are contributions of time and money substitutes or complements abstractthis article empirically investigates the relationship between donations of time and money using canadian tax policy reforms that changed the tax price of charitable donations the 1988 reform where a charitable tax deduction was converted to a credit and the 2000 reform in provincial income taxes provide tax price variations plausibly exogenous to individuals unobserved heterogeneity our estimates on cross price effects imply that individuals make more time donations as the tax price of charitable donations increases and hence money and time donations are substitutes as some theories would imply this contrasts with earlier findings using cross sectional data

rules with discretion and local information to ensure that individual actors take certain actions community enforcement may be required this can present a rules versus discretion dilemma it can become impossible to employ discretion based on information that is not widely held because the wider community is unable to verify how the information was used instead actions may need to conform to simple and widely verifiable rules we study when discretion in the form of exceptions to a simple rule can be implemented if the information is shared by the action taker and a second party who is able to verify for the larger group that an exception is warranted in particular we compare protocols where the second party excuses the action taker from taking the action ex ante with protocols where the second party instead forgives a rule breaking actor ex post jel codes c73 d82

currency preferences and the australian dollar abstract we investigate currency substitution and currency complementarity in the case of the australian dollar data spanning 1984 2003 contain evidence of the australian dollar s substitution for the deutschmark and complementarity with the yen and the us dollar consistent with the theory that international variables will in general affect the demand for domestic money atemporally nonseparable preferences also give rise to the possibility of third currency effects our regressions find some evidence of these for example a rise in the us federal funds rate has been associated with rises in the value of the australian dollar against the mark and yen controlling for changes in other interest rates and in money supplies and real outputs

the transactions demand for money in a two currency economy abstract in this paper the model of the transactions demand for money of baumol 1952 is extended to an economy where transactions are conducted in two currencies the currency substitution hypothesis that the domestic demand for domestic money depends on the expected rate of depreciation as well as the domestic rate of interest and level of income is derived from the model in addition several new insights into the implications of currency substitution are provided

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

instability of the u s money demand function this paper surveys the two major episodes of instability of the u s money demand function known respectively as the mystery of missing money and the great velocity decline it also assesses the recent literature on open economy money demand models and their usefulness in explaining the puzzling behavior of money demand manifested shortly after the transition to floating exchange rates copyright 1991 by blackwell publishers ltd

why have private savings rates in the united states and canada diverged abstract one of the central questions in macroeconomics for many years has been whether government policy can affect private saving rates and if so to what extent and through what channels the question has remained controversial because as with other macroeconomic questions experiments to check divergent hypotheses cannot be deliberately performed so economists must rely upon the often dubious evidence from the limited experiments with which nature and history have endowed us this paper discusses the results of an exceptionally good natural experiment that has been provided by canada and the u s over the past thirty five years after moving in tandem for almost twenty five years american and canadian private saving rates have diverged dramatically over the last decade the primary conclusion emerging from our analysis of this phenomenon is that tax policies can have a potent impact on private savings behavior differences in tax structures and in the interactions of taxation and inflation appear to be important factors explaining the divergent behavior of the american and canadian private savings rates recognizing the importance of asset revaluations caused partially but not entirely by tax effects also helps to explain the different behavior of u s and canadian savings there may also be a relationship between government deficits and the private savings differential

the illusory effects of saving incentives on saving the authors evaluate research on how tax based saving incentives iras and 401 k s affect saving previous research overstates the impact of the incentives on saving by failing to account for several issues households with saving incentives have stronger tastes for saving than others saving incentives have interacted with debt nonfinancial assets financial markets and pensions and saving incentives represent pretax balances whereas taxable accounts represent posttax balances accounting for these issues essentially eliminates the impact of saving incentives on saving the authors conclude that little if any of the contributions to existing saving incentives have raised saving

from theory to practice canadian economists contributions to public finance we survey canadian economists contributions to the field of public finance from the mid 1980s to 2016 we highlight the development and extension of the models and tools of public economics and the empirical studies that have deepened our understanding of the efficiency and distributional issues over a wide range of public finance issues we also highlight contributions to the development of policies through commissioned reports and the important role that canadian institutions the canadian tax foundation the think tanks and the federal and provincial departments of finance have played in shaping tax and fiscal policies de la theorie a la pratique contributions des economistes canadiens a la finance publique on examine les contributions des economistes canadiens au domaine de la finance publique du milieu des annees 1980 a 2016 on souligne le developpement et l extension des modeles et des outils d economie publique et les etudes empiriques qui ont aide a approfondir notre comprehension des enjeux d efficacite et de distribution dans un vaste eventail de questions de finance publique on souligne aussi les contributions des rapports commandites au developpement de politiques publiques ainsi que le role important d institutions canadiennes l association canadienne d etudes fiscales les groupes d experts ainsi que les ministeres des finances du gouvernement federal et des gouvernements provinciaux dans le design des politiques fiscales

monetary union with voluntary participation a monetary union is modelled as a technology that makes a surprise policy deviation impossible and requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy within a fully dynamic context we show that such an arrangement may dominate a regime with independent national currencies two new results are delivered by the voluntary participation assumption first the optimal plan is shown to respond to a country s temptation to leave the union by tilting both current and future policy in its favour this yields a non linear rule according to which each country weight in policy decisions is time varying and depends on its incentive to abandon the union second we show that there might be conditions such that a break up of the union as has occurred in some historical episodes is efficient the paper thus provides a first formal analysis of the incentives behind the formation sustainability and disruption of a monetary union

how retirement saving programs increase saving this paper summarizes the authors work on the effect of ira and 401 k contributions on net personal saving they consider many different nonparametric approaches to controlling for heterogeneity in individual saving behavior and conclude that the weight of the available evidence suggests that contributions to both iras and 401 k s largely represent new saving the authors devote particular attention to reconciling their results with the findings in other studies that reach different conclusions sometimes using the same databases that the authors analyze methodological limitations that undermine the reliability of results in other studies explain many of these disparities

even up maintaining relationships abstract when are economic interactions mediated by prices and transfers and when are they mediated by variations in the continuation payoffs within a relationship to address this question we examine a relationship between two players who periodically face opportunities to undertake randomly generated projects that impose a cost on one player and a benefit on the other as well as opportunities to make voluntary transfers to one another we characterize the set of equilibria with particular emphasis on the efficient frontier in the absence of transfers incentives are often created by adjusting the continuation values of the relationship sometimes increasing player 1 s continuation payoff to induce player 1 to accept a particularly costly current project and sometimes increasing player 2 s continuation payoff in contrast once transfers enter the picture continuation payoffs maximize the sum of the two players payoffs no matter how asymmetric the point on the pareto frontier under consideration however transfers can also be relatively rare and in particular can occur less often than the adjustments in continuation values that occur without transfers players thus rely on transfers to create incentives but manage to do so while rarely making transfers

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

tax subsidies and household saving evidence from canada targeted tax based saving incentives can be a powerful tool for promoting household and national saving this study examines the effect of the cancellation of the registered home ownership savings plan rhosp a canadian tax subsidized saving program on household saving the cancellation provides exogenous variation in eligibility for the subsidy that is uncorrelated with householdspecific heterogeneity in saving behavior the empirical analysis suggests that the subsidy had a substantial impact on saving each dollar contributed to the program represented 56 93 and 20 57 cents of new household and national saving respectively

portfolio theory and currency substitution one of the major reasons friedman 1953 and johnson 1972 advocated flexible exchange rates was to eliminate supply side monetary substitutability which can incapacitate domestic monetary policy however contributors to the currency substitution literature including miles 1978 girton and roper 1981 and mckinnon 1982 have argued that when economic agents hold both domestic and foreign monies variations in foreign interest rates or expected future exchange rates can make domestic money demand functions unstable as economic agents shift resources in response to changes in prospective relative returns as a result they and others have claimed that flexible exchange rates may not secure domestic monetary autonomy l the major purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the conditions under which foreign and domestic monies are substitutes in demand when economic agents have motives to hold both and to contrast the determinants of currency substitutability with those of the more general concept of asset substitutability importantly it is demonstrated that the usual portfolio theoretic justification for including opportunity cost variables such as foreign interest rates foreign inflation rates or expected

collusion and price rigidity we consider an in nitely repeated bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each rm receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period we focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe wherein any punishments are borne equally by all rms we identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each rm is strictly increasing in its cost level such fully sorting schemes offer efficiency bene ts as they ensure that the lowest cost rm makes the current sale but they also imply an informational cost distorted pricing and or equilibrium path price wars since a higher cost rm must be deterred from mimicking a lower cost rm by charging a lower price a rigid pricing scheme where a rm s collusive price is independent of its current cost position sacri ces efficiency bene ts but also diminishes the informational cost for a wide range of settings the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires i the absence of equilibrium path price wars and ii a rigid price if rms are sufficiently impatient however the rigid pricing scheme cannot be enforced and the collusive price of lower cost rms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat when the model is modi ed to include i i d public demand shocks the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a rm s lower cost realization may occur only when current demand is high

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

international currency substitution and the income velocity of money abstract this paper presents new empirical evidence on the degree to which international currency substitution destabilizes domestic money demand it also provides an explanation of some apparent discrepancies among previous empirical studies of currency substitution this explanation hinges on the distinction between the elasticity of currency substitution and the cross elasticity of money demand a large small value of one elasticity does not imply a large small value of the other a large cross elasticity is required for currency substitution to destabilize domestic money demand the empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the view that these cross elasticities are typically small

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

psychology and savings policies many observers of the current economic scene are concerned about the low rate of personal saving in the united states one well known researcher laurence kotlikoff 1992 calls the situation a crisis he proposes that each american worker receive an annual statement from the social security administration with projected benefits upon retirement arguing that if each of us got this statement our attention would be caught and perhaps our psychology of saving which is in such urgent need of redress would really change p 107 i agree with the thrust of kotlikoff s recommendations and join him in applauding steps that will alter the general public s psychology of saving however as economists we need to recognize that the economic theory of saving is similarly in urgent need of redress if we are to understand why people are saving so little and are to make helpful recommendations as to how to get people to save more we have to incorporate more of the psychology of saving into our economic theories kotlikoff s policy proposal while a sensible one highlights the growing gap between theory and policy prescription in this domain if households are acting in accordance with the life cycle theory of saving then undersaving is impossible so why do they need to have their psychology redressed and how does this psychology fit into the model this example reflects an increasing frustration in the economics community about personal saving many observers have come to the conclusion that the low saving rate represents an important problem on two fronts macroeconomists worry that the low saving rate will produce too little investment and microeconomists worry that individuals particularly the baby boomers are not putting enough away to finance a satisfactory lifestyle in retirement these are serious concerns however the frustration comes from the realization that even if there was agreement that the saving rate needs to go up economic theory offers little help in constructing a solution in the standard life cycle framework the only policy variable is the after tax rate of return to saving yet it is well known that the theory does not specify the sign of the relationship between the saving rate and the interest rate raising the interest rate increases the returns to saving but decreases the amount of saving necessary to yield any given future consumption level furthermore empirical estimates offer little help most studies are unable to reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of personal saving with respect to the interest rate is zero clearly this is frustrating the theory only gives us one lever to use and we don t know whether to push or pull with this background i wish to supply what should be considered good news the theory is misspecified life cycle models of saving fail to describe actual household saving in three important ways this failure of the theory is good news because by incorporating some basic psychology we can enrich the theory and generate specific policy recommendations in this paper i will begin by characterizing the problems with the theory and then go on to discussing the implications of modifying the theory

collusion under monitoring of sales collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms prices are private information and their quantities are public information such an information structure is consistent with several recent price fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins for a class of symmetric oligopoly games it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion an asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas in practice cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members

the effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income a panel study of the 1988 tax flattening in canada abstract federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the canadian personal income tax schedule changing the marginal tax rates for many individuals using methods similar to those applied by auten and carroll rev econ 81 4 1999 681 in the study of the effects of the 1986 u s tax reform act we estimate the responsiveness of income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in canada however we find evidence of a much higher response in self employment income in the labor income of seniors and from those with high incomes

renegotiation proof relational contracts abstract we study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other in the first part of the paper we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all pareto optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors in the second part we examine different concepts of renegotiation proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation proof payoffs

did tax flattening affect rrsp contributions in 1988 marginal personal income tax rates changed in canada for some individuals by reasonably substantial amounts in this note a large sample of tax filer data is examined and the conclusion is drawn that when attention is paid to the possible confounding of marginal tax rate and non linear income effects there is no convincing evidence that the tax rate changes affected contributions to registered retirement saving plans rrsps est ce que l aplatissement des taux d imposition influence les contributions au reer en 1988 les taux marginaux d imposition du revenu personnel ont change au canada et pour certaines personnes ces changements ont ete substantiels cette note examine un grand echantillon de rapports d impots et en arrive a la conclusion que quand on prend en compte le melange possible des effets du taux marginal d imposition et des effets de revenu non lineaires il n y a pas de resultats qui montrent de facon probante que les changements dans les taux d imposition ont influence les contributions au reer

the effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income a panel study of the 1986 tax reform act this paper uses a treasury department panel of more than 4 000 taxpayers to estimate the sensitivity of taxable income to changes in tax rates on the basis of a comparison of the tax returns of the same individual taxpayers before and after the 1986 tax reform the analysis emphasizes that the response of taxable income involves much more than a change in the traditional measures of labor supply the evidence shows an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net of tax rate that is at least one and could be substantially higher the implications for recent tax rate changes are discussed

new evidence on taxes and portfolio choice abstract identifying the effect of differential taxation on portfolio allocation requires exogenous variation in marginal tax rates marginal tax rates vary with income but income surely affects portfolio choice directly in systems of individual taxation like canada s couples with the same household income can face different effective tax rates on capital income when labor income is distributed differently within households using this source of variation we find portfolio responses to taxation among more affluent households the estimated effects are statistically significant but economically modest in a placebo test using data from the u s which has joint taxation we find no effect of the intra household distribution of labor income on portfolios

crowd out education and employer contributions to workplace pensions evidence from canadian tax records this study assesses whether workplace pensions help individuals overcome knowledge barriers to saving for retirement using administrative data from canada and exploiting unique features of the pension system i find compelling evidence that each 1 contributed to workplace pensions partially crowds out other retirement saving by approximately 0 50 among interior savers in a regression kink design centering on unionized workers for methodological reasons further analysis indicates active versus passive decisions are influenced by education exploiting compulsory schooling reforms for identification i conclude by showing pension and education reform are both viable mechanisms for boosting saving from a life cycle perspective jel codes e21 h30 i21 j32

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

currency substitution and instability in the world dollar standard comment myron ross correctly points out in his comment that u s price inflation is better predicted by the american money supply mlus than by the broader ten country world money supply mlw over the whole statistical time series from 1960 to 1980 provided in mckinnon s 1982 article specifically he showed that american price inflation is more highly correlated with mlus lagged one or two years than with mlw similarly lagged however mckinnon s present tense assertion that in general growth in the world money supply is a better predictor of american price inflation than is american money growth applies only to the weak dollar standard of the 1970 s and early 1980 s as his preceding discussion intended but failed to indicate clearly only in this later period of volatile exchange rates and price level instability in the united states do alternative hard currencies such as the yen and deutsche mark become competitive as international stores of value and units of account hence international currency substitution associated with the ebb and flow of speculation against or for the dollar significantly destabilized the demand for mlus in the 1970 s and 1980 s and only in this later period might one expect the sum of these internationally substitutable monies ml to predict world and perhaps even american price inflation better than does mlus in contrast during the strong dollar standard of the 1950 s and 1960 s the dollar was unchallenged as international money exchange rates were by and large convincingly fixed speculation for or against the dollar was incapable of substantially altering u s interest rates or of directly affecting the demand for mlus because cyclical international influences did not then destabilize the demand for dollars mlus was by itself a fairly efficient predictor of american prices thus ross s statistical results for the period 1960 to 1980 show somewhat greater predictive strength in mlus compared to ml because the 1960 s data outweigh the dissimilar data of the 1970 s let us instead partition the sample of imf data around the year 1970 whence began the transition from fixed to fluctuating exchange rates and the maturation of alternative monetary systems in europe and japan after applying similar statistical correlation procedures to those used by ross we show a striking structural shift in the world s monetary system the explanatory power of mlw increases sharply as that of mlus declines moderately tan 1982 for the early period of 1960 to 1970 table 1 shows simple correlation coefficients between annual percentage changes in money supplies and changes in american and world wholesale price indices the mlus provides a good explanation of u s prices and of world prices one to two years hence whereas the broader definition of mlw in which mlus enters with a 50 percent weight does surprisingly poorly being insignificantly correlated with american or world prices apparently money growth in industrial countries other than the united states was not then an independent source of worldwide inflationary pressure during the strong dollar standard table 2 shows the same simple correlations between percentage changes in prices and money for the weak dollar standard of stanford university please note that a typographical error giving the last word in the original title as market appeared on the cover of the june 1982 issue of this review the title was correct in the table of contents and on the article

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

currency substitution capital mobility and money demand abstract this paper re examines the currency substitution cs issue by specifying a general portfolio balance pb model where domestic residents demand for foreign money is distinguished from their demands for foreign non monetary assets the latter possibility which reflects international capital mobility as opposed to cs per se is already a key feature in the open economy macro literature the inclusion of foreign money leaves the usual asset demand functions unchanged in the pb model that ignores cs at least as far as the appropriate rate of return arguments and their signs are concerned although this suggests that cs is of limited importance in macro modelling it implication for the estimation of money demand functions is pursued an initial attempt is made to empirically isolate the separate efects of high capital mobility and currency substitution for canada germany the united kingdom and the united states the results while not conclusive due to high multicollinearity problems bring into question the empirical as well as the theoretical relevance of currency substitution

the predictive performance of the time series model and the regression model of the income velocity of money this paper provides a comparative study of the relative performance of two models of the income velocity of money a time series model and a regression model using quarterly data from five eec countries our empirical results show that the regression model provides more accurate in sample prediction than the time series model out of sample however the regression model does not consistently outperform the time series model instead a linear composite perdiction combining the predictions from the time series and the regression models appears to perform the best two other results of this paper are 1 the stochastic structure of the income velocity of money can be adequately represented by a random walk with drift model after seasonality is properly accounted for 2 the regression model is temporally unstable for four of the five eec countries

infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers this paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers it is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick and carrot punishments a fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors

relational incentives and moral hazard in teams this paper studies moral hazard in teams using a model where efforts are promoted via the combination of profit shares and relational contracts the focus is on how these two forms of incentives interact according to the degree of effort observability and the importance of future interaction the optimal allocation of profit shares can range from a wide dispersion across players to a full concentration of shares in the hands of a single player when shares are sufficiently concentrated the corresponding residual claimant can also adopt the role of administering all relational contracts therefore serving as an endogenously chosen principal copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

on the pacific salmon treaty this article studies the optimal design of the pacific salmon treaty which was signed by the usa and canada in 1999 to share salmon on the pacific coast moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other if a country s observed output is suspiciously too high the treaty either reduces the country s future share or asks the country to make a monetary transfer to its opponent a calibrated version of our model shows that it is optimal for the usa to pay canada 328 93 million every 30 78 years switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1 55

sovereign debt as intertemporal barter author s kletzer kenneth m wright brian d abstract borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk averse party subject to endowment shocks the surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign the sole punishments consist of renegotiation proof changes in the path of future payments we show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever that is borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater long term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short term loans the analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

an equilibrium approach to international merger policy i treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game i show that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium within a particular class of trigger strategy equilibria i then consider a series of comparative statics and extensions a if for some exogenous reason one of the countries becomes more lenient towards mergers than the other country becomes more lenient as well b merger remedies increase the probability that a merger is approved and increase total welfare c the effects of a merger wave are magnified by the equilibrium approval policy d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved jel classification f0 l4

currency substitution and the precautionary demand for money abstract although the implications of currency substitution have received considerable attention recently the microeconomic foundations of this phenomenon seem largely to have been taken for granted the present paper considers the precautionary motive for holding cash balances as one possible motivation for the currency substitution hypothesis a three asset model is presented in which transaction costs are explicit and an agent is faced with uncertain cash requirements in two different currencies the role played by the expected rate of depreciation in the optimal portfolio allocation is found to conform with prior beliefs

marginal tax rates and tax favoured pension savings of the self employed evidence from sweden in recent years the study of how individuals respond to policies that aim at promoting pension savings has emerged as a vital area of economic research this paper adds to this body of literature by estimating the tax price elasticity of contributions to tax favoured pension savings accounts on a population of self employed individuals i exploit a unique total database over the swedish population that covers the years 19992005 using instrumental variables i obtain a tax price elasticity estimate of 0 51 and an income elasticity estimate of 0 13 whereas ordinary least squares ols produces estimates that conflict with consumer theory

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

exchange rate volatility and currency substitution abstract this paper employs a conventional small open economy portfolio balance macromodel to unveil new implications of currency substitution increased substitutability between foreign and domestic currency is found to affect the response of the exchange rate of both asset market and commodity market shocks in particular the extent of exchange rate overshooting and undershooting depends on the degree of currency substitution

efficiency and observability with long run and short run players we present a general algorithm for computing the limit as 1 of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long run and short run players allowing for the possibility that the players actions are not observable by their opponents we illustrate the algorithm with two economic examples in a simple partnership we show how to compute the equilibrium payoffs when the folk theorem fails in an investment game we show that two competing capitalists subject to moral hazard may both become worse off if their firms are merged and they split the profits from the merger finally we show that with short run players each long run player s highest equilibrium payoff is generally greater when their realized actions are observed journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d21 d82 d92 e22