bookbuilding and strategic allocation in the bookbuilding procedure an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue the banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors we examine the books for 39 international equity issues we find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids regular investors receive favorable allocations especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed the investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors investment banks commonly build a book before pricing an equity issue in the united states it has been standard practice for a number of years in many other countries where fixed price offerings were traditionally used the bookbuilding procedure is becoming increasingly common especially for international equity issues 1 under the formal bookbuilding procedure the investment banker solicits indications of interest from institutional investors such indications consist of a bid for a quantity of shares and might include a maximum price i e a limit price or other details the investment banker uses the information to construct a demand curve the issue price is not set according to any explicit rule but rather based on the banker s interpretation of investors indications of interest he generally sets the price at a level at which demand exceeds supply and then allocates shares to the bidders at his discretion thus the

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

trade reforms credibility and development abstract this paper analyzes the implications of uncertainty regarding the future course of trade liberalization on investment and policies uncertainty concerning the future tariff rate is shown to depress saving and to operate as a subsidy tax on inward outward investment we identify the need to tax subsidize private investment in the importable exportable sector the elimination of sectorial private investment policies calls for a rise drop in the public private capital ratio in the outward oriented inward oriented activities in the presence of an external credit ceiling a higher degree of risk aversion increases the magnitude without changing the nature of the policies

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

a note on competitive investment under uncertainty uncertainty over future output prices or input costs can affect investment by a riskneutral firm in two opposing ways first it can increase the value of the marginal unit of capital which leads to more investment this only requires that the stream of future profits generated by the marginal unit be a convex function of the stochastic variable by jensen s inequality the expected present value of that stream is increased this result was demonstrated by richard hartman 1972 and later extended by andrew abel 1983 and others in their models constant returns to scale and the substitutability of capital with other factors ensure that the marginal profitability of capital is convex in output price and input costs even with fixed proportions however this convexity can result from the ability of the firm to vary output so that the marginal unit of capital need not be utilized at times when the output price is low or input costs are high if investment is irreversible and can be postponed a second effect of uncertainty is to create an opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting for new information to arrive before committing resources this increases the full cost of investing in a marginal unit of capital which reduces investment 2 hence the net effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment depends on the size of this opportunity cost relative to the increase in the value of the marginal unit of capital the sign of the net effect is significant because of its possible policy implications pindyck 1988 and giuseppe bertola 1989 developed models in which a firm faces a downward sloping demand curve and found the net effect to be negative ricardo caballero 1991 has recently studied investment by an individual firm facing a stochastically shifting demand curve he shows that as returns to scale become constant and the elasticity of demand faced by the firm rises this opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting approaches zero thus in the limit of constant returns and an infinitely elastic demand curve an increase in uncertainty tends to raise rather than decrease current investment even if that investment is irreversible it is important to stress that caballero s limiting result treats the firm in isolation and describes the effect of a meanpreserving increase in price uncertainty and not an increase in industry wide demand uncertainty this note shows that in a competitive market the key interactions between irreversibility and uncertainty occur at the industry level and can only be understood by making price and industry output endogenous 3 doing so restores the positive opportunity cost associated with irreversible investment in addition caballero s result is based on a model with convex adjustment costs an innovative aspect of the model is that these costs can be asymmetric thereby allowing for partial or complete irreversibility complete irreversibility corresponds to a cost of massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02139 this work was supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8618502 and by mit s center for energy policy research my thanks to julio rotemberg and especially ricardo caballero for very helpful comments and discussions 1then the marginal profit of capital at each time t in the future is max o pt ct where ct is variable cost thus a unit of capital represents a set of all options on future production which are worth more the greater the variance of pt or ct 2for a detailed discussion of this point and a survey of the recent literature on irreversibility and its implications for investment and market evolution see pindyck 1991 3studies that make price endogenous include steven lippman and richard rumelt 1985 avinash dixit 1989 1991 and john leahy 1990

price cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment this article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms investment behavior and welfare maximizing regulation of price and quantity regulated firms invest in smaller more frequent increments than social planners with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate and at higher levels when they are substantial when quantity is also regulated the average cost of building capacity increases but the price cap decreases immediately after firms make their initial investment regulators want to transfer surplus from customers to shareholders by raising the price cap to induce additional investment

strategic liquidity supply and security design we study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity in our model asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash flows liquidity suppliers can be competitive or strategic in the optimal trading mechanism associated to an arbitrary given security issuers with low cash flows sell their entire holdings of the security while issuers with high cash flows are typically excluded from trade by designing the security optimally issuers can avoid exclusion altogether we show that the optimal security is debt because of its low informational sensitivity debt mitigates the adverse selection problem furthermore by pooling all issuers with high cash flows debt also reduces the ability of a monopolistic liquidity supplier to exclude them from trade in order to better extract rents from issuers with lower cash flows

the valuation of floating rate instruments abstract a framework for valuing floating rate notes is developed to examine the effects of 1 lags in the coupon formula 2 special contractual features and 3 default risk evidence from a sample of floaters indicates they sold at significant discounts while lags in the coupon formulas and other contractual features make these notes more variable they do not account for the magnitude of the discounts we conclude that the fixed default premium in the coupon formula of a typical note is inadequate to compensate for time varying default premiums demanded by investors who treat other corporate short term paper as close substitutes

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

asymmetric information and options in an extension of the kyle 1985 model of continuous insider trading it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage even when an option would appear to be redundant its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic this eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option the change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the design of securities abstract this paper investigates the determinants of security design we consider the assignment of both cash flows and voting rights focusing on corporate control we postulate that a conflict of interest exists between contestants for control and outside investors the conflict arises because private benefits of control give contestants an incentive to acquire control even when this reduces firm value security design is a tool for resolving these conflicts and maximizing firm value our main result is that a single voting security is optimal

monte carlo methods for security pricing the monte carlo approach has proved to be a valuable and flexible computational tool in modern finance this paper discusses some of the recent applications of the monte carlo method to security pricing problems with emphasis on improvements in efficiency we first review some variance reduction methods that have proved useful in finance then we describe the use of deterministic low discrepancy sequences also known as quasi monte carlo methods for the valuation of complex derivative securities we summarize some recent applications of the monte carlo method to the estimation of partial derivatives or risk sensitivities and to the valuation of american options we conclude by mentioning other applications

the analytic valuation of american options no analytic solutions exists for the valuation of american options written on futures contracts and foreign currencies for which early exercise may be optimal this article formulates the american option valuation problem in economically and mathematically meaningful ways this enables us to derive valuation formulas for american options the properties associated with the optimal exercise boundary are examined and a numerical technique to implement the valuation formulas is presented article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

market concentration macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary policy abstract this paper studies the effect of market structure and macroeconomic uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy we motivate our analysis with a simple model which predicts that 1 investment and production in more concentrated sectors are more affected by demand shocks and 2 high uncertainty makes investment and production more sensitive to demand shocks the empirical analysis estimates the effect of monetary shocks on sectoral output for different sectors in the us using a structural vector autoregressive var approach the results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions

multinational investment under uncertainty in the chemical processing industries this study uses a sample of chemical processing industries to evaluate the effect of two types of uncertainty on the decision to invest in an industry it analyzes the effects of relative price uncertainty through exchange rates and input prices and demand uncertainty on the probability of expansion in a particular country the study then focuses on the behavior of individual companies and distinguishes companies by whether or not they are multinationals in the production of the product the results confirm previous evidence that exchange rate uncertainty has a negative effect on capacity expansions by domestic corporations and no effect on investment by multinational corporations finally the study also shows that expansions of production capacity in this industry are more likely to occur in those countries where capacity utilization is higher

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

an incentive compatible solution for trade credit term incorporating default risk abstract this paper studies the optimal trade credit term decision in an extended economic ordering quantity eoq framework that incorporates a default risk component a principal agent bilevel programming model with costs minimization objectives is set up to derive the incentive compatible credit term the supplier determines the credit term as the leader in the first level programming by balancing her his financing capacity with the retailer s default risk order behavior and cost shifting at the second level the retailer makes decisions on ordering and payment time by reacting on the term offered by the supplier a first order condition solution procedure is derived for the bilevel programming when credit term is confined within the practically feasible interval two key results are obtained the condition to derive incentive compatible credit term and an equation system to derive threshold default risk criterion filtering retailers suitable for credit granting numerical experiments show that the capital cost of the supplier is the most important factor determining the credit term default risk acts like a filtering criterion for selecting retailers suitable for credit granting empirical evidence supporting our theoretical considerations is obtained by estimating three panel econometric models using a dataset from china s listed companies

the impact of rent control on rents in the free sector in most cases rent control covers only a part of the housing stock this note provides a simple analysis of the impact which rent control and non price rationing exert on the rent in the free sector it is shown that depending on the rationing mechanism rents in the free sector can be higher or lower than in the absence of rent controls

a continuous time model to determine the intervention policy for pbgc abstract the pension benefit guaranty corporation pbgc which insures private defined benefit pension plans is facing mounting deficits the main cause of this predicament for pbgc can be traced down to the misuse of the insurance by a few companies we therefore propose an active intervention policy which would result in termination of severely underfunded plans for the pbgc a continuous time model is provided to help determine the point of intervention if necessary using option pricing techniques a clear exposition of the intervention doctrine is thus obtained via this model we also provide a numerical illustration of the working of the model on a hypothetical pension plan

continuous time methods in finance a review and an assessment i survey and assess the development of continuous time methods in finance during the last 30 years the subperiod 1969 to 1980 saw a dizzying pace of development with seminal ideas in derivatives securities pricing term structure theory asset pricing and optimal consumption and portfolio choices during the period 1981 to 1999 the theory has been extended and modified to better explain empirical regularities in various subfields of finance this latter subperiod has seen significant progress in econometric theory computational and estimation methods to test and implement continuous time models capital market frictions and bargaining issues are being increasingly incorporated in continuous time theory the roots of modern continuous time methods in finance can be traced back to the seminal contributions of merton 1969 1971 1973b in the late 1960s and early 1970s merton 1969 pioneered the use of continuous time modeling in financial economics by formulating the intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice problem of an investor in a stochastic dynamic programming setting merton 1973b also showed how such a framework can be used to develop equilibrium asset pricing implications thereby significantly extending the asset pricing theory to richer dynamic settings and expanding the scope of applications of continuous time methods to study problems in financial economics 1 within a span of about 30 years from the publication of merton s inf luential papers continuous time methods have become an integral part of financial economics indeed in certain core areas in finance such as e g asset pricing derivatives valuation term structure theory and portfolio selection continuoustime methods have proved to be the most attractive way to conduct research and gain economic intuition the continuous time approach in these areas has produced models with a rich variety of testable implications the econometric theory for testing continuous time models has made rapid strides in the last decade and has thus kept pace with the impressive progress on the theoretical front one hopes that the actual empirical investigations and estimation using the new procedures will follow suit soon

the first best sharing rule in the continuous time principal agent problem with exponential utility abstract the continuous time principal agent model with exponential utility developed by holmstrom and milgrom admits a simple closed form solution the second best sharing rule is a linear function of aggregated output here we show that the first best sharing rule is also linear in aggregated output the result follows immediately from the separability of the problem and the fact that principal and agent both have cara utility journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 j33

pricing american style securities using simulation abstract we develop a simulation algorithm for estimating the prices of american style securities i e securities with opportunities for early exercise our algorithm provides both point estimates and error bounds for the true security price it generates two estimates one biased high and one biased low both asymptotically unbiased and converging to the true price combining the two estimators yields a confidence interval for the true price the proposed algorithm is especially attractive compared with lattice and finite difference methods when there are multiple state variables and a small number of exercise opportunities preliminary computational evidence is given

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

the impact of default risk on the prices of options and other derivative securities abstract this paper presents a model for valuing derivative securities when there is default risk the holder of a security is assumed to recover a proportion of its no default value in the event of a default by the counterparty both the probability of default and the size of the proportional recovery are random the paper shows how data on bonds issued by the counterparty can be used to provide information about model parameters

on the fluctuations in consumption and market returns in the presence of labor and human capital an equilibrium analysis abstract we examine the effects of human capital on consumption stock market and other fluctuations in a general equilibrium continuous time model a representative consumer worker investor derives utility from consumption and leisure a representative firm demands labor as the sole input to a stochastic production technology driven by general possibly nonmultiplicative shocks for cobb douglas utility and multiplicative shocks labor is nonstochastic and consumption and stock market volatility are equated as under no human capital deviations from this are analyzed for logarithmic utility and constant elasticity of substitution production technology cases are identified where the presence of labor causes consumption to be smoother than the stock market

a one factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options 1990 a one factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options financial analysts journal vol 46 no 1 pp 33 39

options on the spot and options on futures this paper analyzes and compares the valuation of two types of options that relate to the same asset options on the asset itself and options on the futures on the asset the early exercise privilege plays a central role in explaining the differences between the values of the two options it is shown that in the case of a cash instrument that does not make interim payments such as gold the value of a call option on the spot is smaller than the call option on the futures contract the opposite is true for put options the early exercise boundaries which characterize when it pays to exercise are also compared and analyzed the financial markets have recently witnessed a proliferation of various types of listed options on commodities and on financial assets commencing with call options on individual common stocks recent innovations have included call and put options on treasury bonds metals foreign currencies and stock market

investment under uncertainty and the value of the firm abstract the investment behavior of a monopolistic firm with a constant returns to scale production function facing a randomly shifting elastic demand is examined uncertainty can have a negative effect on the value of the firm and on investment

environment asset characteristics and optimal effluent fees this article investigates theissue of optimal effluent fees in a frameworkwhere waste emissions are abated by investingin capital of which the pay off is uncertainand the cost is fully sunk the stock of wasteemissions harms an individual firm sproduction but the firm will underestimatethis external effect upon investing consequently the firm will invest lesscapital and thereby pollute more than issocially desirable the regulator who can useeffluent fees to correct this should imposelower effluent fees on irreversible investmentsthan on costlessly reversible ones whenuncertainty arises

the consumption based capital asset pricing model the paper provides conditions on the primitives of a continuous time economy under which there exist equilibria obeying the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm the paper also extends the equilibrium characterization of interest rates of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 to multi agent economies we do not use a markovian state assumption this work provides sufficient conditions on agents primitives for the validity of the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm of breeden 1979 as a necessary condition breeden showed that in a continuous time equilibrium satisfying certain regularity conditions one can characterize returns on securities as follows the expected instantaneous rate of return on any security in excess of the riskless interest rate the security s expected excess rate of return is a multiple common to all securities of the instantaneous covariance of this excess return with aggregate consumption increments this common multiple is the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion of a representative agent rubinstein 1976 published a discrete time precursor of this result the exis tence of equilibria satisfying breeden s regularity conditions had been an open issue we also show that the validity of the ccapm does not depend on breeden s assumption of markov state information and present a general asset pricing model extending the results of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 as well as the discrete time results of rubinstein 1976 and lucas 1978 to a multi agent environment since the ccapm was first proposed much effort has been directed at finding sufficient conditions on the model primitives the given assets the agents preferences the agents consumption endowments and in a production econ omy the feasible production sets conditions sufficient for the existence of continuous time equilibria were shown in duffie 1986 but the equilibria demonstrated were not shown to satisfy the additional regularity required for the ccapm in particular breeden assumed that all agents choose pointwise interior consumption rates in order to characterize asset prices via the first order conditions of the bellman equation interiority was also assumed by huang 1987 in demonstrating a representative agent characterization of equilibrium an approach exploited here the use of dynamic programming and the bellman equation aside from the difficulty it imposes in verifying the existence of interior 1 financial support from the national science foundation is gratefully acknowledged we thank

optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diffusion process abstract we consider a consumption portfolio problem in continuous time under uncertainty a martingale technique is employed to characterize optimal consumption portfolio policies when there exist nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth we also provide a way to compute and verify optimal policies our verification theorem for optimal policies involves a linear partial differential equation unlike the nonlinear partial differential equation of dynamic programming the relationship between our approach and dynamic programming is discussed we demonstrate our technique by explicitly computing optimal policies in a series of examples in particular we solve the optimal consumption portfolio problem for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility functions when the asset prices follow a geometric brownian motion the optimal policies in this case are no longer linear when nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth are included by these examples one can see that our approach is much easier than the dynamic programming approach

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

how many parts to make at once reprinted from factory the magazine of management volume 10 number 2 february 1913 pp 135 136 152 interest on capital tied up in wages material and overhead sets a maximum limit to the quantity of parts which can be profitably manufactured at one time set up costs on the job fix the minimum experience has shown one manager a way to determine the economical size of lots

exploiting the conditional density in estimating the term structure an application to the cox ingersoll and ross model we propose an empirical method that utilizes the conditional density of the state variables to estimate and test a term structure model with known price formulae using data on both discount and coupon bonds the method is applied to an extension of a two factor model due to cox ingersoll and ross 1985 cir our results show that estimates based on only bills imply unreasonably large price errors for longer maturities we reject the original cir model using a likelihood ratio test and conclude that the extended cir model also fails to provide a good description of the treasury market

the dynamics of dual job holding and job mobility this article concerns dual job holding and its link to job mobility we present evidence from u s data on patterns of dual job holding hours changes and job mobility we find that workers move into and out of second jobs frequently that these movements are associated with large changes in work hours and that hours constraints may prompt workers to take second jobs second we review theories of dual job holding and present a stochastic dynamic model of dual job holding and job mobility in which decisions to take second jobs and or change main jobs are made simultaneously

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the effect of uncertainty and aggregate investments on crude oil price dynamics this paper is a study of the dynamics of the oil industry and we derive a mean reverting process for the crude oil price oil is supplied by a market leader opec and by an aggregate that represents non opec producers the non opec producers take the oil price as given the cost of non opec producers depends on past investments shifts in these investments are influenced by costs of structural change in the construction industry a drop in the oil price to below a given level triggers lower investments but if the oil price reverts back to a high level investments may not immediately expand in an uncertain oil demand environment cost of structural change creates a value of waiting to invest this investment behaviour influences the oil price process

an exact solution to a dynamic portfolio choice problem under transactions costs the presence of any friction in financial markets qualitatively changes the nature of the optimization problem faced by an investor it requires one to either act or do nothing an issue which of course does not arise in frictionless situations the investor considered here accumulates wealth without consuming until some terminal point in time when he consumes all his objective is to maximize the expected utility derived from that terminal consumption we postpone the terminal point far into the future to obtain a stationary portfolio rule the portfolio policy is in the form of two control barriers between which portfolio proportions are allowed to fluctuate we show how to calculate them

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

informed lending and security design we examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects lenders may be either too conservative in which case they reject positive npv projects or too aggressive in which case they accept negative npv projects in the first case the uniquely optimal security is debt in the second case it is levered equity in equilibrium profitable projects that are relatively likely to break even are financed with debt while less profitable projects are financed with equity highly profitable projects are financed by uninformed arm slength lenders professional lenders have specialized expertise in screening projects unlike the typical entrepreneur to whom they lend they have been exposed to a wide variety of projects in the past professional lenders have experienced loan officers and analysts who know precisely what information is relevant how to treat soft information such as management quality and how to weigh the various pieces of information in making a forecast of the project s cash flows and default risk this paper examines how securities should be optimally designed when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects in our model screening generates an informative albeit private signal about the project s profitability high signals indicate a positive net present value npv and low signals indicate a negative npv where the project s npv is increasing

valuation optimal asset allocation and retirement incentives of pension plans we provide a framework in which we link the valuation and asset allocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetime marginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pension plan formula in turn we examine the retirement policies that are implied by the primitives of the model and the value of pension obligations our model provides an explicit valuation formula for a stylized defined benefits plan the optimal asset allocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio of the pension liabilities and the growth optimum portfolio independent of the pension liabilities we show that the worker will retire when the ratio of pension benefits to current wages reaches a critical value which depends on the parameters of the pension plan and the discount rate using numerical techniques we analyze the feedback effect of retirement policies on the valuation of plans and on the asset allocation decisions article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

non exclusive competition in the market for lemons in order to check the impact of the exclusivity regime on equilibrium allocations we set up a simple akerlof like model in which buyers may use arbitrary taris under exclusivity we obtain the zero profit separating riley rothschilds stiglitz allocation under non exclusivity there is also a unique equilibrium allocation that involves a unique price as in akerlof 1970 these results can be applied to insurance in the dual model in yaari 1987 and have consequences for empirical tests of the existence of asymmetric information

equilibrium with new investment opportunities abstract we develop a general equilibrium model where there are opportunities to abandon existing technologies and adopt new technologies we study how technologies change endogenously in an equilibrium and the effect of technological changes on the equilibrium we find that locally the equilibrium resembles that from cox et al 1985 econometrica 53 363 384 globally the equilibrium can be viewed as the equilibria from cir economies pasted together we also find that while the equilibrium consumption and security price processes are continuous the equilibrium return processes experience jumps at the time of technological changes

bond and option pricing when short rates are lognormal this article describes a one factor model for bond and option pricing that is based on the short term interest rate and that allows the target rate mean reversion and local volatility to vary deterministically through time for any horizon the distribution of possible short rates is lognormal so the rate neither falls below zero nor reflects off a barrier at zero a model like this allows one to match the yield curve the volatility curve and the cap curve surprisingly adding to future local volatility lowers the volatility curve a conventional binary tree with probabilities of 0 5 but variable time spacing is used to value bonds and options when the inputs are constant the slope of the yield curve starts out positive and ends up negative while its curvature shifts from negative to positive even when mean reversion is zero the volatility curve has a negative slope the differential cap curve rises steeply through the effects of volatility and then falls steeply through the effects of discounting and a falling forward rate used as the strike price

growth controls real options and land development abstract many urban growth controls attempt to check sprawl by restricting allowable new housing densities however land may be undeveloped to preserve its real option value real options in land markets arise from uncertainty as to the optimum use of a site by limiting allowable development choices growth controls can narrow real options and potentially accelerate investment this paper examines the effect of price volatility a generator of option value on the timing of development after the imposition of an urban growth boundary ugb around seattle while the net effect of the ugb is to lower the likelihood of new housing outside the boundary by between 28 and 39 price volatility is no longer a deterrent to development

optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets abstract we study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard a financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermediary we calculate the optimal contract for any given effort level and show the natural emergence of extreme punishment for defaults under which investors stop paying the intermediary after the first default with securitization contracts optimally designed we find securitization improves the intermediary s screening incentives furthermore the equilibrium effort level and the surplus converge to their first best levels with sufficiently many assets

an exact solution for the investment and value of a firm facing uncertainty adjustment costs and irreversibility this paper derives closed form solutions for the investment and value of a competitive firm with a constant returns to scale production function and convex costs of adjustment solutions are derived for the case of irreversible investment as well as for reversible investment optimal investment is a non decreasing function of q the shadow value of capital relative to the case of reversible investment the

securitization and lending competition we study the eects of securitization on interbank lending competition when banks see private signals of local applicants repayment chances if banks cannot securitize the outcome is e cient they lend to their most creditworthy local applicants with securitization banks lend also to remote applicants with strong observables in order to lessen the lemons problem they face in selling their securities this reliance on observables is ine cient raises the mean default risk and may lead to a deceptive rise in credit scores

multiple versus single banking relationships theory and evidence a theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank firm data according to the theory relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects owing to internal problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from nonrelationship banks the latter however face an adverse selection problem as they do not know the quality of the project and may refuse to lend in these circumstances multiple banking can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of the project the empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model

overcoming adverse selection how public intervention can restore market functioning as illustrated by liquidity support equity injections and asset repurchases in financial crises and by imf credit lines to countries authorities often intervene in orderto revive markets that have dried up or to create newones in suchsituations agents participate only if they receive from the governmental scheme more than in the marketplace while the market outcome depends on who joins the scheme the paper provides a first analysis of market jumpstarting and its two way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints in the model sellers in need of cash have private information about the value of their legacy asset the absence of buyer confidence forces authorities to intervene to jump start the market we characterize the optimal intervention and draw two main implications first the government should clean up the market through buybacks of the weakest assets and then through some equity injections and leave the agents with the strongest legacy assets to the market in particular authorities should not substitute fully for the market even when they have no comparative disadvantage in acquiring assets or shares thereof second the government creates its own competition by cleaning up the market from its most toxic pieces at the optimal intervention the government always strictly overpays for the legacy asset yet and unlike what would be suggested by coasian profit evasion the existence of a later market imposes no welfare cost while it is cast in a public intervention context the analysis of mechanismdependent reservation utilities also admits important private sector applications

a duration model of irreversible oil investment theory and empirical evidence the aim of this paper is to analyse the implications of the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty for investment in oil fields on the united kingdom continental shelf ukcs we consider the problem of an operator who owns a licence to develop and extract oil from a field of known capacity an intertemporal optimization model in discrete time is developed to derive decision rules for the timing of the irreversible development investment and for the optimal rate of extraction model simulation is then used to describe the properties of the numerical solutions the predictions of the theory on the determinants of the irreversible investment decision are then examined using statistical duration analysis data on the length of the time period between discovery and development are available for individual fields on the ukcs we measure the duration of the irreversible investment gestation lag for each field and test the model by assessing the significance of the theoretical variables in explaining the significance of such a lag both our theoretical model and our empirical results suggest the importance of a nonlinear interaction of the level of oil prices and the volatility of oil prices in determining the development lag the simulation of our theoretical model shows a nonlinear impact of oil price volatility on the trigger level of oil prices our empirical results suggest that the effect of price volatility is a function of the expected price level with increased price volatility having a positive impact on the duration of investment appraisal when expected prices are low and a negative impact when they are high

investment under uncertainty does competition matter abstract empirical applications of real options models in competitive environments implicitly exploit the optimality of myopic planning in a seminal paper leahy j v 1993 investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior quarterly journal of economics 108 1105 1133 shows that the optimal investment strategy of a myopic planner who ignores market entries and exits of competitors as well as the resulting price effects constitutes a market equilibrium under rather general conditions as a result the calculation of optimal investment strategies is simplified considerably because competition does not have to be taken into account in this paper however we demonstrate by using simulation experiments that myopic planning may lead to non optimal investment strategies this is due to the fact that it is difficult or even impossible to specify the correct or equivalent price process for the myopic investor using real world data we quantify the degree of suboptimality and propose measures to reduce the error

secondary market liquidity and security design theory and evidence from abs markets we develop and empirically test a theory of optimal security design under adverse selection accounting for strategic trading by uninformed investors who will liquidate a security in secondary markets only if their idiosyncratic carrying costs exceed the security s expected trading loss such investors demand primary market discounts equaling expected carrying costs borne plus trading losses incurred issuers minimize the total illiquidity discount by splitting cash flow into tranched debt claims with liquidity predicted to increase with seniority while the optimal number of tranches increases with underlying cash flow risk empirical tests confirm our model predictions

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

a note on optimal order quantities for credit purchases abstract in this note optimal purchase quantities are derived for firms that regularly purchase items on credit these derivations represent modifications to the traditional economic order quantity model and include situations where handling and storage costs are charged as incurred prepaid or billed after usage buying on credit introduces float foregone as a relevant cost and makes discounting an integral element in the analysis wholesale and retail firms operating in developing marketbased economies are noted as example scenarios where the results from these derivations are managerially significant

the relation between forward prices and futures prices abstract this paper consolidates the results of some recent work on the relation between forward prices and futures prices it develops a number of propositions characterizing the two prices these propositions contain several testable implications about the difference between forward and futures prices many of the propositions show that equilibrium forward and futures prices are equal to the values of particular assets even though they are not in themselves asset prices the paper then illustrates these results in the context of two valuation models and discusses the effects of taxes and other institutional factors

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

sunk costs firm size and firm growth for several decades the conventional wisdom has been that expected firm growth rates are independent of firm size a property known as gibrat s law however recent empirical work has found a negative relation between firm growth and firm size this paper provides a theoretical explanation for this negative relation in a model of new firm growth where capacity and technology choices involve some degree of sunkness additional empirical implications of the theory of sunk costs are also developed these relate to profit rates tobin s q exit rates degree of sunkness of capacity costs as well as size and growth rates copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

a joint approach for setting unit price and the length of the credit period for a seller when end demand is price sensitive this paper considers the seller buyer channel in which the end demand is price sensitive and the seller may offer trade credit to the buyer the unit price seller charged by the seller and the length of the credit period offered by the seller to the buyer both influence the final demand for the product hence we consider both to be policy variables for the seller we use the case of no credit as a benchmark in our analysis the paper provides procedures for determiningthe seller s and the buyer s policies under non cooperative as well as cooperative relationships in the non cooperative case we determine for the seller the optimal unit price and the length of the credit period for the cooperative structure we provide a procedure for characterizingpareto efficient solutions r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition we study the optimality of debt through the interaction between se curity design and information acquisition an impatient seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity facing dierent securities the buyer has incentives to acquire in formation from dierent aspects of the fundamental which in turn aects security design speci cally the buyer bene ts from information acqui sition at the expense of the seller through adverse selection the seller hence deliberately designs the security to induce the buyer to acquire the information least harmful to the seller s interest since securities can be designed in arbitrary ways the resulting incentive to acquire information is very exible thus we introduce exible information acquisition to capture this interaction we show that debt is uniquely optimal com pared with the security design literature we neither assume monotonicity of the feasible securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on the fundamental or information structures fixed aggregate cash ow and homogeneous information cost are two key factors driving the results jel d86 d82 g32

irreversible investment under uncertainty and the threat of bankruptcy abstract the firm level theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty is extended to account for bankruptcy with a sufficiently large risk of bankruptcy firms prefer to defer their investment decision to a later date simulated option values reach as high as 30 percent