the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

commodity price shocks and civil conflict evidence from colombia how do income shocks aect armed con ict theory suggests two op posite eects if labor is used to appropriate resources violently higher wages may lower con ict by reducing labor supplied to appropriation this is the opportunity cost eect alternatively a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation this is the rapacity eect our paper exploits exogenous price shocks in inter national commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in colombia to assess how dierent income shocks aect con ict we examine changes in the price of agricultural goods which are labor intensive and natural resources which are capital intensive we focus on coee and oil the two largest exports we nd that a sharp fall in coee prices in the 1990s increased violence dierentially in regions growing more coee by lower ing wages and the opportunity cost of joining armed groups in contrast a rise in oil prices increased violence dierentially in the oil region by in creasing municipal revenue siphoned through rapacity this pattern holds in several other agricultural and natural resource sectors providing robust evidence that price shocks aect con ict in opposite directions depending on the factor intensity of the commodity

foreign investment and spillover efficiency in an underdeveloped economy evidence from the mexican manufacturing industry abstract in this paper we consider the question whether differences in technical efficiency of mexican plants in part derive from spillover efficiency associated with foreign direct investment we use labour productivity as a measure of technical efficiency and relate this to capital intensity labour quality and scale of production we measure the degree of competition by different concentration indices and the final factor determining efficiency is the presence of foreign subsidiaries if there is a positive relation between efficiency of domestic plants and the foreign participation of various industries we conclude that there is a spillover of technical efficiency the empirical evidence from the study indicates that this is the case

productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment evidence from uk industry level panel data this paper examines intra industry productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment fdi in the uk manufacturing sector the empirical analysis uses panel data for 48 uk industries over the period 1991 1995 a major contribution is empirical evidence on spillover effects in situations where the host country is developed the results indicate that the very presence of fdi has a positive spillover impact on the productivity of uk owned firms the analysis also shows that the extent to which local firms benefit from the introduction of advanced technology depends largely on their own technological capabilities

geopolitics and international organizations an empirical study on imf facilities there is growing awareness that the distribution of imf facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers this paper focuses on the fact that the imf may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of imf loans differentiating between concessional and non concessional facilities to carry out the empirical analysis we construct a new database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 imf countries over 1990 2003 focusing on emerging and developing economies we use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients while controlling for economic and political determinants our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are non concessional whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans this study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping imf lending decisions potentially affecting the institution s effectiveness and credibility

bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations i present a framework for analyzing decision makers with an imperfect understanding of their environment s correlation structure the decision maker faces an objective multivariate probability distribution his own action is one of the random variables he is characterized by a directed acyclic graph over the set of variables his subjective belief filters the objective distribution through his graph via the factorization formula for bayesian networks this belief distortion implies that the decision maker s long run behavior may affect his perception of the consequences of his actions accordingly i define a personal equilibrium notion of optimal choices i show how recent models of boundedly rational expectations as well as new ones e g reverse causality can be subsumed into this framework as special cases some general properties of the bayesian network representation of subjective beliefs are presented as well as a missing data foundation

existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties abstract this paper reconsiders the valuation equilibrium concept jehiel and samet 2007 and proposes an additional regularity condition concerning the players equilibrium strategies the condition which requires equilibrium strategies to induce the same local behaviour at all nodes with similar optimal actions increases both the predictive power and the internal consistency of the concept especially when used as a tool to study boundedly rational behaviour in games with imperfect information and or imperfect recall it is shown not to conflict with existence

evolutionary dynamics and backward induction the backward induction or subgame perfect equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large

learning and risk aversion we study how learning shapes behavior towards risk when individuals are not assumed to know or to have beliefs about probability distributions in any period the behavior change induced by learning is assumed to depend on the action chosen and the payoff obtained we characterize learning processes that in expected value increase the probability of choosing the safest actions and provide sufficient conditions for them to converge to the choices of risk averse expected utility maximizers we provide a learning theoretic motivation for long run risk choices such as those in expected utility theory with known payoff distributions

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

resource curse or not a question of appropriability this thesis presents three self contained essays focusing on empirical questions in growth and development economics each article addresses specific questions on why countries perform differently in particular i analyse the effect of democracy on economic development the relationship between natural resources and growth and the efficiency of foreign development assistance in the first essay democracy consolidation and growth i analyse the effect of democracy on economic growth in this context i argue that an important aspect to consider is how consolidated political systems are put simply i find that it is not only a question of how democratic countries are but also how long they have been democratic in other words economic performance tends to improve with the duration of uninterrupted democracy the performance of autocracies on the other hand tends to deteriorate over time however for newly established political systems there seems to be a cost of being democratic this implies that democracies only bear their fruit after some time the analysis has important policy implications to overcome initial straits international assistance focused on democratic consolidation may be important and a very good investment in fostering long run development the second essay resource curse or not a question of appropriability together with anne boschini and jesper roine is concerned with the relation between natural resources and economic development for most laymen as well as for most economists it would seem reasonable that countries richly endowed in natural resources also benefit from this wealth however a large literature has found a systematic negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth we suggest that this so called resource curse is not determined by resource endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources a country possesses and the quality of institutions in the country this combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource the concept of appropriability captures the likelihood of natural resources leading to rentseeking corruption or conflicts which in turn will harm economic development our results suggest that if institutions are good enough the curse may be turned into a blessing this may explain why some countries such as norway and botswana tend to benefit from their resources while others such as angola and sierra leone do not the third and final essay of this thesis foreign sectoral aid fungibility growth and poverty reduction is a contribution to the aid efficiency literature which is concerned with the question of whether aid helps or hinders economic development foreign development assistance is often targeted on specific public expenditure sectors if this aid is not used in the sector for which it was granted e g health education it is said to be fungible and donors may end up financing something completely different from what they intended e g military expenditures the major concern about sectoral fungibility is that the alternative use of aid may be less productive or less socially useful however measuring fungibility is not sufficient to determine whether foreign sectoral aid fungibility is actually harmful what is important is how the funds treated as fungible are used the essay starts by obtaining estimates of fungibility for 57 countries the results suggest that sectoral aid is indeed largely treated as fungible by recipient countries next to assess the economic and health effects of fungibility these estimates are incorporated into an empirical model of aid and growth as well as into a model of aid and infant mortality altogether i find no evidence of more fungible sectoral aid leading to worse performance

political foundations of the resource curse a simplification and a comment in this note we show how a considerably simpler model than the one in our original jde 2006 paper generates all the same results we also acknowledge an error in the specification of a utility function in our previous paper

the impact of natural resources survey of recent quantitative evidence the cross country empirical evidence for the natural resource curse is ample but unfortunately fraught with econometric difficulties a recent wave of studies on measuring the impact of natural resource windfalls on the economy exploits novel datasets such as giant oil discoveries to identify effects of windfalls uses natural experiments and within country econometric analysis and estimates local impacts these studies offer more hope in the search of quantitative evidence

skill complexity and strategic interaction abstract we present a win loss game between players with explicitly modeled cognitive limitations differences in the players abilities to analyze the available moves induce preferences over the complexity of the environment and hence incentives to manipulate that complexity other things equal higher skill players are more likely to win in a class of long horizon games with constant complexity greater complexity reduces the advantage of the higher skill player when the higher skill player is the last mover when the lower skill player moves last increasing complexity induces countervailing effects either of which may dominate finally when complexity can be manipulated over the course of the game the benefits of strategic manipulation of complexity can override objective considerations about best move choice resulting in purposeful departures from subgame perfect nash equilibrium behavior

local knowledge transfer and performance implications for alliance formation in asia foreign firms in host country environments frequently face location based disadvantages this study proposes three means channels of overcoming local knowledge disadvantages based on a sample of 558 japanese joint ventures jvs located in southeast and east asia we find that partnering with local firms the first channel can be a primary strategy for accessing local knowledge and improving jv performance jv experience in the host country the second channel also mitigates local knowledge disadvantages and leads to increased jv performance the third channel the foreign parent s host country experience leads to increased performance in the absence of a local partner however when a jv is formed with a local partner increased parent experience in the host country leads to decreased performance suggesting that the need for a local partner declines as parent experience in a host country increases

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

to what extent can foreign direct investment help achieve international development goals for fdi to help alleviate absolute poverty and stimulate economic growth in developing countries two conditions have to be met first developing countries need to be attractive to foreign investors second the host country environment in which foreign investors operate must be conducive to favourable fdi effects with regard to overall investment economic spillovers and income growth this paper argues that it is more difficult to benefit from fdi than to attract fdi the widely perceived concentration of fdi in few developing countries tends to obscure that in relative terms various small and poor countries are fairly attractive to fdi yet the mobilisation of domestic resources remains by far more important than attracting fdi for financing investment and stimulating economic growth furthermore high inward fdi is no guarantee for poverty alleviation and positive growth effects in particular the empirical evidence suggests that host country conditions typically prevailing in poor countries including weak institutions and an insufficient endowment of complementary factors of production constrain the growth enhancing and poverty alleviating effects of fdi the crux is that creating an environment in which fdi may deliver social returns will take considerable time exactly where development needs are most pressing

payoff assessments without probabilities a simple dynamic model of choice abstract we develop a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face the decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them and these assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world at each stage the decision maker chooses the strategy that she assesses to give the highest payoff she updates her assessments adaptively we show that such behavior leads to maxmin choices we also consider the decision maker who experiences shocks journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

the eclectic paradigm of international production a restatement and some possible extensions this article reviews some of the criticisms directed towards the eclectic paradigm of international production over the past decade and restates its main tenets the second part of the article considers a number of possible extensions of the paradigm and concludes by asserting that it remains a robust general framework for explaining and analysing not only the economic rationale of economic production but many organisational and impact issues in relation to mne activity as well

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

the dutch disease a disease after all many third world oil producers are encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base while west european oil and gas producers netherlands united kingdom are suffering a decline in their traded goods manufacturing sector induced by real wage pressures it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil revenues may be somewhat ora mixed blessing the quip of the economist notwithstanding the mechanism behind this unbalance is clear enough part of the oil revenues is spent on non traded goods which leads to a real appreciation i e a rise in the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods this in turn draws resources out of the non oil traded sector into the non traded goods producing sector corden and neary 1982 van wijnbergen 1980 one may say that this is an efficient response to the increase in income from oil production the united kingdom mexico egypt simply should move into oil derived industries and non traded goods and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are exhausted however many developing countries are hesitant to take this advice after all the post world war ii success stories in economic development involve without exception countries that promoted their traded goods sector aggressively moreover it is a well established stylised fact that technological progress is faster in the traded non sheltered sectors of an economy than in the non traded sector balassa 1964 is an early reference considering the hypothesis that technological progress rather than taking place exogenously with the passage of time is a function of accumulated experience the concern of countries like egypt mexico or indonesia is much easier to understand since solow 1957 and denison 1962 it is known that capital accumulation explain only a small part of economic growth if most of economic growth is caused by learning by doing induced technologica

regional innovation and spillover effects of foreign direct investment in china a threshold approach huang l liu x and xu l regional innovation and spillover effects of foreign direct investment in china a threshold approach regional studies using a data set on twenty nine chinese provinces for the period 1985 2008 this paper establishes a threshold model to analyse the relationship between spillover effects of foreign direct investment fdi and regional innovation in china there is clear evidence of double threshold effects of regional innovation on productivity spillovers from fdi specifically only when the level of regional innovation reaches the minimum innovation threshold will fdi in the region begin to produce positive productivity spillovers furthermore positive productivity spillovers from fdi will be substantial only when the level of regional innovation attains a higher threshold the double threshold divides chinese provinces into three super regions in terms of innovation with most provinces positioned within the middle level innovation super region policy implications are di

effects of policies on patenting in wind power technologies abstract this paper explores the effects of policies and other factors driving innovation in wind power technologies in twelve oecd countries over more than two decades patent counts are used as an indicator for innovation the factors considered are generally derived from the systems of innovation literature count data econometric model were used for the estimations the suggest that patenting in wind power technology is positively related to public r d in wind power reflecting supply side policy the stock of wind capacity reflecting learning effects the number of patents per capita reflecting a country s innovative capacity and the share of green party voters reflecting the legitimacy of the technology in particular the presence of production or capacity targets for wind power or renewable energy sources and a stable policy environment reflecting policy process appear to be favourable for patenting wind power technologies these results are robust to various model specifications distributional assumptions and alternative classifications of wind power technologies in the patent search

commodity prices and growth an empirical investigation whereas empirical evidence on the effect of higher commodity prices on the long run growth of commodity exporters is ambiguous time series analyses using vector autoregressive var models have found that commodity booms raise income in the short run in this paper we adopt panel error correction methodology to analyze global data for 1963 to 2008 to disentangle the short and long run effects of international commodity prices on output per capita our results show that commodity booms have unconditional positive short term effects on output but non agricultural booms in countries with poor governance have adverse long term effects which dominate the short run gains our findings have important implications for non agricultural commodity exporters with poor governance especially in light of the recent wave of resource discoveries in low income countries

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

the globalisation of technology what remains of the product cycle model this paper reexamines two hypotheses associated with earlier versions of the product cycle model the first hypothesis that innovations are almost always located in the home country of the parent company is rejected on the basis of evidence drawn from one hundred years of u s patent office data the second hypothesis that the international dispersion of activity is led by technology leaders is historically valid however over the last twenty years technology leaders have been ahead instead in the globalization of technology that is in developing internal international networks to exploit the locationally differentiated potential of foreign centers of excellence c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered recent studies examining the relation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth have failed to take account of the extent of the independent taxing powers available to sub national governments and thus have substantially overstated the degree of effective decentralization results from a cross section study of 19 oecd member countries suggest that when the measure of fiscal decentralization is limited to the revenues over which sub national governments have full autonomy its impact on economic growth is not statistically significant

patent protection southern innovation and welfare in a north south trade model in a north south trade model we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern innovation profits and welfare southern patent protection may make the northern firm worse off and the southern firm better off by increasing the southern firm s incentive for innovation and affecting the nature of competition in the world market the impact of southern patent protection on a country s welfare and on world welfare depends on the cost of southern innovation and the degree of product substitutability we provide important insights into the outcomes of international negotiations regarding patent enforcement in the southern countries

the impact of inward fdi on the performance of chinese manufacturing firms recent years have witnessed the emergence of china as one of the most important destinations for foreign direct investment fdi which reached us 403 98 billion by the end of 1999 moftec 2000 china is now the largest recipient of fdi in the developing world however the amount of fdi will underestimate its overall consequences if spillover effects are significant murphy 1992 o malley 1994 buckwalter 1995 this study investigates the impact of fdi on the performance of chinese locally owned firms in manufacturing

the local impact of mining on poverty and inequality evidence from the commodity boom in peru summary this paper studies the impact of mining activity on socioeconomic outcomes in local communities in peru in the 1990s and 2000s the value of peruvian mining exports grew by 15 times and since the early 2000s one half of fiscal revenues from mining have been devolved to local governments has this boom benefitted people in local communities using the district level poverty map of 2007 the latest available with accurate data on consumption poverty and inequality together with district level data on mining production and fiscal transfers to local governments we present some evidence to answer this question we find that mining districts have larger average consumption per capita and lower poverty rates than otherwise similar districts these positive impacts however decrease drastically with administrative and geographic distance from mining centers moreover consumption inequality within mining districts is higher than in comparable nonproducing districts this dual effect of mining is accounted for by first the better educated immigrants required and attracted by mining activity and second the jobs that some community natives obtain in industries and services related to mining the inequalizing impact of mining both across and within districts may help explain the social discontent with mining in peru despite its enormous revenues an area for future research highlighted in the paper regards the usefulness of fiscal transfers to local governments the mining canon a key component of the fiscal decentralization reform of 2002 we find neither a detrimental nor a beneficial effect from the mining canon in peru whether this is explained by our early measurement of results 5 years into the decentralization program or by the lack of implementation capacity of local governments remains to be answered

fdi impact and spillover evidence from china s electronic and textile industries m ultinational corporations mncs may invest in a host country when they possess non tangible productive assets that cannot be easily licensed but can be transferred within the firm direct equity participation in the host country is therefore required for mncs to reap the rents from their nontangible productive assets which may include technological know how marketing and managing skills relationships with suppliers and customers and reputation if foreign direct investment fdi does effectively convey these assets we should expect fdi to boost the productivity of the host country firms that receive fdi a more complex issue is the indirect spillover effects of fdi to non fdi domestic firms to the extent that fdi may bring new products and technologies to the host country non fdi receiving domestic firms may also stand to benefit from fdi through personnel turnover demonstration effects and knowledge spillovers the presence of fdi in a certain industry however may exert adverse effect on domestic firms in that industry by enjoying better technologies and lower production costs firms with fdi may cut into the market share of domestic firms without fdi in a short run imperfectly competitive market structure the productivity of domestic firms may be reduced when sales fall so that fixed costs are spread over fewer units in the long run however the increased competition induced by the increased presence of fdi in domestic industries may force

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

gold exploitation and socioeconomic outcomes the case of burkina faso abstract in the early 2000s burkina faso launched several legal reforms aimed at increasing gold production this resulted in a gold mining boom making gold the main export product and the main source of economic growth of the country we hypothesize that gold extraction improved population living standards this paper investigates how the gold boom in burkina faso which began in 2007 has affected socioeconomic outcomes we use a simple theoretical model to motivate the testing of several hypotheses regarding these impacts employing a difference in differences strategy as well as panel data models we estimate the impacts using data from household surveys undertaken in 2003 and 2009 and administrative data consistent with our model the results suggest that areas hosting gold extraction have better average living standards in terms of headcount ratios poverty gaps and household expenditures than do areas without gold however the gold boom is also shown to have potentially increased local inequality and child labor in areas with these income gains these results demonstrate the importance of proactive government policy in mitigating negative welfare impacts

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

mutual productivity spillovers between foreign and local firms in china the existing literature treats advanced technology sourcing as the only cause of reverse productivity spillovers from local to foreign firms and implies that mutual spillovers between foreign and local firms can only happen in the developed world this paper argues that the diffusion of indigenous technology and local knowledge helps the productivity enhancement of multinationals so that there can be mutual spillovers even in a developing country the results from a large sample firm level econometric analysis and a comparative case study of seven companies in chinese manufacturing support this new argument as mutual spillovers are identified between local chinese firms and overseas chinese or oecd invested firms

oil and regime type in latin america reversing the line of causality abstract in its first generation the literature on the resource curse typically posited that resource dependence shapes a country s economy and politics more recent work posits that the effects are mediated by institutions we take this newer approach further by arguing that economic and political institutions not just mediate but actually shape resource dependence our focus is on performance across national oil companies nocs in latin america we explain performance variation by invoking variations in regime and market features nocs that operate in contexts of greater independence from the executive branch stronger checks and balances within and outside the sector and greater market forces though not necessarily private actor dominance exhibit better performance institutions thus influence sector conditions rather than the other way around we advance this argument using original data from colombia and venezuela and supplementary data from mexico brazil and argentina our study focuses on the oil boom bust cycle of 2003 2016

increasing returns and the genesis of american resource abundance the usa became the world s leading mineral producing nation between 1870 and 1910 a development paralleled by the rising resource intensity of american manufacturing this paper challenges the premise that resource abundance simply reflected the country s geological endowment of mineral deposits instead in the century following 1850 the usa exploited its natural resource potentials to a far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial minerals the paper argues that natural resource abundance was an endogenous socially constructed condition that was not geologically preordained it examines the complex legal institutional technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the us supply responses to the expanding domestic and international industrial demands for minerals and mineral products it suggests that strong positive feedbacks even in the exploitation of depletable resources were responsible for the explosive growth of the american minerals economy

self confirming equilibrium rium path of play thus if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs even though beliefs about play at off path information sets need not be correct we characterize the ways in which self confirming equilibria and nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self con firming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts nash equilibrium and its refinements describe a situation in which i each player s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and ii each player s beliefs about the opponents play are exactly correct we propose a new equilibrium concept self confirming equilibrium that weakens condition ii by requiring only that players beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play thus each player may have incorrect beliefs about how his opponents would play in contingencies that do not arise when play follows the equilibrium and moreover the beliefs of different players may be wrong in different ways the concept of self confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that noncooperative equilibria should be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process in which players revise their beliefs using their observations of previous play suppose that each time the game is played the players observe the actions chosen by their opponents but that players do not observe the actions their opponents would have played at the information sets that were not reached along the path of play then if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs so the equilibrium is self confirming in the weak sense of not being inconsistent with the evidence by analogy with the literature on the bandit problem e g rothschild 1974 one might expect that a non nash self confirming equilibrium can be the outcome of plausible learning processes this point was made by fudenberg and

imf bailouts and moral hazard this paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with imf bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the perceived probability of imf bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis we do not find strong evidence that the extent of investor moral hazard changed after the non bailout of russia in august 1998 that signaled a modification to imf intervention policy in contrast we find evidence that investor moral hazard is intensified for those countries that have stronger political connections to the imf and that are thereby more likely to be bailed out by the imf this pattern prevailed even after the russian crisis

learning to play games in extensive form by valuation abstract game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form we study learning in such games by using valuation of moves a valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability we consider a myopic player who chooses moves with the highest valuation each time the game is played the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made we show for a repeated win lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game there is almost surely a time after which she always wins when a player has more than two payoffs a more elaborate learning procedure is required we consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made when all players adopt this learning procedure with some perturbations then with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played a single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

case based decision theory this paper suggests that decision making under uncertainty is at least partly case based we propose a model in which cases are primitive and provide a simple axiomatization of a decision rule that chooses a best act based on its past performance in similar cases each act is evaluated by the sum of the utility levels that resulted from using this act in past cases each weighted by the similarity of that past case to the problem at hand the formal model of case based decision theory naturally gives rise to the notions of satisficing decisions and aspiration levels

just in time inventory control and the economic integration of japanese owned manufacturing plants with the county state and national economies of the united states reid n 1995 just in time inventory control and the economic integration of japanese owned manufacturing plants with the county state and national economies of the united states reg studies 29 345 355 this paper attempts to shed light on the ongoing debate concerning the spatial implications of just in time jit manufacturing systems the central issue around which this debate has focused concerns the extent to which use of jit inventory control encourages the spatial clustering of the members of a jit network this paper tests the hypothesis that plants which use jit inventory control purchase a greater proportion of their material inputs from inside their host economy than plants which do not use jit inventory control using survey data collected from 239 us based japanese owned manufacturing plants this hypothesis is tested for host economies defined at three geographic scales county state and national support for the hypothesis is found at the county but not at the state and national scales

social divisions and institutions assessing institutional parameter variation this paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions it argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness which in turn should depress institutional payoffs absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income the empirical results support this hypothesis and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large

insecure resources bilateral trade and endogenous predation a game theoretic analysis of conflict and trade this article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries we identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary s arming affects domestic welfare in three different ways the first is an export revenue effect which increases welfare because arming causes export revenue to go up i e there is an arming induced terms of trade improvement the second is a resource predation effect which increases welfare because arming increases the appropriation of a rival country s resource input to produce a consumption good the third is an output distortion effect which reduces welfare because arming lowers the domestic production of civilian goods based on these effects we show circumstances in which greater trade openness reduces the intensity of arming we also discuss the implications of resource security asymmetry for conflict and trade

cointegrating institutions the time series properties of country institutional measures abstracta country s political and economic institutions are critical for economic prosperity the literature abounds with institutional measures precisely because institutions are multidimensional we use panel unit root and cointegration tests to examine the time series properties of several institutional measures to answer two questions first do institutional changes tend to be permanent second which subsets of institutions tend to converge or move together these answers have important implications for whether permanent institutional reform is possible and whether reforms can be undertaken one institutional area at a time or instead must simultaneously encompass multiple institutional areas

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

minerals institutions openness and growth an empirical analysis competing explanations of the resource curse are tested using panel data the data support the existence of a mineral resource curse for developing countries with weak institutions consistent with the hypothesis that owners of mineral resources use weak institutions and openness to trade to stifle the development of human capital to the detriment of growth in other sectors of the economy manufacturing imports substitute for the development of domestic production so openness to trade correlates with lower growth in mineral dependent economies the dutch disease and debt overhang explanations of the resource curse are not supported

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

consistency and cautious fictitious play we study a variation of fictitious play in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action s utility against the historical frequency of opponents play regardless of the opponents strategies the utility received by an agent using this rule is nearly the best that could be achieved against the historical frequency such rules are approximately optimal in i i d environments and guarantee nearly the minmax regardless of opponents behavior fictitious play shares these properties provided it switches infrequently between actions we also study the long run outcomes when all players use consistent and cautious rules

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

how do mineral states learn path dependence networks and policy change in the development of economic institutions summary based on case study methods i draw lessons from the political economy of macroeconomic management in chile and peru to explain how mineral states learn to think long term and eventually escape the resource curse i give an institutionalist account of the rise of countercyclical funds showing how the long term development of elite networks qualifies the contemporary making of curse escapes policy networks compose one central avenue of institutional development for both the reproduction of path dependence and the making of institutional change the exposition challenges political economy of development frameworks which over emphasize structural initial conditions and assume steady rent seeking behavior of state agents

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

the resource curse and its potential reversal several recent papers suggest that the negative association between natural resource intensity and economic growth can be reversed if institutional quality is high enough we try to understand this result in more detail by decomposing the resource measure using alternative measures of both resources and institutions and by studying different time periods while an institutional reversal is present in many specifications only ores and metals interacted with the icrg measure of institutional quality consistently have a negative growth effect but a positive interaction that turns the curse around when institutions are good enough

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

trade matters in the fight against poverty narratives perceptions and lack of evidence in the case of fish trade in africa two opposing views exist in the literature on the potential role that international fish trade plays in economic development while some claim that fish trade has a pro poor effect others denounce the negative effect of fish export on local populations food security and doubt its contributions to the macro economy in this paper we explore this debate in sub saharan africa our analysis did not find any evidence of direct negative impact of fish trade on food security neither did it find evidence that international fish trade generates positive pro poor outcomes this paper discusses the possible reasons for this apparent lack of development impact and highlights the unsupported assumptions underlying the current discourse about international fish trade we suggest that given lack of evidence for the development benefits of fish trade between africa and developed countries fisheries policy could consider support for regional africa to africa trade that meets the growing african demand for lower value fish means of overcoming barriers to intra african trade in fish are discussed

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

does oil corrupt evidence from a natural experiment in west africa abstract this paper explores the oil discovery announcements in sao tome and principe 1997 1999 to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption for this purpose we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts sao tome and principe to cape verde a control west african country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries the unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents we analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations we find clearest increases on vote buying education namely in the allocation of scholarships and customs ranging from 31 to 40 of the subjective scale we interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources