the role of consumption credit in agricultural tenancy abstract in traditional agriculture it is common practice for landlords to give consumption loans to their own tenants if the tenant derives all his income from the landlord it is puzzling that the landlors needs another means of expropriating the surplus he could just raise the rent the paper suggests that consumption credit may be a side payment designed to enable the landlord to absorb the tenant s risk due to weather uncertainty without weakening his incentive to work tenancy is modelled as an agency contract designed in terms of information may be available to the landlord

sharecropping and the capitalist transition in agriculture some evidence from the highlands of ecuador abstract sharecropping has been the subject of much debate among economists concerned with static efficiency and to some extent with equity this paper shifts the focus to the dynamics of structural change the research reported adds to the discussion a detailed account of a large number of sharecropping contracts and why they vary and offers a theory of the relationship between sharecropping as practised in the ecuadorian province of carchi and a particular pattern of structural change which is described as the transition to an agrarian structure dominated by capitalised family farms the prevalent use of wage labour on sharecropped land and the place of sharecropping in intergenerational asset transfers are shown to be important elements in explaining this transition

agriculture in recent development theory abstract this paper is a critical review of recent contributions to the literature on agriculture in development theory it considers and compares the main lines of advance made within neoclassical neo marxian and structuralist approaches recent neo marxian and structuralist studies of agrarian development reveal that traditional agriculture is neither stationary nor efficient that resource allocation cannot be separated from wealth distribution or production organization that forms of surplus appropriation do not necessarily follow the dictates of efficiency that the social relations of production may inhibit accumulation and determine the forms of technological change that the state s role in primitive accumulation is more economic than explicitly coercive political and that political and macroeconomic constraints preclude a simple get the prices right view of the intersectoral terms of trade the thrust of these developments is to challenge both neoclassical and some orthodox marxian formulations of agrarian development issues and add to the insights to be gleaned from a political economy of development

inequality and violent crime abstract we investigate the robustness and causality of the link between income inequality and violent crime across countries first we study the correlation between the gini index and homicide and robbery rates within and between countries second we examine the partial correlation by considering other crime determinants third we control for the endogeneity of inequality by isolating its exogenous impact on these crime rates fourth we control for measurement error in crime rates by modeling it as both unobserved country effects and random noise finally we examine the robustness of this partial correlation to alternative measures of inequality the panel data consist of nonoverlapping 5 year averages for 39 countries during 1965 95 for homicides and 37 countries during 1970 94 for robberies crime rates and inequality are positively correlated within countries and particularly between countries and this correlation reflects causation from inequality to crime rates even after controlling for ot

the resurgence of sharecropping historical anomaly or political strategy although traditional economic theories regard sharecropping as inefficient and likely to dwindle in systems of capitalist commodity production sharecropping has exhibited remarkable persistence under a range of historical conditions this article explores the reasons for the unexpected tenacity of share farming and considers its implications for the analysis of rural class structure and agrarian change using the example of the resurgence of sharecropping in the california strawberry industry the paper demonstrates that political constraints on agricultural production are key determinants of the contemporary adoption of sharecropping establishing a context in which sharecropping not only facilitates but is recreated by capitalist accumulation

home biased gravity the role of migrant tastes in international trade abstract immigrants tend to buy products from their home countries as a result the more immigrants of a given ethnicity a country has the more it will tend to import from those immigrants countries of origin this effect of migrant heterogeneity is ignored by the standard gravity literature that assumes homogeneous preferences among resident consumers this paper embeds that observed regularity into a structural gravity model gravity derived from the almost ideal demand system generates bilateral trade shares with three distinct components ethnic composition of the resident population bilateral trade cost and per capita income using international trade and transnational migration data among 40 countries this paper estimates the home bias of each ethnic group in tastes the results show that consumers tastes for products from their country of origin deviate from unbiased levels by 35 percent on average ethnic taste bias is found to explain half of the trade bias counterfactuals suggest that anti immigration policy significantly impedes trade with immigrants countries of origin

uncertainty and incentives empirical work testing for a trade off between risk and incentives has had at best mixed success this article provides two simple reasons associated with subjectivity of performance appraisals why we might not expect to see any negative relationship both reasons relate to empirically observed problems associated with monitoring i supervisors sometimes bias their evaluations based on their personal feelings toward their subordinates and ii supervisors will sometimes offer evaluations that reduce their costs these aspects of monitoring are ignored in the standard model and can reverse the usual negative trade off between risk and incentives

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

an empirical analysis of risk incentives and the delegation of worker authority the authors empirically test prendergast s 2002 theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives using data from the 1998 british wers the authors investigate whether there is 1 evidence of a risk incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal agent model 2 evidence of a positive relationship between incentive pay and the delegation of worker authority 3 evidence of a positive relationship between risk and authority 4 support for the main testable implication of prendergast s model namely that the evidence favoring a risk incentives tradeoff should strengthen when authority controls are added to the empirical model the answers are affirmative for all four questions thereby providing evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with

internationalization of western venture capitalists into emerging markets risk assessment and information in india this paper provides the first analysis of the internationalization of venture capital firms through an examination of risk assessment and information usage by firms in india personal interviews were conducted with executives in 31 84 of the active venture capital firms the paper extends previous research by comparing perceptions of the behavior of domestic venture capital firms in india foreign primarily u s venture capital firms in india and u s venture capital firms in their domestic markets foreign firms in india place significantly greater emphasis on product market factors and accountants reports than domestic firms in india they place significantly less emphasis on financial contributions of management in assessing risk and own due diligence and information from entrepreneurs than do u s firms in their domestic market they make more use of information from trade publications and relating to production capacity and technology and information from accountants reports than do domestic venture capital firms in india the evidence is consistent with venture capital firms adapting to local market conditions rather than implementing recipes from their domestic markets

migration experience and earnings in the mexican labor market we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between u s migration experience and earnings in the mexican labor market we use our model to analyze the effects of self selection and endogeneity on ols estimates of the return to migration experience in the mexican labor market under plausible assumptions ols estimates provide a lower bound on the true average return to migration experience among return migrants using mexican migration project mmp data we find a return to migration experience of about 2 2 percent per year our estimates are robust to the inclusion of proxies for unobserved skill a comparison with patterns in the 1995 mexican population and dwelling count suggests that our results are robust across data sets and are driven by a relationship between migration experience and wages not hours worked we also explore the plausibility of multiple mechanisms that could explain this relationship we find the most evidence for the theory that individuals are acquiring occupation specific work experience in the united states the return to a year of occupation specific migration experience is estimated to be as high as 8 7 percent for some occupations

return migration and violence abstract there is reason to suspect that return migrants can reduce social violence in migrant prone regions of the world taking into account that recent research shows positive effects of return migration we consider that returners may reduce violence by contributing to social renewal and economic growth in their home communities we estimate the direct effects of return migration in the context of mexico a traditionally migrant country that has suffered record levels of violence in the past decade using data on homicide rates from 2456 municipalities for the 2011 2013 period and an instrumental variable bivariate tobit maximum likelihood approach we find that higher rates of return migration lead to a decline in local homicide rates we also show with a censored quantile instrumental variable cqiv model that municipalities in the bottom quartile of the homicide rate distribution benefit the most from return migration our work has important implications for crime reduction policies in developing countries and specifically in mexico where social violence has wreaked havoc on society in recent years

effects of immigrant legalization on crime in the late 1970s rates of undocumented immigration into the united states began to increase dramatically fearing negative labor market and social effects congress passed the 1986 immigration reform and control act irca the primary purpose of the bill was to enhance the controls on the hiring of undocumented immigrants making it illegal to hire or recruit undocumented immigrants however the legislation also represented a near universal legalization of immigrants in the united states a group comprising almost three million people about 1 percent of the nation s population this paper examines the effects that the irca had on the commission of crime in the united states i provide estimates of the total effect of this legalization exploiting the large amount of variation in both the geographical distribution and the quasi random timing of the legalizations i find persistent decreases in crime of 3 percent to 5 percent primarily driven by a drop in property crimes this fall in crime is equivalent to 120 000 180 000 fewer violent and property crimes committed each year across the nation due to legalization moreover the declines in crime cannot be explained by existing trends economic conditions declines in drug crimes changes to police forces and prison populations or other common explanations of changes in crime rates during this period

do migrants improve governance at home evidence from a voting experiment can international migration promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability a behavioral measure of the population s desire for better governance was designed to examine this question a postcard was distributed to households promising that if enough postcards were mailed back results from a survey module on perceived corruption would be published in the national media data from a tailored household survey were used to examine the determinants of this behavioral measure of demand for political accountability undertaking the costly action of mailing the postcard and to isolate the positive effect of international emigration using locality level variation the estimated effects are robust to the use of instrumental variables including past migration and macro shocks in the destination countries the estimated effects can be attributed mainly to migrants who immigrated to countries with better governance especially migrants who return home

a theory of sharecropping the role of price behavior and imperfect competition this paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets we consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage we consider two different classes of contracts i tenancy contracts and ii crop buying contracts it is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping

community and market in contract choice the jeepney in the philippines economic development is usually associated with a transformation from traditional economic institutions based on local community ties to modern institutions based on wide impersonal markets an often cited example is the shift from crop sharing to leasehold tenancy in the past it was commonly considered that sharecropping was inefficient in achieving optimal resource allocations because it reduced tenants incentives to apply their own labor as well as other current inputs and that the conversion of sharecroppers to leaseholders or owner operators represented a precondition of modern agricultural development indeed land tenure reform programs that rule out the practice of sharecropping have been advocated widely and adopted in some developing countries 2 this view based on the well known marshallian theorem has been demolished recently by the new land tenure economics or more broadly the theory of contract choice started by cheung and elaborated by newbery stiglitz and others 3 it has now been established that the actual contract choice depends on risk and transaction costs without which both the share and leasehold contracts can achieve pareto optimality on the other hand historically in the course of urban industrial development in western europe and japan the cropsharing contract was replaced by the leasehold contract in land tenure while the piece rate contract was replaced by the time rate contract in labor employment such observations interpreted in the light of the

contract choice and enforcement in an agrarian community agricultural tenancy in upland java this study explores the conditions under which a certain contract is preferred to others through an intensive survey of an upland village in west java despite an obvious difficulty in enforcing the terms of share contract in a highly complex intercropping system no significant difference in allocative efficiency was found between share tenancy and other forms of land tenure the results indicate that share tenancy was chosen only by the landlords who had the ability to enforce contractual terms at a low opportunity cost

choice of contracts in turkish agriculture sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy have coexisted under extremely diverse settings for centuries from labor abundant south and east asia to land abundant west africa and the americas this fact has intrigued generations of economists since adam smith marshall s lucid exposition of the productive inefficiencies of sharecropping in the principles paved the way for a major effort to reconcile neoclassical theory with the reality of coexistence 1 another substantial segment of the literature condemned sharecropping as an exploitative mechanism in semifeudal societies and predicted its downfall 2 more recent theoretical treatments however hail the share contract as a simple yet ingenious arrangement that guarantees the second best outcome in environments characterized by risk input market imperfections and moral hazard 3 the intuition underlying this argument is widely accepted but has yet to yield a general explanation of the real world coexistence phenomenon nor should we expect such an explanation each country and historical episode has its unique climatic technological and institutional characteristics and different motives for the adoption of share contracts may dominate in different settings 4 it is troublesome in fact that our empirical knowledge is so thin given that our theory of agricultural contracts is so rich 5 one reason of course is that appropriate data are costly and difficult to collectfor contractual choice is stubbornly complex and is best observed at the individual agent or household level there has been empirical work but much of it has examined the well worn marshallian theme is sharecropping less efficient than self cultivation 6 our knowledge of the conditions under which different contracts are likely to arise is limited to a handful of studies on the indian subcontinent or the united states in this article i examine the determinants of contractual choice during the 1970s for samples of individual turkish landlords and tenants the data were drawn from a 1973 survey that was national in

limited liability and the existence of share tenancy abstract the paper considers the problem confronting an absentee landlord who can lease out his land on a fixed rent contract share rent contract or a mixture of the two it is argued that in poor areas it is natural to have each contract underwritten by an implicit limited liability clause which allows a person to forego paying rent under extreme crop failures in the presence of such an implicit clause a certain tension appears between a tenant and a landlord with the former preferring risky projects and the latter preferring safe ones it is shown that in such a case share tenancy turns out to be the dominant system from among the class mentioned above because it minimises the tension between the landlord and the tenant the result is then used to discuss conditions under which share tenancy will tend to wither away

distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net contract choice evidence from tigray ethiopia rural households in the semiarid northern ethiopian highlands are net buyers of food crop failure due to erratic and unpredictable rainfall occurs frequently and leads to food shortages and income shocks the renting out of land may be one of the coping responses of households exposed to shocks we developed a theoretical household model for poor landlord households capturing their contract choice response to downside production shocks we tested econometrically whether contract choice may depend on poverty capital constraints production risk and random shocks the multinomial logit model estimates show that poor households experiencing random shocks are more likely to choose fixed rent contracts as a distress response to shocks suggesting that fixed rent contracts may be used to meet immediate needs but at the expense of future incomes we also found that fixed rent contracts are preferred when ex ante production risk is low while sharecropping is more likely where production risk is high finally we found an indication that the choice of a fixed rent contract as a coping response to shocks comes as a last resort after all other means of coping are exhausted

multi task sharecropping contracts the italian mezzadria we use recent developments in the multi task principal agent methodology to study a sharecropping contract that was pervasive in central italy we distinguish between subsistence crops and cash crops we analyse the spillover effect from one crop to the other and we show that this reduces the ability of this sharecropping economy to adjust to a changed environment we trace the effects of the changes in agricultural prices in the second half of the nineteenth century finally we propose some explanation for the puzzling phenomenon of the reintroduction of many feudal clauses in the sharecropping contract when the rest of the italian economy was beginning to modernize copyright 1996 by the london school of economics and political science

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

start up ventures towards the prediction of initial success abstract there are numerous studies on new product activities that try to measure the relative impact of different factors on success or failure the research on new ventures is less comprehensive and often only a few items are considered this article reports on the early results from a research program that is combining the research on both new products and new ventures to come up with a more comprehensive evaluation of relative success factors the literature was reviewed to determine the most significant factors found in prior work a 68 item questionnaire was developed and used with the chief executives of 24 new technical ventures all associated with the rpi incubator or technology park ten of the 17 factors investigated yielded reliable measurements which were then subjected to siepwise regression analysis to determine the relative impact of each factor on the two success measurements used initial quantified success and initial subjective success it should be recognized that initial success does not necessarily predict ultimate success an area to be investigated in continuing studies the two success measurements were not correlated and the correlations with the independent variables were therefore different initial quantified success showed a strong negative correlation with market attractiveness companies entering smaller or more slowly growing markets were doing better than those in the larger faster growing markets initial quantified success was positively correlated with the level of entrepreneurial characteristics exhibited by the leader s these were the only two variables exhibiting significant relationships with quantified success initial subjective success was negatively correlated with market dynamism rather than market attractiveness negative correlation was also measured with both r d intensity and the organic nature of the firm this latter finding is contrary to much of the new product literature which emphasizes the need for individual independence and initiative such may be the case with new products or ventures within large organizations but in small independent ventures the entrepreneur should provide strong control and guidance a positive correlation was observed with the entrepreneurial characteristics and also with the degree of match between the firm s experience and the new business requirements no significant correlation was observed with 1 product or service uniqueness 2 gross margin or 3 strategic aggressiveness the lack of correlation with these variables is surprising but it may be due to the small size of the sample the research confirmed two items that are understood by most scholars and experienced practitioners the importance of the entrepreneur and the importance of pursuing new ventures that match the technical and market experience of the team the less obvious results are those that suggest that success is favored by strong review and control by the entrepreneur rather than the development of employee initiative and independence also the initial success appears to be coming more readily to firms in more slowly growing or less dynamic markets it will take an expanded sample and a longer time horizon to determine if these initial trends continue to ultimate success

unwelcome immigrants the labor market experiences of 1980 mariel cuban and haitian refugees in south florida this article examines the situation of 2 recently arrived and disadvantaged immigrant groups in the context of 2 competing theoretical traditions classical assimilation and recent labor market segmentation theories predictions of both concerning us labor market entry of foreign minorities and determinants of subsequent mobility are tested on the basis of representative surveys most are not confirmed the analysis supports the hypothesis of heterogeneous modes of incorporation into the labor market including substantial numbers of refugees who remain outside of it sizable proportions have only managed to find fringe employment in a energing informal economy in south florida among cubans employment in the ethnic enclave is associated with positive returns comparable to those of entry into the primary labor market haitians lack an enclave option and thus cluster into secondary and informal employment although most remain without work determinants of these various situations are examined on the basis of multivariate logistic regressions implications of results for immigration theory and policy are discussed authors

sharing monitoring and incentives marshallian misallocation reassessed a general equilibrium model is presented wherein wage labor requires monitoring in order to extract effort landlords may also elect to adopt sharetenancy contracts in which workers have an incentive to supply unsupervised effort two distortions exist monitoring costs in one sector and a share tax in the other efficiency statements require second best comparisons adopting more specific functional forms this mixed wage sharetenancy economy is technically efficient and provides greater benthamite social welfare than a wage only economy when private incentives lead to mixing the incidence of sharetenancy is hypothesized to increase with monitoring costs density of tenants per landlord and labor intensity of production

entrepreneurial orientation risk and incentives the case of franchising the standard principal agent model predicts a trade off in contract design between the protection against risk and incentive motivations distinguishing two types of risks we show that contrary to this traditional view the relationship between risk and incentives can be positive in franchise contracting this implies that the royalty rate decreases with the risk faced by the franchisee on the local market using a unique panel dataset combining french franchise and financial data we address this issue empirically alongside performance outcomes the data support the hypothesis of a negative relationship between risk and the royalty rate which contradicts the prediction of the standard agency theory furthermore our estimations provide evidence that chain performance increases with an adjusted royalty rate this paper has important implications for contract design showing that with increasing local market uncertainty and low risk aversion franchisors should reduce the royalty rate

testing between competing models of sharecropping the marshallian approach assumes a prohibitively high cost of monitoring the sharecropper s activities while the monitoring approach argues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers activities i present new evidence using detailed data collected from eight indian villages most tenants own some land of their own this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements the differences in input and output intensities on owned minus sharecropped land of the same household are found to be sizable and significant suggesting a rejection of the monitoring approach and supporting the notion of the marshallian productive inefficiency of sharecropping

farm size and non traditional exports determinants of participation in world markets abstract this paper examines irrigated grape production by small and large farms in the sao francisco valley bahia pernambuco of northeastern brazil it argues that while small farms have lower costs in producing these nontraditional export crops they are vulnerable because they do not have secure access to postharvest transport and marketing services the paper also argues that large grape firms have been able to maintain a dominant presence in export grape production because of the presence of a large supply of labor largely female and because of weak labor legislation which allows them to reduce the cost of labor in various ways

abusa the structural history of an economic contract this speculative essay seeks an interpretation of abusa a share cropping arrangement which has been of fundamental importance in the development of the ghanaian cocoa industry according to theoretical expectations such an arrangement is both inefficient and inequitable a pre modern or pre capitalist productive relationship which will inevitably yield to a pattern of fixed rents and wage labour here the role of abusa in the spectacular growth of the cocoa economy and in its recent decline is examined with reference to the development of individual contracts it is argued that this ontogenetic development of abusa is structured by the changing domestic circumstances of farm owner and farm worker their competing interests in a maturing cocoa farm are negotiated and expressed in a sequence of contractual arrangements which gives the worker increasing access to the land and the product of his own labour it is suggested that if the evolution of productive relations towards more evidently capitalist

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

the nature of the agricultural firm abstract models explaining the choice between rent wage and share contracts in agriculture abstract from the large variations within the classes of rent share and owner managed forms of organization regarding the extent to which a specific form accommodates specialization between labor and management as a result modern explanations of agricultural organizations are misleadingly dependent on risk aversion or the assumption that landowners have an absolute advantage in production decisions viewing the agricultural firm as a constitution instead of as a nexus of contracts facilitates an agency explanation of alternative organizational forms and their amenability to specialization

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

evidence on the incentive properties of share contracts abstract ever since adam smith share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives sharecropping tenants face incentives to undersupply productive inputs since they receive only a fraction of the marginal revenue the empirical literature reports that lands under sharecropping are indeed less productive and employ inputs less intensively than those operated by owners this paper shows that 1 sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy are both associated with low quality lands 2 plots under sharecropping and fixed rent present on average the same unconditional productivity 3 controlling for observed land quality and input use their average productivities are also identical to those of owner operated plots and 4 the input choices satisfy the same profit maximization conditions for all land contracts these results challenge the conventional wisdom connecting sharecropping to incentive distortions they support an alternative view that farmers optimally employ more input resources into

moral hazard experimental evidence from tenancy contracts agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries output sharing rules that make farmers less than full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agr

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

diversification into horticulture and poverty reduction a research agenda summary horticultural produce and processed products from the developing world are becoming increasingly popular both in domestic and in international markets global production and exports are rising steadily however yield increases have been smaller than area growth and have been negligible or even negative in the least developed countries while experience shows that horticulture can offer good opportunities for poverty reduction because it increases income and generates employment care must be taken that small and poor farmers are not excluded from the opportunities in these market sectors in this article we argue that development agencies must put more emphasis on horticultural research and development especially in the following priority areas genetic improvement safe production systems commercial seed production postharvest facilities and the urban peri urban environment

contracts resource use and productivity in sharecropping this article identifies the contractual terms in sharecropping that result in efficient use of resources evidence is then presented from pakistan to comment on the manner in which landlords ensure that sharecroppers fulfil the terms it is shown that landlords in general specify contract terms that encourage sharecroppers to adopt new techniques of production productivity comparisons are also made for farms under different tenancy contracts to conclude that share cropping tenancies do not appear to result in output loss even when technology is changing

globalization brain drain and development this paper reviews four decades of economics research on the brain drain with a focus on recent contributions and on development issues we first assess the magnitude intensity and determinants of the brain drain showing that brain drain or high skill migration is becoming a dominant pattern of international migration and a major aspect of globalization we then use a stylized growth model to analyze the various channels through which a brain drain affects the sending countries and review the evidence on these channels the recent empirical literature shows that high skill emigration need not deplete a country s human capital stock and can generate positive network externalities three case studies are also considered the african medical brain drain the exodus of european scientists to the united states and the role of the indian diaspora in the development of india s information technology sector we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for education immigration and international taxation policies in a global context

migration and asymmetric information comment a comment on an article by viem kwok and hayne leland concerning the relationship between asymmetric information and the brain drain of skilled labor from developing countries is presented a reply by kwok and leland p 535 is also included annotation

clicking on heaven s door the effect of immigrant legalization on crime we estimate the eect of legalization on the crime rate of immigrants by exploiting the italian policy framework as an ideal regression discontinuity design xed quotas of residence permits are available each year applications must be submitted electronically on specic click days and they are processed on a rst come rst served basis until the available quotas are exhausted by matching data on applicants including the timing of applications in milliseconds with restricted use criminal records for the year before and after click days we show that obtaining legal status reduces the probability of being reported for having committed a serious crime by 0 6 percentage points on average on a baseline crime rate of 1 percent this eect is driven by applicants that are allegedly employed by other immigrants as domestic workers but are most likely unemployed who exhibit the highest crime rate in the year before click days as well as the greatest reduction in crime after obtaining legal status by contrast applicants sponsored by rms exhibit a very low crime rate both before and after click days we conclude that undocumented immigrants confronting worse labor market opportunities are at a higher risk of committing crimes while they are also more responsive to legalization

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

emerging strategies in the venture capital industry abstract this article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms there are three main sets of results first the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different strategic groups members of these groups are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms 1 financial resources equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources five major sources resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm 2 staff resources the way venture capital firms use staff resources particularly regarding investee management assistance is becoming increasingly varied across different groups some firms provide fewer than 2 days per year while others provide up to 450 man days per year per client 3 venture stages while the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1 2 and 3 investment specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages 4 use of financial resources firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make 100 m to 1000 m and in their role as a direct investor versus a broker for institutional funds practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways first they may find it useful to compare their firm s orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm s that comprised this study second they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine clarify and or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm a second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups annualized after tax return on investments of between 25 and 40 remain the most common objective across all firms a 5 to 6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms a third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater certainty about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm the most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry second they should consider the finding that industry wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry it is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger older funds some of these funds would be characterized as industry leaders pace setters and innovators the sample provides a solid representation of the broad middle of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry while larger older funds are under represented their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about future direction of the venture capital industry finally the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital for investors the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied basically this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry geographic considerations for users of venture capital the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities staff utilization orientations sources and uses of financial resources this should make for more informed shopping among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to shop for the most compatible firm

contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk we analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard on the part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique of cultivation in the presence of limited liability high powered incentive contracts such as fixed rental contracts will induce the farmer to adopt techniques of cultivation that are too risky from the point of view of the landlord on the other hand low powered incentive contracts such as fixed wage contracts will induce the farmer to supply too little effort we show that sharecropping contracts emerge as a natural solution to balance these two conflicting considerations

role of risk sharing and transaction costs in contract choice theory and evidence from groundwater contracts empirical modeling of contract choice has been problematic because routine large scale surveys do not contain sufficient information on matched partners and on contractual terms this paper is based on a primary level survey of groundwater contracts in india we discuss several different measures for riskiness and transaction costs and use them to test for alternative theories of contract choice although the risk sharing explanation has been most popular in the theoretical literature it is not found to be significant the data are more consistent with a double sided incentive model where the need for giving proper incentives to the buyer and the seller determines contract choice

a model of venture capitalist investment activity the paper describes the activities of venture capitalists as an orderly process involving five sequential steps these are 1 deal origination the processes by which deals enter into consideration as investment prospects 2 deal screening a delineation of key policy variables which delimit investment prospects to a manageable few for in depth evaluation 3 deal evaluation the assessment of perceived risk and expected return on the basis of a weighting of several characteristics of the prospective venture and the decision whether or not to invest as determined by the relative levels of perceived risk and expected return 4 deal structuring the negotiation of the price of the deal namely the equity relinquished to the investor and the covenants which limit the risk of the investor 5 post investment activities the assistance to the venture in the areas of recruiting key executives strategic planning locating expansion financing and orchestrating a merger acquisition or public offering 41 venture capitalists provided data on a total of 90 deals which had received serious consideration in their firms the questionnaire measured the mechanism of initial contact between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the venture s industry the stage of financing and product development ratings of the venture on 23 characteristics an assessment of the potential return and perceived risk and the decision vis i vis whether to invest the modal venture represented in the database was a start up in the electronics industry with a production capability in place and seeking 1 million median in outside financing there is a high degree of cross referrals between venture capitalists particularly for the purposes of locating co investors factor analysis reduced the 23 characteristics of the deal to five underlying dimensions namely 1 market attractiveness size growth and access to customers 2 product differentiation uniqueness patents technical edge profit margin 3 managerial capabilities skills in marketing management finance and the references of the entrepreneur 4 environmental threat resistance technology life cycle barriers to competitive entry insensitivity to business cycles and down side risk protection 5 cash out potential future opportunities to realize capital gains by merger acquisition or public offering the results of regression analyses showed expected return to be determined by market attractiveness and product differentiation r2 0 22 perceived risk is determined by managerial capabilities and environmental threat resistance r2 0 33 finally a discriminant analysis correctly predicted in 89 4 of the cases whether or not a venture capitalist was willing to commit funds to the deal on the basis of the expected return and perceived risk the reactions of seven venture capitalists who reviewed the model s specification were used to test its validity

effects of technology on incentive design of share contracts do observed contracts have the properties predicted by the principal agent model with moral hazard in contract theory this paper tests the predictions of such an agency model in the context of sharecropping in north india the most well known explanation for sharecropping is based on the principal agent model with a trade off between risk and incentives even though sharecropping contracts are quite prevalent in rural areas of developing countries there is very little evidence on factors determining the instruments used to provide incentives in such contracts using information in the data giving rise to exogenous variation in technology across regions this paper tests for the effect of cultivation technology on the incentive structure of share contracts as predicted by the agency model existing empirical evidence on sharecropping seems to indicate that yield on sharecropped plots is lower than on owner operated plots i e there is an incentive problem or moral hazard radwan a shaban 1987 jean jacques laffont and mohamed s matoussi 1995 there is some informal evidence that landowners use various mechanisms to improve efficiency in sharecropping by participating in cost sharing and by repeating contracts robert m townsend and rolf a mueller 1994 examine the nature of these mechanisms in detail but their data do not permit econometric tests more generally though the principal agent model has been widely studied there is little existing empirical evidence for it michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 find that executive compensation is only weakly sensitive to firm performance in recent work rajesh k aggarwal and andrew a samwick 1999 find that executive s pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of firm s performance however their results are sensitive to the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms in the regressions as pierre a chiappori and bernard salanie 2003 note in a recent survey empirical work on contract theory using nonexperimental data needs to be careful in adequately correcting for underlying heterogeneity across agents otherwise the parameters of interest would be hard to interpret if such heterogeneity affects contract choice for example douglas w allen and dean lueck 1995 find no role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contracts but they do not take the heterogeneity across agents into account in a recent paper addressing the issue of heterogeneity across agents ackerberg and botticini 2002 find a significant role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contract after correcting for endogenous matching between landowners and tenants they find that wealthier tenants are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts in this paper we are able to address such estimation issues and check for the robustness of our results regarding the relationship between technology and the design of share contracts department of economics pennsylvania state university university park pa 16801 e mail pxp22 psu edu this paper derives from related work done earlier in my dissertation i am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions i thank james heckman lars stole robert townsend kala krishna and seminar participants for useful comments financial support from the andrew mellon foundation for both rounds of fieldwork is gratefully acknowledged any errors remain my own 1 see nirvikar singh 1991 for a survey of various theories of sharecropping including steven n cheung 1969 c h hanumantha rao 1971 joseph e stiglitz 1974 david newbery and stiglitz 1979 avishay braverman and stiglitz 1982 mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal 1985 and sudhir shetty 1988 a common feature of the different theories is an emphasis on uncertainty and asymmetric information 2 an exception is daniel a ackerberg and maristella botticini 2002 ackerberg and botticini differ from our paper in that they examine the role of tenant s risk aversion in the choice between fixed rental contract and share contract they do not examine share contracts per se 3 see john e core and wayne guay 2000

singapore venture capitalists vcs investment evaluation criteria a reexamination the venture capital vc industry in singapore is of recent origin however funds under management in singapore have grown from s 45 million in 1983 to s 7 86 billion in 1996 these developments together with the recent announcement of government s vision of singapore becoming a hub for venture capital in the region provide an opportunity for an examination of the venture capital industry in singapore the vc industry originated in the western hemisphere in response to the need for risk capital for high technology industries in the light of the differences in investment opportunities around singapore and the nature of industrial developments in south east asia in general the authors anticipated that the investment criteria employed by venture capital firms vcs in singapore would differ the results however reveal that criteria adopted by singapore vcs are not very different from those adopted by vcs in other countries including u s the results also confirm that the entrepreneur s characteristics or the top management s capabilities are seen as being primary indicators of the venture s potential further examination of vcs investment process revealed that the investment criteria adopted by successful vcs were no different from those adopted by less successful vcs this confirms that investment selection is a multi stage process wherein venture assessment is only one of the steps in this process before vcs evaluate a venture they screen investment proposals based on their investment preferences or investment strategies vcs in our sample had definite ideas about where to invest and in what types of firms how do vcs select appropriate investment strategies however has not been adequately dealt in the literature and is a fitting subject for further studies

validation of the venture evaluation model in korea abstract this article examines the validity of the venture evaluation model in korea by directly comparing the relative importance of evaluation criteria on the funding decision with the relative importance of factors influencing venture s empirical performance specifically we first identify the relative importance of evaluation criteria based on whether a deal is accepted or rejected current evaluation model next we derive the relative importance of those criteria revealed in the empirical performance based on the success failure of ventures that overlap with the deals originally used as accepted cases performance based model finally to better understand the differences between the two models we measure the general perceptions of venture capitalists on the importance of those criteria without regard to specific deals normative model to identify potentially important criteria we reviewed the existing related studies on evaluation criteria and we interviewed 10 venture capitalists as a result we selected 31 evaluation items the questionnaire consists of two parts and deals with the following four cases in part a 1 1 case 1 general perceptions concerning the 31 criteria in part b 2 2 case 2 one of the most successful ventures 3 3 case 3 one of the least successful ventures 4 4 case 4 one of the rejected ventures using a five point scale we asked the respondents to rate the 31 criteria based on their general perceptions without referring deals case 1 and on the specific deals they had handled cases 2 3 and 4 to prevent any firm or respondent from affecting the results more than it ought to we distributed the questionnaire to each firm in proportion to the investment amounts we also asked the respondents to fill out only one questionnaire including four cases seventy four venture capitalists including 10 interviewed responded to this questionnaire they have worked as investment directors or managers in the top rated 20 venture capital companies selected according to investment amounts on the basis of the ratings of 31 criteria for the previous four cases we developed three investment models first the current evaluation model reveals which criteria are more important in deciding whether or not to fund the model measures the relative importance of evaluation factors in discriminating between the accept case 2 and case 3 and the reject case 4 decision second the performance based model consists of the relative weights of evaluation factors influencing the two performance categories success case 2 and failure case 3 this model shows the relative importance of evaluation criteria that are reflected in the venture s empirical performance finally we identify the normative model revealing the venture capitalists general perceptions concerning the importance of individual criteria in light of their past field experiences case 1 by comparing the three models we find that the importance of these criteria revealed from venture capitalists perceptions and empirical performances is fairly similar but not sufficiently reflected in the actual deal evaluation in particular the entrepreneur related characteristics are not considered the most important in evaluating venture proposals according to the current evaluation model but they do turn out to be the most important factors in evaluating empirical performance this is in strong contrast to the findings of some existing studies which contend that the entrepreneurrelated criteria ultimately determine the funding decision instead the result confirms the previous assertion that the evaluation of managerial capability is the most challenging task in the venture selection process in the current evaluation model financing ability is considered more important than either superiority of product and technology or production capability contrary to venture capitalists perceptions and empirical performance results therefore it seems necessary to raise the level of specialization of venture capital firms through the acquisition of managerial skills from developed countries and by enhancing the technical background of individual venture capitalists

rigidities in rural labor markets an empirical test the presence of potentially binding constraints in rural labor markets is investigated by examining spillover effects on land market participation decisions farm and household data from icrisat village level surveys are used in a multinominial logit model that accounts for the simultaneous nature of the land and labor market participation decisions estimated parameters and likelihood ratio tests indicate that except for the presence of potentially binding constraint on the supply of female labor off the farm no other evidence of binding constraints is present in these villages copyright 1990 by mit press

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

the role of venture capital in financing small business abstract venture capital is a primary and unique source of funding for small firms because these firms with sales and or assets under 5 million have very limited access to traditional capital markets venture capital is a substitute but not a perfect substitute for trade credit bank credit and other forms of financing for small firms small businesses are not likely to be successful in attracting venture capital unless the firms have the potential to provide extraordinary returns to the venture capitalist this study provides an analysis of a survey of venture capital firms that participate in small business financing the survey participants are venture capital firms that were 1986 members of the national venture capital association nvca the largest venture capital association in the united states the average size of the venture capital firms responding to the survey is 92 million dollars in assets with a range from 600 thousand to 500 million twenty three percent of the respondents have total assets below 20 million and 27 have assets above 100 million the venture capitalists investment assets held in small firms delineate the supply of venture capital to small firms sixty three of the 92 venture capitalists have more than 70 of their assets invested in small firms the venture capitalists were asked how their investment plans might change with changes in the tax law that were projected in the spring of 1986 fifty four percent expected to increase their investments in small firms and 38 did not expect to change these activities venture capitalists are very selective in allocating their resources the average number of annual requests that a venture capitalist receives is 652 and the median number is 500 only 11 5 of the respondents receive more than 1 000 proposals per year

a back door brain drain abstract the long run effect of migration solely by unskilled workers is that skilled workers in the home country acquire additional human capital yet their share in the country s workforce falls consequently the country s average level of human capital is lowered

toward a theory of agricultural insurance in this paper we develop a theory of crop insurance we start by reaffirming the risk spreading role of competitive crop insurance markets it is argued however that once the problems of imperfect information are recognized a competitive crop insurance market may not exist at all two candidates present themselves first is market insurance with the public sector as a source of costly information gathering and dissemination and second is the direct provision of crop insurance by the public sector we focus on the latter and develop a model of public insurance as a decentralized plan where the farmer determines factor utilization taking the insurance contract as given in turn the insurance agency taking factor utilization as determined by the farmer chooses the optimal contract so as to maximize the value of aggregate output in the economy

productivity and distribution under cropsharing tenancy abstract this paper develops a model of sharecropping assuming tenant autonomy competitive behavior of landlords and laborers and endogenously determined wage and share rental rates the coexistence of wage labor and sharecropping is explained in terms of their incentive labor process and risk sharing characteristics sharecropping serves as a surrogate for the direct supervision of the labor process its incidence is shown to rise in the presence of unemployment at a subsistence wage the model implies that the abolition of tenancy will raise output raise labor income and reduce land income

migration remittances and inequality estimating the net effects of migration on income distribution this paper examines the net effects of migration and remittances on income distribution potential home earnings of migrants are imputed as are the earnings of non migrants in migrant households in order to construct no migration counterfacmals to compare with the observed income distribution including remittances the earnings functions used to impute migrant home earnings are estimated from observations on non migrants in a selection corrected estimation framework which incorporates migration choice and labor force participation decisions for a sample of households in bluefields nicaragua migration and remittances increase income inequality when compared with the no migration counterfactual 1998 elsevier science b v

temporary migration human capital and language fluency of migrants this paper investigates human capital investment of immigrants whose duration in the host country is limited either by contract or by their own choice the first part of the paper develops a model which distinguishes between temporary migrations where the return time is exogenous or optimally chosen the analysis has a number of interesting implications for empirical work some of which are explored in the second part of the paper the analysis focuses on language capital and tests the hypothesis that country specific human capital investments are sensitive to the duration in the host country s labour market the results show that the acquisition of language capital is sensitive to the intended duration in the host country

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

networks in the modern economy mexican migrants in the u s labor market this paper attempts to identify job networks among mexican migrants in the u s labor market the empirical analysis uses data on migration patterns and labor market outcomes based on a sample of individuals belonging to multiple origin communities in mexico over a long period of time each community s network is measured by the proportion of the sampled individuals who are located at the destination the united states in any year we verify that the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job when his network is exogenously larger by including individual fixed effects in the employment and occupation regressions and by using rainfall in the origin community as an instrument for the size of the network at the destination

venture capitalists decision policies across three countries an institutional theory perspective this paper examines the influence of economic institutions upon venture capitalists vcs decision policies we conducted policy capturing experiments on 119 vcs across three countries representing distinct economic institutions us mature market economy south korea emerging economy and china transitional economy results show that vcs in rules based market economies us rely upon market information to a greater extent than vcs in emerging economies korea and chinese vcs transitional economy weight human capital factors more heavily than either us or korean vcs findings suggest that although professional institutions may dictate which information is included in vc decision policies the extent to which that information is emphasized is determined partly by the economic institution in which the decision maker operates journal of international business studies 2007 38 691 708 doi 10 1057 palgrave jibs 8400291

risk preferences and the economics of contracts t he literature of risk aversion and risk preference is one of the richest sources of ad hoc assumptions concerning tastes n o significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes such theories have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down they give the appearance of considered judgement yet really have only been ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures george j stigler and gary s becker 1977 p 89

the spread of sharecropping in tuscany the political economy of transaction costs land tenure is central to many agricultural transformations the author examines one of these transformations the spread of sharecropping in late medieval and early modern tuscany previous research suggested that sharecropping spread as agricultural relations were refeudalized in contrast the author s analyses of fixed term and share term leasing sharecropping show that landlords used sharecropping when it lowered their overall costs of labor supervision and land management however to explain the spread of sharecropping the florentine political economy which created particular patterns of land management costs and labor supervision costs must also be considered florence was a well developed center for urban manufacturing landlords were frequently urban merchants and they resided in florence these factors were crucial in shaping agricultural relations landlords use of sharecropping to reduce the overall costs of land management and labor supervision increased as the distance from florence the site of landlords principal activities increased as the size of farms increased and when crops had high costs of labor supervision and land management thus the use of sharecropping to lower costs associated with agricultural production must be considered in the context of the tuscan political economy

ambivalence of class subjectivity the sharecroppers of the post bellum southern usa the paper argues that the economic literature on sharecropping uses a modernist notion of subjectivity that fails to explain the complexity of economic behaviour or the social context in which agency is formed i look at the case of economic subjectivity of southern sharecropping tenants in the post bellum usa using non determinist marxist class analysis together with the concept of subjectivity drawing from postcolonial theory in particular the work of homi bhabha i argue that this alternative approach to economic subjectivity which posits an ambivalent or contradictory subjectivity provides us with a better analytical grasp of economic agency and a better explanation of the perpetuation or demise of a productive form such as sharecropping copyright the author 2008 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press