stopping agents from cheating abstract when a principal hires two or more agents to work in a correlated environment each agent s reward will depend on the other s performance unfortunately with just the usual optimal incentive constrained contracts being offered the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal they cheat however the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost this mechanism uses one agent to police the other and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts

price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly abstract we revisit the classic discussion of the endogenous choice of a price or a quantity contract but in a mixed duopoly we find that choosing the price contract is a dominant strategy for both firms whether the goods are substitutes or complements

the hold up problem in government contracting a two period procurement model is considered in an incomplete contract framework in contrast to o hart and j moore 1988 the welfare maximizing government as the buyer is able to accomplish ex ante optimal contracts which guarantee first best specific investments of both buyer and seller these contracts are precisely characterized regardless of the underlying supports of cost and benefit distributions renegotiation inevitably occurs in some states of nature this renegotiation always increases the ex ante fixed trade price hence the empirical observation of soft budget constraints in government contracting can be rationalized furthermore in accordance with common beliefs the seller s rents accrue only at the production stage copyright 1996 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

defence procurement theory and uk policy since the early 1980s competition as a means of obtaining best value for money has dominated uk defence procurement policy this paper describes the uk defense equipment market and the procurement problem there are sections on the economic theory of procurement contracting regulation and competition the conclusion evaluates uk defence procurement policy and assesses some of the policy issues for the 1990s copyright 1996 by oxford university press

a mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms in this paper a mixed oligopoly model is considered in which a state owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms previous articles on mixed oligopoly did not include foreign private firms the effect on the equilibrium involves a lower price and a different allocation of production relative to the case when all private firms are domestically owned in addition issues such as the effects of an open door policy allowing foreign firms to enter and the effects of foreign acquisition of domestic firms are discussed

trade policy and mixed enterprises this paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments in the case of rivalry in the home market the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive for the case of cournot rivalry in a third market the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership while in the case of bertrand rivalry with differentiated products the optimal export tax increases

effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly abstract in a mixed oligopoly an increase in tax ad valorem or specific does not change total output but increases the output of the public firm and the tax revenue also privatization may increase both tax revenue and welfare

school finance reform and private school enrollment evidence from california abstract abstract this paper uses the school finance reforms in california in the 1970s to examine whether the constraints such reforms impose on school districts lead to switching to private schools misspecifications of demand in previous work have led to understatement of reform effects an empirical model of schooling share equations is derived from a discrete choice framework large biases are shown to result from failure to account for heterogeneity of demanders and school district specific fixed effects simulations indicate that the changes in public provision potentially resulting from reform explain a sizeable portion of the growth in the private school share

mixed oligopoly privatization subsidization and the order of firms moves several types of objectives abstract we show the robustness of results in earlier works for a subsidy in mixed oligopoly these results do not depend upon the fact that each private firm maximizes its own profits

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

does immigration induce native flight from public schools into private schools abstract the paper tests whether native born american families respond to inflows of immigrants by sending their children to private school the analysis uses 1980 and 1990 census data from 132 metropolitan areas for primary school students no significant relation between immigration and private school enrolment is found for secondary schools a significant link emerges for every four immigrants who arrive in public high schools it is estimated that one native student switches to a private school white students account for most of this flight natives appear to respond mainly to immigrant children who speak a language other than english at home

endogenous price leadership and the strategic acquisition of information we model a differentiated bertrand duopoly in which a firm s earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading in such a setting with second mover advantage we then study the firms incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game both i neither firm acquiring information and ii one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome even if information is free information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition

immigration and spending on public education california 1970 2000 abstract the evolution of education spending in california has received plenty of attention from both academics and practitioners after this state s education finance reform in the 1970 s this paper quantifies the contribution of immigration to the relative decline in elementary and secondary public education spending per student in california in the period 1970 2000 a quantitative model of school choice and voting over public education is used to perform the counterfactual experiments of interest the model predicts that education spending per student in california would have been 24 higher in the year 2000 if u s immigration had been restricted to its 1970 level

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

privatization neutrality theorem revisited fjell and heywood 2004 show that privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a production subsidy if firms move sequentially we find that the neutrality holds for any time structure if instead an output floor is introduced

the new economic case for migration restrictions an assessment abstract migration barriers tend to reduce global production by impeding efficient spatial reallocation of labor recent research argues for a countervailing effect of barriers tending to raise global production by preventing the spread of impoverishing institutions from poor to rich countries while evidence of this mechanism is scarce it is theoretically plausible at high migration rates we propose and calibrate a simple model of dynamically efficient migration when migrants spread economic institutions between countries the net effect of migration depends on three parameters transmission the degree to which origin country total factor productivity is embodied in migrants assimilation the degree to which migrants productivity determinants become like natives over time in the host country and congestion the degree to which transmission and assimilation change at higher migrant stocks on current evidence about the magnitudes of these parameters dynamically efficient policy would not imply open borders but would imply relaxation of current restrictions

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

mixed duopoly privatization and subsidization with excess burden of taxation we investigate optimal tax subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation we compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes mixed and private cournot duopolies and stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships we show that in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem privatization affects resulting welfare duopole mixte privatisation et subsidisation en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire on examine les politiques optimales de taxes et de subventions dans le cas d oligopoles mixtes et prives en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire on compare les subsides optimaux et les effets sur le niveau de bien etre dans quatre regimes les duopoles de cournot mixte et prive et la concurrence a la stackelberg avec leadership public et prive on montre que contrairement a ce que suggeraient les travaux anterieurs sur le theoreme de la neutralite de la privatisation la privatisation affecte les niveaux de bien etre

education finance reform and the distribution of education resources between 1971 and 1996 opponents of local funding for public schools successfully challenged the constitutionality of school finance systems in sixteen states using the variation across states in the timing of these cases the authors investigate the impact of reform on the distribution of school resources their results suggest that court ordered finance reform reduced within state inequality in spending by 19 to 34 percent successful litigation reduced inequality by raising spending in the poorest districts while leaving spending in the richest districts unchanged thereby increasing aggregate spending on education reform led states to fund additional spending through higher state taxes copyright 1998 by american economic association

second mover advantage and price leadership in bertrand duopoly we consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated product bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs we generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and or complements dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions we show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage for the linear version of the model we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance the analysis yields as the unique equilibrium outcome sequential play with the low cost firm as leader

immigration and the welfare state immigrant participation in means tested entitlement programs this paper documents the extent to which immigrants in the united states over the past 30 years participate in the many programs that make up the welfare state the immigrant native difference in the probability of receiving cash benefits is small but the gap widens once other programs are included in the analysis 21 percent of immigrant households receive some type of assistance as compared with only 14 percent of native households the types of benefits received by earlier immigrants influence the types of benefits received by newly arrived immigrants hence there might be ethnic networks that transmit information about the availability of particular benefits to new immigrants excerpt

regulating a dominant firm unknown demand and industry structure in this article we study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm actively competes generally the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding constraints on regulatory problems we characterize optimal policies both when demands are known complete information and unknown incomplete information to the regulator optimal policies under complete information may set the price at the dominant firm above or below its marginal cost optimal policies under incomplete information may be either pooling or separating constant over a range of the prior distribution of the firm s private information and leave no information rent to the firm

the new economics of regulation ten years after the new economics of regulation is an application of the principal agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms after a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed a survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules the auctioning of incentive contracts the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment and the hierarchical problems in regulation empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion

the organization and scope of agents regulating multiproduct industries abstract a mechanism design problem with two dimensional uncertainty is solved to derive the optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with private information about the marginal cost of producing two different goods the paper establishes that informational economies of scope or incentive complementarities arise when one firm produces both goods the regulator should weigh these economies against the benefits of relative performance incentives when choosing between integrated and decentralized organizations unless the marginal costs of the two products are sufficiently positively correlated the optimal ex ante policy gives control of both markets to a single firm journal of economic literature classification number s d82 l22 l51

comparing bertrand and cournot in mixed markets abstract we revisit the classic comparison between bertrand and cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms the results are often strikingly different and opposite to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in the standard setting with all profit maximizing firms

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

native internal migration and the labor market impact of immigration this paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of how immigration influences the joint determination of the wage structure and internal migration behavior for native born workers in local labor markets using data from the 1960 2000 decennial censuses the study shows that immigration is associated with lower in migration rates higher out migration rates and a decline in the growth rate of the native workforce the native migration response attenuates the measured impact of immigration on wages in a local labor market by 40 to 60 per cent depending on whether the labor market is defined at the state or metropolitan area level

privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry we consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized in the short run privatization is harmful because prices rise the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost in the long run privatization leads to further entry the net effect is beneficial if consumer preference for variety is not too weak a sufficient statistic for the social surplus to be higher in the long run is that the public firm makes a loss this suggests that profitable firms should not necessarily be privatized

sustaining fiscal policy through immigration this paper explores the fiscal implications of immigration to the us and argues that immigration policy should be viewed as a vital part of fiscal policy in particular a case is made that skill

endogenous role in mixed markets a two production period model in this paper i investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly where private and state owned public firms compete by allowing two production periods i find that many equilibria exist including the cournot type equilibrium and one stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower however another stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist if small inventory costs are introduced the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower

endogenous price leadership we consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow while the follower role is most attractive for each firm we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten a general theory of equilibrium selection in games mit press cambridge ma 1988 allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader

welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed bertrand duopoly abstract i investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces while a private enterprise has no such obligation i show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first best outcome walrasian equilibrium

csr in an asymmetric duopoly with environmental externality we investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation a la ramsey and a negative environmental externality pollution in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility csr in its statute and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function if the market is sufficiently large the csr firm sells more accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit seeking rival

coordination in split award auctions we analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier and suppliers have private cost information an intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split the need to coordinate is reflected in a split price that does not vary with private information we also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner take all auctions

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

room in the kitchen for the melting pot immigration and rental prices this paper studies the response of housing markets to immigration shocks following card 1990 i examine the changes in rental prices in miami and three comparison groups after the mariel boatlift this exogenous immigration shock added an extra 9 to miami s renter population in 1980 i find that rents increased from 8 to 11 more in miami than in the comparison groups between 1979 and 1981 by 1983 the rent differential was still 7 rental units of higher quality were not affected by the immigration shock units occupied by low income hispanic residents in 1979 experienced an extra 8 differential hike with respect to other low income units relative housing prices moved in the opposite direction from rents in the short run

regulation competition and asymmetric information abstract this article studies a model of regulation under asymmetric information when there exists a competitive fringe of unregulated alternative producers the correlation between the unknown cost parameters of the fringe and of the regulated firm allows the regulator to use the threat of entry by the fringe to reduce the informational cost of regulation the presence of the fringe is welfare enhancing the allocative distortions can be larger or smaller than those in the no fringe case and the optimal contract sometimes allows inefficient entry the optimal contract can exhibit non standard bunching phenomena and discontinuities

foreign lenders and the real sector we develop a theory of the interaction between the entry of lenders and the real sector the high liquidation skills of incumbent lenders render them too tough in terminating high risk return projects being foreign to the market newcomers have lower ability to liquidate than incumbents this makes them softer in liquidating high risk return projects but renders their funding more costly we show that the entry of lenders and the share of high risk return projects can reinforce each other through firms liquidation values this interaction dampens the output impact of liquidity shocks hence financial liberalization can enhance stability

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

the subsidiarity bias in regulation abstract we study the choice of the regulatory structure when a firm engages in different activities for different countries under decentralization regulatory contracts suffer from two opposite distortions the competition between regulatory authorities leads to too high powered contracts however with a dispersed ownership structure contracts tend to be too low powered for sufficiently substitutable activities decentralization always leads to an inefficient drift towards fixed price contracts nonetheless when regulators have private agendas and possess the discretion to distort their policy to gain the support of some interest groups decentralization may be preferred to centralization as competition between regulatory authorities mitigates their discretionary power

corporate social responsibility or payoff asymmetry a study of an endogenous timing game we revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms payoffs previous research investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly wherein one welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms it shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly in contrast to its result we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric our result indicates that asymmetry and not welfare concerning objectives yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly

do liquidity constraints matter in explaining firm size and growth some evidence from the italian manufacturing industry the paper investigates whether liquidity constraints affect firm size and growth dynamics using a large longitudinal sample of italian manufacturing firms we run standard panel data gibrat regressions suitably expanded to take into account liquidity constraints proxied by cash flow scaled by firm sales moreover we characterize the statistical properties of fi rms size growth age and scaled cashflow distributions pooled data show that i liquidity constraints engender a negative statistically significant effect on growth once one controls for size ii smaller firms grow more and experience more volatile growth patterns after controlling for liquidity constraints iii the stronger liquidity constraints the more size negatively affects firm growth we find that pooled size distributions depart from log normality and growth rates are well approximated by fat tailed tent shaped laplace densities we also study the evolution of growth size distributions over time our exercises suggest that the strong negative impact of liquidity constraints on firm growth which was present in the pooled sample becomes ambiguous when one disaggregates across years finally firms who were young and strongly liquidity constrained at the beginning of the sample period grew persistently more than those who were old and weakly liquidity constrained

the economics of immigration this literature review concerns the impact of immigration on the economy of the host country focusing on the experience of the united states the emphasis is on the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the author shows that research earlier in this period generally concluded that the economic effects of immigration were positive but that more recent research on later migrations have generally concluded that immigration may be having an adverse effect on the earnings of native unskilled workers and be placing an increased burden on welfare programs the importance of such economic analysis for the formulation of appropriate migration policies is stressed

mixed oligopoly privatization and strategic trade policy this paper investigates the effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies within an international mixed oligopoly serving a single market if the government uses a domestic production subsidy then welfare is always increased with privatization while the optimal subsidy falls if the government uses an import tariff privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space the optimal tariff however may rise or fall in recent years many countries around the world are privatizing their state owned industries at the same time many of these countries are also showing remarkable changes in their economic policies toward international trade on many occasions tariffs are significantly altered and domestic production subsidies are substantially reduced for example russia has privatized its aircraft industry and doubled its tariff on imported aircraft colombia has privatized its stateowned automobile maker colombia automotriz and reduced the import tariffs on foreign made cars in argentina the government is pursuing a policy of selective privatization and subsequent reduction of subsidies in western europe countries such as germany and spain have privatized their major airlines lufthansa and iberia respectively and significantly reduced subsidies what is the connection between privatization and strategic trade policies does privatization require a welfare maximizing government to alter trade barriers the objective of this paper is to answer these questions by investigating the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies the effects of privatization are typically analyzed in the context of mixed oligopoly models where state owned welfare maximizing public firms interact with profit maximizing private firms 1 we investigate the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies by incorporating strategic trade instruments in an international mixed oligopoly model specifically we consider two strategic trade instruments an import tariff and a domestic production subsidy the government chooses the optimal level of tariff or subsidy to maximize domestic welfare for each trade instrument we primarily focus on two questions first does privatization increase

the effect of education on crime evidence from prison inmates arrests and self reports we estimate the effect of high school graduation on participation in criminal activity accounting for endogeneity of schooling we begin by analyzing the effect of high school graduation on incarceration using census data instrumental variable estimates using changes in state compulsory attendance laws as an instrument for high school graduation uncover a significant reduction in incarceration for both blacks and whites when estimating the impact of high school graduation only ols and iv estimators estimate different weighted sums of the impact of each schooling progression on the probability of incarceration we clarify the relationship between ols and iv estimates and show that the weights placed on the impact of each schooling progression can explain differences in the estimates overall the estimates suggest that completing high school reduces the probability of incarceration by about 76 percentage points for whites and 3 4 percentage points for blacks we corroborate these findings using fbi data on arrests that distinguish among different types of crimes the biggest impacts of graduation are associated with murder assault and motor vehicle theft we also examine the effect of drop out on self reported crime in the nlsy and find that our estimates for imprisonment and arrest are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not educational differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime we estimate that the externality of education is about 14 26 of the private return to schooling suggesting that a significant part of the social return to education comes in the form of externalities from crime reduction

should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining a mixed duopoly approach abstract should civil servants employees in the public sector be allowed to bargain collectively to answer this question we construct a model of unionized mixed duopoly and examine the regulatory framework of public institutions especially focusing on a wage regulation imposed on the public firm the wage regulation turns out to yield critical welfare implications as it gives rise to two opposing strategic effects the wage regulation intensifies downstream market competition while it loosens upstream market competition the overall welfare effect is ambiguous depending crucially on the degree of product differentiation between the firms we also show that in contrast to the popular belief granting the right to bargain collectively to civil servants would not necessarily help them because they tend to demand excessively high wages when they are allowed to bargain collectively finally we briefly discuss a new perspective on the role of profit motives in public institutions when the wages are determined endogenously

education finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california abstract this paper examines the effect of different education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public education we focus on california which in the 1970 s was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state finance and subsequently saw its funding of public education fall between 10 and 15 relative to the rest of the us we show that a simple political economy model of public finance can account for the bulk of this drop we find that while the distribution of spending became more equal this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade off between equity and resources we show that if california had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether funding for public education would also have dropped by almost 10

r d competition between public and private sectors abstract we investigate a mixed market where a welfare maximizing public research institute competes against profit maximizing private firms we investigate r d competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and r d expenditure we find that the innovation size r d expenditure chosen by the public institute is too small too large from the viewpoint of social welfare respectively and so the government should control the public institute appropriately we also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes

endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly abstract endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing for choosing their quantities the results are strikingly different from those obtained in a corresponding oligopoly with all profit maximizing firms

mixed oligopoly privatization and subsidization abstract this paper demonstrates three effects of domestic production subsidies in a mixed oligopoly industry regarding privatization and efficiency first if subsidies are used before and after privatization welfare is unchanged by privatization second if subsidies are used only before privatization then privatization always lowers welfare regardless of the number of private firms in the industry third the subsidy contributes to overall efficiency in a mixed oligopoly due to cost distribution effects

all school finance equalizations are not created equal school finance equalization has probably affected american schools more than any other reform of the last 30 years understanding it is a prerequisite for making optimal social investments in human capital yet it is poorly understood in this paper i explain why it differs from conventional redistribution because it is based on property values which are endogenous to schools productivity taste for education and the school finance system itself i characterize equalization schemes and show why some level down and others level up schemes that strongly level down have unintended consequences even poor districts can end up worse off i also show how school finance equalization affects property prices private school attendance and student achievement

incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers abstract market structure is endogenized in a normative model of public procurement featuring a social cost of profit product variety economies of scale and incomplete information about cost depending on parameters either sole sourcing or dual sourcing might be optimal however if the social cost of profit is positive but not too large incomplete information biases optimal market structure in favor of sole sourcing on the other hand this bias in favor of sole sourcing may be reversed if the social cost of profit is large an application to the publicly financed treatment for drug abuse motivates the analysis