a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

monetary non neutrality in the sidrauski model under uncertainty abstract introducing uncertainty in the reis s reis r 2007 the analytics of monetary non neutrality in the sidrauski model economics letters 94 1 129 135 version of the sidrauski model leads to a monetary policy that is not super neutral even though money and consumption are separable in the utility function this is because the real interest rate is affected by such a policy only in the case of an interest rate inelastic money demand does the super neutrality result survive

when not all conflict is bad manufacturing marketing conflict and strategic incentive design researchers and managers broadly agree that coordination and harmony between manufacturing and marketing improve firm performance by eliminating suboptimal practices within the firm in this paper we present a contrasting view of the manufacturing marketing interface we model a duopoly in which the firms compete on price and quality dimensions the manufacturing and marketing managers within each firm are presented with conflicting incentives focused on cost minimization and revenue maximization respectively these managers bargain with each other before arriving at compromise decisions regarding price and quality while frequently encountered in practice this conflicting objectives puzzle is surprising because one expects that centralized coordination by the owners of the firm towards profit maximization would lead to higher profits in this paper we resolve the conflicting objectives puzzle and demonstrate that surprisingly the firm s resulting profits in this setting of conflict can be higher than those obtained when the decisions of the managers are perfectly coordinated we also analyze the equilibrium in incentive plans when the owners can choose between compromise and perfect coordination our results offer a new interpretation of manufacturing marketing conflict as a strategic tool that can enhance firm profits

technical note delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce in this paper we use an agency theory framework to address the issue of delegating pricing responsibility to the salesperson in this analysis it is shown that delegating the pricing responsibility to the salesperson is as profitable as centralization when the salesperson and the sales manager have identical information about the selling environment but delegation may be more profitable when the saleperson s information is superior to that of the sales manager s it is also argued that this characteristic is typical of market conditions where we observe delegation of such responsibility in cases identified by weinberg weinberg c b 1975 an optimal commission plan for salesman s control over price management sci 21 8 april 937 943 and stephenson cron and frazier stephenson p r w l cron g frazier 1979 delegating pricing authority to the salesforce the effects on sales and profit performance j marketing43 april 21 28

delegating pricing decisions in competitive markets with symmetric and asymmetric information delegating pricing decisions to the salesforce has been a salient issue for marketing academics and practitioners we examine this issue in a competitive market using standard agency theory with symmetric and asymmetric information under symmetric information we find that the optimal contracts have a nice property that allows managers to reach the upper bound on firms profit by using either centralized or delegated pricing and hence there are no incentive based reasons to prefer centralized versus delegated contract types thus managers can focus on the design of the optimal incentive scheme without worrying about the contract type under asymmetric information we find that there always exists an equilibrium where all firms use centralized pricing that is either unique or payoff equivalent to equilibria that have a combination of contract types these results are robust to a large class of agent and market parameters however if restrictions are exogenously imposed on contract form or observability the above results are no longer true as in earlier work we demonstrate our results by providing explicit solutions under the holmstrom and milgrom 1987 framework

why do salespeople spend so much time lobbying for low prices in business to business settings a company s sales force often spends considerable time lobbying internally for authorization to charge lower prices these internal lobbying activities are time consuming and divert attention from other tasks such as interacting with customers we explain why internal lobbying activities serve an important role they help the firm elicit truthful reporting of demand information from the sales force as a result it may be profitable for the firm to require lobbying and make the requirement onerous even though lobbying is a nonproductive activity that creates an additional administrative burden and imposes a deadweight loss

centralized pricing versus delegating pricing to the salesforce under information asymmetry the issue of delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce is of interest to marketing academics and practitioners it has been shown by lal 1986 that under certain situations with information asymmetry it is more profitable for the firm to delegate pricing authority to the salesforce than to have centralized pricing in this paper we re examine situations where information asymmetry exists and analyze its effect on the decision of the firm to set a price or delegate pricing responsibility to the salesforce using contract theory we find that when the salesperson s private information can be revealed to the firm through contracting centralized pricing performs at least as well as price delegation we derive the optimal centralized pricing contract under a set of standard assumptions used in the economics and business literature

rational inattention optimal consideration sets and stochastic choice we unite two basic approaches to modelling limited attention in choice by showing that the rational inattention model implies the formation of consideration sets only a subset of the available alternatives will be considered for choice we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for rationally inattentive behaviour which allow the identification of consideration sets in simple settings chosen options are those that are best on a stand alone basis in richer settings the consideration set can only be identified holistically in addition to payoffs prior beliefs impact consideration sets linear inequalities identify all priors consistent with each possible consideration set

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

tying the manager s hands constraining opportunistic managerial intervention we discuss and examine empirically a firm level equivalent of the ancient problem of tying the king s hands namely how to avoid managerial intervention that is undertaken to reap private benefits but is harmful to overall value creation that is managerial opportunism the link from managerial intervention to firm level value creation is moderated by employee motivation thus intervention in the form of managers overruling employees or reneging on delegation may demotivate employees particularly when the intervention is perceived as being unfair undertaken for personal gain etc we argue that a number of mechanisms such as managers staking their personal reputation employees controlling important assets strong trade unions etc may function as constraints on managerial proclivities to intervene thus reducing the problem of managerial opportunism we derive four hypotheses from these ideas and test them using path analysis on a rich dataset based on 329 firms in the spanish food and electric electronic industries

new products quality changes and welfare measures computed from estimated demand systems this paper examines the construction of a price index based on an estimated demand system in principle the method examined can produce a price index that takes account of the introduction of new p

does hospital competition harm equity evidence from the english national health service increasing evidence shows that hospital competition under fixed prices can improve quality and reduce cost concerns remain however that competition may undermine socio economic equity in the utilisation of care we test this hypothesis in the context of the pro competition reforms of the english national health service progressively introduced from 2004 to 2006 we use a panel of 32 482 english small areas followed from 2003 to 2008 and a difference in differences approach the effect of competition on equity is identified by the interaction between market structure small area income deprivation and year we find a negative association between market competition and elective admissions in deprived areas the effect of pro competition reform was to reduce this negative association slightly suggesting that competition did not undermine equity

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

competition among hospitals we examine competition in the hospital industry in particular the effect of ownership type for profit not for profit government we estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in california then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger california hospitals in 1995 face an average price elasticity of demand of 4 85 not for profit hospitals face less elastic demand and act as if they have lower marginal costs their prices are lower than those of for profits but markups are higher we simulate the effects of the 1997 merger of two hospital chains in san luis obispo county where the merger creates a near monopoly prices rise by up to 53 and the predicted price increase would not be substantially smaller were the chains not for profit

contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models abstract settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory i e where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes if contracts have no memory a repeated agency game can be played myopically there are no gains to long term relationships conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented in an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract in a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome domain additivity implies no memory

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations in this paper we examine the problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in determining his optimal job assignment but which might also adversely affect his market value we show that spot contracts are optimal and generate the first best effort level when the manager is risk neutral when the manager is risk averse the optimal contact consists either of a partial insurance contract against downward revisions in compensation or a competitive spot contract depending upon the nature of prior information

limited information and advertising in the u s personal computer industry traditional discrete choice models assume buyers are aware of all products for sale in markets where products change rapidly the full information assumption is untenable i present a discrete choice model of limited consumer information where advertising influences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase i apply the model to the u s personal computer market where top firms spend over 2 billion annually on advertising i find estimated markups of 19 over production costs where top firms advertise more than average and earn higher than average markups high markups are explained to a large extent by informational asymmetries across consumers where full information models predict markups of one fourth the magnitude i find that estimated product demand curves are biased toward being too elastic under traditional models i show how to use data on media exposure to improve estimated price elasticities in the absence of micro ad data

the industrial organization of health care markets the u s health care sector is large and growing health care spending in 2011 amounted to 2 7 trillion and 18 percent of gdp approximately half of health care output is allocated via markets in this paper we analyze the industrial organization literature on health care markets focusing on the impact of competition on price quality and treatment decisions for health care providers and health insurers we conclude with a discussion of research opportunities for industrial organization economists including opportunities created by the u s patient protection and affordable care act

mergers when prices are negotiated evidence from the hospital industry in recent years many hospitals have merged in part to gain bargaining leverage with managed care organizations mcos we investigate the price impact of hospital mergers by formulating and estimating an equilibrium bargaining model between hospital systems and managed care health insurers over prices for inpatient services we estimate the parameters of the model using claims and discharge data from northern virginia in 2006 inova health system proposed to acquire prince william hospital we nd that this merger would have raised prices signicantly and that the remedy of separate bargaining imposed by the ftc in a separate hospital case would have resulted in a larger price increase

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration a simple model abstract this paper investigates the effect of reputation in a model where two parties make noncontractable contributions to an economic undertaking it is shown that the optimal allocation of ownership between the parties is more similar in a repeated than in a one shot version of the model this implies that unified ownership and reputation are substitutes low discount rates and repeated investment decisions thus favor subcontracting and joint venture arrangements of the type commonly observed in japanese industry while full integration is more likely to be optimal when reputational forces are weak

relationship organization and price delegation an experimental study price delegation to the salesforce is a practice widely adopted by firms this paper examines the relationship between price delegation and managerial profits using a laboratory economics experiment a novel feature of our experiment is that we study how varying the relationship organization of the sales manager and salesperson to allow for 1 requests by the salesperson for the manager to choose price delegation and for 2 the manager to award a small bonus after observing the salesperson s decisions can affect behavior the results show that contrary to the theoretical prediction managers choose price delegation frequently and salespeople respond reciprocally leading to higher manager profits under price delegation moreover this behavior increases when requests and bonuses are allowed we show that a behavioral economics model that incorporates positive reciprocity can explain these results well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1778 this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care market summary managed care health insurers in the usa restrict their enrollees choice of hospitals to within specific networks this paper considers the implications of these restrictions a three step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer the results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans a welfare analysis assuming fixed prices implies that restricting consumers choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately 1 billion per year across the 43 us markets considered this figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

socioeconomic inequality of access to healthcare does choice explain the gradient equity of access is a key policy objective in publicly funded healthcare systems however observed inequalities of access by socioeconomic status may result from differences in patients choices using data on non emergency coronary revascularisation procedures in the english national health service we found substantive differences in waiting times within public hospitals between patients with different socioeconomic status up to 35 difference or 43 days between the most and least deprived population quintile groups using selection models with differential distances as identification variables we estimated that only up to 12 of these waiting time inequalities can be attributed to patients choices of hospital and type of treatment heart bypass versus stent residual inequality after allowing for choice was economically significant patients in the least deprived quintile group benefited from shorter waiting times and the associated health benefits were worth up to 850 per person

incentives and targets in hospital care evidence from a natural experiment performance targets are commonly used in the public sector despite their well known problems when organisations have multiple objectives and performance is difficult to measure it is possible that such targets may work where there is considerable consensus that performance needs to be improved we investigate this possibility by examining the response of the english national health service to high profile waiting time targets we exploit a natural policy experiment between two countries of the uk england and scotland to establish the global effectiveness of the targets we then use a within england hospital analysis to confirm that responses vary by treatment intensity and to control for differences in resources which may accompany targets we find that targets met their goals of reducing waiting times without diverting activity from other less well monitored aspects of health care and without decreasing patient health on exit from hospital

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

assessing competition in hospital care markets the importance of accounting for quality differentiation quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry where the choices of medicare patients are unaffected by prices unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market i estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial the estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness

market information and firm performance the value of new information depends on how accurate the information is but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in we develop a game theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information information is more valuable for larger firms we find that except under some conditions more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a stackelberg mode of conduct than in a bertrand nash mode

competition in public service provision the role of not for profit providers abstract with public services such as health and education it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision many such services are provided by monopoly not for profit providers and there is concern that for profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality this paper explores the implications of entry by for profit providers when there is unobserved quality the model generates three key policy relevant insights first by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms it frames the relevant trade offs precisely second it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not for profit as an active provider third it characterizes the optimal payment or voucher value to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

does empowerment lead to higher quality and profitability abstract this paper examines the implications of alternative empowerment regimes on a firm s product quality and profitability when ownership and management of the firm are separated and it faces environmental uncertainties the analyses of a three stage game highlight the circumstances under which empowering a manager to make quality investment decisions results in higher profitability and or product quality when delegation reduces a manager s disutility either monitored or complete empowerment arise as the preferred management system if delegation increases the manager s disutility of effort and uncertainties about consumers preferences are small forcing may become the preferred management system

does hospital competition save lives evidence from the english nhs patient choice reforms recent substantive reforms to the english national health service expanded patient choice and encouraged hospitals to compete within a market with fixed prices this study investigates whether these reforms led to improvements in hospital quality we use a difference in difference style estimator to test whether hospital quality measured using mortality from acute myocardial infarction improved more quickly in more competitive markets after these reforms came into force in 2006 we find that after the reforms were implemented mortality fell i e quality improved for patients living in more competitive markets our results suggest that hospital competition can lead to improvements in hospital quality

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

is hospital competition socially wasteful we study the consequences of hospital competition for medicare beneficiaries heart attack care from 1985 to 1994 we examine how relatively exogenous determinants of hospital choice such as travel distances influence the competitiveness of hospital markets and how hospital competition interacts with the influence of managed care organizations to affect the key determinants of social welfare expenditures on treatment and patient health outcomes in the 1980s the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous but in the 1990s competition unambiguously improves social welfare increasing hmo enrollment over the sample period partially explains the dramatic change in the impact of hospital competition

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

price delegation and salesforce contract design with asymmetric risk aversion coefficient of sales agents abstract an important issue that has attracted the interest of academics and practitioners in both marketing and operations is should pricing decisions be made by the firm or delegated to the salesforce this problem has been addressed in the research literature based on the assumption that the exact risk aversion coefficients of the sales agents are known to the firm which may not be true in most applications in this paper we study this problem but assuming that the risk aversion coefficients of agents are private information of the sales agents for both centralized pricing and delegated pricing settings the optimal compensation and pricing contracts are designed and the sensitivity analyses are conducted an interesting finding is that the risk aversion and effort valuation have substitutable impacts on the pricing policy preference of the firm and the agents either strong risk aversion or high effort valuation can drive the firm and the agents to favor centralized pricing over delegated pricing

inflation investment and growth a money and banking approach output growth investment and the real interest rate in long run evidence tend to be negatively affected by inflation theoretically inflation acts as a human capital tax that decreases output growth and the real interest rate but increases the investment rate opposing evidence this paper resolves this puzzle by requiring exchange for investment as well as consumption inflation then decreases the investment rate and still decreases both output growth and real interest up to some moderately high rate of inflation above which increasingly low investment finally causes capital to fall relative to labour and the real interest rate to rise

insurer provider networks in the medical care market i use data on the hospital networks offered by managed care health insurers to estimate the expected division of profits between insurers and providers i include a simple profit maximization framework and an additional effect hospitals that can secure demand without contracting with all insurers e g those most attractive to consumers and those that are capacity constrained may demand high prices that some insurers refuse to pay hospital mergers may also affect price bargaining i estimate that all three types of hospitals capture higher markups than other providers these results provide information on the hospital investment incentives generated by bargaining

internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly abstract we demonstrate that the benefit that an oligopolistic firm derives from departmentalization managerial specialization depends upon the internal organization of the rival firm as a result even if both firms are assumed a priori identical they need not select an identical form of internal organization since the benefit from departmentalization exhibits increasing returns to scale a duopolist derives more restricted benefits from departmentalizing compared with a monopolist the implications of increased competition or the form of internal organization upon the compensation of managers depends upon the degree of correlation between the uncertain demands that face competing firms

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

salesforce incentives market information and production inventory planning salespeople are the eyes and ears of the firms they serve they possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of decisions a key question is how a firm can provide incentives to its salesforce so that it is in their interest to truthfully disclose their information about the market and to work hard many people have considered this question and provided solutions perhaps the most well known solution is due to gonik 1978 who proposed and implemented a clever scheme designed to elicit market information and encourage hard work the purpose of this paper is to study gonik s scheme and compare it with a menu of linear contracts a solution often used in the agency literature in a model where the market information possessed by the salesforce is important for the firm s production and inventory planning decisions

gmm estimation of a money in the utility function model the implications of functional forms this paper studies consumer demand for real balances by allowing money to enter directly into an aggregate utility function as an asset that provides liquidity services the essay extends existing literature by investigating a money in the utility function model under a variety of specifications of the representative agent s objective function the empirical analysis employs the generalized method of moments technique to estimate the coefficients of the euler equations derived from the structural model the parameter estimates are compared across specifications of the utility function and across data sets the results provide some support for the view that the liquidity services provided by real balances contribute to utility

the effectiveness of field price discretion empirical evidence from auto lending in many markets it is common for headquarters to create a price list but grant local salespeople discretion to negotiate prices for individual transactions how much if any pricing discretion headquarters should grant is a topic of debate within many firms we investigate this issue using a unique data set from an indirect lender with local pricing discretion we estimate that the local sales force adjusted prices in a way that improved profits by approximately 11 on average a counterfactual analysis shows that using a centralized data driven pricing optimization system could improve profits even further up to 20 over those actually realized this suggests that centralized pricing if appropriately optimized can be more effective than field price discretion we discuss the implications of these findings for auto lending and other industries with similar pricing processes this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

free to choose reform choice and consideration sets in the english national health service choice in public services is controversial we exploit a reform in the english national health service to assess the effect of removing constraints on patient choice we estimate a demand model that explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on patients we find that post removal patients became more responsive to clinical quality this led to a modest reduction in mortality and a substantial increase in patient welfare the elasticity of demand faced by hospitals increased substantially post reform and we find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by improving quality this suggests greater choice can raise quality

parallelism in information production moral hazard and relative performance evaluations we analyse how to design incentive schemes for agents producing information the agents may for example be divisional managers market researchers or consultants financial analysts corporate auditors research scientists or political pollsters we show that an agent should be compensated more for making a correct rather than an incorrect prediction and for agreeing rather than disagreeing with colleagues depending on the environment correctness should be compensated more or less than agreement also compensation should increase with the difficulties of making correct or conforming predictions one consequence of the result is that it may sometimes reduce a principal s total incentive costs to engage with more information producers performing parallel investigations because the possibility to make relative performance evaluations of the agents may substantially reduce the costs of motivating the agents in performing their duties as desired

the analytics of monetary non neutrality in the sidrauski model abstract this note analytically characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of the sidrauski model and reaches three conclusions regarding monetary policy i it is typically not neutral ii in some cases it is not neutral even in the steady state and iii a policy that has the nominal interest rate falling over time may sustain higher output and consumption forever

borrowing from pui to pay pom multiple borrowing and over indebtedness in rural thailand summary rural financial markets have grown rapidly in asian emerging market economies thus contributing to economic development and the reduction of poverty at the same time however the level of indebtedness of rural households has increased making households more vulnerable to shocks one of the reasons for rising household debt is the ease of borrowing simultaneously from a growing number of lending institutions this paper addresses two major questions first does borrowing from multiple sources increase rural households risk of over indebtedness second do over indebted rural households refinance their outstanding loans through multiple borrowing running the risk of becoming trapped in a debt cycle employing a dynamic random effects bivariate probit model for a unique set of longitudinal household panel data from northeast thailand this study examines the bidirectional relationship between over indebtedness and multiple borrowing to determine to what extent rural households become trapped in debt cycles on the one hand the results indicate that households in northeast thailand take on multiple loans which further increases their risk of becoming over indebted on the other hand our model results do not confirm the widespread notion that over indebted rural households use multiple loans to refinance unpayable debts

price uncertainty and consumer search a structural model of consideration set formation we offer an econometric framework that models consumer s consideration set formation as an outcome of her costly information search behavior because frequently purchased products are characterized by frequent price promotions of varying depths of discounts a consumer faces significant uncertainty about the prices of the brands the consumers engage in a fixed sample search strategy that results in their discovering the posted prices of a subset of the available brands this subset is referred to as the consumer s consideration set the proposed model is estimated using the scanner data set for liquid detergents our key empirical results are i consumers zincur significant search costs to discover the posted prices of the brands ii whereas in store displays and feature ads do not influence consumers quality perceptions of the brands they significantly reduce search costs for observing the prices of the brands iii per capita income of consumer s household significantly increases her search costs and iv the consumers price sensitivity is seriously underestimated if we were to assume that consumers get to know all the posted prices at zero cost the proposed model is also estimated for the ketchup category to enable us to do cross category comparisons of consumers price search behavior

setting the right incentives for global planning and operations we study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing and local demand management the stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units and the firm relies on the business units forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations we propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer an appealing refinement of nash equilibrium moreover these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions after analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand

the role of search frictions in the long run relationships between inflation unemployment and capital abstract this paper explores the long run relationships between inflation unemployment and capital accumulation by proposing a model with search frictions in both goods and labor markets this framework allows us to identify a negative extensive margin effect of inflation on the number of firms demanding capital and a positive intensive margin effect of inflation on the capital demanded per firm the two effects together generate a hump shaped relationship between long run inflation and aggregate capital these results are consistent with our empirical evidence from a cross section of 76 countries which suggests a non monotonic relationship between inflation and investment to gdp ratio in the long run our calibrated results are also consistent with empirical findings from the u s data on the effect of inflation on capital stock unemployment and the real interest rates

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

on the relation between conservatism in accounting standards and incentives for earnings management this paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation we show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm s expected future payoff and the stewardship role in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk averse manager current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management such manipulation reduces accounting numbers stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing we then show that risk sharing and hence contract efficiency can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where absent earnings management accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias compared with under an unbiased standard where absent earnings management accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

limited choice sets local price response and implied measures of price competition it is becoming increasingly evident that a consumer s brand choice decision in low involvement categories does not involve full search evaluation and comparison of price information of all brands available at point of purchase global price response the authors propose a two stage choice process in which the consumer first identifies a subset of brands within the universal set of brands called the choice set and then evaluates only those brands that are in the choice set relative to one another to select a single brand the authors find that consistent with reports of the extent of external price search of consumers response to shelf price variations is limited to the brands in the choice set local price response their results indicate that employing the assumption of global price response may lead to biased estimates of price elasticity and derived measures of clout and vulnerability to enable a managerially meaningful and useful assessment of a brand s competitive clout and vulnerability the