a bayesian model of voting in juries abstract we model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule we offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent regardless of the size of the jury and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed we prove a jury theorem for our general model as the size of the jury increases the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule for unanimity rule the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency a property that could emerge only in a continuous model journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

a nonequilibrium analysis of unanimity rule majority rule and pareto i introduction voting theory is important for understanding economics as well as politics international organizations vote on trade regulations legislatures vote on minimum wage and governments vote on the provision of public goods voting also affects industrial organization for instance limited partnerships may vote on the allocation of resources to various units and shareholders may vote on investment decisions carrera and richmond 1988 what voting rule best achieves pareto optimal outcomes in such cases in the absence of transactions costs it is widely believed that unanimity rule is the best voting rule for promoting pareto efficiency berggren 1996 buchanan and tullock 1962 mueller 2003 buchanan 1967 writes it is evident that unanimous consent is the political counterpart of the pareto criterion for optimality p 285 traditionally viewed unanimity rule guarantees more efficient outcomes than majority rule because unanimity rule only passes proposals that make everyone better off other voting rules like majority rule can pass proposals that make some individuals worse off one of the assumptions that is either explicit or implicit in the these studies is the assumption of rational proposals we define a proposal as rational if it helps maximize the proposer s utility at the end of the game in our analysis proposals are not rational instead they are generated either randomly or sincerely in a single dimensional voting model and evaluated by the pareto criterion or pareto optimality this produces two striking results with regard to pareto optimality first if proposal generation is random then majority rule is usually more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule second if individuals propose their ideal points then majority rule always selects pareto optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule considering all possible proposals as done in our random generation models has a long tradition in social choice literature arrow 1951 caplin and nalebuff 1988 niemi and weisberg 1968 riker 1982 sen 1979 it also has the advantage of modeling certain types of incomplete information modeling votes where bills are introduced for reasons other than making them pass see stewart 2001 pp 338 41 modeling exogenously generated proposals and for allowing mistakes by the proposer such foundational work should be of interest to those who relate unanimity rule to pareto principles in the study of public goods cornes and sandler 1996 lindahl 1967 political parties aldrich 1995 and legislative institutions colomer 2001 niou and ordeshook 1985 tsebelis 2002 to name a few ii previous studies perhaps the first in depth study of the relationship between unanimity rule and a pareto principle was buchanan and tullock s calculus of consent 1962 buchanan and tullock argued that if decision making costs were negligible unanimity rule would always be the most desirable k majority rule simply because it preserved the pareto principle p 88 although the exact pareto principle they had in mind is not entirely clear it seems that buchanan and tullock were arguing for the criteria of accepting a change from the status quo only if it lead to a pareto improvement otherwise the status quo should be preferred pp 92 93 sen 1979 p 25 1 mueller 2003 pp 138 and 140 41 further compared unanimity rule to majority rule and concluded that unanimity rule typically performs better in terms of the pareto criterion to illustrate his reasoning mueller describes a community voting on both the purchase of a new firehouse and the taxes needed to pay for it in a single bill if the decision was made under unanimity rule the distribution of taxes would be redefined until the firehouse benefited all otherwise the bill would not pass if the decision was made under majority rule a majority might distribute the taxes on a minority such that members of the majority would be net gainers and members of the minority would be net losers

unanimous rules in the laboratory we study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory in line with theoretical predictions we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule we also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior finally we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects veto s welfare properties

the unanimous voting rule is not the political equivalent to market exchange the unanimous voting rule is often viewed as analogous to voluntary market ex change this paper demonstrates that when third party pecuniary effects exist this analogy breaks down because unlike markets unanimous voting requires compensation for these ef fects thus efficient market outcomes typically will be rejected by the unanimous voting rule even when transactions costs are low enough to make compensation feasible the political outcome under unanimity will differ from the market outcome the distributional effects of unanimity provide the incentive for people to substitute rent seeking behavior for productive activity and reduce the incentive for productive change providing additional reasons why a less than unanimous voting rule may be optimal when resources are to be allocated politically

information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation a laboratory experiment abstract this paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation pr elections comparing this with majority rule consistent with theoretical predictions poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed a dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under pr so abstention is higher in pr in contrast with private interest environments and welfare is lower deviations from nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium qre which allows for voter mistakes

minority voting rights can maximize majority welfare i use condorcet s information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to enforce its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority special voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully and more participation means more information is aggregated which makes the majority better off this result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of lani guinier s arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation benefitting everyone

equilibrium pricing in a partial search market the shopbot paradox abstract price competition is explored when consumers costlessly learn product prices but not ancillary fees and have greater disutility to paying these fees there is a unique symmetric nash equilibrium price between the competitive bertrand and monopoly diamond prices

term premia and inflation uncertainty empirical evidence from an international panel dataset this paper provides cross country empirical evidence on bond risk premia i construct a panel of zero coupon nominal government bond yields spanning ten industrialized countries and nearly two decades i hence compute forward rates and then use two different methods to decompose these forward rates into expected future short term interest rates and term premiums the first method uses an affine term structure model with macroeconomic variables as unspanned risk factors the second method uses surveys i find that term premium estimates declined across countries over the sample period especially in countries that appear to have reduced inflation uncertainty by making substantial changes in the monetary policy frameworks of their central banks during the recent financial crisis term premiums have remained flat and even declined further in some countries perhaps reflecting the effects of quantitative easing actions by many central banks

voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information we analyze two candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters each voter has noisy private information about the state variable we show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity nevertheless elections fully aggregate information in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change if all private information were common knowledge equilibrium voting behavior is to a large extent determined by the electoral rule i e if a candidate is required to get at least x percent of the vote in order to win the election then in equilibrium this candidate gets very close to x percent of the vote with probability close to one finally if the distribution from which preferences are drawn is uncertain then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero

divided majority and information aggregation theory and experiment this paper studies theoretically and experimentally the properties of plurality and approval voting when a majority gets divided by information imperfections the majority faces two challenges aggregating information to select the best majority candidate and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate under plurality the majority cannot achieve both goals at once under approval voting it can welfare is strictly higher because some voters approve of both majority alternatives in the laboratory we find i strong evidence of strategic voting and ii superiority of approval voting over plurality finally subject behavior suggests the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies

manipulated electorates and information aggregation we study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost voters are symmetric ex ante and prefer policy a in state a and policy b in state b but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state each recruited voter observes a private signal that is imperfectly informative about the unknown state but does not learn the size of the electorate in contrast to existing results for large elections there are equilibria in which information aggregation fails as the voter recruitment cost disappears a perfectly informed organizer can ensure that policy a is implemented independent of the state by appropriately choosing the number of recruited voters in each state

deliberation preference uncertainty and voting rules a deliberative committee is a group of at least two individuals who first debate about what alternative to choose prior to these same individuals voting to determine the choice we argue first that uncertainty about individuals private preferences is necessary for full information sharing and second demonstrate in a very general setting that the condition under which unanimity can support full information revelation in debate amounts to it being common knowledge that all committee members invariably share identical preferences over the alternatives it follows that if ever there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under unanimity rule there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under any voting rule moreover the converse is not true of majority rule if there is uncertainty about individuals preferences

get rid of unanimity rule the superiority of majority rules with veto power we study unanimous decision making under incomplete information we argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent we show that majority rules with veto power are i pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and ii ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations

monetary policy expectations at the zero lower bound we show that conventional dynamic term structure models dtsms estimated on recent u s data severely violate the zero lower bound zlb on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates in contrast shadow rate dtsms account for the zlb by construction capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates and achieve good forecast performance these models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy including the timing of policy liftoff from the zlb and the pace of subsequent policy tightening we also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow rate dtsm when yields are constrained near the zlb

voting and vetoing the consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory it is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee that is in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game nonveto players earn zero some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed specifically i study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players quantitative results are given for the case of the un security council

is the negative interest rate policy effective abstract this paper examines the effectiveness of the negative interest rate policy conducted by several central banks to stabilize economic growth and inflation expectations through the signaling channel in doing so we assess survey based expectations data for up to 44 economies from 2002 to 2017 and analyze the impact of the adoption of a negative interest rate policy on expectations made by professionals based on a difference in differences approach our main findings are as follows first we show that the introduction of negative policy rates significantly reduces expectations regarding 3 month money market interest rates and also 10 year government bond yields second we also provide evidence for a significantly positive effect of this unconventional monetary policy tool on gdp growth and inflation expectations this implies that the negative interest rate policy appears to be effective in boosting economic growth and overcoming a deflationary spiral consequently the effect of negative nominal interest rates on real interest rate expectations is also negative

the response of interest rates to us and uk quantitative easing we analyse declines in government bond yields following announcements by the federal reserve and the bank of england of plans to buy longer term debt using dynamic term structure models we decompose us and uk yields into expectations about future short term interest rates and term premiums we find that declines in us yields mainly reflected lower expectations of future short term interest rates while declines in uk yields appeared to reflect reduced term premiums thus the relative importance of the signalling and portfolio balance channels of quantitative easing may depend on market institutional structures and central bank communication policies

term premia and inflation uncertainty empirical evidence from an international panel dataset comment term premia implied by maximum likelihood estimates of affine term structure models are misleading because of small sample bias we show that accounting for this bias alters the conclusions about the trend cycle and macroeconomic determinants of the term premia estimated in wright 2011 his term premium estimates are essentially acyclical and often just parallel the secular trend in longterm interest rates in contrast bias corrected term premia show pronounced countercyclical behavior consistent with theoretical and empirical arguments about movements in risk premia jel e31 e43 e52 g12 h63 in an important recent paper wright 2011 presents a new international interest rate dataset and estimates term premia in far ahead forward rates using an affine gaussian dynamic term structure model dtsm as well as a survey based method he then relates these empirical term premia to macroeconomic conditions notably inflation uncertainty in particular he shows that the marked secular decline in estimated forward term premia across countries is correlated with decreases in measures of uncertainty around forecasts of future inflation in this comment we demonstrate that his model based term premium estimates are distorted by smallsample bias in the estimated model parameters accounting for this bias changes the behavior of the resulting term premium estimates in terms of their trend and cyclical behavior in an affine gaussian dtsm bond yields are determined by a small number of risk factors and the dynamic evolution of these risk factors follows a gaussian vector autoregression var if the risk factors in such a model are observable and if the model is maximally flexible i e if it has no parameter restrictions beyond those required for identification we know from joslin singleton and zhu 2011 that the maximum likelihood estimates of the var parameters can be found by

the swing voter s curse in the laboratory this paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on pivotal voter models our experiment controls for different information levels of voters as well as the size of the electorate the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters the design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world our results support the equilibrium predictions of the feddersen pesendorfer model and clearly reject the notion that voters in the laboratory use naive decision theoretic strategies the voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter s curse and adjust their behavior to compensate while the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behavior we find that aggregate outcomes such as efficiency turnout and margin of victory closely track the theoretical predictions

monetary policy surprises and interest rates evidence from the fed funds futures market abstract this paper estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on bill note and bond yields using data from the futures market for federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components interest rates response to anticipated target rate changes is small while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant these responses are generally consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure surprise target rate changes have little effect on expectations of future actions however which helps to explain the lack of empirical support for the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

would rational voters acquire costly information abstract we analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them voters can acquire some costly information about the alternatives in agreement with downs s rational ignorance hypothesis individual investment in political information declines to zero as the number of voters increases however if the marginal cost of information is near zero for nearly irrelevant information there is a sequence of equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to correspond to the interests of the majority for arbitrarily large numbers of voters thus rationally ignorant voters are consistent with a well informed electorate

the effectiveness of alternative monetary policy tools in a zero lower bound environment this paper reviews alternative options for monetary policy when the shortterm interest rate is at the zero lower bound and develops new empirical estimates of the effects of the maturity structure of publicly held debt on the term structure of interest rates we use a model of risk averse arbitrageurs to develop measures of how the maturity structure of debt held by the public might affect the pricing of level slope and curvature term structure risk we find that these treasury factors historically were quite helpful for predicting both yields and excess returns over 1990 2007 the historical correlations are consistent with the claim that if in december 2006 the fed were to have sold off all its treasury holdings of less than 1 year maturity about 400 billion and use the proceeds to retire treasury debt from the long end this might have resulted in a 14 basis point drop in the 10 year rate and an 11 basis point increase in the 6 month rate we also develop a description of how the dynamic behavior of the term structure of interest rates changed after hitting the zero lower bound in 2009 our estimates imply that at the zero lower bound such a maturity swap would have the same effects as buying 400 billion in long term maturities outright with newly created reserves and could reduce the 10 year rate by 13 basis points without raising short term yields

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

the interest rate effects of government bond purchases away from the lower bound abstract i analyze the recent experience of unconventional monetary policy in sweden to study the interest rate transmission mechanisms of government bond purchases when interest rates are away from the lower bound using dynamic term structure models and event study regressions i find that government bond purchases have important portfolio balance and signaling effects the signaling channel operates mainly by lowering short rate expectations in the intermediate segment of the yield curve while the portfolio balance channel is effective in lowering longer maturity term premia in addition i find that target interest rate policy and government bond purchases operate in different segments of the yield curve this suggests that a combination of the two policies can be used to lower interest rates across the whole maturity spectrum making monetary policy more expansionary

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo we analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players conflict of interest players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo this leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia under certain conditions the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock players never reach an agreement gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences provided they are sufficiently patient in legislative settings our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks

aggregating information by voting the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses this article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common value election with continuous private signals in equilibrium some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting in deference to those with higher quality signals even as the number of highly informed peers grows large however citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting so that voter participation remains at realistic levels e g 50 to 60 percent for simple examples the precise level of voter turnout along with the margin of victory are determined by the distribution of expertise improving a voter s information makes her more willing to vote consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence but makes her peers more willing to abstain providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting equilibrium participation is optimal even though the marginal voter may have very little e g below average expertise and even though nonvoters information is not utilized copyright oxford university press