technological specialization and the decline of diversified firms we document a strong decline in corporate diversification activity since the late 1970s and we develop a dynamic model that explains this pattern both qualitatively and quantitatively the key feature of the model is that synergies endogenously decline with technological specialization leading to fewer diversified firms in equilibrium the model further predicts that segments inside a conglomerate should become more related over time which is consistent with the data finally the calibrated model also matches other empirical magnitudes well output growth rate market to book ratios diversification discount frequency and returns of diversifying mergers and frequency of refocusing activity

financial markets and growth the last five years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth this issue had been extensively studied nearly two decades earlier by goldsmith 1969 mckinnon 1973 shaw 1973 and others who produced considerable evidence that financial development correlates with growth but their work though insightful lacked analytical foundations in traditional growth theory financial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity but not to their respective growth rates the latter were ascribed to exogenous technical progress the recent revival of interest in the link between financial development and growth stems mainly from the insights and techniques of endogenous growth models which have shown that there can be self sustaining growth without exogenous technical progress and that the growth rate can be related to preferences technology income distribution and institutional arrangements this provides the theoretical underpinning that early contributors lacked tinancial intermediation can be shown to have not only level effects but also growth effects the resulting models have offered important insights into the effect of financial development on growth and vice versa they have also provided new impetus to empirical research on these issues this paper reviews the ground covered so far on the theoretical and empirical front and points to some still unresolved issues

endogenous growth and the possibility of eliminating pollution abstract this paper studies the effect on optimal growth of the possibility that at some moment in the future a technology is discovered that eliminates pollution we formalize this possibility as a probability p per unit of time of discovering such a technology we focus on steady state behavior and show that the optimal rate of growth increases with the hope of eliminating pollution for an economy where there is no growth in the steady state of the optimal trajectory when p 0 a positive p may imply positive growth the higher the value of the probability the larger the endogenous rate of growth

the federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission the authors show that the interest rate on federal funds is extremely informative about future movements of real macroeconomic variables then they argue that the reason for this forecasting success is that the funds rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves that is the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy actions finally using innovations to the funds rate as a measure of changes in policy the authors present evidence consistent with the view that monetary policy works at least in part through credit i e bank loans as well as through money i e bank deposits copyright 1992 by american economic association

pollution abatement and balanced growth the analysis of endogenous growth models with pollution often concentrates on steady state trajectories under the assumption that the steady state is in some sense stable in the present note we provide examples showing that this issue should be dealt with carefully we use the rebelo ak model augmented with a stock of pollutants causing a negative externality it is found that optimal growth is not necessarily balanced contrary to the outcome of the standard rebelo model moreover the existence of the externality may affect long run optimal growth rates

privatisation around the world evidence from panel data this paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977 99 period the empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries endowed with deep and liquid stock markets and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints but the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries where shareholders are poorly protected banks powerful and capital markets less developed

internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources this article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market unlike a bank headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in winner picking the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another by doing a good job in the winner picking dimension headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm wide credit constraints the model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects this article analyzes the process by which internal capital markets channel limited resources to different uses inside a company in so doing it seeks to address two related sets of questions first what is the fundamental economic rationale for creating an internal capital market that is under what circumstances can it make sense to combine several technologically distinct projects under one roof and have them seek funding from corporate headquarters as opposed to setting them up as stand alone companies that each raise external financing on their own second given this rationale what is the optimal size and scope of an internal capital market should headquarters be involved in funding a large number of projects or just a few and should these projects be unrelated to one another or in similar lines of business the answers to both sets of questions flow from the insight that in a credit constrained setting where not all positive npv projects can be financed headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce funds across projects for example the cash flow generated by one division s activities may be taken and spent on investment in another division where the returns are higher or alternatively one division s assets may be used as collateral to raise financing that is then diverted to the other division simply put individual projects must compete for the scarce funds and headquarters job is to pick the winners and losers in this competition

revisiting the bright and dark sides of capital flows in business groups prior studies report that the business group structure and the associated intra group capital flows are prone to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority investors yet business group is a prevalent and stable structure around the globe particularly where capital markets are underdeveloped using data from china this paper empirically studies the trade off between the negative and positive roles played by intra group capital flows and tests the efficiency implications of such trade off we find that from the perspective of the whole group intra group capital flows are most efficient when the groups are least subject to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and when they face strong external financing constraints

option pricing and foreign investment under political risk abstract the paper analyses asset prices in a context of uncertainty over future government policy as current policy is maintained perceived risk abates thus leading to a gradual appreciation of asset prices and a gradual decrease in their conditional variance option values computed under this process have time series and the term structure of conditional volatility which in general are downward sloping in price series without a policy reversal implied volatility from option prices will exceed actual volatility with this wedge progressively disappearing this may be viewed as the volatility analogue of the peso premium for assets subject to large infrequent price drops

privatization and globalization an empirical analysis abstract this paper examines the link between globalization measured by foreign direct investment fdi and foreign portfolio investment fpi and privatization of state owned enterprises in a multi country sample that focuses on developing countries we hypothesize that privatization has an effect on fdi fpi as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors similarly we expect fdi fpi to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows technology and managerial skills that accompany fdi fpi make the environment more prone to competition providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around this relation is assessed in two ways first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach and second through panel causality tests we find a bi directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization particularly in the case of fdi

does improved environmental policy enhance economic growth the environmental impacts on an economy is studied over time using endogenous growth theory externalities from the environment on production are central in the analysis and we examine whether an optimal path realizes more rapid economic growth the paper focuses mainly on developing countries where production is largely influenced by the environmental quality the result of the analysis indicates that the economic growth rate may not depend on the internalization of the environmental externality but rather on the internalization of the human capital externality the level of economic activity however generally seems to depend on the internalization of both externalities

electoral information in developed stock market testing conditional heteroscedasticity in the market model this investigates the influence of major electoral information on abnormal returns around the announcement date in the developed stock market and examines whether these explanatory variables are associated with observed cumulative abnormal returns using a regression analysis the analytical results demonstrate that average abnormal returns are significantly negative before the date of the announcement of the results of a general election on days 6 and 3 and after that announcement date on days 4 6 and 10 this phenomenon can be attributed to hedging activity of the investors to reduce risk

democracy political risks and stock market performance this study examines the impacts of democracy and political risk on stock market using annualized panel data for 49 emerging markets for 2000 2012 we find evidence that democracy and political risk do have impact on stock market returns and the relationship between democracy and political risk is parabolic i e there is a threshold level of democracy after which political risk begins to decline also our results suggest that decreases in political risk lead to higher returns

confidence building and politics in privatization some evidence from spain abstract this paper analyzes privatization on the stock market and has two main findings first sips underpricing is consistent with the confidence building hypothesis derived from political risk under asymmetric information larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization which is consistent with the hypothesis that governments use underpricing to be credible privatizators second evidence gives support to the hypothesis that explicit political motives influence the design of privatization which is affected by the political majority

measuring country event risk compensation on brics international portfolio management the brics nations brazil russia india and china have a strong relative economic growth pattern in the world among economic powers the allure of globalization has made the analysis and assessment of national critical component of international portfolio management in recent years we construct the model from comparing the relative sd of stock return whereby higher sds are generally associated with more risk this relative sd forms a principle component in the change of the weights on the international portfolio choice the result shows that event jump risk not only makes the investor s allocation more conservative overall but also it can be compensated on brics event risk

on a clear day you might see an environmental kuznets curve we shed some new light on the environmental kuznets curve ekc and show how it can be viewed as a particular form of equilibrium relationship where technology and preference parameters determine the shape of the curve in contrast to most of the literature on the ekc we estimate a theoretically consistent model on long run data swedish sulfur emission covering the period 1900 2002 furthermore we test and date structural change the model suggests four regimes 1900 1918 1919 1933 1934 1967 and 1968 2002 generating four rather different patterns for pollution over time the policy conclusions are consonant with pearce s general view about the ekc there is no theoretical presumption that it has an inverted u shape nor should any country try to grow out of the environmental problems without analyzing the benefits and costs of so doing

takeover motives during the conglomerate merger wave this article examines the stock market response to acquisition announcements during and immediately after the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s the main finding is that acquirer shareholders benefited from diversification acquisitions which implies that diversification was not driven by managerial objectives it is also shown that the market responded positively to bidders who retained the management of target companies and negatively to bidders who replaced target management this is consistent with the hypothesis that the market favored acquisitions intended to exploit managerial synergies it suggests that the market disliked takeovers that were motivated to discipline target management evidence on buyer and target price earnings ratios is presented that is inconsistent with the conjecture that conglomerates were able to mislead investors by earnings per share manipulation

the wacc fallacy the real effects of using a unique discount rate in this paper we test whether firms properly adjust for risk in their capital budgeting decisions if managers use a single discount rate within firms we expect that conglomerates underinvest overinvest in relatively safe risky divisions we measure division relative risk as the difference between the division s asset beta and a firm wide beta we establish a robust and significant positive relationship between division level investment and division relative risk next we measure the value loss due to this behavior in the context of acquisitions when the bidder s beta is lower than that of the target announcement returns are significantly lower

the impact of party alternative on the stock market the case of japan this paper tries to clarify whether change in political regime has an effect on the behaviour of the stock market in japan the empirical study finds that the transition of ruling party effect is not a crucial variable to the nikkei 225 the alienation felt by the japanese about the political environment resulting in a succession of prime ministers does not influence the nikkei 225 stock market behaviour therefore former prime ministers who have resigned have become scapegoats for the poor performance of financial and economic policies

is it inefficient investment that causes the diversification discount diversified conglomerates are valued less than matched portfolios of pure play firms recent studies find that this diversification discount results from conglomerates inefficient allocation of capital expenditures across divisions much of this work uses tobin s q as a proxy for investment opportunities therefore hypothesizing that q is a good proxy this paper treats measurement error in q using a measurement error consistent estimator on the sorts regressions in the literature i find no evidence of inefficient allocation of investment the results in the literature appear to be artifacts of measurement error and of the correlation between investment opportunities and liquidity diversif ied conglomerates appear to trade at a discount relative to matched portfolios of pure play firms studies documenting this stylized fact include lang and stulz 1994 berger and ofek 1995 comment and jarrell 1995 and servaes 1996 recent empirical work has sought to find the source of this diversification discount building on the theoretical work in milgrom and roberts 1990 stein 1997 and scharfstein and stein 2000 on the inefficiency of internal capital markets this literature has asked specifically whether diversified firms allocate their capital expenditures inefficiently across divisions the canonical answer has been yes and has been supported by two types of evidence first studies such as lamont 1997 shin and stulz 1998 shin and park 1998 and rajan servaes and zingales 2000 all find that internal capital markets in conglomerates transfer funds across divisions in a suboptimal manner second studies such as berger and ofek and scharfstein 1998 provide evidence suggesting that the divisions of conglomerates do not respond adequately to investment opportunities in comparison to single segment firms however these findings about divisional investment may be an artifact of measurement error most of these studies rely on tobin s q the market value of the capital stock divided by its replacement value as a proxy for investment opportunities and tobin s q is likely to be a poor proxy shin and stulz

share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends abstract this study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price share allocation and other terms governments choose when they privatize state owned enterprises via a public share offering using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations sips with total proceeds of over 446 billion during the period 1977 1997 we find that governments consistently underprice sip offers tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors impose control restrictions on privatized firms and typically use fixed price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers all to further political and economic policy objectives

a trade off theory of ownership and capital structure abstract this paper determines the optimal ownership share held by a unit into a second unit when both face a tax bankruptcy trade off full ownership is optimal when the first unit has positive debt because dividends help avoid its default positive debt is in turn optimal when its corporate tax rate exceeds a threshold and or thin capitalization rules place an upper limit on the debt level in the second unit and or the volcker rule bans bailout transfers to the second unit full ownership is no longer optimal only if there is a tax on intercorporate dividend this theory rationalizes observations on multinationals financial conglomerates and family groups

resource allocation within firms and financial market dislocation evidence from diversified conglomerates we argue and demonstrate that resource allocation within firms internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing financial market dislocation we estimate a structural model of internal capital markets to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision and illustrate how these forces interact with external capital market stress the weaker stronger division obtains too much little capital as though it is 12 9 more less productive than it really is out of sample simulated data are consistent with the actual data showing that internal capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16 30

corporate diversification and credit constraints real effects across the business cycle we study whether differences in access to credit cause focused firms to perform differently from diversified firms in the product market prior work has identified binding credit constraints for bank dependent firms during recessions we assess whether corporate diversification alleviates these constraints we find that during recessions sales growth rates drop more for bank dependent focused firms than for rival segments of bank dependent diversified firms we also find that during recessions inventory growth rates drop more for bank dependent focused firms than for bank dependent diversified firms even after we control for contemporaneous sales growth consistent with a credit constraint explanation we find no difference in the sensitivities to recessions of bank independent focused and bank independent diversified firms jel g30 g31 g32 copyright 2006 oxford university press

the bright side of internal capital markets we examine capital expenditure decisions of discount firms in response to wal mart s entry into their markets before wal mart s entry focused incumbents and discount divisions of diversified incumbents are similar in size geographic dispersion and firm debt levels however discount divisions of diversified firms are significantly more productive after wal mart s entry diversified firms are quicker to either exit the discount business or stay and fight also their capital expenditures are more sensitive to the productivity of their discount business internal capital markets function well as transfers are away from the worsening discount divisions it appears diversified firms make better investment decisions

political risk in emerging and developed markets using analyst estimates of political risk we show that political risk represents a more important determinant of stock returns in emerging than developed markets average returns in emerging markets experiencing decreased political risk exceed those of emerging markets experiencing increased political risk by approximately 11 per quarter in contrast the difference is only 2 5 per quarter for developed markets further the difference between the impact of political risk in emerging and developed markets is statistically significant we also document a global convergence in political risk over the last 10 years political risk has decreased in emerging markets and increased in developed markets if this trend continues the differential impact of political risk in emerging vs developed markets may narrow

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

endogenous market thinness and stock price volatility thin equity markets cannot accommodate temporary bulges of buy or sell orders without large price movements the resulting volatility can induce risk averse transactors who face transaction costs to desert these markets thus thinness and the related price volatility may become joint self perpetuating features of an equity market irrespective of the volatility of asset fundamentals if however appropriate incentive schemes are adopted to encourage entry by additional investors this vicious circle can be broken eventually shifting the market to a selfsustaining superior equilibrium characterized by a higher number of transactors lower price volatility and larger supply of the asset a number of empirical studies cohen et al 1976 telser and higimbotham 1977 pagano 1986 tauchen and pitts 1983 have found that thin speculative markets are ceteris paribus more volatile than deep ones a plausible explanation for this finding is that thin markets are generally characterized by small numbers of transactors per unit time and thus their prices are more sensitive to the impact of individual traders demand shocks conversely in deep markets transactors are so many that the uncorrelated demand shocks experienced by individual traders tend to offset each other and leave market prices largely unaffected while this suggests a rationale for the observed relationship between market size and price volatility it does so by taking market size as the exogenous factor however the volatility of a speculative market may feed back on its size in the sense that the high liquidation risk implied by very volatile prices can induce potential entrants to keep out of the market this paper shows that in a stock market with transaction costs this interaction between thinness and volatility can produce multiple steady state equilibria some characterized by low trade and high volatility and others by high trade and low volatility whether the market will settle in one equilibrium or another depends entirely on the expectations held by economic agents sections 2 and 3 the existence of these multiple bootstrap equilibria can be explained heuristically as follows each additional trader generates a positive externality for other actual or potential traders by decreasing the riskiness of the stock lower risk in turn tends to attract more investors with the effect of raising stock prices and inducing corporations to issue additional equity we thus have a feedback loop between market size and price volatility where market size is measured both along the dimension of the number of traders and along that of the total stock of equities if however investors face transactions costs in the stock market this positive feedback may fail to be operative if the volume of trade is expected to be small investors with relatively high transaction costs will abstain from trading thus the market

confidence building on euro convergence evidence from currency options we study the evolution of investor confidence in 1992 1998 over the chance of individual currencies to converge to the euro using data on currency option prices convergence risk which may reflect uncertainty over policy commitment as well as exogenous fundamentals induces a level of implied volatility in excess of actual volatility this volatility wedge should gradually decrease as confidence grows over time as convergence policy is maintained and the risk of a reversal is progressively resolved empirically we indeed find a positive volatility wedge which declines over time only for currencies involved in the euro convergence process the wedge and other convergence risk measures are correlated with both exogenous fundamentals and proxies for policy commitment uncertainty we also find that the wedge responds to policy shocks in an asymmetric fashion suggesting that policy risk is resolved at different rates after negative and positive shocks finally we estimate a regime switching model of convergence uncertainty using data on interest rates currency rates and currency option prices the results confirm the time varying and asymmetric nature of convergence risk and indicate that investors demand a risk premium for convergence risk

privatization political risk and stock market development in emerging economies this paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk we argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights we present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies we conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies

consumption pollution tradeoffs in an environment vulnerable to pollution related catastrophic collapse abstract this paper considers the consequences of an avoidable risk of irreversible environmental catastrophe for society s optimal long run consumption pollution tradeoffs the risk is assumed to be a nondecreasing function of pollution concentration which evolves as a dynamic environmental renewal process the main objective of the paper is to derive qualitative insights regarding the effects of such risk on optimal management

are there limits to growth a simple theoretical model of pollution is developed that generates an inverted u shape relationship between per capita income and environmental quality this model is then used to study long run growth the same inverted u shape is shown to appear in time series and the prospects for sustained growth are shown to hinge on whether increasingly strict environmental regulation is compatible with a constant rate of return on capital implementation is also studied tax and voucher schemes are shown to have an advantage over direct regulation because they provide the correct incentives for capital accumulation copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

financial development and economic growth abstract this paper examines the empirical relationship between long run growth and financial development proxied by the ratio between bank credit to the private sector and gdp we find that this proxy is positively correlated with growth in a large cross country sample but its impact changes across countries and is negative in a panel data for latin america we argue that the latter findings is the result of financial liberalization in a poor regulatory environment our findings also show that the main channel of transmission from financial development to growth is the efficiency rather than the volume of investment

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

deposit competition and financial fragility evidence from the us banking sector preliminary and incomplete please do not cite without permission we develop and estimate an empirical model of the u s banking sector using a new data set covering the largest u s banks over the period 2002 2013 our model incorporates insured depositors and run prone uninsured depositors who have rich preferences over dierentiated banks banks compete for deposits in the spirit of matutes and vives 1996 and can endogenously default we estimate demand for uninsured

a dynamic model of housing demand estimation and policy implications a dynamic model of housing demand using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid we specify estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of housing demand our model generalizes previous applied econometric work by incorporating realistic features of the housing market including non convex adjustment costs from buying and selling a home credit constraints from minimum downpayment requirements and uncertainty about the evolution of incomes and home prices we argue that these features are critical for capturing salient features of housing demand observed in the psid after estimating the model we use it to simulate how consumer behavior responds to house price and income declines as well as tightening credit these experiments are motivated by the u s recession starting in december of 2007 that saw large falls in home prices large negative income shocks for many households and tightening credit standards in the short run relatively few households adjust their housing stock households respond instead by reducing non housing consumption and reducing wealth because they wish to avoid losing their home and the associated adjustment costs households that adjust in the short run are those hit with a series of bad shocks such as a negative income shock and a home price decline a larger proportion of households do adjust their consumption in the long run increasing their housing stock since housing is less expensive however such changes may occur several years after the shocks listed above

diversification and cash dynamics abstract why do diversified firms hold significantly less cash than focused firms we study this question using a dynamic model of corporate investment saving and diversification decisions we find that investment dynamics are more important in explaining the cash differences than financing frictions more efficient internal capital markets increase cash differences and are especially valuable when a firm diversifies or refocuses contrary to static models more diverse conglomerates have lower cash differences endogenous selection diversifying firms are larger and have better growth opportunities accounts for 68 of the cash difference and the diversification event itself reduces cash holdings by 32

the optimal timing of adoption of a green technology we study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the context of an ak endogenous growth model we show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental quality with respect to consumption when it is increasing we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption we show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital implying that capital poor countries tend to take longer to adopt also country specific characteristics as the existence of high barriers to adoption may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries if the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases with consumption a country should never delay adoption the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or if adoption costs are too high to never adopt the policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international debate surrounding the environmental political agenda

evidence on the dark side of internal capital markets this article documents differences between the sensitivity of investment of stand alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerate firms unrelated segments exhibit lower o sensitivity of investment than stand alone firms this fact is driven by unrelated segments of conglomerate firms that tend to invest less than stand alone firms in high s industries this finding is robust to matching on industry year size age and profitability the differences are more pronounced in conglomerates in which top management has small ownership stakes suggesting that agency problems explain the investment behavior

decision processes agency problems and information an economic analysis of capital budgeting procedures corporations use a variety of processes to allocate capital this article studies the benefits and costs of several common budget procedures from the perspective of a model with agency and information problems processes that delegate aspects of the decision to the agent result in too many projects being approved while processes in which the principal retains the right to reject projects cause the agent to strategically distort his information about project quality we show how the choice of a decision process depends on these two costs and specifically on severity of the agency problem quality of information and project risk capital budgeting would be easy in a world without agency and information problems the decision maker would simply calculate a project s irr and compare it to the cost of capital but in the real world those providing the funds for investment must rely on self interested agents to identify projects and provide information on expected returns as a result the quality of capital allocation depends on how effective the decision process is in attenuating agency problems and bringing forth accurate information corporations employ a variety of decision procedures in practice some decisions are fully delegated to division and plant managers typically expansion of an existing plant some decisions require approval of headquarters typically construction of a new plant and other decisions require approval conditional on the nature of the proposal such as when projects requiring more than 1 million go to headquarters while smaller projects can be approved locally 1

liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending ditions for precisely the population that is most likely to have a difficult time obtaining credit those with low incomes and poor credit histories these consumers who typically cannot qualify for regular bank loans comprise the so called subprime market because the company we study originates subprime loans its loan applications and transaction records provide an unusual win dow into the consumption and borrowing behavior of households that are rationed in primary credit markets moreover we track loan repayments allowing us to analyze the difficulties in lending to the subprime population we begin by documenting the importance of short term liquidity constraints for individuals in our sample we present two pieces of evidence both are based on purchasing behavior and indicate a high sensitivity to cash on hand first we document a dramatic degree of demand seasonality associated with tax rebates overall demand is almost 50 percent higher during tax rebate season than during other parts of the year this seasonal effect varies with household

the corporate propensity to save why do corporations accumulate liquid assets we show theoretically that intertemporal trade offs between interest income taxation and the cost of external finance determine optimal savings intriguingly we find that controlling for tobin s q saving and cash flow are negatively related because firms lower cash reserves to invest after receiving positive cash flow shocks and vice versa consistent with theory we estimate negative propensities to save out of cash flow we also find that income uncertainty affects saving more than do external finance constraints therefore contrary to previous evidence saving propensities reflect too many forces to be used to measure external finance constraints

abnormal returns of uk privatizations from underpricing to outperformance this paper offers a review and discussion of the evidence concerning the underpricing and long run performance of british pipos privatization initial public offerings between 1977 and 1996 i e from the first privatization under a labour government british petroleum until the last ones by a conservative government railtrack more recent years are excluded because the change of government the introduction of a windfall tax on excess profits of regulated utilities and changes in the regulatory regime mark a totally different landscape compared with the previous twenty years evidence is found that underpricing was not followed by underperformance as is usually observed with ipos but rather strong outperformance this trend is decomposed by subgroups within a 55 observations sample and it is concluded that lax regulation was probably the main driving force of abnormal returns of british pipos

contract pricing in consumer credit markets we analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high risk borrowers and limiting defaults to do this we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives we estimate the model using detailed transaction level data on subprime auto loans we show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance we also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior

political booms financial crises political booms measured by the rise in governments popularity predict financial crises above and beyond better known early warning indicators such as credit booms this predictive power howev

are internal capital markets efficient using segment information from compustat we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm s other segments but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow the investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single segment firms the sensitivity of a segment s investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm s other segments

internal versus external capital markets this paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation we focus pritnarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending while both represent centralized forms of financing in the former case the financing is owner provided while in the latter ceise it is not we argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences 1 it leads to more monitoring than bank lending 2 it reduces managers entrepreneurial incentives and 3 it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management

the flotation of companies on the stock market abstract in some countries the size of the stock market and the number of listed companies have persistently lagged behind the growth of the economy trading externalities can help explain this fact an entrepreneur who goes public increases risk sharing opportunities for others this externality can lead to an inefficiently low number of listed companies and also generate multiple equilibria when flotation decisions are positively correlated across entrepreneurs this happens if these face borrowing constraints and lack liquidity and thus cannot diversify their portfolios unless they go public it also happens if trading shares is costly so that a sufficient number of issues must be listed to lure investors into the market

macropolicies in transition to a market economy a three year perspective countries in transition to market economies have had to implement macroeconoimic stabilization programs at the same time that they were engaged in massive changes of their political institutions and the systemic framework of their economies what has been the interaction of stabilization with economic liberalization and deep institutional reform in the countries of eastern europe in particular the relations among initial conditions political developments reform strategies and outcomes experience in eastern europe suggests that when there is a political breakthrough as in the countries under review a radical stabilization liberalization stragety is probably the least risky approach to reform and will not constrain output or structural reform over the medium term even stabilization that is initially successful in containing inflation will later come under pressure because of social policies and the structural transitions impelled by reform several factors are identified that affect the credibility of reforms and lessons are derived for countries that have stabilized and those that yet face this task

public offerings of state owned and privately owned enterprises an international comparison we compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies the evidence indicates that government officials in the united kingdom underprice ipos significantly more than their private company counterparts in canada and malaysia however the opposite is true there does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company ipos we provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms evidence from developing countries this paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992 we use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures both unadjusted and market adjusted results show significant increases in profitability operating efficiency capital investment spending output employment level and dividends we also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples

equity market liberalizations as country ipo s equity market liberalizations are like ipos but they are ipos of a country s stock market rather than of individual firms both are endogenous events whose benefits are limited by poor investor protection agency costs and information asymmetries as for stock prices following an ipo there are legitimate concerns about the efficiency in the period following the liberalization of the stock market returns of countries that liberalize their equity markets equity markets of liberalizing countries experience extremely strong performance immediately after the liberalization but then go through a period of poor performance this pattern of stock returns is more dramatic for countries with poorer financial development before the liberalization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do firm boundaries matter in his famous article the nature of the firm ronald coase 1937 raised two fundamental questions that have spawned a large body of research do firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources and what determines where firm boundaries are drawn while the first of these questions has received some theoretical attention notably oliver williamson 1975 1985 benjamin klein et al 1978 and sanford grossman and oliver hart 1986 it has largely been ignored empirically instead the empirical work in this area discussed in the other articles in this session has addressed the second question by analyzing the determinants of vertical integration thus while we know something about the forces that determine firm boundaries we know relatively little about how these boundaries affect actual firm behavior this is a major limitation in our understanding of the nature of the firm to begin to assess how firm boundaries affect behavior we analyze whether there are differences between integrated and nonintegrated chemical manufacturers in their investments in production capacity we focus on producers of vinyl chloride monomer vcm the sole use of which is in the production of the widely used waterproof plastic polyvinyl chloride pvc vcm is a homogenous commodity and is traded in relatively liquid markets moreover there is no obvious production link between vcm and pvc other than that one is an input into the other for example pvc is not a byproduct of vcm production nevertheless twothirds of vcm producers in our sample are integrated downstream into pvc the existing literature would ask why we observe this degree of integration we ask instead whether integrated and nonintegrated vcm producers invest differently in production capacity

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

privatization financial development property rights and growth abstract this study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i e property rights contracting rights political institutions and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms performance capital markets development and economic growth most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance efficiency and profitability which percolates to economic growth privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions namely the french civil law countries the stronger the economic and the governing institutions the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth overall privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector

debt and seniority an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management we argue that long term debt has a role in controlling management s ability to finance future investments a company with high widely held debt will find it hard to raise capital since new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors conversely for a company with low debt we show there is an optimal debt equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments we derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

what drives international financial flows politics institutions and other determinants abstract this paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending first employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed effects framework the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance second cross sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending third instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows the results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of lucas lucas robert e 1990 why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries american economic review papers and proceedings 80 2 92 96 1990 paradox of why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries the analysis also does a first step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking