the effect of telehealth insurance mandates on health care utilization and outcomes this paper uses panel data techniques to investigate the impact of state mandates to cover telehealth services on private insurance premiums and enrollment health care utilization and health outc

did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates a reconciliation and new results application of the coase theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from a consent divorce regime to no fault unilateral divorce laws should not affect divorce rates each iteration of the empirical literature examining the evolution of divorce rates across us states has yielded different conclusions about the effects of divorce law liberalization i show that these results reflect a failure to jointly consider both the political endogeneity of these divorce laws and the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the political regime taking explicit account of the dynamic response of divorce rates to the policy shock i find that liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade but that this increase was substantially reversed over the next decade that said this increase explains very little of the rise in the divorce rate over the past half century both administrative data on the flow of new divorces and measures of the stock of divorcees from the census support this conclusion these results are suggestive of spouses bargaining within marriage with an eye to their partner s divorce threat

communicating subjective evaluations consider managers evaluating their employees performances should managers justify their subjective evaluations suppose a manager s evaluation is private information justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal s scope for distorting her evaluation of the employee i show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the employee s performance was poor the justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation downwards for good performance however the manager pays a constant high wage without justification the empirical literature demonstrates that subjective evaluations are lenient and discriminate poorly between good performance levels this pattern was attributed to biased managers i show that these effects occur in optimal contracts without any biased behavior

equity and educational performance in this paper we review the main issues under discussion in the field of economics of education with a special focus on latin america we seek to organize the debate about educational policies by showing how these policies respond to different models based on different assumptions and hypotheses about how the educational system functions methodological and informational problems make it difficult to test the validity of different policies this would explain the enormous number of studies in the field that conclude with conflicting policy prescriptions we also use data from chile to analyze the importance of the school in educational outcome and to explore the heterogeneous impacts of student and school characteristics on educational achievement the results obtained allow us to conclude that the school plays a very important role in explaining educational achievement we also find that low income students stand to benefit the most from attending a private school however this conclusion is valid for a marginal analysis and does not necessarily apply to a massive reallocation of students among schools

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

why have urban poverty and income inequality increased so much argentina 1991 2001 abstract this article analyzes the trends in income inequality and poverty among argentine households during the nineties we assess the effect of changes in labor force participation unemployment educational levels and returns to individual characteristics on income inequality and poverty by using a microsimulation approach we found that unemployment accounts for a large part of the increase in income inequality and poverty experienced in the past decade changes in labor force participation had an equalizing effect over the whole period while changes in the returns to workers sociodemographic characteristics could be associated with a small increase in income inequality with respect to poverty unemployment affected negatively the proportion of households below the poverty line amplified the poverty gap and increased the severity of poverty in contrast changes in labor force participation are associated with a reduction in the poverty rate

rising inequality in mexico household characteristics and regional effects we use an empirical framework to identify the contributions of microeconomic factors to the sharp rise in household per capita income inequality in mexico between 1984 and 1994 results indicate that changes in returns to household characteristics in particular changes in returns to education are responsible for about half of the increase in the gini coefficient the deteriorating conditions in rural areas relative to the urban areas and of the southern region relative to other regions account for another fourth of the increase in the gini

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism abstract this paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal agent relationship with moral hazard the key aspect is that rewards have informational content when the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent s performance she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent in accordance with the often observed compression of ratings we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent s interim performance imperfectly i e she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance furthermore we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent s effort provided that the principal s stake in the project is small

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

a note on cheap talk and burned money abstract austen smith and banks cheap talk and burned money j econ theory 91 1 2000 1 16 study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of crawford and sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 i identify an error in the main theorem of austen smith and banks and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications i also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning this strengthens a result of austen smith and banks but uncovers other errors in their analysis finally an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in american public education naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation i derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area my results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling little of the effect of tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting this finding may be explained by another finding students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of tiebout choice among districts

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

the effect of economic opportunity and family background on adolescent cohabitation on adolescent cohabitation and childbearing among low income blacks this article uses a hazards model permitting continuous covariates and fixed effects to estimate the effect of local employment opportunity and family background on the cohabitation and childbearing of black youths from low income households support is found for w j wilson s hypothesis that employment opportunity encourages the formation of cohabitational unions as well as for the opportunity cost hypothesis that employment opportunity discourages childbearing outside such unions however the latter effect appears to be larger suggesting that the opportunity cost hypothesis is the primary channel through which higher employment rates result in lower rates of illegitimacy among underclass youths

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

school attendance and child labor a model of collective behavior this paper theoretically investigates how community approval or disap proval aects school attendance and child labor and how aggregate behavior of the community feeds back towards the formation and persistence of an anti or pro schooling norm the proposed community model continues to take aggregate and idiosyncratic poverty into account as an important driver of low school attendance and child labor but it provides also an explanation for why equally poor villages or regions can display dierent attitudes towards schooling distinguishing between three dierent modes of child time allocation school attendance work and leisure the paper shows how the time costs of schooling and child labor productivity con tribute to the existence of a locally stable anti schooling norm it proposes policies that eectively exploit the social dynamics and initiate a permanent escape from the anti schooling equilibrium an extension of the model explores how an education contingent subsidy paid to the poorest families of a community manages to initiate a bandwagon eect towards education for all the optimal mechanism design of

bad news an experimental study on the informational effects of rewards both psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have hidden costs one possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to oer higher rewards when she knows the task to be di cult our experiment tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is perceived by their recipients our design allows us to decompose the overall eect of rewards on eort into a direct incentive and an informational eect the results show that most participants correctly interpret high rewards as bad news in accordance with theory the negative informational eect co exists with the direct positive eect

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

measuring changes in poverty a methodological case study of indonesia during an adjustment period analysis of the effects of policy changes on the poor is often hindered by the difficulties inherent in measuring poverty and comparing levels of poverty before and after policy changes this article outlines two techniques which can overcome many of these measurement problems stochastic dominance conditions which can facilitate a robust poverty ranking of distributions of living standards and a decomposable poverty index which allows measured changes in aggregate poverty to be disaggregated into their various components such as the changes among population subgroups and growth and redistributive components these techniques can be applied to a wide range of indicators of economic well being and poverty lines and to assumptions about the poor the approaches are illustrated using household survey data from indonesia before and after external shocks and the subsequent structural adjustment program in the mid 1980s the study finds that favorable initial conditions and pro poor pattern of growth enabled indonesia to maintain its momentum in poverty alleviation during the period

school subsidies for the poor evaluating the mexican progresa poverty program abstract this paper evaluates how the progresa program which provides poor mothers in rural mexico with education grants has affected enrollment poor children who reside in communities randomly selected to participate in the initial phase of the progresa are compared to those who reside in other control communities pre program comparisons check the randomized design and double difference estimators of the program s effect on the treated are calculated by grade and sex probit models are also estimated for the probability that a child is enrolled controlling for additional characteristics of the child their parents local schools and community and for sample attrition to evaluate the sensitivity of the program estimates these estimates of program short run effects on enrollment are extrapolated to the lifetime schooling and the earnings of adults to approximate the internal rate of return on the public schooling subsidies as they increase expected private wages

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

who pays the high health costs of older workers evidence from prostate cancer screening mandates between 1992 and 2009 30 us states adopted laws mandating that health insurance plans cover screenings for prostate cancer because prostate cancer screenings are used almost exclusively by men over age 50 these mandates raise the cost of insuring older men relative to other groups this article uses a triple difference empirical strategy to take advantage of this quasi random natural experiment in raising the cost of employing older workers using integrated public use microdata series data from the march supplement of the current population survey i find that the increased cost of insuring older workers results in their receiving 2 8 lower hourly wages being 2 less likely to be employed and being 0 7 less likely to have employer sponsored health insurance

state mandated benefits and employer provided health insurance abstract one popular explanation for the low rate of employee health insurance coverage is the presence of numerous state regulations which mandate that group health insurance plans must include certain benefits by raising the minimum cost of providing any health insurance coverage these mandated benefits make it impossible for firms which would have desired to offer minimal health insurance at a low cost to do so i use data on insurance coverage among employees in small firms to investigate whether this problem is an important cause of employee non insurance i find that mandates have little effect on the rate of insurance coverage this finding is robust to a variety of specifications of the regulations i also find that this lack of an effect may be because mandates are not binding since most firms appear to offer these benefits even in the absence of regulation

governmental interventions and household behavior in a developing country anticipating the unanticipated consequences of social programs abstract estimates of the joint effects of governmental health education and family planning programs as well as sources of water on fertility child mortality and schooling are obtained from combined district level and household level data from rural india the estimates are used both to test the implications of a model of household decision making and to assess the effectiveness of the joint public provision of such services in shifting resources from increasing family size to augmenting human capital per person the results appear consistent with household optimizing behavior and suggest that reductions in the costs of medical services contraceptives and schooling and the improvement of water sources are mutually reinforcing alternatives for implementing the joint policy goals of reduced population growth and increased human capital formation

marital status and fertility in the united states welfare and labor market effects the incidence of marriage and the proportion of childbearing that occurs within marriage have decreased sharply in the united states in the last several decades this paper examines whether the probability that a woman is currently married and the number of children she has borne as reported in the 1980 u s census are related to two identifiable factors the variation in welfare programs across states specifically afdc and medicaid benefits and afdc up expenditures or the variation in the market wage opportunities available to women and to their potential husbands afdc and medicaid benefit levels are associated with fewer women being currently married medicaid benefits are related to lower fertility levels for both black and white women whereas afdc benefits in cash and food are associated with lower fertility among white women ages 15 24 those states that extend afdc benefits to families with unemployed parents in other words fathers in intact poor families do not have significantly more women married or higher fertility rates contrary to what might be expected from economic incentives men s market wages are associated with more frequent marriage and higher fertility whereas higher market wage opportunities for women have substantial effects in the opposite direction all of which are consistent with standard models of gender specialization and the demand for marriage and fertility

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

intention based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control abstract empirical research suggests that despite strengthening conventional incentives to put in effort exerting control might reduce worker performance the present paper shows that intention based reciprocity can explain such hidden costs of control if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information not being controlled might then be considered to be kind because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort this argument contrasts existing theoretical wisdom on the hidden costs of control that is almost exclusively based on signaling

financial deepening inequality and growth a model based quantitative evaluation we propose a coherent unified approach to the study of the linkages among economic growth financial structure and inequality bringing together disparate theoretical and empirical literature that is we show how to conduct model based quantitative research on transitional paths with analytical and numerical methods we calibrate and make tractable a prototype canonical model and take it to an application namely thailand 1976 96 an emerging market economy in a phase of economic expansion with uneven financial deepening and increasing inequality we look at the expected path generated by the model and conduct robustness experiments because the actual path of the thai economy is imagined here to be just one realization of many possible histories of the model economy we construct a covariance normalized squared error metric of closeness and find the best fit simulation we also construct a confidence region from a set of simulations and formally test the model we broadly replicate the actual data and identify anomalies robert m townsend is a professor at the university of chicago and a consultant at the federal reserve bank of chicago kenichi ueda is an economist at the international monetary fund the views expressed in this paper are those of authors and do not necessarily represent those of the frb chicago the federal reserve system or the imf we thank the national statistics office of thailand for permission to use the ses data we received helpful comments from robin brooks fabio canova marco cagetti larry christiano angus deaton paul evans jess gaspar hyeok jeong ashok mody tomoyuki nakajima hajime takizawa chris udry annette vissing jorgensen and the participants of the nber general equilibrium conference at new york university the conference honoring rolf r mantel in argentina seminars at cornell university grips hitotsubashi university ohio state university oxford university and the imf as well as the imf conference on macroeconomic policy and poverty reduction we are especially indebted to the editors and referees townsend acknowledges financial support from the nsf and nichd we thank natalia ramondo for excellent research assistance

does child labour displace schooling evidence on behavioral responses to an enrollment subsidy this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled does child labour displace schooling evidence on behavioral responses to an enrollment subsidy conducted between 1995 and 1996 in bangladesh the study observed that the subsidy increases schooling but its effect on child labour is ambiguous the subsidy increased schooling by far more than it reduced child labour substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy the reduction in the incidence of child labour by boys girls represents about one quarter eighth of the increase in their school enrollment rate

should transfers to poor families be conditional on school attendance a household bargaining perspective this article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children s human capital family decisions are assumed to be the result of generalized nash bargaining between the two parents we show that as long as bequests are zero conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers the mother s welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers thus conditioning transfers to bequest constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off

strategic ignorance as a self disciplining device we analyse the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare the extent of the externality is initially unknown but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure we show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions incomplete learning may occur on a markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra personal game in such a case each agent s incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self restricted information this conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance all equilibria featuring this property strictly pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs

wage inequality and the distribution of education abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between education and wage inequality in metropolitan brazil the study is based on data from ten brazilian annual household surveys pnads which are available for the period 1976 1986 the universe of analysis is limited to occupied prime age males the inequality measure used was theil s second measure which is analytically convenient for a study of the determinants of inequality it is shown that there exist sharp differences in wage inequality across metropolitan areas to identify whether these large regional differences in inequality are directly associated with differences in educational levels or with differences in the steepness of the wage education profiles some simulations are conducted the results indicate that regional differences in the distribution of education are not able to explain much of the regional differences in wage inequality as a matter of fact the differences in wage inequality were shown to be intrinsically associated with differences in the steepness of the wage education profiles

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

welfare marital prospects and nonmarital childbearing the roles of the entitlements of the afdc program and marital prospects in the fertility and marriage choices of young women are assessed in the context of a model incorporating heritable endowment heterogeneity assortative mating concern for child quality and potential parental and public support alternatives estimates based on data describing the fertility and marital experience up to age 23 of the eight birth cohorts of women in the nlsy provide evidence that higher afdc benefit levels and lower marital prospects induce young women to choose to have a child outside of marriage