the classification and performance of alternative exchange rate systems abstract owing to dissatisfaction with the imf s de jure classification of exchange rate regimes a substantial literature has emerged presenting de facto classifications of exchange rate systems and using the latter classifications to compare performances of alternative regimes in terms of key macroeconomic variables this paper critically reviews the literature on de facto regimes in particular the paper 1 describes the main methodologies that have been used to construct de facto codings 2 surveys the empirical literature generated by de facto regime codings and 3 lays out the problems inherent in constructing de facto classifications the empirical literature is found to yield few robust findings we argue that the as yet unfulfilled objective of this literature and the major research agenda for the future in this area lies in the need of a more thorough investigation of the degree of monetary policy independence without relying exclusively on movements in exchange rates an agenda the attainment of which is made especially challenging because of the lack of comprehensive and reliable data on reserves and interest rates

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

the global implications of regional exchange rate regimes abstract we examine the implications of a regional fixed exchange rate regime for global exchange rate volatility the concept of the optimum currency area turns out to play an important role the formation of a regional regime tends to decrease global volatility when countries are symmetric the effects tend to be ambiguous in the case of asymmetries the reduction in global volatility is larger when the rest of the world has more rigid labor markets than the peggers and when the exchange rate management is done mostly by countries with relatively more flexible labor markets and in the presence of a negative correlation in productivity shocks across countries

agriculture in recent development theory abstract this paper is a critical review of recent contributions to the literature on agriculture in development theory it considers and compares the main lines of advance made within neoclassical neo marxian and structuralist approaches recent neo marxian and structuralist studies of agrarian development reveal that traditional agriculture is neither stationary nor efficient that resource allocation cannot be separated from wealth distribution or production organization that forms of surplus appropriation do not necessarily follow the dictates of efficiency that the social relations of production may inhibit accumulation and determine the forms of technological change that the state s role in primitive accumulation is more economic than explicitly coercive political and that political and macroeconomic constraints preclude a simple get the prices right view of the intersectoral terms of trade the thrust of these developments is to challenge both neoclassical and some orthodox marxian formulations of agrarian development issues and add to the insights to be gleaned from a political economy of development

competition risk and managerial incentives this paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers a central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure the main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases as a result of greater product substitutability or greater market size principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs at the same time more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm level profits consequently managers incentives are positively correlated with firm level risk consistent with empirical evidence a decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives

reaching for the stars who pays for talent in innovative industries innovative firms need to hire and motivate highly talented workers this article connects the potential returns to innovation to the structure of compensation for skilled employees we show that the software firms that operate in software sectors with high potential upside gains to innovation pay more to star workers than do other firms that operate in stable markets firms operating in product domains with highly skewed positive returns pay employees more in up front starting salaries and offer higher compensation growth the large estimated effects on earnings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls for worker and firm characteristics

the new theory of optimum currency areas highbrow opinion is like a hunted hare if you stand long enough it will come back to the place it started from dennis robertson

responding to rivals and complements how market concentration shapes generational product innovation strategy this study examines how competitive market conditions shape the responsiveness with which businesses release generational product innovations gpis following the introduction of gpis by either competitors or complementary firms gpis are substantial technical advances in the performance of products within technology regimes prior studies of innovation timing in the organizational strategy literature emphasize internally driven strategies of gpi although internally driven strategies may predominate when businesses face diffuse competition for their product lines the literature largely overlooks the point that businesses need to be increasingly responsive to external events as market concentration increases this study which examines businesses competing in the u s packaged software industry in the 1990s shows that increasing industry concentration raises the stakes surrounding market positions and leads to greater interdependence of innovation strategies in an industry including interactions both with competitors and with other players in a larger system of complementary products as concentration increases therefore organizations are less driven by historical patterns of innovation and become increasingly responsive to innovations by both types of external actors

terms of trade policy in a model with non produced means of production abstract terms of trade policies between agriculture and industry are analysed in a two sector sraffian model if both sectors use only produced means of production and labor it can be shown that an improvement in agriculture s terms of trade always leads to higher profits in agriculture however when non produced means of production are introduced an exogenous increase in the relative price of agricultural commodities may cause the rate of profit in agriculture to increase remain constant or even decrease two preconditions are identified for the case in which a favorable movement in agriculture s terms of trade decreases that sector s profit rate first at least one quality of competitively priced land must be scarce relative to the total output required second the initial economy wide rate of profit must be positive finally the effect of an input subsidy used in conjunction with terms of trade policy is considered it is shown that under certain conditions reducing the price of production inputs can also cause profits to fall and rents to rise in agriculture

terms of trade and class conflict in a computable general equilibrium model for mexico a computable general equilibrium model for mexico is constructed in which class conflict over the distribution of the surplus is the principal determinant of the terms of trade the model consists of seven social classes and eight productive sectors classes are distinguished as fundamental or subsumed according to whether their incomes are primarily determined by conscious class struggle or by the resulting system of relative prices flexible prices are assumed to clear markets for which non produced means of production such as agricultural land limit supply while output in the remaining sectors is determined by the level of effective demand for the latter sectors two theories of price formation are compared and are seen to differ radically in their implicit conception of the nature of class conflict a keynes kalecki closure is considered in which prices are determined by a fixed mark up on costs this enables capitalists to protect themselves from incursions on the rate of profit due to labou

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

what makes companies pursue an open science strategy whereas recent scholarly research has provided many insights about universities engaging in commercial activities there is still little empirical evidence regarding the opposite phenomenon of companies disseminating scientific knowledge our paper aims to fill this gap and explores the motivations of firms that disclose research outcomes in a scientific format besides considering a dimension internal to the firm we focus particularly on knowledge sourcing from academic institutions and the appropriability regime we conduct an econometric analysis with firm level data from the fourth edition of the french innovation survey cis and matched scientific publications for a sample of 2512 rd performing firms from all manufacturing sectors this analysis provides evidence that firms are more likely to adopt academic principles if they need to access scientific knowledge that is considered important for their innovation development whereas the mere existence of collaborative links with academic institutions is not a strong determinant furthermore the results suggest that the inclination of firms to publish is sensitive to the level of knowledge spillovers in a sector and the effectiveness of legal appropriation instruments c 2013 elsevier b v all rights reserved

positions and rewards the allocation of resources within a science based entrepreneurial firm we study the link between resource allocation and employee publication in the open science in a quantitative case study of one science based entrepreneurial firm we bridge the literature on incentives with that on authority structures to argue that a positive relationship between rewards and productivity will be strongest for individuals in positions of scientific leadership within the firm in a novel dataset we find that prolific publishers receive greater year end bonuses and are allocated additional direct reports but this relationship only holds for individuals in scientific leadership roles these results contribute to our understanding of resource allocation processes and reward structures in science based firms

agency costs and innovation abstract stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of innovative research there are many possible explanations for this fact the paper seeks to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across individuals and organizations it is shown that incentive costs associated with a given task depend on the total portfolio of tasks that an individual or an organization undertakes mixing hard to measure activities innovation with easy to measure activities routine is particularly costly since it will either lead to misallocation of attention across tasks or to misallocation of risk larger firms are at a comparative disadvantage in conducting highly innovative research because of the costs associated with managing a heterogeneous set of tasks it is further argued that optimal organizational responses to coordination and control of routine tasks will lead to bureaucratization within the firm and to financial constraints imposed by capital markets both of which are hostile to innovation

on the dynamic efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria abstract this paper compares bertrand and cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with r d research and development competition it shows that cournot competition induces more r d effort than bertrand competition however the price is lower and output is larger in bertrand than in cournot competition furthermore the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium if either r d productivity is low or spillovers are weak or products are very different if r d productivity is high spillovers are strong and goods are close substitutes then the bertrand equilibrium islessefficient than the cournot equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification number l13

exchange rate systems and macroeconomic stability abstract we examine macroeconomic stability and the properties of the international transmission of business cycles under three exchange rate systems a flexible a unilateral peg ems and a single currency emu the subjects of study are germany and france in france macroeconomic volatility under emu is comparable to that under a flexible exchange rate system but considerably lower than that under ems in germany output volatility is significantly higher under ems relative to the flexible regime and increases even further under emu inflation though becomes more stable emu also induces a strong negative international transmission of country specific supply shocks and amplifies their role this fact may complicate ecb policymaking

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

cheat or perish a theory of scientific customs abstract performance incentives have become increasingly important in academia evidence suggest that they increase not only researchers effort but also their cheating we develop a principal agent framework in which a research institution principal aims to reward scientific productivity considering the social benefit of research and the remuneration costs researchers agents take into account what others are doing as a consequence the introduction of performance incentives not only leads to fraudulent behavior in the short run but may also deteriorate the scientific norm in the long run in the face of these dynamics the principal pursues two goals to increase productivity effort incentive policy and to deal with fraud anti fraud policy several factors determine the optimal mix of policies economic factors researchers cost of providing high or low effort the societal value of scientific knowledge and the societal costs of scientific misbehavior and psychological factors the evolution of norms over time an important insight of our theory is that when research institutions seek to encourage the production of high quality research they should also raise the salary for normal research to avoid misconduct

r d and ceo departure date do financial incentives make ceos more opportunistic the purpose of this article is to examine whether research and development r d expenditure is biased downward because of self serving behavior of highly incentivized managers this offers an insight into the general relationship between incentives and opportunism using instrumental variables and panel data methods for a sample of high r d spenders in the uk we examine whether r d is reduced in cases of imminent departure of the ceo results show evidence for this but only for the sample above the median in intensity of stock and options in the compensation package this suggests that opportunism is enhanced by inappropriately strong incentives the main results are robust to the inclusion of a number of corporate governance variables jel classification g30 o30

inventorship and authorship as attribution rights an enquiry into the economics of scientific credit abstract authorship and inventorship are attribution rights upon which individual scientists build their reputation and career social and legal norms concerning their distribution within research teams are currently criticized for failing to inform third parties on individual contributions we examine the case of teams engaged in the double disclosure of their research results through both publications and patents and model the negotiation process taking place between junior or female team members and the senior male ones we suggest that the former may give up inventorship in order to secure authorship even when entitled to the both based on a sample of 680 patent publication pairs related sets of patents and publications we show that very frequently one or more authors of a publication do not appear as inventors of a related patent this is less likely to happen for first and last authors which is in accordance both with our model and the prevailing legal norms on inventorship however the probability of exclusion from inventorship also declines with seniority and increases for women which is compatible with our model only

intrinsic motivation and optimal incentive contracts i study the role of intrinsic motivation on optimal incentive contracts agents engage in efforts to generate projects with both financial return and intrinsic value to the agent in a neutral environment where intrinsic motivation has no direct effect on the disutility of effort static contracts are unaffected by intrinsic motivation in contrast the firm s profits from an implicit contract are increasing in the degree to which the agent is intrinsically motivated showing that implicit contracts and intrinsic motivation are complements the results are further extended to consider the role of multiple implicit contracts and product market strategy

four formal izable theories of the firm in this essay i define and compare elemental versions of four theories of the firm these elemental theories are distilled from important contributions by hart holmstrom klein williamson and others although these contributions have been widely cited and much discussed i have found it difficult to understand the commonalities distinctions and potential combinations of these seemingly familiar contributions in this essay therefore i attempt to clarify these issues in three steps i begin with informal summaries of the theories then turn to simple but formal statements of each elemental theory and finally nest the four elemental theories in an integrative framework

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

product differentiation process r d and the nature of market competition abstract we investigate the relationship between process and product rd ii bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product rd and iii cooperation in product r d promotes both types of r d relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of r d discourages r d relative to cooperation in just product r d

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

individual preferences organization and competition in a model of r d incentive provision abstract understanding the organization of rd 2 knowledge is not perfectly appropriable 3 scientists are responsive to both monetary and non monetary incentives and 4 firms compete on the product market we show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists and these effects interact first high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high and to strengthen incentives when competition is low second the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is u shaped with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers we also show that the performance contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research while the fixed component decreases we relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence and also discuss their implications for management and public policy

sectoral balance in development a survey abstract this paper surveys the literature on sectoral balance to see how sectoral imbalances can retard economic development it examines definitions of sectors and balance provides background facts theories and planning tools reviews the debate on balanced growth and surveys two sector models of agriculture industry consumption investment and luxury basics interaction the open economy and the role of service nonmarket and unproductive sectors it argues that the examination of important development issues requires multisectoral analysis incorporating the insights of several of these models and that alternative models with different structural characteristics deserve attention

endogenous spillovers and the performance of research joint ventures we present a model of r d with endogenous spillovers and demonstrate that noncooperation can produce maximal spillovers the only other noncooperative outcome is minimal spillovers when noncooperation achieves maximal spillovers so does an rjv whereas minimal noncooperative spillovers imply partial but not necessarily maximal spillovers by an rjv partial rjv spillovers are chosen for anti competitive reasons and an rjv may also close a lab for anti competitive reasons the possibility of anti competitive outcomes is precluded in the existing literature on rjvs which focuses on symmetric outcomes our model predicts when anti competitive behaviour by an rjv arises

non produced means of production in sraffa s system basics non basics and quasi basics all value land and other non produced means of production can make no contribution to the value of commodities rent is consequently a deduction from the total surplus produced by labour although the labour theory of value has been the subject of extensive criticism for more than a century the associated issues of non produced means of production1 have been largely ignored indeed steedman 1977 who argues that the entire apparatus be abandoned and replaced with sraffa s 1960 theory of production prices makes no refer ence to the problem of rent this paper investigates the extent to which the classical intuition regarding non produced means of production is consistent with sraffa s system in production of commodities by means of commodities sraffa provides a rigorous refor mulation of the classical theories of intensive and extensive rent noting that land and natural resources occupy among means of production a position equivalent to that of non basics among products in single product systems non basics are typically interpreted as luxury goods and it can be shown inter alia that technical progress in non basic industries does not affect the system of relative prices and the economy wide rate of profit if it is true that land is always non basic then we might conclude that the classical view is broadly confirmed by sraffa s modernisation of the theory of value unfortunately both the extensive and intensive systems are formally multiple product process economies for which the definition of non basics is considerably more subtle and complex than in single product industries 2 important properties of single product non basics do not always survive the transition to multiple product economies prices and profits may respond in unexpected ways to technical change taxes and class conflict over the distribution of the surplus the source of the perverse behaviour is traced to a class of commodities characterised here as quasi basics the paper is organised as follows in section 2 we show that in systems with extensive

an optimum currency area odyssey abstract the theory of optimum currency areas was conceived and developed in three highly influential papers written by mundell 1961 mckinnon 1963 and kenen 1969 those authors identified characteristics that potential members of a monetary union should ideally possess in order to make it feasible to surrender a nationally tailored monetary policy and the adjustment of an exchange rate of a national currency we trace the development of optimum currency area theory which after a flurry of research into the subject in the 1960s was relegated to intellectual purgatory for about 20 years we then discuss factors that led to a renewed interest into the subject beginning in the early 1990s milton friedman plays a pivotal role in our narrative friedman s work on monetary integration in the early 1950s presaged subsequent optimum currency area contributions mundell s classic formulation of an optimal currency area was aimed in part at refuting friedman s strong case for floating exchange rates and friedman s work on the role of monetary policy had the effect of helping to revive interest in optimum currency area analysis the paper concludes with a discussion of recent analytical work using new keynesian models which has the promise of fulfilling the unfinished agenda set out by the original contributors to the optimum currency area literature that is providing a consistent framework in which a country s characteristics can be used to determine its optimal exchange rate regime

product market competition and organizational slack under profit target contracts in a framework a la martin 1993 we introduce a common component in the managers private information in order to address three related questions what is the impact of contracts that reward managers on the basis of realized profits on firms productive and allocative efficiency relative to cost target contracts how do these contracts shape the relationship between competition and organizational slack can we then explain the existing evidence of an inverted u shaped relationship between competition and cost reducing activities as documented in aghion et al aghion p bloom n blundell r griffith r howitt p competition and innovation an inverted u relationship the quarterly journal of economics 120 pp 701 728 2005 we show that profit target contracts introduce a horizontal contractual externality between the competing firms that mitigates organizational slack and improves upon productive efficiency relative to cost plus mechanisms moreover when executive compensations are conditioned on profits an inverted u shaped relationship between product market competition and managerial effort obtains finally we also show that when contractual instruments are endogenous i e when shareholders can choose between profit and cost target rules the equilibrium with profit target contracts always exists and is the only one that survives to standard refinements