corporatism and unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s a number of studies have found an association between corporatist institutions and low unemployment in the 1970s and or 1980s three gaps in our understanding of corporatism s labor market effects are addressed here 1 which of the two principal forms of corporatism corporatist wage setting or union participation in economic policymaking or both generates these effects 2 what are the causal mechanisms 3 did these effects continue in the 1990s in the face of globalization restrictive monetary policy growing dissension within labor movements and related developments the impact of corporatism across 16 affluent oecd countries in the 1980s and 1990s is assessed using pooled time series cross section analysis the results suggest that wage coordination was conducive to low unemployment in the 1980s because it fostered moderation in labor costs spurred faster economic growth and encouraged governments to more aggressively pursue policies to reduce unemployment in the 1990s this effect disappeared largely because unemployment outcomes in low wage coordination countries improved rather than because unemployment outcomes in high wage coordination countries deteriorated union participation in economic policymaking was associated with low unemployment throughout the two decades conditional on the presence of leftist government union participation appears to have had this effect mainly via government policy

equality employment and budgetary restraint the trilemma of the service economy this article presents an analysis of the postindustrial economy from a political economy perspective it identifies a set of specific distributional trade offs associated with the new role played by the services sector as the chief source of employment growth in advanced democracies over the last three decades it is argued that three core policy objectives budgetary restraint wage equality and expansion of employment constitute a political trilemma that allows only two of the goals to be successfully pursued at the same time using a combination of statistical and case oriented analysis the authors demonstrate the political and economic salience of the trilemma the distributional tensions inherent in each strategy to cope with it and the political institutional constraints under which these strategies are chosen

sacrifice and stigma reducing free riding in cults communes and other collectives this paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions the analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity rather religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to participatory crowding the analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma self sacrifice and bizarre behavioral restrictions the model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious social clubs fraternities communes political parties work groups and families

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

distribution and redistribution in postindustrial democracies this paper analyzes the processes of distribution and redistribution in post industrial democracies we combine a pooled time series data base on welfare state effort and its determinants assembled by huber ragin and stephens 1997 with data on income distribution assembled in the luxembourg income survey lis archive in the case of the lis data we re calculate the micro data in order to remove the distorting influence of pensioners on pre tax pre transfer income distribution we examine the determinants of three dependent variables pre tax pre transfer income inequality post tax post transfer income inequality and the proportional reduction in inequality from pre to post tax and transfer inequality we hypothesized that pre tax pre transfer income inequality would be determined by labor market institutions union density bargaining centralization labor market conditions unemployment and economic structures post industrialism third world imports we hypothesized that the reduction in inequality would be determined by political configurations directly by left government and indirectly via their effect on welfare state generosity by left government and christian democratic government post tax and transfer income inequality was hypothesized to be a product of the combination of labor market variables and political variables the results broadly confirms our hypotheses and the overall fit is very good

the spirit of capitalism and savings behavior abstract this paper presents a capitalist spirit model of savings by including wealth in the intertemporal utility function while this model includes the life cycle model and bequest model as two special cases it sheds light on why wealth holding has tended to increase with age why decumulation of wealth after retirement has not happened and why households with and without children have not shown significant differences in their savings behavior the capitalist spirit approach is especially useful for understanding savings by the rich and savings across countries and over time jel e21 b10

religious adherence and county economic growth in the us abstract we estimate a barro type conditional convergence model using religious adherence data from the american religious data archive to analyze independent effects of church adherence rates on economic growth in the united states at the county level per capita income growth is modeled as a function of initial per capita income initial human capital stock and a set of control and related variables including religious adherence religious diversity and regional indicator variables we also investigate the independent effects of three main denominations namely catholics evangelical christians and mainline christians on county economic growth our results indicate that the religious adherence in general is significantly greater than zero and not beneficial for us county income growth we find mixed results for effects of various denominations

a long run perspective on saving historical estimates of long run gross savings rates are provided for 11 countries which represent about 48 per cent of world product in real terms and close to half of world savings even though savings rates declined over the past decade in nine of the 11 countries present rates are usually well above their prewar levels factors which influence savings rates are also examined

spatial competition and the core models of spatial competition have proven useful in describing differentiated product markets a serious problem is the nonexistence of nash equilibria this problem is resolved by modelling the price formation process using the core the equilibrium is the outcome of a two stage process in the first stage two firms choose locations simultaneously the second stage has prices determined by an allocation in the core of a cooperative subgame allowing for coalitions of buyers and sellers these prices approach the competitive level as the distance between the firms goes to zero thus capturing the essence of duopoly rivalry this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

wage inequality and varieties of capitalism this article draws on a new data set that enables the authors to compare the distribution of income from employment across oecd countries specifically the article conducts a pooled cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of wage inequality in sixteen countries from 1973 to 1995 the analysis shows that varieties of capitalism matter the authors find that the qualities that distinguish social market economies from liberal market economies shape the way political and institutional variables influence wage inequality of particular interest to political scientists is the finding that the wage distributive effects of government partisanship are contingent on institutional context union density emerges in the analysis as the single most important factor influencing wage inequality in both institutional contexts

occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism the british industrial revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically dominant group we propose a theory of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for this pattern parents shape their children s preferences in response to economic incentives middle class families in occupations requiring effort skill and experience develop patience and a work ethic whereas upper class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure these class specific attitudes which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape i introduction the industrial revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth it also set off a social and political transformation that redefined hierarchies in society and reshaped the distribution of income and wealth before the onset of industrialization in eighteenth century britain wealth and political power were associated with the possession of land over the course of the nineteenth century a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen emerged as the economic elite for the most part the members of this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social origins in the urban middle classes the landed elite was left behind and eventually lost its political and economic predominance many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to differences in values attitudes and ultimately preferences across social classes there are countless examples both in scholarly and in fictional writing of portrayals of members of the landowning class as averse to work unwilling to save ill disposed tocommercialactivity andunabletoconsidermoneyassomething

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

unemployment and other nonemployment benefits unemployment benefit systems in most oecd countries have become more generous since the early 1960s the coverage rate has increased the level of benefits has increased relative to the predisplacement wages and maximum benefit periods in unemployment insurance systems have become longer moreover work availability and willingness to work requirements have most likely been enforced less effectively in the high unemployment environment since the late 1970s the changes in benefit systems have contributed to higher unemployment but may also have increased labor force participation the article stresses the potential importance of invalidity early retirement and sickness benefit systems for labour market outcomes in half of oecd countries the number of recipients of these benefits exceeds the official numbers of unemployed higher replacement ratios in these alternative systems than in unemployment insurance may encourage a migration towards the higher benefit systems but the extent to which this happens depends on administration of the schemes copyright 1995 by oxford university press

when are agents negligible the authors examine the following paradox in a dynamic setting equilibria can be radically different in a model with a finite number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents they present a simple strategic setting in which this paradox is a general phenomenon however the paradox disappears when there is noisy observation of the players actions and the aggregate level of noise does not disappear too rapidly as the number of players increases the authors give several economic examples in which this paradox has recently received attention durable goods monopoly corporate takeovers and time consistency of optimal government policy copyright 1995 by american economic association

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

public sector unions corporatism and macroeconomic performance what accounts for the apparent breakdown of the positive relationship between powerful trade union organizations and macroeconomic performance is corporatism a relic of a different age a luxury o

an evaluation of does economic inequality breed political conflict studies contradictory findings that economic inequality may have a positive negative or no impact on political conflict are a puzzle for conflict studies three approaches have been used t o explain the inconsistent findings of the ei pc economic inequality political conflict nexus statistical modeling formal modeling and theory building because analysts have tended to possess different research skills these three approaches have been employed in isolation from one another singly however all three approaches have proved deficient and are unlikely to solve the ei pc puzzle the most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers such an approach to the ei pc puzzle produces a crucial test of the deprived actor and rational actor theories of conflict the approach is also our best hope for solving the other long standing puzzles in conflict studies

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

small states in big trouble state reorganization in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s coalitions of politicians fiscal bureaucrats and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform the largest single nontradables sector in their society the state particularly the welfare state they exposed state personnel and agencies to market pressures and competition to reduce the cost of welfare and other state services the impetus for change came from rising foreign public and private debt rising public debt levels and expensive welfare states interacted to create a tax wedge between employers wage costs and workers received wages this undercut international competitiveness worsening current account deficits and leading to more foreign debt accumulation two factors explain variation in the degree of reorganization in each country differences in their electoral and constitutional regimes and the willingness of left parties to risk splitting their core constituencies introduction of market pressures is an effort to go beyond the liberalization of the economy common in industrial countries during the 1980s and both to institutionalize limits to welfare spending and to change the nature of statesociety relations away from corporatist forms of interest intermediation in short not just less state but a different state

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

implementation of first best allocations via generalized tax schedules abstract the classical problem of optimal taxation introduced by j mirrlees rev econ stud 38 1971 175 208 is addressed and it is argued that by using generalized tax schedules i e schedules which depend not only on individual income but also on the whole profile of incomes announced by the society a planner can implement any pareto optimum which stands in great contrast with the set of second best pareto optima attainable via classical tax schedules the mechanism relies crucially on the fixed probability distribution of characteristics and on a finite number of agents journal of economic literature classification numbers d78 d82 h21

the church versus the mall what happens when religion faces increased secular competition recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation an unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity cost of religious participation in this paper we identify a policy driven change in the opportunity cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on sunday known as blue laws many states have repealed these laws in recent years raising the opportunity cost of religious participation we use a variety of data sets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws religious attendance falls and that church donations and spending fall as well these results do not seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change nor do we see comparable declines in membership in or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws we then assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the nlsy we find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use and that this increase is found only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws the effect is economically significant for example the gap in heavy drinking between religious and nonreligious individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed

unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types abstract in auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use weakly dominant strategies however it is not assured that the outcome is unique we present an example in which no mechanism can yield the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique bayesian equilibrium outcome next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using sequential mechanisms i e we show that it is possible to obtain the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium outcome journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d70

the religious transition a long run perspective we use factor analysis to derive a robust measure of religiosity from items reported in five waves of the world value survey our measure of religiosity is negatively correlated with per capita income development apparently causes religiosity to fall to about half its pre modern level most components of the demand for religion are reduced by development the supply of religion declines once churches lose control over the institutions providing collective goods like education health and social security these goods used to be supplied by churches jointly with religious services but tend to be supplied by the state with rising levels of development aspects of supply and demand are integrated in a ces production function framework that can explain the direction of causality in the observed negative correlation between income and religiosity

the economic effects of the protestant reformation testing the weber hypothesis in the german lands following max weber many theories have hypothesized that protestantism should have favored economic development with its religious heterogeneity the holy roman empire presents an ideal testing ground for this hypothesis using population figures of 272 cities in the years 1300 1900 i find no effects of protestantism on economic growth the finding is precisely estimated robust to the inclusion of various controls and does not depend on data selection or small sample size denominational differences in fertility behavior and literacy are unlikely to be major confounding factors protestantism has no effect when interacted with other likely determinants of economic development instrumental variables estimates considering the potential endogeneity of religious choice are similar to the ols results

religion and economy religion has a two way interaction with political economy with religion viewed as a dependent variable a central question is how economic development and political institutions affect religious participation and beliefs with religion viewed as an independent variable a key issue is how religiosity affects individual characteristics such as work ethic honesty and thrift and thereby influences economic performance in this paper we sketch previous studies of this two way interaction but focus on our ongoing quantitative research with international data

profit maximizing nonlinear pricing if the preferences of the consumers are represented by utility functions that are differentiable quasi linear and satisfy the single crossing condition the characteristics of the profit maximizing nonlinear outlay schedule for a monopolist are well known we demonstrate that these characteristics are robust against weaker assumptions on the utility functions

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

secularization and long run economic growth in a consumer culture the consumer not christ is king skye jethani i introduction this paper proposes a novel theory of identity choice and endogenous economic growth in which secularization is both cause and consequence of successful economic development it contributes to the literature on the fundamentals of economic growth acemoglu 2009 by proposing a theory of how culture driven by economic change may change rapidly and where cultural change in turn drives further economic development the core idea is that through abandoning their religious identity their strife for salvation from the dire situation on earth individuals are able to derive more pleasure from material possessions and consumption activities the prospect of pleasure in this world motivates them to work harder and save more for future consumption increasing labor supply and capital accumulation induces technological progress and income growth which entices further individuals to abandon religion in order to derive more pleasure from material possessions which motivates them to supply more labor and capital etc through this feedback loop the economy takes off when religiosity declines and industrialization is observed in conjunction with secularization following the literature i define religious as believing in a god or a group of gods and following the rules of a religion mckendrick brewer and plumb 1982 although the proposed theory is perhaps more general the paper focuses on economic and religious developments of the western world which means it focuses on christian beliefs i define as the core creed of christian religion that through belief in and acceptance of the death and resurrection of jesus christ sinful humans can be reconciled with god and thereby are offered salvation and the promise of eternal life metzger and coogan 1993 the christian church is the agent specialized in promoting the desire for these immaterial heavenly values and goals ekelund et al 1997 i define as religious identity the self identification with christian religious values in section ii i argue that individuals identify with either immaterial self transcendence values religion or with material self enhancement values materialism i argue that individuals using individual possessions or consumption activities as identity fixers have chosen a secular materialistic identity i define as secularization the decline in the social significance of religion manifested by the decline in the number of religious people individuals identifying with religion measured by declining church attendance bruce 2011 most scholars of religion agree that for christians church attendance is a good measure of religiosity brierley 1999 bruce 2011 warner 2010 attending the sunday service was obligatory for protestants of most denominations as well as for members of the anglican church and deliberate failure to attend sunday mass is still considered to be a grave sin according to catholic canon law in the economists language church attendance is a revealed preference because church is the only place where sins can be forgiven not attending shows a loss of interest in salvation and eternal life the main goods offered by the church attendance is strongly but not perfectly correlated with adherence in particular attendance declines before membership declines bruce 2011 moreover there exists a temporary phase of fuzzy fidelity in which many individuals claim that while religion is not important in their life they continue to consider themselves christians and occasionally appear in church voas 2008 this temporary state is not explicitly taken into account in the theory below but considered to be best described by a secular identity as industrialization secularization is a general phenomenon observed throughout the western world the first data point however is only observed in 1851 for england when church attendance was about 60 brierley 1999

optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population abstract in the standard optimal income taxation problem tax payments depend only on each consumer s own actions piketty j econ theory 61 1993 23 41 shows that if one individual s tax schedule depends on others actions and the government knows the exact ability distribution it can implement any undistorted allocation as the unique revelation game outcome if some individuals misreveal their types piketty s mechanism may assign infeasible allocations we require that tax schedules must balance the government budget for every possible vector of revelations when individuals reveal their type by simple announcements all undistorted allocations can be still implemented even with off equilibrium feasibility constraints

differences and changes in wage structures preface introduction and summary richard b freeman lawrence f katz 1 a comparison of changes in the structure of wages in four oecd countries lawrence f katz gary w loveman david g blanchflower 2 international differences in executive and managerial compensation john m abowd michael l bognanno 3 the gender earnings gap some international evidence francine d blau lawrence m kahn 4 international wage curves david g blanchflower andrew j oswald 5 the changing structure of male earnings in britain 1974 1988 john schmitt 6 real wages employment and wage dispersion in u s and australian labor markets robert g gregory francis vella 7 labor markets and economic growth lessons from korea s industrialization 1970 1990 dae il kim robert h topel 8 wage differentials in italy market forces institutions and inflation christopher l erickson andrea c ichino 9 the swedish wage structure the rise and fall of solidarity wage policy per anders edin bertil holmlund 10 getting together and breaking apart the decline of centralized collective bargaining richard b freeman robert s gibbons 11 earnings inequality in germany katharine g abraham susan n houseman 12 a comparative analysis of east and west german labor markets before and after unification alan b krueger jorn steffen pischke contributors author index subject index

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

welfare state retrenchment revisited entitlement cuts public sector restructuring and inegalitarian trends in advanced capitalist societies in recent years it has become commonplace for comparativists to emphasize the resilience of welfare states in advanced capitalist societies and the failure of neoliberal efforts to dismantle the welfare state challenging some tenets of the resilience thesis this article seeks to broaden the discussion of welfare state retrenchment the authors argue that a sharp deceleration of social spending has occurred in most oecd countries since 1980 that welfare states have failed to offset the rise of market generated inequality and insecurity and that welfare programs have become less universalistic they stress the distributive and political consequences of market oriented reforms of the public sector

nonlinear price discrimination with a finite number of consumers and constrained recontracting abstract in the monopoly nonlinear pricing problem with unobservable consumer types we study mechanisms in which the firm makes the set of consumer options conditional on the aggregate reports of consumer types it receives previous mechanisms that exploit knowledge of the true type distribution often have multiple equilibria or use noncredible contracts off the equilibrium path when the monopolist can replace contracts after initial reports subject to the constraint that truthful consumers are not made worse off the outcome is essentially the same as when the monopolist has full information this holds whether or not the monopolist can make offers to consumers who reject all original contract offers when the monopolist must guarantee nonnegative surplus to all truthful consumers in all contingencies the equilibrium outcome has undistorted contracts but lower profits for the monopolist

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

left government policy and corporatism explaining the influence of partisanship on inequality the author argues that to understand the relationship between partisan government and equality two fundamental things need to be done separate the effects of partisanship on policy and of policy on the economy and assess the influence of government partisanship once the mediating role of corporatism is accounted for the main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between government partisanship policy and inequality at the lower half of the wage distribution the analysis is motivated by a puzzling finding in previous work the absence of government partisanship effects on earnings inequality the author focuses on the role of three different policies government employment the generosity of the welfare state and minimum wages the results show that government employment is a most significant determinant of inequality although it is affected by left government only when corporatism is low they also demonstrate that welfare state generosity does not affect inequality and in turn is not associated with left government finally they reveal that the effect of government partisanship on minimum wages and of minimum wages on inequality is completely conditional on the levels of corporatism these effects are only present when corporatism is low the author explains why specific policies do or do not affect earnings inequality and also why corporatism mitigates or magnifies the influence of government partisanship by explicitly exploring the determinants of policy and earnings inequality the article represents an important contribution to our understanding of how governments can promote redistribution

earnings inequality and welfare spending a disaggregated analysis the welfare state is generally viewed as either providing redistribution from rich to poor or as providing publicly financed insurance both views are incomplete welfare policies provide both insurance and redistribution in varying amounts depending on the design of the policy the authors explore the political consequences of the mix of redistribution and insurance in the context of studying the impact of income inequality on expenditures in different categories of welfare spending in advanced industrial societies from 1980 to 1995 they find that spending on pensions health care family benefits poverty alleviation and housing subsidies is largely uncorrelated with income inequality but that spending on income replacement programs such as unemployment insurance sickness pay occupational illness and disability are significantly higher in countries with more egalitarian income distributions they show that this pattern is exactly what a theory of political support for redistributive social insurance programs would predict

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic