technological vs ecological switch and the environmental kuznets curve we consider an optimal technology adoption ak model in line with boucekkine krawczyk and vallee 2011 an economy caring about consumption and pollution as well starts with a given technological regime and may decide to switch at any moment to a cleaner technology at a given permanent or transitory output cost at the same time we posit that there exists a pollution threshold above which the assimilation capacity of nature goes down featuring a kind of irreversible ecological regime we study how ecological irreversibility interacts with the ingredients of the latter optimal technological switch problem with a special attention to induced capital pollution relationship we find that if a single technological switch is optimal one recovers the environmental kuznets curve provided initial pollution is high enough if exceeding the ecological threshold is optimal then the latter configuration is far from being the rule

voting power in the ec decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements abstract in this paper we study the voting power in the council of ministers of the ec the purpose of this paper is twofold first to evaluate the voting power for the member states of today s community and second to analyse the balance of power after two different enlargements of the community the analysis is based on the shapley shubik and the banzhaf power indices of simple cooperative games the modified version of the shapley shubik index is used to analyse how the sub systems of the ec can change the distribution of power in the decision making process

fertility volatility and growth abstract empirically growth rates are negatively correlated with birth rates they are also correlated with production risk we argue that these stylized facts are related and arise jointly from the decision of how many children to have in a risky environment

risk optimal government finance and monetary policies in a growing economy optimal tax and monetary policies in a stochastic monetary growth model are investigated our findings are of three general types first both capital income taxes and monetary growth are shown to influence the economy through effective risk adjusted measures expressed as a linear function of their respective means and variances second two stochastic neutrality results relating to money and bonds the two nominal assets in the economy are identified third optimal policy rules relating to taxes bond finance and money creation are characterized an essential component of optimal financial policy is a risk adjusted balanced budget

policy inconsistency and external debt service abstract in this paper it is argued that the willingness of debtors to make external debt service payments reflects in part their inability to credibly and permanently default the benefits of a credible default would include increased private investment but this would in turn tend to create conditions in which it would then be optimal for the government to resume payments thus debt remains a threat even after the announcement of repudiation it follows that the expected benefits of such an action are limited and may be offset by penalties imposed by creditors jel f34

approaches to efficient capital taxation leveling the playing field vs living by the golden rule this paper analyzes intersectoral and intertemporal efficiency effects of the tax reform act of 1986 using a general equilibrium model that considers impacts of taxes on the allocation of capital across industries assets sectors and time the model pays close attentiona to capital adjustment dynamics we find that the 1986 reform worsened the intertemporal efficiency of resource allocation by increasing marginal effective tax rates on various uses and types of capital this negative efficiency effect is more that offset however by postivie effects from an improved intersectoral allocation of capital and a reduction of labor market distortions

exchange rate determination and asset prices in a stochastic small open economy abstract this paper constructs a stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy consisting of risk averse optimizing agents the stochastic processes describing the rate of monetary growth government expenditure private production and the foreign price level are taken to be exogenous determining all asset risks and returns and the equilibrium stochastic process describing the domestic inflation rate and the exchange rate the model is used to examine the effects of the means and variances of policy shocks on the equilibrium and the determinants of the foreign exchange risk premium

risk capital financing and the separation of ownership and control in business groups abstract this paper analyses business groups composed of legally independent firms connected through a network of cross shareholdings a model which allows to calculate the value of the firms of a group and the integrated ownership shares held by an outside stockholder is described a taxonomy for the collection of risk capital generalizing the one which applies for a single firm is proposed the connection between the process of raising risk capital and the separation of ownership from control in business groups is demonstrated and given a formal mathematical description empirical evidence relating to the amount of risk capital collected by italian business groups in the 80s and to the extent of the divorce between ownership and control is also provided

spectrum value for coalitional games abstract assuming a spectrum or ordering of the players of a coalitional game as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation we consider a variation of the shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum this results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along the spectrum is critical we present both a characterization of this value by means of properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it in simple majority games the greatest power accrues to moderate players who are located neither at the extremes of the spectrum nor in its center in supermajority games power increasingly accrues towards the extremes and in unanimity games all power is held by the players at the extreme of the spectrum

designing the voting system for the council of the european union this paper examines the system of qualified majority voting used by the council of the european union from the perspective of enlargement of the union it uses an approach based on power indices due to penrose 1946 banzhaf 1965 and coleman 1971 to make two analyses 1 the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness and 2 the question of how the threshold number of votes required for qmv should be determined it studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the nice treaty 1 no enlargement the eu comprising 15 member countries and 2 full enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates the proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine matter as the membership changes the analysis of how the threshold affects power shows the trade offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the council to act the main findings are 1 that the weights laid down in the nice treaty are close to being fair the only significant discrepancies being the under representation of germany and romania and the over representation of spain and poland 2 the threshold required for a decision is set too high for the council to be an effective decision making body

interest rates and monetary policy uncertainty abstract this paper analyzes a model in which optimizing households are uncertain about monetary policy and learn about it over time in this model the variance of changes in nominal and ex post real interest rates increases with the variance of the household s predictive distribution over money growth a positive relation between unexpected changes in nominal interest rates and the money stock results from monetary policy uncertainty finally if money growth covaries negatively with real wealth an increase in monetary policy uncertainty increases the expected real rate of interest and decreases the nominal rate of interest

the cost of business cycles under endogenous growth robert e lucas jr argued that the welfare gains from reducing aggregate consumption volatility are negligible subsequent work that revisited his calculation continued to find small welfare benefits further reinforcing the perception that business cycles do not matter this paper argues instead that fluctuations can affect welfare by affecting the growth rate of consumption i show that fluctuations can reduce growth starting from a given initial consumption which can imply substantial welfare effects as lucas himself observed empirical evidence suggests the welfare effects are likely to be substantial about two orders of magnitude greater than lucas original estimates

measuring the average marginal tax rate from the individual income tax the economic effects of taxation depend on the configuration of marginal tax rates we consider here the appropriate measure of a marginal tax rate for the federal individual income tax which has a graduated rate structure and allows for numerous legal and illegal deductions from total income our conclusion is that the explicit marginal rate from the tax schedule is the right concept for many purposes hence we construct approximately weighted averages of these marginal tax rates for 1916 80 when weighted by adjusted gross income the arithmetic average of marginal tax rates is 5 in 1920 2 in 1930 6 in 1940 20 in 1950 23 in 1960 24 in 1970 and 30 in 1980 we also discuss the dispersion of marginal tax rates as well as the behavior of average tax rates and deductions from taxable income one noteworthy result concerns the fraction of adjusted gross income that accrues to families that face a marginal tax rate of at least 35 this fraction quadruples from 1964 to 1980 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

bargaining power at europe s intergovernmental conferences testing institutional and intergovernmental theories this article examines how european union member states make choices about political institutions at intergovernmental conferences the grand negotiations where many key institutional changes are made using data on member state preferences from the intergovernmental conference leading to the treaty of amsterdam i test competing bargaining theories institutionalism and intergovernmentalism and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations compared to intergovernmentalism i present a formal model to discern between these competing theories of bargaining power derive a statistical model directly from this formal model and then use data from the european union s treaty of amsterdam to test these theories and corresponding power sources veto power associated with institutional models better explains intergovernmental conference outcomes compared to power from size and economic might often associated with intergovernmental analyses i would like to thank kathy bawn julia gray tim groseclose james honaker joe jupille thomas konig jeff lewis sven oliver proksch george tsebelis and the participants in ucla s graduate student formal theory and statistical methods workshops for their insightful comments on various drafts of this article i am also grateful for the comments from several anonymous reviewers and the editors at international organization an earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 2006 data and replication material are available at http faculty unlv edu jslapin

production technologies in stochastic continuous time models abstract properties of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models can be revealed by either using numerical solutions or qualitative analysis very precise and intuition building results are obtained by working with models which provide closed form solutions closed form solutions are known for a large class of models some of which however have some undesirable features such as potentially negative output this paper offers closed form solutions for models which are just as tractable but do not suffer from these shortcomings

concentration of shareholder voting power in finnish industrial companies wide concern has recently arisen in finland regarding an observed increase in the relative shareholdings of institutional owners in a single year 1985 households shareholdings in listed companies fell by six percentage points from the average of 43 per cent prevailing in the early 1980s this change has been especially noticeable with respect to industrial companies in which the direct share of households currently averages only 25 per cent among institutions the shareholdings of nonfinancial corporations have increased the most followed by the holdings of investment trusts and banks in february 1987 the finnish parliament passed a new law permitting the establishment of unit trusts as it was anticipated that such funds would be set up by banks and insurance companies parliament also introduced legislation restricting the rights of these financial institutions to own companies outside of banking or insurance the intention was to prevent further concentration of economic power in the hands of financial institutions the upper limit on a bank s shareholding in another company was reduced from 20 to 10 per cent of the stock or voting rights and the limit on an insurance company s holdings was similarly lowered from 50 to 20 per cent banks will have five years to adjust their current holdings whereas insurance companies are allowed to keep previously acquired shares in excess of the new limit what is interesting about the reasons given by parliament for the new measures is the view that companies can be minority controlled this is believed to be the case when the ownership structure consists of a few relatively large and many small holdings minor shareholders may not be motivated enough to attend company meetings no quantitative estimate is given however of the relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power

on the role of government in a stochastically growing open economy abstract the relationship between the size of government economic growth and volatility in a small open economy is analyzed first we characterize the stochastic equilibrium for a centrally planned economy contrasting it with a closed economy the role of government consumption expenditure both as a stabilizing and a destabilizing factor is discussed the optimal size of government is derived and we find that an open economy will have a larger government if and only if it is a net creditor second the stochastic equilibrium in a decentralized economy is characterized and the optimal tax structure derived finally the role of government production expenditure and its impact on risk is briefly discussed

the effective tax rate and the pretax rate of return abstract this paper presents new estimates of the taxes paid on nonfinancial corporate capital on the pretax rate of return to capital and on the effective tax rate the basic time series show that both the pretax rate of return and the effective tax rate have varied substantially in the past quarter century an explicit analysis indicates that after adjusting for different aspects of the business cycle pretax profitability was between one and 1 5 percentage points lower in the 1970s than in the 1960s the rate of profitability in the 1960s was also about one half of a percentage point greater than the profitability in the 7 years of the 1950s after the korean war changes in productivity growth in inflation in relative unit labor costs and in other variables are all associated with changes in profitability none of these variables however can explain the differences in profitability between the 1950s 1960s and 1970s looking at broad decade averages the effective tax rate and the pretax rate of return move in opposite directions lower pretax profits occuring when the tax rate is high there thus appears to have been no tendency for pretax profits to vary in a way that offsets differences in effective tax rates

voting power in the european union enlargement abstract the shapley shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal the banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can effect a swing if there are n players in a voting situation then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in o n 2 n we present a combinatorial method based in generating functions to compute these power indices efficiently in weighted double or triple majority games and we study the time complexity of the algorithms moreover we calculate these power indices for the countries in the council of ministers of the european union under the new decision rules prescribed by the treaty of nice

an institutional critique of intergovernmentalism most intergovernmentalist analyses of european integration focus on treaty bargaining among european union member governments recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis an approach that asserts that a government s ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the council of ministers to which it is pivotal this approach suffers from two major weaknesses first it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments second power index analysis fails to consider the important roles of the commission of the european communities and the european parliament in legislative processes today s procedures affect the mix of agenda setting and veto power and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes if intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds it must take into account these legislative dynamics

tariff and tax reform dynamic implications abstract in an endogenously growing small open economy with a capital good and a consumption good we characterize the optimal combination of an import tariff and consumption taxes under the revenue neutrality constraint focusing on the case in which the economy imports the capital good we obtain two main results first consumption of the capital good is distorted more than the consumption good at the optimum second the optimal tariff rate is positive implying that free trade is not optimal even for a small open economy with no market failure

risk the financial market and macroeconomic equilibrium growing recognition of the importance of stock market phenomena to the real economy underscores the need for models linking exogenous uncertainty asset market performance and the rest of the economy in an optimizing framework without certainty equivalence this paper constructs a three agent model with continuous time stochastic variables uncertain private production and government expenditure and forward looking rational agents the growth rate of output physical capital accumulation financial asset returns and uncertain inflation are determined as functions of the exogenous uncertainty in the economy analysis of the model finds that increased risk associated with government policy often reverses in an explainable way the conventional comparative static predictions of nonstochastic macro models

a theoretical basis for the environmental kuznets curve abstract this paper attempts to explain the environmental kuznets curve ekc or inverted u shaped relationship between income and environmental degradation in the framework of endogenous growth model considering a closed economy one part of capital is used for commodity production which generates pollution that degrades existing environment and the remaining part is used for abating pollution i e upgrading environment sufficient abatement activity improves restores environmental quality a sufficient abatement activity associated with commodity production could only lead optimally towards steady state the ratio of allocation of capital between two sectors production and abatement is fixed along the optimal path but it varies along the non optimal path that exists in the off steady state in the economy allocation of capital for abatement activity varies over time thus a change from insufficient to sufficient allocation of capital i e investment for abatement activity is the basis for an inverted u shaped relationship between environmental quality and economic growth

a model of creative destruction with undiversifiable risk and optimising households this paper studies optimal household behaviour in a model of creative destruction the saving technology is characterised by stochastic returns that follow a poisson process it is shown that equilibrium conditions with optimising households differ substantially from equilibrium conditions where investment in r d is determined by firms three out of four market failures disappear and a new market failure resulting from a complementarity in financing r d is identified studying the social optimum shows that it contains as the special case of risk neutrality the social optimum derived in the literature

efficient dynamic pollution taxation in an uncertain environment this paper analyzes efficient pollution taxation within a stochastic model of endogenous growth pollution is a by product of production and causes disutility furthermore the productivity which results from environmental quality is uncertain this reflects e g uncertain capital depreciation induced by natural disasters like hurricanes or floods this uncertainty is shown to raise an ambiguous impact on the optimal pollution level as well as on optimal environmental taxation market equilibrium turns out to be suboptimal since the households mis perceive their individual impact on pollution conditions for welfare maximizing pollution taxation are stated and it is shown that a direct pollution tax is not appropriate to yield pareto optimal growth instead a linear capital income tax together with a linear abatement subsidy build an efficient tax scheme if secondarily the governmental budget is balanced moreover an increase in the riskiness of environmental productivity may even lead to an increase in the optimal pollution level and to a decrease in optimal environmental taxation depending predominantly on the preference parameters

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

some surprising properties of power indices abstract while it is troubling when power index values change with the index the problem is more severe different indices can generate radically different rankings for example a 15 player game exists with over a trillion different strict index rankings of the players in contrast with a fixed number of players certain indices always share the same ranking e g the shapley and banzhaf rankings agree with three players but they can have opposite rankings with more players it is explained why index outcomes can be sensitive to assumptions and to when players leave a game journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d71

the cost of uncertainty about the timing of social security reform abstract we develop a model to study optimal decision making in the face of uncertainty about the timing and structure of a future event the model is used to study optimal decision making and welfare when individuals face uncertainty about when and how social security will be reformed for young individuals with many years to optimally hedge the risks that they face the welfare cost of uncertainty about the timing and structure of reform is just a few basis points of total lifetime consumption in contrast the cost of reform uncertainty can be greater than 1 of total lifetime consumption for individuals close to retirement even if they have saved optimally up to that point finally the cost is significantly higher still for those who do not save optimally to hedge these risks

capital income taxation with imperfect competition a key feature of modern dynamic economies is imperfect competition some imperfect competition is due to institutions such as patents and copyrights that allow firms to exercise market power over the sale of products they invent some imperfect competition is due to various forms of increasing returns to scale and product differentiation since market power is an essential feature of innovation and growth in the new economy as it was in the old economy we need to know how imperfect competition affects the conventional wisdom on tax policy i argue that it has particularly striking implications for the taxation of capital the current consensus among economists is

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

managing the evolution of multilateralism author s downs george w rocke david barsoom peter n abstract in the past five years a relatively extensive literature has emerged that explores the demand for multilateral cooperation that is those factors that motivate states to develop or resist developing formal institutions that operate to increase interstate economic military or environmental cooperation 1 these factors include the transaction costs associated with ad hoc and multiple bilateral arrangements increased interstate trade the diffusion of liberal trade theory information about the costs of environmental degradation and trends in elite ideology to date however our understanding of the supply side of multilateralism the standards that are set for admission the order and speed with which candidate states are admitted and the impact of expansion on cooperation and future evolution has been relatively undeveloped 2 partly as a result theorists have had little to say about how multilateral institutions are likely to evolve or what the policy consequences of their expansion will be 3 supply side issues are important because multilateral organizations usually do not spring forth full blown they grow instead of forming an inclusive agreement that is one that covers nearly all of the states that its designers eventually hope to include many multilateral organizations start out with substantially smaller memberships and generally expand over time we argue that among the many possible explanations for the choice of this design strategy there is a rational choice argument

optimal government finance policy and exchange rate management in a stochastically growing open economy abstract optimal monetary policy is analyzed in a stochastic small open economy consisting of risk averse representative agents the analysis shows how optimal monetary policy should be directed toward an optimal interest rate target this target which maximizes the intertemporal utility of the representative agent is determined by balancing off the marginal gains of a higher interest rate on increased growth and the future consumption it generates against the marginal losses stemming from a reduction in the holdings of real money balances the paper shows how an appropriately set monetary growth rate eliminates the need for continuous intervention in the exchange market

the relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power in british companies a study of the application of power indices for simple g ames this paper reports an analysis of the relationships between shareholding and voting power distributions in a sample of british companies it applies two standard approaches to the measurement of power in simple games the shapley shubik and the banzhaf power indices the results indicate that power is more concentrated than ownership in every case a comparison of the two indices reveals that typically the banzhaf index gives a more concentrated power distribution for the shapley shubik index the power ratio for the largest shareholder is accurately described in terms of the size of holding and the concentration of the remainder the corresponding banzhaf power ratio is less dependent on these variables there is no association between power concentration and company size

the relation between price and marginal cost in u s industry an examination of data on output and labor input reveals that some u s industries have marginal cost well below price the conclusion rests on the finding that cyclical variations in labor input are small compared with variations in output in booms firms produce substantially more output and sell it for a price that exceeds the costs of the added inputs the paper documents the disparity between price and marginal cost where marginal cost is estimated from annual variations in cost it considers a variety of explanations of the findings that are consistent with competition but none is found to be completely plausible

income uncertainty and optimal redistribution 1 introduction redistribution policy under a utilitarian criterion aims to transfer dollars from one group in the population to another if the weighted utility gain to the recipients exceeds the utility cost to the donors under diminishing marginal utility of income part of any exogenous change in one group s income should be shared with the other group for example if taxpaying workers suffer a negative shock to their mean earnings then part of this utility shock should be spread to nonworkers in the form of lower transfer payments and vice versa for the case of a positive shock this article demonstrates the counterintuitive result that under reasonable preference representations a policymaker may respond optimally to a negative utility shock by redistributing income away from the harmed group thus exacerbating the group s utility loss in particular under risk aversion a mean preserving increase in the variance of income typically has an effect on well being analogous to a decrease in mean income 1 it may nevertheless be welfare enhancing to transfer income away from those suffering an increase in income uncertainty even though this policy compounds their welfare loss the main ideas can be demonstrated in a simple framework for illustration the analysis will focus on redistribution from taxpaying workers to nonworkers the central result is that a meanpreserving increase in earnings uncertainty among taxpayers can increase optimal transfer amounts to nonworkers increasing optimal income replacement rates even though the redistribution exacerbates the taxpayers utility loss from the increase in uncertainty 2 model footnote 1 many factors in the economy affect earnings uncertainty even conditional on being employed such as the form of compensation e

optimal saving under poisson uncertainty abstract this paper studies optimal saving and investment behaviour of a household that can either invest in a riskless or a risky saving technology when risk results from a poisson process the focus is on behaviour of households in a general equilibrium setup poisson processes are introduced since they allow us to understand and model endogenous cycles jointly with long run growth it turns out that a very simple intuitive and tractable characterization of equilibrium is possible journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 o33 o41

the welfare cost of capital income taxation in a growing economy the welfare cost of capital income taxation is analyzed in a general equilibrium framework where the private sector is represented by a competitive household endowed with perfect foresight and an infinite life the value of the welfare cost depends essentially on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function numerical estimates are presented for different values of the parameters of the model the welfare gain obtained by the abolition of the capital income tax is smaller when the private sector is not endowed with perfect foresight it is reduced by about 40 percent when expectations are myopic the allocation efficiency cost of the corporate tax dwarfs the intertemporal welfare cost

outside options component efficiency and stability abstract in this paper we introduce a component efficient value for tu games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition it is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way we show that for all tu games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value

optimal regime switching and threshold effects we consider a general control problem with two types of optimal regime switch the first one concerns technological and or institutional regimes indexed by a finite number of discrete parameter values and the second features regimes relying on given threshold values for given state variables we propose a general optimal control framework allowing to derive the first order optimality conditions and in particular to characterize the geometry of the shadow prices at optimal switching times if any we apply this new optimal control material to address the problem of the optimal management of natural resources under ecological irreversibility and with the possibility to switch to a backstop technology

optimal tax debt and expenditure policies in a growing economy abstract this paper employs an endogenous growth model to analyze the role of a consumption tax in enhancing growth and welfare provided government expenditure impacts directly on the decisions of private agents two fiscal instruments are necessary to replicate the first best optimum the tradeoff between consumption and income taxes to achieve this outcome is discussed and shown to depend upon the degree of congestion associated with the public good and the level of government expenditure relative to its social optimum in general the analysis suggests a potentially important role for a consumption tax as part of an overall optimal fiscal package

intertemporal substitution risk aversion and economic performance in a stochastically growing open economy abstract the constant elasticity utility function implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion with empirical evidence suggesting that this relationship may or may not hold studies of risk and growth should decouple these two parameters this paper provides an analytical characterization and numerical simulations of the equilibrium of a stochastically growing small open economy under general recursive preferences we show that errors committed by using the constant elasticity utility function even for small violations of the compatibility condition can be substantial our results suggest that the constant elasticity utility function should be employed with caution

tax reform and u s economic growth in this paper we evaluate the impact of the tax reform act of 1986 on u s economic growth we first calculate effective tax rates on income from capital employed in corporate noncorporate and household sectors we then project the future growth of the u s economy with and without the 1986 tax reform we find that much of the potential gain in welfare was dissipated through failure to index the income tax base for inflation the most promising avenue for future reform is to include income from household assets in the tax base while reducing tax rates on business income

a portfolio approach to endogenous growth equilibrium and optimal policy abstract this paper develops a portfolio approach to modeling endogenous growth in continuous time that is especially suitable for addressing fiscal and financial issues in policy design the analysis focuses on the equilibrium relationship between fiscal and financial policy rates of return and wealth allocation we analyze two models the first is based on the arrow romer model with increasing returns and an external effect of capital on labor productivity the second draws on barro s analysis of government spending and endogenous growth in both models we study the equilibrium allocation and discuss the optimal fiscal and financial policy

inflation uncertainty and growth in a cash in advance economy abstract this paper analyzes the effects of inflation variability on economic growth in a model where money is introduced via a cash in advance constraint in this setting we find that inflation adversely affects long run growth even when the cash in advance constraint applies only to consumption at the same time we find that inflation and growth are positively related in the short run furthermore variability increases average growth through a precautionary savings motive since inflation and inflation variability tend to be highly correlated the presence of uncertainty attenuates the negative long run relationship between inflation and real growth it also provides a partial rationale for the apparent lack of robustness in cross country regressions of growth and inflation

military spending and stochastic growth abstract this study examines capital accumulation military spending arms accumulation and output growth in a stochastic endogenous growth model the analysis shows that higher lower growth in foreign military spending leads to faster slower economic growth in the home country if the home country s intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption is smaller larger but more volatility in foreign military spending can lead to higher economic growth in the home country when its intertemporal substitution elasticity is large in addition shocks to output production may stimulate economic growth

do we now collect any revenue from taxing capital income the wide variation in effective tax rates on income from different types of capital received by different investors creates numerous tax arbitrage opportunities that result in a loss in both government revenue and economic efficiency the objective of this chapter is to estimate the revenue and distributional effects of tax arbitrage using tax data from 1983 by examining the effects of two tax changes that would each substantially reduce the opportunities for tax arbitrage our principal conclusions are as follows 1 taxing real rather than nominal interest income would have raised government revenue in 1983 by 25 5 billion 2 this increase in revenue would occur mainly at the expense of those in the highest tax brackets 3 taxing the cash flow from real capital and exempting from tax any income from financial assets would have raised government revenue by 17 4 billion since this tax change eliminates all distortions to savings and investment decisions our revenue forecast suggests that the tax l

leverage uncertainty and investment decisions abstract we explore the role of taxes on stimulating investment decisions for levered firms under cash flows and investment costs uncertainty using the adjusted present value based real options approach developed by myers and read 2019 we extend their work to consider combined tax credits and uncertain investment costs we then run a numerical analysis to quantify the impact of uncertainty corporate tax and investment tax credit in stimulating investments

on the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenues abstract when arthur laffer and other supply side advocates plot total tax revenue as a function of a particular tax rate they draw an upward sloping segment called the normal range followed by a downward sloping segment called the prohibitive range a brief literature review indicates that tax rates on the prohibitive range in theoretical and empirical models have been the result of particularly high tax rates high elasticity parameters or both the labor tax rate which maximizes total revenue for example will depend on the assumed labor supply elasticity this paper introduces a new curve which summarizes the tax rate and elasticity combinations that result in maximum revenues separating the normal area from the prohibitive area a general purpose empirical u s general equilibrium model is used to plot the laffer curve for several elasticities and to plot the newly introduced curve using the labor tax example results indicate that the u s could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive area but that the tax wedge or labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher than most estimates would suggest

optimal transition to renewable energy with threshold of irreversible pollution when cheap fossil energy is polluting and pollutant no longer absorbed beyond a certain concentration there is a moment when the introduction of a cleaner renewable energy although onerous is optimal with respect to inter temporal utility the cleaner technology is adopted either instantaneously or gradually at a controlled rate the problem of optimum under viability constraints is 6 dimensional under a continuous discrete dynamic controlled by energy consumption and investment into production of renewable energy viable optima are obtained either with gradual or with instantaneous adoption a longer time horizon increases the probability of adoption of renewable energy and the time for starting this adoption it also increases maximal utility and the probability to cross the threshold of irreversible pollution exploiting a renewable energy starts sooner when adoption is gradual rather than instantaneous the shorter the period remaining after adoption until the time horizon the higher the investment into renewable energy

enlargement processes and distributional conflicts the politics of discriminatory membership in the european union this paper examines discriminatory membership in the european union from a game theoretical perspective i argue that discriminatory membership enables the enlargement of international organizations with heterogenous member states eu members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected eu members as to render expansion pareto efficient the empirical findings of a probit analysis on the eu accession negotiations and outcomes of all five eu enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim the eu grants acceding states restricted membership rights if distributional conflicts emerge moreover the candidate s bargaining power and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes influence the enlargement outcomes

what drives the swing voter in africa what makes african voters up for grabs existing approaches to the swing voter have several liabilities this article introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations the issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable africa using a count model estimation technique and original survey data from ghana s critical 2008 elections the analysis challenges the near consensus in african politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy when voters perceive politicians as providing collective developmental goods the efficacy of clientelism as a tool to win over voters is reduced many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collective goods thus contradicting the literature presenting these as mutually exclusive finally the analysis shows that incumbents do better when they provide collective goods even in highly clientelistic environments

fiscal policy elastic labor supply and endogenous growth abstract endogenizing labor supply leads to fundamental changes in the equilibrium structure of the ak growth model the balanced growth equilibrium can be described in terms of two tradeoff loci relating the equilibrium growth rate to the fraction of time devoted to leisure the implications of endogenous labor supply for fiscal policy are analyzed three issues are addressed first the effects of various distortionary tax changes and government expenditure changes on the equilibrium growth leisure employment tradeoff are analyzed second optimal fiscal policy is characterized finally the formal analysis is supplemented by numerical results focusing particularly on the quantitative welfare implications

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

on the optimality of interest rate smoothing abstract this paper studies some continuous time cash in advance models in which interest rate smoothing is optimal we consider both deterministic and stochastic models in the stochastic case we obtain two results of independent interest i we study what is to our knowledge the only version of the neoclassical model under uncertainty that can be solved in closed form in continuous time and ii we show how to characterize the competitive equilibrium of a stochastic continuous time model that cannot be computed by solving a planning problem we also discuss the scope for monetary policy to improve welfare in an economy with a suboptimal real competitive equilibrium focusing on the particular example of an economy with externalities

computing power indices for large voting games voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which different members have different numbers of votes although this approach to the measurement of power has been known for a long time its application to large games has been limited by the difficulty of computing these indices this paper presents a new method for computing power indices that combines exact methods with an approximate method due to owen this method is of most utility in situations where the number of players is large and the voting weights are concentrated in the hands of a small number of members

the importance of asymmetric tax policy and dangers of aggregation existing tax policies have many complex features that make distinctions across goods factors and financial structures that distort economic allocations their importance is ignored when tax policy is summarized by an effective tax rate in fact the losses due to asymmetries are often larger than the losses due to the level of taxation

fiscal policy inflation and the accumulation of risky capital the effect of government policies on the level of investment and inflation has become a major concern of policy makers in a number of industrial countries proposals to raise the level of business investment have included overall tax cuts tax incentives to spur investment and a reduction in the level of government spending this paper presents a theoretical apparatus to explore the relationships between fiscal policy government debt inflation and capital accumulation it develops a one sector growth model embodying a stochastic production function and government fiscal policy atomistic agents in the economy choose consumption levels and allocate their wealth between risky capital and risky government debt to maximize expected discounted utility over an infinite horizon fiscal policy by affecting asset yields affects the composition of portfolios the price of government bonds and the accumulation of capital the model is used to answer three general questions 1 does the level of government expenditure affect the rate of capital accumulation and inflation in steady state 2 does the mode of government finance when the choice is between an income tax and deficit finance affect these magnitudes 3 what is the effect of uncertainty in the productivity of capital on growth the analysis relates to several areas of literature 1 the analysis of the relationship between capital accumulation and debt 2 the theory of the demand for government debt 3 considerations of the effect of income taxation on risk bearing and 4 the analysis of capital accumulation under uncertainty 1 the effects on output and the capital stock of the government s expenditure decision and its decision to finance its expenditure by taxation or debt issue are explored in two major bodies of economic theory the literature on the burden of the debt as developed by modigliani 1961 diamond 1965 and phelps and shell 1969 for example implies that policies which increase the value of outstanding government debt will tend to lower the level of the capital stock by displacing capital with public debt in private wealth the theory of money and growth as represented by tobin 1965 and sidrauski 1967b also implies that government debt displaces capital but specifically recognizes the role of capital gains on government debt

constitutional political economy in the european union this article surveys recent research in constitutional political economy in europe although not all of theworks discussed necessarily focus only on european constitutional issues or are written by europeans european constitutional issues figure importantly in each area surveyed the article examines the literatures linking constitutional institutions to economic growth government size government deficits and corruption bicameralism direct democracy and federalism three exclusively european topics also are covered constitutional issues in the transition countries the structure of the european union and the draft constitution for the european union

optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth models abstract we find that the optimal long run tax on capital income is zero even if the capital stock does not converge to a steady state nor to a steady state growth rate the optimal tax on human capital is also zero if human capital is not a final good but the long run wage tax is not generally zero we argue that consumption tax proposals such as the flat tax are not consumption taxes and are biased against human capital

budget balance welfare and the growth rate dynamic scoring of the long run government budget this paper determines conditions under which a reduction in the role of government either through a tax cut alone or together with accompanying expenditure cuts will improve long run government fiscal balance for a ceteris paribus cut in the income tax rate to improve long run government balance the intertemporal elasticity of substitution must exceed unity a tax cut balanced by an expenditure cut is likely to improve the long run balance even if it does not improve the short run balance the relationship between improving the long run fiscal balance and economic welfare is also analyzed

flexible integration emu and relative voting power in the eu this paper studies the implications offlexible integration in the european union itanalyses the voting power of member states in thecouncil of ministers when differently sized subgroupsof the eu are set up european monetary union isreferred to as the most important example of flexibleintegration the banzhaf index is calculated to studythe distribution of voting power in the decisionmaking process according to the stability and growthpact the results show considerable fluctuations especially for smaller countries in relative votingpower the latter being defined as the relationbetween voting power and relative voting weight

measuring the efficiency cost of taxing risky capital income this paper derives a measure of the efficiency cost of taxing risky capital income in an infinite horizon stochastic model the resulting expression differs from all those proposed in the existing literature the correct measure of efficiency cost will normally be smaller than any of those used in policy studies possibly dramatically so uncertainty changes the expression for efficiency cost through effects arising not only from stochastic capital gains on existing capital but also from stochastic costs of replacing existing capital the latter effect reduces efficiency costs and normally outweighs the first effect copyright 1989 by american economic association

managerialism revisited in the light of bargaining game theory abstract this lecture proposes to view the modern firm as a coalition of shareholders employees and business partners rather than to identify it with a single maximizer such as an entrepreneur this view may be thought of as a revival of the original thought of managerialism but tries to go further by analyzing implications of the interactions of those agents on the behavior of the firm in a bargaining game theoretic framework the lecture reviews the literature on game theoretic approaches to the theory of the firm and discusses a few important theoretical and institutional issues

an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment this article analyzes the potential conflict between economic growth and the maintenance of environmental quality in an overlapping generations model short lived individuals make decisions which have long lasting effects on both factor productivity and the environment the model provides a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and income whereby economic growth is associated first with declines then improvements in environmental quality it suggests circumstances in which multiple pareto ranked steady state equilibria may arise and in which sustained growth of both capital and environmental quality may occur overmaintenance of the environment analogous to dynamically inefficient overaccumulation of capital may emerge copyright 1994 by royal economic society

excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments abstractin this article we introduce a new value for cooperative games this value is based on the shapley 1953 value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players one example of such exclusions are the coalition statements of parliamentary parties a case study demonstrates the application of the new value for these situations

the deadweight loss from non neutral capital income taxation abstract this paper develops an overlapping generations general equilibrium model that treats explicitly the role of capital goods in the production process and uses the model to measure the relative magnitudes of different distortions associated with capital income taxation across industries assets and time one of the main results is that uniform capital income taxation is almost certainly suboptimal theoritically but that optimal deviations from uniform taxation are empirically inconsequencial the paper also introduces and applies a general technique for distinguishing intergenerational transfers from efficiency gains in the analysis of the impact of policy changes on long run welfare

optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

what determines eu decision making needs power or both this paper examines the determinants of power in the council of the european union it argues that quantitative power indices stemming from voting theory provide a good description of the actual distribution of power among eu members of course we cannot directly verify the accuracy of such indices since it is impossible to measure power directly instead we evaluate whether these power measures explain a quantifiable manifestation of the exercise of power namely members shares of eu budget allocation as an alternative explanation of the eu budget we also consider a needs view of the budget where members allocations are determined by principles of solidarity our empirical analysis is based on 1976 2001 data on the patterns of the eu budget shares and on measures of each member state s needs and political power our results indicate that at least 60 of the budget expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics and the remaining 40 to the declared benevolent eu budget policies however when we apply specific voting power measures that allow correlated preferences and cooperative voting patterns between the member states our estimates indicate that the power politics view can explain as much as 90 of the budget shares we conclude that power politics can explain a major part of the council decisions and that correlated preferences and voting cooperation between eu countries potentially play significant roles in eu decision making heikki kauppi and mika widgren

corporate governance and game theoretic analyses of shareholder power the case of spain the definition and implementation of control is at the heart of the corporate governance debate the paper approaches the issue by using power indices derived from the theory of cooperative games an application to spanish listed firms shows that incentives for large shareholders to form controlling blocs are high in the spanish system of corporate governance ownership concentration is therefore the main mechanism to mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers moreover these results suggest that the shapley shubik index is not an appropriate measure of shareholder power

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

are there limits to growth a simple theoretical model of pollution is developed that generates an inverted u shape relationship between per capita income and environmental quality this model is then used to study long run growth the same inverted u shape is shown to appear in time series and the prospects for sustained growth are shown to hinge on whether increasingly strict environmental regulation is compatible with a constant rate of return on capital implementation is also studied tax and voucher schemes are shown to have an advantage over direct regulation because they provide the correct incentives for capital accumulation copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

economic growth under money illusion abstract empirical and experimental evidence documents that money illusion is persistent and widespread this paper incorporates money illusion into a stochastic continuous time monetary model of endogenous growth we model an agent s money illusion behavior by assuming that he maximizes nonstandard utility derived from both nominal and real quantities money illusion affects an agent s perception of the growth and riskiness of real wealth and distorts his consumption savings decisions it influences long run growth via this channel we show that the welfare cost of money illusion is negligible whereas its impact on long run growth is noticeable even if the degree of money illusion is low

capital income taxation and risk taking in a small open economy abstract how do capital income taxes affect household portfolio choice and growth we approach this question within the context of a stochastic model of a small open economy in which taxes on income from domestic capital equity and foreign bonds affect household portfolio choice welfare and the growth rate of the economy the theoretical and numerical analysis demonstrates the important role that risk plays in determining the mean and variability of growth as well as the conditions under which a higher tax rate can be welfare improving to shed more light on the complex theoretical interaction between taxes and risk taking we estimate a reduced form multinomial probit model of household portfolio choice using the method of simulated moments the empirical evidence is in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom we find that higher taxes make it less likely that the household will hold risky assets

ownership concentration and the theory of the firm a simple game theoretic approach a model of the shareholder constraint is described in terms of the relationship between shareholding concentration and corporate control a unified perspective including takeovers as a special case is developed whereby leading coalitions are costly to form and possess power in a shareholder voting game control is defined in terms of power indices for simple games a static theory of the firm is developed in terms of the optimal formation of controlling coalitions a dynamic theory of an owner controlled firm is described which explains increasing shareholding dispersion accompanying growth i introduction capital market constraints on managerial discretion are usually described in terms of two mechanisms i the ability of large shareholders to organise their voting power to enforce wealth maximisation and ii the threat of takeover following a fall in the share price most writers have tended to emphasise the takeover mechanism on the assumption that the capacity of shareholders to organise voting coalitions is weak however as aoki 1983 has recently argued the trend towards greater shareholding concentration with the growing importance of institutional shareholders gives a greater role to the first mechanism large shareholders cannot easily sell their holdings without adversely affecting the share price and therefore become locked in to dealing directly with management despite its central role the treatment of share concentration has usually been ad hoc most writers have taken low concentration as implying a loose constraint or management control by making it difficult for shareholders to organise by contrast a tight constraint ownership control prevails where there is at least a sizeable minority holding however little attention has been this paper and leech 1987 are based on warwick economic research paper no 262 ownership concentration and the theory of the firm a simple game theoretic approach applied to us corporations in the 1930s july 1985 i wish to thank peter law for helpful discussions of the ideas contained in them i am also grateful for comments to john cable keith cowling paul geroski donald hay two anonymous referees and participants in a staff seminar at warwick university aoki concludes that the tendency toward a managerial revolution in the sense of wider dispersal of shareholders control is now definitely reversed he suggests that the takeover mechanism is losing its role in disciplining management which fails to maximise share values rather it is becoming a means for large acquisition minded corporations to take over well managed small and medium firms

taxation risk taking and growth a continuous time stochastic general equilibrium analysis with labor leisure choice abstract this paper investigates the equilibrium relationship between taxation portfolio choice risk taking and capital accumulation specifically it examines how taxes affect risk taking and capital accumulation we extend the existing literature by relaxing two crucial assumptions in modelling risk taking behavior i that the investment opportunity set is fixed and ii that there is no distinction between attitudes towards risk and behavior towards intertemporal substitution we extend the investment opportunity set of individuals through optimally determined human capital and distinguish intertemporal substitution from attitudes towards risk via a recursive utility function in the presence of these extensions the paper successfully derives a closed form solution to the stochastic growth model with stochastic wage income

adjustment costs and investment in a stochastic endogenous growth model abstract this paper introduces costly investment into a stochastic equilibrium macro model investment is determined by an endogenously determined tobin q that depends upon the structural parameters of the economy the model permits a sequence of economies allowing for an increasing role of government to be studied the effects of both a structural change taking the form of a higher variance of productivity shocks and fiscal policy on the equilibrium is analyzed paying particular attention to the impact on the growth rate and its variability the role of the tobin q in determining the response of the mean growth rate and its variance is emphasized

the welfare cost of factor taxation in a perfect foresight model this paper examines the marginal efficiency cost of various factor taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium model the au thor solves for the excess burden of anticipated and unanticipated t emporary and permanent tax policies using a range of estimates for taste and technology parameters he finds excess burdens larger than those indicated by previous studies that use static models these exc ess burdens are sensitive to parameter values and timing however th e rankings of alternative tax policies turn out to be insensitive to structural parameter values copyright 1987 by university of chicago press