the information value of the fomc policy directive under the new operating procedures the federal reserve s federal open market committee fomc meets every one to two months to determine its monetary policy objectives over the near term at the conclusion of each meeting the fomc issues a policy directive to the system s account manager at the new york federal reserve bank specifying short run money growth targets and a federal funds interest rate tolerance range the policy directive is not disclosed to the public until after the next meeting when a new directive becomes effective in an earlier paper o brien 1981 evidence was presented suggesting that immediate disclosure of the fomc policy directives over the period january 1976 june 1979 would have improved the accuracy of market expectations of near term interest rate levels by no more than minor amounts in this paper we examine the information value of the fomc policy directives in predicting near term levels of interest rates urder the federal reserve s revised operating procedures adopted in late october 1979 but modified in late 1982 in the next section the interest rate information value of the fomc policy directive is discussed in terms of a simple money demand and supply model

bureaucratic theory and the choice of central bank goals economists have frequently asserted that central bank priorities among economic goals have not been appropriate to the public s desires for example one interpretation of the results of reuber s pioneering study of central bank preferences was that the bank of canada s reactions reflect the placing of a very heavy implicit weight on price stability compared with higher employment presumably based on a judgement about the relative economic costs of more unemployment and more price inflation the evidence examined on the relative economic costs of price inflation and unemployment suggests that the economic costs of inflation are not as high relative to the costs of unemployment as the reactions and statements of the authorities have implied reuber p 132 1

financial liberalization and house price dynamics in europe this article investigates the determinants of house prices in a sample of european countries over the period 1970 to 2004 focusing on the role of financial liberalization we find that it has mainly affected the short term dynamics of residential prices in particular the impulse effects on house prices of income and mortgage debt have become smaller on the other hand the effects of interest rates past house prices and to a lesser degree stock market have strengthened in other words there seems to have been a certain de linking of short term house price dynamics from income whereas the housing market may have become more similar to a financial asset market with interest rates and expectations of capital gains playing a more prominent role

the dynamic correlation and volatility of real estate price and rental an application of msv model this article investigates the dynamic conditional correlation between price and rental among four types of real estate markets namely housing retail office and factory in the case of hong kong from january 1993 to december 2008 the dynamic conditional correlation multivariate stochastic volatility dcc msv model and bayesian markov chain monte carlo mcmc are employed to capture the volatility and time varying correlation of property price and rental in each market the empirical results demonstrate that the volatilities of price are significantly larger than those of rental for each type of real estate markets throughout the whole sample period besides the findings indicate that the correlations between price and rental are time varying and the average correlation in the housing market is much larger than those in the other three markets also the conditional correlations in the factory market are the most volatile while those in the office market are relatively stable additionally two pa

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

secrecy signalling and the accuracy of expectations during the borrowed reserves operating regime abstract this paper demonstrates that the information in the undisclosed federal open market committee fomc policy directive is not completely incorporated into the yield curve one day before fomc meetings but is incorporated one day after meetings during the borrowed reserves operating regime these results suggest that monetary policy changes are informally but effectively disclosed to market participants through signals from the open market desk these findings indicate that the legislation before congress that would mandate the immediate release of the fomc policy directive would have had little impact on the accuracy of financial market expectations over the sample

taming the bullwhip effect whilst watching customer service in a single supply chain echelon we study a generalised order up to policy that has highly desirable properties in terms of order and inventory variance and customer service levels it generates we quantify exactly the variance amplification in replenishment orders i e the bullwhip effect and the variance of inventory levels over time for i i d and the weakly stationary auto regressive ar moving average ma and auto regressive moving average arma demand processes we demonstrate that high customer service as measured by fill rate and smooth replenishments need not increase inventory cost substantially we observe that in some instances of the arma demand pattern this comes at the expense of a relatively small increase in safety stock whilst in other instances inventory levels can actually be reduced

inventory management for stochastic lead times with order crossovers we study the impact of stochastic lead times with order crossover on inventory costs and safety stocks in the order up to out policy to motivate our research we present global logistics data which violates the traditional assumption that lead time demand is normally distributed we also observe that order crossover is a common and important phenomenon in real supply chains we present a new method for determining the distribution of the number of open orders using this method we identify the distribution of inventory levels when orders and the work in process are correlated this correlation is present when demand is auto correlated demand forecasts are generated with non optimal methods or when certain ordering policies are present our method allows us to obtain exact safety stock requirements for the so called proportional order up to pout policy a popular implementable linear generalization of the out policy we highlight that the out replenishment policy is not cost optimal in global supply chains as we are able to demonstrate the pout policy always outperforms it under order cross over we show that unlike the constant lead time case minimum safety stocks and minimal inventory variance do not always lead to minimum costs under stochastic lead times with order crossover we also highlight an interesting side effect of minimizing inventory costs under stochastic lead times with order crossover with the pout policy an often significant reduction in the order variance

monetary mystique secrecy and central banking abstract the paper contains a discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy it documents the federal reserve s defense of secrecy as argued in a recent freedom of information act suit the federal reserve s arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed the discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial

an empirical analysis of the determination of house prices in the united kingdom between the first quarters of 1970 and 1980 the average price of new houses in the united kingdom increased five fold over the same period building societies grew to become major financial institutions attracting almost 50 per cent of the personal sector s holdings of liquid assets and responsible for more than 85 per cent of house purchase finance this paper sets out to examine the extent to which building societies have been responsible for the rapid acceleration of house prices and indicates the other main determinants of this phenomenon the analysis is extended to a discussion of recent econometric research into house price determination and arrives at a more general specification employing an error correction estimation methodology

optimal policies and approximations for a serial multiechelon inventory system with time correlated demand since clark and scarf s pioneering work most advances in multiechelon inventory systems have been based on demand processes that are time independent this paper revisits the serial multiechelon inventory system of clark and scarf and develops three key results first we provide a simple lower bound approximation to the optimal echelon inventory levels and an upper bound to the total system cost for the basic model of clark and scarf second we show that the structure of the optimal stocking policy of clark and scarf holds under time correlated demand processes using a martingale model of forecast evolution third we extend the approximation to the time correlated demand process and study in particular for an autoregressive demand model the impact of lead times and autocorrelation on the performance of the serial inventory system

the impact of forecasting methods on the bullwhip effect abstract this paper considers the impact of forecasting methods on the bullwhip effect for a simple replenishment system in which a first order autoregressive process describes the customer demand and an order up to inventory policy characterizes the replenishment decision a bullwhip effect measure is derived for the optimal forecasting procedure that minimizes the mean squared forecasting error for the specified demand process similar measures are obtained for the moving average and exponential smoothing methods the findings indicate that different forecasting methods lead to bullwhip effect measures with distinct properties in relation to lead time and underlying parameters of the demand process moreover a simple rule is established to help managers select a forecasting method that yields the lowest inventory cost

when and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information abstract this paper analyzes the role of noisy or imprecise announcements in mitigating the basic credibility problem in monetary policy based on a model where the monetary authority s private information gives rise to an unavoidable trade off between flexibility and credibility the analysis finds that noisy announcements can serve as a meaningful form of communication to make that trade off more favorable however such talk is not cheap the analysis predicts that those central banks who can speak more precisely are those who are less likely to speak at all

publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent evidence from the us federal reserve transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers we consider one potential cost the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions we construct a model that compares incentives for members with career concerns to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private we test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee asking whether the fomc s 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent we find evidence that this is indeed the case there has been much recent discussion of the advantages of transparency in agency relationships both in and outside of government while research has attempted to model this issue theoretically there has been less progress with empirical tests a problem due no doubt in large part to the fact that it is difficult to make before and after comparisons of a shift in transparency often no data are available on an agent s actions prior to the establishment of transparency in this article we focus on one specific type of transparency publishing verbatim transcripts of committee meetings and one specific reason why this type of transparency might not be desirable the possibility that the quality of deliberation on a committee will suffer if the deliberations take place in public we develop a theoretical model that helps to identify the potential costs of this type of transparency and we then test the model empirically using an original dataset on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee fomc our dataset is unique in that it records views expressed by policymakers at fomc meetings and not just their official votes our empirical tests focus in particular on the observed effect of the institutional change that occurred in 1993 when the fomc decided to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings after a delay of five years transparency is a particularly relevant issue in monetary policy because it is commonly argued that when central banks take actions such as publishing macroeconomic forecasts revealing individual votes on monetary policy committees or releasing minutes of meetings this will lead to improved economic outcomes while simultaneously facilitating democratic accountability 1

the stabilizing effect of inventory in supply chains this paper presents a hierarchical model framework for the analysis of the stabilizing effect of inventories in multiechelon manufacturing distribution supply chains this framework is used to compare the variance of demand to the variance of replenishment orders at different echelons of the system e g retailer wholesaler empirical data and experience with management games suggest that in most industries inventory management policies can have a destabilizing effect by increasing the volatility of demand as it passes up through the chain the bullwhip effect our model helps to explain these observations and indicates mechanisms that can promote stabilization the analysis results also define sufficient conditions for the existence of stabilization and relate these conditions to the optimality of myopic control policies

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

modelling uk house prices using cointegration an application of the johansen technique this paper provides an econometric analysis of the long term equilibrium determination of uk house prices using the relatively recent johansen cointegration procedure this long term equilibrium specification is then utilized in order to estimate a parsimonious dynamic model for uk house prices

the reeded edge and the phillips curve money neutrality common knowledge and subjective beliefs abstract i present a simple two person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money however the value of a unit of money is uncertain i show 1 a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge 2 if seller and buyer have identical beliefs making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade 3 if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs then monetary revaluations have no net effect 4 when the seller knows the value of money but the buyer does not the expected utilities of both seller and buyer are proportional to 1 1 2 where is the standard deviation of the value of money expressed as a fraction of the mean and 5 when beliefs are subjective monetary policy can improve total gains from trade as in friedman s explanation of the phillips curve and an optimal level of inflation can be determined journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e52

price level determinacy with an interest rate policy rule and rational expectations abstract this paper reconsiders a result obtained by sargent and wallace namely that price level indeterminacy obtains in their model if the monetary authorities adopt a feedback rule for the interest rate rather than the money stock it is shown that the indeterminacy vanishes if the interest rate rule is chosen so as to have a desired effect on the expected quantity of money demanded this holds even if considerable weight is given in the choice of a rule to the aim of smoothing interest rate fluctuations

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

central bank communication and monetary policy a survey of theory and evidence over the last two decades communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy these real world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication mostly empirical and almost all of it written in this decade we survey this ever growing literature the evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve central banks macroeconomic objectives however the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy

preliminary evidence on the determinants of federal reserve open market operations in the absence of a fixed policy rule the federal reserve bank fed has significant discretion in setting monetary policy the existence of professional fedwatchers attests to the fact that fed policy actions are difficult to interpret recent literature has focused on the motivations behind fed policy making and the need for secrecy and ambiguity we investigate one aspect of fed behavior the propensity of the fed to buy and sell government securities beyond that required to implement stated policies milton friedman 1982 26 called attention to this issue when he wrote

the dynamics of the singapore private housing market in this paper a dynamic stock flow model is modified and applied to the singapore private housing market two empirical models are then constructed which offer an explanation for the dynamic patterns of both real private housing prices and new housing construction in the long run movements in the real gdp per capita and the total housing stock are found to have significant impacts on real housing prices while the user cost the public resale housing prices and the autocorrelation of housing prices with one lag explain most of the short run dynamics of real housing prices on the supply side the long run price elasticity of new housing construction is 1 31 it is also found that long run new housing construction drops 6 5 per cent for every 1 per cent increase in the total housing stock

interurban house price gradient effect of urban hierarchy distance on house prices this paper applies a general spatial equilibrium model to investigate the effect that distance within the urban hierarchy can have on interurban house prices our spatial model predicts a negative

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

analysis of the bullwhip effect in two parallel supply chains with interacting price sensitive demands abstract this paper offers insights into how the bullwhip effect in two parallel supply chains with interacting price sensitive demands is affected in contrast to the situation of a single product in a serial supply chain in particular this research studies two parallel supply chains each consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer and the external demand for a single product depends on its price and the other s price in a situation in which each price follows a first order autoregressive process in this paper we propose an analytical framework that incorporates two parallel supply chains and we explore their interactions to determine the bullwhip effect we identify the conditions under which the bullwhip effect is amplified or lessened with interacting price sensitive demands relative to the situation without interaction

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

inventories and the volatility of production a stylized fact associated with inventory behavior is that the variance of production exceeds the variance of sales this paper presents a model of production decisions with demand uncertainty that incorporates no nnegativity constraints on inventories even with no productivity shocks optimal behavior by the firm is consistent with this stylized fact either if demand exhibits positive serial correlation or if the firm can backlog excess demand the reason is that a demand shock affects both the actual inventory level given unchanged production and the desired level production must replenish the stock and adjust to the new desired level copyright 1987 by american economic association

optimal central bank transparency should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further we show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency up to this optimum more transparency is desirable it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts but beyond the optimum people might 1 start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts and or 2 get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive this deteriorates the perceived quality of private sector inflation forecasts as a result inflation is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence by using a large scale panel data set on the transparency of central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized our results indicate that while several central banks would benefit from further transparency increases some already have reached the optimal level

a century of us central banking goals frameworks accountability several key episodes in the 100 year history of the federal reserve have everal key episodes in the 100 year history of the federal reserve have been referred to in various contexts with the adjective great attached to been referred to in various contexts with the adjective great attached to them the great experiment of the federal reserve s founding the great them the great experiment of the federal reserve s founding the great depression the great infl ation and subsequent disinfl ation the great moderation depression the great infl ation and subsequent disinfl ation the great moderation and the recent great recession here i ll use this sequence of great episodes and the recent great recession here i ll use this sequence of great episodes to discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of federal to discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of federal reserve policymaking the goals of policy the policy framework and accountability reserve policymaking the goals of policy the policy framework and accountability and communication the changes over time in these three areas provide a useful and communication the changes over time in these three areas provide a useful perspective i believe on how the role and functioning of the federal reserve have perspective i believe on how the role and functioning of the federal reserve have changed since its founding in 1913 as well as some lessons for the present and for changed since its founding in 1913 as well as some lessons for the present and for the future the future

why doesn t society minimize central bank secrecy i introduction central banks have repeatedly revealed a preference for secrecy in conducting monetary policy in the united states for example the federal reserve has expressed its bias towards policy secrecy in a number of ways ranging from delays in releasing the minutes of federal open market committee fomc meetings to ambiguous policy statements at congressional hearings 1 nevertheless the degree of disclosure required by congress and the court system does not appear to minimize central bank secrecy indeed the fed s right to limit disclosure of policy intentions was upheld in a recent supreme court case 2 furthermore similar social tolerance of central bank secrecy appears in the banking institutions of other countries since legal and social institutions allow for central bank secrecy its presence may be attributed to the preferences of the social planners who designed these institutions in the first place forward looking planners know that monetary policy in future periods will be the outcome of a symbiotic relationship between monetary authorities politicians and private interest groups 3 as the relative importance of these different groups and their preferences change over time so will the policy objectives of the monetary authorities if secrecy is allowed monetary authorities could effect policy changes in response to relationship changes without immediate detection by private markets recognizing this policy effect of secrecy a social planner would design institutions to affect the environment so that desirable future policy formation takes place 4 this paper offers two explanations for why social institutions do not legally minimize central bank secrecy 5 first when establishing institutional disclosure requirements for central banks social planners recognize the tendency for central bankers to be secretive this secrecy imposes costs upon members of society by making shifts in policy objectives more difficult to detect faced with this tendency members of society set legal institutions that appear to require less disclosure because more restrictive laws would induce central bankers to become more secretive in other less informative ways 6 second if the policy objectives that society finds desirable change over time then members of society may directly prefer some degree of central bank secrecy economic theory holds that unanticipated changes in monetary policy can have an economic effect intuitively secrecy allows central banks to conduct unanticipated policy actions in periods when on average society most prefers them for example in periods when public opinion favors pushing down unemployment central banks may conduct a surprise monetary expansion 7 the paper develops examples of each of these two effects using a discretionary equilibrium similar to that in cukierman and meltzer 1986a the desired trade off between two policy objectives changes over time in response to changing political pressures although i use the trade off between output and inflation as an example the basic results hold with any policy trade off that varies over time the policy objectives could include targets for real exchange rates or interest rates for instance the plan of the paper is as follows section ii describes the discretionary equilibrium given institutional settings for the conduct of monetary policy sections iii and iv describe examples of each of the two explanations for secrecy described above concluding remarks follow ii the degree of policy disclosure in a discretionary equilibrium when the policy objectives of the monetary authorities shift over time due to changing economic or political circumstances their choice of discretionary policy also shifts 8 in the absence of a mechanism to pre commit to a particular policy rule the authorities will implement policy changes

safety stock determination with correlated demands and arbitrary lead times abstract in this new paper a new method is proposed for determining the safety stock when daily demands are autocorrelated and lead times follow an arbitrary distribution the method is then used as a basis for examining effects on the safety stock when the usual assumptions namely independence and normality of daily demand and normality of lead times are violated the new method is derived by using inequalities on the basis of probability arguments it is simple to use and provides an upper bound of the safety stock further numerical investigation based on the new method shows that the effect of autocorrelation is more pronounced than departure from normality in determining the safety stock substantial error may be incurred if such autocorrelation is ignored in the test cases

coordinating lead times and safety stocks under autocorrelated demand we consider a supply chain in which orders and lead times are linked endogenously as opposed to assuming lead times are exogenous this assumption is relevant when a retailer s orders are produced by a supplier with finite capacity and replenished when the order is completed the retailer faces demands that are correlated over time either positively or negatively which may for example be induced by a pricing or promotion policy the auto correlation in demand affects the order stream placed by the retailer onto the supplier and this in turn influences the resulting lead times seen by the retailer since these lead times also determine the retailer s orders and its safety stocks which the retailer must set to cover lead time demand there is a mutual dependency between orders and lead times the inclusion of endogenous lead times and autocorrelated demand represents a better fit with real life situations however it poses some additional methodological issues compared to assuming exogenous lead times or stationary demand processes that are independent over time by means of a markov chain analysis and matrix analytic methods we develop a procedure to determine the distribution of lead times and inventories that takes into account the correlation between orders and lead times our analysis shows that negative autocorrelation in demand although more erratic improves both lead time and inventory performance relative to iid demand positive correlation makes matters worse than iid demand due to the endogeneity of lead times these effects are much more pronounced and substantial error may be incurred if this endogeneity is ignored

central bank secrecy interest rates and monetary control we construct a dynamic rational expectations model of the federal funds and deposit market that provides a rationale for central bank secrecy about current monetary aggregate objectives in this analysis the trading desk values secrecy because it reduces the influence of monetary control policy on interest rates we then examine actual u s experience with monetary control and determine that the reserve bias predicted by the model is present in the data from 1978 to 1985 finally we demonstrate that central bank secrecy may not lower the value of commercial banks

impact of market demand mis specification on a two level supply chain this paper investigates the impact of mis specifying the market demand process on a serially linked two level supply chain box jenkins models are used to represent both the true and a mis specified market demand processes it is shown that the impact of mis specification on cost is minor if the supply chain tries to minimise the market demand forecast errors furthermore our analysis suggests that mis specification does not always result in additional costs a managerial insight is revealed poor forecast accuracy is not always bad for the total supply chain costs in other words employing more accurate forecasting methods may actually result in higher total supply chain costs

a theory of fed watching in a macroeconomic policy game this paper examines the phenomenon of fed watching within the context of a macroeconomic policy game following a cukierman and a h meltzer s 1986 article the policymaker s preferences are private information and noisy monetary control causes past observations of money growth to be a noisy signal of the monetary authority s future intentions individuals are allowed to acquire additional information about the monetary authority s preferences thus both past observations of money growth and costly information about the policymaker s preferences are used by agents in forming expectations about policy the public s acquisition of information alters the monetary authority s strategic calculus making noisy monetary control less desirable copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

modelling house price volatility states in the uk by switching arch models this article analyses investment risk in the housing market by examining volatility properties of house prices for the uk we use both arch and garch models to estimate price conditional heteroscedasticity and find evidence of a time varying property in the volatilities of the house price series we then use the swarch model and find there are three volatility states in the price series our estimations suggest the uk housing markets are relatively stable and different states do not switch very often the magnitude of high price volatility is as high as 20 99 times of the low volatility for the older housing market and 14 times of the low volatility for the new housing market in addition the older housing market is less efficient than the new housing market since the impacts of events on the volatility state of the older house prices is more lasting than in new housing market

optimal centralized ordering policies in multi echelon inventory systems with correlated demands this paper treats a depot warehouse system in which demand occurs at the warehouse or retail level this work differs from a number of other studies in that we allow item demands to be correlated both across warehouses and also correlated in time our motivation for this generalization arises from our experience with an actual system of this type used by a major national producer and distributor of consumer products we observed both high correlations between successive monthly demands around 0 7 and correlations between demands for an item at different locations also about 0 7 in a given time period we derive an explicit expression for the optimal safety stock as a function of the level of correlation through time the analysis requires two assumptions 1 the allocation assumption and 2 the equal coefficient of variation assumption similar assumptions have been used by other researchers finally numerical evaluations are included to illustrate the impact of the various magnitudes of correlation

strategic central bank communication discourse analysis of the bank of japan s monthly report abstract we conduct a discourse analysis of the bank of japan s monthly report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles we find that ambiguous expressions tend to appear more frequently with negative expressions and this tendency is more pronounced in recessions this suggests that the central bank communicates strategically by obfuscating the reports when their private information is unfavorable

rules or discretion in public sector decision making rules and discretion in public sector decision making are compared in a macroeconomic setting where there is a potential role for an active stabilization policy when the policymaker has private information about nominal shocks the credibility of announcements about the state of nature is shown to depend critically on both the policymaker s preferences over output and inflation and on the institutional setting rules or discretion the issue of rules versus discretion is found to depend on the flexibility lost under a rule relative to the timeinconsistency problem arising under discretion

estimating the information value of immediate disclosure of the fomc policy directive this paper studies the information value of immediate disclosure of the fomc policy directive the value of disclosure is measured by its ability to reduce investors expected uncertainty about futures interest rates where uncertainty is defined as the conditional variance of forecast errors analytical relationships between new information and the conditional variance of forecast errors are developed and the relation of the uncertaintyreducing value of information to its social value as defined in recent literature is indicated in the empirical work forward interest rates are treated as reflecting market expectations conditioned on existing information the empirical tests indicate that information in the undisclosed prevailing policy directives 1974 79 were able to make only a very marginal improvement in the predictive accuracy of forecasts relying only on the forward rates thus the hypothesis that immediate disclosure has a significant information value to market participants is not supported it is very common in public policymaking to assume that disclosing policy intentions which relate to intervention into money bond or foreign exchange markets would have undesirable destabilizing effects on these markets the federal open market committee recently expressed this view in its appeal to the u s supreme court to overturn a federal district court ruling that the committee was obliged under the freedom of information act to disclose immediately the prevailing policy directive 1 the destabilizing argument has also been used by some to question the practice of the weekly release of the monetary statistics by the federal reserve 2 presumably reflecting a similar view intervention in foreign exchange markets by the federal reserve and other central banks is generally not disclosed to the public either those who have advocated immediate board of governors federal reserve system helpful comments on an earlier draft by william conrad william melton kenneth kopecky robert shiller edward j kane and mark rubinstein are gratefully acknowledged michael grupe provided help with certain parts of the empirical work the research assistance of dan uslander and andy weddig is also appreciated the views expressed here reflect those of the author and not necessarily others associated with the federal reserve 1 the policy directive gives instructions to the system s account manager for the conduct of open market operations which constitute the fomc s short run monetary policy objectives currently the policy directive is disclosed only after a new directive becomes effective a lower court initially ruled that the directive was subject to the freedom of information act without considering the fomc s substantive arguments against disclosure the supreme court sent the case back to the lower court to consider the substantive arguments the lower court ruled against disclosure referring to a lack of evidence by the plaintiff that immediate disclosure would not harm the federal reserve s monetary function or the government s commercial interest in profitably trading government securities 2 conrad 2 found no evidence of over reaction in the treasury bill market to the weekly release of the monetary statistics however a proposal to stop or alter the weekly release procedure is under consideration by the federal reserve

measuring and avoiding the bullwhip effect a control theoretic approach an important contributory factor to the bullwhip effect i e the variance amplification of order quantities observed in supply chains is the replenishment rule used by supply chain members first the bullwhip effect induced by the use of different forecasting methods in order up to replenishment policies is analysed variance amplification is quantified and we prove that the bullwhip effect is guaranteed in the order up to model irrespective of the forecasting method used thus when production is inflexible and significant costs are incurred by frequently switching production quantities up and down order up to policies may no longer be desirable or even achievable in the second part of the paper a general decision rule is introduced that avoids variance amplification and succeeds in generating smooth ordering patterns even when demand has to be forecasted the methodology is based on control systems engineering and allows important insights to be gained about the dynamic behaviour of replenishment rules