pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility this paper studies the design of a pay as you go social security system in an overlapping generations model where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through capital investment if investments are publicly observable pension benefits must be linked positively to the level of investment and payroll taxes negatively to the number of children the outcome is characterized by full insurance with all parents regardless of their number of children enjoying identical consumption levels without observability benefits must increase and payroll taxes decrease with the number of children the second best level of investment and the resulting average fertility rate are less than their corresponding first best levels

no gender difference in willingness to compete when competing against self we report on two experiments investigating whether there is a gender difference in the willingness to compete against oneself self competition similar to what is found when competing against others other competition in one laboratory and one online market experiment involving a total of 1 200 participants we replicate the gender gap in willingness to other compete but find no evidence of a gender difference in the willingness to self compete we explore the roles of risk and confidence and suggest that these factors can account for the different findings finally we document that self competition does no worse than other competition in terms of performance boosting

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

optimal labour contracts when workers have a variety of privately observed reservation wages if a firm does not know the individual ex post outside opportunities of its contracted workforce then it can use hours wages and redundancy payments to screen them will a second best contract have underemployment inefficiency or overemployment and with a stochastic contract are those workers randomly selected for layoff worse off than their retained colleagues involuntary layoff or vice versa involuntary retention the answers depend on the nature of the workers preferences two polar cases are looked at corresponding to permanent and temporary layoff the former is characterized by overemployment and involuntary retention the latter by underemployment and involuntary layoff also examined are simple contracts where all retained workers are paid a common wage and all laid off workers receive a common redundancy payment handling asymmetric information in stochastic contracts has led to two technical innovations first a number of results are proved even though all the truth telling constraints are explicitly included second a new regularity condition is found under which the local constraints are sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility at an optimum

real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information abstract we study the cost of adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners the principal and managers the agent information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types and a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range in an observationally different way than when fixed adjustment costs or irreversibilities cause a similar phenomenon uncertainty in the form of an increase in the spread of agents types tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition the model gives a new interpretation of tobin s q under asymmetric information explaining some results of the mergers and acquisition literature

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

inflexible rules in incentive problems in practice contracts involve standard terms or rules allowing for variations only under exceptional circumstances we develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature even in the absence of transactions costs rules arise when an agent has countervailing incentives to misrepresent private information these incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante applications in regulatory labor and legal settings

agent discretion and the choice of insurance marketing system this article argues that different insurance marketing organizations arise as a means to minimize the costs of correctly matching policyholder risks with insurance coverage when policyholders are easily sorted without sales agent participation in screening exclusive dealing will be the preferred marketing organization when agent information is important for risk placement independent agency may be preferred empirical support for our theory is obtained from analysis of compensation contracts and market shares of the different marketing forms exclusive dealers are found to be prevalent in relatively standardized homogeneous product lines and markets and their agents receive less profit based compensation than those of independent agency insurers these findings are consistent with our theory

do competitive workplaces deter female workers a large scale natural field experiment on job entry decisions an important line of research using laboratory experiments has provided a new potential reason for gender imbalances in labour markets men are more competitively inclined than women whether and to what extent gender differences in attitudes toward competition lead to differences in naturally occurring labour markets remains an open question to examine this we run a natural field experiment on job entry decisions where we randomize almost 9000 job seekers into different compensation regimes by varying the role that individual competition plays in setting the wage and the gender composition we examine whether a competitive compensation regime by itself can cause differential job entry the data highlight the power of the compensation regime in that women disproportionately shy away from competitive work settings yet there are important factors that attenuate the gender differences including whether the job is performed in teams whether the position has overt gender associations and the age of the job seekers we also find that the effect is most pronounced in labour markets with attractive alternative employment options furthermore our results suggest that preferences over uncertainty can be just as important as preferences over competition per se in driving job entry choices

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

screening in a matching market contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting if the informed party s reservation value does not depend on its private information its type it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers low types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to high types we challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment we consider a market where players meet pairwise and where in each match either side may be chosen to make a take it or leave it offer as frictions become sufficiently low we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information in particular all contracts are free of distortions

the price of advice we develop a model of consulting advising where the role of the consultant is to reveal signals to her client that refine the client s original private estimate of the profitability of a project although the client can perfectly observe and evaluate these signals the consultant may only be able to do the same imperfectly or not at all this captures the idea that the expert may not fully understand the impact of her advice on the client we characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client it is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not the main result of the article is that in the optimal mechanism the consultant obtains the same profit as though she could perfectly observe and evaluate the impact of the signals whose release she controls on the client s profit estimate

implications of power when the ceo can pressure the cfo to bias reports abstract building on archival anecdotal and survey evidence on managers roles in accounting manipulations i develop an agency model to examine the effects of a ceo s power to pressure a cfo to bias a performance measure like earnings this power has implications for incentive compensation reporting quality firm value and information rents predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like sox and the extent to which the ceo s or cfo s incentives significantly impact on earnings management the model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non powerful ceo can extract rents which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between ceo power and excessive compensation

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

taxing family size and subsidizing child specific commodities abstract the effects and optimal choice of policy instruments directly affecting the welfare of parents and children are examined within the context of a household economics model if fertility were exogenous and households differed in number of children only a first best could be implement through a grant conditional on family size outside this very special case public intervention is either not justifiable on distributional grounds or involves taxing child specific commodities less than adult specific commodities if fertility is endogenous family size must be taxed or subsidized according to whether household expenditure on children is decreasing or increasing in the mother s wage rate

push or pull performance pay incentives and information we study a principal agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input we show 1 performance pay may not be optimal even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input 2 total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable and 3 bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types we explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage r d activity but our results have applications beyond this context

on the size of the gender difference in competitiveness we design a new procedure for measuring competitiveness and use it to estimate the magnitude of the gender gap in competitiveness before working on a task participants choose what percentage of their payoffs will be based on a piece rate compensation scheme the rest of their payoff is allocated to a competitive compensation scheme this novel procedure allows us to distinguish between 101 levels of competitiveness as opposed to the binary measure used in the literature whereas the binary measure allows researchers to conclude that about twice as many men as women choose to compete typically two thirds versus one third the new procedure sheds light on the intensive margin we find that the intensity of the preference is more extreme than the binary measure could detect for example we find that only one fifth of the most competitive 25 of our participants are women and the most competitive 10 of our participants are all men the new procedure also allows us to study the correlation between comp

the importance of being confident gender career choice and willingness to compete abstract this study investigates the extent to which gender differences in choosing to enter competitive tournaments are due to women s lower taste for competition or differences in confidence we examine three types of confidence and find that confidence measured by expected ranking is the most important determinant of decisions to enter tournaments conditional on ability this measure eliminates gender differences in winner take all tournaments and when entered with risk measures eliminates differences in ranked compensation tournaments when the sample is split by career choice there are no gender differences for students in stem fields and in the humanities and the social sciences differences can be explained by confidence however for business school students gender differences in willingness to compete in winner take all tournaments persist even after accounting for risk aversion and confidence men in business set themselves apart from the rest of the population men and women alike with the highest levels of tournament entry and the most positive performance responses to competition

motivating with simple contracts abstract in practice incentive schemes are rarely tailored to the specific characteristics of contracting parties however according to economic theory optimal contracts should be highly dependent on individual conditions we reconcile these observations in the context of a principal agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection motivating an agent could be increasingly costly to the principal because a more productive agent could also be more able to manipulate the terms of the contract as a result the principal may optimally pool some types by offering a contract with constant transfer and bonus we also explore parameterizations where the optimal contract is fully separating but simple contracts attain a significant portion of the optimal welfare

market participation in delegated and intrinsic common agency games we study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals sellers affects market participation by a privately informed agent consumer when participation is restricted to all or nothing intrinsic agency the agent must choose between both principals contracts and selecting her outside option when the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract delegated agency competition is more intense the two games have distinct predictions for participation intrinsic agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer under delegated agency relative to monopoly market participation increases respectively decreases when contracting variables are substitutes respectively complements on the intensive margin equilibrium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product offerings is identical to both the first best and the monopoly outcome

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

alternative models of earnings determination and labor market structures there are three distinct research traditions in the analysis of individual earnings determination human capital or earnings function analyses aggregate wage analyses and labor demand analyses an important and incongruous aspect of each is the treatment of geographical differences in labor markets this paper first investigates the magnitude and character of geographical wage differentials the sizable differences discovered there are then related to the existing and highly simplified models of labor market differences while the two major classes of models compensating differentials and labor demand differ significantly in assumptions and implications it is impossible to distinguish adequately between them there appears to be a clear need for more structural analyses of labor market operations

designing a private industry government auctions with endogenous market structure abstract this paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure doupoly dual sourcing monopoly sole sourcing or government owned production are a function of the bids in designing the optimal mechanism the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus producer surplus and revenue under incomplete information doupoly is implemented less frequently and government production more frequently than under complete information when bidders are symmetric the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second price auction applications to privatization deregulation and defense procurement are discussed

economic segmentation worker power and income inequality how economic segmentation generates income inequality constitutes a central question for theories of economic and social organization and of socioeconomic achievement previous research emphasizes two sources of the structural variation in income 1 employers with large amounts of resources for a variety of reasons may find it in their interests to pay workers higher wages and 2 some workers are able to acquire power against their employers as well as against other workers and can therefore extract higher earnings in this paper we investigate several issues involved in the links among economic segmentation worker power and income inequality we argue that the structure of economic segmentation is multidimensional and reflects such distinct concepts as concentration economic scale state intervention in the market capital intensity and organization size worker power also is derived from diverse sources such as union membership occupational skill and licensing class position and tenure wi

optimal delegation with multi dimensional decisions this paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms in a framework with a twodimensional policy space and no monetary transfers contrary to the one dimensional setting if the conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension the optimal mechanism never exhibits any pooling and the agent s ideal policies are never chosen simple delegation sets that trade off inflexible rules and full discretion are no longer optimal but take more complex shapes

nonrevelation in employment contracts the author considers an employment contracting model in which firms have private information that is directly payoff relevant to workers and workers are always free to quit in contrast to existing models firms will sometimes fail to reveal adverse information to workers in equilibrium because of the effect this will have on quits risk averse workers can prefer such pooling contracts to separating ones because inducing truth telling requires firms to cut wages in states that are already bad for the worker applications to firms incentives to reveal unsafe working conditions and impending layoffs or plant closures are discussed copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

unwelcome immigrants the labor market experiences of 1980 mariel cuban and haitian refugees in south florida this article examines the situation of 2 recently arrived and disadvantaged immigrant groups in the context of 2 competing theoretical traditions classical assimilation and recent labor market segmentation theories predictions of both concerning us labor market entry of foreign minorities and determinants of subsequent mobility are tested on the basis of representative surveys most are not confirmed the analysis supports the hypothesis of heterogeneous modes of incorporation into the labor market including substantial numbers of refugees who remain outside of it sizable proportions have only managed to find fringe employment in a energing informal economy in south florida among cubans employment in the ethnic enclave is associated with positive returns comparable to those of entry into the primary labor market haitians lack an enclave option and thus cluster into secondary and informal employment although most remain without work determinants of these various situations are examined on the basis of multivariate logistic regressions implications of results for immigration theory and policy are discussed authors

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

do sunk costs matter let bygones be bygones khieu samphan former head of state of the khmer rouge government asking cambodians to forget the more than one million people who died under his government s rule i introduction sunk costs are costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered sunk costs do not change regardless of which action is presently chosen therefore an individual should ignore sunk costs to make a rational choice introductory textbooks in economics present this as a basic principle of rational decision making frank and bernanke 2006 10 mankiw 2004 297 nonetheless people are apparently often influenced by sunk costs in their decision making once individuals have made a large sunk investment they have a tendency to invest more in an attempt to prevent their previous investment from being wasted the greater the size of their sunk investment the more they tend to invest further even when the return on additional investment does not seem worthwhile for example some people remain in failing relationships because they have already invested too much to leave others buy expensive gym memberships to commit themselves to exercising still others are swayed by arguments that a war must continue because lives will have been sacrificed in vain unless victory is achieved these types of behavior do not seem to accord with rational choice theory and are often classified as behavioral errors people who commit them are said to be engaging in the sunk cost fallacy students are repeatedly taught in economic classes that sunk costs are irrelevant to decision making so that they may ultimately learn to make better decisions invoking the theory as a normative prescription conditioning on the level of sunk costs is also taken as evidence that people do not always make rational choices thaler 1991 suggesting that the explanatory power of rational choice theory is limited in this article we argue that in a broad range of environments reacting to sunk costs is actually rational agents may rationally react to sunk costs because of informational content reputational concerns or financial and time constraints a informational content consider a project that may take an unknown expenditure to complete the failure to complete the project with a given amount of investment is informative about the expected amount needed to complete it therefore the expected additional investment required for fruition will be correlated with the sunk investment moreover in a world of random returns the realization of a return is informative about the expected value of continuing a project a large loss which leads to a rational inference of a high variance will often lead to a higher option value because option values tend to rise with variance consequently the informativeness of sunk investments is amplified by consideration of the option value b reputational concerns in team relationships each participant s willingness to invest depends on the investments of others in such circumstances a commitment to finishing projects even when they appear ex post unprofitable is valuable because such a commitment induces more efficient ex ante investment thus a reputation for throwing good money after bad the classic sunk cost fallacy can solve a coordination problem in contrast to the desire for commitment people might rationally want to conceal bad choices to appear more talented which may lead them to make further investments hoping to conceal their investments gone bad c financial and time constraints given financial constraints larger past expenditures leave less ability to make future expenditures ceteris paribus thus financial constraints may lead companies or individuals to stick with projects that no longer appear to be the best choice moreover given limited time to invest in projects as the time remaining shrinks individuals have less time over which to amortize their costs of experimenting with new projects and therefore may be rationally less likely to abandon current projects

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

vertical restraints under asymmetric information on the role of participation constraints the impact on vertical contracting of a type dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information the welfare and private properties of contracts controlling both the retail price and the sales level are compared with those restricting only sales when firms choose contracts non cooperatively retail price restrictions are desirable for the upstream supplier although detrimental to consumers whenever the retailer reservation utility has a relevant impact on optimal contracts if this impact is relatively weak and contracts are chosen cooperatively vertical price control fails to maximize firms joint profit although it would be beneficial to consumers

how much discretion for risk regulators we analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort congress delegates regulation to an agency although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry the optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade off the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm but it implements policies that are too pro industry the agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent partial discretion is preferred otherwise we then investigate how this trade off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

optimal border policies for invasive species under asymmetric information this paper analyzes the problem faced by a border protection agency if endogenous exporter abatement activities affect invasive species risk allowing for unobservable differences in abatement cost we show how the optimal inspection penalty regime differs from the symmetric information case departing from previous literature we allow for technical assistance a policy instrument specifically permitted and commonly employed under article 9 of the world trade organization sanitary and phytosanitary agreement we find the information asymmetry can make it optimal for the importing country to provide technical assistance grants for exporter risk abatement even if it would otherwise be inefficient further we show that fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy affects the qualitative nature of optimal policy if technical assistance has no outside value in the exporter s country optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts balancing higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive if technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter s economy it can introduce countervailing incentives making a uniform tariff penalty combination optimal

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

randomization in coalition contracts this article analyzes a much debated clause in the coalition contract between spd and fdp in rheinland pfalz two parties write a contract based on which decisions under incomplete information have to be made at a later point in time it is shown that a complex complete contract can achieve the first best outcome however a simple incomplete contract can implement the first best outcome only if use of seemingly inefficient randomization is made

gender competitiveness and study choices in high school evidence from switzerland willingness to compete has been found to predict individual and gender differences in educational choices and labor market outcomes we provide further evidence for this relationship by linking swiss students baccalaureate school high school specialization choices to an experimental measure of willingness to compete boys are more likely to specialize in math in baccalaureate school in line with previous findings competitive students are more likely to choose a math specialization boys are more likely to opt for competition than girls and this gender difference in competitiveness could partially explain why girls are less likely to choose a math intensive specialization

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

procurement and predation dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers abstract this paper studies the relationship between a financially constrained firm and a stronger opponent who is not cash constrained when these firms repeatedly compete in a procurement context we characterize and discuss the procurement agency s optimal strategy when faced with such asymmetric firms we highlight a trade off between the long run benefits from competition and the short run benefits from reduced costs finally we show that to reduce costs in the short run the financially weak firm should be favored in future procurement

contractual distortions in a market with frictions abstract this paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions while principals e g firms have all contractual power their market power is constrained as agents e g workers can choose to wait and search for better offers we find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents utilities with type independent costs of search and waiting equilibrium contracts are always first best if agents are impatient and discount future payoffs however distortions vanish only gradually in the latter case we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities both of which are absent in the case of type independent costs of search

economic dualism a critical review in this paper we examine the model underlying the dual economy approach to labor market segmentation we provide a specification of the components of the model as well as the linkages between components this construction of the underlying model allows us to evaluate it systematically as a model to consider and to evaluate each component and linkage separately while we conclude that there are several important contributions to retain from the dual approach including the insight that capital structure conditions labor market outcomes we argue that it is inadequate for sustaining theoretical and empirical development as a new starting point for the study of economic and labor market segmentation we suggest a resource perspective which retains insights from the dual approach but avoids its overly restrictive assumptions

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour theory and estimates for germany italy uk and usa abstract the comparative statics predictions of models of the joint determination of household saving and fertility are derived under various hypotheses self interest altruism of parents towards children altruism of children towards parents etc and compared with those of models which determine saving under the assumption of exogenous fertility country specific saving and fertility equations are then estimated using time series data for germany italy uk and usa for each of the countries considered the estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that saving and fertility are jointly determined by self interested parents and reject the alternative hypotheses the data also show that a self financing expansion of social security discourages fertility and generally raises household saving

are two a good representative for many abstract this paper studies a discrete formulation of the screening model with type dependent reservation utilities it closes the gap between various pooling results derived in continuous type models and the separating results obtained for the binary case we show that binary models do not capture the most interesting features of general models with countervailing incentives however as soon as at least three types are introduced all interesting results of the continuum case can be replicated in a discrete framework two kinds of pooling can appear in the three type model overtake pooling which can be ruled out by standard monotonicity conditions and crash pooling which is really a consequence of countervailing incentives journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

gender power fertility and family policy the birth of children often shifts the balance of power within a family if family decisions are made according to the welfare function of the spouses this shift in power might cause a time consistency problem in a model of cooperative family decision making we show that this problem can lead to a systematic downward bias in fertility by keeping fertility low spouses mitigate the ex ante undesired shift in the balance of power that results from the presence of children this provides scope for welfare enhancing policy intervention we discuss to what extent existing family policy measures are suitable for overcoming the bias

optimal contracting of separable production technologies abstract we analyze the class of agency problems with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent in which hidden actions and hidden information on the agent s efficiency are jointly present technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule we show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent s inputs together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent s actions and indirect utility

entitling the pollutee liability versus standard under private information this paper considers and compares two different legal means full liability and standard to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs the familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage nevertheless voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist e g for coasean reasons however such out of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law we propose a modification of standards the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied yet can trade this right for financial compensations contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and often better than the polluter pays principle this relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty here liability dominates the standard

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the impact of advice on women s and men s selection into competition we conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice by a more experienced and better informed person affects an individual s entry into a real effort tournament and the gender gap our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action policies overall advice improves the entry decision of subjects in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down the improvements are mainly driven by increased entry of strong performing women who also become more confident and reduced entry of weak performing men we find that the overall gender gap persists even though it disappears among low and strong performers the persistence is due to an emerging gender gap among intermediate performers driven by women men following more the advice to stay out of enter the tournament in this performance group this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

local industrial dominance and earnings attainment drawing on the ecological concept of local industrial dominance we examine how the industrial distribution of the metropolitan labor force influences workers earnings industrial dominance is defined as the proportional overrepresentation of the local labor force in a given industry or industrial sector a contextual analysis of census microdata for the largest 125 smsas shows that within industries and sectors workers in metropolitan areas in which their industry is dominant have significantly higher earnings than workers in areas in which that industry is less dominant these results holdfor two different measures of dominance andfour racelsex groups the effects of local dominance on earnings appear stronger for industries in the core and state sectors for financial business and personal service functions andfor public administration the influence of dominance is partly explained by the tendency of locally dominant industries to be composed of larger establishments

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

partnership dissolution with interdependent values we study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed in contrast with the case of private values cramton gibbons and klemperer 1987 in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal there exists a wide class of situations in which full efficiency cannot be reached in these cases i the subsidy required to restore the first best is minimal when the entire ownership is allocated initially to one of the parties and ii ruling out external subsidies the second best welfare is maximized when one of the parties initially has full ownership

how costly is diversity affirmative action in light of gender differences in competitiveness affirmative action is often criticized for causing reverse discrimination and lowering the qualifications of those hired under the policy however the magnitude of such adverse effects depends on whether the best suited candidate is hired absent the policy indeed affirmative action may compensate for the distortion discrimination imposes on the selection of candidates this paper asks whether affirmative action can have a similar corrective impact when qualified individuals fail to apply for a job we evaluate the effect of introducing a gender quota in an environment where high performing women fail to enter competitions they can win we show that guaranteeing women equal representation among winners increases their entry the response exceeds that predicted by the change in probability of winning and is in part driven by women being more willing to compete against other women the consequences are substantial as the boost in supply essentially eliminates the anticipated costs of the policy this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

contributions of neoclassical economics to public utili iy analysis neoclassical economics the dominant economics paradigm has influenced and been influenced by developments in regulated industries we identify major theoretical and empirical accomplishments discuss the impactofthese accomplishmentsonpolicydevelopment andlist the channelsthrough which the impacts are madepossible we then discuss regulatorypolitics lack ofresearchperspective an overly narrow focus on economic efficiency and the academic profession as factors limiting the impact of neoclassical economics on public policy

fertility human capital accumulation and the pension system this paper provides a unified treatment of externalities associated with fertility and human capital accumulation within pas as you go pension systems it considers an overlapping generations model in which every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion of types being determined endogenously the number of children is deterministically chosen but the children s future ability is in part stochastic in part determined by the family background and in part through education in addition to the customary externality source associated with a change in average fertility rate this setup highlights another externality source this is due to the effect of a parent s choice of number and educational attainment of his children on the proportion of high ability individuals in the steady state our other results include i investments in education of high and low ability parents must be subsidized ii direct child subsidies to one or both parent types can be negative i e they can be taxes iii net subsidies to children direct child subsidies plus education subsidies to at least one type of parents must be positive iv parents who have a higher number of children should invest less in their education

competing with confidence the ticket to labor market success for college educated women abstract this study examines whether the female earnings gap results from gender differences in preferences for competition and confidence we use laboratory experiments on college seniors to measure tastes for competition and confidence and then track these subjects labor market experiences in the early years after college women s compensation is positively correlated with preferences for competition coupled with confidence while men s compensation is not women who exhibit a taste to compete and are confident about their performance earn substantially more than other women and do not earn less than men further enjoying competition or being confident alone is insufficient to raise compensation half of this female earnings effect is explained by college major and labor market controls but even controlling for these characteristics a higher taste for competition for the most confident women results in more than a 7 increase in compensation

coase lecture the glass ceiling despite decades of progress women remain underrepresented in the upper part of the earnings distribution we review the recent research trying to explain this phenomenon after briefly revisiting gender differences in education we turn our attention to a body of work that has argued that gender differences in psychological attributes are holding back women s earnings we then review another active area of research focused on the challenges that women may face when trying to juggle competing demands on their time in the workplace and the home particularly when the home includes children we discuss recent work documenting women s greater demand for flexibility in the workplace as well as work measuring the labour market penalties associated with such demand for flexibility particularly in the higher paying occupations in the economy we highlight possible countervailing forces both at work and at home that may explain why these work family considerations may remain highly relevant to today s glass ceiling despite reduced time spent in non market work and a trend towards a more equal division of non market work between men and women finally we discuss the role that public policy and human resource practices may play in adding more cracks to the glass ceiling

gender competitiveness and career choices gender differences in competitiveness have been hypothesized as a potential explanation for gender differences in education and labor market outcomes we examine the predictive power of a standard laboratory experimental measure of competitiveness for the later important choice of academic track of secondary school students in the netherlands although boys and girls display similar levels of academic ability boys choose substantially more prestigious academic tracks where more prestigious tracks are more math and science intensive our experimental measure shows that boys are also substantially more competitive than girls we find that competitiveness is strongly positively correlated with choosing more prestigious academic tracks even conditional on academic ability most important we find that the gender difference in competitiveness accounts for a substantial portion about 20 of the gender difference in track choice

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

under pressure gender differences in output quality and quantity under competition and time constraints gender gaps in income and level of position in the workplace are widespread one explanation for this inequality is that the genders perform dierently under competi tive conditions as previous experimental studies have found a signi cant gender gap in competitive tasks that are perceived to favor men in this paper we use a verbal task that is perceived to favor women and nd no gender dierence under competition per se we also reject the hypothesis that a stereotype threat explains the inability of women to improve performance under competition we propose an alternative expla nation for gender inequality namely that women and men respond dierently to time pressure with reduced time pressure competition in verbal tasks greatly increases the performance of women such that women signi cantly outperform men this eect appears largely due to the fact that extra time in a competition improves the quality of women s work leading them to make fewer mistakes on the other hand men use this extra time to increase the quantity of work which results in a greater number of mistakes

managerial expertise private information and pay performance sensitivity this paper characterizes optimal pay performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities the model presumes that the rate at which a manager s opportunity wage increases in his expertise depends on the nature of that expertise i e whether it is general or firm specific the analysis demonstrates that when managerial expertise is largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity is lower higher than its optimal value in a benchmark setting of symmetric information furthermore when managerial skills are largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity decreases increases as managerial skills become a more important determinant of firm performance unlike the standard agency theoretic prediction of a negative trade off between risk and pay performance sensitivity this paper identifies plausible circumstances under which risk and incentives are positively associated in addition to providing an explanation for why empirical tests of risk incentive relationships have produced mixed results the analysis generates insights that can be useful in guiding future empirical research

coordination and externalities abstract we analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly we consider a general multi agent situation with externalities among agents incomplete information and type dependent reservation utilities when the regulator optimally leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents centralized coordination reduces global activity coordination induces more activity when the principal optimally leaves rents to the most inefficient agents last if we impose budget balance our mechanism can also be interpreted as the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d62 d82 l51

budget constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information i study a budget constrained private valuation sealed bid sequential auction with two incompletely informed risk neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non monotonic functions of a bidder s type multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation efficiency and revenue the sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders the sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods if a particular good say is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale then auction revenue and the price of good are higher when good is sold first

incomplete contracts and signaling this article presents a principal agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness i show that in the presence of transactions costs incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal s type two types of transactions costs are considered those incurred ex ante drafting costs and those incurred ex post enforcement or verification costs i prove that in the presence of either of these costs asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does

using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information abstract we consider the design of government policy to ration such scarce resources as water or pollution permits in the presence of limited information when government policy is formulated some informed agents e g established public utilities know how highly they value the resource other uninformed agents e g potential independent power producers only learn their valuations at some later date the government allows uninformed agents to trade the resource rights they receive on a competitive market informed agents may or may not have the same privilege the optimal initial distribution of resource rights differs significantly according to whether informed agents can trade the rights they receive

working for the woman female managers and the gender wage gap most previous research on gender inequality and management has been concerned with the question of access to managerial jobs and the glass ceiling we offer the first largescale analysis that tur

contract design and bargaining power abstract it is a common assumption in contract theory that the uninformed side makes a take it or leave it proposal in contrast this paper explores a model which allows a shift in bargaining power continuously between the two parties endowing the informed side with more bargaining power gradually reduces distortions

optimal commodity taxation and redistribution within households using a collective model of consumption we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household the main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household essentially taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain group of goods those for which the slope of the engel curves is larger for the targeted person

stereotypes and tournament self selection a theoretical and experimental approach abstract we present a theoretical model in which agents have imperfect self knowledge about their abilities and have to self select into either a high paying or a low paying tournament the model shows that negative positive stereotypes generate underrepresentation overrepresentation of stereotyped agents in the high paying tournament even when the stereotype is false this is because stereotypes affect self assessment and consequently subsequent behavior we call this mechanism self stereotyping we run a lab experiment in which we use subjects beliefs about the gender bias of a real effort task to test the predictions of the theoretical model the results of the experiment are in line with the predictions of the model for men but not for women which partially validates the model and the self stereotyping mechanism

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

selection into self improvement and competition pay gender stereotypes and earnings volatility abstract we examine whether men and women differ in their willingness to select into a contract that pays upon improving one s past performance experiment participants choose to perform a task under either a regular piece rate or a larger piece rate provided they improve relative to a previous round women are less willing than men to select into self improvement pay and this gender gap is largely explained by higher risk aversion and to a smaller extent lower self confidence high earnings volatility widens the gender gap and makes self improvement pay less attractive than competition pay we find no effect of gender stereotypes in the willingness to sort into self improvement the results provide insight into the feasibility and potential of using self improvement contracts as gender neutral incentive mechanisms

transfers to families with children as a principal agent problem abstract the relationship between government and parents is modelled as a principal agent problem with the former in the role of principal and the latter in that of agents we make four major points the first is that if the well being of the child depends not only on luck but also on parental actions that the government cannot readily observe the latter can influence parental behaviour by conditioning income transfers to families on child performance the second point is that if there are market inputs into the making of a happy or successful child which the government can observe but not ascribe to any particular parent or child because they are bought anonymously an income transfer policy can be usefully complemented by an indirect subsidy on the price of these inputs the third is that if parents care about their children incentive considerations may have to be tempered by the need to compensate those who have the misfortune of getting a child with low ability the fourth is that parents can be induced to have the socially desirable number of children by making the transfer conditional not only on child performance but also on number of children ways of making these findings operational and the effects of administrative costs are discussed in some detail