prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

what explains wage gaps between farm and city exploring the todaro model with american evidence 1890 1941 nominal wage gaps between farm and city employment are one of the most pervasive aspects of modern economic growth so much so that they have become a key stylized fact of development economics indeed a good portion of the literature on the third world has focused on this problem at length both in terms of labor market behavior and in terms of policy formation in the face of factor market distortions yet wage gaps are not simply an institutional peculiarity of newly industrializing third world countries since they seem to have been even greater among nineteenthand twentieth century western nations while unskilled full time nominal city wages are about 41 higher than farm wages in the contemporary third world they were about 51 higher among late nineteenth century industrializers they were even higher in england in the 1830s about 73 2 furthermore the evidence suggests that these wage gaps vary substantially over time they rose from 29 to 41 in the american north between the antebellum and postbellum periods and were about 50 by the mid 1890s in the united states as a whole a figure that reached an all time u s high of about 65 by the late 1930s 3 there are three questions that these wage gaps raise not just one first would these nominal full time wage gaps disappear if they were properly measured proper measurement would include the fact that cities are more costly places to live that cities may have greater disamenities that farmers also make in kind payments to their workers and that farm laborers suffer seasonal underemployment elsewhere

search platforms showrooming and price parity clauses we provide a model in which consumers can search for rms directly or through a platform the platform lowers search costs and provides convenience benets but charges rms for the transactions it facilitates in equilibrium we show consumers buy through the platform despite rms setting higher prices on the platform higher prices on the platform give rise to the possibility of showrooming in which consumers search on the platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices in settings like this search platforms like amazon s marketplace and booking com have adopted price parity clauses requiring rms oer their best prices on the platform arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming we use our model to evaluate the implications of showrooming and price parity clauses

the effects of taxation price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition abstract many government contracts with or policies towards oligopolistic sectors essentially involve private firms selling a given proportion or quantity of output to the government at a fixed price p r with the remainder being sold on the open market often this is combined with consumer rationing examples include cement and sugar in india and health housing and defence in many countries the paper investigates the effects of these schemes including sales and excise taxation on prices output and household welfare under oligopoly and monopolistic competition less government control reduced may raise prices and tax shifting can be above or below 100 percent

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

price coherence and excessive intermediation suppose an intermediary provides a benefit to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary s technology we develop a model to show that the intermediary would want to restrict sellers from charging buyers more for transactions it intermediates with this restriction an intermediary can profitably raise demand for its services by eliminating any extra price buyers face for purchasing through the intermediary we show that this leads to inflated retail prices excessive adoption of the intermediaries services over investment in benefits to buyers and a reduction in consumer surplus and sometimes welfare competition among intermediaries intensifies these problems by increasing the magnitude of their effects and broadening the circumstances in which they arise we discuss applications to payment card systems travel reservation systems rebate services and various other intermediaries jel codes d40 l11 l14 l42

quantitative restrictions and the welfare effects of capital inflows abstract this paper explores the welfare effects of capital inflows when some imports are subject to quantitative restrictions it is shown that in a heckscher ohlin model where all imports are restricted by quotas and some fraction of the initial domestic capital stock is foreign owned a capital inflow is welfare improving regardless of the ranking of sectoral factor intensities with sector specific capital stocks and both tariff ridden and quota restricted imports the consequences of direct foreign investment in any sector are uncertain and depend upon whether the two imports are compensated substitutes or complements as well as the characteristics of production

protection and the harmful effects of endogenous capital flows abstract assume a country has in place a binding tariff and is a price taker on world markets in which capital is internationally mobile and unimpeded regardless of trade patterns possible specificity of capital or factor intensities an increase in the tariff harms the country if capital is frozen and harms the country even more when capital mobility brings rates of return into line among countries

first party content and coordination in two sided markets the strategic use of first party content by two sided platforms is driven by two key factors the nature of buyer and seller expectations favorable versus unfavorable and the nature of the relationship between first party content and third party content complements or substitutes platforms facing unfavorable expectations face an additional constraint their prices and first party content investment need to be such that low zero participation equilibria are eliminated this additional constraint typically leads them to invest more less in first party content relative to platforms facing favorable expectations when first and third party content are substitutes complements these results hold with both simultaneous and sequential entry of the two sides with two competing platforms incumbent facing favorable expectations and entrant facing unfavorable expectations and multi homing on one side of the market the incumbent always invests weakly more in first party content relative to the case in which it is a monopolist this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

technical progress and outputs under variable returns to scale this paper analyzes the implications of three types of technical progress on outputs in a variable returns to scale framework it is shown that hicks ne utral technical improvement is ultra biased in production regardless of the direction and severity of the returns to scale the output eff ect of intensive factor saving technical progress is more ultra biase d relative to neutral progress regardless of the industrial pattern of returns to scale these results may break down if the system unde r variable returns to scale is unstable intensive factor using techn ical progress however may have any output effect copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products we study a two sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one the monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform the market allocation is constraint efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers an increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition as a result the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges in contrast an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition in this case the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms

a pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments abstract a literature that began with wicksell 1896 has shown that an ad valorem tax is welfare superior to an equal yield unit tax in both monopoly and oligopoly markets this paper proves a stronger result for any unit tax imposed on a monopoly there exists an ad valorem tax that pareto dominates it that produces larger profit tax revenue and consumer surplus the paper then considers whether this pareto result generalizes to all cournot nash oligopolies the paper shows that pareto dominance holds in such markets whenever the tax level exceeds a critical value that depends on various market parameters

the effects of import quotas on national welfare does money matter recent evidence shows that there is an increasing use of non tariff barriers to trade ntbs and especially of quantitative restrictions such as import quotas in the world economy to protect import competing industries see table i 1 international trade theory however has traditionally focused on the welfare effects of tariffs as well as on the equivalence between tariffs and quotas with little attention paid to the welfare implications of quotas the latter have basically been restricted within the traditional heckscher ohlin trade model where for the case of a small open economy import quotas always reduce welfare a few recent studies have attempted to fill in this gap in the literature for instance young 19 compares optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country in a stochastic environment neary 14 on the other hand investigates the welfare implications of tariffs quotas and voluntary export restraints under different assumptions on capital mobility finally chao hwang and yu 3 4 examine the welfare effects of import quotas under variable returns to scale although the existing literature has generated important policy implications most of the analysis has been conducted within a barter exchange framework it is well known however that the introduction of money can alter results obtained within a non monetary environment 2 accordingly this paper attempts to re examine the welfare effects of import quotas for a small monetary economy we develop a two sector trade model in which money enters the economy

price and variety in the spokes model the spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition provides a new analytical tool for dierentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition an increase in the number of rms leads to lower equilibrium prices when consumers have relatively high product valuations but surprisingly to higher equilibrium prices for in termediate consumer valuations new entry alters consumer and social welfare through price market expansion and matching eects with free entry the market may pro vide too many or too few varieties from a social welfare perspective and the equilibrium price remains above marginal cost even when the number of rms is arbitrarily large

welfare gains from capital inflows under import quotas abstract the presence of tariffs was assumed in the literature which examined the effect of additional foreign investment on the welfare of the host country in the small country setting however this paper analyzes the case of import quotas and shows that additional inflows of foreign capital improve the host country s welfare when import quotas are kept constant

monopolistic competiton on the pyramid the purpose of this paper is to develop a model of monopolistic competition that has a simple locational interpretation and which allows for multifirm competition one of the major weaknesses of the standard circular road model is the fact that it allows only localized competition this creates problems when one wishes to analyze problems of international trade where one often has to work with firms with different production costs one of the major advantages of the pyramid model presented here is that one can easily compute the firms equilibrium profits even when their production costs differ copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

oil prices and rural migration the dutch disease goes south abstract we construct a two period general equilibrium model to evaluate policies affecting agricultural migration and exports the model is applied to mexico for the period 1986 1987 to obtain certain qualitative policy conclusions related to the dutch disease brought about by oil price increases dutch disease phenomena can be brought about both as the result of real exchange rate changes as well as price changes caused by migration out of agriculture in the short run it may be possible to use fiscal policy such as value added subsidies to agriculture to at least partially negate the effects of an oil price increase on agricultural exports jel f31 f41

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

politics and perceived country creditworthiness in international banking this paper marks a departure from most previous studies of country creditworthiness in international banking because it incorporates systematically generated quantitative indicators of political instability in the analysis the authors empirically test for the effects of political instability on perceived country creditworthiness using data on thirty heavily indebted developing countries for the period 1967 86 in addition to economic factors they examine the effects of three types of political instability regime change political legitimacy and armed conflict the authors also distinguish between proximate instability and chronic instability they find significant effects of proximate instability particularly in governmental regime on indicators of countries perceived creditworthiness copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

equilibrium with product differentiation tive consumer formulations is used to examine the properties of single and multiple price equilibria conditions under which decreases in the intensity of consumer preferences reduce price are given it is shown that with certain types of demand curves entry can eliminate price cost markups even given product differentiation if competition is localized it is demonstrated that entry does not affect the markup finally the effect of spurious product differentiation on price is examined

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

domestic distortions and international trade in this paper we develop techniques for measuring the trade policy equivalent of domestic distortions using a distance function approach our measure the trade restrictiveness index is shown to equal the uniform tariff which is welfare equivalent to a given pattern of domestic taxes and subsidies we extend the index to incorporate taxes in markets for nontraded goods and factors of production and illustrate its operationality with an application to liberalisation in mexican agriculture we conclude that our index has considerable potential in empirical work and as an aid to trade negotiators it is widely appreciated that government policies of a purely domestic nature can have major implications for a country s international trade to give just one example such implications were widely discussed in the context of the recent gatt round in which u s negotiators insisted that intra ec agricultural policy should be viewed as trade distorting however analysts and negotiators have not hitherto had access to a conceptual framework which would allow the trade effects of domestic policies to be measured in a consistent way in this paper we propose such a framework and show how it may be implemented empirically of course other attempts have been made to quantify the overall distortionary effects of domestic policies these have involved constructing empirically based indexes such as producer or consumer subsidy equivalents 2 however such measures have no theoretical foundation moreover since they use the shares of different sectors in production or consumption as weights they are likely to be systematically biased for example sectors whose output levels are reduced by high taxation are assigned low weights whereas their true weights should be higher by contrast we show below that our approach is based firmly on welfare economics and correctly uses marginal rather than average production and consumption shares as weights the approach we propose draws on recent work by two of the authors anderson and neary 1990 1992b which dealt with trade distortions only that work developed a scalar index the trade restrictiveness index or tri which equals the equiproportionate rate of trade restriction which is equivalent in welfare terms to

platform competition and seller investment incentives many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for profit platforms which charge buyers and sellers for access what is the effect of for profit intermediation on seller investment incentives since for profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for profit platforms however we show that for profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and thus access prices we characterize the effect of for profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

effects of restraining steel exports from the republic of korea and other countries to the united states and the european economic community in this article a model is developed to evaluate the impact on an exporting country of a restraint imposed on its export by an importing economy in the context of a three region model of world trade in a single product the welfare changes in any of the three regions in the model and in the global economy can be evaluated the model is applied to the restraints imposed on steel exports from the republic of korea to the united states and the european economic community eec the united states and the eec are found to have incurred significant losses as a result of the restraints the largest part of these losses are quota rents transferred to korea and the rest of the world under reasonable parameter assumptions korea and the rest of the world obtain net gains from the quotas because the resource misallocation costs are smaller than the quota rents the model is modified to analyze a tariff barrier rather than a quantitative restraint it is found that an equivalent tariff on steel transforms korea and the rest of the world from net gainers to net losers as a result of a restraint

variable returns to scale urban unemployment and welfare the proposition that free trade is superior to no trade has a classical ancestry adam smith and ricardo were amongst the first proponents of free trade samuelson 26 proved and it is held by economists today that free trade is the optimal policy in the presence of standard paretoconditions it is also generally agreed amongst economists that lower trade intervention is superior to higher trade intervention given competitive conditions in a small country these propositions do not hold however in the presence of factor market imperfections such as wage differentials in a small country and therefore production or wage subsidies improves social welfare the two models which are generally used to investigate the positive as well as normative aspects of trade theory in the presence of unemployment are the uniform real minimum wage model which is based on the assumption of general rigidity of real wage in one or two sectors of production and the sector specific minimum wage model which focuses on the phenomenon of rural urban migration in the face of large scale urban unemployment these two models are commonly utilized by trade theorists to analyze trade and unemployment specifically studies by haberler 13 johnson 16 batra and seth 3 findlay 12 and brecher 6 7 investigate the consequences of rigid factor prices for a small country whereas the normative as well as positive aspects of sector specific unemployment have been explored by harris and todaro 15 bhagwati and srinivasan 4 5 and more recently by batra and naqvi 2 das 10 and kahn 19 it has been correctly observed that the introduction of an exogenously specified real minimum wage among other things generates unorthodox results concerning unemployment and gains from trade a large body of research has also been concerned with the welfare implications of different commercial policies in the context of variable returns to scale kemp and negishi 20 have pointed out the beneficial effects of trade in the presence of variable returns to scale production subsidy and consumption taxes eaton and panagariya 11 have analyzed the question of gains from trade in the presence of variable returns to scale and in the context of pareto welfare criterion whereas choi and yu 8 have examined the welfare implications of tariffs and consumption taxes as well as the welfare rankings of these policies under variable returns to scale while panagariya and succar 25 have modified the necessary and sufficient conditions for stability under increasing returns to scale in urban sector

taxation and welfare in an oligopoly with strategic commitment this paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment firms compete in two stages in the first stage firms decide on strategic cost reducing r d investment whereas they choose output in the second stage taking an excise tax subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game the short run as well as long run effects on output cost reducing r d investment and second best welfare will be examined the crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost reducing r d investments is clarified and a variant of the le chatelier samuelson principle in the authors game theoretic model is obtained copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

export share requirements trade balances and welfare a two period analysis abstract this paper provides a two period three sector general equilibrium model for examining the effects of a temporary increase in export share requirements to foreign owned firms on the trade balance and national welfare the analysis suggests that the policy of a temporary rise in export requirements results in increases in the non tradable prices for both periods as well as intertemporal welfare the policy also leads to an improvement in the first period trade balance

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

urban unemployment and the gains from trade a welfare ranking of alternative commercial policies is constructed for the mobile capital harris todaro economy it is sh own that despite the presence of unemployment most noninterventioni st policies suggested by the competitive model of gains from trade ca rry over to the mobile capital harris todaro economy yet in contradi ction to the competitive model it is shown that all forms of trade i ntervention are not detrimental to welfare only those that reduce th e volume of trade are the export promotion policies so copiously fol lowed by developing countries are vindicated but their import substi tution policies are shown to be without justification copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

political uncertainty and asset valuation evidence from business relocations in canada abstract quebec s drive for sovereignty from canada has been the source of political uncertainty for decades in canada this paper studies empirically stock market s reaction to the announcements of business relocations from the province of quebec to other provinces within canada similar announcements about toronto are used for control empirical results show that the market s reaction to the announcements of business relocations a from quebec is positive b from toronto is negative and c to toronto is positive the difference in abnormal returns between the quebec and toronto samples is positive and significant

cooperation among competitors some economics of payment card associations we analyze platforms in two sided markets with network externalities using the specific context of a payment card association we study the cooperative determination of the interchange fee by member banks the interchange fee is the access charge paid by the merchants banks the acquirers to cardholders banks the issuers we develop a framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card after drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative determination of the interchange fee we describe in detail the factors affecting merchant resistance compare cooperative and for profit business models and make a first cut in the analysis of system competition

trade liberalization in oligopolistic competition with unemployment a general equilibrium analysis this paper examines the short and long run effects of partial trade liberalization through relaxation of quantity restrictions in an oligopolistically competitive economy with unemployment while the short run effects of the liberalization policy are ambiguous its long run impacts are clear the policy dampens the price of the imported goods raises firms output and reduces the number of firms furthermore the policy lowers the unem ployment ratio and hence improves welfare when the economy suffers from sector specific unemployment whereas the policy may aggravate underemployment and thus may lower welfare for a labour surplus economy

missed sales and the pricing of ancillary goods firms often sell a basic good as well as ancillary ones hold up concerns have led to ancillary good regulations such as transparency and price caps the hold up narrative however runs counter to evidence in many retail settings where ancillary good prices are set below cost e g free shipping or limited card surcharging in countries where the no surcharge rule was lifted we argue that the key to unifying these conflicting narratives is that the seller may absorb partly or fully the ancillary good s cost so as not to miss sales on the basic good a supplier with market power on the ancillary good market then takes advantage of cost absorption and jacks up its wholesale price hold ups occur only when consumers are initially uninformed or naive about the drip price and shopping costs are high the price of the basic good then acts as a signal of the drip price since a high markup on the basic good makes the firm more wary of missed sales regardless of whether consumers are informed uninformed but rational or naive mandating price transparency and banning loss making on the ancillary good leads to i an efficient consumption of the ancillary good and ii a reduction of its wholesale price generating strict welfare gains

the agency model and mfn clauses i provide an analysis of vertical relations in markets with imperfect competition at both layers of the supply chain and where exchange is intermediated either with wholesale prices or revenue sharing contracts revenue sharing is extremely attractive to firms that are able to set the revenue shares but often makes the firms that set retail prices worse off this is so whether revenue sharing lowers or raises industry profits these results are strengthened when a market moves from the wholesale model of sales to the agency model of sales which results in retailers setting revenue shares and suppliers setting retail prices i also show that retail price parity restrictions raise industry prices these results provide a potential explanation for why many online retailers have adopted the agency model and retail price parity clauses

unemployment and foreign capital the relative opportunity costs of domestic labour and welfare the consequences of increased foreign capital for an economy with unemployment are analyzed under different assumptions that influence the relative oportunity costs of domestic labor the investigation suggests that the implications of the literature on the welfare effect of increased foreign capital are misleading the paper shows that welfare gains result from increased foreign capital if the opportunity costs of labor are sufficiently low relative to the wages earned by laborers employed by new foreign capital a number of cases where this occurs are presented the findings of the paper suggest that cases where increased foreign capital must be welfare harming represent extreme parameterizations in the set of possibilities copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

a note on the nonequivalence of import barriers and voluntary export restraints abstract this paper uses a general equilibrium approach to analyze the consequences of import barriers and voluntary export restraints with respect to international prices and domestic prices under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets it shows that the final outcome with respect to domestic prices depends on the way in which governments allocate the revenue arising from the restrictions the equivalence result obtained by using partial equilibrium is only one of the possible outcomes

currency risk and country risk in international banking this paper focuses on the conditions under which banks are subject to currency and country risks on their dollar denominated loans to foreign firms and governments we conclude that currency risk is a function of the rates of domestic and foreign inflation deviations from purchasing power parity and the effect of these deviations on the firm s and the nation s dollar equivalent cash flows country risk is largely determined by the variability of the nation s terms of trade and the government s willingness to allow the national economy to adjust rapidly to changing economic fortunes banks typically try to cope with currency risk when lending to foreign firms and governments either by both denominating and funding their loans in the foreign currency or failing that by denominating their foreign loans in dollars the latter practice appears to protect the banks by shifting any risk associated with exchange rate fluctuations to the borrowers yet to the extent that changes in currency values affected the ability and or willingness of foreign borrowers to repay their dollar loans the exchange risk on these loans is converted into credit risk this is the element of currency risk referred to in the paper s title when the government is the borrower credit risk becomes country risk the objective of this paper is to explore the conditions under which banks are subject to currency and country risks on their dollar denominated foreign loans section i analyzes the sources of currency risk for firms while section ii extends the analysis to study the riskiness of dollar loans to foreign firms under several currency scenarios the political economic circumstances under which dollar loans to foreign governments could be subject to currency and country risk are the subject of section iii section iv discusses in more detail the various political and economic indicators of country risk section v summarizes the paper s key points

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

risk aversion and optimal trade restrictions if the representative consumer of a country is risk averse then the choice of trade controls must take account of their effects on the fluctuations of domestic real income if the world price of the importable is uncertain and risk aversion is high then the optimal policy for achieving a ceiling on expected imports involves a reduction in imports and a rise in the domestic price as the world price falls moreover a quota is superior to a tariff in achieving the ceiling under domestic uncertainty a tariff is superior to a quota but it could be optimal to reduce the domestic price as imports increase economists have long recognized the equivalence of price and quantity controls under certainty the comparison of these control modes and the characterization of the optimal form of control under uncertainty has been undertaken by two groups of authors weitzman 1974 1978 considered a planning authority which faces uncertainty about the costs and benefits of producing a good he showed that the ranking of price and quantity controls depends on the curvature of the cost and benefit functions and that an optimal policy can be considered as a mixture of price and quantity controls his work was developed by laffont 1977 ireland 1977 malcomson 1978 and yohe 1978 in the context of international trade the comparison of tariffs and quotas under uncertainty has been undertaken by fishelson and flatters 1975 pelcovits 1976 dasgupta and stiglitz 1977 young 1979 1980a b and helpman and razin 1980 recently young and anderson 1980 showed that the policy maximizing expected consumer s surplus given a constraint on expected imports expected import expenditure is a specific tariff an ad valorem tariff in contrast to weitzman s planning model the price instrument is superior to the quantity instrument whatever the curvature of the benefits function 2 the conclusion of young and anderson appears to provide a strong argument against using quantity instruments to restrict trade however the expected surplus criterion is a valid welfare measure only if the marginal utility of income is constant in this paper we characterize the optimal form of trade restriction if the representative consumer of the importing country exhibits risk aversion toward income fluctuations the optimal policy can have surprising properties properties which with high risk aversion are better approximated by a quota rather than a tariff hence the second best justification for using quantity controls to restrict trade turns out to depend on

international retail banking as a strategy an assessment we assess the viability of a bank s strategy of entering into retail banking worldwide wherever regulations permit via a review of literature and evidence on foreign direct investment in banking issues we discuss include the roles of regulation the costs of operating at a distance and in an unfamiliar environment and the advantages or offsetting factors which foreign banks may possess relative to their local competitors the factors the paper examines are uncompetitive host markets product differentiation economies of scale management and technology cost of capital government support and vertical integration

tariffs foreign capital and immiserizing growth with urban unemployment and specific factors of production abstract in this note we show that a recent observation of brecher alejandro as regards tariff induced capital inflows essentially extends to a setting with urban unemployment three factors of production and a variety of labor market conditions in the urban sector

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

international factor mobility minimum wage rates and factor price equalization a synthesis this paper examines the behavior of a small open economy facing perfectly elastic supply curves for some of its productive factors in particular the paper derives some comparative statics properties of such economies compares them with the properties of otherwise identical economies in which all factor prices are determined endogenously and investigates the relationship between factor price rigidities factor price equalization and the pattern of specialization among the new results which are proved it is shown that as more and more factor price rigidities are imposed on an economy it comes closer to a state of factor price equalization

monopolistic competition nonhomotheticity and the stability of the chamberlinian tangency solution the focal point in the recent literature on international trade and monopolistic competition is to recast the chamberlinian partial equilibrium theory in a general equilibrium framework using a similar setting this paper asks whether the chamberlinian tangency solution is stable under general equilibrium paradoxical results follow when entry occurs profit per firm can increase and the tangency solution can be unstable a necessary and sufficient condition for stability is obtained the concepts of average and marginal factor intensities play an important role in obtaining the stability copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

two sided network effects a theory of information product design how can firms profitably give away free products this paper provides a novel answer and articulates trade offs in a space of information product design we introduce a formal model of two sided network externalities based in textbook economics a mix of katz and shapiro network effects price discrimination and product differentiation externality based complements however exploit a different mechanism than either tying or lock in even as they help to explain many recent strategies such as those of firms selling operating systems internet browsers games music and video the model presented here argues for three simple but useful results first even in the absence of competition a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity second we identify distinct markets for content providers and end consumers and show that either can be a candidate for a free good third product coupling across markets can increase consumer welfare even as it increases firm profits the model also generates testable hypotheses on the size and direction of network effects while offering insights to regulators seeking to apply antitrust law to network markets

protection and the gainful effects of foreign capital abstract an increased foreign capital inflow into a protected sector is generally immiserizing we show that if the protected sector produces an intermediate input positive welfare effects may emerge a striking result is that it might lead to an increased import demand for the intermediate input which is a substitute for the product of the import competing sector

foreign capital inflows and welfare in an economy with imperfect competition abstract this paper examines the resource allocational and welfare effects of exogenous inflows of foreign capital in a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition and unemployment although the welfare impact for the short run is ambiguous and dependent upon the strength of excess profits and scale economies relative to unemployment in manufacturing in the long run additional inflows of foreign capital always improve national welfare with capital mobility hence attracting foreign capital remains a sound policy for economies characterized by imperfect competition scale economies and regional unemployment

welfare implications of growth under quotas abstract using the standard trade model it is shown that growth under quotas always improves welfare this result is contrary to johnson s 1967 result on the possibilities of immeserizing growth in the presence of tariffs

tariffs quotas and voluntary export restraints with and without internationally mobile capital this paper presents a general framework for comparing the effects of tariffs quotas and vers voluntary export restraints both with and without international capital mobility expressions for the shadow price of foreign exchange and the shadow price of capital under each type of trade restriction are derived and it is shown that although international capital mobility raises the welfare cost of tariff protection it lowers the welfare cost of quantitative restrictions in most cases the effects of exogenous shocks in the presence of quotas are intermediate between those in the presence of tariffs and those in the presence of vers tarifs douaniers contingentements et restrictions volontaires d l exportation quand le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur presente un cadre general d analyse qu il utilise pour comparer les effets de tarifs douaniers de contingentements et de restrictions volontaires a l exportation dans des contextes ofu le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur derive le prix fictif du change etranger et le prix fictif du capital sous l un et l autre types de restrictions au commerce et montre que meme si la mobilite internationale du capital augmente le cofut en terme de bien etre de la protection tarifaire elle reduit le cofut en terme de bien etre des restrictions sur les quantites echangees dans tous les cas les effets de chocs exogenes quand des contingentements existent sont toujours dans la fourchette entre ceux qu on observe quand des tarifs douaniers existent et ceux qui prevalent quand des restrictions volontaires i l exportation existent

must take cards merchant discounts and avoided costs antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts the paper attempts to shed light on this must take cards view from two angles first the paper gives some operational content to the notion of must take card through the avoided cost test or tourist test would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register it analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange fees second it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card systems determination of interchange fees internalization by merchants of a fraction of cardholder surplus issuers per transaction markup merchant heterogeneity and extent of cardholder multi homing it compares the industry and social optima both in the short term fixed number of issuers and the long term in which issuer offerings and entry respond to profitability

external increasing returns and the shadow price of foreign exchange abstract this paper shows that under external increasing returns to scale and a strictly concave production possibilities frontier the shadow price of foreign exchange in the presence of a tariff is the same as that in an economy with purely constant returns to scale however with a quota or a voluntary export restraint this shadow price is in general quite different from that in a purely constant returns to scale economy

on the harris todaro model with intersectoral capital mobility n b professor neary was based at trinity college dublin when this article was first published the full text of the article is not available in ora at this time citation neary j p 1981 on the harris todaro model with intersectoral capital mobility economica 48 191 219 234

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

tariffs quotas and domestic content protection some political economy considerations in this paper we have focused our attention on the relation between the configuration of protection seeking and of rent seeking interests and the choice of the protection instruments in doing so we have abstracted from the problem of nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas recent writings on product differentiation rodriguez 1979 donnenfeld 1984 have thrown new light on this old issue it may well be that the discussion is of key importance to the understanding of industry s predilection for quantitative restraints we also failed to deal with the question on nonequivalence of restrictive measures under conditions of uncertainty finally we touched only peripherally on the interaction among state it is perhaps more realistic to regard trade barrier formation as a game among nations as in baldwin and clarke 1985 every player seeks at once to protect its import substituting industries and to promote its exports by putting up barriers and by demanding that others lower theirs this approach is more suited however to explain the severity of restraints than it is to explain the nature of restraints which is the problem at hand trade restrictions have a protective and a revenue effect in less developed countries with ineffectual internal revenue collecting systems revenue seeking governments may ally themselves with protection seeking emergent industries and institute high tariffs tariffs and quotas may coexist if the trade restriction seeking alliance includes traders voluntary export restraints the newest of the protective devices may be popular because they circumvent international treaties and short circuit cumbersome procedures associated with changes in tariffs or quotas but they also have the virtue of inviting foreign exporters to act like price setters the harm to the foreign exporters is thereby mitigated in fact exporters may be gainers hence the danger of retaliatory action on the part of foreign governments is lessened domestic content legislation is a unique device in that the same domestic factor benefits from protection and also collects the protection created revenue we show the formal identity between the south african situation in which the maximum black white worker ratio is a binding constraint and regulations requiring that a given percentage of the value of the product be domestically produced we also derive formally the maximum permissible foreign content ratio which is optimal from the point of view of the protected interests in our analysis we have said virtually nothing about the victims of protectionism a discussion of the impact of the various measures on those who bear the cost of protection would doubtless deepen our understanding of the problem we should thus consider the magnitude of the deadweight loss and of the income transfer and the concentration or dispersion of the losers last but not least we should consider the question of awareness thus the cost impact of a tariff is easier to perceive than that of a quota with the cost of a ver or of domestic import content rule the most difficult to calculate of all it may be that the principle of the hiding hand is as important to the new political economy as the benthamite principles were to the old

import quotas and vers a comparative analysis in a three country framework abstract because a ver is inherently discriminatory the traditional two country analysis comparing it to a quota is inadequate this paper adopts a general equilibrium three country approach to compare tariffs quotas and vers a quota equivalent ver is defined alternatively in terms of quantity or price the welfare of the importing country is higher under a quota and that of the non restricted exporter is higher under a ver the welfare comparison for the ver restricted country is ambiguous a result which is at variance with conventional wisdom

ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect competition abstract this paper derives optimal commodity tax rules for a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition to achieve this functions are constructed that describe the effects of taxation upon the equilibrium prices and profit levels of imperfectly competitive industries the use of these functions allows existing tax rules to be generalised to accommodate imperfect competition

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

what does purchasing power parity mean this paper examines the theoretical and empirical content of purchasing power parity ppp in efficient markets it analyzes the sources of deviations from the strictest version of ppp that exchange adjusted price levels are everywhere identical focusing on the role played by uncertainty relative price changes inappropriate price data transaction costs and government intervention in creating these deviations it then identifies and addresses the key issue involving purchasing power parity are the deviations from ppp that occur sufficiently large persistent and predictable as to enable individuals or governments to successfully exploit them an answer of no is shown to be consistent with both economic theory and the empirical evidence

platform monopolization by narrow ppc bpg combination booking et al abstract the price parity clauses ppcs that online booking platforms impose have come under antitrust scrutiny wang and wright 2017 show how by preventing showrooming a narrow ppc can reduce search costs and benefit consumers under between platform competition in response to having to give up its wide ppc to hotels booking com emphasized its best price guarantee bpg to customers we observe that a narrow ppc combined with a low hassle costs bpg leaves only wang and wright s price parity and monopoly equilibrium ppme in which consumers are worse off than with no platform operating at all a more efficient incumbent platform can deter entry with the bpg while the narrow ppc eliminates competition from direct sales channels an equally efficient platform could enter and compete consumer prices down because of the existence of hassle costs yet this equilibrium is fragile to network effects if sellers have incentives not to price differentiate between platform s and their direct sales channel a narrow ppc alone suffices to sustain the ppme in both cases the detrimental pricing contract combination that we point out calls for different platform competition policy