sophisticated stable sets in exchange economies abstract within the framework of pure exchange economies we demonstrate that the von neumann and morgenstern stable set in the allocation space may differ from that in the corresponding utility space following harsanyi 1974 management sci 20 1472 1495 we then define the notion of the sophisticated stable set and establish an equivalence theorem like the core the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space coincides with that in the utility space we also show that the sophisticated stable set has the desirable property of individual rationality journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 c70 c71

the hazard of moral hazard untangling the asian crisis abstract the paper critically examines the explanations of the asian crisis which emphasize the role of national policies and institutions that allegedly created moral hazard by overprotecting the investors industrial policy crony capitalism and government guarantees accorded to banks and industrial firms that are considered too important to fail we also discuss the international dimension of the moral hazard argument in the presence of international monetary fund imf bail out the paper finds these explanations theoretically ill defined and empirically weak and argues that the prescriptions for changes in policy and institutions based on them are unlikely to prevent similar kinds of crises in the future

learning by doing vs learning from others in a principal agent model abstract we introduce learning in a principal agent model of output sharing under moral hazard we use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement experience weighted attraction ewa and individual evolutionary learning iel to represent individual learning learning in the principal agent model is difficult due to the stochastic environment the discontinuity in payoffs at the optimal contract and the incorrect evaluation of foregone payoffs for iel and ewa social learning is much more successful in adapting to the optimal contract than standard individual learning algorithms a modified iel using realized payoffs evaluation performs better but still falls short of social learning

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

asset pricing implications of pareto optimality with private information we compare the empirical performance of a standard incomplete markets asset pricing model with that of a novel model with constrained pareto optimal allocations we represent the models stochastic discount factors in terms of the cross sectional distribution of consumption and use these representations to evaluate the models empirical implications the first model is inconsistent with the equity premium in the united states united kingdom and italy the second model is consistent with the equity premium and the risk free rate in all three countries if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is roughly 5 and the quarterly discount factor is less than 0 5

from technological catch up to innovation based economic growth south korea and taiwan compared abstract this paper sets out to analyse the divergent models pursued by south korea and taiwan in regard to technological catching up and their ongoing transition towards innovation based economies it is found that south korea s former high debt and chaebol dominated model inclined it to pursue a schumpeterian scale based technological development while taiwan s former pro stability small and medium sized enterprise sme based model tended to favour its emphasis on a neo marshallian network based technological development it will be argued that the state s approach to economic liberalisation and firms demand for capital for technological upgrading are the major factors that have underpinned the adjustment efforts of these two countries

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

explaining korea s lower investment levels after the crisis summary this paper examines the reasons for korea s lower investment levels after the crisis of 1997 98 through estimation of an error correction model of real investment the econometric results suggest that the fall in investment rates resulted from a decline in the long run equilibrium value of investment rates due to a deterioration in terms of trade they also show that recent investment levels are neither too high nor too low relative to the long run equilibrium value the variation in terms of trade seems to have pronounced effects on investment through its effect on corporate profits and cash flows in korea

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

bureaucracy and growth a cross national analysis of the effects of weberian state structures on economic growth the role of bureaucratic authority structures in facilitating economic growth has been a sociological concern since max weber s classic contributions almost 100 years ago using a recent and original data set we examine the characteristics of core state economic agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 developing countries for the 1970 1990 period our weberianness scale offers a simple measure of the degree to which these agencies employ meritocratic recruitment and offer predictable rewarding long term careers we find that these weberian characteristics significantly enhance prospects for economic growth even when we control for initial levels of gdp per capita and human capital our results imply that weberianness should be included as a factor in general models of economic growth they also suggest the need for more attention by policymakers to building better bureaucracies and more research by social scientists on variations in how state bureaucracies are organized

interpreting the korean crisis financial liberalisation industrial policy and corporate governance as the interpretation of its economic miracle has been so the interpretation of the recent crisis in korea remains highly controversial 1 although there are many important issues which have been raised by the korean crisis such as exchange rate policy labour market policy and the architecture of the international financial system chang 1998a three issues have been especially controversial in the debate financial liberalization industrial policy and corporate governance

dynamic financial constraints distinguishing mechanism design from exogenously incomplete regimes we formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of constrained credit insurance that allow for moral hazard and limited commitment we compare them to full insurance and exogenously incomplete financial regimes autarky saving only borrowing and lending in a single asset we develop computational methods based on mechanism design linear programming and maximum likelihood to estimate compare and statistically test these alternative dynamic models with financial information constraints our methods can use both cross sectional and panel data and allow for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity we estimate the models using data on thai households running small businesses from two separate samples we find that in the rural sample the exogenously incomplete saving only and borrowing regimes provide the best fit using data on consumption business assets investment and income family and other networks help consumption smoothing there as in a moral hazard constrained regime in contrast in urban areas we find mechanism design financial information regimes that are decidedly less constrained with the moral hazard model fitting best combined business and consumption data we perform numerous robustness checks in both the thai data and in monte carlo simulations and compare our maximum likelihood criterion with results from other metrics and data not used in the estimation a prototypical counterfactual policy evaluation exercise using the estimation results is also featured

breakthroughs deadlines and self reported progress contracting for multistage projects we study the optimal incentive schemes for multistage projects staged financing pervasive in both venture capital and research grants arises as a feature of the optimal contract the nature of progress plays an important role when progress is tangible incentives are provided through a series of deadlines and a reward scheme that decreases over time early progress in one stage gives the agent more time and funding to complete the next one when progress is intangible unverifiable progress reports are used despite the fact that the information in the report has no social value the optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date if the agent reports progress at that date then the principal gives him a relatively short deadline to complete the project if not then a probationary phase begins in which the project is terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported we explore the implications for welfare and optimal project design

vulnerability to a currency crisis lessons from the asian experience are currency crises caused by manias and panics in financial markets or by unsustainable deteriorations in domestic macroeconomic conditions this question is explored in the context of the recent asian currency crisis the theoretical concept of vulnerability is used to identify three early warning indicators of susceptibility to a currency crisis rapid accumulation of mobile capital domestic lending booms and overvalued exchange rates it is shown that the crisis and noncrisis countries of asia may be distinguished empirically using these indicators over the decade preceding the crisis this exercise provides convincing evidence that the crisis emanated largely from domestic macroeconomic conditions

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

the monetary compensation mechanism an alternative to the clean development mechanism abstract one of the key challenges in resolving global warming problem is how to induce developing countries to reduce emissions the cdm was proposed in the kyoto protocol as a means of obtaining the cooperation of developing countries in controlling greenhouse gases but it has some intrinsic problems and has generated considerable controversy this paper presents an alternative mechanism the monetary compensation mechanism mcm i study the characteristics of this mechanism with a dynamic principal agent model by solving the model numerically i obtain the optimal solution for a scenario based on 1990 data the monetary compensation rate under the mcm is comparable to the price of cers in the cdm but the mcm has several advantages over the cdm

dynamic prudential regulation is prompt corrective action optimal the current u s bank capital regulation features prompt corrective action which mandates regulators to intervene in and liquidate banks based on their book value capital ratios to see if prompt corrective action is optimal i build a dynamic model of repeated interactions between a banker and a regulator under hidden choice of risk private information on returns and limited commitment by the banker and costly liquidation i first characterize the optimal incentive feasible allocation i then demonstrate that the optimal allocation is implementable through the combination of a risk based deposit insurance premium and a book value capital regulation with stochastic liquidation

capital market crises liberalisation fixed exchange rates and market driven destabilisation everyone knows the epigraph to anna karenina happy families are all alike every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way tolstoy may well have been right about families but the extension of his judgement to economies hit by capital market crises distinctly fails their causes and unhappy consequences in latin america and asia over the past 20 years have many elements in common

debt restructuring and the politics of exclusion a case study of the daewoo motor bupyeong plants in incheon south korea this paper examines the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the debt restructuring of the south korean motor vehicle industry and shows how the contested process of exclusion operates through the politics of forgetting it focuses on the power relations among multiple actors involved in the debt restructuring of a bankrupt auto company daewoo motor company in order to understand the politics of exclusion and forgetting as a series of complex multiscalar processes in order to analyse power relations among multiple actors at different geographical scales this study examines these actors conflicting economic and political interests ideologies positions strategies resources and effectiveness of their power the study shows that the politics of inclusion and exclusion derives not only as a result of global external forces but also from conscious policy choices made by multiple actors at different geographical scales this paper offers an alternative angle to the binary view of the relationship amon

markov perfect risk sharing moral hazard and limited commitment abstract we define characterize and compute markov perfect risk sharing contracts in a dynamic stochastic economy with endogenous asset accumulation and simultaneous limited commitment and moral hazard frictions we prove that markov perfect insurance contracts preserve standard properties of optimal insurance with private information and are not more restrictive than a long term contract with one sided commitment markov perfect contracts imply a determinate asset time path and a non degenerate long run stationary wealth distribution quantitatively we show that markov perfect risk sharing contracts provide sizably more consumption smoothing relative to self insurance and that the welfare gains from resolving the commitment friction are larger than the gains from resolving the moral hazard friction at low asset levels while the opposite holds for high asset levels

deposit insurance and lender of last resort functions we consider issues concerning the design of a banking system safety net when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present in our model both entities have a role to play moreover issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not we discuss when and why or why not a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest and we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria

repeated moral hazard with effort persistence abstract i study a problem of repeated moral hazard where the effect of effort is persistent over time each period s outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts i show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort a simple rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a related standard repeated moral hazard the solutions for consumption in the two problems are observationally equivalent implying that the main properties of the optimal contract remain unchanged with persistence for illustration i present the computed solution of an example

endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design abstract we create a dynamic theory of endogenous risk sharing groups with good internal information and their coexistence with relative performance individualistic regimes which are informationally more opaque inequality and organizational form are determined simultaneously numerical techniques and succinct reformulations of mechanism design problems with suitable choice of promised utilities allow the computation of a stochastic steady state and its transitions regions of low inequality and moderate to high wealth utility promises produce the relative performance regime while regions of high inequality and low wealth produce the risk sharing group regime if there is a cost to prevent coalitions risk sharing groups emerge at high wealth levels also transitions from the relative performance regime to the group regime tend to occur when rewards to observed outputs exacerbate inequality while transitions from the group regime to the relative performance regime tend to come with a decrease in utility promises some regions of inequality and wealth deliver long term persistence of organization form and inequality while other regions deliver high levels of volatility

repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model with an application to deposit insurance abstract we consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs the insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level we characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents we then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance our results suggest in a deposit insurance context that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on and to make deposit insurance payments only later or not at all

the political economy of industrial policy in korea the article aims to provide some additional empirical support and theoretical consolidation for the emerging alternative interpretation of the korean developmental experience which emphasizes the role of the state after briefly reviewing some mainstream interpretations it presents a detailed account of state intervention in korea where it is revealed that industrial policy played the central role then it explains how the korean state was able to avoid some of the obvious dangers of such a policy which is often associated with economic failures in developing countries it then explores the basis of state power in korea which provided a background for such an outcome copyright 1993 by oxford university press

a legitimate paradox neo liberal reform and the return of the state in korea this article examines the neo liberal reforms that the kim government implemented in post crisis korea it argues that by embracing the reforms the state paradoxically re legitimised itself in the national political economy the process of enacting the reforms completed the power shift from a collusive state chaebol alliance towards a new alliance based on a more populist social contract but one that nonetheless generally conformed to the tenets of neo liberalism kim and his closest associates identified the malpractices of the chaebols as the main cause of the crisis so reforming the chaebols would be the key to economic recovery combining populism and neo liberalism they drew on support from both domestic and international sources to rein in rather than nurture the chaebols

universal banking and firm risk taking abstract this paper analyzes the welfare implications of banks taking equity stakes in firms under conditions of imperfect information and moral hazard two cases of bank control over investment decisions are analyzed in the first the bank does not control the investment decisions of the firm here the investment efficiency is higher and bank risk is lower for an optimal positive level of bank equity holdings however in the case when the bank has veto power over investment proposals by the firm there is a trade off between increased investment efficiency and increased bank risk

stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences abstract we introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence stable sets provide a successful alternative to core notions of externalities i e core core and strong nash equilibrium which are typically empty however the stable sets do exist in situations where the above core notions are empty

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

optimal mortgage design this article studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income costly foreclosure and a stochastic market interest rate we show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable rate mortgage option arm under the optimal contract the borrower is given discretion of how much to repay until his balance reaches a certain limit the default rates and interest rate payment on the mortgage correlate positively with the market interest rate gains from using the optimal contract relative to simpler mortgages are the biggest for those who face more income variability buy pricey houses given their income level or make little or no down payment our model thus may help to explain a high concentration of option arms among riskier borrowers jel g20 g21 g33

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

bank capital and equity investment regulations abstract this paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks minimum required capital asset ratio and the regulation that limits and in some countries forbids banks investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms there are two sources of moral hazard in the model one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project among other things the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank s stability and can also be pareto improving equity regulation is never pareto improving and does not increase the bank s stability

optimal unemployment insurance with human capital depreciation and duration dependence this paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance ui scheme our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies benefits should decrease with unemployment duration the optimal program also generates two main novel features which are not present in stationary models first if human capital depreciates rapidly enough during unemployment ui transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient program second we study the optimality of imposing a history contingent wage tax after reemployment our numerical simulations based on the spanish and us economies show that the wage tax should decrease with the length of worker s previous unemployment spell and become a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers as a by product of our study we develop a systematic approach suitable for studying recursively a wide range of dynamic moral hazard problems and other models with similar characteristics

symmetric von neumann morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies abstract we show that in a finite neoclassical pure exchange economy with a weaker monotonicity condition than the usual one if the number of traders of each type is the same and every type has a corner on one of the commodities then the set of all symmetric pareto optimal allocations in the economy i e pareto optimal allocations which assign indifferent commodity bundles to traders of the same type is a von neumann morgenstern stable set moreover this is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations a similar result holds in atomless economies with a finite number of types without the convexity assumption on the preference relations it is also not necessary to assume in the atomless case that the members of the types partition have the same measure

financial crisis in southeast asia dispelling illusion the minskyan way this paper extends minsky s financial instability hypothesis to the case of the open liberalised economy making it possible to put forward a specifically minskyan account of the road to the financial crisis in southeast asia 1997 1998 the analysis suggests that the threats to growth and employment emanating from the financial sector which minsky identified in the closed economy setting are much intensified in open liberalised developing economies financial liberalisation is an important key factor in this process rival explanations of the crisis are examined and rejected in favour of the extended minskyan explanation the policy implications are derived and discussed copyright 2002 oxford university press

payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments abstract the first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare a payments system with period by period settlement in outside money improves on decentralized exchange an efficient allocation is supported by a payments system where settlement is not imposed in the second model there is random matching and unobserved productivity shocks and preference shocks we explore how risk should be shared optimally in this economy and interpret the results in terms of how actual payments systems should operate journal of economic literature classification numbers e4 e5

yuliy sannikov winner of the 2016 clark medal yuliy sannikov is an extraordinary theorist who has developed methods that offer new insights in analyzing problems that had seemed well studied and familiar for example decisions that might bring about cooperation and or defection in a repeated play prisoner s dilemma game or that affect the balance of incentives and opportunism in a principal agent relationship his work has broken new ground in methodology often through the application of stochastic calculus methods the stochastic element means that his work naturally captures situations in which there is a random chance that monitoring communication or signaling between players is imperfect using calculus in the context of continuous time games allows him to overcome tractability problems that had long hindered research in a number of areas he has substantially altered the toolbox available for studying dynamic games this essay offers an overview of sannikov s research in several areas

on ramsey s conjecture efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information abstract in his seminal paper of 1928 ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level the validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments in particular it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets this paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents a version of bayesian implementation is introduced and a recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established efficient allocations are renegotiation proof and the expected utility of any agent cannot go to zero with positive probability if the economy does not collapse if the economy collapses all agents will get zero consumption forever thus including any degree of private information in the neoclassical growth model will deny ramsey s conjecture if efficient allocations are considered

implications of endogenous group formation for efficient risk sharing the existing literature on sub game perfect risk sharing suffers from a basic inconsistency while a group of size n is able to coordinate on a risk sharing outcome it is assumed that deviating subgroups cannot i relax this assumption and characterise the optimal contract among all coalition proof history dependent contracts this alters the predictions of the standard dynamic limited commitment model i show that the consumption of constrained agents depends on both the history of shocks and its interaction with the current income of other constrained agents from this i derive a formal test for the presence of endogenous group formation under limited commitment

optimal risk sharing with effort and project choice we consider first best risk sharing problems in which the agent can control both the drift effort choice and the volatility of the underlying process project selection in a model of delegated portfolio management it is optimal to compensate the manager with an option type payoff where the functional form of the option is obtained as a solution to an ordinary differential equation in the general case the optimal contract is a fixed point of a functional that connects the agent s and the principal s maximization problems we apply martingale duality methods familiar from optimal consumption investment problems

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

the asian debt and development crisis of 1997 causes and consequences abstract interpretations of the asian crisis have coalesced around two rival stories the death throes of asian state capitalism story about internal real economy causes and the panic triggering debt deflation in a basically sound but under regulated system story that gives more role to external and financial system causes the paper presents the stories and assesses the evidence the evidence in particular the chronology of the crisis supports the second rather better than the first the paper discusses the interests driving capital account liberalization without a framework of regulation the single most irresponsible act of public authorities in the whole crisis us and uk financial firms allied with their treasuries and with the imf the wto and the oecd saw themselves at a chronic disadvantage in the asian system of long term relationships and patient capital this alliance supported by segments of asian political and financial elites achieved dramatic domestic financial sector liberalization and capital account opening in asia over the 1990s setting up the conditions for crisis paradoxically the crisis may be looked back upon not as the triumph of benign globalization and neoliberal economic doctrine but as the beginning of its end

korea the misunderstood crisis abstract the article argues against the conventional wisdom that the current korean crisis is a crisis from underregulation rather than from overregulation it argues that ill managed financial liberalization abandonment of investment coordination and poor exchange rate management were the underlying causes of the crisis it then argues that while certain structural changes made such policy shifts somewhat inevitable there were also poor strategic choices and ideological prejudices involved the article finally discusses whether the current international monetary fund program of institutional reform in the anglo american direction will be able to revive the korean economy in the long run

a political economic analysis of the failure of neo liberal restructuring in post crisis korea this paper evaluates imf led neo liberal restructuring in post crisis korea the main conclusions are that the economic rebound in 1999 2000 was both incomplete and unsustainable restructuring created a ongoing credit crunch that continues to constrain investment spending korea may have been pushed onto a long term low investment low growth trajectory insecurity and inequality have risen substantially and the influence of foreign capital has dramatically increased the paper concludes by suggesting that koreans should reject radical neo liberal restructuring and consider instead reforms to democratise and modernise their traditional state guided growth model copyright 2002 oxford university press

forbearance and prompt corrective action this article investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance we construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral borrow from banks and invest in long term projects we assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but lose the collateral and that depositors can withdraw deposits we show that optimal regulation exhibits forbearance if the ex ante probability of collapse in collateral value is sufficiently low but exhibits prompt termination of problem banks if this probability is sufficiently high copyright 2007 the ohio state university

allocating bank regulatory powers lender of last resort deposit insurance and supervision abstract we examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation we find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance it also leads the bank to invest suboptimally in loans giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome in the multi regulator arrangement we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer the choice between the unified regulator arrangement and the multi regulator arrangement involves a trade off the multi regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels these results assume the absence of information frictions when banks are better informed than regulators we show that regulators may have an incentive not to share private information suggesting it is important to consider regulators informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation

consumption commitment and cycles abstract this paper examines the properties of efficient allocations of risk in an economic environment in which the outside enforcement of risk sharing arrangements is infinitely costly in these allocations unanticipated relative productivity movements have effects on both the current and future distribution of consumption across individuals if preferences over consumption and leisure are nonhomothetic these changes in the allocation of consumption will generate persistent cycles in aggregate output that do not occur in efficient allocations when enforcement is costless

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

solvency runs sunspot runs and international bailouts abstract this paper introduces a model of intervention by an international financial institution ifi under asymmetric information the ifi is unable to distinguish between runs due to fundamentals and those which are the result of pure sunspots however it maximizes global welfare by offering a relending package consistent with generating a separating equilibrium where voluntary creditor participation implies that underlying fundamentals are good the need for direct ifi lending in the package is shown to depend on the commitment capacity of creditors this adverse selection problem provides an alternative rationale for bagehot s principle of last resort lending at high rates of interest to the moral hazard motivation commonly found in the literature

a new methodology linking concentration dynamics to current and steady state profits examining korean industrial policy during take off abstract we model the dynamics of industrial structure and market power using korean manufacturing data during the take off period 1978 82 structure conduct performance scp methodologies have been criticized for using accounting data and because a few superior firms may have greater shares and greater profits both are argued to present possible spurious correlations between concentration and profits this paper follows earlier work which shows that market structure responds to observed accounting profits as if these were accurate indices of real profits and not as if leading firms are perceived to have unmatchable advantages the methodological contribution of this model is a new latent variable for steady state profits derived from the speed of structural adjustment long run profits are identified by the hypothesis that structural adjustment will be more rapid when industries are farther from steady state levels we analyze the long run profits latent variable finding strong support for this hypothesis the speed of adjustment is greater for positive and negative deviations from steady state structure we show that the profits and structural adjustment relationship is non monotone the scp criticisms above are based on spurious correlations which are monotone in profits and structure positing spurious correlations which are at the same time monotone in structure and non monotone in structural adjustment seems less plausible than accepting the scp results which are consistent with both our analysis also is new in that it is the first direct econometric analysis of korean industrial policy during its take off years we note that in korea unlike elsewhere industrial policy was hypothesized to lead to concentration and market power in the popular press and by professional economists ours is the first direct econometric analysis of this hypothesis and we find it supported

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

on optimal unemployment compensation abstract the design of an optimal unemployment compensation scheme is analyzed using a dynamic principal agent relationship between a risk neutral planner the principal and risk averse workers the agents where the planner s inability to observe workers job search efforts creates a moral hazard problem to design an implementable scheme we require that each agent is guaranteed a minimum level of expected discounted utility regardless of his past history in contrast with previous studies we find that the optimal contract is quite close to actual unemployment compensation schemes both qualitatively and quantitatively

new perspectives on east asian development conventional explanations of rapid growth in east asia have focused on the efficient allocation of resources resulting from market led outward oriented strategies this study challenges that approach east asian success has centred around the accumulation dynamic both because of its direct importance to the growth process and also because of its close and interdependent linkages with exports on this basis the study considers the institutions and policies which were used to manage economic rents in support of rapid growth and to ensure a more strategic and orderly integration into the world economy the study also examines the contribution of regional trade and investment flows to east asian industrialisation the potential for replicating similar strategies is considered

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

the political economy of indirect control this paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its authority we develop a dynamic principal agent model in which a principal a government delegates the prevention of a disturbance such as riots protests terrorism crime or tax evasion to an agent who has an advantage in accomplishing this task our setting is a standard dynamic principal agent model with two additional features first the principal is allowed to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players second the principal suffers from limited commitment using recursive methods we derive a fully analytical characterization of the likelihood intensity and duration of intervention the first main insight from our model is that repeated and costly interventions are a feature of the efficient equilibrium this is because they serve as a punishment to induce the agent into desired behavior the second main insight is a detailed analysis of a fundamental tradeoff between the intensity and duration of intervention which is driven by the principal s inability to commit finally we derive sharp predictions regarding the impact of various factors on likelihood intensity and duration of intervention we discuss these results in the context of some historical episodes

getting it done dynamic incentives to complete a project a principal wants an agent to complete a project the agent undertakes unobservable effort which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed we characterize the contracts that the principal sets with and without commitment with full commitment the contract involves the agent s value and wage declining over time in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal also involves the agent s wage declining over time while the worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal has a constant wage and is in fact the unique stationary equilibrium the best weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium for the principal is achieved by a constant wage that maximizes the principal s payoff conditional on wages being constant we compare these solutions to the efficient outcome