truthful bundle multiunit double auctions we address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers each buyer demands some bundle s of various commodities and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity to design truthful double auction mechanisms we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget to the best of our knowledge this padding method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy proof individually rational budget balanced and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment furthermore these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle single unit mechanisms with higher efficiency lower buying prices and higher selling prices

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

default risk and risk averse international investors abstract this paper develops an endogenous default risk model for small open economies that interact with risk averse international investors whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion dara by incorporating risk averse investors who trade with an emerging economy the present model explains a larger proportion and volatility of the spread between sovereign bonds and riskless assets than the standard model with risk neutral investors the paper shows that if investors have dara preferences then the emerging economy s default risk capital flows and bond prices are a function not only of the fundamentals of the economy but also of the level of financial wealth and risk aversion of international investors in particular as investors become wealthier or less risk averse the emerging economy becomes less credit constrained as a result the emerging economy s default risk is lower and its bond prices and capital inflows are higher additionally with risk averse investors the risk premium in the asset prices of the sovereign countries can be decomposed into two components a base premium that compensates the investors for the probability of default and an excess premium that compensates them for taking the risk of default

nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism abstract this paper examines two noncooperative open loop solution concepts in a simple model of economic growth and distribution formulated as a differential game between workers who may save or consume and capitalists who may consume or invest it is demonstrated that both players prefer the stackelberg game to the nash game furthermore it is shown that under fairly realistic assumptions about the parameters of the model both workers and capitalists would prefer to act as the follower in the stackelberg game this means that capitalism is in a stalemate i e in a position where neither class wants to take the initiative and announce its strategy first the result is interpreted as an explanation of the difficulties met in designing and implementing incomes policies and social contracts

a classical model of the class struggle a game theoretic approach the class struggle is formalized as a differential game in a strictly supply side model an approach that synthesizes the models of lancaster and goodwin four different steady state equilibria are derived each corresponding to different assumptions about the degree to which each class is organized to promote its own interests in particular the goodwin growth cycle is shown to emerge from a world characterized by unorganized capitalists and workers in which individuals ignore the effects of their own actions on economywide variables more relevant for discussion of modern capitalism are the hierarchical equilibria especially the codetermination equilibrium in which the existence of a full employment equilibrium turns out to be problematic finally comparative statics results suggest that the incentives for technological change differ widely among the four regimes

currency premia and global imbalances we show that a global imbalance risk factor that captures the spread in countries external imbalances and their propensity to issue external liabilities in foreign currency explains the cross sectional variation in currency excess returns the economic intuition is simple net debtor countries offer a currency risk premium to compensate investors willing to finance negative external imbalances because their currencies depreciate in bad times this mechanism is consistent with exchange rate theory based on capital flows in imperfect financial markets we also find that the global imbalance factor is priced in cross sections of other major asset markets

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

economic growth and conflict over the distribution of income abstract a thorough analysis of economic growth inflation and fluctuations resulting from the class struggle is presented the paper begins with the formulation of an extended predator prey model and pays attention to population growth technical progress differential saving consumption out of wealth trade union activity inflation labour hoarding affluence and the inherent contradictions of capitalism the paper proceeds with a neo classical reformulation to allow for smooth substitution possibilities in production and for time taken to recruit and fire labour an alternative extension of the model based on maximising the reduction in unit costs subject to kaldor s technical progress function is also provided

the transformation problem abstract the history of the marxian transformation problem is surveyed from 1885 to the present particular emphasis is placed on the less well known literature and the focus is on problems of interpretation rather than on technicalities a substantial bibliography is provided

bkk the ez way international long run growth news and capital flows we study the response of international investment flows to short and long run growth news among developed g7 countries positive long run news for domestic productivity induces a net outflow of investments in contrast to the effects of short run growth shocks we document that a standard backus keho and kydland 1994 bkk model fails to reproduce this novel empirical evidence we augment this model with epstein and zin 1989 preferences ez bkk and characterize the resulting recursive risk sharing scheme the response of international capital flows in the ez bkk model is consistent with the data

trade reduction vs multi stage a comparison of double auction design approaches with the growth of electronic markets designing double auction mechanisms that are applicable to emerging market structures has become an important research topic in this paper we investigate two truthful double auction design approaches the trade reduction approach and the multi stage design approach and compare their resulting mechanisms in various exchange environments we find that comparing with the trade reduction approach the multi stage design approach offers mechanisms applicable to more complicated exchange environments furthermore for the known trade reduction mechanisms we prove that the corresponding mechanisms under the multi stage design approach are superior in terms of both social efficiency and individual payoffs in each exchange environment of interest our computational tests show that the mechanisms under the multi stage design approach achieve very high efficiency in various scenarios

the importance of ordering in sequential auctions to date the largest part of literature on multi unit auctions has assumed that there arek homogeneous objects being auctioned where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all ofk units these modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential the aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction we study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd price auctions two heterogeneous jobs and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints

marx s transformation problem and pasinetti s vertically integrated subsystems pasinetti 1988 constructs a complete generalization of marx s transformation problem in the context of a non uniform growth model by proving that production prices are not proportional to the physical quantities of labour supplied to vertically hyper integrated subsystems pasinetti therefore restricts the labour theory of value to a pre institutional stage of analysis in this paper i demonstrate that the transformation problem dissolves once we consider the vertically integrated subsystems induced by the specific institutional setup of a capitalist economy i prove that production prices both in steady state and non uniform growth models are proportional to the physical quantities of labour supplied to vertically super integrated subsystems in consequence the labour theory of value suitably generalized also applies at the institutional stage of analysis

a dominant strategy double auction a double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed this mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer s bid double auction in addition the mechanism always produces full information first best prices the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism the mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices

why do we have nominal government debt abstract we study the choice between nominal and indexed debt in a stochastic macroeconomic model with discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with distortionary taxes nominal debt provides valuable insurance against the budgetary effects of economic fluctuations we show that a welfare maximizing government always issues some nominal debt even though nominal debt increases inflation along the time consistent path of the economy the result is fairly robust with respect to changes in assumptions about policy constraints and about the macroeconomic setting

growth cycles with induced technical change this paper concerns itself with two related topics the relative shares of workers and capitalists in the national income and the labour augmenting bias of technical change both have been dealt with in contrasting fashion in two seminal papers on distribution theory kennedy i964 attempts to explain the then observed constancy of relative shares with the help of the now famous invention possibility frontier however the wage and profit rates are exogeneous to his model goodwin i967 on the other hand presents a model of cycles in growth rates in which the share of labour the wage rate and the profit rate are endogenously determined however unlike the kennedy analysis technical change is assumed to be constant and exogeneously given given that these pioneering works have addressed themselves to important questions it seems a worthwhile task to build a model in which the shares of labour and capital the wage rate the profit rate and technical change are all endogenously determined the perspective we have chosen here introduces the key element of kennedy s perception induced technical change into the goodwin scheme and the consequences of so doing are traced out in the following terse account there are two classes in the economy workers and capitalists only one good q t is produced and it can be either consumed or invested capital stock k t is homogeneous and for simplicity also assumed to be non depreciating the capital output ratio at time t is denoted by o t labour i t is also homogeneous and its productivity at time t a t q t l t improves at the rate ac t labour s share in the national income denoted by u t is

inflation targeting a new framework for monetary policy he world s central bankers and their staffs meet regularly in venues from basle to washington to share ideas and discuss common problems perhaps these frequent meetings help explain why changes in the tactics and strategy of monetary policymaking such as the adoption of money growth targets in the 1970s the intensification of efforts to reduce inflation in the 1980s and the recent push for increased institutional independence for central banks tend to occur in many countries more or less simultaneously whatever their source major changes in the theory and practice of central banking are of great importance for both individual countries and the international economy in this article we discuss a new strategy for monetary policy known as inflation targeting which has sparked much interest and debate among central bankers and monetary economists in recent years this approach is characterized as the name suggests by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy other important features of inflation targeting include increased communication with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary policymakers and in many cases increased accountability of the central bank

intermediary asset pricing abstract we model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary intermediaries face an equity capital constraint risk premia r

value price and exploitation the logic of the transformation problem this paper tries to clarify the logical structure of the relationship between labor values and prices from an axiomatic perspective the famous transformation problem is interpreted as an impossibility result for a specific interpretation of value theory based on specific assumptions and definitions a comprehensive review of recent literature is provided which shows that there are various theoretically relevant and logically consistent alternative interpretations based on different assumptions and definitions

nominal versus indexed debt a quantitative horse race abstract the main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks we model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance we use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion government outlays uncertainty and contingent debt service our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment thus the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates we obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions we further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing volatile countries

the optimal inflation rate in new keynesian models should central banks raise their inflation targets in light of the zero lower bound we study the effects of positive steady state inflation in new keynesian models subject to the zero bound on interest rates we derive the utility based welfare loss function taking into account the effects of positive steady state inflation and solve for the optimal level of inflation in the model for plausible calibrations with costly but infrequent episodes at the zero lower bound the optimal inflation rate is low typically less than two percent even after considering a variety of extensions including optimal stabilization policy price indexation endogenous and statedependent price stickiness capital formation model uncertainty and downward nominal wage rigidities on the normative side price level targeting delivers large welfare gains and a very low optimal inflation rate consistent with price stability these results suggest that raising the inflation target is too blunt an instrument to efficiently reduce the severe costs of zero bound episodes

optimal time consistent government debt maturity this paper develops a model of optimal debt maturity in which the government cannot issue statecontingent debt as the literature has established if the government can perfectly commit to fiscal policy it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short term assets and issuing long term debt these positions are quantitatively very large relative to gdp and do not need to be actively managed by the government our main result is that these conclusions are not robust when lack of commitment is introduced under lack of commitment large and tilted debt positions are very expensive to finance ex ante since they ex post exacerbate the government s problem stemming from a lack of commitment in contrast a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost entailed by a lack of commitment though this structure also limits the ability to insure against shocks and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions we show that the optimal time consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility thus under lack of commitment the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols

modularity and greed in double auctions abstract designing double auctions is a complex problem especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another the goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions by relating it to the exhaustively studied problem of designing one sided mechanisms with a single seller or alternatively a single buyer we consider several desirable properties of a double auction feasibility dominant strategy incentive compatibility the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a deferred acceptance implementation exact and approximate welfare maximization and budget balance for each of these properties we identify sufficient conditions on two one sided algorithms one for ranking the buyers one for ranking the sellers and on a method for their composition into trading pairs which guarantee the desired property of the double auction our framework also offers new insights into classic double auction designs such as the vcg and mcafee auctions with unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers

sovereign debt portfolios bond risks and the credibility of monetary policy we document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency we introduce two features into a government s debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding risk averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment a government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post which leads risk averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante this makes local currency debt too expensive from the government s perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency

truthful double auction mechanisms following the multistage design approach we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms the bc lp mechanism and the mbc mechanism for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers in this market each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity furthermore various transaction related costs will be incurred when a buyer trades with a seller we prove that under both mechanisms truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all buyers and sellers when the buyers bundle information and the transaction cost information are common knowledge the bc lp mechanism can be implemented by just solving two linear programs whereas the mbc mechanism has a higher complexity the empirical study shows that the mbc mechanism achieves higher efficiency over the bc lp mechanism and that both outperform the ksm tr mechanism the only known truthful mechanism for a more restrictive exchange market

on the flexibility of monetary policy the case of the optimal inflation tax this paper examines optimal monetary policy under uncertainty in a context in which policy makers are able to make credible policy commitments we study an optimal taxation problem of minimizing the social cost of financing a stochastic and exogenous level of government transfers since in the basic model the welfare costs of inflation derive only from expected inflation the optimal monetary policy is highly responsive to the state of nature in a benchmark case in which all shocks are transitory the optimal policy calls for loading all the variability of government transfers on the shoulders of the inflation tax

the structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies the article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions there exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains when these conditions hold and a compromise is in force the role of the state consists in institutionalizing coordinating and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists the combination of private ownership of the instruments of production with representative political institutions based on widespread suffrage constitutes a compromise between workers who consent to the private appropriation of profit by owners of capital and capitalists who accept the democratic institutions through which workers can make effective claims for an improvement of their material conditions this form of societal organization was con

why do emerging economies borrow short term the authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long term debt they first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders by issuing long term debt the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis transferring risk to bondholders in equilibrium this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost therefore the government faces a tradeoff between safer long term borrowing and cheaper short term debt second the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance they show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium a higher risk premium on long term bonds than on short term bonds during crises the term premium increases with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities this suggests that changes in bondholders risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises

the debt burden and debt maturity at low and moderate levels of government debt there appears to be little relation between the level of debt and its maturity but at high levels of debt a strong inverse relation emerges we start the paper by documenting this inverse relation for those oecd countries which have reached very high levels of debt we then provide a theory of the joint movements of debt and maturity which can explain both sets of facts it is based on the idea that at high levels of debt the government may need to decrease the maturity of the debt as debt increases in order to maintain the credibility of its anti inflation stance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

fiscal hedging with nominal assets abstract we analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy with distortionary labor income taxes nominal rigidities nominal debt of various maturities and short selling constraints optimal policy prescribes the almost exclusive use of long term debt such debt mitigates the distortions associated with hedging fiscal shocks by allowing the government to allocate them efficiently across states and periods

combinatorial auction design combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors dealing with these forces trade offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency revenue maximization low transaction costs fairness failure freeness and scalability computational complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders by maintaining fairness in the face of computational limitations by limiting biddable combinations and by limiting the use of combinatorial bids combinatorial auction designs include single round first price sealed bidding vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanisms uniform and market clearing price auctions and iterative combinatorial auctions combinatorial auction designs must deal with exposure problems threshold problems ways to keep the bidding moving at a reasonable pace avoiding and resolving ties and controlling complexity

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed

agent competition double auction mechanism this paper proposes an agent competition double auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer to customer marketplaces under the proposed double auction mechanism bidding one s true valuation private information is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions the proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency furthermore these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities

a smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints we address the problem of designing multi item procurement auctions for a monopsonistic buyer in capacity constrained environments using insights from classical auction theory we construct an optimization based auction mechanism smart market relying on the dynamic resolution of a linear program minimizing the buyer s cost under the suppliers capacity constraints suppliers can modify their offers in response to the optimal allocation corresponding to each set of bids giving rise to a dynamic competitive bidding process to assist suppliers we also develop a bidding suggestion device based on a myopic best response mbr calculation that solves an associated optimization problem assuming linear costs for the suppliers we study within a game theoretic framework the sequence of bids arising in this smart market under a weak behavioral assumption and some symmetry requirements an explicit upper bound for the winning bids is established we then formulate a complete behavioral model and solution methodology based on the mbr rationale and show that the bounds derived earlier continue to hold we analytically derive some structural and convergence properties of the mbr dynamics in the simplest nontrivial market environment which suggests further possible design improvements and investigate bidding dynamics and incentive compatibility issues via numerical simulations