career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

incentives and transactions costs within the firm estimating an agency model using payroll records we estimate an agency model using the payroll records of a copper mine that paid a production bonus to teams of workers we estimate the cost of incomplete information due to insurance and incentives considerations and the inefficiency caused by the simple form of the incentive contract itself at the estimated parameters the cost of worker risk aversion insurance is of similar magnitude to moral hazard incentives overall incomplete information accounted for one half of the bonus system s inefficiency relative to potential full information profits the other half is attributed to the bonus system s inefficient generation of incentives and insurance relative to the optimal incentive contract

the effect of wage subsidies on piece rate workers evidence from the penny per pound program in florida abstract this paper studies a fair trade program in which consumers provide a wage subsidy bonus to piece rate tomato pickers the total subsidy determined by sales to participating buyers is divided among workers based on their relative output a worker who produces more gets a larger share of the bonus although seemingly mimicking the existing piece rate pay scheme the mechanism associated with the bonus payment is really a relative performance evaluation as the size of total bonus is exogenous and invariant to workers effort therefore for a given sized subsidy the combined total or per worker average utility gains would become the largest if the workers keep their efforts at the pre program level empirical analysis shows that worker effort and hence productivity increases substantially in response to the program suggesting that currently workers combined gains per dollar of subsidy are not being maximized

lessons from the kibbutz on the equality incentives trade off the first kibbutz was established southwest of the sea of galilee in 1910 but the vast majority of kibbutzim were established in the 1930s and 1940s shortly before the creation of the state of israel in 1948 founders aimed to create a new human being who cared about the group more than about himself a homo sociologicus who would challenge the selfish homo economicus this idealistic view can explain many of the key features of kibbutzim equal sharing in the distribution of income no private property a noncash economy communal dining halls where members ate their meals together high provision of local public goods for use by kibbutz members separate communal residences for children outside their parents homes which were supposed to free women from their traditional role in society and allow them to be treated equally with men collective education to instill socialist and zionist values communal production whereby kibbutz members worked inside their kibbutzim in agriculture or in one of the kibbutz plants and no use of hired labor from outside kibbutzim because hiring labor was considered exploitation under the reigning socialist ideology to an economist steeped in thinking about incentives that self interested individuals face there are three reasons why an equal sharing arrangement of this sort seems unlikely to last first high ability members have an incentive to exit equal sharing arrangements to earn a wage premium so called brain drain second low ability individuals have an incentive to enter equal sharing arrangements so that they can be subsidized by more able individuals so called adverse selection third in context of equal sharing shirking and free riding are likely to be prevalent however kibbutzim have survived successfully for the past century and currently consist of 120 000 members living in 268 kibbutzim in a number of ways the kibbutzim offer an exceptional environment to examine the potential trade off between equality and incentives

venture capitalists as principals contracting screening and monitoring there is a large academic literature on the principal agent problem in financial contracting this literature focuses on the conflicts of interest between an agent who is an entrepreneur with a venture that needs financing and a principal who is the investor providing the funds for the venture theory has identified a number of ways that the investor principal can mitigate these conflicts first the investor can structure financial contracts i e the allocation of cash flow and control rights between the entrepreneur and investor to provide incentives for the entrepreneur to behave optimally second the investor can engage in information collection before deciding whether to invest in order to screen out ex ante unprofitable projects and bad entrepreneurs and third the investor can engage in information collection and monitoring once the project is under way despite the large volume of theory empirical work has lagged behind in comparing the contracts and actions of real world principals to their counterparts in financial contracting theory in this paper we describe recent empirical work and its relation to theory for one prominent class of such principals venture capitalists vc s in our view vc s are real world entities that closely approximate the investors of theory vc s invest in entrepreneurs who need financing to fund a promising project or company vc s have strong incentives to maximize value but at the same time receive few or no private benefits of control although they are intermediaries vc s typically receive at least 20 percent of the profits on their portfolios see paul gompers and josh lerner 1999 in addition to being interesting from a theoretical perspective vc actions and contracts of are interesting from a practical perspective vc s have been extremely successful in the last several years i they have been associated with a number of the prominent corporate successes like ariba cisco ebay and yahoo ii they have generated substantial returns and wealth for their investors and iii they have raised and invested record amounts of money

specification of spatial dynamic externalities and implications for strategic behavior in disease control we propose a novel distance and density dependent specification of externalities that captures spatial dynamics within and between neighboring land parcels we use this specification to model the short and long distance diffusion and control of an infectious disease in two privately owned and ecologically connected vineyards using computational experiments to generate individual and aggregate payoffs our results suggest that ignoring the within parcel spatial dynamics in the model may overestimate the social cost of an externality we find that increased resource value heterogeneity defined as the difference in grape prices received by the two vineyards has a detrimental impact on aggregate payoffs

push or pull performance pay incentives and information we study a principal agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input we show 1 performance pay may not be optimal even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input 2 total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable and 3 bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types we explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage r d activity but our results have applications beyond this context

an empirical analysis of sales force compensation plans among the array of direct and indirect methods of motivation and control available to the sales manager is sales force compensation in this article the authors summarize theoretical predictions from the economics marketing finance and accounting literatures on the structure of optimal sales force compensation plans guided by these insights they then construct empirical models to quantify the effect of various sales force factors firm and product factors and market factors on compensation using data from 286 firms in 39 industries the authors examine determinants of incentive components and total pay and the optimal horizon for incentive pay copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

payment systems and the structure of inequality conceptual issues and an analysis of salespersons in department stores output related payment systems such as commissions and piece rates are common in many jobs their central feature is that the wage of an employee is tied directly to her current performance focusing on salespersons in department stores the author considers wage differences under three payment systems a straight salary a straight commision and a salary plus commission four conceptions of wage inequalities under the three systems are contrasted a risk sharing a bargaining a sorting and a social status interpretation the empirical analyses compare the pay schemes and wages of approximately 63 000 salespersons in 178 department stores in 1981

explaining organizational diseconomies of scale in r d agency problems and the allocation of engineering talent ideas and effort by firm size the comparative efficiency and success of small firms in r d remains largely unexplained this paper empirically examines scale diseconomies in offering employment contracts as an explanation for diseconomies of scale in r d the paper argues that small firms more efficiently resolve the severe agency problems of hidden information and hidden behavior in r d small firms more efficiently offer contracts that reward performance than large firms and consequently small firms attract and retain engineers with higher ability and skill further small firms through these more performance contingent contracts induce higher levels of effort than large firms the study tests and generally confirms these hypotheses using data collected from 912 current and former engineering employees of two large high technology companies

salaries or piece rates on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops the objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes hourly vs piece rates is systematically related to the workers risk aversion and ability we derive the equilibrium relationship between agents risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives payment scheme in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched the equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice using confidential data from the national agricultural workers survey naws we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs crops they harvest based on workers risk aversion and no matching based on ability when controlling for matching we find strong evidence that high risk averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk averse workers choose piece rates we also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker jel j33 d82 q12

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

playing for keeps pay and performance in the nba i introduction a basic insight of agency theory is that properly designed incentive contracts can align the interests of agents with those of the principal and recent empirical work shows that workers do indeed respond to financial incentives 1 contractual incentives however are not the only force motivating workers workers also have incentives to vary effort at different points of their contract cycle to increase effort just before a new contract is signed to lock in a more lucrative deal and then reduce it after a multi year contract is secured these types of contract related incentives create clear moral hazard problems but have received little empirical attention the motivating hypothesis in this paper is that imperfect information and multi year contracts create an implicit incentive for workers to strategically alter effort over the contract cycle in the year prior to signing the contract their contract year workers may exert above average effort to convince employers that they are high quality and thus raise long term compensation once the contract is signed however workers may exert less effort because wages are effectively independent of contemporaneous performance an empirical difficulty is that this moral hazard may be obscured by two factors a selection effect may lead only high quality workers to receive contracts and career concerns may provide additional incentives and dampen the post contract decline 2 this paper employs a unique dataset for professional basketball players in the national basketball association nba from 1988 to 2002 to examine the contract related incentive effects the data include contract information year signed length of contract and value of contract for every active player in 2000 and performance measures points scored rebounds assists etc throughout each player s career contract related incentive effects are estimated from changes in individual performance over the contract cycle if performance systematically improves just before signing a new contract and falls afterward some of the fluctuation is likely due to contract related incentives i also examine the traditional link between pay and past performance which is necessary for these types of incentives to be relevant the critical advantage of this data is the detailed information on individual performance individual contract status and individual pay 3 in contrast previous work on individual incentives for example lazear 2000 paarsch and shearer 2000 and shearer 2004 studied changes infirmwide compensation plans while the empirical literature on executive pay and performance for example murphy 1985 1986 jensen and murphy 1990 gibbons and murphy 1992 kaplan 1994 and hall and liebman 1998 typically examined the link between individual pay and firm performance the individual level data constructed here have the critical variation across individuals which is needed to identify the impact of these contract related incentive effects the empirical work begins with a test of the link between pay and performance which is necessary for contract related incentives to be operational not surprisingly better performers in the nba are rewarded with higher salaries and longer contracts more relevant to the incentive issue players are strongly rewarded for improvements in performance in their contract year a one point increase in a player s scoring average for example is associated with an annual salary increase of over 300 000 this link provides the crucial motivation for the hypothesis that players will exert additional effort in their contract year to lock in the better contracts that they expect to follow the data then provide strong evidence of contract related incentive effects as overall performance does in fact improve relative to a player s long run average in the contract year and then declines after a long run contract is signed

the future of personnel economics personnel economics is defined as the application of microeconomic principles to human resources issues that are of concern to most businesses the field now about 20 years old arose for three reasons first those of us who were teaching standard labour economics to business students encountered a disinterested audience business students believe that labour supply and demand unemployment investment in education and other topics which are of primary concern to labour economists are almost irrelevant to their future business careers their boredom with what we had to sell signalled that a change in the product might be warranted second the issues studied by human resources specialists were of interest to economists but the approach taken by the non economist was unsatisfying it was loose unfocused and ad hoc and lacked the general rigorous framework to which economists have grown accustomed the economist s reaction was to enter an industry where it was believed rents existed third the technology of economics changed as a result of some breakthroughs particularly those dealing with agency and contract theory economists were better equipped to tackle problems that had evaded them in the past

on imperfect evaluation and earning differentials this paper investigates the relationship between the technology for evaluating performance and optimal contract choice specifically the paper examines the different compensation packages that arise when occupations differ in evaluation technology workers are risk averse work effort is endogenous and there exists asymmetric information in occupations in which it is less difficult to measure output it is shown that compensation is more closely tied to output the implications for work effort the sorting of workers by ability and average compensation are developed analysis of a new data set confirms our predictions concerning earning differentials and wage growth the powerful 1 6 million member national education association and other teacher organizations have traditionally fought the notion of rewarding better teachers with more money arguing that there is no objective way to measure a teacher s competence and that it would lead to favoritism and bad morale time june 20 1983

firms choice of method of pay using data from the bls industry wage survey the author tests the theory that firms choose their methods of pay by balancing the gains from more precise links between performance and pay against m

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

incentives for lawyers moving away from eat what you kill the authors study an international law firm that changed its compensation plan for team leaders to address a multitasking problem team leaders were focusing their effort on billable hours and not spending sufficient time on leadership activities to build the firm compensation was changed to provide greater incentives for the leadership activities and weaker incentives for billable hours the effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm s team leaders was large and robust team leaders increased their non billable hours and shifted billable hours to team members the firm s new compensation plan combining an objective formula with subjective evaluations is the fastest growing compensation system among law firms today

does job testing harm minority workers evidence from retail establishments because minorities typically fare poorly on standardized tests job testing is thought to pose an equality efficiency trade off testing improves selection but reduces minority hiring we develop a conceptual framework to assess when this trade off is likely to apply and evaluate the evidence for such a trade off using hiring and productivity data from a national retail firm whose 1 363 stores switched from informal to test based worker screening over the course of one year we document that testing yielded more productive hires at this firm raising mean and median tenure by 10 or more consistent with prior research minorities performed worse on the test yet testing had no measurable impact on minority hiring and productivity gains were uniformly large among minority and nonminority hires these results suggest that job testing raised the precision of screening without introducing additional negative information about minority applicants most plausibly because both the job test and the informal screen that preceded it were unbiased

dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting a comment abstract indjejikian and nanda j accounting and economics 27 1999 177 establish that lack of commitment results in an expected economic loss relative to a long term full commitment contract if there is inter period correlation of performance measures they attribute this loss to a ratchet effect we demonstrate the following first their proposed equilibrium is not sustained unless there is some form of limited commitment second these limited commitment assumptions need not induce a ratchet effect third the ratchet effect is neither necessary nor sufficient for an expected economic loss to occur the loss is due to the principal s inability to commit ex ante to the second period incentive rate

a discrete choice model with social interactions with an application to high school teen behavior we develop an empirical discrete choice interaction model with a finite number of agents we characterize its equilibrium properties in particular the correspondence between interaction strength number of agents and the set of equilibria and propose to estimate the model by means of simulation methods in an empirical application we analyze the individual behavior of high school teenagers in almost 500 school classes from 70 schools in our baseline model endogenous social interaction effects are strong for behavior closely related to school truancy somewhat weaker for behavior partly related to school smoking cell phone ownership and moped ownership and absent for behavior far away from school asking parents permission for purchases intra gender interactions are generally much stronger than cross gender interactions in a model with school specific fixed effects social interaction effects are insignificant with the exception of intra gender interactions for truancy copyright c 2007 john wiley sons ltd

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

performance pay and workplace injury panel evidence using panel survey data we show cross sectional evidence of an elevated risk of workplace injury for those paid piece rates and bonuses while consistent with adam smith s behavioural conjecture this could simply reflect sorting across workers or firms in response we successively control for a risk proxy for worker fixed effects and for worker with employer match fixed effects no previous examination has controlled for such fixed effects or examined us survey data the estimates indicate that injury risk increases substantially when blue collar manual workers become paid by piece rates and bonuses

introduction to the distribution of earnings and of individual output by a d roy this article summarises the lasting contribution of roy s 1950 fundamental paper roy a d 1950 the distribution of earnings and of individual output economic journal vol 60 239 pp 489 505

wage contracts when output grows stochastically the roles of mobility costs and capital market imperfections the paper considers an industry in which individual output follows a stochastic growth process with a cumulative effect it analyzes the roles of labor mobility and capital market conditions in the determination of wage contracts positive costs of mobility are shown to be necessary for the provision of wage and employment insurance when workers have no access to the capital market when insurance is provided wages grow less than average productivity if the capital market is perfect wage insurance will be provided even in the absence of costs of mobility in this case wages grow faster than average productivity

signaling in secret pay for performance and the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy although the vast majority of u s firms follow a policy of pay secrecy research provides a limited understanding of its overall utility to organizations building on signaling theory we develop

worker cooperation and the ratchet effect workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase output but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much money workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves we show that this outcome is inevitable in a competitive environment however there are noncompetitive situations where firms can use piece rates to get cooperation from their workers these predictions are consistent with case history evidence from the cotton spinning industry in england in the nineteenth century and the lincoln electric company in the united states even today

interdependence in worker productivity this paper investigates interactions between co worker productivity levels in a rich empirical context workers have unambiguous output measures compensation that depends on individual and group output to differing degrees and potential peers beyond their immediate work group important productivity interdependencies exist which could arise from the group based component of compensation peer pressure common supervisors or information exchanges but not group based output or technological interdependence workers with the strongest individual incentives seem least sensitive to these interactions in contrast they are important to workers with no individual incentives for these workers peer pressure must be a powerful influence copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

multiple output agency incentives in data production experimental evidence abstract this paper interprets the production of sample surveys as a multiple output agency problem in which interviewers act as agents for the principal investigator of the survey the central aspect of data production that gives rise to the agency problem is that sampling error cannot be separated out from interviewer performance we argue that contract effects on data production are important because the quality quantity incentives facing interviewers affect the survey in terms of its bias and its sample size direct evidence pertaining to these quality quantity tradeoffs in the production of attitudinal surveys is examined through consideration of an experiment in which piece rate and fixed wage contracts were randomly assigned across interviewers using these randomly assigned contracts we find that observable quality dimensions do not respond to quantity incentives but unobservable quality dimensions do respond weakly in a negative way

sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance an experimental investigation agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this proble

cleaning house the impact of information technology monitoring on employee theft and productivity this paper examines how firm investments in technology based employee monitoring impact both misconduct and productivity we use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology it product we use difference in differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of it monitoring on theft and productivity we find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover we examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result economic and cognitive multitasking fairness based motivation and perceived increases of general oversight the observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip based earnings of workers our results suggest that employee misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and employees this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management