the causes of preference reversal observed preference reversal cannot be adequately explained by violations of independence the reduction axiom or transitivity the primary cause of preference reversal is the failure of procedure invariance especially the overpricing of low probability high payoff bets this result violates regret theory and generalized nonindependent utility models preference reversal and a new reversal involving time preferences are explained by scale compatibility which implies that payoffs are weighted more heavily in pricing than in choice copyright 1990 by american economic association

green goods are they good or bad news for the environment evidence from a laboratory experiment on impure public goods green goods such as recycled paper stationary or carbon neutral flights provide increasingly popular examples of impure public goods motivated by theoretical treatments of green goods as a bundle of private and public characteristics in proportions fixed by the provider we design an experiment with two linked treatments to test how the presence of impure public goods affects behaviour towards public good causes we set parameters such that from a standard economic perspective the presence of the impure public good is behaviourally irrelevant in a treatment where the impure public good provides only small contributions to the public good we observe that on aggregate pro social behaviour is lower in the presence of the impure public good on the contrary in the treatment where the impure public good is more generous towards the public good component at the expense of private earnings individuals are unaffected in their behaviour we observe that impure public goods that are theoretically irrelevant and are mostly self interested may hinder pro social behaviour and look for explanations in social psychology such as the phenomenon of thoughtful anchoring motivated reasoning and reluctant altruism the results from this experiment question the role of green goods in enhancing environmentally friendly behaviours

non transitive choice event splitting effects or framing effects recent studies have examined possible causes of the robust empirical failure of the transitivity axiom of expected utility theory by pitting regret aversion against alternative explanations such as event splitting effects these tests show that cycles replicate when the latter are controlled but are sensitive to changes in problem representation the control for event splitting effects however does not rule out their contribution to cyclical choices in some circumstances an experiment is reported which investigates this possibility cyclical choices are observed that cannot be due to event splitting effects but appear attributable to within event and between act evaluations of decision problems plus framing effects

randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity averse preferences abstract in random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment agents are assumed to act as if they faced each problem on its own while this approach is valid when agents are expected utility maximizers ambiguity averse agents may use the randomization device to hedge and thereby contaminate the data

does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom one of the most puzzling paradoxes in decision theory is the preference reversal phenomenon this phenomenon seems to contradict the transitivity axiom for a long time one of the cornerstones of utility theory this paradox is established whenever a decision maker prefers lottery x to lottery y but is willing to put a lower selling price on x than on y such experiments first reported by harold lindman 1971 and sarah lichtenstein and paul slovic 1971 were repeated by david grether and charles plott 1979 werner pommerehne et al 1982 and robert reilly 1982 although the later researchers improved the mechanism through which the selling price emerges they all found systematic reversals a new approach to this problem was developed by charles holt 1986 and edi karni and zvi safra 1987 from two different starting points these authors showed that the preference reversal phenomenon does not necessarily prove a violation of the transitivity axiom as it may contradict the independence axiom this implies that people do not maximize expected utility but in that case the preference reversal phenomenon becomes just another evidence against expected utility theory but not against the transitivity axiom these results have their own disadvantages although the independence axiom is not as fundamental as transitivity it is nevertheless very appealing on normative grounds of course the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradicts at least one of the assumptions of expected utility theory but empirical evidence shows that despite its normative appeal violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom may happen see for example joshua ronen 1971 and doug snowball and clif brown 1979 in this paper i therefore suggest a decision mechanism for the preference reversals lotteries which is transitive and satisfies the independence axiom but not the reduction axiom

lottery choice incentives complexity and decision time this paper reports the results of an experiment on lottery choice in which decision cost is measured as decision making time a simple decision cost model motivates this measurement and the experiment and predicts relationships between incentive mechanism manipulations and decision making time which are borne out in the experiment the decision cost model also suggests that decisions will change in the face of the incentive manipulations in the experiment this suggestion is borne out in a complex decision making environment but not in a simple one specification tests demonstrate that observed changes in subjects behavior are not merely due to changes in subject specific error variance one may conclude from this that the payoff dominance problem is a real issue in complex decision making experiments copyright 1993 by royal economic society

are preferences monotonic testing some predictions of regret theory in this paper the authors demonstrate that the assumption of regret aversion which has been invoked in regret theory to explain several well documented violations of expected utility theory also implies the existence of strict preferences between some stochastically equivalent actions and implies certain systematic violations of monotonicity the authors report an experimental test of these predictions they find that while choices between stochastically equivalent actions are entirely consistent with expected utility theory there is clear evidence of the monotonicity violations predicted by regret theory copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

preference reversals and the independence axiom of all of the paradoxical patterns of behavior reported in laboratory experiments one of the most perplexing for decision theorists is the preference reversal phenomenon a subject in a preference reversal experiment is typically given a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a modest amount of money a p bet and a lottery with a low probability of winning a large amount of money a bet the lowest amount of money for which the subject would willingly sell either of these lotteries is also elicited the most common reversal is for a subject to choose the p bet over the bet but to put a higher selling price on the bet preference reversals were first reported by harold lindman 1971 and sarah lichtenstein and paul slovic 1971 in discussing the psychologists discovery of such reversals david grether and charles plott remark the inconsistency is deeper than mere lack of transitivity or even stochastic transitivity it suggests that no optimization principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices 1979 p 623 this paper offers a simple alternative explanation of documented preference reversals an explanation that does not require the abandonment of the transitivity assumption

do subjects remember the past in many experiments experimenters use the random lottery incentive mechanism and ask many questions to each subject that is at the end of the experiment just one of the questions is picked at random and the subject paid on the basis of their answer to this one question the idea is that subjects should separate the various questions and reply to each as if it were a separate question this procedure is methodologically sound if the subjects preferences obey expected utility eu theory which implies a form of separation but if they do not this incentive mechanism is open to criticism indeed many referees use this argument against the research they argue that subjects do not consider questions separately if the questions are revealed to the subjects one by one then the appropriate alternative hypothesis is that their behaviour evolves with the questions here this hypothesis is tested that the questions already answered affect the answers to the subsequent questions the analysis shows that

research on the motion picture industry state of the art and new directions off the beaten track away from theatrical release the motion picture industry has been subject of extensive academic research over the last decades however most scholars focused on the u s theatrical motion picture market the number of research activities regarding even more profitable release windows such as home video or television has been substantially lower although international distribution is essential for a motion picture project to break even there has been little significant re search on most other markets this paper aims at summarizing the current state of research on the motion picture industry particularly from marketing and management perspective revealing research gaps and proposing recommendations for future research endeavors therefore a three pillar scheme is developed to systemize previous findings research on intraorganizational decision making contractual relationships between national stakeholders and international market competition are differentiated since these insights are mainly derived from u s theatrical exhibition they can hardly be applied to other markets and exhibition windows thus potential research areas are identified to expand knowledge of posttheatrical and international markets

how many viewers does a cable network need a survival analysis of cable networks this article employs survival duration analysis to determine how subscriber levels affect cable networks survival probabilities using piecewise constant hazards estimation we find that an additional one million subscribers increases a cable network s probability of survival in a given year by 17

values elicited from open ended real experiments abstract the idea that preferences are only revealed by real incentives is deeply embedded in economists worldview consequently evidence from hypothetical experiments has not readily permeated economic thinking one method for determining whether hypothetical experiments provide useful information about preferences is to compare them to similar real goods experiments this study looks at responses elicited by three real experiments we examine the proportion of responses that meet a series of criteria that range from a broad appeal of plausibility to a narrow restriction based on quasi concavity of preferences we argue that these proportions are unreasonably low

reduction of compound lotteries with objective probabilities theory and evidence abstract the reduction of compound lotteries axiom rocl has assumed a central role in the evaluation of behavior toward risk and uncertainty we present experimental evidence on its validity in the domain of objective probabilities our battery of lottery pairs includes simple one stage lotteries two stages compound lotteries and their actuarially equivalent one stage lotteries we find violations of rocl and that behavior is better characterized by a source dependent version of the rank dependent utility model rather than expected utility theory since we use the popular 1 in k random lottery incentive mechanism payment procedure in our main test our experiment explicitly recognizes the impact that this payment procedure may have on preferences thus we also collect data using the 1 in 1 payment procedure we do not infer any violations of rocl when subjects are only given one decision to make these results are supported by both structural estimation of latent preferences as well as non parametric analysis of choice patterns the random lottery incentive mechanism used as payment protocol itself induces an additional layer of compounding by design that might create confounds in tests of rocl therefore we provide a word of caution for experimenters interested in studying rocl for other purposes such as the relationship between ambiguity attitudes and attitudes toward compound lotteries to carefully think about the design to study rocl payment protocols and their interaction with the preferences being elicited

present value tests of an intertemporal model of the current account abstract this paper first demonstrates that in a simple intertemporal open economy model the current account is equal to the expected decline of the present discounted value of net output of a country net output is defined as gross domestic product less the sum of investment plus government spending it then uses econometric methods for present value models to analyze the current account for four countries in two of these countries the model does a satisfactory job of explaining the current account

habit formation in consumer preferences evidence from panel data this paper tests for the presence of habit formation using household data a simple model of habit formation implies a condition relating the strength of habits to the evolution of consumption over time when the condition is estimated with food consumption data from the panel study on income dynamics the results yield no evidence of habit formation at the annual frequency this finding is robust to a number of changes in the specification it also holds for several proxies for nondurables and services consumption created by combining psid variables with weights estimated from consumer expenditure survey data

economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon a reexamination in a recent issue of this review david grether and charles plott 1979 hereinafter referred to as g p presented a series of experiments that show that individual decisions are made in a manner inconsistent with standard preference theory this inconsistency can be illustrated by the following example individuals under suitable laboratory conditions first have a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a small sum of money the p bet probability bet and a lottery with a high stake but low probability of winning the m bet money bet after indicating a preference for one of the lotteries in the pair the same subjects are then asked to place a monetary value on each of the individual lotteries grether and plott found that a large number of participants stated a preference for the p bet in the first round but placed a higher value on the other lottery the m bet in the second round this behavior a preference reversal is inconsistent with the traditional statements of preference theory

investment and the current account in the short run and the long run theoretical models of the relationship between investment and the current account impose restrictions on the joint dynamic behavior of these variables these restrictions come in two forms one imposes causal orderings on investment and the current account the other restriction concerns the permanent responses of these variables to different shocks we use these restrictions to identify empirically structural shocks from vector autoregressions of investment and the current account for canada under certain identifications our results support the implications of the intertemporal small open economy model however these results are sensitive to perturbations of the identifications

managerial objectives the r rating puzzle and the production of violent films we analyze project choice in the motion picture industry and find evidence consistent with revenue maximization and excessive hedging we find that movies that are very violent or feature sex and violence do not provide excess returns but they increase revenues particularly in the international market further they tend to lose money less often and their returns are more predictable even though there are never mega hits this evidence is consistent with studies of other industries and it partially explains the r rating puzzle that is the preponderance of r rated films although most studies find that g and pg rated films perform better

market experience eliminates some anomalies and creates new ones we report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals we investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions a tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes we find little support for the former but strong support for the latter also whilst just enough market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly therefore although market experience shapes behaviour in our experiments it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory

bose einstein dynamics and adaptive contracting in the motion picture industry audiences discover what films they like and spread the word information feedback produces bose einstein dynamics in the motion picture box office revenue distribution information cascades generate box office hits and flops the revenue distribution evolves recursively over the run as a mixture of the opening and a stochastic competition among films the motion picture run is decentralized adaptive and self organizing semistationary admission prices local information and contingency rich contracts match the film rental price and the supply of theatrical engagements to demand copyright 1996 by royal economic society

motion picture profit the stable paretian hypothesis and the curse of the superstar abstract this paper investigates the stable distribution as a model of profit in motion pictures the skew of this distribution and its paretian tails capture with great fidelity the statistics of the movies features of the business such as the nobody knows principle the curse of the superstar the angel s nightmare the instability of profit and the form of artist contracts follow from the properties of the stable distribution

international capital mobility amongst the major industrialised countries too little or too much this paper examines capital flows among the major industrialized countries with a view to assessing m feldstein and c horioka s 1980 claim that international capital mobility is limited it argues that saving investment correlation tests are inherently flawed and proposes an alternative methodology for testing the degree of international capital mobility it finds that capital flows have been excessive in the sense that they are driven by speculative forces rather than by economic fundamentals copyright 1995 by royal economic society

habit formation and the present value model of the current account yet another suspect abstract in a recent paper gruber gruber j w 2004 a present value test of habits and the current account journal of monetary economics 51 1495 1507 claims that habit formation in consumption plays an important role in current account fluctuations in selected developed countries extending the present value model of the current account pvm with consumption habits in this paper however i show that the habit forming pvm is observationally equivalent to the pvm augmented with persistent transitory consumption which is induced by world real interest rate shocks based on a small open economy real business cycle soe rbc model endowed with consumption habits as well as persistent world real interest rate shocks this paper resolves the inherent identification problem of the habit forming pvm by bayesian methods to seek effects of habit formation on current account fluctuations in typical small open economies canada and the united kingdom results reveal no clear evidence that habit formation plays a crucial role in current account fluctuations

robustness information processing constraints and the current account in small open economies article i nfo in this paper we examine the effects of two types of induced uncertainty model uncertainty due to robust ness rb and state uncertainty due to finite information processing capacity called rational inattention or ri on consumption and the current account we show that the combination of rb and ri improves the model s predictions for i the contemporaneous correlation between the current account and income and ii the volatility and persistence of the current account in small open emerging and developed economies in addition we show that the two informational frictions improve the model s ability to match the impulse response of consumption to income and the relative volatility of consumption to income growth

testing the rate of preference reversal in personal and social decision making classic preference reversal where choice and valuation procedures generate inconsistent preference orderings has rarely been tested in hypothetical health care treatment scenarios two studies the first non incentivised and the second incentivised are reported in this article in both studies respondents are asked to make decisions that affect themselves a personal decision making frame and those for whom they are responsible a social decision making frame the results show non negligible and systematic rates of preference reversal in both frames although these rates are slightly but non significantly lower in the incentivised condition moreover in both studies the rate of predicted preference reversal was somewhat higher in the social than in the personal decision making frame a finding that is explained by greater risk aversion when choosing treatment options for others than when choosing treatments for oneself

quality signals in information cascades and the dynamics of the distribution of motion picture box office revenues abstract the movies are an ideal testing ground for information cascade models one can observe the dynamics of box office revenues from the opening to the end of the run to study the possibility that information cascades occur in the movies one has to incorporate the fact that agents can observe box office revenues as reported on the evening news and communicate word of mouth information about the quality of the movies they have seen one must consider many movies rather than the mere two choices assumed in information cascade models we develop an agent based model of information cascades with these extensions our objective is to see if the conclusions of information cascade models hold with these extensions they do not and to see if the agent based model can capture the features of the motion picture box office revenues it does

choices involving uncertain probabilities abstract this paper contains an analytic and empirical component the analytic one examines how people should value information on probabilities versus payoffs according to expected utility theory it also examines under what conditions various generalized utility models such as subjective expected utility theory prospect theory and rank dependent utility entail testable predictions for preference for information the empirical component examines people s actual information preferences and to what extent they fit the various models after describing two experiments and their findings it is concluded that generalized utility models are unlikely to offer much insight into risky decision making

testing different stochastic specificationsof risky choice the harless camerer hc hey orme ho and random preference rp models of stochastic variation in choice under uncertainty are compared implications of these models including some that are independent of the deterministic theory with which they are combined are tested in an experiment in which participants respond to decision problems twice the hc model generally performs poorly the ho model predicts more violations of dominance than are observed while the rp model fails to account for those few violations which do occur additional regularities are observed which are inconsistent with all three models when combined with expected utility theory

the common consequence effect testing a unified explanation of recent mixed evidence abstract the common consequence effect is perhaps the most investigated violation of expected utility theory and yet no single generalised expected utility model convincingly organises the experimental data this paper reports a test of a modified version of expected cardinality specific utility theory with boundary effects neilson w s 1992 economics letters 39 275 278 which can explain some recent mixed evidence without recourse to subjective probability weighting models the results do not convincingly support the boundary effect hypothesis and neither support the more usual probability weighting arguments but do indicate instability in preferences largely consistent with event splitting effects

preference reversals without the independence axiom the preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the transitivity axiom of decision theory however recent theoretical papers have demonstrated that the preference reversals that were observed in earlier experiments could be explained by subject violations of the independence axiom or the compound lottery axiom therefore those preference reversals are not known to be inconsistent with generalization of expected utility theory that replace the independence axiom the present paper reports the results of experiments in which a substantial proportion of subject responses violate the asymmetry axiom these results are inconsistent with expected utility theory and its generalizations copyright 1989 by american economic association

alcohol and self control a field experiment in india this paper studies alcohol consumption among low income workers in india in a 3 week field experiment the majority of 229 cycle rickshaw drivers were willing to forgo substantial monetary payments in order to set incentives for themselves to remain sober thus exhibiting demand for commitment to sobriety randomly receiving sobriety incentives significantly reduced daytime drinking while leaving overall drinking unchanged i find no evidence of higher daytime sobriety significantly changing labor supply productivity or earnings in contrast increasing sobriety raised savings by 50 percent an effect that does not appear to be solely explained by changes in income net of alcohol expenditures

does hollywood make too many r rated movies risk stochastic dominance and the illusion of expectation we estimate the probability distributions of budgets revenues returns and profits to g pg pg13 and r rated movies the distributions are non gaussian and show a self similar stable paretian form with nonfinite variance and nonstationary mean the profit distributions have asymmetric tails which means that hollywood could trim its downside risk while increasing its upside possibilities by shifting production dollars out of r rated movies into g pg and pg13 rated movies stars who are willing to appear in edgy counterculture r rated movies for their prestige value may induce an illusion of expectation leading studios to green light movies that have biased expectations

mortgage choice as a natural field experiment on choice under risk data on approximately 280 000 borrowers from the uk survey of mortgage lenders are used to model choices between variable and fixed rate mortgages the choice is assumed to depend on three factors risk attitude interest rate expectations and individual discount rate the ordered probit model is used for estimation while taking account of a number of econometric issues including missing counterfactuals selectivity and endogeneity a large number of strong effects are found including higher income borrowers are less risk averse and have a lower discount rate and risk aversion rises with the amount borrowed providing evidence of increasing relative risk aversion

new horizons or a strategic mirage artist led distribution versus alliance strategy in the video game industry abstract in this paper we contribute to the debate between researchers who argue that the emergence of online distribution allows content producers in the creative industries to bypass powerful publishers and distributors and other researchers who argue that this strategy cannot succeed without the complementary assets that these intermediaries provide we use a case study of the dutch video game developer dvgd bringing to market an identical game using two different but comparable distribution channels as a quasi experiment in the first release dvgd used online distribution to reach consumers directly whereas in the second it used an alliance with an established video game publisher we find that while the alliance required dvgd to share with the publisher a substantial fraction of the value appropriated by the game the alliance strategy resulted in greater absolute financial performance and relative market performance compared to the self publishing strategy we conclude that the differences in performance can be traced back to specialized complementary assets required for successful commercialization

a present value test of habits and the current account abstract forecasts derived from standard intertemporal current account ica models generally fail to match the volatility of actual current accounts this paper offers a solution to the excess volatility problem of standard ica models by incorporating consumption habits into the standard model the model as developed in the paper shows that significant habit formation implies increased current account volatility as sluggishness is introduced into the consumption adjustment process that follows income shocks a theory consistent measure of the degree of habit formation is estimated using gmm the estimated habit parameter is found to be statistically significant in six of eight quarterly samples

optimal bundling strategies under heavy tailed valuations we develop a framework for the optimal bundling problem of a multiproduct monopolist who provides goods to consumers with private valuations that are random draws from a distribution with heavy tails we show that in the vickrey auction setting the buyers prefer separate provision of the goods to any bundles we also provide a complete characterization of the optimal bundling strategies for a monopolist producer who provides goods for profit maximizing prices for products with low marginal costs the seller s optimal strategy is to provide goods separately when consumers valuations are heavy tailed and in a single bundle when valuations are thin tailed these conclusions are reversed for goods with high marginal costs for simplicity we use a specific class of independent and identically distributed random variables but our results can be generalized to include dependence skewness and the case of nonidentical one dimensional distributions

when to exit a product evidence from the u s motion picture exhibition market when is it optimal for a multi product firm to exit a product we analyze strategic product exit using data on motion pictures exhibition choices in a major metropolitan first run market to estimate the survivor function for films at a given theatre this analysis indicates that a film s survival at a particular theatre is affected by intra firm relative performance and interfirm competitive pressures we find that theatres within chains avoid business stealing preliminary analysis further suggests that theatres compete for market share with neighboring theatres by increasing the time to exit when the competing theatre is owned by a different chain this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

production growth and business cycles ii new directions abstract this paper outlines new directions for investigations of real business cycle models consideration of stochastic growth of exogenous and endogenous forms analysis of suboptimal outcomes arising due to externalities of distorting taxes and implications of labor market heterogeneity

observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods the preference reversal phenomenon is usually interpreted as evidence of nontransitivity of preference but has also been explained as the result of the difference between individuals responses to choice and valuation problems the devices used by experimenters to elicit valuations and the random lottery selection incentive system this paper reports an experiment designed so that none of these factors could generate systematic nontransitivities yet systematic violations of transitivity were still found the pattern of violation was analogous with that found in previous preference reversal experiments and is consistent with regret theory copyright 1991 by the econometric society

further evidence of the impact of regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty a preliminary experimental study of the relative impact of regret and disappointment on individual choice under uncert ainty is followed up and extended in various ways taken in conjuncti on with the earlier work the new results provide further evidence of the limitations of von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory a nd indicate the potential power of the alternative models discussed it is argued that there is sufficient weight of evidence to encourage further systematic investigation copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

rational choice with status quo bias abstract motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one s current situation on her choice behavior the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case we follow a revealed preference approach and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect and that are applicable in any choice situation to which the standard static choice model applies

business cycle implications of internal consumption habit for new keynesian models we study the implications of internal consumption habit for new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium nkdsge models bayesian monte carlo methods are employed to evaluate nkdsge model fit simulation experiments show that internal consumption habit often improves the ability of nkdsge models to match the spectra of output and consumption growth nonetheless thefit of nkdsge models with internal consumption habit is susceptible to the sources of nominal rigidity to spectra identified by permanent productivity shocks to the choice of monetary policy rule and to the frequencies used for evaluation these vulnerabilities indicate that the specification of nkdsge models is fragile

understanding preference imprecision the term preference imprecision seems to have different meanings to different people in the literature one can find references to a number of expressions for example vagueness incompleteness randomness unsureness indecisiveness and thick indifference curves some of these are theoretical constructs some are empirical the purpose of this paper is to survey the various different approaches and to try to link them together to see if they are all addressed to the same issue and to come to some conclusions in the course of this survey we report on evidence concerning the existence of preference imprecision and its impact on theoretical and empirical work

measuring consumers willingness to pay at the point of purchase abstract economists psychologists and marketing researchers rely on measures of consumers willingness to pay wtp in estimating demand for private and public goods and in designing optimal price schedules existing market research techniques for measuring wtp differ in whether they provide an incentive to consumers to reveal their true wtp and in whether they simulate actual point of purchase contexts the authors present an empirical comparison of several procedures for eliciting wtp that are applicable directly at the point of purchase in particular the authors test the applicability of becker degroot and marschak s 1964 well known incentive compatible procedure for assessing the utility of lotteries to measuring consumers wtp in three studies the authors explore the reliability validity and feasibility of the procedure and show that it yields lower wtp estimates than do non incentive compatible methods such as open ended and double bounded contingent valuation they show experimentally t

testing new theories of choice under uncertainty using the common consequence effect a generalised common consequence problem is used to contrast the predictions of expected utility theory and several new theories of choice under uncertainty an experiment designed to test these predictions is reported systematic violations of expected utility theory are detected but although a consistent pattern emerges from the data it offers little support for any of the new theories the analysis is extended to test predictions which are unique to regret theory and significant regret effects are detected

can world real interest rates explain business cycles in a small open economy abstract while the world real interest rate is potentially an important mechanism for transmitting international shocks to small open economies much of the recent quantitative research that studies this mechanism concludes that it has little effect on output investment and net exports we re examine the importance of world real interest rate shocks using an approach that reverses the standard real business cycle methodology we begin with a small open economy business cycle model but rather than specifying the stochastic processes for the shocks and then solving and simulating the model to evaluate how well these shocks explain business cycles we use the model to back out the shocks that are consistent with the model s observable endogenous variables then we use variance decompositions to examine the importance of each shock we apply this methodology to canada and find that world real interest rate shocks can play an important role in explaining the cyclical variation in a small open economy in particular they can explain up to one third of the fluctuations in output and more than half of the fluctuations in net exports and net foreign assets

indifference or indecisiveness choice theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences abstract a commonly held belief in economics is that an individual s preferences that are revealed by her choices must be complete this paper takes issue with this position by showing that one may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon observing her choice behavior we relax the standard weak axiom of revealed preferences warp and show that a potent theory of individual choice with and without risk can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with some other standard postulates the most notable features here are that an agent is allowed to be indifferent between certain alternatives and indecisive about others moreover an outside observer can identify which of these actually occur upon examining the observable choice behavior of the decision maker as an application we also show how our theory may be able to cope with the classical preference reversal phenomenon

risky innovation the impact of internal and external r d strategies upon the distribution of returns a b s t r a c t external innovation increases the profits of the median firm but also increases dispersion and the kur tosis of the distribution of profits this means that external strategies are risky and may require a very large number of attempts before average returns are obtained this puts smaller firms into a position of disproportionately high risk despite the earlier evidence that the rewards from innovation are positively skewed we find no effect of innovation strategies upon the skewness of the distribution of firms profits

current account dynamics under information rigidity and imperfect capital mobility abstract the current account in developed countries is highly persistent and volatile in comparison to their output growth the standard intertemporal current account model with rational expectations re fails to explain the observed current account and consumption dynamics the re model extended with imperfect capital mobility by shibata and shintani 1998 can account for the consumption dynamics but only at the cost of the explanatory power for the volatility of the current account this paper replaces re in the intertemporal current account model with sticky information si in which consumers are inattentive to shocks to their income the si model can better explain a persistent and volatile current account than the re model but it overpredicts the persistence of changes in consumption the si model extended with imperfect capital mobility explains both the current account and consumption provided that sufficiently high degrees of information rigidity and imperfect capital mobility are considered

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

inexperienced and experienced players in an oligopolistic market game with minimal information we consider an oligopolistic market game in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good the consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function the firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers due to the minimal information provided the players do not have a well specified model of their environment given a simple mode of adaptive behavior which we showed in a previous paper explained the data relatively well our main objective here is to analyze whether experienced players behave differently to inexperienced players copyright 1999 by oxford university press

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

interest rates exchange rates and present value models of the current account this paper develops a testable intertemporal model of the current account that allows for variable interest rates and exchange rates these additional variables are channels through which external shocks may influence the domestic current account the restrictions from the theoretical model are subjected to present value tests using quarterly data from three small open economies the paper finds that including the interest rate and exchange rate improves the fit of the intertemporal model over what was found in previous studies the model predictions better replicate the volatility of current account data and better explain historical episodes of current account imbalance

intra experimental income effects and risk aversion abstract harrison s 1986 modification of the bekker degroot and marshak 1964 mechanism for eliciting risk preferences is employed to test the hypotheses of expected utility theory with respect to changes in income increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion subjects in the laboratory are shown to exhibit such behavior

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

pricing an option on revenue from an innovation an application to movie box office revenue we develop a model for valuing revenue streams from innovations the stochastic properties of revenue from innovations create a more difficult environment in which to value options than when the underlying is a security there is no initial revenue and cumulative revenue cannot decrease revenues from innovations are characterized by different lives and different rates of the resolution of uncertainty a common deterministic model for predicting revenue from an innovation is known as the bass model we embed the bass model in a gamma process resulting in a stochastic process with moments proportional to the mean of the bass model to illustrate this model we choose the valuation of options on movie box office revenue these options enable film distributors to manage the risk of a movie and they offer diversification opportunities for investors we develop the econometric methodology for ex ante parameter estimation and a bayesian updating scheme using markov chain monte carlo simulation as data after release become available call prices obtained using the maximum likelihood ml parameter estimates from the full data set closely approximate the average discounted value of ex post call payouts that would have occurred at option maturity

choosing to cofinance analysis of project specific alliances in the movie industry we use a movie industry project by project dataset to analyze the choice of financing a project internally versus financing it through outside alliances the results indicate that project risk is positively correlated with alliance formation movie studios produce a variety of films and tend to develop their safest projects internally our findings are consistent with internal capital market explanations we find mixed evidence regarding resource pooling i e sharing the cost of large projects finally the evidence shows that projects developed internally perform similarly to projects developed through outside alliances

incentives in experiments a theoretical analysis experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks we provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question assuming statewise mo

preference reversals for ambiguity aversion this paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant the reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context dependent weightings of attributes we offer an explanation based on sugden s random reference theory with different elicitation methods generating different random reference points then measurements of ambiguity aversion that use willingness to pay are confounded by loss aversion and hence overestimate ambiguity aversion this paper was accepted by teck ho decision analysis

examining risk preferences under high monetary incentives experimental evidence from the people s republic of china several experimental sessions were conducted to elicit certainty equivalents for a sequence of lotteries involving real monetary outcomes the opportunity to conduct sessions in the people s republic of china afforded the ability to offer very large monetary incentives relative to subjects living costs in the highest payoff condition subjects earned three times their normal monthly revenue in the course of a two hour experiment results indicate a statistically significant impact of the level of monetary incentives on revealed risk preferences however even under extreme monetary incentives subjects demanded amounts well in excess of expected value for low probability gain prospects copyright 1992 by american economic association

seasonality in the u s motion picture industry the observed seasonality of box office revenues reflects both seasonality in underlying demand for movies and seasonality in the number and quality of available movies i separately identify these aspects by estimating weekly demand for movies using movie fixed effects a long panel of movies weekly revenues and restrictions on their decay pattern i find that the estimated seasonality in underlying demand is much smaller and slightly different from the observed seasonality of sales the biggest movies are released at times when demand is highest amplifying the underlying seasonality price rigidities in the industry may facilitate this amplification effect

the market for motion pictures rank revenue and survival i introduction on any given day in every major city there may from 50 to 100 motion pictures playing on theater screens each is unique and its producer hopes it will catch that bit of magic that lights up the screen and the box office yet few achieve this feat and most lead brief unpredictable lives each film competes for screens and audiences during its brief life against a changing array of imperfect and equally unique substitutes how is one to understand this market is there any sense in which this market could be called competitive and how is it organized what institutions and contracts are adapted to this market environment and how do they shape the results we seek to answer some of these questions by examining the relationship between contractual practices and motion picture hazard and survival distributions our modeling is based on a large sample of motion picture revenues and theater bookings during their theatrical runs our detailed sample of motion picture lifetimes is a rare look at this fascinating industry whose unusual and complex features challenge economic theory in interesting ways as smith and smith 1986 506 observe given the interesting characteristics of movies as ideal examples of differentiated products and of the institutional arrangements governing their production and distribution such increased data availability would make this an exceptionally attractive area for applied micro economic research much of the empirical work on the motion picture industry has focused on the attributes of successful movies smith and smith 1986 examined the impact of oscar awards on the cumulative rentals of movies released from the 1950s through the 1970s in more recent work nelson et al undated have quantified the value of an oscar award on movie revenues using a large panel of data and an event study methodology in a somewhat broader empirical study prag and cassavant 1994 examined the determinants of movie revenues and marketing expenditures they found that marketing expenditures and quality are important determinants of a film s success and that production cost star actors and awards are positively related to marketing expenses in the present paper we attempt to account for the dynamic patterns in the data because each film is unique and plays in its own way its life as a commercial product in the theatrical market is hazardous indeed most motion pictures have short and unpredictable lives because audiences must discover what they like and films compete against an ever changing cast of competitors for these reasons it is productive to use evolutionary models of survival and death to model the data 1 we model competition among films in the theatrical market as an evolving rank tournament of survival 2 motion pictures live and die in the box office tournament as they are challenged during their run by a randomly evolving cast of new competitors the challengers come from films previously released and from newly released films the contending films are ranked by film goers and those with high rank survive and are carried over to the next week low ranked films fail and are replaced by new contenders these attributes of the motion picture market contribute to increasing returns and give the box office revenue distribution the distinctive convex shape of a tournament prize distribution 3 the leading products command a disproportionate share of the market and they have longer runs even then a film s rank in the tournament is ephemeral and its life unpredictable in fact of any 10 major theatrical films produced on the average 6 or 7 are unprofitable and 1 will break even vogel 1990 29 ii the motion picture exhibition market once a film is produced it is distributed to theaters who exhibit it for audiences the distributor chooses a release pattern the number and location of theaters in which the film is booked or licensed to play

factors determining uk album success this article uses a recently compiled dataset on the uk album sales to determine which factors contribute to best selling album sales success we control for factors including length of time since release nationality of artist artist type and album type testing the increasing returns to information hypothesis information on general public online review scores for the albums in the dataset allows for a strong test of the accuracy of online reviews in predicting music sales as online reviews are a relatively recent phenomenon while the release of many of the albums predates the widespread use of internet

habit formation in consumption a meta analysis abstract we examine 597 estimates of habit formation reported in 81 published studies the mean reported strength of habit formation equals 0 4 but the estimates vary widely both within and across studies we use bayesian and frequentist model averaging to assign a pattern to this variance while taking into account model uncertainty studies employing macro data report consistently larger estimates than micro studies 0 6 vs 0 1 on average the difference remains 0 5 when we control for 30 factors that reflect the context in which researchers obtain their estimates such as data frequency geographical coverage variable definition estimation approach and publication characteristics we also find that evidence for habits strengthens when researchers use lower data frequencies employ log linear approximation of the euler equation and utilize open economy dsge models moreover estimates of habits differ systematically across countries

a blueprint for success in the us film industry this article analyses motion picture box office gross revenue using a cross section of films from 1997 to 2001 the dependent variable is total domestic box office revenue the independent variables investigated include production budget peak number of screens that the film was shown on in theaters consumer price index for movie tickets personal income season and year of the release in theaters a measure of pre existing audience aggregate critic rating mpaa rating genre word of mouth recommendation the presence of popular stars and the award nominations a distinction is made in the analysis between information available to the public prior to the release of the film in theaters ex ante and information available to the public after the film opens in theaters ex post results for the ex ante ordinary least squares ols regression reveal positive impacts of budget summer and holiday release dates critical reviews sequels and several genres on gross revenue significant positive determina

prospect theory and energy efficiency abstract investments in energy efficiency entail uncertainty and when faced with uncertainty consumers have been shown to behave according to prospect theory preferences are reference dependent and exhibit loss aversion and probabilities are subjectively weighted using data from a choice experiment eliciting prospect theory parameters i provide evidence that loss averse people are less likely to invest in energy efficiency then i consider policy design under prospect theory when there are also externalities from energy use a higher degree of loss aversion implies a higher subsidy to energy efficiency numerical simulations suggest that the impact of prospect theory on policy may be substantial

lessons from a behavioral economics success story comment on theory and experiment what are the questions among the many challenges that smith forthcoming details one that stands out is that theory and experiments face an incompatibility in the following sense theorists propose models which implicitly assume that the situation being modeled is divorced from everything else the individual might encounter either in the past or in the future in essence when they describe the game they preclude consideration of anything outside of the rules experimentalists on the other hand cannot make this implicit assumption while they have taken great pains to construct experiments that reflect as closely as possible the games described by theorists and often these experimental procedures are exceedingly clever they cannot remove subjects pasts or futures consequently economic experiments can never test only the theory they are designed to test instead they must test the theory in conjunction with all of the social cultural and historical baggage that subjects bring with them smith of course is right and his paper provides a call for new research to address this problem there are several directions that this researchmight go one is for experimental economists to somehow refine their procedures to isolate the laboratory from the outside world this after all is the technique used in the natural sciences but one can questionwhether this can ever be achieved for the social sciences an alternative direction is for theorists to write models that do not isolate rational actors from the rest of the world where the first direction lets theorists hold fast and expect experimentalists to adjust the second direction does the opposite something between these two is probably the right answer and indeed such a coordinated approach in which theorists address newmodeling questions and experimentalists change their approach to testing theoretical models was successful in a different part of economics the study of behavior toward risk my purpose here is to drawon the lessons from this successful research agenda and use them to develop a newdirection for experimental work on games

the terms of trade productivity growth and the current account abstract this paper extends the analytical framework provided by glick and rogoff 1995 journal of monetary economics 35 159 192 to an economy with traded and nontraded goods and it analyzes the impact of country specific and global productivity shocks on the current account and investment each of these disturbances have different implications for the current account and investment that are largely consistent with the empirical results first the current account responds more than investment to country specific traded productivity growth second global traded productivity and country specific nontraded productivity growth have no effect on the current account but they have a significant impact on investment third the global component of nontraded productivity is negligible and has no significant impact on either the current account or investment in addition the response of the current account and investment to relative prices the terms of trade and exchange rate are insignificant this paper also discusses the potential reasons for it

does realism matter in contingent valuation surveys the importance of stressing the realism or policy relevance of a contingent valuation cv survey is commonly recognized by cv researchers this paper focuses on the relationship between the probability that a subject s response will result in real consequences and the subject s accurate reporting of willingness to pay results from experiments support the argument that efforts to make contingent valuation surveys real are important however our results also suggest that the connection between the survey and the likelihood of a payment must be rather powerful before surveys generate accurate reporting of willingness to pay for a public good

testing a present value model of the current account evidence from us and canadian time series abstract this paper presents a simple model of current account determination based upon the permanent income hypothesis of private consumption behavior under rational expectations the model employs a representative national agent who is forward looking and can borrow and lend at a constant world interest rate a present value relationship for the current account is derived and its implications are tested on post war data for the united states and canada testing is done using the framework developed by campbell and shiller 1987 which allows the forcing variables in the model to be difference rather than trend stationary our empirical results indicate the most stringent restrictions of the present value model are strongly rejected by the us and canadian data however less formal procedures suggest the consumption smoothing model has some ability to track the dynamic behavior of the us current account jel f32

demand and supply dynamics for sequentially released products in international markets the case of motion pictures we develop an econometric model to study a setting in which a new product is launched first in its domestic market and only at a later stage in foreign markets and where the product s performance demand and availability supply are highly interdependent over time within and across markets integrating literature on international diffusion success breeds success trends and the theatrical motion picture industry the focus of the empirical analysis we develop a dynamic simultanenous equations model of the drivers and interrelationship of the behavior of consumers audiences and retailers exhibitors our findings emphasize the importance of considering the endogeneity and simultaneity of audience and exhibitor behavior and challenge conventional wisdom on the determinants of box office performance which is predominantly based on modeling frameworks that fail to account for the interdependence of performance and availability specifically we find that variables such as movie attributes and advertising expenditures which are usually assumed to influence audiences directly mostly influence revenuesindirectly namely through their impact on exhibitors screen allocations in addition consistent with the idea that the buzz for a movie is perishable we find that the longer is the time lag between releases the weaker is the relationship between domestic and foreign market performance an effect mostly driven by foreign exhibitors screen allocations

payoff dominance vs cognitive transparency in decision making i introduction there is a general question about how well laboratory markets work in eliciting true preferences given the low opportunity costs of making errors as in harrison 1989 vernon smith 1982 set out a series of conditions that must be adhered to if a laboratory market investigation is to provide insight into economic behavior in naturally occurring markets the opportunity cost question posed above is covered under smith s payoff dominance and reward saliency precepts for laboratory market experiments if the experimental setting is to elicit true preferences from the subjects the monetary payoffs in the experiment must be salient and dominate potential extraneous influences on subject behavior this paper reports on three series of experiments which employ the becker degroot marshak bdm mechanism to investigate the interaction between payoff dominance reward saliency and cognitive effort in the decision task the bdm mechanism is well suited to this task because it involves only individual choice is theoretically incentive compatible and offers a high degree of experimenter control over payoffs initial information and feedback on the results of decisions becker degroot and marschak 1964 introduced the following preference elicitation mechanism individuals state the most they would be willing to pay wtp 1 for a good then a random price is drawn from a distribution known to the individuals if the stated value is greater than or equal to the random price the individual buys the good at the randomly determined price otherwise the individual does not buy the good the bdm bidding mechanism can be shown to be incentive compatible the intuition is straightforward it is not in the individual s interest to understate true wtp if the random buying price falls between the stated wtp and the true wtp the individual has foregone a beneficial trade it is also not in an individual s interest to overstate true wtp if the random buying price is greater than the true value but less than the stated value the individual will be required to buy the good at a price greater than true wtp a more formal proof is easy to construct 2 let v the true value of one unit of the auction good b the bid submitted to purchase one unit of the good r the price randomly determined to be paid if the good is purchased p r probability that price r is randomly selected y sup o initial income u y utility a function of money income and the value of the good and e initial monetary balance provided in an experiment in the wtp version of the bdm auction the good is purchased if b greater than or equal to r with the subject paying only r and not purchased if b less than r in experiments using the bdm the subject cannot bid more than the experimental balance e so it must be that v less than e if the experiment is to be demand revealing assuming that subjects maximize expected utility they will submit bid b that maximizes eu integral of p r u y sup o e v r dr between limits b and 0 integral of p r u y sup o e dr between limits e and b the first integral describes the expected payoff for random prices r below the bid b and the second integral describes the expected payoff for random prices between the bid b and the maximum possible bid as limited by the balance e the maximum over b occurs when the derivative of eu with respect to b is zero in other words when deu db p b u y e v b u y e 0 so long as p b greater than 0 i e there is some probability the offered bid will be the price the above implies that the maximum occurs when b v in other words it is individually optimal to submit a bid b equal to one s true value v for the commodity although the bdm is incentive compatible in theory it is an empirical question whether it has this property in practice