nonrenewable resources with switching costs abstract this paper considers a firm s decision to commence or to suspend extraction of a nonrenewable resource when there are start up or shut down costs for a given level of reserves the critical price that would cause an inactive mine to be opened exceeds the price that would induce an active mine to be closed as one would expect greater switching costs cause firms to be less inclined to change status this impact can be substantial even for modest switching costs possible implications of switching costs are considered including the potential for firms to abandon mines with economically valuable remaining reserves

democracy creeping socialism and ideological socialism in rent seeking societies rent seeking societies suffer from a serious distortion of incentives incentives to engage in distributional struggles to seek contrived transfers are strong but incentives to engage in productive work are too weak stagnation and some unemployment should be expected long lasting democracies within unchanged borders create a permissive environment for rent seeking the provision of rents very much depends on government the stronger the governmental involvement in the economy the higher social security spending the more rents the government is likely to generate therefore creeping socialism understood as increased government control of the economy should reinforce the rent seeking society and the corresponding negative effects on growth and employment whether such creeping socialism is backed by ideological socialism or not should make little difference for growth or employment these ideas have been tested and partially supported by a 19 nation sample of industrial democracies using data from the sixties and seventies by and large the rent seeking approach is fairly successful in explaining national differences in economic growth rates but receives ambiguous support or less for unemployment olson s 1982 1983 proposition about the negative impact of long lasting democracy within unchanged borders on economic growth is much better supported than the growth retarding effects of government revenues or social security spending are

irreversible investment with regime shifts under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms growth prospects do not vary over time this paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times a value maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm s investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift under this policy investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q moreover investment typically is very small but in some states the capital stock jumps implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined

interest groups and the rise and decline of growth interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth a la olson 1982 it is unknown however what impact if any groups exert on the volatility of growth an important hindrance to development in this article we first consider what impact we should expect olson groups to have on the volatility of growth we then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a cross country panel using system generalized method of moments the findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability in addition the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies

explaining the rain the rise and decline of nations after 25 years in the quarter century since the publication of mancur olson s rise and decline of nations a large literature has evolved testing the central hypothesis regarding olson s thesis on institutional sclerosis these tests have taken the form of both econometric regression analysis involving a sample of various nations and detailed narrative case studies of specific nations tests have appeared in both economics and political science journals as well as in collected volumes and independent books performed primarily by authors from america and europe a review of over 50 separate works reveals that on the whole the theory of institutional sclerosis is generally but certainly not universally supported no systematic bias in favor of or opposition to olson is found to have arisen on the basis of methodology publication outlet or authorship location

the public economy and economic growth in western market economies this essay analyzes the impact of two welfare states one for households and the other forfirms on economic growth in twelve advanced market economies between 1962 and 1983 we find that both welfare states contain stimulative and depressing forms of spending transfers in support of household income stimulate growth while public production of goods and services largely consumed by households depresses growth transfers to firms may have a predominantly negative impact on growth while military spending has a stimulative impact on the economy we also find that increasing household tax burdens a correlate of postwar welfare state expansion slows economic growth national debates about economic growth have increasingly been structured as zero sum choices between the welfare state for households and economic growth this reasoning neglects the potentially stimulative components of the welfare state for households and ignores the potentially negative impact of the welfare state forfirms

inflation and social consensus in the seventies it is widely believed that the two oil price shocks of the i 970s played a major role in the increase in inflation in industrial countries while this hypothesis is consistent with the timing of changes in inflation at the global level it seems to break down when applied to individual countries cross sectionally for example over the period i973 9 switzerland had an average inflation rate of 4 7 while in neighbouring italy inflation averaged i5 6 over the same period furthermore inflation in the pre opec period i97i 2 was actually higher in switzerland than in italy it seems that a supply shock explanation of inflation in the seventies also requires an explanation of why different countries responded so differently to a similar set of shocks at the world level the purpose of this paper is to offer such an explanation and to test the hypothesis with a cross sectional equation accounting for differences in average inflation rates over the period i973 9 in eighteen oecd countries this time period includes the year of the first opec shock i 973 and the following six years up to the time of the second opec shock the hypothesis to be tested is set in the framework of a model similar to that of brunner et al i 980 the key features of the brunner model are that the adjustment of real wage expectations is subject to lags and that labour supply is positively related to the difference between the perceived real wage and the expected or target real wage given these two assumptions a negative supply shock gives rise to a period of stagflation whose intensity will be greater the slower is the speed of adjustment of real wage expectations the model of this paper extends the brunner model in three ways first across countries the speed of adjustment of real wage expectations or targets is assumed to depend positively on the degree of social consensus as proxied negatively by an indicator of average long run strike activity second the model allows for the possibility of inflation inertia or systematically incorrect inflation expectations as well as a sluggish adjustment of real wage expectations third the model incorporates the hypothesis that money supply growth will vary across countries according to variations in inflationary pressures as perceived by governments the first section of the paper provides a discussion of the rationale for the key proposition regarding strikes and social consensus as well as a brief discussion of the role of wage bargaining institutions section ii develops a theoretical model which yields a reduced form cross sectional equation relating the average i 973 9

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

rescaling contraction with a lower cost technology when revenue declines abstract a mature oil field rescaled contraction describes a switch to a technological alternative more appropriate for the depleted state of an underlying resource off shore oil rigs are an illustration since the original technological scale designed for very large output flows becomes inappropriate as the operational efficiency declines later in life and facing a dwindling output flow so a more appropriate extraction technology becomes economic a real option representation is formulated on a stochastic oil price and deteriorating output volume we consider investment divestment decisions both separately and jointly which have different implications for government policies and also option values the resulting model yields analytical or semi analytical results indicating that immediate switching to the lower cost technology could sometimes be hastened as the price volatility increases depending on the current revenue if divestment and switching are considered jointly however greater volatility could also promote hysteresis

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

interest groups and economic performance some new evidence mancur olson s theory of the decline of nations is path breaking in political economics it has been tested cross sectionally in numerous empirical studies we survey the existing results briefly with a special focus on studies using the number of lobbies as an exogenous variable using data from the period 1973 2006 we then present the field s first time series analysis of the effects of the number of interest groups on the german lobby list and macroeconomic performance gauged in terms of economic growth and inflation the number of interest groups as a proxy for their influence is shown to have an important impact on macro variables interest group activity significantly leads to a decline in the growth rate and a rise in the inflation rate

valuing managerial flexibility an application of real option theory to mining investments abstract the value of managerial flexibility is assessed using data on prices costs grades reserves ore extraction and metal output for a panel of canadian copper mines a real option model is estimated and solved for project and option values most empirical researchers i consider the initial investment decision but neglect flexible operation thereafter ii assume that price is stochastic but ignore cost and reserve uncertainty and iii model price as a nonstationary stochastic process the evolution of three state variables price cost and reserves is assessed here differences in assumptions compared to others are found to lead to large differences in estimated project and option values

sex discrimination and competition in product and labour markets theoritical explanations for wage discrimination collapse in the long run because competition should drive discriminations firms out of the market in product markets with imperfect competition em

determinants of interest group formation it is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes however few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity this paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting a nation s stability socioeconomic development political system size and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation as predicted by theory

the impact of taxes on growth and distribution in developed capitalist countries a cross national study has the scope of public planning in contemporary capitalist economies promoted or hindered economic growth and income distribution we explore this question by assessing the impact of various mechanisms for raising government revenues on investment growth and income distribution in 22 developed market economy countries the article considers whether growth and distribution are affected differently by governments relative reliance on personal and corporate income taxes social security contributions property taxes and sales and value added taxes or by the relative progressivity of tax mechanisms our findings lend support to the assertion that fiscal instruments especially personal income taxes can be used successfully to achieve greater income equality on the other hand these findings run counter to the conventional notion that an automatic trade off exists between an active public sector and a dynamic expanding economy although there is surely some tension between the economic goals of growth and equality it is not at all clear that they are necessarily incompatible or that government can contribute only to the latter

corporatism in decline an empirical analysis of the impact of corporatism on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes in 18 industrialized democracies during the 1970s and early 1980s most studies on corporatism indicated that corporatist policies led to lower unemployment and inflation and higher economic growth rates in the mid and late 1980s however voices claiming that corporatism is in decline became more and more frequent although hardly any empirical examinations were undertaken the purpose of this study is to estimate empirically the influence of corporatist arrangements on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes in the 1980s as compared with the 1970s and 1960s this pooled time series cross sectional analysis provides evidence that corporatist policies have not lost their capacity to achieve the desired macroeconomic goals in the 1980s in addition corporatism significantly reduces the number of working days lost however no evidence was found that corporatism leads to increased economic growth there is evidence that economic growth is adversely affected by government outlays

a dynamic model of cleanup estimating sunk costs in oil and gas production the environmental remediation required to permanently decommission most industrial projects is an expensive irreversible investment real options literature shows that temporary closure has value under uncertainty however even if there is no intention to restart operations there is an incentive to label a closure as temporary to avoid having to remediate ongoing or future environmental externalities i estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of closure under price and quantity uncertainty to evaluate the likelihood of reactivation the model reveals that the option to temporarily close is being widely used to avoid environmental remediation of oil and gas wells in canada

a real options model to evaluate the effect of environmental policies on the oil sands rate of expansion abstract canadian oil sands hold the third largest recognized oil deposit in the world while the rapidly expanding oil sands industry in western canada has driven economic growth the extraction of the oil comes at a significant environmental cost it is believed that the government policies have failed to keep up with the rapid oil sands expansion creating serious challenges in managing the environmental impacts this paper presents a practical yet financially sound real options model to evaluate the rate of oil sands expansion under different environmental cost scenarios resulting from governmental policies while accounting for oil price uncertainty and managerial flexibilities our model considers a multi plant multi agent setting in which labor costs increase for all agents and impact their optimal strategies as new plants come online our results show that a stricter environmental cost scenario delays investment but leads to a higher rate of expansion once investment begins once constructed a plant is highly unlikely to shut down our model can be used by government policy makers to gauge the impact of policy strategies on the oil sands expansion rate and by oil companies to evaluate expansion strategies based on assumptions regarding market and taxation costs

distributional coalitions state strength and economic growth toward a comprehensive theory of economic development high performing economies in the asia pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in latin america prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries combining a statist perspective with olson s theory of interest group formation this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective using a longitudinal research design this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight asian pacific and twelve latin american countries by considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society the results indicate that approximately two thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained

interest groups and investment a further test of the olson hypothesis mancur olson s institutional sclerosishypothesis may be evident in the effects ofinterest groups on investment in physicalcapital to test this proposition we usecross sectional data on 42 countries forwhich information on the number of interestgroups is available to estimate the effectof those groups on the share of gdp thatgoes into physical investment the resultsindicate that interest groups have adifferent effect on physical investment inoecd and non oecd countries in the oecdcountries we find support for thehypothesis that interest groups harminvestment in physical capital indeveloping countries interest groupseither have no effect on physicalinvestment or they have a slight beneficialimpact

bureaucratic tenure and economic performance in centrally planned economies murrell and olson 1991 set forth the hypothesis that in centrally planned economies economic interests over time become fragmented as bureaus become more autonomous and form into narrowly based distributional coalitions as a consequence the national leader s encompassing interest in economic growth becomes compromised and growth begins to slow this paper provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that growing bureaucratic autonomy results in declining economic growth in centrally planned economies

who determines mexican trade policy using a political economy approach the authors analyze the pattern of protection in mexico s manufacturing sector during the period of trade policy reforms 1985 89 when mexico experienced significant trade liberalization and an important inflow of foreign direct investment they take into account the potential effect of foreign direct investment on endogenous tariff formation it turns out that the data support this analytic approach in which the formulation of trade policy reflects political support and in which the presence of foreign direct investment in the sector strongly affects the pattern of tariff protection before and after reform in mexican manufacturing especially sectors with heavy foreign direct investment received greater protection in import competing sectors although the move toward greater openness was associated with a reduction in the influence of industrial and foreign investor lobbying

does competition lessen discrimination some evidence this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses we analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups

an empirical comparison of alternate regime switching models for electricity spot prices one of the most profound features of electricity spot prices are the price spikes markov regime switching mrs models seem to be a natural candidate for modeling this spiky behavior however in the studies published so far the goodness of fit of the proposed models has not been a major focus while most of the models were elegant their fit to empirical data has either been not examined thoroughly or the signs of a bad fit ignored with this paper we want to fill the gap we calibrate and test a range of mrs models in an attempt to find parsimonious specifications that not only address the main characteristics of electricity prices but are statistically sound as well we find that the most universal and robust structure is that of an independent spike 3 regime model with heteroscedastic diffusion type base regime dynamics and shifted spike regime distributions

government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries 1952 76 in the past decade or more the pace of economic growth has slowed considerably and the share of government expenditure in national product has increased considerably the average annual growth rate of per capita gdp for the 16 most important developed market economies was 6 3 from 1955 73 and 2 0 from 1973 79 the average share of government in gdp went from 27 in 1955 to 34 in 1970 to 43 in 1979 2 the simple correlation proves nothing but it suggests the growth of government might be one of the causes of the slowdown many economists have theorized that government production is staticly less efficient than private sector production with competitive markets see

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

consensus versus majoritarian democracy political institutions and their impact on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes this article argues that consensual political institutions as operationalized by lijphart and crepaz 1991 have significantly favorable effects on unemployment inflation and the number of working days lost whereas economic growth remains unaffected although this finding is consistent with olson s theoretical concept of encompassing organizations this study shows that olson s empirical operationalization is flawed strong two party westminster systems based on single member district electoral rules and single party bare majority cabinets do not perform as well as weak multiparty coalition governments with proportional representation as an electoral rule an empirical measure of encompassing organizations is introduced termed popular cabinet support a cross sectional time series panel study of 162 elections 18 countries and 9 elections per country n 162 provides strong evidence that governments with consensual inclusive and accommodative constitutional structures and wider popu

government special interest groups and economic growth in descending order of robustness and strength the four major conclusions are i the experience of industrial countries in the postwar period indicates that a large welfare state has been associated with a high rate of economic growth ii the olson thesis that powerful special interest groups impede growth receives empirical support iii the relation between growth and the welfare state is non linear with increases in the size of the welfare state beyond some critical level one sixth of gdp according to our estimates resulting in reductions rather than increases in the growth rates and iv the strength of the growth promoting properties of the welfare state is positively related to the strength of special interest groups as proxied by the proportion of the work force unionized one possible interpretation of these results runs as follows a large welfare state may retard economic growth by reducing the incentives to work to save to move and to change on the other hand in a situation where special interest groups have aquired significant power to block change if they so desire the welfare state which offers assistance to those who are the victims of change may play a growth enhancing role in reducing the incentive to block change the fourth conclusion just stated supports this view the welfare state may also foster economic growth through favourable effects on social consensus political stability and labour management relations the results suggest that the growth promoting forces predominate as long as the welfare state is not too large but beyond a certain point which corresponds more or less to the median situation among developed countries today the growth retarding elements come to the fore

regime switching in stochastic models of commodity prices an application to an optimal tree harvesting problem abstract this paper investigates whether a regime switching model of stochastic lumber prices is better for the analysis of optimal harvesting problems in forestry than a more traditional single regime model prices of lumber derivatives are used to calibrate a regime switching model with each of two regimes characterized by a different mean reverting process a single regime mean reverting process is also calibrated the value of a representative stand of trees and optimal harvesting prices are determined by specifying a hamilton jacobi bellman variational inequality which is solved for both pricing models using a implicit finite difference approach the regime switching model is found to more closely match the behavior of futures prices than the single regime model in addition analysis of a tree harvesting problem indicates significant differences in terms of land value and optimal harvest thresholds between the regime switching and single regime models

determinants of the increase in the number of interest groups in western democracies theoretical considerations and evidence from 21 oecd countries mancur olson s theory of institutionalsclerosis is based on the notion that thenumber of interest groups within a countryincreases with the duration of itspolitical stability the following paperargues that the increase in the number ofinterest groups over time could also be aconcomitant of economic development theoretically both explanations provetenable an empirical cross sectionalregression analysis using data from 21oecd countries finds no evidence for asignificant impact of the duration ofpolitical stability on the number ofinterest groups a significantly positiveeffect is however reported for the degreeof economic development

an options pricing approach to ramping rate restrictions at hydro power plants this paper investigates the impact of ramping rate restrictions imposed on hydro operations to protect aquatic ecosystems the optimal ramping decision is specified as an optimal control problem which results in a hamilton jacobi bellman hjb equation electricity prices are modelled as a regime switching stochastic process the optimal control is determined by solving the hjb equation numerically using a fully implicit finite difference approach with semi lagrangian time stepping the paper focuses on the effect of ramping restrictions on a hydro plant s value and optimal operations and provides an analysis of which factors cause ramping restrictions to have a greater or lesser impact on profitability it is shown that hydro plant value is negatively affected by ramping restrictions but the extent of the impact depends on key parameters which determine the desirability of frequent changes in water release rates interestingly for the case considered value is not sensitive to ramping restrictions over a large range of restrictions the results point to the importance of accurately modelling electricity prices in gauging the trade offs involved in imposing restrictions on hydro operators which may hinder their ability to respond to volatile electricity prices and meet peak demands

the rise and decline of nations economic growth stagflation and social rigidities the years since world war ii have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions leading political economist mancur olson offers a new and compelling theory to explain these shifts in fortune and then tests his theory against evidence from many periods of history and many parts of the world

growth and the welfare state in the eu a causality analysis in this paper we test for causality between gdp growth andsocial protection expenditure in the european union to that end we apply hsiao s 1981 sequential procedure to data for twelveeu countries along the 1970 1994 period our results suggestthat for belgium germany ireland luxembourg the netherlands portugal and spain causality runs only from social protectiongrowth to gdp growth while for denmark france greece italy and the united kingdom no causality is found between socialprotection growth and gdp growth

differentiating mixed member electoral systems mixed member majoritarian and mixed member proportional systems and government expenditures the increasing use of mixed member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems an analysis of mixed member system policy effects is problematic given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems this article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed member majoritarian mmm and mixed member proportional mmp systems lead to differences in policy outputs the political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that mmp systems which are more proportional than mmm systems are correlated with higher levels of government spending thus the mmm mmp

trade and the variety of democratic institutions students of comparative politics have long acknowledged the importance of such institutional factors as electoral systems parliamentary versus presidential rule and the strength of parties but they have either regarded the institutions as given or have explained them entirely in domestic terms associating proportional representation for example with the intensity of social cleavages in economically advanced democracies however these institutional aspects can be plausibly linked to dependence on trade proportional representation the parliamentary system strong parties and large electoral districts have survival value for developed democracies exposed to trade that the recently revived agitation for proportional representation in the united kingdom has been cast explicitly in terms of economic necessity and dependence on trade adds force to this argument and suggests the need for further historical research on other cases of institutional adaptation and change

government size and economic growth a new framework and some evidence from cross section and time series data a study of the impact of government size on economic performance and growth is important theoretically one point of view suggests that a larger government size is likely to be detrimental to efficiency and economic growth because for example i government operations are often conducted inefficiently ii the regulatory process imposes excessive burdens and costs on the economic system and iii many of government s fiscal and monetary policies tend to distort economic incentives and lower the productivity of the system at the other extreme one can identify some points of view that assign to the government a critical role in the process of economic development and could argue that a larger government size is likely to be a more powerful engine of economic development there are several arguments on which the latter point of view is based these include besides others i role of the government in harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests ii prevention of exploitation of the country by foreigners and iii securing an increase in productive investment and providing a socially optimal direction for growth and development

the size of government in majoritarian and consensus democracies this article looks at the effect of democratic institutions on the size of government with the help of the ordinary least squares regression analysis of data from the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1974 to 1995 the study provides considerable evidence that the variance in the type of democracy measured by the lijphart index of majoritarian consensus political institutions has a systematic effect on the variance in the size of government measured both by total government outlays as well as total government revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product the article further argues that such institutional effects on the size of government are strengthened by partisan politics more specifically the analysis demonstrates the presence of the multiplicative interaction effect of the mutually reinforcing nature between the institutional structure and partisan composition of government in their association with the size of government

resource extraction with a carbon tax and regime switching prices exercising your options this paper develops a model of a profit maximizing firm with the option to exploit a non renewable resource choosing the timing and pace of development the resource price is modelled as a regime switching process which is calibrated to oil futures prices a hamilton jacobi bellman equation is specified that describes the profit maximization decision of the firm the model is applied to a problem of optimal investment in a typical oils sands in situ operation and solved for critical levels of oil prices that would motivate a firm to make the large scale investment needed for oil sands extraction as well as to operate mothball or abandon the facility regime shifts can have an important effect on the optimal timing of investment and extraction the paper examines the effect of several carbon tax schemes on optimal timing of construction production and abandonment a form of green paradox is identified

model unvertainty political learning and institutions a broader view on mancur olson s theory of institutional sclerosis in his rise and decline of nations mancur olson argues that politically stable countries suffer from declining growth rates caused by the growing influence of distributional coalitions that accumulate over time the empirical literature supports the notion of a negative relationship between a country s duration of political stability and its growth rates but finds only weak support for a negative influence of distributional coalitions on growth this paper sketches a simple model of party competition under model uncertainty which may explain this mixed empirical picture it shows that politically stable democracies are less well equipped to adjust to shifts in their economic environment than democracies with a shorter history of political stability in a further step the paper relates the major theme of this theory and olson s theory to the more recent literature on institutions and growth directions for further research are discussed

toward a business cycle model of tariffs a modified interest group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations this model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations the united states great britain and germany empirical analysis lends strong support to the model s central thesis that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle tariff changes occurring in the three nations with the exception of british tariff increases generally conform to the expectations of the model furthermore business cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability

consistent estimates of the impact of special interest groups on economic growth empirical studies designed to testolson s 1982 theory of institutional sclerosis aretypically forced to rely upon proxies to measure theability of special interest groups to engage inredistributive activities which in turn areexpected to hinder economic growth this note showsthat reliance on proxies biases the estimates towardzero here instrumental variable routines areutilized which increase the estimated impact ofspecial interests on the economy

the hamilton model with a general autoregressive component estimation and comparison with other models of economic time series abstract this paper generalizes the hamilton model to the important case in which the autoregressive component need not contain a unit root using u s quarterly real gnp data the model is estimated and the results are compared to those of hamilton some monte carlo evidence for the model is presented and its in sample forecasting performance is discussed and compared to the original hamilton model the arima model and the deterministic time trend model

jumps and stochastic volatility in oil prices time series evidence abstract in this paper we examine the empirical performance of affine jump diffusion models with stochastic volatility in a time series study of crude oil prices we compare four different models and estimate them using the markov chain monte carlo method the support for a stochastic volatility model including jumps in both prices and volatility is strong and the model clearly outperforms the others in terms of a superior fit to data our estimation method allows us to obtain a detailed study of oil prices during two periods of extreme market stress included in our sample the gulf war and the recent financial crisis we also address the economic significance of model choice in two option pricing applications the implied volatilities generated by the different estimated models are compared and we price a real option to develop an oil field our findings indicate that model choice can have a material effect on the option values

on the market consistent valuation of fish farms using the real option approach and salmon futures we consider the optimal harvesting problem for a fish farmer in a model which accounts for stochastic prices featuring schwartz 1997 two factor price dynamics unlike any other literature in this context we take account of the existence of a newly established market in salmon futures which determines risk premia and other relevant variables that influence risk averse fish farmers in their harvesting decision we consider the cases of single and infinite rotations the value function of the harvesting problem determined in our arbitrage free setup constitutes the fair values of lease and ownership of the fish farm when correctly accounting for price risk the data set used for this analysis contains a large set of futures contracts with different maturities traded at the fish pool market between 12 06 2006 and 22 03 2012 we assess the optimal strategy harvesting time and value against two alternative setups the first alternative involves simple strategies which lack managerial flexibility the second alternative allows for managerial flexibility and risk aversion as modeled by a constant relative risk aversion utility function but without access to the salmon futures market in both cases the loss in project value can be very significant and in the second case is only negligible for extremely low levels of risk aversion in consequence for a risk averse fish farmer the presence of a salmon futures market as well as managerial flexibility are highly important

inflation drag or taxation in drag responsible for the rising share of government in australian gdp i am sure that these results will be by no means the last word possible many other influences have been neglected nonetheless they are quite striking and appear to indicate that price level effects inflation have been a major if not the major influence in terms of raising the shares of government revenue and expenditure in gdp over the period 1949 50 to 1987 88 in australia this inflation drag which is really taxation in drag has only been able to operate because of a combination of a highly progressive personal taxation system and the absence for most of this period of any inflation indexation of the tax system i postulate that the primary cause is a high demand from certain segments of the community and special interest groups for greater government outlays and transfer payments however these demands may not in themselves be enough to achieve the objectives of these groups unless combined with rational voter ignorance about the real price to be paid for these activities in terms of higher taxes and future taxes to pay the accumulated deficits a high inflation rate makes it possible for real government expenditures to rise greatly while at the same time the government announces notional tax cuts which may be incorrectly perceived by voters as real tax cuts particularly since the early to middle 1970s australian governments have not had to rely on announcing tax increases to finance rapidly growing real levels of expenditure this has lowered the perceived cost of these programs and facilitated the rapidly rising share of government revenue and expenditure in gdp a sign of some voter disenchantment with ever rising expenditure shares has come in the last year or two as the hawke keating government has been successful in actually slightly lowering the expenditure share one obvious reform which would force governments to be more honest with voters is complete inflation indexation of tax brackets and capital income however as the experimentation with inflation indexation by the fraser government showed no government is likely to voluntarily persist with even partial let alone complete tax indexation to introduce and maintain such a measure some sort of tax constitution as explored by brennan and buchanan 1980 1985 may be desirable since the likelihood of achieving such reform via a constitutional referendum seems remote a promising alternative is the various flat tax proposals such as the hall and rabushka 1985 scheme any scheme which brings average and marginal tax rates into greater equality not only forces politicians to be more honest and open about the consequences of expenditure increases but it also unequivocally improves the efficiency of the tax system via the lowering of work disincentive effects swan 1982 1984 and the excess burden of taxation for a given overall government tax take there cannot be any aggregate income effect offsetting the favourable substitution effect from lowering marginal tax rates when the average level of taxes is raised there is a potential role for income effects since individuals who have been made worse off by tax increases may be motivated to work more to maintain their income higher government expenditure does not necessarily provide higher benefits from public goods to offset lower personal after tax income it is interesting that supporters of big government such as wilenski 1986 30 should use the income effect argument to claim that the effect of taxes on work incentives is an empirical matter since he is in effect conceding that the higher government expenditure which results from higher taxes does not necessarily compensate taxpayers for the burden of these higher taxes i e that the income effect exists and is unfavourable a more fundamental line of attack on the rational ignorance of voters which may be the root cause of many weaknesses displayed by so called democratic governments has only been hinted at here such fundamental reforms may involve the institution of well informed middle persons between voters and governments fostered by revolutionary proposals such as markets in votes and payments for votes instead of the present penalties for failing to vote

government expenditure and economic growth a cross country study this paper examines the relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the rate of growth of real per capita gdp the work of the u n international comparison project has recently made available new estimates for over 100 countries of both per capita gdp and the share of government consumption these new estimates are based on direct price comparisons rather than exchange rate conversions as a result the statistics for different countries are more comparable and cross country studies will be more reliable

filtering and forecasting commodity futures prices under an hmm framework abstract we propose a model for the evolution of arbitrage free futures prices under a regime switching framework the estimation of model parameters is carried out using the hidden markov filtering algorithms comprehensive numerical experiments on real financial market data are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithm in particular the model is calibrated with data from heating oil futures and its forecasting performance as well as statistical validity is investigated the proposed model is parsimonious self calibrating and can be very useful in predicting futures prices

do large cabinets favor large governments evidence on the fiscal commons problem for swiss cantons abstract the fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics for a panel of the 26 swiss cantons over the 1980 1998 periods this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes we distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments cabinet size and coalition size in addition we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation the results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government while fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent

the implications of institutional design for macroeconomic performance reassessing the claims of consensus democracy the choice between a proportional representation pr or plurality based electoral system is commonly assumed to involve a trade off the former is assumed to provide fairer representation but at a

exit discrimination in the nba a duration analysis of career length exit discrimination is defined as the involuntary termination of employment due to racial characteristics holding productivity constant we test for exit discrimination in the national football league nfl using a panel study on career length our analysis focuses on six positional groups defensive backs defensive linemen linebackers running backs tight ends and wide receivers in our analysis in addition to race we include performance variables to determine their importance in determining career length using both parametric and semi parametric hazard models we find no evidence of exit discrimination in the nfl

an examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in oecd countries perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests those which can be readily rejected because no test results support them and those upon which one should remain agnostic because the test results are not consistent in the first group are population pop decentralization of government dcnt and length of time of modernization date one can state quite confidently that these three variables are determinants of interest group activity in the second group are the variables measuring characteristics of the political system poly dem1 dem2 pfrc one can with ease reject the hypotheses to which these variables are relevant there is a large group of variables which stand in the middle group however for these variables there are gradations of success in the tests the variables on socioeconomic development inc agri news and number of industries and political subdivisions nind regp are only significant in the one variable tests especially important is their failure to obtain the correct signs in the tests reported in table 3 the variables on ethnic fractionalization efrc and olson s hypothesis on destruction of groups ndfo have the correct signs in table 3 and are significant in table 1 thus it is more difficult to reject efrc and ndfo as determinants of interest group activity than inc nind and regp finally it should be mentioned that once appropriate simultaneous equations techniques are applied government size is no longer supported as a significant variable this paper will conclude with comments of a more conjectural nature on the implications of the results in the case of three specific variables first the results on hypothesis 3 suggest that population affects the number of interest groups independently of indirect effects through other variables this direct effect occurs because groups become proportionately smaller and more homogeneous as population increases hence one can expect the political economy of larger countries to be significantly different from that of smaller countries the results suggest that larger countries will have a denser array of interest groups and that these groups because of their homogeneity will find it easier to decide on and pursue policies in the narrow interests of their members secondly the results support olson s claim that there will be a gradual accumulation of interest groups in developed democracies given that olson attributes to interest groups a large role in determining the economic fortunes of a country the fact that his accumulation hypothesis is supported is a result of some significance finally if one accepts the two stage least squares results it has been shown that changes in government size do not induce changes in interest group activity an important conclusion can be reached when this result is taken in combination with the results of other studies which show that interest groups induce changes in the size of government mccormick and tollison 1981 and mueller and murrell 1983 these results do not support the capture theory of government that governmental institutions are created perhaps in the public interest and then dominated by interest groups rather the results support the theory that the institutions themselves are the creatures of interest group activity

competition small business financing and discrimination evidence from a new survey we analyze credit applications loan denials and interest rates paid by small businesses across owner gender race and ethnicity in addition we examine data from owners who said they did not apply for credit because they believed that their applications would have been turned down after controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables including personal and business credit histories substantial differences in denial rates between firms owned by african americans and white males remain moreover consistent with becker s classic theories 1957 we find evidence that increases in competition in the firm s local banking market reduces these differences

on solving the multirotational timber harvesting problem with stochastic prices a linear complementarity formulation this article develops a two factor real options model of the harvesting decision over infinite rotations assuming a known stochastic price process and using a rigorous hamilton jacobi bellman methodology the harvesting problem is formulated as a linear complementarity problem that is solved numerically using a fully implicit finite difference method this approach is contrasted with the markov decision process models commonly used in the literature the model is used to estimate the value of a representative stand in ontario s boreal forest both when there is complete flexibility regarding harvesting time and when regulations dictate the harvesting date

liberty and development a further empirical perspective this paper uses the wright ratings of economic freedom to investigate the relationship between economic freedom and economic development for most countries in the world this rela tionship is apparently strong and direct for such economic freedoms as freedom of property and freedom of movement but inverse for freedom of association these findings appear to be indepen dent of the type of economic system or civil liberties as measured by the gastil ratings which have their own important effects on economic development