a theory of socio economic disparities in health over the life cycle motivated by the observation that medical care explains only a relatively small part of the ses health gradient we present a life cycle model that incorporates several additional behaviours that potentially explain jointly a large part of observed disparities as a result the model provides not only a conceptual framework for the ses health gradient but more generally an improved framework for the production of health we derive novel predictions from the theory by performing comparative dynamic analyses more generally our comparative dynamic method can be applied to models of similar form e g human capital health deficits firm investment to name a few

trends in male earnings inequality this study uses newly available time series data on the u s earnings distribution to analyze trends in male earnings inequality between 1958 and 1977 the major finding is that the observed slow upward trend in earnings inequality is well explained by a small number of plausible economic factors the paper has four parts part ii briefly reviews related time series research on both earnings and income inequality male earnings inequality is considered from the human capital perspective in section iii and from a less structured approach in section iv the last section is a summary and conclusion

earnings inequality among males in the united states trends and the effect of labor force growth we analyze the variance of log earnings within labor force cohorts of u s males with particular attention to the influence of labor force growth rates estimates with data from the 1968 79 current population surveys reveal increases in earnings inequality within labor force cohorts even after we control for the level of education experience and unemployment a model of human capital investment is used to analyze differences among cohorts in the life cycle profile of the variance of log earnings it is shown that a pattern of sharply increasing and then declining labor force growth rates will tend to raise the return on human capital investment and thereby increase the variance of postschooling investment and log earnings early in the life cycle this positive effect on relative earnings inequality should decline with experience and possibly become negative because of the post world war ii baby boom and baby bust recent labor force entrants have faced just such a pattern of actual and projected labor

spatial effects of air pollution on public health in china increasingly serious air pollution poses a great threat to public health and daily life based on the grossman china health production function this paper examines the effects of the spatial agglomeration of chinese public health and the spatial effects of air pollution and other factors on public health considering three aspects this study employed chinese macro data on public health and air pollution from 2004 to 2013 to conduct an empirical analysis using a spatial econometrics technique the main conclusions are as follows due to extensive and persistent air pollution there was a significant spatial agglomeration impact on public health regional public health presented a convergence effect and effects of air pollution s negative externalities on public health were significant compared with the estimation results obtained when spatial dependence was not considered the negative effect of the concentration of pm2 5 on public health was higher implying that the traditional approaches tend to create biases when spatial correlation is ignored from a regional perspective the regional differences in the effects of air pollution on public health were significant adopting differentiated environmental policies for different regions is the future direction towards which china s environmental governance will develop

valuing morbidity from wildfire smoke exposure a comparison of revealed and stated preference techniques estimating the economic benefits of reduced health damages due to improvements in environmental quality continues to challenge economists we review welfare measures associated with reduced wildfire smoke exposure and a unique dataset from california s station fire of 2009 allows for a comparison of cost of illness coi estimates with willingness to pay wtp measures the wtp for one less symptom day is estimated to be 87 and 95 using the defensive behavior and contingent valuation methods respectively these wtp estimates are not statistically different but do differ from a 3 traditional daily coi estimate and 17 comprehensive daily coi estimate jel q51 q53

pollution private investment in healthcare and environmental policy in this paper we demonstrate that in a two period overlapping generations model the relationship between environmental taxation and economic activity output level and growth has an inverted u shape when we take into account the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the individual decision of each working age agent to improve her health we also demonstrate that the link between environmental tax and lifetime welfare also has an inverted u shape and that a tighter environmental policy might enhance economic activity while reducing steady state lifetime welfare finally we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax

gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control abstract numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive wage effort relationship in almost all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm this paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage effort relationship we compare the standard bilateral gift exchange game between an owner manager and a worker with two trilateral ones where the firm is owned by a shareholder and controlled by a manager the wage effort relationship is similar in all three situations most strikingly workers reward higher wages with higher effort even when the manager does not share in the firm s profits

stochastic replicator dynamics this article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks i show that under these dynamics strategies that do not survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies are eliminated in the long run even in the presence of nonvanishing perturbations i also give an example that shows that the stochastic dynamics in this article have equilibrium selection properties that differ from other dynamics in the literature

strategic entry deterrence and terrorism theory and experimental evidence using a two stage rent seeking framework we present a simple model of strategic entry terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers the theory illustrates that relative to a cooperative outcome negative externalities lead to over spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under spending on deterrence our experimental results are broadly consistent subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures in contrast to theoretical predictions participation decisions while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest were influenced by a subject s ability to participate in multiple contests

in search of predatory pricing can predatory pricing be reproduced in a laboratory environment we report research motivated by this objective we began with conditions that based on the literature appeared to combine the features this literature has suggested are favorable to the emergence of predation next we operationalized what was meant by predatory pricing in our design in order to compare prices with predictions from alternative theories of 10 experiments none evidenced predatory behavior most supported the dominant firm theory the second series of experiments addresses remedies for predation and finds that the effect is to increase prices and reduce efficiency

does payoff equity facilitate coordination a test of schelling s conjecture abstract starting from schelling 1960 several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal form games with multiple equilibria the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike payoff inequities as abundant experimental evidence suggests in this line we propose a selection principle called equity eq which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest money payoff if only one such equilibrium exists using a within subjects experimental design furthermore we study the relative performance of eq in twelve simple 2 2 coordination games in many of these games we find that eq explains individual behavior better than a large range of alternative theories including theories of bounded rationality and several other equilibrium selection principles yet we also observe that the frequency of eq play depends on the payoff structure of the game for instance eq play diminishes when the alternative equilibrium is socially efficient and not very unfair compared with the eq equilibrium our data suggests that equilibrium selection is affected by several factors and that subjects are heterogeneous in this respect but also that equity is often a crucial factor to understand coordination

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders an experimental study feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like ebay or amazon marketplace this article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders through a set of experiments based on the trust game our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system however such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders in particular a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner s rating decision before making their own decision provides better results both in terms of trust and earnings

measuring benefits from air pollution control where do we stand measuring the benefits from reduced morbidity this paper presents a simple model of preventive health care similar to that of grossman 1972 and uses the model to define what a person would pay for a change in air quality the model assumes that one can build up resistance to acute illnes by increasing his stock of health capital however health capital decays at a rate which depends on air pollution for acute illness willingness to pay as derived from the model is greater than the benefit estimate computed using the damage function approach to illustrate the size of this discrepancy estimates of willingness to pay are computed using data from the michigan panel study of income dynamics the case for government providing information about risks rests secure in the theory of public goods informational scale economies and problems of dissemination conceivably call for a principal agent relationship in which certain types of decisions are delegated to the agency however the setting of standards and prohibitions is too simplistic it seldom recognizes that personal action tends to interact with and partially offset them 8 references

on the existence of predatory pricing an experimental study of reputation and entry deterrence in the chain store game a single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants there are two types of monopolists weak monopolists whose single period best response is to acquiesce after entry and strong monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry data show high levels of predatory pricing defined as weak monopolists fighting all entrants in early periods both with and without experimenter induced strong monopolists we reject a number of predictions of the asymmetric information sequential equilibrium model of kreps and wilson 1982 and find important deviations from more general sequential equilibrium models as well

an evolutionary model of bargaining abstract individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the nash demand game they make their demands by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly there is no common knowledge over the long run typically one division will be observed almost all of the time this stochastically stable division is close to the nash solution when all agents in the same population are alike when the populations are heterogeneous a generalization of the nash solution results if there is some mixing between the two populations the stable division is fifty fifty journal of economic literature classification number c78

on the detection of collusion and predation abstract this lecture not only shows how game theory can contribute to the detection of collusion and predation but also how experts for the defense can use game theoretic arguments to make such detection difficult a few important european anti trust cases are discussed to illustrate

parental behavior and the value of children s health a health production approach data on individual children and on sibling pairs are used to examine how family resource allocations affect children s health and to estimate willingness to pay for reduced acute illness in children results highlight the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of child health and suggest that children with greater stocks of health capital whose parents invest in preventive and remedial medical care experience fewer days of illness estimated willingness to pay to avoid one day of illness induced school loss is about 100 to 150 a range broadly consistent with limited prior evidence but sub stantially more than unit values applied in recent policy analyses all else equal willingness to pay is higher among single parents and for uninsured children and the estimated income elasticity is only 0 14 implied aggregate benefits of reductions in children s sick time associated with air pollution control may be substantial

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

an economic analysis of air pollution and health the case of st louis a health oriented choice model is developed in which individuals are viewed as producers of health and good health is desired for both consumption and investment purposes individuals are able to adjust their consumption of medical care in order to defend against reductions in air quality a compensating variation type marginal willingness to pay expression is derived for improved air quality and the model is tested using cross sectional data on employed adult residents of st louis missouri estimates of marginal willingness to pay for the average employed person are derived for a 30 reduction in ozone these values range from 18 45 to 24 48 per year

strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary contribution experiments abstract voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time we use a two stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1 repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct response method which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter

through time changes in family income inequality the effect of non synchronous regional growth factors affecting the dynamics of income inequality in the us during the 1948 92 period are examined specifically it extends the work of maxwell who found that through time changes in family income inequality are related to demographic and industry factors and draws upon the insights of other researchers who have recognized that the us national economy is actually a composite of semi autonomous regional economies the results provide strong evidence that family income inequality is related to the pattern of regional economic growth and the relative proportion of unmarried families

distribution of income and toxic emissions in maine united states inequality in two dimensions abstract ecological distribution refers to inequalities in the use of environmental sinks and sources this article explores one such dimension of ecological distribution that of toxic air emissions using data from the risk screening environmental indicators model and the united states census bureau i analyze the distribution of both environmental risk and income at the block group level in the state of maine the state of maine was chosen for its historical dependence upon natural resources as well as its economic and spatial heterogeneity results clearly indicate that the toxic air emissions are distributed much more unequally than is income and that those inequalities are reinforcing while not in itself an indication of environmental injustice such analyses may help us to rethink the assumption that there is a tradeoff between income and pollution

gift exchange in a multi worker firm one of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level in general 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher effort these results are observed for simple one employer one worker relationships in this paper we investigate whether they generalize to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers we compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers we find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce and intention based reciprocity rather than social preferences seems to be the main driving force behind gift exchange

learning in common value auctions some initial observations abstract inexperienced bidders in first price common value auctions suffer from a winner s curse losing money on average with experience bidders approximate the nash equilibrium the mechanisms underlying this adjustment are 1 a market selection effect as the most aggressive bidders are less likely to return for subsequent sessions and 2 players who lose money bid less experiential learning and those who would have lost money had they won the auction with the high bidder s signal bid less observational learning

comparative dynamic analysis of the full grossman model the paper applies the method of comparative dynamic analysis to the full grossman model for a particular class of solutions it derives the equations implicitly defining the complete trajectories of the endogenous variables relying on the concept of frisch decision functions the impact of any parametric change on an endogenous variable can be decomposed into a direct and an indirect effect the focus of the paper is on marginal changes in the rate of health capital depreciation it also analyses the impact of either initial financial wealth or the initial stock of health capital while the direction of most effects remains ambiguous in the full model the assumption of a zero consumption benefit of health is sufficient to obtain a definite for any direct or indirect effect

the many faces of human sociality uncovering the distribution and stability of social preferences there is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others interests in decision making this heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other regarding behaviors and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across situations we tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us to simultaneously estimate outcome based and reciprocity based social preferences we find that non selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception neither at the level of the representative agent nor when we allow for several preference types do purely selfish types emerge instead three temporally stable and qualitatively different other regarding types emerge endogenously i e without pre specifying assumptions about the characteristics of types when ahead all three types value others payoffs significantly more than when behind the first type which we denote as strongly altruistic type is characterized by a relatively large weight on others payoffs even when behind and moderate levels of reciprocity the second type denoted as moderately altruistic type also puts positive weight on others payoff yet at a considerable lower level and displays no positive reciprocity while the third type is behindness averse i e puts a large negative weight on others payoffs when behind and behaves selfishly otherwise we also find that there is an unambiguous and temporally stable assignment of individuals to types moreover the three type model substantially improves the out of sample predictions of individuals behavior across additional games while the information contained in subject specific parameter estimates leads to no or only minor additional predictive power this suggests that a parsimonious model with three types captures the bulk of the predictive power contained in the preference estimates

burning money and pseudo first mover advantages an experimental study on forward induction abstract the mere potential for one player to burn money prior to play has been shown in theory to be an effective device to select this player s most preferred outcome e g in the battle of the sexes game j econ theory 48 1989 476 j econ theory 57 1992 36 in this study we assess the behavioral relevance of this theoretical claim it is shown that its validity depends on whether the game is played in extensive or normal form in extensive form games first movers benefit substantially from having the opportunity to burn money in advance the effect is much weaker in the normal form game however in two control treatments first movers who can select between two related games gain an advantage although standard forward induction arguments do not have any bite these results suggest that we need to make further theoretical advances to understand the role of physical timing and first mover advantages in games

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game in an experimental investigation of milgrom and roberts 1992 model play consistently converges to a unique equilibrium providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behavior that the theory predicts play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima followed by an attempt to pool and then if no pooling equilibrium exists separation suggesting myopia rather than a forward looking process when both pure strategy equilibria and separating equilibria exist equilibrium selection is a function of the past history of play an adaptive learning model characterizes the major features of the data and provides predictions of intermediate term behavior that is otherwise lacking in the theory

a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift abstract binmore and samuelson binmore k samuelson l 1999 evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection review of economic studies 66 363 393 have shown that perturbations drift are crucial to study the stability properties of nash equilibria we contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift based on the similarity theory introduced by tversky tversky a 1977 features of similarity psychological review 84 327 352 the innovation is that we derive the similarity relations from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game we obtain different models of drift depending on how we model that perception and show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in components of nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect

predatory pricing in a multiple market experiment a note abstract isaac and smith 1985a b present a strong behavioral case that predatory pricing is not an observable laboratory phenomenon we propose several modifications of their design resulting in a multiple market experiment in which predatory pricing is present the primary modification involves conducting several markets concurrently providing an active escape opportunity for any prey and a potential reward to a reputation for predation these results provide a behavioral existence proof for the predatory pricing phenomenon they do not address the issue of the phenomenon s behavioral robustness

predation asymmetric information and strategic behavior in the classroom an experimental approach to the teaching of industrial organization abstract classroom market experiments can complement the theoretical orientation of standard industrial organization courses this paper describes various experiments designed for such courses and presents details of a multi market game with entry and exit in this experiment incumbents have a cost advantage in their home markets and mobile firms decide which market to enter after entry decisions are made firms choose prices and quantities to offer for sale predatory pricing is possible with this setup and the experiment can be used to motivate discussions of monopoly competition entry and efficiency other classroom experiments with an industrial organization focus are surveyed

the dynamic relationship between environmental pollution economic development and public health evidence from china abstract during the last two decades of rapid economic growth china s environmental pollution has become increasingly serious and the corresponding health damage has become a significant problem that has attracted domestic and foreign attention as china pursues sustainable economic growth the issues of environmental degradation and public health should be well addressed using sulfur dioxide emissions wastewater emissions and soot and dust emissions as indicators of environmental quality this study investigates the comprehensive dynamic relationship between environmental quality economic development and public health in china for the first time to control for potential endogeneity this paper utilizes a carefully designed simultaneous equation model sem that is composed of three equations that describe the relationships among economic development environmental quality and public health using panel data from 30 chinese provinces for the period from y2002 to y2014 the model verified the negative effect of environmental pollution on public health moreover economic and social factors may also affect public health for instance real gdp per capita has a significant negative impact on perinatal mortality rates and education and medical conditions also contribute significantly to promoting economic growth and improving the level of public health

the relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games abstract in this note we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of g e bolton and r zwick 1995 games econ behav 10 95 121 more specifically we replaced exactly equal splits by nearly equal splits either slightly favoring the proposer or the responder such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust we find however a significant change in behavior fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 c92

grossman s missing health threshold we present a generalized solution to grossman s model of health capital 1972 relaxing the widely used assumption that individuals can adjust their health stock instantaneously to an optimal level without adjustment costs the grossman model then predicts the existence of a health threshold above which individuals do not demand medical care our generalized solution addresses a significant criticism the model s prediction that health and medical care are positively related is consistently rejected by the data we suggest structural and reduced form equations to test our generalized solution and contrast the predictions of the model with the empirical literature

the dynamics of population growth differential fertility and inequality studies of population growth relative to income distribution from single equation and simultaneous equation models have shown that higher population growth rates increase inequality the reasons for this inequality contain important welfare issues including the fact that different income groups grow at different rates with lower income the fastest the differential fertility of the income groups complicates these issues the lorenz curve has often been used as a foundation of the theory of inequality comparisons and uses cumulative shares of income as a function of cumulative shares of population the mortality rates age of new entrants and the mobility across income groups must be factored in these can be analyzed simultaneously using a multistate life table which describes simultaneous transitions across age groups and states data from brazil was used to test whether increase in the fertility rates of the poor would affect income inequality the results indicate a 100 increase in the fertility of the poor which increases the percentage of poor in the equal fertility case there were decreases in the percent of poor from the original number these results confirm that inequality measures can give conflicting signals and could be inconsistent with real changes in relative welfare analyzing relationships between population growth and inequality is difficult and standard measures are inadequate to test hypotheses about the distribution effects of migration or high fertility it appears to be impossible to differentiate changes in population make up from changes in economic status

valuing morbidity an integration of the willingness to pay and health status index literatures placing dollar values on human health has long been a controversial aspect of policy analysis and remains difficult given the relatively small number of morbidity valuation studies available by combining both the economic and health literature this paper offers an alternative approach to morbidity valuation and provides estimates for a wide range of short term health conditions

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

nutrition and nonparticipation in the us food stamp programme microdata from the national food consumption survey are used to test for differences in caloric and protein intake distributions we compare poor households that participate in the us food stamp programme to eligible households that do not participate tests for stochastic dominance provide unambiguous evidence that eligible nonparticipants suffer from relative undernutrition compared to participating households probit analysis is used to identify characteristics of participating and nonparticipating households

preferences intentions and expectation violations a large scale experiment with a representative subject pool we specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies the effects of distributional preferences and penalizing unfair proposer behavior perceived intentions on responder decisions in the ultimatum game we allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend among other things on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers the latter allows expectation violations to be a driving force for responder behavior we estimate the model on a large representative sample from the dutch population we find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socio economic characteristics of responders strong inequity aversion to the other player s disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents responders tend to punish more unequal offers made by proposers if they expect that unequal proposals are made less often

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

valuing changes in health risks a comparison of alternative measures essential to efficient provision of health safety and the environment is correct valuation of risks to human health in a world of scarcity difficult decisions concerning tradeoffs between health and other desirables are unavoidable in this paper we develop a model of health investment under uncertainty which yields a general expression for values of changes in risks to human health the preference based values of morbidity risks and mortality risks are ex ante dollar equivalents of changes in expected utility associated with risk changes the preference based values are related to two alternative measures costs of illness and preventive expenditures which are thought to be lower bounds on the value of risk reductions we demonstrate that these alternative measures are not even special cases of the more general measure and that the size relationships among the three measures are complex also we derive the relationship between the willingness to pay for risk changes and the consumer surpluses associated with health changes which occur with certainty the next section contains a brief review of the approaches to valuing changes in health

uncertainty inequalities in health and the demand for health abstract as it has become increasingly recognized that inequalities in health stem more from inequalities in wealth rather than from inequalities in access to medical care economists have begun to suggest that michael grossman s model of the demand for health may be a useful analytical framework for investigating the issue ironically the more popular of grossman s two sub models the pure investment model provides little by way of insights into the relationship between inequalities in wealth and inequalities in health in common with other pure investment models of human capital formation grossman s model predicts that an individual s health investment decisions at each stage in the lifecycle will be independent of his initial wealth this paper shows that if uncertainty is introduced into the model this result no longer holds it also shows that if individuals display decreasing absolute risk aversion wealthier individuals will invest more in health capital than individuals who start life with relatively small stocks of financial capital

the demand for health some new empirical evidence this paper presents some new estimates of the pure investment and pure consumption models of the demand for health in contrast to previous studies the paper presents parameter estimates of both reduced form and structural demand for health care equations the latter which are obtained by treating health capital as a latent variable in a recursive equation system provide a safer way of checking the consistency of the model s predictions with the data the present analysis of the pure consumption model differs from previous analyses in its recognition of the dependency of the shadow price of initial assets on the entire lifetime profiles of the model s exogenous variables the paper also explores the implications in terms of reliability of parameter estimates of the failure on the part of previous studies to recognize this

corruption and culture an experimental analysis article i nfo article history why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions in 2005 we conducted a bribery experiment and found that among undergraduates we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country among graduate students we could not in 2007 we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the uk was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour we conclude that while corruption may in part be a cultural phenomenon individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin

equal split in the informal market for group train travel in this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected at the central train station of the city of kiel germany group tickets are used by individual proposers looking for co travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure the shared ride is offered for a fixed price we observe that the prevailing price offer corresponds to an equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co travelers this result is remarkable because the positions of the bargaining parties are clearly asymmetric and formation of the full group is not guaranteed

what limits escalation varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment abstract threat power is the ability to impose a great loss on someone else at relatively low own cost and can be measured by the ratio of other s and own loss it can be varied by assuming that rejecting an ultimatum reduces the payoff of the proposer to its share and that of the responder to its 1 share where 0 1 results demonstrate that proposers become more greedy when is high whereas responders adjust to threat power but punish greed to a high extent irrespective of own rejection cost

valuing environmental health effects an economic perspective this paper provides an overview of some of the issues involved in comparing benefit cost analysis and cost effectiveness analysis based on quality adjusted life years as alternative approaches to assessing environmental policies that affect human health it concludes that i although qalys have the advantage of reflecting policy impacts on both health status and longevity in a single scalar measure they are not consistent with utility theory unless individuals preferences satisfy some restrictive conditions ii they do not capture other important aspects of the valuation of changes in mortality and morbidity iii cost effectiveness analysis based on qalys as a measure of effectiveness omits non health related effects of environmental policy and iv it leaves unanswered the important question of what level of environmental regulation is appropriate

estimating stated preferences with rated pair data environmental health and employment effects of energy programs abstract respondents stated preferences for attributes related to various electricity generation scenarios are analyzed using a series of pairwise ratings multiple observations for each respondent facilitate estimating individual scale parameters scale estimates can identify uninformative rating patterns and make it possible to delete such observations or adjust wtp calculations cross section time series analysis of the data indicates that nonprice attributes increase in salience during the course of the experiment thus later responses may be better indicators of preferences than earlier responses comparisons of polychotomous with dichotomous models indicate that most respondents relative preference ratings are not simply dichotomous but discriminate systematically along the rating scale