bidding behavior in descending and ascending auctions this research examines how individual differences and institutional practices influence consumer bidding in auctions bidders may be motivated by different goals e g thrill of winning the item with minimal attention to what they pay for it versus prudence winning the item at a price at or below its perceived value also innate or auctioneer induced differences may exist in the precision and salience of bidder cognitions about the item s value we report two studies on how these motivational and cognitive factors influence bids in descending and ascending auctions respectively each study also manipulated a situational variable wait time at each price step the two auctions realized different average prices for the same item set average bids were higher in the descending versus ascending auction in several study conditions in both auction formats bidders primed with thrill versus prudence bid higher but more precise and or salient values attenuated this goal effect among other results in the descending auction longer wait times elicited higher bids from bidders primed with thrill but not prudence in the ascending auction longer wait times produced lower bids for bidders primed with prudence but not thrill these findings on consumer bidding behavior have practical implications for auction design

endogenous entry and self selection in private value auctions an experimental study this paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry in first price independent private value auctions n potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in an auction or receive a known outside option in the second stage entrants submit bids after learning their own private values and the number of entrants an equilibrium model of heterogeneous risk averse bidders implies a self selection effect where bidding in the auction is lower with endogenous entry because only less risk averse bidders enter this effect is confirmed by the experiment we also observe excessive entry relative to the theoretical model

an incentive aligned mechanism for conjoint analysis abstract this article specifies analyzes and validates a rigorous and practical truth telling mechanism game for conjoint applications the mechanism requires only one real product variation and has truth telling in conjoint as its bayesian nash equilibrium thus making it possible to incentive align participants in most conjoint applications using the ipod package as the context the author shows empirically that the mechanism substantially improves purchase prediction compared with a standard conjoint procedure

war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

learning by bidding we analyze a dynamic second price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who upon seeing a posted price learns whether his valuation is above that price in the essentially unique equilibrium an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise an uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder this model also provides a rationale behind the use of a secret reserve price in private value settings

an experiment on learning with limited information nonconvergence experimentation cascades and the advantage of being slow abstract we present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous time low information setting for a dominance solvable version of a cournot oligopoly with differentiated products we find little evidence of convergence to the nash equilibrium in an asynchronous setting characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies play tends toward the stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player convergence is significantly more robust for a serial cost sharing game which satisfies a stronger solution concept of overwhelmed solvability as the number of players grows this improved convergence tends to diminish seemingly driven by frequent and highly structured experimentation by players leading to a cascading effect in which experimentation by one player induces experimentation by others these results have implications both for traditional oligopoly competition and for a wide variety of strategic situations arising on the internet

a comparison of buyer determined and price based multiattribute mechanisms reverse auctions are fast becoming the standard for many procurement activities in the past the majority of such auctions have been solely price based but increasingly attributes other than price affect the auction outcome specifically the buyer uses a scoring function to compare bids and the bid with the highest score wins we investigate two mechanisms commonly used for procurement in business to business markets in a setting in which buyers welfare is affected by exogenous nonprice attributes such as the quality service and past relationships under both mechanisms bidders bid based on price but in the buyer determined mechanism the buyer is free to select the bid that maximizes her surplus while in the price based mechanism the buyer commits to awarding the contract to the low price bidder we find both in theory and in the laboratory that the buyer determined mechanism increases the buyer s welfare only as long as enough suppliers compete if the number of suppliers is small and the correlation between cost and quality is low the buyer is better off with the price based mechanism these findings are intended to help procurement managers make better decisions in designing procurement mechanisms for a variety of settings

consumer research for consumers this article outlines a consumer focused approach for the study of consumer behavior i argue that much of the existing literature by developing knowledge that focuses on the determinants of consumer purchasing is implicitly biased toward a marketing perspective of consumer behavior in contrast i propose the need for a consumer focused approach that would advance knowledge aimed at helping consumers make wiser purchases this approach should address the most important and challenging consumer decisions describe consumer behavior in a manner that leads to prescriptions consider the actions of other parties in the marketplace and identify biases unique to or exacerbated by the consumer context this article then illustrates what such a consumer focused approach would imply for consumer research in three areas negotiations financial services and auctions

the effect of explicit reference points on consumer choice and online bidding behavior sellers often explicitly suggest to buyers that they compare one option to other reference options building on the notion that loss aversion is more pronounced when comparisons are explicit rather than implicit we propose that the mere fact that consumers are explicitly told to make particular comparisons induces more risk averse cautious choice and bidding behavior this proposition was supported in a field experiment involving real online auctions in which comparisons among listings either were done spontaneously by bidders or were encouraged using an explicit instruction to compare the focal auction with adjacent listings results showed that explicit reference points 1 diminished the influence of adjacent auction prices on the focal auction s price 2 led participants to submit fewer lower and later bids 3 increased the incidence of sniping 4 decreased bidding frenzy and 5 decreased the tendency to bid on multiple items simultaneously the impact of explicit comparisons on risk averse behavior was further tested in a very different context using a laboratory choice experiment in that study explicit instructions to compare option sets increased the tendency to choose the compromise low risk and all average alternatives we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research

bidding frenzy speed of competitor reaction and willingness to pay in auctions this research examines how the intensity of the dynamic competitive interaction with other bidders in ascending auctions influences consumers willingness to pay wtp for auctioned products it focuses on one important aspect of this interaction the speed of competitor reaction the key hypothesis is that having one s own bids reciprocated by competing bidders more quickly increases one s wtp in an auction evidence from five experiments demonstrates this effect and pinpoints the essential aspects of the psychological mechanism that underlies it in particular the effect of speed of competitor reaction on bidding behavior 1 is serially mediated by the perception that the auction is more intensely competitive and by a greater desire to win 2 is distinct from the effects of time pressure and of the auction s duration or overall rate of progression 3 is not driven by inferences about the auctioned product s market value 4 is not qualified by the number of competing bidders nor due to any inferences about the latter and 5 hinges on direct competitive interaction with other human bidders

testing for risk aversion a stochastic dominance approach we conduct an experiment based on the stochastic dominance framework in order to investigate risk aversion in isolation of other effects such as subjective probability distortion the certainty effect and framing effects the result is striking most individuals are not risk averse 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the information in the high yield bond spread for the business cycle evidence and some implications the market for high yield below investment grade corporate bonds developed in the middle 1980s we show that since this time the high yield spread has had significant explanatory power for the business cycle we interpret this finding as possibly symptomatic of financial factors at work in the business cycle along the lines suggested by the financial accelerator we also show that over this period the high yield spread outperforms other leading financial indicators including the term spread the paper bill spread and the federal funds rate we conjecture that changes in the conduct of monetary policy over time may account for the reduced informativeness of these alternative indicators all of which are tied closely to monetary policy copyright 1999 by oxford university press

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

are you risk averse over other people s money decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others such as in the typical corporate structure does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences we examine this question in two simple settings lottery choices and sealed bid auctions using controlled laboratory experiments we find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion this reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others this result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents

eliciting subjective probabilities with binary lotteries abstract we evaluate a binary lottery procedure for inducing risk neutral behavior in a subjective belief elicitation task prior research has shown this procedure to robustly induce risk neutrality when subjects are given a single risk task defined over objective probabilities drawing a sample from the same subject population we find evidence that the binary lottery procedure also induces linear utility in a subjective probability elicitation task using the quadratic scoring rule we also show that the binary lottery procedure can induce direct revelation of subjective probabilities in subjects with popular non expected utility preference representations that satisfy weak conditions

an experimental test of the commitment cost theory are used in making public policy recommendations carrying out cost benefit analysis and formulating marketing and pricing strategies unlike traded goods individuals are not likely familiar with valuing and pricing nonmarket goods as such a key characteristic among almost all nonmarket goods is uncertainty regarding value that individuals have uncertainty regarding the value they have for nonmarket goods is supported by a number of recent empirical findings e g johannesson et al loomis and ekstrand van kooten krcmar and bulte among other things uncertainty may be a result of unfamiliarity with the good in question for example a poll of scottish individuals found that over 70 were unfamiliar with

learning to bid the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation we examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good despite the absence of private valuations asymmetric information or risk aversion bidder strategies do not converge to the bertrand nash equilibrium strategies even in the long run deviations from equilibrium strategies depend on uncertainty regarding the value of the good auction structure the agents learning model and the number of bidders although individual agents learn nash bidding strategies in isolation the learning of each agent by flattening the best reply correspondence of other agents blocks common learning these negative externalities are more severe in second price auctions auctions with many bidders and auctions where the good has an uncertain value ex post

economics and emotion institutions matter abstract in two different types of institutions english and dutch auctions we collect heart rate data a proxy for emotion to test hypotheses based on findings in neural science about the effect of emotion on economic behavior we first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions next we ask if knowledge of the intensity of a participant s emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic variables our answer is that institutions matter in the dutch english auctions we find no evidence that knowledge of emotional intensity affects our ability to predict price setting behavior we then entertain the proposition that the cardiac system is an information system that processes economic events we are able to show that this hypothesis is consistent with our observations and furthermore that the processes differ across institutions

collusion in uniform price auctions experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions in uniform price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction we provide experimental evidence that in uniform price auctions non binding pre play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes on the other hand regardless of the opportunities for communication in discriminatory auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule this evidence suggests that uniform price auctions of treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure

auctions with toeholds an experimental study of company takeovers we run experiments on english auctions where the bidders already own a part toehold of the good for sale the theory predicts a very strong explosive effect of even small toeholds while asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry it is not nearly as strong as predicted we explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless this is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria which makes them fail when human players are involved our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails moreover we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring

constructive consumer choice processes consumer decision making has been a focal interest in consumer research and consideration of current marketplace trends e g technological change an information explosion indicates that this topic will continue to be critically important we argue that consumer choice is inherently constructive due to limited processing capacity consumers often do not have well defined existing preferences but construct them using a variety of strategies contingent on task demands after describing constructive choice consumer decision tasks and decision strategies we provide an integrative framework for understanding constructive choice review evidence for constructive consumer choice in light of that framework and identify knowledge gaps that suggest opportunities for additional research

an empirical study of credit shock transmission in a small open economy in this paper we identify and estimate the dynamic effects of foreign us and national canadian credit shocks in a small open economy we use standard credit spreads as proxies to the external finance premium our first result suggests that the us and canadian credit spreads contain substantial forecasting power for several measures of the canadian real economic activity especially during the recent financial crisis and its aftermath secondly an adverse us credit shock generates a significant and persistent economic slowdown in canada the national external finance premium rises immediately while interest rates credit aggregates output and employment indicators decline variance decomposition reveals that credit shocks have a sizeable effect on real activity measures leading indicators and credit spreads yet the unexpected shocks in domestic credit spreads are not able to generate any significant dynamic response of the real activity once we control for the us credit market conditions

the impact of discrete bidding and bidder aggressiveness on sellers strategies in open english auctions reserves and covert shilling in practice the rules in most open english auctions require participants to raise bids by a sizeable discrete amount furthermore some bidders are typically more aggressive in seeking to become the current bidder during competitive bidding most auction theory however has assumed bidders can place any tiny continuous bid increase and recommend as optimal the tiniest possible increase this article examines how incorporating discrete bidding and bidder aggressiveness affect optimal strategies for an important decision for auction sellers which is setting the lowest acceptable bid at which to sell the property we investigate two alternative methods sellers often use to enforce this decision these are setting an irrevocable reserve before the auction and covert shilling where the seller or confederates pose as bona fide bidders and raise bona fide bids unsuspected by bidders these optimal strategies interest auction participants especially sellers who must recognize the bidding rules and bidder aggressiveness they will encounter in actual auctions we also examine how these strategies change with the auction context such as the number of bidders and how they differ from corresponding strategies already identified for continuous bidding our model examines open english auctions where bidders have independent private valuations we find that discrete bidding does affect these strategies as does the aggressiveness of the bidder with the highest valuation relative to the average aggressiveness of all other remaining bidders we identify the seller s optimal discrete reserve and show that if the highest valuator is relatively more less aggressive this increases decreases from the optimal continuous reserve and also increases decreases as the number of bidders increases with continuous bidding by contrast this reserve is invariant to the number of bidders as this bidder becomes relatively more aggressive for a given number of bidders the optimal discrete reserve increases while as he or she becomes less aggressive the seller s expected auction utility increases which increases the set of auctions where discrete bidding generates higher seller welfare than continuous we propose a covert shilling model that requires shilling sellers and any confederates and auctioneers to outwardly act no differently than with reserves to avoid detection we identify cases where the seller optimally shills once the bona fide bidding has stopped and identify the corresponding optimal point to stop shilling and accept the next bona fide bid if offered this stopping point does not depend on where bona fide bidding stops or aggressiveness or the number of bidders or on whether shill bids alternate with bona fide bids or are consecutively entered we also find that the optimal lowest acceptable bid with shilling can be higher lower than that with reserves if the highest valuator is sufficiently unaggressive aggressive by comparison in continuous bidding shilling and reserves yield identical lowest acceptable bids sometimes the seller using a shilling strategy optimally should not shill at all and instead accept the bid where bona fide bidding stops this can occur when that bid or the number of bidders is sufficiently high or when the highest valuator is as or less aggressive than other bidders optimal shilling can be as practical to implement as reserves because it does not require sellers to have any information beyond that needed in a reserve auction if sellers shill optimally they can never be worse off compared to using a reserve and can be better off shilling can make bidders worse off but can also make them better off when the seller using a shilling strategy optimally accepts bids below the optimal reserve in these latter cases shilling pareto dominates reserves ex ante we provide numerical examples to illustrate these results we discuss how our results might be affected if shilling is not covert or bidders valuations have a common value component rather than being independent or by the rules used in many discrete bid internet auctions

overbidding and overspreading in rent seeking experiments cost structure and prize allocation rules we study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent seeking contests most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost and find both overbidding relative to the nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts which we term overspreading we investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally and of convex versus linear costs of effort while holding fixed the nash equilibrium prediction for effort we find the share rule results in average effort closer to the nash prediction and lower variation of effort combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results we can explain a significant amount of non equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design these results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest

financial intermediation business failures and real business cycles in this paper a general equilibrium business cycle model is construct ed that when subjected to real disturbances mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output money business failures risk pr emia intermediary loans and prices in contrast monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence thus providing support for real business cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business cycle behavior a credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

bidding behavior and decision costs in field experiments i introduction positive opportunity costs of mental effort may invalidate the predictions of traditional models of rational or hyperrational agents conlisk 1996 uses deliberation costs as a recurring theme when discussing four important reasons for incorporating bounded rationality in economic models smith and walker 1993 and smith and szidarovszky 1999 present effort models that predict individual behavior will more closely match the predictions of rational behavior theories as 1 the stakes of the decision increase and 2 the decision costs decrease smith and walker 1993 find evidence of these two effects in a comprehensive review of 31 published laboratory experiments camerer and hogarth 1999 extend smith and walker s survey by examining 74 experimental papers and find evidence in favor of the cognitive effort theory noting that higher levels of incentives have the largest effects in judgment and decision tasks p 34 although the laboratory evidence is compelling there has been little verificati on of these predictions outside the laboratory 1 the present article fills this gap by examining field data from 214 multiunit sports card auctions carried out in an active marketplace on the floor of a sports card show we auctioned four types of trading cards with book values ranging from 3 to 70 providing significant variation in the stakes of the auction our auctions also included two distinct types of subjects some auctions had sports card dealers bidding against each other whereas others had individual card collectors as the participants this variation allows us to explore the second dimension of decision cost theory do dealers who commonly participate in sports card auctions and therefore likely require less effort to bid optimally bid more rationally than nondealers our measure of rational bidding comes from multiunit auction theory which predicts strategic demand reduction in uniform price auctions 2 for each type of bidder and each type of card we measure this demand reduction behavior in the uniform price auction relative to a control the multiunit vickrey 1961 auction where bidders are predicted to fully reveal their demands our sports card data generated from sales of 428 cards with a combined book value of nearly 10 000 provide two major insights first we find that the predicted strategic behavior is considerably greater when the auctioned cards have higher values second dealers exhibit more of the predicted strategic behavior than do nondealers for both lower and higher priced cards one conjecture to explain this finding is that nondealers may find that the cognitive effort required to bid strategically exceeds the benefits especially for low valued cards by contrast dealers have more experience with auctions and make their living by buying selling trading cards so their cognitive costs are likely much lower than those of nondealers these two findings are consistent with recent theoretical models of monetary rewards and decision costs and extend previous experimental evidence from the laboratory into the field ii experimental design as mentioned recent theoretical literature has suggested that demand reduction inherent in uniform price auctions with multiunit demand can induce inefficient allocations and possible reductions in auction revenue to avoid the inefficiencies associated with the uniform price auction theorists have identified an alternative mechanism the generalized vickrey auction which gives bidders a dominant strategy of revealing their true valuations for all units of the good in this multiunit vickrey auction as in the uniform price auction each bidder can submit up to n different sealed bids on individual units and the highest n bids are declared winners if a bidder submits one or more of the winning bids his or her price for the first unit equals the highest rejected bid submitted by someone else and his or her price for the kth unit equals the kth highest of the rejected bids submitted by others

eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay evidence from field trials in northern ghana we utilize the becker degroot marschak 1964 mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern ghana the bdm mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research allowing us to directly estimate demand compute heterogeneous treatment effects and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting we demonstrate the implementation of bdm along these three dimensions compare it to the standard take it or leave it method for eliciting willingness to pay and discuss practical issues for implementing the mechanism in true field settings jel classifications c93 d12 d82 l11 l31

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

subjective probabilities in games an application to the overbidding puzzle this article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games we conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first price auctions the experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction and indeed overbid when provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions subjects learn to make better predictions and to curb significantly overbidding the structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed

the importance of ordering in sequential auctions to date the largest part of literature on multi unit auctions has assumed that there arek homogeneous objects being auctioned where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all ofk units these modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential the aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction we study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd price auctions two heterogeneous jobs and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints

the role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks abstract the recent financial turmoil has underlined the importance of analyzing the link between banks balance sheets and economic activity we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which bank capital mitigates an agency problem between banks and their creditors as a result the capital position of banks affects their ability to attract loanable funds and therefore influences the business cycle through a bank capital channel of transmission we find that the bank capital channel greatly amplifies and propagates the effects of technology shocks on output investment and inflation moreover bank capital shocks create sizeable declines in output and investment

risk aversion and the winner s curse this article analyzes an auction in which bidders see independent components of a common prize value the nash equilibrium for two rational bidders is shown to be independent of risk attitudes the information structure allows explicit calculation of an alternative equilibrium in which naive bidders do not correctly discount the value of the prize contingent on winning and thus they suffer the winner s curse subjects in a laboratory experiment clearly fall prey to the winner s curse the data conform most closely to the predictions of the naive model moreover the level of risk aversion implied by fitting the naive model is similar to an independent risk aversion measure obtained in a separate private value bidding exercise

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions comment glenn harrison s recent 1989 article in this review has provoked the loudest debate yet heard among experimental economists his critique of the james cox vernon smith and james walker 1983a b 1985a b 1988 henceforth csw laboratory studies of first price sealed bid auctions with independent and private values in my view raises a fundamental methodological issue that is well worth debating and the csw research program deserves further discussion in this short comment i confine myself to what i see as the most important issues and do not try to address all evidence relevant to the ongoing debate first i summarize harrison s central argument very briefly after pointing out two shortcomings in harrison s specific analysis of csw i propose a methodological reconciliation finally and with some trepidation since my own experience with the auction data is relatively slight i suggest an alternative approach to understanding the anomalies discovered by csw

shocks structures or monetary policies the euro area and us after 2001 abstract the us federal reserve cut interest rates more vigorously in the recent recession than the european central bank did by comparison with the fed the ecb followed a more measured course of action we use an estimated dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to show that comparisons based on such simple metrics as the variance of policy rates are misleading we find that because there is greater inertia in the ecb s policy rule the ecb s policy actions actually had a greater stabilizing effect than did those of the fed as a consequence a potentially severe recession turned out to be only a slowdown and inflation never departed from levels consistent with the ecb s quantitative definition of price stability other factors that account for the different economic outcomes in the euro area and us include differences in shocks and differences in the degree of wage and price flexibility

monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics a survey of thirty one experimental studies which report data on the comparative effects of monetary rewards and opportunity cost shows 1 several studies in which increased rewards shift the central tendency of the data toward the predictions of rational models 2 in virtually all cases rewards reduce the variance of the data around the predicted outcome this is consistent with a model in which rewards are balanced against decision cost in agent behavior and explicates the argument that when rational models fail it can be attributed to low opportunity cost of deviations from the rational prediction

6 revenue effects and information processing in english common value auctions an experiment analyzing behavior in english common value auctions is reported english auctions raise more revenue than first price auctions only when bidders do not suffer from a strong winner s curse agents employ other bidders dropout prices along with their private information as nash bidding theory predicts however a simple and natural signal averaging rule which does not require recognizing the adverse selection effect of winning the auction better characterizes the data than the nash rule monte carlo simulations using fiml estimates of the signal averaging rule predict a number of data characteristics not directly employed in the estimation procedure copyright 1996 by american economic association

on the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions abstract bids in oral auctions are restricted to discrete levels this paper both examines the choice of levels at which bids will be allowed and also presents a simple model of the role of the discrete levels in bidding strategy we consider two different distributions of bidders values identifying cases in which revenue is maximized by increasing intervals by constant intervals and by decreasing intervals moreover conditions under which the choice of bid levels that maximizes bid taker revenue also maximizes economic efficiency are developed we present a model of the economic trade off between auction duration and step size we consider the previously undiscussed issue of when economically motivated bidders should skip bid levels and when they should merely make minimum advances and develop a model in which it is equilibrium behavior always to make the minimum allowed advance

the motivating uncertainty effect uncertainty increases resource investment in the process of reward pursuit can a reward of an uncertain magnitude be more motivating than a reward of a certain magnitude this research documents the motivating uncertainty effect and specifies when this effect occurs people invest more effort time and money to qualify for an uncertain reward e g a 50 chance at 2 and a 50 chance at 1 than a certain reward of a higher expected value e g a 100 chance at 2 this effect arises only when people focus on the process of pursuing a reward not when they focus on the outcome the reward itself when the focus is on the process of reward pursuit uncertainty generates positive experience such as excitement and hence increases motivation four studies involving real rewards lend support to the motivating uncertainty effect this research carries theoretical implications for research on risk preference and motivation and practical implications for how to devise cost efficient consumer incentive systems

varma versus var for macroeconomic forecasting in this article we argue that there is no compelling reason for restricting the class of multivariate models considered for macroeconomic forecasting to vector autoregressive var models given the recent advances in vector autoregressive moving average varma modeling methodology and improvements in computing power to support this claim we use real macroeconomic data and show that varma models forecast macroeconomic variables more accurately than vars

the effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria the logit version of quantal response equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes if all other factors are held constant including the nash equilibria of the game we explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria the data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the logit equilibrium model we extend the theoretical quantal response equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better

who upholds the surging gold price the role of the central bank worldwide who upholds the surging gold price conventional wisdom suggests that the depreciation of the exchange rate inflation and economic turmoil are the suspects nonetheless while these factors cease why does the gold price still stay around hikes the gold market belongs to a global arena different from other commodities its participants include the national central banks worldwide however surprisingly the role played by these tremendous market participants gold holdings on the gold price has been ignored in past empirical works this research focuses on central banks gold holdings to explore who upholds the surging gold price several interesting outcomes are derived first our empirical evidence shows an inverse phenomenon relative to news reports from the mass media that the gold holdings of central banks worldwide in fact continuously descend second the mainstream countries of the world have not played a main role in the rising trend of the gold price in the recent decade instead newly emer

combinatorial clock auctions price direction and performance abstract the lack of price guidance towards efficiency relevant packages in ascending combinatorial clock auctions acca can lead to a low efficiency allocation of goods we propose a descending price combinatorial clock auction dcca with a newly devised pricing strategy to improve on this problem using agent based simulations we document that the dcca provides significant improvements over the acca and we are able to understand in which environments these improvements are likely to be the strongest we test these predictions in the laboratory with human subjects and find evidence that the dcca generates improvements in auction efficiency and revenue

slow dutch auctions theorists have long believed that dutch auctions are strategically equivalent to standard sealed bidding however in recent controlled experiments with actual dutch and sealed bid internet auctions of collectibles the dutch auctions produced significantly more revenue we believe that this happened in part because the internet dutch auctions are a slow process in which bidders incur incremental transaction costs if they delay bidding this paper presents models of slow dutch auctions that include these costs and explain this belief we first present a decision theoretic model of a slow dutch auction while simple the decision theoretic model is fairly general and provides the basic intuition underlying our revenue results we then develop a game theoretic model of a slow dutch auction we derive two symmetric payoff equivalent equilibria of the game in the absence of a cost of return and then consider the more general case of costly return when the cost of return is in an appropriate range the seller s expected revenue is an increasing function of that cost

effects of participative pricing on consumers cognitions and actions a goal theoretic perspective using a goal theoretic approach we examine how goal related mind sets influence consumers reactions to participative pricing mechanisms where consumers participate in price determination e g auctions relative to economically equivalent fixed price offers we show that the congruence between individuals notions of high perceived control over shopping situations and participative price environments produces an implementation oriented mind set that influences cognitions and intentions in the absence of such congruence we can independently create implemental mind sets that replace the natural deliberative thinking of consumers contemplating a purchase demonstrating the subtle yet powerful role mind sets play in dictating thought and action is a unique contribution of this research

rationalizable bidding in first price auctions abstract we analyze the consequences of strategically sophisticated bidding without assuming equilibrium behavior in particular we characterize interim rationalizable bids in symmetric first price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals we show that 1 every nonzero bid below the equilibrium is rationalizable 2 some bids above the equilibrium are rationalizable 3 the upper bound on rationalizable bids of a given player is a nondecreasing function of her signal in the special case of independent signals and quasi linear valuation functions i the least upper bound on rationalizable bids is concave hence ii rationalizability implies substantial proportional shading for high valuations but is consistent with negligible proportional shading for low valuations we argue that our theoretical analysis may shed some light on experimental findings about deviations from the risk neutral nash equilibrium

using laboratory experimental auctions in marketing research a case study of new packaging for fresh beef this paper illustrates the use of laboratory experimental auctions in a pretest market research program for new products we review the experimental auctions literature discuss the range of auction mechanisms available and present the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular mechanism for a laboratory pretest market we then present a step by step example of how a theoretically incentive compatible auction mechanism fifth price sealed bid was used in a laboratory pretest market for vacuum packaged beef based on the illustration we discuss the potential for using laboratory experimental auctions in pretest market research we present the limitations that may be encountered in such applications and outline research aimed at improving the behavioral properties of the technique

factor augmented varma models with macroeconomic applications we study the relationship between vector autoregressive moving average varma and factor representations of a vector stochastic process we observe that in general vector time series and factors cannot both follow finite order var models instead a var factor dynamics induces a varma process while a var process entails varma factors we propose to combine factor and varma modeling by using factor augmented varma favarma models this approach is applied to forecasting key macroeconomic aggregates using large u s and canadian monthly panels the results show that favarma models yield substantial improvements over standard factor models including precise representations of the effect and transmission of monetary policy

a short run pricing model for a speculative asset tested with data from the gold bullion market 1983 a short run pricing model for a speculative asset tested with data from the gold bullion market applied economics vol 15 no 5 pp 563 581

an experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the epas emission trading auction the clean air act requires the epa to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances under the discriminative auction rules sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the epa auction consistent with theoretical predictions buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient and increasing the number of buyers increases bids buyers facing human opponents compete more aggressively than the risk neutral prediction but bids do not differ systematically from this prediction when buyers face computerized nash robots copyright 1995 by american economic association

governance and contract choice theory and evidence from groundwater irrigation markets abstract this paper examines the role governance institutions play in the adoption of contracts we develop a simple model of the contracting relationship in a setting where unverifiable outcomes exist and use it to interpret data on groundwater irrigation contracts in bangladesh a distinguishing feature of this market is the variety of village level institutions which impose different degrees of punishment for contract violation consistent with the model we find households adopt contracts that rely on unverifiable outcomes which are not formally contractible when punishment for contract violation is weak conversely households adopt contracts that rely on formally contractible and verifiable outcomes when punishment is severe this evidence is consistent with contract terms being chosen optimally given what is or is not formally contractible

anchoring effects on consumers willingness to pay and willingness to accept we examine the susceptibility of consumers willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta judgments to influence by arbitrary anchors the results of four studies suggest that although circumstantial differences between buying and selling decisions can lead to systematic differences in susceptibility to anchoring effects the principles governing the impact of anchoring on wtp and wta judgments are essentially the same in particular robust anchoring effects are observed when the anchor relates to the focal source of uncertainty further wtp and wta judgments are most susceptible to anchoring and endowment effects under uncertainty about the desire to trade the implications of this research for our understanding of anchoring and endowment effects are discussed

do financial variables help forecasting inflation and real activity in the euro area abstract this paper uses a large data set consisting of 447 monthly macroeconomic time series concerning the main countries of the euro area to simulate out of sample predictions of the euro area industrial production and the harmonized inflation index and to evaluate the role of financial variables in forecasting we considered two models which allow forecasting based on large panels of time series forni et al rev econom statist 82 2000 540 mimeo 2001b and stock and watson mimeo 1999 performance of both models were compared to that of a simple univariate ar model results show that multivariate methods outperform univariate methods for forecasting inflation at one three six and twelve months and industrial production at one and three months we find that financial variables do help forecasting inflation but do not help forecasting industrial production

estimating individual discount rates in denmark a field experiment we estimate individual discount rates with respect to time streams of money using controlled laboratory experiments these discount rates are elicited by means of field experiments involving real monetary rewards the experiments were carried out across denmark using a representative sample of 268 people between 19 and 75 years of age individual discount rates are estimated for various households differentiated by socio demographic characteristics such as income and age our conclusions are that discount rates are constant over the 12 month to 3 year horizons used in these experiments and that discount rates vary substantially with respect to several socio demographic variables hence we conclude that it would be reasonable to assume constant discount rates for specific household types but not the same rates across all households

coherent arbitrariness stable demand curves without stable preferences economic theories of valuation generally assume that prices of commodities and assets are derived from underlying fundamental values for example in finance theory asset prices are believed to reflect the market estimate of the discounted present value of the asset s payoff stream in labor theory the supply of labor is established by the tradeoff between the desire for consumption and the displeasure of work finally and most importantly for this chapter consumer microeconomics assumes that the demand curves for consumer products chocolates cds movies vacations drugs and so forth can be ultimately traced to the valuation of pleasures that consumers anticipate receiving from these products because it is difficult as a rule to measure fundamental values directly empirical tests of economic theory typically examine whether the effects of changes in circumstances on valuations are consistent with theoretical prediction for example whether labor supply responds appropriately to a change in the wage rate whether compensated demand curves for commodities are downward sloping or whether stock prices respond in the predicted way to share repurchases however such comparative static relationships are a necessary but not sufficient condition for fundamental valuation e g summers 1986 becker 1962 was perhaps the first to make this point explicitly when he observed that consumers choosing commodity bundles randomly from their budget set would nevertheless produce downward sloping demand curves

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

the price of gold and the exchange rate abstract this paper examines the theoretical relationship between the major exchange rates and the prices of internationally traded commodities in the empirical section the case of gold is analyzed using forecast error data among other things it is found that since the dissolution of the bretton woods international monetary system floating exchange rates among the major currencies have been a major source of price instability in the world gold market and as the world gold market is dominated by the european currency bloc appreciations or depreciations of european currencies have strong effects on the price of gold in other currencies