regulated prices rent seeking and consumer surplus price controls lead to misallocation of goods and encourage rent seeking the misallocation effect alone ensures that a price control always reduces consumer surplus in an otherwise competitive market with convex demand if supply is more elastic than demand or with log convex demand e g constant elasticity even if supply is inelastic the same results apply whether rationed goods are allocated by costless lottery or whether costly rent seeking and or partial decontrol mitigates the inefficiency our analysis exploits the observation that in any market consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal revenue curve

out of control what can we learn from the end of massachusetts rent control abstract this paper uses the sudden end of rent control in massachusetts in 1995 to estimate the effects of rent control i examine boston msa data from the american housing survey years 1985 1998 to determine how rent control affected the quantity price and quality of rental housing my results suggest rent control had little effect on the construction of new housing but did encourage owners to shift units away from rental status and reduced rents substantially rent control also led to deterioration in the quality of rental units but these effects appear to have been concentrated in smaller items of physical damage i also examine specifications that allow rent control to affect rent levels both directly through controlled status and indirectly through spillover effects from nearby rent controlled units these estimates imply that rent control may have small effects on the price of the non controlled rental housing stock

state misallocation and housing prices theory and evidence from china this paper examines the equilibrium price effects of the privatization of housing assets that were previously owned and allocated by the state i develop a theoretical framework that shows that privatization can have ambiguous effects on prices in the private market and that the degree of misallocation of the assets prior to privatization deter mines the subsequent price effects i test the predictions of the model using a large scale housing reform in china the results suggest that the removal of price distortions allowed households to increase their consumption of housing and led to an increase in equilibrium hous ing prices jel l33 018 p25 r31 r38 state participation in the housing market occurs in several forms in countries throughout the world the provision of subsidized housing as a welfare benefit to low income households is common throughout the western hemisphere in addition local governments in several cities in the united states have implemented regula tions that limit the increase of rents charged by landlords 1 this paper focuses on a form of state intervention in housing that occurs through the provision of subsidized homes to state employees the economic consequences of this area of research are potentially large as employer provided housing in the state sector is common throughout the developing world particularly in asia and sub saharan africa government regulation of the private market or the creation of a separate mar ket ensures that certain households have access to housing at prices that are below market value state interventions that aim to bring affordable housing to particu lar subsegments of the population can create economic inefficiencies they distort the decisions that individuals make regarding residential mobility joseph gyourko and peter linneman 1989 gordon a hughes and barry mccormick 1987 and employment michael svarer michael rosholm and jakob roland munch 2005 wang forthcoming and they lead to underinvestment in the construction and main

open loop and feedback models of dynamic oligopoly abstract a simple method of estimating the degree of oligopoly power in dynamic markets using either open loop or feedback subgame perfect strategies is developed new theoretical results are presented for families of oligopoly models differences between discrete time and continuoustime models and open loop and feedback models are demonstrated the effects of increasing the number of firms or adjustment costs are examined

interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714 this article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation the british government tightened the usury laws in 1714 reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6 to 5 a sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital collateralised credits which had accounted for a declining share of total lending returned to their former role of prominence our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly we find no evidence that they offered a form of pareto improving social insurance almost since the beginning of recorded history usury restrictions have been widely used the laws of hammurabi from the 2nd millennium bc regulated interest rates as did the old testament and the catholic church while early rules often outlawed the taking of interest altogether later restrictions stipulated maximum permissible interest rates to the present day many developing and islamic countries and us states impose limits on private loan contracts to stamp out predatory lending by credit sharks only recently italy re introduced a law against usurious credit contracts glaeser and scheinkman 1998 blitz and long 1965 homer and sylla 1996 the effects of usury regulation have remained controversial numerous scholars have argued that they had damaging consequences and that this conclusion applies to both

the economics of predation what drives pricing when there is learning by doing predatory pricing a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy and its existence and efficacy are widely debated the purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure our framework encompasses important phenomena such as learning by doing network effects switching costs dynamic demand and certain types of adjustment costs due to its prominent role in legal cases involving alleged predation we examine learning by doing in more detail we first show that predation like behavior arises routinely in our learning by doing model equilibria involving predation like behavior typically coexist with equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing to disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we next decompose the equilibrium pricing condition and develop alternative characterizations of a firm s predatory pricing incentives we finally measure the impact of these incentives on industry structure conduct and performance we show that forcing a firm to ignore the predatory incentives in setting its price can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation like behavior along with the predation like behavior however a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated

rent control and misallocation rent control is still an important type of government regulation of housing markets in many countries and numerous researchers have studied its implications for allocation welfare and investments in housing the present paper aims to improve our understanding of the effect of second generation rent control when it is applied only to one sector of the rental market it is diagrammatically shown that the welfare effects are very different between a universal and a limited application of rent control studying the danish case of second generation rent control lower rents are found in controlled sectors and a minor increase of the rent in the uncontrolled sector using the area of living space in the dwelling as a measure for housing consumption evidence is also produced of both overallocation and underallocation of housing in the rent controlled sectors as envisaged by economic theory

strategic investment and conjectural variations abstract this paper analyzes investment decisions under the alternative assumptions of competitive collusive open loop non cooperative and feedback non cooperative behavior steady state capital stocks prices and outputs are obtained and compared the paper shows that one of the linear feedback equilibrium decision rule coefficients is a dynamic version of a contemporaneous conjectural variation the same decision rule coefficients are shown to imply a particular value for the contemporaneous conjecture the implied conjecture embodies subgame perfection and approaches the competitive value as the number of firms in the industry increases

optimal dynamic durability abstract consider a firm that adjusts its production and the choice of durability for its products instantaneously we show that when the marginal cost with the respect to durability is nonincreasing a the optimal durability for both the competitive firm and the monopolist decreases over time and b the monopolist will produce a good with lower durability than the competitive firm we thus lend support for empirical findings and causal observations that found the phenomenon of declining durability over time

oligopolies and product durability abstract we analyze a simple two period quantity setting model where firms rent all of their output we compare the durability chosen by an oligopolist to the competitive socially optimal durability the model shows in subgame perfect equilibria the durability chosen by oligopolists will be cost minimizing independent of their output levels thus swan s independence result can be extended to oligopoly markets if the firms rent their output we also demonstrate the independence result can be extended to certain corner solutions

households willingness to pay for public housing in the presence of price controls nonmarket housing allocation mechanisms such as queueing prevent households from revealing their marginal willingness to pay for housing through market prices we derive the households marginal willingness to pay using the intuitive idea that the length of the queue for a specific house reflects the households willingness to pay for housing characteristics we apply our methodology to public housing in the amsterdam metropolitan area and show that on average the households marginal willingness to pay for a unit of public housing is close to its marginal costs this suggests that the welfare loss of public housing through distortions in housing supply is rather limited and is mainly through distortions in housing demand we provide indirect evidence of the latter by showing that queueing induces inefficient matching of households and housing

equity and efficiency in rationed labor markets the social welfare implications of income tax policy are shown to critically depend on whether or not labor markets are rationed i e on the existence of involuntary unemployment with rationed labor markets raising taxes on the employed and transfers to the unemployed might improve both equity and efficiency it improves equity by redistributing income from the employed to the unemployed it improves efficiency as it encourages people with a small utility surplus of employment to exit the labor market leaving their jobs for people with a higher utility surplus i derive conditions under which this result continues to hold when only part of the labor market is rationed when there is both frictional and rationing unemployment and when rationing endogenously follows from trade unions monopoly power

emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly this paper examines the use of taxation to control external damage due to pollution when product durability is endogenously determined a special form of the emissions function is also examined which is equivalent to an excise tax on output the dynamic oligopoly model indicates that many conventional results in the durability and taxation literature need not hold when durability is endogenously determined in particular the analysis shows durability may not be independent of industry structure nor will firms minimize their manufacturing costs of providing service in addition the second best tax on imperfectly competitive firms is not necessarily less than the tax on a competitive firm when firms choose their product s durability

price reactions to new competition a study of us luxury car market 1986 1997 abstract this paper examines the questions of whether the incumbent responds to entry and which firms respond to entry in an industry by using a data sample of the us luxury car market during the period of 1986 and 1997 the statistical analysis finds that the incumbent s response varies across firms but some group of firms responds to entry similarly in particular this paper finds that the german exporters of luxury cars respond significantly to the entry of a japanese rival in the us market similarly by reducing their prices and mark ups the extent to which they respond to entry become greater as the japanese firm s market share increases the statistical test accepts the hypothesis of the equality of coefficients among the german firms but rejects the hypothesis when both the german and british firms are included in the sample

learning by doing and product durability many durable goods industries are industries that have significant learning affects i examine a monopolist s and social planner s cost minimizing durability choice in both the short and the long run when learning effects are present the model indicates that the relationship between durability and learning depends crucially upon whether or not knowledge decays and on learning s impact on the marginal cost of durability in particular this model demonstrates that swan s 1970 1971 independence result will hold in the long run if knowledge does not decay but will not hold if knowledge does decay thus whether or not monopolists will manufacture products with the same durability or quality as a social planner depends to a large extent on the type of learning process in the industry and on whether or not quality and durability directly influence this learning process

durable good monopoly and best price provisions best price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available if the seller subsequently cuts price then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund a durable good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments the provisions require special circumstances to be practical but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings three applications are discussed international commodity agreements markets for electric turbogenerators and markets for financial claims copyright 1990 by american economic association

on revenue recycling and the welfare effects of second best congestion pricing in a monocentric city abstract this paper examines congestion taxes in a monocentric city with pre existing labor taxation when road toll revenue is used to finance labor tax cuts 35 of the optimal road tax in our numerical model does not reflect marginal external congestion costs but rather functions as a ramsey mirrlees tax i e an efficiency enhancing mechanism allowing for an indirect spatial differentiation of the labor tax this adds a quite different motivation to road pricing since welfare gains can be produced even in absence of congestion we find that the optimal road tax is non monotonic across space reflecting the different impacts of labor supply elasticity and marginal utility of income which both vary over space the relative efficiencies of some archetype second best pricing schemes cordon toll flat kilometer tax are high 84 and 70 respectively when road toll revenue is recycled lump sum the optimal toll lies below its pigouvian level extensions in a bimodal framework show that the optimality of using road toll revenue to subsidize public transport depends on the initial inefficiency in public transport pricing

rationing and rent dissipation in the presence of heterogeneous individuals this paper discusses the implications of rationing by waiting when consumers have different time costs and personal valuations the joint distribution function of time costs and personal valuations is used to characterize market equilibrium it is argued that under certain conditions an increase in the variance of time costs will reduce the dissipation of rent furthermore it is shown that introducing a secondary market for a rationed good does not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations the model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent seeking activities such as the patent system and import quotas

unemployment and other measures of labor market inefficiency a comparison of u k and u s labor markets 1931 96 unemployment is probably the most widely feared phenomenon of our times it represents an enormous waste of human resources reflects an important degree of inefficiency in economic systems and causes a disturbing degree of social distress organisation for economic co operation and development oecd 1994 pp 4 6 i introduction unemployment is undoubtedly one of the most researched areas of economics determinants of the number of unemployed and duration of unemployment the role of unemployment on the depreciation of human capital and on general life satisfaction the interrelationship of unemployment and inflation and unemployment and output okun s law and policies to reduce or even eliminate unemployment are just a few of the areas of research on unemployment the underlying assumption in many studies on unemployment is that there is a very close correspondence between unemployment and labor market inefficiency as witnessed in the quote by the oecd just given although rarely if ever stated there is also the assumption that a given unemployment rate indicates similar levels of inefficiency either across time and or regions or countries unfortunately and somewhat surprisingly this assumption has not been tested thus far 1 given the importance of comparisons of unemployment on the direction of macroeconomic policy of governments it is very important to determine whether unemployment is indeed a good proxy for labor market inefficiency the goal of the article therefore is to examine this issue thus we pose the following key questions 1 to what degree do unemployment rates reflect labor market efficiencies 2 if the goal is to measure relative labor market inefficiency is it meaningful to compare unemployment rates over time and 3 to what degree do differences in unemployment rates across countries reflect differences in labor market inefficiencies basic economic theory shows that inefficiency in any market depends not only on the wedge between supply and demand but also on the elasticities of demand and supply the calculation of so called harberger triangles harberger 1954 of deadweight loss dwl which has a long history in the industrial organization and public finance literatures indicates that for a given wedge between supply and demand the dwl can be very different depending on the elasticities of supply and demand interestingly however studies examining the costs of unemployment do not focus on this basic view of welfare loss studies such as gordon 1973 ahsenfelter 1980 hurd 1980 clark and oswald 1994 murphy and topel 1997 and leslie and blackaby 1999 among others examine the costs of unemployment from an individual perspective but do not measure inefficiency from a market perspective which is the focus of the harberger triangles except for a publication by fortin and bernier 1988 2 we know of no other application of calculating harberger triangles to determine the level of inefficiency in the labor market therefore this article uses labor market data from 1931 to 1996 in the united states and united kingdom to calculate the dwl of unemployment and then compares the estimates of dwl to the unemployment rate to determine how closely related inefficiency and unemployment are 3 the following section investigates the theoretical relationships between unemployment labor supply and demand elasticities and dwl from this discussion we propose two alternative measures of inefficiency the first is the unemployment loss index dwl divided by gross domestic product gdp which indicates how large labor market inefficiency is relative to total output in the economy the second measure is dwl per unemployed person a measure of the potential average gains to employing an unemployed individual section iii outlines the data and methodology used to estimate the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand over time in the united states and united kingdom allowing for changes in the elasticities over time

is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution textabstractwe analyze the redistributional dis advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the in efficiency of labor rationing compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change a minimum wage increase raises involuntary unemployment but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment a minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing we show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment we write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum wage increase is undesirable in nearly all oecd countries a reduction in the minimum wage along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant would yield a pareto improvement

dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs a differential game approach abstract this paper develops a differential game model of duopoly in which firms incur costs associated with how fast they change their level of output the analysis solves for a subgame perfect equilibrium to the model in which the steady state level of output lies strictly between the static cournot and perfect competition solutions furthermore we demonstrate that the limit game in which the speed of adjustment parameter approaches zero does not tend toward the static cournot equilibrium

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

the allocative cost of price ceilings in the u s residential market for natural gas a direct consequence of restricting the price of a good for which secondary markets do not exist is that in the presence of excess demand the good will not be allocated to the buyers who value it the most we demonstrate the empirical importance of this allocative cost for the u s residential market for natural gas which was subject to price ceilings during 1954 89 using a household level discrete continuous model of natural gas demand we estimate that the allocative cost in this market averaged 3 6 billion annually nearly tripling previous estimates of the net welfare loss to u s consumers

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

the importance of bundling in a gorman lancaster model of earnings the idea that the labor market of individuals can be decomposed into payments to separate productive attributes has an enduring appeal in economics assuming that demographic groups differ only in their endowments of productive characteristics it is possible to rationalize observed demographic earnings differentials without invoking the arguments that characteristics specific to a particular demographic group are direct objects of employer demand by aggregating skills over all demographic groups it is possible to produce a theory of the market determination of the prices of skills held in different amounts by different demographic groups this paper considers conditions under which characteristics are uniformly priced across sectors of a multisector economy the paper presents empirical evidence that rejects uniform pricing of characteristics as a description of the us labor market bundling may account for this evudence but other hypotheses do as well authors

market structure and the durability of goods a basic proposition in microeconomics is that a monopolist tends to produce less output than would be produced by a competitive industry with this proposition in mind it is tempting to suggest that monopolistic producers of durable goods will produce goods with less durability than would be produced by a competitive industry this result was derived by martin 1962 kleiman and ophir 1966 levhari and srinivasan 1969 and schmalensee 1970 however swan 1970 showed that monopolists would choose the same degree of durability for their goods as would competitive producers the reason that earlier writers had reached a different result was that they had focused on long run equilibrium profits and ignored the role of initial conditions in optimizing decisions the swan independence result that durability is independent of market structurewas first derived under the assumption of constant returns to scale specifically the average cost of production was assumed to be an increasing function of durability but independent of the level of output the constant returns to scale assumption was first relaxed by sieper and swan 1973 by introducing a fixed capacity cost they showed that with finitely lived capacity which required replacement the independence result continued to hold in the very long run although market structure could affect durability before attainment of long run equilibrium no systematic results were derived kamien and schwartz 1974 introduced rising average cost curves and resurrected the result of earlier writers that a monopolist would choose a lower durability than competitive firms however swan 1977 pointed out that the kamien schwartz analysis is flawed by not allowing the monopolist access to the same technology as the competitive industry if the monopolist is allowed to choose the optimal number of plants then swan s independence result holds finally auernheimer and saving 1977 introduced costs of adjusting the rate of output and the durability of output they showed that if long run increasing costs arise from pecuniary external diseconomies then the independence result is preserved as remarked by schmalensee 1979 in his survey the general message of

optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets this paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results first we show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first importantly this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers in that context a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low skilled workers as it prevents low skilled wages from falling through incidence effects second when labor supply re sponses are along the extensive margin only the co existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low skilled work is always second best pareto ineffcient a pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low skilled workers and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers overall our results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low skilled workers are complementary policies pa

underpricing in public lotteries a critique of user pay and all pay tariffs i introduction a body of literature spanning from medical ethics to public economics has amassed regarding the nonmarket rationing of public resources a dominant focus has surrounded the merits and shortcomings of alternative rationing mechanisms as gauged by their effectiveness distributive justness and allocative efficiency these instruments include administrative criteria such as need merit or seniority based rules queues or waiting lines whereby access to the rationed good or service is determined by arrival times and lotteries whereby chance dictates the distribution of the good while nonmarket rationing in any case may lead to the misallocation of resources compared to rationing solely by price e g glaeser and luttmer 2003 empirical observation reveals that public agencies commonly distribute underpriced goods and services to individual consumers and firms the current study takes nonmarket rationing as given and investigates the properties of alternative lottery mechanisms the use of lot teries dates to biblical times boyce 1994 elster 1992 with modern examples including the military draft fienberg 1971 medical services cookson and dolan 2000 recreational privileges on public lands and waterways scrogin 2005 residential housing following hurricane katrina the white house office of the press secretary 2005 and public school admission and voucher programs berry cullen jacob and levitt 2006 from a design perspective lotteries are intriguing because they can take a variety of forms with each possessing unique incentive and revenue generating properties however given the purported inefficiencies of lottery rationing it is natural to question how they have sustained in allocative situations entailing public resources two explanations have emerged in the literature the first historic explanation is attributed to the fairness of the classic lottery mechanism in which the probability of being drawn is uniform and endogenous to the number of participants because entrants are equally likely to be drawn the mechanism is perceived as being nondiscriminatory empirical evidence presented in kemp and bolle 1999 supports this hypothesis in the rationing of some types of goods and services to individual consumers the fairness of lottery rationing is also consistent with the distributive objective of specific egalitarianism put forth by tobin 1970 and discussed later by elster 1992 whereby specific goods and services are allocated such that a greater degree of equality is attained relative to that of a competitive market while egalitarianism and efficiency would appear to be at odds che and gale 2007 demonstrated that lotteries can be more efficient than markets when individuals face binding wealth constraints in a similar vein wijkander 1988 demonstrated that social welfare can be increased by lottery rationing under certain conditions a second more objective explanation for the sustained use of lotteries is that public agencies may be legally constrained by price controls particularly when rationing to individuals and households taylor tsui and zhu 2003 acting as a self sustaining regulated monopolist the agency is confronted with selecting a rationing mechanism and a pricing policy that are both politically feasible and financially viable compared to need merit and seniority based allocation rules lotteries and queues are administratively simple and low cost to implement alternatively lotteries eschew the waiting time and coordination costs confronted by potential entrants under queuing however the initial distribution under lottery rationing may prove allocatively inefficient collectively the literature suggests that agency objectives may deviate from revenue maximization in distributing some types of scarce public resources with lotteries proving to be superior in some settings to alternative nonmarket rationing mechanisms

markov puppy dogs and related animals abstract it is shown that steady state markov perfect equilibria of discrete time infinite horizon quadratic adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state in contrast to continuous time games the limit of these equilibria as adjustment costs approach zero is the same as the equilibria of their static counterpart games a classification scheme is presented and it is shown that the taxonomy is identical to that of analogous two stage games such as those analyzed by fudenberg and tirole american economic review papers and proceedings 1984 74 361 366 this classification is useful in that it implies that steady state equilibria need not be explicitly calculated to analyze qualitatively the effects of adjustment costs in strategic environments it is also argued that estimated conjectural variations parameters may capture a well defined property of strategic interaction in a dynamic game

the learning curve and optimal production under uncertainty this article examines the implications of the learning curve in a world of uncertainty we consider a competitive firm whose costs decline with cumulative output because the price of the firm s output evolves stochastically future production and cumulative output are unknown and are contingent on future prices and costs we derive an optimal decision rule that maximizes the firm s market value produce when the price exceeds a critical level which is a declining function of cumulative output we show how the shadow value of cumulative production the total value of the firm and the decision to produce depend on the volatility of the price and other parameters uncertainty increases the critical price required for the firm to produce but also increases the value of thefirm thus during periods of high volatility firms facing a learning curve ought to be producing less but are worth more

on sunk costs and trade liberalization in appled general equilibrium the authors argue that the rationalization gains often predicted by static applied general equilibrium models with imperfect competition and scale economies are artificially boosted by an unrealistic treatment of fixed costs they introduce sunk costs into one such model calibrated with real world data the authors show how this changes the oligopoly game in a way significant enough to affect both qualitatively and quantitatively the outcome of a trade liberalization exercise copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

the dynamic adjustment of optimal durability and quality they don t make them like they used to is a well known adage which is investigated in this paper we show that when the marginal cost with respect to durability or quality per unit of production does not increase with production then a a competitive firm and a monopolist will choose an optimal durability or quality path that decreases over time b the more likely it is that quality and quantity are substitutes either in consumption or production the more likely it is that quality will deteriorate over time as the market approaches the steady state c substitutability of quality and durability will tend to drive quality down even faster when durability declines

time for revisionism on rent control economists traditional hostility to rent contols is based on models that treat the housing market as perfectly competitive and on the experience with hard controls in new york city and many european countries following world war ii the current soft rent control systems in north america are varied and qualitatively different from earlier hard controls the theoretical case against them is weak particularly when the housing market is viewed as imperfectly competitive the empirical case against them is weak too economists should reconsider their blanket opposition to current rent control systems and evaluate them on a case by case basis

attention variation and welfare theory and evidence from a tax salience experiment this article shows that accounting for variation in mistakes can be crucial for welfare analysis focusing on consumer under reaction to not fully salient sales taxes we show theoretically that the efficiency costs of taxation are amplified by differences in under reaction across individuals and across tax rates to empirically assess the importance of these issues we implement an online shopping experiment in which 2 998 consumers purchase common household products facing tax rates that vary in size and salience we replicate prior findings that on average consumers under react to non salient sales taxes consumers in our study react to existing sales taxes as if they were only 25 of their size however we find significant individual differences in this under reaction and accounting for this heterogeneity increases the efficiency cost of taxation estimates by at least 200 tripling existing sales tax rates nearly doubles consumers attention to taxes and accounting for this endogeneity increases efficiency cost estimates by 336 our results provide new insights into the mechanisms and determinants of boundedly rational processing of not fully salient incentives and our general approach provides a framework for robust behavioural welfare analysis

housing market spillovers evidence from the end of rent control in cambridge massachusetts we measure the capitalization of housing market externalities into residential housing values by studying the unanticipated elimination of stringent rent controls in cambridge massachusetts in 1995 pooling data on the universe of assessed values and transacted prices of cambridge residential properties between 1988 and 2005 we find that rent decontrol generated substantial robust price appreciation at decontrolled units and nearby never controlled units accounting for a quarter of the 7 8 billion in cambridge residential property appreciation during this period the majority of this contribution stems from induced appreciation of never controlled properties residential investment explains only a small fraction of the total

asynchronized multiperiod commitments and cycles abstract we consider a game where agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions we compare the outcomes of both timing patterns and show that spillovers and strategic interactions are crucial for such a comparison a typology used in industrial organization distinguishing four cases fat cat top dog lean and hungry puppy dog allows us to compare the actions taken in the staggered variant and in the synchronized one the staggered variant exhibits cycles and players are both better off when there are strategic complementarities between them a timing game is then set up so as to endogenize the choice between the two variants we study two examples are developed i bertrand competition and ii a wage setting game when there are two monopoly unions in two interrelated firms we show that the staggering of price decisions generates counter cyclical mark ups in the first example and the staggering of wage decisions generates cycling output in the industry in the second example

the misallocation of housing under rent control the standard analysis of price controls assumes that goods are efficiently allocated even when there are shortages but if shortages mean that goods are randomly allocated across the consumers that want them the welfare costs from misallocation may be greater than the undersupply costs we develop a framework to empirically test for misallocation the methodology compares consumption patterns for demographic subgroups in rent controlled and free market places we find that in new york city which is rent controlled an economically and statistically significant fraction of apartments appears to be misallocated across demographic subgroups jel c25 d12 d61 r20

the effect of rent control on commute times this paper adds to the empirical literature on rent control we hypothesize that rent control affects commute times new jersey census tract data from the urban institute geolytics neighborhood change database show a positive and statistically significant relationship between rent control and commute times for 1980 1990 and 2000 for 1980 and 1990 we confirm that it is a lack of household mobility that is behind the longer commutes for 2000 detailed rent control data allow an examination of the consequences of the specific type of vacancy decontrol legislation the most restrictive ordinances have the strongest effect on commute times

the learning curve and pricing in the chemical processing industries data on 37 chemical products are used to test a number of hypotheses about the learning curve and industrial price behavior the results document a strong and consistent learning effect learning is found to be a function of cumulated industry output and cumulated investment rather than calendar time standard economies of scale appear significant but small in magnitude relative to the learning effect variations in the slope of the learning curve are linked to differences in r d expenditures and capital intensity market concentration is found to be a strong influence on price flexibility and the timing of learningrelated price changes

capacity investment preemption and commitment in an infinite horizon model the commitment value of capacity is analyzed in an infinite horizon duopoly model the paper focuses on the role of alternative behavioral assumptions about the ability of firms to commit to investment paths each firm s investment strategy in a feedback nash equilibrium is shown to be a decreasing function of its rival s current capacity this creates an incentive for a firm to expand its capacity to preempt subsequent rival investment in a precommitment equilibrium there are no incentives to invest preemptively as a consequence steady state capacity levels are greater in a feedback nash equilibrium than in a precommitment equilibrium copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the demand for space in china abstract we review the evolution of housing policy in the people s republic of china as the government has between 1949 and the present shifted the provision of housing services from a market system to a planned system and back again properly designing and assessing housing policies in china or elsewhere requires knowing the price and income elasticities of housing demand while demand elasticities for housing have been much studied around the globe relatively few studies have estimated housing elasticities in formerly planned economies we use the unusually rich data from the 1991 to 2006 chinese health and nutrition surveys to estimate that in china s renewed market phase the permanent income elasticity of housing services demand in china is 70 and the elasticity of housing services demand with respect to the price of space is 64 we also estimate that in china the own price and income elasticities of the demand for habitable space are 38 and 29 respectively

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

equity and efficiency aspects of rent control an empirical study of new york city modem rent controls arose during world war ii to deal with the war related influx into urban areas since then numerous cities have either considered adopted or eliminated rent controls the policy debate about the desirability of rent controls continues unabated and becomes particularly acute when high inflation rates drive up rents rapidly rent controls have both efficiency and distributional consequences the economics literature has produced theoretical insights about the inefficiencies created by rent controls this literature is frequently cited by opponents of rent controls who argue that the efficiency costs of rent controls are manifested in a decaying housing stock and altered mobility patterns proponents of rent control invariably argue that the distributional impacts of rent controls outweigh efficiency costs considering the large number of cities that have investigated or adopted rent controls relatively little empirical research documents either the efficiency or distributional effects of rent controls the most notable exceptions are the studies of new york city by de salvo 3 olsen 13 and roistacher 15 and the studies of los angeles by rydell et al 16 and fallis and smith 4 more recently linneman lo and marks 12 have further examined ramifications of rent controls in new york city and vancouver this paper fills some gaps in knowledge about the effects of rent controls we examine rent controls in new york city in 1968 using the new york city housing and vacancy survey 2 the paper extends the work of olsen 13 although there are important differences in both the questions addressed and methodology used this paper examines in detail the distributional consequences of rent controls for new york city residents both

transfer taxes and household mobility distortion on the housing or labor market we estimate the effect of the uk stamp duty land tax sdlt a transfer tax on the purchase price of property or land on different types of household mobility using micro data exploiting a discontinuity in the tax schedule we isolate the impact of the tax from other determinants of mobility we compare homeowners with self assessed house values on either sides of a cut off value where the tax rate jumps from 1 to 3 percent we find that a higher sdlt has a strong negative impact on housing related and short distance moves but does not adversely affect job induced or long distance mobility overall our results suggest that transfer taxes may mainly distort housing rather than labor markets

the distributional impacts of minimum wage increases when both labor supply and labor demand are endogenous we develop and estimate a one shot search model with endogenous firm entry and therefore zero expected profits and endogenous labor supply positive employment effects from a minimum wage increase can result as the employment level depends upon both the numbers of searching firms and workers welfare implications are similar to the classical analysis workers who most want the minimum wage jobs are hurt by the minimum wage hike with workers marginally interested in minimum wage jobs benefiting we estimate the model using cps data on teenagers and show that small changes in the employment level are masking large changes in labor supply and demand teenagers from well educated families see increases in their employment probabilities and push out their less privileged counterparts from the labor market this article has supplementary material online

the welfare costs of rationing by waiting with price controls and rationing by waiting rational consumers increase the quantity boughtperpurchase this individually rational response is socially wasteful and the cost of making it is a deadweight loss this cost plus the value of time spent in queues may exceed the total rent transferred from suppliers to consumers by price controls i e the value of resources spent competing for the rent may exceed the rent itself this point is illustrated by an empirical application to gasoline price controls rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent trangerred the efficiency of the price system is often illustrated lby pointing to the obvious wastes associated with alternative allocation mechanisms for example the queues that accompany price controls and first come first served allocations although rationing by waiting wastes resources in a dramatically visible fashion the magnitude of the waste and the factors that determine it seldom have been examined empirically moreover existing theory on the subject is incomplete unless the first come first served rule is precisely specified consumers will compete for available supplies in ways other than waiting in the model developed below queues cause consumers to compete by increasing amounts bought per trip to the market the analysis demonstrates that such individually rational adjustments only increase the welfare cost of rationing by waiting and thus are socially self defeating the theoretical model is illustrated empirically by estimating the welfare costs of a market wide ceiling on gasoline prices this application was motivated by the availability of two key pieces of information the value of time spent in gasoline queues and the effect of waiting lines on amounts bought per purchase this information was obtained from a survey of motorists conducted during the era of federal gasoline price regulations to focus on competition among consumers one of the inefficiencies that results from price controls is ignored the supply reduction leading to the

a whiter shade of pale on the political economy of regulatory instruments we consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes exemplified with environmental pollution when in power a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view to influencing the policy of future possibly different governments we demonstrate that a brown government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes as quotas establish property rights that are costly to reverse conversely a green government prefers to regulate by taxes in order to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences making green governments greener and brown governments browner compared to when such strategic considerations were not an issue jel d81 d9 h23 l51 q28 q38

optimal pricing of public lotteries and comparison of competing mechanisms this article establishes optimal pricing rules for rationing indivisible units of rival and otherwise nonexcludable goods by lottery or a hybrid of a lottery and outright sale by posted price given the distributional objective of maximizing expected consumer surplus the solutions to unconstrained and constrained versions of the pricing problem may be expressed in classic inverse elasticity form with the lottery price appearing as an entry fee user fee or a combination of the two numerical analysis of a rich class of private value distributions indicates that sizable gains in expected consumer surplus can be realized over competitive pricing and zero pricing

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines