international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

investment and financing activity following calls of convertible bonds abstract the staged financing hypothesis of mayers mayers d 1998 why firms issue convertible bonds the matching of financial and real investment options journal of financial economics 47 83 102 predicts that investment and financing activity will increase following in the money convertible bond calls the prediction for out of the money convertible calls is different no increase is expected we study the rate of both corporate investment and external financing around forced conversions using benchmarks that are analogous to those recommended by barber and lyon barber b lyon j 1996 detecting abnormal operating performance the empirical power and specification of test statistics journal of financial economics 41 359 400 we also examine the cross section of changes in investment and financing activity conversion forcing firms exhibit an increase in both capital expenditures and debt financing around the year of the convertible bond call however the same result holds for the sample firms that conducted out of the money convertible calls further there is no relation between changes in investment activity and changes in debt issuance at the firm level the evidence is inconsistent with the notion that forced conversions serve as a catalyst for staged financing and investment

perfect equilibria in a trade liberalization game the credibility of temporary protection is examined in a simple infinite horizon perfect information game of timing in which the domestic government uses the threat of future liberalization to induce the domestic firm to invest all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria are cyclical and surprisingly one of them implements optimal temporary protection however this equilibrium fails to pass another credibility criterion called renegotiation proof the game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies copyright 1990 by american economic association

corporate conservatism and relative compensation this paper demonstrates that in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating discontinuities in compensation when performance is low because of firings lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark depending on type in particular very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

evidence on corporate hedging policy this paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging decisions the paper examines the evidence in light of currently mandated financial reporting require ments and in particular the constraints placed on anticipatory hedging data on hedging are obtained from 1992 annual reports for a sample of 3 022 firms out of the 771 firms classified as hedgers 543 firms disclose information in their annual reports on their hedging activities the remaining 228 firms report use of derivatives but no information on hedging activities based on the evidence i draw the following conclusions with respect to the models of hedging evidence is inconsistent with financial distress cost models evidence is mixed with respect to contracting cost capital market imperfections and tax based models and evidence uniformly supports the hypothesis that hedging activities exhibit economies of scale

observability and the payback criterion among the enigmas of corporate finance theory that have received little attention is the puzzling use of the payback method as a capital budgeting tool although the payback method has many drawbacks it is widely used in industry see klammer 1972 fremgren 1973 schall sundem and geijsback 1978 1 gordon 1955 attempted to explain this anomaly by observing that the inverse of the payback period is an approximation for the internal rate of return but as sarnat and levy 1969 point out the accuracy of the approximation depends on the life of the project and its irr for low values of irr the inverse of payback is a very poor approximation moreover it is difficult to believe that corporations that use complex and sophisticated technologies need a rule of thumb to approximate something as simple to compute as the irr in fact empirical evidence shows that most firms compute both the irr and the payback period see schall the payback criterion continues to be widely used in industry although there is little support for it among the academicians this paper attempts to find an economic rationale for it by using an incentive model with asymmetric information it argues that when the managers possess private information regarding projects selected for implementation it is in their interest to choose ceteris paribus projects that pay back faster since manager s wages depend on output because their productivity is unknown by choosing projects that pay back fast they hope to improve their reputations i wish to thank milton harris and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions while i retain the responsibility for any remaining errors 1 it has been found that payback is rarely used as a primary capital budgeting method it is used as a secondary criterion to a discounted cash flow method such as npv net present value or irr internal rate of return

capital budgeting and delegation abstract as part of our ongoing research into capital budgeting processes as responses to decentralized information and incentive problems we focus in this paper on when a level of a managerial hierarchy will delegate the allocation of capital across projects and time to the level below it in our model delegation is a way to save on costly investigation of proposed projects therefore it is more extensive the larger are the costs of such investigations this delegation takes advantage of the fact that the lower level manager s preferences are assumed to be similar though not identical to those of the higher level

hedging and liquidity this article develops a model for evaluating alternative hedging strategies for financially constrained firms a key advantage of the model is the ability to capture the intertemporal effects of hedging on the firm s financial situation we characterize the optimal hedge a wide range of alternative hedging strategies can be specified and the model allows us to determine in each case if the hedging strategy raises or lowers firm value and by how much we show that hedging firm value hedging cash flow from operations and hedging sales revenue are not optimal the article highlights the fact that every hedging strategy comes packaged with a borrowing strategy which requires careful consideration futures markets often provide the most liquid and convenient instruments for managing risk however because futures contracts are marked to market it is often impossible to simultaneously hedge cash flows and values for example a futures contract that locked in the value of gold that a corporation planned to extract in one year would generate an uncertain cash flow pattern over the year this article examines how liquidity and cash flow timing problems associated with different hedging strategies can affect a firm s value in our model the objective for hedging is to increase the firm s financial flexibility an optimal hedge maximizes the firm s liquidityslack in the form of excess cash or unused debt capacitywhen liquidity is most valuable this lowers the danger of costly financial distress reduces the effective cost of external financial constraints and makes value maximizing investments affordable a firm with no financial constraints does not gain from hedging and the higher the firm s financial constraints the greater the potential value of hedging the value of hedging depends critically on the design of the hedging strategy we show that the optimal hedge minimizes the variability in the marginal value of the firm s cash balances such a hedge efficiently redistributes cash balances across different states and periods taking cash from those states for which the marginal cost of the financial constraint is low and giving cash to those states for which the marginal

the value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressures an argument often heard in favor of trade agreements is that by committing to free trade a government can credibly distance itself from domestic lobbies but several existing models of endogenous protection suggest that governments have no interest in foreclosing interest group pressures since governments derive rents from the political process we develop a small country model in which factors are sector specific in the short run but mobile in the long run we show that in this setting a government may be worse off in the political equilibrium than under commitment to free trade and hence it may value a trade agreement

estimating product market competition methodology and application abstract in oligopolies firms behave strategically and commit to actions that elicit favorable responses from rivals firm actions consequently are a function of the nature of these strategic interactions in this paper we develop a methodology for the empirical estimation of strategic interactions in product markets we then apply our measure of strategic interactions to ceo compensation we use quarterly data on profits and sales from compustat to estimate the slope of firm s reaction function when the slope is negative and marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival s actions the firm is classified as a strategic substitute when the slope is positive and marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival s actions the firm is classified as a strategic complement as predicted by theory we find significant evidence that strategic substitutes decrease the pay for performance incentives of their ceos on the other hand strategic complements significantly increase ceo pay for performance incentives the empirical measure developed can be used to test a wide variety of strategic models

financial signalling and the deep pocket argument this article provides a formal representation of telser s 1966 deep pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant s and the incumbent s financial structures are endogenous the entrant s financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets financiers are uncertain of the entrant s true value but they know the incumbent s true worth both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production in equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity while the high value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent this provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy

job displacement relative wage changes and duration of unemployment using special cps data on displaced workers this article investigates the wage consequences of job displacement in a framework that emphasizes the effects of past job duration s and unemployment duration s on postdisplacement wages our model also attempts to take account of the simultaneity between unemployment duration and the postdisplacement wage it is found that duration strongly reduces subsequent earnings and that considerable overstatement of the loss in firm specific training investments is implied by conventional routes to measuring wage losses

time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals abstract in a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments moral hazard in production leads to a nondegenerate distribution of income which the government would like to flatten ex post self enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution we investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem and show that in the constrained optimal equilibrium usually a linear tax schedule is imposed this remains true if renegotiation of the social agreement is possible journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 e6 h21

pollution permits and environmental innovation abstract this paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation stand alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing technology pollution permits that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation they have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used when the innovation occurs options to pollute at a given striking price fare better than allowances because they create private incentives to phase out pollution in the case of innovation we characterize the social optimum and show that it can be implemented by issuing options to pollute inter alia finally the paper compares ex ante and ex post government procurement surprisingly ex post licensing by the innovator to the government may yield a higher licensing fee than an ex ante contract

how firms should hedge substantial academic research explains why firms should hedge but little work has addressed how firms should hedge we assume that firms can experience costly states of nature and derive optimal hedging strategies using vanilla derivatives e g forwards and options and custom exotic derivative contracts for a value maximizing firm facing both hedgable price and unhedgable quantity risks customized exotic derivatives are typically better than vanilla contracts when correlations between prices and quantities are large in magnitude and when quantity risks are substantially greater than price risks finally we discuss how our model may be applied in practice copyright 2002 oxford university press

hedging financing and investment decisions theory and empirical tests abstract in this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging financing and investment decisions a simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments they will borrow less invest more in risky assets and hedge more the model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage a result consistent with debt capacity arguments we test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm level hedging financing and investing decisions the results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging financing and investment decisions are jointly determined in addition we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries we consider a small open economy that faces a commitment problem in trade liberalization we examine how the relationship with a large trading partner affects the ability of the small countrys government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism if the small country s government is patient enough it can overcome its domestic commitment without the help of the large country unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country s dynamic incentives liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country however if capacity in the import competing sector can only be reduced gradually a conditional reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions with the large country liberalizing before the small country

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

managerial career concerns and investments in information we extend the implicit incentives literature by analyzing how career concerns affect a riskneutral manager s decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it the manager has unknown ability that determines the probability with which a good project is available so the market updates ability assessments from project outcomes while project choice is efficient in equilibrium an unobservable investment in the precision of project evaluation allows the manager to control the probabilities of future reputational states this distorts his investment in precision above first best when project payoffs can be observed only on accepted projects

reputation and time consistency recent work has shown that reputational arguments based on trigger strategies can sometimes be used to deal with the problem of time inconsistency in government policy this idea was exploited by robert barro and david gordon 1983 in a model of inflation and by v v chari and patrick kehoe 1988 in a model of capital taxation here it is shown that reputational arguments of this sort are widely applicable 2 a general policy model is developed based on an economy that is stationary over time contains identical households and has no endogenous state variables it is shown in general that the infinite horizon version of this model has equilibria in trigger strategies that yield outcomes strictly better than those attainable as equilibria in the one period model

on the existence of an optimal capital structure theory and evidence one of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure the geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions by modigliani and miller 18 19 the general academic view by the mid 1970s although not a consensus was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy costs no sooner did this general view become prevalent in the profession than miller 16 presented a new challenge by showing that under certain conditions the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level since then there has developed a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting to reconcile miller s model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure e g deangelo and masulis 5 kim 12 and modigliani 17 the general result of this work is that if there are significant leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs agency costs of debt and loss of non debt tax shields and if the income from equity is untaxed then the marginal bondholder s tax rate will be less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing the firm s optimal capital structure will involve the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and various leverage related costs the upshot of these extensions of miller s model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage related costs are economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing the miller model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several timeseries studies which provide evidence on the existence of leverage related costs trczinka 28 reports that from examining differences in average yields between taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds one cannot reject the miller hypothesis that the marginal bondholder s tax rate is not different from the corporate tax rate however trczinka is careful to point out that this finding does not necessarily imply that there is no tax advantage of corporate debt if the personal tax rate on equity is positive indeed buser and hess 1 using a longer time series of data and more sophisticated econometric techniques estimate that the average effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically positive and is not of a trivial magnitude more importantly they document evidence that is consistent with the existence of significant leverage related costs in the economy

corporate financial hedging with proprietary information abstract if a firm has information pertinent to its own dividend stream that is not made available to its shareholders it may be in the interests of the firm and its shareholders to adopt a financial hedging policy this is in contrast with the modigliani miller theorem which implies that with informational symmetry such financial hedging is irrelevant in certain cases hedging policies are identified that are unanimously supported by shareholders

optimal cross holding with externalities and strategic interactions we analyze a two period setting where firms first choose equity positions in each other and second engage in operating activities that cause externalities firms facing positive externalities optimally choose long equity positions to increase their profits firms facing negative externalities encounter a prisoners dilemma where each firm optimally chooses short positions in the first period committing to a more aggressive operating stance that results in lower profits in contrast to the prior literature regulation restricting cross holdings reduces consumer surplus and economic welfare when the number of firms is fixed however such regulation can increase entry improving net welfare

debt investment and product market competition a note on the limited liability effect abstract this paper extends a model by brander and lewis brander j lewis t 1986 oligopoly and financial structure the limited liability effect american economic review 76 956 970 on the relationship between capital structure investment and product market competition based on the limited liability effect of debt empirical papers see for example campello campello m 2003 capital structure and product markets interactions evidence from business cycles journal of financial economics 68 353 378 and chevalier chevalier j 1995a capital structure and product market competition empirical evidence from the supermarket industry american economic review 85 415 435 chevalier j 1995b do lbo supermarkets charge more an empirical analysis of the effect of lbos on supermarket pricing journal of finance 50 1095 1112 generally reject the limited liability theories in favor of the predatory theories because leverage leads to less investment and weaker product market competition this paper shows that when firms also have an investment choice leverage can lead to weaker product market competition in a limited liability model in addition non zero leverage is still optimal within this model based solely on the limited liability effect in predatory models debt is motivated by issues outside of product market concerns for example to solve an agency problem finally this model is also consistent with the investment decisions documented empirically

policy cooperation among benevolent governments may be undesirable this paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable it also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency since the work of hamada 1976 investigating the effects of increasing policy cooperation among countries has been a major topic in international economics a standard conclusion of this work is that increasing policy cooperation among countries is desirable in a seminal paper rogoff 1985 has challenged this view using a simple monetary model rogoff shows that cooperation among policy makers can lead to a lower level of welfare than noncooperation does rogoff s result has caused much consternation among those who advocate policy cooperation and his work has been criticized along several dimensions for example some authors including canzoneri and henderson 1988 have noted that a key assumption in rogoff s model is that the objective function of each country s policy maker does not coincide with the objective function of its residents indeed if in his model policy makers maximize the welfare of their country s residents the counterexample is overturned and cooperation strictly dominates noncooperation this feature leads some to interpret rogoff s result as simply saying that if policy makers form a coalition against the private sector they may be worse off than if they do not others such as neck and dockner 1988 have claimed that rogoff s result depends on private agents acting strategically under this interpretation rogoff s result is relevant to say economies with a large trade union but not to economies with a large number of competitive private agents in a somewhat different vein persson 1988 and especially devereux 1986a b have questioned the significance of welfare comparisons across different institutional regimes in a model without a solid foundation for the behavioural relationships this paper presents a simple model in which governments are benevolent but cooperation is still undesirable the model is a two country version of fischer s 1980 optimal tax model in it private agents are competitive in that each agent takes both prices and government policies as uninfluenced by his actions and each government maximizes the welfare of its country s residents in the paper the two different regimes cooperative and noncooperative

timing decisions in organizations communication and authority in a dynamic environment this paper develops a theory of how organizations make timing decisions we consider a problem where an uninformed principal decides when to exercise an option and interacts with an informed but biased agent this problem is common examples include headquarters deciding when to close a plant drill an oil well or launch a product because time is irreversible the direction of the agent s bias is crucial for communication and allocation of authority when the agent favors late exercise centralized decision making where the principal retains authority and communicates with the agent often features full information revelation but ine cient delay delegation is never optimal in this case in contrast when the agent favors early exercise communication under centralized decision making is partial while option exercise is unbiased or delayed delegation is optimal if the bias is small or delegation can be timed thus delegating decisions such as plant closures is never optimal while delegating decisions such as product launches may be optimal

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

political pressure deflection much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes political pressure deflection pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to sell is valuable to politicians the puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger essentially like entry deterrence u s trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example especially antidumping law and its evolution

credible carbon policy the paper sets out the credibility problem in carbon policy provides a number of examples of non credibility in recent energy policy and identifies the costs of failing to address it the time inconsistency of carbon policy arising because of multiple objectives the irreversibility of energy investments and the scope for ex post reneging on ex ante commitments to set policy instruments such as carbon taxes or emission permits at appropriate levels is set in a conceptual framework analogies with monetary policy are drawn and a solution to the time inconsistency problem is proposed through the establishment of an energy carbon agency

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of free trade areas we consider the impact of the formation of free trade agreements on multilateral tariff cooperation we assume that countries are limited to selfenforcing multilateral arrangements that balance the gains from deviating against the costs of an ensuing trade war we find that the emergence of free trade areas will be accompanied by a temporary retreat from liberal multilateral trade policies as the initial balance supporting multilateral cooperation is upset eventually however as the full impact of the emerging free trade agreement on multilateral trade patterns is felt this initial balance tends to reemerge and liberal multilateral trade policies can be restored

renegotiation proof equilibria in repeated prisoners dilemma abstract in this note it is shown that the requirement of weak renegatiation proofness does not eliminate any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated prisoner s dilemma specifically it is demonstrated that when players are sufficiently patient any feasible and individually rational outcome can be sustained by means of an equilibrium in which the punishing player always profits by carrying out the punishment

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

risk management in the global economy a review essay abstract this paper provides a review of developments in the area of risk management at both the firm level and the macro economy we review rationales regarding why firms choose to manage risk as well as new developments in measuring and managing risk in a dynamic setting we also consider current risk sharing arrangements in light of the theory regarding optimal risk sharing the paper concludes with some suggestions for additional research that emphasizes the importance of incorporating market incompleteness in an equilibrium setting we also discuss the role of incompleteness at the macro level and speculate on how derivatives markets may influence macro economic stabilization policy

a theory of yes men this paper illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinion of their supervisors when firms use subjective performance evaluation this desire to conform arises endogenously from the firm s need to induce the worker to exert effort the author shows that firms may optimally eschew the use of incentive contracts to retain workers incentives for honesty the author illustrates that the incentive to conform implies inefficiencies even when workers are risk neutral and is likely to lead to more centralized decision making than in the absence of the desire to conform copyright 1993 by american economic association

when managers cover their posteriors making the decisions the market wants to see the stock market has opinions as to what choices firms should make we show that concern for current share prices may lead managers to make these choices rather than those suggested by their own superior information even when arbitrarily many privately informed firms have to make a similar decision the market s prejudices may still prevail we compare the distortions that arise from share price maximization with those due to herd behavior among profit maximizing firms and show that the former results in strictly less efficient use of information

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate abstract this paper focuses on how best to measure the corporate marginal tax rate which is an important input into financial analysis of the cost of capital financing policy corporate hedging and corporate reorganizations the results indicate that the simulated tax rate used by shevlin 1990 and graham 1996 although difficult to calculate is the best available proxy for the true marginal tax rate if the simulated rate is unavailable an easy to calculate trichotomous variable or the statutory marginal tax rate which captures the progressivity in the tax schedule are reasonable alternatives better than most commonly used tax variables

green with envy implications for corporate investment distortions we model agents whose preferences exhibit envy an envious agent s utility increases with what he has and decreases with what others have with this setup we are able to provide a new perspective on the nature of investment distortions with centralized and decentralized capital budgeting systems centralized capital budgeting leads to corporate socialism in investments in multidivisional firms whereas decentralized capital budgeting leads to overinvestment numerous additional testable predictions are also generated

tax incentives to hedge for corporations facing tax function convexity hedging lowers expected tax liabilities thereby providing an incentive to hedge we use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax code provisions on average the tax function is convex although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge other tax code provisions have minor impacts among firms facing convex tax functions average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5 4 percent of expected tax liabilities in extreme cases these savings exceed 40 percent if a firm faces a convex tax function then hedging that reduces the volatility of taxable income reduces the firm s expected tax liability for a firm facing some form of tax progressivity when taxable income is low its effective marginal tax rate will be low but when income is high its tax rate will be high if such a firm hedges the tax increase in circumstances where income would have been low is smaller than the tax reduction in circumstances where income would have been high thus lowering expected taxes in examining the importance of various motives to hedge researchers have employed two general methods survey and regression analysis there are potential problems with each for example some managers might view the information requested in a survey as proprietary or might hesitate to admit that they employ derivatives to speculate rather than hedge to employ regression methods researchers must generate proxies for tax status in addition to other firm characteristics to the extent that a tax variable e g whether the firm has a net operating loss carryforward proxies for factors such as financial distress as well as tax circumstances analysts face an identification problem in interpreting the results

the effect of leverage on bidding behavior theory and evidence from the fcc auctions this is an exploration of how bidding behavior of firms in various auctions is affected by their capital structure the theoretical model considers a first price sealed bid and an english auction we find that as debt levels increase firms tend to reduce their bids the lower bids give the competition incentives to reduce their bids as well these results are investigated empirically using data from the 1994 1995 fcc spectrum auctions consistent with the theoretical model higher debt levels of the bidding firm and of the competition tend to lead to lower bids additional determinants of bidding behavior in these auctions are also analyzed copyright 2002 oxford university press

is partial tax harmonization desirable we consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions on one hand governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates on the other hand they are unable to commit to future policies and once capital has been installed have incentives to increase taxes in this setting there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions we compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios no tax harmonization all countries set taxes unilaterally global tax harmonization all countries coordinate their capital taxes and partial tax harmonization only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes we show that if capital is sufficiently mobile partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements we examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self sustaining we show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation rather efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre commit to policy domestically moreover the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are

a theory of socialistic internal capital markets abstract we develop a model of a two division firm in which the strong division has on average higher quality investment opportunities than the weak division we show that in the presence of agency and information problems optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division this leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division the selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions

taxation of investment and savings in a world economy the equilibrium of capital and equilibrium market prices are derived for a world economy with a unified securities market mobile capital no uncertainty and varying tax rates on different sources of income in each country the paper then characterizes optimal tax rates for a small country in this setting focusing on the peculiar incentives created when the before tax rate of return differs among securities due to differences in their typical tax treatment copyright 1986 by american economic association

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

investment cash flow sensitivities are useful a comment on kaplan and zingales arecent paper in this journal by kaplan and zingales reexamines a subset of erms from work of fazzari hubbard and petersen and criticizes the usefulness of investment cash eow sensitivities for detecting enancing constraints we show that the kaplan and zingales theoretical model fails to capture the approach employed in the literature and thus does not provide an effective critique moreover we describe why their empirical classiecation system is eawed in identifying both whether erms are constrained and the relative degree of constraints across erm groups we conclude that their results do not support their conclusions about the usefulness of investment cash eow sensitivities in a recent paper in this journal kaplan and zingales 1997 hereinafter kz argue that investment cash eow sensitivities do not provide useful evidence about the presence of enancing constraints because kz use a subset of the same erms and the same regressions as fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 hereinafter fhp and claim page 176 that fhp can legitimately be considered the parent of all papers in this literature it is appropriate that we respond based on a simple theoretical model kz reach the provocative conclusion page 211 that the investment cash eow sensitivity criterion as a measure of enancial constraints is not well grounded in theory in section i we show that the kz model does not capture the theoretical approach employed in fhp and many subsequent studies most of the kz paper attempts to show that empirical investment cash eow sensitivities do not increase monotonically with the degree of enancing constraints within the 49 low dividend erms from the fhp sample in section ii we explain why the kz classiecation of the degree of constraints is eawed in identifying both whether or not erms are constrained absolute constraints as well as the relative degree of constraints across erms as a result we argue in section iii that there is no expected ex ante pattern for the

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

on the determinants of corporate hedging finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes expected costs of financial distress or other agency costs this paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm s use of forwards futures swaps and options combined with computstat data on firm characteristics of 169 firms in the sample 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986 the data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions have less coverage of fixed claims are larger have more growth options in their investment opportunity set and employ fewer hedging substitutes

gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries this paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size we show that at points on the frontier where only one country s incentive constraint binds the efficient agreement will be a non stationary one that starts with a positive trade distortion but eventually reaches free trade our analysis illustrates how i relative country size ii consumption smoothing incentives and iii sunk investments affect the form of efficient trade agreements in contrast to previous work on gradualism our results are obtained from a model in which the economic environment is stationary