revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion in this article i study how the presence of a revolving door and potential collusion between a regulator and a regulated firm affect the regulator s performance incentives contrary to the conventional wisdom these seemingly undesirable features of the regulatory system may serve the interests of the government because i the regulator s efforts to enhance her industry qualifications may have a complementary effect on her regulatory performance and ii the regulator may become more aggressive in regulation so as to signal her industry qualifications to the firm collusion between a regulator and a firm also can be beneficial because a regulator may increase her monitoring effort in order to increase the chance of achieving a profitable side contract with the firm and side contracting may not always succeed

optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers we study optimal incentive provision for knowledge workers a crucial resource for many organizations we augment a standard moral hazard framework to reflect two key patterns first retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave thereby harming their employer second the value of the workeru 05f3s outside option might depend on effort on the job optimal contracts that retain workers exhibit properties such as first best effort and surplus or non responsiveness to changes in underlying conditions due to large rents full retention is however costly for employers hence even when socially inefficient separation might occur in equilibrium 2014 elsevier b v

collusion and renegotiation in a principal supervisor agent relationship this paper describes a principal agent relationship with a supervisor who has information about the agent the agent and the supervisor have the possibility to collude and misinform the principal from the literature we know that there exists an optimal contract which excludes collusion in equilibrium the optimal contract however is ex post inefficient and creates scope for renegotiation if renegotiation is allowed then under some parameter constellations the optimal contract is a contract which necessarily induces collusion the paper thus shows that the principal s behavior toward ex post inefficiencies may determine whether collusion occurs in equilibrium

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

james mirrlees contributions to the theory of information and incentives the theory of information and incentives has revolutionized economics we now understand how markets and other modes of private economic transaction as well as public policy are affected when different participants have different information or when the actions of some participants are not observable to others mirrlees has made pathbreaking contributions arguably the two most important contributions to the development of these ideas and methods of analysis his review of economic studies article 1971c on optimal nonlinear income taxation introduced a technique that evolved into the revelation principle which fully characterizes all policies that are incentive compatible or feasible under information asymmetry this technique is now the workhorse model for numerous applications his bell joumal of economics article 1976a on hierarchies and organizations and some of his important unpublished yet widely circulated papers referred to below played a similar role for the theory of the design of incentives to induce effort he identified the precise way in which observable outcomes convey probabilistic information about the underlying unobservable action and thereby clarified how rewards or punishments based on outcomes can serve as incentives to action mirrlees developed these ideas in the context of specific applications however they are truly fundamental to economic theory and they have profoundly influenced subsequent thinking and research on the design of

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

capture and the bureaucratic mafia does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity does the revolving door phenomenon erode bureaucratic integrity to answer this question we undertake a quantitative case study of a private university in south korea that recruited a former vice minister of education as its president specifically we investigate whether after employing this high ranking former public official the university received favorable treatment from the education ministry in terms of funding estimates from difference in difference triple difference and synthetic control methods all suggest that the high profile public official s recruitment is associated with financial benefits from the official s former employing agency no such advantage however was observed for benefits from other agencies this result offers suggestive but compelling evidence that the revolving door distorts the allocation of government resources the financial benefits the university received are due not to the recruited official s greater competence expertise or knowledge but rather to his implicit collusion with the government

pareto optimality and competition there is a general consensus that u s financial markets are very competitive and efficient with prices quickly reflecting the available information there is also a widespread belief that these competitive and efficient markets enable the efficient allocation of scarce capital among alternative investment opportunities this belief is not based on direct observation it is virtually impossible to obtain the data concerning the joint probability distribution of returns to all possible projects which would be required for a direct assessment of the efficiency of the resource allocations to which the market gives rise rather it is based on the well known result that perfectly competitive markets generate pareto efficient resource allocations the object of this paper is to question that conclusion to show that even with apparently competitive and efficient markets resource allocations may not be pareto efficient

a theory of soft capture in this paper wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information in a three tier model a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator the firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator in a self enforcing equilibrium the regulator transmits the firm produced signal internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents the main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator

cross cultural equity evaluations a questionnaire experimental approach abstract the theoretical background of the empirical investigations to be reported in this paper are positionalist aggregation functions which are numerically representable the broad borda rule is proposed as an aggregation mechanism for the case of a complete profile of the so called individual extended orderings we modify this rule to reflect considerations of equity students from germany israel the baltic states austria and slovenia were confronted with questionnaires that describe situations most of which reflect different aspects of needs all situations start from the preference structure which underlies an equity axiom we are focussing on the following three points a what is the percentage of respondents satisfying the equity axiom b how often do the students revise their initial decision when more and more people join the side of the more advantaged c are there major differences across countries and cultures

what do revolving door laws do abstracton the basis of evidence from state public utility commissions we find that revolving door laws laws that restrict the post government employment opportunities of public sector workers including public utility regulators do not do much at least with respect to electricity prices in this paper we take advantage of a quasi experiment afforded by the fact that revolving door laws were introduced in different states at different times to investigate their effects on electricity prices our findings suggest that while revolving door laws temporarily dampen industrial electricity prices they have no effect on commercial or residential prices there is also some evidence that these regulations affect the characteristics of state public utility commissioners commissioners from states with revolving door regulations serve shorter terms and are less likely to be subsequently employed in the private sector compared with their counterparts from states without revolving door laws

did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in japan the principal agent problem between the regulator regulated banks and taxpayers is critical to the viability of the financial system s safety net there exists the danger that the regulator will collude with regulated banks to pursue their benefits at the expense of taxpayers thereby reducing effectiveness of financial supervision this paper proposes that the human relationship prevailing between the regulatory authorities and private banks referred to as amakudari is a form of collusion between the regulator and banks that endangers the safety net mechanism in japan statistical analysis of data on regional banks shows that those banks accepting post retirement officials from the ministry of finance have reduced capital adequacy levels and increased non performing loans thus the statistical result supports the hypothesis proposed in this paper

endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design abstract we create a dynamic theory of endogenous risk sharing groups with good internal information and their coexistence with relative performance individualistic regimes which are informationally more opaque inequality and organizational form are determined simultaneously numerical techniques and succinct reformulations of mechanism design problems with suitable choice of promised utilities allow the computation of a stochastic steady state and its transitions regions of low inequality and moderate to high wealth utility promises produce the relative performance regime while regions of high inequality and low wealth produce the risk sharing group regime if there is a cost to prevent coalitions risk sharing groups emerge at high wealth levels also transitions from the relative performance regime to the group regime tend to occur when rewards to observed outputs exacerbate inequality while transitions from the group regime to the relative performance regime tend to come with a decrease in utility promises some regions of inequality and wealth deliver long term persistence of organization form and inequality while other regions deliver high levels of volatility

lobbies delegation and the under investment problem in regulation abstract a time inconsistency problem in regulation often results in under investment especially where there are high sunk costs in network industries such as electricity gas telecommunications and water this paper provides a new perspective on this hold up problem facing the price regulation of a firm with market power where full commitment to a price regime is not possible we compare a political equilibrium based on a voting model with lobbying with a delegation equilibrium where a government can delegate to a particular type of pro or anti industry regulator our analysis suggests two possible ways in which we may observe price regulation that encourages socially optimal investment in the absence of externally imposed regulatory commitment first there is less than total transparency in which voters receive an optimal amount of information and second the decisions on price are delegated to a sufficiently but not excessively pro industry regulator

distributive justice theoretical foundations and empirical findings abstract the first part of this paper discusses various theories of distributive justice such as utilitarianism rawlsianism approaches within cooperative bargaining theory and the notion of fair allocations the focus is on the different informational bases used in these solution concepts the second part reports some results from empirical investigations where a particular distributive problem had to be solved by undergraduate students of economics and business administration the question we are posing is whether the respondents behaviour can to some extent at least be rationalized in terms of utilitarian ethics

on the optimal income taxation some further numerical results abstract using numerical calculations we show in the optimal income tax model that a realistic value for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 0 5 leads to conclusions different from some of those drawn by mirrlees 1971 and atkinson 1973 the marginal tax rates are not so low and the shape of the tax schedule is for a great majority of the population substantially nonlinear a new feature in our calculations is that both results come out without going to maximin as done by atkinson 1973 we study in special cases the locality of the zero limit of the marginal tax rate at the upper end of the ability distribution and we achieve a very definite conclusion this result is really very local we also present an interesting approximation result concerning the relationship between the level of the government revenue and the marginal tax rate for individuals with high ability an important methodological remark analogous to sen s critique on the ethical measures of inequality is made on the interpretation of optimal income tax calculations

role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information we investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent we characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 that restricts the message spaces the principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss we show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes we also extend the results of the single agent model to the multi agent model

collusion in organizations the principal agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations this theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome at least partially the asymmetries of information he faces by now optimal contracts with adverse selection or hidden knowledge with moral hazard or hidden action or with nonverifiability by a third party of some variables known ex post by both the principal and the agent are relatively well understood despite insightful extensions to multiagent or multiprincipal organizations this body of knowledge falls short of a comprehensive theory of organizations one major reason beyond the restrictive nature of the organizations studied lies in the noncooperative approach generally followed to model multiagent settings indeed in this standard paradigm the cooperation of agents desired by the principal can be induced by the contracts he offers to the agents each of them maximizing his own welfare given the behavior of the other agents what remains is that the principal has complete control of the game played by the agents unwanted communication or side contracting between agents can be prevented this is a rather unrealistic assumption contract theory teaches us that the principal structures the contracts so as to minimize the informational rents given up to the agents because of their informational advantages it is quite natural to expect a collective reaction on the part of the agents to protect their rents we need to understand how agents can react to the rules of an organization and beyond to understand how a principal who is aware of the incentives for collusion should design the organization modeling coalitional or collusive behavior and characterizing the regulatory responses to such behavior is a major task of organization theory the empirical relevance of this line of work is easy to establish a clear example is that of auctions for which the occurrence of cooperative behavior between bidders is a general and well documented phenomenon see porter and zona 1993

a theory of bureaucratization based on reciprocity and collusive behavior this paper addresses how an organization becomes a bureaucracy bureaucratization emerges from a self enforced norm of reciprocity between agents in an organization who exchange favors and promote subgoals which differ from the objective of the firm such collusive behavior becomes harder and harder to prevent over time as a result incentive schemes lose their flexibility and bureaucratization becomes a necessary equilibrium phenomenon in the long run the distribution of agents private information their preferences for the future and the force of the social norm of reciprocity are analyzed in terms of their effects on the long run behavior of the organization and on the speed of the bureaucratization process i introduction any theory of bureaucracy concerned with the analysis of the public sector or designed to understand the behavior of private organizations2 must find out why states and firms end up being more and more inefficient over time why organizations become routinized as they grow older and why unflexible rules unavoidably emerge in the long run in other words any theory of bureaucracy should also be accompanied by a theory of bureaucratization which could help us to understand organizations from a dynamic point of view following weber 1978 we hereafter define the bureaucratization of an organization as the process by which it adopts less flexible rules over time the aim of this paper is to explain this process in the case of the theory of the firm the formation of a dynamic theory of organizations has been on the research agenda at least since marshall who was the first to point out that old organizations and firms tend to decline over time first such

optimal monitoring policies in agencies this article considers a principal agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monitoring technology that can be used to acquire additional information about the agent s actions subsequent to observing the agent s output although randomized monitoring policies are feasible we show that in a variety of contexts optimal monitoring policies are deterministic and lower tailed that is there exists some critical level of output such that further investigation of the agent s actions occurs if and only if output falls below this critical level

the occupations of regulators influence occupational regulation evidence from the us private security industry licensing requirements for us private security firms and guards differ substantially from state to state state regulatory institutions for this industry also vary considerably some states have specialized regulatory boards with industry personnel guards firm owners and or public police as board members while others rely on non specialized regulators such as departments of commerce state professional regulation or consumer affairs these cross state variations in licensing requirements and regulatory institutions provide an opportunity to explore relationships between the two private security regulation is of particular interest in this context because previous empirical research implies that allocating more resources to private security reduces crime and that relatively stringent licensing requirements limit entry thereby increasing crime a panel of 1991 2010 state data is employed to see if particular regulatory institutions are associated with particular licensing requirements empirical results suggest that requirements for entry into this market tend to be relatively strict when active private security personnel are in control of licensing and that different patterns of regulation generally apply when police or non specialized agencies control licensing therefore both public interest and private interest explanations for the observed relationships between the structure of regulatory institutions and resulting licensing requirements are discussed

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

on monitoring and collusion in hierarchies abstract this paper studies a stylized three layer agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent s productive effort it is demonstrated that the possibility of collusion imposes no additional cost on the principal if the supervisor s report is hard information i e monitoring evidence can only be concealed and not forged this result holds irrespective of the nature of the penalty that can be imposed on the agent the findings suggest that it is strictly better for the principal to monitor the agent s action rather than to audit the agent s private information journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l23

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

two part pricing with costly arbitrage this paper considers the optimal two part pricing strategy of a monopolist whose customers collude when they purchase the firm s product in contrast to the sentiment in the existing price discrimination literature i find that a monopolist s profit can actually increase when consumers share its good when transaction costs for collusion are zero the firm can extract the full consumer surplus through two part prices when transaction costs are positive or there are a substantial number of consumers without access to resale the firm may be hurt by arbitrage

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

contracts under wage compression a case of beneficial collusion this paper considers a principal agent model with adverse selection and limited wage discrimination under wage compression an agent may have an incentive to free ride on other agents by manipulating his private information when collusion among the agents is not possible the principal distorts the output schedule to reduce information rent associated with the free riding opportunity under collusion however the principal can reduce the information rent by inducing side contracts among the agents thus partly removing the distortion in the output schedule we show that side contracts among the agents take place in equilibrium and that the prospect of collusion is beneficial

behind the revolving door a new view of public utility regulation regulatory officials frequently work for firms they regulate after they leave office this revolving door has been the subject of much scrutiny owing to the natural suspicion of corruption in a time dependent supergame i take a strategic look behind the revolving door and find it can lead to improved performance of regulated industries when firm managers and regulators have finite and concurrent terms investment incentives are minimal staggered terms and revolving doors can result in improved performance of regulated firms when each side s actions at each date are contingent on past outcomes

moonlighting public service and private practice we study job incentives in moonlighting when public service physicians may refer patients to their private practices some doctors in the public system are dedicated and behave sincerely but others the moonlighters are utility maximizers allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare but equilibrium public care quality may increase or decrease if quality increases moonlighting improves each consumer s expected utility unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions such as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior price regulation in the private market limits such adverse behaviors in the public system and improves consumer welfare

politics and administration this paper develops a theory of the eectiveness of government programs in the model a bureaucrat chooses a mechanism for assigning a good such as a license or a benet payment to a client of uncertain qualications the mechanism uses a means test to verify the client s eligibility a politician who values the payos of a subset of client types exercises oversight by designating the resources available for means testing and the population of clients that can be served the model makes predictions about common administrative pathologies including inecient and politicized distribution of resources program errors and backlogs when the politician favors marginally qualied clients programs will tend to be universal with low per capita spending and high error rates when the politician favors highly qualied clients programs have smaller client populations higher per capita spending and lower error rates notably the bureaucrat can only use discriminatory testing in the latter case and programs with larger budgets do not spend more per client

collusion and renegotiation in hierarchies a case of beneficial corruption corruption opportunities arise when a principal delegates enforcement or audit authority to a supervisor the supervisor may then strike a deal with the agent she is supposed to monitor and conceal important information from the principal corruption imposes a constraint on governance and appears therefore to be harmful for the principal we show that this need not be the case in our model the prospect of corruption can make the principal better off the reason is that the collusion possibility generates dynamic effects which in cases where only limited intertemporal commitments can be made may be beneficial for the principal

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

asymmetric information and public economics the mirrlees vickrey nobel prize this paper surveys the contributions of nobel laureates james mirrlees and william vickrey to the study of asymmetric information in economics particularly as they relate to problems in public economics it discusses and interprets mirrlees s work on optimal income taxation and relates it to previous work on optimal distribution of income including that of vickrey it also describes vickrey s fundamental contribution to auction theory and its importance for the more general field of preference revelation it also includes an evaluation of the prize winners work in other areas of public economics particularly on optimal indirect taxation and marginal cost pricing

equity responsibility and the cultural dimension we present questionnaire studies concerning equity judgments based on an axiom that underlies rawls s difference principle our investigation spanning over a period of fifteen years was run at german austrian and slovenian universities we also modified two of our basic scenarios to check for responsibility aspects additionally we included information on socio demographic characteristics of respondents in a probit model answers depend on cultural environments but results indicate some convergence over time responsibility considerations are important if they can be attributed to particular persons although overall explanatory power of demographic attributes is low we observe significant gender differences

national vs european incentive policies bargaining information and coordination abstract we build a hierarchical model of contractual relationships under moral hazard to address issues about subsidiarity i e optimal de centralization of incentive industrial policies at the national level or at the european community level incentive policy is viewed as an incentive contract for producers who take unobservable decisions that have spillover effects across member states a community agency designs contracts for producers and contractual compensatory transfers between states on the basis of its observations then national regulators and their home producers negotiate according to a generalized nash bargaining a national contract that complements the community contracts given that national regulators will have access to more observations on the producers activities in this setting we show that full centralization is never optimal we give sufficient conditions for complete decentralization to be optimal and when both policies are present we characterize how they interact to provide incentives to producers

coalitions incentives and risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting it is shown that the principal can implement given efforts via non individualistic incentive contracts at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result for there is no coalition proof revelation mechanism improving the principal s welfare journal of economic literature classification number d82

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

career concerns monetary incentives and job design we study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns the agent s career concerns are determined by the outside market we show that the principal might want to give the strongest explicit incentives to agents far from retirement to account for the fact that career concerns might induce behavior in conflict with the principal s preferences furthermore we show that maximized welfare might be decreasing in the strength of career concerns that optimal incentives can be positively correlated with various measures of uncertainty and that career incentives have strong implications for optimal job design