duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

gauging exchange rate targeting exchange rates exchange rate management monetary policy rule inflation targeting exchange rate regimes exchange rate classification factor instrumental variables data rich estimation abstract in this paper we examine whether a monetary authority targets the exchange rate per se or instead simply appears to do so as it responds to the exchange rate and other variables in service to inflation and output targets we combine data rich estimation with a system of forward looking equations in order to disentangle the possibilities the combined approach reveals the potentially misleading nature of standard estimates of the extent of exchange rate and inflation targeting we illustrate the approach by applying it to two de jure inflation targetters canada and korea in contrast to standard methods and much past work we find that neither country targets its exchange rate and both are bona fide inflation targetters

collaborate or consolidate assessing the competitive effects of production joint ventures we analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger under standard regularity conditions the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger though the effect on prices quantities and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition in light of our results regarding profits we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge imperfect information cost synergies and organizational asymmetries we further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture i e by delegation of input pricing jel l13 l23 l42

trilemma stability and international macroeconomic archetypes this paper uses the simple geometry of the classic open economy trilemma to introduce a new gauge of the stability of international macroeconomic arrangements the new stability gauge reflects the simultaneity of a country s choices of exchange rate fixity financial openness and monetary sovereignty so the new gauge is bounded and correspondingly non gaussian we use the new stability gauge in nonlinear panel estimates to examine the post bretton woods period and we find that trilemma policy stability is linked to official holdings of foreign exchange reserves in low income countries we also find that the combination of fixed exchange rates and financial market openness is the most stable arrangement within the trilemma and middle income countries have less stable trilemma arrangements than either low or high income countries the paper also characterizes international macroeconomic arrangements in terms of their semblance to definitive policy archetypes and it uses the trilemma constraint to provide a new gauge of monetary sovereignty

implicit understandings in channels of distribution formal agreements can be used to achieve coordination among channel members these agreements work by exerting explicit control over the members who make the agreements however implicit understandings can be used as a partial substitute for more formal agreements in this paper we show that implicit understandings can develop as channel members learn about each other s behavior we show that this learning leads to the use of the implicit influence each channel member has over the other s behavior the learning leading to an implicit understanding requires some form of experimentation or historical observation this learning results in an oscillating retail price when only one channel member learns the other s behavior both channel members obtain greater profits than when neither member learns and both channel members obtain less profits than when both members learn however the member who does not learn obtains more profits than the member who learns we also show that implicit understandings r

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

current account imbalances and financial integration in the euro area abstract while the current account of the euro area as a whole has remained almost balanced in the past two decades several member countries have sizeable deficits or surpluses in this paper we interpret these imbalances as indicators of net capital flows among the euro area countries we distinguish between balances against the euro zone and the rest of the world and examine these for the eu 15 countries we find that for euro members the net flows follow differences in per capita incomes even before the introduction of the euro our results show further that with the introduction of the common currency the elasticity with respect to per capita incomes of net capital flows within the euro area has increased for the members of the euro zone this increase can neither be observed for the flows between the euro members and the rest of the world nor for the flows between the countries that stayed outside the monetary union and the euro zone we interpret this as evidence for increasing financial integration in the euro area there is also some evidence suggesting that the introduction of the euro has led to some financial diversion

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

do central banks respond to exchange rate movements a structural investigation abstract we estimate a small scale structural general equilibrium model of a small open economy using bayesian methods our main focus is the conduct of monetary policy in australia canada new zealand and the uk we consider generic taylor type rules where the monetary authority reacts in response to output inflation and exchange rate movements we perform posterior odds tests to investigate the hypothesis whether central banks do target exchange rates the main result of this paper is that the central banks of australia and new zealand do not whereas the bank of canada and the bank of england do include the nominal exchange rate in its policy rule this result is robust for various specification of the policy rule we also find that terms of trade movements do not contribute significantly to domestic business cycles

monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy we lay out a small open economy version of the calvo sticky price model and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap we use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rulebased policy regimes for the small open economy domestic inflation and cpi based taylor rules and an exchange rate peg we show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail we also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules

coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration abstract this paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model a vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a two part tariff exclusive dealing contract with its retailer coexistence emerges when more than two vertical cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes when vertical integration and separation coexist welfare could be improved by reducing the number of vertically separating firms the scope for coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

real financial market exchange rates and capital flows foreign exchange rates asset prices and capital movements are expected to be closely related to each other as international capital markets become more and more integrated this paper provides new empirical evidence from an index of exchange rate adjusted cross country asset price ratios which may be interpreted as a real effective financial exchange rate the integrated stock flow approach reveals that a country s real effective financial exchange rate is cointegrated with international investors net foreign holdings of its assets the associated error correction equations have useful interpretations against the backdrop of uncovered return parity and investor portfolio rebalancing behavior

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

us shocks and global exchange rate configurations many academics and observers emphasize that a sharp us dollar depreciation is inevitable for returning the burgeoning us current account deficit to more sustainable levels how may such a us dollar adjustment occur and what may it imply for global exchange rate configurations the paper focuses on the role of us specific economic shocks in the adjustment process and finds that such us shocks have historically exerted a remarkably heterogeneous effect across currencies it shows that this heterogeneity is not only due to policy choices of inflexible exchange rate regimes or to monetary policy but to an important extent is explained by market forces in particular the degree of financial integration foremost in portfolio investment though not by trade this helps explain why it has been in particular the euro and its predecessor currencies as well as other european currencies that have contributed the bulk to the adjustment of the us dollar effective exchange rate over the past 25 years while other flexible currencies have been much less responsive to us shocks the results suggest that currency flexibility is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving a more balanced contribution across currencies to an adjustment of global exchange rate configurations exchange rates are responsive to foreign shocks only to the extent that market mechanisms are in place that make this transmission work which requires in particular that countries have well developed financial markets and are financially integrated these findings have implications for an unwinding of global imbalances and for monetary policy choices and financial market policies in emerging market economies marcel fratzscher

optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand abstract if oligopolistic firms can observe and enforce retail prices upon their retailers they may select to do so if retailers have private information about an uncertain state of the demand delegating the pricing decision to the retailer has both an advantageous effect of alleviating price competition among firms and a disadvantageous effect of transferring surplus from the firm to its agent the disadvantageous effect may be dominant if the products produced by the firms are sufficiently differentiated and or the degree of prior uncertainty about the demand is sufficiently high

financial integration and the wealth effect of exchange rate fluctuations abstract recent years have witnessed a large increase in international financial integration in the form of largely offsetting cross holdings across countries we assess how such financial leverage affects the international transmission of monetary shocks and find that it leads to sizable welfare differentials that far exceed the impact due to nominal rigidities we document the relevance of the exact nature of holdings with bond holdings associated with larger effects than equity holdings the impact of financial leverage on welfare is also sensitive to the extent of exchange rate pass through and the substitutability between goods produced in different countries

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

price stability with imperfect financial integration this paper studies whether the international monetary system can be affected by asymmetries in the cross country positions in the international financial markets i e the fact that some countries are large debtors while others are creditors an important channel that is explored is the interaction between international risk sharing and the stabilization role of monetary policy in each country the main finding is that the welfare costs of incomplete markets and the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability are increasing with the cross country asymmetries in the initial net international positions and in particular they become nonnegligible when the persistence of the shocks increases 1 of a permanent shift in steady state consumption for the welfare costs of incomplete markets and 0 2 for the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability when global imbalances become larger optimal monetary policy requires an increase in the volatilities of the real returns on assets and in particular of the nominal interest rates which should happen to be more correlated across countries

classifying exchange rate regimes deeds vs words abstract most of the empirical literature on exchange rate regimes uses the imf de jure classification based on the regime announced by the governments despite the recognized inconsistencies between reported and actual policies in many cases to address this problem we construct a de facto classification based on data on exchange rates and international reserves from all imf reporting countries over the period 1974 2000 which we believe provides a meaningful alternative for future empirical work on the topic the classification sheds new light on several stylized facts previously reported in the literature in particular we find that the de facto pegs have remained stable throughout the last decade although an increasing number of them shy away from an explicit commitment to a fixed regime hidden pegs we confirm the hollowing out hypothesis but show that it does not apply to countries with limited access to capital markets we also find that pure floats are associated with only relatively minor nominal exchange rate volatility and that the recent increase in the number of de jure floats goes hand in hand with an increase in the number of de facto dirty floats fear of floating

do trade costs in goods market lead to home bias in equities abstract two of the main puzzles in international economics are the consumption and the portfolio home biases we solve for international equity portfolios in a two country two good stochastic equilibrium model with trade costs in goods markets we show that introducing trade costs as suggested by obstfeld and rogoff obstfeld m rogoff k 2000a the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics is there a common cause nber macroeconomics annual 15 is not sufficient to explain these two puzzles simultaneously on the contrary we find that trade costs create a foreign bias in portfolios for reasonable parameter values this result is robust to the addition of non tradable goods for standard calibrations of the preferences

will there be a dollar crisis almost everyone believes that the us current account deficit must eventually end and that this end will involve dollar depreciation however many believe that this depreciation will take place gradually this paper shows that any process of gradual dollar decline fast enough to prevent the accumulation of implausible levels of us external debt would impose capital losses on investors much larger than they currently expect as a result there will at some point have to be a wile e coyote moment a point at which expectations are revised and the dollar drops sharply it is much less clear however whether this crisis will produce macroeconomic problems paul krugman

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

segmentation and time of day patterns in foreign exchange markets abstract this paper sheds light on a puzzling pattern in spot foreign exchange markets domestic currencies appreciate depreciate systematically during foreign domestic working hours this phenomenon spans many years and several exchange rates and overrides calendar effects we argue that it is mainly due to liquidity and inventory patterns that emerge from the combination of two factors domestic agents tend to be net buyers of foreign currency and to trade mostly in their country s working hours the prevalence of domestic foreign traders demanding the counterpart currency during domestic foreign working hours implies sell price buy price pressure on the domestic currency during domestic foreign working hours

the value of marketing expertise this paper has three objectives 1 to construct a theoretical model that aids in evaluating marketing expertise 2 to use that theoretical model to identify factors influencing the value of marketing expertise and 3 to empirically test the model by observing how different market conditions influence whether companies emphasize marketing expertise we accomplish these objectives as follows first we use decision theory to find an expression for the expected value of marketing expertise we do not use decision analysis in the normative tradition nor do we assume that firms actually use formal decision analysis rather we assume that firms are rational and that decision theory describes their actions given that assumption we predict how firms should evaluate marketing here marketing expertise helps a firm make better marketing decisions at least on average hence the value of marketing expertise increases as marketing decisions become more important second consistent with decision theory

information sharing between vertical hierarchies abstract when do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information we show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents information with small externalities principals share information when externalities and correlation have opposite signs and do not share information when externalities and correlation have the same sign in this second case principals face a prisoners dilemma since they obtain higher profits by sharing information

foreign direct investment in vertically related markets we study an mne s choice of fdi mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing we show how the market s vertical structure and trading features affect this choice an mne s incentives to expand through cross border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms the opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts instead of two part tariffs are used our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome fdi and should discourage fdi through acquisition investissements exterieurs directs sur les marches verticaux dans cet article nous etudions le choix d une entreprise multinationale de proceder a un investissement exterieur direct dans un marche vertical avec sources d approvisionnement locales nous montrons la facon dont la structure verticale et les caracteristiques commerciales du marche ont une incidence sur une telle decision les mesures incitatives offertes aux entreprises multinationales pour se developper par l entremise d acquisitions transfrontalieres plutot que par l investissement dans de nouvelles installations sont plus fortes sur les marches dotes d un pouvoir de negociation et d une concentration en amont plus eleves ainsi que par des conditions contractuelles non observables l inverse s observe sur les marches ou les contrats a prix de gros sont utilises en lieu et place des tarifs binomes en termes de bien etre notre analyse suggere que le pays hote ne devrait pas toujours accueillir les investissements exterieurs directs et devrait decourager ces memes investissements realises par l entremise d acquisitions

excessive retailing at the bertrand equilibria in oligopolistic markets where competition is in prices producers may prefer to be represented by agents that sell their products even if those agents do not provide any direct services to promote the sale of the product and even if contracting is costly contracting with the agents serves as a medium to relieve competitive pressures in the product market the benefit that a single firm derives from contracting is an increasing function of the number of firms that have already contracted with agents hence if the contracting cost is relatively low there exists a unique equilibrium where all firms contract with agents

the strategic value of partial vertical integration we investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration namely partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods the partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration this information vertical effect translates into a competition horizontal effect the partially integrated hierarchy s commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price which strategically relaxes competition our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions

vertical separation with private contracts we consider a manufacturer s incentive to sell through an independent retailer rather than directly to final consumers when contracts with retailers cannot be observed by competitors if retailers conjecture that identical competing manufacturers always offer identical contracts symmetric beliefs manufacturers choose vertical separation in equilibrium even with private contracts vertically separated manufacturers reduce competition and increase profits by inducing less aggressive behaviour by retailers in the final market manufacturers profits may be higher with private than with public contracts our results hold both with price and with quantity competition and do not hinge on retailers beliefs being perfectly symmetric we also discuss various justifications for symmetric beliefs including incomplete information

equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information abstract games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path standard selection criteria such as passive symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs we propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs we conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in an application on vertical multi lateral contracting we find that our criterion outperforms the other selection criteria

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

firm strategies in the mid tail of platform based retailing while millions of products are sold on its retail platform amazon com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them most of these products are sold by third party sellers who pay amazon a fee for each unit sold empirical evidence clearly suggests that amazon tends to sell high demand products and leave long tail products for independent sellers to offer we investigate how a platform owner such as amazon facing ex ante demand uncertainty may strategically learn from these sellers early sales which of the mid tail products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell the platform owner s cherry picking of the successful products however gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level unobserved by the platform owner we analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a game theoretic model with two types of sellers one with high demand and one with low demand we show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller s demand interestingly the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller s product whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner s threat of entry the platform owner s entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period although it increases consumer surplus in the later period we also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome

verifying exchange rate regimes credibility and transparency are at the core of the current debate on exchange rate regimes among the reasons why intermediate regimes have fallen out of favor a possibly important one is that they are not transparent it is difficult to verify them this paper investigates how difficult it is for investors to verify from observable data if the authorities are in fact following the exchange rate regime that they claim to be following of the various intermediate regimes the authors focus on the case of basket pegs with bands statistically it can take a surprisingly long span of data for an econometrician or an investor to verify whether such a regime is actually in operation the authors find that verification becomes more difficult as the regime s bands widen and or more currencies enter in the basket peg the authors analyze regimes announced as free floating and find that in some cases the observed exchange rate data validate the announced regime

how to solve the price puzzle a meta analysis the short run increase in prices following an unexpected tightening of monetary policy constitutes a frequently reported puzzle yet the puzzle is surprisingly easy to explain away when all published models are quantitatively reviewed we collect about 1 000 point estimates of impulse responses from 70 articles using vector autoregressive models and present a simple method of research synthesis for graphical results our ndings indicate publication selection in favor of the intuitive response of prices to a tightening the estimates depend systematically on study design when misspecications are

macroeconomic stability and the preferences of the fed a formal analysis 1961 98 the rate of inflation in the u s has declined from an average of 4 5 in the period 1960 79 to an average of 3 6 in 1980 98 between those two periods the standard deviations of inflation and the output gap have also declined these facts can be attributed to the interaction of three possible factors a shift in central bank preferences a reduction in the variability of aggregate supply shocks and a more efficient conduct of monetary policy in this paper we identify the relative roles of these factors our framework is based on the estimation of a small structural macro model for the u s economy jointly with the first order conditions which solve the intertemporal optimization problem faced by the fed overall our results indicate that the policy preferences of the fed and in particular the implicit inflation target have changed drastically with the advent of the volcker greenspan era in addition we find that the variance of supply shocks has been lower and monetary policy has been conducted more efficiently during this period

vertical integration foreclosure and productive efficiency we analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers downstream firms of varying efficiency via secret two part tariffs when integrated with the inefficient retailer the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output shifting effect this effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below cost pricing at the wholesale level thereby rendering integration procompetitive output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products moreover we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers costs and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation

the long or short of it determinants of foreign currency exposure in external balance sheets abstract a major focus of the recent literature on the determination of optimal portfolios in open economy macroeconomic models has been on the role of currency movements in determining portfolio returns that may hedge various macroeconomic shocks however there is little empirical evidence on the foreign currency exposures that are embedded in international balance sheets using a new database we provide stylized facts concerning the cross country and time series variation in aggregate foreign currency exposure and its various subcomponents in panel estimation we find that richer more open economies take longer foreign currency positions in addition we find that an increase in the propensity for a currency to depreciate during bad times is associated with a longer position in foreign currencies providing a hedge against domestic output fluctuations we view these new stylized facts as informative in their own right and also potentially useful to the burgeoning theoretical literature on the macroeconomics of international portfolios

the salesperson as outside agent or employee a transaction cost analysis this descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function i e the use of employee direct salespeople rather than manufacturers representatives reps a hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 u s sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of going direct in a given district results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well the transaction cost model is generally supported the principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson s performance the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism i e to use a direct sales force among other findings direct sales forces are also associated with complex hard to learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities several factors prove unrelated including company size the amount of travel a district requires and the importance of key accounts this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 3 pages 234 254 in 1985

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

the six flaws of the eurozone when it was created it was reasonable to think that the architecture of the monetary union was not perfect it was also likely that the imperfections would lead to difficulties possibly even crises this article identifies six flaws most of which had been identified even before the launch of the euro it starts by pinpointing why the eurozone a bold and unprecedented experiment is inherently fragile it is not conducive to the convergence of national inflation rates it is not an optimum currency area and it is not a federal state taking these characteristics as given the article argues that the eurozone needs to address their implications it observes that it has not been the case so far hence the six flaws fiscal discipline has not been achieved the need for a banking union which has finally been recognized and only partly implemented the ecb is not a complete and fully independent central bank some member countries need a sovereign debt relief structural reforms are badly needed but intrusiveness cannot be the solution the governance of the eurozone is not designed for crisis management

capital inflows and euro area long term interest rates abstract capital flows into the euro area were particularly large in the mid 2000s and the share of foreign holdings of euro area securities increased substantially between the introduction of the euro and the outbreak of the global financial crisis we show that the increase in foreign holdings of euro area bonds in this period is associated with a reduction of euro area long term interest rates by about 1 55 percentage points which is in line with previous studies that document a similar impact of foreign bond buying on us treasury yields these results are relevant both from a euro area and a global perspective as they show that the phenomenon of lower long term interest rates due to foreign bond buying is not exclusive to the united states and foreign inflows into euro area debt securities may have added to increased risk appetite and hunt for yield at the global level

strategic aspects of vertical delegation abstract this paper offers an overview of the strategic aspects of situations where either institutionally or contractually a firm delegates some of its decisions to another firm a subsidiary an internal division etc delegation may have several kinds of strategic benefits in the short term it may improve the competitive position of the firm or induce a more lenient behavior from its competitors in the long run it may be used to deter the entry of potential competitors to foreclose market access or to induce actual competitors to exit the paper analyzes the trade off between these possible benefits and the agency costs of delegation and emphasizes the key issues of credibility and commitment

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

transaction cost theory inferences from clinical field research on downstream vertical integration a bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation the widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going to market inclusive of distribution as well as its administration is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer examples of unique assets are account specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities conversely transaction cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets such as an inventory of standard parts since its formulation in 1975 the transaction cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel se

external adjustment and the global crisis abstract the period preceding the global financial crisis was characterized by a substantial widening of current account imbalances across the world since the onset of the crisis these imbalances have contracted to a significant extent in this paper we analyze the ongoing process of external adjustment in advanced economies and emerging markets we find that countries whose pre crisis current account balances were in excess of what could be explained by standard economic fundamentals have experienced the largest contractions in their external balance we subsequently examine the contributions of real exchange rates domestic demand and domestic output to the adjustment process allowing for differences across exchange rate regimes and find that external adjustment in deficit countries was achieved primarily through demand compression rather than expenditure switching finally we show that changes in other investment flows were the main channel of financial account adjustment with official external assistance and ecb liquidity cushioning the exit of private capital flows for some countries

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

the european sovereign debt crisis the origin and propagation of the european sovereign debt crisis can be attributed to the flawed original design of the euro in particular there was an incomplete understanding of the fragility of a monetary union under crisis conditions especially in the absence of banking union and other european level buffer mechanisms moreover the inherent messiness involved in proposing and implementing incremental multicountry crisis management responses on the fly has been an important destabilizing factor throughout the crisis after diagnosing the situation we consider reforms that might improve the resilience of the euro area to future fiscal shocks

the external wealth of nations measures of foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing countries abstract although capital flows are closely monitored surprisingly little is known about the accumulated stocks of foreign assets and liabilities held by various countries especially in the developing world this paper constructs estimates of foreign assets and liabilities and their equity and debt subcomponents for a sample of 67 industrial and developing countries it characterizes the stylized facts of international balance sheets and asks whether there are trends in net foreign asset positions and shifts in debt equity ratios over time finally it explores the sensitivity of estimated stock positions to the treatment of valuation effects not captured in balance of payments data

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

monetary policy in a data rich environment abstract most empirical analyses of monetary policy have been confined to frameworks in which the federal reserve is implicitly assumed to exploit only a limited amount of information despite the fact that the fed actively monitors literally thousands of economic time series this article explores the feasibility of incorporating richer information sets into the analysis both positive and normative of fed policymaking we employ a factor model approach developed by stock j h watson m w diffusion indices journal of business economic statistics 2002 20 2 147 forecasting inflation 1999 journal of monetary economics 44 2 293 that permits the systematic information in large data sets to be summarized by relatively few estimated factors with this framework we reconfirm stock and watson s result that the use of large data sets can improve forecast accuracy and we show that this result does not seem to depend on the use of finally revised as opposed to real time data we estimate policy reaction functions for the fed that take into account its data rich environment and provide a test of the hypothesis that fed actions are explained solely by its forecasts of inflation and real activity finally we explore the possibility of developing an expert system that could aggregate diverse information and provide benchmark policy settings

europe and global imbalances although europe in the aggregate is not a major contributor to global current account imbalances its trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world mean that it will still be affected by a shift in the current configuration of external deficits and surpluses we assess the macroeconomic impact on europe of global current account adjustment under alternative scenarios emphasizing both trade and financial channels finally we consider heterogeneous exposure across individual european economies to external adjustment shocks philip r lane and gian maria milesi ferretti

entry and product variety with competing supply chains we study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with exclusive retailers who are privately informed about their costs the number of brands in the market determined by the manufacturers zero profit condition depends on the presence of asymmetric information and on the types of contracts between manufacturers and retailers with two part tariffs wholesale prices fully reflect retailers costs with linear contracts wholesale prices are constant and independent of retailers costs the number of brands is lower resp higher with asymmetric information than with complete information when contracts are linear resp with two part tariffs moreover although the number of brands is always higher with linear contracts than with two part tariffs joint profits of manufacturers and retailers are higher with linear prices we also discuss manufacturers incentives to choose different contract forms and analyze the effects of endogenous entry on welfare

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

macroeconomic forecasting using diffusion indexes this article studies forecasting a macroeconomic time series variable using a large number of predictors the predictors are summarized using a small number of indexes constructed by principal component analysis an approximate dynamic factor model serves as the statistical framework for the estimation of the indexes and construction of the forecasts the method is used to construct 6 12 and 24 monthahead forecasts for eight monthly u s macroeconomic time series using 215 predictors in simulated real time from 1970 through 1998 during this sample period these new forecasts outperformed univariate autoregressions small vector autoregressions and leading indicator models

country portfolios in open economy macro models this paper develops a simple approximation method for computing equilibrium portfolios in dynamic general equilibrium open economy macro models the method is widely applicable simple to implement and gives analytical solutions for equilibrium portfolio positions in any combination or types of asset it can be used in models with any number of assets whether markets are complete or incomplete and can be applied to stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models of any dimension so long as the model is amenable to a solution using standard approximation methods we first illustrate the approach using a simple two asset endowment economy model and then show how the results extend to the case of any number of assets and general economic structure

introduction of a second channel implications for pricing and profits in this paper we study the optimal pricing strategies when a product is sold on two channels such as the internet and a traditional channel we assume a stylized deterministic demand model where the demand on a channel depends on prices degree of substitution across channels and the overall market potential we first study four prevalent pricing strategies which differ in the degree of autonomy for the internet channel for a monopoly we provide theoretical bounds for these pricing strategies we also analyze the duopoly case where an incumbent mixed retailer faces competition with a pure retailer and characterize price equilibria finally through a computational study we explore the behavior price and profits under different parameters and consumer preferences for the alternative channels

assessing the sustainability of external imbalances in the european union we assess the sustainability of the current account ca balance net international investment position niip and net external debt ned in a sample of 22 eu countries using two complementary approaches first we employ time series stationarity tests of current account balance to gdp ratios as well as cointegration tests of exports and imports of goods and services second we assess the level of trade balance that stabilises the niip and the ned we find that there is sustainability of the ca balance in eight countries niip in five countries and ned in 10 countries whereas there is evidence of a lack of sustainability in five debtor nations and three creditor nations both approaches are consistent with each other given the relationship between flows and stocks the existence of structural breaks and valuation effects via exchange rate and interest rate changes

marketing production coordination in channels of distribution abstract in this paper we analyze the effects of functional horizontal decentralization by a channel member on the performance of an industrial channel of distribution we use the model of eliashberg j steinberg r 1987 management science 33 981 1000 which describes a channel of distribution consisting of a manufacturer and a value adding distributor we allow the distributor to decentralize decision making between his marketing and production functions our results show that functional decentralization at the distributor level increases the price sensitivity of the distributor concerning the price he faces from the manufacturer causes a shift in the distributor s demand curve increases the distributor s inventory activities in terms of both quantity and time frame and under certain conditions increases the manufacturer s inventory as expected the decentralized distributor has a less coordinated pricing policy vis a vis the production policy using numerical means we show that functional decentralization can improve the overall channel profitability i e for both manufacturer and distributor this counter intuitive result suggests that in our non repeated perfect information game setting functional decentralization can yield a pareto dominant equilibrium outcome where both the distributor and manufacturer are better off even though it is only the distributor who is changing his organizational decision making

reply to managing channel profits comment we welcome moorthy s comment moorthy k s 1987 managing channel profits comment marketing sci 6 fall 375 379 it provides an opportunity to clarify several issues raised in our 1983 paper that paper was motivated by one concern channel coordination we believed that channel members benefit from coordination and that many institutional arrangements such as quantity discounts are actually coordinating mechanisms we developed a simple model to demonstrate our belief for historical accuracy mcguire and staelin cited by moorthy had already independently developed a useful model of duopolistic channel competition being unaware of their working paper our model not surprisingly differed from theirs both papers provide important but different insights into channel management

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

interactions between members of a marketing production channel under seasonal demand abstract key decisions in a marketing production channel faced with a seasonal demand include production and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and processing and pricing decisions for the retailer in such situations a variety of contracts are possible including contracts under which the manufacturer charges a constant price throughout the season or the retailer processes at a constant rate throughout the season also possible are channel structures in which the manufacturer and retailer cooperate to make decisions jointly the main objective of the present paper is to compare optimal policies under all the situations described above we show that having a constant manufacturer s price or a constant processing rate does not have a significant impact upon the retailer s price or inventory decisions however if the demand is not highly seasonal a constant processing rate contract will result in higher production and processing rates and a lower manufacturer s price compared to a constant manufacturer s price contract also a centralized channel involving joint decision making will lead to a lower price at the retail level and higher production and processing rates hence issues such as channel coordination and contracts between manufacturers and retailers which have received significant attention in the marketing literature have implications for the production area as well

competing vertical structures precommitment and renegotiation we consider a model where two agents privately informed about their own characteristics play a normal form game on behalf of two uninformed principals we analyze the existence of precommitment effects through public announcements of contracts in a model where agency contracts designed ex ante can always be secretly renegotiated at the ex ante and interim stages we show that the existence of precommitment effects depends both on the strategic complementarity of the agents actions and on the direct effect of the opponents actions on each principal s welfare in our model the possibility of renegotiation is crucial for the existence of precommitment effects the results are introduced through an example of cournot and bertrand competition between firms viewed as vertical structures

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed

exchange rate misalignments in duopoly the case of airbus and boeing we examine the effect of exchange rate misalignments on competition in the market for large commercial aircraft this market is a duopoly where players compete in dollar denominated prices while one of them airbus incurs costs mostly in euros we construct and calibrate a simulation model to investigate how companies adjust their prices to deal with the effects of a temporary misalignment and how this affects profit margins and volumes we also explore the effects on the long run dynamics of competition we conclude that due to the duopolistic nature of the aircraft market airbus will pass only a small part of the exchange rate fluctuations on to customers through higher prices moreover due to features specific to the aircraft industry such as customer switching costs and learning by doing even a temporary departure of the exchange rate from its long run equilibrium level may have permanent effects on the industry

international currency exposures valuation effects and the global financial crisis abstract we examine the evolution of international currency exposures with a particular focus on the 2002 12 period during the run up to the global financial crisis there was a widespread shift towards positive net foreign currency positions such that relatively few countries exhibited the archetypal emerging market short foreign currency position on the eve of the global financial crisis during the crisis the upheaval in currency markets generated substantial currency generated valuation effects much of which were not reversed there is some evidence that the distribution of valuation effects was stabilizing in the sense of showing a negative covariation pattern with pre crisis net foreign asset positions