subsidizing renewable energy under capital mobility abstract this paper provides a rationale for subsidizing green renewable energy production within a multi country model where energy is produced with mobile capital in green and dirty production we investigate the countries decentralized choice of emissions taxes and green energy subsidies without green subsidies the emissions tax is set inefficiently low since each country ignores the environmental externality inflicted on other countries and since the emissions tax leads to a capital outflow to other countries when the green subsidy is available countries choose a positive subsidy rate since this reduces the overall distortion of the tax subsidy system in doing so each country internalizes a larger part of the environmental externality as a consequence capital is relocated from the dirty into the clean sectors and reduces global pollution hence the subsidy is not only beneficial for the country which imposes it but also for all countries

strategic export policy with foreign direct investment and import substitution abstract the paper examines discretionary and strategic foreign direct investment fdi incentives in the export sector relative to a non interventionist policy the analysis is based on a two country model with both countries seeking to attract fdi countries differ in cost levels and in their levels of tariff protection on intermediate inputs a shift in the trade policy regime toward the strategic promotion of exports results in a decrease in fdi allocated to the low cost country when it has a low level of protection on intermediate inputs and an increase in fdi when it has a high level of protection on intermediates inputs furthermore even if fdi increases with export policy activism relative to non intervention welfare may be lower

minimum wage competition between local governments in china abstractthe theory of fiscal and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is more advanced than its empirical testing this is particularly true of labour regulation in general and minimum wag

environmental policy intra industry trade and transfrontier pollution the paper discusses effects of domestic environmental policy on foreignemissions and on transboundary pollution we use a dixit stiglitz typemodel of monopolistic competition with an endogenous number of firms production generates environmental externalities which spill over to theother country it is shown that environmental policy has an impact onmarket structure at home and abroad these market structure effectsinduce changes in emissions abroad in contrast to what has been derivedin earlier contributions it turns out to be possible that tighterenvironmental standards at home lead to less emissions abroad the paperderives these results and provides the economic intuition behind them finally conditions for optimal environmental policies are derived

environmental regulations under simple negligence or strict liability we use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmentalregulations and show that when jurisdictions compete for firms that engagein environmentally risky behaviour strict liability implements the sociallyoptimal outcome while simple negligence does not even if the jurisdictionsfully cooperate in setting standards of care consequently we argue that even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority likein the european union this would not implement the socially optimaloutcome we also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulationsmakes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence

environmental federalism and environmental liability abstract environmental federalism considers what level of government should optimally regulate pollution this paper addresses this question for accidental pollution which government regulates through the ex post liability regimes of either negligence or strict liability we find that decentralizing the choice between these regimes does not in general induce the socially optimal outcome when firms can pay all damages all regions may choose negligence and impose an overly strict standard of due care when firms may be bankrupted by damages all regions may choose strict liability which induces too little care in addition asymmetric equilibria are possible in which some regions choose negligence others strict liability combining negligence with a pigovian tax or strict liability with a bonding requirement can align regional authorities incentives with those of a central government

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

endogenous market structures in international trade natura facit saltum abstract almost all of the large literature on international trade with imperfect competition assumes exogenous market structures the purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model that generates alternative market structures as nash equilibria for different parameterizations of the basic model equilibrium market structure is a function of the underlying technology familiar configurations such as a duopoly competing in exports or a single multinational producing in both markets arise as special cases small tax policy changes can produce large welfare effects as the equilibrium market structure shifts implying discontinuous jumps in prices quantities and profits

endogenous international joint ventures and the environment abstract this paper examines the welfare effects of emission taxes under a choice between an international joint venture jv and a full ownership fdi foreign direct investment by parent firms from a developed country the north and a developing country the south as well as their location and share decisions if the south has a poor abatement technology its best policy is to impose a relatively high emission tax to attract a full ownership fdi if it has a good abatement technology the best policy is to impose a relatively low emission tax to attract the jv furthermore deregulation of foreign ownership of the jv improves the quality of the environment

multiproduct firms and environmental policy coordination the literature that analyzes the coordination of environmental taxes by governments considers that firms produce a single good at a single plant however in practice firms tend to produce several goods at various production plants multiproduct firms these firms may organize themselves in a centralized or decentralized fashion for purposes of decision making this affects their output and pollution levels this paper sets out to analyze the coordination of environmental taxes considering multiproduct firms we find that the organizational structure chosen by the owners of the firms depends on whether or not governments coordinate with one another in setting taxes and on whether the goods produced are substitutes or complements social welfare is greater if a supranational authority sets taxes in all countries in this case joint welfare is never lower if the authority is constrained to set the same tax in all countries

environmental policy with endogenous plant locations in a game between the governments of two countries each chooses its own environmental policy the nash equilibria of the game are generally not pareto optimal on the one hand each country may want to attract industry giving it an incentive to choose low environmental taxes or standards on the other hand if disutility from pollution is sufficiently high each country might prefer that a firm locates only in other countries this effect tends to make the environmental policy under non cooperation stricter than it would be with cooperation

energy consumption and co2 emissions convergence in european union member countries a tonneau des danaides abstract as the consumption of energy is responsible for approximately 80 of ghg in eu iea 2008 the impact of energy activity on the environment has received increasing attention over the last decades from scholars researchers politicians and society as a whole within eu member countries it is commonly accepted that the design of energy and mitigation policies either at national or at european level require a detailed and integrated investigation of convergence divergence pattern among the participating countries in this paper we examine the distribution dynamics of energy consumption and co2 emissions their intensities as well as the carbonization index in 23 european countries over a forty one year period in particular from 1970 to 2010 for this purpose we used quah s methodology which is based on the dynamics of cross section distributions the main conclusion is that for all the examined variables the hypothesis of convergence patterns for the eu sample is not valid moreover regarding each examined variable different groups of polarization established important differences occur across eu countries according to the climate type with respect to the examined variables our analysis provides strong evidence supporting the fact that national and european energy and mitigation policies should be implemented according to the non convergence paradigm the body of evidence provided by our analysis is of great importance to energy policy makers and for issues related to climate change

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

environmental management policy under international carbon leakage this article studies environmental management policy when two fossil fuel consuming countries noncooperatively regulate greenhouse gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas the presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel price changes affects the tax quota equivalence we explore each country s incentive to choose a policy instrument in a two stage policy choice game and find subgame perfect nash equilibria this sheds new light on the questions of which policy instrument is more stringent and of why adopted instruments could be different among countries in particular our result suggests a reason why developing countries tend to employ emission taxes whereas developed countries tend to adopt quotas

climate policy bucket or drainer abstract worldwide industry is responsible for about 40 of greenhouse gas ghg emissions making it an important target for climate policy energy intensive industries may be particularly vulnerable to higher energy costs caused by climate policy if companies cannot offset rising energy costs and would face increased competition from countries without climate policy they may decide to relocate their industrial production to the countries without climate policy the resulting net effect of climate policy on ghg emissions in foreign countries is typically referred to as carbon leakage carbon leakage may lead to higher global ghg emissions due to the use of less advanced technology in less developed countries based on a literature review of climate policy earlier environmental policy and analyses of historical trends this paper assesses the carbon leakage effects of climate policy for energy intensive industries reviews of past trends in production location of energy intensive industries show an increased global production share of non annex 1 countries however from empirical analyses we conclude that the trend is primarily driven by regional demand growth in contrast climate policy models show a strong carbon leakage even though future climate policy may have a more profound impact than environmental policies in the past the modelling results are doubtful leakage generally seems to be overestimated in current models especially as potential positive spillovers are often not included in the models the ambiguity of the empirical analyses and the modelling results warrants further research in the importance of production factors for relocation

optimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms this study explores an optimal pre committed or ex ante environmental tax policy in a three stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants after the government has chosen the optimal emission tax rate we show not only that the optimal emission tax is non decreasing with the declining cost of relocation e g setup or fixed costs or else the progress of globalization but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country causing the resulting welfare to decline as a consequence the domestic welfare varies in a non monotonic way we also show that such a counterintuitive non monotonic relationship does not arise under time consistent ex post emission taxes

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

environmental policy in a federation with special interest politics and inter governmental grants the paper explores the potential effect of intergovernmental grants igg on sub national local environmental policy in a federal structure in the model a politically inclined local government receives campaign contributions from the polluters lobby in return for lower pollution taxes a benevolent federal government uses igg as an incentive to reduce the resulting distortion in the local pollution tax igg are formulaic transfers that are conditional on pollution levels lower pollution in a sub national jurisdiction relative to others translates into a higher share of the grant and vice versa in equilibrium the grant effect reduces the distortion created in the pollution tax by the lobby effect and may even lead to a higher than pigouvian tax when the local government assigns a large enough weight on social welfare and or when the grant is large enough further igg result in the tax levels of jurisdictions becoming interdependent in an interesting way environmental policies in two jurisdictions may become strategic complements or substitutes depending on their relative pollution levels the possibility of strategic substitution implies that federal welfare may not increase even when environmental policy becomes stricter in one state

pollution havens endogenous environmental policy and foreign direct investment in an increasingly integrated world economy countries may have greater incentives to weaken environmental policy as disguised protection intended to give a competitive edge to local firms this may generate pollution havens as firms relocate in response to different environmental policies foreign direct investment fdi weakens profit shifting policy considerations while increasing environmental damages but at the same time may provide external benefits we derive conditions under which the fdi recipient country has an incentive to manipulate its environmental standard to prevent or attract fdi potentially eliminating or creating pollution havens in addition to examining the impact of fdi on the equilibrium state of the environment

environmental standards and cournot duopoly a stability analysis in this paper the dynamic effects of public environmental policies are investigated in a cournot duopoly with both heterogeneous and homogeneous expectations in a context of limited rationality it is shown that the increase in upper limits to emissions always tends to destabilise markets and generate a chaotic market dynamics in both cases the policy implication of this result is that the use of environmental policies may favour market stability it is also shown that higher costs of abatement technology entail a higher likelihood of stability loss although in the heterogeneous expectations case also a decrease in costs may destabilise

efficient climate policy with internationally mobile firms a major concern in the design of an incomplete climate agreement is thatfirms that use fossil fuels intensively may respond to emission regulationsby relocating their plants from cooperating to non cooperating countries this paper analyses how the cooperating countries might deal with the issueof firm delocation through emission taxes trade provisions and alocalisation subsidy to mobile firms it is shown that firms should not beinduced to stay in the cooperating countries by lowering emission taxesbelow the pigouvian tax rate incentives to stay should be given partlythrough trade provisions and partly through a localisation subsidy a secondbest solution without localisation subsidies is also discussed in thatcase the efficient emission tax is lower than the pigouvian tax rate finally the paper discusses the implications of the first best and thesecond best policy regimes for the pattern of firm localisation

dynamic climate policy under firm relocation the implications of phasing out free allowances the allocation of free allowances for firms within the european union emissions trading scheme was found to lead to substantial overcompensation which is why some stakeholders recently called for phasing out of free allowances in the near term this paper analyzes the consequences of phasing out free allowances in a two period model when one country unilaterally implements climate policies a carbon price induces firms to invest in abatement capital but may lead to the relocation of some firms the regulator addresses the relocation problem by offering firms transfers i e free allowances conditional on maintaining the production in the regulating country if transfers are unrestricted in both periods then the regulator implements the first best by equalizing the carbon price with the marginal environmental damage and using transfers to prevent any relocation however if transfers in the future period are restricted the planner optimally implements a declining carbon price path with the first period price exceeding the marginal environmental damage a high carbon price triggers investments in abatement capital and thus creates a lock in effect with a larger abatement capital stock firms are less affected by carbon prices in the future and therefore less prone to relocate in the second period

border adjustments supplementing nationally determined carbon pricing as agreed on in the paris agreement each country determines its own contribution to combat climate change on a voluntary basis there is no mechanism to force a country to comply with its own nationally determined contributions this bottom up approach builds on unilateral actions and yields a kind of carbon pricing which is not necessarily identical across countries as a consequence these nationally determined climate policies have drawbacks in terms of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness for firms producing in high carbon price countries to reduce these negative effects border adjustments bas may be appropriate subsequent to more stringent environmental regulation we model a three stage game involving carbon price competition in the first stage the introduction of bas in the second stage and oligopolistic competition between firms in the third stage strategic trade theory suggests that the qualitative results about the optimal ba policy may vary with the underlying type of competition namely bertrand and cournot competition however our results are similar for both types of competition we conclude that bas are suitable for supporting a more stringent environmental policy moreover we find that anticipation of the implementation of bas in the second stage yields higher average carbon prices in the first stage since high carbon price countries increase their carbon prices whereas the other countries partially offset

fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities new results and an application to us air pollution abstract the economics of fiscal federalism has identified two book end departures from first best provision of a public good local governments may respond to local conditions but ignore inter jurisdictional spillovers alternatively central governments may internalize spillovers but impose uniform incentives ignoring local heterogeneity we provide a simple model that demonstrates that the choice of pricing policy also depends crucially on a third factor the shape of marginal costs of providing the public good if marginal costs are convex then marginal abatement cost elasticities will be higher around the local policies this increases the deadweight loss of those policies relative to the centralized policy ceteris paribus if they are concave then the opposite is true using a detailed simulation model of the us electricity sector we then empirically explore these tradeoffs for us air pollution we find that us states acting in their own interest lose about 31 5 of the potential first best benefits whereas the second best uniform policy loses only 0 2 of benefits the centralized policy outperforms the state policy for two reasons first inter state spillovers are simply more important that inter state heterogeneity in this application second because of the convexity of the marginal cost functions elasticities are much lower over the range relevant to the centralized policy dampening the distortions

how effective is the minimum wage at supporting the poor this study investigates the antipoverty efficacy of minimum wage policies proponents of these policies contend that employment impacts are negligible and suggest that consumers pay for higher labor costs through imperceptible increases in goods prices adopting this empirical scenario the analysis demonstrates that an increase in the national minimum wage produces a value added tax effect on consumer prices that is more regressive than a typical state sales tax and allocates benefits as higher earnings nearly evenly across the income distribution these income transfer outcomes sharply contradict portraying an increase in the minimum wage as an antipoverty initiative

converging to a common pattern of energy use in developing and industrialized countries abstract the evolution of the energy intensity paths in the period 1971 to 1992 shows developing and industrialized countries converging to a common pattern of energy use this trend becomes evident when using the gross domestic product of each country expressed in purchasing power parity in constant us dollars developing countries have been reluctant to make commitments under the kyoto protocol as they oppose any measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that might constrain their economic development however the use of the energy intensity indicator can be an alternative measure preserving the economic development while reducing greenhouse gas emissions for the fulfillment of the kyoto protocol goals

property rights protest and the siting of hazardous waste facilities ture since that time no major hwf has been sited anywhere in the united states the epa had anticipated that local opposition would make finding these sites an exceptionally difficult task their pessimism was well founded and if anything understated according to the hazardous waste counsultant s latest state by state review the outlook for siting hwfs in the future is even more bleak than in the past due in large part to what they term a worsening of the emotional atmosphere surrounding siting efforts this failure to site any new hwf has come about in spite of assurances by government and company officials that new facilities built according to the present standards would pose negligible risks to the local residents attempts have been made to break the deadlock by instituting extensive public participation procedures establishing state siting boards with the power to overrule local decision makers and requiring facility owners to compensate local governments for safety services the latter provided in this paper we argue that the ambiguous nature of the present property rights governing the siting of hwfs is an important cause of the stalemate we offer a new approach to siting which recognizes the de facto property rights assumed by local communities we propose a political market via a referendum

an empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy abstract using a new dataset on the stringency and enforcement of environmental policy this study is the first to find robust confirmation of a pollution haven effect in a cross country context by accounting for strategically determined environment trade and intellectual property right ipr policies a simple game theoretic approach to policy determination is described which suggests an identification strategy based on other country characteristics it is found that for the top 20th percentile of countries in terms of growth in u s multinational affiliate value added as much as 8 6 of that growth between 1999 and 2003 can be attributed to declining relative stringency and enforcement of environmental policy the results are robust to a number of identification tests weak iv tests and third country spatial effects further evidence is found that relatively footloose industries are more likely to be affected by environmental policy than more traditionally dirty industries and enforcement of environmental policies tends to be a more important deterrent than the stringency of the policy set

cross hauling of polluting factors abstract this paper analyzes the investment environment overlap using a two stage model of two jurisdictions capital exports are modeled as choice variables for capital owners who weigh income considerations against the effects of capital exports on the quality of their local environments and on environmental policy this framework reveals that capital owners have an incentive to cross haul polluting factors across jurisdictions when direct controls are used to regulate emissions and that this cross hauling induces policymakers to ratchet up environmental policies in both locations the importance of instrument type and commitment on environmental policy is also analyzed

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

environmental and resource economics a canadian retrospective the paper reviews research contributions to environmental and resource economics by scholars in canada we focus mainly on work from the past 25 years but also highlight earlier pathbreaking work we begin by looking at broad trends in research both internationally and within canada we then review canadian contributions to various topics in the field canadians have played a leading role in the development of the field especially in resource economics international environmental economics and the valuation of environmental amenities

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

plant location wind direction and pollution policy under offshoring we examine pollution policy in a unified three country framework with the country in the middle playing double roles as both a polluter and a victim we find that government preference over profits and consumer surplus to be important and so is environmentalism in particular the most downwind country has the least incentives to control pollution under oligopoly several additional undesirable scenarios may arise due to the interaction between wind direction and the incentive trade offs in rent shifting and pollution control we analyse the mechanisms behind and provide policy guidance

buy coal a case for supply side environmental policy free riding is at the core of environmental problems if a climate coalition reduces its emissions world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more they may also extract the dirtiest type of fossil fuel and invest too little in green technology the coalition s second best policy distorts trade and is not time consistent however suppose that the countries can trade the rights to exploit fossil fuel deposits as soon as the market clears the above mentioned problems vanish and the first best is implemented in short the coalition s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them

regional tax coordination and foreign direct investment this paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries one of which is not part of the union and a globally mobile firm we show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain first for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union second by internalising all of the union s benefits from foreign direct investment a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation depending on which motive dominates tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination

inter regional competition comparative advantage and environmental federalism in this paper we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods we develop a two region two good model with inter regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets where both regions produce both goods despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution this suggests that federalism can lead to either a race to the bottom or a race to the top without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition resume concurrence inter regionale avantage comparatif et federalisme environnemental dans ce texte les auteurs comparent l appareil de definition de politique environnementale endogene pour des gouvernements centralises et decentralises quand les regions ont des avantages comparatifs dans la production de divers biens polluants on developpe un modele a deux regions et a deux biens operant dans un cadre ou existent 1 des effets de retombees inter regionales toxiques pour l environnement 2 concurrence parfaite dans les marches des produits et 3 ou les deux regions produisent les deux biens malgre les effets de pollution entre regions le modele predit que la decentralisation peut entrainer des standards et des taxes portant sur l environnement qui sont soit plus faibles ou plus forts selon le degre d avantage comparatif regional et la nature de la pollution transfrontiere on suggere que le federalisme peut conduire a une emulation soit vers le bas soit vers le haut sans avoir a avoir recours a des efforts de lobbying inefficaces ou a la concurrence pour le capital pour expliquer le resultat

the impact of selected abatement strategies on transnational pollution the terms of trade and factor rewards a general equilibrium approach abstract widespread publicity of international conflict over transfrontier pollutants such as acid deposition and the november 1986 chemical spill in the rhine river has increased the public s awareness of the need to devise abatement strategies appropriate for transnational pollution this article develops a general equilibrium approach for analyzing the economic impacts of selected abatement strategies the model includes internationally mobile goods capital and pollution flows and flexible output and factor prices the general equilibrium approach provides policymakers with important information which is usually not revealed by a partial equilibrium approach that is demonstrated by applying the model to the north american acid deposition issue

have air pollutant emissions converged among u s regions evidence from unit root tests previous studies of income distribution have found evidence indicating that incomes across u s regions have converged supporting the prediction of the neoclassical growth model a potential shortcoming in these studies is that only one measure of well being is considered a measure of wealth linked to incomes or production this paper examines whether income convergence was accompanied by air pollutant emission convergence results from unit root tests provide some evidence that indicators of environmental quality have converged across u s regions during the 1929 1994 period

harmonizing tailpipe policy in symmetric countries improve the environment improve welfare abstract we show that harmonizing emissions policy may be bad for the environment and or global welfare even when pollution is transboundary and countries are identical in every way harmonization effectively internalizes the transboundary aspects of pollution but it also changes the politics surrounding tailpipe regulation with harmonization producers can no longer avoid strict local regulation by simply exporting their products to overseas markets with weak standards for consumer goods as a result harmonization may raise political opposition to regulation to examine these competing effects we develop a generic treatment of the politics of environmental regulation a treatment we show to be isomorphic to three popular models of political economy majority rules a political elite and a political contributions approach we find that harmonization both weakens environmental regulation and reduces global welfare when the level of political capture by dirty industry is high relative to the rate of pollution transmission across borders

environmental taxation and the double dividend in decentralized jurisdictions this research explores the implications for jurisdictional welfare of sharing environmental rents between private and public consumption an integrated model is developed from research literatures on jurisdictional competition the double dividend and on the design of tax refund instruments this model shows that jurisdictional welfare increases as environmental rents are initially allocated towards public consumption yielding a double dividend but that this dividend may or may not continue as all rents are shifted to public finance when the double dividend occurs the rent allocation both improves the efficiency of the tax system and reduces the private public consumption distortion that decentralized jurisdictional decision making creates in some parameter configurations there is an optimal rental allocation between the private sector and the local government at this optimum environmental and fiscal policies are set at their first best levels and decentralized jurisdictional decision making is globally efficient if less rents are allocated to public finance than this optimum fiscal and environmental policies will be suboptimal whereas if too much rent is allocated for public consumption fiscal and environmental policies will be set at levels above the global efficiency standard these results illustrate the crucial importance of environmental rent sharing for the efficiency of jurisdictional decision making

as time goes by an investigation of how asset allocation varies with investor age abstract we investigate how individuals asset allocations in their portfolios vary with age considering the relationship between individual attitudes and behavior we find individuals portfolios become more risk seeking with age even taking account of asset accumulation counter to their intuition

greenhouse gas emission controls and firm locations in north south trade this paper studies greenhouse gas emission ghg controls in the presence of international carbon leakage through international firm relocation in a new economic geography model with two countries north and south only north sets a target for ghg emissions we compare the consequences of emission quotas and emission taxes under trade liberalization on location of two manufacturing sectors with different emission intensities and degrees of carbon leakage with low trade costs further trade liberalization increases global emissions by facilitating carbon leakage regulation by quotas leads to spatial sorting resulting in less carbon leakage and less global emissions than regulation by taxes

fiscal pressure tax competition and environmental pollution as one of the strategies local governments adopt in response to fiscal stress tax competition influences the social optimum level of public goods such as environment this paper aims to investigate the mechanism of regional tax competitions from the perspective of financial stress recently the effect of tax competition on environmental pollution rises gradually existing empirical researches mostly apply a fiscal decentralization based perspective and ignore the spatial correlation between pollution and tax competition under the perspective of financial stress this paper measures the impact of inter regional enterprise income tax competition and value added tax competition on environmental pollution of 30 provinces using empirical analysis and then estimates the direct effect indirect effect and total effect based on it from year 2004 2014 it s been found that inter regional tax competition not only brings negative influence to local environment but also makes the environmental quality become worse in spatial correlation regions these findings are of enlightening politic revelations to further standardize enterprise tax competition among local governments and to promote the sustainable development both in economy and environment

pollution havens and industrial agglomeration abstract this paper examines the pollution haven hypothesis using a spatial economy model of two countries and two sectors the manufacturing sector generates cross border pollution which reduces cross sectoral productivity of agricultural goods and lowers local income we derive a demand reducing effect that discourages firms to move to the country with laxer environmental regulations in the absence of any comparative advantage our analysis also demonstrates that manufacturing agglomeration forces can alleviate the pollution haven effect a pollution haven may not arise if environmental regulation is slightly more stringent in the larger country

a note on environmental federalism interpreting some contradictory results abstract this paper reconciles some conflicting interpretations of recent literature on interjurisdictional environmental regulatory competition 6 7 present a model in which competition to attract investment by lowering environmental standards leads to a pareto optimal equilibrium 3 and 4 describe a model in which such competition can result in a suboptimal nash equilibrium while it would be possible to draw opposite policy implications from the two models regarding the appropriate degree of environmental federalism such a conclusion would be incorrect this paper reconciles the different results by showing that they depend in large part on monopoly profits and tax exporting not the nature of the pollution externality or environmental federalism

greenhouse gas emission controls in an open economy to examine how greenhouse gas emission controls affect a country s industrial and trade structures this article presents an open economy model that has both ricardian and heckscher ohlin features we specifically compare emission quotas emission taxes and emission standards the patterns of production and trade critically hinge on those policy tools it is shown that a domestic emission control may lead to carbon leakage and may not reduce the world emissions and that emission standards may work as a hidden production subsidy toward an emission intensive industry

environmental policy in open economies and monopolistic competition this paper analyses the implications of international trade for non cooperative environmental policy in the case of local production externalities a particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting international spillover caused by trade a tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad since such a policy reduces their variety of imports due to fewer domestic product inventions or their consumption of each imported brand due to higher import prices ignoring the negative spillover non cooperative governments implement inefficiently strict standards in equilibrium in contrast to this clear cut inefficiency result the impact of international trade on the state of the environment is ambiguous

environmental policy in majoritarian systems abstract this paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental tax policies in majoritarian federal electoral systems such as the u s and derives implications for the environmental federalism debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental taxes in the absence of majority bias the socially preferred policy would be federal district level taxation which accounts both for cross boundary pollution and differences in industry concentration across districts in majoritarian systems however where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts the majority party at the national or state level favors home districts depending on the location of polluting industries and the associated damages the majority party may therefore impose sub optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias majority bias can influence the social welfare ranking of alternative environmental tax policies in some cases majority bias may make decentralized or federal uniform taxation the preferred solution

end of pipe or cleaner production how to go green in presence of income inequality and pro environmental behavior in this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned in particular consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product but also its environmental impact this environmental valuation has a positional content consumers attach a positive attribute to the green product while penalizing the brown one in this context we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end of pipe abatement efforts we find that the interplay between the intensity of market competition consumers income disparity and environmental concern can play a crucial role in directing the green producer towards one or the other technological choice more precisely the adoption of cleaner production technologies can be discouraged by low average income and by tough competition while it can be spurred by the moral social incentive towards pro environmental behavior

an asset allocation puzzle this paper examines popular advice on portfolio allocation among cash bonds and stocks it documents that this advice is inconsistent with the mutual fund separation theorem which states that all investors should hold the same composition of risky assets in contrast to the theorem popular advisors recommend that aggressive investors hold a lower ratio of bonds to stocks than conservative investors the paper explores various possible explanations of this puzzle and finds them unsatisfactory copyright 1997 by american economic association

competition in crime deterrence this paper studies competition between jurisdictions in the eradication of crime in one story criminals choose the jurisdiction in which they will commit their crimes while jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to deterrence to protect local production in another story the criminals cannot change jurisdictions but they can not rob the owners of mobile capital jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to the deterrence of local crime so as to secure property rights and to attract capital in both stories competition between jurisdictions leads to overdeterrence relative to the pareto optimal level

environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes the effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental r d joint ventures rjvs environmental rjvs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts threetypes of environmental rjv are discussed inthis paper r d cartelization in which firmschoose r d efforts to maximize the jointprofit rjv competition in which firms sharethe r d fruits to maximize their own profits and rjv cartelization in which firms share r dfruits and maximize the joint profit an r dcartelization minimizes output quantities maximizes the total emission and minimizes thesocial surplus an rjv cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes r d efforts minimizes the totalemission and maximizes the social surplus

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

the effects of pollution taxes on urban areas with an endogenous plant location this paper has integrated space into the effect of a direct pollution control on the pollution damage of heavily populated areas like cbd this integration gives us some new insights into the effectiveness of a pollution tax as a pollution control device when the plant location of the firm is endogenized it is shown that when the plant location is endogenous as pollution taxes become higher the firm moves its plant towards the cbd causing higher pollution damage to the cbd residents if the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale

are individual investors tax savvy evidence from retail and discount brokerage accounts using brokerage account data we analyze the tax awareness of individual investors we find strong evidence that taxes matter investors prefer to locate bonds and mutual funds in retirement accounts and in december harvest stock losses in their taxable accounts however investors also trade actively in their taxable accounts realize gains more frequently than losses and locate a material portion of their bonds in taxable accounts though taxes leave clear footprints in the data we analyze many investors could improve their after tax performance by fully capitalizing on the tax avoidance strategies available to equities while optimally locating their assets

optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility abstract a single region s optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility in this model property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods e g residential property the key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods the role of labor mobility is also investigated

nimby taxes matter the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes this paper links the theoretical and empirical literatures on interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition focusing on the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes it begins by demonstrating that local environmental taxes can be inefficient and that the inefficiency depends on the tax elasticity of polluters responses the paper then uses panel data from the toxics release inventory to estimate the magnitude of the tax elasticities and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the theoretical inefficiency of local taxes 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

personal investing advice theory and evidence data from a unique survey containing information on the composition of the respondents total asset holdings both inside and outside their retirement accounts shed light on individual asset allocation behavior individual asset allocations are consistent with the recommendations of expert practitioners and with the prescriptions of economic theory the survey respondents maintain in cash and near cash investments a proportion of their wealth that declines as wealth increases they hold these safe assets outside their retirement accounts the proportion of total assets that they hold in equities declines with age and rises with wealth they do not appear to manage their assets across retirement and nonretirement accounts to maximize tax efficiency

environmental regulation induced foreign direct investment the last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the relationship between environmental regulations and international capital flows however empirical studies have so far failed to find conclusive evidence for this so called pollution haven or race to the bottom effect where foreign direct investment fdi is assumed to be attracted to low regulation countries regions or states in this paper we present a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate that greater stringency in environmental standards can lead to a strategic increase in capital inflows which we refer to as environmental regulation induced fdi our result reveals a possible explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature and provides an illustration of the conditions under which environmental regulations in the host country can affect the location decision of foreign firms

competing for a duopoly international trade and tax competition we analyse the tax subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of rms in a duopolistic industry competition between identical countries for a monopoly rm s plant is known to result in subsidy in ation which leaves the winning country indierent towards hosting the rm in sharp contrast we show that with two rms both are taxed in equilibrium and the host countries appropriate the entire social surplus generated within the industry despite the explicit non cooperation between governments we extend our baseline model to allow for dierences in country size we investigate when this size asymmetry becomes su ciently large to change the nature of the equilibrium inducing concentration of production in the larger country

methodological proposal for territorial distribution of the percentage reduction in gross inland energy consumption according to the eu energy policy strategic goal abstract a 20 reduction in the consumption of energy is one of the main goals of the european union s eu 20 20 20 energy strategy but the uniform application of this overall goal to all of the countries is neither fair nor equitable as it does not take into consideration the characteristics of the energy system in each member state this article therefore proposes a nonlinear distribution methodology with objective dynamic goals for reducing gross inland energy consumption according to the context and characteristics of each member state we hope it will open discussion on how these overall goals can be weighted then we analyse the situation of the energy indicators related to energy efficiency in the reference year 2005 used by the eu for reaching its goal of reducing the gross inland consumption by 20 by 2020 and its progress from 1996 to 2007 finally the methodology proposed is applied to the year 2020 on the nuts0 territorial level that is to members of the eu according to the eurostat nomenclature of territorial units for statistics nuts weighting is done based on energy intensity per capita gross inland consumption and per capita energy intensity in two scenarios the eu 15 and eu 27

labor supply flexibility and portfolio choice in a life cycle model abstract this paper examines the effect of the labor leisure choice on portfolio and consumption decisions over an individual s life cycle the model incorporates the fact that individuals may have considerable flexibility in varying their work effort including their choice of when to retire given this flexibility the individual simultaneously determines optimal levels of current consumption labor effort and an optimal financial investment strategy at each point in his life cycle we show that labor and investment choices are intimately related the ability to vary labor supply ex post induces the individual to assume greater risks in his investment portfolio ex ante

fourier quantile unit root test for the integrational properties of clean energy consumption in emerging economies abstract since the adoption of the kyoto protocol in 1997 and its entry into force in 2005 as well its aftermath such as the doha amendment and paris agreement national policies have become more conscious of the usage of clean energy mostly the different forms of renewable energy and nuclear energy ratifying countries and signatories had committed themselves to binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse emissions by 8 with respect to 1990 levels until 2012 also based on the particular contribution to global emissions from each country this paper examines the integrational properties of clean energy consumption from eight emerging economies which are also high greenhouse gas emitters the empirical results show that the clean energy consumption is stationarity for brazil and philippines by using a quantile unit root test without smooth breaks koenker and xiao 2004 however after capturing the smooth breaks bahmani oskooee et al 2018 we find the clean energy consumption of china pakistan and thailand are stationary the time varying deterministic trend with smooth breaks is more fitted to the path of clean energy consumption in comparison to the deterministic trend without smooth breaks the paper suggests economic insights useful for policy making

environmental policy when market structure and plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region two firm model is developed in which firms choose the number and the regional locations of their plants both firms pollute and market structure is endogenous to environmental policy there are increasing returns at the plant level imperfect competition between the home and the foreign firm and transport costs between the two markets at critical levels of environmental policy variables small policy changes cause large discrete jumps in a region s pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a plant or shifts production to from a foreign branch plant the implications for optimal environmental policy differ significantly from those suggested by traditional pigouvian marginal analysis

efficient waste management policies and strategic behavior with open borders during the last decade waste management has been characterized by two main trends the growth of international trade of waste materials and the introduction of extended producer responsibility epr as a policy instrument in this paper a two country stylized model with imperfect competition in the recycling market is used to address two research questions first how do epr recycling targets interact with other policy instruments such as taxes on recycling residues and excise duties second how does strategic behavior of national policy makers influences the use of policy instruments the model demonstrates that a combination of epr with other instruments is needed to achieve the first best outcome when governments do not coordinate policies across borders strategic behavior may lead to a race to the bottom for taxes on recycling residues conversely strategic behavior may lead to a counter intuitive race to the top for excise duties and epr recycling targets it is shown that these instruments are not only used to stimulate waste prevention but also to extract rents from foreign recyclers

new economic theories this paper analyses some of the most important spillovers of recent developments of economic theory into environmental economics attention is given to the anlaysis of sustainable economic development paths where endogenous growth models are used the implications of environmental dumping and more generally of policies concerning global environmental issues where new trade theories are very useful and the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments when markets are imperfectly competitive where industrial organisation theory is employed the paper does not only note recent developments in environmental economics but also relates these to the previous environmental economics literature thus it can be assessed whether new results actually improve our knowledge of crucial economic and environmental issues

are asean countries havens for japanese pollution intensive industry in an era of closer worldwide economic integration the role that environmental regulations play in shaping a country s comparative advantage is greater than ever this has led to fears that dirty firms will relocate from developed to developing countries where environmental regulations may be less stringent the so called pollution haven hypothesis to date however there is little support for the existence of pollution havens despite anecdotal evidence and the theoretical predictions in this paper we employ a unique industry level dataset for japan and examine whether japanese industries have relocated production to their asean neighbours in response to the relative stringency of japanese environmental regulations not only do we find no evidence for pollution haven consistent behaviour but also some indication that the complex relationship between the characteristics of japanese dirty industries and environmental regulations may actually have reduced japanese outward fdi to the philippines

on the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise one of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but in the absence of incentives the multinational s preferred location is the other more advanced region the paper shows that subsidies by making the multinational switch location may increase aggregate welfare if the multinational exports in the absence of incentives the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment which otherwise would not take place in one of the two regions further it intensifies competition in the market the paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified but also that the competition effect by hurting domestic firms may cancel out any other positive role of incentives

firm location and city size reduced productivity advantages as a factor in the decline of manufacturing in urban areas abstract this paper develops a model of firm location and city size that arrives at theoretical conclusions that differ from those of other authors comparative statics results suggest that changes in national wage levels and productivity levels create no determinate dis advantage for large cities relative to small ones as sites for manufacturing activity increased wage and reduced productivity premiums of large cities however result in unambiguous disadvantages statistical analysis indicates that the productivity advantages of large cities have declined in as many as eight two digit manufacturing industries that provide more than one third of metropolitan production worker employment

estimating energy conservation patterns of greek households abstract this paper develops an empirical model to investigate the main determinants of household energy conservation patterns in greece employing cross section data in the empirical analysis household energy conserving choices models are employed using a discrete and a latent trait variable respectively as a dependent variable the results show that socio economic variables such as consumers income and family size are suitable to explain differences towards energy conservation preferences in addition the results suggest that electricity expenditures and age of the respondent are negatively associated with the number of energy conserving actions that a consumer is willing to adopt finally other variables such as environmental information feedback and consciousness of energy problems are characteristics of the energy saver consumer by evaluating consumer s decision making process with regards to energy conservation measures we are able to formulate and propose an effective energy conservation framework for greece an energy policy framework is among the main prerequisites not only to achieve sustainable development but also to maintain consumers quality of life

tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets abstract the literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in imperfectly competitive markets governments have an incentive to subsidize exports of their own firms yet the consequence of the departure from laissez faire is a wasteful subsidy race in contrast this paper shows that even in imperfectly competitive markets there is a strong tendency for laissez faire to prevail the driving force is the firms willingness to exploit tax or subsidy differentials by relocating production a small tax differential induces firms to change their place of production the change in market structure has a negligible effect on the oligopoly equilibrium but a non negligible impact on government revenues when tax policy is non discriminatory governments gain lose by attracting all firms when production is taxed subsidized hence laissez faire is the only equilibrium since from the point of view of the two producing countries laissez faire nondiscrimination pareto dominates the intervention equilibrium discrimination nondiscrimination is a simple device to result in a mutual beneficial outcome

asean tigers and sustainability of energy use decomposition analysis of energy and co2 efficiency dynamics abstract this study is a comparative analysis of the development of energy intensity and co2 emission intensity in the asean countries in the years 1971 97 the reasons and driving forces behind the changes are studied in the article using a complete decomposition methodology the decomposition analysis explains energy use or co2 emissions with three different factors activity effect structural effect and intensity effect the authors provide an analysis of dynamic changes of energy consumption and co2 emission flows intensity effects on energy use and co2 emissions revealed large differences in the performance of asean countries an interesting finding of the study is that in the 1990s the intensity effects on co2 emissions in asean countries have started to increase indicating decreasing co2 efficiencies of the economies the general observation on the basis of decomposition analyses is that the phase of industrialization is increasing the energy intensity of the nations and when the increased energy demand is fulfilled with fossil fuels the co2 emissions will inevitable grow however it has to be recognized that the co2 emissions per capita in asean countries are very low except in singapore compared with many oecd countries

does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement quasi experimental evidence from china abstract this paper draws on a natural experiment generated by the national specially monitored firms nsmf program in china to evaluate the effectiveness of central supervision at improving local environmental enforcement we explore a unique firm level chinese environmental statistics dataset and utilize a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of central supervision through the nsmf program on an industrial firm s chemical oxygen demand cod emissions the results suggest that central supervision significantly reduces industrial cod emissions by at least 26 8 these results highlight the substantial room for improvement in chinese environmental regulations via central supervision a more flexible environmental decentralization regime and comprehensive central supervision are thus recommended for future reforms