how does increased corn ethanol production affect us natural gas prices abstract in recent years there has been a push to increase biofuel production in the united states the biofuel of choice so far has been ethanol produced from corn the effects of increased corn ethanol production on the consumer prices of food and energy continue to be studied and debated this study examines in particular the effects of increased corn ethanol production on us natural gas prices a structural model of the natural gas market is developed and estimated using two stage least squares a baseline projection for the period 2007 2018 is determined and two scenarios are simulated in the first scenario current biofuel policies including eisa mandates tariffs and tax credits are removed in the second scenario we hold ethanol production to the level required only for largely obligatory additive use the results indicate that the increased level of corn ethanol production occurring as a result of the current us biofuel policies may lead to natural gas prices that are as much as 0 25 higher on average than if no biofuel policies were in place a similar comparison between the baseline and second scenario indicates natural gas prices could be as much as 0 5 higher on average for the same period

incentives contracts and markets a general equilibrium theory of firms1 this paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of alchian and demsetz 1972 and grossman and hart 1986 contract theory in the spirit of holmstrom 1979 and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of arrow and debreu 1954 and mckenzie 1959 in the model presented here the set of firms that form and the contractual arrangements that appear the assignments of agents to firms the prices faced by firms for inputs and outputs and the incentives to agents are all determined endogenously at equilibrium agents choose consumption but they also choose which firms to join which roles to occupy in those firms and which actions to take in those roles agents interact anonymously with the large market but strategically within the small firms they join the model accommodates moral hazard adverse selection signaling and insurance equilibria may be pareto ranked

a note on defensive expenditures harmonised law diverse results in the context of many environmental hazards there is scope for self defence by victims multiple equilibria arise in a model of bilateral precaution under a regime of strict but incompletely enforced environmental liability this means that the same system of environmental law instigated in two economies may lead to very different outcomes it impacts upon policy analysis in a variety of ways and provides a channel for cultural factors to matter we explore the positive and normative effects of subsidising self defence

entrepreneurship and organization design we model entrepreneurship and the emergence of firms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents what distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for those who are relatively unmanageable while possibly excellent managers themselves become entrepreneurs entrepreneurs compete and create value by building efficient organizations and offering potentially well paid jobs to others while the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs this result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship

default and punishment in general equilibrium we extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools the equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates along with the usual prices of assets and commodities by reinterpreting the variables our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates it also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets we show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model and that default in conjunction with refinement opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets the market chooses the promises default penalties and quantity constraints of actively traded assets

valuation equilibrium with clubs abstract this paper considers model worlds in which there is a continuum of individuals who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities we show how through a suitable choice of commodity space restrictions on the composition of feasible groups can be incorporated into the specification of the consumption and production sets of the economy we also show that if there are a finite number of types then the classical results from the competitive analysis of convex finite agent economies can be reinterpreted to apply journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 h41

biofuel market and carbon modeling to analyse french biofuel policy abstract in order to comply with european union objectives france has set up an ambitious biofuel plan this plan is evaluated on the basis of two criteria tax exemption on fossil fuels and greenhouse gases ghg emission savings an economic marginal analysis and a life cycle assessment lca are provided using a coupling procedure between a partial agro industrial equilibrium model and an oil refining optimization model thus we determine the minimum tax exemption needed to place on the market a targeted quantity of biofuel by deducting the biofuel long run marginal revenue of refiners from the agro industrial marginal cost of biofuel production with a clear view of the refiner s economic choices total pollutant emissions along the biofuel production chains are quantified and used to feed an lca the french biofuel plan is evaluated for 2008 2010 and 2012 using prospective scenarios results suggest that biofuel competitiveness depends on crude oil prices and demand for petroleum products and consequently these parameters should be taken into account by authorities to modulate biofuel tax exemption lca results show that biofuel production and use from seed to wheel would facilitate the french government s compliance with its plan climat objectives by reducing up to 5 ghg emissions in the french road transport sector by 2010

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

the impact of ethanol production on us and regional gasoline markets abstract this study quantifies the impact of increasing ethanol production on wholesale retail gasoline prices employing pooled regional time series data from january 1995 to march 2008 we find that the growth in ethanol production kept wholesale gasoline prices 0 14 gallon lower than would otherwise have been the case the negative impact of ethanol on retail gasoline prices is found to vary considerably across regions the midwest region has the biggest impact at 0 28 gallon while the rocky mountain region had the smallest impact at 0 07 gallon the results also indicate that the ethanol induced reduction in gasoline prices comes at the expense of refiners profits we find a net welfare loss of 0 5 billion from the ethanol support policies in multiple markets

can position limits restrain rogue trading this paper studies the imposition of position limits on commodity futures from the perspective of curbing excessive speculation and thus manipulation we present a simple general equilibrium model in a static rational expectations framework and agent heterogeneity to illustrate that excessive speculation serves to enrich other agents at the expense of the speculator position limits on the contrary are not only superfluous but also counter productive as they exacerbate market power and lead to a deterioration in efficiency position limits not only reduce social welfare but also cannot restrain market manipulation

the impact of energy prices on the volatility of ethanol prices and the role of gasoline emissions abstract the contribution of renewable energy resources is vital for a country s economic growth by providing high efficiency in energy as well as an effective tool for the confrontation of climate change in particular concerning the eu an increase in the consumption of renewable energy resources as a proportion of the total energy consumption by its member states was set as an objective until 2020 ethanol has been widely used as a substitute to conventional energy like gasoline and oil the present paper surveys the role of alternative energy prices and gas emissions in the formation of the ethanol prices the results of the empirical survey confirmed the existence of a sole relationship among the variables employed according to the results obtained an increase in the volume of emissions or in gasoline prices results in an increase in ethanol prices while the opposite is confirmed in the case of crude oil he elasticity of ethanol prices to the increase of the emissions is another result worth mentioning indicative of the significant role of the emissions in the formation of ethanol prices

entrepreneurial land developers joint production local externalities and mixed housing developments abstract housing developments condos and suburban developments are not necessarily homogeneous developers provide different types of units of various sizes and other characteristics catering to different types of customers in this paper we allow joint production and local consumption externalities within each development and show that land developers who seek a profit maximizing set of units in developments may provide mixed developments we show that there exists an equilibrium and that every equilibrium is pareto efficient we provide examples in which mixed developments arise in a long run equilibrium we relate this work to a widely used hedonic pricing model by rosen 1974 and to an equilibrium concept under asymmetric information by rothschild and stiglitz 1976

biofuel related price transmission using renewable identification number prices to signal mandate regime this paper improves on existing methods of testing price links between biofuels petroleum petroleum products and agricultural commodity feedstocks by incorporating information contained in the prices of renewable identification numbers rins that are used for biofuel mandate compliance theoretical equations are developed to show the role rin prices can play in the relationships among energy biofuel and agricultural commodity prices rin price data are used a to infer values of fuels where market data are unavailable and b to define binding and non binding mandate regimes a specific empirical exercise exploits the rin price data to conduct cointegration tests on high frequency data representing spot and futures prices relating to ethanol and biodiesel from february 2009 through march 2015 finding little evidence of short term biofuel and petroleum product substitution during this period

incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection we decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a competitive market for mechanisms that is for menus of contracts facing a budget constraint informed individuals purchase lottery tickets to enter mechanisms whereas firms sell tickets and supply slots at mechanisms at given prices beyond optimization market clearing and rational expectations an equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change or cut prices an equilibrium exists and is incentive efficient an equilibrium can be computed as the solution to a programming problem that selects the incentive efficient outcome preferred by the highest type within an appropriately defined set for two types economies this is the only equilibrium outcome

a roller coaster ride an empirical investigation of the main drivers of the international wheat price over the last decade commodity prices have registered substantial booms and busts marked by extreme volatility wheat in particular one of the main nonoil commodities has registered a roller coaster in price levels which seems to be inconsistent with supply and demand fundamentals to acutely investigate the drivers of wheat prices and quantify their impact a vector error correction model vecm has been used the exogenous variables have been distinguished into four groups market specific factors broad macroeconomic determinants speculative components and weather variables the quadriangulation of the determinants will enable us to better understand the movements in wheat price and identify the specific role of each component the results show that a mix of factors are contributing to wheat price movements including speculation global demand and real effective exchange rate

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

how market efficiency and the theory of storage link corn and ethanol markets this article uses the theories of market efficiency and supply of storage to develop a conceptual link between the corn and ethanol markets and explores statistical evidence for the link we propose that a long run no profit condition is established in distant futures markets for ethanol corn and natural gas and then use the theory of storage to define an inter temporal equilibrium among these prices the relationship shows that under certain conditions future price expectations will influence nearby futures prices and that a short term relationship between input and output prices will exist we demonstrate validity of the theory using a structural price model and then by means of time series techniques

competitive markets with endogenous health risks we study an economy where agents productivity and labor endowment depend on their health status and indivisible occupational choices affect individual health distributions we show that pareto efficiency requires cross transfers across occupations moreover workers with relatively less safe jobs must get positive transfers whenever labor supply is not very reactive to wages a condition in line with the findings of a large empirical literature in these instances compensating wage differentials equalizing the utilities of ex ante identical workers in different jobs undermine ex ante efficiency moreover competitive equilibria where only assets with deterministic payoffs are traded are not first best finally we show that simple transfer schemes implemented through linear subsidies to health insurance enhance efficiency

competitive pooling rothschild stiglitz reconsidered we build a model of competitive pooling which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join in equilibrium pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price even though each household s deliveries are the same at all pools the rothschild stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case we show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic competitive story in our perfectly competitive framework their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it does not and is unique

clubs and the market large finite economies abstract this paper builds a general equilibrium model of finite economies with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of other club members because club memberships are indivisible and choices of club memberships must be coordinated across the population the core of such an economy may be empty and equilibrium may not exist however for large finite club economies an approximate core is not empty and states in this approximate core can be approximately decentralized by prices for private goods and for club memberships the arguments use convexification tools familiar from the literature on private goods economies and a new tool of some independent interest that addresses the special problems created by the nature of club memberships journal of economic literature classification numbers d2 d5 h4

clubs and the market this paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of the other members of their clubs the space of agents is a continuum but clubs are finite it is shown that i competitive equilibria exist and ii the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states the central subtlety is in modeling club memberships and expressing the notion that membership choices are consistent across the population

impacts of ethanol policy on corn prices a review and meta analysis of recent evidence abstract the literature on the impacts of biofuels on agricultural commodity prices is characterized by contradictory findings we review studies published between 2007 and 2014 that estimate the effects of u s corn ethanol policy on corn prices and find estimates ranging from nil to over 80 such divergent results make it difficult to assess the merits of alternative biofuel policies to bring more clarity to the issue and facilitate comparisons across studies we assemble a database of over 150 medium to long run estimates of the effect of corn ethanol production on corn prices from 29 published studies we first normalize corn price impacts by the change in corn ethanol volume to control for the large differences in ethanol quantities across scenarios we then conduct a meta analysis to identify the factors that drive the remaining variation in corn price impacts across studies in addition to ethanol volumes we find that modeling framework projection year inclusion of ethanol co products and biofuel production from other feedstocks explain much of the differences in price effects the results indicate that a one billion gallon expansion of the us corn ethanol mandate in the year 2015 would lead to a three to four percent increase in corn prices with smaller price changes projected in future years

competition in portfolio management theory and experiment we explore theoretically and experimentally the general equilibrium price and allocation implications of delegated portfolio management when the investor manager relationship is nonexclusive our theory predicts that competition forces managers to promise portfolios that mimic arrow debreu ad securities which investors then combine to fit their preferences a weak version of the capital asset pricing model capm obtains where state prices relative to state probabilities implicit in prices of traded securities will be inversely ranked to aggregate wealth across states our experiment broadly corroborates the price and choice predictions of the theory however price quality deteriorates when only a few managers attract most of the available wealth wealth concentration increases because funds flow toward managers who offer portfolios closer to replicating ad securities as in the theory but also because funds flow to managers who had better performance in the immediate past an observation unrelated to the theory this paper was accepted by jerome detemple finance

bertrand and walras equilibria under moral hazard we consider a simple model of competition under moral hazard with constant return technologies we consider preferences that are not separable in effort marginal utility of income is assumed to increase with leisure especially for high income levels we show that in this context bertrand competition may result in positive equilibrium profit this result holds for purely idiosyncratic shocks when only deterministic contracts are considered and extends to unrestricted contract spaces in the presence of aggregate uncertainty finally these findings have important consequences on the definition of an equilibrium we show that in this context a walrasian general equilibrium a la prescott townsend may fail to exist any equilibrium must involve rationing

how does petroleum price and corn yield volatility affect ethanol markets with and without an ethanol use mandate the recent increase in ethanol use in the us strengthens and changes the nature of links between agricultural and energy markets here we explore the interaction of market volatility and the scope for policy to affect this interaction with a focus on how corn yields and petroleum prices affect ethanol prices mandates associated with new us energy legislation may intervene in these links in the medium term future we simulate stochastically a structural model that represents these markets and that includes mandates in order to assess how shocks to corn or oil markets can affect ethanol price and use we estimate that the mandate makes ethanol producer prices more sensitive to corn yields and less sensitive to changes in petroleum prices overall we note a discontinuity in these links that is caused by the mandate ethanol use can exceed the mandate if petroleum prices and corn yields are high enough but the mandate limits downside adjustments in ethanol use to low petroleum prices or corn yields

general equilibrium returns to human and investment capital under moral hazard we present a tractable general equilibrium model with multiple sectors in which firms offer workers incentive contracts and simultaneously raise capital in stock markets workers optimally invest in the stock market and at the same time hedge labour income risk firms rationally take agents portfolio decisions into account in equilibrium the cost of capital of each sector is endogenous the distortion induced by moral hazard generates counterintuitive effects on the real economy for example the value of labour market participation may be higher under moral hazard than under first best further a positive productivity shock may decrease welfare in the moral hazard economy in addition our model generates predictions on the effects of moral hazard on asset markets for example in the presence of moral hazard the capital asset pricing model fails because firms by choosing optimal incentive contracts transfer risk both through wages and through the stock market this leads to several cross sectional asset pricing anomalies such as size and value effects as we characterize optimal contracts we can also present empirical predictions relating workers compensation firm productivity firm size and financial market abnormal returns