a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

fully absorbing dynamic compromise abstract i consider a repeated divide the dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period s allocation see kalandrakis 14 i show that if proposals can be non exhaustive then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a markov perfect equilibrium this result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence

utility functions for public outputs and majority voting abstract this paper studies the existence and stability of majority voting equilibria over sequences of one dimensional choice problems in the public sector voters public sector preferences are derived from their primitive preferences over public outputs and private consumption by maximizing the latter out if agents ignore the potential effects of public sector states on private sector prices we find that majority voting equilibria will exist under the usual assumptions but these equilibria are not stable unless the primitive utility functions are separable and admit no wealth effects on demand for public goods if agents do take account of the effects of public sector states on private sector prices voting cycles may arise even when the choice space is one dimensional

agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining abstract we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda in the procedure proposals must be made on only one issue at a time although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table when bargaining frictions are small there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements including ones with delay however equilibrium payoffs cannot be made arbitrarily small perpetual disagreement cannot be supported in equilibrium this multiplicity contrasts with the uniqueness found in the literature for a procedure where offers can be made in any subset of remaining issues

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

bargaining orders in a multi person bargaining game abstract this paper studies a complete information bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of different sizes or bargaining strengths the bargaining order is determined endogenously with a finite horizon there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the buyer purchases in order of increasing size from the smallest to the largest with an infinite horizon if the sellers have sufficiently different sizes there is a unique equilibrium outcome which has the same bargaining order if the sellers have similar sizes with an infinite horizon there may be multiple equilibrium outcomes with different bargaining orders

meetings with costly participation we study a collective decision making process in which people interested in an issue may participate at a cost in a meeting and the resulting decision is a compromise among the participants preferences we show that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme and when the compromise is the median the outcome is likely to be random the model and its equilibria are consistent with evidence on the procedures and outcomes of us regulatory hearings jel d7 h0 l5

endogenous incomplete contracts a bargaining approach in this paper we argue that by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts this point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once for all bargain over the entire stream a long term contract or through a series of bargaining rounds a short term contract within this structure short term contracts arise as equilibrium outcomes under very general conditions because a short term contract implies reduced bargaining costs for one of the agents in essence reduced transaction costs produce a short term contract jel classification l14 c78

on the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations abstract the preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined it is shown that the buyer weakly prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history with substitute goods such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head to head competition with complementary goods strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers their price offers have short deadlines and or goods are weak complements sellers strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard baron ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement in standing committees however existing agreements can be amended this article studies an extension of the baron ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees in each of an infinite number of periods the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy which is in turn the default for the next period the model provides a number of quite different predictions i from a positive perspective the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity in that case patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy markov perfect equilibria in contrast the unique markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding baron ferejohn framework ii if players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria including all markov perfect equilibria are inefficient

the inflation discipline of currency substitution abstract we examine the argument that currency substitution should be encouraged since it provides an inflation discipline in highly stylized games of national welfare maximization we find that as currency substitution increases currency survival comes to dominate all other considerations and inflation rates do indeed come down however we find no reason to think that these competitive inflation rates will be optimal the discipline embodied in currency substitution may be too weak or too strong it may be a poor substitute for direct coordination of monetary and fiscal policies we try to relate our analysis to recent u k proposals

bargaining piecemeal or all at once perfect information rubinstein style bargaining models are used to explore questions about multiple issue bargaining is it ever sensible to offer on only a subset of the issues being bargained what is the effect of limiting offers so that they must cover all issues we conclude that in realistic settings the answer to the first question is yes and that restricting offers to those covering all issues may be harmful to one or both parties

alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit abstract in a seminal paper ariel rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two person bargaining problem in this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum if the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways for example because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small we also show that for a fixed discount rate all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

a problem with euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics abstract euclidean public sector preferences can not be induced from a strictly quasiconcave primitive utility function and a linear constraint

bargaining with an agenda gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda a family of increasing sets of joint utilities parameterized by time a solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time we axiomatize an ordinal solution i e one that is covariant with order preserving transformations of utility it can be viewed as the limit of step by step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next the stepwise agreements may follow the nash solution the kalai smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit

international currency substitution and the income velocity of money abstract this paper presents new empirical evidence on the degree to which international currency substitution destabilizes domestic money demand it also provides an explanation of some apparent discrepancies among previous empirical studies of currency substitution this explanation hinges on the distinction between the elasticity of currency substitution and the cross elasticity of money demand a large small value of one elasticity does not imply a large small value of the other a large cross elasticity is required for currency substitution to destabilize domestic money demand the empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the view that these cross elasticities are typically small

multi issue bargaining with endogenous agenda abstract the first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues the agenda matters even if players become arbitrarily patient this result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues it is found that simultaneous bargaining over packages should be a prevailing phenomenon but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay journal of economic literature classification number c78

the importance of the agenda in bargaining abstract this paper discusses a multi issue bargaining game in which the players set up an agenda and negotiate on the issues sequentially according to this agenda we demonstrate that the agenda might play an important role in the bargaining and discuss the relationship between the agenda and the final outcome of the bargaining game assuming that players have conflicting evaluations regarding the importance of the issues under negotiation we identify the type of agenda each player prefers we also show that in such cases the outcome of the bargaining game need not to be efficient by demonstrating the strategic use of the agenda the paper explains the phenomenon of bargaining on the agenda

structure induced equilibria and perfect foresight expectations this paper extends the work on structure induced equilibria by explicitly considering voters expectations the standard assumption of myopic expectations is contrasted with the alternative assumption of perfect foresight expectations in the institutional setting examined perfect foresight means voters know how the outcome on the first issue in a sequence of two issues conditions majority rule outcomes on the second issue if voters act on this knowledge when voting on the first issue then several important results follow first voters may possess multipeaked preferences defined over the first issue with a majority cycle resulting so that there is no equilibrium to the whole sequence of elections second even if cycling does not result the exact location of the equilibrium involves a broader conspiracy than previously thought a conspiracy of not only preferences and institutional structure but also voters expectations as conditioned by that structure

delays and partial agreements in multi issue bargaining abstract we model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically one player values the existing pie more than the future one while the other player has the opposite valuation we show that players may consume only a fraction of the existing pie in the first period and then consume the remainder of it along with the second pie at the date at which the second pie becomes available thus our model features a special form of bargaining delay in which agreements take place in multiple stages such partial agreements arise when players are patient enough when they expect the second pie to become available soon and when the asymmetry in their valuations is large enough

currency substitution and the demand for money some evidence for canada recently the possibility that foreign and domestic currencies are substitutes has received considerable attention see 1 2 3 10 19 21 currency substitution has important implications for the working of flexible exchange rates if the degree of currency substitution is high small changes in the money supply would induce large changes in the exchange rate furthermore currency substitution would transmit the effect of monetary disturbances from one country to another indeed significant currency substitution would seriously undermine the ability of flexible exchange rates to provide monetary independence this paper examines the empirical importance of currency substitution in the framework of the demand function for money if currency substitution is important the expected change in the exchange rate should be a significant determinant of the demand for home currency in section 2 we undertake such a test for the canadian demand for money during the recent flexible exchange rate period there is considerable evidence that the forward exchange rate is a good measure of the expected exchange rate our own tests confirm these results for canadian data since 1970

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

non cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies abstract the joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a cooperative approach we provide an analysis for such economies by means of non cooperative bargaining two bargaining models are analyzed one based on demands the other on proposals we show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable i e core outcomes in the case of the proposal model the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d21 d42

currency substitution and the optimal inflation tax abstract there exist conflicting results on the optimal inflation tax in open economies subject to currency substitution this paper reconciles the different results and concludes that except in very special cases the optimal inflation tax is positive

bargaining in a long term relationship with endogenous termination abstract this paper studies a dynamic game of perfect information in which two players start bargaining over the partition of a new cake each time agreement is struck over the partition of an existing cake negotiations over the partition of each cake take place according to rubinstein s alternating offers model the parameters of the model are the players rates of time preference the time interval between two consecutive offers and the lag time between the end of one set of negotiations and the start of the next we characterize the unique stationary perfect equilibrium and investigate the possible existence of non stationary equilibria journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 c78

the budget process and the size of the budget the new congressional budget process provides members of congress with a new set of institutional mechanisms for making budget decisions this article addresses the question of whether or under what conditions rigid application of the new budget process modeled as first selection of the size of the budget and second its division produces smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process in which the size of the budget is determined residually the theoretical result is that the new process sometimes results in relatively large budgets a testable implication of the theory is that given a choice of how stringently the budget process is to be employed members of congress jointly consider preferences and the expected outcomes under available institutional arrangements and select the arrangement usually a rule that yields the most favorable outcome empirical results from the budget process in the house from 1980 to 1983 are generally supportive of the theoretically derived hypothesis of rational choice of institutional arrangements

on the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates in this paper we consider a particular international economic policy regime the laissez faire regime the distinguishing features of which are unrestricted portfolio choice and floating exchange rates and as we show this regime although favored by many economists is not economically feasible it does not have a determinate equilibrium that is an implication of an overlapping generations model more basically it is an implication of the notion that money is wanted only in order to accomplish trades

economic exchange during hyperinflation historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt individuals normal trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning of markets to explore these issues we construct a theoretical model of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of economic exchange in our model buyers must carry cash while shopping and some transactions take place in a decentralized setting in which buyer and seller negotiate over the terms of trade of an indivisible good since buyers face the constant threat of incoming younger hence richer customers their bargaining position is weakened by inflation allowing sellers to extract a higher real price however we show that higher inflation also reduces buyers search increasing sellers wait for customers as a result the volume of transactions concluded in the decentralized sector falls at high enough rates of inflation all agents suffer a welfare loss

agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining ii unrestricted agendas we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous unrestricted agenda in which offers can be made in any subset of outstanding issues we find necessary and sufficient conditions for this procedure to have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium agreement

international currency substitution and seigniorage in a simple model of money i introduction currency substitution describes the change in the holdings of domestic and foreign real balances in response to fluctuations in the relative prices of these currencies so far the empirical evidence on the strength of currency substitution has been mixed miles 1978 finds evidence in favor of strong currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar bordo and choudhri 1982 criticize miles on the ground that miles has a misspecified model and their estimates of a canadian money demand function indicate little currency substitution in a recent paper rogers 1992 finds that dollarization in a high inflation economy such as mexico s is quite strong and statistically significant imrohoroglu 1994 on the other hand estimates the extent of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar using a gmm approach and finds that the elasticity of currency substitution in canada is quite low between 0 29 and 0 43 depending on the instruments used furthermore the estimate of the share of u s dollar denominated deposits in producing canadian liquidity services is on the order of 1 percent to 3 percent the policy implications of currency substitution have been extensively analyzed most of these studies concentrate on the impact of currency substitution on the volatility of exchange rates and the autonomy of domestic monetary policy under a flexible exchange rate regime 1 recently researchers have started to explore whether currency substitution alters the results in the optimal inflation tax literature for example vegh 1989 shows that it may be optimal to resort to the inflation tax under currency substitution since it reduces the distortion introduced by an exogenously given positive foreign interest rate in his model a positive foreign interest rate creates a distortion because it acts as an indirect consumption tax kimbrough 1991 analyzes a small open economy under currency substitution where domestic agents are required to use domestic real balances to purchase the domestic nontraded good foreign real balances to purchase the imported good and either domestic or foreign real balances to purchase the exportable good he finds that it is optimal to follow the friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate in this setup since money serves as an intermediate good guidotti and vegh 1993 however argue that kimbrough s 1991 result only applies under very restrictive assumptions on the transactions technology and that in general the optimal inflation rate is positive under currency substitution aizenman 1992 considers a multi country money in the utility function model in a common currency area where there are collection costs associated with income taxation he shows that in the absence of a cartel agreement on how to share the seigniorage revenue the optimal inflation rate for individual countries will exceed the optimal inflation rate under a cooperative solution canzoneri and diba 1992 study the role of currency substitution in a two country money in the utility function model under a flexible exchange rate regime where there are collection costs of lump sum taxes they show that the outcome of a noncooperative seigniorage maximization or welfare maximization game is characterized by the friedman rule the cooperative outcome on the other hand includes the inflation tax as part of an optimal tax package since lump sum taxes are costly to collect the theoretical literature summarized above suggests that currency substitution may have important economic implications most of the attention has been on the role of the elasticity of currency substitution the share of foreign real balances in the residents domestic portfolio has largely been ignored laney radcliffe and willett 1984 and joines 1985 emphasize the distinction between the elasticity of substitution and the cross elasticity of money demand and argue that a high cross elasticity is necessary for currency substitution to have a major destabilizing impact on domestic money demand

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

a note on multi issue two sided bargaining bilateral procedures abstract this note considers a two sided multi issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same side may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues the note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield in particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity conflicting priorities may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement the different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures moreover the conflict over procedure can be substantial among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players journal of economic literature classification number c7

first things first the agenda formation problem for multi issue committees abstract the paper focuses on sequential bargaining procedures in which parties are allowed to differ in several respects we first highlight the strategic effects in the bargaining game and the often conflicting incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas we then show that there is a pareto superior agenda among the issue by issue procedures this consists in setting the most important issue first unless this is difficult urgent in the sense that there is probability of game breakdown after a rejection in the negotiations over this issue in this case parties prefer to negotiate over the easy issue first

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

the currency substitution hypothesis and relative money demand in mexico and canada the author estimates demand for dollars relative to domestic currency in mexico and canada using 1 a multivariate model with a relative money demand equation and 2 single equation models including an error correction representation he also analyzes the models encompassing properties the anomalous correlation between the mexican dollarization ratio and expected peso depreciation implies that convertibility risk was associated with holding mexidollars under this interpretation higher expected depreciation coincides with a drop in relative demand for dollars because there is the possibility that the government will forcibly convert mexdollars when these central bank liabilities rise and foreign reserves run low several testable alternative explanations are rejected copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

currency substitution and seigniorage maximizing inflation the case of cambodia this article contributes a new empirical study on currency substitution in cambodia in our analysis a model of money in the utility function is adopted the empirical results indicate that the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic real currency balances in cambodia is high moreover the high share of foreign real balances in providing domestic liquidity services in cambodia is also confirmed by empirical analysis given these findings the effects of the currency substitution on the government ability to gain from seigniorage revenue are also examined the analysis from simulated results shows that the cambodian government has little opportunity to gain from seigniorage revenue

waiting to persuade i analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power measured as the probability of making offers but learn as they play the game i show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date but never reach one before it given any discount rate if the learning is sufficiently slow the players agree immediately i show that for any speed of learning the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long provided that the players are sufficiently patient therefore although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn

selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two issue complete information bargaining game abstract this paper explores the effects of a selective acceptance rule on the outcome of two issue negotiations the alternating offer game introduced here allows for the possibility that settlement may be reached on one issue while negotiation continues about the other this model captures features of laws that are generally believed to increase efficiency the analysis shows that if one issue is indivisible there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with no pareto improving alternative equilibria with opposing valuations rapid communication guarantees inefficiency these are unique examples of this strong form of inefficiency in an alternating offer bargaining game with complete and perfect information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 j30

on dynamic compromise abstract most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal so why don t legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority we show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient and initial allocations are not too unequal the compromise is only sustainable if starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise we find that the range of discount factors for which the equilibrium exists increases as the number of legislators increases in this sense compromise is easier in larger legislatures

foreign inflation transmission under flexible exchange rates and currency substitution the dynamic and steady state effects of a permanent unanticipated increase in foreign inflation on a small open economy are analyzed under flexible exchange rates and currency substitution the velocity of domestic money and consequently the domestic inflation rate may rise along the transition path to steady state but only if demand for foreign currency is sufficiently elastic such that the substitution from foreign to domestic money on impact is large higher foreign inflation is transmitted negatively when demand is inelastic all else constant a higher initial level of foreign real balances increases the magnitude of the transmission effects copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

gmm estimates of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar this paper investigates the empirical strength of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar euler equations implied by a small open economy money in the utility function model are estimated and tested by hansen s generalized method of moments procedure the major empirical finding is that both the elasticity of currency substitution and the share of u s currency in the production of canadian liquidity services are economically small even though the combined domestic and u s real balances appear to provide statistically significant economizing on transactions costs copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

optimal taxation and inflation in an open economy abstract this paper examines the role of the inflation tax in the optimal revenue raising tax package for a small open economy where money is held because it serves to reduce transacttions costs associated with purchasing goods consumers choose whether domestic money or foreign money will serve as the medium of exchange for various goods purchases so as to minimize such costs results are derived regarding the appropriate role of taxes on domestic and foreign money in the optimal tax structure it is demonstrated that with a sufficiently rich tax structure friedman s rule which calls for a monetary policy that drives the nominal interest rate to zero is a component of the optimal tax policy

bargaining frictions bargaining procedures and implied costs in multiple issue bargaining the paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players bargaining costs in multiple issue bargaining settings when bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached issue by issue negotiation can generate bargaining costs different from those that occur if all issues are bargained simultaneously these cost differences result in differences in allocations across bargaining procedures such that players disagree on the desired method of bargaining similar results hold for certain fixed cost bargaining friction specifications this analysis provides a potential explanation of both agenda bargaining and incomplete contracts

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo abstract we consider a non cooperative bargaining game where in each round if a proposal is rejected with a probability the allocation implemented in the previous round is implemented as a status quo and the game proceeds to the next round and with the complementary probability no allocations are implemented and the negotiations break down we show that there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium such that in any round a proposer offers a proposal such that the responder is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it and an agreement is achieved if the probability of breakdown is close to zero the sequence of equilibrium allocations evolves from the initial status quo to an allocation near the equilibrium allocation of the rubinstein bargaining game over time the effect of the initial status quo on the equilibrium allocations vanishes over time

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

the competitive externalities and the optimal seignorage this study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decisionmakers who can effectively print more money via the central bank the author derives the sequential rational expectation equilibrium and shows that the presence of competing decisionmakers increases the inflation rate and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax laffer curve the analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces where the centralized government system is weak similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

negotiations in multi issue committees abstract we propose a non cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game the main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi issue committees and its relation to the importance of the issues we start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes we then consider multi issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas we argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda we conclude with a sufficient condition on players preferences which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda

logical deficiencies in spatial models a constructive critique a fundamental property of any good theoryis logical consistency however two commonassumptions in the rational choice approach topolitical analysis that induced preferences overpolicy are separable and that such preferences areindependent of changes in exogenous factors are notconsistent with the archetypal assumptions ofindividual utility maximization these particularpathologies of spatial models of politics have notbeen well recognized in the political scienceliterature

self control and bargaining abstract this paper examines a bargaining game with alternating proposals where sophisticated quasi hyperbolic discounters negotiate over an infinite stream of payoffs in markov perfect equilibrium payoffs are almost always unique and a small advantage in self control can result in a large advantage in payoff in subgame perfect equilibrium a multiplicity of payoffs and delay can arise despite the complete information setting markov perfect equilibria are the best subgame perfect equilibria for the agent with more self control and the worst for the agent with less self control naivete can help a player by increasing their reservation value

dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo we analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players conflict of interest players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo this leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia under certain conditions the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock players never reach an agreement gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences provided they are sufficiently patient in legislative settings our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks

order independent equilibria we study a noncooperative game of coalition formation based on an underlying game in coalitional form we introduce order independent equilibria oie a strategy profile is an oie if for any specification of first movers in the sequential game it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff our results are 1 payoffs in oie that use pure stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form 2 if the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then for each payoff vector there exists an oie with the same payoff journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71 c72 c78

the optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency substitution abstract an important result in the optimal inflation tax literature is that if money is modeled as reducing transactions costs the optimal nominal interest rate is zero this paper examines this issue in the context of a small open economy where both domestic and foreign currency circulate as media of exchange it is shown that the presence of foreign money enables the government to reduce the distortion introduced into the economy by a positive foreign nominal interest rate by setting a positive domestic nominal interest rate

optimizing multi stage negotiations abstract we consider procedures where issues of varying importance and risk are negotiated in stages negotiation at any stage requires an agreement at each previous stage if negotiation terminates players realize the benefits from all earlier agreements we formalize this process by a strategic n stage negotiation game the expected subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is characterized by an intuitive compact formula which aggregates all the structural elements of the multi stage process we describe the optimal negotiation agenda for a given decomposition of the bargaining problem and we derive intuitive prescriptions for an optimal decomposition