large scale deployment of renewables for electricity generation comparisons of resource assessments suggest that sufficient renewable energy resources are available to allow for large scale deployment of renewable energy technologies economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from i market structure ii competition in an uneven playing field and iii various non marketplace barriers however even if these barriers are removed the problem of technology lock out remains the key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased r d support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience this paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies are possible but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share copyright 2005 oxford university press

unintended consequences of price controls an application to allowance markets abstract price controls established in a cap and trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor however they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions in particular when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price regardless of the prevailing market price in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for u s firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper although in practice many other conditions will determine its use

environmental regulation technological diversity and the dynamics of technological change inducing technological progress is an important objective of environmental regulation we investigate under which conditions regulation induced technological progress pursues the best technological option we analyze a setting with vertical and horizontal technological progress cost uncertainty time limited patent protection and a case that is typical for some emissi4on intensive industries like electricity generation or the chemical industry under taxes and standards only the current least cost technology is used and developed implying a lock in into a possibly inferior technology tradable permits yield slower progress but can facilitate the simultaneous development of technologies rendering lock ins less likely

lessons from the polder energy tax design in the netherlands from a climate change perspective this paper evaluates energy tax reform in the netherlands between 1988 and 2002 from a climate change perspective in particular the introduction of two indirect taxes on energy products is now responsible for a considerable amount of tax revenue from a green tax base the paper discusses the energy tax base and rate structure from a modern pigovian tax perspective and illustrates the practical difficulties involved in the indirect and non uniform taxation of emissions also further improvements of the energy tax structure are discussed such as a better targeting of the energy tax base and tax rate to fuel characteristics

should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors abstract if some but not all countries are cooperating to reduce co2 emissions one could make the following argument a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors and therefore co2 emissions in the cooperating countries however this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy and since it is only total co2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate there is no point in a policy that simply relocates co2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy according to this line of reasoning carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy this paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods it is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods however informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors

the merits of new pollutants and how to get them when patents are granted the performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa this interaction is studied for a type of innovation where a new technology reduces emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time causes a new type of damage if the new pollutant associated with this technology is sufficiently different from existing ones such that marginal damage is increasing in each of them but additive across pollutants a diversification of the pollution portfolio is socially desirable in a situation where the incentives to develop such a technology are created by patents the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent holding firm this result carries over to other types of innovation the performance of taxes is limited by either the inability to implement specific pollution mixes or monopoly pricing for constant returns to scale at the industry level the combined use of taxes and permits ensures the first best mix of technologies and provides positive research incentives

international migration and real wages is there any neo classical ambiguity abstract recent research has shown that while labor emigration increases the nominal wage rate the impact on the real wage rate remains quite ambiguous the present paper reexamines the issue under the standard two factor two commodity international trade model normally employed for this purpose the principal finding of this paper is that once the problem is correctly formulated and analyzed introducing utility maximizing consumers no such ambiguity exists indeed labor emigration always leads to an increase in the welfare real wage of labor in the source country

prices vs quantities the effects on technology choice abstract it is well known that price and quantity based regulation approaches provide different investment incentives but usually only the effect on the level of investment is studied in this paper we show that under uncertainty they also lead to the adoption of different technologies due to the disparate risks that a regulated firm is exposed to different regulatory instruments induce different technologies and this effect cannot be compensated by varying the design of the instruments furthermore price based instruments lead to the adoption of a socially suboptimal technology so that the inclusion of technology choice provides a bias in favor of a quantity based regulation compared with weitzman s weitzman m l 1974 prices vs quantities review of economic studies 41 477 491 criterion

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

optimal taxation economic growth and income inequality that there is a trade off between equityand efficiency economic growth is wellknown two models have been developed thatlink government spending and taxation toeconomic growth this paper uses thesemodels to provide estimates of thegrowth maximizing tax rate then a twoequation structural model is developed andestimated that is used to find thetrade off rate between economic growth andincome inequality and the growth maximizinglevel of income inequality for the unitedstates over the period 1960 1990

international migration non traded goods and economic welfare in the source country abstract this paper examines the economic effects of emigration in a source country producing both traded and non traded commodities it is shown that even if the economy faces fixed terms of trade emigration can still affect the welfare of the non migrants and the direction of the effect in this context will always be negative

a note on international migration non traded goods and economic welfare in the source country abstract this note extends the work of rivera batiz to the case where capital is collectively owned and the decision to emigrate entails both a withdrawal of labor services from the source country and the surrender of the ownership of capital in this framework which seems to have wide real world relevance for socialist labor managed and peasant economies it is found that emigration helps increase the welfare of the non migrant this result which seems quite robust to its specifications is exactly the opposite of that of rivera batiz and points to the need for great caution in drawing policy conclusions with regard to issues pertaining to emigration

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

should renewable energy policy be renewable political flexibility brings about trade offs for policy makers aiming to support the deployment of renewable energy sources res on the one hand it allows incorporating new information on ex ante uncertain benefits and costs of res policy on the other hand it may deter res investments this paper scrutinizes how these trade offs play out economically and politically when res policy makers choose the degree of flexibility as well as the instruments to implement flexibility the analysis builds on a theoretical framework distinguishing between flexibility by design and by adjustment it is complemented by a discussion of three case studies res support schemes in germany and the united kingdom and the eu emissions trading scheme theoretical as well as empirical results suggest that the politically chosen degree of flexibility by policy design may be sub optimally low in contrast flexibility by policy adjustment is often excessively high

the optimal initial allocation of pollution permits a relative performance approach the initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes we generalize the analysis of bohringer and lange 2005 eur econ rev 49 8 2041 2055 to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter firm relative performance comparisons including grandfathering and auctions as well as novel mechanisms we show that using firms historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting while using firms historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms instead it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions we then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous this paper compares qualitatively and quantitatively the welfare effects of emissions taxes auctioned emissions permits and free grandfathered permits when technological innovation is endogenous we find that there is no unambiguous case for preferring any of these policy instruments the relative welfare ranking of instruments depends on the costs of innovation the extent to which innovations can be imitated the slope and level of the marginal environmental benefit function and the number of polluting firms we illustrate the types of situations when there can be significant welfare discrepancies between the policies and when there are not

does ecological economics have a future contradiction and reinvention in the age of climate change abstract this paper addresses the role of neoclassical methodologies in ecological economics and the contradictions these methodologies pose to the field s critical founding principles we first consider robert costanza s treatment of nicholas stern s global deal and then survey climate change related articles published in this journal over the past five years this survey reveals how mainstream neoclassical methodologies dominate discourse and do so by marginalizing more critical political economy analyses this situation imperils the field s founding vision of a no growth steady state it also fails to address the related growth dynamics of capitalism without such a critical treatment the field s formal embrace of methodological pluralism actually entails an ideological empiricism that renders ecological economics theoretically incoherent this situation undermines the field s historical promise as an alternative economic paradigm ecological economics now faces a problematic future its survival in a form faithful to its founding vision will require an explicit choice to address its internal contradictions and reinvent itself in ways relevant to our contemporary context without such a choice ecological economics will likely succumb to an implicit acceptance of the hegemony of mainstream economic methodologies and their pro growth imperatives

competitiveness and exemptions from environmental taxes in europe a number of european countries have introduced a variety of environmental taxes a common characteristic of their implementation is the inclusion of exemptions and tax relief in particular for some sectors of manufacturing industry this paper analyses the pattern and motivation of exemptions as they have developed in western european countries making clear the difference between the nominal and effective tax rates once the exemptions have been taken into account the principal motivation for exemptions relates to concern about competitiveness while particular environmentally intensive sectors may have some grounds for concern even these might be able to achieve cost effective environmental improvements such that their competitive position is not over disadvantaged while for an economy structured like the uk s an environmental tax plus rebate scheme sometimes called an ecological tax reform would be likely to yield benefits in terms of competitiveness the exemptions usually run counter to the environmental economic logic of using environmental taxes to internalise social costs and give economic signals that are based on the full costs of production and they are likely to increase the costs of achieving a given level of emission reduction with little justification for them also on the grounds of competitiveness it would therefore be undesirable on both economic and environmental grounds for them to remain a feature of the implementation of environmental taxes in the future

the growth tax in the united states by providing public goods including law and order national defense and income redistribution that expands the gains from exchange the scope and membership of the constitutional agreement government expenditures act as a positive externality on the growth rate beyond that level taxes act as a negative externality in this paper a simple model is formulated and the optimal growth maximizing tax rate found empirical estimation finds it to be in the range of 21 5 22 9 percent the effect of taxation beyond this level is a cumulative loss of about 30 trillion 1972 dollars in gnp over the period 1949 89

incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms the direction and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs we establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement negligence may however induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases increases marginal abatement costs for low high levels of abatement

technical change and the marginal cost of abatement abstract we address one aspect of the treatment of technical change in the environmental economics literature how technical change impacts the marginal cost of abatement we review a selection of papers that employ a variety of representations of technical change and show that these representations have quite different and sometimes surprising effects on the marginal costs of pollution reductions we argue that these varied representations in fact correspond to a variety of different technology options we then present results indicating that this representation matters the impacts of technical change on the marginal cost of abatement can crucially impact policy analysis

does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption when the rate of technology adoption is inverted u shaped abstract we show that for a broad class of technologies the relationship between policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted u shaped this happens when the marginal abatement cost mac curves of conventional and new technologies intersect which invariably occurs when emissions are proportional to output and technological progress reduces emissions per output this outcome does not result from policy failure on the contrary in social optimum the relationship between the slope of the marginal damage curve and the rate of technology adoption is also inverted u shaped under more general conditions these curves can look even more complicated e g such as inverted w shaped

does britain or the united states have the right gasoline tax this paper develops an analytical framework to assess the second best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution congestion and accident externalities as well as interactions with the broader fiscal system we provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the us and the uk under a variety of parameter scenarios under our central parameter values the second best optimal gasoline tax is 1 01 gal for the us and 1 34 gal for the uk current tax rates are much lower than this in the us and higher in the uk the calculations are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions the congestion externality is the largest component in both nations revenue raising needs also play a significant role as do accident externalities and local air pollution potential welfare gains from reducing the current uk tax rate are estimated at nearly one fourth the production cost of all gasoline used in the uk even larger gains could be achieved by switching to a tax on vehicle miles with equal revenue yield for the us the welfare gains from optimizing the gasoline tax are smaller but those from switching to an optimal tax on vehicle miles are very large

the impact of international migration on real wages another look abstract this paper examines the issue of how emigration alters real wages in the source country the analysis is carried out first using the two class framework developed by rivera batiz 1984 and then by means of a simple model of scale economies and imperfect competition our results indicate that within these contexts real wages are likely to decline in response to emigration if 1 the migrants possess a large fraction of physical or human capital that they take with them when migration occurs or 2 emigration reduces the scale of operation of domestic firms our conclusions are compared to those of quibria 1989

do exogenous shocks better leverage the benefits of technological change in the staged elimination of differential environmental regulations evidence from china s cement industry before and after the 2008 great sichuan earthquake abstract technological modernization is crucial for productivity and environmental management and has profound implications for china where both overproduction and industrial pollution are serious issues this study reports empirical results for existing cement plants in sichuan province in china capturing changes in productivity and environmental performance between 2007 and 2010 during this time period as the moratorium period of differential environmental regulations came to an end certain existing plants modernized their production processes after the great sichuan earthquake in 2008 using primary data and the directional distant function approach this study investigates the financial and environmental benefits of technological modernization by examining improvements in productivity and environmental performance we find that the decision to modernize by changing the production process from conventional vertical shaft kilns vsks to modern dry rotary kilns as part of a cleaner production strategy yields significant savings in pollution abatement costs without compromising production efficiency we compare this modernization strategy to a reference strategy whereby firms continued to use vsk technology and invested in end of pipe technology to satisfy stricter environmental regulations we find that the environmental benefits of technological modernization are approximately three times greater than the non environmental financial benefits when environmental benefits are considered the payback period is significantly reduced going from 8 97 years to 2 26 years

international migration increasing returns and real wages the present paper makes an exploratory attempt to investigate the impact of emigration on real wages in the presence of increasing returns to scale in production the problem has been posed in the context of a 2 x 2 model of international trade where one of the commodities is a non traded good and is subject to a type of increasing returns to scale that are external to the firm but internal to the industry analysis indicates that in this instance international emigration unambiguously increases real wages in the source country this result which seems to be at odds with the general presumption in this area is quite robust to variations in the underlying assumptions behind the analysis summary in fre excerpt

r d and abatement under environmental liability law comparing incentives under strict liability and negligence if compensation differs from harm abstract this paper analyzes equilibrium r d in pollution control and equilibrium pollution abatement by polluters who are subject to environmental liability law when the level of compensation differs from the level of environmental harm we contrast the performance of strict liability with that of the negligence rule privately optimal levels necessarily deviate from socially optimal ones under strict liability whereas private decisions are first best under negligence unless compensation is much smaller than harm it is established that the way in which privately optimal r d deviates from the first best level depends on the kind of technical change in pollution abatement counterintuitively polluters might overinvest into r d in pollution control if compensation falls short of harm and may underinvest if compensation exceeds harm

international migration and real wages a resolution note the authors examine the impact of international labor migration on wages in country of origin two types of emigration are distinguished bundled emigration which can result in a reduction of real wages and pure labor emigration which results in an increase in real wages annotation

policy instruments for curbing co2 emissions the case of the netherlands taxes may seem to be the most attractive instrument for curbing the emissions of carbon dioxide this paper however argues that environmental taxes involve a number of serious complications especially in an open economy riddled with market imperfections like the netherlands therefore a wide ranging policy mix is called for as far as households and sheltered sectors are concerned regulation can continue to play a major role within the context of unilateral policies aimed at exposed sectors the combination of subsidies and voluntary agreements may be more cost effective than the tax instrument

abatement and allocation in the pilot phase of the eu ets we use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over allocation that took place across european countries during the pilot phase 2005 2007 of the european union emission trading scheme using a dynamic panel data model we estimate the counter factual business as usual emissions scenario for eu member states comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions we find that both over allocation and abatement occurred along with under allocation and emissions inflation over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over allocation of approximately 280 million euas and total abatement of 247 mt co2 however we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 mt co2 also occurred possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features

on the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies abstract capacity costs of renewable energies have been decreasing dramatically and are expected to fall further making them more competitive with fossils building on an analytically tractable peak load pricing model we analyze how intermittency of renewable energies affects the market diffusion that results from these lower costs in particular once renewables have become competitive by attaining the same levelized cost of electricity lcoe as fossils the marginal increase in efficient capacities due to a further cost reduction varies substantially initially it is small then it rises but it falls again once renewable capacities are large enough to satisfy the whole electricity demand at times of high availability if external costs of fossils are internalized by a pigouvian tax then perfect competition leads to efficient investments in renewable and fossil capacities even though we assume that only a subgroup of consumers can adapt their demand to price fluctuations that are caused by the intermittency of renewables moreover fossils receive a capacity payment through the market for their reliability in serving demand of non reactive consumers maximum electricity prices rise with the share of renewables if regulators impose a price cap this initially raises investments in renewables but the effect may reverse if the share of renewables is large

the ex post impact of an energy tax on household energy demand this paper presents an econometric study dealing with household demand for energy in the netherlands the main objective of the paper is to present an estimation of the actual impact of an already implemented energy tax introduced in the netherlands in 1996 the approach differs from the existing literature in that 1 it uses panel data for the same period in which the tax was introduced and 2 it estimates a demand function that controls for a large set of variables such as outside temperature type of house and of house insulation household cooking behavior and an extensive number of durable goods and electrical appliances the study concludes that in the short term the energy tax had a small but significant impact on energy consumption in the netherlands concretely the yearly average demand reduction was of 8 for electricity and 4 4 for gas additionally the influence of variables other than price and income on household energy demand is discussed using this information the impact that the energy tax had on household energy use can be compared with the energy reduction that could have been achieved when using other policy instruments

hybrid carbon incentive mechanisms and political acceptability this paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions for current polluters unfortunately pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems in contrast consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched moreover monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems while opportunities for cost or burden sharing exist as well

a paler shade of green environmental policy under induced technical change conventional wisdom argues that environmental policy is less costly if it induces the development of cleaner technologies in contrast to this argument we show that once the second best nature of actual economies is taken into account the cost of environmental policy may well be larger with induced technical change itc than without thus itc may lower both the emissions reductions and the welfare gains associated with environmental policy in an endogenous policy framework itc may reduce the desired stringency of the policy

end of pipe or cleaner production how to go green in presence of income inequality and pro environmental behavior in this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned in particular consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product but also its environmental impact this environmental valuation has a positional content consumers attach a positive attribute to the green product while penalizing the brown one in this context we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end of pipe abatement efforts we find that the interplay between the intensity of market competition consumers income disparity and environmental concern can play a crucial role in directing the green producer towards one or the other technological choice more precisely the adoption of cleaner production technologies can be discouraged by low average income and by tough competition while it can be spurred by the moral social incentive towards pro environmental behavior

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control comment following on from an analysis by milliman and prince this article considers further the relative incentives for technical change provided by different pollution control instruments the comments involve the recognition that emission targets are typically chosen fairly arbitrarily because of regulators lack of knowledge of abatement cost schedules there is also a more detailed discussion of the practicability of auctioning emissions permits as these have been less thoroughly covered in the literature than the other instruments

intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies and the choice of policy instruments environmental benefits only unfold if green environmentally friendly technologies are widely diffused and intensively deployed within a firm we investigate how different types of policies directly and in combination affect the number of different green energy technologies adopted by a single firm intra firm diffusion using data from a dedicated survey on the diffusion of green energy technologies of 1200 swiss firms and applying well identified econometric models we found that energy taxes are a very effective policy instrument for the intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies even more important however are non political measures that show the largest effect among all tested instruments additional analyses show that a time consistency in policy making is more important for energy tax regimes than for regulations and b no evidence for complementarities between the policy types could be identified

environmental regulations transfers and trade theory and evidence abstract this paper develops a theory of compensation of producers for the costs associated with environmental regulations we show that the existence of transfers can give counter intuitive effects of environmental policy on both output and trade flows in particular the compensation obtained by producers neutralizes the effect of environmental policy on output and consequently on trade flows this may help explain why previous empirical research has found weak evidence that environmental regulations affect trade patterns the theory is tested using agricultural sector data the evidence supports the hypothesis that environmental regulations and transfers are positively correlated

pollution permits and compliance strategies abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spot and futures markets for tradeable pollution permits on the potential polluters compliance decisions polluters can buy permits invest in pollution abatement or else stop production or source out we show that stand alone spot markets induce excessive investment the introduction of a futures market reduces this incentive to invest but is not the optimal way to control pollution a menu of options on pollution rights possibly coupled with intertemporally bundled sales yields higher welfare because of its focus on long run demand elasticities and rent extraction this paper can be applied to a variety of situations such as demand side management public transportation bypass in telecommunications or forward sales by a private monopolist

optimal taxation and economic growth a comment scully public choice 115 299 312 2003 claims that for the united states in 1960 1990 the growth maximizing size of the state was about 19 of gdp however if an error in the model specification is corrected and if 2001 vintage data is used instead of 1996 vintage data estimates of the growth maximizing size of the state range between 9 and 29 of gdp further the method spuriously identifies a growth maximizing tax rate even if no relationship exists between growth and the size of the state the model cannot address reliably the question it attempts to answer

on reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs investment subsidies are widely used to induce adoption of new technologies that can lower the marginal cost of reducing emissions to economize on these subsidies governments would like to distinguish between firms that need to receive a subsidy to adopt a new technology and firms that would adopt that technology even without subsidies we show that policies consisting of a menu of emission taxes and investment subsidies can potentially induce firms to self select

case study evidence that direct regulation remains the main driver of industrial pollution avoidance and may benefit operational efficiency abstract environmental regulation is required to reduce industrial pollution to levels that are socially acceptable and economically efficient but there is debate over the most efficient form of such regulation typically a limited range of environmental and economic parameters are accounted for in the econometric studies that inform that debate this paper integrates evidence from two separate studies to assess a broad range of parameters related to the efficiency of industrial environmental regulation questionnaire responses from 25 italian manufacturers of building chemicals and 28 irish pharmaceutical manufacturers provided evidence on the environmental effectiveness and operational impacts of different regulatory instruments combined with extensive emissions data from irish pharmaceutical manufacturers survey results enabled a quantitative estimation of pollution avoidance specifically attributable to direct regulation the monetised social benefit of avoided pollution was found to be equal to direct compliance costs chemical manufacturers in italy and ireland stated that direct regulation is a more important driver of industrial environmental performance than economic or voluntary regulation and their responses indicated that direct compliance costs may be countered somewhat by stimulated operational improvements it was concluded that direct regulation is an effective approach for multi pollutant control in an industrial context and that the efficiency of such regulation may be underestimated in studies that do not consider the full range of pollutants and operational effects

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

does a recession call for less stringent environmental policy a partial equilibrium second best analysis this paper analyses second best optimal environmental policy responses to real and financial shocks in a two period partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms an environmental externality and credit constraints we show that to alleviate credit constraints and encourage investment the second best optimal emission tax falls short of marginal emission damages the optimal response to shocks depends on how the shock affects the size of the environmental and credit market failures and the effectiveness of the tax in alleviating these market failures under mildly restrictive assumptions on functional forms the optimal response to a persistent negative productivity shock or a tightening of credit is to reduce the emission tax our results are informative for how climate change policy should optimally change with the business cycle

optimal pollution standards and non compliance in a dynamic framework in this paper we present a stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime at each time the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non compliance with the pollution limit and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions we derive two main results first we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases while both emissions and the level of non compliance decrease second we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm s capital investment is socially desirable we numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount which crucially depends on the severity of the fine in the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment

rushing the impatient allowance reserves and the time profile of low carbon investments postponing the issue date of allowances in a cap and trade scheme by e g a reserve mechanism impacts the time profile of low carbon investments if the postponement constrains intertemporal arbitrage short term investments increase but long term investments are deterred this effect aggravates the shortage of long term investments at least partially attributed to firms impatience the cancellation of allowances agreed for phase iv of the eu ets is suitable to counteract the negative effects of cap neutral postponement on long term investments by making the reserve redundant all effects crucially depend on how firms form expectations about future allowance prices

markets and regulatory hold up problems abstract many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance a firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation we show that such incentives which resemble a hold up problem may not be overcome when government s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax the hold up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits a time consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations even if no permits are traded and their market price is low indeed an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

linking induced technological change and environmental regulation evidence from patenting in the u s auto industry a b s t r a c t this article uses a carefully screened patent database in automobile emission control technologies and a detailed regulatory action analysis to examine firms innovation in response to u s technology forcing auto emissions standards enacted between 1970 and 1998 the study finds that under the performance based technology forcing pbtf auto emissions regulations both automakers and compo nent suppliers innovated and introduced more advanced emission control technologies for automobile applications the study also shows that stringent pbtf regulation temporarily induced domestic u s firms to become more innovative than foreign firms that operated in the local u s market during the early phase of the regulatory regime findings of this research strongly imply that government intervention in the form of technology forcing regulation can drive firms to invest in technological innovation

international migration non traded goods and economic welfare in the source country a comment abstract labor emigration redistributes income in a two factor two good economy where one good is internationally non traded labor s nominal wage rises as nominal capital payments fall recent research has shown that the prices of non traded goods rise causing society s welfare to decline here the induced change in the real income of each factor is considered separately there is an ambiguity with regard to the real income of non emigrating labor if labor spends a relatively small fraction of income on the non traded good its real income may rise even though society suffers the loss of welfare

environmental policy reconsidered the role of technological innovation abstract this paper discusses recent environmental policy wisdom in the light of technological and organizational innovation starting from empirical evidence it argues that the main econometric models which are used in environmental policy analysis do not consider properly the determinants and effects of innovation and offer unreliable estimates of policy effects some solutions to the latter problem show that the integration between environmental policy and industrial policy can be more efficient than traditional environmental policies in the protection of the environment technological cooperation moreover can be an important instrument to stabilize international environmental agreements

does host market regulation induce cross border environmental innovation this paper evaluates the effect of host country environmental policy stringency on the offshoring of environmental patents for 2000 top world r d performers it is shown that a more stringent environmental regulation triggers both the extensive and intensive margin of patent offshoring in the field of environmental technologies results are robust to various different specifications alternative definitions of innovation offshoring and of regulation restrictions and to the consideration of possible endogeneity of regulation it is suggested inter alia that r d subsidies and non market based regulatory measures are more important than market based instruments as drivers of cross border environmental innovation length 26 pages

technology diffusion with market power in the upstream industry this paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting downstream industry that can purchase an abatement technology from a monopolistic upstream industry second best policies are derived for the full range of the abatement technology s emission intensities and marginal abatement costs the second best permit quantity can be both above or below the socially optimal emission level explicit consideration of the output market provides further insights on how market power distorts the allocation in the downstream industry the ranking between permits and taxes is ambiguous in general but taxes weakly dominate permits if full diffusion is socially optimal in addition it is analysed how a cap on the permit price affects the diffusion of an abatement technology

the effect of allocation above emissions and price uncertainty on abatement investments under the eu ets abstract the european union emission trading scheme eu ets by far the largest in its kind has inspired several other carbon markets in the world based on interviews with plant managers from almost all belgian ceramics lime and cement producers this study describes how manager s perceptions on emission trading affected investment decisions in line with behavioural economics reference dependence is found to explain why free allocation below emissions creates a greater incentive to abatement investment compared to allocation above emissions in the ceramics sector allocation above emissions refrained managers from including carbon gains in payback times this contradicts the famous coase theorem which predicts that free allocation has no effect on abatement incentives the results indicate that auctioning part of the emission rights will reduce barriers to abatement investment carbon price uncertainty is seen as a disincentive for abatement investment by some managers and as an incentive by others intermediate levels of uncertainty add option value to abatement investments because the associated gradual learning adds flexibility in an uncertain carbon constrained future however high levels of uncertainty creating a risk of offshoring even when companies innovate creates an option value to postpone abatement investments narrow framing misperceiving the risk hedging counter cyclicality of carbon costs reinforces the option value to wait therefore policy should aim to reduce price uncertainty for very low and very high carbon prices not for an intermediary price range

green electricity policies in the netherlands an analysis of policy decisions over the last decades fundamental changes can be observed in both market conditions and the national policy framework for green electricity in the netherlands the dutch government has regularly intervened in markets demonstrating fundamental shifts in policy and approach this study aims to analyse the developments in renewable energy policy making in the netherlands it assesses changes in the choice of policy instruments and target groups the role of stakeholders and offers explanations behind policy successes and failures dutch green electricity policy over the last decade can be characterised roughly by three phases in the early 1990s the government negotiated voluntary agreements with the energy distribution sector on targets for green electricity sales which were never met in the second half of the 1990s a regulatory energy tax was introduced from which customers of green electricity were exempt this led to a substantial increase in demand which was largely met by green electricity imports and did not lead to additional domestic renewable energy capacity finally a change in policy has taken place recently 2003 shifting the focus from promotion of demand to the promotion of supply through a system of regulated feed in tariffs despite the renewable energy policies growth of the renewable energy market in the netherlands has been small and targets have not been fully met the dutch government has not yet succeeded in substantially reducing market uncertainties and in building confidence among market parties because the policies have not been stable and policy objectives have frequently been partly ambiguous in addition the influence of stakeholders in renewable energy policy making has been small which has the early acceptance and implementation of alternative policies

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare

an economic analysis of household waste management abstract this paper provides a comprehensive model of household waste management policy incorporating the possibility of waste reduction effort by the firm and the household and of illegal waste disposal by the household when household waste reduction effort is insignificant the first best optimum can be achieved using various combinations of environmental tax on the firm and waste collection charge on the household however when household waste reduction effort is significant the first best optimum is not achievable and explicit monitoring of illegal waste disposal is needed rendering a simple pigouvian tax sub optimal this paper solves for the second best optimal policy and provides some comparative statics of the optimal policy

international migration non traded goods and economic welfare in a two class economy a reply abstract this paper sketches a formal model of an economy producing traded and non traded goods in which two classes of individuals are differentiated each owning different endowments of capital and labor and allocating different proportions of their income to the consumption of each commudity the effects of emigration on prices income distribution and the real income of each class is then examined

prices vs quantities technology choice uncertainty and welfare technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain while it is well known that price and quantity based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention this paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty i show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent even in terms of expected values moreover a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced finally the firms technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits but not under an emissions tax