assessing income population and technology impacts on co2 emissions in canada where s the ekc abstract this study investigates the macroeconomic forces underlying carbon dioxide co2 emissions from fossil fuel use in canada in keeping with the relevant literature on environmental degradation three forces are expected to influence co2 emissions gross domestic product per capita gdp capita population and technological change while previous work has employed reduced form models that allow for non linear relationships between co2 and gdp capita it has been common practice to assume linear relationships between co2 and the latter two variables this study tests a more flexible model using a five region panel data set in canada over the period 1970 2000 findings indicate that gdp capita is unrelated to co2 that an inverted u shaped relationship exists with population and that a u shaped relationship exists with technology thus technological and population changes are supported over the commonly hypothesized environmental kuznets curve an inverted u shaped relationship between gdp capita and environmental degradation for affecting co2 emissions from fossil fuel use in canada

is trade good or bad for the environment sorting out the causality we seek to contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment by asking what is the effect of trade on a country s environment for a given level of gdp we take specific account of the endogeneity of trade using exogenous geographic determinants of trade as instrumental variables we find that trade tends to reduce three measures of air pollution statistical significance is high for concentrations of so2 moderate for no2 and lacking for particulate matter although results for other environmental measures are not as encouraging there is little evidence that trade has a detrimental effect on the environment

migration and intergroup conflict abstract two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two stage game assuming equal within group sharing and endogenous group sizes it is shown how agents leave groups with high productive efficiency and migrate to groups with high appropriative and defensive capabilities

production and conflict models versus rent seeking models a production and conflict p c model and a rent seeking rs model are compared for one group two groups and k groups adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the p c model but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the rs model the total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within group and between group decisiveness productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role the collective action problem is more severe for the rs model as group size increases the ratio of within group to between group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the p c model while it increases convexly for the rs model adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in rs groups than in p c groups while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result the severe between group fighting in the p c model for many groups causes the p c model to be preferable for few groups while the rs model is preferable for many groups applications are considered to intergroup migration inside versus outside ownership divestitures mergers and acquisitions multidivisional versus single tier firms and u form versus m form of economic organization

environment and development is there a kuznets curve for co2 emissions this article re examines the relationship between growth in per capita income and environmental degradation using econometric techniques appropriate for smooth transition regressions with panel data this is a more intuitive and flexible methodology than the polynomial models widely used in the literature and it can reconcile some of the mixed results found previously the methodology is applied to carbon dioxide emissions from nonoecd countries over the period 1971 to 1997 although there is no evidence of environmental kuznets curve we find two regimes namely a low income regime where emissions accelerate with economic growth and a middle to high income regime associated with a deceleration in environmental degradation

natural resources and internal conflict we present a model of conflict in which each group decides to claim the country s income and invest in arms or to accept a group neutral allocation of income and not invest in arms apart from the usual cooperative or conflictual societies their strategic choice can result in hierarchically stratified societies in which one group is dominant we show how the presence and exploitation of certain types of resources matters for the occurrence of conflict or social hierarchical stratification and for the possible effects of trust manipulation in particular we find that first robust encompassing point and lootable resource rich economies tend to be conflictual plantation economies hierarchically stratified and diversified economies cooperative second foreign intervention aimed at changing the balance of power in the case of conflict is most effective in robust and diffuse resource rich economies third trust manipulation as a means to counter conflict is most effective in subsistence and diffuse resource rich economies throughout the article we cite ample case study and econometric evidence to support our model

misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining pure exchange and public good economies in order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economics when the agents are not informed about their opponents payoffs we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation in pure exchange public good economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption the set of allocations obtained at the linear strategies nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained walrasian lindahl allocations with respect to the agents true utilities without this assumption the result holds for two agent pure exchange economies and under alternative assumptions for public good economies c 2002 elsevier science usa

are incentives against economic justice abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains but is not restricted to quasi linear preferences we analyze the manipulability of the generalized money rawlsian fair gmrf solutions i we show that the nash and strong nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each gmrf solution coincide with the no envy solution in equilibrium efficiency is preserved according to agents true preferences ii a corollary is that the gmrf solutions naturally implement the no envy solution in nash and strong nash equilibria

vulnerable trade the dark side of an edgeworth box abstract we examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an edgeworth box economy appropriation possibilities generate equilibrium of coerced redistribution and voluntary trade in a reduced box potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price wedge wherein the effective relative price is lowered for the exporter and raised for the importer as the vulnerability of one or both goods increases the price wedge widens causing trade to diminish if vulnerability becomes sufficiently high then equilibrium with trade ceases to exist in the edgeworth box economy

the impact of economic growth on co2 emissions in azerbaijan abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the economic growth and co2 emissions in azerbaijan a cointegration analysis is conducted over the period 1992 2013 for getting more robust results johansen ardlbt dols fmols and ccr methods are employed to explore cointegration and estimate long run coefficients we use cubic quadratic and linear specifications and conclude that the last one is an adequate representation for the impact of the economic growth on co2 emissions in azerbaijan the results from the different cointegration methods are consistent with each other and show that the economic growth has a positive and statistically significant impact on the emissions in the long run implying that the ekc hypothesis does not hold for azerbaijan the income elasticity of co2 emissions using different methods is found to be between 0 7 and 0 8 moreover we find that any short run imbalance can be adjusted towards the long run equilibrium path within less than one year the paper concludes that measures to increase energy efficiency carbon pricing instruments in production and international domestic trade activities and nationwide social awareness programs to instruct about the negative consequences of pollution can be considered as relevant environmental policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions

a dynamic model of conflict and appropriation abstract this paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by hirshleifer 1991 1995 and skaperdas 1992 to an infinite horizon differential game our aim is to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among a smaller group of agents in an intertemporal context the model yields the conclusion that there exists a unique linear nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategy even when strategies are defined over the entire state space we demonstrate that partial cooperation can be seen as a long run response to conflict moreover a decrease in the effectiveness of appropriation the depreciation rate of a common pool stock the rate of time preferences or an increase in the degree of noise improves the degree of partial cooperation and thus welfare in an anarchic society

the income environment relationship evidence from a binary response model abstract the empirical environmental kuznets curve ekc literature is vast but far from conclusive many authors have analysed the existence of an ekc for various pollutants others have used the ekc framework to identify country characteristics that help to explain the income environment relationship in this framework environmental degradation is analysed using a second or third order polynomial in income and a limited number of control variables some authors question whether this standard framework is appropriate this paper proposes an alternative to study the specific characteristics of countries that have experienced economic growth and an improving environment at the same time we estimate a binary response model and find an ekc like relation between the probability that a country s environment improves with economic growth and per capita gdp our evidence further suggests that the level of environmental damage is an important explanatory variable we also confirm the importance of an open political system these results indicate that the binary response model could be a valuable alternative to test which country specific characteristics are associated with a negative ier

insecure property and technological backwardness we consider the incentive to adopt superior technologies when private property is insecure the welfare costs of insecure property can be substantially greater than those commonly associated with diversion and with the disincentive effect induced by imperfect appropriation of returns when private property is sufficiently insecure anticipation of conflict over economic distribution gives rise to technological backwardness even though 1 superior technologies are readily available at zero cost and 2 the ex post diversion of resources might be small

endogenous destruction in conflict theory and extensions this article develops a general equilibrium model of conflict to characterize the implications of endogenous destruction for bargaining and fighting specifically we consider the scenario where two contending parties engage in bargaining to avoid fighting when there are direct costs e g arms buildups and indirect costs e g destruction to consumable resources of conflict without imposing specific functional form restrictions on conflict production and destruction technologies we show their interactions in determining an optimal decision between fighting and bargaining we find that under the shadow of conflict bargaining is costly as the contending parties always allocate more resources to arming for guarding settlement through bargaining than in the event of fighting in contrast to conventional thinking that bargaining is pareto superior over fighting we show conditions under which fighting dominates bargaining as the nash equilibrium choice the positive analysis may help explain the general causes of fighting without resorting to the assumption of incomplete information or misperceptions jel d74 h56 c7

deterrence in contests this paper explores the role of deterrence in contests as a general rule we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents it is necessary that the contest be destructive we show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist a corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions agents should always be expected to engage in contests applied to international relations our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts

external threat and collective action i introduction individuals with common interests usually attempt to further their welfare by acting collectively examples of collective action include the provision of a public good or collective good the establishment of clubs and the formation of alliances or political parties in his seminal work the logic of collective action olson 1965 uses the provision of collective goods as an example to discuss collective action problem or coordination failure in particular he analyzes how group size and the distribution of individual benefits of a collective good may affect the provision level of the good two of the most celebrated propositions from his book are the suboptimality proposition the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good p 35 and the exploitation proposition there is a systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small p 29 these propositions have generated a broad research effort in collective action problems in economics and political science many scholars have examined the validity of these propositions 1 a limitation of olson s theory is that he analyzed collective action problems as phenomena within a single group while assuming that external threat to a group either does not exist or is treated as a constant in many cases however two or more groups compete against each other in these situations a group s provision of collective goods might be affected by the configurations of its own group and the competing groups and relative strength of the groups to illustrate assume that two alliances of states say a and b are competing for supremacy an increase in a s military spending poses a greater threat to b s security in response to the heightened threat members of b might feel the need to increase their military spending which in turn could affect the military spending decisions of members of a bruce 1990 develops a model that endogenizes external threat in a three country model with two allies and one adversary interest group lobbying is another example to understand a group s lobbying behavior scholars often focus on the number and size of firms within the group and their geographical distribution however the configuration of a competing interest group and the two groups relative strengths should also figure into an individual firm s decision concerning the appropriate contribution to its group s lobbying efforts other examples include party discipline voter turnout ledyard 1981 1984 palfrey and rosenthal 1983 electoral coalitional politics tsebelis 1990 hausken 1995a b negative campaigning in primary elections newman and niou 2000 factional rivalry in civil wars and joint ventures for research and development in industrial organizations all these examples point to the importance of external threat in explaining the logic of collective action in this article to study simultaneously the way intergroup competition and intragroup collective action interact we develop a collective good model that endogenizes external threat in the context of competition between two groups a group can be either defensive or offensive in nature we define a group as defensive if its fighting capacity can be used only to defend its own resources a group is offensive if its fighting capacity can be used to expropriate resources from its rivals as well as protect its own resources we realize that empirically it is difficult to determine whether a group is offensive or defensive but theoretically it is useful to know how the offensive or defensive nature of a group can affect the collective action problem we analyze collective action problems when 1 one of the groups is offensive whereas the other is defensive and 2 both groups are offensive respectively also in group competition if conquests are economically profitable the way spoils of victory are divided among group members can also affect collective action

maximal manipulation of envy free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non quasi linear preferences the purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy free solutions we show that under a certain domain richness condition each individual obtains the welfare level of his optimal envy free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions this maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy free solution if an envy free solution satisfies a mild condition the set of nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy free allocations

the impact of economic development and social political factors on ecological footprint a panel data analysis for 15 mena countries abstract this paper extends the work of al mulali and ozturk 2015 1 by re investigating the environment kuznets curve ekc hypothesis for 15 mena middle east and north african countries using the ecological footprint ef as a proxy of environmental degradation over the period 1975 2007 unlike the existing studies we augment the basic ekc relationship by considering life expectancy at birth fertility rate and political institutional index variables as new possible determinants of environmental degradation the estimation of this relationship has been conducted for all mena 15 countries for oil exporting and non oil exporting countries sub samples the results show that energy use worsens ecological footprint whereas real gdp per capita exhibits an inverted u shaped relationship with ef in oil exporting countries and in the sample as a whole i e the ekc hypothesis is validated for the non oil exporting countries the relationship between ef and economic growth is u shaped moreover our findings show that socio demographic variables such as urbanization life expectancy at birth and fertility rate improve the environment in the long term we also found that the improvement of political institutions in those countries has not been accompanied by a reduction of environmental stress the granger causality results support evidence of the existence of an error correction mechanism between the ef real gdp energy use and the fertility rate specifically in the short term we found strong evidence for bidirectional causality among the ecological real gdp and energy use variables

achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers abstract two agents bargain over the allocation of a bundle of divisible commodities after strategically reporting utility functions to a neutral arbitrator the outcome is decided by using a bargaining solution concept chosen from a family that includes the nash and the raiffa kalai smorodinsky solutions when reports are restricted to be continuous strictly increasing and concave it has been shown that this kind of distortion game leads to inefficient outcomes we study the distortion game originated when agents are also allowed to claim non concave utility functions contrasting with the previous literature any interior equilibrium outcome is efficient and any efficient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of the distortion game in a similar fashion to the nash demand game we consider some uncertainty about the opponent s features to virtually implement the nash bargaining solution

scarcity growth and r d abstract the limits to economic growth due to resource scarcity can be alleviated only by the development of backstop substitutes this paper combines resource based economic growth with r d to reduce the cost of backstop technologies characterizing the entire dynamics of optimal growth and r d processes we find that an economy s growth prospects depend on its type as determined by its production technology and learning ability and by its knowledge capital endowment a wide variety of growth patterns emerges ranging from cases in which an economy that without r d eventually stagnates converges to a steady state is diverted by r d onto a path of sustained growth to cases in which r d is not warranted resource scarcity is shown to encourage r d due to the increased reliance on the backstop technology

manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism abstract given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities consider the n person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution any constrained equal income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d71

on the social efficiency of conflict abstract in sharp contrast with the economic literature on conflict this paper shows that confrontation may be efficiency enhancing conditions are derived under which a contest over the exclusive control of a resource pareto dominates peaceful access

output emissions and technology some thoughts abstract the principal goal of this article is to identify the implications of a binding emission constraint on a firm s optimal capital labor ratio and to determine whether it is appropriate to write a firm s production function as an increasing function of its emissions alone i find that even though a firm s supply curve may be written as a positive function of its emissions it is not appropriate to write the production technology as an increasing function of only its emissions except under special circumstances

are there limits to growth a simple theoretical model of pollution is developed that generates an inverted u shape relationship between per capita income and environmental quality this model is then used to study long run growth the same inverted u shape is shown to appear in time series and the prospects for sustained growth are shown to hinge on whether increasingly strict environmental regulation is compatible with a constant rate of return on capital implementation is also studied tax and voucher schemes are shown to have an advantage over direct regulation because they provide the correct incentives for capital accumulation copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

are there increasing returns to pollution abatement empirical analytics of the environmental kuznets curve in pesticides abstract according to the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis economic growth and the reduction of environmental degradation are compatible goals an inverted u shaped relationship between economic performance and environmental pollution suggests that empirically an economy is associated with smaller levels of pollution after some threshold income point one potential explanation for the empirical evidence of an ekc is increasing returns to pollution abatement where the abatement efficiency rises with an increase in the scale of abatement doubling the clean up efforts more than doubles the abatement of pollution as this efficiency gain makes abatement less expensive pollution might fall as more abatement is undertaken this study tests the hypothesis that there are increasing returns to abating pollution empirical evidence on environmental risks in the us agricultural sector since 1970 support the existence of increasing returns in addition i estimate the productivity of pollution abatement using refined empirical productivity measurement methods and explicitly control the level of technology the results show the importance of including an environmental productivity variable in the ekc framework

let them cheat abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a bundle of infinitely divisible goods among a group of agents with classical preferences we propose to measure an agent s sacrifice at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption as a solution we select the allocations at which sacrifices are equal across agents and this common sacrifice is minimal we then turn to the manipulability of this solution in the tradition of hurwicz 1972 we identify under some mild assumptions on preferences the equilibrium allocations of the manipulation game associated with this solution when all commodities are normal for each preference profile each equal division constrained walrasian allocation is an equilibrium allocation conversely each equilibrium allocation is equal division constrained walrasian furthermore we show that if normality of goods is dropped then equilibrium allocations may not be equal division constrained walrasian

characterizing nonlinearities in business cycles using smooth transition autoregressive models during the past few years investigators have found evidence indicating that various time series representing business cycles such as production and unemployment may be nonlinear in this paper it is assumed that if the time series is nonlinear then it can be adequately described by a smooth transition autoregressive star model the paper describes the application of these models to quarterly logarithmic production indices for 13 countries and europe tests reject linearity for most of these series and estimated star models indicate that the nonlinearity is needed mainly to describe the responses of production to large negative shocks such as oil price shocks

technical progress structural change and the environmental kuznets curve abstract the paper shows that under reasonable assumptions about technical progress a positive sustainable growth rate fails to exist the argument is that a growing part of income has to be spent for continuing technical progress in order to compensate the pollution effects of growth hence in the long run either the sustainability condition will be violated or the growth rate must decline to zero furthermore in finite time the level of wealth will decrease despite growing income and a constant pollution level thus further growth is no longer reasonable similar arguments also hold for the environmental effects of structural change favoring less pollution intensive economic activities an evolutionary change of goods and production technology may shift the limits of growth and is hence a prerequisite for a long run ekc

smooth transition pollution income paths abstract we explore the idea of regime switching as a new methodological approach in the analysis of the emission income relationship the basic idea is that when some threshold is passed the economy could move smoothly to another regime with the emission income relationship being different between the old and the new regime the methodology is applied to a panel dataset of us state level sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions sulfur dioxide emissions are found to smoothly peak at a relatively late stage of economic development and then smoothly decrease at high levels of income however for the nitrogen oxide emissions environmental pressure tends to rise with economic growth then slows down but does not decline with further growth

prosperity without conflict abstract social conflict and slow growth are features of many developing economies this paper considers the role institutions of property rights and conflict management can play in both achieving prosperity and mitigating conflict in these economies we study how introducing conflict over economic distribution into an otherwise standard model of growth can shape optimal second best taxation policy when diversionary activities cannot be taxed in this context we find that the maximization of economic efficiency may call for a reduction in growth in order to mitigate the problem of diversion even though the economy s growth is inefficiently slow in the absence of taxation this is so when institutional quality is sufficiently poor but not otherwise the paper warns against the conventional justification of growth promoting policies on efficiency grounds independently of institutions

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

subgame perfect implementation of bargaining solutions abstract this paper provides simple four stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two person bargaining solutions in subgame perfect equilibrium the solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent s utility function so that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement outcome is 0 this class of solutions includes the nash kalai smorodinsky and relative utilitarian solutions the game forms have a structure of alternating offers and contain no integer device

sustainable growth and the environmental kuznets curve abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with pollution and both human and physical capital human capital is produced cleanly and physical capital can be used for pollution control economic growth is sustainable in the long run it is optimal for human capital to grow more rapidly than physical capital output and consumption while pollution declines for realistic parameter values our results differ sharply from stokey s result for an ak technology that sustained economic growth is not optimal the model can generate an environmental kuznets curve a pollution tax or a voucher system can implement the pareto efficiency solution

effective property rights conflict and growth abstract this paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare this interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights a symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor these results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights furthermore if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare improving

let s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad this paper shows that a minimal degree of consideration for other people s well being enables society to agree that one social policy is the best i offer axioms that imply that this best policy maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities the weight of each individual is the inverse of his or her maximal possible utility from social endowments the suggested policy is not sensitive to the choice of the von neumann morgenstern utilities the key axiom is that individuals agree that giving all the endowments always to one person is as bad as giving them to any other person

models as usual for unusual risks on the value of catastrophic climate change we study the role of alternative intertemporal preference representations in a model of economic growth stock pollutant and endogenous risk of catastrophic collapse we contrast the traditional discounted utility model which assumes risk neutrality with respect to intertemporal utility with a multiplicative choice model that displays risk aversion in that dimension first we show that both representations of preferences can rationalize the same business as usual economy for a given interest rate and no pollution externality second once we introduce a collapse risk whose hazard rate is a function of the pollution stock multiplicative preferences recommend a much more stringent policy response an illustration in the context of climate change indicates that switching to the multiplicative preference representation has a similar effect in terms of policy recommendations as scaling up the schedule of the hazard rate by a factor of 100

the effect of decision weights in bargaining problems abstract bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory under rank dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker the same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion the main finding is that these two forms can have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that exhibit a weak monotonicity property in particular in a large class of bargaining problems both increased utility risk aversion and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent are advantagous for a player this is demonstrated for the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution the nash bargaining solution does not behave regularly in this respect

economies of scope and scale in green advocacy environmental advocacy is a large and growing activity whilst a number of economists have analysed the advocacy process no systematic attempt has been made to understand the factors influencing the organisation of the sector we explore the relationship between economies of scale and scope in advocacy under the most popular specification of a tullock type contest economies of scope arise when and only when the scale of that activity is sufficiently large the incentives for merger are socially efficient implying no need for policy intervention

sanctions and civil conflict using a formal general equilibrium framework this paper analyses how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict it is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries moreover sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance the likelihood of success rises as this income increases

intra industry trade in intermediate products pollution and internationally increasing returns this paper examines the relationship between intra industry trade in intermediate products pollution and increasing returns we develop a two country model in which production occurs in two stages final and intermediate good production intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition and final good production exhibits increasing returns with respect to the number of varieties of intermediates pollution occurs in the production of the final good when polluting intermediates are used we analyze the effects of international trade in intermediate products on pollution output and welfare under an endogenous tax scenario and with two types of pollution functions the results show that because of increasing returns international trade either leads to lower total pollution in each country or lower pollution per unit of output in at least one country in addition intra industry trade causes countries to import the environmental quality of their trading partners

a tradable permit system in an intertemporal economy it is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates i e rewards for holding permits to find the rates however we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices which is difficult to obtain this study intends to solve this problem in two ways first we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule for example if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate as is the case for global warming if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions as a second approach we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits however we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium

a tale of two elasticities a general theoretical framework for the environmental kuznets curve analysis abstract we show that a variety of seemingly diverse concepts used to theoretically explaining the ekc have a common origin in two key preference and production elasticities we also prove that they jointly correspond to a unique underlying preference technology theoretical framework

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

the environmental kuznets curve does one size fit all abstract this paper uses a new panel data set on state level sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from 1929 1994 to test the appropriateness of the one size fits all reduced form regression approach commonly used in the environmental kuznets curve literature empirical results provide initial evidence that an inverted u shape characterizes the relationship between per capita emissions and per capita incomes at the state level parameter estimates suggest however that previous studies which restrict cross sections to undergo identical experiences over time may be presenting statistically biased results

an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment this article analyzes the potential conflict between economic growth and the maintenance of environmental quality in an overlapping generations model short lived individuals make decisions which have long lasting effects on both factor productivity and the environment the model provides a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and income whereby economic growth is associated first with declines then improvements in environmental quality it suggests circumstances in which multiple pareto ranked steady state equilibria may arise and in which sustained growth of both capital and environmental quality may occur overmaintenance of the environment analogous to dynamically inefficient overaccumulation of capital may emerge copyright 1994 by royal economic society

land inequality and conflict intensity this paper investigates the impact of land inequality on conflict intensity a fundamental distinction with the existing literature lies in the nature of inequality under consideration we investigate how land inequality across landlords only influences the intensity of the fight against a rebel group comprised of landless individuals we show that conflict intensity is non monotonic in land inequality in particular the most severe conflicts occur for intermediate land inequality levels moreover a pareto improving and thus voluntary transfer of land from the smaller to the larger landlord may exist

the manipulability of resource allocation mechanisms the vulnerability to manipulate behaviour of resource allocation mechanisms is evaluated by determining the nash equilibria of associated manipulation games under manipulation all monotonic correspondences are essentially equivalent to the walrasian correspondence for most non monotonic correspondences of interest the initial position appears at equilibrium to be efficient

status concern and the exploitation of common pool renewable resources we examine the impact of social status concern in a common pool renewable resource oligopoly a small number of players share access to a common pool resource and sell their production in a common market where they are oligopolists we depart from the mainstream literature on common pool resource oligopolies by considering that each player cares about her social status we allow for two channels to impact a player s welfare harvest and profits under the first channel a player has a bump in her utility when her harvest is larger than the average harvest of the rest of the players in this case we show that the presence of this channel exacerbates the tragedy of the commons under the second channel a player enjoys a bump in her utility if she manages to earn more profits than the average profits of the other players in this case we show that social status concern may temporarily alleviate the tragedy of the commons it results in a decrease of extraction over an interval of stock sizes

mutual raiding of production and the emergence of exchange joint exchange and raiding can emerge in a world of mutual raiding when the appropriated production is less valuable to the appropriator than to the defender and the defense is not too inferior to attack the amounts of resources allocated to production and raiding and the amounts of goods exchanged reciprocally are determined endogenously the model reduces to pure exchange and pure raiding as special cases pure exchange emerges when the usability of appropriation is sufficiently low pure raiding emerges if the defense is sufficiently inferior to attack the results of the model are intermediate between the results of the two extreme cases jel c6 c72 d51 d72 d74 f10 i introduction in the american civil war each side to some extent looted the other still some true reciprocal exchange between the two sides was conducted by blockade runners whereby the south exported cotton and imported manufactured goods varying across time space pure market exchange may be supplemented by or grow out of such activities as war piracy 1 corruption 2 extortion 3 crime 4 plundering or theft referred to as raiding or mutual raiding generally agents individuals groups companies nations can meet their consumption needs by exchange of goods in accordance with comparative advantage or else by attempts at confiscating the other s production resources goods or trade flows each route has been the subject of separate study this article develops a model in which the equilibrium balance between the two ways of acquiring desired goods is determined by the values of various parameters governing the productive and conflictual processes involved how can exchange conducted voluntarily and with mutual advantage emerge in a world where appropriation and defense through mutual raiding appear to be more natural means of survival 5 classical economics describes how agents exchange goods reciprocally voluntarily and nonviolently 6 political economy describes how agents appropriate and defend one productive resource without reciprocal exchange 7 a few authors attempt to integrate production exchange and appropriation 8 this article lets two agents exchange goods reciprocally and raid each other s production mutually hausken 2003 33 36 classifies the 78 possible models in the exhaustive spirit of rapoport and guyer 1966 for how one or several of the five objects production resources consumption goods exports and imports can be set under attack as is also the case for rider 1999 anderton et al 1999 and anderton 1999 this article utilizes ratio forms of the contest success function 9 reduction to a pure exchange model presented in section ii or a pure raiding model occurs by adjusting parameters also assuming raiding of production rider 1999 claims that pure exchange is impossible 10 which is correct when the production is equally valuable to the appropriator and defender rider shows that in the absence of pure exchange it could turn out and in fact it inevitably turns out that the advantages of diversified consumption achieved by mutual raiding exceeds the wastage of fighting effort if his result were universal one would not observe pure exchange in the real world which in fact we do accordingly this article shows that rider s 1999 result is not inevitable even when accepting his assumption that each agent produces only one of the two desired goods we believe that the two characteristics value of appropriation and superiority of defense over attack 11 are realistic and help explain the empirics as well as reciprocal exchange in the real world 12 regarding the first characteristic grossman and kim 1995 1279 present the following argument which is contrary to most contest models which let appropriated objects be equally valuable to the appropriator and the defender we also allow for the possibility that predation is destructive by which we mean that in any appropriative interaction the predator gains less than the prey loses

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two player model of society where only armed self enforcement of property rights is possible the main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players the parameter space is partitioned into regions in which the respective types of equilibrium occur the equilibrium types involve positive arms expenditure by respectively neither player the richer player and both players the latter case involves a sub type in which the poorer player s entire endowment is expended on arms jel d30 d72 d74