the expected inflation channel of government spending in the postwar u s abstract there exist sticky price models in which the output response to a government spending change can be large if the central bank is nonresponsive to inflation according to this expected inflation channel government spending drives up expected inflation which in turn reduces the real interest rate and leads to an increase in private consumption this paper examines whether the channel was important in the post wwii u s with particular attention to the 2009 recovery act period first we show that a model calibrated to have a large output multiplier requires a large response of expected inflation to a government spending shock next we show that this large response is inconsistent with structural vector autoregression evidence from the federal reserve s passive policy period 1959 1979 then we study expected inflation measures during the recovery act period in conjunction with a panel of professional forecaster surveys a cross country comparison of bond yields and fiscal policy news announcements we show that the expected inflation response was too small to engender a large output multiplier

what accounts for the changes in u s fiscal policy transmission using vector autoregressions on u s time series for 1957 79 and 1983 2004 we find government spending shocks to have stronger effects on output consumption and wages in the earlier period we try to account for this observation within a dsge model featuring price rigidities and limited asset market participation specifically we estimate the structural parameters of the model for both periods by matching impulse responses model based counterfactual experiments suggest that most of the changes in fiscal policy transmission are accounted for by increased asset market participation and the more active monetary policy of the volcker greenspan period

group loyalty and the taste for redistribution interpersonal preferences preferences that depend on the characteristics of others are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior as an alternative approach this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences i show that self reported attitudes toward welfare spending are determined not only by financial self interest but also by interpersonal preferences these interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises and racial group loyalty individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises these findings help to explain why levels of welfare benefits are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states

recognition redistribution and liberty abstract this paper examines the relationship between redistribution recognition and liberty in particular it critiques the existing approaches in the critical literature that either reduces redistribution to a simple subset of recognition or insists that recognition is both necessary and sufficient for redistribution to occur it argues instead that the introduction of the relatively weak assumption of minimal individual liberty is required for recognition and that while recognition is necessary it is insufficient for redistribution it also considers the sustainability of voluntary redistribution in a liberal society and voluntary recognition in an authoritarian society finally the approach is applied to the problems of discrimination genocide and ethnic conflict

nonfarm diversification poverty economic mobility and income inequality a case study in village india this paper assembles data at the all india level and for the village of palanpur uttar pradesh to document the growing importance and influence of the non farm sector in the rural economy between the early 1980s and late 2000s the suggestion from the combined national sample survey and palanpur data is of a slow process of non farm diversification whose distributional incidence on the margin is increasingly pro poor the village level analysis documents that the non farm sector is not only increasing incomes and reducing poverty but appears as well to be breaking down long standing barriers to mobility among the poorest segments of rural society efforts by the government of india to accelerate the process of diversification could thus yield significant returns in terms of declining poverty and increased income mobility the evidence from palanpur also shows however that at the village level a significant increase in income inequality has accompanied diversification away from the farm a growing literature argues that such a rise in inequality could affect the fabric of village society the way in which village institutions function and evolve and the scope for collective action at the village level failure to keep such inequalities in check could thus undermine the pro poor impacts from the process of structural transformation currently underway in rural india

energy subsidies in california s electricity market deregulation deregulation and re regulation of california s electricity market not only failed in terms of anticipated cost reductions improved customer service and higher competition it also led to the introduction of various additional energy subsidies this paper analyzes california s electricity market deregulation process from a subsidy viewpoint under deregulation in california investor owned utilities were not allowed to pass their energy procurement costs fully on to their customers and therefore subsequently and inevitably ran into severe financial problems such retail price regulation is an energy subsidy that is both economically and environmentally unfavorable because it veils true price signals to electricity consumers and in this way discourages energy conservation other policies implemented in california that represent perverse energy subsidies are the purchase of power by the state of california the suspension of retail competition and the potential misuse of money from the recovery of stranded costs many interventions implemented by the state to smooth out the impacts of the energy crisis insulated electricity consumers from market realities supported the existing structure of california s electricity market which is predominantly based on fossil fuels and suppressed market incentives to improve energy conservation

caste and tribe inequality evidence from india 1983 1999 abstract despite policies targeting scheduled castes sc and scheduled tribes st there remain large disparities of living standards between sc st and non sc st households in india the sc st households may be poorer because they possess lower human and physical capital but they may also earn lower returns to these assets this study finds that 30 50 of the welfare disparities are attributable to different returns such structural differences between the sc and the non sc st are partly because the sc earn lower returns to schooling a large part of the structural disparities between the st and the non sc st comes from the fact that the areas where the st live are different from those where the non sc st live in addition the st tend to earn lower returns even with controls for geographical conditions

why dowry payments declined with modernization in europe but are rising in india in contrast to most dowry oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization those in india have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades this paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste the theoretical model contrasts caste and non caste based societies in the former there exists an inherited component to status caste that is independent of wealth and in the latter wealth is the primary determinant of status modernization is assumed to involve two components increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status or caste groups the paper shows that in caste based societies the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments whereas in non caste based societies increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline

students perceptions of teacher biases experimental economics in schools we put forward a new experimental economics design with monetary incentives to estimate students perceptions of grading discrimination we use this design in a large field experiment which involved 1 200 british students in grade 8 classrooms across 29 schools in this design students are given an endowment they can invest on a task where payoff depends on performance the task is a written verbal test which is graded non anonymously by their teacher in a random half of the classrooms and graded anonymously by an external examiner in the other random half of the classrooms we find significant evidence that students choices reflect perceptions of biases in teachers grading practices our results show systematic gender interaction effects male students invest less with female teachers than with male teachers while female students invest more with male teachers than with female teachers interestingly female students perceptions are not in line with actual discrimination teachers tend to give better grades to students of their own gender results do not suggest that ethnicity and socioeconomic status play a role

alliances in the shadow of conflict victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war this article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy first if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution this increases the likelihood of fighting in turn anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance s ability to succeed against the outside enemy second the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely third higher differences in the alliance players contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting

distribution network prices and solar pv resolving rate instability and wealth transfers through demand tariffs 1 in 4 detached households in southeast queensland have installed rooftop solar pv amongst the highest take up rates in the world electricity distribution network capacity is primarily driven by periodic demand and household load generally peaks in the early evening whereas solar pv production peaks during the middle of the day and thus a mismatch exists compounding matters is the fact that the structure of the regulated two part network tariff is dominated by a flat rate variable charge in this article interval meter data at the customer switchboard circuit level confirms that solar households use only slightly less peak capacity than non solar households and that non trivial cross subsidies are rapidly emerging a tariff model demonstrates that a peak capacity based demand tariff is a more efficient cost reflective and equitable pricing structure that improves the stability of tariffs given a rate of return regulatory constraint

behavior in group contests a review of experimental research group contests are ubiquitous some examples include warfare between countries competition between political parties team incentives within firms group sports and rent seeking in order to succeed members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending individual efforts however since effort is costly each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members contest theory shows that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size sharing rule group impact function contest success function and heterogeneity of players we review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions almost all studies of behavior in group contests find significant over expenditure of effort relative to the theory we discuss potential explanations for such over expenditure including the utility of winning bounded rationality relative payoff maximization parochial altruism and social identity despite over expenditure most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory with the exception of the group size paradox finally studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de escalate and potentially eliminate between group conflict

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

the incentive effects of inequality an experimental investigation author affiliation hyejin ku hku fsu edutimothy c salmon tsalmon smu edu acknowledgment the authors would like to thank the national science foundation for research support in funding these experiments we also thank participants at the cornell edinburgh conference on relativity inequality and public policy the international esa meeting in washington d c the european esa meeting in innsbruck and the conference on aspirations and poverty at the university of warwick as well participants in seminars at virginia commonwealth university carnegie mellon university helmut schmidt university and goethe university in frankfurt 1 introductioneconomists have established many ways in which initial inequality may influence the paths of economic development in a series of historical studies engerman and sokoloff 1997 2002 2005 argue that the initial differences in factor endowments between north and south america contributed to the emergence of different institutions between the two regions which in turn led to the divergence in the rates of growth persson and tabellini 1994 examine more recent data and argue that there is a significant and large negative relation between inequality and growth while banerjee and duflo 2003 argue that the relationship between growth and inequality is an inverted u shaped function understanding the relationship between inequality and economic growth is important in the design of a broad range of economic development policies and there is a substantial literature that investigates the mechanics behind the linkages between growth and inequality loury 1981 galor and zeira 1993 banerjee and newman 1993 durlauf 1996 benabou 1996 2000 and mookherjee and ray 2003 are well established studies in the literature and the typical nature of the proposed linkage between inequality and either growth or persistent inequality in these papers is differential endowment or investment opportunities of agents often in the form of human capital and occupational choice we propose a new possible linkage between inequality and growth which may also be useful in explaining the persistence of inequality the linkage we propose is the incentive effects of inequality from a behavioral perspective specifically we argue that individuals may respond not just to the absolute return on their effort but also to their return relative to that of others if present this effect can lead to inequality having a direct impact on the decisions of individuals unlike in the existing literature wherein it only alters aggregate societal outcomes to explain the nature of the effect we investigate suppose that as a result of identity marks such as gender caste or race an individual receives lesser rewards than others in society for the same amount of effort provided then one can envision this individual eventually becoming discouraged by repeatedly facing disadvantageous inequality and this could result in the individual exhibiting a variety of responses ranging from decreased on the job work effort to decreased human capital acquisition and decreased contributions to public goods if such a behavioral response to inequality exists then there are a number of important consequences associated with it first this effect ceteris paribus would generate a negative relationship between inequality and economic growth there are a number of forces at play in an aggregate economy so this is not to claim that the overall relationship between inequality and growth must be negative if this effect exists but the partial effect of inequality on growth due to this behavioral effect would be negative second separately or in addition to the theoretical models cited above this effect could generate persistent inequality from initial idiosyncratic inequality the reason is that even if the initial inequality were idiosyncratic if a worker responds by exerting less effort or investing less in human capital then this response has the potential to legitimize and then perpetuate the initially low rewards for that individual or group

can t buy me love a field experiment exploring the trade off between income and caste status in an indian matrimonial market i introduction the relationship between economic motive and observance of discriminatory social customs is hardly new to economists this is implicit in the writings of becker 1957 1973 1974 on discrimination and other social customs and explicit in arrow s essay 1972 on discrimination and akerlof s work 1980 on the interactive relationship between economic incentives and discriminatory social customs as scholars like becker arrow and akerlof have investigated the relationship between economic incentives and the prevalence of custom based discrimination of which status based discrimination is an example it is natural to consult the related empirical evidence on the impact of economic incentives on the extent of status based discrimination surprisingly the extant empirical literature is mostly silent on how economic incentives may directly interact with status based discrimination 1 this is atypical as one would be hard pressed to find an issue as weighty as status based discrimination yet our knowledge in this aspect remains oddly limited our study aspires to rectify this gap this study investigates whether and what magnitude of economic incentive can diminish the incidence of status based discrimination by designing a controlled field experiment in an actual marketplace a reputable arranged marriage market that is conducted via newspaper advertisements the existing literature suggests that this market might be especially prone to strong discriminatory mate selection behavior based on the social identity status of an individual where caste identity of an individual is an easily measured indicator of social status the genesis of this discrimination can be attributed to a high status female s concern for a decline in her social status if she engages in a marital relationship with a low status male against this backdrop we ask whether a low status male could attempt to weaken this enduring form of discrimination by providing systematic economic incentive in the form of high monthly groom incomes to a high status female so that the former s marriage proposal receives preliminary consideration by the latter conditional on both individuals participation in this market the marketplace that we utilize is a well functioning arranged marriage market conducted via matrimonial advertisements in a widely circulated bengali language newspaper marriageable males in this market typically advertise their caste and income information among other attributes after these advertisements appear in the newspaper interested families contact the advertiser mostly in form of detailed letters expressing their interest in that advertisement this provides a confidential and reliable measure of first intent of the interested party in this case females therefore the conjunction of an exceptionally strong status based mate selection behavior a reputed market for arranged marriages and an exclusive correspondence process furnish us with a unique opportunity to investigate the main research hypothesis of our study to the best of our knowledge this is the first field experiment that exclusively focuses on how economic incentives can influence status based discrimination in an actual market 2 to operationalize the experiment we create nine unique matrimonial advertisements each representing a fictitious groom type 3 these potential grooms belong to one of the three blocks where each block contains three grooms from a given caste group we vary the caste status across these blocks we consider three different caste groups high middle and low strictly ranked so in the study region we vary the income features of grooms within a block we consider three different monthly income levels i e high medium and low that are considered feasible for each caste group in the study region furthermore we randomly assign other characteristics relevant for this market to all the potential grooms so that these features on average do not affect the behavior of responders

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

ethnic diversity social sanctions and public goods in kenya abstract this paper examines ethnic diversity and local public goods in rural western kenya the identification strategy relies on the stable historically determined patterns of ethnic land settlement ethnic diversity is associated with lower primary school funding and worse school facilities and there is suggestive evidence that it leads to poor water well maintenance the theoretical model illustrates how inability to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads to collective action failures and we find that school committees in diverse areas do impose fewer sanctions on defaulting parents we relate these results to the literature on social capital and economic development and discuss implications for decentralization in less developed countries

social identity and inequality the impact of china s hukou system abstract we conduct an experimental study to investigate the causal impact of social identity on individuals performance under incentives we focus on china s household registration hukou system which favors urban residents and discriminates against rural residents in resource allocation our results show that making individuals hukou identity salient significantly reduces the performance of rural migrant students relative to their local urban counterparts on an incentivized cognitive task and consequently significantly lowers their relative ranking in the earnings distribution under the piece rate regime however the impact of hukou identity salience is insignificant in the tournament regime suggesting that its negative effect on migrant students performance may be mitigated when competition is introduced the results demonstrate the impact of institutionally imposed social identity on individuals economic performance and potentially on inequality

community composition and collective action analyzing initial mail response to the 2000 census this paper analyzes how community heterogeneity influences resident decisions to undertake actions generating public benefits the decision in question is completing and returning the 2000 census questionnaire an action which secures a significant amount of federal grants for the community the model developed to explain this action allows members of societal groups to differentially value public benefits that accrue to other group members racial generational and socioeconomic class heterogeneity all predict significantly lower response rates at the county level the potential for endogenous sorting into heterogeneous counties implies that the magnitude of true behavioral effects exceeds these estimates

on non uniqueness in rational expectations models an attempt at perspective abstract many macroeconomic models involving rational expectations give rise to an infinity of solution paths even when the models are linear in all variables some writers have suggested that this non uniqueness constitutes a serious weakness for the rational expectations hypothesis one purpose of the present paper is to argue that the non uniqueness in question is not properly attributable to the rationality hypothesis but instead is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations it is also argued that there typically exists in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models a single solution that excludes bubble or bootstrap effects one that occur only because they are arbitrarily expected to occur a systematic procedure for obtaining solutions free from such effects is introduced and discussed in addition this procedure is used to interpret and reconsider several prominent examples with solution multiplicities including ones developed by fischer black and john b taylor

history social divisions and public goods in rural india we examine the influence of three historically important sources of social divisions on the availability of public goods in rural india colonial power landowner peasant relations as determined by the land tenure system and social fragmentation based on the hindu caste system and the presence of sizable religious minorities using data on public goods from 1991 we find that regions that were under british colonial power in the pre independence period and those where agrarian power was concentrated in the hands of landlords have lower access to these goods as do areas with high levels of social fragmentation jel h41 p16

does access to formal agricultural credit depend on caste summary this paper analyzes whether caste impedes access to formal agricultural credit in india credit is provided mainly through cooperative and commercial banks using national data we find that cooperative banks discriminate against lower caste borrowers and find weak evidence that commercial banks instead bias lending in their favor in accordance with affirmative action policies we compare the organizational structures of the two types of bank and explain discrimination by cooperative banks in terms of interest group capture at the district level by showing that discrimination takes place in those districts where higher castes dominate

fiscal multipliers under an interest rate peg of deterministic versus stochastic duration this paper revisits the size of the fiscal multiplier the experiment is a fiscal expansion under the assumption of a pegged nominal rate of interest we demonstrate that a quantitatively important issue is the articulation of the exit from the policy experiment if the monetary fiscal expansion is stochastic with a mean duration of t periods the fiscal multiplier can be unboundedly large however if the monetary fiscal expansion is for a fixed t periods the multiplier is much smaller our explanation rests on a jensen s inequality type argument the deterministic multiplier is convex in duration and the stochastic multiplier is a weighted average of the deterministic multipliers the quantitative difference in the two multipliers also arises in a model with capital and in the baseline nonlinear model however the differences between the two is less pronounced in the nonlinear models

discrimination social identity and durable inequalities what are the mechanisms by which societal discrimination affects individual achievement and why do the effects of past discrimination endure once legal barriers are removed we report the findings of two experiments in village india that suggest that the mechanisms of discrimination operate in part within the individuals who are members of the groups who have been discriminated against we demonstrate that publicly revealing an individual s membership in such a group alters his behavior in ways that make the effects of past discrimination persist over time a growing literature in social psychology on stereotype threat finds that stereotyped based expectations affect individual performance in the domain of the stereotype a study by jeff stone et al 1999 is illustrative when college students were asked to perform a task described as diagnostic of natural athletic ability blacks stereotyped as better athletes but worse students than whites performed better than whites when the same test was presented as diagnostic of sports intelligence the performance of blacks declined that of whites improved and the racial gap was reversed evidence suggests that a mediating factor in stereotype threat is a change in self confidence mara cadinu et al 2005 in our studies we investigated whether the public revelation of social identity caste affects cognitive task performance and responses to economic opportunities by young boys in village india subjects were sixth and seventh graders drawn from the two ends of the caste hierarchy we asked subjects to learn and then perform a task under incentives and we manipulated whether their peers in the experimental session knew their caste caste is well suited to this manipulation because unlike race gender and ethnicity there are no unambiguous outward markers of caste among young boys six subjects generally from six different villages participated in each experimental session in the control condition the subjects were anonymous within the six person group in the experimental conditions the experimenter publicly revealed subjects names and caste in the task solving mazes in which performance was studied here the low caste subjects in the anonymous condition did not perform significantly differently from high caste subjects but when caste identity was publicly revealed in a mixed caste group a significant caste gap emerged the caste gap was due to a 20 percent decline in the average number of mazes solved by the low caste the study shows that publicly revealing the social identity of an individual can change his behavior even when that information is irrelevant to payoffs our results are a generalization of the literature on stereotype threat like that literature we find that individuals performance is more in accordance with the stereotype of the group when group membership is made salient in some way unlike that literature salience in our experiments depends on the public revelation of social identity and more importantly we do not argue that the domain of the tasks undertaken by discussants rachel croson university of pennsylvania iris bohnet harvard university stefano dellavigna university of california berkeley

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

international spillovers and water quality in rivers do countries free ride transboundary spillovers may degrade environmental quality if countries free ride this paper examines the extent of such degradation in water quality in international rivers using data from river monitoring stations in the un s global emissions monitoring system gems it compares pollution levels in international and domestic rivers the results suggest that free riding may substantially increase pollution in international rivers but the estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of country effects this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

macroeconomic effects from government purchases and taxes for u s annual data that include world war ii the estimated multiplier for temporary defense spending is 0 4 0 5 contemporaneously and 0 6 0 7 over 2 years if the change in defense spending is permanent gauged by ramey s defense news variable the multipliers are higher by 0 1 0 2 since all estimated multipliers are significantly less than 1 greater spending crowds out other components of gdp particularly investment the lack of good instruments prevents estimation of reliable multipliers for nondefense purchases multipliers in the literature of two or more likely reflect reverse causation from gdp to nondefense purchases increases in average marginal income tax rates measured by a newly constructed time series have significantly negative effects on gdp when interpreted as a tax multiplier the magnitude is around 1 1 the combination of the estimated spending and tax multipliers implies that the balanced budget multiplier for defense spending is negative we have some evidence that tax changes affect gdp mainly through substitution effects rather than wealth effects

monetary fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus abstract increases in government spending trigger substitution effects both inter and intra temporal and a wealth effect the ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate this paper estimates markov switching policy rules for the united states and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior when the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new keynesian model government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized the paper reports the model s predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the american recovery and reinvestment act s implied path for government spending under alternative monetary fiscal policy combinations

the tragedy of the commons in international fisheries an empirical examination abstract historically all capture fisheries have proven hard to manage internationally shared stocks face an additional impediment to effective management previous fisheries studies estimate gains from cooperation for particular species or locations but evidence is lacking on the wider effect that international sharing has in relation to other variables that affect stock status this paper is an attempt to shed a broader light on the effect of sharing by identifying whether shared fish stocks are systematically more exploited i compile exploitation status biological and economic data into a unique two period panel of more than 200 fish stocks from around the globe with which i test the theoretical implications of sharing the empirical results from ordered category estimation suggest that shared stocks are indeed more prone to overexploitation

endogenous group formation in experimental contests abstract we experimentally study endogenous alliance formation and contest effort choices in a generic three player contest differences in intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to expend effort cause self selection weakly motivated players have an incentive to enter into an alliance and to free ride on strongly motivated players hence strong players prefer to stand alone self selection has direct consequences for effort in endogenously formed alliances but we also find evidence of an effort stimulating effect if players endogenously form an alliance which is in line with theories of in group favoritism the experimental evidence on self selection is in conformity with a theory analysis of the game

on the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences abstract this note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability presented by bester and guth bester h guth w 1998 journal of economic behavior and organization 34 193 209 applies under more general preference and payoff functions

evolution of preferences1 we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

persistent parochialism trust and exclusion in ethnic networks decentralized groups such as close knit residential neighborhoods and ethnically linked businesses often achieve high levels of cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices that we call parochialism we investigate the contribution of within group cultural affinity to the ability of parochial groups to cooperate in social dilemmas we analyze parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders we show that there is a range of degrees of parochialism for which parochial networks can coexist with an anonymous market offering unrestricted trading opportunities

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

conflict and distribution abstract we develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics the model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth ethnicity religion and political ideology we settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics however in general the conflict distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d72 d74

spending reversals and fiscal multipliers under an interest rate peg this paper examines whether fiscal stimuli are more effective when the monetary policy is less responsive to inflation first we provide empirical evidence suggesting that in the period of u s passive monetary policy a positive government spending shock was followed over time by a spending cut second our theoretical analysis reveals that the pegged nominal interest rate is not a sufficient condition to generate a large fiscal multiplier an increase in government spending could increase the long run real interest rate if it is associated with a government spending reversal and a less responsive monetary policy consequently the response of private consumption can be negative and the government spending multiplier is not necessarily greater than 1

don t touch my road evidence from india on affirmative action and everyday discrimination summary this article investigates whether affirmative action in the form of electoral quotas affects group based discrimination the redistributive effect of quotas is subject to debate and their ultimate target is discrimination to identify the effect of electoral quotas i take advantage of their rotation across space and over time in india to proxy discrimination i use a measure of caste based exclusion from a public infrastructure namely streets in 2006 44 5 household members of the marginalized castes labeled scheduled castes sc still suffered from caste based exclusions i document that ongoing sc quotas reduce the likelihood of caste based exclusion for members of the scs by about one fifth the results also imply that the effect is not persistent it disappears with the end of the sc quota from a policy maker s perspective these results are mixed since electoral quotas do affect everyday discrimination even if the effect does not last these results are consistent with a temporary change in the behavior of members of the dominant castes after a one shot electoral quota these results are inconsistent with either a change in the stereotypes held by members of the dominant castes or a change in the aspirations of members of the lower castes

the evolution of preferences and competition a rationalization of veblen s theory of invidious comparisons we examine how preferences evolve by natural selection in a competitive environment similar to that characterizing much of our evolutionary past we find that the evolutionarily stable preferences in this context exhibit a concern not only for absolute payoffs but also for relative payoffs and that this intensifies the degree of competition relative to what obtains when players consider only absolute payoffs we argue that this has consequences for the equilibrium population size we argue that the premise of this analysis is consistent with the available anthropological evidence and that the prediction is broadly consistent with the findings of experimental game theory

electric utility stranded costs valuation and disclosure issues we analyze the stock market s valuation of electric utility stranded costs i e costs that might become unrecoverable under deregulation and investigate whether stranded costs that have arisen as a result of voluntary firm business decisions are valued differently from those that are more directly linked to regulatory mandates further we study whether investor valuations differ across jurisdictions finally we examine the relation between investor valuation of stranded costs and the decision by utilities to make stranded cost related disclosures in their financial statements voluntarily we find that investors anticipate that on average approximately 10 of total stranded costs will be borne by utility shareholders stranded costs arising from voluntary operating or investing decisions made by utilities are valued more negatively than those associated with mandatory power purchase contracts consistent with investors assigning a higher recovery probability to the latter investor valuations of stranded costs associated with utility generating investments do not differ systematically across jurisdictions we find that stranded costs are valued less negatively for voluntary disclosers not just in the year of disclosure but also in the preceding two years implying that it is not disclosure per se that favorably influences valuation voluntary disclosers operate in jurisdictions that have more clearly established stranded cost recovery mechanisms suggesting that both stranded cost disclosure and valuation are prompted by reduction in uncertainty about recoverability

us and them the origin of identity and its economic implications we investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we propose an evolutionary explanation we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival in an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios one entailing rent seeking behavior and the other involving public good provision our results are in conformity with empirical evidence

the spillover effects of affirmative action on competitiveness and unethical behavior we conduct an artefactual field experiment to examine various spillover effects of affirmative action policies in the context of castes in india we test a if individuals who enter tournaments in the presence of affirmative action policies remain competitive after the policy has been removed and b whether having been exposed to the policy generates unethical behavior and spite against subjects from the category who has benefited from the policy we find that these policies substantially increase the confidence and the competitiveness of the backward caste members however we find no spillover effect on confidence and competitiveness once affirmative action is withdrawn any gain in competitiveness due to the policy is then entirely wiped out furthermore the strong existing bias of the dominant category against the backward category is not significantly aggravated by affirmative action except when individuals learn that they have lost the previous competition

an economic analysis of identity and career choice standard economic models which focus on pecuniary payoffs cannot explain why there are highly able individuals who choose careers with low pecuniary returns therefore financial incentives are unlikely to be effective in influencing career choices of these individuals based on akerlof and kranton 2000 we consider a model of career choice and identity where individuals derive non pecuniary identity payoffs using factor analysis on a range of attitude questions we find two factors related to identity career orientation and social orientation which are important for educational choices the implication is that policymakers and institutions of higher education need to focus on identity related issues rather than just improved financial incentives if they aim at attracting the high ability youth to occupations with excess demand for labor

backlash the unintended effects of language prohibition in u s schools after world war i do forced assimilation policies always succeed in integrating immigrant groups this article examines how a specific assimilation policy language restrictions in elementary school affects integration and identification with the host country later in life after world war i several u s states barred the german language from their schools affected individuals were less likely to volunteer in world war ii and more likely to marry within their ethnic group and to choose decidedly german names for their offspring rather than facilitating the assimilation of immigrant children the policy instigated a backlash heightening the sense of cultural identity among the minority

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

social identity and preferences social identities prescribe behaviors for people we identify the marginal behavioral effect of these norms on discount rates and risk aversion by measuring how laboratory subjects choices change when an aspect of social identity is made salient when we make ethnic identity salient to asian american subjects they make more patient choices when we make racial identity salient to black subjects non immigrant blacks but not immigrant blacks make more patient choices making gender identity salient has no effect on intertemporal or risk choices

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

cultural identities and resolution of social dilemmas we report an experiment on payoff equivalent sequential provision and appropriation games with high and low caste indian villagers a central question is whether caste identities affect resolution of social dilemmas making caste salient elicits striking changes in behavior compared to baseline treatment with no information about others castes homogenous groups with high caste villagers are more successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste villagers the success of mixed caste groups is somewhere between which is inconsistent with a group identity model absent salient information on caste behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by reciprocity jel c93 h41 z13

the evolutionary logic of honoring sunk costs i introduction economists claim that sunk costs should not figure in current decision making because by definition these expenditures cannot be retrieved and should be treated as bygones but there is a large literature both experimental and anecdotal in which people are observed to waste resources by honoring bygones that could not possibly make them better off see e g arkes and blumer 1985 arkes and ayton 1999 mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 thaler 1980 such excess in wasting resources is unlikely to have been tolerated by nature in the process of evolution if it did not serve some purpose to enhance fitness in our remote past the purpose of this study is to suggest such a function whereby evolutionary processes have hardwired a concern for sunk costs in human decision making 1 the concept of honoring sunk costs has been referred to in the literature as the concorde fallacy 2 arkes and blumer 1985 have a number of other examples of good money being thrown after bad economists have provided various explanations for why sunk costs appear salient to humans kanodia bushman and dickhaut 1989 and prendergast and stole 1996 propose a theory where reputational effects make agents unwilling to change their decisions mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 have suggested several models involving information content reputation or constraints on decision making that provide rational reasons for taking sunk costs into account likewise baliga and ely 2011 have proposed a model in which sunk costs may acquire salience as a memory kludge because they may contain information about the value of a project previously initiated but whose value has now been forgotten carmichael and macleod 2003 have proposed a model where in a bilateral bargaining situation the norm of taking account of sunk costs resolves the hold up problem that typically results in underinvestment thaler 1980 arkes and blumer 1985 and whyte 1986 suggested a prospect theory approach to understanding sunk cost effects arkes and blumer 1985 the philosopher nozick 1993 and others have argued that honoring sunk costs can alleviate problems of time inconsistency and temptation john may believe that going to the theater is a good thing but when the time comes he cannot rouse himself to do so because it would require relinquishing whatever else appears appealing at the time to circumvent this john buys tickets in advance as a precommitment device but to do this he must believe in the first place that his future self is going to honor sunk costs 3 whatever the reason for the time inconsistent preferences say hyperbolic discounting the honoring of sunk costs may be used to remedy the problem of time inconsistency but nozick for example offers no reason for why sunk costs are honored in the first place we offer an evolutionary reason to suggest why nature may have hardwired a proclivity in humans to honor sunks costs a reason that differs from those offered in the articles cited above we propose that the built in salience of sunk costs is an adaptation to the problem of self control self control problems may arise in decision making because contrary to our untutored perceptions the human brain has a triune 4 rather than a unitary structure maclean 1989 panksepp 1998 because of the way the brain has evolved different regions within it defined by their own neuroanatomical and neurochemical features deal with different aspects of action and behavior although interconnected through chemical and neuronal pathways the different control centers tend to act autonomously and may conflict in their responses to stimuli when the emotional or motivational centers which lie in the sub cortical limbic system push us to certain actions that the rational persona in the cortex wishes to deny there is a conflict and the problem of self control arises panksepp 1998 301 notes

has monetary policy become more effective we investigate the implications of changes in the structure of the u s economy for monetary policy effectiveness estimating a vector autoregression over the pre and post 1980 periods we provide evidence of a reduced effect of monetary policy shocks in the latter period we estimate a structural model that replicates well the economy s response in both periods and perform counterfactual experiments to determine the source of the change in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the economy s volatility we find that by responding more strongly to inflation expectations monetary policy has stabilized the economy more effectively in the post 1980 period

monopoly regulation discontinuity stranded assets abstract for regulated electricity utilities if trend load growth enters a state of terminal decline through disruptive competition and costs are unable to contract at a similar rate the regulatory outcomes that follow produce strikingly different results to an equivalent episode in a competitive market where profits fall and assets are written off under economic regulation prices rise to offset volumetric losses and in the presence of disruptive competition a destructive price spiral can ensue in these circumstances some component of the regulated utility s assets meet the definition of stranded failure to deal with stranded assets will eventually and needlessly damage shareholders consumers and welfare however the regulatory compact makes this an especially complex area of economics zero recovery of stranded monopoly assets is not credible policy a normative analysis of economics and law suggests full recovery is not credible either in this article asset stranding experience from the us is reviewed and a series of policy principles are established viz asset stranding is a case by case proposition involving recovery via non bypassable pricing mechanisms quantified and packaged as a partial return of capital possibly financed by transition bonds on a time limited basis financial risk tolerances of the utility and the stability of post stranding consumer tariffs are important parameters that should guide the policy approach to asset stranding but ultimately asset stranding is a policy choice not an analytical determination

are government spending multipliers greater during periods of slack evidence from 20th century historical data a key question that has arisen during recent debates is whether government spending multipliers are larger during periods of slack some researchers and policymakers have argued that while government spending multipliers are estimated to be modest on average they might become greater during times when resources are underutilized auerbach and gorodnichenko 2012 forthcoming henceforth ag test this hypothesis and find larger multipliers dur

the regulation of privatized monopolies in the united kingdom this article examines the experience in the united kingdom with the regulation of privatized monopolies its conclusions are 1 that there are significant differences between rpi x or price cap and u s rate of return regulation which provides greater scope for bargaining in the former system 2 that u k regulators have taken seriously their duty to promote competition but that the existing economic literature is of limited help in this task 3 that price regulation is likely to be more effective where technology is changing slowly and or where technology is changing rapidly and 4 that the case for rpi x price cap rather than rate of return regulation is strongest in telecommunications gas supply and electricity supply and least strong in gas and electricity transmission grids

fiscal stimulus with spending reversals abstract the short run effects of fiscal policy depend not only on current tax and spending choices but also on expectations about future policy adjustment while general equilibrium models typically restrict medium term adjustment to taxation we highlight the importance of government spending dynamics first we provide time series evidence for the united states suggesting that an exogenous increase in government spending prompts a rise in public debt followed over time by a reduction in spending below trend second we show how expected spending reversals alter the short run impact of fiscal policy in a new keynesian model bringing it closer in line with the evidence

is altruism evolutionarily stable and envy and malevolence remarks on bester and guth abstract in a convincing analysis of the conditions and strength of altruism bester and guth journal of economic behavior organization vol 34 1998 193 209 unfortunately restrict the interpretation of their results their paper provides us with an analysis of the conditions and strength of malevolence or envy as well

kinship incentives and evolution we analyze how family ties affect incentives with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty and they may transfer output to each other with equally altruistic siblings their equilibrium effort is non monotonic in the common degree of altruism and it depends on the harshness of the environment we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship relatedness factor numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment and how this a ects economic outcomes

are profit maximisers the best survivors a darwinian model of economic natural selection abstract this paper demonstrates that the friedman conjecture that profit maximisation summarises appropriately the conditions for firm survival is not generally true if firms have market power profit maximisers are not necessarily the best survivors because of the possibility of spiteful behaviour of the following kind say a firm forgoes profit maximisation and thus decreases its survival chances but its deviation from maximisation harms its profit maximising competitors more than itself though the firm will be less likely to survive than it would if it maximised its profits it will still be more likely to survive than its competitors

violent crime does social capital matter this paper examines empirically the effect of some commonly used indicators of social capital such as the prevalence of trust on community members and the participation in voluntary secular and religious organizations on the incidence of violent crimes this is a cross country study whose basic sample consists of 39 developed and developing countries and whose dependent variable is the national intentional homicide rate the paper identifies and deals with three challenges in the empirical estimation of the effect of social capital on the incidence of violent crimes the omittedvariable problem is dealt with by including income inequality and economic growth as additional determinants of a country s violent crime rate the joint endogeneity or reverse causation problem is accounted for by using instrumental variables for social capital in the crime regression the specificity problem that is the potentially opposite effects of group specific and society wide social capital is noted and addressed only indirectly by emphasizing the results applied to the social capital indicators that have application for society as a whole the main result of the paper is that only the component of social capital measured by trust on community members has the effect of reducing the incidence of violent crimes the results regarding measures of other indicators of social capital are rather unclear this may be due to a combination of limited samples inability to fully control for reverse causation and most likely the opposite effects that society wide and group specific social capital may have on violent crime lederman and menendez are economists with the office of the chief economist for latin america and the caribbean of the world bank loayza is a senior economist with the research department of the central bank of chile and he is currently on leave from the development economics research group of the world bank the opinions expressed herein should not be attributed to the world bank the authors are grateful to ed glaeser jeff grogger gale johnson sanjay marwah steve messner nicholas sambanis and an anonymous referee for invaluable comments and suggestions the authors are responsible for any remaining errors

can energy price regulations smooth price fluctuations evidence from china s coal sector abstract due to the dominance of coal in china s energy mix coal prices have always been a challenging part of pricing reform the recent frequent government interventions raise the key research questions what is the actual impact of price policies on coal price fluctuations and how can forward looking pricing policies be made by proposing a novel classification of coal pricing policies and introducing an expectation and forward looking coefficient the paper examines the relationship between coal price fluctuations and pricing policies using the generalized method of moments gmm method it shows that the lagging coal price and coal demand play a positive role in regulating coal prices while coal supply and marketization have significantly negative effects on coal price fluctuations the heterogeneous impacts of price policies are due to differences in market players expectations policy instruments and the methods of policy release in addition china s coal pricing policy portfolio from 2013 to 2016 exerted synergy effects on the restraint of coal price fluctuations as the forward looking coefficient was considerably low the government s intervention behaviors were obviously biased towards ex post facto responses the paper suggests short run and long run policies to advance marketization of coal prices amid the energy transition

is there a fiscal free lunch in a liquidity trap this paper uses a dsge model to examine the eects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap the spending multiplier can be much larger than in the normal situation if the liquidity trap is very persistent and scal stimulus can be rapidly implemented moreover the budgetary costs may be minimal as the large response of output boosts tax revenues allowing for something close to a scal free lunch however we caution that the multiplier may be much smaller under plausible implementation lags for many types of public spending and or if the liquidity trap lasts less than two years in addition because the marginal impact of scal expansion decreases in the scale of the outlay it is crucial to distinguish between average and marginal multipliers

racism and redistribution in the united states a solution to the problem of american exceptionalism abstract the two main political parties in the united states in the period 1976 1992 put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race we argue that redistributive politics in the us can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues in political competition we identify two mechanisms through which racism among american voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain in common with others we suggest that voter racism decreases the degree of redistribution due to an anti solidarity effect that some voters oppose government transfer payments to minorities whom they view as undeserving we suggest a second effect as well that some voters who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti redistributive republican party because its position on the race issue is more consonant with their own and this too decreases the degree of redistribution in political equilibrium this we name the policy bundle effect we propose a formal model of multi dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects and estimate the model for the period in question we compute that voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11 18 points the total effect decomposes about equally into the two sub effects we also find that the democratic vote share is 5 38 points lower than it would have been absent racism the magnitude of this effect would seem to explain the difference between the sizes of the public sector in the us and northern european countries

jobs off the farm wealth human capital and social group in rural eastern india abstractthis study examines the effects of wealth human capital and social group on the occupational choice and income of farm households to gain an understanding of the mechanism underlying the

jumping and sniping at the silents does it matter for charities abstract despite its popularity as a fundraiser for charities very little research has been done on the bidding and revenue properties of the silent auction this paper examines the consequences of two behaviors common in silent auctions jump bidding and sniping in laboratory experiments with endogenous participation our results suggest that deliberative jumping the result of impatient bidders attempting to telescope time tends to increase revenue while deliberative sniping by experienced bidders tends to decrease it we also show that when charities can encourage jumping and discourage sniping silent auctions can perform as well as their sometimes more entertaining but more expensive alternative the english auction

spite and development in a wide variety of settings spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to cooperation trade and thus economic development this paper shows that spiteful preferences the desire to reduce another s material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one s relative payoff are surprisingly widespread in experiments conducted in one of the least developed regions in india uttar pradesh in a one shot trust game the authors find that a large majority of subjects punish cooperative behavior although such punishment clearly increases inequality and decreases the payoffs of both subjects in experiments to study coordination and to measure social preferences the findings reveal empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another s material payoff either for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead is stronger among individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a culture that stresses status seeking it is plausible that the observed social preference patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture thus an exciting question for future research is the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or detrimental to economic development

cognitive dissonance status and growth of the underclass we present a model of cognitive adaptation to examine the growth and behaviours of the underclass in the model individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance between status seeking and social recognition adapt their attitudes regarding what is deemed status worthy this yields the endogenous formation of an underclass in which non pecuniary social returns counteract the effect of traditional incentives i e wages in motivating behaviour by gaining insight into the process of psychological adaptation of those living in poverty the paper sheds light on economic policies that mitigate the disenfranchisement and hence the growth of the underclass

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

the incentive effects of affirmative action in a real effort tournament abstract affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament winners that is less efficient in this paper we study the empirical validity of such concerns in a case where the disadvantage affects capacities to compete we conducted real effort tournaments between pairs of children from two similar schools who systematically differed in how much training they received ex ante on the task at hand contrary to the expressed concerns our results show that the implementation of affirmative action did not result in a significant performance loss for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects instead it rather enhanced the performance for a large group of participants moreover affirmative action resulted in a more equitable tournament winner pool where half of the selected tournament winners came from the originally disadvantaged group hence the negative selection effects due to the biased tournament rules were at least partially offset by performance enhancing incentive effects

caste stratification and wealth inequality in india summary we analyze the relationship between wealth inequality and caste divisions in india using nationally representative surveys on household wealth conducted during 1991 92 and 2002 03 according to our findings the groups in india that are generally considered disadvantaged known as scheduled castes or scheduled tribes have as one would expect substantially lower wealth than the forward caste groups while the other backward classes and non hindus occupy positions in the middle using the anogi decomposition technique we estimate that between caste inequality accounted for about 13 of overall wealth inequality in 2002 03 the stratification parameters indicate that the forward caste hindus overlap little with the other caste groups while the latter have significantly higher degrees of overlap with one another and with the overall population using this method we are also able to comment on the emergence and strengthening of a creamy layer or relatively well off group among the disadvantaged groups especially the scheduled tribes

financial literacy information flows and caste affiliation empirical evidence from india abstract this paper empirically investigates the relevance of social interaction and caste affiliation for individual awareness of financial instruments and investment behavior of households in india the results of our empirical analysis which is based on a large scale survey on saving patterns of indians suggest a positive relationship between financial literacy and social interaction however especially backward caste people living in regions with a large fraction of backward castes have a lower probability of being aware of various financial instruments in contrast we find only weak empirical evidence for a direct effect of caste affiliation and social interaction on investment behavior