the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

political support and tax reforms with an application to italy in 2001 the italian government introduced a personal income tax reform to be implemented in successive phases in 2004 taxes were reduced to all income levels with higher gains for low income and high income individuals than for middle income ones a large debate arised this paper explores the political economy reasons under this tax reform mainly the attempt of the government to attract the uncertain voters swing voters a probabilistic voting model is introduced to capture the importance of swing voters the model predicts that the average personal income tax rate tends to be lower for groups of lower income higher preference for leisure and containing more politically mobile voters swing voters however data from italian polls show that while the tax reform was a good strategy to attract swing voters the specific design of the reform which favored high income and low income individuals but not the middle class was not the more appropriate strategy

unintended consequences of price controls an application to allowance markets abstract price controls established in a cap and trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor however they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions in particular when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price regardless of the prevailing market price in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for u s firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper although in practice many other conditions will determine its use

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

generic advertising in an asymmetric cournot oligopoly we examine how benefits of mandated generic advertising vary with firm size in an asymmetric cournot oligopoly market generic advertising funded through a mandatory assessment changes demand but also increases firms costs the effect on a firm s profits depends upon the nature of the change in demand and the company s market share situations are identified in which generic advertising 1 disproportionately favors large small firms 2 decreases profits and 3 increases decreases social welfare our findings explain the concerns that are often raised on small firms being disadvantaged by generic advertising we discuss implications for policy and for firms advertising strategies copyright 2010 oxford university press

measuring and testing advertising induced rotation in the demand curve advertising can rotate the demand curve if it changes the dispersion of consumers valuations we provide an elasticity form measure of the advertising induced demand curve rotation in five demand models and test for its presence in the us nonalcoholic beverage market the almost ideal demand system aids model reveals that doubling advertising spending rotates the demand curves clockwise for milk and coffee and tea with associated slope changes of 7 and 12 soft drink advertising rotates its demand curve counterclockwise our policy suggestion is that milk and soft drink firms time advertising to coincide with high and low price periods respectively

simulating price patterns for tradable green certificates to promote electricity generation from wind abstract this article uses computer simulation to anticipate the price dynamics in a market for tradable green certificates tgcs these markets have been used in europe to promote generation of electricity from renewable resources like wind similar markets have been proposed in the united states of america usa where the certificates are called renewable energy credits recs the certificates are issued to the generating companies for each megawatt hour of renewable electricity generation the companies may sell the certificates in a market and the revenues from certificate sales provide an extra incentive to invest in new generating capacity proponents argue that this market based incentive can be designed to support government mandates for a growing fraction of electricity generation from renewable sources in the usa these mandates are set by the states and are known as renewable portfolio standards rps we simulate the price dynamics of a market designed to support an aggressive mandate for wind generation in the northwestern usa the simulations show that the certificate price climbs rapidly to the cap in the early years after the market opens investors then react to these high prices with construction of new wind capacity after a few years wind generation meets and then exceeds the requirement we show that this pattern appears again and again when the simulations are repeated with wide variations in the estimates of behavioral parameters we use the model to study the impact of different trading strategies by the wind companies and by the distribution companies we also study the simulated market response if the usa adopts the carbon allowance market envisioned in the climate stewardship act the article concludes with recommendations for policy makers involved in tgc market design

a panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid the donor community has been increasingly concerned that development assistance intended for crucial social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive military and other expenditures the link between foreign aid and public spending is not straightforward because some aid may be fungible this article empirically examines the impact of foreign aid on the recipient s public expenditures using cross country samples of annual observations for 1971 90 for the base sample of 14 developing countries it finds that aid is not fungible at the aggregate level and there is no associated tax relief increasing the number of countries however makes aid fungible moreover results based on the main sample indicate that aid is fungible in three out of five sectors examined developing country governments receiving earmarked concessionary loans for agriculture education and energy reduce their own resources going to these sectors and use them elsewhere only loans to the transport and communication sector are fully spent on the purposes intended by donors because most aid appears to be fungible the rate of return on a specific donor funded project tells little about the impact of that assistance a better approach may be to tie foreign aid to an overall public expenditure program that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors

price controls and the behavior of auction markets an experimental examination price ceilings and price floors are common in all market systems the ancient greeks and hellenistic era egyptians are known to have utilized price controls see h michele p 272 and j p levy p 41 and numerous public policy questions today involve them apparently for as long as price controls have existed their effects have been debated for example diocletion s favorable view of his price ceilings was disputed by the religious philosopher lactantius who charged that the policy led to scarcity and low grade articles p 145

the political economy of naturalization this paper presents a political economy model in which self interested natives decide when citizenship and or voting rights should be granted to foreign born workers native voters know that immigrants hold different political preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible they also consider however that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration we find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity quality productivity and preferences of potential immigrants the political composition and the age structure of the native population as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

comparative statics for oligopoly a generalized result we perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival s strategic variable taking into account the responses of all other firms we obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second order partial derivative of the firm s payoff function we then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships i e strategic substitute and complement

price controls and banking in emissions trading an experimental evaluation we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate the effects of price controls and permit banking on limiting permit price risk while both instruments reduce between period price volatility and within period price dispersion combining price controls and permit banking yields important benefits banking alone produces high permit prices in earlier periods that fall over time but the combined policy produces lower initial prices and lower volatility however banking price controls and the combination all produce higher between period emissions volatility hence for emissions markets that seek to control flow pollutants with strictly convex damages efforts to limit permit price risk can result in higher expected damage

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

double auction dynamics structural effects of non binding price controls in competitive equilibrium non binding price controls that is price floors below and ceilings above the equilibrium should not affect market outcomes but in laboratory experiments they do we build a simple dynamic model of double auction markets with zero intelligence zi computer traders that accounts for many though not all of the discrepancies between the data and the walrasian tatonnement predictions the success of the model in organizing the data and in isolating various consequences of price controls shows that the simple zi model is a powerful tool to gain insights into the dynamics of market institutions

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

idiosyncratic shocks in an asymmetric cournot oligopoly abstract several authors have studied the impact of a marginal cost variation in the cournot model on consumers surplus firms profits and social welfare we unify and extend the results when all marginal costs change simultaneously hence we bring together two strands of literature respectively on mean preserving and subgroup common shocks the effect of any shock is decomposed into two parts an average impact ai and a heterogeneity effect he the former improves welfare if the inverse demand function is concave enough and the market is concentrated enough the latter when the diffusion of the shock is negatively correlated with the market share distribution finally we apply our decomposition to various special cases

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

can foreign aid accelerate stabilization this paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization following alesina and drazen 1991 we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies since the delay is used to signal each faction s strength the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in the release of information we show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer foreign aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization but aid decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms

an experimental investigation of hard and soft price ceilings in emissions permit markets tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution allowing the market for permits to determine the price price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits we test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms with special attention on the soft price ceiling we focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings hard ceilings effectively limit elevated prices in this setting by contrast reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied furthermore the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases

demand shifts and market structure in free entry oligopoly equilibria abstract this papers examines the structural implications of demand shifts in free entry oligopoly equilibria the model generalizes the conjectural variations framework to consider asymmetric firm conjectures allows for the possibility of cost differences across firms and endogenizes conditions of entry and exit in the industry in non competitive environments changes in incumbent output and industry profitability are inversely related to changes in the equilibrium price following a demand shift in response to rotations of demand through the equilibrium point changes in profitability are positively related to changes in industry concentration and when marginal costs are non decreasing inversely related to changes in market power

redistribution tax under non benevolent governments i analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system i employ these assumptions members gain special benefits in the majority parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers the member s utility function is given in a quasi linear function the government s objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and i classify governments according to the weight the four main results are a stable majority dose not support myopic government the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers the stable transfer of non benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy

labor market effects of employer provided health insurance i introduction increasing health insurance coverage is arguably an important policy goal the congressional budget office 2003 estimates that in 1998 20 30 million americans had no health insurance for the entire year approximately 40 million were uninsured at a specific point in time in the year and nearly 60 million were without coverage some time during the year most individuals who have health insurance in the united states obtain it through their employer in 1999 65 8 of nonelderly americans had employer provided insurance also called group insurance or employer sponsored insurance either through their own employer or through the employer of another household member see gruber 2001 employer provided insurance plans generally have lower premiums and offer more benefits than individual insurance plans health insurance providers can offer cheaper and better plans to company employees for at least two reasons first the average administrative cost of such plans is lower than individual plans second employment based plans are typically subject to less adverse selection than individual plans particularly so for large employers furthermore the tax subsidy afforded employment based health insurance renders the effective consumer price substantially lower than the cost see pauly 1986 and gruber 2001 together these various factors give a strong incentive for employers to offer and employees to accept coverage as part of their employment contract as employer provided insurance is by far the most prevalent form of coverage in the private sector policy makers look for further expansion of this base as a way to insure the uninsured while avoiding direct public financing as a way to increase employer based health insurance coverage some states either have or are considering government mandates that require employers to provide insurance to certain types of workers 1 the state of hawaii requires private sector employers to offer health insurance to all workers who work for more than 20 h a week and requires these workers to have insurance the state of california is currently considering a similar mandate there is a considerable interest from policy makers on the effects of such mandates on labor market outcomes in this study we report on an experiment that was designed to provide some insights about possible effects of alternative health insurance regulations on the competitive labor market with a particular focus on mandates since we only considered a competitive market setting with complete contracts and no wage rigidities our results may not be directly applicable to all labor market situations 2 however the study provides useful insights about the interaction of health insurance benefit provision wages and employment structure for labor markets where the competitive wage setting and the complete contracts assumptions are reasonable with these limitations in mind our results can be also generalized to other types of employer provided fringe benefits such as paid vacations or pension plans as any government intervention health insurance regulation may affect the labor market theory predicts that in perfectly competitive labor markets health insurance creates no distortionary effects on the labor market equilibrium as long as the coverage is not mandated and there are no wage rigidities 3 all workers who value insurance above its cost of provision are offered insurance and accept it the wages are adjusted downward see rosen 1986 and gruber 2000 summers 1989 used a simple supply and demand analysis to show that the effect of increases in premiums on equilibrium labor hours and wage depends both on the elasticity of labor demand and labor supply and on how fully workers value changes in the cost of health insurance if the demand or the supply of labor is completely inelastic or if workers fully value the insurance then an increase in the premium would result in an equal decrease shift in wages

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

economic effects of non binding price constraints for decades the conventional wisdom among economists has been that a non binding price floor or price ceiling has no effect whatsoever on the market equilibrium and quantity 1 this hypothesis rests on the shaky theoretical assumption that the competitive firm s perception of future market conditions is not altered when the government imposes a price control recent experiments by isaac and plott 6 and smith and williams 18 cast doubt on this conventional wisdom but they offer no theory to explain their findings similarly working 19 benedict 1 and johnson 8 alluded that price supports set below the market equilibrium price would distort the supply response offarmers without explaining why only lee 10 and eeckhoudt and hansen 4 have developed theories to explain why firms react this way lee used an intertemporal decision making model to show that a price ceiling implemented above the current price would affect both price and output in the current period however lee discussed only those cases where resources have a finite inventory non renewable resources which once depleted cannot be produced again following sandmo 15 ishii 7 and coes 3 eeckhoudt and hansen analyzed the restraining effects of minimum and maximum prices on a competitive firm using a static equilibrium model they explained the short run response of a utility maximizing firm to the imposition of price constraints however eeckhoudt and hansen were unable to sign the effect that a price ceiling has on the volume of industrial output furthermore they ignored all long run adjustments our model differs from the previous studies in that we assume firms maximize the market value of the firm in so doing we are able to determine both the short run and the long run effects that currently non binding price restrictions have on a competitive industry consider the conventional competitive market in which the long run equilibrium is achieved when all the firms in the industry have an expected net worth comparable to their next best alternative for simplicity assume a price floor pf is inacted that is lower than the current market price and will remain constant for the forseeable future furthermore assume the government agrees

generic product advertising spillovers and market concentration we examine the decision to advertise a homogenous good we show that the likelihood of inefficiently low advertising rests heavily on how one models the mechanism by which advertising affects demand regardless of this mechanism however there is always a lower bound of concentration below which no advertising occurs even when welfare enhancing in such cases mandatory programs will raise welfare if they induce entry although producer surplus may decline our model also provides an explanation for the stylized fact that advertising intensity first rises and then falls as concentration increases copyright 2008 oxford university press

a spatial equilibrium model for imperfectly competitive milk markets a generalization of takayama and judge s spatial equilibrium model that allows for any degree of market structure is presented the model is applied to the japanese dairy industry to examine interregional milk movements generated under alternative assumed degrees of market competition the results indicate that the perfect competition and monopoly equilibrium solutions result in a lower and a higher price respectively than actual price levels on the other hand the cournot nash equilibrium solutions are the most similar to actual observations and the actual interregional milk movements are best explained by imperfectly competitive behavior

electoral equilibria with restricted strategies we construct a spatial election model in which candidates inherit initial positions in the strategy space presumably from previous political activity and they are restricted to strategies close to their initial positions we establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium the equilibrium need not entail an expectation of a zero plurality for each candidate we then apply this model to a sequence of elections in which a series of opposition candidates challenge incumbents given certain regularity conditions the result will be an apparent incumbency advantage corresponding to that observed in recent congressional elections

tick size price grids and market performance stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium abstract the tick size in a financial market is the minimum allowable difference between ask and bid prices by the rules of each exchange no transactions can occur within the tick interval the impact of tick size is an ongoing controversy which we study by experimental methods whose simplicity helps distinguish among competing models of complex real world securities markets we observe patterns predicted by a matching cooperative game model because a price grid interferes with a competitive equilibrium and restrictions on order flow interfere with information aggregation the matching model provides predictions when the competitive model cannot although their predictions are the same when a competitive equilibrium does exist our experiments examine stable allocations average prices timing of order flow information flow and price dynamics larger tick size invites more speculation which in turn increases liquidity however increased speculation leads to inefficient trades that otherwise would not have occurred

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

examining the effectiveness of price limits in an artificial stock market abstract this paper proposes an agent based framework to examine the effectiveness of price limits in an artificial stock market the market is composed of many boundedly rational and heterogeneous traders whose learning behavior is represented by a genetic programming algorithm we calibrate the model to replicate several stylized facts observed in real financial markets based on this environment the impacts of price limits are analyzed from the perspectives of volatility price distortion volume and welfare we find that the imposition of price limits possesses both positive and negative effects however compared with the market without price limits appropriate price limits help to reduce volatility and price distortion and increase the liquidity and welfare

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

comparative statics for oligopoly demand shift effects when demand rises in an imperfectly competitive industry price output profits consumer surplus and welfare may individually rise or fall the possibilities are thus broader than with either a demand shift under competition or a cost shift in either typ e of industry systematic relationships are established showing howe ver that the pattern of effects cannot be arbitrary imperfect compe tition is necessary for profits to fall when demand rises profits alw ays rise with either perfect competition or perfect collusion this a gain contrasts with the cost shift case where imperfect competition is not necessary for perverse profit effects copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the influence of generic advertising on brand preferences more than a billion dollars is spent annually on generic advertisements that promote the consumption of commodity goods generic advertising is designed to increase primary demand or the size of the pie without affecting selective demand or the share of the pie we find evidence to the contrary generic advertising increases the consumer s sensitivity to changes in price and systematically alters brand preferences these effects of generic advertising can be attributed to the tendency of generic ads to change the relative importance of the attributes used to evaluate the brands the results have implications for the public policy issue of how to effectively implement generic advertising without differentially benefiting certain brands and the managerial issue of how to integrate generic and brand advertising in order to achieve product category and brand differentiation goals

the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade an experimental study a study is a limited exploration into the relationship between the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade and the resulting market performance laboratory experimental methods are applied to separate competing theories the competitive model predicts well relative to cartel models nevertheless when measurements are taken relative to the performance of markets where conspiracies are not possible the effects of attempted conspiracies can be determined

cooperation for monopolization an empirical analysis of cartelization this paper examines the ability of a large numbers cartel to raise price cost margins the cartel in question is a dairy cooperative associated milk producers inc ampi with more than 30 000 members we develop a model of spatial limit pricing that we test using the method of seemingly unrelated regressions adjusting for serial correlation our results suggest that the cartel successfully obtained and used market power and that its power was proportional to its market share in contrast after an antitrust consent decree margins fell significantly and were no longer related to market shares these results are robust under both pooled and market fixed effects analysis copyright 1994 by mit press

political influence economic interests and endogenous tax structure in a computable equilibrium framework with application to the united states 1973 and 1983 we consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model ofa competitive political economy in which the economic interestsof groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibriumpolicy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed the model incorporates an amended version of the gemtap taxmodel calibrated to data for the united states for 1973 and1983 emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of gemtaphouseholds into homogeneous groups affects the numericalrepresentation of interests and influence for representativemembers of each group

demand uncertainty competition and non binding price controls abstract in our paper we will present a general model that demonstrate that a price floor or a price ceiling although not effective at the existing market price nevertheless alters the competitive equilibrium and leads to erroneous policy conclusions

a model of stability and persistence in a democracy abstract we develop an intertemporal model of political competition which accounts for three stylized facts of political life in representative democracies i political stability and the absence of discrimination ii a limited degree of political competition and iii the persistence of different political outcomes in otherwise similar economies in our model political stability is desirable for risk averse voters voters only vote for decent policy proposals which do not discriminate against single groups we derive properties of the set of possible political outcomes and study the issue of robustness against renegotiation journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d70 d72

market stability backward bending supply in a laboratory experimental market 1999 presidential address western economic association the paper investigates the stability properties of markets with backward bending supply curves parameters are chosen so that the two classic models of price dynamics the walrasian model and the marshallian model give opposite predictions the results are 1 market instability can be observed 2 in the backward bending case stability is captured by the walrasian model and the marshallian model of dynamics is rejected previous experiments have demonstrated that the marshallian model works in the forward falling case thus which theory of dynamics is appropriate for a market depends upon the underlying reasons for demand and supply shapes

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

aid allocation and poverty reduction the authors derive a poverty efficient allocation of aid and compare it with actual aid allocations they build the poverty efficient allocation in two stages first they use new world bank ratings of 20 different aspects of national policy to establish the current relationship between aid policies and growth onto that they add a mapping from growth to poverty reduction which reflects the level and distribution of income they compare the effects of using headcount and poverty gap measures of poverty they find the actual allocation of aid to be radically different from the poverty efficient allocation in the efficient allocation for a given of poverty aid tapers in with policy reform in the actual allocation aid tapers out with reform in the efficient allocation aid is targeted disproportionately to countries with severe poverty and adequate polices the type of country where 74 percent of the world s poor live in the actual allocation such countries receive a much smaller share of aid 56 percent than their share of the world s poor with the present allocation aid is effective in sustainably lifting about 30 million people a year out of absolute poverty with a poverty efficient allocation this would increase to about 80 million people even with political constraints introduced to keep allocations for india and china constant poverty reduction would increase to about 60 million reallocating aid is politically difficult but it may be considerably less difficult than quadrupling aid budgets which is what the authors estimate would be necessary to achieve the same impact on poverty reduction with existing aid allocations

voting competitions with interested politicians platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter we examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter preferences if politicians utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election equilibrium strategies will diverge instead of converging to the median voter s preferences as long as politicians have different preferences we present conditions i for political compromise and ii for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement

clientelism and aid abstract using a model of probabilistic voting we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region we consider politicians with mixed motives they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office we label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power we find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption when elasticity is low the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set this substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy perhaps more surprising is the opposite case which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare maximizing policy set

price controls non price quality competition and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium we investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities when price controls exist the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed hence we investigate the nature of non price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence we develop a quality competition model based on matching theory equilibria of the quality competition model always exist in such price constrained markets moreover they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist additionally we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality competition model in the presence of price restrictions in a series of experiments we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model in particular price controls induce non price competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model

elections and income redistribution this paper has analyzed a model of elections in which each candidate selects a reputation for the distribution of income that can be expected if he is elected the first result established that whenever there are three or more groups of voters and no single group has half or more of the voters if the candidates believe that the voters choices are determined solely by the candidates redistributional reputations then there is no electoral equilibrium the candidates expectations about the voters choices were then reformulated using a qualitative response model the next result established that this alternative model leads to the existence of electoral equilibria the remainder of the paper analyzed the nature of these equilibria for any given electorate among other things the results established that there is always a unique equilibrium provided a simple procedure for finding the precise location of this equilibrium and showed that this location implicitly maximizes the sum of the voters utility functions on the possible income distributions the penultimate sections provided some simple examples which illustrate the main results in the paper and a discussion of these results in terms of the politics of redistribution

papers in experimental economics on nonbinding price controls in a competitive market interest in the effect of nonbinding price controls on double auction markets stems from two primary considerations the double auction institution converges to a competitive allocation more rapidly and with fewer participating agents than any other institution with which it has been compared see smith et al one way to improve our understanding of this important property is to determine what conditions if any can interfere with or retard this convergence process nonbinding price controls represent a condition that may affect this convergence process hence if such effects can be documented they will provide a body of data that any future proposed model of the double auction process should be able to explain a second reason for studying the effect of nonbinding controls on the double auction is practical the organized commodity exchanges often set limits on price fluctuations during any single day when prices at any point during a day rise above qr fall below the closing prices of the preceding day by more than the amount of the limit no further trading for that day is permitted walter labys p 162 consequently commodity trading frequently occurs at prices near the level of nonbinding price floors or ceilings mark issac and charles plott report the results of twelve exploratory experiments in which various price control constraints are imposed on double auction markets their two principal conclusions can be summarized as follows 1 the hypothesis is rejected that nonbinding price controls that is price ceilings above or price floors below the competitive equilibrium ce will serve as a focal point or signalling price on which sellers and buyers will key their contracts 2 inconclusive evidence is presented in support of the hypothesis that nonbinding controls near the ce will bias prices below ce when there is a price ceiling and above ce when there is a price floor support for this second hypothesis is not conclusive because some experimental markets show a tendency to converge from below and others from above depending upon the relative bargaining strength of buyers as against sellers thus sampling variation among subjects can yield a group in which buyers sellers are able to make contracts at an average price below above ce for several periods of trading consequently in an experiment in which there is a price ceiling floor five cents above below ce and in which contract prices are observed to occur below above ce one cannot determine conclusively whether the observed effect was due to the nonbinding price control or to the bargaining characteristics of the market participants we report below an experimental design developed for the purpose of separating these confounding factors and allowing the effect of nonbinding controls to be isolated the results of sixteen experiments strongly support the hypothesis that markets with a nonbinding price ceiling floor near ce will converge from below above relative to any otherwise identifiable tendency to converge from below above an analysis of the effect of a nonbinding price ceiling floor on the distributions of bids and offers reveals the cause of this bias ceilings limit the bargaining strategies of sellers especially but also that of buyers while floors have the opposite effect thus in the absence of price controls double auction trading is characterized by a process in which sellers typically make concessions from offer prices well above ce while buyers most often concede from bid prices well below ce a price ceiling truncates seller offer prices at the ceiling requir university of arizona and indiana university respectively research support by the national science foundation is gratefully acknowledged

contracting for aid abstract foreign aid is analyzed as a contract where the north gives a transfer to the south in return for poverty reduction regarded as an international public good the issue of conditionality is first discussed in a moral hazard framework and then under asymmetric information about the degree of altruism of the government of the south additional actors like local ngos and multilateral aid institutions are then added to the model the optimal contracts to avoid free riding or collusion are then presented

market power in oral double auctions this paper reports the results of a series of oral double auction experiments in which some traders possess market power a market is set up in which the configuration of the supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices this market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive equilibrium price despite the competitive nature of the oral double auction institution the nonconvergence occurs most frequently in the experiments involving experienced subjects

firm specific output limits in a posted offer market distributive and efficiency effects abstract in this paper we look at the effect of the removal of firm specific binding and non binding quotas in experimental posted offer markets in the experiments we see that the effect of both binding and non binding quotas is carried over to the deregulated regime the effect of non binding quotas while being in effect on the number of contracts is statistically significant we also see that distribution of surplus may actually affect the convergence path of prices that is with binding quotas price convergence is observed from below the competitive equilibrium

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates