can foreign aid reduce income inequality and poverty this paper s goal is to examine the effect of foreign aid on income inequality and poverty reduction for the period 1971 2002 since simple cross country regressions cannot be taken as true time series findings we focus on dynamic panel data techniques which allow accounting for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems we find some weak evidence that foreign aid is conducive to the improvement of the distribution of income when the quality of institutions is taken into account however this result is not robust this finding is consistent with recent empirical research on aid ineffectiveness in achieving economic growth or promoting democratic institutions

the millennium challenge corporation organizational constraints on us foreign aid 2004 11 summary the millennium challenge corporation mcc was established in 2004 to channel billions of us foreign assistance dollars to various infrastructure projects within a select group of low income countries that could presumably help themselves when ruling justly investing in people and encouraging economic freedom were considered primary contributors to self sustaining economic growth through multi method analysis this study reveals that with its choice of assessment categories and accompanying indicators the mcc undermines its governing principles in aid candidate qualification

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

is corporate aid targeted to poor and deserving countries a case study of nestle s aid allocation summary empirical evidence on the targeting of private aid is largely lacking even though corporate donors are an increasingly important source of aid we contribute to closing this gap by performing a case study of nestle the allocation of nestle s aid is compared to that of swiss oda and ngo aid testing for both altruistic and selfish aid motivations we conclude that nestle s aid clearly lacks focus in terms of targeting poor countries which appears to be the downside of the strong link between commercial presence and aid moreover according to our tobit estimations nestle grants more aid to recipient countries with stronger democratic but also more corrupt institutions

catalyzing aid the imf and donor behavior in aid allocation the international monetary fund imf has often asserted that its programs encourage aid by signaling policy credibility commonly referred to as aid catalysis our study investigates this claim for sector specific aid and for bilateral and multilateral donors using data on 136 recipient countries for the 1986 2009 period we employ a two part quantitative model to match the donor decision making process consisting of a first stage recipient selection equation and a second stage allocation equation on selected recipients we find strong support that imf programs catalyze aid on aggregate but the evidence varies across different types of aid aid catalysis is stronger and more robust in sectors linked to the imf s core competency areas namely debt related relief and general budget support but weaker and less robust for infrastructure production multisector and humanitarian aid and non existent for health and education across donors imf programs are associated with increases in aid by countries with larger voting shares in the imf such as the united states and japan but less so by countries with few votes or for multilateral agencies this finding is consistent with research in international political economy arguing that the imf s powerful stakeholders drive the organization s decisions and policies taken together our findings emphasize the imf s multi dimensional impact on the global development agenda an erstwhile overlooked factor in studies of aid allocation while refuting the purported positive effects of imf programs on aid for social policy

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

does conditionality work a test for an innovative us aid scheme performance based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries however hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms we attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the millennium challenge corporation mcc was successful in promoting better control of corruption we employ a difference in difference in differences ddd approach considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized we find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the mcc while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of mcc aid appears to have weakened the incentive to fight corruption over time

foreign aid an instrument for fighting communism abstract in this paper we test the argument that the sizeable reduction in aggregate aid levels in the 1990s was due to the end of the cold war we test two different models using a dynamic econometric specification on a panel of 17 donor countries spanning the years 1970 97 we find aid to be positively related to military expenditures in the former eastern bloc during the cold war but not in the 1990s suggesting that the reductions in aid disbursements are driven by the disappearance of an important motive for aid we also study the effect on aid allocation but here we do not find any robust effects of the end of the cold war

motivations for aid to developing countries abstract this paper attempts to identify the underlying principles of aid allocation and particularly the balance of motivations as between the needs of recipient countries and the interests of donor countries two alternative models are fitted by cross country regressions to bilateral and multilateral aid flows to some 80 developing countries in 1969 1970 and 1978 1980 the first recipient need model assumes that all aid is given to compensate for shortfalls in domestic resources this model provides a reasonable explanation for the distribution of multilateral aid but it is clearly not applicable for bilateral aid flows the second donor interest model assumes that all aid serves only donor interests defined to cover political security investment and trade interests this model gives generally good explanations of bilateral aid but is a poor fit for multilateral aid the relative importance of the various donor interests differs sharply among donors the paper ends with an analysis of the shift in the balance of aid over the 1970s towards the recipient need element and with a reference to the sharp change in policy in the 1980s towards increasing emphasis on donor interest aid

did high debts distort loan and grant allocation to ida countries summary we examine the allocation of net loans net transfers and grants to ida countries over the period 1982 2008 focusing on the role of debt and debt sustainability in the decisions of multilateral and bilateral donors we find no evidence of defensive lending but strong evidence of defensive granting a significant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio indeed characterizes the decisions of both multilateral and bilateral creditors the impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries is however accommodated through higher grants in addition to debt relief these findings are consistent with a substitution of grants for loans and with the new approach to debt sustainability but question the efficiency and selectivity of foreign aid

will markets direct investments under the kyoto protocol lessons from the activities implemented jointly pilots under the kyoto protocol countries can meet treaty obligations by investing in projects that reduce or sequester greenhouse gases elsewhere prior to ratification treaty participants agreed to launch country based pilot projects referred to collectively as activities implemented jointly aij to test novel aspects of the project related provisions relying on a ten year history of projects we investigate the determinants of aij investment our findings suggest that review agency preferences related to national political objectives and possibly deeper cultural ties influenced project selection and limited the number of aij projects bilateral ties also appear to have affected investment decisions directly possibly because of related transaction costs the results suggest an investment process different from the assumptions that underlie well known estimates of cost savings related to the protocol s flexibility mechanisms we conclude that if approaches developed under the aij programs to approve projects are retained the scale of investment under kyoto s flexibility provisions and their cost savings will be less than what is generally anticipated and the pattern of investment less driven by abatement costs

interest rates and currency prices in a two country world abstract this paper is a theoretical study of the determination of prices interest rates and currency exchange rates set in an infinitely lived two country world which is subject both to stochastic endowment shocks and to monetary instability formulas are obtained for pricing all equity claims nominally denominated bonds and currencies and these formulas are related to earlier closely related results in the theories of money finance international trade

the effect of foreign aid on corruption a quantile regression approach abstract this paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on corruption using a quantile regression method we show that foreign aid generally reduces corruption and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries moreover this effect is different by different donor countries

choosing to target what types of countries get different types of world bank projects well governed countries are more likely to make use of foreign aid for the purposes of economic development and poverty alleviation therefore if aid agencies are providing funds for the sake of development these countries should receive more aid and categorically different types of aid as compared with poorly governed countries in poorly governed countries aid should be given in forms that allow for less discretion using an original data set of all world bank projects from 1996 to 2002 the author distinguishes programmatic projects from investment projects and national from subnational investment projects if the world bank allows more discretion in well governed countries then it will choose to provide programmatic and national aid for these recipients the author presents evidence that the world bank provides a larger proportion of national investment lending in better governed countries with regard to programmatic lending he finds mixed evidence among counties eligible for international development association ida aid good governance surprisingly is associated with a lower proportion of programmatic aid whereas for international bank for reconstruction and development ibrd borrowers good governance is associated with a higher proportion the author subjects these results to a number of robustness checks although he confirms the existing result in the literature that the world bank provides larger overall amounts of aid to better governed countries his examination of the disaggregated data leads to questioning whether both lending wings of the world bank are designing aid programs in the most prodevelopment way possible

migration and foreign aid when it comes to linkages between migration and the global allocation of foreign development assistance the size of the immigrant population from a recipient country residing in a donor country is an important determinant of dyadic aid commitments two complementary hypotheses probe this relationship first donors use foreign aid to achieve their broader immigration goals targeting migrant sending areas to increase development and decrease the demand for entry into the donor country second migrants already residing in the donor country mobilize to lobby for additional aid for their homeland empirical tests on a large sample of country pairs made up of twenty two donors and more than 150 recipients over the period 1993 to 2008 show robust support for these hypotheses

the scope of imf conditionality international organizations are governed by two parallel sets of rules formal rules which embody consensual procedures and informal rules which allow exceptional access for powerful countries a new data set drawn from the imf s records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution s autonomy i find evidence of u s influence which operates to constrain condition ality but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the united states in ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances broad authority is delegated to the imf which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition the imf has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality international organizations have become increasingly important actors in inter national politics they have proliferated have expanded in membership have acquired new legal enforcement powers and have extended their reach into the details of domestic political economy in their member states af ew including the international monetary fund imf or simply the fund command significant resources and wield considerable authority some critics have argued that these international organizations are sufficiently autonomous to create a democratic def icit at the international level as they pursue a vision of undemocratic liberal ism 1 other critics have argued that international organizations are nothing more than instruments in the hands of powerful states 2 these critiques of course cannot simultaneously be true and both run into difficulties the puzzle that the rogue agency view cannot explain is why the principals have chosen to delegate so much authority in principal agent terms this view posits that both screening and monitoring have failed the principals are unable to select agents with preferences similar to their own and are unable

the leadership factor in african policy reform and growth in 1997 the world bank s two vice presidents for sub saharan africa attributed a significant improvement in africa s growth prospects to a new generation of leaders replacing their once largely statist and corrupt predecessors of 48 african leaders holding office on 1 january 1999 22 were in power a decade earlier and eight ten years before that examination of ten countries with focus on kenya and zambia raises the question why after these incumbents had created such an economic catastrophe were socio political structures unable to replace them with better leaders there are no clear answers the literature on the political economy of economic reform has tended to focus on interest group analysis with only a few studies according a major role to the emergence of individuals whose vision and initiative launch their countries onto paths of rapid growth promoting reform in africa encounters many difficulties yet there is increasing evidence that action by national leaders to raise agricultural production and promote the export of labor intensive manufactures would greatly enhance the prospects for accelerated growth the paper urges other social scientists to help us learn more about how african social structures can create power bases for individuals with the vision to promote and sustain economic reform

corrupt governments do not receive more state to state aid governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non state actors abstract a core result of the aid allocation literature is that the quality of governance in recipient countries does not affect the amounts of foreign aid received donor countries may still give aid to poorly governed countries because of a dilemma they face those countries most in need typically also lack proper institutions this paper argues that donors try to resolve this dilemma by delivering aid through non state actors using aid shares as well as absolute amounts of aid allocated through state and non state channels and considering different dimensions of governance we provide evidence that bypassing governments via ngos and multilateral organizations is indeed a response to weak recipient state institutions the effect is stronger in aid sectors where donors can more easily switch between channels and weaker for higher levels of economic self interest among donors

the design of monetary and fiscal policy a global perspective abstract we study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies we show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities even under active policies that yield local determinacy we also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation we then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria we show that interest rate policies that respond to the output gap while potentially a source of significant inefficiencies may be effective in preventing multiple equilibria and costly oscillatory equilibrium dynamics

monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default abstract this paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt we apply a cash in advance model where the government does not have access to non distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt if the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined if instead money supply is controlled the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined

can the west save africa in the new millennium the western aid effort toward africa has surged due to writ ings by well known economists a celebrity mass advocacy campaign and decisions by western leaders to make africa a major foreign policy priority this survey contrasts the predominant transformational approach west comprehensively saves africa to occasional swings to a marginal approach west takes one small step at a time to help individual africans evaluation of one step at a time initiatives is generally easier than that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments although these have been oversold or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions we see two themes emerge from the literature survey 1 escalation as each successive western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results as judged at least by stylized facts since again the econometrics are shaky the response has been to try an even more ambitious effort and 2 the cycle of ideas rather than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas we see a cycle in aid ideas in many areas in africa with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience both escalation and cyclicality of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the transfor mational approach in contrast the marginal approach has had some successes in improving the well being of individual africans such as the dramatic fall in mortality

development paradigm failures over time the international development community has advocated various development paradigms but countries following these paradigms have often performed poorly we provide an explanation for this poor performance in our model the political leader of a developing country chooses a policy and whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner these choices affect domestic production and aid inflows production is high when productive capacity is high and when the policy is appropriate in the country specific circumstances and implemented honestly aid inflows are high when the policy is close to the paradigm in equilibrium countries with low productive capacity and high corruption resulting from weak political institutions follow the paradigm more closely hence our model suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail because they are primarily followed by countries that would fail anyway we provide empirical evidence in support of the main assumptions and results

fiscal risk in a monetary union diverse fiscal policies which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks can threaten price stability in a monetary union the fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit in equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits creating a crisis the crisis requires a policy response to restore lending we focus on two responses default and policy switching both of which must be designed to restore fiscal solvency under the assumption that agents know the policy response we show that default poses no risk to price stability but that policy switching does we simulate the model to quantify fiscal risk in the european monetary union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values we find that the probability of a fiscal crisis in greece and italy countries whose debt relative to gdp had strayed far above the 60 percent limit is positive but small however a small increase in debt can lead to a large increase in risk

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

the influence of political distortions on economic performance alberto alesina is the nathaniel ropes professor of political economy and chairman of the department of economics at harvard university in this interview he discusses with brian snowdon his views on several important contemporary issues including politics and the business cycle budget deficits currency unions the european union the size of nations economic growth inequality democracy foreign aid ethnic fractionalisation and the welfare state in the us and europe

debt relief and governance quality in developing countries summary in this paper we empirically discuss whether or not debt relief has been economically rational in the past 15 years from analyzing the determinants of debt relief our results suggest that governance quality did not play a role in the decision of creditor countries to forgive debt in the 1990s furthermore even the actual debt burden of highly indebted poor countries was not crucial in deciding whether or not debt forgiveness was granted rather debt relief followed a strong path dependence those countries whose debt had been forgiven in the first half of the 1990s were also granted debt forgiveness in the second half of the decade however this allocation pattern changed at the beginning of the 21st century when path dependence diminished and some dimensions of governance quality were taken into account by donor countries

pollution shadow economy and corruption theory and evidence abstract we study how the shadow economy affects pollution and how this effect depends on corruption levels in public administration production in the shadow economy allows firms to avoid environmental regulation policies a large informal sector may be accompanied by higher pollution levels our theoretical model predicts that controlling the levels of corruption can limit the effect of the shadow economy on pollution we use panel data covering the period from 1999 to 2005 in more than 100 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between the shadow economy and the levels of pollution are dependent on the levels of corruption our results hold when we control for the effects of other determinants of pollution time varying common shocks country fixed effects and various additional covariates

distortionary taxation debt and the price level this paper considers the nominal and real determinacy of equilibria under an exogenously specifi ed path of interest rates in an economy in which taxation is either lump sum or distortionary under lump sum taxation we confirm the well known finding that equilibria display nominal in determinacy if the primary surplus is exogenous endogenous under distortionary taxation this classification is no longer relevant nominal determinacy is always ensured since distortionary taxes establish a link between the allocation and the sequences of taxes and debt and hence the price level regardless of whether the primary surplus is exogenous or endogenous distortionary taxation however increases the scope for real indeterminacy as a general feature the real in determinacy of equilibria depends on the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies i e on the sequences of taxes debt and interest rates if for example fiscal policy runs a balanced budget the central bank should set the nominal interest rate in a way consistent with long run deflation in order to ensure real determinacy this finding is different from a balanced budget policy under lump sum taxes where no such qualification with respect to the interest rate needs to be made

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

can poor countries lobby for more us bilateral aid summary this article explores if countries can lobby the us government for the allocation of us bilateral foreign aid we consider an informational lobby model where lobbying has two effects first a direct effect by informing us policymakers about their countries needs second an indirect effect on policymakers by informing them about common interests in economic or geopolitical terms the lobbyist thus influences the decisions about the allocation of aid resources we estimate the effect of the recipient country s lobbying agents in obtaining foreign aid the econometric results show that lobbying positively affects the amount of bilateral aid received

remittances deteriorate governance abstract i use a natural experiment of oil price driven remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim countries to demonstrate that remittances deteriorate the quality of governance especially in countries with weak democratic institutions the results indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase in remittances raises corruption by 1 5 index points on a 6 point scale which is equivalent to a dollar 600 decrease in per capita gdp concomitantly remittances may enable governments to reduce their delivery of public services for example health care school enrollment the results suggest that political institutions may mediate the potentially beneficial socioeconomic effects of remittance inflows

central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem we study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate discretionary fiscal and monetary policy makers we show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers objectives are perfectly aligned otherwise an instrument problem exists when the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short sighted relative to the private sector excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy despite this property the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument

can foreign aid accelerate stabilization this paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization following alesina and drazen 1991 we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies since the delay is used to signal each faction s strength the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in the release of information we show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer foreign aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization but aid decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms

public trust and corruption perception disaster relief public trust in government and nongovernment organizations is essential to the public s willingness to donate and to support those organizations we measure public trust in disaster aid using people s perception of these organizations effectiveness in delivering aid relief to the victims of two recent major earthquakes in china based on the survey data collected in 2013 from about 2100 residents in hong kong we document the vulnerability of these residents trust perceptions in aid delivery we find that the sharp decline in trust perception is highly negatively correlated with their perception of corruption of local governments in china

the big push deja vu a review of jeffrey sachs s the end of poverty economic possibilities for our time jeffrey sachs s new book the end of poverty economic possibilities for our time penguin press new york 2005 advocates a big push featuring large increases in aid to finance a package of complementary investments in order to end world poverty these recommendations are remarkably similar to those first made in the 1950s and 1960s in development economics today as then the big push recommendation overlooks the unsolvable information and incentive problems facing any large scale planning exercise a more promising approach would be to design incentives for aid agents to implement interventions piecemeal whenever they deliver large benefits for the poor relative to costs

fiscal consequences of public corruption empirical evidence from state bond ratings empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention we empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the united states on state bond ratings which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt after controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt

the international foreign aid regime who gets foreign aid and how much this paper analyses the data on international foreign aid it examines the basic data on who gets foreign aid how much how aid dependent are the recipient countries and how the international foreign aid regime has evolved it is argued that the pattern of the flow of foreign aid suggests that aid provided has little relationship to human needs in developing and transitional countries

fluidity of regulation csr nexus the multinational corporate corruption example corporate social responsibility csr is a relatively undeveloped concept despite its increasing importance to corporations one difficulty is the possible inexactness of csr another is the apparent reluctance by regulatory authorities and policy makers to intervene in the area this is largely a result of inhibitions created by traditional approaches to company law with emphasis on shareholder protection and financial disclosure the consequence is the stultification of independent development of csr by tying social issues to financial performance this attitude might not be unconnected to the theoretical and practical challenges in justifying csr and defining its scope the underlying impediment is a factual and theoretical failure to distinguish instrumental and pure ethical csr this article demonstrates that ethical csr highlights the role of regulation and a principal stance is that regulation is neither incompatible nor irreconcilable with ethical csr the article argues that cognizance of the intrinsic moral justification of pure csr is required for delineating the scope of csr as well as for clarifying the desirability and extent of its regulation it argues that the dynamic history and visage of multinational corporate corruption illuminates the fluidity of the regulation csr relationship the current and widening backlash against transnational corporate corruption is arguably a demonstration of the position that regulation and csr are not mutually exclusive and absolute concepts this article submits that recognition and application of this ethical and instrumental csr distinction is fundamental to the development of csr and resolution of connected questions of regulation

did aid promote democracy in africa the role of technical assistance in africa s transitions did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in africa in the 1990s we argue that after the cold war donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats ability to use aid for patronage to remain in power autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections we test our theory with panel data for all sub saharan african countries while other factors played pivotal roles in africa s political liberalization we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of africa s democratization

predictability of aid do fickle donors undermine aid effectiveness aid recipients and donors alike frequently voice concerns about the lack of predictability of development aid the existing literature often treats predictability and volatility as closely related but this paper shows that they are conceptually and empirically distinct using two main data sources we demonstrate that contrary to common belief lack of predictability typically involves managing both aid shortfalls and windfalls and hampers aid management even in countries with stable implementation of macroeconomic policies although regression analysis of the sources of low predictability for a large panel picks up two indicators that could be seen as justifying unexpected revisions in aid disbursements a large unexplained residual remains for which we cannot identify a link between low predictability and aid effectiveness concerns by donors using detailed data from imf programmes we demonstrate the significant costs of low predictability of budget aid in relatively well performing recipient countries deviations of disbursed from expected budget aid of more than 1 of gdp on average are absorbed asymmetrically aid shortfalls lead to debt accumulation and cuts in investment spending whereas aid windfalls help reduce debt but also lead to additional government consumption lack of predictability thus shifts government spending from investment to consumption activities oya celasun and jan walliser

foreign aid fertility and human capital accumulation this paper analyses the effect of foreign aid on population growth and human capital accumulation consistent with empirical evidence from sub saharan africa the model shows that foreign aid can work against its stated goal of alleviating poverty and promoting growth humanitarian aid fosters population growth and adversely affects the recipients incentive to invest in human capital the analysis suggests that foreign aid may lock a recipient economy in a low equilibrium trap

aid delivery through non governmental organisations does the aid channel matter for the targeting of swedish aid this paper analyses whether aid channelled through non governmental organisations ngos is less affected by selfish donor motivations and better targeted to needy recipient countries than aid distributed by state agencies we employ tobit and probit models and make use of an exceptionally detailed database that allows an assessment of the allocation of swedish aid channelled through ngos in comparison to the allocation of swedish official aid our analysis provides mixed results on the one hand ngos appear to be altruistic as far as available indicators on political and commercial motivations of aid can tell on the other hand needs based targeting of aid by ngos turns out to be surprisingly weak gdp per capita of recipient countries shapes the allocation of official aid but not that of aid channelled through ngos the headcount of absolute poverty has a significantly positive effect on aid allocation but its impact is not particularly strong when ngos are involved overall the swedish case supports the sceptical view that ngos are not necessarily superior donors compared to state aid agencies

targeting aid to the needy and deserving nothing but promises by reallocating aid to where it is needed most and where a productive use is most likely donors could help alleviate poverty in developing countries the rhetoric of donors suggests that this insight has increasingly shaped the allocation of aid we assess the poverty and policy orientation of bilateral and multilateral aid in different ways in addition to presenting stylised facts based on bivariate correlations we apply a tobit model that captures both altruistic and selfish donor motives we find little evidence supporting the view that the targeting of aid has improved significantly most donors provide higher aid to relatively poor countries but so far the fight against poverty has not resulted in a stronger focus on needy recipients with favourable local conditions the estimation results reveal that the policy orientation of aid critically depends on how local conditions are measured in general however donors appear to be less policy oriented than poverty oriented the response of donors to changing institutional and policy conditions in recipient countries turns out to be fairly weak we reject the proposition that multilateral aid is clearly superior to bilateral aid in terms of rewarding poor countries with better policies and institutions

chaotic dynamics in a cash in advance economy abstract this paper introduces sufficient conditions for the existence of deterministic cycles and chaos in cash in advance models building on the earlier work of woodford 1994 chaotic equilibria are shown to be particularly likely in the cash in advance model because of a unique characteristic of such models a discontinuous derivative in the difference equation map at the satiation level of real balances the existence of a kink means that chaotic equilibria may exist without implausibly large curvatures in the utility function since a chaotic time series that makes use of the kink would sometimes exhibit zero nominal interest rates the paper also gives an example of chaos in which nominal interest rates remain strictly positive

donor policy rules and aid effectiveness abstract the present paper examines the macroeconomic impact of aid by introducing endogenous aid allocations into a neoclassical growth framework on this basis it is shown that donor policies can have important implications for the trajectory of recipients gdp per capita depending on specific donor policy choices aid disbursements may lead to faster transitional growth stagnation or cyclical growth moreover the analysis also suggests that donor policies may be part of the reason why foreign aid is not found to be uniformly effective in raising long run productivity across recipients

aid infrastructure and fdi assessing the transmission channel with a new index of infrastructure official development assistance oda and foreign direct investment fdi are widely perceived to be alternative means of supplementing domestic savings and promoting economic development in low and middle income countries however possible complementarities of aid and fdi have received limited attention so far it remains open to debate whether aid could render recipient countries more attractive to fdi by removing specific bottlenecks that prevent higher fdi inflows in particular we raise the hypothesis that aid specifically targeted at economic infrastructure helps developing countries attract higher fdi inflows through improving their endowment with infrastructure in transportation communication energy and finance by performing 3sls estimations we explicitly account for dependencies between three structural equations on the allocation of sector specific aid the determinants of infrastructure and the determinants of fdi we find strong and robust evidence that aid in infrastructure is effective in improving the recipient countries endowment with infrastructure in sharp contrast other aid is not effective in improving infrastructure infrastructure consistently proves to be an important determinant of developing countries attractiveness to fdi consequently only targeted aid promotes fdi indirectly through the infrastructure channel in addition aid in infrastructure has direct effects on fdi it appears that foreign investors anticipate longer term effects of aid on the country s endowment with infrastructure and expect aid financed infrastructure to serve them particularly well

25 years of aid allocation practice whither selectivity the 4p framework poverty population policy and proximity is introduced as a way of understanding a donor s aid allocation we use the two part model and examine the period 1982 2006 the results indicate that recent conclusions of increasing selectivity are misplaced for the seven major donors analyzed who together represent the majority of development aid indeed the effect of each of the commonly mentioned time trends selectivity the end of the cold war and the commencement of the global war on terror is much smaller than the role of donor heterogeneity which appears sizeable and entrenched

halving poverty by doubling aid is there reason for optimism this paper criticises the world bank as overly optimistic with respect to its ability to fine tune development aid and to focus it on countries with good policies rather than on countries with poor policies in order to raise its effectiveness it is shown that recipient regions showed very different patterns of aid inflows and economic growth in the past and that aid flows yielded the highest correlation to growth when their magnitudes shrank it is furthermore argued that categorising countries by quality of domestic policies is not only questionable at a given point of time especially in countries with failing governmental institutions and open borders as in many african countries it suffers also from incentive problems so that countries receiving more aid can become victims of changes in their domestic policies which are more permissive and etatist to the disadvantage of private agents the paper instead pleads for a shift to aid policies decoupled from country specifics and more oriented to fundamental beyond border problems of the well being of the poor an international endowment fund under supranational law should finance research and implementation of research findings related to common international goods as it was suggested by sachs concerning aids and tropical disease research

foreign aid and voting in international organizations evidence from the iwc i use a unique dispute between major aid donors in the international whaling commission iwc to investigate whether donor nations change their aid giving in response to changes in aid recipients voting behavior inside international organizations ios this relationship is difficult to pin down in most ios because agenda items constantly change and donor coalitions fluctuate with them i exploit the fact that the iwc has on the one hand seen two fixed aid donor blocs opposing each other for three decades over a single issue but has on the other hand seen rich variation in both membership and voting behavior of aid recipient countries using an identification strategy that relates changes in bilateral aid to within recipient variation in iwc voting bloc affiliation and fixed cross sectional variation in donors voting bloc the evidence suggests that japan rewards joining the pro whaling bloc and that countries who recently experienced aid reductions from the three big anti whaling donors the u s the u k and france are more likely to join the pro whaling bloc

sorting through global corruption determinants institutions and education matter not culture abstract identifying the robust determinants of corruption among cultural economic institutional and geographical factors has proven difficult from a policy perspective it is important to know whether inherent largely unchangeable attributes are responsible or if institutional and economic attributes are at work accounting for model uncertainty we use bayesian model averaging bma to analyze a comprehensive list of 36 potential corruption determinants across 123 countries covering 87 percent of the world population the bma methodology sorts through all 68 719 476 736 possible model combinations 2 36 in order to carve out the robust correlates we then take a step toward alleviating endogeneity concerns in an instrumental variable bma framework our results indicate that cultural factors are largely irrelevant whereas particular economic and institutional characteristics matter the rule of law emerges as the most persistent predictor with a posterior inclusion probability pip in the true model of 1 00 whereas we find strong evidence for government effectiveness pip of 0 88 urbanization 0 85 and the share of women in parliament 0 80 as meaningful determinants of lower corruption levels in developing countries the extent of primary schooling enters as a powerful factor with a pip of 1 00

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

hold your nose and vote corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy this paper analyzes how corruption alters policy decisions in democracy and examines whether this distortion can result in a long term persistence of corruption even when the voters are well informed and rational by applying a citizen candidate model of representative democracy the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private consumption altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions the outcome is a reduction in real public expenditure and if the median voter s demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic a reduction in taxes in this case some citizens benefit indirectly from corruption the paper also presents some empirical evidence that in democratic countries corruption results in lower tax revenue and proceeds to show that when this occurs citizens anticipating a shift in preferences in favor of public expenditure may support institutions that favor corruption this result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in democracy to some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system it also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community

exchange rate policy under sovereign default risk abstract we examine monetary policy options for a small open economy where sovereign default might occur due to intertemporal insolvency under interest rate policy and floating exchange rates the equilibrium is indetermined under a fixed exchange rate the equilibrium is uniquely determined and independent of sovereign default

are corruption indices a self fulfilling prophecy a social labeling perspective of corruption rankings of countries by perceived corruption have emerged over the past decade as leading indicators of governance and development designed to highlight countries that are known to be corrupt their objective is to encourage transparency and good governance high rankings on corruption it is argued will serve as a strong incentive for reform the practice of ranking and labeling countries corrupt however may have a perverse effect consistent with social labeling theory we argue that perceptual indices can encourage the loss of needed investment and thus contribute to higher rates of corruption within unfavorably ranked countries in effect corruption indices may inhibit foreign direct investment the effect of which is to encourage the status quo in terms of corruption ranking using an experimental study design we test the effects of country corruption rankings on the assessment of country investment desirability and find ranking exposure causes shifts in country investment desirability for 10 of 12 countries studied these findings suggest that corruption rankings which are based on perceptions of corruption may cause country isolation and a reduction in legitimate means of investment

what determines corruption international evidence from microdata this paper uses a microlevel data set from 49 countries to create a direct measure of corruption which portrays the extent of bribery as revealed by individuals who live in those countries in addition it investigates the determinants of being asked for a bribe at the individual level the results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery examples are gender income education marital status the city size the country s unemployment rate average education and the strength of the institutions in the country jel k4 d73 p16

aid dutch disease and manufacturing growth abstract we examine the effects of aid on the growth of manufacturing using a methodology that exploits the variation within countries and across manufacturing sectors and corrects for possible reverse causality we find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country s competitiveness as reflected in the lower relative growth rate of exportable industries we provide some evidence suggesting that the channel for these effects is the real exchange rate appreciation caused by aid inflows we conjecture that this may explain in part why it is hard to find robust evidence that foreign aid helps countries grow

the fiscal myth of the price level i examine the fiscal theory of the price level according to which non ricardian policy and predetermined nominal government debt fiscally determine prices i argue that the non ricardian policy

global horse trading imf loans for votes in the united nations security council we investigate whether temporary members of the united nations security council receive favorable treatment from the international monetary fund imf using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004 our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary security council membership and participation in imf programs even after accounting for economic political and country specific factors there is also evidence that security council membership reduces the number of conditions included in imf programs imf loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the fund can win favor with voting members of the security council

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

gradualism in aid and reforms abstract dynamic strategic interaction between an international donor and a recipient government is analyzed to review the efficacy of aid conditionality for governance reforms in ldcs it is shown that irrespective of whether the donor can fully commit to the aid program or not for maximal improvement in governance the aid should be disbursed in increments with each subsequent tranche being conditional on prior reforms demonstrating aid gradualism while the attraction of future aid incentivizes authorities to push through reforms these reforms in turn also make aid diversion less feasible further under full commitment the optimal aid package may involve offering scope for interim aid diversion to the elite for long term improvement in governance with such aid diversion being more likely to happen when the total aid budget is large with only partial commitment so that time consistency requires the donor to reconfigure aid in each round it is shown that a interim aid diversion is no longer viable and b both aid and reforms exhibit strong gradualism or what is known as the starting small and grow later principle in commitment models

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

foreign aid responses to political liberalization this paper analyzes the impact of political liberalization on receipt of foreign aid it distinguishes different types of donors facing different constraints in rewarding democratization with foreign aid notably bilateral donors the world bank and the european commission based on a sample of 174 recipient countries from 1995 to 2009 the paper jointly examines short term dynamics and long term effects of sustained liberalization except for the world bank donors react to regime change bilateral donors are found to reward political liberalization in the second year after transition

save the poor shoot some bankers bilateral or multilateral organizations control about 90 of official overseas development assistance oda much of which is wasted this note traces aid failure to the daisy chain of principal agent beneficiary relationships linking rich donors to aid bureaucrats to poor recipients waste results when aid middlemen un intentionally misdirect oda waste can be reduced by clarifying domestic goals for oda using fewer middlemen with greater intrinsic motivation empowering recipients and or replacing bureaucracy with markets

aid and growth what does the cross country evidence really show abstract we examine the effects of aid on growth in cross sectional and panel data after correcting for the possible bias that poorer or stronger growth may draw aid contributions to recipient co

aid growth and devolution summary this paper examines whether the degree of fiscal decentralization in aid receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness the decentralization theorem predicts that the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness since local decision makers are better informed about local needs thereby decentralization may also have reverse effects e g through coordination problems excessive regulation administrative costs and local capture we use panel data for up to 60 countries and find that aid contributes to economic growth in centralized developing economies whereas it is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries the cases of indonesia the philippines and uganda support our findings our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how the two development instruments foreign aid and decentralization interact

human rights treaty ratification of aid receiving countries this paper studies the decision to ratify human rights treaties hrt at the united nations we present new empirical evidence that sheds light on who raties when and why controlling for the quality of domestic human rights institutions high levels of predetermined hrt participation relative to other aid recipients has a signicant positive eect on a country s foreign aid receipts suggesting that aid donors use treaty participation as a criterion to allocate foreign aid surprisingly though we nd that high levels of hrt participation precipitates a decline in the quality of domestic human rights institutions taken together with the result that donors reward treaty participation with foreign aid this suggests that using foreign aid as an incentive for treaty participation has indirect negative consequences for real human rights inconsistent with the traditional view that aid donors have a positive preference for human rights practices in developing countries we show however that the treaty participation of other aid recipients has a strong and positive eect on domestic human rights institutions that more than osets the negative eects

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

aiding violence or peace the impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub saharan africa abstract this paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict we improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using gdp levels of donor countries as instruments a more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing the literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models thereby forcing unlikely i i d structures on the error terms implicitly 1 as a consequence malfunctioning institutions deep rooted political grievances or any other obvious yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away we find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue the continuation probability such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration we do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start the onset probability

a typology of political conditionality beyond aid conceptual horizons based on lessons from the european union summary this paper asks how political conditionality needs to be conceptualized and researched to reflect global changes it argues that a diversification of political conditionality beyond aid is now taking place political conditionality reaches across different external policy fields and includes cooperative and punitive measures it has also moved from political rights toward social and environmental rights to capture this diversification conceptually the article presents an ideal typical typology that is then refined based on the example of the european union eu a review of the literature on eu political conditionality reveals a gap in studying the interaction of different political conditionality instruments