performance contracting in after sales service supply chains performance based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital intensive industries such as aerospace and defense known as power by the hour in the private sector and as performance based logistics pbl in defense contracting it aims to replace traditionally used fixed price and cost plus contracts to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by tying a supplier s compensation to the output value of the product generated by the customer buyer to analyze implications of performance based relationships we introduce a multitask principal agent model to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts in our model the customer principal faces a product availability requirement for the uptime of the end product the customer then offers contracts contingent on availability to n suppliers agents of the key subsystems used in the product who in turn exert cost reduction efforts and set spare parts inventory investment levels we show that the first best solution can be achieved if channel members are risk neutral when channel members are risk averse we find that the second best contract combines a fixed payment a cost sharing incentive and a performance incentive furthermore we study how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle as uncertainty in support cost changes finally we illustrate the application of our model to a problem based on aircraft maintenance data and show how the allocation of performance requirements and contractual terms change under various environmental assumptions

food insecurity poverty and the malawian starter pack fresh start or false start abstract chronic food insecurity and chronic poverty are closely related in malawi since independence in 1964 national food security has been a key policy objective however until the 1990s less emphasis was placed on the household dimensions of food security and its links with chronic poverty in the last decade a number of initiatives have been used in malawi to tackle the issue of household food insecurity one of the most controversial has been the starter pack programme launched in 1998 initially consisting of a free handout of packs of improved maize seed legumes and fertiliser to every small holder farm household in malawi the scheme under donor pressure was subsequently scaled down to become a form of targeted social safety net programme this paper analyses the strengths and weakness of both the original programme and its scaled down version and assesses the reason for the considerable opposition to the programme from malawi s donor community although starter pack is no longer operative in malawi the malawian experience is used to derive lessons for other countries where household food insecurity is an important dimension of chronic poverty

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

redefining recs part 2 untangling certificates and emission markets abstract renewable energy and greenhouse gas emissions markets are currently in a state of confusion regarding the treatment of renewable energy certificate recs how should emission trading schemes treat recs how can emission mitigation policies provide real incentives for renewable generation the objective of rec markets should be to promote additional renewable energy investments the author asserts that defining recs in terms of attributes especially off site attributes does not further this goal ambiguous language such as environmental attribute or environmental benefit creates confusion in the marketplace while failing to address the relevant coordination issues with renewable portfolio standard compliance markets voluntary emission offset markets or emission cap and trade markets specifically defining recs in terms of off site attributes creates a number of problems including that once an emissions cap and trade scheme is in place such definitions of a rec can become indefensible the author proposes to redefine recs in terms of on site attributes which resolves the aforementioned problems and allows compliance and voluntary renewable energy and emission markets to function without conflicts ideally environmental commodities should be homogeneous first best measures of the relevant environmental good as well as easily measured and verified the author proposes tradable environmental commodities that achieve these characteristics

strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain the importance of material flow management for a profit maximizing firm has been well articulated in the supply chain literature we demonstrate in our analytical model that a firm must also actively manage information flows within the supply chain which translates to controlling what it knows as well as what its competitors and suppliers know in our model of horizontal competition between an informed and an uninformed firm with a common upstream supplier material and information flows intersect through leakage of demand order information to unintended recipients as a result the informed firm s drive to control information flows within the supply chain can trigger operational losses through material flow distortion these losses can be so severe that the firm may prefer not to acquire information even when it is costless to do so our results underscore the importance of strategic information management actively managing the supply chain s information flows and making trade offs with material flows where appropriate to maximize profits

call center outsourcing contract analysis and choice this paper considers a call center outsourcing contract analysis and choice problem faced by a contractor and a service provider the service provider receives an uncertain call volume over multiple periods and is considering outsourcing all or part of these calls to a contractor each call brings in a fixed revenue to the service provider answering calls requires having service capacity thus implicit in the outsourcing decision is a capacity decision insufficient capacity implies that calls cannot be answered which in turn means there will be a revenue loss faced with a choice between a volume based and a capacity based contract offered by a contractor that has pricing power the service provider determines optimal capacity levels the optimal price and capacity of the contractor together with the optimal capacity of the service provider determine optimal profits of each party under the two contracts being considered this paper characterizes optimal capacity levels and partially characterizes optimal pricing decisions under each contract the impact of demand variability and the economic parameters on contract choice are explored through numerical examples it is shown that no contract type is universally preferred and that operating environments as well as cost revenue structures have an important effect

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

on the role of commitment in a principal agent relationship with an informed principal abstract in many circumstances a principal who has private information when contracting with an agent may perform some further action simultaneously with or after the agent s choice of an action we analyze such a principal agent relationship with an informed principal as a noncooperative game and distinguish two extensive form games first the principal can commit to his subsequent action at the time of contracting second the principal s announcement for his action is not binding at the time of performance we show that commitment by the principal leads to separation and no commitment leads to pooling journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d82

prices wages and poverty in rural india what lessons do the time series data hold for policy abstract looking back over 40 years or so one finds that higher relative prices of food in india have typically been associated with higher poverty incidence and lower real agricultural wages this has not gone unnoticed by critics of agricultural policy reform in india who have argued that reform could permanently increase poverty by permanently raising food prices relative to non food prices however a number of other observations about the time series evidence cast doubt on this interpretation the correlation with poverty as it is being measured is not a distributional effect yet it is very unlikely that the rural sector as a whole could be worse off from a higher relative price of food instead the correlation with poverty can be explained by shocks to aggregate food output the correlation between food prices and real wages can be explained by changes in farm yields and inflation critics of reform appear to have misread the lessons for policy but these data cannot be used to support the view that higher food prices due to policy reform will on their own reduce rural poverty

zambia s input subsidy programs over the last decade subsidies for fertilizer and hybrid maize seed have re emerged as a cornerstone of the government of the republic of zambia s grz s agricultural development and poverty reduction strategies this article reviews the farmer input support programme fisp and other grz input subsidy programs since structural adjustment it then synthesizes existing and presents new empirical evidence on the programs targeting outcomes and effects results suggest that although 73 of smallholder households cultivate less than 2 hectares of land and that these households constitute 78 of the smallholder farms below the us 1 25 capita day poverty line the majority 55 of fisp fertilizer goes to households that cultivate larger areas other factors constant wealthier households receive more subsidized inputs subsidized fertilizer promotes maize intensification and extensification at the expense of fallow land but an additional kg of subsidized fertilizer only raises maize output by 1 88 kg on average as a result of low maize fertilizer response rates poor targeting crowding out and diversion of fertilizer intended for the program financial benefit cost ratios for fisp fertilizer are well below one the article concludes with recommended reforms to fisp including that it be downsized and the savings invested in known drivers of pro poor agricultural growth

how do fertilizer subsidy programs affect total fertilizer use in sub saharan africa crowding out diversion and benefit cost assessments a major determinant of input subsidy programs effects on the achievement of national policy goals is the extent to which they raise total fertilizer use this study synthesizes recent literature on how the new generation of targeted input subsidy programs has affected national fertilizer use after accounting for crowding effects and derives benefit cost bc estimates of the fertilizer subsidy programs for kenya malawi and zambia after accounting for crowding out and diversion we highlight two major findings first accounting for the illicit diversion of program fertilizer can profoundly influence estimates of how fertilizer subsidy programs affect total fertilizer use and program impacts given recent evidence that 33 or more of total program fertilizer may be diverted before being received by intended beneficiary farmers the failure to account for program diversion is shown to overestimate the contribution of the subsidy programs to national fertilizer use by 67 3 in the case of malawi by 61 6 for zambia and by 138 0 for kenya the second major finding is that the incremental value of maize output produced from these subsidy programs is considerably less than their costs in most years except under unusually high maize price assumptions conventional bc analyses that do not account for crowding out and diversion may seriously overestimate the benefits of input subsidy programs greater attention to program design and implementation details to reduce problems of crowding out and diversion can substantially raise the returns to such programs

implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity amanufacturer writes supply contracts with n buyers then the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer builds capacity finally demand is realized and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers the court remedy for breach of contract specific performance versus expectation damages affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation and hence how the firms make investments ex ante the firms may also engage in renegotiation design inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation for example when a buyer grants a financial hostage to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation tradable options which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers this paper proves that under surprisingly general conditions the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts fixed quantity contracts this may require renegotiation design and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly

signaling new product reliability with after sales service contracts prior studies on performance based contracting pbc for after sales services have highlighted its advantages over traditional resource based contracting rbc when products are established and their reliability is known to all parties we develop a game theoretic model to investigate how these insights are affected when the vendor is privately informed about the reliability of a newly developed product a novel feature of our model is the interaction between reliability signaling private information and the vendor s discretionary investment in spares inventory private action which arises naturally in the setting we consider we find that this interaction leads to contrasting equilibrium outcomes under the two contracts rbc induces the vendor to focus on inventory savings leading to underinvestment in spares whereas pbc induces the vendor to focus on reliability signaling achieved through overinvestment in inventory as a result neither contract is efficient we investigate two means to mitigate this inefficiency but either approach has caveats a making inventory verifiable removes the trade off between reliability signaling and inventory investment but results in diverging contract preferences between the vendor and the buyer b pooling inventories across multiple buyers saves inventory costs but it also hinders reliability signaling potentially exacerbating inefficiency this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

modelling trends in food market integration method and an application to tanzanian maize markets abstract pushed by increasing availability of price data and extensive market liberalisation efforts in many developing countries research on food market integration has evolved rapidly over the last two decades empirical methods to measure market integration diverged in two directions on the one hand there is the parity bounds model pbm using a switching regressions technique while on the other hand the use of threshold autoregressive tar models has been proposed this article provides a discussion on the two methods and argues that tar models are better able to capture the dynamics of the arbitrage process underlying interconnected markets furthermore we extend the standard tar model to include a time trend in both the threshold and the adjustment parameter using weekly maize price data on seven selected markets in tanzania we illustrate how both transaction cost and the speed of adjustment have changed during the nineties

what are the effects of input subsidy programs on maize prices evidence from malawi and zambia an important hypothesized benefit of large scale input subsidy programs in africa is that by raising maize production the subsidies should put downward pressure on retail maize prices to the benefit of urban consumers and the rural poor who tend to be net food buyers to inform debates related to this rationale for input subsidies this study estimates the effects of fertilizer subsidies on retail maize prices in malawi and zambia using market or district level panel data covering the 2000 2001 to 2011 2012 maize marketing years results indicate that roughly doubling the size of malawi s subsidy program reduces maize prices by 1 2 2 5 on average in zambia roughly doubling the scale of the country s subsidy program reduces maize prices by 1 8 2 8 on average the results are robust across countries and model specifications and indicate that the fertilizer subsidy programs in malawi and zambia have had a minimal effect on retail maize prices

signalling and renegotiation in contractual relationships this paper examines how the possibility of renegotiation affects contractual outcomes in signaling games when an infinite number of rounds of renegotiations are allowed before contracts are executed the main results of the paper are 1 contracts may still contain distortions 2 the popular efficient separating equilibrium outcome is never an equilibrium outcome with renegotiation 3 incentive compatibility constraints can be generalized to incorporate renegotiation 4 equilibrium outcomes can be separating and nevertheless depend on the uninformed player s prior and 5 renegotiation in signaling games may lead to outcomes similar to equilibrium outcomes of screening games in which multiple contract purchases are allowed copyright 1993 by the econometric society

fertilizer subsidies political influence and local food prices in sub saharan africa evidence from nigeria abstract the last decade has seen a resurgence in the use of fertilizer subsidies in sub saharan africa however there is limited empirical evidence on the effects of fertilizer subsidy programs on local food prices using an instrumental variables approach we explore the effect of a fertilizer subsidy program on the seasonal growth rates of grain prices in nigeria our results suggest that the fertilizer subsidy program had very small effects on the growth rates of grain prices between the post planting and post harvesting seasons we also find that political influence played a role in the distribution of subsidized fertilizer we discuss how the weak effects on the price growth rates may be caused by low market orientation output market structures greater focus on farmers incomes low marginal productivity of fertilizer and politically influenced targeting

warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard this article examines the use of prices and warranties as signals of product quality to consumers who choose how to maintain their purchases the seller s incentives are strongly affected by the interaction of quality and maintenance in determining product reliability two different assumptions about this interaction are made a separating equilibrium in which high quality is signalled with a low warranty and low price is shown to be possible in both cases

can yardstick competition reduce waiting times yardstick competition is a regulatory scheme for local monopolists e g hospitals where the monopolist s reimbursement is linked to performance relative to other equivalent monopolists this re

warranties as a signal of quality in this paper we demonstrate through an example that in oligopolistic markets it is only in special cases that warranties can serve as signals of quality warranties are perfect signals only in cases in which the intrinsic attributes of products are neither too clustered nor too widely spaced otherwise multiple separating equilibria arise and the informational content of warranties is limited

the impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic r d alliance this paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a two stage research and development r d stage and marketing stage alliance with a marketer and an innovator the marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator we find that the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer we show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later otherwise she should do the opposite we identify two major effects of royalty revision first royalty revision provides the marketer with a flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates across the two stages of the alliance to better align the innovator s incentives this incentive realigning effect improves the marketer s profit second royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator because the innovator worries that the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable one to herself later this information revealing effect hurts the marketer s profit we characterize in what kind of alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision so that managers should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision and in what kind of alliances markerters would not benefit from royalty revision so that managers should commit not to revise the initial royalty contract with royalty contracts that are contingent on the r d outcome of the r d stage we find that contingent contract structure could be either substitutable by fully capturing the incentive re aligning effect or complementary by weakening the information revealing effect to royalty revision depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage managers may need to use a contingent contract if possible either to replace or with royalty revision accordingly to improve profits this paper was accepted by kamalini ramdas entrepreneurship and innovation

spatial price efficiency in mozambique s post reform maize markets maize zea mays shortages and maize price instability continue to occur in mozambique in spite of policy reforms and great capacity for increased production in northern mozambique this study measured the efficiency of spatial maize price arbitrage in mozambique s post reform period spatial price inefficiency does not seem to explain why food shortages continue to occur in mozambique suggesting nonprice market constraints such as poor infrastructure and poor market institutions as more likely explanations baulch s spatial efficiency test indicated that it is not profitable to ship maize from northern surplus maize regions to southern mozambique records of interregional maize shipments show that indeed grain is not being shipped from the north to the south market liberalization may have improved spatial price efficiency but high transfer costs still limit trade and potential benefits from freeing markets under these circumstances food shortages and price instability are likely to continue

multiple regime spatial price transmission with an application to maize markets in southern africa conventional threshold models of price transmission allow for different speeds of adjustment to equilibria depending on the magnitude of price differentials between markets however these models typically assume only one underlying long run equilibrium price relationship in this article we develop a framework for allowing multiple equilibria and multiple speeds of adjustment with regime separation depending on the magnitude of trade flows between regions rather than the magnitude of price differentials applying this framework to maize price transmission between south africa and zambia shows no transmission during periods of high imports when the government was heavily involved in maize importation but stronger transmission during periods of low imports when the government was not importing copyright 2012 oxford university press