frictionless commerce a comparison of internet and conventional retailers there have been many claims that the internet represents a new nearly frictionless market our research empirically analyzes the characteristics of the internet as a channel for two categories of homogeneous products books and cds using a data set of over 8 500 price observations collected over a period of 15 months we compare pricing behavior at 41 internet and conventional retail outlets we find that prices on the internet are 9 16 lower than prices in conventional outlets depending on whether taxes shipping and shopping costs are included in the price additionally we find that internet retailers price adjustments over time are up to 100 times smaller than conventional retailers price adjustments presumably reflecting lower menu costs in internet channels we also find that levels of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed when we compare the prices posted by different internet retailers we find substantial dispersion internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 for books and 25 for cds however when we weight these prices by proxies for market share we find dispersion is lower in internet channels than in conventional channels reflecting the dominance of certain heavily branded retailers we conclude that while there is lower friction in many dimensions of internet competition branding awareness and trust remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers

robust trading mechanisms we consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information it is shown that posted price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy a posted price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

price discrimination through offers to match price in this paper a firm discriminates between two classes of customer who have a different cost of information by coupling a list price with an offer to match the pr ice of any other shop if the list price elsewhere is lower the firm will be successful in discrimination the list price of each firm is increasing in the number of sellers and the total sales are decreasi ng in the number of sellers furthermore if sellers coordinate they discriminate more efficaciously and increase their profits by increa sing their total sales copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies in this article we evaluate two claims made in recent studies of the welfare states of advanced industrial societies first that welfare states have remained quite resilient in the face of demands for retrenchment and second that partisan politics have ceased to play a decisive role in their evolution addressing the first claim we present analysis from a new data set on unemployment insurance and sickness benefit replacement rates for 18 countries for the years 1975 99 we find considerably more evidence of welfare retrenchment during the last two decades than do recent cross national studies second we examine the end of partisanship claim by estimating the effects of government partisanship on changes in income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment programs our results suggest that contrary to claims that partisanship has little impact on welfare state commitments traditional partisanship continues to have a considerable effect on welfare state entitlements in the era of retrenchment

political implications of increasing numbers of women in the labor force political scientists generally agree that women s behavior is strongly affected by their growing labor market participation but how will political life be affected when practically all women in a

implementation in differential information economies abstract we consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in differential information economies we provide necessary conditions for implementation and slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation

trends in female labor force participation in sweden labor force participation of married women increased from 49 1 to 83 5 during the past 2 decades by cross section estimates on micro data of the probability of labor force participation in 1967 1973 and 1980 and by using these estimates for predicting changes in labor force participation we have found that increases in own wage has been by far the most important explanatory factor women s real wages have increased relative to husband s after tax earnings both as an effect of the introduction of compulsory separate taxation in 1971 and as an effect of dramatically decreased sex differentials in pay partly associated with increased female education

mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly we analyze price competition between two brands buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty we identify a unique symmetric mixed strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers

intercountry comparisons of labor force trends and of related developments an overview this paper is a survey of analyses of women s labor force growth in 12 industrialized countries originally presented at a conference in sussex england in june 1983 the main focus of the conference papers and of the current survey is on growth of the labor force of married women in the years 1960 80 trends in fertility wages and family instability also receive attention as related developments married women s labor force growth is observed in all countries except for the ussr after 1970 where labor force rates of women reached the level of men growth rates differ among countries they apparently respond to growth in real wages and to growth in education but response elasticities differ among countries estimates of these elasticities contained in the country papers were helpful in predicting the trends other findings include ubiquitous declines in fertility and growth of divorce in the 1970s both developments are related to long run labor force growth in all countries wages of women were lo

implementation in economies with a continuum of agents we study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy we consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self selective first and second best allocations an upper hemicontinuity property of bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated using this we can for example conclude that if a given continuous mechanism implements uniquely a walrasian allocation in the continuum economy then all bayesian equilibria of large approximation economies will with probability close to one yield an allocation which is almost ex post pareto optimal

increasing returns path dependence and the study of politics it is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as path dependent the concept however is often employed without careful elaboration this article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their causes and consequences the investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism specific patterns of timing and sequence matter a wide range of social outcomes may be possible large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events particular courses of action once introduced can be almost impossible to reverse and consequently political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life

maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals abstract this paper examines the logical relationship among maskin monotonicity independent person by person monotonicity independent weak monotonicity strategy proofness and coalitional strategy proofness in a society with infinite individuals

on the generic nonoptimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms a general theorem that includes pure exchange economies it is shown that if an economy s participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no potentially conflicting interests i e if the economy is indecomposable then every continuous truth dominant allocation mechanism will attain nonoptimal allocations on an open dense set of preference profiles classical edgeworth box exchange economies economies with no externalities and no production but with arbitrary numbers of consumers and goods as well as economies with public goods and economies with other kinds of externalities are all shown via simple arguments to be indecomposable the results are extended to cover nonrevelation mechanisms copyright 1990 by the econometric society

optimal robust bilateral trade risk neutrality a risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item we prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non wasteful randomized posted prices

asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information the authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible individually rational and nearly efficient the main theorem covers both the case in which aggregate uncertainty remains when the economy is replicated and the case in which replication eliminates aggregate uncertainty in addition the authors demonstrate how their theorem does or does not apply to standard asymmetric information problems such as the buyer s bid double auction problem akerlof s lemons problem and insurance with asymmetric information copyright 1992 by the econometric society

efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive abstract efficient anonymous and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive i e each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone s wealth equivalently in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type the characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear and it also applies to continuum economies perfectly competitive mechanisms are non generic although non vacuous in finite economies and are generic but non universal in continuum economies we use these results to provide bridges to related work journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d51 d62

strategy proofness and essentially single valued cores in this paper we search for solutions to various classes of allocation problems we hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging roth 1982b shows that in the context of housing markets the core correspondence which is shown to be single valued by roth and postlewaite 1977 is strategy proof moreover ma 1994 shows that it is the only solution that is pareto efficient individually rational and strategy proof

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

women s suffrage and the growth of the welfare state in this paper we test the hypothesis that extensions of the voting franchise to include lower income people lead to growth in government especially growth in redistribution expenditures the empirical analysis takes advantage of the natural experiment provided by switzerland s extension of the franchise to women in 1971 women s suffrage represents an institutional change with potentially significant implications for the positioning of the decisive voter for various reasons the decisive voter is more likely to favor increases in governmental social welfare spending following the enfranchisement of women evidence indicates that this extension of voting rights increased swiss social welfare spending by 28 and increased the overall size of the swiss government

why are gender quota laws adopted by men the role of inter and intraparty competition in nearly every case of quota law adoption the support of party elites is critical but this raises a puzzle what can motivate predominantly male elites to put these policies in place this artic

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent abstract it is known that on some social choice and economic domains a social choice function is coalition strategy proof if and only if it is maskin monotonic e g muller e and satterthwaite m 1977 the equivalence of strong positive association and strategy proofness j econ theory 14 pp412 18 this paper studies the foundation of those results i provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy proofness and maskin monotonicity this generalizes some known results

implementation of walrasian expectations equilibria in an exchange economy with differentially informed traders non exclusivity of information nei is the condition that each trader s private information be perfectly predictable by an outside observer who has observed the private information of all other traders nei is one of a set of conditions which taken together are sufficient for the implementability of fully revealing expectations equilibria here we show that this condition is in fact necessary for the weak implementation of a much broader class of walrasian equilibria herein called expectations equilibria

on bayesian implementable allocations this paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment we show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences we also identify conditions under which the rational expectations equilibrium correspondence is implementable we extend the concepts of fair allocations and lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information and show that envy free allocations and lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

female voting power the contribution of women s suffrage to the growth of social spending in western europe 1869 1960 women s suffrage was a major event in the history of democratization in western europe and elsewhere public choice theory predicts that the demand for publicly funded social spending is systematically higher where women have and use the right to vote using historical data from six western european countries for the period 1869 1960 we provide evidence that social spending out of gdp increased by 0 6 1 2 in the short run as a consequence of women s suffrage while the long run effect is three to eight times larger we also explore a number of other public finance implications of the gender gap

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

path shifting of the welfare state electoral competition and the expansion of work family policies in western europe what explains the surprising growth of work family policies in several west european countries much research on the welfare state emphasizes its institutional stickiness and immunity to major change yet over the past two decades governments in germany the netherlands and the united kingdom have introduced important reforms to their welfare regimes enacting paid leave schemes expanded rights to part time work and greater investments in child care a comparison of these countries reveals a similar sequence of political and policy change faced with growing electoral instability and the decline of core constituencies party leaders sought to attract dealigning voter groups such as women this led them to introduce feminizing reforms of their party structures and adopt policies to support mothers employment in all three cases women working within the parties played an important role in hatching or lobbying for these reforms after comparing three countries that moved in a path shifting direction this article engages in a brief traveling exercise examining whether a similar set of dynamics are lacking in two countries austria and italy that have moved more slowly in reforming these policies against the prevailing scholarly literature that emphasizes path dependence and slow moving change this article reveals the continued power of electoral politics in shaping redistributive policies