a public choice perspective of imf and world bank lending and conditionality the paper explains imf and world banklending and conditionality stressingchanges in relative bargaining power ofdifferent stakeholders over time itapplies public choice theory to explain theinterests of the institutions memberstates its borrowers and staffs as well asprivate actors attaching their money to theifis programs using panel data for 43countries between 1987 99 it is shown thatthe number of fund conditions seems to beinfluenced by contemporaneous world bankactivity and bad policies

competitive incentives working harder or working smarter almost all jobs require a combination of cognitive effort and labor effort this paper focuses on the effect that competitive incentive schemes have on the chosen combination of these two types of efforts we use an experimental approach to show that competitive incentives may induce agents to work harder but not necessarily smarter this effect was stronger for women this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

daily wages and piece rates in agrarian economies the paper presents an analysis of the coexistence of daily wage and piece rate contracts in agrarian economies we show that when individual effort is taken into account daily wage labourers typically form a convex set in the space of working ability the most able and the least able labourers work on piece rates as they can thus choose their own level of effort we also prove that on a monopsonistic labour market the use of both contracts in equilibrium results from the profitability of market segmentation imperfect substitutability between workers under different contracts and the downward rigidity of daily wages can also explain the coexistence of the two types of contracts in more general settings e g perfect competition q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the international monetary fund and developing countries a review of the evidence and policy options as its systemic role evaporated with the collapse of the bretton woods system so the international monetary fund imf became drawn into a much more specific role in the context of the balance of payments bop problems that developing countries were encountering at its inception the imf had been seen as having no specific role in developing countries but now it became exclusively these countries that formed its clientele while during the 1970s the imf had continued to make a few relatively large loans to a limited number of industrial countries italy and the united kingdom beyond the mid 1970s industrial countries ceased to draw any resources from it

temporary foreign workers and firms theory and canadian evidence abstract temporary foreign worker tfw programs have grown considerably in size when uncapped we develop a simple efficiency wage model to explain this phenomenon and examine the empirical evidence for it we also use the model to evaluate the implications of tfw programs for domestic workers in our framework firms that have been unable to find domestic workers may hire tfws at the wage previously advertised to domestic workers due to the lower outside option for tfws than domestic workers tfws will exert more effort for the same wage firms would thus prefer to hire otherwise identical tfws rather than domestic workers our model identifies an unintended consequence of a tfw program since the repercussions of a failed domestic job search are less severe if a tfw may be hired instead firms have an incentive to lower their wage offers made to domestic workers using canadian data we find that relative to domestic workers tfws work longer hours have lower rates of absenteeism and are less likely to be laid off consistent with higher effort in our model moreover for tfws from home countries with a relatively high outside option effort is lower than for tfws from other countries resume travailleurs etrangers temporaires et entreprises theorie et exemple canadien en l absence de plafonnement les programmes de travailleurs etrangers temporaires ptet se sont considerablement developpes afin d expliquer ce phenomene et d en examiner les preuves empiriques nous avons developpe un modele simple de salaire d efficience nous avons egalement utilise ce modele pour evaluer l incidence des ptet sur les travailleurs domestiques dans notre cadre d etude les entreprises peinant a trouver une main d uvre locale peuvent embaucher des travailleurs etrangers temporaires au salaire prealablement propose aux travailleurs domestiques compte tenu d options exterieures plus faibles les travailleurs etrangers temporaires deploieront davantage d efforts pour le meme salaire les entreprises prefereront donc embaucher des travailleurs etrangers par ailleurs identiques plutot que des travailleurs domestiques notre modele identifie une consequence inattendue aux ptet etant donne que les consequences d une recherche d employes domestiques infructueuse sont attenuees par l embauche de travailleurs etrangers temporaires les entreprises sont incitees a diminuer les offres salariales proposees aux travailleurs locaux en exploitant les donnees propres au canada nous avons decouvert que les travailleurs etrangers temporaires travaillaient plus d heures avaient des taux d absenteisme inferieurs et etaient moins susceptibles de se faire congedier que les travailleurs domestiques conformement au concept d effort accru developpe dans notre modele en outre pour les travailleurs etrangers temporaires originaires de pays a options exterieures relativement elevees l effort sera moindre que pour ceux provenant d autres pays

occupational self selection a human capital approach to sex differences in occupational structure a rich and diverse literature exists concerning the distribution of labor incomes one approach namely that of human capital concentrates on lifetime accumulation paths of earnings capacity units human capital individual variations in human capital imply differences in earnings power thereby yielding strong implications concerning earnings distribution within a population despite its explanatory power the human capital model has been widely criticized one criticism centers on its inability to obtain inferences concerning occupational distribution the purpose of this paper is to alleviate at least some such criticism by applying the hedonic price approach so as to embed occupational choice into the human capital framework the significance is that neoclassical economic theory can be used to obtain implications concerning the determinants of occupational structure excerpt

time is money time pressure incentives and the quality of decision making many decisions in economics and finance have to be made under severe time pressure furthermore payoffs frequently depend on the speed of decision making as for instance when buying and selling stocks in this paper we examine the influence of time pressure and time dependent incentive schemes on the quality of decision making in an experimental beauty contest game we find that convergence to equilibrium is faster and payoffs are higher under low time pressure than under high time pressure interestingly time dependent payoffs under high time pressure lead to significantly quicker decision making without reducing the quality of decisions

imf programs do they work can they be made to work better abstract a central issue in the debate about a new international financial architecture has been whether programs of policy reform supported by the international monetary fund work the fund claims that on balance they do because of their positive effect on the balance of payments others claim that programs are ineffective and suggest that they should be discontinued this paper reviews the econometric evidence dealing with the macroeconomic effects of imf programs it goes on to provide additional evidence and judges success against alternative criteria although the record is not good the paper argues that it would be unwise for the fund to cease lending and to abandon conditionality altogether imf programs need to be redesigned and refocused the paper concludes by identifying a number of principles that should underpin reform

lottery choice incentives complexity and decision time this paper reports the results of an experiment on lottery choice in which decision cost is measured as decision making time a simple decision cost model motivates this measurement and the experiment and predicts relationships between incentive mechanism manipulations and decision making time which are borne out in the experiment the decision cost model also suggests that decisions will change in the face of the incentive manipulations in the experiment this suggestion is borne out in a complex decision making environment but not in a simple one specification tests demonstrate that observed changes in subjects behavior are not merely due to changes in subject specific error variance one may conclude from this that the payoff dominance problem is a real issue in complex decision making experiments copyright 1993 by royal economic society

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

one two three infinity newspaper and lab beauty contest experiments beauty contest is a game in which participants have to choose typically a number in 0 100 the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers we describe and analyze beauty contest experiments run in newspapers in uk spain and germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them despite the uncontrollability of these experiments these results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried we claim that all observed behavior across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools can be interpretedas iterative reasoning level 1 reasoning level 2 reasoning and level 3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples while the equilibrium choice level maximum reasoning is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists the results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject pools and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines

allocating decision rights on the shop floor a perspective from transaction cost economics and organization theory this paper explores the links that the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor maintains with labor transaction attributes and several structural traits of the firm the approach is based on the transaction cost apparatus and harnesses the theoretical and empirical background provided by organization theory data are presented from a wide field survey in the spanish food and electronics industries standard industry classification sic 20 and 36 evidence not only verifies the influence of firm size property age and unionism but also shows that the allocation of decision rights is related to a particular mix of labor transaction traits specifically one of the most important results is that employer opportunism offers greater explanatory power than employee opportunism

political economy influences within the life cycle of imf programmes increasing attention is being paid to political economy dimensions of the imf s operations however up until now the literature has lacked a systematic overview of how politics and economics interact in this context this paper sets out to fill the gap its conceptual basis is that of the life cycle of an imf programme what determines the decision to turn to the fund for financial assistance what determines the outcome of negotiations what determines whether a country will come back to the fund answers to these questions cannot be satisfactorily given by examining economics alone the paper draws on existing evidence to provide an empirically based discussion of the issues involved it also points the direction in which future research needs to go some of the policy implications of the analysis are also examined

the dual process drift diffusion model evidence from response times we introduce a model of response time and choice that borrows from two distinct psychological traditions as in dual process models rapid automatic decisions are qualitatively different from considered decisions as in the drift diffusion model delayed considered decisions occur when confidence hits a threshold level we conduct a simple experiment in which our hybrid model matches key properties of the data as our model predicts decision times are bimodal automatic decisions are of far lower quality than considered decisions and automatic decisions are more prevalent when prior information improves thereby raising their quality jel d83 d87 c91

the distributional effects of imf programs a cross country analysis abstract this paper measures the effects of 58 international monetary fund programs during 1975 91 on gini coefficients and income of the poorest quintile these variables are traced over the two to five years following program initiation this research also presents a new technique to control for differences in countries initial economic circumstances the study finds evidence of a significant deterioration in income distribution and the incomes of the poor in fund program countries relative to their nonprogram counterparts when pre program external imbalance is severe in cases where prior external imbalance is not as great countries participating in fund programs actually show relative improvements in distributional indicators

imf programmes is there a conditionality laffer curve the long standing debate over imf conditionality has received a new lease of life in the context of the debate over a new international financial architecture conditionality has increased in recent years and some proposals for reform envisage a continuation of this trend however by emphasising the importance of implementation as well as design it may be argued that increased conditionality will have a negative effect on final out turns there may be a conditionality laffer curve the policy issue is whether conditionality has reached or gone beyond its optimal level there is some evidence that is consistent with the claim that conditionality has become excessive

progress in behavioral game theory i s game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not it is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question the seminal book by von neumann and morgenstern the theory of games and economic behavior was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational in more recent work game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise at one extreme highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions at the other extreme adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple modelsmostly developed to describe nonhuman animals in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all when game theory does aim to describe behavior it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing this paper describes an approach called behavioral game theory which aims to describe actual behavior is driven by empirical observation mostly experiments and charts a middle course between over rational equilibrium analyses and under rational adaptive analyses the recipe for behavioral game theory i will describe has three steps start with a game or naturally occurring situation in which standard game theory makes a bold prediction based on one or two crucial principles if behavior differs from interested readers familiar with game theory should read crawford 1997 whose approach is more eclectic than mine he concludes p 236 that most strategic behavior can be understood via a synthesis that combines elements from each of the leading theoretical frameworks traditional game theory evolutionary game theory and adaptive learning with a modicum of empirical information about behavior behavioral game theory adds psychological interpretations to this synthesis

testing mixed strategy equilibria when players are heterogeneous the case of penalty kicks in soccer the concept of mixed strategy is a fundamental component of game theory and its normative importance is undisputed however its empirical relevance has sometimes been viewed with skepticism the main concern over the practical usefulness of mixed strategies relates to the indifference property of a mixedstrategy equilibrium in order to be willing to play a mixed strategy an agent must be indifferent between each of the pure strategies that are played with positive probability in the mixed strategy as well as any combination of those strategies given that the agent is indifferent across these many strategies there is no bene t to selecting precisely the strategy that induces the opponent to be indifferent as required for equilibrium why an agent would in the absence of communication between players choose exactly one particular randomization is not clear of course whether agents in real life actually play nash equilibrium mixed strategies is ultimately an empirical question the evidence to date on this issue is based almost exclusively on laboratory experiments e g barry o neill 1987 amnon rapoport and richard b boebel 1992 dilip mookherjee and barry sopher 1994 jack ochs 1995 kevin a mccabe et al 2000 the results of these experiments are mixed o neill 1987 concludes that his experimental evidence is consistent with nash mixed strategies but that conclusion was contested by james n brown and robert w rosenthal 1990 with the exception of mccabe et al 2000 which looks at a three person game the other papers generally reject the nash mixedstrategy equilibrium while much has been learned in the laboratory there are inherent limitations to such studies it is sometimes argued that behavior in the simpli ed arti cial setting of games played in such experiments need not mimic real life behavior in addition even if individuals behave in ways that are inconsistent with optimizing behavior in the lab market forces may discipline such behavior in the real world finally interpretation of experiments rely on the assumption that the subjects are maximizing the monetary outcome of the game whereas there may be other preferences at work among subjects e g attempting to avoid looking foolish that distort the results tests of mixed strategies in nonexperimental data are quite scarce in real life the games played are typically quite complex with large strategy spaces that are not fully speci ed ex ante in addition preferences of the actors may not be perfectly known we are aware of only one paper in a similar spirit to our own research using data from classic tennis matches mark walker and john wooders 2001 test whether the probability the player who serves the ball wins the point is equal for serves to the right and chiappori department of economics university of chicago 1126 east 59th street chicago il 60637 levitt department of economics university of chicago groseclose graduate school of business stanford university 518 memorial way stanford ca 94305 the paper was presented at games 2000 in bilbao and at seminars in paris and chicago we thank d braun j m conterno r guesnerie d heller d mengual p reny b salanie and especially j l ettori for comments and suggestions and m mazzocco and f bos for excellent research assistance any errors are ours 1 the theoretical arguments given in defense of the concept of mixed strategy equilibria relate either to puri cation john c harsanyi 1973 or to the minimax property of the equilibrium strategy in zero sum games for recent elaborations on these ideas see authur j robson 1994 and phil reny and robson 2001 2 the ultimatum game is one instance in which experimental play of subjects diverges substantially from the predicted nash equilibrium robert slonim and alvin e roth 1998 demonstrate that raising the monetary payoffs to experiment participants induces behavior closer to that predicted by theory although some disparity persists

high powered performance pay and crowding out of nonmonetary motives a previous literature cautions that paying workers for performance might crowd out nonmonetary motives to work hard empirical evidence from the field however has been based on between subjects designs that are best suited for detecting crowding out due to low powered incentives high powered incentives in the workplace tend to increase output but it is unknown whether this masks crowding out this paper uses a within subject experimental design and finds evidence that crowding out also extends to high powered incentives in a real work setting with paid workers there is individual heterogeneity however with a minority of workers reporting crowding in of motivation thus the impact of performance pay might depend on the mix of worker types data and the online appendix are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2846 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

incentives for helping on the job theory and evidence recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers performance through helping efforts this article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation the model is tested with australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups the evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced while individual efforts are increased when promotion incentives are strong piece rates and profit sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

gender and competition at a young age gender gaps may be observed in a variety of economic and social environments one of the possible determining factors is that men are more competitive than women and so when the competitiveness of the environment increases the performance of men increases relative to that of women we test this hypothesis in a field study conducted with 9 year old children running on a track they first run alone and then in pairs over a short distance with different gender composition of the pairs the results support the hypothesis that performance in competition varies according to gender when children ran alone there was no difference in performance in competition boys but not girls improved their performance this finding relates to the discussion regarding single sex schools the outcomes of examinations in a mixed sex school can show a gender gap in favor of boys even when this gap does not reflect actual abilities girls who are as talented as boys will end up performing worse just because they are not as competitive and will not achieve as high scores in examinations as boys

managing demand and sales dynamics in new product diffusion under supply constraint the bass diffusion model is a well known parametric approach to estimating new product demand trajectory over time this paper generalizes the bass model by allowing for a supply constraint in the presence of a supply constraint potential customers who are not able to obtain the new product join the waiting queue generating backorders and potentially reversing their adoption decision resulting in lost sales consequently they do not generate the positive word of mouth that is typically assumed in the bass model leading to significant changes in the new product diffusion dynamics we study how a firm should manage its supply processes in a new product diffusion environment with backorders and lost sales we consider a make to stock production environment and use optimal control theory to establish that it is never optimal to delay demand fulfillment this result is interesting because immediate fulfillment may accelerate the diffusion process and thereby result in a greater loss of customers in the future using this result we derive closed form expressions for the resulting demand and sales dynamics over the product life cycle we then use these expressions to investigate how the firm should determine the size of its capacity and the time to market its new product we show that delaying a product launch to build up an initial inventory may be optimal and can be used as a substitute for capacity also the optimal time to market and capacity increase with the coefficients of innovation and imitation in the adoption population we compare our optimal capacity and time to market policies with those resulting from exogeneous demand forecasts in order to quantify the value of endogenizing demand

fairness and incentives in a multi task principal agent model this paper reports on a two task principal agent experiment in which only one task is contractible the principal can either offer a piece rate contract or a voluntary bonus to the agent bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks in contrast almost all agents with a piece rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts this behavior contradicts the self interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness

bargaining with deadlines and imperfect player control anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that bargaining sessions subject to deadlines often begin with cheap talk and rejected proposals agreements if they are reached at all tend to be concluded near the deadline we attempt to capture and explain these phenomena in a strategic bargaining model that incorporates a bargaining deadline the possibility of strategic delay and a lack of perfect player control over the timing of offers imperfect player control is generated by an exogenous uniformly distributed random delay in offer transmission our model has a symmetric markov perfect equilibrium unique at almost all nodes in which players adopt strategic delay early in the game make and reject offers later on and reach agreements late in the game if at all in equilibrium players miss the deadline with positive probability the expected division of the surplus is unique and close to an even split

the effect of imf programs on economic growth abstract using a bivariate dynamic version of the heckman selection model we estimate the effect of participation in international monetary fund imf programs on economic growth we find evidence that governments enter into agreements with the imf under the pressures of a foreign reserves crisis but they also bring in the fund to shield themselves from the political costs of adjustment policies program participation lowers growth rates for as long as countries remain under a program once countries leave the program they grow faster than if they had remained but not faster than they would have without participation

piece rates fixed wages and incentives evidence from a field experiment data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages the experiment was conducted within a tree planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both compensation systems unrestricted statistical methods estimate the productivity gain to be 20 since planting conditions potentially affect incentives structural econometric methods are used to generalize the experimental results to out of sample conditions the structural results suggest that the average productivity gain outside of the experimental conditions would be at least 21 7

testing the theory of tournaments an empirical analysis of broiler production broiler chickens are raised by contract growers whose rewards depend explicitly upon relative performance we use data on the performance of broiler producers facing both tournament and linear performance evaluation compensation structures to test three predictions from the theory of tournaments that changes in the level of prizes that leave prize differentials unchanged will not affect performance that in mixed tournaments more able players will choose less risky strategies and that tournament organizers will attempt to handicap players of unequal ability or reduce mixing to avoid the disincentive effects of mixed tournaments our evidence is consistent with each prediction

the power of incentives variable pay is usually defined as pay that is tied to some measure of worker output the most typical form of variable pay historically was the piece rate which was more prevalent during the early part of the 20th century than it is at the beginning of the 21st there is a resurgence in variable pay particularly as it relates to executives whose pay is tied to output through some mechanism like stock options or bonuses that depend on individual or firm performance why use variable pay the typical reaction is that variable pay provides incentives to put forth effort although true discrete pay schemes also generate incentives much of the confusion in the literature results from the use of the terms high powered and low powered incentives which connote difference in ability to elicit worker effort it is more informative to make distinctions between discrete and continuous pay and between inputbased and output based pay 2 pay structures can be summarized by the following equation

to see is to believe common expectations in experimental asset markets abstract we experimentally manipulate agents information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present namely the asset market experiments introduced by smith et al 1988 recent studies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be an artefact of confusion which can be reduced by training subjects to understand the diminishing fundamental value we reconsider this view and propose that when it is made public knowledge that training has occurred this may also reduce uncertainty over the behavior of others and facilitate the formation of common expectations our design disentangles the direct effect of training from the indirect effect of its public knowledge and our results demonstrate a distinct and statistically significant effect of public knowledge over and above that of training alone

the public private sector gender wage differential in britain evidence from matched employee workplace data this article shows that little of the gender earnings gap in the public and private sectors in britain are explained by differences in employee characteristics the differences in workplace characteristics however make a significant sizeable contribution it is shown that performance related pay and company pension schemes are associated with higher relative earnings in the private sector whilst increased provision of family friendly employment practices in the public sector is associated with higher relative earnings for women

gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking comparing children in colombia and sweden we explore gender differences in preferences for competition and risk among children aged 912 in colombia and sweden two countries differing in gender equality according to macro indices we include four types of tasks that vary in gender stereotyping when looking at competitiveness running skipping rope math and word search we find that boys and girls are equally competitive in all tasks and all measures in colombia unlike the consistent results in colombia the results in sweden are mixed with some indication of girls being more competitive than boys in some tasks in terms of performance change whereas boys are more likely to choose to compete in general boys in both countries are more risk taking than girls with a smaller gender gap in sweden

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

deferred compensation vs efficiency wages an experimental test of effort provision and self selection abstract we compare the ability of two common compensation structures efficiency wages ew and deferred compensation dc at inducing effort from workers we test predictions on effort provision and elicit preferences between the two wage structures the theoretical predictions on effort are generally well supported although we find over provision of effort with ew in consequence although the theoretical prediction that dc is more cost effective is supported the difference is small we also find a marked preference for ew that cannot be explained by risk aversion the two effects combine to largely dissipate any advantage that dc may have in inducing effort

the theoretical foundation of industrial relations and its implications for labor economics and human resource management the author identifies the core principle that forms the theoretical and policy foundation for the field of industrial relations labor is embodied in human beings and is not a commodity and argues that the field s two central dependent variables are labor problems and the employment relationship next he uses this core principle along with complementary ideas from institutional economics to develop a theoretical framework that not only explains the nature of the employment relationship and labor problems but also reveals shortcomings in related theories from labor economics and human resource management finally this framework is used to derive the fundamental theorem of industrial relations demonstrate that optimal economic performance occurs in a mixed economy of imperfect labor markets and organizations and show that a certain amount of labor protectionism promotes economic efficiency and human welfare

the importance of nongovernmental organizations ngos in global governance and value creation an international business research agenda the emergence of organized civil society and of nongovernmental organizations ngos as organizational manifestations of broader social movements has dramatically altered the global political economic landscape the increasing global reach of ngos challenges established international business ib research and highlights opportunities for broadening and adapting extant paradigms in the field in this article we introduce the concept of ngos and contrast them with their private sector firm and public sector government counterparts within the context of ib we discuss factors giving rise to ngos as important organizational entities that participate in global value creation and governance and identify limits to their efficacy and viability we identify important questions raised by incorporating ngos into our conceptualization of global context and we challenge three basic tenets of ib theory the definition and dynamics of an institutional field the relevance centrality of a firm government i e two sector bargaining model and the pre eminence of the firm as the global organization of interest within the field we conclude by offering suggested research directions that should serve as catalysts for this new and potentially rich area of future ib research

the effects of imf and world bank lending on long run economic growth an empirical analysis summary the international monetary fund and the world bank frequently and often repeatedly extend loans to developing nations these loans have been blamed for generating adverse economic outcomes the growth impact of fund and bank loan programs is assessed using an empirical growth model that controls for other determinants of growth a unique feature of this study is the use of the value of loans rather than the number of programs the estimates indicate that bank lending stimulates growth in some cases primarily by increasing public investment fund lending is either neutral or detrimental to growth the channel for this effect is a negative impact of fund lending on public as well as private investment

the effects of imf programs in the third world debate and evidence from latin america abstract this article reviews the debate about the effects of imf sponsored stabilization programs in the third world after examining recent studies by fund economists results of a new study on a latin american country set are presented in this research imf programs are associated with insignificant changes in the current account significant improvements in the overall balance of payments increases in inflation mixed effects on growth and a strong and consistent pattern of reduction in labor share of income the latter result is incorporated into a distribution oriented critique of fund policy

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

the future of personnel economics personnel economics is defined as the application of microeconomic principles to human resources issues that are of concern to most businesses the field now about 20 years old arose for three reasons first those of us who were teaching standard labour economics to business students encountered a disinterested audience business students believe that labour supply and demand unemployment investment in education and other topics which are of primary concern to labour economists are almost irrelevant to their future business careers their boredom with what we had to sell signalled that a change in the product might be warranted second the issues studied by human resources specialists were of interest to economists but the approach taken by the non economist was unsatisfying it was loose unfocused and ad hoc and lacked the general rigorous framework to which economists have grown accustomed the economist s reaction was to enter an industry where it was believed rents existed third the technology of economics changed as a result of some breakthroughs particularly those dealing with agency and contract theory economists were better equipped to tackle problems that had evaded them in the past

personnel economics past lessons and future directions presidential address to the society of labor economists san francisco may 1 1998 in 1987 the journal of labor economics published an issue on the economics of personnel since then personnel economics defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues has become a major part of labor economics now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available in recent years a number of firm based data sets have surfaced that allow personnel economics to be tested using two such data sets i give support to the implications of theories that relate to life cycle incentives tournaments piecework incentives pay compression and peer pressure i conclude that personnel economics is real it is far more than a set of clever theories it has relevance to the real world additionally firm based data make asking and answering new kinds of questions feasible the value of research in this area is h

carrots that look like sticks toward an understanding of multitasking incentive schemes constructing compensation schemes for effort in multidimensional tasks is complex particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable when incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures such as quantity produced the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions such as quality will be neglected yet there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal agent model prediction this article reconciles the literature using both theory and empirical evidence the theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principal s monitoring ability and the principal s choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

monitoring motivation and management the determinants of opportunistic behavior in a field experiment economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation employees are rational cheaters who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs we investigate the rational cheater model by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism a significant fraction of employees behave as the rational cheater model predicts a substantial proportion of employees however do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate this heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer jel d2 j2 l2 l8 m12

piece rates fixed wages and incentive effects statistical evidence from payroll records we develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages the model implies optimal decision rules for the firm s choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages that can be estimated using regression methods using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a british columbia tree planting firm we estimate these bounds to be an 8 8 and a 60 4 percent increase in productivity structural estimation which accounts for the firm s optimal choice of a compensation system suggests that incentives caused a 22 6 percent increase in productivity however only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives in part by reducing quality

the high politics of imf lending analysts have long suspected that politics affects the lending patterns of the international monetary fund imf but none have adequately specified or systematically tested competing explanations this paper develops a political explanation of imf lending and tests it statistically on the developing countries between 1985 and 1994 it finds that political realignment toward the united states the largest power in the imf increases a country s probability of receiving an imf loan a country s static political alignment position has no significant impact during this period suggesting that these processes are best modeled dynamically an analysis of two subsamples rejects the hypothesis that the imf has become less politicized since the end of the cold war and suggests that the influence of politics has actually increased since 1990 the behavior of multilateral organizations is still driven by the political interests of their more powerful member states

clean evidence on peer effects we study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output in the pair treatment two subjects worked at the same time in the same room and peer effects were possible in the single treatment subjects worked alone and peer effects were ruled out we find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs moreover average output is higher in the pair treatment thus peer effects raise productivity finally low productivity workers are the most sensitive to the behavior of peers

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

optimal production sales policies and entry time for successive generations of new products abstract this paper explores the optimal initial inventory at launch sales plan and introduction time for a new generation of a product we propose a multi generation demand model that accounts for supply constraints a mathematical model of the supply restricted multi generation diffusion problem is then developed and the optimal sales policy is derived closed form analytical expressions as well as numerical experiments are used to investigate the effect of consumers backlogging cost of production capacity unit profit margin for the products market expansion by the new generation and cannibalization of older generations through consideration of supply restrictions and lost sales we are able to generalize previous findings on market entry policy by showing that there is a continuous range of optimal introduction times we show that the inter dependence between production capacity and initial inventory varies based on the introduction time of the new generation we also provide an application of the proposed model in the case of sony s playstation 3 game console the results suggest that the company introduced the product too late and overproduced inventory which as supported by empirical evidence had a negative impact on the product s performance limitations and considerations for the application of the model are also discussed

on us politics and imf lending abstract the political factors shaping imf lending to developing countries have attracted attention in recent empirical work this goes in particular for the role and influence of the us however scant formal modelling makes interpretation of empirical results difficult in this paper we propose a model in which the us acts as principal within the imf and seeks to maximize its impact on the policy stance of debtor countries we derive an optimal loan allocation mechanism which leads to the testable hypothesis that the probability of an imf loan is increasing in the amount of political concessions countries make a political concession is defined as the distance between a country s bliss point and its actual policy stance measured relative to the us we introduce a bliss point proxy and demonstrate that our hypothesis is strongly supported in the data moreover we show that not accounting for bliss points may lead to endogeneity bias in empirical work

what field experiments have and have not taught us about managing workers this paper reviews the field experimental evidence on firm employee relationships there is strong evidence that output rises in response to financial incentives but more mixed support for worker reciprocity in response to employer generosity non financial approaches such as worker recognition or adding meaning to mundane tasks can also increase output social relations are central to how firms function and have been shown to have an important impact on the design of incentive schemes what we do not know however far exceeds that which we have learned a broad swathe of important topics including recruiting worker promotion and training are virtually untouched thus far by field experiments

imf lending programs participation and impact abstract participation in imf programs has been an option that more and more developing countries have exercised in recent years in this paper a detailed analysis of such participation over the period 1976 1986 provides a number of insights into the motivations for and the macroeconomic effects of such participation participation is driven by a combination of past performance present external influences and sluggish adjustment of developing countries the ability to predict which countries will participate in the imf program is quite good with nearly 90 percent of variation in such choices accounted for by the explanatory variables employed increased participation has as contemporaneous effects a reduction in economic growth and domestic investment and an improvement in the current account lagged effects of increased participation on economic growth and domestic investment are positive and in most estimates quantitatively greater than the contemporaneous effects there is also evidence of significantly lower public investment an increased budget surplus and real depreciation of the exchange rate with increased participation results for domestic credit creation and government current expenditure although they have a sign consistent with more austere policy cannot be shown to be significantly different from those not participating

optimal pricing strategy for new products robinson and lakhani 1975 initiated a long research stream in marketing when they used the bass model 1969 to develop optimal pricing path for a new product a careful analysis of the extant literature reveals that the research predominantly suggests that the optimal price path should be largely based on the sales growth pattern however in the real world we rarely find new products that have such pricing pattern we observe either a monotonically declining pricing pattern or an increase decrease pricing pattern that does not seem close to the sales path in this paper we use a variation of the generalized bass model called gbm developed by bass et al 1994 that yields optimal pricing policies that are consistent with empirical data

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

diffusion of innovations under supply constraints in this paper we present a canonical setting that illustrates the need for explicitly modeling interactions between manufacturing and marketing sales decisions in a firm we consider a firm that sells an innovative product with a given market potential the firm may not be able to meet demand due to capacity constraints for such firms we present a new model of demand modified from the original model of bass to capture the effect of unmet past demand on future demand we use this model to find production and sales plans that maximize profit during the lifetime of the product in a firm with a fixed production capacity we conduct an extensive numerical study to establish that the trivial myopic sales plan that sells the maximal amount possible at each time instant is not necessarily optimal we show that a heuristic build up policy in which the firm does not sell at all for a period of time and builds up enough inventory to never lose sales once it begins selling is a robust approximation to the optimal policy specializing to a lost sales setting we prove that the optimal sales plan is indeed of the build up type we explicitly characterize the optimal build up period and analytically derive the optimal initial inventory and roll out delay finally we show that the insights obtained in the fixed capacity case continue to hold when the firm is able to dynamically change capacity

pushing subjects beyond rationality with more alternatives in experimental auctions the use of experimental economics in valuation of market and nonmarket goods has grown over the past few years the ability of experimental auctions eus to reveal consumer preferences and their malleability has been praised in previous literature because of the high cost of conducting eus researchers usually present multiple products to participants determining how many products to present has no clear guideline the results of this study show that subjects do not value products the same way across different number of options offered to them the main indicator is the increasing variance in responses for a benchmark product when more products are available with an econometric specification allowing for heteroscedasticity as a function of the number of product offerings the results indicate that the number of goods available for bidding is not to be taken as a trivial task in experimental design for value elicitation

executive compensation and tournament theory empirical tests on danish data this article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation i test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2 600 executives in 210 danish firms during a 4 year period i ask are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance most of the predictions gain support in the data

independent actor or agent an empirical analysis of the impact of u s interests on international monetary fund conditions abstract in this paper we analyze whether international monetary fund imf conditionality is exclusively designed to be in line with observable economic indicators or whether it is partly driven by the imf s major shareholder the united states a panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries submitted during the period april 1997 through february 2003 revealed that the number of conditions on an imf loan depended on a borrowing country s voting pattern in the un general assembly closer allies of the united states and other group of 7 g7 countries received imf loans with fewer conditions especially prior to elections these results are relevant to current public policy debates on the role and process of setting imf loan conditions and provide broader insight into the influence of the united states and other g7 countries on international institutions

tempus fugit time pressure in risky decisions we study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects pure loss prospects and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses in two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains but increases risk aversion for losses for mixed prospects subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure depending on the framing of the prospects the results suggest the importance of aspiration levels and thus the overall probability to break even under time pressure we discuss the implications of our findings for decision making situations that involve time pressure

choking under time pressure the influence of deadline dependent bonus and malus incentive schemes on performance abstract many economically relevant activities are executed under notable time pressures incentivized deadlines are often the reason people feel pressured in such an environment individual preferences can predict performance through a laboratory experiment we examine the predictive power of individual loss aversion on performance under deadline dependent incentives participants worked on a real effort task under two payoff equivalent contracts framed in bonus and malus terms the results show lower performance for individuals with high loss aversion when working under a malus contract these individuals needed more time to reply and were less able to avoid maluses than other individuals choking can explain this observed behavior

the impact of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness we examine whether competitiveness in women is influenced by biological factors female participants in a laboratory experiment solve a simple arithmetics task first under a piece rate and then under a competitive tournament scheme participants can then choose which compensation scheme to apply in a third round we find that the likelihood of selecting into the competitive environment varies strongly and significantly over the menstrual cycle and with the intake of hormonal contraceptives the observed patterns are consistent with a negative impact of the sex hormone progesterone on competitiveness we show that the effect of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness is due neither to an impact on performance nor to an impact on risk aversion or overconfidence

men women and competition an experimental test of behavior this study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance i e piece rate and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance i e a tournament we test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards in the winner take all wta condition only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment 4 50 in the graduated tournament condition the same payment 4 50 was divided among the first second and third finishers in the tournament in the wta condition men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women in addition a clear sorting effect occurs in the wta condition in early rounds of the wta condition male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants however the difference disappears over time after controlling for forecasting skill gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the wta condition however lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry in the graduated tournament the situation was reversed men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates even after controlling for skill forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament while the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant the men entered at much higher rates as a consequence men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently

what explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments such as roads and dams to promoting policy reform this change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment after nearly 20 years experience with policy based or conditional lending there have now been many studies of adjustment lending most of which take a case study approach many conclude that policy based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform the authors examine a database of 220 world bank supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail they find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time variables under the world bank s control resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions have no relationship with an adjustment program s success or failure what development agencies must do then is select promising candidates for adjustment support when the candidates is a poor selection devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform to improve its success rate with adjustment lending the world bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not that is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers to become more effective at supporting policy reform the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending

a reply to new product diffusion decisions under supply constraints in our prior work on product diffusions in presence of a capacity constraint we postulated that a firm operating in such an environment should always attempt to fulfill as much of the present demand as is possible with the capacity constraint in other words the firm would never have demand backlogged while accumulating inventory in this note we derive a sufficient condition for the optimality of such fulfillment policy this paper was accepted by candace a yano operations management

the war for the fare how driver compensation affects bus system performance two systems of bus driver compensation exist in santiago chile most drivers are paid per passenger transported while a second system compensates other drivers with a fixed wage compared with fixed wage drivers per passenger drivers have incentives to engage in la guerra por el boleto the war for the fare in which drivers change their driving patterns to compete for passengers this paper takes advantage of a natural experiment provided by the coexistence of these two compensation schemes on similar routes in the same city using data on intervals between bus arrivals we find that the fixed wage contract leads to more bunching of buses and hence longer average passenger wait times the per passenger drivers are assisted by a fascinating group of independent information intermediaries called sapos who earn their living by standing at bus stops recording arrival times and selling the information to subsequent drivers who drive past this bus bunching phenomenon has frustrated passengers in cities around the world so it is exciting to see evidence that contract design can improve performance in this dimension according to our results a typical bus passenger in santiago waits roughly 10 longer for a bus on a fixed wage route relative to an incentive contract route however the improved wait times on the incentivecontract routes come at a cost the incentives lead drivers to drive noticeably more aggressively causing at least 67 more accidents per kilometer driven most people in santiago blame la guerra por el boleto for the poor service provided by buses our results have implications for the design of incentives in public transportation systems

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

new product diffusion decisions under supply constraints two recent papers on managing new product diffusion decisions under production constraints reach somewhat contradictory conclusions ho et al ho t h s savin c terwiesch 2002 managing demand and sales dynamics in new product diffusion under supply constraint management sci 48 2 187 206 show that it is never optimal to refuse to satisfy any customers when the firm has inventory of the product on the other hand in a very similar model kumar and swaminathan kumar s j m swaminathan 2003 diffusion of innovations under supply constraints oper res 51 6 866 879 show that production constraints may in fact lead a firm to reject customers orders even when the firm has the inventory to satisfy them to slow down new product diffusion we provide a counterexample to the results of ho et al 2002 and show that in their and kumar and swaminathan s 2003 models it may be optimal to deny customers a product in inventory we provide a generalization of both models that includes the ability to dynamically price the product and also allows capacity and production costs to vary over time we show that the unintuitive but optimal behavior of denying customers products that are in inventory disappears when the firm can dynamically set prices this paper was accepted by candace a yano operations and supply chain management

selection into self improvement and competition pay gender stereotypes and earnings volatility abstract we examine whether men and women differ in their willingness to select into a contract that pays upon improving one s past performance experiment participants choose to perform a task under either a regular piece rate or a larger piece rate provided they improve relative to a previous round women are less willing than men to select into self improvement pay and this gender gap is largely explained by higher risk aversion and to a smaller extent lower self confidence high earnings volatility widens the gender gap and makes self improvement pay less attractive than competition pay we find no effect of gender stereotypes in the willingness to sort into self improvement the results provide insight into the feasibility and potential of using self improvement contracts as gender neutral incentive mechanisms

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion