openness central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio traditional explanations of the negative correlation between openness and inflation presume that an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio reduces the inflation bias of descretionary monetary policy temple 2002 concludes however that such a relationship fails to emerge in cross country data our analysis of the same cross country data considered by temple indicates that once the degree of central bank independence and its interaction with greater openness and the sacrifice ratio in addition increased openness lessens the positive effect of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio

postwar developments in business cycle theory a moderately classical perspective for issues regarding business cycles the phillips curve or aggregate supply portion of a macroeconomic model s specification is crucial unfortunately the relevant dynamic behavior is poorly understood flexible price models appear inconsistent with the data while existing sticky price models are unlikely to be policy invariant nevertheless current knowledge is adequate to design a rule for monetary policy that would if maintained result in near zero inflation and output fluctuations that are small by historical standards an operational rule of this type is described and some indication of its effectiveness is reported copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

explaining peak inflation rates prior to disinflationary policy adjustments or what got us into this mess this study investigates using annual data from 1974 2004 whether unionization rates trade openness and central bank independence can help explain cross national and inter temporal variations in level of peak inflation prior to a disinflationary policy adjustment i find that unionization is positively associated with both peak inflation rates whereas more independent central banks and trade openness are correlated with lower inflation levels these results are robust to controlling for the high inflation decade of the 1970s and to using average rather than peak inflation as the explanatory variable

the institutional foundations of monetary commitment a comparative analysis abstract this paper adopts an institutional perspective on the problem of designing governance structures for restraining monetary policy this perspective broadens the standard literature on central bank independence in several dimensions first although it recognizes that an independent central bank is one important institutional arrangement it also considers a much broader variety of institutional arrangements that have been used historically and today to restrain monetary policy second it considers not only the formal or legal institutional arrangements governing monetary policy but also the broader environment or institutional endowment in which those formal arrangements are embedded third this paper is concerned with the problem of enforcement given the institutional endowment in which formal monetary rules are implemented how likely are they to stick broadening the perspective in these ways frames the issue as a matching problem when it is recognized both that countries differ in the nature of their institutional endowments and that there is an array of possible formal arrangements that can be adopted to govern monetary policy the question then becomes how best to align the formal arrangements with the endowment in which they will be embedded case studies of diverse monetary policy making institutions in cote d ivoire argentina thailand and new zealand are used to motivate and illustrate the analysis

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

the future impact of trans pacific partnership s rule making achievements the case study of e commerce while policymakers and scholars often emphasise the significance of the rule making aspect when they discuss the benefits of negotiating free trade agreements ftas we know little about the ways in which rules are actually made we need impartial assessment of the status of rule making to draw any concrete policy implications moreover how international economic rules develop in terms of enforceability has been a neglected but important research question for students of international economics and laws international economic rules evolve through a series of ftas that are signed by a different set of countries by using the case study of e commerce chapters this paper will specifically examine 1 how earlier ftas paved the way to the trans pacific partnership tpp e commerce negotiations 2 whether rule making achievements of tpp are substantial compared against earlier ftas and 3 whether rule making achievements of tpp if any are likely to have some impact on post tpp ftas

the causes of unemployment in france a flow approach a flow model is used to identify the causes for rising unemployment in france between 1978 and 1990 two flow equations are estimated as functions of exogenous factors such as aggregate demand factor costs structural shifts and long term factors and then used in simulations for the level of unemployment it is shown that the main reason for high unemployment in france is a slow down in the demand for labour due to high labour and energy costs in the early 1980s and to tight aggregate demand over the whole period change in the labour supply have had an increasing impact in recent years

openness exchange rate regimes and the phillips curve abstract recent research suggests that the phillips curve slope measured using sacrifice ratios from the period 1961 88 is positively related to trade openness contradicting the romer 1993 openness and inflation theory and evidence quarterly journal of economics 108 869 903 hypothesis that disinflations are less costly in open economies in this paper i consider sacrifice ratios and output inflation trade offs from 1981 98 and allow their dependence on openness to vary with the exchange rate regime sacrifice ratios are weakly negatively related to openness but the strength of the relationship does not increase with exchange rate flexibility output inflation trade offs are negatively related to openness and the strength of the relationship increases with exchange rate flexibility

fiscal policy and the current account deficits and trade jose vinals does the balance of payments act as an external constraint on the design of domestic economic policy in practice most governments believe it does yet popular discussion is sometimes confused this paper begins by evaluating the nature of the external constraint and the extent to which it can adequately be measured by the current account of the balance of payments it is often argued that a fiscal expansion will increase employment it is also widely held that a fiscal expansion necessarily leads to a deterioration of the current account while these propositions may hold in specific circumstances neither is generally true the theoretical basis of the two propositions is examined and compared with recent international experience when important changes in fiscal stance occurred the popular presumptions are confirmed by recent experience in the us the uk and germany but france is a counterexample to the first and spain to the second the important policy implication is that one can identify both in theory and in practice clear circumstances in which expansionary fiscal policy is appropriate and will not be thwarted by external considerations

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

sectoral variability and the foundations of optimal inflation rate abstractthe recent monetary search models argue that the real effects of inflation on economic activity can be gauged through relative price variability rpv our study uses a large panel data of

proliferating regional trade arrangements why and whither this paper investigates why regional trade arrangements rtas are proliferating extensively and how the effects of multiple rtas by interacting with each other evolve over time our empirical analysis based on an extended gravity model utilising a large panel dataset of 175 countries from 1948 to 1999 shows that rtas on average increase global trade by raising intra bloc trade without damaging extra bloc trade the net trade effects however heavily depend on the types of rta strategic evolution over time which we categorise as expansionary rtas duplicate rtas or overlapping rtas we find that countries excluded from an rta can benefit more from duplicating a separate rta than from joining an existing rta this result explains why the number of bilateral trade blocs rather than the membership size of existing rtas is currently exploding we also find that the net trade creating effects of rtas are substantially lower for countries participating in overlapping rtas this result suggests that it is less likely that the currently proliferating rtas will completely merge and lead the world economy to global free trade our empirical results are robust to controlling for the characteristics of countries that may influence the impact of rtas

openness inflation and the phillips curve a puzzle models of open economies with nominal rigidities are often thought to predict a correlation between openness to trade and the slope of the output inflation trade off or phillips curve using a variety of measures of the trade off and a standard measure of openness this paper argues that the direct evidence for a correlation is not strong in turn this calls into question the usual explanation for the negative correlation between openness and inflation that was documented by romer 1993 the paper considers some alternative explanations for the romer evidence

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

italy the real effects of inflation and disinflation over the past 15 years the italian economy has experienced rather uncommon developments by comparison with the rest of europe these developments have been described alternatively in terms of near collapses miracles or impending bankruptcy such dramatic characterizations are of little help in understanding what happened yet they somehow reflect a history of large and often unexpected changes and a sequence of policy turn arounds from a distance the italian experience still raises some issues of general interest regarding the means and the timing of an adjustment process in italy return to profitability was pursued before macroeconomic stabilization instead of resulting from it as happened elsewhere it is indeed our contention that this evolution is sometimes commendable adjustment in italy was quicker and less costly in terms of output investment and employment

distribution aggregate demand and unemployment in oecd countries the primary aim of this paper is to investigate the role of income distribution in the determination of unemployment to this end the author develops a post keynesian model that shows that unemployment is effectively determined by income distribution aggregate demand and the inadequacy of capital equipment the deriv ed unemployment equation is applied to ten large industrial countries o ver the period 1976 89 the empirical findings provide strong support fo r the hypothesis that shifts in income distribution and inadequacy of capital equipment are major sources of unemployment copyright 1993 by royal economic society

political business cycles and central bank independence this paper develops a dynamic model of rational partisan business cycles in which wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the election result empirical analysis of 20 oecd countries supports the theoretical implication that left wing incumbents increase output but increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it the model is extended to incorporate the effects of alternative measures of central bank independence cbi the measure of objective independence outperforms the other measures and it is found that cbi reduces politically induced business cycles

theoretical developments in the light of macroeconomic policy and empirical research macroeconomics is surveyed with emphasis on the implications of the new classical and rational expectations critiques for the keynesian paradigm and the role of macro policies at the background are the main macro developments of the 1 970s and 1 980s as well as the specific lessons of recent high chronic inflation processes a synthesis is emerging in which the basic keynesian view of the existence of market and price coordination failures as well as room for pareto improving policy intervention are maintained at the same time the theoretical underpinnings are undergoing substantial change mainly due to a rational expectations reformulation

profit sharing wage bargaining and unemployment bertil holmlund the paper examines the effects of profit sharing in an economy with decentralized wage bargaining profit sharing makes workers income more sensitive to wage changes and this leads to wage moderation but economy wide profit sharing may also improve workers outside income opportunities and this strengthens the union s hand in bargaining and tend to raise wages it turns out that equilibrium unemployment is reduced by profit sharing as long as the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is less than one whereas unemployment is increased if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one i introduction martin weitzman s book the share economy 1984 proposes fundamental changes in labor compensation systems the basic idea is that the traditional fixed wage remuneration should be replaced by a scheme with a fixed base wage plus a share of profits or revenues hiring decisions are assumed to rest with the employers who will expand employment until workers marginal product equals the pre determined base wage the latter is taken to be lower in the profit sharing economy than the wage level in the corresponding wage economy the lack of widespread use of profit sharing arrangements is attributed to externalities and weitzman therefore argues in favor of tax incentives to promote the sharing system does profit sharing actually lead to wage moderation this paper examines this issue within a simple model where wages are set through negotiations between unions and firms profit sharing creates a direct link between the performance of the firm and workers income and this involves incentives to settle for lower wages and higher employment an economy wide profit sharing system will however also affect workers income opportunities outside their current firm this will strengthen the union s hand in bargaining by raising its threat point i e the expected income available to workers if an agreement is not reached in the wage negotiations it turns out that the general equilibrium effect of economy wide profit sharing is crucially dependent on the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital profit sharing leads to wage moderation thereby reducing unemployment when the elasticity of substitution is less than one but increases unemployment when the elasticity of substitution is greater than one the next section of the paper outlines the bargaining model that is used in the analysis sections 3 and 4 examine profit sharing and section 5 concludes the paper ii bargaining in a wage economy imagine an economy with a perfectly competitive output market with output prices normalized to unity suppose that wage negotiations take place at the level of the firm and that the employer determines the employment level after the wage negotiations have been settled to characterize the bargaining outcome we invoke the widely used right to manage framework of nickell and andrews 1983 in this model there is bargaining over the wage in contrast to a monopoly union model in which the union simply calls out its desired wage to which firms passively respond by adjusting employment to the profit maximizing level the negotiated wage is assumed to be given by a nash bargain between the local union and the firm and the bargain pertaining to firm union pair i maximizes the product substitute mathematical expression omited 1 where lambdal sub i is workers utility from agreement and lambdal sub 0 is the union s threat point i e the utility available in case of disagreement pi sub i is the firm s profits when there is an agreement and pi sub i is the fall back level of profits the degree of union power is captured by beta if beta is equal to one we have the monopoly union case where the union simply chooses its desired point on the labor demand curve each union is assumed to care about the expected income of its members

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

inflation targeting matters evidence from oecd economies sacrifice ratios using data from oecd economies we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters we also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely applying heckman s procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations

determinants of price adjustment this paper reports results of an empirical study investigating the adjustment speed of prices to change in costs and demand particular emphasis is laid on the impact of concentration on the adjustment speed in addition the effects of the business cycle and capital intensity are considered it shows that concentrated industries tend to adjust prices faster while capital intensity has a negative impact prices are more flexible during an upswing than in times of a recession

aggregate supply and demand factors in oecd unemployment an update unemployment in the oecd countries has continued to rise to unprecedented levels the eec countries which on average ended the turbulent 1970s with an unemployment rate of close to 7 per cent are now in the mid 1980s approaching an 11 per cent level the united states is virtually the only country for which the changes in unemployment during the 1970s have not been systematically upward and for which the 1984 rate was more or less back to where it had been both ten years and five years earlier see figure 1 the reasons for the sustained increase in unemployment during the 1970s as well as the possible reasons for differences in patterns across industrial countries have been studied but question marks undoubtedly remain our own emphasis in an earlier study has been on the combination of the great supply shocks of the previous decade and the contractionary macro policy response of most oecd countries to these shocks as well as on the more recent policy coordination problem between the united states and europe with a few more years that have elapsed and quite a few percentage points of additional unemployment there is obviously room for both an update and a reappraisal starting from a fairly conventional aggregate supply as and aggregate demand ad macro framework an increase in unemployment may come

wage setting and unemployment persistence in europe japan and the usa the persistence of high unemployment in the main european economies is one of the most puzzling economic developments of the past fifteen years average japanese unemployment has risen slightly since the mid seventies whereas unemployment in the united states still exhibits cyclical fluctuations around a gently rising level in marked contrast average unemployment in france germany and the united kingdom rose to a higher plateau during the latter part of the seventies shot up again in the early eighties and has remained persistently high identification of the causes of such unemployment persistence is crucial before one makes policy recommendations three possible causes spring to mind first persistence in the determinants of equilibrium and disequilibrium unemployment second excessive power of insiders in wage setting combined with high correlation between employment status and insider status and finally a high degree of state dependence sluggishness in labour demand although in general one expects all three causes to have played a role in the persistence of high european unemployment there is still a need to identify their relative importance the first set of factors has been assessed empirically in recent papers by among others sachs 1983 bruno and sachs 19x5 bruno 1986 layard and nickel1 1985 bean layard and nickel1 1986 newell and symons 1985 and others many of these papers have also allowed for sluggishness in labour demand although they did not particularly focus on it the second set of factors has been investigated by blanchard and summers 1986 who concluded that there is evidence of much higher correlation between employment status and insider status in the three largest european economies than in the united states

governance structures and the durability of economic reforms evidence from inflation stabilizations abstract this paper investigates the relationship between a country s political economic and institutional environment and its ability to implement sustainable economic reform programs the policy issue on which the study focuses is inflation stabilization it consists principally of econometric estimations of the relationship between the success of stabilizations in a large sample of countries and several political and economic explanatory variables the hypotheses tested are drawn both from the recent macroeconomic literature on policy credibility and from political science the major findings include the following 1 a despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary political repression does not appear to be an effective means for implementing sustainable stabilization policies durable economic reforms and political freedoms appear to be complementary 2 b as has been previously argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically political instability is detrimental to policy reform 3 c the political will and popular consensus for stabilization policies are enhanced during a severe economic crisis 4 d there is weak evidence that intervention by the international monetary fund rather than supporting reform programs can undermine their credibility

a bayesian perspective on inference from macroeconomic data bayesian methods are logical admissible linguistically natural helpeful conceptually simple and honest but they are also preposterous and very labor intensive generalized bayesian methods allow data to be confusing and inconclusive a bayesian viewpoint allows one to get a handle on the conundrums of exploratory data analysis which are prevalent when the theory is vague and experiments are expensive these ideas are illustrated with a bayesian analysis of the determinants of the u s unemployment rate using four different priors as inputs

wage gaps factor shares and real wages the relationships which link real wages capital intensity and factor shares are tested as a prelude to tests of the relationship between wage rigidities and labour market institutions evidence from seven countries indicates that the evolution of factor shares is well explained by changes in capital intensity which is itself well explained by product wages and technical progress a key implication is that changes in full employment capital labour ratios have been the dominant reason for the longer run decline of profit shares in europe and japan relative to the united states it follows that changes in cyclically adjusted factor shares provide little or no information regarding the gap between the actual real wage and its full employment value

making monetary policy objectives and rules what is it that monetary policy makers do and how do they do it the simple answer is that a central banker moves interest rates in order to maintain steady real growth and stable prices in this essay i examine the issues that arise in framing the problem faced by monetary policy makers i begin with a discussion of how over the past decade or so central banks have been made more independent and more accountable the result has been the virtual elimination of the inflation bias problem that is caused by political interference in the monetary policy process and better overall macroeconomic performance the essay proceeds with an example of a formal version of the policymakers problem describing their objectives and the information they need to formulate a policy rule i conclude with a discussion of a simple versus complex policy rules the impact of uncertainty on policy making and how central bankers use formal modelling in making their day to day decisions copyright 2000 by oxford university press

on the impossibility of central bank independence four decades of time and intellectual inconsistency the intellectual justification for modern central banking time inconsistency celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the cambridge journal of economics however the key progeny of the time inconsistency literature central bank independence has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research in the first instance the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country second central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence i conclude that independence fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context with central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

free trade areas in east asia discriminatory or non discriminatory ver the past decade we have witnessed the worldwide proliferation ofregional trade arrangements rtas even after the launch of the wtomultilateral trading system rtas have continued to spread however there havebeen marked variances across regions in terms of the degree to which regionaltrade integration has been carried out the east asian region is characterised bythe dearth of rtas regional integration moves have involved merely partial orloosely institutionalised groupings i e afta asean free trade area andapec asia paci c economic cooperation in particular the major three eastasian countries china japan and korea have tended to bypass the prevalenttrend of regionalism and instead have generally preferred multilateral trade liberal isation approaches under the gatt and wto regulations regarding rtas their stance against regionalism has mainly been for the following reasons i relative predominance of interregional trade and investment relations overintraregional transactions ii historical animosities stemming from the legaciesof japanese colonialism iii lack of central leadership and iv diversities inculture race language and level of economic development within the region in recent years however the region s support has shifted from multilateraltrade arrangements to rtas a turning point was the outbreak of the east asian nancial crisis in 1997 besides triggering massive economic unrest in east asia the crisis revitalised the demand for regional economic cooperation which calledfor more cooperation and policy coordination among neighbouring economies