political constraints to growth in an economic union abstract this paper studies the political economy of growth in an economic union such as the eu in the spirit of acemoglu aghion and zilibotti acemoglu d aghion p and zilibotti f 2006a distance to frontier selection and economic growth journal of the european economic association 4 1 37 74 acemoglu d aghion p and zilibotti f 2006b growth development and appropriate versus inappropriate institutions mimeo mit as the economy approaches the world technology frontier structural reforms that increase competition in intermediate goods sectors are necessary to boost innovation and productivity growth reforms however raise the opposition of incumbents and therefore are politically difficult to implement when there are important cross border policy spillover effects national governments are more easily captured by vested interests as they fail to internalize the benefits of reforms on the rest of the union in this situation productivity growth may be sluggish and the economy can fail to converge to the frontier on the other hand when policy is chosen by a union government or a collective body that takes into account union welfare the internalization of spillovers raises the perceived benefit of reforms and consequently lowers the ability of lobbies to obtain high levels of protection

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

a behavioral theory of r d expenditures and innovations evidence from shipbuilding i base an integrated model of innovation development and launch on the behavioral theory of the firm this model specifies that research and development expenses are increased when low performance causes problemistic search and when excess resources cause slack search innovations generated by search are launched if low performance gives managers high risk tolerance using data from shipbuilding firms i show that high performance reduces r d intensity and innovation launches and high slack increases r d intensity as predicted

foreign entry cultural barriers and learning this paper examines the longevity of foreign entries hypotheses are developed on the mode start ups vs acquisitions and ownership structure wholly owned vs joint ventures in relation to cultural distance the hypotheses are tested within a framework of organizational learning using data on 225 entries that 13 dutch firms carried out from 1966 onwards results show that the presence of cultural barriers punctuates an organization s learning cultural distance is a prominent factor in foreign entry whenever this involves another firm requiring the firm to engage in double layered acculturation we also identify locational paths of learning the longevity of acquisitions is positively influenced by prior entries of the firm in the same country similarly the longevity of foreign entries in which the firm has a majority stake improves whenever the expanding firm engaged in prior entries in the same country and in other countries in the same cultural block

long memory and mean reversion in real exchange rates in latin america this article examines the long run purchasing power parity ppp hypothesis for 12 latin american real effective exchange rates reers using fractional integration techniques the empirical result

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

second generation fiscal federalism political aspects of decentralization and economic development summary this essay contributes to second generation fiscal federalism sgff which traces the implications of incentives created by political and fiscal institutions the approach explores how various forms of fiscal federalism work in the presence of political officials who rather than being benevolent social planners face various forms of political incentives the paper focuses on three sets of positive models first it explores self enforcing federalism that is how federal systems are held together given various tendencies for federal systems to become centralized or fall apart second it considers how specific political institutions such as democracy interact with decentralization finally it studies various political impediments to economic growth again highlighting the interaction with decentralization 2013 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

fiscal federalism and economic growth this paper uses an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth the analysis shows that federalism which allows public good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers who live in different jurisdictions increases the incentive to save this stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth

capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms abstract this paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms we show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package if instead profits can be fully taxed then source based investment taxes vanish if domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners then source based investment taxes can be used to shift income away from these to domestic citizens and they may even be used to finance lump sum transfers to domestic residents

taxation of mobile factors as insurance under uncertainty this paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors i e capital under uncertainty the wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages in particular the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages thereby providing insurance for this reason jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump sum taxation is available in addition this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition

decentralization and economic growth in europe for whom the bell tolls the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth are analyzed a theoretical framework is developed that builds on the relationships between government size and growth and between decentra

does tax competition really promote growth abstract this paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input absent stochastic shocks decentralized tax setting two or more jurisdictions maximizes the rate of growth as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies extreme tax competition stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem which dampens down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level growth can be lower with decentralization our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth with decentralization

on the dynamics of growth and fiscal policy with redistributive transfers abstract this paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by studying the case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures public production services public consumption services and state contingent redistributive transfers we make two contributions to the literature firstly we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which rational voters choose the capital tax rate and the allocation of total tax revenues between productive government expenditures public production services and non productive ones public consumption services and redistributive transfers we study the properties of these policies and their impact on growth secondly we deliver analytic results for the long run and transitional dynamics of optimal fiscal policies and endogenous growth in particular we establish existence and investigate the possibility of uniqueness and dynamic determinacy and how this possibility is affected by the chosen allocative and redistributive policies

international expansion of emerging market enterprises a springboard perspective in this article we present a springboard perspective to describe the internationalization of emerging market multinational corporations em mnes em mnes use international expansion as a springboard to acquire strategic resources and reduce their institutional and market constraints at home in so doing they overcome their latecomer disadvantage in the global stage via a series of aggressive risk taking measures by aggressively acquiring or buying critical assets from mature mnes to compensate for their competitive weaknesses we discuss unique traits that characterize the international expansion of em mnes and the unique motivations that steer them toward internationalization we further delineate peculiar strategies and activities undertaken by these firms in pursuit of international expansion as well as internal and external forces that might compel or facilitate their propulsion into the global scene we finally explain the risks and remedies associated with this international springboarding strategy and highlight major issues meriting further investigation

local decentralization and local economic growth a cross sectional examination of us metropolitan areas this paper builds on the growing empirical literature that explores the relationship between government structure and economic growth it uses a new data set of 314 us metropolitan areas to examine the relationship between local decentralization and local economic growth the results indicate a negative relationship between the central city share of metro area population and economic growth and a positive relationship between both the number of municipalities per 100 000 residents and the number of counties per 100 000 residents and economic growth those findings provide support for the hypothesis that decentralization enhances economic growth

do international acquisitions by emerging economy firms create shareholder value the case of indian firms while overseas acquisitions by emerging economy firms are gaining increased attention from the business press our understanding of whether and why this inorganic mode of international expansion creates value to acquirer firms is limited we argue that international acquisitions facilitate internalization of tangible and intangible resources that are both difficult to trade through market transactions and take time to develop internally thus constituting an important strategic lever of value creation for emerging economy firms furthermore the magnitude of value created will be higher when the target firms are located in advanced economic and institutional environments country markets that carry the promise of higher quality of resources and therefore stronger complementarity to the existing capabilities of emerging economy firms an event study of 425 cross border acquisitions by indian firms during 2000 2007 supports our predictions

regulation and pricing of pharmaceuticals reference pricing or price cap regulation we study the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical firms pricing strategies using a unique policy experiment from norway which in 2003 introduced a reference price rp system called index pricing for a sub sample of off patent pharmaceuticals replacing the existing price cap pc regulation we estimate the effect of the reform using a product level panel dataset covering the drugs exposed to rp and a large number of drugs still under pc regulation in the time before and after the policy change our results show that rp significantly reduced both brand name and generic prices within the reference group with the effect being stronger for brand names we also identify a negative cross price effect on therapeutic substitutes not included in the rp system in terms of policy implications the results suggest that rp is more effective than pc regulation in lowering drug prices while the cross price effect raises a concern about patent protection

fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered recent studies examining the relation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth have failed to take account of the extent of the independent taxing powers available to sub national governments and thus have substantially overstated the degree of effective decentralization results from a cross section study of 19 oecd member countries suggest that when the measure of fiscal decentralization is limited to the revenues over which sub national governments have full autonomy its impact on economic growth is not statistically significant

residence and source based capital taxation in open economies with infinitely lived consumers abstract in this paper we investigate tax competition in a neoclassical growth model where each country may use both residence and source based capital taxes we show that both types of capital taxes are zero at any interior steady state just as in a closed economy for symmetric countries and even for countries that differ only with respect to size and productivity we prove analytically and verify numerically that the open economy policies coincide exactly with the closed economy policies in all time periods for countries that are asymmetric in other dimensions we find that source based taxes are used to manipulate the intertemporal terms of trade in the short run either way the fiscal externalities of source based taxes vanish once residence based taxes are allowed

internationalization and firm risk an upstream downstream hypothesis corporate international diversification theory posits that multinational corporations mncs should have lower risk and higher financial leverage than purely domestic corporations dcs we suggest an alternative upstream downstream hypothesis according to which the overall effect of internationalization on the risk and leverage of mncs is expected to vary with home and target market conditions the empirical results are consistent with the suggested hypothesis

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

capital market integration and fiscal sustainability abstract by constructing a two country endogenous growth model with a debt financing government this paper studies the relationship between the sustainability of public finance and increases in inter regional factor mobility to this end it identifies the minimum tax rate that ensures fiscal sustainability against the backdrop of capital tax competition and studies whether competition for mobile capital lowers or improves fiscal sustainability the main findings are as follows i when countries are symmetric increasing capital flows promotes economic growth through the expansion of romer type knowledge spillovers resulting in increased fiscal sustainability in all countries and ii when a marked difference exists between countries tax competition caused by capital movements might lower fiscal sustainability in a country with abundant capital and large outstanding debt

transforming disadvantages into advantages developing country mnes in the least developed countries we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of developing country multinational enterprises mnes in comparison with developed country mnes developing country mnes tend to be less competitive than their developed country counterparts partly because they suffer the disadvantage of operating in home countries with underdeveloped institutions we argue that this disadvantage can become an advantage when both types of mne operate in countries with difficult governance conditions because developing country mnes are used to operating in such conditions the empirical analysis shows that although developing country mnes rarely appear among the largest mnes in the world they are more prevalent among the largest foreign firms in the least developed countries ldcs especially in ldcs with poorer regulatory quality and lower control of corruption

tragedy of the fiscal common fiscal stock externalities in a leviathan model of federalism the paper deals with vertical tax competition between self interested governments in a dynamic environment in a federation competition between the federal and the state governments arises when tax sources are not separated but pooled since dynamic inefficiencies will be stressed the focus is on fiscal stock externalities rather than on flow externalities the paper shows that the leviathans in a federation tax the fiscal common resource more extensively than the single leviathan in a unitary state furthermore the positive impact of political stability on public consumption of the fiscal common will be discussed

decentralization and economic growth revisited an empirical note abstract although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development there is a mixed picture of the decentralization effect on economic growth across earlier empirical studies using the instrument variables iv technique with the latest cross country data for the period from 1997 to 2001 this paper found that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on per capita gdp growth therefore when the focus is placed on the latest information on the economic situation in the latter 1990s decentralization particularly on the fiscal expenditure side is instrumental in economic growth

fiscal decentralisation and idc economic growth an empirical investigation the impact of fiscal decentralisation on ldc economic growth and development is widely debated in the development literature notwithstanding this there has been little attempt to test systematically this relationship accordingly in this note we present an empirical examination of the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralisation and economic growth rates across a sample of twenty three ldcsfrom 1974 to 1991 we fail to find however any strong systematic relationship between the two among our sample of ldcs

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

taxation risk taking and growth a continuous time stochastic general equilibrium analysis with labor leisure choice abstract this paper investigates the equilibrium relationship between taxation portfolio choice risk taking and capital accumulation specifically it examines how taxes affect risk taking and capital accumulation we extend the existing literature by relaxing two crucial assumptions in modelling risk taking behavior i that the investment opportunity set is fixed and ii that there is no distinction between attitudes towards risk and behavior towards intertemporal substitution we extend the investment opportunity set of individuals through optimally determined human capital and distinguish intertemporal substitution from attitudes towards risk via a recursive utility function in the presence of these extensions the paper successfully derives a closed form solution to the stochastic growth model with stochastic wage income

fiscal centralization versus decentralization growth and welfare effects of spillovers leviathan taxation and capital mobility abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods leviathan taxation and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare we show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth however the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non monotonic and displays a hump shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition some tax competition is desirable but fierce tax competition may be harmful we also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare as in previous studies however if spillovers are below this critical level capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems

failure to complete cross border m as to vs from emerging markets while cross border mergers and acquisitions m as involving emerging markets have been increasing in recent years a high percentage collapse before completion this study investigates how the predictors of cross border m a completion involving emerging markets depend upon the direction of global expansion i e investment inbound to a developing market or outbound from a developing market analysis based on 15 years of data from four emerging economies brazil russia india and china from 1995 to 2010 reveals fundamental differences in the predictors of inbound vs outbound m a completion country level factors reflecting differences in political trade and legal environments strongly affect the completion for inbound m as but have a much weaker influence on outbound m as by contrast firm level factors such as past m a experience have a significantly stronger effect on completion for outbound than for inbound m as most interestingly two deal level factors the percentage of stake sought by the acquirer and whether or not the deal is a cash transaction increase the likelihood of completion for inbound but decrease it for outbound m as these findings have important managerial implications for enhancing the success of global expansions

fiscal federalism decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism has identified several channels through which government decentralization could affect economic growth much of the literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services but decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms in contrast some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency and thus may diminish growth given this theoretical ambiguity several studies have attempted to identify the effect of decentralization on economic growth empirically over the last two decades we review and conduct a meta analysis of this empirical literature based on our analysis we point out open questions and discuss possible ways to answer them jel h77 043 c52 i introduction building on various theoretical contributions an empirical literature analyzing the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has emerged since the 1990s the relevant studies vary as to whether they use cross sectional time series or panel data as to whether they rely on cross country or single country samples and they vary in estimation methods decentralization measures and sample composition given the size and heterogeneity of the empirical literature it is useful to review the individual studies and summarize their main findings conducting a comprehensive search we identify 31 published and unpublished studies on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth each of these studies estimates several models resulting in over 400 individual estimates while we first review these studies in a traditional manner our main aim is to analyze these estimates quantitatively specifically the main contribution of this article is to offer a meta analysis of the empirical findings on fiscal decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis is a useful methodology in our context as it is difficult to obtain clear cut conclusions with only a traditional survey of empirical literature the individual studies vary substantially in their characteristics and correspondingly in the findings they report by conducting a meta analysis however we can identify how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular study relate to its findings the meta analysis approach thus addresses model uncertainty with regard to each individual estimate in addition it can also serve as a partial response to the methodological critique of empirical research on fiscal decentralization by rodden 2004 as it helps to clarify the quantitative effects of different decentralization measures and estimation techniques finally as meta analytical techniques are rarely used in economics we also aim at contributing to the further establishment of this methodology stanley 2001 2008 the next section briefly discusses the various theoretical arguments as to why fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth we then provide a short traditional survey of the empirical studies in section iii we review this literature more systematically and quantitatively in section iv in section v we report the results of meta regressions and discuss how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a given study are related to its specific findings finally section vi provides a discussion of the results and some conclusions ii how could fiscal federalism affect economic growth theoretical approaches within the framework of the solow swan model solow 1956 swan 1956 fiscal federalism may be associated with a different level of efficiency in governance than unitary systems leading to a different value of solow s a the level of technology a regime change toward federalism would then be associated with temporarily different growth rates and eventually different levels of income but not with persistent growth differences

dynamic fiscal competition a political economy theory abstract i develop a political economy theory of dynamic fiscal competition via public spending and debt with internationally mobile capital strategic policies generate two cross border externalities that voters in each country fail to internalize 1 an increase in public spending that bolsters capital accumulation but also 2 a race to the top in public debt which crowds out capital the relative size of these two externalities varies with the number of financially integrated countries and interacts with the domestic political conflict between young and old voters despite residence based taxation capital tax rates are lower under strategic policies than under coordination furthermore they may decline with financial integration strategic policies lead to lower long run output and welfare relative to coordination but are preferred by subsequent generations of voters if the number of financially integrated countries is low or the political weight of the young is high

fiscal decentralization and economic growth a cross country study abstract we use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970 1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth we find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries but none in developed countries several explanations are offered for our findings

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

fiscal competition and growth when capital is imperfectly mobile is tax competition good for economic growth we address this question using a simple model of endogenous growth governments in a system of many small jurisdictions benevolently maximize the welfare of immobile residents quadratic de installation costs limit the mobility of capital we look at optimal taxation and long run growth and we analyse the effects of cost parameter variations on taxation and growth a race to the bottom in capital tax rates is only one possibility the relationship between capital mobility and capital tax rates is not monotonic growth and capital mobility are unambiguously positively related

distributive politics and the costs of centralization this paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting with centralization regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region specific projects the outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within region benefits the number of projects funded may be non monotonic in the strength of project externalities the efficiency gains from decentralization and the performance of constitutional rules such as majority voting which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization

production technologies in stochastic continuous time models abstract properties of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models can be revealed by either using numerical solutions or qualitative analysis very precise and intuition building results are obtained by working with models which provide closed form solutions closed form solutions are known for a large class of models some of which however have some undesirable features such as potentially negative output this paper offers closed form solutions for models which are just as tractable but do not suffer from these shortcomings

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association