information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

rational expectations in microeconomic models an overview abstract this paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations more specifically we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria the implementation of equilibria the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets the purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the journal of economic theory symposium on rational expectations in microeconomic models

two who called the great depression an initial formulation of the monetary origins view the consensus view in the economics profession today is that the genesis of the great depression was the tightening of policy by the fed in 1928 and 1929 mainly to stem the stock market boom nevertheless monetary historians have not provided evidence that any economist writing prior to the stock market crash of october 1929 foresaw that the fed s actions would lead to a major depression this paper shows that two economists william foster and waddill catchings co authored a paper in july 1929 containing arguments strikingly similar to the present consensus view their critique of fed policy supports the view that the genesis of the great depression had monetary origins and was preventable

the growth of interorganizational systems in the presence of network externalities we develop a model of network growth in the presence of network externalities for the case where a buyer initiates an interorganizational system with its suppliers in our two stage model suppliers joining the network in the first stage can gain economic benefit from increased market share or higher price for the primary product suppliers encounter negative externalities since the economic benefit accruing to participating suppliers is less for increasingly larger networks in the first stage the buyer may experience initial supplier adoption of the network followed by a stalling problem due to negative externalities in order to overcome this stalling problem the buyer may find it optimal to subsidize some suppliers costs to join the network in the second stage we characterize the buyer s optimal second stage subsidy policy and show the conditions under which the buyer will find it optimal to offer a subsidy if the suppliers have some positive ex ante expectation of a second stage subsidy the growth of the network will be retarded in the first stage resulting in suboptimal profits for the buyer

avoiding default the role of credit in the consumption collapse of 1930 high consumer indebtedness threatens future consumption spending if default is expensive consumer spending collapsed in 1930 turning a minor recession into the great depression households were shouldering an unprecedented burden of installment debt down payments were large contracts were short equity in durable goods was therefore acquired quickly missed installment payments triggered repossession reducing consumer wealth in 1930 because households lost all acquired equity cutting consumption was the only viable strategy in 1930 for avoiding default institutional changes lowered the cost of default by 1938 when recession began again indebted households chose to default rather than reduce consumption

effects of information revelation policies under market structure uncertainty geographically dispersed sellers in electronic reverse marketplaces such as those hosted by market makers like ariba are uncertain about the number of competitors they face in any given market session we refer to this uncertainty about the number of competitors as market structure uncertainty over the course of several market sessions sellers learn about the competitive nature of the marketplace how they learn to reduce the market structure uncertainty depends on the market transparency scheme or the revelation policy adopted a revelation policy determines the extent to which information the number of sellers in a session their bidding patterns etc is revealed to sellers because these policies control what sellers learn and how they bid in future sessions they determine buyer surplus possibly because market structure uncertainty is more prevalent in information technology enabled marketplaces than traditional ones prior work has not addressed the impact of revelation policies on this type of uncertainty currently there is little guidance available to buyers in choosing the appropriate revelation policy to address this information technology enabled problem we use game theory to compare the buyer surplus generated under a set of revelation policies commonly used in electronic reverse marketplaces we demonstrate that the policy that generates the least amount of market structure uncertainty for the sellers always maximizes buyer surplus we further investigate to provide intuition regarding how bidders reactions to overcome uncertainty differs with the nature of uncertainty and how those reactions impact buyer surplus

an empirical study of federal law versus local environmental enforcement a potential problem with local enforcement of national legislation is the varying degrees of implementation that the decentralized structure may create to study the severity of this problem induced by the mismatch of local and national incentives i look at the enforcement of the swedish environmental code which is enforced at the local level i measure enforcement in terms of environmental fines issued in each of sweden s 290 municipalities i argue that the green party values the tradeoff between business friendliness and environmental concerns differently from other parties using both a difference in differences approach and iv i find that municipalities with the green party in the ruling coalition issue more fines than other municipalities this is problematic from an efficiency and equality perspective the result suggests that politicians do not only affect environmental policy but also that for a given policy they can affect the outcome through implementation and enforcement

the effects of information transparency on suppliers manufacturers and consumers in online markets this paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading environment we study these effects in business to business electronic markets with firms competing in both upstream and downstream industries the prior literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm buyer or the upstream firm seller is a monopoly it is not clear whether information transparency would still create value if both buyers and sellers face oligopolistic competition where the benefits of information transparency could be competed away to answer this question we first develop a simple two echelon e market model and then extend the model to more general settings we find that information transparency can create value for the overall e market yet it affects buyers and sellers very differently one side will be hurt depending on the competition mode cournot or bertrand in the downstream this suggests that a manufacturer owned a supplier owned and a neutral e market will have different preferences for information transparency finally we find that information transparency can hurt consumers when the downstream industry engages in bertrand competition this is a surprising result given the expectation that online markets create substantial value for consumers

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

do parties matter for economic outcomes a regression discontinuity approach a long standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies this question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities this article uses a regression discontinuity design namely party control changes discontinuously at 50 of the vote share which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes the method is applied to a large panel data set from swedish local governments with a number of attractive features the results show that there is an economically significant party effect left wing governments spend and tax 2 3 more than right wing governments left wing governments also have 7 lower unemployment rates which is partly due to that left wing governments employ 4 more workers than right wing governments jel c21 d72 d78 h71 h72

uncertainty and the employment dynamics of small and large businesses we examine the impact of uncertainty on employment dynamics alternative measures of uncertainty are constructed based on the survey of professional forecasters and regression based forecasting models for gdp growth inflation sp the impact on large businesses are generally non existent or weaker our results suggest that to truly understand the effects of uncertainty on employment dynamics we need to focus on the relatively smaller and entrepreneurial businesses we discuss implications for the framing of economic policy

electronic b2b marketplaces with different ownership structures this paper analyzes electronic marketplaces with different ownership structures biased marketplaces and neutral marketplaces biased marketplaces can be either buyer owned or supplier owned whereas neutral marketplaces are owned by independent third parties we develop a single period model with fulfilled expectations equilibrium the buyers experience positive network effects that are a function of the number of suppliers and the suppliers receive similar positive network effects depending on the number of buyers we develop a general model with atomistic buyers and suppliers we find that biased marketplaces set prices to induce greater participation demand from both buyers and suppliers compared to a neutral marketplace this counterintuitive result can be understood in the context of the positive cross network effects experienced by buyers and suppliers and the added benefit to the owner of a biased marketplace from participating in the marketplace biased marketplaces also provide greater social welfare compared to neutral marketplaces

the process of innovation assimilation by firms in different countries a technology diffusion perspective on e business this paper extends our previous studies on the assimilation of internet based e business innovations by firms in an international setting drawing upon theories on the process and contexts of technology diffusion we develop an integrative model to examine three assimilation stages initiation adoption routinization the model features technological organizational and environmental contexts as prominent antecedents of this three stage assimilation process based on this model we hypothesize how technology readiness technology integration firm size global scope managerial obstacles competition intensity and regulatory environment influence e business assimilation at the firm level a unique data set of 1 857 firms from 10 countries is used to test the conceptual model and hypotheses to probe deeper into the influence of the environmental context we compare two subsamples from developed and developing countries our empirical analysis leads to several key findings 1 competition positively affects initiation and adoption but negatively impacts routinization suggesting that too much competition is not necessarily good for technology assimilation because it drives firms to chase the latest technologies without learning how to use existing ones effectively 2 large firms tend to enjoy resource advantages at the initiation stage but have to overcome structural inertia in later stages 3 we also find that economic environments shape innovation assimilation regulatory environment plays a more important role in developing countries than in developed countries moreover while technology readiness is the strongest factor facilitating assimilation in developing countries technology integration turns out to be the strongest in developed countries implying that as e business evolves the key determinant of its assimilation shifts from accumulation to integration of technologies together these findings offer insights into how innovation assimilation is influenced by contextual factors and how the effects may vary across different stages and in different environments

uncertainty irreversibility durable consumption and the great depression what was the role of uncertainty in the great depression this paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model to show that in response to an increase in uncertainty agents increase expenditure on irreversible durable goods and reduce investment in irreversible physical capital these relative movements occur because durable goods provide a store of utility and are less irreversible than physical capital these substitutions are unclear at the start of the great depression but are clearly visible at the deep end of it in 1932 when the volatility of stock returns is consistently high coefficients on the variance which is consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis both the theoretical hypothesis and its empirical tests are of a partial equilibrium nature yet the great depression was a general equilibrium event this paper puts the uncertainty argument explicitly in a general equilibrium model with consumer durables and capital goods both subject to irreversibility constraints i associate income uncertainty with the stochastic process driving output fluctuations and an increase in uncertainty is modelled as a mean preserving spread on the distribution of this shock the general equilibrium setup also incorporates a specific notion of irreversibility namely that goods are irreversible if there are no buyers when one wants to sell the test of the uncertainty hypothesis in general equilibrium is a simulation of a calibrated version of the model what makes the reaction to a mean preserving spread nontrivial is the clash of the theoretical predictions of precautionary savings and irreversible investment in a general equilibrium context savings should increase and investment should fall to complicate matters durable goods have components of both consumption and investment so what was the role of uncertainty in the great depression in this setup a calibrated model provides a simple answer higher uncertainty makes agents cut capital investment and increase expenditure on durables there are two reasons for this the first is that durables are the least irreversible of the two assets in the model and the second is that durable goods act as a store of utility and thus as insurance the view of the uncertainty hypothesis that a cut in expenditure on durable goods is a key response to high uncertainty is not supported by a standard general equilibrium model there may however be some truth in itfbut for the wrong reasons and at the wrong time it is not a fall in durable expenditure per se but rather an increase relative to

distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange abstract we analyze the profitability of information sharing among cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand in this setting previous authors showed information exchange to be unprofitable when firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes we introduce a measure of the increase in the accuracy of firms demand forecasts when information is shared we provide two examples showing when this measure is large information exchange is profitable even though firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes moreover we show that in the linear conditional expectations framework which has been standard in the literature this measure reveals these accuracy gains to be severely limited

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

investment and uncertainty precipitating the great depression in the united states a severe collapse of fixed capital formation distinguished the onset of the great depression from other investment downturns between the world wars using a model estimated for the years 1890 2000 we show that the expected profitability of capital measured by tobin s q and the uncertainty surrounding expected profits indicated by share price volatility were the chief influences on investment levels and that heightened share price volatility played the dominant role in the crucial investment collapse in 1930 investment did not simply follow the downward course of income at the onset of the depression rather its slump helped to propel the wider collapse

an experimental investigation of the impact of information on competitive decision making managers often employ market response models as decision aids and historical information of competitors market outcomes to aid their competitive decisions in oligopolistic settings however little is known about how access to a decision aid or the availability of competitors market outcomes impact a firm s competitive decisions e g prices or market outcomes resulting from those decisions e g profits or how managers make these decisions across such informational conditions hence the objective of this paper is twofold first we investigate whether access to a decision aid and historical information of competitors outcomes yields more or less competitive decisions and outcomes second we determine which learning constructs such as choice reinforcement and beliefs about projected profits best explain competitive actions across various information conditions we find that relative to the availability of competitive information access to a decision aid has a larger effect on lowering prices and profits we also find that in two firm markets price competition is even more intense than in five firm markets similarly the availability of market share information leads to more aggressive pricing even when profits are held constant finally we outline the implications of our findings in making managerial resource allocations to market research endeavors

information transparency of business to business electronic markets a game theoretic analysis the abundance of transaction data available on the internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces in such a transparent environment it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals costs is this good news or bad news in this study we focus on theinformational effects of business to business b2b exchanges and explore firms incentives to join a b2b exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission we then study the equilibria by developing a game theoretic model under asymmetric information we examine whether the incentives to join a b2b exchange would be different under different competition modes quantity and price different information structures and by varying the nature of the products substitutes and complements our results challenge the information transparency hypothesis i e open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms in contrast to the popular belief we show that information transparency could be a double edged sword the individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality this may have important implications for the microstructure design e g data access rules of b2b electronic marketplaces

environmental policy in majoritarian systems abstract this paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental tax policies in majoritarian federal electoral systems such as the u s and derives implications for the environmental federalism debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental taxes in the absence of majority bias the socially preferred policy would be federal district level taxation which accounts both for cross boundary pollution and differences in industry concentration across districts in majoritarian systems however where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts the majority party at the national or state level favors home districts depending on the location of polluting industries and the associated damages the majority party may therefore impose sub optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias majority bias can influence the social welfare ranking of alternative environmental tax policies in some cases majority bias may make decentralized or federal uniform taxation the preferred solution

does the volatility of commodity prices reflect macroeconomic uncertainty abstract while there exists numerous studies on the macroeconomic effects of oil and commodity shocks the literature is quite silent on the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on oil and commodity prices and especially on their volatility this paper tackles this issue through the estimation of a structural threshold vector autoregressive tvar model on a sample of 19 commodity markets we aim at i assessing whether the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on commodity price returns depends on the degree of uncertainty and ii investigating the transfer from macroeconomic uncertainty to price uncertainty using a newly developed measure of commodity price uncertainty our findings show that both agricultural and industrial markets are highly sensitive to the variability and the level of macroeconomic uncertainty while the impact on precious metals is more parsimonious given their well identified safe haven role in time of economic turmoil in addition we find evidence that the recent 2007 09 recession has generated an unprecedented episode of high uncertainty in numerous commodity prices interestingly our analysis further reveals that volatility and uncertainty in prices can be disconnected this is especially true for the oil market as most important shocks in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s that lead to price volatility do not generate price uncertainty highlighting the relevance of our uncertainty measure in linking uncertainty to predictability rather than to volatility

the great crash and the onset of the great depression this paper argues that the collapse of stock prices in october 1929 generated temporary uncertainty about future income which led consumers to forgo purchases of durable goods that the great crash generated uncertainty is evidenced by the decline in surety expressed by contemporary forecasters that this uncertainty affected consumer behavior is shown by the fact that spending on consumer durables declined drastically in late 1929 while spending on perishable goods rose slightly this effect is confirmed by the fact that there is a significant negative relationship between stock market variability and the production of consumer durables in the prewar era

measuring our ignorance one book at a time new indicators of technological change 1909 1949 abstract new indicators of technological change in the us based on information drawn from the catalogue of the library of congress for the period 1909 1949 are developed and used to pinpoint the relationship first between technical change and economic activity and second between fluctuations in innovative activity and the great depression although links between technological change output and productivity are found results suggest that the slowdown in technological progress in the early 1930s did not contribute significantly to the great depression on the other hand the remarkable acceleration in innovations after 1934 did play a role in the recovery

analyzing online b2b exchange markets asymmetric cost and incomplete information this research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online b2b exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand in the present model we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market given the complete cost information each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost in addition the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs when each supplier s marginal cost is private information the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer s reservation price comparing these two market settings we find whether it is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost when the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer s reservation price are sufficiently large each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information on the contrary when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer s reservation price complete cost information benefits the suppliers

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

electronic data interchange competitive externalities and strategic implementation policies electronic data interchange edi is an emerging type of standardized inter organizational information system we analyze the impact of edi on the upstream suppliers competitive position in a simple two level hierarchical market structure where the buyer faces a linear demand curve and the competing heterogeneous suppliers have an upward sloping marginal cost function we show that a suppliers adoption of edi can generate positive externalities for the buyer and negative or competitive externalities for other suppliers as a result the buyer provides a price premium to those suppliers who adopt edi and increases their sales volume and market share moreover when the benefits that the buyer can derive from implementing edi are substantial and the suppliers edi adoption costs are high it may be in the buyer s best interest to subsidize the suppliers so as to encourage them to adopt edi instead of mandating them to do so regardless of whether the buyer employs a mandatory or a subsidizing policy the buyer and the end consumers may be the only ones who gain from this new technology consequently a partial adoption by the supplier base may be optimal for the buyer when the suppliers adoption costs are sufficiently high we also show that while edi reduces the transaction costs of the buyer the upstream market tends to become more concentrated as a result of increased cost differentials these results provide one economic explanation of the fact that many companies have actually reduced their supplier base after implementing edi despite a significant reduction in their market transaction costs

temporary disability insurance and labor supply evidence from a natural experiment most developed countries have compulsory insurance programs for temporary disability that is cash benefits for non work related sickness despite the economic significance of these programs little is known about their effects on work absenteeism or labor supply we exploit a policy reform that consisted of the abolishment of a waiting day together with an increase of cash benefits for short sick leaves we find that the total number of days of sickness absence was reduced by the reform which is likely due to the fact that the abolishment of the waiting period made it less costly for workers to be absent for short periods

a model of market power and efficiency in private electronic exchanges we investigate how private electronic markets pems can be used as a strategic tool by a large producer to compete against a consortium of smaller producers we model the competition between a large producer and consortium of producers in a two tier supply chain as a game and characterize the resulting subgame perfect nash equilibrium our results demonstrate that as the costs of inputs to production increase there are greater returns to ownership of a private exchange further we demonstrate strong welfare enhancing effects of the pem as the production efficiency of upstream suppliers declines finally from a policy standpoint we show that when upstream suppliers are highly efficient the creation of a private electronic exchange by the large producer will result in significant welfare loss

does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement quasi experimental evidence from china abstract this paper draws on a natural experiment generated by the national specially monitored firms nsmf program in china to evaluate the effectiveness of central supervision at improving local environmental enforcement we explore a unique firm level chinese environmental statistics dataset and utilize a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of central supervision through the nsmf program on an industrial firm s chemical oxygen demand cod emissions the results suggest that central supervision significantly reduces industrial cod emissions by at least 26 8 these results highlight the substantial room for improvement in chinese environmental regulations via central supervision a more flexible environmental decentralization regime and comprehensive central supervision are thus recommended for future reforms