war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies this paper studies a simultaneous move infinite horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort the delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance we show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium the paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives we also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear quadratic payoffs

clocks and trees isomorphic dutch auctions and centipede games we report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and dutch auctions centipede games with a clock format unravel as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two player tree format centipede games dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral nash equilibrium bids unlike previous literature on clock format dutch auctions our data provide a new expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and dutch auctions

predicting how people play games a simple dynamic model of choice we use the simple dynamic model developed in sarin and vahid 1999 games and economic behavior 28 294 309 to explain the experiments reported in erev and roth 1998 american economic review 88 848 881 in an earlier paper sarin and vahid 1998 mimeo texas a m university and monash university we showed that the model predicted behavior in repeated coordination games remarkably well and better than equilibrium theory or reinforcement learning models in this paper we show that the same one parameter model can also explain behavior in games with a unique mixed strategy nash equilibrium better than alternative models hence we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

behavioral heterogeneity in dynamic search situations theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper presents models for search behavior and provides experimental evidence that behavioral heterogeneity in search is linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences observed search behavior is more consistent with a new model that assumes dynamic updating of utility reference points than with models that are based on expected utility maximization specifically reference point updating and loss aversion play a role for more than a third of the population the findings are of practical relevance as well as of interest for researchers who incorporate behavioral heterogeneity into models of dynamic choice behavior in for example consumer economics labor economics finance and decision theory

expenditure taxes income taxes and time inconsistency abstract traditional welfare based comparisons of different tax structures implicitly assume that the government can precommit to its future optimal policy when optimal tax rates are time inconsistent however such comparisons may be misleading this paper uses a two period representative consumer optimal taxation model to study the implications of time consistency for the welfare rankings of expenditure and income taxation i show that the welfare rankings of optimal policies may not be preserved by time consistent ones

hand in the cookie jar an experimental investigation of equity based compensation and managerial fraud the use of equity based compensation is an increasingly popular means by which to align the incentives of top management with those of the shareholders however recent theoretical and empirical research indicates that the use of equity based compensation has the unintended consequence of creating the incentive to commit managerial fraud of the type being reported in the press this paper reports experimental evidence that shows that the amount of fraud committed by subjects is positively correlated with the level of equity as is the level of effort in addition the amount of fraud that is committed is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and subjects risk aversion the experimental design permits the identification of causal relations in the directions just noted

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

a reality check for game theory there is a tendency for some economists who are less familiar with game theory gt to comment that it has never fulfilled its early promise and that it essentially has little to offer as a tool to understand predict and guide human social and economic behaviour for instance in sylvia nasar s book a beautiful mind she recounts the remarkable controversy that surrounded the award of a nobel prize for gt including one committee member apparently asking for a single major example that game theory had any empirical validity whatsoever p 371 an excellent reply to such sceptics would be to present them with a copy of colin camerer s new book behavioral game theory this is not to say that his book catalogues an unbroken string of successes for the theory as we shall see neither gt nor human behaviour emerges unscathed from the body of work reported therein

contests as selection mechanisms the impact of risk aversion abstract we investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two player tullock contest our theoretical model yields two main predictions first an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage second if the prize money is sufficiently large a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent in a laboratory experiment we confirm both the non monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests

information characteristics and errors in expectations experimental evidence we design an experiment to test the hypothesis that in violation of bayes rule some people respond more forcefully to the strength of information than to its weight we provide incentives to motivate effort use naturally occurring information and control for risk attitude we find that the strength weight bias affects expectations but that its magnitude is significantly lower than originally reported controls for non linear utility further reduce the bias our results suggest that incentive compatibility and controls for risk attitude considerably affect inferences on errors in expectations

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

transparency efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass through investment trust games we design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market in a repeated game an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower a pre experiment one shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject we alter the transparency of exchanges between non adjacent parties we find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare however transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor increasing welfare further this has asymmetric effects borrowers and intermediaries achieve greater welfare benefits than investors we discuss implications for what specific aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency

contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality experimental evidence from the vietnamese dairy sector in emerging markets for high value food products in developing countries processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality one widely embraced approach is contract farming but relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context we use the example of the vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk a framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk on farmers investment in quality improving inputs statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use resulting in better output quality the bonus payment generates even higher quality milk we also find that input choice levels depend on farmers socio economic characteristics such as wealth while individual risk preferences seem to be less important implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed

decision support for retirement portfolio management overcoming myopic loss aversion via technology design as firms continue to abandon pensions in favor of employee managed retirement plans tremendous demands are being placed on the decision making proficiency of future retirees as reflected in the equity premium puzzle individual investors tend to hold overly conservative portfolios that provide meager payoffs over time consequently there is growing concern that the vast majority of retirement accounts might be insufficiently funded when employees reach retirement given that most retirement plans can now be managed online a potential solution lies in designing a web based decision support system dss that helps future retirees make more profitable portfolio management decisions this paper reports the results of a study in which 159 retirement plan participants were asked to use an experimental website to manage a portfolio of retirement investments over a simulated 30 year period using a psychological approach toward designing the dss myopic loss aversion is put forth as a theoretical explanation for the psychological mechanisms that encourage investors to hold overly conservative portfolios armed with this knowledge three design features information horizon system restrictiveness and decisional guidance are implemented as part of an overarching design strategy targeted at increasing investors willingness to take calculated risks the results indicate that investor conservatism diminishes when the dss presents prospective probabilities and payoffs over long time horizons in contrast short term information horizons constitute a major stumbling block for investors however when confronted with short term information horizons risk aversion can be successfully counteracted by configuring a dss to either restrict the frequency of decisions or to suggest a relatively aggressive portfolio allocation these findings carry important implications for theory and practice

are you risk averse over other people s money decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others such as in the typical corporate structure does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences we examine this question in two simple settings lottery choices and sealed bid auctions using controlled laboratory experiments we find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion this reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others this result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents

horizontal product differentiation in auctions and multilateral negotiations we experimentally compare first price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting both institutions yield identical surplus for the buyer a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results from differentiation s influence on sellers pricing behaviour the data are consistent with this finding being driven by concessions from low cost sellers in response to differentiation reducing their likelihood of being the buyer s surplus maximizing trading partner further analysis shows that introducing product differentiation increases the intensity of price competition among sellers which contrasts with the conventional wisdom that product differentiation softens competition

experimental economics accounting and society in memory of john dickhaut abstract this volume consists of papers presented at a conference in memory of john dickhaut the conference sponsored by the economic science institute at chapman university focused on four areas of john s research interests during his career accounting and society methodology in experimental economics neural economics and trust and reciprocity all of the papers make novel interesting contributions to the study of human behavior in economic institutions and should interest readers in a range of fields including accounting anthropology economics finance neurology and psychology

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

a payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games abstract this paper investigates how well a simple two sided incomplete information game with a full support prior can be used to explain non nash equilibrium outcomes observed in the centipede game experiments i estimate the variance of the uncertainty about preferences in several versions of the model select two models and compare these models to the estimation results of the altruism model and the quantal response models it is shown that the two selected models have a better fit than the one parameter altruism and quantal response models and that the estimated variance can explain all qualitative features of these experimental results journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c19 c 44 c91

exploring the diffusion of low energy houses an empirical study in the european union abstract diffusion of low energy houses is an important part of energy and climate policy in the european union eu and in individual eu countries key barriers to the adoption of low energy houses include additional construction costs and uncertainty surrounding actual energy and cost savings in this paper we econometrically analyze determinants of low energy house adoption including time and risk preferences we rely on original data from a large survey conducted among households in eight eu countries to our knowledge this is the first empirical study of low energy building adoption to rely on a demographically representative sample our set of covariates includes parameters of time and risk preferences that were elicited via state of the art incentivized multiple price list experiments and via self assessment scales we find mixed results for the effects of time discounting on low energy house adoption risk preferences do appear to matter as risk proneness increases so does the adoption of zero net or energy plus building but not passive houses consistent with the low cost hypothesis about environmental attitude and action we find no results for environmental attitudes and social norms

risk attitudes randomization to treatment and self selection into experiments randomization to treatment is fundamental to statistical control in the design of experiments however randomization implies some uncertainty about treatment condition and individuals differ in their preferences towards taking on risk since human subjects often volunteer for experiments or are allowed to drop out of the experiment at any time if they want to it is possible that the sample observed in an experiment might be biased because of the risk of randomization on the other hand the widespread use of a guaranteed show up fee that is non stochastic may generate sample selection biases of the opposite direction encouraging more risk averse samples into experiments we directly test these hypotheses that risk attitudes play a role in sample selection our results suggest that randomization bias does affect the overall level of risk aversion in the sample we observe but that it does not affect the demographic mix of risk attitudes in the sample we show that the common use of non stochastic show up fees can generate samples that are more risk averse than would otherwise have been observed

a large scale test of the effects of time discounting risk aversion loss aversion and present bias on household adoption of energy efficient technologies abstract this paper empirically and jointly analyses the relations between standard time discounting risk aversion loss aversion and present bias and household stated adoption of low to high stake energy efficiency technologies eets light emitting diodes leds energy efficient appliances and retrofit measures the analysis relies on a large representative sample drawn from eight european union countries preferences over time risk and losses were elicited and jointly estimated from participant choices in incentivized context free multiple price list experiments the findings from econometrically estimating eet adoption equations provide some support for the hypothesis that individuals who are more loss averse or more risk averse or who exhibit a lower time discount factor are less likely to have adopted eets yet some of the results significance levels and effect sizes appeared sensitive to the addition of covariates which may be an indication of bad controls finally omitting one or several of the parameters capturing preferences over time risk and losses when estimating the eet adoption equations did not appear to cause omitted variable bias

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

the value of private versus public risk and pure altruism an experimental economics test in 1996 johannesson et al published a paper entitled the value of private safety versus the value of public safety based on the preliminary evidence from a hypothetical contingent valuation study for public and private safety these authors argue that consumers behave as pure altruists who consider the cost of a program that might be imposed on other voters when they determine their maximum willingness to pay for public safety programs the authors conclude that further empirical research in this area is warranted this article presents a set of laboratory economics experiments to test johannesson et al s conjecture under controlled conditions in which participants face an actual risk of financial loss the laboratory results extend those of johannesson et al s providing strong evidence of pure altruism in coercive settings involving public risks

health insurance and the demand for medical care evidence from a randomized experiment we estimate how cost sharing the portion of the bill the patient pays affects the demand for medical services the data come from a randomized experiment a catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out of pocket price the price elasticity is approximately 0 2 we reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure for example by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization

the influence of serotonin deficiency on choice deferral and the compromise effect abstractpsychological and physiological states such as mood hunger stress and sleep deprivation are known to affect decision making processes and therefore crucially influence consumer behavior a possible biological mechanism underlying the observed variability of consumer behavior is the context sensitive variation in the levels of neuromodulators in the brain in a series of four experimental studies the authors pharmaceutically reduce the levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain to diminish the availability of subjects cognitive resources in doing so they study how serotonin brain levels influence 1 subjects tendency to avoid buying and 2 consumers preference for product options positioned as a compromise in a given choice set rather than for more extreme alternatives i e the compromise effect using realistic product choice scenarios in a binding decision framework they find that a reduction of brain serotonin levels leads to choice deferral and decreases the compromise

equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three person centipede game the two person centipede game is one of the most celebrated paradoxes of backward induction in complete information extensive form games an experimental investigation of a three person centipede game shows that the paradoxical results are strongly affected by the size of the stakes when the number of players in the game is increased from two to three and the game is played for unusually high stakes with group composition being randomly changed from trial to trial the paradox is considerably weakened as players approach equilibrium play with multiple iterations of the stage game when the game is played with low stakes there is no evidence for equilibrium play or learning across iterations of the stage game an adaptive learning model that assumes updating of the individual probabilities of choice outperforms alternative static and dynamic models in accounting for the major results observed in the high stake experiment

assessing farmers risk preferences and their determinants in a marginal upland area of vietnam a comparison of multiple elicitation techniques we examine the consistency of risk preference measures based on eight hypothetical elicitation methods and a lottery game applied to smallholder farmers in a marginal upland environment in vietnam using these measures we identify influencing factors of risk aversion via regression analysis whereby unlike previous studies we include several proxies of social capital such as social networks and norms data were collected from household heads and spouses separately in a random sample of 300 households although correlations between most of the various risk preference measures are all statistically highly significant most are weak on average respondents have a high degree of risk aversion and specific characteristics gender age idiosyncratic shocks education social norms network reliance with extended family and connections to local authorities are significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods whereas others the household s dependency ratio wealth and covariate shocks are significant in a few methods only the explanatory power of the models is limited indicating that other factors are likely to be of greater importance in determining risk preferences the results can help target safety nets encourage investments and lead to the development of more applicable methods for assessing risk preferences of smallholders in developing countries

cycles of learning in the centipede game abstract this paper studies the evolutionary properties of the centipede game for this game the use of backward induction as a model of rational behavior has been consistently challenged by the experimental evidence our claim is that backward induction can still accurately predict the players behavior provided that they are given time enough to appreciate the strategic environment in which they operate we support this claim by proving convergence to the backward induction solution for all continuous time monotonic selection dynamics however we also show that this solution is intrinsically unstable and how this instability is positively related to the length of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c79

individual preferences and the exponential growth bias abstract the exponential growth bias egb refers to individuals underestimation of the effects of exponential growth and has been shown to affect important financial decisions such as retirement savings we develop and test a novel experimental design to evaluate the magnitude of the egb based on multiple price lists our design simultaneously elicits the egb as well as subjects utility curvatures and time preferences allowing for non linear utility we structurally estimate the magnitude of the egb as about half as large as when linear utility is assumed these results shed light on the relationship between individual preferences and the egb

elicitation formats and the wta wtp gap a study of climate neutral foods we conduct a field valuation experiment where we vary the valuation method contingent valuation vs inferred valuation as well as the payment format dichotomous choice vs payment card willingness to accept and willingness to pay valuations are elicited in a within subjects design for foods with climate neutral labels we find a similar gap for valuations elicited with the contingent or the inferred valuation method however we also find that the gap can be muted by using a payment card elicitation format

learning for a bonus how financial incentives interact with preferences this paper investigates the effect of financial incentives on student performance and analyzes for the first time how the incentive effect in education is moderated by students time preferences to examine this effect we use real labor market incentive programs that we combine with data from experiments on time preferences we find not only that students who are offered financial incentives for better grades have on average better first and second year grade point averages but also more strikingly that highly impatient students respond more strongly to financial incentives than relatively patient students this finding suggests that financial incentives are most effective at the beginning of an educational program when real labor market benefits are in the distant future

the neglect of correlation in allocation decisions we study the effect of variation in correlation on investment decision in an experimental two asset application comparison of allocations across problems suggests that subjects neglect probabilistic information on the joint distribution of returns and base their allocations on the observed return levels for the two assets when asked to predict future returns subjects try to replicate the historical distribution thereby falling into the probability matching bias predictions drastically vary when correlations become negative while allocations are not significantly affected by changes in sign of correlation the observed allocation patterns contradict the predictions of standard models of choice the inconsistency is attributed to common behavioral bias in financial decision field implications of the results are discussed

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

backward induction in the wild evidence from sequential voting in the us senate in the us senate roll calls are held in alphabetical order we document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet to speak to the mechanism behind this result we develop a simple model of sequential voting in which forward looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues estimating our model structurally we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play we also consider but ultimately dismiss alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying

controlling preferences for lotteries on units of experimental exchange in an experimental setting when outcomes are stochastically related to actions predictions of equilibrium behavior depend not only on the participants preference orderings of outcomes but also on their orderings of lotteries on outcomes as well we introduce and test a reward structure that can be utilized in any experimental setting to allow the experimenter to decree beforehand the subjects preferences for lotteries on experimental outcomes we show analytically that the proposed reward structure can induce subjects to behave as if they have the decreed preference function defined on experimental outcomes empirical tests using two different choice settings provide evidence to support this ability to control preferences

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

discounting behavior a reconsideration we re evaluate the theory experimental design and econometrics behind claims that individuals exhibit non constant discounting behavior theory points to the importance of controlling for the non linearity of the utility function of individuals since the discount rate is defined over time dated utility flows and not flows of money it also points to a menagerie of functional forms to characterize different types of non constant discounting behavior the implied experimental design calls for individuals to undertake several tasks to allow us to identify these models and to several treatments such as multiple horizons and the effect of allowing for a front end delay on earlier payments the implied econometrics calls for structural estimation of the theoretical models allowing for joint estimation of utility functions and discounting functions using data collected from a representative sample of 413 adult danes in 2009 we draw striking conclusions assuming an exponential discounting model we estimate discount rates to be 5 6 on average this is significantly lower than all previous estimates using controlled experiments we also find no evidence to support quasi hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting and only modest evidence to support other specifications of non constant discounting furthermore the evidence for non constant discounting while statistically significant is not economically significant in terms of the size of the estimated discount rates we undertake extensive robustness checks on these findings including a detailed review of the previous comparable literature

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

on the effects of group identity in strategic environments abstract we examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games we find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though best responding to uniform randomization of the partner we conclude that group identity not only affects player s social preferences as identified in earlier research but also affects the decision making process independent of changes in the utility function

promotion turnover and compensation in the executive labor market this paper develops a generalized roy model with human capital accumulation moral hazard and career concerns we identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives the structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm size pay gap we find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size certainty equivalent pay decreases with firm size in larger firms and for more highly ranked executives weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums this risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm size gap in total compensation larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives finally the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant but their collective effect on firm size pay differentials nets out

risk aversion and incentive effects comment charles a holt and susan k laury 2002 develop an experimental design to determine the risk attitude of an individual they use their observations to argue that increased incentives appear to change risk attitudes leading to greater risk aversion popular utility functions that do not allow for such effects are therefore misspecified building on this finding they estimate a flexible utility function that characterizes their aggregate data well but that does not assume constant absolute or relative risk aversion the basic holt and laury 2002 hl design should become an important tool for the interpretation and design of experiments in which risk attitudes could play a role however their most important result showing the effect of scaling up the stakes of the lottery choice task is confounded by a possible order effect an order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task the primary methodological contribution of experiments in economics is to enhance control ideally such control makes the explanatory variables of interest in this case scale orthogonal to other explanatory variables such as order allowing clearer inferences about behavior than one could get from field econometric data we argue that not controlling for order effects results in a misspecification of utility functions that is as important as that of scale the subjects in the hl design were given sequences of three or four tasks as shown in table 1 task 1 involved choices over lotteries with a baseline level of prizes which we will refer to as the 1 scale task 2 involved hypothetical choices over prizes with a scaled up level of prizes either 20 50 or 90 task 3 repeated task 2 but with choices that involved real payoffs task 4 was a return to the baseline task with real 1 prizes in some sessions subjects were not given task 2 or task 3 what could one infer from the comparison of measured risk attitudes in the 1 and 20 tasks in hl unfortunately any observed difference could be due either to the scale of the prizes involved or the task order or some combination of both thus the effect of scale is intrinsically confounded with the possible effect of task order this is a logical flaw in their design which

the utilization of outpatient medical services in japan we estimate the price elasticity of demand for outpatient care in japan we use a nationally representative microdata set consisting of nearly 440 000 japanese patients using time between outpatient visits as a demand measure we estimate a cox proportional hazards model to calculate price effects with predicted probabilities we simulate yearly utilization and obtain elasticity estimates for most diagnostic categories we obtain inelastic downward sloping demand curves with price elasticities from 0 12 to 0 54 for the anomalous category we cannot reject a zero slope the elasticity estimates for japan are similar to u s estimates despite institutional differences

on the centipede game abstract in rosenthal s centipede game if at the start of play it is commonly known that the players will choose rationally at vertices that are actually reached then the backward induction outcome results that is the first player goes out at the first move journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73 d82

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

consumer inequality aversion and risk preferences in community supported agriculture abstract in community supported agriculture csa consumers face a tradeoff between i the desire to support a csa farmer and obtain environmentally friendly goods and ii the risk associated with a long term commitment we elicit inequality aversion and risk preferences of a sample of 162 french csa consumers using incentivized field experiments we find that csa consumers are concerned about payoff inequalities while we obtain evidence of advantageous inequality aversion toward csa farmers we also find disadvantageous inequality seeking we find that csa consumers are risk averse and loss averse and distort probabilities we also observe that inequality and risk preferences in the loss domain might complement each other to strengthen consumers support for csa farmers

cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma more than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience as suggested by backward induction remains inconclusive this paper provides a meta analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game we describe forces that affect initial play formation of cooperation and unraveling breakdown of cooperation first contrary to the backward induction prediction the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation we identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect to account for an important part of this effect second despite these initial differences the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations importantly despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies this paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round and conditional on establishing cooperation the first defection round moves earlier with experience simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation

attitudes towards large income risk in welfare states an international comparison using survey data and the instrument developed by barsky et al we estimate the distribution of attitudes towards income risk in a country where many employment and health related risks are generously covered by a tax financed social insurance system norway in 2006 under a constant relative risk aversion assumption the sample average for the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 3 8 with standard deviation 2 3 this number is then contrasted to that for five other oecd countries where risk attitudes have been measured using the same instrument and also prior to the financial crisis chile france italy the netherlands and the usa when we relate this distribution for stated relative risk aversion to that for generosity of social insurance and the risks related to employment and health expenditure a picture emerges suggesting that more extensive welfare states induce higher risk tolerance for foreground risks a relationship that is in line with the theory on risk vulnerability

heterogeneous effect of coinsurance rate on healthcare expenditure generalized finite mixtures and matching estimators the article proposes a combination of finite mixture models and matching estimators to account for heterogeneous and nonlinear effects of the coinsurance rate on healthcare expenditure the analysis with panel data for adult japanese consumers in 2008 2010 and for female consumers in 2000 2010 demonstrates the presence of subpopulations with high medium and low healthcare expenditure and subpopulation membership is explained by lifestyle variables generalized finite mixtures provide adequate fit compared to loglinear model conditional average treatment effect estimations reveal the existence of nonlinear effects of the coinsurance rate in the subpopulation with high expenditure

choice under uncertainty evidence from ethiopia india and uganda we review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in ethiopia india and uganda using these data we estimate that just over 50 of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately however when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory

stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly an explanation based on managerial incentives abstract this paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly if an owner s decision to hire a manager is modeled explicitly then the subgame perfect equilibrium may coincide with the stackelberg solution interestingly this can happen even when the cost of hiring a manager is the same for the owner of each firm

exploring the capability to reason backwards an experimental study with children adolescents and young adults this is the first study investigating the development of the capability to reason backwards in children adolescents and young adults aged 6 to 23 under controlled laboratory conditions the experimental design employs a modified version of the race game as in the original game subjects need to apply backward analysis in order to solve the games we find that subjects capability to reason backwards improves with age but that this process systematically differs across genders our repetition of the games indicates that differences exist also in learning between age groups and across genders

consistency and cautious fictitious play we study a variation of fictitious play in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action s utility against the historical frequency of opponents play regardless of the opponents strategies the utility received by an agent using this rule is nearly the best that could be achieved against the historical frequency such rules are approximately optimal in i i d environments and guarantee nearly the minmax regardless of opponents behavior fictitious play shares these properties provided it switches infrequently between actions we also study the long run outcomes when all players use consistent and cautious rules

deal or no deal decision making under risk in a large payoff game show we examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular tv game show deal or no deal and related classroom experiments contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes our results point to reference dependent choice theories such as prospect theory and suggest that path dependence is relevant even when the choice problems are simple and well defined and when large real monetary amounts are at stake

risk incomprehension and its economic consequences abstractalmost all theoretical and empirical studies implicitly assume that every economic agent understands the concept of risk we exploited a unique feature of the indonesian family life survey and argued that this assumption may not apply to the developing world a third of working men failed to understand the concept of risk and this incomprehension did not result from a mistake or a preference for simple answers moreover after applying ols we found that relative to risk comprehensive men risk incomprehensive men earned 11 9 per cent less and possessed household assets worth 9 8 per cent less

high stakes behavior with low payoffs inducing preferences with holt laury gambles abstract kahneman and tversky 1979 argued that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices yet results by holt and laury 2002 suggest that questionnaire responses and decisions in hypothetical and low monetary payoff environments do not well predict decisions in higher monetary payoff environments this raises the question of whether investigating decision making in high stakes environments requires using high stakes here we show that one can induce preferences using the binary lottery reward technique e g berg et al 1986 in order to study high stakes decision making using low stakes in particular we induce preferences such that decisions in a low stakes environment reflect well the choices made in the high stakes environment of holt and laury 2002 this finding is of interest to anyone interested in studying high stakes decision behavior without paying high stakes

monopoly and oligopoly provision of addictive goods this article investigates monopoly and oligopoly provision of an addictive good consumer preferences are modeled as in becker and murphy 1988 addictive goods have characteristics that create interesting strategic issues when suppliers are noncompetitive we characterize the perfect markov equilibrium of a market with noncompetitive supply of an addictive good and compare it with the efficient solution depending on particular parameter values we find a wide variety of possible steady state outcomes including ones with output above the efficient level and price below marginal cost we also find that market power can be disadvantageous

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

three player trust game with insider communication we examine behavior in a three player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second and the second may invest in the third any amount sent from one player to the next is tripled the third player decides the final allocation among three players the baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases cooperation between these two interestingly there is an external effect of insider communication the first player who is outside communication sends 54 more and receives 289 more than in the baseline treatment as a result insider communication increases efficiency from 44 to 68

checkmate exploring backward induction among chess players it is difficult to overstate the profound impact that game theory has had on the economic approach and on the sciences more generally for that reason understanding how closely the assumptions that underpin game theoretic analysis conform to actual human decision making is a question of first order importance to economists in this spirit backward induction represents one of the most basic concepts in game theory backward induction played a prominent role in reinhard selten s 1965 development of perfect equilibrium and it has helped to shape the modern refinement literature although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory existing empirical evidence suggests that economic agents engage in backward induction less frequently than theorists might hope backward induction has fared especially poorly in the centipede game which was introduced by robert w rosenthal 1981 and has since been extensively analyzed ken binmore 1987 robert j aumann 1988 philip j reny 1988 david m kreps 1990 geir b asheim and martin dufwenberg 2003 the original centipede game is a two player finite move game in which the subjects alternate choosing whether to end the game or to pass to the other player the subject s payoff to ending the game at a particular node is greater than the payoff he receives if the other player ends the game at the next node but less than the payoff earned if the other player elects not to end the game the player making the final choice gets paid more from stopping than from passing and thus would be expected to stop if the opponent will stop at the last node then conditional on reaching the penultimate node the player maximizes his earnings by stopping at that node following this logic further backward induction leads to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the game is stopped at the first node as pointed out in prior research