibration exercise and find that the extreme impatience observed in experiments can be accommodated by a standard exponential discounting model with no discounting and expectation of a small increase in the base consumption level the calibration uses existing estimates of curvature of utility

partisan monetary policies presidential influence through the power of appointment we investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy making influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the federal open market committee fomc or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the board of governors to investigate these two channels of influence we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the fomc our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

is there a dead spot new evidence on fomc decisions before elections using new data that chronicle the fed s internal forecast of the output gap from 1973 to 1998 this paper tests for an electoral cycle in the decisions of the federal open market committee fomc the paper provides evidence of a dead spot in the committee s decisions before presidential elections for given values of these internal forecasts the fomc is less likely to decide to tighten monetary policy in the year preceding a presidential election than at other times

estimation in a class of simultaneous equation limited dependent variable models estimation in a class of simultaneous equation limited dependent variable models is considered the minimum chi squared method is used to compare the asymptotic relative efficiency of marginal and new conditional maximum likelihood estimators for this class of models efficient minimum chi squared estimation procedures are described a two step algorithm based on a conditional maximum likelihood estimator provides a natural framework for both computing a linearized and locating the joint maximum likelihood estimator the unimodality of the simultaneous equation tobit likelihood function is proved and this model is used to illustrate the empirical application of some of the estimators considered in the paper the relative efficiency of these estimators in the simultaneous equation tobit model is examined in a set of monte carlo experiments many applications of microeconomic theory to individual data face the joint problems of censoring and simultaneity in particular the dependent variable under investigation may not be continuously observed and some of the conditioning variables representing the outcome of other decisions by the individual may be simultaneously determined smith and blundell 1986 developed an asymptotically efficient test for exogeneity or simultaneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model as a byproduct a conditional maximum likelihood estimator was obtained which is consistent under the alternative hypothesis of simultaneity nelson and olsen 1978 amemiya 1978 1979 and heckman 1978 consider a number of consistent marginal maximum likelihood estimators based on marginal maximum likelihood estimators of the reduced form parameters for the probit and tobit models in contrast the estimator derived from smith and blundell 1986 is based on the corresponding conditional maximum likelihood estimators this paper is concerned with estimation in a class of simultaneous limited dependent variable regression models which includes the simultaneous probit and tobit models as special cases analogous marginal and conditional maximum likelihood estimators to those of nelson and olsen 1978 amemiya 1978 1979 heckman 1978 and smith and blundell 1986 are derived and other new estimators are suggested the minimum chi squared approach discussed by ferguson 1958 malinvaud 1970 and rothenberg 1973 is used to compare the asymptotic relative efficiency of various estimators considered a simple two step algorithm based on the conditional maximum likelihood

testing linear hypothesis on national account data stock adjustment models of money demand have employed either the nominal or real adjustment process but they have not been tested statistically due to their nonnested ness this paper formulates a general stock adjustment model which includes both nominal and real adjustment processes as its nested subsets each process is then tested against the general specification the paper also examines the homogeneity of money demand with respect to price level and income in the general model

whose monetary policy is it anyway abstract the rising inflation of the 1970s inspired substantial theoretical analysis of the goals of central banks in models with time inconsistent monetary policy central bankers are assumed to produce positive equilibrium inflation because they target an unemployment rate below the nairu ball 1995 notes that these models could explain the level of inflation but not its frequent and persistent movements although real shocks as in rogoff 1985 can produce temporary changes in inflation ball explains the recurrent and persistent movements in inflation throughout the past 40 years with random changes in the preferences of the monetary policymakers occurring even at the frequency of fomc meetings this paper provides empirical support that shifts in goals can indeed occur at this frequency however it is not necessarily the tastes of the policymakers that are changing the fomc s reading of the policy desired by the public can evolve over time and if the fomc is not completely goal independent it will accommodate these changes

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

asset holding and consumption volatility we investigate the possibility that limited participation in asset markets and the stock market in particular might explain the lack of correspondence between the sample moments of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and asset returns in u k data we estimate ownership probabilities to separate likely shareholders from nonshareholders enabling us to control for changing composition effects as well as selection into the group we then construct estimates of the imrs for each of these different groups and consider their time series properties we find that the consumption growth of shareholders is more volatile than that of nonshareholders and more highly correlated with excess returns to shares in particular one cannot reject the predictions of the consumption capital asset pricing model for the group of households predicted to own both assets this is in contrast to the failure of the model when estimated on data for all households

estimating time preferences from convex budgets experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what seems reasonable for economic decision making such high rates are often attributed to present biased discounting a well known bias of standard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption utility attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversion to identify concavity researchers find reasonable discounting but at the cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature we present a new methodology for identifying time preferences both discounting and curvature from simple allocation decisions we find reasonable levels of both discounting and curvature and surprisingly dynamically consistent time preferences jel c91 d12 d81 understanding and estimating time preferences is obviously of great importance to economists marketers and policy makers consumers decide how much to invest in savings education real estate and life insurance how much to diet exercise and smoke whether to marry when to have children and what to leave in their wills while there has been substantial research estimating time preferences using aggregate consumption data 1 the bulk of the effort has occurred in laboratory environments 2 among the many laboratory techniques employed recent studies have favored multiple price lists mpl with monetary payments 3 with mpls individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller payment amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future the interest rate increases monotonically in a price list such that the point where an individual switches from preferring sooner payments to later payments carries interval

time consistency stationarity and time invariance a sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic preference reversals between sooner smaller and later larger rewards when the sooner reward could be immediate the theoretically motivated design permits separate identification of time consistent stationary a ndtime invariant choices at least half of the subjects are time consistent but only three quarters of them exhibit stationary choices about half of subjects with time inconsistent choices have stationary preferences these results chal lenge the view that present bias preferences are the main source of time inconsistent choices the past twenty years have seen a surge of interest in time inconsistent preferences mostly this has been motivated by psychological experiments and introspection that have suggested the existence of present bias a decision maker prefers smaller immediate reward to a larger delayed reward but when she is asked about her preferences between these two alternatives when both are equally shifted into the future her preferences are reversed although there is no inconsistency per se in her answers this behavior has been taken to suggest that when the decision maker will be asked to update her choices in the future she will generally deviate from her ex ante plans our goal in the present study is to perform a dynamic preference reversal experiment as such one is required to extend the standard framework of pref erences over temporal payments to a dated collection of such preferences this extension allows us to formally define three distinct properties stationarity im plies that ranking of temporal payments depends only on the time distance and payment distance between the alternatives time invariance assumes that the decision maker evaluates each temporal payment relative to the evaluation pe

appointment procedures and fomc voting behavior an important issue for the conduct of monetary policy in the united states is whether the various appointment procedures of members of the federal open market committee help determine their voting behavior it is usually asserted that the method by which district bank presidents are appointed leads to more independence and or more conservative behavior increased independence is generally believed to reduce suboptimal short run manipulation of monetary policy but at the cost of reducing the central bank s accountability to the country s short run and longrun objectives the social desirability of any potential differences in monetary policy resulting from these appointment procedures and the optimality of discretionary policy in general are not addressed in this paper however instead the effect on monetary policy of the different appointment procedures currently in place within the federal reserve system is examined does the increased independence that the district bank presidents supposedly possess produce significantly different monetary policy from that of the politically appointed board governors many studies have examined the effects various appointment procedures may have on voting at the fomc and the results have been somewhat mixed belden 2 chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 3 havrilesky and gildea 6 and puckett 8 find that bank presidents tend to vote for tighter policy than board governors while tootell 10 finds no differences between the two groups most of the literature has concluded that in some unclearly defined way and for no clear theoretical reason the more independent district presidents are more conservative than the board governors in this paper conservative is defined over several clear dimensions in order to test whether district presidents vote more conservatively than board governors some slight variation in the voting behavior of bank presidents and board governors is found but the causes of any dissimilarities are shown to be much different from those asserted in the earlier literature

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

risk and preference reversals in intertemporal choice abstract this paper argues that observations of non stationary choice behavior need not necessarily imply specific properties of the individual s discount function as we show the observed preference reversals in intertemporal choice are consistent with constant discounting and can alternatively be explained by decreasing absolute risk aversion together with the individual s risk perception this risk may concern the size of the actual outcome or the endowment consumption stream to which the outcome is added both types of uncertainty naturally appear in the context of intertemporal choice we show how relative degrees of changes in risk over time can determine choices