expected utility skewness and the baseball betting market a subjective expected utility model is developed to explain the gambling behaviour of bettors on major league baseball games in the united states betting activity was examined over 15 seasons for the period 1978 1992 the observed overbetting of favourite teams by baseball bettors can be reconciled without abandoning the traditional assumption of risk aversion additionally there is some evidence to suggest that positive skewness has a discernible influence in the decision making process for higher odds contests

bureaucrats or politicians part ii multiple policy tasks abstract policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats this paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non elected bureaucrats politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short termism is an issue or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome we then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ

bureaucracy infrastructure and economic growth evidence from u s cities during the progressive era recent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private enterprise can flourish i hypothesize that establishment of such a bureaucracy will lengthen the period that public decision makers are willing to wait to realize the benefits of expenditures leading to allocation of a greater proportion of government resources to long gestation period projects such as infrastructure this hypothesis can be tested using data generated by a natural experiment in the early part of this century when a wave of municipal reform transformed the governments of many u s cities controlling for city and time effects adoption of civil service is found to increase the share of total municipal expenditure allocated to road and sewer investment other estimates imply that this increased share raises the growth rate of city manufacturing employment by one half percent per year this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle this paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain using panel data from the american states i find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle that is while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year this pattern does not exist in states with strict no carry rules neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

the effectiveness of hiring credits this article analyses the effectiveness of hiring credits using comprehensive administrative data we show that the french hiring credit implemented during the great recession had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages relying on the quasi experimental variation in labour cost triggered by the hiring credit we estimate a structural search and matching model simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features it was non anticipated temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages we estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits either countercyclical or time invariant in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

a theory of wages and labor demand with intra firm bargaining and matching frictions this article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within firm strategic bargaining we yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital the solution exhibits overemployment we show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power similarly the hold up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital beyond the neo classical analysis firms are the field of several strategic interactions between capital owners and labor between marginal employees and incumbents and more generally between different groups with various bargaining positions within the firm it is usually considered that the bargaining power of workers entails an employment level that is lower than in a competitive labor market and any increase in the bargaining power of workers raises unemployment these results are true for a wide class of models and notably in the now standard framework to analyze unemployment namely search and matching models of pissarides 2000 however stole and zwiebel 1996a 1996b show that the above results are totally changed in the intra firm bargaining model where employees engage in individual wage negotiation with the firm in fact under the assumption that contract incompleteness does not enable either party to commit to future wages and employment decisions they show that intra firm bargaining yields no rent for employees and gives rise to overemployment compared to a competitive labor market the basic idea of stole and zwiebel is that a firm with a diminishing marginal productivity of labor can decrease the bargained wage which increases in the marginal productivity of labor by raising employment in stole and zwiebel s setting firms overemploy strategically up to the point where workers get their reservation wage

civil service reform abstract civil service rules governing the selection and motivation of bureaucrats are among the defining institutions of modern democracies although this is an active area of reform in the us and elsewhere economic analyses of the issue are virtually nonexistent this paper provides a welfare evaluation of civil service reform it describes the effect of reform on the interaction of politicians voters and bureaucrats and shows that society often faces trade offs between improving the bureaucracy and improving the performance of politicians my results characterize the conditions under which merit based recruitment and civil service protections such as tenure can improve welfare

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

political budget cycles and the civil service evidence from highway spending in us states abstract we study political budget cycles in infrastructure spending that are conditional on bureaucratic organization bureaucrats can facilitate or hinder politicians ability to engage in voter friendly spending around elections to test this idea we use civil service reforms undertaken by us states in the second half of the 20th century to study political budget cycles in highway spending under civil service and patronage we find that under patronage highway spending is 12 higher in election years and 9 higher in the year before an election by contrast under civil service highway spending is essentially smooth over the electoral cycle these findings provide a novel way through which civil service rules can stabilize government activity

a theory of jurisdictional assignments in bureaucracies 1 what determines the allocation of tasks among government agencies this paper develops a formal model of task allocation that argues that jurisdictions are strategically designed to achieve legislative goals in the model agencies choose unobservable policies and political outcomes are a noisy indicator of these choices the legislature therefore faces a compliance issue when the agencies policy preferences are different from its own the legislature exerts control by defining agency jurisdictions setting ex ante budgets and choosing ex post contractual inducements the principal result is that tasks will be consolidated under a single roof when that agency prefers lower levels of policy than the legislature in other cases separating tasks prevents resources from being allocated in a manner undesirable for the legislature

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted