new human resource management practices complementarities and the impact on innovation performance in this paper we take our theoretical point of departure in recent work in organisational economics on systems of human resource management hrm practices we develop the argument that just as complementarities between new hrm practices influence financial performance positively there are theoretical reasons for expecting them also to influence innovation performance positively we examine this overall hypothesis by estimating an empirical model of innovation performance using data from a danish survey of 1 900 business firms using principal component analysis we identify two hrm systems which are conducive to innovation in the first one seven of our nine hrm variables matter almost equally for the ability to innovate the second system is dominated by firm internal and firm external training of the total of nine sectors that we consider we find that the four manufacturing sectors correlate with the first system firms belonging to wholesale trade and to the ict intensive service sectors tend to be associated with the second system

influence costs and capital structure this paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities the hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions in corporations for example top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees while at the same time they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making this creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management s discretionary decisions as a result divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm this incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs for example in the event of a divestiture since the firm s capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers incentives to influence top management s decisions the control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions hence there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions the findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations we identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure the top management s prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers and the difference in the valuation of the division s assets in the current firm and under alternative uses

observability and the payback criterion among the enigmas of corporate finance theory that have received little attention is the puzzling use of the payback method as a capital budgeting tool although the payback method has many drawbacks it is widely used in industry see klammer 1972 fremgren 1973 schall sundem and geijsback 1978 1 gordon 1955 attempted to explain this anomaly by observing that the inverse of the payback period is an approximation for the internal rate of return but as sarnat and levy 1969 point out the accuracy of the approximation depends on the life of the project and its irr for low values of irr the inverse of payback is a very poor approximation moreover it is difficult to believe that corporations that use complex and sophisticated technologies need a rule of thumb to approximate something as simple to compute as the irr in fact empirical evidence shows that most firms compute both the irr and the payback period see schall the payback criterion continues to be widely used in industry although there is little support for it among the academicians this paper attempts to find an economic rationale for it by using an incentive model with asymmetric information it argues that when the managers possess private information regarding projects selected for implementation it is in their interest to choose ceteris paribus projects that pay back faster since manager s wages depend on output because their productivity is unknown by choosing projects that pay back fast they hope to improve their reputations i wish to thank milton harris and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions while i retain the responsibility for any remaining errors 1 it has been found that payback is rarely used as a primary capital budgeting method it is used as a secondary criterion to a discounted cash flow method such as npv net present value or irr internal rate of return

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

empirical estimation and use of risk preferences discussion in 1976 a number of people present today attended a conference in mexico which has since then 1978 resulted in a state of the arts volume edited by roumasset boussard and singh on risk uncertainty and agricultural development the papers presented today convey the feeling that since that time there has been little progress in measuring risk aversion or in discriminating between alternative theories of behavior under risk i will argue that this is because the papers concentrate on approaches to measurement of risk aversion and testing of theories which hold little promise of fast progress please excuse that i will be somewhat partisan in the remarks and rely heavily on studies with which i have been involved i know them best

risk averters that love risk marginal risk aversion in comparison to a reference gamble we propose an analytical distinction between standard risk aversion based on the valuation of a single gamble and marginal risk aversion based on the change in valuation between two gambles we measure marginal risk aversion in two dimensions mean and variance data from a field experiment is used to study marginal risk aversion our results suggest that individuals rely on a reference gamble when assessing marginal risk individual responses to marginal changes in mean and variance are nearly identical in direction and magnitude suggesting that information on both standard and marginal risk aversion is needed to accurately model behavior copyright 2008 oxford university press

estimation of farmers risk attitude an econometric approach abstract an econometric procedure for estimating arrow pratt coefficients of risk aversion is derived the model of farmers allocating land among different crops and time between leisure and labor allows for testing arrow s hypotheses of decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion the empirical results support these hypotheses

labour market deregulation flexibility and innovation labour flexibility is often portrayed as important to competitive success using evidence from an original survey of uk firms this paper investigates the relationships between firms use of on the one hand various flexible work practices human resource management techniques and industrial relations systems and on the other hand the innovative activities of those firms our results suggest that the sort of low road labour flexibility practices encouraged by labour market deregulation short term and temporary contracts a lack of employer commitment to job security low levels of training and so on are negatively correlated with innovation

a theory of acquisition markets mergers versus tender offers and golden parachutes we develop a model of the acquisition market in which the acquirer has a choice between two takeover mechanisms mergers and tender offers a merger is modeled as a bargaining game between the acquiring and target firms whereas a tender offer is modeled as an auction in which bidders arrive sequentially and compete for the target at any stage of the bargaining game the acquiring firm can stop negotiating and make a tender offer in equilibrium there is a unique level of synergy gains below which the acquiring firm makes only a merger attempt as it expects to lose in the competition resulting from a tender offer for synergy gains above this level tender offers can occur however to get tender offers target shareholders must give their managers golden parachutes that give higher payoffs in tender offers than in mergers article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

loss aversion and managerial decisions evidence from major league baseball i introduction and motivation previous research indicates that management changes are important events for organizations partly because they lead to reversals of poor prior decisions 1 however this research begs the question of why it may be necessary to replace the manager in order to bring about such changes in this article we test for evidence of loss aversion and distinguish between loss aversion and agency costs as explanations for why managers hang on to poorly performing assets or employees they were instrumental in acquiring or hiring the study contributes to the literature on managerial decisions and to the sports economics literature it may be necessary to replace managers if their investment decisions are affected by loss aversion as aronson wilson and akert 2010 point out avoiding admission of mistakes is a common human trait once we have committed time or energy to a cause it seems to be nearly impossible to convince us that the cause is unworthy psychological aversion to admitting mistakes is related to loss aversion and reflects a cognitive bias the manager fails to see the problem or discounts negative experience as non representative agency costs provide an alternative explanation for why it may be necessary to replace managers to rectify prior mistakes agency costs arise when an agent e g a manager acts in his her own interest but not in the interest of the principal e g the firm owner in the presence of asymmetric information managers may have incentives to disguise or conceal poor decisions to avoid negative consequences such as reduced marketability as a manager demotion or termination this concern with career and reputation can lead to overlooking inefficiencies including asset underperformance and overpayment for the underperforming assets using three decades of data on managerial and player turnover in major league baseball mlb we 1 estimate the tendency of incumbent managers to hold on to low performing players rather than divest them 2 test the hypothesis that new managers unwind the mistakes of previous managers and 3 distinguish between loss aversion and agency costs as alternative explanations for retention of poor performing players our empirical analysis focuses on poor performing players who were hired by previous managers this is because either loss aversion or agency cost may have induced the prior manager to hang onto poor performing players new managers can be expected to move quickly to address these types of problems hence we can use new manager retention decisions to determine if the decisions are affected by whether or not the poor performer was hired by a previous manager failure of the acquiring manager to divest poor performing players could be consistent with either the manager s aversion to loss a cognitive bias or the manager s unwillingness to admit mistakes agency costs in the form of career concerns to distinguish between these we follow the career concerns literature and reason that experienced managers are less likely to suffer reputational harm if they terminate poor performers whom they hired loss aversion in contrast does not suggest a relationship between managerial experience and failure to terminate poor performers there are several advantages to using baseball data for this study the empirical design holds industry and competitive conditions constant and allows us to directly observe the performance of acquired assets players and how managers react to their performance once it is revealed we are able to identify the manager who made the acquisition decision and can measure the performance of individual players we also observe the player retention decisions of the subsequent manager the manager who did not acquire the player hence we can evaluate how the acquiring manager s behavior differs from that of the manager who inherits poor performing players some who were acquired by the prior manager and others who were hired by even earlier managers

nonparametric test of the expected utility hypothesis a nonparametric test of the expected utility hypothesis is developed in this paper the expected utility hypothesis is shown to hold if there exists a feasible solution to a particular system of linear inequalities furthermore when a feasible solution exists boundaries on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion can be calculated explicitly the test is applied to data on land allocations modeled as choices over lottery sets results contrary to those obtained in many laboratory experiments show that in most cases the expected utility hypothesis cannot be rejected

the disciplinary role of takeovers this paper presents a theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial incentive problems stemming from asymmetric information it is argued that an informed raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation more sensitive to information unavailable to shareholders the paper also highlights the importance of specifying the source of contractual inefficiencies when analyzing the effect of takeovers on incentives

delegating the decision making authority to terminate a sequential project abstract this paper considers a two stage project which requires investments to be made by different agents who have career concerns at each stage the principal needs to decide whether the project should be continued or not after the first stage outcome is realized the principal can either keep the decision making authority regarding the termination policy or else delegate it to one of the agents with career concerns the first stage agent always wants to continue the project in which case the sunk cost fallacy occurs on the contrary the second stage agent may prefer to stop it voluntarily to protect his reputation therefore when the career concerns are strong the principal should delegate the authority to the second stage agent if an early termination of the project is also the best policy for the principal while if the career concerns are weak the principal should keep the authority

is risk aversion really correlated with wealth how estimated probabilities introduce spurious correlation economists frequently focus on correlations between wealth and risk preferences but rarely observe the probabilities needed to test this relationship empirically these unobserved probabilities are typically estimated via profit or production functions conditioned on wealth correlates which may leave statistical fingerprints on subsequently estimated risk aversion coefficients and confound correlations between wealth and risk preferences using data from an experiment with observable probabilities we compare risk aversion coefficients based on true probabilities with those based on probabilities estimated using standard approaches and show how estimated probabilities can change risk aversion coefficients substantially and introduce spurious correlation between risk aversion and wealth

managerial career concerns and investments in information we extend the implicit incentives literature by analyzing how career concerns affect a riskneutral manager s decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it the manager has unknown ability that determines the probability with which a good project is available so the market updates ability assessments from project outcomes while project choice is efficient in equilibrium an unobservable investment in the precision of project evaluation allows the manager to control the probabilities of future reputational states this distorts his investment in precision above first best when project payoffs can be observed only on accepted projects

when risk generates chaos abstract with risk averse producers the traditional linear cobweb model becomes nonlinear the currently produced quantity is an homographic function of previous years quantities this may result in the market generating chaotic price and quantity series especially if demand is rigid hedging facilities are unable to reduce the magnitude of fluctuations which are socially detrimental especially from the consumers point of view this might justify public intervention on markets such as staple food commodities or health cares

the market for interfirm asset sales partial sell offs and total liquidations abstract we investigate the valuation consequences of voluntary proposals to sell part or all of a corporation s assets for partial sell offs successful sellers and buyers reap statistically significant abnormal returns of 1 66 and 0 83 respectively unsuccessful sellers realize gains at the bid announcement of 1 41 that are lost at the offer termination in contrast proposals to liquidate the firm are associated with significant average abnormal returns of 12 24 we interpret these findings as evidence that asset sales are associated with the movement of resources to higher valued uses rather than as evidence of market mispricing before the divestiture announcements

is expected utility theory applicable a revealed preference test we proffer a method to assess the adequacy of expected utility theory eut in empirical studies involving discrete and continuous choices the method calibrates a utility function to revealed choices and rejects eut for absurd degrees of implied concavity over the wealth at risk we find eut rejections in cases where risk averse choices are made between gambles with similar stakes regardless of their absolute sizes eut is shown to be applicable only when expected payoffs of gambles are similar or when more than half of wealth is at risk we illustrate our method with an application to agricultural production

escalation errors and the sunk cost effect an explanation based on reputation and information asymmetries this paper is concerned with explaining a paradox of human behavior consider the following example a department manager makes a large investment in new production equipment and soon after learns of different equipment that could perform the same operations at lower cost incremental analysis favors switching but the manager refuses saying he does not want to waste the investment already made such real world examples have been extensively documented and studied by social scientists see thaler 1980 and staw 1981 in these examples the decision maker having commited to a course of action subsequently discovers new information that indicates that continuing the earlier commitment would likely result in worse consequences than switching in spite of this he clings to and even escalates his earlier

managerial reputation and divisional sell offs a model and empirical test abstract this paper presents a reputation model of divestiture activity that yields a sharp cross sectional implication for event studies of sell off announcements a decision to divest a division that is known to be successful conveys good news about the division in contrast a decision to divest a division that is known for underperformance conveys no news about the division we test these hypotheses on a sample of sell off announcements for which we find stories in the wall street journal unambiguously characterizing the division being sold as either a winner or a loser the stock price reaction to the sell off of losers is indistinguishable from zero while the stock price reaction to the sell off of winners is a statistically significant 2 5 these results are strengthened when we expand the sample to include divisions whose profitability was announced in the company s annual report for this expanded sample the average stock price reaction to the announcements of sell offs of losers remains indistinguishable from zero while returns from the sell offs of winners average a highly significant 3 4

econometric estimation of producers risk attitudes general methods are proposed for the identification and econometric estimation of the parameters of the distribution of risk attitudes in a producer population the proposed methods also provide the basis for the development of statistical tests of model specification and of behavioral hypotheses econometric risk attitude estimation is shown to be possible under less restrictive conditions than previously believed a moment based version of the general model is applied to indian data and the econometrically estimated risk attitudes are presented and compared to experimental results for a similar group of producers

an appraisal of expected utility hypothesis tests constructed from responses to hypothetical questions and experimental choices a decision problem exists when the possible consequences of a decision are important and the best choice is not obvious anderson dillon hardaker moreover when the consequences of each choice are described in probabilistic terms the decision problem is said to exist under uncertainty the expected utility hypothesis euh characterizes the following solution for an uncertain decision problem a identify the action choices available a

expo power utility a flexible form for absolute and relative risk aversion a new utility function which i call expo power is proposed that exhibits decreasing constant or increasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing or increasing relative risk aversion depending on parameter values numerical analysis suggests that the expo power function performs well in incorporating these risk preference structures and that arbitrary risk preference specifications may lead to biased risk response estimates

working time trends and developments in europe the objective of this paper is to summarise what is known about key trends and developments in working time across europe the european region analysed in this paper includes not only the 27 current member states of the european union eu but extends even beyond its borders this paper review trends and patterns in working hours in the broadest range of countries possible given data limitations especially outside the eu with a focus on average weekly hours of work and the proportion of workers working excessively long hours defined as usual working hours of 48 or more per week developments regarding one unique form of working time arrangement part time work with a focus on the incidence of part time work in each country changes in this incidence over time the female share of part time employment and issues related to the quality of part time jobs and finally considers trends in the organisation of working time across europe with a focus on the incidence of non standard work schedules e g night work and weekend work and shift work as well as the extent to which various types of flexible working time arrangements are being deployed in individual enterprises finally the paper presents some policy suggestions within a broad framework designed to advance the international labour organisation ilo concept of decent work in the area of working time

work arrangements and firm innovation is there any relationship this study investigates the relationship between labour market flexibility proxied by the proportion of workers with different contractual arrangements and other indicators of flexible work relations and firms innovative ability as measured by the percentage of new products in total sales on the one hand more flexibility e g a higher labour turnover might be favourable to a firm s innovation potential aside from having potential wage savings a larger inflow of new personnel may enrich the pool of firm innovative ideas on the other hand higher work flexibility may also have some drawbacks a permanently high turnover rate may diminish social cohesion and trust and increase the probability of opportunistic behaviour results suggest that internal flexibility is positively associated with innovation for both high tech and low tech firms especially for high tech firms however greater external flexibility might hinder innovation copyright oxford university press

labour market regulation industrial relations and technological regimes a tale of comparative advantage in this paper we present comparative evidence from oecd countries concerning the impact of labour market institutions and regulations on technological specialization the interplay between the degree of labour market flexibility the system of industrial relations and the knowledge base of different industries determines the viability of different human resource strategies thereby shaping the patterns of comparative advantage our empirical results show that countries with coordinated industrial relations systems and strict employment protection tend to specialize in industries with a cumulative knowledge base we argue that two mechanisms explain these patterns the larger the scope for resorting to internal labour markets the lower the adjustment costs imposed by labour market regulation furthermore employment protection and coordinated industrial relations regimes by aligning workers and firms bjectives encourage firm sponsored training as well as the accumulation of firm specific competencies allowing firms to fully exploit the potential of the internal labour market copyright 2002 oxford university press

the globalisation of technology a new taxonomy book synopsis international management of research and development brings together the most influential contributions to managing organising and coordinating r d and innovation on a global scale in addition to papers on the fundamental principles trends and drivers of international r d it covers strategies and operations of global r d it also provides an introduction to modern concepts such as knowledge networks open innovation and virtual innovation it is a key reference collection for professors researchers and practitioners

joint risk preference technology estimation with a primal system applied studies of the firm in a risky environment have concentrated either on the firm s technology or on its risk preferences these models result in generally inconsistent and inefficient parameter estimates a primal model is proposed which allows a firm s preferences and technology to be estimated jointly in the presence of risk the model is applied to iowa corn production and estimated technology parameters are compared with those from other approaches modest risk aversion leads to inelastic even backbending per acre supplies and input demands yield heteroskedasticity in inputs leads to supply heteroskedasticity in prices especially for risk neutral firms

do short term objectives lead to under or overinvestment in long term projects we examine managerial investment decisions in the presence of imperfect information and short term managerial objectives prior research has argued that such an environment induces managers to underinvest in long run projects we show that short term objectives and imperfect information may also lead to overinvestment and we identify how the direction of the distortion depends upon the type of informational imperfection present when investors cannot observe the level of investment in the long run project suboptimal investment will be induced when investors can observe investment but not its productivity however overinvestment will occur there has been in recent years substantial public debate on the question of whether the long run investment decisions of the managers of publicly traded companies may be distorted by market pressures recent work by economists has tried to identify the potential source and nature of such distortions research has naturally focused on situations that are characterized by i short term managerial objectives the managers are concerned not only with the firm s long run stock price but also with the firm s short run stock price due to incentive schemes or the fear of losing control and ii imperfect information the market has less information than the firm s managers about the firm s long run projects the results of this research have indicated that in some situations short term objectives and imperfect information may lead to underinvestment in long run projects this paper seeks to extend prior work on the effects of short term objectives and imperfect information on long run investment decisions we demonstrate that imperfect information together with an emphasis on a firm s short run valuation may lead not only to underinvestment but also to overinvestment in long run projects the direction of the distortion depends

little innovation many jobs an econometric analysis of the italian labour productivity crisis during the past twenty years italy has realized changes in labour legislation leading to a decentralization of wage bargaining and increased flexibility in labour relations both these factors have helped to curb wage growth and to enhance employment growth but have also led to a crisis in italian labour productivity growth our estimates among 3 000 firms show that firms with high shares of flexible workers a high labour turnover and lower costs of labour relative to capital experienced significantly lower rates of labour productivity growth our findings raise doubts about the mainstream call for flexibilisation of european labour markets we argue hat the italian shift towards a low productive and labour intensive growth path is problematic gainst the background of an ageing population

the bright and dark side of staging investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns we believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship we find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry however staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely

diminishing marginal utility of wealth and calibration of risk in agriculture expected utility theory eut has dominated the agricultural economics literature on behavior under risk particularly since the late 1970s in eut risk preferences are completely defined by the curvature of the utility function an expected utility maximizer with a concave utility curve would avoid choices that represent a greater wealth risk estimates of risk aversion coefficients based on assumed utility functional forms have been valued in predicting producers responses to proposed policy see saha shumway and talpaz for a review yet these estimates are biased if there are omitted variables such as knowledge understanding and managerial expertise that are related to the probability distribution of profit if the production function is jointly estimated with the utility function then the riskincreasing or risk reducing properties of production inputs may also wrongly be ascribed to the concavity of the utility function since allais substantial evidence has been accumulated to suggest systematic flaws in eut mostly in experimental settings with small stakes applied economists have regarded these violations as exceptions due to the special circumstances surrounding their observation recently rabin showed that attributing all risk behavior in small gambles solely to diminishing marginal utility of wealth leads to improbable levels of risk aversion his calibration theorem based on dichotomous choices suggests that a person who turns down a lottery with a 0 5 probability of winning 125 and 0 5 probability of losing 100 will always turn down any bet with a 0 5 chance of losing 600 no matter how large of a gain may be had with the remaining 0 5 probability we generalize rabin s work to continuous payoff distributions and continuous choice problems to show that his criticism extends to realistic risky situations the concavity problem is not limited to small money risks rather when risky choices have similar average payouts utility functions must display ridiculous levels of concavity to predict individual choices below we present our general calibration problem and apply the results to an empirical risk study in agricultural economics to illustrate the unintended consequences of using eut to explain risk response

job security provisions and employment european countries have enacted various job security provisions over the last 30 years employers are required to pay workers on separation or to give advance notice of termination in anything less than a perfectly functioning market there are effects of the provisions on employment incumbents are more likely to retain their jobs but new workers are less likely to be hired an examination of the european data suggests that severance pay requirements reduce employment

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

corporate takeovers the efficiency arguments in recent years the tender offer takeover has been praised and damned with a ferocity suggesting that the survival of capitalism is at stake the truth as in most disputes with substantial metaphysical content is more prosaic some takeovers enhance economic efficiency some degrade it and the balance of effects though not fully known is most likely a close one in this essay i try to lay bare the debate s foundations and bring it back to earth with an injection of evidence

the political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry a similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the new economics of institutions the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity in this survey the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined in addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or where there are answers no strong evidence in support of them this essay then in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics

nonstructural risk attitude estimation this paper presents an econometric approach to risk attitude estimation that does not require joint estimation of the structure of the firm s technology and input decision rules the nonstructural approach replaces optimal input choice with the assumption that farmers optimally manage their portfolios of productive activities by thus shifting the focus from the detailed production decisions of the farm manager to the net returns of the whole farm operation the modeling problem is simplified the nonstructural approach is used to estimate risk attitudes in three indian villages the results are compared to previous experimental and econometric estimates from the same villages

asset specificity and the political behavior of firms lobbying for subsidies in norway previous research into endogenous trade policy has described extensively the political incentives of firms with specific assets but no studies have shown directly that firms behave as predicted we adopt insights from transaction costs economics to develop measures of asset specificity and to investigate how variation in these measures affects the political behavior of firms in particular we examine the lobbying choices of norwegian firms in the 1980s given available subsidy funds from norway s oil boom and some government decisions in the 1970s firms with more specific assets faced potentially greater losses from adjusting to new activities in the face of competitive pressures and thus had greater incentives to lobby for subsidies to protect themselves joint contacting of parliament and government on behalf of firm interests by representatives of both management and labor should be particularly likely where firms had specific assets data analysis shows that asset specificity as indicated by r d intensity and job immobility predicts joint contacting independently of plausible alternative explanatory variables like firm size and export orientation

empirical estimation and use of risk preferences an appraisal of estimation methods that use actual economic decisions the topic addressed in this paper concerns the conceptual basis estimation procedures and resources required for implementation of methods for estimating risk preferences by observing behavior an attempt is made to review and appraise previous literature as well as to explore some alternative approaches to begin it is important to contrast four general types of empirical settings of interest these are micro farm level macro market or other aggregations descriptive positivistic and prescriptive normative studies the prescriptive or conditionally normative studies seemingly have dominated agricultural economic studies of risk these generally have been micro in nature and have focused on

is labour market flexibility harmful to innovation in a neoclassical framework one can argue that unemployment can be reduced by means of institutional changes that allow for a better working of the labour market and notably by achieving downward wage flexibility i argue that although various policy recommendations about removing labour market rigidities are indeed advantageous in the short trun they are detrimental from a schumpeterian perspective since they discourage product and process innovation reduced innovation efforts will in turn weaken the supply side strength of an economy the paper explores the implications of schumpeter s notion of creative destruction and of schmookler s hypothesis of demand pulled innovations borrowing from recent empirical innovation research

the significance of sell off profitability in explaining the market reaction to divestiture announcements abstract previous research on asset sales has emphasized the divestment motivation and the use of the proceeds from the sale as determinants of selling firm value gains in contrast this paper explores the extent to which the relevant information necessary to evaluate sell offs is embodied in the profitability of the sale i e the price received by the seller over the value in use of the divested assets where the latter is a function of past operating earnings and book value our empirical results show that sell off profitability is substantially more significant in explaining the market reaction to divestiture announcements than the previous literature has suggested we provide strong evidence of a positive relation between selling firm abnormal returns during sell off announcements and profit on the sale which remains significant after controlling for the motivation behind the sell off the use of the proceeds from the sale and the presence of agency costs of managerial discretion we conclude that sell off profitability explains a major portion of selling firm abnormal returns and is one of the most significant determinants of the market reaction to divestiture announcements

why hang on to losers divestitures and takeovers we study the divestiture decisions of managers who care about their reputations managers divestiture and investment decisions are publicly observable but managers privately observe signals with respect to the future payoff distribution of investments they have initiated we establish that in equilibrium there is too little divestiture these inefficiencies create the opportunity for wealth enhancing divestiture motivated takeovers a key result is that only managers of targets with middle of the road asset specificity should consider the takeover threat credible these findings suggest that uniqueness of assets is an important determinant of both agency costs and takeover activity our analysis leads to several empirical predictions overwhelming empirical evidence has documented large gains in shareholder wealth that arise from takeovers jarrell brickley and netter 1988 and jensen and ruback 1983 the source of these gains has remained elusive however although takeovers are followed by some infusion of new managerial talent we have not witnessed the kind of profound post takeover restructuring of the productive activities of target firms that would readily justify the documented wealth gains a commonly observed post takeover initiative is divestiture of some of the target s lines of business bhide 1989 and bhagat shleifer and vishny 1990 what is puzzling is that if the gains from takeovers stem from the anticipation of such divestitures then why were these divestitures not undertaken by the target firm s management in the first place the purpose of this paper is to provide a possible answer to this question our focus is on the divergence in incentives between managers and shareholders with respect to divestitures of ongoing projects we show that managers might rationally decide to hang on to projects that should be divested in

welfare improving employment protection this paper derives new results on the welfare effects of employment protection using data from 17 oecd countries we show that there exists an inverse u shape relationship between employment protection and economic growth using a simple theoretical model with non contractible specific investments we show that over some range increasing employment protection does indeed raise welfare we also show that the optimal level of employment protection depends on other labour market features such as the bargaining power of workers and the existence of wage rigidities like the minimum wage

dynamic decisions under risk application of ito stochastic control in agriculture in agricultural economics most studies of dynamic decisions under risk have been empirical with less emphasis on theory in finance resource economics and general economics however ito stochastic control is popular for theoretical work optimal decisions can be characterized using the powerful ito stochastic calculus this paper describes the assumptions and methods of ito control constructs a dynamic model of agricultural decisions under risk and illustrates with four examples

alternative mechanisms for corporate control we examine performance and management characteristics of fortune 500 firms experiencing one of three types of control change internally precipitated management turnover hostile takeover and friendly takeover we find that firms experiencing internally precipitated management turnover perform poorly relative to other firms in their industries but are not concentrated in poorly performing industries in contrast targets of hostile takeovers are concentrated in troubled industries there is also weaker evidence that hostile takeover targets underperform their industry peers we interpret this evidence as consistent with the idea that the board of directors is capable of firing managers whose leadership leads to poor performance relative to industry but that an external challenge in the form of a hostile takeover is often required when the whole industry is in decline the evidence also indicates that firms run by a member of the founding family are less likely to experience either internally precipitated top management turnover or a hostile takeover on the other hand firms whose top management team is dominated by a single relatively young top executive while lacking in internal discipline are more likely to experience a hostile takeover this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth sell off activities arise when a firm sells part of its assets e g a segment a division etc but continues to exist in essentially the same form this study investigates the effect of voluntary sell offs on stock returns from a sample of over 1000 sell off events first public announcements the evidence shows that both sellers and buyers earn significant positive excess returns from these transactions the excess returns earned by buyers are smaller than those earned by sellers there is also evidence that sell off announcements are preceded by a period of significant negative returns for the sellers which suggests that the sellers on average performed poorly prior to their sell off activities substantial research has been undertaken in recent years on mergers acquisitions tender offers capital structure changes and other financial planning topics this research has considerably expanded our knowledge about the association of these decisions with the welfare of the stockholders involved in these transactions selling a portion of the firm s assets is another important financial planning decision 2 this paper investigates the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth a sell off is defined as selling part of a firm s assets e g a segment a division etc while the firm continues to exist in essentially the same form as that prior to the sell off this study does not examine the effects of involuntary ordered by the government sell offs and other similar activities such as spin offs leveraged buy outs liquidations reorganizations etc 3