competition in a deregulated air transportation market abstract under deregulation airlines developed hub and spoke hs networks enabling them to aggregate demand increase frequency reduce airfares and prevent entry into the marketplace this research evaluates airline profit based on micro economic theory of behaviour under deregulation through a two stage nash best response game equilibria in the air transportation industry is sought to evaluate the most profitable hs network for an airline to survive in a deregulated environment in the first stage of the game an integer linear program aids in generating potential networks in the second stage a nonlinear mathematical program maximizes profits for each airline based on the networks chosen by all participants the variables of the mathematical program include frequency plane size and airfares in an illustrative example both monopoly and duopoly solutions are attainable as a function of demand

the relative productivity hypothesis of industrialization the american case 1820 to 1850 a two sector model is used to explore the role of the agricultural sector in the process of industrialization our hypothesis is that areas industrialize earlier where the wages for females and children relative to those for adult males are initially low furthermore the lower this relative productivity of females and children in the pre industrial economy the proportionately more will their relative wages increase and the higher will be the ratio of manufactured to agricultural goods the model is used to interpret the conditions that fostered the rapid industrialization of the american northeast but not the south from 1820 to 1850

it based technical change and job instability we investigate the impact of it diffusion on the stability of employment we document the evolution of different components of job instability over a panel of 348 cities in france from the mid 1970s to the early 2000s the evidence goes against the view that the diffusion of it has spurred job instability yet analysing long term differences in the occupational structure we find that it diffusion has increased the share of high skill occupations at the expense of low skill occupations this is consistent with french firms reliance on their internal labour market to meet the new skill requirements associated with it diffusion

labor market monopsony there has been a renewed interest in monopsony in labor markets in recent years that includes both the traditional static approach to monopsony ably reviewed by boal and ransom 1997 and the new approach to monopsony with more attention paid to dynamic issues developed in detail by manning 2003 the articles presented in this supplement highlight both approaches and illustrate the range of labor market settings in which the exercise of monopsony power may be important the first use of the term monopsony in economics is widely attributed to robinson 1969 robinson conceived of monopsony as analogous to monopoly whereas monopoly refers to the case of a single seller confronted in a market by many buyers monopsony refers to the case of a single buyer confronted in a market by many sellers just as the monopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve for his product and

qos commitment between vertically integrated autonomous systems abstract vertically integrated autonomous systems bargain to provide quality of service guarantees and revenue sharing depending on the perceived quality of service and access price consumers determine whether they subscribe to the access provider s service four types of contracts are compared i best effort ii bilateral bargaining iii cascade negotiations and iv grand coalition cooperation the impact of the consumers qos sensitivity parameter and power relation are tested for each contract assuming that the consumers quality of service sensitivity parameter is unknown and might evolve dynamically due to error judgement word of mouth effect or competition pressure a learning algorithm is detailed and implemented by each integrated autonomous systems under asymmetrical information its convergence and the influence of bias introduction by the most informed autonomous system is analyzed

changes in job instability and insecurity using monthly survey data this article provides evidence on changes in short term job instability and insecurity using the survey of income and program participation monthly measures from this data set are contrasted with annual measures from the survey of income and program participation and the panel study of income dynamics neither data set shows an increase in job turnover during the 1980s and 1990s we also examine indicators of increased insecurity these include the probability that a job ends involuntarily is followed by a spell of nonemployment or that the subsequent job has lower wages these indicators of insecurity also show no upward trend

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

workers machines and economic growth this paper models technology adoption as replacing workers by machines which perform the same job in the production process the paper shows that such modelling of technology adoption affects significantly the analysis of economic growth this model can explain large and persistent international differences in output levels and growth rates caused by small differences in underlying parameters

should the personal computer be considered a technological revolution evidence from u s metropolitan areas the introduction and diffusion of personal computers are widely viewed as a technological revolution using u s metropolitan area level panel data this paper asks whether links between pc adoption educational attainment and the return to skill conform to a model of technological revolutions in which the speed and extent of adoption are endogenous the model implies that cities will adjust differently to the arrival of a more skill intensive means of production with the returns to skill increasing most where skill is abundant and its return is low we show that the cross city data fit many of the predictions of the model during the period 1980 2000 the pc diffusion era

declining job security this article defines and analyzes job security in the context of implicit contracts designed to overcome incentive problems in the employment relationship contracts of this nature generate predictions concerning the relationship between job security parameters such as worker seniority and sectoral economic conditions and the probability of separations to test these predictions i estimate binomial and multinomial models of job separations using panel study of income dynamics psid data for the years 1976 93 the results are consistent with a decline over time in the incentives to maintain existing employment relationships for male workers and for skilled white collar women

equilibria in networks we study a model in which two carriers choose networks to connect cities and compete for customers we show that if carriers compete aggressively e g bertrand like behavior one carrier operating a single hub spoke network is an equilibrium outcome competing hub spoke networks are not an equilibrium outcome although duopoly equilibria in nonhub networks can exist if carriers do not compete aggressively an equilibrium with competing hub spoke networks exists as long as the number of cities is not too small we provide conditions under which all equilibria consist of hub spoke networks

equilibrium bias of technology this paper presents three sets of results about equilibrium bias of technology first i show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor augmenting technologies the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased toward that factor meaning that the induced technological change increases the relative marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant moreover this induced bias can be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an increase in its supply thus leading to an upward sloping relative demand curve i also show that these results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological possibilities are considered second i prove that under mild assumptions the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change that is absolutely biased toward that factor meaning that it increases its marginal product at given factor proportions the third and most important result in the paper establishes the possibility of and conditions for strong absolute equilibrium bias whereby the price marginal product of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply i prove that under some regularity conditions there will be strong absolute equilibrium bias if and only if the aggregate production function of the economy fails to be jointly concave in factors and technology this type of failure of joint concavity is possible in economies where equilibrium factor demands and technologies result from the decisions of different agents

a cost allocation problem arising in hub spoke network systems abstract this paper studies a cost allocation problem arising from hub spoke network systems when a large scale network is to be constructed jointly by several agents both the optimal network design and the fair allocation of its cost are essential issues we formulate this problem as a cooperative game and analyze the core allocation which is a widely used solution concept the core of this game is not necessarily non empty as shown by an example a reasonable scheme is to allocate the cost proportional to the flow that an agent generates we show that if the demand across the system has a block structure and the fixed cost is high this cost allocation scheme belongs to the core numerical experiments are given with real telecommunication traffic data in order to illustrate the usefulness of our analytical findings

industrial pricing theory and managerial practice we organize the existing theoretical pricing research into a new two level framework for industrial goods pricing the first level consists of four pricing situations new product competitive product line and cost based the second level consists of the pricing strategies appropriate for a given situation for example within the new product pricing situation there are three alternative pricing strategies skim penetration and experience curve pricing there are a total of ten pricing strategies included in the framework we then identified a set of cost product market and information conditions which determine what pricing situation s a firm is facing as well as which strategies are appropriate within a given situation some of these determinant conditions are common to many pricing strategies e g highly elastic demand while others are unique to a given strategy within a particular pricing situation for example within the product line situation the profitability of supplementary sales is a unique determinant of the complementary product pricing strategy razor and blade pricing using this framework as a basis for an empirical study we examined how well current industrial pricing practice matches the prescriptions from the existing research our sample consisted of 270 respondents 27 response rate of these more than 50 indicated that they used more than one pricing strategy in formulating their most recent pricing decision for a high value industrial product sold in the united states as in previous research cost plus pricing was the most often cited pricing strategy 56 of the respondents since the respondents were able to indicate their use of more than one pricing strategy the data are of the pick k from n variety in order to model the managers pricing strategy choices we constructed a stacked binary logit with a separate observation for each strategy within a given pricing situation the signs of the determinant variables were estimated as interaction terms the new product pricing strategies skim penetration experience curve were used for new models in the market skim pricing was used in markets with high levels of product differentiation by firms at a cost disadvantage due to scale penetration pricing was used by firms with a cost advantage due to scale in markets with high level of overall elasticity but low brand elasticity experience curve pricing was used for minor innovations by firms with low capacity utilization in markets with a high level of differentiation the competitive pricing strategies leader parity and low price supplier were used in mature markets parity pricing was used by firms in a poor competitive situation i e high costs low market share low product differentiation these firms were also unable to take advantage of high levels of elasticity since their capacity utilization was high in contrast the low price supplier strategy was used by firmswith low costs due to scale advantages since they have low utilization these firms can take advantage of elastic brand demand none of the determinants were significantly related to the choice of leader pricing product line pricing strategies bundling complementary product and customer value pricing were more likely to be used by firms which sell substitute or complementary products bundle pricing was used for per sale contract pricing in markets with high levels of brand elasticity complementary product pricing razor and blade was used by firms that enjoyed high profitability on its supplementary sales using customer value pricing a firm offers a stripped down version of its current products to appeal to more price sensitive segments or to leverage new distribution channels this strategy was used to target a narrow segment in high growth markets where price changes are difficult to detect cost based pricing was more likely to be used in marketswhere demand is very difficult to estimate in such a situation cost based pricing makes a great deal of sense in general the results show that the managers pricing strategy choices are consistent with normative pricing research however questions about how managers combine their strategies to arrive at a final price as well as the organizational influences on pricing strategies remain important areas for future research

supplier initiated outsourcing a methodology to exploit synergy in transportation over the last decades transportation has been evolving from a necessary though low priority function to an important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive edge over their competitors to cut down transportation costs shippers often outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice this paper proposes a new procedure that puts the initiative with the service provider instead supplier initiated outsourcing this procedure is based on both operations research and game theoretical insights to stress the contrast between the traditional push approach of outsourcing and the here proposed pull approach where the service provider is the initiator of the shift of logistics activities from the shipper to the logistics service provider we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking insinking has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proactively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential moreover these synergies can be allocated to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of a so called shapley monotonic path of customized tariffs insinking is illustrated by means of a practical example based on data from the dutch grocery transportation sector

rational expectations with imperfect competition a bertrand edgeworth example we study a model in which price setting oligopolists have private information about the commodity they sell we construct an equilibrium in which some but not all of the information is transmitted by prices we show that when the number of sellers increases this equilibrium converges in distribution to the perfectly revealing competitive equilibrium

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

performance measures and metrics in outsourcing decisions a review for research and applications outsourcing an operations strategy that influences the performance of a supply chain has become an important component of global operations management an effective global sourcing strategy helps companies to manage the flow of parts and finished products in meeting the needs of overseas and domestic markets outsourcing reduces the cost of assets facilitates core competencies to reduce production costs leads to strategic flexibility and reduces administrative and overhead costs some of the reasons why companies are against outsourcing include integration challenges sacrificing their competitive base opportunistic behaviour rising transaction and coordination costs limited innovation and higher procurement costs despite these shortcomings outsourcing will continue to play an important role in enhancing organizational competitiveness therefore an attempt has been made to review the literature on outsourcing with particular reference to performance measures and metrics pmms used in arriving at outsourcing decisions the main objective of this paper is to present a taxonomy classification of pmms in outsourcing decisions at the pre outsourcing during outsourcing and post outsourcing stages also based on the literature review and analysis an attempt is made to determine a list of specific tools and techniques for pmms in outsourcing finally the limitations of the paper and future research directions are presented

cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation abstract logistics costs in general and transportation costs in particular represent a large fraction of the operating costs of many companies one way to try to reduce these costs is through horizontal cooperation among shippers thus when the transportation needs of two or more companies are merged their collective transportation requirements can be met at lower cost the attainable cost savings are due to economies of scale which translate into cheaper rates due to increased negotiation power use of larger vehicles and bundling of shipments in this paper a linear model is presented and used to study the cost savings that different companies may achieve when they merge their transportation requirements on the one hand solving this optimization model for different collaboration scenarios allows testing and quantifying the synergies among different potential partners thus identifying the most profitable collaboration opportunities on the other the problem of allocating the joint cost savings of the cooperation is tackled using cooperative game theory the proposed approach is illustrated with an example in which different cooperative game solution concepts are compared extensive numerical experiments have also been carried out to gain insight into the properties of the corresponding cost savings game and the behavior of the different solution concepts

changes in job security and their causes an empirical analysis for france 1982 2002 abstract in this paper we analyze the changes in the risks of involuntary job loss in france between 1982 and 2002 we find that these risks are higher in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s we develop an econometric analysis to separate the effects of institutional changes from the effects of new technologies our estimates show that the rise in job loss rates is significantly more pronounced in industries that have the largest share of r d workers and the largest rate of new technologies users these findings suggest that technological changes contribute to decreasing the incentive to keep workers for long period of time and to increasing job insecurity

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

cooperative interconnection settlement among isps through nap abstract this paper studies the settlement problem among internet service providers isps who interconnect with each other through network access point nap a cooperative game framework is adopted for the analysis two commonly adopted allocations i e the non settlement profit allocation and the shapley value based profit allocation are analyzed and compared we check whether these two allocations can encourage isps to interconnect with each other i e in the core of the game and at the same time demonstrate fairness in settlement our results show that the non settlement allocation is not in the core and does not preserve fairness and the shapley value based profit allocation is in the core and demonstrates fairness however the complex structure of shapley value makes it difficult to understand for isps and hard to be implemented at nap especially when isps can only make their pricing decisions independently therefore we propose a characterized profit allocation cpa which is in the core preserves fairness and is easy to interpret we further propose a settlement rule based on cpa which enables the isps to act independently but achieve global optimality we also extend our basic model to incorporate interconnection quality decisions and market competition and show that the proposed settlement rule and its extended form work well in these scenarios numerical experiments confirm that cpa and its corresponding settlement rule can effectively encourage interconnection among isps and motivate isps to expand their networks

collaboration among small shippers in a transportation market abstract intense competition in markets is pushing companies to increase their operational efficiency one possible way to achieve increased efficiency is through cooperation with other companies we study the coalition formation among small shippers in a transportation market characterized by uncertain demand we analyze the decisions taken by the coalition and study the effect of shipper characteristics on the benefit of collaboration analysis shows that the shippers always benefit from the coalition but when the benefits are to be allocated the coalition may not always guarantee the budget balance which is elementary for sustainability of any coalition using a game theoretical approach this study proposes saving allocation mechanisms and discusses the conditions that lead to a balanced budget