the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

reducing bureaucratic corruption interdisciplinary perspectives on what works abstract this article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti corruption policies with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants drawing on the work of economists political scientists sociologists and anthropologists we examine seven policy categories 1 rewards and penalties 2 monitoring 3 restructuring bureaucracies 4 screening and recruiting 5 anti corruption agencies 6 educational campaigns and 7 international agreements notably rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti corruption policies nevertheless we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring including anti corruption audits and e governance in addition adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption an emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature we conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem it cannot be treated in the long term with individual level solutions

are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth firm level evidence exploiting a unique data set containing information about the estimated bribe payments of ugandan firms the authors study the relationship between bribe payments taxes and firm growth in uganda for the period 1995 97 using industry location averages to circumvent the potential problem of endogeneity and to deal with issues of measurement error they find that both the rate of taxation and the rate of bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth for the full data set a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with three percentage point reduction in firm growth an effect about three times that of taxation moreover after excluding outliers the authors find that bribery has a much greater negative impact on growth and taxation a considerably smaller one this provides some validation of firm level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards development even more than taxation does

congested public goods the case of fire protection abstract this paper uses a fire protection measure based on a community s fire insurance rating to estimate the strength of congestion effects for fire protection services the empirical results show that the congestion properties of fire protection are much like those of a pure public good in addition the paper introduces a new notion of returns to scale for public goods and estimates the relevant parameters for the fire protection case

bureaucratic capacity delegation and political reform thecentraltensionmotivatingcontemporarytheories of delegation from politicians to bureaucrats lies in the potential conflict between the value of bureaucratic expertise on one hand and the desire for political control on the other this tension is well known and has been debated at least since weber s classic work on bureaucracy modern bureaucracies are staffed with individuals who by virtue of rational bureaucratic organization are highly skilled policy experts who in principle should be able to help less knowledgeable politicians achieve their goals however the very skills and expertise that bureaucrats enjoy create the possibility that bureaucrats will usurp the rightful role of politicians in policymaking processes because the way this tension is resolved determines the ultimate compatibility of democracy and bureaucracy existing theories of delegation typically focus on understanding how and to what extent politicians can resolve it 1 in many contexts particularly developing democracies bureaucracy does not fit the weberian characteristics that are assumed in the existing delegation literature the bureaucracies may be staffed with individuals who lack the personal capacity to execute orders effectively the organizational structure may lead to breakdowns within bureaucratic hierarchies making it difficult for senior administrators to control their subordinates departments and ministries may lack basic budgets and resources to undertake implementation actions they may suffer from incentives for

one size fits all decentralization corruption and the monitoring of bureaucrats summary the majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argue that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument for use in keeping corruption at bay we argue that this result crucially depends on the effectiveness of monitoring bureaucrats behavior the benefits of decentralization only occur if there is a supervisory body such as a free press which is often lacking in a substantial number of countries using cross country data we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the press into account our main finding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of freedom of the press whereas countries without effective monitoring suffer from decentralization our policy implication is that a free press is a necessary pre condition for successful decentralization programs

bureaucracy and growth a cross national analysis of the effects of weberian state structures on economic growth the role of bureaucratic authority structures in facilitating economic growth has been a sociological concern since max weber s classic contributions almost 100 years ago using a recent and original data set we examine the characteristics of core state economic agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 developing countries for the 1970 1990 period our weberianness scale offers a simple measure of the degree to which these agencies employ meritocratic recruitment and offer predictable rewarding long term careers we find that these weberian characteristics significantly enhance prospects for economic growth even when we control for initial levels of gdp per capita and human capital our results imply that weberianness should be included as a factor in general models of economic growth they also suggest the need for more attention by policymakers to building better bureaucracies and more research by social scientists on variations in how state bureaucracies are organized

flexing muscle corporate political expenditures as signals to the bureaucracy when corporations and their employees spend money in the political arena to what extent are they purchasing special treatment complaints about the deleterious effects of corporate money in politics are ubiquitous in american political discourse however in order to pinpoint the place of these expenditures in american democracy and to appreciate fully the consequences of various reform proposals itiscriticaltoidentifytheprecisemechanism through which any preferential treatment might occur in this spirit scholars have suggested that corporations make political expenditures because they hope to influence government behavior through either explicit quid pro quos with legislators for constituency service or favorable votes baron 1989 grossman and helpman 1994 2001 improved access to legislators hall and wayman 1990 langbein 1986 or enhancement of the electoral prospects of sympathetic incumbents pooleandromer1985 empiricalevidenceverifying a definitive relationship between expenditures and specific policy change unfortunately has proven elusive in a recent review essay ansolabehere de figueiredo and snyder 2003 116 conclude contributions explain a miniscule fraction of the variation in voting behavior in the u s congress they suggest thatcontributionsarebetterthoughtofasconsumption goods that fulfill a desire to participate in politics than as investment in a political marketplace

demand for local public spending evidence from the british social attitudes survey the british social attitudes survey bsas is a uk wide survey that provides a rich source of information on individuals attitudes to a variety of topics including locally provided service in this paper we seek to model answers to questions on attitudes to local authority spending which invite the expression of a private demand for local public spending a convincing picture has emerged of locally provided public goods as imperfectly congested public goods with a price elastic and probably income inelastic demand the view that central government grants may induce voter confusion over tax prices of public services also finds support

mixed markets and crime abstract this paper specifies and solves a two stage game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control in the first stage of the model private targets and the government choose levels of policing in the second stage criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit the paper s key results are as follows first private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less protected targets suffer second an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing this is an instance of a political incentive externality where private policing affects the objective function of the government specifically it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good third the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing in effect private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening this in turn may lead to an increase in the severity of crime fourth the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient and in some situations mixing may reduce the utility of all targets

congestion function specification and the publicness of local public goods abstract this paper is about the measurement of congestion within the median voter demand framework the model of congestion traditionally used in the literature and four others are compared and tested in a median voter framework the results show that a more flexible functional form which imposes fewer a priori restrictions on the data does at least as good a job of explaining variations in local government expenditures furthermore it is shown that measured publicness of local public goods depends entirely on the a priori restrictions imposed on the congestion function

why do firms hide bribes and unofficial activity after communism abstract our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden unofficial activity to be much larger in russia and ukraine than in poland slovakia and romania a comparison of cross country averages shows that managers in russia and ukraine face higher effective tax rates worse bureaucratic corruption greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith in the court system our firm level regressions for the three eastern european countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output

inter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents abstractinter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents regional studies this paper shows that if taxes on economic rent are assigned to anticipatory first moving regions and inter regional transfers are mandated centrally rents are under taxed relative to optimal levels this provides a possible explanation for low rent capture observed in australia and canada two resource rich federal economies that also have fiscal equalization transfers between regions

plata o plomo bribe and punishment in a theory of political influence we present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes plata spanish for silver and the threat of punishment plomo spanish for lead we then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country s public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution the use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high ability citizens to enter public life cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians this predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption and worse politicians moreover the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the influence game so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials protecting officials from accusations of corruption immunity will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may increase the quality of politicians these predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only bribes are used the positive evils and dangers of the representative as of every other form of government may be reduced to two heads first general ignorance and incapacity or to speak more moderately insufficient mental qualifications in the controlling body secondly the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community

on the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods abstract this paper contends that a measurement problem the zoo effect has led to upwardly biased estimates of the degree to which local public goods are subject to congestion the suggestion is that the observed positive correlation between public expenditure and population size reflects in large measure the wider range of services provided in more populous jurisdictions not simply a high propensity of these goods to become congested

the invisible hand and the grabbing hand evidence from a survey of 105 shop owners in moscow and warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection as well as the burden of regulation and corruption are much greater in moscow the evidence suggests that the invisible hand model of government better fits the warsaw local government and the grabbing hand model is more appropriate for moscow the evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced and that the quality of government may be as essential this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effect of democracy on corruption income is key summary this paper provides an explanation for the ambiguous relationship between democracy and corruption using rich panel data with annual observations from 1998 to 2012 allows us to control not only for country and time invariant factors but also for potential reverse causality between corruption and income levels in a 3sls framework democracy reduces corruption but only in economies that have already crossed a gdp capita level of approximately us 2 000 in 2005 us for poorer nations democratization is suggested to increase corruption other institutional characteristics are unlikely to drive this result and findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks and quantile regressions

the impact of corruption on investment predictability matters abstract this paper argues that it is not only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption corruption regimes that are more predictable in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable using the data collected by world bank in preparing the world development report of 1997 we provide empirical support for the conjecture

locally provided public schooling in brazilian municipalities the objective of this paper is to assess the demand for public schooling in the brazilian municipalities within a median voter framework the quantile regression and spatial techniques proved to be useful to account for the spatial and marginal effects associated with educational services the coefficients attached to the main variables price income and population were significant and had the expected sign the relatively high values for those parameters attest the status for these merit goods as luxuries last but no least the municipal school system in brazil seems to present increasing returns to scale both at the school and the municipality level

is corruption an efficient grease this paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework it analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency corruption and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries both developed and developing using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective it may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective we thus find evidence for the grease the wheels hypothesis in its weak and strong forms

an analysis of returns to scale in public production with an application to fire protection abstract this paper analyzes returns to scale in public production existing studies fail to differentiate among three dimensions of scale service quality the level of governmental activity and the number of people served a fourth dimension economies of scope is need for agencies that provide multiple services this paper provides a formal definition of returns to scale for each dimension this framework is applied to fire protection using a translog cost function with two services fire prevention and fire suppression the results indicate economies of scope increasing returns to quality scale and constant returns to population scale

revenue erosion through exemption and evasion in cameroon 1993 abstract the administration of tax statutes materially determines their economic effects a survey of cameroonian businesses a country seemingly typical of its economic level demonstrates widespread erosion of the tax bases paid by businesses through exemptions and evasion businesses seem willing to provide information on these potentially confidential activities the survey provides information on the number of businesses evading taxes or having exemptions on the characteristics of these businesses relative to others on whether businesses maintain information of use to the tax administration on the contacts between the administration and businesses affecting evasion and on penalties imposed by the administration

how petty is petty corruption evidence from firm surveys in africa summary evidence suggests that corruption is costly for african firms this paper however shows that a minor difference in the way the question on bribe payments is asked has a large effect on estimates of the size of the burden on average firms report payments that are between 4 and 15 times higher when they report them as a percent of sales than when they report them in monetary terms the paper discusses several possible reasons for this but none explain the difference one plausible remaining reason is that firm managers overestimate bribes when they report them in percentage terms

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

evaluating efficient public good provision theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries abstract provision of most public goods e g health care libraries education police fire protection utilities can be characterized by a two stage production process in the first stage basic inputs e g labor and capital are used to generate service potential e g opening hours materials which is then in the second stage transformed into observed outputs e g school outcomes library circulation crimes solved as final outputs are also affected by demand side factors conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about public productive in efficiency and its determinants hence this paper uses a specially tailored fully non parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in stage one only we thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 flemish public libraries our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding i e local funding versus intergovernmental transfers strongly affect library productive efficiency

corruption and market competition evidence from post communist countries summary this paper empirically examines whether market competition is associated with greater bribe payments we use firm level data from the business environment and enterprise performance surveys since market competition could be endogenous and some firms report zero bribes we employ a tobit estimation methodology instrumenting for market competition we find that greater market competition increases the amount of bribes paid results are robust across several measures of market competition however market competition is less strongly associated with bribes in the presence of other obstacles of doing business that could also lead to more bribes

exchange rate dynamics in anticipation of time contingent regime switching modelling the effects of a possible delay abstract the procedure of fixing a currently floating exchange rate at a given and publicly announced future date has a broad range of applications based on a continuous time monetary exchange rate model with flexible prices this paper analyzes exchange rate dynamics during the transition from floating to fixed rates in a situation in which market participants are uncertain about adherence to the fixing date and in which they take account of a possible delay in the regime switch the closed form solutions derived here allow us to quantify announcement effects as well as effects on the exchange rate variance caused by news that significantly changes the market s assessment of uncertainty

economic regulations red tape and bureaucratic corruption in post communist economies summary should state regulatory involvement in the economy necessarily generate corruption while excessive regulatory burden is often treated as a cause of corruption this paper argues otherwise it distinguishes regulatory policy or de jure regulatory regimes from regulatory implementation and offers a more nuanced argument about the relationship between state regulations and bureaucratic corruption the analysis of business survey data covering 25 post communist economies demonstrates that mechanisms of regulatory implementation rather than heavy handed regulatory policy are responsible for bribery this analysis draws attention to the theoretical distinction between different types of regulatory hurdles and their differential effects on the quality of governance

red tape and corruption abstract we study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal bureaucrat agent hierarchy the principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best red tape produces information but is costly to the agent and is administered by a corrupt bureaucrat first the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent in exchange for reducing the amount of red tape second the bureaucrat may take bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape even though the former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape we show that the equilibrium level of red tape is above the social optimum

evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization abstract theoretically federal transfers that make household location decisions efficient should ignore local cost differences subsidize positive externalities and offset differences in federal tax payments and local taxes levied on non residents but not local tax revenues from residents transfers that redistribute resources equitably across regions will likely target areas with individuals of low earnings potential or low real incomes applying these criteria empirically canadian equalization policy appears neither efficient nor equitable but exacerbates pre existing inefficiencies and underfunds minorities locational inefficiencies cost canada 0 41 of income annually and cause over funded provinces to have populations of 30 beyond their efficient long run levels

the publicness of local public goods evidence from ontario municipalities recent studies of local public good provision report publicness parameter estimates of about one indicating private good characteristics this empirical investigation of a wider range of communities obtains parameter estimates of significantly less than one indicating a high degree of publicness exists in smaller municipalities and within the service areas of individual public facilities comprising the supply network in larger centres it is argued that the observed values of the publicness parameters have no normative significance as to the merits of public versus private provision la materialite publique d usage des biens publics locaux resultats d une etude de municipalites ontariennes les etudes recentes sur l approvisionnement de biens publics locaux indiquent des coefficients de materialite publique d usage autour de l unite c est a dire que les biens publics locaux ont de fortes caracteristiques semblables aux biens prives ce memoire presente les resultats d un enquete empirique d un large eventail de communaut6s locales et en arrive a des valeurs pour le coefficient de materialite publique d usage qui sont bien moins que l unite et qui donc indiquent un haut degre de materialite publique d usage dans les petites municipalites mais aussi dans les zones de service d infrastructures particulieres parc bibliotheque poste de pompier etc qui forment le reseau d approvisionnement de biens publics dans les grands centres les auteurs suggerent que les valeurs observees de ces coefficients de materialite publique d usage n ont aucune portee normative et donc ne sauraient arbitrer les merites relatifs d un approvisionnement prive ou public de certains biens

estimating the publicness of local government services alternative congestion function specifications the standard approach to estimating median voter expenditure equations has incorporated the specification of a congestion function a n to convert the total output q of a government provided good into individual consumption qi in their classic papers borcherding and deacon 2 and bergstrom and goodman 1 adopted a simple form a n n y using this form estimated values of y 0 imply that the service in question is classified as a pure public good while y 1 implies a private good this approach is attractive from an empirical standpoint because it allows the data to determine the degree of publicness of the local government output the empirical findings of borcherding and deacon bergstrom and goodman and numerous later studies that used the median voter approach indicate that most local government services do not exhibit a significant degree of publicness 2 recent studies have questioned whether estimates of publicness are sensitive to the particular specification of the congestion relationship 6 9 researchers also have objected to the standard form because it holds the degree of publicness fixed which implies a decreasing marginal rate of congestion 3 6 15 moreover holding the degree of publicness fixed implies a single estimated value of y is sufficient to classify the publicness of the good critics of the standard approach argue that the degree of publicness should vary with population size for instance a local park may exhibit no congestion for small population sizes but eventually become congested as population increases unfortunately no clear guidelines for specifying the congestion function are available edwards suggested that flexible functional forms are to be preferred because they let the data speak for themselves 6 92 he also argued that the preferred form is one that fits the data best based on these criteria he concluded that a flexible form such as an exponential form is su

bribe or die gender differences in entrepreneurship in emerging markets this paper examines the relation between gender differences in entrepreneurship and firm level bribery one of the most impactful business obstacles to private sector growth using data from a comp

the genesis and spread of economic corruption a microtheoretic interpretation abstract this paper argues that the ability to engage in corruption arises from the possession of quasi monopoly power or authority by one of the parties to corruption this authority is passed on routinely through delegation of functions in state and publicly owned enterprises or acquired by explicit or implicit contract with another party or by solemn promise to act in good faith corruption tends to spread by enlisting the support of more individuals within and across activities this support is needed to overcome risks to solve problems of indivisibility and to reap benefits of network externalities

credible commitment and property rights evidence from russia most managers said that state arbitration courts did not work badly in disputes with other businesses but few expected these courts to protect their rights in disputes with state officials more importantly managers who expressed confidence that state arbitration courts could constrain state officials invested at higher rates even controlling for the perceived effectiveness of state institutions thus tightening constraints on state agents can increase the security of property and bolster state capacity these results generate insights into debates on the role of state in the economy the origins of secure property rights the nature of state capacity the importance of informal institutions and the process of legal reform

a strategic theory of bureaucratic redundancy do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition i develop a game theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task importantly agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal s and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents but redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal s in this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent s jurisdiction can be terminated

per capita public expenditures and population size a non parametric analysis using french data based on the median voter model we specify a flexible general framework of the effect of municipality size on per capita public expenditures previous literature has recognized that municipality size should have a non linear effect on the quality of public goods provision and to this end different papers have applied a range of alternative parametric specifications using a very large sample of french communes we are able to estimate the effect of municipality size semi parametrically in contrast with the parametric specifications we find evidence of the u shaped relationship between per capita public expenditures and population which is predicted by theory

africa s overgrown state reconsidered bureaucracy and economic growth how close is the link between outsized states and economic stagnation in africa this article shows that african public bureaucracies are not as large as often portrayed that they have been getting smaller and that reducing their size alone has not bee n a prescription for economic revival to the contrary the countries with higher levels of public employment such as botswana and mauritius are apt to have the better economic records these findings suggest that a superabundance of public personnel is not in itself a major impediment to growth in africa too much attention has been paid to quantitative or first generation bureaucratic problems and too little attention has been given the second generation issues of bureaucratic quality