efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

on the relevance of export demand conditions for capital income taxation in open economies this paper highlights the role of export demand conditions in determining the real cost of external funding for a country that has unrestricted access to funding from the international capital market at a predetermined real interest rate if such a country enters into a free trade arrangement which includes national treatment provisions for foreign investment then the capital income tax becomes an appropriate second best instrument for ensuring that national welfare is maximized if the capital income tax is set optimally the national return on savings will always be at least as great as the domestic marginal product of capital

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

on china s domestic capital mobility and the role of the government empirical evidence over 1970 2006 this article investigates capital mobility across 29 provinces in china for the period of 1970 2006 using the feldstein horioka fh approach and campbell and mankiw s consumption smoothing cs framework it also examines the role of the governments in driving provincial capital mobility if the provincial government investment is not properly separated out from the private investment the fh framework applied to the overall saving and investment private plus public is found to underestimate the private saving investment correlation and hence overstates the degree of private capital mobility compared with the cs framework that focuses on the private consumption and output both frameworks indicate strong correlation between private saving investment and private consumption output implying strong barriers in the provincial private capital flows however there is ample evidence that capital mobility has been rising over time particularly after the mid 1990s it also appears that the government facilitates capital flows through inter governmental transfers during the sample period the extent of provincial capital mobility sheds light on the ability of different provinces in diversifying idiosyncratic provincial risks the earlier findings are robust to alternative measurements of variables and model specifications

intelligent agents for negotiations in market games i model in competitive markets human decision makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of note that such coalitions are legal provided market power is not monopolized we present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt our negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory however it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential coalition partners in this paper we present the negotiation model

optimality versus practicality in market design a comparison of two double auctions we consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers traders privately know their values costs which are statistically dependent two mechanisms are considered the buyer s bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market clearing price it fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding the designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved this optimality however comes at the expense of plausibility i the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders beliefs about each other s value cost ii a trader may suffer a loss ex post iii the mechanism may run a surplus deficit ex post we compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer s bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism

tastes and technology in a two country model of the business cycle explaining international trade on international financial markets allows people to insure country specific risk and smooth consumption intertemporally equilibrium models of business cycles with trade on global financial markets typically yield international consumption correlations near one and excessive volatility of investment the authors incorporate nontraded goods in the model and find that the implications for aggregate consumption investment and the trade balance are consistent with business cycle properties of industrialized countries however the model driven by technology shocks alone yields counterfactual implications for comovements between consumption and prices at the sectoral level taste shocks produce price quantity relationships more consistent with the data copyright 1995 by american economic association

continuity in auction design abstract j cremer and r p mclean econometrica56 1988 1247 1257 have shown that the auctioneer can extract all the surplus when the private valuations of bidders are not statistically independent the paper shows that this result does not necessarily arise under limited liability or risk aversion under limited liability and or risk aversion we prove that the functions corresponding to the auctionner s optimal expected gain and to the maximum total surplus are continuous in the space of possible information distributions thus by continuity the auctioneer wil not be able to extract all the rents when bidders private valuations are approximately independent

theory based measurement of the saving investment correlation with an application to norway i introduction the findings of feldstein and horioka 19c 0 have led to numerous theoretical and empirical papers on the close correlation between domestic saving and domestic investment and its supposed implications for international capital mobility feldstein and horioka 1980 317 state that with perfect world capital mobility there should be no relation between domestic saving and domestic investment saving in each country responds to the worldwide opportunities for investment while investment in that country is financed by the worldwide pool of capital however in a cross country regression using period averaged saving and investment figures for sixteen oecd countries they obtain a significant coefficient close to unity and conclude that capital is rather immobile this result constitutes the feldstein horicka puzzle as it contradicts the widely held perception that capital is highly mobile across countries subsequent empirical work confirmed the close correlation though its implication for the degree of capital mobility is a moot point see tesar 1991 this paper contributes to the understanding of the puzzle on both theoretical and empirical counts first we present a theory based econometric specification for estimating saving investment correlations second we discuss the possible usefulness of the estimates for detecting capital mobility third we provide empirical results for the interesting case of norway we argue that feldstein and horioka s basic idea that the saving investment correlation contains information about international capital mobility is correct but that the interpretation of the estimated correlation value must be altered substantially in view of the results derived from modern macroeconomic models our research is motivated by the observation that various regression equations have been used to measure the saving investment correlation but that none of them has a firm theoretical foundation this in turn raises questions about the interpretation and comparability of the existing empirical results we propose an econometric specification that is founded in intertemporal general equilibrium models in which agents optimize under intertemporal budget constraints we show that time series studies have estimated misspecified equations and that cross section studies are seriously flawed because they neglect dynamics as a result the puzzle may turn out to be an artifact caused by measurement errors however the significance of reliable measurement of saving investment correlations goes beyond solving the feldstein horioka puzzle because they represent stylized facts open economy models should explain norway serves as a suitable example to cement our methodological arguments with empirical evidence thanks to its system of capital controls which were phased out during the 1970s and 1980s the oil discoveries and its small size we demonstrate that the failure to take structural breaks into account seriously distorts the picture making a strong case for careful diagnostic testing our main empirical result is that the feldstein horioka puzzle does not exist for norway the paper proceeds as follows in section ii we briefly summarize the state of the discussion regarding feldstein and horioka s findings in section iii we derive our specification from the theory compare it to the previous specifications and discuss how to make inferences about capital mobility in section iv we sketch major developments in the post war norwegian economy notably the abolition of capital controls and the emergence of the important oil sector section v presents the empirical results section vi summarizes and concludes ii the feldstein horioka puzzle many authors have confirmed feldstein and horioka s result of a high and stable correlation of saving and investment for oecd countries both in cross country studies and in time series studies

on savings and investment dynamics in a small open economy abstract this paper constructs a stochastic overlapping generations two country model of savings and investment under conditions of perfect international capital mobility the focus of the analysis is on the relationship between savings and investment dynamics in a small open economy in response to stochastic variations in domestic and or foreign production technologies the model is simulated under alternative specifications of the stochastic distribution governing both technologies this provides insight into the very complicated nature and rich diversity of possible relationships between savings and investment dynamics

what do saving investment relationships tell us about capital mobility abstract this paper re examines the tests of international capital mobility based on saving investment regressions originated by feldstein while analyses of various measures of capital controls provide some support for the feldstein hypothesis it is shown that the existence of nontraded goods can independently lead to a saving investment correlation this theoretical critique is supported empirically an analysis of the stability of the coefficients resolves the oft reported puzzle in the literature that economies appear to have become increasingly closed financially over time

international capital mobility net versus gross stocks and flows abstract feldstein and horioka 1980 observed that net capital flows have been small in relation to domestic saving and investment flows for oecd countries in the post war period which they interpreted as evidence of low capital mobility this paper argues that the correlation between gross domestic and international financial flows can be a better indicator of capital mobilitythan net capital flows contrary to the conventional wisdom among international economists gross flows have been small in relation to gross domestic asset creation for oecd countries although by this measure the degree of capital mobility increased in the 1980s

intelligent agents for negotiations in market games 2 application for part i see ibid vol 13 no 5 p 1103 8 1998 in competitive markets human decision makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of note that such coalitions are legal provided market power is not monopolized we present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt our negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory however it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential coalition partners in the part i we presented the negotiation model in this paper we apply it to power markets

international capital mobility what do national saving investment dynamics tell us abstract we interpret the relationship between national saving and investment in the long run as reflecting a solvency constraint and interpret the ease with which a country can run current account imbalances in the short run before it has to ultimately reverse the transaction at some future date to satisfy the solvency constraint as being positively related to the degree of international capital mobility we apply panel error correction techniques to data for 20 oecd countries from 1960 to 1999 we find that saving and investment display a long run cointegration relationship that is consistent with the interpretation that a long run solvency constraint is binding for each country over time however deviations from this long run equilibrium relation have become more persistent which suggests that capital mobility has increased

bad investments and missed opportunities postwar capital flows to asia and latin america since 1950 the economies of east asia grew rapidly but received little inter national capital while latin america received considerable international capitaleven as their economies stagnated the literature typically explains the failureof capital to flow to high growth regions as resulting from international capitalmarket imperfections this paper proposes a broader thesis that country specificdistortions such as domestic labor and capital market distortions also impactcapital flows we develop a dsge model of asia latin america and the rest ofthe world that features an open economy business cycle accounting framework tomeasure these domestic and international distortions and to quantify their con tributions to international capital flows we find that domestic distortions havebeen the predominant drivers of international capital flows and that the generalequilibrium effects of these distortions are very large international capital market distortions also matter but less

terms of trade dynamics in asia an analysis of national saving and domestic investment responses to terms of trade changes in 14 asian ldcs abstract i estimate a three equation model of savings investment and growth on pooled time series data for 14 asian developing countries to explore terms of trade dynamic effects on the current account a terms of trade deterioration lowers aggregate saving and raises investment in the current year it also exerts a positive lagged effect on investment due to the unanticipated temporary nature of the terms of trade change the current account oscillates before returning gradually to its steady state level the model explains 65 per cent of the variance in the sample countries current accounts over the period 1962 1983

existence and convergence of equilibria in the buyer s bid double auction this paper concerns a bayesian game model of the buyer s bid double auction which is a procedure for organizing trade that selects a market clearing price from a list of offers bids strategic misrepresentation by traders may make the outcome of trade inefficient satterthwaite and williams 1989 showed that misrepresentation and inefficiency quickly converge to zero as the number of traders on each side of the market increases this is extended here to cases in which the number of buyers may differ from the number of sellers the existence of equilibria in a generic instance of the model is also proven this paper concerns a market in which each trader privately knows his own preferences such a trader may have an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in order to influence the market price in his favour a buyer for instance may bid less than his true evaluation of the good for sale in an attempt to drive the price down similarly a seller may ask for more than he is willing to accept with behaviour of this kind a seller s offer could exceed a buyer s bid even though a mutually profitable trade between them exists in the market as a whole a price may be determined at which all potential gains from trade are not achieved strategic misrepresentation may therefore cause inefficiency our confidence in markets rests upon the belief that this inefficiency is insignificant when there are a large number of small traders a small trader in a large market is unlikely to have much influence on the market price as a consequence he has little incentive to misrepresent and the market is therefore almost fully efficient this argument however is vague about a very important point when is a trader relatively small and how many traders constitute a large market the meaning of small and large in this context is critical to understanding when this intuitive argument applies this argument is investigated here by thoroughly analyzing a particular model of trade a market is considered in which money may be exchanged for indivisible units of a good for n m 1 there are n sellers each of whom has a unit to sell and m buyers each of whom wishes to buy a unit each trader is therefore small in that he trades at most one unit we shall consider arbitrary values of n and m however trade is organized with the following rules each seller submits an offer while each buyer submits a bid the n m offers bids are ordered in a list sl s2 sn m any

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

the optimality of a simple market mechanism strategic behavior in a finite market can cause inefficiency in the allocation and market mechanisms differ in how successfully they limit this inefficiency a method for ranking algorithms in computer science is adapted here to rank market mechanisms according to how quickly inefficiency diminishes as the size of the market increases it is shown that trade at a single market clearing price in the k double auction is worst case asymptotic optimal among all plausible mechanisms evaluating mechanisms in their least favorable trading environments for each possible size of the market the k double auction is shown to force the worst case inefficiency to zero at the fastest possible rate

using game theory to analyze electric transmission pricing policies in the united states abstract us public policy towards the private electric power industry is moving away from restrictive regulation and towards promotion of competition alternative policies concerning access to and pricing of transmission are now being discussed similar issues may arise in europe as trade barriers fall our purpose is to show how game theory can help illuminate that debate and identify desirable policies game theory models are used to estimate the possible effects of various policies upon productive efficiency and the distribution of gains among sellers transmitters and buyers of power static cooperative models are used to calculate the possible outcomes of short run transmission games long run games in which the amount of transmission capacity is a decisition variable are modeled as dynamic noncooperative stackelberg games one conclusion is that under some conditions price regulation and mandatory access could hurt power buyers by removing incentives for building transmission capacity another conclusion is that under a system of voluntary access and price regulation it may be better to allow wheeling prices to exceed the marginal cost of transport rather than to risk losing the benefits of cooperation

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

determinants of the current account balance in the united states this article studies the role of public and private imbalances in the behaviour of the current account balance in the united states in the context of an intertemporal model the estimation evaluates the effects of public and private imbalances on the dynamics of the current account correlation coefficients support the ricardian equivalence higher budget deficit correlates with a reduction in private consumption and an increase in private savings government saving does not vary significantly with macroeconomic variables in the short or in the long run in contrast fluctuations in government investment vary significantly with a number of economic variables in the long and in the short run accordingly fluctuations in the budget deficit are likely to be driven by fluctuations in public investment in contrast to government savings private savings vary significantly with macro variables in the long and in the short run fluctuations in private investment appear less evident compared to that in privat

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

saving investment correlations and capital mobility on the evidence from annual data this paper evaluates the use of saving investment correlations to measure capital mobility it is argued that the intertemporal approach to the balance of payments predicts that the practice of calculating the correlation coefficient using long term averages of saving and investment shares biases the result toward accepting the hypothesis of capital immobility calculations based on annual data show that the correlation coefficient is much lower and that is varies considerably estimates of intranational capital mobility based on saving and investment shares of u s federal states show that the saving and investment link is much looser within a nation than among nations copyright 1992 by royal economic society

political vs currency premia in international real interest differentials a study of forward rates for 24 countries abstract different approaches to quantifying the degree of capital mobility for a cross section of currencies particularly saving investment correlations and tests of real interest parity have appeared to show a surprisingly low degree of financial integration we use a new data set forward rate data for 24 countries including many small industrialized countries and seven ldcs to decompose the real interest differential into two parts the covered interest differential or political premium and the real forward discount or currency premium the latter in turn can be decomposed into the exchange risk premium and expected real depreciation we find a high degree of capital mobility across political boundaries for most of the g 11 countries plus hong kong and singapore for our sample period of 1982 to 1987 even for most of the other ldcs and smaller industrialized countries for which covered interest parity clearly fails the political premium is not as big a component of the real interest differential as the currency premium france would appear to have higher capital mobility than most by the criterion of real interest differentials but is seen in fact to have low capital mobility by the criterion of covered interest differentials a clear example of the superiority of the latter criterion

application of actor critic learning algorithm for optimal bidding problem of a genco the optimal bidding for generation companies genco in the deregulated power market is an involved task the problem is formulated in the framework of the markov decision process mdp a discrete stochastic optimization method when the time span considered is 24 hours the temporal difference method becomes attractive for application the cumulative profit over the span is the objective function to be optimized the temporal difference technique and actor critic learning algorithm is employed an optimal strategy is devised to maximize the profit a market clearing system is included in the formulation simulation cases of three seven and ten participants are considered and the results obtained are discussed

the global financial crisis and the european single market the end of integration using various versions of the feldstein horioka fh coefficient we measure the time varying degree of capital mobility and economic integration in the european union prior research shows high correlation between domestic investment and savings implying low capital mobility this surprising result has led to subsequent research on the feldstein horioka puzzle our empirical findings show that the puzzle is less puzzling with a coefficient of 0 52 in the period 1990 1995 in eu countries approaching its minimum value of 0 02 in the period 2003 2008 this clearly indicates that the fh coefficient is time varying signalling a deepening of economic integration in the european union yet with the advent of the global financial crisis the fh coefficient has increased to 0 26 underlining worrying signs of disintegration

game theory approach to use of noncommercial power plants under time of use pricing the authors use the game theory approach for evaluating the impact of the introduction of customer owned noncommercial power plants ncp when time of use pricing is used various results from this analysis are derived some of which are that the conflict between ncp customer and the supplier forces the supplier to reduce the price of ncp customers perception of the situation in which they are involved in plays an important role in this conflict the game model analysis presented provides a detailed quantitative information on electricity prices and on the ways of using ncp

does trade integration cause convergence abstract using a business cycle model we analyse the conditions for trade integration to produce economic convergence we find large stable economies with integrated structures are likely to diverge but smaller more volatile or less well integrated economies will converge the symmetry of shocks is unimportant

explaining saving investment correlations national saving and investment rates are highly positively correlated in virtually all countries this is puzzling as it apparently implies a low degree of international capital mobility this paper shows that the observed positive correlation between national saving and investment rates arises naturally within a quantitatively restricted equilibrium model with perfect mobility of financial and physical capital the model is consistent with the fact that saving investment correlations are larger for larger countries but are still substantial for small countries further the model is consistent with the finding that current account deficits tend to be associated with investment booms copyright 1993 by american economic association

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

international capital mobility in the long run and the short run can we still learn from saving investment data the idea to learn about international capital mobility from saving and investment data remains appealing our approach is based on var methods and overcomes some of the problems associated with saving investment regressions when the data are non stationary we propose a new measure of long run capital mobility that can be easily calculated as a by product of the estimation procedure of a cointegrated var in an application to historical us and british data we find long run capital mobility to have been remarkably stable over the century whereas variations in the mobility of capital primarily seem to have affected short run capital flows

unemployment insurance and short time compensation the effects on layoffs hours per worker and wages we analyze two unemployment insurance systems in one unemployed workers receive benefits while those on reduced hours do not as in north america at least until recently in the other short time compensation is paid to workers on reduced hours as in europe the first system causes inefficient temporary layoffs for some parameters the latter does not but implies inefficient hours per worker some evidence is presented regarding these effects despite policymakers recent enthusiasm for short time compensation the clear implication of this project is that changes should come on the tax not benefit side of the system

saving and investment in an open economy with non traded goods the authors examine a model of a small open economy in which there is free international mobility of financial capital investment in capital goods and a nontraded good such an environment is rich enough to explain several phenomena that are inexplicable in other models the authors explain why a high saving country may nonetheless borrow from abroad to finance investment they suggest an explanation of why saving and investment may be correlated even with no restrictions on trade in assets the authors also provide an optimizing model of stages in the balance of payments copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

a dominant strategy double auction a double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed this mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer s bid double auction in addition the mechanism always produces full information first best prices the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism the mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices

domestic saving and international capital movements in the long run and the short run the evidence and analysis in this paper support the earlier findings of feldstein and horioka 1980 that sustained increases in domestic savings rates induce approximately equal increases in domestic rates of investment new estimates for the post opec period 1974 79 imply that each extra dollar of domestic saving increases domestic investment by approximately 85 cents in a sample of 17 oecd countries an explicit analysis of the problems of identification and simultaneous equations bias suggests that the regression estimates are more relevant as a guide to the long run response of international capital flows than to their short run behavior coefficient estimates based on annual variations in savings and investment are subject to potentially severe simultaneous equations bias that is not present when annual observations are averaged over a decade or more and the regression is estimated with a cross country sample of these averages a portfolio model of international capital allocation that is presented in the paper indicates that the short run change in the rate of net foreign investment in response to a sustained increase in domestic saving is likely to be substantially greater than the ultimate steady state response this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

capital mobility and the relationship between saving and investment rates in oecd countries abstract this paper considers tests that use data on saving and investment rates to determine the degree of international capital mobility two types of evidence are presented to show that a high correlation between saving and investment rates across oecd countries can be consistent with a high degree of capital mobility this evidence qualifies the conclusions of previous studies and casts doubt on the usefulness of testing hypotheses about capital mobility with data on saving and investment rates

transaction analysis in deregulated power systems using game theory the electric power industry is in transition to a deregulated marketplace for power transactions in this environment all power transactions are made based on price rather than cost a regional power pool is noted as the most straightforward path to a deregulated electricity marketplace however many questions remain unanswered regarding the economics of power pool participation in a deregulated energy marketplace participants are interested in maximizing their own profits regardless of the system wide profits it is perceived that competition will reduce the price of electricity for retail customers however the key issue for participants is related with the price definition to remain competitive in this paper the authors use game theory to simulate the decision making process for defining offered prices in a deregulated environment the outcome of this study may be used by power pool coordinators to discourage unfair coalitions a modified ieee 30 bus power system is used as a deregulated power pool to illustrate the main features of the proposed method

estimating saving investment correlations evidence for oecd countries based on an error correction model abstract saving investment correlations are important stylized facts in open economy macroeconomics and indicators of capital mobility they are best estimated by an error correction model ecm because an ecm is consistent with intertemporal general equilibrium models the ecm is a synthesis of previous approaches applying the ecm to the oecd countries we find that in general saving and investment are cointegrated the ecm is more powerful in detecting cointegration than the two step engle granger procedure estimates of the saving investment correlation are robust with respect to overdifferencing we find evidence of a large country effect and an increase in capital mobility within the oecd area

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

cointegration of long span saving and investment abstract we find that saving and investment cointegrate in all or most countries in maddison s research memorandum no 443 1991 long span data set by a variety of time series and panel data tests we interpret our results as reflecting current account solvency and not capital immobility

a quantitative assessment of the decline in the u s current account low frequency changes in the u s current account can be understood in terms of the influence of differences in productivity growth rates across time and across countries using standard growth theory in particular the secular decline is primarily driven by the increase in the u s tfp growth rate relative to its trading partners differences in population growth rates or fiscal policy have no significant effects on the low frequency changes in the u s current account

the law of proportionate effect and oecd bank sectors the paper investigates the growth dynamics of the bank sectors in the oecd area over the period 1985 1994 and examines whether the structural financial reforms of the late 1980s have affected their growth path based on a test of gibrat s law of proportionate effect it is found that the 1985 89 period was characterized by size convergence implying that smaller bank sectors were expanding more rapidly however in the 1990 1994 period the pattern reversed to proportionate growth the analysis of the determinants of bank market growth reveals that macroeconomic growth operational bank efficiency credit quality and capitalization are the main drivers of bank industry growth

regional effects of taxes in canada an applied general equilibrium approach this paper reports on an applied general equilibrium regional model for canada which is used to investigate the regional effects of taxes earlier literature on regional tax effects is reviewed and the main features of the model are briefly described existing literature on regional tax effects is largely non quantitative and does not discuss several important regional features of taxes such as taxes which are predominantly on products or industries located in particular regions results suggest that regional effects of taxes can be significant and in the canadian case at least do not tend to counterbalance one another in general richer regions tend to lose and poorer regions gain from federal taxes but other regional characteristics such as manufacturing non manufacturing or resource non resource can be important this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values we introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions we exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values ipv model we also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest applying our methods to much studied u s forest service timber auctions we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates this correlation causes expected profit the profit maximizing reserve price and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional ipv analysis of the data would suggest

fiscal deficits and intergenerational welfare in almost small open economies the intergenerational welfare effects of government deficits are examined in a simple life cycle economy which can borrow at given interest rates and import at given prices but has unexploited market power in exports despite perfect capital market integration a deficit financed tax cut to the current young causes an immediate real exchange rate of return on domestic assets subsequently the real exchange rate depreciates to a lower steady state value and the after tax wage decreases by more than the tax increase needed to service the larger deficit

the study of the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategies of gencos the paper studies the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategies of gencos in a pool based power market the generator under consideration can form any potential coalition with other generators subgroups are then formed and each of these subgroups consists of some members which coordinate their bidding strategies to achieve a common goal noncooperative gaming applies among all the subgroups while cooperative gaming applies among the members in each subgroup by implementation of bids sensitivities the paper presents an algorithm for the members in each coalition subgroup to obtain optimal bids which essentially is based on interior point optimal power flow ipopf model a priority list produced after optimal bids are found for all the potential combinations of coalition is used by the generator under consideration to bargain with members on the list the algorithm and model are tested by the ieee 30 bus system and numerical results are presented

identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity in many procurement auctions the bidders unobserved costs depend both on a common shock and on idiosyncratic private information assuming a multiplicative structure i derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and propose a non parametric estimation procedure that results in uniformly consistent estimators of the cost components distributions the estimation procedure is applied to data from michigan highway procurement auctions private information is estimated to account for 34 of the variation in bidders costs it is shown that accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity has important implications for the evaluation of the distribution of rents efficiency and optimal auction design

domestic savings intra national and intra european union capital flows 1971 1991 abstract this paper examines the relationship between savings and investment for the pre 1995 twelve members of the eu during the period 1971 1991 the results of the statistical analysis suggest that the capital market of the members of the eu resembles that of intra national regions implying a considerable degree of capital market integration this conclusion however is subject to several caveats the relationship between savings and investment in the case of portugal for example is unusual

domestic savings and intra national capital flows abstract regional british data on savings and investment are shown to be uncorrelated consistent with the hypothesis of perfectly mobile intra national capital flows

an endogenous growth model with expanding ranges of consumer goods and producer durables this paper constructs a growth model with the feature that the range of differentiated consumption goods and the range of specialized producer durables are both endogenously determined the author shows that this feature allows the domestic investment rate to be closely associated with the domestic saving rate even when international financial markets are integrated he also argues that this feature is important in explaining the observed cross country diversity in growth performance and saving behavior copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

tax policy and economic growth lessons from the 1980s the past seven years of u s economic policy and performance constitute a truly remarkable if confusing experiment few would have guessed in 1980 that inflation would fall rapidly to 4 percent and hold pretty steady during a lengthy recovery that productivity growth would partially rebound the national debt more than double capital imports reach 150 billion in a single year or that employment would continue to expand at rates envied by other advanced economies perhaps fewer still would have predicted two major and two minor tax reforms would be passed in six years a flip flop in depreciation schedules and a top personal tax rate below 30 percent while it is always easier to draw inferences concerning economic growth its determinants and policies affecting the determinants with long historical hindsight this paper will attempt to provide information evaluation and conjecture to draw some tentative lessons about the effects of tax policies in the 1980s on long run economic growth the good news from the 1980s is the remarkable achievement of substantially lower marginal tax rates making the government a much smaller silent partner in many economic decisions for example the tax advantage of debt finance is reduced substantially with the much lower marginal tax rates the bad news is that the nation could not afford all of the good news the very large budget deficits add to the instability in the tax code in addition to whatever other problems they cause moreover in a country with the lowest saving and investment rates in the advanced world the consequence of which may be to decrease our long run growth potential and short run trade competitiveness the remaining anti saving and investment features of our tax law while probably less important in the long run than the u s

factor rewards and the international migration of unskilled labor a model with capital mobility abstract conventional economic wisdom holds that the migration of unskilled labor from less developed countries to neighboring developed countries should be expected to narrow the wage gap between those countries and thereby reduce the incentive for further migration if capital is mobile internationally this reasoning may be inappropriate instead emigration of unskilled labor out of the less developed country provides an incentive for capital to leave the country too as a consequence wage rates move in the same direction in each country and the gap between wage rates across countries even may increase

transmission analysis by nash game method this paper describes an open access transmission method for maximizing profits in a power system the proposed method is based on the nash bargaining game for power flow analysis in which each transaction and its optimal price are determined to optimize the interests of individual parties transmission losses are considered by the proposed method and test cases and results are discussed to present the merits of the proposed method

crowding out in open economies results from a simulation study it has recently been shown that industrialized countries in the 1970s and 1980s are characterized by a high correlation between national saving and investment this regularly is considered puzzling in the context of highly integrated international capital markets in this paper the author shows that both the failure of real interest parity and productivity changes are each sufficient to generate a high positive correlation between national saving and investment these results indicate that it is easier than previously thought to reproduce a high correlation between saving and investment in models with perfect capital mobility

savings investment and international capital flows abstract the high correlation between national savings and domestic investment rateshas been interpreted as evidence that capital is not internationally mobile this paper surveys the theory and evidence on the relationship between savings and investment in a sample of 23 oecd countries a positive correlation between savings and investment rates is found in both the short and long runs however a wide variety of models generate such co movements in savings and investment in response to exogenous disturbances even under conditions of complete financial markets thus the savings investment correlation provides little evidence on the question of international capital mobility

vignettes on the world capital market this paper is motivated by a sense that we as a profession need to understand much better than we now do how the world capital market works we seem to be genuinely schizophrenic in the ways we build models many of them are closedeconomy models in which the rest of the world does not even appear yet others of them are models of the small open economy in which hardly any degree of freedom is left for economic policy to influence events lying behind the schizophrenia is i believe a genuine ignorance on our collective part of how the world capital market

domestic determinants of the current account balance of the united states the u s economy is found to be sufficiently open to make the balance on foreign transactions an essential part of the equilibration process between saving and investment specifically over the past two decades changes in the national saving rate have increasingly been matched by changes in net foreign rather than domestic investment thus it would be counterfactual to assume in policy discussions that measures to raise the national saving rate add fully to the stock of productive capital in the united states barring only keynesian complications conversely a stimulus to domestic investment could be validated in part by drawing on foreign saving

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

the modified vickrey double auction abstract we modify w vickrey s 1961 j finance 16 8 37 mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism we provide sufficient conditions under which the modified vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency in addition we prove that the modified vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d44 d82

an intertemporal model of saving and investment this paper characterizes a market economy with infinitely long lived consumers and value maximizing firms which face costs of adjustment for capital the temporary equilibrium of this economy is similar to the short run equilibrium of standard macroeconomic models consumption is a function of wealth investment is related to the value of firms equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply is achieved by the endogenous adjustment of the sequence of current and future interest rates the dynamic behavior of output consumption and investment in this economy is the same as in an optimal growth model with adjustment costs the paper shows this equivalence and then uses it together with the equivalence of taxes to technological shocks to study the dynamic effects of fiscal policy

the feldstein hoiroka puzzle across countries this article tests the feldstein hoiroka puzzle for a sample of 49 countries from two angles that of co movements in the saving investment series and the magnitude of the saving retention coefficient src the overall conclusion we obtain from the results of three different cointegration tests leaves no room for puzzle in the majority of the countries included in the sample on the other hand various statistical tests applied to the srcs show that there are significant differences among the high income middle income and low income country groups with regards to the salient aspects of capital mobility first there are significant differences in the average srcs of the country groups second the srcs are differently distributed around their means among the country groups the results yielded by a third test dictate that future research should pay more attention to the underlying distribution of the srcs within country groups when testing the country size argument

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

on the fiscal policy implications of low capital mobility some further evidence from cross country time series data in an attempt to determine whether an increase in a nation s private saving stimulated say by tax policies raises domestic investment or flows abroad feldstein and horioka 4 and feldstein 2 examined the relationship between the saving and investment rates of a sample of industrialized countries their results pointed to the existence of a strong almost one to one relationship between investment and saving rates they interpreted that finding as implying that the assumption of perfect capital mobility is invalid in that sustained increases in domestic saving rates induce approximately equal increases in domestic investment rates 2 150 the finding has farreaching implications for instance with low international capital mobility a country s growth prospects are tied to its saving effort if the saving effort is weak relative to investment opportunities realized investment rates could fall short of their potential and thus impact adversely on growth it also implies that fiscal deficits lead to neoclassical crowding out of investment so that both the keynesian view as well as the ricardian equivalence proposition do not hold since the feldstein and horioka henceforth denoted by fh article numerous papers have offered alternative explanations for the strong saving investment correlations many of those explanations center on supposed weaknesses of the econometric methodology employed by fh and feldstein one of the arguments initially proposed by fieleke 5 and tobin 19 is the policyresponse argument according to that argument if the government adjusts its policy instruments to offset current account imbalances a strong positive correlation between saving and investment would result however that correlation reflects the policy response and not low capital mobility in a recent paper summers 16 proposed a direct test of that argument and his empirical results

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha