aid volatility policy and development summary we build on bulir and hamann s analysis of aid volatility bulir a hamann j 2003 aid volatility an empirical assessment imf staff papers 50 1 64 89 bulir a hamann j 2008 volatility of development aid from the frying pan into the fire washington dc imf paper submitted to this special section showing that the conclusions reached depend on the dataset used their argument that the poorest countries have the highest volatility appears not to be correct the impact of volatility on growth is negative overall but differs between positive and negative volatility the mix between responsive components of aid for example programme aid and proactive components for example technical assistance is important finally we conclude that measures which increase trust between donor and recipient and reductions in the degree of donor oligopoly reduce aid volatility without obviously reducing its effectiveness

optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons in many industries managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline we investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm s objective is to maximize expected revenues examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry which markets space such as seats on airline flights cabins on vacation cruises and rooms in hotels that become worthless if not sold by a specific time we formulate this problem using intensity control and obtain structural monotonicity results for the optimal intensity resp price as a function of the stock level and the length of the horizon for a particular exponential family of demand functions we find the optimal pricing policy in closed form for general demand functions we find an upper bound on the expected revenue based on analyzing the deterministic version of the problem and use this bound to prove that simple fixed price policies are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity finally we extend our results to the case where demand is compound poisson only a finite number of prices is allowed the demand rate is time varying holding costs are incurred and cash flows are discounted the initial stock is a decision variable and reordering overbooking and random cancellations are allowed

the imf s role in structural adjustment in the 1980s conditional lending for structural adjustment in developing countries moved the imf beyond its role of macroeconomic crisis management fund supported adjustment programmes have often been flawed by a lack of distributional analysis and by poor sequencing of reforms notably premature financial liberalisation as a result they have caused avoidable hardship in addition the attempt to taper out aid as part of the reform programme leads to avoidable reductions in post stabilisation growth an important role for the fund in poststabilisation environments is to provide credible signals to private investors as macroeconomic crises spread across latin america and africa during the 1980s the imf became much more involved in low income countries whereas following its interventions in developed countries the fund had rapidly withdrawn post crisis in the low income countries its involvement became continuous this was partly because stabilisation often took longer however additionally by the 1980s it was already evident that whereas those poor countries which had adopted market based development strategies were developing those which had adopted inward oriented high regulation strategies were in decline unlike the economic crisis of 1998 the crises of the 1980s were concentrated among the inward orientated hence a reasonable diagnosis was that the crises were not merely manifestations of fiscal imbalance but that many other policies needed reform the task thus went beyond the conventional one of rectifying a crisis to reorienting a development strategy the fund joined with the world bank in an attempt to induce these reforms through sustained conditional lending hence the imf moved beyond its traditional role of short run macroeconomic crisis management fund and bank conditions were linked through cross conditionality but with the fund as the lead agency on many areas of policy this gave the fund a critical role in structural adjustment the fund s instrument for concessional lending in low income countries is its extended structural adjustment facility esaf in 1997 the board of the fund commissioned an external review of its esaf programmes in which we participated the report of the evaluation botchwey et al 1998 suggested three lines of criticism of fund adjustment programmes and these form the basis of our analysis in this paper the first is that through flawed design the programmes have sometimes had adverse consequences for the poor either directly through reducing incomes or indirectly through reductions in social service provision our criticism is of the sequence sometimes adopted by fund

quality and competition in recent years the practitioner literature in operations management has seen a dramatic surge in articles on quality management it reflects the increased emphasis on quality by u s firms which has been attributed largely to increased competition faced by them the question of how quality is influenced by competitive intensity however has not received much attention either in the practitioner or the academic research literatures the notion of competitive intensity itself has not been defined precisely in this paper we develop formal models of oligopolistic competition to investigate whether equilibrium levels of quality increase as competition intensifies we consider three different competitive settings i asymmetric duopolistic competition where the dominant firm s intrinsic demand potential decreases ii a symmetric duopoly where the firms are precluded from cooperating in setting quality levels and iii symmetric oligopolistic competition where the number of firms increases we find that the relation between equilibrium quality and competitive intensity depends on what is understood by increased competition and in addition the relation is contingent on the values of parameters describing the cost and demand structure for the industry

economic lot sizing and dynamic quantity competition abstract we study a problem of dynamic quantity competition in continuous time with two competing retailers facing different replenishment cost structures retailer 1 faces fixed ordering costs and variable procurement costs and all inventory kept in stock is subject to holding costs retailer 2 only faces variable procurement costs both retailers are allowed to change their sales quantities dynamically over time following the structure of the economic order quantity eoq model retailer 1 places replenishment orders in batches and retailer 2 follows a just in time jit policy the objective of both retailers is to maximize their individual average profit anticipating the competitor s replenishment and output decisions the problem is solved by a two stage hierarchical optimization approach using backwards induction the second stage model is a differential game in output quantities between the two retailers for a given cycle length at the first stage the replenishment policy is determined we prove the existence of a unique optimal solution and derive an open loop nash equilibrium we show that both retailers follow contrary output strategies over the order cycle the eoq retailer driven by inventory holding costs decreases his market share whereas the output of the jit retailer increases moreover depending on the cost structure the eoq retailer might partially be a monopolist at the first stage the eoq retailer determines the cycle length anticipating the optimal output trajectories at the second stage

does conditionality work a test for an innovative us aid scheme performance based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries however hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms we attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the millennium challenge corporation mcc was successful in promoting better control of corruption we employ a difference in difference in differences ddd approach considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized we find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the mcc while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of mcc aid appears to have weakened the incentive to fight corruption over time

inventories stock outs and production smoothing if stock outs are ignored and if demand shocks are additive then optimal behaviour requires that the marginal cost of production mc be equated with the expected marginal revenue of increasing expected sales by one unit emr however with more general demand shocks and still ignoring stock outs the excess of mc over emr has the same sign as the covariance of the slope of the demand curve and the marginal valuation of inventory the equality of emr and mc is also broken by taking account of stock outs even if demand shocks are additive if there is a production lag then taking account of stock outs implies that optimal behaviour will be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost of production is linear two alternative definitions of production smoothing are presented and optimal behaviour in the presence of stock outs displays each type of smoothing it is a well known proposition that a firm producing a storable good under conditions of increasing marginal cost will tend to smooth the time profile of its production relative to the time profile of its sales the incentive to smooth production arises from the fact that the cost function is a convex function of the level of production for a given average level of production average costs can be reduced by reducing the variation in production of course if the cost function is linear in the level of production then this incentive to smooth production disappears however we will demonstrate in this paper that if the possibility of stock outs is explicitly incorporated into the firm s dynamic optimization problem i e if we impose a non negativity constraint on inventories and if there is a lag in production then optimal behaviour can be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost function is linear

participating in african monetary unions an alternative evaluation abstract this paper complementary to that of devarajan and de melo deals with the development strategies and performances of 12 franc zone african countries 11 of them gathered in two monetary unions during 1960 1981 beside the actual rate of growth the relative growth performance is considered this performance measured as a residual of a regression on exogenous factors factors independent of economic policy appears to be close to the average performance of other developing countries and better than that of other african countries the results are explained by the direct influence of the foreign exchange regime of the zone and by its impact on economic policy economic policies of individual countries show however some substantial degree of autonomy

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

revisiting the effects of imf programs on poverty and inequality investigating how lending programs of the international monetary fund imf affect poverty and inequality we explicitly address model uncertainty we control for endogenous selection into imf programs using data on 86 low and middle income countries for the 1982 2009 period and analyze program effects on various poverty and inequality measures the results rely on averaging over 90 specifications of treatment effect models and indicate adverse short run effects of imf agreements on poverty and inequality for the whole sample while for a 2000 2009 subsample the results are reversed there is evidence that significant short run effects might disappear in the long run author s abstract

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

a true test do imf programs hurt the poor this article analyses the effect of imf programs on poverty with data from 82 countries during 1985 2000 two indicators of poverty infant mortality rates and the human development index hdi are utilized and the effects of the imf s concessionary and nonconcessionary programs are investigated as well as economic and institutional factors the results show that the imf s programs have no significant direct impact on poverty growth and good institutions however both have significant impacts lowering infant mortality and increasing the hdi the fund s concessionary programs increase the impact of growth on lowering infant mortality while the nonconcessionary programs lower the impact of growth on the hdi where a great proportion of the people are suffered to languish in helpless misery that country must be ill policed and wretchedly governed a decent provision for the poor is the true test of civilization samuel johnson 1791 once a country was in crisis imf funds and programs not onl

what happened to the washington consensus the phrase the washington consensus was so the story goes coined by john williamson at a conference in response to the suggestion that during the 1980s countries in latin america were being confronted with conflicting and therefore confusing advice from the international monetary fund and the world bank williamson s response was that there was in fact a strong consensus about policy across the washington based institutions around the need for macroeconomic stability microeconomic liberalisation and openness their advice was therefore not conflicting but reinforcing

performance based conditionality a european perspective abstract the critique of conditionality has led to the recent emphasis on ownership by the recipient government to promote ownership it has been suggested that traditional ex ante conditionality based on promises of policy changes be replaced by ex post conditionality in which aid is based on performance in terms of ultimate objectives in this spirit the european commission has reformed its adjustment aid this article reviews early experience with the eu initiative in four countries benin burkina faso madagascar and uganda we find a shift toward intermediate indicators which are too distant from the final impact of the policies

externalities and corrective policies in experimental markets this paper reports on the behaviour of simple laboratory markets which have an externality experiences with these markets provide some help in answering two broad questions 1 do markets with externalities behave in accordance with the law of supply and demand 2 how do the pollution tax pollution standard and pollution licenses compare as methods for correcting the externality

resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies abstract in this paper we investigate the coordinated use of marketing and manufacturing strategies to formulate a defensive business strategy for an incumbent firm upon market entry while defensive marketing strategies have been researched extensively little has been done on defensive manufacturing strategies and even less on coordinating these two we propose a formulation for the joint formation of a defensive strategy by the marketing and production functions under budget constraint considerations the incumbent firm may allocate its resourcesto advertising and distribution expenditures as well as to manufacturing investments to reduce the unit production cost the incumbent firm has also the option of simply allocating all of its resources purely to advertising and distribution we show that while there exist cases where the optimal reaction to entry involves investments in manufacturing improvements there are also cases where defense is in marketing strategies alone we identify the market conditions that promote such reactions to entry and also provide sensitivity analysis

the imf and the mobilisation of foreign aid abstract particularly in the context of the millennium development goals there has been much discussion of the association between the international monetary fund and bilateral aid flows what role should the fund be playing in helping to achieve the mdgs some observers have suggested that the fund should seek to reduce its role in poor countries and should be minimising its own lending they see aid donors taking on a larger role and present the imf and aid donors as substitutes others envisage a much bigger lending role for the fund this may hint at complementarities although this discussion raises important policy issues there are very few studies that examine the relationship empirically this paper attempts to help fill this gap it explores the extent to which the imf has had a catalytic effect on official development assistance and the potential channels through which catalysis might work it finds strong evidence of a positive association and suggests that this may have more to do with condit

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

experimental tests of water quality trading markets abstract many watersheds in the u s have established water quality trading programs to help realize cost effective reductions in water pollution however the success of these programs has been limited this study highlights some of the unique features of water based credit trading markets that may explain the lack of success and uses laboratory experiments to isolate their effects in particular we compare two forms of a baseline and credit institution a pigouvian tax subsidy regulation and characteristic of air quality programs a textbook cap and trade regulation across these institutions we examine the effects of abatement technology adoption we find that a baseline and credit program when it requires firms to make upfront investments to generate tradable credits is less efficient than cap and trade and tax subsidy institutions furthermore we find that when efficient trading requires costly technology adoption institutions that involve inter firm trading including cap and trade are less efficient than the tax subsidy

instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous this paper compares qualitatively and quantitatively the welfare effects of emissions taxes auctioned emissions permits and free grandfathered permits when technological innovation is endogenous we find that there is no unambiguous case for preferring any of these policy instruments the relative welfare ranking of instruments depends on the costs of innovation the extent to which innovations can be imitated the slope and level of the marginal environmental benefit function and the number of polluting firms we illustrate the types of situations when there can be significant welfare discrepancies between the policies and when there are not

optimal production purchasing and pricing a differential game approach abstract this paper deals with a problem of determining optimal production and pricing policies of a manufacturing firm which is supplying a retailer the latter faces a price dependent demand function towards the final consumers and wishes to determine optimal purchasing and pricing policies both firms carry inventories and backlogging is permitted the problem is modelled as a two player nonzero sum differential game with the inventory levels as the state variables the controls are the rates of production and purchasing as well as the prices assuming linear production costs but convex ordering and holding costs open loop nash controls are characterized by using switching point analysis as well as phase diagrams

investment incentives under emission trading an experimental study this paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits we consider three allocation auction policies auctioning off costly permits through an ascending clock auction grandfathering permits with re allocation through a single unit double auction and grandfathering with re allocation through an ascending clock auction our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering we nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment it affects the static efficiency from permit trading

reforming the international financial system for effective aid delivery the role of the multilateral aid agencies in the delivery of aid is as old as the debate on the role of aid in economic development aid is effective in a good policy environment however effective aid delivery is equally important this is why the need to reform the institutions involved in the process of delivering aid is crucial among others the paper concluded that there is a need for redefining the roles and the establishment of a well articulated network among the various institutions involved in the aid process more importantly given the different actors and motives at play in the transfer of resources to recipient countries the role of a supranational institution to coordinate and give direction is indispensable

a typology of political conditionality beyond aid conceptual horizons based on lessons from the european union summary this paper asks how political conditionality needs to be conceptualized and researched to reflect global changes it argues that a diversification of political conditionality beyond aid is now taking place political conditionality reaches across different external policy fields and includes cooperative and punitive measures it has also moved from political rights toward social and environmental rights to capture this diversification conceptually the article presents an ideal typical typology that is then refined based on the example of the european union eu a review of the literature on eu political conditionality reveals a gap in studying the interaction of different political conditionality instruments

designing organizations for trading pollution rights regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions our research focuses on choosing a permit trading mechanism that is both economically efficient and politically viable we consider an organized trading process and a revenue neutral auction both of which involve an initial allocation of permits based on past history each is tested in a competitive and in a non competitive environment to determine which mechanism performs best the results of our research suggest that overall the organized trading process outperforms the revenue neutral auction

a dynamic inventory model with the right of refusal we consider a dynamic inventory production model with general convex order production costs and excess demand that can be accepted or refused by the firm excess demand that is accepted is backlogged and results in a backlog cost whereas demand that is refused results in a lost sales charge endogenizing the sales decision is appropriate in the presence of general convex order costs so that the firm is not forced to backlog a unit whose subsequent satisfaction would reduce total profits in each period the firm must determine the optimal order and sales strategy we show that the optimal policy is characterized by an optimal buy up to level that increases with the initial inventory level and an order quantity that decreases with the initial inventory level more importantly we show the optimal sales strategy is characterized by a critical threshold a backlog limit that dictates when to stop selling this threshold is independent of the initial inventory level and the amount purchased we investigate various properties of this new policy as demand stochastically increases the amount purchased increases but the amount backlogged decreases reflecting a shift in the way excess demand is managed we develop two regularity conditions one that ensures some backlogs are allowed in each period and another that ensures the amount backlogged is nondecreasing in the length of the planning horizon we illustrate the buy up to levels in our model are bounded above by buy up to levels from the pure lost sales and pure backlogging models we explore additional extensions using numerical experiments

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

tradeable carbon permit auctions how and why to auction not grandfather abstract an auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change to minimize administrative costs permits would be required at the level of oil refineries natural gas pipe lines natural gas liquid sellers and coal processing plants to maximize liquidity in secondary markets permits would be fully tradable and bankable the government would conduct quarterly auctions a standard ascending clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery an auction is preferred to grandfathering giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions because it allows reduced tax distortions provides more flexibility in distribution of costs provides greater incentives for innovation and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents

competitive strategies for two firms with asymmetric production cost structures we model joint production marketing strategies for two firms with asymmetric production cost structures in competition the first firm called the production smoother faces a convex production cost and a linear inventory holding cost the second firm called the order taker faces a linear production cost and holds no inventory each firm is assumed to vary continuously over time both its production rate and its price in view of an unstable surge pattern of demand the underlying theoretical motivation is to investigate the temporal nature of the equilibrium policies of two competing firms one operating at or near capacity the production smoother and one operating significantly below capacity the order taker we characterize and compare the equilibrium strategies of the two competing firms among our results we show that if the duopolistic production smoother finds it optimal to hold inventory then he will begin the season by building up inventory continue by drawing down inventory until i

opportunity cost for free allocations of emissions permits an experimental analysis an important feature of emissions trading is how emissions permits are allocated the choice between an auction and free allocation should not influence firms production choices nor consumer prices according to economic theory however many parties expect the method of allocation to affect product prices this paper describes an experimental investigation into price determination under a cap and trade program with different allocation methods participants initially display diverse pricing strategies however given a simple economic setting in which earnings depend on behavior we find that subjects learn to consider the opportunity cost of permits and overall behavior moves toward the economic prediction

redesigning the aid contract donors use of performance indicators in uganda abstract the perceived failure of traditional ex ante conditionality has led to proposals for using performance indicators as a basis for aid allocations ex post conditionality in this article we assess the role of performance indicators and their impact on the aid contract between donors and the government of uganda in uganda the use of performance indicators has radically changed donor recipient relations by improving both program monitoring and donor coordination it has however not yet fundamentally changed the incentive structure in the aid contract to improve the incentive structure we propose a distinction between indicators used for monitoring and those designed to guide aid allocations

what does the show case show evidence of and lessons from adjustment in uganda abstract uganda is often seen as an african show case for the beneficial effects of structural adjustment high growth rates have been combined with a high degree of ownership of the reforms at the same time critics have pointed to continued aid dependence and limited growth of the important agricultural export sector the contribution of this paper to this debate is three fold first ownership has not always been exemplary and is still fragile in some respects second although aid has indeed been important for bringing about high growth aid dependence has diminished over time third there have been real supply responses from the agricultural export sector

the macroeconomic impact of development aid a critical survey the early literature explained aid s macroeconomic impact in the context of the dual gap model showing a clear link between aid and growth many now believe that the empirical evidence shows there to be no such relationship this paper critically reviews the different theoretical perspectives the dual gap model the savings debate recipient fiscal response and aid as dutch disease and the empirical debates on aid savings and growth the basis for denying a relationship between aid and growth is shown to be weak though more recent areas of research offer promising directions for future work

a new look at the effects of export instability on investment and growth abstract this paper is concerned with the effects of export instability on investment and growth it is shown that past cross sectional empirical studies on the effects of export instability either in prices or in value terms used an incorrect measure of instability that does not properly take account of the share of exports in gdp using a new instability index and a broad set of conditioning variables it is shown that export instability was positively associated with investment but negatively associated with growth in a large sample of countries during the period from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s

explaining african economic performance africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital in many respects it has been the most capital hostile region we review and interpret the aggregate level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance there is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence pointing to four factors as being important these are a lack of openness to international trade a high risk environment a low level of social capital and poor infrastructure these problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

strategic it investments the impact of switching cost and declining it cost the declining cost of information technology it over time provides the later entrant in information intensive industries a cost advantage on the other hand the earlier entrant has the potential to build and retain its market share if consumers incur a cost in switching to the later entrant we investigate the impact of a decline in the it cost and the switching cost on it investment strategies of firms we find that a declining it cost always hurts the early entrant s profit the early entrant may assume an aggressive investment strategy or a defensive investment strategy in response to a decline in the it cost depending on whether the switching cost relative to the extent of decline in the it cost is high or low respectively a decline in it cost also hurts the later entrant s profit if the switching cost is high a surprising result is that when the decline in the it cost is higher than a critical value a higher switching cost increases consumer surplus when firms control the switching cost the early entrant increases its investment in quality and switching cost and maintains its quality and its market share leadership irrespective of the extent of decline in the it cost

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

financing sustainable development country undertakings and rights for environmental sustainability cures abstract we propose a global mechanism to finance sustainable development sd that offers a number of advantages over the current global environmental facility gef the mechanism would be multinational provide incentives for rich and poor countries to promote sd incorporate the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and link incentives and funding for sd to structural benchmarks and performance targets it would operate as a large fund into which rich countries would pay based on their level of population per capita income and change in a measure of environmental sustainability receipts from the funds called country undertakings and rights for environmental sustainability cures would be made to poor countries based on their population per capita income and absolute level of environmental sustainability this approach differentiates payments and receipts on the basis of income while rewarding improvements in environmental performance in rich countries and making greater payments to countries with greater environmental problems to promote flexibility recipient countries would be able to trade bank or borrow their assigned cures provided that the trade resulted in a verifiable improvement in environmental sustainability in the purchasing country a reformed gef that adopted the desirable features of cures if widely adopted and funded at a sufficiently high level would offer a significant boost to global sd and would greatly assist poor countries to address the twin challenges of poverty and environmental degradation

dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments a survey abstract in this paper i survey and discuss recent developments on the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced abatement technology a main conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that under competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and control moreover taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the regulator is myopic if the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it optimally regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices taxes and policies by setting quantities issuing tradable permits are almost equivalent the literature also shows that under competitive conditions there is no difference between auctioning permits and grandfathering moreover timing and commitment of environmental policy is not crucial for adoption under competitive conditions commitment has positive incentive effects however if an r d sector has market power in the presence of market imperfections the ranking of the different policy instruments is ambiguous

heterogeneity irreversible production choices and efficiency in emission permit markets abstract this paper investigates a class of market mechanisms for environmental regulation based on the clean air act tradable discharge permit program laboratory market experiments capture some of the more salient institutional features and focus on issues of firm technological heterogeneity and irreversible investment regarding the operation of the permit market experimental results suggest that higher degrees of abatement cost heterogeneity may lead to reduced trade volume while the implications of increased cost heterogeneity regarding price volatility are mixed finally increased cost heterogeneity appears to result in decreased laboratory efficiency

dynamic efficiency in experimental emissions trading markets with investment uncertainty this study employs a laboratory experiment to assess the performance of tradable permit markets on dynamic efficiency arising from cost reducing investment the permit allocation rule is the main treatment variable with permits being fully auctioned or grandfathered the experimental results show significant investment under both allocation rules in the presence of ex ante uncertainty over the actual investment outcome however auctioning permits generally provides stronger incentives to invest in r d leading to greater dynamic efficiency compared to grandfathering

marketing production coordination in channels of distribution abstract in this paper we analyze the effects of functional horizontal decentralization by a channel member on the performance of an industrial channel of distribution we use the model of eliashberg j steinberg r 1987 management science 33 981 1000 which describes a channel of distribution consisting of a manufacturer and a value adding distributor we allow the distributor to decentralize decision making between his marketing and production functions our results show that functional decentralization at the distributor level increases the price sensitivity of the distributor concerning the price he faces from the manufacturer causes a shift in the distributor s demand curve increases the distributor s inventory activities in terms of both quantity and time frame and under certain conditions increases the manufacturer s inventory as expected the decentralized distributor has a less coordinated pricing policy vis a vis the production policy using numerical means we show that functional decentralization can improve the overall channel profitability i e for both manufacturer and distributor this counter intuitive result suggests that in our non repeated perfect information game setting functional decentralization can yield a pareto dominant equilibrium outcome where both the distributor and manufacturer are better off even though it is only the distributor who is changing his organizational decision making

optimal pricing and lot sizing under conditions of perishability and partial backordering we formulate a generalized model of dynamic pricing and lot sizing by a reseller who sells a perishable good we assume that when it is economic to backlog demand the reseller can plan for periods of shortage during which demand can be partially backordered when the good is highly perishable the reseller may need to backlog demand in order to market the good at a reasonable price we present a simple solution procedure for solving the optimization problem the procedure entails solving first a single nonlinear equation and then if required two nonlinear equations

foreign aid and the question of fungibility this paper analyzes whether the foreign assistance provided for specific categories of expenditure is shifted among them contrary to the wishes of donors it also considers whether aid reduces the tax effort of recipient governments econometric results are presented for the dominican republic that show that the fungibility of aid has resulted in a thwarting of the intentions of donors an attempt is made to account for the observed differences in behavior of individual countries in altering expenditures copyright 1993 by mit press

adjustment growth and income distribution in indonesia during the decade of the 1970s and until 1982 the growth performance of the indonesian economy was very good with gdp growing at 7 2 percent per annum oil exports provided the major engine of growth for the entire economy during that period in addition within agriculture growth was fueled by the boom in paddy production which converted indonesia from the largest rice importing country in the world to virtual self sufficiency by the mid 1980s paddy production increased at an annual rate of 7 1 percent between 1978 80 and 1983 4 the two oil price booms of 1973 and more particularly 1979 fueled a major expansion of the economy which lasted until the crisis the predominant role of the oil sector is clearly revealed by recalling that earnings from crude oil and petroleum products accounted for two thirds of all export earnings one fourth of total gnp and 70 percent of government domestic revenues in 1982 oil prices peaked in 1982 and revenues from this sector started to contract reducing drastically the basis and prospects for economic growth

aid and performance a reassessment two visions of aid effectiveness and allocation are compared the first corresponding to the new aid paradigm argues that aid is only effective if domestic policies are appropriate the second in contrast argues that aid effectiveness depends on the external and climatic environment the worse this environment or the more vulnerable the recipient countries the greater the effectiveness of aid cross sectional econometric tests related to gdp growth on two 12 year pooled periods clearly favour the second view the two views can be reconciled through the principle of performance based aid allocation where performance is defined as outcomes adjusted for the impact of environmental factors performance can then be measured in several manners which are subject to comparison one approach would lead one to allocate more aid the worse the external environment is for a given policy and the better the policy is for a given environment

dynamic pricing and ordering decisions by a monopolist this paper considers the relationship between pricing and ordering decisions for a monopolistic retailer facing a known demand function where over the inventory cycle the product may exhibit i physical decay or deterioration of inventory called wastage and ii decrease in market value called value drop associated with each unit of inventory on hand the retailer is allowed to continuously vary the selling price of the product over the cycle we introduce a notion of instantaneous margin and use it to derive profit maximizing conditions for the retailer the model explains the markdown of retail goods subject to decay it also provides guidance in determining when price changes during the cycle are worthwhile due to product aging how often such changes should be made and how such changes affect ordering intervals and quantities