banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

on monoculture and the structure of crop rotations an issue when seeking to identify rotation choice is persistence in yield enhancement and input saving carry over effects focusing on carry over length and the monoculture decision we use quasi convexity of choice functions to develop price independent and price dependent principles concerning rotation structure iowa corn soybean rotation data suggest corn has one year memory for corn soybeans in the prior year is yield increasing 16 5 bu ac and nitrogen saving 51 lb ac the hypothesis that soybean has two year memory cannot be rejected corn in the prior year two years increases yield by 7 bu ac 11 6 bu ac we simulate to find price and practice subsidy levels that support different rotations

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

bond calls credible commitment and equity dilution a theoretical and clinical analysis of simultaneous tender and call stac offers this paper is an exploration of the ability of game theory to explain real world corporate maneuvering we explore this issue by investigating bond tender offers accompanied by a threat to call nontendered bonds so called simultaneous tender and call stac offers we argue that stacs engender a transparent game played by bondholders and shareholders we model this game and use this model to predict the outcome of stacs finally we investigate the issue of whether this theoretical model explains the outcomes of four actual stac issues made by james river may department stores and houston lighting power company our clinical analysis provides support for the explanatory power of our model calibrating the predictions of the model with data from these stacs we demonstrate a correspondence between theory and actual corporate behavior as predicted by our model subgame perfection or threat credibility and preplay coordination are central to explaining the outcomes of the stacs

valuing product innovation genetically engineered varieties in us corn and soybeans we develop a discrete choice model of differentiated products for us corn and soybean seed demand to study the welfare impact of genetically engineered ge crop varieties using a unique data set spanning the period 1996 2011 we find that the welfare impact of the ge innovation is significant in the last five years of the period analyzed our preferred counterfactual indicates that total surplus due to ge traits was 5 18 billion per year with seed manufacturers appropriating 56 of this surplus the seed industry obtained more surplus from ge corn whereas farmers received more surplus from ge soybeans

making waves to innovate or be a fast second internal finance leads to a stalemate in innovation games each firm wants to free ride on the others costly experimentation when instead innovation is financed externally e g with venture capital or initial public offerings there is an endogenous cost to delay waiting to make risky irreversible investment conveys pessimistic information i characterize the relative sizes of waves of leaders and followers in innovation cycles and the endogenous intertemporal distribution of quality as each wave builds and crashes finally old waves leave an adverse selection hangover such that too much early innovation can cause the market for future innovation to break down

modelling cost complementarities in terms of joint production abstract cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods it is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs roughly if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases this case of substitutive synergies is argued to be typical the key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate moebius inversion in terms of higher order differences

institutional markets financial marketing and financial innovation firms and institutions are monitored and controlled through a complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations because of these agency theoretic relations institu tional behavior in financial markets is not a simple reflection of the preference structures of individuals institutional preferences give rise to a demand for new financial instru ments and innovations even when the returns on these instruments are spanned in the sense of complete pricing the innovations can be thought of as solving moral hazard problems an agency theoretic example serves to illustrate the demand supply and financial marketing of stripped securities in short institutions matter the past two decades have witnessed an explosion of financial innovations the changes are too varied and diffuse to permit an easy taxonomy but broadly they seem to fall into two classes first there are the new securities and their markets beginning with puts and calls we have moved on to euromarkets mortgage pass throughs and cmo s strips straps and swaps putable converti bles primes and scores and s p futures and all of the other instruments that inhibit the financial zoo second there are the dynamic trading strategies that make heavy use of the new instruments basket and program trading the asset pricing theories that now characterize different types of money management and the various incarnations of portfolio insurance have changed financial decision making as dramatically as the available array of instruments has changed along with these changes has come an enormous increase in the demand for the services of financial economists we are called upon not only to value the new instruments and the new strategies but to design them as well like engineers

adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability the argument has frequently been made that the pattern of diffusion associated with most new innovations will typically have certain characteristics a diffusion curve for an innovation is usually defined as the proportion of its potential users who have already adopted as a function of time measured from the first adoption many empirical studies by both economists and other social scientists have shown that diffusion curves nearly always have two distinct characteristics i they are s shaped the proportion adopted is an increasing function of time which is initially convex but eventually becomes concave and ii they tend to be right hand skewed the inflection point occurs at a time corresponding to a proportion adopted which is less than one half so that the function is concave over the greatest amount of time in fact this skewing is occasionally severe enough to make the diffusion curve appear concave everywhere the focus of most empirical studies of innovation diffusion has centered on identification of either the major determinants of the speed of diffusion or the characteristics of firms which determine how long they delay adoption the seminal contributions are griliches 6 study of hybrid corn and mansfield s 121 study of 12 industrial innovations these studies and most of the similar ones following conclude that diffusion is faster for innovations with higher profitability and that large firms tend to be the earliest adopters some studies e g mansfield 121 herregat 71 have attempted to ascertain

valuation effects of greenmail prohibitions greenmail payments are widely viewed as actions designed by managers to perpetuate their tenure in offiee this view which suggests that greenmail prohibitions would enhance shareholder wealth receives mixed empirical support in this paper the average market reaction to charter amendments prohibiting greenmail payments is weakly nega tive suggesting there is a value to maintaining managerial flexibility nonlinear maxi mum likelihood estimation however reveals a strong positive correlation between the market reaction and the firm s abnormal stock price runup over the three months just prior to the proxy mailing date for the subsample of firms with a relatively large prior runup the precommitment not to pay greenmail is value enhancing if the prior runup reflects takeover rumors then this evidence is consistent with the proposition that greenmail pay ments amidst takeover speculations are value decreasing

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovations we develop a dynamic model of the adoption of financial innovations each period firms decide whether or not to adopt an innovation of uncertain value and the profitability of each period s adoptions reveals information about the innovation s value we show that characteristics of financial innovation waves cited by critics as evidence of irrational excess are in fact consistent with fully rational behavior we also show that social welfare is enhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable value and that financial intermediaries base an incentive to encourage such adoption article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a theory of the syndicate form follows function we relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi rents this improves incentives for individual bankers to cultivate investor relationships that translate into greater expected proceeds reputational concerns of lead bankers amplify the effect we derive conditions under which restricted entry and designation of a lead banker strictly pareto dominate in which case it is also strictly pareto dominant for the syndicate s fee to be greater than members cost of participation copyright the american finance association 2001

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

framing controversial actions regulatory focus source credibility and stock market reaction to poison pill adoption we contribute to the research on organizational accounts by examining the role of different framing languages and the credibility of the frame articulator on justifying controversial organizational actions drawing on regulatory focus theory and the literature on source credibility we develop novel arguments as to how a gains versus nonlosses framing and the perceived credibility of the speaker influence stakeholder responses as well as how the effectiveness of these aspects is influenced by context we test our arguments using data on the framing of the adoption of poison pills by u s firms between 1983 and 2008 using content analysis and an event study we find that a gains framing aligned with the dominant institutional logic leads to a positive stock market reaction while statements emanating from speakers with potentially self serving interests negatively affect the stock market reaction our findings further show that the effectiveness of framing and source credibility are dependent on contextual attributes such as speaker visibility prior performance and practice prevalence

the evolution of buyout pricing and financial structure in the 1980s we examine changes in the pricing and financial structure of large management buyouts in the 1980s over time 1 buyout price to cash flow ratios rose in absolute terms particularly in deals financed using public junk bonds 2 required bank principal repayments accelerated leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt obligations 3 private subordinated and bank debt were replaced by public junk debt and 4 management teams and dealmakers took more money out of transactions up front these patterns are consistent with an overheating phenomenon in the buyout market preliminary post buyout evidence lends some support to this interpretation

the effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth abstract this paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth i find evidence that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines also the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with abnormally high rates of defeat of unsolicited tender offers although this evidence is consistent with managerial entrenchment the evidence implies that on average poison pill defenses have seemingly had only a modest effect on firm valuation

financial innovation the last twenty years and the next the word revolution is entirely appropriate for describing the changes in financial institu tions and instruments that have occurred in the past twenty years the major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes the outlook for the future is for a slowing down of the rate of financial innovation but much growth and improvement are still in prospect

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

from microlevel decisions to landscape changes an assessment of agricultural conservation policies the growth in conservation programs has created a need for modeling frameworks capable of measuring microlevel behavioral responses and macrolevel landscape changes this paper presents an empirical model that predicts farmers production practices and the resulting levels of agricultural runoffs at more than 42 000 agricultural sites in the upper mississippi river basin under alternative conservation policies results suggest that payments for conservation tillage and crop rotations increase the use of these conservation practices however the acreage response is inelastic and the programs are not likely to be cost effective on their own for addressing hypoxia problem in the gulf of mexico

advantageous innovation and imitation in the underwriting market for corporate securities investment banks that develop new corporate securities systematically lead the new underwriting market despite being imitated early by equally competitive rivals we study how innovators and imitators set underwriting fees in order to identify empirically the source of this advantage using data of innovative securities since 1985 we do find that innovators set systematically higher fees than imitators this premium decreases as more issues occur and faster for later generation products imitation is also quicker for later generations this evidence supports the hypothesis that the innovator has superior skills in structuring any given issue of the new security

portfolio theory for independent assets this paper presents several new concepts for portfolio problems with independently distributed asset prices a criterion is developed for including or excluding assets in an optimal portfolio for an investor maximizing the expected value of a von neumann morgenstern utility function the central concept of the generalized harmonic mean is introduced it is shown to be the analogue of the riskless rate of return for problems without a riskless asset a new ordering theorem is proven showing that an optimal portfolio always consists of positive amounts of the assets with the largest mean values next the concept of independence from irrelevant alternatives is introduced for portfolio problems this is a property of utility functions and is proven to be true for most of the commonly used utility functions altogether the results provide new insights and tools for portfolio problems with independent assets and extend earlier results by samuelson and fishburn and porter

traders vs relationship managers reputational conflicts in full service investment banks we present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients interest on the other hand banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so a behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities the model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral and type reputation concerns

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

risk analysis with single index portfolio models an application to farm planning sharpe s 1963 single index portfolio model the separation theorem and a solution method suggested by elton gruber and padberg are adapted in this paper to the farm diversification problem the objectives are to develop risk measures based on single index parameters and computationally simple methods for farm risk planning that are suitable for microcomputers and modern hand held calculators the intent is to produce a normative model with possible extension applications

rational frenzies and crashes most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a walrasian auctioneer because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later rather than only now or never their current willingness to pay is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is a consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information leading to both frenzies in which demand feeds on itself and crashes in which price drops discontinuously the paper also shows how a result from static auction theory the revenue equivalence theorem can be applied to solve for a dynamic price path

sprayed to death path dependence lock in and pest control strategies theoretical literature on the economics of technology has emphasized the effects on technological trajectories of positive feedbacks in a competition among technologies that all perform a similar function the presence of increasing returns to adoptions can force all but one technology from the market furthermore the victor need not be the superior technology this paper provides an empirical study of one technological competition which illuminates this theoretical work it uses theoretical results to explain why chemical control of agricultural pests remains the dominant technology in spite of many claims that it is inferior to its main competitor integrated pest management copyright 1996 by royal economic society

sequential sales learning and cascades when ipo shares are sold sequentially later potential investors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors this can lead rapidly to cascades in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information and imitate earlier investors although rationing in this situation gives rise to a winner s curse it is irrelevant the model predicts that 1 offerings succeed or fail rapidly 2 demand can be so elastic that even risk neutral issuers underprice to completely avoid failure 3 issuers with good inside information can price their shares so high that they sometimes fail 4 an underwriter may want to reduce the communication among investors by spreading the selling effort over a more segmented market consider a scenario in which an issuer is selling a new security of uncertain value for example an ipo initial public offering of stock or high yield debt through an underwriter the s e c has banned variable price sales while the value of this new security is highly uncertain to individual market participants investors hold perfectly accurate information when aggregated moreover there are many potential investors and a small number of these investors can jointly determine the value of the firm or its project with high precision it would seem that in this scenario underpriced offerings would succeed and overpriced offerings would fail nevertheless this paper shows that if the distribution channels of invest ment banks are limited underpriced offerings can fail and overpriced offer ings can succeed with limited distribution channels it takes the under writer time to approach interested investors therefore later investors can observe how well an offering has sold to date or at least how successful it has sold relative to offerings previously undertaken by this underwriter

client discretion switching costs and financial innovation we analyze the incentives of investment banks to develop innovative products we show that client characteristics and market structure affect these incentives significantly investment banks with larger market shares have greater incentives to innovate and smaller banks are likely to share their innovations with the largest bank innovation incentives increase in volatile environments and regulatory scrutiny actually encourages loophole exploitation activity our predictions are consistent with stylized facts and the analysis has broad testable implications for innovative activity in other markets similarly characterized by a lack of comprehensive protection for intellectual property rights for example the software industry article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the war for the fare how driver compensation affects bus system performance two systems of bus driver compensation exist in santiago chile most drivers are paid per passenger transported while a second system compensates other drivers with a fixed wage compared with fixed wage drivers per passenger drivers have incentives to engage in la guerra por el boleto the war for the fare in which drivers change their driving patterns to compete for passengers this paper takes advantage of a natural experiment provided by the coexistence of these two compensation schemes on similar routes in the same city using data on intervals between bus arrivals we find that the fixed wage contract leads to more bunching of buses and hence longer average passenger wait times the per passenger drivers are assisted by a fascinating group of independent information intermediaries called sapos who earn their living by standing at bus stops recording arrival times and selling the information to subsequent drivers who drive past this bus bunching phenomenon has frustrated passengers in cities around the world so it is exciting to see evidence that contract design can improve performance in this dimension according to our results a typical bus passenger in santiago waits roughly 10 longer for a bus on a fixed wage route relative to an incentive contract route however the improved wait times on the incentivecontract routes come at a cost the incentives lead drivers to drive noticeably more aggressively causing at least 67 more accidents per kilometer driven most people in santiago blame la guerra por el boleto for the poor service provided by buses our results have implications for the design of incentives in public transportation systems

dynamics of innovation and risk we study the dynamics of an innovative industry in which agents learn about the likelihood of negative shocks managers can exert risk prevention effort to mitigate the consequences of shocks if no shock occurs confidence improves attracting managers to the innovative sector but when confidence becomes high inefficient managers exerting low risk prevention effort also enter this stimulates growth while reducing risk prevention the longer the boom the larger the losses if a shock occurs although these dynamics arise in the first best asymmetric information generates excessive entry of inefficient managers earning informational rents inflating the innovative sector and increasing its vulnerability