allocation of fixed transmission cost to wheeling transactions by cooperative game theory this paper describes a methodology to allocate the cost of transmission network facilities to wheeling transactions in decentralized power systems the authors propose that the responsibility placed on transmission facilities involved in each transaction be according to the transmission usage pattern their proposal incorporates the mw mile method and considers economies of scale of transmission network facilities they also incorporate a nucleolus scheme in the cooperative game theory to deal with matters of conflict the applicability of their method is demonstrated in a numerical example

transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation the allocation of costs of a transmission system to its users is still a pending problem in many electric sector market regulations this paper contributes with a new allocation method among the electric market participants both cooperation and competition are defined as the leading principles to fair solutions and efficient cost allocation the method is based mainly on the responsibility of the agents in the physical and economic use of the network their rational behavior the formation of coalitions and cooperative game theory resolution mechanisms the designed method is applicable to existing networks or to their expansion simulations are made with sample networks results conclude that adequate solutions are possible in a decentralized environment with open access to networks comparisons with traditional allocation systems are shown and cooperative game solutions compare better in economic and physical terms

coalition formation in transmission expansion planning the study of a decentralized coalition formation scheme in a specific power systems transmission expansion scenario is the purpose of this paper the authors define first who are the agents in the expansion game and provide a decentralized coalition scheme based on bilateral shapley values finally they allocate the total costs of expansion amongst the agents based on the coalition history and they compare their method with a centralized scheme

game theoretical multi agent modelling of coalition formation for multilateral trades in recent years electric utility industries worldwide have been undergoing deregulation to introduce competitiveness in the generation transmission and distribution of electric power the once centralised system planning and operation management must be remodelled to adapt to the new market structure in particular the trading mechanism needs to be totally revised as any party may now get involved in this free market subject to the unavoidable constraints such as generation volumes physical transmission means and days ahead scheduling this paper presents a multi agent model in conjunction with game theory to resolve the coalition formation for multilateral trades the authors have implemented the model using the java language and the jatlite jat0 3 agent development tools developed by stanford university

allocation of unit start up costs using cooperative game theory this paper discusses a three part generation offer strategy that enables generators to put in unbundled variable operating costs and fixed start up no load costs we then propose methods based on cost sharing axioms to allocate fixed start up no load costs among electricity consumers load retailers that take into account equity and rationality considerations we focus on the single period cost allocation first we apply three well known game theoretic axioms the core the nucleolus and the shapley value we discuss the relative merits and demerits of each criterion and also explore certain theoretical conditions for the existence of the core and the shapley value lying inside the core finally the multiperiod start up cost allocation problem is studied allocations based on individual periods vis a spl grave vis composite allocation for all periods are compared and contrasted numerical examples are used to illustrate all theoretical concepts

the control of invasive species on private property with neighbor to neighbor spillovers invasive pests cross property boundaries property managers may have private incentives to control invasive species despite not having sufficient incentive to fully internalize the external costs of their role in spreading the invasion each property manager has a right to future use of his own property but his property may abut others properties enabling spread of an invasive species the incentives for a foresighted property manager to control invasive species have received little attention we consider the efforts of a foresighted property manager who has rights to future use of a property and has the ability to engage in repeated discrete control activities we find that higher rates of dispersal associated with proximity to neighboring properties reduce the private incentives for control controlling species at one location provides incentives to control at a neighboring location control at neighboring locations are strategic complements and coupled with spatial heterogeneity lead to a weaker link public good problem in which each property owner is unable to fully appropriate the benefits of his own control activity future use rights and private costs suggest that there is scope for a series of coase like exchanges to internalize much of the costs associated with species invasion pigouvian taxes on invasive species potentially have qualitatively perverse behavioral effects a tax with a strong income effect e g failure of effective revenue recycling can reduce the value of property assets and diminish the incentive to manage insects on one s own property

the demand for standing and seated viewing accommodation in the english football league using match attendance data collected from a postal survey of football league clubs separate demand equations are estimated for standing and seated viewing accommodation some significant differences between attendance patterns for the two types of accommodation are identified current form the championship significance of the match and a geographical distance variable are found to be important determinants of standing attendance while the club s historical record is of particular importance for seated attendance the paper also discusses the implications of the results in view of the current moves towards the conversion of stadia to all seated accommodation

using game theory to analyze electric transmission pricing policies in the united states abstract us public policy towards the private electric power industry is moving away from restrictive regulation and towards promotion of competition alternative policies concerning access to and pricing of transmission are now being discussed similar issues may arise in europe as trade barriers fall our purpose is to show how game theory can help illuminate that debate and identify desirable policies game theory models are used to estimate the possible effects of various policies upon productive efficiency and the distribution of gains among sellers transmitters and buyers of power static cooperative models are used to calculate the possible outcomes of short run transmission games long run games in which the amount of transmission capacity is a decisition variable are modeled as dynamic noncooperative stackelberg games one conclusion is that under some conditions price regulation and mandatory access could hurt power buyers by removing incentives for building transmission capacity another conclusion is that under a system of voluntary access and price regulation it may be better to allow wheeling prices to exceed the marginal cost of transport rather than to risk losing the benefits of cooperation

evaluating changes in league structure the reorganization of the scottish football league this article investigates the relationship between league structure and the demand for professional team sport using data from the scottish football league sfl 1971 to 1980 the sfl was restructured in 1975 and thus provides an excellent opportunity for the empirical analysis of the influence of league structure the general channels by which league structure affects demand are explored estimates are made of the impact on individual clubs by predicting what attendances would have been in the absence of the league reorganization finally the distribution of attendances across clubs is examined for evidence of the influence of league structure

natural resource use with limited tenure property rights abstract we study the dynamic harvest incentives faced by a renewable resource harvester with insecure property rights a resource concession is granted for a fixed duration after which it is renewed with a known probability only if a target stock is achieved despite the insecurity of this property right simple concessions contracts can be designed to induce first best harvest trajectories we examine how those contracts will depend on economic ecological and institutional variables and apply theoretical insights to two concessions managed fisheries in baja california mexico

cost allocation and net load variability a basic principle of electricity market design is that cost allocation should follow cost causation as closely as possible as renewable resources play a larger role in electricity generation system operators have become increasingly concerned about costs related to variability in net load while variable generation resources have attracted a great deal of attention along these lines load is a larger source of variability in most systems this paper introduces a shapley value framework to assess the total system cost attributable to electricity market participants that either exacerbate or alleviate net load variability furthermore this paper investigates the extent to which these costs are adequately reflected in wholesale market prices numerical tests indicate that the cost of variability on the hourly time scale is in most cases internalized by market integrated generators and buyers mitigating concerns that variability imposes a socialized cost from ramping or cycling of thermal generators

locational market power screening and congestion management experience and suggestions the existing new england electricity market follows a uniform pricing system inframarginal generators are paid a uniform clearing price while constrained on generators are paid bid prices subject to a locational market power screen in this paper we first report the operation experience of this approach during the market s first two years we then briefly review the new england power system nepool locational pricing proposal being implemented two new approaches for locational market power screening are presented the first one is based on a zonal network model and the second is based on a nodal transmission model both approaches are being evaluated by an independent consultant and are be to recommended to nepool test results of both approaches are included

some costs of incomplete property rights with regard to federal grazing permits public land uses other than raising livestock have gained greater importance in pol icy proposals recently under the current prop erty rights regime the market solution of trading grazing permits is restricted political action is used to allocate public land use the effect of in creased political pressure to emphasize non commercial uses on grazing permits values is es timated if the rights to grazing permits were secure and transferable then the grazing permits values would not decrease in value as non commercial uses become more desired results indicate the opposite effect occurs in that as non commercial uses become more dear grazing per mit values have declined jel q15

optimal fossil fuel taxation with backstop technologies and tenure risk abstract the paper derives the global welfare optimizing time path for a tax on fossil fuels causing a negative stock externality climate change under increasing marginal extraction cost and in the presence of an unlimited backstop resource causing no externality in a basic competitive case the optimal tax equals the pigou rate equivalent to the present discounted value of marginal damage costs we consider two separate types of tenure insecurity for resource owners and their impact on the tax implementing the optimal policy when insecure control is with respect to future ownership to the resource competitive extraction is higher than otherwise and the efficiency implementing tax exceeds the pigou rate when tenure insecurity instead implies possible expropriation holdup of investment in extraction capacity it deters extraction and the optimal tax is lower than the pigou rate

attendance and promotions in minor league baseball the carolina league this empirical study investigates determinants of attendance at minor league baseball games in the carolina league in 2006 the focus of the analysis is on the effect of a wide variety of game day promotions on attendance on a game by game basis rather than aggregate attendance during the season the ordinary least square ols results imply that attendance is positively a function of per capita income in the city or county hosting the team runs scored by the home team friday and saturday games and promotions that provide cost reduced food or beverages low and high value merchandise and post game fireworks attendance is negatively a function of home team errors monday games and possibly rainy conditions during the game an unusual finding with respect to minor league baseball is that team performance variables affect attendance however home team runs scored and home team errors contribute to the overall entertainment experience for the home team fans and thus yield plausible effects on attendance

a model of regulated open access resource use abstract this paper develops a model of regulated open access resource exploitation the regulatory model assumes that regulators are goal oriented choosing target harvest levels according to a safe stock concept these harvest quotas are implemented by setting season lengths conditioned on the industry fishing capacity the industry enters until rents are dissipated conditioned on season length regulations harvest levels fishing capacity season length and biomass are determined jointly using parameter estimates from the long regulated north pacific halibut fishery predictions of these variables from the regulated open access model are compared to predictions that arise from the gordon model

an energy brokerage system with emission trading and allocation of cost savings an energy brokerage system can achieve lower emission levels for interconnected electric utilities in a cost effective way the paper presents a linear programming formulation of an energy brokerage system in an operational planning framework emission trading among utilities is envisaged to achieve emission reduction targets the power and emission buy sell quotes for individual utilities are computed and communicated to a central broker the broker determines the power and emission interchange schedule which maximizes the power system savings for all participating utilities the shapley value criterion is proposed for allocation of cost savings among the utilities this criterion reflects the true marginal contribution of a utility to the aggregate system savings and hence is superior to the existing methods of cost savings allocation

what s an oscar worth this article examines the impact of an academy award nomination and award for best picture best actor actress and best supporting actor actress on a film s i market share of theaters ii average revenue per screen and iii its probability of survival the model is estimated using weekly box office data for a matched sample of nominated and non nominated films the results indicate substantial financial benefits for a nomination and award for best picture and best actor actress the structure of rewards is consistent with that found in two stage single elimination tournaments

reputation and the league standing effect the case of a split season in minor league baseball abstractsplit season league design resets standings at the midpoint of the season thus allowing for two periods in which a team can potentially achieve success in a single season this context allows us to test both the reputation of the first half winner and the league standing effect on demand examination of game level data from the 2010 southern league reveals fans are unaffected by measures of both team quality and league standing in the second half of the season on the other hand the first half winners saw an 11 increase in attendance as a percent of stadium capacity suggesting that in the second half of the season winners matter more than winning

cost assignment model for electrical transmission system expansion an approach through the kernel theory a cost assignment model is proposed for the expansion of electrical transmission systems based on the cooperation and interaction principles that are the foundation of the cooperative game theory a solution algorithm is proposed that considers the development of independent cooperative games for each expansion segment and whose final assignment can be obtained by any game theory solution method kernel nucleolus shapley value etc the kernel method was chosen because it has both equilibrium and transparency characteristics in the computation of final assignments the model accepts both the technical load nature generation levels etc and economic power station marginal costs etc variables that characterize the network to be analyzed cost assignment will depend both on the capacity economic use and the noncoincident maximum use of the expansion lines made by individual and group agents

winning games versus winning championships the economics of fan interest and team performance championship prospects as distinct from game winning prospects may contribute to a fan s interest in a particular sports team if so then both season length and the structure of championship playoffs help determine the equilibrium allocation of playing skills across the teams of a league evidence from a regression analysis of team attendance in baseball indicates that ticket demand depends in part on perceived flag winning prospects several patterns in the winning percentages of league leaders in the major u s team sports are consistent with the perspective that championship considerations influence the allocation of playing skills