contract enforcement and trade liberalization in mexico s footwear industry abstract the wave of formal legal system reforms sweeping developing countries provides only a partial solution to the problem of enforcing agreements between firms informal institutions govern the majority of interfirm transactions economic reform also necessitates changes in these institutions this paper examines the evolution of contract enforcement in the mexican footwear industry as trade barriers were removed in the closed economy geographic agglomeration of manufacturing allowed the manufacturers trade associations to maintain information about the behavior of retailers and gave retailers strong incentives to maintain reputations by providing an alternative source for procurement trade liberalization weakened the power of manufacturers

generalised morality and the problem of transition to an impersonal exchange regime a response to platteau this essay addresses the problem of transition from a personalised exchange regime that characterises most ldcs to the more impersonal form of exchange that marks advanced market economies this debate has received impetus from the discussion launched by platteau 1994 in the pages of this journal where he seeks to clarify the social conditions that allow the market system to evolve while the role of private and public order institutions in generating market order is recognised this is regarded as inadequate necessitating the invocation of generalised morality gm to complete the explanation it is argued here that gm does not need to be invoked the article pleads for taking a closer look at the historical role of risk bearing institutions especially financial institutions evidence from the bangladesh rice market is adduced in support of the contention that there exist elements even within a traditional exchange regime that can evolve into modern impersonal forms this is brought out by ex

truth trust and market transactions what do we know john humphrey and hubert schmitz have recently made an important contribution to the literature on trust and economic transactions between firms unfortunately the evidence that high levels of societal trust contribute significantly to economic growth is far less reliable than they suggest we need more research but research informed by greater conceptual clarity about trust and the institutional arrangements that contribute to trust the framework presented here for conceptualising the various sources of trust should help guide empirical research

the development of nominal wage rigidity in the late 19th century wage price and output indexes suitable for comparing cyclical movements across decades show a decrease in nominal wage flexibility the change in wage inflation associated with output fluctuations after the 1880s following an increase in strike frequency linked to the spread of large scale manufacturing cross sectional data show that firms in industries experiencing more strikes in the 1880s were less likely to cut nominal wages in the depression of 1893 this and other evidence suggests that the nineteenth century decrease in wage flexibility was caused by an increase in workers bargaining power in the absence of binding wage contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

prices productivity and wage bargaining in open economies according to the standard union bargaining model unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages but product market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain we formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model where labour and product market conditions together determine wages a wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four nordic countries wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio but also on productivity international prices and exchange rates there is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness

nominal wage contracts and the persistent effects of monetary policy we consider an efficiency wage model where wages affect turnover and firms choose optimal labor contracts under uncertainty about demand and productivity we show that there may be an equilibrium with nominal wage contracts where monetary shocks affect output furthermore monetary shocks have persistent effects on output because the previous state of the labor market affects the reemployment probability of quitting workers persistence increases if workers have bargaining power with endogenous policy a credibility problem arises naturally in the model equilibrium inflation increases with persistence but decreases with the natural rate of unemployment for given persistence

insider power unemployment dynamics and multiple inflation equilibria this paper incorporates employment dynamics due to insider power into the barro gordon theory of inflation unlike in the static barro gordon case and even though our infinitehorizon model is linear quadratic there can be two markov perfect equilibria so that the same unemployment may correspond to either low or high inflation both equilibrium inflation rates measured per unit of the gap between the insiders and government s employment targets are higher than the corresponding rate in the static case the low inflation equilibrium has intuitive comparative statics properties in that inflation is increasing in insider power and the discount factor but the high inflation equilibrium behaves in the opposite way the highinflation equilibrium can be eliminated by a future precommitment to a fixed inflation regime e g erm but only if this precommitment can be made with certainty contrary to the static model inflation may be lower when the union puts a positive weight on a wage target than when it cares only about employment even when this wage target is consistent with a lower employment level than the employment target

wages profits and rent sharing the paper suggests a new test for rent sharing in the u s labor market using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector it shows that a rise in a sector s profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long run level of wages in that sector the paper controls for workers characteristics for industry fixed effects and for unionism lester s range of wages is estimated for rent sharing reasons alone at approximately 24 per cent of the mean wage

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

social surplus and profitability under different spatial pricing policies one of the most controversial parts of the u s antitrust laws is the robinson patman act posner has argued it should be discarded entirely 34 bork has called it the misshapen progeny of intolerable draughtsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic theory 10 382 the robinson patman act is an amendment passed in 1936 to section 2 of the clayton act in the words of its co sponsor its purpose was to prevent discrimination between competing customers of a seller so that any price differentials should be limited to the sound economic differences in costs 33 5 because of its concern with price discrimination it is the robinson patman act that is relevant to the spatial pricing policies of firms however the precise limitations the law imposes on spatial prices are not exactly well defined one point is relatively clear that no question of unlawful price discrimination would arise so long as the f o b price is 1 uniform and 2 available to all customers on a nondiscriminatory basis no legal requirement exists that the alternative f o b price be of any particular amount or computed in any particular way 85 f t c 1174 1176 1 49 while f o b mill pricing is legally unassailable the legal status of uniform delivered pricing where firms charge the same price at all points of sale is somewhat ambivalent see dunn 16 for a discussion what is certain is that firms charging neither mill nor uniform prices may be open to successful prosecution especially if they set price schedules which have bumpdip changes for example in the utah pie case see breit and elzinga 12 for more details firms were found guilty of price discrimination since their delivered prices were lower in the local utah market than at points closer to their plants

cooperation harassment and involuntary unemployment an insider outsider approach the authors present a theory of involuntary unemployment which explains why the unemployed workers outsiders are unable or unwilling to find jobs even though they are prepared to work for less than the prevailing wages of incumbent workers in siders the outsiders do not underbid the insiders since were the y to do so the insiders would withdraw cooperation from them making their work unpleasant with harassment and thereby reducing the prod uctivity and increasing the reservation wages of the underbidders th e resulting labor turnover costs create economic rent which the insid ers tap in wage setting and as a result involuntary unemployment ma y arise copyright 1988 by american economic association

a traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations under the traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations aggregate demand shocks move output and prices in the same direction while aggregate supply shocks move output and prices in opposite directions this paper examines the joint behavior of u s output unemployment prices wages and nominal money and asks whether it is consistent with this interpretation the answer is a qualified yes

trust and inter firm relations in developing and transition economies the role of trust in facilitating economic growth has been highlighted in previous contributions to this journal in order to take this debate forward this article argues 1 that more attention needs to be given to the relationship between sanctions and trust and 2 that it is worth distinguishing between the minimal trust for making markets effective and the extended trust required for deeper kinds of inter firm co operation to work the article goes on to ask why minimal trust is lacking and so hard to construct in the republics of the former soviet union it then examines how extended trust grows or can be made to grow in industrial supply chains and clusters in developing countries

how well does the is lm model fit postwar u s data postwar u s time series for money interest rates prices and gnp are characterized by a multivariate process driven by four exogenous disturbances those disturbances are identified so that they can be interpreted as the four main sources of fluctuations found in the is lm phillips curve model money supply money demand is and aggregate supply shocks the dynamic properties of the estimated model are analyzed and shown to match most of the stylized predictions of the model the estimated decomposition is also used to measure the relative importance of each shock to interpret some macroeconomic episodes and to study sources of permanent shocks to nominal variables

behind the market stage where real societies exist part i the role of public and private order institutions this two part article is an attempt to clarify the social conditions upon which the viability and efficiency of the market system rest it strives to show that the embeddedness thesis that is an explanation based upon the existence of long run personal ties involving the use of reputation mechanisms among transactors cannot fully elucidate the question as to how the problem of trust is solved in market societies as explained in part i there are difficulties of both theoretical and empirical historical kinds and these explain why the market order needs to be sustained by private and public order institutions in part ii the role of generalised morality in backing or supplementing such institutions is discussed in the light of game theory and particular emphasis is put on the ability of moral norms to sustain honest behaviour by generating the right kind of preferences and establishing trust the vexed problem of the dynamics of norm emergence and erosion is then addressed with a view to showing

the costs of price stability downward nominal wage rigidity in europe in most european countries the prevailing terms of employment including the nominal wage can be changed only by mutual consent this legal feature gives workers a strategic advantage in wage negotiations when employers push for a nominal wage cut the upshot is a long run trade off between inflation and unemployment for low levels of inflation in spite of all agents being rational and with no expectational errors specifically downward nominal wage rigidity and excess unemployment at zero inflation are related to three factors the coverage of collective agreements the legal framework at contract renewal and the strictness of the employment protection legislation for non union workers

insider bargaining power starting wages and involuntary unemployment recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage we con

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

insiders outsiders and nominal wage contracts while the consequences of nominal wage contracts have been rather thoroughly analyzed there is no generally accepted theory of why such contracts prevail in this paper i argue that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is important for understanding nominal wage contracts since most employment fluctuations take the form of fluctuations in hiring insiders are normally not affected by them since prices are primarily determined by costs demand shocks have small effects on real wages thus insiders have little incentive to change to more complicated contracts with rigid nominal wages nominal demand shocks have large effects on the employment opportunities of outsiders but outsiders have little influence on labor contracts

dynamics and asymmetric adjustment in insider outsider models this paper analyzes the time consistent and efficient solution for wages and employment in intertemporal insider outsider models of bargaining with endogenous membership when the reservation wage is made endogenous in a general equilibrium context insider outsider models can generate a fundamental asymmetry in the adjustment of employment to the steady state while upturns are gradual severe downturns are characterized by a sharp drop in employment obtained by laying off workers further reductions in employment are achieved solely through quits copyright 1992 by royal economic society