semi targeted all pay auctions a partial exclusion principle abstract this paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all pay auctions when players differ in ability the contest organizer splits the overall prize of the competition into a targeted and an untargeted prize the targeted prize is exclusively for disadvantaged low ability agents and excludes advantaged agents partially from the overall prize we consider a setting with one high ability and two low ability contestants and fully characterize equilibrium assuming that the contest organizer aims to maximize expected total effort we show that i almost any targeted prize is preferable to a standard all pay auction without targeted prize ii the exclusion principle baye et al 1993 can be implemented by a wide range of sufficiently large targeted prizes and iii partial exclusion by means of an appropriately chosen targeted prize benefits the organizer more than complete exclusion we also discuss the robustness of our results in settings with more than three agents

tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting we consider a symmetric two player common value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value we show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a tullock contest than in the standard auctions

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

optimal retail contracts with asymmetric information and moral hazard constrained joint profit maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately informed about demand conditions before contracting with the manufacturer demand is increased by dealer promotion which is unobservable by the manufacturer consequently the manufacturer does not know whether to attribute a low level of sales to a decline in demand or to a lack of promotion we show that in general the optimal contract exhibits some form of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing the type of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing depends on how price and quantity affect the link between sales and promotion

lottery versus all pay auction contests a revenue dominance theorem abstract we allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way i e she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort resp revenue the two predominant contest regimes are considered all pay auctions and lottery contests for all pay auctions the optimal bias is derived in closed form it implies extreme competitive pressure among active contestants and low endogenous participation rates moreover the exclusion principle advanced by baye et al 1993 becomes obsolete in this case in contrast the optimally biased lottery induces a higher number of actively participating contestants due to softer competition our main result regarding total revenue comparison under the optimal biases reveals that the all pay auction revenue dominates the lottery contest for all levels of heterogeneity among contestants the incentive effect due to a strongly discriminating contest rule all pay auction dominates the participation effect due to a weakly discriminating contest rule lottery

contests with small noise and the robustness of the all pay auction this paper considers all pay contests in which the relationship between bids and allocations reflects a small amount of noise prior work had focused on one particular equilibrium however there may be other equilibria to address this issue we introduce a new and intuitive measure for the proximity to the all pay auction this allows in particular to provide simple conditions under which actually any equilibrium of the contest is both payoff equivalent and revenue equivalent to the unique equilibrium of the corresponding all pay auction the results are shown to have powerful implications for monopoly licensing political lobbying electoral competition optimally biased contests the empirical analysis of rent seeking and dynamic contests

asymmetric contests with conditional investments rent seeking scenarios competitions for promotions and research and development r d races are examples of competitions in which participants expend resources regardless of whether they win or lose although similar in their all pay feature such competitions often differ in important dimensions these include the type of technologies employed in competition the type of asymmetries among competitors the degree to which expenditures are sunk and the number of prizes consider lobbying settings in which firms expend resources in order to influence a policymaker if expenditures take the form of monetary outlays and all firms have the same cost of capital then it is reasonable to think of firms marginal cost of influence as linear but if a firm has a reputational advantage and high costs of capital its lobbying technology may be more reasonably thought of as having convex costs relatively low marginal costs up to a moderate level of influence due to the reputational advantage and relatively high marginal costs at higher levels of influence due to the high costs of capital similarly the lobbying technology of a firm that is relatively unknown and has low costs of capital may be characterized by concave costs lobbying restrictions geographic location or preferential treatment by the policymaker further impact firms lobbying technologies inducing additional nonlinearities and asymmetries among firms in some lobbying settings firms also commit to expenditures conditional on a favorable outcome for example a firm may commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted one of a limited number of manufacturing licenses thus the specification of firms lobbying technologies the type of asymmetries among firms the combination of unconditional and conditional investments and the number of eventual winners may change according to the lobbying setting studied the same is true for other competitions with an all pay feature in a competition for promotions workers often differ in their abilities experience and social skills more than one prize

financial deepening trade openness and economic growth in latin america and the caribbean this contribution investigates the causal interactions between financial deepening trade openness and economic growth in 13 latin american and caribbean countries we construct a composite indicator for financial deepening and use it to detect granger causality within a modified vector autoregressive vector error correction model var vecm framework we find almost no evidence for the popular hypothesis of finance led growth evidence of bidirectional finance growth causality is stronger but mostly instable in the long run most results indicate a demand following or insignificant causal relationship between finance and growth there is also no evidence that finance indirectly induces growth via the channel of trade openness hence policies that prioritize financial and trade sector development cannot be supported

external debt capital flight and political risk abstract this paper explains the simultaneous occurence of large external debts private capital outflows and low domestic capital formation we consider a general equilibrium model in which two government types with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in office uncertainty over the fiscal policies of future governments generates capital flight and small domestic investment and induces the government to overaccumulate external debt the model also predicts that left wing governments are more inclined to restrict capital outflows than right wing governments finally we examine how political uncertainty affects the risk premium and how debt repudiation may occur after a regime change

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

price discrimination by a many product firm determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unknown tastes is a difficult task this paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products becomes large

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions we consider the design of regulatory policy when the regulator is imperfectly informed about both the firm s cost function and the demand function it faces to some extent the optimal policy here is the natural combination of the optimal policies when there is uncertainty only about either demand or cost important qualitative differences also exist however for example it may be optimal to set prices below marginal cost and the pricing authority delegated to the firm may be more limited when there is uncertainty about both cost and demand

favoritism in asymmetric contests head starts and handicaps abstract i examine a contest with identity dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous a contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start the former reduces the contestant s score by a fixed percentage the latter is an additive bonus although total effort increases if the weak contestant is favored with a head start the optimal use of handicaps is not as clear cut depending on the nature of the asymmetry it may or may not be optimal to handicap the strong contestant moreover it is generally optimal to combine the two instruments for instance when contestants are sufficiently heterogeneous the weak contestant should be given both a head start and a handicap it may also be possible to induce higher effort and at the same time make both contestants better off ex ante

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

optimal favoritism in all pay auctions and lottery contests abstract we analyze the revenue enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants two instruments of favoritism are considered head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids in the all pay auction head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first best revenue in the lottery contest head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue as all pay auctions revenue dominate lottery contests under optimal biases we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments

wages and foreign ownership a comparative study of mexico venezuela and the united states abstract this paper explores the relationship between wages and foreign investment in mexico venezuela and the united states despite very different economic conditions and levels of development we find one fact that is robust across all three countries higher levels of foreign investment are associated with higher wages however in mexico and venezuela foreign investment is associated with higher wages only for foreign owned firms there is no evidence of wage spillovers leading to higher wages for domestic firms the lack of spillovers in mexico and venezuela is consistent with significant wage differentials between foreign and domestic enterprises in the united states where the evidence suggests some wage spillovers from foreign to domestic enterprises wage differentials are smaller

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

asymmetric rent seeking with more than two contestants this article considers a rent seeking model with n asymmetriccontestants each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent oneof the n contestants is selected as the winner based ontullock s probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale a pure strategy nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated

tie breaks and bid caps in all pay auctions we revisit the complete information all pay auction with bid caps introduced by che and gale 1998 dropping their assumption that tie breaking must be symmetric any choice of tie breaking rule leads to a dierent set of nash equilibria compared to the optimal bid cap of che and gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid cap combined with a tie breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder moreover the designer is better o breaking ties deterministically in favor of the weak bidder than symmetrically except when bidding costs are strongly convex jel classication d72 d44

sargent wallace meets krugman flood garber or why sovereign debt swaps do not avert macroeconomic crises this paper argues that the frequent failure of the debt swaps follows from fundamental forces driven by the market s assessment of the scarcity of fiscal revenue relative to the demand for fiscal outlays as a country approaches the range of partial default swaps may not provide the expected breathing room and could even bring the crisis forward our methodology combines three independent themes exchange rate crises as the manifestation of excessive monetary injections the fiscal theory of inflation and sovereign debt the integrated framework derives devaluation and external debt repudiation as part of a public finance optimising problem

the right to return this article studies the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract the two extreme cases are the consignment contract which allocates all the burden to the manufacturer and the no return contract in which retailers purchase the merchandise outright and assume responsibility for unsold inventory contract choices are shown to vary across countries industries products and types of transactions the article identifies six main factors affecting this choice optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment relative advantage in disposing of the unsold inventory optimal risk allocation incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand information asymmetry and costs associated with the consignment contract per se several testable implications are presented and the choice of contracts in the publishing industry is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

good bye financial repression hello financial crash some unintended consequences of financial liberalization in latin america are analyzed in this paper intrinsic imperfectious in financial markets and the policy dilemmas they pose are reviewed first the stylized facts of southern cone experiments in financial liberization are then presented alternative ways of organlzing domestic capital markets under latin american conditions are discussed and an eclectic reform mongering program is proposed

the implications of knowledge based growth for the optimality of open capital markets this paper re examines the view that opening capital markets must have long run benefits the analysis shows that the desirability of opening a country s capital markets depends on the nature of the technology assumed models of knowledge based growth predict that changes that alter the economy s level of production will also affect the economy s growth rate and hence the welfare of future generations standard neoclassical growth models imply no such effects on growth or welfare if production does involve an important element of learning by doing inference from the standard models may be seriously misleading in particular opening capital markets does not necessarily improve welfare for the nation or for the world as a whole

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

a theory of affirmative action in college admissions i introduction race conscious preferential admissions have been widely practiced by selective colleges and universities to enhance minority representation in higher education for example the college of arts and sciences at the university of michigan automatically added 20 points out of a possible 150 points to a minority applicant s score in its rating system harvard university has an unofficial lift scheme which also targets minority applicants however controversy has surrounded affirmative action ever since its inception for instance california texas and florida have already terminated the use of race conscious admissions at state funded institutions this debate culminated in the recent supreme court ruling regarding admissions procedures at the university of michigan which endorsed admissions rules that took into account race as a qualifying characteristic unfortunately positive studies on this issue have been scarce relative to the high profile of the debate according to holzer and neumark 1999 theoretical studies of the efficiency of affirmative action on education are virtually nonexistent some have argued that affirmative action is merely a patronage program and necessarily results in mediocracy rather than meritocracy in the debate on affirmative action practices in college admissions a major criticism is that affirmative action designed to create diversity comes at the cost of academic quality a competing view offered by those opposed to affirmative action is that it weakens school applicants incentives to achieve academic excellence for instance justice thomas wrote in his opinion in grutter v bollinger that there is no incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the lsat once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score supporters of this practice tend to emphasize the importance of diversity and the positive influence of diversity on the pedagogical environment steele 1990 these views however do not fully recognize the incentive structure behind affirmative action admissions rules it is unclear how a college admissions rule affects high school students incentives to achieve academic excellence which adds to their human capital stock and future productivity the process of college admissions by and large resembles a contest in which contestants exert costly effort in order to win a limited number of prizes in the context of college admissions to compete for a limited number of seats in the incoming class college candidates have to present their academic credentials such as gpa and sat score to the admissions officer to win the seat high school students have to invest in their human capital which improves the academic performance whereas the academic investments are costly and nonrefundable regardless of the outcome for example the tuition the money spent on books the salary paid to tutors the time and energy and so on all of these features may be approximated by an all pay auction mechanism we propose a simple theoretical framework that models the process of college admissions as an all pay auction to investigate two major questions is there any theoretical rationale for an affirmative action admissions rule how do such rules affect college candidates incentives to invest in academic effort two candidates one a minority and the other a nonminority simultaneously choose their academic efforts human capital investments to compete for a seat in a college we show that an academic quality oriented college prefers to adopt an admissions rule that scales up the test score of the minority relative to the nonminority although this rule is designed purely to maximize the expected academic quality of the incoming class it turns out to favor the minority and create ethnic diversity we show that the unique equilibrium affirmative action admissions rule creates a positive cross group interaction between college candidates incentives to make educational effort

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

a tug of war team contest this paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams in each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug of war there exists a unique markov perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player s valuation and the current state of the tug of war we derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug of war evolves according to a time homogeneous absorbing markov chain

revenue ranking of optimally biased contests the case of two players it is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two player tullock contest is unique for parameter values r 2 this allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher r

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

international and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises abstract we build a model of emerging markets crises which features two types of collateral constraints firms in a domestic economy have limited borrowing capacity from international investors they also have limited borrowing capacity with respect to each other we study how the presence and changes in these collateral constraints affect financial and real variables a binding international constraint in the aggregate leads to a sharp rise in interest rates and fire sales of domestic assets while limited domestic collateral can lead to wasted international collateral these two collateral constraints can interact in important ways the first is disintermediation a fire sale of domestic assets causes banks to fail in their function of reallocating resources across the economy leading to wasted international collateral the second is a dynamic effect we show that firms in an economy with limited domestic collateral and a binding international collateral constraint will not adequately precaution against adverse shocks increasing the severity of these shocks

initial conditions and the outcome of economic reform abstract this paper studies how initial conditions affect the outcome of reform using the case of trade liberalization as an example the paper illustrates empirically and theoretically the seemingly paradoxical case of larger impact of reform when initial conditions are poorer

using return policies to elicit retailer information we show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions roughly stated the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions a retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms as a consequence a retailer is less inclined to misstate market conditions by serving as an additional control instrument a returns policy reduces the manufacturer s need to ration cut production

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

financial liberalisations in latin america in the 1990s a reassessment this paper studies the experience of latin america latam with financial liberalisation in the 1990s the rush towards financial liberalisations in the early 1990s was associated with expectations that external financing would alleviate the scarcity of saving in latam thereby increasing investment and growth yet the data and several case studies suggest that the gains from external financing are overrated the bottleneck inhibiting economic growth is less the scarcity of saving and more the scarcity of good governance a possible interpretation for these findings is that in countries where private savings and investments were taxed in an arbitrary and unpredictable way the credibility of a new regime could not be assumed or imposed instead credibility must be acquired as an outcome of a learning process consequently increasing the saving and investment rates tends to be a time consuming process this also suggests that greater political instability and polarisation would induce consumers to be more cautious in increasing their saving and investment rates following a reform hence reaching a sustained take off in latin america is a harder task to accomplish than in asia

demand uncertainty and returns policies manufacturers facing uncertain demand may induce distributors to carry ample stocks of their products by agreeing to accept returns of unsold goods for credit the authors model the manufacturer s decision to accept returns showing that this decision depends crucially on the nature of the demand uncertainty uncertainty over customer arrivals favors returns while uncertainty over consumers valuation of the manufacturer s product leads distributors to set retail prices too high from the manufacturer s standpoint when returns are allowed the authors show that returns can be expected to raise retail prices while maintaining shrinking distributor margins copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

why are latin america s savings rates so low an international comparative analysis abstract this paper presents a theoretical and empirical assessment of the determinants of savings rates with special emphasis on latin american savings rates the study is based on international comparisons using data from 36 countries for 1970 1992 a distinction is made between private and public savings the later are endogenously determined by economic and political variables per capita income growth is the most important determinant of private and public savings public savings are lower in countries with higher political instability public savings crowd out private savings but less than proportionately low latin american savings are due to the magnitudes of their determinants rather than structural differences

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

financial liberalisation in emerging markets how does bank lending change financial liberalisation has often failed in the past due to underestimated problems of structural change we analyse such changes in lending behaviour of thai commercial banks during a liberalisation phase by way of unique micro data liberalisation has expected positive effects such as lowering the interest rate spread and collateral requirements liberalisation causes structural change such as a decline in collateral based and relationship banking however the liberal isation evidence is consistent with more risk taking such as lending to more risky projects and less protection against default the thai experience suggests obvious policy lessons

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies