local government structure and public expenditures the law of 1 n postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theunited states at both the state andnational level and across countries fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures using a sample of georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures indicating support for the law of 1 nat the local level

eco labelling consequences in general equilibrium a graphical assessment international environmental groups propose to implement new standards of forest management through programs that certify producers who meet criteria to enhance biodiversity or sustainability these producers could earn an eco label that identifies their products for consumers we consider whether a market economy might generate feedbacks that produce undesirable side effects as consumers respond to price changes while the general case is ambiguous the theoretical framework shows the potential that certification may lead to a reallocation of land toward less ecologically sustainable uses with the possibility of sufficient impact to diminish global biodiversity or sustainability of forest products

efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

a derivation of the marginal abatement cost curve abstract the relationship between a firm s technology and its marginal abatement cost mac curve is explored even under the simplest specifications the mac curve will be kinked at some point except under a special assumption which in reality could easily be violated the nondifferentiability implies that the choice of instrument under uncertainty may depend on the targeted level of emissions reduction also stability conditions for dynamic tax mechanisms may be violated in the neighborhood of the kink point a policy implication is that in some cases output restrictions are as efficient as emissions restrictions in contrast to previous results

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

strategic judgment proofing a liquidity constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may harm bystanders the entrepreneur raises senior secured debt to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy for a fixed level of borrowing senior debt creates better incentives for precaution taking than either junior debt or outside equity the entrepreneur s level of borrowing is however socially excessive giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents overleveraging but leads to suboptimal incentives lender liability exacerbates the incentive problem even further a limited seniority rule dominates these alternatives shareholder liability mandatory liability insurance and punitive damages are also discussed

the distortive effects of antitrust fines based on revenue in most jurisdictions antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits and in some others caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce we uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate propose simple models to characterise their comparative static properties and quantify them with simulations based on market data we conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules of thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare how competition authorities cas should set fines and how they actually do so in practice is a highly debated issue among antitrust practitioners in europe where fines are often set directly by the cas appeal courts have often slashed cas decisions precisely on the grounds of how they set the fines an illuminating example is the uk competition appeal tribunal cat decision in 2011 to cut the fines set by the office of fair trading oft for members of the construction recruitment cartel substantially on the grounds that the wrong measure of affected commerce was used

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator abstract we present a model of environmental regulation in which the stringency of a firm s emissions standard is determined by cooperative bargaining between the firm and a regulator we show that bargaining can be socially beneficial because it can achieve the first best outcome this outcome is never an equilibrium of the noncooperative stackelberg game we also show that the social cost function is not the preferred objective function for a regulator when regulations are determined by bargaining social costs are lower with a regulator that attaches more importance to damages and enforcement costs than to the firm s compliance costs

duopoly and quality standards abstract in the absence of sunk costs a low quality producer benefits from a mildly restrictive quality standard whereas a high quality producer suffers from it consumers welfare increases if the firm producing the higher quality does not increase its quality significantly in response to the increase in quality by its rival a sufficiently severe standard causes exit from the industry when there are no sunk cost the high quality producer exits first

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

pollution taxes when firms choose technologies we consider the properties of a pollution tax when the regulated firm has a discrete choice of technologies with which to reduce pollution the firm s technology choice makes possible two sequences of play the traditional one in which the regulator moves first committing to a tax rate before the firm adopts a technology and an alternative one in which the firm moves first by adopting a technology we find that a range of pollution levels including possibly the first best one are unattainable when the regulator moves first the regulator may be better able to achieve the first best outcome when the firm moves first

bankruptcy and care choice this article considers the care choice of a potentially bankrupt injurer when care is pecuniary and the legal system is characterized by strict liability i show contrary to previous results that such an injurer may take too little or too much care and that neither injurer care nor victim welfare is necessarily increasing in injurer wealth when injurers behave optimally analysis of an expected cost function demonstrates that injurer expected costs are a concave and increasing function of injurer assets a result suggesting applications to the study of vertical relationships and markets for agents

how liable should a lender be the case of judgment proof firms and environmental risk comment recently u s environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability a model of a potentially judgment proof owner of a firm a lender and a potential victim is developed in which this policy can increase accident frequency and reduce efficiency full partial and zero lender liability rules and a minimum equity requirement are analyzed partial lender liability and an equivalent minimum equity requirement deliver the highest level of efficiency although the former can deliver a higher contribution by the lender to the victim than the latter policy and empirical implications are also discussed copyright 1995 by american economic association

competition and monopoly power in local government an extension of caplan 2001 caplan 2001 shows that because land is asource of immobile wealth localgovernments can use the property tax toavoid competitive pressures of the tieboutmodel allowing them to deviate fromcitizens preferences in this comment ishow that the property tax is not the onlytax local governments can use to avoidcompetitive pressure most taxes placed onproperty owners allow local governments toextract some rents despite perfect citizenmobility

standing tiebout on his head tax capitalization and the monopoly power of local governments much of the public finance literature argues that localgovernments behave competitively due to residents ease of exitand entry the model presented here challenges this widespreadconclusion though it is costless to relocate to anotherlocality the presence of tax capitalization makes it impossiblefor land owners to avoid monopolistic pricing of public servicesby moving land owners can only choose between paying the taxdirectly or paying it indirectly in the form of a lower sale valuefor their housing if they exit in consequence the only realcheck on local governments comes through imperfectly functioningelectoral channels

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

commodity taxation in a differentiated oligopoly the authors introduce commodity taxation into a vertical differentiation model with endogenous product selection they show that a uniform ad valorem tax lowers both qualities distorts the allocation of consumers between firms and lowers the consumer prices of both variants a small uniform tax is always welfare improving over the no tax equilibrium a differentiation of tax rates may or may not be desirable on welfare grounds if a welfare improvement is possible through a nonuniform tax it is always the high quality variant that must be taxed at a higher rate copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the taxation of polluting products in a differentiated industry this paper studies the provision of environmental quality in an imperfectly competitive market it uses a vertical differentiation model in which the free entry equilibrium results in an under provision of quality the following main results are obtained first a commodity tax may have a significant impact on the market structure in this setting it tends to increase the number of active firms second through its impact on market structure a commodity tax may be welfare improving even though quality creates a positive externality third a commodity tax may bring about an equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to a pareto efficient allocation

ecolocical certification of forest products economic challenges abstract with increasing rates of forest depletion worldwide increasingly the question is being asked can markets play a role in mitigating the deleterious environmental and social impacts of forestry activities the forest stewardship council and others have proposed systems of ecological certification where otherwise very similar products are viewed by consumers as different products because additional information on the products history is provided the certification assures the consumer that the products have been produced with practices that meet fundamental ecological and social standards for ecological certification systems to be viable and deliver products to the market over the long term the relationships among key components must evolve economically and institutionally consisting of local forest management firms local certifying non government organizations international non government organizations timber and product markets the ecological certification system transcends local forests and communities to international markets conceptually the system is a series of principal agent relationships this paper in addition to developing the concept of ecological certification analyzes the relationships among the many actors and the relationship of the actors to the forest

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

the benefits of extended liability we characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity this firm the agent is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder the principal the level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable this level of care depends both on the degree of incompleteness of the regulatory contract and on the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent increasing the wealth of the principal that can be seized upon an accident has no value when private transactions are regulated but might otherwise strictly improve welfare an incomplete regulation supplemented by an ex post extended liability regime can sometime achieve the second best

strategic choice of quality when quality is costly the persistence of the high quality advantage in a two firm two stage model of vertical product differentiation i show that for every convex fixed cost function of quality the firm that chooses the higher quality at the first stage earns the higher profits the result holds for the pure strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous quality game and it holds as well if firms choose their qualities in sequential order

liability and organizational choice abstract scholars have long maintained that increases in liability encourage firms to contract out risky activities in order to take advantage of so called judgment proof strategies these strategies allow entities to limit their liability through contractual arrangements with nearly insolvent firms however the use of judgment proof firms triggers countervailing effects it provides opportunities to externalize liability through judgment proof firms but the insolvency of these firms introduces distortion in care levels that can generate more liability costs these costs may outweigh the benefits of externalizing liability making contracting out suboptimal a simple model of organizational decision making with judgment proof firms is developed and applied to the oil industry where contracting out decreased in response to heightened liability following the exxon valdez oil spill

from pigou to extended liability on the optimal taxation of externalities under imperfect financial markets an important contribution of economics to public policy rests on the precept that price signals should force producers of externalities to internalize the welfare of other economic agents pigou 1920 s celebrated insight on the taxation of externalities provided an intellectual foundation for a variety of policies from pollution taxes permits to experience rating pigovian taxation s policy appeal is limited if the polluter has insufficient resources to pay the damage when it occurs to defend pigovian taxation in the presence of judgment proof agents its proponents point at the many institutions extending liability to third parties yet little is known about the validity of pigou s analysis in this context the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of extended liability and investigates whether full internalization is called for in the presence of agency costs between potential polluters and providers of guarantees its contribution is two fold it first shows that the better the firms corporate governance and the stronger their balance sheet the more closely taxes should track the corresponding externality it then develops the first analysis of extended liability when guarantors themselves may be judgment proof and the extension of liability may give rise to further externalities relatedly it derives the curvature of the optimal taxation of externalities in a multiplant firm

local property and state income taxes the role of interjurisdictional competition and collusion this paper addresses two long standing positive questions in public finance i why is the property tax despite widespread popular complaints against its fairness the almost exclusive tax instrument used by local governments and ii why do we consistently observe higher levels of governments states undermining local property tax systems through income tax funded grants and state imposed caps on local property tax rates a new intuitive argument to explain question is presented and tested in simulations using a computable general equilibrium model with parameters set to be consistent with new jersey data both the intuitive argument and the simulation results indicate that setting local income tax rates to zero is a dominant strategy for community planners when faced with popular sentiment against the property tax community planners can collude and introduce local income taxes simultaneously to prevent adverse general equilibrium migration and price changes since zero income tax rates are dominan

economy wide effects of forest policies a general equilibrium assessment from vietnam using vietnam as a case study we employ an applied general equilibrium age model to test three policy options for managing commercial forestry specifically we examine the impact of an export ban an increase in the ad valorem royalty by 100 and an increase of 100 in the export tax a ban on exports raises domestic capital formation benefits the domestic consumer and decreases deforestation the other two policies have little effect on the utility of the domestic household the findings demonstrate the need to assess forestry policies in the context of the broader economic structure

market power in the eco industry polluters incentives under environmental liability law this paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco industry under strict liability polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement but socially optimal output given abatement under negligence with firm specific abatement standards polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output under negligence with industry wide abatement standards the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal second best considerations are offered for each case under strict liability negligence these apply to the level of liability the behavioral standard

liability and large scale long term hazards this paper analyzes the application of liability to large scale long term hazards the key features distinguishing such hazards are the long temporal separation between exposure to a hazard and disease and the large damages when injuries finally emerge the large scale of damages creates a strong incentive to avoid liability payments and the long temporal separation creates numerous avenues through which parties can avoid paying possible damage awards the analysis focuses on the incentive to avoid paying damages by vertically divesting production tasks associated with serious occupational risks such divestiture can lower liability costs if the small firm operating the risky stage goes out of business before latent injuries emerge or has insufficient assets to pay damages and declares bankruptcy when suits are filed the paper then presents an empirical regression analysis of small firm entry into the u s economy between 1967 and 1980 the period in which liability laws were changing the point estima

a positive theory of the predatory state while the distinction between public and private goods is essential in developing a normative theory of non predatory states the focus of this article is on a positive theory of predatory states since the predatory relationship between the state and its subjects depends on the power of the state to grab or to appropriate coercively and the subject s ability to escape or hide the boundaries of the state are decided by the nature of the assets that can be taken more or less easily accordingly i will introduce a new distinction between captive and fugitive assets that positively captures the frontiers of a state space the us railroading in the nineteenth century provides an illustration regarding the explanatory power of an asset appropriating perspective of the state compared to a public goods approach

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overcharges research for this paper was supported by a grant from the economic and social research council res 062 23 2211

assessing the efficiency of local open space provision abstract this paper tests the efficiency of local provision of land conservation i examine how housing prices which capitalize open space amenities and future tax obligations change after municipalities vote on referendums for conservation spending using a dynamic regression discontinuity based on voting outcomes results suggest that average housing prices increase about 0 68 1 12 for every 1000 per household of open space spending authorized which indicates inefficiency and underprovision of conservation i also examine tax capitalization and supply side explanations for estimated capitalization

agricultural land retirement and slippage lessons from an australian case study this paper uses a computable general equilibrium cge model to examine the economic implications of agricultural land retirement from wool production for conservation in australia employing an innovative specific factors characterization of production to generate short run and long run results we show that the potential welfare gains from land retirement can be significant however in several scenarios examined we find that slippage in agricultural production is significant resulting in reduced welfare our slippage results provide insights into the relationship between the potential causes of slippage and describe how a land retirement policy can be designed to minimize this effect jel c68 q24

bidding with securities auctions and security design we study security bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities that is they offer payments that are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold the value depends on investment by the winner thus creating the possibility of moral hazard such auctions are commonly used both formally and informally in formal auctions the seller generally restricts bids to an ordered set such as an equity share or royalty rate by restricting the bids standard auction formats such as first and second price auctions can be used in informal settings with competing buyers the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront rather bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid based on his beliefs ex post we characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies in this setting and show that an informal mechanism yields the lowest possible revenues across all mechanisms we also determine the optimal formal mechanism and show that the security design is more important than the auction format we show that the revenue equivalence principle that expected revenues are independent of the auction format holds if the set of permissible securities is ordered and convex such as equity otherwise it need not hold for example when bidders offer standard debt securities a second price auction is superior on the other hand if bidders compete on the conversion ratio of convertible debt a first price auction yields higher revenues finally we examine how different forms of moral hazard impact our results

drilling like there s no tomorrow bankruptcy insurance and environmental risk this paper measures the effects of bankruptcy protection on industry structure and environmental outcomes in oil and gas extraction using administrative data from texas i exploit variation in an insurance requirement that reduced firms ability to avoid liability through bankruptcy among small firms the policy substantially improved environmental outcomes and reduced production most production was reallocated to larger firms with better environmental records but high cost production where social cost may have exceeded social benefit decreased these results suggest that incomplete internalization of environmental costs due to bankruptcy is an important determinant of industry structure and safety effort in hazardous industries

remarks on good vs bad characteristics in vertical differentiation abstract in a recent paper garella and lambertini economic letters 65 1999 245 claim that we should distinguish between good and bad characteristics in analysing the incentives for a duopoly to vertically differentiate their products we prove here that the results obtained by the authors are false and we show that in the context of their model maximum differentiation should appear whether characteristic is good or bad

natural oligopolies a vertical differentiation model this article contains a more complete characterization of conditions under which vertically differentiated markets are or are not natural oligopolies than has been found previously in the literature specifically previous results on markets in which firms have cost functions with constant returns are incomplete these results are expanded moreover results are provided for markets with firms having increasing or decreasing marginal cost functions

green markets eco certification and equilibrium fraud abstract consumers voluntarily pay significant price premiums to acquire unobservable environmental attributes in green markets this paper considers the performance of eco certification policy under circumstances where consumers cannot discern environmental attributes in goods but are able to form rational expectations regarding the extent of illicit activities in the green market the main results are i fraud is less prevalent in green markets when entry barriers limit the number of firms ii conventional environmental policies on polluting techniques increase the incidence of fraud and can even preclude the use of non polluting techniques which would otherwise emerge in green markets iii voluntary eco certification policies can decrease fraud increase output and raise profits per firm and iv in cases where the socially optimal resource allocation can be supported the optimal policy involves negative unit certification fees positive fixed certification fees and is revenue generating for the certifying agent

environmental risks and bank liability abstract many governments have introduced or are considering introducing laws to recover from the liable parties the cleanup costs caused by pollution damages in particular the banks who finance the firms causing environmental damages may be considered liable in various court cases in the us and elsewhere banks have been found liable while they have been exempted in others we develop a model in which the insurance sector may insure the firm for the pollution risk and the bank may lend money for investment under complete information of the bank about the firm s activities the limited liability of the firm induces excessive investment and insufficient care but full liability of the bank creates the appropriate internalization of the environmental risk this rationalization of the laws on lender liability must be qualified because in general the banks suffer from agency problems adverse selection and moral hazard in their relationships with firms in the adverse selection case full liability of the bank leads to underinvestment partial liability is better but may fail to implement the optimal second best allocation in the case of moral hazard full responsibility is killing the project too often while still leading to low care too often partial responsibility may achieve the second best optimal allocation but in some cases the level of responsibility necessary to induce the proper level of care is too high for the project to be financed by the bank we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results with regards to liability laws for environmental damages

debt and seniority an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management we argue that long term debt has a role in controlling management s ability to finance future investments a company with high widely held debt will find it hard to raise capital since new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors conversely for a company with low debt we show there is an optimal debt equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments we derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior