tourism as a long run economic growth factor the spanish case this paper examines the role of tourism in the spanish long run economic development the tourism led growth hypothesis is confirmed through cointegration and causality testing the results indicate that at least during the last three decades economic growth in spain has been sensible to persistent expansion of international tourism the increase of this activity has produced multiplier effects over time external competitivity has also been proved in the model to be a fundamental variable for spanish economic growth from the empirical analysis it can be inferred the positive effects on income that government policy in the adequacy of supply as well as in the promotion of tourist activity may bring about

revisiting the tourism led growth hypothesis for turkey using the bounds test and johansen approach for cointegration abstract this paper empirically revisits and investigates the tourism led growth tlg hypothesis in the case of turkey by employing the bounds test and johansen approach for cointegration using annual data from 1960 2006 although gunduz and hatemi j 2005 is the tourism led growth hypothesis valid for turkey applied economics letters 12 499 504 support the tlg hypothesis for turkey suggesting unidirectional causation from tourism to economic growth by making use of the leveraged bootstrap causality tests and ongan and demiroz 2005 the contribution of tourism to the long run turkish economic growth ekonomick casopis journal of economics 53 9 880 894 suggest bidirectional causality between international tourism and economic growth in turkey this study does not find any cointegration between international tourism and economic growth in turkey therefore unlike the findings of gunduz and hatemi j 2005 and ongan and demiroz 2005 this study rejects the tlg hypothesis for the turkish economy since no cointegration was found and error correction mechanisms plus causality tests cannot be run for further steps in the long term

the contribution of tourism development to economic growth in the korean economy abstract this study investigates the causal relations between tourism growth and economic expansion for the korean economy by using engle and granger two stage approach and a bivariate vector autoregression var model two principle results emerge from this study first the results of a cointegration test indicate that there is no long run equilibrium relation between two series second the outcomes of granger causality test imply the one way causal relationship of economic driven tourism growth the hypothesis of tourism led economic growth is not held in the korean economy this consequence is supported by testing the sensitivity of causality test under different lag selections along with the optimal lag

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

estimating level effects in diffusion of a new technology barcode scanning at the checkout counter cross country or cross industry studies of technology diffusion typically estimate how independent factors affect diffusion speed or timing often based on a two stage approach in many applications however countries industries differ most in the saturation level of diffusion in a single stage econometric approach to a standard diffusion model we therefore estimate how the saturation level covaries with independent factors in our application to diffusion of an important retail information technology we focus on the competitive effect of hypermarkets superstores we also find standard scale income and labour substitution effects

the valuation of sequential exchange opportunities sequential exchange opportunities are valued using the techniques of modern option pricing theory the vehicle for analysis is the concept of a compound exchange option this security is shown to exist implicitly in several contractual settings a valuation formula for this option is derived the formula is shown to generalize much previous work in option pricing several applications of the formula are presented

deposit insurance and moral hazard problem the case of turkish banking system we investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of turkish commercial banks we construct a model under reasonable assumptions with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk moral hazard risk empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system we relate this excessive risk taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks the research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk taking

the limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative abstract market value accounting mva might improve market and regulatory discipline on financial institutions unfortunately there are serious conceptual measurement and incentive problems with implementing mva that have not received significant attention these problems are suggested by the theory of asymmetric information and the role intermediaries play in solving information and monitoring problems after analyzing the problems with mva we develop an alternative approach that applies mva principles where they are most feasible and uses a statistical procedure where asymmetric information problems make mva particularly problematic an empirical analysis suggests that this procedure may substantially improve the distribution of regulatory discipline

market structure uncertainty and intrafirm diffusion the case of optical scanners in grocery stores this study uses monthly data on the adoption of optical scanners by sixty three grocery chains in thirty two large u s cities to identify the determinants of the rate of intrafirm diffusion the methodology involves a two stage approach that relates market environment characteristics to the estimated rate of intrafirm diffusion the results indicate that firms with larger market shares adopt a new innovation scanners more quickly initially but diffuse the innovation through their stores more slowly than firms with smaller market shares in addition firms that lag competitors in the initial adoption of scanners tend to diffuse the innovation more quickly copyright 1992 by mit press

appearance and reality in deposit insurance the case for reform abstract this paper argues that the staffs and explicit insurance reserves of u s deposit insurers have been overwhelmed by de facto financial disaster the full costs of financing federal deposit insurance have become enormous and increasingly inequitable in distribution to reduce voluntary risk taking authorities must reprice and redesign the system of de facto deposit insurance coverage six complementary reforms are discussed 1 accounting for institutional assets liabilities and net worth at market value 2 enhancing opportunities for deposit insurers to manage their risk exposure 3 recalibrating insurance coverages 4 imposing risk rated premiums 5 mixed private and governmental competition in deposit insurance and 6 constraining insurance agency and federal reserve authority to bail out insolvent institutions

the diffusion of innovations in protected industries the textile industry the diffusion of the shuttleless loom a major innovation in the textile industry has been relatively slow in spite of the undisputed improvement with respect to the conventional shuttle loom used for weaving textiles the diffusion of shuttleless looms in industrialized countries is analysed in the framework of an epidemic diffusion model where the diffusion speed parameter is allowed to vary of the various factors affecting the speed of diffusion trade liberalization seems to have the most potent impact in accelerating diffusion this finding is consistent with the idea that trade liberalization is conducive to speeding up the diffusion of innovations

did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in japan the principal agent problem between the regulator regulated banks and taxpayers is critical to the viability of the financial system s safety net there exists the danger that the regulator will collude with regulated banks to pursue their benefits at the expense of taxpayers thereby reducing effectiveness of financial supervision this paper proposes that the human relationship prevailing between the regulatory authorities and private banks referred to as amakudari is a form of collusion between the regulator and banks that endangers the safety net mechanism in japan statistical analysis of data on regional banks shows that those banks accepting post retirement officials from the ministry of finance have reduced capital adequacy levels and increased non performing loans thus the statistical result supports the hypothesis proposed in this paper

the s l debacle public policy lessons for bank and thrift regulation this book describes the period of failures of savings and loan associations and sets out a program of policies to prevent future debacles it explains the regulatory actions and inactions that created the incentives for large numbers of thrifts to make excessively risky and ill conceived and in some cases fraudulent and criminal investments it describes the failure of the accounting system to provide adequate information to regulators and in many cases even to the managers of the thrifts themselves concerning the health and riskiness of individual thrifts it also discusses how the regulatory system that had been conceived in an earlier and highly regulated era was overwhelmed in the deregulated environment of the early 1980s it shows how the reforms that were made in response to the growing crisis were too little and too late and finally it offers a set of policy reforms that could prevent future crises in the savings and loan industry this work should be of interest to political and financial economists

a contracting theory interpretation of the origins of federal deposit insurance conventional wisdom holds that the enactment of federal deposit insurance helped small rural banks at the expense of large urban institutions this paper uses asymmetricinformation agency cost paradigms from corporate finance theory and data on bank stock prices to show how deposit insurance could and did help stockholders of large banks the broadening stockholder distribution of large banks during the stock market bubble of the late 1920s undermined the efficiency of double liability provisions in controlling incentive conflict among large bank stakeholders federal deposit insurance restored depositor confidence by asking government officials to take over and bond the task of monitoring managerial performance and solvency at u s banks

the impacts of international tourism demand on economic growth of small economies dependent on tourism abstract this paper studies the impacts on economic growth of a small tourism driven economy caused by an increase in the growth rate of international tourism demand we present a formal model and empirical evidence the ingredients of the dynamic model are a large population of intertemporally optimizing agents and an ak technology representing tourism production the model shows that an increase in the growth of tourism demand leads to transitional dynamics with gradually increasing economic growth and increasing terms of trade in our empirical application an econometric methodology is applied to annual data of antigua and barbuda from 1970 to 2008 we perform a cointegration analysis to look for the existence of a long run relationship among variables of economic growth international tourism earnings and the real exchange rate the exercise confirms the theoretical findings

quality and endogenous tourism an empirical approach abstract we propose a theoretical model and an empirical study that highlight the role of quality of tourism services and endogenous tourism in long run economic growth we study a theoretical growth model of international trade where tourism is the growth engine and quality of tourism services has a positive impact on long term growth we also provide an empirical analysis to test the relation between tourism quality and economic growth in spain over the period 1970 2010 our results show that in the long run tourist arrivals quality of tourism accommodations and foreign gdp have a positive effect on spanish gdp in the short term changes in economic growth appear to lead to growth in tourist arrivals our findings support a two way causal relationship between real gdp growth and tourism growth in spain

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

rank stock order and epidemic effects in the diffusion of new process technologies an empirical model in this article we construct a general duration model of technology adoption that incorporates the main factors discussed in different theories of diffusion of new process technologies the model is applied to data on diffusion of cnc in the uk engineering industry although we find strong evidence in support of rank and endogenous learning effects there seems to be little evidence in support of the stock and order effects the main factors affecting the diffusion of cnc are found to be endogenous learning firm size industry growth rates the cost of the technology and expected changes in the cost of the technology

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

the diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in the european union we study the technological and regulatory determinants of the diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in the european union using a logistic model of diffusion we find that the transition from the analogue to the digital technology during the early 1990s and the corresponding increase in spectrum capacity had a major impact on the diffusion of mobile telecommunications countries which granted first licenses at later points in time show a significant but slow catching up effect implying international convergence only by around 2006 the impact of introducing competition has also been significant during both the analogue and the digital period though the effect was smaller than the technology effect

does entry regulation hinder job creation evidence from the french retail industry are product market and entry regulation key sources of low employment growth in many european countries we investigate this question in the context of the french retail trade industry since 1974 approval by regional zoning boards has been required for the creation or extension of any large retain store in france we exploit a unique database that provides time and region specific variation in boards approval decisions we show that stronger deterrence of entry by the boards increased retailer concentration and slowed down employment growth in france

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

deposit insurance around the world in the past two decades in a series of banking crises around the world banks have become systematically insolvent these crises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike to make such financial system breakdowns less likely and to limit their costs if they occur policymakers feel the need for financial safety nets these include such policies as implicit or explicit deposit insurance a lender of last resort function of the central bank bank insolvency resolution procedures and bank regulation and supervision of these policies explicit deposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes almost tripled with most oecd countries and an increasing number of developing economies adopting some form of explicit depositor protection in 1994 deposit insurance became the standard for the newly created single banking market of the european union establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advice given to developing economies

a dynamic analysis of the adoption of a new technology the case of optical scanners two p roportional hazard models are used to investigate the differingeffects of marke t structure variables on the conditional probabilityof a firm initially adoptin g the new technology of optical scanners as the innovation spreads through the f ood store industry during the early stage leading firms with large average sto re size which are not members of chains and which operate in less concentrated m arkets with higher incomes and wage rates tend to adopt scanners sooner later on differences in seller concentration market share and size become less impo rtant as other firms follow prior adoptions copyright 1987 by mit press

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

restoring banking stability beyond supervised capital requirements emerging economies have been particularly prone to financial sector crises reflecting marked information asymmetries and political interference as well as the substantial volatility in underlying economic conditions and the vulnerability of banking and finance when structural economic changes create a new and uncharted operating environment the standard regulatory paradigm relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy but it may not be enough other measures to improve the incentive structure for bankers regulators and other market participants could effectively increase the number of concerned skilled and watchful eyes intermittent application of supplementary blunt instruments could also be useful

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

optimal bank reorganization policies and the pricing of federal deposit insurance optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits and interest rate on deposits the economy s risk free interest rate and the regulators bank audit administration costs under competitive conditions the threshold assets to deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank s risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank s current assets to deposits ratio should regulatory agencies close reorganize an ailing federally insured financial institution if so when the recent record rate of failures of savings and loans associations s ls has renewed the urgency of this question the regulatory agencies are empowered but not required to reorganize financial institutions that are statutorily insolvent i e have zero or negative regulatory net worth recently regulators have in many instances permitted insolvent financial institutions to remain in operation 2 also while debating on the increase of the proposed funding of the federal deposit insurers the u s congress argued whether it would be desirable and if so when to close more s ls thus when regulators should close a troubled financial institution has become a major question of bank regulatory policy while the existing academic literature provides powerful insights into the structure and pricing of the insurers liability this literature offers very little guidance regarding the timing of bank reorganizations 3 indeed to the best of our knowledge the value of the federal

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

determinants of thrift institution resolution costs this paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980 1988 a simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution this model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies the empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s this evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator s closure rule our econometric evidence moreover is consistent with the hypothesis that for troubled institutions tangible net worth systematically understates market value net worth in addition the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed the sharp increase in market interest rates in late 1979 and early 1980 and the deregulation of deposit rates led to record losses in the thrift industry in the early 1980s and to a major erosion of the industry s capital many institutions never fully recovered from these problems and most currently insolvent thrift

insurance markets with loss prevention activity profits market structure and consumer welfare this article considers the joint production of insurance protection and loss prevention by insurers we first examine the loss distribution of consumers that is potentially the most profitable for insurers unlike in the preponderance of the insurance literature which assumes cost based pricing of insurance policies we allow the insurer to charge whatever price the market will bear we then examine the expected profit maximizing strategy of assumes cost based pricing of insurance policies we allow the insurer to charge whatever price the market will bear we then examine the expected profit maximizing strategy of the insurer in several different market settings whether the insurance protection and loss prevention services can be perfectly bundled plays a key roll in the insurer s pricing decision we consider consumer welfare under various market settings and demonstrate that a consumer may be better off when the insurance market is monopolistic rather than competitive finally we consider whether monopoly power in the loss prevention market leads to monopoly power in an otherwise perfectly contestable insurance market we also show conditions under which a loss prevention monopolist would increase expected profit by integrating into the insurance market

fair insurance guaranty premia in the presence of risk based capital regulations stochastic interest rate and catastrophe risk abstract a multiperiod model is developed to measure the costs posed to the guaranty fund in a setting that incorporates risk based capital regulations interest rate risk and the possibility of catastrophic losses the guaranty contract is modeled as a put option on the asset of the insurance company with a stochastic strike price and an uncertain maturity the impacts of the key factors of this model are examined numerically and shown to make material differences in the costs to the guaranty fund

does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation evidence from the russian experiment this study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks using the deposit insurance scheme introduced into the russian banking system as a natural experiment the fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit taking and decreased reliance upon state owned banks as custodians of retail deposits we find that banks entering the new deposit insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system these results hold up in a multivariate panel data analysis that controls for bank and time random effects the longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets moreover this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks we also find that implementation of the new deposit insurance system has the effect of leveling the playing field between state owned banks and privately owned banks finally we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk taking financial risk and to a lesser degree operating risk increase following implementation

the pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies the paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis despite of the potential moral hazard problems we argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance especially when the insured institution is insolvent applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option we first derive a closed form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies then we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for the properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk based pricing scheme