cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

the optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents tournaments are widely used in organizations explicitly or implicitly to reward the best performing employees for example by promotion or bonuses and or to penalize the worst performing employees for example by demotion withholding bonuses or unfavorable job assignments these incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees relative performance while the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents we show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity under a wide range of conditions loser prize tournaments that is tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers are optimal for the firm the reason is that low ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments as compared to winner prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints jel m52 j33 j24

the technical efficiency of large bank production abstract significant difficulties in commercial banking in the late 1980s raise questions about bank performance and efficiency with the use of data envelopment analysis dea we consider the relative technical efficiency of 201 large banks from 1984 to 1990 bank technical inefficiency averages just over 5 percent much lower than found in existing estimates larger and more profitable banks have higher levels of technical efficiency at the same time however larger banks are more likely to operate under decreasing returns to scale

rank order contracts for a principal with many agents for a principal with many agents rank order contracts remain incentive compatible even when information about agents performance is known only to the principal because the total payment from the principal to all agents taken together is independent of the outcome that occurs under wider conditions than those considered previously in the literature there is shown to exist a rank order contract equivalent exactly or approximately to any nonlinear piece rate contract under those conditions therefore results that depend on the unenforceability of piece rates under such asymmetric information disappear if rank order contracts can be used in principal agent models compensation paid to agents is based on their outputs because their inputs are not public information in this context information is public if it is verifiable in court so that a contract contingent on it is legally enforceable rank order contracts also called tournaments and contests make each agent s compensation a function solely of the ranking of his output relative to the outputs of other agents in contrast individual piece rate contracts make each agent s compensation a function only of his own output lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 and nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 all have results comparing the two when agents actions are not observed by the principal but only for the case in which the principal is risk neutral and the utility function of agents additively separable in income and action the main purpose of the present paper is to show that for the case of a continuum of agents these two kinds of contract are in fact formally equivalent or in some cases approximately equivalent under somewhat more general conditions than those considered so far in the

managerial bonuses and subordinate mistreatment abstract can performance bonuses increase the likelihood that managers coerce their subordinates into exerting high levels of effort when doing so promotes neither efficiency nor equity we consider a laboratory setting in which managers compete to obtain a large bonus at the end of the experiment and the probability of obtaining it depends partly on the effort exerted by the subordinates we find that managers are more than twice as likely to punish subordinates exerting fair levels of effort if they compete for individual bonuses than when there are no bonuses this is not the case when they compete for pooled bonuses giving managers discretionary power over how to share them with their subordinates as most subordinates willingly exert maximal effort a model in which individuals are assumed to care about equity captures subordinates behavior well managers willingness to coerce subordinates into exerting unfairly high levels of effort on the other hand cannot be readily accounted for by any of the existing models of social preferences

lying and reciprocity abstract we extend the literature on the determinants of lying to the impact of reciprocity in strategic interactions we study a theoretical model with reciprocity by assuming that a player s degree of altruism depends on her perception of the other player s altruism towards herself specifically we consider a sequential two player contest and vary the second mover s degree of information on the first movers lying behavior this yields predictions on the second mover s behavior which we study in a largescale online experiment and the laboratory surprisingly the second mover s lying propensity does not depend on her information on the first mover s lying behavior to investigate whether this is specific to lying we consider an additional treatment with the same payoff structure where subjects can increase their chances of winning by simple statements without lying as we do find evidence for reciprocity there the lack of reciprocity cannot solely be attributed to the contest structure

an empirical investigation of changes in scale economies for the commercial banking firm 1979 1986 the period of the 1980s represents a particularly turbulent time for the banking industry a number of technological and regulatory changes have occurred including the elimination of regulation q which had limited the explicit interest payments that banks could pay on some types of deposits it would be expected that these changes would affect the structure of costs for banks the behavior of the cost function is studied over the 1979 1986 time period and in contrast to previous studies using earlier data increasing economies of scale are found in the later years for banks in both unit and branch banking states these results indicate that there may be increased cost pressure for smaller banks to become larger either through mergers and acquisitions or through internal growth this may lead to further consolidation pressures within the industry and reductions in the overall number of banking firms copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

multiperson tournaments an experimental examination modern hierarchical organizations like corporations must motivate agents to work hard given their pyramid structure it is not surprising that one commonly used motivator is the promotion tournament in such tournaments agents compete to advance to positions at higher organizational levels though these tournaments are common little research has empirically looked at the interface of organizational structure and tournament design this paper aims to take a step in filling this void by comparing the performance of various tournament designs using controlled laboratory techniques

the diffusion of production processes in the u s banking industry a finite mixture approach abstract this article applies finite mixture distributions to the estimation of cost functions for financial firms through time the mixture approach allows the estimation of multiple technologies when firms technology choices are unobservable technology switching diffusion and underlying technical change are simultaneously evaluated an application to large samples of u s banks for the years 1982 1986 illustrates the approach results suggest banks switch to lower cost production technologies when unburdened by strict branching regulations

tournaments and office politics evidence from a real effort experiment in many environments tournaments can elicit more effort from workers except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other because it is hard to separate effort ability and output in many real workplace settings the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin there is even less evidence on the impact of sabotage because real world acts of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjective peer evaluation or office politics we discuss a real effort experiment in which effort quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments our results suggest that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics competitors are more likely to sabotage each other in tournaments and as a result workers actually provide less effort simply because they expect to be the victims of sabotage adjusting output for quality with the rating of an independent auditor shrinks the incentive effect of the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod

incentives for helping on the job theory and evidence recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers performance through helping efforts this article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation the model is tested with australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups the evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced while individual efforts are increased when promotion incentives are strong piece rates and profit sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

cost efficiency and banking performances in a partial universal banking system application of the panel smooth threshold model this paper studies the cost efficiency of bank in a partial universal banking system pubs taiwan instead of assuming one common technology in the bank cost function two technologies are assumed to be imbedded in the cost function fee revenues are used as threshold to divide the banks into two technologies a bank whose fee revenues exceeding the threshold is designated as universal bank technology while falling below the threshold is designated as traditional deposit loan technology the panel smooth transition model is adopted which allows banks to smoothly adjust between the two technologies two criteria are suggested overbanking and the trend toward fee revenues to assess the new model s performances with respect to scale economies the results do find a panel smooth transition model yield more reasonable results than the conventional ols and random effect of panel data approach based on the panel smooth transition model the optimal fixed asset size is around ten billion new taiwan dollars

organization design proximity and productivity responses to upward social comparison we investigate the mechanisms that shape social comparison in organizations and generate social comparison costs in particular we focus on heterogeneity in the strength and type of incentives and argue that from an efficient design perspective such variance in rewards is a double edged sword while the sorting and incentive effects that result may increase productivity the social comparison processes that arise may dampen it we posit that the mechanisms underlying these behavioral costs are shaped not only by the magnitude of reward variance but by the formal and informal design elements shaping the distance of advantaged peers in other words the more proximate socially structurally or geographically are those to whom one socially compares the larger the behavioral response empirically we use an unanticipated event during which outlets of a bank previously operating under essentially homogenous incentives were assigned to tournament groups with differing ex ante probabilities of winning a

contagion effect on sovereign interest rate spreads abstract this paper analyzes the extent to which sovereign default risk in contagious that is contagion tests are conducted to determine whether news regarding the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower affect the spreads charged to others the empirical results support the view that a systematic risk element enters into the default risk perceptions of lenders implying the existence of significant contagion effects in international lending

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

product line deregulation and the cost structure of us savings and loan associations recent legislative actions restrict thrift powers which were broadened by deregulatory actions in the early 1980s using nationwide data for savings and loans s ls evidence is found that these restrictions may rise intermediation costs for s ls by limiting their ability to exploit economies of scope between mortgage related and other outputs in addition economies of scale for a wide size range of s ls are found evidence is also found to suggest that insolvent s ls have higher costs for the same level of outputs than solvent s ls

how uncertainty and ambiguity in tournaments affect gender differences in competitive behavior abstract tournament incentives prevail in labor markets yet the number of tournament winners is often unclear to competitors while it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment we present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other but the number of winners is either uncertain but with known probabilities or ambiguous with unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners we compare these two conditions to a control treatment with a known number of winners we find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in the performance of men who choose to compete while we observe no change for women men also increase their willingness to enter competition in the presence of ambiguity overall both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity these findings suggest that management should make tournament conditions transparent and information available in order to prevent gender disparities from increasing under uncertainty and ambiguity

a note on price volume dynamics in an emerging stock market abstract we present a continuum economy with risk neutral agents having heterogeneous expectations and restricted short sales a stochastic version of the model is also formulated and the resulting time series behavior of the price and volume series under a specific money supply process derived the implications of the model are tested in the emerging turkish stock market where institutional arrangements comply with the restrictions of the model the results indicate that as predicted by the model price levels and trading volume are cointegrated the error correction models are also estimated and found to be significant in most cases

competition as a savings incentive a field experiment at a homeless shelter abstract this paper describes a randomized field experiment testing the impact of a savings competition on the behavior of homeless individuals staying at a transitional shelter when monetary prizes were offered for achieving the highest saving rates within a particular month average savings increased by 80 a 30 increase in savings rate while income and attendance at case management meetings remained unchanged however repeating the competition in the following month had no effect because responsive savers selected out of the shelter after the first month in summary while a savings competition can increase savings in the short run its effect may be limited to the intensive margin and may diminish with repetition

threshold effects of financial status on the cost frontiers of financial institutions in nondynamic panels this article applies hansen s 1999 2000 threshold regression model to estimate translog cost frontiers in the hope of shedding light on the banking industry s production processes and the extent of its technical efficiency te the threshold technique allows for the existence of multiple technologies of production distinguished by an exogenous threshold variable strong evidence of multiple technologies is found in the industry irrespective of which financial indicator as constructed by factor analysis defines the threshold variable cost savings and scale economies among the various underlying technologies are compared herein we also highlight the differences between the threshold results and the conventional cost frontier

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

spite and preemptive retaliation after tournaments abstract we investigated money burning after tournaments first we show that substantial money burning was triggered if participants perceived a situation as competitive second we investigated to which extent aggression between former contestants was motivated by preemptive retaliation or spite to disentangle both motives we introduced a credible and visible self binding signal contrary to previous studies we found that aggression against a defenceless subject played an important role preemptive retaliation proved to be another dominant motive we conclude that voluntary self binding signals may have the potential to mitigate but not eliminate antisocial behavior after a competition because it seems to be driven by spite to a large extent our results help us to better understand and eventually mitigate destructive behavior in work environments

changes in the cost of intermediation the case of savings and loans the minimum cost output configuration for a firm may change as the result of a variety of factors including changes in market structure in this paper we test this structural change hypothesis with savings and loan data we find support for the hypothesis that separable constant returns to scale production functions characterize the average savings and loan in our sample in 1983 this is in contrast to the cost complementarities found in 1978 we argue that this result may be the result of regulatory changes that allowed savings and loans to alter their production mix to fully capture the benefits of joint production it seems reasonable to assume that the cost minimizing configuration of a multiproduct firm is potentially subject to nonstationarity during periods of structural change in input and or output markets the late 1970s and early 1980s represent such a period of turbulence for many markets in the financial services industry volatile interest rates combined with technological and regulatory changes may have caused firms in this industry to alter their output mixes in an effort to capture cost complementarities from joint production the purpose of this paper is to test this hypothesis of structural change in the savings and loan industry using both a translog and minflex laurent translog mlt specification of the production function we have chosen to investigate savings and loans s ls during the late 1970s and early 1980s for two reasons first s ls provide an ideal vehicle for testing our hypothesis because they were restricted almost exclusively to mortgages and securities as outputs before the passage of the depository institutions deregulation and monetary control act of 1980 and the garn st germain act of 1982 moreover there were also market changes with respect to both the pricing and mix of inputs i e deposits our second rationale involves the fact that there is a large and growing body of literature in the area of what is now called the

efficiency in the savings and loan industry abstract the stochastic econometric cost frontier approach is modified to investigate efficiency in mutual and stock s ls using 1991 data on u s s ls this methodology allows both the cost frontier and error structures to differ between s ls of these two ownership forms a likelihood ratio test indicates that the data support this unrestricted model which implies efficient mutual and stock s ls use different production technologies various measures of inefficiency show that on average stock s ls are less efficient than mutual s ls the second part of the article relates the inefficiency measures to several correlates

executive compensation and tournament theory empirical tests on danish data this article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation i test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2 600 executives in 210 danish firms during a 4 year period i ask are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance most of the predictions gain support in the data

finite mixture estimation of multiproduct cost functions this paper presents a technique of cost function estimation based on the theory of finite mixture distributions which allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple technologies of production when the researcher does not know which observations correspond to which technologies the finite mixture technique provides estimates of the proportions of firms using the various technologies facilitates comparisons between technologies and preserves the traditional interpretations of cost estimation after describing the mixture procedure the technique is illustrated on a large sample of savings and loan associations and it is concluded that this industry exhibits multiple technologies of production copyright 1991 by mit press

frontier estimation and firm specific inefficiency measures in the presence of heteroscedasticity the purpose of this article is to illustrate a straightforward and useful method for addressing the problem of heteroscedasticity in the estimation of frontiers a heteroscedastic cost frontier model is developed and estimated using bank cost data similar to that used by ferrier and lovell our results show dramatic changes in the estimated cost frontier and in the inefficiency measures when accounting for heteroscedasticity in the estimation process we find that the rankings of firms by their inefficiency measures is affected markedly by the correction for heteroscedasticity but not by alternative distributional assumptions about the one sided error term

asymmetric employer information promotions and the wage policy of firms abstract this paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information building on the seminal work by waldman 1984a and milgrom and oster 1987 we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions using experimental labor markets we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion furthermore we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover

cost structures in multinational and domestic banking abstract prior research on international banking has proposed many reasons for the multinationalization of u s banks but provided little empirical support for its propositions using a pooled time series data set from 1987 to 1990 this study analyzes the ray and expansion path scale economies and expansion path subadditivity of u s based multinational banks mnbs both at the firm and the plant levels it also measures and analyzes inefficiencies for these banks inefficiencies are measured relative to a thick frontier cost function a similar analysis is conducted for domestic banks dbs for comparison purposes no support is found for the prior belief that similar cost structures exist for mnbs and dbs in general we find that mnbs are able to fully exploit economies of scale and face lesser diseconomies from joint production and lower inefficiencies than dbs

sabotage in tournaments evidence from a laboratory experiment although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent we study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads additionally we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name sabotage communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output if sabotage is not possible the principals choose tournament incentives more often this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

which microfinance institutions are becoming more cost effective with time evidence from a mixture model italian speakers tend to stress the second component of german morphologically complex words such as compounds and prefix verbs even if the first component is lexically stressed to improve their prosodic phrasing an automatic pronunciation teaching method was developed based on auditory feedback of prosodically corrected utterances in the learners own voices basically the method copies contours of f0 local speech rate and intensity from reference utterances of a german native speaker to the learners speech signals it also adds emphasis to the stress position in order to help the learners better recognise the correct pronunciation and identify their errors a perception test with german native speakers revealed that manipulated utterances significantly better reflect lexical stress than the corresponding original utterances thus two groups of italian learners of german were provided with different feedback during a training session one group with manipulated utterances in their individual voices and the other with correctly pronounced original utterances in the teacher s voice afterwards both groups produced the same sentences again and german native speakers judged the resulting utterances resynthesised stimuli especially with emphasised stress were found to be a more effective feedback than natural stimuli to learn the correct stress position since resynthesis was obtained without previous segmentation of the learners speech signals this technology could be effectively included in computer assisted language learning software

incentive systems in a real effort experiment in the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects payments based on individual team and relative performance are compared subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort the results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels in team production free riding occurred but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay effort was higher but more variable in tournaments while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others finally attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions

personnel economics past lessons and future directions presidential address to the society of labor economists san francisco may 1 1998 in 1987 the journal of labor economics published an issue on the economics of personnel since then personnel economics defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues has become a major part of labor economics now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available in recent years a number of firm based data sets have surfaced that allow personnel economics to be tested using two such data sets i give support to the implications of theories that relate to life cycle incentives tournaments piecework incentives pay compression and peer pressure i conclude that personnel economics is real it is far more than a set of clever theories it has relevance to the real world additionally firm based data make asking and answering new kinds of questions feasible the value of research in this area is h