taylor rules for the ecb using expectations data we estimate taylor rules for the euro area using consensus economics data for expected inflation and output growth and compare these estimates with more conventional specifications in which actual outcomes are used we find that the ecb takes expected inflation and expected output growth into account in setting interest rates while in the more conventional model specification the coefficient of realized inflation is not significantly different from zero

asymmetric reaction functions for the euro area this paper offers a preliminary evaluation of ecb conduct of monetary policy by estimating a fairly general reaction function for the euro area the specification of the policy rule embodies a number of nonlinearities which are shown to stem from asymmetric preferences and a convex aggregate supply curve asymmetric preferences allow but do not require policy makers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the reference values and translate into an asymmetric reaction function the empirical analysis on monthly euro area aggregated data over the last 5 years reveals that ecb monetary policy is effectively described by a nonlinear policy rule according to which output contractions have required a larger policy response than output expansions moreover actual movements in the euro interest rate closely resemble the simulated path that a bundesbank type of behaviour would have implied copyright 2003 oxford university press

firm profitability regional unemployment and human capital in wage determination this paper presents an analysis of wage formation in the norwegian private sector using data for individual workers matched with firm level information and regional unemployment a key issue is to test whether or not firm specific variables affect individual wages after controlling for individual specific factors and working conditions the results imply positive effects of firm specific profitability and firm size the elasticity of wages with respect to value added per worker and firm size is 5 and 3 3 respectively empirical evidence of a downward sloping regional wage curve is also reported while there is no support of the hypothesis of compensating wage differentials since data for three levels of aggregation are used the ols estimates of the standard errors are downward biased therefore results using a random effects model are also reported taking the multi level structure of the data into account

multiperiod wage contracts and productivity profiles when creditors do not honor human capital as collateral firms can mediate financially by offering workers long term wage contracts the optimal contract specifies a wage consisting of a spot general skill component plus a component equal to the expected time averaged value of the worker s specific skills with a competitor variations in the smoothed specific component are due only to changes in expectations about the likelihood of quitting a competing firm the theory also explains interindustry disparities in wage paths and statistical discrimination by firms

unveiling the ecb s monetary policy behaviour under different inflation regimes this paper provides clear cut evidence that the ecb follows an asymmetric monetary policy rule concerned more with inflation rather than sustaining economic growth the driving force of interest rate cuts is the fall of the inflation rate below its target level the paper evaluates the implications of the above policy on real activity by simulating a small new keynesian model this clearly indicates that the reaction of the ecb to negative output deviations and or to financial stress conditions in the low inflation regime fails to reduce the adverse effects of negative demand and financial sector shocks on economic activity

worth waiting for delayed compensation training and turnover in the united states and japan this article utilizes a rich data set on workers and their employers in the united states and japan to test several predictions of human capital theory the data set incorporates both prospective and retrospective measures of turnover includes multiple measures of training and provides a basis for calculating plant specific returns to tenure contrary to human capital theory there is no evidence that establishments with high levels of training have either high returns to tenure or low levels of turnover surprisingly establishments with high returns to tenure do not have low levels of turnover

on the job search and moral hazard we analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on the job search in our model agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation at the same time workers do on the job search deferred compensation improves workers incentives to exert effort but distorts their on the job search decisions we show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker firm pair of on the job search is high moreover the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects if firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation fewer firms with vacancies enter the on the job search market and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation these feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria a low turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation and a high turnover equilibrium where they do not furthermore the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on the job search are small

promotion turnover and discretionary human capital acquisition this article explores human capital acquisition decisions when job placement helps determine competition for a worker with asymmetric information workers may invest in firm specific capital without long term contracts specific investment increases promotion chances and hence wage competition shifting competition back to a time when firms are symmetrically uninformed if general human capital is the efficient output maximizing investment then an equivalent firm specific investment maximizes expected career wages this is a general result for sellers in second price auctions sellers of labor invest to maximize the expected second highest bidder valuation wage not the winner s expected valuation

returns to seniority in union and nonunion jobs a new look at the evidence in cross sectional data the positive association between seniority and earnings is typically much stronger for nonunion workers than for union workers a finding that seems inconsistent with the generalization that seniority is more important in the union sector than in the nonunion sector the authors of this paper show that standard estimates of the return to seniority are likely to be biased upward due to unmeasured worker heterogeneity job heterogeneity or both and they argue that this bias is likely to be larger in the nonunion sector than in the union sector when they correct for this problem in analyzing data on male blue collar workers for the years 1968 80 they find a larger return to seniority in the union sector than in the nonunion sector

weak instrument robust tests in gmm and the new keynesian phillips curve we discuss weak instrument robust statistics in gmm for testing hypotheses on the full parameter vector or on subsets of the parameters we use these test procedures to reexamine the evidence on the new keynesian phillips curve model we find that u s postwar data are consistent with the view that inflation dynamics are predominantly forward looking but we cannot rule out the presence of considerable backward looking dynamics moreover the phillips curve has become flatter recently and this is an important factor contributing to its weak identification

modelling monetary policy inflation targeting in practice this paper estimates a simple structural model of monetary policy in the uk focusing on the policy of inflation targeting introduced in 1992 we find that i the adoption of inflation targeting led to significant changes in monetary policy ii post 1992 monetary policy is asymmetric as policy makers respond more to upward deviation of inflation away from the target iii post 1992 policy makers may be attempting to keep inflation within the 1 4 2 6 range rather than pursuing a point target of 2 5 and iv the response of monetary policy to inflation is nonlinear as interest rates respond more when inflation is further from the target

the nature of credit market failure abstract hidden knowledge gives rise to over lending if as evidence suggests the returns distributions preferred by borrowers are also favoured by lenders even the stiglitz weiss model yields over lending when entrepreneurs are sufficiently risk averse

policy regime changes judgment and taylor rules in the greenspan era this paper investigates policy deviations from linear taylor rules motivated by the risk management approach followed by the fed during the greenspan era we estimate a nonlinear monetary policy rule via a logistic smoothing transition regression model where policy makers judgment proxied by economically meaningful variables drives the transition across policy regimes we find that ignoring judgment induced nonlinearities while estimating taylor rules has remarkable costs in terms of fit above 250 bps in 10 quarters although linear taylor rules describe well the broad contours of monetary policy they fail to detect relevant policy decisions driven by policy makers judgment

job duration seniority and earnings an important stylized fact about labor markets is that workers with longer seniority with their current employer have higher earnings than other workers with the same total labor market experience this study shows that workers in longer jobs earn more throughout than workers in a series of shorter jobs and that the measured positive cross sectional return seniority is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker the job or the worker employer match the implication is tha t earnings do not in fact rise very much with seniority copyright 1987 by american economic association

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

earnings functions specific human capital and job matching tenure bias is negative this article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital such as job tenure are included in earnings functions there may be a sample selection bias because of job matching effects because workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage offers we develop a model for wage offers in a labor market characterized by both specific human capital and job matching the model provides a theoretical basis for empirical earnings functions containing specific capital and it demonstrates that sample selection bias reduces the estimated return to specific human capital and tenure

gender piece rates and wages evidence from matched employer employee data why are women disproportionately on piece rates we investigate three possible explanations 1 women are more likely to be on piece rates because they have a shorter expected tenure than men 2 a greater demand for flexibility between work and home attracts women to work place technologies suitable for variable pay based on individual performance 3 women prefer piece rates because they are subject to less wage discrimination when objective performance measures are available the weight of our empirical evidence supports the third hypothesis the unexplained gender wage gap is substantially smaller in the piece rate regime than in the time wage regime copyright 2004 oxford university press

seniority wages and productivity a turbulent decade why does a worker s wage tend to grow with seniority in the firm and what does this have to do with productivity two decades ago neoclassical labor economists thought that the theory of human capital provided a good answer to this question the last decade has however been one of puzzles and doubt at this point few would give an unambiguous answer and much hinges on the answer an attractive feature of human capital theory is that it yields a consistent and coherent explanation for several aspects of the employer employee relationship for example seniority systems layoff policies that vary with skill and the relationship between tenure and turnover can be explained in terms of human capital the fact that these explanations are connected leads however to something like a domino effect doubts about one cast doubt on the others if the human capital explanation for the wage seniority relationship is flawed then human capital explanations for other phenomena may require reevaluation in addition an important body of empirical research is built around the assumption that at any point in time a person s wage indicates the person s productivity included here is the extensive literature on the human capital earnings function as well as work on labor demand market discrimination and compensating differentials that assumption has become controversial in recent years in part because implicit contract theories predict that compensation will be redistributed over the period of the contract if a person s spot wage has little to do with spot productivity but rather is an instrument of a complex insurance or deferred compensation scheme then a reassessment of the empirical research may be necessary

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

inflation zone targeting abstract we study optimal monetary policy design in a simple model that deviates from the linear quadratic paradigm and provides a rationale for the practice of inflation zone targeting we show that the presence of either zone quadratic preferences or a zone linear relationship between inflation and economic activity provides strong incentives to deviate from conventional linear policies we calibrate the model based on parameters for the united states and the euro area and employ a numerical dynamic programming algorithm to derive the optimal policies with this algorithm we examine the role of uncertainty model structure and relative preference towards economic stability in determining the width of the implied targeted inflation zone

nonlinearity in the fed s monetary policy rule this paper investigates the nature of nonlinearities in the monetary policy rule of the us fed using the flexible approach of hamilton 2001a we find that while there is significant evidence of nonlinearity for the period to 1979 there is little such evidence for the subsequent period possible asymmetries in the fed s reactions to inflation deviations from target and the output gap in the 1960s and 70s may tell part of the story but do not capture the entire nature of the nonlinearity the inclusion of the interaction between inflation deviations and the output gap as recently proposed appears to characterize the nonlinear policy rule more adequately

monetary policy rules in a new keynesian euro area model the first part of this paper is devoted to describe a new keynesian model which after calibration shows a great fit on euro area macroeconomic data then the stabilizing properties of alternative monetary policy rules are evaluated for consideration of the european central bank ecb our main finding is that a simple rule that provides the reaction of the nominal interest rate to price inflation wage inflation and its previous observation can fairly well approximate the optimal monetary policy this result is robust to including an ecb preference on interest rate smoothing

risk adverse selection and capital market failure this paper investigates the implications of adverse selection for capital market equilibrium when borrowers are risk averse k j arrow and r c lind 1970 argue that when capital markets fail to spread risk properly interest rates are too high the market adds a risk premium that the social planner would not this paper shows that when projects differ in quality in a pooling equilibrium the private market sets interest rates too low even accounting for the risk premium hence there is overinvestment the result is shown to be robust to the introduction of moral hazard copyright 1990 by royal economic society

financial contracting under risk neutrality limited liability and ex ante asymmetric information this paper derives equilibrium financial contract forms in a risk neutral capital market with asymmetrically informed borrowers entrepeneurs and investors in doing so the analysis generalizes the work of demeza and webb 1987 by allowing for arbitrary profit distributions arbitrary contract forms and variable investment choices the main result of this inquiry is as follows when higher quality entrepreneurs have better ex post profit distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property equilibrium contracts take a standard debt form so long as admissible investor payoff functions are monotone non decreasing in firm profit without the monotonicity constraint contracts often take a different live or die form

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

the fed s monetary policy rule and u s inflation the case of asymmetric preferences abstract this paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which the decision makers are allowed but not required to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values the estimates of the central bank s euler equation indicate that the preferences of the fed had been asymmetric only before 1979 with the interest rate response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude we show that this asymmetry on output implied an average inflation bias around 1 5 while the implicit inflation target also declined the asymmetric preferences induced inflation bias appears to account for a sizable fraction of the historical decline in the inflation mean

why do wages increase with tenure on the job training and life cycle wage growth observed within firms empirical results in this paper indicate that firm specific wage growth occurs almost exclusively during periods of on the job training this finding suggests that within firm wage growth is mainly determined by contemporaneous productivity growth the results provide no evidence that contractual considerations are an important source of firm specific wage growth copyright 1989 by american economic association

intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations this paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization the organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period this results in intergenerational conflicts of interest the old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits we use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium

firm specific seniority and wages this article studies the relationship between seniority and wages micro data with more than one observation from each firm are utilized to single out the seniority effect on wages arising within firms from the total seniority wage effect the results show that the seniority effect arises within firms but do not support the human capital explanation of the seniority wage profile employees with high levels of firm specific on the job training requirements have less steep wage profiles the results give some support to the theory of delayed compensation as piece rate workers have negligible returns to seniority