investment and market dominance we analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment special cases include incremental investment patent races learning by doing and network externalities we investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments to this end we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes which applies to our investment game finally we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient

unit roots and structural change an application to us house price indices this paper employs time series analysis to investigate the price dynamics of the house price indices included in the s p case shiller composite10 index and the validity of the ripple effect following the approach outlined by meen 1999 more specifically the paper first considers the time series properties of the capital gain from the sale of houses that is it examines whether shocks to the capital gain series produce permanent or transitory changes in general the findings lack uniformity and depend upon the assumptions imposed by the testing procedures secondly it considers the time series properties of the ratio of regional house price indices to the composite10 index that is it examines whether shocks to these house price ratios exhibit trend reversion the tests of this ripple effect also display conflicting evidence

getting ppp right identifying mean reverting real exchange rates in panels abstract recent advances in testing for the validity of purchasing power parity ppp focus on the time series properties of real exchange rates in panel frameworks one weakness of such tests however is that they fail to inform the researcher as to which cross section units are stationary as a consequence a reservation for ppp analyses based on such tests is that a small number of real exchange rates in a given panel may drive the results in this paper we examine the ppp hypothesis focusing on the stationarity of the real exchange rates in up to 25 oecd countries we introduce a methodology that when applied to a set of established panel unit root tests allows the identification of the real exchange rates that are stationary our results reveal evidence of mean reversion that is significantly stronger as compared to that obtained by the existing literature strengthening the case for ppp

why do different countries choose a different public private mix of educational services we observe a wide range across countries in the percentage of total enrollments that attend private rather than public schools this paper seeks to explain 1 the systematically higher proportion of private enrollments pvt in developing as compared with developed countries at the secondary level and 2 the seemingly random variation across countries within a given level of education and stage of development i argue that the latter is due to differentiated demand and nonprofit supply both of which stem from cultural heterogeneity especially religious heterogeneity in contrast the large pvt at the secondary level in developing countries is hypothesized to stem from limited public spending which creates an excess demand from people who would prefer to use the public schools but are involuntarily excluded and pushed into the private sector the limited public spending on secondary education in turn is modelled as a collective decision which is strongly influenced by the

optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions abstract this paper presents an analysis of optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions an earlier paper on the same topic lewis and sappington rand j econ 19 1998 438 457 is reviewed a difficulty with their analysis is discussed and an alternative formulation of their model is proposed two broad classes of problem are considered i the case where social and private incentives are roughly aligned which implies optimal prices are weakly above marginal costs and ii the case where social and private incentives diverge which implies pricing below marginal cost may be optimal journal of economic literature classification numbers d42 d82 l51

ripple effects in south african house prices this paper analyses the ripple effect of house prices in large medium and small sized houses of five major metropolitan areas of south africa namely cape town durban unicity greater johannesburg port elizabeth uitenhage and pretoria based on available quarterly data covering the period of 1966 q1 to 2010 q1 following the extant literature the issue is contextualised as a unit root problem with one expecting the ratios of metropolitan house price to national house price to exhibit stationarity to an underlying trend value if there is diffusion in house prices using bayesian and non linear unit root tests besides the standard linear tests of stationarity with and without structural break overwhelming support is found for the existence of robust ripple effects also factor analysis conducted suggested that ripple effects originate in cape town for the large housing segment and in durban for the medium and small sized houses

modeling charitable giving using a box cox standard tobit model there is a large literature investigating the determinants of charitable giving in particular price and income elasticities we find that many of the most often reported results from this literature rely on a model specification that is inappropriate when applied to recent federal tax file data we develop a standard tobit model with a box cox transformation parameter that nests a number of other specifications the box cox model yields estimates of price elasticities and expected charitable contributions that differ from those obtained using the typical specification additionally we find that the use of sample weights provides potentially important policy insights copyright 1991 by mit press

competition and screening with motivated health professionals two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals who are privately informed about their ability and motivation hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue the non profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers in equilibrium when both hospitals are active the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability neutral allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar the non profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for profit one

quality competition with profit constraints abstract firms in markets such as health care and education are often profit constrained due to regulation or their non profit status and they are often viewed as being altruistic towards consumers we use a spatial competition framework to study incentives for cost containment and quality provision by altruistic firms facing profit constraints if prices are regulated profit constraints lead to lower cost containment efforts but higher quality if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic under price competition profit constraints reduce quality and cost containment efforts but lead to lower prices if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic profit constrained firms cost containment efforts are below the first best while their quality might be too high or too low if prices are regulated profit constraints can improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price depending on the degree of altruism

incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non marketable good this good is valued by a single principal and there is a verifiable measure of the agent s performance crucially the agent is intrinsically motivated due to warm glow altruism in addition the agent s budget which is controlled by the principal must not be less than the monetary performance cost faced by the agent this gives rise to a limited liability constraint it also restricts the agent s ability to under report costs in such environment we determine the link between the agent s budget and performance our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal agent problem and to most in the literature on mission motivated organisations and public services provision

booms and busts in the uk housing market the often volatile behaviour of uk house prices between 1957 and 1994 is analysed in an annual econometric model theory suggests that financial liberalisation of mortgage markets in the 1980s should have led to notable shifts in house price behaviour the evidence supports the predictions of theory suggesting shifts took place in wealth effects as in the consumption function and that real interest rates and income expectations became more important the presence of transactions costs suggests important nonlinearities in house price dynamics the paper also contains an explicit econometric treatment of expectations demography supply spillovers from the rented sector and of composition biases in the official house price index

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism cost sharing rules for paying physicians have been advanced as a way of generating incentives for the provision of quality care while recognizing their potential negative effects on production efficiency however the optimal sharing rate typically depends on the degree to which the physician acts in the interest of the patient what we identify as the physician s altruism since the degree of altruism is likely to vary across physicians and to be private information the standard rules for setting the cost sharing rate are unlikely to be optimal this paper derives conditions for the optimal non linear cost sharing mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information about altruism and shows how it can sometimes be implemented through a menu of linear cost sharing schemes the model can be used to rationalize the design of the fund holder system for general practictioners that operated in the 1990s in the united kingdom

unit root testing against an st mtar alternative finite sample properties and an application to the uk housing market a class of smooth transition momentum threshold autoregressive st mtar tests is proposed to allow testing of the unit root hypothesis against an alternative of asymmetric adjustment about a smooth nonlinear trend monte carlo simulation is employed to derive finite sample critical values for the proposed test and illustrate its attractive power properties against a range of stationary alternatives the empirical relevance of the st mtar test is highlighted via an application to aggregate house price data for the uk interestingly house prices are found to exhibit structural change characterized a fitted logistic smooth transition process with the newly proposed st mtar test providing the most significant results of the alternative smooth transition unit root tests available

the nonprofit sector and industry performance abstract despite the importance of nonprofit industries in the economy little analysis has been conducted as to whether the behavior of such industries differs from that of for profit industries extending previous firm level analyses we propose a neoclassical theory with an endogenous nonprofit sector our analysis implies that nonprofit firms have a competitive advantage over for profit firms so that marginal changes in the industry operate through the for profit sector as such marginal industry behavior is identical to that of a for profit industry and nonprofit regulations may have a limited impact or even no impact on overall industry performance our theory has the methodological advantage that standard for profit analysis applies directly to nonprofit firms because they can be analyzed as for profit firms with lower costs we discuss aspects of the empirical literature that test this theory of nonprofit activity

not for profit entrepreneurs abstract entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not for profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives such incentives protect donors volunteers consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur we derive conditions under which completely self interested entrepreneurs opt for not for profit status despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises we also show that even in the absence of tax advantages unrestricted donations would flow to non profits rather than for profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non profits

theories of non profit institutions abstract as thoughtful modelling and empirical research of non profit enterprises continues to grow two general views of non profit organizations are emerging one view is that non profit firms are inefficient and wasteful another view is that non profit firms are a response to market failure and thus may improve efficiency the purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical and empirical work that represents the current divided state of thinking in this area

would nonprofit workers accept to earn less evidence from france this article focuses on wage differentials between french nonprofit for profit and public sectors considering the public sector allows testing more extensively the labour donation theory preston 1989 the findings support this theory because nonprofit workers accept to earn significantly less than they would earn in the for profit and public sectors they also suggest differences in the motivations of workers in these sectors nonprofit workers are attracted to their work for reasons transcending material compensation

whither the nonprofit wage differential estimates from the 1990 census this article provides new estimates of the nonprofit for profit wage differential in the u s economy using observations on 4 1 million private sector employees from the 1990 census i find either zero or slightly positive economy wide wage differences between nonprofit and for profit employees in a standard earnings equation format significant wage differentials are found at the disaggregated occupation and industry level and provide a basis for testing hypotheses explaining nonprofit for profit wage differences

corporate governance and globalization this survey gives an overview of the current state of knowledge on the question of whether corporate governance structures worldwide are determinants of differences in economic performance we look at the identities of owners monitoring boards and legal systems and find that some though not all corporate governance structures give rise to differences in performance the paper ends with a tentative look at the prospects of corporate governance structures converging worldwide copyright 2004 oxford university press

productivity crowding out in labor markets with motivated workers abstract when workers intrinsic motivation matters a wage increase has mixed consequences on applicants productivity and motivation as shown in public service healthcare education and politics in a simple theoretical framework where ability and motivation are workers private information we rationalize these differentiated responses and identify intuitive conditions for higher wages inducing self selection of more or less productive and motivated workers the selection patterns depend both on the statistical association between workers characteristics and on the difference between the incentivized returns to ability across sectors we emphasize a crowding out effect of wage on workers productivity that has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature before

the economics of vocation or why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse abstract given the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions why could not nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the profession we tell a story in which the status of nursing as a vocation implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of applicants attracted the underlying mechanism accords with the notion that increasing wages might attract the wrong sort of people into the profession and highlights an in efficiency wage mechanism particular to vocations which makes wages sticky up wards the analysis has implications for job design in vocation based sectors such as nursing and teaching

wage determination of registered nurses in proprietary and nonprofit nursing homes this study explores why registered nurses employed in nonprofit nursing homes earn higher wages than those employed in proprietary facilities previous studies have explained this finding in a property rights context where higher wages were posited to result from the weaker incentives for cost minimization accompanying nonprofit status this paper tests an alternative explanation of sectoral wage differences which is predicated on the reason for the coexistence offor profit and nonprofit firms in a given industry informational constraints concerning the quality of care are posited to cause the long term health care market to fail to provide care at the upper levels of a quality of care continuum nonprofits are viewed as a response to this form of market failure acting to fulfill customers demand for higher quality and higher cost long term care with attendant demand for higher quality nurses than in for profit homes both the observed sectoral pattern in selectivity and wage decompositions based on selectivity corrected wage regressions call into question the property right explanation yet are consistent with an asymmetric information explanation

nonlinear pricing with random participation the canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent s participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents outside options we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification we develop a multidimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing first with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar nodistortion at the top result persists but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching second in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that generally the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome however when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form efficient quality allocations with cost plus fee pricing

macroeconomic effects of ownership structure in oecd countries the paper investigates the impact of ownership concentration on gdp growth for a sample of 18 oecd countries over the period 1980 to 2004 the econometric analysis shows that more concentrated ownership can speed up growth for countries approaching the technological frontier provided that labour market regulation is sufficiently tight in the absence of employment regulation the logic of financial markets discipline applies and dispersed ownership appears as more favorable for growth based on econometric results impact coefficients are calculated allowing to evaluate the growth points gained lost following a given change in ownership concentration this exercise reveals that a reform in the domain of ownership structure can yield sizeable effects in terms of growth importantly these effects are unequally distributed across countries anglo saxon countries would take more advantage of deregulation i e increased dispersion of ownership in a context of deregulated labour markets while continental european countries would benefit more from increased concentration of ownership in a context of reinforced labour regulation

hospital competition and quality with regulated prices we analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices considering the effect of both introducing competition monopoly versus competition and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs increased substitutability or a higher number of hospitals with semi altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous in contrast to the received body of theoretical literature this is consistent with and potentially explains the mixed empirical evidence

principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard abstract this paper analyzes competition between two principals for the exclusive services of an agent of unknown ability the principals differ in their marginal and average valuations for the agent s input they compete by offering menus of incentive contracts a prominent feature of the equilibrium when neither principal fully dominates is that they both offer identical pooling contracts to an interval of intermediate ability types all these types supply a constant input level receive the same monetary rewards and yield zero profits to the principals in addition the effort of low ability types is greater than the efficient level and welfare may be lower than if there was only one principal journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 c72

signaling and screening of workers motivation abstract this paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm we characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers motivation is private information while posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply the optimal wage scheme entails a trade off between the probability of filling the vacancy the rents left to the worker and the expected worker s motivation

modeling charitable contributions of time and money abstract public goods theory predicts that government spending on charity can perfectly crowd out charitable contributions empirical research has found little support for the perfect crowd out hypothesis however the empirical work only measures part of a contributor s total contribution gifts of money contributors also volunteer labor this article extends the public goods model to the case in which individuals contribute both time and money to a charity that in turn produces a public good the model suggests that charitable contributions of time and money are perfectly substitutable in equilibrium this result offers new interpretations for existing empirical observations and suggests a new test of the crowd out hypothesis the implications of the model are empirically tested using a national survey of charitable activity

competition in public service provision the role of not for profit providers abstract with public services such as health and education it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision many such services are provided by monopoly not for profit providers and there is concern that for profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality this paper explores the implications of entry by for profit providers when there is unobserved quality the model generates three key policy relevant insights first by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms it frames the relevant trade offs precisely second it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not for profit as an active provider third it characterizes the optimal payment or voucher value to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically

an accurate measurement of the crowd out effect income effect and price effect for charitable contributions in the past empirical research on charitable contributions has focused on two issues estimating the income and price elasticities of contributions and estimating the extent to which government funding crowded out private contributions the two fundamental problems in all these studies are the differences in the underlying conceptual models and the use of imperfect data for empirical analysis this paper addresses both of these problems

dynamic income progressive taxes and the timing of charitable contributions using an econometric model of charitable giving and a 10 year panel of tax return data i find that previous studies have underestimated the effects of permanent income and overestimated the effects of permanent changes in tax prices the significant statutory tax changes that occurred during the 1980s especially in 1986 serve to identify the key model parameters my results imply that people smooth their giving when transitory income changes but also time their giving to exploit transitory changes in tax prices the results also raise questions about how effectively the tax incentives permanently influence the level rather than just the timing of charitable giving by individuals

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federal system proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks the author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations the author characterizes the response of political economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions partial replacement is the most likely outcome though others are possible copyright 1987 by american economic association

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

thanks for nothing not for profits and motivated agents we re examine the labor donation theory of not for profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them or that they dominate for profits in terms of welfare but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non profit form more attractive to managers we show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not for profit firms would be competed out by for profit firms therefore in the choice between not for profit and for profit provision other than incentive problems the distribution of rents between management and workers and consequently the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

effects of property rights on labor costs of nonprofit firms an application to the day care industry this paper estimates differences in labor costs between nonprofit and for profit firms in the day care industry a theoretical model which draws on the property rights literature as well as recent theo ries of nonprofit labor markets predicts that the magnitude and sign of the nonprofit salary differential will depend on specific characteristics of the samples analyzed empirical results reveal that in th e most competitive segment of the day care industry the nonprofit salary differential is insignificant however in the less competitive government subsidized segment of the industry the nonprofit different ial is significantly positive it ranges from 5 percent to 10 percent copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

moonlighting public service and private practice we study job incentives in moonlighting when public service physicians may refer patients to their private practices some doctors in the public system are dedicated and behave sincerely but others the moonlighters are utility maximizers allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare but equilibrium public care quality may increase or decrease if quality increases moonlighting improves each consumer s expected utility unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions such as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior price regulation in the private market limits such adverse behaviors in the public system and improves consumer welfare

property rights and wages the case of nursing homes in this paper we develop the implications of the property rights theory of the firm for wage determination and test the model using data from the u s nursing home industry the main theoretical prediction is that any attenuation of property rights will lead to higher wage rates for the firm s employees the empirical evidence indicates that indeed profit maximizing nursing homes do pay the lowest wage rates for given quality labor and that the stronger the cost minimizing incentives provided by medicaid reimbursement programs the lower the wage rate paid by these nursing homes

globalization and location choice an analysis of us multinational firms in 1980 and 2000 in this paper we examine foreign location choices of the top 100 us multinational corporations mncs in 1980 and 2000 we first ask whether there has been a change in mnc foreign location choice in this two decade period second we explore the underlying reasons of location change by focusing on country level factors accounting for firm industry and regional level explanations our findings suggest first that the extent of mncs activities around the globe is more extensive than assumed by regionalists arguments and well beyond ohmae s triad but still less widespread than claimed by the globalists the two main traditions within the globalization regionalization debate second we uncover an interesting de location pattern in this period third we develop an integrative framework where both economic and institutional cultural arguments are shown to influence mncs foreign location choice in different ways we conclude with a discussion of our findings and provide suggestions for future research

managerial talent motivation and self selection into public management the quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries calls to attract the economy s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound this paper studies self selection into managerial and non managerial positions in the public and private sector using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation we find that if demand for public sector output is not too high the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector as a result relatively many of the more able managers self select into the private sector since this outcome is efficient our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private sector levels is not cost efficient

are house prices in south africa really nonstationary evidence from spsm based panel kss test with a fourier function this study applies the sequential panel selection method spsm to investigate the time series properties of provincial house prices for entire large medium and small middle segments of south africa quarterly time series data were collected from nine provinces in south africa for different house size categories over the period of 1978 q1 to 2012 q4 whereas other panel based unit root tests are joint tests of a unit root for all members of a panel and are incapable of determining the mix of integrated of order zero i 0 series and integrated of order one i 1 series in a panel setting the spsm proposed by chortareas and kapetanios 2009 can clearly identify how many and which series in the panel are stationary processes by classifying a whole panel into a group of stationary and nonstationary series the empirical results from several panel based as well as standard pure time series unit root tests indicate that house prices for the nine provinces studied here are either stationary or nonstati

competition and equity in health care markets we provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under fixed prices to investigate how hospital competition affects i quality differences between hospitals and as a result ii health inequalities across hospitals and patient severities the answer to the first question is ambiguous and depends on factors related to both demand and supply of health care whether competition increases or reduces health inequalities depends on the type and measure of inequality health inequalities due to the postcode lottery are more likely to decrease if the marginal health gains from quality decrease at a higher rate whereas health inequalities between high and low severity patients decrease if patient composition effects are sufficiently small we also investigate the effect of competition on health inequalities as measured by the gini and the generalised gini coefficients and highlight differences compared to the simpler dispersion measures

the social role of not for profit organizations hospital provision of charity care during the 1980s the state of new york shifted from a straight block grant to a matching grant method for reimbursing hospitals with the matching rate varying from 0 to 75 percent across years these changes allow estimation of pure income and price effects for hospitals supply of uncompensated care charity and bad debts the price efrect is positive and significant but no income effect was found hospitals in more concentrated markets provide more charity care as do teaching hospitals and the presence of public hospitals in a market reduces private hospitals provision of charity care

competitive insurance markets with two unobservables i study a screening game in a competitive insurance market in which insurance customers differ with respect to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion it is shown that indifference curves of customers may cross twice thus the single crossing property does not hold when differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large firms cannot use policy deductibles to screen high risk customers types may be pooled in equilibrium or are separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair levels this leads to excessive entry of firms in equilibrium