improving supply chain performance and managing risk under weather related demand uncertainty we consider a manufacturer retailer supply chain for a seasonal product whose demand is weather sensitive the retailer orders from the manufacturer supplier prior to the selling season and then sells to the market we examine how a manufacturer can structure a weather linked rebate to improve his expected profit the proposed class of rebate contracts offers several advantages over many other contract structures including no required verification of leftover inventory and or markdown amounts and no adverse effect on sales effort by the retailer we provide a thorough analysis of the manufacturer s and retailer s decisions in this context we show that the weather linked rebate can take many different forms and this flexibility allows the supplier to design contracts that are pareto improving and or limit his risk in offering the contract and the retailer s risk in accepting it for weather rebates with certain characteristics the manufacturer can fully hedge his risks of offering a weather rebate by paying a risk premium we show how this can be accomplished we also show that the basic structural results extend to settings in which the two parties would like to limit their risk

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

the impact of sharing customer returns information in a supply chain with and without a buyback policy in this paper we examine a single period problem in a supply chain in which a stackelberg manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer who faces customer returns and demand uncertainty we show that the manufacturer incurs a significant profit loss with and without a buyback policy if it fails to account for customer returns in the wholesale price decision under the assumption that the retailer is better informed than the manufacturer on customer returns information we show that without a buyback policy the retailer prefers not to share if the manufacturer overestimates while it prefers to share customer returns information if the manufacturer underestimates this information if the manufacturer offers a buyback policy we have the opposite results we also discuss incentives to share the customer returns information and some of the issues that are raised in sharing this information

environmental drag evidence from norway abstract economic growth affects the environment negatively a polluted environment and other environmental constraints reduce economic output and the well being of consumers the cost to society of environmental constraints may be called the environmental drag the traditional economic analysis of growth neglects the environmental drag while this paper attempts to measure it empirically we employ a dynamic general equilibrium model of the norwegian economy extended to include some important environmental linkages which feed back to the productivity of labor and capital from damages to health materials and nature the environment also directly affects the consumers well being using this model we are able to estimate the environmental drag measured as reduced welfare from consumption and environmental services we present macroeconomic effects in terms of reduced production and consumption and calculate the overall welfare effects we find that the environmental constraints incorporated in the model probably have a modest effect on production over the next century the direct welfare loss from a degraded environmental quality however is significant a lower rate of technological growth and a lower discount rate both increase the drag

the impact of customer returns on pricing and order decisions abstract in this paper we address the simultaneous determination of price and inventory replenishment when customers return product to the firm we examine cases when the quantity of returned product is a function of both the quantity sold and the price in single and multi period problems with and without uncertainty in demand we derive results for optimal prices and order quantities and discuss how the firm should change price and inventory quantities in order to mitigate the negative effects of returns from customers

channel coordination under price protection midlife returns and end of life returns in dynamic markets this paper examines three channel policies that are used in declining price environments price protection p is a mechanism under which the manufacturer pays the retailer a credit applying to the retailer s unsold inventory when thewholesale price drops during the life cycle midlife returns m allow the retailer to return units partway through the life cycle at some rebate and end of life returns e allow the retailer to return unsold units at the end of the life cycle under decliningretail prices if the wholesale prices and the return rebates are set properly then em i e midlife and end of life returns achieves channel coordination however such a policy may not be implementable because it may require the manufacturer to be worse off as a result of coordination if p is used in addition to em and the terms are set properly then pem guarantees both coordination and a win win outcome if theretail price is constant over time then em is sufficient to guarantee both coordination and a win win outcome

the incentives for supply chain collaboration to improve material efficiency in the use of steel an analysis using input output techniques abstract in the face of increasing demand and limited emission reduction opportunities the steel industry will have to look beyond its process emissions to bear its share of emission reduction targets one option is to improve material efficiency reducing the amount of metal required to meet services in this context the purpose of this paper is to explore why opportunities to improve material efficiency through upstream measures such as yield improvement and lightweighting might remain underexploited by industry established input output techniques are applied to the gtap 7 multi regional input output model to quantify the incentives for companies in key steel using sectors such as property developers and automotive companies to seek opportunities to improve material efficiency in their upstream supply chains under different short run carbon price scenarios because of the underlying assumptions the incentives are interpreted as overestimates the principal result of the paper is that these generous estimates of the incentives for material efficiency caused by a carbon price are offset by the disincentives to material efficiency caused by labour taxes reliance on a carbon price alone to deliver material efficiency would therefore be misguided and additional policy interventions to support material efficiency should be considered

optimal procurement contracts with pre project planning the paper studies procurement contracts with pre project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard to model the procurer s problem we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard the optimal contract displays system atic distortions in information acquisition due to a rent effect adverse selection induces too much infor mation acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to prevent false project cancellations moral hazard mitigates the distortions related to cost overruns yet exacerbates those related to false negatives the optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that achieves the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

analysis of the impact of price sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating supply chain this paper analyzes the impact of price sensitivity factors on characteristics of returns policy contracts in a single period product supply chain the contract considers stochastic and price dependent demand we present an analytical model and then use numerical methods with the stackelberg game to identify the contract properties we numerically show that a returns policy indeed improves supply chain performance however the benefits earned from the returns policy under price sensitive and variable demand are different for different supply chain partners first when price sensitivity is high profit of the manufacturer decreases with increase in demand variability second when price sensitivity is sufficiently high and demand variability increases the manufacturer has to surrender part of the profits to the retailer in order to continue sales however even after surrendering part of the profits to the retailer the manufacturer still earns profits that are higher than those available in a wholesale price contract last from the perspective of division of channel profits the retailer is always worse off in case of returns policies than in a wholesale price contract therefore to apply this form of incentive in practice managements should consider the impact of price sensitivity on the returns policy and its performance

predatory pricing and the acquisition cost of competitors this paper investigates whether predatory price cutting reduces a trust s cost of acquiring its competitors a variant of the litzenberger rao valuation model is estimated with the expenditures for 43 rival firms purchased by the old american tobacco company between 1891 and 1906 the coefficient estimates indicate that ceteris paribus alleged predation significantly lowered the acquisition costs of the tobacco trust both for asserted victims and through reputation effects for competitors that sold out peacefully although qualified by data limitations these results support the classical view of predatory pricing as a systematic business practice

why is production more volatile than sales theory and evidence on the stockout avoidance motive for inventory holding this paper argues that the macroeconomically interesting features of inventory behavior are well captured by a model in which firms face only demand uncertainty with a nonnegativity constraint on inventories empirical implications of the stockout avoidance model of inventory behavior are derived and then tested on disaggregated automobile industry data the results largely support the model though they suggest a small role for production smoothing as well subsidiary evidence on the relative variance of demand and cost shocks suggests that demand shocks are indeed more important

effects of carbon taxes in an economy with prior tax distortions an intertemporal general equilibrium analysis abstract this paper analyzes the costs of carbon taxes in a model that recognizes interactions between this tax and pre existing taxes first we examine the extent to which costs of a u s carbon tax are reduced when its revenues finance cuts in income taxes such use of revenues significantly reduces but does not eliminate the overall policy costs the positive overall costs reflect the carbon tax s focus on intermediate inputs and its relatively narrow base in comparison with income taxes we also examine the sensitivity of the carbon tax s costs to the level of pre existing taxes for any given use of revenues welfare costs rise significantly with pre existing tax rates indicating that models disregarding pre existing taxes may substantially understate the costs of new environmental tax initiatives

aggregate spending and the terms of trade is there a laursen metzler effect this paper investigates the spending and current account effects of terms of trade shifts in a model where households maximize utility over an infinite planning period in the framework developed here an economy specialized in production must experience a fall in aggregate spending and a current surplus as a result of an unanticipated permanent worsening in its terms of trade the paper s model thus provides a setting in which the current account deficit predicted by laursen and metzier harberger and others fails to materialize

cost raising strategies advantage rivals by raising their costs in this paper we show that strategies designed to raise rivals costs have a number of advantages over predatory pricing they are credible do not necessarily require the victim to exit and do not necessarily require the existence of classical market power the paper sets up a general model proves a number of general results and then applies the model to specific strategies involving overbuying inputs and vertical integration

the right to return this article studies the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract the two extreme cases are the consignment contract which allocates all the burden to the manufacturer and the no return contract in which retailers purchase the merchandise outright and assume responsibility for unsold inventory contract choices are shown to vary across countries industries products and types of transactions the article identifies six main factors affecting this choice optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment relative advantage in disposing of the unsold inventory optimal risk allocation incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand information asymmetry and costs associated with the consignment contract per se several testable implications are presented and the choice of contracts in the publishing industry is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model

supply chain performance anomalies fairness concerns under private cost information abstract this work investigates how fairness concerns influence supply chain decision making while examining the effect of private production cost information and touching on issues related to bounded rationality we conduct laboratory work utilizing a supply chain dyad with an upstream supplier feeding a downstream retailer under a simple wholesale price contract we perform human computer h c experiments where human subjects play the role of the supplier paired with the computerized retailer as well as human human h h experiments where human subjects play the role of both supplier and retailer these experiments allow us to isolate other effects like bounded rationality from the effects of fairness concerns on supply chain decision making we find that compared to standard analytical model the bounded rationality slightly reduces overall supply chain profit without changing its distribution between the supplier and the retailer while fairness concerns lead to greater supply chain profits and a more balanced supply chain profit distribution we further illustrate that under private cost information the retailer s fairness concern is suppressed by the lack of reciprocity from not being able to observe her rival s profit information but that the supplier s fairness concern from altruism persists based on our experimental results we modify classical supply chain models to include utility functions that incorporate both bounded rationality and fairness concerns the estimated other regarding coefficients are significantly lower under private information than under public information for the h h experiments and we find no evidence of inequity aversion for the h c experiments

demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution this paper examines two ways channel members at the manufacturing and retail ends deal with asymmetric information in the context of new product introduction a manufacturer who has private information that demand for a new product will be high can differentiate itself from a manufacturer less confident of demand by undertaking high levels of pre launch advertising and offering a high wholesale price a retailer for its part can screen potentially high demand from potentially low demand products by stipulating a take it or leave it slotting allowance the assumption being that the offer will be accepted only by manufacturers confident of sufficient demand to recover the high initial cost of slotting allowances it is shown that manufacturers prefer to signal demand through advance advertising and wholesale price retailers to screen demand through slotting allowances it is shown that unless advance advertising is sufficiently effective slotting allowances yield higher total channel profits and higher social welfare

returns policy new model introduction and consumer welfare abstract this paper investigates how economic outcomes differ for new model introduction between two extreme contracts outright sales contract and returns policy contract with full credit under the outright sales contract we show that the retailer s incentive to introduce a new model can lead to a reduction of consumer welfare when the retailer is moderately risk averse the primary conclusion from this study is that the returns policy contract resolves this conflict between firms and consumers and that the supply chain introduces the new model only when consumer surplus from the new model is higher than that from the old model

why northern income growth is not the solution to southern poverty abstract decreasing southern poverty is arguably today s main goal of economic development the two main views on how this can be achieved are not compatible the traditional view held by most economists and development agencies is not working well the traditional view is that rich northern high consumption societies should consume yet more in order to help the south by providing larger markets this paper outlines the alternative view that the north should stabilize its resource consumption and reduce its damage to global life support systems any higher consumption must come from productivity improvements rather than from increased throughput growth if natural resources were infinite then growth would be unreservedly good since resources are finite more northern growth inevitably means less room for southern growth for example the north has consumed much global sink capacity by its co 2 and cfc emissions productivity improvements must replace throughput growth as the path of progress for the north and eventually for the south as well

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

optimal returns policy for supply chain with e marketplace abstract we study in this paper a supply chain which is integrated by a returns policy in the past owing to a lack of sales channels the returned products would worth very little now with the advance of the e commerce the returned products can be sold with a higher price on the e marketplace in light of this we first investigate the optimal returns policy under the existence of the e marketplace through a mean variance analysis we further study the risk issue associated with the optimal policy extensive simulations are then carried out and the managerial insights are discussed

antitrust predation and the antitrust paradox abstractthe widely recognized influence that the chicago school of law and economics had on the institution of antitrust is nowhere more apparent than in predatory pricing law starting with aaron director this movement had many distinguished contributors but even in this company robert bork stands out for his part in persuading the judiciary to refocus antitrust law on the interests of consumers rather than on the interests of competing firms in the antitrust paradox and other writings bork advanced the chicago school insight that the kind of aggressive price cutting that at the time passed for predatory pricing is instead an essential and for consumers beneficial attribute of competition the resulting change in direction that antitrust has taken in predatory pricing cases culminated in the court s matsushita matsushita electric industrial co v zenith ratio corp 475 u s 574 1986 and brooke group brooke group ltd v brown williamson tobacco corp 509 u s 209 1993 opinions both

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

optimal reverse channel structure for consumer product returns consumers often return a product to a retailer because they learn after purchase that the product does not match as well with preferences as had been expected this is a costly issue for retailers and manufacturers in fact it is estimated that the u s electronics industry alone spent 13 8 billion dollars in 2007 to restock returned products lawton c 2008 the war on returns wall street journal may 8 d1 the bulk of these returns were nondefective items that simply were not what the consumer wanted to eliminate returns and to recoup the cost of handling returns many retailers are adopting the practice of charging restocking fees to consumers as a penalty for making returns this paper employs an analytical model of a bilateral monopoly to examine the impact of reverse channel structure on the equilibrium return policy and profit more specifically we examine how the return penalty is affected by whether returns are salvaged by the manufacturer or by the retailer interestingly we find that the return penalty may be more severe when returns are salvaged by a channel member who derives greater value from a returned unit also the manufacturer may earn greater profit by accepting returns even if the retailer has a more efficient outlet for salvaging units

coordinating supply chains with competition capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing abstract this paper motivated by the experiences of a major us based semiconductor manufacturer presents an integrated model of incentive problems arising in forecasting and capacity allocation our model involves multiple product managers and multiple manufacturing managers who forecast the means of their respective demand and capacity distributions a central coordinator is responsible for allocating capacities to product lines when these distributions are unknown to the central coordinator and capacity is scarce the managers misrepresent their forecasts a product manager inflates his forecast to gain a greater allocation of the capacity a manufacturing manager deflates his forecast to cover for the uncertainties in production we propose a game theoretic model and design a mechanism a bonus scheme for all managers and an allocation rule to allocate realized capacity to the product managers that elicits truthful reporting by all managers the results herein show that the structure of the truth eliciting bonus schemes is rather simple with easily calculable parameters we also show that large classes of allocation rules including the current allocation practice of the firm are manipulable a bonus is often required for elicitation of truthful information we synthesize the implications of our results for the practitioners

green throughput taxation environmental and economic consequences according to optimal taxation theory raw materials should be taxed to capture the embedded scarcity rent in their value to reduce both natural resource use and the corresponding emissions or the throughput in the economic system the best policy may be a tax on material inputs as a first approach to throughput taxation this paper considers a tax on intermediates in the framework of a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with environmental feedbacks to balance the budget payroll taxes are reduced as a result welfare indicators as material consumption and leisure time consumption are reduced while on the other hand all the environmental indicators improve

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

comparative normative optimal behavior in two echelon multiple retailer distribution systems for a single period product abstract several recent papers extended the classical single echelon newsboy model for style goods to two echelons that is one studies the interactive decisions between the manufacturer and the retailer now recognized as two separate entities however these papers assumed that there is only one retailer this paper studies optimal decisions and outcomes pertaining to a system with one manufactory and multiple retail outlets compared are the optima from different market ownership configurations ranging from a fully integrated system a single owner owns the manufactory and all retail outlets to a situation in which all entities are separately owned and the manufacturer charges different retailers different prices differential pricing some of our findings appear counter intuitive e g we show that from the societal point of view enforcing uniform pricing is no more desirable that permitting differential pricing

robert bork s contributions to antitrust perspectives on tying behavior abstractrobert bork was one of the key proponents of the traditional chicago school view of tying and antitrust which is that tying can never be used to extend or leverage market power from one market to another so it should also never be an antitrust violation in this paper we review the traditional chicago school perspective and in particular bork s arguments on the topic and then discuss how these arguments relate to the more recent theoretical literature on the subject which takes a game theoretic approach we then discuss bork s later views on tying concerning the microsoft case we include a discussion of whether these later views of tying and antitrust were different from his earlier views or instead whether it was the nature of the cases that had changed

on sequential commitment in the price dependent newsvendor model abstract we investigate the effect of sequential commitment in the decentralized newsvendor model with price dependent demand sequential commitment allows the self profit maximizing parties to commit to contract parameters e g wholesale price retail price buyback price and order quantity sequentially and alternately and we investigate its effect on the equilibrium profits of the channel and its members sequential commitment introduces more flexibility to contracting in the supply chain and our analysis can provide some insight to channel members who follow a bargaining process to determine the values of contract parameters we show that the introduction of sequential commitment to the price dependent pd newsvendor model with buybacks can significantly improve the manufacturer s and the channel expected profits but it can also decrease the retailer s expected profit finally we demonstrate that with sequential commitment under some conditions the choice of the first mover is endogenized and we identify the unique sequence of commitments by channel members that would arise in equilibrium

green policies and public finance in a small open economy we explore the effects of greener preferences for the public finances employment and the domestic capital stock in a second best framework we find that greener preferences typically result in capital flight also employment declines despite the factor substitution that is induced by a lower tax on labour and a higher tax on natural resources if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is positive private utility declines public consumption in contrast may rise if most of the improvement in environmental quality occurs through a lower level rather than a cleaner composition of economic activity however if the labour supply curve bends backwards private utility rises while public consumption falls i introduction the deterioration of the natural environment constitutes one of the major challenges facing public policy today business groups are concerned that environmental protection induces both capital flight and major losses in private income environmental groups in contrast maintain that a more ambitious environmental policy may not impose large costs in particular environmental taxation may be attractive especially for the high tax countries of western and northern europe in these countries the

predation and its rate of return the sugar industry 1887 1914 we show that the price wars following two major entry episodes were predatory our proof is twofold by direct comparison of price to marginal cost and by construction of a lower bound to predicted competitive price cost margins that we show to exceed observed margins predation occurred only when its relative cost to the dominant firm the american sugar refining company asrc was small its most clear effect was to lower the acquisition price of entrants and small incumbents it may also have deterred future capacity additions and raised asrc s share of industry profits predation operated by strengthening asrc s reputation as a willing predator

supplier manufacturer coordination in capacitated two stage supply chains abstract manufacture to order is an increasingly popular strategy in commodity electronics and other similar markets where many different product configurations can be produced from common components to succeed in this environment manufacturers need to keep both cost and order fulfillment time low in this article we compare three different mechanisms that a manufacturer whose revenues depend on order delays may use to affect its component supplier s inventory decisions these mechanisms are specifying components inventory level offering a share of the earned revenues to the supplier called simple revenue sharing and offering a two part revenue sharing scheme we show that whereas the first two approaches do not lead to supply chain coordination the two part scheme does we demonstrate with numerical experiments that up to a point the component supplier benefits from having a high utilization of its production facility whereas the manufacturer benefits from having excess production capacity

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

the implications of pooled returns policies abstract when selling products with highly uncertain demands and short life cycles it is common for a manufacturer to offer some form of returns policy to entice the distributors to increase their order quantities in this paper we consider a multi item returns policy called pooled or joint returns policy under which the distributor can return any combination of the products up to r percent of the total purchases across all products we analyze the distributor s optimal profit and order quantity under the pooled returns policy and compare these operating characteristics to the case when a single item non pooled returns policy is instituted under the non pooled returns policy the distributor can only return on individual items using item specific return limits we show an intuitive result that the distributor will always achieve a higher profit under the pooled policy however the manufacturer could actually obtain a lower profit under the pooled policy due to a counter intuitive result the distributor may order less under the pooled policy even though the pooled policy offers more flexibility this counter intuitive result motivates us to determine the conditions under which the distributor would order less under the pooled policy finally we develop a heuristic for determining the distributor s optimal order quantities associated with the n product case under the pooled policy

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

the impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry abstract in contrast to the existing return policies literature assuming that information is symmetrical between the manufacturer and the retailer we study the full returns policy s impact on supply chains with information asymmetry we first study the case that the base level of the demand follows a discrete distribution with two states we find that the retailer benefits from the full returns policy in all circumstances while the manufacturer and the supply chain are better off under some conditions we then consider the situation in which the base level of the demand is a type of ar 1 process

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

analysis of supply chains with quantity based fixed incentives abstract this paper examines the use of quantity based fixed incentives to coordinate inventory decisions in a decentralized supply chain we consider a two stage supply chain of autonomous supplier and distributor and prove that the optimal ordering policy for the newsvendor distributor under fixed incentives is an s s type policy we further show that external and internal quantity based incentives can restore channel coordination in single period and channel members can benefit through arbitrary splitting of the resulting additional chain profit the single period results are extended to multiple periods and the impact of fixed incentives on the distributor s optimal stocking policy and channel efficiency are examined under three different multi period supplier strategies numerical examples are used to compare the multi period strategies and to provide additional managerial insights the results show that contrary to common belief incentive plans developed and maintained based only on current inventory data perform poorly in long term and that such incentive plans must be periodically updated to enhance their efficiency furthermore we show that high level of incentives designed to push too much inventory downstream of the supply chain can actually reduce the chain s efficiency

a serial supply chain of newsvendor problem with safety stocks under complete and partial information sharing abstract we consider a supply chain where multiple members are serially connected the decision is to determine the ordering quantity of a member to the next upstream member in the supply chain the basic cost model is similar to the newsvendor problem with additional consideration to safety stock this paper presents optimal approaches for coordination of the supply chain under both complete and partial information sharing in order to maximize the total expected benefit for complete information sharing we develop an optimal coordination algorithm for partial information sharing we propose an optimal coordination algorithm based on the alternating direction method and the diagonal quadratic approximation method a numerical example is discussed to show the optimal convergence of ordering quantities and discuss the properties of the proposed algorithms