corporate conservatism and relative compensation this paper demonstrates that in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating discontinuities in compensation when performance is low because of firings lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark depending on type in particular very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

structural changes and sustainability a selected review of the empirical evidence abstract the paper offers a review of selected topics in the empirical literature on structural change and sustainability we focus on aspects of structural change that directly affect emissions and energy intensity changes of the sectoral composition of economies trade and international fragmentation of production technological change and innovation and demand we identify several empirical facts first only a few countries have experienced a decoupling between growth and emissions due to proportionately faster growth rather than greater energy efficiency second the long term shift from manufacturing to services has not led in all cases to the de materialisation of economies and a lower environmental burden exploitation of energy efficiency increases depends on the ability of the service sectors to incorporate technical changes to reduce energy intensity third global trade and energy and emissions intensity trends support the pollution haven hypothesis which predicts displacement of the environmental burden from developed to emerging countries the pursuit by developing countries of a long term strategy of trading jobs for emissions is likely to exacerbate the asymmetry related to emissions intensities between developed and less developed economies the review should inform debate on environmental policy within the broader context of innovation and development policies

primary energy demand in japan an empirical analysis of long term trends and future co2 emissions abstract this paper examines the long run relationship between energy demand gnp and the real energy price in japan using data covering 1887 2001 it is found that if an underlying energy demand trend is appropriately incorporated the resulting econometric model produces a long run income elasticity of about unity and a long run price elasticity of about 0 2 the estimated model is utilised to forecast energy consumption and co 2 emissions up to 2012 it is shown that given current economic conditions and policies there is considerable uncertainty about whether japan will be able to meet its kyoto target by reducing co 2 emissions in 2008 2012 to the 1990 level it is shown that this uncertainty depends on the strength of the economy and leaves the japanese government with a difficult policy dilemma if there is a resurgence in growth to something near the annual average growth rate since the early 1980s a considerable effort will be required in order to meet its kyoto target requiring not only using the kyoto mechanisms but also additional tougher domestic policies and measures such as emissions capping r d incentives and education for energy conservation in addition to a pricing and tax policy

will small energy consumers be faster in transition evidence from the early shift from coal to oil in latin america abstract this paper provide evidence of the early transition from coal to oil for 20 latin american countries over the first half of the 20th century which does not fit the transition experiences of large energy consumers these small energy consumers had earlier and faster transitions than leading nations we also provide evidence for alternative sequences inverse revertible in the transition from coal to oil furthermore we demonstrate that leapfrogging allowed a set of follower economies to reach the next rung of the energy ladder oil domination 30 years in advance of the most developed economies we examine these follower economies where transition took place earlier and faster than the cases historically known in order to understand variation within the energy transitions and to expand the array of feasible pathways of future energy transitions we find that being a small energy consumer makes a difference for the way the energy transition takes place but also path dependence including trade and technological partnerships domestic energy endowment which dictates relative prices and policy decisions seem to be the variables that shaped past energy transitions

delegation and incentives this article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives it extends the standard principal agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority the agent s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project we find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent in fact if the agent is protected by limited liability delegation is never optimal

why do salespeople spend so much time lobbying for low prices in business to business settings a company s sales force often spends considerable time lobbying internally for authorization to charge lower prices these internal lobbying activities are time consuming and divert attention from other tasks such as interacting with customers we explain why internal lobbying activities serve an important role they help the firm elicit truthful reporting of demand information from the sales force as a result it may be profitable for the firm to require lobbying and make the requirement onerous even though lobbying is a nonproductive activity that creates an additional administrative burden and imposes a deadweight loss

manufacturer allowances and retailer pass through rates in a competitive environment a commonly held belief has grocery and mass merchandise retailers gaining power relative to the upstream consumer package goods manufacturers one of the major justifications for this belief is that manufacturers are now giving retailers more side payments such as trade allowances slotting allowances etc however a number of researchers have shown that these concessions have not translated into increased profit for the retailer relative to the manufacturer this paper explores via an analytic model why one might see retailers getting concessions from the manufacturer without being able to translate them into high profits we do this by representing the interaction between the channel members as a one period profit maximizing game where manufacturers decide on how large a side payment i e a concession to give to each retailer and retailers decide on how much of this side payment to use to promote the manufacturer s product at the heart of our model is a demand function for each product offering i e a specific brand sold by a specific retailer this demand function is linear in own and other s prices but based on empirical evidence is assumed to be nonlinear in the effects of merchandising activities e g short term price discounts better shelf space advertising etc specifically merchandising effects are modeled with a square root function that also acknowledges most short term promotional effects result in brand or store switching versus increase category volume the model is composed of six parameters these are the inherent popularity of the brand at a particular outlet own price sensitivity cross but within the store price sensitivity customer s sensitivity to within store promotion activities customer s sensitivity to between store promotional activities and the degree to which promotional activities yield incremental product category sales we use our underlying demand formulation to find the equilibrium solution to the full information stackelberg leader game for different store and brand loyalty environments as captured by our six parameters these parameters are chosen based on empirical evidence to span possible market conditions that each channel member might have our findings and modeling efforts should be of interest to analytic channel modelers and scholars interested in the mass merchandising and grocery store industries for a theoretical point of view we build upon the case 4 model of lee and staelin 1997 to allow for promotional activities from a substantive point of view we show that manufacturers will freely give retailers side payments even though they know these retailers will pocket a substantial portion of this concession moreover we identify conditions within our model that lead to larger allowances lower pass through rates and lower retail profits outcomes that are compatible with recent industry trends in addition we highlight the difference in effect on profits prices etc of changes in consumers sensitivity to inter store differences in storewide merchandising activities one of the more counter intuitive results of these analyses is that it is in the manufacturer s best interest to help retailers increase their spatial monopoly by decreasing consumers tendency to cross store shop because of merchandising activities

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

pass through and consumer search an empirical analysis retail price pass through is one of the most important issues facing manufacturers of consumer packaged goods although retailers tend to pass higher wholesale prices through to consumers quickly and completely they often do not pass on trade promotions currently asymmetric pass through is commonly thought to result from retailers exercise of market power alternatively it may be because of consumer search behavior and retailers competitive response we test this theory using a panel threshold asymmetric error correction model applied to wholesale and retail scanner data for ready to eat cereal for a number of retailers in the los angeles metropolitan market we find that consumer search behavior contributes significantly to imperfect pass through by allowing pass through to depend on market power and consumer search costs we find results that are contrary to the conventional wisdom namely market power causes retail prices to fall quickly and rise slowly whereas consumer search behavior causes retail prices to rise quickly and fall slowly precisely the rockets and feathers phenomenon

the adjustment of dividends to permanent earnings a fundamental issue in corporate finance is whether dividend changes convey information about future earnings of the firm there is an extensive literature in finance and accounting which discusses this issue however these studies have yielded puzzling results studies using the eventstudy methodology and the cross sectional regression approach have usually found a significant relationship between dividend changes and subsequent earnings on the other hand empirical studies based on time series regression by watts 32 and gonedes 8 have found that dividends convey little information about subsequent earnings most of the previous studies have examined the relationship between dividends and reported earnings or the relationship between dividends and analyst earnings forecasts however as nakamura and nakamura 26 suggested dividend changes may be related to the permanent earnings of the firm if managers have superior information to investors on future earnings they should be able to form more precise estimates of permanent earnings managers may then use dividends as an instrument to reflect their beliefs about the likely changes in permanent earnings thus consistent with lintner s 19 observations an increase in current earnings which reverses in subsequent periods would typically not elicit a dividend change whereas an increase in earnings that is expected to persist would lead to a dividend change the use of reported earnings figures rather than permanent earnings in the empirical examination may explain the puzzling results documented in previous dividend studies if managers indeed determine dividends based on their forecasts of permanent earnings empirical investigation using either reported earnings or short run earnings forecasts will be subject to a serious measurement error this measurement problem could distort the empirical relationship in dividend earnings studies in this paper we propose a permanent earnings model to explain the corporate dividend behavior the model is an extension of the previous partial adjustment models of dividends by

side payments in marketing side payments known politely as gainsharing and pejoratively as bribery are prevalent in marketing indeed many management schools have added ethics modules to their basic marketing courses to discuss these issues and there is much discussion of side payments in the literature e g adams 1995 borrus borrus amy 1995 a world of greased palms business week november 6 36 38 mauro mauro paolo 1997 why worry about corruption international monetary fund washington d c mohl mohl bruce 1996 auto dealers color surveys to polish image buyer s say salesmen tamper with makers questionnaires boston globe august 11 b1 b6 murphy murphy kate 1995 corporate gifts what s naughty or nice business week december 11 122 peterson peterson barbara s 1996 taxing question will the government make you pay for your next travel benefits frequent flyer february 27 30 and rose ackerman rose ackerman susan 1996 bribes and gifts proc conf economics values and organization april 19 20 yale university new haven ct we seek to provide insight with respect to one class of marketing side payments we hope that our analyses clarify some of the issues and suggest how these side payments affect marketing activities we begin by focusing on one common example of potential side payments salesforce ratings of internal sales support we derive two formal results and speculate on how these results generalize the two results are 1 that having one group of employees rate another implies that there are almost always incentives for side payments but 2 the side payments need not reduce the firm s profit at least in theory the firm is always able to revise the reward system to factor out these side payments the first result based on a straightforward proof has important practical implications for managers who may wish to preclude side payments they may be unable to design a ratings based reward system that does not have inherent incentives for side payments the second result in our opinion is quite surprising it suggests that marketing managers might be advised to invest more time into understanding how side payments affect employee reactions to reward systems they might want to reconsider costly efforts to monitor police or preclude such side payments while our results do not substitute for a moral discussion of side payments we hope that the formal structure for one common marketing situation provides valuable insight the system we analyze is based on a practical managerial problem we have observed the salesforce evaluates a sales support group with a real valued rating the sales support group is rewarded based on that rating whereas the sales force is rewarded based on outcomes such as sales or customer satisfaction that indicate incremental profits to the firm the reward to the salesforce might also depend upon how it rates sales support for example the salesforce might be held to a higher standard whenever it rates sales support as excellent we argue in the paper that the firm will want this to happen in addition the salesforce might ask for a side payment from the sales support group as compensation for high ratings we cast the practical problem as a formal game and incorporate the following issues 1 incremental actions taken by the salesforce and by sales support are perceived to be onerous 2 the measure of incremental profit is a noisy measure 3 both the salesforce and sales support are risk averse 4 given the reward system imposed by the firm both the salesforce and sales support will maximize their well being and 5 given the structure of the reward system the firm will seek to maximize expected profits we first show that there are almost always incentives for side payments specifically we demonstrate that sales support is better off with a side payment while the salesforce is no worse off this is not surprising because the reward to sales support is increasing in the rating while in the absence of a side payment the salesforce will select a rating such that its net marginal returns to increasing the rating are zero the exception occurs when the rating is constrained by the firm to be less than this optimal rating but even then there might be incentives for side payments we next show that the firm can anticipate these side payments and design a reward system to factor them out at no loss of profit the intuition is straightforward the firm first adjusts the marginal returns in the reward functions for sales support and for the salesforce such that they will each take the optimal actions even though they engage in side payments then the firm adjusts their fixed compensation so that the firm extracts its full profit the proof is difficult because we must show that adjusted reward systems exist and we must show that they allow the full profit to be extracted throughout the paper we discuss the practical implications of our results we close by highlighting future research opportunities

comment cross brand pass through fact or artifact cross brand pass through implies that a retailer responds to wholesale promotional support from a target brand by changing the retail prices of competitive brands besanko et al 2005 model a target brand s retail price as a function of its own and other brands wholesale prices using 780 observations 15 price zones 52 weeks and take the many significant coefficients for other brands wholesale prices that they find as evidence of cross brand pass through because price zones do not react independently to wholesale prices when they set a brand s retail price besanko et al s 2005 estimation overstates the number of independent observations by a factor of 15 when we correct for this overstatement of independent observations we find that the number of stable significant coefficients for other brands wholesale prices is lower than one would expect by chance we conclude that there is no evidence of cross brand pass through in the 11 categories analyzed by besanko et al 2005

energy paths in the european union a model based clustering approach this paper examines typical energy paths i e the intertemporal development of the energy mixes of the member states of the european union over 1971 2010 we apply model based clustering to detect major energy profiles and their compositional dynamics the seven identified clusters show typical combinations of energy carriers dominating the primary energy consumption of a country we find that countries tend to take a path towards higher quality energy mixes over time however path inertia and dependencies arise from both infrastructure and resource endowments higher energy quality profiles are usually associated with higher national income and energy use per capita providing some evidence of the existence of a national level energy ladder we also find convergence in energy intensity over time and a relationship between a country s own resources and import dependency

the quality double whammy this research focuses on how consumers perceive the quality level of a complex stimulus in our case a service encounter and how this perception affects consumers overall assessment of the quality level of the firm as such it should be of interest to consumer behavior theorists as well as to those involved in marketing management issues we start our presentation by developing a normative bayesian data integration and updating model somewhat similar to that put forth by rust et al 1999 the major constructs of interest in this model are the person s belief about the overall service quality level of a firm and what will happen on the next service encounter two major results following from this baseline normative model are that the updated means of these two beliefs are identical to the dynamic updating equations put forth by boulding et al 1993 and that an underlying assumption of this model is that consumers form unbiased perceptions of the complex stimulus next based on substantial empirical evidence from the behavioral literature we incorporate into this baseline model a process by which consumers form nonrandom perceptions specifically we postulate that a person s perception of a complex service encounter is a blend of the objective dimensions of the service encounter and the person s prior overall belief about the quality level of the firm the relative weights placed on these two factors are determined at least in part by the experience level of the customer and the complexity of the service encounter we then use this expanded model to compare and test different models of service quality and provide deeper insights into the process by which consumers form perceptions of both the service transaction and the overall service quality level of a firm we test this model using data from two different experiments in each experiment we manipulate the service provided and the person s initial will and should expectations using both obtrusive and unobtrusive measures of the underlying constructs of our model we employ multiple tests to determine the veracity of our expanded model relative to the baseline model these tests support the expanded model specification as found previously and as predicted by a bayesian updating process consumers prior beliefs influence their cumulative overall opinion of service quality e g anderson and sullivan 1993 bolton and drew 1991 boulding et al 1993 rust et al 1999 perhaps more importantly these prior beliefs also influence their perceptions of the data themselves which in turn affect their new updated overall opinion these two different influences of prior beliefs on cumulative evaluations of quality constitute the double whammy referred to in the title this double whammy effect has major managerial significance specifically we see from our model development that all activities of a firm will be perceived in light of a person s prior beliefs and that these priors will be double counted relative to our baseline model thus any marketing action taken by a firm will be perceived more positively or negatively depending on the person s prior belief about the quality level of the firm as such our model provides a formal explanation for the notion of brand equity as differential leverage in marketing activities as proposed by keller 1993

energy transition and path creation for natural gas in the brazilian electricity mix abstract emerging economies will account for more than 90 of net energy demand growth to 2035 although there is international consent about the need for reducing green house gas ghg emissions reduction targets have been left to governments responsibility such opening lead to different energy policies and approaches among countries specially comparing developing economies to developed ones technology development and new reserves found have set natural gas as the lead resource for transitioning energy mixes to lower carbon levels however hydropower has been the main source for the brazilian electricity grid and increasing dispatch of natural gas in fact increases ghg which has been the core of current brazilian energy policies we estimated future brazilian market shares of hydro thermal wind and nuclear power through historical data analysis of power dispatch and installed capacity the findings propose that current brazilian administration is creating a new technological path which will lead far from the desired ghg targets if actual growth rate of thermal power continues by the year 2022 thermal plants will be major suppliers of the brazilian electricity grid leaving hydro with the second largest market share furthermore we propose several approaches for increasing adoption of renewable distributed generation and the development of other market niches for natural gas in brazil as alternative paths

own brand and cross brand retail pass through in this paper we describe the pass through behavior of a major u s supermarket chain for 78 products across 11 categories our data set includes retail prices and wholesale prices for stores in 15 retail price zones for a one year period for the empirical model we use a reduced form approach that focuses directly on equilibrium prices as a function of exogenous supply and demand shifting variables the reduced form approach enables us to identify the theoretical pass through rate without specific assumptions about the form of consumer demand or the conduct of a category pricing manager thus our measurements of pass through are not constrained by specific structure on the underlying economic model the empirical pricing model includes costs of all competing products in the category on the right hand side not only the cost of the focal brand and yields estimates of both own brand and cross brand pass through rates our results provide a rich picture of the retailer s pass through behavior we find that pass through varies substantially across products and across categories own brand pass through rates are on average more than 60 for 9 of 11 categories a finding that is at odds with the claims of manufacturers about retailers in general importantly we find substantial evidence of cross brand pass through effects indicating that retail prices of competing products are adjusted in response to a change in the wholesale price of any given product in the category we find that cross brand pass through rates are both positive and negative we explore determinants of own brand and cross brand pass through rates and find strong evidence in multiple categories of asymmetric retailer response to trade promotions on large versus small brands for example brands with larger market shares and brands that contribute more to retailer profits in the category receive higher pass through we also find that trade promotions on large brands are less likely than small brands to generate positive cross brand pass through i e induce the retailer to reduce the retail price of competing smaller products on the other hand small share brands are disadvantaged along three dimensions trade promotions on small brands receive low own brand pass through and generate positive cross brand pass through for larger competing brands moreover small share brands do not receive positive cross pass through from trade promotions on these larger competitors we also find that store brands are similarly disadvantaged with respect to national brands

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

a lagrange multiplier test of the restrictions for a simple rational expectations model the lagrange multiplier test of the restrictions for a simple but common class of rational expectations model is developed for these kinds of models the value of this test will never exceed the likelihood ratio the difference is usually small because monte carlo evidence suggests that it performs similarly to the likelihood ratio and wald tests in small samples however an economic example suggests that larger differences are possible

the process of industrialization from the perspective of energetic metabolism abstract this paper empirically analyzes the socioeconomic energy metabolism of austria in the period 1830 1995 during this period austria underwent a transition from being a largely agricultural society to being an industrial society we describe the changes associated with this transition in terms of the physical economy or more precisely in terms of changes in the throughput of energy assessed in physical units j per year in accordance with currently used methods of material flow accounting mfa we define the indicators direct input and domestic consumption with respect to socioeconomic energy flows using these indicators we analyze the transition from 1830 at which time biomass provided more than 99 of austria s domestic energy consumption dec to 1995 when biomass accounted for 30 and fossil energy for 60 of dec total dec in austria increased by a factor of 6 in this period the paper discusses the relevance of these changes for processes of interaction between society and its natural environment focusing on the interrelations between energy metabolism and changes in land use

doing more with less innovation input and output in family firms family firms are often portrayed as an important yet conservative form of organization that is reluctant to invest in innovation however simultaneously evidence has shown that family firms are flourishing and in fact constitute many of the world s most innovative firms our study contributes to disentangling this puzzling effect we argue that family firms owing to the family s high level of control over the firm wealth concentration and importance of nonfinancial goals invest less in innovation but have an increased conversion rate of innovation input into output and ultimately a higher innovation output than nonfamily firms empirical evidence from a meta analysis based on 108 primary studies from 42 countries supports our hypotheses we further argue and empirically show that the observed effects are even stronger when the ceo of the family firm is a later generation family member however when the ceo of the family firm is the firm s founder innovation input is higher and contrary to our initial expectations innovation output is lower than that in other firms we further show that the family firm innovation input output relationships depend on country level factors namely the level of minority shareholder protection and the education level of the workforce in the country

editorial the scientific process at its best i write this editorial to point out a recent research trilogy in marketing science that shows the scientific process and author efforts at its best in particular in 2005 an article the first of the trilogy was published in marketing science by besanko dube and gupta hereafter bdg that focused on the issue of crossbrand retail pass through that is are retail prices of competing brands adjusted by the retailer in response to a change in the wholesale price of any given brand in the category bdg address this issue by fitting a reduced form model log price regressed on log cost to data from the well utilized dominick s finer foods dff data set on 78 products 11 product categories across 15 price zones looking at cross brand pass through coefficients bdg find significant evidence supporting their claim and also describe how these effects vary according to the size share of the brand clearly this is an important problem with important empirical findings then two years later the second part of the trilogy was published by mcalister 2007 who raises some concern about bdg 2005 because prices are not set independently across the 15 zones by dff and hence the effective degrees of freedom may not be as assumed in bdg 2005 as a result mcalister 2007 reports that if the data are not disaggregated to the level of the price zone as in bdg 2005 one finds a large proportion of nonsignificant elasticities this was taken as nonevidence of cross brand pass through and hence if you will the debate however just as with bdg 2005 the mcalister data left a number of unanswered issues because no formal test for nonzero elasticities was done nor were explorations of longer data series performed that may allow for more powerful tests clearly mcalister 2007 is also an important paper as it re examined both the methods used and the data generating assumptions of bdg 2005 something that is commonly swept under the rug and it also left more questions to explore finally in 2008 in this issue we have the last part of the research trilogy where dube and gupta dg 2008 reanalyze the original bdg 2005 data this time using more appropriate hierarchical bayesian methods rossi and allenby 2003 applied both at the disaggregate store level and at the aggregate chain level to address concerns raised in mcalister 2007 and using formal bayes factors to test the null hypothesis of zero cross brand pass through elasticities their new findings now reinforce bdg s conclusion 2005 that cross brand pass through does exist but at a significantly reduced level than originally claimed so why this editorial and why is the dg article the scientific process at its best first and foremost let us see what the field has gained from this research 1 the original bdg 2005 paper addressed an important topic one important enough that another scholar spent the effort to read it carefully and reanalyze it 2 through mcalister 2007 we can see the importance of testing hypotheses in only as powerful a way as the data will allow for and in dg 2008 those methods are applied both to the original bdg 2005 data and to a longer time series of data so a reinquiry in this case led to a more appropriate aggregation of the data and an exploration of the effects of nonaggregation and a more powerful set of techniques to be applied 3 as is common great research sometimes raises more questions than it answers in this case my belief is that this empirical debate is far from over but because the authors all invested their time we now are at a better place at which to continue the discussion

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

corruption and competition in procurement auctions we investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement our assumption is that the bureaucrat i e the agent that administers the market if corrupt may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe as firms expect to be paying a bribe a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated bribe we show however that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firms and thereby to generate a price increase that goes far beyond the bribe received by the bureaucrat we discuss the effect of other forms of bureaucratic discretion in the procurement process and analyze conditions under which unilateral anticorruption controls restore price competition

testing interest rate parity and rational expectations for canada and the united states the purpose of this paper is to examine the joint hypothesis of interest rate parity and rational expectations for canada and the united states using monthly data two approaches to testing are considered 1 the substitution method and 2 testing the cross equation non linear rational expectations restrictions from solving the interest rate parity equation it is demonstrated that standard application of the substitution method requires the assumption that the interest rate parity equation holds deterministically tests for unit roots in the spot exchange rate and interest rate differentials are also investigated

creating micro marketing pricing strategies using supermarket scanner data micro marketing refers to the customization of marketing mix variables to the store level this paper shows how prices can be profitably customized at the store level rather than adopting a uniform pricing policy across all stores historically there has been a trend by retailers to consolidate independent stores into large national and regional chains this move toward consolidation has been driven by the economies of scale associated with these larger operations however some of these large chains have lost the adaptability of independent neighborhood stores micro marketing represents an interest on the part of managers to combine the advantages of these large operations with the flexibility of independent neighborhood stores a basis for these customized pricing strategies is the result of differences in interbrand competition across stores these changes in interbrand competition are measured using weekly store level scanner data at the product level obviously this presents a huge estimation problem since we wish to measure substitution between each product at a store level for a chain with 100 stores and 10 products in a category we would need to estimate over 100 000 parameters to reliably estimate these individual store differences we phrase our problem in a hierarchical bayesian framework essentially each store level parameter can be thought of as a combination of chain level and random store specific effects the improvement in estimating this model comes from exploiting the common chain level component in addition we relate these store specific changes to demographic and competitive characteristics of the store s trading area which helps explain why these differences are present these estimated differences in price response are in turn used to set store level prices to simplify and focus the problem we limit our attention to everyday price changes i e the prices of products that are not advertised there are many marketing variables that can be adjusted at a storelevel e g promotions and product assortments the reason we concentrate upon everyday pricing is driven by its importance in the marketing mix that most profits are earned on products sold at their everyday price and the amenability of everyday prices to store level customizations a limitation of this approach is that it yields only a partial solution to the retailer s global optimization problem a challenge for the retailer in implementing micro marketing pricing strategies is to retain a consistent image while altering prices that adapt to neighborhood differences in demand our approach is to search for price changes that leave image unchanged we argue that a sufficient condition for holding the input to store image constant from everyday pricing is to hold average price and revenues at their current levels we implement this condition by introducing constraints into the profit maximization problem future research into store choice may yield more efficient conditions a benefit of holding the retailer s image constant is that it does not require costly new information about competitors and promotional activity instead retailers are able to derive these store level customizations based largely upon scanner data this is very advantageous since this information is already being collected and is readily available our results indicate that micro marketing pricing strategies would be profitable and could increase gross profit margins by 4 percent to 10 percent when these gross profit gains are considered after administrative and operating costs are taken into account they could increase operating profit margins by 33 percent to 83 percent these gains come from encouraging consumers through everyday price changes to switch to more profitable bundles of products and not through overall price changes at the chain level these results show that the information contained in the retailer s store level scanner data is an under utilized resource by exploiting this information using newer and more powerful computational techniques managers can better appreciate its value the implication is that profits could be increased and gains can be made by using this information as the basis for micro marketing

optimal sales force compensation in dynamic settings commissions vs bonuses this paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multiperiod moral hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales the sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales and his incentive responsiveness might change over time the paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive scheme a pure commission dominates a bonus plan and vice versa a commission is optimal if the agent is most difficult to motivate in the last period otherwise combining the commission with a bonus plan can lower the firm s cost of providing incentives in earlier periods the results are robust to different types of cost externalities and demand externalities across periods however if the firm obtains intermediate sales information bonus plans dominate commissions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

diversifying the brazilian electricity mix income level the endowment effect and governance capacity abstract low and middle income countries are usually trapped by their natural resource abundance and thus have little opportunity to diversify their electricity matrix on the other hand in high income countries new electricity sources have been growing faster regardless of their resource endowments as income grows countries should have more opportunities to develop new technologies thus the evolution of technologies to generate electricity should lead to a new mix of fuel consumption along the steps of an imaginary electricity ladder from the more traditional to the more advanced and cleaner technologies notwithstanding the income effect the endowment effect could hinder the diversity of electricity sources in this context we examine whether or not brazil has been able to diversify its electricity mix with respect to income growth by breaking what we called the endowment trap based on an economic model developed in this research we found evidence that brazil has succeeded in breaking its hydroelectric dependency but has not eliminated the polluting sources

historical energy price shocks and their changing effects on the economy abstract the purpose of this paper is to identify the changes in the impact of energy shocks on economic activity with an interest in assessing if an economy s vulnerability and resilience to shocks improved with economic development using data on the united kingdom over the last three hundred years the paper identifies supply aggregate demand and residual shocks to energy prices and estimates their changing influence on energy prices and gdp the results suggest that the impacts of supply shocks rose with its increasing dependence on coal and declined with its partial transition to oil however the transition from exporting coal to importing oil increased the negative impacts of demand shocks more generally the results indicate that improvements in vulnerability and resilience to shocks did not progress systematically as the economy developed instead the changes in impacts depended greatly on the circumstances related to the demand for and supply of energy sources if these experiences are transferable to future markets a transition to a diversified mix of renewable energy is likely to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to energy price shocks

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

a quarterly model of unanticipated monetary growth output and the price level in the u k 1963 1978 abstract this paper develops and estimates using quarterly data from 1963 to 1978 a three equation model of the u k economy in which output is affected only by unanticipated monetary growth whereas the price level is influenced by both anticipated and unanticipated changes in the money supply expectations of monetary growth are assumed to be muth rational the model was estimated using efficient procedures and tests of the over identifying restrictions were favourable to the model specification in particular anticipated monetary growth was found to have no significant effect on output

technical note sequential multiproduct price competition in supply chain networks we analyze a general model in which at each echelon of the supply process an arbitrary number of firms compete offering one or multiple products to some or all of the firms at the next echelon with firms at the most downstream echelon selling to the end consumer at each echelon the offered products are differentiated and the firms belonging to this echelon engage in price competition the model assumes a general set of piecewise linear consumer demand functions for all products potentially brought to the consumer market where each product s demand volume may depend on the retail prices charged for all products consumers preferences over the various product retailer combinations are general and asymmetric similarly the cost rates incurred by the firms at the most upstream echelon are general as well we fully characterize the equilibrium behavior under linear price only contracts and we show how all equilibrium performance measures can be computed via a simple recursive scheme moreover we establish how changes in the model parameters in particular exogenous cost rates or intercept values in the demand functions impact the system wide equilibrium these comparative statics results allow for the quantification of cost pass through effects and the measurement and characterization of the firms brand value lastly we illustrate what qualitative impacts various changes in the structure of the supply chain network may bring forth

comparison of energy transitions in the united states and developing and industrializing economies summary we compare the energy transitions of the united states with several developing and industrializing economies the analysis reveals three important differences between trends first the developing world experiences energy related transitions at lower levels of income with faster rates of change in conditions over time and in a more simultaneous fashion than that of the united states second over similar income ranges i e segments of economic growth current developing economies are using less energy per capita than the united states did historically finally this more efficient economic growth translates into lower systemic environmental impact per capita than that of the united states

a general theory of pass through in channels with category management and retail competition i provide a general formulation of the channel pass through problem as a comparative static of the retail price equilibrium and i analyze the impact of category management and retail competition on pass through focusing on brand and retailer differences and the nature of the cost change being passed through whether it is brand specific retailer specific both or neither with category management a retailer s response to a brand specific cost change is not limited to that brand in general a retailer will also change the prices of other brands the cross brand effect can be positive or negative and depending on its sign it either enhances or attenuates pass through i explain the cross brand effect as an interaction between two forces a demand substitution force that pushes for a negative cross brand effect and a strategic complementarity force that pushes for a positive cross brand effect retail competition adds another layer of strategic complementarity causing other retailers to respond even for retailer specific cost changes and increasing pass through of categorywide cost changes but its effect for brand specific cost changes is ambiguous i apply the theory to two commonly used demand functions linear demand and nested logit and show that they have significantly different pass through properties the paper concludes with a discussion of how the theory relates to the empirical literature including the companion piece by besanko et al besanko d j p duba s gupta 2005 own brand and cross brand retail pass through marketing sci 24 1 123 137

consumer deliberation and product line design this paper studies optimal product line design when consumers need to incur costly deliberation to uncover their valuations for quality to induce deliberation a firm must maintain quality dispersion and cut the price of the high end product so that consumers are motivated to deliberate in the hope that high end consumption fits their needs to prevent deliberation the firm may have to offer downgraded quality at a low price so that an impulsive purchase will not appear too wasteful whether the firm should induce deliberation depends on how much surplus it creates by aligning the supply of quality with heterogeneous demand for quality and how much surplus it captures during this process interestingly equilibrium firm profit consumer surplus and social welfare can all increase with the cost of deliberation we extend the model to accommodate consumers heterogeneous prior beliefs of their valuations for quality we also discuss how market research could benefit from taking into account the endogeneity of consumer deliberation

competition in corruptible markets firms seeking business opportunities often face corruptible agents in many markets this paper investigates the marketing strategy implications for firms competing for business and for the buyer in a corruptible market we consider a setting in which a buyer a firm or government seeks to purchase a good through a corruptible agent supplier firms that may or may not be a good fit compete to be selected by the agent only the agent observes whether a firm is a good fit corruption arises due to the agent s incentive to select a nondeserving firm in exchange for bribes intuitively and as expected a sufficiently large monitoring of the agent eradicates corruption interestingly however increasing the monitoring from an initial low level can backfire making the agent more likely to select a nondeserving firm this nonmonotonic agent behavior makes it difficult for the buyer to reduce corruption the implication is that the buyer should choose either to be ignorant or to take drastic measures to limit

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

choice and procrastination author s o donoghue ted rabin matthew abstract recent models of procrastination due to self control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self control problems we develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self control problems this menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones a person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never to be completed option hence providing a non procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones

logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior an equilibrium framework discrete choice models of demand have typically been estimated assuming that prices are exogenous since unobservable to the researcher product attributes such as coupon availability may impact consumer utility as well as price setting by firms we treat prices as endogenous specifically prices are assumed to be the equilibrium outcomes of nash competition among manufacturers and retailers to empirically validate the assumptions we estimate logit demand systems jointly with equilibrium pricing equations for two product categories using retail scanner data and cost data on factor prices in each category we find statistical evidence of price endogeneity we also find that the estimates of the price response parameter and the brand specific constants are generally biased downward when the endogeneity of prices is ignored our framework provides explicit estimates of the value created by a brand i e the difference between consumers willingness to pay for a brand and its cost of production we develop theoretical propositions about the relationship between value creation and competitive advantage for logit demand systems and use our empirical results to illustrate how firms use alternative value creation strategies to accomplish competitive advantage

the foreign corrupt practices act a new perspective the foreign corrupt practices act fcpa was found to have no negative effect on the export performance of american industry market share of u s industry in countries where the fcpa is reported to be an important trade disincentive was compared with u s market share in other countries no differences were discovered

competitive procurement with corruption we study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes with complete information and no corruption the efficient firm will win the contract for sure if the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power however bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win so in equilibrium the efficient firm loses the contract with positive probability the optimal scoring rule for the buyer deemphasizes quality relative to price and does not fully handicap and may even favor the efficient firm

three laws of energy transitions the paper formulates and explores a hypothesis on three general energy transition laws the law of stable long term energy costs to income ratio the law of improving energy quality and the law of growing energy productivity these laws are essential for shaping long term projections and checking for their consistency all three are rooted in amazingly stable in time and universal across countries energy costs to income ratios limited energy purchasing power sets up thresholds which if exceeded bring asymmetry to energy demand to price elasticity the author believes that the theoretical postulate on the substantial substitution among production factors which is used in the production functions theory may be incorrect in reality innovations mainly lead to the substitution of a low quality production factor with the same yet of a better quality improving energy quality with stable costs to income ratio is accompanied by growing energy productivity energy costs to income thresholds are indicators allowing for better projections of oil prices

instrumental variables procedures for estimating linear rational expectations models abstract this paper illustrates how to use instrumental variables procedures to estimate the parameters of a linear rational expectations model these procedures are appropriate when disturbances are serially correlated and the instrumental variables are not exogenous we compare our procedures to some alternative estimators that estimate free parameters from restrictions implied by the euler equations the procedures are applicable to a variety of linear rational expectations models several examples of which we cite

demand signalling under unobservable effort in franchising linear and nonlinear price contracts we study the signalling strategy of a principal who is privately informed about its high demand potential to an uninformed risk neutral agent we analyze the model in the context of a contract between a franchisor and a franchisee we examine the distortions of a two part pricing scheme necessary to credibly inform the franchisee agent we also study whether the inability of the franchisor principal to observe the agent s effort moderates or exaggerates the distortions from the first best two part pricing scheme a surprising outcome is that even though the principal incurs greater signalling cost the magnitude of distortion in the two part scheme is smaller when service is unobservable than when it is not thus a signalling strategy employing the fixed and variable fees is harder to detect under moral hazard empirical studies failing to control for moral hazard may incorrectly conclude that signalling strategy does not occur we later consider a three part scheme to verify whether or not the schem

competing for low end markets recent business research points to the fortune awaiting to be tapped in low end markets in this paper we investigate how the size of the low end market influences a firm s profits and the pioneering firm s quality choice as low valuation consumers increase in a market on average consumers willingness to pay decreases this may lead us to expect firms profits to decrease as the size of the low end market increases our analysis shows that if the size of the low end market is below a threshold an increase in the size of the low end market may actually dampen price competition and improve profits as firms can then strategically choose their quality levels such that their products are more differentiated conventional wisdom also suggests that the pioneering firm will offer a higher quality product and earn more profits compared with the later entrant in contrast to this notion of quality advantage our analysis identifies circumstances in which a pioneer can offer a lower quality product and yet earn more profits an experimental test lends support for some of our model s predictions we further extend the model to consider markets with multiple firms firms with multiple products and consumers with limited purchasing power

determinants of store level price elasticity using weekly scanner data representing 18 product categories the authors estimated store specific price elasticities for a chain of 83 supermarkets they related these price sensitivities to a com

decision stages and asymmetries in regular retail price pass through we study the pass through of wholesale price changes onto regular retail prices using an unusually detailed data set obtained from a major retailer we model pass through as a two stage decision process that reflects both whether as well as how much to change the regular retail price we show that pass through is strongly asymmetric with respect to wholesale price increases versus decreases wholesale price increases are passed through to regular retail prices 70 of the time while wholesale price decreases are passed through only 9 of the time pass through is also asymmetric with respect to the magnitude of the wholesale price change with the magnitude affecting the response to wholesale price increases but not decreases finally we show that covariates such as private label versus national brand 99 cent price endings and the time since the last wholesale price change have a much stronger impact on the first stage of the decision process i e whether to change the regular retail price than on th

why are bad products so hard to kill it is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low we argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers incentives rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low to avoid investing in low demand products the firm must also reward decisions to kill products however rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success the inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low demand products we explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions

does anticipated monetary policy matter an econometric investigation a heated debate has arisen over the policy ineffectiveness proposition associate with the work of lucas sargent and wallace it postulates that anticipated aggregate demand policy will have no effect on business cycle fluctuations so that one deterministic feedback policy rule is as good as any other from the point of view of stabilizing the economy this paper develops a methodology for empirically analyzing rational expectations models displaying this neutrality result and then applies it to the important question of whether anticipated monetary policy matters to the business cycle

long term diversification paths and energy transitions in europe the concentration of the energy mixes of eight european countries is measured latecomers historically enjoyed lower levels of concentration in their energy mixes early comers followed an inverted u path of concentration latecomers a u path a time effect and size effect explains the different patterns small energy consuming countries will be able to do faster transitions

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

channel pass through of trade promotions packaged goods manufacturers spend in excess of 75 billion annually on trade promotions even though their effectiveness has been hotly debated by academics and practitioners for decades one reason for this ongoing debate is that empirical research has been limited mostly to case studies managerial surveys and data from one or two supermarket chains in a single market in this paper we assemble a unique data set containing information on prices quantities and promotions throughout the entire channel in a category our study extends the empirical literature on pass through in three important ways first we investigate how pass through varies across more than 1 000 retailers in over 30 states second we study pass through at multiple levels of the distribution channel third we show how the use of accounting metrics such as average acquisition cost rather than transaction cost yields biased estimates of pass through and therefore overstates the effectiveness of trade promotions we find that mean pass through elasticities are 0 71 0 59 and 0 41 for the wholesaler retailer and total channel respectively more importantly at each level of the channel we observe large variances in pass through estimates that we explain using various measures of cost and competition surprisingly we find that market structure and competition have a relatively small impact on pass through we conclude by showing how the profitability of manufacturer and wholesaler deals can be improved by utilizing detailed effectiveness estimates for example a manufacturer using an inclusive trade promotion strategy might offer a 10 off invoice deal to all retailers on every product this strategy would decrease manufacturer and wholesaler profits for 56 of product store combinations whereas retailers experience a profit boost in 96 of cases manufacturers and wholesalers can avoid unprofitable trade deals for specific products and retailers by utilizing estimates of pass through consumer price elasticity and margins compared to the inclusive strategy such a selective trade promotion strategy would improve deal profitability by 80 and reduce costs by 40

linearity with project selection and controllable diffusion rate in continuous time principal agent problems i extend holmstrom and milgrom s model by allowing the agent to control privately or publicly the diffusion rate process and show that the optimal contract is still linear i discuss the conditions under which conflicts over the choice of diffusion rate do and do not arise as an application i examine project selection problems of a firm conflicts between the manager and investors arise because giving the manager too much incentive to work to increase the profit from ongoing operations can induce him to be too conservative in project selection possibly resulting in optimal contracts with low sensitivities

optimal sales force compensation we analyze a dynamic moral hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts we explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice fixed salaries quota based bonuses commissions or a combination thereof are optimal fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue cost ratios quota based bonuses commissions should be used if the revenue cost ratio takes intermediate large values if firms face demand uncertainty markets are rather thin and the revenue cost ratio large firms should combine a commission with a quota based bonus if word of mouth advertising affects sales a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal when entering a new market or launching a new product firms should install long term bonus plans

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

latin american hydropower a century of uneven evolution abstract latin america is home to a number of the largest countries powered by hydroelectricity in the world today both in absolute and per capita levels this region accounts for over 20 per cent of the world s hydropower and has by far the largest share of hydroelectricity over total electricity generation in the world excluding china latin american hydropower exhibits the fastest growth in the world over the last 30 years despite these records latin america s large hydroelectric potential began to be realised late in comparison to most advanced countries and its advance has been notably uneven across time and space this article provides a succinct survey of the evolution of hydropower for 20 latin american countries over the past century and offers a unique quantitative comparative perspective into the past and present of hydroelectricity in the region we investigate the role played by the different domestic energy endowments in the way hydroelectricity developed across the region we conclude that the gross theoretical hydroelectric potential is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding the historical evolution of hydroelectricity in different countries we used panel data analysis to examine the role of alternative sources of energy electric demand and each nation s capacity to supply electricity infrastructure our model explicitly accounts for the effects of different gross theoretical potentials and the effect of time passage overall we report that latin american hydropower followed an uneven path over the 20th century

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

creating win win trade promotions theory and empirical analysis of scan back trade deals manufacturer trade promotion spending is second only to cost of goods sold as a profit and loss item yet manufacturers often lose money on these deals as a result of forward buying by retailers the search for more effective forms of trade promotion and the availability of scanners at cash registers has led to the emergence of a new type of trade deal the scan back that gives retailers a discount on unitssoldduring the promotion rather than on unitsbought we develop a theory to compare retailer pricing decisions and profitability under scan back and traditional off invoice trade deals we show that when the terms of the trade deal are identical retailers prefer off invoice trade deals and manufacturers prefer scan backs manufacturers can however redesign the scan back to leave the retailer weakly better off and leave themselves strictly better off using proprietary data from the beverage category we conduct an empirical analysis and find that during the promotion period scan back trade deals relative to off invoice deals 1 do not cause excess ordering and 2 generate higher retail sales through lower retail prices implications for researchers and managers are discussed