production lot sizing and carbon emissions under cap and trade and carbon tax regulations cap and trade and carbon tax are two emission regulations widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms based on economic order quantity eoq model this paper examines the production lot sizing issues of a firm under these two regulations respectively the optimal lot size and emissions under the two regulations are achieved we then investigate the impacts of production and regulation parameters on the optimal lot size and emissions furthermore we compare the firm s optimal carbon emissions under the two regulations it is found that under the cap and trade regulation the firm s decisions of the optimal emissions as well as permits trading depend on the differentiated permits trading prices if setup incurs the same cost as holding incurs per unit of generated emissions both regulations always lead to the same optimal emissions which is also equal to that without emission regulation otherwise neither regulation always leads to lower emissions than the other does

a competitive distribution of auctions in this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded a competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism it is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller s best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market the purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium for an economy in which sellers compete by offering different direct mechanisms to buyers no attempt is made to give a complete characterization of all possible equilibria rather we focus on one equilibrium in which the contracts that are offered by sellers in equilibrium and buyer s behaviour under these contracts are both independent of traders beliefs about one another the equilibrium illustrates one of the reasons why contracts that are employed in practice may not be as finely tuned to beliefs as the theory of mechanism design says that they should be the answer is simply that contracts are not offered in a vacuum sellers in the model studied in this paper need to compete with one another in order to attract buyers highly tuned mechanisms tend to extract buyer surplus in such an environment sellers are able to attract many buyers by offering to use cruder mechanisms that leave some surplus for buyers in this paper sellers are allowed to have different costs for the commodity that is being traded nonetheless the equilibrium for the limit economy in which there are infinitely many buyers and sellers is such that every seller offers a second price auction and publicizes a reserve price equal to his cost in a standard monopoly auction the optimal reserve price for the seller exceeds his cost by an amount that depends on his beliefs about buyers valuations myerson 1981 a seller who raises his reserve price has his profits affected in two distinct ways by raising his reserve price the seller makes it unprofitable for some buyer types to participate in his auction the seller therefore loses any surplus that he might have earned by trading with these buyers the buyers who still find it profitable to participate in the seller s auction will end up having to pay a higher price when they win because of this increase in the seller s reserve price this means that the seller will be able to extract a bit more surplus from buyers who continue to participate the seller raises the reserve price until the marginal cost associated with raising the reserve price is just equal to the marginal gain associated with the ability to extract more surplus from remaining buyers competition mitigates this argument since there is a limit to the amount of surplus that the seller can extract from remaining buyers before they decide that they should instead choose one of the alternative auctions that are being held on the market with

environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies abstract this paper analyses the effects of the environmental policy instruments taxes and standards on the investment behaviour of firms in the context of an international duopoly two production factors are considered the capital stock and a polluting input the government of each country values high profits for its firm and a good environmental quality through standards on the polluting input firms get commitment on output which is not the case under taxes standards thus seem a better environmental policy instrument because for the same use of the polluting input taxes lead the duopolists to higher investment with lower profits this result was derived in a two stage game model it was confirmed in a differential game model with open loop strategies the paper shows that in a differential game model with feedback strategies an effect occurs that counteracts the first effect the cause of this is that taxes induce substitution between capital and the polluting input the conclusion is that under taxes firms invest more due to the absence of commitment but invest less due to substitution between the inputs the net effect depends on the values of the parameters taxes are better than standards for low rates of depreciation and discount for low investment costs and for high productivity of capital

trade s dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution abstract this study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the u s mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs public health damages and trade benefits noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages results show trade liberalization leads mexico to curtail pollution in both games cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the united states from mexico s pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game

what separates us sources of resistance to globalization with increasing sophistication economists have been estimating gravity equations for five decades robust evidence shows that borders and distance impede trade by much more than tariffs or transports costs can explain we therefore advocate investigation of other sources of resistance despite the greater difficult involved in measuring and modelling them from our selective review of recent findings a unifying explanation emerges a legacy of historical isolation and conflict forged a world economy in which neither tastes nor information are homogeneously distributed cultural difference and inadequate information manifest themselves most strongly at national borders and over distance

game theoretic modelling of transboundary pollution transboundary pollution is pollution which is emitted in one country and deposited or causing harm in another country due to the absence of a supranational institution that could enforce international legislation transboundary externalities cannot be approached in the same way as domestic pollution problems in an attempt to find non traditional solutions to such crossborder problems recent environmental economics literature incorporates behavioural assumptions with the help of game theory this paper discusses how different types of transboundary pollution have been approached and which static and dynamic game theoretic solution concepts have been evaluated while full cooperation among countries yields the economically optimal outcome it is difficult to reach because countries are faced with an inequitable sharing of the burden of pollution abatement and with the incentive to free ride side payment schemes to aid burden sharing and strategies to circumvent free riding are reviewed issues such as transaction costs information and motivation are briefly discussed

environmental tax policy and intergenerational distribution abstract we study the effects of environmental taxation within the context of an overlapping generations model the quality of the environment is modelled as a durable consumption good introduction of the environmental tax harms old existing generations and benefits young existing generations as well as all future generations increasing the tax in a pareto improving manner is easier the higher the pre existing tax the reverse holds if tax policy is decided by majority rule a suitably designed bond policy can be used to redistribute the efficiency gains due to the internalisation of environmental externalities across the generations

the tragedy of the commons and socialization theory and policy we revisit the tragedy of the commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheep they let graze on a common parcel of land while relying on di fferent forms of rationality nash players pure or impure kantian players we examine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow ing a vertical oblique socialization process a la bisin and verdier 2001 we study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land and we show that introducing a quota may in some cases reduce the proportion of kantians pure and impure and worsen the tragedy of commons with respect to the laissez faire finally we examine whether a government should promote either a pure or an impure kantian morality by comparing the relative fi tness of pure impure kantians and their interactions with the congestion of land

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

the acid rain differential game this paper considers an acid rain differential game countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil countries face a trade off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not this paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open loop and markov perfect nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game it will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady state levels of the buffer stocks differ the theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between great britain and ireland finally some results are given for the whole of europe

on competing mechanisms under exclusive competition abstract we study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents competition is exclusive each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him exclusive competition is at the center stage of recent analyses of markets with private information economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms which induce truthful revelation of agents exogenous private information this paper investigates the rationale for this restriction we provide two results first we construct an economic example showing that direct mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria second we show that truth telling strongly robust equilibrium outcomes survive against principals unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

transboundary pollution in the black sea comparison of institutional arrangements this paper analyses the transboundary pollution between romania and ukraine coastal states along the black sea and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem to achieve this goal we use a dynamic and strategic framework we compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first best case with three different institutional arrangements the non cooperative game of countries the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the black sea commission our findings indicate that the non cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules

immigration and trade creation econometric evidence from canada immigrants may expand trade with their country of origin owing to superior knowledge of or preferential access to market opportunities the authors test this proposition using canadian trade data with 136 partners from 1980 to 1992 in an augmented gravity equation they find that a 10 percent increase in immigrants is associated with a 1 percent increase in canadian exports to the immigrant s home country and a 3 percent increase in imports they also find that among the primary categories of immigrants independents have the greater influence on trade immigration via the entrepreneur class appears to have less impact on trade than all other classes except refugees

imperfect competition in auction designs we study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers the sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions upon observing the set reserve prices the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid we show that this game has at least one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient reserve prices are not driven to zero cost we also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

trade transboundary pollution and foreign lobbying in this paper we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution we show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream polluted country but if the upstream polluting country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country s social welfare and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country thus the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments susceptibility to foreign political influence

investigation of rfid investment in a single retailer two supplier supply chain with random demand to decrease inventory inaccuracy abstract inventory information inaccuracy is one of the main causes to the inventory waste in supply chain operations which motivates many companies to adopt modern tracing technologies e g radio frequency identification rfid to decrease inventory errors and strengthen the cooperation between the supply chain stakeholders considering different types of rfid possess unequal technique features in tracing items in more practical environment for the first time this paper explores the different effectiveness of rfid in decreasing the inventory inaccuracies in a supply chain containing one retailer and two suppliers firstly a novel scale factor function is introduced to illustrate the relationships between the variable cost of rfid and the non full abilities of rfid in decreasing inventory inaccuracies then under the stochastic demand and inaccurate inventory analytical models are formulated to investigate the cost effectiveness of different rfids to the optimal order quantities and the expected profits in different scenarios uncoordinated and coordinated supply chains hereby the best coordination strategies are addressed at last numerical results obtained from different scenarios on adopting rfid and a practical case level rfid system for recycling packaging cases indicate that rfid can not only decrease inventory inaccuracies but also strengthen the supply chain coordination

an equity assessment of introducing uncertain forest carbon sequestration in eu climate policy large emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to cause major environmental problems in the future european policy makers have therefore declared that they aim to implement cost efficient and fair policies to reduce carbon emissions the purpose of this paper is to assess whether the cost of the eu policies for 2020 can be reduced through the inclusion of carbon sequestration as an abatement option while equity is also improved the assessment is done by numerical calculations using a chance constrained partial equilibrium model of the eu emissions trading scheme and national effort sharing targets where forest sequestration is introduced as an uncertain abatement option fairness is evaluated by calculation of gini coefficients for six equity criteria to policy outcomes the estimated gini coefficients range between 0 11 and 0 32 for the current policy between 0 16 and 0 66 if sequestration is included and treated as certain and between 0 19 and 0 38 when uncertainty about sequestration is taken into account and policy makers wish to meet targets with at least 90 per cent probability the results show that fairness is reduced when sequestration is included and that the impact is larger when sequestration is treated as certain

robust competitive auctions a competitive distribution of auctions peters 1997 is robust to the possibility of a seller s deviation to any arbitrary mechanisms let alone direct mechanisms because the sufficient condition for the robustness is embedded in its notion of equilibrium

equitable cost benefit analysis of climate change policies the literature of welfare maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity this paper introduces three ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously the first method inspired by kant and rawls maximises net present welfare without international cooperation as if all regions share the fate of the region affected worst by climate change optimal emission abatement varies greatly depending on the spatial and temporal resolution that is the grid at which maximum impact is defined the second method is inspired by varian s no envy emissions are reduced so as to equalise total costs and benefits of climate change over all countries of the world and over all time periods emission reductions are substantial this method approximately preserves the inequities that would occur in a world without climate change the third method uses non linear aggregations of welfare the utilitarian default is linear in a cooperative setting this method cannot distinguish between sources of inequity the higher the aversion to inequity the higher optimal greenhouse gas emission reduction

a cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem abstract a two country dynamic game model of whaling is considered it is assumed that the countries have exact information possibly with some time delay about each other s whaling efforts measured by the number of vessels involved in whaling it is shown how to construct equilibrium strategies which are affine in the available information and which when jointly carried out realize a given pareto optimal decision numerical results suggest that some of these strategies are credible i e the countries do believe that the announced strategies will be followed

emissions trading of global and local pollutants pollution havens and free riding abstract in the presence of local sulfur and global carbon pollutants we examine the pollution haven hypothesis and free riding behavior under domestic emissions trading poorer southern countries become pollution havens when free trade opens up whenever sulfur damage functions are linear or when sulfur levels in equilibrium are not higher in the south with global trading of carbon permits the pollution haven effect emerges in equilibrium whenever the convex sulfur damage functions are nonlinear countries that do not participate in a global protocol designed to reduce carbon emissions enjoy double benefits stemming from free riding and cleaner local environments

immigrant links to the home country empirical implications for u s bilateral trade flows immigrants ties to their home countries can play a key role in fostering bilateral trade linkages immigrant ties include knowledge of home country markets language preferences and business contacts that have the potential to decrease trading transaction costs empirical results for the united states suggest that immigrant links have historically been important in increasing bilateral trade flows with immigrants home countries copyright 1994 by mit press

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

social welfare in a common property oligopoly output in a markov nash cournot equilibrium to a noncooperative differential game in which in oligopolists extract a common property nonrenewable resource is bounded by the output of in firm and in i firm static oligopolies we discuss the welfare effects of the number of firms and of the divergence between private and social discount rates we compare extraction under the markov and open loop equilibria and then offer an explanation for the possibility that the resource is exhausted instantaneously in a continuous time game this explanation does not depend on the fact that the period of commitment is infinitesimal this essay models the extraction by an oligopolistic industry of a common property nonrenewable resource we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium mpe in a game amongst firms and then provide general conditions under which the resource is exhausted instantaneously if there is unrestricted access to a resource agents perceive its shadow value to be 0 and extract too rapidly when access is restricted to a finite number of agents in none of whom possess exclusive property rights an additional complication may arise if firms behave as oligopolists in the product market they have an incentive to extract the resource too slowly in order to increase the price thus where m firms exploit a resource in the absence of property rights there are conflicting tendencies the absence of property rights encourages excessive exploitation whereas the finite number of firms encourages insufficiently rapid exploitation there are a number of situations where the lack of property rights and the presence of market power coexist examples include i national fisheries which are large enough to affect fish populations and output prices ii common exploitation of aquifers or rivers where individual use affects the price of an agricultural output or of another input iii production by oligopolistic firms which degrades the environment we consider the case of nonrenewable resources such as oil this implies a simple equation of motion for the stock of the resource and emphasizes the role of the number of firms and the stock size such models are often appropriate even if the resource is not literally nonrenewable for example tropical forests or groundwater aquifers are potentially renewable given enough time as indeed oil deposits may be however the rate of replenishment may be insignificant given

is aging harmful to the environment how does aging affect the environment we analyze this question using anoverlapping generations model featuring uncertain lifetimes andenvironmental externalities we show that whether aging is harmful to theenvironment depends on the curvature of utility function which ismeasured by the degree of relative risk aversion we also explore theimplication of the results for environmental policy in an aging society

equity development and climate change control the paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions a game theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control then the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed jel c7 h0 h3 q38

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open

international equity and differentiation in global warming policy ne of the major obstacles to reaching a comprehensive agreement on global warming is the setting of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for individual countries long standing tensions between industrialized and developing countries have raised the issue of equity in burden sharing moreover individual industrialized nations have pleaded special circumstances and have sought differentiation in their obligations this paper analyzes alternative rules for distributing tradable carbon dioxide emissions permits a non linear programming model which distinguishes between allocation based and outcome based rules is used to analyze the relative welfare outcomes the model is applied to the world body of nations and yields several important policy implications

on endogenous competitive business cycles the belief that the long run equilibrium of a competitive monetary economy that does not experience any exogeneous shocks whether originating from the external environment or from policy should be modelled as a state that is stationary or perhaps growing at a constant rate seems to be deeply rooted in the mind of some economists

the stability likelihood of an international climate agreement results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies this paper provides the methodology of stability likelihood sl that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions we show that the concept of sl improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses moreover our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty

can international environmental cooperation be bought in this paper a two stage game of international environmental agreement formation with asymmetric countries is analytically solved the equilibrium of the game makes it possible to determine the size and composition of a stable agreement two cases are studied in the first case countries differ only in abatement costs while in the second case they differ in environmental damages in both cases two different institutional settings one without transfers and another with transfers are considered the results establish that the asymmetry assumption has no important effects on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the symmetric case if transfers are not used or abatement costs represent the only difference among countries however when the only difference is in environmental damages the level of cooperation that can be bought through a self financed transfer scheme increases with the degree of asymmetry

cooperation on climate change mitigation abstract we analyze conditions under which it is possible to achieve efficient mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions with a self enforcing international agreement in which all countries find it in their self interest to abide by the agreement we model the choice of emissions by countries as a dynamic game we use a two part punishment scheme for deviations from an agreement that is renegotiation proof and show when this scheme supports the efficient outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium using numerical examples we show that an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium exists for a range of reasonable parameter values the existence of such equilibrium may be non monotonic in the discount rate and the ratio of slope of marginal abatement cost and marginal damages

on the cultural transmission of preferences for social status abstract we study the formation of preferences for social status as the result of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits we characterize the behavior of parents with preferences for status in terms of socialization of their children to this particular cultural trait we show that degenerate distributions of the population whereby agents have either all status preferences or all non status preferences are dynamically unstable moreover under some conditions there exists a unique stationary distribution which is non degenerate in which both status and non status preferences co exist in the population and this distribution is locally stable finally we study the dependence of the stable stationary distribution of status preferences on institutional technological and policy parameters which affect agents economic conditions

competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices abstract in this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts two variants of the model are studied one extends a model first analyzed by wolinsky rev econ stud 55 1988 71 84 in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers the other variant extends the model of mcafee econometrica61 1993 1281 1312 in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions the equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d82

time consistent shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction we study the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by countries in a cooperative game of pollution reduction we compute the characteristic function for all possible coalitions and apply the shapley value to determine a fair distribution of the total cooperative cost among players we design a mechanism for allocation over time of total individual cost so that the initial agreement remains valid for the whole duration of the game

a two level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between russia china and annex b countries this paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between russia and developing countries dcs mainly represented by china on the international market of emission permits created by the kyoto protocol the model uses a formulation of i a demand function for permits from annex b countries and ii marginal abatement costs mac in russia and china provided by two detailed models gemini e3 is a computable general equilibrium model that provides the data to estimate annex b demand for permits and macs in russia poles is a partial equilibrium model that is used to obtain mac curves for china the competitive scenario is compared with a monopoly situation where only russia is allowed to play strategically the impact of allowing dcs to intervene on the international emission trading market is thus assessed

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

the kyoto protocol and developing countries abstract under the kyoto protocol the world s wealthier countries assumed binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the agreement requires these countries to consider ways to minimize adverse effects on developing countries of these actions transmitted through trade using a general equilibrium model of the world economy we find that adverse effects fall mainly on energy exporting countries for some even greater than on countries that are assuming commitments removing existing fuel taxes and subsidies and using international permit trading would greatly reduce the adverse impacts and also reduce economic impacts on the countries taking on commitments another approach preferential tariff reduction for developing countries would benefit many developing countries but would not target those most adversely affected if instead oecd countries directly compensated developing countries for losses the required annual financial transfer would be on the order of 25 billion 1995 us in 2010

optimal tax schemes and the environmental externality abstract this paper analyzes optimal tax schemes in an overlapping generations model with the environment which deteriorated by the consumption to achieve the optimal allocation two sorts of consumption tax schemes are analyzed in addition we examine another tax scheme with the maintenance subsidy

bioeconomics of spatial exploitation in a patchy environment abstract this paper presents a model of renewable resource exploitation that incorporates both intertemporal dynamics and spatial movement the model combines the h s gordon vernon smith hypothesis of a rent dissipation process with ricardian notions that resources are exploited across space in a pattern dependent upon relative profitabilities the population structure is characterized in a manner consistent with modern biological ideas that stress patchiness heterogeneity and interconnections among and between patches generally we find the equilibrium patterns of biomass and effort across the system to be dependent upon bioeconomic conditions within each patch and the nature of the biological dispersal mechanism between patches we use simple examples to illustrate how the distribution of effort throughout the system reflects the heterogeneity and the spatial biological linkages

incentive equilibrium in an overlapping generations environmental game we consider two overlapping generations that want to coordinate their strategies of working consuming and controlling pollution since the cooperative solution is not an equilibrium and hence is not a self enforcing contract a mechanism is required to sustain it we show how incentive strategies and the resulting incentive equilibrium could provide such a mechanism we also derive the conditions that ensure the credibility of these strategies

a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions abstract in recent years the transboundary pollution problems in the world are becoming more and more serious the diffusion of pollutants is common and each region which suffers from the pollution wishes that the polluter in neighboring regions would either reduce polluting or compensate for the damages this paper studies a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric regions there are two novel features in this paper first there is a stackelberg game between the industrial firms and their local government while the governments can cooperate in pollution reduction second transboundary pollution damages the regions in two ways through a global accumulative pollutant and a regional non accumulative pollutant the paper characterizes the parameter spaces that governments in two neighboring regions can collaborate and gives the feedback nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms it is found that only when the governments get cooperation the regional impact caused by the neighboring region pollution diffusion could be taken into consideration when the governments develop strategies additionally a payment distribution mechanism is proposed and a subgame consistent cooperative solution is provided with such a payment distribution both governments will receive a higher payoff in a cooperative solution than in a non cooperative solution at any instant of time during the game

product based cultural change is the village global we provide a model of product based cultural change where trade integration leads to cultural convergence a standard trade model of dixit stiglitz monopolistic competition is coupled with a micro founded model of cultural dynamics we show that access to varieties that are attached to a global cultural type changes the incentives of parents to socialize their children and transmit their type the resulting increase in agents of the global cultural type leads to a magnification of the initial shock a striking feature of the model is that even temporary shocks to openness may have permanent effects through the changing distribution of preferences in the economy

intergenerational altruism and the environment we construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in barro 1974 it is shown that steady state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism despite individuals altruism the competitive equilibrium is not optimal we thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized

optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second best world evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players abstract this paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question in a second best world should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally we find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small this result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution i e it uses uniform standards whereas local authorities use different shadow prices and therefore different standards

time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution abstract this note determines a rule to share a surplus gained when two countries or regions agree to coordinate their policies to reduce downstream pollution an intertemporal decomposition scheme for the total side payment is proposed this scheme has the following individual rationality property in each subgame that starts along the cooperative trajectory one country is guaranteed to receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution for this country another notion of individual rationality obtains this country will at any instant of time during the play of the game receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution

the optimal number of firms in the commons a dynamic approach we consider a common property resource sold in imperfectly competitive markets there is a dynamic externality current harvests lower future stocks raising future harvest costs and a static crowding externality increasing industry size raises costs but lowers prices thus it has ambiguous welfare effects the optimal industry size typically changes over time so that a first best outcome cannot be obtained with a fixed number of firms single firm exploitation is optimal only under special circumstances the socially optimal open loop steady state industry size corresponds to the static optimum both generally differ from the closed loop steady state optimum

participation and duration of environmental agreements we analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies if complete contracts are feasible participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments however most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate if investments are noncontractible countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate but the free rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem under well specified conditions even the first best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete

why are some people and countries more protectionist than others we analyze two cross country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio demographic and other indicators we nd that pro trade preferences are signi cantly and robustly correlated with an individual s level of human capital in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed individuals in non traded sectors tend to be the most pro trade while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist third an individual s relative economic status has a very strong positive association withpro trade attitudes finally non economic determinants in the form of values identities and attachments play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade high degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism patriotism are associated withprotectionist tendencies c

exposure to foreign media and changes in cultural traits evidence from naming patterns in france abstract free trade in audio visual services has faced opposition on the grounds that foreign media undermine domestic culture and ultimately global diversity using a long panel of french birth registries we assess the media culture link using name frequencies as a measure of tastes controlling for the number of people who currently have a name and unobserved name effects our regressions show that media influences choices via selective imitation parents are much more likely to adopt media names that they associate with youth using estimated parameters we simulate our model of name choice to reveal that absent foreign media fewer than 5 of french babies would have been named differently our simulations also suggest a positive effect of foreign media on the welfare of parents

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

globalization and the dynamics of cultural identity this paper presents a simple model where micro founded dynamics of cultural identity are endogenous and interact with an international trade equilibrium this process generates a strong home bias under autarky we then show that goods market integration causes a phenomenon of cultural divergence whereby the distributions of cultures become more dissimilar across countries and one of the cultures that existed under autarky ultimately disappears by way of contrast we show that social integration causes cultural convergence and can counterbalance the effects of goods market integration

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

incentives and stability of international climate coalitions an integrated assessment this paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and the stability of the resulting climate coalition using the integrated assessment model witch coalition stability is assessed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference the aggregation of social welfare and the severity of climate damages the profitability stability and strong potential internal stability of a number of coalitions those potentially effective in reducing ghg emissions is explored in the paper the main conclusion is that only the grand coalition i e a coalition where all world regions cooperate to reduce emissions can maintain ghg concentration below 550 ppm co2 eq however this coalition is not internally stable even when allowing for monetary transfers across world regions nonetheless the paper also shows that strongly potentially internally stable coalitions exist though of smaller size which can mitigate global warming and limit ghg concentrations to 600 ppm co2 eq

building climate coalitions on preferential free trade agreements in this paper we discuss the endogenous formation of climate coalitions in an issue linkage regime in particular we propose a preferential free trade agreement on which a climate coalition should be built the basic idea is that the gains of free trade can provide strong incentives for countries to join the coalition as a framework a multi stage strategic trade model is employed in which each country may set an emission cap being effective on a permit market in addition a discriminatory import tariff may be imposed on dirty goods however at the heart of our approach is a preferential free trade arrangement among the members of a climate coalition leading to a favourable shift in the terms of trade as a main result trade liberalisation is found as an institution highly effective in building climate coalitions in particular the parametrical simulation of the model shows that participation in joint emission reduction is higher consumption patterns are more environmentally friendly and coalitional welfare is much more improved than in case of a single issue environmental agreement

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations