bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the online world as each day thousands of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per year 1 this large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers competing for buyers the obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce and any competitive edge a seller can find could be important one such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders away from their competitors when designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one the entry decision of prospective bidders is rarely considered most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and randomly determined it should be clear however that the most crucial part of a successful auction is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate in general this should be expected to have a positive effect on revenue at least in noncommon value environments and in certain types of auctions it may help combat the possibility of bidder collusion because there are typically competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue when auctions are for unique goods it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction format can effect the entry decision of a bidder consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or even identical objects how does this bidder make the decision of which auction to enter the obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes his or her expected utility so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value the real question then is how are these expected utilities constructed profit from participating in the auction is an obvious argument there are also a number of environmental considerations that might effect this decision that would be difficult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the auctioneer quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature it is also possible that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder this latter point will be the issue of this study the particular focus will be looking at bidder preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the field the sealed bid first price will be abbreviated as just the sealed bid auction and the ascending or english auction the other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than the ascending and second price or first price and descending is that it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic differences between them such differences lead to substantial differences in terms of the difficulty of deciding how to bid and also in the possibility that an outcome leads to a bidder experiencing some form of regret regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below his value as he may think that if only he had bid higher he could have won although such feelings of regret may be considered irrational that does not preclude their existence such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending auction if one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that differ only in regard to whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format it is not immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric independent private values environment were all bidders risk neutral then of course revenue equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indifferent

individual behavior and bidding heterogeneity in sealed bid auctions where the number of bidders is unknown i introduction most of the work in sealed bid auction theory and related experimental work has focused on the case in which the number of bidders is known this is of course not always the case in naturally occurring environments for instance construction firms submitting bids in a sealed bid procurement auction may not know exactly how many other firms have completed the costly process of preparing and submitting a bid until bidding has closed there is a body of theory to address environments with an unknown number of bidders mcafee and mcmillan 1987 matthews 1987 harstad kagel and levin 1990 krishna 2002 1 the purpose of this article is to provide theoretical considerations and analysis of a large data set of individual bids from laboratory sealed bid auction markets in which buyers have some information about the number of rivals but not certainty 2 according to the received theory the availability of information about the number of rivals as expected directly affects bidding and therefore seller revenue in first price fp auctions but should not affect bidding in the second price sp auctions although bidding own valuation is optimal in sp auctions regardless of the number of bidders the majority of previous experimental work on auctions with known number of bidders has shown systematic deviation kagel 1995 while a few studies report coincidence with theory see isaac and james 2000b for an extended discussion earlier work on fp auctions with known number of bidders indicated systematic overbidding compared to risk neutral equilibrium risk aversion has been suggested as one of the possible explanations for observed overbidding cox roberson and smith 1982 dyer kagel and levin 1989 is the only previous experimental study looking at individual bidding in auctions where the number of bidders is unknown and their design is different from this study they look at fp auctions with restricted auction size of either six or three participants and ask subjects to submit three bids two bids for contingent bidding procedure and one bid for noncontingent bidding procedure subjects submit all three bids simultaneously and do not know at the time which procedure will be used they find overbidding in this environment compared to risk neutral nash equilibrium although we test for deviation from risk neutral bidding strategy in a more general setting our study also addresses a broader set of questions previous studies of open bid ascending silent auctions suggested that there may have been revenue loss to the sellers by bidders guarding their higher valued items that is remaining physically proximate to the bidding stations isaac and schnier 2005 the possibility that guarding was at the root of the revenue reductions was investigated by isaac and schnier 2006 who replaced the open bid ascending silent auctions with both fp and sp sealed bid auctions which is the environment studied in this article their paper reported on the aggregate revenue effects of the switch to sealed bid auctions but did not look at individual behavior it is clear that such analysis of individual bidding behavior must be informed by theories of bidding with an unknown number of rivals because such is the reality facing bidders in a multiple sealed bid silent auction context in addition data from a noncomputerized experiment closely approximating field auctions allows the analysis of possible behavioral adjustments in the field for example the attempt to guard the item and count the number of bidders such an analysis is presented in this article 3 our analysis of fp auctions contributes to the discussion about the causes of heterogeneous deviation of individual bidding from risk neutral theory cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1988 reported heterogeneous bidding above risk neutral equilibrium in fp auctions for mechanisms with fixed number of bidders and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 for auctions with endogenous entry where the number of bidders was known at the time of submitting a bid

from physical to human capital accumulation inequality and the process of development this paper develops a growth theory that captures the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth along the process of development it argues that the positive impact of inequality on the growth process was reversed in this process in early stages of the industrial revolution when physical capital accumulation was the prime source of growth inequality stimulated development by channelling resources towards individuals with a higher propensity to save as human capital emerged as a growth engine equality alleviated adverse effects of credit constraints on human capital accumulation stimulating the growth process this research develops a growth theory that captures the endogenous replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of economic growth in the transition from the industrial revolution to modern growth the proposed theory offers a unified account for the effect of income inequality on the growth process during this transition it argues that the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of economic growth changed the qualitative impact of inequality on the process of development in the early stages of the industrial revolution when physical capital accumulation was the prime source of economic growth inequality enhanced the process of development by channelling resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher in the later stages of the transition to modern growth as human capital emerged as a prime engine of economic growth equality alleviated the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital accumulation and stimulated the growth process the proposed theory unifies two fundamental approaches regarding the effect of income distribution on the process of development the classical approach and the credit market imperfection approach 1 the classical approach was originated by smith 1776 and was further interpreted and developed by keynes 1920 lewis 1954 kaldor 1957 and bourguignon 1981 according to this approach saving rates are an increasing function of wealth and inequality therefore channels resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save 1 the socio political economy approach provides an alternative mechanism equality diminishes the tendency for socio political instability or distortionary redistribution and hence it stimulates investment and economic growth see the comprehensive survey of benabou 1996b

trade and direct investment in producer services and the domestic market for expertise foreign producer services can provide substantial benefits for domestic firms we build on earlier monopolistic competition models of intermediate producer services in this paper results show that 1 while foreign services are partial equilibrium substitutes for domestic skilled labour they may be general equilibrium complements 2 service trade can provide crucial missing inputs that reverse comparative advantage in final goods 3 the optimal tax on imported services may be a subsidy and 4 in our dynamic formulation there may be earnings losses for immobile workers along a transition path that suggest potentially important equity consequences of reform jel classification f12 f16 f23 commerce international et investissement direct dans les services de production et le marche interieur de l expertise les services de production en provenance de l etranger peuvent engendrer des avantages substantiels pour les entreprises domestiques dans ce memoire les auteurs construisent sur la base de certains modeles anterieurs de concurrence monopolistique de services de production intermediaires les resultats montrent que 1 alors que les services de l etranger sont des substituts pour le travail domestique specialise en equilibre partiel en equilibre general ils peuvent etre des complements 2 le commerce de services peut fournir des intrants cruciaux qui manquent et ce faisant renverser les avantages comparatifs dans les produits finaux 3 la fiscalite optimale imposee sur les services importes peut etre une subvention et 4 dans la formulation dynamique du modele il peut y avoir perte de revenus pour les travailleurs immobiles le long du sentier de transition ce qui suggere qu il peut y avoir des consequences importantes au plan de l equite associees a certaines reformes

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

anomalies risk aversion economists ubiquitously employ a simple and elegant explanation for risk aversion it derives from the concavity of the utility of wealth function within the expected utility framework we show that this explanation is not plausible in most applications since anything more than economically negligible risk aversion over moderate stakes requires a utility of wealth function that is so concave that it predicts absurdly severe risk aversion over very large stakes we present examples of how the expected utility framework has misled economists and why we believe a better explanation for risk aversion must incorporate loss aversion and mental accounting

entry into auctions an experimental analysis this paper investigates entry decisions into rst and second price auctions using an experimental design to extract information on willingness to pay to enter wte we nd that subjects tend to overpay to enter both auction formats in particular if the subjects believe they will be bidding against bidders following the risk neutral nash strategy their wte is greater than the optimal risk neutral amount 97 of the time for rst price auctions fpa and 90 for second price auctions spa if they believe that they are bidding against subjects who bid as do the other subjects they submit a wte that is too high 92 of the time for fpa and 69 of the time for spa we also nd in line with previous studies signicant overbidding in both the fpa and spa we then investigate whether introducing risk aversion ra or joy of winning joy can explain the joint observation of over entry and overbidding in particular using bid data alone we structurally estimate three models one allowing ra only one allowing for joy only and one allowing for both ra and joy while a model with joy alone overestimates wte we nd that ra alone can explain 38 of wte but a model with both ra and joy where ra is estimated using fpa bids and joy is estimated using spa bids can explain 65 of wte moreover joy appears to explain nearly all of the of the male wte but only 44 of the female wte

foreign know how firm control and the income of developing countries nber working paper seriesforeign know how firm control and the income of developingcountriesariel bursteinalexander monge naranjoworking paper 13073http www nber org papers w13073national bureau of economic research1050 massachusetts avenuecambridge ma 02138may 2007we thank manuel amador pol antras andy atkeson wilbur john coleman pete klenow eva nagypal giorgio primiceri andres rodriguez clare esteban rossi hansberg martin schneider aleh tsyvinski and seminar participants in various places for useful comments and suggestions gilberto arce providedsuperb research assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author s and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the national bureau of economic research 2007 by ariel burstein and alexander monge naranjo all rights reserved short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including notice is given to the source

reconciling the pattern of trade with the pattern of migration aspects of the brain drain are considered in a theoretical context the emphasis is on the migration of those with managerial skills between countries with abundant skilled labor and those with abundant unskilled labor the results indicate that countries with abundant skilled labor therefore export managers e g through multinational subsidiaries and skilled labor intensive goods yet import skilled employees the brain drain excerpt

optimal auctions revisited in symmetric privately known values oral auctions with costly entry for bidders the seller can do no better than by committing ex ante to a reservation price and entry fees or subsidies which result in no fewer and at most one more bidders than a reservation price equal to the seller s value would in the absence of entry fees or subsidies journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c72

comparative study of one bid versus two bid auctions abstract the paper focuses on a comparative investigation of the standard one bid first price auction and a corresponding two bid auction where each buyer may place two bids a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids we characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove some results on the ranking of revenues for the symmetric case we show that subjects in an experiment prefer the two bid over the one bid auction when given the possibility of choosing between the two and compare the observed behavior to the theoretical predictions

self selection and market power in risk sharing contracts abstract although the theory of optimal contracts and the principal agent model are now well established in the literature empirical support for this theory has been mixed at best we use economic experiments to test contract theory and assess the empirical relevance of two possible confounding factors that may explain why the theory has not received stronger empirical support first parameters of interest may be biased if agents self select into projects with differing risk profiles based on risk preferences second differing levels of market power on either side of the market could shift contract terms in ways contrary to theoretical predictions in general we find support for classical contract theory augmented to accommodate market power and self selection based on risk preferences we also find evidence for a third confound in the form of the characteristics of agents not party to the transaction affecting the terms of the contract

a theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions abstract jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value we present field data that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience we go on to examine the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

selection into auctions for risky and ambiguous prospects we study experimentally the selection into first price sealed bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders a control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes jel c91 d44 d81

changes in the world distribution of income between 1950 and 1977 trends in the world distribution of income are much discussed and philosophised about the issue of increasing economic inequality among nonsocialist countries in the post war period is central to the debate about the international economic order in i969 the pearson commission report was already pointing to the widening gap between the developed and developing countries as a central issue of our time and was proposing the reduction of that gap as the main objective of international co operation according to that report gnp per capita had increased between i960 and i967 at annual rates of 2 5 and 3 6 in developing and developed countries respectively morawetz i978 found that the gap between the two sets of countries rose from i 2 6 fold in i950 to i3 2 fold in i975 other authors see a more complicated picture atkinson i975 for instance has argued that although the share of poor countries in world income probably declined between i950 and i970 that of the countries at the middle of the world distribution probably increased 2 what may be a mere assessment of relative growth performances among nonsocialist countries becomes a basic theoretical element in the radical stream of economic literature for authors like amin i974 emmanuel i972 and frank i978 the capitalist mode of development necessarily leads to the rich countries of the centre becoming richer and poor countries of the periphery becoming poorer in a degree depending on their involvement in international trade for them a widening gap between developed and developing countries is simply the statistical confirmation of an unavoidable consequence of the national and international capitalist system in the latter perspective the issue at stake is of such importance that the contrast between the abundance of theoretical literature and the lack of empirical work is striking the few existing studies of changes in world distribution provide an inadequate picture intra country income distributions are not taken into account observation periods do not exceed i5 years 8 for andic and peacock i96i and for beckerman and bacon i970 i5 for kirman and tomasini i969 socialist as well as some non socialist countries are excluded and national incomes are converted to u s dollars at official exchange rates 3 finally none of these studies covers the i970s although several shocks which might have affected world distribution occurred during that decade for the non socialist countries to which they refer the andic peacock and beckerman bacon studies found the gini coefficient almost constant over

multinational production data and stylized facts abstract we present a comprehensive data set on the bilateral activity of multinational firms with focus on two variables affiliate revenues and the number of affiliates across country pairs our

the high low divide self selection by values in auction choice abstract most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter we examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and or the outcome of the auctions the results show a strong impact on auction choice subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often the number of bidders in each auction revenue efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized

mismatch in the spanish labor market overeducation the objective of this article is to explain the job match which is assessed by comparing attained education and job required education as reported by workers we frame our empirical work according to the occupational mobility theory using a cross section of workers from a representative survey of the spanish labor force we consider overeducated workers to be those who report that the level of education their jobs require is below the level of education they have attained our results indicate that overeducated workers have less experience decreased on thejob training and higher turnover than other comparable workers we also observe an improvement in the job match over age and mobility

the value of control in emerging markets when a developed country multinational firm acquires majority control of a firm in an emerging market there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm s stock price in 1986 2006 developed market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1 16 on average over a three day event window positive acquirer returns and dollar value gains appear unique to emerging market mergers and acquisitions and are not replicated when the same developed market acquirers take over firms in developed markets the size of the stock price increase is more pronounced a the weaker the contracting environment in the emerging market and b for industries with high asset intangibility the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

does education expansion increase intergenerational mobility education expansion may lead to over education where the social connections of parents may exert more significant influence on the return to education of children with the assumption of a positive correlation between return on human capital and parental income in the presence of over education we show that i the expansion of education may cause horizontal inequity in education opportunities and inefficiency in human capital accumulation ii the positive correlation between return on human capital and parental income causes a more persistent intergenerational immobility iii an expansion of education especially higher education leads to more persistent intergenerational immobility

alternative common value auction procedures revenue comparisons with free entry the logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants rather than being fixed responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating in a thoroughly symmetric model a seller may prefer that competition be indirect an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely this insight allows a complete revenue ranking of standard auction procedures with endogenous entry

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

productivity differences and the dynamic effects of labor movements barriers to labor mobility across countries coexist with substantial differences in living standards largely attributable to productivity differences a growth model with endogenous labor movements is used to assess the effects on output capital accumulation and welfare of removing barriers to labor mobility the model is parameterized so that it is consistent with evidence on historical labor movements and is applied to two cases the enlargement of the european union and the hypothetical creation of a common labor market in the north america the main finding is that there are large resulting gains in terms of output and welfare

does having a cadre parent pay evidence from the first job offers of chinese college graduates abstract we estimate the wage premium associated with having a cadre parent in china using a recent survey of college graduates carried out by the authors the wage premium of having a cadre parent is 15 and this premium cannot be explained by other observables such as college entrance exam scores quality of colleges and majors a full set of college human capital attributes and job characteristics these results suggest that the remaining premium could be the true wage premium of having a cadre parent

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

intergenerational transfers of public sector jobs a shred of evidence on nepotism the attractiveness of public sector jobs in italy may induce parents working in this sector to use their positions and the network of relationships to favor their sons daughters in gaining access to public sector jobs we verify whether children of public employees effectively enjoy an advantage estimating a model of the probability of working in the public sector controlling for individual characteristics and labor market conditions we show that if the father is a public employee the probability of his child working in the same sector is increased by a huge 44 this advantage is larger for low ability individuals stayers and southern italian residents we interpret these findings as evidence of nepotism in public employment

a theory of economic unions a comment gino gancia giacomo ponzetto and jaume ventura have written an extremely interesting paper on a topic that is very timely for the global economy in this article i will first argue that gpv have succeeded in formalizing their hypothesis and that while providing very suggestive analytical results additional work can and should be done with the model especially with regards to relative changes in the relative weights of incumbent countries second i will comment on the potential insights if the rest of the world is modeled more realistically third i will call for extending the baseline model to incorporate additional aspects beyond trade such as investment and immigration flows which appear to be relevant for the story of the european union and its discontents four i will add my non european perspective on using the model to understand the story of the european union this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

markets externalities and the dynamic gains of openness inflows of foreign knowledge can be the key for developing countries to catch up with the world technology frontier in this paper i construct a simple tractable model to analyze a the incentives of foreign firms to bring their know how to a developing country and b the incentives of domestic firms to invest in their own know how the model embeds the two mechanisms typically considered separately in the literature for the diffusion of knowledge externalities and markets the relative preponderance of these mechanisms significantly changes the dynamic implications of openness notably openness allows developing countries to fully catch up only when market transactions fully dominate the diffusion of ideas while externalities can also push domestic firms to upgrade their productivity the equilibrium exposure to ideas in the country is always below the frontier and asymptotically the country would remain importing foreign know how however in general the dynamic gains of openness are substantial

true world income distribution 1988 and 1993 first calculation based on household surveys alone the paper derives world income or expenditure distribution of individuals for two years 1988 and 1993 it is the first paper to calculate world distribution for individuals based entirely on household survey data from 91 countries and adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity between the countries measured by the gini index inequality increased from an already very high 63 in 1988 to 66 in 1993 the increase was driven more by rising differences in mean incomes between the countries than by rising inequalities within countries the most important contributors were rising urban rural differences in china and slow growth of rural incomes in south asia compared to several large developed market economies

foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes abstract governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment fdi focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes this paper examines the impact of indirect non income taxes on fdi by american multinational firms using affiliate level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of american companies estimates imply that 10 higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7 1 lower affiliate assets which is similar to the effect of 10 higher income tax rates affiliate output falls by 2 9 as indirect taxes rise by 10 while higher income taxes have more modest output effects high corporate income tax rates depress capital labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates whereas high indirect tax rates do not these patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect fdi

bidding behavior in competing auctions evidence from ebay much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction however in many online auctions a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from ebay our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid as the theory predicts the paper also shows that winning bidders who cross bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

occupational choice and development abstract the rise in world trade since 1970 has been accompanied by a rise in the geographic span of control of management and hence also a rise in the effective international mobility of labor services we study the effect of such a globalization of the world s labor markets the world s welfare gains depend positively on the skill heterogeneity of the world s labor force we find that when people can choose between wage work and managerial work the worldwide labor market raises output by more in the rich and the poor countries and by less in the middle income countries this is because the middle income countries experience the smallest change in the factor price ratio and where the option to choose between wage work and managerial work has the least value in the integrated economy our theory also establishes that after economic integration the high skill countries see a disproportionate increase in managerial occupations using aggregate data on gdp openness and occupations from 115 countries we find evidence for these patterns of occupational choice

price formation in a sequential selling mechanism abstract this paper studies a dynamic trade institution where an auction is combined with a buy it now option this option presents a take it or leave it price offered by the seller to a potential buyer before the auction if the buyer rejects this buyout price the object is auctioned off in equilibrium sales should take place only in the auction an experimental test reveals that average buyout prices and profits are well captured by the theoretical prediction however a substantial amount of sales takes place before the auction this is caused by offering too low or accepting too high buyout prices we discuss alternative explanations such as risk preferences and wrong formation of beliefs that might account for agents behavior

overeducation in the labor market this article examines the reasons for the observed discrepancy between workers actual and required levels of schooling and the resulting differences in returns to schooling overeducated workers are found to be younger and to have lower amounts of on the job training than workers with the required level of schooling they also have higher rates of firm and occupational mobility characterized by movement of higher level occupations the findings suggest that overeducation can be explained by the trade off between schooling and other components of human capital and by the mobility patterns of overeducated workers

overeducation in the labour market abstract this paper presents a review of the literature on overeducation the paper assesses the consistency of overeducation within the context of a number of theoretical frameworks including human capital theory hct and assignment theory the analysis goes on to discuss the various measurement controversies associated with the study of overeducation in order to provide an assessment of the extent to which the impacts of the phenomenon represent an economic reality as opposed to a statistical artefact after reviewing the literature it is concluded that the impacts of overeducation are likely to be non trivial and that the phenomenon may potentially be costly to individuals and firms as well as the economy more generally the existence of overeducation also raises some doubts with respect to the validity of some of the central assumptions and predictions of hct that are unlikely to be fully explained by gaps in the standard wage equation framework

the impact of surplus schooling on earnings some additional findings this paper examines the impact of overeducation or surplus schooling on earnings overeducated workers are defined as those with educational attainments substantially above the mean for their specific occupations two models are estimated using data from the 1980 census though our models data and measure of overeducation are different from those used by rumberger 1987 our results are similar our results show that overeducated workers often earn less than their adequately educated and undereducated counterparts

overeducation undereducation and the british labour market this paper addresses the issue of overeducation and undereducation using for the first time a british dataset which contains explicit information on the level of required education to enter a job across the generality of occupations three key issues within the overeducation literature are addressed first what determines the existence of over and undereducation and to what extent are over and undereducation substitutes for experience tenure and training second to what extent are over and undereducation temporary or permanent phenomena third what are the returns to over and undereducation and do certain stylized facts discovered for the us and a number of european countries hold for britain

changing roles of ability and education in u s intergenerational mobility using data on young adults from the 1979 and 1997 national longitudinal survey of youth we investigate the changing roles of ability and education in the transmission of economic status across generations we find that ability plays a substantially diminished role for the most recent cohort whereas education plays a much larger role the first finding results primarily from a smaller effect of children s ability on status the second from an increased correlation between parental status and educational attainment a replication of the analysis by gender reveals that the changes in the role of ability are largely driven by men whereas the changes in education s role are largely driven by women jel j62 i24

are international trade and factor mobility substitutes abstract this paper analyzes whether factor flows and commodity trade are substitutes or complements i e whether increasing the level of one impacts adversely or favorably on the volume of the other it derives with the aid of a new general equilibrium framework of the world which allows possible differences in factor endowments tastes and technologies across the two trading countries the necessary and sufficient condition for substitutability and complementarity the results are then further examined in two special cases a survey of different concepts of substitutability and complementarity which have appeared in the literature is also given

outsourcing in a global economy we study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade we model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts the extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers the relative cost of searching in each market the relative cost of customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each country

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

brain drain or brain gain technology diffusion and learning on the job this paper studies technology transfer when technology is embodied in human capital and learning requires on the job communication between managers and workers patterns of technology diffusion depend on where high knowledge managers work and how much time they allocate to training workers managers appropriate the surplus training creates and in the open economy managers face a cross country trade off between labor costs and the value of knowledge transfer complementarity between country level efficiency and managerial knowledge makes learning more valuable in the north meaning that high knowledge managers choose to work in the north and globalization precipitates a brain drain of high knowledge southern agents to the north the brain drain reduces learning opportunities in the south and exacerbates cross country technology differences

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices