asymmetry and revenue in first price auctions abstract we show by an example that in first price ipv auctions asymmetry in bidders valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus asymmetry need not reduce competition in first price auctions

sealed bids sunk costs and the process of competition how do firms recover precontract costs for example suppose 10 firms compete in a sealed bid auction for the right to explore and develop an offshore oil field each spends 500 000 to estimate the value of the field and to prepare its bid suppose this investigation reveals that the tract is worth approximately 20 million if sunk costs do not matter competition dictates that the winner must bid 20 million but if the winner is to recover its prebid costs the maximum offer can be only 19 5 million furthermore long run industry equilibrium considerations suggest that the highest bid will be only 15 million 20 million minus the total bid preparation costs of 5 million if competition forces firms to charge marginal cost why do firms ever invest in resources which become sunk in some industries inframarginal rents can be used to recover these costs however the example above as well as many others involves an all or none deci

a model of product line design and introduction sequence with reservation utility abstract cannibalization is a major concern for a firm when designing a product line in addition external options from outside the firm s product line may also play a significant role in this paper we investigate the impact of external options represented by reservation utility on product line design and introduction sequence we find that a heterogeneous reservation utility defines the relative attractiveness of segments and corresponding product line b reservation utility makes it more favorable to introduce products sequentially rather than simultaneously c aggregating segments is an effective way to mitigate cannibalization when it becomes too difficult to manage with different values of reservation utility across multiple segments and d introducing products in a non monotone order of quality can improve profit from simultaneous introduction when the value of reservation utility of a middle segment is particularly high

commonality in product design cost saving valuation change and cannibalization abstract offering a variety of products is important for a firm to attract different consumer segments however high product variety increases production and distribution costs modular product design and parts commonality are approaches used to counter this trend in cost and still offer a variety of products this paper develops a model to examine when modular products should be introduced and how much modularity to offer the model looks at a market consisting of a high segment and a low segment customers choose the product that maximizes their surplus which is defined as the product s utility minus its price presence of commonality affects the utility of a product greater commonality decreases production cost but makes the products more indistinguishable from one another this makes the product more desirable for the low segment but less desirable for the high segment the firm s objective is to design the products and set the prices so as to maximize its profit

mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets the effects on prices and efficiency abstract united states antitrust merger analysis has recently focused on simulating the unilateral effects of mergers we develop a model to simulate the unilateral price increase from a merger in an auction market we illustrate our results in the context of hospital mergers in the u s and calibrate our simulations to known market parameters we compare the price increases in our model to those suggested by analytically simpler models the simulation results suggest that the unilateral price increases predicted by our model are modest in general we also simulate the merger cost savings that are needed to offset the price effects

the design of procurement contracts this paper investigates the interaction between bidding for procurementprograms and fractional buys this problem is analyzed from the standpoint of a cost minimizing procuring agent it is shown that underimperfect competition a multiple source purchase is generally preferred to a single source contract similarly the author demonstrates that a strictly intermediate cost sharing arrangement i e an incentive contract dominates either the cost plus or the firm fixed price arrangements copyright 1986 by american economic association

asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers abstract much of the theoretical auction literature assumes that there are no observable differences between the bidders of an auction in this paper i present an asymmetric auction model where the distribution of a bidder s value depends on some commonly observed characteristics the model is applied to joint bidding and mergers in auction markets the results provide additional evidence that first price auctions are less susceptible to the acquisition and exercise of market power than open auctions

investment incentives in procurement auctions this paper investigates firms incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction a format largely used for procurement two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable we find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head on competition using the second price auction as a benchmark we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient these results have implications for market design when investment is important different market institutions provide different incentives for firms to reduce costs acquire information expand and so on in short to undertake any activity that affects their competitive positions accordingly the performance of these market institutions should be judged not only from a static perspective taking firms competitive positions as given but also from a dynamic perspective auction markets are a natural competitive environment to study because there is a clear sense in which we can design such markets by choosing appropriate rules for competition in this paper we study how the first price auction fpa a format commonly used for procurement affects firms incentives to invest in cost reduction many procurement markets are characterized by a small number of participants heterogeneity among firms and low rates of turnover therefore it is interesting to investigate to what extent the format used for the auction contributes to these characteristics the basic ingredients of our model are as follows there are n firms and one of them has the opportunity prior to the auction to make an investment we model this investment as an improvement in the ex ante distribution of costs for this firm the main question we ask is what are the firm s incentives to invest given that this investment is observed by its competitors clearly the benefits of such investment depend on how the firm s competitors react in other words to determine the firm s incentive to invest we need to compare the equilibrium at the procurement stage if it makes this investment and if it does not in section 3 we derive new comparative statics results for the fpa we find that after the investment the investor s opponents will bid collectively more aggressively this result holds generally when there are only two bidders or when the investor s opponents are symmetric proposition 1 otherwise a sufficient condition is that investment changes market leadership proposition 2 in the language of industrial organization investment has a negative strategic effect in the fpa this erodes 1

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

a mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing an emerging phenomenon in the management of information systems is outsourcing outsourcing is the contracting of various system management functions by user firms to vendors this paper focuses on the outsourcing bidding process pertinent to the selection of one contractor by a user firm the paper explores bidding situations where the vendors have different levels of expertise and cost structures truth revealing mechanisms that induce the vendors to bid competitively in line with their costs are utilized and a mixed integer programming model is presented the model allows the user firm to obtain the optimal expected contract cost some interesting conclusions emerge from the analysis of representative examples used in the paper first the results clearly show that truth revealing strategies always result in lower contract costs for the user firm than if the user firm were to follow the straightforward strategy of always choosing the lowest bid second the user firm can reduce contract costs by deploying a discriminatory selection policy vis a vis the different vendors third subsidies need to be given in order to ensure truth revealing behavior of the vendors thus the qualitative interpretations of the model parallel bidding behavior practices observed in the real world

analysis of an industrial component commonality problem we discuss a case study of an industrial production marketing coordination problem involving component commonality for the product line considered the strategic goal of the company is to move from the current low volume market to a high volume market the marketing department believes that this can be achieved by substantially lowering the end products prices however this requires a product redesign to lower production costs in order to maintain profit margins the redesign decision involves grouping end products into families all products within one family use the same version of some components this paper fits in the stream of recent literature on component commonality where the focus has shifted from inventory cost savings to production and development cost savings further we consider both costs and revenues leading to a profit maximization approach the price elasticity of demand determines the relationship between the price level and number of units sold consequently we integrate information from different functional areas such as production marketing and accounting we formulate the problem as a net present value investment decision we propose a mixed integer nonlinear optimization model to find the optimal commonality decision the recommendation based on our analysis has been implemented in the company in addition the application allows us to experimentally validate some claims made in the literature and obtain managerial insights into the trade offs

optimal temporal product introduction strategies under valuation changes and learning consider a firm facing two consumer segments with differing valuations for quality the demand is stationary and known and consumers make repeat purchase over two time periods however once a premium product is introduced the valuations of the consumers change in the next period the firm derives a cost savings due to learning effect in the second period the magnitude of which depends on the sales volume in the first period under such a situation should a firm introduce a premium product before a basic product or the vice versa should it introduce two products simultaneously when should a firm expand or consolidate its product line what is the optimal product introduction strategy for a firm using a two period stylized model we seek to answer these questions we characterize the optimal product introduction strategy for the firm we describe three easily calculable parameters that govern the optimal choice of the firm the conditions under which a firm should expand or consolidate its product line are discussed we study the effects of cost savings and customer valuation changes we show that the dominated product strategies in absence of these effects can be a part of an optimal product strategy of a firm under valuation changes and cost savings the managerial implications of the model are discussed

the frontier of telecommunications deregulation small countries leading the pack interconnection equal access unbundling and industry structure are four key determinants of facilities based competition in telecommunications using these building blocks this paper analyzes the differences in telecommunications regulatory regimes in australia chile guatemala and new zealand assessing the effect on competition and consumer welfare some regulation is necessary as incumbents can prolong their market power after demonopolization by exploiting positive externalities inherent to telecommunications networks the authors emphasize the superiority of market mechanisms over traditional regulatory processes to achieve efficient transactions among operators such market mechanisms need clear rules and credible enforcement

procurement auctions with entry of bidders abstract in procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction an optimal mechanism therefore entails distortions of effort laffont and tirole 1987 if potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction then decreasing the firms rent may imply reduced entry we show that if potential bidders are uninformed before entry commitment to a plain nondistortive auction is optimal in contrast if potential bidders learn all their private information before entry the optimal mechanism entails the same distortions as in laffont and tirole s static model

optimal auction design and r d abstract an indivisible object is to be procured through bidding from one of two prospective suppliers firms decide whether to invest in cost reduction before the bidding the procurer commits to a mechanism ahead of investment decisions by firms if the procurer can charge entry fees that may be discriminatory a sealed bid second price auction uniquely implements the first best outcome and is optimal for the buyer revenue equivalence holds when first best investments are symmetric however it breaks down when first best investments are asymmetric without entry fees the procurer may want to bid discriminate between ex ante identical firms to induce the favored firm to invest and become strong while the unfavored firm not to invest and stay weak this result runs counter to the earlier findings on discrimination in procurement auctions without pre contract r d the principal favors the weaker agent to induce stronger bid competition

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

the implications of the liberalization in telecommunication markets for market structure and price policy evidence from a small open economy this study analyses the impact of liberalization on market structure and pricing in the greek telecommunication market from 1992 to 2005 the data refers to 44 of the most prominent companies of fixed telephony mobile telephony and internet services and was compiled by means of interviews with the help of a questionnaire our descriptive analysis concluded that liberalization of the telecommunication market reduced its concentration degree increased competition and induced price cuts this conclusion is supported by other research studies concerning other countries of the eu since greece as an eu member country has also implemented the respective european policy in the specific industry as far as the econometric level is concerned we used panel feasible generalized least squares fgls fgls is an appropriate tool for samples such as our own composed by intersectoral data that extend to more than one time periods and without correlation between the unobserved effects and the interpretative variable

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

full line or specialization strategy the negative effect of product variety on product line strategy abstract this paper studies the product line decisions of firms under two consumer segments differing in their quality sensitivity we focus on a negative impact of the product variety on the consumers motivation to purchase while each product is horizontally differentiated in the presence of this impact and high fixed costs relative to variable costs it is shown that when a highly quality sensitive segment exists it is always advantageous for the monopoly to specialize in only one product serving this segment however the appearance of a competitor can drastically change the product line in the market under the duopolistic setting where two firms sequentially determine their product lines we show that the leader gains a better financial result by offering its product to the low segment for many cases including the case where no product is offered to the high segment by either of the firms who are in equilibrium furthermore we obtain another interesting result that indicates that the follower s profit can exceed the leader s profit when the quality sensitivities between the two consumer segments are sufficiently different even though the two firms are symmetric except for the order of their product offerings

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

the private r d investment response to federal design and technical competitions it is the federal government s role to promote investment in research and development rd and 2 contracting with private firms and nonprofit organizations such as universities to perform rd the winning firm recovered its development costs in the form of profits on the sale of the airplanes and the losing firms did not recoup their r d investment mansfield 1971 p 122

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

optimal research for cournot oligopolists we extend the classical cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function by undertaking research firms can acquire private asymmetric information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision the model is a two stage game in the first stage research levels are chosen and in the second stage conditional on private research outcomes production decisions are made we find that for a linear continuous information structure there is a unique nash equilibrium to the game in the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well the model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

an econometric analysis of telecom competition privatization and regulation in africa and latin america this paper explores the effects of privatization competition and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 african and latin american countries from 1984 through 1997 fixed effects regressions reveal that competition measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines payphones and connection capacity and with decreases in the price of local calls privatization combined with an independent regulator is positively correlated with telecom performance measures privatization alone however is associated with few benefits and is negatively correlated with connection capacity

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

the effect of commonality on safety stock in a simple inventory model we examine the effects of component commonality on optimal safety stock levels in a two product two level inventory model the criterion is to minimize system safety stock subject to a service level constraint although our model is specialized its analysis provides insights not available in other multilevel inventory models

operationalizing technology improvements in product development decision making abstract achieving competitive advantage and price premiums in many technology based markets requires the incorporation of current technology in new products to do so firms in hyper competitive environments increasingly plan and design their products concurrent with the independent development and validation of underlying technologies simultaneous validation of a core technology has important implications for a company s product positioning and launch sequence decisions making these traditional marketing decisions relevant to operations managers prior research has shown that to minimize cannibalization in the absence of such improvements in technology a firm should not launch low end products before high end products however concurrent evolution of technology can make it desirable and even necessary to introduce low end products before high end products this is because in technology based industries improvements in technology delay the introduction of a high end product and a firm must trade off the benefit of launching the low end product earlier greater discounted profits against the cost of cannibalization of high end product sales high end product cannibalization can be further reduced by offering the customer an option to upgrade from the low end to high end product with important implications for the firm s product positioning and introduction sequence decisions based on our study in the high technology industry we model the product positioning and introduction sequence decisions under the simultaneous evolution of technology our analysis indicates that it may be optimal in a variety of circumstances for a firm to launch products in an increasing order of performance even in the absence of network externalities besides presenting analytical results for product positioning and profit from different introduction sequences the paper also makes a contribution to managerial practice by providing insights in the form of a conceptual framework

the performance of privatized firms in the czech republic abstract with the growing importance of privatizations as a part of government policy most empirical studies of these privatizations conclude that firm performance immediately improves following privatization privatization has been the most important part of the transition from the centrally planned economies of central and eastern europe and has a larger impact on those economies than privatizations in other countries however few studies have looked at the performance of firms following mass privatization this study uses 453 separate firms 101 firms privatized in both waves for a total of 554 observations in the first and second waves of czech voucher privatization using methodology from previous studies we find that while the overall effects from privatization are positive the effects vary by privatization wave size and industry firms privatized in the first wave performed worse decline in performance following privatization than firms privatized in the second wave we also fail to find ownership concentration or debt as an important factor in restructuring the firm i believe that the results are consistent with two hypotheses first economic and political structure surrounding the privatization waves plays an important part in the success of privatization stable environments both political and economic help privatized firms restructure and improve operating performance as well as attract foreign investors and capital even in less developed countries but in transitional economies undergoing mass privatization in rapidly changing and developing economic and political environments hinder firms from restructuring and improving performance following privatization results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with a longer preparation period prior to privatization an implicit seasoning improve performance following privatization

entry coordination and auction design with private costs of information acquisition i introduction in most auction literature bidders are passively endowed with private information about their valuations the analysis then focuses on optimal elicitation of private information on many occasions bidders may instead have to incur costs to collect this information 1 auction design in these cases has to balance between information acquisition and information elicitation which are interdependent the performance of an auction depends not only on the bidding equilibrium but also crucially on the information acquisition equilibrium 2 as a salient feature auction design with information acquisition costs has been complicated by entry coordination among bidders due to multiple entry equilibria issue in a symmetric independent private value ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 with fixed information acquisition cost levin and smith 1994 note that the ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auction a second price auction with no entry fee and no reserve induces many asymmetric entry equilibria other than the targeted symmetric one the existence of asymmetric entry equilibria in this setup fundamentally lies in bidders constant marginal cost of entry 3 information acquisition costs could be private information of bidders just as with their private information about values for example in the cases of construction procurements or u s timber auctions many aspects of prebid information acquisition and analyzation are private knowledge of bidders 4 clearly when information acquisition costs are private information of bidders auction design has to additionally take into account information elicitation at the information acquisition stage this aspect of analysis has yet to be reflected in the literature while the case with fixed information acquisition costs has been thoroughly studied by milgrom 1981 mcafee and mcmillan 1987 engelbrecht wiggans 1987 1993 harstad 1990 levin and smith 1994 mcafee quan and vincent 2002 ye 2004 2007 and cremer spiegel and zheng 2009 among others a widely recognized insight of these studies is that ex ante efficiency can be achieved through a second price auction while setting the reserve at the seller s valuation if ex ante entry fees can be used to extract all the expected surplus of bidders then there is a congruence between the revenue and total surplus 5 this article advances this line of research by studying the implications of private acquisition costs on auction design with an emphasis on bidders coordination at the information acquisition stage specifically we consider the ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 and levin and smith 1994 while allowing the information acquisition costs to be bidders private information which follow a continuous distribution in light of our previous discussion this article attempts to answer the following questions 1 how are ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auctions affected by this additional dimension of private information in other words how does information rent extraction at the entry stage affect the auction designs 2 can this private information alleviate rather than aggravate the problem of entry coordination with the dispersion in private information acquisition costs the multiplicity of entry equilibria arising from the constant marginal cost in levin and smith 1994 might be avoidable the types with higher information acquisition costs must have less incentive to enter which could reduce the number of entry equilibria the questions are will sufficient dispersion coordinate bidders and induce a unique entry if yes how much dispersion is enough due to the potential multiplicity of entry equilibria for any given mechanism it is rather difficult to compare performances across varieties of mechanisms to overcome this difficulty we come up with an alternative approach our analysis begins with characterizing efficient and revenue maximizing auctions for any given feasible entry pattern which can be described through a vector of bidders entry thresholds of acquisition costs

entry and r d in procurement contracting abstract a model of competitive procurement and contracting is presented in this paper the key features of the model include precontract r d an endogenous number of homogeneous firms and sealed bid auction rules both diminishing and constant returns to scale drs and crs in r d expenditure technologies are considered i find that the sealed bid first price auction fpa is equivalent to the second price auction spa under drs technology the revenue equivalence theorems breaks down under crs because multiple equilibria arise in the r d stage when spa is used howerer spa yields a unique perfect equilibrium given sufficient heterogeneity among potential firms the free entry perfect equilibrium is also characterized the buyer prefers free entry through an appropriate selection of the reservation price

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

telecommunications deregulation and subadditive costs are local telephone monopolies unnatural abstract in early 1996 congress passed the telecommunications law providing the foundation for the opening of regulated local telephone monopolies to competition one important premise for introducing competition into local telephone markets is that these markets are not or are no longer natural monopolies this paper reexamines the natural monopoly issue using a cost function that controls for firm heterogeneity our subadditivity tests suggest that local exchange carriers lecs costs are subadditive when there are controls for unobserved heterogeneity suggesting that local telephone markets are natural monopoly markets

the effects of sensitization and habituation in durable goods markets abstract we develop a model to study the impact of changes in price sensitivity on the firm as it introduces multiple generations of a durable product where unit costs are a convex function of quality we incorporate the psychological processes of sensitization and habituation into a model of discretionary purchasing of replacement products motivated by past experience when price sensitivity decreases with each purchase sensitization the myopic firm offers a higher quality product at a much higher price with each generation when price sensitivity increases with each purchase habituation the myopic firm engages in price skimming when sensitization is followed by habituation the myopic firm eventually provides higher quality than the market is willing to pay for leading to a steep drop off in sales and profits the actions of the forward looking firm depend on the discount rate a firm with a low discount rate builds its customer base before offering a higher quality and higher priced product in contrast a firm with a high discount rate quickly increases price and quality following the same path to falling profits of the myopic firm these results provide insight into the firm and consumer behaviors underlying the phenomenon of performance oversupply identified in the innovation literature

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

component commonality with service level requirements this paper extends recent results of baker et al baker k r m j magazine h l w nuttle 1986 the effect of commonality on safety stocks in a simple inventory model management sci 32 982 988 in understanding the impact of component commonality on stocking levels under service level constraints a model is formulated for an arbitrary number of products with general joint demand distribution the results obtained are not all intuitive while utilizing commonality is beneficial nothing general can be said about the resulting change in the components stock levels when the cost structure is of a particular simple form though some interesting general patterns do emerge we also discuss the case of using a service level measure where rationing of common components might be required and characterize the implied rationing rule

commonality decisions when designing for multiple markets abstract it is well established that a manufacturer s commonality decisions between related products are driven by trade offs between cost savings from standardization and demand effects of customization prior research has examined these trade offs in the context of product line design for a single geography where cannibalization is a primary concern however the insights from a single market may not readily apply when serving related products for different geographies where cannibalization ceases to be a concern the downside of commonality for geographically separated markets arises from a mismatch in customer preferences which results in disutilities in this paper we model the trade off between the consumer side disutilities and the cost side scale economies in the presence of demand uncertainty and derive the optimal extent of commonality between products for both the markets in the context of two product development strategies i primary market centric design pmd and ii design for multiple markets dfm our insights from analytical and numerical analysis show that when consumers are very picky and market uncertainty is low the dfm strategy outperforms the pmd strategy counter to the practice of introducing primary market centric products into emerging markets our study demonstrates the need for more customization especially in small but uncertain markets our research has important implications for automakers in integrating the diversity in tastes while making commonality decisions for multiple markets

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd