black markets for currency hoarding activity and policy reforms abstract in emerging market economies under development of financial markets leads to goods hoarding and foreign currency accumulation as forms of investment in this paper an asset market model supplemented by explicit treatment of smuggling and second economy activity is used to study the paths of black market exchange rates second economy prices hoarding stocks and privately held dollar balances following policy reforms we discuss conditions for overshooting and related dynamics of exchange rates and prices following official exchange rate adjustments price reforms and altered risks of monetary confiscation or currency reforms the saddlepath trajectory of financial adjustment is simulated using data from recent russian experience 1997 elsevier science b v

corruption and inflation abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between corruption and inflation using alternative indicators of corruption i find a significant positive association between corruption and inflation even after controlling for a variety of other determinants of the latter

law enforcement and the black market exchange rate abstract this paper examines how a system of multiple exchange rates can give rise to unreported exports and imports and a black market for foreign exchange risk aversion rather than an assumed smuggling or detection technology generally guarantees the coexistence of legal and illegal trading evidence for brazil suggests that enforcement of the exchange rate and trade regime is an important fundamental of the black market exchange rate that has so far invariably been left out of empirical work

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

dual exchange rates in europe and latin america this article uncovers some important empirical regularities surrounding the operation of formal dual exchange rates in europe and latin america in the 1970s and 1980s although there are some parallels between the european and latin american experiences there are also interesting differences in terms of the size and nature of the distortion created by two official exchange rates the response of the distortion to foreign interest rates real commercial exchange rates and domestic budget deficits and the motives for adopting this exchange rate regime empirical work on dual exchange rate regimes is made difficult by the transitory nature of these regimes and by frequent changes in institutional practices

price dynamics in the belarusian black market for foreign exchange using unique data from an internet based foreign exchange trading platform we show that the black market efficiently incorporated public information on the state of the belarusian economy during the balance of payments crisis of 2011 between may and october 2011 the government repeatedly devalued the belarusian ruble and eventually abandoned its fixed exchange rate regime measures derived from black market transaction data have significant predictive power for these devaluations the significance of these black market measures survives even when we include standard macroeconomic indicators in our forecasting model in line with standard economic theory activity in the black market has dried up subsequently

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

empirical regularities in black markets for currency abstract this paper develops a model of the black or parallel market foreign exchange rate this rate is seen to depend upon the level of the official rate the unobserved equilibrium rate the premium offered for exchange sold through the black market and government reserve level policies the model is then empirically estimated for 10 countries over a period from 1957 through 1983 the results generally support the model specified by theory additionally the paper provides weak form tests concerning the efficiency of the black market the results cannot reject the hypothesis that the current black market rate incorporates all relevant historical price information

the impact of corruption on investment predictability matters abstract this paper argues that it is not only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption corruption regimes that are more predictable in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable using the data collected by world bank in preparing the world development report of 1997 we provide empirical support for the conjecture

fiscal disequilibrium in developing countries abstract fiscal equilibrium necessitates that permanent government expenditures be covered by permanent government revenues the concept of permanent goverment expenditures and revenues takes into account future revenue from capital investments as well as temporary windfalls hence equilibrium may exist despite temporary imbalance between revenue and expenditure the causes of disequilibrium can be classified into five categories export boom price inelastic tax system public enterprise performance increased expenditure produced by political exigencies or administrative weaknesses and worsening terms of trade in practice unrealistic customs valuations specific as opposed to ad valorem taxes and administrative difficulties have been the most common sources of declining government revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product increased subsidies both to consumer goods and to public enterprises as well as inadequate control mechanisms have been the most frequent causes of rising government expenditure

corruption and the shadow economy an empirical analysis this paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa we hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries the hypotheses are tested for a cross section of 98 countries our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions based indices of corruption are used employing an index of corruption based on a structural model however corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income but not in high income countries

exchange rate differential and balance of payments under dual exchange markets abstract this paper develops a model of an economy that uses two exchange markets an official market in which the exchange rate is determined by central bank intervention and a free market in which the exchange rate is determined by market forces the official market handles selected imports and exports while the free market handles the remaining imports and exports and capital transactions the model is used to discuss the effects of various policies on the differential between the free and the official exchange rates and on the balance of payments

is corruption an efficient grease this paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework it analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency corruption and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries both developed and developing using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective it may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective we thus find evidence for the grease the wheels hypothesis in its weak and strong forms

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

black and official exchange rates in morocco an analysis of their long run behaviour and short run dynamics 1974 1992 using vector error correction vec model estimation on monthly data from morocco for the period january 1974 to december 1992 this article tests the hypothesis that there is a long run stable relationship between the official and the black market exchange rates for us dollars we also examine the short run dynamics in the relationship between the two markets the econometric results indicate that the two exchange rates are cointegrated furthermore we reject weak exogeneity in the case of the official exchange rate but fail to reject it in the case of the black market rate granger causality tests show that the black market rate causes the official exchange rate the results seem to support the efficiency hypothesis suggesting that participants in the black market are able to anticipate changes in the official exchange rate the findings also suggest that morocco s decision in january 1993 to introduce only current account convertibility and keep controls on capital accounts was wise

the impact of corruption on the black market premium mohsen bahmani oskooee and gour g goswamifrecently the impact of institutional factors on macro variables has been gaining momentum researchers have investigated the impact of corruption law and order and bureaucracy on economicgrowth inflation investment productivity and the real exchange rate in this article we investigateempirically the impact of institutional factors on the black market premium in many developingnations because of government restrictions on capital and trade flows there exists a black market forforeign exchange by using data from 60 developing countries over the 1982 1995 period we showthat the black market premium is higher in countries that are plagued by more corruption this tindingseems to be insensitive to five different measures of corruption as well as whether cross section orpanel data are used jel classiflcation f31 zio

the black market for foreign exchange an international comparison abstract the dornbusch et al 1983 model for the determination of the black market foreign exchange premium is modified and then estimated for 19 countries for various periods during 1970 1979 in which we identified the existence of a black market for foreign exchange the outstanding result is the almost total uniformity of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variable expected profits from black market transactions and the small spread of the elasticities of the black market premium with respect to the expected profits and the real official exchange rate

fiscal consequences of public corruption empirical evidence from state bond ratings empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention we empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the united states on state bond ratings which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt after controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt

how does corruption affect public debt an empirical analysis summary this paper investigates the relationship between corruption the shadow economy and public debt it additionally examines whether the shadow economy increases the adverse effects of corruption on public debt the model is empirically tested for 126 countries over 1996 2012 using ordinary least squares ols fixed effects system generalized method of moments gmm and instrumental variable estimation and two measures of corruption the transparency international corruption perceptions index and the kaufmann et al corruption index results confirm that increased corruption and a larger shadow economy lead to an increase in public debt results additionally indicate that the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on public debt suggesting that they act as complements results also suggest that a larger shadow economy reduces tax revenues and thus increases public debt similarly higher government expenditure enhances the effects of corruption on government debt hence reducing corruption should be a primary policy goal of governments given the complementarity detected between corruption and the shadow economy reducing corruption would also lead to a fall in the size of the shadow economy and public debt reducing corruption will also minimize the adverse effects of corruption on government debt through government expenditure

trend breaks and non stationarity in the yugoslav black market for dollars 1974 1987 we estimate a model of the black market premium for dollars in yugoslavia from 1974 to 1987 unlike previous applications of the model our analysis addresses non stationarity in the underlying data by allowing for trend breaks endogenous structural break tests indicate the presence of breaks closely associated with the death of tito and changes in laws affecting the operation of the black market after accounting for these breaks we find strong support for the underlying model in addition we find evidence consistent with the era of increased government involvement in the black market leading to greater volatility of the premium following regime change

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

corruption and the composition of government expenditure abstract this paper asks whether predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure corruption is found to reduce government spending on education in a cross section of countries

corruption types of corruption and firm financial performance new evidence from a transitional economy using a nationwide survey of provincial institutional quality and a sample of private manufacturing small and medium scale enterprises the smes this paper contributes to the literature by considering for the first time the effects of corruption on the financial performance of vietnamese private smes interestingly contrary to previous findings we find that corruption when measured by a dummy variable does not affect firms financial performance after controlling for heterogeneity simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity however the intensity of bribery and the majority of the forms of corruption were found to have negative impacts on firms financial performance hence a typical approach using only a dummy variable for bribery might not adequately evaluate the impact of bribe intensity or even ignores the negative impacts of some types of bribes on firms financial performance the findings suggest that anti corruption measures are vital for the development of the vietnamese private smes

distribution properties of latin american black market exchange rates abstract this paper conducts a statistical analysis of the distribution properties of black market exchange rate changes for 12 latin american currencies the infinite variance stable law hypothesis is tested using a regression type technique to estimate the parameters of the stable paretian distribution strong evidence is found supporting this hypothesis a separate analysis of extreme observations using a robust statistical procedure further supports these findings

the black market for dollars in brazil the model of the black market for dollars focuses on the interaction of portfolio decisions relevant to the holding of asset stocks and the determinants of net flows of dollars associated with tourism and smuggling a partial equilibrium model of the black market shows that the level of the premium is determined by the official real exchange rate and the official depreciation adjusted interest differential as well as seasonal factors associated with tourism expectations of future exchange rate changes under rational expectations are shown to affect the current level of the black market premium the empirical evidence provides ample support for the role of the key determinants of the premium as well as for an important seasonal pattern the magnitude of the seasonal variation is evidence of the imperfect substitutability between black dollars and cruzeiro assets in portfolios

long run dynamics of black and official exchange rates abstract this paper examines the relationships among black and official foreign exchange rates its primary purpose is to investigate the way in which black and official markets process information application of cointegration tests to the turkish markets for us dollars and west german marks in the mid 1980s indicates that the two black markets are efficient information processors for the black and official markets of each currency evidence is found suggesting the possibility of overshooting by the black exchange rate this inefficiency may not be able to be arbitraged away because of restrictions on capital flows through official channels

cointegration tests of purchasing power parity in africa abstract despite two decades of implementing economic reforms there is still a significant gap between official and black market exchange rates in africa african policy makers continue to implement exchange rate policies based largely on the assumption that purchasing power parity ppp holds this paper examines whether there is empirical support for ppp in africa we used johansen s cointegration technique and error correction modeling on annual data for black market exchange rates and cpi in 30 countries covering 1960 97 we found strong support for the ppp doctrine as a useful guide for exchange rate policy reform in africa

are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth abstract while financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively their interaction has not we develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects but act as substitutes in doing so the substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent conversely financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it we test this substitutability by predicting growth of countries and industries using measures of financial development lack of corruption and a key interaction term both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor as well as to a substitutability between them the growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0 63 1 68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th the results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers omitted variables or other theories of growth and convergence

war news and black market exchange rate deviations from purchasing power parity wartime south vietnam abstract this study evaluates the impact of war news on black market exchage rate deviations from purchasing power parity ppp in wartime vietnam the greater the number and intensity of u s troop engagements with the enemy the greater the confidence in the south vietnamise government and its fist currency during the period of heaviest u s military operations from 1967 to mid 1969 about 20 25 percent of the value of the piaster on the black market can be attributed to this confidence factor the results suggest that where variables to measure the news are available short run deviations from ppp can be readily explained

backward and forward solutions for economies with rational expectations in models where anticipations of future endogenous variables influence current behavior there exists an infinity of solutions under the assumption of rational expectations this problem has been dealt with in the study of macro economic models by the implicit or explicit use of one of three additional requirements optimality consistency with alleged economic behavior or conformity of the endogenous variables to an imposed stationarity condition these requirements have coincided in existing models leading to the choice of a unique solution a forward solution the purpose of this paper is to review the problem characterize the solutions and examine whether these requirements are acceptable section i presents a simple model and derives the set of solutions the model makes no claim to generality but has the major advantage that the issues are easily understood in this simple case section ii discusses the requirement of consistency with economic behavior section iii discusses the requirement of stationarity and section iv provides some conclusions