why you can t find a taxi in the rain and other labor supply lessons from cab drivers i replicate and extend the seminal work of camerer et al labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time quarterly journal of economics 112 1997 407 441 who find that the wage elasticity of daily hours of work for new york city taxi drivers is negative and conclude that their labor supply behavior is consistent with reference dependence in contrast my analysis of the complete record of all trips taken in nyc taxi cabs from 2009 to 2013 shows that drivers tend to respond positively to unanticipated as well as anticipated increases in earnings opportunities additionally using a discrete choice stopping model the probability of a shift ending is strongly positively related to hours worked but at best weakly related to income earned i find substantial heterogeneity across drivers in their elasticities but the estimated elasticities are generally positive and rarely substantially negative i find that new drivers with smaller elasticities are more likely to exit the industry whereas drivers who remain quickly learn to be better optimizers have positive labor supply elasticities that grow with experience these results are consistent with the neoclassical optimizing model of labor supply and suggest that consideration of gain loss utility and income reference dependence is not an important factor in the daily labor supply decisions of taxi drivers jel codes d01 d03 j22

behavioral contract theory abstract this review provides a critical survey of psychology and economics behavioral economics research in contract theory first i introduce the theories of individual decision making most

information school choice and academic achievement evidence from two experiments we examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower income families in a public school choice plan receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher performing schools parents with high scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores using random variation from each experiment we find that attending a higher scoring school increases student test scores the results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose

the role of application assistance and information in college decisions results from the h r block fafsa experiment growing concerns about low awareness and take up rates for government support programs like college financial aid have spurred calls to simplify the application process and enhance visibility we present results from a randomized field experiment in which low income individuals receiving tax preparation help were also offered immediate assistance and a streamlined process to complete the free application for federal student aid fafsa for themselves or their children treated participants were also provided with aid estimates that were compared against tuition cost amounts for nearby colleges the combined assistance and information treatment substantially increased fafsa submissions and ultimately the likelihood of college attendance persistence and aid receipt in particular high school seniors whose parents received the treatment were 8 percentage points more likely to have completed two years of college going from 28 to 36 during the first three years following the experiment families who received aid information but no assistance with the fafsa did not experience improved outcomes the findings suggest many other opportunities for using personal assistance to increase participation in programs that require filling out forms to become eligible jel codes i2 h4 j24 copyright 2012 oxford university press

the welfare implications of moral hazard and adverse selection in competitive insurance markets i model a competitive insurance market with both moral hazard and adverse selection and analyze the effect on welfare when both problems are present simultaneously an examination of the interaction between these two problems leads to two hypotheses first the nature of the equilibrium contracts is such that each problem partially offsets the welfare loss associated with the other and second the degree to which this occurs increases as agents become more heterogeneous simulation results overwhelmingly support both hypotheses

are ghettos good or bad spatial separation of racial and ethnic groups may theoretically have positive or negative effects on the economic performance of those groups we examine the effects of segregation on outcomes for blacks in schooling employment and single parenthood we find that blacks in more segregated areas have significantly worse outcomes than blacks in less segregated areas we control for the endogeneity of location choice using instruments based on political factors topographical features and residence before adulthood a one standard deviation decrease in segregation would eliminate one third of the black white differences in most of our outcomes

does asymmetric information matter in the early insurance market evidence from the auto insurance market in the late 1960s the performance of automobile insurance declined dramatically in japan in spite of rapid growth in the diffusion rate and the premiums were sharply raised several times in order to improve the situation this observation indicates the possible presence of adverse selection death spiral and provides an ideal situation for assessing informational asymmetry using bodily injury liability bil insurance data from 46 japanese prefectures over the period 1966 to 1975 this article tests two hypotheses of adverse selection i high risk drivers were more likely to join the bil insurance market and ii sharp premium increases drove low risk policyholders away various empirical analyses show that there is little evidence for either type of adverse selection we also test whether a risk misperception hypothesis can explain our results and find some evidence that the population density have a significantly positive impact on the demand for bil insurance an earlier version of this artic

adverse selection repeated insurance contracts and announcement strategy in this note we present a strategy which relies on multi period contracts and on a self selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection

job search and hyperbolic discounting structural estimation and policy evaluation this paper estimates the structural parameters of a job search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search effort it estimates quantitatively the degree of hyperbolic discounting and assesses its implications for the impact of various policy interventions aimed at reducing unemployment the model is estimated using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy the likelihood function explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic programming solution to the model both observed and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for the results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting especially for low and medium wage workers the structural estimates are also used to evaluate alternative policy interventions for the unemployed estimates based on a model with exponential discounting may lead to biased inference on the economic impact of policies jel c6 c73 d90 j64 j68

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

the illusory effects of saving incentives on saving the authors evaluate research on how tax based saving incentives iras and 401 k s affect saving previous research overstates the impact of the incentives on saving by failing to account for several issues households with saving incentives have stronger tastes for saving than others saving incentives have interacted with debt nonfinancial assets financial markets and pensions and saving incentives represent pretax balances whereas taxable accounts represent posttax balances accounting for these issues essentially eliminates the impact of saving incentives on saving the authors conclude that little if any of the contributions to existing saving incentives have raised saving

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

how retirement saving programs increase saving this paper summarizes the authors work on the effect of ira and 401 k contributions on net personal saving they consider many different nonparametric approaches to controlling for heterogeneity in individual saving behavior and conclude that the weight of the available evidence suggests that contributions to both iras and 401 k s largely represent new saving the authors devote particular attention to reconciling their results with the findings in other studies that reach different conclusions sometimes using the same databases that the authors analyze methodological limitations that undermine the reliability of results in other studies explain many of these disparities

bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply how can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention i derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand the size of the price change and the degree of frictions the degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum the bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities i apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1 of earnings as a result small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities extensive and intensive margin elasticities and other disparate findings pooling estimates from existing studies i estimate a hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0 33 on the intensive margin and 0 25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

tying life insurance and savings decisions a multiperiod expected utility approach abstract many whole life insurance contracts provide in addition to protection in case of death of the insured also a savings element the main purpose of this article is to provide an economic rationale for this practice two alternative models are offered in both models it is assumed that there is an asymmetry of information between the insurers and insureds where the know better their probability of death and hence adverse selection may cause a market failure it is shown that by offering several deliberately designed contracts tying savings and insurance the insurers can induce the insureds to self select that is insureds with higher probability of death will voluntarily choose different contracts than those with a lower probability of death and hence will reveal their probability of death to the insurers the problem of adverse selection is thus overcome in the first model contracts differ in the amount of insurance they specify and the amount of savings tied with insurance in the second model a multiperiod actually two period contract and a single period contract are offered the multiperiod contract specifies a savings element which will be received by the insured if he or she lives at the end of the second period it is shown that by the right choice of the return on the savings part insureds with lower probabilities of death will choose the multiperiod contract whereas insureds with higher probability of death will prefer two successive single period contracts again self selection is achieved these two models show that tie in arrangements of savings and insurance may help overcome the adverse selection problem and hence an economic rationale is provided for their existence the paper also examines the demand for life insurance and savings the sensitivity of the demand for these products to variations in key parameters is analyzed the differences between the sensitivity analyses results obtained when insurance and savings decisions are made separately and those obtained when these decisions are simultaneosly made are highlighted and explained

using differences in knowledge across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the eitc on earnings we develop a new method of estimating the impacts of tax policies that uses areas with little knowledge about the policy s marginal incentives as counterfactuals for behavior in the absence of the policy we apply this method to characterize the impacts of the earned income tax credit eitc on earnings using administrative tax records covering all eitc eligible lers from 19962009 we begin by developing a proxy for local knowledge about the eitc schedule the degree of sharp bunching at the exact income level that maximizes eitc refunds by individuals who report self employment income the degree of self employed sharp bunching varies signi cantly

retirement security in an aging population abstract elderly individuals exhibit wide disparities in their sources of income for those in the bottom half of the income distribution social security is the most important source of support program changes would directly affect their well being income from private pensions assets and earnings are relatively more important for higher income elderly individuals who have more diverse income sources the trend from private sector defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans has shifted responsibility for retirement security to individuals a significant subset of the population is unlikely to be able to sustain their standard of living in retirement without higher pre retirement saving

information spillovers margins scale and scope with an application to canadian life insurance a model of the production of life insurance services is developed the focus is on price setting ability and the cost advantages from size and diversity the model characterizes insurers decisions on the face value and number of policies and the number of insurance lines the model is applied to canadian life insurance firms unit revenue cost margins average from 13 per cent to 40 per cent across lines of insurance these margins emanate from information spillovers generated by marketing activities cost advantages due to size are small but are substantial from diversity returns to scale average from 1 13 to 1 40 while returns to scope from offering multiple insurance lines average from 70 per cent to 100 per cent

asymmetric information and learning evidence from the automobile insurance market this paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models using data from the automobile insurance market i find that in contrast to what recent research suggests the evidence is consistent w

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

the effects of exposure to better neighborhoods on children new evidence from the moving to opportunity experiment the moving to opportunity mto experiment offered randomly selected families housing vouchers to move from high poverty housing projects to lower poverty neighborhoods we analyze mto s impacts on children s long term outcomes using tax data we find that moving to a lower poverty neighborhood when young before age 13 increases college attendance and earnings and reduces single parenthood rates moving as an adolescent has slightly negative impacts perhaps because of disruption effects the decline in the gains from moving with the age when children move suggests that the duration of exposure to better environments during childhood is an important determinant of children s long term outcomes jel i31 i38 j13 r23 r38

site selection bias in program evaluation site selection bias can occur when the probability that a program is adopted or evaluated is correlated with its impacts i test for site selection bias in the context of the opower energy conservation programs using 111 randomized control trials involving 8 6 million households across the united states predictions based on rich microdata from the first 10 replications substantially overstate efficacy in the next 101 sites several mechanisms caused this positive selection for example utilities in more environmentalist areas are more likely to adopt the program and their customers are more responsive to the treatment also because utilities initially target treatment at higher usage consumer subpopulations efficacy drops as the program is later expanded the results illustrate how program evaluations can still give systematically biased out of sample predictions even after many replications jel codes c93 d12 l94 o12 q41

pricing in microinsurance markets summary microinsurance markets have exhibited strong growth rates in recent years great parts of the industry are however challenged by fundamental issues of providing insurance products one of the most significant of which is pricing risk in this paper we provide a nontechnical analysis of insurance pricing problems and a review of the set of opportunities that can address some of the specific pricing constraints in microinsurance markets a key contribution of this paper is the investigation of conventional techniques as potential solutions for improving the pricing of insurance risk in microinsurance markets

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

insurance consumption and saving a dynamic analysis in continuous time this paper shows how the demand for non life insurance interacts with consumption and saving the analysis is set in continuous time using the maximum principle when insurance is actuarially fair the insurance and consumption decisions are separable with loaded premiums and alternatively without insurance optimal consumption is dynamically related to the growth rate of the loss probability and a growing loss probability generates precautionary saving with loaded premiums less than full insurance is demanded at each instant and optimal cover varies over time whether or not the loss probability is constant

behavioral economics and public policy a pragmatic perspective the debate about behavioral economics the incorporation of insights from psychology into economics is often framed as a question about the foundational assumptions of economic models this paper presents a more pragmatic perspective on behavioral economics that focuses on its value for improving empirical predictions and policy decisions i discuss three ways in which behavioral economics can contribute to public policy by oering new policy tools improving predictions about the eects

market potential and economic development with non homotheticity abstract we investigate the relationship between gdp per capita trade costs demand and income inequality between 1996 and 2011 specifically we apply the aggregate aids based gravity model as developed in fajgelbaum and khandelwal 2016 to a panel of 40 countries to generate a new measure of market potential we then relate this measure of market potential to country level gdp per capita finding a significant positive relationship which performs better than ces based measures of market potential the aids model allows for non homotheticities in demand and the possibility that nations produce goods with higher or lower income elasticities income inequality and gdp per capita of trade partners matter for domestic incomes but interact with these elasticities our paper shows that ldcs that export products with low income elasticities like india and china rank much lower in market potential than in a ces or a translog specification

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

active vs passive decisions and crowd out in retirement savings accounts evidence from denmark using 41 million observations on savings for the population of denmark we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice subsidies for retirement accounts which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts we estimate that each 1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent in contrast policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts increase wealth accumulation substantially we estimate that approximately 15 of individuals are active savers who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts 85 of individuals are passive savers who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated we conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons i subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond ii they generate substantial crowd out conditional on response and iii they do not increase the savings of passive individuals who are least prepared for retirement jel codes h2 h3

consumer lock in with asymmetric information abstract a two period version of the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of competitive screening in an insurance market is presented its features include repeat purchase of insurance among consumers no commitment among insurers or consumers asymmetric information among insurers about a consumer s accident history and state contingent contracts an equilibrium may exist in this model with full pooling in period one and consumer lock in in period two in such an equilibrium high risk consumers are experience rated and firms earn negative profits in period one and positive profits in period two

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

consumption versus expenditure previous authors have documented a dramatic decline in food expenditures at the time of retirement we show that this is matched by an equally dramatic rise in time spent shopping for and preparing meals using a novel data set that collects detailed food diaries for a large cross section of u s households we show that neither the quality nor the quantity of food intake deteriorates with retirement status we also show that unemployed households experience a decline in food expenditure and food consumption commensurate with the impact of job displacement on permanent income these results highlight how direct measures of consumption distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated shocks to income whereas measures of expenditures obscure the distinction

optimal defaults and active decisions defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions we identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves we study such active decisions in the context of 401 k saving we find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401 k enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt in enrollment procedure producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment we also present a model of 401 k enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment i e default enrollment standard enrollment i e default non enrollment or active decisions i e no default and compulsory choice active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous financial illiteracy however favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment