spousal bargaining over care for elderly parents in china imbalances in sex ratios influence the allocation of support abstractusing a unique chinese survey of parents and adult children this paper examines how married children negotiate with their spouses for time devoted to caring for their own parents applying a collective bargaining framework i show that the sex ratio at marriage shifts household bargaining in favour of the husband s parents when women are less scarce or against his parents when women are scarcer such changing dynamics in the family may potentially reverse the current preference for sons in china implying that those with sons rather than daughters may be increasingly in need of state support

rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

marriage market divorce legislation and household labor supply this paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply in our approach the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of distribution factors these factors are defined as variables that affect the household members bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set we extend the collective labor supply model developed by chiappori to allow for distribution factors we show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process the model is estimated using psid data for the year 1988 our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model also the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects

building the family nest premarital investments marriage markets and spousal allocations we develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by premarital investments the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching and endogenously determined sharing rules form the basis of intra household allocations by incorporating pre marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra marital sharing rules in particular we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre marital investments and intra household allocations are efficient the efficiency of both pre marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that for each couple the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

how do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets evidence from america s second generation sex ratios i e relative numbers of men and women can affect marriage prospects labor force participation and other social and economic variables but the observed association between sex ratios and social and economic conditions may be confounded by omitted variables and reverse causality this paper uses variation in immigrant flows as a natural experiment to study the effect of sex ratios on the children and grandchildren of immigrants the flow of immigrants affected the second generation marriage market because second generation marriages were mostly endogamous i e to members of the same ethnic group the empirical results suggest that high sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and a large negative effect on female labor force participation perhaps surprisingly the marriage rates of second generation men appear to be a slightly increasing function of immigrant sex ratios higher sex ratios also appear to have raised male earnings and the incomes of parents with young children the empirical results are broadly consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase female bargaining power in the marriage market

capital accumulation and the characteristics of private intergenerational transfers many recent studies of the process of family accumulation in general and household response to social security in particular have revealed growing dissatisfaction with the life cycle theory of saving see for example barro 1978 kotlikoff 1979 darby 1979 kotlikoff and summers 1981 kurz 1981 blinder gordon and wise 1981 david and menchik 1982 leimer and lesnoy 1982 an alternative to the life cycle hypothesis is expressed by defining the preference of each family over its own consumption as well as the welfare of the generations that follow thus each family consists of an infinite chain of generations who have interdependent preferences and for this reason we shall call it the inter generational hypothesis it was recently used by barro 1974 1978 to attack the conclusions of the life cycle hypothesis our purpose in this paper is to start the long road of studying the structure of the private inter generational transfer system with the aim of providing additional tests of the two competing hypotheses

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

a systematic review of the bottom base of the pyramid literature cumulative evidence and future directions sixteen years ago prahalad and hart strategy business 26 2 14 2002 introduced the possibility of both profitably serving the poor and alleviating poverty this first iteration of the bottom base of the pyramid approach known as bop 1 0 focused on selling to the poor in 2008 after ethical criticisms leveled at it the field moved to bop 2 0 instead emphasizing business co venturing since 2015 we have witnessed some calls for a new iteration bop 3 0 with the focus broadening to a more sustainable development approach to poverty alleviation in this paper we seek to answer the question how has the bop approach evolved over the past 16 years and has it delivered on its early promise we conducted a systematic review of 276 papers published in journals in this period utilizing a rigorous correspondence analysis method to map key trends and then further examined the 22 empirical studies conducted on the bop approach our results suggest that the field has evolved passing through a number of trends and coming full circle with our analysis pointing to more recent bop literature emphasizing similar themes to those espoused in the initial bop iteration i e treating the bop as consumers rather than reflecting the principles espoused in either bop 2 0 or bop 3 0 our analysis also points to a lack of clear evidence that the bop concept has delivered on its promise either to businesses that they can serve bop markets profitably or to bop participants that involvement by multinational corporations will help alleviate poverty

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

the invisible hand and the grabbing hand evidence from a survey of 105 shop owners in moscow and warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection as well as the burden of regulation and corruption are much greater in moscow the evidence suggests that the invisible hand model of government better fits the warsaw local government and the grabbing hand model is more appropriate for moscow the evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced and that the quality of government may be as essential this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

balancing incentives in the compensation contracts of nonprofit hospital ceos abstract given the considerable insight into corporate governance achieved through studies of executive compensation in proprietary firms it is surprising that executive contracting in nonprofit organizations remains largely unexplored in this paper we use the multitask principal agent model of holmstrom and milgrom the journal of law economics and organization 7 1991 suppl 24 to argue that nonprofit hospitals represent an optimal response to information asymmetries between managers and boards for a board with multidimensional objectives the agency problem is getting top executives to distribute their efforts across all dimensions of the hospital s mission the nonprofit form is preferred because the absence of high powered incentives such as share ownership reduces executives incentives to place undue emphasis on improving financial performance at the expense of important but less observable tasks using newly available compensation data we test the model by comparing the conditional distributions of earnings for industrial and nonprofit hospital ceos in ontario our best estimates are that ceos in publicly traded firms earn twice as much on average as those in similarly sized nonprofit hospitals but bear roughly eight times the income variance estimates of the associated degree of risk aversion are well within conventional bounds and are consistent with the trade off between insurance and incentives predicted by the theory

do husbands and wives pool their resources evidence from the united kingdom child benefit common preference models of family behavior imply income pooling a restriction on family demand functions such that only the sum of husband s income and wife s income affects the allocation of goods and time testing the pooling hypothesis is difficult because most family income sources are not exogenous to the allocations being analyzed in this paper we present an alternative test based on a natural experiment a policy change in the united kingdom that transferred a substantial child allowance to wives in the late 1970s using family expenditure survey data we find strong evidence that a shift toward greater expenditures on women s clothing and children s clothing relative to men s clothing coincided with this income redistribution

the impact of corruption on entry strategy evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies with globalization and the growth in emerging economies multinational enterprises mnes now frequently confront challenges associated with corrupt governments already a growing body of research has demonstrated that corruption significantly reduces a countrys aggregate inflows of foreign direct investment through its effects on firm performance we move the analysis of corruption from aggregate financial flows toward managerial theory and practice by examining how firms adjust their strategy for entering foreign markets in corrupt environments and how different types of corruption affect firms choices building on institutional theory we predict that mnes will respond to pervasive and arbitrary corruption in a host country by selecting particular types of equity and nonequity modes of entry using data on 220 telecommunications development projects in 64 emerging economies we find that firms adapt to the pressures of corruption via short term contracting and entry into joint ventures we also find that the arbitrariness surrounding corrupt transactions has a significant impact on firms decisions in addition to the overall level of corruption in contrast to extant research we show that mnes use nonequity entry modes or partnering as an adaptive strategy to participate in markets despite the presence of corruption

do neoliberal policies deter political corruption this article probes the relationship between neoliberal economic poli cies and political corruption focusing in particular on the impact of trade and invest ment policies regulatory policy and the overall size of the public sector on corruption using a large cross national data set from the mid to late 1990s we test the neolib eral hypotheses that market oriented economic policies are associated with lower lev els of political corruption and state intervention in the economy with higher levels consistent with the neoliberal argument we find that open trade and investment pol icies and low effective regulatory burdens do correlate with lower levels of political corruption however we find no consistent relationship between the aggregate size of the public sector and political corruption while the neoliberal hypothesis on polit ical corruption has initial empirical support its lessons cannot be applied wholesale market oriented states may be less corrupt but interventionist states as measured by public spending are not necessarily more corrupt

organizational isomorphism and corruption in financial institutions empirical research in emerging countries the globalizations of capital markets in the last 20 years has led to a historic degree of financial integration in the world it is clear however that globalization is not conducive to a complete homogeneity of financial markets and institutions among others one element of diversity is the importance of the impact of corruption in emerging countries corruption decreases the credibility of financial institutions and markets scandals and unethical behavior in financial institutions erode confidence in such firms relying on neoinstitutional literature this article focuses on the link between corruption and organizational isomorphism in financial institutions in emerging countries therefore our aim is to examine the institutional reasons for corruption in financial institutions in emerging countries our structural equation model is based on empirical research in financial institutions in emerging countries a questionnaire was administrated to 70 top executives of financial institutions in 18 different emerging countries

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

the determinants of bargaining power in an empirical model of transfers between adult children parents and in laws for south korea abstract we derive a bargaining model of transfers between adult children and their parents and then estimate the model using data from south korea our analysis extends the literature on family bargaining by i arguing that transfers from the couple represent semiprivate consumption e g it is plausible that the wife cares more about her parents than about the husband s parents and vice versa and ii using results from laboratory experiments to help identify the model we find that women have slightly more bargaining power than men in the couple s decision making we also find that when an adult child receives an extra dollar of income she transfers half of it to her parents this result is consistent with previous work finally we reject the null hypothesis that bargaining power within the family depends only on the potential wage of each spouse

mitigating principal agent problems in base of the pyramid markets an identity spillover perspective the potential for profitably distributing products to previously underserved base of the pyramid bop markets as a means of poverty alleviation has received growing interest within the management field however such business models often struggle with the agency costs that arise between the firm and local sales agents as the institutions and infrastructure in bop markets make traditional contractual and monitoring mechanisms difficult and expensive to employ we present the results of two complementary studies which were both conducted with salespeople in rural guatemala the first study employed a quasi experimental field study combined with in depth interviews while the second study was a laboratory experiment the results of the studies suggest that identity based mechanisms can potentially mitigate agency costs through a positive identity spillover effect in multiproduct settings abstract from author

household intertemporal behaviour a collective characterization and a test of commitment in this paper a formal test of intra household commitment is derived and performed to that end two models of household intertemporal behaviour are developed in both models household members are characterized by individual preferences in the first formulation household decisions are always on the ex ante pareto frontier in the second model the assumption of intra household commitment required by ex ante efficiency is relaxed it is shown that the full efficiency household euler equations are nested in the no commitment euler equations using this result the hypothesis that household members can commit to future allocations of resources is tested using the consumer expenditure survey i strongly reject this hypothesis it is also shown that the standard unitary framework is a special case of the full efficiency model however if household members are not able to commit household intertemporal behaviour cannot be characterized using the standard life cycle model these findings have two main implications first policy makers can change household behaviour by modifying the decision power of individual household members second to evaluate programmes designed to improve the welfare of household members it would be beneficial to replace the standard unitary model with a characterization of household behaviour that allows for lack of commitment

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

dowry and intrahousehold bargaining evidence from china this paper analyzes the relationship between a woman s intrahousehold bargaining position and her welfare within marriage using household data from rural china simultaneity problems are overcome by using dowry to proxy for bargaining position omitted variable bias is addressed by using grain shocks in the year preceding marriage as an instrument for dowry instrumented dowry positively impacts numerous measures of a wife s welfare including household purchases the time allocation of household members and the woman s satisfaction with life offering strong evidence in support of collective models of the household

entrepreneurial universities and overt opportunism entrepreneurial universities are a catalyst for regional economic development and growth yet the entrepreneurial university may not always capture the full gains made by the broader economy due to opportunistic behavior by its faculty scientists we expand agency theory to address conditions when opportunistic behavior persists in the face of substantial information symmetry and where principals appear to tolerate opportunism despite the authority to sanction their agents using a sample of 105 us research universities and 73 603 scientists we demonstrate that some scientists privately leak discoveries invented while working for their universities counter to prior prediction we find that universities acting as principals often do not retaliate even when having knowledge of such opportunistic behavior and the capability to punish non complying agents to extend theory we examined contexts that exacerbate and alleviate such overt opportunism high value discoveries and sizable entrepreneurial activity are associated with greater opportunistic behavior whereas efforts to empower those who have close professional ties with scientists their departments and technology commercialization offices are related to reduced opportunism to complement our empirical analyses we provide a stylized mathematical model that shows how agency theory can improve its predictive power once it formally recognizes certain conditions under which agents wield substantial bargaining power over their principals who in turn seem to tolerate agents overt opportunistic behavior

private monetary transfers in rural china are families altruistic monetary transfers between relatives may be motivated by altruism or they may represent payments for services rendered data from a large 1988 household survey are used to test these hypotheses and to study the size and direction of transfers in rural china the analysis suggests that altruism alone cannot explain the observed transfers and that exchange may be involved most of the money flows appear to be transfers from adult children to elderly parents and remittances from migrants child care is likely to be one of the main services that parents render to adult children in exchange for money

collective labor supply and welfare the paper develops a general collective model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own possibly altruistic preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be pareto efficient an alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process agents first share nonlabor income according to some given sharing rule then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption this setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies moreover the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule up to a constant finally the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting

entrepreneurship in and around institutional voids a case study from bangladesh abstract in many developing countries those living in poverty are unable to participate in markets due to the weakness or complete absence of supportive institutions this study examines in microcosm such institutional voids and illustrates the activities of an entrepreneurial actor in rural bangladesh aimed at addressing them the findings enable us to better understand why institutional voids originate and to unpack institutional processes in a setting characterized by extreme resource constraints and an institutional fabric that is rich but often at odds with market development we depict the crafting of new institutional arrangements as an ongoing process of bricolage and unveil its political nature as well as its potentially negative consequences

the coevolution of industries social movements and institutions wind power in the united states this study of the u s wind energy industry extends theory on the process of industry emergence by developing and testing a coevolutionary model of the relationship between social movement organizations smos institutions and industries building on research that suggests that smos can influence institutions and the path of emerging industries we show that the growth of an industry can also influence the diversity of social movements by motivating the participation of specialist smos these new smos in turn deploy distinct knowledge capabilities goals and strategies to produce institutional changes that are necessary for the continued growth of the industry our study offers a more complete conceptualization of the influence of social movements on industry emergence and growth and it extends understanding of how smo diversity is produced

parental wealth and adult children s welfare in marriage abstract many studies find that parental resources importantly determine children s human capital schooling returns and earnings the collective household approach suggests that in addition parental resources of marital partners may importantly affect resource distributions within marriage this paper presents empirical results consistent with this framework they suggest that parental wealth continues to play roles in augmenting welfare of children into adulthood beyond provision of human capital in early life cycle stages or direct financial aid during adulthood and that actual transfers from parents to adult children do not fully measure influences of parental wealth on behaviors and welfare of adult children

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

the impact of corruption on firm tax compliance in transition economies whom do you trust tax compliance is an important issue for gov ernments and the public alike to meet public needs and fund public mandates firms around the world are expected to comply with tax laws factors that are related to orga nizational firm tax compliance have not been sufficiently examined in the literature owing to the increasing global influence of transition economies factors associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particu larly of interest based on a sample of over 5 000 firms from 22 former soviet bloc transition economies we find that higher levels of corruption and higher levels of par ticularized trust reliance on friends and family are asso ciated with lower levels of tax compliance interestingly we also find that the negative relationship between cor ruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust trust in strangers overall our study s results suggest that institutional factors play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies

corruption and microenterprises in russia abstract in russia compliance with the rules and regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life has created a hostile environment for microenterprises more serious than the regulations per se however is the potential niche they create for opportunistic behavior by regulatory authorities in russia the regulatory state has created a corrupt cadre of government bureaucrats who frequently engage in rent seeking behavior while enforcing regulations firms are not uniformly affected by corruption however this paper shows empirical evidence of differential incidence of extortion based on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics corruption in russia is similar to a regressive tax and acts as a disincentive to innovation and growth it may induce technologically inefficient production decisions and can dilute economies of scale and scope

household bargaining over fertility theory and evidence from malaysia we develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible the model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes we show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage if couples bargain with commitment fertility outcomes take account of both spouses fertility preferences and do not depend on the threat point in marital bargaining if couples bargain without commitment the influence of each spouse s fertility preference on fertility outcomes depends on the relevant threat point in marital bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power we test the models using household data from the malaysia family life survey this data set contains information on each spouse s desired fertility level as well as fertility outcomes we exploit differences in threat points in marital bargaining across ethnic groups to help identify the underlying bargaining model the evidence suggests couples bargain without commitment

bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation do wages in the civil service affect corruption and by how much abstract this paper presents what is to our knowledge the first empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the civil service on corruption first we show that theory is ambiguous on the relationship between civil service pay and corruption then we examine the issue using a new data set on wages for low income countries we find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross country averages where we control for a wide array of variables the relationship implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

international financial integration and economic growth abstract this paper uses new data and new econometric techniques to investigate the impact of international financial integration on economic growth and also to assess whether this relationship depends on the level of economic development financial development legal system development government corruption and macroeconomic policies using a wide array of measures of international financial integration for 57 countries and an assortment of statistical methodologies we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that international financial integration does not accelerate economic growth even when controlling for particular economic financial institutional and policy characteristics

dowry and wife s welfare a theotrical and empirical analysis becker attributes the existence of marital transfers to inflexibility in the division of joint product within the marriage if that were the only reason we would not have observed the coexistence of dowries and bride prices this paper offers an alternative analysis while becker s interpretation is retained for bride prices a dowry is now represented as a premortem bequest by altruistic parents for a daughter it not only increases the wealth of the new conjugal household but also enhances the bargaining power of the bride in the allocation of the output within the household thereby safeguarding here welfare using micro data from taiwan we found that a dowry improves the bride s welfare whereas a bride price has no effect these empirical results support the theoretical predictions of the model

organizational isomorphism and corruption an empirical research in russia based on neo institutional literature this article aims to show the influence of organizational isomorphism on corruption the focus is institutional explanations of corruption our model is based on empirical research in russia at the end of the 1990s a face to face questionnaire was conducted with 552 top executives in private firms across various economic sectors we used the structural equation model partial least squares pls technique to test our hypotheses the developed model provides an integrated approach to the study of the relationship between corruption and organizational isomorphism our empirical data from firms in russia allowed us to test various theoretical hypotheses concerning the influence of organizational isomorphism on corruption our emphasis is on the influence of competitive and institutional isomorphism on corruption

collective labour supply with children we extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption we show how this model allows the analysis of welfare consequences of policies aimed at changing the distribution of power within the household our setting provides a conceptual framework for addressing issues linked to the targeting of specific benefits or taxes we also show that the observation of the labor supplies and the household demand for the public good allow one to identify individual welfare and the decision process this requires either a separability assumption or the presence of a distribution factor

the double edged sword of legitimacy in base of the pyramid markets as compared to developed countries a much higher proportion of entrepreneurs within base of the pyramid bop markets operate unregistered businesses prior research has suggested that the primary cause of such informal activity in these settings is the general failure of weak institutions to provide sufficient resources to warrant formalization we attempt to extend such thinking by deconstructing the discrete and inter related effects of formal business registration on the level of resources obtained by entrepreneurs from financial labor and legal institutions within bop markets using a multi method approach involving 299 entrepreneurs within guatemala city our results suggest that being seen as a legitimate registered business can actually lead to both increased resource provision and resource appropriation more specifically adhering to the norms and rules prescribed by regulatory institutions within weak legal environments can convey positive signals of stability and profitability that both attract the desired attention from formal institutional actors as well as unwanted attention from criminals

international validation of the corruption perceptions index implications for business ethics and entrepreneurship education international government and corporate corruption is increasingly under siege although various groups of researchers have quantified and documented world wide corruption apparently no one has validated the measures this study finds a very strong significant correlation of three measures of corruption with each other thereby indicating validity one measure was of black market activity another was of overabundance of regulation or unnecessary restriction of business activity the third measure was an index based on interview perceptions of corruption corruption perceptions index or cpi in that nation validity of the three measures was further established by finding a highly significant correlation with real gross domestic product per capita rgdp cap the cpi had by far the strongest correlation with rgdp cap explaining over three fourths of the variance corruption is increasingly argued to be a barrier to development and economic growth business students often do not see ethics courses as being as relevant as other value free disciplines or core courses the data in this study suggests otherwise sustainable economic development appears very dependent on a constant virtuous cycle that includes corruption fighting and the maintenance of trust and innovation all reinforcing each other

geography of the family we study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents the firstborn child s location choice influences the behavior of the second born child and can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the other these strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with firstborn children locating further away from their parents than second born children we also analyze the location choices empirically using german data these data confirm our theoretical predictions jel h41 j10

marriage the sharing rule and pocket money the case of south korea abstract using longitudinal data on private consumption from south korea this article examines the marital balance of power between spouses in a dynamic setting by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level and spouses time constant unobserved bargaining power i find that unobserved power plays a significant role in intrahousehold resource allocation the income pooling hypothesis is no longer rejected after accounting for unobserved power relative spousal earnings may be a good proxy for the long term balance of power to an extent that cross sectional variation in relative earnings across households reflects the pattern of spousal matching however within marriage changes in relative earnings do not induce any significant resource transfer between spouses the balance of bargaining power is stable within marriage

reinventing strategies for emerging markets beyond the transnational model with established markets becoming saturated multinational corporations mncs have turned increasingly to emerging markets ems in the developing world such em strategies have been targeted almost exclusively at the wealthy elite at the top of the economic pyramid recently however a number of mncs have launched new initiatives that explore the untapped market potential at the base of the economic pyramid the largest and fastest growing segment of the world s population reaching the four billion people in these markets poses both tremendous opportunities and unique challenges to mncs as conventional wisdom about mnc global capabilities and subsidiary strategy in ems may not be appropriate how mncs can successfully enter these low income markets has not been effectively addressed in the literatures on global and em strategies an exploratory analysis involving interviews with mnc managers original case studies and archival material indicates that the transnational model of national responsiveness global efficiency and worldwide learning may not be sufficient results suggest that the success of initiatives targeting low income markets is enhanced by recognizing that western style patterns of economic development may not occur in these business environments business strategies that rely on leveraging the strengths of the existing market environment outperform those that focus on overcoming weaknesses these strategies include developing relationships with non traditional partners co inventing custom solutions and building local capacity together these successful strategies suggest the importance of mncs developing a global capability in social embeddedness

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare