new issues in corporate finance flow of funds data are used to compare methods of finance in 5 countries over the period 1970 to 1985 many of the problems associated with previous studies are avoided by estimating net instead of gross financing proportions the degree of consolidation of accounts reciprocal arrangements between borrowers and lenders and compensating deposit requirements on borrowers no longer distort financing patterns corrections for inflation are provided by employing flow rather than stock figures and using own aggregation procedures to derive stock measures significant variations in financing emerge these are not readily explained by traditional descriptions of corporate finance in particular taxation as an alternative the paper suggests that relationships between borrowers and lenders establish forms of commitment that are conducive to the provision of long term finance the separation between investment and finance which has been the starting point of corporate finance theory is untenable in a multiperiod context in which terms of finance define future allocation of control

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

a new industrial strategy preparing europe for the turn of the century abstract this paper argues that the present significance of the forces of transnationalism centripetalism and short termism which relate back to an underlying concentration of power in modern economies provides strong grounds for developing a set of coherent industrial strategies within europe the paper goes on to argue that much can be learned from the japanese experience not so much in terms of the details of their strategy but more in terms of their general approach but such strategies have to be informed by a vision of the future europe the suggestion made on grounds of both democracy and efficiency is that we should not support national or european champions but rather aim for an economy in which relatively small dynamic enterprises can survive and prosper

tax perceptions and preferences over tax structure in the united kingdom do voters know their tax liabilities accurately or do they systematically misperceive them could such misperceptions influence voters choices over alternative tax structures proposed by politicians this paper assesses the accuracy of individuals tax perceptions in the uk using micro data from the british social attitudes survey 1995 and tests an empirical model of the determinants of tax structure preferences including tax misperceptions a systematic bias towards over estimation of income and expenditure tax vat liabilities is found and individ uals tax preferences appear to be both dominated by self interest and distorted by tax misperceptions whether using a traditional utility maximisation framework or a variety of public choice frameworks economists agree that consumer voters or taxpayer voters dislike taxes taxes lower the consumption possibility set and thereby utility politicians proposing higher taxes expect to lose votes unless they can persuade voters that the utility gain from the use of those taxes will exceed the tax induced utility loss of course the extent of individuals losses will depend on their circumstances and how revenues are raised the tax structure traditional tax incidence and excess burden analyses and models of political costs associated with the tax structure hettich and winer 1984 1988 each provide guidance on the extent to which different individuals may be expected to suffer and vote differently under alternative tax structures much will depend on attitudes towards and perceptions of specific taxes especially personal income taxes and consumption taxes underlying most such analyses are two common presumptions i tax preferences are dictated by self interest and ii individuals accurately assess their tax liabilities and so make informed choices two largely independent areas of literature have challenged these assumptions first models incorporating altruism

partial fiscal decentralization and sub national government fiscal discipline empirical evidence from oecd countries recent theoretical research suggests that financing sub national governments expenditure out of own revenue sources is linked to more responsible budgeting because the financial implications of spending decisions then are internalized within a jurisdiction we test this proposition empirically on a sample of 23 oecd countries over the 1975 2000 period and find evidence in line with the hypothesis that greater revenue decentralization measured as sub national governments share of own source tax revenues in general government tax revenue is associated with improved sub national government budget deficits surpluses this finding is cross validated with a novel independent dataset consisting of all 34 oecd member states from 2002 to 2008

distributive implications of an aging society abstract the paper reviews recent research on the impact of an aging population on the distribution of income after briefly discussing the demographic conditions responsible for population aging a short account is given of demographic trends in the industrialized world in order to disentangle the many potential channels by which an aging society affects the dispersion of income several levels of aggregation are distinguished the paper differentiates between intra and intergenerational issues between direct and indirect demographic inequality effects and between the distribution of current and lifetime income it emphasizes the critical role of age related redistributive tax transfer systems like public pension schemes and health care systems sources of distributional policy conflicts are identified at both the cross section level and the lifetime level of income inequality the institutional design of intergenerational burden sharing individual disincentive reactions shifts in age income profiles related to cohort size and politico economic repercussions are shown to drive the relation between population aging and income distribution in distinct and partially opposite ways

european industrial policy and industrial policy in europe among the most vexing problems facing those concerned with the formation and implementation of industrial policy is deciding what it is why it exists and whether there ought to be more or less of it than exists at present any random collection of six economists is sure to produce at least a dozen different opinions on the subject not least because many economists have trouble in reconciling their gut reaction that industrial policy should not exist with the obvious fact that it does the vigorous debate that now rages between those who believe that industrial policy should and those that believe that it should not be consciously pursued by gov ernments is but a pale reflection of the true diversity of opinion that exists on the subject even amongst that group of economists who are enthusiastic about industrial policy the range of specific policy proposals that have been put forth is enormous and the debate within this group is no less active and acrimonious than that between the pros and antis following what is a clear if unintended character istic of many of the contributions to this debate this paper is devoted to complicating ratherthan simpli fying the issues in particular the question that we shall explore is whether there might be a type of industrial policy which should be applied at a supra national level although this question has been actively discussed in europe since the signing of the treaty of rome at least the revival of free marketideologies the looming menace of 1992 and recent discussions of european political union have all added a good deal of fuel to the fire more than a few ambitious european politicians have launched initiatives that apparently usurp national policy prerogatives and the response by many national governments has become increasingly angry and strident traditional liberalism struggled for years to define the boundaries of the state in terms of the

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

strategic public policy around population thresholds abstract political economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both re election and financial incentives this article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether when and how local office holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases using data from all 589 belgian municipalities over the period 1977 2016 our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits particularly for apartments these policy changes occur early in the election cycle and at least for housing policy are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold

the political costs of taxes and government spending the marginal political costs of different types of taxes and government spending as well as voter preferences over different fiscal variables are examined using two different specifications for political cost one based on the probability of incumbent defeat and the other based on the incumbent s percentage of the vote models associated with these two specifications in which voting behaviour depends on disaggregated taxes and government expenditures are estimated using clata from canadian provincial elections the empirical results which indicate that different types of taxes and expenditures have quite different marginal political costs have important implications for models that incorporate voter pref erences

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

revealed preferences for property taxes an empirical study of perceived tax incidence voting in an election over removal of a homestead exemption is examined to determine different groups perceptions of the incidence of the property tax homeowners in two categories appear to evaluate accurately the effects on them of the homestead exemption renters with higher cost rental contracts are more likely to believe they are significantly affected by the change in the property tax structure these results demonstrate the ability of local governments to discriminate in tax share price across groups of voters copyright 1992 by mit press

production organization and efficiency during transition an empirical analysis of east german agriculture enterprise restructuring is expected to improve efficiency in transition economies with data from former east germany we compare the efficiency of family farms and partnerships with large scale successor organizations of the collective and state farms lsos using parametric and nonparametric techniques we show that lsos display lower technical efficiency than do family farms and partnerships but that this difference is small and declining during transition mainly as a result of structural changes in agriculture family farms are not as scale efficient as partnerships and lsos and partnerships are superior to all other organizational forms

demographic structure and the political economy of education subsidies this paper investigates the politico economic impact of a society s age structure on the extent of public funding of education education subsidies serve to internalize positive spillovers of human capital investment but redistribute resources from the working old to the non working young thus creating a conflict of interest between the two generations the political process is characterized by a representative democracy

the performance of private and cooperative socialist organization postwar yugoslav agriculture socialist enterprises in yugoslav agriculture show higher levels of productivity than private producers the author examines the sources of these differences with total factor productivity estimates based on sectoral aggregate cobb douglas production functions which permit separation of environmental policy and organizational effects the results support the following conclusions cooperative socialist enterprises are not inherently inefficient and can even outperform private producers both types of producers were responding to their environment and their differential rates of technological change reflect the different constraints they faced and socialist enterprises exhibited technology adoption behavior similar to nonsocialist enterprises elsewhere copyright 1987 by mit press

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

the challenge of high unemployment it is argued that policymakers macroeconomists and microeconomists should all take high unemployment more seriously the shortcomings of existing theories of unemployment are discussed and a new definition of involuntary unemployment is proposed a model is sketched in which falling aggregate demand leads to keynesian unemployment because labor is heterogeneous and relative wages matter microeconomic theory is criticized for assuming away unemployment and in the process radically changing the answers to some basic questions in trade theory and public finance finally some speculative explanations are offered for the low unemployment now found in states like new jersey and massachusetts this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

industrial strategy a missing link in british economic policy this paper critically analyzes the potential and limitations of economic instruments for environmental protection it presents a general framework for analyzing environmental issues along with a taxonomy for classifying different approaches to environmental protection a key contribution of the paper is to identify critical steps in marketing economic incentive approaches for environmental protection the challenge to researchers is to design tools that will help achieve environmental goals more effectively this means taking careful account of political technical and economic constraints in system design copyright 1993 by oxford university press

the role of tax bases and collections costs in the determination of income tax rates seigniorage and inflation a growing theoretical literature on optimal taxation predicts that governments will set the tax rates on money holdings and on more traditional tax bases to minimize the deadweight losses of collecting government revenue under the presumption that relative collection costs and tax bases have not changed significantly over time the empirical time series seigniorage literature has focused on the theory s tax smoothing implication finding only weak support we show that changes in collections costs and tax bases played an important role in the determination of tax composition and find stronger support for tax smoothing when this is taken into account

efficiency in social versus private agricultural production the case of yugoslavia this paper extends the work of michael l boyd 1987 by examining the question of efficiency in yugoslavian agricultural production using the stochastic production frontier the authors fin d the private sector produces with higher output efficiency than the social sector next they examine regional efficiency differences the authors findings reinforce earlier analysis of the economic impact of regional development policy pursued in yugoslavia less developed republics appeared unable to utilize efficiently the large volume of investment resources allocated from the more developed republics via the central government copyright 1993 by mit press

financing higher education and majority voting abstract this paper examines the state funding of higher education treated as an investment good generating an externality under majority voting the model considers a single cohort over two periods individuals maximise net lifetime income subject to the government s budget constraint with a proportional tax cyclical voting does not occur despite double peaked preferences comparative static results are obtained a fall in non education expenditure leads to a fall in the choice of grant and a positive externality is a necessary though not sufficient condition for ensuring majority support for some positive level of the grant

legal constraints and the choice of educational grant structures recent empirical work suggests that legalconstraints are significant in choosingstate educational grant structures unfortunately the literature has not takensuch constraints into account thus callinginto question particular grant structurerecommendations this paper studies theconditions under which a legislature underorder to reform its educational grantstructure prefers foundation grants overdistrict power equalization grants atheoretical model is presented in which thechoice is shown to depend on the legalbasis of the court s decision and theempirical validity of this conclusion isdemonstrated using connecticut data and aseparate model of school districtexpenditure choice

pareto efficiency and majority voting why high taxes on the middle class may be desirable in this paper we use a simple median voter model to analyze the effects of tax systems with differing degrees of progressivity we find that relatively high taxes on middle incomes have two important advantages on the one hand they help to ensure that all citizens are better off than they would be in a world without government and on the other hand they reduce the tax level chosen in the election therefore the progression in the middle income range not only ensures that wicksell s requirement of ex post efficiency of the tax system is achieved it may also increase social welfare

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

the demand for education under capital market imperfections this paper studies the theoretical implications of the demand for education assuming the same regime for financing consumption and the direct costs of education when the capital market is not perfect it is motivated by the policy concerns on the financing of post secondary education in case of an imperfect capital market the separation theorem see e g wallace and ihnen 1975 is not valid and the theoretical implications substantially deviate from their counterparts under a perfect capital market regime for example in a capital market with credit rationing the borrowing rate exerts a positive effect on the demand for education whereas this effect is negative in case of a perfect capital market the theoretical results are used to discuss the effects of government policy on the demand for post compulsory education

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

vertical externalities in tax setting evidence from gasoline and cigarettes abstract a common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property consequently state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses we find that when the federal government increases taxes there is a significant positive response of state taxes for example a 10 cent per gallon increase in the federal tax rate on gasoline leads to a 3 2 cent increase in the state tax rate

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

exploring the cross country gap in patenting a stochastic frontier approach abstract this paper benchmarks the patent activities of a sample of oecd countries against the world frontier and explores the sources of the cross country differences in patenting regarded as a proxy for innovation a patent production frontier is estimated for a panel of 21 oecd countries over the 1990 2002 period using stochastic frontier analysis patenting performance for each country is decomposed into basic patenting capacity and patenting efficiency the gap between europe and the world leaders in terms of basic patenting capacity remains substantial with little sign of convergence over the sample period in terms of patenting efficiency japan germany and italy have improved their relative position in recent years the gap in patenting performance between the uk and the world frontier is due to relative underperformance in both patenting capacity and efficiency in patent production institutional factors are found to be significantly associated with the patenting efficiency of an economy

a positive model of tax reform this paper is devoted to the explanation of tax policy from a behavioural theoretic point of view it for the first time brings together within a unified framework behavioural determinants of government expenditure taxation and tax reform administrative and compliance costs associated with taxation factors generally neglected in models of taxation as well as tax avoidance evasion deadweight losses and the costs that are involved in the tax reform process itself play a crucial role in the model the paper investigates how these factors influence the development of taxation and expenditure and the occurrence of tax reform

elections and income redistribution this paper has analyzed a model of elections in which each candidate selects a reputation for the distribution of income that can be expected if he is elected the first result established that whenever there are three or more groups of voters and no single group has half or more of the voters if the candidates believe that the voters choices are determined solely by the candidates redistributional reputations then there is no electoral equilibrium the candidates expectations about the voters choices were then reformulated using a qualitative response model the next result established that this alternative model leads to the existence of electoral equilibria the remainder of the paper analyzed the nature of these equilibria for any given electorate among other things the results established that there is always a unique equilibrium provided a simple procedure for finding the precise location of this equilibrium and showed that this location implicitly maximizes the sum of the voters utility functions on the possible income distributions the penultimate sections provided some simple examples which illustrate the main results in the paper and a discussion of these results in terms of the politics of redistribution

public employees as swing voters empirical evidence on opposition to public reform reform offers economic gains for society atlarge but can represent a threat to theinterests of public employees publicsector reform faces opposition from votersemployed in public sector norwegian dataallow for an analysis this interpretation survey data show that public employeesprefer less reform than the rest of thepopulation the voting behavior of publicemployees is more sensitive to reform thanis that of other voters the swing voterhypothesis and hence shares of publicemployees in a local jurisdiction have anegative impact on the probability ofreform