do r d tax credits work evidence from a panel of countries 1979 1997 this paper examines the impact of fiscal incentives on the level of r d investment an econometric model of r d investment is estimated using a new panel of data on tax changes and r d spending in nine oecd countries over a 19 year period 1979 1997 we find evidence that tax incentives are effective in increasing r d intensity this is true even after allowing for permanent country specific characteristics world macro shocks and other policy influences we estimate that a 10 fall in the cost of r d stimulates just over a 1 rise in the level of r d in the short run and just under a 10 rise in r d in the long run

product introduction with network externalities the authors study the introduction of a new product in a market with network externalities there is a common presumption that such markets exhibit excess inertia i e that they are biased toward existing products in contrast the authors provide conditions under which equilibrium involves insufficient friction i e a tendency to rush into new incompatible technologies they also analyze the firms incentives to make their products compatible and they show that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against compatibility copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

dynamics and seasonality in quarterly panel data this article presents an empirical analysis of the dynamics of individual earnings using spanish quarterly earnings i propose a new econometric methodology to control for the seasonality in my dataset moreover i apply this methodology to the study of earnings mobility in spain using transition probabilities among earnings quintiles for the period 1985 1996 i find substantial mobility from one year to the next however earnings changes are basically among adjacent quintiles workers with university education are more mobile than workers with primary and secondary education on the other hand i observe greater negative mobility among earnings quintiles and more persistence of low earnings situations in the 1990s especially for workers with primary education

negative intra group externalities in two sided markets two types of agents interact on a pre existing free platform agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type we ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit we show that this might be impossible if intra group negative externalities are sufficiently but not too strong with respect to positive inter group externalities

the creation and capture of rents wages and innovation in a panel of u k companies this paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of british firms a head count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information innovating firms are found to have higher average wages but rival innovation tends to depress own wages this appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation in other words innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability quasi rents or tobin s average q instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0 29

using survey data to test standard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferes we estimate extrapolative adaptive and regressive models of expectations static or random walk expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight in comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias no variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors expectations regarding exchange rates in the past expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way often by using the forward exchange rate there is however a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate in that the two may not be equal the gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate for example has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium if the aim

forward discount puzzle and liquidity effects some evidence from exchange rates among the united states canada and japan this paper empirically examines whether the interaction between foreign exchange markets and monetary markets can help to resolve the forward discount puzzle following the monetary models of lucas 1990 and fuerst 1992 we define as liquidity effects the negative impact of monetary injection on nominal interest rates temporary deviations from the standard euler equation the liquidity effect identified by these models weakens the linkage between current forward rates and expected future spot rates and improves on the standard rational expectations model that predicts a one to one correspondence between the two using time series of exchange rates among the united states canada and japan this paper shows that the liquidity measure identified above has an impact on forward premiums and that once the liquidity effect is taken into consideration the unbiased prediction of the forward discount rate is recovered to some extent in a theoretically consistent manner

investment tax incentives prices and the supply of capital goods using data on the prices of capital goods this paper shows that much of the benefit of investment tax incentives does not go to investing firms but rather to capital suppliers through higher prices the reduction in the cost of capital from a 10 percent investment tax credit increases equipment prices 3 5 7 0 percent this lasts several years and is largest for assets with large order backlogs low import competition or with a large fraction of buyers able to use investment subsidies capital goods workers wages rise too instrumental variables estimates of the short run supply elasticity are around 1 and can explain the traditionally small estimates of investment demand elasticities in absolute value the demand elasticity implied here exceeds 1

coordination with third party externalities abstract when agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties if an agent cares about them or believes others do they can affect equilibrium selection we present evidence from lab experiments showing that changes in the size and the sign of third party externalities have a significant impact on tacit coordination decision makers are more willing to incur a cost to try to avoid imposing a large negative externality on a third party than they are to avoid a small negative externality or to generate a large positive externality however when decision makers incentives are at odds with the interests of third parties many of them appear to ignore third party externalities even if they are large in magnitude and ignoring them implies substantial earning inequalities and reductions in group earnings individuals revealed to be other regarding in a non strategic allocation task often behave as if selfish when trying to coordinate we discuss explanations for our findings

balance of payments crises in an optimal portfolio model abstract balance of payments crises are often associated with large current account movements preceding and following the crises in this paper we treat the issue of balance of payments crises in a general equilibrium model to allow for such current account movements at the same time we model the portfolio decisions of the individuals in an explicit risk and return framework the resulting behavior for money demand foreign exchange reserves and current account is derived most importantly the risk and return framework allows for a discussion of the influence of uncertain government domestic credit policies on the current account behavior preceding the attack and on the probability of an attack

delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information abstract this paper analyzes a complete information infinite horizon multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies we characterize the set of equilibria for the game we show that when players are sufficiently patient significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the number of involved parties rises indeed when the number of bargainers is large perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d23 d62

evaluating the innovation box tax policy instrument in the netherlands 2007 13 patent boxes are tax incentive schemes aimed at stimulating research and development r d in firms by providing favourable tax rates to profits that can be linked to a specific immaterial asset such as a patent because these profits are often hard to separate from other firm profits patent boxes have been argued to be prone to tax shifting of firms and tax competition between nations as they might shift the location of the profits without affecting the location of r d activities whether or not this occurs may also depend on conditions set in the patent box we evaluate the innovation box policy instrument in the netherlands which is essentially a patent box but without the formal requirement of a patent we ask whether the innovation box has an effect on local r d investment of the firm additionality thereby putting the hypothesis of tax shifting to the test we find that the innovation box indeed has a positive effect on r d investment but the average firm that uses the policy tends to use only a part of the tax advantage for extra r d investment

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

adoption externalities as public goods abstract a public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities for positive externalities agents furnish a public good by taking an action similarly for negative externalities agents furnish a public good by not taking an action we examine these externalities in a binary choice problem i e adoption externalities in each case there is a potential role for government intervention even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed since one equilibrium pareto dominates all others we analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention

in search of a stylised fact do real wages exhibit a consistent pattern of cyclical variability the paper surveys the studies on the cyclical behaviour of real wages published from the twenties onwards the traditional simple neoclassical model of the labour market suggests that real wages tend to move countercyclically however from a theoretical viewpoint there are few reasons to expect this behaviour once the simple model is extended to account for imperfect competition uncertainty lagged responses or contracting between firms and workers empirical studies give different answers to the problem the contributions reviewed in the paper are arranged roughly in a chronological order the interwar period the postwar pre econometric studies the econometric work using aggregate data the evidence produced on the basis of longitudinal data the analyses of the shock responsiveness of real wages and finally the most recent papers attempting a reconciliation of the somewhat conflicting evidence derived from aggregate and panel data

strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts this paper characterizes equilibrium exclusionary contracts between buyers an incumbent firm and a potential entrant when buyers can either vertically integrate or contract with the outside entrant in this setting exclusionary contracts are generally shown to be efficient and to deter inefficient entry that would otherwise occur with multiple unorganized buyers equilibrium contracts are shown to take a divide and conquer form and in some cases to deter some efficient entry in such cases efficient contracting can be restored by a policy that prohibits price discrimination and gives agents free reign to sign exclusionary agreements copyright 1994 by american economic association

getting ppp right identifying mean reverting real exchange rates in panels abstract recent advances in testing for the validity of purchasing power parity ppp focus on the time series properties of real exchange rates in panel frameworks one weakness of such tests however is that they fail to inform the researcher as to which cross section units are stationary as a consequence a reservation for ppp analyses based on such tests is that a small number of real exchange rates in a given panel may drive the results in this paper we examine the ppp hypothesis focusing on the stationarity of the real exchange rates in up to 25 oecd countries we introduce a methodology that when applied to a set of established panel unit root tests allows the identification of the real exchange rates that are stationary our results reveal evidence of mean reversion that is significantly stronger as compared to that obtained by the existing literature strengthening the case for ppp

how effective are fiscal incentives for r d a review of the evidence this paper surveys the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for r d we describe the effects of tax systems in oecd countries on the user cost of r d the current position changes over time and across different firms in different countries we describe and criticize the methodologies used to evaluate the effect of the tax system on

does government r d policy mainly benefit scientists and engineers conventional wisdom holds that the social rate of return to r d significantly exceeds the private rate of return and therefore r d should be subsidized in the u s the government has directly funded a large fraction of total r d spending this paper shows that there is a serious problem with such government efforts to increase inventive activity the majority of r d spending is actually just salary payments for r d workers their labor supply however is quite inelastic so when the government funds r d a significant fraction of the increased spending goes directly into higher wages using cps data on wages of scientific personnel this paper shows that government r d spending raises wages significantly particularly for scientists related to defense such as physicists and aeronautical engineers because of the higher wages conventional estimates of the effectiveness of r d policy may be 30 to 50 too high the results also imply that by altering the wages of scientists and engineers even for firms not receiving federal support government funding directly crowds out private inventive activity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

real wages over the business cycle evidence from panel data one topic on which keynes did not disagree with classical economists was the cyclical behavior of real wages keynes 1936 as well as various classical writers predicted that real wages should move countercyclically quoting the general theory p 17 in general an increase in employment can only occur through the accompaniment of a decline in real wages thus i am not disputing this vital fact which the classical economists have rightly asserted as indefeasible this prediction is based on the premise of competition and a given short run capital stock increases in employment then correspond to more intensive use of capital and through diminishing product lower real wages for this reason evidence by dunlop 1938 and tarshis 1939 that real wages move procyclically was viewed as paradoxical both dunlop and tarshis based their findings on an observed positive correlation between real and money wages which given the procyclical movement of money wages implies a positive correlation between

cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no deadline while with a deadline we identify delays both for positive and negative externalities without a deadline we find that 1 when externalities are positive there exists no spne in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay 2 when externalities are negative it may happen that all spne with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity this is the cyclical delay phenomenon

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

monetary integration inflation convergence and output shocks in the european monetary system i introduction the maastricht treaty of 1992 outlines a plan for the economic and monetary union emu of members of the european monetary system ems the treaty provides for a european central bank and ultimately a single monetary unit as a preliminary to a single currency the ems established a system of fixed exchange rates among its members over the long run for such a fixed exchange rate regime to be sustainable and a single currency feasible the monetary policies of the members cannot be highly divergent thus the treaty requires policy convergence loosely defined as monetary convergence from the ems s members before preceding to monetary union however the precise conditions for successful convergence are not so clear as macdonald and taylor 1991 point out a successful ems requires monetary policy coordination among its member states if balance of payments and competitiveness problems resulting from disequilibrium real exchange rates are to be avoided yet empirical studies of whether the members of the ems have achieved monetary convergence have reached mixed conclusions hafer and kutan 1994 and macdonald and taylor 1991 this evidence raises questions about whether the ems has failed to bring about a high degree of monetary convergence or whether the definition of monetary convergence used in these studies requires refinement monetary policies cannot diverge much in a successful monetary union however the precise policies needed for success depend upon balance of payments considerations convergence in a fixed exchange rate system is ultimately defined by balance of payments equilibrium we often think of balance of payments equilibrium in terms of inflation convergence and the maastricht criteria define convergence as such 1 when inflation differentials are very large monetary and inflation convergence will largely coincide but when inflation differentials are more moderate inflation convergence may require that monetary growth rates diverge slightly depending upon differences in output growth velocity or shifts in preferences for tradeable goods the purpose of this paper is to explore whether inflation convergence in the ems interfered with the goal of monetary convergence given different trends in output and velocity across member countries the evidence reported here shows that in a core group of ems countries inflation rates have converged but monetary aggregates have not one reason for the differences in the results of tests of monetary convergence in the ems is that researchers have failed to condition their tests for monetary convergence upon the appropriate factors 2 for example according to a monetary model of the balance of payments tests of monetary convergence should account for differences in output trends velocity differences are important conditioning factors as well the evidence presented here shows that trends in velocity help explain the lack of monetary convergence in the ems while different output trends do not ii definitions of monetary convergence previous studies have defined monetary convergence as the cointegration of similar monetary policy variables reserve money or interest rates based upon maximum likelihood estimation techniques developed by johansen and juselius 1990 macdonald and taylor 1991 argue that fewer than five different trends in monetary aggregates for a sample of five countries reflects long run convergence thus according to macdonald and taylor if five countries show evidence of four or fewer trends in money growth long run convergence has occurred hafer and kutan 1994 improve upon macdonald and taylor s definition by distinguishing partial monetary convergence from full monetary convergence partial convergence means that time series data for five countries would show fewer than five trends in monetary aggregates but full convergence is defined as one common trend for all five countries in monetary aggregates

contracting with externalities and outside options this paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions we show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient regardless of externalities created by interim actions otherwise in the presence of externalities on outside options all markov perfect equilibrium may be inefficient this formulation encompasses many economic models and we analyze the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications

the timing of contracting with externalities abstract this paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades if instead externalities become stronger sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents outside options under some linearity conditions the principal s preferences with respect to different timings of contracting are opposed to their efficiency ranking

contracts job experience and cyclical labor market adjustments longitudinal estimates of the variability of individual wages hours and weeks worked over the course of changing demand states are provided for all workers generally and for workers of varied levels of job experience emphasis is placed on that part of job experience represented as years on current job a commonly used proxy for the magnitude of firm specific skills interpretation of resulting estimates in the context of the labor market contracting literature is attempted generally significant procyclical patterns are found for real weekly wages weekly hours and weeks worked the extent of weekly wage variability is much greater than is generally suggested in the literature furthermore workers with greater tenure exhibit greater cyclical wage and hours variability and less weeks variability finally empirical distinctions are drawn separately for white collar and blue collar as well as union and nonunion workers

naked exclusion comment the ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject of contention in the antitrust literature the courts concern with such exclusionary contracts has been challenged by those who argue that an incumbent faced with buyers whose interest is to promote entry and competition would have to pay buyers more for the inclusion of exclusionary provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion in a provocative article eric b rasmusen et al 1991 henceforth rrw have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably using such contractual provisions because it can exploit buyers lack of coordination in essence if buyers expect other buyers to sign such provisions then they may see little reason not to do so themselves the rrw argument is potentially an important one because most alleged instances of entry deterrence through exclusionary contracts with customers occur in situations with multiple buyers unfortunately however rrw s two main results contain errors in this note we reconsider the rrw model providing correct characterizations of the likelihood and cost of exclusion for an incumbent firm our results indicate that while the intuition suggested by rrw is valid the equilibrium likelihood and cost of exclusion differ from what rrw derive moreover our analysis illuminates some further aspects of exclusionary contracting with multiple buyers among these issues we focus on how an incumbent can use discriminatory offers to exploit the externalities that exist among buyers in the provision of competition in section i we review the basic assumptions of the rrw model in sections ii and iii we then consider in turn the cases of simultaneous and sequential offers studied by rrw for the simultaneous model we distinguish between settings in which the incumbent can and cannot discriminate in its offers to different buyers this distinction is the source of the problem in rrw s analysis their simultaneous offer model assumes no discrimination but the proof of their proposition 2 assumes at times that discrimination is feasible we show that absent the ability to discriminate the incumbent can exclude profitably only when buyers fail to coordinate on their most preferred continuation equilibrium in contrast we show that when discrimination is possible the incumbent need not rely on a lack of buyer coordination to segal department of economics landau building stanford university stanford ca 94305 e mail ilya segal stanford edu whinston department of economics northwestern university 2003 sheridan road evanston il 60208 e mail mwhinston nwu edu we thank eric rasmusen john wiley and participants in the berkeley stanford iofest the university of copenhagen vertical restraints conference and a seminar at the antitrust division of the u s department of justice for helpful comments we thank federico echenique for excellent research assistance 1 for example a recent department of justice investigation concerned the use of exclusive contracts by the leading provider of computerized ticketing services ticketmaster most major cities have several large concert sports venues in many cities ticketmaster has exclusive contracts with a very large share of these venues 2 the other leading response to the argument that contracts with buyers cannot be a profitable method of exclusion is given in philippe aghion and patrick bolton 1987 section i one factor limiting the applicability of the aghion and bolton theory however is that it involves partial exclusion the contracts signed are not fully exclusionary they involve finite stipulated damages and the profitability of the strategy arises from extracting rents from an entrant when entry occurs indeed in the aghion and bolton model contracts that fully exclude offer no benefits over writing no contract at all in section iii of their paper aghion and bolton also discuss a two buyer version of their model in which externalities arise across buyers in contrast to the analysis here and in rrw they allow the incumbent to make an offer to a buyer i that is conditional on the acceptance decision of the other buyer 3 r innes and r j sexton 1994 also discuss the use of discriminatory offers in the context of a model in which buyers can form coalitions with the entrant

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

the neo luddite s lament excessive upgrades in the software industry we examine two reasons why a monopoly supplier of software may introduce more upgrades than is socially optimal when the upgrade is backward but not forward compatible so users who upgrade reduce others network benefits one explanation involves a commitment problem profits and social welfare may suffer because ex post the monopolist will want to sell the upgraded product to new consumers the second involves consumer heterogeneity here oversupply arises from the difference between the externality that upgrades impose on the marginal and average consumer and from the effect of upgrades on sales of the base good

irreversible choice of uncertain technologies with network externalities in this article i explore the problem of sequential and irreversible technology choice in the presence of network externalities when the technologies stochastically evolve over time early potential users are shown to adopt an irreversible technology too early compared to the social optimum the effect of increasing the uncertainty of the technologies on an early potential user s decision is analyzed i find that the sponsor of new emerging technology might choose a research strategy that is too safe i also study the consequences of allowing side payments between generations of consumers and demonstrate that an ex post optimal standardization policy can impair ex ante social welfare

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

monetary policy and real wage cyclicality this article points to the potential role of monetary policy in affecting the degree of real wage cyclicality we show that the degree and direction of real wage cyclicality is determined by the interaction of i the returns to scale in production ii the nature of aggregate shocks and iii monetary policy given that production technology is fairly constant in the short run we suggest that variations in the real wage output covariance depend largely on the combination of the latter two identifying well documented monetary policy phases in six major organization for economic co operation and development oecd countries and accounting for both aggregate demand and supply shocks we provide empirical evidence to support our main theoretical claim

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

inventories rational expectations and the business cycle abstract the simplest macroeconomic models in which markets clear instantaneously and expectations are rational preclude the existence of business cycles that is of serially correlated deviations of output from trend this paper studies one of several mechanisms that can be used to make these so called new classical models produce business cycles the mechanism is the gradual adjustment of inventory stocks two macroeconomic models of inventory holdings are formulated both imply first that current output should be a decreasing function of the stock of inventories and second that inventories once perturbed from equilibrium levels should adjust only gradually these two features are then embedded into an otherwise standard macroeconomic model in which markets clear instantaneously and expectations are rational two principal conclusions are reached first disturbances such as unanticipated changes in money will set in motion serially correlated deviations of output from trend second if desired inventories are sensitive to the real interest rate then even fully anticipated changes in money can affect real variables

gender differences in rent sharing and its implications for the gender wage gap evidence from sweden abstract this study using matched employer employee data analyses gender differences in rent sharing results indicate significantly smaller remuneration from firm profits for women a difference that increases along the wage distribution gender differences in rent sharing explain less than 2 of mean gender wage differentials as differences are found in remuneration from firm profit and not in the mean profit levels of employing firms

a theory of endogenous coalition structures consider an environment with widespread externalities and suppose that bind ing agreements can be written we study coalition formation in such a setting our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game we establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilib rium coalition structures we develop an algorithm that generates under certain conditions an equilibrium coalition structure our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions in particular we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a cournot oligopoly journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78 d62 q 1999 academic press

wages profits and capital intensity evidence from matched worker firm data swedish data on workers matched with firms balance sheet reports are used to examine the relation between wages and firms ability to pay results indicate that experienced and highly educated workers are sorted into profitable firms wages are positively correlated with profits and the capital labor ratio after controlling for worker quality degree of effort supervision job characteristics local unemployment firms employment history and employer size lester s range of pay due to rent sharing is around 12 24 of the mean wage in sweden which is close to the estimates for the united states and united kingdom

business cycle models aggregation and real wage cyclicality a substantial literature has developed to estimate the true cyclicality of real wages that is composition bias free two major issues are addressed in this article aggregation of heterogeneous workers and potential bias in the measurement of the labor input a general analysis of the biases is presented and alternative approaches in the literature are nested in a single framework estimates based on an efficiency units concept that avoids the usual aggregation problems are presented composition bias underestimates the usual parameters of interest unless both the price and the quantity of the labor input are adjusted appropriately

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

network economics and the environment insights and perspectives local interactions and network structures appear to be a prominent feature of many environmental problems this paper discusses a wide range of issues and potential areas of application including the role of relational networks in the pattern of adoption of green technologies common pool resource problems characterized by a multiplicity of sources the role of social networks in multi level environmental governance infrastructural networks in the access to and use of natural resources such as oil and natural gas the use of networks to describe the internal structure of inter country relations in international agreements and the formation of bilateral links in the process of building up an environmental coalition for each of these areas we examine why and how network economics would be an effective conceptual and analytical tool and discuss the main insights that we can foresee

wages profits and rent sharing the paper suggests a new test for rent sharing in the u s labor market using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector it shows that a rise in a sector s profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long run level of wages in that sector the paper controls for workers characteristics for industry fixed effects and for unionism lester s range of wages is estimated for rent sharing reasons alone at approximately 24 per cent of the mean wage

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

competing for loyalty the dynamics of rallying support abstract we consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group we focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially we show that competition reduces agents welfare with public goods or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents and increases agents welfare with public bads we apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers vote buying and exclusive deals jel d42 d62 d72 d82 g34 h41

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

shareholder wealth and wages evidence for white collar workers we present empirical evidence on the relationship between individual wages conditional on worker characteristics and equity returns using a unique survey from the bureau of labor statistics equity returns affect the wages only of workers with three or more years of tenure a 4 percent increase in a firm s market value raises pay by 0 3 percent within three years our estimates suggest that each 10 increase in shareholder wealth raises the present value of a firm s wage bill by 1 the elasticity of white collar wages with respect to equity returns is one third smaller than the ceo salary elasticities in our sample

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

how effective are level based r d tax credits evidence from the netherlands this paper examines the impact of the r d fiscal incentive program on r d by dutch firms taking a factor demand approach we measure the elasticity of firm r d capital accumulation to its user cost econometric models are estimated using a rich unbalanced panel of firm data covering the period 1996 2004 with firm specific r d user costs varying with tax incentives using the estimated user cost elasticity we perform a cost benefit analysis of the r d incentive program we find some evidence of additionality suggesting that the level based program of r d incentives in the netherlands is effective in stimulating firms investment in r d however the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected only for small firms the analysis also indicates that the level based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme leads to a substantial social dead weight loss

overshooting and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle a reappraisal transitions to floating exchange rate regimes have led to sharp increases in exchange rate volatilities with no corresponding changes in the distribution of macroeconomic fundamentals in the spirit of dornbusch 1976 we assess whether nominal exchange rate overshooting is responsible for this phenomenon as long as uncovered interest rate parity holds nominal exchange rate overshooting is linked to a persistent fall in the spread between domestic and foreign nominal interest rates we thus develop a limited participation model in a small open economy setting with small adjustment costs on money holdings overshooting substantially contributes to the nominal exchange rate volatility

wage premia price cost margins and bargaining power in belgian manufacturing abstract an asymmetric nash bargaining model as developed by j svejnar 1986 is empirically tested on industry wage negotiations in belgium union s relative bargaining power emerges from this model as the fraction of firm s profits per worker which the unions are able to capture in excess of the alternative wage the estimates of the bargaining power coefficients for blue as well as white collar workers reject the symmetric split the difference outcome determinants of the cross industry variation of bargaining power are explored as well

why are wages cyclical in the 1970 s this article investigates cyclicality in real wages between 1969 and 1982 using panel study of income dynamics data there is little evidence that movements in and out of the labor market induced aggregate wage cyclicality during these years however cyclicality in the movement of workers between heterogeneous labor market sectors affected aggregate wage cyclicality while sector location is important sector selectivity is not correlated with wages yet even within sectors cyclicality is present in real wages over this time period and is the result of cyclicality in overall wage levels as well as in the coefficients associated with particular worker characteristics

the principal agent model with multilateral externalities an application to climate agreements we consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present the motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness to pay wtp for emissions abatement due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and thus can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading moreover optimal contracts can include a boundary part i e the endogenous type dependent participation constraint is binding which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract compared to this outside option a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low wtp and reduce her payoff for high types subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal

negative externalities may cause delay in negotiation we study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity dependent negative externalities the unique equilibrium of long finitely repeated generic games can either display delay where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline or in spite of the random element in the game a well defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one

insider effects in wage determination abstract the paper attempts to shed new light on the determinants of industry wages by a cross country comparison of wage setting relationships making use of comprehensive and consistent panel data on industries from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s the empirical analysis involves estimations of identically specified industry wage equations for each of five countries sweden norway finland germany and the united states a key finding is that industry wages in the u s are the most responsive to sectoral price and productivity changes by contrast industry wages in the nordic countries are largely unaffected by sectoral conditions the results cast doubt on the competitive model as an accurate characterization of wage setting under decentralization

real wages and the business cycle the objectives of this review are threefold 1 to characterize the empirical literature on the cyclical behavior of real wages 2 to identify the sources of the differences in results across studies and 3 to enumerate key factors that determine the cyclicality of real wages given a host of measurement and methodological issues drawing firm conclusions is difficult but several generalizations can be made the estimated cyclicality of real wages depends crucially on the time period of analysis and the choice of whether to examine the production or the consumption wage composition effects play an important but complicated role as well

spatial dynamics and heterogeneity in the cyclicality of real wages neither the issue of how local and aggregate labor markets interact over time nor the issue of how heterogeneity by education race and other factors interacts with these spatial dynamics has prev

internal and external effects of r d subsidies and fiscal incentives empirical evidence using spatial dynamic panel models abstract most studies evaluating the macroeconomic effects of financial support policies on business funded r d use econometric methods that do not consider the existence of spatial effects and generate biased estimates in this paper we discus and address this problem using spatial dynamic panel data methods this allow us to provide new insights on the internal in country and external out of country effects of both research and development r d subsidies and fiscal incentives we use a database of 25 oecd countries for the period 1990 2009 in relation to internal effects for both instruments we find a non linear relationship between their effect on private r d and their level suggesting the possibility of leveraging and crowding out effects we also find a substitution effect between the r d subsidies and fiscal incentives implemented within a country concerning the spatial component we find evidence of positive spatial spillovers among private r d investments however our results suggest the existence of competition substitution effects between national r d policies

unraveling the complex interrelationships between exchange rates and fundamentals abstract this research investigates the intrinsic characteristics of currency values by fundamentally decomposing investor expectations on 16 currencies the results on 195 exchange rates over several decades indicate investors perceive countries to be more likely to choose devaluation solutions to bop problems when inflation is lower and when an alternative drop in real income growth is more painful in addition empirical support is provided for the hypothesis that forward rates often appear biased because the distributional expectations incorporated into them include for a country with a current account deficit a small probability of a large spot decline that does not actually occur in most finite samples

cyclical behavior of real wages in japan this paper studies the cyclicality of aggregate real wages in japan by using both static and dynamic approaches i measure comovements between real wages and business cycle indicators this paper finds that while real wages constructed using the consumer price index and the gdp deflator are procyclical real wages constructed using the producer price index are countercyclical this result is robust to the data and methods used to compute the comovements

on the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations abstract the preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined it is shown that the buyer weakly prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history with substitute goods such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head to head competition with complementary goods strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers their price offers have short deadlines and or goods are weak complements sellers strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated

the joint response of stock and foreign exchange markets to macroeconomic surprises using us and japanese data abstract this paper investigates the joint response of stock and foreign exchange fx market returns to macroeconomic surprises employing a system method of estimation that allows for the cross country and cross market interaction for asset returns and risk premia using us and japanese data we find that us stock markets are asymmetrically responsive to domestic developments in output growth and interest rates but are not influenced by macroeconomic surprises from japan the surprise in the fx market seems to affect stock markets in the us and japan respectively in particular we find that the interest rate surprise in the us and inflation surprise in japan tend to overstate the impact that these surprises would have on the respective stock market the impact of the surprises would appear smaller if macroeconomic developments induced by the fx market were incorporated into the model

breakdown in multilateral negotiations abstract we analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions in contrast to preexisting literature we do not normalize the parties reservation utilities to zero we show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome even if only two sellers are present

macroeconomic sources of foreign exchange risk in new eu members abstract we address the issue of foreign exchange risk and its macroeconomic determinants in several new eu members we derive the observable macroeconomic factors consumption and inflation using the stochastic discount factor sdf approach the joint distribution of excess returns in the foreign exchange market and the factors are modeled using a multivariate garch in mean specification our findings show that both real and nominal factors play important roles in explaining the variability of the foreign exchange risk premium both types of factors should be included in monetary general equilibrium models employed to study excess returns to contribute to the further stability of domestic currencies the new eu members should strive to implement stabilization policies aimed at achieving nominal as well as real convergence with the core eu members

rent sharing and wages evidence from company and establishment panels a central question in labor economics and macroeconomics is whether the textbook competitive model provides an adequate representation of the labor market using longitudinal data on companies and establishments this article suggests that it may not as predicted by rent sharing models of the labor market changes in profitability are shown to feed through into long run changes in wages these are not temporary wage effects and are not driven by the unionized workplaces in the data the article s estimates imply that for rent sharing reasons alone lester s range of wages is approximately 16

the effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle evidence from micro data in this paper we address the question of whether wages are affected by labor market conditions in a manner more consistent with a contract approach than with a standard spot market model from a simple implicit contract model we derive implications about the links between wages and past labor market conditions using individual data from the current population survey and the panel study of income dynamics we find that an implicit contract model with costless mobility describes these links better than either a simple spot market model or an implicit contract model with costly mobility

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

the relative adjustment of wages and prices direct tests within a multiple equation system in order to assess the relative rigidity of the aggregate price level and the nominal wage rate most researchers have focused on the implied behaviour of the real wage rate in response to a purely demand disturbance the present work examines the explicit behaviour of the two variables and is therefore able to analyse the variables short run responses within the context of their defined long run behaviour while the paper reports evidence of long run stability in the real wage rate additional evidence is presented which supports both sticky price and sticky wage models the determining factor is the choice of lag

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

a traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations under the traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations aggregate demand shocks move output and prices in the same direction while aggregate supply shocks move output and prices in opposite directions this paper examines the joint behavior of u s output unemployment prices wages and nominal money and asks whether it is consistent with this interpretation the answer is a qualified yes

the revelation and delegation principles in common agency games in the context of common agency adverse selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi principal games we then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities abstract building on genicot and ray g genicot d ray contracts and externalities how things fall apart j econ theory 131 2006 71 100 we develop a model of non cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal allowing for agent coordination we show that the outcome of our bargaining procedure may differ remarkably from those of the offer and the bidding games in particular we find that bargaining can break agents coordination and that the principal s payoff can be decreasing in his own bargaining power

a comparison of the cyclical behavior of union and nonunion wages in the united states this paper presents an extensive analysis of the behavior of union and nonunion wages over the business cycle using quasi panels developed from the current population survey in an attempt to resolve or reconcile competing claims about the cyclical behavior of union and nonunion wages union wages were roughly as procyclical as nonunion wages were prior to the early 1980s substantial reductions in union wage procyclicality since then are associated with reductions in the procyclical exercise of bargaining power

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

do r d tax incentives lead to higher wages for r d workers evidence from the netherlands this paper examines the impact of the dutch r d tax incentive scheme on the wages of r d workers we construct firm specific r d tax credit rates that vary over time following variations in the dutch r d tax incentive program using instrumental variables we estimate a wage sharing model with an unbalanced firm level panel data covering the period 1997 2004 the elasticity of the r d wage with respect to the fraction of the wage supported by the fiscal incentives scheme is estimated at 0 2 in the short run and 0 24 in the long run

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances