capacity expansion contraction of a facility with demand augmentation dynamics we analyze the cost effective addition or removal of capacity from a facility governed by demand augmentation dynamics that is if the demand for goods or services exceeds the planned capacity of the facility during any period of a multiperiod planning horizon then additional capacity must be introduced within that period to meet the deficit the paper obtains an optimal management strategy that minimizes the sum of capital labor maintenance and underpro vision costs for n consecutive periods in the face of uncertain demands dynamic programming is used to demonstrate that under certain conditions on the cost functions an inventory like s s policy is optimal appropriately interpreted to define the removal as well as the augmentation of capacity the threshold levels s and s can be evaluated for each period without a costly search procedure in addition we show how to calculate various quantities of interest associated with the optimal policy

career concerns in a simple experimental labour market abstract we experimentally investigate a simple version of holmstrom s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods profits of firms are determined by agents unknown ability and the effort they choose before making second period wage offers firms are informed about first period profits in a different treatment firms additionally learn the abilities of agents theory suggests high first period equilibrium effort in the hidden ability treatment but no effort elsewhere however we find that effort tends to be higher in the revealed ability treatment and therefore conclude that transparency does not weaken but strengthen career concerns incentives

gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control abstract numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive wage effort relationship in almost all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm this paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage effort relationship we compare the standard bilateral gift exchange game between an owner manager and a worker with two trilateral ones where the firm is owned by a shareholder and controlled by a manager the wage effort relationship is similar in all three situations most strikingly workers reward higher wages with higher effort even when the manager does not share in the firm s profits

managerial bonuses and subordinate mistreatment abstract can performance bonuses increase the likelihood that managers coerce their subordinates into exerting high levels of effort when doing so promotes neither efficiency nor equity we consider a laboratory setting in which managers compete to obtain a large bonus at the end of the experiment and the probability of obtaining it depends partly on the effort exerted by the subordinates we find that managers are more than twice as likely to punish subordinates exerting fair levels of effort if they compete for individual bonuses than when there are no bonuses this is not the case when they compete for pooled bonuses giving managers discretionary power over how to share them with their subordinates as most subordinates willingly exert maximal effort a model in which individuals are assumed to care about equity captures subordinates behavior well managers willingness to coerce subordinates into exerting unfairly high levels of effort on the other hand cannot be readily accounted for by any of the existing models of social preferences

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

inter firm social dilemmas with agency risk abstract many social dilemmas involve decisions made by firms we design a laboratory experiment that represents firms principal agent problem and includes an inter firm social dilemma and stochastic agent performance agents unobservable effort affects the likelihood of a bad outcome occurring such as a regulatory violation this harms the agent s principal but can also damage others thus creating an inter firm social dilemma in our baseline treatment we omit the agency problem and principals make their firm s effort decision directly in the second treatment principals can only offer an unconditional wage contract to their agent although a non contractual ex post bonus can be paid in a third treatment principals can condition wages on the stochastic outcome and a fourth treatment combines the conditional wage with a non contractual bonus we find that principals use a combination of a conditional wage and the non contractual ex post bonus to help overcome the agency problem and incentivize agents to choose higher effort fixed wage unconditional contracts lead to significantly lower effort levels even when augmented with bonuses similarly conditional contracts on their own also perform poorly only the combination of conditional wage contracts and discretionary bonuses is effective in limiting agency risk to address the inter firm social dilemma problem

strikes scabs and tread separations labor strife and the production of defective bridgestone firestone tires this paper provides a case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality we consider whether a long contentious strike and the hiring of permanent replacement workers by bridgestone firestone in the mid 1990s contributed to the production of an excess number of defective tires using several independent data sources we find that labor strife in the decatur plant closely coincided with lower product quality count data regression models based on two data sets of tire failures by plant year and age show significantly higher failure rates for tires produced in decatur during the labor dispute than before or after the dispute or than at other plants also an analysis of internal firestone engineering tests indicates that p235 tires from decatur performed less well if they were manufactured during the labor dispute compared with those produced after the dispute or compared with those from other non striking plants monthly data suggest that the production of defective tires was particularly high around the time wage concessions were demanded by firestone in early 1994 and when large numbers of replacement workers and permanent workers worked side by side in late 1995 and early 1996

strike coordination and dismissal in uniform wage settings abstract we study a gift exchange game with 12 employees and one employer when the employer can offer individually differentiated wages in a setting without collective action we observe high levels of wages effort choices and total earnings when the employer is restricted to offering a uniform wage trust and reciprocity drop dramatically due to widespread shirking the stepwise introduction of two collective action mechanisms strike and coordination increases the employees share of the total earnings but does not mitigate the free riding problem adding employment risk to the collective action setup drives up wages reduces free riding and leads to higher total earnings however this increase in productivity is not sufficient to achieve the high levels of wages efforts and earnings that we observe with individually differentiated wages

fair wages and effort provision combining evidence from a choice experiment and a field experiment the presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important consequences for firms and labor markets knowledge about the extent and determinants of reciprocal effort choices is however incomplete we investigate the role of fairness perceptions and social preferences in a field experiment in which workers were hired for a one time job we show that workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their performance if the hourly wage increases whereas those who feel adequately paid or overpaid at the base wage do not change their performance moreover we find that only the workers who display reciprocity in a choice experiment show reciprocal effort responses in the field the workers who lack reciprocity in the choice experiment do not respond to the wage increase even if they feel underpaid at the base wage our findings suggest that fairness perceptions and social preferences are key in workers performance response to wage increases in our study the wage increase affects effort mainly through the removal of perceived unfairness i e the elimination of negative reciprocity toward the firm rather than positive reciprocity these results are the first direct evidence of the fair wage effort hypothesis in the field and also help interpret previous contradictory findings in the literature data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1970 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

tax aversion in labor supply abstract in a real effort laboratory experiment labor supply decreases more with the introduction of a tax than with a financially equivalent drop in wages this tax aversion is large in magnitude when we decompose the productivity decrease that arises from taxation we estimate that 40 is due to the lower net wage and the remaining 60 to tax aversion this tax aversion affects labor supply more on the extensive margin working less than on the intensive margin being less productive while working the aversion is equally strong whether tax revenue goes to the u s government or back to the experimenter a laboratory tax we discuss the implications of our results for the relationship between labor supply and taxation

the multinational firm direct investment is incorporated into a simple general equilibrium model of international trade the analysis focuses on an attempt to endogenize the internalization decision it is argued that a reasonable approach assumes that arm s length contracts must be simple so that complex arrangements require internalization the model relates direct investment to the degree of underlying uncertainty and to fundamental trade determinants such as relative factor endowments the behavior of the model contrasts sharply with that of the markusen helpman model which takes internalization for granted

does payoff equity facilitate coordination a test of schelling s conjecture abstract starting from schelling 1960 several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal form games with multiple equilibria the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike payoff inequities as abundant experimental evidence suggests in this line we propose a selection principle called equity eq which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest money payoff if only one such equilibrium exists using a within subjects experimental design furthermore we study the relative performance of eq in twelve simple 2 2 coordination games in many of these games we find that eq explains individual behavior better than a large range of alternative theories including theories of bounded rationality and several other equilibrium selection principles yet we also observe that the frequency of eq play depends on the payoff structure of the game for instance eq play diminishes when the alternative equilibrium is socially efficient and not very unfair compared with the eq equilibrium our data suggests that equilibrium selection is affected by several factors and that subjects are heterogeneous in this respect but also that equity is often a crucial factor to understand coordination

partial gift exchange in an experimental labor market impact of subject population differences productivity differences and effort requests on behavior we report a gift exchange experiment firms make wage offers workers respond by determining an effort level higher effort is more costly to workers and firms have no mechanism for punishing or rewarding workers consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis workers provide more effort at higher wages but undergraduates provide substantially less effort than mbas evidence suggests this results from differences in prior work experience firms nonbinding effort requests are at least partially honored resulting in increased overall effort for undergraduates although higher wages are relatively more costly for lower productivity firms workers do not provide them with more effort

foreign direct investment and exports a time series approach the impact of the accelerated internationalization of the last decade on the austrian economy is a controversial issue granger s concept of casuality is used to investigate one aspect of the internationalization of production the realtionship between foreign outward direct investment and exports using aggregate flow data from the austrian economy the stationarity of the time series is examined and cointegration tests for the adequacy of the multivariate time series approach are performed the estimation results suggest significant causality of austrian foreign outward direct investment and exports in both directions impulse response analysis and varience decomposition show a very slow dynamic response of both variables to exogenous shocks of the other it furthermnore indicates the possiblity of a positive effect of exogeneously increased foreign direct investment on exports and a negative effect of export shocks on foreign direct investment however significant long run effects are not established

multinational corporations and trade structure first a model of horizontally and vertically integrated firms is developed these firms are then embedded in a general equilibrium model of trading countries it is shown how multinational corporations emerge as a result of differences across countries in factor compositions intersectoral intraindustry and intrafirm trade can coexist and intrafirm trade takes place in invisibles headquarter services and intermediate inputs it is shown how the various trade components depend on the structure of the world economy the model predicts trade patterns which are close to observed trade patterns the importance of multinational corporations in the conduct of foreign trade has been recognized for many years nevertheless there exists no well articulated theory that explains the conditions for their emergence and predicts under these conditions a structure of trade that comes close to observed trade patterns i have developed in helpman 1984 a theory which is designed to fill in this gap and it is the purpose of this paper to extend it in order to make it better fit reality my earlier work builds on the standard theory of monopolistic competition in differentiated products in which every firm produces a single variety the distinguishing feature of that study is the interpretation of the technology so as to allow for specialized inputs which service plants that are geographically separated from the location of the inputs employment in particular those inputs can be located in one country and service plants located in other countries management and product specific rd multinational corporations have often production facilities in several countries see for example u s tariff commission 1973 chapter iii moreover in my earlier work all intra firm trade consisted of trade in the services of the specialized inputs i e in headquarter services while empirically a large part of intra firm trade takes place in intermediate inputs see buckley and pearce 1979 hence there is a need to extend the theory in order to take account of these missing features and in order to evaluate their contribution to the explanation of trade patterns this task is undertaken in the following sections by incorporating the model of the horizontally and vertically integrated firm from helpman 1983 into the theory of

do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders an experimental study feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like ebay or amazon marketplace this article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders through a set of experiments based on the trust game our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system however such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders in particular a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner s rating decision before making their own decision provides better results both in terms of trust and earnings

pay reference points and police performance several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one in the months after new jersey police officers lose in arbitration arrest rates and average sentence length decline and crime reports rise relative to when they win these declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union s demand the findings support the idea that considerations of fairness disappointment and more generally reference points affect workplace behavior

social comparison and effort provision evidence from a field experiment social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains we conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers effort provision if their own wage or that of a co worker is cut workers were assigned to groups of two performed identical individual tasks and received the same performance independent hourly wage cutting both group members wages caused a decrease in performance but when only one group member s wage was cut the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers wages were cut this finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage cut treatments is the other group member s wage level in contrast workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member s pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers wages remained unchanged this indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort jel c93 j33 m53

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

fair wages and effort evidence from a field experiment the presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important consequences for firms and labor markets knowledge about the extent and determinants of reciprocal effort choices is however incomplete we investigate the role of fairness perceptions and social preferences in a field experiment in which workers were hired for a one time job we show that workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their performance if the hourly wage increases whereas those who feel adequately paid or overpaid at the base wage do not change their performance moreover we find that only the workers who display reciprocity in a choice experiment show reciprocal effort responses in the field the workers who lack reciprocity in the choice experiment do not respond to the wage increase even if they feel underpaid at the base wage our findings suggest that fairness perceptions and social preferences are key in workers performance response to wage increases in our study the wage increase affects effort mainly through the removal of perceived unfairness i e the elimination of negative reciprocity toward the firm rather than positive reciprocity these results are the first direct evidence of the fair wage effort hypothesis in the field and also help interpret previous contradictory findings in the literature

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

a meeting of the minds informal agreements and social norms using coordination games we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists we combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior we demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion we estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10 of total earnings and more than 120 in the bertrand game we show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

the optimal timing of a foreign direct investment analyses of the optimal timing of foreign direct investment fdi decisions have been curiously lacking in the general literature on multinational enterprises cf buckley 1979a b although comparative static analyses exist comparing exporting to the host country with market servicing from a production unit sited in the host country horst 1971 hirsh 1976 the only attempt to predict the timing of the switch from exporting to foreign based production is that of aliber 1970 although vernon 1966 gives a cost based rationale for the switch this chapter attempts to fill this gap in the theory of fdi section 2 1 outlines and criticises previous attempts to deal with the problem sections 2 2 4 present a simple model which ignores set up costs and sections 2 5 and 2 6 give a more detailed analysis including such costs further extensions of the theory are considered in section 2 7 and the conclusions are summarised in section 2 8 the problem emerges as being more complex than had previously been appreciated

corruption and the shadow economy an empirical analysis this paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa we hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries the hypotheses are tested for a cross section of 98 countries our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions based indices of corruption are used employing an index of corruption based on a structural model however corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income but not in high income countries

wage subsidies and fair wages abstract wage subsidies can be provided directly to the worker or indirectly by subsidizing the employer with reduced cost of labor employers offer higher wages the standard literature stipulates that this statutory incidence bears no implications for the economic incidence we propose and test a mechanism by which indirect subsidies lead to higher social welfare studies show that workers reciprocate higher wages with higher effort indirect subsidies are shifted to the workers as higher wages leading workers to reciprocate with higher effort and productivity a controlled laboratory experiment supports our behavioral hypotheses and confirms the behavioral and welfare implications

in search of workers real effort reciprocity a field and a laboratory experiment we present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage nor to a positive or negative peer comparison this result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort in an additional real effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables an exact calculation of an employer s surplus from the work contract is a crucial prerequisite for a positive wage effort relation this demonstrates that an employee s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake jel c91 c92 j41

worker reciprocity and employer investment in training standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training empirical evidence however indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts we propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if the worker is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity a reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment we present empirical evidence that supports the proposed mechanism workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15 higher training rates than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity

the economics of foreign direct investment and trade with an application to the u s food processing industry this article investigates the determinants of foreign direct investment and its relationship to trade in the u s food industry a multinational corporation maximizes profits by choosing between production at home which is exported and production in a host country this introduces the possibility that foreign affiliate sales can substitute and or complement exports the empirical framework consists of a four equations system with foreign affiliate sales exports affiliate employment and fdi as endogenous variables the results confirm small substitution between foreign sales and exports and that the host country s protection policies affect the decision to invest abroad

contractual incompleteness unemployment and labor market segmentation this article provides evidence that involuntary unemployment and the segmentation of labour markets into firms offering good and bad jobs may both arise as a consequence of contractual incompleteness we provide a simple model that illustrates how unemployment and market segmentation may jointly emerge as part of a market equilibrium in environments where work effort is not third party verifiable using experimental labour markets that differ only in the verifiability of effort we demonstrate empirically that contractual incompleteness can cause unemployment and segmentation our data are also consistent with the key channels through which the model explains the emergence of both phenomena copyright 2014 oxford university press

simultaneous capacity and production management of short life cycle produce to stock goods under stochastic demand this paper derives the optimal simultaneous capacity and production plan for a shortlife cycle produce to stock good under stochastic demand capacity can be reduced as well as added at exogenously set unit prices in both cases studied with and without carryover of unsold units a target interval policy is optimal there is a usually different target interval for each period such that capacity should be changed as little as possible to bring the level available into that interval our contribution in the case of no carry over is a detailed characterization of the target intervals assuming demands increase stochastically at the beginning of the life cycle and decrease thereafter in the case of carry over we establish the general result and show that capacity and inventory are economic substitutes the target intervals decrease in the initial stock level and the optimal unconstrained base stock level decreases in the capacity level in both cases optimal service rates are not necessarily constant over time a numerical example illustrates the results

strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary contribution experiments abstract voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time we use a two stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1 repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct response method which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter

pensions reforms workforce ageing and firm provided welfare this paper investigates the impact of an exogenous increase in the legal retirement age on the firms propensity to provide welfare services voluntarily to their employees to this purpose we explo

gift exchange in a multi worker firm one of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level in general 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher effort these results are observed for simple one employer one worker relationships in this paper we investigate whether they generalize to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers we compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers we find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce and intention based reciprocity rather than social preferences seems to be the main driving force behind gift exchange

carrots that look like sticks toward an understanding of multitasking incentive schemes constructing compensation schemes for effort in multidimensional tasks is complex particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable when incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures such as quantity produced the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions such as quality will be neglected yet there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal agent model prediction this article reconciles the literature using both theory and empirical evidence the theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principal s monitoring ability and the principal s choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring

explaining gift exchange the limits of good intentions this paper explores the limitations of intention based social preferences as an explanation of gift exchange between a firm and a worker in a framework with one self interested and one reciprocal player gift giving never arises in equilibrium instead any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players besides gift exchange this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games the self interested player never benefits from reciprocity we discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift exchange in employment relations

the many faces of human sociality uncovering the distribution and stability of social preferences there is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others interests in decision making this heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other regarding behaviors and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across situations we tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us to simultaneously estimate outcome based and reciprocity based social preferences we find that non selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception neither at the level of the representative agent nor when we allow for several preference types do purely selfish types emerge instead three temporally stable and qualitatively different other regarding types emerge endogenously i e without pre specifying assumptions about the characteristics of types when ahead all three types value others payoffs significantly more than when behind the first type which we denote as strongly altruistic type is characterized by a relatively large weight on others payoffs even when behind and moderate levels of reciprocity the second type denoted as moderately altruistic type also puts positive weight on others payoff yet at a considerable lower level and displays no positive reciprocity while the third type is behindness averse i e puts a large negative weight on others payoffs when behind and behaves selfishly otherwise we also find that there is an unambiguous and temporally stable assignment of individuals to types moreover the three type model substantially improves the out of sample predictions of individuals behavior across additional games while the information contained in subject specific parameter estimates leads to no or only minor additional predictive power this suggests that a parsimonious model with three types captures the bulk of the predictive power contained in the preference estimates

reciprocity and wage undercutting it is well documented that employers refuse to hire workers who o er their services at less than the prevailing wage the received explanation is that workers are motivated by reciprocity they desire to reward kindness and punish hostility to refuse an outsider s underbid is viewed as a kind choice that is met with good e ort a low wage is viewed as an insult that is met with shirking we have developed a general theory of reciprocity which in this paper is applied to a wage setting game played by an employer and two workers we show that when workers are motivated by reciprocity equilibrium behaviour accords well with the aforementioned stylized facts 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation d63 e24 j41

why not cut pay abstract i interviewed over 300 business people labor leaders business consultants and counselors of unemployed people all in the northeast of the united states during the recession of the early 1990 s in order to learn why wages and salaries declined in only a few firms employers were reluctant to cut pay because they believed doing so would hurt employee morale leading to lower productivity and current or future difficulties with hiring and retention it was thought that these effects would in the end cost more than the savings from lower pay there were few indications that unemployed people had excessive wage expectations on the contrary many unemployed were too flexible and found themselves rejected by firms as overqualified in most companies pay cuts were not a useful alternative to layoffs because pay cuts would not make it worthwhile to retain many employees and because layoffs harmed morale less than would pay cuts the findings support none of the theories of wage rigidity except those of solow and akerlof that emphasize morale

does economic development impact the foreign direct investment trade relationship a gravity model approach the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between foreign direct investment fdi and trade in a bilateral context that is home source country s exports and fdi to a host recipient country are analyzed using a gravity model approach the fdi trade relationship has been a centerpiece of the international economics literature over the past decade the home country s primary concern here is on the possible loss of employment due to more fdi than trade lipsey of late there have been concerns on knowledge spillovers and the erosion of technological leadership market failure due to capital outflows for a host country the focus is on the effects of fdi on economic growth and development and technology transfer prior theoretical studies have used mostly imperfect competition models to identify the fdi trade relationship helpman and krugman markusen and venables a majority of the empirical studies has used regression techniques with one period lagged trade and fdi as an argument in current trade or fdi equations barrell and pain gopinath pick and vasavada egger aggregate firmlevel data and industry product specific data have been used in many of these studies blonigen lipsey and ramstetter some have used cointegration methods to infer on the long run association between trade and fdi pfaffermayr however few fdi trade

transparency and reciprocal behavior in employment relations abstract the impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels that with a random component determine principals payoff it is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals however there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases

burning money and pseudo first mover advantages an experimental study on forward induction abstract the mere potential for one player to burn money prior to play has been shown in theory to be an effective device to select this player s most preferred outcome e g in the battle of the sexes game j econ theory 48 1989 476 j econ theory 57 1992 36 in this study we assess the behavioral relevance of this theoretical claim it is shown that its validity depends on whether the game is played in extensive or normal form in extensive form games first movers benefit substantially from having the opportunity to burn money in advance the effect is much weaker in the normal form game however in two control treatments first movers who can select between two related games gain an advantage although standard forward induction arguments do not have any bite these results suggest that we need to make further theoretical advances to understand the role of physical timing and first mover advantages in games

factor movements and commodity trade as complements abstract several models are presented in which factor mobility leads to an increase in the volume of world trade the models share the common characteristic that the basis for trade is something other than differences in relative factor endowments these alternative bases for trade include returns to scale imperfect competition production and factor taxes and differences in production technology taken together the models suggest a more general idea the widely held notion that trade in goods and factors are substitutes is in fact a rather special result which is a general characteristic only of factor proportions models

what field experiments have and have not taught us about managing workers this paper reviews the field experimental evidence on firm employee relationships there is strong evidence that output rises in response to financial incentives but more mixed support for worker reciprocity in response to employer generosity non financial approaches such as worker recognition or adding meaning to mundane tasks can also increase output social relations are central to how firms function and have been shown to have an important impact on the design of incentive schemes what we do not know however far exceeds that which we have learned a broad swathe of important topics including recruiting worker promotion and training are virtually untouched thus far by field experiments

cheat or perish a theory of scientific customs abstract performance incentives have become increasingly important in academia evidence suggest that they increase not only researchers effort but also their cheating we develop a principal agent framework in which a research institution principal aims to reward scientific productivity considering the social benefit of research and the remuneration costs researchers agents take into account what others are doing as a consequence the introduction of performance incentives not only leads to fraudulent behavior in the short run but may also deteriorate the scientific norm in the long run in the face of these dynamics the principal pursues two goals to increase productivity effort incentive policy and to deal with fraud anti fraud policy several factors determine the optimal mix of policies economic factors researchers cost of providing high or low effort the societal value of scientific knowledge and the societal costs of scientific misbehavior and psychological factors the evolution of norms over time an important insight of our theory is that when research institutions seek to encourage the production of high quality research they should also raise the salary for normal research to avoid misconduct

a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift abstract binmore and samuelson binmore k samuelson l 1999 evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection review of economic studies 66 363 393 have shown that perturbations drift are crucial to study the stability properties of nash equilibria we contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift based on the similarity theory introduced by tversky tversky a 1977 features of similarity psychological review 84 327 352 the innovation is that we derive the similarity relations from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game we obtain different models of drift depending on how we model that perception and show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in components of nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect

if wages fell during a recession abstract many economies exhibit downward wage rigidity surveys of managers indicate that employers hold wages rigid because they believe morale will suffer after a wage cut otherwise there is little evidence for how employers beliefs contribute to wage rigidity and whether those beliefs are accurate using an experiment we demonstrate that effort falls after workers experience a wage cut despite this partial confirmation of the bewley 1999 morale theory half of the employers in our experiment cut wages and lose money as a result under nominal inflation real wage cuts do not have a significant effect on effort

the relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games abstract in this note we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of g e bolton and r zwick 1995 games econ behav 10 95 121 more specifically we replaced exactly equal splits by nearly equal splits either slightly favoring the proposer or the responder such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust we find however a significant change in behavior fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 c92

crowding out in the labor market a prosocial setting is necessary recent studies mostly from prosocial settings suggest that monetary rewards may crowd out effort exertion by economic agents we design a field experiment with data entry workers to investigate the extent of such crowding out effects in a labor market using simple variations in the job description of a task we induce a natural work setting under the work frame and emphasize social preference under the social frame we find that crowding out of labor participation critically depends on framing whereas small monetary rewards reduce the participation rate under the social frame the participation rate is nondecreasing in the wage rate under the work frame moreover among the workers who participate in the task those who receive a positive wage perform a considerably higher amount of work than those who are paid zero wage under either frame thus there is weak evidence of crowding out only when the task is explicitly given a prosocial flavor and not under a regular work setting furthermore emphasizing social preference in the labor market in such a way reduces the overall labor supply and seems to have an adverse effect on the quality of work data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1807 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

hold up with a vengeance when contracts are incomplete or unenforceable inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold up if individuals care for negative reciprocity these problems may be reduced as revenge becomes a credible threat however negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds we explore this issue analytically deriving predictions for hold up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control we also test and support these predictions in an experiment

preferences for power abstract power the ability to determine the outcomes of others usually comes with various benefits higher compensation public recognition etc we develop a new game the power game to demonstrate that a substantial fraction of individuals enjoy the intrinsic value of power they accept lower payoffs in exchange for power over others without any benefits to themselves these preferences exist independently of other components of decision rights cannot be explained by social preferences and are not driven by mistakes confusion or signaling intentions we further show that valuation of power i is higher when individuals directly determine outcomes of others ii depends on how much discretion one has over those outcomes and iii is tied to relationships between individuals we establish that ignoring preferences for power may have large welfare implications and consequently should be included in the study of political systems and labor contracts

social comparison and performance experimental evidence on the fair wage effort hypothesis we investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity we present three studies which all use three person gift exchange experiments consistent with akerlof and yellen s 1990 fair wage effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level we observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects we also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences

preferences intentions and expectation violations a large scale experiment with a representative subject pool we specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies the effects of distributional preferences and penalizing unfair proposer behavior perceived intentions on responder decisions in the ultimatum game we allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend among other things on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers the latter allows expectation violations to be a driving force for responder behavior we estimate the model on a large representative sample from the dutch population we find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socio economic characteristics of responders strong inequity aversion to the other player s disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents responders tend to punish more unequal offers made by proposers if they expect that unequal proposals are made less often

capacity expansion under stochastic demands we consider the problem of optimally meeting a stochastically growing demand for capacity over an infinite horizon under the assumption that demand for product follows either a nonlinear brownian motion or a non markovian birth and death process we show that this stochastic problem can be transformed into an equivalent deterministic problem consistent with earlier work by a manne the equivalent problem is formed by replacing the stochastic demand by its deterministic trend and discounting all costs by a new interest rate that is smaller than the original in approximate proportion to the uncertainty in the demand

friends or foes optimal incentives for reciprocal agents abstract widely used performance based contracts put positive or negative externalities on co workers these externalities have been proven to shape an organization s working climate especially when workers exhibit social preferences however it is a priori unclear whether a more friendly or a more competitive working environment should be encouraged in this paper we develop a theoretical model in which a self interested principal has to motivate a set of agents to work hard agents are symmetric potentially risk averse and exhibit reciprocity concerns towards each other we show that the principal reduces the cost of achieving high effort provision by designing a psychological gift exchange game thereby replacing monetary with psychological incentives we find that the optimal incentive scheme depends on the interplay between the agents attitudes towards risks and their preferences for reciprocity in particular the optimal scheme implements i a relative performance compensation scheme which induces an exchange of unkindness if agents are relatively little risk averse and ii a joint performance compensation scheme which induces an exchange of kindness if agents are sufficiently risk averse our findings can explain some puzzling empirical results

double for nothing experimental evidence on an unconditional teacher salary increase in indonesia how does a large unconditional increase in salary affect the performance of incumbent employees in the public sector this paper presents experimental evidence on this question in the context of a policy change in indonesia that led to a permanent doubling of teachers base salaries the analysis uses a large scale randomized experiment across a representative sample of indonesian schools that accelerated this pay increase for teachers in treated schools the findings show that the large pay increase significantly improved teachers satisfaction with their income reduced the incidence of teachers holding outside jobs and reduced self reported financial stress nevertheless after two and three years the increase in pay led to no improvement in student learning outcomes the effects are precisely estimated making it possible to rule out even modest positive impacts on test scores the results suggest that unconditional pay increases are unlikely to be an effective policy option for improving the effort and productivity of incumbent employees in public sector settings

gift exchange in the workplace addressing the conflicting evidence with a careful test tests of gift exchange wherein agents receive excess wages which are noncontingent on performance in one shot settings have yielded contradictory evidence they sometimes find effort boosts consistent with gift exchange whereas they sometimes find no effort increases consistent with a standard model we identify eight confounds that could have led to the mixed evidence agent disutility from being viewed as selfish small samples insufficient wage raises an effort ceiling fatigue selection of abler workers reemployment concerns and peer effects and run a comprehensive test addressing them our test consisted of a field experiment hiring workers for a data entry job followed by laboratory games assessing their prosocial behavior after addressing these confounds we find that behavior during the field test was consistent with a standard model workers did not repay fixed wage raises with an effort boost but they did raise effort in response to a piece rate the piece rate scheme was also more e

capacity expansion with interrupted demand growth abstract in most long range planning problems accurate forecasting of demand growth is often difficult sometimes unexpected shocks in the economy occur and disrupt the predicted growth rate of demand for example growth can unexpectedly cease for and indeterminate length of time due to crucial occurrnces such as wars economic recessions or oil price shocks in this paper we examine the effects of unforeseen demand plateaus on the capacity expansion problem of sizing and timing production facilities we assume that demand for capacity follows a stochastic process that is we allow for plateaus to happen at random future times and to continue for an uncertain duration when the demand process is generated by an alternating renewal process we show that demand plateaus result in a modified discounting rate and a modified import cost

do monetary incentives undermine performance on intrinsically enjoyable tasks a field test economists have long been intrigued by an influential literature in psychology positing that monetary pay lowers performance on enjoyable tasks by crowding out agents intrinsic interest in them b

experimental labor markets and policy considerations incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects this survey focuses on experimental labor markets investigating two aspects that are important for a better understanding of labor market relations and their consequences for labor market policies the first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess the prevalence of reciprocal considerations in incomplete labor contracts the second part summarizes the relatively small but growing experimental literature exploring labor market issues in macroeconomics and public finance studying the interaction between taxation and labor market outcomes

the interactions among foreign direct investment economic growth degree of openness and unemployment in taiwan the vector autoregression method of variance decomposition and impulse response function analysis are applied to analyse various relationships among foreign direct investment fdi economic growth unemployment and degree of openness in taiwan the analysis results show that these five variables have a long run equilibrium relationship however unemployment rate and fdi outflow have weak exogeneity we also found that there exist three unidirectional causalities from fdi outflow to fdi inflow from economic growth to degree of openness and from economic growth to unemployment in short run furthermore the shocks of economic growth and degree of openness have positive effects on fdi inflow on the contrary the shocks in economic growth and fdi inflow have negative effects on unemployment rate

equal split in the informal market for group train travel in this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected at the central train station of the city of kiel germany group tickets are used by individual proposers looking for co travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure the shared ride is offered for a fixed price we observe that the prevailing price offer corresponds to an equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co travelers this result is remarkable because the positions of the bargaining parties are clearly asymmetric and formation of the full group is not guaranteed

corruption and culture an experimental analysis article i nfo article history why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions in 2005 we conducted a bribery experiment and found that among undergraduates we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country among graduate students we could not in 2007 we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the uk was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour we conclude that while corruption may in part be a cultural phenomenon individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin

the timing of discretionary bonuses effort signals and reciprocity abstract in a real effort experiment we investigate the relationship between reciprocity and the timing of discretionary bonuses in a two period principal agent manager worker setting we vary the timing of the manager s bonus decision in order to examine two main channels reward and trust through which discretionary bonuses may operate average worker performance improves when bonus decisions are made between the two periods since both channels are simultaneously active first period output significantly increases as workers attempt to signal their trustworthiness to managers when the bonus decision is made upfront or at the end average output is no different than in a baseline setting without the bonus mechanism furthermore output after a bonus is not paid decreases substantially consistent with negative reciprocity our main findings are reinforced by using time spent on the available real leisure activity as an alternative measure of subjects effort

reciprocity under brief and long time delays we report the results from three experiments embedded in the same overarching design which extends the gift exchange paradigm for the study of worker employer relationships we focus on the effect of the length of the delay between the time at which workers learn their wage and when they choose an effort level on the relationship between wage and effort we compare effort choices made within a few hours with those made several weeks afterward we find that the strength of the wage effort relationship decreases over time and this change appears to be driven by workers who receive low wages jel c91 j33 m52

employability miles and worker employability awareness this article studies the use and impact of a employability miles voucher scheme these vouchers could be used for participation in a restricted number of training courses which all aim to stimulate employees to develop a more active attitude towards their own employability using data from two surveys of one firm s workforce we find that voucher use is related to various personality traits and personal characteristics in particular a worker s ambition goal setting and education level are positively related to voucher use in addition workers with longer tenure spend their vouchers more often conversely workers with a more positive self image as well as those who are negatively reciprocal spend their vouchers less often the negative relation between voucher use and negative reciprocity suggests that workers who are more negatively reciprocal perceive the voucher as an hr tool for outplacement further we find that voucher use positively affects worker employability awareness and willingness t

what limits escalation varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment abstract threat power is the ability to impose a great loss on someone else at relatively low own cost and can be measured by the ratio of other s and own loss it can be varied by assuming that rejecting an ultimatum reduces the payoff of the proposer to its share and that of the responder to its 1 share where 0 1 results demonstrate that proposers become more greedy when is high whereas responders adjust to threat power but punish greed to a high extent irrespective of own rejection cost

timing of kindness evidence from a field experiment abstract we conduct a field experiment in a naturally occurring labor environment and track whether the performance of workers responds to unexpected wage increases specifically we investigate how the timing of wage increases affects efforts we find that workers performance is substantially higher for the same total wage when their wage is increased in two steps as opposed to a single increase at the outset moreover workers are more honest and are more willing to do voluntary extra work after surprising wage increases compared to a baseline condition without increases

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion