interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

understanding bank runs the importance of depositor bank relationships and networks we use a unique new database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run we use minute by minute depositor withdrawal data to understand the effectiveness of deposit insurance the role of social networks and the importance of bank depositor relationships in influencing depositor propensity to run we employ methods from the epidemiology literature which examine how diseases spread to estimate transmission probabilities of depositors running and the significant underlying factors we find that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing bank runs further our results suggest that social network effects are important but are mitigated by other factors in particular the length and depth of the bank depositor relationship depositors with longer relationships and those who have availed of loans from a bank are less likely to run during a crisis suggesting that cross selling acts not just as a revenue generator but also as a complementary insurance mechanism for the bank finally we find there are long term effects of a solvent bank run in that depositors who run do not return back to the bank our results help understand the underlying dynamics of bank runs and hold important policy implications

market contagion evidence from the panics of 1854 and 1857 to test a model of contagion where individuals hear some bad news and communicate it to their acquaintances who then pass it on leading to a market panic requires a knowledge of the information networks of participants something hitherto unavailable for two panics in the 1850s this paper examines the behavior of irish depositors in a new york bank as recent immigrants their social network was determined largely by their place of origin in ireland and where they lived in new york during both panics this social network turns out to be the prime determinant of behavior

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

did bank distress stifle innovation during the great depression we find a negative relationship between bank distress and the level quality and trajectory of firm level innovation during the great depression particularly for r d firms operating in capital intensive industries however we also show that because a sufficient number of r d intensive firms were located in counties with lower levels of bank distress or were operating in less capital intensive industries the negative effects were mitigated in aggregate although depression era bank distress was associated with the stifling of innovation our results also help to explain why technological development was still robust following one of the largest shocks in the history of the u s banking system

bank runs and institutions the perils of intervention we study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create we show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals instead once a run is underway benevolent government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals placing further strain on the banking system when depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals their incentive to participate in the run increases in fact ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self fulfilling run to occur jel g21 g8

consequences of bank distress during the great depression the consequences of bank distress for the economy during the depression remain an area of unresolved controversy since john m keynes 1931 and irving fisher 1933 macroeconomists have argued that bank distress magnified the extent of the economic decline during the depression as the intermediaries controlling money and credit banks were in a special position to transmit their distress to other sectors but the mechanism through which banking distress mattered for the economy has been hotly contested milton friedman and anna j schwartz 1963 saw the contraction in the money multiplier driven in their view by panicked depositors withdrawals of deposits as the primary mechanism through which banking distress affected the real economy they described the mechanism transmitting banking distress to the real sector as operating at the national level through changes in the aggregate supply of money and interest rates bank distress reduced the money supply available to the public either through the closure of banks and the consequent freezing of bank deposits or the withdrawals of deposits by depositors that feared bank failure ben s bernanke 1983 building on fisher 1933 emphasized the transmission of monetary shocks via their effects on the balance sheets of borrowers and on the supply of credit by banks borrowers balance sheets were worsened by debt deflation as the result of fixed dollar debt obligations borrowers net worth and cash flow declined with the rising value of debt service costs relative to income borrowers with positive net present value projects but weak balance sheets had less internally generated retained earnings to invest and could not qualify for credit furthermore bernanke argued that the contraction of the money supply produced contraction of nominal income and prices relative to fixed debt service which weakened borrowers balance sheets and in turn weakened banks not only did firms financial distress reduce the number of qualified borrowers the contraction in banks net worth forced a reduction in the supply of bank loans to qualified borrowers many firms and individuals relied on banks for credit and as those banks suffered losses of capital due to asset value declines and contractions in deposits as depositors reacted to bank weakness by withdrawing their funds even borrowers with viable projects and strong balance sheets experienced a decrease in the effective supply of loanable funds bernanke termed the combined weakening of borrowers balance sheets and the contraction in bank credit supply a rise in the cost of credit intermediation the scarcity of perfect substitutes for the positive net present value investments of firms with weak balance sheets and for the credit supplied by existing banks implies that the weakening of firms and banks balance sheets the disappearance of banks and the contraction in surviving banks lending made it more difficult for the economy to channel funds to their best use thus what began as a contraction in aggregate demand became a contraction in aggregate supply which magnified adverse economic shocks and prolonged and deepened the depression the financial distress of firms and banks and the decline in bank lending were not only symptoms of the depression but means for magnifying the shocks that caused the depression bernanke s statistical evidence in support of this story is derived from time series analysis at the national level in calomiris graduate school of business 601 uris hall columbia university 3022 broadway new york ny 10027 and national bureau of economic research e mail cc374 columbia edu mason department of finance drexel university 3141 chestnut street philadelphia pa 19104 e mail joe mason drexel edu we thank valerie ramey david wheelock charles himmelberg steve zeldes gary gorton two referees and seminar participants at columbia university wharton northwestern university and the 2001 economic history association meetings for helpful comments on an earlier draft we gratefully acknowledge support from the national science foundation the university of illinois and the federal reserve bank of st louis

why do bank runs look like panic a new explanation this paper demonstrates that even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria a bank run may still occur when depositors expectations on the bank s fundamentals do not change more specifically a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank specific information will be revealed or when they learn that precise bank specific information will not be revealed the results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs it also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

a critical review of contagion risk in banking the recent financial crisis has focused the attention of scholars and policymakers on how to improve financial stability through better macro prudential regulation and supervision in this paper we compare the existing theoretical and empirical literature on contagion through the banking system it is argued that the structure of the interbank market the size of banks the linkages among them the level of correlation of their investments and the transparency of the regulator are key factors in determining the possibility of contagion we discuss the different findings and present avenues for future research

in which context is the option clause desirable the option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels it has been used within the diamond and dybvig j pol econ 91 401 419 1983 framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance this literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts it will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt it will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in a free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt related agency problems and b under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self fulfilling prophecies it will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt makes the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems

do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline deposit insurance and banking crises this paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline we focus on the experiences of argentina chile and mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises regardless of bank fundamentals and investors responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises

fundamentals panics and bank distress during the depression we assemble bank level and other data for fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure fundamentals explain bank failure risk well the first two friedman schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure the third friedman schwartz crisis is more ambiguous but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate the final crisis early 1933 saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre 1933 bank failures even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact

cyclical correlations credit contagion and portfolio losses abstract we model aggregate credit losses on large portfolios of financial positions contracted with firms subject to both cyclical default correlation and direct default contagion processes cyclical correlation is due to the dependence of firms on common economic factors contagion is associated with the local interaction of firms with their business partners we provide an explicit normal approximation of the distribution of portfolio losses we quantify the relation between the variability of global economic fundamentals strength of local firm interaction and the fluctuation of losses we find that cyclical oscillations in fundamentals dominate average losses while local interaction causes additional fluctuations of losses around their average the strength of the contagion induced loss variability depends on the complexity of the business partner network

bank runs in emerging market economies evidence from turkey s special finance houses recent banking crises in emerging market countries have renewed debates about deposit insurance because insurance erodes banks incentives to manage risks prudently some argue that its elimination would improve bank stability yet eliminating insurance could be de stabilizing if it recreates risks of self fulfilling runs this paper examines dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of runs on turkey s special finance houses an uninsured sub sector of islamic banks detailed data on withdrawals are analyzed in a vector autoregressive framework that enables us to distinguish between informational and self fulfilling elements of runs we found that both types of dynamics were at work during the runs suggesting a role for deposit insurance judiciously used in ruling out expectational problems that fuel tendencies to run

sources of panics evidence from the weekly data abstract we use weekly data 1867 1933 to investigate the sources of banking and financial panics we find that while a panic s exact starting date is unpredictable one can identify environments conducive to panics a lack of liquidity in financial markets seems to be a key source results also reveal the effectiveness of the aldrich vreeland act inelastizing the money supply and shortening the panic of 1914 and suggest that the panic of 1933 may have been caused by a speculative attack on the gold backed us dollar via the banks as opposed to a run on the banks directly

the evolution of a financial crisis collapse of the asset backed commercial paper market this paper documents runs on asset backed commercial paper abcp programs in 2007 we find that one third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the abcp crisis and that runs as well as yields and maturities for new issues were related to program level and macro financial risks these findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics have implications for commercial paper investors degree of risk intolerance and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures

tail risk and systemic risk of us and eurozone financial institutions in the wake of the global financial crisis we evaluate multiple market based measures for us and eurozone individual bank tail risk and bank systemic risk we apply statistical extreme value analysis to the tails of bank equity capital losses to estimate the likelihood of individual institutions financial distress as well as individual banks exposure to each other spillover risk and to global shocks extreme systematic risk the estimation procedure presupposes that bank equity returns are heavy tailed and tail dependent as identifying assumption using both us and eurozone banks allows one to make a cross atlantic comparison of tail risks and systemic stability we also assess to what extent magnitudes of tail risk and systemic risk have been altered by the global financial crisis the results suggest that both tail risk and systemic risk in the us are higher than in the eurozone regardless of the considered sample period

dynamic debt runs and financial fragility evidence from the 2007 abcp crisis we use the 2007 asset backed commercial paper abcp crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs our model features dilution risk maturing short term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders making runs more likely the model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage asset values and asset liquidity but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch the strength of guarantees and asset volatility

information contagion and bank herding we show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks when bank loan returns have a common systematic factor the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor the increase in a bank s cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality in addition to the systematic risk factor hence banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives

an experiment on the causes of bank run contagions abstract to understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions we conduct bank run experiments in a modified diamond dybvig setup with two banks left and right the banks liquidity levels are either linked or independent left bank depositors see their bank s liquidity level before deciding right bank depositors only see left bank withdrawals before deciding we find that left bank depositors actions significantly affect right bank depositors behavior even when liquidities are independent furthermore a panic may be a one way street an increase in left bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the right bank but a decrease does not calm depositors

ripples of fear the diffusion of a bank panic community reactions against organizations can be driven by negative information spread through a diffusion process that is distinct from the diffusion of organizational practices bank panics offer

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

the information sensitivity of debt in good and bad times abstract we empirically show the dynamics of information production and information sensitivity of bank debt around the great recession as more precise information is produced at the onset of the crisis bank debt becomes informationally sensitive along two separate dimensions first precise information amplifies the effect of market expectations on default risk second for banks that are already expected to perform poorly more precise information further increases default risk both effects are muted in good times overall our findings are consistent with information based models of financial crises

the link between life insurance activities and economic growth some new evidence abstract this paper applies the panel seemingly unrelated regressions augmented dickey fuller suradf test to re investigate the stationarity properties of real life insurance premiums per capita and real gross domestic product gdp per capita for 41 countries within three levels of income covering 1979 2007 our empirical results first reveal that the variables in these countries are a mixture of i 0 and i 1 processes and that the traditional panel unit root tests could lead to misleading inferences second for the estimated half lives the degrees of mean reversion are greater in high income countries third there is concrete evidence favoring the hypothesis of a long run equilibrium relationship between real gdp and real life insurance premiums after allowing for the heterogeneous country effect the long run estimated panel parameter results indicate that a 1 increase in the real life premium raises real gdp by 0 06 finally we determine that the development of life insurance markets and economic growth exhibit long run and short run bidirectional causalities these findings offer several useful insights for policy makers and researchers

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

the federal reserve and panic prevention the roles of financial regulation and lender of last resort this paper surveys the role of the federal reserve within the financial regulatory system with particular attention to the interaction of the fed s role as both a supervisor and a lender of last resort the institutional design of the federal reserve system was aimed at preventing banking panics primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window this new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s after which the fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create stigma for window borrowing policies that contributed to the panics of the great depression the legislation of the new deal era centralized fed power in the board of governors and over the next 75 years the fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks nevertheless prior to the recent crisis the fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort with the latter role weakened further by stigma the fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly as the fed begins its second century there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention

depositor behavior under macroeconomic risk evidence from bank runs in emerging economies depositor behavior has been associated with bank specific characteristics random runs or contagion episodes using evidence on the 2000 02 bank runs in argentina and uruguay this paper shows that macroeconomic risk is also important few macroeconomic shocks can quickly cause large runs macroeconomic risk affects deposits regardless of traditional bank specific characteristics furthermore bank exposure to macroeconomic factors can explain differences in deposit withdrawals during crises the evolution of bank specific characteristics is mainly driven by macroeconomic factors while the informational content of bank specific variables declines overall depositors seem responsive to risk in a broader sense than that often considered by the literature

corporate entrepreneurship and financial performance the case of management leveraged buyouts executive summary leveraged buyouts lbos have created much controversy in the literature centering on their potential effect on a company s ability to innovate engage in new ventures and support entrepreneurial projects some believe that post lbo debt reduces the financial resources available for entrepreneurial activities conversely others argue that despite the burden of debt some lbos provide executives with an opportunity to innovate and take risks malone 1989 however past studies have focused primarily on changes in r d spending and ignored other corporate entrepreneurship ce activities a firm might pursue additionally these studies have not documented the changes in ce after a management led lbo thus past studies offer only a snapshot of the effect of lbos on ce finally earlier studies did not directly examine the association between changes in entrepreneurial activities after the lbo and changes in performance to address these shortcomings this study adds to the literature in three ways first it compares a company s pre and post lbo commitment to corporate entrepreneurship ce measured along two dimensions innovation and venturing second the study compares pre and post company performance levels third the study shows how changes in a company s entrepreneurial activities impact performance therefore the following hypotheses were tested h1 a company s commitment to ce activities increases after an lbo h2a company performance will be higher after an lbo than before the transaction h2b post lbo company performance will surpass that of the firm s industry average h3 changes in post lbo ce activities venturing and innovations are positively associated with company financial performance data were collected from 47 lbo companies data were gathered from secondary sources to augment and validate interview data data collected from two executives per firm were averaged and the mean was then used in all analyses data covered the three years immediately before and three years immediately after the lbo companies in the sample were selected based on three criteria first at least 25 of the value of the lbo should have been paid by the firm s senior executives vice presidents and higher second the firm must have gone through a single lbo and must have remained private through the period of the study that eliminated reverse lbos from consideration finally the firm must have undergone its lbo at least three years before data collection this provided an opportunity to observe changes in a company s ce and performance multivariate analysis of covariance mancova analysis of covariance ancova and multiple regression were used to test the study s hypotheses the results supported h1 showing that lbo companies increased their commitment to developing new products placed greater emphasis on commercializing their technology enhanced the quality and size of their rd and intensified their new venture efforts however r d spending did not change significantly after the lbo the results also showed that post lbo company performance was significantly higher than pre lbo levels and the industry s average thus supporting h2a and h2b finally as stated in h3 changes in a company s ce activities were significantly associated with changes in post lbo company performance leveraged buyouts lbos have created considerable controversy among scholars executives and public policy makers concern centers on the potential impact of an lbo on a company s willingness to innovate and engage in entrepreneurial ventures to date little empirical research has been devoted to documenting the changes that occur in a company s entrepreneurial behavior after an lbo and to linking these changes to company performance using data from 47 lbos this study s results lead to three conclusions first companies reported increases in their product development technology related alliances r d staff size and capabilities and new business creation activities moreover these firms did not change their r d spending or the focus of r d projects second post lbo company performance was higher than pre lbo levels third changes in corporate entrepreneurship activities after lbos were significantly and positively associated with changes in company performance

bank failures and bank fundamentals a comparative analysis of latin america and east asia during the nineties using bank level data abstract this paper uses bank level data from recent banking crises in east asia and latin america to address the following two questions 1 to what extent did individual bank conditions explain the failures 2 in terms of their fundamentals was it mainly the weak banks ex ante that failed in the crisis countries the results show that for the two regions bank level fundamentals significantly affect the likelihood of collapse for these banks systemic shocks both macroeconomic and liquidity that triggered the crises mainly destabilized the weak banks ex ante particularly in east asia which raises questions about the role that regional differences play for the degree of banking sector resilience to systemic shocks in the financial and macroeconomic environment

bank net worth and frustrated monetary policy abstract i present a model in which bank net worth determines both loan market competition and monetary transmission to firm borrowing rates in the model banks are local monopolists for borrowers near them when they are flush with equity banks expand their lending compete for customers at the edges of their markets and pass through changes in the monetary policy rate to their loan rates when they lose substantial equity banks consolidate retreat from rivalry and frustrate monetary transmission the model explains why interest rate pass through weakens after financial crises its predictions are consistent with several facts about bank to firm lending

building an incentive compatible safety net abstract bank safety nets originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems have become an important destabilizing influence government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net

the banking panics in the united states in the 1930s some lessons for today in this paper we discuss the lessons learned from the us banking panics in the 1930s for the response by the federal reserve to the crisis of 2008 we revisit the debate over illiquidity versus insolvency in the banking crises of the 1930s and provide empirical evidence that the banking crises largely reflected illiquidity shocks in the recent crisis the fed under bernanke had well learned the lesson from the banking panics of the 1930s of conducting expansionary monetary policy to meet demands for liquidity however unlike in the 1930s the deeper problem of the recent crisis was not illiquidity but insolvency and especially the fear of insolvency of counterparties a number of virtually insolvent us banks deemed too big and too interconnected to fail were rescued by fiscal bail outs

suspension of payments bank failures and the nonbank public s losses abstract we present evidence on the effects of suspensions of payments from an episode that is close to a controlled experiment for examining those effects in 1861 about 44 of the banks in wisconsin closed 81 of the banks in illinois closed and noteholders suffered substantial losses the historical record suggests that an effective suspension of payments in wisconsin but not in illinois may explain the difference our statistical evidence indicates that the suspension of payments increased the probability of a bank remaining open by about 21 percentage points and decreased noteholders losses by about 14 cents per dollar

contagion and bank failures during the great depression the june 1932 chicago banking panic the authors examine the social costs of asymmetric information induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance their case study is the chicago bank panic of june 1932 the authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks copyright 1997 by american economic association

alternatives for distressed banks during the great depression using data on individual banks during the great depression i find that institutions that failed during periods in which failures were especially numerous such as the banking panics appear to have been at least as financially sound as banks that were able to pursue alternative resolution strategies such as merging with another institution or suspending and recapitalizing during less extreme periods this result suggests that problems associated with having numerous banks in distress simultaneously during the depression may have exacerbated the number of banks closed and the economic downturn

the political lessons of depression era banking reform ironically the primary motivations for the main bank regulatory reforms in the 1930s regulation q the separation of investment banking from commercial banking and the creation of federal deposit insurance were to preserve and enhance two of the most disastrous policies that contributed to the severity and depth of the great depression unit banking and the real bills doctrine other regulatory changes affecting the allocation of power between the fed and the treasury were intended to reduce the independence of the fed while giving the opposite impression the ill conceived banking legislation of the 1930s took very little time to pass but a great deal of time to disappear the overarching lesson is that the aftermath of crises are moments of high risk in public policy the great depression provoked banking reform legislation that was quick comprehensive and unusually responsive to popular opinion each of these three aspects increases the risk that regulation will have adverse consequences

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

too many to fail evidence of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak this paper studies bank failures in 21 emerging market countries in the 1990s by using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak this too many to fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors financial crises the too big to fail effect domestic financial development and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers the paper also shows that the too many to fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit

bank asset liquidation and the propagation of the u s great depression we hypothesize that financial disintermediation during and after the great depression arose from the slow liquidation of failed bank deposits empirical results from incorporating the stock of failed national bank deposits for the period 1921 40 in vector autoregression var models suggest that the stock of deposits in closed banks undergoing liquidation is as important as money stock in terms of explaining output changes over forecast horizons from one to three years hence we infer that the dynamic effects of banking sector shocks were cumulative and pervasive during and after the depression