a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

do governors get what they want an alternative examination of the line item veto this paper reconsiders the impact of the governor s line item veto on the state budget process the governor s ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness rather than a smaller expenditure budget the percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor s original budget request over fiscal years 1983 1989 is examined the empirical results indicate that under certain political situations the line item veto authority enhances the governor s ability to obtain his or her desired budget

political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies abstract law and politics affect the financial structure of the public corporation perhaps as much as economics law restricts financial institutions from holding large equity blocks and from networking the small blocks they do own impetus for these restrictions came from several sources a public spirited belief that financial stability would be fostered by financial fragmentation american federalism each state created its own insular set of financial institutions rivalries between groups of financial institutions and popular mistrust of powerful private financial institutions the stability of many of these rules also derives from the political resistance that one would expect corporate managers and benefited financial institutions to offer to any change

decision costs in legislative bargaining an experimental analysis we conduct an experiment to assess the effects of different decision rules on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation specifically we compare the amount of costly delay observed in an experimental bargaining game under majority and unanimity rule our main finding is that individual subjects are more likely to reject offers under unanimity rule this higher rejection rate as well as the requirement that all subjects agree leads to more costly delay this result provides empirical support for a classic argument in favor of less than unanimity decision rules put forth by buchanan and tullock the calculus of consent logical foundations of constitutional democracy university of michigan press ann arbor 1962

how words and money cultivate a personal vote the effect of legislator credit claiming on constituent credit allocation the district affect how constituents allocate credit legislators use credit claiming messages to influence the expenditures they receive credit for and to affect how closely they are associated with spending in the district constituents are responsive to credit claiming messages they build more support than other nonpartisan messages but contrary to expectations from other studies constituents are more responsive to the total number of messages sent rather than the amount claimed our results have broad implications for political representation the personal vote and the study of u s congressional elections p articularistic spending a large literature argues cultivates a personal vote for incumbents cain ferejohn and fiorina 1987 ferejohn 1974 lazarusandreiley2010 levittandsnyder1997 mayhew 1974 to build this support legislators are assumed to direct projects and programs to their districts constituents in turn are thought to reward their legislator for the level of federal spending in the district levitt and snyder 1997 str omberg 2004 or the

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the baron ferejohn model abstract we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs for games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with this characterization we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs for the case where the players have the same discount factor we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer for the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d70

supermajority voting requirements for tax increases evidence from the states abstract this paper measures the effect of state level supermajority requirements for tax increases on tax rates unobserved attitudes towards taxation tend to influence both the adoption of supermajority requirements and tax policy consequently one cannot distinguish between the effect of these requirements and their correlation with these unobserved attitudes a model is presented in which legislatures controlled by a pro tax party adopt a supermajority requirement to reduce the majority party agenda control the propensity of pro tax states to adopt supermajority requirements results in an underestimate of the true effect of these requirements on taxes to correct this identification problem the paper first uses fixed effects to control for unobserved attitudes and then employs instruments that measure the difficulty of amending state constitutions the paper concludes that supermajority requirements have significantly reduced taxes

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

supermajority rule and the law of 1 n this paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1 n which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government our analysis suggests that supermajority rule despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending increases the 1 n effect because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract additional members using data from us states from 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust worsening effect on the fiscal commons problem identified by the law of 1 n

the stock pools and the securities exchange act abstract the stated justification for the securities exchange act of 1934 exchange act was to eliminate manipulation the primary evidence of manipulation was the existence of stock pools through which groups of traders jointly traded in a particular stock the conclusion of congress that the pools were manipulative is inconsistent with the evidence produced by the senate s own investigation the returns on a sample of pool stocks are also inconsistent with manipulation these findings suggest that congressional and presidential desires to increase political control over the new york stock exchange was a more important motivation for the exchange act

optimal taxation and fiscal constitution abstract assuming a world with excessive taxes the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes in particular it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases as currently used in some us states is the means of attaining this objective their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries that of franchise restrictions is discussed

granting votes exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within between specification for panel data instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors political goals this study uses a unique panel dataset on more than 500 croatian municipalities over a 12 year period to uncover the extent to which grant distribution is biased owing to grantors electoral concerns instead of the default fixed effects approach to modelling panel data we apply a novel within between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities we find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocations both within and between municipalities particularly when it comes to local level electoral concerns the paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically biased grant allocation using panel data particularly when they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time variant and time invariant factors or when they cannot apply a quasi experimental approach because of specific institutional contexts

senate representation and coalition building in distributive politics p7 vhe senate s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics the great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal fttnds than others but all senators have equal voting weight as a result even though all senators votes are of equal value to the coalition builder they are not of equal prwice coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states building on formal models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested first coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently second the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small state senators than large state senators the hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997 98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs the findings support both hypotheses

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

supermajority rule the law of 1 n and government spending a synthesis i develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending where the coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition an increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending a higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition i develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of i a nonexcludable good ii a distributive consumption good iii infrastructure spending and iv a transfer payment a supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending an increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending i also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1 n if the coase theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement thus the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1 n

how to succeed at increasing spending without really trying the balanced budget amendment and the item veto congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending in particular the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents interests through pork barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest however assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results the supermajorities requires by the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log rolling that promote and may indeed increase pork barrel spending

separation of powers and the tax level in the u s states we estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party in the states with the line item veto the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified with a regression discontinuity design we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect we propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship the sequential nature of the budget bargaining game that is the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line item veto implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level

universalism and the value of political power although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive i develop a game theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation to quantify the effects of political power on the agreed upon allocation i structurally estimate the model using the bridge bill capital budget in 1992 i find that 16 73 of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

distributive politics and the allocation of federal grants understanding the dynamics of policy distribution requires an appreciation of federal grant programs that have achieved a prominent place in nearly all areas of domestic policy the theoretical literature on distributive politics however focuses almost exclusively on a centralized top down view of policy distribution by examining the role of presidents legislators and bureaucrats scholars have ignored participants who have become key actors in the distribution of federal expenditures the recipient jurisdictions this analysis of the allocation patterns under six federal programs shows that local governments exert important influences on the distribution of federal grants and that the distributional patterns and their determinants vary over time the analysis also points out the importance of disaggregation by focusing on programs and recipient jurisdictions as opposed to total federal expenditures and regions states or congressional districts

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

the collapse of first executive corporation junk bonds adverse publicity and the run on the bank phenomenon abstract in april 1991 regulators seized the major subsidiaries of first executive corporation fe an insurer that invested heavily in junk bonds during the junk bond market turmoil of 1989 1990 adverse publicity fueled a bank run at fe forcing a 4 billion portfolio liquidation before the market rose 50 60 in 1991 1992 more traditional insurers did not receive commensurate press coverage despite their substantial exposure to real estate declines which were roughly 2 5 times the junk bond decline seizure of fe s subsidiaries was defensible although fe would have become solvent within a year given average junk bond market appreciation

changing the price of pork the impact of local cost sharing on legislators demands for distributive public goods abstract the provision of public services through national legislatures gives legislators the chance to fund locally beneficial public projects using a shared national tax base nationally financed and provided local congestible public goods will be purchased at a subsidized price below marginal cost and may be inefficiently too large as a consequence an important assumption behind this inefficiency is that national legislators in fact demand more of the locally beneficial project as the local price for projects declines this paper provides the first direct test of this important assumption using legislators project choices following the passage of the water resources development act of 1986 wrda 86 we find legislators chosen water project sizes do fall as the local cost share rises with a price elasticity of demand ranging from 0 81 for flood control and shoreline protection projects to 2 55 for large navigation projects the requirement of wrda 86 that local taxpayers contribute a greater share to the funding of local water projects reduced overall proposed project spending in our sample by 35 and the federal outlay for proposed project spending by 48

presidential particularism and divide the dollar politics when inuencing the allocation of federal dollars across the country do presidents strictly pursue maximally ecient outcomes or do they systematically target dollars to politically inuential constituencies in a county level analysis of federal spending from 1984 to 2008 we nd that presidents are not universalistic but particularistic that is they reliably direct dollars to specic constituents to further their political goals as others have noted presidents target districts represented by their co partisans in congress in the pursuit of inuence visavis the legislature but we show that at much higher levels presidents target both counties within swing states and counties in core states that strongly supported the president in recent elections swing state particularism is especially salient during presidential reelection years and core partisan counties within swing states are most heavily rewarded rather than strictly pursuing visions of good public policy or pandering to the national median voter our results suggest that presidents systematically prioritize the needs of politically important constituents

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

party affiliation and public spending evidence from u s governors this paper investigates whether the party affiliation of governors democrat or republican has an impact on the allocation of state expenditures exploiting gubernatorial election results from 1960 to 2012 and a regression discontinuity design rdd we find that democratic governors allocate a larger share of their budget to health hospitals and education sectors we find no significant impact of the political party of governors on total spending only on the allocation of funds the results are robust to a wide range of controls and model specifications jel d72 h75 h72

presidential pork executive veto power and distributive politics mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others the model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers including the effects of divided government electoral rules and term limitations for the executive

friends with benefits patronage networks and distributive politics in china abstract existing research on distributive politics mainly focuses on the influence of electoral competition between political parties but less is known about non electoral mechanisms of resource allocation inside a dominant party this study examines how informal patron client networks within the ruling communist party shape the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in china a major one party regime using a new dataset on city level fiscal transfers and a novel method to infer informal political connections through past promotions we show that provincial leaders allocate significantly more transfers to localities governed by officials who are part of their networks this bias persists even when we use a specification that only exploits variations in connection caused by exogenous turnovers of higher level leadership we evaluate two plausible motivations behind this bias network based policy coordination and collective corruption and find evidence in stronger support of the former our findings suggest that private networks may function as an important albeit costly tool of mobilization in one party systems

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

the president and the distribution of federal spending scholarship on distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on the internal operations of congress paying particular attention to committees and majority parties this article highlights the president who has extensive opportunities both ex ante and ex post to influence the distribution of federal outlays we analyze two databases that track the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 24 year period the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled using district and county fixed effects estimation strategies we find no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence that majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays we find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president s party represent them

political influence in the distribution of agricultural disaster payments this paper examines the impact of committee membership and electoral votes on the distribution of ad hoc agricultural disaster payments across u s counties our results show that both house oversi

the hunt for party discipline in congress ttt e analyze party discipline in the house of representatives between 1947 and 1998 the effects of 1 v party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes adding a second cutting line makes at best a marginal improvement over the standard single line model analysis of legislators who switch parties shows however that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator s ideal point in contrast to our approach we find that the snyder groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects

incumbency and distributive politics intergovernmental transfers in mexico in this article the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition in what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes than to reward core supporters how are constraints introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re election likely to influence distributive politics predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 mexican states between 2004 and 2012

public spending and the paradox of supermajority rule this article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending we propose a simple conjecture if rent seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators demands for rent seeking activities are price inelastic a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending other things equal using data from u s state legislatures 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

budget institutions and political insulation why states adopt the item veto abstract forty three of the fifty states of the united states have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions in this paper i test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power using data from 1865 to 1994 i show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future liberal legislatures the results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas first by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions second it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily insulate policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power e g moe 1989 de figueiredo 2002

monopoly manipulation and the regulation of futures markets in the textbook model of competition all buyers and sellers are tiny compared with the market as a whole these people trade fungible commodities in an ongoing auction every seller s product is the same as every other s all participants in the market are sophisticated every buyer continues to purchase so long as the price is less than the value he places on the commodity every seller continues to sell so long as the price is greater than the marginal cost of production new buyers and sellers can jump in at an instant s notice and if they find the going rough they can jump out again no one can take advantage of a trading partner because someone else will offer the prospective victim a better deal information about bids and offers spreads instantly to all participants and would be entrants every beneficial trade takes place the trading leads to an outcome that is best for each buyer each seller and society as a whole of course textbook economies occur only in textbooks it is commonplace to lament the fact that traders are not microscopic compared with the market traders are gullible entry and exit

the right type of legislator a theory of taxation and representation abstract we develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen candidate model of legislatures individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics when these are positively correlated rich voters always prefer a rich legislator but poor voters face a trade off a rich legislator will secure more pork for the district but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution parties and class representation in legislatures we demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases as the standard common pool intuition suggests and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect

stock price manipulation it is generally agreed that speculators can make profits from insider trading or from the release of false information both forms of stock price manipulation have now been made illegal in this article the authors ask whether it is possible to make profits from a different kind of manipulation in which an uninformed speculator simply buys and sells shares they show that in a rational expectations framework where all agents maximize expected utility it is possible for an uninformed manipulator to make a profit provided investors attach a positive probability to the manipulator being an informed trader article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

local favoritism in at large proportional representation systems abstract pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system we estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown using data from norwegian regional governments we still find a hometown bias we document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the regional governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments citizens also tend to vote more often for parties whose gubernatorial candidate is from their own hometown consistent with expectations of particularistic benefits a possible explanation is that regional council members are often recruited from local politics and remain loyal to their roots we find no evidence that regional council experience affects politicians future career prospects at the local level

demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining i propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play the equilibrium majorities and the policy outcome the ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is however invariant to fundamental institutional differences and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power the bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office the order of play is endogenous and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker the role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied

strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources how do government agencies allocate program resources some authors presume that agencies seek to maximize program objectives others suggest agencies favor the districts important to the president s election in addition agencies may distribute larger program resources to those districts whose congressional representatives are best positioned to help the agency we examined how federal government agencies responded both to the 2006 election when control of congress shifted from the republican to the democratic party and to the 2010 election when the house switched from democratic to republican control we used a difference in difference analysis to evaluate the impact of each election on the agencies allocations of contracts agencies generally responded to the elections by allocating more contract resources to districts represented by the winning party however federal agencies reacted differently to changing political environments depending on the characteristics of the agency for example after the 2006 election those agencies with programs favored by republican members of congress allocated more resources to democratic districts these republican agencies presumably are the most vulnerable to the risk of losing future appropriations democratic agencies and neutral agencies facing no significant threats to their appropriations did not respond to the election as strongly finally more vulnerable districts received the most support especially by the republican agencies we reaffirmed these results by using the 2010 congressional elections in which the political orientations of the districts favored with more contract distributions was reversed

presidential unilateral action partisan influence and presidential power focusing on executive orders eos and extending previous models we present a general theoretical framework of unilateral presidential action this framework allows us to examine systematically how various possible party roles such as agenda setting result in legislative gridlock which in turn create or undercut presidential incentives and how directional constraints on discretion undermine presidential leverage in particular negative agenda setting and party discipline intensify gridlock enhancing presidential policy gains positive agenda setting s effect depends upon governmental regime empirically majority parties consistently play some role especially negative agenda setting regardless of the threshold used to define eo significance while party discipline is more pronounced with higher thresholds also while a majority party median is crucial for constraining the direction of how presidents use discretion with lower thresholds a chamber median whose preference may be induced by party pressure is key with higher thresholds

the consumer demand for education this paper presents new evidence on the estimation of the demand for education unlike previous studies this study uses the translog les indirect utility function to analyze the demand for education within a multicommodity framework for annual u s consumption expenditures for the period 1958 82 various restrictive existing specifications of the demand for education are tested and rejected income and price elasticities of education are estimated that are larger than those of existing studies taste change has moved toward the consumption of education and the consumer has suffered from a loss in welfare due to increases in prices over time

congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays the literature on the organization of the united states congress has been dominated by distributive and informational theory one important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork barrel activities here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork barrel is alive and well in the contemporary united states congress we focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts finding strong and systematic evidence of pork barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization

the self regulation of commodity exchanges the case of market manipulation influential economists argue that government regulation of manipulative practices in financial markets is unnecessary because exchanges have incentives to take nearly first best precautions against the exercise of market power this article shows that the theoretical arguments underlying this proposition are weak because exchange members are likely to ignore the effects of manipulation on inframarginal traders and price informativeness competition between exchanges may be limited and collective action problems preclude efficient exchange intervention for these reasons exchanges will likely take few precautions against market power an examination of the history of self regulation at 10 exchanges prior to the passage of laws proscribing manipulation shows that they took few if any measures to curb manipulation since the characteristics of manipulation imply that it can be deterred efficiently through the use of harm based sanctions this theory and evidence strongly suggest that self regulation is a

cluster sample methods in applied econometrics inference methods that recognize the clustering of individual observations have been available for more than 25 years brent moulton 1990 caught the attention of economists when he demonstrated the serious biases that can result in estimating the effects of aggregate explanatory variables on individual specific response variables the source of the downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares ols standard errors is the presence of an unobserved state level effect in the error term more recently john pepper 2002 showed how accounting for multi level clustering can have dramatic effects on t statistics while adjusting for clustering is much more common than it was 10 years ago inference methods robust to cluster correlation are not used routinely across all relevant settings in this paper i provide an overview of applications of cluster sample methods both to cluster samples and to panel data sets

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining this paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule that requires logrolling across additional members increases with the ratio of seats in the house relative to seats in the senate using a panel of us states 1970 2008 we find that the ratio of house to senate seats has a robust positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

the birth of pork local appropriations in america s first century after describing a newly assembled dataset consisting of almost 9 000 local appropriations made by the u s congress between 1789 and 1882 we test competing accounts of the politics surrounding them before offering a more nuanced historically contingent view of the emergence of the pork barrel we demonstrate that for most of this historical period despite contemporary accusations of crass electoral motives the pattern of appropriations is largely inconsistent with accounts of distributive politics grounded in a logic of legislative credit claiming instead support for appropriations in the house mapped cleanly onto the partisan ideological structure of congress for most of this period and only in the 1870s produced the universalistic coalitions commonly associated with pork barrel spending we trace this shift to two historical factors the emergence of a solid democratic south and growth in the fraction of appropriations funding recurrent expenditures on extant projects rather than new starts

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation

do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny evidence from the us states 1960 1997 buchanan and tullock 1962 demonstrates that supermajority rules can reduce tyranny of majority problems in a democracy however recent theoretical work by dixit grossman and gul 2000 postulates that this static analysis of supermajority rules may be inadequate to explain political decisions in a dynamic setting in fact supermajority rules may increase the incidence of majority tyranny because of rotating political representation using data from us state legislatures we examine the effect of supermajority rules on different categories of government expenditures and tax revenues during the latter half of the 20th century we find supermajority rules have little effect on general government expenditures and tax revenues however supermajority rules are associated with lower public welfare transfers which supports the traditional analysis of the fiscal effects of supermajority rules

economic policy and special interest politics a great deal of research has been done on the boundary between economics and political science in the last five to ten years this research in political economics spans many subfields such as macroeconomics trade public finance regulation rational choice politics and game theory a common denominator has been to study structural models of the political process agents behave rationally within well specified economic and political institutions where the policymaking process is formulated as an extensive form game methodologically much progress has been made relative to traditional approaches which were often based on inconsistent or irrational political and economic behaviour relying on non derived influence functions political support functions or vote functions yet the modem work has largely developed separately in each subfield without much contact with other subfields and each of the resulting literatures tends to focus on a distinct but partial aspect of the political process in this lecture i shall argue that even though the progress to date has been substantial we can gain a better understanding of policymaking in democracies by combining the insights from different strands of thinking on some economic policy issues the conflicting views both among citizens and politicians basically reduce to a single left to right dimension examples may include the politics of inflation vs unemployment capital taxation or the size of government we can think about policy issues within this domain of general interest politics as being resolved via traditional downsian electoral competition at least to a first approximation but the economic policy process also allows narrow interest groups ample opportunities to concentrate benefits to their own group at the expense of the population as a whole the resulting policy conflict is generically multi dimensional resolving it by voting alone would thus result in condorcet cycles we therefore need to go beyond the simplest electoral models to understand policy determination within this domain of special interest politics this lecture deals with special interest politics to make my point about fruitful analytical arbitrage i will stick to the same underlying policy example throughout this will be a simple model of a society where the government uses

seniority in legislatures we construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system we model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues modeled as a divide the dollar game however each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide by majority rule whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the baron ferejohn rule an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal if the legislature rejects the proposal another agenda setter is randomly selected and the process is repeated if the legislature accepts the proposal the legislative session ends and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office the voters verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature we find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system and that legislators are always reelected