non monotonic effects of market concentration on prices for residential solar photovoltaics in the united states abstract emerging renewable energy markets may become more concentrated over time as the most efficient firms accumulate market share the effects of this market concentration on prices are tested using a rich dataset of residential solar photovoltaic pv systems in the united states a novel hypothesis is explored that the effects of market concentration may be non monotonic prices may decline in market concentration due to efficiency gains associated with returns to scale but increase in concentration in already concentrated markets due to increasing market power the results of an econometric model provide evidence to support the non monotonic hypothesis however the data suggest that the relationship between prices and firm scale is nuanced and that both large and small scale pv installers may wield efficiency advantages

is there more than one critical concentration ratio an empirical test for the portland cement industry past attempts to estimate the critical concentration ratio maintained the hypothesis of only two structural groupings competitive versus non competitive in view of the spectrum of competitive conduct allowed by oligopoly theory the validity of the two groupings is restrictive and should be tested using data from the portland cement industry this paper conducts such a test employing a non linear switching regression technique based on the logistic function the hypothesis of two structural groupings is not rejected

modeling inertia and variety seeking tendencies in brand choice behavior theories of exploratory behavior suggest that inertia and variety seeking tendencies may coexist within the individual implying that the same individual may exhibit inertia and variety seeking at different times depending on his her choice history past research has not allowed for such within consumer variability in these tendencies the purpose of this study is to present a choice model that allows us to identify such hybrid behavior i e a mixture of inertia and variety seeking and to distinguish hybrid behavior from simpler types of behavior such as pure inertia pure variety seeking and zero order behavior the model is estimated at the household level using panel data for three product classes covering a total of 1069 households the empirical analysis shows that more than half the households analyzed exhibited hybrid behavior rather than simpler types of behavior

spatial competition with free entry chamberlinian tangencies and social efficiency abstract free entry in loschian spatial competition leads to a tangency between each firm s negatively sloped average revenue and the downsloping portion of average costs as in chamberlin s monopolistic competition it is generally concluded that this equilibrium involves too many inefficiently small firms however this conclusion is incorrect the difference between price and firm marginal production costs in spatial equilibrium is just sufficient to cover the additional marginal cost of output resulting from availability of multiple locations this chamberlinian tangency does not imply inefficiency because it does not include all the social costs and benefits resulting from spatial competition

strategic and operational decisions under sales competition and collection competition for end of use products in remanufacturing abstract providing incentives to customers for recycling their end of use products is a commonly adopted strategy by remanufacturers for achieving economic scale of remanufacturing however the entrance of remanufacturers threaten the sales of new products that are produced by original equipment manufacturers oems thus oems may also take back end of use products by providing incentives to restrict the capacities of remanufacturers consequently oems and remanufacturers compete not only on prices in sales market but also on incentives in recycle market therefore we formulate a closed loop supply chain model consisting of an oem and a remanufacturer to investigate their equilibrium prices and incentives moreover we consider that the remanufacturer can strategically focus the economies of scale on the sales market or on the recycle market we derive the equilibrium decisions and profits under each of the remanufacturer s strategies and identify the characteristics of these equilibrium results we further derive the conditions to determine the firms behaviors toward the competition we also find that the higher competitiveness in the sales market will encourage the remanufacturer to focus the economic scale on the recycle market instead of the sales market which is also beneficial to the oem

on the nature of competition with differentiated products there is an old debate going back to bertrand 1883 and edgeworth 1925 about the fragility of market equilibrium when competition arises among a few sellers it was hotelling s belief that price instability vanishes when products are differentiated hotelling 1929 recently attention was drawn to the fact that even if product differentiation can weaken the forces leading to price instability it cannot eliminate completely the possibility of price cycles d aspremont et al 1979 the purpose of this paper is to show that vertical and horizontal product differentiation do not operate in the same manner a stable market outcome including an endogenous product specification arises more frequently with the former than with the latter horizontal product differentiation is rooted in taste differences more precisely the potential customers have heterogeneous preferences about the proportion in which the attributes of the product should be combined a wide range of substitute products can then survive in the same market simply because each of them combines the various attributes of the product in a proportion suitable to a particular segment of customers between two products in the range the level of some attributes is augmented while that of others is lowered each variety has its own circle of customers exactly as the inhabitants located around a particular shop form its potential market none the less competitors can raid these privileged market shares by adequate price cuts by contrast vertical product differentiation refers to a class of products which cohabit simultaneously on a given market even though customers agree on a unanimous ranking between them between two products in the range the level of all attributes is augmented or lowered the survival of a low quality product then rests on the seller s ability to sell it at a reduced price compensating thereby for the higher a priori attractiveness of a more desirable quality the seller of a low quality product will specialise in the segment of customers whose propensity to spend on the corresponding range of products is low either because they have relatively lower income or relatively less intensive preferences than other customers at the same time the seller of a high quality product will enjoy an absolute advantage over his competitor 2 interestingly it turns out that price and product competition does not lead to the same results in these two situations regarding the stability of the market equilibrium to stress the differences we have chosen to concentrate on two

spatial competition with a land market hotelling and von thunen unified we introduce into the standard spatial competition model the consumption of land by households and study the spatial competition under the influence of a land market in contrast to the standard assumption of a fixed given distribution of households we introduce the possibility of households relocation in reaction to firms location decisions thus the spatial distribution of households is treated as endogenous and a land market is introduced on which households compete for land use households consume simultaneously land and firms output accordingly the demand of each household becomes in turn endogenous as it depends on the income left after the land rent is paid not surprisingly the results obtained within this more general framework prove to be very different from the standard results for example in the 2 and 3 firm cases the optimal configuration of firms is a nash equilibrium when transport costs are high enough or the amount of vacant land is large enough the existence property is restored in the 3 firm case when the transport costs are high enough the introduction of vacant land causes a discontinuous change in the set of equilibrium configurations

on the endogeneous formation of secondary employment centers in a city a new approach is proposed to explain the formation of secondary employment centers in a monocentric city specifically a large firm considers locating a new plant in a city where none of the existing businesses has a significative share of the labor force so that its location can be viewed as a secondary employment center the choice of this location results from the interplay between the process of competition on both the labor and land markets and the technological externalities generated by the proximity of the city center where other firms are located

reward programs and tacit collusion reward programs a promotional tool to develop customer loyalty offer incentives to consumers on the basis of cumulative purchases of a given product or service from a firm reward programs have become increasingly common in many industries the best known examples include frequent flier programs offered by airlines frequent guest programs offered by hotels and frequent shopper programs offered by supermarkets despite the widespread business practice of reward programs research efforts on reward programs particularly in marketing have been scarce our paper takes an important step towards understanding the design of reward programs and its implications on pricing strategies we study a market that consists of two segments heavy and light user segments the key distinction between the two segments is that the heavy user segment purchases in each period and thus is a candidate for the reward programs in contrast the light user segment exits the market after one purchase and is not in a position to exploit reward programs an important feature of our model is that we allow for different price sensitivity between heavy user and light user segments our model closely examines the type of rewards a reward worth a dollar to the consumer might have different cost implications for the offering firm depending on the type of reward for example cash rewards have higher unit reward cost inefficient reward for the firm than a free product of the firm such as an airline ticket or long distance minutes efficient reward specifically we examine an interesting puzzle observed in the marketplace several firms offer a cash reward or a product not made by the firm such as jackets electronic items etc these firms could offer their own product as rewards and significantly lower their cost we examine whether there is any reason for such a seemingly suboptimal practice our analysis shows that reward programs weaken price competition by offering the incentives for repeat purchases reward programs increase a firm s cost to attract competing firms current customers because firms gain less from undercutting their prices equilibrium prices go up moreover as consumers become unwilling to switch because of potential rewards the firm with a larger market share in the heavy user segment charges higher prices therefore a low price in the first period which leads to a larger market share in the heavy user segment will always be followed by a high price in the second period in our model consumers are rational and can correctly anticipate firms incentive to offer lower prices initially to enroll them into the reward programs our paper offers an explanation as to why the type and amount of reward may vary across the programs we identify two determining factors for the selection of rewards size and relative price sensitivity of the heavy user segment we find that in a market with a small heavy user segment that is also much more price sensitive than the light user segment it is optimal for firms to offer the most inefficient rewards the intuition is based on the firms incentive to exploit the price insensitive light user segment by offering inefficient rewards firms are able to commit to weaker competition and therefore higher prices when the heavy user segment is large or not very price sensitive when compared to the light user segment competing firms should adopt the most efficient rewards to maximize their profit this may well be the case in a number of real world situations in which efficient rewards are quite prevalent we also find that optimal reward amount has a negative relationship with unit reward cost because both firms use rewards to attract the heavy users they tend to offer more when they adopt the more efficient rewards finally our paper identifies the relationship between market characteristics and theimpact of reward programs on firms profits and consumers benefits we find that firms gain from the adoption of reward programs as long as light users are not too price sensitive when light users are very price sensitive firms engage in intense price competition thus benefiting little from the loyalty of heavy users created through rewards because reward programs increase market prices light users who do not get the reward earn strictly lower benefit in contrast heavy users often stand to gain more from the reward program in most cases firms and the heavy users are better off at the expense of light users

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

a model of stochastic variety seeking in this paper we propose and test a stochastic model of consumer choice that incorporates attribute based variety seeking our stochastic variety seeking model svs has nested within it a fixed variety seeking model a zero order model of choice and a first order pure variety model we compare the svs model to alternative models under stochastic variety seeking we examine the nature of the variety sought and provide a test of the satiation hypothesis unlike fixed variety seeking models our model allows variety seeking to vary in intensity and consistency over individuals as well as over purchase occasions we show that the model is equivalent to a random utility model with the features that the attributes of brands relative to those of the brand previously bought influence choice and the extent of variety seeking is random over choice occasions for a given individual the model permits a closed form solution to the conditional switching probabilities parameterized by variety seeking parameters and dependent on brand attributes we apply our model to individual choice data obtained from a field study specifically designed for the purpose at hand

sequential product positioning under differential costs this paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures it shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost it positions away from the most attractive location in the market further the larger the second mover s cost advantage the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location the paper also models uncertainty in the first mover s mind about the later entrant s cost structure and shows that an increase in this uncertainty in the sense of mean preserving spread also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market overall this paper suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product

spatial differentiation and price discrimination in the cement industry evidence from a structural model we estimate a structural model of the cement industry that incorporates spatial differentiation and price discrimination focusing on the us southwest over 1983 2003 we leverage the structure of the model to obtain consistent estimates of the underlying parameters using data on market outcomes that are substantially aggregated our results indicate that transportation costs around 0 46 per tonne mile rationalize the data this friction enables relatively isolated plants to obtain higher prices from nearby customers we further find that disallowing price discrimination would create 30 million in consumer surplus annually and show how the model can identify suitable divestitures in merger analysis

spatial pricing spatial rents and spatial welfare this paper presents a model of spatial equilibrium that integrates elements of spatial pricing and tha nen location models properties of equilibrium under mill uniform and discriminatory pricing regimes are explored three comparative propositions concerning firm consumer and landowner welfare that obtain under the alternative pricing schemes are presented the welfare findings contrast with those found in the extant spatial pricing literature in particular the superiority of mill pricing from a consumer welfare perspective is questioned

digital pricing with piracy and variety seeking abstract this paper aims to explore behavioral digital pricing which incorporates realistic consumer behavior into firms pricing and anti piracy investment models we consider a duopoly market with an original company and a pirated group selling digital products the demand is sensitive to both parties prices we extend the traditional hotelling model by taking into account the effects of externality on both parties we then propose three types of price competition games i cournot model ii stackelberg model with the original company as the leader and iii the stackelberg model with the pirated group as the leader in model ii if the value of externality effects is lower than a threshold the original company will benefit from the government anti piracy policy that tolerates some piracy finally we investigate the behavior of consumer variety seeking in a two period cournot model with the presence of variety seeking both the original and pirated parties will adopt higher prices in the first period surprisingly variety seeking brings higher profits to both parties in two periods

equilibrium existence in the linear model of spatial competition this paper considers a generalization of the hotelling model of spatial competition it is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two stage location price game exists only under very stringent conditions these conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair when the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strategies if transport costs are not sufficiently convex the convexity of transport costs is crucial in determining whether there is excessive or insufficient diversity of products copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

organizational costs sticky equilibria and critical levels of concentration jn the thirty years since joe bain s seminal i study 1951 many economists have attempted to determine whether or not there exists a critical level of market concentration at which a discontinuity occurs in the relation between industry concentration and profitability in this paper we develop and test a more general model based on organizational costs which posits the existence of two critical levels of market concentration one at which an existing cooperative equilibrium will break down as concentration declines and one at which a cooperative equilibrium will become attainable as concentration increases we show that the standard model of the critical level of concentration can be regarded as a special case of our more general model and also that the more general model attains a statistically superior fit in section ii we briefly review some of the previous literature in this area we develop our model in section iii and specify and estimate it in sections iv and v in sections vi and vii we summarize and interpret our results and present some policy implications of our findings

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition abstract the main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of consumer concentration around the market center on the equilibrium locations of location price games in the case of symmetric triangular density it is shown that no symmetric equilibrium exists however we demonstrate the existence of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies these equilibria are also characterized our secondary purpose is to study the sequential entry of two firms when the location space is not restricted to the market space this leads us to uncover a substantial first mover advantage which has been neglected in the literature

variety seeking through brand switching a concept of variety seeking behavior is modeled as a stochastic brand choice model the model yields a measure of variety seeking for each individual consumer panel data for 28 products are analyzed for each household and the possibility of market segmentation by variety seeking behavior is explored

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

concentration price and critical concentration ratios a potentially important parameter that has not yet been convincingly estimated is the critical concentration ratio this paper attempts to estimate it in three types of market the estimation of a critical concentration ratio if one exists seems of potentially great importance because of its implication for antitrust policy if a critical concentration ratio were found and if concentration had no effect below that level it would seem to follow that a horizontal merger in a market where concentration was below the critical level and where the merger could not increase concentration to the critical level could not substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly

inertia and variety seeking in a model of brand purchase timing previous research on state dependence indicates that a brand s purchase probabilities vary over time and depend on the levels of inertia and variety seeking and on the identity of the previously purchased brand brand choice probabilities obtained from models such as the logit and the probit are however fixed over time conditional on the previous brand purchased and on the levels of marketing variables consequently state dependence has largely been studied as a time invariant phenomenon in brand choice models with the levels of inertia and variety seeking assumed to be constant over time to account for the time varying nature of state dependence would require a model in which brand switching probabilities depend upon interpurchase times one modeling framework that can account for this dependence is based on the hazard function approach the proposed approach works as follows all other factors being equal an inertial household purchasing a brand on a particular occasion is most likely to repurchase that brand on the next occasion if the household switches it will be to a brand located perceptually close in attribute space to the previously purchased brand in other words an inertial household has the highest switching hazard for the same origin and destination brands with a progressively lower hazard rate for brands perceptually located farther and farther away from the origin brand the amount by which the hazard is lowered depends upon the perceptual distance and the inertia level of the household on the other hand if the household is variety seeking the most likely brand purchased would be a brand located farthest away from the previously purchased brand in attribute space in other words the hazard rate of repurchase is the lowest with the rate increasing with the distance of the destination brand from the origin brand and the level of that household s variety seeking tendency the effects of inertia and variety seeking are therefore incorporated at the attribute level into a brand purchase timing model in doing so we attempt to provide greater insight into the nature of state dependence in models of purchase timing our model and estimation procedure will enable us to distinguish between households that are inertial and those that are variety prone in addition to accounting for state dependence the model also accounts for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity among households in their brand preferences and in their sensitivities to marketing activities a majority of studies in marketing using the hazard function approach to investigate purchase timing have not accounted for heterogeneity in marketing mix effects the study integrates recent methods that incorporate the effects of inertia and variety seeking in brand choice models with a semi markov model of purchase timing and brand switching the proposed model enables us to 1 infer market structure via a perceptual map for the sample households and 2 investigate implications for the introduction of a line extension we provide empirical applications of the proposed method using three different household level scanner panel data sets we find that differing levels of inertia and variety seeking characterize the three data sets the findings are consistent with prior beliefs regarding these categories in addition our results indicate that the nature of interbrand purchase timing behavior depends upon the extent of inertia or variety seeking in the data we are also able to characterize the structure of the three product markets studied this provides implications for interbrand rivalry in the market further we demonstrate how the model and results can be used to predict the location of a line extension in the perceptual space of households finally we obtain implications for the timing of brand promotions

corporate environmental citizenship variation in developing countries an institutional framework this study focuses on why some companies in developing countries go beyond environmental regulations when implementing their corporate environmental social responsibilities or citizenship behavior drawing mainly upon the new institutional theory this study develops a conceptual framework to explain three institutional factors companies market orientations industrial characteristics and corporate identities accordingly we suggest that companies from developing countries that are oriented to markets in developed countries operate in highly concentrated industries and have missionary identities adopt corporate environmental citizenship behavior by going beyond environmental regulations the study also discusses the theoretical policy and managerial implications of the conceptual framework

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

the electoral politics of extreme policies a government may adopt extreme policies policies lying outside the interval between the ideal points of the political parties for electoral purposes it can benefit when a change in policy is costly and when the opposing party cannot commit to maintaining the status quo

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

the spatial labour market and spatial competition nakagome m 1986 the spatial labour market and spatial competition reg studies 20 307 312 we examine the effects of spatial competition on wages and regional unemployment it is demonstrated in this article that the perverse results concerning wage levels are also seen to prevail in the spatial labour market i e competition among neighbouring firms may yield lower equilibrium wage levels than a spatial monopsony wage our study investigates the extent to which such spatial theory replicates the conclusions of classical non spatial labour economics we also attack the problem of why regional unemployed workers do not change their location to obtain a higher level of job opportunities

bounded rationality in pricing under state dependent demand do firms look ahead and if so how far the authors propose an empirical procedure to investigate the pricing behavior of manufacturers and retailers in the presence of state dependent demand rather than assuming that firms are perfectl

vertical differentiation with variety seeking consumers we analyze price and quality competition in a vertically differentiated duopoly in which consumers have a preference for variety the preference for variety is a consequence of diminishing marginal utility for repeated experiences with the same product we find consumer variety seeking can either soften or intensify price competition depending on the difference in firm qualities and the strength of consumer preference for variety when the qualities are similar or the consumer preference for variety is strong prices and profits are higher than would be obtained in the absence of variety seeking on the other hand if qualities differ enough or the preference for variety is weak stronger preferences for variety are associated with more intense price competition and lower profits when firms set their qualities before competing on price and the range of feasible qualities is restricted such that variety seeking softens competition competing firms choose to minimally differentiate themselves from each other the preference for variety can drive the firms to offer multiunit discounts and the greater price flexibility from these discounts does not necessarily reduce profits relative to simple unit pricing this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

an extension of the monocentric urban spatial equilibrium model to a multicenter setting the case of the two center city abstract firms in a monocentric city conforming in substance to the new urban economics produce an export commodity under agglomeration economies and employ homogeneous labor and capital workers reside about the cbd in decreasing densities with distance a developer establishes a second export production center within the city s residential area conditions for economic viability and growth of the subcenter are examined and its impacts on short run and long run city location patterns are discussed a limiting condition on subcenter employment size is provided

price competition in markets with consumer variety seeking we investigate price competition between firms in markets characterized by consumer variety seeking while previous research has addressed the effect of consumer inertia on prices there exists no research on the effects of variety seeking on price competition our study fills this gap in the literature using a two period duopoly framework as in klemperer s analysis of inertial markets we show that the noncooperative pricing equilibrium in a market with consumer variety seeking may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without variety seeking specifically our variety seeking model implies tacit collusion between firms in both periods unlike the inertia model of klemperer that implies tacit collusion between firms only in the second period but implies fierce price competition in the first period when consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about future prices the implied first period prices increase further which is consistent with what klemperer finds in an inertial market to summarize while our variety seeking analyses support two key results pertaining to second period prices and rational expectations previously derived for inertial markets by klemperer they depart from one key result pertaining to first period prices

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

two stage perfect equilibrium in hotelling s model hotelling i 929 suggests that his spatial competition model can be used to describe a wide range of differentiation problems he points to the selection of product variety within an industry as a potential application most of the subsequent work in his tradition has taken the equivalence of the two problems for granted in this note we look more closely at this equivalence we distinguish between two types of differentiated products according to the variety of preferences assumed with respect to those products building on this distinction we recognize that the demand faced by a firm locating on hotelling s line is analogous to the demand faced by a firm selecting a horizontally differentiated product it should be emphasized thus that the equivalence between the geographical and the product selection problem is by no means general and relies on specific assumptions about consumers preferences next we formulate a small model close to hotelling s one in which firms select a horizontally differentiated product within this model it will be shown that a pure strategy price equilibrium exists for every pair of products this statement is to be contrasted with the results of d aspremont et al i979 who have shown that in the original hotelling s setting an equilibrium fails to exist when firms are too close together 1 in addition we will examine the product selection problem faced by firms in a two stage game in the first stage each firm selects a product in the second stage the firm defines a price for its product we will seek the existence of a perfect equilibrium in this game a perfect equilibrium in this context can be viewed as a nash equilibrium in a game in which firms select a product aware of the non cooperative price equilibrium that will occur for each of their choices it will be shown that contrary to hotelling s principle the two firms will maximise their differentiation i e firms will locate at opposite ends of the market

effects of price promotions on variety seeking and reinforcement behavior a stochastic model is proposed to examine how changes in frequency of price discounts affect brand choice decisions of consumers who exhibit variety seeking and reinforcement behavior it is shown that the effect on choice depends on whether the brand offering discounts is a major or minor brand in the product category this model extends the existing literature on stochastic models of variety seeking behavior by explicitly incorporating switching due to promotions along with intrinsic switching due to variety seeking the model yields testable hypotheses which are supported in a laboratory experiment and on analyses of the iri cracker data