embeddedness cooperation and popular economy firms in the informal sector this paper is motivated by empirical observations on popular economy firms pefs in the informal sector of santiago de chile these are labor managed firms embedded in popular milieu where cooperation between their members plays a central role this paper develops a partial equilibrium microeconomic theory of pefs first it endogeneizes the level of cooperation between the workers second it develops a static and a dynamic model to analyze whether embeddedness influences the behavior of the pef embeddedness is assumed to be captured by three different characteristics suggested by the empirical observations most of them influence the employment and income levels in the pef

comments on credit ratings and the bis capital adequacy reform agenda the new basel capital accord basel committee on banking supervision 1999 has the objective of making capital requirements appropriately sensitive to the degree of risk in bank activities this is important because the original capital accord 1998 has been widely criticized for the lack of risk sensitivity of the capital charges assessed against various types of loans many observers believe this has resulted in regulatory arbitrage on the part of banks to the detriment of the quality of the assets banks hold on their books the basel committee has proposed a standardized approach for determining risk based capital using external ratings and two other approaches based on internal models for dealing with credit risk 1 altman et al 2002 examines in detail whether the goal of appropriate risk sensitivity is met by the proposed risk weights of the standardized approach the main conclusion of the altman et al paper and the underlying issues can be seen in fig 1 which plots the proposed risk weights and the historical corporate bond losses by rating as the authors note ratings aaa through a have experienced virtually no defaults but are assigned weights of 20 aaa and aa and 50 a percent more problematic the proposed risk weights for baa and ba rated loans are both 100 even though the loss experience for ba is 10 times higher than for baa finally the b and below rated loans have risk weights only half again as large as baa rated loans while the historical loss experience has been 55 times greater thus the basel proposal fails to capture the relative risks of the various ratings altman et al journal of banking finance 26 2002 923 928

agency relationships in family firms theory and evidence does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held owner managed firms to agency threats ignored by jensen s and meckling s 1976 agency model private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms they also expose firms to a self control problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which harm themselves as well as those around them jensen 1994 p 43 thus shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerialand owner opportunism we extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm after developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and specifically altruism exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held owner managed firms we use data obtained from a large scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory finally we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held owner managed firms

cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks we develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in prisoners dilemma games agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff biased imitation the dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters whenever agents hold some information beyond their interaction neighbors defectors and cooperators always coexist in disconnected components otherwise polymorphic networks can emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors any stochastically stable state has at most two disconnected components simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the speed at which the network evolves increases with the radius of interaction and decreases with the radius of information

forward looking behavior in hawk dove games in endogenous networks experimental evidence abstract we conduct an experiment in continuous time every subject can change her links to others and her action in a hawk dove game which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners at any time we hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links and that players take these norms into account when deciding on their strategy for such limitedly forward looking players who consider others linking reactions we introduce a strategy adaptation rule anticipatory better reply rule abr and a related stability criterion reaction anticipatingly stable ras our data support our assumption on linking reactions subjects seem to take these reactions into account when deciding to switch from hawk to dove abr behavior however better reply behavior is prevalent when short term profits allure ras configurations occur more often than nash equilibria of the base game however with respect to stability they perform similar

the perception and measurement of transaction costs the chapter discusses various explanations of how transaction cost minimising corporate configurations come about it contrasts darwinian with rational explanations finding both unsatisfactory what matters rather than computation of fully recognised transaction costs are managerial perceptions of transaction costs these perceptions are not expressed in numbers but in language this is related to arguments derived from bounded rationality and from transaction cost economics the chapter argues that issues of managerial perception must become central to analysis existing academic traditions which accord primacy to perception and to language are drawn upon and argued to be of great relevance to future work

the effect of entrepreneurial rhetoric on microlending investment an examination of the warm glow effect microlending provides a valuable alternative to traditional financing for entrepreneurs in impoverished countries drawing from theory on political rhetoric and the concept of warm glow giving we examine characteristics of entrepreneurial narratives that are related to how quickly entrepreneurs receive funding using a sample of 6051 narratives from entrepreneurs in developing countries we demonstrate that narratives higher in language indicating blame and present concern lead to more rapid funding while narratives higher in accomplishment tenacity and variety lead to slower funding our findings suggest that the presentation of investment profiles should be carefully managed to maximize funding likelihood

constrained interactions and social coordination we consider a co evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to we find that a payoff domination convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice the main reason behind this result is that whenever there is a small cluster of agents playing the efficient strategy other players want to link up to those layers and choose the efficient action

compliance with agreements in cross cultural transactions some analytical issues assessing whether the other party is likely to fulfil all obligations can be arduous when a transaction is international the mechanisms that underpin compliance with agreements and the functional detail of these mechanisms may vary in relative importance between countries perplexing the foreign operative additionally a foreigner may suffer from informational constraints communications distortions and difficulty in achieving full acceptance in the local business culture

altruistic investment decision behavior in early stage ventures in this study we develop and test a gendered social capital model of altruistic investment behavior that explains why some informal investors expect high returns on their investments while others expect no payback at all prior literature predominantly assumes that informal investors engage in investment activities with a return on investment and profit in mind however other non financial objectives for informal investment e g altruistic informal investment have also been suggested although their antecedents unexplored we suggest altruistic investment behavior depends on life circumstances determined by social capital gender and their combination our empirical evidence supports these propositions

an analysis and critique of the bis proposal on capital adequacy and ratings abstract this paper examines two specific aspects of stage 1 of the bank for international settlement s bis s proposed reforms to the 8 risk based capital ratio we argue that relying on traditional agency ratings could produce cyclically lagging rather leading capital requirements resulting in an enhanced rather than reduced degree of instability in the banking and financial system despite this possible shortcoming we believe that sensible risk based weighting of capital requirements is a step in the right direction the current risk based bucketing proposal which is tied to external agency ratings or possibly to internal bank ratings however lacks a sufficient degree of granularity in particular lumping a and bbb investment grade corporate borrowers together with bb and b below investment grade borrowers severely misprices risk within that bucket and calls at a minimum for that bucket to be split into two we examine the default loss experience on corporate bonds for the period 1981 1999 and propose a revised weighting system which more closely resembles the actual loss experience on credit assets

opportunism and ngos entrepreneurship and green north south transfers abstract through the lens of entrepreneurship this paper applies the new institutional economics to examine two case studies of environmental nongovernmental organizations ngos in latin america to clarify their political economic roles southern ngos that rely on northern donors are viewed as entrepreneurial economic entities producing international public goods these nonprofit ngos take their place alongside for profit firms as contributors to economic production employment institutional innovation and technology transfer the theoretical framework proposed assumes that self interested behavior coexists with loyalty commitment and altruism as well as opportunism

endogenous networks social games and evolution abstract this paper studies a social game where agents choose their partners as well as their actions players interact with direct and indirect neighbors in the endogenous network we show that the architecture of any nontrivial nash equilibrium is minimally connected and equilibrium actions approximate a symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game we apply the model to analyze stochastic stability in 2 2 coordination games we find that long run equilibrium selection depends on a trade off between efficiency and risk dominance due to the presence of scale effects arising from network externalities our results suggest a general pattern of equilibrium selection

credit risk in private debt portfolios default loss severity and average loss rates for a large sample of privately placed bonds are presented and compared with loss experience for publicly issued bonds the chance of very large portfolio losses is estimated and some determinants of such losses are analyzed results show ex ante riskier classes of private debt perform better on average than public debt both diversification and the riskiness of individual portfolio assets influence the bad tail of the portfolio loss distribution private placements are similar to corporate loans in that both are monitored private debt the results are thus relevant to management and securitization of private debt portfolios generally more than half of nonfinancial corporate debt finance is iss ued privately and decisions of the financial intermediaries that invest in such debt depend importantly on its credit risk regulators of such institutions are similarly attentive to portfolio credit risk and it is an important consideration in the design of securitizations of pools of private debt in spite of its importance little is known empirically about private debt credit risk especially ex ante risk as a function of portfolio characteristics many studies have examined the loan portfolio performance of banks thrifts and insurance companies but the ex ante risk characteristics of the portfo

credit ratings and the bis capital adequacy reform agenda abstract in this paper we have revised and updated our earlier study in order to analyze the most recent second draft of the bis s proposed reforms of bank capital requirements we conduct monte carlo experiments using data on defaults and severity rates on publicly traded us corporate bonds over the 1981 1999 period analyzing the whole period and various sub periods it is clear that the most recent draft of the bis proposed reforms seriously overestimates the relative riskiness of high quality debt relative to low quality debt in the so called standardized model as a result the most recent proposal still contains inherent risk shifting taking incentives for banks

outlines of a behavioral theory of the entrepreneurial firm abstract in a behavioral theory of the firm btf cyert and march cyert r m march j g 1963 a behavioral theory of the firm prentice hall englewood cliffs nj present a clutch of ideas for explaining the behavior of established firms within an environment of well defined markets stakeholder relationships technologies and so on in this paper we outline a behavioral theory of the entrepreneurial firm that emphasizes transforming environments rather than acting within extant ones in particular we explicate three ideas that parallel key concepts in btf 1 accumulating stakeholder commitments under goal ambiguity in line with a political conception of goals 2 achieving control as opposed to managing expectations through non predictive strategies and 3 predominately exaptive rather than adaptive orientation

credit risk models and agricultural lending credit risk models are developed and used to estimate capital requirements for agricultural lenders under the new basel capital accord the study uses credit value at risk methods to calculate probability of default loss given default and expected and unexpected losses two applied models creditmetrics and moody s kmv are estimated using farm financial data the results show that the necessary capital for agricultural lenders under the new basel accord varies substantially depending on the riskiness and granularity of the portfolio

on the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games there are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions we examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play we model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players with such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk dominant thus the endogenous network structure not only has implications for the interaction pattern that emerges but it also has a significant impact on the play in the coordination game relative to what would arise if the same interaction network were exogenous

the dilemma of accountability for professionals a challenge for mainstream management theories professional institutions are increasingly confronted by fiscal constraints and political pressures to improve and increase their accountability in a competitive consumer driven market accordingly the need to ensure efficiency and accountability is of strategic importance this article reports on a qualitative study of medical professionals that assessed the utility of financial incentives and external control methods derived from agency theory to ensure accountability of professionals the authors argue that approaches derived from stewardship and institutional theories can extend the principal agent perspective to sustain greater social and ethical accountability

conformism and self selection in social networks i present a model of conformism in social networks that incorporates both peer effects and self selection i show that conformism has positive social value and that social welfare can be bounded by network polarization and connectivity measures i apply the model to empirical data on high school students participation in extracurricular activities i find that the local effect of conformism i e the endogenous peer effect for a fixed network structure ranges from 7 5 to 45 depending on the number of peers that an individual has simulations show that the optimal policies of an inequality averse policymaker change depending on a school s enrollment small schools should encourage shy students to interact more with other students while large schools should focus on promoting role models within the school