optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime abstract we study a simple law enforcement model where the organizational structure of a criminal group is endogenous and determined jointly with the amnesty granted to whistleblowers we allow criminals to choose between a horizontal partnership and a vertical hierarchical organization structure and we study how this choice affects the optimal leniency granted by a benevolent legislator whose aim is to minimize crime we show that the optimal amnesty with an endogenous organizational choice is less lenient than that granted when the policy targets vertical organizations only in the equilibrium partnerships coexist with vertical organizations

laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs the number of cartels detected in the united states and in europe has increased considerably since the introduction of corporate leniency programs in antitrust legislation it cannot however be ruled out that this apparent success results in part from increased cartel activity we explore the effects of corporate leniency programs on pricing and cartel activity by use of an experiment we find that in the lab i fewer cartels are established when a leniency program is in place and ii cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static nash equilibrium price and have lower survival rates

fines leniency and rewards in antitrust this article reports results from an experiment studying how fines leniency and rewards for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices subjects use costly fines as punishments leniency improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports leniency with rewards prices fall at the competitive level overall our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well run leniency and reward schemes these findings may also be relevant for similar white collar organized crimes such as corruption and fraud

a potential disintegration of the west antarctic ice sheet implications for economic analyses of climate policy the earth system may react in a nonlinear threshold response to climate forcings incorporating threshold responses into integrated assessment models iams used for climate policy analysis poses nontrivial challenges for example due to methodological limitations and pervasive deep uncertainties here we explore a specific threshold response a potential disintegration of the west antarctic ice sheet wais we review the current scientific understanding of wais identify methodological and conceptual issues and demonstrate avenues to address some of them through a stochastic hazard iam framework combining emulation expert knowledge and learning we conclude with a discussion of challenges and research needs

letting the briber go free an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes this paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes basu 2011 advocates legal immunity for bribe givers while retaining culpability for bribe takers results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices weak economic incentives for the bribe giver or retaliation by bribe takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation as a result asymmetric liability on its own may face challenges in the field

notes on bribery and the control of corruption abstract existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem when an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested he has to take into account the fact that he may in turn be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain but from the other side the purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion having done so it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption these turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests

repeated games with long run and short run players this paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long and short run players and little discounting because the short run players are unconcerned about the future each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction best response curves the natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values in fact this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player s choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but in contrast to standard repeated games the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents realized actions

empirical models of political risks in u s oil production operations in venezuela in 9 of the years between 1961 and 1978 venezuelan regimes took actions adverse to the profitability of u s oil companies local production operations in this study 2 time series discriminant models were developed for classifying each of the 18 years according to the occurrence of such action in the first model adverse government action was found more likely to occur following years of economic decline and periods when u s companies earned high profits from petroleum investments in venezuela in the second model government action tended to occur after periods of relative deprivation experienced by venezuelans to illustrate the use of discriminant models in forecasting political risks hypothetical scenarios were formulated from which projections were made through 1985 of the likelihood of government action against those u s oil companies operations remaining since the nationalization of petroleum

the structure of economic modeling of the potential impacts of climate change grafting gross underestimation of risk onto already narrow science models scientists describe the scale of the risks from unmanaged climate change as potentially immense however the scientific models because they omit key factors that are hard to capture precisely appear to substantially underestimate these risks many economic models add further gross underassessment of risk because the assumptions built into the economic modeling on growth damages and risks come close to assuming directly that the impacts and costs will be modest and close to excluding the possibility of catastrophic outcomes a new generation of models is needed in all three of climate science impact and economics with a still stronger focus on lives and livelihoods including the risks of large scale migration and conflicts

obtaining a driver s license in india an experimental approach to studying corruption we conduct two experiments to understand the process of obtaining a driver s license in india in the first experiment we randomly assign license candidates to one of three groups bonus offered a financial reward if they could obtain their license fast lesson offered free driving lessons upfront and control the control group alone illustrates bureaucratic failures 71 of the license getters in that group avoided the mandated driving test and 62 failed a surprise driving test the system responds to private needs there are more license getters in the bonus group but at a social cost there are more license getters who cannot drive in the bonus group the system however also appears to respond to social considerations as there are more license getters in the lesson group large extra legal payments are made by license getters those in the control group pay 2 5 times the official fee more of these extra legal payments take place in the bonus group surprisingly these extra legal payments are not direct bribes to bureaucrats but instead payments to agents in the second experiment we perform an audit study to better understand the role of agents the audit shows that agents can provide licenses to individuals even if they cannot drive but the audit also shows that agents cannot as easily circumvent all other rules we argue that our findings are most consistent with agents being the channel for corruption in this system we also report some suggestive evidence that bureaucrats create red tape possibly to induce more license candidates to use agents

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change the stern review calls for immediate decisive action to stabilize greenhouse gases because the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweighs the costs the economic analysis supporting this conclusion consists mostly of two basic strands the first strand is a formal aggregative model that relies for its conclusions primari ly upon imposing a very low discount rate concerning this discount rate aspect i am skeptical of the review s formal analysis but this essay points out that we are actual ly a lot less sure about what interest rate should be used for discounting climate change than is commonly acknowledged the review s second basic strand is a more intuitive argument that it might be very important to avoid possibly large uncertain ties that are difficult to quantify concerning this uncertainty aspect i argue that it might be recast into sound analytical reasoning that might justify some of the review s conclusions the basic issue here is that spending money to slow global warming should perhaps not be conceptualized primarily as being about consump tion smoothing as much as being about how much insurance to buy to offset the small change of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to compensate by ordinary savings

strategic leniency and cartel enforcement the cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the united states and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency i develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20 year span statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime jel d43 l12 l13 k21 in 1993 the department of justice doj introduced a new leniency program with the intent of destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels the program commits the doj to the lenient prosecution of early confessors in particular it guarantees complete amnesty from federal prosecution to the first confessor from each cartel provided that an investigation into the confes sor s cartel is not already underway it also offers discretionary penalty reductions to conspirators who confess when an investigation is already ongoing the new leniency program has become the cornerstone of cartel enforcement efforts in the united states e g scott d hammond 2004 and recently has inspired antitrust authorities in australia canada the european union japan south korea and elsewhere to introduce similar programs oecd 2002 2003 this paper tests the efficacy of the new leniency program the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency a common finding is that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultane

effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion we investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance we explore this through a formal leniency program in our experiment we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework we not only study the effect of the presence of such a mechanism on behavior but also the dynamic effect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency we find that in the presence of a leniency mechanism subjects collude and accept bribes less often while paying more taxes but there is no increase in bribe offers our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases the collusion and bribe acceptance rate and increases the collected tax yield it also does not encourage bribe offers in contrast the removal of the institutional mechanism does not induce negative effects suggesting a positive spillover effect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been removed

prioritarianism and climate change prioritarianism is the ethical view that gives greater weight to well being changes affecting individuals at lower well being levels this view is influential both in moral philosophy and in theoretical work on social choice where it is captured by a social welfare function swf summing a concave transformation of individual well being numbers however prioritarianism has largely been ignored by scholarship on climate change this article compares utilitarianism and prioritarianism as frameworks for evaluating climate policy it reviews the distinctive normative choices that are required for the prioritarian approach specifying a ratio scale for well being if the prioritarian swf takes the standard atkinson form determining the degree of concavity of the transformation function i e the degree of social inequality aversion and choosing between ex ante and ex post prioritarianism under conditions of risk the article also sketches some of salient implications of a prioritarian swf for climate policy with respect to the social cost of carbon the social discount rate optimal mitigation and the dismal theorem finally it discusses the issue of variable population

government intervention in the venezuelan petroleum industry an empirical investigation of political risk two important aspects of political risk analysis that have not received much attention in the literature are a the reasons why multinational firms experience different types of intervention and b the timing of intervention in order to address these issues this research develops a conceptual model of political risk based on the premise that host government intervention is related to specific objectives of the government vis a vis multinational firms information reflecting the attainment of objectives motivates the government to intervene in a given manner the application of this model to the case of the venezuelan petroleum industry from years 1947 to 1976 provides some support for this model and gives insight into the timing of specific types of intervention

power to the people evidence from a randomized field experiment on community based monitoring in uganda this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled power to the people evidence from a randomized field experiment on community based monitoring in uganda intervention started in 2004 and consisted of a training and a six month follow up in uganda the study observed that localized nongovernmental organizations encouraged communities to be more involved with the state of health service provision and strengthened their capacity to hold their local health providers to account for performance the community based monitoring project increased the quality and quantity of primary health care provision the program led to a significant increase in the weight of infants by 14 z scores and a significant decrease in child mortality by 33 utilization of outpatient services was significantly higher 20 percent in the treatment group and the overall effect across utilization measures is large and significant funding for the study derived from bank netherlands partnership program world bank research committee world bank africa region division swedish international development agency department for research cooperation

leniency policies and illegal transactions abstract we study the consequences of leniency reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self report to law enforcers on sequential bilateral illegal transactions such as corruption manager auditor collusion or drug deals it is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction here we find that when not properly designed leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence

expropriation of foreign direct investments empirical evidence and implications for the debt crisis the message from the empirical tests is the following first we were not able to support the public interest hypothesis stating that selective expropriations are driven by a national welfare calculus with costs and benefits directly related to the technological characteristics of foreign firms instead the hypothesis that governments decide on expropriations with regard to their political self interest seems to be more appropriate this is true if we look at more widespread expropriations that are unspecific in terms of technological standards industries the main factor that drives politically motivated expropriations is the poor overall economic performance of a country which reinforces earlier findings e g picht 1988 351

specifications of social welfare in economic studies of climate policy overview of criteria and related policy insights an important assumption in economic studies of climate policy is the social welfare function this paper shows that applying distinct decision or social welfare criteria can result in different optimal policies of climate control notably if climate change impacts are uncertain first decision criteria in current climate economic studies are reviewed next the most important alternatives are discussed including their mathematical formalization and incorporation in economy climate models most of these alternative criteria suggest more stringent climate policies to be optimal than the standard discounted utilitarianism approach however several important welfare criteria have not or hardly seen any application in the economic analysis of climate policy we conclude that there is clear need for systematic research on this theme for which the current review provides a solid basis

resource nationalism meets the market political risk and the value of petroleum reserves this paper investigates the effect of resource nationalism on the value of petroleum crude oil and natural gas reserves we develop a framework for treating resource nationalism as political risk and utilize data on reserve transactions from john s herold and political risk ratings from international country risk guide and institutional investor for the period 2000 2006 controlling for other factors that affect reserve value we demonstrate the value destruction of political risk and estimate the political risk discount for 37 countries the paper contributes to both the international business literature and practitioner approaches to political risk analysis in demonstrating use of publicly available market data from real asset transactions to measure the cost of political risk we also show that the discount depends on market conditions the higher expected future petroleum prices are the larger is the discount at any level of political risk this insight adds a new dimension to analysis of political risk which is typically measured and examined without regard to market conditions

legalizing bribe giving i introduction corruption remains an endemic problem in the developing world and has become a central political issue in many countries empirical work has considerably advanced our understanding of how widespread corruption is and how it can cause harm 1 governments and agencies such as the world bank have sponsored numerous anticorruption programs however regarding how to best fight corruption in practice research has lagged behind policy 2 recently kaushik basu chief economist then of the indian government and now of the world bank proposed a specific approach in basu s 2011 pamphlet why for a class of bribes the act of giving a bribe should be treated as legal he describes a society where bribery is rampant a scourge that deserves to be banished and proposes for the case of harassment bribes that people pay to get services they are legally entitled to 3 the following policy legalize bribe giving double the fine for bribe taking and make the bribe taker pay back the bribe if discovered when a citizen bribes a bureaucrat under traditional law the two become partners in crime they thus lack incentives to report the activity under basu s policy bp which he deems fairly radical incentives are provided for the bribe giver to report the bribe taker if this is foreseen the bureaucrat would not accept the bribe in the first place that is the key idea will it work a hot debate has raged in indian and international press the economist appeared sympathetic 4 however in some quarters the proposal stirred outrage and commentators discarded it mainly on moral grounds 5 more tempered thoughtful criticism has come from economists dreze 2011 in particular wrote a penetrating comment arguing that basu does not give adequate attention to some institutional and moral concerns which may change conclusions basu s intriguing presentation is informal as is the heated debate it inspired perhaps one should not expect the issues to be easily settled through such discourse the proposal is reminiscent of somewhat analogous tools used in other fields such as leniency policies in antitrust and whistleblower protection and reward schemes against fraud and organized crime scholars who studied those measures have suggested they may be effective if well designed and administered but counterproductive if details are not set right 6 deeper understanding of the pros and cons of subtle legal rules may require careful scrutiny within a formal model in section ii we develop a simple formal model to represent the scenarios basu and his commentators care about as explicit games by comparing equilibria we draw conclusions regarding the conditions under which bp is likely to be effective bp gets mixed context dependent grades and we highlight complementarities with other policies the proposal works best if coupled with measures that increase the costs for bureaucrats of denying citizens what they deserve and that reduce the costs for citizens of getting justice verifying whether a bribe was paid entails costs which may deter reporting hence bp works better against larger bribes inefficient or corrupt law enforcement increases these costs so bp will be more effective if it is part of a wider reform package that also fosters independence and accountability of the legal system in section iii we take into account also the legal and moral considerations brought up by dreze revealing other problems related to bp we propose a modified policy mbp that escapes many objections the idea is inspired by leniency rules in antitrust rather than legalize bribe giving only those who report having paid a bribe would be awarded legal immunity extortionary harassment bribes are distortive when they are not paid because a justified and presumably welfare enhancing licence is then not issued with other arguably often more serious forms of corruption distortions occur when bribes are paid not otherwise

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change how much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming the stern review argues that the damages from climate change are large and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions an examination of the review s radical revision of the economics of climate change finds however that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function the review s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates