markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant the problem of noncompliance and enforcement in transferable discharge permit tdp markets has not received much attention this paper examines the consequences of noncompliance for a tdp market given fairly general assumptions about the characteristics of the enforcement policy in place the analysis reveals that when firms are noncompliant tdp markets retain their efficiency property only under some fairly stringent conditions the effect of noncompliance on the equilibrium permit price raises some important questions about the ability of a tdp market to achieve and remain in equilibrium when firms are noncompliant

pareto improving campaign finance policy this paper argues that campaign finance policy in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing can be pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters the optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen the argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions

multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders in the last few years governments in many parts of the world have aggressively sought to privatize socially held assets this wave of privatization has included the sale of industrial enterprises in the former soviet union and eastern europe the sale of public transportation systems in britain and scandinavia and the sale of radio spectra in the u s both the enormity and the importance of these sales have naturally led to an examination of how best to accomplish this task auctions have been proposed and have frequently been used as time honoured convenient and attractive mechanisms for such sales this in turn has led to a revival of interest in the theory of auctions particularly those involving multiple objects the magnitude of these privatization sales has meant that in many instances it is realistic to consider that buyers may run up against liquidity or borrowing constraints the presence of these financial constraints introduces important differences into traditional auction theory for instance pitchik and schotter 1986 and che and gale 1996 1998 have shown that when bidders are subject to such constraints the conclusion of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds when multiple objects are auctioned in the presence of budget constraints it may be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object with a view to raising the price paid by his rival and depleting his budget so that the second object may then be obtained at a lower price in effect a bidder may wish to raise a rival s costs in one market in order to gain advantage in another thus unlike in traditional auction theory a particular bidder s payoff is affected by the price paid by a rival bidder it is important to note that this effect comes into play only when several objects are sold

lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies abstract this paper uses the common agency approach to analyze the joint determination of product and labor market distortions in a small open economy capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages while other factors of production are not organized the paper shows that product and labor market distortions always move in the same direction and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labor it also shows that labor market distortions are second best hence conditionality by foreign organizations should target distortions in product markets but not in labor markets

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

emission standards and stochastic waste load empirical work regarding the impact of environmental regulations on firm behavior has been developed under the assumption that emissions of pollutants are deterministic the implication is that the regulation is effective only when the constraint is exactly satisfied in real life however it is seldom the case that emission constraints are exactly satisfied the purpose of this paper is to find out whether regulation schemes are ineffective or whether the structure is an optimal reaction to random fluctuations in emissions the swedish pulp and paper industry is used as an empirical illustration

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

ethical influences on the evolution of the us tradable permit approach to air pollution control abstract in 1975 a novel approach to air pollution control was implemented in the usa from this rather humble beginning this approach has now been expanded rather dramatically in several different directions this paper describes this evolution shows how the design of the system has been adapted to accommodate ethical concerns and describes how the latest versions of this approach have transformed the regulatory process which spawned the approach in the first place

corruption federalism and policy formation in the oecd the case of energy policy we investigate whether the effect of government corruption is conditional on a country s institutional structure federal systems have an additional layer of government making lobbying relatively more costly we investigate whether the effect of government corruption on environmental policy in the form of restrictions on energy use is conditional on a federal system being in place using 1982 96 data from 11 industry sectors in 12 oecd economies we find that while greater government corruption reduces the stringency of environmental policy the effect declines in federal systems

firm behaviour under pollution ratio standards with non compliance this paper compares a firm s short run optimal production and abatement rules under emission level standards and standards expressed in terms of emissions per unit of output ratio standards the models allow for non compliance with standards with expected penalties dependant on either level or relative violations of the standard in question it is shown that ratio arguments make a difference to the optimal decision rules derived for a profit maximising firm for example for a given level of emissions the firm both produces more and abates more under a ratio standard so that ratio and level standards cannot be used interchangeably to achieve the same combination of emissions and output the implications for the efficiency of pollution control are briefly discussed

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

erratum standards versus standards the effects of different pollution restrictions when economists refer to pollution standards they almost universally mean uniform restrictions on pollution emissions e g william j baumol and wallace e oates 1975 ch 13 susan rose ackerman 1973 david besanko 1978 however in practice standards take many forms not only emissions restrictions but restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input restrictions on the use of a polluting input or mandated use of a particular pollution control technology these specifications of regulations will have a variety of effects on a firm s resource allocation decisions for instance allowing pollution per unit of output as the standard instead of directly restricting the level of pollution gives the firm some choice in addition to reducing pollution it can increase its output to dilute the pollution this paper examines the effects of five different forms of pollution standards on input decisions the level of production and firm profits the results show that the different standards by providing firms with different incentives change the firm s allocation decisions and affect the relative profitability of the standards section i reviews the existing literature on the incentives of different instruments the following section describes the model to be used five different forms of pollution constraints are individually examined in section iii using a graphical approach their relative effects as well as some special cases are assessed in section iv finally section v raises the case of different standards when firms are not identical

competition policy for elections do campaign contribution limits matter this paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes states are a natural laboratory to examine this issue we analyze elections to assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions we find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation we also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race

the costs of water pollution regulation in the pulp and paper industry this paper studies plant level data on actual and permitted levels of water pollution emissions for the pulp and paper industry there is widespread and substantial overcompliance with the relevant regulations aggregate bod emissions in 1992 were only 50 of the amount allowed overcompliance appears to imply a zero marginal abatement cost and its prevalence therefore has the potential to substantially change the debate over the costs of regulation we show instead that plants incurred substantial costs to overcomply marginal abatement costs were roughly 13 000 ton in 1992 we discuss possible explanations for costly overcompliance and their implications for estimation

auctions or grandfathering the political economy of tradable emission permits despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits we still observe that a hybrid policy in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions is adopted in some cases we also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits this paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering auctions or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy by constructing a two stage lobbying game in which the type of policy instrument auction grandfathering or a hybrid instrument is determined in the first stage and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups

second best energy policies for heterogeneous firms this paper investigates second best issues in the regulation of external costs of energy use by heterogeneous firms the efficiency of regulatory energy policies depends in general on the policy incentives given for both output reduction and input substitution the resulting endogeneity of firms supply functions appears to lead to complicated policy rules in contrast to earlier efforts the analysis considers an arbitrarily large number of non identical price taking firms in a joint market a large variety of possible production functions including varying levels of economies of scale and possibilities for input substitution and elasticities of market demand which may vary from completely elastic to completely inelastic two second best instruments are considered namely output taxes and energy efficiency standards and are compared to the benchmark of first best energy taxes the underlying market factors determining the relative efficiency of these second best instruments when used optimally are identified

the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs this paper addresses the following question to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost effectively should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target the total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs monitoring costs and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms under common assumptions i show that allowing noncompliance is cost effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty however one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs this last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty in fact the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty and can actually be lower finally tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms abatement costs

does technological innovation really reduce marginal abatement costs some theory algebraic evidence and policy implications the existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs we show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching algebraically we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs empirically we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in korea regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case one policy implication economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command and control policies

comparative statics of a monopolistic firm facing price cap and command and control environmental regulations abstract an exhaustive comparative statics analysis of a model of a monopolistic firm facing price cap regulation and a variety of commonly implemented command and control environmental regulations is carried out the comparative statics are intrinsic to each of the models and thus form their basic empirically testable properties several unanticipated results emerge from the analysis in particular it is shown that a subset of the intrinsic comparative statics are qualitatively invariant to all of the commonly employed command and control environmental regulations that a price cap regulated profit maximizing monopoly might face while others are specific to the type of command and control environmental regulation in place

the role of federal renewable fuel standards and market structure on the growth of the cellulosic biofuel sector abstract this article examines the effect of the renewable fuel standards and market power on the growth of the cellulosic biofuel sector we develop a sectoral model to show how changes in the regulations governing cellulosic fuel production affect the equilibrium quantity of cellulosic ethanol based on model calibration for washington state we find that existing low cost waivers purchased by obligated parties in lieu of cellulosic fuel production negate the effectiveness of the renewable fuel standard to induce the production and consumption of cellulosic biofuels however raising waiver price slightly relative to the status quo significantly increases the equilibrium quantity of cellulosic ethanol the high cost of cellulosic ethanol production is often cited as the cause of the lack of cellulosic ethanol production which is used to justify low waiver prices our policy message is the converse the low current waiver price significantly contributes to the cellulosic ethanol market stagnation in the context of the current biofuel policy

double dipping in environmental markets abstract there is an increasing tendency to use markets to induce the provision of environmental services as such markets increase in scope potential market participants might sell multiple environmental services the question we consider here is whether participants in such markets should be allowed to sell credits in more than one market simultaneously some have argued in favor of such double dipping because it would make the provision of environmental services more profitable in practice however most programs do not allow double dipping we show that if the optimal level of pollution abatement is sought then double dipping maximizes societal net benefits however if pollution policies are set in a piecemeal fashion then the caps for each market are unlikely to be optimal and in this second best setting a policy prohibiting double dipping can lead to greater social net benefits we explore conditions under which a single market policy is preferred or equivalently where piecemeal policies are likely to yield particularly inefficient outcomes

a review of low carbon fuel policies principles program status and future directions a low carbon fuel standard lcfs is a market based policy that specifies declining standards for the average lifecycle fuel carbon intensity afci of transportation fuels sold in a region this paper i compares transportation fuel carbon policies in terms of their economic efficiency fuel price impacts greenhouse gas emission reductions and incentives for innovation ii discusses key regulatory design features of lcfs policies and iii provides an update on the implementation status of lcfs policies in california the european union british columbia and oregon the economics literature finds that an intensity standard implicitly taxes emissions and subsidizes output the output subsidy results in an intensity standard being inferior to a carbon tax in a first best world although the inefficiency can be corrected with a properly designed consumption tax or mitigated by a properly designed carbon tax or cap and trade program in california from 2011 to 2015 the share of alternative fuels in the regulated transportation fuels pool increased by 30 and the reported afci of all alternative fuels declined 21 lcfs credit prices have varied considerably rising to above 100 credit in the first half of 2016 lcfs programs in other jurisdictions share many features with california s but have distinct provisions as well c 2016 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

permit trading and credit trading a comparison of cap based and rate based emissions trading under perfect and imperfect competition this paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions permit trading and on relative standards per unit of output credit trading two types of market structure are considered perfect competition and cournot oligopoly we find that output abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading allowing trade between permit trading and credit trading sectors may increase welfare with perfect competition permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading with imperfect competition credit trading may outperform permit trading environmental policy can lead to exit but also to entry of firms entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes especially under imperfect competition we find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

on the correspondence between individual and aggregate food consumption functions evidence from the usa and the netherlands this paper provides evidence from the us and dutch budget surveys that income elasticity of family food consumption is a function of family income and other observable characteristics of the household it also finds that the conditional variance of family food consumption depends on family income this complicated pattern of dependence of family food consumption on income breaks the exact correspondence between the family and the aggregate food consumption functions simple dynamic models for aggregate food consumption are developed which are used for forecasting 1997 john wiley sons ltd

voluntary environmental agreements good or bad news for environmental protection abstract there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements vas as an environmental policy tool this article uses a simple model to determine whether vas are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection we consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls the stick approach or by cost sharing subsidies the carrot approach the results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative depending on a number of factors including the allocation of bargaining power the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of funds

political contribution caps and lobby formation theory and evidence abstract the perceived importance of special interest group money in election campaigns motivates widespread use of caps on allowable contributions we present a bargaining model in which the effect of a cap that is not too stringent on the amount a lobby can contribute improves its bargaining position relative to the politician it thus increases the payoff from lobbying which will therefore increase the equilibrium number of lobbies when lobby formation is endogenous caps may then also increase aggregate contributions from lobbies and increase politically motivated government spending we present empirical evidence from u s states that support various predictions of the model we find a positive effect on the number of pacs formed from enacting laws constraining pac contributions moreover the estimated effect is non linear as predicted by the theoretical model very stringent caps reduce the number of pacs but as the cap increases above a threshold level the effect becomes positive contribution caps in the majority of u s states are above this threshold

regulation by prices quantities or both a review of instrument choice choosing appropriate policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation once objectives are agreed and suitable targets adopted policy makers can employ command and control regulation and or economic instruments and choose between fixing a price or a quantity this paper examines the relative advantages of price quantity and hybrid instruments according to their efficiency under uncertainty the trade off between credible commitment and flexibility implementation international considerations and political economy various illustrations of the theory are provided with two detailed applications to climate change and transport policy specifically congestion and safety pricing

information alliances in contests with budget limits we study the role of information exchange that may occur in alliances in a contest without noise contestants learn their own limits of what they can spend in a contest they may also form alliances and learn the limits of all players who are within the same alliance then they decide independently about their own contest efforts alliance formation for the purpose of information exchange is beneficial for members of the same alliance and neutral for all other players also a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members further we identify and discuss the set of stable alliance combinations

noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets some extensions abstract this paper extends the results of previous research on transferable discharge permit tdp markets with noncompliant firms to make a specific comparison between standards and tdp systems when regulatory authorities are unable to achieve full compliance particular attention is given to the importance of the shape of the penalty function facing noncompliant firms the analysis indicates that under plausible penalty functions tdp markets may allow more pollution or a higher fraction of regulated firms out of compliance these results highlight the importance of implementation in the success of pollution control strategies relying on tdp markets

on emissions trading and market structure cap and trade versus intensity standards this paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading we particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two sector clean and dirty model with cournot competition among firms who face a fixed cost of production the clean sector is defined as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions we compare the welfare implications of a cap and trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards it is shown that a firm s long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in the respective sector intensity standards can result in clean firms selling allowances to dirty firms or dirty firms selling to clean firms the former outcome yields higher welfare it is demonstrated that cap and trade outperforms the intensity based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit with intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large

equitably slicing the pie water policy and allocation abstract non point source pollution is deteriorating water quality throughout the world new zealand is addressing this issue by regulating land based nutrient losses with debates over how to allocate limits across a heterogeneous landscape we develop a spatially explicit economic land use model to investigate efficiency and equity issues from seven approaches to allocate nutrient discharges across two new zealand watersheds we find that the preferred allocation differs across land use land characteristics and regulation stringency and that there is no universal best allocation option therefore decision makers should focus on at least efficiency and equity and on how to compensate those most affected

a trading ratio system for trading water pollution discharge permits abstract the fact that water flows to the lowest level uni directionally is a very specific and useful property of water by utilizing this property we design a trading ratio system trs of tradable discharge permits for water pollution control such a trading ratio system has three main characteristics 1 the zonal effluent cap is set by taking into account the water pollutant loads transferred from the upstream zones 2 the trading ratios are set equal to the exogenous transfer coefficients among zones and 3 permits are freely tradable among dischargers according to the trading ratios this paper shows that the trs can take care of the location effect of a discharge and can achieve the predetermined standards of environmental quality at minimum aggregate abatement costs problems with hot spots and free riding can be avoided and the burdens on both dischargers and the environmental authority should be relatively light

mass media and special interest groups abstract media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior it is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups however existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias we present a theoretical model that reconciles these results the model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group and media outlets reliance on subscription in addition to advertising revenues

the economic implications of using haccp as a food safety regulatory standard abstract this article discusses the nature and role of hazard analysis critical control point haccp as a food safety control system and in particular its role as an element of public food safety regulation the notion of efficiency in food safety regulation is discussed and related to the nature of food safety controls it is suggested that if appropriately applied haccp is a more economically efficient approach to food safety regulation than command and control cac interventions the economic implications of haccp are discussed with reference to estimates of the costs and benefits in particular for the food industry finally the use of haccp as an international trade standard and the facilitation of trade in processed food products is considered

further results on permit markets with market power and cheating abstract this paper examines a market for pollution permits in which one firm has market power and one or more firms is noncompliant i show that the firm with market power may choose to hold more permits than it needs effectively retiring permits from the market i also show that some noncompliance may be socially desirable because it can mitigate the distortion caused by market power similarly some degree of market power may be socially desirable because it can in turn mitigate the distortion caused by noncompliance

welfare implications of the renewable fuel standard with an integrated tax subsidy policy abstract this paper derives the optimal integrated tax subsidy policy where one input is taxed and revenues are used to subsidize the use of a substitute input to reduce greenhouse gas emissions given the existing policies under the renewable fuel standard policies we measure the welfare effects and impact on cellulosic ethanol production after implementing the tax subsidy policy using a general equilibrium model a revenue neutral integrated tax subsidy scheme leads to a small positive tax rate for crude oil and a large positive subsidy for cellulosic ethanol because the former has a larger emissions coefficient than the latter the overall welfare effects of an integrated tax subsidy scheme are less than a 1 increase for the economy but the growth in the cellulosic ethanol industry could range from 28 to 238 because the revenues from taxing crude oil are directly used to subsidize cellulosic ethanol production

on the pooling of cross sectional and time series data in the presence of heteroskedasticity abstract we analyze the effect of heteroskedasticity on log linear aggregation and its implications for the pooling of cross section and aggregate time series data an empirical analysis of food consumption based on us family budget survey and aggregate time series data illustrates

optimal investment policies for a polluting firm in an uncertain environment in this paper a stochastic dynamic model of the firm is used as a framework to study the optimality of abatement investments production causes pollution as an inevitable byproduct and in this model the latter is taxed by the government the firm can diminish these tax payments through reducing its pollution output by carrying out abatement investments it turns out that provided that its liquidity position is sufficiently strong the firm performs a growth policy such that expected marginal revenues of productive and abatement investments are balanced growth stops as soon as marginal revenue equals the shareholders time preference rate at that time dividend is paid out we also obtain that the emissions tax rate must exceed a certain lowerbound when the government wants emissions to decrease during the firm s growth phase

campaign finance and voter welfare with entrenched incumbents two candidates compete for elective office each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters but this requires costly advertising the candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising these contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors should the candidate win the election voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests there is an incumbency advantage in fundraising which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system while it can reduce welfare in other districts the optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects

the tradable permits approach to protecting the commons lessons for climate change tradable permit approaches for rationing access to the commons have been applied to many different types of resources in many different countries this essay reviews the experience with three main applications of tradable permit systems air pollution control water supply and fisheries management as well as some unique related programmes the purpose of the review is to draw together what we have learned about tradable permits in practice that might offer some useful insights for the implementation of the three tradable permit mechanisms that are part of the kyoto protocol copyright 2003 oxford university press

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

enforcement and price controls in emissions trading this paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms abatement costs the analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits when this occurs accommodating the effect of abatement cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second best optimal values however it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices this enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs and the policy produces the second best optimal outcome

emissions trading ercs or allowances emissions trading takes place from two alternative baselines 1 emission reduction credits ercs in which the baseline is existing regulations which are often activity based or 2 cap and trade which specifies the total allowable emissions this paper examines the effects of these two tradable permit systems on marginal and average costs for the firm using electricity generation as an example the erc system subsidizes the activity level to which it is tied and fails to incorporate the full cost of external harm into the product price if the permit limit is chosen ef ficiently the cap and trade system is more effi cient

abatement and permits when pollution is uncertain and violations are fined this paper considers a firm s choice of abatement and of the number of permits if actual pollution is stochastic such that full compliance cannot be ensured this straightforward extension induces non trivial and unexpected comparative static properties such as permits and abatement can be either substitutes or complements higher fines can lower the number of acquired permits or abatement and higher permit prices can reduce abatement yet integrating these reactions into a competitive permit market eliminates puzzling features this is an additional justification of tradable permits over standards where regulators must cope with potentially counterproductive firm reactions

pollution standards vs charges under uncertainty conventional analysis of pollution control policy under uncertainty does not properly account for the potential cost effectiveness difference between standards and charges thus drawing misleading conclusions for the case of inefficient standards correcting for this anomaly the following conclusions can be drawn when uncertainty involves the position of the marginal damage cost schedule rather than policy indifference a charge is always superior to an inefficient standard when uncertainty is about the position of the marginal control cost schedule policy indifference may occur but if it does it must be the case that the slope of marginal damage cost exceeds that of marginal control cost

weitzman revisited emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs and market power of polluting firms studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets by introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of weitzman rev econ stud 41 477 491 1974 this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric cournot oligopoly that weitzman s policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market power since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price their total abatement effort including the restriction of output is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price taking firms consequently the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes in a further step the provided policy recommendations are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric

aggregation with log linear models when economic theory suggests a log linear specification for individual agents e g cobbdouglas production it is common to estimate the same log linear model with aggregate data invoking a representative agent assumption and thereby assuming away aggregation errors this paper gives necessary and sufficient restrictions on the distribution of agents in an economy for log linear agent models to aggregate into log linear macro models and discusses the aggregation bias resulting from violation of these restrictions theorems tests economic rationales and empirical results are given included are connections to random walks and to cointegration analogous results for log level models are derived

performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution abstract this paper presents a model of pollution regulation in an oligopolistic market two forms of regulation are considered performance standards which regulate pollution directly by an upper limit on emissions and design standards which regulate pollution indirectly by a minimum usage requirement of an enissions control input equilibria under each regulatory regime are characterized a welfare analysis reveals that performance standards are preferred to design standards if the objective is minimization of emissions plus pollution damage costs however the comparison is indeterminate if the regulator s objective is total surplus less pollution damage an equivalence between emissions taxes and performance standards is established so the above welfare comparisons also apply to emissions taxes versus design standards

marketable permits market power and cheating abstract in this paper we present a model of a noncompliant firm operating in a marketable pollution permit market in the main result of the paper we show how compliance is related to the initial distribution of permits a firm with market power will cheat less the larger its endowment of permits is from a fixed stock of permits the competitive fringe however will cheat more as its endowment of permits is reduced generating an ambiguous global impact on cheating

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

emissions reductions or green booms general equilibrium effects of a renewable portfolio standard renewable portfolio standards rps are commonly promoted as a policy tool to reduce emissions associated with fossil generation while also stimulating development of local renewable resource endowments we develop a general equilibrium model of an rps policy that captures key features such as a fixed factor renewable endowment substitution across sectors of the economy and endogenous price responses we analytically decompose the effects of an rps into a a substitution effect b an output tax effect and c an output effect we show that an increase in the rps can either deliver large resource booms or large emissions savings but not both our framework can translate different renewable resource endowments and pre existing standards across states into economic and environmental impacts to inform current renewable energy and climate policies

the kyoto protocol market power and enforcement the kyoto protocol aims to limit aggregate carbon emissions by participating countries to 1990 emissions levels in aggregate it also allows for the creation of a permit market in which countries will be able to buy and sell the right to emit carbon dioxide this paper investigates how market power held by the countries of the former soviet union and enforcement of the carbon emission limits might affect the abatement and the cost of compliance with the kyoto protocol to do so it uses a modified version of the van egteren weber 1996 model to investigate a permit market in the presence of both market power and enforcement difficulties it then simulates the model finding that if meeting abatement targets is the goal regulating the supply side of the market and convex fine schedules are the most effective tools

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

random wastes imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards abstract this paper considers a firm s choice of optimal pollution abatement strategy in an environment where pollution licences are purchased through a market and a fine is levied for pollution in excess of the licences held the pollution associated with any level of abatement is stochastic and the authority monitors pollution via a random sample of observations firms choose cost minimising values for the mean and variance of emissions and the authority selects its sample size and the number of licences issued to achieve an exogenous level of environmental quality with abatement costs and monitoring costs at a minimum level

campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups abstract regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones are these regulations desirable this paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry in the absence of entry contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field with entry however a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions in particular a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo and even if better policies are chosen the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups creating costly rent seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying

non compliance and the quota price in an itq fishery this paper examines the effects of non compliance on quota demands and the equilibrium quota price in an itq fishery i show that whereas lower quota prices are implied unambiguously by expected penalties which are a function of the absolute violation size the expectation of penalties based upon relative violations of quota demands can under certain conditions produce higher quota prices than in a compliant quota market if there are both compliant and non compliant firms in the fishery the result would then be a shift in quota demand from compliant to non compliant firms rather than the reverse the findings are generally applicable to quota markets in other industries including pollution permit markets

a note on permits standards and technological innovation abstract montero j environ econom manage 44 2002 23 contrasts the incentives to invest in new abatement technologies under different regulatory instruments and argues that one needs to consider the induced output effects that derive from lower abatement costs montero shows that once one takes into account these effects on output command and control instruments can generate stronger incentives to innovate than market based instruments this result rests on strategic output effects under command and control however he maintains that under perfectly competitive conditions market based instruments will continue to weakly dominate command and control regulation this note clarifies two issues raised by montero first i use montero s approach to show that in fact performance concentration standards will generate greater incentives to innovate than market based instruments in perfectly competitive markets one does not require strategic effects to get this result second montero abstracts from production costs and concentrates solely on abatement costs he implicitly assumes that marginal production costs are constant i show that some of montero s results change once increasing marginal production costs are considered when marginal costs are increasing the benefit of additional output is tempered and market based instruments again look more favorable

campaign advertising and voter welfare this paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it an electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players many voters two candidates and one interest group the group has non verifiable insider information on the candidates quality and on the basis of this information offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position candidates spend the contributions they receive on non directly informative advertising this paper shows that 1 a separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive 2 although voters are fully rational a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare improving and 3 split contributions may arise in equilibrium and if they arise too often they are detrimental to voters

the impact of public scrutiny on corporate philanthropy this paper proposes that a corporation s vulnerability to public scrutiny drives its corporate giving the hypothesis that companies donate for strategic motives is tested against the alternative that they do so for altruistic reasons court cases and news articles were selected as proxies for public scrutiny macroeconomic variables were used to gauge the level of public charitable need and test for altruism through examining the philanthropic behavior of 40 fortune 500 companies over 7 years this paper finds that companies are strategic and altruistic in their giving

inefficient equilibria in lobbying lobbying is often represented as a common agency game common agency games typically have multiple equilibria one class of equilibria called truthful has been identified by bernheim and whinston quarterly journal of economics 1986 101 1 1 31 in this paper we identify another class of equilibria which we call natural in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative the alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65 of the matches while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5 of the matches 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

pollution taxes and standards a continuum of quasi optimal solutions abstract a generalized second best problem involving a perfectly competitive industry which produces a pollution type of externality is examined the pollution tax is allowed to assume an arbitrary value possibly zero while a pollution standard set as a ratio of pollution to output is determined by a first order optimizing condition the general condition for a set of quasi optimal solutions includes the pareto optimal solution as a special case it is also found that when the pollution tax is below the optimal level the usual implication is that the standard should be set so that the marginal cost of pollution reduction exceeds the marginal external damage

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

emissions taxes versus intensity standards second best environmental policies with incomplete regulation the best emissions tax or emissions cap may be an inferior instrument under incomplete regulation leakage without leakage an intensity standard regulating emissions per unit of output is inferior due to an implicit output subsidy this inefficiency can be eliminated by an additional consumption tax with leakage an intensity standard can dominate the optimal emissions tax since the implicit output subsidy prevents leakage the addition of a consumption tax improves an intensity standard s efficiency may prevent leakage and may be efficient comparing intensity standards to output based updating shows that the latter dominates if updating is sufficiently flexible