industry characteristics and interest group formation an empirical study the role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics however few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics in cross sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation we discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy

do governors get what they want an alternative examination of the line item veto this paper reconsiders the impact of the governor s line item veto on the state budget process the governor s ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness rather than a smaller expenditure budget the percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor s original budget request over fiscal years 1983 1989 is examined the empirical results indicate that under certain political situations the line item veto authority enhances the governor s ability to obtain his or her desired budget

valuation and control in venture finance this paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm i assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm i show that to separate the entrepreneur s value of control from the firm s expected payoff the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment the entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information and improved risk sharing venture capital firms often finance projects which at the time of funding have neither revenues nor even a product in existence however by using an intricate system of control rights venture capitalists can overcome many failures inevitable in a complex task of converting entrepreneurial talent into companies products and markets

financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

interest groups and the rise and decline of growth interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth a la olson 1982 it is unknown however what impact if any groups exert on the volatility of growth an important hindrance to development in this article we first consider what impact we should expect olson groups to have on the volatility of growth we then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a cross country panel using system generalized method of moments the findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability in addition the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation an influential explanation for rising dowry payments is the marriage squeeze the present paper shows this explanation to be internally inconsistent the marriage squeeze argument for inflation relies on the fact that population growth leads to an excess supply of brides in the marriage market this excess supply is resolved by some women postponing marriage so that the average age of brides increases in previous studies the argument is stated informally here a matching model of marriage is developed to formally analyze the link between dowry payments and population growth it is shown that a marriage squeeze cannot yield dowry inflation in fact when women who do not find matches at the desirable marrying age re enter the marriage market as older brides a marriage squeeze is shown to imply dowry deflation population change is therefore not a promising explanation for the observed increases in dowry payments

are preferences for fiscal discipline endogenous differences in voters fiscal preferencesare examined taking advantage of theexceptional swiss institutional setting empirical evidence suggests thatpreferences are determined by strictlycultural patterns cultural area measuredby language thus fiscal preferences canbe considered as being largely exogenous this implies that except for specialcases it is not possible to find simpleproxy variables for fiscal preferences anad hoc index of fiscal preferencesought to be built up when the introductionof this variable is required forcomprehensive explanatory models of fiscaldiscipline or for other related studies

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

line item veto where is thy sting roponents of giving the president the authority to use a line item veto argue that the institutional change is needed to limit special interest legislation and restrain spending opponents respond that it would grant too much added power to the president thereby upsetting the delicate balance wisely crafted by the founding fathers this article focuses on the presumption evidently shared by both sides in the debate that adoption of item veto authority will have significant consequences in terms of budget outcomes and the distribution of power 1 curiously there presently exists little empirical support for the presumption that item veto authority is important most studies comparing states with various types of veto authority have failed to detect significant effects associated with item veto additional tests of our own are consistent with these results after reviewing the empirical evidence we reconsider the alleged effects of item veto authority by seating the popular depiction in an explicit model of the budgetary process formal modeling exposes logical inconsistencies contained in popular veto discourse further the model makes clear that the predicted consequences of item veto commonly projected as ubiquitous in fact arise only in select settings

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

politics partisanship and the power to veto does gubernatorial line item veto power affect state budgets abstracthow does line item veto liv power affect a governor s ability to structure the state budget is liv power only relevant as a partisan tool is it still relevant when the state legislature can override the veto we use a rich disaggregated data set to test the effect of the gubernatorial liv on state budgets controlling for political factors such as party affiliation of the governor and legislature minority status of the governor and the legislature s ability to override a liv our results suggest that liv power has very weak influence if any on governors ability to influence state budgets

immigration redistribution and universal suffrage the effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated this paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations which are that i immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people s higher levels of xenophobia and that ii immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote since the demand for redistribution depends on the expected gap between median voter income and mean income immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because as non citizens they do not change the median voter s income but as economic stakeholders they do affect the mean income four empirical consequences of i and ii are tested at the individual level evidence from the european values survey in 45 countries confirms ii showing that immigrants expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high in contrast i is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used

local government service production the politics of allocative sluggishness a partial adjustment model with endogenous speed of adjustment is developed to analyze how pressure from interest groups and mass media influence the adjustment process of local governments a survey questionnaire to the local politicians is used to measure the pressure indicators based on a combined cross section and time series data base for norwegian local governments the sluggishness of the adjustment process is estimated the dynamics of the adjustment process is shown to reflect the activity of interest groups and media pressure pressure groups related to primary education explain an important part of the sluggishness observed pressure groups promoting kindergartens and health care care for the elderly stimulate reallocations

missing women age and disease relative to developed countries and some parts of the developing world most notably sub saharan africa there are far fewer women than men in india and china it has been argued that as many as a 100 million women could be missing the possibility of gender bias at birth and the mistreatment of young girls are widely regarded as key explanations we provide a decomposition of these missing women by age and cause of death while we do not dispute the existence of severe gender bias at young ages our computations yield some striking new findings 1 the vast majority of missing women in india and a significant proportion of those in china are of adult age 2 as a proportion of the total female population the number of missing women is largest in sub saharan africa and the absolute numbers are comparable to those for india and china 3 almost all the missing women stem from disease by disease comparisons and not from the changing composition of disease as described by the epidemiological transition finally using historical data we argue that a comparable proportion of women was missing at the start of the 20th century in the united states just as they are in india china and sub saharan africa today

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

why dowry payments declined with modernization in europe but are rising in india in contrast to most dowry oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization those in india have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades this paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste the theoretical model contrasts caste and non caste based societies in the former there exists an inherited component to status caste that is independent of wealth and in the latter wealth is the primary determinant of status modernization is assumed to involve two components increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status or caste groups the paper shows that in caste based societies the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments whereas in non caste based societies increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

executive veto power and credit claiming the line item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending a model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods the item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature

how to succeed at increasing spending without really trying the balanced budget amendment and the item veto congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending in particular the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents interests through pork barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest however assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results the supermajorities requires by the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log rolling that promote and may indeed increase pork barrel spending

state government expenditure determinants and tax revenue determinants revisited the primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes that the preferences of public officials and the decision processes used to act on those preferences matter state government data state only not state and local from 1980 1985 and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models a previous merrifield 1991 state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables but it was based only on 1985 data 49 observations the larger data set 147 observations including better data for some of the variables indicated that most of merrifield s 1991 findings are robust the state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis as well as the hypotheses about specific variables the expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants and comparisons with results published in the literature though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

breaking the caste barrier intergenerational mobility in india we contrast the intergenerational mobility rates of the historically disadvantaged scheduled castes and tribes sc st in india with the rest of the workforce in terms of their education attainment occupation choices and wages using survey data from successive rounds of the national sample survey between 1983 and 2005 we find that intergenerational education and income mobility rates of sc sts have converged to non sc st levels during this period moreover sc sts have matched non sc sts in occupation mobility rates we conclude that the last 20 years of structural changes in india have coincided with a breaking down of caste based barriers to socioeconomic mobility

monetary incentives on inter caste marriages in india theory and evidence abstract we study the effect of a policy in india that offers monetary incentives to inter caste marriages in which one of the spouses is of historically disadvantaged castes i e scheduled castes and the other is not we show that in theory the monetary incentives increase the incidence of exogamy but may reduce the welfare of certain caste or gender building on our theoretical analysis we estimate the effect of the monetary incentives on the incidence of exogamy the welfare and inter spousal transfers using national family and health survey data we find that a 10 000 rupee increase in the incentive raises the exogamy between scheduled caste men and non scheduled caste women by 4 percent in rural india however we also find that the same increase reduces the welfare of women in rural areas

the institutional and political factors which influence taxation the ability of politicians to concentrate the benefits of spending while dispersing the costs of taxation makes taxation attractive distributive politics but the degree to which it is attractive varies widely among the states the objective of the research was to develop a fully specified model of per capita tax revenues of state governments not state plus local and thereby identify the political and institutional factors which cause the attractiveness of taxation to vary the resulting model includes 17 significant explanatory variables which together account for all but 10 of the variation in per capita tax revenue thirteen of the significant variables are institutional or political factors thus providing decisionmakers specific options for influencing the future size of government

separation of powers and the tax level in the u s states we estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party in the states with the line item veto the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified with a regression discontinuity design we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect we propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship the sequential nature of the budget bargaining game that is the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line item veto implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level

the rising price of husbands a hedonic analysis of dowry increases in rural india dowries in south asia have steadily risen over the last 40 years and now often amount to over 50 percent of a household s assets this paper attempts to investigate the reasons behind this increase it adapts rosen s implicit market model to the indian marriage market and tests predictions from the model with data from six villages in south central india and from the indian census it is found that a marriage squeeze caused by population growth resulting in larger younger cohorts and hence a surplus of women in the marriage market has played a significant role in the rise in dowries

the provocative public sector domestic political protest and public sector growth in the oecd 1965 1982 the results shown in tables 1 through 8 above are consistent in that gg is repeatedly shown to be significant whether making cross national comparisons of dpp or predicting intra national variations over time therefore hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed the confirmation of hypotheses 2a and 2b shows that taking into account public sector size government growth is most provocative in countries where it represents a major socio economic change i e where the public sector is small government growth has a neutral impact where the role of the public sector is long established i e where the public sector is large

a nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the european union tests of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance are metric sensitive and arbitrary in the evaluation of the stringency of the rules in the aggregation of these evaluations in an index and in the imposition of a linearly specified model we propose a nonlinear principal component analysis to solve these problems and evaluate the relative disciplinary power of each rule a battery of panel regressions on 1980 2003 optimally transformed data relative to 12 eu countries confirms that upon controlling for standard economic political and institutional variables more stringent rules reduce fiscal imbalances and budget size

the elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal constraints we study whether fiscal restrictions affect volatilities and correlations of macrovariables and the probability of excessive debt for a sample of 48 us states fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators and volatilities and correlations are computed in several ways the second moments of macroeconomic variables in states with different fiscal constraints are economically and statistically similar excessive debt and the mechanism linking budget deficit and excessive debts are independent of whether tight or loose fiscal constraints are in place creative budget accounting may account for the results

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

resource windfalls and public debt a political economy perspective abstract can natural resource windfalls increase public debt in democracies adopting a political economy perspective we show that the answer is in the affirmative resource windfalls increase both the government s income and wealth the former mitigates the need to borrow whereas the latter encourages further borrowing as it improves its terms implying an ambiguous pure effect of resource windfalls on debt re election considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia we show that higher political myopia induced by more stringent institutional re election restrictions magnifies the wealth effect turning positive the effect of resource windfalls on debt we test the model s predictions using a panel of u s states over the period 1963 2007 our identification strategy rests on constitutionally entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in re election prospects and geographically based cross state differences in natural endowments our baseline estimates indicate that a resource windfall of 1 induces an increase of approximately 20 in the public debt of states with more stringent re election restrictions

can t buy me love a field experiment exploring the trade off between income and caste status in an indian matrimonial market i introduction the relationship between economic motive and observance of discriminatory social customs is hardly new to economists this is implicit in the writings of becker 1957 1973 1974 on discrimination and other social customs and explicit in arrow s essay 1972 on discrimination and akerlof s work 1980 on the interactive relationship between economic incentives and discriminatory social customs as scholars like becker arrow and akerlof have investigated the relationship between economic incentives and the prevalence of custom based discrimination of which status based discrimination is an example it is natural to consult the related empirical evidence on the impact of economic incentives on the extent of status based discrimination surprisingly the extant empirical literature is mostly silent on how economic incentives may directly interact with status based discrimination 1 this is atypical as one would be hard pressed to find an issue as weighty as status based discrimination yet our knowledge in this aspect remains oddly limited our study aspires to rectify this gap this study investigates whether and what magnitude of economic incentive can diminish the incidence of status based discrimination by designing a controlled field experiment in an actual marketplace a reputable arranged marriage market that is conducted via newspaper advertisements the existing literature suggests that this market might be especially prone to strong discriminatory mate selection behavior based on the social identity status of an individual where caste identity of an individual is an easily measured indicator of social status the genesis of this discrimination can be attributed to a high status female s concern for a decline in her social status if she engages in a marital relationship with a low status male against this backdrop we ask whether a low status male could attempt to weaken this enduring form of discrimination by providing systematic economic incentive in the form of high monthly groom incomes to a high status female so that the former s marriage proposal receives preliminary consideration by the latter conditional on both individuals participation in this market the marketplace that we utilize is a well functioning arranged marriage market conducted via matrimonial advertisements in a widely circulated bengali language newspaper marriageable males in this market typically advertise their caste and income information among other attributes after these advertisements appear in the newspaper interested families contact the advertiser mostly in form of detailed letters expressing their interest in that advertisement this provides a confidential and reliable measure of first intent of the interested party in this case females therefore the conjunction of an exceptionally strong status based mate selection behavior a reputed market for arranged marriages and an exclusive correspondence process furnish us with a unique opportunity to investigate the main research hypothesis of our study to the best of our knowledge this is the first field experiment that exclusively focuses on how economic incentives can influence status based discrimination in an actual market 2 to operationalize the experiment we create nine unique matrimonial advertisements each representing a fictitious groom type 3 these potential grooms belong to one of the three blocks where each block contains three grooms from a given caste group we vary the caste status across these blocks we consider three different caste groups high middle and low strictly ranked so in the study region we vary the income features of grooms within a block we consider three different monthly income levels i e high medium and low that are considered feasible for each caste group in the study region furthermore we randomly assign other characteristics relevant for this market to all the potential grooms so that these features on average do not affect the behavior of responders

political competition and pork barrel politics in the allocation of public investment in mexico this paper examines the effect of political competition in local elections in re gional allocation of public investment the study employs data on mexican elections covering the period 1990 95 characterised by an increase in electoral competition and coupled with increasing demands for decentralisation throughout the states empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that regional allocation of public investment by central government was driven by political opportunism and local pork barrel politics a positive relationship was found between the regional allocation of public investment and support for the central ruling party this might indicate that local spending inefficiencies were partially explained by the specific support for the incumbent party

information and control in ventures and alliances this paper develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence of objectives and applies it to nancial contracting between an investor and a privately informed entrepreneur we show that formal investor control is i increasing in the information asymmetries ex ante ii increasing in the uncertainty surrounding the venture ex post iii decreasing in the entrepreneur s resources and iv increasing in the entrepreneur s incentive consict in contrast real investor control that is actual investor interference is decreasing in information asymmetries control rights are further such that control shifts to the investor in bad states of nature

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

affirmative action in education evidence from engineering college admissions in india abstract this paper examines an affirmative action program for lower caste groups in engineering colleges in india we study both the targeting properties of the program and its implications for labor market outcomes we find that affirmative action successfully targets the financially disadvantaged the upper caste applicants that are displaced by affirmative action come from a richer economic background than the lower caste applicants that are displacing them targeting by caste however may lead to the exclusion of other disadvantaged groups for example caste based targeting reduces the overall number of females entering engineering colleges we find that despite poor entrance exam scores lower caste entrants obtain a positive return to admission our estimates however also suggest that these gains may come at an absolute cost because the income losses experienced by displaced upper caste applicants are larger than the income gains experienced by displacing lower caste students limited sample sizes in our preferred econometric specifications however prevent us from drawing strong conclusions from these labor market findings

an examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in oecd countries perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests those which can be readily rejected because no test results support them and those upon which one should remain agnostic because the test results are not consistent in the first group are population pop decentralization of government dcnt and length of time of modernization date one can state quite confidently that these three variables are determinants of interest group activity in the second group are the variables measuring characteristics of the political system poly dem1 dem2 pfrc one can with ease reject the hypotheses to which these variables are relevant there is a large group of variables which stand in the middle group however for these variables there are gradations of success in the tests the variables on socioeconomic development inc agri news and number of industries and political subdivisions nind regp are only significant in the one variable tests especially important is their failure to obtain the correct signs in the tests reported in table 3 the variables on ethnic fractionalization efrc and olson s hypothesis on destruction of groups ndfo have the correct signs in table 3 and are significant in table 1 thus it is more difficult to reject efrc and ndfo as determinants of interest group activity than inc nind and regp finally it should be mentioned that once appropriate simultaneous equations techniques are applied government size is no longer supported as a significant variable this paper will conclude with comments of a more conjectural nature on the implications of the results in the case of three specific variables first the results on hypothesis 3 suggest that population affects the number of interest groups independently of indirect effects through other variables this direct effect occurs because groups become proportionately smaller and more homogeneous as population increases hence one can expect the political economy of larger countries to be significantly different from that of smaller countries the results suggest that larger countries will have a denser array of interest groups and that these groups because of their homogeneity will find it easier to decide on and pursue policies in the narrow interests of their members secondly the results support olson s claim that there will be a gradual accumulation of interest groups in developed democracies given that olson attributes to interest groups a large role in determining the economic fortunes of a country the fact that his accumulation hypothesis is supported is a result of some significance finally if one accepts the two stage least squares results it has been shown that changes in government size do not induce changes in interest group activity an important conclusion can be reached when this result is taken in combination with the results of other studies which show that interest groups induce changes in the size of government mccormick and tollison 1981 and mueller and murrell 1983 these results do not support the capture theory of government that governmental institutions are created perhaps in the public interest and then dominated by interest groups rather the results support the theory that the institutions themselves are the creatures of interest group activity

sovereign risk premia the link between fiscal rules and stability culture abstract there is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy such as fiscal rules reduce sovereign risk premia nevertheless it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters in our analysis of european bond spreads before the financial crisis we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies these proxies refer to a country s past stability performance government characteristics and survey results related to general trust we find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules yet the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture

can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities theory and evidence from india accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation as practiced in indian states to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy making ifind that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate this finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies as is found in this case jel d72 d78 hl 1 h50

democrats republicans and taxes evidence that political parties matter i estimate the influence of political parties on state tax burdens over a forty year period 1960 2000 holding constant a large number of state and voter characteristic variables i find that i tax burdens are higher when democrats control the state legislature compared to when republicans are in control ii the political party of the governor has little effect after controlling for partisan influences in the state legislature i explain how both findings are consistent with median voter theory my results suggest that after five years of democratic control of the legislature state government would be approximately 3 to 5 percent larger than if republicans controlled the legislature during that same period with the better specifications producing estimates in the higher end of this range

political competition and state government size do tighter elections produce looser budgets we test implications of politicalcompetition theory concerning government size usingdata from u s states we find that greaterpolitical competition in the race for governor actsas a check against bigger government evidence onthe effectiveness of legal limits on expendituresand or revenues growth is mixed the democraticparty is associated with bigger government but onlywhen party representation in both the governor shouse and the legislature is strong the flypapereffect of grants is found to be strong our resultshave implications for models of fiscal illusion

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

what do economists tell us about venture capital contracts venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment all kinds of agency problems are present moral hazard adverse selection hold up problems window dressing etc entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into contracts that influence their behavior and mitigate the agency costs in particular they select an appropriate kind and structure of financing and specify the rights as well as the duties of both parties the typical features of venture capital investments are an intensive screening and evaluation process an active involvement of venture capitalists in their portfolio companies a staging of capital infusions the use of special financing instruments such as convertible debt or convertible preferred stock syndication among venture capitalists or a short investment horizon

presidential pork executive veto power and distributive politics mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others the model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers including the effects of divided government electoral rules and term limitations for the executive

persistence in government spending fluctuations new evidence on the displacement effect in spite of peacock and wiseman s 1961 nber study demonstrating the displacement effect simplistic theoretical and empirical distinctions between temporary and permanent spending are common in this paper impulse response functions from arma models as well as cochrane s non parametric method support peacock and wiseman s conclusion by showing 1 government spending in the aggregate displays strong persistence to temporary shocks 2 simple decomposition methods intended to yield a temporary spending series have a weak statitistical foundation and 3 persistence in spending has increased during this century also as a basic fact of government spending behavior the displacement effect lends support to interest group and bureaucracy models of government spending growth

does affirmative action work caste gender college quality and academic success in india public policy in modern india features affirmative action programs intended to reduce inequality that stems from a centuries old caste structure and history of disparate treatment by gender we study the effects of one such affirmative action program an admissions policy that fixes percentage quotas common across more than 200 engineering colleges for disadvantaged castes and for women we show that the program increases college attendance of targeted students particularly at relatively higher quality institutions an important concern is that affirmative action might harm intended beneficiaries by placing them in academic programs for which they are ill prepared we find no evidence of such adverse impacts

the line item veto and public sector budgets evidence from the states abstract the paper examines the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending analysis of a rich set of state budget data indicates that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto and that in the short run the item veto s potency is contingent upon the political setting in certain circumstances governors with political incentives to use an item veto alter spending and revenues in a statistically significant and quantitatively important fashion these results suggest that state budgets have not been importantly altered as a result of the existence of the line item veto and shed doubt on the use of the line item veto to reduce federal government spending

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

financial intermediaries ownership structure and monitored finance evidence from japan this paper introduces new and unique data from 127 japanese private equity funds that enable a first ever direct comparison of individual owner manager structures versus financial intermediation structures in terms of the governance provided to investee companies through private equity funds the data indicate individual owner manager structures financial disintermediation give rise to much smaller portfolios of entrepreneurial firms and more advice to entrepreneurs across the scope of different financial intermediation structures including banks life insurance companies securities firms corporations and government bodies there are further differences in the provision of governance and value added advice provided to investees the data further indicate us affiliated funds in japan are more likely to have smaller portfolios and provide more advice to entrepreneurial companies possibly due to a greater skill set in providing advice to facilitate the development of small entrepreneurial firms

who marries whom and why this paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market the model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects it rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations the model was used to estimate u s marital behavior in 1971 72 and 1981 82 the marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women

marriage institutions and sibling competition evidence from south asia using data from south asia this article examines how arranged marriage cultivates rivalry among sisters during marriage search parents with multiple daughters reduce the reservation quality for an older daughters groom rushing her marriage to allow sufficient time to marry off her younger sisters relative to younger brothers younger sisters increase a girls marriage risk relative to younger singleton sisters younger twin sisters have the same effect these effects intensify in marriage markets with lower sex ratios or greater parental involvement in marriage arrangements in contrast older sisters delay a girls marriage because girls leave school when they marry and face limited earning opportunities when they reach adulthood the number of sisters has well being consequences over the life cycle younger sisters cause earlier school leaving lower literacy a match to a husband with less education and a less skilled occupation and marginally lower adult economic status data from a broader set of countries indicate that these cross sister pressures on marriage age are common throughout the developing world although the schooling costs vary by setting

venture capital financing moral hazard and learning we consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model the value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project the allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard the optimal contract is a time varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option the option itself is based on the control of the funds the dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project a positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities finally relationship financing including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting

the growth of government in italy evidence from 1861 to 1979 that the public sector has grown both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the economy is an undisputable fact that both growth rates have accelerated in recent history is also an unchallenged fact more cautious must we be about why these trends have occurred and are persisting we have tested three partially competing theories of government growth using italian annual data from 1861 to 1979 and assessed that the redistribution model explains the facts better than either the public goods model or the specialized interest hypothesis although the latter tells the most convincing story about the causes underlying transfers to firms we have also tried to discriminate between two competing views of a politician the value free intermediary found in the median voter literature and the entrepreneur emphasized in the theory of agency costs the bits of evidence we gathered are more consistent with a politician entrepreneur than a politician intermediary

evaluating efficient public good provision theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries abstract provision of most public goods e g health care libraries education police fire protection utilities can be characterized by a two stage production process in the first stage basic inputs e g labor and capital are used to generate service potential e g opening hours materials which is then in the second stage transformed into observed outputs e g school outcomes library circulation crimes solved as final outputs are also affected by demand side factors conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about public productive in efficiency and its determinants hence this paper uses a specially tailored fully non parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in stage one only we thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 flemish public libraries our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding i e local funding versus intergovernmental transfers strongly affect library productive efficiency

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

large scale affirmative action in school choice admissions to iits in india we provide a real life application of a large scale affirmative action policy in school choice in the context of engineering school admissions in india where students not only care about what program they are matched to but also what type of seat category they are admitted under we explain the market and the mechanism currently in use two significant shortcomings of the current mechanism are explained the affirmative action policy in use leaves many seats vacant even though there are students who would take these seats we provide the insight of a potential matching theoretical solution to these problems

preplanned exit strategies in venture capital abstract this paper empirically considers the role of preplanned exits the investor s initial strategy to sell the investee firm via an acquisition or an initial public offering ipo at the time of initial contract with the entrepreneur legal conditions and investor versus investee bargaining power in the allocation of cash flow and control rights in entrepreneurial finance we introduce a sample of 223 entrepreneurial investee firms financed by 35 venture capital funds in 11 continental european countries and these data indicate the following first preplanned acquisition exits are associated with stronger investor veto and control rights a greater probability that convertible securities will be used and a lower probability that common equity will be used the converse is observed for preplanned ipos second investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common equity in countries of german legal origin relative to socialist scandinavian and french legal origin third more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get financed with common equity and less likely to be financed with convertible preferred equity while more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use common equity

special interest groups and growth this paper explores empirically the relation between special interest groups and economic growth our analysis exploits new data on the number of groups observed across countries and time in order to mitigate the identification problems associated with earlier studies also in contrast to earlier work we examine the impact of groups on two sources of growth capital accumulation and technological change in addition to the impact of groups on output growth the findings are consistent with olson s the rise and decline of nations the political economy of economic growth stagflation and social rigidities new haven yale 1982 claim that societies with greater numbers of interest groups grow slower accumulate less capital and experience reduced productivity growth relative to others

the political economy of centralization and the european community since 1972 the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries in an international cross section analysis it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in gdp the actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed the dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds popitz law of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the ec commission high ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states the voters attitudes toward european unification are analyzed in a pooled regression

partisan politics and public finance changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies 1955 1989 this paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels the analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 oecd countries the results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model of special note is the distinction between the electorate and the government ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays the results also suggest contrary to conventional wisdom that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy

new resources and new ideas private equity for small businesses abstract private equity for rapidly growing small business is raised primarily from the organized venture capital market and the informal market comprised of high net worth individuals or angel investors we discuss commercially and publicly available data on private equity the research findings of studies that use these data and some of the more important questions that the available data have been unable to address

pressure politics and government spending in belgium in this article we tried to offer an explanation for the evolution in belgian government spending over the period 1961 1984 this explanation was based on a demand model featuring the median voter and a supplement with a political module in the traditional part of the model price income and population variables were used for the political module we called upon the pressure group theory of mueller and murrell 1983 while we also developed our own theory

married to intolerance attitudes towards intermarriage in germany 1900 2006 we analyze under what conditions intermarriage can be used as an indicator of tolerance and whether such tolerant attitudes persisted in germany during the twentieth century we find strong evidence for the persistence of tolerant attitudes towards intermarriage with jews at the same time our empirical analysis also cautions against using intermarriage as a simple proxy for tolerance the size of jewish communities in the early twentieth century is an important confounding factor

explaining the growth of government in sweden a disequilibrium approach previous studies aimed at explaining the growth of government in a particular country have failed to distinguish between explanatory variables acting on the supply and demand side respectively alternatively they have tested one explanation at a time implying explanatory equations that are misspecified in addition no allowance has been made for the fact that the interaction between supply and demand can hardly be assumed to be a self equilibrating process where the price of public goods and services adjusts to equate the two instead a framework of disequilibrium seems more appropriate for the analysis of the growth of government

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

vertical externalities in tax setting evidence from gasoline and cigarettes abstract a common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property consequently state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses we find that when the federal government increases taxes there is a significant positive response of state taxes for example a 10 cent per gallon increase in the federal tax rate on gasoline leads to a 3 2 cent increase in the state tax rate

competencies cracks and conflicts regional mobilization in the european union over the past 5 years a new and unexpected form of interest representation has developed in the european union subnational governments that mobilize directly in brussels the authors propose explanations for this phenomenon drawing on theories of public choice resource mobilization and multilevel governance the first set of hypotheses is concerned with the material and cultural resources that may induce a subnational government to organize in the european arena the second set of hypotheses explains regional representation as an outcome of overlapping competencies tensions and conflicts in a system of multilevel governance logistic analysis of the probability of regional representation provides support for the second set of hypotheses the authors find that subnational representation is positively associated with the degree of overlap between the competencies of subnational and supranational governments and with the political distinctiveness of a region and the relative strength of citizens regi

rent seeking and political tenure first estimates this paper computes a measure of rent seeking based on costs of tenure within a political tenure type model a new incumbency variable is introduced and a variant to existing datasets is presented consistent ml rent seeking estimates are computed for our sample of oecd democracies the statistical advances in limited dependent variable models in particular the decomposition of the tobit estimates enabled us to compute rent seeking estimates as costs of tenure the tobit partial derivatives and to compute the impact of explanatory variables on the probability of being above the limit which we interpret as the probability of tenure

interest groups and the size of government the results of the previous section estimates of a three equation model from 23 observations must obviously be regarded as tentative the consistent positive relationship between number of interest groups and size of government observed with changing sets of included independent variables changing samples of nations and treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined does imply rather unequivocally that interest groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size beyond helping to reinforce this conclusion the results of the previous section should be regarded as first steps in the development of a model of the polity that can explain participation in the political process by interest groups and citizens as well as the size of government

property rights over marital transfers in developing countries the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage focusing on dowry we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom in doing so we clarify and formalize the dual role of dowry as a pre mortem bequest and as a market clearing price identified in the literature we use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that in contrast to other rights women s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development we show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights we also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

is the median voter a clear cut winner comparing themedian voter theory and competing theories in explaining localgovernment spending this paper attempts to test the power of the median model againstthe respective strength of other alternate models based onredistributive political institutional and interest group theoriesin explaining the demand for public spending in new york statecounties during 1990 1980 and 1970 to execute the comparison ofthe performance of median voter model with that of each of thenonmedian voter ones various nonnested tests such as j and jatests n tilde w and encompassing tests have been employed results of the study show that although the median voter model hasa marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternativetheories it may not be relied upon solely when many otherinstitutional redistributive and interest group factors are alsorelevant for explaining public spending the results of this studydiffer from those in congleton and bennett 1995 we do not findthat interest group models are substantially weaker than the medianvoter model

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

economic and political determinants of fee income in norwegian local governments this paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of fee income in norweigan local governments the point of departure is a representative voter model emphasizing the effects of pure economic variables the benchmark model is extended by including two aspects of the political system ideology and strength it is evident that increased socialist influence increases the size of the local public sector while a strong political leadership has an advantage in opposing pressure to increase spending

executive budget proposal executive veto legislative override and uncertainty a comparative analysis of the budgetary process this study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal the executive veto the legislative override and legislative uncertainty about the executive s preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process a sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents a legislature an appropriations committee and an executive is presented to focus attention on the executive proposal the veto the override provision and uncertainty simplifying assumptions are made 1 the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power and 2 there is a closed amendment control rule in order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions we examine a particular arrangement of agents preferences and a two item budget the results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal the executive veto rule the override provision and the uncertainty we achieve three striking results first the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto second for a given override provision a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases third with the same change in institutions the government budget may increase