on the early holocene foraging to early agriculture we consider a world in which the mode of food production foraging or agriculture is endogenous and in which technology grows exogenously within a model of coalition formation we allow individuals to form co operative communities bands of foragers or farmers rationally at the lowest levels of technology equilibrium entails the grand coalition of foragers a co operative structure which avoids over exploitation of the environment but at a critical state of technology the co operative structure breaks down through an individually rational splintering of the band at this stage there can be an increase in work and through the over exploitation of the environment a food crisis in the end technological growth may lead to a one way transition from foraging to agriculture

sticks and carrots two incentive mechanisms supporting intra group cooperation abstract in this note we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra group cooperation in the context of prisoner s dilemma payoffs rewards for cooperating and punishments for defection where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship

inflation persistence in central and eastern european countries this article studies inflation persistence with time varying coefficient autoregressions for 12 central european countries in comparison with the united states and the euro area we find that inflation persistence tends to be higher in times of high inflation since the oil price shocks inflation persistence has declined both in the united states and the euro area in most central and eastern european countries for which our study covers 1993 2012 inflation persistence has also declined with the main exceptions of the czech republic slovakia and slovenia where persistence seems to be rather stable our findings have implications for the conduct of monetary policy and for a possible membership in the euro area among the two time varying coefficient methods we use our results favour the flexible least squares smoother over the kalman smoother we also conclude that the ols estimate of an autoregression is likely upward biased relative to the time average of time varying parameters when the paramete

the effect of social security contributions on coverage and wages a gender perspective using a natural experiment from colombia author affiliation andres j vargas andres vargas ttu edu acknowledgment i would like to thank steve trejo dan hamermesh gerald oettinger jacqueline angel dan slesnick adriana kugler stefano farne two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of texas at austin the second conference on aging in the americas and texas tech university for their insightful and valuable comments i am also grateful to cesar caballero and alejandra corchuelo from the colombian national department of statistics dane for providing me with the data all remaining errors are mine 1 introductiontheoretically social security contributions are considered a benefit linked payroll tax because of the connection between the taxes paid by or on behalf of each worker and that individual s expected benefits hence with the presence of tax benefits linkages workers receive a higher compensation and the contributions are analogous to a price paid for a privately supplied commodity summers 1989 a general payroll tax on the other hand has no linkage to benefits for the individual taxpayer and therefore carries efficiency costs the benefit linkages of social security contributions depend on the extent to which workers perceive that they are getting the contributions back as benefits and on how much the individual values those benefits this depends in turn on the quality of the services offered by the entities financed by the tax if they are perceived as good employees will consider the contributions as a deferred compensation or insurance program and will accept a reduction in the net wage with no employment effects if they are perceived as bad the contributions will be considered as a pure tax with the corresponding effects on employment kesselman 1997 the objective of this article is to investigate from a gender and marital status perspective the effects of pension and health care contributions on the employment and wages of workers covered by social security regulations it is interesting to study colombia because the country implemented a large social security reform in 1993 that allows the identification the labor market effects of these contributions furthermore payments for pension and health care provisions amount to a quarter of the wage bill there this in conjunction with an 11 average contribution for other payroll taxes positions colombia as the country with the highest payroll tax rate in latin america the end of the 1980s and early 1990s was a period of deep structural transformations in latin america these reforms were part of efforts to liberalize economies and increase the participation of the market in the production and allocation of goods and services and were the product of the collapse most economies in the region experienced during the 1980s due to their mounting fiscal and monetary imbalances heckman and pages 2004 these large exogenous shifts in policy regimes offer very good case studies of the interaction between institutions and labor market outcomes the main reforms in colombia during this period included the approval of a new constitution key reforms to the labor market a major trade reform and liberalization in direct foreign investment more than two years after these reforms were put in place colombia implemented a social security reorganization that transformed the institutional framework for pension funds and health care provision law 100 of december 1993 regarding the health care regime the social security reform replaced the existing discretionary affiliation system that covered only the worker with a mandatory one that features a stricter prepayment system and covers also the family of the worker on the subject of pensions the reform introduced a fully funded social security system and gave the workers the choice between this new scheme of individual capitalization of public funds and the existing pay as you go system

endogenous formation of coalitions with composite goods abstract we construct a model of endogenous formation of coalitions when three goods are necessary for a composite good and composite goods are substitutes for each other this analysis extends economides and salop s journal of industrial economics xl 1992 105 model of composite goods where two goods are necessary we analyze the welfare implications of coalition structure and investigate which coalition structure leads to the highest social welfare the paper investigates whether the most desirable coalition structure represents an equilibrium and provides a sufficient condition for the socially efficient coalition structure to be a stable nash coalition structure

political coalition breaking and sustainability of policy reform abstract this paper examines the need and potential for coalition breaking in policy reform efforts related to agriculture and the environment the objective is to consider traditional policy tools that can break existing political coalitions given the powerful noncompetitive role of strong interest groups such as government bureaucracy and large trading organizations choice of the policy mix is modeled as a cooperative game a modification of the nash bargaining solution is used to endogenize coalition formation this framework is then used to examine the potential for an external development agency to promote environmental interests in the policy formation process the results explain how in some countries a small increase in strategic aid may achieve a major breakthrough in policy reform even if past activities have been unproductive and how in other countries a major increase in aid may be fruitless

oil price inflation pass through in romania during the inflation targeting regime abstractin the wake of the inflation targeting strategy in romania we estimate the impact of international oil prices upon the consumer price index cpi and core inflation the inflation target was systematically missed by the monetary authorities who explain this failure by exogenous factors using a frequency domain framework we show that the oil price inflation pass through can be observed only for those components of inflation which include volatile prices and only in the medium run our results put forward that the constant missing of the target cannot be explained by the oil price inflation pass through and the credibility of the strategy is put into question

labor market rigidities and informality in colombia informality is at the center of the economic debate in colombia fueled by the high level prevalent in the country and its substantial increase during the 1990s we study the effect of labor market rigidities namely the increase in non wage costs and the minimum wage on the size of the informal sector the transition into and out of informality and wages our results indicate that rises in non wage costs and the minimum wage increase the probability of transition into informality as well as the size of the informal sector the business cycle has second order effects the analysis across education groups points towards strong exclusion motives for low skilled informal workers mainly driven by labor demand adjustments in response to increasing hiring costs and argues somehow in favor of exit motives for workers with higher educational attainment in addition we document facts regarding the evolution and characteristics of the informal sector across alternative definitions of informality

do binding agreements solve the social dilemma we investigate whether binding agreements can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods by signing a binding agreement players can prevent free riding by the contributors to a public good however a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient in our setting the individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global coalition is always the socially optimal structure agreements form sequentially and the equilibrium outcome is an asymmetric structure which consists of two coalitions our experiment therefore lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient in fact we observe an outcome which is even less efficient than that predicted by the equilibrium agreement structure however it seems that when subjects reach agreements they do so with the intention of cooperating rather than free riding furthermore it seems that they learn to cooperate over time and reach the global agreement more often towards the end of sessions keywords

a theory of endogenous coalition structures consider an environment with widespread externalities and suppose that bind ing agreements can be written we study coalition formation in such a setting our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game we establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilib rium coalition structures we develop an algorithm that generates under certain conditions an equilibrium coalition structure our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions in particular we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a cournot oligopoly journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78 d62 q 1999 academic press

equilibrium homophily in networks abstract i look at the equilibrium effects of homophily in network formation games having positive externalities i show that very weak preferences for network effects such as a preference for being part of a clique may result in very high levels of homophily at equilibrium i present an empirical procedure that allows an evaluation of the role of network effects on the observed level of homophily in the data i apply my method to the formation of friendship networks in the usa i show that network effects are small and have a negligible contribution to the observed racial homophily in friendship networks

mergers and the importance of fitting well abstract this paper highlights the importance of partners fitting well for a stable merger to arise if all firms fit perfectly no stable merger can be performed on the contrary if not all firms are compatible a stable merger may arise

law and employment lessons from latin america and the caribbean analyzing the effects of regulation and deregulation on latin american labor markets law and employment joins the ongoing debate about the virtues and costs of legislating mandatory benefits for workers of the numerous labor regulations that were altered or created in latin america during the last thirty years many have had unintended and far reaching results nobel prize winning economist james j heckman and carmen pages document the behavior of firms attempting to stay in business and be competitive while facing the high costs of complying with these labor laws they challenge the prevailing view that labor market regulations affect only the distribution of labor incomes and have little or no impact on efficiency or the performance of labor markets this volume shows that mandated benefits reduce employment have a disruptive impact on turnover rates and labor market flexibility promote inequality and discriminate against marginal workers along with in depth studies of colombia peru brazil argentina chile and uruguay law and employment provides comparative analysis from a range of european countries and the united states while also covering important changes in reg

labor income responds differently to income tax and payroll tax reforms we estimate the responses of gross labor income with respect to marginal and average net of tax rates in france over the period 2003 2006 we exploit a series of reforms to the income tax and payroll tax schedules affecting individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage our estimate for the elasticity of gross labor income with respect to the marginal net of income tax rate is around 0 2 while we find no response to the marginal net of payroll tax rate the elasticity with respect to the average net of tax rate is not significant for the income tax schedule while it is close to 1 for the payroll tax schedule a plausible explanation is the existence of significant labor supply responses to the income tax schedule combined with sticky posted wages i e the gross labor income minus payroll taxes divided by hours worked finally the effect of the net of income tax rate seems to be driven by participation decisions in particular those of married women

collusion exclusion and inclusion in random order bargaining this paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random order value e g the shapley value collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them say i this contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion which lets i exclude j s resource but not use it himself and inclusion which lets i use j s resource but not exclude j from it this representation yields a third difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion generalizing existing results for specific games namely collusion is profitable unprofitable when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased by other players

bidding for the surplus a non cooperative approach to the shapley value abstract we propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero monotonic environments with transferable utility the mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the shapley value payoffs we extend our results to implement the weighted shapley values finally we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments the modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure and implements the shapley values of the super additive cover of the environment journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

a one stage model of link formation and payoff division abstract in this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously we analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to nash equilibria strong nash equilibria and coalition proof nash equilibria we find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

strategy proofness and essentially single valued cores revisited abstract we consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents preferences possibly exhibit externalities in such contexts many different core notions were proposed one is the individually rational core ir core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non blocking agents receive their endowments we show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality efficiency and strategy proofness then for any problem for which the ir core is non empty the allocation rule must choose an ir core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the ir core we further show that the result cannot be generalized to supersets of the ir core we apply our result to housing markets coalition formation and networks

the evolution of exchange abstract stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange we analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market in both models traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial but occasionally they make mistakes the models differ in the probability of mistakes when all mistakes are equally likely the set of stochastically stable allocations contains the set of efficient allocations when more serious mistakes are less likely the stochastically stable states are those allocations always efficient with the lowest envy level

decentralized trade random utility and the evolution of social welfare abstract we study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money the processes are affected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents maximization of random utility by imposing structure on the utility noise term logit distribution one is able to calculate exactly the stationary distribution of the perturbed markov process for any level of noise we show that the stationary distribution places the largest probability on the maximizers of weighted sums of the agents intrinsic utilities and this probability tends to 1 as noise vanishes

core existence in vertically differentiated markets we prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms products are equispaced along the quality spectrum this result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder

inflation persistence and nonlinearities in central and eastern european countries abstract in this paper we provide an insight into the inflation dynamics in a panel of central and eastern european countries applying unit root tests and allowing for nonlinearities we show that inflation rates in more than half of these countries are stationary

coalitions tipping points and the speed of evolution this study considers pure coordination games on networks and the waiting time for an adaptive process of strategic change to achieve ecient coordination although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally ecient norm coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow as well as hasten convergence to eciency

on the stability of coalition structures abstract we resolve a seeming conflict between a non existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games barbera s gerber a 2007 a note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games economics letters 95 85 90 and the universal existence of stable coalition structures in tu games under the value casajus a 2008 outside options component efficiency and stability games and economic behavior forthcoming doi 10 1016 j geb 2007 04 003

stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems abstract this study examines a dynamic process of n person coalitional bargaining problems we investigate the evolution of social conventions by embedding a coalitional bargaining setting in a dynamic process in each period a group of players may make some coalitional move that is forming a new team or negotiating the division of a surplus players revise their coalitions and surplus divisions over time in the presence of stochastic noise which leads players to make a suboptimal decision under a logit specification of choice probabilities we find that the stability of a core allocation decreases in the wealth of the richest player furthermore stochastically stable allocations are core allocations that minimize the wealth of the richest player

the axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure we present a unified framework for a broad class of values in transferable utility games with coalition structure including the owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions we provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of efficiency linearity independence of null coalitions and coordination with two versions of balanced contributions inside a coalition and weighted sharing in unanimity games respectively

the new econometrics of structural change dating breaks in u s labor productivity we have seen the emergence of three major innovations in the econometrics of structural change in the past fifteen years 1 tests for a structural break of unknown timing 2 estimation of the timing of a structural break and 3 tests to distinguish unit roots from broken time trends these three innovations have dramatically altered the face of applied time series econometrics in this paper we review these three innovations and illustrate their application through an empirical assessment of u s labor productivity in the manufacturing durables sector

r d networks we develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition firms incentives to invest in r d and the architecture of collaboration networks in the absence of firm rivalry the complete network where each firm collaborates with all others is uniquely stable industry profit maximizing and efficient by contrast under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint this suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links

international fisheries agreements a game theoretical approach this paper surveys the application of game theory to the economic analysis of international fisheries agreements the relevance of this study comes not only from the existence of a vast literature on the topic but especially from the specific features of these agreements the emphasis of the survey is on coalition games an approach that has become prominent in the fisheries economics literature over the last decade it is shown that coalition games were first applied to international fisheries agreements in the late 1990s addressing cooperative issues under the framework of characteristic function games then progressively this cooperative approach was combined with non cooperative elements such as the stability analysis of the agreements finally partition function games which model coalition formation endogenously were introduced and became the standard approach to study the formation and stability of international fisheries agreements a key message that emerges from this literature strand is that self enforcing cooperative management of internationally shared fish stocks is generally difficult to achieve hence the international legal framework and regulations play a decisive role on ensuring cooperation over the use of these resources

switching from payroll taxes to corporate income taxes firms employment and wages after the 2012 colombian tax reform the 2012 colombian tax reform reduced payroll taxes and employer contributions to health insurance by 13 5 percent while also increasing corporate income taxes and leaving untouched the benefits to workers financed through these taxes shifting taxation from formal employment to other business activities is a policy recipe under heated discussion in latin america the reform offers an ideal laboratory for studying empirically the potential distortions against formal employment associated with payroll taxes in contrast to other taxes on firms we analyze the impact of the reform on employment and wages using monthly firm level data on all formal employment in nonpublic firms in the country and a difference in differences approach that takes advantage of the fact that a few sectors were exempt from the 2012 tax reform we find a positive average effect of 4 3 percent on employment and 2 7 percent on average firm wages for the average firm the employment effect is found only for micro and small firms whereas the bulk of the employment is concentrated in medium and large firms which show no significant effect according to these estimates about 145 000 new jobs were created between january and may of 2015 by virtue of the reform these results are generally supportive of efforts to reduce payroll taxes though our findings on employment are less robust than those on wages and large firms do not seem to have benefitted the apparent lack of effect for medium and large employers is also a source of concern we speculate that it may be due to these firms being more sensitive to the increase in corporate taxation that financed the reduction in payroll taxes but lack of access to the relevant data prevents us from offering solid evidence regarding this hypothesis

coalitional stochastic stability in games networks and markets abstract this paper examines a dynamic process of unilateral and joint deviations of agents and the resulting stochastic evolution of social conventions our model unifies stochastic stability analysis in static settings including normal form games network formation games and simple exchange economies as stochastic stability analysis in a class of interactions in which agents unilaterally and jointly choose their strategies we embed a static setting in a dynamic process over time agents revise their strategies based on the improvements that the new strategy profile offers them in addition to the optimization process there are persistent random shocks on agents utility that potentially lead to switching to suboptimal strategies under a logit specification of choice probabilities we characterize the set of states that will be observed in the long run as noise vanishes we apply these results to examples of certain potential games

core and periphery in networks abstract we study a model of network formation where the benefits from connections exhibit decreasing returns and decay with network distance we show that the unique equilibrium network is a periphery sponsored star where one player the center maintains no links and earns a high payoff while all other players maintain a single link to the center and earn lower payoffs both the star architecture and payoff inequality are preserved in an extension of the model where agents can make transfers and bargain over the formation of links under the condition that the surplus of connections increases in the size of agents neighborhoods our model thus generates two common features of social and economic networks 1 a core periphery structure 2 positive correlation between network centrality and payoffs

on the core the weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions this paper deals with the concepts of core and weber set with a priori unions a la owen as far as we know the owen approach to games with a priori unions has never been studied from the coalitional stability point of view thus we introduce the coalitional core and coalitional weber set and characterize the class of convex games with a priori unions by means of the relationships between both solution concepts

participative democracy and local environmental issues the present paper deals with the management of environmental quality at the level of a city more precisely we propose two different contractualisms among citizens that allow them to reduce the polluting emissions caused by their consumption of both a private and a collective good in the first contractualism the mayor proposes to citizens to establish neighbourhood committees they have the responsibility of defining the total amount of polluting emission by private and public transportation means in their neighbourhood it comes out that the mediation of the neighbourhood committees brings out a lower total pollution than in the case where each individual citizen acts on his own interest however the emission level brought out by the neighbourhood committees is not pareto optimal on the other hand extending the first coalitional game by a supplementary stage focused on bargaining between the neighbourhood committees allows us to define a participative democracy procedure this two stage procedure brings about a pareto optimal pollution level 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

a noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules abstract we introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency like the consistency axiom our game form together with a bilateral principle yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of nash equilibria the result holds for a large class of consistent and monotone rules including the constrained equal award the propositional rule and many other well known rules moreover all of the subgame perefect equilibria are coalition proof in the associated game in strategic form journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 and d63

the persistence of inflation in the united states abstract has the persistence of inflation in the united states changed since 1965 we estimate the persistence of inflation over time using different measures and estimation procedures and we produce confidence intervals for our estimates as well as formal tests of unchanged persistence we find that inflation persistence has been high and approximately unchanged in the u s over our sample period we reconcile our results with other studies that reached different conclusions

latin america s social policy challenge education social insurance redistribution abstract long regarded as a region beset by macroeconomic instability high inflation and excessive poverty and inequality latin america has undergone a major transformation over the last 20 years the region has seen improved macroeconomic management and substantial and sustained reductions in poverty and inequality in this paper we argue that social policy including human capital and education social insurance and redistribution need special attention if achievements of the last two decades are to be sustained and amplified starting in the mid 1990s many governments in the region introduced a variety of programs including noncontributory pensions and health insurance and cash transfers targeted to the poor social spending in latin america increased sharply these policies have been widely praised and we believe they have resulted in substantial improvements in the lives of the poor in the region however a more nuanced view shows some worrisome trends moving forward we believe it is nec

the evolution of walrasian behavior consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior occasionally experimenting with some small probability in this context it is shown that the unique long run outcome of the process has all firms playing walrasian i e choosing an output that maximizes profits when taking the market clearing price as given

coalition formation as a dynamic process abstract we study coalition formation as an ongoing dynamic process with payoffs generated as coalitions form disintegrate or regroup a process of coalition formation pcf is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value compared to inaction this future value in turn is endogenous it depends on coalitional movements at each node we study existence of equilibrium pcfs we connect deterministic equilibrium pcfs with unique absorbing state to the core and equilibrium pcfs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set in addition we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium pcfs

do place based tax incentives create jobs abstract in this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of place based payroll taxes in stimulating local employment by exploiting a unique policy setting in norway where a system of geographically differentiated payroll taxes was suddenly abolished due to an eu regulation the reform was enforced independently of the regional labor market developments creating arguably exogenous variation in the payroll tax rates that firms in different local labor markets faced over time we find evidence of partial shifting of payroll tax increases on to worker wages as well as a significant decline in local employment these findings suggest that in settings with some degrees of wage rigidity place based payroll tax incentives can be effective in stimulating local employment

a game theoretic mathematical programming analysis of cooperative phenomena in oligopolistic markets this paper investigates cooperative behavior in an industry that supplies a homogeneous product and consists of oligopolistic firms the analysis is conducted within a game theoretic framework in which each firm is viewed as a player whose strategy is its level of production by defining a suitable characteristic function that evaluates the worth of each possible coalition we attempt to quantify the individual and collective bargaining powers of firms in order to predict merger or contractual agreements and production strategies in particular we define three games via three characteristic functions each of which is based upon some assumed market behavior on the part of the players for each game we investigate whether the firms would choose to remain separate or form a grand coalition or some other coalition structure for some insightful special cases we are able to establish the resulting outcome and assert whether a core allocation of profits among members of an emerging coalition exists and whether the shapley value allocation belongs to the core in the more general case we use the u s copper industry as an example to illustrate how shapley values may be used to determine possible emerging coalition structures

climate clubs overcoming free riding in international climate policy notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic under standing of climate change it has proven difficult to forge inter national agreements because of free riding as seen in the defunct kyoto protocol this study examines the club as a model for international climate policy based on economic theory and empirical modeling it finds that without sanctions against non participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement by contrast a regime with small trade penalties on non participants a climate club can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement jel q54 q58 k32 k33

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

assessing the effect of payroll taxes on formal employment the case of the 2012 tax reform in colombia in 2013 colombia implemented a tax reform that reduced payroll taxes by a total of 13 5 percentage points of wages this paper evaluates the effects of this component of the 2012 colombian tax reform on firms formal employment and average wages we construct a panel of firms based on their employees administrative records to account for the endogeneity of the treatment we use an instrumental variables technique that exploits the exogenous variation from the decisions of firms that are similar to each other in several dimensions but belong to different economic sectors based on our preferred specification we estimate a positive and significant increase in formal employment as a result of the implementation of the reform of approximately 213 000 jobs in existing pre reform firms in the long run these effects will increase to more than 600 000 jobs the effect of the reform on the average wages paid by firms was also found to be positive for some sizes of firms but the overall effect in the short run is rather small

conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining abstract we consider a multilateral nash demand game in which short sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource we prove that the resulting process converges with probability one to a state in which all players agree on a strictly self enforcing division of resources i e a strict core allocation highlighting group dynamics we show how the myopic actions of players may lead to the break up of groups in the short run but can ultimately bring about a situation from which a strictly self enforcing allocation can be reached

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

on coalitional semivalues in this paper we propose a characterization of the coalitional value for transferable utility games owen 1977 and we define and study coalitional semivalues which are generalizations of semivalues dubey neyman and weber 1981

the impact of lowering the payroll tax on informality in colombia in 2012 the colombian government reduced employer payroll contributions from 29 5 to 16 0 percent two years later the informality rate had diminished by about 4 0 percentage points this paper attempts to estimate how much of this reduction was due to the tax reform isolating the impact of other macroeconomic variables a natural approach to performing this task is to apply a difference in differences methodology using a household survey panel since the colombian survey does not have a panel structure we simulated one using a matching difference in differences methodology according to the results the tax reform is associated with a 4 8 percentage point decrease in the informality of workers affected by the reform in the thirteen main metropolitan areas this represents approximately half the reduction of the relevant informality rate during that period affecting mostly salaried men and workers in general with low levels of education

stochastic stability for roommate markets we show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings this implies that whenever the core is non empty e g for marriage markets a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable i e stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets including those with an empty core an important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core

the logit response dynamics we develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit response learning dynamics in games with arbitraryspecification of revision opportunities the result allows us to show convergence to the set of nash equilibria in the class of best response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games we also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specificationof revision opportunities our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games

labor market analysis and labor policymaking in the nation s capital the author who served as chief economist checo at the u s department of labor in 2011 and 2012 discusses her work in the department and the nature of government policy making in the areas of labor and employment she lauds the extent to which policy making in the department is based on empirical evidence and economic analysis and says greater interaction between the department and academic economists who can provide such evidence and analysis would be beneficial she offers figures on the ongoing labor market effects of the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession and discusses the department s efforts to address problems including long term unemployment and the problems of african american and hispanic workers

the evolution of free trade networks abstract this paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement fta network formation game among n countries we first explore the static model introduced by goyal and joshi 2006 and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable fta networks then we develop a dynamic model under random perturbations and identify long run outcomes to remove prediction uncertainty inherited from static analysis the results show that both partial free trade and global free trade will result when there are only three countries however when more countries are involved only the complete fta network emerges

the incidence of payroll taxation evidence from chile i provide new evidence on the incidence of payroll taxation by examining the experience of chile before and after the privatization of its social security system this policy change led to a sharp exogenous reduction in the payroll tax burden on chilean firms on average payroll tax rates fell by 25 over 6 years using data from a census of manufacturing firms i estimate that the incidence of payroll taxation is fully on wages with no effect on employment this finding is robust to a variety of empirical approaches to the problem of measurement error in firm level measures of taxes worker

endogenous trading bloc formation in a north south global economy the majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries rather than between developed and developing countries this paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon it develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries the countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners in the coalition proof nash equilibrium either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries la plupart des blocs commerciaux sont formes de pays similaires plutot que de pays developpes et en voie de developpement ce memoire explique pourquoi ce genre de resultat peut emerger en tant que phenomene d equilibre on developpe un modele d economie mondiale asymetrique dans lequel il y a au moins quatre pays les pays different par la taille et la nature de leurs marches et choisissent leurs partenaires commerciaux dans un equilibre libre de coalitions a la nash ou bien il existe un regime global de libre echange ou bien des zones de libre echange entre pays similaires emergent

a limit theorem for the core of betrand oligopoly games with externalities abstract this paper formulates the concept of betrand oligopoly partition games furthermore it is demonstrated that such well defined games have positive externalities more importantly the core is proved to approximate the equal division solution in infinite markets

double penalty in returns to education informality and educational mismatch in the colombian labour market abstractthis article examines the returns to education taking into consideration the existence of educational mismatches in the formal and informal employment of a developing country results show that the returns of surplus required and deficit years of schooling are different in the two sectors moreover they suggest that these returns vary along the wage distribution and that the pattern of variation differs for formal and informal workers in particular informal workers face not only lower returns to their education but suffer a second penalty associated with educational mismatches that puts them at a greater disadvantage compare to their formal counterparts

coalition formation in standard setting alliances we present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance especially close rivals the predicted alliance configurations are simply the nash equilibria i e those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance we illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing unix operating system standards in 1988

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

a competitive partnership formation process a group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs all single agents as well as all partnerships generate values if two agents choose to cooperate they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another in equilibrium which may or may not exist no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships this paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps when an equilibrium exists partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process moreover several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived

on the emergence of an mfn club equal treatment in an unequal world motivated by gatt we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the mfn principle of non discrimination the underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade while an mfn club does not alter average tariff levels across countries it increases aggregate world welfare makes non members worse off and can immiserize its high cost members these results imply that i core wto rules such as mfn are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and ii the distributional effects of mfn maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted special and differential treatment at the wto jel classification f13 f10 f15

coalitional stochastic stability abstract this paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature an equilibrium selection criterion is defined which we call coalitional stochastic stability css this differs from existing work on stochastic stability in that profitable coalitional deviations are given greater importance than unprofitable single player deviations a general characterization of css is given together with more detailed characterizations for specific classes of games applications include contracting asymmetric social norms and collusive price setting the latter of which is shown in some circumstances to facilitate competitive outcomes

the socially stable core in structured transferable utility games we consider socially structured transferable utility games for every coalition the relative strength of a player is measured by a power function the socially stable core consists of the socially and economically stable payoff vectors it is non empty if the game itself is socially stable the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core generically it consists of a finite number of payoff vectors convex tu games have a non empty socially stable core irrespective of the underlying social structure when the game is permutationally convex the socially stable core is shown to be non empty if the power vectors are permutationally consistent and is shown to contain a unique element if the power vectors are permutationally compatible we demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of the socially stable core by applying it to structured hierarchy games sequencing games and the distribution of water

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

labor market effects of payroll taxes in developing countries evidence from colombia abstract we use a panel of manufacturing plants from colombia to analyze how the rise in payroll tax rates over the 1980s and 1990s affected the labor market our estimates indicate that formal wages fall by between 1 4 and 2 3 as a result of a 10 rise in payroll taxes this less than full shifting is likely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and the presence of downward wage rigidities in colombia because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted from employers to employees employment also falls our results indicate that a 10 increase in payroll taxes lowered formal employment by between 4 and 5 in addition we find some evidence of less shifting and larger disemployment effects for production than for nonproduction workers these results suggest that policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of less skilled workers by reducing social security taxes may be effective in latin american countries where minimum wages bind and benefits are often not directly lin

determinants of hourly earnings in ecuador the role of labor market regulations ecuadorian labor costs are said to be high because of the existence of many mandated benefits using the 1994 living standards measurement survey we show that the effect of these benefits is actually mitigated by a reduction of base earnings that is of the foundation on which they are paid the reduction is larger in the private than in the public sector and is negligible for unionized workers we also show that in spite of mandated benefits interindustry wage differentials are comparable to those of bolivia a country characterized by flexible labor markets but otherwise similar to ecuador

regional labour informality in colombia and a proposal for a differential minimum wage the very high level of informal labour in colombia is a symptom of the labour market is not functioning properly moreover this undesirable outcome is highly heterogeneous across the country the

do payroll tax breaks stimulate formality evidence from colombia s reform alternative work arrangements have grown rapidly around the world in latin america these alternative work arrangements have long been part of the labor market and have continued to grow the informal sector grew rapidly in latin america over the past few decades comprising up to half of the working population in many countries some attribute the growth in alternative work arrangements and informality to regulations and taxes while others argue that it is precisely the lack of enforcement of regulations that allows unprotected employment arrangements to flourish we examine whether reducing taxes associated with employment stimulates formal sector employment we exploit the fact that the tax reform introduced in colombia in 2012 affected only certain types of workers and not others in particular workers earning less than ten times the minimum wage and self employed workers with more than two employees experienced a reduction of payroll taxes of 13 5 percent between 2013 and 2014 we use the colombian household surveys social security records and the monthly manufacturing sample to conduct difference in differences analyses of the reform we find evidence of increased formal employment for the affected groups after the reform using all three data sets we find that the probability of formal employment and the likelihood of transitioning into registered employment increased for the affected groups after the reform we also find that the level and share of permanent employment relative to temporary employment grew after the reform for those earnings less than ten times the minimum wage the results are greatest for those in smaller firms and for those earnings close to the minimum wage

the effects of labour market policies in an economy with an informal sector in this article we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector our model extends mortensen and pissarides 1994 by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal sector productivity we use the model to analyse the effects of labour market policy on informal sector and formal sector output on the division of the workforce into unemployment informal sector employment and formal sector employment and on wages finally we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy specifically we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal sector matches in this article we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the effects of labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector what we mean by an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly affected by labour market policies such as severance or payroll taxes we find that labour market policies that apply only to the formal sector nonetheless affect the size and the composition of employment in the informal sector this is important since there is substantial economic activity in the informal sector in many economies particularly in developing countries estimates for some latin american countries put the informal sector at more than 50 of the urban work force 1 the informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some developed economies 2 although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a segmented labour market framework this interpretation is not consistent with recent empirical evidence from latin america under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the secondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal sector jobs maloney 2004 presents evidence for several latin american countries that challenges this view and instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector similarly using data from the argentinian household survey pratap and quintin 2006 reject the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater buenos aires area concluding that there is no evidence of a formal sector wage premium after controlling for individual and establishment we thank mauricio santamaria for stimulating conversations that inspired our interest in this topic we also thank bob hussey and fabien postel vinay as well as our editor steve pischke and two anonymous

regulation of entry labor market institutions and the informal sector abstract this paper develops a two sector matching model that incorporates the main features of latin american labor markets it has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries the model is numerically solved using brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed reducing formal sector s entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare thus the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal

recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games abstract an evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game unlike its predecessors in the evolution learning literature this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors the stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a rawlsian swf for a common class of utility functions in contrast to previous analyses the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions

quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory abstract overeducation is an empirical phenomenon in two dimensions qualitative and quantitative quantitative overeducation addresses a firm s decision to train more employees than needed one explanation for this decision is modeled in this article that of classical bargaining power the main idea is that after investing in human capital the employer uses employees outside the firm to raise the bargaining power when he negotiates with the employees within the firm on how to share the profit of the firm to model this we use cooperative game theory for the first time the labor market is modeled by a coalition structure and the payoffs are determined by the value casajus 2009

free trade networks abstract the paper examines the formation of free trade agreements ftas as a network formation game we consider an n country model in which possibly asymmetric countries trade differentiated industrial commodities we show that if all countries are symmetric the complete fta network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable we also compare ftas and customs unions cus as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization noticing that unlike cus each signatory of an fta can have another fta without consent of other member countries

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open

sharing the surplus an extension of the shapley value for environments with externalities economic activities both on the macro and micro level often entail wide spread externalities this in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected we propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains costs of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient we show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency linearity dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an average game adding an additional axiom we identify one unique rule satisfying these properties