strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

securitization of taxes implicit in payg pensions to preserve solvency a pay as you go payg pension system needs to adjust contribution rates and pension promises over time currently it is not possible to hedge in the financial market against politically determined uncertainty as regards these parameters i consider a policy reform whereby property rights are established on the implicit lifetime tax levied by payg finance and are assigned to the pension institution these property rights are well defined if the reform also features rule based allocation of aggregate risk in the form of defined contribution or defined benefit schemes i show that a payg pension system may indeed be instantly restructured so as to minimize political risk and allow financial market diversification of risk a side benefit is securitization of human capital flows which are not traded in existing financial markets the new securities if traded in appropriately competitive financial markets are complementary to the notional account reforms of the 1990s however fiscal instability can increase if securitization is implemented in the absence of initial solvency and credible adoption of rule based methods to allocate aggregate risk salvador valdes prieto

public pension reform in europe policies prospects and evaluation this paper describes the demographic and economic factors underlying the reform of public pension programmes in europe it examines the policy response both at the europe wide level and within individual european countries several programme reform strategies that have been implemented are evaluated these strategies are the greater pre funding of public pensions and expanded second tier private pension components parametric reforms to existing programmes and the development of formula driven actuarially fair public programmes efforts to provide greater incentives for individuals to postpone retirement are also discussed

information and legislative bargaining the political economy of u s tariff suspensions this paper studies the political influence of individual firms on congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on u s imports of intermediate goods we develop a legislative bargaining model in which firms influence legislators by transmitting information about the value of protection using verbal messages and lobbying expenditures model estimation using firm level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures reveals that the probability a suspension is granted decreases with each additional firm that expresses opposition this effect is significantly larger than that of either opponent or proponent lobbying due to the greater information content of verbal opposition and legislative bargaining costs jel f13 d7

strategic restraint in contests abstract economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a political game between two interest groups the possible ex post realized outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies in the literature policy proposals are exogenous we extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies in a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then in a second stage engage in a contest over the proposed policies our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and in turn wasteful lobbying activities

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

rent seeking and the provision of public goods in this short paper i adopt the public choice school paradigm of modeling a government in order to compare its performance with that of the market in the standard model of the provision of public goods private provision is represented by the cournot nash equilibrium in individual contributions public provision incorporates rent seeking whereby some of the aspects of the allocation are determined indirectly by influence activities of the interested parties thus both allocation procedures yield inefficiency and the question is which procedure results in a greater amount of inefficiency private provision with its free riding incentives or public provision with its rent seeking incentives the results indicate that public provision may well be preferred to private provision of public goods thus superiority of private provision is not guaranteed even in the case of a non benevolent government copyright 1993 by royal economic society

a positive theory of social security based on reputation we construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay as you go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium we alalyze the welfare implictions of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measure to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness

how to win the political contest a monopolist vs environmentalists this paper sheds light on the political economy of local energypolitics both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective first a case study of a small town in southern germany schonau is presented where environmentalists have won thepolitical contest against the regional energy monopolist and havefounded an energy supply firm themselves the different stagesof the political process are explained and analysed second apolitical economy model is developed where environmentalists anda monopolistic utility firm confront each other both on thepolitical and on the energy market in the lobbying equilibriumthe probability of the environmentalists winning the gamedepends on the monopoly rent and the perceived social costs ofenergy production it is shown that it is optimal for themonopolist to reduce his output below the monopolistic output finally the winning strategy in the schonau case is discussedin the light of the theoretical results of the paper

individual risk in an investment based social security system this paper examines the risk aspects of an investment based defined contribution social security plan we focus on the risk after the plan is fully phased in individuals deposit a fraction of wages to a personal retirement account pra invest these funds in a 60 40 equity debt mix and in a similarly invested annuity at age 67 the value of the assets follows a random walk with mean and variance of a 60 40 equity debt portfolio over the period 1946 95 a mean log return of 5 5 percent net of administrative costs of 0 4 percent and a standard deviation of 12 5 percent we study he stochastic distributions of this process by doing 10 000 simulations of the 80 year experience of the cohort that reached age 21 in 1998 the resulting annuities are compared to the future defined benefits specified in current law the benchmark benefits with no uncertainty a 5 5 percent log return would permit the benchmark benefits to be purchased with pra deposits of 3 1 percent of payroll only one sixth of the pay as you go tax needed for the benchmark benefits saving a higher share of wages provides a cushion that protects the individual from the risk of an unacceptably low level of benefits for example pra deposits of 6 percent of wages reduces the probability that the benefits are less than the benchmark to 0 17 and the probability that they are less than 61 percent of the benchmark to 0 05 pra deposits of 9 percent of wages half of the tax rate required in a pay as you go system would substantially reduce these risks this pure investment based plan is an extreme case the investment risk can be reduced further by using a mixed system that combines pay as you go and investment based components or that makes intergenerational transfers conditional on the performance of stock and bond prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

rent seeking and rent setting with asymmetric effectiveness of lobbying this paper provides a more general model of the determination of rent seeking costs by combining the following features endogenous rent determination asymmetric effectiveness of contending agents in their lobbying efforts and multiple periods in doing so the paper generalizes some aspects of the work of applelbaum and katz 1987 rogerson 1982 leininger 1992 and kohli 1992 some results obtained are i in the short run when the regulator s salary is higher than in an alternative occupation both the per unit cost of rent seeking and the total rent set by regulator are highest for the same value of the relative effectiveness parameter ii in the long run an increase in the effectiveness parameter leads to a reduction in the social costs of rent seeking iii in a repeated game the equilibrium rent is lower the higher is the regulator s discount factor

time inconsistent preferences and social security in this paper we examine the role of social security in an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals with time inconsistent preferences who face mortality risk individual income risk and borrowing constraints we find that unfunded social security lowers the capital stock output and consumption for consumers with time consistent or time inconsistent preferences however it may raise or lower welfare depending on the strength of time inconsistency

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

are contributions to public pension programmes a tax on employment many studies describe the potentially adverse impact on employment of the payroll costs of financing public pension programmes conventionally empirical studies treat contributions to public pension programmes as a pure tax in for example calculations of the tax wedge by oecd but this approach ignores any future rights to benefits that are perceived by contributors in fact public pension programmes contain both an actuarial and a redistributive component the former closer to saving the latter a tax the paper constructs indicators of the tax component of pension programmes both between and within generations across a range of oecd countries and time periods it uses these measures in a cross country panel analysis of the determinants of age and gender specific economic activity rates the results reveal robust evidence that when public pension programme contributions are broken down into a tax component and a savings component the tax component of the payroll contribution reduces economic activity rates among women while a higher retirement saving component has the opposite effect there is little evidence that average tax rates however constructed have any adverse impact on the economic activity rates of men richard disney

ageing and unused capacity in europe is there an early retirement trap we address the issue of how early retirement may interact with limited use of financial markets in producing financial hardship later in life when some risks such as long term care are not insured we argue that the presence of financially attractive early retirement schemes in a world of imperfect financial and insurance markets can lead to an early retirement trap indeed europe witnesses many early retired individuals in financial distress in our analysis we use data on 10 european countries which differ in their pension and welfare systems in prevailing retirement age and in households access to financial markets we find evidence that an early retirement trap exists particularly in some southern and central european countries people who retired early in life are more likely to be in financial hardship in the long run our analysis implies that governments should stop making early retirement attractive let retirees go back to work improve access to financial markets and make sure long term care problems are adequately insured viola angelini agar brugiavini and guglielmo weber

a quantile based test of protection for sale model this paper proposes a new test of the protection for sale pfs model by grossman and helpman 1994 unlike existing methods in the literature our approach does not require any data on political organization we use quantile and quantile iv regressions to do so using the data from gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 surprisingly the results do not provide any evidence favoring the pfs model we also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it

self enforcing trade agreements evidence from time varying trade policy the bagwell and staiger 1990 theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs i increase with imports ii increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities and iii decrease with the variance of imports the authors find us import policy during 1997 2006 to be consistent with this theory a one standard deviation increase in import growth the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the us imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent by 88 percent and by 76 percent respectively

credence attributes voluntary organizations and social pressure abstract credence attributes of products are unobservable through search or experience some consumers are willing to pay a premium for their provision and in addition citizens can apply social pressure on firms to supply credence attributes firms have formed voluntary organizations to assure the provision of credence attributes and the credible provision provides product differentiation this paper provides a theory of the voluntary provision of credence attributes in the presence of demand pull from consumers and social pressure from ngos where an organization chooses a credence standard and firms compete given the standard the credence standard is lower the larger the organization and social pressure results in a higher standard

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

increasing longevity and social security reforms a legislative procedure approach abstract increasing longevity causes an upward trend in the dependency ratio in many countries this raises concerns about the financial sustainability of social security schemes and reform proposals and initiatives abound it is shown that a fundamental policy choice inevitably arises since a given social security system cannot be maintained by simply indexing pension ages to longevity the political reform process is analysed using the so called legislative procedure when longevity increases the retirement age is raised more than proportionally to the increase in longevity but the young also make larger transfers to the old

quasi hyperbolic discounting and retirement abstract some people have self control problems regularly this paper adds endogenous retirement to laibson s quasi hyperbolic discounting savings model quarterly journal of economics 112 1997 443 477 earlier selves think that the deciding self tends to retire too early and may save less to induce later retirement still earlier selves may think the pre retirement self does this too much saving more to induce early retirement the consumption pattern may be different from that with exponential discounting other observational non equivalence includes the impact of changing mandatory retirement rules or work incentives on savings and a possibly negative marginal propensity to consume out of increased future earnings naive agents are briefly considered

taxation pension and saving in a small open economy an overlapping generations model of a small open economy is used to explore several policy options aimed at reducing the burden of income taxes and pay as you go payg contributions on labor income so as to improve the incentives to supply labor including the return of funded collective fc pension plans in the tax base turns out to be counterproductive cutting payg benefits in contrast succeeds in improving efficiency in general and labor market incentives in particular under specific variants of the fc plan reducing payg benefits even proves to be pareto welfare improving

rent seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts the objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive tullock s standard rent seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts a positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest because a contender s private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent seeking model the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous it is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful excessive aggregate efforts

contests with multi tasking the standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented multi dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure mitigating one of its main advantages simplicity in this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize the amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player we look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest per dimension and totally and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions the standard tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework

reconsidering the empirical evidence on the grossman helpman model of endogenous protection the emergence of the grossman and helpman 1994 model of endogenous protection as the preeminent model in the political economy of trade literature has been significantly advanced by the finding that its predictions about the cross industry pattern of protection are broadly consistent with the data however in their empirical implementation of the grossman helpman model researchers have assumed the presence of multiple policy instruments and extraneous political factors we argue that incorporating these assumptions into the theory significantly changes its predictions about the cross industry pattern of protection jel classification f1 l emergence du modele de protection endogene de grossman helpman en tant que modele le plus important dans la litterature sur l economie politique du commerce international a ete confirmee de maniere significative quand on a decouvert que ses predictions quant au pattern de protection a travers les industries se trouvaient generalement confirmees par les donnees cependant dans leur verification empirique du modele de grossman helpman les chercheurs ont postule la presence de multiples instruments de politique publique et de certains facteurs politiques on suggere que l ajout de ces postulats change de maniere significative les predictions du modele quant au pattern de protection dans les divers secteurs

rent seeking firms consumer groups and the social costs of monopoly i introduction when a positive monopoly rent is secured under government protection firms compete with one another to win the monopoly by expending resources the opportunity costs of such rent seeking activities the values of goods and services that could be produced with resources expended on such rent seeking activities are part of the social costs of monopoly many economists have examined the social costs of monopoly defining them as the sum of the deadweight loss and the firms rent seeking costs examples include tullock 1967 krueger 1974 posner 1975 rogerson 1982 and fisher 1985 1 recently several economists such as wenders 1987 ellingsen 1991 and schmidt 1992 have pointed out that consumers do not always allow government protection of a monopoly rather consumers often seek government protection of themselves they try to defend their consumer surplus against a monopoly by spending resources for example consumers often lobby politicians for government regulation that requires a natural monopolist to set its price below the unregulated profit maximizing level the opportunity costs of such consumer surplus defending henceforth cs defending activities are also part of the social costs of monopoly an interesting question then becomes whether consumers cs defending activities increase or decrease the social costs of monopoly as compared with those incurred in the case of inactive consumers wenders 1987 argues that consumers cs defending activities lead to higher social costs of monopoly on the other hand ellingsen 1991 and schmidt 1992 show that consumers participation to defend their consumer surplus lowers the social costs of monopoly this paper also addresses the question of whether consumers cs defending activities increase or decrease the social costs of monopoly but differs from previous research by analyzing a model in which the government decides first whether or not to regulate a monopoly and then decides which firm to be the monopolist 2 we compare the social costs of monopoly in the case of active consumers with those incurred in the case of inactive consumers we demonstrate that given just one rent seeking firm consumers cs defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly but given two or more rent seeking firms such activities generally reduce the social costs of monopoly section ii sets up the basic model we consider a rent seeking and cs defending henceforth rcs contest with one consumer group it has two stages in the first stage firms and the consumer group compete by expending outlays to win their prizes 3 the prize for each firm is an unregulated monopoly and that for the consumer group is a regulated monopoly each firm and the consumer group choose their outlays simultaneously and independently in the second stage after knowing the government s decision on the form of the monopoly the firms compete against each other to win the monopoly they expend their outlays simultaneously and independently at the end of the second stage the government chooses the winning firm ellingsen 1991 argues that his sequential move framework is more realistic than his simultaneous move framework since in most cases consumers compete against existing monopolists rather than potential ones over the forms of monopolies in his sequential move framework potential monopolists first compete to win the monopoly and then the winner and consumers compete over the form of the monopoly however consider a situation in which the government periodically reassigns a monopoly in this situation consumers compete against potential monopolists including the incumbent monopolist over the form of the monopoly and the firms periodically compete to be the monopolist the sequential move game in this paper is more appropriate for this situation than the sequential move game of ellingsen 1991

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

rent dissipation through self regulation the social cost of monopoly under threat of reform this piece offers an alternative perspective on the social cost of monopoly and rent seeking an existing monopolist whose right is contested in a political market has an incentive to expend resources on direct lobbying efforts while also attempting to defuse reformist opposition because the strength of reformist opposition will generally be a function of the monopolist s past present and expected future pricing output decisions such opposition is endogenous the probability that an existing monopoly right will be retained depends on both direct lobbying efforts by the monopolist as well as the strength resolve and cohesiveness of the reformers by modifying its output pricing decision and in effect engaging in self regulation the monopolist gives up current profits in exchange for the expected future profits associated with retaining its monopoly rights such opposition dissipating effort is a form of indirect rent seeking that is complementary to direct lobbying efforts and unlike the tullock costs implied by the incumbent s direct lobbying this form of indirect rent seeking may imply a reduction in the social cost of monopoly

on the contribution of economics to the evaluation and formation of social insurance policy if one had to choose a single policy that best characterizes the postwar behavior of governments it might well be their expansion of social insurance today s citizen of a typical developed country is insured through government programs against unemployment disability medical expenses impoverishment in youth and middle age through welfare systems impoverishment in old age through old age pensions loss of spousal support due to divorce through social security dependent benefits fluctuating earnings through progressive tax systems early death of a spouse via survivor s insurance and late death via annuity insurance the remarkable growth of social insurance has occurred against a backdrop of increased geographic mobility dramatic changes in demographics and at least in the united states a dissolution of the family the extent to which social insurance has been the cause of family decline and demographic change or its result is one of many complex questions that economics or any other social science is unlikely to ever fully answer economic analysis while not being able to discover the precise recipe leading to our social insurance institutions has at least been able to taste many of the key ingredients economics has and can provide real insight into a the need for social insurance programs b the appropriate size of such programs and c how social insurance programs affect the economy this paper seeks to illustrate each of these three kinds of economic contributions to the evaluation and formation of social insurance policy section i drawing on my 1987 article presents an efficiency argument for compulsory saving through a progressive social security system section ii drawing on my paper with avia spivak and laurence summers 1982 and on alan auerbach s and my 1987b paper illustrates an analysis of the appropriate size of social insurance programs examining in turn the questions of whether households save enough and buy enough life insurance or whether more government intervention in these matters is appropriate section iii drawing on my 1989 book illustrates how social insurance programs can affect the economy by discussing potential savings effects of health insurance particularly an asset tested medicaid scheme section iv concludes the paper with suggestions for future research and policy options as indicated the paper draws on my own and coauthored research and it provides only limited references for no better reason than easing my task and saving space in so doing i do not pretend to suggest that this is more than a very small subset of a huge volume of research sparked in the 1970s in large part by martin feldstein

the commitment value of funding pensions abstract this paper studies how funding public pensions can improve policy outcomes when short sighted governments cannot commit we focus on sustainable plans where optimal nonlinear pensions are not reneged on by sequential governments funding pensions is a commitment mechanism it implies lower contributions than does the second best policy which reduces temptation to over redistribute later and to misuse revealed private information funding may be preferable even if the population growth rate is higher than the rate of return on assets second best optimal policies are also more likely to be renegotiation proof under fully funded pensions

from traditional db to notional dc systems the pension reform process in sweden italy and germany this paper provides a critical review of the pension reform strategy that turns defined benefits db public pay as you go systems into notional defined contribution ndc systems we show that properly designed ndc public pension systems contain powerful economic and political mechanisms that may facilitate pension reform but that the distinction between public ndc and db systems is more ambiguous than usually claimed jel h55 j14 j26

rent seeking with uncertain opposition abstract it is observed that sometimes dispersed interests are passive to rent seeking by concentrated interests and that sometimes they provide rigorous opposition this paper assumes that opposing political activism is triggered when rents accruing to concentrated interests exceed a threshold level unknown to the latter in these conditions rents will increase asymptotically to a level less than the trigger level the threat of opposition means that social costs of rent seeking may be less than found by static analysis under certainty the model may be applicable to certain types of regulation such as taxi licensing or pollution control

compiling the actuarial balance for pay as you go pension systems is it better to use the hidden asset or the contribution asset the aim of this article is twofold to establish the connection between the contribution asset ca and the hidden asset ha and to determine whether using either of them to compile the actuarial balance ab sheet in the pay as you go payg pension system will provide a reliable solvency indicator with these aims in mind we develop a model based on those first put forward by settergren and mikula 2005 and boado penas et al 2008 to obtain the analytical properties of the ca and to confirm its soundness as a measure of the assets of a payg scheme our model also enables us to explore whether and to what extent the ha can be considered a second alternative measure of the assets for payg schemes the main theoretical finding is that despite their very different natures the ha and the ca may nearly coincide at the limit when the interest rate of the financial market approaches the growth of the covered wage bill from above but the ha supplies a solvency indicator which is not always consiste

intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics abstract this paper adopts a stochastic overlapping generations framework to analyze the allocation of aggregate financial risks under different social security systems and a majority voting rule we study whether there will be switches between pay as you go payg and fully funded ff systems in such an economy we show that in case of a negative aggregate shock low income young individuals will form a political coalition with the elderly to implement a payg system payg scheme is shown to persist even after a good aggregate shock if the system is redistributive enough

transition from a pay as you go to a fully funded pension system the case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness abstract in recent contributions to the theory of public pension systems it was argued that a pareto improving transition from an established unfunded pension system to a funded one is possible this result is derived in an overlapping generations model with identical individuals in the present study an extended model with differing individuals of an intragenerationally fair unfunded pension scheme is introduced within this more realistic framework it is shown that in general a pareto improving transition to a funded system is not possible because any instrument applied to the financing of pensions in the transition phase involves intragenerational redistribution

protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing we extend the protection for sale framework to non tari barriers introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the grossman and helpman 1994 model and its empirical implementation where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection the econometric analysis supports our augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model jel classification f13

the optimal mix between funded and unfunded pension systems when people care about relative consumption the paper studies the optimal portfolio mix between funded and unfunded pension systems when people care about relative consumption in pay as you go systems with fixed contribution rates pensions are tied to wages this lowers the uncertainty of individuals future relative position thereby increasing the attractiveness of unfunded systems the paper shows analytically that the optimal share of funding decreases with the importance of relative standing a calibrated version of the model suggests that the concern for relative standing has also a quantitatively important impact on the optimal share of funding for reasonable assumptions it is typically around 20

institutional and individual investors saving for old age this paper brings together the academic literature on individual and institutional investors in order to understand the nature of difficulties faced by them and set the background for the special issue this introductory article and the papers in the special issue contribute to the debate on how to support individuals in their savings commitments and investment decision making and whether and how institutional investors have fulfilled their role in supporting the development of the funded pension industry there are three main conclusions i individual investors are not ready for the role that has been assigned to them in the pension industry ii institutional investors are a long way short of establishing healthy relational contracts and trustworthy relationships with their clients and iii more effective regulation may be needed

lessons for an aging society the political sustainability of social security systems what is the future of social systems in oecd countries in our view the answer belongs to the realm of politics we evaluate how political constraints shape the social security system in six countries france germany italy spain the uk and the us under population aging two main aspects of the aging process are relevant to the analysis first the increase in the dependency ratio the ratio of retirees of workers reduces the average profitability of the unfunded social security system thereby inducing the agents to reduce the size of the system by substituting their claims towards future pensions with more private savings second an aging electorate leads to larger systems since it increases the relevance of pension spending on the policy makers agenda the overall assessment from our simulations is that the political aspect dominates in all countries albeit with some differences spain the fastest aging country faces the largest increase in the social security contribution rate when labor market considerations are introduced the political effect still dominates but it is less sizeable country specific characteristics not accounted for in our simulations such as the degree of redistribution in the pension system and the existence of family ties in the society may also matter our simulations deliver a strong policy implication an increase in the effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the voters while often increasing its generosity finally delegation of pension policy to the ec may reduce political accountability and hence help to reform the systems

quantifying the laffer curve on the continued activity tax in a dynastic framework it is argued that the tax on continued activity should be removed by implementing actuarially fair schemes however these schemes cannot fund the expected social security ss deficit this article proposes to give individuals a fraction of the actuarially fair incentives in the case of postponed retirement ss faces a trade off between giving enough incentives to make individuals delay retirement and giving little increase in pensions in order to help finance its expected deficit this trade off is captured by a laffer curve finally when the ss system aims to maximize welfare the optimal tax on postponed retirement is still strictly positive erratum vol 49 issue 4 1539

strategic behavior in contests comment in an influential paper avinash dixit 1987 considers a class of symmetric two player contests in which each player s effort xi influences the probability of winning a prize valued at k 0 letting p x1 x2 denote the probability 1 that player 1 wins the expected payoffs of the two players are p1 5 p x1 x2 k 2 x1 and p2 5 1 2 p x1 x2 k 2 x2 dixit s main result is that if there is perfect symmetry between the players and each player s effort has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on his or her probability of winning i e

the financial stability of notional account pensions a number of european countries are reforming their pension benefit formulas by adopting notional accounts these accounts are used to determine individual benefits but pay as you go financing is retained this paper addresses the belief that by choosing adjustment rules cleverly notional accounts can provide automatic financial equilibrium in the short run if this were true it would be a valuable advantage in terms of insulating the government budget from demographic pressures while insulating the pension budget from fiscal pressures it is shown that notional account benefit formulas cannot provide automatic financial equilibrium in the short run the paper also suggests that if indexing rules are chosen in a particular way and shocks revert rapidly to a mean the pension institution may achieve financial stability in the long run however long run stability is unlikely to be valuable because political interference occurs in the short run

protection for sale or surge protection this paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential grossman and helpman protection for sale pfs model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting a model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges but only for organized industries is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework this suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought

a rent seeking model of voluntary overcompliance addendum in a previous paper haan in environ resour econ 2016 i missed some relevant literature essentially related to that paper in this addendum i discuss how two earlier contributions graichen et al in public choice 108 273 293 2001 liston heyes in j environ econ manag 41 1 12 2001 are related to haan environ resour econ 2016 and how haan environ resour econ 2016 differs from those contributions

different approaches for dealing with social security he u s social security system is a government pension program financed by worker payroll taxes as workers pay in their payroll taxes they accumulate credits toward benefits in the language of pensions this is a defined benefit plan at any point in time one can project tax inflows and benefit outflows based on various economic and demographic assumptions and determine the long run actuarial soundness of the system or to put it another way determine whether the present set of tax and benefit schedules will be consistent in the long term every year such forecasts are made by the social security and medicare trustees now three cabinet officers the commissioner of social security and two outside members social security and medicare boards of trustees 1995 every four years a quadrennial advisory council is appointed to review these forecasts and to comment on relevant policy issues in the past many of these councils have had important impacts on social security policy for example the 1983 greenspan commission proposed a number of measures that saved the system from imminent financial difficulty and the 1975 council recommended changing procedures that had until then led to overindexation of social security for inflation another advisory council was formed in 1994 and i was asked to chair it it also included three members from business three from unions and six others from the private pension industry the self employment sector and independent

the effects of investing social security funds in the stock market when fixed costs prevent some households from holding stocks with fixed costs of participating in the stock market consumers with high income will participate in the stock market but consumers with lower income will not participate if a fully funded defined contribution social security system tries to exploit the equity premium by selling a dollar of bonds per capita and buying a dollar of equity per capita consumers who save but do not participate in the stock market will increase their consumption thereby reducing saving and capital accumulation calibration of a general equilibrium model indicates that this policy could reduce the aggregate capital stock substantially by about 50 cents per capita

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

does the ndc scheme mimic the french point system after the implementation of the notional defined contribution ndc pension scheme in italy and sweden in the 90s some authors argued that its design merely replicates the functioning of the poin

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the intergenerational welfare state and the rise and fall of pay as you go pensions this article develops a theory of the two armed intergenerational welfare state consistent with key features of modern welfare arrangements and uses it to rationalise the rise and fall in generosity of pay as you go pensions solely on efficiency grounds by using the education arm a dynamically efficient welfare state is shown to improve upon long run laissez faire even when market failures are absent to release these downstream welfare gains without hurting any transitional generation help from the pension arm is needed in the presence of an intergenerational education externality pensions initially rise in generosity but can be replaced by fully funded pensions eventually

comment on s valdes prieto the financial stability of notional account pensions in an important contribution to this journal valdes prieto 2000 has shown that the recently popular concept of notional accounts cannot guarantee short run financial stability of pay as you go financed public pension schemes in the sense of automatic budget equality for any given time path of the contribution rate in result 2 p 406 he states that notional accounts do not provide automatic financial balance in the short run when the credited notional interest rate is the growth rate of contribution revenue except for the steady state growth case in the proof he uses a table p 408 table 1 in which the maximum value of the ratio of expenditures to revenues of the pension plan is calculated for the case of a rising growth rate of contribution revenue this maximum ratio is always above 1 the author explains his finding as follows when the growth rate of contribution revenue is used as the notional interest rate which is credited to the stock of notional capital of those members reaching age 65 the rise in expenditure is greater than the rise in revenue generating a deficit ibid the following simple example confirms result 2 but shows that the ratio of expenditures to revenues behaves in the opposite way to that asserted by valdes prieto a rise in the growth rate of revenues leads to a temporary surplus of the plan whereas a fall in the growth rate implies a temporary deficit the example is based on a discrete time 3 olg model in which individuals work the first two periods of their three period life earning 1 dollar each and the contribution rate 0 is fixed at 20 percent contributions are credited to the notional account in the period in which they are paid and earn an interest equal to the growth rate of contribution revenue which is credited to the account at the beginning of the next period at the beginning of the third period the account balance is paid out as a one shot retirement benefit in panel a of table 1 it is assumed that there are 100 workers in each of the cohorts entering the labor market in period t 2 and that this number

the gains from pension reform we classify social security pension systems in three dimensions actuarial versus non actuarial funded versus unfunded and defined benefit versus defined contribution systems recent pension reforms are discussed in terms of these dimensions shifting to a more actuarial system reduces labor market distortions although limiting the scope for redistribution shifting to a funded system may increase saving redistribute income to future generations and distort contermporary labor supply a partial shift to a funded system helps individuals diversify their pension assets a shift from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system means that income risk will be shifted from workers to pensioners

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40

the effects of 401 k participation on the wealth distribution an instrumental quantile regression analysis we use instrumental quantile regression approach to examine the effects of 401 k plans on wealth using data from the survey of income and program participation using 401 k eligibility as an inst

competitive policy development we present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies yet agree on certain common objectives policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals these investments are specific to a given proposal which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power competition undermines this agenda power forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker this beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals jel d72 d73 d78 e61 during the early years of the new deal president franklin delano roosevelt faced an enormous challenge he believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues including agriculture trade banking employment and social insurance however although roosevelt was well versed in policy crafting workable proposals for such a far reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity or that of his immediate advisors instead the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies although these individuals shared some common goals e g ending the great depression they also had deep seated ideological disagreements among themselves and with the president about what policies the federal government should pursue classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency weber 1991 famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a mere dilettante when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors more recently scholars

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

group specific public goods orchestration of interest groups with free riding we consider a situation in which two groups contest group specific public goods each member of the group may have a different valuation of the prize our model can be interpreted as the contestants cost of lobbying efforts being non linear or the returns to their efforts being decreasing we show that the level of free riding depends on the return of the investment we consider the situation under which one group initiates a contest to which different individuals and or groups can be added the question we pose is what is the optimal structure of additional groups

voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic this paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far sighted and myopic individuals all individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short term view instant gratification when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply consequently they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions henceforth when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving we consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters the payroll tax rate that determines the size or generosity of the system and the bismarckian factor that determines its redistributiveness individuals vote sequentially we examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind all far sighted or all myopic while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far sighted agents furthermore while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far sighted counterparts the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics

immigration and pension benefits in the host country this paper examines the role that low skilled immigration plays in determining pension benefits of the host population with an overlapping generations model which allows identifying which groups of native population are in favour or against immigration we find that despite immigrants having low average productivity an open borders policy would be implemented since most of current domestic cohorts gain from immigration only younger workers might be against immigration since they will coincide with immigrants in their retirement periods moreover we show how a larger immigrant quota would increase the probability of a pareto improvement for the current domestic population