optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas abstract tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances this paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance domestic market power for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives in the presence of revenue seeking ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels also some welfare implications emerge

product cannibalization and the role of prices the role of brand prices in contributing to product cannibalization is examined price elasticities and reference price theory are used to provide a theoretical foundation and empirical test for the impact of a firm s cheap brand on one of its expensive brands results are consistent with the conclusion that the market share of the company s premium brand was cannibalized by a growth in sales of its cheap brand

import penetration and the politics of trade protection abstract in this paper we reconsider a key empirical prediction generated by an important class of political economy models of trade policy namely that trade protection should be higher in sectors characterized by lower import penetration we call this the standard prediction the existing empirical evidence offers little support for this prediction in this paper we argue that the standard prediction depends critically on the assumptions that trade taxes are the only policy instruments and that the government has access to non distortionary taxation we analyze a model in which the government can use quotas and vers in addition to trade taxes and raising public funds may be costly under a simple sufficient condition our model predicts that the protection level increases with import penetration both in sectors that are protected with tariffs and in sectors that are protected with quantitative restrictions

the political economy of international factor mobility we model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility in a common agency setting domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters welfare and contributions collected we characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome we establish a similar result for quotas allowing for partial rent capturing for the strategic environment under consideration we also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

technical note intertemporal price discrimination via reference price effects we consider the dynamic pricing problem a monopolistic seller faces when customers arrive in heterogeneous time periods and their purchase decisions are affected by reference prices formed from their past observations of prices we illustrate that a new form of price discrimination opportunity exists in such situations where the seller s optimal pricing strategy is a cyclic one even when the customers are loss neutral and their demand functions are identical this result differs from those of prior studies where the optimal price paths are shown to be asymptotically constant and thus is unique due to the interaction between the heterogeneous arrivals and the reference price effects we also provide the cycle length of the optimal pricing policy when the demand function is linear and when customers are loss neutral in this era when customer information is easier accessible our results suggest the sellers consider this new dimension of price discrimination in conjunction with the old ones to take advan

practice prize report an assortmentwide decision support system for dynamic pricing and promotion planning in diy retailing the main objective of this report is to describe a decision support system for dynamic retail pricing and promotion planning our weekly demand model incorporates price reference price effects seasonality article availability information features and discounts building on previous research we quantify demand interdependencies and integrate the resulting profit lifting effects into the optimal pricing model the methodology was developed and implemented at baumax an austrian do it yourself retailer along with the practical requirements an objective function was employed that can be used as a vehicle for implementing a retailer s strategy eight pricing rounds with thousands of different stock keeping units have each served as a testing ground for our approach based on various benchmarking methods a positive impact on profit was reported the currently implemented marketing decision support system increased gross profit on average by 8 1 and sales by 2 1

repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting in a partnership game each player s utility depends on the other players actions through a commonly observed consequence e g output profit price which is itself a function of the players actions and an exogenous stochastic environment if a partnership game is repeated infinitely and each player s payoff in the infinite game supergame is the long run average of his expected one period utilities then efficient combinations of one period actions can be sustained as nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players actions or information but can only observe the resulting consequences

political economy of the u s mexican tomato trade agreement we develop a political economy model to analyse the us mexican tomato trade agreement by treating the minimum import price as a negotiated settlement we incorporate the special characteristics of the us mexican tomato dispute namely trade among large countries the role of competing fresh and processed tomato lobbies quota revenues accruing to mexican producers bargaining for a minimum import price rather than a tariff and the role of the canadian tomato market we show the importance of the size of the lobby group s supply the weight elected officials place on national welfare and the elasticities of export supply and import demand in determining the optimal price wedge for the united states larger fresh tomato or cherry grape tomato supply intensifies the degree of protection awarded to us growers while us processors work to mitigate this effect from mexico s perspective larger mexican fresh or cherry grape output induces a push towards free trade due to the agreement s depressing effect on mexican prices while mexican processors and quota revenues exacerbate the price wedge

lobbying counterlobbying and the structure of tariff protection in poor and rich countries a political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing protection is higher on average in poor countries and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing whereas poor countries do the reverse numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection

variable pricing in oligopoly markets behavioral research has found that consumers respond to variability in prices in addition to price levels we show that this finding can explain why some firms vary their prices more frequently than others we examine pricing strategies composed of an average price and price variability and employ logit market share models to analyze equilibrium pricing strategies in an oligopoly two competing logit specifications termed price sensitivity and payoff sensitivity are considered and are shown to yield contradictory implications for pricing policy from three empirical studies on restaurant choice we find that the price sensitivity model is the better model

exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection the recent confrontation between china and the united states over currency policy illustrates a broader phenomenon exchange rate misalignments tend to spill over into trade policy although previous studies have shown that aggregate protectionist activity is positively related to the level of the real effective exchange rate we explore this relationship at the industry level several industry specific characteristics determine the protectionist response to exchange rate changes including the degree of exchange rate pass through the level of import penetration and the share of imported intermediate inputs in total industry inputs we find that the marginal effect of currency appreciation on the number of industry level antidumping petitions is positive and significant only for industries with high pass through therefore exchange rates appear to induce demands for trade barriers only in industries where competitiveness is directly harmed by currency appreciation

technical note a price vector model of demand for consumer durables preliminary developments although considerable research has been conducted on optimal pricing policies for manufacturers relatively little work has been done on how price enters the consumer choice process in this paper a model is developed for durables purchasing which integrates both economic and behavioral research by specifying a vector of five price concepts which affect purchasing behavior of particular interest are variables relating to future price expectations due to data limitations a revised model is estimated and the results provide preliminary support for the general model

peeling away the layers impacts of durable tariff elimination abstract we demonstrate that durable mfn tariff elimination affects trade patterns through several layers and magnitudes of effects are sizable the wto information technology agreement s ita unique setting allows us to overcome the challenges associated with identifying effects of non discriminatory trade policies due to two reasons i ita constitutes a quasi natural experiment of several passive signatories joining the agreement as an unavoidable part of pursuing a larger policy objective and ii ita s partial coverage of the it sector provides a natural control group for identification based on cross product variation our analysis finds novel nonlinear impacts of tariff liberalization complete tariff elimination results in large additional trade gains over and above tariff reductions especially for intermediate goods the commitment to durable tariff elimination through wto bindings adds another two layers boosting both imports and exports more than equivalent unilateral reforms this commitment spurned development of a downstream it export sector in passive signatories

are markets with loss averse consumers more sensitive to losses behavioral pricing and revenue management aim to incorporate realistic consumer behavior into firms pricing and inventory models the key input to these models is market demand which is often assumed to inherit the characteristics of consumer behavior as when for example one assumes that a market consisting of loss averse consumers is more responsive to losses than to gains yet market demand and consumer behavior need not be related and so we argue that approach to modeling market demand is misguided this paper proposes an approach that accounts for the heterogeneity in consumer valuation we aggregate the demand of individual loss averse consumers to obtain market demand and show that market demand may be more responsive to gains or losses or it may be equally responsive our results have profound implications not only for how best to characterize the market demand of behaviorally biased consumers but also for determining the firm s optimal pricing policy this paper was accepted by serguei net

the impact of heterogeneity in purchase timing and price responsiveness on estimates of sticker shock effects the notion that individuals have an internal reference price against which they compare observed prices is well supported by several psychological theories empirically several papers in the marketing literature employing scanner panel data have modeled the impact of reference prices on brand choice via the sticker shock formulation in which consumers evaluate choice alternatives using differences between shelf prices and reference prices most of the studies reported thus far have not accounted for heterogeneity in price response among consumers and have typically imputed reference prices from the shelf prices of brands that a consumer is supposed to have observed on previous purchases in the category since category marketing activity can differentially affect the purchase timing of households we argue that this measure of reference price may follow certain systematic patterns across consumers and when combined with unaccounted for price response heterogeneity may result in a spurious sticker shock effect specifically we show that estimates of sticker shock are biased upward if households that are price sensitive in the brand choice decision are also more responsive to category promotion activity in their purchase timing decision we discuss some general conditions under which the bias occurs and conduct a simulation experiment to confirm our specific hypotheses our simulation results show that changes in purchase timing are a critical determinant of the bias in the sticker shock effect we also show that unaccounted for price response heterogeneity can in itself result in a biased sticker shock parameter however this requires very large differences in price sensitivities across consumers far greater than what is normally observed we develop a hierarchical bayes version of the nested logit model which models heterogeneity via individual level parameters in a continuous random effects framework we estimate the model on scanner panel data from the yogurt and ketchup categories we find in both categories that the 95 probability interval of the posterior distribution of the mean sticker shock coefficient contains the value zero therefore at least for the data used in this study there is no evidence for the sticker shock effect at the aggregate level in contrast the corresponding coefficient from a standard model which ignores this heterogeneity is highly significant and supports the existence of a possibly spurious sticker shock effect consistent with our explanation of the underlying cause of the bias households that are more price sensitive in the choice decision are also found to be more responsive to category promotion activity in their decision to purchase in the category the results highlight the measurement problems associated with imputing reference prices from past prices since the frequency duration and price level of a retailer s promotional program depend on its size and prevalence accurate estimates of the sticker shock effect are essential for formulating optimal promotion strategies an adequate accounting of consumer heterogeneity is critical to this effort

modeling loss aversion and reference dependence effects on brand choice based upon a recently developed multiattribute generalization of prospect theory s value function tversky and kahneman 1991 we argue that consumer choice is influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points and that consumers weigh losses from a reference point more than equivalent sized gains loss aversion we sketch implications of this model for understanding brand choice we develop a multinomial logit formulation of a reference dependent choice model calibrating it using scanner data in addition to providing better fit in both estimation and forecast periods than a standard multinomial logit model the model s coefficients demonstrate significant loss aversion as hypothesized we also discuss the implications of a reference dependent view of consumer choice for modeling brand choice demonstrate that loss aversion can account for asymmetric responses to changes in product characteristics and examine other implications for competitive strategy

commercial policy with altruistic voters in public discussions of policy evidence that import competing sectors earn low or falling incomes is often used to argue for protection this paper rationalizes the apparent effectiveness of this argument in both direct and indirect democracies in direct democracies a small degree of voter altruism leads to protection in the specific factors model when the import competing sector earns little similarly voter altruism creates an incentive in representative democracies for self interested parties to present evidence to legislators on the income of import competing factors this leads to a theory in which campaign contributions buy access to legislators rather than buy votes

protection for sale an empirical investigation comment do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient are lobbies net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents we estimate the influence driven grossman and helpman 1994 and the tariff function findlay and wellisz 1982 models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models we find strong evidence that protection is indeed for sale the important new result is however that not only the existence of lobbies matters but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions using j tests to compare the power of the models directly we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the influence driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the tariff function model

dynamic stochastic inventory management with reference price effects we analyze the joint inventory and pricing decisions of a firm when demand depends on not only the current selling price but also a memory based reference price and customers are loss averse the presence of reference price effect leads to a nonconcave one period expected revenue in price and reference price we introduce a transformation technique that allows us to prove under some mild assumptions the optimality of a reference price dependent base stock list price policy which is characterized by a base stock level and a target reference price in addition we show that the target reference price is increasing in the reference price but except in the loss neutral case the base stock level is not monotone in the reference price we also show that in the steady state of the model with the reference price effect the optimal price is lower while the optimal base stock level is higher than their counterparts in the model without the reference price effect

incorporating reference price effects into a theory of consumer choice although there has been a good deal of research on incorporating the effects of reference price formation into empirical models of consumer buying behavior little formal theoretical work had been undertaken to date this paper incorporates reference price effects into the traditional economic theory of consumer choice and examines the effects of reference price formation on the results of the traditional theory its marketing implications and the implications for empirical models which examine the effects of reference price formation on actual consumer behavior several implications of the theoretical model are empirically tested using weekly retail egg sales data from southern california this analysis indicates that reference price formation does have significant effects on consumer behavior furthermore these effects are asymmetric with consumers two and a half times more responsive to egg price increases that are in excess of the reference price than they are to comparable egg price decreases

price promotions limiting competitive encroachment in this paper we explore equilibrium pricing strategies in an infinite horizon repeated game for an oligopoly we model the interactions between three firms in a market of switchers and loyals our analysis shows that if there are sufficiently large number of switchers in the market the demand parameter is within an acceptable range and the firms have a sufficiently low discount rate alternating promotions between national firms can be an outcome of a perfect nash equilibrium between competing firms this equilibrium results in an implicit collusion between national firms and therefore suggests that price promotions can be interpreted as a long run strategy pursued by national firms to defend their market shares from possible encroachments of a third firm in this way we attempt to provide an explanation for the patterns of promotion observed in some industries and in particular the beverage industry

consumer price sensitivity in the retail industry latitude of acceptance with heterogeneous demand abstract estimating the effect of price changes on demand is an essential task for retailers this study proposes a methodology based on consumer utility for modeling the price thresholds phenomenon that allows for threshold asymmetry incorporates consumer heterogeneity and uses weekly aggregated brand level data unlike other studies based on consumer utility models which generate results only for the price elasticity of market share a methodology for estimating price elasticity of demand is also included data on fast moving goods detergents toilet paper soft drinks meats liquid juices and yogurts supplied by a major retail chain are used to demonstrate the existence of price thresholds and their effects on price elasticity in every case it was found that within the thresholds or latitude of acceptance consumers are relatively less sensitive to price variations while beyond them a higher sensitivity was observed in some cases a product brand was classified as inelastic within the latitude of acceptance and elastic outside of it

a transaction cost rationale for private branding and its implications for the choice of domestic vs offshore outsourcing in this study i take a transaction cost approach to explore the coincidence of private branding with offshore outsourcing two retail trends that have attracted substantial attention but have never been analyzed concurrently retailers now play an increased role in marketing a product to shoppers although their marketing efforts are usually specific to the supplier who brands the product this is called brand specificity a special case of asset specificity that drives up the cost of conducting the manufacturer retailer transaction especially when the parties are located in different nations with the right to brand a product being shifted from manufacturers to retailers private branding can eliminate this problem of brand specificity that inflicts a transaction cost penalty on offshore outsourcing which is why the two seemingly unrelated retail trends coexist data obtained from a national chain reveal that the retailer is more likely to brand a product that needs its marketing efforts but less motivated to outsource the product offshore before putting a private brand on it these results establish a transaction cost link between private branding and offshore outsourcing from which important theoretical and practical implications can be drawn

unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents in this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions we distinguish two cases i when actions are mutually observable among agents ii when actions are not observable at all in i there is a mechanism in which the first best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium in ii we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules however we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi stage mechanism that has a unique second best perfect bayesian equilibrium

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

unprotective tariffs ineffective liberalization and other mysteries an investigation of the endogenous dimensions of trade policy formation in australia 1 introductionsince its formation as a federation in 1901 australia embraced a fairly comprehensive tariff schedule in relation to imported manufactures 1 tariff rates fluctuated considerably over the years however over the course of the century they remained sufficiently high to earn australian manufacturing the reputation of one of the most heavily protected manufacturing sectors in the industrialized world 2 in recent years a number of liberalization waves have surfaced the most notable of these took place in 1973 1977 1988 1991 and most recently in 1994 with the signing of the uruguay round of the gatt agreement still tariffs remain a principal actor in australia s menu of industrial policies in a recent edition of the annual report of the productivity commission 3 published in november 1999 it is noted that although tariffs have dropped considerably since 1994 they remain an important form of assistance tariff assistance still accounts for around 90 of measured effective assistance to the manufacturing sector 4 p 52 given the pervasiveness of australian tariff policy the significant welfare implications of changes in that policy and the particular importance of international trade for this country ensuing from its idiomorphic cultural resource endowment and geographic characteristics 5 considerable research effort has been invested in the examination of various dimensions of this issue at the forefront of pertinent empirical research two items have attracted considerable interest 1 the host of determinants of the highly dispersed tariff concessions and 2 the impact of liberalization on imports research that falls in the category that examines the former including anderson 1980 conybeare 1984 aislabie 1988 and feaver and wilson 1998 is consistent at varying degrees with the theory of endogenous trade policy formation 6 according to the foundations of this theory tariff concessions may be viewed as public outcomes that facilitate a political equilibrium the mechanics are rather elementary when the profit loss that arises from import competition exceeds the transaction cost of a successful lobbying campaign for protection private interests will undertake such lobbying activities the higher the loss from foreign competition the more fervent the lobbying effort hence an increase in import penetration is likely to trigger greater protection7 trefler 1993 p 139 unlike this line of inquiry the critical causal relationship of interest to studies that fall in the category that investigates item 2 including simmons and smith 1994 relates to the effects of tariff changes on imports rather than the reverse the causal directions of the nature examined by studies that investigate issues 1 and 2 are of course not mutually exclusive higher import penetration increases tariffs and higher tariffs in turn decrease import penetration however despite the simultaneity of these variables studies of australia s trade policies associated with research lines 1 and 2 followed separate paths by only considering unidirectional causal relationships and yet these paths do converge the meeting point perplexing results on the one hand studies of endogenous protection such as anderson 1980 and aislabie 1988 have consistently failed to establish the expected result that an increase in import penetration will lead to higher tariffs on the other studies of trade liberalization often find that tariff reduction shave asurprisingly small effect on imports with a study by simmons and smith 1994 concluding that at least in relation to the examined industry removal of the tariff would have no effect on the level of imports p 57 it is important to note that analogous and equally puzzling findings pertaining to improbably smalle ffect so fliberalization on imports have been identified in the caseofothercountries suchastheunitedstates byanumberofauthors

multiattribute loss aversion and reference dependence evidence from the performing arts industry we study the prevalence of multiattribute loss aversion and reference effects in a revenue management setting based on data of individual level purchases over a series of concert performances the reference dependence that drives consumer choice is not only based on the price but also on observed sales as a fraction of the seating capacity during their past visits we find that consumers suffer from loss aversion on both prices and seats sold consumers incur significant utility loss when prices are above their references or when the actual seat sales are lower than their references we suggest pricing policies that can address consumer decisions driven by such reference dependence and loss aversion this paper was accepted by vishal gaur operations management

lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting abstract this paper develops a theory of tariff protection that incorporates cooperative behavior and lobbying governments use import tariffs or subsidies to maximize a weighted sum of lobbying contributions and general welfare governments do not use export taxes or subsidies and thus balance the interests of export and import competing lobbies in setting tariff levels in a symmetric model cooperation between governments is sustained by threats of punishment in future periods unless governments place too much weight on the future the result is a cooperative tariff otherwise the result is a reciprocal import subsidy

are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal a highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock the reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability bankruptcy constraint limits the payments the principal can make provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small this finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms even though limited liability becomes an issue for different ranges of liquidation values under the two schemes tournaments are still superior when the liquidation value of the firm is intermediate or large even though the limited liability constraint is still binding for intermediate values surprisingly uncertainty in the price of output strengthens the need for tournaments by expanding the range of liquidation values over which tournaments are dominant because price uncertainty introduces additional bankruptcy risk these findings provide insight into policy implications in the contracting out of services by state and local governments in procurement in rent seeking contests and in tournaments used by hmos

price coordination in distribution channels a dynamic perspective abstract in this study we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels i are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry over effects on demand ii should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities to answer these questions we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price the latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy we then compute and compare strategies total channel profits and individual profits under vertical integration and decentralization at steady state and along the optimal time paths one of our main findings states that for some values of the initial reference price there is a time interval where channel decentralization performs better than coordination during this transition period at least one of the channel members could be tempted to end his cooperation especially if he is not farsighted and if there are no binding agreements with the other channel partners

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

empirical generalizations from reference price research considerable theoretical justification for consumers use of psychological reference points exists from the research literature from a managerial perspective one of the most important applications of this concept is reference price an internal standard against which observed prices are compared in this paper we propose three empirical generalizations that are well supported in the marketing literature first there is ample evidence that consumers use reference prices in making brand choices second the empirical results on reference pricing also support the generalization that consumers rely on past prices as part of the reference price formation process third consistent with other research on loss aversion consumers have been found to be more sensitive to losses i e observed prices higher than reference prices than gains we also propose topics for further research on reference prices

the role of importers and exporters in the determination of the u s tariff preferences granted to latin america abstract this paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market to this end the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment the predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the united states and latin american countries the results suggest that latin american exporters and us importers lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the united states more interestingly these findings also show that u s importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences these results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries

a competitive dynamic pricing model when demand is interdependent over time abstract in this study we contribute to the dynamic pricing literature by developing a finite horizon model for two firms offering substitutable and nonperishable products with different quality levels customers can purchase and store the products even if they do not need them at the time in order to use them in future the stockpile of the products generated by customers affects the demand in future periods therefore the demand for each product not only is a function of prices and quality levels but also of the products stockpile levels in addition the stockpile levels change the customers consumption behavior more product in a stockpile leads to more consumption therefore we address not only the price and demand relationship but also the stockpiling and consumption relationship in a competitive environment the decision variable of each firm at the beginning of each period is its unit sale price we use a deterministic dynamic program to calculate the equilibrium prices at the beginning of each period by assuming that the market stockpile is public information we show the existence of a unique nash equilibrium we next consider the case when the firms do not know the market stockpile we then develop appropriate heuristics to calculate the optimal prices in each case a numerical study is also provided to calculate the price levels in different scenarios and compare their performances

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

competitive market structures a subset selection analysis market structure models are used to identify submarkets or to test for the presence of submarkets where within group competition is much stronger than across group competition the implicit assumption in such models is that the brands in a submarket compete on the basis of their shared product features however if significant variety seeking effect exist in the market such an assumption may not be valid we present a model based on a subset selection procedure for analyzing competitive market structures and develop tests of significance for variety seeking effects present in the market for each brand in the market the subset selection procedure identifies sets submarkets of brands that are in close competition the competitive market structure is defined by the possibly overlapping submarkets that are identified for each brand and the model provides insights on whether the brands in a submarket are of a reinforcing or a variety seeking kind the application of our model to two different consumer packaged goods markets highlights its contribution relative to extant methods

the bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets a well established phenomenon of consumer buying behavior is that consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference point and exhibit loss aversion i e their propensity to buy is more negatively affected by prices above the reference point than it is positively affected by prices below the reference point the objective of this paper is to analytically examine how the competitive strategy and profitability of firms are affected by the presence of consumer loss aversion in the price dimension although we assume that consumer loss aversion increases consumer propensity to search for lower prices we find that it does not necessarily lead to lower prices or profits when firms compete over multiple periods and when the consumer reference price in subsequent periods is affected by current prices specifically consumer loss aversion could lead to higher prices and profits when consumer valuation is sufficiently high relative to search costs and the proportion of consumers with positive search costs is in an intermediate range we also show that when forward looking firms incorporate the negative effect of price promotions on future profits the equilibrium range of price promotions may actually increase

dynamic risk sharing with two sided moral hazard abstract a group of risk averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consumption good individual outputs are observable but efforts are not the contracting problem admits a recursive formulation and the optimal value function is the fixed point of a contraction mapping when the agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period every continuation contract of an optimal contract is itself optimal the marginal utility ratio between one agent and another is a submartingale the results imply that it is in general important to restrict an agent whose moral hazard constraint is binding from saving through another agent within the risk sharing group limited commitment and long run implications of optimal contracting are also examined

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

incentive contracts in two sided moral hazards with multiple agents abstract the paper studies a contracting problem in which a principal enters in two sided moral hazards withnindependent agents there are no technological or informational linkages among thenagency problems despite this independence optimal incentive schemes essentially eliminate the principal s incentive problem when team size is large enough reputation like effects appear in a static setting through an improved aggregation of information about the actions of the principal one implication of this result is that it is generally suboptimal to require an agent s compensation to depend only on his own outcome another implication is the existence of purely informational economies of scale to increasing team size thus the concentration of otherwise unrelated transactions in a single firm creates wealth through a more efficient use of information about the principal s actions the paper also shows that extremely simple statistical contracts are approximately optimal in large teams the outcome of such contracts is observationally indistinguishable from standard principal agent contracts this provides a theoretical justification for using standard principal agent contracts in environments that involve two sided hazard in a fundamental way journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 d23

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

costly revenue raising and the case for favoring import competing industries abstract a standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export oriented industries to attract more assistance than import competing industries in reality however trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries this paper shows how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable in a standard protection for sale framework the model is then estimated and its predictions tested using u s tariff data an empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue raising is also obtained

how dynamic consumer response competitor response company support and company inertia shape long term marketing effectiveness long term marketing effectiveness is a high priority research topic for managers and emerges from the complex interplay among dynamic reactions of several market players this paper introduces restricted policy simulations to distinguish four dynamic forces consumer response competitor response company inertia and company support a rich marketing dataset allows the analysis of price display feature advertising and product line extensions the first finding is that consumer response differs significantly from the net effectiveness of product line extensions price feature and advertising in particular net sales effects are up to five times stronger and longer lasting than consumer response second this difference is not due to competitor response but to company action for tactical actions price and feature it takes the form of inertia as promotions last for several weeks for strategic actions advertising and product line extensions support by other marketing instruments greatly enhances dynamic consumer response this company action negates the postpromotion dip in consumer response and enhances the long term sales benefits of product line extensions feature and advertising therefore managers are urged to evaluate company decision rules for inertia and support when assessing long term marketing effectiveness

do tournaments solve the two sided moral hazard problem abstract the paper analyzes the optimality of relative performance evaluation via two part piece rate tournaments in incentive contracting with multiple agents and two sided moral hazard if the agents are risk averse it is shown that a tournament is optimal only when the following conditions hold i there is common uncertainty inflicted on the activities of the agents that is not contingent on their actions but can be contingent on the principal s action ii the principal sufficiently saves in transaction costs by employing a tournament iii the number of agents is sufficiently large then the feedback effect of using a tournament to monitor the agents is that the principal s moral hazard problem is relaxed when the principal takes a single action it can also be relaxed when the principal can vary her actions with the agents but there are economies of scale in her activity absent common uncertainty the optimum scheme is shown to be a fixed performance standard rather than a tournament but if the agents are risk neutral a tournament can still be optimal provided that ii and iii hold

protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing we extend the protection for sale framework to non tari barriers introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the grossman and helpman 1994 model and its empirical implementation where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection the econometric analysis supports our augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model jel classification f13

classical statistics as a theory of incentives abstract the use of likelihood ratio contracts in principal agent situations is common they are known to be optimal for the principal in complete information situations although they do not take explicit account of the strategic interaction between principal and agent this paper extends the comparison between bayesian nash equilibrium and likelihood ratio contracts to incomplete information environments it is shown that likelihood ratio contracts may be equilibrium contracts when the principal is ignorant of the agent s costs but that they typically are not when the agent has private information about the effects of his action

multi period pricing in the presence of competition and social influence abstract this paper examines single and dynamic pricing policies of two competing firms over two periods in the presence of social influence assuming two firms adopt the same pricing policy we find that under either pricing policy firm profits always decrease with the degree of social influence firms prefer dynamic pricing policy when social influence is either relatively weak or sufficiently strong for firms under dynamic pricing policy to set zero prices in the first period otherwise single pricing policy is more preferable the conclusions are similar when the market size varies over periods except that dynamic pricing policy is always more profitable if the market size in period 2 is sufficiently large we have further compared the two pricing policies with posted pricing policy the results show that dynamic pricing policy dominates when social influence is relatively weak while posted pricing policy dominates when social influence is sufficiently strong because of the synergy between social influence and the reference price effect finally when each firm freely chooses either single or dynamic pricing policy we find that if the degree of social influence is relatively small two asymmetric equilibria exist where two firms adopt different pricing policies if the degree of social influence is very large however the unique equilibrium is both firms adopting dynamic pricing policy these findings provide important implications for firms to make more informed pricing decisions in an increasingly competitive environment with strong social influence

consumer price and promotion expectations an experimental study the authors report results from a controlled experiment designed to investigate the impact of a brand s price promotion frequency and the depth of promotional price discounts on the price consumers

costly distribution and the non equivalence of tariffs and quotas when governments impose a quota or tariff on imports it is well known that the resulting rents and revenues trigger costly rent seeking and revenue seeking activities which are welfare reducing and may be economically more significant than the efficiency losses resulting from the protectionist induced resource misallocation repeated interaction among firms can eliminate wasteful rent and revenue seeking expenditures through cooperation we show that while aggregate outcomes are equivalent under tariffs and quotas if cooperation arises the conditions under which cooperation arises differ by policy this difference arises because a firm must incur additional cost to physically import and distribute the goods associated with additional quota licenses whereas there is no such cost when it comes to consuming additional tariff revenue thus quotas and tariffs are non equivalent we provide a simple sufficient condition under which cooperative elimination of rent seeking under quotas is easier than cooperative elimination of revenue seeking under tariffs and therefore a quota is the preferred policy whenever the policy admits cooperation

predicting competitive response to a major policy change combining game theoretic and empirical analyses this research uses procter gamble s value pricing initiative as a context for testing whether actual competitor and retailer response to a major policy change can be predicted using a game theoretic model we first estimate demand functions for p g and competitor brands from the period before value pricing was initiated we then formulate a dynamic manufacturer retailer stackelberg model that includes p g a national brand competitor and a retailer the model takes p g s move as given and prescribes the price and promotion response of the competitors and the retailer we substitute the estimated demand parameters into the model to obtain prescriptions for each competitor and the retailer and see whether these prescriptions are related to the actual response we find that the dynamic game theoretic model calibrated with empirical estimates of demand parameters has significant predictive power we also test the predictive power of two benchmark models the first is based on the reaction function approach of leeflang and wittink leeflang peter s h wittink dick r 1992 diagnosing competitive reactions using aggregated scanner data internat j res marketing9 39 57 and the second is a simplification of our dynamic model where the retailer is not strategic the dynamic game theoretic model performs better than either benchmark

dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel abstract in this paper we study a dynamic two player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price we consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its variations contribute to the building of an internal reference price one of the model s distinctive features is that it accounts for the two meanings of price i e its classical objective measure of the cost of acquiring a particular quantity of the product and its subjective roles as an assessment of the quality of the product and an evaluation of gains or losses deal vs sacrifice resulting from buying a cheap or an expensive product this dual computation is done with respect to the internal reference price our objective is to investigate the impact of retailer s myopia on the pricing strategies and payoffs of channel members in this context a myopic retailer is an agent that disregards the effects of its pricing strategy on the evolution of the perceived brand quality and the reference price

efficient algorithms for the dynamic pricing problem with reference price effect we analyze a finite horizon dynamic pricing model in which demand at each period depends on not only the current price but also past prices through reference prices a unique feature but also a significant challenge in this model is the asymmetry in reference price effect which implies that the underlying optimization problem is nonsmooth and no standard optimization methods can be applied we identify a few key structural properties of the problem which enable us to develop strongly polynomial time algorithms to compute the optimal prices for several plausible scenarios we complement our exact algorithms by proposing an approximation heuristic and provide an upper bound on the optimal objective value finally we conduct numerical experiments to study the optimal price path and demonstrate the value of dynamic pricing when demands are seasonal we further compare numerically one of the exact algorithms with the heuristic and offer managerial suggestions this paper was accepted by yinyu ye optimization

technical note dynamic pricing with gain seeking reference price effects we study a dynamic pricing problem of a firm facing reference price effects at an aggregate demand level where demand is more sensitive to gains than losses we find that even the myopic pricing strategy belongs to one type of discontinuous maps which can exhibit complex dynamics over time our numerical examples show that in general the optimal pricing strategies may not admit any simple characterizations and the resulting reference price price dynamics can be very complicated we then show for a special case that a cyclic skimming pricing strategy is optimal and we provide conditions to guarantee the optimality of high low pricing strategies

the impact of reference price effects on the profitability of price promotions this paper investigates the impact of reference price effects on retailer price promotions and describes why these effects can make promoting profitable first we analyze the profit impact of reference price effects generated by a single period of promotion the promotion can increase profit if the gain that these effects create in the promotion period outweighs the loss they create in future periods we then describe how retailers can estimate the optimal strategy of recurring promotions that maximizes profits from reference price effects over a time horizon examples of such strategies are presented for a retailer selling a national brand of peanut butter we obtain insights into how promotion prices timing and profits are affected by changes in costs interest rates consumers reactions to reference price effects and error in estimates used in the model the retailer s optimal reaction to a trade deal is also examined this strategy involves a phase of increased promotion activity sandwiched between phases of decreased activity we explain these results using the effects described in the single period model

an empirical analysis of internal and external reference prices using scanner data single source yogurt data are used to examine whether both internal and external reference prices affect purchase decisions internal reference prices are memory resident prices based on actual fair or other price concepts external reference prices are observed stimuli such as regular prices that stores may display along with a sale price for comparability discrete choice models with variables representing the two types of reference prices are estimated and both types of variables are found to have significant effects on purchase probabilities this suggests that consumers may use multiple reference points in evaluating price in purchase decisions in addition a model using an indicator of a sale price discount explains purchase probabilities as well as one that models the actual discount which suggests that consumers may be reacting to the indication of savings rather than to the amount of the discount

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

the effects of consumers price expectations on sellers dynamic pricing strategies abstract the authors propose a dynamic market equilibrium model to investigate how consumers form price expectations and how these expectations influence their sequential search behavior and prices in the market they derive a perfect bayesian nash equilibrium and show that whereas higher current period prices induce search consumers who observe higher historical prices form higher price expectations become more pessimistic and search less furthermore the authors show that when prices increase as a result of an increase in marginal costs consumers respond by searching more which then leads to higher prices and instant price adjustment in contrast because consumer search activities decline when prices fall sellers may respond by lowering their prices just enough to dampen consumers search tendencies when costs decrease the authors test their theoretical model and its implications and find support for it in a series of simulated market experiments

information transmission and inefficient lobbying abstract in a seminal paper grossman and helpman 1994 introduced a framework to understand how lobbying influences the choice of import export tariffs in this paper we extend their analysis and assume that lobbies have private information to analyze the effects of information transmission in a grossman and helpman lobby game information transmission leads to two agency costs one refers to the cost of signaling and the other to the cost of screening the lobby s competitiveness the signaling cost reduces distortions resulting from the screening cost on the other hand distortions from the screening cost enhance the signaling cost the two combined effects generate more distortions in the political game than each effect separately tariff protection and lobbies rents are lower than those found in grossman and helpman s truthful equilibrium therefore information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of rent seeking activities

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

efficiency in partnerships we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a partnership to be able to sustain efficiency when the output is stochastic when limited liability is imposed we show that only the level of the average liability of the partnership is important the individual levels of liability are irrelevant however the allocation of the total liability among the partners is crucial when additional conditions such as neutrality or individual rationality are imposed

negotiated trade restrictions with private political pressure we consider a home government with political pressure to restrict trade the foreign country is compensated with a portion of the tariff revenues or quota rents but cannot directly observe the political pressure abroad in this setting the two countries negotiate over the volume of trade and transfer of rents depending on the level of political pressure we determine globally optimal incentive compatible trade policies in which the home government has no incentive to overstate or understate the pressure for protection

pricing and promotions in asymmetric duopolies this paper develops a modeling framework for making promotions decisions in contrast to some of the prior research the framework explicitly models promotions its central feature is the view of promotions competition as a multistage game in which regular prices are chosen first followed by the choice of promotion depths and frequencies it is used to illustrate the nature of competition between a national brand and private label in equilibrium the national brand promotes to ensure that the private label does not try to attract consumers away from the national brand moreover the private label does not promote this equilibrium is also contrasted with varian s framework used by other researchers in which mixed strategy equilibrium prices are interpreted as promotions

the political economy of international trade and factor mobility abstract free trade in goods and factors is efficient when we move away from economic theory and consider the policies actually followed by governments we observe distortions being implemented both on goods and factors trades it is natural then to question the relative merits of the two types of intervention and the normative literature has provided only partial answers we ask then why is the international flow of goods and factors not free and the political economy literature has looked at the two issues only separately in studying the determination of trade policy a theoretical paradigm has emerged focusing on the role of influence driven contributions this approach has also found strong empirical support the literature on the political economy of factor mobility on the other hand is fragmented distortions in labor and capital flows are typically the subject of different studies and only recently a unified framework has been proposed more work has to be done in this area as well as in integrating the political economy of trade and factor movements

pricing and manufacturing decisions when demand is a function of prices in multiple periods in most deterministic manufacturing decision models demand is either known or induced by pricing decisions in the period that the demand is experienced however in more realistic market scenarios consumers make purchase decisions with respect to price not only in the current period but also in past and future periods we model a joint manufacturing pricing decision problem accounting for that portion of demand realized in each period that is induced by the interaction of pricing decisions in the current period and in previous periods we formulate a mathematical programming model and develop solution techniques we identify structural properties of our models and develop closed form solutions and effective heuristics for various special cases of our models finally we conduct extensive computational experiments to quantify the effectiveness of our heuristics and to develop managerial insights

asymmetric reference price effects and dynamic pricing policies we consider a group of frequently purchased consumer brands which are partial substitutes and examine two situations the first where the group of brands is managed by a retailer and second where the brands compete in an oligopoly we assume that demand is a function of actual prices and reference prices and develop optimal dynamic pricing policies for each situation in addition to researchers studying pricing strategy our results may interest retailers choosing between hi lo pricing and an everyday low price and manufacturers assessing whether to follow procter gamble s lead and replace a policy of funding consumer price reductions through trade deals with a constant wholesale price a reference price is an anchoring level formed by customers based on the pricing environment the literature suggests that demand for a brand depends not only on the brand price but also whether the brand price is greater than the reference price a perceived loss or is less than it a perceived gain the responses to gains and losses are asymmetric broadly speaking we find that when enough consumers weigh gains more than losses the optimal pricing policy is cyclical likewise when they weigh losses more than gains a constant price is optimal thus we provide a rationale for dynamic pricing which is quite distinct from the three explanations previously offered 1 decreasing unit variable costs due to learning effects 2 the transfer of inventory to consumers who face lower inventory holding costs than do retailers and 3 competitive effects our explanations apply even when the other explanations do not i e in mature product categories where learning effects are minimal when retailer inventories are minimized through the use of just in time policies and when competitive effects do not exist as in a monopoly greenleaf 1995 has shown numerically that in the presence of reference price effects the optimal pricing policy for a monopolist can be cyclical we first analytically extend greenleaf s result to a monopolist with a constant cost of goods facing a homogeneous market where all customers either weigh gains more than losses or vice versa using this building block we examine a monopolist retailer managing multiple brands we assume that demand is a linear function of prices of multiple brands and together with an expression which reflects the reference price effect further we assume that the retailer maximizes average profit per period next we analyze a duopoly and extend the results to an oligopoly we assume that the manufacturers are able to set the retail prices as in an integrated channel here we retain the same demand function as for the retailer and derive markov perfect nash equilibria we use two alternative processes of reference price formation the exponential smoothed es past price process which is frequently used in the literature and for the multi brand situations the recently proposed reference brand rb process hardie johnson and fader 1993 in the latter the reference price is the current price of the last brand bought the reference brand we adapt the individual level rb formulation in hardie et al to an aggregate demand specification for the es process we obtain most results analytically for the rb process we use simulation finally we extend our results to a population with two customer segments segment 1 which weighs gains more than losses and segment 2 which does the opposite i e is loss averse when the market consists exclusively of segment 1 customers and es is the reference price process we find that prices are cyclical in all cases analyzed i e for a monopoly a monopolist retailer managing multiple brands a duopoly and an oligopoly if the rb formulation is the underlying process a monopolist retailer managing two brands uses cyclical prices but in a duopoly the equilibrium solution is for the brands to maintain constant prices when all customers belong to segment 2 i e they are loss averse constant prices are optimal in all cases for both reference price formulations when the population consists of both segment 1 and segment 2 and the es process applies we develop a sufficient condition for cyclical pricing policies to be optimal the condition is expressed in terms of the proportion of the two segment sizes the absolute difference between the gain and loss parameters of each segment and their respective exponential smoothing constants interestingly for reasonable values of the latter two factors cyclical policies are optimal even when the proportion of segment 1 is quite small similar magnitudes are obtained numerically for the rb case

hysteresis price acceptance and reference prices the existence of price thresholds in grocery retailing is well documented most authors explain the existence of price thresholds using assimilation contrast theory adaptation level theory or prospect theory however each of these theories is untenable if consumers are believed to behave rationally we offer a theoretical explanation grounded in real options theory rot and economic hysteresis we test the rot hypothesis against three plausible alternatives using a maximum likelihood friction model that we augment for unobserved heterogeneity our findings support the rot hypothesis and suggest that the existence of price thresholds in aggregate data are driven by a common recognition of real option values which do not disappear with the inclusion of consumer heterogeneity

dynamic pricing with loss averse consumers and peak end anchoring we study the dynamic pricing implications of a new behaviorally motivated reference price mechanism based on the peak end memory mode this model suggests that consumers anchor on a reference price that is a weighted average of the lowest and most recent prices loss averse consumers are more sensitive to perceived losses than gains relative to this reference price we find that a range of constant pricing policies is optimal for the corresponding dynamic pricing problem this range is wider the more consumers anchor on lowest prices and it persists when buyers are loss neutral in contrast with previous literature in a transient regime the optimal pricing policy is monotone and converges to a steady state price which is lower the more extreme and salient the low price anchor is our results suggest that behavioral regularities such as peak end anchoring and loss aversion limit the benefits of varying prices and caution that the adverse effects of deep discounts on the firm s optimal prices and profits might be more enduring than previous models predict

voluntary export restraints antidumping procedure and domestic politics a voluntary export restraint ver is preferred to a tariff by a government concerned about electoral returns when the influence of industry profits is large relative to the losses to consumers from higher prices if the foreign firm is uncertain of these pressures the antidumping code facilitates the complete transfer of the relevant information and generates a ver rather than a tariff in equilibrium the choice across instruments is determined by the political attributes domestic and foreign profits rise with the antidumping generated ver and the ver lowers the volume of trade by more than the expected duty copyright 1996 by american economic association

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines