duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

sticks and carrots two incentive mechanisms supporting intra group cooperation abstract in this note we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra group cooperation in the context of prisoner s dilemma payoffs rewards for cooperating and punishments for defection where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship

external liabilities and crises abstract we examine the determinants of external crises focusing on the role of foreign liabilities and their composition using a variety of statistical tools and comprehensive data spanning 1970 2011 we find that the ratio of net foreign liabilities to gdp is a significant crisis predictor this is primarily due to the net position in debt instruments the effect of net equity liabilities is weaker and net fdi liabilities seem if anything an offset factor we also find that i breaking down net external debt into its gross asset and liability counterparts does not add significant explanatory power to crisis prediction ii the current account is a powerful predictor iii foreign exchange reserves reduce the likelihood of crisis more than other foreign asset holdings and iv a parsimonious probit containing those and a handful of other variables has good predictive performance in and out of sample the latter result stems largely from our focus on external crises sensu stricto

judo economics in markets with asymmetric firms abstract i study a market entry game with price competition and perfectly substitutable products limiting the initial capacity judo economics is a plausible entry strategy i show that under asymmetry in production cost or product quality capacity limitation can become obsolete

collusion in multiproduct oligopoly games under a finite horizon applying recent results on finitely repeated games to oligopoly theory the author finds that there exists a class of finite horizon output games in which collusion can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium trigger strategies prevent defection from the cooperative outcome by credibly threatening that the defector will be forced to exit the industry for the case of a multiproduct oligopoly it is shown that collusion in one market can be enforced by the threat of punishment in a second market if someone defects even though the two markets are structurally independent the firms make them strategically interdependent through their strategies copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

entry exit and performance in airline markets abstract data from the airline industry indicate that 1 entry generally is not induced by price levels substantially above the norm 2 entry reduces fares and increases output and exit increases fares and reduces output and 3 incumbents cut price and maintain output in response to entry and survivors increase both price and output in response to exit these findings cast doubt on the ability of entry to prevent or reverse price increases from anticompetitive mergers

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

a theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining this paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play although the bargaining phase is cheap talk following a generalized alternating offer protocol sharp predictions arise from three axioms two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan the third embodies a theory of disagreement that play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in which bargaining broke down equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all discount factors and are simple to construct all equilibria generate the same welfare optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bargaining protocol the theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitoring and heterogeneous discount factors and yields new insights into classic relational contracting questions

generous paupers and stingy princes power drives consumer spending on self versus others this research examines how consumers spending on themselves versus others can be affected by temporary shifts in their states of power five experiments found that individuals experiencing a state of power spent more money on themselves than on others whereas those experiencing a state of powerlessness spent more money on others than on themselves this effect was observed using a variety of power manipulations hierarchical roles print advertisements episodic recall and mental role playing across spending intentions and actual dollars spent and among college and national samples we propose that this effect occurs because power and powerlessness affect the psychological utility of self versus others and this in turn affects the monetary worth allocated to spending on self versus others the research makes novel contributions to appreciating how the spending on the self versus others varies as a function of psychological states and increases our understanding of the role of power in consumer behavior

diversification multi market contact and profitability this paper analyses the relationships between diversification multi market contact and industry profitability it focuses on the link between diversification and multi market contact to show that when diversification establishes or increases the extent to which firms meet in more than one market the effect of such multi market contact is to increase the possibility that collusion emerges as an evolutionary stable strategy as a result multi market contact may increase the potential for tacit collusion and so lead to higher profitability the effects of diversification and multi market contact on the price cost margin and the rate of return to capital are estimated using a specially constructed new database for uk manufacturing industry in 1979 this database provides information on the diversification and multi market contact of 418 firms across 134 manufacturing industries thus linking firm and industry level data the results show a clear positive effect of multi market contact on industry profitability

cartel sustainability in retail markets evidence from a health service sector abstract this paper studies the role of cost asymmetries and product differentiation on cartel sustainability by drawing data from a failed retail cartel unlike the extensive theoretical literature little empirical evidence exists on these relationships first we analyze cartel compliance and find that players are more likely to comply when cost is symmetric and own cost is high next based on a structural model and counterfactual experiments we show that a cartel price that satisfies all cartel members does not exist this result indicates an inherent difficulty of sustaining collusion in retail markets with heterogeneous players we also show that firm heterogeneities especially product differentiation rather than cost asymmetries hinder collusion more finally we derive the level of patience or the discount factor required for cartel sustainability when firms split profits based on the shapley value

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

cartels profits and excess capacity a model of a collusive duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity is studied the negotiated output quotas depend on the bargaining power of the firms which derives from the damage the firms can do by cutting prices for fixed capacities the unit profit of the small firm is at least as large as that of the large firm and the relative position of the small firm is better when demand is low when the capacities can be chosen once and for all there is excess capacity in equilibrium so long as the cost of capacity is not too high copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the nash bargaining solution is optimal abstract we consider the problem faced by players in a two person bargaining game who have different opinions about what is the appropriate solution concept to use a procedure is proposed to resolve such a conflict and it is shown that the nash bargaining solution constitutes the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the procedure as a by product we obtain that in the axiomatic characterization of the nash solution the controversial independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom can be replaced by a much weaker recursivity axiom which amounts to requiring independence of alternatives that cannot be obtained as an outcome of a risk sensitive solution

trade costs and multimarket collusion contrary to conventional wisdom this article argues that trade liberalization may facilitate collusion and reduce welfare with the help of a duopoly model in which firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets we first show that if trade costs i e tariffs transport costs and discount factors are not too high efficient cartel agreements necessitate the cross hauling of goods as that entails lower deviation incentives in this setting we then demonstrate that reciprocal trade liberalization always raises total output when trade costs are within a range whose lower bound exceeds a threshold level but may reduce total output and thus be pro collusive when trade costs are below that threshold level

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

the time vs money effect shifting product attitudes and decisions through personal connection the results of five field and laboratory experiments reveal a time versus money effect whereby activating time vs money leads to a favorable shift in product attitudes and decisions because time increases focus on product experience activating time vs money augments one s personal connection with the product thereby boosting attitudes and decisions however because money increases the focus on product possession the reverse effect can occur in cases where merely owning the product reflects the self i e for prestige possessions or for highly materialistic consumers the time versus money effect proves robust across implicit and explicit methods of construct activation

ringleaders in larger number asymmetric cartels the concept of a cartel ringleader has specific legal meaning but has received relatively little attention in the economic literature of cartels this article draws on a sample of 89 european cartels to identify how often ringleaders exist who they are and what they do it argues that ringleaders are more likely where the traditional cartel problems are likely to be most acute i e with larger numbers of members exhibiting substantial size asymmetries this is confirmed for price fixing and bid rigging cartels and is especially pronounced where the ringleader displays aggressive as opposed to merely organisational behaviour

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

a non cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon abstract for an alternating offer bargaining game with an uncertain horizon the equilibrium payoff to a player is greater the less risk averse is he relative to his opponent as the horizon becomes infinite in length the equilibrium partition converges to the nash bargaining solution

the negotiation of sustainable tariffs abstract the governments of two countries explicitly negotiate over a new pair of tariffs as soon as they reach agreement the countries put into effect the agreed upon pair of tariffs which must be self enforcing we investigate how the difference in the two governments patience affects the negotiation results provided that the common optimum tariff is the status quo tariff rate for each country we find that the country with the more patient government gains most from the negotiation if the time lag between a defection and punishment in the implementation phase is short the opposite is true if the response lag in the implementation phase is long

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry abstract this paper examines the dynamic interaction between united airlines and american airlines on a set of duopoly routes we estimate quarterly conduct parameters or conjectural variations and test constant behaviour bertrand cournot and collusive models we also test two regimeswitching models derived from the green porter price war model one based on reversion to bertrand behaviour during price wars the other on reversion to cournot behaviour the three constant behaviour models are all rejected the regime switching models can both describe the data but the cournot based version is preferred

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

trade negotiations domestic policies and the most favored nation clause this paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non discrimination links trade agreements to non trade agreements and under certain conditions helps governments further lower tariffs and or domestic standards policies these conditions are i governments objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards policies ii domestic standards are sufficiently valued and iii policies are strategic complements these can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non discrimination ce texte montre comment le fait de restreindre les instruments de politique commerciale a la seule poursuite de liens commerciaux libres de discrimination relie accords commerciaux et non commerciaux et a certaines conditions aide les gouvernements a reduire encore davantage les tarifs douaniers et ou les normes politiques nationales ces conditions sont que i les fonctions objectives soient suffisamment concaves par rapport aux normes politiques nationales ii les normes nationales soient suffisamment valorisees et iii les politiques soient des complements strategiques ces arguments fournissent le rationale pour limiter les mesures de protection a la seule non discrimination

is the french mobile phone cartel really a cartel abstract france telecom ft sfr and bouygues telecom bt have been fined by france s conseil de la concurrence cc for organizing a mobile phone cartel with stable market shares one half one third and one sixth respectively and for directly exchanging commercial information while not contesting the legal decision it is argued here that the economic reasoning is flawed 1 as the cc made much of the firms stable market shares we have first followed this line of reasoning by considering that the market shares are quotas under uniform costs even if there is a general incentive to form a monopolistic cartel bt was too small for it to be worth its while to join it it is not necessary to exchange information directly to coordinate market shares and prices effectively all partial cartels are unlikely 2 we then departed from the cc by considering that the non uniform market shares are explained by the costs in cournot competition this allows costs to be deduced from the observed market shares by assuming that they are kept the same when switching from cournot competition to any form of cartel we deduced that market shares cannot be other than stable and non uniform any monopoly is unlikely to come about because ft has negative incentives to form a monopolistic cartel no partial cartels of two operators are viable because at least one member would lose out the paper also shows that stackelberg competition is unlikely as well as bertrand edgeworth competition in conclusion cournot competition is the only arrangement that guarantees no losses to all operators

on the role of patience in collusive bertrand duopolies abstract this paper analyzes the role of patience in a repeated bertrand duopoly where firms bargain over which collusive price and market share to implement it is shown that the least patient firm s market share is not monotone in its own discount factor

a model of collusion timing abstract i develop a dynamic model of collusion affording a substantial role to entry heterogeneous firms make collusion entry exit and investment decisions within an evolving environment the collusive agreement adopted is a rule of thumb motivated by the details of collusion in the lysine market it is found that an entrant will wait until it has a market share comparable to its competitors before agreeing to collude allowing for collusive possibilities tends to yield a less concentrated industry with reduced consumer welfare the model characterises events in the lysine market and could provide insights into markets with the potential for collusion and entry and uncertainty about the characteristics of potential entrants

collusion and heterogeneity of firms we examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic bertrand competition we show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting first we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold with or without capacity constraints next we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria in the long run the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

conspiracy at the pump abstract on the basis of evidence of price fixing in may 2006 the canadian competition bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of quebec in june 2008 criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets we employ a differences in differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets we find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1 75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation we also briefly discuss how well the stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real world conspiracy

list pricing and discounting in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly list or retail pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice we modify the standard bertrand edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount or not in a subsequent stage we show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome this is true for a general class of rationing rules further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

profit sharing in a collusive industry abstract we study a model in which collusive duopolists divide up the monopoly profit according to their relative bargaining power we are particularly interested in how the negotiated profit shares depend on the sizes of the firms if each can produce at the same constant unit cost up to its capacity we show that the profit per unit of capacity of the small firm is higher than that of the large one we also study how the ratio of the negotiated profits depends on the size of demand relative to industry capacity and how this ratio changes with variations in demand

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

the structure of competition how competition between one s rivals influences imitative market entry this paper investigates how the pattern of encounters between a firm s competitors affects the firm s inclination to follow its competitors into a new market we theorize that direct encounters between a firm s rivals lead to a herding effect making imitative market entry more likely past mutual forbearance between a firm s competitors resulting from asymmetric multimarket competition further strengthens this herding effect by enhancing the firm s expectations of market attractiveness in contrast aggressive past rivalry between the competitors resulting from symmetric multimarket contact dampens these expectations producing a competition effect that makes herding less probable we test our idea in two distinct contexts the chinese pharmaceutical industry and the taiwanese computer hardware industry and find consistent support in both settings we discuss how our analysis of what we call the structure of competition can be extended to research on other forms of firm behavior

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

a price setting supergame between two heterogeneous firms when firms attempt to tacitly collude they inevitably face a market sharing problem this problem is further complicated when firms have asymmetries this paper studies a price setting supergame between two firms with different costs the paper investigates sustainability of tacit collusion and solves the market sharing problem under tacit collusion the resulting equilibrium from the supergame is used to study limit pricing government policies toward entrants and welfare change due to technological progress and a change in the time discount rate the paper shows that even costlessly achieved technological progress can decrease social welfare

on interdependent supergames multimarket contact concavity and collusion abstract following bernheim and whinston 1990 this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms ability to collude real world imperfections tend to make firms objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent firms payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others then multimarket contact always facilitates collusion it may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any the effects of conglomeration are discussed multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents objective function is submodular in material payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13 l21

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

collusion among asymmetric firms the case of different discount factors abstract this study investigates collusive behavior among asymmetric firms for this purpose we develop a selection criterion for deriving a unique collusive outcome and apply it to the case when firms have different discount factors our analysis reveals that for collusion to be self enforcing it is unnecessary that all firms have sufficiently high discount factors but rather only that firms on average have a sufficiently long run view the optimal collusive outcome entails a strict ordering of output quotas in which firms with relatively low discount factors receive a disproportionate share of market demand as found in the case of a common discount factor a fall in a firm s discount factor reduces the likelihood of successful collusion this effect reduces firm profits on the other hand in the event that firms can collude a lowering of a firm s discount factor increases its output quota so that its profits rise

current accounts in debtor and creditor countries the authors reexamine a classic question in international economics what is the current account response to a transitory income shock such as a temporary improvement in the terms of trade a transfer from abroad or unusually high production to answer this question they construct a world equilibrium model in which productivity varies across countries and international borrowing and lending take place to exploit good investment opportunities despite its conventional ingredients the model generates the novel prediction that favorable income shocks lead to current account deficits in debtor countries and current account surpluses in creditor countries evidence from thirteen oecd countries broadly supports this theoretical prediction

multimarket contact economies of scope and firm performance we integrate the efficiency and competitive effects of product market scope choice into a comprehensive model of economic performance and empirically test the model in the context of the u s airli

collusion and research joint ventures i examine the question whether cooperation in r d among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion suppose that firms engage in a stochastic r d race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated game framework innovation under non cooperative r d leads to an inter firm asymmetry destabilizing collusion in pre discovery and post discovery periods innovation sharing under cooperative r d preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit thereby facilitating collusion however welfare may increase with cooperative r d i also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

a dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars we provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among jirms investment entry and exit it is a symmetric information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an activejim that is likely to exit in the near future numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment only the collusive industry generates price wars also the collusive industry offers both more and higherquality products to consumers albeit often at a higher price the positive effect of collusion on variety and quality more than compensates consumers for the negative effect of collusive prices so that consumer surplus is larger with collusion

examining models of collusion the market for lysine abstract we compare the experience with collusion in the market for lysine with the predictions of theory the lysine market provides an ideal setting following the confessions of cartel participants in antitrust investigations data availability allows demand and cost functions to be estimated and observed mark ups compared with predictions we find that several integral aspects of collusion in the lysine market are not adequately addressed in the literature the dynamics associated with entry and investment persistent asymmetries between firms the cartel s bargaining problem and the existence of cheating in equilibrium these issues are likely to have much wider applicability beyond the lysine market

collusion in dynamic oligopolies in the presence of entry threats this paper considers a generalized oligopoly supergame where an endogenous entry decision is included the author proves that strategies based on most severe symmetric punishments can sustain some degree of collusion even with arbitrarily small entry barriers provided that the discount rate is sufficiently small the model provides a justification for a view suggesting that neither substantial barriers to entry nor strategic or informational asymmetries are necessary for an oligopoly with some degree of cooperation to prevail copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

price discrimination or uniform pricing which colludes more abstract conventional wisdom attributes different economic outcomes of uniform pricing and price discrimination to the heterogeneity in market conditions or market participants such as differences in demand elasticity or production costs we offer a new explanation for the observed differences that relates to behavioral aspects rather than demand or supply side effects in particular in a symmetric bertrand duopoly laboratory experiment for which theory predicts no differences between the two pricing regimes we find that tacit price collusion is systematically higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing

general equilibrium tax incidence under imperfect competition a quantity setting supergame analysis the incidence of various taxes is analyzed in a model with competitive and oligopolistic sectors friedman s grim trigger strategies support collusion with firms producing output to maximize joint profits subject to the constraint that no firm desires to cheat the sustainable level of output depends on the capitalized value of future retaliation therefore tax induced changes in the net return to capital the discount rate affect the output mix through their impact on the sustainability of collusion this collusive pricing effect is isolated and analyzed one result is that a general factor tax on capital but not labor is shifted

the determination of price and output quotas in a heterogeneous cartel applying a selection criterion that uses both subgame perfection and the nash bargaining solution this paper investigates the relationship between firms cost functions and collusive behavior it is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price that the low cost firm would set if it was a monopolist comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low cost firm s unit cost but is decreasing in the high cost firm s unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

adjustment costs and the sequencing of trade liberalisation a common feature of trade agreements between countries is that the integration of markets proceeds in stages this paper examin es conceptually the role played by adjustment costs in determining the best way to structure an agreement between two countries when there are multiple sectors to be liberalised adjustment costs to liberalisatio n of industries might influence the timing of liberalisatio n with the analysis bearing similarity to why tariff reductions tend to be phased in over time when two industries have no spillover eff ects trade agreements with sequential liberalisation will be less costly to sustain however if the liberalisation of one in dustry influences permanently the flow of benefits from liberalising the other industry simultaneous liberalisation may be easier to sustain

collusion at the extensive margin abstract we augment the multi market collusion model of bernheim and whinston 1990 by allowing for firm entry into and exit from individual markets we show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other s markets or territories we characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart specifically it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable finally we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a proportional response enforcement mechanism

eliciting time versus money time scarcity underlies asymmetric wage rates marketing strategies are often tied to how consumers spend time e g waiting in lines searching across stores in return for money e g receiving a discount viewing such time money tradeoffs in terms of a reservation wage rate for consumers we identify a wage rate asymmetry between two elicitation procedures a money elicit mel state the minimum amount of money m that you would accept in return for spending a given number of hours t and b time elicit tel state the maximum number of hours t that you would spend in return for accepting a given amount of money m while these procedures are normatively equivalent we propose that tel vs mel wage rates are higher because time scarcity receives a higher weight in tel judgments in eight studies including both hypothetical and real settings we document the wage rate asymmetry the time scarcity process and a downstream consequence of tel vs mel reducing the likelihood of accepting a time money tradeoff we discuss the implications for practice and for research on wage rates time versus money procedural invariance and scarcity

global imbalances from a stock perspective the asymmetry between creditors and debtors abstract after the global financial crisis a reduction in global current account flow imbalances was observed still global disequilibria as measured in terms of countries net foreign assets stock imbalances kept increasing this paper explores the link between stock and flow imbalances our results show that stock imbalances are self correcting or stabilizing in debtor countries but self feeding or destabilizing in creditor countries in debtor economies the negative net foreign asset position improves the current account balance helping to limit the accumulation of net external debt in creditor countries the positive net foreign asset position also improves the current account leading to additionally increasing net external assets the decomposition of the current account reveals that the income balance widens stock imbalances in both cases the asymmetry between creditors and debtors is explained by the differential behavior of the trade balance which fails to adjust in the case of creditors

international currency exposures valuation effects and the global financial crisis abstract we examine the evolution of international currency exposures with a particular focus on the 2002 12 period during the run up to the global financial crisis there was a widespread shift towards positive net foreign currency positions such that relatively few countries exhibited the archetypal emerging market short foreign currency position on the eve of the global financial crisis during the crisis the upheaval in currency markets generated substantial currency generated valuation effects much of which were not reversed there is some evidence that the distribution of valuation effects was stabilizing in the sense of showing a negative covariation pattern with pre crisis net foreign asset positions