behavioral contract theory abstract this review provides a critical survey of psychology and economics behavioral economics research in contract theory first i introduce the theories of individual decision making most

an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

is tiger woods loss averse persistent bias in the face of experience competition and high stakes although experimental studies have documented systematic decision errors many leading scholars believe that experience competition and large stakes will reliably extinguish biases we test for the presence of a fundamental bias loss aversion in a high stakes context professional golfers performance on the pga tour golf provides a natural setting to test for loss aversion because golfers are rewarded for the total number of strokes they take during a tournament yet each individual hole has a salient reference point par we analyze over 2 5 million putts using precise laser measurements and find evidence that even the best golfers including tiger woods show evidence of loss aversion jel d03 d81 l83

reference dependent preferences and labor supply the case of new york city taxi drivers i develop a model of daily labor supply where preferences are dependent on a reference daily income level and i apply this model to data on the labor supply of new york city taxi drivers i find that there may be a reference level of income on a given day that affects labor supply however there is substantial day to day variation in a given driver s reference level and most shifts end before reaching the reference income level this pattern is inconsistent with an important role for reference dependent preferences

keeping your gains close but your money closer the prepayment effect in riskless choices abstract although research on loss aversion now spans more than three decades researchers are still debating whether or in which cases the finding holds true for money we contribute to this debate by exploring how prepayment affects financial decisions in one set of experiments we show that when faced with a tradeoff between post and prepayment participants overvalue prepaid money and sometimes even prefer it over objectively higher gains importantly this effect was more pronounced when prepayment was more distant from its pure representation in dollars and cents experiment 1a as well as when potential losses were directly linked to specific options experiment 1b as far as the processes involved our results suggest that prepayment leads to increased personal commitment to prepaid options experiment 1c in a second set of experiments we show that even when the tradeoff element is eliminated participants are more motivated and engaged in a task that is prepaid rather than post paid experiments 2a and 2b based on our findings we discuss how firms can use prepayment mechanisms to get more out of their agents and how individuals can be motivated to better utilize their money

the behavioralist visits the factory increasing productivity using simple framing manipulations recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts we provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a chinese high tech manufacturing facility our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research framing manipulations in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility using a natural field experiment we report several insights for example conditional incentives framed as both losses and gains increase productivity for both individuals and teams in addition teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains the magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1 that is total team productivity is enhanced by 1 purely due to the framing manipulation importantly we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time rather the effects are observed over the entire sample period moreover we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run this paper was accepted by gerard p cachon decision analysis

assessing the employment impacts of environmental and natural resource policy this paper provides an introductory guide for environmental andresource economists to methods of assessing the impact of environmentaland natural resource policy on employment it examines five basicapproaches to evaluating the effect of a policy action on employment 1 supply and demand analysis of the affected sector 2 partialequilibrium analysis of multiple markets 3 fixed price generalequilibrium simulations input output i o and social accounting matrix sam multiplier models 4 non linear general equilibriumsimulations computable general equilibrium cge models and 5 econometric estimation of the adjustment process particularly timeseries analysis the basic modeling structure and data requirementsfor each of these approaches are described simple examples of theirapplication to evaluation of environmental and natural resourcepolicy are developed and the relative merits and applicability of each are discussed

shrouded attributes and information suppression evidence from the field we use eld and natural experiments in online auctions to study the revenue eect of varying the level and disclosure of shipping charges our main ndings are 1 disclosure aects revenues for low shipping charges a seller is better odisclosing 2 increasing shipping charges boosts revenues particularly when these charges are hidden and 3 the level and disclosure of the shipping charge have little eect on the number of bidders attracted to an auction

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

loss aversion and labor supply in many occupations workers labor supply choices are constrained by institutional rules regulating labor time and effort provision this renders explicit tests of the neoclassical theory of labor supply difficult here we present evidence from studies examining labor supply responses in neoclassical environments in which workers are free to choose when and how much to work despite the favorable environment the results cast doubt on the neoclassical model they are however consistent with a model of reference dependent preferences exhibiting loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity jel j22 b49

self control and the development of work arrangements a significant part of the development experience is the change in the way work is structured to use a historical example the industrial revolution involved workers moving from agriculture to manufacturing from working on their own to working with others in factories and from flexible work hours to rigid work days how are we to understand these changes why did they occur what impacts did they have on labor productivity and possibly growth in answering questions such as these economic theories draw on different assumptions about aggregate production market failures and innovation yet almost all rely on one of two determinants of labor productivity human capital and incentives human capital theories broadly construed emphasize how work arrangements utilize the distribution of human capital and in learning models facilitate its development incentive theories again broadly construed emphasize how workplace arrangements align worker payoffs to minimize moral hazard in this paper we bring together and advance a growing literature on a third feature worker self control individuals may not be able to work as hard as they would like some workplace arrangements may make self control problems more severe while others may ameliorate them below we describe evidence from a field experiment broadly supportive of the selfcontrol perspective we then argue that many work arrangements can be understood differently through this perspective specifically we

salience and consumer choice we present a theory of context dependent choice in which a consumer s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods such as quality or price an attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good s attributes relative to that attribute s average level in the choice set or more broadly the choice context consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes and their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality price ratios the model accounts for a variety of disparate evidence including decoy effects and context dependent willingness to pay it also suggests a novel theory of misleading sales

expectations as endowments evidence on reference dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experiments while evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to reference points little is known about what determines them we conduct two experiments that show that reference points are determined at least in part by expectations in an exchange experiment we endow subjects with an item and randomize the probability they will be allowed to trade subjects that are less likely to be able to trade are more likely to choose to keep their item in a valuation experiment we randomly assign subjects a high or low probability of obtaining an item and elicit their willingness to accept for it the high probability treatment increases valuation of the item by 20 30 copyright 2011 oxford university press

how elastic are preferences for redistribution evidence from randomized survey experiments we analyze randomized online survey experiments providing interactive customized information on us income inequality the link between top income tax rates and economic growth and the estate tax the treatment has large effects on views about inequality but only slightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences an exception is the estate tax informing respondents of the small share of decedents who pay it doubles support for it the small effects for all other policies can be partially explained by respondents low trust in government and a disconnect between concerns about social issues and the public policies meant to address them jel d31 d72 h23 h24

is the endowment effect an expectations effect a hallmark result within behavioral economics is that individuals choices are affected by current endowments a recent theory due to k szegi and rabin 2006 quarterly journal of economics 121 1133 1165 explains such endowment effect with a model of expectations based reference dependent preferences departing from past work we conduct complementary experiments to disentangle expectations verified probabilistic beliefs held by subjects from other features of endowment such as assignment to a good hence allowing us to compare the effect of expectations with that of other variations while mere assignment can affect choices we do not find a large role in the effect for k szegi rabin expectations

carrot or stick contract frame and use of decision influencing information in a principal agent setting a fundamental management accounting issue is how to incorporate decision influencing information e g an ex post state signal into employment contracts our experiment examines the effects of contract framing on such information use in a principal agent setting in each of 40 rounds participants as employer and worker negotiate a contract that specifies pay depending on an ex post state signal state signal pay is framed as either a bonus or a penalty over two groups the results show that the bonus frame facilitates information use because of worker loss aversion although both groups initially underweigh the state signal the bonus group quickly converges toward the optimal weight whereas the penalty group persistently underweighs the state signal

a dual self model of impulse control we propose that a simple dual self model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi hyperbolic discounting and rabin s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small the model also implies that self control costs imply excess delay as in the o donoghue and rabin models of quasi hyperbolic utility and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist the base version of our model is consistent with the gul pesendorfer axioms but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load

environmental policy and the economic downturn this paper considers how environmental policies should respond to macroeconomic downturns it first explores the implications of the global economic downturn of 2008 09 for environmental policies focusing in particular on the example of action against climate change the arguments for and against activist fiscal policies in general are then reviewed and the case made that a demand induced downturn provides a very good opportunity to undertake a necessary step change in the public spending component of environmental policies and to start working through a backlog of public investment to improve the environment fiscal policy should be used to improve the allocation of resources across time and space recent fiscal stimuli are considered in the light of this discussion it is also argued that there is little cause to delay the introduction of price signals to internalise environmental externalities but the levels at which such signals should be set requires careful analysis changes over the business cycle may be warranted depending on the nature of the environmental externality and the cause s of the business cycle in question

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

observing unobservables identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice we estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology we randomized 58 000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major south african lender along three dimensions i an initial offer interest rate featured on a direct mail solicitation ii a contract interest rate that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate and ii a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing these three randomizations combined with complete knowledge of the lender s information set permit identification of specific types of private information problems our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate via unobservable risk and anticipated effort from hidden action effects via moral hazard in effort induced by actual contract terms we find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems a rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13 to 21 of default is due to moral hazard asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high risk borrowers

environmental jobs and growth in the united states abstract green growth is increasingly being seen as a means of simultaneously meeting current and future climate change obligations and reducing unemployment this paper uses detailed industry level data from the bureau of labor statistic s green goods and services survey to examine how the provision of so called green goods and services has affected various aspects of the us economy our descriptive results reveal that those states and industries that were relatively green in 2010 became even greener in 2011 to investigate further we include green goods and services in a production function the results show that between 2010 and 2011 industries that have increased their share of green employment have reduced their productivity although this negative correlation was only for the manufacture of green goods and not for the supply of green services in further analysis we investigate skill technology complementarities in the production of green goods and services and show that industries that increased their provision of green goods and services grew more slowly reduced their expenditure on technology inputs and increased their demand for medium educated workers whilst simultaneously reducing their demand for lower skilled workers

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

incentive design under loss aversion compensation schemes often reward success b ut do not penalize failure fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature yet the standard principal agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance this paper shows that under loss aversion there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is e ndogenous a further benefit of capping losses for example through options is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes jel f3 f4

using loss aversion to incentivize energy efficiency in a principal agent context evidence from a field experiment abstract promoting energy efficient behavior of agents in a principal agent context simultaneously decreases costs for firms and mitigates co2 emissions along this line we analyze the effect of incentive framing on energy efficient driving behavior our results contribute to the understanding of the drawbacks of loss framing in a situation with persistent labor market relations an extremely low bonus and heterogeneous prior performance the introduction of a bonus framed as a gain outperforms that of a bonus framed as a loss

new york city cab drivers labor supply revisited reference dependent preferences with rational expectations targets for hours and income this paper reconsiders whether cabdrivers labor supply decisions reflect reference dependent preferences following botond koszegi and matthew rabin 2006 we construct a model with targets for hours as well as income both determined by rational expectations estimating using henry s farber s 2005 2008 data we show that the reference dependent model can reconcile his 2005 finding that drivers stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with the negative wage elasticity of hours found by colin camerer et al 1997 and farber 2005 2008 the model yields sensible estimates that avoid farber s 2008 criticism that drivers income targets are too unstable to allow a useful reference dependent model of labor supply

innovation intermediaries accelerating environmental sustainability transitions abstract institutions in the united states are undergoing modifications that present direct challenges for the environment and society and may result in institutional uncertainty and instability this article explores whether innovation intermediaries can be employed as a key component of a strategy to create a window of opportunity for green job creation infrastructure changes and technological innovation in response to these types of institutional modifications based on a systematic literature review this article outlines a framework that combines institutional modifications with technological innovation and infrastructure development as part of an economic development strategy important findings are that connections between innovation intermediaries such as incubator and accelerator centers niche actors such as green champions and regime actors such as policy entrepreneurs show potential to contribute to a green economic development strategy but require further examination for the specific roles played by policy entrepreneurs to help create the conditions for scaling niche experiments and simultaneously disrupting the regime the key contribution is in defining the role of sustainability oriented innovation intermediaries at linking local state and business actions in order to scale up and influence green economic development in a politically feasible manner during times of institutional uncertainty and instability

neoclassical theory versus prospect theory evidence from the marketplace several experimental studies have provided evidence that suggest indifference curves have a kink around the current endowment level these results which clearly contradict closely held economic doctrines have led some influential commentators to call for an entirely new economic paradigm to displace conventional neoclassical theory e g prospect theory which invokes psychological effects this paper pits neoclassical theory against prospect theory by investigating data drawn from more than 375 subjects actively participating in a well functioning marketplace the pattern of results suggests that prospect theory adequately organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers but consumers with intense market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical predictions moreover the data are consistent with the notion that consumers learn to overcome the endowment effect in situations beyond specific problems they have previously encountered this transference of behavior across domains has important implications in both a positive and normative sense

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

framing of incentives and effort provision a prospect theory model combining loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity predicts that the link between incentives framing and effort is ambiguous small penalties yield higher effort but isomorphic contracts with large penalties decrease effort we conduct two experiments a framed field and a conventional lab experiment in which economically equivalent contracts are framed as menus of either i bonuses ii penalties or iii bonuses and penalties the experimental results confirm the main intuition of the model as subjects performed best when bonuses and penalties are combined a follow up lottery experiment confirms that both loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity influenced the performance

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

optimal choice and beliefs with ex ante savoring and ex post disappointment we propose a new decision criterion under risk in which individuals extract both utility from anticipatory feelings ex ante and disutility from disappointment ex post the decision maker chooses his degree of optimism given that more optimism raises both the utility of ex ante feelings and the risk of disappointment ex post we characterize the optimal beliefs and the preferences under risk generated by this mental process and apply this criterion to a simple portfolio choice insurance problem we show that these preferences are compatible with first degree and second degree stochastic dominance and yield a preference for early resolution of uncertainty furthermore they are consistent with observed violations of the independence axiom such as the preference reversal in the allais paradox and predict that the decision maker takes on less risk compared to an expected utility maximizer our decision criterion can thus help explain the equity premium puzzle and the preference for low deductibles in insurance contracts

trade credit and systemic fragility this paper treats an idealized monetary framework in which merchant banks finance trade trade which is induced by decentralized production indeed merchant bank credit instruments coupled with local bank deposits facilitate decentralization of both production and trade at the same time decentralized production exhibiting technological complementarity induces systemic monetary fragility however with the decentralization of trade the indemnification of either merchant bank credit instruments or of local bank deposits eliminates fragility in particular deposit insurance also stabilizes credit the result is a stable cashless economy a replacement of trade in specie 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

is tomorrow another day the labor supply of new york city cabdrivers the labor supply of taxi drivers is consistent with the existence of intertemporal substitution my analysis of the stopping behavior of new york city cabdrivers shows that daily income effects are small and that the decision to stop work at a particular point on a given day is primarily related to cumulative daily hours to that point this is in contrast to the analysis of camerer et al who find that the daily wage elasticity of labor supply of new york city cabdrivers is substantially negative implying large daily income effects this difference in findings is due to important differences in empirical methods and to problems with the conception and measurement of the daily wage rate used by camerer et al

catering to investors through security design headline rate and complexity this study investigates how banks design financial products to cater to yield seeking investors we focus on a large market of investment products targeted exclusively at households retail structured products these products typically offer a high return under their best case scenario the headline rate that is nested in a complex payoff formula using a text analysis of the payoff formulas of the 55 000 products issued in europe from 2002 to 2010 we measure product headline rates complexity and risk over this period product headline rates depart from the prevailing interest rates as the latter decrease complexity increases and risky products become more common in the cross section the headline rate of a product is positively correlated with its level of complexity and risk higher headline rate more complex and riskier products appear more profitable to the banks distributing them our results suggest that financial complexity is a by product of banks catering to yield seeking investors

labor economics and the psychology of organizations this essay is a discussion of how economists are attempting to understand institutions within the organizations of the labor market the institutions and issues discussed include mandatory retirement discontinuous jumps in wages pay compression rights of tenure up or out hierarchies timing of raises promotions and evaluations the existence of partnerships the use of bonuses vs penalties and pay as a motivator

heuristic thinking and limited attention in the car market can heuristic information processing affect important product markets analyzing over 22 million wholesale used car transactions we find evidence of left digit bias in the processing of odometer values whereby individuals focus on the number s leftmost digits the bias leads to discontinuous drops in sale prices at 10 000 mile odometer thresholds along with smaller drops at 1 000 mile thresholds these findings reveal that information processing heuristics matter even in markets with large stakes and easily observed information we model left digit bias in an inattention framework and structurally estimate the inattention parameter empirical patterns suggest the results are driven by final customers rather than professional agents jel d12 d44 d83 l81

coherent arbitrariness stable demand curves without stable preferences economic theories of valuation generally assume that prices of commodities and assets are derived from underlying fundamental values for example in finance theory asset prices are believed to reflect the market estimate of the discounted present value of the asset s payoff stream in labor theory the supply of labor is established by the tradeoff between the desire for consumption and the displeasure of work finally and most importantly for this chapter consumer microeconomics assumes that the demand curves for consumer products chocolates cds movies vacations drugs and so forth can be ultimately traced to the valuation of pleasures that consumers anticipate receiving from these products because it is difficult as a rule to measure fundamental values directly empirical tests of economic theory typically examine whether the effects of changes in circumstances on valuations are consistent with theoretical prediction for example whether labor supply responds appropriately to a change in the wage rate whether compensated demand curves for commodities are downward sloping or whether stock prices respond in the predicted way to share repurchases however such comparative static relationships are a necessary but not sufficient condition for fundamental valuation e g summers 1986 becker 1962 was perhaps the first to make this point explicitly when he observed that consumers choosing commodity bundles randomly from their budget set would nevertheless produce downward sloping demand curves

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

estimating the effect of salience in wholesale and retail car markets we investigate whether the first digit of an odometer reading is more salient to consumers than subsequent digits we find that retail transaction prices and volumes of used vehicles drop discontinuously at 10 000 mile odometer thresholds echoing effects found in the wholesale market by lacetera pope and sydnor 2012 our results reveal that retail consumers devote limited attention to evaluating vehicle mileage and that this drives effects in the wholesale market we estimate the inattention parameter implied by the price discontinuities in addition our results suggest that estimating consumer level structural parameters using data from an intermediate market can give misleading results

your loss is my gain a recruitment experiment with framed incentives empirically labor contracts that financially penalize failure induce higher effort provision than economically identical contracts presented as paying a bonus for success an effect attributed to loss aversion this is puzzling as penalties are infrequently used in practice the most obvious explanation is selection loss averse agents are unwilling to accept such contracts i formalize this intuition then run an experiment to test it surprisingly i find that workers were 25 percent more likely to accept penalty contracts with no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection consistent with the existing literature penalty contracts also increased performance on the job by 0 2 standard deviations i outline extensions to the basic theory that are consistent with the main results but argue that more research is needed on the long term effects of penalty contracts if we want to understand why firms seem unwilling to use them

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

reference points and effort provision a key open question for theories of reference dependent preferences is what determines the reference point one candidate is expectations what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs in a real effort experiment we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision we find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation based reference dependent preferences if expectations are high subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low

financial crises and coordination failure a comment abstract the three papers of this session link financial crises explicitly or implicitly to coordination failure in bryant journal of banking and finance 2002 the possibility of coordination failure is due to complementarity in the productive technology in chui et al journal of banking and finance 2002 foreign lenders to a small country fail to coordinate on the optimal strategy rolling over short term loans finally amable et al journal of banking and finance 2002 implicitly introduce coordination failure through a production function with external increasing returns to scale this sort of thick markets externality can be viewed as a reduced form that stands for coordination problems in a non walrasian economy