optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

investigating bid preferences at low price sealed bid auctions with endogenous participation abstract at procurement auctions with bid preferences qualified firms are treated special a common policy involves scaling the bids of preferred firms by a discount factor for the purposes of evaluation only introducing such an asymmetry has three effects first preferred firms may inflate their bids yet still win the auction second nonpreferred firms may bid more aggressively than in the absence of preferences third the preference policy can affect participation for different cost distributions we solve numerically for the equilibrium bid functions under different discounts and then simulate behaviour our approach allows us to quantify the relative importance of the three effects we find that the participation effect is relatively unimportant and in most cases a positive cost minimizing preference rate exists download download video 34mb video 1

demand elasticities for food products in brazil a two stage budgeting system the object of this article is to estimate demand elasticities for a basket of staple food important for providing the caloric needs of brazilian households these elasticities are useful in the measurement of the impact of structural reforms on poverty a two stage demand system was constructed based on data from household expenditure surveys pof produced by ibge the brazilian bureau of statistics in 1987 88 and 1995 96 we have used panel data to estimate the model and have calculated income own price and cross price elasticities for eight groups of goods and services and in the second stage for 11 sub groups of staple food products we estimated those elasticities for the whole sample of consumers and for two income groups

inflation bias after the euro evidence from the uk and italy this article presents an indirect approach to investigate the possible existence of measurement error bias in the harmonized index of consumer prices for the uk and italy our empirical results show that there is no significant evidence of a bias for the uk or for italy prior to the introduction of the euro since january 2002 however the inflation rate in italy has been underestimated by at least 6 percentage points

on optimal public good provision with tax evasion it is proved that for public goods with zero income effects also called ziff public goods tax evasion does not affect the optimal level of public expenditure further examples show that in general tax evasion may lead to less but also to more public expenditure

the law of small numbers investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement abstracta commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts however restricted auctions are frequently used among eu member states to procure small contracts in this article we investigate this paradox using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009 we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result to our knowledge this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts

procurement contracting with time incentives theory and evidence in public procurement social welfare often depends on how quickly the good is delivered a leading example is highway construction where slow completion inflicts a negative externality on commuters in response highway departments award some contracts using scoring auctions which give contractors explicit incentives for accelerated delivery we characterize efficient design of these mechanisms we then gather an extensive data set of highway projects awarded by the california department of transportation between 2003 and 2008 by comparing otherwise similar contracts we show that where the scoring design was used contracts were completed 30 40 faster and the welfare gains to commuters exceeded the increase in procurement costs using a structural model that endogenizes participation and bidding we estimate that the counterfactual welfare gain from switching all contracts from the standard design to the efficient apb design is nearly 22 of the total contract value 1 14 billion copyright 2011 oxford university press

the incentive effects of levelling the playing field an empirical analysis of amateur golf tournaments levelling the playing field is an important policy instrument to guarantee an equitable competition among heterogeneous individuals however the incentive effects of those policies are usually not explicitly addressed in empirical studies in this article the performance in amateur golf tournaments is analysed to gain insights into the incentive effects of those types of policies the empirical analysis takes advantage of the fact that tournaments in amateur golf are of two distinctive types that apply different scoring rules while one scoring rule is based on gross scores i e the total number of strokes of a player the second scoring rule is based on net scores where the total number of strokes is normalized with respect to the respective player s handicap performance comparisons of players who participated in both types of tournaments suggest that levelling the playing field as in tournaments based on net score has positive and significant performance effects

representative evidence on lying costs abstract a central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally these models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation to provide an empirically validated microfoundation for these models it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives we measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the german population by calling them at home in our setup participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport misreporting cannot be detected reputational concerns are negligible and altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role yet we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication

estimating the value and distributional effects of free state schooling the effects of free of charge state education on income distribution are often studied by allocating government education outlays to households assuming that these outlays equal the benefit which households attach to state schooling this paper proposes a demand analysis approach to estimating the true value of state education as perceived by consumers and uses the results to assess the inefficiency of public provision empirical analysis based on data from cyprus suggests that state schooling costs twice the amount households are willing to pay for the implications of this finding for the equality and anti poverty effects of state education are illustrated

favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts abstract this paper studies the rationale for giving preference to domestic firms in the award of government contracts when the regulator is interested in maximizing domestic welfare it is seen that in the absence of comparative advantages the regulator should discriminate in favor of the domestic firms because foreign firms profits do not enter in domestic welfare furthermore i show that the form of the discrimination function depends on the mechanism being used in order to simplify the implementation of an optimal policy the regulator should choose mechanisms based on second price auctions

the effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions in government procurement auctions of construction contracts entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent rms this bidding behavior makes them more sus ceptible to losses aecting their prospect of survival in april of 2000 the oklahoma department of transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects using newly developed quantile regression approaches this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants first we nd that the information release eliminates the bidding dierential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries second we argue that the policy change aects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market we nd that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent the policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition

discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives abstract discriminating in favor of domestic suppliers in the award of government procurement contracts is a widespread practice in this paper we extend the previous analysis of mcafee and mcmillan 1989 government procurement and international trade journal of international economics 26 291 308 and branco 1994 favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts journal of international economics 37 65 80 by considering in the same model the bidding competition stimulation effect and the favoritism effect we prove that the optimal policy can be implemented by a modified vickrey auction or by a complex modified first price auction we also consider that firms can reduce their cost by a nonobservable effort we show that taking moral hazard into account does not modify the awarding rule but that the government must use the payment rule to require a greater level of effort from the favored firm

on the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions we provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric rst price auctions connecting their equilibria to the concavity of the underlying type distributions and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions we apply these tools to studying procurement auctions in which as is common in practice one seller is given an advantage re ecting for example better reliability or quality we show conditions under which for any given rst price handicap auction there is a second price auction with bonuses that outperforms it with most of our results involving ex post dominance

does the sun shine on art prices this paper examines how variation in mood influences subjective risk and hence auction prices for art in london during the period 1990 2007 the private value of an object is closely related to taste and mood which is proxied for by the variation in weather using a unique data set that includes presale estimates for paintings sold through sotheby s and christie s auction houses as well as weather data for london from the british atmospheric data centre we find that the lower part of the price distribution is populated with paintings with a relative high private value whereas in the upper part prices are driven primarily by the common value characteristics our findings have important implications for collectors and investors in the art market

moral hazard incentive contracts and risk evidence from procurement deadlines and late penalties are widely used to incentivize effort tighter deadlines and higher penalties induce higher effort but increase the agent s risk we model how these contract terms affect the work rate and time to completion in a procurement setting characterizing the efficient contract design using new micro level data on minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day by day information on work plans hours worked and delays we find evidence of ex post moral hazard contractors adjust their effort level during the course of the contract in response to unanticipated productivity shocks in a way that is consistent with our theoretical predictions we next build an econometric model that endogenizes the completion time as a function of the contract terms and the productivity shocks and simulate how commuter welfare and contractor costs vary across different terms and shocks accounting for the traffic delays caused by construction switching to a more efficient contract design would increase welfare by 22 5 of the contract value while increasing the standard deviation of contractor costs a measure of risk by less than 1 of the contract value

upward bias in the consumer price index under the zero inflation economy abstract this study estimates the demand system using japanese microdata and calculates the cost of living index coli in the recent zero inflation situation the consumer price index cpi can approximate the coli while there are upward biases in the cpi during the 1980s

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

can affirmative action be cost effective an experimental examination of price preference auctions one of the most controversial questions facing our economy and society in recent years is the question of affirmative action the debate centers around an issue of minority representation in which the rights of the majority are depicted as being compromised by affirmative action programs set up to increase the welfare of minorities implicit in this discussion is the assumption that all affirmative action programs must be cost increasing this result it is claimed follows trivially from economic theory since any interference into the competitive process which prevents the most capable from being chosen must be wasteful and costly in this paper we challenge this claim with experimental results demonstrating that pricepreference auctions in which high cost minority firms are given preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts in such a way that it is possible for these firms to win a contract but not have submitted the lowest bid can be programs that both enhance minority representation and are cost effective in that they decrease the cost of government procurement in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions eric maskin and john riley 1995 and the optimal auction literature roger myerson 1981 it has been shown that in asymmetric auctions in which firms draw their costs from

predicting bid prices by using machine learning methods abstractit is well known that empirical analysis suffers from multicollinearity and high dimensionality in particular this is much more severe in an empirical study of itemized bids in highway pr

is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly a widespread practice particularly in public sector procurement and dispersal is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage arguments for such policies vary but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a presumed economic cost of the subsidy when disadvantaged competitors compete in auctions the subsidy serves to make them more competitive rivals other bidders rationally respond by bidding more aggressively we consider a model of procurement auctions and show that a policy of subsidizing inefficient competitors can lower expected project cost and also enhance economic efficiency some subsidy is generally better than no subsidy for a wide range of parameters

entry and subcontracting in public procurement auctions we empirically study how the interplay between entry and subcontracting choices is affected by the use of different auction formats in public procurement the difference in differences strategy used exploits a data set of auctions for public works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions we find that the use of first price auctions causes a marked decline in both entry and subcontracting we also find that the type of firms entering first price auctions changes with firms becoming more likely to bid jointly with other firms in ad hoc joint ventures data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 2071 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

non parametric tests of consumer behaviour the neoclassical model of consumer behaviour postulates that a consumer s choice behaviour can be described as deriving from utility maximization subject to a budget constraint one is then naturally led to ask what this model implies about observed behaviour this question has been addressed from two quite distinct approaches the first approach originating in the work of slutsky 1915 and antonelli 1886 derives necessary and sufficient conditions involving the derivatives of the demand functions the second approach originating in the work of samuelson 1938 1947 1948 derives algebraic conditions on the demand functions implied by maximizing behaviour

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

optimal favoritism in all pay auctions and lottery contests abstract we analyze the revenue enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants two instruments of favoritism are considered head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids in the all pay auction head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first best revenue in the lottery contest head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue as all pay auctions revenue dominate lottery contests under optimal biases we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments

price adjustment policies in procurement contracting an analysis of bidding behavior the fluctuations in fuel prices over the past decade led a number of government agencies to introduce price adjustment clauses in procurement contracting those clauses were primarily designed to reduce contractors uncertainty without considering the impact of such initiatives on bidding and the budget we analyze a newly constructed detailed panel of observations on bids for construction contracts and compare bidding behavior across periods and projects and across items within projects estimates from a difference in differences approach indicate that bidding becomes more aggressive and less dispersed after the implementation of this policy the difference is more pronounced when we consider itemized bids than overall project bids alternative techniques of regression discontinuity and nonparametric estimation are applied and yield consistent results

welfare comparison under exact aggregation new econometric model of aggregate consumer behavior in the united states and to apply this model to the analysis of impacts of alternative economic policies on the welfare of individual consuming units the model incorporates time series data on quantities consumed prices the level and distribution of income and demographic characteristics of the population it also incorporates cross section data on the allocation of consumer expenditures for households with different demographic characteristics our econometric model is based on the theory of exact aggregation developed by lau 1977a c this theory makes it possible to dispense with the notion of a representative consumer in constructing models of aggregate consumer behavior one of the most remarkable implications of lau s theory of exact aggregation is that systems of demand functions for individuals with common demographic characteristics can be recovered uniquely from the system of aggregate demand functions using the individual demand functions we can analyze the impact of economic policy on consumer welfare

how revealing is revealed preference this lecture address the following two key criticisms of the empirical application of revealed preference theory when the rp conditions do not reject they do not provide precise predictions and when they do reject they do not help characterize the nature of irrationality or the degree direction of changing tastes recent developments in the application of rp theory are shown to have rendered these criticisms unfounded a powerful test of rationality is available that also provides a natural characterization of changing tastes tight bounds on demand responses and on the welfare costs of relative price and tax changes are also available and are shown to work well in practice

government procurement and international trade abstract we model the bidding for a government contract in which there is imperfect competition each bidder is better informed about his own costs than either his rival bidders or the government and the distribution of the domestic firms costs differs from the distribution of foreign firms costs because of comparative advantage effects we find that the government minimizes its expected procurement cost by operating a price preference policy not necessarily purchasing from the lowest bidder

simple tests of distributional effects on macroeconomic equations the presence of distributional effects in macroeconomic equations is shown to coincide with nonlinearity in micro behavioral relationships parameters estimated with aggregate data as in representative agent models contain distributional biases that are not measurable using aggregate data alone tests for distributional effects and other measures of the extent of aggregation problems are derived using distributional data observed over time significant distributional effects are noted for a model of annual aggregate u s commodity expenditure data a static model that accommodates individual heterogeneity is found to be statistically equivalent to a simply dynamic model that accommodates first order autocorrelation

nonparametric engel curves and revealed preference this paper applies revealed preference theory to the nonparametric statistical analysis of consumer demand knowledge of expansion paths is shown to improve the power of nonparametric tests of revealed preference the tightest bounds on indifference surfaces and welfare measures are derived using an algorithm for which revealed preference conditions are shown to guarantee convergence nonparametric engel curves are used to estimate expansion paths and provide a stochastic structure within which to examine the consistency of household level data and revealed preference theory an application is made to a long time series of repeated cross sections from the family expenditure survey for britain the consistency of these data with revealed preference theory is examined for periods of consistency with revealed preference tight bounds are placed on true cost of living indices

estimating the true cost of living for households with different incomes using data from taiwan this empirical study investigates why the true costs of living for different income groups in taiwan as measured by the superlative tornqvist price index have grown dissimilarly over the sample period specifically it shows that using the aggregate cost of living col estimates for the entire households as is commonly practiced would produce noticeable group bias effect in measurement also the magnitude of the commodity substitution bias in the conventional consumer price index cpi is found to be positively related to household income in general because of the presence of these two biases the true col for households belonging to the two ends of the income spectrum is found to be over estimated this article is therefore in full agreement with arrow s proposition that an alternative and separate set of price index be constructed

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

the impact of affirmative action on labor demand a test of some implications of the le chatelier principle this paper presents an alternative approach to measuring the impact of affirmative action on firms affirmative action is modeled as a series of hiring quotas if the quotas are binding then a firm subject to affirmative action will operate with greater costs of production have less elastic demand for inputs and be less able to substitute between most inputs the results are consistent with the hypothesis that affirmative action regulations significantly constrain firms behavior own wage elasticities are less elastic and most inputs are less substitutable for constrained firms further affirmative action raises costs by 6 5 percent for firms subject to the program copyright 1992 by mit press

disadvantaged business enterprise goals in government procurement contracting an analysis of bidding behavior and costs programs that encourage the participation of disadvantaged business enterprises dbe as subcontractors have been a part of government procurement auctions for over three decades in this paper we examine the impact of a program that requires prime contractors to subcontract out a portion of a highway procurement project to dbe firms we study how dbe subcontracting requirements affect bidding behavior in federally funded projects within a symmetric independent private value framework we use the equilibrium bidding function to obtain the cost distribution of firms undertaking projects either with or without subcontracting goals we then use nonparametric estimation methods to uncover and compare the cost of firm bidding on a class of asphalt projects related to surface treatment in texas the analysis shows little differences in the cost structure between projects that have subcontracting goals and those that do not

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

should the cost of living index provide the conceptual framework for a consumer price index in some countries the cost of living col index serves as the conceptual framework for the cpi but it has been rejected in others this paper reviews issues that have arisen in the statistical agency debate and in the economics literature on the col index including rhetorical matters which have influenced the debate i contend that col theoiy is useful as a decision making framework in estimating components of the cpi and that col index theory provides appropriate guidance for measuring consumer inflation contrary to the view that has been adopted for the european hicp and expressed by an advisory committee for the rpi in several countries the united states netherlands sweden the theory of the cost of living col index provides the conceptual framework for the country s consumer price index cpi see united states department of labor 1997 balk 1994 and dalen 1999 others reject the cost of living index framework an example is the australian bureau of statistics 1997 rejection of the col index is also explicit in an rpi advisory committee recommendation in the united kingdom in still other countries canada being an example official documents for the cpi are ambiguous about the role of the col index statistics canada 1995 the international guideline for consumer price indexes the ilo manual turvey 1989 does not even mention the col index the question has taken on heightened interest recently part of the stimulus comes from the european union s relatively new harmonised indexes of consumer prices hicp for the hicps eurostat has rejected the col

the effects of male and female labor supply on commodity demands we examine the effects of male and female labor supply on household demands and present a simple and robust test for the separability of commodity demands from labor supply using data on individual households from six years of the uk fes we estimate a demand system for seven goods which includes hours and participation dummies as conditioning variables allowance is made for the possible endogeneity of these conditioning labor supply variables we find that separability is rejected furthermore we present evidence that ignoring the effects of labor supply leads to bias in the parameter estimates

asymmetry in procurement auctions evidence from snow removal contracts differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procure ment auctions relying on a structural approach this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in montrthe empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of montrbecause of prohibitive equipment storage costs the extent of inefficiency due to asym metry is empirically assessed various policy experiments are performed a bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts when bidders willingness to pay depends in part on observable variables the princi pal s interest is not best served by creating a level auction playing field this article studies procurement auctions for snow removal contracts in montrit investigates the degree to which companies in disadvantageous locations should win even if they do not submit the lowest bid from the submitted bids a novel empirical methodology estimates the extent of cost variation across firms along with its variation within loca tion although the dispersion is substantial the gain from treating bidders unequally is limited when observed individual characteristics affect the firms costs and their bidding strategies all bidders cannot be treated alike these differences in characteristics or asymmetries among bidders may arise from their size as noted by laffont et al 1995 their capacity constraints as in jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 or the possession of better information as in hendricks and porter 1988 and hendricks et al 1994

near optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions consider a setting with n sellers having i i d costs with log concave density f from cumulative f and a buyer who puts a premiumi on procuring from seller i we show how for any given 1 n a sim ple second price bonus auction can be chosen which comes surprisingly close to giving the auctioneer the same surplus as an optimal mecha nism the bonuses depend only on the magnitude and monotonicity of the slope of virtual costs given f we show that these in turn depend only on fairly coarse information about f we explore how this result generalizes to asymmetrically distributed costs abstract

measuring the substitution bias in japan the demand system approach and a superlative index this study estimates the demand system using japanese micro data and calculates the cost of living index coli to assess the substitution bias in the consumer price index the estimated bias during the sample period of 1982 2000 is about 0 06 percentage points which is larger than the estimates calculated from a superlative index the difference between the coli and a superlative index can be explained with the upward movements of the average utility level in japan since the cost of living for the rich has grown more rapidly than that for the poor

small business set asides in procurement auctions an empirical analysis as part of public procurement many governments adopt small business programs to pro vide contract opportunities for businesses often with preferences for firms operated by mem bers of groups designated as disadvantaged the redistribution arising from such programs however can introduce significant added costs to government procurement budgets in this paper the extent to which small business set asides increase government procurement costs is examined the estimates employ data on japanese public construction projects where approximately half of the procurement budget is set aside for small and medium enterprises smes applying a positive relationship between profitability and firm size obtained by the non parametric estimation of asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values a counterfactual simulation is undertaken to demonstrate that approximately 40 percent of smes would exit the procurement market if set asides were to be removed surprisingly the resulting lack of competition would increase government procurement costs more than it would offset the production cost inefficiency

promoting fair competition in public procurement abstract if a government cares for local firms profit but not for foreign firms foreign firms will be discriminated against when competing for government procurement contracts foreign firms will be chosen less often and when chosen earn less profit than local firms we analyze a more central authority s policies against such discrimination given a situation in which a government has private information on product quality and the competing firms have private information on own costs necessary and sufficient conditions for free revelation of quality information are derived finally optimal policy when these conditions are not satisfied is characterized and discussed

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

assessing the impacts of preferential procurement on low carbon building abstract the significance of global warming is shaping building procurement with much of the effort aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions through a preferential bidding mechanism however only a limited number of studies have quantitatively estimated the potential impact of bid preference on the emission reduction from building construction the aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of how bid discounts change owners procurement costs and the magnitudes of emission mitigation a two stage optimization model is designed to help the owner determine the discount rate that would automatically control the emission of the awarded contract within a desired level the goal is for bidders to regard emission reduction efforts as an investment with returns coming in the form of an increased chance of winning the bid our results imply that for the building retrofit project studied herein a discount rate of 0 6 is suggested for every percentage of emission reduction this discount level reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 28 2 while raising procurement costs by 3 7 relative to a non preference mechanism the increased procurement costs can be partially compensated under existing cap and trade scheme the results show that the choice of discount significantly alters bidders efforts on emission mitigation and emission control cost can be minimized with the proposed optimization algorithm

the substitution bias of the laspeyres price index an analysis using estimated cost of living indexes the most commonly used measure of the cost of living the consumer price index cpi published by the bureau of labor statistics is essentially a laspeyres price index it is well known however that a laspeyres price index provides an upward biased estimate of the cost of living because in keeping the same base period basket of goods as weights it does not take into account substitution among commodities induced by relative price changes the magnitude of the bias is an empirical question which is the focus of this study an estimate of the substitution bias may be obtained by taking the difference between the laspeyres price index and an estimated true cost of living index the true cost of living index cli is based on the theory of consumer demand it is the ratio of the minimum expenditures under two different price regimes necessary to maintain a constant level of utility as opposed to the constant basket of goods in the laspeyres index the size of the bias depends on two factors 1 the size of consumption substitution elasticities if there is no commodity substitution then the cli and laspeyres index coincide regardless of changes in relative prices and 2 the magnitude of relative price changes if all prices move together then the cli and laspeyres index again coincide regardless of the size of substitution elasticities in order to compute a true cli it is necessary to specify a particular utility function and estimate the parameters of the resulting system of demand equations see for example louis phlips p 135 several estimates of the magnitude of the substitution bias have appeared in the literature but all previous studies suffer from a common weakness they are all based on a very small number of commodities essentially because of econometric problems involved in estimating large systems of demand equations in one group of studies demand models have been estimated using highly aggregated data in which total consumption is grouped into four to nine aggregate commodites such as housing durables or clothing arthur goldberger and theodore gamaletsos for example estimate the linear expenditure system les demand model using data on five aggregate goods for several european countries and compare the resulting cli for one of the countries greece to the corresponding laspeyres price index tran van hoa estimates costof living indexes for six australian provinces using data on nine aggregate goods phlips cites work by r sanz ferrer who computed a cli for belgium from data on eight aggregate commodities in such studies using highly aggregated data the estimate of the substitution bias may be understated because the aggregation obscures substitution in consumption within categories which is perhaps more prevalent than substitution between gross aggregates another shortcoming of these three aggregate studies is the fact that they use only a single demand system and hence do not explore the sensitivity of the cli to a priori u s bureau of labor statistics the groundwork for this study was my dissertation i would like to thank the chairman and members of my committee r robert russell llad phillips and robert deacon for their support and helpful suggestions and jack triplett robert pollak richard j mcdonald and a referee for valuable comments on an earlier version the views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the bureau of labor statistics for a theoretical discussion of cost of living indexes see robert pollak 1971b and paul samuelson and subramanian swamy

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

on discrimination in auctions with endogenous entry abstract when entry is exogenous strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues myerson 1981 when entry is endogenous so that entrants expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism optimal discrimination takes a completely different form the revenue maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics besides those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength these predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large the optimality of first price auctions is also discussed jel d44 h57

the effect of federal davis bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations on highway maintenance costs the author compares winning bids on state and federal highway maintenance projects in colorado between 2000 and 2011 to determine whether federal prevailing wage and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations are associated with increased construction costs the effect of the davis bacon act is evaluated when average wage rates prevail for almost all workers involved in highway maintenance for most of the period of the study the federal minimum for work completed by disadvantaged businesses is 10 the goal for colorado exceeds this minimum by two to three percentage points summary data indicate that federal projects are more expensive than state projects but projects funded by the federal government are also larger and more complex regression results indicate that with controls for project size and complexity no statistically significant difference is found in the cost of federal and state projects results also indicate that federal regulations are not associated with reduced bid competition a

the cost of living with the rpi substitution bias in the uk retail prices index this paper uses revealed preference restrictions and nonparametric statistical methods to bound the true cost of living index which corresponds most closely to the uk retail prices index rpi this is used to assess the rpi formula for substitution bias we show that neither the direction nor the existence of bias in the rpi forumla can be established on a priori theoretical grounds however we find empirical evidence of a variable but generally positive bias in the rate of inflation recorded by the rpi formula

are bid preferences benign the effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions abstract bid preferences in procurement auctions allow firms from an identifiable group an advantage in bidding against unfavored firms while economic efficiency is expected to fall as a result of bid preferences government procurement costs may either increase or decrease depending on the competitive response of favored and unfavored firms this paper uses data from california auctions for road construction contracts where small businesses receive a 5 percent bid preference in auctions for projects using only state funds and no preferential treatment on projects using federal aid i show that while firms bidding behavior matches theoretical predictions procurement costs are 3 8 percent higher on auctions using preferences the higher procurement cost in preference auctions is attributed to reduced participation by lower cost large firms structural estimates of latent firm costs are then used to evaluate how efficiency and the division of surplus between firms and the government are impacted by bid preferences firm profits are 3 1 percent lower under bid preferences however this is overwhelmed by the efficiency loss due to reduced large firm participation the efficiency loss conditional on firm participation is estimated to represent around 0 1 percent of overall procurement costs including the adverse effect of preferences on the participation of large firms increases the estimated efficiency loss to 3 6 percent which represents 27 cents for each additional dollar awarded to small businesses through the program counterfactual simulations indicate that if participation were instead inelastic to bid preferences the 5 percent bid preference would be close to the optimal level

what do we learn about consumer demand patterns from micro data the aim of this paper is to assess the importance of using micro level data in the econometric analysis of consumer demand to do this we utilize a time series of repeated cross sections covering some 4 000 households in each of 15 years employing a number of different aggregation procedures we conclude that aggregate data alone are unlikely to produce reliable estimates of structural price and income coefficients however once certain aggregation factors as well as trend and seasonal components are included an aggregate model is not necessarily outperformed across all demand equations in terms of forecasting ability jel d12 c52 c31 the purpose of this paper is to develop a complete consumer demand system based on a time series of individual household data and to use it to measure the biases introduced into the study of consumer de mand behavior when aggregate data are used in place of the appropriate microeco nomic data we assess the suitability of ag gregate data through the impact on income and price elasticities and by evaluating the ability of both micro and aggregate based models to forecast aggregate consumer de mand the biases introduced by the use of aggregate data depend upon the way that household characteristics interact with in come and price effects and on departures of demand systems from linearity we explore the structure of microeconomic demand sys tems and the role of household characteris tics in the behavior of consumer demand both for the light this may shed on the pattern of future demands and for the im plications this behavior has for issues of aggregation consumer demand patterns typically found in micro data sets vary considerably across households with different household characteristics and with different levels of income we model this variability by making intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations of our demand sys tem depend on household characteristics and by allowing for nonlinear total log expenditure terms in fact in theory consistent demand systems it is total ex penditure rather than disposable income that is allocated across goods we find that this general framework leads to a well specified data coherent demand system which is a quadratic extension of the popu lar almost ideal model of angus s deaton and john muellbauer 1980 the micro level estimates are shown to be sensitive to the treatment of endogeneity of total expen diture and to the specification of interaction terms with household characteristics in ad dition this specification is also shown to possess many attractive features for the evaluation of aggregate models

estimation of complete demand systems from household budget data the linear and quadratic expenditure systems in this paper we explore two issues in empirical demand analysis the estimation of complete systems of demand equations using household budget data section i and the incorporation of demographic characteristics into such systems section ii although there are numerous studies which use time series data to estimate complete demand systems and many which estimate engel curves from household budget data there are virtually none which combine budget data from different periods to estimate complete systems since each budget study corresponds to a single price situation one might conjecture that estimation of complete systems would not be possible unless budget studies were available from a large number of periods this is incorrect in section i we argue that interesting complete demand systems can be estimated from a small number of budget studies despite the limited price variability represented in such data to demonstrate this we use budget study data for two periods to estimate a pair of related demand systems the familiar linear expenditure system les and a quadratic expenditure system qes a generalization of les in which the demand equations are quadratic in total expenditure the inclusion of demographic variables in the analysis of household consumption patterns is desirable because there are likely to be systematic differences in the consumption behavior of households with different demographic characteristics but the effects of demographic characteristics have seldom been studied within the framework of complete demand systems in section ii we propose translating as a general method for incorporating demographic variables into complete systems of demand equations this method has not previously been discussed as a general technique for bringing demographic variables into demand systems although it has been employed in several studies to improve the estimates of the les and the qes presented in section i we reestimate these two systems using translating to incorporate family size

how costly is affirmative action government contracting and california s proposition 209 abstract this paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using california s proposition 209 which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state funded contracts after proposition 209 prices on state funded contracts fell by 5 6 relative to federally funded projects for which preferences still applied most of the price decline after proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high minority areas finally short run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action

the incentive effects of affirmative action in a real effort tournament abstract affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament winners that is less efficient in this paper we study the empirical validity of such concerns in a case where the disadvantage affects capacities to compete we conducted real effort tournaments between pairs of children from two similar schools who systematically differed in how much training they received ex ante on the task at hand contrary to the expressed concerns our results show that the implementation of affirmative action did not result in a significant performance loss for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects instead it rather enhanced the performance for a large group of participants moreover affirmative action resulted in a more equitable tournament winner pool where half of the selected tournament winners came from the originally disadvantaged group hence the negative selection effects due to the biased tournament rules were at least partially offset by performance enhancing incentive effects

efficiency in auctions with failed resale abstract the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi object uniform price auctions with asymmetric bidders we theoretically show that when the exogenous probability of a resale market is sufficiently low final efficiency is lower than in an auction without resale our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the probability that bidders participate in a resale market resale always increases efficiency compared to the auction allocation but it also induces demand reduction by high value bidders which reduces auction efficiency consistent with theory and in contrast to what is usually argued the possibility of resale may reduce final efficiency and changes in the probability of resale have a non monotonic effect on efficiency we also analyze bargaining chat data to provide insights into the functioning of resale markets