does cutting the tax rate to zero induce behavior different from other tax cuts evidence from pakistan using a series of pakistani tax reforms and administrative records i document that taxable income responses induced by to zero tax cuts are orders of magnitude larger than ones induced by similar

reducing bureaucratic corruption interdisciplinary perspectives on what works abstract this article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti corruption policies with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants drawing on the work of economists political scientists sociologists and anthropologists we examine seven policy categories 1 rewards and penalties 2 monitoring 3 restructuring bureaucracies 4 screening and recruiting 5 anti corruption agencies 6 educational campaigns and 7 international agreements notably rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti corruption policies nevertheless we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring including anti corruption audits and e governance in addition adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption an emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature we conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem it cannot be treated in the long term with individual level solutions

an eoq model with stock dependent demand shortage inflation and time discounting abstract this paper develops a finite time horizon deterministic economic order quantity eoq inventory model with shortages where the demand rate at any instant depends on the on hand inventory stock level at that instant the effects of inflation and the time value of money are taken into account considering two separate inflation rates namely the internal company inflation rate and the external general economy inflation rate the results are discussed with a numerical example and particular case of the model is discussed in brief a sensitivity analysis of the optimal solution with respect to the parameters of the system is carried out

from the lab to the field a review of tax experiments tax experiments have been gaining momentum in recent years although this literature dates back several decades with new developments in methods and data availability tax experiments have gradually moved away from lab settings and towards the field this movement from the lab to the field has happened against the background of the credibility revolution in applied economics which has seen more rigorous methods applied to policy relevant questions and of the availability to researchers of administrative data from tax returns these developments have allowed significant advances in the experimental literature on tax compliance this paper reviews this literature giving particular attention to field experiments using administrative data but putting them in the broader context of the compliance literature a particular effort is made to take a global perspective in a literature that is only recently seeing the emergence of evidence from africa latin america and asia

ford whitman harris and the economic order quantity model ford whitman harris first presented the familiar economic order quantity eoq model in a paper published in 1913 even though harris s original paper was disseminated widely it apparently was unnoticed for many years before its rediscovery in 1988 during this period much confusion developed over the origin of the eoq model this paper explores the early literature on this model and traces the evolution of the confusion it also sketches the remarkable life of harris who made contributions as an engineer inventor author and patent attorney even though he received no formal education beyond high school harris s original 1913 essay is reprinted following this paper

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

the r q inventory policy subject to a compound poisson demand pattern abstract most inventory management models are based upon rather restrictive assumptions e g unit sized demands and the normal distribution for total demand during replenishment time in a majority of inventory management systems circumstances seem to allow these simplifications and inventory policies based upon these assumptions yield satisfying results however in some particular cases these simplifications differ fundamentally from the actual conditions and particle therefore application of the models mentioned above can result in an overinvestment in inventory or in an unacceptable low service level one of the situations in which we cannot rely on these simplified inventory models is studied in this paper we consider an inventory subject to a probabilistic non unit sized demand pattern and we propose an exact and an approximate reorder point calculation method for the r q inventory policy the exact algorithm involves formulas for the discrete distributions of the total demand during replenishment time and the undershoot the approximate method is based on the use of continuous distributions and will be more appropriate when historical data are sparse results of both approaches are compared the algorithms proposed in this study are simple fast and easy to implement in a variety of existing inventory management systems

financial management in inventory problems risk averse vs risk neutral policies abstract in this work we discuss the effect of risk measure selection in the determination of inventory policies we consider an inventory system characterized by the loss function of luciano et al 2003 var as a risk measure for multi period static inventory models international journal of production economics 81 82 375 384 we derive the optimization problems faced by risk neutral quadratic utility mean absolute and cvar decision makers results show that while the global nature of the optimal policy is assured for risk coherent and risk neutral decision makers the convexity of the quadratic utility problem depends on the stochastic properties of demand we investigate the economic and stochastic determinants of the different policies this allows us to establish the conditions under which each type of decision maker is indifferent to imprecision in the distribution families finally we discuss the numerical impact of the choice of the risk measure by means of a multi item inventory the introduction of an approach based on savage scores allows us to offer a quantitative measurement of the similarity discrepancy of policies reflecting different risk attitudes

uncertainty and global sensitivity analysis in the evaluation of investment projects abstract this paper discusses the use of global sensitivity analysis sa techniques in investment decisions global sa complements and improves uncertainty analysis ua providing the analyst decision maker with information on how uncertainty is apportioned by the uncertain factors in this work we introduce global sa in the investment project evaluation realm we then need to deal with two aspects 1 the identification of the appropriate global sa method to be used and 2 the interpretation of the results from the decision maker point of view for task 1 we compare the performance of two family of techniques non parametric and variance decomposition based for task 2 we explore the determination of the cash flow global importance gi for valuation criteria utilized in investment project evaluation for the net present value npv we show that it is possible to derive an analytical expression of the cash flow gi which is the same for all the techniques this knowledge enables us to 1 offer a direct way to compute cash flow gi 2 illustrate the practical impact of global sa on the information collection process for the internal rate of return irr we show that the same conclusions cannot be driven in particular a one has to utilize a numerical approach for the computation of the cash flow influence since an analytical expression cannot be found and b different techniques can produce different ranking these observations are illustrated by means of the application to a model utilized in the energy sector for the evaluation of projects under survival risk the quantitative comparison of cash flow ranking with respect to the npv and irr concludes the paper illustrating that information obtained from the sa of the npv cannot be transferred to the irr

the participation dividend of taxation how citizens in congo engage more with the state when it tries to tax them this article provides evidence from a fragile state that citizens demand more of a voice in the government when it tries to tax them i examine a field experiment randomizing property tax collection across 356 neighborhoods of a large congolese city the tax campaign was the first time most citizens had been registered by the state or asked to pay formal taxes it raised property tax compliance from 0 1 in control to 11 6 in treatment it also increased political participation by about 5 percentage points 31 citizens in taxed neighborhoods were more likely to attend town hall meetings hosted by the government or submit evaluations of its performance to participate in these ways the average citizen incurred costs equal to their daily household income and treated citizens spent 43 more than control treated citizens also positively updated about the provincial government perceiving more revenue less leakage and a greater responsibility to provide public goods the results suggest that broadening the tax base has a participation dividend a key idea in historical accounts of the emergence of inclusive governance in early modern europe and a common justification for donor support of tax programs in weak states

welfare implications of non scale r d based growth models non scale r d based growth models imply that the decentral and the socially optimal long run growth rate coincide nonetheless the distortions inherent in a market economy bias both the r d investment share and the saving rate as a result the level of the balanced growth path may differ substantially between the two types of solution implying a dramatic loss in welfare the present paper explores the sources and magnitude of this gap in addition the consequences of public policies are examined distinguishing between isolated policy measures from an overall policy programme

why can modern governments tax so much an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries we develop an agency model explaining why third party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful while third party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion we embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development showing that the tax take evolves as an s shape driven by changes in third party information we show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development

stochastic properties of a production inventory process with planned production using transform methodology abstract we consider a stochastic inventory process in which demand is generated by individual events separated by independent stochastic time intervals whereas production takes place in batches of possibly varying sizes at different points in time the resulting processes are analysed using laplace transform methodology expressions for inventory and stockouts are developed applying the theory of residues an example includes poisson distributed demand intervals assuming costs for set ups for carrying inventory and for stockouts conditions are developed for determining the optimal production policy on the one hand when applying the traditional average cost measure on the other when applying the annuity stream principle

global sensitivity analysis in inventory management abstract this paper deals with the sensitivity analysis sa of inventory management models when uncertainty in the input parameters is given full consideration we make use of sobol function and variance decomposition method for determining the most influential parameters on the model output we first illustrate the method by means of an analytical example we provide the expression of the global importance of demand holding costs order costs of the harris economic order quantity eoq formula we then present the global sa of the inventory management model developed by luciano and peccati 1999 capital structure and inventory management the temporary sale problem international journal of production economics 59 169 178 for the economic order quantity estimation in the context of the temporary sale problem we show that by performing global sa in parallel to the modeling process an analyst derives insights not only on the eoq structure when its expression is not analytically known but also on the relevance of modeling choices as the inclusion of financing policies and special orders

the costs of patronage evidence from the british empire i combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the british colonial administration for the period 1854 1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage once allocated they provide more tax exemptions raise less revenue and invest less the promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

tax rates and tax evasion evidence from missing imports in china tax evasion by its very nature is difficult to observe we quantify the effects of tax rates on tax evasion by examining the relationship in china between the tariff schedule and the evasion gap which we define as the difference between hong kong s reported exports to china at the product level and china s reported imports from hong kong our results imply that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 3 percent increase in evasion furthermore the evasion gap is negatively correlated with tax rates on closely related products suggesting that evasion takes place partly through misclassification of imports from higher taxed categories to lower taxed ones in addition to underreporting the value of imports

evaluation of capital costs in a multi level inventory system by means of the annuity stream principle abstract in this paper some results obtained from applying the annuity stream principle for evaluating capital tied up in inventory and work in progress and presented this principle departs from the cashflows associated with the production inventory processes considered in contrast to traditional procedures by which the inventory value is determined from physical stock evaluated at costs incurred to date in many situations it appears that the traditional procedure will underestimate the amount of capital tied up in production in this paper the two principles are applied to a multi level inventory system and the capital cost expressions and optimal order quantities are compared

truth telling by third party auditors and the response of polluting firms experimental evidence from india in many regulated markets private third party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit potentially creating a conflict of interest this article reports on a two year field experiment in the indian state of gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting there are three main results first the status quo system was largely corrupted with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard although true emissions were typically higher second the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards third treatment plants in turn reduced their pollution emissions the results suggest reformed incentives for third party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective jel codes q56 m42 d22 copyright 2013 oxford university press

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

differential importance and comparative statics an application to inventory management abstract in this work we deal with the problem of establishing which parameters impact an inventory policy the most a new sensitivity measure is introduced by relating the differential importance d and the comparative statics cs techniques we discuss the properties of the new indicator and show that it shares the additivity property we provide the expression of for optimization models numerical results are offered for the sensitivity analysis of a recently introduced inventory management model

using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural elasticities theory and evidence from pakistan we develop a framework for nonparametrically identifying optimization frictions and structural elasticities using notches discontinuities in the choice sets of agents introduced by tax and transfer policies notches create excess bunching on the low tax side and missing mass on the high tax side of a cutoff and they are often associated with a region of strictly dominated choice that would have zero mass in a frictionless world by combining excess bunching observed response attenuated by frictions with missing mass in the dominated region frictions it is possible to uncover the structural elasticity that would govern behavior in the absence of frictions and arguably capture long run behavior we apply our framework to tax notches in pakistan using rich administrative data while observed bunching is large and sharp optimization frictions are also very large as the majority of taxpayers in dominated ranges are unresponsive to tax incentives the combination of large observed bunching and large frictions implies that the frictionless behavioral response to notches is extremely large but the underlying structural elasticity driving this response is nevertheless modest this highlights the inefficiency of notches by creating extremely strong price distortions they induce large behavioral responses even when structural elasticities are small

are bureaucrats paid like ceos performance compensation and turnover of top civil servants abstract recent research explores the effect of financial and career incentives on public sector hiring processes and subsequent performance the reverse relation between performance and bureaucrats compensation and turnover has received only limited attention due to the distinct features of public sector organizations bureaucrats are traditionally argued to require either permanent positions and fixed wages or low powered performance incentives this article studies how the performance of top civil servants in norwegian local governments affects their compensation and turnover we thereby build on a unique new dataset over the period 1991 2014 our results indicate that better performing top civil servants obtain a higher compensation and are less likely to be replaced nonetheless these incentives remain low powered in line with agency theory prescriptions

numerical computation of inventory policies based on the eoq σx value for order point systems abstract this paper examines the numerical computation of two control parameters order size and order point in the well known inventory control model an s q system with a safety stock strategy the aim of the paper is to show that the eoq x value is both sufficient for controlling the system and essential for the economic consequences of using approximations in computations of optimal policies in view of the evidence from a number of studies showing that firms use of statistical inventory control lags far behind academic interest in the area this is also an important aspect the determination of optimal values for the control variables even in this very simple inventory control system is a complex task and therefore not suited to practical implementation where one or more of the following issues are neglected the interdependence of order size and order point the difference between stock on hand and net stock and the excess stockout included in the next period we use the determination of optimal values for the control variables as a framework to evaluate the economic consequences of these approximations applied in pratical inventory control

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

tax farming redux experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis a vis taxpayers we report the first large scale field experiment on these issues where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in punjab pakistan into one of three performance pay schemes or a control after two years incentivized units had 9 4 log points higher revenue than controls which translates to a 46 higher growth rate the scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best increasing revenue by 12 9 log points 64 higher growth rate with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions the revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously the majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes but instead report higher bribes the results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors bargaining power over taxpayers who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down

the effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement evidence from a natural experiment in china abstract this paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the agricultural taxes in 2005 across china on county governments incentives for tax enforcement i show that the revenue loss of county governments was largely offset by tougher tax enforcement the incentive for vat enforcement can be weakened however if the county 1 receives a lower share of total vat revenues 2 has a broader vat tax base or 3 has more abundant sources of revenue from land sales these findings suggest that incentives of local governments can be vital to tax enforcement and to the tax capacity of a country

the deterministic eoq and epq with partial backordering at a rate that is linearly dependent on the time to delivery abstract our original models for the eoq and epq with partial backordering assumed that the backordering rate is a constant in this paper we extend those models to allow to increase linearly as the time until delivery decreases we show how those previous models can be adapted to find the optimal decision variable values for this new assumption and develop for each model type a condition that the initial value of must meet for partial backordering to be optimal

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

strengthening state capabilities the role of financial incentives in the call to public service we study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in mexico different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites and job offers were subsequently randomized screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants intellectual ability personality and motivation this allows the first experimental estimates of i the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants ii the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer and iii the role of job attributes distance attractiveness of the municipal environment in helping fill vacancies as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities a theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry we find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their iq personality and proclivity towards public sector work i e we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities

the glittering prizes career incentives and bureaucrat performance bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations across a wide range of civil services entry is competitive promotion is constrained by seniority jobs are for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age this implies that older entering officers who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire may be less motivated to exert effort using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in india we provide evidence that i officers who cannot reach the senior most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended and ii this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

performance based wages in tax collection the brazilian tax collection reform and its effects we use panel data from the brazilian tax collection authority to examine the effects of a major incentive reform instituted in 1989 to improve tax enforcement beforehand fine collections per inspection were relatively stable however a striking trend break occurred afterwards which we attribute to the incentive reform not to changes in the macroeconomy or personal and corporate income tax rates our estimates suggest the growth in fines per inspection after the reform is about 75 above what it would have been without it and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across tax regions

making corruption harder asymmetric information collusion and crime we model criminal investigation as a principal agent monitor problem in which the agent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence building on insights from laffont and martimort s 1997 paper we s

sensitivity analysis in investment project evaluation abstract this paper discusses the sensitivity analysis of valuation equations used in investment decisions since financial decision are commonly supported via a point value of some criterion of economic relevance net present value economic value added internal rate of return etc we focus on local sensitivity analysis in particular we present the differential importance measure dim and discuss its relation to elasticity and other local sensitivity analysis techniques in the context of discounted cash flow valuation models we present general results of the net present value and internal rate of return sensitivity on changes in the cash flows specific results are obtained for a valuation model of projects under severe survival risk used in the industry sector of power generation

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

governance and the effectiveness of public health subsidies evidence from ghana kenya and uganda abstract distributing subsidized health products through existing health infrastructure could substantially and cost effectively improve health in sub saharan africa there is however widespread concern that poor governance in particular limited health worker accountability seriously undermines the effectiveness of subsidy programs we audit targeted bed net distribution programs to quantify the extent of agency problems we find that around 80 of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended and up to 15 of subsidies are leaked to ineligible people supplementing the program with simple financial or monitoring incentives for health workers does not improve performance further and is thus not cost effective in this context

company taxation and tax spillovers separate accounting versus formula apportionment it is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing the us and canada use so called formula apportionment fa to tax corporate income and the eu is debating a switch from separate accounting sa to fa this paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of fa to sa the focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation input choice and transfer pricing as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries the analysis shows that a move from sa to fa will not eliminate such spillovers and will in cases identified in the paper actually aggravate them

why the european union should adopt formula apportionment with a sales factor using a two country tax competition model with a multinational enterprise mne this paper addresses the question of whether the european union should replace separate accounting sa in corporate income taxation by formula apportionment fa and if so which apportionment factors should be used our main result is that fa with a sales factor may mitigate or even eliminate fiscal externalities caused by the countries tax policy hence our analysis provides a microfoundation for the sales apportionment factor in an empirical calibration to the eu 15 we show that the transition from sa to fa with a sales only formula raises average tax rates by 2 and average tax revenues by 1 billion euros or 0 1 of gdp these effects result in an increase of welfare

capital structure and inventory management the temporary sale price problem the paper discusses the use of adjusted present value techniques in a problem of inventory management the temporary sale price problem in the presence of equity or debt financing while traditional net present value approaches produce results very similar to those of the average cost approach our consideration of the capital structure of the firm opens the way to theoretically and numerically different inventory policies