designing forest taxes with varying government preferences and budget targets abstract a model of forest policy design is constructed to examine how government preferences affect the choice of forest taxes government preferences are modelled by assuming that the government faces a binding revenue constraint and cares about the provision of public goods from forests the equilibrium is second best given the imposition of the revenue constraint on the government s decision making our results show that a revenue constrained government will make different choices than a government that does not face revenue constraints this has important implications for the choice of property and harvest taxes as well as pigouvian forest taxes

economic growth and institutions some sensitivity analyses 1961 2000 do institutions help explain macroeconomic performance this article addresses two issues first especially given the practical implications of the literature measurement of institutions should avoid tautologies and therefore this study uses econometrics to estimate the effect of objectively measurable institutions such as labor market organization financial development fiscal federalism and political regime type second the growing literature on these promising factors in turn is unfortunately incommensurable because previous studies fail to control for other institutional and in some cases standard economic variables given data on up to ninety four countries from 1961 through 2000 extreme bound analysis eba an econometric technique that addresses the sensitivity of previous findings to alternative assumptions about model specification suggests that some institutions associated with the organization of labor and capital are robust correlates of investment few data support the view that variables related to the organization of the state including fiscal federalism and political regime type affect macroeconomic performance without implication the author thanks richard nelson doug chalmers robert shapiro alessandra casella brendan o flaherty geoffrey garrett alexander hicks brett hammond mark kesselman the editor lisa martin and two anonymous referees for helpful comments also ross levine peter rousseau geoffrey garrett and torben iversen were very helpful in locating data the views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the board of governors of the federal reserve system or any member of its staff

capital taxation and accumulation in a life cycle growth model almost all of the serious economic work on savings decisions within the past decade has relied on some variant of the life cycle hypothesis in which savings arise out of individual choices of an optimum lifetime consumption path this paper reexamines the incidence and welfare consequences of capital income taxes within a realistic life cycle model the results suggest that the elimination of capital income taxation would have very substantial economic effects for example a complete shift to consumption taxation might raise steady state output by as much as 18 percent and consumption by 16 percent the long run welfare gain from such a shift would for plausible parameter values exceed 150 billion annually stated somewhat differently shifting to consumption taxation would raise the lifetime utility of the representative consumer by the equivalent of about six years income in the new steady state these estimates dwarf estimates of the static welfare cost of taxation and significantly exceed even extreme previous estimates of the dynamic loss this study departs from earlier analyses of the effects of taxes on capital income in several respects probably the most important difference between this treatment and most preceding ones lies in the assumptions about the interest elasticity of saving it is shown below that the common two period formulation of saving decisions yields quite misleading results a more realistic model of life cycle savings demonstrates that for a wide variety of plausible parameter values savings are very interest elastic this implies that shifting away from capital income taxation would significantly increase capital formation making possible long run increases in consumption many studies of the welfare effects of capital income taxation have ignored the general equilibrium effects of increased capital formation in an economy with life cycle savings there is no presumption that the undistorted growth path corresponds to any sort of social optimum as peter diamond has shown life cycle savings can lead to a steady state capital intensity either greater or less than the golden rule level more generally it is clear that there is no reason to believe that a life cycle economy will maximize any particular intertemporal social welfare function a fundamental tenet of welfare evaluation is that preexisting distortions must be considered in evaluating the consequences of tax changes the results presented in this paper take explicit account of the nonoptimal character of the no tax steady state this explains in large part why such a sizeable welfare effect of capital taxes is found in an economy far from the golden rule level of capital intensity there are substantial gains in steady state consumption achievable through increased capital formation section i of the paper examines the aggregate savings function in a continuous time life cycle framework the second section clarifies the differences between wage and consumption taxes an aggregate production function is added to complete the model in the third section the effects of changes in capital taxes on both steady state incidence and welfare are considered within a general equilibrium framework the final section of the paper discusses some implications of the results and suggests areas which appear to warrant further study assistant professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research analyst national bureau of economic research i am grateful to alan auerbach martin feldstein laurence kotlikoff to the participants in the nber workshop on business taxation and to the harvard public finance seminar for useful discussions james poterba and james buchal performed the numerical calculations

fiscal policies in the world economy this paper uses a two country general equilibrium model of the world economy in order to analyze the effects of budget deficits and government spending on world rates of interest consumption and international indebtedness it demonstrates the difference between the effects of fiscal expenditures and tax cuts as well as between the effects of current policies and expected future policies it is shown that the qualitative effects of fiscal policies depend on whether the country introducing the policies runs a surplus or a deficit in its current account following the positive analysis of the short run and the steady state effects the paper concludes with a normative analysis of the welfare implications of budget deficits

survival of the gene intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving abstract this paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children s human capital at low incomes it posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line the model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework moreover it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving in contrast with the existing literature the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one s own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children s income uncertainty

international effects of tax reforms in an open economy with international capital flows there is an equivalence relation between income tax consumption tax international borrowing tax and an external interest earning tax this paper analyzes tax reform involving shifts between income and consumption taxes in this setting it is shown that the real effects of such revenue neutral tax reform depend critically on the country s current account position and the nature of the reform in particular whether the world interest rate rises or falls as a consequence of a budget deficit depends on the tax system in force the analysis provides a clear rationale for the international coordination of tax policies copyright 1989 by royal economic society

educational policy and the economics of the family this paper analyzes the implications of alternative ways to model decision making by families for educational policy we show that many of the policy implications associated with credit constraints cannot be distinguished from the implications of models of the family that differ from the conventional barro becker model we then argue that it is the combination of credit constraints and non conventional preferences that provides a robust basis for government intervention to promote educational investment

the aging population and the size of the welfare state data for the united states and countries in western europe indicate a negative correlation between the dependency ratio and labor tax rates and the generosity of social transfers after other factors that influence the size of the welfare state are controlled for this occurs despite the increased political clout of the dependent population implied by the aging of the population this paper develops an overlapping generations model of intra and intergenerational transfers including old age social security and human capital formation that addresses this seeming puzzle we show that with democratic voting an increase in the dependency ratio can lead to lower taxes or less generous social transfers

factor income taxation in a horizontal innovation model we consider the optimal factor income taxation in a standard r d model with technical change represented by an increase in the variety of intermediate goods in the model there are externalities both to working and to saving due to market power by firms incomplete appropriability of the benefits of inventions and the cost of economic activity in terms of public expenditures redistributing the tax burden from labor to capital will increase employment but in most cases reduce the rate of growth with conflicting effects on the deadweight loss from the externalities under plausible calibrations of the model the optimal tax rate on capital will be sizable

markov perfect equilibria in intergenerational games with consistent preferences abstract this paper considers the subgame perfect equilibria in markov strategies of an abstract intergenerational game in which the generations preferences are consistent in the sense that they admit recursive aggregators given biconvergence i show that such equilibria exist and are equivalent both to the solutions of bellman s recursive optimality equations and to the optima of the first generation s utility function these results are then applied to a simple model casting new light on the neutrality of government debt and to another accommodating impure altruism finally two new examples crisply illustrate how the paper s equivalences fail when biconvergence fails

markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies with production uncertainty this paper concerns the existence of markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies previous work on deterministic models has established existence only under extremely restrictive conditions we show that the introduction of production uncertainly yields an existence theorem for aggregative infinite horizon models with very general forms of altruism journal of economic literature classification numbers

economic growth with intergenerational altruism in this paper we study the properties of equilibria in an aggregative growth model with intergenerational altruism in this model each generation is active for a single period at the beginning of this period it receives an endowment of a single homogeneous good which is the output from a bequest investment made by the previous generation it divides the endowment between consumption and investment the return from this investment constitutes the endowment of the next generation each generation derives utility from its own consumption and that of its immediate successor however since altruism is limited in the sense that no generation cares about later successors the interests of distinct agents come into conflict models of this type have been used to analyze a number of issues concerning intergenerational altruism one line of research pursued by arrow 1973 and dasgupta 1974a elucidates the implications of rawls principle of just savings others beginning with phelps and pollak 1968 have addressed the question of how an altruistic growth economy might actually evolve over time topics of subsequent investigation have included the efficiency and optimality of equilibrium programs and the implications of intergenerational altruism for the distribution of wealth unfortunately the positive features of equilibrium programs have received little attention from previous authors aside from a few comments by kohlberg 1976 virtually nothing is known about the asymptotic behaviour of capital stocks in these models in particular will the long run capital stock which arises from intergenerational conflict be higher or lower than the turnpike associated with the solution to the optimal planning problem on a priori grounds the answer is not clear agents who take only a limited interest in the future will tend to bequeath less than those who are far sighted however since each generation views its children s bequest as pure waste it must bequeath a larger sum to obtain the same consumption value in this paper we obtain steady state results for equilibrium capital stocks completely analogous to the well known optimal planning results by comparing steady states we

conversion to a consumption tax the transition in a life cycle growth model this paper examines the transitional losses that may follow conversion from an income tax to a consumption tax even when conversion eventually raises steady state lifetime welfare two recent studies have left the impression that the transitional losses would be large using a life cycle growth model this paper examines two reasons why these studies have probably overestimated the transitional losses the model computes the welfare gains and losses of each age cohort along the transition path it is shown that the greater the bequest motive and subjective discount rate generating the particular initial income tax steady state the smaller would be the transitional losses similarly a policy of age phasing would reduce the losses the results demonstrate the importance of examining the transition path whenever a policy change alters capital accumulation

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

a dynamic theory of factor taxation many important questions in macroeconomics concern the impact of taxation and spending policies on private resource allocation one approach typified by robert hall 1971 and william brock and stephen turnovsky 1981 is to use dynamic general equilibrium models to address basic issues in fiscal and tax policy the objective is to explicitly examine macroeconomic issues without embracing the market imperfections fixed prices missing markets money illusion etc found in conventional macroeconomic analysis there is currently great interest in dynamic fiscal policy problems this decade has already seen two major adjustments in tax policy and many attempts to substantially alter spending patterns the result of this tumult has been unprecedented peacetime deficits and much uncertainty about what measures will ultimately be used to bring the budget into balance in this paper i discuss the impact of alternative fiscal policies in a dynamic general equilibrium model i examine the shortrun effects of fiscal policy changes the efficiency cost of alternative dynamic tax policies the effects of uncertain policy formation and the redistributive effects of factor taxation

a strategic analysis of global warming theory and some numbers we model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases the theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise the first set of results establishes theoretically and then with illustrative numbers the over emissions due to a tragedy of the commons the power of simple sanctions to lower emissions and increase welfare is then examined as is the effect of cost asymmetry finally a complete theoretical charactrization is provided for the best equilibrium and it is shown that it has a very simple structure it involves a constant emission rate through time

rawlsian intergenerational justice as a markov perfect equilibrium in a resource technology the rawlsian maximin criterion is combined with nonpaternalistic altruistic preferences in a nonrenewable resource technology the maximin programme is shown to be time inconsistent for a subset of initial conditions a solution to this intergenerational conflict is found under a given assumption as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium

intertemporal complementarity and optimality a study of a two dimensional dynamical system the theory of optimal intertemporal allocation has been developed primarily for the case in which the objective function of the planner or representative agent can be written as u c1 c2 ldots equiv sum infty t 1 delta t 1 w c t where c t represents consumption at date t w the period felicity function and delta epsilon o 1 a discount factor representing the time preference of the agent

consistent climate policies what are the optimal climate policies when time preferences deviate from the standard exponential discounting and decision makers cannot commit to future policies we show that with time declining discounting the delay and persistence of climate impacts provide a commitment device to policy makers we quantify the commitment value in a climate economy model by solving time consistent markov equilibrium capital and emission taxes explicitly the returns on capital and climate investments are no longer equal leading to a large increase in the emission tax compared to a benchmark with equalized returns the commitment value increases the tax by a factor of 20 in our quantitative assessment

dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy abstract this paper is concerned with the issue does there exist a social security program which can be maintained period after period to address this issue the paper considers dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy the altruism is intergenerational nonpaternalistic and two sided it is assumed that generations coexisting in the same period agree on a social welfare function which evaluates the consumption of various generations and play a game against those living in different periods a perfect equilibrium of this game is shown to exist and its properties are examined journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d62 h55

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

intergenerational altruism with future bias abstract we show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience this underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations we explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time we argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay as you go pension system which every government views as a self enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old age transfers

can america stay on top the united states has long enjoyed a unique position of economic supremacy not only is it far and away the most populous of the advanced market economies for most of the past century it has also had substantially higher per capita income than any other major nation as a result the only puzzle about the pax americana that took shape in the 1940s is that it took so long in coming at the time the united states actually took on the mantle of world leadership it had about as much purchasing power as all other market economies combined by the early 1990s however almost everyone believed that the age of u s supremacy was nearing its end u s gdp per capita was no longer exceptional when measured at current exchange rates although when measured at purchasing power parity instead the united states still led its rivals in real output per head perhaps more significant other advanced countries had clearly overtaken u s productivity in some industries and surpassed the united states in some technologies the rapid growth of asian developing countries further suggested that the balance of world economic power might be shifting away from the original advanced nations probably nobody now alive will see china come anywhere close to u s income per capita but all it has to do is reach one fifth of the u s level to become the world s largest economy in absolute terms while prophets of declinism like kennedy 1989 and thurow 1992 did not entirely dominate the discourse nye 1992 for example argued that despite its gradual relative economic decline the united states retained the resources to remain the world s political leader for decades to come circa 1992 few people would have dared to suggest that a second american century might be in prospect at the millennium however such suggestions are indeed being made for

a note on fiscal policy investment location decisions and exchange rates abstract the paper argues that trade balances and exchange rates may be quite responsive to changes in the relative attractiveness of locating production facilities or storing other taxable forms of wealth in different countries this suggests that there are at least three important channels through which fiscal policy changes may be transmitted to exchange rates it is argued that a country oriented analysis of asset choice as distinct from the traditional currency oriented portfolio balance framework may be important for understanding the behavior of exchange rates

competitiveness in a globalised world michael porter on the microeconomic foundations of the competitiveness of nations regions and firms in this paper we provide the text of an interview with professor michael porter discussing his research and ideas relating to the microeconomic foundations of global competitiveness the discussion provides a microeconomic perspective on some of the key issues relating to recent research on competitiveness productivity clusters us economic leadership economic growth and development

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

trade capital mobility and tax competition this paper examines a system of governments national state or local that finance public expenditures with taxes on mobile capital e g a property tax unlike previous research on tax competition explicit consideration is given to the general equilibrium determination of the prices at which goods are traded between regions the analysis identifies inefficiencies in government behavior that are not apparent in models in which the terms of trade are exogenously given capital taxation is shown to create an inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions accompanied by an inefficient pattern of trade a model is presented in which the chosen levels of public good outputs differ across regions containing identical residents and production possibilities there is a wasteful diversity of public good supplies

capital income taxation in a world economy a territorial system versus a residence system this paper investigates the effects of a tax reform of conversion from capital income to consumption taxes on capital accumulation in a two country model in the territorial system the tax reform will normally lead to a negative comovement between capital accumulation in two countries while in the residence system it will lead to a positive comovement copyright 1991 by royal economic society

taxation of investment and savings in a world economy the equilibrium of capital and equilibrium market prices are derived for a world economy with a unified securities market mobile capital no uncertainty and varying tax rates on different sources of income in each country the paper then characterizes optimal tax rates for a small country in this setting focusing on the peculiar incentives created when the before tax rate of return differs among securities due to differences in their typical tax treatment copyright 1986 by american economic association

intergenerational transfers and demographic transition abstract this paper presents an analysis of demographic transition based on the endogenous evolution of intergenerational transfers along an economy s endogenous path of development two period lived agents belonging to overlapping generations choose optimally their desired levels of consumption and fertility together with their desired sizes of transfers to both parents and children parents are more efficient than children in producing output but some parental time must be devoted to child rearing at low levels of development fertility is high and the flow of net intergenerational transfers is from the young to the old at high levels of development fertility is low and the flow of net transfers is from the old to the young these results accord strongly with empirical observations and the analysis may be seen as formalising for the first time a long standing and well respected hypothesis in the demographic transition literature

tax reform and external balance abstract this paper examines the effect of a transformation from capital taxation to consumption in an open economy with the residential capital tax rate being endogenous an increase in the domestic consumption tax rate decreases the interest rate increases capital accumulation and increases the domestic country s net foreign asset holdings and trade surplus with the territorial capital tax rate being endogenous an increase in the domestic consumption tax rate may either increase or decrease the domestic country s interest rate net foreign asset holdings and trade surplus depending on the interest elasticity of capital demand

risk bearing and the theory of income distribution this paper develops the stochastic theory of distribution with a dynamic model which focuses on the role of incomplete insurance in generating inequality unlike previous work our approach takes explicit account of the reason for market incompleteness in modeling agents behaviour in particular the amount of risk borne is endogenous using a model of growth with altruism in which agents are risk averse and there is moral hazard we show that lineage wealth follows a markov process which converges globally to an ergodic distribution this also represents the long run population distribution of wealth we discuss the role of particular assumptions such as availability of production loans and unboundedness of utility in yielding the qualitative properties of the distribution of wealth the choice of occupation and the prevention of poverty traps