endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

applications of aggregation theory to sustainability assessment in order to aid operations that promote sustainability goals researchers and stakeholders use sustainability assessments although assessments take various forms many utilize diverse sets of indicators numbering anywhere from two to over 2000 indices composite indicators or aggregate values are used to simplify high dimensional and complex data sets and to clarify assessment results although the choice of aggregation function is a key component in the development of the assessment there are few literature examples to guide appropriate aggregation function selection this paper applies the mathematical study of aggregation functions to sustainability assessment in order to aid in providing criteria for aggregation function selection relevant mathematical properties of aggregation functions are presented and interpreted cases of these properties and their relation to previous sustainability assessment research are provided examples show that mathematical aggregation properties can be used to address the topics of compensatory behavior and weak versus strong sustainability aggregation of data under varying units of measurements multiple site multiple indicator aggregation and the determination of error bounds in aggregate output for normalized and non normalized indicator measures

international trade policy benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians the claim that sophisticated non operational efficiency based arguments for intervention facilitate obfuscatory policy induced income transfers will meet in some quarters the counterclaim that this is an overly cynical interpretation of politicians policy motives rent seeking can likewise be argued to be an overly cynical conception the theory of rent seeking would impute self interest motives to the offer of payment for a cup of coffee

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

lobbying dup activities and welfare a response to tullock professor tullock 1981 in trying to understand the results in my 1981 paper on lobbying and welfare has raised issues that require further clarification and analysis for brevity s sake i shall concentrate here on the essentials leaving minor remarks of tullock s aside 1 the specific case of lobbying which i addressed originally was tariffseeking by pr otectionist lobbies so that the tariff would be endogenous i then showed that one could not argue in this instance that an exogenouslyspecified tariff at x was necessarily welfare superior to an endogenous tariff at x0 all other forms of lobbying were excluded of course 2 tullock argues that this result obtains because he and krueger 1974 think whereas i do not that tariff rcvcnucs can be wasted as it happens krueger 1974 made no such assumption she explicitly compared in her analysis of the specific cast of premium seeking for import quotas aircad in place quotas with such premium seeking with tariffs that had no corresponding revenue seeking or for that matter any waste resulting from the government directly expending the tariff revenue bhagwati and srinivasan 1980 were the first to introduce the revenue seeking concept and to argue that it was wholly inappropriate for krueger to compare tariffs and quotas on the assumption that the latter gave rise to fill premium seeking whereas the former gave rise to zero revenue seeking

static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies a great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non market instruments according to several analytical studies market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non market instruments in the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

potential cost savings from internal external co2 emissions trading in the korean electric power industry abstract korea plans to introduce an emissions trading scheme for the controlling greenhouse gas emissions in 2015 using shephard s 1970 output distance function we first estimate the shadow price of co 2 for power generators in the korean fossil fueled electric generation industry then by assuming that each power generator is required to reduce co 2 emissions by one ton we compute the potential cost savings from internal trading among generators within the same plant and from external trading across plants at prevailing market prices the results indicate that on average the generators paid 14 63 to abate one ton of co 2 emissions in 2007 plants realized additional gains through external trading in particular cost savings from trades between different fuel fired plants were substantial

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

u s interest groups prefer emission trading a new perspective if there is to be environmental regulation what kind of regulation would the main interest groups then prefer this political distortion must be taken into account when designing future environmental regulation such as co2 regulation the three main interest groups in the u s private business environmentalist groups and the electricity sector prefer a grandfathered permit market business is attracted by this solution because free initial distribution of permits both favours existing sources financially and furthermore creates a barrier to entry for new firms environmentalist groups have changed attitudes and promote the idea too as a way of negotiating higher target reduction levels with industry to maintain voluntary contributions from their members finally electric utilities prefer a grandfathered permit market and this step towards less planned economy may be explained by the rise of competition in the u s electricity sector therefore it is suggested that a grandfathered permit market is a more effective policy than a tax in relation to organized interests such as industry electric utilities and environmental organizations in perspective the grandfathered permit market may be mixed with the use of taxes in the case of co2 regulation for example taxes may be applied to badly organized polluters such as households and the transport sector because their lobbying power is weak

rent seeking spillovers and the benefits of decentralization abstract in the presence of spillovers decentralized provision of local public goods may lead to a higher surplus than centralized provision even though localities have identical preferences indeed free riding costs associated to decentralization can be lower than the costs of rent seeking and influence activities under centralization actually centralization yields a higher level of regional surplus only if both the spillover effect from local public spending is sufficiently large and the elasticity of the influence function is sufficiently small

cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis of air quality regulations a cost benefit analysis of sulfur dioxide regulations concludes that the clean air act should be amended to lower the cost of pollution control net benefits will be higher the study shows if marginal costs and benefits are equated instead of continuing the current method of mandating a level of emissions a better control strategy will be more effective than stringent control even when there is great uncertainty and error 8 references 2 tables dck

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be