on the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions an experimental study abstract this article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together possible applications include mergers collusion and joint bidding arrangements the change produces a strong party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining weak bidder s the predicted effects include inefficiency a decrease in the seller s revenue and higher bidders payoffs under risk neutrality the members of the strong party benefit less than the weak bidders the prediction is reversed when the bidders are sufficiently risk averse these hypotheses are tested experimentally contrary to the theory joint bidding increases efficiency and the seller s revenue decreases by less than expected strong bidders benefit more than weak bidders indicating that incentives to bid jointly may be greater than hypothesized additionally the experiment assesses the effect of group decision making a nash equilibrium prediction for individual group differences based on differences in risk attitudes is not supported by the data

globalization and the great u turn income inequality trends in 16 oecd countries the debate on the resurgence of income inequality in some advanced industrial societies has often focused on the impact of an increasingly integrated world economy typified by growing capital mobility heightened international competition and an increase in migration this study represents one of the first systematic cross national examinations of the role of globalization in the inequality u turn results indicate on the one hand that total inequality variation is principally affected by the percentage of the labor force in agriculture followed by the institutional factors union density and decommodification and only then by globalization on the other hand longitudinal variation in inequality while still dominated by the percentage of the labor force in agriculture is also principally affected by aspects of globalization such as southern import penetration and direct investment outflow and to a lesser extent by migration in other words globalization explains the longitudinal trend of inc

changing income inequalities within and between nations new evidence fresh data sources on cross national income are examined to document recent changes in the composition of world income inequality within and between nations new evidence shows that during the 1980s and 1990s the composition of world income inequality experienced a fundamental change characterized by the diminishing significance of between nation income differences and the growing prominence of within nation inequalities two competing trends account for this change 1 steady growth in the average level of income inequality within nations and 2 a decline in income inequality between nations these recent trends signify a reversal in one of the major legacies of the industrial revolution the internationalization of world income inequality across national borders the findings raise important questions for future studies of cross national inequality and development

index investment and financialization of commodities the authors found that concurrent with the rapidly growing index investment in commodity markets since the early 2000s prices of non energy commodity futures in the united states have become incr

a designer s choice between single prize and parallel tournaments in this article i theoretically and experimentally compare a designer s profits from two tournament designs the first design is a standard winner take all tournament with a single prize the second design features two winner take all parallel tournaments with different prizes where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing i develop a simple model that illustrates how the relative performances of these designs change as contestants abilities differ the theoretical model shows that the designer s profit is higher lower in the parallel tournament when contestants abilities differ greatly are similar i complement these findings with experimental evidence the experiments show that the parallel tournament is more profitable under high heterogeneity whereas under low heterogeneity the designer is better off with the single prize tournament furthermore high ability agents under participate and low ability agents over participate in the high prize tournament relative to the theoretical prediction jel c72 d82 j33 m51 m52

brand credibility and marketplace globalization the role of perceived brand globalness and localness consumers in western markets are increasingly critical towards globalization and re embrace local values companies thus must decide whether to continue to pursue global branding strategies and or rejuvenate local branding strategies to explore the implications of market globalization for consumer preferences we use signaling theory to investigate the role of perceived brand globalness pbg and brand localness pbl as signals of brand credibility related downstream effects and boundary conditions across two countries with differing levels of globalization in globalized markets pbg is a weaker signal of brand credibility than pbl whereas in globalizing markets the two signals are of equal importance

asymmetric auctions with resale an experimental study we study auctions with resale based on hafalir and krishna s 2008 6 model as predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without so that average auction prices tend to increase when the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do but not nearly as much as the theory predicts in other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral nash model s predictions bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without in line with the theory

inequality in the world polity the structure of international organization recent research reveals strong effects of involvement in international organizations on state policies but much of this research downplays inequality in world political participation and there is only a limited understanding of what explains world polity ties using data on memberships in intergovernmental and international non governmental organizations igos and ingos for 1960 through 2000 this study analyzes inequality in the world polity igo ties are fairly evenly distributed but the level of inequality in ingo ties is as high as the level of world income inequality since 1960 inequality in ties to igos decreased sharply but inequality in ties to ingos remained more stable a conflict centered model of the world polity is developed here that explains world political participation as a function of material and symbolic conflict rich core western states and societies have significantly more ties to the world polity than do others powerful states dominate igos less now than they did in 1960 but rich core western societies have grown more dominant in the ingo field

policy as myth and ceremony the global spread of stock exchanges 1980 2005 we examine the antecedents and consequences in developing countries of creating a national stock exchange a core technology of financial globalization we study local conditions and global institutional pressures in the rapid spread of exchanges since the 1980s and examine how conditions at the point of adoption affected exchanges subsequent vibrancy little prior research connects the process of diffusion with the operational performance of adopted policies we find that international coercion was associated with more ceremonial adoption but that contrary to expectations common in institutional research contagion processes via peer groups and normative emulation of prestigious actors enhanced vibrancy economic globalization provides a generative context in which to consider the policy implications of organizational theory and research globalization creates both opportunities and challenges for countries on the periphery of the world economy the central question for policy makers is what structures and institutions they should adopt to promote economic and social vibrancy notably waves of alternative theories and associated packages of reforms have swept over the globe in recent decades observing this process of global diffusion and often abandonment of policies and practices meyer boli thomas and raminrez 1997 extended analyses of myth and ceremony at the organization level to the nation state in their world society approach a core idea in this work is that coercion and mimicry of peers or competitors typically based in a substrate of network ties often

de globalization theories predictions and opportunities for international business research de globalization now a distinct possibility would induce a significant qualitative shift in strategies structures and behaviors observable in international business ib coming to terms with this qualitative shift would require ib research to develop a much deeper integration of politics the key driver of de globalization to support such integration this paper introduces two relevant theories of de globalization from political science liberalism and realism both predict de globalization under current conditions but lead to different expectations about the future world economy liberalism suggests a patchwork of economic linkages while realism predicts the emergence of economic blocs around major countries this paper discusses the resulting opportunities in three areas of ib research political strategies and roles of multinational enterprises mnes global value chains and the role of the national context for political strategies and roles there is a need to explore how regular business activities and deliberate political agency of mnes affect the political sustainability of globalization for value chains questions include their future reach and specialization changes in organizational forms and the impact of political considerations on location decisions research opportunities on national contexts relate to their ability to sustain globalization and their connection with economic and military power

are the economy and the environment decoupling a comparative international study 1960 20051 ecological modernization theory posits that even though economic development harms the environment the magnitude of the harmful link decreases over the course of development in contrast the treadmill of production theory argues that the strong relationship between environmental harms and economic development will remain constant or possibly increase through time to evaluate these competing propositions interactions between economic development and time are used in cross national panel analyses of three measures of carbon dioxide emissions the results vary across the three outcomes as well as between developed and less developed countries providing mixed support for both theoretical perspectives the authors conclude by discussing how both theories could benefit from engaging contemporary research concerning changes within the transnational organization of production and the structure of international trade and how these global shifts influence environment economic development relationships

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first price auctions a laboratory study abstract landsberger et al landsberger m rubinstein j wolfstetter e zamir s 2001 first price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge review of economic design 6 461 480 identified optimal bidder behavior in first price private value auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge and they derived comparative statics predictions regarding the auctioneer s expected revenue and the efficiency of the allocation the experiment reported here tests the behavioral components of these comparative statics predictions the results support the prediction that buyers are inclined to bid more aggressively when they learn they have the low value contrary to the theory buyers are inclined to bid less when they learn they have the high value consistent with theory the overall proportion of efficient allocations is lower than in the first price auction before information is revealed but as a result of high value bidders decreasing their bids the expected revenue does not increase on a regular basis contrary to the theory s predictions

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

auctions with resale opportunities an experimental study we study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller s and buyer s markets we offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior prices and resource allocation building upon the hafalir and krishna 2008 model we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller s market than a buyer s market there is a price revenue efficiency trade off established theoretically between these two resale regimes in equilibrium however final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer advantaged resale case jel d44 c92

is there convergence across countries a spatial approach we analyze convergence across countries over the last half century as a result of globalizing forces drawing on theories of modernization dependency the world system political trade blocs and the world society we consider economic demographic knowledge financial and political dimensions of convergence using a new methodology we calculate the minimum volume ellipsoid encompassing different groupings of countries finding that during the 1960 2009 period countries have not evolved significantly closer or similar to one another although groups of countries based on their core periphery status or membership in trade blocs exhibit increasing internal convergence and divergence between one another

experimental evidence on the performance of emission trading schemes in the presence of an active secondary market as auction based emission trading schemes ets become more common in addressing climate change it is of interest to study the effects of bargaining power in resale markets on original as well as post resale allowance allocations in terms of prices and efficiency this article provides an experimental study of first price private value asymmetric auctions followed by a double auction resale market opportunity we compare the double auction to other resale regimes with an uneven distribution of market power and contrast initial bids resale prices and efficiency despite the conventional wisdom that full efficiency requires the absence of market power we find that double auction resale markets lead to lower efficiency than the monopsony resale regime the level of efficiency achieved however is close to the highest across mechanisms that have differential bargaining power at the resale stage

price formation in a sequential selling mechanism abstract this paper studies a dynamic trade institution where an auction is combined with a buy it now option this option presents a take it or leave it price offered by the seller to a potential buyer before the auction if the buyer rejects this buyout price the object is auctioned off in equilibrium sales should take place only in the auction an experimental test reveals that average buyout prices and profits are well captured by the theoretical prediction however a substantial amount of sales takes place before the auction this is caused by offering too low or accepting too high buyout prices we discuss alternative explanations such as risk preferences and wrong formation of beliefs that might account for agents behavior

a theory of commodity price fluctuations this paper studies the price fluctuations of storable commodities that are traded in open markets and are subject to random shocks to demand or more particularly to supply it relaxes the common assumption that the shocks are identically and independently distributed in favor of temporally dependent and periodic disturbances the existence of a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium is demonstrated for each of the models analyzed and testable implications of the models are derived an illustrative empirical investigation is then undertaken for the model with periodic disturbances using monthly time series observations for seven commodities over the period 1960 93

globalization pressures and the state the worldwide spread of central bank independence the authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank following the world system world society and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology they assume that states are in cultural political and economic competition with each other thereby seeking to maintain their position and status frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment the authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade investment and multilateral lending increases they also model the cross national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role equivalent trade relationships between countries they find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000

spanning the institutional abyss the intergovernmental network and the governance of foreign direct investment global economic transactions such as foreign direct investment fdi must extend over an institutional abyss between the jurisdiction and therefore protection of the states involved intergovernmental organizations igos represent an important attempt to span this abyss the authors use a network approach to demonstrate that the connections between two countries through joint membership in the same igos are associated with a large positive influence on the fdi that flows between them moreover they show that this effect occurs not only in the case of connections through economic igos but also through those with social and cultural mandates this demonstrates that relational governance is important and feasible in the global context even for the most risky transactions the authors also examine the interdependence between the igo network and the domestic institutions of states social and cultural igo connections do more and economic igo connections less to increase fdi when the target country is mo

the secondary circuit of capital reconsidered globalization and the u s real estate sector1 the author examines the u s real estate sector to show how the state shapes global real estate flows and networks of activity through the creation and control of liquid resources the analysis focuses on the role of state laws and regulations in the expansion of the mortgage backed securities markets and the development of real estate investment trusts reits these institutional developments represent a series of ad hoc state efforts to delocalize residential and commercial property and embed real estate financing within global capital markets rather than viewing globalization as weakening the state the author argues that the u s state s capacity to influence the degree and development of liquidity is a powerful mechanism of globalization

portfolio speculation and commodity price volatility in a stochastic storage model simulated prices from a stochastic storage model are used to examine the price impacts of speculation by rational investors who diversify their financial portfolios by holding agricultural commodity futures the main result is that rather than destabilizing commodity prices as is commonly believed portfolio speculation actually reduces price volatility portfolio speculation can potentially destabilize a commodity s price because the additional demand for long futures by speculators is expected to drive up the cash price during both periods of low net demand when the cash price is below average and periods of high net demand when the cash price is above average our theoretical analysis demonstrates that the higher level of inventory that is associated with portfolio speculation results in a larger release of stocks during periods of high net demand the price simulations reveal that this stock adjustment effect is strong since overall price volatility is smaller rather than larger with portfolio speculation

competitive storage and commodity price dynamics by buying cheap and selling dear risk neutral commodity speculators can smooth commodity prices and induce serial dependence in price even when none would exist under a simple process of supply and demand commodity prices are variable and strongly positively correlated from one year to the next the variability is often explained by supply factors and the autocorrelation by the activities of speculators we show that this explanation is not consistent with the evidence speculation can substantially increase autocorrelation for prices that are weakly autocorrelated in its absence but not to the high levels that are observed in the data

bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions an experimental study abstract we review an asymmetric auction experiment based on plum int j game theory 20 1992 393 private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions one of which first order stochastically dominates the other we test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders preference for first vs second price auctions

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

collusion and information revelation in auctions abstract the theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings however such analyses neglect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts wherein information revealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behaviour we experimentally test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation in first price auctions the results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first price mechanism failed collusion attempts distort bidding behaviour resulting in a loss of seller revenue and efficiency moreover the first price mechanism does not result in less collusion than the second price mechanism we conclude that while the features of the first price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behaviour make it highly susceptible to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

workers of the less developed world unite a multilevel analysis of unionization in less developed countries past scholars of unionization have offered exemplary cross national studies of affluent democracies and case studies of less developed countries ldcs what has been lacking is cross national research on unionization across ldcs we conduct a multilevel analysis of the likelihood that a worker is unionized with the late 1990s world values surveys of 39 ldcs we propose that unionization in ldcs can be explained by the individual characteristics of workers as well as the country level factors of institutions industrialization and globalization our analyses yield several conclusions first owing to the legacy of state socialism ex communist countries have much higher unionization second our analyses show that class very effectively explains union membership across ldcs although skilled manual workers are more unionized than most educated professionals stand out for their distinctively high unionization third the debt crisis significantly undermined unionization through the institutional influence of international monetary fund imf agreements and the globalization pressure of debt service despite being the focus of much research industrialization democratization the size of the state international labour organization conventions and international trade and investment are surprisingly insignificant decomposing the sample by communist legacy signing an imf agreement is significant in ex communist countries and debt service is significant in countries without a communist legacy overall we conclude that the debt crisis has undermined unionization and class remains a powerful basis of mobilization across ldcs

trade globalization since 1795 waves of integration in the world system the term globalization as used by social scientists and in popular discourse has many meanings we contend that it is important to distinguish between globalization as a contemporary political ideology and what we call structural globalization the increasing worldwide density of large scale interaction networks relative to the density of smaller networks we study one type of economic globalization over the past two centuries the trajectory of international trade as a proportion of global production is trade globalization a recent phenomenon a long term upward trend or a cyclical process using an improved measure of trade globalization we find that there have been three waves since 1795 we discuss the possible causes of these pulsations of global integration and their implications for the early decades of the twenty first century

outside options another reason to choose the first price auction abstract in this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first price and second price auctions with outside options we find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors outside options however overbidding in first price auctions is significantly higher with outside options than without first price auctions yield more revenue than second price auctions this revenue premium is significantly higher with outside options in second price auctions the introduction of outside options has only a small effect