subsidizing renewable energy under capital mobility abstract this paper provides a rationale for subsidizing green renewable energy production within a multi country model where energy is produced with mobile capital in green and dirty production we investigate the countries decentralized choice of emissions taxes and green energy subsidies without green subsidies the emissions tax is set inefficiently low since each country ignores the environmental externality inflicted on other countries and since the emissions tax leads to a capital outflow to other countries when the green subsidy is available countries choose a positive subsidy rate since this reduces the overall distortion of the tax subsidy system in doing so each country internalizes a larger part of the environmental externality as a consequence capital is relocated from the dirty into the clean sectors and reduces global pollution hence the subsidy is not only beneficial for the country which imposes it but also for all countries

racing to the bottom and racing to the top the crucial role of firm characteristics in foreign direct investment choices this study builds on the pollution haven and induced innovation arguments as explanations for firm behavior with regard to international environmental management and argues both need to be integrated this implies that foreign direct investment is capable of facilitating a race to the bottom and a race to the top simultaneously using novel and detailed data we test whether environmental capabilities and weaknesses and other characteristics affect us firms foreign direct investment choices in chinese provinces with more or less stringent environmental regulation this enables a more detailed analysis by allowing country regulation to vary spatially and over time our study finds that heterogeneity in capabilities and firm size jointly determine foreign direct investment and in doing so shows the simultaneity of a race to the bottom and to the top specifically firms with environmental capabilities invest in more stringently regulated regions and firms with weaknesses are less likely to target such regions these diverging effects are both moderated by firm size which further amplifies each of them our findings underscore the need to integrate pollution haven and induced innovation arguments in a joint analysis they furthermore show the relevance of methodological choices when testing hypotheses integrating the above arguments empirically

can fat tail create the momentum and reversal we suggest that fat tail variations can cause both short term momentum and long term reversal simultaneously in both the time series and cross sectional returns of securities the fat tail of the

misintermediation and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract individuals plan consumption and production for different point in the future using interest rates of various maturities as a guide however the financial intermediaries individuals work through traditionally do not match the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities as a result aggregate production plans and aggregate consumption plans for each period in the future need not coincide the resulting discrepancy will eventually appear as a recession or boom involving an unanticipated change in interest rates and production inside the original intertemporal production possibilities frontier maturity transformation is therefore not an essential function of financial intermediation but rather a mis function one which we call misintermediation

micro economic modelling of biofuel system in france to determine tax exemption policy under uncertainty abstract liquid biofuel support program launched in 1993 in france is implemented through tax exemptions to biofuels produced by agro industrial chains activity levels are fixed by decree and allocated by the government to the different chains based on earmarked budget increase voted in the parliament total quantity of biofuels will be increased by 50 in the horizon 2002 2003 a micro economic biofuel activity model containing a detailed agricultural sector component that is represented by 700 farms is used to estimate costs and surpluses generated by the activity at the national level as well as tax exemption levels furthermore monte carlo simulation has been used to search for efficient tax exemptions policies in an uncertain environment where biofuel profitability is significantly affected by petroleum price and soja cake prices results suggest that for the most efficient units both at the industry level large size biomass conversion units and at the agricultural sector level most productive farms unitary tax exemptions could be decreased by 10 20 for both biofuels ethyl ether and methyl ester with no risk for the viability of any existing chain

endogenous market structures in international trade natura facit saltum abstract almost all of the large literature on international trade with imperfect competition assumes exogenous market structures the purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model that generates alternative market structures as nash equilibria for different parameterizations of the basic model equilibrium market structure is a function of the underlying technology familiar configurations such as a duopoly competing in exports or a single multinational producing in both markets arise as special cases small tax policy changes can produce large welfare effects as the equilibrium market structure shifts implying discontinuous jumps in prices quantities and profits

regulation factor rewards and international trade this paper develops an approach for incorporating regulation into the theory of production distribution and trade using environmental regulation as an example four major conclusions emerge in the course of the analysis 1 production process regulation is equivalent in its effect on other cooperating factors to neutral technical regress i e negative progress 2 specific unambiguous income redistribution consequences follow from such regulation if commodity prices are held constant the factor used relatively intensively in the non regulated industry will gain absolutely in terms of both goods 3 unilateral or uncoordinated regulation destroys the link between uniform world commod ity prices and identical factor proportions factors prices across trading countries or regions 4 if any factor of production is freely mobile across frontiers the least differential regulation as between countries will entirely drive out the regulated industry from the more to the less regulated economy

ethical influences on the evolution of the us tradable permit approach to air pollution control abstract in 1975 a novel approach to air pollution control was implemented in the usa from this rather humble beginning this approach has now been expanded rather dramatically in several different directions this paper describes this evolution shows how the design of the system has been adapted to accommodate ethical concerns and describes how the latest versions of this approach have transformed the regulatory process which spawned the approach in the first place

international trade and environmental quality a survey abstract international trade has been incorporating various aspects of environmental issues since 1970 the extent to which environmental problems might affect many facets of trade or vice versa has been the subject of considerable debate over these years in this article we have attempted to establish some of the links between international trade and environmental quality by performing a comprehensive literature review we discuss issues such as establishing direct and indirect effects of international trade on environmental quality effects of trade on economic development environmental quality and energy and their relation with each other and finally the role of governments and international organizations in this context studies have so far revealed some linkages between trade and environment through conventional trade theory however interactions between international trade and types of pollution their sink and assimilative capacity need to be analyzed using a general equilibrium approach currently very little knowledge and agreement on the nature of interactions between trade theories development process and environmental quality exist existing studies have shown that the structure of environmental regulations should be modified to reflect the existence of trade under imperfect competition therefore further research on the interaction between new trade theory and environmental regulation is needed also theoretical and quantitative analysis regarding the effects of environmental regulations on competitiveness and location decision is needed the intensity and type of environmental measures vary across issues and countries therefore harmonizing environmental measures creates an inefficient atmosphere and to assume that trade restrictions will either improve or reverse the environmental damages is a serious mistake given the dynamic and intricate nature of the problem trade and environment debate continues despite vast research and poses a challenge for researchers and policy makers in the foreseeable future

environmental management policy under international carbon leakage this article studies environmental management policy when two fossil fuel consuming countries noncooperatively regulate greenhouse gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas the presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel price changes affects the tax quota equivalence we explore each country s incentive to choose a policy instrument in a two stage policy choice game and find subgame perfect nash equilibria this sheds new light on the questions of which policy instrument is more stringent and of why adopted instruments could be different among countries in particular our result suggests a reason why developing countries tend to employ emission taxes whereas developed countries tend to adopt quotas

optimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms this study explores an optimal pre committed or ex ante environmental tax policy in a three stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants after the government has chosen the optimal emission tax rate we show not only that the optimal emission tax is non decreasing with the declining cost of relocation e g setup or fixed costs or else the progress of globalization but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country causing the resulting welfare to decline as a consequence the domestic welfare varies in a non monotonic way we also show that such a counterintuitive non monotonic relationship does not arise under time consistent ex post emission taxes

exchange rate volatility and u s monetary policy an arch application this paper examines the effect of shifts in u s monetary policy regimes on the stochastic process that generates foreign exchange rates to account for the observed behavior of the data record the author models nominal dollar exchange rates as univariate autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic processes he then tests the stability of this process across u s monetary policy regimes for four of the currencies in the sample accounting for regime shifts improves the fit of the model regime shifts also appear to diminish the degree of persistence of variance making it less likely that exchange rates are integrated in variance copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

pollution havens endogenous environmental policy and foreign direct investment in an increasingly integrated world economy countries may have greater incentives to weaken environmental policy as disguised protection intended to give a competitive edge to local firms this may generate pollution havens as firms relocate in response to different environmental policies foreign direct investment fdi weakens profit shifting policy considerations while increasing environmental damages but at the same time may provide external benefits we derive conditions under which the fdi recipient country has an incentive to manipulate its environmental standard to prevent or attract fdi potentially eliminating or creating pollution havens in addition to examining the impact of fdi on the equilibrium state of the environment

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

efficient climate policy with internationally mobile firms a major concern in the design of an incomplete climate agreement is thatfirms that use fossil fuels intensively may respond to emission regulationsby relocating their plants from cooperating to non cooperating countries this paper analyses how the cooperating countries might deal with the issueof firm delocation through emission taxes trade provisions and alocalisation subsidy to mobile firms it is shown that firms should not beinduced to stay in the cooperating countries by lowering emission taxesbelow the pigouvian tax rate incentives to stay should be given partlythrough trade provisions and partly through a localisation subsidy a secondbest solution without localisation subsidies is also discussed in thatcase the efficient emission tax is lower than the pigouvian tax rate finally the paper discusses the implications of the first best and thesecond best policy regimes for the pattern of firm localisation

dynamic climate policy under firm relocation the implications of phasing out free allowances the allocation of free allowances for firms within the european union emissions trading scheme was found to lead to substantial overcompensation which is why some stakeholders recently called for phasing out of free allowances in the near term this paper analyzes the consequences of phasing out free allowances in a two period model when one country unilaterally implements climate policies a carbon price induces firms to invest in abatement capital but may lead to the relocation of some firms the regulator addresses the relocation problem by offering firms transfers i e free allowances conditional on maintaining the production in the regulating country if transfers are unrestricted in both periods then the regulator implements the first best by equalizing the carbon price with the marginal environmental damage and using transfers to prevent any relocation however if transfers in the future period are restricted the planner optimally implements a declining carbon price path with the first period price exceeding the marginal environmental damage a high carbon price triggers investments in abatement capital and thus creates a lock in effect with a larger abatement capital stock firms are less affected by carbon prices in the future and therefore less prone to relocate in the second period

pollution control through price incentives the role of rent seeking costs in monopoly markets abstract we consider the effect of rent seeking costs on the design of an efficient pollution tax earlier work has concluded that a pollution tax levied on an otherwise unregulated monopoly should always be less than the pigouvian rate this study demonstrates that if rent seeking costs are present the appropriate discharge tax for a monopoly firm can equal or exceed the marginal damage from its pollution calculations reveal that under a wide range of conditions the ideal corrective tax for a monopoly firm is very close to the fully internalizing pigouvian tax

appearance and reality in deposit insurance the case for reform abstract this paper argues that the staffs and explicit insurance reserves of u s deposit insurers have been overwhelmed by de facto financial disaster the full costs of financing federal deposit insurance have become enormous and increasingly inequitable in distribution to reduce voluntary risk taking authorities must reprice and redesign the system of de facto deposit insurance coverage six complementary reforms are discussed 1 accounting for institutional assets liabilities and net worth at market value 2 enhancing opportunities for deposit insurers to manage their risk exposure 3 recalibrating insurance coverages 4 imposing risk rated premiums 5 mixed private and governmental competition in deposit insurance and 6 constraining insurance agency and federal reserve authority to bail out insolvent institutions

carbon leakage grandfathering as an incentive device to avert firm relocation emission allowances are sometimes distributed for free in an early phase of a cap and trade scheme to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms this paper investigates whether grandfathering can also be used to avert the relocation of firms to countries with lower carbon prices we show that under certain conditions relocation can be averted in the long run even if the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time and immediate relocation is profitable in its absence this requires that the permit price triggers sufficient investments into low carbon technologies or abatement capital that create a lock in effect which makes relocation unprofitable

market evidence on the effective maturity of bank assets and liabilities the recent years increase in interest rate volatility has intensified concern over the exposure of commercial banks to interest rate or funding risk since the effect of interest rate changes on the equity value of a bank depends on the maturity or duration of the bank s assets and liabilities assessing an individual bank s interest rate risk exposure requires information about the maturity composition of its portfolio it is difficult however to assess a bank s risk exposure from balance sheet data because several important asset and liability items have theoretically ambiguous effective maturities in a frictionless market a security s effective maturity will equal its stated maturity or time to repricing with market imperfections e g depositors transaction or information costs however the equilibrium cost of some deposit items may respond sluggishly or incompletely to market rate changes see hester and pierce 1975 or flannery 1982 such liabilities market values discounted at market rates would therefore fluctuate with the level of interest rates these liabilities are sometimes called core deposits which manifest sticky responses to market rate changes we define an asset or liability s effective maturity as the maturity of a fixed rate perfectly elastically supplied security with the same market value elasticity as the bank balance sheet item under consideration naturally a balance sheet item s effective maturity is the relevant determinant of its contribution to the bank s overall interest rate risk sensitivity

capital standard forbearance and deposit insurance pricing under garch abstract we propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that simultaneously incorporates the capital standard and the possibility of forbearance the model employs the recently developed garch option pricing technique in determining the deposit insurance value our model offers two distinctive advantages first it explicitly considers the implications of the strict enforcement on capital standard as stipulated in fdic improvement act of 1991 second the use of the garch model allows us to capture many robust features exhibited by financial asset returns by the garch option pricing theory the value of a contingent claim is a function of the asset risk premium this unique feature is found to be prominent in determining the bank s deposit insurance value we also examine the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard behavior in this multiperiod deposit insurance setting

hedging against interest rate risk reconsidering volatility adjusted immunization abstract it is well known that long term interest rates display a lower volatility than short term interest rates the imperfect correlation between changes in long term and short term interest rates is also well documented simple immunization techniques based on duration and convexity do not take such factors into account this paper suggests an approach which considers unequal volatility and imperfect correlation when building immunizing portfolios our results suggest that this approach may lead to significant improvements over both duration based and convexity based immunization strategies volatility adjusted and correlation adjusted immunization also outperform strategies based on factor analysis of interest rates changes

does environmental dumping lead to delocation environmental dumping is often viewed as an instrument used by some countries in the attempt to attract foreign investments stated otherwise the delocation of firms would be a major outcome of a stiff environmental policy in this paper we study the impact of a strict anti pollution policy pursued by a government on domestic firms locational decisions and determine the main variables that interact with such a policy some preliminary welfare implications are also provided

cross hauling of polluting factors abstract this paper analyzes the investment environment overlap using a two stage model of two jurisdictions capital exports are modeled as choice variables for capital owners who weigh income considerations against the effects of capital exports on the quality of their local environments and on environmental policy this framework reveals that capital owners have an incentive to cross haul polluting factors across jurisdictions when direct controls are used to regulate emissions and that this cross hauling induces policymakers to ratchet up environmental policies in both locations the importance of instrument type and commitment on environmental policy is also analyzed

plant location wind direction and pollution policy under offshoring we examine pollution policy in a unified three country framework with the country in the middle playing double roles as both a polluter and a victim we find that government preference over profits and consumer surplus to be important and so is environmentalism in particular the most downwind country has the least incentives to control pollution under oligopoly several additional undesirable scenarios may arise due to the interaction between wind direction and the incentive trade offs in rent shifting and pollution control we analyse the mechanisms behind and provide policy guidance

buy coal a case for supply side environmental policy free riding is at the core of environmental problems if a climate coalition reduces its emissions world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more they may also extract the dirtiest type of fossil fuel and invest too little in green technology the coalition s second best policy distorts trade and is not time consistent however suppose that the countries can trade the rights to exploit fossil fuel deposits as soon as the market clears the above mentioned problems vanish and the first best is implemented in short the coalition s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them

is environmental dumping greater when plants are footloose concerns have been expressed that in a global market place with mobile capital national governments will have incentives to set weak environmental policies environmental dumping to protect the international competitiveness of their domestic firms and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants may be relatively footloose so that governments are concerned to prevent capital flight in this paper we investigate whether the mobility of firms does indeed increase incentives for environmental dumping we do this by taking a simple model of imperfect competition and comparing the environmental policies that would be set by non cooperative governments for two different move structures where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate the exogenous location case or market share game and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate the endogenous location case or location game this raises an important modelling issue for it is natural in the market share game that governments would set different environmental policies depending on the number of firms that locate in their countries and if we are to compare just the effect of different move structures then in the location game we should also allow governments to condition their environmental policies on the number of firms that locate in them contrary to previous models of the location game where governments set a single instrument independent of the number of firms that locate in their countries we show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game may be greater or less than in the location game depending in particular on the degree of substitution between products of the firms and hence the intensity of market competition we also show that there is more environmental dumping in the location game when governments use a single instrument than when they condition their instruments on the number of firms that locate in their countries

the impact of selected abatement strategies on transnational pollution the terms of trade and factor rewards a general equilibrium approach abstract widespread publicity of international conflict over transfrontier pollutants such as acid deposition and the november 1986 chemical spill in the rhine river has increased the public s awareness of the need to devise abatement strategies appropriate for transnational pollution this article develops a general equilibrium approach for analyzing the economic impacts of selected abatement strategies the model includes internationally mobile goods capital and pollution flows and flexible output and factor prices the general equilibrium approach provides policymakers with important information which is usually not revealed by a partial equilibrium approach that is demonstrated by applying the model to the north american acid deposition issue

spatial economic theory of pollution control reflections on a paradox abstract in their analyses of the impact of pollution taxation on the location of polluting decisions u k mathur j environ econom management 3 16 28 1976 and s s gokturk j reg sci 19 461 467 1979 obtained the result that a tax increase on urban pollution concentration may not succeed in pushing the polluting firm away from the urban center in this paper is shown that the sufficient condition for success in this case depends upon the specification of the production and pollution emissions technology and may be the opposite to the one posited by mathur and has more intuitive appeal

greenhouse gas emission controls and firm locations in north south trade this paper studies greenhouse gas emission ghg controls in the presence of international carbon leakage through international firm relocation in a new economic geography model with two countries north and south only north sets a target for ghg emissions we compare the consequences of emission quotas and emission taxes under trade liberalization on location of two manufacturing sectors with different emission intensities and degrees of carbon leakage with low trade costs further trade liberalization increases global emissions by facilitating carbon leakage regulation by quotas leads to spatial sorting resulting in less carbon leakage and less global emissions than regulation by taxes

producer surplus and subsidization of pollution control device a non monotonic relationship regulators have been concerned with the impact of environmental regulation on the profitability of regulated firms there have been numerous grants and subsidy programs to reduce the cost of emission control equipment intuitively there should be a monotonically increasing relationship between profits and the amount of subsidization however the author shows that this may not be so since regulation may establish a collusive outcome amongst oligopolistic competitors the role of the subsidization policy may then be seen as the following given cournot players the regulator may subsidize the emission control device to prevent the industry from reaching a profit superior outcome copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

pollution havens and industrial agglomeration abstract this paper examines the pollution haven hypothesis using a spatial economy model of two countries and two sectors the manufacturing sector generates cross border pollution which reduces cross sectoral productivity of agricultural goods and lowers local income we derive a demand reducing effect that discourages firms to move to the country with laxer environmental regulations in the absence of any comparative advantage our analysis also demonstrates that manufacturing agglomeration forces can alleviate the pollution haven effect a pollution haven may not arise if environmental regulation is slightly more stringent in the larger country

strategic environmental policy under incomplete information this paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy it is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition relative to the full information case incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour a countervailing effect tending to raise distortion is however revealed from the analysis this effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies the results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information when environmental standards rather than direct production subsidies are the strategic instrument

strategic behaviour in international metallurgical coal markets abstract this paper analyses whether prices and trade flows in the international market for metallurgical coals were subject to non competitive conduct in the period 2008 to 2010 to do so i develop mathematical programming models a stackelberg model two varieties of a cournot model and a perfect competition model for computing spatial equilibria in international resource markets results are analysed with various statistical measures to assess prediction accuracy of the models the results show that real market equilibria cannot be reproduced with a competitive model however real market outcomes can be accurately simulated with the non competitive models suggesting that market equilibria in the international metallurgical coal trade were subject to strategic behaviour of coal exporters

environmental taxes and first mover advantages this paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies to analyze this question i assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously when taxes are set sequentially an effect denoted as the sequential setting effect arises that raises the equilibrium taxes i show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners when this overspill is low enough taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting however the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower in this case governments set taxes sequentially when the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously in this case each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

a note on environmental federalism interpreting some contradictory results abstract this paper reconciles some conflicting interpretations of recent literature on interjurisdictional environmental regulatory competition 6 7 present a model in which competition to attract investment by lowering environmental standards leads to a pareto optimal equilibrium 3 and 4 describe a model in which such competition can result in a suboptimal nash equilibrium while it would be possible to draw opposite policy implications from the two models regarding the appropriate degree of environmental federalism such a conclusion would be incorrect this paper reconciles the different results by showing that they depend in large part on monopoly profits and tax exporting not the nature of the pollution externality or environmental federalism

greenhouse gas emission controls in an open economy to examine how greenhouse gas emission controls affect a country s industrial and trade structures this article presents an open economy model that has both ricardian and heckscher ohlin features we specifically compare emission quotas emission taxes and emission standards the patterns of production and trade critically hinge on those policy tools it is shown that a domestic emission control may lead to carbon leakage and may not reduce the world emissions and that emission standards may work as a hidden production subsidy toward an emission intensive industry

environmental policy in majoritarian systems abstract this paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental tax policies in majoritarian federal electoral systems such as the u s and derives implications for the environmental federalism debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental taxes in the absence of majority bias the socially preferred policy would be federal district level taxation which accounts both for cross boundary pollution and differences in industry concentration across districts in majoritarian systems however where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts the majority party at the national or state level favors home districts depending on the location of polluting industries and the associated damages the majority party may therefore impose sub optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias majority bias can influence the social welfare ranking of alternative environmental tax policies in some cases majority bias may make decentralized or federal uniform taxation the preferred solution

a bilevel programming approach to determining tax credits for biofuel production abstract this paper presents a bilevel programming formulation of a leader follower game that can be used to help decision makers arrive at a rational policy for encouraging biofuel production in the model the government is the leader and would like to minimize the annual tax credits it allows the petro chemical industry for producing biofuels the crops grown for this purpose are on land now set aside and subsidized through a different support program the agricultural sector is the follower its objective is to maximize profits by selecting the best mix of crops to grow as well as the percentage of land to set aside two solution algorithms are developed the first involves a grid search over the tax credit variables corresponding to the two biofuels under consideration ester and ethanol once these values are fixed nonfood crop prices can be determined and the farm sector linear program solved the second algorithm is based on an approximate nonlinear programming nlp formulation of the bilevel program an engineering approach is taken where the discontinuities in the government s problem are ignored and the farm model is treated as a function that maps nonfood crop prices into allocation decisions results are given for an agricultural region in the northern part of france comprising 393 farms

end of pipe or cleaner production how to go green in presence of income inequality and pro environmental behavior in this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned in particular consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product but also its environmental impact this environmental valuation has a positional content consumers attach a positive attribute to the green product while penalizing the brown one in this context we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end of pipe abatement efforts we find that the interplay between the intensity of market competition consumers income disparity and environmental concern can play a crucial role in directing the green producer towards one or the other technological choice more precisely the adoption of cleaner production technologies can be discouraged by low average income and by tough competition while it can be spurred by the moral social incentive towards pro environmental behavior

impact of electricity prices on foreign direct investment evidence from the european union in the course of recent years growing concerns over increasing energy prices have emerged in the context of maintaining europe s international competitiveness in particular rising electricity price differentials adversely affect firms total production costs and ultimately impact their investment decisions nonetheless electricity prices as locational determinants of foreign direct investment fdi have received little attention in the literature so far we address this gap by including electricity prices in the traditional framework of fdi analysis and examine the impact of price variation on net fdi inflows in countries of the european union eu we use a panel of 27 countries for a period of 2003 2013 and system generalised method of moments gmm as method of estimation the main findings of the paper confirm that besides tax rates unit labour costs and competitive disadvantage in secondary education also electricity prices contribute to eroding competitiveness of the countries yet the effect of electricity prices does not seem to be uniform across the eu in fact southwestern countries tend to be more adversely affected than north eastern both in the short and long run

environmental regulation cost and industry structure changes nonstationary markov analyses are used to investigate impacts of environmental regulatory costs associated with compliance on changes in market structure in pulp and paper industries results show environmental regulation expenditures have statistically significant effects on the probabilities of capacity moving to a larger company size category so industry structure is affected by environmental regulation however counter to expectations results further show consolidation occurs with higher probability when environmental costs are falling rather than when they are rising policy analyses that presume immediate policy responses to cost changes or that industry structure is unchanged may yield time inconsistent policy conclusions

performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution abstract this paper presents a model of pollution regulation in an oligopolistic market two forms of regulation are considered performance standards which regulate pollution directly by an upper limit on emissions and design standards which regulate pollution indirectly by a minimum usage requirement of an enissions control input equilibria under each regulatory regime are characterized a welfare analysis reveals that performance standards are preferred to design standards if the objective is minimization of emissions plus pollution damage costs however the comparison is indeterminate if the regulator s objective is total surplus less pollution damage an equivalence between emissions taxes and performance standards is established so the above welfare comparisons also apply to emissions taxes versus design standards

locational choices of firms and decentralized environmental policy with various instruments abstract suppose there exists a federation with a given number of mobile firms generating waste emissions in the jurisdiction in which they locate this paper demonstrates that if jurisdictions use emission taxes or marketable emission rights to control pollution within their boundaries and distribute the revenues captured by these instruments in a socially efficient way firms locate efficiently taking their pollution externalities into account decentralized environmental policy relying on direct controls however prevents locational efficiency of mobile firms furthermore if jurisdictions are small decentralized environmental policy with emission taxes and marketable pollution rights also support an efficient environmental quality while a policy using direct controls sets too high emission standards

market discipline and bank subordinated debt note a lengthy literature in banking has addressed the question of whether the market prices of liabilities respond to individual bank risk taking activity that is whether any market disciplines exists however despite the obvious importance of this question the current record has led to no consensus on the issue results have been contradictory in this journal alone hannan and hanweck 1988 conclude that the market does extract at least some price for risk taking while avery belton and goldberg 1988 find no such evidence in this study we argue that this line of inquiry has a serious f law in that it fails to use theoretical models of bank instrument valuation to determine the appropriate testing of market discipline therefore the empirical models have lacked the necessary exactness to isolate the appropriate null hypotheses to redress this shortcoming and advance the methodology of this area of the literature we use a pricing model which comes to the banking area from the options pricing literature to look at the yield spread on bank liabilities using this model it is clear that the value of large uninsured bank liabilities cannot be described as a linear monotonic function of risk moreover current bank regulation affects the assumed role risk measures play in the pricing of such debt instruments both of these complications mean that simple regressions are not likely to adequately address the relationship between the value of debt and underlying risk in the final section we empirically investigate the presence of market discipline using contingent claims pricing we find that accounting measures of bank risk still have little predictive value in explaining yield spreads and therefore offer little evidence of meaningful market discipline

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

environmental regulation induced foreign direct investment the last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the relationship between environmental regulations and international capital flows however empirical studies have so far failed to find conclusive evidence for this so called pollution haven or race to the bottom effect where foreign direct investment fdi is assumed to be attracted to low regulation countries regions or states in this paper we present a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate that greater stringency in environmental standards can lead to a strategic increase in capital inflows which we refer to as environmental regulation induced fdi our result reveals a possible explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature and provides an illustration of the conditions under which environmental regulations in the host country can affect the location decision of foreign firms

on the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy this paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy we call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms

bank regulation and deposit insurance the subject of government bank regulation is intimately intertwined with that of government deposit insurance if the government is to insure bank deposits it should also have some say in the risks that insured banks are allowed to take otherwise it would leave itself wide open to unlimited potential losses john h kareken in this issue comes close to arguing that banks without government deposit insurance could provide satisfactorily safe transactions accounts i would go one step further and argue that government deposit insurance is not just unnecessary but actually undesirable banks that offer transaction deposits are supposedly subject to an inherent instability problem that makes them prone to self realizing depositor panics traditionally transaction deposits are denominated as a fixed number of currency units while the assets corresponding to these deposits are mostly finite term securities or commercial loans if depositors all want their money at once the banks simply do not have it to the extent that their assets are marketable the banks can sell them off to meet withdrawals with only minimal losses but if there is a run on the banking system as a whole the banks scramble for funds could conceivably drive interest rates up and asset prices down to the point at which the banks are actually insolvent simply because of depositor fears that they might fail to the extent that bank assets consist of poorly marketable commercial loans they are even more exposed to the risk of runs this inherent instability problem is the most commonly cited argument for government deposit insurance and the careful government regulation it entails or ought to entail however the money market mutual fund mmmf is a recent market innovation that completely solves this inherent instability problem of the payments system as kareken points out in his paper mmmfs like all mutual funds are run proof since their obligations to their investors are simply pro rata shares in the current market value of the

environmental policy when market structure and plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region two firm model is developed in which firms choose the number and the regional locations of their plants both firms pollute and market structure is endogenous to environmental policy there are increasing returns at the plant level imperfect competition between the home and the foreign firm and transport costs between the two markets at critical levels of environmental policy variables small policy changes cause large discrete jumps in a region s pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a plant or shifts production to from a foreign branch plant the implications for optimal environmental policy differ significantly from those suggested by traditional pigouvian marginal analysis

measuring tail thickness to estimate the stable index α a critique a generalized pareto or simple pareto tail index estimate above 2 has frequently been cited as evidence against infinite variance stable distributions it is demonstrated that this inference is invalid tail index estimates greater than 2 are to be expected for stable distributions with as low as 1 65 the nonregular distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic for a null of normality and an alternative of symmetric stability is tabulated by monte carlo methods and appropriately adjusted for sampling error in repeated tests real stock returns yield a stable of 1 845 and reject iid normality at the 996 level

the monotonicity of the term premium abstract fama s evidence that the term premium on treasury securities is not monotonically increasing is found to depend entirely on the behavior of bid asked mean returns on 9 and 10 month bills and only during the subperiod 8 64 12 72 when transactions costs as reflected in the bid asked spread are taken into account there is found to be no way to exploit this non monotonicity the anomalous behavior of the quotations is attributed to the treasury s auctions of 9 month bills during the period 9 66 10 72 the hypothesis that the term premium is a monotonically increasing function of maturity remains unrefuted

intra industry trade in intermediate products pollution and internationally increasing returns this paper examines the relationship between intra industry trade in intermediate products pollution and increasing returns we develop a two country model in which production occurs in two stages final and intermediate good production intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition and final good production exhibits increasing returns with respect to the number of varieties of intermediates pollution occurs in the production of the final good when polluting intermediates are used we analyze the effects of international trade in intermediate products on pollution output and welfare under an endogenous tax scenario and with two types of pollution functions the results show that because of increasing returns international trade either leads to lower total pollution in each country or lower pollution per unit of output in at least one country in addition intra industry trade causes countries to import the environmental quality of their trading partners

controlling the monopolistic polluter nihilism or eclecticism abstract this paper is concerned with the consequences of pollution control when the polluter is a monopolist who can choose between abating pollution by reducing output and by adopting a less polluting technology it is suggested that the risk of welfare losses resulting from control policy is lower when technology is flexible than when it is rigid nevertheless some risk does remain so the paper concludes with a discussion of the possible use of selective control instruments to keep the risk to a minimum

unilateral climate policy and foreign direct investment with firm and country heterogeneity we analyse the effects of unilateral climate policy in a two country two firm model with endogenous plant location and heterogeneity in both country size and firm s characteristics the effectiveness of unilateral climate policy is shown to depend on the joint effect of country and firm heterogeneity and on their impact on equilibrium location choice for being effective and not leading to production relocation in the long run unilateral climate policy should be moderate implemented by a sufficiently larger area and complemented by mechanisms promoting the international transfer of clean technologies the model indicates that the smaller area cannot take the lead in global climate mitigation for a protracted time period finally when the local community is not environmentally concerned the unilateral policy unambiguously makes the society worse off

estimates of the variance of u s inflation based upon the arch model it is generally agreed that the unpredictability of future inflation is a major component of the welfare loss associated with inflation perfectly predicted inflation might induce some costs through institutional rigidities governmental interference and transaction costs but in the long run these should be rather minimal as these institutions adopt various forms of indexing when inflation is unpredictable risk averse economic agents will incur a loss even if prices and quantities are perfectly flexible in all markets inflation is a measure of the relative price of goods today and goods tomorrow thus uncertainty in tomorrow s price impairs the efficiency of today s allocation decisions friedman in his nobel lecture 8 argues convincingly that higher variability of inflation would lead to decreased output ceteris paribus he then conjectures that higher rates of inflation are generally associated with higher variability of inflation and presumably greater uncertainty about future rates if this is true then higher rates of inflation would also be associated with low levels of output which implies a positively sloped phillips curve this paper uses a new statistical technique arch to estimate the conditional mean and variance of inflation from u s time series data the main finding is that the variance of inflation in the seventies was only slightly greater than in the sixties

interest risk sensitive deposit insurance premia stable ach estimates abstract the parameters of interest rate uncertainty are estimated by maximum likelihood for the period 1952 1982 and used to evaluate bank or thrift deposit insurance as a function of duration mismatching capital asset ratio and the recent history of interest rate forecasting errors homoskedasticity is overwhelmingly rejected in favor of adaptive conditional heteroskedasticity ach even after removing this heteroskedasticity normality gives much lower likelihood than paretian stable distributions with characteristic exponent in the range 1 614 to 1 714 the conditional deposit insurance values fluctuate by factors in excess of 300 for some duration gaps over the past three decades

tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets abstract the literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in imperfectly competitive markets governments have an incentive to subsidize exports of their own firms yet the consequence of the departure from laissez faire is a wasteful subsidy race in contrast this paper shows that even in imperfectly competitive markets there is a strong tendency for laissez faire to prevail the driving force is the firms willingness to exploit tax or subsidy differentials by relocating production a small tax differential induces firms to change their place of production the change in market structure has a negligible effect on the oligopoly equilibrium but a non negligible impact on government revenues when tax policy is non discriminatory governments gain lose by attracting all firms when production is taxed subsidized hence laissez faire is the only equilibrium since from the point of view of the two producing countries laissez faire nondiscrimination pareto dominates the intervention equilibrium discrimination nondiscrimination is a simple device to result in a mutual beneficial outcome

fair insurance guaranty premia in the presence of risk based capital regulations stochastic interest rate and catastrophe risk abstract a multiperiod model is developed to measure the costs posed to the guaranty fund in a setting that incorporates risk based capital regulations interest rate risk and the possibility of catastrophic losses the guaranty contract is modeled as a put option on the asset of the insurance company with a stochastic strike price and an uncertain maturity the impacts of the key factors of this model are examined numerically and shown to make material differences in the costs to the guaranty fund

the lesser of two evils an empirical investigation of foreign direct investment pollution tradeoff this article investigates the relationship between foreign direct investment fdi and pollution measured by carbon dioxide co2 emissions the results suggest that while lax environmental regulations might attract fdi the foreign companies utilize less polluting technology as compared to local firms in low income countries thus fdi does not necessarily increase pollution levels in the host countries the findings therefore simultaneously support the pollution haven and the pollution halo hypotheses