some evidence on herding behavior of u s banks the authors examine the international lending decisions of u s commercial banks of different sizes from 1977 to 1982 for evidence ofthe ex istence of herding behavior granger sims causality tests for the loans gran ted by the top nine the next fifteen and the remaining u s banks provide no c lear evidence of herding between the top nine and the next fifteen banks there is however evidence that the remaining banks mostly small ones herded behind the top twenty four banks overall the analysis presented here points to a very weak herding behavior copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

resolving differences in willingness to pay and willingness to accept reply gwendolyn c morrison 1997 raises a logical point regarding our experimental test of the divergence between willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta measures of economic value shogren et al 1994 she argues that our design does not provide a true test of the existence of a fundamental endowment effect since we did not control for the potential of a pivoting indifference map daniel kahneman et al 1990 she concludes that even though our ev idence shows that the mean wtp and wta bids for market goods with close substitutes e g candy bars and coffee mugs converge after market experience the endowment effect might still be alive and well albeit at statisti cally insignificant levels

security analysis and trading patterns when some investors receive information before others in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time this article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others the model implies that under some conditions investors will focus only on a subset of securities herding while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics in addition the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft cited trading strategies such as profit taking short term position reversal and following the leader mimicking earlier trades in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time while these models provide many important insights in reality some investors either fortuitously or owing to superior skill acquire pertinent information before others by being first an investor can exploit this information to great advantage information that is uncovered only slightly later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed we show in this article that the sequential nature of information arrival has a significant effect on both the trading decisions and the types of information collected by investors the model we develop describes the investment choices of a set of competitive risk averse investors who investigate the long term prospects of firms lucky or high ability investors uncover the

creating venture capital industries that co evolve with high tech insights from an extended industry life cycle perspective of the israeli experience this paper presents an industry life cycle model of venture capital vc and associated startup intensive high tech clusters based on the israeli experience of the last 35 years throughout vc is considered as a new industry which when successful traverses five phases background conditions pre emergence emergence restructuring and consolidation each phase comprises a number of events and processes including policy ones a central process is vc emergence a cumulative self reinforcing process involving a number of interrelated sub processes a central sub process in the israeli case was vc startup co evolution which was the critical link between the vc emergence and the transformation of the high tech cluster into a startup intensive configuration our analysis suggests that provided appropriate background conditions prevail vc could be central vector in the transformation of existing high tech clusters 2006 elsevier b v all rights reserved

profit distribution and compensation structures in publicly and privately funded hybrid venture capital funds abstract policy makers have become increasingly concerned at the lack of risk capital available to new and early stage entrepreneurial ventures as a public response to a perceived market failure several governments have set up programs to channel equity finance to capital constrained but high potential young enterprises critically government support is often directed through the agency of private venture capital funds we examine the profit distribution and compensation structures used in these hybrid public private funds we appraise government policy makers ability to use these structures to improve the expected returns in market failure areas in order to attract private sector investors and professional managers to participate in these funds the results derived from our simulation study suggest that such asymmetric profit sharing models can only resolve relatively modest market failures unless the programs also manage to attract highly competent investors who are able to produce above average gross returns in market failure areas

government as fund of fund and vc fund sponsors effect on employment in portfolio companies governments around the world have set up fund of fund programs to increase the supply of venture capital financing to young growth oriented firms in these programs a government fund of fund acts as limited partner in a venture capital fund the venture capital investment process is hereby delegated to external investors which were selected by the government fund of fund we investigate employment growth in 108 portfolio companies that benefited from the arkimedes fund of fund in flanders accounting for the heterogeneity in the types of venture capital investors managing hybrid funds and the associated goal diversity and resource endowments we find that portfolio companies backed by hybrid independent venture capital funds show greater employment growth than those backed by hybrid captive or hybrid government venture capital funds this finding is relevant because it indicates that the financial objectives of hybrid independent venture capital funds are highly compatible with the government s objective of employment growth as providing companies with superior monitoring and value adding services with the objective of realizing a successful exit creates employment in the process

imperfect information and staggered price setting many keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times this paper presents an explanation for this staggered price setting the authors develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others this gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs staggering can be the equilibrium outcome in addition the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations copyright 1988 by american economic association

speculative prices and popular models t he rational expectations revolution in economics was born of the recognition that the expectations people hold for future economic variables are fundamental to their behavior thus our economists economic models require their those who make up the economy economic models models which they use to generate their expectations the key idea of rational expectations models is to collapse the two models into one to assume that people know or behave as if they know the true model that describes the economy this idea allows economists to construct simple and elegant models of the economy models that are appealing theoretically and that can be studied without collecting any data about the models in the minds of economic actors the problem with the rational expectations models is that collapsing the two kinds of models into one is a gross oversimplification obviously the popular models the models that are used by the broad masses of economic actors to form their expectations are not the same as those held by economists once one accepts the difference economic modelling cannot proceed without collecting data on the popular models themselves this paper reports on such a data collection effort on popular models using questionnaire survey methods with the purpose of understanding speculative markets i will report here on my research to understand the u s stock market crash of october 1987 research fumiko konya yoshiro tsutsui and i undertook to understand the japanese stock market crash of october 1987 research karl case and i undertook to understand recent real estate booms and research john pound and i undertook to understand the periodic hot markets for initial public offerings ipo s of common stock

the equilibrium distribution of wage settlements and economic stability several authors recently have attempted to extend the fischer contract model by allowing agents to endogenize the contract pattern see e g gray 1978 and blanchard 1979 aside from the early literature on the pattern bargaining ross 1948 rees and hamilton 1963 and mcguire and rapping 1968 however the only literature that endogenizes the pattern of negotiation is fethke and policano 1982 1984 adopting a game theoretic framework in which each sector selects the contract length and the timing of its negotiation date so as to minimize the expected resource cost of contracting they investigate the determinants and aggregate implications of alternative negotiation patterns in a twosector model with relative and aggregate disturbances in this paper contract length is assumed to be fixed and indexing provisions are ignored our attention is concentrated on the determinants of the timing of bargaining and the macroeconomic consequences of the resulting year to year distributions of wage settlements these questions will be analyzed in a game theoretic framework where bargaining units choose the timing of bargaining and the authority chooses the money supply rules suppose that the distribution of wage settlements is uniform and that the monetary authority chooses optimum monetary policy such as that given by fischer 1977 then the behaviors of the price level output and the real wage are symmetric between odd and even periods and hence bargaining units are indifferent to the timing of bargaining at the same time the authority minimizes the loss function given the distribution of wage settlements consequently no player has an incentive to change his current strategy and the economy is in nash equilibrium in effect fischer 1977 examines the properties of this equilibrium without providing a game theoretic treatment of the problem we require answers to three questions 1 is uniform distribution the only equilibrium of this labor contract economy 2 if not what is the optimal pattern of negotiation from the

rational herding in financial economics abstract this paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets some models can predict perfect herding in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities negative externalities in bank runs positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition principal agent problems based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation or informational learning cascades the paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research

information incentives and contract timing patterns a prominent feature of wage contracting in the united states is the bunched timing pattern that is often associated with the process of pattern bargaining the model describes the bunching of wage contracts as the equilibrium outcome of decentralized decisions in an economy composed of both competitive and monopolistically competitive product markets agents time their wage adjustment to take advantage of the information associated with the timing decisions of others this information based motive leads to staggered contracting a bunching equilibrium requires the presence of heterogeneous product markets and occurs because the information transmitted by contracting agents differs across the market structures copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

payments for ecosystem services programs predicting landowner enrollment and opportunity cost using a beta binomial model this paper concerns predicting enrollment in payment for ecosystem services pes programs to promote habitat preservation on private lands we develop a beta binomial model to address both program participation and the amount of land enrolled by each potential enrollee we apply the estimation approach to stated preference data from non industrial private forest owners in finland as an alternative econometric model we also develop a multivariate censored regression model of enrollments using cross validation we find that the beta binomial model predicts at least as well as the multivariate censored model yet has fewer parameters using our estimation results we demonstrate policy predictions regarding program enrollment and landowner opportunity cost

public versus private venture capital seeding or crowding out a pan european analysis abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between public and private sources of venture capital in europe and the development of the industry controlling for characteristics of the legal systems in 15 european countries over the period 1990 1996 large public participation is correlated with smaller vc industries but analyses do not support the view that public venture capitalists are acting to seed the industry or that are they crowd out private funds on the contrary public involvement seems to cause greater amounts of money to be invested in the industry as a whole we argue that the effects of public intervention whatever the motives are real and probably result from demonstrating sanctioning the social merit of venture capital and from signaling an enduring commitment to it

introduction funding gaps theoretical and empirical foundations of government policies to plug alleged business funding gaps are highly controversial but rarely subject to wide ranging in depth debate this symposium from major scholars in the field provides a counterbalance topics addressed cover the theory of lending under asymmetric information its implications for overlending relationship lending as a market solution to information asymmetries government emulation of private sector decision making to eliminate underprovision of high tech equity and theoretically based empirical work testing for funding deficiencies in the high tech sector despite the very different and potentially contradictory contributions the result is surprisingly a set of mutually agreed policy conclusions

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

willingness to pay in different policy planning methods insights into respondents decision making processes willingness to pay in different policy planning methods insights into respondents decision making processes

bank runs the deposit currency ratio and the interest rate abstract this paper provides a model of an economy with a banking system which is subject to bank runs the model is then used to explain the rise in short term interest rates during bank runs and the fall in the deposit currency ratio in anticipation of possible runs

contracts and exits in venture capital finance using a sample of european venture capital vc investments i study the relation between vc contracts and exits the data indicate that ex ante stronger vc control rights increase the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will exit by an acquisition rather than through a write off or an ipo my findings are robust to controls for a variety of factors including endogeneity and cases in which the vc preplans the exit at the time of contract choice my findings are consistent with control based theories of financial contracting such as aghion and bolton 1992

capital market imperfections high tech investment and new equity financing highly variable returns asymmetric information and a lack of collateral should cause small high tech firms to have poor access to debt new equity financing has several advantages over debt but may be costly compared to internal finance we examine an unbalanced panel of over 2 400 publicly traded us high tech companies over the period 1981 98 most small high tech firms obtain little debt financing new equity financing in the form of the initial public offering is very important and permits a major increase in firm size after going public comparatively few firms make heavy use of external finacing

willingness to accept compensation for the environmental risks of oil transport on the amazon a choice modeling experiment abstract this paper looks at the question of whether subsistence level indigenous people place a value on the preservation of ecosystems independent of direct impacts of environmental change such as impacts on their production activities the economics literature generally suggests that non use values don t exist among the poor and in the informal sector of the economy we examine this issue through a choice modeling experiment a survey was conducted of rainforest communities who live on the banks of the amazon river rio solimoes in the vicinity of proposed oil and gas pipelines the data were analyzed in the choice modeling framework revealing relatively high amounts of compensation that were necessary in order to accept the potential ecosystem damages associated with oil transport even if the people were completely compensated for direct damages such as loss of access to productive resources these results suggest that environmental quality is important for its own sake a result that is very different from the implicit assumption among many economists

using choice experiments to value the natura 2000 nature conservation programs in finland this paper is concerned with the preferences of the finnish households for a controversial nature conservation program the european union s natura 2000 network since the program was mainly based on biological considerations it met strong public opinions from different interest groups in finland using the choice experimental method we attempt to estimate the values that the finnish households would place on different preservation levels it is found that the mean willingness to accept for a decrease in the nature preservation area is much greater than the mean willingness to pay for an increase by the same amount also the marginal willingness to pay becomes zero after an initial increase in the natural preservation area which is consistent with our earlier findings in a binary choice valuation study policy implications of these results are also discussed in relation to different decision criteria

counterinflationary policy in a unionised economy with nonsynchronised wage setting a model of the determination of wages and employment in a unionised economy with nonsynchronised wage setting is presented in this paper it is shown that a monetary deflation can lead to prolonged unemployment even though the unions act rationally and with full information about the change in policy the model generates a statistical phillips curve in which the rate of change of money wages depends on the anticipated growth rate of the money supply and on disequilibrium unemployment conventional incomes policies are shown to have desirable social effects but run counter to the perceived self interest of the trade unions and are therefore likely to be resisted taxes on wage increases have desirable long run effects but do not appear able to reduce the transitional unemployment costs of monetary deflation

using choice experiments to value the environment this paper we outline the choice experiment approach to environmental valuation this approach has its roots in lancaster s characteristics theory of value in random utility theory and in experimental design we show how marginal values for the attributes of environmental assets such as forests and rivers can be estimated from pair wise choices as well as the value of the environmental asset as a whole these choice pairs are designed so as to allow efficient statistical estimation of the underlying utility function and to minimise required sample size choice experiments have important advantages over other environmental valuation methods such as contingent valuation and travel cost type models although many design issues remain unresolved applications to environmental issues have so far been relatively limited we illustrate the use of choice experiments with reference to a recent uk study on public preferences for alternative forest landscapes this study allows us to perform a convergent validity test on the choice experiment estimates of willingness to pay

when bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs the design of effective public venture capital programmes recently public efforts to finance small high technology firms have proliferated we review the motivations for these efforts and make some preliminary observations about their design we explore the underlying challenges that the financing of young growth firms poses the ways that specialised financial intermediaries address them and the rationales for public efforts to finance these companies the final section makes a set of observations about the ways in which the structure of these efforts can most effectively complement private sector activity a frequent fault in programme design is the presumption that technological criteria can be divorced from business considerations when evaluating firms the federal government has played an active role in financing new firms particularly in high technology industries since the soviet union s launch of the sputnik satellite in recent years european and asian nations and many us states have adopted similar initiatives while these programmes precise structures have differed the efforts have been predicated on two shared assumptions i that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms and ii that the government either can identify investments which will ultimately yield high social and or private returns or can encourage financial intermediaries to do so in contrast to other government interventions designed to boost economic growth such as privatisation programmes these claims have received little scrutiny by economists the neglect of these questions is unfortunate while the sums of money involved are modest relative to public expenditures on defence procurement or retiree benefits these programmes are very substantial when compared to contemporaneous private investments in new firms government programmes in this arena have been divided between those efforts that directly fund entrepreneurial firms and those that encourage or subsidise the development of outside investors in this paper i will focus on public venture capital initiatives programmes that make equity or equity like investments in young firms or encourage other intermediaries to make such investments in some such programmes such as the advanced technology program and the small business innovation research programmes discussed below the funds are provided as a contract or outright grant while these efforts have proliferated a consensus as to how to structure these programmes remains elusive while the design of regulatory agencies has been extensively studied from a theoretical and empirical perspective little work has

spike models in contingent valuation spike models allow for a nonzero probability of zero willingness to pay in referendum style contingent valuation experiments they include many of the often used models as special cases and allow various analyses that are not possible in standard applications in this paper the economic rationale for the spike models and their estimation techniques are discussed and empirical illustrations are provided one study suggests that mean willingness to pay is zero and both studies strongly suggest that median wtp is zero these results have some bearing on the continuing debate of the incentive properties of hypothetical surveys and the construction of scenarios in contingent valuation experiments

willingness to pay and willingness to accept how much can they differ comment i agree with the point made by edoh y amiran and daniel a hagen 2003 that there can be a substantial or even infinite divergence between the wta and wtp for a public good even where there is a nonzero elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good provided that the indifference curves are asymptotically bounded with respect to market goods in the manner they describe this is an important point they are also correct to point out that the elasticity of substitution is a local concept whereas their asymptotic boundedness condition applies also for discrete changes my 1991 paper used a local analysis because it was following the structure of the analysis in robert d willig 1976 and alan randall and john r stoll 1980 i wanted to show that while randall and stoll appeared to extend willig s local result on wta versus wtp from price changes to changes in the quantity of a public good the relevant elasticity was in fact different and involved the substitution elasticity as well as the income elasticity i view these points by amiran and hagen as not two separate results but essentially the same result their asymptotic boundedness condition generalizes my zero elasticity of substitution condition to discrete changes the asymptotic boundedness condition can be expressed as follows assuming a bivariate utility function u x q and given a reference point x q associated with a reference utility level u u x q there exists some q q such that for all q q there exists no x such that u x q u in other words no amount of x can substitute for the reduction in public good from q to q q in the case of a zero elasticity of substitution q q but as amiran and hagen show in their theorem 1 this is unnecessarily restrictive when dealing with a discrete reduction in q furthermore their theorem 2 can be viewed as a special case of their theorem 1 in which q 0 which makes q an essential commodity it is well known in consumer theory that the wta to avoid the loss of an essential market good is infinite their theorem 2 extends this result to the case of an essential nonmarket good but as their theorem 1 shows essentialness is not necessary for an infinite wta the boundedness condition is the key and this implies a fundamental lack of substitutability between money market goods and the public good

monetary policy and the timing of wage negotiations abstract in a model of long term labor contracts the simultaneous determination of the pattern of contract negotiation and the pattern of monetary policy intervention yields a nash equilibrium in which agents allow a discretionary role for policy the resulting pattern of negotiation depends on the stochastic nature of the system when all disturbances are aggregate in nature a synchronized pattern of negotiation is optimal regardless of the frequency of monetary policy intervention when both aggregate and relative disturbances affect the system a pattern of bunched negotiations can result with the authority intervening at dates away from the negotiation dates

wage contingencies the pattern of negotiation and aggregate implications of alternative contract structures abstract a model of long term contracts is developed in which the choice of the negotiation pattern is endogenized when disturbances to the economy derive primarily from relative shocks staggered negotiation is optimal because adjustments made by negotiating agents transmit desirable employment effects into sectors that are looked into previously negotiated contracts the price level acts as the transmission mechanism indexation of wages to the price level enhances the benefits of staggered negotiation because the sector specific information revealed by the price level acts as a substitute for explicit inclusion in the contract of sector specific information the degree of persistence and the level of variation in aggregate output and employment measures which are commonly used in comparing the merits of synchronized versus staggered regimes are shown to be inappropriate criteria upon which to judge the optimality of the negotiation pattern

the equilibrium and optimal timing of price changes this paper studies the welfare properties of the equilibrium timing of price changes staggered price setting has the advantage that it permits rapid adjustment to firm specific shocks but the disadvantages that it causes unwanted fluctuations in relative prices and that by creating price level inertia it can increase aggregate fluctuations because each firm ignores its contribution to these problems staggering can be a stable equilibrium even if it is highly inefficient in addition there can be multiple equilibria in the timing of prices changes indeed whenever there is an inefficient staggered equilibrium there is also an efficient equilibrium with synchronized price setting

union wage settlements during a disinflation this paper examines the role of union wage contracts in the persistence of inflation and the implication of these contracts for the problem of disinflation in the united states a quantitative model of overlapping con tracts explicitly oriented toward the major union sector is developed the model takes account of expectations of future wage price and employment conditions as in more aggregated models that have been used in macroeconomic research in addition the distribution of workers according to contract length as well as deferred wage increases and escalator clauses are explicitly used in the model the main aim of the model is to determine the constraints which these contracts impose on disinflation paths the model indicates that the maximum speed of disinflation is extremely slow in the early phases if a rise in unemployment is to be avoided but increases considerably before the new lower rate of inflation is reached the disinflation path is considerably slower than that observed after hyperinflation periods however the existence of a path of inflation reduction raises questions about whether the institution of union wage con tracts is really the direct cause of costly disinflations or whether their influence works indirectly by raising credibility problems about a monetary disinflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

preferences for site and environmental functions when selecting forthcoming national parks abstract a political decision to establish the first ever national parks in denmark allowed us to examine if people hold preferences regarding which site to be designated as national park separate from the preferences for its environmental functions to this end we designed a choice experiment representing the national park alternatives by the possible site and the possible improvements in environmental functions results revealed that respondents have strong preferences for the establishment of a national park per se furthermore there are significant differences in taste parameters for the different sites which cannot be explained by respondents valuing the different functions differently across sites instead we explain the results with differences in regional and cultural preferences we also performed a balanced split sample test of anchoring effects and found clear evidence of this we included a zero bidder screening question prior to the choice set part of the survey instrument to improve wtp estimation

bank failure contagion in historical perspective abstract bank failures are contagious due to the lack of bank specific information depositors who lack financial information on individual banks make withdrawal decisions based on the condition of the banking system as a whole a high ratio of bank failures then signals an adverse condition within the banking sector and triggers systemwide bank runs this paper looks at bank panics in u s history and shows the importance of solvency information specific to individual banks the major empirical finding is that the government or banks stopped bank panics mainly by providing financial information on banks

survey evidence on diffusion of interest and information among investors abstract questionnaire surveys of institutional and individual investors were undertaken to learn about patterns of communications it was found that direct interpersonal communications are very important in investor decisions questions elicited what fraction of investors were unsystematic and allowed themselves to be influenced by word of mouth communications or other salient stimuli randomly sampled investors were studied as well as investors in stocks whose price had recently increased dramatically contagion or epidemic models of financial markets are proposed in which interest in individual stocks is spread by word of mouth the survey evidence is interpreted as supporting such models

ipos trade sales and liquidations modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis using a detailed sample made up of more than 20 000 investment rounds we analyze the time to ipo trade sale and liquidation for about 6 000 venture backed firms we model these exit times using competing risks models biotech and internet firms have the fastest ipo exits internet firms are also the fastest to liquidate while biotech firms are however the slowest the conditional probability for ipos are clearly non monotonous with respect to time as time flows venture capital backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an ipo however after having reached a plateau investments that have not yet exited have fewer and fewer possibilities of ipo exits as time increases the bubble period from 1998 to 2000 was an easy money period where venture capitalists gave much more money to firms many of which did not offer outstanding growth potential as they tended to liquidate much faster than in normal times

the investment strategies of publicly sponsored venture capital funds abstract this paper investigates the effects of public ownership on the investment strategy of hybrid vc funds we exploit a unique dataset containing data for all of the venture capital funds in europe that received financial support from the european investment fund eif during the years 1998 2007 the dataset includes 179 vc funds that invested in 2482 companies we find that the level of public ownership shows a weak negative correlation with the likelihood of observing a write off and that a higher public share is associated with a longer duration for the investment the latter effect is more relevant for those investments that generate intermediate financial returns the results are robust to the introduction of controls at the target firm level and for financial market conditions

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

learning in sequential wage negotiations theory and evidence when union firm pairs bargain sequentially and when unobserved components of firms abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry we derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among followers than leaders in wage negotiations considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of canadian contract negotiations

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

a comparison of stated preference methods for environmental valuation this paper presents an empirical comparison of contingent valuation cvm and choice experiments which are used to value environmental quality changes both of these methods require individuals to state their preferences for environmental qualities however choice experiments differ from cvm in that environmental attributes are varied in an experimental design which requires respondents to make repeated choices between bundles of attributes the empirical application involved the effect of environmental quality changes arising from forest management practices on recreational moose hunting values significant differences were found between the values derived from the two methods however detailed examination of the implied choice behaviour suggested that respondents ignored substitute recreation areas in the cvm question restricting the choice experiment model to consider only the one site where quality was varied resulted in welfare estimates similar to the cvm model this highlights the importance of substitutes in environmental valuation and suggests that choice experiments may be more appropriate than cvm in some cases