spectrum auction designs and revenue variations this study examines a sample of 93 national 3g spectrum auctions for the period 2000 2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations an implied reduced form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid per mhz per million populations values to regulator determined auction design characteristics auction competitiveness mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents the analysis reveals that among other factors all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3g spectrum auction revenues

the poverty gap in school spending following the introduction of title i abstract title i of the 1965 elementary and secondary education act explicitly directed more federal aid for k 12 education to poorer areas for the first time in us history with a goal of promoting regional convergence in school spending using newly collected data we find some evidence that title i narrowed the gap in per pupil school spending between richer and poorer states in the short to medium run however the program was small relative to then existing poverty gaps in school spending even in the absence of crowd out by local or state governments the program could have reduced the gap by only 15 percent

combining buy in penalties with commissions at auction houses most auction sellers consign property to auction houses rather than holding the auction themselves in addition to charging sellers a commission on property that sells in the auction many auction houses also specify buy in penalties in auction contracts this is an amount the seller must pay the auction house if the property fails to sell at auction an important managerial question for auction houses is whether and when buy in penalties can increase revenues of the auction house seller or both and what combinations of commission and buy in penalty to use we show that auctions which combine buy in penalties with lower commissions pareto dominate auctions that use only commissions this strategy motivates the seller to set a lower reserve which creates a surplus in auction revenues that can go to one or both parties this strategy is pareto dominant even if the auction house and the seller are uncertain about the number of bidders at the auction or the auction house is uncertain about the seller s own valuation for the property at the time the buy in penalty commission and reserve are contractually set we also discuss the incentive issues raised by this strategy

fiscal shenanigans targeted federal health care funds and patient mortality we explore the effectiveness of matching grants when lower levels of government can expropriate some of the funds for other uses using data on the medicaid disproportionate share program we identify states that were most able to expropriate funds payments to public hospitals in these states were systematically diverted and had no significant impact on patient mortality payments that were not expropriated were associated with significant declines in patient mortality overall subsidies were an effective mechanism for improving outcomes for the poor but the impact was limited by the ability of state and local governments to divert the targeted funds

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

bidding frenzy speed of competitor reaction and willingness to pay in auctions this research examines how the intensity of the dynamic competitive interaction with other bidders in ascending auctions influences consumers willingness to pay wtp for auctioned products it focuses on one important aspect of this interaction the speed of competitor reaction the key hypothesis is that having one s own bids reciprocated by competing bidders more quickly increases one s wtp in an auction evidence from five experiments demonstrates this effect and pinpoints the essential aspects of the psychological mechanism that underlies it in particular the effect of speed of competitor reaction on bidding behavior 1 is serially mediated by the perception that the auction is more intensely competitive and by a greater desire to win 2 is distinct from the effects of time pressure and of the auction s duration or overall rate of progression 3 is not driven by inferences about the auctioned product s market value 4 is not qualified by the number of competing bidders nor due to any inferences about the latter and 5 hinges on direct competitive interaction with other human bidders

cops and crime abstract the violent crime control and law enforcement act of 1994 established the community oriented policing services cops program that provided grants to states and localities to pay up to 75 of the cost for new police hires for 3 years to date the cops program has awarded almost 5 billion in hiring grants paying for 64 000 new police officers we use annual data from 1990 through 2001 from 2074 cities with populations in excess of 10 000 to show that for each officer paid for by grant funds the size of the force expands by 0 70 officers the size of cops grants are correlated with population and crime rates but not the pre cops time trends in crime rates or the size of the police force this allows us to use the size of cops grants as an instrument for the size of the police force in regressions where crime is the outcome of interest these models indicate that police added to the force by cops generated statistically significant reductions in auto thefts burglaries robberies and aggravated assaults

unsticking the flypaper effect in an uncertain world abstract we provide a novel explanation for the flypaper effect based on insurance arguments in our model the flypaper effect arises due to the differential response of precautionary savings to private income or fiscal transfers shocks in an uncertain world with incomplete markets the model generates two testable implications i the flypaper effect is a decreasing function of the correlation between fiscal transfers and private income and ii such relationship is stronger the higher is the volatility of fiscal transfers and or private income an empirical analysis of argentinean provinces for the period 1963 2006 finds strong support for the model s implications

the incidence of medicare abstract the medicare program transfers nearly 300 billion annually from taxpayers to beneficiaries this paper considers the incidence of such transfers in the context of a life cycle model with uncertainty about future health care expenditures we find the distributional consequences of the medicare program are roughly neutral in dollar terms households living in high income neighborhoods pay more in taxes but they also receive more in benefits these dollar flows however ignore the insurance value of the medicare system given the incomplete insurance coverage of lower income elderly households prior to the medicare program the money metric benefits to lower income groups exceed the dollar flows suggesting that medicare redistributes more than a simple accounting exercise would suggest

when rational sellers face nonrational buyers evidence from herding on ebay people often observe others decisions before deciding themselves using ebay data for dvd auctions we explore the consequences of neglecting nonsalient information when making such inferences we show that bidders herd into auctions with more existing bids even if these are a signal of no longer available lower starting prices rather than of higher quality bidders bidding a given dollar amount are less likely to win low starting price auctions and pay more for them when they do win experienced bidders are less likely to bid on low starting price auctions remarkably the seller side of the market is in equilibrium because expected revenues are nearly identical for high and low starting prices

the flypaper effect what happens to a state s spending when it receives an unconditional grant from the federal government the standard theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in spending will be the same as that generated by an equivalent increase in local incomes or roughly 5 10 percent for most states in contrast numerous empirical analyses have found that spending increases by much more with some estimates near 100 percent this result is known as the flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where it hits the authors review this evidence as well as other studies that find similar behavior in firms

the rise of the states u s fiscal decentralization in the postwar period article i nfo article history one of the most dramatic changes in the fiscal federalism landscape during the postwar period has been the rapid growth in state budgets which almost tripled as a share of gdp and doubled as a share of government spending between 1952 and 2006 we argue that the greater role of states cannot be easily explained by changes in tiebout forces of fiscal competition such as mobility and voting patterns and are not accounted for by demographic or income trends rather we demonstrate that much of the growth in state budgets has been driven by changes in intergovernmental interactions restricted federal grants to states have increased and federal policy and legal constraints have also mandated or heavily incentivized state own source spending particularly in the areas of education health and public welfare these outside pressures moderate the forces of fiscal competition and must be taken into account when assessing the implications of observed revenue and spending patterns

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

nonstandard bidder behavior in real world auctions empirical work on auctions has found that bidders deviate from standard behavior in important ways we investigate a range of these behaviors including nonrational herding auction fever quasi endowment effect and escalation of commitment our innovations are to more completely control for unobservables by using new data from a field experiment on ebay and by accounting for censoring of bids below the starting price consistent with standard auction theory and in contrast to the predictions of the nonstandard behaviors we find that auction starting price has no effect on bidder willingness to pay in a private values setting we conclude that there is little evidence that these nonstandard behaviors are important in the field

who pays for public employee health costs abstract we analyze the incidence of public employee health benefits because these benefits are negotiated through the political process relevant labor market institutions deviate significantly from the competitive private sector benchmark empirically we find that roughly 15 percent of the cost of recent benefit growth was passed onto school district employees through reductions in wages and salaries strong teachers unions were associated with relatively strong linkages between benefit growth and growth in total compensation our analysis is consistent with the view that the costs of public workers benefits are difficult to monitor contributing to benefit oriented and often under funded compensation schemes

finders keepers forfeiture laws policing and local budgets to encourage anti drug policing the federal government and many state governments have enacted laws that allow police agencies to keep a substantial fraction of the assets that they seize in drug arrests we use rich new data on police seizures and local spending to explore the reactions of both governments and police to the incentives created by these policies we find that local governments offset police seizures by reducing their other allocations to police partially undermining the incentives laid out in statute and diverting the earmarked funds to other purposes police in turn respond to the real net incentives for seizures once local offsets are taken into account by increasing the drug arrest rate heroin prices also increase suggesting that the increased emphasis on anti drug policing raises the supply costs of illicit drugs these findings highlight both the promise and pitfalls of using financial incentives to solve agency problems in a federal system both local agents and intervening governments have sophisticated responses to financial incentives and these responses must be taken into account in both designing effective policies and evaluating their consequences 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

tax mix corners and other kinks abstractthis paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of statewide fiscal limitations the decentralized government finance archetype and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed flypaper effect arises in the constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind and how it cannot in general be taken as a symptom of local government overspending an empirical application to italian province panel data provides consistent evidence of the role of corner solutions produced by two sided tax limits in explaining the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants

auctions with a buy price the case of reference dependent preferences abstract in an auction with a buy price the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price this paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction s reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price the model both explains why a revenue maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders reference price through the auction s reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders reference price through the auction s reserve price only the comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction s buy price have no effect on bidding behavior

special interest groups and the allocation of public funds i propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income in this model violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government the predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry although windfalls are legally unrestricted the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to 2 30 per capita upon receipt of funds the marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0 20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income states which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less these results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature

does partisan affiliation impact the distribution of spending evidence from state governments expenditures on education abstract how and why does partisan affiliation impact policy using a regression discontinuity strategy and focusing on state education spending we find that democratic and republican governors allocate spending differently in particular school districts with higher shares of minority students receive larger state transfers than other districts under democratic governors a similar pattern occurs in state transfers to higher education institutions this is true regardless of whether the governor is eligible for reelection we find no evidence that democrat governors are simply sending money to areas with a larger share of democrats these results suggest that the observed policy divergence is driven by differences in preferences of elected candidates

government decision making and the incidence of federal mandates abstract this paper analyzes the effects of federally mandated program changes on state spending and revenues incorporating and evaluating the predictive value of several common theories of the state decision making process using several sources of exogenous increases in public medical spending i estimate that the entire state portion of the burden of mandated spending is borne by decreases in other public welfare spending while federal mandates may influence the composition of benefits at the state level it is much more difficult for them to change the total level of state transfers comparison of state reactions to different shocks suggests that these reductions are due in part to the substitutability of programs in the voter utility function but also in part to the stickiness of spending within budget categories states with greater racial differences between recipients and voters and states with less generous neighbors reduce other public welfare spending by even more alleviating the burden the medical expansions imposed on their taxpayers mandates may thus serve only to increase inequality across states

selecting optimal selling format of a product in b2c online auctions with boundedly rational customers abstract the advancement of internet technology has enabled new formats for selling products in the b2c online auctions at present on the major online auction sites there exist three popular selling formats namely the posted price pure auction and buy price auction formats it is an important decision problem for a firm to select the most profitable format to sell its products through the internet the customer behavior is of course a crucial element of the decision process to the best of our knowledge most models available today assume that customers are perfectly rational to better understand the decision process in this paper we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration we first present a behavior choice function to characterize the behavior of the customers with bounded rationality then corresponding to each selling format we construct a revenue model based on the bounded rationality for analysis finally we conduct some elaborate computational experiments to investigate the performance of each revenue model for developing new managerial insights our computational results clearly demonstrate how the bounded rationality of customer behavior affects the choice of a preferable selling format for a b2c firm in an online auction

hospital ownership and public medical spending the hospital market is served by firms that are private for profit private not for profit and government owned and operated i use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that was intended to improve medical care for the poor to test three theories of organizational behavior i find that the critical difference between the three types of hospitals is caused by the soft budget constraint of government owned institutions the decision makers in private not for profit hospitals are just as responsive to financial incentives and are no more altruistic than their counterparts in profit maximizing facilities my final set of results suggests that the significant increase in public medical spending examined in this paper has not improved health outcomes for the indigent i introduction the hospital market is served by firms that are private for profit private not for profit and publicly owned and operated in this paper i examine how a hospital s type of ownership influences its response to profitable opportunities that are created by changes in government policy the policy change that i exploit was designed to improve the quality of medical care for lowincome individuals by significantly increasing hospitals financial incentives to treat them this program also substantially increased the revenues of those hospitals that had been serving a disproportionate share of the indigent i use this plausibly exogenous change in government policy to test three different theories of organizational behavior and then to assess the impact of hospital behavioral responses on health outcomes the response of organizations to changes in government policy will have an important impact on the consequences of these policies this is likely to be especially true in the medical sector in which the federal state and local governments contract directly

corrupting learning evidence from missing federal education funds in brazil abstract this paper examines if money matters in education by looking at whether missing resources due to corruption affect student outcomes we use data from the auditing of brazil s local governments to construct objective measures of corruption involving educational block grants transferred from the central government to municipalities using variation in the incidence of corruption across municipalities and controlling for student school and municipal characteristics we find a significant negative association between corruption and the school performance of primary school students students residing in municipalities where corruption in education was detected score 0 35 standard deviations less on standardized tests and have significantly higher dropout and failure rates using a rich dataset of school infrastructure and teacher and principal questionnaires we also find that school inputs such as computer labs teaching supplies and teacher training are reduced in the presence of corruption overall our findings suggest that in environments where basic schooling resources are lacking money does matter for student achievement

anchoring in payment evaluating a judgmental heuristic in field experimental settings abstractanchoring the biasing of estimates toward a previously considered value is a long standing and oft studied phenomenon in consumer research however most anchoring work has been in the lab and the results from field work have been mixed here the authors use real transactions from an empirically investigated and commercially employed pricing scheme pay what you want to better understand how anchors influence payments sixteen field studies n 21 997 and four hypothetical studies n 3 174 reveal four main points 1 although anchoring replicates both with and without financial consequences studies 1 2 the percentile rank gap between anchors in the distribution of payments is a much stronger predictor of anchoring emerging than merely the absolute gap between the anchors on a number line studies 3 5 2 low anchors influence payments more than high anchors studies 6a b 3 findings from the literature that should enhance anchoring effects anchor precision descriptive and inj

the value of school facility investments evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design author s cellini stephanie riegg ferreira fernando rothstein jesse abstract despite extensive public infrastructure spending surprisingly little is known about its economic return in this paper we estimate the value of school facility investments using housing markets standard models of local public goods imply that school districts should spend up to the point where marginal increases would have zero effect on local housing prices our research design isolates exogenous variation in investments by comparing school districts where referenda on bond issues targeted to fund capital expenditures passed and failed by narrow margins we extend this traditional regression discontinuity approach to identify the dynamic treatment effects of bond authorization on local housing prices student achievement and district composition our results indicate that california school districts underinvest in school facilities passing a referendum causes immediate sizable increases in home prices implying a willingness to pay on the part of marginal homebuyers of 1 50 or more for each 1 of capital spending these effects do not appear to be driven by changes in the income or racial composition of homeowners and the impact on test scores appears to explain only a small portion of the total housing price effect c 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

choice experiments are not conducted in a vacuum the effects of external price information on choice behavior abstract consumers carry a wealth of external knowledge and experience into a study that may affect choices in even the most well crafted experiment we derive a conceptual model showing how the level and variability of price perceptions outside the task at hand might affect choice behavior and we conduct an experiment to test the model by manipulating information provided to respondents in a way to alter the outside the experiment perceptions mixed logit error component models show that reference dependent models best describe the choice data and we find that consumer choice is significantly affected by the experiment manipulations the predictions of the model are borne out in the data as expected price sensitivity is generally higher for price changes above a price reference point than below also as predicted exogenously increasing external reference prices and exogenously reducing the variability in references prices both serve to increase the probability of making a purchase and reduce the probability of choosing none these results have important implications for the design and practice of choice experiments as they show that consumer choice is affected by perceptions of the level and variability of prices outside the experiment more generally the results highlight the need to understand the formation and distribution of reference prices when predicting consumer choice

an analysis of factors affecting price volatility of the us oil market abstract this paper studies the price volatility of the crude oil market by examining the market structure of opec the stable and unstable demand structure and related elasticity of demand in particular the impacts of prosperity and recession of the world economy and the resulting demand shift on crude oil price are investigated the error correction model is used to estimate the demand relations and related elasticity the income effect on demand functions is evaluated to shed light on future prices a simulation of potential oil prices under different scenarios on a cut of one million barrels per day by opec is evaluated from our simulation given the 4 cut in opec production the oil price is expected to increase unless the recession is severe the magnitude and scope of a price hike would be diminished if non opec or domestic production were greatly expanded

the effect of semantic cues on consumer perceptions of reference price ads this article examines the differential effects of two types of semantic cues 1 cues connoting that an advertised price discount exhibits low consistency over time and 2 cues connoting that an advertised discount is highly distinctive vis a vis competitors results suggest that for manipulations of external reference prices with offering price held constant semantic cues that connote high distinctiveness are more effective in influencing consumers price related evaluations when the external reference price is otherwise implausibly high than are semantic cues that connote low consistency for manipulations of offering prices with external reference price held constant however semantic cues connoting high distinctiveness exert more relative influence on price related cognitions when offering prices are high

consumer perceptions of comparative price advertisements the authors analyze the issue of comparative price advertising from a behavioral perspective because public policy recognizes that comparative pricing may lead to consumer misperceptions the auth

the aggregate effects of health insurance evidence from the introduction of medicare this paper investigates the effects of market wide changes in health insurance by examining the single largest change in health insurance coverage in american history the introduction of medicare in 1965 i estimate that the impact of medicare on hospital spending is over six times larger than what the evidence from individual level changes in health insurance would have predicted this disproportionately larger effect may arise if market wide changes in demand alter the incentives of hospitals to incur the fixed costs of entering the market or of adopting new practice styles i present some evidence of these types of effects a back of the envelope calculation based on the estimated impact of medicare suggests that the overall spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990 may be able to explain about half of the increase in real per capita health spending over this time period

beyond incentives do schools use accountability rewards productively we use a regression discontinuity design to analyze an understudied aspect of school accountability systems how schools use financial rewards for two years california s accountability system financially rewarded schools based on a deterministic function of test scores qualifying schools received per pupil awards amounting to about 1 of statewide per pupil spending corroborating anecdotal evidence that awards were paid out as teacher bonuses we find no evidence that winning schools purchased more instructional material increased teacher hiring or changed the subject specific composition of their teaching staff most importantly we find no evidence that student achievement increased in winning schools supplemental materials for this article are available online

do federal grants boost school spending evidence from title i abstract one of the federal government s main elementary and secondary education programs is title i which allocates money for compensatory education to school districts based on child poverty i use sharp changes in per pupil grant amounts surrounding the release of decennial census data to identify effects of title i on state and local education revenue and how much the program ultimately increases spending by recipient school districts i find that state and local revenue efforts initially are unaffected by title i changes but that local governments substantially and significantly crowd out changes in title i within in a 3 year period

the effect of plausible and exaggerated reference prices on consumer perceptions and price search this article examines whether advertisers regular price claims affect consumer perceptions and price search behavior experiments involving simulated shopping via personal computers indicate that compared to an ad with no reference price an ad with a plausible reference price raised subjects estimates of the advertiser s regular price and the perceived offer value an exaggerated reference price had generally the same positive effects on perception as a plausible reference price even for the more skeptical subjects further when subjects were presented with an advertised sale price above the lowest expected price the exaggerated reference price increased the percentage of subjects who purchased the product from the advertiser without checking other stores prices

finders keepers forfeiture laws policing incentives and local budgets to encourage anti drug policing the federal government and many state governments have enacted laws that allowpoliceagencies tokeepasubstantial fractionofthe assets thattheyseizeindrugarrests weuserich new data on police seizures and local spending to explore the reactions of both governments and police to the incentives created by these policies we find that local governments offset police seizures by reducing their other allocations to police partially undermining the incentives laid out in statute and diverting the earmarked funds to other purposes police in turn respond to the real net incentives for seizures once local offsets are takenintoaccount byincreasingthedrugarrestrate heroinpricesalsoincrease suggestingthattheincreased emphasis on anti drug policing raises the supply costs of illicit drugs these findings highlight both the promise and pitfalls of using financial incentives to solve agency problems in a federal system both local agents and intervening governments have sophisticated responses to financial incentives and these responses must be taken into account in both designing effective policies and evaluating their consequences 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

buyer behavior under the best offer mechanism a theoretical model and empirical evidence from ebay motors abstract we use data from ebay best offer listings to analyze haggling over prices in transactions with one seller and a series of potential buyers for a limited supply product we characterize this transaction mechanism as a sequential move game to investigate buyer behavior our model suggests that a buyer s offer price increases in relations to the number of buyers who have previously made an offer on the item and the buy it now price chosen by the seller on the other hand the offer price decreases for items which have been listed on ebay for a longer period of time we empirically test our theoretical predictions using data on the sales of toyota camry cars on ebay motors the empirical evidence is consistent with our model

effects of seller supplied prices on buyers product evaluations reference prices in an internet auction context a field experiment investigated the impact of two external reference points under the seller s control on the final price of an auction when an item s seller specified a high external reference price a reserve price the final bid was greater than when the seller specified a low external reference price a minimum bid when the seller provided both high and low reference prices the reserve influenced the final bid more the low reference price led to a lower outcome compared to when the seller did not communicate any reference price the number of bidders influenced outcomes in the absence of seller supplied reference prices

promotional bundles and consumers price judgments when the best things in life are not free a series of experiments examined the amount that consumers were willing to pay for products bundled together in a promotion describing one of the disparate products in the bundle as free decreased the price consumers were willing to pay for each product when sold individually however a freebie offer did not influence the overall price for the bundle of disparate products a finding robust across two different settings and populations the differential effect of freebies is explained by varying judgment difficulty with the price being easier to arrive at for just a single product than for the combination consistent with this explanation factors that influence judgment difficulty the salience of the company s motive for offering the freebie and time pressure to make a judgment moderated the effects of a free offer on the amount consumers were willing to pay

the effects of relative and referent thinking on tourism product design abstract this study adopts three field experiments to analyze the influence of relative and referent thinking in online tourism auctions of bed and breakfast b b accommodations on consumer bidding behavior in study one the starting bid price equals or is lower than the reference price relative and referent thinking are applied to evaluate the products to see whether consumers prefer monetary or non monetary sales promotions and if they are willing to pay a higher end price in study two moderate extreme deviation appears between the start bidding price and reference price non monetary monetary sales promotions are favored and so higher end price would be paid in study three consumers tended to pay a higher end price due to the symbolic meaning of luxury b b for example greater wealth and social status and did not have a preference for monetary sales promotions the findings could help future researchers when designing tourist products for online auction strategies

reserve prices in auctions as reference points we consider second price and first price auctions in the symmetric independentprivate values framework we modify the standard model by theassumption that the bidders have reference based utility where the reserveprice minimum bid plays the role of the reference point in contrast to theusual result the seller s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number ofbidders even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility losswhen he has to pay more than the reserve price the impact on the optimalreserve price can be strong when there are many bidders

all school finance equalizations are not created equal school finance equalization has probably affected american schools more than any other reform of the last 30 years understanding it is a prerequisite for making optimal social investments in human capital yet it is poorly understood in this paper i explain why it differs from conventional redistribution because it is based on property values which are endogenous to schools productivity taste for education and the school finance system itself i characterize equalization schemes and show why some level down and others level up schemes that strongly level down have unintended consequences even poor districts can end up worse off i also show how school finance equalization affects property prices private school attendance and student achievement

the cross price effect on willingness to pay estimates in open ended contingent valuation abstract previous literature has shown that potential buyers use a reference price or product to form their opinion about the value of a new product therefore the pricing decision is an interactive process we investigate the two generalizations of the cross price effect the neighborhood price effect and the asymmetric price effect on consumer willingness to pay wtp for multiple similar products in an open ended contingent valuation context results show that the cross price effect on wtp is prominent with the neighborhood price effect holding in contingent valuation no conclusions are reached about the asymmetric price effect