the housing market impacts of shale gas development using data from pennsylvania and an array of empirical techniques to control for confounding factors we recover hedonic estimates of property value impacts from nearby shale gas development that vary with water source well productivity and visibility results indicate large negative impacts on nearby groundwater dependent homes while piped water dependent homes exhibit smaller positive impacts suggesting benefits from lease payments results have implications for the debate over regulation of shale gas development jel l71 q35 q53 r31 technological improvements in the extraction of oil and natural gas from unconventional sources have transformed communities and landscapes and brought debate and controversy in the policy arena shale gas plays underlying the populated northeastern united states were thought to be uneconomical less than ten years ago but now contribute a major share of us gas supply 1 natural gas has been hailed as a bridge to energy independence and a clean future because of its domestic sourcing and compared with coal and petroleum derivatives its smaller carbon footprint and reduced emissions of other pollutants e g particulates sulfur dioxide car

tax policy asset prices and growth a general equilibrium analysis abstract this paper presents a computable general equilibrium tax policy model that combines a consideration of disaggregate industry effects with an integrated treatment of short and long run adjustments to policy initiatives the model s explicit consideration of forward looking investment decisions and adjustment dynamics permits assessments of short run effects of tax policy on asset values as well as long term impacts on capital accumulation simulations reveal that effects on asset values and investment depend critically on whether policies are oriented toward new or old capital investment tax credits yield significant increases in investment without conferring windfall gains to corporate shareholders corporate tax cuts with the same revenue cost on the other hand yield large windfalls to shareholders while providing only a modest investment stimulus incidence and growth effects differ considerably across sectors particularly between business and housing

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

a new look at residential electricity demand using household expenditure data the recent push for a federal energy policy that could substantially change electricity prices in the u s highlights the need to obtain accurate residential electricity demand estimates many electricity demand estimates have been obtained based on the assumption that consumers optimize with respect to known marginal prices but increasing empirical evidence suggests that consumers are more likely to respond to average prices under this assumption this paper develops a new strategy based on gmm to estimate household electricity demand our approach allows a national level demand estimation from publicly available expenditure data and utility level consumption data complementing studies that use individual billing data which are richer yet often proprietary we estimate the price elasticity near 1 which is at the upper end in magnitude among the estimates from previous studies we apply our elasticity estimates in a u s climate policy simulation to determine how these elasticity estimates alter consumption and price outcomes compared to the more conservative elasticity estimates commonly used in policy analysis

residential consumption of gas and electricity in the u s the role of prices and income abstract we study the residential demand for electricity and gas working with nationwide household level data that cover recent years namely 1997 2007 our dataset is a mixed panel multi year cross sections of dwellings households in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the united states as of 2008 we estimate static and dynamic models of electricity and gas demand we find strong household response to energy prices both in the short and long term from the static models we get estimates of the own price elasticity of electricity demand in the 0 860 to 0 667 range while the own price elasticity of gas demand is 0 693 to 0 566 these results are robust to a variety of checks contrary to earlier literature metcalf and hassett 1999 reiss and white 2005 we find no evidence of significantly different elasticities across households with electric and gas heat the price elasticity of electricity demand declines with income but the magnitude of this effect is small these results are in sharp contrast to much of the literature on residential energy consumption in the united states and with the figures used in current government agency practice our results suggest that there might be greater potential for policies which affect energy price than may have been previously appreciated

erratum standards versus standards the effects of different pollution restrictions when economists refer to pollution standards they almost universally mean uniform restrictions on pollution emissions e g william j baumol and wallace e oates 1975 ch 13 susan rose ackerman 1973 david besanko 1978 however in practice standards take many forms not only emissions restrictions but restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input restrictions on the use of a polluting input or mandated use of a particular pollution control technology these specifications of regulations will have a variety of effects on a firm s resource allocation decisions for instance allowing pollution per unit of output as the standard instead of directly restricting the level of pollution gives the firm some choice in addition to reducing pollution it can increase its output to dilute the pollution this paper examines the effects of five different forms of pollution standards on input decisions the level of production and firm profits the results show that the different standards by providing firms with different incentives change the firm s allocation decisions and affect the relative profitability of the standards section i reviews the existing literature on the incentives of different instruments the following section describes the model to be used five different forms of pollution constraints are individually examined in section iii using a graphical approach their relative effects as well as some special cases are assessed in section iv finally section v raises the case of different standards when firms are not identical

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

the windy commons wind power generation is growing rapidly in the united states doubling nearly every three years since 1998 yet wind is an open access resource and past experiences with open access resources suggest that tragedies of the commons may occur while the engineering literature has focused on turbine siting within a wind farm to maximize profits and minimize interaction effects the economics literature has overlooked interaction effects between windfarms we provide a qualitative framework for measuring wake externalities and use simulation modeling to determine their magnitude we find that a turbine wake externalities and thus losses to downwind sites increase with the square of wind velocity and can be substantial b decentralized ownership across wind farms leads to overcapitalization in upwind sites and undercapitalization in downwind sites relative to sole ownership c when multiple potential patches are considered more land will be used upwind for wind power under decentralized ownership and d numerical simulations suggest that total rents are reduced under decentralized ownership by up to 12 while total power produced increases by approximately 10 under our central parameters decentralized ownership may be preferred to a sole owner depending on the value society places on clean power relative to dirty power

second opinions and price competition inefficiency in the market for expert advice we consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer s need in our model experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions we explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort in particular the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum an intervention that limits price competition via price control increases welfare

efficiency costs of meeting industry distributional constraints under environmental permits and taxes many pollution related industries wield strong political influence and can e ectively veto policy initiatives that would harm their profits a politically realistic approach to environmental policy therefore seems to require the alleviation of significant profitlosses to these industries the regulatory authority can do this by freely allocating some emissions permits or by exempting some inframarginal emissions from a pollution tax however such policies compel the government to forego an e cient potential revenue source and to rely more heavily on ordinary distortionary taxes as a result achieving distributional objectives comes at a cost in terms of e ciency using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models we analyze the e ciency costs implied by the distributional constraint that adverse impacts on profits in particular industries must be avoided both models indicate that the e ciency cost implied by this constraint dwarfs the other e ciency costs when the required amount of abatement is very small when the abatement requirement becomes more extensive however the cost of this constraint diminishes relative to the other e ciency costs of pollution control we also calculate the compensation ratio the share of potential policy revenue that the government must forego to protect the industries in question we show how this ratio is a ected by the extent of abatement supply and demand elasticities and the potential for end of pipe treatment one definition of this ratio corresponds to the share of pollution permits that must be freely allocated to prevent profit losses in the targeted industries numerical simulations of sulfur dioxide pollution control suggest that the bush administration s clear skies initiative would exceed this ratio freely allocating more permits than necessary to preserve profits our models also highlight significant di erences between gross and net policy revenues when abatement is extensive a large fraction of the revenue collected from emissions permits or taxes is o set by the revenue loss from erosion of the base of existing factor taxes

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

what drives taxi drivers a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods credence goods are characterized by informational a symmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by seller s this paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in athens g reece set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers p resumed information and income on the extent of fraud results reveal that taxi drivers c heat passengers in systematic ways passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system l eads to manipulated bills higher income seems to lead to more fraud

signaling corporate social responsibility third party certification versus brands corporate social responsibility csr is a credence attribute of products which can be signaled either through a label certified by a third party or via unsubstantiated claims used as part of a brand building strategy we use an experimental posted offer market with sellers and buyers to compare the impact of these signaling strategies on market efficiency only third party certification gives rise to a separating equilibrium and an increase in csr investments unsubstantiated claims can generate a halo effect on consumers whereby the latter are nudged into paying more for the same level of csr investments by firms

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

consumer information in a market for expert services abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of the valuation they place for getting a serious problem fixed we introduce consumer information into this framework by assuming that prior to visiting an expert some consumers receive an information signal about whether they have a serious or a minor problem we show that when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is sufficiently high the expert does not cheat any low valuation consumer regardless of their information status but cheats the high valuation consumers those high valuation consumers with bad signals are the most frequent victims of cheating whereas those with good signals are the least likely victims when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is below a certain threshold however the unique equilibrium involves no cheating

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

on the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets a client has a problem but does not know whether it is serious or minor she consults an expert who can correctly diagnose and fix her problem this paper characterizes the equilibrium pricing and recommendation strategies of an expert under the assumptions that i the type of treatment is verifiable by the client ii the client has the option of rejecting any treatment recommendation and iii the expert is not liable for the outcome of the treatment it is found for any parameter configuration that there exist equilibria in which the expert makes fraudulent recommendations resulting in inefficient treatment the market outcome is compared with that under an alternative market environment in which the expert is liable for treatment outcome but the type of treatment performed is non verifiable it is shown that for some parameter configurations the equilibrium is more efficient when liability is in place than when the treatment is verifiable these findings stand in sharp contrast to the received wisdom that the market outcome under verifiability of treatment is efficient while the market outcome under liability for outcome is not finally this paper shows that the existence of some honest experts may induce more fraudulent behavior by opportunistic experts

second best biofuel policies and the welfare effects of quantity mandates and subsidies abstract the quest for biorenewable energy sources is held to justify a number of government interventions including support policies for biofuels such as those responsible for the recent rapid growth of us ethanol production this article provides an analytical assessment of such policies we construct a general equilibrium open economy model that captures the rationale typically invoked to justify government intervention in this setting to alleviate the environmental impact of energy consumption and to decrease us energy dependence on foreign sources the model is used to study both the positive and normative implications of alternative policy instruments including the subsidies and mandates specified by the 2007 energy independence and security act from a positive perspective we find that biofuels mandates are equivalent to a combination of fuel taxes and biofuels subsidies that are revenue neutral from a welfare perspective we show that biofuels mandates dominate biofuels subsidies and that combining fuel taxes with mandates would be welfare enhancing

when do experts cheat and whom do they target a credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer this information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed i propose two new theories of expert cheating suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers according to these theories cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination and experts cheat selectively for instance experts target high valuation and high cost customers finally selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services

gender effects in the credence goods market an experimental study abstract in this paper we offer further explanation for differences in earnings across genders we investigate difference in preferences in payment systems for credence goods we find that women were no less likely to select variable rate payment schemes as compensation for providing credence goods than men however overall earnings remained higher for men than for women disaggregating behavior by type of payment and gender reveals that women who chose fee for service provided significantly fewer units of services paid for than men who chose fee for service this difference accounts for the lower overall earnings for women in our experiments

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

emissions reductions or green booms general equilibrium effects of a renewable portfolio standard renewable portfolio standards rps are commonly promoted as a policy tool to reduce emissions associated with fossil generation while also stimulating development of local renewable resource endowments we develop a general equilibrium model of an rps policy that captures key features such as a fixed factor renewable endowment substitution across sectors of the economy and endogenous price responses we analytically decompose the effects of an rps into a a substitution effect b an output tax effect and c an output effect we show that an increase in the rps can either deliver large resource booms or large emissions savings but not both our framework can translate different renewable resource endowments and pre existing standards across states into economic and environmental impacts to inform current renewable energy and climate policies

cost effectiveness of renewable electricity policies we analyze policies to promote renewable sources of electricity a portfolio standard rps raises electricity prices and primarily reduces gas fired generation a knee of the cost curve exists between 15 and 20 goals for 2020 in our central case and higher natural gas prices lower the cost of greater reliance on renewables a renewable energy production tax credit lowers electricity price at the expense of taxpayers which limits its effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions and it is less cost effective at increasing renewables than a portfolio standard neither policy is as cost effective as a cap and trade policy for achieving carbon emission reductions

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

are fair trade goods credence goods a new proposal with french illustrations in the literature fair trade ft goods are usually associated with other products differentiated by process attributes such as organic food genetically modified gm food or child labour free clothing all of these products are regarded as credence goods this classification refers to the simplified definition of credence goods which describes product attributes which consumers cannot evaluate even after having consumed the good focusing on the characteristics of ft goods this article proposes a reassessment of the link between ft goods and credence properties as defined by darby and karni we first demonstrate that 1 the usual classification masks important particularities of ft goods compared to other goods with process attributes and 2 the full definition of credence goods may even provide a better description of the quality of ft goods however and this is our second theoretical contribution the lack of consensus among experts concerning ft standards and their level of efficiency encourage us to consider ft goods as indeterminate goods as defined by lupton this result leads us to suggest a new typology of product attributes summarized in an innovative diagram it sheds light on how competition between the different ft approaches works and why the ft market is still confined to a niche if not threatened with collapse we mainly illustrate our theoretical analysis with observations relating to the french ft market and institutions

emissions taxes versus intensity standards second best environmental policies with incomplete regulation the best emissions tax or emissions cap may be an inferior instrument under incomplete regulation leakage without leakage an intensity standard regulating emissions per unit of output is inferior due to an implicit output subsidy this inefficiency can be eliminated by an additional consumption tax with leakage an intensity standard can dominate the optimal emissions tax since the implicit output subsidy prevents leakage the addition of a consumption tax improves an intensity standard s efficiency may prevent leakage and may be efficient comparing intensity standards to output based updating shows that the latter dominates if updating is sufficiently flexible

job satisfaction age and tenure a generalized dynamic random effects model abstract this paper examines the effects of age and tenure on job satisfaction we estimate a generalized dynamic random effects ordered probit model using the british household panel survey contrary to previous literature we find that age has no significant impact on job satisfaction for females and a limited impact for males who report higher levels of job satisfaction we also find that tenure shares a non monotonic relationship with job satisfaction for females for males the same result is found only at higher levels of job satisfaction our results suggest that age and tenure effects on job satisfaction vary with gender

the economic aftermath of resource booms evidence from boomtowns in the american west the current us oil and gas boom is injecting labour capital and revenue into communities near reserves will these communities be cursed with lower long run incomes in the wake of the boom we study the oil boom and bust cycle of the 1970s and 1980s to gain insights using annual data on drilling to identify western boom and bust counties we find substantial positive local employment and income effects during the boom in the aftermath of the bust however we find that incomes per capita decreased and unemployment compensation payments increased relative to what they would have been if the boom had not occurred

quality incentives for gps in a regulated market abstract this paper analyses whether gps in a capitation system have incentives to provide quality even though health is a credence good a model is developed where the quality of the service varies due to inherent differences between the gps and rational patients make choices based on the outcome of treamtent we find that it is difficult to provide appropriate incentives since the search activity of patients offsets direct effects of a change in reimbursement variation in the inherent ability of the gps is good since it increases the search activity of the patients and the optimal reimbursement scheme is inversely proportional to the dispersion in types finally we find that offering a menu of contracts can potentially increase social welfare above the level of a simple capitation regime but it tends to lead to a higher variation in quality levels

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training