directed matching and monetary exchange we develop a model of monetary exchange where as in the random matching literature agents trade bilaterally and not through centralized markets rather than assuming they match exogenously and at random however we determine who meets whom as part of the equilibrium we show how to formalize this process of directed matching in dynamic models with double coincidence problems and present several examples and applications that illustrate how the approach can be used in monetary theory some of our results are similar to those in the random matching literature others differ significantly

money and capital abstract the effects of money anticipated inflation on capital formation is a classic issue in macroeconomics previous papers adopt reduced form approaches putting money in the utility function or imposing cash in advance but using otherwise frictionless models we follow instead a literature that tries to be explicit about the frictions making money essential this introduces new elements including a two sector structure with centralized and decentralized markets stochastic trading opportunities and bargaining these elements matter quantitatively and numerical results differ from findings in the reduced form literature the analysis also reduces a gap between microfounded monetary economics and mainstream macro

a model of debit card as a means of payment abstract this paper provides an explanation for both the rapid growth in the use of a debit card over time and the cross sectional difference in the use of a debit card using a search theoretic model the trade off between cash and a debit card as means of payment is incorporated such that a buyer incurs disutility cost proportional to the amount of cash holdings while a seller accepting a debit card bears a fixed record keeping cost regardless of transaction amount as record keeping cost decreases with the development of information technology over time disutility cost of cash holdings required for pairwise trade eventually exceeds record keeping cost so that all the agents with different wealth levels choose to use a debit card as a means of payment also disutility cost of cash holdings required for pairwise trade would be higher for the rich than for the poor implying the cross sectional feature of payment pattern that the rich use a debit card more frequently than the poor there are two distinct mechanisms that improve welfare as record keeping cost decreases one is to reduce deadweight loss from holding cash and the other is to reduce its distortionary effect on output produced in pairwise trade

anonymous markets and monetary trading abstract we study infinite horizon monetary economies characterized by trading frictions that originate from random pairwise meetings and commitment and enforcement limitations we prove that introducing occasional trade in centralized markets opens the door to an informal enforcement scheme that sustains a non monetary efficient allocation all is required is that trading partners be patient and their actions be observable we then present a matching environment in which trade may occur in large markets and yet agents trading paths cross at most once this allows the construction of models in which infinitely lived agents trade in competitive markets where money plays an essential role

money and crime in a cash in advance model a cash in advance model in which holding money is risky is constructed to study the coexistence of multiple means of payment and monetary policy implications in steady state equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution of cash goods for credit goods depends on the crime rate as well as the nominal interest rate credit may be in use although the return on money is not positive with theft a money injection reduces the crime rate and makes cash more preferable for a greater variety of goods inflation improves welfare however without theft inflation makes credit more preferable and decreases welfare in general the friedman rule is not optimal

money is privacy an extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record keeping device money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit based transactions continues to fall in this paper we investigate another use for money the provision of privacy that is a money purchase does not identify the purchaser while a credit purchase does in a simple trading economy with moral hazard the efficiency of money is compared with that of credit and we find that money may be useful even when information is free

banking a new monetarist approach we develop a model where i banks take deposits and make investments ii their liabilities facilitate third party transactions other models have i or ii not both although we argue they are intimately connected we show that they both emerge from limited commitment we describe an environment characterize desirable allocations and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements banks are essential without them the set of feasible allocations is inferior as a technical contribution we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions show they involve backloading and analyse how this interacts with banking we also confront the theory with economic history copyright 2013 oxford university press

money credit and banking in monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained this problem creates a role for financial intermediaries such as banks who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans in general financial intermediation improves the allocation the gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers liquidity constraints we also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving

barter and monetary exchange under private information the authors develop a model of production and exchange with uncertainty concerning the quality of commodities and study the role of fiat money in ameliorating frictions caused by private information the model is specified so that without private information only high quality commodities are produced and there is no welfare gain from using money with private information there can be equilibria and sometimes multiple equilibria where low quality commodities are produced and money can increase welfare money works by promoting useful production and exchange in efficient monetary equilibria agents adopt strategies that increase the probability of acquiring high quality output copyright 1994 by american economic association

inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange we study a random matching model of money in which a subset of people called bankers have known histories and the rest called nonbankers have unknown histories earlier we showed that if there are no outside assets then an optimal arrangement has bankers issuing objects banknotes that are used in trades involving nonbankers here the same model is used to compare such exclusive use of inside money to the exclusive use of outside money we show that the set of implementable outcomes using outside money is a strict subset of the set using inside money

a model of money with multilateral matching we develop a model of decentralized monetary exchange to examine the distributional effects of inflation across heterogeneous agents the agents have private information about their productivity preferences or money holdings matching is multilateral and each seller is visited by a stochastic number of buyers the good is allocated according to a second price auction in money in equilibrium homogeneous buyers hold different amounts of money leading to price dispersion we find the closed form solution for the distribution of money holdings entry of sellers is suboptimal except at the friedman rule inflation acts as a regressive tax

money and collateral this paper presents a model in which money and collateral are both essential and complement each other as media of exchange the model has implications for asset prices output in ation and monetary policy both in steady state and

social norms and money abstract in an economy where there is no double coincidence of wants and without public record keeping of past transactions money is usually seen as the only mechanism that can support exchange in this paper we show that as long as the population is finite and agents are sufficiently patient a social norm establishing gift exchange can substitute for money however for a given discount factor population growth eventually leads to the breakdown of the social norm additionally increases in the degree of specialization in the economy can also undermine the social norm by contrast monetary equilibrium exists independent of the population size we conclude that money is essential as a medium of exchange when the population is large

money and credit redux do we need both money and credit in models with explicit roles for payment instruments we show the answer is no if credit is easy money is useless if credit is tight money can be essential but then credit is irrelevant and changes in debt limits are neutral real balances respond endogenously to leave total liquidity constant this is true for exogenous or endogenous policy and debt limits secured or unsecured credit and fairly general preferences and pricing mechanisms while we also show how to overturn some results the benchmark model suggests credit conditions matter less than some people think

the need to rethink agricultural policy in general and to perform some radical surgery on commodity programs in particular there were some 6 8 million farmers in the united states in 1935 this was the highwater mark for the number of farms in the united states of this total there were a good number of small low production farms in the south one mule sharecropper farms and a good number of small subsistence farms in appalachia and the cut over regions of the lake states at the other end of the size scale there were some very large farms often of the corporate type in california south texas and along the mississippi delta but the overwhelming number of farms in the united states in the mid 1930s were moderate sized family farms in the midwest these farms tended to run between 100 and 200 acres in size in the typical case the family provided the labor and the management of the farming operation and had some equity in it this was a period of deep dark depression

money asset prices and the liquidity premium this paper examines the effect of monetary policy on the liquidity premium i e the market value of the liquidity services that financial assets provide to guide the empirical analysis i set up a monetary search model in which bonds provide liquidity services in addition to money the theory predicts that money supply and the nominal interest rate are positively correlated with the liquidity premium but the latter is negatively correlated with the bond supply the empirical analysis over the period from 1946 and 2008 confirms the theoretical findings this indicates that liquid bonds are substantive substitutes for money and the opportunity cost of holding money plays a key role in asset price determination the model can rationalize the existence of negative nominal yields when the nominal interest rate is low and liquid bond supply decreases

whither monetary economics i argue that monetary economics should be pursued by applying implementation theory to models which contain explicit frictions that make money essential the argument has two parts first i argue that models in which real balances are assumed to be productive models with money in utility or production functions or with cash in advance constraints contain hidden inconsistencies second i argue that the approach advocated is capable of providing new insights about some of the main issues in monetary economics the effects of monetary shocks the welfare cost of inflation and the roles of inside and outside money

money in search equilibrium in competitive equilibrium and in competitive search equilibrium we compare three market structures for monetary economies bargaining search equilibrium price taking competitive equilibrium and price posting competitive search equilibrium we also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry we study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure under bargaining trade and entry are both inefficient and inflation implies first order welfare losses under price taking the friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second and inflation may actually improve welfare under posting the friedman rule yields the first best and inflation implies second order welfare losses

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

should we pay for ecosystem service outputs inputs or both payments for ecosystem service outputs have recently become a popular policy prescription for a range of agri environmental schemes the focus of this paper is on the choice of contract instruments to incentivise the provision of ecosystem service outputs from farms the farmer is better informed than the regulator in terms of hidden information about costs and hidden actions relating to effort the results show that with perfect information the regulator can contract equivalently on inputs or outputs with hidden information input based contracts are more cost effective at reducing the informational rent related to adverse selection than output based contracts mixed contracts are also cost effective especially where one input is not observable such contracts allow the regulator to target variables that are costly to fake as opposed to those prone to moral hazard such as effort further results are given for fixed price contracts and input based contracts with moral hazard the model is extended to include a discussion of repeated contracting and the scope that exists for the regulator to benefit from information revealed by the initial choice of contract the models are applied to a case study of contracting with farmers to protect high biodiversity native vegetation that also provides socially valuable ecosystem services

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

a model of the threat of counterfeiting abstract a simple matching model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed in contrast to the existing literature lotteries are included these provide scope for the operation of the intuitive criterion of cho and kreps the application of that refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting if the cost of producing counterfeits is low enough then there is no monetary equilibrium otherwise there is a monetary equilibrium without counterfeiting in other words the threat of counterfeiting can eliminate the monetary equilibrium

the welfare effect of access to credit i present a model in which credit and outside money can be used as means of payment in order to analyze how access to credit aects welfare when credit markets feature limited participation allowing more agents to use credit has an ambiguous eect on welfare because it may make consumption risk sharing more ine cient i calibrate the model using u s data on credit card transactions and show that the increase in access to credit from 1990 to the near present has had a slightly negative impact on welfare

search bargaining money and prices under private information this paper presents a model of money and search where bargaining determines prices and the quality of goods is private information it studies how a lemons problem affects the purchasing power of money there are multiple pareto ranked equilibria the superior equilibrium where no lemons are produced exists even if information about quality is relatively scarce in other equilibria there is price dispersion and uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers for all goods taxing money balances a proxy for inflation makes buyers less selective thus reducing the average quality of supply and the premium paid for known quality

money and information this paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply when the fraction of high quality producers in the economy is given money promotes the production of high quality goods which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously when this fraction is endogenous however we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium the origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low quality producers which can result in a higher fraction of low quality producers in the monetary equilibrium finally we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium consequently money is welfare enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange but not because it saves information costs

on the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking such as the ability to undertake more profitable long term investment opportunities and the difficulties associated with it such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders i show that a specific banking arrangement a joint liability scheme provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

money banking and monetary policy abstract an important function of banks is to issue liabilities like demand deposits that are relatively safe and liquid we introduce a risk of theft and a safe keeping role for banks into modern monetary theory this provides a general equilibrium framework for analyzing banking in historical and contemporary contexts the model can generate the concurrent circulation of cash and bank liabilities as media of exchange or inside and outside money it also yields novel policy implications for example negative nominal interest rates are feasible and for some parameters optimal for other parameters strictly positive nominal rates are optimal