the impact of uncertainty shocks in emerging economies abstract a recent strand of research proposes that sudden jumps in uncertainty generate rapid drops and recoveries in real macroeconomic variables that drive the business cycle using an empirical model we find substantial heterogeneity in reactions to these shocks across countries in comparison to the u s and other developed countries emerging economies suffer much more severe falls in investment and private consumption following an exogenous uncertainty shock take significantly longer to recover and do not experience a subsequent overshoot in activity we provide evidence that the dynamics of investment and consumption are correlated with the depth of financial markets we control for the potential role of a credit channel and estimate that it can account for up to one half of the increased fall in investment generated by uncertainty shocks among emerging economies with less developed financial markets in this context monetary and fiscal policy actions that alleviate the impact of credit constraints facing firms may reduce the impact of uncertainty shocks in these economies

the dynamics of international capital flows results from a dynamic hierarchical factor model abstract the present paper examines the degree of comovement of gross capital inflows which is a highly sensitive issue for policy makers we estimate a dynamic hierarchical factor model that is able to decompose inflows in a sample of 47 economies into i a global factor common to all types of flows and all recipient countries ii a factor specific to a given type of capital inflows iii a regional factor and iv a country specific component we find that the latter explains by far the largest fraction of fluctuations in capital inflows followed by regional factors which are particularly important for emerging markets fdi and portfolio inflows as well as bank lending to emerging europe the global factor however explains only a small share of the overall variation we also employ dynamic panel and time series regressions to explain the determinants of the estimated components the global factor is shown to reflect u s financial conditions

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

global financial shocks and foreign asset repatriation do local investors play a stabilizing role we study the dynamic response of gross capital flows in emerging market economies to different global financial shocks using a panel vector autoregressive pvar approach our focus lies primarily on the potentially stabilizing role played by domestic investors in offsetting the response of foreign investors to adverse global shocks we find that while foreign investors tend to retrench from emerging markets in response to global risk aversion and monetary policy shocks foreign asset repatriation by resident investors does not always follow suit local investors play a meaningful stabilizing role in the face of global risk aversion shocks with sizeable asset repatriation largely offsetting the retrenchment of non residents in contrast foreign investor retrenchment in response to global monetary policy shocks is not mirrored by asset repatriation finally we find robust evidence that positive global real shocks tend to have a positive impact on net capital inflows to emerging markets our results shed light on the likely impact of the fed s qe tapering on capital flows to emerging market economies

sudden stops are global and local investors alike the main goal of this paper is to characterize the determinants of sudden stops caused by domestic vis a vis foreign residents are the decisions of domestic investors to invest abroad or of foreign investors to cut off funds from the domestic economy governed by the same set of determinants given the distribution of different types of sudden stop episodes over time and its different macroeconomic consequences the authors argue that the determinants may not be alike using an effective sample of 82 countries with annual information over the period 1970 2007 the analysis finds that global investors are less likely to stop bringing their capital when their economy is growing and the world interest rate is lower domestic agents are more willing to invest abroad if the macroeconomic performance of the domestic economy is poor high inflation the financial system is weak and there are high external savings current account surpluses increasing financial openness makes the domestic country more vulnerable to sudden stops caused by either local or global investors finally countries with higher shares of foreign direct investment are less prone to inflow driven sudden stops whereas the opposite holds for outflow driven sudden stops

news and monetary shocks at a high frequency a simple approach we develop a simple approach to identify economic news and monetary shocks at a high frequency the approach is used to examine financial market developments in the united states following the federal reserve s may 22 2013 taper talk suggesting that it would begin winding down its quantitative easing program our findings show that the sharp rise in 10 year treasury bond yields immediately after the taper talk was largely due to monetary shocks with positive economic news becoming increasingly important in subsequent months

a model of expertise we study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees when the decision maker consults only a single expert the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker we ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts we first show that there is no perfect bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs when both experts are biased in the same direction it is never beneficial to consult both in contrast when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both indeed in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal

information access and contributions a signaling model of lobbying interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker if their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker s constituency they have costless access and report their private information truthfully if their interests conflict they are forced to pay a strictly positive contribution in order to enhance the credibility of their reports the policymaker bases her policy decision on the competing reports and the size of the contributions accompanying these reports the interest groups contribution decisions are plagued by a free rider problem i derive the implications of this problem for the size and pattern of contributions and for the degree of information aggregation

lobbying and asymmetric information informational lobbying the use by interest groups of their alleged expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies is often regarded as an important means of influence this paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting on the one hand the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker whilst on the other hand the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to mis report or conceal its private information

lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy this paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen candidate model of representative democracy with the menu auction model of lobbying positive and normative issues are analysed on the positive side lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences on the normative side coordination failure among lobbyists can result in pareto inefficient policy choices in addition by creating rents to holding office lobbying can lead to excessive entry into electoral competition

intraregional spillovers in south america is brazil systemic after all the high business cycle correlation between brazil the large neighbour in south america and other countries in the region has been a frequent source of concern for policymakers as it has been viewed as evidence of the large influence of the former country on its neighbours this paper studies the importance of such influence documenting trade linkages over the last two decades and quantifying spillover effects in a vector autoregression setting we find that after controlling for common external factors spillovers from brazil are only relevant for southern cone economies especially mercosur s members and peru but not for the rest of south america and these findings are consistent with the extent of trade linkages between these countries we find also that spillovers can take two different forms the transmission of brazil specific shocks and the amplification of global shocks through their impact on brazil s output finally we also find suggestive evidence that depreciations of brazil s currency may not have significant impact on output of its key trading partners

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

strategic transmission of costly information it is ofren the case that an individual s decision is at least partly based on information received from another and when the agents payoffs depend on both the former s decision and on the latter s information there is an incentive for the informed individual to attempt to bias the decision maker s decision in his or her favor by strategically manipulating the information transmitted in a seminal paper crawford and sobel 1982 hereafter c s study such strategic information transmission in the context of an abstract sender receiver game variants of the crawford and sobel model have been applied widely and as the application varies so often does the interpretation of type in some cases type refers to a preference parameter given by nature as for example in bargaining theory e g farrell and gibbons 1989 matthews 1989 whereas in other settings for instance legislative decision making or expert testimony type refers to more or less technical information concerning how decisions map into final consequences and as such is acquired information e g gilligan and krehbiel 1987 milgrom and roberts 1986 when the information has to be acquired it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly for otherwise there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed so long as the receiver can observe surely or at least accurately infer whether the sender is informed and so long as messages are cheap talk there is no issue here for strategic information transmission save whether to become informed at all however there are many circumstances when it is inappropri ate to assume the receiver has such knowledge one possibility is that a receiver may know that a sender has some relevant informa tion but be uncertain of the quality of this information a second perhaps more important possibility is that a receiver is unable to tell whether a potential sender is uninformed inter alia this problem constitutes the rationale for ignorance of the law being inadmissible as a legal defense were it admissible then informed miscreants would mimic uninformed transgressors leads voters to be skeptical of politicians claiming ignorance of illegal arms deals and makes the sec sensitive to problems in distinguishing insider trading from legitimate good judgement so there is an intrinsic asymmetry in that it is generally possible for say senders to verify possession of at least some information but it is typically prohibitively difficult to verify any lack of knowledge

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

real time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy abstract using a neoclassical monetary model we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that operates as a real time gross settlement rtgs system we illustrate how the cost of such systems ultimately derives from the credit constraints imposed by rtgs the effects of these constraints can be undone if the central bank makes intraday credit freely available if intraday credit is only available on a collateralized basis however rtgs will always impose a liquidity cost

informational lobbying and political contributions abstract interest groups can potentially influence political decision makers by offering contributions and by providing relevant information that sways the decision in the group s favor what mix of these two instruments should an interest group choose and how does the use of one instrument affect the effectiveness of the other in this paper we identify an information externality that raises the cost of offering contributions and show that this indirect search cost reduces the group s incentive to gather information when contributions are allowed furthermore we analyze how competition among lobby groups as providers of information and contributions affect the choice and effectiveness of the instruments we show that the information externality rewards the group that can abstain from information search and focus its influence on contributions

is it whom you know or what you know an empirical assessment of the lobbying process abstract do lobbyists provide issue specific information to members of congress or do they provide special interests access to politicians we present evidence to assess the role of issue expertis

electoral bias and policy choice theory and evidence this paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice we tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory the usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in england the results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies

revolving door lobbyists we study how ex government ocials benet from the personal connections acquired during public service lobbyists with experience in the oce of a us senator suer a 24 drop in generated revenue when that senator leaves oce the eect is immediate discontinuous around the exit period and long lasting consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians the drop in revenue is increasing in the committee assignments power held by the exiting politician

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

trust coordination and the industrial organization of political activism we study political activism by several interest groups with private signals when their ideological distance to the policymaker is small a low trust regime prevails agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted taking advantage of the cone rmation provided by others activism conversely the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure when ideological distance is large a high trust regime prevails lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers and the policymaker s response threshold is correspondingly lower within some intermediate range both equilibria coexist we then study the optimal organization of ine uence activities contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate jel d72 d78 d82