liquidity risk and occupational choices we explore which financial constraints matter the most in the choice of becoming an entrepreneur we consider a randomly assigned welfare program in rural mexico and show that cash transfers signi cantly increase entry into entrepreneurship we then exploit the cross household variation in the timing of these transfers and find that current occupational choices are significantly more responsive to the transfers expected for the future than to those currently received guided by a simple occupational choice model we argue that the program has promoted entrepreneurship by enhancing the willingness to bear risk as opposed to simply relaxing current liquidity constraints

toward a theory of sustainable entrepreneurship reducing environmental degradation through entrepreneurial action this article explains how entrepreneurship can help resolve the environmental problems of global socio economic systems environmental economics concludes that environmental degradation results from the failure of markets whereas the entrepreneurship literature argues that opportunities are inherent in market failure a synthesis of these literatures suggests that environmentally relevant market failures represent opportunities for achieving profitability while simultaneously reducing environmentally degrading economic behaviors it also implies conceptualizations of sustainable and environmental entrepreneurship which detail how entrepreneurs seize the opportunities that are inherent in environmentally relevant market failures finally the article examines the ability of the proposed theoretical framework to transcend its environmental context and provide insight into expanding the domain of the study of entrepreneurship

does entry size matter the impact of the life cycle and technology on firm survival a wave of empirical studies has recently emerged showing that smaller scale entry is confronted with a lower likelihood of survival than their larger counterparts the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the relationship between size of a firm when entering an industry and the likelihood of survival holds under different technological conditions and across the different stages of the industry life cycle the empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between firm size and the likelihood of survival is shaped by technology and the stage of the industry life cycle while the likelihood of survival confronting small entrants is generally less than that confronting their larger counterparts the relationship does not hold for mature stages of the product life cycle or in technologically intensive products in mature industries that are still technologically intensive entry may be less about radical innovation and possibly more about filling strategic niches thus negating the impact of entry size on the likelihood of survival

developing acquired foreign subsidiaries the experience of mnes in transition economies drawing on subsidiary evolution and dynamic capabilities research i test how development and growth of subsidiaries recently acquired in transition economies are affected by multinational enterprise mne and target capabilities these subsidiaries often lack important resources their cross border transfer enhancement and exploitation are problematic however data on 170 acquisitions in central and eastern europe confirmed the importance of the pre acquisition experiences of both target and mne for subsidiary growth although cultural differences moderated the predicted effects notably

the market evolution and sales takeoff of product innovations in contrast to the prevailing supply side explanation that price decreases are the key driver of a sales takeoff we argue that outward shifting supplyand demand curves lead to market takeoff our fundamental idea is that sales in new markets are initially low because the first commercialized forms of new innovations are primitive then as new firms enter actual and perceived product quality improves and prices possibly drop which leads to a takeoff in sales to provide empirical evidence for this explanation we explore the relationship between takeoff times price decreases and firm entry for a sample of consumer and industrial product innovations commercialized in the united states over the past 150 years based on a proportional hazards analysis of takeoff times we find that new firm entry dominates other factors in explaining observed sales takeoff times we interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand shifts during the early evolution of a new market due to nonprice factors is the key driver of a sales takeoff

the policy impact of new rules for loan participation on credit union returns abstract in recent years credit unions have increasingly purchased loan participation agreements in order to diversify their loan portfolios and manage loan growth responding to high charge off rates for these loans and concern for systemic risk the national credit union administration imposed in 2013 new rules on federally insured credit unions that limited the purchase of loan participations from a single originator to the greater of 5 million or 100 of net worth this study uses a difference in difference framework to examine the effect the policy had on returns as a result of the policy change credit unions with a high share of net worth in loan participations earned on average a return on assets 47 basis points less than their counterparts further we find evidence that suggests these lower returns were driven by a decline in participation loans with recourse provisions liquidity issues and relatively higher interest expenses

entrepreneurship developing countries and development economics new approaches and insights this paper provides an introduction to this special issue of small business economics dealing with the long postponed integration of entrepreneurship into the discipline of development economics and casting a formal light on the role of entrepreneurship in developing countries the paper departs from the premise that with more than a billion people living in absolute poverty it is of great practical importance to understand if and when entrepreneurship is a binding constraint on economic development and catching up in developing countries this in turn requires at least a deeper theoretical modeling of the entrepreneur in development economics this special edition contains a number of contributions emanating from the unu wider project on promoting entrepreneurial capacity which integrates the disciplines of entrepreneurship and development economics these contributions model and explore the role of the entrepreneur in key areas of concern for development economics such as structural change and economic growth income and wealth inequalities welfare poverty traps and market failures this introduction discusses and contextualizes these various contributions and their implications for further theoretical and empirical work

reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

skin in the game and moral hazard what determines securitization levels and should they be regulated to address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling abs to rational investors absent regulation originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high effort incentives are below first best absent regulation optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort

the two views of small firms in industry dynamics a reconciliation abstract recent empirical studies show that small firms are confronted with a lower likelihood of survival than their larger counterparts an alternative view is that small firms can overcome inherent size disadvantages by occupying strategic niches this paper offers empirical evidence in the context of product life cycles suggesting that the relationship between firm size and the likelihood of survival is shaped by the stage of the industry life cycle and that both views of small firm survival relative to large firms are correct

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

securitization and bank performance theory suggests that securitization provides financial institutions with an opportunity to lower the cost of funding improve credit risk management and increase profitability in practice however it might lead to adverse consequences through a number of indirect channels therefore the net impact of securitization on bank performance is ambiguous this study aims to evaluate whether banks improve their performance through the use of the securitization market by applying a propensity score matching approach in other words we build a counterfactual group of banks to assess what would have happened to the securitizing banks had they not securitized using us commercial banking data from 2001 to 2008 we first test these hypotheses using univariate analysis and find that securitizing banks are on average more profitable institutions with higher credit risk exposure and higher cost of funding however the propensity score matching analysis does not provide evidence of significant causal effects of securitization on the performance of banks therefore securitization does not seem to outperform alternative funding risk management and profitability improvement techniques used by banks that have ex ante similar characteristics to those securitizing our evidence raises important questions about the motives for banks increasing securitization activities and consequent implications for the banking system

synthetic or real the equilibrium effects of credit default swaps on bond markets we provide a model of nonredundant credit default swaps cdss building on the observation that cdss have lower trading costs than bonds cds introduction involves a trade off it crowds out existing demand for the bond but improves the bond allocation by allowing long term investors to become levered basis traders and absorb more of the bond supply we characterize conditions under which cds introduction raises bond prices the model predicts a negative cds bond basis as well as turnover and price impact patterns that are consistent with empirical evidence we also show that a ban on naked cdss can raise borrowing costs

housing price booms and crowding out effects in bank lending analyzing the period 1988 2006 we document that banks that are active in strong housing markets increase mortgage lending and decrease commercial lending firms that borrow from these banks have significantly lower investment this is especially pronounced for firms that are more capital constrained or borrow from more constrained banks various extensions and robustness analyses are consistent with the interpretation that commercial loans were crowded out by banks responding to profitable opportunities in mortgage lending rather than with a demand based interpretation the results suggest that housing prices appreciations have negative spillovers to the real economy which were overlooked thus far received november 29 2016 editorial decision january 12 2018 by editor david hirshleifer authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

ownership structure speculation and shareholder intervention an institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading speculation and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance intervention increases the value of the institution s existing shareholdings but intervention only increases the institution s trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution s information relative to that of uninformed traders thus the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention we examine key factors that affect the intervention decision the usefulness of short swing provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention and implications for ownership structure across different firms institutional investors hold an ever greater fraction of corporate america s equity traditionally these institutions were stock pickers who tried to beat the market through trading if a firm whose stock they held seemed headed for trouble these investors headed for the door the wall street rule more recently some of these institutions have been using the ownership rights attached to their shares to pressure firms to act in the shareholders interest some have even argued that there is a synergy between gathering information for use in trading shares speculation and intelligently pressuring firms to improve performance intervention we argue that these motives can also conflict analyzing these motives allows us to predict which firms are most likely to attract institutional intervention which in turn has crosssectional implications for firm ownership structure recent examples suggest that institutional investors with large stakes sometimes intervene and sometimes follow the wall street rule so that there is indeed a choice to be studied in the early 1990s there was a wave of activism by a variety of large institutional investors among them calpers the california public employees pension fund putnam management a mutual fund manager and j p morgan a bank holding company these institu

modeling productive entrepreneurship in developing countries this paper develops a model of entrepreneurial start ups in an economy with costly firm creation costly entry to the skilled labor market and a mismatch between skilled workers and available jobs as prevailing in many developing countries it examines several mitigating policies such as improving the business environment reducing tax rates and cost of starting business and subsidizing entrepreneurial search and skilled employment to be effective policies need to target the most binding constraints to productive entrepreneurship when the constraints are on the side of firms search subsidies would be more effective in encouraging productive start ups than subsidies to skilled employment although fewer entrepreneurs may choose to operate in the formal sector than under the latter both types of subsidies should be phased out with reforms of the business environment and improved labor markets

the impact of corruption on entry strategy evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies with globalization and the growth in emerging economies multinational enterprises mnes now frequently confront challenges associated with corrupt governments already a growing body of research has demonstrated that corruption significantly reduces a countrys aggregate inflows of foreign direct investment through its effects on firm performance we move the analysis of corruption from aggregate financial flows toward managerial theory and practice by examining how firms adjust their strategy for entering foreign markets in corrupt environments and how different types of corruption affect firms choices building on institutional theory we predict that mnes will respond to pervasive and arbitrary corruption in a host country by selecting particular types of equity and nonequity modes of entry using data on 220 telecommunications development projects in 64 emerging economies we find that firms adapt to the pressures of corruption via short term contracting and entry into joint ventures we also find that the arbitrariness surrounding corrupt transactions has a significant impact on firms decisions in addition to the overall level of corruption in contrast to extant research we show that mnes use nonequity entry modes or partnering as an adaptive strategy to participate in markets despite the presence of corruption

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

public private entanglement entrepreneurship in lebanon s hybrid political order while the literature is clear that political influence and clientelism characterises the investment decisions of entrepreneurs and the performance of their firms when governance is weak it is less understood how governance systems and entrepreneurs interact particularly when governance is of a hybrid nature we address this issue in this paper by studying how entrepreneurs obtain access to electricity in lebanon showing that the hybrid political order imposes a high cost on electricity we furthermore find that a hybrid political order channels entrepreneurial talent into lobbying and bribery the key constraint that emerges from the hybrid political order in this case is the corrupt organisation of governance of the electricity sector this results in higher prices because bribes for contracts have to be earned back in entrenchment of oligopolies because contracts often come with political protection

banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets theories of financial intermediation predict that bank loans should not be marketable because of moral hazard problems banks will not conduct credit risk analysis or monitor borrowers if they are not at risk for failing to perform these services throughout most of history bank loans have not in fact been marketable yet by the end of the 1980 s the amount of commercial and industrial loan sales outstanding had grown to over 250 billion from trivial amounts at the beginning of the decade to explain the opening of this loan sales market we present a model of incentive compatible loan sales that allows for implicit contractual features between loan sellers and loan buyers we then test for the presence of these features using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

the failure of models that predict failure distance incentives and defaults statistical default models widely used to assess default risk fail to account for a change in the relations between different variables resulting from an underlying change in agent behavior we demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997 2006 as the level of securitization increases lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality consistent with this behavior we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors ignoring other credit relevant information as a result among borrowers with similar reported characteristics over time the set that receives loans becomes worse along the unreported information dimension this change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults to illustrate this effect we show that the interest rate on a loan becomes a worse predictor of default as securitization increases moreover a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk could therefore be undermined by the actions of market participants

liquidity management of u s global banks internal capital markets in the great recession abstract the recent crisis highlighted the importance of globally active banks in linking markets one channel for this linkage is through how these banks manage liquidity across their entire banking organization we document that funds regularly flow between parent banks and their affiliates in diverse foreign markets we show that parent banks when hit by a funding shock reallocate liquidity in the organization according to a locational pecking order affiliate locations that are important for the parent bank revenue streams are relatively protected from liquidity reallocations in the organization while traditional funding locations are more extensively used to buffer shocks to the parent bank balance sheets

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

is the first to market the first to fail empirical evidence for industrial goods businesses abstract when entering a new market the first entrant typically faces the greatest market and technological uncertainties memorable phrases reflect the associated survival risk such as the first to market is the first to fail and the pioneer is the one with the arrows in its back although research estimates the market pioneer s survival rate the typical pioneer survival rate has not been compared with that of early followers the authors study compares survival rates for 167 first entrant market pioneers versus 267 early followers for these industrial goods businesses 66 of the pioneers versus 48 of the early followers survived at least ten years the main conclusion is that the pioneer s temporary monopoly over the early followers plus its first mover advantages typically offset the survival risks associated with market and technological uncertainties these results are consistent with previous research in the sense that first mover advantages that increase a pioneer s market share also hel

r d induced industry polarization and shake outs abstract we consider the standard two stage game of r d and cournot competition with ex ante identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that r d is characterized by mildly instead of strongly decreasing returns to scale we establish that only extreme r d levels are possible at equilibrium and that for a broad range of parameters equilibria are asymmetric in r d levels possibly leading one firm to endogenously exit this provides a simple link between returns to scale in r d and industry polarization including shake outs a novelty is that exit may be triggered by positive opportunities in a strategic setting given the original nature of our r d equilibrium a complete welfare analysis is conducted including a possible role for r d subsidies

evolutionary trends of industry variables abstract the paper offers empirical evidence on the evolutionary trends of industry variables it investigates the time path of patents product price and quantity and number of firms from the first introduction of a product to maturity of the market the paper extends earlier work by gort and klepper by expanding the data on products through 1991 and augmenting it with new products and new data sources the reexamination of the aging patterns reveal the gort and klepper results to be robust the time trends follow the expected patterns with remarkable consistency and are strongly significant for most products new evidence on patenting activity reveal an eventual decline in technological activity over the later years of the product market life cycle

entrepreneurship and advancing national level economic efficiency we explore the channels under which entrepreneurship fosters productivity by disentangling its impact on national level economic efficiency and find that more entrepreneurship in aggregate is not always good for economic growth and most importantly identifying the form and activity of entrepreneurship is critical for policy makers to better manage changes in their economies our national level results also suggest that the new product entrepreneurship and to a lesser extent improvement driven opportunity entrepreneurship both significantly contribute to the improvement of national level efficiency however both measures would benefit from further development and it seems a higher coincidence of both is more likely to advance a nation s economic efficiency

distributive justice corruption and entrepreneurial behavior this article introduces equity theory to the economic growth literature to examine whether a relationship exists between perceptions of distributive justice and the productivity of entrepreneurial behavior using survey responses from 317 entrepreneurs in india we find that productive entrepreneurship is positively related to distributive justice perceptions but negatively related to perceptions that corruption is pervasive in contrast nonproductive forms of entrepreneurship are negatively related to distributive justice but positively related to corruption unexpectedly the findings also show that corruption mediates the relationship between distributive justice and legal entrepreneurial behavior while distributive justice mediates the relationship between corruption and illegal entrepreneurial behavior we conclude with a discussion of the study s findings and their implications for entrepreneurship and economic growth

economic performance through time prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1993 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

predator or prey parasitic enterprises in economic development abstract in many developing and transition economies mafia like activities are rampant extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives incorporated in a model of industrialization bimodal club convergence may result economies may get stuck in a predators club characterized by a vicious cycle of poverty and predation societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club poor societies with a high flow of new entrepreneurs however may grow out of the trap and join the rich producers club

surfeiting the appetite may sicken entrepreneurship and happiness do the presence and nature of entrepreneurship impact on national happiness and are nations with happy citizens better for entrepreneurs to start new businesses to provide tentative answers we survey the literature on entrepreneurship and subjective well being and use various data sources to uncover the first evidence of the relationship between entrepreneurship and happiness at the country level we find that opportunity motivated entrepreneurship may contribute to a nation s happiness but only to a certain point at which the effects of happiness begin to decline moreover our results suggest that a nation s happiness affects early stage opportunity driven entrepreneurial activity

outside and inside liquidity we propose an origination and contingent distribution model of banking in which liquidity demand by short term investors can be met with cash reserves inside liquidity or sales of assets outside liquidity to long term investors outside liquidity is a more e cient source but asymmetric information about asset quality can introduce a friction in the form of excessively early asset trading in anticipation of a liquidity shock excessively high cash reserves and too little origination of assets by banks the model captures elements of the current flnancial crisis and yields policy prescriptions on public liquidity provision to overcome liquidity crises

loan sales and the cost of bank capital this paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers bank regulation together with competitive deposit and equity financing can give banks an incentive to sell loans but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral hazard problem a solution is given for the optimal design of the bank loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral hazard problem an explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased banks practice of making loans and then selling them to other institutions and individuals has grown in popularity an important example in the development of loan selling has been the increase in banks mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority of the government national mortgage association gnma and then sold to secondary market investors recently however there has been a dramatic rise in the volume of other types of loans being sold especially by money center banks portions of commercial loans originated by these larger banks are being sold to smaller banks foreign banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in addition banks car loans and credit card receivables have also been pooled and sold to institutions and individuals selling loans that were once considered nonmarketable assets a process that has been termed asset securitization may be signalling the start of a fundamental change in the commercial banking business the leading banks in loan selling operations now view themselves more as originators and distributors of loans rather than as institutions holding loans as assets the potentially large impact of loan sales on the future of commercial banking naturally evokes the question of what incentives exist for banks to sell loans in this paper we show that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and

asymmetric information in securitization an empirical assessment abstract asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages both securitized and not and using a methodology previously applied to insurance data that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability the main finding is that for given observable characteristics securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non securitized ones we show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons

imperfect information transmission from banks to investors macroeconomic implications abstract our goal is to elucidate the interaction of banks screening effort and strategic information production in loan backed asset markets using a general equilibrium framework asset quality is unobserved by investors but banks may purchase error prone ratings the premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of banks screening effort the fact that rating strategies reflect banks private information about asset quality helps keep this premium high conventional regulatory policies interfere with this decision margin thereby reducing signaling value of high ratings and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem we propose a tax subsidy scheme that induces efficiency

introduction to special issue of small business economics on female entrepreneurship in developed and developing economies research into entrepreneurship has for many years been interested in the differences in rate of participation and performance by female entrepreneurs the motivation for considering female entrepreneurship in both developing and developed countries arises from our increasing understanding of the significance of the role of women in creating running and growing businesses as a fundamental driver for economic growth this special issue examines the reasons for differences in gender participation across levels of development using empirical studies

why firms engage in corruption a top management perspective this study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms engagement in corruption building on a survey of 341 executives in india we find that if executives have social ties with government officials their firms are more likely to engage in corruption further these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive the results collectively illustrate the role that executives social ties and perceptions have in shaping illegal actions of their respective firms

the social organization of conspiracy illegal networks in the heavy electrical equipment industry we analyze the social organization of three well known price fixing conspiracies in the heavy electrical equipment industry although aspects of collusion have been studied by industrial organization economists and organizational criminologists the organization of conspiracies has remained virtually unexplored using archival data we reconstruct the actual communication networks involved in conspiracies in switchgear transformers and turbines we find that the structure of illegal networks is driven primarily by the need to maximize concealment rather than the need to maximize efficiency however network structure is also contingent on information processing requirements imposed by product and market characteristics our individual level model predicts verdict guilt or innocence sentence and fine as functions of personal centrality in the illegal network network structure management level and company size people of the same trade seldom meet together but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some diversion to raise prices

grit and self employment a multi country study blending the literatures on grit and self employment we propose the role of grit in separating the self employed from the employed based on a sample of 13 210 respondents from nine countries our results indicate that not only is grit related to self employment but also grit is more strongly related to self employment for risk takers females and younger individuals the findings are robust controlling for several individual characteristics and alternate specifications and have implications for the broader literature on self employment

bank skin in the game and loan contract design evidence from covenant lite loans in a model of dual agency problems where borrower lender and bank nonbank incentives may conflict we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness as bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread we find support for the hockey stick relation with bank s stake in covenant lite loans averaging 8 0 median we also find that covenant lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high

loan sales and relationship banking firms raise money from banks and the bond market banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms optimal financial structure the endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal there is excessive trade in highly rated names and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds we provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets and bond markets further we posit that risk based capital requirements may be socially desirable the term collateralized loan obligations clos was coined in 1989 when corporate loans were first used as collateral in collateralized debt obligations cdos 1 since then the growth in loan sales has been enormous according to lucas et al 2006 1 1 trillion of cdos were outstanding as of 2005 and 50 of their collateral was comprised of loans in addition to pooled securities banks also trade first loss positions on single names through direct sales of individual loans in the united states loan sales have grown from 8 billion in 1991 to 154 8 billion by 2004 2 if a bank securitizes or sells a loan that it originated it is buying insurance on credit events over which it has either more control or more information than the buyer in the face of this informational friction why did the secondary market for corporate loans develop in the 1990s what effect has this had on relationship banking in this paper we characterize when a liquid secondary market for loans arises when a liquid secondary loan market is socially desirable and we provide testable predictions on the effect of the emergence of this market on prices and quantities in bond and primary loan markets our predictions are based on both changes in the parameters that lead to higher loan liquidity and changes in the contracts that are written between banks and firms given this higher liquidity

shadow banks and macroeconomic instability we develop a macroeconomic model in which in which commercial banks can o oad risky loans to a highly levered shadow banking sector and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets we highlight the liquidity creation role played by securitization we show how an endogenous tightening of credit constraints can exacerbate the e ect of shocks by limiting the ability of shadow banks to supply collateral and of banks to securitize the model is able to reproduce the cyclical behavior of bank and non bank credit and leverage macroeconomic shocks that directly impact the worth of financial sector are particularly harmful to economic activity but purely redistributive intra financial shocks can also generate recessions we discuss how government policy can stabilize the securitization market when the shadow banking system becomes impaired

entry exit and diffusion with learning by doing early entry has the advantage of higher revenues per unit of output early on late entry has the benefit of learning from the experience of earlier entrants and hence lower production costs the advantages are balanced off in a continuous time perfect foresight equilibrium competition generates s shaped diffusion and staggered entry and exit a monopolist will innovate less than a competitive industry but the innovation that he does do he will do sooner copyright 1989 by american economic association

institutions transaction costs and economic growth this essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth these obstacles are examined in the context of the political economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth the essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth

phase transitions and emergence of entrepreneurship the transformation of chinese soes over time abstract configurational theory has been a key building block of organizational research an understanding of how certain configurations evolve over time especially during discontinuous changes such as economic transition has been largely a missing link in the literature considering economic transition as a process rather than an outcome this study examined strategic adaptations among chinese soes in two phases 1990 and 2002 findings from two surveys and from interviews revealed that environmental characteristics changed significantly over time and that firms responded with more entrepreneurial strategies aimed at firm growth rather than at satisfying state planners such changes were related to improved performance the study closes by offering implications for research and practice

credit default swaps and the empty creditor problem the empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy we analyze this problem from an ex ante and ex post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps cds we show that cds and the empty creditors they give rise to have important ex ante commitment benefits by strengthening creditors bargaining power they raise the debtor s pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default however we also show that lenders will over insure in equilibrium giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy we discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance jel g30 g32 g33 one of the most significant changes in the debtor creditor relationship in the

short term safety or long term failure empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk based on a sample of u s commercial banks from 2002 to 2012 this paper shows that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on both z scores and the likelihood of bank failure indicating a short term risk reduction and a long term risk increase effect we also find disparate impacts between mortgage and non mortgage securitization loan sale activities are found to have a similar impact to securitization

the life cycle of a competitive industry firm numbers first rise then later fall as an industry evolves this nonmonotonicity is explained using a competitive model in which innovation opportunities fuel entry and relative failure to innovate prompts exit equilibrium time paths for price and quantity also share features of the data the model is estimated using data from the u s automobile tire industry a particularly dramatic example of the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers

counterparty risk in financial contracts should the insured worry about the insurer we analyze the efiect of counterparty risk on insurance contracts using the case of credit risk transfer in banking in addition to the familiar moral hazard problem caused by the insured s ability to in uence the probability of a claim this paper uncovers a new moral hazard problem on the other side of the market we show that the insurer s investment strategy may not be in the best interests of the insured the reason for this is that if the insurer believes it is unlikely that a claim will be made it is advantageous for them to invest in assets which earn higher returns but may not be readily available if needed this paper models both of these moral hazard problems in a unifled framework we flnd that instability in the insurer can create an incentive for the insured to reveal superior information about the risk of their investment in particular a unique separating equilibrium may exist even in the absence of any signalling device this provides one of the main contributions of the paper an example in which cheap talk can achieve separation in an insurance market

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

when shakeout doesn t occur the evolution of the turboprop engine industry abstract a careful case study of the history of the turboprop engine industry 1948 1997 is offered as an example of non shakeout pattern the persistence of high concentration is not associated with the exit of smaller manufacturers but instead a stable coexistence of generalist and specialist strategies emerges in sharp contrast to the pattern observed in the otherwise similar jet engine industry this paper identifies the relevant variables of a more general theory of industry life cycle by taking into account the lack of creation of significant increasing returns in r d manufacturing or marketing all of which are commonly found in industries that produce systemic products

venture capitalists decision policies across three countries an institutional theory perspective this paper examines the influence of economic institutions upon venture capitalists vcs decision policies we conducted policy capturing experiments on 119 vcs across three countries representing distinct economic institutions us mature market economy south korea emerging economy and china transitional economy results show that vcs in rules based market economies us rely upon market information to a greater extent than vcs in emerging economies korea and chinese vcs transitional economy weight human capital factors more heavily than either us or korean vcs findings suggest that although professional institutions may dictate which information is included in vc decision policies the extent to which that information is emphasized is determined partly by the economic institution in which the decision maker operates journal of international business studies 2007 38 691 708 doi 10 1057 palgrave jibs 8400291

the fragility of short term secured funding markets abstract this paper develops an infinite horizon model of financial institutions that borrow short term and invest in long term assets that can be traded in frictionless markets because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation they are subject to potential runs we derive distinct liquidity collateral and asset liquidation constraints which determine whether a run can occur as a result of changing market expectations we show that the extent to which borrowers can ward off an individual run depends on whether it has sufficient liquidity collateral and asset liquidation capacity these determinants depend on the borrower s endogenous balance sheet and on exogenous fundamentals systemic runs are possible if shocks to the valuation of collateral held by outside investors are sufficiently strong and uniform and if the system as a whole is exposed to high short term funding risk the theory has policy implications for prudential regulation and lender of last resort interventions

public trading and private incentives this article studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firm s large shareholder who can affect firm value public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder s activity this increases the latter s incentives to engage in value increasing activities indeed if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed a more informative price rewards him for his activity implications are derived for the decision to go public capital structure and security design we consider a firm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed shares which are publicly traded the block holder is an insider in the sense that he can undertake actions that directly affect the firm s value moreover the insider might not take all value increasing actions as at least some of them involve a private cost for him in other words there is an incentive problem the article s main premise is that public trading as part of the price formation process generates information not only about exogenous factors affecting firm value but also about the insider s activity for instance as a result of public trading a firm s stock price will incorporate the market s evaluation of how a controlling shareholder allocates corporate resources we identify two sources of incentives for the insider to engage in activities that will increase firm value the first one is his stake in the firm since the insider participates in a value increase in proportion to his equity stake a larger stake increases the benefit to him from the firm value being high the view that large shareholders affect firm value is indeed widespread shleifer and vishny 1997 they alleviate the free rider problem pervasive in firms with passive dispersed investors unable or unwilling to affect the firm s operations that is outsiders

securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle l auteur etudie l efficience de la titrisation comme moyen d intermediation financiere a l aide d un modele ou sont formalises des projets d investissement heterogenes et l asymetrie de l information sur la qualite des actifs titrises il montre qu en conservant une partie du risque l emetteur des actifs titrises signale de maniere credible leur qualite

statistical default models and incentives the likelihood that a bank loan will default is of interest to both regulators and investors under the basel ii regulatory guidelines a bank must hold capital in proportion to the riskiness of its assets the probability of default is a pri mary determinant of the riskiness of a loan investors in turn price a loan in the secondary market based on its expected cash flow which again depends on the default probability how should market participants assess the default probability on a pool of bank loans it is natural to consider historical data on loan condi tions and default rates and to estimate a statisti cal model that can be used to predict defaults going forward such statistical models have been widely used across the financial markets to enhance market liquidity and impose capital requirements on financial institutions the accuracy of predictions from statistical models was especially poor in the subprime mortgage market in the period from august 2007 onwards 1 we argue that one cause for this failure was that these models relied entirely on hard information variables and ignored changes in the incentives of lenders to collect soft infor

the monitoring incentive of transactional and relationship lenders evidence from the syndicated loan market we identify a group of lenders specializing in syndicating tradable loans referred to as transactional lenders tls we show that borrowers borrowing from tls experience worse operating performance and more severe credit quality deterioration after loan origination compared to those borrowing from relationship lenders this difference in the postloan issue performance remains robust after controlling for the potential self selection of the lender type or using percentage of traded loans out of all syndicated loans to capture lenders propensity for syndicating tradable loans our results also remains qualitatively the same after we drop various types of risky loans

investment risk cds insurance and firm financing abstract we develop a model in which investment risk drives the demand for cds insurance the model shows the efficiency of cds contracting over the state of the economy it shows that cds overinsurance insurance in excess of renegotiation surpluses is procyclical allowing for greater financing when the probability of default is lower our theory predicts that the incidence of so called empty creditors is largely constrained to firms that are safer face lower bankruptcy costs have more severe management creditor agency problems and whose assets are costlier to verify our analysis generates a number of empirical predictions and provides new insights into the regulation of cds markets

entrepreneurs creativity and firm innovation the moderating role of entrepreneurial self efficacy there are several studies in entrepreneurship investigating determinants of innovation outcomes in smes although entrepreneurs entrepreneurial creativity is often seen as a prerequisite previous research indicates it is not an exclusive determinant of innovation we use theoretical logics of social cognitive theory and innovation theory to develop a conceptual model of entrepreneur s creativity self efficacy and innovation outcomes the model is then tested on a large sample of small and medium firms from two distinct economies the united states and slovenia empirical findings partially support the proposed moderation effects of entrepreneurial self efficacy but with the same variations between countries the implications of these results in relation to entrepreneurship theory and practice are discussed