investment and coordination in oligopolistic industries we examine investment by firms in 24 chemical product industries to determine whether firms invest preemptively to achieve persistent increases in market share or whether there is evidence of behavior to maintain market share the data indicate that investment reduces the probability that rival firms will expand capacity but the effect is temporary large firms tend to maintain market share while smaller firms tend to invest simultaneously with rivals the role of preemptive investment is limited to that of permitting a firm to invest with a lower probability of redundant investment by rivals preemption does not allow a persistent increase in market share but instead acts as a means by which firms may coordinate capacity investment to help avoid episodes of industry overcapacity

dynamic limit pricing and internal finance abstract this paper examines a model of dynamic limit pricing with a profit maximizing fringe constrained to finance new investment from internal finance in a differential game the dominant firm controls price thereby determining the current earnings of the fringe while the fringe chooses its optimal retention ratio if market growth is less than the discount rate an important feature of the solution is that price must eventually drop to the fringe long run cost of production if market growth is initially rapid the dominant firm is much more aggressive in limiting fringe growth

exchange rates inflation and the sterilization problem germany 1975 1981 when the goals of internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium are in conflict sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market may provide an independent policy instrument through which the central bank can resolve its dilemma in the short run this paper is concerned with the west german bundesbank s use of sterilization during the recent years of exchange rate flexibility the paper asks whether the bundesbank pursued sterilization during the years 1995 1981 and whether sterilized foreign exchange intervention exerts a significant influence on the exchange rate in the german case estimation of a stylized bundesbank reaction function suggests an affirmative answer to the first of these questions to assess the efficacy of sterilized intervention a structural portfolio balance model of german asset markets and prices is estimated dynamic perfect foresight simulations of the empirical model are used to ascertain whether imperfect substitutability between foreign and domestic bonds is sufficient to allow the bundesbank to attain independent internal and external goals over the short run of about a month the model s verdict is that the bundesbank has little if any power to influence the exchange rate over that time span without altering current or expected future money market conditions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

subjective discounting in an exchange economy this paper describes the equilibrium of a discrete time exchange economy in which consumers with arbitrary subjective discount factors and homothetic period utility functions follow linear markov consumption and portfolio strategies explicit expressions are given for state prices and consumption wealth ratios we provide an analytically convenient continuous time approximation and show how subjective rates of time preference affect risk free rates but not instantaneous risk return trade offs hyperbolic discount factors can be a source of return volatility but they cannot be used to address asset pricing puzzles related to high frequency sharpe ratios

economies of scale and barriers to entry dixit has recently presented a model in which established firms select capacity to discourage entry but cannot employ threats they would not rationally execute after entry entry deterrence in a slight modification of this model involves the classical limit price output under linear or concave demand however the capital cost of a firm of minimum efficient scale is an upper bound on the present value of the monopoly profit stream that can be shielded from entry it is argued that this suggests the general unimportance of entry barriers erected by scale economies

an experimental and theoretical analysis of price matching refund policies abstract price matching refund policies or offers by firms to match competitor s prices are common in both consumer and industrial marketing much of the previous theoretical work in economics suggests that price matching refunds are associated with higher prices in contrast the trade press postulates that price matching policies are associated with lower prices given these inconsistent views regarding price matching policies the authors experimentally examine how consumers view and interpret such policies and then develop a model that incorporates these consumer interpretations as well as asymmetries across stores in the model the asymmetry across stores is the key to deriving the conditions under which a signaling equilibrium exists in the presence of price matching policies the critical point is that the competition reducing and price discrimination effects which seem to form the basis of most of the previous theoretical literature can be counteracted by the presence of differentiated firms

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

excess capacity as a barrier to entry an empirical appraisal this paper examines excess capacity barriers to entry and investment dynamics in a sample of thirty eight chemical product industries logit and log linear models of investment behavior are estimated and specific case examples are considered the results show that incumbents rarely built excess capacity pre emptively in an effort to deter entry in general entrants and incumbents exhibited similar investment behavior

non hyperbolic time inconsistency the commonly used hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic discount functions have been developed to accommodate decreasing impatience which is the prevailing empirical finding in intertemporal choice in particular for aggregate behavior however these discount functions do not have the flexibility to accommodate increasing impatience or strongly decreasing impatience this lack of flexibility is particularly disconcerting for fitting data at the individual level where various patterns of increasing impatience and strongly decreasing impatience will occur for a significant fraction of subjects this paper presents discount functions with constant absolute cadi or constant relative crdi decreasing impatience that can accommodate any degree of decreasing or increasing impatience in particular they are sufficiently flexible for analyses at the individual level the cadi and crdi discount functions are the analogs of the well known cara and crra utility functions for decision under risk

eliciting discount functions when baseline consumption changes over time abstract many empirical studies on intertemporal choice report preference reversals in the sense that a preference between a small reward to be received soon and a larger reward to be received later reverses as both rewards are equally delayed such preference reversals are commonly interpreted as contradicting constant discounting this interpretation is correct only if baseline consumption to which the outcomes are added remains constant over time the difficulty with measuring discounting when baseline consumption changes over time is that delaying an outcome has two effects 1 due to the change in baseline consumption it changes the utility from receiving the outcome and 2 it changes the factor by which this utility is discounted in this paper we propose a way to disentangle the two effects which allows us to draw conclusions about discounting even when baseline consumption changes over time

cartels profits and excess capacity a model of a collusive duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity is studied the negotiated output quotas depend on the bargaining power of the firms which derives from the damage the firms can do by cutting prices for fixed capacities the unit profit of the small firm is at least as large as that of the large firm and the relative position of the small firm is better when demand is low when the capacities can be chosen once and for all there is excess capacity in equilibrium so long as the cost of capacity is not too high copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

contestable markets under uncertainty in this article we present a model of a market which is ex post contestable we show that in a market characterized by uncertainty a firm will face a tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility and generally will make some precommitments to take advantage of ex ante technologies we show that in the face of potential entry the incumbent will increase his precommitments and in so doing will affect the probability of entry the degree of market contestability is therefore endogenously determined by the choice of precommitments the extent to which precommitments will be used to affect entry probabilities is shown to depend on the efficiency of ex ante production adjustment costs and the degree of uncertainty in particular we show that the market becomes more contestable as the relative efficiency of ex post production increases and as market conditions become more uncertain

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

an equilibrium selection theory of monopolization we develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market e g investing in process innovation or product development as well as in the market e g setting quantities or prices competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms investment levels relative size and profitability we show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market in particular it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm while not generating new equilibria this result complicates the task of determining whether a firm s dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization we discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation and illustrate these by means of two well known antitrust cases

the fragility of time time insensitivity and valuation of the near and far future we propose that the temporal dimension is fragile in that choices are insufficiently sensitive to it and second such sensitivity as exists is exceptionally malleable unlike other dimensions such as money which are attended by default to test this we axiomatize a constant sensitivity discount function and in four studies we show that the degree of time sensitivity is inadequate relative to the compound discounting norm and strongly susceptible to manipulation time sensitivity is increased by a comparative within subject presentation experiment 1 direct instruction experiment 3 and provision of a visual cue for time duration experiment 4 time sensitivity is decreased using a time pressure manipulation experiment 2 in each study the sensitivity manipulation has an opposite effect on near future and far future valuations increased sensitivity decreases discounting in the near future and increases discounting in the far future in contrast such sensitivity manipulations have little effect on the money dimension

a dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion abstract we model capacity building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible while building their capacity over time firms compete a la cournot in the product market given their installed capacity there is no exogenous order of moves no commitment regarding future decisions and no finite horizon we investigate markov perfect equilibrium mpe paths of the investment game which may include episodes during which firms invest at different times a preemption pattern and episodes in which firms invest simultaneously a tacit collusion pattern these episodes may alternate and are typically several when firms have yet to invest in capacity the sole pattern that is mpe compatible is a preemption episode firms invest at different times but have equal value the first such investment may occur earlier and therefore be riskier than socially optimal when both firms hold capacity tacit collusion episodes may be mpe compatible firms invest simultaneously at a postponed time hence holding back production in the meantime thereby generating an investment wave in the industry such investment episodes are more likely with higher demand volatility faster market growth and lower cost of capital discount rate

oligopoly limit pricing we expand milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents each incumbent is informed as to the level of an industry cost parameter and selects a preentry price while a single entrant observes each incumbent s preentry price we find that incumbents are unable to coordinate deception which results in a separating equilibrium in which preentry prices are not distorted further introducing the refinement of unprejudiced beliefs we show that the no distortion equilibrium is the only refined separating equilibrium plausible pooling equilibria fail to exist or involve downward distortions in preentry prices

uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting we propose an evolutionary explanation for the pattern of intertemporal preference reversals often ascribed to hyperbolic discounting we take the view that preferences manifested for example in urges cravings and inclinations are the outcome of evolutionary forces and so will induce animals or humans to make survival maximizing choices in typical decision problems we show that if the typical problem involves payoffs whose realization times are uncertain then optimal preferences give rise to relatively patient behavior when the time horizon is long but induce a switch to impatience when the horizon grows short such reversals do not entail dynamic inconsistency in typical decision problems behavior there is optimal however if a decision maker is confronted with a choice for which the realization time uncertainty falls outside the evolutionary norm her preferences may well prompt her to behave inconsistently we argue that if such a choice problem recurs her evolutionarily endowed aability to learn will lead her to make self commitments against these urges this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

market uncertainty and competitive equilibrium entry abstract firms facing an uncertain market environment can choose the optimal mix of early and late production by trading off informational advantages of late production against cost advantages of early production consequently their choice of entry into the market whether early and or late depends on the interplay of cost and stochastic demand conditions this paper characterizes the competitive equilibrium conditions that determine the mode of market entry and derives comparative statics results to show how competitive equilibrium entry modes vary with changes in various market conditions

for a few dollars more reserves and growth in times of crises abstract based on a dataset of 112 emerging economies and developing countries this paper addresses the question whether the accumulation of international reserves has effectively protected countries during the 2008 09 financial crisis more specifically the paper investigates the relation between international reserves and the existence of capital controls we find that the level of reserves matters countries with high reserves relative to short term debt suffered less from the crisis particularly when associated with a less open capital account this suggests some degree of complementarity between reserve accumulation and capital controls

endogenous stackelberg leadership abstract we consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so to that end we study a two stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2 we show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten 1988 allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous stackelberg leader journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

on adjustment costs and the stability of equilibria in practice one does not expect conflicting agents to move instantaneously to an equilibrium instead the final equilibrium is often the consequence of disequilibrium dynamics this paper through the use of local game theory introduces a general framework for disequilibrium dynamics based on the existence of adjustment costs the analysis is presented within the context of oligopoly theory and shows that the existence of adjustment costs will in many cases result in a unique equilibrium at which market shares are inversely proportional to these costs this paper also introduces two new solution concepts for n person normal form games

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

switching costs in infinitely repeated games abstract we show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period this shows that the results in lipman and wang do have analogs in the case of infinitely repeated games lipman b wang r 2000 switching costs in frequently repeated games j econ theory 93 august 2000 149 190 we also discuss whether the results here or those in lipman wang imply a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence with respect to small switching costs we conclude that there is not a discontinuity with respect to switching costs but that the switching costs do create a discontinuity with respect to the length of a period

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

what makes us government bonds safe assets us government bonds are considered to be the world s safe store of value especially during periods of economic turmoil such as the events of 2008 but what makes us government bonds safe assets we highlight coordination among investors and build a model in which two countries with heterogeneous sizes issue bonds that may be chosen as safe asset our model illustrates the benefit of a large absolute debt size as safe asset investors have nowhere else to go in equilibrium and the large country s bonds are chosen as the safe asset moreover the effect becomes stronger in crisis periods

strotz meets allais diminishing impatience and the certainty effect abstract decision makers tend to exhibit a higher degree of impatience when considering a delay to an immediate reward than when contemplating an identical delay to an equal future reward this work argues that diminishing impatience originates from the distinction between the certain present and the risky future a simple functional representation of preferences exhibiting time inconsistency when the future is uncertain is derived experimental evidence which is inconsistent with other formulations that account for diminishing impatience supports the proposed approach the new theory uncovers a tight relation between diminishing impatience and well known behavioral regularities in choice under risk and uncertainty jel d12 d81

a theory of market structure with sequential entry this article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry we characterize the perfect nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions first equilibria never involve excess capacity second a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are positive when computed myopically i e with no further entry third the equilibrium number of firms is the smallest number that can deter entry fourth aggregate output in equilibrium is no smaller than the limit output we calculate some explicit solutions to the model and examine comparative static properties

four score and seven years from now the date delay effect in temporal discounting we describe a new anomaly in intertemporal choice the date delay effect discount rates that are imputed when time is described using calendar dates e g on october 17 are markedly lower than those revealed when future outcomes are described in terms of the corresponding delay e g in six months date descriptions not only reduce discount rates but also affect the implied shape of the discount function when inferred from intertemporal choices between options referenced by calendar dates the discount function appears markedly less hyperbolic we discuss potential psychological bases of the date delay effect its implications and other modes of temporal reference

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

innovation in a generalized timing game we examine innovation as a market entry timing game with complete information and observable actions we characterize all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two player symmetric model allowing both the leader s and the follower s payoff functions to be multi peaked non monotonic and discontinuous we provide sufficient conditions for when the equilibria can be pareto ranked and when the equilibrium is unique economic applications discussed include process and product innovation and the timing of the sale of an asset

pre commitment and flexibility abstract this paper considers several related strategic duopoly settings in which uncertainty creates an option value from retaining flexibility by delaying investment or output decisions until after uncertainty is resolved this value of flexibility must be weighed against the strategic value of pre commitment yielding a trade off between flexibility and pre commitment we obtain a simple characterization of the timing of output decisions as a consequence of the degree of uncertainty particular attention is paid to the implications for entry deterrence by an incumbent firm and to the possible flexibility enhancing effects of investment in capital

discounting the distant future an experimental investigation we use a laboratory experiment to elicit discount rates over a 20 year time horizon using government savings bonds as a payment vehicle when using a constant exponential discount rate function we find an implied average discount rate of 4 9 which is much lower than has been found in previous experimental studies that used time horizons of days or months however we also find strong support for non constant declining discount rates for longer time horizons with an extrapolated implied annual discount rate approaching 0 5 in 100 years there is heterogeneity in discount rates and risk preferences in that people with more optimistic beliefs about technological progress have higher discount rates these findings contribute to the debate over the appropriate discount rate to use in comparing the long term benefits of climate change mitigation to the more immediate costs

heterogeneity under competition a standard prediction of neoclassical microeconomics is that with perfect competition free entry and atomistic firms producing a homogeneous product equilibrium finds all firms employing that technology which has minimum average cost that competition drives out inefficient producers and reduces heterogeneity within industries is consequently a commonplace rule of thumb in economic thinking this paper demonstrates that demand uncertainty is sufficient to produce heterogeneity in the equilibrium employment of production technologies and to permit the coexistence of producers exhibiting different minimum average costs this heterogeneity is ubiquitous because the conditions for its presence are not stringent

eating your own lunch protection through preemption recent discussions of management practices among successful high technology companies suggest that one key strategy for success is to eat your own lunch before someone else does the implication is that in intensely competitive or hypercompetitive markets firms with a leading position should aggressively cannibalize their own current advantages with next generation advantages before competitors step in to steal the market given the pace of technological and other types of change such strategy often requires creating next generation advantages while the current advantages are still profitable that is trading current profits for future market leadership we capture the tradeoff between a market leader s willingness to reap profits with its current set of advantages and its desire to maintain market leadership by investing in the next generation using a competitive model that determines the equilibrium launch time of a next generation advantage we find that in absence of lower launch costs for an

optimal reserve composition in the presence of sudden stops abstract we analytically derive optimal central bank portfolios in a minimum variance framework with two assets and transaction demands caused by sudden stops in capital inflows in this model transaction demands become less important relative to traditional portfolio objectives as debt to reserve ratios decrease we empirically estimate optimal dollar and euro shares for 23 emerging market countries and find that optimal reserve portfolios are dominated by anchor currencies and at current debt to reserve ratios introducing transaction demand has a relatively modest effect for most countries we find that in general the dollar acts as a safe haven currency during sudden stops for country specific and global sudden stops increasing the optimal share of dollar bonds in central bank portfolios correspondingly our model predicts that dollar shares should decline as debt to reserve ratios fall as observed in recent data we also find that the denomination of foreign currency debt has little importance for optimal reserve portfolios

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

precommitment and financial structure an analysis of the effects of taxes while modern industrial organization theory predicts the use of sunk costs to deter entry this paper examines some factors that might act to moderate the commitment value of capital and hence the entry barring impact of these sunk costs to the point perhaps that empirical detection might be difficult the authors show that the tax system and financial contracts of the incumbent firm may affect its optimal precommitment decision and in fact may attenuate the strategic incentives for precommitment copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

discount rates inferred from decisions an experimental study two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 4 4 factorial design scenario postponing a receipt postponing a payment expediting a receipt expediting a payment time delay 0 5 1 2 and 4 years and size of cashflow 40 200 1000 and 5000 individual discount rates were inferred from the responses and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios time delays and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected a market segmentation approach was found lacking the results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position

resolving the commitment versus flexibility trade off the role of resource accumulation lags we examine how time consuming resource accumulation influences the classic strategy trade off between commitment and flexibility in particular using 1975 95 data from the worldwide petrochemical

hyperbolic discounting and the standard model eliciting discount functions abstract experiments on static intertemporal choice find evidence of particularly extreme impatience toward immediate rewards while this is often taken as support for hyperbolic discounting it could also arise because the most likely participants in experiments may be those with the most immediate need for money we conduct a calibration exercise and find that the extreme impatience observed in experiments can be accommodated by a standard exponential discounting model with no discounting and expectation of a small increase in the base consumption level the calibration uses existing estimates of curvature of utility

preemptive investment toehold entry and the mimicking principle this article explores the ability offirms to successfully enter against an initial monopolist by pursuing toehold entry sinking entry costs early and planning to produce only later we endow the incumbent with strongfirst mover advantages for example capital is the only input and is completely sunk and in each period the incumbent invests before entrants nevertheless the incumbent s profit can easily be negative if it tries to deter all entry when the market is growing the incumbent may need prohibitive capital in place early on because once toehold entry has occurred the incumbent s planned capital expansion might no longer be rational surprisingly even if market conditions remain stationary the incumbent may still allow some entry in the model some firms are always deterred showing that several firms can deter others more effectively than can a singlefirm the difference arises because onefirm cannot commit to mimicking the aggregate investment path that several independent firms would choose this mimicking principle offers a general perspective for understanding when a monopolist finds deterrence optimal

contestability a revisionist view many claims have been made about the significance of the contribution of contestability theory to industrial organizat ion this paper concludes that contestability theory leaves unanswere d questions about the identity of entrants and the source of their re sources a modification to the theory is proposed rather than as a h indrance to potential entry sunk costs are viewed as being of key si gnificance for the disciplining of oligopolists through potential ent ry with the proposed modification the analysis of the costs of mult iproduct firms may be more easily integrated with recent developments in industrial organization copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

collusion and dynamic under investment in quality in a dynamic game of investment in product quality i investigate whether collusive underinvestment equilibria can be supported by the threat of escalation in investment outlays when there are no spillovers underinvestment equilibria exist even though by deviating a firm can gain a persistent strategic advantage when there are strong spillovers underinvestment equilibria fail to exist a weakening of patent protection can thus lead to more investment in equilibrium a nonfragmentation result is shown to hold in all free entry equilibria industry concentration is bounded away from zero no matter how large the market and despite the existence of underinvestment equilibria

changes in background risk and risk taking behaviour economic decision making under uncertainty often takes place in the presence of multiple risks and in markets that are less than complete as a consequence choices about endogenous risks sometimes must be made while simultaneously facing one or more immutable exogenous background risks that are not under the control of the agent and that are independent of endogenous risks it is somehow natural to assume that an exogenous deterioration in background wealth will cause an individual to take more care elsewhere if we define a deterioration for example as making the individual poorer by removing a fixed amount of initial wealth we know from pratt 1964 that decreasing absolute risk aversion dara of an individual s von neumann morgenstern utility function yields this natural result if on the other hand background wealth becomes riskier due to the addition of a zero mean risk that is also statistically independent of all other risks behavior will be more risk averse if and only if preferences are risk vulnerable as defined by gollier and pratt 1996 risk vulnerability described below in section 4 is a stronger notion than dara and includes proper risk aversion pratt and zeckhauser 1987 and standard risk aversion eeckhoudt and kimball 1992 kimball 1993 as particular cases but a deterioration in background wealth may encompass more complicated distribution changes than the introduction of another statistically independent risk in this paper we examine background wealth deteriorations that take the form of both general firstand second degree stochastic dominance changes in risk fsd and ssd respectively in particular we determine conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for each of these two types of background risk changes to imply more risk averse behavior on the part of the individual for the case of fsd changes this condition turns out to be ross stronger characterization of decreasing absolute risk aversion in the case of general ssd changes in the distribution of background wealth the condition derived is a stronger version in ross sense of the conditions characterizing preferences that are locally risk vulnerable in the sense of gollier and pratt the necessary and sufficient conditions derived are fairly restrictive upon preferences however if we take as positive behavior that individuals act in a more risk averse manner whenever the distribution of background wealth deteriorates these conditions place canonical limits upon appropriate utility representations at the very least they

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

decreasing impatience a criterion for non stationary time preference and hyperbolic discounting despite recent interest in hyperbolic discounting there has been little discussion of exactly what property of time preferences is instantiated by hyperbolic or quasi hyperbolic functional forms the paper revives an earlier proposal in prelec 1989 that the key property is prattarrow convexity of the log of the discount function which corresponds to decreasing impatience di at the level of preferences di provides a natural criterion for assessing the severity of departure from stationarity in that greater di is equivalent to more choices of dominated options in two stage decision problems as well as greater convexity of the log of the discount function inefficient choices may arise as intentional precommitments or as unintended reversals of preference by naive agents

the currency composition of international reserves demand for international reserves and global safe assets abstract this paper examines determinants of the international reserves ir currency composition before and after the global financial crisis gfc applying the annual data of 58 countries we confirm that countries that trade more with the us euro zone uk and japan and issue more debt denominated in the big four currencies us dollar euro pound and yen hoard more ir in these currencies we find scale effects in which countries tend to diversify from the big four currencies as they increase their ir gdp and that a growing shortage of global safe assets gsas induces countries to hold more big four currencies countries hold less big four currencies as ir after the 2008 gfc while they hold more of such currencies since the tapering of the fed s quantitative easing qe the 2008 gfc and qe tapering weakened and sometimes reversed the effect of several economic factors we also find that target2 balances matter for the currency composition of ir in the euro zone commodity exporting countries tend to diversify their ir from the big four currencies when their terms of trade improve and that the valuation effects induced by euro usd exchange rate changes diminish the significance of the gfc in explaining the currency composition of ir

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

ramsey meets laibson in the neoclassical growth model the neoclassical growth model is modified to include a variable rate of time preference with no commitment ability and log utility the equilibrium features a constant effective rate of time preference and is observationally equivalent to the standard model the extended framework yields testable linkages between the extent of commitment ability and the rates of saving and growth the model also has welfare implications including the optimal design of institutions that facilitate household commitments steady state results are obtained for general concave utility functions and some properties of the transitional dynamics are characterized for isoelastic utility

working capital and fixed investment new evidence on financing constraints this article presents new tests for finance constraints on investment by emphasizing the often neglected role of working capital as both a use and a source of funds the coefficient of endogenous working capital investment is negative in a fixed investment regression as expected if working capital competes with fixed investment for a limited pool of finance this finding addresses a criticism of previous research on finance constraints that cash flows may simply proxy shifts in investment demand in addition previous studies may have underestimated the impact of finance constraints on growth and investment because firms smooth fixed investment in the short run with working capital

efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time inconsistent abstract we consider an exchange economy with time inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable if consumers have identical discount factors then allocations that are pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation proof in an economy with a sequence of markets competitive equilibria are pareto efficient in this sense and for generic endowments only if preferences are locally homothetic

advantage to a risk neutral firm of flexible resources under demand uncertainty this paper shows that flexible resources resources that can be resold or switched between productive processes are valuable to firms facing uncertain demand it is assumed that the firm must make its input purchase decision before the demand for its final product is known it is this differential in timing of the purchase of inputs versus selling of outputs which is the special problem confronted in this paper and which makes the existence of a flexible resource valuable to the firm stigler in a 1939 article recognized that in a risky environment there are advantages to resources which are flexible but did not provide an optimizing model in his analysis 4 others such as turnovsky 5 appelbaum and lim 1 sheppard 3 and epstein 2 have examined this timing problem and have recognized as we do that in a market characterized by uncertainty a firm will face a trade off between efficiency and flexibility 1 39 however the issue of the advantage of flexible resources under uncertainty has not been directly examined usually because the focus has been on outputs rather than inputs 1 or on attitudes toward risk even when input choice is responsive to uncertainty as in epstein 2 the inputs are not flexible in our sense because it is only the timing of input purchase which is flexible not the uses to which inputs can be assigned of the several ways uncertainty in demand can be conceptualized for the firm these papers have commonly considered a situation where it is the product price which is uncertain 2 5 in contrast this paper assumes that while price is known the quantity demanded is uncertain this allows us to consider a slightly different kind of firm from the previous work the firm is assumed to be a pure price taker it might be in an oligopolistic industry where total industry demand is known but the market share for each firm has yet to be revealed 2 or the firm might be in a regulated industry where prices are set and all market adjustments come on the quantity side

incentives for procrastinators we examine how principals should design incentives to induce time inconsistent procrastinating agents to complete tasks efficiently delay is costly to the principal but the agent faces stochastic costs of completing the task and efficiency requires waiting when costs are high if the principal knows the task cost distribution she can always achieve first best efficiency if the agent has private information the principal can induce first best efficiency for time consistent agents but often cannot for procrastinators we show that second best optimal incentives for procrastinators typically involve an increasing punishment for delay as time passes

dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs abstract the literature on strategic investment emphasized the case of completely irreversible investment this paper considers an oligopoly model in which investment is reversible and capacity is subject to adjustment costs an n player linear quadratic differential game is analyzed existence and characterization results for perfect equilibrium feedback strategies are provided feedback strategies provide incentives for each player to invest strategically so as to preempt subsequent expansion by rivals a larger set of perfect equilibria is constructed by using memory dependent trigger strategies equilibria of this type are shown to support joint value maximization for some initial states and asymmetric steady states

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

optimal firm growth under the threat of entry the paper studies the incumbent entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting we find that under an open loop information structure the incumbent anticipates entry by overinvesting whereas in the markov perfect equilibrium the incumbent slightly underinvests in the period before the entry the entry cost level where entry accommodation passes into entry deterrence is lower in the markov perfect equilibrium further we find that the incumbent s capital stock level needed to deter entry is hump shaped as a function of the entry time whereas the corresponding entry cost where the entrant is indifferent between entry and non entry is u shaped

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

does inequality lead to greater efficiency in the use of local commons the role of strategic investments in capacity abstract this paper examines how inequality in access to credit affects the strategic behavior of users of a common resource in their investment and extraction decisions a dynamic two stage game is developed in which agents choose the level of sunk investment in capacity and the consequent extraction path the results show that agents invest in excess capacity except when inequality is very high the relation between inequality and efficiency in resource extraction is found to be non monotonic with the steady state resource stock being closest to the optimal level when either inequality is very high or very low

firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry a choice between commitment and flexibility abstract this paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing we examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous with two identically sized firms there are symmetric cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria with one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms there is a unique stackelberg equilibrium we conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by stackelberg equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 l11

financial instability reserves and central bank swap lines in the panic of 2008 in this paper we connect the events of the last twelve months the panic of 2008 as it has been called to the demand for international reserves in previous work we have shown that international reserve demand can be rationalized by a central bank s desire to backstop the broad money supply to avert the possibility of an internal external double drain a bank run combined with capital flight thus simply looking at trade or short term debt as motivations for reserve holdings is insufficient one must also consider the size of the banking system m2 here we show that a country s reserve holdings just before the current crisis relative to their predicted holdings based on these financial motives can significantly predict exchange rate movements of both emerging and advanced countries in 2008 countries with large war chests did not depreciate and some appreciated meanwhile those who held insufficient reserves based on our metric were likely to depreciate current account balances and short term debt levels are not statistically significant predictors of depreciation once reserve levels are taken into account our model s typically high predicted reserve levels provide important context for the unprecedented u s dollar swap lines recently provided to many countries by the federal reserve this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effect of incomplete information about future technological opportunities on pre emption abstract in this paper we model the strategic choice of investment by an incumbent firm facing competition from a potential entrant and the uncertain prospect of technological development the model presented extends the basic dixit model into two directions it allows for production over two periods and introduces uncertainty about the technology available in the second we show that the incumbent does not necessarily prefer to pre commit irreversibility of investment creates in fact an option value of retaining flexibility and the strategic gains from pre commitment must be compared with the option value for strategic investment to be chosen the strategic use of investment can also explain the observed inertia of incumbent firms in the adoption of new technologies compared to new entrant firms

uncertain lifetime and intertemporal choice risk aversion as a rationale for time discounting this article makes explicit the links between preferences over lotteries on length of life and intertemporal choice it shows that the approach used by traditional life cycle models to account for uncertain survival corresponds to a strong assumption of risk neutrality with respect to length of life relaxing such an assumption leads us to develop a more general formulation of lifetime utility in which time discounting is directly related to preferences over length of life exponential and hyperbolic discounting are found to result in a first approximation from constant and hyperbolic risk aversion with respect to length of life

investment and competition this paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable consistent with these theories we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries however we find that investment q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting indeed oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries

capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm size empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries we propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent with the observed facts the model highlights the mode of product market competition and the extent of investment reversibility as key determinants of the size distribution of firms in an industry in particular if firms compete in prices and the rate of depreciation is large then the industry moves toward an outcome with one dominant firm and one small firm industry dynamics in this case resemble a preemption race contrary to the usual intuition this preemption race becomes more brutal as investment becomes more reversible

risk and preference reversals in intertemporal choice abstract this paper argues that observations of non stationary choice behavior need not necessarily imply specific properties of the individual s discount function as we show the observed preference reversals in intertemporal choice are consistent with constant discounting and can alternatively be explained by decreasing absolute risk aversion together with the individual s risk perception this risk may concern the size of the actual outcome or the endowment consumption stream to which the outcome is added both types of uncertainty naturally appear in the context of intertemporal choice we show how relative degrees of changes in risk over time can determine choices