anticipated international environmental agreements abstract consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement iea to be in effect sometime in the future what is the impact of the future iea on current emissions after its announcement we show that the answer to this question is ambiguous we examine four types of ieas that aim to reduce pollution stock in the environment iea type 1 sets a level of emissions iea type 2 and iea type 3 set a percentage and a uniform cut vis a vis the business as usual policy respectively iea type 4 sets the policy that maximizes future joint benefits of the signatories we show that all of these agreements reach their goal in the long run but the intended benefits of these ieas can potentially be offset by the anticipatory non cooperative response of the signatories leading to an environmental degradation in the short run which iea is preferable depends on the targeted level emissions during the phase of cooperation when this target is above a certain threshold welfare under iea type 1 is larger than under iea type 2 which is larger than under iea type 3 moreover the highest level of welfare that can be attained under iea type 1 is above the highest level of welfare achieved by any one of the other three ieas

production costs scope economies and multi client outsourcing under quantity competition abstract two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi client outsourcing mco phenomenon analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers high in house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor under certain conditions if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria if both firms make decisions sequentially collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium furthermore the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of mco with regard to diverse market parameters finally it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when mco occurs this research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls supply chain cities and the china price

frontiers of climate change economics the economics of climate change is an active field of research the contributions to a special issue are put in context of the literature and it is suggested that second best issues such as carbon leakage and the green paradox need to be complemented with a political economy analysis of why certain instruments are politically infeasible and with intra and intergenerational analyses of the impact of climate policy a case is also made for more empirical work on the gradual and catastrophic damages of global warming

balancing the carbon budget for oil the distributive effects of alternative policies keeping temperature change below 2 c will require leaving large reserves of fossil fuels unextracted we assess alternative policies to achieve this goal in a world divided into two regions one regulated with emissions pricing and one unregulated supplied by multiple resource pools with different extraction costs and a carbon free backstop whose costs decline over time global emissions can be reduced by combinations of three policies 1 increasing the size of the regulated coalition 2 raising the tax or tightening the cap within the regulated coalition and 3 accelerating cost reductions of the clean technology we ask how combinations achieving the same cumulative co2 emissions the carbon budget affect the discounted surplus of regulated and unregulated consumers and the wealth of the extractors we first evaluate these policy alternatives in a two pool theoretical model with high and low cost extractors and once tradeoffs are illuminated in a calibrated oil market model a global co2 tax is both cost effective and the best policy for regulated consumers extractors and unregulated consumers however prefer a technology only policy when the regulating coalition is subglobal support for the clean substitute is desired and often required but the preferred policy portfolio of the coalition involves a tighter cap and less technology policy than is globally optimal leaving room for bargaining over who pays for clean innovation

should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors abstract if some but not all countries are cooperating to reduce co2 emissions one could make the following argument a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors and therefore co2 emissions in the cooperating countries however this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy and since it is only total co2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate there is no point in a policy that simply relocates co2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy according to this line of reasoning carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy this paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods it is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods however informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors

comparing optima do simplifying assumptions affect conclusions consider a family of maximization models in which the optimum trades off beneficial and costly effects then comparative statics derived under many kinds of simplifying assumptions about the benefits technology are also true for general convex and nonconvex technologies for example any comparative statics conclusion about investment by a risk averse decision maker under uncertainty that holds when expected returns are described by a general linear function also holds for an arbitrary nonlinear expected return function

climate policy with tied hands optimal resource taxation under implementation lags in the presence of implementation lags announced pigouvian taxation leads to fossil fuel prices that are too low from society s perspective this results in excessive emissions and reduced incentives for green innovation such effects are compounded by the presence of pre existing subsidies to fossil fuel use we show that the intertemporal resource tax path may need to be modified to optimally take into account the perverse incentives from policy lags and pre existing policies we find that it might be optimal to subsidize rather than tax resource extraction at the instant of implementation

energy conservation more effective with rebound policy this article sketches the problem of indirect energy use effects also known as rebound of energy conservation there is widespread support for energy conservation especially when it is voluntary as this seems a cheap way to realize environmental and energy climate goals however this overlooks the phenomenon of rebound the topic of energy rebound has mainly attracted attention from energy analysts but has been surprisingly neglected in environmental economics even though economists generally are concerned with indirect or economy wide impacts of technical change and policies this paper presents definitions and interpretations of energy and environmental rebound as well as four fundamental reasons for the existence of the rebound phenomenon it further offers the most complete list of rebound pathways or mechanisms available in the literature in addition it discusses empirical estimates of rebound and addresses the implications of uncertainties and difficulties in assessing rebound suggestions are offered for strategies and public policies to contain rebound it is advised that rebound evaluation is an essential part of environmental policy and project assessments as opposed to earlier studies this paper stresses the relevance of the distinction between energy conservation resulting from autonomous demand changes and from efficiency improvements in technology equipment in addition it argues that rebound is especially relevant for developing countries

second best carbon taxation in the global economy the green paradox and carbon leakage revisited acceleration of global warming resulting from a future carbon tax is large if the price elasticities of oil demand are large and that of oil supply is small the fall in the world interest rate weakens this weak green paradox effect especially if intertemporal substitution is weak still social damages from greenhouse gases drop if the fall in oil supply and cumulative emissions is strong enough if the current carbon tax is set too low the second best future carbon tax is set below the first best too to mitigate adverse green paradox effects unilateral second best optimal carbon taxes exceed the first best taxes due to an import tariff component the intertemporal terms of trade effects of the future carbon tax increase current and future tariffs and those of the current tax lower the current tariff finally carbon leakage and globally altruistic and unilateral second best optimal carbon taxes if non kyoto oil importers price carbon too low are analysed in a three country model of the global economy

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

should we be worried about the green paradox announcement effects of the acid rain program this paper presents the first empirical test of the green paradox hypothesis according to which well intended but imperfectly implemented environmental policies may lead to detrimental outcomes due to supply side responses we use the introduction of the acid rain program in the u s as a case study the theory predicts that owners of coal deposits expecting future sales to decline would supply more of their resource between the announcement of the acid rain program and its implementation moreover the incentive to increase supply would be stronger for owners of high sulfur coal this would all else equal induce an increase in sulfur dioxide emissions using data on prices heat input and sulfur content of coal delivered to u s power plants we find strong evidence of a price decrease and of an increase in the sulfur premium some indication that the amount of coal used might have increased and no evidence of fuel switching towards higher sulfur coal overall our evidence suggests that while the mechanism indicated by the theory might be at work market conditions and concurrent regulation largely prevented a green paradox from arising these results have implications for the design of climate policies

efficient adaptation in long term contracts take or pay provisions for natural gas to mitigate the inflexibility of long term contracting for natural gas parties will look for terms that minimize the need for costly adjudication while maintaining incentives for appropriate adaptation the authors examine the incident of take or pay provisions in contracts between natural gas producers and pipelines from this perspective they argue that take obligations can be viewed as a mechanism for effecting appropriate incentives for contractual performance and show that efficient breach considerations define an optimal take percentage as a function of characteristics of the transaction these incentives are distorted by regulated price ceilings which cause the adoption of take obligations in excess of optimal levels the findings refute the common perception that take or pay provisions are just an artifact of wellhead price regulation and serve no useful purpose in the absence of regulation 20 references 1 figure 1 table

unilateral climate policy and the green paradox extraction costs matter i analyze the effect of unilateral climate policies in a two country model where fossil fuel extraction costs depend on both current extraction and remaining stock and where a constant marginal cost clean substitute is available an intensification of climate policy in the country with an initially stricter policy does not increase early fossil fuel extraction i e there is no weak green paradox or the present value of pollution costs i e there is no strong green paradox if energy demand in that country is initially met with a mix of fossil fuel and a substitute whether a stricter climate policy in the country with an initially laxer policy causes a weak green paradox depends on the price elasticity of energy demand and the strength of the flow and stock dependence of extraction costs if the reduction of total extraction is sufficiently strong it overcompensates for a weak green paradox with respect to pollution costs thus a weak green paradox does not necessarily imply a strong green paradox due to stock dependence politique climatique unilaterale et paradoxe vert l incidence des couts d extraction l article analyse l effet des politiques climatiques unilaterales dans un modele a deux pays ou les couts d extraction de combustibles fossiles dependent a la fois de l extraction actuelle et du stock residuel et ou la disponibilite d un substitut energetique propre et constant a cout marginal demeure une intensification des politiques climatiques dans le pays de pair avec une politique initialement plus stricte n augmente ni l extraction precoce des combustibles fossiles c est a dire qu il n y a pas de paradoxe vert faible ni la valeur actuelles des couts de pollution c est a dire qu il n y a pas de paradoxe vert accru x00ab pour autant que la demande en energie dans ce pays est initialement satisfaite par une combinaison d un combustible fossile et d un substitut qu une politique climatique plus stricte dans ce pays dote d une politique initialement plus laxiste entrane un paradoxe vert moins prononce depend de l elasticite par rapport au prix de la demande d energie de l importance du flux et de la dependance en matiere de stock relativement aux couts d extraction si une reduction de l extraction totale est suffisamment forte elle surcompensera un paradoxe vert limite relativement aux couts de pollution ainsi un faible paradoxe vert n engendre pas necessairement un fort paradoxe vert en raison de la dependance au stock

informal sector regulatory compliance and leakage abstract the paper models a vertically related formal and informal sector and endogenizes the size and regulatory compliance status of the informal sector when the formal sector can circumvent costly regulations by outsourcing polluting intermediate goods from the informal sector stricter regulations increase when the composition effect of regulation dominates its scale effect or decrease total pollution and may even have a non monotonic impact we identify conditions under which a partially compliant informal sector acts as a source of leakage and examine implications for optimal enforcement policy further we show that price discrimination by the formal sector when it purchases the intermediate goods from the informal sector can worsen regulatory compliance by the informal sector and lead to more pollution

incomplete international cooperation to reduce co2 emissions alternative policies abstract as a first step toward a global treaty to control co2 emissions individual countries contemplate unilateral reductions in their fuel use such actions if significant would reduce world market fuel prices thereby stimulating fuel use elsewhere and causing problems for exporting countries possibly jeopardizing this policy initiative among the policy alternatives for mitigating the price effects of reduced demand reduced fuel consumption combined with buying or leasing fuel deposits to achieve a reduced supply is discussed in particular this policy which at first seems prohibitively costly is shown to dominate the original policy approach under a fairly wide set of circumstances

announcing climate policy can a green paradox arise without scarcity unintended consequences of a pre announced climate policy are studied within a framework that allows for competition between polluting and clean energy sources we show that early announcement of a carbon tax gives rise to a green paradox in that it increases emissions in the interim period between announcement and actual implementation irrespective of the scarcity of fossil fuels the paradoxical outcome is driven by consumption saving tradeoffs facing households who seek to smooth consumption over time and holds both when the announced implementation date is taken as a credible threat and when households are skeptical about the political will or capability of the government to implement the policy as announced

scope economies market information and make or buy decision under asymmetric information abstract this paper presents a make or buy m b model in which a firm say firm 1 may produce in house or outsource a product to the unique vendor the monopolist in the outsourcing market demand for the finished product is stochastic and price sensitive and firm 1 s information forecast about the base market demand and corresponding precision are known when the m b decision is faced firm 1 is risk neutral and owns a constant return to scale technology while the vendor is risk averse and enjoys the advantage of scope economies a traditional solution is provided under perfect information under asymmetric information we demonstrate that when outsourcing is realized both parties expected profits increase with firm 1 s forecast accuracy only if the forecasted market demand is higher than the base demand i e good news outsourcing strictly dominates in house production if the yield of the vendor s production input is sufficiently low or its economies of scope are remarkably attractive furthermore it is optimal for firm 1 to hide information at first and decide whether or not to share information only after the vendor s supply price is announced however the vendor s profit is constrained by the trade off between the coordination effort for impelling firm 1 to share information and the advantages of its monopoly on outsourcing market low production costs as well as scope economies

general equilibrium effects of green technological progress this paper demonstrates that technological progress in production of renewable energy can influence the extraction path of fossil fuels indirectly by a change in the equilibrium interest rate we show in a simple model that the indirect effect can be so strong that first period or even aggregate extraction levels rise with green technological progress contrary to popular expectations

the supply of non renewable resources there exists no formal treatment of non renewable resource nrr supply systematically deriving quantity as function of price we establish instantaneous restricted fixed reserves and unrestricted nrr supply functions the supply of a nrr at any date and location not only depends on the local contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other dates and locations besides the usual law of supply which characterizes the own price effect cross price effects have their own law they can be decomposed into a substitution effect and a stock compensation effect we show that the substitution effect always dominates a price increase at some point in space and time causes nrr supply to decrease at all other points this new but orthodox supply setting extends to nrrs the partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies thereby it provides a generalization of many results about policy induced changes on nrr markets the properties of restricted and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for hotelling homogeneous as well as ricardian non homogeneous reserves for a single deposit as well as for several deposits that endogenously come into production or cease to be active

unilateral emission cuts and carbon leakages in a dynamic north south trade model the effects of a unilateral cut in emissions are analyzed in a dynamic two country model two intermediate goods are produced one of which uses the fossil fuel these inputs are traded and combine to produce a final good the effect of a cut in fossil fuel use by a bloc e g annexure 1 countries in the kyoto protocol depends on whether the fuel is priced at marginal cost or above in the latter case a green paradox may appear the paper s contribution lies in analyzing the dynamics and trade implications of the unilateral action

the determination of spot and futures prices with storable commodities this paper analyzes the effects of futures trading in a market for a storable commodity in which producers and speculators are assumed to be risk averse and specifications of the aggregate supply and inventory demand functions are derived from explicit optimization a critical aspect is how the parameters of these functions change with the introduction of the future market as it is through these induced parameter changes that the futures market exerts its influence on the spot price the effects of the futures market on both the long run average spot price and its variance are analyzed while we are unable to draw any definitive conclusions on this issue we find that in all cases considered the futures market stabilizes the spot price as well as lowering its long run mean for many years now the question of the effects of futures trading on the stability of spot prices has been extensively debated this topic has been discussed at various levels for example farmers and agricultural interest groups have claimed that futures trading destabilizes spot prices thereby imposing welfare losses on the economy in the united states congress has decided that futures trading can cause price destabilization and has subjected futures trading to the regulation of the commodity futures trading commission at a more analytical level economists have been investigating the issue both empirically and more recently theoretically as well

digital pricing with piracy and variety seeking abstract this paper aims to explore behavioral digital pricing which incorporates realistic consumer behavior into firms pricing and anti piracy investment models we consider a duopoly market with an original company and a pirated group selling digital products the demand is sensitive to both parties prices we extend the traditional hotelling model by taking into account the effects of externality on both parties we then propose three types of price competition games i cournot model ii stackelberg model with the original company as the leader and iii the stackelberg model with the pirated group as the leader in model ii if the value of externality effects is lower than a threshold the original company will benefit from the government anti piracy policy that tolerates some piracy finally we investigate the behavior of consumer variety seeking in a two period cournot model with the presence of variety seeking both the original and pirated parties will adopt higher prices in the first period surprisingly variety seeking brings higher profits to both parties in two periods

is there really a green paradox abstract in the absence of a co2 tax the anticipation of a cheaper renewable backstop increases current emissions of co2 since the date at which renewables are phased in is brought forward and more generally future emissions of co2 will decrease the effect on global warming is unclear green welfare falls if the backstop is relatively expensive and full exhaustion of fossil fuels is optimal but may increase if the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to the cost of extracting the last drop of fossil fuels plus marginal global warming damages as then it is attractive to leave more fossil fuels unexploited and thus limit co2 emissions we establish these results by analyzing depletion of non renewable fossil fuels followed by a switch to a clean renewable backstop paying attention to timing of the switch and the amount of fossil fuels remaining unexploited we also discuss the potential for limit pricing when the non renewable resource is owned by a monopolist finally we show that if backstops are already used and more backstops become economically viable as the price of fossil fuels rises a lower cost of the backstop will either postpone fossil fuel exhaustion or leave more fossil fuel in situ thus boosting green welfare however if a market economy does not internalize global warming externalities and renewables have not kicked in yet full exhaustion of fossil fuel will occur in finite time and a backstop subsidy always curbs green welfare

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

free trade and global warming a trade theory view of the kyoto protocol this paper demonstrates how three important results in environmental economics true under mild conditions in closed economies are false or need serious amendment in a world with international trade in goods since the three results we highlight have framed much of the ongoing discussion and research on the kyoto protocol our viewpoint from trade theory suggests a re examination may be in order specifically we demonstrate that in an open trading world but not in a closed economy setting 1 unilateral emission reductions by the rich north can create self interested emission reductions by the unconstrained poor south 2 simple rules for allocating emission reductions across countries such as uniform reductions may well be efficient even if international trade in emission permits is not allowed and 3 when international emission permit trade does occur it may make both participants in the trade worse off and increase global emissions

coordinating investment production and subcontracting we value the option of subcontracting to improve financial performance and system coordination by analyzing a competitive stochastic investment game with recourse the manufacturer and subcontractor decide separately on their capacity investment levels then demand uncertainty is resolved and both parties have the option to subcontract when deciding on their production and sales we analyze and present outsourcing conditions for three contract types 1 price only contracts where an ex ante transfer price is set for each unit supplied by the subcontractor 2 incomplete contracts where both parties negotiate over the subcontracting transfer and 3 state dependent price only and incomplete contracts for which we show an equivalence result while subcontracting with these three contract types can coordinate production decisions in the supply system only state dependent contracts can eliminate all decentralization costs and coordinate capacity investment decisions the minimally sufficient price only contract that coordinates our supply chain specifies transfer prices for a small number 6 in our model of contingent scenarios our game theoretic model allows the analysis of the role of transfer prices and of the bargaining power of buyer and supplier we find that sometimes firms may be better off leaving some contract parameters unspecified ex ante and agreeing to negotiate ex post also a price focused strategy for managing subcontractors can backfire because a lower transfer price may decrease the manufacturer s profit finally as with financial options the option value of subcontracting increases as markets are more volatile or more negatively correlated

climate policy under factor mobility a differentiated case for capital taxation abstract in a general equilibrium model with two periods and a finite fossil resource i analyze the non cooperative climate policies of symmetric countries that are in competition for mobile factors of production capital and fossil energy the paper shows that countries that want to slow down climate change but are also concerned about tax revenues from mobile tax bases have a rationale to supplement environmental taxes on fossil fuels with source based capital taxes or subsidies more specifically countries find it beneficial to subsidize capital in period one and tax it in period two the first period subsidy on capital facilitates a higher environmental tax by counteracting its adverse effects and increases national and global welfare in equilibrium by contrast the capital tax in period two induces inter and intratemporal distortions that lead to lower welfare the rate of resource extraction is inefficiently high in equilibrium no matter which tax portfolio is at the governments disposal furthermore unintended green paradox effects of demand side policies are shown to arise even in general equilibrium with factor mobility finally factor mobility does not necessarily lead to a higher rate of extraction and lower welfare compared to autarky

market definition in antitrust analysis a regression based approach alleged violations of either sherman 2 s antimonopoly strictures or clayton 7 s proscriptions against anticompetitive mergers necessarily involve a particular product and must occur in a particular place that is the plaintiff in either a 2 or 7 suit must define a relevant market within which the violation alleged has occurred even in the most mundane antitrust analysis however market definition is rarely readily accomplished and unaccompanied by a series of caveats and the possibility of the opposing parties in an antitrust suit failing to contest each other s proffered definition is virtually nil 2 because economists from

the supply side of co2 with country heterogeneity several recent articles have analyzed climate policy paying explicit attention to the fact that carbon resources are non renewable in most of this body of literature the economy is treated as a single unit and in the context of climate policy it seems reasonable to interpret this as the whole world however carbon taxes and other climate policies differ substantially across countries with such heterogeneity the effects on the emission paths of changes in taxes costs and subsidies might be very different from what is found for a hypothetical world of identical countries

double limit pricing abstract we study oil extraction by a monopolist who faces demand from a climate aware and a climate ignorant region a renewable perfect substitute for oil is available at constant unit cost the climate aware region uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments due to heterogeneity in climate policies between regions the oil price path possibly contains two limit pricing phases we specify conditions under which a tightening of climate policies results in lower initial carbon emissions a renewables subsidy and a carbon tax effectively force the monopolist to sell more oil to the climate ignorant region during the stage when demand from the climate aware region has already vanished we calibrate the model and numerically investigate climate damage and welfare effects of the policies of the climate aware region we find that both the carbon tax and a renewables subsidy lower climate damage even though cumulative emissions are fixed

monopoly unilateral climate policies and limit pricing abstract we examine the behavior of a fossil fuel monopolist who faces demand from two regions a climate club and the rest of the world row each region is able to produce a perfect substitute for fossil energy at constant marginal costs the climate club uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments the row is policy inactive we fully characterize the market equilibrium and show that due to differences in climate policies between the climate club and the row the monopolistic fossil fuel supplier may choose for two limit pricing phases to postpone entry of renewables producers first in the climate club and later in the row as soon as energy demand from the climate club shifts from fossil fuels to renewables the monopolist abruptly increases the fossil price for the row

unilateral climate policy with production based and consumption based carbon emission taxes this paper characterizes a sub global climate coalition s unilateral policy of reaching a given climate damage reduction goal at minimum costs following eichner and pethig j environ econ manag 2013 we set up a two country two period model in which one of the countries represents a climate coalition that implements a binding ceiling on the world s first period emissions the other country is the rest of the world and refrains from taking action the coalition can make use of production based carbon emission taxes in both periods as in eichner and pethig j environ econ manag 2013 but here we consider consumption based carbon emission taxes as an additional instrument the central question is whether and how the coalition employs the consumption based taxes along with the production based taxes in its unilateral cost effective ceiling policy all cost effective policies identified analytically and numerically consist of a mix of both types of taxes implying that there is a tax mix which is less expensive for the coalition than stand alone consumption based or stand alone production based taxes with full cooperation both taxes are perfect substitutes in our model but in case of unilateral action they are imperfect substitutes because coalition s total welfare loss from two different but moderate distortions is smaller than that from a single but severe distortion

optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock externalities abstract underlying some of the most pressing environmental problems are the interlinked resource and environmental stock externalities with threshold effects using a simple dynamic model it is shown how in the face of such externalities the static market based policy instruments such as pigouvian taxes should be modified it is shown that even if for an initial period there is going to be no pollution stock damage the optimal policy still requires that abatement begins immediately and at increasing rates simulation of the model for the case of fossil fuel burning and the consequent global warming shows that the optimal carbon tax and therefore the optimal control strategy is particularly sensitive to changes in the marginal abatement cost and the level of fossil fuel demand policy simulations contrast the optimal control policy with and estimate the welfare losses from alternative policies deriving from arbitrary tax paths the latter include i a no tax policy ii a constant carbon tax rate iii the european community s proposed carbon tax path and iv a delayed optimal tax path

too much coal too little oil abstract our main message is that it is optimal to use less coal and more oil once one takes account of coal being a backstop which emits much more co2 than oil the way of achieving this is to have a steeply rising carbon tax during the initial oil only phase a less steeply rising carbon tax during the intermediate phase where oil and coal are used alongside each other and the following coal only phase and a flat carbon tax during the final renewables only phase the laissez faire outcome uses coal forever or starts with oil until it is no longer cost effective to do so and then switches to coal we also analyze the effects on the optimal transition times and carbon tax of a carbon free albeit expensive backstop solar or wind energy subsidizing renewables to just below the cost of coal does not affect the oil only phase the gain in green welfare dominates the welfare cost of the subsidy if the subsidy gap is small and the global warming challenge is acute without a carbon tax a prohibitive coal tax leads to less oil left in situ and substantially delays introduction of renewables but curbs global warming substantially as coal is never used finally we characterize under general conditions what the optimal sequencing oil and coal looks like

a supplier s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information in the supply chain literature an increasing body of work studies how suppliers can use incentive schemes such as quantity discounts to influence buyers ordering behaviour thus reducing the supplier s and the total supply chain s costs various functional forms for such incentive schemes have been proposed but a critical assumption always made is that the supplier has full information about the buyer s cost structure we derive the optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information and compare it to the situation where the supplier has full information

brown backstops versus the green paradox abstract anticipated climate policies are ineffective when fossil fuel owners respond by shifting supply intertemporally the green paradox this mechanism relies crucially on the exhaustibility of fossil fuels we analyze the effect of anticipated climate policies on emissions in a simple model with two fossil fuels one scarce and dirty e g oil the other abundant and dirtier e g coal we derive conditions for a green orthodox anticipated climate policies may reduce current emissions the model can also be used to analyze spatial carbon leakage calibrations suggest that intertemporal carbon leakage from 0 to 8 is a relatively minor concern

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

market information and firm performance the value of new information depends on how accurate the information is but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in we develop a game theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information information is more valuable for larger firms we find that except under some conditions more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a stackelberg mode of conduct than in a bertrand nash mode

unilateral co2 reductions and carbon leakage the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model featuring six world regions with trade in energy and non energy goods is used to simulate the period from 1990 through 2100 in 10 year intervals the simulations explore the effect of unilateral action by the oecd to curb global co2 emissions unilateral cuts create incentives for free riding by non participating regions so that global emissions are reduced by less than the amount that the oecd cuts back its regional emissions carbon leakage occurs through two channels first basic materials production increases in unconstrained regions resulting in increased carbon intensity of gdp second reductions in oecd oil imports cause the world oil price to fall leading to an increased energy intensity in the non participant regions in this paper we use a general equilibrium model to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of oecd reductions in curbing global co2 concentrations

greenhouse gas emission controls in an open economy to examine how greenhouse gas emission controls affect a country s industrial and trade structures this article presents an open economy model that has both ricardian and heckscher ohlin features we specifically compare emission quotas emission taxes and emission standards the patterns of production and trade critically hinge on those policy tools it is shown that a domestic emission control may lead to carbon leakage and may not reduce the world emissions and that emission standards may work as a hidden production subsidy toward an emission intensive industry

climate change policy market structure and carbon leakage abstract the 1997 kyoto protocol on climate change obliges the industrialized countries to initiate the international effort of abating anthropogenic greenhouse gas ghg emissions if such an initiative is to be taken the associated competitive effects may lead to significant relocation of developed countries energy intensive production this paper examines this issue i adopt an oligopolistic structure combined with increasing returns to scale production technologies to represent the strategic interaction among the firms producing energy intensive products this representation is then embedded within a multi regional computable general equilibrium model which in turn is used for quantifying these relocational effects the results suggest that significant relocation of energy intensive industries away from the oecd may occur depending on the type of market structure with leakage rates as high as 130 in which case ghg control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to higher global emissions

us biofuels subsidies and co2 emissions an empirical test for a weak and a strong green paradox abstract using energy data over the period 1981 2011 we find that us biofuels subsidies and production have provided a perverse incentive for us fossil fuel producers to increase their rate of extraction that has generated a weak green paradox further in the short run if the reduction in the co 2 emissions from a one to one substitution between biofuels and fossil fuels is less than 26 percent or less than 57 percent if long run effect is taken into account then us biofuels production is likely to have resulted in a strong green paradox these results indicate that subsidies for first generation biofuels which yield a low level of per unit co 2 emission reduction compared to fossil fuels might have contributed to additional net co 2 emissions over the study period

carbon leakage the green paradox and perfect future markets policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate instead of alleviate climate change green paradox in a two period three country general equilibrium model with finite endowment of fossil fuel one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second periods when that cap is tightened the extent of carbon leakage depends on the interaction of various parameters and elasticities conditions for the green paradox are specified all determinants of carbon leakage resulting from tightening the first period cap work in the opposite direction when the second period cap is tightened tightening the second period cap does not necessarily lead to the green paradox

do renewable energy policies reduce carbon emissions on caps and inter industry leakage abstract in a parsimonious two sector general equilibrium model we challenge the widely held tenet that within a cap and trade system renewable energy policies have no effect on carbon emissions if the cap does not capture all sectors we demonstrate that variations of a renewable energy subsidy change aggregate carbon emissions through an inter industry leakage effect we decompose this effect into intuitively intelligible components that depend in natural ways on measurable elasticity parameters raising the subsidy always reduces emissions if funded by a lump sum tax reinforcing recent findings that tightening environmental regulation can cause negative leakage however if the subsidy is funded by a levy on electricity it can increase emissions these results provide a valuable basis for an informed design of renewable energy policies and an accurate assessment of their effectiveness we highlight how a state of the art statistic used by governments to gauge such effectiveness virtual emission reductions is biased because inter industrial leakage effects are not captured

an index decomposition analysis of china s interregional embodied carbon flows abstract being the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world china also possesses enormous regional disparities in terms of carbon dioxide emissions significant carbon emission flows from developed regions to undeveloped regions through inter regional trade have been observed in china in order to examine the determining factors of such virtual carbon flows an index decomposition analysis was conducted to investigate emissions embodied in trades among eight regions which were grouped with recourse to the latest available provincial i o tables in china this paper finds that trade balance and energy intensity are two most salient factors with regard to interregional carbon flows in the largest outsourcing region the northwest region of china the two factors account for 35 6 59 1 of the total carbon surplus respectively thus china is experiencing more efficiency losses than efficiency gains resulting from carbon transfers in order to switch to a future efficiency gain situation policies and supports for technology innovation in and transfer to inland regions as well as enhanced technology standards for expanded carbon intensive productions in less developed regions are suggested to complement the current policy of carbon intensity target

substitution between biofuels and fossil fuels is there a green paradox we show that i subsidies for renewable energy policies with the intention of encouraging substitution away from fossil fuels may accentuate climate change damages by hastening fossil fuel extraction and that ii the opposite result holds under some specified conditions we focus on the case of subsidies for renewable resources produced under increasing marginal costs and assume that both the renewable resources and the fossil fuels are currently in use such subsidies have a direct effect and an indirect effect working in opposite directions the direct effect is the reduction in demand for fossil fuels at any given price the indirect effect is the reduction in the current equilibrium price for fossil fuels which tends to increase the amount of fossil fuels demanded whether the sum of the two effects will actually result in an earlier or later date of exhaustion of the stock of fossil fuels depends on the curvature of the demand curve for energy and of the supply curve for the renewable substitute

strategic pigouvian taxation stock externalities and polluting non renewable resources este trabajo propone una extension del modelo de wirl y dockner 1995 disenado para analizar la interdependencia bilateral a largo plazo entre un cartel exportador de un recurso y una coalicion de paises importadores en primer lugar se incorporan los efectos agotamiento al analisis de las propiedades intertemporales de un impuesto pigouviano en segundo lugar se calculan los equilibrios feedback de stackelberg los resultados muestran que la dinamica del impuesto depende criticamente del nivel del dano medioambiental marginal ademas tambien demuestran que el impuesto definido por el equilibrio de nash perfecto de markov es un impuesto pigouviano neutral en el sentido que solo corrige la ineficiencia causada por la externalidad del stock sin embargo para el equilibrio feedback de stackelberg el impuesto es ventajoso para los paises importadores ya que la imposicion pigouviana estrategica reduce el poder de mercado del cartel

partial outsourcing monitoring cost and market structure we investigate firms outsourcing decisions when production requires a large number of inputs the novelty of our approach is that it provides a testable framework to characterize the equilibrium fraction of outsourced inputs we demonstrate that intensified competition in a cournot market for the final good typically enlarges the set of outsourced components relative to those produced in house the proportions of outsourced inputs are found to be strategic substitutes independently of whether firms compete with respect to quantities or prices in the market for the final good jel classification d20 l22 sous traitance partielle cout de monitarisation et structure de marche l auteur examine les decisions de sous traitance des entreprises quand la production reclame un grand nombre d intrants la nouveaute de l approche proposee est qu elle fournit un cadre conceptuel testable pour definir en equilibre la fraction des intrants obtenue en sous traitance on montre qu une concurrence plus intense pour le produit final dans un marchea la cournot accroit l ensemble des intrants obtenus en sous traitance par rapport a l ensemble de ceux qui sont produit a l interne il s avere que les proportions des divers intrants obtenus en sous traitance sont des substituts que les firmes se concurrencent par les prix ou les quantites dans le marche du produit final

the carbon rent economics of climate policy abstract by reducing the demand for fossil fuels climate policy can reduce scarcity rents for fossil resource owners as mitigation policies ultimately aim to limit emissions a new scarcity for space in the atmosphere to deposit emissions is created the associated scarcity rent or climate rent that is for example directly visible in permit prices under an emission trading scheme can be higher or lower than the original fossil resource rent in this paper we analyze analytically and numerically the impact of mitigation targets resource availability backstop costs discount rates and demand parameters on fossil resource rents and the climate rent we assess whether and how owners of oil gas and coal can be compensated by a carbon permit grandfathering rule one important finding is that reducing cumulative fossil resource use could actually increase scarcity rents and benefit fossil resource owners under a permit grandfathering rule for our standard parameter setting overall scarcity rents under climate policy increase slightly while low discount rates of resource owners imply higher rent losses due to climate policies new developments of reserves or energy efficiency improvements could more than double scarcity rents under climate policy another important implication is that agents receiving the climate rent regulating institutions or owners of grandfathered permits could influence the climate target such that rents are maximized rather than to limit global warming to a socially desirable level for our basic parameter setting rents would be maximized at approximately 650 gtc emissions 50 of business as usual emissions implying a virtual certainty of exceeding a 2 c target and a likelihood of 4 c warming

velocity and the variability of money growth evidence from granger causality tests note economists and policy makers were caught off guard by the behavior of the income velocity of money in 1982 the velocity of m1 which had grown at a 3 3 percent average annual rate from 1970 1981 fezl by 4 4 percent in 1982 in the fourth quarter of 1982 the decline was 12 6 percent at an annual rate the 1982 decline in velocity significantly reduced nominal gnp growth and may have helped cause the fall in real gnp the 1982 episode has generated quite a bit of controversy the decline in velocity is important not only for its possible relation to real gnp but also because it has led some economists to seriously question monetarism monetarists believe that there is a predictable link between money growth and nominal gnp growth when velocity declined in 1982 that link appeared to have weakened seemingly undermining the monetarist beliefs in fact robert gordon 1983 has called the 1982 episode the velocity recession and the demise of monetarism milton friedman 1984 has stated that the decline in velocity does not undermine monetarism at all he believes that velocity fell because of the extreme volatility of money growth following the announced change in federal reserve operating procedures in october 1979 figure 1 shows the income velocity of m1 v and the standard deviation of current and seven lags of m1 growth s a large increase in the volatility of money growth in 1980 precedes the decline in velocity in 1982 based on this friedman states that the 1982 episode strengthens not weakens the case for the monetarist proposition of a constant growth rule of the money supply this paper uses the granger causality method to test friedman s hypothesis that the volatility of money growth causes velocity to change we conclude that friedman is correct i e the volatility of money measured by the standard deviation of money growth causes velocity in the granger sense in the next section we review some of the recent explanations offered by economists for the 1982 decline in velocity the concluding section presents our results of the granger tests of friedman s hypothesis

flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral cost effective action internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires the flattening of the extraction path of world fossil energy resources world carbon emissions we consider governments with sign unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation or by a sub global climate coalition unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost effective way in a two country two period general equilibrium model with a non renewable fossil energy resource we characterize the unilateral cost effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart we show that with full cooperation there exists a cost effective ceiling policy in which only first period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries in contrast the cost effective ceiling policy of a sub global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods the share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost effective taxes

international capital markets oil producers and the green paradox a rapidly rising carbon tax leads to faster extraction of fossil fuels and accelerates global warming we analyze how general equilibrium effects operating through the international capital market affect this green paradox in a two region two period world with identical homothetic preferences and without investment the global interest rate falls and the green paradox weakens with investment or a relatively more impatient oil importing region the green paradox may be strengthened because the future oil demand function shifts downward or because the interest rate rises if the oil importing region is very much more patient than the oil exporting region the green paradox may be reversed but in our calibrated model the effects are tiny with exploration and endogenous initial oil reserves a future carbon tax lowers cumulative oil extraction in partial equilibrium if the boost to current oil extraction is weakened strengthened or reversed in general equilibrium so is the fall in cumulative extraction a partial and general equilibrium welfare analysis of a future carbon tax both for full and partial exhaustion is given the effects of stock dependent extraction costs are separately discussed in an appendix

a stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry abstract we consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader follower type move each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm we show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally we then devise a simple to implement information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off we also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results

unilateral climate policy harmful or even disastrous this paper deals with possible foreign reactions to unilateral carbon demand reducing policies it differentiates between demand side and supply side reactions as well as between intra and inter temporal shifts in greenhouse gas emissions in our model we integrate a stock dependent marginal physical cost of extracting fossil fuels into eichner and pethig s int econ rev 52 3 767 805 2011 general equilibrium carbon leakage model the results are as follows under similar but somewhat tighter conditions than those derived by eichner and pethig int econ rev 52 3 767 805 2011 a weak green paradox arises furthermore a strong green paradox can arise in our model under supplementary constraints that means a green policy measure might not only lead to a harmful acceleration of fossil fuel extraction but to an increase in the cumulative climate damages at the same time in some of these cases there is even a cumulative extraction expansion which we consider disastrous

outsourcing in a global economy we study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade we model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts the extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers the relative cost of searching in each market the relative cost of customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each country

open access and the evolution of the u s spot market for natural gas federal regulations promoting open access transportation dramatically altered the organizational structure of the u s market for natural gas in the 1980s generally unbundling the merchant and transport functions of interstate pipelines an empirical analysis of wellhead spot prices is undertaken to examine the effect of open access on the geographic scope of the spot market using monthly spot price data from 1984 91 three statistical tests are applied and compared price correlations granger causality and cointegration we find that open access integrated the regional wellhead markets into a national competitive market for natural gas the effects of unbundling on contracts for natural gas are then investigated incentives for long term contracts between pipelines and producers are shown to be effectively removed by the introduction of competitive buying and selling of gas at the wellhead through open access

the role of carbon capture and sequestration policies for climate change mitigation this paper takes the policy failure in establishing a global carbon price for efficient emissions reduction as a starting point and analyzes to what extent technology policies can be a reasonable second best approach from a supply side perspective carbon capture and storage ccs policies differ substantially from renewable energy policies they increase fossil resource demand and simultaneously lower emissions we analyze ccs and renewable energy policies in a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model for settings of imperfect or missing carbon prices we find that in contrast to renewable energy policies ccs policies are not always capable of reducing emissions in the long run if feasible ccs policies can carry lower social costs compared to renewable energy policies in particular when second best policies are only employed temporally in case fossil resources are abundant and renewable energy costs low renewable energy policies perform better our results indicate that a pure ccs policy or a pure renewable energy policy carry their own specific risks of missing the environmental target a smart combination of both however can be a robust and low cost temporary second best policy

absolute abundance and relative scarcity environmental policy with implementation lags we study the effectiveness of environmental policy in a model with nonrenewable resources and an unavoidable implementation lag we find that a time lag between the announcement and the implementation of an emissions quota induces an increase in emissions in the period between the policy s announcement and implementation since a binding constraint on emissions restricts energy use during the implementation phase more of the resources must be extracted outside of it we call this the abundance effect in the case of multiple resources that differ in their pollution intensity a second channel emerges since cleaner sources are relatively more valuable when the policy is implemented it is optimal to conserve them before the cap is enforced this ordering effect tends to induce a switch to dirtier resources before the policy is implemented compounding the increase in emissions via the abundance channel using the announcement lag in title iv of the 1990 caaa as a case study we are able to empirically show that the abundance effect and ordering effect are both statistically and economically significant we discuss a number of alternative policy options to deal with these undesirable side effects of policy announcements