government deficits the real interest rate and ldc debt on global crowding out abstract the paper uses a three regions model of global saving investment balance to present a global crowding out interpretation of present economic trends the model builds on data which point to a possible shortage of savings explosive growth of social expenditures structural public sector deficit in north and south changes of the age pyramid real wage rigidity in many industrial countries

an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

power illusion in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis abstract one feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power game theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality we conduct an experimental test of the classical baron ferejohn model with five player groups holding real power constant we compare treatments with differences in nominal power we find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place finally and of particular importance as a methodological observation giving subjects a pause accelerates learning

greenhouse policy persuasion towards a positive theory of discounting the climate future abstract the climate policy issue is in a state where different visions or proposals compete with one another in the political arena the success of such a vision or proposal largely depends on the success of its proponents in persuading the public or a yet undecided ultimate authority of its merits this essay identifies a discounting related ambiguity in cost benefit analyses of climate change making two competing visions and proposals legitimate by placing the induced opportunity for greenhouse policy persuasion in a political economy context it is shown how visionaries and lobbyists can exploit human time preferences for the purpose of greenhouse policy persuasion

time preference the discounted utility model and health the constant rate discounted utility model is commonly used to represent intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations this paper examines the appropriateness of this model and argues that the model fails both normatively and descriptively as a representation of individual intertemporal preferences for health outcomes variable rate discounted utility models are more flexible but still require restrictive assumptions and may lead to dynamically inconsistent behaviour the paper concludes by considering two ways of incorporating individual intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations that allow for complementarity of health outcomes in different time periods

discounting in integrated assessments of climate change one of the key decisions that economists working on integrated studies of climate change face is the selection of the method of accounting for damages resulting from possible climate change across a long temporal scale and the method for the intertemporal comparison of the costs associated with possible greenhouse gas abatement strategies sensitivity tests show that the method applied and the resulting discount rate has a major impact on the optimal climate strategy the paper is intended to provide a short review of the various techniques that have been proposed and applied in various integrated models of climate change the underlying problem is as follows we can attempt to be consistent with the economic theory and empirical observations but in this case the derived discount rate will be on the order of 5 to 8 as a result even possibly significant damages from climate change turn out to be negligible when considered at their present value the artificially low discount rate based on ethical reasoning on the other hand makes our climate related decisions and resource allocations inconsistent with the majority of other public policy decisions

bargaining in bicameral legislatures when and why does malapportionment matter malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures it is widely argued confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions ample empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures the theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak it is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the closed rule infinite horizon model of baron and ferejohn 1989 we assess the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures two sets of results are derived first when bills originate in the house and the senate considers the bill under a closed rule the equilibrium expected payoffs of all house members are surprisingly equal second we show that small state biases can emerge when 1 there are supermajority rules in the malapportioned chamber 2 the senate initiates bills which produces maldistributed proposal probabilities and 3 the distributive goods are lumpy we thank seminar participants at new york university the university of pennsylvania and the 2002 annual meeting of the american political science association for helpful comments james snyder and michael ting gratefully acknowledge the financial support of national science foundation grant ses 0079035 stephen ansolabehere gratefully acknowledges the support of the carnegie corporation under the carnegie scholars program this paper was written while michael ting was at the university of north carolina at chapel hill and he thanks the department of political science there for their support

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

senate representation and coalition building in distributive politics p7 vhe senate s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics the great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal fttnds than others but all senators have equal voting weight as a result even though all senators votes are of equal value to the coalition builder they are not of equal prwice coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states building on formal models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested first coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently second the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small state senators than large state senators the hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997 98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs the findings support both hypotheses

intergenerational transfers and the social discount rate this paper investigates the relationship between intergenerational asset transfers and the choice of the discount rate for use in cost benefit analysis in a model of a competitive overlapping generations economy constrained by a socially managed exhaustible resource provided that there are no distortions in capital markets and that all agents hold perfect foresight cost benefit techniques will result in a pareto efficient resource allocation if the discount rate is set equal to the market rate of interest but since the path of the interest rate depends on the level of intergenerational transfers cost benefit techniques do not ensure a socially desirable distribution of welfare between generations a social optimum will result only if intergenerational transfers are properly chosen and enforced decentralized private altruism may result in intergenerational transfers that both present and future individuals would agree are too small if members of the present generation attach positive weight to the general welfare of future generations not simply their personal descendants in a world where intergenerational transfers are non optimal second best policy making may imply a constrained optimum that is inefficient together these findings suggest that cost benefit analysis is at best a partial criterion to policy formulation that should be used only in conjunction with ethical principles that define the proper distribution of welfare between present and future generations

new evidence on financial crowding out this paper has provided evidence that federal government borrowing has in fact as least for the period 1970 through 1982 exercised a significant impact upon short term interest rates in the private sector in particular it is shown here that the rate of change of the interest yield on three month t bills exercises a positive and very highly significant impact upon the rate of change of the prime rate of interest to the extent that private sector spending is sensitive to the interest rate a very strong argument on behalf of financial crowding out can be made

policy reform shadow prices and market prices how should public projects and policy reforms be assessed when market prices give misleading signals revenues and costs at market prices then give distorted measures of social gains and losses and our appraisal should use social opportunity costs or shadow prices we show how shadow prices may be integrated into an analysis of policy reform demonstrate the critical dependence of these prices on government policy and analyse their relations with market prices the model allows for a wide range of sources of impairment of price signals we also discuss key issues in the analysis of price reform and privatisation

cost benefit analysis and the european union cohesion fund on the social cost of capital and labour florio m 2006 cost benefit analysis and the european union cohesion fund on the social cost of capital and labour regional studies 40 211 224 cost benefit analysis is a formal regulatory requirement for the evaluation of cohesion fund projects it requires the calculation of shadow prices observed prices in less developed european union regions do not reflect the social opportunity cost of labour and capital because of market failures and policy constraints the paper discusses simple rules for the calculation of financial and economic discount rates and of shadow wages i e the opportunity costs of capital and labour in the context of the appraisal of infrastructure projects part financed under the cohesion fund it is argued that for the 2007 13 programming period the european commission should adopt a unique financial discount rate of 3 5 in real terms social discount rates of 5 5 for the convergence regions and 3 5 for competitiveness regions and a region specific shadow wage rate co

wilderness development decisions and the krutilla fisher model the case of scotland s flow country this paper reports some results from an empirical study of wilderness management in the flow country of northern scotland the flow country is an area of extensive blanket bog characterized by extensive populations of internationally rare breeding birds and by a very distinctive landscape the principle threat to the area at present comes from large scale afforestation this activity is subsidized by the state through the forestry commission and yet seems likely to create irreversible external cost flows the economic efficiency of continued planting in the area is tested for using the krutilla fisher model preservation benefits accruing to both users and non users are estimated using contingent valuation

dynamic inconsistency in valuing environmental goods abstract intertemporal tradeoffs continue to intrigue both academics and policy makers this paper explores patterns of dynamic inconsistency in valuing environmental goods we develop a model that predicts an individual will value extended access to an environmental good less than avoiding delayed access if time and money are complementary this value disparity results in a low marginal rate of time preference for avoiding delayed access and a high rate for acquiring extended access using the contingent valuation method we find behavior partially consistent with predictions marginal rates of time preference are highly situation and individual specific

beneficial collusion in corruption control the case of nonmonetary penalties abstract we analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent s corruption by supplementing a costless noncollusive outside detector such as the media with a collusive internal supervisor the principal s objective is to minimize the overall costs made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption if the penalties on the corrupt agent and a failing supervisor are nonmonetary in nature and yet the two parties can engage in monetary side transfers the principal may stand to benefit by allowing supervisor agent collusion this benefit may even prompt the principal to actively encourage collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict preference over an honest supervisor

empirical and public choice evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates and the implications for intergenerational discounting the derivation of the correct discount rate for intergenerational projects in cost benefit analysis is particularly contentious public choice has resulted in lower discretionary exponential discount rates for many intergenerational projects in britain and the usa this is shown to be strong indirect evidence that the true social discount rate may be a hyperbolic rather than an exponential function there is also empirical evidence for this hypothesis the hyperbolic nature of discounting is also a standard finding in the behavioural sciences for intergenerational time frames hyperbolic discount rates should be employed together with exponential discount rates in cost benefit sensitivity analyses

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

on monitoring and collusion in hierarchies abstract this paper studies a stylized three layer agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent s productive effort it is demonstrated that the possibility of collusion imposes no additional cost on the principal if the supervisor s report is hard information i e monitoring evidence can only be concealed and not forged this result holds irrespective of the nature of the penalty that can be imposed on the agent the findings suggest that it is strictly better for the principal to monitor the agent s action rather than to audit the agent s private information journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l23

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

domestic saving and international capital movements in the long run and the short run the evidence and analysis in this paper support the earlier findings of feldstein and horioka 1980 that sustained increases in domestic savings rates induce approximately equal increases in domestic rates of investment new estimates for the post opec period 1974 79 imply that each extra dollar of domestic saving increases domestic investment by approximately 85 cents in a sample of 17 oecd countries an explicit analysis of the problems of identification and simultaneous equations bias suggests that the regression estimates are more relevant as a guide to the long run response of international capital flows than to their short run behavior coefficient estimates based on annual variations in savings and investment are subject to potentially severe simultaneous equations bias that is not present when annual observations are averaged over a decade or more and the regression is estimated with a cross country sample of these averages a portfolio model of international capital allocation that is presented in the paper indicates that the short run change in the rate of net foreign investment in response to a sustained increase in domestic saving is likely to be substantially greater than the ultimate steady state response this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

reassessing the government s discount rate policy in light of new theory and data in a world economy with a high degree of capital mobility abstract the paper reexamines the government s discount rate policy in the context of new evidence on international capital mobility the relationship between deficits and interest rates the relationship between consumer interest rates and the consumer s rate of time preference and intergenerational compensation it concludes that the approximate discount rate for government decisions will differ depending on the policy problem and that the government s borrowing rate is appropriate in some cases and in others the private rate should be used for long term policies the benefit cost rationale for discounting breaks down and must be reestablished on principles incorporating intergenerational equity

discount rates and shadow prices for public investment abstract this paper extends the harberger sandmo dreze model for public discount rates to a many good economy it derives a formula for discount rates which are specific to each public enterprise or agency and used by them to discount future outputs and inputs evaluated at market prices such an approach is shown to be more efficient than that of simply using a single rate for all public projects it is also more practical than asking each public firm to use second best shadow prices in their analyses of investment projects the general results are first provided then simple cases are considered and numerical examples presented to help interpret our formula and analyse its main determinants

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

money debt and deficits in a dynamic game this paper analyzes a dynamic linear quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities the equilibrium outcome of the game determines the time path of money creation fiscal deficits and public debt the game is solved for different equilibrium concepts the equilibria are then compared and interpreted with reference to alternative institutional arrangements the main results are i coordination increases the speed of adjustment towards the steady state and takes the steady state value of public debt closer to the desired target ii precommitments take the non cooperative equilibrium closer to the coordinated outcome iii increasing the weight that each policymaker assigns to his own private objectives slows down the adjustment process places more burden on the opponent but has ambiguous effects on the steady state value of public debt

cross disciplinary evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates researchers in different disciplines have independently found evidence to suggest that the social discount rate may be hyperbolic rather than exponential in nature both behaviorist research and some empirical economics studies support the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis u s and u k government discounting dispensations for some long run public development projects are explicable in terms of an underlying hyperbolic social discount rate a statistical aggregation argument demonstrates that even if the behaviorist economics and public choice evidence for hyperbolic discounting is not conclusive the social discount rate of a set of people who individually express time preferences best modeled by exponential discounting functions is nonetheless hyperbolic further empirical economics studies of discounting preferences are required comparisons of different national discounting practices would also be useful to see how widespread is the use of unusually low exponential rates of discount for long run projects the application of hyperbolic discounting would have most impact in long run benefit cost analyses however government agencies would require overwhelming evidence before switching from exponential to hyperbolic discounting

a flow of funds analysis of crowding out some international evidence in a pioneering article in this journal zahn 22 investigated the separate and combined influences of increase in government spending and government borrowing on the time path of income the investigation was undertaken within the framework of a small quarterly model of the u s economy consisting of both commodity and financial flow of funds sectors by explicitly using government borrowing zahn tested the crowding out hypothesis as one involving both government spending and borrowing effects on the flow of funds between commodity and financial markets the combination of both the expansionary influences of government spending and contractionary influences of government borrowing on the time path of income determine the extent of real crowding out zahn distinguishes between pure and partial multipliers the influence of an increase in government spending financed strictly by an increase in government borrowing is measured by the pure multipliers they are based on the assumption that increases in endogenous net taxes as a result of an expansionary fiscal policy are held in a treasury account and offset in the government budget constraint by equal decreases in the monetary base on the other hand the influence of an increase in government spending financed in part by endogenous net taxes and the remainder by government borrowing is measured by the partial multipliers the major results in zahn 22 may be summarized as follows the pure multipliers show that the greatest influence of an increase in government spending financed strictly by borrowing is registered during the first two quarters but afterwards crowding out occurs the partial multipliers show similar results but crowding out is substantially less because borrowing requirements are reduced lastly the cumulative multipliers indicate that a sustained increase in government spending financed either by borrowing or by both endogenous net taxes and borrowing increases income during the sample period but at a decreasing rate and after many years the influence falls to zero in other words crowding out occurs as a result of the negative sign of the government borrowing multipliers but it is not large enough to outweigh the expansionary influence of government spending except in the very long run when the steady state government spending multiplier approaches zero zahn s conclusions are in principle compatible with those found in most previous and

on what basis should health be discounted the discount rate to be applied in health care programmes should be based on the time preference rate for health and this same rate should be applied to costs as well due to the limited tradeability of health when eliciting its time preference rate the intertemporal choices must be framed in such a way as to resemble as closely as possible those facing health planners and decision makers

the social cost of labor and project evaluation a general approach abstract this paper presents a general framework for analyzing shadow wages in ldcs we focus on i the differences between the domestic and international prices ii the equilibrating mechanisms in the economy iii the endogeneity of earnings in industry and agriculture iv the consequences of industrial employment creation on agriculture and v the nature of migration and unemployment we identify those reduced form relationships which are central in determining the shadow wage and use them to obtain general formulae for the shadow wage these formulae can be specialized to alternative technological behavioral and institutional settings this yields many new results concerning the relationship between the shadow wage and the market wage also earlier results on shadow wages are derived as special cases of our formulae

empirical measures of factors affecting social rates of discount economists have long considered possible divergences between private and social rates of time preferences in this paper we investigate factors hypothesized to affect this potential divergence results indicate that time preferences of individuals may be influenced by 1 whether the resource in question is publicly or privately managed respondents tend to have lower rates of time prefernce for publicly managed resources and 2 the type of good being managed respondents tend to have lower rates of time preference for income derived from a forest than for income derived from a portfolio of stocks and bonds additional factors which may influence the revealed rate of time preference include the pattern of benefits derived over time and various personal characteristics of the respondent although numerous methodological problems cloud the issues our results suggest that capital markets may fail to aggregate utility over individuals and between goods and that it may therefore be appropriate for governments to consider using lower rates of discount than the private sector and to vary the rate used according to the type of good being evaluated

contracts under wage compression a case of beneficial collusion this paper considers a principal agent model with adverse selection and limited wage discrimination under wage compression an agent may have an incentive to free ride on other agents by manipulating his private information when collusion among the agents is not possible the principal distorts the output schedule to reduce information rent associated with the free riding opportunity under collusion however the principal can reduce the information rent by inducing side contracts among the agents thus partly removing the distortion in the output schedule we show that side contracts among the agents take place in equilibrium and that the prospect of collusion is beneficial

testing in models of asymmetric information this paper explores the role of testing in models of asymmetric information we demonstrate conditions under which testing for underlying characteristics can overcome adverse selection problems and lead to a full information competitive equilibrium this paper provides a more general statement of mirrlees result on the optimal use of infinite fines where testing cannot fully resolve the problems associated with asymmetric information we outline the source of the difficulties our results developed in the context of a labour market can be directly extended to other environments in problems with asymmetric information testing to discover an agent s chosen action or underlying characteristics may significantly reduce the cost of moral hazard and adverse selection

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

new evidence on deficits and interest rates it is generally assumed on theoretical grounds that increases in government borrowing cause interest rates to rise 1 but empirical support for this proposition has been weak at best several recent papers have uncovered no strong relationship between deficits and short terrn interest rates however the research reported here indicates that although the relationship between deficits and short terrn interest rates may be tenuous there is strong evidence that larger deficits are associated with higher long terrn interest rates much of the debate about whether there is a strong relationship between federal borrowing and interest rates concerns the crowding out question this controversy centers on the direct and indirect eilffects of government fiscal actions on private spending these effects have been well documented in the theoretical literature e g buiter 1977 carlson and spencer 1975 blinder and solow 1973 many of the crowding out effects studied in this literature depend on the connection between government borrowing and high interest rates friedman 1978 meyer 1975 silber 1970 this is called short run indirect crowding out and may occur when increases in government spending and borrowing cause interest rates to rise which then may cause private spending to be reduced buiter 1977 pp 310 13

intergenerational equity discounting and the role of cost benefit analysis in evaluating global climate policy when public policies with impacts far into the future are being debated the question inevitably is raised whether cost benefit analysis which discounts future costs and benefits is not biased against future generations and whether if such discounting is appropriate at all a lower rate should be used to avoid such bias the debate on global climate change is no exception this paper sketches and analyses the welfare foundations of cost benefit analysis and from this perspective analyses the role of cost benefit analysis in the climate policy debate particularly with reference to intergenerational effects the paper concludes that the cost benefit criterion cannot provide a definitive basis for deciding whether we should commit to a longer term programme to moderate climate change the issues of intergenerational equity are not that global climate change will significantly lower the gnp of future generations but relate to the possibility of science fiction like changes in the planet that will produce catastrophic effects in the future and the typical way in which the cost benefit problem is posed obscures the basic choices that we should be evaluating

malapportionment and multilateral bargaining an experiment abstract members of collective decision making bodies often represent communities that differ in population sizes malapportionment results when decision making power is not allocated evenly across the population two well known institutions with malapportionment have emerged bicameralism and weighted voting this paper studies experimentally how agenda setting power affects the distribution of resources comparing across those two institutions conventional wisdom suggests that malapportionment favors scarcely populated states i find that this is the case under weighted voting but not necessarily in a bicameral system in the later case the allocation of agenda setting power can be used to eliminate distortions stemming from malapportionment

land use regulation in the lake george basin an ecological economic perspective abstract this paper examines land use policy in lake george new york in spite of a multitude of federal state and local regulations the environmental quality of lake george has deteriorated significantly in recent years we attribute this to a planning approach based implicitly on conventional economics this approach is characterized by marginal analysis exclusive reliance on discounted market values and an emphasis on economic growth we argue that an ecological economic approach explicitly recognizing the inherent conflict between economic activity and environmental protection is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the lake george environment we recommend a proactive planning approach clearly delineating the level of environmental integrity to be achieved and allowing this to be the governing factor in determining the permissible level of economic activity

on fiscal deficits the real exchange rate and the world rate of interest we use a full general equilibrium two country two period model with perfect capital markets and intertemporal optimization and perfect foresight underlying private consumer behaviour in both countries to analyse effects of pure fiscal policy we demonstrate that higher government budget deficits in one country caused by a cut in commodity taxes today balanced by an equal present value increase tomorrow will not be offset one for one by higher private savings because of pure substitution effects triggered by the change in the intertemporal terms of trade the tax change causes the country with the increased government deficit will therefore run a larger current account deficit which in turn unambiguously leads to higher world real interest rates whether a real appreciation results in the country with the higher deficit is shown to depend on the metzler condition for an undereffected transfer if we spend more on our goods than they spend on our goods on the margin government deficits will lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate of the country with the government deficit and vice versa

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

choosing a government discount rate an alternative approach abstract this paper examines the choice of a government discount rate under the reasonable assumption that the level of government spending is determined in a top down fashion by macroeconomic and political considerations rather than in a bottom up fashion it is shown that setting the discount rate at the maximal internal rate of return available from unfunded government projects leads to an efficient portfolio choice under current and foreseeable conditions this implies a discount rate in the 10 or more real range rather than the 2 4 real discount rate recommended by second best theorists

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price