the economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators party leaders and groups doing business with congressional committees the costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements the problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible as in congressional committees while legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees once an issue leaves a committee the costs of monitoring decline and leadership influence increases the absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain thus party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior however obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains

the impact of divided government on legislative production it seems obvious that divided governments should produce less legislation than unified governments yet studies have consistently failed to find such an effect because almost all existing studies focus on the experience of the u s national government the data have limited analysis to a consideration of executive legislative division and ignore the impact of division between bicameral chambers the state level data set employed in this study is not so limited the results show that divided legislatures decrease the production of laws by almost 30 nonetheless consistent with previous studies using national level data executive legislative divisions have no impact of legislative production the reason for this asymmetry is theoretically motivated additional hypotheses of interest are also tested including whether republican controlled legislative chambers are more conservative than democratic chambers in the sense of producing fewer laws than their democratic counterparts

reputational capital opportunism and self policing in legislatures this paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the house of representatives i create a measure of reputational trustworthiness based upon pooled samples of constituency opinion derived from the national election studies surveys i then examine the extent to which such reputational good will among constituents deters lame duck foreign travel by exiting house incumbents within the context of a quasi experimental research design the analysis suggests that legislators may be self policed by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to the point of discouraging unethical activity urveys i then examine the extent to which such s derived from the national election studies

land ownership as insurance and the market for land a study in rural vietnam we propose simple empirical insights to analyze the relationship between the value of the safety net embedded in land and households decision to sell land land sales may differ from other kinds of land transactions such as rental free loans and gifts in terms of future capacities to safeguard livelihood households well insured through nonland riskcoping mechanisms are expected to make use of sales more frequently than others we test this hypothesis with 2006 survey data from vietnam and find that selling households are less vulnerable better educated and richer than those that use other transfer types

competition in political and economic markets do anomalies play an important role in explaining economic and political choices are political decisions more prone to anomalies irrationality and inefficiency than economic decisions in their integration of results derived from experimental psychology and applied political economy frey and eichenberger 1990 argue that social scientists ought to answer these questions in the affirmative after examining a large body of choice data frey and eichenberger conclude that individuals deviate from the axioms of rational choice in their view the resultant anomalies in individual behavior are unaffected by the aggregation which occurs in the economic marketplace they conclude that political decision making systems correct no larger a proportion of these anomalies than are corrected by the economic market in many institutional settings outlined in their paper decision making systems can be expected to magnify individuals deviations from rational behavior system wide irrational behavior will then produce less frequent trading and a less efficient allocation of resources in this note we examine two components of frey and eichenberger s argument first we reconsider their evidence for irrational behavior in light of a larger body of experimental data which includes choices made in market settings second we argue that competition in political markets will tend to eliminate aggregate anomalies just as it does in economic markets experimental economists often generate data which distinguish between choices individuals indicate in unstructured environments and transactions individuals consummate in markets initial statements regarding choices are often inconsistent with subsequent trading behavior these data indicate that the economist s maximization paradigm based on tenets of rational choice is

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

legislative organization of fiscal policy in the voluminous literature on fiscal policy there is little evidence about the impact of legislative organization on shaping fiscal decisions by comparing different organizations of committee structure to control tax and spending policies this article presents such evidence regarding spending we test whether the dispersion of spending authority among multiple committees creates a problem similar to that of the common pool using american state data we find that when only one committee has the authority to spend spending is restrained relative to when spending authority is balkanized regarding taxation we hypothesize that if a single committee controls not only all spending authority but also all taxation authority that committee will have more incentive to tax than a committee that does not control spending it can obtain the benefits of increased taxation more directly again this proposition is supported by evidence at the state level

does rising landlessness signal success or failure for vietnam s agrarian transition in the wake of reforms to establish a free market in land use rights vietnam is experiencing a pronounced rise in rural landlessness to some observers this is a harmless by product of a more efficient economy while to others it signals the return of the pre socialist class structure with the rural landless at the bottom of the economic ladder the authors theoretical model suggests that removing restrictions on land markets will increase landlessness among the poor but that there will be both gainers and losers with uncertain impacts on aggregate poverty empirically they find that landlessness is less likely for the poor and that the observed rise in landlessness is poverty reducing on balance however there are marked regional differences notably between the north and the south

searching for symptoms of political shirking congressional foreign travel despite the hypothesized propensity for shirking to marklegislative institutions the evidence is rather equivocal moreover most of the research has focused exclusively onlegislator voting thereby constraining whatevergeneralizations might emerge the purpose of this paper is tocontribute to the debate over the question of politicalshirking by extending the range of phenomena examined toinclude congressional foreign travel our analysis providesevidence that opportunism is a problem in congress we findthat last period problems have arisen in the area of foreigntravel and that increased scrutiny to the problem on the partof congress only shifted consumption patterns i e legislators began taking foreign junkets near but not at theend of their legislative careers not all foreign travelshould be construed as worthless junketing since there isstrong evidence that some foreign travel is related tomembers responsibilities on congressional committees

the forgotten property rights evidence on land use rights in vietnam summary studies of land property rights usually focus on tenure security and transfer rights rights to determine how to use the land are regularly ignored however user rights are often limited relying on a unique vietnamese panel data set at both household and plot levels we show that crop choice restrictions are widespread and prevent crop diversification restrictions do not decrease household income but restricted households work harder and there are indications that they are supplied with higher quality inputs our findings are consistent with the view that it is possible to intervene effectively in agricultural production to promote output and food security nevertheless potential benefits of a more diversified crop pattern must be carefully considered in a period where global food markets are in turmoil

campaign finance reform and electoral competition using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002 this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races this is reflected in several dimensions conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins the regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office and they increase the probability that incumbents win re election campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent

final voting in legislatures in representative democracies such as the united states legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process for example much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs ideological influences on congressional voting behavior in this approach the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups including the legislator s own preferences for wealth and ideology james kau and paul rubin 1979 joseph kalt and mark zupan 1984 sam peltzman 1985 missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence gary becker 1983 as such rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature in this paper we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control we seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing sequence and outcomes of such votes specifically we look at final floor voting in the u s congress the patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required the findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints in section i the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail the purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization rather it is to focus the reader s attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature empirical results including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills are reported in section ii the data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the u s house of representatives during the 96th and 98th congresses some concluding remarks are offered in section iii

can land market reform mitigate the exclusionary aspects of rapid agro export growth abstract agro export growth has been associated with land concentration and employment instability in the wake of exclusionary agro export booms land market reform has been proposed as a way to improve peasant land access through the market developing a model of the economic competitiveness of different classes of producers this paper evaluates the likely effectiveness of land market reform while the model itself gives ambiguous answers numerical simulation identifies a large gap between market price and peasants abilty to pay for land among the components of land market reform policy progressive land taxation appears unlikely to close that competitiveness gap while farm land mortgage banks appear more likely to mitigate exclusionary aspects of growth

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

behavioral responses to risk in rural china does risk perpetuate poverty in a credit constrained economy jalan and ravallion study portfolio and other behavioral responses to measured risk using household panel data for rural china one quarter of wealth is held in unproductive liquid forms but only a small share of this appears to be a precaution against income risk the authors estimate that eliminating income risk would reduce the share of wealth held in liquid form by less than 1 percentage point moreover that effect is confined largely to middle income groups high income households do not it seems need to hold unproductive cautionary wealth and the poor probably cannot afford to do so the authors find no evidence that income risk discourages schooling but risk does inhibit the out migration of labor generally the results provide only limited support for the idea that uninsured risks promote unproductive portfolio behavior in this setting there is such an effect but it is small in magnitude and cannot be deemed an important cause of poverty

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

state government expenditure determinants and tax revenue determinants revisited the primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes that the preferences of public officials and the decision processes used to act on those preferences matter state government data state only not state and local from 1980 1985 and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models a previous merrifield 1991 state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables but it was based only on 1985 data 49 observations the larger data set 147 observations including better data for some of the variables indicated that most of merrifield s 1991 findings are robust the state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis as well as the hypotheses about specific variables the expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants and comparisons with results published in the literature though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses

formal and informal risk sharing in ldcs theory and empirical evidence in village economies limited commitment models have been proposed as theoretical alternatives to the complete markets hypothesis and have been shown to be empirically relevant yet village institutions might be able to enforce some contracts we construct a theoretical model which shows how households can insure through both formal and informal contracts when some verifiable production takes place in an environment of incomplete markets this theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets when all risks can be insured by formal contracts because all states of nature would be verifiable and the case where only informal agreements are available agreements specifying informal transfers that needs to be self enforceable we derive two equations of interest the income equation which is partially determined by the formal contract and an euler type equation where consumption growth is affected by lagged consumption instead of being a martingale using semi parametric specifications we derive testable restrictions of our model we estimate both equations using data of village economies in pakistan empirical results are consistent with the model the estimation and allows to show that the incentive constraints due to selfenforcement bind and that formal contracts are used to reduce the probability of binding the constraint

towards an understanding of the role of standard setters in standard setting abstract we investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting we examine how certain professional and political characteristics of fasb members and sec commissioners predict the accounting reliability and relevance of proposed standards notably we find fasb members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that decrease reliability and increase relevance partly due to their tendency to propose fair value methods we find opposite results for fasb members affiliated with the democratic party although only when excluding financial services background as an independent variable jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

financial market responses to treasury debt announcements note this paper considers the effect of u s treasury debt announcements on interest rates from 1982 85 the analysis measures the announcement s expected component in two ways the reported market expected announcements from the credit markets column of the wall street journal just prior to the announcements and time series techniques rate response to regular announcements of all maturity classes of treasury debt appear negligible reflecting the treasury s ongoing efforts to keep the market informed of future financing needs however announcements of cash management bills an irregular and residual category of treasury debt generate significant market responses copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

the new institutional economics and its applicability to development abstract the several remarkable developments in the social sciences which have come to be known as the new institutional economics nie have not yet been fully exploited for analyzing the determinants and effects of institutional change in the context of development this paper identifies two important components of the nie and illustrates both a potential complementarities between them and b their applicability to various problems and policies in the long term development of developing countries

political deadlocks and distributional information the value of the veil contractarian normative theory relies on the veil of ignorance construct to generate the political consensus required for its theories of justice by eliminating distributional information the veil is presumed to facilite consensus building by reducing conflict over the distributional effects of proposed constitutional rules or institutions this paper explores the extent to which excessive distributional information might also impede the ordinary day to day decision making of democratic institutions our analysis suggests that distributive information makes political deadlocks under majority rule more likely statistical evidence suggests that the efficacy of the u s congress has been reduced by the dramatic increase in distributional information made available to it over the past twenty five years

less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement comment the purpose of this comment has not been to question the main point of holcombe s paper unanimous legislative agreement if it occurs could be inefficient for the reasons put forth by holcombe the motivation for this comment is that holcombe s explanation for the existence of legislative unanimity is not a compelling one since it begs an important question that question is if the cooperation exists to maintain a unanimous coalition why does not the cooperation exist to maintain a less than unanimous coalition unless holcombe can answer this question satisfactorily his explanation for legislative unanimity is fundamentally flawed

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

asset smoothing consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints abstract a growing literature asks whether low wealth agents can accumulate assets over time or whether they are trapped in poverty this paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model with endogenous asset price risk to explore savings and portfolio decisions in a resource poor environment characterized by risk and subsistence constraints optimal portfolio strategies are found to bifurcate despite divisible assets and fully rational agents wealthier agents acquire a higher yielding portfolio and pursue conventional consumption smoothing poorer agents acquire a less remunerative portfolio and pursue asset smoothing rather than consumption smoothing asset based risk coping thus results in positive correlation between initial wealth and portfolio rate of return

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

new ways to assess and enhance land registry sustainability evidence from rwanda summary rwanda has recently implemented a nation wide program of first time land regularization ltr that many believe set new standards for the region we use administrative data combined with household survey and program rollout information to explore sustainability of the infrastructure created in this process including the impact of public efforts to increase registration of subsequent transactions we find that the program provided significant benefits in terms of gender equality and credit access while opening up new opportunities in terms of land taxation or land use planning but that high level of rural informality may undermine these in the medium to long term while public efforts to decentralize service provision helped to significantly reduce informality additional efforts are likely to be needed to ensure sustainability of the registry we discuss how rwanda can further move in this direction and draw out implications for other countries considering first time adjudication and registration of property rights

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

a dynamic option value for institutional change marketable property rights in the sahel in this article we use dynamic programming methods to create an option value measure of the value of the institutional innovation of marketable property rights this measure has two properties that are important to understanding institutional change it is truly dynamic and it allows for agent heterogeneity in the case of west africa we find that the collapse of customary risk management institutions is a vital part of the demand for marketability rights as agents struggle to smooth income and consumption in its wake we find that the social efficiency implications of this demand for institutional innovation are ambiguous

land titling and rural transition in vietnam abstract we examine the impact of the 1993 land law of vietnam which gave households the power to exchange transfer lease inherit and mortgage their land use rights we use household surveys before and after the law was passed together with the considerable variation across provinces in the speed of implementation of the reform to identify the impact of the law we find that the additional land rights led to statistically significant increases in the share of total area devoted to long term crops and in labor devoted to nonfarm activities however these changes are not large in magnitude and appear to be driven mainly by the increased security of tenure provided by the law rather than by increased access to credit markets or greater land market participation

balance of trade announcements and asset prices influence on equity prices exchange rates and interest rates abstract this paper examines the informational impact of traded balance announcements on asset prices including equities currrencies long and short term debt instruments and financial futures this study finds that in the 1980s prior to the 1985 plaza agreement for international economic cooperation information in trade balance announcements seem to have influenced only interest rates however in the 1985 1987 period such announcements also influenced stock prices and currency values these influences intensity further in the 1987 1988 period thus asset prices are sensitive to news in trade balance announcements and this sensitivity seems to have increased significantly in recent years with important implications for asset pricing models and economic policy formulation jel f30

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

committee characteristics and re election margins an empirical investigation of the us house models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re election interests of incumbent legislators attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful nevertheless the notion lives on nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system in the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents contrary to this simplifying characterization the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions we suggest here that these realities warrant a re opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member s vote share and that assignment to a narrowly focused specialized committee does not

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

further evidence on segmentation in the treasury bill market abstract this paper shows that differences in supplies of 13 and 12 week treasury bills have statistically significant and economically meaningful effects on their yield differentials from january 1985 through october 1991 controlling for the general slope of the treasury bill yield curve the tendency of bills maturing at month ends to have lower yields and the tendency of bills whose supply is augmented by cash management bills to have higher yields the finding that market participants do not arbitrage away yield differentials that owe to differences in supplies indicates that demand curves for individual bills are downward sloping and that segmentation in the treasury bill market is more pervasive than previously documented

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

self interest altruism and health risk reduction an economic analysis of voting behavior while classical economic theory suggests that the demand for private goods is motivated by economic self interest a growing body of literature suggests that the demand for public goods is driven both by self interest and by altruistic motives the political arena has been a major testing ground for this hypothesis recently a number of studies have tried to empirically isolate and determine the importance of economic versus ideological factors in explaining political choices by representatives kau and rubin 1979 peltzman 1984 kalt and zupan 1984 while congressional voting records have provided a rich source of data for empirical analysis a consensus opinion on the importance of self interest versus altruism has not been reached and remains controversial altruistic motivations have also been

does duration of political control matter interstate differences in branch banking laws this study began by trying to explain differences in state branch banking regulations introducing a variable that captures the effect of political dominance over time improves upon the commonly used measures of political dominance at a specific point in time even the direct comparison with the previously used percentage point in time variables shows that duration of political influence matters significantly no matter which party is in control the length of time it has been in control in a state influences political outcomes we show that in terms of which kind of legislation will be enacted democratic and republican control exert equal but opposite effects on legislative results in other words length of control matters independently of party affiliation but party affiliation affects the nature of the outcome of the political process

the development of a land market insights from cote d ivoire this paper contributes to the debate on rural land sales in africa first it shows that the emergence of sales in the forested area of cote d ivoire corresponds to an imperfect land commoditization due to the social embedding of land transfers in the autochthon migrant relationship then it analyzes land sales in a former no man s land outside this relationship where the transactions correspond to complete sales however a diachronic analysis reveals an involution in the market related to the transformation of the pioneer s individual private right into a family right once the land is inherited highlighting therefore another social dimension of land markets 2006 by the board of regents of the university of wisconsin system

non binding linked issues referenda analysis and an application non binding referenda petitions are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle this paper provides a simple theoretical and empirical analysis of a particular form of non binding referenda so called linked issues petitions it analyzes the ability of issue linkage to increase participation levels above those of single issue petitions and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and eastern enlargement of the european union

the market for land an analysis of interim transactions abstract an interim sale is a sale undertaken with the intention of buying back the same good in the near future interim transactions play a prominent role in several markets and they tend to generate multiple equilibria such markets can get caught at a low turnover equilibrium it is alleged that in many ldcs the market for buying and selling land is extremely inactive an interim transactions model is constructed to explain this phenomenon wider issues in land markets including distress sales are analysed as well the model is applied also to labour tying and seasonality in backward agriculture

gender differences in land inheritance schooling and lifetime income evidence from the rural philippines this article examines the difference in lifetime incomes arising from parental preferences in the allocation of land inheritance and investments in schooling between sons and daughters in the rural philippines sons are preferred with respect to land inheritance receiving 0 15 additional hectares of land while daughters are treated more favourably in schooling investments receiving 1 5 more years of schooling however differences in both current and life cycle incomes between sons and daughters are insignificant this suggests that filipino parents allocate intergenerational transfers to equalise incomes among their children without sacrificing efficiency

executive veto power and credit claiming the line item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending a model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods the item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature

separating economic from political influences on government decisions abstract the public interest theory is a poor predictor of government decisions relative to interest group theories but a sophisticated public interest theory is a more serious alternative to the former testing the sophisticated theory s predictions is problematic however when public interest is coincident with an interest group s interests a four step method is developed that disentangles public interest and interest group interests by separating economic from political incentives applying the method to the national forest service decisions about wilderness designations indicates whether interest groups were successful in influencing allocation decisions and whether allocation decisions were in the public interest

campaign war chests as a barrier to entry in congressional races i introduction issues surrounding the nature and degree of competition in political races have been examined extensively in both the economic and political science literature with most attention focused on the interplay between incumbent and challenger expenditures and electoral success this study extends our understanding of political competition by investigating the impact of an incumbent s war chest on a challenger s decision to mount a campaign 1 for this purpose a war chest is defined as a pool of unencumbered funds accumulated prior to the start of a campaign for elective office 2 sorauf 1988 182 has observed that early receipts even without early spending discourage competition in the primary and attractive challengers in the general election jacobson 1985 26 has argued the most effective strategy for keeping a seat in congress is to avoid serious opposition contemporary critics and reformers of campaign financing practices use such words as frighten intimidate and overpower to describe the role of an incumbent s war chest 3 despite this kind of attention little is actually known about the degree to which war chests diminish entry or reduce the quality of a challenge we present three alternative mechanisms to explain how an incumbent s war chest might deter entry each is based upon a war chest serving as a credible commitment to spend heavily if challenged specifically war chests may either represent excess capacity in financing a campaign or serve as a signal of non observable incumbent characteristics that define a formidable opponent aside from determining whether an incumbent is challenged a war chest might also affect the quality of the challenger for example potential candidates with prior political experience may be unwilling to risk their political capital on a long shot proposition to test for these effects on entry into house races a trichotomous logit model is estimated the choices are uncontested race contested by an ordinary challenger and contested by an experienced challenger although the empirical model is not sufficiently rich to fully distinguish among competing mechanisms the regression results are robust incumbent war chests negatively affect the likelihood of a contested race and the quality of the challenger ii war chests as a barrier to entry becker 1958 106 in comparing economic and political competition observed i n an ideal political democracy competition is free in the sense that no appreciable costs or artificial barriers prevent an individual from running for office in the theory of the firm entry occurs when the expected postentry stream of profits minus the cost of entry is positive analogously an individual will enter a political race when the expected gain from holding office is positive expected gain as defined by baron 1989 is a function of campaign costs the probability of winning and the personal valuation placed by the candidate on the office the first two determinants are partly endogenous depending upon the strategic interplay of the candidates the third aside from its direct effects indirectly affects the first two for example persons hungry for office may be committed to expending greater effort and funds on their campaigns thus increasing their probability of winning similarly as lott has emphasized nontransferable brand name capital would be another factor creating a commitment to aggressively pursue office thereby affecting campaign costs and the probability of winning 4 that some challengers are deterred however need not imply the existence of a political market failure in a contestability sense the lack of a viable challenger on the ballot does not imply a lack of competition good representation will discourage entry similarly the fact that some incumbents will aggressively seek re election frightening away potential challengers is not a sign that competition is lacking

formal and informal rural credit in four provinces of vietnam abstract this paper uses a survey of 932 rural households to uncover how the rural credit market operates in vietnam households obtain credit through formal and informal lenders formal loans are almost entirely for production and asset accumulation while informal loans are used for consumption smoothening the determinants of formal and informal credit demand are distinct while credit rationing depends on education and credit history in particular regional differences in the demand for credit are striking a one size fits all approach to credit policy in vietnam would be inappropriate