the theory of mixed demand functions abstract the properties of samuelson s mixed demand functions which express demand as a function of a mixed set of prices and quantities are derived by analyzing compensated or substitution effects and uncompensated effects the relationships between mixed demand functions and conditional or rationed demands are examined this provides insights on the behavioral implications of consumer theory for alternative demand specifications

arbitrary values good causes and premature verdicts abstract this paper offers an alternative interpretation of the conclusions kahneman and knetsch propose based on two contingent valuation cvm surveys the evaluation argues that while framing is important to cvm estimates the design implementation and empirical findings reported from these surveys do not support their judgments moreover with the exception of temporal embedding conventional economic descriptions of individual behavior can explain the response patterns that they suggest are at variance with standard value theory

dual distribution channels the competition between rental agencies and dealers managerial decisions involving marketing channels are among the most critical that an organization must make part of the reason for this importance is that relationships between manufacturers and their intermediaries usually involve long term commitments that are difficult to change on the other hand in order to respond to the realities of the market place an organization must be ready to adapt its distribution practices sometimes under considerable uncertainty about the long term consequences such a problem faces the u s automobile industry which has led manufacturers to experiment with various channel structures when manufacturers first changed their distribution policies they were clear about the short term effect on sales but were unsure about its longer term impact on profitability in this article we develop a model to analyze the marketing of durable products through multiple channels our analysis suggests that even though it was not apparent at the time manufacturers were indeed behaving optimally when they changed their policies our model provides insights not only to automobile manufacturers but also to practitioners and academics who are interested in understanding the unique problems associated with marketing durable products through multiple channels we develop a two period model by assuming that a single manufacturer markets a durable product through two retailers a rental agency and a dealer the rental agency focuses mainly on renting the product in a daily rental market while the dealer focuses on selling the product to a different set of customers in the sales market to model the development of channels in the u s automobile industry we analyze three different channel structures the first structure a separate channel reflects the state of the industry through most of the 1980s when rental agencies were franchised solely to rent and dealers solely to sell the cars in response to a decrease in overall sales manufacturers encouraged rental agencies to sell their slightly used rental cars in the consumer market resulting in the second structure an overlapping channel dealers did not like this arrangement however and in the next experiment a buyback channel some manufacturers began buying back used rental cars and selling them through dealers in terms of the consumer side of the model we assume that consumers are heterogeneous and have product valuations that are distributed uniformly between a low and a high value in addition they recognize that as the durable depreciates with use its secondhand market value decreases while both sold and rented goods depreciate with use we assume based on an analysis of market prices that sold goods depreciate at a higher rate than rented goods given these different depreciation rates and consumers underlying utility functions we develop the market demand functions in the dealer s and rental agency s markets then for each of the channel structures we solve the intermediaries and manufacturer s problems the main contribution of this article is that it allows us to evaluate the profitability associated with various channel structures for all the players in our analysis the dealer the rental agency and the manufacturer in terms of the intermediaries we find that the overlapping channel is the most profitable structure for the rental agency on the other hand it is the least profitable for the dealer in terms of manufacturer profitability our model suggests that the separate channel is the least profitable and the overlapping channel is the most profitable it is interesting to note that the distribution structure in existence today is more akin to a buyback channel this strikes us as a compromise channel which alleviates dealer concerns with the overlapping channel and yet does not harm rental agencies as much as a separate channel these are surprising results because conventional wisdom has been that the overlapping channel was competing away profits for all players this suggests to us that automobile manufacturers were indeed on the right track when they began experimenting with the structure of their distribution channels

a new method of estimating risk aversion i show existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model i derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to wage elasticity and degree of complementarity between consumption and labor i bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies across states using labor supply elasticity estimates i find a mean estimate of 1 then show generating 2 requires that wage increases cause sharper labor supply reductions jel d81 j22

globalisation and unequalisation what can be learned from value chain analysis although many have gained from the process of globalisation there remains a stubbornly large number of people living in absolute poverty and a rise in inequality within and between countries the issue is thus not whether to participate in the global economy but how to do so in a manner which provides for sustainable and equitable income growth this study shows how value chain analysis can be used to chart the growing disjuncture between global economic activity and global income distribution and to provide causal explanations for this outcome in so doing value chain analysis provides valuable insights into policy formulation and implementation

on the valuation of uncertainty in welfare analysis thisarticle developsa general model of private and public choice under temporal uncertainty the model incorporatesthe effectsof ris k preferencesand the pros pect of future learning into both the individual and aggregate valuationsof public projects the analys isprovidesnew ins ightson individual valuation itsimplicationsfor benefit cos t analys isand the characterization of paretoefficiency under uncertainty it also resolves some of the confusion in the option value and quasioption value literature private and public decisions typically involve many sources of uncertainty including uncertainty about prices income technology environmental quality health etc temporal uncertainty is also common where some of the risk 1 getsresolved over time due to learning additionally private and public decisions often exhibit some form of irreversibility implying that current choicescan affect the ability of decision makers to be flexible and to adjust their future choices in response to forthcoming information when uncertainty and irreversibility are both present welfare analys isgainscomplexity and importance although considerable progress has been made since weisbrod s seminal article a better understanding of the roles of uncertainty and irreversibility in welfare analys improve our ability aseconomis ts to communicate the importance of risk in project evaluation to public decision makers

measuring welfare effects of product contamination with consumer uncertainty abstract a methodology is developed for measuring consumer welfare loss from market demand due to contamination when information is imperfect comparison of behavior before and after awareness permits calculation of the cost of ignorance which occurs when news of contamination is withheld or undiscovered for a time as well as when excessive reporting and exaggeration cause overreaction avoidance costs are also calculated for consumers who consume less than they would with perfect information due to risk aversion the methodology is applied to analyzing the heptachlor crisis which reduced milk consumption in hawaii by over 80

risk aversion and incentive effects new data without order effects holt and laury 2002 used a menu of ordered lottery choices to make inferences about risk aversion under various payment conditions the main results of that paper were a subjects are risk averse even for relatively small payments of less than 5 b risk aversion increases sharply with large increases in the scale of cash payoffs and c there is no significant effect from increasing the scale of hypothetical payment with a few exceptions noted in the paper all treatments began with a low payment choice followed by a choice with hypothetical payments that had been scaled up by 20 50 or 90 followed by a real cash decision with the same high payment scale 20 50 or 90 followed by a single final low 1 real payment choice those in the 90 treatment could earn amounts ranging from 9 00 to 346 50 in this task as glenn w harrison et al 2004 correctly note this design confounds order and treatment effects since the high real payment choice was always completed after the low real and high hypothetical payment tasks in a new experiment reported below we first seek to replicate harrison et al s finding that the order effect participating in a low payment choice before making a high payment choice magnifies the scale effect in a second treatment each subject completes the menu of lottery choices under just one payment condition 1 or 20 real or hypothetical thereby eliminating any order effects i new data

does self help group participation lead to asset creation summary we evaluate the effect of self help group participation on a long term impact parameter namely asset creation indian self help groups shgs are unique in that they are mainly ngo formed microfinance groups but later funded by commercial banks the results reveal that longer membership in shgs positively impacts asset creation robust to various asset specifications with longer participation in shgs members move away from pure agriculture as an income source toward other sources such as livestock income training by ngos positively impacts asset creation but the type of shg linkage per se has no effect

unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market gastroenterology with and without a centralized match the entry level market for american gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996 before and since it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment we find that both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used gastroenterologists are less mobile and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were internal medicine residents than when the clearinghouse was in use this suggests that the clearinghouse not only coordinates the timing of appointments but also increases the scope of the market compared to a decentralized market with early appointments

is the income elasticity of environmental improvements less than one we estimated the income elasticity of environmental improvements for a number of european data sets the value of this parameter is consistently found to be less than one with few exceptions our findings are compared with state of the art contingent valuation studies from other countries we also compared our findings with those reported in the literature on charitable donations and corporate donations these studies show a similar pattern donations decrease as a percentage of income as income increases

the sound of silence observational learning in the u s kidney market mere observation of others choices can be informative about product quality this paper develops an individual level dynamic model of observational learning and applies it to a novel data set from the u s kidney market where transplant candidates on a waiting list sequentially decide whether to accept a kidney offer we find strong evidence of observational learning patients draw negative quality inferences from earlier refusals in the queue thus becoming more inclined towards refusal themselves this self reinforcing chain of inferences leads to poor kidney utilization despite the continual shortage in kidney supply counterfactual policy simulations show that patients would have made more efficient use of kidneys had the concerns behind earlier refusals been shared this study yields a set of marketing implications in particular we show that observational learning and information sharing shape consumer choices in markedly different ways optimal marketing strategies should take into account how consumers learn from others

tiers in one sided matching markets theory and experimental investigation the design of a matching market may affect behavior in prematch stages in some settings forward looking agents might purchase low priced properties with the intention of trading up from a design standpoint such behavior is undesirable we investigate a tiered structure as a potential solution using a model that endogenizes prematch acquisition decisions we show that tiers promote exchange while protecting the primary market in the laboratory we find that both firm revenue and total social surplus are improved by tiered matching and the amount of improvement depends on the exchange mechanism the firm uses we focus on two popular mechanisms deposit first and request first we find that subjects are less likely to take advantage of the match under tier free deposit first mechanism possibly because of risk aversion thus a tiered approach is more critical under the request first mechanism we confirm that risk aversion partly explains deviations from theory this paper was accepted by uri gneezy

quality adjusted price indexes and the willig condition abstract this paper provides a graphical explanation of willig s condition for developing consistent price indexes for quality change the framework also describes how the single crossing condition generalizes the willig condition

weak complementarity path independence and the intuition of the willig condition abstract weak complementarity is usually invoked for valuing public goods using information on private goods however using uncompensated demands requires a second condition the willig condition this paper present an intuitive explanation of the willig condition and shows that the alternative versions are equivalent to a path independence condition for line integrals this condition is fulfilled for compensated demands but not uncompensated demands except in restrictive special cases it is shown that this is a type of quasi homotheticity and requires that the income flexibility of quality must equal the income elasticity of the weak complement the importance and restrictiveness of the willig condition are shown using three alternative functional forms

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

evaluating policy interventions with general equilibrium externalities abstract we report on the results of analytical and numerical models that describe the effects of non separable externalities or public goods on public policies with important general equilibrium consequences in the numerical exercise we calibrate a general equilibrium model with non separable air quality benefits in order to measure the excess burden and total net benefits of transportation and energy taxes in the 1995 u s economy the change in the physical level and the economic value in air quality associated with a given policy is a function of the substitution patterns between air quality and market goods that we assume the size of the deadweight loss due to pre existing distortions such as a tax on labor income is substantially affected by these substitution patterns

framing inclusive innovation within the discourse of development insights from case studies in india abstract the concept of inclusive innovation for development has become increasingly prominent in both academic and policy discourses raising important questions as to how this is being framed results from case studies conducted in india suggest inclusive innovation to be interpretively flexible and contested one case presents a grassroots framing emphasising social and political empowerment rooted in community self sufficiency autonomy and traditional belief systems in contrast the other cases co opt the language of inclusion to present a predominantly market based framing heavily emphasising market readiness and participation this framing is transforming rural social practices including the organisation of space and time the meaning of production and the role of women introducing the potential for market dependency

the welfare cost of uncertainty in policy outcomes this paper proposes a simple index of the welfare significance of uncertainty in the public goods resulting as policy outcomes our measure is the ex ante compensation an individual would require to accept an uncertain level of service compared to receiving the expected value of the distribution of possible values for that service our compensation measure is a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion the variance in the measure of environmental service associated with policy and relevant for the individual and a set of conventional parameters that describe the properties of nonmarket benefit measures under conditions of certainty we would expect that the inverse virtual price elasticity of the for the environmental service and the square of the coefficient of relative variation are the primary factors influencing the size of our compensation index this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

electronic tickets smart cards and online prepayments when and how to advance sell advance selling occurs when sellers allow buyers to purchase at a time preceding consumption shugan and xie 2000 electronic tickets smart cards online prepayments and other technological advances make advance selling possible for many if not all service providers these technologies lower the cost of making complex transactions at a greater distance from the seller s site they also give sellers more control over advance selling by decreasing arbitrage as technology enhances the capability to advance sell more academic attention is vital this paper strives to exploit these technologies by developing advance selling strategies until recently advance selling research focused on the airline industry and specific characteristics of that industry these characteristics included the price insensitivity of late arrivals e g business travelers compared with early arrivals e g leisure travelers demand uncertainty across flights on the same day and capacity constraints recent findings by shugan and xie 2000 show that advance selling is a far more general marketing tool than previously thought it does not require these industry specific characteristics it only requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuations moreover sellers without the ability to price discriminate can use advance selling to improve profits to the level of first degree price discrimination this finding is important because buyers are nearly always uncertain about their future valuations for most services e g the utility of next year s vacation or a future college education in this paper we take the next step from shugan and xie 2000 we show that advance selling profits do not come from buyer surplus but from more buyers being able to purchase we determine when and how to advance sell in a variety of situations including situations with limited capacity second period arrivals refunds buyer risk aversion exogenous credibility continuous preference distributions and premium pricing we determine when advance selling improves profits and when it does how to set advance prices we ask and answer seven questions first when should sellers advance sell second how much can advance selling improve profits compared with only spot selling third what factors impact the profitability of advance selling and how fourth should advance prices be higher or lower or the same as spot prices fifth how do capacity constraints impact advance selling strategies sixth should sellers limit the number of advance sales finally what is the possible impact of buyer risk aversion first we provide precise conditions when sellers should advance sell for example without capacity constraints we show that sellers should advance sell when marginal costs are sufficiently low to make it profitable to sell to buyers with low valuations and sufficiently high to convince buyers that the spot price will be higher than the advance price second we find that advance selling can almost double the profits from optimal spot selling to early arrivals we also show that advance selling has no impact on consumer surplus in markets with homogenous consumers and no capacity constraints therefore advance selling can increase social welfare because seller profits increase third we find that two very important factors impacting the profitability of advance selling are seller credibility and marginal costs buyers only advance buy when they expect an advantage from advance buying over spot buying without capacity constraints sellers must credibly convince buyers that the advance price is at a discount to the spot price we show that this condition is met under different circumstances for example large marginal costs can create credibility because buyers believe that these costs will lead to high spot prices fourth we find although optimal advance prices can be at a discount to the spot price that sometimes a premium is optimal premiums are optimal when capacity is large but limited and marginal costs are not too large buyers advance purchase at a premium to spot prices when capacity is limited and spot prices are low note that this is not a risk premium and risk aversion is not required no prior research has suggested this strategy because that research relies on the assumption that early arrivals are more price sensitive than later ones without that assumption premium advance pricing is sometimes optimal fifth we find that binding capacity constraints can impact the profitability of advance selling in opposite ways on one hand capacity constraints create seller credibility buyers believe that spot prices will be high when they know spot capacity is limited and perhaps more limited by advance sales on the other hand when capacity is limited the need to increase sales from discounted advance prices diminishes sixth consistent with desiraju and shugan 1999 we find that limiting advance sales can be profitable but only under restrictive conditions these conditions are 1 selling to all early arrivals would leave insufficient capacity in the spot period to sell to all second period arrivals with high valuations 2 the optimal spot price is high and 3 marginal costs are sufficiently small to make advance selling profitable finally we find that buyer risk aversion can sometimes increase the profitability of advance selling our findings provide precise guidelines for a large number of service providers that will have the technical capability to advance sell for those service providers advance selling provides a creative pricing strategy that can potentially provide substantial improvements in profits

gender differences in revealed risk taking evidence from mutual fund investors abstract using data from a national survey of nearly 2000 mutual fund investors we investigate whether investor gender is related to risk taking as revealed in mutual fund investment decisions consonant with the received literature we find that women exhibit less risk taking than men in their most recent largest and riskiest mutual fund investment decisions more importantly we find that the impact of gender on risk taking is significantly weakened when investor knowledge of financial markets and investments is controlled in the regression equation this result suggests that the greater level of risk aversion among women that is frequently documented in the literature can be substantially but not completely explained by knowledge disparities

water quality violations and avoidance behavior evidence from bottled water consumption we examine the impact of poor water quality on avoidance behavior by estimating the change in bottled water purchases in response to drinking water violations using data from a national grocery chain matched with water quality violations we find an increase in bottled water sales of 22 percent from violations due to microorganisms and 17 percent from violations due to elements and chemicals back of the envelope calculations yield costs of avoidance behavior at roughly 60 million for all nationwide violations in 2005 which likely reflects a significant understatement of the total willingness to pay to eliminate violations

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

social loss aversion and optimal contest design when managers are designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople service employees franchisees or product development teams a key question is what should the optimal proportion of winne