performance attribution using an apt with prespecified macrofactors and time varying risk premia and betas this paper assesses the selection and timing abilities of 130 equity mutual funds using a conditional apt model with specified macrofactors and time varying risk premia and betas for all fund categories based on investment objectives a significant proportion of the funds exhibits negative abnormal asset selection performance based on the unconditional jensen 1968 alpha and a reduced proportion of the funds in each category attempts to time the realizations of the macrofactors including those captured by the residual market factor the average selection performance of the mutual funds improves and the proportion of funds attempting to time macrofactor realizations declines when measured using the asset selection and factor timing models with time varying risk premia and betas

mimicking portfolios and exact arbitrage pricing we characterize the sets of mimicking positions with returns that can serve in place of factors in an exact k factor arbitrage pricing relation for a set of n assets all of the sets are k dimensional nonsingular linear transformations of each other we interpret three examples of such transformations and discuss empirical considerations we provide conditions under which the mimicking positions can be expressed as portfolios and we characterize the relation between mimicking portfolios and the minimumvariance frontier

efficiency of job creation in a search and matching model with labor force participation in a search and matching model where workers are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to productivity and there is labor force participation albrecht et al 2010 show that satisfying the hosios rule leads to excessive vacancy creation we show that efficient vacancy creation requires a modified version of the hosios condition that captures not only the standard search externalities but also the output externality and the participation externality

media scrutiny and the quality of public officials i investigate whether attempts by the media to determine a candidate s fitness for office lowers the average quality of public officials what i call the media scrutiny paradox media scrutiny imperfectly signals heterogeneous candidates type but imposes privacy costs and reputational costs on politicians the quality of office holders falls if the selection effect is adverse and outweighs the screening effect a low quality information signal which could result if the media focus on irrelevant aspects of behavior makes the screening effect small and the media paradox more likely to hold individuals of good character might invest more in their reputation and have more at stake from being falsely identified as a rapscallion the actual malice standard established in new york times v sullivan likely increased relatively the cost of candidacy for good people and lowered the quality of officials

approximate factor structures interpretations and implications for empirical tests this paper provides some new insights about approximate factor structures as defined by chamberlain and rothschild 2 and their implications for empirical tests first we show that any economy that satisfies an approximate factor structure can be transformed in a manner that does not alter the characteristics of investor portfolios into an economy that satisfies an exact factor structure as defined by ross 9 second we show that principal components analysis represents just one of many methods of forming groups of well diversified portfolios with no idiosyncratic risk in large samples correct factor loadings will be obtained by regressing security returns on any group of these portfolios our interpretations of the chamberlain and rothschild results also provide additional insights into the testability of the arbitrage pricing theory we show that securities cannot be repackaged to hide factors in the manner suggested by shanken 10 without the variance of some of the repackaged securities approaching infinity in large economies

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

strikes and political activism of trade unions theory and application to bangladesh the behavior of bangladeshi trade unions is characterized bypolitical activism and momentous strikes called hartalsthere have played a crucial part in most political changes inthis country we offer a theoretical framework for discussingthis fact and we test empirically its main prediction bybringing out the political cycle that characterizes theoccurrence of strikes in bangladesh

good types in authoritarian elections the selectoral connection in chinese local congresses a new electoral design for subnational congress elections in china allows me to investigate the informational utility of authoritarian elections authoritarian regimes are notoriously bad at solving the moral hazard problem in the voter s agency relationship with politicians borrowing from the literature on political selection i theorize that authoritarian elections can nonetheless solve the adverse selection problem chinese voters can use their electoral power to select good types with personal qualities that signal they will reliably represent local interests i analyze original data from a survey of 4 071 chinese local congressmen and women including voter nominees and communist party nominees i find that voters do in fact overcome coordination difficulties to nominate and elect good types in contacting politicians about local problems after the elections however voters hedge their bets by contacting regime insiders too at these very local levels congressional representation by means of

on the efficiency of participation with vertically differentiated workers in this journal albrecht et al 2010 assume that the planner problem is constrained by participation decisions when this constraint is relaxed participation is too high whereas market tightness is too low subsidizing non participants improves market efficiency and reduces unemployment

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

participation recruitment selection and the minimum wage this paper reexamines the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search matching model with bargained wages and free entry assuming that firms hire their best applicants we state that participation is insufficient whatever workers bargaining strengths the reason for this is that when holding a job the marginal participant should receive the entire output as a consequence introducing a small minimum wage raises participation job creation and employment therefore the aggregate income of the economy is enhanced

signaling through obstruction obstruction is a time honored tradition in legislative politics in many cases obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful and in some of these cases purely costly even to the obstructor in this article i construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient the theory based on the legislators reelection motivations offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting including the legislator s value for reelection the appeal of the legislator s challenger the legislator s individual specific seniority competence and or valence and the visibility of the legislator s obstruction efforts to the voter finally the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing even in the absence of pandering

interpreting the factor risk premia in the arbitrage pricing theory abstract in the arbitrage pricing theory of ross assets expected returns are shown to be approximately linear in the factor loadings of the process generating returns this note provides a very simple and direct proof of the proposition that the coefficients in this approximate pricing relation can be interpreted as the excess returns on portfolios perfectly correlated with the factors whenever a riskless asset and such mimicking portfolios exist

the market model and capital asset pricing theory a note this note shows that a linear market model is sufficient to derive a linear relationship between beta and expected return furthermore the slope of the relationship will be identical with that of the capital asset pricing model if the return on the market portfolio is normally distributed however results from characterization theory suggest that the linear market model assumption is close to that of multivariate normality the market model a common specification of the return generating process for common stocks holds a central place in financial economics this note shows that a linear market model implies the security market line associated with the capital asset pricing model capm of sharpe 18 lintner 6 and mossin 9 however the distributional assumptions implicit in the linear market model are such that the generalization achieved is slight results from characterization theory are used to show that when a linear market model with homoscedastic errors holds for each stock multivariate normality is implied the results in this note have implications for the arbitrage pricing theory apt of ross 12 13 and roll and ross 11 in ross 13 where a single factor model is proposed with the return on the market as the factor a large numbers argument is used which allows the derivation of the security market line without the additional baggage of mean variance theory however given similar assumptions we show here that the same relationship can be derived without the approximation implicit in the apt argument

some results in the theory of arbitrage pricing this paper derives a stronger version of huberman s recent preference free pricing theorem this pricing result relates the expected return on an asset to its factor responses and the covariance structure of the residuals from a linear factor model it must characterize any infinite asset economy in which no arbitrage opportunities are present whether or not the factor model has uncorrelated residuals this result provides the intuition for the role of residual risk in the pricing model and eliminates some classes of arbitrage opportunities still present under huberman s bound some applications to empirical tests and performance measurement are also discussed the arbitrage pricing theory is one of several financial pricing models which attempts to explain the cross sectional variation in expected returns on assets in certain respects it is similar to the capital asset pricing model but there are both substantive and subtle differences one of the key advantages of the apt is that it derives a simple linear pricing relation approximating that in the capm without some of the latter s objectionable assumptions perhaps the key disadvantage of the apt is that it provides no clues as to what might be important factors nor as to how to interpret the factor premiums which appear in the pricing equation this paper serves several purposes after reviewing the linear factor model formulation in section i it derives in section ii a stronger version of huberman s 9 recent preference free pricing theorem this pricing result relates the expected return on an asset to its factor responses and the covariance structure of the residuals this relation must characterize any infinite asset economy in which no arbitrage opportunities are present whether or not a linear factor model with uncorrelated residuals is the appropriate returns generating mechanism section iii specializes this result by eliminating the effects of residual covariances and compares the results here to those of previous apt models when applied to the standard linear factor model with uncorrelated residuals this new pricing bound eliminates arbitrage opportunities which remain under huberman s bound this result also provides for the first time the intuition for the role of residual risk in the approximate pricing relation section v provides an interpretation of the factor premiums and gives a valid asset pricing model interpretation to the apt which is consistent with merton s

electoral competition and politician turnover abstract in this paper we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election we consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates abilities in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information we first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability rather than an established good candidate next we establish that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates i e each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters viewpoint

a dynamic globally diversified index neutral synthetic asset allocation strategy an investor with the ability to assess the prospective return and risk structure of the global capital markets can construct portfolios that over time will not only outperform actively or passively managed domestic asset portfolios but will also outperform passively managed global portfolios a bayesian approach to dynamic seemingly unrelated regression dsur is a robust and effective means to forecast the one step ahead conditional distribution of asset returns this approach recognizes the time varying nature of the global capital markets the predictive moments are used to derive a single factor return model once an index portfolio is specified the index portfolio represents an investor s underlying portfolio given the factor model that assesses the relative attractiveness and risk of the assets in relation to the index an index neutral portfolio is constructed as an overlay to enhance the returns of the index portfolio this portfolio is mean variance optimal is notional neutral i e the sum of the asset exposures is zero and has returns that are designed to be uncorrelated with the returns of the index portfolio the implementation of such an index neutral portfolio using derivative securities is simulated over the period january 1988 to december 1993

the relation between mean variance efficiency and arbitrage pricing the mean standard deviation diagram has proven to be a valuable tool for understanding equilibrium asset pricing theory first introduced by markowitz 1952 1959 and tobin 1958 the diagram helps students and researchers alike to develop intuition about the capital asset pricing model capm its properties are useful for analyzing the conditions under which the market portfolio is mean variance efficient and for linking the location of the market portfolio in the diagram with the validity of the capm in addition its simple geometry seems to be the critical inspiration for roll s 1977 argument that the capm cannot feasibly be tested because the market portfolio is unobservable and because of a mathematical equivalence between the individual return beta linearity relation and the market portfolio s mean variance efficiency p 129 recent research on equilibrium asset pricing both theoretical and empirical has tended to focus on multibeta pricing models especially the arbitrage pricing theory apt this paper will show that the simple intuition derived from the

accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials political agency models suggest that elected public officials choose different policies than appointed officials do this paper is the first a to apply a clean empirical design to study whether t

political short termism a possible explanation we consider a two period model in which politicians differ in their motivations and show that a good politician may suboptimally provide a public good that gives an immediate payoff because if he provided one that gives a payoff only in the second term the citizens would consider it sufficiently likely that he is a bad politician and therefore they would not reelect him quite surprisingly such short termism may be socially optimal it increases the probability that the office will be held in the future by a good politician and induces a bad politician to act more in the public interest

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

an asset pricing theory unifying the capm and apt this study shows that the competitive equilibrium version of the arbitrage pricing theory may be extended to develop an exact mode l if idiosyncratic risks obey the ross separating distribution the r esults indicate that one only need add the market portfolio as an ext ra factor to the factor model in order to obtain an exact asset prici ng relation the empirical arbitrage pricing theory is also general ized to allow for some factors to be omitted from the econometric m odel employed to test the theory the importance of the market portfo lio is shown to be a monotonic increasing function of the number of o mitted factors copyright 1988 by american finance association

integration or segmentation of the canadian stock market evidence based on the apt the domestic and international arbitrage pricing theories are modified to encom pass the hypotheses that the canadian and global north american equity markets are com pletely or partly integrated segmented the exchange rate determination literature is used to identify potentially priced binational factors and the sensitivities and factor prices are es timated using non linear sur the two equity markets are only partly integrated segmented canadian stock returns are influenced by the pure domestic components of the term structure and lagged industrial production and by the pure international components of the differential

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

factor pricing in a finite economy abstract prior theoretical derivations of the arbitrage pricing theory apt bound an aggregate measure of the deviation of mean asset returns from that predicted by a linear pricing equation it is conceivable given this bound that some assets might be badly mispriced by the model in this paper a more intuitive derivation of the factor pricing equation is presented which describes the deviation on an asset by asset basis the deviation is shown to be small for assets in a realistic finite economy and is arbitrarily close to zero for those assets with arbitrarily small size relative to aggregate wealth it follows that the linear pricing equation provides a good approximation for the mean returns of all traded assets

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

challenger entry and voter learning we develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters given incumbent failure in office challenger entry is more likely but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed at the same time challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications how a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running depending on the electoral environment the model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting the incumbency advantage and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare while pointing to new interpretations of and future avenues for empirical research on elections

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

lame ducks and local fiscal policy quasi experimental evidence from portugal i use the introduction of mayoral term limits in portugal to identify how an exogenous variation in eligibility for office affects policy decisions relying on a quasi experimental difference in differences approach i find that term limited incumbents pursue more conservative fiscal policies than those who are eligible for re election heterogeneous effects show that the treatment effects primarily reflect the behaviour of right leaning term limited incumbents results are in line with a model in which right leaning officeholders try to maintain a good reputation by pleasing an electorate prone to redistribution while they are eligible but adopt policies closer to their true preferences when term limited

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

efficiency in a search and matching model with endogenous participation abstract we show that in a search matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect to market productivity satisfying the hosios rule leads to excessive vacancy creation

unemployment insurance in theory and practice a hallmark of modern labor economics is the close interplay between the development of theory data sources and econometric testing the evolution of the economic analysis of unemployment insurance provides a good illustration new theoretical approaches in particular job search theory have inspired a large amount of empirical research some of it methodologically innovative and most of it highly relevant for economic policy the paper presents a broad survey and an assessment of the economic analysis of unemployment insurance as it has evolved since the 1970s

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

a structural model of electoral accountability this paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the eects of electoral ac countability we estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection eects using data on u s governors for 1982 2012 we nd that the possibility of reelection provides a signi cant incentive for incumbents to exert eort we also nd a selection eect although it is weaker in terms of its eect on average governor performance according to our model the widely used two term regime improves voter welfare by 4 2 compared to a one term regime and nd that a three term regime may improve voter welfare even further

corruption and the composition of government expenditure abstract this paper asks whether predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure corruption is found to reduce government spending on education in a cross section of countries

a simple approach to arbitrage pricing theory the following sections are included introductionarbitrage pricingdiscussionreferencesdiscussion notes on the arbitrage pricing theorypure arbitrage pricing theoryapproximate arbitrage and the aptapproximate factor modelsthe competitive equilibrium version of the aptconclusionnotereferences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a unified beta pricing theory abstract this paper derives ross s mutual fund separation theory and a new equilibrium version of ross s arbitrage pricing theory as special cases of a general theory the paper also reveals that the two theories are identical in their predictions of asset prices and portfolio returns the capital asset pricing model a restricted case of the mutual fund separation theory receives special treatment

derivation of the capital asset pricing model without normality or quadratic preference a note derivation of the capital asset pricing model requires various assumptions including normality or quadratic preference the objective of this note is to show that the normality or quadratic preference assumption can be replaced by the fair game condition that assets residual returns have zero mean conditional upon the return of the market portfolio

economic policy economic performance and elections this paper explores the role of reelection pressures in determining economic policy by assuming that voters are uncertai n as to the efficacy of different policies a reelection process is derived that depends on both a politician s past policies and the level of economic activity during his time in office it is shown th at the less uncertain are voters as to which policy is best the more likely is a politician to manipulate policy for reelection purposes manipulation entails implementing the policy that is more likely to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income copyright 1993 by american economic association

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

spatial models of delegation canonical assumptions this approach may be justified on grounds of tractability but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation consequently the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation we show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion and surprisingly many turn on the ignored though equally canonical technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed relative to policies relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation one that is closer to classical treatments the theory allows us to relate different institutional features commitment specialization costs monitoring multiple principals to delegation s observable properties lthough the practice of delegation dates back to antiquity the book of exodus refers to itonly in the last century has much scholarship examined its causes and effects and only recently has research focused on developing and testing formal theories that explore the logic of delegation 1 despite this recent surge in formal work on delegation scholars have failed to generalize several important properties of the early pathbreaking models instead of revisiting assumptions that were initially imposed for the sake of convenience recent papers tend to maintain and reinforce the cannonical assumptions applying these limited models to ever richer institutional settings although the breadth of understanding about delegation across various settings is impressive this approach has come at a price it has produced an understanding that only partly captures delegation s informational rationale in even the simplest contexts the literature is rich in predictions about delegation in complicated institutional settings when stylized foundational assumptions are satisfied but poor in explanations for and intuitions about why a poorly informed boss chooses to delegate to subordinates with different preferences moreover we lack an understanding of what basic features drive the boss s choice of which agent is given control of policy for example scholars have provided detailed explanations about how separation of power systems affect delegation by legislatures to agencies but the basic question does the informational rationale for delegation hinge on the boss s risk preferences has been ignored despite the analysis of complicated signaling and screening games between bosses with ex post controls and their subordinates we do not yet understand when or why the ally principle the boss picks the most ideologically similar agent as delegatee fails in simple settings we try to put models of delegation on more solid footing by examining a larger more general set of environments we eschew the canonical assumptions of quadratic utility or even risk aversion unidimensional outcome spaces and additive and homogeneous random shocks to policy our analysis focuses first on two basic questions when does delegation occur and to whom does the boss delegate we then consider richer institutionally driven extensions e g the role of commitment and monitoring devices the impact of multiple bosses and the institution in which their preferences are aggregated through a sequence of nested models with varying levels of abstraction the analysis isolates the relations between various assumptions and different findings

the effects of labour market policies in an economy with an informal sector in this article we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector our model extends mortensen and pissarides 1994 by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal sector productivity we use the model to analyse the effects of labour market policy on informal sector and formal sector output on the division of the workforce into unemployment informal sector employment and formal sector employment and on wages finally we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy specifically we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal sector matches in this article we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the effects of labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector what we mean by an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly affected by labour market policies such as severance or payroll taxes we find that labour market policies that apply only to the formal sector nonetheless affect the size and the composition of employment in the informal sector this is important since there is substantial economic activity in the informal sector in many economies particularly in developing countries estimates for some latin american countries put the informal sector at more than 50 of the urban work force 1 the informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some developed economies 2 although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a segmented labour market framework this interpretation is not consistent with recent empirical evidence from latin america under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the secondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal sector jobs maloney 2004 presents evidence for several latin american countries that challenges this view and instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector similarly using data from the argentinian household survey pratap and quintin 2006 reject the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater buenos aires area concluding that there is no evidence of a formal sector wage premium after controlling for individual and establishment we thank mauricio santamaria for stimulating conversations that inspired our interest in this topic we also thank bob hussey and fabien postel vinay as well as our editor steve pischke and two anonymous

electoral control in new democracies the perverse incentives of fluid party systems how do fiuid party systems that exist in many new democracies affect democratic accountability to address this question the authors analyze a new database of all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in poland since 1991 they find that when district level economic outcomes are bad voters in that country punish legislators from a governing party and reward legislators from an opposition party as a result electoral control in poland works through political parties just as it does in mature democracies however the authors also find that in contrast to mature democracies legislators from a governing party tend to switch to an opposition party when the economy in their district deteriorates when they do so their chances of reelection are better than those of politicians who remained loyal to governing parties and are no worse than those of incumbents who ran as opposition party loyalists these empirical results suggest that while elections in new democracies function as a mechanism of political control fiuid party systems undermine the extent to which elections promote democratic accountability

an explicit bound on individual assets deviations from apt pricing in a finite economy abstract ross s arbitrage pricing theory apt is a tractible and reasonable alternative to the mean variance model nonetheless understanding of the theory has been obscured by the complexity of the sequence economy models used for motivation by contrast we give a simple and direct derivation of the apt in a finite economy using an explicit bound on the deviations from apt prices across assets a coarse calculation shows that theoretical deviations from apt pricing are negligible in our economy

yes the apt is testable the arbitrage pricing theory apt has been proposed as an alternative to the meanvariance capital asset pricing model capm this paper considers the testability of the apt and points out the irrelevance for testing of the approximation error we refute shanken s objections including his assertion that roll s critique of the capm is applicable to the apt we also explain the testability of the apt on subsets and we explore the relationship between the apt and the capm the arbitrage pricing theory apt has been the subject of extensive research efforts since it was introduced by ross 36 37 the research has included theoretical papers and a growing empirical literature 2 nonetheless there seems to be some confusion in the literature about the relation between the theoretical underpinnings of the apt and its empirical tests this paper is an attempt to alleviate the confusion to illustrate the issues and to provide a focus section i of this paper is devoted to examining and refuting some points raised in shanken 40 which considers the testability of the apt the underlying premise of the apt is that asset returns ri are generated by a factor model of the form

politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterror i present a model of interactions between voters a government and a terrorist organization the model focuses on a previously unexplored conceptualization of counterterrorism as divided into tactic specific observable and general unobservable tactics when there is divergence between voters and government preferences strategic substitution among different modes of attack by terrorists and agency problems between the voters and government create a situation in which the politically optimal counterterrorism strategy pursued by the government in response to electoral and institutional incentives is quite different from the security maximizing counterterrorism strategy in particular in response to electoral pressure the government allocates resources to observable counterterror in excess of the social optimum this problem is particularly severe when governments put great weight on rent seeking or care less about counterterror than do voters and when terrorists have a large set of tactics from which to choose voters can decrease the magnitude of the agency problem by increasing the benefits of reelection by for example slackening requirements for nonsecurity related public goods i have received valuable comments and advice from bruce bueno de mesquita randy calvert martin cripps james fearon amanda friedenberg robert powell matthew stephenson and barbara walter i thank the weidenbaum center on the economy government and public policy at washington university for financial support

candidates credibility and re election incentives i study elections between citizen candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re election in each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences the elected candidate chooses the policy to implement and how much rent seeking to engage in when in office as the voter decides both which candidate to elect and subsequently whether the candidate is retained this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability i show that in the best stationary equilibrium when utility functions are concave over policy non median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter in this equilibrium there are two candidates who are elected at some history and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge this divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent seeking increasing voter welfare copyright 2013 oxford university press

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

multi beta capm or equilibrium apt a reply in their influential empirical paper roll and ross 11 state we think that in many discussions of the capm scholars were actually thinking of the apt and of process 1 the factor model with just a single factor in light of recent developments in the asset pricing literature i think it can now meaningfully be suggested that in many discussions of the apt scholars may have actually been thinking of a multi beta interpretation of the capm indeed much can be said in support of each of these perspectives for a single paradigm is emerging which integrates fundamental aspects of both the capm and the apt broadly speaking the equilibrium capm paradigm emphasizes the role of covariance between asset returns and an endogenous preference based aggregate while the arbitrage apt paradigm focuses on the covariance between asset returns and factors in the return generating process the emerging equilibrium factor paradigm encompasses each of these relations as well as a third covariance between the factors and the equilibrium aggregate my thesis in shanken 17 was that i the arbitrage paradigm has not produced a refutable hypothesis and that ii recognition of the role of the factor aggregate covariance relation appears to be essential if positive economic significance is to be attributed to asset pricing empirical work dybvig and ross d r attempt to resolve the empirical indeterminacy of the arbitrage paradigm by appealing to the condition that residual variance should not be too large i explain in section ii that this condition is inherently ambiguous from an empirical perspective and does not permit the formulation of a precise testable implication the equilibrium factor models which d r discuss do yield testable restrictions on parameters in the return generating process however consistent with my second point above these restrictions involve joint hypotheses that cannot be verified without observing the entire universe of assets thus contrary to their claim considerations similar to those in roll s 10 critique are indeed relevant to the testing of these models this and other similarities between the equilibrium apt and the capm are discussed in section iii i begin by clarifying some basic terminology

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding