recursive equilibria in dynamic economies with stochastic production in this paper we prove the existence of recursive equilibria in stochastic production economies with infinitely lived agents and incomplete financial markets we consider a general dynamic model with several commodities which encompasses heterogeneous agent versions of both the lucas asset pricing model and the stochastic neo classical growth model as special cases our main assumption is that there are atomless shocks to fundamentals that have a purely transitory component and a component that does not depend on last period s shocks directly

walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria part i mixed strategies abstract we examine the connection between walrasian equilibria of a limit economy with infinitesimal firms and the noncooperative cournot equilibria of approximating finite economies with significant firms following earlier work of novshek and sonnenschein we allow for set up cost and permit a minimal form of mixed strategies we depart from them by requiring that the aggregate production set exhibits some degree however small of decreasing returns contrasting with their results it is shown that a regular walrasian equilibrium of a limit economy can always be approximated by a sequence of noncooperative equilibria for the tail of the approximating finite economies thus there is a surprising qualitative discontinuity when one passes from the novshek sonnenschein case of aggregate constant returns to scale of the decreasing returns case of this paper

the regulation of non point source pollution and risk preferences an experimental approach many environmental problems notably arising from agriculture can be classified as non point source pollution problems in this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms designed to deal with such problems collective fining random fining and a tax subsidy scheme we find that the fining schemes induce under abatement a feature being enforced with experience we further elicit the participants risk attitude and show that the performance of collective fining is not affected by the subjects risk preferences under a system based on random fining the performance of the mechanism worsens in the presence of risk seeking subjects however coordination on over abatement under the tax subsidy can be alleviated if subjects are risk averse c 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

prices and investment with collateral and default abstract this paper uses the framework of an olg economy with three period lived agents in which a durable good serves as collateral for loans to study the effect of an unanticipated income shock when the economy is in a steady state equilibrium we focus on the consequence of default on loans when the value of the collateral falls below the value of the debt it secures we analyze the impulse response functions of the price and production of the durable good and show that there is an asymmetry between the response of the price and investment of the durable good to a positive and a negative income shock arising from default on the collateralized loans we show that this asymmetry can be seen in the data on housing prices and construction and is attributable to the default on mortgages in periods of decreasing prices which acts as a turbo mechanism magnifying the decline in investment

optimal penal codes in price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper constructs optimal pure strategy penal codes for a broad class of symmetric bertrand supergames with capacity constraints the results should simplify the analysis of bertrand supergames because the punishments comprising the penal codes constructed below have a very simple form and the associated payoffs are often easy to calculate it is also shown that for a commonly employed subclass of the games considered the admission of mixed strategies does not allow severer punishments the analysis draws heavily on the pathbreaking work of abreu 1984 he demonstrated that in the search for optimal penal codes attention can be restricted to simple penal codes simple penal codes are characterized by a vector of outcome paths one for each player the ith outcome path is interpreted as the punishment to be imposed on the ith player if he deviates from the equilibrium path or from any punishment path section 2 explains the basic framework of analysis the class of bertrand games studied is very general no particular rationing rule is imposed some mild restrictions are placed on the firms sales functions instead the commonly used models of levitan and shubik 1972 and beckman 1965 are special cases of the games analysed below it is assumed throughout that there is a price firms can be induced to charge if the punishment for charging a different price gives the offending firm a payoff equal to its security level for the supergame thus either there must exist a static nash equilibrium in pure strategies or else the discount factor must not be too close to zero in section 3 optimal penal codes are constructed and it is established that the punishments comprising them always drive punished firms to their security levels the arguments employed make clear that optimal penal codes are not generally unique this issue is addressed in section 4 where it is also shown that the levitan shubik rationing rule exhibits more types of optimal penal codes than do other rules in particular if the levitan shubik rule is employed then punishments that are analogous to abreu s 1986 symmetric two phase punishments for cournot games can be used to construct optimal penal codes in bertrand games this property does not hold generally however

optimal symmetric punishments in a bertrand differentiated products duopoly abstract this paper studies how product differentiation affects collusive pricing in a duopoly when products are horizontally differentiated and firms compete in prices in contrast to earlier work the punishment mechanism supporting collusion is assumed to be the optimal symmetric punishment proposed by abreu 1986 journal of economic theory 39 191 225 such punishments have previously been characterized only for cournot oligopolies and for bertrand oligopolies with capacity constraints the optimal symmetric punishment turns out to have a simple two phase structure after one period of an intense price war firms return to the collusive outcome if prices are restricted to be non negative and the discount factor is large the price war will be extended to more than one period the best collusive price is shown to be lower the more substitutable are products

mueller s profits in the long run mueller uses a measure of persistent or long run interfirm differences in profitability obtained by estimating a separate time series model for each firm to reexamine this question his results are quite different from those obtained from cross sections of annual profit rates and the differences shed new light on old issues moreover in describing and analyzing the separate profit series and in comparing the cross sectional with the time averaged results mueller focuses attention on the dynamics of the profit process and the relative importance of the different factors that affect it as a result the careful reader will come away from this book with a set of questions that just might lie at the heart of the debate about profitability movements among manufacturing firms and that ought at least in part to be analyzable with currently available tools and data i have divided my review into four sections first i outline mueller s model and consider its relationship to other recent work on profitability differences next i summarize mueller s empirical results both the more descriptive time series results and the estimates of his model and then i provide a brief comparison with the results schmalensee 1985 and ravenscraft 1983 obtain on the determinants of cross sectional profitability differences any ultimate reconciliation of the different findings and any more detailed analysis of their implications will require a deeper understanding of the factors causing profitability movements over time the last section of this review considers the dynamic issues on which mueller and his results focus attention and discusses the models that seem appropriate for analyzing them it is clear that further empirical work on these issues must make some allowance for mergers and acquisitions on the one hand and bankruptcies and liquidations on the other the review concludes by explaining why this is so and by considering how it might be done

international financial integration and crisis contagion international financial integration helps to diversify risk but also may spread crises across countries we provide a quantitative analysis of this trade off in a two country general equilibrium model with collateral constrained borrowing using a global solution method borrowing constraints bind occasionally depending upon the state of the economy and levels of inherited debt we examine different degrees of international financial integration moving from financial autarky to bond and equity market integration financial integration leads to a significant increase in global leverage substantially escalates the probability of crises for any one country and dramatically increases the degree of contagion across countries outside of crises the impact of financial integration on macroeconomic aggregates is relatively small but the impact of a crisis with integrated international financial markets is much less severe than that under financial market autarky thus a trade off emerges between the probability of crises and the severity of crises using a large cross country database of financial crises in developing and developed economies over a forty year period we find evidence in support of the model

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

plant closings and exit behaviour in declining industries the plant closing and exit strategies of firms operating in a declining industry are examined a dynamic game theoretic model is utilized the perfectness criterion is used to restrict the set of nash equilibria there are two key equilibrium results first when firms have the same number of plants high cost plants close before lower cost plants second a larger firm i e a firm operating more plants begins closing plants before a smaller firm as long as cost differences are not large copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

collateral avoids ponzi schemes in incomplete markets without introducing either debt constraints or transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of ponzi schemes we show the existence of equilibrium in an infinite horizon incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure

securitized markets international capital flows and global welfare we study the effect of collateralized lending and securitization on the global supply of securitized assets welfare and international net and gross capital flows in a two country general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic investment risk the financial sectors in the two countries home and foreign differ by the collateral requirement for investment loans with home requiring lower margins in autarky home endogenously supplies more assets and enables more risk sharing upon financial integration capital flows from foreign to home leading to lower interest rates and an increase in the global supply of assets foreign enjoys substantial welfare gains through better risk sharing and portfolio reallocation while the welfare experience for home is ambiguous gross capital flows arise when agents face aggregate shocks to the expected payoff to investment projects but can collapse when shocks concern the variance of returns

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

approximate versus exact equilibria in dynamic economies this paper develops theoretical foundations for an error analysis of approximate equilibria in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets while there are several algorithms that compute prices and allocations for which agents first order conditions are approximately satisfied approximate equilibria there are few results on h interpret the errors in these candidate solutions and how to relate the computed allocations and prices to exact equilibrium allocations and prices we give a simple example to illustrate that approximate equilibria might be very far from exact equilibria we then interpret approximate equilibria as equilibria for close by economies that is for economies with close by individual endowments and preferences

financial intermediation house prices and the welfare effects of the u s great recession abstract this paper quantifies the welfare costs of the great recession in the united states and their distribution between borrowing and saving households we use a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with shocks to aggregate income and to the financial intermediation sector the model matches the boom bust cycle in house prices the dynamics of household leverage and the increase in inequality of wealth observed in the u s after 2007 we find large welfare costs for financially constrained households the borrowers savers instead benefited from a redistribution of housing wealth due to the de leveraging of borrowers caused by the plunge in house prices this redistribution mechanism was exacerbated by the financial intermediation shock we also show that the welfare costs for borrowers would have been lower if aggregate leverage had remained at pre 2001 levels

bertrand the cournot paradigm and the theory of perfect competition in this paper we extend to a general equilibrium context bertrand s classic critique of cournot we present a game theoretic model of a pure exchange monetary economy in which buyers as well as sellers announce both quantities and prices when buyers act strategically the edgeworth nonexistence problem is circumvented under weak conditions a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists for this game we make precise the bertrand idea that when agents in a finite economy are permitted to compete by price the resulting allocations will be competitive specifically the nash equilibria for our game yield allocations that are competitive allocations for the underlying exchange economy provided that there are at least two buyers and two sellers actively trading in every market under this characterization of strategic behaviour then two is enough for competition our objective is to provide a general equilibrium game theoretic formulation of the idea of bertrand price competition bertrand s classic critique of cournot can be paraphrased as follows when agents regard price rather than quantity as the strategic variable no price above the competitive equilibrium price can be sustained as a noncooperative equilibrium this idea is made precise in our game theoretic model of a pure exchange economy in which buyers as well as sellers act strategically our treatment of buyers behaviour is novel while sellers announce price and quantity vectors buyers specify sums of money and menus of alternative nonmonetary commodity bundles a buyer s action is a commitment to purchase any one of the specified commodity bundles in exchange for the sum of money our first result is that under weak conditions a nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists the paper thus also points to a way of resolving the classical edgeworth nonexistence problem second all nash equilibria yield allocations that are competitive for the underlying economy provided that in every market at least two buyers and two sellers are actively trading under this characterization of strategic

regulating collateral requirements when markets are incomplete in this paper we examine the eects of default and collateral on risk sharing we assume that there is a large set of assets which all promise a risk less payo but which distinguish themselves by their collateral requirements in equilibrium agents default the assets have dierent payos and there are as many linearly independent assets available for trade as there are states of the world we derive necessary and sucient conditions for equilibria to be pareto ecient in the presence of uncertainty we explore some examples for which the collateral equilibrium allocation is identical to the arrow debreu allocation either when agents have a high preference for the durable good or when the endowment distribution of the durable good is relatively homogeneous we examine a series of examples to understand which collateral levels prevail in equilibrium and under which conditions there is scope for regulating margin requirements that is restricting the sets of tradable assets through government intervention in these examples equilibrium is always sub optimal but regulation never leads to a pareto improvement while the competitive equilibria are constrained ecient there do exist regulations which make large

how should commodities be taxed a supergame theoretic analysis abstract this paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets we consider both a cournot and a bertrand supergame with discounting with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick and carrot optimal punishments we show that irrespective of firms choice variable and under both punishment schemes increased reliance on ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement contrary to the conventional wisdom according to which ad valorem taxation should be preferred on welfare grounds we find that welfare under specific taxation might be higher than welfare under ad valorem taxation the main conclusion of our analysis is that traditional welfare results on the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation based on static models do not necessarily survive in a dynamic setting where the possibility of collusion among firms is taken into account in response to an increase in the ad valorem tax rate sufficiently patient firms might find it rational to form an implicit cartel which would not have existed otherwise

price quantity strategic market games this paper is yet another in a rapidly growing series e g 2 11 on strategic approaches to economic equilibrium our aim here is to make precise the remark implicitly due to bertrand 1 or 10 ch 4 5 that if the agents in an economy use price setting strategies then the strategic nash equilibria will in fact be walrasian and this without any assumption of a large number of small agents however in our models not only prices but also quantities are set by the agents thus it might actually be more appropriate to call them bertrand cournot types of models we begin with a standard walras exchange economy with a finite number of traders and commodities this is recast as a game in strategic form in essentially two different ways there is a trading post for each commodity to which traders send contingent statements about how much they wish to buy and sell and at what prices in model 1 the trading point is determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply and demand curves in model 2 trade takes place so as to meet as many contingent statements as possible each buyer whose orders are filled pays the price he quoted using a fiat money which can be borrowed costlessly and limitlessly but after trade is over there is a settlement of accounts and a penalty is levied on those who are bankrupt no attempt is made to model the penalty in any detail it is simply described in the form of a disutility but this in turn may be imagined to stem from confiscation of assets see remark 5 or the necessity of procuring highly priced loans etc call a noncooperative equilibrium active if it turns out that no trader is isolated i e trapped as the sole buyer or seller at some trading post then our results may be described as follows in model 1 the active2 n e of the game coincide with the c e of the market furthermore there is a subset of tight active n e which also coincide with the c e and each n e in this subset is strong

note performance evaluation of state owned enterprises a process perspective state owned enterprises soes have become important instruments of social and economic policy in industrialized mixed economies and in developing countries the use of soes as instruments of public policy and the resulting clashes between these enterprises and private firms on the one hand and government and other controllers on the other are causing concern public committees in different countries as well as international organizations have been searching for positive theory for guidance in handling the multitude of problems related to these enterprises theoretical models have made important contributions to the formalization of certain problems and the classification of the information needed to solve them unfortunately these theoretical models have had little relevance for the solution of important real problems much of the research on soes is concerned with how these enterprises should behave and what should be the product of their operations almost no research has been done on why soes function as they do the paucity of knowledge about the operation of soes stems both from insufficient research effort and from the concern of researchers with formal structures and products of these organizations and not with management behavior or with decision processes the purpose of this paper is to call for research beyond the confines of traditional economics using the tools of management science to obtain insights into the difficult but salient problems of soes

research joint ventures product differentiation and price collusion abstract we investigate the interplay between firms decisions in product development either joint or independent and their ensuing repeated pricing either collusive or bertrand nash a joint venture develops a single product whereas independent ventures develop their respective products which can be differentiated we prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion whilst firms r d decisions have no bearings on collusive sustainability if differentiation is vertical we also discover the non monotone dependence of firms venture decisions at the development stage upon their time preferences as well as upon consumers willingness to pay

a two period model with portfolio choice understanding results from different solution methods using a stylized two period model we compare portfolio solutions from two local solution approaches the approach of judd and guu 2001 and the approach of devereux and sutherland 2010 2011 with the true nonlinear portfolio solution

the method of endogenous gridpoints with occasionally binding constraints among endogenous variables we show how the method of endogenous gridpoints can be extended to solve models with occasionally binding constraints among endogenous variables very efficiently we present the method for a consumer problem with occasionally binding collateral constraints and non separable utility in durable and non durable consumption this problem allows for a joint analysis of durable and non durable consumption in models with uninsurable income risk which is important to understand patterns of consumption saving and collateralized debt we illustrate the algorithm and its efficiency by calibrating the model to us data

optimal punishments with detection lags abstract in this note we characterize optimal two phase punishments in the presence of an n period detection lag i e when cheating on an implicit agreement can be kept secret for a certain time period two simple applications are also provided

on the detection of collusion and predation abstract this lecture not only shows how game theory can contribute to the detection of collusion and predation but also how experts for the defense can use game theoretic arguments to make such detection difficult a few important european anti trust cases are discussed to illustrate

wealth dynamics in a bond economy with heterogeneous beliefs two types of agents have diverse beliefs about the law of motion for an exogenous endowment one knows the true process and the other learns about it via bayes theorem financial market structure affects the dynamics of the wealth distribution when markets are complete the learning agent loses wealth as in blume and easley 2006 the absence of markets for some arrow securities alters the direction in which wealth is transferred when the only traded asset is a risk free bond the learning agent accumulates wealth both agents survive and the more knowledgeable agent is driven to his debt limit

collateral requirements and asset prices many assets derive their value not only from future cash flows but also from their ability to serve as collateral in this article we investigate this collateral premium and its impact on asset returns in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents we document that borrowing against collateral substantially increases the return volatility of long lived assets moreover otherwise identical assets with different degrees of collateralizability exhibit substantially different return dynamics because their prices contain a sizable collateral premium that varies over time this premium can be positive even for assets that never pay dividends

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly this paper uses data presented in a report of the monopolies and mergers commission on the market for white salt to test the implications of some recent developments in oligopoly theory the market in question is a homogeneous price setting duopoly where firms are subject to capacity constraints we find that the conclusions of models based on one shot non cooperative games do not hold collusion in the market is readily explained by the types of threat strategies underlying abreu s simple penal codes possible explanations of the collusive equilibrium in terms of joint profit maximization are not supported by the data indeed the explanation of the equilibrium remains an open question copyright 1993 by royal economic society

the suboptimality of optimal punishments in cournot supergames we investigate within a cournot supergame whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible we show that for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes

international portfolios a comparison of solution methods we compare the performance of the perturbation based local portfolio solution method of devereux sutherland 2010a 2011 with a global solution method as a test suite we use model specifications that broadly capture features of international financial trade between advanced economies and between advanced and emerging economies we consider both symmetric country setups and asymmetric setups that capture important empirical facts such as differences in macroeconomic volatility differences in portfolio composition and high equity premia we find that the local method performs well at business cycle frequencies both in the symmetric and asymmetric settings while significant differences arise at long horizons in asymmetric settings

slack in the state owned enterprise an evaluation of the impact of soft budget constraints abstract in this paper slack in resource utilization is estimated using data envelopment analysis for a sample of 67 indian state owned 63 private sector and 27 foreign owned enterprises on a comparative basis the study is cross sectional and carried out for the year 1991 to assess how far the operation of soft budget constraints has had an impact on the economic performance of indian firms particularly operated as state owned enterprises specifically the presence of debt capital provided primarily by government owned financial institutions is strongly and negatively related to performance the results show that if firms turn out to be all equally efficient then average materials costs human capital usage costs costs associated with other operating items and physical capital usage by each state owned enterprise sampled can be reduced by rs 203 million rs 201 million rs 53 million and rs 255 million respectively if existing levels of inputs are used efficiently then the average addition to the value of output by each state owned enterprise can rise by rs 693 million the analyses reveal significant slack in resource utilization in indian state owned firms resulting from soft budget constraints and the implications of the existence of slack are discussed

international capital flows portfolio composition and the stability of external imbalances abstract this paper develops a simple and tractable model of net capital flows in which time varying gross country portfolios are an essential element in current account imbalances the main constituents of country portfolios in the model are general derivatives which could be interpreted as nominal bond assets and liabilities in particular under very weak conditions the world wealth distribution is stationary stationarity is generated by movements in derivative i e bond risk premia such that the return on a debtor country s gross liabilities is less than the return on its gross assets this is well known feature of the us international investment position we also provide suggestive evidence that a similar property holds more widely for a sample of advanced and emerging market countries

endogenous leverage and asset pricing in double auctions abstract we propose a double auction mechanism for the exchange of leveraged assets and bonds in an agent based model in this framework we validate recent results in general equilibrium theory about endogenous leverage and its consequences for asset pricing we find that the institutional details of exchange are critical for a good match between the theoretical equilibrium state and the final state of the double auction specifically the outcome of the double auction is sensitive to the details of how markets for debt and collateral are coordinated and how collateral is cleared when trade is restricted to neighbours in a network final prices and allocations are significantly different from unrestricted equilibrium

dynamic competitive economies with complete markets and collateral constraints in this article we examine the competitive equilibria of a dynamic stochastic economy with complete markets and collateral constraints we show that provided the sets of asset pay offs and of collateral levels are sufficiently rich the equilibrium allocations with sequential trades and collateral constraints are equivalent to those obtained in arrow debreu markets subject to a series of limited pledgeability constraints we provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be pareto efficient and show that when collateral is scarce equilibria are not only pareto inefficient but also often constrained inefficient in the sense that imposing tighter borrowing restrictions can make everybody in the economy better off we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of markov equilibria and for the case of two agents for the existence of equilibria that have finite support these equilibria can be computed with arbitrary accuracy and the model is very tractable

a case for incomplete markets we propose a new welfare criterion that allows us to rank alternative financial market structures in the presence of belief heterogeneity we analyze economies with complete and incomplete financial markets and or restricted trading possibilities in the form of borrowing limits or transaction costs we describe circumstances under which various restrictions on financial markets are desirable according to our welfare criterion

collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle this paper investigates the efiect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand uctuations in the absence of capacity constraints i e a limiting case of our model haltiwanger and harrington 1991 show that flrms flnd it more di cult to collude during periods of decreasing demand we flnd that this prediction can be overturned if flrms capacities are su ciently small capacity constraints imply that punishment proflts move procyclically so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive proflts are rising haltiwanger and harrington s main prediction remains valid for su ciently large capacities

aggregate efficiency market demand and the sustainability of collusion this paper studies the effects of firms aggregate efficiency and the level of demand on collusion collusion is more difficult in markets where aggregate efficiency i e the ability of firms to profitably produce at prices exceeding the cournot price is large relative to the level of demand

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

portfolio and welfare consequences of debt market dominance the ability to issue debt that pays in units of the domestic good leads a country to accumulate a large and negative net foreign asset position while maintaining a positive position in equity this debt market advantage also helps to explain the weak relationship between the real exchange rate and relative consumption our stylized model matches the key facts about the u s international portfolio the u s real exchange rate and explains nearly 50 of the observed variation in the valuation effects we find that taxing bond market transactions increases the volatility of the exchange rate capital flows and allocations in contrast taxing equity positions stabilizes the exchange rate and capital flows while having little impact on the allocation lastly the paper describes a global solution method for portfolio problems under incomplete markets

managerial autonomy of state owned enterprises determining factors the present paper reports on managerial autonomy of state owned enterprises soes or its reverse the control which is exerted by government and supervising public authorities on soes first it examines the types of control applied using evidence from a sample of 110 greek soes the paper identifies certain distinct dimensions of control related to strategic business boundary issues pricing decisions resource acquisition and mobilisation issues second environmental and organisational determinants of the control intensity are identified results broadly suggest that the intensity of control as perceived by enterprise managers is i positively related to dependence on the state for resources to enterprise size and to political visibility i e social orientation of product market strategy and ii negatively related to market competition and demand unpredictability an interpretation of the results is attempted drawing on wider organisational social and economic theories policy implications are discussed

financial integration and growth in a risky world abstract we revisit the debate on the benefits of financial integration in a two country neoclassical growth model with aggregate uncertainty the framework accounts simultaneously for gains from a more efficient capital allocation and gains from risk sharing together with their interaction global numerical methods allow for meaningful welfare comparisons gains from integration are quantitatively small even for riskier and capital scarce emerging economies these countries import capital for efficiency reasons before exporting it for self insurance leading to capital flows and growth reversals along the transition this opens the door to richer empirical implications than previously considered in the literature

phasing out the gses we develop a new model of the mortgage market where both borrowers and lenders can default risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers the government plays a crucial role by providing both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations as well as to high financial sector leverage mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries balance sheets increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee crowds in the private sector reduces financial fragility leads to fewer but safer mortgages lowers house prices and raises mortgage and risk free interest rates due to a more robust financial sector consumption smoothing improves and aggregate welfare increases while borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees savers are substantially better off while aggregate welfare increases so does wealth inequality jel g12 g15 f31

on the feasibility of maximal collusion abstract this note explores when joint profit maximizing behavior between firms can be supported by arbitrary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies we show that for a large class of games maximal collusion is feasible if and only if a simple discount parameter condition is satisfied

collusion and heterogeneity of firms we examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic bertrand competition we show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting first we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold with or without capacity constraints next we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria in the long run the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market

weaving together the normative and regulative roles of government how the norwegian sovereign wealth fund s responsible conduct is shaping firms cross border investments based on institutional theory i extend research on the regulative role of national government in society and suggest that government exerts important influences on firms actions through the diffusion of norms i suggest that the norwegian government by instituting an ethical council that publicly censors and certifies the cross border investments of the norwegian sovereign wealth fund government pension fund global contributes to the professionalization of responsible investment principles and thus plays a normative role in shaping firms investments employing a quasi natural experiment i find that focal norwegian firms are more likely to make responsible cross border investments following the formation of the council on ethics in 2004 and its associated censorship announcements further i find that the normative pressure for responsible investments is mediated by firms imitation or overlap with the norwegian sovereign wealth fund s investments however the mediated effect of normative pressure on responsible investments becomes weaker for government owned firms these findings highlight the importance of normative mechanisms through which government can influence firms behavior especially in contexts where regulatory authority may not hold moreover these findings reveal the interplay among the normative mimetic and regulative pressures and the heterogeneity in the extent to which firms within the same country demonstrate institutional isomorphism

statistical arbitrage with default and collateral abstract this paper studies the implications of the absence of statistical arbitrage opportunities in a two period incomplete market economy where default is allowed but there are collateral requirements modified versions of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing are obtained

dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer we analyze a simple dynamic durable good model two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game we solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the necessarily mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller a buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller

collateral constraints and asset prices abstract we study the effects of collateral constraints in an economy populated by investors with nonpledgeable labor incomes and heterogeneous preferences and beliefs we show that these constraints inflate stock prices and generate spikes and crashes in price dividend ratios and volatilities clustering of volatilities and leverage cycles they also lead to substantial decreases in interest rates and increases in sharpe ratios when investors are anxious about hitting constraints due to production crises in the economy furthermore stock prices have large collateral premiums over nonpledgeable incomes we derive asset prices and stationary distributions of the investors consumption shares in closed form

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

tacit collusion in repeated auctions uniform versus discriminatory within an infinitely repeated game i compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions for this purpose i characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats i show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats but bidders deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the payoff irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem this discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in england wales and elsewhere

market size and substitutability in imperfect competition a bertrand edgeworth chamberlin model competition is often associated with the idea that there are many traders in the market or that each price maker is small as compared to the market this paper introduces this notion of market size in a model of price competition with imperfect substitutes by constructing a model which creates a bridge between the chamberlin and bertrand edge worth lines of work on price competition we investigate the role of two fundamental parameters in the existence of an equilibrium the market size given by the number n of competitors and the degree of substitutability we prove that a for a given number of n 2 of competitors a sufficiently large but finite degree of substitutability entails nonexistence this thus generalizes the bertrand edgeworth nonexistence result which applies only to perfect substitutes b conversely for a given upper bound on the degree of substitutability a sufficiently large number of competitors ensures existence which thus introduces a significant role for market size in models of imperfect competition we finally investigate the proximity of an equilibrium when it exists to a competitive outcome and we find that both high substitutability and large market size are a condition for competitiveness

prisoners dilemma in duopoly super games abstract the choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here it is shown that this relocates the prisoners dilemma backward from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion and where discount rates appear as the payoffs likewise a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior cooperative or non cooperative are simultaneously chosen journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

profit sharing with workers facilitates collusion among firms we show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand we first show that firm profits can always be increased by tying wages to market conditions the optimal agreement takes the form of an option and features partial sharing because increased sharing raises the expected price wage differential but reduces price wage variability we then show that given any cartel there exist market conditions such that simply giving some expected profit to workers raises expected firm profits via the transfer s impact on the incentive to cheat on the cartel

collateral once again abstract this paper shows how collateral is used to prove the second part of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in a collateral default setting which connects the concept of an arbitrage free price with the solution of the individual utility maximization problem

asset shortages liquidity and speculative bubbles abstract we study the effect of asset shortages on liquidity in economies with limited enforcement of debt contracts we establish that under a suitable assumption in terms of gains from trade liquidity does not dry up and trading volumes do not disappear as credit conditions worsen the equilibrium outcome becomes arbitrarily close to a purely speculative equilibrium and bubbles occur in the limit the result applies to incomplete markets and more generally to equilibria where collateral constraints interfere with the additivity of the payoff pricing functional

walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria part ii pure strategies abstract we examine the connection between walrasian equilibria of a limit economy with infinitesimal firms and noncooperative cournot equilibria of approximating finite economies with significant firms nonconvex production sets decreasing returns in the aggregate and endogenous determination of the number of active firms are allowed a walrasian equilibrium is a limit of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria only if a condition loosely analogous to downward sloping demand in the partial equilibrium constant returns to scale case holds the condition is also sufficient to guarantee the existence of a robust sequence of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria which converges to the walrasian equilibrium

privatization not the only answer abstract governments in many developing countries created state owned enterprises soes to produce goods or provide services the private sector seemed unwilling or unable to offer in many cases soes have turned out to be problem children at best inefficient and at worst unable to fulfill their original functions now the recommended solution to the problem of state owned enterprises is privatization but privatization is no more a solution to the problems of soes than soes were a solution to the problems they were created to solve the problem of soes is not ownership but rather a lack of explicit goals and objectives and an absence of organization cultures and systems that support and encourage fulfillment of those goals and objectives in some circumstances privatization may aid in fulfillment of an enterprise s goals and objectives because of the culture and systems it fosters in other cases not

stationary equilibria in asset pricing models with incomplete markets and collateral we consider an infinite horizon exchange economy with incomplete markets and collateral constraints as in the two period model of geanakoplos and zame 2002 households can default on their liabilities at any time and financial securities are only traded if the promises associated with these securities are backed by collateral we examine an economy with a single perishable consumption good where the only collateral available consists of productive assets in this model competitive equilibria always exist and we show that under the assumption that all exogenous variables follow a markov chain there also exist stationary equilibria these equilibria can be characterized by a mapping from the exogenous shock and the current distribution of financial wealth to prices and portfolio choices we develop an algorithm to approximate this mapping numerically and discuss ways to implement the algorithm in practice a computational example demonstrates the performance of the algorithm and shows some quantitative features of equilibria in a model with collateral and default

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

investment planning and arm s length control in a nationalised industry applying a relatively decentralised system of control which would keep state owned enterprises soe at arm s length from ministerial departments has been a stated policy for many governments around the world however the specific controls typically used for implementing this policy have seldom been successful the purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate certain of these controls drawing upon the british system of arm s length control of nationalised industries in order to delimit the problem the paper cuts across the government soe relationship from the perspective of investment planning using primary information from the capital investment process in a particular nationalised industry the paper searches for evidence on whether and in what ways existing controls have not been successful three types of controls are investigated 1 the economic and financial groundrules which are supposed to simulate a competitive business style efficiency these rules are often assumed to act as an invisible hand limiting direct government control 2 the direct investment review in the framework of the wider public sector expenditure survey in discussing the nature of this review the paper examines whether government approval of investment conforms to an incrementalist or muddling through model it further considers the role for incremental methods in controlling soe investment 3 the attempt to use corporate planning as a control instrument evidence from internal control processes within the enterprise and in particular the review of investment by a central executive is used in order to evaluate the above controls this serves to show the diffuse character of the planning process and the possibilities and limitations of using similar controls at the government level suggestions are put forward for strengthening these forms of control by modifying or reinforcing certain elements within the existing arm s length framework the paper would be useful for evaulating the difficulties involved in establishing some form of orderlines and formalisation in government soe relationships it shows some of the weaknesses associated with certain technocratic rules and solutions to public policy problems in this environment

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

margin regulation and volatility an infinite horizon asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints can explain why adjustments in stock market margins under us regulation t had an economically insignificant impact on market volatility in the model raising the margin requirement for one asset class may barely affect its volatility if investors have access to another unregulated class of collateralizable assets through spillovers however the volatility of the other asset class may substantially decrease a very strong dampening effect on all assets return volatilities can be achieved by a countercyclical regulation of all markets

collusive price leadership with capacity constraints abstract in this paper collusive price leadership in homogeneous good capacity constrained repeated price competition is examined in the stage game firms choose their timing of price setting although setting a price early is disadvantageous per se a large firm has an incentive to move early in order to demonstrate its commitment not to deviate if the discount factor is not too large this behavior raises the collusive price compared to that arising in collusion with simultaneous moves as a result all firms obtain strictly higher profits

performance evaluation of state owned enterprises in theory and practice this study explores the goal orientation of state owned enterprises soes with a view to develop a behavioral theory of soes it is set in india where as in many other countries the government expects soes to promote the public interest rather than maximize profits the research design consisted in searching for patterns in the subjective evaluations of a set of indian soes by critical environmental actors senior bureaucrats and influential journalists the study attempted to get at each respondent s espoused theory for performance evaluation as well as his or her theory in use and compared both with official goals as well as the prescriptions of welfare economists five models of performance evaluation varying in criteria and weighting schemes were considered the results showed with surprising consistency that commercial profitability was the most important criterion that explained bureaucrats subjective evaluations lack of comprehensive information seemed to accentuate their reliance on profitability but not by very much for a minority of bureaucrats type 1 the more important explanation seemed to be their incorrect belief that soes could be judged like private firms official policy notwithstanding for the majority type 2 who espoused views consistent with official policy the explanation seemed to be conceptual confusion or double standards both types also behaved as if they would like soes to maximize profitability rather than just break even or earn a reasonable return some of these findings were true for responding journalists as well given these results managers of indian soes can be expected to seek profits not only to reduce financial dependence on government but also to gain a measure of external legitimacy recognizing the importance of profitability as a criterion in use they can be expected to propose strategies that would increase their firm s profitability and resist those that would reduce it regardless of official goals where managers are free to act independently profitability may prevail as the dominant decision criterion but where they are not the outcome may depend on more complex factors more generally the profit motive in soes may be as strong or stronger than it appeared to be in india in countries with a less sophisticated administrative systems or personnel b an official ideology more to the right than in socialist india and c a higher proportion of mixed enterprises the paper concludes with the implications of these findings for the design of performance evaluation systems at the government soe interface